COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-14-00493-CR

BRENCE J. WALKER APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE

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FROM THE 396TH DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY

TRIAL COURT NO. 1335687D

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MEMORANDUM OPINION1

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I. INTRODUCTION

Appellant Brence J. Walker appeals his conviction for the unlawful 

possession of a firearm by a felon. Walker argues that the trial court erroneously 

overruled his motion to suppress evidence of two firearms found when police 

inventoried the vehicle he had been driving just prior to his arrest. We will affirm.

 

1See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
2

II. BACKGROUND

After the State charged Walker, he filed a motion to suppress, which the 

trial court “carried . . . with the case,” withholding a ruling until the State had 

concluded its case-in-chief. At trial, Fort Worth Police Officer Daniel Evans 

testified that on July 25, 2013, he and other members of the “Zero Tolerance 

Unit” were watching a location suspected of being a narcotics trafficking hot 

point. Evans was also checking the license plates of passing vehicles to see if 

there were arrest warrants associated with those vehicles. Evans said that one 

of the persons the unit was looking for was Walker because arrest warrants had 

been issued for him. Evans testified that he ran the plates of a gray Chevrolet

Impala that passed by and that his system indicated that Walker was associated 

with the vehicle. Evans stated that in short order, Walker pulled into a local 

convenience store, and that after Walker exited the car and went inside, Evans 

called for assistance and then went inside to arrest Walker.

According to Evans, Walker initially hesitated to accompany Evans to his 

patrol vehicle, but he said that after Evans “threatened to use [his] taser on him,” 

Walker complied. Evans said he then placed Walker under arrest and sat him in 

the backseat of a patrol vehicle. Evans said that he looked through the window 

of the Impala and saw a dog and a backpack in the front right passenger seat. 

By Evans’s account, he ordered the vehicle inventoried and impounded given the 

vehicle’s location—a location that Evans said is a high-crime area and an area 

where Chevrolet Impalas specifically are stolen. Evans also said that two fellow 
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officers arrived to conduct the inventory on the Impala and that Evans drove 

Walker to jail.

The Fort Worth Police Department’s impoundment policy, which was 

admitted during Evans’s time on the stand, states that an officer may impound a 

vehicle and inventory it when, among other conditions, the “driver is removed 

from the vehicle and placed under arrest, there is reasonable connection 

between the arrest and the vehicle, and no other alternatives are available other 

than impoundment to ensure the protection of the vehicle.” Specifically testifying 

to Evans’s decision to impound the Impala, Evans said that Walker was no 

longer in the vehicle, that he had placed Walker under arrest, and that there was 

a reasonable connection between arresting Walker and the vehicle in that there 

was an arrest warrant out for Walker which specifically referenced the license 

plates, color, make, and model of the vehicle that Walker was driving. Evans 

also said that Walker was associated with the vehicle because Walker had just 

exited it after having pulled in to the convenience store.

Evans said that at the time he ordered the vehicle impounded, there were 

no other alternatives to impoundment. Evans also expressed concern for the 

dog in the vehicle, citing that it was a hot day and the windows to the vehicle 

were rolled up. Evans averred, however, that the owner of the vehicle arrived 

after he had left the convenience store and after fellow officers began their 

inventory of the vehicle.
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Fort Worth Officer Jason Morehouse testified that when he arrived to assist 

Evans, Evans had already handcuffed Walker and placed him in the backseat of 

a police vehicle. Morehouse said that by that time, the Impala had already been 

designated for impound and a wrecker had been called to transport the vehicle to 

the city pound. Morehouse testified that it was department policy that before 

allowing a vehicle to be towed, police “conduct an inventory of the inside of the 

vehicle.” According to Morehouse, the policy behind this procedure is to ensure 

the safety of the person’s personal property and to protect the police department 

from liability. Morehouse said that at the time he began an inventory of the 

vehicle, the only person connected with the vehicle was Walker. Morehouse also 

said that the department’s impound policy had been followed in that Walker was 

arrested shortly after exiting the vehicle and that there was a reasonable 

connection between that arrest and the vehicle in that the warrant for Walker’s 

arrest also associated Walker with the vehicle. And like Evans, Morehouse said 

that the vehicle should not be left alone in that neighborhood.

Morehouse said that his inventory of the Impala was “pretty clean” except 

that he did find a backpack on the front passenger side of the vehicle. Among 

other items, Morehouse found two handguns inside the backpack as well as 

“several loose bullets” and multiple magazines for both guns. The State 

introduced and published photographs of these items and had Morehouse 

describe them to the jury.
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According to Morehouse, the “registered owner of the vehicle” arrived after 

he had inventoried the vehicle but prior to the wrecker’s arrival. Thus, 

Morehouse released the vehicle to the owner and she took the dog with her. 

Morehouse averred that he did not know how the registered owner knew to come 

to the convenience store to retrieve the vehicle. Morehouse also testified that 

because the vehicle had already been designated for impoundment and 

inventoried, per department policy, he could have declined to release the vehicle 

to the registered owner and instead required her to complete the impound 

process by retrieving her vehicle from the city pound.

After the close of evidence, the trial court denied Walker’s motion to 

suppress. In its findings of fact, the trial court found that Evans arrested Walker 

after Walker had “pull[ed] into a parking lot and enter[ed] a gas station.” In its 

conclusions of law, the trial court concluded that Evans’s actions constituted 

Walker having been “removed from the Impala.” The trial court also concluded 

that “Evans and . . . Morehouse followed the Fort Worth Police Department policy 

on impoundment and inventory of a motor vehicle.”

The jury returned a verdict of guilty to the State’s charge of unlawful 

possession of a firearm by a felon. After a punishment hearing, and predicated 

on its enhancement findings, the trial court sentenced Walker to thirty-two years’ 

confinement. The trial court entered judgment accordingly, and this appeal 

followed.
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III. DISCUSSION

In four subtitled points, all of which are subsumed within one overarching 

argument, Walker argues that the trial court erred by overruling his motion to 

suppress. In his brief, Walker cites to both state and federal authorities 

pertaining to his rights concerning searches and seizures, but he does not 

distinguish his state and federal claims. See U.S. Const. Amend. IV, V, XIV; Tex. 

Const. art. I, §§ 9, 10, 19; see also Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art. 38.23 (West 

2001). Because Walker’s briefing does not provide specific arguments or 

authorities to distinguish his state-law claims from his federal-law claims, we will 

limit our analysis to the Fourth Amendment. See Welch v. State, 93 S.W.3d 50, 

52 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).

A. Standard of Review

We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence under a 

bifurcated standard of review. Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 673 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2007); Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). 

In reviewing the trial court’s decision, we do not engage in our own factual 

review. Romero v. State, 800 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990); Best v. 

State, 118 S.W.3d 857, 861 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.). The trial 

judge is the sole trier of fact and judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the 

weight to be given their testimony. Wiede v. State, 214 S.W.3d 17, 24–25 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2007); State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000), 

modified on other grounds by State v. Cullen, 195 S.W.3d 696 (Tex. Crim. App. 
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2006). Therefore, we give almost total deference to the trial court’s rulings on 

(1) questions of historical fact, even if the trial court’s determination of those facts 

was not based on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor, and (2) applicationof-law-to-fact questions that turn on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. 

Amador, 221 S.W.3d at 673; Montanez v. State, 195 S.W.3d 101, 108–09 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2006); Johnson v. State, 68 S.W.3d 644, 652–53 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2002). But when application-of-law-to-fact questions do not turn on the credibility 

and demeanor of the witnesses, we review the trial court’s rulings on those 

questions de novo. Amador, 221 S.W.3d at 673; Estrada v. State, 154 S.W.3d 

604, 607 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); Johnson, 68 S.W.3d at 652–53.

Stated another way, when reviewing the trial court’s ruling on a motion to 

suppress, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial 

court’s ruling. Wiede, 214 S.W.3d at 24; State v. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d 808, 818 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2006). When the trial court makes explicit fact findings, we 

determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the 

trial court’s ruling, supports those fact findings. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d at 818–19. 

We then review the trial court’s legal ruling de novo unless its explicit fact 

findings that are supported by the record are also dispositive of the legal ruling. 

Id. at 818.

B. The Fourth Amendment and Inventories

The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and 

seizures by government officials. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Wiede, 214 S.W.3d at 
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24. To suppress evidence because of an alleged Fourth Amendment violation, 

the defendant bears the initial burden of producing evidence that rebuts the 

presumption of proper police conduct. Amador, 221 S.W.3d at 672; see Young 

v. State, 283 S.W.3d 854, 872 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 

1093 (2009). A defendant satisfies this burden by establishing that a search or 

seizure occurred without a warrant. Amador, 221 S.W.3d at 672. Once the 

defendant has made this showing, the burden of proof shifts to the State, which 

is then required to establish that the search or seizure was conducted pursuant 

to a warrant or was reasonable. Id. at 672–73; Torres v. State, 182 S.W.3d 899, 

902 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488, 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2005).

A peace officer’s inventory of the contents of an automobile is permissible 

under the Fourth Amendment. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 375–

76, 96 S. Ct. 3092, 3100 (1976); see also Benavides v. State, 600 S.W.2d 809, 

810 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980). Inventories serve to protect (1) the 

owner’s property while it is in custody, (2) the police against claims or disputes 

over lost or stolen property, and (3) the police from potential danger. Opperman, 

428 U.S. at 369, 96 S. Ct. at 3097. Inventories must be conducted in good faith 

pursuant to reasonable standardized police procedures. Colorado v. Bertine, 

479 U.S. 367, 374, 107 S. Ct. 738, 742 (1987).

Reasonable cause for impoundment of an automobile may exist when the 

driver is removed from his automobile and placed under custodial arrest and his 
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property cannot be protected by any means other than impoundment. Lagaite v. 

State, 995 S.W.2d 860, 865 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. ref’d). 

The State bears the burden of proving that an impoundment is lawful and may 

satisfy its burden by showing that (1) the driver was arrested, (2) no alternatives 

other than impoundment were available to insure the automobile’s protection, 

(3) the impounding agency had an inventory policy, and (4) the policy was 

followed. Delgado v. State, 718 S.W.2d 718, 721 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).

C. The Trial Court Did Not Err

Here, the trial court heard evidence that Walker was arrested shortly after 

he exited the Impala. The trial court further heard evidence that no alternatives 

other than impoundment were available to ensure the Impala’s protection and 

that the Impala was particularly in harm’s way given its make and model and the 

neighborhood where the police arrested Walker. The trial court had before it the 

Fort Worth Police Department’s inventory policy. And the State introduced the 

testimony of two officers who averred how the policy had been followed.

Walker argues that he was not “removed” from his vehicle because he had 

exited the Impala and gone into the convenience store before Evans arrested 

him. But Morehouse testified that Evans’s arrest of Walker immediately after 

Walker had exited the Impala constituted “removal” under the department’s 

policy. And even though Evans’s testimony is somewhat confusing in his 

responses to defense counsel’s questioning regarding what constituted 

“removal,” Evans affirmatively testified during the State’s questioning that his 
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arrest of Walker constituted removal under the department’s policy. We must 

assume that any conflict found in Evans’s testimony was resolved by the trial 

court in favor of its ruling. See Amador, 221 S.W.3d at 673. We hold that the 

trial court did not err by overruling Walker’s motion to suppress.

IV. CONCLUSION

Having overruled Walker’s points in their entirety, we affirm the trial court’s 

judgment.

/s/ Bill Meier

BILL MEIER

JUSTICE

PANEL: LIVINGSTON, C.J.; MEIER and GABRIEL, JJ.

DO NOT PUBLISH

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

DELIVERED: February 11, 2016