Filed 1/11/24 Lopez v. Valdez CA2/7

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

ARTHUR LOPEZ,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

ROBERT VALDEZ,

Defendant and Respondent.

 B324256

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. 

22STRO05463) 

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Patricia A. Young, Judge. Affirmed.

Arthur Lopez, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.

No appearance for Defendant and Respondent.

_________________
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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Arthur Lopez, representing himself, appeals from an order 

denying his petition for a civil harassment restraining order 

against his ex-wife Cheryl Lopez’s “associate” Robert Valdez, who

Lopez claimed in his petition is involved in drug trafficking, 

prostitution, and other criminal activities. In his petition Lopez 

alleged that on May 14, 2022 Valdez, having been served with a 

subpoena in another (apparently related) case, “became violent 

and proceeded to assault [Lopez] with repeated threats of bodily 

harm and pursued [Lopez] as part of his assault,” even though 

Lopez “was standing over a block away on a public sidewalk.” 

Lopez further alleged Valdez followed up the assault with written 

threats to rape and injure Lopez. Attached to Lopez’s petition

were several text messages containing threats to do bodily harm 

to Lopez. Lopez also alleged Valdez was involved in repossessing

cars, colluded with Cheryl Lopez “to withhold” Lopez’s car from 

him, was evading service, and gave false testimony in an Orange 

County Superior Court case. 

The trial court, after finding Valdez was evading service, 

granted Lopez’s request to serve Valdez by mail and continued 

the hearing on the petition. A month later, Lopez (remotely) and 

Valdez (in person) appeared at the continued hearing. The 

proceedings were transcribed by a court reporter. The court’s 

minute order states that both parties testified and that the court 

received into evidence text messages submitted by Valdez. The 

order states: “The Court finds the party requesting the order of 

protection did not sustain the applicable burden of proof and 

accordingly the request is denied. Any temporary restraining 
3

order earlier issued[1]is hereby dissolved. [¶] The case is ordered 

dismissed with prejudice.” Lopez timely appealed. 

In his designation of the record on appeal, however, Lopez 

checked the box stating he was choosing to proceed without a 

reporter’s transcript of what was said at the hearing in the 

superior court. Lopez checked the box stating: “I understand 

that without a record of the oral proceedings in the superior 

court, the Court of Appeal will not be able to consider what was 

said during those proceedings in deciding whether an error was 

made in the superior court proceedings.” 

DISCUSSION

Lopez sought a restraining order against Valdez under 

Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6, which “was enacted ‘to 

protect the individual’s right to pursue safety, happiness and 

privacy as guaranteed by the California Constitution.’ 

[Citations.] It does so by providing expedited injunctive relief to 

victims of harassment.” (Brekke v. Wills (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 

1400, 1412; see Duronslet v. Kamps (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 717, 

724.) Section 527.6, subdivision (a)(1), provides a “person who 

has suffered harassment . . . may seek a temporary restraining 

order and an order after hearing prohibiting harassment as 

provided in this section.” If the court finds “by clear and 

convincing evidence that unlawful harassment exists, an order 

shall issue prohibiting the harassment.” (§ 527.6, subd. (i).) 

“The elements of unlawful harassment, as defined by the 

language in [Code of Civil Procedure] section 527.6, are as 

follows: (1) ‘a knowing and willful course of conduct’ entailing a 

1 There was no earlier-issued temporary restraining order.
4

‘pattern’ of ‘a series of acts over a period of time, however short, 

evidencing a continuity of purpose’; (2) ‘directed at a specific 

person’; (3) ‘which seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the 

person’; (4) ‘which serves no legitimate purpose’; (5) which ‘would 

cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional 

distress’ and ‘actually cause[s] substantial emotional distress to 

the plaintiff’; and (6) which is not a ‘[c]onstitutionally protected 

activity.’” (Schild v. Rubin (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 755, 762.) 

A course of conduct under section 527.6 includes “following or 

stalking an individual, making harassing telephone calls to an 

individual, or sending harassing correspondence to an individual 

by any means, including, but not limited to, the use of public or 

private mails, interoffice mail, facsimile, or email.” (§ 527.6, 

subd. (b)(1); see Harris v. Stampolis (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 484,

497.) “‘The quick, injunctive relief provided by section 527.6 “lies 

only to prevent threatened injury”—that is, future wrongs’—and 

‘is not intended to punish the restrained party for past acts of 

harassment.’” (Olson v. Doe (2022) 12 Cal.5th 669, 678.)

Where the defendant appeals from an order granting a civil 

harassment restraining order, we review the trial court’s findings 

for substantial evidence and the court’s ultimate ruling for abuse 

of discretion. (Parisi v. Mazzaferro (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 1219, 

1226, disapproved on another ground in Conservatorship of O.B.

(2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1003, fn. 4; Harris v. Stampolis, supra, 

248 Cal.App.4th at p. 497; R.D. v. P.M. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 

181, 188.) We “‘resolve all conflicts in the evidence in favor of . . . 

the prevailing party, and indulge all legitimate and reasonable 

inferences in favor of upholding the trial court’s findings.’” 

(Parisi, at p. 1226; see Reynauld v. Technicolor Creative Services 

USA, Inc. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1007, 1015; Maaso v. Signer
5

(2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 362, 371; see also Conservatorship of 

O.B., at p. 1005 [“when presented with a challenge to the 

sufficiency of the evidence associated with a finding requiring 

clear and convincing evidence, the court must determine whether 

the record, viewed as a whole, contains substantial evidence from 

which a reasonable trier of fact could have made the finding of 

high probability demanded by this standard of proof”].)

Where the plaintiff appeals from an order denying a 

request for restraining order, however, the standard of review is 

different. “The party seeking a restraining order bears the 

burden of establishing the circumstances justifying the order. 

[Citation.] ‘“In the case where the trier of fact has expressly or 

implicitly concluded that the party with the burden of proof did 

not carry the burden and that party appeals, it is misleading to 

characterize the failure-of-proof issue as whether substantial 

evidence supports the judgment. . . . [Instead] the question for a 

reviewing court becomes whether the evidence compels a finding 

in favor of the appellant as a matter of law . . . .”’” (Jan F. v. 

Natalie F. (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 583, 593.) Where, as here “the 

issue on appeal turns on a failure of proof at trial,” the question is 

“whether the appellant’s evidence was (1) uncontradicted and 

unimpeached and (2) of such a character and weight as to leave 

no room for a judicial determination that it was insufficient to 

support a finding.” (SwiftAir, LLC v. Southwest Airlines Co.

(2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 46, 59, internal quotation marks and 

citations omitted.)

Lopez cannot show that the evidence is uncontradicted and 

unimpeached or that it compels a finding in his favor as a matter 

of law because there is not an adequate record of what happened 

at the trial. Though Lopez signed his declaration in support of 
6

the petition under penalty of perjury, there is nothing in the 

record indicating the court received it into evidence or otherwise 

considered it. The court’s order refers only to the parties’ sworn 

testimony at the trial. As stated, Lopez chose to proceed with 

this appeal without a reporter’s transcript of the trial. Without a 

reporter’s transcript (or a settled statement describing what the 

testimony was), Lopez cannot show, and we have no way of 

evaluating whether, the testimony of the parties and whatever 

text messages were introduced into evidence2 compel a finding 

Lopez was entitled to a restraining order as a matter of law. As 

the Supreme Court has explained, the “lack of a verbatim record 

of such proceedings will frequently be fatal to a litigant’s ability 

to have his or her claims of trial court error resolved on the 

merits by an appellate court. This is so because it is a 

fundamental principle of appellate procedure that a trial court 

judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and the burden is 

on an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record 

presented to the appellate court, that the trial court committed 

an error that justifies reversal of the judgment.” (Jameson v. 

Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608-609.) And where, as here, “‘“the 

record is inadequate for meaningful review, the appellant 

defaults and the decision of the trial court should be affirmed.”’” 

(Id. at p. 609; see Ballard v. Uribe (1986) 41 Cal.3d 564, 574 [by 

failing to provide a reporter’s transcript or a settled statement, 

the appellant could not meet his burden of showing prejudicial 

error].)

2 As stated, the trial court’s order said Valdez introduced a 

group of text messages as an exhibit. It is unclear whether 

anyone introduced into evidence the text messages Lopez 

attached to his petition.
7

In his opening brief, Lopez repeats the allegations in his 

petition, including his claim Valdez threatened him on May 14, 

2022. Lopez also repeats his allegations Valdez sent him 

threatening text messages, was involved in prostitution and 

sex trafficking, evaded service of process, and perjured himself in 

a family law case, all of which, Lopez argues, entitled him to a 

restraining order under Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6. 

Lopez, however, has not cited any evidence in the clerk’s 

transcript (the only record there is), thus forfeiting the argument 

on appeal. (See L.O. v. Kilrain (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 616, 629

[appellant forfeited challenge to civil harassment restraining 

orders by failing “to appropriately cite the record” and “failing to 

set forth the evidence offered to support those orders”]; Alki 

Partners, LP v. DB Fund Services, LLC (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 574, 

589 [“An appellant who fails to cite accurately to the record 

forfeits the issue or argument on appeal that is presented without 

the record reference.”].) Although whenever possible we will not 

strictly apply technical rules of procedure in a manner that 

deprives a self-represented litigant of a hearing, we nevertheless 

must apply the procedural and substantive principles and rules 

of appellate review to a self-represented litigant’s arguments on 

appeal, just as we would to arguments by litigants represented by 

attorneys. (See In re Marriage of Furie (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 

816, 824; Hopkins & Carley v. Gens (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1401, 

1413-1414.)
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DISPOSITION

Lopez’s motion to augment is denied. Lopez’s oral motion 

for judicial notice is denied. The order denying Lopez’s petition 

for a restraining order is affirmed. 

SEGAL, Acting P. J.

We concur:

FEUER, P. J.

EVENSON, J.*

* Judge of the Alameda County Superior Court, assigned by 

the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the 

California Constitution.