No. 89-552 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1990 

CAROLYN BIRGENHEIER, 

Petitioner and Respondent, - - -. - < I C - - L- - -v- - -. 

-" . , 

-- TRUSTEES, YELLOWSTONE COUNTY SCHOOL -. 

DISTRICT NO. 2, and ED ARGENBRIGHT, :-A :I 

C.! i ; 2 

Superintendent of Public Instruction, , 

Respondents and Appellants. - . -- .,J 

--1 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the First Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Lewis and Clark, 

The Honorable Thomas Honzel, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Laurence R. Martin and Sol Lovas, Billings Montana 

Beda Lovitt, Chief Legal Counsel, Office of Public 

Instruction, Helena, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Emilie Loring, Missoula Montana 

Amicus Attorneys: 

Catherine Swift, Montana School Boards Assn., 

Helena, Montana 

Filed: 

Submitted on Briefs: March 16, 1990 

Decided: May 15, 1990 
Justice Fred J. Weber delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

Plaintiff, a nontenure teacher, filed this action requesting 

reinstatement, after her temporary, one-year contract was not 

renewed. The District Court of the First Judicial District, Lewis 

and Clark County, ruled that the School District's notice of nonrenewal did not properly comply with 820-4-206, MCA, and remanded 

the matter to the School District for the District to provide 

plaintiff with a statement of reasons for her termination. The 

School District appeals. We affirm. 

We restate the issues for consideration as follows: 

1. Did the School District follow adequate procedure in 

terminating the nontenure teacher? 

2. Even though plaintiff had been terminated, was she 

entitled to a further statement of reasons under 520-4-206, MCA? 

On August 22, 1985, plaintiff, Carolyn Birgenheier, signed an 

llAcknowledgement of Temporary Appointment1' with School District No. 

2, Yellowstone County, Montana (School District), which stated: 

This will acknowledge my understanding that my 

appointment by the Billings Public Schools is temporary, 

and that I cannot presume reappointment. The term of 

this temporary appointment is from August 26, 1985 until 

June 7, 1986. 

On September 10, 1985, she signed a one-year "Teacher's Contractw 

with the School District as an elementary music teacher. That 

contract stated in pertinent part: 

1. That the teacher is hereby employed to teach, as and 

where assigned, in the schools of District for and during 

the school year beginning on or about 08/26/85 and 

terminating on or about 06/7/86. 
In April 1986, plaintiff received a letter from Billings 

Public Schools which stated: 

Thank you for your service to Billings Public 

Schools during this school term. As you are aware, you 

were hired under a one-year contract for the 1985-86 

school year. Please be notified that your contract will 

have reached its term by the end of the current school 

year, and will not be renewed by the Board of Trustees. 

As we advertise to fill the position you now hold, 

we hope that you will feel free to make application for 

it. Thank you again for your year of service. We hope 

you have enjoyed your time with us. 

The "Master Agreement", the contract between the teachers and 

the School District, provided as follows with regard to nontenure 

teacher termination: 

Section 7 Non-Tenure Teacher Severance Policv: 

Subd. 1. Every non-tenured teacher shall be entitled to 

the following rights if his/her contract is not being 

renewed. 

(a) The teacher shall be notified by the 

Superintendent, in writing, that his or her contract 

will not be renewed pursuant to Montana statutes. 

(b) The notice shall state the specific reasons 

for non-renewal. 

(c) The teacher may appeal his/her non-renewal to 

the Board of Trustees or a committee thereof, by 

May 1. The Board, or its committee, shall reach a 

decision within twenty (20) days of the submittal 

of the appeal. 

Plaintiff gave her notice of non-renewal appeal to the Board 

of Trustees pursuant to the Master Agreement. The School District 

affirmed the decision not to renew without a further statement of 

reasons. Plaintiff then appealed to the County Superintendent. 

The Findings of Fact of the County Superintendent established that 

the notice of non-renewal of nontenure teacher was timely; that 

plaintiff's appeals to the School Board and County Superintendent 
were timely; that plaintiff was non-renewed "for the reason: 

expiration of temporary one-year contract ; and that plaintiff 

signed a standard teaching contract and an Acknowledgement of 

Temporary Contract prior to the 1985-86 school term. The pertinent 

conclusion of law by the County Superintendent was that the School 

District was bound to provide nontenure. teachers with some 

indication of the reason or basis for the decision to terminate. 

While not denominated either a finding of fact or conclusion of 

law, the key conclusion on the part of the County Superintendent 

was that "this Hearing Officer does agree with the Petitioner 

[plaintiff] that this particular one-year contract stipulation is 

an attempt to evade the 'specific reasont test of the Bridqer 

case." Bridger Educ. Assln v. Board of Trustees (1984), 209 Mont. 

31, 678 P.2d 659. The County Superintendent then ordered that the 

decision of the Board of Trustees was overturned and that the 

plaintiff was reinstated with full salary and benefits for the 

1986-1987 year. 

The School District appealed that decision to the State 

Superintendent of Public Instruction (State Superintendent). The 

State Superintendent reversed the County Superintendent, holding 

that this was "not a termination situation as covered by Bridqer, 

but rather, a contractual issue resolved in accordance with the 

terms of the agreement.I1 He pointed out that plaintiff was 

notified and acknowledged that she accepted a temporary position 

which would terminate at the end of the next school year and that 

such acknowledgement was made in addition to the regular teaching 
contract. In addition he pointed out that at the end of the 

temporary appointment she was notified that she was given the 

opportunity to reapply for the position and was encouraged to do 

so. He further concluded there was nothing in the record to 

support the County Superintendent's conclusion that the School 

District was using temporary appointments to evade the requirement 

of a statement of reasons. 

Plaintiff requested judicial review of the State 

Superintendent's decision, contending that the State Superintendent 

erred in concluding that Bridser did not apply; that the State 

Superintendent erred in ignoring the requirements of 5 20-4-206, 

MCA, that terminated nontenure teachers be given the reasons for 

termination; and that because all teachers are on one-year 

contracts, the expiration of such a contract is not a Itreasonl1 for 

termination. 

The District Court concluded as follows: 

[elven though the school district may be immune from suit 

under Section 2-9-111, MCA, it still must comply with the 

requirements of Section 20-4-206(3), MCA, and the Bridser 

decision. Under Bridser, a school district must provide 

a nontenured teacher with a statement of reasons which 

states what undesirable qualities merit a refusal to 

enter into a further contract. Since the school district 

did not provide such a statement, it is the opinion of 

the Court that under Bridser the matter must be remanded 

to the school district for a statement which complies 

with that decision. 

The District Court ordered a remand to the School District for a 

statement of reasons. The District Court did not address the issue 

of the reinstatement of the plaintiff. From that decision, the 

School District appeals. 
Did the School District follow adequate procedure in 

terminating the nontenure teacher? 

It is important that we consider the specific provisions which 

apply to the termination of a nontenure teacher. Section 20-4- 

206, MCA, as set forth in 1989, has not been changed since the 1975 

amendment, and in pertinent part states: 

(1) The trustees shall provide written notice by 

May 1 to all nontenure teachers who have been reelected. 

Any nontenure teacher who does not receive notice of 

reelection or termination shall be automatically 

reelected for the ensuing school fiscal year. 

(3) When the trustees notify a nontenure teacher 

of termination, the teacher may within 10 days after 

receipt of such notice make written request of the 

trustees for a statement in writing of the reasons for 

termination of employment. Within 10 days after receipt 

of the request, the trustees shall furnish such statement 

to the teacher. 

After a consideration of the argument by counsel, including 

the references to Bridqer, we conclude that it is necessary for us 

to restate our interpretation of 5 20-4-206, MCA, as it applies to 

nontenure teachers. Under that statute, the School Board was 

required to give written notice to the plaintiff nontenure teacher 

by May 1. Had such notice not been given, the nontenure teacher 

would have been automatically reelected for the following school 

year. Here the School District timely gave the required notice. 

As a result of the giving of that notice, the plaintiff was 

terminated for the ensuing school fiscal year. Under the statute, 

a statement of reasons was not required in order to effectively 
terminate the plaintiff. We emphasize that under the statute, the 

notice of termination is sufficient even in the absence of any 

statement of reasons. Under the provisions of 5 20-4-206, MCA, 

we hold that the School Board properly gave written notice by May 

1 to the plaintiff of her termination, and that such notice was 

effective to terminate the contract relationship between the 

plaintiff and the School District so that she would not be 

automatically reelected for the following year. 

I1 

Even though plaintiff had been terminated, was she entitled 

to a further statement of reasons under § 20-4-206, MCA? 

As mentioned, the School District advised the plaintiff that 

the reason for her non-renewal was that her temporary one-year 

contract had expired. The School District maintains that is a 

sufficient statement under the statute. 

Plaintiff contends that all teachers are on one-year contracts 

so that the expiration of a one-year contract is not a Itreason" for 

termination. Her argument essentially is grounded in our Bridser 

decision. She believes that decision requires a more enlarged 

statement of reasons. 

It is apparent that Bridser has caused interpretive problems 

for the parties. In Bridser, the key statement was: 

The non-tenured teacher is entitled to a notice which 

states what undesirable qualities merit a refusal to 

enter into a further contract. 

That statement was not required for the holding in Bridser. In 

addition, it is somewhat inaccurate. It suggests that in the 

7 
absence of undesirable qualities which merit a refusal to enter 

into a further contract, a nontenure teacher may not be terminated. 

That is not a requirment of § 20-4-206, MCA. That section only 

requires a statement in writing of the reasons for termination upon 

request of the nontenure teacher. We therefore overrule the 

statement in Bridser that a nontenure teacher is entitled to notice 

which states what undesirable qualities merit a refusal to enter 

into a further contract. If there are undesirable qualities on the 

part of the teacher, it would be reasonable for a school district 

to inform the teacher of those undesirable qualities; but there is 

no statutory standard that the reasons must be somehow sufficient 

to merit a refusal to enter into a contract. We conclude and hold 

that under 3 20-4-206, MCA, upon written request, a teacher is 

entitled to a statement in writing of the reasons for termination 

of employment. As we have mentioned, 5 20-4-206, MCA, does not 

contain any specific requirements with regard to the extent or 

nature of the statement of reasons. In a similar manner, the 

Master Agreement does not contain any such specific requirements. 

We conclude that under the statute the trustees are obligated to 

furnish a statement stating the "reasons for terminationvv in 

reasonable detail. 

We note that § 20-4-206(4), MCA, provides that when the 

financial condition of the school district requires a reduction in 

the number of teachers and the reason for the termination is the 

reduction in the number of teachers employed, the provisions of 

this section do not apply. This case does not involve such a 
reduction in force. 

We recognize that the School District may have hesitated to 

give details of its reasons in order to eliminate an argument under 

Bridser that the reasons were not sufficient to justify the nonrenewal of the teacher. We trust that concern has been eliminated 

by this opinion. While we have concluded that a teacher is 

entitled to a statement setting forth reasons for termination of 

employment in reasonable detail, we emphasize that the inadequacy 

of such a statement will not in any way affect the termination, 

assuming that timely notice of termination was given. 

We conclude that under the facts of this case, it is 

reasonable to require the School District to give a further 

explanation of the reasons for termination in view of the request 

by the teacher. We therefore remand to the District Court, and 

ultimately to the School District, for the furnishing to the 

plaintiff of a statement in writing of the reasons for the 

termination of her employment in reasonable detail, in addition to 

the previous reason given by the School District, that being 

expiration of the temporary one-year contract. 

Affirmed. 

We Concur: 

Justice John Conway Harrison, dissenting. 

I dissent. I can find no reason to remand this case to the 

School District. The plaintiff was hired for a one-year period 

and was later given the opportunity and was encouraged to reapply 

for the job.