Interim Decision #2506 

MATTER OF KU 

' ' In Deportation Proceedings 

A-15857820 

Decided by Board July 22, 1976 

(1) Notwithstanding the fact that a final order of deportation had been entered against the 

respondent, the subsequent order of the immigration judge which reopened the proceedings for the purpose of determining whether respondent was entitled to a new 

grant of voluntary departure, was an interlocutory order because the factual issues 

underlying tt e subsequent order involved an entirely new question. Therefore, the 

Board was without jurisdiction to entertain an appeal of the subsequent order, and the 

Service's motion seeking reconsideration was denied. 

(2) Matter of Rangel-Cantu, 12 I. & N. Dec. 74, overruled in part, to the extent it is 

inconsistent with the Board's position respecting its jurisdiction over interlocutory 

appeals announced in this decision. 

CHARGE: 

Order: Act of 1952—Section 241(a)(2) [8 U.S.C. 1251(a)(2)]--Nonimmigrant 

crewman—remained longer 

ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: 

James J. Orlcw, Esquire 

Wasserman, Orlow, Ginsberg & Rubin 

636 Public Ledger Building 

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19106 

ON BEHALF OP SERVICE: 

Sam Bernsen 

General Counsel 

George Indelieato 

Appellate Trial Attorney 

In a decision dated February 24, 1976, the immigration judge 

reopened these deportation proceedings in order to permit the respondent to apply for a new grant of voluntary departure. The Immigration 

and Naturalization Service took an appeal from that decision, although 

no hearing hid yet been held to determine whether or not the respondent actually merited the relief sought. We deemed the appeal interlocutory in nature, and pursuant to our decision in Matter of Sacco, 15 I. 

& N. Dec. 109 1974), we dismissed the Service's appeal for lack of 

jurisdiction. The Service has now submitted a motion seeking reconsideration of our May 10, 1976 dismissal of the appeal. The motion will be 

de/lied. 

In order to avoid the piecemeal review of the many questions which 

may arise it a deportation proceeding, we have held that we lack 

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Interim Decision #2506 

jurisdiction to entertain appeals from interlocutory orders of inunigradon judges. Matter of Sacco, supra. On occasion, we may assume 

jurisdiction by certification if an interlocutory order raises a significant 

issue involving the administration of the immigration laws. See Matter 

of Seren, 15 I. & N. Dee. 590 (BIA 1976). In addition, certain orders, 

although interlocutory in form, may be far-reaching in effect and have a 

sufficient degree in finality to warrant appeal jurisdiction. See Matter of 

Fong, 14 I. & N. Dec. 670 (BIA 1974). 

The Service does not contend that the immigration judge's order 

reopening these proceedings raises any significant issue regarding the 

administration of the immigration laws. Instead, the Service merely 

asserts that on the facts of this case reopening is not warranted. The 

Service does, however, disagree with our characterization of the immigration judge's order as interlocutory," and therefore contends that we 

should address the merits of the appeal 

The Service contends that only those orders which precede the entry 

of a final order of deportation are "interlocutory" within the contemplation of Matter of Sacco, supra. According to the Service, the immigration judge's present order is not an interlocutory order because there 

has once been a final order of deportation entered in this case. We reject 

this construction of what constitutes an interlocutory appeal 

It is true that a final order of deportation was rendered by the 

immigratiom judge. The factual issue underlying this case, however, 

involves an entirely new question, namely, whether or not the respondent now deserves a new grant voluntary departure. See generally 

Matter of Young, 13 I. & N. Dec. 528 (BIA 1970); Matter of Onyedibia, 

15 I. & N. Dec. 37 (BIA 1974); Matter of Ozcan, 15 I. & N. Dec. 

301 (BIA 1975). The immigration judge's order reopening these proceedings does not dispose of the merits do the respondent's request for 

such relief. The immigration judge's order merely resolves the preliminary question of whether or not to hold a hearing at which evidence 

going to the merits may be presented. This. is not a final disposition of 

the respondent's request for voluntary departure anew. For example, it 

is possible that the Service may persuade the immigration judge that 

the respondent does not merit such relief at the reopened hearing. 

The Service also relies on Matter of Ranget-Cantu, 12 I. & N. Dec. 73 

(BIA 1967), in arguing that it may take an appeal from an immigration 

judge's grant of a motion to reopen an alien's immigration case. Matter 

of Rangel-Cantu, supra, involved the question of an immigration 

judge's jurisdiction to reopen an exclusion proceeding after the execution of the order of exclusion and deportation. The presence of that issue 

would have justified our taking jurisdiction by certification in accordance with 8 CFR 3.1(c). However, we did not.review the case pursuant 

to that authority, and instead we stated that ". . . the Service has the 

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Interim Decision #2506 

right to app sal [an immigration judge's] order on a motion to reopen an 

exclusion case." Matter of Rangel-Cantu, 12 I. & N. Dee. at 74. 

The language used in Matter of Rangel-Cantu, supra, does support 

the Service's position. However, as we have indicated, subsequent 

Board decisions have taken a much narrower view of our jurisdiction to 

entertain appeals from interlocutory order of immigration judges. We 

therefore overrule Matter of Rangel-Cantu, supra, to the extent that it 

is inconsistent with our present position on our jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals. 

We have no jurisdiction to entertain the Service's appeal in this case, 

and we can perceive no reason for taking the matter on certification. The 

immigration judge has ordered the proceedings reopened. He will presumably entertain evidence and enter a final order on the respondent's 

request for voluntary departure anew. After that, both sides will have 

the opportmity to take an appeal to us from the immigration judge's 

decision. 

ORDER: The motion to reconsider is denied. 

Irving A_ Appleman, Member, Concurring: 

The Service motion for reconsideration argues with some persuasiveness, that a deportation order had already vested in this case, and that 

accordingly, we were not confronted with an interlocutory order, but, in 

effect a revival of completed proceedings. 

The definition of interlocutory action is necessarily subject to varying 

interpretaticns. Normally, the issue is presented to us in the framework 

of a ruling prior to, or as part of, the primary deportation proceedings. 

Matter of Sacco, 15 I. & N. Dec. 109 (BIA 1974). Here, when the 

proceedings are reopened by an immigration judge, the deportation 

order is without force and the outcome undecided until the conclusion of 

the reopened hearing. As the majority points out, fragmented appeals 

are undesirable and contrary to the intent of the Immigration and 

Nationality Act (Section 100, Section 5, Act of September 26, 1961, 75 

Stat. 651). T:ie immigration judge entered the last order in the case; the 

motion was properly addressed to him; and he had the authority to 

entertain it. Matter of Yeung 13 I. & N. Dee. 52S (BIA 1970)_ It rests in 

his sound discretion to accept or reject it. We have had no abuse pointed 

out to us in this case, nor has the Service pointed to any general area of 

difficulty that will be occasioned by our holding. 

While it is unnecessary to our holding to reach the merits, it should 

perhaps be noted that the Service has chosen a singularly poor vehicle 

for raising the issue. Subsequent to the original grant of voluntary 

departure by the immigration judge the alien was granted administrative extensions of the voluntary departure privilege, allegedly to allow 

him to proceed abroad to Toronto, Canada to receive his immigration 

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Interim Decision #2506 

visa. The warrant of deportation did not issue until May 13, 1975. 

Thereafter deportation was stayed by reason of Senate consideration of 

a private bill. By October 1975 consular processing was finally completed and a visa number was made available for issuance of a visa the 

following month. The motion to reopen was filed on November 18, 1975, 

and the immigration judge directed reopening of the proceedings. 

In his decision granting the motion, the immigration judge commented as follows: 

Copies of letters sent by counsel to the Service, and an affidavit by the respondent, 

show that the Service had misplaced respondent's file and that the United States Consul 

in Toronto had two or three separate files on the respondent; only after considerable 

delay were these files consolidated, but until such consolidation had occurred, the visa 

application could not be processed . . . it appears that the failure to depart may have 

been caused by circumstances beyond respondent's control... 

Following the order of the immigration judge directing reopening of 

the proceedings, the district director moved for reconsideration and 

requested an opportunity to file a brief. The immigration judge 

reaffirmed on February 24, 1976. An appeal was taken by the Service 

which arrived here April 16, 1976. On May 10, 1976, we dismissed the 

Service appeal; whereupon the Service requested, and was granted, a 

stay of execution, and on June 11, 1976, filed a motion for reconsideration of our order. It is now over seven months since the original order of 

reopening. 

In all this time not only has no significant issue been raised concerning 

the administration of the immigration laws, as the majority points out, 

but the unusually vigorous efforts of the Service in this case, have been 

devoted to impeding exploration of a situation which may possibly have 

been brought about, at least in some part, by government derelictions. 

One would normally expect the Service to desire a close scrutiny of this 

possibility, and to welcome appropriate corrective action, if warranted. 

I concur in the vote of the majority and add the further thought that the 

zeal shown in prosecuting this particular appeal might have been better 

used in bringing the matter to a speedy conclusion on the merits. 

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