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18-70-cr 

United States v. Squires 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 

SUMMARY ORDER 

Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary order filed 

on or after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 32.1 and this Court’s Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a 

document filed with this Court, a party must cite either the Federal Appendix or an 

electronic database (with the notation “summary order”). A party citing a summary order 

must serve a copy of it on any party not represented by counsel. 

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at 

the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, 

on the 17th day of December, two thousand eighteen. 

PRESENT: JOSÉ A. CABRANES, 

CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY, 

RICHARD J. SULLIVAN, 

Circuit Judges. 

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Appellee, 18-70-cr 

v. 

RICHARD M. SQUIRES, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

 

FOR APPELLEE: Miroslav Lovric and Paul D. Silver, 

Assistant United States Attorneys, for 

Grant C. Jacquith, United States Attorney, 

Northern District of New York, Albany, 

NY. 
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FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES: Melissa A. Tuohey, Assistant Federal 

Public Defender, for Lisa A. Peebles, 

Federal Public Defender, Northern 

District of New York, Syracuse, NY. 

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District of 

New York (Thomas J. McAvoy, Judge). 

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, 

ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the December 21, 2017 judgment of the District Court be 

and hereby is AFFIRMED. 

Defendant-Appellant Richard M. Squires (“Squires”) appeals from a judgment of the District 

Court sentencing him principally to 30 years’ imprisonment for sexual exploitation of a child, 18 

U.S.C. §§ 2251(a), receipt of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(A), and possession of child 

pornography, 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B). Squires challenges his sentence as substantively 

unreasonable. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of 

the case, and the issues on appeal. 

We review sentences for both procedural and substantive reasonableness, applying a 

“deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 189 (2d Cir. 2008) 

(en banc) (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Here, Squires contends that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because the District Court 

failed to account for his “history and characteristics, which were offered by the defense in mitigation 

and reduced the perceived need for lengthy incarceration.” Squires Br. at 18. Though we have 

generally treated such challenges as pertaining to procedural rather than substantive reasonableness, 

see, e.g., United States v. Wagner-Dano, 679 F.3d 83, 88-89 (2d Cir. 2012) (“Failure to consider the 

§ 3553(a) factors constitutes procedural error.”), the distinction is immaterial here because Squires’s 

argument is unavailing regardless of how it is construed. 

With respect to procedural reasonableness, “we presume ‘that a sentencing judge has 

faithfully discharged [his or] her duty to consider the statutory factors.’” United States v. Verkhoglyad, 

516 F.3d 122, 129 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Fernandez, 443 F.3d 19, 30 (2d Cir. 2006)). 

District courts need not fill the record with “robotic incantations that [they have] considered each of 

the § 3553(a) factors,” Cavera, 550 F.3d at 193 (internal quotation marks omitted), or “make specific 

responses to points argued by counsel in connection with sentencing,” United States v. Bonilla, 618 

F.3d 102, 111 (2d Cir. 2010). In this case, the District Court stated that it had “considered all 

pertinent information, including but not limited to . . . the submissions of counsel . . . and all of the 

[§ 3553(a)] factors.” J.A. 115; see Bonilla, 618 F.3d at 111 (affirming sentence as procedurally 

reasonable where district court used nearly identical language). And the District Court specifically 

highlighted Squires’s “history and characteristics” as one reason for imposing a sentence below the 
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range recommended by the United States Sentencing Guidelines. J.A. 116. Accordingly, we see no 

procedural error here. 

Nor can we conclude that Squires’s sentence is substantively unreasonable. A sentence is 

substantively unreasonable “only in [those] exceptional cases where the trial court’s decision ‘cannot 

be located within the range of permissible decisions.’” Cavera, 550 F.3d at 189 (quoting United States 

v. Rigas, 490 F.3d 208, 238 (2d Cir. 2007)). The purpose of our review for substantive reasonableness 

is not to substitute our view for that of the District Court, id., but to “provide a backstop for those 

few cases that, although procedurally correct, would nonetheless damage the administration of 

justice because the sentence imposed was shockingly high, shockingly low, or otherwise 

unsupportable as a matter of law,” United States v. Rigas, 583 F.3d 108, 123 (2d Cir. 2009). In light of 

the particular facts of this case—which include sexual exploitation of several developmentally 

disabled minors and possession of 50,000 images and videos of child pornography—Squires’s 

sentence, though lengthy, is within the range of permissible decisions. 

CONCLUSION 

We have reviewed all of the arguments raised by Squires on appeal and find them to be 

without merit. For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the December 21, 2017 judgment of the 

District Court. 

 FOR THE COURT: 

 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk