Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 4 / Friday, January 5, 1996 / Notices 419

service period. However, if the licensee

adopts 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, Option

B, for containment leakage rate testing at

Zion, Unit 1, with the potential for Type A

test intervals of 10 years, the exemption for

P–16 is hereby revoked.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the

Commission has determined that

granting these exemptions will not have

a significant impact on the human

environment (60 FR 45499).

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 28th day

of December 1995.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Gail Marcus,

Acting Director, Division of Reactor Projects—

III/IV, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

[FR Doc. 96–146 Filed 1–4–96; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

[Docket No. 50–341]

Detroit Edison Co., (Fermi 2);

Exemption

I

Detroit Edison Company (the licensee)

is the holder of Facility Operating

License No. NPF–43, which authorizes

operation of the Enrico Fermi Atomic

Power Plant, unit 2 (the facility). The

facility is a boiling water reactor located

at the licensee’s site in Monroe County,

Michigan. This license provides, among

other things, that the facility is subject

to all rules, regulations, and orders of

the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (the Commission) now or

hereafter in effect.

II

By letter dated September 1, 1995, the

licensee requested, pursuant to 10 CFR

50.12(a), a one-time schedular

exemption for Fermi, unit 2, from the

local leak rate test intervals for types B

and C leak rate tests required by 10 CFR

part 50, appendix J, sections III.D.2(a)

and III.D.3. types B and C tests are

associated with leakage testing of

bellows, manway gasket seals, flanges,

and containment isolation valves. The

purpose of the tests is to assure that

leakage through primary reactor

containment does not exceed allowable

leakage rate values as specified in the

Technical Specifications and that

periodic surveillance is performed.

Sections III.D.2(a) and III.D.3 require, in

part, that types B and C tests be

performed at intervals no greater than 2

years. The licensee has proposed a onetime exemption to allow a 25-percent

extension to the 2-year testing interval.

The exemption is requested to

support a revised outage schedule and

to avoid the potential for a forced

reactor shutdown. If a forced outage is

imposed to perform testing, it would

present undue hardship and cost in the

form of increased radiological exposure.

Furthermore, if a forced outage is

imposed to perform the required testing,

an additional plant shutdown and

startup will be required.

III

Due to a lengthy turbine outage and

power ascension program, the licensee

has deferred the 1996 refueling outage

from March 1996 until September 1996.

This will permit targeted fuel burnup to

be met so that cycle 6 operation can be

conducted as planned. However, the 2-

year interval for performing types B and

C tests expires in April 1996. Since

these tests cannot be performed when

the plant is at power, performance of

these tests to meet the 2-year interval

would necessitate a plant shutdown.

Therefore, Detroit Edison has proposed

a one-time exemption to allow a 25-

percent extension to the testing interval.

This will allow for a maximum types B

and C test interval of 30 months and

will permit continued plant operation

until the September 27, 1996, outage

date.

The proposed exemption would add a

one-time only 6-month extension to the

appendix J test intervals for types B and

C testing. As stated in 10 CFR part 50,

appendix J, the purpose of the primary

containment leak rate testing

requirements is to ensure that leakage

rates are maintained within the

Technical Specification requirements

and to assure that proper maintenance

and repair is performed throughout the

service life of the containment boundary

components. The requested exemption

is consistent with the intent of 10 CFR

50.12(a), in that it represents a one-time

only schedular extension of short

duration. The required leak tests will

still be performed to assess compliance

with Technical Specification

requirements, albeit later, and to assure

that any required maintenance or repair

is performed. As noted in section

III.D.2(a) of appendix J, it was intended

that the testing be performed during

refueling outages or other convenient

intervals. Extending the appendix J

intervals by a small amount to reach the

next refueling outage will not

significantly impact the integrity of the

containment boundary, and therefore,

will not significantly impact the

consequences of an accident or transient

in the unlikely event of such an

occurrence during the 6-month

extended period.

Past Unit 2 local leak rate test data

have, in general, demonstrated good

leak rate test results. A combined Type

B and C leakage rate was established by

the licensee at the conclusion of the last

refueling outage and a running total

leakage is maintained during each

operating cycle. This running total

leakage rate is 73.81 standard cubic feet

per hour, which is 41.5 percent of the

limit of 0.6 La. Based on this margin, it

is clear that extending the test interval

a maximum of 6 months will not affect

the overall integrity of the containment.

On September 12, 1995, shortly after

the licensee’s submittal, the

Commission approved amendments to

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, to adopt

performance-oriented and risk based

approaches to containment leakage

testing. The new rule allows licensees

the option of continuing to comply with

the previous Appendix J or to adopt the

new performance-based standards. The

new rule allows for extending the test

intervals for up to 5 years for Type C

tests and 10 years for Type B tests.

Industry guideline NEI 94–01 provides

a methodology for establishing test

frequencies based on performance. An

interval of 30 months is initially

established (except for air locks), with

provisions to increase the test intervals

based on satisfactory performance.

Additionally, an extension of up to 25-

percent of the test interval (not to

exceed 12 months) is allowed for

scheduling purposes only. Thus, the

licensee’s proposal to extend the

interval for Type B and C tests to a

maximum of 30 months is within the

most limiting test interval that is

permitted by the new rule, i.e., 30

months plus 25-percent extension for

scheduling.

As indicated, the revised Appendix J

was not available when the licensee was

preparing this exemption request. The

option involving performance-oriented

and risk-based approaches is strictly

voluntary and the licensee is under no

obligation to adopt it. Adoption of the

new rule would require revisions to the

technical specifications, additional

training, a number of planning and

scheduling changes, and a considerable

amount of procedural modifications that

are inconsistent with the time remaining

before the April 1996 end date for the

2-year interval for Type B and C tests.

IV

Based on the above, the staff

concludes that the licensee’s proposed

extension of the test intervals for test

components identified in its submittal is

acceptable. This is a one-time

exemption from the Type B and C test

interval requirements as prescribed in

Appendix J, and is intended to be in

effect until the tests are performed

during the fall 1996 refueling outage.

This approval is based on the
420 Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 4 / Friday, January 5, 1996 / Notices

assumption that all other tests will be

conducted in accordance with the

requirements of Appendix J.

The Commission’s regulations at 10

CFR 50.12 provide that special

circumstances must be present in order

for an exemption from the regulations to

be granted. According to 10 CFR

50.12(a)(2)(ii), special circumstances are

present whenever application of the

regulation in the particular

circumstances would not serve the

underlying purpose of the rule or is not

necessary to achieve the underlying

purpose of the rule. As discussed above,

the intent of Appendix J is to assure that

containment leakage does not exceed

technical specifications limits, and the

staff finds that this small interval

extension will not significantly affect

that assurance. To require a shutdown

solely for surveillance testing is not

necessary to achieve the underlying

purpose of the rule.

Accordingly, the Commission has

determined, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12,

that this exemption is authorized by law

and will not present an undue risk to

the public health and safety, and is

consistent with the common defense

and security. The Commission further

determines that special circumstances

as provided in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) are

present in that application of the

regulation in these particular

circumstances is not necessary to

achieve the underlying purpose of the

rule. Therefore, the Commission hereby

grants the exemption from 10 CFR Part

50, Appendix J, Sections III.D.2(a) and

III.D.3 to the extent that the Appendix

J test interval for performing Type B and

Type C tests may be extended by 25

percent until the fall 1996 refueling

outage, on a one-time only basis, for

Fermi 2, as described in Section III

above.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the

Commission has determined that the

granting of this exemption will have no

significant impact on the quality of the

human environment (60 FR 61576).

Dated at Rockville, Maryland this 18th day

of December 1995.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Jack W. Roe,

Director, Division of Reactor Projects—III/IV,

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

[FR Doc. 96–147 Filed 1–4–96; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

[Docket No. 50–354]

Public Service Electric & Gas

Company and Atlantic City Electric

Company Hope Creek Generating

Station Notice of Consideration of

Issuance of Amendment to Facility

Operating License, Proposed No

Significant Hazards Consideration

Determination, and Opportunity for a

Hearing

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (the Commission) is

considering issuance of an amendment

to Facility Operating License No. NPF–

57, issued to Public Service Electric &

Gas Company and Atlantic City Electric

Company (the licensee), for operation of

the Hope Creek Generating Station,

located on the east shore of the

Delaware River in Lower Alloways

Creek Township, Salem County, New

Jersey.

The proposed amendment would

change Hope Creek Generating Station

Technical Specification (TS) 1.4,

‘‘Channel Calibration’’, to define actions

required for channel calibration of

instrument channels containing

resistance temperature detector or

thermocouple sensors.

The instrument channels affected by

this calibration issue are required to be

operable in Operational Conditions 1, 2

and 3. The licensee has determined this

issue impacts operability of the affected

channels. Hope Creek is currently in

Operational Condition 5 and the

affected instrument channels are not

required to be operable. However, the

outage schedule indicates that the

licensee will be going to Operational

Condition 3 on February 2, 1996. Hope

Creek TS 3.0.4 prohibits entry into an

operational condition when the

Limiting Conditions for Operation are

not met. The licensee requires 3 days to

implement the change. Therefore, the

licensee requested that this amendment

request be approved no later than

January 31, 1996. Since this schedule

does not permit the NRC to publish this

notice in the Federal Register with

allowance for a 30-day public comment

period, the licensee requested that this

action be handled as an exigent request.

Before issuance of the proposed

license amendment, the Commission

will have made findings required by the

Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended

(the Act) and the Commission’s

regulations.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.91(a)(6) for

amendments to be granted under

exigent circumstances, the NRC staff

must determine that the amendment

request involves no significant hazards

consideration. Under the Commission’s

regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means

that operation of the facility in

accordance with the proposed

amendment would not (1) involve a

significant increase in the probability or

consequences of an accident previously

evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of

a new or different kind of accident from

any accident previously evaluated; or

(3) involve a significant reduction in a

margin of safety. As required by 10 CFR

50.91(a), the licensee has provided its

analysis of the issue of no significant

hazards consideration, which is

presented below:

1. Will not involve a significant increase in

the probability or consequences of an

accident previously evaluated.

Since no physical change is being made to

the instrumentation channels, or to any

system or component that interfaces with the

instrumentation channels, there is no change

in the probability of any accident analyzed in

the UFSAR [Updated Final Safety Analysis

Report].

There is no change in the consequences of

an accident. The proposed change continues

to ensure the surveillance requirements meet

the licensing basis. Also, the testing

performed will continue to demonstrate the

capability of the affected instrumentation

channels to respond to changes in the state

of the monitored parameters in a manner

consistent with assumptions in the accident

analysis.

Therefore, the proposed change does not

involve a significant increase in the

probability or consequences of an accident

previously evaluated.

2. Will not create the possibility of a new

or different kind of accident from any

previously evaluated.

The proposed change does not result in

any design or physical configuration changes

to the instrumentation channels. Operation

incorporating the proposed change will not

impair the instrumentation channels from

performing as provided in the design basis.

By aligning the TS to be consistent with the

current calibration practice we will prevent

the possibility for unnecessary removal and

potential damage of the temperature

detectors (for sensor calibration). The

instrument channels will continue to

function as assumed in the accident analyses.

Therefore, the proposed change does not

create the possibility of a new or different

kind of accident from any previously

evaluated.

3. Will not involve a significant reduction

in a margin of safety.

Since the proposed change does not

involve the addition or modification of plant

equipment, is consistent with the intent of

the existing Technical Specifications, is

consistent with the current industry practices

as outlined in NUREG 1433, ‘‘Standard

Technical Specifications General Electric

Plants, BWR/4’’ Revision 1 and is consistent

with the design basis of the Instrumentation

Systems and the accident analysis, no action

will occur that will involve a significant

reduction in a margin of safety.