J-A06008-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

DEMETRIUS LEON WOODS-STUBBS 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1447 WDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 8, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-02-CR-0000866-2022

BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., PANELLA, P.J.E., and BECK, J.

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, P.J.: FILED: June 11, 2024

Demetrius Leon Woods-Stubbs appeals from the judgment of sentence, 

entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, following his 

convictions, after a nonjury trial, for one count each of firearms not to be 

carried without a license1 and possession of a controlled substance.2 In this 

appeal, Woods-Stubbs challenges the court’s denial of his pre-trial motion to 

suppress evidence. After careful consideration, we affirm.

The facts of this case are as follows. On November 30, 2021, Officer 

Robert Pedley of the City of Pittsburgh Police, an officer with 15 years of 

training and experience, responded to a report of a female in bed not 

breathing. See N.T. Suppression Hearing, 6/16/22, at 5. Officer Pedley 

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6106(a)(1).

2 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16).
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arrived at the home and proceeded to the second-floor front bedroom, where 

he saw firefighters, emergency personnel, the unresponsive and soon-to-bedeclared-deceased female, and Woods-Stubbs. Id. at 5-6.

Officer Pedley observed the emergency personnel attempting to 

resuscitate the unresponsive female and one of the personnel informed Officer 

Pedley that the unresponsive female was unlikely to survive. Id. at 6. Officer 

Pedley left the room and proceeded downstairs to call for backup until 

homicide detectives arrived. Id. at 7. Within minutes of returning downstairs, 

the unresponsive female was declared deceased due to an unknown cause. 

See Officer Robert Pedley Body Camera Video, 11/30/21, at 4:15. The 

decedent’s suspicious death became the immediate subject of police 

investigation. See N.T. Suppression Hearing, 6/16/22, at 16.

After declaring her deceased, the emergency personnel began 

descending the stairs to exit the home, and Officer Pedley returned to the 

second-floor bedroom where the decedent’s body remained. See Officer 

Robert Pedley Body Camera Video, 11/30/21, at 9:50. As he approached the 

room, Officer Pedley observed Woods-Stubbs at the foot of the bed with his 

body tucked behind a dresser making a stuffing motion with his hands in his 

waistband. See N.T. Suppression Hearing, 6/16/22, at 7. Woods-Stubbs was 

fully dressed and was wearing a coat. See Officer Robert Pedley Body Camera 

Video, 11/30/21, at 10:04-10:07. Once a few feet away, Officer Pedley 

requested identification and Woods-Stubbs told him that he did not have any. 

Id. at 10:08.
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Upon being asked how he knew the decedent, Woods-Stubbs answered 

that he did not know her well. Id. at 10:16. Woods-Stubbs told officers that 

he had been at the house with the decedent for two days. Id. at 13:29. He 

explained that the last time he had seen her alive, the decedent answered the 

door and let him into the home that prior evening around midnight. Id. at 

10:50. Woods-Stubbs also said that he and the decedent drank alcohol and 

smoked weed prior to Woods-Stubbs falling asleep around 2 a.m. in the bed 

he had shared with her. Id. at 11:40, 14:09. Further, Woods-Stubbs 

recounted that he awoke around 4 a.m. to use the bathroom and nudged the 

decedent, who was asleep at the time but moved a little. Id. at 12:11. 

Woods-Stubbs told Officer Pedley that, after using the bathroom, he fell back 

asleep and did not notice anything. Id. Woods-Stubbs stated that the 

decedent’s mother woke him the next morning. Id. at 12:50.

Woods-Stubbs noted that he did not know the cause of the decedent’s 

unresponsiveness or death. Id. at 13:46. Woods-Stubbs further told Officer 

Pedley that prior to staying with the decedent, he was staying with his sister, 

who lives nearby. Id. at 16:16. Woods-Stubbs also told Officer Pedley both 

that he had a criminal record and, at some point in the past, he had been shot 

in the spine, which affected his mobility. Id. at 14:52, 16:43.

After approximately eight minutes of interaction, Officer Pedley’s 

training and experience led him to believe that Woods-Stubbs was concealing 

contraband or a weapon in his waistband, so he and Pittsburgh Police Officer 
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Miller3 asked Woods-Stubbs to exit the bedroom and step into an adjacent 

bedroom where they further asked if Woods-Stubbs was armed. See N.T. 

Suppression Hearing, 6/16/22, at 8. After Woods-Stubbs responded that he 

was not armed, Officer Pedley conducted a pat-down search of Woods-Stubbs’ 

person, and, upon reaching Woods-Stubbs’ waistband, Officer Pedley felt what 

he knew to be the grip end of a handgun. Id. at 9. Officer Pedley removed 

the loaded handgun, made it safe, and Officer Miller placed Woods-Stubbs in 

handcuffs. Id. Thereafter, police further recovered marijuana, cocaine, and 

Clonazepam from Woods-Stubbs’ person. Id. at 10. 

On November 30, 2021—that same day—Woods-Stubbs was charged 

with various crimes relating to the incident. On January 27, 2022, those 

charges were amended, at which point, both above-mentioned offenses were 

held for trial.

On March 30, 2022, Woods-Stubbs filed a pre-trial motion to suppress 

the gun and drugs police discovered on his person because, he alleged, police 

did not have reasonable suspicion to conduct the stop or the frisk search, in 

violation of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). On June 16, 2022, the court 

conducted a suppression hearing and denied Woods-Stubbs’ motion. 

On June 21, 2022, the court held a nonjury trial. On August 9, 2022, 

after holding its verdict under advisement, the court convicted Woods-Stubbs 

of both above-mentioned charges. The court deferred sentencing for the 

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3 Officer Miller’s first name does not appear in the certified record.
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preparation of a pre-sentence investigation report. On November 8, 2022, 

the court sentenced Woods-Stubbs to an aggregate term of 9-18 months’ 

incarceration followed by two years’ probation.

On December 8, 2022, Woods-Stubbs filed a timely notice of appeal. 

Both Woods-Stubbs and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. 

On appeal, Woods-Stubbs raises the following issue for our review:

Whether the trial court erred in denying [] Woods-Stubbs’[] 

motion to suppress the firearm and drugs that were found on his 

person where the police officers frisked him for officer safety but 

they did not have reasonable suspicion, based on specific and 

articulable facts, to believe that he was armed and dangerous? 

Appellant’s Brief, at 6.

Instantly, Woods-Stubbs argues that neither the law nor the facts of 

record support the trial court’s conclusion that the police officers had 

reasonable suspicion to conduct the Terry search of his person. Specifically, 

Woods-Stubbs asserts that, contrary to the court’s findings, he did not make 

any furtive movements, which, he alleges, Officer Pedley’s body camera 

footage confirms. Woods-Stubbs claims that over the course of eight minutes 

of interaction, he did nothing suspicious, which he asserts Officer Pedley 

further confirmed through testimony. See Appellants Brief at 15-17, citing 

N.T. Suppression Hearing, 6/16/22, at 13 (Officer Pedley testifying that, upon 

approaching Woods-Stubbs, Woods-Stubbs’ left hand was on top of bedroom 

dresser, but his right hand was behind dresser and not visible, Officer Pedley 

then interacted with Woods-Stubbs for eight minutes, asking questions about 

the incident, during which period of time he could see Woods-Stubbs’ hands, 
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and Woods-Stubbs did not make any furtive movements, was cordial, polite, 

and respectful). 

Woods-Stubbs cites to our decisions in Commonwealth v. Reppert, 

814 A.2d 1196 (Pa. Super. 2002), and Commonwealth v. Simmons, 17 

A.3d 399 (Pa. Super. 2011), for the proposition that “pre-stop furtive 

movements, by themselves, may not be used to justify an investigative 

detention and search where . . . the totality of the circumstances has 

established that the furtive movements did not raise immediate concern for 

the safety of the officer[.]” Appellant’s Brief, at 18 (citation omitted).

Further, Woods-Stubbs asserts that Pennsylvania law requires police to 

articulate the danger posed under the specific circumstances of the case. See

Appellant’s Brief, at 21-22, citing Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 935 A.2d 

1275 (Pa. 2007). Woods-Stubbs points out that, here, the officers did not 

testify to observing a bulge or the outline of the firearm and he alleges the 

officers failed to reasonably support their conclusion that Woods-Stubbs was 

armed and dangerous. In sum, Woods-Stubbs argues Officer Pedley lacked 

reasonable suspicion to conduct the search and thus the fruits of the search 

should be suppressed. We conclude that Woods-Stubbs is not entitled to 

relief. 

The appellate standard of review for a challenge to the denial of a 

suppression motion is well-settled:

We may consider only the Commonwealth’s evidence and so much 

of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when 

read in the context of the record as a whole. Where the record 
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supports the factual findings of the trial court, we are bound by 

those facts and may reverse only if the legal conclusions drawn 

therefrom are in error. An appellate court, of course, is not bound 

by the suppression court’s conclusions of law.

Commonwealth v. Livingstone, 174 A.3d 609, 618-19 (Pa. 2017) (citation 

omitted). We may affirm the suppression court’s decision if there is any basis

in the record to support it, even if we rely on different grounds to reach the 

same result. See Commonwealth v. Cartagena, 63 A.3d 294, 301 (Pa. 

Super. 2013). In reviewing questions of law, the appellate standard of review 

is de novo and the scope plenary. See Livingstone, 174 A.3d at 619. 

As a panel of this Court cogently explained, the United States and 

Pennsylvania constitutions protect citizens from unreasonable police searches 

and seizures:

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution,[4] made 

applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, and 

Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution[,5] protect a 

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4 The Fourth Amendment states:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 

papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 

shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 

probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 

describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to 

be seized.

U.S. CONST. Amend. IV. 

5 The Pennsylvania Constitution states:

The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and 

possessions from unreasonable searches and seizures, and no 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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person from unlawful searches and seizures. Our Supreme Court 

has long held that[,] although the Pennsylvania Constitution 

provides broader protection from unreasonable searches and 

seizures than the United States Constitution, the Terry doctrine, 

announced in the seminal case of Terry[, supra], sets forth the 

reasonableness standard for Article I, Section 8 of the 

Pennsylvania Constitution.

Commonwealth v. Brame, 239 A.3d 1119, 1127 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citation, 

footnote, quotation marks, and brackets omitted).

In Commonwealth v. Hicks, 208 A.3d 916 (Pa. 2019), our Supreme 

Court explained the two categories of permissible warrantless seizures that 

police may effectuate and what protections are attendant to each type of 

seizure:

We recognize only two types of lawful, warrantless seizures of the 

person, both of which require an appropriate showing of 

antecedent justification: first, an arrest based upon probable 

cause; second, a ‘stop and frisk’ based upon reasonable suspicion. 

Here, we are concerned with this latter type of seizure—

interchangeably labeled an “investigative detention,” a “Terry

stop,” or, when coupled with a brief pat-down search for weapons 

on the suspect’s person, a “stop and frisk.”

To maintain constitutional validity, an investigative detention 

must be supported by a reasonable and articulable suspicion that 

the person seized is engaged in criminal activity and may continue 

only so long as is necessary to confirm or dispel such suspicion. 

The asserted grounds for an investigative detention must be 

evaluated under the totality of the circumstances. So long as the 

initial detention is lawful, nothing precludes a police officer from 

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warrant to search any place or to seize any person or things shall 

issue without describing them as nearly as may be, nor without 

probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation subscribed to by 

the affiant.

PA CONST. Art. I, § 8.
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acting upon the fortuitous discovery of evidence suggesting a 

different crime than that initially suspected[.] However, an 

unjustified seizure immediately violates the Fourth Amendment 

rights of the suspect, taints the evidence recovered thereby, and 

subjects that evidence to the exclusionary rule.

Id. at 927-928 (citations, some quotation marks, and brackets omitted).

Also, importantly, a “mere encounter,” a third recognized type of lawful 

warrantless police-citizen interaction, does not require any level of suspicion 

by police or any response by the citizen. Commonwealth v. Young, 162 

A.3d 524, 529 (Pa. Super. 2017) (mere encounter between police officer and 

citizen does not need support of any level of suspicion and carries no official 

compulsion on part of citizen to stop or to respond to police). “A mere 

encounter can be any formal or informal interaction between an officer and a 

citizen, but will normally be an inquiry by the officer of a citizen. The hallmark 

of this interaction is that it carries no official compulsion to stop or respond.” 

Commonwealth v. DeHart, 745 A.2d 633, 636 (Pa. Super. 2000) (citation 

and quotation marks omitted). The mere fact that a citizen ordinarily feels 

obligated to respond to a police officer, without more, however, is not 

sufficient to make an interaction a seizure. See Commonwealth v. Mathis, 

173 A.3d 699, 713 (Pa. 2017).

“A mere encounter may escalate into an investigatory detention or 

seizure if police action becomes too intrusive.” Young, 162 A.3d at 529. See

also Commonwealth v. Strickler, 757 A.2d 884, 889-90 (Pa. 2000) (court 

employs objective totality of circumstances test to determine whether seizure 

has taken place by inquiring whether reasonable person would believe he or 
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she is free to leave); Commonwealth v. Watkins, 750 A.2d 308, 312-13

(Pa. Super. 2000) (police detention becomes custodial and requires probable 

cause when coercive to extent of functional arrest under totality of 

circumstances, considering: basis for detention; length; location; whether 

suspect was transported against his or her will, how far, and why; whether 

restraints were used; whether law enforcement showed, threatened, or used 

force; and investigative methods employed to confirm or dispel suspicions). 

“An officer may stop and briefly detain a person for investigatory 

purposes when that officer has reasonable suspicion, based on specific and 

articulable facts, that criminal activity may be afoot.” Commonwealth v. 

Smith, 172 A.3d 26, 33 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation and quotation marks 

omitted). “[T]he fundamental inquiry is an objective one, namely, whether 

the facts available to the officer at the moment of the intrusion warrant a man 

of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate.”

Commonwealth v. Gray, 784 A.2d 137, 142 (Pa. Super. 2001). When 

making that determination, we must consider the totality of the 

circumstances, including such factors as “tips, the reliability of the informants, 

time, location, and suspicious activity, including flight.” Id., citing 

Commonwealth v. Freeman, 757 A.2d 903, 908 (Pa. 2000). “[I]n 

determining whether the officer acted reasonably . . ., due weight must be 

given, not to his inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch,’ but to the 

specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in 

light of his experience.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.
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Our Supreme Court recently reiterated that, “[t]he purpose of a Terry

frisk is to dispel any fear that the stopped suspect is armed and dangerous.”

In re T.W., 261 A.3d 409, 421 (Pa. 2021). Such a frisk does not require the 

officer to be certain that the individual is armed. See id; see also Minnesota 

v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 372-73 (1993) (officer must have reasonable 

suspicion of criminal activity prior to conducting pat down search). To 

establish reasonable suspicion to conduct the frisk, “the police officer must 

articulate specific facts from which [the officer] could reasonably infer that the 

individual was armed and dangerous.” Commonwealth v. Bozeman, 205 

A.3d 1264, 1274 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citations omitted).

In determining whether a frisk was constitutionally valid and supported 

by reasonable suspicion, the suppression court examines “whether a 

reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief 

that his safety or the safety of others was in danger.” Commonwealth v. 

Taylor, 771 A.2d 1261, 1269 (Pa. 2001) (citation and quotation marks 

omitted). The court makes this safety determination based on the totality of 

the circumstances as viewed through the eyes of a trained police officer. See

Commonwealth v. Williams, 980 A.2d 667, 671 (Pa. Super. 2009).

However, an investigatory detention may not be premised on officer 

safety—safety considerations are relevant only when the detention is based 

upon the police officer’s reasonable suspicion or probable cause that the 

person being stopped is committing or has committed a criminal offense. See

Commonwealth v. Adams, 205 A.3d 1195, 1204 (Pa. 2019). Without
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reasonable suspicion or probable cause, police may not conduct an 

investigatory detention. See id.

Here, in deciding that the police search of Woods-Stubbs’ person was 

justified and lawful, the suppression court made the following findings of fact 

and conclusions of law at the end of the suppression hearing:

[T]he officer arrives on the scene, and [y]ou have a deceased 

person. You have a person who’s in the room with the body [] 

making furtive movements, putting something in his waistband[. 

H]e’s beside the dresser, kind of secreted behind. [Officer Pedley] 

said [that] whether it was [a weapon,] evidence[, or], drugs, he 

didn’t know.[6 Officer Pedley] just knew that it could have been 

something that was being put in his waistband or in that area. 

[A]nd then [Officer Pedley] had the discussion with [WoodsStubbs]. In that discussion[, Woods-Stubbs] very clearly tells 

[Officer Pedley] that he has a criminal record[. During their 

conversation, Officer Pedley and Woods-Stubbs talked] about the 

[decedent] and what Woods-Stubbs knows or doesn’t know and 

some information about where [he] had come from, and he had 

walked from his sister’s house[. After eight minutes of interaction, 

Officer Pedley] asked [Woods-Stubbs] to step into [an adjacent 

____________________________________________

6 Officer Pedley testified at the suppression hearing as follows:

A: [] As I approached [] Woods-Stubbs, he was in the bedroom, 

at the foot of the bed, with his body tucked behind a dresser, 

making a stuffing motion with his hands in his waistband.

Q: And that stuffing motion, given your training and experience, 

what is that usually indicative of?

A: It would be consistent with somebody attempting to hide 

contraband in their waistband area.

Q: Just contraband?

A: Contraband or firearms.

N.T. Suppression Hearing, 6/16/22, at 7-8.
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bed]room. While they’re waiting for the homicide detectives, 

[Officer Pedley informed Woods-Stubbs of his intention to search 

Woods-Stubbs for weapons. Woods-Stubbs] doesn’t object, [and 

Officer Pedley] pats him down[ and] finds the firearm. I think that 

under the totality of the circumstances, given these particular very 

strange circumstances, that there’s a deceased person, that 

officers on scene have no knowledge of exactly how that person 

came to be deceased, they haven’t ruled out anything[, thus, the 

officers had reasonable suspicion to search Woods-Stubbs].

N.T. Suppression Hearing, 6/16/22, at 33-35. The trial court further explained 

its reasoning for denying suppression in its Rule 1925(a) opinion:

In the instant case, [Woods-Stubbs] was in the room with a 

deceased female whose cause of death was unknown. While 

officers were awaiting the arrival of homicide detectives, [WoodsStubbs] could be seen hiding his body behind a dresser while 

stuffing something into the waistband area of his pants[,] arousing 

the suspicion of Officer Pedley. [Woods-Stubbs’] behavior, 

combined with his statements[,] led [Officer] Pedley to believe 

that [Woods-Stubbs] was concealing a firearm or contraband and 

was engaged in criminal activity. [Officer Pedley] asked [WoodsStubbs] to step [in]to an adjoining room to remove him from the 

bedroom where the [decedent’s] body was located, and [WoodsStubbs] denied having a weapon on his person. When Officer 

Pedley reached around [Woods-Stubbs’] waistband to pat him 

down, he immediately felt the butt of a firearm. 

Trial Court Opinion, 5/18/23, at 5.

First, as a threshold issue, the parties appear to agree that WoodsStubbs was subjected to an investigatory detention and search that must be 

supported by reasonable suspicion. Importantly, Woods-Stubbs does not 

argue that his seizure or search required more support than reasonable 

suspicion or that he was functionally arrested prior to Officer Pedley locating 

the gun. Further, the Commonwealth does not make any argument that 

Woods-Stubbs was not seized at the time of the search.
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Nevertheless, the suppression court never specified the point at which 

Woods-Stubbs was specifically seized, and that question appears to remain 

open. However, the timing of the seizure must be determined because the 

Terry frisk may only be conducted incident to a valid investigatory detention. 

See Adams, 205 A.3d at 1204. Indeed, we have previously noted that the 

court is required to identify the moment a seizure occurs to properly frame its 

analysis on the constitutionality of the police conduct in question. See

Commonwealth v. Mackey, 177 A.3d 221, 233 (Pa. Super. 2017).

The determination of when a seizure was effectuated is a question of 

law. See Commonwealth v. Lyles, 97 A.3d 298, 302 (Pa. 2014) (The issue 

of “whether a seizure occurred [] is a pure question of law subject to plenary 

review.”) (citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Young, 162 A.3d 

at 529 (“Whether an interaction between a private individual and a police 

officer is a mere encounter or a seizure is a question of law.”). 

Although the trial court did not make a specific finding on when the stop 

occurred, and the parties have not developed argument on the issue, we 

conclude that the factual record—one that includes the notes of testimony 

from the suppression hearing and body camera video of nearly the entire 

interaction7—is sufficiently developed for us to decide this question of law. 

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7 As discussed infra, at n.11, Officer Pedley testified that, although his body 

camera captured some of Woods-Stubbs’ furtive movements, Officer Pedley 

was physically able to observe more of those movements in the moments just 

prior to the camera capturing the same. See N.T. Suppression Hearing, 

6/16/22, at 14-15. 
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Based on our review of the record, we find that Officer Pedley and 

Woods-Stubbs had a mere encounter up to the moment of the frisk; WoodsStubbs was only seized once Officer Pedley conducted the frisk in the room 

adjacent to the one where the interaction began. This is because, as explained 

below, under the circumstances of this case, and pursuant to our Supreme 

Court’s caselaw, we conclude that a reasonable person would have felt free to 

leave, see Strickler, supra, at any point during the interaction prior to the 

frisk. See Commonwealth v. Parker, 161 A.3d 357, 363 (Pa. Super. 2017) 

(factors to be considered in making determination of whether reasonable 

person would feel free to leave include: showing of authority or exercise of 

force; demeanor of police officer; tone and manner of expression; content of 

interrogatories or statements; number of police officers; whether there is 

physical contact or police direction of subject’s movements; location and 

timing; whether officer informs citizen is suspected of criminal activity; and

visible presence of weapons on officer).

Here, at the point of initial contact with Woods-Stubbs in the secondfloor front bedroom, Officer Pedley calmly and non-confrontationally 

approached Woods-Stubbs, keeping several feet of distance between them. 

See Officer Robert Pedley Body Camera Video, 11/30/21, at 10:09. Officer 

Pedley was the only police officer8to approach Woods-Stubbs at that time, 

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8 Although Officer Pedley was the only officer on scene initially, there was one 

other person in the room—a uniformed medical professional—who, after a few 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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and, although uniformed, he did not make any initial show of authority beyond 

asking if Woods-Stubbs’ had identification.

9

 Id. at 10:10. Woods-Stubbs 

responded that he did not. Id. at 10:11.

Officer Pedley then asked, conversationally, how Woods-Stubbs knew 

the decedent. Id. at 10:12. Woods-Stubbs politely replied and provided a 

narrative answer, which included that he did not know the decedent well, but 

had spent time with her recently and that he had slept in the house where the 

decedent was found that morning. Id. at 10:12-10:40. Upon hearing that 

Woods-Stubbs might have information important in the investigation of the 

decedent’s cause of death, Officer Pedley began to take notes with a pen and 

paper. Id. at 10:41.

During the encounter, Officer Pedley never informed Woods-Stubbs that 

he was a suspect of any crime. Woods-Stubbs was polite, respectful, cordial, 

and cooperative throughout the entire interaction. See N.T. Suppression 

Hearing, 6/16/22, at 13. Further, Woods-Stubbs answered every question 

____________________________________________

minutes, left the room in the middle of the interaction between Officer Pedley 

and Woods-Stubbs. See Officer Robert Pedley Body Camera Video, 11/30/21, 

at 17:18. Officer Miller arrived in uniform just prior to the point where the 

encounter moved from the front bedroom to the adjacent room and positioned

himself in the hallway behind Officer Pedley. See id. at 17:57.

9 During a mere encounter, police officers may ask for identification without 

escalating the interaction into an investigative detention. Compare

Commonwealth v. Au, 42 A.3d 1002, 1009 (Pa. 2012) (arresting officer’s 

request for identification did not transform encounter with Appellee into 

unconstitutional investigatory detention), with Commonwealth v. Cost, 224 

A.3d 641, 651 (Pa. 2020) (police retention of identification is material and 

substantial escalating factor in totality assessment).
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completely and often volunteered additional information that was not 

requested of him. Woods-Stubbs’ unsolicited divulgences included both that 

Woods-Stubbs was previously arrested and that he had been shot on a prior 

occasion. See Officer Robert Pedley Body Camera Video, 11/30/21, at 14:52,

16:43.

Also, Officer Pedley did not search Woods-Stubbs’ name or information 

in any database, either in response to Woods-Stubbs’ failure to produce any 

valid identification or to Woods-Stubbs’ revelations that he possessed a 

criminal record and had been shot on a prior occasion. See Mathis, 173 A.3d

at 713 (no seizure effectuated, and interaction only mere encounter, where 

interaction between police and defendant was polite, police did not inform 

defendant he was suspected of criminal activity, and interaction was relaxed, 

non-confrontational, and conversational); see also Lyles, 97 A.3d at 306-07 

(appellant subjected to mere encounter, and not investigative detention, 

where officer quickly jotted information instead of attempting to memorize it, 

did not use appellant’s information to run background check, and took no 

additional steps to suggest detention or restrict appellant’s freedom of 

movement).

Upon Officer Miller’s arrival on scene, Officer Pedley informed WoodsStubbs that the officers wanted to move him to the adjacent room to separate 

him from the decedent’s body. See Officer Robert Pedley Body Camera Video, 

11/30/21, at 18:01. At this point, the interaction still remained a mere 

encounter. See Mathis, 173 A.3d at 712-13 (police request to move into 
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another room of house did not elevate interaction to investigative detention

from mere encounter). 

Finally, immediately upon entering the adjacent room, Officer Pedley 

informed Woods-Stubbs’ he was going to search his person for officer safety, 

prior to having Woods-Stubbs sit on the bed for a few minutes to await further 

questions. At that point, Officer Miller positioned himself to block the doorway 

from that room into the hallway—which doorway ultimately led to the stairs 

and the exit of the home—and Officer Pedley simultaneously frisked WoodsStubbs’ person. See Officer Robert Pedley Body Camera Video, 11/30/21, at 

18:27. This was the point where police seized Woods-Stubbs, and reasonable 

suspicion was required to both support the stop and the frisk. See Adams, 

205 A.3d at 1204 (officer physically closed defendant’s vehicle door as 

defendant began to open it, signaling defendant not free to leave); see also

Mathis, 173 A.3d at 713 (defendant seized once officer reached out and 

grabbed his jacket); Commonwealth v. Lewis, 636 A.2d 619, 621-23 (Pa. 

1994) (seizure effectuated where four non-uniformed officers stood side-byside, informed defendants they were investigating potential drug couriers, 

asked whether defendants would mind speaking with them, and followed as 

defendants backed away five to ten feet until backed up to wall); 

Commonwealth v. Greber, 385 A.2d 1313, 1316 (Pa. 1978) (detention by 

blocking defendants’ automobile constituted seizure); In the Interest of 

C.C., 780 A.2d 696, 700 (Pa. Super. 2001) (seizure effectuated once

defendant frisked).
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Since we have concluded Woods-Stubbs was seized,10 we must 

determine if it was supported by reasonable suspicion. Here, we find it was 

because Officer Pedley found Woods-Stubbs, who was likely one of the last 

individuals to see the decedent alive, located in the room with the nonresponsive decedent. The decedent’s cause of unresponsiveness (and

subsequent death) was unknown and suspicious, and the subject of active 

police investigation. While Officer Pedley awaited the arrival of homicide 

detectives, he observed Woods-Stubbs hiding his body behind a dresser and

stuffing something into the waistband area of his pants,

11 which Officer Pedley 

testified he believed could have been a weapon or contraband. See Smith, 

172 A.3d at 33 (officer may stop and briefly detain person for investigatory 

purposes when officer has reasonable suspicion, based on specific and 

articulable facts, that criminal activity may be afoot). Under these facts, we 

____________________________________________

10 As discussed above, neither the trial court nor the parties specify at what 

point Woods-Stubbs was seized. We conclude that Woods-Stubbs’ seizure 

occurred at the moment he was frisked.

11 Woods-Stubbs claims that the trial court’s finding that he made furtive 

movements or a stuffing motion in his waistband is unsupported by the record. 

We disagree. First, our review of Officer Pedley’s body camera video clearly 

shows the stuffing motion described at the suppression hearing. See Officer 

Robert Pedley Body Camera Video, 11/30/21, at 10:04 – 10:07. Second, the 

suppression court found Officer Pedley credible when he testified to observing 

Woods-Stubbs’ furtive movements prior to those same movements being 

captured by his body camera. See N.T. Suppression Hearing, 6/16/22, at 15-

16 (Officer Pedley explaining that due to its position on his chest, his body 

camera did not capture everything that he was able to observe first-hand as 

he turned his head to look over the stairwell wall upon approaching WoodsStubbs); see also supra at n.7.
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conclude that it was reasonable for Officer Pedley to believe Woods-Stubbs 

might have secreted evidence related to the decedent’s death in his 

waistband, thus giving rise to reasonable suspicion to effectuate a stop.

Regarding Officer Pedley’s search of Woods-Stubbs’ person, in addition 

to relying on the above particular facts, in answering Officer Pedley’s 

questions, Woods-Stubbs admitted that he smoked marijuana with the 

decedent on the night prior, noted that he had an existing criminal record, 

stated that he had been shot on a prior occasion, explained he had been with 

the decedent for the past two days, stated that he was possibly the last person 

to have seen the decedent alive overnight, and noted that he was not sure as 

to the decedent’s cause of death.12 See In re T.W., 261 A.3d at 421 (police

officer may frisk suspect based upon reasonable suspicion that suspect is 

armed and dangerous). We conclude, therefore, that it was reasonable for 

Officer Pedley to frisk Woods-Stubbs, incident to investigating Woods-Stubbs’ 

potential connection to the decedent’s suspicious death, where Officer Pedley 

testified that he observed Woods-Stubbs potentially hiding a weapon in his 

waistband. See Terry, supra at 27; see also Commonwealth v. 

____________________________________________

12 Indeed, it was the combination of Woods-Stubbs’ actions, his location, and 

his answers to Officer Pedley’s questions that raised a reasonable suspicion 

that criminal activity was afoot and that Woods-Stubbs was armed and 

dangerous. Based on the record and the totality of these circumstances, we 

disagree with Woods-Stubbs’ assertion that the search of his person was 

based solely on furtive movements, his location, or a combination of only 

those two factors. See Appellant’s Brief, at 18, citing Reppert, supra; see 

also id. at 15, citing Commonwealth v. Grahame, 7 A.3d 810, 816 (Pa. 

2010).
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Cunningham, 287 A.3d 1, 11 (Pa. Super. 2022) (officer may pat-down 

individual whose suspicious behavior officer is investigating on basis of 

reasonable belief individual is presently armed and dangerous, which must be 

based on specific articulated facts from which officer reasonably inferred 

individual was armed and dangerous). 

Also, we find Hernandez, supra, inapposite because Officer Pedley, in 

fact, clearly articulated the danger posed under the specific circumstances of 

this case. Indeed, Officer Pedley testified that he observed Woods-Stubbs 

making a stuffing motion into his waistband while secreted behind the dresser, 

actions that Officer Pedley believed may have been Woods-Stubbs hiding a 

weapon in his waistband. See N.T. Suppression Hearing, 6/16/22, at 7-8; 

see supra at n.6.

In sum, we conclude that, in light of his training and experience, and 

under the totality of the circumstances, Officer Pedley articulated sufficient 

facts to establish reasonable suspicion both to conduct an investigative 

detention of Woods-Stubbs, and to search Woods-Stubbs’ person for weapons.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

DATE: 06/11/2024