IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 21–1275 

Submitted February 21, 2023—Filed April 14, 2023 

PHYLLIS KONCHAR,

Appellant, 

vs. 

JOSEPH PINS, ST. JOSEPH’S CHURCH OF DES MOINES, and THE ROMAN 

CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF DES MOINES,

Appellees. 

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Sarah Crane, Judge. 

A former principal of a Catholic school appeals the dismissal of her fraud, 

defamation, and breach of contract claims. AFFIRMED.

May, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which all justices joined. 

Waterman, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which McDermott, J., joined. 

Mark D. Sherinian (argued) and Emily E. Wilson of Sherinian & Hasso Law 

Firm, Des Moines, for appellant. 

Brianna L. Long (argued), Frank Harty, and Haley Hermanson of 

Nyemaster Goode, P.C., Des Moines, for appellees. 
2 

MAY, Justice. 

Phyllis Konchar was the principal at St. Joseph’s Catholic School for 

nineteen years. After her employment was terminated, Konchar brought suit 

against St. Joseph’s Church, a priest, and the Des Moines Diocese. The district 

court granted summary judgment to the defendants as to Konchar’s fraud claim, 

her breach of contract claim, and one of her defamation claims. A jury returned 

defense verdicts on Konchar’s remaining defamation claims. Konchar appeals. 

Following our review, we conclude that Konchar has not shown grounds 

for reversal. We affirm. 

I. Background Facts and Proceedings. 

A. St. Joseph’s School. St. Joseph’s School is a Catholic school operated 

by St. Joseph’s Church, a juridical entity in the Roman Catholic Diocese of 

Des Moines. A priest administers the church and school. The priest is appointed 

by and subordinated to the Bishop of the Diocese. The Bishop is appointed by 

and subordinated to The Pope. 

B. Catholic Schools and Their Principals. According to The Diocese of 

Des Moines Catholic Schools Personnel Handbook, “Catholic schools exist to 

enable students to learn the traditions and doctrines of the Catholic Church and 

to carry out the Gospel message of Jesus Christ in their daily lives.” In describing 

the “roles and responsibilities” of a school’s principal, the Handbook notes that 

“[i]n Catholic schools, the principal functions as the spiritual, academic, 

managerial, communications and public relations leader of the school.” 

(Emphasis added.) As “spiritual leader,” the principal 
3 

A. Evidences the value and qualities of a Catholic school education. 

B. Demonstrates an active faith life personally and professionally. 

C. Provides leadership for the ongoing building of the school as a 

faith community. 

D. Provides opportunities and participates in prayer, prayer 

services, liturgical celebrations, and reception of the sacraments. 

E. Models and expects Gospel values and Christian behavior 

throughout the school. 

F. Communicates the mission of the school as a ministry of the 

church and parish. 

C. Phyllis Konchar. In the fall of 1999, Phyllis Konchar became principal 

of St. Joseph’s Catholic School. She served in this role for nineteen years. As will 

be explained below, Konchar’s employment was terminated on March 9, 2018. 

At the time of her termination, Konchar’s employment was governed by an 

annual administrator contract for the period of August 1, 2017, to July 31, 2018. 

The administrator contract allowed for Konchar to be terminated for “cause,” 

which the contract defined to include “performance, conduct or behavior on the 

part of the employee which, in the sole opinion of the employer, adversely affects 

the desirability of continued employment.” 

D. Pastor Pins. In 2017, Bishop Richard Pates was the Bishop for the 

Diocese. Bishop Pates appointed Father Joseph Pins as St. Joseph Parish Priest 

in July 2017. This role gave Father Pins authority over staff at St. Joseph’s 

School, including principal Konchar. 

Soon after Father Pins’s appointment, he learned of several problems 

involving Konchar. For example, a gym teacher filed a written complaint against 
4 

Konchar for harassment. And when a music teacher decided to resign, she sent 

an email to Father Pins stating that “it was [Konchar’s] bullying that made me 

leave.” Current and former employees told Father Pins that the work 

environment was “toxic.” 

There were other worries, too. Konchar hired an employee for the school 

office after Father Pins specifically told her not to. And Konchar paid an employee 

extra money out of her own personal account. Also, the Iowa Department of 

Education notified the school that it would be audited concerning the 

free-and-reduced-lunch program. A business manager believed Konchar had 

approved applications that were noncompliant because the families’ incomes had 

been too high to qualify for the program. 

In light of these and other concerns, the Diocese’s human resources 

director began an investigation of Konchar in the fall of 2017. Also, in November 

2017, Father Pins issued a performance improvement plan (PIP) to Konchar. It 

identified four areas of concern: “insubordination,” “different treatment of 

employees,” “a culture of fear and intimidation,” and “a lack of collaboration with 

parish staff.” 

Konchar viewed the PIP as a threat to her continued employment. In 

response, Konchar used the school’s electronic messaging system—called 

“Dojo”—to ask parents to attend the December 7 board of education meeting and 

“support Principal Konchar’s future employment.” Later, she sent a follow-up 

message stating that the meeting had been canceled but to direct any 

communication “to Father Pins.” 
5 

In December, Bishop Pates suggested that Father Pins and Konchar 

should try a form of mediation. Father Pins and Konchar met with mediator Tom 

Green on several occasions between December 2017 and February 2018. 

Together, they created a document entitled “Building Agreements.” Among other 

things, the “Building Agreements” document included a list of “Our Agreements.” 

The list included a wide range of items, such as: “Keep each other informed,” 

“Support each other’s success,” “No tip toing around each other,” “Eliminate the 

drama,” and “Get to know each other better—our human sides.” Significant to 

this appeal, the list also included this item: 

Fr. Pins’ agreement to Phyllis. I want to offer you my support, 

celebrate your success and help you reach your leadership goals; 

help you reach your retirement plans on your terms. Asks her to trust 

him. 

(Emphases added.) 

Konchar and Father Pins signed the “Building Agreements” document on 

February 22. 

While Konchar and Father Pins were mediating, the Diocese’s human 

resources’ investigation continued. On March 9, the human resources director 

sent a letter to Konchar that explained: 

The Diocese of Des Moines Human Resources department 

conducted an investigation into a complaint that was received about 

you. Individuals including current and former employees of Saint 

Joseph School as well as former pastors were interviewed. 

Based upon the investigation, the office concluded that you 

are alleged to have engaged in conduct that exposed Saint Joseph 

to risks associated with potential violations of the Iowa Wage 

Payment Collections Act (Iowa Code Chapter 91A) and the Iowa 

Black Listing Law (Iowa Code Chapter 730.2). 
6 

The investigation did not pass judgment on whether you 

violated these laws. The investigation focused on the exposure that 

was created and the environment that was fostered. 

On the same day, Father Pins informed Konchar that her contract would 

not be renewed for the next school year. He told Konchar that she could finish 

out the school year if she did not disclose this decision. 

Konchar chose to speak out. That afternoon, she sent out this Dojo 

message to parents and staff: 

Dear Parents, 

I was informed by Father Pins today that my contract would 

not be renewed next year. He further stated that I would be 

terminated immediately if I contacted parents, staff, or the board of 

education and told them about his decision. As you can tell, I have 

made the decision to be terminated. It has been my privilege to serve 

you and your children. I wish you all of the best. 

Sincerely, 

Phyllis Konchar. 

Many parents responded with support for Konchar. At least one parent started 

a petition to reinstate Konchar. 

On March 11, Father Pins sent an email to the “St. Joseph Parish and 

School Community”: 

I regret having to send this message. As many of you may 

know, Ms. Konchar and I have philosophical differences of opinion 

regarding the church and school. We were working toward 

developing a cooperative relationship when I received complaints 

from a number of current and former staff. With the assistance of 

the diocese, these concerns were examined. We concluded that there 

was a pattern of conduct that warranted choosing not to renew Ms. 

Konchar’s contract. I informed Ms. Konchar of this decision and 

asked her to maintain the decision in confidence and in a 

professional manner. She shared with me that she had the right to 
7 

tell the world – and she apparently has attempted to do so. In 

response she was let go. 

There’s apparently a perception that this decision was the product 

of animosity between Ms. Konchar and me. Please be advised that the prior 

two pastors, were consulted and Bishop Pates approved the decision 

following the evaluation of the past conduct. 

You probably know that in situations like this the church and Ms. 

Konchar’s employer have to maintain a level of discretion. The best action 

at this time is for prayer for Ms. Konchar, myself, and all associated with 

the parish. We pray especially for St. Joseph School and its students who 

are the most important consideration at this time. 

Sincerely, 

Fr. Joe Pins 

(Emphases added.) 

The next day, March 12, Konchar sent out another Dojo message. This 

time, Konchar responded to Father Pins’s March 11 email, which she described 

as “outrageous”: 

Dear Parents, 

This will probably be my last post, as I’m sure Father Pins will 

find a way to block me from this account. My email was deactivated 

Friday, but my personal email is . . . . 

You may have received the outrageous email from Father 

yesterday. First of all, he cannot discuss any personnel matters as 

they are confidential. 

For full disclosure, there were two complaints filed against me 

by two employees who left abruptly. This was investigated by the 

Diocese, as it should be, and was determined to be unfounded. This 

unfounded accusation was his “rationale” for termination. But 

really, he has not liked me since he came. He has been working 

toward this since last July and was finally able to accomplish what 

he and Paula have wanted. It’s hard for them to have someone who 

will stand up to them. Frankly, he has no knowledge about School, 

about children, about humanity. 
8 

You certainly have a snapshot of his bizarre behavior that I 

have dealt with all year. He gave me a document February 22 which 

stated he would like me to remain at St. Joseph’s until my 

retirement, then terminated me March 9th. 

I will pray for all of you. I am beyond humbled, blessed, and 

grateful for your kind words on the petition and for your support. 

I love you all, 

Phyllis Konchar. 

Also on March 12, the Diocese of Des Moines issued a press release. It 

stated: 

An investigation by the Diocese of Des Moines was conducted 

at St. Joseph School regarding the school administrator after a 

series of internal concerns were presented to the diocese. 

The outcome of the investigation pointed to serious irregularities 

in the school administration under her direction. The principal was 

advised of these and invited to remain in place for the remainder of 

the school year on the condition that the situation remain private. 

She chose otherwise. 

The parish and school community regret this turn of events 

but assure Mrs. Phyllis Konchar of appreciation for her 19 years of 

service to the school, wish her well and assure her of our prayers. 

(Emphasis added.) That evening, the story of Konchar’s firing was on the 

Des Moines Register’s webpage. The Register story mentioned that some “parents 

are petitioning to have” Konchar reinstated. According to the Register story, 

though, “Konchar said she would accept the principal position again only if the 

current priest left.” 

E. Procedural History. In May 2018, Konchar commenced this action 

against Father Pins, St. Joseph’s Church, and the Diocese of Des Moines. She 

alleged fraud and defamation by all defendants. She alleged breach of contract 

against Father Pins only. 
9 

Konchar’s claims of fraud and breach of contract were based on 

statements in the “Building Agreements” document. Konchar’s defamation 

claims were based on statements in Father Pins’s email of March 11 and the 

Diocese’s press release of March 12. 

After extensive discovery, the defendants moved for summary judgment. 

The district court denied the motion as to Konchar’s defamation and fraud 

claims. But the court granted summary judgment as to Konchar’s breach of 

contract claim. Among other things, the court found that the “Building 

Agreements” language was “not sufficiently definite or certain as to be 

enforceable” as a contract. 

Discovery continued. In February 2020, Konchar filed a motion to compel. 

Konchar asked the court to inspect in camera certain documents that the 

defendants had withheld under attorney–client privilege. Konchar claimed that 

the documents may be discoverable under the crime-fraud exception. The court 

denied this motion. 

Later, the defendants renewed their request for summary judgment. The 

court granted summary judgment as to Konchar’s fraud claim (and Konchar does 

not appeal that ruling). The court also granted summary judgment as to 

Konchar’s claim that she had been defamed by the statement in Father Pins’s 

March 11 email that “the prior two pastors, were consulted.” But the court 

denied summary judgment as to Konchar’s claim that she had been defamed by 

Father Pins’s statement (in the same email) that “there was a pattern of conduct 

that warranted choosing not to renew Mrs. Konchar’s contract.” (Emphasis 
10 

added.) The court also denied summary judgment as to Konchar’s claim that she 

had been defamed by the statement in the Diocese’s March 12 press release that 

its “investigation pointed to serious irregularities in the school administration 

under [Konchar’s] direction.” (Emphasis added.) So the case went to trial on 

those two defamation claims. 

The trial spanned from August 2 to August 13. Thirty-six witnesses 

testified. Over 100 exhibits were admitted. Ultimately, the jury returned defense 

verdicts on both defamation claims. The court entered judgment on the verdict. 

This appeal followed. 

II. Analysis. 

Konchar raises four issues on appeal. She contends the district court 

(1) erred in granting summary judgment as to the breach of contract claim, 

(2) abused its discretion by denying her motion to compel, (3) erred in granting 

summary judgment as to the “two pastors” defamation claim, and (4) abused its 

discretion by admitting certain evidence. The defendants deny that Konchar has 

shown any reversible error. Additionally, the defendants raise an alternative 

basis to affirm, namely, that all of Konchar’s claims were barred under the 

ecclesiastical abstention doctrine. 

A. Breach of Contract Claim. We start with Konchar’s breach of contract 

claim. Konchar argues that the district court erred by granting summary 

judgment as to this claim. We disagree. 

We review summary judgment rulings for correction of errors at law. 

Bandstra v. Covenant Reformed Church, 913 N.W.2d 19, 36 (Iowa 2018). 
11 

“Summary judgment is proper ‘if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show 

that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact.’ ” Id. (quoting Walderbach 

v. Archdiocese of Dubuque, Inc., 730 N.W.2d 198, 199 (Iowa 2007)). “When 

reviewing a district court’s ruling, we view the record in the light most favorable 

to the nonmoving party.” Id. 

Of course, “to prove a breach of contract claim, a party must show . . . ‘the 

existence of a contract.’ ” Iowa Mortg. Ctr., L.L.C. v. Baccam, 841 N.W.2d 107, 

110–11 (Iowa 2013) (quoting Molo Oil Co. v. River City Ford Truck Sales, Inc., 578 

N.W.2d 222, 224 (Iowa 1998)). For a contract to be enforceable, its “terms must 

be sufficiently definite for the court to determine the duty of each party and the 

conditions of performance.” Royal Indem. Co. v. Factory Mut. Ins., 786 N.W.2d 

839, 846 (Iowa 2010). “[W]e look for terms with precise meaning that provide 

certainty of performance.” Anderson v. Douglas & Lomason Co., 540 N.W.2d 277, 

286 (Iowa 1995). This inquiry presents “a question of law.” Heartland Express, 

Inc. v. Terry, 631 N.W.2d 260, 268 (Iowa 2001). 

Konchar claims that an enforceable contract arose from this statement in 

the “Building Agreements” document: 

Fr. Pins’ agreement to Phyllis. I want to offer you my support, 

celebrate your success and help you reach your leadership goals; 

help you reach your retirement plans on your terms. Asks her to trust 

him. 

(Emphases added.) 

The district court concluded that this language was “not sufficiently 

definite or certain as to be enforceable.” We agree. This language includes no 
12 

“terms with precise meaning that provide certainty of performance.” Anderson, 

540 N.W.2d at 286. It does not allow us “to determine the duty of each party and 

the conditions of performance.” Royal Indem. Co., 786 N.W.2d at 846. It was not, 

as Konchar suggests, a promise of tenure-like immunity from termination. It 

contained no guarantee that her employment would continue until some 

unspecified time when Konchar decided to retire. Rather, it speaks only of Father 

Pins’s desire (“I want . . . .”) to “help” Konchar. And it does not specify Konchar’s 

“retirement plans” or what it would mean for her to “reach” those plans “on [her] 

terms.” Indeed, Konchar concedes that “the manner in which Rev. Pins might 

have helped Ms. Konchar reach her retirement plans was not specified.” 

All things considered, then, we agree with the defendants that the 

“Building Agreements” document is better characterized as aspirational than 

contractual. It is a statement of shared aspirations to improve a working 

relationship. It uses terms like “Shared Vision” and “Shared Goals.” It describes 

goals like: “Keep each other informed,” “Support each other’s success,” “No tip 

toing around each other,” “Eliminate the drama,” and “Get to know each other 

better—our human sides.” It speaks of “[m]ov[ing] away from hearts at war” and 

towards “hearts at peace.” Its “informal” statements “expressing goodwill and 

hope for association are too vague to be enforceable as contract provisions.” 

Beraha v. Baxter Health Care Corp., 956 F.2d 1436, 1441 (7th Cir. 1992) 

(applying Illinois law). 

Although our analysis of the document’s text is dispositive, we note that 

context also supports the district court’s ruling. As the court noted: 
13 

It is undisputed that Plaintiff served as Principal of the School 

pursuant to the terms of a written administrator contract. Nothing 

in the administrator contract guaranteed Plaintiff the right to work 

for the School as Principal until any specific “retirement” date. 

Instead, Plaintiff worked under a one-year contract that terminated 

on July 31, 2018, unless earlier terminated. It defies credibility or 

common sense to suggest that there was a meeting of the minds 

between the parties that by executing the mediation document on 

February 22, 2018, the parties intended to amend the administrator 

contract to, in essence, guarantee Plaintiff employment until some 

unspecified retirement date. 

Because Konchar failed to show that the “Building Agreements” document 

was an enforceable contract, the district court was right to dismiss Konchar’s 

breach of contract claim. 

B. Attorney–Client Privileged Documents. Konchar claims that the 

district court abused its discretion by refusing to conduct an in camera review of 

certain attorney–client communications. Keefe v. Bernard, 774 N.W.2d 663, 667 

(Iowa 2009) (applying abuse of discretion standard for motions to compel 

discovery). We disagree. 

Iowa’s attorney–client privilege is codified at Iowa Code section 622.10 

(2018). “Any confidential communication between an attorney and the attorney’s 

client is absolutely privileged from disclosure against the will of the client.” Keefe, 

774 N.W.2d at 669 (quoting Shook v. City of Davenport, 497 N.W.2d 883, 886 

(Iowa 1993), abrogated by Wells Dairy, Inc. v. Am. Indus. Refrigeration, Inc., 690 

N.W.2d 38, 44–45 (Iowa 2004)). The privilege is “of ancient origin” and “is 

premised on a recognition of the inherent right of every person to consult with 

legal counsel and secure the benefit of his advice free from any fear of disclosure.” 
14 

Id. (quoting Bailey v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R., 179 N.W.2d 560, 563 

(Iowa 1970)). 

Like other courts, though, we have recognized an exception for 

“communications by one contemplating crime or the perpetration of fraud to an 

attorney for advice as to how to succeed.” State v. Kirkpatrick, 263 N.W. 52, 55 

(Iowa 1935). As the district court noted, however, there is relatively little Iowa 

caselaw about the crime-fraud exception. The parties appear to agree that Iowa’s 

exception is equivalent to the federal version. We assume without deciding that 

this is correct. See Kuehl v. Tegra Corp., No. 21–0416, 2022 WL 2155269, at *5 

(Iowa Ct. App. June 15, 2022) (relying on federal authority to describe the 

crime-fraud exception). 

As the United States Supreme Court has explained, “the purpose of the 

crime-fraud exception” is “to assure that the ‘seal of secrecy,’ between lawyer 

and client does not extend to communications ‘made for the purpose of getting 

advice for the commission of a fraud’ or crime.” United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 

554, 563 (1989) (citation omitted) (quoting O’Rourke v. Darbishire, [1920] AC 

581, 604 (PC)). “Because the attorney–client privilege benefits the client, it is the 

client’s intent to further a crime or fraud that must be shown.” In re BankAm. 

Corp. Secs. Litig., 270 F.3d 639, 642 (8th Cir. 2001). 

“Before engaging in in camera review to determine the applicability of the 

crime-fraud exception, ‘the judge should require a showing of a factual basis 

adequate to support a good faith belief by a reasonable person,’ that in camera

review of the materials may reveal evidence to establish the claim that the 
15 

crime-fraud exception applies.” Zolin, 491 U.S. at 572 (quoting Caldwell v. Dist. 

Ct., 644 P.2d 26, 33 (Colo. 1982)). Even if this showing is made, the district court 

still has discretion in determining whether in camera review is appropriate. Id.

When exercising this discretion, the court should consider “the facts and 

circumstances of the particular case,” including “the likelihood that the evidence 

produced through in camera review, together with other available evidence then 

before the court, will establish that the crime-fraud exception does apply.” Id. 

Applying these principles here, we find no grounds for reversal. To begin 

with, the defendants point out that any arguments about a “crime fraud” 

exception may be moot now because Konchar’s fraud claim was dismissed and 

Konchar has not appealed that ruling. And while Konchar’s appellate brief asks 

us to consider expanding the exception to torts other than fraud, we agree with 

the defendants that this argument was not preserved below. “It is a fundamental 

doctrine of appellate review that issues must ordinarily be both raised and 

decided by the district court before we decide them on appeal.” State v. Trane, 

984 N.W.2d 429, 434–35 (Iowa 2023) (quoting State v. Bynum, 937 N.W.2d 319, 

324 (Iowa 2020)). It does not appear that the district court ruled on a possible 

expansion of the exception to nonfraud torts. Rather, the district court only ruled 

on whether the traditional crime-fraud exception applied. 

And as to that ruling, we can find no error. Konchar claims that the district 

court should have reviewed attorney–client emails because one of the defendants’ 

attorneys provided the defendants with advice and counsel as to many of the 

decisions at issue in Konchar’s suit, including Bishop Pates’s request that Father 
16 

Pins and Konchar participate in mediation, the Diocese’s investigation of 

allegations against Konchar, the decision to terminate Konchar, and the wording 

of the statements issued by Father Pins and the Diocese. Konchar argues that 

the attorney’s “involvement in the decisions to terminate” Konchar “after the 

successful mediation,” plus the attorney’s “participation in the investigation and 

his drafting of the press releases [sic] was a sufficient prima facie showing upon 

which” the district court “should, at a minimum, have reviewed” the emails in 

camera. 

We disagree. Konchar failed to make any initial showing that any privileged 

communications were made in furtherance of a crime or fraud by the defendants. 

See In re BankAm. Corp., 270 F.3d at 642 (“There must be a specific showing 

that a particular document or communication was made in furtherance of the 

client’s alleged crime or fraud.”); Rabushka ex rel. U.S. v. Crane Co., 122 F.3d 

559, 566 (8th Cir. 1997) (“[Plaintiff] merely offered his general theory that a fraud 

occurred and asserted that any communications made aided that fraud, a 

showing that does not satisfy the requirements of the crime-fraud exception or 

justify in camera review.”). So the district court had no reason to intrude on the 

privilege by reviewing attorney–client communications. There was no abuse of 

discretion. 

C. “Two Pastors” Defamation Claim. Konchar contends that the district 

court erred by granting summary judgment as to her defamation claim 

concerning Father Pins’s “two pastors” statement. As noted, this statement 
17 

appeared in Father Pins’s March 11 email to the school and parish community. 

Here is an excerpt: 

There’s apparently a perception that this decision was the 

product of animosity between Ms. Konchar and me. Please be 

advised that the prior two pastors, were consulted and Bishop Pates 

approved the decision following the evaluation of the past conduct. 

(Emphasis added.) 

We conclude that the court was right to dismiss the “two pastors” 

defamation claim. Bandstra, 913 N.W.2d at 36 (reviewing for correction of errors 

at law). As the defendants rightly observe, “there can be no defamation without 

a false statement.” And substantial truth is an established defense to a 

defamation claim.1 Yates v. Iowa W. Racing Ass’n, 721 N.W.2d 762, 769 (Iowa 

2006). As one observer noted: 

A defendant does not have to prove the literal truth of a 

defamatory statement to prevail. An effective defense can rely on the 

substantial truth doctrine. The substantial truth doctrine states 

that “[t]ruth will protect the defendant from liability even if the 

precise literal truth of the defamatory statement cannot be 

established,” as long as the “gist” or “sting” of the statement is true. 

A crisp formulation of the doctrine states that a publication is 

substantially true if (a) it is factually similar to the literal truth, and 

(b) it differs from the truth by no more than immaterial details. A 

statement differs from the truth “by no more than immaterial 

details” if the statement does not harm the plaintiff’s reputation 

more than would the pleaded truth. 

1Although defendants’ brief does not ask us to affirm on substantial truth grounds, that 

theory was raised and litigated below and, therefore, we may rely on it to affirm. King v. State, 

818 N.W.2d 1, 12 (Iowa 2012) (noting “[o]ur rules provide that an appellee need not even file a 

brief in our court”; further noting “we may choose to consider only grounds for affirmance raised 

in the appellee’s brief, but we are not required to do so, so long as the ground was raised below”).
18 

Meiring de Villiers, Substantial Truth in Defamation Law, 32 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 

91, 99–100 (2008) (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted). 

Here it is undisputed that—indeed—Father Pins did consult with the two 

prior pastors about Konchar. And both pastors shared concerns about Konchar. 

So, to the extent Konchar’s claim depends solely on whether Father Pins 

“consulted” with the “two pastors,” her claim fails under the substantial-truth 

doctrine. 

But in some of Konchar’s filings, and again at oral argument, Konchar has 

suggested that her defamation claim is not just about whether Father Pins 

consulted with the two pastors. Consultation alone is not the “gist” or “sting,” 

she suggests. Id. Indeed, Konchar appears to concede that Father Pins did 

consult with the pastors in the fall of 2017. Rather, Konchar’s claim is about 

what happened in 2018. Konchar believes that Father Pins’s “two pastors” 

statement falsely implied that the two pastors approved of her 2018 firing even 

though—according to their deposition testimony—the pastors weren’t even 

consulted in 2018. So the “two pastors” statement was defamatory, Konchar 

believes, because it created the false appearance that Father Pins had valid 

reasons to fire her when—in fact—he had no valid reasons at all. Instead, 

Konchar believes, Father Pins simply didn’t like her. 

Ultimately, then, Konchar’s defamation claim is about whether a Catholic 

priest was justified in deciding that Konchar should no longer serve as principal 

at a Catholic school. But the district court believed that this kind of inquiry 

would run afoul of the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause. See Koster v. 
19 

Harvest Bible Chapel–Quad Cities, 959 N.W.2d 680, 687 (Iowa 2021) (noting the 

general rule “that religious controversies are not the proper subject of civil court 

inquiry” (quoting Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for U.S. & Can. v. Milivojevich, 426 

U.S. 696, 713 (1976))); Kliebenstein v. Iowa Conf. of United Methodist Church, 

663 N.W.2d 404, 407 (Iowa 2003) (noting the “general rule that ‘[d]efamation 

actions are precluded by the First Amendment when an examination of the truth 

of the allegedly defamatory statements would require an impermissible inquiry 

into church doctrine and discipline’ ” (alteration in original) (quoting 

50 Am. Jur. 2d Libel and Slander § 117, at 420 (1995))). In fact, the district court 

specifically found that the First Amendment precludes inquiries by “a civil court” 

into “the decision of whether Konchar was suitable for the role of Principal at 

St. Joseph’s.” And Konchar’s briefs do not challenge this conclusion.2 So we 

presume without deciding that the district court was correct, and we decline to 

reverse. McKinney v. Hartman, 3 Iowa (Clarke) 344, 345 (1856) (“The 

presumption is, that the ruling was correct, and it is for the party alleging error, 

to show it affirmatively. This has been too frequently settled to be now 

questioned.”); see Struve v. Struve, 930 N.W.2d 368, 378 (Iowa 2019) (noting the 

“burden rests upon the appellant . . . to establish error” (quoting Jones v. Univ. 

of Iowa, 836 N.W.2d 127, 140 (Iowa 2013))); State v. Cook, 330 N.W.2d 306, 313 

2Konchar’s opening brief focuses on the factual issue of whether Father Pins’s “two 

pastors” comment was about 2017 conversations with the pastors or, instead, events that 

occurred in 2018. Konchar’s opening brief also discusses the qualified privilege—although the 

district court did not rely on qualified privilege in dismissing the “two pastors” claim. Konchar’s 

reply brief claims that a jury would not have to determine whether the two prior pastors had “in 

fact approved the non-renewal decision” because the “only issue” is “whether the two priests 

were consulted at all.” 
20 

(Iowa 1983) (“We do not presume error.”); In re Behrend’s Will, 10 N.W.2d 651, 

655 (Iowa 1943) (“Errors are not presumed . . . .”); Cent. Tr. Co. v. City of Des 

Moines, 216 N.W. 41, 42 (Iowa 1927) (“Error is not presumed.”). 

D. Evidentiary Issues. Konchar also argues that the district court abused 

its discretion by allowing certain testimony of a former administrative assistant 

at St. Joseph’s (Tanya Dunn), four former St. Joseph’s teachers (Jill Dotson, 

Autumn O’Connor, Jenny Gervais, and Natalie Bradley), and a former member 

of St. Joseph’s Board of Education (Richard Carpenter). Each of these witnesses 

testified about Konchar’s reputation and behaviors in her role as principal, 

including some negative aspects. Konchar argues that the district court abused 

its discretion by admitting certain negative comments about her because (1) the 

defendants “failed to establish the foundation” for these witnesses’ opinions and 

(2) the witnesses’ descriptions of specific conduct were not “relevant to the 

character trait at issue.” 

We review evidentiary challenges for an abuse of discretion. State v. 

Thompson, 954 N.W.2d 402, 406 (Iowa 2021). Moreover, “the erroneous 

admission of evidence does not require reversal ‘unless a substantial right of the 

party is affected.’ ” Mohammed v. Otoadese, 738 N.W.2d 628, 633 (Iowa 2007) 

(quoting Iowa R. Evid. 5.103(a)). “[T]he burden rests upon the appellant not only 

to establish error but to further show that prejudice resulted.” Jones, 836 N.W.2d 

at 140 (alteration in original) (quoting In re Behrend’s Will, 10 N.W.2d at 655). 

Following our review, we are not convinced that Konchar has shown an 

abuse of discretion in the district court’s evidentiary determinations. In any 
21 

event, even if we assume that the evidence identified by Konchar should have 

been excluded, Konchar still hasn’t shown “that prejudice resulted.” Id. (quoting 

In re Behrend’s Will, 10 N.W.2d at 655). Thirty-six witnesses testified in this 

ten-day trial. Over 100 exhibits were admitted. Konchar’s complaints involve a 

relatively small segment of the total evidence. Moreover, much of the evidence 

that troubles Konchar was effectively duplicated by other evidence. All things 

considered, we believe Konchar received a fair trial. We decline to order another. 

III. Conclusion. 

Konchar has shown no grounds for reversal. We affirm. 

AFFIRMED. 

Waterman, J., files a concurring opinion, in which McDermott, J., joins. 
22 

#21–1275, Konchar v. Pins 

WATERMAN, Justice (concurring).

I join the majority opinion in full. I write separately to confirm the majority 

opinion leaves the door open to formally apply the ministerial exception in our 

state. I would apply that exception in this case as an alternative ground to affirm 

dismissal of all tort claims asserted by Phyllis Konchar related to her termination 

as principal and “spiritual leader” of this church-operated private school. The 

ministerial exception better protects the autonomy of religious organizations 

guaranteed under the First Amendment to choose who ministers their faith and 

spares churches, dioceses, priests, and bishops the entanglement with costly 

civil litigation this case exemplifies. The extensive discovery, depositions, and 

trial spanning two weeks that these church defendants endured could have been 

avoided by a prompt dispositive motion under the ministerial exception long 

recognized by the United States Supreme Court, federal circuit courts, and other 

state courts. 

The religion clauses of the First Amendment guarantee religious 

institutions the freedom to exercise their religion without interference from 

secular authority. See U.S. Const. amend. I; Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical 

Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 194 (2012). The enactment of 

Title VII, which prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of sex, race, 

ethnicity, national origin, or religion, presented a dilemma: applying Title VII to 

religious institutions would mean those institutions at times could not exercise 

their religion in the employment context without risking civil liability. See 
23 

Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 185. The federal circuits developed the ministerial 

exception as the means to harmonize the protections of Title VII with the freedom 

guaranteed by the First Amendment. See id. at 188; McClure v. Salvation Army, 

460 F.2d 553, 560 (5th Cir. 1972) (excepting, for the first time, the employment 

relationship between a religious institution and its ministers from the reach of 

Title VII). Federal courts have applied the ministerial exception beyond Title VII 

to bar state law claims as well. E.g., Starkey v. Roman Cath. Archdiocese of 

Indianapolis, Inc., 41 F.4th 931, 944–45 (7th Cir. 2022) (affirming summary 

judgment dismissing tortious interference claims). We should do the same. 

Today, the ministerial exception gives practical effect to the constitutional 

guarantee by ensuring “that the authority to select and control who will minister 

to the faithful—a matter ‘strictly ecclesiastical’—is the church’s alone.” 

Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 195 (citation omitted) (quoting Kedroff v. St. Nicholas 

Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94, 119 (1952)). This 

is so because the process of choosing ministers is more than just an employment 

decision. Id. at 188. It implicates the faith and belief of individuals as well as the 

mission of the religious institution. Id. 

Accordingly, the ministerial exception applies to employees performing a 

ministerial role. Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049, 

2063 (2020). There are two dimensions to the application. First, the exception 

protects the employment decision itself. See Sumner v. Simpson Univ., 238 Cal. 

Rptr. 3d 207, 223 (Ct. App. 2018). It does not turn on the motivation or reasoning 

behind the decision. Id. Inquiring into the motivation or reasoning would require 
24 

the sort of entanglement that the First Amendment prohibits and the exception 

avoids. See id. (“[T]he state may no more require a minimum basis in doctrinal 

reasoning than it may supervise doctrinal content.” (quoting Schmoll v. Chapman 

Univ., 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 426, 430 (Ct. App. 1999))). 

Second, determining whether an employee is a “minister” focuses on 

function, not form; duties, not title. Our Lady of Guadalupe, 140 S. Ct. at 2064 

(“What matters, at bottom, is what an employee does.”). This means the 

ministerial exception will cover more people than just those who have been 

ordained. See, e.g., id. (parochial school teachers); Starkey, 41 F.4th at 937–38 

(parochial school guidance counselor); Gunn v. Mariners Church, Inc., 84 Cal. 

Rptr. 3d 1, 3 (Ct. App. 2008) (worship director); Rehfield v. Diocese of Joliet, 

182 N.E.3d 123, 142 (Ill. 2021) (parochial school principal); Kirby v. Lexington 

Theological Seminary, 426 S.W.3d 597, 611 (Ky. 2014) (seminary professor). 

But see Archdiocese of Wash. v. Moersen, 925 A.2d 659, 669–70 (Md. 2007) 

(holding a church organist does not qualify as a minister); see also Smith v. 

Raleigh Dist. of N.C. Conf. of United Methodist Church, 63 F. Supp. 2d 694, 710 

(E.D.N.C. 1999) (concluding harassment claims of receptionist and secretary did 

not require court to intrude on the “spiritual functions” of a church). 

The district court correctly determined that as principal of St. Joseph 

School, Konchar was a “minister within the meaning of the ministerial 

exception.” And the majority aptly recognizes Konchar’s role as a spiritual leader 

running that school as a faith community. The Illinois Supreme Court opinion 

in Rehfield v. Diocese of Joliet, 182 N.E.3d 123, is instructive. In that case, the 
25 

court looked not to the title of the position (“lay principal”), but to its duties, 

including “the spiritual and religious education, development and growth of all 

pupils and staff in the principles of the Roman Catholic faith, as well as the 

students’ and staff’s adherence to those same Roman Catholic principles.” Id. at 

141. Those duties qualified Rehfield as a minister. Id. at 142. As such, the court 

did not inquire into the motivation for the diocese’s actions that led to her claim—

if the ministerial exception applies, the claims are dismissed. See id. at 134 (“If 

. . . the ministerial exception applies to plaintiff’s whistleblower claim, the trial 

court’s dismissal . . . should be affirmed.”). The same reasoning applies to 

Konchar. 

The corollary of this rule is that the ministerial exception extends to all 

issues arising out of the employment of the minister and not just to the hiring 

or firing itself. This includes tort claims—such as Konchar’s defamation claim—

arising out of the termination of a minister’s employment. See, e.g., Starkey, 

41 F.4th at 944–45 (dismissing state law tortious interference claims); Hyman v. 

Rosenbaum Yeshiva of N. Jersey, 289 A.3d 826, 838 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 

2023) (affirming summary judgment under ministerial exception to dismiss 

teacher’s defamation claim). The key is that the claim must be “part and parcel” 

of the employment decision to fall within the ministerial exception. See Hyman, 

289 A.3d at 838; Sumner, 238 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 222; Gunn, 84 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 9. 

There is no doubt that Father Pins’s communication to the families of St. 

Joseph School “is ‘part and parcel’ ” of the decision to terminate Konchar’s 

employment. See Hyman, 289 A.3d at 829–30, 838 (sending an email to parents 
26 

explaining why a teacher had been fired was “part and parcel” of the decision to 

terminate him); Gunn, 84 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 9 (explaining to the congregation why 

a worship director had been fired was “part and parcel” of his termination). 

Indeed, it would have been irresponsible not to alert parents of the change in 

leadership for their children. It is further part and parcel of the decision that 

Father Pins would explain to the parents the counsel he had taken to reach his 

decision. Thus, his “two pastors” comment arises out of the employment dispute. 

We have not yet formally applied the ministerial exception. So far, we have 

applied only the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine, under which courts “may not 

determine the correctness of interpretations of canonical text or some decisions 

relating to government of the religious polity.” Rehfield, 182 N.E.3d at 134 

(quoting Duncan v. Peterson, 947 N.E.2d 305, 312 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010)); see, e.g.,

Koster v. Harvest Bible Chapel-Quad Cities, 959 N.W.2d 680, 690–91 (Iowa 2021) 

(declining to “interpret [church] doctrine and practices”); cf. Serbian E. Orthodox 

Diocese for U.S. & Can. v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 713–14 (1976) (declining to 

pry into a dispute “strictly and purely ecclesiastical in its character, a matter 

over which the civil courts exercise no jurisdiction, in a matter which concerns 

theological controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the 

conformity of the members of the church to the standard of morals required of 

them” (quoting Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 733 (1871)). The ecclesiastical 

abstention doctrine is separate from the ministerial exception in that the former 

considers the “character” of the dispute, but the latter does not. Compare 

Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 713–14 (accounting for the “character” of the matter), 
27 

with Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 190–95 (examining only the nature of the 

employment of the minister). Yet the two doctrines are “intertwined.” Rehfield, 

182 N.E.3d at 134. In recognizing the one, we have already recognized the value 

of the principles underpinning the other. 

We have “refuse[d] to interfere with a church’s relationship with its 

ministers.” Pierce v. Iowa–Mo. Conf. of Seventh-Day Adventists, 534 N.W.2d 425, 

427 (Iowa 1995) (per curiam) (affirming summary judgment dismissing claims of 

“ministerial intern”). This sounds like the ministerial exception, but in reaching 

our decision, we relied on the ecclesiastical abstention caselaw. Id. (citing

Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 709). True, we also cited McClure v. Salvation Army, but 

we still examined the “essence” of the termination and determined that it was 

strictly ecclesiastical. Id. This is the application of ecclesiastical abstention. 

Closer to the heartland of the ministerial exception, we have affirmed 

summary judgment dismissing a defamation claim on qualified privilege grounds 

where the claim stemmed from statements made only to a church community 

and one person who retained close ties to that community. See Koster, 

959 N.W.2d at 693. We also affirmed summary judgment dismissing a breach of 

fiduciary duty claim to avoid interpretation of the church “doctrine and practice.” 

Id. at 690–91. We relied in part on our hands-off approach in Bandstra v. 

Covenant Reformed Church: “The means by which [the church official] chose to 

counsel and advise the congregation is outside the purview of the government.” 

Id. at 687 (quoting Bandstra v. Covenant Reformed Church, 913 N.W.2d 19, 41 
28 

(Iowa 2018)). The plaintiffs in Koster and Bandstra were parishioners—not 

ministers—so we did not apply or even mention the ministerial exception. 

In my view, the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine inadequately protects 

the religious freedom of our churches and parochial schools. Church leaders 

should be able to decide who ministers to their faithful and who runs their 

religious schools without state interference or entanglement in our court system.

See Rayburn v. Gen. Conf. of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1171 

(4th Cir. 1985) (applying ministerial exception to spare church officials from 

“subpoena, discovery, cross-examination, the full panoply of legal process 

designed to probe the mind of the church in the selection of its ministers”). We 

should apply the ministerial exception so that cases like Konchar’s can be 

dismissed on the pleadings without protracted litigation. “Summary judgment is 

an important procedure in . . . immunity cases because a key purpose of the 

immunity is to avoid costly litigation, and that . . . goal is thwarted when claims 

subject to immunity proceed to trial.” Nelson v. Lindaman, 867 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Iowa 

2015). 

Allowing a case like Konchar’s to proceed to trial defeats the purpose of 

the ministerial exception. Heard v. Johnson, 810 A.2d 871, 876–77 (D.C. 2002). 

It is only “early in litigation” that courts can “avoid excessive entanglement in 

church matters.” Bryce v. Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Colo., 289 F.3d 648, 

654 n.1 (10th Cir. 2002). Here, claims that should have been dismissed early 

instead survived summary judgment and proceeded to a multi-week trial that 

included testimony of a Roman Catholic Bishop, a monsignor, two priests, the 
29 

chancellor for the Diocese, and a canon law expert. The ministerial exception 

avoids such protracted litigation that itself unconstitutionally infringes on 

ecclesiastical matters. See NLRB v. Cath. Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 502 (1979) 

(observing “the very process of inquiry” risks violating the First Amendment); 

Skrzypczak v. Roman Cath. Diocese of Tulsa, 611 F.3d 1238, 1245 (10th Cir. 

2010) (stating that merely investigating Title VII claims brought by a minister 

would be antithetical to the First Amendment); Kirby, 426 S.W.3d at 609 

(cautioning that subjecting religious institutions to discovery and trial risks 

“constitutional injury”). 

Churches are not above the law. See Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1171. But the 

First Amendment grants them broad leeway to hire and fire their own ministers, 

including the spiritual leader of this parochial school. These defendants’ costly 

entanglement with civil litigation in this case should have been avoided under 

the ministerial exception. 

With these additional reasons, I join in full the majority opinion affirming 

the district court judgments. 

McDermott, J., joins this concurrence.