UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.  No. 00-4364

PHILLIP L. DAUGHERTY,

Defendant-Appellant. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.  No. 00-4365

JAMIE TRESSA BUMPUS,

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of West Virginia, at Charleston.

John T. Copenhaver, Jr., District Judge.

(CR-99-208)

Submitted: November 30, 2000

Decided: December 20, 2000

Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.

No. 00-4364 affirmed and No. 00-4365 dismissed by unpublished per

curiam opinion. 
COUNSEL

Gregory M. Courtright, COLLINS & COURTRIGHT, Charleston,

West Virginia; Nathan A. Hicks, Jr., Charleston, West Virginia, for

Appellants. Rebecca A. Betts, United States Attorney, Monica K.

Schwartz, Assistant United States Attorney, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c). 

OPINION

PER CURIAM: 

Phillip L. Daugherty pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute cocaine

base (crack) in violation of 21 U.S.C.A. § 846 (West 2000), and was

sentenced to a term of ninety-two months imprisonment. Jamie Tressa

Bumpus pled guilty to one count of distributing crack in violation of

21 U.S.C.A. § 841(a) (West 2000), and received a sentence of twelve

months and one day. Both appeal their sentences. Daugherty contends

that the district court clearly erred in determining the amount of crack

attributable to him for sentencing purposes and in denying him an

adjustment for acceptance of responsibility. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual, §§ 2D1.1, 3E1.1 (1998). Bumpus maintains that the

district court incorrectly applied the guidelines when it denied her

motion for a departure for duress and coercion. USSG § 5K2.12, p.s.

We affirm Daugherty’s sentence and dismiss Bumpus’s appeal. 

Daugherty acknowledged his responsibility for several grams of

crack seized from the vehicle in which he was a passenger when he

was arrested.* At his sentencing hearing, the government presented

*The car belonged to Levi Phillips, who cooperated with investigators

and testified before a grand jury, then became a fugitive before

Daugherty was sentenced. 

2 UNITED STATES v. DAUGHERTY
evidence of additional amounts of crack attributable to Daugherty

through the testimony of Lisa Gibson, a paid informant. Gibson was

extensively cross-examined and questioned by the district court judge.

She maintained consistently that she bought crack worth $10, $20,

and $50 from Daugherty five to ten times, that she had seen him on

other occasions with a plastic sandwich bag containing crack, had

seen him cooking crack once, and afterward had seen him with a twoinch cookie of crack. Daugherty testified that he sold Gibson $20

worth of crack twice in 1996, but had not seen her after that until the

day he was arrested, when she came to his house as he was leaving.

The district court found Gibson’s testimony more credible than

Daugherty’s. The credibility of a witness is a matter for the factfinder,

and is not susceptible to review. United States v. Feurtado, 191 F.3d

420, 424 n.2 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 1840 (2000).

Based on Gibson’s testimony, the district court determined that

Daugherty was responsible for 17.18 grams of crack. The district

court’s determination of this factual issue is reviewed for clear error.

United States v. Randall, 171 F.3d 195, 210 (4th Cir. 1999). Given

that the district court found Gibson’s testimony credible, we cannot

say that the court clearly erred in finding that Daugherty was responsible for 17.18 grams of crack. 

The district court found that Daugherty had falsely denied relevant

conduct for which he was accountable and, on that basis, held that he

had not accepted responsibility. See USSG § 3E1.1, comment.

(n.1(a)) (defendant who falsely denies relevant conduct that district

court determines to be true acts in a manner inconsistent with acceptance of responsibility). We do not find that the district court clearly

erred in so finding. See United States v. Ruhe, 191 F.3d 376, 388 (4th

Cir. 1999) (providing standard). 

Bumpus, who lived with Daugherty, presented evidence at her sentencing that Daugherty abused her, and requested a downward departure based on coercion and duress under USSG § 5K2.12. The district

court found that the abuse had occurred, but that Bumpus’s criminal

conduct did not result from the abuse, and that a departure was not

warranted. The district court’s decision not to depart is not reviewable

on appeal unless the district court’s decision is based on a mistaken

belief that it lacks authority to depart. United States v. Brock, 108

UNITED STATES v. DAUGHERTY 3
F.3d 31, 33 (4th Cir. 1997). Here, the record discloses no such mistake on the part of the district court. 

We therefore affirm Daugherty’s sentence and dismiss Bumpus’s

appeal for lack of jurisdiction. We dispense with oral argument

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the

materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional

process.

No. 00-4364 — AFFIRMED

No. 00-4365 — DISMISSED

4 UNITED STATES v. DAUGHERTY