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MICHAEL G. BAILEY

United States Attorney

ANNA WRIGHT

Assistant U.S. Attorney

NATHANIEL J. WALTERS

Assistant U.S. Attorney

State Bar No.: 029708

405 West Congress, Suite 4800

Tucson, Arizona 85701-5040

Telephone: (520) 620-7300

E-mail: anna.wright@usdoj.gov nathaniel.walters@usdoj.gov Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America,

 Plaintiff, 

 vs. 

Scott Daniel Warren,

 Defendant.

17-MJ-00341-RCC-JR

GOVERNMENT’S PROPOSED FINDINGS 

OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

At a three-day bench trial in this matter, the government proved beyond a reasonable 

doubt that the defendant abandoned personal property and drove on a restricted road in the 

Cabeza Prieta National Wildlife Refuge, and the defendant failed to carry his burden as to 

his asserted affirmative defenses. As such, the defendant is guilty as charged, and the 

government respectfully requests that the Court enter a verdict of guilty as to all counts. 

Per the Court’s Order at the conclusion of evidence, the government offers the

following proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law in support of a guilty verdict.

I. Findings of Fact

1. Any visitor with a general access permit to the Cabeza Prieta National 

Wildlife Refuge (“CPNWR”) may drive on the eastern portion of Charlie Bell Road as far 

as Charlie Bell Pass. (RT 5/6/19 at 11:25-12:4, 49:5-17).
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2. Visitors with general access permits may not, however, drive west on Charlie 

Bell Road past Charlie Bell Pass. (RT 5/6/19 at 12:19-21, 13:4-10). The area to the west of 

Charlie Bell Pass is a designated wilderness area and, absent certain exceptions, no vehicle 

travel is allowed within a designated wilderness area. (RT 5/6/19 at 19:2-13, 26:19-27:8; 

RT 5/7/19 138:23-139:3).

3. On June 1, 2017, the defendant and twelve others drove out to the CPNWR 

from Ajo, Arizona, in a white truck, a red truck and a grey SUV. (RT 5/6/19 at 39:16-23; 

RT-D 5/6/19 at 45:15-16). All three vehicles travelled together from the eastern edge of 

CPNWR westward on Charlie Bell Road to Charlie Bell Pass. (RT 5/6/19 at 13:4-7, 13:21-

14:2, 31:12-16; RT-D 5/6/19 at 47:12-18).

4. At Charlie Bell Pass, the red truck and grey SUV parked. Id.

5. The defendant, however, drove the white truck past Charlie Bell Pass to 

Charlie Bell Well, which is one and a half miles to the west of Charlie Bell Pass along 

Charlie Bell Road. (RT 5/6/19 at 18:24-19:4; RT-D 5/6/19 47:12-48:2). 

6. In so doing, the defendant drove past two clear and unobstructed signs posted 

on either of Charlie Bell Road at Charlie Bell Pass indicating that the road was closed to 

public use. (RT 5/6/19 at 13:11-14, 32:10-34:18; RT-D 5/6/19 at 48:3-7, 48:13-14). 

7. At Charlie Bell Well, the defendant left a cache of items, including plastic 

one-gallon water jugs, green milk crates, cookies, blankets, medical supplies and skin 

creams, for others to find or distribute. (RT 5/6/19 at 20:8-21:2; RT-D 5/6/19 at 54:9-21).

8. The defendant then drove the white truck to a spot almost a mile further to 

the west along Charlie Bell Road, past another clear and obvious sign indicating that the 

road was closed to public use. (RT 5/6/19 at 21:9-20, 23:19-24, 34:20-35:15; RT-D 5/6/19 

at 49:11-50:7). At that point, he was about two and a half miles inside the designated 

wilderness area. (RT 5/6/19 at 21:16-23). 

9. The defendant then hiked to the south and left caches of one-gallon water 

jugs and cans of beans in the designated wilderness area for others to find and use as they 

saw fit. (RT 5/6/19 at 46:8-47:4, 53:6-54:8).
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10. When the defendant returned to the white truck after leaving supplies on the 

CPNWR, United States Fish and Wildlife Officer Joseluis Valenzuela was waiting for him. 

(RT 5/6/19 at 22:25-23:7; RT-D 5/6/19 at 58:15-18). 

11. Officer Valenzuela drove down to the white truck after finding plastic onegallon jugs and cans of beans cached on the Border Patrol rescue beacon at Charlie Bell 

Pass and the defendant’s cache of items at Charlie Bell Well. (RT 5/6/19 at 15:1-22, 17:7-

24, 20:8-15). The supplies left on the rescue beacon were similar to those Officer 

Valenzuela found next to the red truck and grey SUV, as well as the items Officer 

Valenzuela found at Charlie Bell Well and next to the white truck. (RT 5/6/19 at 22:13-

24). The defendant testified that he couldn’t “say 100 percent” but was “virtual[y] 

certaint[]” that the items found on the rescue beacon were supplies he brought with him on 

June 1. (RT-D 5/6/9 at 51:16-25).

12. When asked by Officer Valenzuela, the defendant presented his general 

access permit and admitted that he was the driver of the white truck. (RT 5/6/19 at 26:7-

27:4, 28:6-14). The defendant also said that he did not know that he was in a wilderness 

area. (RT 5/6/19 at 28:15-19). When asked if he had permission to drive the white truck in 

a designated wilderness area, the defendant told Officer Valenzuela that he spoke to the 

refuge manager and assistant refuge manager. (RT 5/6/19 at 28:20-29:14). Officer 

Valenzuela took this to mean that the defendant was claiming to have a special use permit 

to drive in a designated wilderness area but that he did not have it with him. (RT 5/6/19 at 

29:15-18). 

13. Officer Valenzuela ultimately learned that the defendant did not have “any 

special use permit or any verbal permission to be down in the wilderness area.” (RT 5/6/19 

at 31:6-22). At that point, Officer Valenzuela told the defendant that he might be cited for 

his actions. (RT 5/6/19 at 31:23-32:4).

14. The CPNWR records demonstrate that the defendant did not have a special 

use permit. (RT 5/6/19 at 31:17-22). In addition, the defendant testified that he did not get 
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a special use permit before driving on the restricted portion of Charlie Bell Road on June 

1, 2017. (RT-D 5/6/19 at 50:8-16, 63:23-64:10; RT-D 5/7/19 at 18:8-19:6).

II. Conclusions of Law

a. Count 1 - Operating a Motor Vehicle in a Wilderness Area

15. To prove that the defendant is guilty of operating a motor vehicle in a 

wilderness area in violation of 50 C.F.R. § 35.5, the government must beyond a reasonable 

doubt that the defendant drove a motor vehicle in a wilderness area designated by federal 

law in the CPNWR. 

16. The Court finds that the government has met its burden of proving these 

elements. The evidence demonstrates that the defendant drove a vehicle into a wilderness 

area designated by federal law in the CPNWR without a special use permit or any other 

authorization.

17. The defendant admitted on June 1, 2017, to Officer Valenzuela and under 

oath at trial that he was the driver of the white truck. Officer Valenzuela and the defendant 

both testified Charlie Bell Road and the surrounding areas are designated wilderness areas 

beginning at Charlie Bell Pass and continuing to the west and south. Officer Valenzuela 

and Juliette Fernandez also testified that the vast majority of CPNWR is designated 

wilderness, including the restricted portions of Charlie Bell Road that the defendant drove 

on that day. (RT 5/6/19 at 19:2-23; RT 5/8/19 at 4:1-13, 11:19-12:14). Finally, the 

defendant did not have authority to drive in the designated wilderness area as proven by 

Officer Valenzuela’s testimony. There was no record of the defendant having obtained 

such a permit, and the defendant admitted under oath that he did not get a special use permit 

before driving on the restricted portion of Charlie Bell Road on June 1, 2017. (RT 5/6/19 

at 31:17-22; RT-D 5/6/19 at 50:8-16, 63:23-64:10; RT-D 5/7/19 at 18:8-19:6).

18. Under the regulation, the government does not have to prove that the 

defendant acted knowingly or intentionally. However, if such proof is required, the 

evidence proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly and intentionally 

operated a motor vehicle in a designated wilderness area. 
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b. Count 2 - Abandonment of Property

19. To prove that the defendant is guilty of abandoning property in violation of 

50 C.F.R. § 27.93, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 

defendant abandoned, discarded, or otherwise left his personal property in a national 

wildlife refuge.

20. “To interpret a statute, we look first to the plain meaning of the text...When 

words in a statute are not defined, they will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, 

contemporary, common meaning.” United States v. Kaplan, 836 F.3d 1199, 1208 (9th Cir. 

2016) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

21. As relevant here, “abandonment” means “[t]o relinquish or give up with the 

intention of never again reclaiming one’s rights or interest in.” ABANDON, Black’s Law 

Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).

22. “Personal property” means “[a]ny movable or intangible thing that is subject 

to ownership and not classified as real property.” PROPERTY, Black’s Law Dictionary 

(10th ed. 2014).

23. The Court finds that the government met its burden of proving these 

elements. The evidence demonstrates that the defendant abandoned, discarded, or 

otherwise left his personal property in the CPNWR.

24. Officer Valenzuela testified that he found supplies on the rescue beacon at 

Charlie Bell Pass and at Charlie Bell Well, both of which are within the CPNWR. (RT 

5/6/19 at 11:22-24, 14:4-9, 19:2-4, 20:8-21:2). The defendant admitted under oath that he 

left those supplies on June 1, 2017, with the intent that other individuals take and use those 

supplies as they saw fit. (RT-D 5/6/19 at 51:7-25). He also testified that he left additional 

supplies to the south of where he parked off Charlie Bell Road almost a mile beyond 

Charlie Bell Well that same day with the intent that other individuals also take and use 

those supplies as they saw fit. (RT-D 5/6/19 at 53:6-54:8). See United States v. Millis, 621 

F.3d 914, 918 (9th Cir. 2010) (defendant who left similar items on Buenos Aires National 

Wildlife Refuge “likely could have been charged...[with] abandonment of property.”).
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25. The Court finds unconvincing the defendant’s claim that he did not abandon 

anything in the refuge because, on prior occasions, he was able to retrieve some of the 

supplies left behind on the CPNWR at a later date.

26. The defendant gave up any right or interest he had in the items he left on the 

CPNWR when he placed them in a public place with the intention that others take them. 

While there was testimony that volunteers “typically” or “sometimes” find emptied water 

jugs at the caches, there was no testimony that any of the other items are ever recovered, 

and one would not expect to recover supplies like blankets at the sites. (See RT-D 5/7/19 

at 20:13-21; RT 5/7/19 at 65:22-66:5). 

27. Moreover, even if the defendant’s actions on June 1 do not amount to 

abandonment of the items, they clearly constitute “otherwise leaving” those terms.

28. The Court rejects the defendant’s claim that the items were not “personal 

property” because they did not belong to him. Plastic one-gallon water jugs, green milk 

crates, cookies, blankets, medical supplies and skin creams all easily fall within the 

definition of personal property. The items are movable things that are subject to ownership 

and are not real property.

c. Affirmative Defenses

i. Notice Under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment

29. The Court concludes that the regulations are not unconstitutionally vague.

30. The “fundamental principles of due process mandate that ‘no individual be 

forced to speculate, at peril of indictment, whether his conduct is prohibited.’” Millis, 621 

F.3d at 917 (quoting United States v. Nader, 542 F.3d 713, 721 (9th Cir. 2008)). However, 

a criminal law is unconstitutionally vague “only where ‘after seizing every thing from 

which aid can be derived, the Court is left with an ambiguous statute.’” Nader, 542 F.3d at 

721 (quoting Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 239 (1993)). Here, the regulations at 

issue are not unconstitutionally vague because they are clear when read for their plain 

meaning.
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31. As discussed above, the defendant’s argument that 50 C.F.R. § 27.93 was 

unconstitutionally vague as to the conduct is meritless. “Abandon” and “personal 

property” have ordinary, contemporary, common meanings. 

32. The defendant’s claim regarding changes made to the hold harmless 

agreement in July 2017 do not make the regulation vague. Any changes to the hold 

harmless agreement in July 2017 clarified that document only. (RT 5/7/18 at 114:7-10). 

Nothing in the hold harmless agreement changed the text of the regulation, which was 

sufficiently clear when read for its plain meaning and available for anyone to read. 

33. Similarly, the language in the hold harmless agreement advising that certain 

penalties could be imposed if a permit holder violated the terms of a permit did nothing to 

alter the penalties described in the regulations at issue. Those penalties are also clear when 

read for their plain meaning and available for anyone to read. 

34. The defendant’s reliance on United States v. True, 946 F.2d 682 (9th Cir. 

1991), and Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972), for the proposition that the 

Court may consider the hold harmless agreement in determining whether the defendant 

was on notice is misplaced. In True, the Ninth Circuit analyzed whether agency action 

could cure a deficient closure order issued under a regulation. In Grayned, the Supreme 

Court included the actions of “those charged with enforcing” a statute as the least of the 

tools in determining its reach. Neither case stands for or even suggests that the actions of 

an agency may transform a constitutionally definite regulation into an unconstitutionally 

vague regulation.

35. The Court finds the defendant’s arguments now that he was unaware are not 

credible, especially considering the lack of testimony as to any reliance on this portion of 

the hold harmless agreement. The defendant’s claim cannot constitute a legal excuse for 

his conduct. See United States v. Int’l Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 563 (1971) 

(“[I]gnorance of the law is no defense.”).

ii. Necessity

36. The Court concludes that the defendant has not established the defense of 
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necessity.

37. To establish a necessity defense, the defendant must show under an objective 

standard “(1) that [they were] faced with a choice of evils and chose the lesser evil; (2) that 

[they] acted to prevent imminent harm; (3) that [they] reasonably anticipated a causal 

relation between his conduct and the harm to be avoided; and (4) that there were no other 

legal alternatives to violating the law.” United States v. Arellano-Rivera, 244 F.3d 1119, 

1125-26 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). Regardless of his subjective 

beliefs, the defendant “must act reasonably” and the “justification defense must be 

analyzed objectively.” United States v. Perdomo-Espana, 522 F.3d 983, 988 (9th Cir. 

2008).

38. The Court finds that the defendant has failed meet his burden as to each of 

the four elements. First, the defendant has not established that he was placed in a position 

where he had to choose the lesser of two evils. Instead, he intentionally traveled to CPNWR 

for the sole purpose of leaving personal property at pre-selected locations, including the 

locations in the designated wilderness areas. (RT-D 5/6/19 at 45:5-46:26). The defendant 

also testified that his group started its “mission” at 6:00 a.m. that day, and he encountered 

Officer Valenzuela in the mid-afternoon. (RT-D 5/7/19 at 16:22-17:3). Actions to avoid 

imminent harm necessarily do not include actions planned in advance with a group and 

then executed over the course of several hours. See United States v. Nolan, 700 F.2d 479, 

484-85 (9th Cir. 1993).

39. The defendant also did not establish that he acted to avoid an imminent harm. 

As the defendant testified, his conduct on June 1 was premised on statistical data and he 

had no information that the supplies he left on the CPNWR that day would help anyone 

anytime in the next two weeks or perhaps longer. (RT-D 5/6/19 at 55:24-56:10). In fact, he 

had no information that anyone was in need of those supplies on that day. (RT-D 5/6/19 at 

54:22-3, 56:11-23). Finally, the defendant testified that sometimes, when he returns to a 

cache up to two weeks later, it is clear that no one has used the supplies left there. (RT-D 

5/7/19 at 23:3-9). Thus, there is no evidence that the defendant knew of any particular 
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person in need of supplies on June 1. He knew it was possible that the supplies might not 

be used for weeks, if at all. Accordingly, the defendant’s actions on June 1 were not aimed 

at preventing an imminent harm within the meaning of the necessity justification. See 

United States v. Dorrell, 758 F.2d 427, 433 (9th Cir. 1985).

40. The defendant also did not establish a causal relationship between his actions 

and the harm he wished to avoid. See United States v. Schoon, 971 F.2d 193, 198 (9th Cir. 

1991). The defendant testified that the harm he wished to avoid was death from dehydration 

in the West Desert. (RT-D 5/7/19 at 24:17-23). As discussed above, the defendant knew 

that it was possible the supplies he left might not be used for weeks, if at all. (RT-D 5/6/19 

at 55:24-56:10; RT-D 5/7/19 at 23:3-9). In addition, while there was testimony that people 

may sometimes drink the water left behind by the defendant and others, there is absolutely 

no evidence that the defendant’s actions would have a “significant effect on the harm he 

sought to remedy[.]” Dorrell, 758 F.2d at 433. 

41. The evidence also shows that there were legal alternatives available to the 

defendant that he chose not to pursue. There are rescue beacons, and designated cooling 

water stations within the designated wilderness areas on CPNWR, as well as law 

enforcement agents. Despite these legal alternatives, the defendant chose to place supplies 

on a rescue beacon and to not provide information to Officer Valenzuela. It is reasonable 

to infer from these actions that the defendant was motivated by another goal, that is, helping 

people who might use the supplies avoid contact with law enforcement agents.

42. The necessity defense applies where a person must make an immediate 

decision to break the law to avoid a greater, and it is inapplicable here.

iii. Religious Freedom Restoration Act

43. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) offers an affirmative 

defense to defendants accused of violating generally applicable federal criminal statutes. 

See Ruiz-Diaz v. United States, 703 F.3d 483, 485-86 (9th Cir. 2012). To establish a prima 

facie RFRA claim, the defendant must present evidence that (1) he has a sincerely held 

religious belief, (2) his activities were an “exercise of religion,” and (3) the government 
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action “substantially burdened” his exercise of religion. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a); Navajo 

Nation v. United States Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1068-69 (9th Cir. 2008). To do this 

he must articulate the scope of his beliefs and then show that the exercise of his sincerely 

held beliefs is substantially burdened by a government action. United States v. Zimmerman, 

514 F.3d 851, 853 (9th Cir. 2007). In this case, to establish that a government action 

constitutes a substantial burden on the defendant’s sincerely held religious belief, the 

defendant must show that he was coerced to act contrary to his sincerely held religious 

beliefs by the threat of criminal sanctions. See Snoqualmie Indian Tribe v. F.E.R.C., 545 

F.3d 1207, 1214 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1070).

44. Only once a defendant has established a prima facie RFRA case does the 

burden shift to the government to demonstrate that the “substantial burden” posed by the 

government action is (1) in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and (2) the 

least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. Navajo Nation, 

535 F.3d at 1068 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–1(b)). The government action is in furtherance 

of a compelling interest if demanding “unbending compliance” advances its stated interest 

to a “meaningful degree.” United States v. Christie, 825 F.3d 1048, 1056 (9th Cir. 2016). 

If the government identifies a compelling interest with particularity, then it must 

demonstrate that it cannot accommodate the claimant’s belief more without furthering its 

interest less. Christie, 825 F.3d at 1056. To do this, the government must demonstrate that 

its preferred means are reasonable and that any other proffered options are either not less 

restrictive or not plausible. Id. at 1061.

45. The Court concludes that the defendant has failed to establish either element 

of a prima facie RFRA case as to either charged offense.

46. As to the first element of the defendant’s prima facie case, the Court finds 

the defendant’s testimony regarding the sincerity of his beliefs is insufficient and not 

credible. The defendant offered no evidence as to the connection between his beliefs and 

the need to place plastic one-gallon jugs, in particular, or canned beans, cookies, blankets, 

medical supplies and skin creams on the CPNWR. In addition, the two witnesses offered 
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by the defendant to corroborate his testimony on this issue failed to do so. (See RT-D 5/6/19 

at 19:16-20:1; RT 5/7/19 at 87:12-89:9; 148:11-17, 152:6-9).

47. The Court also finds that the defendant’s beliefs are more properly 

characterized as being political, rather than religious or spiritual, in nature, because the 

defendant offered extensive testimony about the statistical data and policy decisions made 

by the organizations he volunteers with to explain his conduct in this case. See Christie, 

825 F.3d at 1056 (A defendant must show that he “do[es] not simply recite [his beliefs] for 

the purpose of draping religious garb over [political] activity[.]’”)

48. As to the second element, the Court finds that the enforcement of the 

regulations at issue in this case do not substantially burden the defendant’s beliefs.

49. At issue in this case is the enforcement of regulations that relate to the 

management of public lands. The government may regulate and administer its own land in 

such a way that “decreases the spirituality, the fervor, or the satisfaction with which a 

believer practices his religion,” Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1063, even if the government’s 

actions would “virtually destroy” the believer’s ability to practice his or her religion. Lyng, 

485 U.S. at 451. RFRA does not grant each citizen “an individual veto to prohibit the 

government action solely because it offends his religious beliefs, sensibilities, or tastes, or 

fails to satisfy his religious desires” and “deprive others of the right to use what is, by 

definition, land that belongs to everyone.” Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1063-64. This is 

especially true where, as here, it is possible to imagine competing and incompatible 

religious uses for the CPNWR. Accordingly, the government’s choice of how to regulate 

the use of and access to its own land cannot create a substantial burden.

50. Moreover, none of the defendant’s beliefs conflict with the regulations at 

issue in this case. As the evidence showed, there are many methods for providing aid in the 

CPNWR, some of which do not violate the rules and regulations. The defendant’s 

preference for one method over another cannot create a substantial burden. See Oklevueha 

Native American Church of Hawaii v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 1012, 1016 (9th Cir. 2016) (finding 

no substantial burden where claimants could substitute legal substances for marijuana 
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consistent with beliefs); Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1071 (“[D]iminishment of spiritual 

fulfillment...is not a ‘substantial burden’ on the free exercise of religion.”).

51. Having found that the defendant did not meet his prima facie RFRA burden, 

the Court need not consider whether the government proved that the enforcement of the 

regulations in this case furthered of a compelling governmental interest by the least 

restrictive means possible. However, the Court also finds that the government met its 

burden. 

52. As part of its overall efforts to further the mission and purpose of the 

CPNWR, the government has a compelling interest in enforcing the regulations that govern 

the CPNWR. As Refuge Supervisor Juliette Fernandez testified, as to designated 

wilderness areas within the CPNWR, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) 

is required by law to manage the CPNWR for the mission of the USFWS, the purpose the 

CPNWR was established for, and the CPNWR’s wilderness character, including 

maintaining its untrammeled, natural and undeveloped character while providing visitors 

with opportunities for solitude, or primitive and unrefined recreation. (RT 5/7/19 at 173:17-

179:19). Each of the regulations violated by the defendants serves to further the mission 

and purpose of the CPNWR. (RT 5/8/19 at 4:14-5:1, 8:20-10:14). The defendant’s actions 

on June 1 negatively impacted the wilderness character of the CPNWR, and nothing less 

than enforcement of the regulations would allow the government to continue to meet its 

compelling interest. (RT 5/7/19 at 124:19-128:3; RT 5/8/19 at 19:10-20:21, 21:11-22:13).

53. The government also has a compelling interest in maintaining the security of 

its borders and controlling immigration. To that end, Congress chose to impose criminal 

sanctions on aliens who enter the United States without authorization and those who 

knowingly assist illegal aliens. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324-1326. “The proposition that the 

government has a compelling interest in regulating its border hardly needs testimonial 

documentation.” United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662, 695 (1989). Here, the Court finds 

that the defendant intended that his actions on June 1 to further the entry of illegal aliens 

into the United States through the CPNWR by providing supplies for the journey and 
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lessening the possibility that illegal aliens would come into contact with law enforcement 

agents. In light of the defendant’s testimony on direct examination, as well as the other 

evidence related to undocumented aliens offered by the defendant, the Court finds that the 

defendant’s testimony that his actions were not directed towards illegal aliens not credible. 

(See RT-D 5/6/19 at 23:19-23, 24:20-25, 26:17-20, 28:22-29:8; RT 5/7/19 at 6:17-7:8, 9:5-

10:19, 14:8-20, 21:9-22:9, 42:7-45:18). This conclusion is further supported by the 

defendant’s placement of supplies on a Border Patrol rescue beacon on June 1. (See RT 

5/6/19 at 22:13-24; RT-D 5/6/9 at 51:16-25).

III. Verdict

54. The defendant has failed to establish the facts necessary to support his

asserted affirmative defenses. The United States has established his guilt beyond a 

reasonable doubt, and the Court finds the defendant guilty of the offenses as charged in the 

Information.

Respectfully submitted this 24th day of May, 2019.

MICHAEL BAILEY

United States Attorney

District of Arizona

/s/ Anna Wright & Nathaniel Walters 

_____________________________

Anna Wright & Nathaniel J. Walters

Assistant U.S. Attorneys

Copy of the foregoing served electronically or by

other means this 24th day of May, 2019, to:

All ECF participants