alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
IV 

★

111TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. RES. 639 

Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that any interest 

or dividends repaid to the government through the Troubled Asset Relief 

Program should be used solely for debt reduction, consistent with the 

authorizing legislation and Article One, Section Nine of the United States 

Constitution. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JULY 13, 2009 

Mr. INGLIS submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the 

Committee on Financial Services 

RESOLUTION 

Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that 

any interest or dividends repaid to the government 

through the Troubled Asset Relief Program should be 

used solely for debt reduction, consistent with the authorizing legislation and Article One, Section Nine of the 

United States Constitution. 

Whereas the Congress of the United States created the Troubled Asset Relief Program under the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (12 U.S.C. 5201 et seq.), which 

was passed in the Senate in its final form on October 1, 

2008, by a vote of 74–25 and then passed in the House 

on October 3, 2008, by a vote of 263–171; 


srobinson on DSKHWCL6B1PROD with BILLS
2 

HRES 639 IH1S 

Whereas the President signed the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 into law on October 3, 2008; 

Whereas section 106(d) of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 states: ‘‘Revenues of, and proceeds 

from the sale of troubled assets purchased under this 

Act, or from the sale, exercise, or surrender of warrants 

or senior debt instruments acquired under section 113 

shall be paid into the general fund of the Treasury for 

reduction of the public debt.’’; 

Whereas Mr. Frank of Massachusetts introduced H.R. 3068 

on June 26, 2009, which, if enacted into law, would make 

$6,500,000,000 of the money repaid to the Troubled 

Asset Relief Program available for loans to housing programs; 

Whereas the Obama Administration was reported to have 

voiced support for the Frank proposal on July 9, 2009; 

and 

Whereas Article One, Section Nine of the United States Constitution states ‘‘No Money shall be drawn from the 

Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by 

Law’’: Now, therefore, be it 

1 Resolved, That it is the sense of the House of Rep2 resentatives that any funds repaid to the Federal Govern3 ment or any interest or dividends on those funds should 

4 be used solely for debt reduction, consistent with the 

5 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 and Arti6 cle One, Section Nine of the United States Constitution. 

Æ 


srobinson on DSKHWCL6B1PROD with BILLS
Exhibit 11.0



Calculation of Earnings per Share*



|                                                     |  |              |       |      |   |       |  |   |      
|---------------------------------------------------- |  | ------------ | ----- | ---- | - | ----- |  | - | -----
|                                                     |  | December 31,
|                                                     |  | 2004         |       | 2003 |   | 2002 
|Weighted Average Shares Outstanding                  |  |              | 4,045 |      |   | 4,028 |  |   | 4,019
|Common Stock Equivalents                             |  |              | 97    |      |   | 63    |  |   | 27   
|Average Common Shares and Equivalents, Fully Diluted |  |              | 4,141 |      |   | 4,091 |  |   | 4,046
|Net Income ($000)                                    |  | $            | 2,173 |      | $ | 1,674 |  | $ | 1,227
|Basic Earnings per Share                             |  | $            | 0.54  |      | $ | 0.42  |  | $ | 0.31 
|Diluted Earnings per Share                           |  | $            | 0.52  |      | $ | 0.41  |  | $ | 0.30 

---

|* | Adjusted to effect a four-for-three stock split in the form of a stock dividend paid on December 3, 2004.
|- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



8
#### STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Percy James COOPER, Appellant.

No. WD 41403.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.

May 29, 1990.

David H. Miller, Dist. Defender, Chilli-cothe, for appellant.

William L. Webster, Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, Philip M. Koppe, Asst. Atty. Gen., Kansas City, for respondent.

*871Before TURNAGE, P.J., and LOWENSTEIN and GAITAN, JJ.

ORDER

PER CURIAM:

Appeal from conviction of robbery in the first degree, § 569.020, RSMo 1986, and armed criminal action, § 571.015.1, RSMo 1986, and from sentences as a prior and persistent offender to consecutive terms of imprisonment of twenty and fifteen years.

Affirmed. Rule 30.25(b).
#### Bradley HOUSTON, Movant-Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent-Respondent.

No. 57107.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division One.

March 20, 1990.

Thomas R. Motley, Dist. Defender, Hannibal, for movant-appellant.

William L. Webster, Atty. Gen., Theodore A. Bruce, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent-respondent.

ORDER

PER CURIAM.

Movant appeals from the denial, without an evidentiary hearing, of his Rule 27.26 motion. We affirm. The findings and conclusions of the motion court are not clearly erroneous, and an extended opinion would have no precedential value. The parties have been furnished with a memorandum for their information only setting forth the reasons for our order affirming the judgment pursuant to Rule 84.16(b).
cc: Hon. William D. Kephart, District Judge 

James Anthony Davis 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

2 

(0) 1947A e
Nebraska Court of Appeals Memorandum Opinions

NOT Selected for Posting to Court Website

(released the week prior to October 4, 2022)

The following memorandum opinions were filed by the Nebraska Court of 

Appeals and can be viewed using SSCALES:

None Available

The above-listed memorandum opinions can be viewed online through the 

appellate court case search available by subscription through Nebraska.gov:

http://www.nebraska.gov/subscriber/.

Current subscribers to Nebraska.gov can search appellate court cases here:

https://www.nebraska.gov/courts/sccales/.
#### James Lappin et al., Doing Business as Gem Piping Co., Plaintiffs, *v.*Rubin R. Sussman, Defendant.

County Court, Westchester County,

September 25, 1956.

*Berman & Lachover*for defendant.

*Hyman Hecker*for plaintiffs.

Harold T. Garrity, J.

Defendant moves to vacate default judgment. Accepting the explanation of defendant’s counsel, it would appear that defendant was one day late in attempting to serve his answer. The correspondence between counsel seems to support that conclusion. Whether or not plaintiffs’ attorney firstly agreed and then reneged on granting an extension of one day is of little moment. The court has before it some 24 pages of affidavits, pleadings, etc., replete with quite extraneous matter, e.g., whether or not one of the plaintiffs and the defendant are related by blood or marriage. What is abundantly clear, however, is that the court is required to adjudicate a situation which should have been resolved by counsel and the parties extending to each other such elementary courtesies which counsel, litigants and courts should take for granted.

Certainly the defendant is entitled to his day in court. The contentiousness between litigants should not be permitted to subvert the good relationships and fraternal amenities among lawyers. The Bar, in their relationships with each other, should strive for “ the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive.” Apart from obviating much friction and easing tensions, it will save much time and money. Extensive motion practice involving minor issues is today too expensive a luxury for the Bar or the courts.

We hold that under section 108 of the Civil Practice Act the defendant should be relieved of the default judgment. The facts *746establish inadvertence and excusable neglect within the meaning thereof.

Motion granted on condition that defendant serve his answer within 10 days from the service of the order with notice of entry. Settle order on notice.
##### 



Exhibit 99

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K of ATMI, Inc. (the
Company) for the period ending December 31, 2002 as filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), as Chief Executive
Officer of the Company and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, each hereby
certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of his knowledge:

(1)   The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)   The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.

|                                                                                                             | 
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | 
|/s/ Eugene G. Banucci

Name: Eugene G. Banucci, Ph.D.
Title: Chief Executive Officer
Date: February 28, 2003 | 

/s/ Daniel P. Sharkey

Name: Daniel P. Sharkey
Title: Chief Financial Officer
Date: February 28, 2003
EXHIBIT 23.1

CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM

We consent to the incorporation by reference in
registration statements No. 333-117956 and 333-79391 on Form

S-8 and No. 333-156652 on Form S-3 of HopFed Bancorp, Inc. and subsidiaries of our report
dated March 31, 2009, relating to the consolidated balance sheets of Hopfed Bancorp, Inc., and subsidiaries as of December 31, 2008 and 2007, and the related consolidated statements of income, comprehensive income, changes in
stockholders equity, and cash flows for each of the years in the three-year period ended December 31, 2008, which report appears in the December 31, 2008 Annual Report on Form 10-K of Hopfed Bancorp, Inc. and subsidiaries.



|                                    
|------------------------------------
|/s/Rayburn, Bates & Fitzgerald, P.C.
|                                    
|Brentwood, Tennessee                
|March 31, 2009
#### STATE of Missouri, ex rel. Anita LEONE, et al., Respondents, v. Ty D. COWAN, Appellant.

No. WD 50742.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.

Aug. 22, 1995.

Jeffrey B. Tonkin, Kansas City, for appellant.

Claire C. McCaskill, Pros. Atty., Michelle Polly-Murphy, Asst. Pros. Atty., Jackson County, Kansas City, for respondents.

Before KENNEDY, P.J., and SMART and LAURA DENVIR STITH, JJ.

*ORDER*

PER CURIAM:

Appellant Ty D. Cowan appeals from a judgment of the trial court determining pa-*581temity and assessing child support and public aid reimbursement. Appellant contends on appeal that the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the instant matter because the minor child was not named in the caption of the Petition. We find that, in the circumstances of this case, the Petition did adequately set out a claim for paternity, and child support and public aid reimbursement.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Rule 84.16(b).
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
LATISHA RAY WINKLER, 

### et al., Plaintiffs, 

# FILED JUN ' ' 20\2 US District &Bankruptcy

### ~~~~~~**t~r** the District of Columbia

v. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Civil Action No. 

# 12 

# 0951 SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA, Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION This matter comes before the court onreview ofplaintiffs' applications to proceed 

### in forma pauperis and

### pro se civil complaint. The Court will grant the applications, and dismiss the complaint. The Court has reviewed plaintiffs complaint, keeping in mind that complaints filed by

### pro
se litigants are held to less stringent standards than those applied to formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. 

### See Haines v. 

### Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,520 (1972). Even

### prose litigants, however, must comply with the Federal Rules ofCivil Procedure. 

### Jarrell v. 

### Tisch, 656 F. Supp. 237,239 (D.D.C. 1987). Rule 8(a) ofthe Federal Rules ofCivil Procedure requires that a complaint contain a short and plain statement ofthe grounds upon which the court'sjurisdiction depends, a short and plain statement ofthe claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and a demand forjudgment for the reliefthe pleader seeks. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). The purpose ofthe minimum standard ofRule 8 is to give fair notice to the defendants ofthe claim being asserted, sufficient to prepare a responsive answer, to prepare an adequate defense and to determine whetherthe doctrine of

### resjudicata applies. 

### Brown v. 

### Califano, 75 F.R.D. 497,498 (D.D.C. 1977).


### 1The complaint is so incoherently written that the Court cannot discern a viable claim within this Court's subject matterjurisdiction or a basis for exercising personaljurisdiction over the named defendant or a clear statement showing plaintiffs' entitlement to the reliefthey seek. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss the complaint without prejudice. An Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is issued separately.

DATE: 

# 6 /**sf('~,** United States District Judge

2
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA SECOND DISTRICT

GEORGE McDANIEL, as Personal ) Representative of the Estate of ) STEVEN PATRICK McDANIEL, ) deceased, and on behalf of H.P.M., a ) minor, and K.L.M., a minor, ) ) Appellant, ) ) v. ) Case No. 2D18-4128 ) SUPER DISCOUNT PHARMACY, LLC, ) ) Appellee. ) ) Opinion filed September 25, 2020. Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County; Elizabeth G. Rice, Judge. Carlos R. Diez Arguelles and Maria D. Tejedor of Diez Arguelles & Tejedor, Orlando; Mark R. Berlick of Bolin Law Group, Tampa; and Wendy S. Loquasto and Susan W. Fox of Fox & Loquasto, LLC, Tallahassee, for Appellant. Thomas A. Valdez and Todd M. Smayda of Quintairos, Prieto, Wood & Boyer, P.A., Tampa, for Appellee Super Discount Pharmacy.- 2 -

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

LaROSE and BLACK, JJ., and CASE, JAMES, R., ASSOCIATE SENIOR JUDGE, Concur.
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906
OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of Annapolis Bancorp, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-KSB for the
year ending December 31, 2005 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Richard M. Lerner, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as
adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|               |  |  |  |                        
|-------------- |  |  |  | -----------------------
|March 27, 2006 |  |  |  | /s/ Richard M. Lerner  
|               |  |  |  | Richard M. Lerner      
|               |  |  |  | Chief Executive Officer
Exhibit
32.1





Certification of Principal
Executive Officer


Pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to


Section
906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002





In connection with the Quarterly Report
of Vision Acquisition III, Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the period
ended December 31, 2009 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on
the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Antti WilliamUusiheimala, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





(1) The
Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2) The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





/s/ Antii William
    UusiheimalaAntti
      William Uusiheimala
                Principal
      Executive Officer
                February
      16,  2010
### THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS

13

- 16

- 00237

- CV

In the Interest of C.A.O., a Child

On a ppeal from the 36th District Court of San Patricio County , Texas Trial Cause No. S

- 15

- 5178FL

- A

JUDGMENT THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS, having considered this ca use on appeal, concludes the appeal should be dismissed for want of prosecution . The Court
orders the appeal DISMISSED FOR WANT OF PROSECUTION in accordance with its opinion . Costs of the appeal are adjudged against appellant.
We further order this decis ion certified below for observance. September 22 , 2016
COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO, TEXAS

VERONICA MONTOYA,

INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF

THE ESTATE OF JESSICA MONTOYA,

DECEASED,

 Appellant,

v.

NICHIRIN-FLEX U.S.A., INC.,

 Appellee. 

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

No. 08-12-00070-CV

Appeal from

120th District Court

of El Paso County, Texas

(TC # 2011-DCV-10027)

J U D G M E N T

The Court has considered this cause on the record and concludes there was no error in the 

judgment. We therefore affirm the judgment of the court below. We further order that Appellee 

recover from Appellant and its sureties, if any, see TEX.R.APP.P. 43.5, on the judgment and all 

costs, for which let execution issue. This decision shall be certified below for observance.

IT IS SO ORDERED THIS 7TH DAY AUGUST, 2013.

ANN CRAWFORD McCLURE, Chief Justice 

Before McClure, C.J., Rivera, and Rodriguez, JJ.
EXHIBIT 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of AmREIT Monthly Income &
Growth Fund IV, L.P. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ended
June 30, 2010, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date
hereof (the Report), I, H. Kerr Taylor, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, in my capacity as an officer of the General Partner of the Company, that,
to my knowledge:

| |    |                                                                                                                                                       
| | -- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| | 1. | The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a)
 or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and                
| |    |                                                                                                                                                       
| | 2. | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
 material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
 Company.

|                       |       |                                                                                                                                                              
|---------------------- | ----- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|Date: August
 13, 2010 | By:   | /s/ H. Kerr Taylor                                                                                                                                           
|                       | Name: | H. Kerr Taylor                                                                                                                                               
|                       | Title | President and Chief Executive Officer of AmREIT Monthly Income &
 Growth IV Corporation, the General Partner of AmREIT Monthly Income &
 Growth Fund IV, L.P.

---
#### STATE of Missouri, Plaintiff/Respondent, v. George CALHOUN, Defendant/Appellant. George CALHOUN, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Defendant/Respondent.

Nos. 65439, 66656.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division Three.

May 2, 1995.

Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer to Supreme Court Denied June 12, 1995.

Douglas R. Hoff, Asst. Public Defender, St. Louis, for appellant.

Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen., Joanne E. Beal, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.

Before CRANE, P.J., and CRANDALL and DOWD, JJ.

*ORDER*

PER CURIAM.

Defendant George Calhoun appeals his conviction after a jury trial of first degree assault, in violation of § 665.050 RSMo 1986, and armed criminal action, in violation of § 571.015 RSMo 1986, on which he was sentenced to consecutive terms of seven years on each count. Defendant also appeals from an order denying on the merits, without an evidential hearing, his Rule 29.15 motion.

No error of law appears and no jurisprudential purpose would be served by a written opinion. However, the parties have been furnished with a memorandum opinion for their information only, setting forth the facts and reasons for this order.

The judgment is affirmed in accordance with Rules 30.25(b) and 84.16(b).
#### Charles OLDHAM, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. MIDWEST PARTS AND EQUIPMENT COMPANY, a Corporation, and Keith Walker, Defendants/Respondents.

No. 66371.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division Five.

Jan. 31, 1995.

Stephen R. Wigginton, Belleville, IL, for appellant.

Daniel T. Rabbitt, Michael J. Lach, Matthew J. Sauter, St. Louis, for respondents.

GRIMM, Chief Judge.

In his original and first amended petitions, plaintiff sued defendant Midwest Parts for negligence. On March 16, 1994, Midwest Parts filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Midwest Parts claimed plaintiff was its statutory employee.

While that motion was pending, plaintiff sought leave to file a second amended petition. Leave was granted on May 10, 1994, and a copy of the amended petition was filed and mailed to Midwest Parts’ attorney that day.

The second amended petition contained two counts and added Keith Walker as a defendant. Count I is directed to Midwest Parts; Count II to Keith Walker.

On May 19, nine days after the second amended petition was filed, Midwest Parts’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction was taken up. The trial court sustained that motion.

The trial court was not asked to take any action on plaintiffs claim against Keith Walker, and none was taken. Rather, plaintiff filed this appeal. We dismiss for lack of an appealable order.

Rule 74.01(b) pertains to judgments involving multiple claims or multiple parties. *586Where multiple parties and claims are involved, the trial court could enter final judgment for Midwest Parts without ruling plaintiffs claim against Keith Walker “only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay.” Rule 74.01(b). No such express determination appears in the record.

Absent a certification, the order granting Midwest Parts’ motion is interlocutory and thus is not final for appeal purposes. *See In re Estate of Caldwell,*766 S.W.2d 464, 467 (Mo.App.E.D.1989). We, therefore, do not reach the merits of plaintiffs appeal.

The appeal is dismissed.

CARL R. GAERTNER and WHITE, JJ., concur.