-1- 

STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

FOR PUBLICATION 

June 15, 2017 

9:00 a.m. 

v No. 330878 

Kent Circuit Court 

ANITA DIANE LAWHORN, LC No. 14-010339-FH 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

Before: BECKERING, P.J., and MARKEY and SHAPIRO, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 Defendant, Anita Diane Lawhorn, was convicted by a jury of third-degree child abuse, 

MCL 750.136b(5). Defendant was sentenced to 365 days in jail with credit for 36 days served 

and 60 months’ probation. The trial court ordered defendant to serve 150 days of her jail 

sentence immediately with the remainder to be served at the end of probation or upon court 

order, whichever occurs first. Defendant now appeals by right.

 Defendant argues that her conviction should be vacated because the third-degree child 

abuse statute, MCL 750.136b(5), is unconstitutionally vague as it does not provide fair notice of 

the prohibited conduct and because it is so indefinite that it gives unstructured and unlimited 

discretion to the trier of fact to arbitrarily determine whether an offense was committed. We 

disagree and so affirm.1

 

1

 Defendant did not challenge the constitutionality of MCL 750.136b in the trial court; 

consequently, defendant’s claim is unpreserved. People v Vandenberg, 307 Mich App 57, 61; 

859 NW2d 229 (2014). Ordinarily, we review challenges to the constitutionality of a statute 

under the void-for-vagueness doctrine de novo. People v Beam, 244 Mich App 103, 105; 624 

NW2d 764 (2000). Unpreserved challenges to the constitutionality of a statute, however, are 

reviewed for plain error. Vandenberg, 307 Mich App at 61. On plain error review, the 

defendant has the burden to show (1) “error”; (2) that was “plain,” meaning “clear or obvious”; 

(3) and that affected substantial rights or caused prejudice, meaning “that the error affected the 
-2- 

 MCL 750.136b defines the crime of third-degree child abuse as follows: 

 (5) A person is guilty of child abuse in the third degree if any of the 

following apply: 

 (a) The person knowingly or intentionally causes physical harm to a child. 

 (b) The person knowingly or intentionally commits an act that under the 

circumstances poses an unreasonable risk of harm or injury to a child, and the act 

results in physical harm to a child. 

 (6) Child abuse in the third degree is a felony punishable by imprisonment 

for not more than 2 years. 

“ ‘Child’ means a person who is less than 18 years of age and is not emancipated by operation of 

law . . . .” MCL 750.136b(1)(a). “ ‘Person’ means a child’s parent or guardian or any other 

person who cares for, has custody of, or has authority over a child regardless of the length of 

time that a child is cared for, in the custody of, or subject to the authority of that person.” MCL 

750.136b(1)(d). For purposes of MCL 750.136b, the term “physical harm” is defined as “any 

injury to a child’s physical condition.” MCL 750.136b(1)(e). In addition, MCL 750.136b(9) 

provides that “[t]his section does not prohibit a parent or guardian, or other person permitted by 

law or authorized by the parent or guardian, from taking steps to reasonably discipline a child, 

including the use of reasonable force.” 

 “[A] statute is presumed to be constitutional and is so construed unless its 

unconstitutionality is clearly apparent.” People v Boomer, 250 Mich App 534, 538; 655 NW2d 

255 (2002). “To determine whether a statute is unconstitutionally vague, this Court examines the 

entire text of the statute and gives the words of the statute their ordinary meanings.” People v 

Lockett, 295 Mich App 165, 174; 814 NW2d 295 (2012). A court must also consider any 

judicial constructions of the statute when determining if it is unconstitutionally vague. Boomer, 

250 Mich App at 539. 

 “The void for vagueness doctrine is derived from the constitutional guarantee that the 

state may not deprive a person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. US 

Const, Am XIV; Const 1963, art 1, § 17.” People v Roberts, 292 Mich App 492, 497; 808 

NW2d 290 (2011) (quotation marks and citation omitted). As explained by the United States 

Supreme Court in Grayned v City of Rockford, 408 US 104, 108-109; 92 S Ct 2294, 33 L Ed 2d 

222 (1972): 

 It is a basic principle of due process that an enactment is void for 

vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined. Vague laws offend several 

important values. First, because we assume that man is free to steer between 

lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the person of ordinary 

outcome of the lower court proceedings.” People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d 130 

(1999). 
-3- 

intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may 

act accordingly. Vague laws may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning. 

Second, if arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws must 

provide explicit standards for those who apply them. A vague law impermissibly 

delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on 

an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and 

discriminatory application. Third, but related, where a vague statute “abut[s] 

upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment freedoms,” it “operates to inhibit 

the exercise of [those] freedoms.” Uncertain meanings inevitably lead citizens to 

“ ‘steer far wider of the unlawful zone’ . . . than if the boundaries of the forbidden 

areas were clearly marked.” [Footnotes omitted, alterations and omission in 

original.] 

 Following from these principles, we have stated: 

A statute may be challenged for vagueness on three grounds: (1) it is overbroad 

and impinges on First Amendment freedoms; (2) it does not provide fair notice of 

the conduct proscribed; or (3) it is so indefinite that it confers unstructured and 

unlimited discretion on the trier of fact to determine whether an offense has been 

committed. [Roberts, 292 Mich App at 497.] 

Because defendant does not argue that the third-degree child abuse statute is overly broad or 

impinges on First Amendment rights, we need only address the issues of fair notice and 

indefiniteness. 

 We begin by noting that “[t]he party challenging the constitutionality of a statute has the 

burden of proving the law’s invalidity.” People v Bosca, 310 Mich App 1, 71; 871 NW2d 307 

(2015). A vagueness challenge to a statute not based on First Amendment grounds must be 

reviewed on the basis of the particular facts of the case at issue. People v Nichols, 262 Mich 

App 408, 410; 686 NW2d 502 (2004). Therefore, a defendant may not assert that a statute is 

overbroad and reaches innocent conduct if the defendant’s conduct clearly falls within the 

language of the statute. See People v Lynch, 410 Mich 343, 352; 301 NW2d 796 (1981). In 

other words, “[a] defendant has standing to raise a vagueness challenge only if the statute is 

vague as applied to his conduct.” People v Al-Saiegh, 244 Mich App 391, 397 n 5; 625 NW2d 

419 (2001). Further, even if “a statute may be susceptible to impermissible interpretations, 

reversal is not required where the statute can be narrowly construed so as to render it sufficiently 

definite to avoid vagueness and where the defendant’s conduct falls within that prescribed by the 

properly construed statute.” Id. “To give fair notice, a statute must give a person of ordinary 

intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited or required.” People v Noble, 

238 Mich App 647, 652; 608 NW2d 123 (1999) (citation omitted). “A statute cannot use terms 

that require persons of ordinary intelligence to speculate regarding its meaning and differ about 

its application.” People v Sands, 261 Mich App 158, 161; 680 NW2d 500 (2004). “For a statute 

to be sufficiently definite, its meaning must be fairly ascertainable by reference to judicial 

interpretations, the common law, dictionaries, treatises, or the commonly accepted meanings of 

words.” Id. To survive constitutional scrutiny, the words used in a statute are not required to 

have a single meaning, Dep’t of State Compliance & Rules Div v Mich Ed Ass’n-NEA, 251 Mich 

App 110, 120; 650 NW2d 120 (2002), and a statute need not define an offense with 
-4- 

“mathematical certainty,” Grievance Administrator v Fieger, 476 Mich 231, 255; 719 NW2d 123 

(2006) (citation omitted). 

 In this case, defendant’s vagueness challenge is directed solely at the statutory definition 

of “physical harm” as “any injury to a child’s physical condition,” MCL 750.136b(1)(e). We 

have previously rejected the argument that the definition of physical harm in MCL 750.136b is 

unconstitutionally vague for purposes of fourth-degree child abuse. People v Gregg, 206 Mich 

App 208, 210-211; 520 NW2d 690 (1994). We held that “the statute clearly provides fair notice 

to persons of ordinary intelligence of the conduct proscribed, namely, an omission or reckless act 

that causes any injury to a child’s physical condition.” Id. at 211. Fourth-degree child abuse is 

also defined in MCL 750.136b. The same definition of “physical harm” applies to both thirddegree and fourth-degree child abuse although third-degree child abuse requires a knowing or 

intentional act and resulting physical harm to the child rather than an omission or reckless act 

that causes physical harm. See MCL 750.136b(1)(e), (5), and (7). Furthermore, a person of 

ordinary intelligence need not speculate about the meaning of “any injury to a child’s physical 

condition” to understand the nature of the physical harm that must not be inflicted on a child. 

Anyone may consult a dictionary, and courts themselves often do so. Sands, 261 Mich App at 

161. Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed) defines “injury” as “hurt, damage, or 

loss sustained.” As relevant to the statute at issue, “physical” can mean “of or relating to the 

body,” and “condition” may mean “a state of being.” Id. Thus, a person of ordinary intelligence 

would clearly understand that the third-degree child abuse statute prohibits a person from 

knowingly or intentionally causing harm or damage to the state of a child’s body, or knowingly 

or intentionally committing an act that poses an unreasonable risk of harm or injury to a child 

and results in harm or damage to the state of a child’s body. 

 Additionally, we held in Gregg that the provision in MCL 750.136b providing that a 

parent or guardian shall not be prohibited “from taking reasonable steps to discipline a child, 

including the use of reasonable force” was not overbroad and did not impinge the defendant’s 

right to discipline his child. Gregg, 206 Mich App at 213. We relied on dictionary definitions of 

“reasonable” that defined the term to mean 

Fair, proper, just, moderate, suitable under the circumstances. Fit and appropriate 

to the end in view. Having the faculty of reason; rational; governed by reason; 

under the influence of reason; agreeable to reason. Thinking, speaking, or acting 

according to the dictates of reason. Not immoderate or excessive, being 

synonymous with rational, honest, equitable, fair, suitable, moderate, tolerable. 

* * * 

 1. agreeable to or in accord with reason or sound judgment; logical. 2. not 

exceeding the limit prescribed by reason; not excessive. [Id. (quotation marks and 

citations omitted).] 

 Thus, a person of ordinary intelligence would also understand that in using physical 

discipline on a child, he or she must act in a manner that is reasonable and not excessive. See 

Sands, 261 Mich App at 161; Gregg, 206 Mich App at 213. Therefore, MCL 750.136b(5) 

provides fair notice of the conduct that is prohibited. See Noble, 238 Mich App at 652. 
-5- 

 We also conclude that MCL 750.136b(5) is not so vague that it allows for arbitrary 

enforcement or gives unstructured and unlimited discretion to the trier of fact to determine 

whether an offense was committed. A criminal statute “must provide standards for enforcing 

and administering the laws in order to ensure that enforcement is not arbitrary or discriminatory; 

basic policy decisions should not be delegated to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on 

an ad hoc and subjective basis.” In re Forfeiture of 719 N Main, 175 Mich App 107, 112-113; 

437 NW2d 332 (1989). This Court has held that applying a “reasonable person standard” to a 

statute is sufficient “to provide fair notice of the type of conduct prohibited,” as well as 

preventing enforcement abuses by “prevent[ing] any ad hoc and subjective application by police 

officers, judges, juries, or others empowered to enforce” it. Plymouth Charter Twp v Hancock, 

236 Mich App 197, 201-202; 600 NW2d 380 (1999). “[S]cienter requirements [also] alleviate 

vagueness concerns.” Gonzales v Carhart, 550 US 124, 149; 127 S Ct 1610; 167 L Ed 2d 480 

(2007). 

 In this case, MCL 750.136b(5) includes a scienter requirement, i.e., that the physical 

harm either be caused “knowingly or intentionally” or be the result of a knowing or intentional 

act that poses an unreasonable risk of harm or injury; the scienter requirement “alleviate[s] 

vagueness concerns.” See Carhart, 550 US at 149. Furthermore, the provision that allows 

parents or guardians to use “reasonable force” when physically disciplining children provides a 

sufficient standard to prevent the statute from being applied in a subjective manner by law 

enforcement, judges, or juries. See Hancock, 236 Mich App at 202. 

 Testimony at trial revealed that defendant admitted that she “whupped” the victim with a 

belt, hit him “too hard,” and caused marks to be left on the victim. Additionally, Kirsten Harder 

testified that when she investigated the case as part of her work for Child Protective Services 

(CPS) in May 2013, she observed injuries on the back of the victim’s thigh and calves that were 

scabbed over, and the victim reported that he also had marks on his buttocks that had bled and 

scabbed over. When Harder asked the victim how he received the marks, he indicated that he 

had gotten in trouble at home a few days earlier, that defendant had “whupped him with a belt on 

the butt and the back of his legs,” and that the marks were made by the “whupping” defendant 

gave him. According to Harder, the victim also reported that defendant instructed him after the 

“whupping” “not to tell anybody what happened at home.” Dr. N. Debra Simms testified that 

she examined the victim in September 2014 and observed scars on the back of the victim’s legs 

that could have been caused by a cord, thin belt, or wire coat hanger, and which were most likely 

permanent. Dr. Simms took photographs of the marks on the victim’s body that were admitted 

into evidence at trial, and Harder testified that the photographs Dr. Simms had taken showed 

marks that were in the same area on the victim as the area where Harder had observed marks on 

him in 2013. 

 A jury could reasonably conclude from this evidence that defendant knowingly or 

intentionally caused an injury to the victim’s physical condition—i.e. “physical harm”—and that 

the force defendant exerted in disciplining the victim exceeded that which would be 

“reasonable,” supporting the jury’s determination that defendant was guilty of third-degree child 

abuse. Defendant’s actions—beating her son with a belt and causing scars—clearly fall within 

the conduct prohibited by MCL 750.136b(5); consequently, the statute is not unconstitutionally 

vague as applied to defendant. Lynch, 410 Mich at 350; Gregg, 206 Mich App at 210-213. The 

statutory definition of third-degree child abuse is sufficiently definite that ordinary people can 
-6- 

understand what conduct is prohibited and to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. 

See Boomer, 250 Mich App at 538-539. 

 Defendant essentially argues that to avoid being considered unconstitutionally vague, the 

statute should specifically delineate all of the acceptable and unacceptable forms of corporal 

punishment and should define physical harm more narrowly. Physical harm is indeed defined 

broadly by the statute to include “any injury to a child’s physical condition.” MCL 

750.136b(1)(e). But an offense need not be defined with “mathematical certainty,” Fieger, 476 

Mich at 255. 

 We conclude that the statute is not unconstitutionally vague; therefore, we affirm 

defendant’s conviction. Defendant also raises a challenge to her sentencing. She argues that her 

sentence of one year in jail with five years’ probation was unreasonable given that her minimum 

guidelines range was 0 to 11 months was unreasonable. We disagree. 

 “[T]he proper interpretation and application of the legislative sentencing guidelines . . . 

are legal questions that this Court reviews de novo.” People v Morson, 471 Mich 248, 255; 685 

NW2d 203 (2004). “Under the sentencing guidelines, the circuit court’s factual determinations 

are reviewed for clear error and must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence. Whether 

the facts, as found, are adequate to satisfy the scoring conditions prescribed by statute, i.e., the 

application of the facts to the law, is a question of statutory interpretation, which an appellate 

court reviews de novo.” People v Hardy, 494 Mich 430, 438; 835 NW2d 340 (2013). 

 MCL 769.34(4)(a) requires the trial court to impose “a jail term that does not exceed the 

upper limit of the recommended minimum sentence range or 12 months, whichever is less,” 

when a defendant’s guidelines range is less than 18 months. Because defendant’s guidelines 

range was 0 to 11 months, defendant’s sentence of one year in jail constitutes an upward 

guidelines departure of one month of additional jail time. MCL 769.31(a). But, based on our 

Supreme Court’s decision in People v Lockridge, 498 Mich 358; 870 NW2d 502 (2015), “under 

Subsection (4)(a), a trial court may, but is no longer required to, impose an intermediate sanction 

if the upper limit of the recommended minimum sentence range is 18 months or less.” People v 

Schrauben, 314 Mich App 181, 195; 886 NW2d 173 (2016). 

 Because defendant was sentenced after the opinion was issued in Lockridge, and the trial 

court was aware of the new sentencing standards set forth in that case, defendant’s departure 

sentence must be reviewed for reasonableness under the “principle of proportionality” test 

adopted in People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630, 635-636; 461 NW2d 1 (1990). See People v 

Steanhouse, 313 Mich App 1, 42, 45, 46-47, 48; 880 NW2d 297 (2015). The Steanhouse Court 

held “that a sentence that fulfills the principle of proportionality under Milbourn, and its 

progeny, constitutes a reasonable sentence under Lockridge.” Steanhouse, 313 Mich App at 47-

48. In People v Masroor, 313 Mich App 358, 374; 880 NW2d 812 (2015), this Court 

summarized the reasonableness standard of review to be applied to departure sentences: 

In a nutshell, Milbourn’s “principle of proportionality” requires a sentence “to be 

proportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances surrounding the offense and 

the offender.” Milbourn, 435 Mich at 636. Milbourn instructs that departure 

sentences “are appropriate where the guidelines do not adequately account for 
-7- 

important factors legitimately considered at sentencing” so that the sentence range 

calculated under the guidelines “is disproportionate, in either direction, to the 

seriousness of the crime.” Id. at 657. The extent of the departure must also 

satisfy the principle of proportionality. Id. at 660. 

 In Steanhouse, 313 Mich App at 46 (citations omitted), this Court also noted several 

factors that courts have considered in applying the proportionality standard, including “(1) the 

seriousness of the offense; (2) factors that were inadequately considered by the guidelines; and 

(3) factors not considered by the guidelines, such as the relationship between the victim and the 

aggressor, the defendant’s misconduct while in custody, the defendant’s expressions of remorse, 

and the defendant’s potential for rehabilitation.” 

 When justifying the sentence imposed in this case, the trial court noted several things 

about the circumstances surrounding the crime and defendant’s background. First, the trial court 

noted that the victim murdered another child. There was testimony at trial that the victim had 

committed this murder, and the presentence investigation report (PSIR) included a description of 

the circumstances surrounding the victim’s apprehension immediately after the murder. The 

PSIR stated that the victim called 9-1-1 after the stabbing and told the dispatcher that “he hated 

his life, had ‘taken many pills,’ and he felt like no one loved him.” Thus, the trial court’s factual 

finding was supported by a preponderance of the evidence and was not clearly erroneous. 

Hardy, 494 Mich at 438. Contrary to defendant’s argument on appeal, the trial court did not find 

that defendant was responsible for the other child’s death or punish defendant for that murder. 

Rather, the trial court noted the likely detrimental effect that defendant’s treatment of the victim 

and the accompanying home environment had on the victim. 

 Second, the trial court found that defendant must have known that Bernard Harrold, 

defendant’s stepfather, beat the victim. Moreover, Harrold himself testified at trial that he used 

corporal punishment on the victim when he started fires or got into trouble at school. Harrold 

also testified that he lived with defendant in May 2013, took care of the children while defendant 

was at work, and inflicted visible physical marks on the victim after using corporal punishment 

on him in May 2013. Testimonial and photographic evidence of the marks on the victim’s legs 

were introduced at trial. Therefore, the trial court’s factual finding in this respect was supported 

by a preponderance of the evidence and was not clearly erroneous. 

 Third, the trial court found that regardless of whether defendant used cocaine, it was 

highly likely that defendant knew that there was cocaine in the home and that Harrold was using 

cocaine. Nonetheless, defendant still permitted Harrold to care for the victim and the other 

children. Harrold testified at trial that he was sometimes under the influence of alcohol and 

cocaine, and the PSIR indicated that the police found drug paraphernalia that tested positive for 

cocaine when they executed a search warrant at defendant’s and Harrold’s residence in August 

2014. Furthermore, Leonard testified at the preliminary examination that during the search, the 

police discovered “cocaine paraphernalia, beer cans scattered throughout the home, with flies, 

mouse feces” and observed mold and backed up sinks in the residence. The PSIR also indicated 

that defendant denied that she was under the influence of drugs when the incident at issue 

occurred and that she denied ever having any problems with substance abuse or addiction. The 

trial court, while acknowledging a belief that defendant used cocaine, did not find that she 
-8- 

actually used cocaine. Instead, the court considered generally the fact that cocaine was being 

used in the home. This factual finding was supported by a preponderance of the evidence and 

was not clearly erroneous. 

 Fourth, the trial court found that there were deplorable conditions inside the home. 

According to the PSIR, when the search warrant was executed at the residence, “[t]he detective 

observed the home to be in an unsafe and deplorable condition,” and “[d]rug paraphernalia was 

found in the upstairs bedroom, which later tested positive for cocaine.” Thus, this factual finding 

was supported by a preponderance of the evidence and was not clearly erroneous. 

 Fifth, the trial court found that defendant was involved in some incidents in New York 

from “many years ago” that suggested “at least the possibility if not the likelihood of some type 

of prior abuse or neglect.” The trial court did not make any specific finding about defendant’s 

conduct in these incidents, but merely noted her involvement. A CPS report for defendant’s 

case, which is included in the lower court record, describes cases from New York in 1995 and 

2000 that involved allegations that defendant abused and neglected her children. One of these 

cases resulted in defendant’s parental rights being terminated by surrender. Contrary to 

defendant’s appellate argument, we find no conflict between the trial court’s findings at 

sentencing and at trial with respect to this matter. At trial, the trial court merely ruled that 

evidence of the victim’s statement that he was afraid that defendant’s other children would be 

taken away from her where his fear was apparently based on knowledge of matters that had 

transpired earlier in New York could only come in at trial to show the victim’s state of mind and 

his concern for defendant. The trial court ruled that it did not matter whether the allegations 

were true or not for purposes of the trial. When the statement was introduced, the trial court 

instructed the jury in accord with its ruling about the purpose for which the statement could be 

considered. Thus, this factual finding by the trial court was supported by a preponderance of the 

evidence and was not clearly erroneous. 

 On appeal, defendant does not cite any authority to support an argument that the sentence 

itself was unreasonable. Her only contention is that the trial court made erroneous factual 

findings. As previously discussed, the trial court’s findings of fact were not clearly erroneous. 

With respect to the sentence the trial court imposed, we conclude that all of the above factors 

considered by the trial court related to the “nature of the offense and the background of the 

offender.” Milbourn, 435 Mich at 651. Furthermore, the trial court could have reasonably found 

that the severity of the impact of defendant’s conduct on the victim received inadequate weight 

under the guidelines’ calculation. Defendant was assessed 10 points for offense variable (OV) 4, 

which applies when a defendant caused “[s]erious psychological injury requiring professional 

treatment” to the victim, MCL 777.34(1)(a), and 10 points for OV 10, which applies when “[t]he 

offender exploited a victim’s physical disability, mental disability, youth or agedness, or a 

domestic relationship, or the offender abused his or her authority status, MCL 777.40(1)(b). So, 

although the guidelines accounted for some degree of the harm the victim suffered, it was 

reasonable for the trial court to conclude that the factors it considered, especially the effects of 

defendant’s behavior on the victim that culminated in his stabbing another child and saying that 

he hated his life and that nobody loved him, were not adequately considered in the guidelines 

calculation. See People v Houston, 448 Mich 312, 321; 532 NW2d 508 (1995) (holding that the 

sentence imposed by the trial court satisfied the proportionality test where “the trial judge found 

that the recommended range was inadequate to reflect the seriousness of this offense” and further 
-9- 

held that even if the guidelines range adequately reflected the seriousness of the offense, “the 

sentence did not constitute an abuse of discretion because the offense involved circumstances not 

accounted for, or accounted for inadequately, in formulating the guidelines.”). A departure 

sentence does not need to be arithmetically measured. Id. at 320. Finally, the extent of this 

departure—one month—was minor in light of all of the factors the trial court found 

demonstrating the seriousness of the offense and surrounding circumstances. See Masroor, 313 

Mich App at 374. 

 For the reasons discussed, defendant’s sentence was “proportionate to the seriousness of 

the circumstances surrounding the offense and the offender” and fulfilled the “principle of 

proportionality.” Milbourn, 435 Mich at 636. Defendant’s sentence was therefore reasonable. 

Lockridge, 498 Mich at 392; Steanhouse, 313 Mich App at 47-48. 

 We affirm. 

/s/ Jane M. Beckering 

/s/ Jane E. Markey 

/s/ Douglas B. Shapiro