30672 Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 117 / Monday June 17, 1996 / Proposed Rules

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Railroad Administration

49 CFR Parts 223, 229, 232, and 238

[FRA Docket No. PCSS–1; Notice No. 1]

RIN 2130–AA95

Passenger Equipment Safety

Standards

AGENCY: Federal Railroad

Administration (FRA), Department of

Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Advance Notice of Proposed

Rulemaking.

SUMMARY: FRA announces the initiation

of rulemaking on rail passenger

equipment safety standards. FRA

requests comment on the need for

particular safety requirements and the

costs, benefits, and practicability of

such requirements. FRA anticipates this

rulemaking will address the inspection,

testing, and maintenance of passenger

equipment; equipment design and

performance criteria related to

passenger and crew survivability in the

event of a train accident; and the safe

operation of passenger train service,

supplementing existing railroad safety

standards. FRA also announces the

formation of a working group to assist

FRA in developing this rule. FRA makes

available preliminary safety concepts

that have been placed before the

working group. This notice is issued in

order to comply with the Federal

Railroad Safety Authorization Act of

1994, to respond to concerns raised by

the General Accounting Office and the

National Transportation Safety Board, to

respond to public concerns, to respond

to petitions for rulemaking, and to

consider possible regulations derived

from experience in application of

existing standards.

DATES: (1) Written comments: Written

comments must be received on or before

July 9, 1996. Comments received after

that date will be considered to the

extent possible without incurring

additional expense or delay.

(2) Public Hearing: Requests for a

public hearing must be made on or

before July 9, 1996.

ADDRESSES: Address comments to the

Docket Clerk, Office of Chief Counsel,

RCC–30, Federal Railroad

Administration, 400 Seventh Street,

S.W., Room 8201, Washington, D.C.

20590. Comments should identify the

docket and notice number and be

submitted in triplicate. Persons wishing

to receive confirmation of receipt of

their comments should include a selfaddressed, stamped postcard. The

dockets are housed in Room 8201 of the

Nassif Building, 400 Seventh Street,

S.W., Washington, D.C. 20590. Public

dockets may be reviewed between the

hours of 8:30 a.m. and 5:00 p.m.,

Monday through Friday, except

holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION, CONTACT:

Edward W. Pritchard, Acting Staff

Director, Motive Power and Equipment

Division, Office of Safety Assurance and

Compliance, RRS–14, Room 8326, FRA,

400 Seventh Street, S.W., Washington,

D.C. 20590 (telephone 202–366–0509 or

202–366–9252), or Daniel L. Alpert,

Trial Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel,

FRA, 400 Seventh Street, S.W.,

Washington, D.C. 20590 (telephone

202–366–0628).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Introduction

Mandate

FRA requests comment on possible

regulations governing rail passenger

equipment. FRA believes such

regulations are necessary for several

reasons. In particular, effective Federal

safety standards for freight equipment

have long been in place, but equivalent

standards for passenger equipment do

not currently exist. The Association of

American Railroads (AAR) sets industry

standards for the design and

maintenance of freight equipment that

add materially to the safe operation of

this equipment. However, over the years

AAR has discontinued the development

and maintenance of passenger

equipment standards.

Worldwide, passenger equipment

operating speeds are increasing. Several

passenger trainsets designed to

European standards have been proposed

for operation at high speeds in the

United States. In general, these trainsets

do not meet the structural or operating

standards that are common practice for

current North American equipment. The

North American railroad operating

environment requires passenger

equipment to operate commingled with

very heavy and long freight trains, often

over track with frequent grade crossings

used by heavy highway equipment.

European passenger equipment design

standards may therefore not be

appropriate for the North American

operating environment. A clear set of

safety and design standards for future

passenger equipment tailored to the

North American operating environment

is needed to provide for the safety of

future rail operations and to facilitate

sound planning for those operations.

The Federal Railroad Safety

Authorization Act of 1994 (the Act),

Pub. L. 103–440, 108 Stat. 4619

(November 2, 1994), requires FRA to

develop initial rail passenger equipment

safety standards within 3 years of

enactment and final regulations within

5 years of enactment. The Act also gives

FRA an important tool to be used to

help develop these safety standards:

FRA is allowed to consult with the

National Railroad Passenger Corporation

(Amtrak), public authorities, passenger

railroads, passenger organizations, and

rail labor organizations without being

subject to the Federal Advisory

Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.).

Approach

FRA established a Passenger

Equipment Safety Standards Working

Group (Working Group) comprised of

representatives of the types of

organizations listed in the Act to

provide the consultation allowed by the

Act. The Working Group first met on

June 6, 1995, and continues to meet to

assist FRA in developing passenger

equipment safety standards. This

ANPRM describes the issues before the

Working Group, and seeks the

assistance of other interested persons in

providing information and views

pertinent to this effort. FRA intends to

use the Working Group throughout this

rulemaking. The minutes of the Working

Group meetings and the materials

distributed at these meetings to date

have been placed in the docket. FRA

intends to keep a current record of the

Working Group’s activities and

decisions in the docket.

Topics Covered

Specific topics discussed by this

ANPRM include:

(1) System safety programs and plans;

(2) Passenger equipment

crashworthiness;

(3) Inspection, testing and

maintenance requirements;

(4) Training and qualification

requirements for mechanical personnel

and train crews;

(5) Excursion, tourist and private

equipment;

(6) Commuter equipment and

operations;

(7) Train make-up and operating

speed;

(8) Tiered design standards based on

a system safety approach;

(9) Fire safety; and

(10) Operating practices and

procedures.

FRA solicits suggestions for other

matters related to passenger train safety

standards that should be considered in

order to promote safe and efficient train

operations. FRA also solicits suggestions

for alternate approaches or ways to

structure passenger equipment safety

standards.
Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 117 / Monday June 17, 1996 / Proposed Rules 30673

Purpose of Notice

Section 215 of the Act (49 U.S.C.

20133) requires the Secretary of

Transportation to prescribe minimum

standards ‘‘for the safety of cars used by

railroad carriers to transport

passengers.’’ The Act specifically

requires the Secretary to consider—

(1) The crashworthiness of the cars;

(2) Interior features (including luggage

restraints, seat belts, and exposed

surfaces) that may affect passenger

safety;

(3) Maintenance and inspection of the

cars;

(4) Emergency procedures and

equipment; and

(5) Any operating rules and

conditions that directly affect safety not

otherwise governed by regulations.

Given the breadth of the specific

items listed in the Act, it is clear that

the Congress intended the agency to

consider the safety of rail passenger

service as a whole, determining the

extent to which existing regulations

should be supplemented or

strengthened. Existing regulations

affecting the safety of rail passenger

service include standards for signal and

train control systems, track safety,

power brakes, glazing, programs of

testing and training for railroad

operating rules, and hours of service of

safety-critical personnel, among others.

While existing locomotive safety

regulations address the structural

characteristics of multiple-unit powered

cars, non-powered cars are not subject

to the same standards. In addition, FRA

has not issued regulations addressing

interior features of passenger

equipment.

The Act requires issuance of initial

passenger safety regulations within 3

years and final regulations within 5

years. FRA intends to establish a

reasonably comprehensive structure of

necessary safety regulations for rail

passenger service in initial standards.

Where further research is needed to

develop a technical foundation for

safety improvements, rulemaking may

be completed over the 5-year period

referred to in the Act.

The Act permits FRA to apply new

requirements to existing passenger cars,

but requires FRA to explain why any

such ‘‘retrofit’’ requirements are

imposed. FRA believes that passenger

equipment operating in permanent

service in the United States has

established a good safety record,

proving its compatibility with the

operating environment. Many of the

structural design changes identified

during preliminary analyses are likely to

be cost effective only if implemented for

new equipment. Appropriate analysis

should be conducted to evaluate

whether selected safety measures can be

applied to existing equipment or to

rebuilt equipment on a cost-effective

basis.

Collaborative Rulemaking and This

Advance Notice

FRA is committed to the maximum

feasible use of collaborative processes in

the development of safety regulations.

As a means to allow the industry to

collaborate with FRA to develop this

rulemaking, FRA established the

Passenger Equipment Safety Standards

Working Group, as described earlier.

FRA structured the Working Group to

give a balanced representation of the

types of organizations listed in the Act.

A list of the private sector members of

the Working Group is given in Table 1.

TABLE 1.—RAIL PASSENGER EQUIPMENT SAFETY STANDARDS; WORKING GROUP MEMBERSHIP LIST

Organization represented Representative Mailing address Telephone Fax

Amtrak ........................................ George Binns, General Manager

for Compliance and Standards.

National Railroad Passenger

Corporation, 30th Street Station, 4th Floor South, Philadelphia, PA 19104.

(215) 349–2731 (215) 349–2767

United Transportation Union ...... David Brooks, Conductor ........... 15200 Brooksview, Brandywine,

MD 20613.

(301) 888–1277 ..............................

National Association of Railroad

Passengers.

Ross Capon, Executive Director 900 Second Street, N.E., Washington, DC 20002–3557.(202) 408–8362 (202) 408–8287

American Public Transit Association.Frank Cihak, Chief Engineer ...... 1201 New York Avenue, N.W.,

Washington, DC 20005.

(202) 898–4080 (202) 898–4049

Federal Railroad Administration Grady Cothen, Deputy Associate

Administrator for Safety

Standards.

400 Seventh Street, S.W.,

Washington, DC 20590–0002.

(202) 366–0897 (202) 366–7136

Electro-Motive Division, General

Motors Corporation.

Harvey Boyd, Senior Research

Engineer.

9301 West 55th Street, La

Grange, IL 60525.

(708) 387–6013 (708) 387–5239

Federal Transit Administration ... Jeffrey Mora, Office of Technology.400 Seventh Street, S.W.,

Washington, DC 20590–0002.

(202) 366–0215 (202) 366–3765

American Association of State

Highway and Transportation

Officials.

William Green, Senior Railroad

Inspector.

New York State Dept of Transportation, 120 Washington Avenue, Albany, New York

12232.

(518) 457–4547 (518) 457–3183

Safe Travel America ................... Arthur Johnson, Chairman ......... 10600 Red Barn Lane, Potomac, MD 20854.(301) 762–7903 ..............................

Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers.Leroy Jones, International Vice

President.

400 North Capitol Street, N.W.,

Suite 850, Washington, DC

20001.

(202) 347–7936 (202) 347–5237

Brotherhood Railway Carmen .... Hank Lewin, Vice President ....... AFL/CIO Building, Suite 511,

815 16th Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20006.

(202) 783–3660 (202) 783–0198

Siemens Transportation Systems, Inc..Frank Guzzo, Director Rolling

Stock.

700 South Ewing, St. Louis, MO

63103.

(314) 533–6710 ..............................

Bombardier Corporation, Transportation Equipment Group.Larry Kelterborn, Consultant ...... 1084 Botanical Drive, Burlington,

Ontario, Canada L7T 1V2.

(905) 577–1052 (905) 577–1055

National Transportation Safety

Board.

Russ Quimby, Investigator ......... 490 L’Enfant Plaza, S.W.,

Washington, DC 20594.

(202) 382–6644 (202) 382–6884

American Public Transit Association.Dennis Ramm, Chief Mechanical

Officer, Metra.

547 W. Jackson Blvd., Chicago,

IL 60661.

(312) 322–6575 (312) 322–6502
30674 Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 117 / Monday June 17, 1996 / Proposed Rules

TABLE 1.—RAIL PASSENGER EQUIPMENT SAFETY STANDARDS; WORKING GROUP MEMBERSHIP LIST—Continued

Organization represented Representative Mailing address Telephone Fax

Federal Railroad Administration Brenda Moscoso, Economist,

Office of Safety Analysis.

400 Seventh Street, S.W.,

Washington, DC 20590–0002.

(202) 366–0352 ..............................

Federal Railroad Administration Thomas, Tsai, Program Manager, Office of Research.400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC 20590–0002.(202) 366–1427 ..............................

TABLE 2.—PASSENGER TRAIN OCCUPANT CASUALTIES; TEN YEAR PERIOD 1985–1994

Train accidents Grade crossing accidentsNon-accident passenger train incidentsTotal passenger

train occupants

Killed Injured Killed Injured Killed Injured Killed Injured

1985 ................................................................... 0 287 0 30 3 424 3 741

1986 ................................................................... 1 409 0 72 4 269 5 750

1987 ................................................................... 17 258 0 20 1 261 18 539

1988 ................................................................... 2 160 0 39 2 246 4 445

1989 ................................................................... 1 103 2 123 8 253 11 479

1990 ................................................................... 0 238 1 41 3 280 4 559

1991 ................................................................... 9 61 0 29 0 333 9 423

1992 ................................................................... 0 48 1 114 3 299 4 461

1993 ................................................................... 54 171 1 86 9 402 64 659

1994 ................................................................... 3 129 0 96 3 343 6 568

Totals ............................................................. 87 1864 5 650 36 3110 128 5624

BILLING CODE 4910–06–P
Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 117 / Monday June 17, 1996 / Proposed Rules 30675

BILLING CODE 4910–06–C
30676 Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 117 / Monday June 17, 1996 / Proposed Rules

An FRA representative chairs the

Working Group, and a representative of

the Federal Transit Administration

(FTA) serves as associate member. Staff

members from the National

Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)

also attend and assist the Working

Group. In addition, the Working Group

is supported by FRA program, legal and

research staff, including technical

personnel from the Volpe National

Transportation System Center (Volpe

Center). Vendors of equipment to

passenger railroads constitute another

essential source of information about

rail passenger equipment safety.

Accordingly, FRA has included vendor

representatives designated by the

Railway Progress Institute (RPI) as

associate members of the Working

Group. As one of its first tasks, the

Working Group developed a statement

of its charter and scope of effort.

The Working Group is broadly

representative of interests involved in

intercity and commuter service

nationwide. This service is regularly

scheduled, employs contemporary

electric multiple-unit (MU) equipment,

electric or diesel electric power, is often

intermingled on common rights-of-way

with freight movements, and often

involves maximum speeds in the range

of 79 to 125 miles per hour (mph) with

speeds up to 150 mph projected in the

near future.

FRA also regulates approximately 100

additional railroads that provide service

often characterized as historic,

excursion, or scenic. These ‘‘tourist’’ or

‘‘museum’’ railroads often employ steam

locomotives or older generation diesel

power, and historic coaches or freight

equipment modified for passenger use.

Tourist and museum railroads vary

widely in the nature of their operating

environment, personnel, train speeds,

and other characteristics. FRA intends

to form a small, separate working group

comprised of tourist and museum

operators and freight or passenger

railroads that host or provide this type

of service. FRA will request that the

Tourist Railway Association, the

Association of Railway Museums, and

AAR provide representation for this

effort.

Regulations governing emergency

preparedness and emergency response

procedures for rail passenger service

will be covered by a separate

rulemaking and are being addressed by

a separate working group. Persons

wishing to receive more information

regarding this separate effort should

contact Mr. Dennis Yachechak,

Operating Practices Division, Office of

Safety Assurance and Compliance,

RRS–11, Room 8314, FRA, 400 Seventh

Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20590

(telephone 202–366–0504) or David H.

Kasminoff, Trial Attorney, Office of

Chief Counsel, FRA, 400 Seventh Street,

S.W., Washington, D.C. 20590

(telephone 202–366–0628).

FRA’s commitment to developing a

proposed rule through the Working

Group necessarily influences the role

and purpose of this ANPRM. FRA sets

forth in this ANPRM numerous

preliminary ideas regarding approaches

to safety issues affecting passenger

service. These are ideas that have

already been placed before the Working

Group as concrete, illustrative

approaches to possible improvements in

the safety of passenger service. They are

provided in this ANPRM as information

to any interested person not involved in

the Working Group’s deliberations. FRA

wishes to emphasize, however, that

these concepts do not constitute specific

proposals of the agency in this

proceeding, nor do they represent the

position of the Working Group. In

addition, issuance of this ANPRM

should not be considered a diminution

of FRA’s intent to prescribe passenger

equipment safety regulations within the

5-year period required by the Act.

FRA expects that the Working Group

will develop proposed rules based on a

consensus process. The proposals will

be based on facts and analysis flowing

from the Working Group’s deliberations.

Accordingly, FRA has requested that the

Working Group’s members and the

organizations that they represent refrain

from responding formally to this

ANPRM.

Just as FRA will not prejudge the

outcome of the Working Group

deliberations, FRA asks organizations

represented on the Working Group to

avoid adopting fixed positions that

could polarize the discussion within the

Working Group. Rather, the

deliberations of the Working Group

should be permitted to mature through

a careful, fact-based dialogue that leads

to appropriate recommendations for

cost-effective standards. The evolving

positions of the Working Group

members—as reflected in the minutes of

the group meetings and associated

documentation, together with data

provided by the membership during

their deliberations—will be placed in

the docket of this rulemaking.

FRA invites other interested parties to

respond to the questions posed in this

ANPRM, submitting information and

views that may be of assistance in

developing a proposed rule. All

comments provided in response to this

ANPRM will be provided to the

Working Group for consideration in

preparation of the proposed rule.

Working Group’s Scope of Effort

The Working Group will focus on

developing safety standards for rail

passenger equipment by applying a

system safety approach—where

practical—to:

(1) Determine and prioritize safety

risks;

(2) Determine steps or corrective

actions to reduce risks; and

(3) Optimize safety benefits.

The Working Group will recommend

future research or test programs when a

technology appears to have the potential

for a safety benefit, but is not yet mature

enough to be applied with confidence.

The Working Group will provide

advice to FRA on all phases of the

rulemaking process, to include:

(1) Recommending what issues or

requirements must be covered by

Federal regulations, and what issues or

requirements can be effectively handled

outside the body of Federal regulations

by industry standards or some other

means;

(2) Reviewing the written comments

in response to the ANPRM, and

recommending those comments that

should affect a Notice of Proposed

Rulemaking (NPRM);

(3) Providing cost information to

support FRA’s economic analysis of the

proposed rule;

(4) Providing information and advice

on the potential benefits of the proposed

rule and its individual elements;

(5) Providing advice regarding critical

assumptions required for the economic

analysis;

(6) Reviewing and critiquing a draft

NPRM prepared by FRA based on

Working Group guidance;

(7) Reviewing the oral and written

comments to the NPRM and

recommending those comments that

should affect a final rule;

(8) Reviewing and critiquing a draft

final rule prepared by FRA based on

Working Group guidance; and

(9) If requested by FRA,

recommending actions to take to

respond to any petitions for

reconsideration received as a result of

the final rule.

The Working Group will also assist

FRA in drafting a second NPRM for

passenger equipment power brake

standards.

To ensure full development of the

issues, the Working Group will attempt

to draw on all sources within the

industry to collect information

necessary to conduct comparative

analyses and reach decisions.

The Working Group will establish a

procedure for considering ideas,

approaches, and performance standards
Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 117 / Monday June 17, 1996 / Proposed Rules 30677

1 ‘‘Analysis of Locomotive Cabs.’’ (Report No.

DOT/FRA/ORD–81/84, National Space Technology

Laboratories, September 1982.)

for use as part of the safety standards.

This procedure should be based on the

concept of reaching an overall

consensus. Overall consensus means

represented organizations may object—

even strongly—to individual ideas,

approaches, or standards, but the

organization can accept and ‘‘live with’’

the evolving set of standards as a whole.

FRA believes the success of this entire

innovative approach to rulemaking

depends on the ability of the group to

reach overall consensus.

The Working Group will consider

whether to continue to meet on a

periodic basis after final rulemaking to

consider changes necessary to keep any

rules or other standards current and

responsive to the needs of the industry.

Background

Need for Passenger Equipment Safety

Standards

Rail passenger service is currently

operated with a high level of safety.

However, accidents continue to occur,

often as a result of factors beyond the

control of the passenger railroad.

Further, the rail passenger operating

environment in the United States is

rapidly changing—technology is

advancing; equipment is being designed

for ever-higher speeds; and many

potential new operators of passenger

equipment are appearing. With this

more complex operating environment,

FRA must become more active to ensure

that passenger trains continue to be

designed, built, and operated with

public safety foremost.

The General Accounting Office (GAO)

recognizes this need in Report GAO/

RCED–93–196, entitled ‘‘AMTRAK

Should Implement Minimum Safety

Standards for Passenger Cars.’’ In

addition, NTSB has issued several

recommendations to FRA and to the

railroad industry concerning the

crashworthiness of locomotives.

Although the recommendations directly

apply to freight locomotives, the same

concerns exist for passenger train

locomotives or power cars.

NTSB’s Crashworthiness Concerns

NTSB’s interest in locomotive

crashworthiness dates to 1970, and

NTSB has made several safety

recommendations to FRA and the

industry concerning increased

protection for crew members in the cab

based on the following accidents:

• On September 8, 1970, a collision

between an Illinois Central (IC) and an

Indiana Harbor Belt (IHB) train occurred

at Riverdale, Illinois. The collision

caused the IC caboose to override the

heavy under frame of the IHB

locomotive demolishing the control cab

of the locomotive. Two following cars

continued in the path established by the

caboose, completing the destruction of

the locomotive cab. The IHB engineer

was found dead in the wreckage. NTSB

recommended that FRA and the

industry expand their cooperative effort

to improve the crashworthiness of

railroad equipment (NTSB Safety

Recommendation R–71–44).

• An accident on October 8, 1970,

involving a Penn Central Transportation

Company freight train and a passenger

train near Sound View, Connecticut,

again demonstrated the weakness of the

locomotive crew compartment. This

collision caused NTSB to reiterate its

recommendation to improve the crash

resistance of locomotive cabs (NTSB

Safety Recommendation R–72–005).

This recommendation was ultimately

classified as ‘‘Closed-No Longer

Applicable’’ following the issuance of

Safety Recommendation R–78–27 which

addressed the same issue.

• The investigation of the collision of

three freight trains near Leetonia, Ohio,

on June 6, 1975, again prompted NTSB

to recommend increased cab

crashworthiness, including

consideration of a readily accessible

crash refuge (NTSB Safety

Recommendation R–76–009). This

recommendation was classified as

‘‘Closed-Acceptable Action’’ on August

6, 1978, following FRA’s assurance that

studies were continuing in this area.

• On September 18, 1978, a Louisville

and Nashville freight train collided

head-on with a yard train inside yard

limits at Florence, Alabama. The lead

unit of the yard train overrode the lead

unit of the freight train. The cab

provided no protection for the head

brakeman and engineer, who jumped

but were run over by their train.

• On August 11, 1981, a Boston and

Maine Corporation freight train and a

Massachusetts Bay Transportation

Authority commuter train collided

head-on near Prides Crossing, Beverly,

Massachusetts. The lead car of the

commuter train overrode the freight

locomotive, pushing components of the

locomotive into the cab killing three

people.

NTSB’s investigations of the above

accidents resulted in recommendations

to FRA regarding crashworthiness

protection to the locomotive operating

compartments (NTSB Recommendations

R–77–37, R–78–27, R–79–11, and R–82–

34). As a result of the FRA-sponsored

report ‘‘Analysis of Locomotive Cabs,’’1

NTSB classified these four

recommendations ‘‘Closed-Acceptable

Action’’ on November 24, 1982.

• A rear-end collision of two

Burlington Northern (BN) freight trains

occurred near Pacific Junction, Iowa, on

April 13, 1983. The operating

compartment of the lead locomotive on

the striking train, BN train 64T85, was

overridden by the caboose of train 43J05

when the trains collided. The

locomotive operating compartment was

crushed. (In general, when a locomotive

strikes a caboose or a light freight car,

the lighter vehicle overrides the

locomotive, frequently with devastating

results.) As a result of this accident,

NTSB issued a recommendation that

FRA initiate and/or support a design

study to provide a protected area in the

locomotive operating compartment for

the crew when a collision is

unavoidable (NTSB Recommendation

R–83–102). This recommendation was

subsequently classified as ‘‘ClosedUnacceptable Action/Superseded’’

based on a future investigation that

reiterated similar concerns regarding

locomotive crashworthiness.

• On July 10, 1986, Union Pacific

(UP) freight train CLSA–09 struck a

standing UP freight train near North

Platte, Nebraska, at a speed of

approximately 32 mph. Three

locomotives and eleven cars from both

trains derailed, and the accident

resulted in one fatality and three

injuries. This accident, in which the

locomotive cab section of train CLSA–

09 was destroyed on impact, probably

would have resulted in fatal injuries to

the engineer and head brakeman of train

CLSA–09 had they not jumped from the

cab prior to the collision. As a result,

NTSB issued Safety Recommendation

R–87–23, which recommends that FRA:

Promptly require locomotive operating

compartments to be designed to provide

crash protection for occupants of locomotive

cabs.

NTSB believes that locomotive

collision investigations continue to

demonstrate that improvements are

needed in the crashworthiness design

standards of locomotives.

As a result of investigations of

numerous accidents involving passenger

trains over the past 20 years, NTSB has

recommended that FRA or the passenger

railroad industry:

(1) Prescribe regulations requiring

emergency means of escape from

railroad passenger cars;

(2) Prescribe regulations requiring

emergency lighting for railroad

passenger cars;

(3) Initiate studies to determine the

relationship between passenger car

design and passenger injuries;
30678 Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 117 / Monday June 17, 1996 / Proposed Rules

(4) Prescribe regulations requiring

passenger cars with secured seats and

luggage retention devices;

(5) Apply system safety principles to

the acquisition, design, construction

and renovation of passenger cars;

(6) Prescribe regulations to require

back-up power for emergency lights and

doors that can be opened in the event

of loss of power;

(7) Require that rail passenger

equipment be fitted with roof escape

hatches;

(8) Promulgate regulations to establish

minimum standards for the interior of

commuter cars so that adequate crash

injury protection and emergency

equipment will be provided;

(9) Promulgate regulations to establish

minimum standards for the design and

construction of interiors of passenger

cars so adequate crash injury protection

will be provided;

(10) Promulgate regulations to

establish minimum safety standards for

the inspection and maintenance of

railroad passenger cars; and

(11) Amend the power brake

regulations to provide appropriate

guidelines for inspecting power brake

equipment on modern passenger cars.

Accident/Incident Data

FRA has compiled a 10-year history of

passenger equipment accidents/

incidents that railroads have reported to

FRA. FRA supplied this information to

the Working Group and placed it in the

docket. Table 2 summarizes the deaths

and injuries reported to FRA by

railroads for occupants of passenger

trains during this 10-year period. The

‘‘train accidents’’ column of Table 2

includes all collisions, derailments, or

fires involving passenger trains that

resulted in more than $6,300 damage to

on-track equipment, signals, track, track

structure, or road bed. The ‘‘grade

crossing accidents’’ column of Table 2

includes all reported impacts of a

passenger train with cars, trucks, busses,

farm equipment, or pedestrians at grade

crossings. The ‘‘non-accident passenger

train incidents’’ column of Table 2

includes all reports of injuries or deaths

of passenger train occupants not caused

by a train accident or grade crossing

accident.

Figure 1 is a pie chart depicting the

percentages of deaths to passenger train

occupants caused by train accidents,

grade crossing accidents, and nonaccident incidents. Figure 2 shows the

10-year trend for each of these causes of

deaths.

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Figure 3 is a pie chart depicting the

percentages of injuries to passenger

train occupants caused by train

accidents, grade crossing accidents, and

non-accident incidents. Figure 4 shows

the 10-year trend for each of these

causes of injuries to occupants of

passenger trains. (Amtrak has noted that

the showing of only 10 years of accident

data is somewhat distorted in that two

accidents account for over 80 percent of

the deaths, and one of the accidents had

substantial intermodal implications.)

Comment is requested regarding the

significance of this data, elements of

societal and railroad cost not included

in the reported data, and factors to be

considered in evaluating the risk of

future catastrophic passenger train

accidents.

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Approach/Structure for Safety

Standards

Scope and Context

FRA recognizes that safety standards

that apply only to passenger equipment

provide only a partial solution to

improving rail passenger safety, and the

best way to increase rail passenger

safety is to keep trains on the track and

spaced apart.

Keeping trains on the track and apart

requires a systems approach to safety

that includes railroad track, right-ofway, signals and controls, operating

procedures, station- and platform-totrain interface design, as well as

equipment. FRA has active rulemaking

and research projects ongoing in a

variety of contexts that address nonequipment aspects of passenger railroad

system safety.

While reflecting the other aspects of

passenger railroad system safety, this

rulemaking will focus on:

(1) Equipment inspection, testing, and

maintenance standards;

(2) Equipment design and

performance standards;

(3) Platform- and station-to-train

interface design and procedures to

promote safe ingress and egress of

passengers; and

(4) Other issues specifically related to

safe operation of rail passenger service

not addressed in other FRA regulations,

proceedings, or program development

efforts.

Existing Rail Passenger Operations

FRA intends to structure any

proposed actions to cause a minimum of

disruption to existing safe operations of

passenger equipment. This notice is

designed to bring to FRA’s attention the

special situations and problems

confronting tourist and excursion

railroads, private passenger car owners,

commuter railroads, and the existing

operations of Amtrak, which all have a

long history of safe operation. FRA

believes the first objective of this

rulemaking should be to construct

common sense minimum safety floors

under these existing operations. To the

extent new technology or innovative

approaches might offer opportunities for

improving safety performance on a costeffective basis, FRA seeks the

appropriate means to exploit these

opportunities.

A common sense safety floor under

existing safe operations includes a

complete pre-departure (or daily) safety

inspection of each departing train

conducted by skilled inspectors, and a

well-planned test and preventive

maintenance program for safety-critical

components of the system triggered by

time, mileage, or some other reliabilitydriven parameter. (A ‘‘safety critical

component’’ is a component whose

failure to function as intended results in

a greater risk to passengers and crew.)

One of the main purposes of this

ANPRM is to solicit information

concerning:

(1) The steps necessary to conduct a

complete pre-departure or daily safety

inspection of the equipment;

(2) A means to demonstrate (e.g.,

training, testing, supervision,

certification) that safety inspectors have

the knowledge and skills necessary to

perform effective inspections or tests;

(3) The minimum planned or periodic

maintenance program required to keep

the equipment in safe operating

condition;

(4) The frequency of required planned

or periodic maintenance; and

(5) The costs and benefits associated

with the requirements under

consideration.

Special Consideration for Tourist and

Excursion Railroads

Tourist and excursion railroads

generally provide passenger rail service

as entertainment or recreation, often at

low speed on track dedicated to that

service alone. FRA recognizes the

extensive service provided by this

growing sector of the railroad industry,

and the need to tailor appropriate safety

requirements to the level of risk

involved. Accordingly, FRA will work

to identify appropriate criteria for

creating relatively simple system safety

plans and programs for tourist and

excursion railroads that recognize the

special needs of this sector of the

industry.

Speed and distance limits may be

helpful to define tourist and excursion

railroads excepted from many of the

effects of any proposed passenger

equipment safety standards. For

instance, less stringent requirements

might be applied to a railroad with a

maximum operating speed of 30 mph

and a maximum trip distance of 250

miles. In addition, operations segregated

from the general railroad system may

warrant consideration for less stringent

requirements. FRA seeks comment on

these proposed limits and, as noted

earlier, will request assistance of an

appropriately representative working

group to develop these issues.

Special Consideration for Private

Passenger Cars

FRA recognizes private passenger cars

as another segment of the industry that

may need special consideration.

However, some important differences

between the two types of operations

exist that need to be taken into account.

Private passenger cars often operate as

part of freight, Amtrak, and commuter

trains at track speeds over long

distances. Providing regulatory relief to

private passenger car owners through

speed and/or distance limitations could

severely restrict current operations. The

host railroads often impose their own

safety requirements on the private

passenger cars and have a strong interest

in any Federal safety standards that

apply to private passenger cars. FRA

intends to fully involve Amtrak, the

American Association of Private Railcar

Owners, and the American Public

Transit Association (APTA) as standards

for private passenger cars are developed.

Does the simple system safety

program proposed for tourist and

excursion railroads make sense for

private passenger cars? If not, why? Do

alternate means exist to provide

regulatory relief to private passenger car

owners without imposing restrictive

speed and distance limits? How should

railroad business or observation cars be

treated?

New Rail Passenger Service or Systems

FRA intends the main thrust of any

proposed safety standards for

equipment design to be focused on new

equipment and new rail passenger

service. New equipment and new

service present the opportunity to

analyze the proposed equipment and its

intended use to ensure that a systematic

approach is taken to design safety into

the operation. However, some of the

safety enhancements that the final rule

resulting from this ANPRM deem

necessary for new equipment may have

the potential to be applied to existing or

to rebuilt equipment. Without such

consideration, opportunities to increase

safety that stand up to a cost/benefit

analysis could be lost. In addition, not

requiring rebuilt equipment to meet the

latest standards provides an incentive to

rebuild equipment rather than purchase

new equipment, thus delaying the full

benefit of the new standards.

Passenger Equipment Power Brakes

On September 16, 1994, FRA

published a notice of proposed

rulemaking on power brakes. 59 FR

47676. Much of the public testimony

received in response to the NPRM

emphasized the differences between

freight operations and passenger

operations, and the differences between

freight equipment brake systems and

passenger equipment brake systems. In

light of this testimony, and because

passenger equipment power brake

standards are a logical subset of

passenger equipment safety standards,
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FRA will separate passenger equipment

power brake standards from freight

equipment power brake standards. The

Working Group will assist FRA to

develop a second NPRM that covers

passenger equipment power brake

standards. Since power brakes have

already been the subject of a recent

ANPRM, NPRM, and supplementary

notice, FRA is not seeking additional

information on passenger equipment

power brakes, and they will not be

addressed in this ANPRM.

Regulatory Flexibility

FRA conducts this proceeding to

determine how best to meet the need to

assure the public of continued safe

operation of passenger trains in a more

complex operating environment.

Although FRA is required by law to

issue minimum standards for passenger

equipment safety, FRA recognizes that

the level of detail properly embodied in

regulations can and should be

powerfully influenced by the presence

of voluntary standards adhered to by

those participating in their

development. FRA encourages the

formation of a rail passenger industry

forum (similar to AAR in some

functions, but more representative of all

segments of the rail passenger industry)

to establish supplementary safety

standards developed through industry

consensus. Such an organization could

reduce the need for detailed Federal

regulations beyond such basic

requirements as may be appropriate to

provide for safety.

FRA desires to structure regulations to

provide the flexibility necessary for

introduction of new technology or new

operating concepts that could improve

service and safety. Use of performance

standards—where feasible—can best

achieve this objective.

FRA desires this ANPRM to stimulate

discussion focused on how FRA can

meet its responsibility to the public

while imposing a minimum regulatory

burden on the rail passenger industry.

Does the industry have plans to

establish a forum with the charter and

authority to develop safety standards by

consensus for the industry, or can an

existing organization serve this

function? If such a group can be

established, what safety concerns have a

high potential of being resolved through

industry consensus and voluntary

action? What time frame would be

required to develop industry safety

standards by consensus? What role

could/should rail labor organizations,

equipment builders, component

suppliers, and state agencies play in

developing these safety standards? What

assurances could be provided that the

industry would adhere to these safety

standards? What role could/should FRA

play to assist the industry in developing

these standards? When consensus

cannot be reached or is not adequate,

and Federal regulations are required,

how can the flexibility/adaptability of

the regulations to meet a dynamic

operating environment and changing

technology be maximized? To what

extent might development of voluntary

industry guidelines limit the need for

highly detailed or prescriptive Federal

standards?

Discussion of Issues

An introductory discussion of several

concepts—crucial to rail equipment

safety—may convey a better

understanding of the approach FRA is

considering to develop safety standards

for new passenger equipment. These

concepts are:

(1) system safety plan and program;

(2) rail vehicle crashworthiness;

(3) crash energy management;

(4) suspension system performance;

and

(5) wheel thermal stress.

System Safety Plan and Program

The heart of the approach to new

passenger equipment safety standards

will be a system safety program. A

system safety plan is a document

developed by the operator—with a large

input from the builder of new

equipment—to describe the system

safety program. The plan should lay out

a top-down approach to how the

system—including the equipment, the

inspection, the testing and maintenance

program, the routes over which the

equipment will operate, and the

operating rules that will be applied to

it—will be designed, tested, and verified

to meet all safety requirements and

provide a safe operation.

A true and complete system safety

approach begins at the top level of the

system—in this case, the ‘‘system’’ is the

entire railroad operation. For the

purpose of risk analysis, the railroad

system must be broken down into its

component systems. No one—or right—

way exists to perform this breakdown. It

can be done many ways. Figure 5 is just

one logical example.

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Many passenger railroads operate at

least partially as a tenant on the rightof-way and property of another railroad.

In this case, the passenger railroad may

have little or no control under the

contractual terms of the tenancy

arrangement, and little or no prospect of

gaining future control over some of the

major risk components of the risk

analysis. The actions of the passenger

railroad cannot change these risk

components, and for the purpose of

performing a system safety analysis,

they must remain fixed and be accepted

as a given unless subject to separate

changes in Federal standards.

For example, a passenger railroad that

operates largely as a tenant would have

little or no control over the Interfaces

(RC1) and Right-of-Way (RC2) risk

components. By holding these risk

components fixed, the system safety

approach degrades to a systems

approach applied to the remaining two

subsystems rather than to the railroad as

a whole. The ‘‘systems’’ methodology

still has considerable merit when

applied to the remaining subsystems,

but a true system safety approach

cannot be applied to a system that has

major risk components that are

constrained. This analysis could help

define the equipment crashworthiness

features required for its intended

purpose, or the operational limitations

needed to improve or retain safety

levels.

What practical constraints must be

taken into account when applying a

system safety approach to passenger

railroads? When all practical constraints

are taken into account, how should the

system safety approach be applied to

help develop passenger equipment

safety standards?

The system safety plan can range from

a relatively simple document—for

conventional equipment being procured

to continue an existing service—to a

detailed document laying out a

comprehensive approach for designing,

testing, and operating state-of-the-art

high-speed passenger rail systems. The

outline of the system safety plan given

in Appendix A applies to the

procurements of new high-speed

trainsets. For the less complex

procurements of replacement equipment

for existing service, the plan should be

simplified and tailored to fit the

particular need. It should be

emphasized that the purpose of the

system safety plan is to force a thorough

thought process to ensure safety is

optimized.

The purpose of a formal system safety

program, among other things, is to

ensure safety is adequately addressed

during the design of passenger trainsets

and during the development of the

inspection, testing, and maintenance

program that supports these trainsets.

The system safety program also permits

other high risk components in the

system to be identified, including

operational aspects and the signaling

and grade crossing technology

employed. The system safety program

requires:

(1) Analysis of the trainset design for

identification of safety hazards (risk

assessment) and systematic elimination

or reduction of the risk associated with

these hazards (mitigating actions);

(2) Analysis of operational aspects for

safety hazards and, where feasible,

systematic elimination or reduction of

the associated risk of these hazards; and

(3) Development of the inspection,

testing, and maintenance concept in a

step-by-step process to determine the

procedures and maintenance intervals

necessary to keep the trainset operating

safely.

MIL–STD–882C defines the approach

taken for system safety programs used

by the United States military. A copy

has been placed in the docket. This

document is an excellent reference for

how to plan and conduct a system safety

program.

FRA solicits comments from all

segments of the rail passenger industry

on formal system safety programs. FRA

is particularly interested in ways to

tailor the program to meet the multitude

of individual situations that exist in the

industry. The purpose of the program is

to ensure that safety is planned into new

systems. FRA is searching for ways to

ensure the system safety program is

good business—not a regulatory burden.

FRA seeks to determine the process

necessary to ensure system safety is

good business and allows flexibility in

tailoring the planning to the level of the

safety need.

Are any system safety plans currently

in use? How much would it cost (in

terms of time and effort) to update

existing or develop new system safety

plans? On average, approximately how

often would system safety plans have to

be updated? How would system safety

plans improve safety? Specifically, what

areas of safety would be improved, by

how much, and why? Please provide

copies of any studies, data, arguments,

or opinions which support your answer.

Rail Passenger Equipment

Crashworthiness

Since vehicle crashworthiness is one

of the means to reduce safety risks, it is

therefore a major subset of the system

safety program. ‘‘Rail passenger

equipment crashworthiness’’ means a

system of interrelated vehicle design

features intended to maximize

passenger and crew survivability of

collisions and derailments. Vehicle

crashworthiness is the last line of

defense or protection in the event all

other precautions fail, and a serious

accident occurs.

A risk assessment done by Arthur D.

Little, Inc., (ADL) for Amtrak regarding

operation of high-speed trainsets in the

Northeast Corridor points to the need

for attention to passenger equipment

crashworthiness by showing that the

following types of collisions could

occur on the Northeast Corridor:

(1) Loaded freight equipment or

locomotives might derail on adjacent

track, overturning and fouling a highspeed main line. (The derailment could

be caused by defective freight

equipment or vandalism.)

(2) The braking system on a freight

train or light locomotives could fail to

operate properly, causing that consist to

split a switch and occupy a high-speed

main line immediately ahead of an

oncoming high-speed passenger train.

(3) A high-speed passenger train

could derail on a curve due to a track

defect (e.g., a broken rail initiated by the

last freight movement) and strike a fixed

object such as an abutment or pier.

Scenarios with substantially similar

consequences are possible even after the

installation of an enhanced train control

system. These are the types of scenarios

feared by freight railroads that allow

passenger trains to operate on their

systems, and have led the freight

railroads to demand insulation from

excessive tort liability.

To ensure crashworthiness, passenger

equipment must:

(1) Maintain an envelope or minimum

volume of survivability for passengers

and crew which resists extreme

structural deformation and separation of

main structural members;

(2) Protect against penetration of the

occupied compartments;

(3) Protect the occupants from being

ejected from occupied compartments;

and

(4) Protect the occupants from

secondary impacts with the interior of

the occupied compartments.

To make a passenger train accident

survivable (1) the spaces occupied by

people must be strong enough not to

collapse, crushing the people; and (2)

the initial deceleration of the people

must be limited so they are not thrown

against the interior of the train with

unsurvivable force. Achieving these

general objectives can be the most

difficult challenge facing equipment

designers.
Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 117 / Monday June 17, 1996 / Proposed Rules 30687

2 ‘‘Evaluation of Selected Crashworthiness

Strategies for Passenger Trains.’’ D. Tyrell, K.

Severson-Green & B. Marquis, U.S. Department of

Transportation Volpe National Transportation

System Center, January 20, 1995; ‘‘Train

Crashworthiness Design for Occupant

Survivability.’’ D. Tyrell, K. Severson-Green & B.

Marquis, U.S. Department of Transportation Volpe

National Transportation System Center, April 7,

1995.

Crash Energy Management

Crash energy management is a design

technique to help equipment designers

meet this challenge. The basic concept

embodied by crash energy management

is that designated sections in

unoccupied spaces or lightly occupied

spaces are intentionally designed to be

weaker than heavily occupied spaces.

This is done so that during a collision,

portions of the unoccupied spaces will

deform before the occupied spaces,

allowing the occupied spaces of the

trainset initially to decelerate more

slowly and minimize the uncontrolled

deformation of occupied space.

The docket contains two technical

papers 2 by the Volpe Center that

analyze the merits of crash energy

management design techniques. These

studies evaluate the effectiveness of

alternative strategies for providing

crashworthiness of passenger rail

vehicle structures and interiors at

increased collision speeds by comparing

them to a design permitted by current

standards.

Current regulations permit cars of

essentially uniform longitudinal

strength. Simplified analysis done using

a lumped-mass computer model and an

idealized load-crush curve predicts this

type of design to be effective in

maintaining survivable volumes in

coaches for train-to-train collision

speeds up to 70 mph. Further analysis

needs to be done using a more complex

distributed-mass computer model and a

widely accepted load-crush curve to

refine this prediction.

Using a simplified lumped-mass

computer model, the assumed uniform

longitudinal strength causes the

predicted structural crushing of the

train to proceed uniformly from the

front to the rear of the train, through

both the unoccupied and occupied areas

of the train. Using a distributed-mass

computer model, structural crushing of

uniform strength equipment tends to be

predicted to occur at both ends of the

car, more in agreement with

observations from actual accidents.

The crash energy management design

approach results in varying longitudinal

strength, with high strength in the

occupied areas and lower strength in the

unoccupied areas. This approach

attempts to distribute the structural

crushing throughout the train to the

unoccupied areas to preserve the

occupant volumes and to control and

limit the decelerations of the cars. The

crash energy management approach has

been found to offer significant benefits.

(Amtrak has noted that while this

concept seems to work well for singlelevel equipment with vestibules at each

end, its application to a bi-level

design—which is now Amtrak’s long

distance standard—was not considered

in these publications.)

The interior crashworthiness study

evaluates the influence of interior

configurations and occupant restraints

on injuries resulting from occupant

motions during a collision. For a

sufficiently gentle train deceleration,

compartmentalization (a strategy for

providing a ‘‘friendly’’ interior) can

provide sufficient occupant protection

to keep widely accepted injury criteria

below the threshold values applied by

the automotive industry.

The Volpe Center reports show that,

if installed properly and used, the

combination of lapbelts and shoulder

restraints can reduce the likelihood of

fatality due to deceleration to nearcertain survival for even the most severe

collision conditions considered.

However, individual restraints may

have limited practical value on a train,

where mobility within the vehicle is an

important attribute of service quality,

and times of most significant risk cannot

be predicted. The most likely

application of personal restraints could

be in a control compartment located at

the front of the train.

The value of a crash energy

management design is not in the energy

absorbed—only a few percent of the

kinetic energy of a high-speed collision

can be absorbed in a reasonable crush

distance. The real safety benefit comes

from allowing the occupied spaces to

decelerate more slowly, while

decreasing the likelihood that occupied

spaces will fail in an uncontrolled

fashion. If the occupied spaces are

initially decelerated more slowly,

people will be pinned to an interior

surface of the trainset with less force,

resulting in fewer and less severe

injuries. Once pinned against an interior

surface, occupants can then sustain

much higher subsequent decelerations

without sustaining serious injuries.

Also, since unoccupied space is

intentionally sacrificed, less occupied

space will be crushed during the

collision.

Crash energy management design

involves a system of interrelated safety

features, in addition to controlled

crushable space, that could include: (1)

design techniques to keep the trainset in

line and on the track for as long as

possible during the initial impact;

(2) Interior design that eliminates

sharp corners and that pads, with shock

absorbing material, surfaces that are

likely to be struck by people thrown

about by a collision;

(3) Attachment of interior fittings and

seats with sufficient strength not to fail

and thereby cause additional injuries;

and

(4) A crash refuge for the vulnerable

crew members in the cab.

To help maintain survivable volumes

in passenger equipment, particularly

during collisions at higher closing

speeds, minimum standards for the

following structural design parameters

would be needed:

(1) Anti-buckling to keep the train in

line and on the track for as long as

possible after impact. (Prevention of

buckling is not always possible, but it

can be delayed);

(2) End structures and anticlimbers to

prevent override and telescoping;

(3) Corner posts to deflect glancing

collisions;

(4) Rollover strength;

(5) Truck to car body attachment; and

(6) A control cab crash refuge.

‘‘Anti-buckling’’ refers to trainset

design techniques intended to prevent

to a certain force level or delay both

vertical (override) and/or lateral

buckling. The current state-of-the-art in

passenger rail equipment design will

impose limitations on the extent to

which anti-buckling can be achieved.

(Devices that meet the anti-buckling

requirements have not been developed

or tested. Those devices that have been

evaluated by the French National

Railroad in actual crash testing of their

latest TGV bi-level design are intended

to prevent override similar to those

devices currently required on North

American equipment.)

Standards would be necessary to

address the general design parameters to

limit decelerations of passengers and

crew, as well as flying objects striking

passengers and crew. One possible

approach is to define, under the

dynamic conditions created by a

specific collision scenario:

(1) Limits on the maximum and

average deceleration of the crew in the

control cab for the first 250 milliseconds

after impact (assuming the crew had

anticipated the collision and placed

themselves in the crash refuge);

(2) Limits on the maximum and

average deceleration of passengers in

passenger cars for the first 250

milliseconds after impact;

(3) Minimum longitudinal, lateral,

and vertical seat attachment strength;

(4) Minimum longitudinal, lateral,

and vertical fitting attachment and
30688 Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 117 / Monday June 17, 1996 / Proposed Rules

luggage stowage compartment strengths;

and

(5) Minimum padding requirements

for seat backs and interior surfaces.

Achieving the second item requires

careful design to create a differential in

structural strength between passenger

seating areas (‘‘occupied volume’’) and

certain other areas that would be

allowed to fail before the occupied

volume. By contrast, permitting uniform

rigidity throughout the trainset could

result in unacceptably high initial

accelerations of the passenger

compartments and possibly make the

accident non-survivable.

Suspension System Performance

A passenger train suspension system’s

purpose is to follow the track at all

speeds of operation and to minimize the

vibrations and motions transmitted to

the passengers. An unsafe condition

occurs whenever the suspension system:

(1) Allows a wheel to lift from a rail;

(2) Allows a wheel to climb over a

rail;

(3) Transmits excessive vibration or

motion to the passengers;

(4) Exerts excessive force on a rail

causing it to shift or roll; or

(5) Allows unstable lateral hunting

oscillations of a truck or wheelset.

The vehicle no longer safely follows the

track when a wheel either climbs the

rail or lifts from the rail. Wheel climb

may occur in curves where large lateral

forces are generated as the truck

negotiates the curve. These lateral

forces, particularly in combination with

changes in vertical wheel load caused

by track surface variations, can cause

the wheel to climb the rail.

The ratio of lateral to vertical forces

acting on a wheel (L/V ratio) is generally

taken as a measure of the proximity of

the wheel to derailment. If L/V remains

less than Nadal’s limit, which is 0.8 on

clean, dry, tangent track, then wheel

derailment is remote.

Whenever insufficient vertical force

exists to support the lateral force acting

on the rail, wheel climb can potentially

occur under a broad range of track

alignment and surface geometry

combinations. If a wheel lifts due to

excessive rolling, twisting, or other

motions of the car body or truck, it will

likely return to the rail as long as no

excessive lateral forces exist to push it

out of line with the rail. However, wheel

lift represents a potentially unsafe

condition, because there is no certainty

of the absence of a strong lateral force

that prevents the wheel’s return to the

rail. To assure that the wheel remains in

contact with the rail, each wheel must

maintain a minimum vertical load of 10

percent of the nominal static wheel

vertical load on straight, level track.

Excessive lateral forces acting on a

rail can cause the rail to rollover and/

or shift outward, allowing a wheelset to

drop between the rails. For this to

happen, all wheels on one side of a

truck must be pushing outward on a

rail. The railroad industry generally

accepts that if the ratio of the sum of the

lateral forces to the sum of the vertical

forces exerted by all the wheels on one

side of a truck on the rail is less than

0.5, there is little danger of rail rollover

or shift.

Excessive lateral forces, induced by a

car traversing the track, can also cause

the track as a unit to shift laterally on

its ballast. To assure that the track does

not get pushed out of alignment by a

train, the ratio of the net lateral load

exerted by each axle to the net vertical

load exerted by that axle must remain

less than 0.5.

Passenger ride quality is generally a

comfort rather than a safety concern,

unless ride quality deteriorates so that

passengers are injured by a rough ride.

To provide minimum protection for

passengers from injuries due to being

thrown about by excessive car body

motions, FRA believes that equipment

should be designed such that car body

lateral accelerations are less than 0.30g

peak-to-peak and the car body vertical

accelerations are less than 0.55g peakto-peak, while the square root of the

sum of lateral accelerations squared

plus the vertical accelerations squared

(the vector sum) is less than 0.604g

peak-to-peak. Compliance with this

design standard would typically be

established as part of an equipment

qualification program.

Sustained lateral oscillations of the

truck (‘‘truck hunting’’) can lead to

derailment. Sensor technology allows

the lateral accelerations of the truck to

be constantly monitored under service

operating conditions. FRA proposes that

trucks be equipped with accelerometers

to monitor for hunting so that corrective

action can be taken when hunting is

detected. FRA proposes to define

‘‘hunting’’ as a lateral acceleration of the

truck frame in excess of 0.8g peak-topeak repeated for six or more cycles.

Recent experience with the

Massachusetts Bay Transit Authority’s

new bi-level commuter cars

demonstrated the close relationship

between suspension system

performance and track geometry. The

suspension system must be able to

perform at low speed over track with

relatively large surface variations, such

as 3-inch cross level deviation, while

maintaining stability and smooth ride

quality at maximum service speeds.

FRA is concerned that suspension

systems of all new passenger equipment

maintain passenger safety over their

entire range of intended operating

conditions. The suspension system

requirements, such as wheel

equalization, must therefore be

established for all equipment and

service based on analysis from the

system safety program. Compliance with

this requirement would typically be

established as part of an equipment

qualification program.

Wheel Thermal Stress

FRA is concerned that frequent,

repeated braking from high speeds

could induce thermal damage in wheels

that can result in cracking and potential

wheel failure in service. New highspeed passenger equipment may include

blended brakes which combine dynamic

and friction braking (either on tread,

disk, or both). Such blended systems

typically maximize the available

dynamic brake portion at all speeds to

minimize wear and thermal input to the

wheels, discs, and friction brake

components. Wheel slide detection and

prevention is typically available to

minimize loss of wheel to track

adhesion of individual wheelsets during

deceleration.

Thermal demand on wheels due to

frictional heating by tread brakes can be

substantial when loaded cars are

operated at high braking ratios. This

scenario may apply to blended systems

which use tread brakes more extensively

to make up for the loss of failed

dynamic brakes. Recent research has

shown that for wheels on some types of

passenger equipment operated at

weights of 60 to 80 tons per car, at

speeds from 80 to 100 mph and

retardation rates of 2 to 3 mph/second,

the brake horsepower which the wheel

must absorb can flash-heat a shallow

layer of the rim to a temperature high

enough to damage the metal and

possibly cause a change in its

mechanical properties.

An operational test under simulated

service conditions was conducted in

October 1992 using wheels

instrumented with thermocouples to

measure temperatures in the rim. The

test train was operated at near-empty

weight (61 tons per car) and at speeds

up to 100 mph. Wheel temperatures

were measured during speed reductions

and stops, at retardation rates from 1.3

to 1.9 mph/second, with tread braking

only. Temperatures as high as 1000 °F.

(538 °C.) were measured by the

thermocouple closest to the tread

surface (approximately 0.1 inch below

the tread surface). The S-plate wheel
Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 117 / Monday June 17, 1996 / Proposed Rules 30689

design common in commuter service

was used to obtain these results.

Current Federal safety standards for

locomotives, under which MU cars are

covered, define a defective wheel due to

cracking as any wheel with ‘‘[a] crack or

break in the flange, tread, rim, plate, or

hub.’’ 49 CFR 229.75(k). Although the

AAR Manual of Interchange Rules

(1980) applies only to interchange

freight service, it is often applied to

equipment in passenger service and

defines a wheel to be ‘‘condemnable at

any time’’ if it contains ‘‘thermal cracks:

transverse cracks in tread, flange or

plate * * *’’ (Rule 41—Section A). The

1984 edition of the same manual adds

a qualification as follows: ‘‘Thermal or

heat checks: Brake shoe heating

frequently produces a fine network of

superficial lines or checks running in all

directions on the surface of the wheel

tread. This is sometimes associated with

skid burns. It should not be confused

with thermal cracking and is not a cause

for wheel removal.’’

Heat checking is recognized by

experienced failure analysts as a

phenomenon distinct from thermal

cracking. In the absence of other effects,

heat checks are believed—at worst—to

progress to minor shelling or spalling

which can be detected and corrected

well before they cause a risk to

operational safety. However, recent

research has shown that heat checks are

unsafe if the affected wheel has also

been subjected to rim stress reversal.

Wrought wheels used in commuter

service are rim-quenched after forming

to create a layer of residual compressive

stress in the rim extending inward from

the tread. Depths of penetration of the

compressive layer are estimated at 1.2

inches (30 mm) by finite element

simulations of the quenching process.

This residual compressive stress is

beneficial since compression tends to

force cracks closed and retard crack

growth.

Repeated wheel excursions to high

temperatures can result in stress

reversal in the wheel rim, especially in

shallow layers near the tread surface

where cracks are likely to originate.

Estimates of residual stresses in new (as

manufactured) wheels were obtained by

application of an advanced finite

element-based technique which uses

stresses due to quenching as an input

state and then calculates the final

residual stress state after repeated

simulated stop-braking from 80 mph at

2 mph/second. The results of this

simulation predict stress reversal

(reversal from circumferential

compression due to quenching to

residual tension) in a layer

approximately 5⁄8-inch (16 mm) deep

from the surface of the wheel tread.

This research causes FRA concern

regarding the possibility of wheel

failures due to cracking initiated in

overbraked wheels. A visual estimation

of thermal damage is difficult in the

absence of cracks. Conventional

practices based on wheel discoloration

have been discredited as being

unreliable indicators of wheel thermal

damage. Within the limits of current

sensor technology, the best means

available to prevent wheel failure

resulting from thermal damage is careful

brake system design to limit the

frictional heating of wheels to within

safe limits.

Ad hoc recommendations identify the

onset of thermal damage at wheel tread

near surface temperatures of 600 to 700

°F. In order to better quantify the effect

of temperature on wheel integrity,

several metallurgical experiments of

wheel material were done. The base

material condition of a non-thermally

abused wheel rim is normally a pearlitic

microstructure hardened to

approximately RC 35. Metallurgical

examination near the treads of thermally

cracked wheels shows a spheroidized

microstructure with an increased

hardness for a layer approximately 1⁄2-

inch deep.

This microstructure form is usually

associated with formation by a sequence

of heating to extremely high

temperatures (above 1400 °F.) followed

by rapid quenching to produce

martensite (an undesirable steel

microstructure), followed by tempering

at high temperature (800 to 900 °F.) to

transform martensite to spheroidite.

Since field data indicated that wheel

temperatures were not reaching the

elevated levels necessary to produce the

laboratory material transformation, more

work was done to try to explain this

inconsistency. This laboratory work

involved testing of wheel steel samples

that were exposed to combined rapid

heating and high compression. The

combination of heat and compression

was used to simulate the environment of

material near a wheel tread surface that

is subjected to combined stop-braking

(heat) and rail contact (compression).

The results of these laboratory tests

showed that the microstructure of the

material can transform at temperatures

below 1200 °F if the material is also

compressed, and the transformed

microstructure can have an appearance

similar to that of spheroidite.

Based on this research, FRA is

concerned that passenger equipment in

service with frequent stops from high

speeds can over brake wheels. Of

particular concern is equipment that

utilizes a high percentage of tread

braking and blended brake systems that

require a wheel tread friction brake to

carry a greater portion of the braking

load when the dynamic portion of the

brake fails.

Disc brakes are commonly used on

high speed passenger trainsets as a

companion to the dynamic brake system

to avoid some of the thermal problems

that can be caused by tread brakes. Disc

air brakes provide fail-safe braking and

high levels of retardation. Disc brakes

offer several advantages as opposed to

tread brakes. Disc brakes are less

sensitive to moisture and have more

uniform coefficients of friction at high

speeds. Disc brakes can also improve

ride quality due to reduced jerk and less

noise. In addition, disc brakes require

lower brake forces than tread brakes,

thus permitting smaller cylinders and

lighter rigging. But the main advantage

of disc brakes is that they allow braking

heat to be dissipated using a heat sink

other than the wheel.

Brake discs can be mounted directly

to the wheel with bolts or can be axle

mounted. Axle mounted discs are

installed on the axle between the

wheels. The disc consists of two friction

rings interconnected by cooling fins,

which exist in several forms, including

a vane design and a ventilated design.

The vanes and fins increase the

convective cooling of the disc as it

rotates. Retarding force is provided by

means of a caliper—actuated by a

pneumatic cylinder—that clamps brake

pads against the rotating disc.

Substantial research and development

effort has gone into the design of disc

brakes, especially for European highspeed trains. While disc brakes are well

suited for high-energy dissipation and

high-temperature events, disc pad wear

and thermally damaged discs are two of

the cost drivers in maintaining highspeed passenger trainsets.

One manufacturer of disc brakes has

recommended limiting disc pad

temperatures to 750 °F. to prevent

thermal damage to the wheels or brake

pads during stop distance tests of a

European trainset to be tested in the

Northeast Corridor.

Based on these concerns and research,

FRA wishes to explore requiring each

railroad establish the maximum safe

speed that each type of its equipment

can be operated over a specific route,

when the dynamic portion of the brake

has failed or is disabled. These speed

limits should be established as part of

the system safety program.

Another possible concern involving

disc brakes is wheel slide. Due to the

high retardation rate that can be

achieved with disc brakes, failure of the
30690 Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 117 / Monday June 17, 1996 / Proposed Rules

wheel slide protection system can cause

the formation of martensite in the

vicinity of the wheel/rail contact region.

This can lead to wheel mechanical

damage similar to that caused by

excessive tread braking.

What steps have the passenger rail

industry taken to prevent wheel damage

due to over braking? What wheel

thermal problems continue to occur in

the field? How should thermal limits on

wheels and discs be handled in safety

regulations?

Tiered Equipment Design Standards

Based on Risk Analysis

FRA believes there may be merit in a

tiered approach to equipment safety

standards based on a risk analysis of the

operating environment in which the

equipment will operate. (Tiers are levels

of design requirements determined by

system safety considerations.) The

advantage of such an approach is that it

takes into account system safety factors

other than equipment design that reduce

safety risks. The tiered approach also

readily lends itself to amending the

safety standards for a new type of

service—a new tier could be added

without changing the existing standards.

The disadvantage is that such an

approach can rapidly become very

complex. Further, when applied to

design performance criteria for new

equipment, an excessively tiered

approach could result in purchases of

equipment that might be severely

limited with respect to its future uses

and marketability.

For simplicity, FRA had initially

envisioned tiered safety standards based

on operating speed alone. FRA

suggested the following logical break

points to the Working Group for tiered

equipment standards:

• Level 1—up to 30 mph—Tourist

and Excursion Railroads.

• Level 2—up to 79 mph—

Conventional Passenger Operations.

• Level 3—up to 125 mph—

Intermediate Speed Operations.

• Level 4—up to 150 mph—High

Speed Operations.

However, discussions with the Working

Group highlighted several objections to

this approach based on tiering by

maximum operating speed alone.

Conventional intercity passenger trains

operated by Amtrak, powered by dieselelectric locomotives, frequently operate

at speeds up to 90 mph, and commuter

railroads provide ‘‘conventional’’

service at speeds up to 110 mph. Both

Amtrak and commuter railroads

expressed a strong opinion that their

‘‘conventional’’ equipment had proven

itself capable of operating safely at

‘‘intermediate’’ speeds.

The majority of the Working Group

has expressed a preference for only two

tiers of equipment standards for

intercity and commuter service, and for

basing the criteria for distinguishing

between the tiers on a system safety

approach rather than solely on operating

speed. As a result, the discussion of

tiered safety standards that follows

centers around a two-tiered approach.

FRA recognizes that approaches

containing more than two tiers may be

desirable. Accordingly, FRA will

carefully consider alternate approaches

received in response to this ANPRM

that contain more than two tiers of

safety standards. Such alternate

approaches should attempt to explain

the safety/economic advantages of safety

standards based on more than two tiers,

and should attempt to define and state

the logic behind the criteria used to

distinguish between these tiers. (A

formal vote by the Working Group on

the number of tiers to use has not been

taken. Amtrak can envision the need for

at least three tiers, as specified in the

introduction of Appendix B.)

The basic concept behind a system

safety approach for tiering is that safety

risks can be reduced by controlling any

number of operating environment

factors in addition to equipment design,

inspection, testing, and maintenance.

Factors that should be considered when

performing a risk analysis to determine

the correct tier of equipment

requirements include:

(1) Maximum operating speed;

(2) Presence of at-grade rail crossings;

(3) Type of protection at highway

grade crossings;

(4) Number of at-grade rail crossings;

(5) Current and projected train traffic

densities;

(6) Capabilities of current and

planned signal systems;

(7) Tracks shared with freight trains;

(8) Shared rights-of-way with freight

or light rail type operations;

(9) Wayside structures; and

(10) Special right-of-way safety

features such as track separation

distance, barriers or track obstruction

detection systems.

If the risk analysis shows that the type

of operation or non-equipment safety

features result in a very low risk

operation, less restrictive—or Tier I—

equipment safety standards would be

appropriate. If the risk analysis shows a

higher risk of operation due to higher

operating speeds, traffic densities, or

some other factor, Tier II equipment

safety standards—which reduce risk

more than Tier I standards—would be

used. A good example of a risk analysis

of a passenger railroad operating

environment is provided in a report

prepared by ADL under contract to

Amtrak, entitled ‘‘Northeast Corridor

Risk Assessment’’ (August 26, 1994). A

copy of this report is included in the

docket.

One of the factors that will make an

approach to equipment safety standards

based on risk assessment difficult to

implement is that the industry must

quantify and make public the degree of

risk that is considered acceptable. Is the

level of risk per billion highway

passenger miles the criterion? Is the

level of risk per billion passenger miles

in scheduled air carrier service the

criterion?

FRA seeks industry comments on a

tiered approach or alternate approaches

to passenger equipment safety

standards. Does the initial approach of

speed break points suggested by FRA

make sense? What would be the impact

of imposing this set of break points?

What existing commuter operations

would be caught between conventional

and intermediate speed standards?

Should FRA grandfather the current

equipment providing this service and

apply the more stringent standards only

to the new or refurbished equipment

procured to provide service in this

speed range? Should FRA also

grandfather all of Amtrak’s equipment

providing service at speeds greater than

79 mph? Should other sets of break

points be considered? If so, which and

why? What should be the major change

in equipment safety standards at each

break point? What problems could be

caused by the approach to

grandfathering current equipment

operating in each speed range?

Rather than the initial FRA approach,

does the concept of tiered standards

based on the outcome of a risk analysis

make sense? Would such an approach

be too complex? Is the industry willing

to undertake the thorough risk analysis

process necessary to make such an

approach effective? What would the

industry use as an acceptable level of

risk to determine break points between

tiers of requirements?

The discussion of possible safety

standards that follows is based on a twotiered approach. The question of exactly

how to draw the line between the two

tiers of requirements is not answered.

For purposes of discussion, Tier I

requirements are broadly applied to

operations with a known low risk or

record of proven safe operation, e.g.,

passenger equipment operating at

speeds of 110 mph or less. Tier II

requirements are broadly applied to

higher risk operating environments, e.g.,

Amtrak’s planned operation at 150 mph

in the Northeast Corridor or perhaps
Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 117 / Monday June 17, 1996 / Proposed Rules 30691

cab-car-forward operations under some

sets of higher risk operating conditions.

Although the discussion of possible

safety standards that follows is based on

a two-tiered approach, this does not

mean FRA assumes a proposed rule will

be based on two tiers. A discussion of

a two-tiered approach serves only as the

simplest means to present the concept

of tiering. FRA remains open to

alternate concepts based on more than

two tiers, or concepts that define the

break point between two tiers

differently.

FRA recognizes the need to handle

special equipment such as that operated

by tourist and excursion railroads and

private passengers cars outside this twotiered system.

FRA also recognizes the possible

future need for a third tier for

equipment intended to operate at very

high speeds—in excess of 150 mph.

However, operations at such speeds

would be considered only on dedicated

rights-of-way with no at-grade highway

or rail crossings. In such instances, FRA

will review equipment safety criteria as

an integral part of an overall system

safety program, issuing a rule of

particular applicability.

Discussion of Possible Safety Standards

Basis for Safety Parameters Under

Consideration

In preparation for rulemaking, FRA

considered the service history of general

system railroads in the United States,

research and technical advice from the

Volpe Center (incorporating learning

from human trauma studies in other

modes of transportation), staff analysis,

and learning gleaned from extensive

consultations with knowledgeable

persons (both within the United States

and abroad) over several years of study.

In addition, FRA has worked with

Amtrak to develop safety features

incorporated into Amtrak’s specification

for high-speed trainsets.

Safety features suggested by FRA to

Amtrak for high-speed trainsets—

intended for use in the mixed

passenger/freight environment—serve as

the basis for sample safety parameters

used by FRA to evoke a discussion of

Tier II equipment safety standards.

Current North American passenger rail

safety practice, recent NTSB

recommendations, and selective use of

requirements gleaned from

recommendations made to Amtrak for

high-speed trainsets serve as the basis

for the sample safety parameters used to

evoke a discussion of safety standards

appropriate for a less challenging

operating environment (Tier I

equipment standards).

FRA made both Tier I and Tier II

equipment safety concepts available to

the Working Group for discussion and

consideration. The safety parameters

contained in these concepts draw upon

AAR Specification S–580 for locomotive

crashworthiness, existing regulations

(49 CFR Part 229), NTSB

recommendations, and an analysis of

the forces produced as a result of

realistic collision scenarios.

Appendix B outlines safety

parameters provided for consideration

for Tier I and Tier II equipment. Given

that Tier II equipment is intended to

operate in an environment that can

create a greater safety risk than Tier I

equipment, most Tier I parameters

outlined in Appendix B also become

Tier II parameters. To simplify the task

of responding to this ANPRM,

Appendix B contains only those Tier II

requirements that are in addition to, or

different from, Tier I requirements.

It is emphasized that neither FRA nor

the Working Group has endorsed these

safety parameters, except to the extent

that they mirror existing regulations.

FRA is not proposing their adoption;

rather, FRA makes available for

discussion the results of efforts by the

technical staff to identify safety risks

and to suggest possible means to

address these risks.

While the basis for many of the safety

parameters suggested for discussion will

be self evident, certain of the more

novel concepts warrant explanation.

The following discussion addresses that

need.

Limiting initial decelerations of

passengers to 6g maximum and 4g

average—as suggested in Appendix B—

is based on automobile crashworthiness

research. These decelerations are

identified as levels that unrestrained

people are likely to survive if the

interior of the vehicle is designed to

mitigate secondary impacts (i.e., the

compartmentalization design strategy).

Analysis shows peak longitudinal

deceleration of the occupied spaces of

coach cars protected by a leading or

trailing locomotive or power car is

expected to be approximately 8g for a

train-to-train collision at a speed in

excess of 30 mph. Greater collision

speed does not significantly increase the

peak deceleration of the occupied coach

volume, but it does increase the time

over which the occupied volume is

decelerated.

During the collision, unrestrained

occupants of such a coach will be

thrown into interior fixtures, such as

seatbacks, with a force substantially

greater than that associated solely with

the deceleration of the train. This

increase in force is due to the occupant

striking the interior at a relative speed

of up to 25 mph. If the seat is to remain

attached during a train-to-train collision

in excess of 35 mph, simulation analysis

indicates that coach seat attachment

strength must be able to resist the

inertial force of 8g acting on the mass

of the seat plus the impact force of the

mass of the passenger(s) being

decelerated from a relative speed of 25

mph.

FRA believes that sufficient potential

crush distance is available in singlelevel equipment with end vestibules

such that good crash energy

management design can achieve the 6gmaximum and 4g-average limits for

passengers (other than those riding in a

leading control cab) even for a highspeed crash scenario. Other equipment

types (bi-level, gallery, and food service

with no vestibules) need to be studied

to determine the limits of potential

crush distance.

On the other hand, FRA recognizes

the difficulty in limiting the initial

deceleration of the crew in the cab to a

survivable level during a high-speed

collision because little unoccupied

crush space is available forward of the

control cab. As a result, Appendix B

contains a design goal of limiting

decelerations on the crew in the cab to

24g maximum and 16g average for the

first 250 milliseconds of the crash pulse.

(The 250-millisecond duration was

selected as the time required for people

to make their initial impact with an

interior surface and be pinned by inertia

against that surface. After this time, the

peak deceleration can be greatly

increased without causing extensive

injuries.) Based on analysis results, the

peak deceleration of a leading control

cab is approximately 12g. Analysis

indicates that this peak deceleration

does not increase as collision speed

increases, but it does increase the time

over which this peak deceleration is

exerted on the cab. During the collision,

unrestrained crew members may be

thrown against the interior of the cab

with a force substantially greater than

that associated solely with the

deceleration of the train. This increase

in force is due to the crew member

striking an interior surface or object at

a relative speed of up to 25 mph.

Decelerations of this magnitude require

restraint systems or a crash refuge to

protect the crew in the cab.

FRA believes that many crash

survivability issues can be resolved

without great difficulty. However,

protecting persons from secondary

impacts is a considerable challenge. To

limit the decelerations of people to

survivable levels, high-speed trainsets
30692 Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 117 / Monday June 17, 1996 / Proposed Rules

must be designed with a crash energy

management feature.

The greater the crush distance that

can intentionally be designed into the

trainset before reaching an occupied

volume, the more survivable a collision

will be. In equipment operated with a

cab car forward, the control cab is

necessarily near the leading surface of

the trainset, so very little crush distance

is available to protect people in the cab.

As a result, the decelerations of people

will be large, resulting in more

numerous and more severe injuries.

An argument presented against

increases in structural strength

requirements for new passenger

equipment is that the new equipment

would be a hazard to existing passenger

equipment operating in the same

corridor. This argument is based, in

part, on a 1972 rear-end collision

between two passenger trains in

Chicago. In this collision, an older,

heavier car climbed over a newer car of

lighter construction, telescoping into the

passenger compartment of the lighter

car, resulting in the deaths of many

people.

Some have contended that increased

structural strength for new passenger

equipment would create an equivalent

incompatible situation between new

equipment and existing equipment.

However, several differences between

the situation in 1972 and today refute

this argument. Today’s passenger

equipment has collision posts,

anticlimbers, and strong truck-to-car

body attachments—all intended to

prevent climbing and telescoping. In

addition, both existing equipment and

new equipment will have the same basic

static end strength (backbone). While

new equipment may have a more

substantial end structure, the crash

energy management system will cause

this end structure to be pushed back

into the unoccupied space of the new

equipment rather than forward into the

existing equipment. Alternatively, some

of the end structure strength

characteristics might be placed inboard

of the crush zones.

Once the crash energy management

system crush distance is consumed, the

full height of the collision posts and

corner posts recommended for the new

equipment will likely deflect the older

equipment up over the new equipment

rather than creating a telescoping

situation. The fears expressed are

therefore unlikely to materialize.

The basis of the concern for side

impact strength and the point of

application of side impact forces stems

from two facts:

(1) Approximately 25 percent of all

highway-rail crossing accidents involve

a highway vehicle striking the side of a

train; and

(2) Designs of some passenger

equipment have floor levels low to the

rail, creating the tendency for a heavy

highway vehicle striking the side of the

train to climb into the occupied

passenger volume rather than being

driven under the underframe of the

passenger rail car.

Analysis shows that current singlelevel intercity passenger coach

equipment is sufficiently strong, and

will derail in collision scenarios similar

to that described above before a

significant amount of crushing of the

occupied passenger volume occurs. FRA

believes that future equipment should

perform at least as well as current

equipment in such collisions, and that

a need exists to specify minimum side

impact protection for rail cars with low

floor levels such as bi-level equipment.

Other scenarios where reasonable side

strength may be of value include side

impacts at switches and at railroad

crossing diamonds (when e.g., a single

freight car rolls free during switching).

A proposed concept for a side impact

strength design requirement involves

the ability of a car body to withstand—

with limited deformation of the car

body structure—the load applied by a

loaded tractor trailer travelling at a

selected speed which collides with the

side of the car over an area and at a

height typical of tractor trailer bumpers.

What specific parameters should be

used to implement this concept, or what

alternate concepts can be proposed for

a side impact strength design

requirement?

FRA’s concern for a minimum

rollover strength requirement is based

on accidents such as that which

occurred to Amtrak’s Lakeshore Limited

in January 1994. The train derailed

while travelling from Albany, New

York, to Chicago, and several cars rolled

down an embankment. Very little

crushing of the occupied volumes of any

of the cars involved occurred. The

current design of single-level intercity

passenger cars generally performs well

when subjected to the impact loads

associated with tipping on a side or

rolling onto its roof from an upright

position. While these loads may vary

significantly depending upon the nature

of the wayside where the rolling occurs,

FRA believes that passenger cars should

have minimum side strength and roof

strength to help minimize the loss of

occupied volume should a rollover

occur. FRA also believes that

locomotives and power cars should

have sufficient side and roof structural

strength to minimize loss of volume in

the operator’s cab under such

conditions.

The sections of this ANPRM

addressing design standards seek input

from the industry on how to take

advantage of the safety improvements

offered by a crash energy management

design approach for future passenger

equipment.

Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance

Requirements

Pre-Departure or Daily Safety

Inspections

A pre-departure or daily safety

inspection is an essential element of a

system safety program for all trains that

carry passengers. The pre-departure or

daily inspection should include the

steps necessary to ensure the train

departs without mechanical, electrical,

or electronic defects that could degrade

the safe operation of the train.

Amtrak has voluntarily implemented

a pre-departure safety inspection of all

passenger trains. Amtrak developed the

inspection procedures in close

cooperation with FRA. The procedures

combine a power brake inspection and

test, a mechanical inspection similar to

that required for freight cars, a safety

appliance inspection, and spot checks

by supervisors. Amtrak has been using

these procedures since April 1994, and

they do not appear to have an adverse

impact on train schedule. Appendix C

contains a copy of the inspection

procedures used by Amtrak. These

inspection procedures are offered as an

example only. They are not a general

solution to how to conduct predeparture safety inspections of

passenger trains.

Using the Amtrak procedures as a

starting point, FRA solicits comments

on how these procedures need to be

tailored to fit the needs of each segment

of the industry. What train schedule

impacts will result from implementing a

pre-departure or daily safety inspection

program? Does FRA need to be made

aware of any circumstances or reasons

for not performing a pre-departure or

daily safety inspection? What range of

options should an operating railroad

have when the safety inspection

uncovers a defect? How should any

proposed safety standards take into

account and encourage the potential

that technology provides to automate

pre-departure or daily inspections of

future equipment? As automated

features are added to passenger trains,

does a train information system that

records and logs inspection and test

results and maintenance status make

sense?
Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 117 / Monday June 17, 1996 / Proposed Rules 30693

In terms of labor, materials, etc., what

additional resources would each

operator need to perform a predeparture inspection equivalent to

Amtrak’s? How many pre-departure or

daily inspections are performed

annually by each operator? What

potential safety benefits could result

from performing inspections equivalent

to Amtrak’s? Please explain or

document estimates. For those currently

performing inspections, what additional

benefits could be realized by modifying

those inspection procedures to meet

Amtrak’s? Please explain or document.

Tourist, Museum, and Other Special or

Unusual Equipment

FRA recognizes that most tourist

railroads are small businesses operating

older equipment on a limited budget. As

a basis for discussion, FRA postulates a

simple system safety program for

excursion and tourist railroads based

on:

(1) A pre-departure safety inspection

that takes into account the type of

equipment being used;

(2) A periodic testing and

maintenance program based on the type

of equipment and the extent of its use;

and

(3) Minimum qualifications for

inspectors and maintenance personnel

to ensure that they have the knowledge

necessary to perform safety-critical

tasks.

FRA needs the tourist and excursion

railroad industry to address the

following questions: What are the effects

of such a simple system safety program

on tourist and excursion railroad

operations? How can the requirements

for a pre-departure safety inspection be

written so they are enforceable but

provide necessary flexibility?

Information available to FRA

indicates that there are approximately

100 excursion railroads subject to FRA

jurisdiction, operating about 250

locomotives and 1,000 passenger cars. Is

this information correct? What size

crews operate excursion and tourist

trains? What is the average annual

passenger car mileage for tourist and

excursion railroads? What human and

physical resources are available to these

railroads for inspection and

maintenance of equipment?

What potential safety benefits are

available from the proposed standards

for tourist and excursion railroads? To

what extent will they be realized under

the proposal? Please explain.

FRA also solicits comments from the

tourist and excursion railroad industry

on how passenger equipment safety

standards may impact them in

unintended ways.

Private Passenger Cars

FRA believes a private passenger car

should be held to the same basic

inspection standards as the other

equipment being hauled in the train

hauling the private car. However, FRA

intends to take into account the

financial burden imposed by requiring

private passenger car owners to modify

their equipment to meet any new design

standards included as part of proposed

passenger equipment safety standards.

FRA needs private passenger car

owners to address the following

questions as part of their response to

this ANPRM: What minimum set of

inspection requirements should host

operators impose on private passenger

cars? How should these minimum

standards be incorporated into Federal

regulations? What effects are foreseen

from the proposed passenger equipment

safety regulations on the ability to

operate this equipment? Take care to

point out all potential unintended

impacts.

How many private passenger cars are

in operation? On average, how many

miles do private passenger cars travel

annually? What potential safety benefits

are available from the proposed

standards for private passenger cars

operators? To what extent will they be

realized under the proposal? Please

explain.

Tier I Equipment

FRA believes standards for predeparture and daily inspections of Tier

I equipment should take into account

the type of equipment being used and

the type of service. Pre-departure safety

inspection and test criteria implemented

by Amtrak should be considered as a

guide for developing a set of core

inspection criteria for incorporation into

Federal safety standards for Tier I

equipment. These inspection criteria are

given as Appendix C.

FRA recommends that each operator

of passenger equipment use these

criteria as a guide, and comment on how

similar criteria could be—or have

been—implemented as part of its

operation. Members of APTA are

encouraged to comment through the

APTA members on the Working Group.

FRA recognizes that the pre-departure

inspection need not be a complete safety

inspection. The combination of the

daily and the pre-departure inspections

should be considered the complete

safety inspection of the train.

To what extent would daily and predeparture inspections vary from current

practice? To what extent would these

requirements impact passenger

operations? How can the requirements

for pre-departure and daily safety

inspections be written so they are

enforceable but provide the flexibility

required to meet service requirements,

hold down costs, and encourage

innovation?

Tier II Equipment

Since Tier II equipment will be

designed for operation in higher risk

and/or consequence operating

environments, FRA believes the safety

inspection program to be used with the

equipment should be developed from a

thorough risk analysis done as part of

the system safety program. This risk

analysis should result in a set of

inspection criteria, tasks, intervals, and

skills required to develop a safety

inspection program that reduces the

overall risk of operation to an acceptable

level.

Planned Testing, Preventive

Maintenance, and Personnel

Qualification Requirements

FRA believes planned testing and

preventive maintenance requirements of

safety-critical systems or components—

triggered by time, mileage, or some

other key reliability/safety parameter—

are also an essential feature of a system

safety program. A key step in the system

safety program is to perform a reliability

analysis or use accumulated reliability

data to determine the planned tests and

preventive maintenance tasks—as well

as what should trigger them—that are

required to maintain a safe operation.

The system safety plan should also

include an approach to accumulate the

data necessary to justify changes in

maintenance approaches or intervals for

safety-critical systems and components.

Most passenger equipment operators

already have testing and maintenance

requirements for their equipment,

though the extent to which they are

based on formalized risk analysis is not

clear. FRA searches for a means to

ensure that all industry system safety

programs include preventive

maintenance and planned testing

requirements while allowing the

industry the flexibility needed to cope

with various operating environments.

FRA also recognizes the desirability of

allowing maintenance or testing

intervals to be changed based on

accumulated operating experience with

the equipment.

Currently, what equipment is tested

and maintained periodically? How often

(in terms of miles, time, or other

parameters) is this equipment tested and

maintained? How can standards be

structured to allow testing or

maintenance intervals to be changed

based on either good or bad operating
30694 Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 117 / Monday June 17, 1996 / Proposed Rules

experience while maintaining adequate

safety margins? What do periodic tests

and maintenance currently entail—

labor, materials, etc.? What benefit(s)

would be associated with a periodic

testing and maintenance requirement?

Please explain.

FRA views the skills and knowledge

of the people responsible for

inspections, testing, and maintenance as

one of the most important requisites of

an effective system safety program. FRA

seeks a means for passenger equipment

operators to demonstrate that the people

performing crucial safety inspections

and maintenance tasks—whether they

be mechanical forces or train crews—

have the current knowledge and skills

necessary for their jobs. As equipment

incorporating new technology—to

include remote sensing and automated

testing—comes into widespread use, a

better trained inspection and

maintenance workforce will be required

and minimum qualification standards

will become more important.

GAO Report RCED–93–68

‘‘Improvements Needed for Employees

Who Inspect and Maintain Rail

Equipment’’ highlights some of the

concerns regarding the knowledge and

training of personnel performing safetycritical tasks. GAO concludes that

training programs for mechanical

employees and foremen have

weaknesses that leave passenger

railroads vulnerable to skill shortfalls in

the inspection, testing, and maintenance

workforce. GAO points out that the

personnel who inspect, test, and

maintain European high-speed

passenger trains receive much more

training and generally are more skilled

than their American counterparts.

European railroads require mechanical

employees either to pass an examination

or to demonstrate their proficiency. An

internal FRA assessment confirms the

findings of this GAO report. Copies of

both the GAO report and the internal

FRA report documenting this

assessment have been placed in the

docket.

FRA seeks comment from all

segments of the industry on how to

require passenger equipment operators

to demonstrate that the people (whether

employees or contractors) performing

safety-critical tasks have the knowledge

and skills to do so. FRA does not wish

to mandate specific training programs or

experience requirements; FRA believes

that these details are the purview of

each individual operator and that each

railroad should establish the minimum

training and qualification requirements

based on the equipment being operated.

However, an important feature of

proposed passenger equipment safety

standards will be a means to measure or

to demonstrate the effectiveness of

individual training programs. Unless

people with the necessary knowledge

and skill perform safety-critical tasks,

passenger equipment operators cannot

have an effective system safety program.

How should the proposed safety

standards be structured to ensure that

each operator meets this important

responsibility to demonstrate the skills

and knowledge of personnel that

perform safety-critical tasks on

passenger equipment? Currently, how

many employees/contractors are

involved in inspecting, testing, and

maintaining a passenger car or

locomotive? How many of these people

are mechanical personnel? Are there

established minimum training and

qualification requirements for

employees and contractors performing

inspections, tests, and maintenance?

Approximately how many labor hours

does each passenger service operator

spend each year on these activities?

What are the potential benefits of

increased training in periodic testing

and maintenance? To what extent are

expenditures on such training cost

effective? Historically, does this type of

training produce identifiable safety

benefits? Please explain.

Tourist, Museum, and Other Special or

Unusual Equipment

FRA believes that tourist and

excursion railroads, museums, and

other operators of special or unusual

equipment that carry passengers should

have:

(1) A planned testing program;

(2) A preventive maintenance

program keyed to mileage, time, or some

other triggering parameter; and

(3) A means to demonstrate that the

people carrying out these programs have

the knowledge and skills necessary to

correctly perform the safety-critical

tasks identified as part of these

programs.

FRA seeks to establish a minimum

program for operators of special or

unusual equipment that takes into

account the resource constraints placed

on these operators, and yet recognizes

that even equipment operated for short

distances and at low speeds requires

periodic maintenance attention by

skilled individuals to maintain safety.

What should be the basis for

scheduling planned tests and preventive

maintenance, and what crucial tasks

need to be performed? How should

tourist and excursion railroads

demonstrate to FRA that personnel

performing safety-critical tasks have the

knowledge necessary to do the job?

Private Passenger Cars

FRA believes that a private passenger

car should be held to the same basic

planned testing and preventive

maintenance standards as the other

equipment being hauled in the train

hauling the private car. However, FRA

anticipates that since private passenger

cars tend not to be highly used

equipment, the events that trigger

planned tests or preventive maintenance

(mileage, time, etc.) will occur less

frequently than for equipment in

regularly scheduled passenger or

commuter service.

Since private passenger cars tend to

be vintage equipment with parts, and

testing and maintenance procedures that

are no longer common in the rail

passenger industry, the knowledge and

skills necessary to conduct an effective

planned testing and preventive

maintenance program are likely to be

possessed by only a few individuals.

What minimum set of planned testing

and preventive maintenance

requirements should host operators

impose on private passenger cars? How

should these minimum standards be

incorporated into Federal regulations?

What should be the basis for scheduling

planned tests and preventive

maintenance for private passenger cars,

and what critical tasks need to be

performed? How should owners of

private passenger cars demonstrate to

FRA that personnel performing safetycritical tasks have the knowledge

necessary to do the job? To what extent

does any third party monitor the quality

of work performed on passenger cars by

contract shops? (Amtrak currently

operates a certification process for

private passenger cars that desire to

operate in Amtrak trains.)

Tier I Equipment

Since Tier I equipment will very

likely be traditionally designed

equipment that operates in

environments with which railroads have

a wealth of experience, planned testing

and preventive maintenance programs

should be based on that experience with

the type of equipment and its extent of

use. Operators of Tier I equipment

should have a planned testing and

maintenance program based on

operating experience with the

equipment. Changes to the program

would also be based on operating

experience.

As part of the operating experience on

Tier I equipment, railroads need to

identify the safety-critical maintenance

tasks and the skills required to perform

them. Railroads must use this

knowledge to develop a training
Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 117 / Monday June 17, 1996 / Proposed Rules 30695

program to ensure inspection and

maintenance personnel have these skills

and are able to demonstrate them.

What should be the basis for

scheduling planned tests and preventive

maintenance for Tier I equipment? What

critical tasks need to be performed?

How should railroads demonstrate to

FRA that personnel performing safetycritical tasks on Tier I equipment have

the knowledge necessary to do the job?

Tier II Equipment

Because Tier II equipment will be

new equipment designed for operation

in higher risk operating environments,

FRA believes the planned testing and

preventive maintenance program for

safety-critical systems and components

should be developed from a thorough

risk analysis done as part of the system

safety program. This risk analysis

should result in a set of planned testing

and preventive maintenance criteria,

tasks, intervals, and skills required to

develop a program that reduces the

overall risk of operation to an acceptable

level. What is an acceptable level of risk

in developing risk-based performance

standards for this type of equipment?

Equipment Design Standards

Standards for Tier I Equipment

Current passenger equipment has

certainly demonstrated its ability to

operate safely at speeds up to 125 mph.

However, the design of this equipment

is largely based on loose industry

standards that are no longer actively

maintained or enforced. The design of

new Tier I passenger equipment should

not be left to a collection of similarly

loose standards. A practical approach to

establish minimum safety standards for

new Tier I equipment would be to

consolidate current safety related design

standards or industry practices directly

into the new regulation.

FRA believes train operation has

significantly changed since the design

requirements in 49 CFR 229.141 for

trains of total empty weight of less than

600,000 pounds and AAR Specification

S–034,‘‘Specification for the

Construction of New Passenger Cars,’’

were first promulgated. Have these

requirements outlived their usefulness,

and should they be eliminated? Would

a regulation based on the compilation of

current North American industry

structural design standards and

practices provide the ‘‘minimum floor’’

crashworthiness requirements for Tier I

equipment?

Initial analysis and computer

modeling by the Volpe Center, using a

lumped-mass model and idealized

force-crush characteristics, predicts the

conventional uniform longitudinal

structural strength design approach to

be as effective as a crash energy

management design approach in

providing protection for passengers and

crew at speeds up to approximately 70

mph. Although crash energy

management design can benefit

passengers of equipment involved in

lower speed collisions, this analysis

suggests that the additional expense of

a crash energy management design may

not be justified for some new Tier I

passenger equipment, depending upon

the upper speed limit in this tier.

The Rail Safety Enforcement and

Review Act (RSERA), Pub. L. No. 102–

365, 106 Stat. 972 (September 3, 1992),

requires FRA to report to the Congress

on the crashworthiness of locomotives

and the effectiveness of AAR

Specification S–580, which is the

current industry standard regarding

crashworthiness of locomotives. Much

of the research and analysis done to

comply with this law can be applied to

head-on and, potentially, rear-end

collisions of passenger trains.

This analysis shows AAR

Specification S–580 provides a

significant increase in crashworthiness

over locomotives built prior to

implementation of this specification.

However, the locomotive collision

computer model developed to support

the RSERA shows a weakness in the

way locomotive builders implement the

S–580 anticlimber requirement. The

model shows—at all but very low

collision speeds—that at the onset of

override, the anticlimber of the

locomotive being overridden is crushed

and sheared or bypassed rather than

loaded vertically by the anticlimber of

the opposing locomotive. Evidence from

several collision investigations tends to

confirm this prediction. Examination of

locomotives and cars equipped with

anticlimbers that have been involved in

collisions where override occurred

shows evidence of bending of the

anticlimber shelf due to high coupler

loads. This bending appears to prevent

the shelf from being capable of resisting

a vertical load. Couplers designed to

break away or load some part of the

structure so that the anticlimber shelf is

not deformed before being required to

resist a vertical load appear to be

necessary to allow the anticlimbers to

function as intended.

FRA believes that if passenger

equipment can be designed to fully

involve (bend but not collapse) the

underframe to resist collision forces

before collision posts or end structures

are loaded, the ability to maintain

uncrushed, survivable volumes will be

maximized. Properly designed

anticlimbers can play an important role

by allowing the significant structural

strength of the underframe to resist the

full collision forces during the initial

phase of an impact. Bending the

underframe before the collision posts or

end structures take over the role of

protecting the cab occupants can

dissipate a large amount of the

collision’s energy that might otherwise

cause crushing of occupied space.

Does other evidence exist to support

or refute this computer model

prediction of anticlimber effectiveness?

What design analysis has been done on

existing anticlimber designs under

dynamic conditions simulating a

collision? Are anticlimber design

changes necessary to ensure that

anticlimbers are loaded vertically as

intended during collisions? Are

practical design concepts available that

may improve anticlimber performance

during collisions? Can anticlimbers be

designed that make bending (but not

collapse) of the underframe likely before

collision posts or end structures are

required to bear significant loads? What

would be the likely costs associated

with alternative designs to ensure that

anticlimbers are loaded vertically

during collisions?

The computer model also predicts

collision post designs currently used by

North American manufacturers exceed

the requirements of AAR S–580 by a

factor of two for freight locomotives—

weight restrictions can prevent such a

large factor of safety in passenger

locomotives—and that this additional

strength provides significant additional

protection to the crew in the cab.

Should a modified version of AAR S–

580 specifying a more effective

anticlimber, stronger and full-height

collision posts, and full-height corner

posts be considered as part of the safety

standards for new conventional

passenger locomotives? What would be

the likely impacts of such a standard on

locomotive weight and performance?

What costs would be associated with

specifying full-height collision posts

and full-height corner posts on

conventional locomotives?

Rather than a standard similar to AAR

S–580, should a unitized type of end

structure with integral collision and

corner posts that extend to the roof line

be considered for a design standard for

conventional passenger locomotives?

Would it be feasible to develop a purer

performance specification for train end

structural strength that allows full

flexibility in the design of structures?

What collision scenarios and forces

should be considered in such an

approach? Such an approach could
30696 Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 117 / Monday June 17, 1996 / Proposed Rules

provide weight and performance

advantages.

Fuel spills are both an environmental

and a safety problem. Fires resulting

from fuel spills can turn a minor

accident into a major event. What is the

experience of passenger railroads with

fuel spills? What clean-up costs have

been incurred? Should all diesel

passenger locomotives—including selfpropelled diesel cars—be equipped with

the type of strengthened fuel tanks that

meet the requirements in Appendix B

proposed for Tier II equipment? If not,

what performance standard should be

used for Tier I diesel passenger

locomotive fuel tanks?

How much would it cost to equip

conventional passenger service

locomotives with the type of

strengthened fuel tanks discussed in

Appendix B? What levels of safety

benefits can be realized from

strengthened fuel tanks? Please explain.

Based on the findings of recent

investigations of accidents involving

passenger trains, several factors have

contributed to the number and the

extent of the injuries suffered. Among

these factors are:

(1) A lack of reliable backup

emergency lighting for coaches;

(2) A lack of means to exit coaches

and locomotives more easily—from both

ends and all compartments—especially

when they are resting on their sides;

(3) Seats that break loose from

attachment points or that rotate; and

(4) Luggage and other objects thrown

about the interior of coaches.

Amtrak believes that existing industry

standards for emergency lighting are

adequate and should become the

Federal standard. NTSB would like a

requirement for securing the batteries

that provide power to emergency lights

so connections to the emergency lights

are not knocked loose during a collision.

During Working Group meetings,

Amtrak pointed out several potential

disadvantages of roof hatches in

passenger equipment because they are

difficult to maintain and are often a

source of leaks. The hatches allow

passengers or trespassers access to the

roof which can be particularly

dangerous in electrified territory.

Amtrak has suggested inclusion of a

clearly marked structural weak spot

where properly equipped emergency

personnel can quickly gain access to the

interior of the coach or locomotive

through the roof as preferable to roof

hatches.

Should Tier I equipment safety

standards include provisions for:

(1) Emergency lighting?

(2) Roof hatches or a clearly identified

structural weak point where properly

equipped emergency personnel can

quickly gain access through the roof?

(3) Minimum strength of seat

attachment?

(4) Minimum strength and enclosed

luggage compartments?

To what extent does passenger

equipment currently have backup power

systems in place? What would it cost to

install a backup power system? What

safety benefits would result from

backup power systems?

How many coach units have backup

emergency lighting? What would it cost

to install a backup emergency lighting

system? What rationale is used to

determine whether a unit will have

backup emergency lighting? To what

extent would potential safety benefits be

realized? Please explain.

What would it cost to install roof

hatches or access areas on cars?

What options exist for enclosing

existing luggage compartments? At what

cost? To what extent would potential

safety benefits be realized from

enclosing luggage compartments? Please

explain.

Safety Glazing

One of the issues addressed by

existing regulations that bears on the

safety of passenger train occupants is

exterior glazing. Because of the

complexity of the issues in this

proceeding, satisfaction with existing

standards, and the need for coordination

with freight interests not represented on

the Working Group, the Working Group

has expressed a reluctance to address

glazing in this proceeding. In order to

determine whether to renew its request

to the Working Group or another

advisory body to examine this issue,

FRA seeks information on incidents of

glazing shattering or spalling that

caused injuries to occupants of

passenger trains. Some perceived

problems with current 49 CFR Part 223

requirements that have come to FRA’s

attention include the following:

(1) The witness plate used for testing

is too thick, allowing spalling of pieces

of glass large enough to cause injury;

(2) The impact test using a 24-pound

cinder block is not repeatable;

(3) Vendors need to be periodically

recertified by an independent testing

laboratory; and

(4) The strength of the framing

arrangement securing the glazing is

neither specified nor tested. (Amtrak

has noted that it currently requires

glazing to be tested in its intended

framing.)

Should FRA revise the glazing

standards for conventional passenger

equipment to:

(1) Require testing with a thinner

witness plate?

(2) Require a more repeatable impact

test? If so, what should the impact test

requirement be?

(3) Require periodic recertification of

vendors by an independent testing

laboratory?

(4) Address the strength of the glazing

frame? If so, how could this be

practically done?

(5) Require increased strength, impact

resistance, or bullet penetration

resistance?

What would the impact on glazing

thickness and weight be if FRA were to

modify Part 223 as suggested above? To

what extent should interior glazing be

considered in this proceeding? Are

appropriate reference standards already

available? What benefits could be

derived from modifying Part 223 as

suggested? What would be the cost to

realize these benefits?

Fire Safety

FRA does not have regulations

covering fire safety of passenger

equipment. Current industry practice is

to follow FRA guidelines published in

the Federal Register on January 17,

1989. (See 54 FR 1837, ‘‘Rail Passenger

Equipment; Reissuance of Guidelines

for Selecting Materials to Improve Their

Fire Safety Characteristics.’’) Fire

resistance, detection, and suppression

technologies have all advanced since

these guidelines were published.

Amtrak follows more stringent

specifications for fire safety than found

in FRA’s guidelines. A trend toward a

systems approach to fire safety is

evident in most countries with modern

rail systems. Are Federal regulations or

more in-depth guidelines needed to:

(1) Prevent fire or retard its growth?

(2) Detect and suppress fire?

(3) Protect occupants from the effects

of fire?

Appendix B

To stimulate thought and generate

discussion on passenger equipment

design standards, FRA is providing for

consideration the detailed set of

equipment design provisions contained

in Appendix B. From experience with

past ANPRM’s, FRA learned that such a

strategy results in more and higher

quality comments on the specific issues

in the proceeding. FRA does not intend

to implement the requirements given in

Appendix B without significant change

based on the deliberations of the

Working Group, supplemented by

information and views received in

response to this notice. FRA strongly

encourages comments on these
Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 117 / Monday June 17, 1996 / Proposed Rules 30697

provisions and proposals for alternative

standards.

Standards for Tier II Equipment

For the past several years, FRA has

held discussions with manufacturers of

foreign high-speed rail equipment

seeking a market for their equipment in

the United States. These manufacturers

sought a clear definition of the

requirements that their equipment must

meet to be allowed to operate in the

United States. Because FRA recognizes

existing North American passenger

equipment standards were not intended

to apply to equipment operating at

speeds significantly over 100 mph, and

because current Federal regulations do

not cover such operations, FRA could

not provide clear guidance. This has

caused confusion, and has led to the

perception that competition for the

American market is risky.

Amtrak has hosted test and revenue

service demonstrations of two foreign,

high-speed trainsets in the United

States. Operating experience gained in

Europe and in the United States with

these trainsets helped place Amtrak in

a position to develop a system

specification to procure trainsets to

operate at speeds up to 150 mph in the

Northeast Corridor. FRA reviewed drafts

of the procurement specification for

these trainsets and made safety-related

recommendations. The resulting

discussions between Amtrak and FRA

highlighted the technical issues that

must be resolved as part of the process

for developing safety standards for highspeed trainsets.

Sample high-speed passenger trainset

design requirements are outlined in

Appendix B. FRA compiled this set of

design requirements to prepare for the

review of Amtrak’s system specification

for high-speed trainsets. FRA developed

this set of proposed requirements based

on discussions with manufacturers and

operators of European equipment,

research done or sponsored by the

Volpe Center, experience gained in

developing a concept for a proposed

rule specifically applicable to the Texas

TGV System, and the results of tests

conducted jointly with Amtrak on highspeed trainsets in the Northeast

Corridor. FRA recognizes that some of

the requirements push the state of the

art. Of particular interest to FRA are

comments on the technical limits of

crash energy management systems and

on how best to define or specify crash

energy management in a set of

performance requirements. FRA

attempted to specify a crash energy

management system by placing limits

on the acceleration experienced by

passengers during the initial phase of a

collision. To design to such a

requirement requires a reference

collision scenario with defined collision

parameters. The advantage of such an

approach is that it is tied directly to the

parameter most responsible for injuries

due to secondary impacts. Can an

approach to designate crash energy

management requirements tied to a

specific design collision scenario be

adequately defined to serve as the basis

for trainset design?

An alternate approach, advocated as

less complex, is to specify the minimum

energy to be absorbed at each location

in the trainset designed to crush before

occupied space crushes. Such an

approach has the advantage of not being

tied to a design based on a collision

scenario. However, FRA believes that

the main value of a crash energy

management design is to increase the

duration of the collision, allowing train

occupants to decelerate more slowly,

and minimize the uncontrolled collapse

of occupied space. The amount of

energy absorbed is of secondary

importance.

FRA also believes that using ability to

absorb energy as a crash energy

management design parameter does not

focus on the real purpose of the crash

energy management system. FRA invites

comments in this area. Is the amount of

energy that can be absorbed in a

collision actually a secondary issue to

slower decelerations and more

controlled collapse?

If ability to absorb energy is used as

the crash energy management system

performance parameter, what are the

limits on controlled crush distance and

energy absorbed that can reasonably be

expected to be achieved? What causes

these limitations? How can a

performance standard based on an

ability to absorb energy be tied to an

ability to decrease the initial

acceleration of train occupants which is

the key parameter for a crash energy

management design? What flexibility is

needed in end-strength requirements of

occupied versus unoccupied volume to

allow effective crash energy

management system design?

A second safety-critical design feature

of key interest to FRA is the strength

and construction of the end frame (or

end structure) of both power cars and

coaches. As noted above, a unitized or

monocoque end structure with vertical

members (collision post(s) and corner

posts) that extend to the roofline, with

significant structural strength where

they are tied into the roofline, may be

capable of protecting crew space more

effectively and with less weight penalty

than more traditional designs. FRA

believes such an end structure may play

a significant role when override occurs

to prevent crushing or penetration of the

occupied volume that it protects. When

combined with an effective crash energy

management design, such an end

structure would be pushed back as a

unit (similar to being mounted on a

spring) through the volume designed to

crush.

Through the Working Group, FRA

will pursue a thoughtful technical

discussion of such an approach

including suggestions on how best to set

performance requirements and

reasonable limits for design strengths.

Should a monocoque end structure—or

equivalent structure—that ties together

the floor, collision posts, corner posts

and roof into a single structure be

required or authorized for high speed

passenger trains? FRA welcomes

proposed alternative approaches

designed to provide equivalent

protection. What costs would be

associated with alternative approaches

designed to prevent crushing or

penetration of the occupied volume in

power and coach cars? Please be

specific in defining the alternative

approach and its cost elements.

A third safety feature that needs a

thorough technical review is how to

design the trainset to stay in line and on

the track during the initial phase of a

collision to give the crash energy

management system an opportunity to

perform its intended function. If the

trainset buckles laterally and leaves the

track too soon, volumes designed to

crush will not be crushed, resulting in

higher decelerations of occupants, and

possibly negating the significant

structural protection provided by end

structures. If the trainset buckles

vertically causing early override, the

protection provided by the underframe

may be bypassed. A discussion of the

design innovations necessary to delay

buckling of the trainset as long as

possible is needed.

What practical design techniques

exist to delay either lateral or vertical

buckling of passenger trainsets involved

in collisions? How much would

installation of alternative buckling delay

systems cost in terms of labor hours and

materials?

As train speed increases, the human

decision and reaction time necessary to

avoid potential calamity decreases.

Automatic control techniques that

briefly take the operator out of the

control loop are a means to eliminate

the human decision and reaction delays

in situations where taking quick and

positive action can be crucial. FRA

believes technology can allow safetycritical parameters pertaining to the

following high-speed trainset
30698 Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 117 / Monday June 17, 1996 / Proposed Rules

3 ‘‘Train Crashworthiness Design for Occupant

Survivability.’’ See note 2.

4 ‘‘Locomotive Crashworthiness Research,’’

Volumes 1–4, DOT–VNTSC–FRA–95–4.1, Final

Report July, 1995.

subsystems or events to be monitored by

remote sensors:

(1) Truck hunting;

(2) Dynamic brake status;

(3) Friction brake status;

(4) Fire detection;

(5) Head-end power status;

(6) Alerter;

(7) Horn and bell;

(8) Wheel slip and wheel slide

control; and

(9) Tilt control system, if equipped.

FRA intends to require monitoring of

dynamic brake status. If the friction

brake of the trainset is designed to be

able to safely handle the entire braking

load without assistance from the

dynamic brake, the dynamic brake may

not be considered a primary safetycritical system.

FRA considered including bearing

overheat in the above list. However, the

Working Group cautioned FRA that onboard bearing sensors have proven to be

unreliable. In the Working Group’s

view, until on-board bearing sensor

technology matures, the industry will

continue to rely on wayside bearing

overheat detection.

Should automatic monitoring for each

of the above events/subsystems be

required? Do other safety-critical

subsystems/events lend themselves to

monitoring by remote sensors? Could

safety be enhanced by requiring an

automatic response from the train

control system—such as slowing the

train—when a monitored parameter falls

outside pre-determined safe limits?

Which events/subsystems are prime

candidates for some form of initial

automatic response followed by a return

to operator or manual control?

Seat arrangement design and

passenger restraint systems have a

potential to reduce the number and the

extent of injuries in the event of a

passenger train collision. This potential

is present at all speeds, but becomes

greater as speed increases. A copy of a

technical paper 3 published by the Volpe

Center describes a study of the occupant

dynamics and predicted fatalities due to

secondary impact for passengers

involved in train collisions with impact

speeds up to 140 mph. The principal

focus of the paper is on the effectiveness

of alternative strategies for protecting

occupants in train collisions, including

‘‘friendly’’ interior arrangements and

occupant restraints.

Three different interior configurations

were analyzed: forward-facing seats in

rows, facing rows of seats, and facing

rows of seats with a table. Two of these

three configurations—the forward-facing

consecutive rows of seats and the facing

rows of seats—were evaluated with the

occupant unrestrained, restrained with a

seat belt alone, and restrained with a

seat belt and shoulder harness.

The injury criteria used to evaluate

interior performance included Head

Injury Criteria (HIC), chest deceleration,

and axial neck load. Based upon these

criteria, the probability of fatality

resulting from secondary impacts was

evaluated for each of the interior

configurations and restraint systems

modeled.

In some configurations, such as seats

in rows, compartmentalization is shown

to be as effective as a restraint system

for the 50th percentile male occupant

simulated. (As noted earlier,

‘‘compartmentalization’’ is an occupant

protection strategy that requires seats or

restraining barriers to be positioned in

a manner that provides a compact,

cushioned protection zone surrounding

each occupant.) FRA intends to work

closely with the Working Group to

structure requirements for the interior of

new passenger equipment that take

advantage of the compartmentalization

concept.

In cases where occupants are allowed

to travel relatively long distances before

impacting the interior, such as the

facing-seats interior, restrained

occupants have a much greater chance

of survival. Fatalities from secondary

impacts are not expected in any of the

scenarios modeled if the occupant is

restrained with a lap belt and shoulder

harness.

Design approaches for passenger

coaches that exploit this potential are

needed. FRA briefed the Working Group

on this research, and the Working Group

has discussed the advantages and

disadvantages of passenger restraint

systems (primarily lap belts) and coach

interior arrangement design to mitigate

injuries. Effectiveness of restraint

systems can be dependent on the

strength of the seat attachment to the car

body. A possible worst case scenario

exists when a seat containing a belted

passenger is struck from behind by an

unbelted passenger. Such a situation

can require the seat attachment design

to carry a double load.

If the seat is to remain attached under

the above conditions during a train-totrain collision in excess of 35 mph,

analysis indicates that coach-seat

attachment strength must be able to

resist the inertial force of 8g acting on

the mass of the seat, plus the mass of the

belted passenger(s), plus the impact

force of the mass of the passenger(s) in

the following seat being decelerated

from a relative speed of 25 mph against

the seat back.

Should lap belts be required? Should

all seating be rear facing? Should facing

seating be allowed? What are the

advantages and disadvantages of placing

tables between facing seats? What are

reasonable performance requirements

for padding materials? Where should

padding materials be located? What

shock-absorbing characteristics should

be required of padding material? What

padding thicknesses are practical? What

seat attachment strength can reasonably

be expected to be achieved?

What seat configurations do passenger

cars operating at speeds greater than 80

mph have? If configurations vary, please

explain the differences and the reasons

for the variations. How many seats does

the average passenger car have? If there

is no such thing as an average passenger

car, how many seats do the different

types of passenger cars have? How many

cars of different types are there?

What costs would be involved with

installing lap belts, shoulder harnesses,

and other safety restraints on passenger

cars? To what extent would safety

benefits be realized from installing

safety restraints? Please explain. A

review of the technical papers placed in

the docket may help with responses to

some of these questions.

Due to the forward location of the

operator of a high-speed passenger train,

he or she is often the person closest to

the point of impact and at most risk

during a collision. Special provisions

are required to protect the operator.

How much crushable space can

practically be located forward of the

operator? Should a lap belt/shoulder

harness combination be provided for

each crew member in the cab? If lap

belts/shoulder harnesses are provided

for crew members, will they wear them?

NTSB has long advocated special

protective crash refuges (protected

areas) for locomotive crew members.

ADL has done computer modeling to

predict the effectiveness of two types of

crash refuge concepts under dynamic

conditions simulating locomotive

collisions. One of these concepts is a

padded trench in the floor of the

locomotive in front of the electrical

cabinets. Such a trench could be

equipped with restraint systems. The

other concept is a seat equipped with a

lap belt and shoulder harness that

rotates and locks in a reverse position

allowing the operator to ride out the

collision in a rear-facing position. (A

report by ADL describing these concepts

is part of the docket.4) Advanced

versions of some European trains
Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 117 / Monday June 17, 1996 / Proposed Rules 30699

employ a concept where the operator’s

position is designed to be pushed to the

rear, relative to the rest of the cab, to

provide the operator additional

protection during a collision. Could any

of these concepts be implemented into

the design of new passenger equipment?

Would they be effective? Would they be

used?

What are some alternative concepts

for the design of such protective

refuges? Are they likely to be effective?

Are they likely to be used? What impact

would they have on locomotive or

power car design? Should FRA require

them as part of high-speed trainset

design requirements? What other,

perhaps more practical means exist to

reduce the vulnerability of the cab crew

to collisions? In terms of time, materials,

and labor, what would installation of

refuges in locomotives cost?

Lack of an accepted, recognized

design tool (computer model) to predict

changes in trainset performance as well

as changes in the ability to protect

people as trainset design parameters are

changed inhibits exploiting new design

techniques that could result in safer

trainsets. Research by the Volpe Center

on the structural response of portions of

the vehicle to the extremely high loads

associated with a collision, and research

by AAR to accurately predict the

performance of suspension systems to

changing track conditions, have

contributed greatly toward the goal of

developing accepted analytical tools.

However, efforts need to be increased

and focused on a common goal.

Because full-scale crash testing of

passenger equipment is prohibitively

expensive, the development of a design

tool that is widely accepted by the

industry is essential. Such a tool could

accelerate investigations of composite

materials that hold promise for

increased strength at less weight than

current materials. A tool of this type

could aid research into utilizing highstrength, light-weight composite

materials and other technologies to

provide operational and safety benefits.

FRA seeks comment from the industry

on what the current state of the art is

regarding modeling techniques for

trainset collisions. Up to what trainset

speeds are current models capable of

predicting the collision mechanics of a

trainset collision? What confidence

levels can be expected with these

models to predict the onset of override

and train set buckling? Are these models

capable of accurately predicting the

acceleration levels in the trainset

throughout the collision, particularly for

the first 250 milliseconds?

FRA also seeks input from the

industry on the potential for such

models to replace full-scale crash

testing. Have the current models that are

being used been validated by full-scale,

partial-scale or component impact

testing? Will it be necessary to validate

new models by test? Are there

limitations as to what type of accident

scenarios existing models are capable of

analyzing?

The accuracy of the modeling

techniques employed is dependent on

the individual vehicle and trainset

crush characteristics used as input to

the models. What means should be used

to quantify large deformation and

dynamic crush characteristics of the

various parts of a trainset? Can this be

achieved through simulation alone? Has

the industry developed dynamic forcedeflection characteristics for existing

North American rolling stock that could

be used as a reference in FRA

crashworthiness studies? If these

characteristics are available, for what

speeds of collision would they be valid?

What are the essential features of such

a modeling tool? How can it be

developed so it will receive wide

acceptance, be credible and be used

within the industry?

FRA outlines a sample set of detailed

design requirements for high-speed

passenger trainsets in Appendix B to

provoke thought and discussion on

these and other technical issues that

need to be resolved to develop highspeed trainset safety standards. As with

the conventional equipment design

standards, FRA is pursuing an

intentional strategy by providing this

level of detail. From experience with

past ANPRM’s, FRA learned that such a

strategy results in more and higher

quality comments. FRA does not intend

to implement the requirements given in

Appendix B without significant change

based on the recommendations of the

Working Group, supplemented by the

information and views obtained in

response to this ANPRM. FRA strongly

encourages comments on these

provisions and proposals for alternative

standards. Again, comments from

interests represented on the Working

Group should, to the maximum extent

possible, be expressed through those

representatives during the Working

Group’s deliberations.

FRA seeks comment from technically

knowledgeable individuals on the initial

set of design standards for high-speed

passenger trainsets outlined in

Appendix B. FRA recognizes that these

standards would preclude operation of

several existing high-speed trainsets in

the United States without structural

design changes. FRA believes that

because these trainsets were designed

for a much less severe operating

environment, and because the American

public demands and deserves the safest

possible transportation system, attention

is warranted for further development of

North American standards. Do

alternative approaches exist to safety

standards for high-speed trainsets that

could provide an equivalent level of

safety at less cost?

Possibility of Design Standards for

Other Tiers of Equipment

Amtrak and some commuter railroads

have a long operating experience safely

running trains of existing equipment at

speeds between 80 and 125 mph. Much

of this equipment is the same

equipment—designed to the same

standards—used for conventional

service (herein defined as service at

speeds less than 80 mph.) This practice

supports the notion that the same set of

design requirements used for

conventional equipment is adequate for

intermediate-speed equipment (i.e.,

equipment designed for service at

speeds up to 125 mph). However,

components wear faster and are subject

to higher dynamic, mechanical, and

thermal stresses at higher speeds.

Perhaps more steps need to be added to

the pre-departure safety inspection for

intermediate-speed equipment. Perhaps

maintenance intervals need to be more

frequent and/or have more tasks

performed as part of the preventive

maintenance program. FRA seeks

information on how inspection, testing,

and maintenance programs for

intermediate-speed equipment should

differ from those used for conventional

equipment.

If the designation between tiers were

based solely on operating speed, design

or performance requirements for

intermediate speed equipment should

logically fall between the requirements

for conventional equipment and the

requirements for high-speed equipment

(i.e., equipment designed for service at

speeds up to 150 mph). Analysis by the

Volpe Center shows a crash energy

management design provides significant

benefits in terms of passenger and crew

protection over conventional designs as

collision speeds increase to over 70

mph. This suggests new intermediatespeed equipment would benefit from a

crash energy management design

approach.

If standards based on more than two

tiers are developed, FRA currently

believes design requirements for new

intermediate-speed equipment should

include the requirements for

conventional equipment and some of

the (possibly modified) requirements for

high-speed equipment. The following

criteria suggested for consideration for
30700 Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 117 / Monday June 17, 1996 / Proposed Rules

5 ‘‘Evaluation of Selected Crashworthiness

Strategies for Passenger Trains’’; ‘‘Train

Crashworthiness Design for Occupant

Survivability.’’ See note 2.

high-speed equipment may have

applicability to intermediate-speed

equipment:

(1) Glazing requirements;

(2) Crash refuge for cab crew;

(3) Crash energy management

system—perhaps to modified

performance standards;

(4) Interior arrangement or restraint

systems to mitigate secondary impacts;

and

(5) Emergency systems.

FRA seeks comment from builders

and operators of intermediate-speed

equipment as to where the design

requirements for such equipment

should be placed on the spectrum

between the design requirements for

conventional equipment and the design

requirements for high-speed equipment.

Design Standards for Systems with

Dedicated Rights-of-Way and No AtGrade Crossings

FRA recognizes that a system safety

program that places emphasis on the

prevention of collisions is highly

desirable. However, fundamental

changes are necessary in the North

American railroad operating

environment before accident prevention

provisions allow equipment structural

design standards to be relaxed. The

main problem is North American

passenger trains generally share, or

operate adjacent to, the rights-of-way

with an ever-increasing number of very

heavy freight trains, and most passenger

rail routes include at-grade crossings

used by heavy highway vehicles. The

risk to passengers and crew members in

this operating environment increases as

passenger train speed increases.

FRA encourages passenger systems to

operate over dedicated rights-of-way

with no at-grade crossings. FRA believes

such systems can potentially provide

the safest means of high-speed

passenger transportation. Should

proposed vehicle crashworthiness

standards be modified for such

operations? If so, to what degree?

Should consideration of equipment

used exclusively on dedicated rights-ofway be undertaken as part of this

proceeding or through a system safety

approach in individual proceedings for

rules of specific applicability?

Discussion of Operating Issues

Commuter Equipment and Operations

FRA is aware that unique features of

some commuter equipment and the

unique operating cycle of commuter

railroads may require specific attention.

Some commuter equipment is stored at

outlying locations overnight to be in

position for the first morning trip into

the major city being served. Mechanical

employees are generally not available at

these outlying locations to do predeparture safety inspections. At those

outlying points where mechanical

employees are not available, an

abbreviated initial daily safety

inspection is generally performed by

train crew members.

During the middle of the day, the pace

of commuter operations generally slows,

and the equipment is brought to a

central location for a more

comprehensive inspection by

mechanical personnel prior to being

dispatched for the evening rush hour.

This reality of the commuter operating

cycle must be taken into account for any

proposed rules governing pre-departure

safety inspections of commuter

equipment. However, where mechanical

employees and facilities are available to

perform the pre-departure inspection, it

must be performed by mechanical

employees. Equipment that receives an

abbreviated inspection by the train crew

at outlying points at the beginning of the

day must receive a complete predeparture inspection by mechanical

employees at the earliest opportunity

during the day.

Some of the MU equipment operated

by commuter railroads is very different

from intercity rail passenger equipment.

FRA needs the help of the operators of

such equipment to identify the

differences that may require special

regulatory treatment to avoid

unintended impacts on commuter

operations. Through participation of

APTA on the Working Group, FRA

anticipates that commuter railroads will

make a special effort to point out unique

operating or equipment features that

should be taken into account to develop

safety standards for commuter

equipment.

Information available to FRA suggests

that nationwide there are about 20

commuter railroads operating roughly

5,400 passenger cars, 400 cab cars, 2,000

multiple unit locomotive pairs, and 400

conventional locomotives. Are these

estimates accurate? What size crews

operate commuter trains?

Approximately how many people stand

on each train? As a result of

implementing the proposed standards,

would commuter operators realize

different levels of safety benefits than

intercity operators? Please explain.

Cab Car Forward and Risk

FRA is concerned regarding operation

of passenger trains with cab cars or MU

locomotives positioned at the head of

the train at high speeds. Such

operations place the train operator and

the passengers in the lead vehicle at

inherently greater risk than operating

the trainset with a locomotive or power

car leading. Current designs of cab cars

and MU locomotives provide little

structural protection to the operator and

forward-most passengers in the event of

a head-on or side-swipe collision. Cab

car locomotives and passenger MU

locomotives are structurally equivalent

from a crashworthiness standpoint.

(Amtrak has noted that not all cab car

locomotives should be considered

equivalent to MU locomotives when the

cab cars are not equipped with stairway

traps in the leading end, such as in the

X2000 train).

Computer modeling of passenger train

collisions at high speeds by the Volpe

Center predicts a dramatic increase in

casualties in head-on collisions of

trainsets operated with a cab car

forward when compared to the same

collision with a power car or locomotive

leading. This prediction is based on a

limited number of hypothetical accident

scenarios. The prediction is not based

on accident statistics. The technical

papers 5 documenting these predictions

are part of the docket.

Recent accidents involving trains

operating with cab cars in the forward

position have heightened FRA’s

concern. On February 9, 1996, a nearhead-on collision occurred between

New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, Inc.,

(NJTR) trains 1254 and 1107 on the

borderline of Secaucus and Jersey City,

New Jersey. Two crewmembers and one

passenger were fatally injured, and an

additional 162 passengers reported

minor injuries. The passenger fatality

and most of the injuries occurred on

train 1254, which was operating with

the cab control car forward and the

locomotive pushing. In addition, the

engineer on train 1254 was fatally

injured.

On February 16, 1996, a near-head-on

collision occurred between Maryland

Mass Transit Administration (MARC)

train 286 and Amtrak train 29 on CSX

Transportation, Inc., at Silver Spring,

Maryland. The MARC train consisted of

a cab control car in the lead, followed

by two passenger coaches and a

locomotive pushing the consist. The

accident resulted in 11 fatalities,

consisting of 3 crewmembers and 8

passengers who were located in the

MARC cab car, and at least 13 non-fatal

injuries to other passengers of the

MARC train.

Following these accidents, FRA

issued Emergency Order No. 20, Notice
Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 117 / Monday June 17, 1996 / Proposed Rules 30701

6 ‘‘Cab Car Crashworthiness Study Final Report,’’

April 1995, Reference 63065.

No. 1, on February 20, 1996, requiring

prompt action to immediately enhance

passenger train operating rules and

emergency egress, and to develop a

more comprehensive interim system

safety plan addressing cab car forward

and MU operations that do not have

either cab signal, automatic train stop,

or automatic train control systems. 61

FR 6876, Feb. 22, 1996. FRA

subsequently issued Notice No. 2 to

Emergency Order No. 20 on February

29, 1996, to refine three aspects of the

original order. 61 FR 8703, Mar. 5, 1996.

NTSB recommends that MU cars and

control cab locomotives be equipped

with corner posts to provide greater

structural protection from a side-swipe

collision. NTSB makes this

recommendation based on the findings

of the investigation of a passenger train

collision that occurred on January 18,

1993, in which Northern Indiana

Commuter Transportation District

(NICTD) eastbound commuter train 7

and NICTD westbound commuter train

12 collided in a corner-to-corner impact

in Gary, Indiana, resulting in 7

passenger fatalities and 95 injuries. The

presence of a gauntlet bridge and

absence of automatic train control

contributed to the cause of this accident.

The damage that both trains sustained

after the initial impact resulted from the

action of dynamic forces that caused the

left front corner and sidewall of the

passenger compartment of each car to

experience a complete structural failure

and intrude inward. Because little

structure was available in the corner

post areas to absorb the forces of the

collision, the substantial car body

intrusion into each car left no survivable

space in the left front areas of either car.

Consequently, NTSB issued Safety

Recommendation R–93–24, which

recommends that:

In cooperation with the Federal Transit

Administration and the American Public

Transit Association, [FRA] study the

feasibility of providing car body corner post

structures on all self-propelled passenger cars

and control cab locomotives to afford

occupant protection during corner collisions.

The RSERA requires FRA to analyze

the crashworthiness of locomotives. As

part of this analysis, the Volpe Center

tasked ADL to do computer modeling of

collisions involving cab cars to predict

the benefit of substantial corner posts.

The docket contains copies of this

report.6 ADL used the following general

approach to evaluate cab car

crashworthiness: Finite element models

for the major structural elements of a

typical cab car were developed and

utilized to compute the load versus

deformation characteristic curves for

major structural elements involved in

collisions. These characteristics were

used as input to the train collision

dynamics model developed previously

for freight locomotives. The collision

dynamics model was modified as

needed to represent a typical passenger

train with a cab car at the head end and

a locomotive at the rear pushing, instead

of a freight train with locomotives at the

head end. The modified models were

then validated by comparison of

predicted results with the actual damage

in documented collisions.

This modeling predicts, for control

cab/MU locomotives of current design,

that when the underframe resists the

forces of collision, a cab car will sustain

substantial loss of survivable volume in

both operator and passenger

compartments in head-on collisions at

closing speeds above 30 mph. The result

of such crush would cause severe injury

or fatality to some of the cab car

occupants.

When the underframe is bypassed and

collision or corner posts resist the forces

of the collision, the cab car will sustain

substantial loss of survivable volume at

collision closing speeds in the 10 to 15

mph range. These predictions

emphasize the importance of designs

that increase the probability that the

underframe will be fully involved in

resisting the forces resulting from a

collision.

ADL took the modeling one step

further by repeating the calculations for

a conceptual cab car with a 50 percent

underframe strength increase and a 400

percent corner post strength increase

over current cab car design practice.

These structural changes increased the

closing speed required to result in a

significant loss of survivable space by

approximately 10 mph. These results

suggest that only a small improvement

in protection is possible through

structural changes for a cab car leading,

train-to-train collision. However, these

structural changes may provide a much

more significant increase in protection

for the less severe scenarios of a grade

crossing collision, a collision with

debris including lading that falls from

freight trains, or a collision with an

object overhanging the track.

Several system characteristics

determine the degree of risk involved in

cab-car-forward or MU equipment

operations. These characteristics

include operating speed, traffic density,

signal system, grade crossings and grade

crossing warning systems (including

barriers to prevent entry onto the

crossing), and right-of-way features. In

addition, the operator of a cab car or MU

equipment often has an opportunity to

exit the control stand area and move

through the passenger compartment

toward the rear of the car when a

collision is impending.

FRA seeks comment focusing on what

is practical and what is economical to

reduce the risk associated with

operating cab cars in the forward

position and operating MU equipment.

FRA poses the following set of questions

to operators and builders of cab car type

equipment: What can be done to

increase the protection provided to the

operator and forwardmost passengers in

a head-on collision with a cab car

leading? Advanced versions of some

European trains employ a concept

where the operator’s position is

designed to be pushed to the rear

relative to the rest of the cab to provide

the operator additional protection

during a collision. Could such a

technique be employed to protect

operators in future North American

equipment? What design changes can be

made to increase the probability that the

underframe will be fully involved in

resisting the collision forces?

Recognizing that structural changes will

have only limited benefit, should speed

restrictions be placed on cab-forward

operations? Should passengers be

prohibited from occupying cab cars

operating above a certain speed when in

a leading position? What would be the

impact of placing speed restrictions on

cab car forward operations? What

mitigating factors may exist that would

alleviate FRA’s concern for the

increased risk associated with cab-carforward operations as speeds increase?

If speed restrictions are placed on cab

car forward operations, what speed

restrictions should be imposed?

What costs and benefits would be

associated with alternatives for

increasing crew and passenger

protection in a head-on collision with a

cab car leading?

Data indicate that at least 400 cab cars

operate as lead units. Is this estimate

accurate? Approximately how many

trips are made each year with cab cars

operating as lead units? At what

maximum speeds do trains operate with

the cab car forward?

FRA estimates that 2,000 MU

locomotive pairs operate as lead units.

Is this estimate accurate? Approximately

how many trips per year involve

multiple unit locomotive pairs?

Combined Passenger and Freight Trains

FRA recognizes that circumstances

exist where freight trains haul passenger

cars and where passenger trains haul

freight cars. For example, freight trains

on occasion include private or business
30702 Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 117 / Monday June 17, 1996 / Proposed Rules

cars, Amtrak trains can include mail

cars, and Amtrak has experimented with

roadrailer-type equipment in passenger

trains. Passenger safety standards

should cover these special situations as

well.

How frequent are such operations?

Are any special safety considerations

necessary for passenger cars hauled by

freight trains or is normal passenger

equipment safety practice adequate for

this special situation? Are any special

safety considerations necessary for

freight-type equipment hauled by

passenger trains or for passenger trains

that haul freight-type equipment.

Station/Platform Boarding and Exiting

Passenger Trains

FRA requests comment on the safety

of persons in station areas, issues

regarding boarding and exiting from

trains, and other issues affecting the

safety of passenger operations. The

following specific issues have come to

FRA’s attention in recent years, and are

illustrative of the concerns that may

warrant examination in this proceeding:

Door Securement

The manner and extent to which end

and side doors are secured varies among

passenger operators. When doors may

be opened with excessive ease, a risk

exists that passengers will unwittingly

fall from moving trains. Of particular

concern is the need to secure passenger

train end doors against casual operation.

However, full, interlocked securement

may greatly complicate evacuation in

emergency situations. In some situations

when a train is departing, the train

doors must be open as it leaves the

station for the crew to observe the

platform area. In some situations when

a train is arriving, the train doors must

also be open to allow trap doors to be

raised to minimize dwell time in

stations not equipped with floor-level

platforms. A signal light that displays

the status of the doors to the crew in the

control cab may have value for

departing trains. Many railroads

currently employ such a display light.

Should passenger car doors be secured

while the train is in motion during

normal operations? What provision

should be made for operation of doors

by passengers in emergency situations?

To what extent does the railroad’s

operating environment (elevated

structures, tunnels, etc.) bear on

resolving this question?

Ground-Level Stations

Ground-level stations are economical

responses to light-density boarding in

both commuter and intercity service.

However, particularly where multiple

tracks are present, the environment

presents the possibility that passengers

may be struck by moving trains.

Attention needs to be directed toward

the design of the interface of the groundlevel station to the train to ensure

passengers can safely board and leave

the train. What station-to-train interface

design features are desirable to

minimize the possibility of injuries

resulting from boarding or departing the

train? What warning is appropriate for

the arrival of passenger trains? Should

movement of freight trains through

stations be announced? What measures

are appropriate to safeguard passenger

movements in stations? What

alternatives have been implemented in

the United States? Internationally? With

what success? What costs are associated

with alternative measures to safeguard

passenger movements in ground level

stations? When is construction of

pedestrian overpasses and fencing

warranted?

Floor-Level Platforms

Station platforms that are elevated to

the level of the passenger car floor

permit prompt boarding and can be

arranged to provide better access for

persons with disabilities. However,

concern has been expressed with regard

to movement of trains through stations

on tracks that are adjacent to platforms.

Attention needs to be directed toward

the design of the interface of the floorlevel platform to the train to ensure

passengers can safely board and leave

the train. What platform-to-train

interface design features are desirable to

minimize the possibility of injuries

resulting from boarding or departing the

train? What warning is appropriate for

the arrival of trains?

High-Speed Movements through

Stations

Express trains often move through

passenger stations without stopping,

sometimes on tracks immediately

adjacent to areas where passengers are

waiting to board local trains. Could

movement of high-speed express trains

through stations present an

unreasonable risk? If so, how could that

risk be mitigated? What measures are

utilized by passenger railroads currently

facing this situation? At what costs can

alternative measures be implemented to

mitigate risks of high-speed express

trains through stations?

Additional Economic Impact

Information

Information available to FRA suggests

that there are about 8,200 passenger cars

and 970 conventional locomotives

dedicated to rail passenger service in

the United States. Is this information

accurate? What ridership levels are

experienced through the year? Would

meeting the new higher standards

described in Appendix B result in

higher fares? If so, how much higher?

Would a decrease in ridership be

anticipated? If so, to what extent? Please

explain the method of estimation. To

which alternative forms of travel would

lost ridership be expected to switch?

How has this conclusion been reached?

What assumptions have been made?

FRA is interested in obtaining copies of

studies or other documentation

addressing the issue of passenger

diversion from rail to other modes of

travel as a result of new rail safety

standards. What factors have the

greatest effect on ridership levels: price,

seat availability, trip time, variability in

trip time, etc.?

Appendix D lists the economic

questions posed by this ANPRM.

Regulatory Impact

FRA will evaluate any proposed

action and its potential impacts to

determine whether it would be

considered significant under Executive

Order 12866 or DOT policies and

procedures (44 FR 11034, Feb. 26,

1979). Due to the substantial impact this

rulemaking may have on a major

transportation safety problem, this

rulemaking is expected to be classified

as significant pursuant to DOT Order

2100.5. FRA will also examine any

proposed action and its potential

impacts to determine whether it will

have a significant economic impact on

a substantial number of small entities

under the provisions of the Regulatory

Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.).

FRA will further evaluate any

proposed rule pursuant to DOT

regulations implementing the National

Environmental Policy Act (42 U.S.C.

432 et seq.).

Any proposed action will be further

evaluated to determine information

collection burdens pursuant to the

Paperwork Reduction Act. Any

proposed action will be evaluated

pursuant to Executive Order 12612 to

determine whether it would have

substantial effects on the states, on the

relationship between the national

government and the states, or on the

distribution of power and

responsibilities among the various

levels of government.

The economic impact of any rule that

may be proposed on the subject of

passenger equipment safety standards

cannot be accurately quantified with the

information currently available to FRA.

An analysis of the economic impact will

be made after evaluating the data
Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 117 / Monday June 17, 1996 / Proposed Rules 30703

submitted in response to this ANPRM,

and the findings of that analysis will be

published as part of any further notices

of rulemaking issued in this matter. In

addition, without fully evaluating the

comments solicited by this ANPRM, it

is impossible to determine what action

FRA will take with regard to the other

areas addressed by this ANPRM, and

thus it is impossible to determine the

economic impact of those changes at

this time. Furthermore, any action taken

by FRA is expected to result in the

prevention or mitigation of accidents,

personal injuries and property damage.

However, until FRA fully considers the

comments requested by this ANPRM

and determines what action it will take,

these benefits cannot be quantified.

Comments and Hearing

FRA solicits the submission of written

comments, which should be filed in

triplicate with the Docket Clerk at the

address provided above. Specific

responses to the questions set forth in

this notice would be appreciated. The

comment period will close on July 9,

1996, so that all comments can be

presented to the Working Group before

its next scheduled meeting in July 1996.

When responding, reference to the topic

or question number in the ANPRM will

ensure full consideration of the

comments submitted.

FRA has not currently scheduled a

public hearing in connection with this

ANPRM. Any interested party desiring

an opportunity for oral comment should

submit a written request to the Docket

Clerk before the end of the comment

period.

Issued in Washington, DC on June 5, 1996.

Jolene M. Molitoris,

Administrator, Federal Railroad

Administration.

Appendix A—Sample System Safety

Plan Elements

The outline that follows describes the

elements of a system safety plan for a safety

program for the development of a new highspeed passenger trainset. Safety programs for

less complex procurements of new

equipment might be greatly simplified

versions of this plan.

General Description

1. The system safety plan shall describe the

system safety program to be conducted as

part of the trainset design process to ensure

all safety-critical issues and Federal safety

requirements are identified and addressed.

2. The system safety program shall ensure

safety issues are treated equal to cost and

performance issues when design trade-offs

are made. The basis for making safety-related

design trade-offs shall be documented.

3. The system safety plan shall be the top

level document—completed as one of the

first design process deliverables—used as

guidance for the development of the

following lower level safety planning and

design guidance documents:

a. Fire Protection Engineering Plan.

b. Software Safety Plan.

c. Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance

Plan.

d. Training Plan.

e. Pre-Revenue Service Acceptance Test

Plan

4. The system safety plan shall describe the

approaches to be taken to accomplish the

following tasks or objectives:

a. Identification of all safety requirements

including Federal requirements governing

the design of the trainset and its supporting

systems.

b. Evaluation of the total system—

including hardware, software, testing and

support activities—to identify known or

potential safety hazards over the entire life

cycle of the equipment.

c. The process to be used to raise safety

issues during design reviews.

d. The process to be used to eliminate or

reduce the risk of the hazards identified.

e. The monitoring and tracking system to

be used to track the progress made toward

resolving safety issues, reducing hazards, and

meeting safety requirements.

f. The development of the testing program

to demonstrate that safety requirements have

been met.

5. The system safety program shall include

periodic safety reviews that result in safety

action items being assigned and tracked.

6. The system safety program shall include

adequate documentation to audit how the

design meets safety requirements and to track

how safety issues were raised and resolved.

7. The system safety plan shall address

how operational limitations may be imposed

if the design cannot meet certain safety

requirements.

Fire Protection Engineering Plan

1. Develop a Fire Protection Engineering

Plan to be used to design adequate fire safety

into the trainset.

2. The Fire Protection Engineering Plan

shall:

a. Require the system developer to

complete a thorough analysis of the fire

protection problem.

b. Require the system developer to use

good fire protection engineering practice as

part of the design of the trainset design

process.

c. Describe and analyze the effectiveness of

the steps to be taken to design the train to

be sufficiently fire resistant to ensure the

detection of a fire and the evacuation of the

train before the fire, smoke or toxic fumes

cause injury to the passengers or crew.

d. Identify, analyze and prioritize the fire

hazards inherent in the design of the trainset.

e. Describe the design approach taken and

justify the design trade-offs made to

minimize the risk of each fire hazard.

f. Present an analysis and propose tests to

demonstrate how the fire protection

engineering approach taken will lead to a

train which meets these fire protection

standards.

g. Be a major subset of the overall System

Safety Plan, and dovetail with the railroad’s

Emergency Preparedness Plan.

h. Present the analysis required to select

materials which provide sufficient fire

resistance to ensure adequate time to detect

the fire and safely evacuate the train. The

system developer shall also propose the tests

to be conducted to demonstrate this analysis

has basis in fact.

i. Present the analysis done to ensure the

ventilation system does not contribute to the

lethality of a fire.

j. Include the analysis performed to

determine which train components require

overheat protection. If overheat protection is

not provided for a component at risk of being

a source of fire, a solid rationale and

justification for the decision shall be

included in the plan.

k. Identify all unoccupied train

compartments which contain equipment or

material which poses a fire hazard, and

analyze the benefit provided from including

a fire or smoke detection system in each

compartment identified. Fire or smoke

detectors shall be installed in compartments

where the analysis determines that they are

necessary to ensure time for safe evacuation

of the train. The analysis shall provide the

reasoning why a fire or smoke detector is not

necessary if the decision is made not to

install one in any of the unoccupied

compartments identified in the plan.

l. Include an analysis of the occupied and

unoccupied spaces which require portable

fire extinguishers. The analysis will include

the proper type and size of fire extinguisher

for each location.

m. Identify all unoccupied train

compartments that contain equipment or

material which poses a fire hazard risk. On

a case-by-case basis, the plan shall analyze

the benefit provided by including a fixed,

automatic fire-suppression system in each

compartment identified. The type and size of

the automatic fire-suppression system for

each necessary application shall be

determined. A fixed, automatic fire

suppression system shall be installed in

compartments where the analysis determines

they are necessary and practical to ensure

time for safe evacuation of the train. The

analysis shall provide the reasoning why a

fixed, automatic fire suppression system is

not necessary or practical if the decision is

made not to install one in any of the

unoccupied compartments identified in the

plan.

n. Describe the procedures to be used for

inspection, maintenance, and testing of all

fire safety systems and equipment.

3. The system developer shall follow the

design criteria, perform the tests, and follow

the operating procedures called for in the

plan.

Software Safety Plan

1. Trainset system software that controls or

monitors safety functions shall be treated as

safety-critical.

2. The system operator shall require the

system developer to develop a software safety

plan to guide the design, development,

testing, integration and verification of

computer programs used to control and/or

monitor trainset functions.
30704 Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 117 / Monday June 17, 1996 / Proposed Rules

3. The software safety plan shall include a

description of how the following tasks will

be accomplished or objectives achieved to

ensure reliable, fail-safe system software:

a. Software design process used.

b. Software design documentation to be

produced.

c. Software hazard analysis.

d. Software safety reviews.

e. Software hazard monitoring and

tracking.

f. Software module level safety tests.

g. Safety tests of multiple modules

combined to function as a software system.

h. Hardware/software integration safety

tests.

i. Demonstration of overall software safety

as part of the pre-revenue service tests of the

trainset.

Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance Plan

1. The plan shall:

a. Provide adequate technical detail on the

procedures to be followed by the system

operator to ensure trainset safety does not

deteriorate over time.

b. Be used as the basis for the trainset

inspection, testing, and maintenance safety

standards.

c. Contain the specific, detailed inspection,

testing, and maintenance procedures and

intervals required to ensure safe, reliable

long-term operation of all train systems.

d. Focus on, and give priority to, those

inspections, preventive maintenance

procedures, and tests required to prevent any

deterioration in train safety.

e. Include an inspection and maintenance

program that ensures all systems and

components of the train are free of general

conditions that endanger the safety of the

crew, passengers, or equipment. These

conditions include but are not limited to:

i. Insecure attachment of components.

ii. Continuous accumulations of oil or

grease.

iii. Improper functioning of components.

iv. Cracks, breaks, excessive wear,

structural defects or weakness of

components.

v. Leaks.

vi. Use of components or systems under

conditions that exceed those for which the

component or system is designed to operate.

2. The plan shall include a description of

the process to be used to develop detailed

information on the inspection, testing and

maintenance procedures necessary for longterm safe operation of the trainset. This

information shall include:

a. Safety Inspection Criteria and

Procedures.

b. Testing Procedures/Intervals.

c. Predetermined corrective action to take

upon failure of an inspection or test.

d. Scheduled Preventive Maintenance.

e. Maintenance Procedures.

f. Special Testing Equipment.

3. The plan shall set initial scheduled

maintenance intervals conservatively. The

intervals shall be extended only when

thoroughly justified by accumulated

operating data.

Training Plan

1. Develop a training plan to provide

employees and contract personnel including

supervisors with the knowledge and skills

necessary to effectively implement the

inspection, maintenance and testing program,

and to safely do his/her job.

2. The training plan shall include the

knowledge and skills necessary for

electronic, computer software, and

mechanical personnel.

3. The plan shall contain detailed

descriptions of the training—crucial to the

safe operation of the trainset— which will be

required for each craft.

4. The plan shall contain the certification

process to be used to be sure each employee

in a safety sensitive position is fit and well

qualified to do his/her job.

5. The training plan shall include the

training necessary for supervisors to be able

to adequately spot check the work of the

inspection, maintenance and testing

personnel that they supervise.

6. The training plan shall include:

a. Identification of all the knowledge and

skills necessary to accomplish the tasks

described in the inspection, testing, and

maintenance plan.

b. Design of a training program including

classroom instruction and hands-on

experience to ensure that employees and

supervisors are given the necessary

knowledge and skills.

c. A means to measure that employees—

including supervisors—have the necessary

knowledge and skills.

d. Modules that specifically address

technology used as part of the trainset that

is new to the railroad industry.

e. A program of periodic refresher training

to recertify employees and contract

personnel.

f. A schedule to have the work force

adequately trained prior to the start of

revenue service.

Pre-Revenue Service Acceptance Testing

Plan

1. Develop a pre-revenue service testing

plan and fully execute the plan prior to

introducing new equipment into revenue

service.

2. The plan shall include:

a. Identification of any waivers of Federal

safety regulations required for the tests or for

revenue service operation of the trainset.

b. A clear statement of the test objectives.

One of the major objectives shall be to

demonstrate that the trainset meets safety

design requirements when operated in the

environment in which it is to be used.

c. A planned schedule for conducting the

tests.

d. A description of the railroad property or

facilities to be used to conduct the tests.

e. A detailed description of how the tests

are to be conducted including:

i. Which components are to be tested;

ii. How they are to be tested;

iii. How frequently they are to be tested;

iv. What criteria are to be used to judge

their performance; and

v. How the test results are to be reported.

f. A description of any special

instrumentation to be used during the tests.

g. A description of the information or data

to be obtained.

h. A description of how the information or

data obtained is to be analyzed or used.

i. A clear description of any criteria to be

used as safety limits during testing.

j. A description of the criteria to be used

to measure or determine the success or

failure of the tests. If acceptance is to be

based on extrapolation of less than full level

testing results, the analysis to be done to

justify the validity of the extrapolation shall

be described.

k. A description of any special safety

precautions to be observed during the testing.

l. A written set of standard operating

procedures to be used to ensure that the

testing is done safely.

m. A verification of the inspection,

maintenance, and testing procedures and

criteria to be used for the revenue service

operation of the trainset.

3. The system operator shall report the

results of the pre-revenue service tests and

correct any safety deficiencies in the design

of the trainset or in the inspection, testing,

and maintenance procedures.

4. If safety deficiencies cannot be corrected

by design changes, operational limitations

may be imposed on the revenue service

operation of the trainset.

Standard Operating Procedures

1. Develop step-by-step standard operating

procedures for performing all safety-critical

or potentially hazardous trainset inspection,

testing, maintenance or repair tasks.

2. Standard operating procedures shall:

a. Describe in detail each step required to

safely perform the task;

b. Describe the qualifications necessary to

safely perform the task;

c. Describe any precautions that must be

taken to safely perform the task;

d. Describe the use of any safety equipment

necessary to perform the task;

e. Be approved by the chief mechanical

officer of the system operator;

f. Be approved by the responsible official

for safety of the system operator;

g. Be read and understood by the

employees and contractors performing the

tasks;

h. Be enforced by supervisors with

responsibility for accomplishing the tasks;

and

i. Be updated and approved annually.

3. Knowledge of standard operating

procedures shall be required to qualify an

employee or contractor to perform a task.

Appendix B—Sample Design

Standards Based on a Tiered

Approach

Introduction

FRA offers this sample outline of tiered

design requirements to help generate

discussion on how to set safety standards for

equipment. As discussed in the body of the

ANPRM, it is not clear whether the

distinction between various tiers would be

based solely on operating speed, a risk

analysis of the envisioned operating

environment, or another method. For

purposes of discussion, this appendix is

based on two tiers determined solely by

operating speed:

Tier I: Existing and future equipment

designed for operation in an environment
Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 117 / Monday June 17, 1996 / Proposed Rules 30705

with known risk or proven safe operation,

e.g., existing passenger equipment operating

at speeds of 110 mph or less or up to 125

mph under specific waiver conditions.

Tier II: Equipment that is envisioned to

operate in higher risk operating

environments, e.g., Amtrak’s planned

operation at 150 mph in the Northeast

Corridor, or perhaps cab car forward

operations under some sets of higher risk

operating conditions.

(APTA takes exception to the possibility of

including cab car forward operations in the

Tier II category.)

FRA recognizes the need to address special

equipment outside this two-tiered system,

such as that operated by tourist and

excursion railroads and private passenger

cars. FRA also recognizes the possible need

to identify additional tiers in the future,

whether it be for an intermediate tier

between Tiers I and II described above or for

equipment intended to operate at very high

speeds, i.e., in excess of 150 mph.

(Amtrak agrees with the logic behind the

tiered safety standard based on speed. The

logical breaks for Amtrak are 0 to 90 mph,

90 to 125 mph, and 125 mph and above, thus

creating a three-tiered standard.)

It is important to emphasize that neither

FRA nor the Working Group has endorsed

the parameters provided, except to the extent

that they mirror existing rail safety laws. FRA

intends that the parameters suggested in this

appendix serve only as the starting point for

discussion to help determine the parameters

to be included in a subsequent Notice of

Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM).

A. Crash Energy Management System Design

Requirements

Tier I: (Note: Existing equipment designs

do not typically incorporate crash energy

management principles in an effort to

mitigate the consequences of a collision.

However, future designs of Tier I equipment

should embrace the following guidelines.)

(APTA believes crash energy management

design requirements should be applied only

to Tier II equipment.)

1. Both the power vehicle and the

passenger vehicle shall be designed with a

crash energy management system to dissipate

kinetic energy during a collision. The crash

energy management system shall cause a

controlled deformation and collapse of

designated sections within the unoccupied

volumes to absorb collision energy and

reduce the decelerations on passengers and

crew resulting from dynamic forces

transmitted to occupied volumes.

2. The design of the power vehicle and

each unit of the passenger vehicle shall

consist of an occupied volume located

between two normally unoccupied volumes.

Where practical, sections within the

unoccupied volumes shall be designed to be

structurally weaker than the occupied

volume. During a collision or derailment, the

designated sections within the unoccupied

volumes shall start to deform and eventually

collapse in a controlled fashion to dissipate

energy before any structural damage occurs

to the occupied volume. Alternately, a crash

energy management strategy shall be

implemented by trainset.

3. The crash energy management system

shall keep the train in line and on the track

long enough to maximize the energy

absorbed by controlled crushing of

designated sections within unoccupied

volumes of the train. The train shall be

designed for controlled collapse of the

designated sections within unoccupied

volumes of the train, starting from the ends

of the train and working toward the center of

the train as the energy to be dissipated

increases.

4. The trainset shall be designed for a crush

distance and crush force that result in

survivable volumes in all occupied areas of

the trainset under the conditions of the

collision scenario. A collision scenario needs

to be defined to serve as a basis for design

analysis of Tier I equipment’s crash energy

management system and structure. What

parameters should be used to define this

collision scenario?

5. The locomotive or power car cab shall

be designed to limit the secondary impact

deceleration of crew members to a maximum

of 24g and an average of 16g for 250

milliseconds after initial impact under the

conditions of the collision scenario.

6. The trainset shall be designed to limit

the secondary impact deceleration acting on

passengers in the leading passenger

compartment to a maximum of 6g and an

average of 4g for 250 milliseconds after initial

impact under the conditions of the collision

scenario.

7. The occupied volume of the power

vehicle and the occupied volumes of the

passenger vehicle shall be designed and

constructed in a manner to preclude

telescoping of the crushed unoccupied

volume structure into the occupied volume.

8. The unoccupied volume of the power

vehicle shall have a static end yield strength

of no less than 50 percent of the required

static end strength of the power vehicle

occupied volume. The unoccupied volume of

each unit of the passenger vehicle shall have

a static end yield strength of no less than 50

percent of the required static end strength

yield of the passenger unit occupied volume.

Any deviation form this requirement must be

fully justified by analysis or test.

9. The crash energy management system

shall start to function at a static end load of

no less than 50 percent of the required static

end strength of the occupied volume, but no

more than 90 percent of the actual static end

strength of the occupied volume.

10. An analysis based on the collision

scenario shall be performed to verify that the

trainset crash energy management system

meets the requirements of this section.

Assumptions made as part of the analysis to

calculate how the kinetic energy of the

colliding passenger train is dissipated shall

be fully justified. The analysis must clearly

show that the designated energy absorbing

sections within the unoccupied volumes of

the trainset crush before collapse of the

occupied volumes start and that the

deceleration of people in the occupied

volumes is limited to the levels required by

paragraphs 5 and 6 above. This analysis shall

be made available to FRA upon request.

(APTA points out that crash energy

management design concepts have not been

validated by tests or analysis for equipment

operating in the speed range envisioned for

Tier I equipment. APTA points to the need

for a major research and physical testing

program to demonstrate and validate crash

energy management design benefits.)

(Amtrak is in full agreement with the

concept of crash energy management, but

similarly feels that some form of full-scale

testing may be required to validate the

computer simulations. Further, Amtrak

warns that this type of testing is expensive

by nature, and an effort to identify a funding

source needs to be initiated now in order not

to delay the rulemaking process.)

Tier II: Same requirements as above for

Tier I equipment.

B. Structural Design Requirements

1. Static End Strength

Tier I: The current U.S. practice is to

require both locomotives and coaches to have

a minimum static end strength of 800,000

pounds without deformation. If a crash

energy management design approach is

taken, this requirement applies only to the

occupied volume of the equipment.

Unoccupied volumes may have a lesser static

end yield strength.

Tier II: The longitudinal static yield

strength of the trainset occupied volumes

shall be no less than 1,000,000 pounds

ultimate strength.

(APTA suggests that the static end strength

requirements for both Tier I and Tier II

equipment should be the same. APTA

believes the occupants of the weaker car may

suffer unduly in a collision of cars of

differing strength.)

2. Anticlimbing Mechanism

Tier I: The current U.S. practice is to

require locomotives (power cars) to have an

anticlimbing mechanism capable of resisting

an upward or downward vertical force of

200,000 pounds. This requirement is given in

Association of American Railroads (AAR)

Specification S–580, that became effective in

August, 1990. Passenger coaches and MU

locomotives (49 CFR 229.141(a)(2)) are

required to have an anticlimbing mechanism

capable of resisting an upward or downward

vertical force of 100,000 pounds. How should

the anticlimber requirements for Tier I

equipment be specified to ensure maximum

advantage is taken of the strength of the

underframe to resist collision forces?

Tier II: a. Anticlimber engagements of each

end of each interior trainset unit shall be

designed to keep the trainset in line and on

the track until the energy-absorbing

capability of the crash energy management

system has been exceeded and the strength

of occupied volumes of the train start to be

overcome.

b. Anticlimber engagements shall be

capable of resisting both vertical and lateral

buckling forces between units due to an

acceleration of 1g acting on the total loaded

mass including trucks of the heavier of the

two coupled units.

3. Link Between Coupling Mechanism and

Carbody

Tier I: The mechanical link which attaches

the front coupling mechanism to the car body

shall be designed to resist a vertical
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downward thrust from the coupler shank of

100,000 pounds for any horizontal position

of the coupler, without exceeding the yield

points of the materials used.

Does this requirement provide protection

to passengers and crew? If not, how should

this parameter be specified?

Tier II: Same requirements as above for

Tier I equipment.

4. Short Hood Structure (Non-MU

Locomotives Only)

Tier I: The skin covering the short hood or

forward-facing end of the locomotive shall be

equivalent to a 1⁄2-inch steel plate with a

25,000 pounds-per-square-inch yield

strength. Higher yield strength material may

be used to decrease the thickness of the

material as long as an equivalent strength is

maintained. This skin shall be securely

attached to the forward collision posts and

shall be sealed to prevent the entry of

flammable fluids into the occupied cab area.

Does this requirement inhibit the application

of crash energy management technology to

Tier I equipment?

Tier II: Same requirements as above for

Tier I equipment.

5. Collision Posts

Tier I: a. Locomotive Forward Collision

Posts—Two collision posts are required, each

capable of withstanding a shear load of

500,000 pounds at the joint of the collision

post to the underframe without exceeding the

ultimate strength of the joint. Each post must

also be capable of withstanding, without

exceeding the ultimate strength, a 200,000

pound shear force exerted 30 inches above

the joint of the post to the underframe (AAR

Specification S–580). This requirement is

independent of train weight. Alternately, an

equivalent end structure may be used in

place of the two collision posts. The single

end structure must withstand the sum of the

forces required for each collision post.

b. MU Locomotive Rear Collision Posts—

Two collision posts are required, each having

an ultimate shear value of not less than

300,000 pounds at a point even with the top

of the underframe member to which it is

attached. If reinforcement is used to provide

the shear value, the reinforcement shall have

full value for a distance of 18 inches up from

the underframe connection and then taper to

a point approximately 30 inches above the

underframe connection (49 CFR

229.141(a)(4)). FRA believes this requirement

needs to be improved. The collision posts

can easily be strengthened and lengthened

(preferably full height to the roofline). An

equivalent single end structure may be used

in place of the two collision posts. The single

end structure must be designed to withstand

the sum of the forces required for the end

posts. For analysis purposes, the required

forces can be assumed to be evenly

distributed at the end structure at the

underframe joint.

c. Passenger Coach Collision Posts—

Current U.S. practice is to require a pair of

collision posts at each end of a passenger

coach. If a passenger coach consists of

articulated or otherwise permanently joined

units, collision posts are required only at the

ends of the permanently coupled assembly of

units, not at the ends of each unit of the

assembly. In other words, collision posts are

required at ends of passenger equipment

where coupling and uncoupling are

expected. The requirements for passenger

coach collision posts are identical to the

requirements for locomotive rear collision

posts. FRA believes this requirement needs to

be improved. The collision posts can easily

be strengthened and lengthened (preferably

full height to the roofline). An equivalent end

structure may be used in place of the two

collision posts.

FRA believes a unified collision post

requirement should apply to all Tier I

passenger vehicles, to include coaches and

power/cab cars. The collision posts should be

stronger and preferably extend to the

roofline. How should collision posts for Tier

I passenger vehicles be specified?

Tier II: As discussed in the body of the

ANPRM, FRA believes that a unitized type of

end structure with integral collision and

corner posts that extend to the roof line

should be considered for a design standard

for passenger equipment.

a. Strength of the Leading and Trailing

Ends of a Trainset.

i. The leading and trailing ends of the

trainset shall be equipped with an end

structure capable of transmitting to the frame

of the leading or trailing unit a horizontally

applied longitudinal load of 1,000,000

pounds uniformly applied at floor level

decreasing uniformly with height to no less

than 400,000 pounds uniformly applied at

the roof line without exceeding the ultimate

strength of the end structure.

(APTA points out that the need for and

basis of the high roofline strength

requirement has not been established.)

ii. A leading/trailing end structure may be

used to meet requirements for corner posts

and collision posts.

b. Strength of Collision Posts or End

Structures. (Ends of trainset other than

leading or trailing ends.)

i. Each end of a trainset unit designed for

automatic coupling that is not a leading or

trailing end of the trainset shall be equipped

with collision posts or an end structure

capable of transmitting to the frame of that

unit a horizontal, longitudinal load of

600,000 pounds applied at floor level

decreasing uniformly with height to no less

than 240,000 pounds applied at the roof line

without exceeding the ultimate strength of

the collision posts or end structure.

(APTA points out that the need for and

basis of the high roofline strength

requirement has not been established.)

ii. A unitized end structure may be used

to meet requirements for corner posts and

collision posts.

6. Corner Posts

Tier I: Corner posts shall be full height

(extending from underframe structure to roof

structure) and capable of resisting a

horizontal load of 150,000 pounds at the

point of attachment to the underframe and a

load of 80,000 pounds at the point of

attachment to the roof structure without

failure. The orientation of the applied

horizontal load shall range from longitudinal

inward to transverse inward. The corner

posts may be positioned to provide

protection or structural strength to the

occupied volume.

Tier II: As discussed in the body of the

ANPRM, FRA believes that a unitized type of

end structure with integral collision and

corner posts that extend to the roof line

should be considered for a design standard

for passenger equipment.

a. Strength of Corner Posts at the Leading

or Trailing End of a Trainset:

i. The leading and trailing ends of the

trainset shall be equipped with a corner post

at the intersection of the end with each side.

ii. Each corner post shall be capable of

resisting—without failure or deformation—a

horizontal load applied at any point in a 90

degree arc from lateral to longitudinal of

333,000 pounds applied at floor level

decreasing uniformly to no less than 133,000

pounds at the roof line.

iii. The corner posts may be part of the end

structure.

b. Strength of Corner Posts Not at the

Leading or Trailing End of a Trainset:

i. Each end of a trainset unit that is not a

leading or trailing end of the trainset and that

is equipped with automatic couplers shall be

equipped with a corner post at the

intersection of the end with each side.

ii. Each corner post shall be capable of

resisting—without failure or deformation—a

horizontal load applied at any point in a 90-

degree arc from lateral to longitudinal of

200,000 pounds applied at floor level

decreasing uniformly to no less than 80,000

pounds at the roof line.

iii. The corner posts may be part of the end

structure.

(APTA does not believe that the corner

post requirements proposed by FRA are

realistic. APTA believes these proposed

corner post requirements should be replaced

with a requirement that the post be able to

resist a load of 65,000 pounds applied at a

point 30′′ above the floor without permanent

deformation.)

7. Crash Refuge

Tier I: (Note: Existing equipment designs

do not typically incorporate crash energy

management principles in an effort to

mitigate the consequences of a collision.

However, future designs of Tier I equipment

should embrace the following guidelines.)

(APTA does not believe that crash refuge

requirements should be applied to future

designs of Tier I equipment.)

a. A refuge or survivable area to which the

crew can retreat in the event of an impending

collision shall be provided. This refuge or

survivable area shall take maximum

advantage of the structural strength of the

power vehicle or control cab and include

shock-mitigating material.

b. This refuge shall have the structural

integrity and shock mitigation necessary to

allow the crew to survive the accelerations

and forces resulting from the collision

scenario described as part of the

recommended crash energy management

system requirements.

c. The crash refuge shall be readily

accessible for quick entry by the crew.

Tier II: Same requirements as above for

Tier I equipment.
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8. Rollover Strength

Tier I: There are no current industry or

Federal specifications for rollover protection

in locomotives or passenger equipment. The

following are proposed examples of such

requirements to protect crew and passengers

in the event of a rollover scenario:

a. Locomotives should be able to withstand

a uniformly applied load equal to 2g acting

on the mass of the locomotive without failure

of the cab side structure or the cab roof

structure. (Local deformation of the side

sheathing or roof sheathing in the cab area is

permitted as long as a survivable volume is

preserved in the crew compartment.)

(APTA believes that this specific

requirement should be replaced with a more

general requirement stating that locomotives

shall be designed to provide a survivable

volume in the crew compartment in the event

of a rollover.)

b. Passenger coach and MU locomotive

sides and roofs shall have sufficient

structural strength to withstand the dynamic

rollover force exerted by an acceleration of 2g

acting on the mass of an individual vehicle

or unit without collapse of the occupied

volume. The occupied volume may deform to

the extent that no more than 10 percent of

initial volume is lost due to crush caused by

the rollover. FRA believes existing North

American designs will likely meet this

requirement.

Tier II: Same requirements as above for

Tier I equipment.

9. Side Impact Strength

Tier I:

a. A side impact design requirement

would, among other things, protect

passengers and crew from side collisions by

heavy highway vehicles at grade crossings.

Such a requirement may be particularly

important for equipment with a floor height

less than 36 inches above the top of the rail.

A concept for the requirement is an ability

to withstand the load applied by a loaded

tractor trailer travelling at a selected speed

colliding with the side of the car over an area

and at a height typical of tractor trailer

bumpers with a limited deformation of the

car body structure. What specific parameters

should be used to implement this concept or

what alternate concepts can be proposed for

a side impact strength design requirement?

b. If the highway vehicle is likely to

override the trainset unit floor structure, the

trainset unit side structures shall be designed

to resist the resulting forces without

penetration of the highway vehicle into the

occupied volume of the trainset unit.

Tier II: Same requirements as above for

Tier I equipment.

(APTA believes the advanced bus design

side penetration requirements should be

considered as an option to the requirements

proposed by FRA.)

10. Truck-to-Car-Body Attachment

Tier I: The intent of the requirement in 49

CFR 229.141(a)(5) and (b)(5) is to keep the

truck attached to the car body in the event

of a derailment or rollover. In place of this

requirement, new designs might be required

to resist without failure a minimum force

applied in any horizontal direction for the

link which attaches the truck to the car body.

The requirement under consideration is as

follows:

a. For all trainset units, ultimate strength

of the truck-to-car-body attachment shall be

sufficient to resist without failure a force of

250,000 pounds or the force due to an

acceleration of 4g acting in any direction on

the mass of the truck, whichever is greater.

b. The mass of the truck includes axles,

wheels, bearings, truck-mounted brake

system, suspension system components, and

any other components attached to the truck.

Tier II: Same requirements as above for

Tier I equipment.

11. Strength of Attachment of Interior

Fittings

a. Seat Strength:

Tier I:

i. All seat components shall be designed to

withstand loads due to the impact of

passengers at a relative speed of 25 mph.

ii. The seat back shall include shockabsorbent material to cushion the impact of

passengers with the seat ahead of them.

Tier II: Same requirements as above for

Tier I equipment.

b. Seat Attachment Strength:

Tier I:

i. Passenger and crew seats shall be

securely fastened to the car structure in a

manner so as to withstand an acceleration of

4g acting in the vertical direction on the

deadweight of the seat or seats, if a tandem

unit.

ii. The ultimate strength of a seat

attachment must be such that the seat

attachment is able to resist the longitudinal

inertial force of 8g acting on the mass of the

seat plus the impact force of the mass of the

passenger(s) being decelerated from a relative

speed of 25 mph.

Tier II: Same requirements as above for

Tier I equipment.

(APTA questions the basis for the seat

strength and seat attachment strength

requirements. APTA also believes the

requirements should apply only to passenger

seats, not to crew seats.)

c. Other Interior Fittings:

Tier I: Other interior fittings shall be

attached to the car body with sufficient

strength to withstand accelerations of 8g/4g/

4g acting longitudinally/laterally/vertically

on the mass of the fitting.

Tier II: In addition to the Tier I

requirement provided above, the following is

required:

The ultimate strength of a locomotive cab

interior fitting and equipment attachment

shall be sufficient to resist without failure

loads due to accelerations of 12g/4g/4g

longitudinally/laterally/vertically acting on

the mass of the fitting or equipment.

(APTA recommends a 3g/3g/3g

requirement for the strength of attachment of

interior fittings for both Tier I and Tier II

equipment.)

d. Luggage Stowage Compartment Strength:

Tier I:

i. Luggage stowage compartments shall be

of enclosed aircraft type.

ii. Ultimate strength shall be sufficient to

resist loads due to accelerations acting

longitudinally/laterally/vertically of 8g/4g/4g

on the mass of the luggage stowed.

(APTA recommends the following

requirement for Tier I equipment: Passenger

luggage stowage racks shall provide

longitudinal restraint for stowed articles.)

Tier II: Same requirements as above for

Tier I equipment.

(APTA recommends 3g/3g/3g for Tier II

equipment luggage stowage compartments)

e. Interior Surface Fittings:

Tier I:

i. To the extent possible, interior fittings

shall be recessed or flush-mounted.

ii. Corners and sharp edges shall be

avoided.

iii. Energy-absorbent material shall be used

to pad surfaces likely to be impacted by

passengers or crew members during

collisions or derailments. (APTA

recommends deleting this requirement.)

Tier II: Same requirements as above for

Tier I equipment.

C. Glazing

Tier I: As addressed in the body of the

ANPRM, FRA believes that portions of the

current glazing requirements in 49 CFR Part

223 may need to be revised to adequately

protect crew members and passengers. In this

proceeding or a separate future proceeding,

FRA may ask for consideration of

modifications to 49 CFR Part 223 to address

the concerns listed below:

1. The witness plate used for testing is too

thick, allowing spalling of pieces of glass

large enough to cause injury;

2. The impact test using a 24-pound cinder

block is not repeatable;

3. Vendors or materials should be

periodically recertified by an independent

testing laboratory;

4. The strength of the framing arrangement

securing the glazing is neither specified nor

tested; and

5. Interior glass breakage in the event of a

collision poses a significant hazard to

passengers.

Tier II: FRA believes that the following

requirements address the concerns listed

above, and also address additional issues

necessary to provide adequate protection to

crew and passengers in the higher risk

environments in which Tier II equipment

will be operating.

1. Anti-Spalling Performance—.001

aluminum witness plate, 12 inches from

glazing surface, no marks in witness plate

after any test.

2. Bullet Impact Performance—Able to stop

without spall or bullet penetration a single

impact of a 9-mm, 147-grain bullet traveling

at an impact velocity of 900 feet/second with

no bullet penetration or spall.

3. Large Object Impact Performance.

a. End Facing—Impact of a 12-pound solid

steel sphere at the maximum speed at which

the vehicle will operate, at an angle equal to

the angle between the glazing surface as

installed and the direction of travel, with no

penetration or spall.

b. Side Facing—Impact of a 12-pound solid

steel sphere at 15 mph, at an angle of 90

degrees to the surface of the glazing, with no

penetration.

4. Small Object Impact Performance.

a. Side Facing—Impact of a granite ballast

stone with major and minor axes of no
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greater than 10 percent difference in length,

weighing a minimum of 0.5 pounds,

travelling at 75 mph, impacting at a 90-

degree angle to the glazing surface, with no

penetration or spall.

5. Frame Strength—Frame holds glazing in

place against all forces that do not cause

glazing penetration.

6. Passing Trains—Glazing and frame shall

resist the forces due to air pressure

differences caused by trains passing with the

minimum separation for two adjacent tracks

while traveling in opposite directions, each

traveling at maximum speed.

7. Interior Glazing—Interior trainset

glazing shall meet the minimum

requirements of AS1 type laminated glass as

defined in American National Standard

‘‘Safety Code for Glazing Materials for

Glazing Motor Vehicles Operating on Land

Highways,’’ ASA Standard Z26.1–1966.

D. Emergency Systems—Each Unit and Each

Level of Bi-Level Units

Tier I:

1. Emergency Lighting.

a. Illumination level shall be a minimum

of 5 foot-candles at floor level for all

potential trainset evacuation routes.

b. A back-up power system capable of

operating all emergency lighting for a period

of at least two hours shall be provided.

c. The back-up power system shall be

capable of operation in all trainset unit

orientations. (APTA recommends adding

‘‘within 45 degrees of vertical’’ to the end of

this requirement.)

d. The back-up power system shall be

capable of operation after the initial shock of

a collision or derailment. (APTA proposes a

3g shock load.)

2. Emergency Communication.

a. Both interior and exterior locations of

emergency communications equipment shall

be specified. Exterior locations must be

compatible with communication equipment

normally carried by emergency response

personnel. Interior locations must be

provided at both ends of every level of

passenger units, for passengers to

communicate emergency conditions to the

trainset operator.

b. Back-up power—Emergency

communication system back-up power shall

be provided for a minimum time period of

two hours.

c. Clear, concise instructions for emergency

use shall be posted at all potential evacuation

locations.

(APTA recommends that these

requirements be deferred to the Passenger

Train Emergency Preparedness Working

Group.)

3. Emergency Equipment.

a. Locations of emergency equipment shall

be clearly marked.

b. Clear, concise instructions for use of

emergency equipment shall be posted at each

location.

(APTA recommends that these

requirements be deferred to the Passenger

Train Emergency Preparedness Working

Group.)

4. Emergency Exits.

a. Locations of emergency exits shall be

clearly marked and lighted.

(APTA recommends eliminating lighted)

b. Clear, concise instructions for use of the

emergency exits shall be posted at each

location.

c. Number of exits required:

i. Four windows—one located at each end

of each side—of a passenger coach shall

operate as emergency exits.

ii. If the coach is bi-level, four windows—

one located at each end of each side—on

each level shall operate as emergency exits.

iii. For special design cars, such as

sleepers, each compartment shall have at

least one emergency exit.

d. Size—Passenger coach sealed window

emergency exits shall have a minimum free

opening of 30 inches wide by 30 inches high.

(APTA recommends 18 inches wide by 24

inches high.)

e. Each locomotive or power cab shall have

a minimum of one roof hatch emergency exit

with either a minimum opening of 18 inches

by 24 inches or a clearly marked structural

weak point in the roof to provide quick

access for properly equipped emergency

personnel. (APTA recommends eliminating

this requirement.)

f. Each passenger coach or passenger

service car shall be equipped with either a

minimum of two roof hatch emergency exits

with a minimum opening of 18 inches by 24

inches (APTA recommends eliminating the

size requirement) or a clearly marked

structural weak point in the roof to provide

quick access for properly equipped

emergency personnel.

g. Each emergency exit shall be easily

operable by passengers and crew members

without requiring the use of any special

tools.

Tier II: Same requirements as above for

Tier I equipment.

E. Doors (APTA recommends this section

apply only to exterior powered side doors.)

Tier I:

1. The status of exterior doors shall be

displayed to the crew. If door interlocks are

used, the sensors used to detect train motion

shall be accurate to within ±2 mph.

2. Doors shall be powered by the

emergency back-up power system.

3. Doors shall be equipped with a manual

override that can be used to open doors

without power both from outside and inside

the trainset. Instructions for manual override

shall be clearly posted in the car interior at

door locations.

4. Doors shall be easily operable by

passengers and crew members following a

derailment or collision without requiring the

use of any special tools to accomplish the

manual override in the event of head-end

power loss.

5. Doors shall open outward to facilitate

timely egress in the event of a collision or

derailment.

Tier II: Same requirements as above for

Tier I equipment.

F. Fuel Tanks

Tier I:

1. External Fuel Tanks.

a. Height off rail—With all locomotive

wheels resting on the ties beside the rail, the

lowest point of the fuel tank shall clear an

8.5-inch combined tie plate/rail height by a

minimum of 1.5 inches. This requirement

results in a minimum 10-inch vertical

distance from the lowest point on the wheel

tread to the lowest point on the fuel tank.

b. Bulkhead and skin—material, thickness,

and strength.

i. Bulkheads—1-inch steel plate with

25,000 psi yield strength. Higher yieldstrength steel may be used to decrease the

thickness required as long as equivalent

strength is maintained.

ii. Skin—1/2-inch steel plate with 25,000

psi yield strength or equivalent. Higher yieldstrength steel may be used to decrease the

thickness required as long as equivalent

strength is maintained.

iii. The material used for construction of

fuel tank exterior surfaces shall not exhibit a

decrease in yield strength or penetration

resistance in the temperature range of 0 to

160 °F.

c. Compartmentalization—The interior of

fuel tanks shall be divided into a minimum

of four separate compartments designed so

that a penetration in the exterior skin of any

one compartment shall result in loss of fuel

only from that compartment.

d. Vent system spill protection—Fuel tank

vent systems shall be designed to prevent

them from becoming a path of fuel loss in the

event the tank is placed in any orientation

due to a locomotive overturning.

e. The bottom surface of the fuel tank shall

be equipped with skid surfaces to prevent

sliding contact with the rail or the ground

from easily wearing through the tank.

f. Structural Strength—The structural

strength of the tank shall be adequate to

support 1.5 times the dead weight of the

locomotive without deformation of the tank.

2. Internal Fuel Tanks.

a. ‘‘Internal fuel tank’’ is defined as a tank

whose lowest point is at least 18 inches

above the lowest point on the locomotive

wheel tread and that is enclosed by, or is part

of, the locomotive structure.

b. Compartmentalization—The interior of

fuel tanks shall be divided into a minimum

of four separate compartments designed so

that a penetration in the exterior skin of any

one compartment shall result in loss of fuel

only from that compartment.

c. Vent system spill protection—Fuel tank

vent systems shall be designed to prevent

them from becoming a path of fuel loss in the

event the tank is placed in any orientation

due to a locomotive overturning.

d. Internal fuel tank bulkheads and skin

shall be 3/8-inch steel plate with 25,000-lb

yield strength or material with equivalent

strength. Skid plates are not required.

Tier II: Same requirements as above for

Tier I equipment.

G. Cab Controls, Interior and Safety Features

Tier I:

1. Slip/Slide Alarms (49 CFR 229.115).

a. Each power vehicle/control cab shall be

equipped with an adhesion control system

designed to automatically detect a loss of

adhesion during power application and then

reduce power to limit wheel slip. (APTA

recommends eliminating this requirement.)

b. The adhesion control system shall also

automatically adjust the braking force on
Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 117 / Monday June 17, 1996 / Proposed Rules 30709

each wheel to prevent sliding during braking.

In the event of a failure of this system to

prevent wheel slip/slide within preset

parameters, a visual and/or audible wheel

slip/slide alarm shall alert the train operator.

The slip/slide alarm shall alert the operator

in the cab of the controlling power vehicle/

control car to slip/slide conditions on any

powered axle of the train. (APTA

recommends eliminating this requirement.)

c. Each powered axle shall be monitored

for slip/slide. (APTA recommends moving

this requirement to passenger equipment

power brake rules.)

2. Operator controls in the power vehicle/

control cab shall be arranged to be

comfortably within view and within easy

reach when the operator is seated in the

normal train control position.

3. The control panels shall be laid out to

minimize the chance of human error.

4. Control panel buttons, switches, levers,

knobs, etc., shall be distinguishable by sight

and by touch.

5. An alerter shall be provided. The alerter

may allow the operator freedom of movement

in the control cab but shall not allow the

operator to move outside the area in which

control of the train is exercised while the

train is in motion.

6. Cab Information Displays.

a. Simplicity and standardization shall be

the driving criteria for design of formats for

the display of information in the cab.

b. Essential, safety-critical information

shall be displayed as a default condition.

c. Operator selection shall be required to

display other than default information.

d. Cab/train control signals shall be

available as a display option for the operator.

e. Displays shall be easy to read from the

operator’s normal position under all lighting

conditions.

7. Pilots, Snowplows, Endplates.

a. The power vehicle/control cab car shall

be equipped with a structurally substantial

endplate, pilot or snowplow which extends

across both rails of the track.

b. The height of the endplate, pilot, or

snowplow shall be greater than 3 inches and

less than 6 inches off the rails.

8. Headlights (49 CFR 229.125)

a. The power vehicle/control cab shall be

equipped with more than one headlight

producing no less than 200,000 candela.

b. The headlights shall be focused to

illuminate a person standing between the

rails at 800 feet (1000 feet for Tier II) under

clear weather conditions.

9. Crew’s Field of View.

a. The cab layout shall be arranged so the

crew has an effective field of view in the

forward direction and to the right and left of

the direction of travel.

b. Field-of-view obstructions due to

required structural members shall be

minimized.

c. The crew’s position in the cab shall be

located to permit the crew to be able to

directly observe traffic approaching the train

from either side of the train. (APTA

recommends this requirement be revised to

be measurable or be eliminated.)

10. Seat Placement/Features.

Seats provided for crew members shall:

a. Be equipped with quick-release lap belts

and shoulder harnesses.

b. Be secured to the car body with an

attachment having an ultimate strength

capable of withstanding the loads due to

accelerations of 12g/4g/4g acting

longitudinally/laterally/vertically on the

mass of the seat and the crew member

occupying it. (APTA recommends a 3g/3g/3g

requirement that applies only to the mass of

the seat.)

c. Be designed so all adjustments have the

range necessary to accommodate a 5thpercentile female to a 95th-percentile male.

d. Be equipped with lumbar support that

is adjustable from the seated position.

e. Be equipped with force-assisted,

vertical-height adjustment, operated from the

seated position.

f. Have manually reclining seat backs,

adjustable from the seated position.

g. Have adjustable headrests.

h. Have folding, padded armrests.

(APTA recommends that these

requirements only apply to floor mounted

seats.)

11. Impact Mitigation.

a. Sharp edges and corners shall be

eliminated from the interior of the cab.

b. Interior surfaces of the cab likely to be

impacted by crew members during a collision

or derailment shall be padded with shockabsorbent material.

Tier II: Same requirements as above for

Tier I equipment.

H. Fire Safety

Tier I:

1. A Fire Protection Engineering Plan shall

be developed as part of the system planning

process.

a. The fire protection engineering plan

shall identify and evaluate the major sources

of fire risk. (APTA recommends that this

requirement be deleted.)

b. The plan shall describe the design steps

taken to delay the onset of lethal conditions

until the fire can be detected, the train

stopped and all personnel safely evacuated.

(APTA recommends that this requirement be

deleted.)

2. The trainset ventilation system shall be

designed so as not to contribute to the spread

of flames or products of combustion.

3. Trainset roof design shall prevent highvoltage arcs from overhead catenaries from

penetrating the skin or shell of the occupied

spaces in the trainset. The roof shall not be

susceptible to ignition due to high-voltage

arcing. (APTA recommends that this

requirement be deleted.)

4. Where possible, components that are

potential sources of fire ignition shall be

located outside occupied volumes and shall

be separated from occupied volumes by a

structural fire-resistant barrier. (APTA

recommends that this requirement be

deleted.)

5. Portions of the trainset structure

separating major sources of ignition, of

energy storage, or of fuel loading from the

occupied volumes of the trainset shall have

sufficient resistance to fire, smoke and fume

penetration to allow time for fire detection

and safe evacuation of the trainset. (APTA

recommends that this requirement be

deleted.)

6. All materials and finishes used or

installed in the construction of the trainset

shall have sufficient resistance to fire, smoke

and fume production to allow sufficient time

for fire detection, for the trainset to stop, and

for safe evacuation of passengers before lethal

conditions develop. (APTA recommends that

this requirement be deleted.)

7. At a minimum, the materials used for

the construction of cab interiors including

but not limited to walls, floors, ceilings,

seats, doors, windows, electrical conduits, air

ducts and any other internal equipment shall

meet FRA guidelines published in the

Federal Register on January 17, 1989. (See 54

FR 1837, ‘‘Rail Passenger Equipment;

Reissuance of Guidelines for Selecting

Materials to Improve Their Fire Safety

Characteristics’’; see also the latest National

Fire Protection Association ‘‘NFPA 130,

Standard for Fixed Guideway Transit

Systems.’’)

8. Detection and Suppression.

a. Fire extinguishers shall be placed in

each unit.

b. All trainset components with a potential

to overheat in the event of a malfunction to

the extent they could be the source of an onboard fire shall be equipped with overheat

warning devices. These components shall

include, but not be limited to:

i. Diesel Engines;

ii. Traction Motors;

iii. Dynamic Brake Energy Dissipation

System Components;

iv. Transformers;

v. Inverters; and

vi. Head-End Power Generation Systems.

(APTA recommends that the system safety

plan determine how to handle components

that could overheat rather than requiring

detection devices.)

Tier II: Same requirements as above for

Tier I equipment.

I. Electrical System Design

No one specific, industry electrical

standard adequately addresses all of the

electrical safety issues relating to the

operation of a trainset. As safe operation of

trains becomes more dependent on electronic

technology, reliable electrical and electronic

systems become crucial. The industry

standard most appropriate for each major

component of the trainset electrical system

needs to be carefully selected.

The requirements provided below are

intended for Tier I and Tier II equipment, as

applicable.

1. Conductor Sizes—Conductor sizes shall

be selected on the basis of current-carrying

capacity, mechanical strength, temperature,

flexibility requirements and maximum

allowable voltage drop. Current-carrying

capacity shall be derated for grouping and for

operating temperature in accordance with

nationally recognized standards.

2. Circuit Protection.

a. The main propulsion power line shall be

protected with a lightning arrestor, automatic

circuit breaker and overload relay. The

lightning arrestor shall be run by the most

direct path possible to ground with a

connection to ground of not less than No. 6

AWG. These overload protection devices

shall be housed in an enclosure designed

specifically for that purpose with arc chute

vented directly to outside air.
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b. Head end power including trainline

power distribution shall be provided with

both overload and ground fault protection.

c. Circuits used for purposes other than

propelling the trainset shall be connected to

their power source through correctly sized

circuit breakers or circuit breaking

contactors.

d. Each auxiliary circuit shall be provided

with a circuit breaker located as near as

practical to the point of connection to the

source of power for that circuit. Such

protection may be omitted from circuits

controlling crucial safety devices.

3. Battery System.

a. The battery compartment shall be

isolated from the cab by a non-combustible

barrier.

b. Battery chargers shall be designed to

protect against overcharging.

c. Battery circuits shall include an

emergency battery cut-off switch to

completely disconnect the energy stored in

the batteries from the load.

d. If batteries are of the type to potentially

vent explosive gases, the battery

compartment shall be adequately ventilated

to prevent accumulation of explosive

concentrations of these gases.

4. Power Dissipation Resistors.

a. Power dissipating resistors shall be

adequately ventilated to prevent overheating

under worst-case operating conditions.

b. Power dissipation grids shall be

designed and installed with adequate air

space between resistor elements and

combustible material.

c. Power dissipation resistor circuits shall

incorporate warning or protective devices for

low ventilation air flow, over-temperature

and short circuit failures.

d. Resistor elements shall be electrically

insulated from resistor frames, and the

frames shall be electrically insulated from the

supports that hold them.

e. The current value used to determine the

size of resistor leads shall not be less than

120 percent of the RMS load current under

the most severe operating conditions.

5. Electromagnetic Interference/

Compatibility.

a. No trainset system shall produce

electrical noise that interferes with trainline

control and communications or with wayside

signaling systems.

b. To contain electromagnetic interference

emissions, suppression of transients shall be

at the source wherever possible.

c. Trainset electrical/electronic systems

shall be capable of operation in the presence

of external electromagnetic noise sources.

d. All electronic equipment shall be selfprotected from damage and/or improper

operation due to high voltage transients and

long-term over-voltage or under-voltage

conditions.

J. Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance

Tier I: The operating railroad shall provide

detailed information on the inspection,

testing, and maintenance procedures

necessary for long-term safe operation of the

trainset. This information should include:

1. Testing Procedures/Intervals;

2. Scheduled Preventive Maintenance;

3. Maintenance Procedures;

4. Special Testing Equipment; and

5. Training of Mechanical Forces.

Tier II: Same requirements as above for

Tier I equipment.

K. Brake System

Existing brake system equipment must

meet the applicable requirements of 49 CFR

Parts 229, 231, and 232, and 49 U.S.C.

Chapters 203 and 207 as they relate to the

specific equipment and operation.

FRA has recognized that the current

regulations fail to adequately delineate

between requirements for conventional

freight braking systems and the more diverse

systems for various categories of passenger

service. FRA also recognizes that the

regulations should be updated to recognize

the contemporary electronic systems that are

used to control elements of power brake

systems.

In response to the above concerns, FRA

published a NPRM for power brake

regulations in September 1994. Four public

hearings were held to discuss particular

issues regarding the proposed rules, and FRA

is in the process of reviewing comments

received for inclusion in a revision to the

original proposed rule.

Proposed brake system design

requirements for Tier I and II equipment will

be determined by the Passenger Equipment

Safety Standards Working Group using the

information on passenger equipment brakes

accumulated in docket PB–9 in response to

the NPRM on power brakes.

L. Automated Monitoring and Diagnostics

As train speed increases, the human

decision and reaction time necessary to avoid

potential calamity decreases. Automatic

control techniques that briefly take the

operator out of the control loop are a means

to eliminate the delays associated with

human decision and reaction in situations

where taking quick and positive action can

be crucial. (APTA recommends that this

paragraph be deleted.)

Tier I: There are no current requirements

for Tier I equipment to incorporate automatic

monitoring and control measures as

described above. Specific functions are

identified below for Tier II equipment, as

increased train speeds and higher risk

operating environments make reactions to

these functions more time-sensitive with

respect to safety. If the functions identified

below can be shown to be practically and

economically feasible in Tier I equipment,

implementation should be considered.

(APTA recommends no such requirements

for Tier I equipment.)

Tier II:

1. The trainset shall be equipped with a

system that monitors the performance of the

following safety-critical items:

a. Reception of Cab Signals/Train Control

Signals;

b. Truck Hunting;

c. Dynamic Brake Status;

d. Friction Brake Status;

e. Fire Detection Systems;

f. Head End Power Status;

g. Alerter;

h. Horn and Bell;

i. Wheel Slip/Slide; and

j. Tilt System, if so equipped.

2. The monitoring system shall alert the

operator when any of the monitored

parameters are out of predetermined limits.

In situations where the system safety analysis

indicates that operator reaction time is

crucial to safety, the monitoring system shall

take immediate, automatic corrective action

such as limiting the speed of the train.

3. The self-monitoring system shall be

designed with an automatic self-test feature

that notifies the operator that the system is

functioning correctly.

M. Trainset System Software

The requirements provided below are

intended for Tier I and Tier II equipment, as

applicable.

1. Software used to monitor and control

trainset safety features or functions shall be

treated as safety-critical.

2. A formal system software safety program

shall be used to develop the system software.

This program shall include a software hazard

analysis and thorough software design walkthrough and verification tests to ensure

software is reliable and designed to be failsafe.

(APTA recommends that Section M be

eliminated.)

N. Trainset Hardware/Software Integration

The requirement provided below is

intended for Tier I and Tier II equipment, as

applicable.

1. A comprehensive hardware/software

integration program shall be planned and

conducted to demonstrate that the software

functions as intended when installed in a

hardware system identical to that to be used

in service.

O. Suspension System Design Requirements

Tier I: FRA does not currently address

suspension system requirements for

passenger equipment.

Tier II:

1. The suspension system shall be designed

so no single wheel lateral to vertical force

(L/V) ratio is greater than 0.8 for a duration

required to travel 3 feet at any operating

speed or over any class of track used by the

trainset unless the axle sum ratio is less than

1.0. The L/V should be measured with an

instrument with a band pass of 0 to 25 Hz.

2. Net axle lateral force may not exceed 0.5

times the static vertical axle load.

3. The minimum vertical wheel/rail force

shall be a minimum of 10 percent of the

static vertical wheel load.

4. The maximum truck side L/V ratio shall

not exceed 0.5.

5. When positioned on track with a

uniform 6-inch superelevation, trainsets shall

have no wheel unload to a value less than 60

percent of its static value on perfectly level

track.

6. When the equipment is positioned on

level, tangent track, and any one wheel is

raised by three inches, no other wheel of the

equipment shall unload to a value of less

than 0.65 times the weight of the unit

divided by the number of wheels supporting

the unit. (Builders of passenger equipment

take exception to this proposed requirement

as too stringent. They prefer a more flexible

requirement allowing individual railroads to
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define wheel unloading requirements for safe

operation under worst case track conditions

for the intended use of the equipment.

Compliance with this requirement must be

demonstrated as part of the vehicle

qualification tests.)

7. All Tier II equipment shall be equipped

with lateral accelerometers mounted above

an axle of each truck. The accelerometer

output signals shall be accurately calibrated

and shall be passed through signal

conditioning circuitry designed to determine

if hunting oscillations of the truck are

occurring. Hunting oscillations are defined as

six or more consecutive oscillations having a

peak acceleration in excess of 0.8g peak-topeak at a frequency of between 1 and 10 Hz.

If hunting oscillations are detected, the train

monitoring system shall provide an alarm to

the operator and automatically slow the train

to a speed where hunting oscillations no

longer occur before returning total control of

the trainset to the operator.

8. Ride Vibration (Quality)—While

traveling at the maximum operating speed

over the intended route, the train suspension

system shall be designed to:

a. Limit the vertical acceleration as

measured by a vertical accelerometer

mounted over the leading truck of each

trainset unit to no greater than 0.55g single

event, peak-to-peak.

b. Limit the lateral acceleration as

measured by a lateral accelerometer mounted

over the leading truck of each trainset unit

to no greater than 0.3g single event, peak-topeak.

c. Limit the combination of lateral and

vertical events occurring within any time

period of 2 consecutive seconds to the square

root of (V2+L2) to no greater than 0.604—

where L may not exceed 0.3g and V may not

exceed 0.55g.

9. If hunting oscillations are detected on

any equipment in the train, the maximum

speed of that train shall be limited to 10 mph

less than the speed at which hunting stops

as the train speed is decreased from the

initial hunting speed.

10. If the ride quality limitations of

paragraph 8 of this section are exceeded, the

operating speed shall be restricted to that

which would result in a peak-to-peak lateral

acceleration no greater than 0.25g and a peakto- peak vertical acceleration no greater than

0.5g.

11. Passenger cars of a non-tilting design

shall not operate under conditions resulting

in a cant deficiency of greater than 6 inches

or that corresponds to a steady-state lateral

acceleration of 0.1g, whichever is less.

12. Trainsets of a tilting design shall not

operate under conditions resulting in a cant

deficiency greater than 9 inches or that

corresponds to a steady-state lateral

acceleration of 0.1g (measured parallel to the

car floor), which ever is less.

13. All wheels shall be heat treated,

curved-plate type or a design with equivalent

resistance to thermal abuse.

14. Bearing overheat sensors are required.

These are not required to be on board, and

may be placed at reasonable wayside

intervals. Periodic bearing inspection

required at 50 percent of the L10 life at a load

factor of 2.

P. General Locomotive/Power Car Design

Requirements

Tier I: 1. All moving parts, high voltage

equipment, electrical conductors and

switches, and pipes carrying hot fluids or

gases shall be installed in non-exposed

locations or shall be appropriately equipped

with interlocks or guards to minimize the

chance of personal injury. (APTA

recommends eliminating this requirement for

Tier I equipment.)

Tier II: Same requirement as above for Tier

I equipment.

Q. Power Vehicle/Control Cab Health and

Comfort Design Features

Issues under this heading may be added to

this proceeding following submission of

FRA’s Report to Congress on Locomotive

Crashworthiness and Working Conditions.

R. Coupler/Draft System Performance (Only

Leading and Trailing Couplers of Integral

Trainsets)

Note: This requirement is applicable only

for use in integral trainsets, envisioned to be

prevalent in the higher speed operating

environments of Tier II equipment.

Otherwise, guidance regarding coupler/draft

system performance requirements remain as

specified.

Tier II: 1. Leading and trailing automatic

couplers of the trainset shall be compatible

with standard AAR couplers with no special

adapters used. These couplers shall include

automatic uncoupling devices that comply

with the Safety Appliance Standards (49 CFR

Part 231) and 49 U.S.C. 20302(a)(1)(A).

2. The leading and trailing trainset unit’s

coupler/draft system design shall include an

anti-climbing feature capable of resisting

without failure a minimum vertical force

between the coupled units in either the up

or the down direction resulting from an

acceleration of 1g acting on the total mass

including trucks of the leading or trailing

unit of the trainset. The coupler/draft system

itself may fail (shear back type coupler) to

allow the anti-climbing feature to engage.

S. Safety Appliance Design Requirements

Tier I: Current safety appliance

requirements are found at 49 CFR Parts 229,

231 and 232, and 49 U.S.C. Chapters 203 and

207. (Existing requirements which are

statutorily based cannot be changed by this

rulemaking.)

Tier II: 1. The leading and the trailing ends

of the trainset shall be equipped with

automatic couplers that:

a. Couple on impact and allow uncoupling

without necessitating a person going between

cars; and

b. Shall be activated either by a traditional

uncoupling lever or some other means of

automatic uncoupling mechanism that does

not require a person to go between

equipment units.

2. Leading and trailing end automatic

couplers and uncoupling devices may be

stored within a shrouded housing, but shall

be easily removed when required for

emergency use.

3. If the units of the trainset are semipermanently coupled, with uncoupling done

only at maintenance facilities, the trainset

units need not be equipped with sill steps,

end or side handholds.

4. If the units of the trainset are coupled

with automatic couplers, the units shall be

equipped with sill steps, end handholds and

side handholds that meet the requirements of

49 CFR 231.14.

5. Passenger handrails or handholds shall

be provided on both sides of steps used to

board or depart the train.

6. Power vehicle and control cab exits shall

be equipped with handholds and sill steps.

7. Safety appliance mechanical strength.

a. All handrails and sill steps shall be

made of 1-inch diameter steel pipe or 5⁄8-inch

thickness steel or a material of equal or

greater mechanical strength.

b. All safety appliances shall be securely

fastened to the carbody structure with

mechanical fasteners that have mechanical

strength greater than or equal to that of a 1⁄2-

inch diameter SAE steel bolt mechanical

fastener.

8. Handrails.

a. Throughout their entire length, handrails

shall be a contrasting color to the

surrounding vehicle body.

b. Vertical handrails shall be installed so

as:

i. The maximum distance above the top of

the rail to the bottom of the handrail shall be

51 inches and the minimum distance shall be

21 inches.

ii. To continue to a point at least equal to

the height of the top edge of the control cab

door.

iii. Minimum hand clearance distance

between the handrail and the vehicle body

shall be 21⁄2 inches for the entire length.

iv. All vertical handrails shall be securely

fastened to the vehicle body.

v. If the length of the handrail exceeds 60

inches, it shall be securely fastened to the

power vehicle body with two fasteners at

each end.

9. Sill steps.

a. Each power vehicle or control cab shall

be equipped with sill steps below each door.

b. Power vehicle or control cab sill steps

shall be a minimum cross-sectional area 1⁄2

by 3 inches, of steel or a material of equal

or greater strength and fatigue resistance.

c. Sill steps shall be designed and installed

so:

i. The minimum tread length of the sill

step shall be 10 inches.

ii. The minimum clear depth shall be 8

inches.

iii. The outside edge of the tread of the sill

step shall be flush with the side of the power

vehicle or cab car body structure.

iv. Sill steps shall not have a vertical rise

between treads exceeding 18 inches. The

lowest sill step tread shall be not more than

20 inches above the top of the track rail.

v. The sill step shall be a color which

contrasts with the surrounding power vehicle

body color.

vi. All sill steps shall be securely fastened.

vii. As a minimum, 50 percent of the tread

surface area shall be open space.

viii. The portion of the tread surface area

which is not open space and is normally

contacted by the foot shall be treated with an

anti-skid material.

10. Safety appliance mechanical fasteners.
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a. Safety appliance mechanical fasteners

shall have mechanical strength and fatigue

resistance equal to or greater than a 1⁄2-inch

diameter SAE steel bolt.

b. Fasteners shall be installed with a

positive means to prevent unauthorized

removal.

c. Fasteners shall be installed to facilitate

inspection.

11. Safety appliances installed at the

option of the system operator shall be firmly

attached with mechanical fasteners and shall

meet the design and installation

requirements given herein.

12. If two trainsets are coupled to form a

single train by an automatic coupler, the

coupled ends must be equipped with end

handholds, side handholds and sill steps. If

the trainsets are semi-permanently coupled,

these safety appliances are not required.

BILLING CODE 4910–06–P
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Appendix C.—AMTRAK Passenger Train Safety Inspection Criteria (Serves as a Sample Only)
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BILLING CODE 4910–06–C
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Appendix D—Economic Questions for

Passenger Equipment Safety Standards

Economic questions which appear in the

body of this document are posed to help FRA

gain a clear understanding of what costs the

industry would incur to meet possible

passenger equipment safety standards. To

estimate the total costs that the industry

would incur as a result of complying with

possible passenger equipment safety

standards, we need to understand how

performance of existing structures,

equipment, programs, and procedures

compare with what would be required to

meet the standards. FRA also needs to gain

a better understanding of both the qualitative

and quantitative benefits associated with the

requirements under consideration.

FRA would appreciate receiving economic

information from all concerned parties

including individual passenger service

operators and equipment manufacturers.

Information regarding only one particular

sector or operator is useful. Use of this

information will result in a more accurate

analysis of costs and benefits.

1. Questions on System Safety Plans

Are any system safety plans or similar

plans currently in use? How much would it

cost (in terms of time and effort) to update

existing or develop new system safety plans?

On average, approximately how often would

system safety plans have to be updated?

How would system safety plans improve

safety? Specifically, what areas of safety

would be improved, by how much, and why?

Please provide copies of any studies, data, or

arguments which support your answer.

2. Questions on Pre-Departure or Daily Safety

Inspections

In terms of labor, materials, etc., what

additional resources would each operator

need to perform a pre departure inspection

equivalent to Amtrak’s? How many predeparture or daily inspections are performed

annually by each operator?

What potential safety benefits would result

from performing inspections equivalent to

Amtrak’s? Please explain/document

estimates. For those currently performing

inspections, what additional benefits could

be realized by modifying those inspection

procedures to meet Amtrak’s? Please explain/

document. What additional costs would

result from performing inspections

equivalent to Amtrak’s, or for those operators

currently performing inspections, what

additional costs would be incurred by

modifying inspection procedures to be

equivalent to Amtrak’s? Please explain/

document.

3. Questions on Periodic Testing and

Maintenance

Currently, what equipment is tested and

maintained periodically? How often (in terms

of miles or time) is this equipment tested and

maintained? What do periodic tests and

maintenance currently entail—labor,

materials, etc.? What benefit(s)/costs would

be associated with a periodic testing and

maintenance requirement? Please explain.

4. Questions on Personnel Qualifications

Currently, how many employees/

contractors are involved in inspecting,

testing, and maintaining a passenger car or

locomotive? How many of these people are

mechanical personnel? Are there established

minimum training and qualification

requirements for employees and contractors

performing inspections, testing, and

maintenance? Approximately how many

labor hours does each passenger service

operator spend each year on these activities?

What are the potential benefits of increased

training in periodic testing and maintenance?

To what extent are expenditures on such

training cost effective? Historically, does this

type of training produce identifiable safety

benefits? Please explain.

5. Questions on Tourist and Excursion

Railroads

Information available to FRA indicates that

there are approximately 100 excursion

railroads operating about 250 locomotives

and 1,000 passenger cars. Is this information

correct? What size crews operate excursion

and tourist trains? What is the average annual

passenger car mileage for tourist and

excursion railroads?

What potential safety benefits are available

from possible passenger equipment standards

for tourist and excursion railroads? To what

extent can these safety benefits be realized,

and what will they cost? Please explain.

6. Questions on Private Passenger Cars

How many private passenger cars are in

operation? On average, how many miles do

private passenger cars travel annually?

What potential safety benefits are available

from possible passenger equipment standards

for private passenger car operators? To what

extent can these safety benefits be realized,

and what will they cost? Please explain.

7. Questions on Commuter Equipment and

Operations

Information available to FRA suggests that

there are about 20 commuter railroads

nationwide operating roughly 5,400

passenger cars, 400 cab cars, 2,000 multiple

unit locomotive pairs, and 400 conventional

locomotives. Are these estimates accurate?

What size crews operate commuter trains?

Approximately how many people stand on

each train?

As a result of implementing possible

passenger equipment standards, would

commuter operators realize different safety

benefits and costs than intercity operators?

Please explain.

8. Questions on Operations With Cab Car

Forward and MUs

What costs and benefits would be

associated with alternatives for increasing

crew and passenger protection in a head-on

collision with a cab car leading?

Data indicate that at least 400 cab cars

operate as lead units. Is this estimate

accurate? Approximately, how many trips are

made each year with cab cars operating as

lead units? At what maximum speeds do

trains operate cab car forward?

Information available to FRA suggests

approximately 2,000 multiple unit

locomotive pairs operate as lead units. Is this

estimate accurate? Approximately how many

trips per year involve multiple unit

locomotive pairs?

9. Questions on Operating Practices and

Procedures

a. What costs and potential benefits are

associated with alternative measures to

safeguard passenger movements in ground

level stations?

b. At what costs can alternative measures

to mitigate risks of high-speed express trains

through stations be implemented?

10. Questions on Equipment Design

Standards

a. What would be the likely costs

associated with different alternatives

available for ensuring that anticlimbers are

loaded vertically during collisions?

b. What costs would be associated with

specifying a more effective anticlimber,

stronger and full height collision posts, and

full height corner posts on conventional

passenger locomotives?

c. How much would it cost to equip

conventional passenger service locomotives

with the type of strengthened fuel tanks

discussed in Appendix B? What levels of

safety benefits can be realized from

strengthened/ruggedized fuel tanks?

d. How many units have backup power

systems currently in place? What would it

cost to install a backup power system? What

levels of safety benefits would result from

backup power systems?

How many coach units have backup

emergency lighting? What would it cost to

install a backup emergency lighting system?

What rationale is used to determine whether

a unit will have backup emergency lighting?

To what extent would potential safety

benefits be realized? Please explain.

What would it cost to install roof hatches

on cars?

What options exist for enclosing existing

luggage compartments? At what cost? To

what extent would potential safety benefits

from enclosing luggage compartments be

realized? Please explain.

e. What levels of benefits would be realized

from modifying 49 CFR Part 223 as

suggested? At what cost would these benefits

be realized?

11. Questions on Design Standards for HighSpeed Equipment

a. What costs would be associated with

alternative approaches designed to prevent

crushing or penetration of the occupied

volume in power and coach cars? Please be

specific in defining the alternative approach

and its cost elements.

b. How much would installation of

alternative buckling delay systems cost in

terms of labor hours and materials?

c. What seat configurations do passenger

cars operating at speeds greater than 80 mph

have? If configurations vary, please explain

the differences and why they vary. How

many seats does the average passenger car

have? If there is no such thing as an average

passenger car, how many seats do the

different types of passenger cars have? How

many cars are there of each different type?
30724 Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 117 / Monday June 17, 1996 / Proposed Rules

What costs would be involved with

installation of lap belts, shoulder harnesses,

and other safety restraints on passenger cars?

To what extent would safety benefits be

realized from installing safety restraints?

Please explain.

d. In terms of time, materials, and labor,

what would installation of crash refuges

(protected areas for the crew when a collision

is unavoidable) in locomotives cost?

12. Question Regarding Size of Fleet Affected

Information available to FRA suggests that

there are about 8,200 passenger cars and 970

conventional locomotives dedicated to rail

passenger service in the United States. Is this

information accurate?

13. Questions Regarding Ridership and

Ticket Prices

What ridership levels are experienced

through the year? Would meeting the new

higher standards described in Appendix B

result in higher fares? If so, how much

higher? Would a decrease in ridership be

expected? If so, to what extent? Please

explain the method of estimation. To which

alternative forms of travel would any lost

ridership be expected to switch? How has

this conclusion been reached? What

assumptions are made? FRA is interested in

obtaining copies of studies or other

documentation addressing the issue of

passenger diversion from rail to other modes

of travel as a result of new rail safety

standards. What factors have the greatest

effect on ridership levels: price, seat

availability, trip time, variability in trip time,

etc.?

[FR Doc. 96–14944 Filed 6–14–96; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–06–P