### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE Se pte mb er

11, 200 7 S es sio n
ROBE RT J. YOUNG COMPANY v. NASHVI LLE HOCK EY CLUB

LI M IT ED P A R TN ER SH IP

A Dire ct A ppeal from the C hancery Court for D avidson County No. 05-1271 II The Honorable Carol McC oy, Chancellor

No. M2006- 2511-COA-R 3-CV - Filed Marc h 26, 2008

Th is c a se ari se s f

ro m a c on tr a c t di sp ute be tw e e n th e pa rt ie s. Th e Ap pe lla

nt h e re in, Na sh vil le Hocke y Club, entered into a “ Sponsorship Agr eeme nt” with the Appellee her ein, Robert J. Young Company . Subsequently , the par ties ag ree d to chang e their a g ree men t

. As a result, the parties enter ed into a subseque nt “L etter of Ag ree ment.” When a play ers’ strike occ urre d, Appellee wished to canc el the contr act. Appe llant clai m ed t hat the “Sponsorship Ag ree ment,” and pa rticularly the forc e majeur e clause contained there in, wer e not superse ded by the “L etter of Ag ree ment.” The trial court g rante d summary judgme nt ag ainst Appellee and, following a hear ing on Appellant’s counte rclaim, g rante d judgme nt in favor of Appellant but did not awa rd damag es based upon its finding that Appellant had mitig ated all of i ts damag es. Appe llant appea ls on the issue of damag es. Appe llee

a pp e a ls o n th e iss ue of

wh a t, i f a

ny , a g re e me nt e xists be tween the pa rt ie s. F ind ingthat th e pla in langua g e of t he “L e tte r o f A g re e me nt” su pp or ts a fi nd ingthat sa

me su pe rs e de s th e “ Spo ns or sh ip Ag ree ment,” we reve rse a nd rema nd.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 ; A ppe al a s o f R igh t; Judg me nt of th e Cha nc e r y C our t R e ve r se d and Rem anded

W. F R ANK C RAW FORD , J. delivere d the opi nion of t he court, in which A LA N E. H I G H ERS , P.J., W .S. and J EF F R EY S TEW A RT , S P .J., not participating.

Robert J. Wa lker a nd John L. Farringer IV of Nashville, Tenne ssee for appellant, Nashville Hoc key Clu b L imi te d Pa

rt ne rs hip
Ralph W. Mello of Na shville, Tennessee for Appe llee, Robert J. Young Company

OP IN ION

T h e mate r ia l f

a c ts o f th is c a s e ar e u n d is p u te d

. Ro b e r t J

. Y o u n g Co mp a n y (“RJY,” or

“ Ap pe lle e ” ) a ndtheNa sh vil le Ho c ke y Cl ub Li mitedPart ne rs hip (“ NH C,” or “ Ap pe lla nt” ) f

ir st discussed ente ring into a sponsorship a gree ment in 1997. On February 20, 1998, the parties entere d-2-

int o a “ Le tte r of In te nt. ” Th e re a ft e r, on Se pte mbe r 1, 199 8, the pa rt ie s ent e re d in to a

“ Spo ns or sh ip Ag re e me nt. ” By it s ow n te rm s, the “ Spo ns or sh ip A gr e e me nt” wa s to ru n f ro m Ju ly 1 , 1 99 8 u nti l June 3 0 , 2 0 0 1

. U n d e r th e “ Sp o n s o r s h ip A g r e e me n t, ” RJ Y a g r e e d to p u r c h a s e f o u r te e n season tickets to Predator hoc key game s and to pay a n annual sp o n sorship fee (paid in six equal installments) for two dashe r-boa rd pane ls. The NHC, in turn, agreed to pa y for c erta in office equipment and rela ted s ervic es from RJY. Section Eleven of the “Sponsorship Agre ement” c ontains

a fo rc e ma je ur e c laus e , w hic h r e a ds a s f oll ow s:

11. FORCE MAJEURE.

In the e vent compliance with any of the pa rt i es ’ obl igations under this Agre ement is impractica l or impossibl e due to a ny
emer gency, inc luding, but not limited to, player strike s, manage ment loc ko uts , la

bo r d isp ute s, e mba

rg oe s, fl ood, e arthq uake , s torm, lig htn ing , f

ir e , e pid e mic
, a c ts o f G od , w ar, natio na l e me rg e nc y, c ivi l disturbance or disobedienc e, riot, sabotage , terrorism, t h reats of

sa bo ta ge or te rr or ism , r e str a int

by c ou rt ord er o r o rd e r o f p ub lic authority, failure of mac hinery or e quipment or any other oc curr ence beyon d the parties’ re asonable control (e ach suc h occur renc e being an “Event of F orce Majeure ”), then the t ime for pe rformance of such obligations shall be extende d for a period e qual to the dura tion of the event of Force Ma

jeure

. The pa rties also agr eed, in Sec ti o n T h i rt een of the “Sponsorship Agre ement,” to a rbitrate a ny disputes aris ing out of the agre ement, and f or payme nt of rea sonable a ttorneys’ fe es and othe r expense s for the pr evailing party.
Within a short period of entering into the “Sponsorship Agreeme nt,” RJY approa ched the NHC to consider c hanging the terms of the “Sponsorship Agre ement.” Spec ifically, RJY wante d to trade in its season ticke t s for one of the luxury suites at the G aylord Entertainment Center ( the “Ar ena” ). RJY also proposed the cre ation of a business c enter for use by the luxury sui t e owners at the Ar ena that would be named the “Robert J. Young B usiness Center.” In addition, RJY asked to b e na me d th e of

fi c ia l sp on so r o f the Pr e dator s f or a te n- ye ar- te rm

–a tit le it c ou ld a dv e rt ise on its truc ks , w e bs ite , a ndmark e tin g mate ri a ls.
Following negotiations , in late Octobe r 1998, the pa rties enter ed into a “L etter of Ag re e me nt. ” Th e “ Le tte r o f A gr e e me nt” re a ds , in pe rt ine nt p art , a s f oll ow s: The suite is listed at $100,000 per ye ar. We agre ed to the following compensa tion structure:

• Term: 10 year s, 1998-2008

• A n n u a l E s c a l a t i o n : 3% inc re a se c omm e nc ing in year four.

• Compensation: $75,000 in year one.-3- • T r a d e I n : R. J

. Y o u n g w il l r e tu r n f our cl u b seats and 10 uppe r leve l season ticke ts ($25 seats).

• B ar t e r A g r e e m e n t : R.J. Young to provide the following equipment over the term of the a gree ment 1. Cop ie r f

a x fo r the bu sin e ss cente r, 2. A high speed c opier, 3. A high speed digital copie r/printer.

* * *

I. Spons orAg r e e s t o P r ov ide Cl ub:

Sui te Lice nsin g Fee Spon sorship Fee

Yea r 1, 1998-99 $ 75,000.00 $ 125,000.00 Yea r 2, 1999-2000 75,000.00 128,750.00 Yea r 3, 2000-2001 75,000.00 132,812.50 Yea r 4, 2001-2002 77,250.00 136,591.00 Yea r 5, 2002-2003 79,568.00 140,689.00 Yea r 6, 2003-2004 81,955.00 144,910.00 Yea r 7, 2004-2005 84,414.00 149,257.00 Yea r 8, 2005-2006 86,949.00 153,735.00 Yea r 9, 2006-2007 89,554.00 158,347.00 Yea r 10, 2007-2008 92,241.00 163,097.00

In exc hange, theNHC agre ed to pay RJY f or certain office equipment, leasing, a nd service for ten year s. The pa

rties per formed c onsistent with the terms of the above “Le tter of Agr eeme nt” from 1998 until 2004. R JY was pr ovi ded Suite C-15, the business ce nter on the ma in suite level at the Are na wa s named the “Robert J. Young Business Center,” a nd the NHC paid for the agr eed- upon copy equipment a nd service s from RJY.

The Predators’ 2004-2005 se ason was delayed and eventua lly cance led as a result of wor

k stoppage a

rising from the expir ation of t he collective bargaining agre ement betwe en NHLplayer s and NHLowner s. In re sponse to the work stoppage , by letter of Dece mber 7, 2004, RJ Y informed the NHC that it was “c anceling” the contr act. By letters dated Janua ry 11, 2005 and Ja nuary 26, 2005, the NHC informe d RJY that the NHC believed that RJY ha d no legal basis to terminate the contra ct. Specific ally, the NHC ra ised the force majeure clause of the “Sponsorship Agre ement.” In response, R JY took the pos ition that the October 1998 “Letter of A gree ment,” su pr a , superse ded the “Sponsorship Agre ement,” a nd that this “Letter of Ag reement” c ontained no for ce ma jeureIn t h i s C o m p l ai n t , R JY al so n am es t h e N ashv i l l e Pred at o rs , L

. L C

. a s a d efen d an t

. In res p o n se, t h e Pred at o rs 1
file d a m o tio n to d ism iss, w h ic h m o tio n w a s g ra n te d b y O rd e r o f A u g u st 9 , 2 0 0 5 . C o n se q u e n tly , t h e N H C is t h e so le

a p p e llan t i n th is a p p e a l.

O n Ju n e 2 0 , 2 0 0 5
, R JY filed it s “ F irst A m e n d e d C o m p la in t.” R JY filed it s “ S e c o n d A m e n d e d C o m p la in t” 2

on O ct ob er 19, 200 5. I n t he “Second A m ended C om pl ai nt , ” R J Y see ks t o avo i d i t s cont r act ual obl i gat i on on t heori es
o f fr u st rat i o n o f co m m erci al p u rpo se, fai l u re o f co n si d erat i o n , l ack o f m u t u al ass en t , an d b reach o f co n t ract on t h e p art of NH C.

R JY also fi l ed a m o t i o n fo r su m m ary j u d g m en t , w h i ch m o t i o n w as su b seq u en t l y d en i ed b y O rd er o f A u g u st 3 9, 2005.

-4- clause . Consequently, RJY contends that, beca use the playe rs strike had f rustrate d the purpose of the contra ct, it was justified in cea sing performance

. On May 18, 2005, RJY filed suit against the NHC. In its Compl aint, RJY seeks re scission 1 of the Oc tober 1998 “ Letter of Agre ement” due to alleged “frustra tion of commercial purpose.” On 2 July 8, 2005, the NHC filed i t s Answer and Counterc laim. In its Answer, the NHC denies the 3 materia l allegations of the Com plaint. In its Count erc laim, the NHC allege s brea ch of c ontrac t on the part of RJY, and cite to the f orce majeure clause of the original “ Sponsorship Agreeme nt.”
Following entry of RJY’s “Second A mended Complaint,” see fn. 2, the NH C filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on Jul y 14, 2006, seeking judgment on all of RJY’s c laims. The NHC’s mot ion wa s gr a nte d by Or de r of Se pte mbe r 13 , 20 06
, the re by le a vin g onl y t he cou nte rc la ims

asserted by the NHC. These issues wer e tried by the court, sitt ing without a jury, on September 11 and 12, 2006. On October 11, 2006, the trial court enter ed its “ Final Or der and Judgment,” which

re a ds , in pe rt ine nt p art , a s f oll ow s:

For the re a so ns se t fo rth in the tr a ns c ri pt, the Cou rt fi nd s a s f oll ow s:
(i) The re w as an e nforc eable and suff i ci entl y definite a gree ment betwee n R.J. Young and Hocke y Club.
(i i) R.J . Y ou ng ma te ri a lly br e a c he d th e pa rt ie s’ a gr e e me nt.
(i ii) R.J . Y ou ng ’s br e a c h w ou ld ha ve c a us e d th e Ho c ke y Cl ub to incur da mages but for

the Court’s finding on mitigation inf ra

. (iv) The Hocke y Club is there fore the preva iling party but the Court declines t o award the Hoc key Club its attorneys fee s because the provision of the parties’ agr ee m ent t hat ca lls for an a war d of attorneys f

ees to the pr evailing party refe ren ce s an ar bitration pr oc e e din g, a ndthe se pr oc e e din gs aro se fr om a la ws uit fi le d b y R. J. Young and the c ompulsory count er cl aims asserte d by the Hocke y Club in response.-5- (v) Although it is the preva iling party, the Court declines to a war d the Hocke y Club any damages because the Court holds that the Hocke y Clu b mi tig a te d a ll of its da ma ge s. Th e ba sis fo r thi s det e rm inatio n is

se t f o r t h o n p a g e s 1 0 6 t o 1 0 9 o f t h e a t t a c h e d tr a n s c r i p t , w h ic h is incorporated by re fer ence

. In its ruling from the benc h , which is incorpor ated into the above Orde r, the trial c ourt specific ally found that “the parties c onducted themselves as though te rms of both a gree ments [the original “Sponsorship Agre ement” and the subsequent “Letter of Agre ement”] wer e in ef fec t, and the Court does not find that the langua ge that the [ “Le tter of Agr eeme nt”] will superse de the previous Le tter of Agr eeme nt resulted in a c ance llation or an avoida nce of some of the pr ovisions of the [“ Sponsorship Agreeme nt”].” In addition, the trial court review ed the mate rial evide nce
conce rning mit i g at i o n o f damage s and conc luded, as set out in its Order , that the NHC’s wa s not entitled to damages. Furthermore, c oncerning attorneys fe es, the trial c ourt interpre ted the “Sponsorship Agree ment” to contain only a pr ovision for attorneys fees in the c ase of arbitration. Because this ca s e ar o s e o u t of a c ross-suits filed by the parties, arbitra tion did not occur and,

c on se qu e ntl y, the tr ia l c ou rt c on c lud e d th a t ne ith e r p art y is e nti tle d to its fe e s a ndc os ts.

The NH C appea ls and raise s four issues for revie w, as stated in its brief :

1. Whether the trial c ourt err ed in finding that the [NH C] was entitled to no damage s despite its holding that R.J. Young brea ched the pa rt ie s’ Spo ns or sh ip A gr e e me nt.

2. W he the r the tr ia l c ou rt

e rr e d in c ha

rg ing the [N HC ] w ith failu re to mit igate the ba

rt e r p ortio n o f t

he ir da ma ge s r e su lti ng fr om R .J

. Young’s bre ach of

the parties’ Sponsors h i p Agreement whe n
a c c e pta nc e of R.J . You ng ’s ba rt e r w ou ld h a ve pr e c lud e d th e [N HC ] fr om o the rw ise mit igatin g th e ir da ma ge s.

3. W he the r the tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d in fi nd ing that the [N HC ] h a d f ull y mitigated the cash da mages re sulting from R.J. Young’s breac h of the pa rt ie s’ Spo ns or sh ip A gr e e me nt b y e nte ri ng int o a ma terially differ ent sponsorship agre ement with a third pa rty.

4. W het her th e tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d in faili ng to a wa

rdthe [N HC ] the ir

a tto rn e ys ’ f

e e s p ur su a nt t o th e Spo ns or sh ip A gr e e me nt.
In the posture of Appe llee, RJY ra ises the following additional issues for r eview:

1. Whethe r the trial c ourt err ed in finding that there was a n
e nf or c e able a gr e e me nt b e tw e e n th e pa rt ie s.-6- 2. Whethe r the trial c ourt err ed in finding that the undate d Letter Ag re e me nt a me nd e d ra the r tha n sup e r[ s] e de d the prior Spo ns or sh ip Ag re e me nt.

3. Whethe r the trial court err ed in finding that the Appellant was the preva iling party.

Be c a us e RJY ’s iss ue s in vo lve the thr e sh oldc on sid e ratio n o f w hat, i f any , e nf or c e able agre ement exists betwe en the pa rties, it is necessa

ry for u s t o fi rs t addre ss this question before

re vie wi ng the a wa

rdof da ma ge s iss ue s raise d by the Ap pe lla nt h e re in. Ap pe lle e ’s iss ue ne c e ssa ri ly involves the question of whe ther summary judgment on RJY’s c ounterc laim was prope r. It is well settled that a motion for summary judgment should be g ra n t ed when the movant demonstrates tha t there a

re no genuine issues of materia l f act a nd that the moving party is entitled to a ju d g me n t a s a matt er of law. See Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04. The party moving for summary jud gme nt be ars the bu rd e n o f d e mon str a tin g th a t no ge nu ine iss ue of ma te ri a l f

a c t e xis ts. Se e Bai n
v . W e lls
, 936 S.W.2d 618, 622 (Tenn.1997)

. On a motion for summ ary judgment, the court must t ake the str on ge st l e gitim ate vi ew of e vid e nc e in f

a vo r o f the no nmo vin g p art y, a llo w a ll r e a so na ble infere nces in f

avor of that party, and discar d all counter vailing evidence

. Se e id

. In By rd v . Ha ll
, 847 S.W.2d 208 (Tenn.1993) , our Supreme Court state d:

Once it is shown by the m o ving party that there is no genuine issue of material fac t, the nonmoving party must then demonstrate, by aff idavits or discovery material, that ther e is a genuine, materia l fac t dispute to warr ant a tria l. In this regar d, Rule 56.05 provides that the nonmoving party ca nnot simpl y rely upon his pleadings but m ust set forth spec ific fa cts showing that there is a genuine issue of material fa c t f or tr ia l.

Id . at 211 (c itations omi tted).
Summary judgment is only appropriate whe n the fa cts and the legal conc lusions drawn fr om the fa cts rea sonably perm i t only one conc lusion. Se e Carv e ll v . Bo tto ms , 900 S.W.2d 23, 26 (T e nn .1 99 5) . Be c a us e on ly q ue sti on s o f l a w a re inv olv ed, th ere is n o p re su mpt ion of c or re c tne ss rega rding a tra il co u rt ' s grant or de nial of summary judgment. Se e Bain , 926 S.W.2d at 622. Th e re fo re , o ur

re vie w o f the tr ia l c ou rt 's gr a nt o f s umm ary jud gme nt i s de novo on the re cord be fore this Court. Se e Wa rre n v . Es tate of Kir k , 954 S.W.2d 722, 723 (Tenn.1997)

. The langua ge used in a

contra ct m u s t b e t aken and under stood in it s plain, ordinary, a nd p o pular sense

. Bob Pearsall Motors , Inc. v. Regal Chrysler-Plymouth, I nc. , 5 2 1 S. W .2d 578 (Tenn.1975) . In construing c ontrac ts, the words expr essing the parties' intentions shoul d be given the usual, natura l, and ordinary meaning. Ballard v. North American Life & Casual ty Co. , 667 S.W.2d 79 (Tenn.Ct.App.1983). If the language of a w ritten instrument is unambiguous, the Court

mus t in te rp re t it

a s w ri tte n r a the r tha n ac c or din g to the un e xp re sse d inte nti on of on e of the pa rt ie s. Sutto n v . Fi

rst Na t'l Bank , 620 S.W.2d 526 (Tenn.Ct.App

. 1 9 8 1 ). A contract is not ambiguous-7-

me re ly b e c a us e the pa

rtie s h a ve dif

fe re nt i nte rp re ta tio ns of th e contr a c t's va ri ou s p ro vis ion s, Coo ke v ill e Gy ne c olo

gy & O bs te tri c s, P. C. v . S ou th eas ter n Da ta S y s. , I nc ., 884 S.W.2d at 462 (citing Om an Co nstr

. Co . v . T e nne sse e Val

le y Autho rit

y , 486 F.Supp. 375, 382 (M.D.Te nn.1979)),

nor ca n this Court create an ambiguity whe re n o n e ex ists in t he contr act. Coo ke v ill e P. C. , 884 S.W.2d at 462 (c iting Edwards v. Travelers Indem. Co. , 201 Tenn. 435, 300 S.W.2d 615, 617-18 (1957)) . The interpr etation of a written contra ct is a matter of law and not of

fac t, s ee R ainey v. Sta nse ll , 8 36 S.W .2 d 1 17 (T e nn .Ct .A pp .1 99 2) . Co ns e qu e ntl y, c on str uc tio n o f th e c on tr a c t is pa rt ic ula rl y s uit e d to dis po sit ion by su mma ry jud gme nt. Id . at 119. There fore
, we revie w the trial

c o u r t ’ s f i n d i n g c o n c e r n i n g t h e a g r e e m e n t b e t w e e n t h e se pa rt ie s de novo upon the re cord w ith no presumption of correc tion acc ompanying the trial court’s conclusions of law

. See Te nn . R. Ap p. P. 13 (d ); Waldron v. Delffs
, 98 8 S.W .2 d 1 82 , 1 84 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . 1 99 8) ; Sims v . Ste war t , 973 S.W.2d 597, 599-600 (Te nn. Ct. App. 1998).

The c ontention betwee n these parties involves the question of whe ther, a s RJY asserts, the

“ Le tte r o f A gr e e me nt” su pe rs e de s th e “ Spo ns or sh ip A gre e me nt, ” or wh e the r, a s th e NH C arg ue s, the “Le tter of Agree ment” mer ely re vises or ame nds cer tain terms of the “ Sponsorship Agreeme nt.” 17 B C. J. S. Con tr a c ts §§ 43 4 a nd43 5 ( 19 99 ) p ro vid e gu idanc e c on c e rn ing su bs e qu e nt a gr e e me nts
ma de by pa

rt ie s to a c on tr a c t, a ndthe e ff e c t of the su bs e qu e nt a gr e e me nts onthe origi na l a gr e e me nt, to w it:
§ 434. Discharge by new c ontract

A contra ct may be discharge d or abr ogated by a new c ontrac t wi th the e ff

e c t of a lte ri ng the te rm s o f the origi na l or of re sc ind ing it altogether

.
Sub se qu e nt t o th e e xe c uti on of a writt e n c on tr a c t, i t is

c omp e te nt f

or the pa rt ie s, by a

ne w c on tr a c t, n ot n e c e ssa ri ly i n writing, either to aba n d o n, waive, or annul the prior c ontrac t. The pa rties to a n a gr e e me nt m a y a lso a gr e e to t e rm inate it b y e xp re ssl y assenting to its rescission while simulta n eo u s ly entering into a ne w agre ement dea ling with the same subject matter. Howeve r, making subsequent contr acts that de al w ith the same subject matter as the

e arl ie r c on tr a c ts d oe s n ot a br og a te the pr e vio us ins trume nts unle ss the subsequent contract either explicit ly rescinds the earlier inst rume nts o r d

e als with the sub

je c t matte r of thos e inst

rume nts s o
c omp re he nsiv e ly as to b e c omp le te with in it se lf

...
* * *
§ 435. Sub sequent inconsi stent agr eem ent; Substituted contract s

A contra ct complete in itself will be conclusively p resumed to supersede a prior onebetwee n the s ame parties and concerning the-8- same subjec t matter whe re the terms of the two ar e s o inconsistent that they ca nnot subsist together.
If the pa rties to a prior a gree ment enter into a subsequent contr act that completely cover s the same subjec t, but the second a gree ment
c on ta ins te rm s tha t ar e inc on sis te nt with thos e of the prior a gr e e me nt,
an d t he two docume nts cannot stand together , the later document superse des and r escinds the earlier agre ement.... Whe n the parties intend a new contra ct to repla ce a ll the provisions of an ea rlier contra ct, the new contra ct is termed the substituted contra ct....

Howeve r, d ev iations or change s in a contra ct do not

ne c e ssa ri ly a br og a te it o r imp ly i ts a

ba nd on me nt, a ndwh e re it i s claimed that by rea son of inconsistency be tween the terms of a new agre ement and those of the old the old one is discha rged, the fact that such was the int ention of th e parties must clearly appear

.
17B C.J.S . Contracts §§ 434 and 435 ( 1999) (f ootnotes omitt ed) ( emphasis adde d).

From the above authority, it i s the intent of the parties that controls the question of a brogation by su b s eq u en t agre ement. And, a s noted above , the intention of the parties is to be asce rtained, whene ver possible, fr om the usual, natura l, and ordinary meaning of the words used by the parties i n t h ei r agre ement. See Ballard v. North American Life & Casual ty Co.
, 6 6 7 S. W

. 2 d 79 (Tenn.Ct.App.1983).

As set forth in the f

act se ction above, the parties e ntere d into a “Le tter of I ntent” on Februa ry 20, 1998. There afte r, on September 1, 1998, the parties enter ed int o the “Spons orship Agre ement.” In Oc tober of 1998, the parti es re n eg otiated ce rtain terms of the “Sponsorship Agree ment” and enter ed int o an undated “Le tter of Agre ement.” This “Le tter of Agre ement,” which was drafte d by the NH C, r e a ds , in re le va nt p art , a s f oll ow s:

Outlined below is the re v ise d s po nso rsh ip a

gr e e ment that includes the l uxury sui te i n the Nashvill e Arena, Sui te C-15. Thi s a gr e e me nt will sup e rse de the pr

e v iou s Le tte r o

f A gr e e me nt be tw e e n Ro be rt

J. Young and the Nashville Predators. Please re view the terms and

c on di t i o n s a n d i f t h e i n f o r m a t i o n c o n t a i n e d i n t h i s d o c u m e n t is

a c c ur a te , p le a se sig n a ndre turn th e e xe c ute d c op y to the Pr e dator s.

* * *

Ple a se no te that this Le tte r Agr e e me nt will

ac t as a c ont

ra c t by and be tw e e n th e Pr e da tor s andRob e rt J. Yo un g. Th e re fo re , p le a se acknow ledge your acc eptanc e of the terms of this Letter Agr eeme nt by exec uting the copy enc losed herewit h and re turning it to t he Nashville Hoc key Club Limited Partnership.-9-

(Emphasis adde d).

As discussed above
, the trial court determined tha t this “Letter of A gree ment” ame nded, but did not supersede , the “Sponsorship Agre em en t

. ” On appea l, RJY contends, int e r a lia , that the “Le tter of Agr eeme nt” did superse de the “ Sponsorship Agreeme nt,” there by abrogat i n g the forc e majeure clause contained the rein. Upon initial revie w, the “L etter of Agre ement” certainly change s the terms of the “Sponsorship Agree ment.” The se new terms ar e very spe cifica lly enumera ted in the “Le tte r of Agr eeme nt.” Consequently, we f ind that the “Le tter of Agr eeme nt” (a s far as the obligations of the respe ctive parties) i s specific and clear e nough to stand alone a nd independe nt of the “Sponsorship Agre ement.” N onetheless, we must dete rm i n e whe ther this rea ding fairly and

a c c ur a te ly d e pic ts the pa

rt ie s’ int e nti on s.

The “ Letter of Agre ement” makes only one ref ere nce to the sponsorship agre ement–in the first sentenc e whe re the document purports to be “the re vised sponsorship agre ement.” A pplying the plain and or dinary me an i n g , t h es e words appe ar to indicate that this is a new, and se parate, agre ement–i.e. the r evised sponsorship agr eeme nt. The parties do not stat e t h at t h e “Le tter of Agreement” ( or any portion thereof) revises th e “ Sp o n s o r s h ip A g r e e me n t, ” o r th a t th e “ L e tt e r

of Agre ement” c ontains revisions, or ame ndments, or cha nges to the “Sponsorship Agreem en t .” Rath er, the parties state that the contents of the “Le tter of Agr eeme nt” constitute “the r evised sponsorship agre ement.” I n legal parlance the adjective “revised” usually signifies a diffe rent, a nd separ ate, doc ument that stands alone. For ex am p l e, a “r evised statute” is defined a s a “body of statutes which have been revised, c ollected, a rra nged in orde r, and re -e nac te d a s a whol e .” Black’ s Law D ictionary (6 ed. 1990). Like wise, and a s an additional illustration, an “a m en d m en t ” to a th complaint mere ly modifies an original complaint, which c omplaint remains bef o re t h e court as mod if ie d. Ho we ve r, a n “ a me nd e d c omp la int ” is c omp le te in i tse lf wi tho ut a do pti on or

re fe re nc e to the original, and ha s the eff ect of superse ding or abrogating the original as a plea ding. See, e.g., Lo uisv ill e & N .R. Co. v . Ho use , 56 S.W . 836 (T e nn . 1 90 0) . A lth ou gh us e of “ re vis e d s po ns or sh ip agre ement” doe s not definitively prove the pa rties’ intent to have the “Le tter of Agr eeme nt” re place the “Sponsorship Agre ement,” it does pr ovide some evide nce f or that finding.

Mo vin g to the se c on d s e nte nc e of the “ Le tte r of Ag re e me nt, ” the pa rt ie s in dic a te that “ [t ]h is agre ement will supe rsede the previous Letter of Agre ement....” A s discussed above , the trial court specific ally stated that it “does not find that the la nguage that the agre ement will superse de the previous Le tter of Agr eeme nt resulted in a c ance llation or an avoida nce of some of the pr ovisions of t he Sponsorship Agree ment.” We are troubled by this finding for two re asons. First, the parties clea rly state that the “ Letter of Agre ement” “ superse des” a previous agr eeme nt, wh i ch they re fer to as the “pr evious Letter of Agre ement.” T here is no ambiguity i n this term–“superse des.” Consequently, in order to give e ffe ct to the inten t o f t he parties, we must interpre t the “Le tter of Ag r e e me n t” to s u p e r s e d e s o me p r io r a g r e e me n t b e tw e e n th e p ar ti e s , s o lo n g a s w e c a n deter mine which docume nt the parties intended to supe rsede

. This brings us to our second c oncern–that being that there is, in fac t, no “pre vious Le tter of Agre ement” betwee n these parties. As set out above, there is an initial “L etter of Intent,” the subsequent “Sponsorship Agre ement,” and then the cur rent and disputed “Le tter of Agre ement.” We first note that, from a logica l standpoint, there wa s no need to s up e rs e de the origi na l “ Le tte r o f I nte nt, ” be c a us e sa me wa s in fe re nti a lly abr og a te d b y th e pa rt ie s’ “Sponsorship Agree ment.” In r eviewing a trial court’ s decision to r esolve a contra ct dispute by the-10-

mecha n i s m o f summary judgment, we must allow all re asonable infere nces in fa vor of the nonmoving party. Bain v . W e lls , 9 36 S.W .2 d 6 18 , 6 22 (T e nn .1 99 7) . Fur the rm or e , an y a mbi gu iti e s in a contr act a

re to be construed a gainst the draf ter. Vant ag e Te c h. L

LC v . Cr os s , 17 S.W .3d 637, 650 ( T e n n

. Ct

. A p p

. 1 9 9 9 ) ( c it ing Spi e ge l v . T hom as , M ann & Smit

h, P .C. , 811 S.W.2d 528, 531 (Tenn.1991) ). He re, the draf ting party is the NHC. Moreove r, as discusse d above, w e know, f rom the use of the pl ain, and unambiguous term “supersede s,” that these pa rties intended the “ Letter of Agre ement” to, in fa ct, re place s o m e pre vious agree ment betwee n them. Because the “ Letter of Intent” was, for all intents a nd purposes, abrogated by the “Sponsorship Agre ement,” t h e l o g i cal infere nce to be draw n from the “previous Letter of Agreeme nt” language is that the parties intende d to supersede their pre vious agree ment as set out in the “Sponsorship Agre ement.”

In addit i o n , t h e last par agra ph of the “ Letter of

Agre ement” indicates that this “Letter Ag re e me nt w ill a c t a s a c on tr a c t by a ndbe tw e e n th e [N HC ] and[RJY ]. The re fo re , p le a se acknow ledge your

acc eptanc e of the t er m s o f t his Letter Agr eeme nt....” From the plain language

us e d, the pa

rt ie s a gr e e that th e “ Le tte r o f A gr e e me nt” (r e fe rr e d to a s th e “ Le tte r A gr e e me nt” ) w ill

serve as a contra ct between them. Again, there i s no ref ere nce to the “ Sponsorship Agreeme nt,” nor

a ny ind ic a tio n th a t th is “ Le tte r o f A gr e e me nt” ou tli ne s o nly th e c ha ng e s th e re to. Be c a us e it i s inc umb e nt u po n thi s Cou rt to c on sid e r the e nti re c on tr a c t in d e te rm ini ng the me a nin g o f any or a ll its parts,” see , e.g. , Cocke County Bd. of High way Commis sioners v. Newpor t Ut i l i t ies Bd. , 690 S

. W. 2 d 2 31, 237 (Tenn.1985) , we c annot over look the fac t that the parties use the term “ Letter Ag re e me nt” to r e fe r t o th is “ Le tte r o f A gr e e me nt, ” wh ic h th e part ies s ta te is the ir c on tr a c t. Returning to t h e language “pre vious Letter of A gree ment,” su pr a , based upon the language

con t ai n ed i n t h e “Le tter of Agr eeme nt,” it is logi cal to infe r that the use of “pre vious Letter of Agre ement” r efe rs to a pre vious contra ct. Because t he only previous contract between the parties is the “Spons orship Agre ement,” w hen the “ Letter of Agre ement” is view ed as a whole, we conclude that the parties intended to superse de their “ Sponsorship Agreeme nt” b y e n tering into the subsequent “Le tter of Agr eeme nt.”
Turning brief

ly to the trial court’s finding that the actions of the parties indicate that both the “Sponsorship Agree ment” and th e “Letter of Agr eeme nt” wer e in ef fec t, we disagre e. From our

rev ie w o f th e r e c o r d
, it ap p e ar s th a t th e p ar ti e s a c tu a ll y o p e r a te d u n d e r th e te r ms o f th e “ L e tt e r of Agre ement” until the playe rs’ strike. A t that point, the c o ntention arose a s to whether the “Le tter of Agre ement” supe rsede d the “Sponsorship Agre ement.” I n short, the parties did not draw upon the terms of the “Sponsorship Agree ment” until the NHC asserted the for ce ma jeure clause . At that time, RJY claimed that the “Sponsorship Agre ement” w as abr ogated. More ov er , as di scussed above, w e find that t h e terms of the “Le tter of Agr eeme nt,” including suite licensing fee and sponsorship fee schedule s, are sufficie ntly de finite to uphold the c ontrac t. Accor dingly, we find that the “Le tter of Agr eeme nt” constitutes t h e co n trac t betwee n these pa rties as same superse des the “Sponsorship Agree ment.” C o n s equently, we find that the trial court erre d in granting summary judgment on RJY’s claims. Based upon our holding that the “ Sponsorship Agreeme nt” is no longer in e ff e c t, w e a lso fi ndthat th e tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d in its da ma ge s a na lys is a nd in its fi nd ing of fa ult in this case.
Based up o n t he for egoing, we r ever se the trial c ourt’s Orde r of Septembe r 13, 2006 dismiss ing RJY’s claims by summary judgment. We also reve rse the trial court’s O rder of Oc tober-11-

11 , 2 00 6, sam e bein g b a se d u po n a n e rr on e ou s f ind ing that th e “ Spo ns or sh ip A gr e e me nt” wa s in eff ect at the time of the allege d brea ch. The matter is re manded f or such f urther pr ocee dings as may be ne c e ssa

ry , in c lud ing , b ut n ot l imi te d to , RJ Y h a vin g th e op po rtun ity to p ro ve its c la ims , a s w e ll

a s a ny da ma ge s a

ri sin g th e re fr om. Cos ts of th is app e a l are a sse sse d o ne -h a lf to the Ap pe lla nt, Nashville Hoc key Club, L.P., and its surety, and one- half to the Appe llee, Robert J. Young Company.

__________________________________________ W. FRANK CRAWFORD, JUDGE