[Cite as State v. Chavis , 2014-Ohio-727.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT MIAMI COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO : : Appellate Case No. 2013-CA-16 Plaintiff-Appellee : : Trial Court Ca se No. 12-CR-312 v. : : DEREK CHAVIS : (Criminal Appeal from : ( Miami County Common Pleas Court) Defendant-Appellant : :

. . . . . . . . . . . O P I N I O N Rendered on the 28th day of February, 2014.

. . . . . . . . . . . EMILY E. SLUK, Atty. Reg. #0082621, Miami County Prosecutor’s Office, 201 West Main Street, Troy, Ohio 45373 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee JESSICA R. MOSS, Atty. Reg. #0085437, 2233 Mia misburg Centerville Road, Dayton, Ohio 45459 Attorney for Defendant-Appellant

. . . . . . . . . . . . . FAIN, J. {¶ 1} Defendant-appellant Derek Chavis appeals from his conviction and sentence, 2

 following his no-contest plea, to Failure to Give Notice of Change of Addr ess or Registration of New Address, in violation of R. C. 2950.05(A), a felony of the fifth degree. Chavis contends that the trial court erred by overruling his motions to w ithdraw his plea, and to dismiss the indictment, made after his plea had been tendered and accepted, but before he had been sentenced. {¶ 2} Chavis predicates error upon his argu ment that when the advance notice requirement for a change of residence address was changed by statutory amendment from seven days to twenty days, that violated the prohibition against retroactive laws contained in Article II, Section 28 of the Ohio Constitution. Because his indictment charged him with the failure to give notice of his change of residence address at least twenty days in advance of the change, he contends that the indictment was defective, and should have been dismissed. Similarly, he contends that because he was not aware that he could only have been charged with the failure to give seven days advance notice, he had a defense to the charge, of which he was unaware when he pled no contest. {¶ 3} We conclude that the proposition of la w upon which Chavis predicates error is unsound. The change in the amount of advance no tice required did not vi olate the constitutional prohibition against retroactive laws. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is Affirmed.

I. The Course of Proceedings {¶ 4} In 1998, Chavis was convicted of Attempted Sexual Battery, and was determined to be a sexu ally oriented offender. {¶ 5} In 2012, Chavis was charged by indictment w ith the failure to give at least twenty days notice of a change of address or registration of a new address, with a prior conviction of the 3

 same offense, a felony of the third degree. In early 2013, Chavis pled no contest to the failure to give at least twenty days notice of his change of address or registrati on of a new address, but without the allegation of a prior offense, making the offense to which he pled no contest a felony of the fifth degree. {¶ 6} Thereafter, but before he was sentenced, Chavis moved to withdraw his plea, and also to dismiss the indictment. Both of thes e motions were predicated upon his argument that the statutory amendment in the amount of advance notice require d, from seven days to twenty days, violated the prohibition against retroactive le gislation contained in Ar ticle II, Section 28 of the Ohio Constitution. {¶ 7} The trial court, concluding that the change in the amount of advance notice required did not violate the retr oactive legislation prohibition, overruled both motions. Chavis was sentenced to ten months in prison, and the trial court ordered Chav is to pay costs and restitution. From his conviction and sentence, Ch avis appeals, setting forth two assignments of

error: THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY REFUSED TO ALLOW APPELLANT TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY [sic] PLEA. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT SUSTAINING APPELLANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS THE INDICTMENT.

II. The 2002 Amendment to Megan’s Law Increasing the Advance Notice Required for a Ch ange of Residence A ddress Did Not Violate the Ohio Constitutional Restrictio n Against Retroacti ve Legislation[Cite as State v. Chavis , 2014-Ohio-727.] {¶ 8} Both of Chavis’s assignments of error are predicated upon his contention that the increase in the amount of advan ce notice required for a change of residence addr ess mandated by a 2002 amendment to R.C. Chapter 2950, the sexual offender classificati on, registration, notice, and notification requirements, violates the Ohio constitutional restriction against retroactive laws. Because he was not aware that the increase in the amount of advance notice from seven days to twenty days was not constitutional, Chavis argues that he was unaware of a potential defense to the charge that he would have had if he had been properly charged with th e failure to give seven days advance notice of his new address. As a result, Chavis argues, his no-contest plea was not knowing and intelligent. {¶ 9} Similarly, Chavis argues that the indictment is defective, since it charges him with the failure to give twenty days advance notice, which, he argues, is not an offense. {¶ 10} We disagree with the legal premis e underlying Chavis’s arguments. {¶ 11} Chavis cites State v. Williams , 129 Ohio St.3d 344, 2011-Ohio-3374, 952 N.E.2d 1108. But that case does not support his proposition. Williams cited previous Ohio Supreme Court jurisprudence that had upheld previous am endments to R.C. Chapter 2950 against claims that those amendments had vi olated Article II, Section 28 of the Ohio Constitution. Williams did not overrule any of those prior cases, holding onl y that as a result of the latest change, enacted by 2007 Am.Sub.S.B. 10, effective January 1, 2008, R.C. Chapter 2950 could no longer be held to be purely remedial. Id. at ¶ 16-21. In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court of Ohio observed: No one change compels our conclusion that S.B. 10 is punitive. It is a matter of degree whether a statute is so punitive that its retroactive application is unconstitutional. [Citation omitted.] When we consider a ll the changes enacted 5

 by S.B. 10 in aggregate , we conclude that imposin g the current registration requirements on a sex offender whose crime was committed prior to the enactment of S.B. 10 is punitive. Accordingly, we conclude that S.B. 10, as applied to defendants who committed sex offenses prior to its enactment, violates Section 28, Article II of the Ohio Constitution , which prohibits the General Assembly from passing retroactive laws. I d. at ¶ 21 (Emphasis added). {¶ 12} In concluding that S.B. 10, enacted in 2007, effective January 1, 2008, violated the retroactive laws prohibition, th e Supreme Court noted that the adverse consequences of being classified as a sex offender were no long er being imposed base d upon a trial court’s determination of the future dang er posed by the offender, but we re being imposed as a direct consequence of being convicted of certain specified offens es, much like any other punitive sanction. {¶ 13} One of the Supreme Court’s prior cases cited in, and not overruled by, Williams is State v. Ferguson , 120 Ohio St.3d 7, 2008-Ohio-4824, 896 N.E.2d 110. Ferguson specifically upheld Am.Sub.S.B. 5, 150 Ohio Laws, Part IV , 6558, enacted in 2003, against the contention that it violated the constitutional prohibition agains t retroactive laws. Id. at ¶ 40. In reaching this conclusion, Ferguson held that as amended by changes more profound than the 2002 change in the amount of advance noti ce required for a new address, the sex offender classification, registration, notice, and notifica tion requirements in R.C. Chap ter 2950 were still remedial, not punitive. Id. at ¶ 33-39. {¶ 14} It was only after the even more prof ound changes in the 2007 amendments that the Supreme Court of Ohio held that the sex offender classification, re gistration, notice, and 6

 notification requirements in R. C. Chapter 2950 had crossed the threshold from remedial to punitive legislation, thereby triggering the constitu tional restriction agains t retroactive laws. Williams, supra . The version of R.C. Chapter 2950 app lied to Chavis precedes the version of the statute held in Williams to have been no longer remedial , but punitive. Therefore, the 2002 amendment changing the amount of advance noti ce required for a new re sidential a ddress was not subject to the constitutional prohibition against retroactive laws. {¶ 15} Thus, the indictment charging Chavis with the failure to give twenty days advance notice of his new residence was not defec tive. And in arguing his motion to withdraw his plea, Chavis noted that although he believe d he had evidence that he had provided notice within seven days, “[w]hen it was tw enty days he felt he did not have that evidence. That’s why we filed the motion to withdraw his plea.” {¶ 16} Both of Chavis’s assign ments of error are overruled.

III. Conclusion {¶ 17} Both of Chavis’s assignments of error having been overruled, the judgment of the trial court is Affirmed.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . DONOVAN and WELBAUM, JJ., concur.
Copies mailed to: Emily E. Sluk Jessica R. Moss Hon. Robert J. Lindeman