25810 Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 101 / Thursday, May 23, 1996 / Rules and Regulations

B block licenses. The Wireless

Telecommunications Bureau (‘‘Bureau’’)

later waived the same provisions for the

long-form applications for the auction of

the broadband PCS A and B block

licenses. These same provisions also

were waived for the short-form

applications filed for the auction of the

broadband PCS C block licenses. We

find that the public interest would be

served by waiving certain ownership

information disclosure requirements for

the long-form applications filed by the

block winning bidders. Specifically, our

rules require applicants to list in their

long-form applications all businesses in

which each attributable stockholder

owns at least five percent. This

requirement necessitates reporting of

interests in firms with no relation to the

licenses auctioned. For many

companies, particularly investment

firms with diverse holdings, compliance

with this requirement is extremely

burdensome, especially when

calculating indirect ownership interests

in outside firms. We believe that, for

purposes of long-form application

processing, requiring stockholders in

applicants to report all firms in which

they hold an interest of five percent or

more is overly burdensome.

7. The purpose of the PCS ownership

disclosure requirements is to allow the

Commission to determine who is the

real party in interest, to determine

compliance with the anti-collusion

rules, the applicable spectrum caps,

certain ownership restrictions such as

the multiple and cross ownership rules,

and the alien ownership restrictions. All

applicants already must certify that they

are in compliance with these

regulations, and the applicants

themselves should be able to supply the

bulk of the information required by

Section 24.813(a) without significant

burden.

8. Consequently, we waive the

information disclosure requirement of

Sections 24.813(a)(1) and 24.813(a)(2) of

the Commission’s rules with respect to

other, outside ownership interests of

attributable stockholders of applicants,

except that outside interests of five

percent or more in other land mobile

services (i.e., Commercial Mobile Radio

Service licensees or applicants or

Private Mobile Radio Service licensees

or applicants) shall be disclosed. Also,

all direct or indirect interests in the

applicant that amount to five percent or

more must be reported. All indirect

interests held in the applicant should be

computed in accordance with the

multiplier approach set forth in 47 CFR

§ 24.204(d)(viii). Institutional investors

need only disclose direct or indirect

interests of ten percent or more in the

applicant, and need to report all outside

business interests of five percent or

more in CMRS or PMRS businesses. We

reserve the right to ask applicants for

any additional information required by

Section 24.813 of the Commission’s

rules at a later date. All other long-form

reporting requirements will continue to

apply.

9. This Order is not subject to the

general notice and comment

requirement of the Administrative

Procedure Act, because it concerns

procedural rules, and we are relieving

applicants of an administrative burden

as opposed to imposing a reporting

burden on them. In addition, good cause

for the waiver is shown. The waiver will

expedite the Commission’s ability to

process broadband PCS C block

applications, thus expediting the

delivery of service to the public.

10. Accordingly, it is ordered That the

requirements of Sections 24.720(f) and

24.720(g) of the Commission’s rules, 47

CFR §§ 24.720(f) and 24.720(g), are

waived to the extent described here

with respect to long-form applications

(FCC Form 600) for broadband PCS C

block licenses.

11. It is further ordered That the

requirements of Sections 24.813(a)(1)

and 24.813(a)(2), 47 CFR §§ 24.813(a)(1)

and 24.813(a)(2), are waived to the

extent described here with respect to

long-form applications (FCC Form 600)

for broadband PCS C block licenses.

Federal Communications Commission.

Michele C. Farquhar,

Chief, Wireless Telecommunications Bureau.

[FR Doc. 96–12943 Filed 5–22–96; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6712–01–M

47 CFR Parts 24 and 90

[FCC 96–203]

Waiver of Bid Withdrawal Payment

Provisions

AGENCY: Federal Communications

Commission.

ACTION: Final rule; waiver.

SUMMARY: The Commission has before it

requests for waiver of the rules

governing bid withdrawal payments

associated with spectrum auctions. On

December 18, 1995, ATA filed a request

for waiver of the bid withdrawal

payment applicable to the 900 MHz

SMR auction. On January 24, 1996,

MAP filed a request for waiver of the

bid withdrawal payment applicable to

the broadband PCS C block auction.

This Order reduces ATA’s bid

withdrawal payment to two times the

minimum bid increment for license 11P

in Round 9 of the 900 MHz SMR

auction, or $45,594. In addition, this

Order reduces MAP’s withdrawal

payment to the minimum bid increment

for license B–380 in Round 10 of the

broadband PCS C block auction, or

$206,400.

EFFECTIVE DATE: May 3, 1996.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

James Hedlund at 202–418–0660.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This

Order, adopted May 2, 1996, and

released May 3, 1996, is available for

inspection and copying during normal

business hours in the FCC Reference

Center, Room 239, 1919 M Street NW.,

Washington D.C. The complete text may

be purchased from the Commission’s

copy contractor, International

Transcription Service, Inc., 2100 M

Street, N.W., Suite 140, Washington

D.C. 20037 (202) 857–3800.

ORDER

I. Introduction

1. The Commission has before it

Requests for Waiver of its rules filed by

Atlanta Trunking Associates, Inc.

(‘‘ATA’’) and MAP Wireless, L.L.C

(‘‘MAP’’). Specifically, ATA and MAP

request waivers of the rules governing

bid withdrawal payments associated

with spectrum auctions. By this Order,

we hereby resolve ATA’s and MAP’s

Requests. Specifically, this Order

reduces ATA’s bid withdrawal payment

to two times the minimum bid

increment for license 11P in Round 9 of

the 900 MHz SMR auction, or $45,594.

In addition, this Order reduces MAP’s

withdrawal payment to the minimum

bid increment for license B–380 in

Round 10 of the broadband PCS C block

auction, or $206,400.

II. Background

2. Waiver Requests. On December 18,

1995, ATA filed a request for waiver of

the bid withdrawal payment applicable

to the 900 MHz SMR auction. Under our

rules, the amount of the bid withdrawal

payment is equal to the difference

between the withdrawn bid amount and

the amount of the subsequent winning

bid, if the subsequent winning bid is

lower. No withdrawal payment is

assessed if the subsequent winning bid

exceeds the withdrawn bid.

3. In its request, ATA alleges it

erroneously submitted a bid of

$125,025,000 for license 11P (Atlanta,

GA) in Round 9 of the 900 MHz SMR

auction. Pursuant to our auction

procedures, the minimum acceptable

bid for that license in Round 9 was

$121,000. According to ATA, it had

intended to submit a bid of $125,025,

but inadvertently added three extra
Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 101 / Thursday, May 23, 1996 / Rules and Regulations 25811

zeroes to its bid. ATA immediately

reported the error after Round 9 had

closed and withdrew its bid in Round

10. When the SMR auction closed, the

winning bid for license 11P was

$531,000. A declaration by L. Harold

Josey, ATA’s vice-president and one of

its authorized bidders, describes the

events surrounding the erroneous bid

submission. ATA states that it cannot

explain how the typographical error

occurred, but suggests that the error may

be due to a function of the

Commission’s bidding software.

4. ATA claims that the public interest

will not be served by strict enforcement

of the bid withdrawal payment rule in

this instance. ATA notes that the error

occurred early in the auction and hence

there was no harm to the integrity of the

auction or other bidders. Because

imposition of the full bid withdrawal

payment would be a significant burden

on ATA, it claims that the ‘‘equities

demonstrate that ATA should be

provided relief from the Commission’s

rules as it relates to this typographical

error.’’

5. On January 24, 1996, MAP filed a

request for waiver of the bid withdrawal

payment applicable to the broadband

PCS C block auction. Under our rules,

the amount of the bid withdrawal

payment is equal to the difference

between the withdrawn bid amount and

the amount of the subsequent winning

bid, if the subsequent winning bid is

lower. No withdrawal payment is

assessed if the subsequent winning bid

exceeds the withdrawn bid.

6. In its request, MAP alleges that due

to a typographical error, it submitted a

bid of $22,680,020 for license B–380

(Rockford, IL) in Round 10 of the

broadband PCS C block auction.

Pursuant to our auction procedures, the

minimum accepted bid for that round

and license was $2,267,000. MAP states

that it intended to submit a bid of

$2,268,002, slightly higher than the

minimum accepted bid. MAP withdrew

its $22,680,020 bid during the bid

withdrawal period for Round 10. As of

Round 170, the standing high bid on

license B–380 was $14,433,000. A

declaration and statement by

Christopher O. Mantle, one of MAP’s

authorized bidders, describes the events

surrounding the erroneous bid

submission. MAP alleges that the error

was attributable to a ‘‘quirk’’ in the

Commission’s bidding software. MAP

claims that the error occurred because

the bidding software places a zero on

each bid entry line, which does not

disappear when a bid is entered unless

it is manually removed. As a result,

MAP’s bid for that round and license

was ten times greater than its intended

bid. According to MAP, the only error

attributable to it is ‘‘failing to notice and

delete the extraneous zero caused by the

bidder’s software format.’’

7. MAP argues that imposition of the

bid withdrawal payment for its

erroneous bid would be inequitable and

contrary to the public interest. It

observes that the Auctions Division has

granted waiver requests to other C block

applicants which sought to correct

clerical or typographical errors. Finally,

MAP argues that Commission precedent

and principles of administrative law

require that parties be allowed to correct

typographical errors when dealing with

governmental agencies.

8. Public Notice. On February 7, 1996,

the Wireless Telecommunications

Bureau (‘‘Bureau’’) released a Public

Notice seeking comment on requests for

waiver of the Commission’s bid

withdrawal payment provisions,

including the requests of ATA and

MAP. See Public Notice, DA 96–145,

‘‘Comment Sought on Requests to Waive

Bid Withdrawal Payments and General

Enforcement Guidelines’’ (rel. February

7, 1996). The waiver requests were filed

by ATA, MAP and PCS 2000, L.P. We

note that we are deferring action on the

request filed by PCS 2000 until a later

date. In addition, the Bureau sought

comment on proposals to reduce the bid

withdrawal payment requirement in

cases of erroneous bids attributed to

inadvertent or typographical mistakes.

The Bureau proposed reducing the bid

withdrawal payment in such

circumstances to the greater of the

upfront payment amount for the market

for which the bid was submitted, or five

percent of that market’s winning bid.

Alternatively, the Bureau proposed to

treat a mistaken bid that is withdrawn

in the same round as if it were made at

the minimum accepted bid (if there are

no other bids for that round), or at the

second highest bit (if there are other

bids above the minimum accepted bid).

The required payment would be the

difference between this amount and the

subsequent winning bid. Finally, the

Bureau sought comment on whether any

circumstances should warrant a

complete waiver of the bid withdrawal

payment (e.g., a bidding error clearly

attributable to a mistake by the

Commission, its staff or contractors).

9. Comments. In total, 20 parties

submitted Comments, and six parties

submitted Reply Comments, concerning

the waiver requests and the Bureau’s

proposed enforcement guidelines. Six

parties, all participants in the

broadband PCS C block auction,

submitted comments urging the

Commission to deny the various waiver

requests and strictly adhere to the

applicable bid withdrawal payment

provisions. Generally, these commenters

argue that a waiver of the bid

withdrawal payment provisions would

distort the auction process and

prejudice other bidders. For example,

Quantum claims that if the Commission

grants any of these waivers, it would

undermine the integrity of the auctions

by announcing to bidders that they may

strategically place ‘‘erroneous’’ bids and

withdraw them with impunity. These

commenters also note that the bidding

software contains numerous safeguards

which are designed to encourage

bidders to verify their bids prior to

submission. PCS One claims that these

safeguards have been effective, as

bidders in the broadband PCS C block

auction have reported only three

mistaken bids out of the approximately

11,500 bids submitted as of February 9,

1996. They further note that the

Commission staff clearly explained the

bid withdrawal provisions as well as the

safeguards built in to the bidding

software prior to the commencement of

the auction.

10. Eight parties, including

participants in the broadband PCS C

block auction and the 900 MHz SMR

auction, urge the Commission to grant

the waiver requests and impose no bid

withdrawal payment requirement when

it is clear that an erroneous bid is the

result of an honest typographical or

clerical mistake. Some of these

commenters note that the Commission

adopted the bid withdrawal payment

provisions to deter insincere bidding.

They further note that in adopting these

provisions, the Commission did not

contemplate the possibility that bidders

might submit erroneous bids, resulting

from typographical or clerical errors.

Several commenters also argue that

alleged problems with the Commission’s

bidding software necessitate granting

the waiver requests at issue. For

example, MAP claims that its erroneous

bid resulted from an ‘‘irregularity’’ in

the ‘‘Go to Market’’ function of its

competitive bidding software. MAP

notes that after it filed its request for

waiver, the Wireless

Telecommunications Bureau released a

Public Notice which stated that ‘‘when

a bidder begins keying in a bid amount,

the zero remains in the bid column as

the bid amount’s final digit.’’

Wilderness claims that the fact that

‘‘several diligent bidders’’ have

submitted erroneous bids with an extra

zero four times indicates that the

Commission’s software is ‘‘far from fool

proof.’’

11. Antigone suggests that there is an

established body of case law governing

mistaken bids that result from clerical or
25812 Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 101 / Thursday, May 23, 1996 / Rules and Regulations

arithmetic errors. According to

Antigone, these cases hold that when a

bidder demonstrates that its bid was the

result of clerical or arithmetic errors, the

government agency holding the auction

cannot require a forfeiture. Antigone

relies particularly on Ruggiero v. United

States for the proposition that once a

factual determination is made that a

bidder made a clerical error, equitable

principles compel the remission of any

bid withdrawal penalty. Similarly, PCS

2000 relies on the practice under certain

provisions of the Federal Acquisition

Regulation (FAR) for the proposition

that bidders who submit erroneous bids

may be permitted to withdraw without

paying any forfeiture.

12. In addition, several parties

submitted comments on our proposed

alternatives to the enforcement of the

bid withdrawal payment provisions in

cases of erroneous bids caused by

inadvertent, typographical mistakes.

One commenter, Auction Strategy Inc.

(ASI), favors the Commission’s second

proposal, but with some modification.

ASI describes how a bidder can ‘‘game’’

the second proposal so as to find out

critical information concerning a

competitor’s bidding strategy without

being subject to any bid withdrawal

payment. ASI proposes modifications

which it claims would reduce the bid

withdrawal payment for erroneous bids

without encouraging bidders to make

strategic ‘‘mistakes.’’

III. Discussion

13. The Commission established a bid

withdrawal payment requirement in

order to discourage insincere bidding.

Insincere bidding, whether purely

frivolous or strategic, distorts the price

information generated by the auction

process and reduces efficiency.

14. The bid withdrawal payment

provisions are silent on how to address

erroneous bids which result from

typographical or clerical errors. In cases

in which the erroneous bid exceeds the

intended bid by factors of 10 or more,

full application of the bid withdrawal

payment provisions could impose an

extreme and unnecessary hardship on

most bidders. We believe, however, that

it may be extremely difficult for the

Commission to distinguish between

‘‘innocent’’ erroneous bids and

‘‘strategic’’ erroneous bids. Furthermore,

we are mindful of the negative impact

that erroneous bids may have on the

integrity of the auction. In particular, an

erroneous bid distort the price

information generated by the auction

process and reduce efficiency. Such

distortion and inefficiency may result

regardless of whether the bid was the

result of an innocent error or was

strategically placed. Consequently, we

have strongly urged bidders to exercise

great caution when submitting their

bids.

15. A waiver of the bid withdrawal

payment provisions applicable to the

900 MHz SMR auction and to the

broadband PCS C block auction is

appropriate when a petitioner

demonstrates that special circumstances

warrant a deviation from the rule and

such deviation will serve the public

interest. Northeast Cellular Telephone

Company v. FCC, 897 F.2d 1164, 1166

(D.C. Cir., 1990), citing Wait Radio v.

FCC, 418 F.2d 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1969). On

the facts before us, we believe that ATA

and MAP have demonstrated that

waivers of the applicable bid

withdrawal payment provisions are

appropriate. ATA and MAP have shown

that they submitted erroneous bids

which exceeded their intended bids by

factors of ten or more. Under these

circumstances, full imposition of the bid

withdrawal payment provisions would

impose an extreme and unnecessary

financial hardship. As noted above,

these provisions were adopted to

discourage insincere bidding. They were

not adopted to impose financial

hardship on bidders who submit

mistaken bids. Full enforcement of the

bid withdrawal payment provisions

would not serve the underlying purpose

of these provisions, nor would it serve

the public interest. For these reasons,

we believe that ATA and MAP are

entitled to a partial waiver of the

applicable bid withdrawal payment

provisions.

16. In cases of erroneous bids, some

relief from the bid withdrawal payment

requirement appears necessary. We are

concerned, however, that a complete

waiver of these provisions could

threaten the economic efficiency of the

auction process. Such a precedent

would encourage future bidders who are

uncertain about how much more to bid

on a particular license to submit

‘‘mistaken’’ bids intentionally so as to

gain insight into competitors’ valuation

of licenses. As ASI points out, accurate

bids are essential to the integrity of the

auction process. In this regard, we

believe that the cases and the practice

under certain provisions of the Federal

Acquisition Regulation (FAR) cited by

Antigone and PCS 2000 are inapposite

because of the unique auction

methodology employed here (e.g.,

simultaneous multiple round bidding).

We also disagree with MAP’s contention

that because the Auctions Division has

previously granted waivers allowing

applicants to correct typographical or

clerical errors in their short-form

applications (FCC Form 175s), MAP

should be entitled to correct the

typographical or clerical error which

resulted in its erroneous bid. The

waivers MAP cites allowed for changes

to be made to the applicant’s FCC Form

175s. These waivers were granted prior

to the commencement of the auction

where concerns about strategic

manipulation of the bidding process

were non-existent. Furthermore,

Commission precedent allowed for

changes to short-form applications to be

made, whereas the Commission has

never allowed a bidder to change its

bids without being subject to the bid

withdrawal payment provisions.

17. Therefore, we intend to partially

waive these provisions in a manner

which is fair to bidders and which

preserves the economic efficiency of the

auction process. For those instances in

which bidders submit an erroneous bid,

we generally agree that the approach

proposed by ASI, which is a

modification of our second proposal

contained in the Public Notice, is most

appropriate. In determining an

appropriate bid withdrawal payment,

we will take into consideration the

round and stage in which a mistaken

bid is withdrawn. In general, the

approach described below follows the

guidelines suggested by ASI and is

designed to eliminate the strategic

benefit of purposely submitting

mistaken bids.

18. Specifically, if at any point during

an auction a mistaken bid is withdrawn

in the same round in which it was

submitted, the bid withdrawal payment

should be the greater of (a) the

minimum bid increment for that license

and round, or (b) the standard bid

withdrawal payment calculated as if the

bidder had made a bid at the minimum

accepted bid. If a mistaken bid is

withdrawn in the round immediately

following the round in which it was

submitted, and the auction is in Stage I

or Stage II, the withdrawal payment

should be the greater of (a) two times

the minimum bid increment during the

round in which the mistaken bid was

submitted or (b) the standard

withdrawal payment calculated as if the

bidder had made a bid at one bid

increment above the minimum accepted

bid. If the mistaken bid is withdrawn

two or more rounds following the round

in which it was submitted, the bidder

should not be eligible for any reduction

in the bid withdrawal payment.

Similarly, during Stage III of an auction,

if a mistaken bid is not withdrawn

during the round it was submitted, the

bidder should not be eligible for any

reduction in the bid withdrawal

payment.
Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 101 / Thursday, May 23, 1996 / Rules and Regulations 25813

Example: Bidder X wishes to place the

minimum accepted bid for Market 1. The

standing high bid for this market after Round

19 of the auction is $1 million. The minimum

bid increment is set at ten percent. Thus, the

minimum accepted bid for Market 1 in

Round 20 would be $1.1 million. In Round

20, Bidder X erroneously submits a bid of

$110 million. If Bidder X withdraws it

erroneous bid during the bid withdrawal

period for Round 20, it would be subject to

a bid withdrawal payment of the minimum

bid increment for Round 20, $100,000, or the

difference between $1.1 million and the

subsequent winning bid, whichever is

greater. If Bidder X does not withdraw its bid

until Round 21, and the auction is in Stage

I or Stage II, it would be subject to a bid

withdrawal payment of two times the

minimum bid increment, $200,000, or the

difference between $1.2 million and the

subsequent winning bid, whichever is

greater. If Bidder X waits until Round 22 or

later to withdraw its erroneous bid, it would

be subject to the standard bid withdrawal

payment. Similarly, if the auction is in Stage

III, and Bidder X fails to withdraw its

erroneous bid in Round 20, it would be

subject to the standard bid withdrawal

payment.

19. Under this approach, the required

bid withdrawal payment would be

substantial enough to discourage

strategic placement of erroneous bids

without being so severe as to impose an

untenable burden on bidders. In

addition, the payment is tailored to the

size of the license and the point in the

auction when the mistaken bid was

submitted. For example, if a mistaken

bid is submitted early in a

simultaneous, multiple round auction,

the potential damage to the economic

efficiency of the auction is lower than

if it were submitted during the later

stages of the auction, and the required

bid withdrawal payment would be

correspondingly lower. As an auction

progresses, however, the potential gain

from a strategically-placed erroneous

bid is higher, and the potential damage

to the efficiency of the auction process

is higher. In other words, erroneous bids

cause greater damage to the economic

efficiency of the auction process as

market prices approach their final

valuation. Thus, the cost of submitting

an erroneous bid during the later stages

of an auction is higher than it would be

if it were submitted earlier in an

auction.

20. We have decided to grant ATA

and MAP relief from full enforcement of

the bid withdrawal payment rules.

Specifically, we will utilize the

approach described above to reduce

ATA’s bid withdrawal payment to two

times the minimum bid increment for

license 11P in Round 9, or $45,594.

Similarly, we will utilize the approach

described above to reduce MAP’s bid

withdrawal payment to the minimum

bid increment for license B–380 in

Round 10 of the broadband PCS C block

auction, or $206,400.

21. We delegate to the Wireless

Telecommunications Bureau (the

‘‘Bureau’’) the authority to resolve

similar requests for waiver of the

Commission’s bid withdrawal

provisions. In order for a party to be

eligible for such a waiver, it must

submit a request for waiver

accompanied by a sworn declaration

attesting to the veracity of the factual

circumstances surrounding the

erroneous bid submission. We will

continue to evaluate these requests on a

case-by-case basis. We caution that

relief will not be available to bidders if

there is evidence that they have engaged

in insincere or frivolous bidding or have

otherwise acted in bad faith. We

consider all allegations of bidder

misconduct very seriously.

IV. Ordering Clauses

22. Accordingly, it is ordered That the

waiver request submitted by Atlanta

Trunking Associates, Inc. is granted to

the extent indicated above.

23. It is further ordered That Atlanta

Trunking Associates, Inc. is subject to a

bid withdrawal payment requirement of

$45,594.

24. It is further ordered That the

waiver request submitted by MAP

Wireless, L.L.C. is granted to the extent

indicated above.

25. It is further ordered That MAP

Wireless, L.L.C. is subject to a bid

withdrawal payment requirement of

$206,400.

26. It is further ordered That we

delegate to the Wireless

Telecommunications Bureau the

authority to resolve bid withdrawal

payment waiver requests involving

factual circumstances similar to those

presented here.

Federal Communications Commission.

William F. Caton,

Acting Secretary.

[FR Doc. 96–12967 Filed 5–22–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6712–01–M

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

Fish and Wildlife Service

50 CFR Part 17

RIN 1018–AC 34

Endangered and Threatened Wildlife

and Plants; Determination of

Threatened Status for the California

Red-Legged Frog

AGENCY: Fish and Wildlife Service,

Interior.

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: The U.S. Fish and Wildlife

Service (Service) determines threatened

status for the California red-legged frog

(Rana aurora draytonii) pursuant to the

Endangered Species Act of 1973, as

amended (Act). The Service originally

proposed to list the California redlegged frog as endangered, but

information obtained during the

comment period suggests that this taxon

is found in more localities within its

current range than previously identified.

The California red-legged frog is now

found primarily in wetlands and

streams in coastal drainages of central

California. It has been extirpated from

70 percent of its former range. The

California red-legged frog is threatened

within its remaining range by a wide

variety of human impacts, including

urban encroachment, construction of

reservoirs and water diversions,

introduction of exotic predators and

competitors, livestock grazing, and

habitat fragmentation. This rule

implements the Federal protection and

recovery provisions afforded by the Act

for this species.

EFFECTIVE DATE: June 24, 1996.

ADDRESSES: The complete file for this

rule is available for public inspection,

by appointment, during normal business

hours at the U.S. Fish and Wildlife

Service, 2800 Cottage Way, Room E–

1803, Sacramento, CA 95825–1846.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Karen J. Miller, at the above address

(916 979–2725).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

The California red-legged frog (Rana

aurora draytonii) is one of two

subspecies of the red-legged frog (Rana

aurora) found on the Pacific coast. Rana

a. draytonii was first described by Baird

and Girard in 1852 from specimens

collected at or near the City of San

Francisco in 1841 (Storer 1925, Cochran

1961). The California red-legged frog is

the largest native frog in the western

United States (Wright and Wright 1949),