## IN THE COURT O F CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF TE XAS

N O

. P D

- 1 0 9 5

- 1 0

A L F R E D O L E Y V A P E C I N A

, A p p e l l a n t

v

.

T H E S T A T E O F T E X A S

O N S T A T E ’ S P E T I T I O N F O R D I S C R E T I O N A R Y R E V I E W

F R O M T H E S E C O N D C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

T A R R A N T C O U N T Y

C O C H R A N

, J

. , d e l i v e r e d t h e o p i n i o n o f t h e C o u r t i n w h i c h K E L L E R

, P

. J

. , a n d

M E Y E R S

, W O M A C K

, J O H N S O N

, K E A S L E R

, H E R V E Y a n d A L C A L A

, J J

. , j o i n e d

. A L C A L A

,

J

. , f i l e d a c o n c u r r i n g o p i n i o n i n w h i c h J O H N S O N

, J

. , j o i n e d

. P R IC E

, J

. , f i l e d a

d i s s e n t i n g o p i n i o n

.

A T a r r a n t C o u n t y j u r y c o n v i c t e d a p p e l l a n t o f t h e m u r d e r o f h i s w i f e

. T h e t r i a l j u d g e

d e n i e d a p p e l l a n t ’ s m o t i o n t o s u p p r e s s h i s s t a t e m e n t s t o p o l i c e d u r i n g c u s t o d i a l q u e s t i o n i n g

a t a h o s p i t a l a f

t e r a m a g i s t r a t e h a d g i v e n h i m h i s A r t i c l e 1 5

. 1 7 r i g h t s

. T h e t r i a l j u d g e 1

r e j e c t e d a p p e l l a n t ’ s c l a i m t h a t h e h a d i n v o k e d b o t h h i s F i f t h a n d S i x t h A m e n d m e n t r i g h t s t o

T E X

. C O D E C R I M

. P R O C . art. 15.17. 1P ecina – 2

c o u n s e l w h e n h e a s k e d t h e m a g i s t r a t e f o r a n a p p o i n t e d a t t o r n e y b u t a l s o s a i d t h a t h e w a n t e d

t o t a l k t o t h e p o l i c e w h o w e r e s t a n d i n g o u t s i d e t h e h o s p i t a l r o o m

. O n r e m a n d f r o m t h i s

C o u r t

, t h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s

, o v e r a d i s s e n t

, h e l d t h a t a p p e l l a n t h a d i n v o k e d h i s F i f t h

A m e n d m e n t r i g h t t o i n t e r r o g a t i o n c o u n s e l d u r i n g t h e m a g i s t r a t i o n p r o c e s s

. 2

W e g r a n t e d t h e S t a t e ’ s p e t i t i o n f o r d i s c r e t i o n a r y r e v i e w t o c l a r i f y t h e d i s t i n c t i o n a f

t e r

M o n t e j o b e t w e e n t h e F i f

t h A m e n d m e n t r i g h t t o i n t e r r o g a t i o n c o u n s e l a n d t h e S i x t h

A m e n d m e n t r i g h t t o t r i a l c o u n s e l

. U n d e r M o n t e j o

, t h e F i f

t h A m e n d m e n t r i g h t t o 3

i n t e r r o g a t i o n c o u n s e l i s t r i g g e r e d b y t h e M i r a n d a w a r n i n g s t h a t p o l i c e m u s t g i v e b e f o r e

b e g i n n i n g a n y c u s t o d i a l q u e s t i o n i n g

. T h e S i x t h A m e n d m e n t r i g h t t o t r i a l c o u n s e l i s t r i g g e r e d

b y j u d i c i a l a r r a i g n m e n t o r A r t i c l e 1 5

. 1 7 m a g i s t r a t i o n

. B o t h t h e F i f t h a n d S i x t h A m e n d m e n t

r i g h t s t o c o u n s e l a p p l y t o p o s t

- m a g i s t r a t i o n c u s t o d i a l i n t e r r o g a t i o n

, b u t e a c h i s i n v o k e d a n d

w a i v e d i n e x a c t l y t h e s a m e m a n n e r

– u n d e r t h e F i f t h A m e n d m e n t p r o p h y l a c t i c M i r a n d a r u l e s

.

W e h o l d t h a t

, b e c a u s e a p p e l l a n t n e v e r i n v o k e d h i s r i g h t t o i n t e r r o g a t i o n c o u n s e l a f t e r t h e

p o l i c e g a v e h i m M i r a n d a w a r n i n g s

, t h e t r i a l j u d g e d i d n o t e r r i n d e n y i n g a p p e l l a n t ’ s m o t i o n

Pec ina v. State , 326 S.W .3d 249, 265-66 (Te x . App.–For t Worth 2010) (“When Pecina 2

reque sted appointment of counse l, which is undisputed, he invoked his Fifth Ame ndment rig ht to

consult with and have counsel pre sent, as the mag istrate explained that rig ht to him, at any police

questioning. The police we re w aiting in the ha ll to question hi m at that moment.”).

The State’s G rounds for Re view ar e as f ollows: 3

(1) The F ort Worth Court’s opinion i mproperly confla tes Appellant’s noninter rog ative

arr aig nment with his subsequent interrog ation.

(2) The F ort Worth Court mi sapplied this Court’s opinion in Hughen v . State

. (3) Appellant could not anticipa torily invoke his Fifth Amendme nt rig hts at a

noninterrog ative ar

raig nment.P ecina – 3

t o s u p p r e s s

.

I

.

A

. F a c t u a l B a c k g r o u n d

.

A r l i n g t o n p a r a m e d i c s r e s p o n d e d t o a 9 1 1 c a l l a n d f o u n d a p p e l l a n t a n d h i s w i f e

,

M i c h e l l e

, i n t h e i r a p a r t m e n t

, b o t h b l e e d i n g f r o m s t a b w o u n d s

. M i c h e l l e

, w h o h a d b e e n

s t a b b e d f i f t y

- f i v e t i m e s

, d i e d b e f

o r e t h e p a r a m e d i c s a r r i v e d

. A p p e l l a n t w a s t a k e n t o t h e

h o s p i t a l

. A s e r r a t e d k i t c h e n k n i f e w i t h a s e v e n

- i n c h b l a d e w a s f o u n d o n t h e b a t h r o o m f

l o o r

.

B a s e d o n t h e i r i n i t i a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n

, d e t e c t i v e s b e l i e v e d t h a t a p p e l l a n t h a d k i l l e d M i c h e l l e a n d

t h e n s t a b b e d h i m s e l f

. A f t e r s e v e r a l d a y s

, t h e y o b t a i n e d a n a r r e s t w a r r a n t

. T h e n D e t e c t i v e s

N u t t a n d F r i a s t o o k J u d g e M a d d o c k

, a l o c a l m a g i s t r a t e

, t o a p p e l l a n t ’ s h o s p i t a l r o o m

.

J u d g e M a d d o c k t e s t i f

i e d a t t h e s u p p r e s s i o n h e a r i n g t h a t s h e n o r m a l l y p e r f o r m s

m a g i s t r a t i o n h e a r i n g s a t t h e A r l i n g t o n C i t y J a i l

, b u t s h e w e n t t o t h e h o s p i t a l f o r a p p e l l a n t ’ s

h e a r i n g

, a s s h e h a d d o n e i n s o m e o t h e r c a s e s

, “ d u e t o t h e p o l i c y o f t h e s h e r i f f ’ s o f f i c e [ t h a t

i t w i l l n o t ] t r a n s f

e r

. . . a D e f

e n d a n t u n t i l h e h a s b e e n f u l l y m a g i s t r a t e d

. ” T h e t w o d e t e c t i v e s

d r o v e J u d g e M a d d o c k t o t h e h o s p i t a l a n d e n t e r e d a p p e l l a n t ’ s r o o m w i t h h e r

. T h e y a l l

i n t r o d u c e d t h e m s e l v e s

. J u d g e M a d d o c k

, w h o w a s f l u e n t i n S p a n i s h

, t o l d a p p e l l a n t

, w h i l e

p o i n t i n g t o t h e d e t e c t i v e s

, “ T h e y a r e h e r e

. T h e y w o u l d l i k e t o s p e a k t o y o u

. ” A p p e l l a n t e i t h e r

s a i d y e s o r n o d d e d

.

T h e d e t e c t i v e s t h e n l e f

t t h e r o o m a n d s t o o d o u t s i d e w h i l e J u d g e M a d d o c k a r r a i g n e d

a p p e l l a n t

. S h e r e a d a p p e l l a n t a S p a n i s h v e r s i o n o f t h e A r t i c l e 1 5

. 1 7 “ A d u l t W a r n i n g F o r m

, ”P ecina – 4

a l t h o u g h s h e h a d o n l y a n E n g l i s h v e r s i o n f o r h i m t o s i g n

. A f

t e r r e a d i n g a p p e l l a n t h i s r i g h t s

, 4

J u d g e M a d d o c k a s k e d i f h e “ w a n t [ e d ] a c o u r t a p p o i n t e d a t t o r n e y

. A n d h e s t a t e d h e d i d

. ” S h e

t h e n a s k e d a p p e l l a n t

, “ D o y o u s t i l l w a n t t o t a l k t o [ t h e d e t e c t i v e s ] ? ” H e s a i d t h a t h e d i d

.

A p p e l l a n t s i g n e d t h e A r t i c l e 1 5

. 1 7 f o r m a c k n o w l e d g i n g t h a t h e u n d e r s t o o d h i s r i g h t s

.

J u d g e M a d d o c k s t a t e d t h a t

, i n h e r o p i n i o n

, a p p e l l a n t ’ s d e c i s i o n t o s p e a k w i t h t h e

d e t e c t i v e s w a s f

r e e a n d v o l u n t a r y a n d t h e r e w a s “ a b s o l u t e l y n o c o e r c i o n

. ” S h e b e l i e v e d t h a t

,

w h e n a p p e l l a n t a s k e d f o r c o u n s e l

, h e w a s a s k i n g f o r t r i a l c o u n s e l

. S h e s a i d t h a t a p p e l l a n t

n e v e r i n d i c a t e d t h a t h e w a n t e d a l a w y e r t o b e p r e s e n t w h e n d e t e c t i v e s q u e s t i o n e d h i m

. J u d g e

M a d d o c k t h e n w e n t i n t o t h e h a l l a n d t o l d t h e d e t e c t i v e s t h a t a p p e l l a n t “ h a d i n i t i a l l y a s k e d f o r

a l a w y e r

, b u t [ t h a t ] s h e h a d b e e n t o l d b y M r

. P e c i n a t h a t h e w a n t e d t o t a l k t o t h e m

. ” S h e

g a v e t h e s i g n e d A r t i c l e 1 5

. 1 7 f o r m t o t h e d e t e c t i v e s

, a n d s h e w a i t e d i n t h e h a l l w a y

.

J udg e Maddoc k rea d the Spanish version of the r ights printed on the Eng lish version, 4

including the following :

(2) You have a rig ht to hire a law y er a nd have him/her

prese nt prior to and during any

interview a

nd questioning by

peac e off icer s or attorne y s repr esenting [t he] state;

(3) I f y ou cannot a ffor d a lawy er, y ou have the rig ht to request the a ppointment of a lawy er to

be pre sent prior to and dur ing a ny such interview

and y ou have the rig ht to have an

attorney appointed to re prese nt y ou if y ou cannot a ffor d an attorne y . This means y ou may

obtain y our own law y er or have a lawy er a ppointed for y ou. You may have r easona

ble

time and opportunity

to consult y our lawy er if y ou desire. [The f orm then desc ribes the

paper work ne cessa

ry to obtain indigent status for counsel];

(4) You have the rig ht to remain silent. You do not have to spe ak to the police;

(5) You ar e not re quired to make a stateme nt, and any statement y ou make c an and [may be]

used ag ainst y ou in court;

(6) You have the rig ht to stop any interviewing or questioning at any time. I f y ou decide to

answe r questions, y ou may stop the questioning a t any time;

(7) You have the rig ht to have an e x amining tr ial if y ou are char g ed with a f elony offe nse;

and

(8) You may

be subjec t to deportation if y ou are not a U.S. citizen.P ecina – 5

D e t e c t i v e s F r i a s a n d N u t t t h e n c a m e b a c k i n t o a p p e l l a n t ’ s r o o m

. D e t

. F r i a s s p o k e

S p a n i s h a n d e x p l a i n e d t o a p p e l l a n t w h o t h e y w e r e a n d t h a t t h e y w a n t e d t o q u e s t i o n h i m a b o u t

h i s w i f e ’ s m u r d e r

. A p p e l l a n t s a i d t h a t h e w a n t e d t o t a l k w i t h t h e m

, s o D e t

. F r i a s w r o t e

, i n

S p a n i s h

, o n t h e 1 5

. 1 7 f o r m

, “ I a s k e d f

o r a l a w y e r

, b u t a l s o I w a n t e d t o s p e a k w i t h t h e

A r l i n g t o n p o l i c e

. ” T h e o f f i c e r s t o l d a p p e l l a n t t h a t t h e y w o u l d r e c o r d t h e i n t e r v i e w

, a n d a s

t h e y p r e p a r e d t h e i r e q u i p m e n t

, D e t

. F r i a s g a v e a p p e l l a n t t h e M i r a n d a w a r n i n g s o r a l l y i n 5

S p a n i s h

. T h e a u d i o e q u i p m e n t m a l f u n c t i o n e d a t f

i r s t

, s o D e t

. F r i a s o r a l l y w a r n e d P e c i n a

a g a i n o n c e t h e t a p e s t a r t e d

. A p p e l l a n t a l s o s i g n e d a c a r d t h a t l i s t e d h i s M i r a n d a r i g h t s i n

S p a n i s h

. A t e v e r y p o i n t

, a p p e l l a n t w a i v e d h i s M i r a n d a r i g h t s

. W h i l e t a p i n g t h e o r a l

s t a t e m e n t

, D e t

. F r i a s w r o t e o u t a w r i t t e n v e r s i o n f o r a p p e l l a n t

, a n d h e s i g n e d i t

. 6

T h e d e t e c t i v e s s a i d t h a t a p p e l l a n t n e v e r a s k e d t o s t o p t h e i n t e r v i e w a n d n e v e r a s k e d

t o s p e a k w i t h c o u n s e l

. T h e y d e n i e d m a k i n g a n y p r o m i s e s

, a n d t h e y s t a t e d t h a t t h e y b e l i e v e d

a p p e l l a n t ’ s w a i v e r w a s k n o w i n g

, i n t e l l i g e n t

, a n d v o l u n t a r y

. A f t e r t h e i r i n t e r v i e w

, t h e

d e t e c t i v e s t o o k J u d g e M a d d o c k b a c k t o h e r o f f i c e

, a n d s h e b e g a n t h e p r o c e s s t o a p p o i n t

a p p e l l a n t ’ s t r i a l c o u n s e l

.

A p p e l l a n t t e s t i f

i e d t h a t

, i f a n a t t o r n e y h a d a d v i s e d h i m n o t t o s p e a k w i t h p o l i c e

, h e

Miranda v. Arizona , 3 8 4 U

. S

. 4 3 6 ( 1 9 6 6 )

. 5

I n his taped statement, a ppellant said that he did not re member muc h about the day his 6

wife die d. He sa id that they had ar g ued about he r not wanting to be with him. He bec ame a ng ry

, and they started to fig ht. Appellant admitted that he ha d cut his wife a nd that no one else was

prese nt when these events oc curr ed. He had no memory of cutting himself. I n his written

statement, appe llant said that he picke d up the knife f rom the kitchen a

nd cut his wife, but he did

not remembe r how many

times he cut her

.P ecina – 6

w o u l d n o t h a v e t a l k e d w i t h t h e m

. T h e r e s t o f h i s t e s t i m o n y d e a l t w i t h w h e t h e r h e w a s

a d v i s e d t h a t h e c o u l d c o n t a c t t h e M e x i c a n C o n s u l a t e

.

T h e t r i a l j u d g e d e n i e d t h e m o t i o n t o s u p p r e s s

. H e f o u n d t h a t a p p e l l a n t w a s f u l l y

i n f o r m e d o f h i s r i g h t s a n d “ i n d i c a t e d t h a t a l t h o u g h h e d i d w a n t a l a w y e r

, t h a t h e w i s h e d t o

a l s o t a l k w i t h d e t e c t i v e s f r o m A r l i n g t o n

, m e a n i n g t h a t h e b a s i c a l l y w a s w a i v i n g h i s r i g h t s a t

t h a t t i m e

. ”

B

. A p p e l l a t e H i s t o r y

.

O n o r i g i n a l s u b m i s s i o n

, t h e F o r t W o r t h C o u r t o f A p p e a l s a f f i r m e d a p p e l l a n t ’ s m u r d e r

c o n v i c t i o n

, f

i n d i n g t h a t

, w h e n a p p e l l a n t a g r e e d t o s p e a k w i t h p o l i c e i n r e s p o n s e t o t h e

m a g i s t r a t e ’ s q u e s t i o n

, h e i n i t i a t e d c o n t a c t w i t h p o l i c e

. A p p e l l a n t ’ s a c t i o n w a i v e d b o t h t h e 7

F i f t h A m e n d m e n t r i g h t t o i n t e r r o g a t i o n c o u n s e l a n d t h e S i x t h A m e n d m e n t r i g h t t o t r i a l

c o u n s e l

, r e g a r d l e s s o f

w h i c h h e m a y h a v e i n v o k e d

. O n d i s c r e t i o n a r y r e v i e w

, w e r e v e r s e d

, 8

h o l d i n g t h a t

, u n d e r M i c h i g a n v

. J a c k s o n

, a p p e l l a n t “ h a d i n v o k e d h i s [ S i x t h A m e n d m e n t ] 9

r i g h t s t o c o u n s e l w h e n a r r a i g n e d b y t h e m a g i s t r a t e a t t h e h o s p i t a l

, ” a n d a p p e l l a n t ’ s “ y e s ”

r e p l y w h e n t h e m a g i s t r a t e a s k e d i f h e s t i l l w a n t e d t o t a l k w i t h t h e p o l i c e w a s i n s u f f i c i e n t t o

r e i n i t i a t e c o n t a c t a n d w a i v e h i s p r e v i o u s l y i n v o k e d S i x t h A m e n d m e n t r i g h t

. W e r e m a n d e d 1 0

Pec ina v. State , No. 2-05-456- CR, 2007 W L 1299263, *7-8 (Te x . App.—For t Worth 7

May 3, 2007) (not desig nated f or publication) (

Pec ina I ).

Id. 8

475 U.S. 625 (1986). 9

Pec ina v. State , 268 S.W .3d 564, 568 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (“While we a g ree with 1 0

the cour t of appe als that Appellant’s Six th Amendment rig ht to counsel attac hed whe n he wa sP ecina – 7

t h e c a s e f

o r t h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s t o c o n d u c t a h a r m a n a l y s i s

.

W h i l e t h i s c a s e w a s p e n d i n g i n t h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s o n r e m a n d

, t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s

S u p r e m e C o u r t o v e r r u l e d M i c h i g a n v

. J a c k s o n

– t h e v e r y c a s e t h a t w e r e l i e d o n i n h o l d i n g t h a t

a p p e l l a n t ’ s i n v o c a t i o n o f h i s S i x t h A m e n d m e n t r i g h t t o c o u n s e l a t t h e m a g i s t r a t i o n h e a r i n g

r e n d e r e d h i s s u b s e q u e n t w a i v e r o f t h e r i g h t t o c o u n s e l f o r t h e p o l i c e

- i n i t i a t e d i n t e r v i e w

i n v a l i d

– i n M o n t e

j o v

. L o u i s i a n a

. H o w e v e r

, t h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s h e l d t h a t

, e v e n a f t e r 1 1

M o n t e j o

, a p p e l l a n t ’ s s t a t e m e n t s s h o u l d h a v e b e e n s u p p r e s s e d b e c a u s e h e i n v o k e d h i s F i f t h

A m e n d m e n t r i g h t t o a n i n t e r r o g a t i o n a t t o r n e y b y a s k i n g t h e m a g i s t r a t e f o r a n a p p o i n t e d

l a w y e r

. W e g r a n t e d r e v i e w t o d i s c u s s t h e d i s t i n c t F i f t h a n d S i x t h A m e n d m e n t r i g h t s t o 1 2

c o u n s e l a f

t e r M o n t e j o a n d t o a p p l y t h o s e d i f f e r e n c e s t o c u s t o d i a l i n t e r r o g a t i o n

.

I I

.

O v e r t h e p a s t f

o u r d e c a d e s

, t h e j u r i s p r u d e n c e c o n c e r n i n g t h e F i f t h A m e n d m e n t r i g h t

t o c o u n s e l d u r i n g p o l i c e i n t e r r o g a t i o n a n d t h e S i x t h A m e n d m e n t r i g h t t o c o u n s e l a t a l l

“ c r i t i c a l ” s t a g e s o f c r i m i n a l p r o c e e d i n g s h a d b e c o m e i n t e r t w i n e d i n c o m p l e x a n d c o n f u s i n g

w a y s

. I t w a s i n c r e a s i n g l y d i f f i c u l t f o r c o u r t s t o d e t e r m i n e w h i c h r i g h t c a n b e i n v o k e d w h e n

a n d w h e t h e r i n v o c a t i o n o f t h e r i g h t t o c o u n s e l u n d e r o n e a m e n d m e n t i n v o k e d t h e r i g h t t o

c o u n s e l u n d e r t h e o t h e r a m e n d m e n t

. F i n a l l y

, i n M o n t e j o

, t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s S u p r e m e C o u r t

arr aig ned by

the mag istrate, we disag ree that Appellant himself initiated contac t with the

police.”) (

Pec ina II ).

Montejo v. Louisiana , 556 U.S. 778, 129 S.C t. 2079 (2009). 1 1

Pec ina v. State , 326 S.W .3d 249, 264–67 (Tex. App.—For t Worth 2010) (Pec ina III ). 1 2P ecina – 8

d i s e n t a n g l e d t h e t w o r i g h t

- t o

- c o u n s e l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n s a n d c l a r i f i e d t h e i r s e p a r a t e

p u r p o s e s a n d a p p l i c a t i o n s b y o v e r r u l i n g M i c h i g a n v

. J a c k s o n a n d r e a f

f i r m i n g t h e b r i g h t

- l i n e

r u l e o f M i r a n d a a n d E d w a r d s

. A s J u s t i c e S c a l i a n o t e d i n h i s M o n t e j o c o n c l u s i o n

, 1 3

T h i s c a s e i s a n e x e m p l a r o f J u s t i c e J a c k s o n ’ s o f t q u o t e d w a r n i n g t h a t t h i s

C o u r t “ i s f

o r e v e r a d d i n g n e w s t o r i e s t o t h e t e m p l e s o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l a w

, a n d

t h e t e m p l e s h a v e a w a y o f c o l l a p s i n g w h e n o n e s t o r y t o o m a n y i s a d d e d

. W e

t o d a y r e m o v e M i c h i g a n v

. J a c k s o n ’ s f o u r t h s t o r y o f p r o p h y l a x i s

. 1 4

W e e x a m i n e h o w t h e l e s s o n s o f M o n t e j o a p p l y i n t h i s c a s e

, o n e t h a t i s f a c t u a l l y v e r y s i m i l a r

t o M o n t e j o

. 1 5

Montejo, 556 U.S. at ___, 129 S.Ct . at 2091-92. 1 3

Montejo , 556 U.S. at __, 129 S.Ct . at 2092 (c itation omit ted). 1 4

J esse Jay

Montejo was ar

rested f or murder and questioned by

police dete ctives. He 1 5

admitted that he had shot a nd killed the victim in a botched burg lary . Severa l day s later he was

char g ed with murder

and, at a preliminary

hear ing, the judge order ed that counse l be appointed to

repr esent him. 129 S.Ct. at 2082. L ater that same da

y , police dete ctives visited Montejo in jail.

They rea d him his Miranda rig hts and asked him to ac company them to find the murder

wea pon.

Montejo ag ree d, and, during the trip, he wr ote “a

n inculpatory

letter of a

pology to the victim’s

widow.” Id. Only

later did Montejo mee t his court-appointed la wy er, “ who was quite upse t that

the detec tives had interr og ated his client in his absenc e.” Id. On appe al, Montejo claimed tha t

the inculpatory

letter should not have be en admitted bec ause he had invoked his Six th

Amendment rig ht to counsel at the pre liminary hear ing a nd thus police offic ers we re ba rre d from

questioning the rea fter w ithout the presenc e of c ounsel. Id . at 2083. The Supre me Court held

that neither a

defe ndant’s re quest for c ounsel at a pr eliminary hear ing nor

appointment of that

counsel a ffe cts the validity of the de fenda

nt’s waiver

of his Miranda rig hts during a subsequent

custodial interrog ation by police. Id. at 2091-92. B ut the Court remande d the ca se to deter mine

whether Montejo had “ma de a c lear asser tion of the rig ht to counsel when the office rs had

approa ched him about a ccompa ny ing the m on the excursion for the murde r we apon,” be cause (1)

the question of whe ther Montejo had va lidly waived his Miranda rig hts had not been f ully

litigated; a

nd (2) he could still press his claim that his S ix th Amendment rig hts had bee n violated

if the police misre prese nted whethe r he ha d been a ppointed a lawy er w hen he pur portedly waived

his Miranda rig hts during tha t custodial interrog ation. Id.P ecina – 9

A

. T h e F i f

t h A m e n d m e n t R i g h t t o I n t e r r o g a t i o n C o u n s e l

. 1 6

T h e F i f t h A m e n d m e n t p r o h i b i t s t h e g o v e r n m e n t f r o m c o m p e l l i n g a c r i m i n a l s u s p e c t

t o b e a r w i t n e s s a g a i n s t h i m s e l f

. I n M i r a n d a v

. A r iz o n a

, t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t c r a f t e d 1 7 1 8

s a f e g u a r d s t o p r o t e c t t h i s “ p r i v i l e g e a g a i n s t s e l f

- i n c r i m i n a t i o n ” i n t h e i n h e r e n t l y c o e r c i v e

a t m o s p h e r e o f c u s t o d i a l i n t e r r o g a t i o n s

. B e f o r e q u e s t i o n i n g a s u s p e c t w h o i s i n c u s t o d y

, 1 9

p o l i c e m u s t g i v e t h a t p e r s o n M i r a n d a w a r n i n g s

. O n l y i f t h e p e r s o n v o l u n t a r i l y a n d

i n t e l l i g e n t l y w a i v e s h i s M i r a n d a r i g h t s

, i n c l u d i n g t h e r i g h t t o h a v e a n a t t o r n e y p r e s e n t d u r i n g

q u e s t i o n i n g

, m a y h i s s t a t e m e n t b e i n t r o d u c e d i n t o e v i d e n c e a g a i n s t h i m a t t r i a l

. 2 0

U n d e r E d w a r d

s v

. A r iz o n a

, o n c e a p e r s o n i n v o k e s h i s r i g h t t o h a v e c o u n s e l p r e s e n t

2 1

We refe r to this right to counse l as the “F ifth Amendment rig ht to interrog ation counsel” 1 6

to disti ng uish it from the “Six th Amendment rig ht to trial counsel.” To be clea r, this

is something of a

misnomer to the extent that it indicates that the F ifth Amendment

itself cre ates a

rig ht to counsel. The r ights c rea ted by Miranda , including the rig ht to

have c ounsel prese nt during custodial interrog ation, “ar e not themselves r ights prote cted

by the Constitut ion but [ are ] i nstead mea sures to insure tha t the rig ht ag ainst

compulsory

self-inc rimination [ is] protec ted.” How ever , beca use of the pe rvasivene ss of

the term’s use in the case s of the Supreme Court . . . interpreting the rig ht to counsel

cre ated by Miranda , we use it here.

Goodwin v. Johnson , 132 F.3d 162, 179 n.12 ( 5th Cir. 1997) (quoting Duck worth v. Eagan , 492

U.S. 195, 203 (1974) (a ll other citations and quotation marks omitted).

U.S. C O N S T

. amend V (“ No per son . . . shall be compelled in a ny criminal ca se to be a 1 7

witness ag ainst himself”).

384 U.S. 436 (1966). 1 8

Id. at 441; see also Dick erson v. United States , 530 U.S. 428, 437-38 (2000) 1 9

(desc ribing the Fif

th Amendment rig ht to interrog ation counsel a s a prophy lactic r ule nec essar

y

to miti g ate the inhe rently coer cive e nvironment of custodial interr og ation).

Miranda , 384 U.S. at 475. 2 0

451 U.S. 477 (1981). 2 1P ecina – 10

d u r i n g c u s t o d i a l i n t e r r o g a t i o n

, a v a l i d w a i v e r o f t h a t r i g h t c a n n o t b e e s t a b l i s h e d b y m e r e l y

s h o w i n g t h a t t h e s u s p e c t r e s p o n d e d t o p o l i c e

- i n i t i a t e d i n t e r r o g a t i o n a f t e r b e i n g a d v i s e d o f

h i s r i g h t s a g a i n

. T h e p u r p o s e o f t h e E d w a r d s r u l e i s t o “ p r e v e n t p o l i c e f r o m b a d g e r i n g a 2 2

d e f e n d a n t i n t o w a i v i n g h i s p r e v i o u s l y a s s e r t e d M i r a n d a r i g h t s

. ” T h a t p r o p h y l a c t i c r u l e 2 3

p r o t e c t s t h e s u s p e c t

– w h o h a s m a d e t h e d e c i s i o n n o t t o s p e a k t o l a w

- e n f o r c e m e n t o f

f i c e r s

w i t h o u t h i s l a w y e r a n d c l e a r l y c o m m u n i c a t e d t h a t d e c i s i o n t o t h e p o l i c e

– f r o m f u r t h e r p o l i c e

b a d g e r i n g

. I n M o n t e j o

, t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t a g a i n p r a i s e d t h e “ c l e a r a n d u n e q u i v o c a l 2 4

g u i d e l i n e s t o t h e l a w e n f o r c e m e n t p r o f

e s s i o n ” t h a t E d w a r d

s p r o v i d e s

. 2 5

I t i s t h e p o l i c e o f

f i c e r o r o t h e r l a w

- e n f

o r c e m e n t a g e n t w h o a d m i n i s t e r s M i r a n d a

w a r n i n g s

, a n d h e d o e s s o i m m e d i a t e l y b e f o r e c u s t o d i a l i n t e r r o g a t i o n

. T h u s

, t h e p o l i c e m u s t 2 6

g i v e t h e F i f

t h A m e n d m e n t M i r a n d a w a r n i n g s d u r i n g t h e p r o c e s s o f c u s t o d i a l i n t e r r o g a t i o n

Id. at 485. 2 2

Michigan v. H

arvey , 494 U.S. 344, 350 (1990). 2 3

Texas v. Cobb , 532 U.S. 162, 175 (2001) (K ennedy , J ., concur ring ). 2 4

Montejo , 556 U.S. at __, 129 S.Ct . at 2091 (interna l quotation marks omitted). 2 5

Miranda , 384 U.S. at 444-45 (suspec t may invoke his Fifth Amendme nt rig ht to 2 6

interrog ation counsel “ prior to” inter rog ation or during interrog ation if he indica tes “in any

manner , and at a

ny stag e of the proce ss that he wishes to consult with an attorne y befor e

speaking ”). In Montejo , the Supreme Court re peate dly ref err ed to the F ifth Amendment rig ht to

counsel during “police initiated” custodial interrog ation, thus it i s that fac tual

scena rio–questioning by

police off

icer s or their a g ents–that g ives rise to the prophy lactic

Miranda war

nings, a nd the invocation or w aiver of the F ifth Amendment rig ht to counsel during

such questioning

. See M

ontejo , 556 U.S. at ___, 129 S.Ct . at 2086 (stating that “antibadg ering ”

by police off

icer s is the rationale of Edwards ), id . at 2087 (re jecting Montejo’s proposed r ule that

would preve nt “police- initiated interrog ation entirely once the Six th Amendment rig ht” to

counsel a ttaches)

, id . at 2089 (purpose of Jack son rule, like that of Edwards , “is to prec lude the

State from badg ering defe ndants into waiving their pre viously asser ted rig hts”).P ecina – 11

b u t b e f o r e q u e s t i o n i n g a c t u a l l y b e g i n s

. B u t

, a s t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t n o t e d i n M c N e i l v

. 2 7

W i s c o n s i n

, i t h a s n e v e r a c c e p t e d t h e n o t i o n o f a n “ a n t i c i p a t o r y ” i n v o c a t i o n o f M i r a n d a

2 8

r i g h t s ( 1 ) g i v e n b y s o m e o n e o t h e r t h a n l a w

- e n f o r c e m e n t o f

f i c e r s o r o t h e r s t a t e a g e n t s ; o r ( 2 )

o u t s i d e t h e c o n t e x t o f c u s t o d i a l i n t e r r o g a t i o n

.

W e h a v e i n f

a c t n e v e r h e l d t h a t a p e r s o n c a n i n v o k e h i s M i r a n d a r i g h t s

a n t i c i p a t o r i l y

, i n a c o n t e x t o t h e r t h a n “ c u s t o d i a l i n t e r r o g a t i o n ”

– w h i c h a

p r e l i m i n a r y h e a r i n g w i l l n o t a l w a y s

, o r e v e n u s u a l l y

, i n v o l v e

. . . . M o s t r i g h t s

m u s t b e a s s e r t e d w h e n t h e g o v e r n m e n t s e e k s t o t a k e t h e a c t i o n t h e y p r o t e c t

a g a i n s t

. T h e f

a c t t h a t w e h a v e a l l o w e d t h e M i r a n d a r i g h t t o c o u n s e l

, o n c e

a s s e r t e d

, t o b e e f

f e c t i v e w i t h r e s p e c t t o f

u t u r e c u s t o d i a l i n t e r r o g a t i o n d o e s n o t

n e c e s s a r i l y m e a n t h a t w e w i l l a l l o w i t t o b e a s s e r t e d i n i t i a l l y o u t s i d e t h e

Id. at 467. As the Miranda Court stated, “An individual nee d not make a pr e- 2 7

interrog ation reque st for a la wy er. While such re quest aff irmatively

secur es his rig ht to have one,

his failure to a sk for a

lawy er doe s not constitute a waiver . No ef fec tive waiver

of the rig ht to

counsel during interrog ation can be rec og nized unless specifica lly made a fter the war

nings w e

here delineate have be en g iven.” 384 U.S. at 470. Thus, a suspect who, be fore the police have

beg un rea ding him his Miranda war nings, a sks them for an attorney , is entitled to one befor e

being questioned. Simil arly , a suspec t who, upon being g iven his Miranda war nings, a sks the

police for an attorne y , is entitled to one befor e being questioned. And a

suspect who initially

states that he unde rstands all of his rig hts and wishes to waive them, but, at any point during the

questioning, stops and a sks for an a ttorney , is entitled to one befor e being questioned fur ther.

501 U.S. 171 (1991); see also Gre en v. State , 934 S.W .2d 92, 97 (Tex. Crim. App. 2 8

1996) (“ L ike the hea

ring in McNeil , appellant’ s reque st for an a ttorney at his appea

ranc e

associate d with the robber y was not an e x pression for assistance in dealing with custodial

interrog ation by

the police.” ); Flamer v. D elaware , 68 F.3d 710, 725- 26 (3d Cir. 1995) (murde r

defe ndant’s re quest for c ounsel at his arr aig nment did not constitut e a F ifth Amendment re quest

for c ounsel at a subse quent police inter rog ation; “

McNeil stands for the pr oposition t hat a r equest

for a n attorney at ar raig nment is, in it self, insuffic ient to invoke the Fif th Amendment rig ht to

counsel a t subsequent custodial interr og ation—even if that interrog ation conce rns the off ense on

which the de fenda

nt was ar raig ned.”) ; Alston v. Redmond , 34 F.3d 1237, 1246 ( 3d Cir. 1994)

(“The antipathy

expressed in McNeil

towards the a

nticipatory

invocation of the Miranda rig hts is

consistent with Miranda ’s under ly ing pr inciples. The Miranda rig ht to counsel is a prophy lactic

rule that doe s not operate independe nt from the dang er it see ks to protect ag ainst—‘the

compelling atmosphere inhere nt in the proce ss of in-custody interrog ation’—and the eff ect that

dang er c an have on a suspec t’s privileg e to avoid compe lled self-inc rimination.”).P ecina – 12

c o n t e x t o f c u s t o d i a l i n t e r r o g a t i o n

, w i t h s i m i l a r f u t u r e e f f e c t

. 2 9

T h u s

, i n M o n t e

j o

, t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t s t a t e d t h a t

, u n d e r i t s F i f t h A m e n d m e n t

j u r i s p r u d e n c e

, “ a d e f

e n d a n t w h o d o e s n o t w a n t t o s p e a k t o t h e p o l i c e w i t h o u t c o u n s e l p r e s e n t

n e e d o n l y s a y a s m u c h w h e n h e i s f i r s t a p p r o a c h e d a n d g i v e n t h e M i r a n d a w a r n i n g s

. ” A n d 3 0

i f h e d o e s i n v o k e h i s F i f t h A m e n d m e n t r i g h t t o c o u n s e l

, “ n o t o n l y m u s t t h e i m m e d i a t e

c o n t a c t [ b y p o l i c e ] e n d

, b u t ‘ b a d g e r i n g ’ b y l a t e r r e q u e s t s i s p r o h i b i t e d

. ” 3 1

O n c e f o r m a l a d v e r s a r y p r o c e e d i n g s b e g i n

, t h e S i x t h A m e n d m e n t r i g h t t o c o u n s e l

a p p l i e s i n e x a c t l y t h e s a m e w a y a s t h e F i f t h A m e n d m e n t r i g h t a p p l i e s t o c u s t o d i a l

i n t e r r o g a t i o n

. T h u s

, M i r a n d a w a r n i n g s s e r v e t h e a r r e s t e e ’ s i n t e r e s t s i n b o t h t h e F i f t h a n d 3 2

S i x t h A m e n d m e n t r i g h t s t o c o u n s e l d u r i n g c u s t o d i a l i n t e r r o g a t i o n s c o n d u c t e d a f t e r a p e r s o n

h a s b e e n f

o r m a l l y c h a r g e d

. B e c a u s e t h e “ d o c t r i n e s e n s u r i n g v o l u n t a r i n e s s o f t h e F i f t h

A m e n d m e n t w a i v e r s i m u l t a n e o u s l y e n s u r e t h e v o l u n t a r i n e s s o f t h e S i x t h A m e n d m e n t

w a i v e r

, ” b o t h t h e F i f t h a n d S i x t h A m e n d m e n t r i g h t s t o i n t e r r o g a t i o n c o u n s e l a r e f u l l y 3 3

501 U.S. at 182 n.3. 2 9

Montejo , 556 U.S. at __, 129 S.Ct . at 2090 (c iting “the Miranda- Edwards-Minnick line 3 0

of ca ses”)

.

Id. 3 1

Id. (noting that case s like Jack son “prote ct the rig ht to have counse l during custodial 3 2

interrog ation–which rig ht happens to be g uara nteed ( once the adver sary judicial proce ss has

beg un) by two source s of law. Since the rig ht under both sourc es is waived using the same

proce dure, doc trines ensuring voluntariness of the F ifth Amendment wa iver simultaneously

ensure the voluntariness of the Six th Amendment waive r”) (citations omitted).

Id. at 2090. 3 3P ecina – 13

e n c o m p a s s e d b y t h e F i f t h A m e n d m e n t M i r a n d a d o c t r i n e

.

B

. T h e S i x t h A m e n d m e n t R i g h t t o T r i a l C o u n s e l

.

T h e S i x t h A m e n d m e n t r i g h t t o c o u n s e l a t t a c h e s o n c e t h e “ a d v e r s a r y j u d i c i a l p r o c e s s

h a s b e e n i n i t i a t e d

, ” a n d i t g u a r a n t e e s “ a d e f e n d a n t t h e r i g h t t o h a v e c o u n s e l p r e s e n t a t a l l

‘ c r i t i c a l ’ s t a g e s o f t h e c r i m i n a l p r o c e e d i n g s

. ” W e r e f e r t o t h i s S i x t h A m e n d m e n t r i g h t w i t h 3 4

t h e s h o r t

- h a n d t e r m “ t r i a l c o u n s e l

. ” G e n e r a l l y

, a n A r t i c l e 1 5

. 1 7 i n i t i a l a p p e a r a n c e a n d

m a g i s t r a t i o n m a r k s t h e i n i t i a t i o n o f a d v e r s a r i a l j u d i c i a l p r o c e e d i n g s i n T e x a s a n d “ p l a i n l y

s i g n a l s ” t h e a t t a c h m e n t o f a d e f e n d a n t ’ s S i x t h A m e n d m e n t r i g h t t o c o u n s e l

. 3 5

I n M i c h i g a n v

. J

a c k s o n

, t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t h a d h e l d t h a t “ i f p o l i c e i n i t i a t e

i n t e r r o g a t i o n a f

t e r a d e f e n d a n t ’ s a s s e r t i o n

, a t a n a r r a i g n m e n t o r s i m i l a r p r o c e e d i n g

, o f h i s

r i g h t t o c o u n s e l

, a n y w a i v e r o f t h e d e f e n d a n t ’ s r i g h t t o c o u n s e l f o r t h a t p o l i c e

- i n i t i a t e d

i n t e r r o g a t i o n i s i n v a l i d

. ” T h a t i s t h e r u l e t h a t t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t e x p l i c i t l y o v e r r u l e d i n 3 6

Montejo , 556 U.S. at __, 129 S.Ct . at 2085. An ac cused ma y invoke his Six th 3 4

Amendment rig ht “at or a fter the initiation of adversa ry judicial criminal proc eeding s – whether

by way of for mal char g e, pre liminary

hear ing, indictment, infor mation, or arr aig nment.” Kirby v.

Illinois , 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972). This is the “star ting point” f

or the Six th Amendment rig ht to

trial counsel be cause “it is only [when adver sary

proce eding s commence ] t hat the g overnme nt

has committed itself to prosec ute, and only then that the adve rse positions of g overnme nt and

defe ndant have solidified.” Id

.

Rothgery v . Gillespie County , 554 U.S. 191, 212 (2008) (stating that Texas’s article 3 5

15.17 mag istration hear ing “ plainly signa ls” the attac hment of the Six th Amendment rig ht to

counsel, “ even if

it is not itself a cr itical stag e.”) ; see also Hughe n v. State , 297 S.W .3d 330, 335

(Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (def endant’ s “Article 15.17 initial appear ance marke d the initiation of

adver sarial judicial pr ocee dings a g ainst him and thus ‘plainly signa l[ ed] attachment’ of his Si x th

Amendment rig ht to counsel.”).

Michigan v. J

ackson , 475 U.S. 625, 636 (1986). 3 6P ecina – 14

M o n t e j o b e c a u s e i t w a s d e e m e d “ u n w o r k a b l e

, ” “ s u p e r f l u o u s

, ” a n d a “ p o l i c y d r i v e n ” d o c t r i n e

w h o s e “ p o l i c y i s b e i n g a d e q u a t e l y s e r v e d t h r o u g h o t h e r m e a n s

. ” 3 7

F u r t h e r m o r e

, t h e J

a c k s o n r u l e s i m p l y d i d n o t t a k e a c c o u n t o f t h e p r a c t i c a l r e a l i t i e s a n d

g o a l s o f t h e a r r a i g n m e n t e v e n t a n d i t s r e l a t i o n s h i p t o t h e s e p a r a t e e v e n t o f c u s t o d i a l

i n t e r r o g a t i o n

. W h e n a p e r s o n i s b r o u g h t b e f o r e a m a g i s t r a t e

, t o l d t h a t h e i s f o r m a l l y a c c u s e d

o f c o m m i t t i n g a c r i m e

, a n d a s k e d i f h e w a n t s a l a w y e r t o r e p r e s e n t h i m i n t h o s e c r i m i n a l

p r o c e e d i n g s

, t h a t i s a n e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t q u e s t i o n f

r o m w h e t h e r h e w a n t s a l a w y e r t o b e w i t h

h i m d u r i n g a n y p o l i c e q u e s t i o n i n g

. A d e f e n d a n t ’ s r e s p o n s e

, “ Y e s

, I w a n t a l a w y e r

, ” i s f a t a l l y

a m b i g u o u s b e c a u s e i t m a y m e a n “ I w a n t a l a w y e r f o r t h e s e j u d i c i a l p r o c e e d i n g s

, ” o r “ I w a n t

a l a w y e r b e f

o r e I t a l k t o t h e p o l i c e

, ” o r “ I w a n t a l a w y e r f o r a l l p u r p o s e s a n d I d o n o t w a n t

t o s a y a n y t h i n g m o r e t o a n y o n e

– y o u o r t h e p o l i c e

– u n t i l I h a v e o n e

. ” 3 8

A s M o n t e j o c o n c l u d e d

, t h i s a m b i g u i t y i s e a s y t o r e s o l v e : a S i x t h A m e n d m e n t r e q u e s t

f o r a n a t t o r n e y a t a n a r r a i g n m e n t

, i n i t i a l a p p e a r a n c e

, o r A r t i c l e 1 5

. 1 7 h e a r i n g i s a r e q u e s t f o r

t h e g u i d i n g h a n d o f c o u n s e l f o r a l l j u d i c i a l c r i m i n a l p r o c e e d i n g s

. I f t h e d e f e n d a n t a l s o

w i s h e s t o i n v o k e h i s S i x t h A m e n d m e n t r i g h t t o c o u n s e l d u r i n g t h e “ c r i t i c a l s t a g e ” o f p o s t

Montejo , 556 U.S. at __, 129 S.Ct . at 2089-91 (c oncluding that, “whe n the marg inal 3 7

benef its of the Jack

son rule a re w eig hed ag ainst its subst antial costs to the truth-see king pr ocess

and the c riminal justice sy stem, we re adily conclude that the rule doe s not ‘pay its way .’”)

.

See M ontejo , 556 U.S. at __, 129 S.Ct . at 2086 (noting that even the Jack son Court 3 8

acknow ledg ed “doubt that de fenda nts ‘actua lly

intend[ed] their re quest for c ounsel to encompa ss

repr esenta tion during a

ny further questioning’ ”).P ecina – 15

a r r a i g n m e n t c u s t o d i a l i n t e r r o g a t i o n

, h e m a y c e r t a i n l y d o s o

. B u t h e d o e s s o b y i n v o k i n g 3 9

t h a t r i g h t t o c o u n s e l

, p u r s u a n t t o M i r a n d a

, E d w a r d s

, a n d M i n n i c k w h e n l a w e n f o r c e m e n t o r

o t h e r s t a t e a g e n t s e m b a r k u p o n c u s t o d i a l i n t e r r o g a t i o n

. 4 0

T h u s

, b o t h t h e F i f

t h a n d S i x t h A m e n d m e n t r i g h t s t o c o u n s e l d u r i n g c u s t o d i a l

i n t e r r o g a t i o n d e p e n d u p o n t h e s a m e t h i n g : “ W h a t m a t t e r s f o r M i r a n d a a n d E d w a r d s i s w h a t

h a p p e n s w h e n t h e d e f

e n d a n t i s a p p r o a c h e d f o r i n t e r r o g a t i o n

, a n d ( i f h e c o n s e n t s ) w h a t

h a p p e n s d u r i n g t h e i n t e r r o g a t i o n

– n o t w h a t h a p p e n e d a t a n y p r e l i m i n a r y h e a r i n g

. ” 4 1

D i s t i l l e d t o i t s e s s e n c e

, M o n t e j o m e a n s t h a t a d e f

e n d a n t ’ s i n v o c a t i o n o f h i s r i g h t t o

c o u n s e l a t h i s A r t i c l e 1 5

. 1 7 h e a r i n g s a y s n o t h i n g a b o u t h i s p o s s i b l e i n v o c a t i o n o f h i s r i g h t

t o c o u n s e l d u r i n g l a t e r p o l i c e

- i n i t i a t e d c u s t o d i a l i n t e r r o g a t i o n

. T h e m a g i s t r a t i o n h e a r i n g i s

n o t a n i n t e r r o g a t i o n e v e n t

. A n u n c h a r g e d s u s p e c t m a y i n v o k e h i s F i f t h A m e n d m e n t r i g h t t o

c o u n s e l ( a n d a d e f

e n d a n t w h o h a s b e e n a r r a i g n e d m a y i n v o k e h i s S i x t h A m e n d m e n t r i g h t t o

c o u n s e l ) f

o r p u r p o s e s o f c u s t o d i a l i n t e r r o g a t i o n w h e n t h e p o l i c e o r o t h e r l a w

- e n f o r c e m e n t

See M ontejo , 556 U.S. at ___, 129 S.Ct . at 2085 (c iting Massiah v. United States , 377 3 9

U.S. 201, 204-05 (1967))

.

Montejo , 556 U.S. at ___, 129 S.Ct . at 2089-90 (sta ting that, e ven without Jack son

, 4 0

“any suspect subjec t to custodial interrog ation has the rig ht to have a la wy er pr esent if he so

reque sts, and to be advised of that rig ht. . . . These thre e lay ers of prophy laxi s are sufficie nt.

Under the Miranda-Edwards-Minnick line of ca ses (whic h is not in doubt ), a de fenda nt who does

not want to speak to the police without counsel prese nt need only say as much whe n he is first

approa ched a

nd g iven the Miranda war nings. . . . I f that re g ime suffice s to protect the integ rity of

a ‘suspe ct’s voluntary

choice not to speak outside his lawy er’ s prese nce’ befor e his arr aig nment,

it is hard to see why

it would not also suffice to prote ct that same c hoice a fter a rra ignme nt, when

Six th Amendment rig hts have a ttached.” ) (c itation omit ted).

Id. at 2091. 4 1P ecina – 16

a g e n t s a p p r o a c h h i m a n d g i v e h i m h i s M i r a n d a w a r n i n g s

. T h a t i s t h e t i m e a n d p l a c e t o e i t h e r

i n v o k e o r w a i v e t h e r i g h t t o c o u n s e l f o r p u r p o s e s o f p o l i c e q u e s t i o n i n g

.

C

. S t a n d a r d o f R e v i e w

I n r e v i e w i n g c l a i m s c o n c e r n i n g M i r a n d a v i o l a t i o n s a n d t h e a d m i s s i o n o f s t a t e m e n t s

m a d e a s t h e r e s u l t o f c u s t o d i a l i n t e r r o g a t i o n

, w e c o n d u c t t h e b i f u r c a t e d r e v i e w a r t i c u l a t e d

i n G u z m a n v

. S t a t e

. W e a f f o r d a l m o s t t o t a l d e f

e r e n c e t o t h e t r i a l c o u r t ’ s r u l i n g s o n 4 2

q u e s t i o n s o f h i s t o r i c a l f a c t a n d o n a p p l i c a t i o n o f l a w t o f a c t q u e s t i o n s t h a t t u r n u p o n

c r e d i b i l i t y a n d d e m e a n o r w h i l e w e r e v i e w d e n o v o t h e t r i a l c o u r t ’ s r u l i n g s o n a p p l i c a t i o n o f

l a w t o f a c t q u e s t i o n s t h a t d o n o t t u r n u p o n c r e d i b i l i t y a n d d e m e a n o r

. 4 3

H o w e v e r

, t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t h a s h e l d t h a t

, i n d e c i d i n g w h e t h e r a n a c c u s e d “ a c t u a l l y

i n v o k e d h i s r i g h t t o c o u n s e l

, ” r e v i e w i n g c o u r t s m u s t u s e a n o b j e c t i v e s t a n d a r d “ [ t ] o a v o i d

d i f f i c u l t i e s o f p r o o f a n d t o p r o v i d e g u i d a n c e t o o f f i c e r s c o n d u c t i n g i n t e r r o g a t i o n s [

. ] ” T h e 4 4

a c c u s e d “ m u s t u n a m b i g u o u s l y r e q u e s t c o u n s e l ” d u r i n g a c u s t o d i a l i n t e r r o g a t i o n ; t h u s

, “ h e

m u s t a r t i c u l a t e h i s d e s i r e t o h a v e c o u n s e l p r e s e n t s u f f i c i e n t l y c l e a r l y t h a t a r e a s o n a b l e p o l i c e

955 S.W .2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997); see Leza v . State , 351 S.W .3d 344, 349 4 2

(Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (“[W] e mea sure the pr opriety of the trial c ourt’s ruling with respec t to

alleg ed Miranda violations under the totality of the c ircumstance s, almost wholly defe rring to the

trial court on que stions of historical fac t and cr edibility , but review ing de novo all questions of

law and mixed questions of law and f act that do not turn on c redibility deter minations.”);

Ripkowski v. State, 61 S.W .3d 378, 381-82 (Te x . Crim. App. 2001).

Leza , 351 S.W .3d at 349. 4 3

Davis v. U

nited States , 512 U.S. 452, 458-59 (1994). 4 4P ecina – 17

o f f i c e r i n t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s w o u l d u n d e r s t a n d t h e s t a t e m e n t t o b e a r e q u e s t f o r a n a t t o r n e y. ” 4 5

W e v i e w t h e t o t a l i t y o f c i r c u m s t a n c e s f r o m t h e v i e w p o i n t o f t h e o b j e c t i v e l y r e a s o n a b l e p o l i c e

o f f i c e r c o n d u c t i n g c u s t o d i a l i n t e r r o g a t i o n

.

W i t h t h a t g e n e r a l b a c k g r o u n d

, w e t u r n t o t h e p r e s e n t c a s e

.

I I I

.

I n t h i s c a s e

, t h e r e w e r e t w o s e p a r a t e e v e n t s : m a g i s t r a t i o n f o l l o w e d b y a c u s t o d i a l

i n t e r r o g a t i o n

. J u d g e M a d d o c k c o n d u c t e d t h e m a g i s t r a t i o n a n d g a v e a p p e l l a n t h i s A r t i c l e

4 6

1 5

. 1 7 w a r n i n g s i n S p a n i s h

. A p p e l l a n t t o l d h e r

, “ I w a n t a l a w y e r

, b u t I a l s o w a n t t o s p e a k

w i t h t h e A r l i n g t o n P o l i c e

. ” I n h e r o p i n i o n

, a p p e l l a n t a s k e d f o r t h e a p p o i n t m e n t o f a t r i a l

a t t o r n e y

, b u t h e w a n t e d t o t a l k t o t h e p o l i c e w h o w e r e s t a n d i n g r i g h t o u t s i d e t h e h o s p i t a l

d o o r

. S h e d i d n o t b e l i e v e t h a t a p p e l l a n t i n v o k e d h i s r i g h t t o c o u n s e l f o r p u r p o s e s o f c u s t o d i a l

i n t e r r o g a t i o n

. A s a n e u t r a l m a g i s t r a t e

, a c t i n g i n h e r j u d i c i a l c a p a c i t y

, s h e c o n c l u d e d t h a t

4 7

Id. at 459. 4 5

The c ourt of appe als mistakenly conclude d that, during the mag istration, appellant wa s 4 6

“appr oache d for inter

rog ation.” Pec ina III

, 326 S.W .3d at 267 (“ The de tectives–a cting throug h

the mag istrate–initiated interrog ation by asking Pecina if he still wanted to talk to them.”) . These

are entirely

distinct events, and the of fice rs wer e not eve n in the hospital room when Judge

Maddock pe rfor

med her mag istration duties, nor could it be said that, as a judge , she wa s

somehow a c onduit for custodial interr og ation by the detec tives.

I ndeed, suc h a re quest would be e ntirely inconsistent with the words that appe llant 4 7

actua lly used. See, e .g., McNeil v. W isconsin , 501 U.S. 171, 178-79 (1991) ( “[T] o find that [the

acc used] invoked his Fifth Amendment rig ht to counsel on the pre sent cha rg es mere ly

by

reque sting the a

ppointment of counsel at his ar raig nment on the unre lated cha rg e is to disreg ard

the ordinar

y meaning of that re quest.”) ( internal quotations marks omitted).P ecina – 18

a p p e l l a n t w a s w i l l i n g t o t a l k t o t h e p o l i c e o f f i c e r s w i t h o u t c o u n s e l

. T h e d e t e c t i v e s t h e n 4 8

e n t e r e d a n d g a v e a p p e l l a n t h i s M i r a n d a w a r n i n g s i n S p a n i s h t h r e e s e p a r a t e t i m e s

. A t n o t i m e

d i d h e h e s i t a t e

, i n v o k e h i s r i g h t t o a n a t t o r n e y a t t h a t i n t e r v i e w

, o r a s k t h e o f f i c e r s t o s t o p

t h e i r q u e s t i o n i n g

. T h e o f f i c e r s c o n c l u d e d t h a t a p p e l l a n t f r e e l y

, v o l u n t a r i l y

, a n d i n t e l l i g e n t l y

w a i v e d h i s r i g h t t o c o u n s e l d u r i n g t h e i r q u e s t i o n i n g

. T h e r e i s n o t h i n g i n t h e r e c o r d t h a t

w o u l d c o n t r a d i c t t h e i r c o n c l u s i o n

.

U n d e r t h e t o t a l i t y o f t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s

, w e a g r e e w i t h t h e t r i a l j u d g e t h a t a n

o b j e c t i v e a n d r e a s o n a b l e p o l i c e o f f i c e r

, c o n d u c t i n g a c u s t o d i a l i n t e r r o g a t i o n

, w o u l d c o n c l u d e

t h a t a p p e l l a n t h a d v o l u n t a r i l y w a i v e d b o t h h i s F i f t h a n d S i x t h A m e n d m e n t r i g h t s t o c o u n s e l

f o r p u r p o s e s o f t h e c u s t o d i a l q u e s t i o n i n g b y D e t e c t i v e s F r i a s a n d N u t t

. B e c a u s e a p p e l l a n t

w a s i n c u s t o d y a t t h e t i m e t h e p o l i c e q u e s t i o n e d h i m

, h e h a d a F i f t h A m e n d m e n t r i g h t t o

c o u n s e l i f h e w i s h e d t o i n v o k e i t

. B e c a u s e f o r m a l a d v e r s a r y p r o c e e d i n g s h a d b e g u n a g a i n s t

a p p e l l a n t a n d w e r e t r i g g e r e d b y J u d g e M a d d o c k ’ s m a g i s t r a t i o n

, h e h a d a S i x t h A m e n d m e n t

The a rticle 15.17 he aring assure s suspects that judg es, not police, a re in c harg e of the 4 8

justice sy stem in America . As Professors D ix and Schmolensky have note d,

A primary

function of the a

ppear ance befor e the mag istrate, of c ourse, is the

provision of the interr og ation war nings, but by

a per son with less interest in

having waiver s than interrog ating office rs. I n addition, presenta tion demonstrates

to suspects that the law e nforc ement ag ency holding them a cknowledg es outside

limit s upon its power over suspects. B oth impartial warning s and the

demonstration of judicial dominanc e may reduc e the inher ently

coer cive impac t of

later c ustodial interrog ation upon suspects.

41 G. D I X & J

. S C H M O L E N S K Y

, T E X A S P R A C T I C E S E R I E S : C R I M I N A L P R A C T I C E A N D P R O C E D U R E

§20:5 (3d ed. 2011).P ecina – 19

r i g h t t o c o u n s e l i f h e w i s h e d t o i n v o k e i t

. H e c o u l d i n v o k e e i t h e r o r b o t h i n p r e c i s e l y t h e

s a m e m a n n e r

– b y t e l l i n g t h e o f f i c e r s

, a f t e r t h e y g a v e h i m t h e M i r a n d a w a r n i n g s

, t h a t h e

w i s h e d t o h a v e a n a t t o r n e y b e f o r e s p e a k i n g t o t h e m

. H e d i d n o t d o s o

. H e

, t h e r e f o r e

, w a i v e d

b o t h h i s F i f

t h a n d S i x t h A m e n d m e n t r i g h t s t o c o u n s e l d u r i n g c u s t o d i a l i n t e r r o g a t i o n

. 4 9

A m a j o r i t y o f t h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s

, i n i t s o p i n i o n

, a c k n o w l e d g e d t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t ’ s

d e c i s i o n i n M o n t e

j o

, a n d s t a t e d t h a t “ M i r a n d a a n d E d w a r d s a r e s t i l l t h e l a w f

o r s u s p e c t s i n

c u s t o d y s u b

j e c t e d t o p o l i c e i n t e r r o g a t i o n

. . . . T o p r o t e c t t h e F i f t h A m e n d m e n t p r i v i l e g e

a g a i n s t s e l f

- i n c r i m i n a t i o n

, t h e p o l i c e m a y n o t i n i t i a t e c u s t o d i a l i n t e r r o g a t i o n o f a s u s p e c t w h o

h a s p r e v i o u s l y r e q u e s t e d a s s i s t a n c e o f c o u n s e l

. ” N o t e x a c t l y

. U n d e r M o n t e j o

, a n d f o l l o w i n g

M i r a n d a

, E d w a r d

s

, a n d M i n n i c k

, t h e c o r r e c t s t a t e m e n t i s

, “ T o p r o t e c t t h e F i f t h A m e n d m e n t

p r i v i l e g e a g a i n s t s e l f

- i n c r i m i n a t i o n

, t h e p o l i c e m a y n o t c o n t i n u e o r r e

- i n i t i a t e c u s t o d i a l

i n t e r r o g a t i o n o f a s u s p e c t w h o h a s p r e v i o u s l y r e q u e s t e d a s s i s t a n c e o f c o u n s e l a f t e r t h e p o l i c e

i n f o r m e d h i m o f h i s r i g h t t o c o u n s e l a t t h e b e g i n n i n g o f a c u s t o d i a l i n t e r r o g a t i o n

. ” J u d g e 5 0

M a d d o c k ’ s m a g i s t r a t i o n d i d n o t t r i g g e r a n y F i f t h A m e n d m e n t r i g h t c o n c e r n i n g c u s t o d i a l

i n t e r r o g a t i o n ; t h a t w a s d o n e b y t h e d e t e c t i v e s a t t h e b e g i n n i n g o f t h e i r i n t e r r o g a t i o n

.

Appellant aptly

notes, “Onc e counse l is invoked, whether it is ca lled 5 Amendment 4 9 t h

invocation or a

6 Amendment invoca tion is a disti nction without a lot of differ ence .” t h

Appellant’s B rief at 6. He is corr ect in the c ontext of post-ar raig nment custodial interrog ation, as

a def endant ha s both a Fifth a

nd Six th Amendment rig ht to counsel during that interrog ation and

either ( or both) is trig g ere d by the police g iving him the Miranda war nings.

See M ontejo , 556 U.S. at __, 129 S.Ct . at 2090 (“ [A] defe ndant [i.e. one who has be en 5 0

formally char g ed with a c rime] who does not want to speak to the police without counsel prese nt

need only say as much whe n he is first appr oache d and g iven the Miranda war nings.” ).P ecina – 20

J u s t i c e H o l m a n

, i n h i s d i s s e n t i n g o p i n i o n i n t h e c o u r t b e l o w

, c o r r e c t l y n o t e d t h a t “ t h e

‘ M i r a n d a

- E d w a r d

s r e g i m e ’ d o e s n o t a p p l y t o ‘ n o n i n t e r r o g a t i v e t y p e s o f i n t e r a c t i o n b e t w e e n

t h e d e f e n d a n t a n d t h e S t a t e

. ’ ” H e s t a t e d t h a t b o t h t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t d e c i s i o n i n M o n t e j o 5 1

a n d o u r p o s t

- M o n t e

j o d e c i s i o n i n H

u g h e n m a k e i t c l e a r t h a t “ w h a t e v e r o c c u r r e d a t

5 2

[ a p p e l l a n t ’ s ] p r e l i m i n a r y h e a r i n g d i d n o t e v e n i m p l i c a t e E d w a r d s b e c a u s e P e c i n a h a d n o t y e t

b e e n a p p r o a c h e d f

o r i n t e r r o g a t i o n n o r h a d h e e v e r u n a m b i g u o u s l y e x p r e s s e d h i s d e s i r e t o

d e a l w i t h t h e p o l i c e o n l y t h r o u g h h i s a t t o r n e y

. ” F u r t h e r

, J u s t i c e H o l m a n c o r r e c t l y n o t e d

, 5 3

“ n o w t h a t t h e M o n t e

j o c o u r t h a s o v e r r u l e d J a c k s o n

, n e i t h e r a d e f

e n d a n t ’ s r e q u e s t f

o r c o u n s e l

a t a r r a i g n m e n t o r s i m i l a r p r o c e e d i n g n o r a p p o i n t m e n t o f c o u n s e l b y a c o u r t g i v e s r i s e t o a

p r e s u m p t i o n t h a t a n y s u b s e q u e n t w a i v e r b y a d e f e n d a n t t o p o l i c e

- i n i t i a t e d i n t e r r o g a t i o n i s

i n v a l i d

. ” W e a g r e e w i t h t h i s a n a l y s i s

.

5 4

B e c a u s e

, u n d e r M o n t e

j o

, a p p e l l a n t n e v e r i n v o k e d h i s F i f t h o r S i x t h A m e n d m e n t r i g h t s

t o c o u n s e l d u r i n g c u s t o d i a l i n t e r r o g a t i o n

, w e c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e t r i a l j u d g e p r o p e r l y d e n i e d

Pec ina III

, 326 S.W .3d at 271 (Holman, J., dissenting). 5 1

I n Hughen , the def

endant wa s taken to a ma g istrate who r ead him his rig hts under 5 2

article 15.17. 297 S.W .3d at 331-32. The defe ndant re quested a ppointment of counsel. Id

. Three hours later , a dete ctive initiated custodial interr og ation by rea ding the defe ndant his

Miranda rig hts, and the def endant wa ived those rig hts and ag ree d to talk to the office r without

counsel. Id. at 332. We held that the F ifth Amendment Miranda waiver was suff icient to waive

his Si x th Amendment rig ht to counsel during that interview. Id. at 335. Hughen specific ally

dealt only with a waive r under

the Six th Amendment bec ause tha t was his specific claim. Under

Montejo , the re sult is ex actly the same unde r either

a F ifth or Six th Amendment claim.

Pec ina III

, 326 S.W .3d at 271 (Holman, J., dissenting)

. 5 3

Id. at 272. 5 4P ecina – 21

a p p e l l a n t ’ s m o t i o n t o s u p p r e s s h i s s t a t e m e n t s m a d e a s a r e s u l t o f t h a t p o l i c e q u e s t i o n i n g

. W e

t h e r e f o r e r e v e r s e t h e j u d g m e n t o f t h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s a n d a f f i r m t h e t r i a l c o u r t ’ s j u d g m e n t

.

D e l i v e r e d : J a n u a r y 2 5

, 2 0 1 2

P u b l i s h