United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit 

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No. 20-1453

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United States of America

 Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Jaime Leonel Reinosa-Salguero

 Defendant - Appellant

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Western District of Arkansas - Ft. Smith

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Submitted: January 11, 2021

 Filed: February 1, 2021 

[Unpublished]

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Before GRUENDER, BENTON, and STRAS, Circuit Judges. 

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PER CURIAM.

Jaime Leonel Reinosa-Salguero pleaded guilty to one count of bank robbery

as well as one count of using a firearm during and in relation to a federal crime of 

violence. See generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A)(iii), 2113(a). The district court1

1

The Honorable P.K. Holmes, III, United States District Judge for the Western 

District of Arkansas. 
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calculated a total offense level of 23 and a criminal-history category of I, resulting 

in an advisory sentencing guidelines range of 46 to 57 months’ imprisonment on the 

bank-robbery count, see U.S.S.G. § ch. 5, Part A, and a mandatory minimum of 120 

months’ imprisonment on the firearm count to run consecutively to the bank-robbery 

sentence, see 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii); U.S.S.G. § 2K2.4(b). The district court 

sentenced Reinosa-Salguero to 120 months’ imprisonment on the bank-robbery 

count (an upward variance to just over double the top end of the guidelines range) 

and 120 months’ imprisonment on the firearm count, for a total sentence of 240 

months’ imprisonment. Reinosa-Salguero appeals, arguing that his sentence is 

substantively unreasonable. We affirm. 

“We review sentences, whether inside or outside the Guidelines range, under 

a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” United States v. Mesa-Lopez, 808 F.3d 

743, 745 (8th Cir. 2015). In considering the substantive reasonableness of an upward 

variance, we “must give due deference to the district court’s decision that the [18 

U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the variance.” United 

States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461-62 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc). “A sentencing 

court abuses its discretion if it fails to consider a relevant factor that should have 

received significant weight, gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant 

factor, or considers only the appropriate factors but commits a clear error of 

judgment in weighing those factors.” United States v. Nelson, 982 F.3d 1141, 1146 

(8th Cir. 2020). 

The district court concluded that an upward variance on the bank-robbery 

count was warranted in light of aggravating factors related to the nature and 

circumstances of this offense, the need to deter such conduct, and the need to protect 

the public. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Specifically, the district court noted 

that: immediately before robbing the bank, Reinosa-Salguero pointed a firearm at 

someone while attempting to steal a car; during the bank robbery, he discharged a 

firearm right over a bank teller’s head; shortly after robbing the bank, he led police 

on a high-speed chase; and, during the high-speed chase, he again used a firearm. In 

light of these facts, the district court concluded that a sentence of just over double 
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the top end of the guidelines range on the bank-robbery count was warranted. We 

find no abuse of discretion in this determination. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 

798 F. App’x 966, 966-67 (8th Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (affirming an upward 

variance to nearly double the top end of the guidelines range in light of similar 

offense conduct). 

Reinosa-Salguero points out that some of these aggravating factors were 

already taken into account in the calculation of his guidelines range and contends

that the district court should have weighed more heavily the fact that his offense 

conduct was a deviation from his nonviolent character. But a sentencing court may 

vary upward based on “factors that have already been taken into account in 

calculating the advisory Guidelines range.” United States v. David, 682 F.3d 1074, 

1077 (8th Cir. 2012). And “[t]he district court’s choice to assign relatively greater 

weight to the nature and circumstances of the offense than to the mitigating personal 

characteristics of the defendant” was well within its wide latitude in weighing 

relevant factors. See United States v. Wisecarver, 644 F.3d 764, 774 (8th Cir. 2011). 

“[T]he mere fact that the court could have weighed the sentencing factors differently 

does not amount to an abuse of discretion.” United States v. Carrillo, 982 F.3d 1134, 

1137 (8th Cir. 2020).

Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm.

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