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LAW OFFICE OF ROGER W. FRAZIER

Roger W. Frazier 2525 East Broadway Blvd., Suite 200

Tucson, Arizona 85716

Tel: (520) 882-4294

Fax: (520) 882-2853

Ariz. Bar No. 012146

roger@frazierlawaz.com

Attorney for Plaintiff

UNITED STATED DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Michael Juell, a married individual,

Plaintiff,

v.

Marin Management Inc., d/b/a DoubleTree by 

Hilton Tucson – Reid Park, a foreign corporation;

 Defendant.

Case No. 

 

 COMPLAINT

 

For his Complaint, Plaintiff, Michael Juell, alleges,

THE PARTIES, VENUE AND JURISDICTION

1. Plaintiff, Michael Juell, is a married man suing in his individual capacity, 

and a resident of Pima County, Arizona. He was employed in Tucson, Pima County, 

Arizona by non-party Interstate-Rim Management Company, LLC (“Interstate Rim”) 

d/b/a DoubleTree by Hilton Hotel – Reid Park (“the Hotel”) since January, 2014 until 

he was told on or about July 10, 2017, that he would not be hired by Interstate-Rim’s 

successor-in-interest, Defendant Marin Management, Inc. 

2. Defendant Marin Management, Inc., (“Marin”) is a California corporation 

with its principle place of business in Sausalito, California, which does business in 

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Tucson, Pima County, Arizona, managing since about June 21, 2017, as the successor in 

interest of Interstate-Rim, managing the Hotel, and caused the events to occur in 

Tucson, Arizona out of which Plaintiff’s claims arise. Marin has no statutory agent 

listed in Arizona.

3. This is an action seeking relief for the Defendants’ failure to honor and 

interference with Plaintiff’s rights under the Family Medical and Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. 

§ 2601et seq.

4. This Court has jurisdiction over the Defendant, and to hear and determine 

this action and to grant the relief requested pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 2517.

5. Jurisdiction and venue are proper in this Court.

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

6. During his employment with Interstate-Rim from January, 2014 until on 

or about June 21, 2017, Plaintiff served as a manager of the bar and restaurant known as 

Javelina Cantina (“the Cantina”) at the Hotel.

7. In April, 2017, Plaintiff was scheduled for neck surgery for May 25, 2017, 

but at the request of Frank Neve, his supervisor who was scheduled to start vacation on 

May 25, 2017, the surgery was moved to June 8, 2017 to accommodate Neve’s 

vacation.

8. Plaintiff timely notified Interstate-Rim of the need for FMLA, and filed 

the appropraite paperwork for FMLA leave, and began his leave on or about June 7, 

2017, and had the surgery as scheduled on June 8, 2017.

9. Plaintiff was the manager of the Cantina when he went on FMLA leave in 

June, 2017. There was also a manager of a restaurant within the Hotel called the Cactus 

Rose, who was Mitch Miller. These were separate positions, but Plaintiff and the 

manager of the Cactus Rose also routinely handled the other’s duties when the other 

was absent. 

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10. Plaintiff was aware that Marin would soon be taking over the 

management of the Hotel, including the Cactus Rose and Cantina. On information and 

belief, all employees of Interstate-Rim had to fill out new hire sheets to work for Marin.

11. On or about June 15, 2017, Plaintiff inquired of Kim Norman, 

(“Norman”), who was then Interstate-Rim’s human resources director at the Hotel, if he 

needed to come in for a group hiring session, and advised that if so, he would have to 

arrange rides, because he was not yet cleared to drive. Ms. Norman informed him that 

he should stay home and rest.

12. On information and belief, on or about June 21, 2017, Marin took over 

management of the Hotel and Cantina.

13. On or about June 27, 2017, Plaintiff met with the Hotel’s general manager 

John Rinella (“Rinella”), an Interstate-Rim employee who was retained by Marin. 

Plaintiff told Rinella that he expected to return to work on July 18, 2017.

14. At their meeting on June 27, 2017, Rinella told Plaintiff he was looking 

forward to Plaintiff’s return, to relieve the load placed on Cactus Rose manager Mitch 

Miller. He had Plaintiff sign a waiver that he did not need insurance through Marin 

(because Plaintiff had insurance through his wife’s employment). Rinella told Plaintiff 

to pick up a new hire packet, which Plaintiff stated he would return as soon as possible, 

and Rinella said “no rush.”

15. On or about June 30, 2017, Plaintiff received a release from his doctor to 

return to work on July 18, 2017, with some minor lifting and movement restrictions.

(See Exhibit 1.)

16. On or about July 3, 2017, Plaintiff returned his new hire packet, passport

and medical release to the Hotel. 

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17. On or about July 10, 2017, Monika Brady (“Brady”), who at that time was 

human resources coordinator for Marin, and who previously had worked for InterimRim in the same capacity, informed Plaintiff by email that his job was being eliminated. 

The email stated:

“Dear Michael,

On behalf of Marin Management Company and the DoubleTree by 

Hilton-Reid Park, I’d like to say thank you for the submission 

of your application. However, at this time, we are not looking to 

fill the position of restaurant manager. We will keep your 

application on file for the future position if and/or when we’re 

looking to refill.

I wish you every success in your career and all of your adventures.

Best, 

Monika Brady”

(See Exhibit 2.)

18. On or about July 17, 2017 Plaintiff called Rinella but he did not answer, 

so Plaintiff called Brady, who told him that his position was eliminated because he was 

not at the hiring sessions. Brady told Plaintiff that she was uncomfortable speaking 

with him and said she was headed to the executive office, where she would give his 

message to Rinella and would have Rinella call Plaintiff, but Rinella never called 

Plaintiff back. 

19. On or about July 18, 2017, Plaintiff filed for unemployment and was 

searching online for a new job, when he came across an advertisement for a restaurant/bar 

manager at the DoubleTree by Hilton Hotel Tucson – Reid Park, obviously posted by 

Marin. (See Exhibit 3.)

20. The job that he saw posted on July 18, 2017 was the job that Marin told him 

it had allegedly eliminated.

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21. On or about October 19, 2017, Plaintiff received a text from the Cactus 

Rose manager, Mitch Miller, indicating that a new manager had been hired for the 

position advertised. Thus, Marin had filled the post at some time prior to that time.

22. Marin operated the Hotel as the same business it was before Marin replaced 

Interstate-Rim, and thus there was substantial continuity of the same business operations.

23. On information and belief, Marin has operated the Hotel, including the 

Cantina and Cactus Rose, at the same facilities that preexisted Marin’s replacement as 

manager, providing the same hotel, restaurant and bar services, using the same facilities 

and workforce as had existed at the end of Interstate-Rim’s tenure, retained the same 

general management team as that under Interstate-Rim, including Rinella as general 

manager, Neve as director of operations, Miller as manager of the Cactus Rose, Lewis 

Wilson as banquet manager, Allan Sherman as executive chef, and John Cowley as night 

manager.

24. The Hotel had more than 50 employees in a 75-mile radius at all times 

relevant to require it to provide FMLA to Plaintiff, and Interstate-Rim was able to provide 

relief to Plaintiff under the FMLA and would have been able to provide his return to the 

same job.

25. Plaintiff, who had been employed for over twelve months when he sought 

to exercise his FMLA rights in June and July, 2016, had a serious health condition and 

circumstance for which he was qualified to use FMLA for the period he was out.

26. Marin was a successor-in-interest employers of Plaintiff following his 

employment with Interstate-Rim pursuant to 29 U.S.C. 2611(4)(A)(ii).

27. Plaintiff was entitled to exercise his FMLA rights in June and July, 2017, 

with Marin to the same extent as if Interstate-Rim had still been his employer.

28. Plaintiff should either have been restored to the position of employment the 

held when his leave was commenced, or to be restored to an equivalent position with 

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equivalent employment benefits, pay, and other terms and conditions of employment. 29 

U.S.C. § 2614(a).

29. Even if Marin eliminated Plaintiff’s specific position, it immediately 

opened up another very similar position to which he should have been placed. To 

eliminate the position and only immediately open it up again, and not place Plaintiff in it, 

is an unlawful interference with, restraint, or denial of the exercise of Plaintiff’s right 

under the FMLA. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1).

30. Defendant retaliated and intentionally discriminated against Plaintiff for 

taking exercising his FMLA rights, when it told him he could take his time to return the 

hiring packet while he was on FMLA leave, not telling him he had to be at a particular 

session, and then using his absence from that session as a basis to fire him or not hire him, 

while telling him instead the position was eliminated. Defendant’s given reason that his 

position was eliminated was pretext for Defendant’s discriminatory motive, and 

Plaintiff’s absence because of being on FMLA was the determinative effect of the 

Defendant’s decision-making process. This was prohibited by 29 U.S.C. 2615(b). 

31. Defendant’s act of eliminating the position and then reposting it was a sham 

to cover up the act of preventing Plaintiff from exercising his rights under the FMLA. 

32. Plaintiff has diligently but unsuccessfully attempted to obtain other 

equivalent employment.

COUNT I

Interference with FMLA rights

33. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained in 

¶¶ 1 through 34 as though fully set forth herein. 

34. Defendant is the successor-in-interest employers of Plaintiff pursuant to 

29 U.S.C. 2611(4)(A)(ii). 

35. Defendant had a duty to either restore Plaintiff to his former position or to 

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an equivalent position with equivalent employment benefits, pay, and other terms and 

conditions of employment. 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a). Defendant terminating Plaintiff’s 

employment and refusing to allow him to return to his job, or to an equivalent position, 

upon return from leave, was interference with Plaintiff’s rights under the FMLA. 29 

U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1).

36. Even if Plaintiff’s job was eliminated on July 10, 2017, the immediate 

reposting and filling of it means that it was not eliminated, and not placing Plaintiff in 

that position was further interference with his FMLA rights. 

37. As a direct and proximate result of the foregoing conduct of the

Defendant, Plaintiff has suffered injury, including lost wages and benefits starting July 

18, 2017 until trial, and interest on the amount awarded, and front pay. 

38. Defendant’s foregoing acts in interfering with Plaintiff’s rights under the 

FMLA were done intentionally or with reckless disregard of Plaintiff’s rights under the 

FMLA, and therefore Plaintiff is entitled to damages for up to three years following his 

termination, and liquidated damages in an amount equal to that awarded under 

paragraph 39 above. 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a).

COUNT II

Retaliation/Discrimination

39. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained in 

¶¶ 1 through 40 as though fully set forth herein.

40. Defendant retaliated and discriminated against Plaintiff for exercising his 

rights under the FMLA when it told him he could take his time to return the hiring 

packet while he was on leave, not telling him that he had to be at a particular session to 

reapply, and then using his absence from that session as a basis to fire him or not hire 

him, while telling him that his position was eliminated, and then posting for and filling 

the same or similar position, and giving him the reason that his job was eliminated, was 

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pretext for discriminating against him for using his FMLA.

41. Defendant’s discriminatory actions were the determinative effect of its

decision making regarding Plaintiff, which was prohibited. 29 U.S.C.§ 2615(b).

42. As a direct and proximate result of the foregoing conduct of the 

Defendant, Plaintiff has suffered injury, including lost wages and benefits starting July 

18, 2017 until trial, and interest on the amount awarded, and front pay.

43. Defendant’s foregoing acts of discrimination were done intentionally or 

with reckless disregard of Plaintiff’s rights under the FMLA, and therefore Plaintiff is 

entitled to damages for up to three years following his termination, and liquidated 

damages in an amount equal to that awarded under paragraph 39 above. 29 U.S.C. § 

2617(a).

ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS

44. Plaintiff is entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees and costs and expert 

witness fees, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(3).

JURY TRIAL DEMAND

45. Plaintiff demands a jury trial on all issues raised by the Complaint to 

which a jury trial is permitted.

RELIEF REQUESTED

 

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendant as follows:

1. Back-pay, front pay, and any other compensation and benefits from 

Defendant that he lost as a result of their interference with his FMLA 

rights, and its discrimination against him for invoking those rights.

2. For attorney’s fees and costs as permitted by 29 U.S.C. § 2517(a)(3).

3. Any other relief deemed proper by the Court.

/ / /

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DATED this 23rd day of January, 2018.

LAW OFFICE OF ROGER W. FRAZIER

By:_/s/ Roger W. Frazier 

Roger W. Frazier

 Attorney for Plaintiff

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