29928 Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 115 / Thursday, June 13, 1996 / Rules and Regulations

PART 997—PROVISIONS

REGULATING THE QUALITY OF

DOMESTICALLY PRODUCED

PEANUTS HANDLED BY PERSONS

NOT SUBJECT TO THE PEANUT

MARKETING AGREEMENT

§ 997.100 [Amended]

2. Section 997.100 is amended by

removing ‘‘$0.70’’ and adding in its

place ‘‘$0.83.’’

PART 998—MARKETING AGREEMENT

REGULATING THE QUALITY OF

DOMESTICALLY PRODUCED

PEANUTS

§ 998.408 [Amended]

3. In § 998.408, paragraph (c) is

amended by removing ‘‘$1.70’’ and

adding in its place ‘‘$1.83’’ and by

removing ‘‘$0.70’’ and adding in its

place ‘‘$0.83.’’

Dated: June 7, 1996.

Robert C. Keeney,

Director, Fruit and Vegetable Division.

[FR Doc. 96–14987 Filed 6–12–96; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 3410–02–P

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 27

[Docket No. 96–ASW–1; Special Condition

No. 27–ASW–3]

Special Condition: Agusta Models

A109D and A109E, High Intensity

Radiated Fields

AGENCY: Federal Aviation

Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Final special condition; request

for comments.

SUMMARY: This special condition is

issued for the Agusta Model A109D and

A109E helicopters. These helicopters

will have a novel or unusual design

feature associated with electronic

systems that perform critical functions.

The applicable airworthiness

regulations do not contain adequate or

appropriate safety standards for the

protection of the electronic systems that

perform critical functions from the

effects of external high intensity

radiated fields (HIRF). This special

condition contains the additional safety

standards that the Administrator

considers necessary to establish a level

of safety equivalent to that established

by the applicable airworthiness

standards.

DATES: The effective date of this special

condition is June 13, 1996. Comments

must be received on or before August

12, 1996.

ADDRESSES: Comments on this proposal

may be mailed in duplicate to the

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA),

Office of the Assistant Chief Counsel,

Attn: Rules Docket No. 96–ASW–1, Fort

Worth, Texas 76193–0007, or delivered

in duplicate to the Office of the

Assistant Chief Counsel, 2601 Meacham

Blvd., Fort Worth, Texas. Comments

must be marked Docket No. 96–ASW–1.

Comments may be inspected in the

Rules Docket weekdays, except Federal

holidays, between 9 a.m. and 3 p.m.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Mr. Carroll Wright, FAA, Rotorcraft

Directorate, Regulations Group, Fort

Worth, Texas 76193–0111; telephone

(817) 222–5120.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The FAA

has determined that notice and

opportunity for prior public comment

hereon are impracticable because these

procedures would significantly delay

issuance of the design approval and

thus delay delivery of the affected

helicopter. These notice and comment

procedures are also considered

unnecessary since the public has been

previously provided with a substantial

number of opportunities to comment on

substantially identical special

conditions, and their comments have

been fully considered. Therefore, good

cause exists for making this special

condition effective upon issuance.

Comments Invited

Although this final special condition

was not subject to notice and

opportunity for prior public comment,

comments are invited on this final

special condition. Interested persons are

invited to comment on this final special

condition by submitting such written

data, views, or arguments as they may

desire. Communications should identify

the regulatory docket number and be

submitted in duplicate to the address

specified under the caption ADDRESSES.

All communications received on or

before the closing date for comments

will be considered. This special

condition may be changed in light of

comments received. All comments

received will be available in the Rules

Docket for examination by interested

persons, both before and after the

closing date of comments. A report

summarizing each substantive public

contact with FAA personnel concerning

this rulemaking will be filed in the

docket. Persons wishing the FAA to

acknowledge receipt of their comments

submitted in response to this final rule

must submit with those comments a

self-addressed, stamped postcard on

which the following statement is made:

‘‘Comments to Docket No. 96–ASW–3.’’

The postcard will be date and time

stamped and returned to the

commenter.

Background

Agusta S.p.A., Cascina Costa, Italy,

applied for an amendment to U.S. Type

Certificate H7EU through the Registro

Aeronautico Italiano (RAI) September

23, 1992, updated July 26, 1993, to

include Model A109D and A109E

helicopters based on previously

certified A109C and A109K2

helicopters. The A109D and A109E

helicopters differ from the previously

certificated model helicopters because

they contain the following:

a. Allison 250–C22(A109D) or Pratt &

Whitney PW206C(A109E) FADEC

controlled engines.

b. A main landing gear that is held in

position by two crossbeams that are

covered by pods and is retractable into

the bottom of the helicopter.

c. A new main rotor titanium hub,

composite tension links, electomeric

bearings, with dampers derived from the

Model A129 helicopter.

d. Updated fuselage and fuel systems;

and

e. A new cockpit layout with flat

panel displays (IDS) for powerplant data

monitoring.

Type Certification Basis

The certification basis established for

the Agusta Model A109D and A109E

helicopters includes: 14 Code of Federal

Regulations (CFR) § 21.29 and 14 CFR

part 27 effective February 1, 1965,

including Amendments 27–1 through

27–8, except as more specifically

required by the following paragraph

amendment levels:

Paragraph Amendment

27.2 ............................................... 28

27.21 ............................................. 21

27.45 ............................................. 21

27.71 ............................................. 21

27.79 ............................................. 21

27.141 ........................................... 21

27.143 ........................................... 21

27.175 ........................................... 21

27.177 ........................................... 21

27.401 ........................................... 27

27.610 ........................................... 21

27.901 ........................................... 23

27.903 ........................................... 23

27.927 ........................................... 23

27.954 ........................................... 23

27.1091 ......................................... 23

27.1093(b) ..................................... 23

27.1189 ......................................... 23

27.1305 ......................................... 23

27.1309 ......................................... 21

27.1321 ......................................... 13
Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 115 / Thursday, June 13, 1996 / Rules and Regulations 29929

Paragraph Amendment

27.1322 ......................................... 11

27.1323 ......................................... 13

27.1325 ......................................... 13

27.1401 ......................................... 10

27.1505 ......................................... 21

27.1519 ......................................... 21

27.1521 ......................................... 23

27.1527 ......................................... 14

27.1529 ......................................... 18

27.1549 ......................................... 23

27.1555 ......................................... 21

27.1557 ......................................... 11

27.1581 ......................................... 14

27.1583 ......................................... 16

27.1585 ......................................... 21

27.1587 ......................................... 21

Section 29.903(b), effective February

1, 1965, for category ‘‘A’’ engine

isolation, elected by the applicant;

Special Conditions No. 27–54–EU–17

for Agusta Model A109 helicopter,

issued on June 26, 1973; equivalent

safety in lieu of compliance shown for:

• Section 27.1189, regarding shut-off

means, and

• Section 27.1305(d), regarding the

fuel quantity indicator.

If the Administrator finds that the

applicable airworthiness regulations do

not contain adequate or appropriate

safety standards for these helicopters

because of a novel or unusual design

feature, special conditions are

prescribed under the provisions of

§ 21.16 to establish a level of safety

equivalent to that established in the

regulations.

Special conditions, as appropriate, are

issued in accordance with § 11.49 after

public notice, as required by §§ 11.28

and 11.29(b), and become part of the

type certification basis in accordance

with § 21.101(b)(2).

Special conditions are initially

applicable to the model for which they

are issued. Should the type certificate

for that model be amended later to

include any other model that

incorporates the same novel or unusual

design feature, or should any other

model already included on the same

type certificate be modified to

incorporate the same novel or unusual

design feature, the special conditions

would also apply to the other model

under the provisions of § 21.101(a)(1).

Discussion

The Agusta Model A109D and A109E

helicopters, at the time of the

application for amendment to U.S. Type

Certificate H7EU, were identified as

incorporating one and possibly more

electrical, electronic, or combination of

electrical and electronic (electrical/

electronic) systems that will perform

functions critical to the continued safe

flight and landing of the helicopters. A

FADEC is an electronic device that

performs the critical functions of engine

control. The control of the engines is

critical to the continued safe flight and

landing of the helicopter during visual

flight rules (VFR) and instrument flight

rules (IFR) operations.

If it is determined that this helicopter

currently or at a future date incorporates

other electrical/electronic systems

performing critical functions, those

systems also will be required to comply

with the requirements of this special

condition.

Recent advances in technology have

prompted the design of aircraft that

include advanced electrical and

electronic systems that perform

functions required for continued safe

flight and landing. However, these

advanced systems respond to the

transient effects of induced electrical

current and voltage caused by the HIRF

incident on the external surface of the

helicopters. These induced transient

currents and voltages can degrade the

performance of the electrical/electronic

systems by damaging the components or

by upsetting the systems’ functions.

Furthermore, the electromagnetic

environment has undergone a

transformation not envisioned by the

current application of § 29.1309(a).

Higher energy levels radiate from

operational transmitters currently used

for radar, radio, and television; the

number of transmitters has increased

significantly.

Existing aircraft certification

requirements are inappropriate in view

of these technological advances. In

addition, the FAA has received reports

of some significant safety incidents and

accidents involving military aircraft

equipped with advanced electrical/

electronic systems when they were

exposed to electromagnetic radiation.

The combined effects of technological

advances in helicopter design and the

changing environment have resulted in

an increased level of vulnerability of the

electrical and electronic systems

required for the continued safe flight

and landing of the helicopters. Effective

measures to protect these helicopters

against the adverse effects of exposure

to HIRF will be provided by the design

and installation of these systems. The

following primary factors contributed to

the current conditions: (1) increased use

of sensitive electronics that perform

critical functions, (2) reduced

electromagnetic shielding afforded

helicopter systems by advanced

technology airframe materials, (3)

adverse service experience of military

aircraft using these technologies, and (4)

an increase in the number and power of

radio frequency emitters and the

expected increase in the future.

The FAA recognizes the need for

aircraft certification standards to keep

pace with technological developments

and a changing environment and, in

1986, initiated a high priority program

to (1) determine and define

electromagnetic energy levels; (2)

develop guidance material for design,

test, and analysis; and (3) prescribe and

promulgate regulatory standards. The

FAA participated with industry and

airworthiness authorities of other

countries to develop internationally

recognized standards for certification.

The FAA and airworthiness

authorities of other countries have

identified a level of HIRF environment

that a helicopter could be exposed to

during IFR operations. While the HIRF

requirements are being finalized, the

FAA is adopting a special condition for

the certification of aircraft that employ

electrical/electronic systems that

perform critical functions. The accepted

maximum energy levels that civilian

helicopter system installations must

withstand for safe operation are based

on surveys and analysis of existing radio

frequency emitters. This special

condition will require the helicopters’

electrical/electronic systems and

associated wiring be protected from

these energy levels. These external

threat levels are believed to represent

the worst-case exposure for a helicopter

operating under IFR.

The HIRF environment specified in

this special condition is based on many

critical assumptions. With the exception

of takeoff and landing at an airport, one

of these assumptions is the aircraft

would be not less than 500 feet above

ground level (AGL). Helicopters

operating under visual flight rules (VFR)

routinely operate at less than 500 feet

AGL and perform takeoffs and landings

at locations other than controlled

airports. Therefore, it would be

expected that the HIRF environment

experienced by a helicopter operating

VFR may exceed the defined

environment by 100 percent or more.

This special condition will require the

systems that perform critical functions,

as installed in the aircraft, to meet

certain standards based on either a

defined HIRF environment or a fixed

value using laboratory tests.

The applicant may demonstrate that

the operation and operational capability

of the installed electrical/electronic

systems that perform critical functions

are not adversely affected when the

aircraft is exposed to the defined HIRF

environment. The FAA has determined

that the environment defined in Table 1

is acceptable for critical functions in
29930 Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 115 / Thursday, June 13, 1996 / Rules and Regulations

helicopters operating at or above 500

feet AGL. For critical functions of

helicopters operating at less than 500

feet AGL, additional factors must be

considered.

The applicant may also demonstrate

by a laboratory test that the electrical/

electronic systems that perform critical

functions can withstand a peak

electromagnetic field strength in a

frequency range of 10 KHz to 18 GHz.

If a laboratory test is used to show

compliance with the defined HIRF

environment, no credit will be given for

signal attenuation due to installation. A

level of 100 v/m and other

considerations, such as an alternate

technology backup that is immune to

HIRF, are appropriate for critical

functions during IFR operations. A level

of 200 v/m and further considerations,

such as an alternate technology backup

that is immune to HIRF, are more

appropriate for critical functions during

VFR operations.

Applicants must perform a

preliminary hazard analysis to identify

electrical/electronic systems that

perform critical functions. The term

‘‘critical’’ means those functions whose

failure would contribute to or cause a

failure condition that would prevent the

continued safe flight and landing of the

helicopters. The systems identified by

the hazard analysis as performing

critical functions are required to have

HIRF protection.

A system may perform both critical

and noncritical functions. Primary

electronic flight display systems and

their associated components perform

critical functions such as attitude,

altitude, and airspeed indications. HIRF

requirements would apply only to the

systems that perform critical functions.

Compliance with HIRF requirements

will be demonstrated by tests, analysis,

models, similarity with existing

systems, or a combination of these

methods. The two basic options of

either testing the rotorcraft to the

defined environment or laboratory

testing may not be combined. The

laboratory test allows some frequency

areas to be under tested and requires

other areas to have some safety margin

when compared to the defined

environment. The areas required to have

some safety margin are those that have

been, by past testing, shown to exhibit

greater susceptibility to adverse effects

from HIRF; and laboratory tests, in

general, do not accurately represent the

aircraft installation. Service experience

alone will not be acceptable since such

experience in normal flight operations

may not include an exposure to HIRF.

Reliance on a system with similar

design features for redundancy, as a

means of protection against the effects

of external HIRF, is generally

insufficient because all elements of a

redundant system are likely to be

concurrently exposed to the radiated

fields.

The modulation that represents the

signal most likely to disrupt the

operation of the system under test,

based on its design characteristics,

should be selected. For example, flight

control system may be susceptible to 3

Hz square wave modulation while the

video signals for electronic display

systems may be susceptible to 400 Hz

sinusoidal modulation. If the worst-case

modulation is unknown or cannot be

determined, default modulations may be

used. Suggested default values are a 1

KHz sine wave with 80 percent depth of

modulation in the frequency range from

10 KHz to 400 MHz and 1 KHz square

wave with greater than 90 percent depth

of modulation from 400 MHz to 18 GHz.

For frequencies where the unmodulated

signal would cause deviations from

normal operation, several different

modulating signals with various

waveforms and frequencies should be

applied.

Acceptable system performance

would be attained by demonstrating that

the critical function components of the

system under consideration continue to

perform their intended function during

and after exposure to required

electromagnetic fields. Deviations from

system specifications may be acceptable

but must be independently assessed by

the FAA on a case-by-case basis.

TABLE 1.—FIELD STRENGTH VOLTS/

METER

Frequency Peak Average

10–100 KHz ...................... 50 50

100–500 ............................ 60 60

500–2000 .......................... 70 70

2–30 MHz .......................... 200 200

30–100 .............................. 30 30

100–200 ............................ 150 33

200–400 ............................ 70 70

400–700 ............................ 4020 935

700–1000 .......................... 1700 170

1–2 GHz ............................ 5000 990

2–4 .................................... 6680 840

4–6 .................................... 6850 310

6–8 .................................... 3600 670

8–12 .................................. 3500 1270

12–18 ................................ 3500 360

18–40 ................................ 2100 750

As discussed above, these special

conditions are applicable initially to the

Model A109D and A109E helicopters.

Should Agusta apply at a later date for

a change to the type certificate to

include another model incorporating the

same novel or unusual design feature,

the special conditions would apply to

that model as well, under the provisions

of § 21.101(a)(1).

Conclusion

This action affects only certain

unusual or novel design features on two

models of helicopter. It is not a rule of

general applicability and affects only

the applicant who applied to the FAA

for approval of these features on the

affected helicopter.

The substance of this special

condition for similar installations in a

variety of helicopters has been subjected

to the notice and comment procedure

and has been finalized without

substantive change. It is unlikely that

prior public comment would result in a

significant change from the substance

contained herein. For this reason, and

because a delay would significantly

affect the certification of the helicopter,

which is imminent, the FAA has

determined that prior public notice and

comment are unnecessary and

impractical, and good cause exists for

adopting this special condition

immediately. Therefore, this special

condition is being made effective upon

issuance. The FAA is requesting

comments to allow interested persons to

submit views that may not have been

submitted in response to prior

opportunities for comment.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Parts 21 and

29

Aircraft, Air transportation, Aviation

safety, Rotorcraft, Safety.

The authority citation for this special

condition is as follows:

Authority: 42 U.S.C. 7572; 49 U.S.C.

106(g), 40105, 40113, 44701, 44702, 44704,

44709, 44711, 44713, 44715, 45303.

The Special Condition

Accordingly, pursuant to the

authority delegated to me by the

Administrator, the Federal Aviation

Administration (FAA) issues the

following special condition as a part of

the type certification basis for the

Agusta Model A109D and A109E

helicopters.

Protection for Electrical and Electronic

Systems From High Intensity Radiated

Fields

Each system that performs critical

functions must be designed and

installed to ensure that the operation

and operational capabilities of these

critical functions are not adversely

affected when the helicopters are

exposed to high intensity radiated fields

external to the helicopters.
Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 115 / Thursday, June 13, 1996 / Rules and Regulations 29931

Issued in Fort Worth, Texas, on May 31,

1996.

Daniel P. Salvano,

Manager, Rotorcraft Directorate, Aircraft

Certification Service.

[FR Doc. 96–14761 Filed 6–12–96; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–13–M

14 CFR Parts 27 and 29

[Docket No. 28008; Amendment No. 27–33,

29–40]

RIN 2120–AF65

Rotorcraft Regulatory Changes Based

on European Joint Aviation

Requirements

AGENCY: Federal Aviation

Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final rule; correction.

SUMMARY: This document contains a

correction to the final rule published in

the Federal Register on May 10, 1996;

(61 FR 21904). The final rule amended

the airworthiness standards for normal

and transport category rotorcraft.

EFFECTIVE DATE: August 8, 1996.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Carroll Wright, (817) 225–5120.

Correction of Publication

In rule document 96–11493, on page

21904, in the issue of Friday, May 10,

1996, make the following correction:

On page 21904, in the first column, in

the heading, Amendment ‘‘No. 29–39]’’,

should read ‘‘No. 29–40]’’.

Issued in Washington, DC on June 7, 1996.

Joseph A. Conte,

Acting Assistant Chief Counsel.

[FR Doc. 96–15067 Filed 6–12–96; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–13–M

14 CFR Part 29

[Docket No. 24802; Amendment No. 29–39]

RIN 2120–AB36

Airworthiness Standards; Transport

Category Rotorcraft Performance

AGENCY: Federal Aviation

Administration, (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final rule; correction.

SUMMARY: This document contains a

correction to the final rule published in

the Federal Register on May 10, 1996

(61 FR 21894). The final rule adopted

new and revised airworthiness

standards for the performance of

transport category rotorcraft.

EFFECTIVE DATE: June 10, 1996.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: T.E.

Archer, (817) 222–5126.

Correction of Publication

In rule document 96–11494, on page

21894, in the issue of Friday, May 10,

1996, make the following correction:

On page 21894, in the first column, in

the heading, Amendment ‘‘No. 20–40]’’

should read ‘‘No. 29–39]’’.

Issued in Washington, DC on June 7, 1996.

Joseph A. Conte,

Acting Assistant Chief Counsel.

[FR Doc. 96–15066 Filed 6–12–96; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–13–M

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 94–ANE–53; Amendment 39–

9648; AD 96–12–06]

RIN 2120–AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Teledyne

Continental Motors and Rolls-Royce,

plc O–200 Series Reciprocating

Engines

AGENCY: Federal Aviation

Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: This amendment supersedes

two existing airworthiness directives

(AD’s), applicable to Teledyne

Continental Motors and Rolls-Royce, plc

O–200 series reciprocating engines, that

currently require resetting engine timing

to 24° Before Top Center (BTC). This

amendment returns to the 28° BTC

engine timing for those engines

equipped with improved cylinders that

have strengthened heads. In addition,

this amendment drops the TCM O–200C

model which never went into

production. This amendment is

prompted by the availability of

improved cylinders. The actions

specified by this AD are intended to

prevent possible cylinder cracking with

subsequent loss of engine power.

DATES: Effective July 18, 1996.

The incorporation by reference of

certain publications listed in the

regulations is approved by the Director

of the Federal Register as of July 18,

1996.

ADDRESSES: The service information

referenced in this AD may be obtained

from Teledyne Continental Motors, P.O.

Box 90, Mobile, AL 36601; telephone

(334) 438–3411. This information may

be examined at the Federal Aviation

Administration (FAA), New England

Region, Office of the Assistant Chief

Counsel, 12 New England Executive

Park, Burlington, MA 01803–5299; or at

the Office of the Federal Register, 800

North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700,

Washington, DC.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jerry

Robinette, Aerospace Engineer, Atlanta

Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Small

Airplane Directorate, Campus Building,

1701 Columbia Ave., Suite 2–160,

College Park, GA 30337–2748;

telephone (404) 305–7371, fax (404)

305–7348.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: A

proposal to amend part 39 of the Federal

Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39)

by superseding airworthiness directive

(AD) 77–13–03, Amendment 39–2925

(42 FR 31770, June 23, 1977), which is

applicable to Teledyne Continental

Motors (TCM) O–200A, O–200B, was

published in the Federal Register on

June 15, 1995 (60 FR 31421). That action

proposed to retain the 24° before top

center (BTC) engine timing for engines

with cylinders that have part number

(P/N) lower than 641917; allow the

return to 28° BTC engine timing for

those engines with cylinder P/N 641917

and subsequent (higher) part numbers,

restamp the engine data plate to indicate

engine timing of 28° BTC; and drop the

TCM O–200C series engines from the

AD’s applicability. The actions must be

accomplished in accordance with TCM

Service Bulletin (SB) No. SB94–8, dated

September 14, 1994.

This AD also supersedes AD 78–19–

02, Amendment 39–3301 (43 FR 41374,

September 18, 1978), applicable to

Rolls-Royce, plc (R–R) O–200A, O–

200B, and O–200C series engines, which

also requires resetting the engine timing

to 24°. This AD combines the TCM

applicability of AD 77–13–03 with the

R–R applicability of AD 78–19–02 into

one, superseding AD.

Interested persons have been afforded

an opportunity to participate in the

making of this amendment.

One commenter (the manufacturer)

states that the timing adjustment may be

set to the limits of (+1°, ¥1°). The

NPRM incorrectly limited the timing

adjustment to (+1°, ¥0°). The FAA

concurs and has revised this final rule

accordingly.

After careful review of the available

data, including the comments noted

above, the FAA has determined that air

safety and the public interest require the

adoption of the rule with the changes

described previously. The FAA has

determined that these changes will

neither increase the economic burden

on any operator nor increase the scope

of the AD.

The FAA estimates that 23,500

engines installed on aircraft of U.S.

registry will be affected by this AD, that

it will take approximately 2 work hours

per engine to accomplish the required

actions, and that the average labor rate