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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Roy R Lustig, 

Plaintiff/Judgment Creditor, 

v. 

Barbara Stone, 

Defendant/Judgment Debtor.

No. MC-18-00004-TUC-JGZ (BPV)

ORDER 

 Pending before the Court is Defendant/Judgment Debtor Barbara Stone’s “Motion 

for Disqualification of Judge Jennifer G. Zipps” (Doc. 40). Plaintiff/Judgment Creditor 

Roy Lustig filed a response (Doc. 37). Stone did not file a reply. For the following 

reasons, the Court will deny Stone’s motion. 

 Stone seeks disqualification on several grounds. She challenges the Court’s 

subject matter jurisdiction, she claims that Lustig is perpetuating a fraud on the Court, she 

objects to the short time span between issuance of the order setting the hearing on 

Objection to the Amended Answer of Garnishee and the actual hearing date. Stone also 

claims that she did not receive notice, or alternatively, timely notice of the hearing on the 

Objection to the Amended Answer of Garnishee. 

 None of Stone’s claims present grounds for disqualification. Section 455(a) of 

Title 28 provides: “[a]ny justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall 

disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be 

questioned.” In addition, pursuant to section 455(b), a judge shall disqualify himself 
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“[w]here he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of 

disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(b). See also 

Code of Conduct for United States Judges, Canons 2 and 3. Because a judge is presumed 

to be impartial, the party claiming bias bears a substantial burden to show that the judge 

is not impartial. See Langley v. Brown, 2007 WL 1186263, at *2 (D. Ariz. April 19, 

2007) (citing Shafler v. HSBC Bank USA, 2007 WL 578993 at *7 (N.D. Cal. February 21, 

2007)). 

 This proceeding concerns the enforcement and execution of a December 7, 2015 

judgment from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. (See 

Docs. 4, 5, 9, 49). The Clerk of Court has issued writs of execution pertaining to the 

judgment. (Docs. 5, 9.) Stone’s challenge to this Court’s exercise of jurisdiction is not 

grounds for recusal. Any objection to jurisdiction is more appropriately addressed 

through a dismissal motion. To the extent that Stone’s claims may be viewed as a 

challenge to the Court’s rulings, any such challenges are more appropriately addressed on 

appeal. Further, Stone’s complaints about Lustig have nothing to do with this Court’s 

ability to be impartial. With regard to timing and notice of the hearing, Arizona statute 

requires that the hearing on objection to the answer of garnishee “shall be commenced 

within five days of the request, not including weekends and holdiays. . . .” A.R.S. § 12-

1580(B). The hearing “may be continued for good cause . . . after due consideration of 

the importance of the judgment debtor's rights and the need for a speedy 

determination. . . . However, in no event shall the hearing be held later than ten days from 

the date of the request unless the request for a continuance is made by the judgment 

debtor.” Id. Presumably, the statutory requirement of a prompt hearing is for the benefit 

of the judgment debtor whose assets are in jeopardy and may remain unavailable to the 

judgment debtor during the proceeding. The record reflects that the Court went to great 

lengths to ensure that Stone had notice of the hearing. The Court directed Lustig’s 

counsel to show at the hearing that Stone received notice, and arrangements were made 

for Stone to appear telephonically. (Doc. 16.) Stone, in fact, appeared at the hearing 
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telephonically. At the hearing, Magistrate Judge Velasco continued the matter “[t]o 

provide all parties, including . . . Stone sufficient time to prepare for hearing on the 

objection . . . .” (Doc. 49 at 3; see also Doc. 28; Doc. 59 at 2.) Magistrate Judge Velasco 

has also directed the Clerk of Court to send Stone pertinent Court filings she said she did 

not have. (Docs. 35, 59; see also Doc. 39 (order directing Clerk to send docket sheets to 

Stone on a weekly basis).) 

 On the instant record, Stone fails to set forth a proper basis for disqualification. 

Nor does the Court find there is any other reason warranting recusal. Therefore, 

 IT IS ORDERED that Stone’s Motion for Disqualification of Judge Jennifer G. 

Zipps (Doc. 40) is DENIED. 

 Dated this 31st day of August, 2018.