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Kenneth W. Welsh, Jr., SBN 020953

J. Taylor Swick SBN 028251

WELSH LAW GROUP, PLC

11811 North Tatum Boulevard, Suite 2350

Phoenix, AZ 85028

Telephone: (602) 569-0698

Facsimile: (602) 595-0682

minuteentries@welshlawgroup.com

E-mail: Kwelsh@welshlawgroup.com tswick@welshlawgroup.com

Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Adult Printed Diapers LLC,

Plaintiff,

vs.

Rearz Incorporated, et al.,

 Defendants.

No. CV-18-00370-PHX-SMB

PLAINTIFF ADULT PRINTED 

DIAPERS, LLC’S RESPONSE TO 

DEFENDANT COOSHIE 

TOOSHIEZ, LLC’S MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT

(Assigned to the Honorable Susan M. 

Brnovich)

Plaintiff Adult Printed Diapers, LLC (“Plaintiff” or “APD”), by and through 

undersigned counsel and pursuant to Rule 56, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, hereby 

responds to Defendant Cooshie Tooshiez, LLC’s d/b/a/ Crown Diapers (“Cooshie”) 

Motion for Summary Judgment. This Response is supported by the following 

Memorandum of Points and Authorities, and the Statement of Facts included herein as 

required by Court’s Rule 16 Scheduling Order.

Plaintiff’s Statement of Facts and Responses to Cooshie’s “Undisputed Facts”

Plaintiff filed its Compliant against eight original Defendants that do business as 

diaper companies. These companies were originally added after Plaintiff’s investigation

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found that these eight diaper brands were buying Plaintiff’s trademarked and copyrighted 

products from, or in connection with, one of the defendants named Rearz at its website 

Rearz.ca. After this investigation determined that these companies had connection to 

Rearz and were working to sell Plaintiff’s diapers through Rearz as its distributors, 

Plaintiff informed each company that they were officially distributing Plaintiff’s Teddy 

Bear printed Aww So Cute branded diapers and then reselling them against Plaintiff’s 

legal and intellectual property rights.

It came to Plaintiff’s attention that Rearz and the other defendants bought Plaintiff’s 

products from its manufacturer overseas and imported them into Canada and the United 

States. Plaintiff was then able to determine that Cooshie is a United States distributor for 

Rearz and its products. Plaintiff also discovered that the defendants, including Cooshie,

then distributed these diapers through multiple websites in Canada and the United States, 

as is shown in various photos and postings from these websites and from buyers, attached 

as exhibits hereto. From information determined by Plaintiff, the defendants then also sold 

Plaintiff’s diapers to medical supply stores, on eBay, and through Craigslist after having 

bought these products from China so that they could sell them to all of these downstream 

distributors.

After Plaintiff filed its suit in this Court against all Defendants, it possessed and 

still does possess information and belief as to the ways in which each Defendant had made 

certain business decisions and participated in certain acts that arose to the level of 

violating the enumerated rights of Plaintiff in this matter. Shortly after being named and 

served in this matter, Cooshie requested that it be removed as a Defendant, simply sending

declarations of some of its representatives in an attempt to claim that it was not at fault for 

the various allegations as filed against it. In response to these declarations, Plaintiff’s 

previous counsel sent an email stating that it “will not dismiss Cooshie Tooshiez based

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merely on a declaration from representatives of [Cooshie]. If [Cooshie] wants to deny the 

allegations in the complaint, they should file an answer and allow us to depose them.” 

Plaintiff originally brought this matter against Cooshie because it has acted as one 

of many downstream sellers for Rearz. The model operated such that Rearz acted as the 

kingpin company in a large-scale ring of illegal sales of Plaintiff’s intellectually-protected

Aww So Cute diapers and where the other defendants were its purported dealers of these 

products. Here, Cooshie made itself out to be an authorized distributor of Plaintiff and its 

branded, protected products, which it and the other defendants never have been. 

Plaintiff did its due diligence through a large-scale internal investigation of the 

actions of Cooshie and its connection to Rearz as a claimed authorized distributor. Plaintiff 

does admit that it did not know everything about the scale of this orchestrated model of 

selling Plaintiff’s diapers without permission from Plaintiff, and it also admits that it may 

never know the full-scale of this scheme, but that is not a reason to grant Cooshie’s

Motion for Summary Judgement. Cooshie’s attempt to mask and conceal its actions

should not preclude Plaintiff from proceeding to trial against Cooshie. Instead, Plaintiff 

should be able to present it claims at trial. 

Plaintiff disagrees with the contentions in Cooshie’s section named “Undisputed 

Facts” and therefore requests that the Court not regard such statements as “undisputed”.

The “facts” as identified by Cooshie are self-serving, inaccurate and compiled in such a 

way as to confuse and mislead. Cooshie claims throughout its Motion for Summary 

Judgement that Plaintiff never produced any evidence that can connect it to Plaintiff and 

the illegal sale of its goods. This statement by Cooshie is completely improper as is 

shown in Plaintiff’s initial disclosures and the attachments hereto. For example, in a page 

disclosed from Cooshie’s own website, Cooshie includes the following information about 

its business: “FAQ: ...In some instances our supplier Rearz in Canada will drop ship 

items we do not have in stock so we can continue to serve our customers....” (boldface 

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type added for emphasis). (Cooshie’s Ex. 4, pg. 11; Ex. 1). Cooshie does not describe 

Rearz as “one of its suppliers” or “a supplier,” but as “our supplier Rearz in Canada” 

which indicates that Cooshie has one Canadian distributor and that is Rearz. As a part of 

the larger claims against all Defendants in this case, Plaintiff has alleged and provided 

documentation to show that Rearz purchased Plaintiff’s products from Plaintiff’s 

manufacturer in China, and that Rearz even fully admits to having done so in this matter. 

(Ex. Rearz MSJ pg. 11, lines 12-15) This first step in the chain of sales therefore is an 

issue that must be heard at trial, since it clearly creates an issue of material fact related to 

Cooshie. 

For Cooshie, the next step is to demonstrate that it does business with Rearz as its 

distributor. Plaintiff has shown this connection through Cooshie’s own website as 

previously disclosed by Plaintiff. (Cooshie Ex. 4, pgs. 5 through 12, Ex. 2). This alone 

establishes a question of fact, ample to keep Cooshie in this matter as a Defendant and for 

Plaintiff to go to trial against Cooshie. If, however more evidence is needed against 

Cooshie, Plaintiff also presents the following factual arguments and attached exhibits to 

prove that Cooshie should not be dismissed from this case.

Legal Standard

I. Standard for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is only an appropriate remedy, if the Court, after receipt of 

evidence and viewing it in a light most favorable to the party that opposes the motion, 

“there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law.” Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir.1986). A genuine issue of 

material fact is found if “there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a 

jury to return a verdict for that party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 

106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Here, Cooshie has not provided evidence 

that removes all genuine issues of material fact. Instead, Cooshie, through its arguments, 

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actually creates more issues of material fact than it does to prove a complete lack thereof,

as demonstrated in the below listed arguments presented by Cooshie, and through 

Plaintiff’s use of its exhibits and the affidavit of Steve Pandi.

II. Plaintiff Does Not Rely on Evidence Not Properly Disclosed

In this case, Plaintiff has timely disclosed evidence, both of Cooshie’s connection 

to Rearz and of the sales of Plaintiff’s products as parts of Rearz’ “mystery boxes” sold in 

the United States. This evidence is shown in screen grabs from Cooshie’s own website as 

well as through various comments from clients who had purchased Rearz mystery boxes in 

the United States through Cooshie and who were confused as to how they were receiving 

Plaintiff’s products as parts of these mystery boxes. (Ex. 4; Cooshie Ex. 4, pgs. 5 through 

12, Ex. 2). Also, Plaintiff has supplemented these previous, timely disclosures by attaching 

an Affidavit of Steve Pandi to this Response in order to further provide the Court with 

evidence of Cooshie’s involvement with Rearz. (Ex. 1). Finally, and in relation to the 

statements made in Pandi’s affidavit, Plaintiff now attaches additional exhibits to this 

Response. These are images found by Plaintiff to respond to the issues presented by 

Cooshie in its Motion for Summary Judgment. (Ex. 2 and 3). Each and every form of 

disclosed document and affidavit mentioned above complies with case law and the Civil 

Rules of Procedure for disclosures as demonstrated below. 

Plaintiff believes that Cooshie will attempt to object to Plaintiff’s use and 

disclosure of a personal affidavit as an exhibit for this Response. Plaintiff’s affidavit is 

however a proper inclusion in a Response to a Motion for Summary Judgement. The 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Arizona Court of Appeals both determine that 

“an affidavit submitted in opposition to a summary judgment motion ‘shall be made on 

personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and 

shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated 

therein.’” Tilley v. Delci, 220 Ariz. 233, 236 (2009); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4); see also GM 

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Dev. Corp. v. Community Am. Mortgage Corp., 165 Ariz. 1, 7, 795 P.2d 827, 833 

(App.1990). Here Pandi’s affidavit is clearly from his own, personal knowledge, is 

admissible, is generated through his competent memory of the facts leading up to the filing 

of this case, and is therefore correctly submitted to support Plaintiff’s Response. 

Secondly, Plaintiff believes that Cooshie will object to the use of any newly 

discovered evidence as exhibits to this Response. However, newly discovered evidence is 

permissible for the purpose of supporting a Response to a Motion for Summary Judgment. 

In fact, when weighing the evidence produced by both parties related to a Motion for 

Summary Judgment, a court simply must decide “whether there is sufficient evidence to 

submit an issue to the jury”... and that the court “need look only to the evidence and 

reasonable inferences which tend to support the case of a litigant against whom a 

peremptory instruction has been given.” Webb v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 352 U.S. 512, 513-

514 (1957). In Arizona, “a party opposing a motion for summary judgment must show 

that evidence is available which would justify a trial of that issue.” Hunter v. Benchimol, 

123 Ariz. 516, 601 P.2d 279 (1979); see also Crocker v. Crocker, 103 Ariz. 497, 446 P.2d 

226 (1968). 118 Ariz. at 86, 574 P.2d at 1305.

It is clear that courts recognize the distinct need for a party, which has had a motion 

for summary judgment filed against it, to be able to defend its position through the 

disclosure of evidence at the time of its response to the motion. Without having the 

opportunity to produce evidence, Plaintiff would not be able to respond to new arguments 

brought by Cooshie in its Motion for Summary Judgment and without this opportunity, 

Plaintiff faces severe disadvantage. 

As stated above, and which is the prevailing view in Arizona, “[i]n determining 

whether summary judgment is appropriate, the Court will consider the facts in a light most 

favorable to the party against whom the motion was granted. Id.; see also Pendleton v. 

Cilley, 118 Ariz. 84, 574 P.2d 1303 (1978). To restrict the use of newly discovered 

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evidence in Plaintiff’s Response would not create a light most favorable to Plaintiff and 

also would prevent the Court from reviewing all evidence it needs in ruling on the Motion 

for Summary Judgment.

III. Plaintiff’s Trademark Infringement Claim Does Not Fail as a Matter of 

Law

One primary argument of Cooshie in its Motion is that Plaintiff cannot protect its 

trademark rights and therefore cannot bring a cause of action against Cooshie for 

trademark infringement. This argument alone creates the needed genuine issue of material 

fact for Plaintiff to overcome the Motion for Summary Judgement. As a part of its claim, 

Cooshie makes the argument that Plaintiff must show “(1) a valid protectable trademark 

and (2) defendant’s use of the mark is likely to cause confusion.” Moab Industries, LLC v. 

FCA US, LLC, No. 3:12 cv 8247-HRH, 2016 WL 5859700 at *3 (Oct. 6, 2016). This 

standard of law should not even be determined as a part of a Motion for Summary 

Judgement. Since the second element of the above referenced test is the likelihood to 

cause confusion, Cooshie is asking the Court to determine a genuine issue of material fact 

as a part of its determinations for the Motion for Summary Judgment. This issue should 

lead to the full dismissal of Cooshie’s Motion as a threshold matter. In fact, the Ninth 

Circuit has held that it has “cautioned that district courts should grant summary judgment 

motions regarding the likelihood of confusion sparingly, as careful assessment of the 

pertinent factors that go into determining likelihood of confusion usually requires a full 

record.” Rearden LLC v. Rearden Commerce, Inc., 683 F.3d 1190, 1210 (9th Cir. 2012); 

Thane Int’l, Inc. v. Trek Bicycle Corp., 305 F.3d 894, 901–02 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Clicks 

Billiards Inc. v. Sixshooters Inc., 251 F.3d 1252, 1265 (9th Cir. 2001); Interstellar, 184 

F.3d at 1109). Rather than allowing Cooshie’s Motion for Summary Judgment, this major 

issue must instead be determined at trial. For this reason alone, Cooshie’s Motion must be 

denied and all matters requiring a full record must be litigated at trial. This is the case 

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“[b]ecause the likelihood of confusion is often a fact-intensive inquiry [and], courts are 

generally reluctant to decide this issue at the summary judgment stage.” Id.; see also, Au–

Tomotive Gold, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 457 F.3d 1062, 1075 (9th Cir.2006) 

(citing Thane Int’l, Inc. v. Trek Bicycle Corp., 305 F.3d 894, 901–02 (9th Cir.2002)); and 

Fortune Dynamic, Inc. v. Victoria’s Secret Stores Brand Mgmt., Inc., 618 F.3d 1025, 

1029, 1039 (9th Cir.2010).

IV. Cooshie Has No Goodwill and Cannot Properly Sell Plaintiff’s Products

Cooshie is also in violation of trademark law because it does not have Plaintiff’s 

goodwill that goes with Plaintiff’s trademark of its own product. This is because a 

trademark owner develops the reputation associated with the products and therefore is the 

only entity with the goodwill that comes from selling its products. Menendez v. Holt, 128 

U. S. 514, 9 Sup. Ct. 143, 32 L. Ed. 526. It then follows, since rights in trademark come 

from both the mark itself and the goodwill associated with that mark, that the owner of the 

mark must combine the goodwill of the business with the sale of the trademarked 

products. Eiseman v. Schiffer, 157 Fed. 473 (holding that products can only be sold 

combined with the goodwill of the Plaintiff’s business that it has bought). Based on this 

reasoning, Cooshie, which has no goodwill from owning the mark and selling the 

products, along with Rearz, is unable to sell Plaintiff’s products in competition with 

Plaintiff. 

V. Confusion in Sponsorship of Plaintiff’s Products Exists from Cooshie’s 

Sales

Cooshie is not protected from infringing Plaintiff’s mark because it improperly 

bought or assisted in the purchase and importation of Plaintiff’s products contrary to 

Plaintiff’s wishes, and then helped to sell these products in the United States. Courts have 

held instead that even the purchase and resale of “genuine” products can cause confusion 

because consumers will be confused as to the sponsorship of those products sold by the 

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infringing party. Babbit Electronics, Inc. v. Dynascan Corp., 828 F.Supp. 944, 956–957 

(S.D.Fla.1993) (holding that “identical goods sold in an unauthorized manner are not 

necessarily genuine for purposes of the Lanham Act”); see also Hunting World, Inc. v. 

Reboans, Inc., 24 U.S.P.Q.2d 1844, 1849, 1992 WL 361741 (N.D.Ca.1992), citing, H.L. 

Hayden Co. v. Siemens Medical Systems, Inc., 879 F.2d 1005, 1023 (2nd Cir.1989); see

Ballet Makers v. United States Shoe Corp., 633 F.Supp. 1328, 1331 (S.D.N.Y.1986); and 

Disenos Artisticos E Industriales, S.A. v. Work, 676 F.Supp. 1254, 1269 (E.D.N.Y.1987)

(holding that “even if there were no possibility of confusion as to source of origin when a 

product is ‘genuine,’ there might still be confusion as to sponsorship when a ‘genuine’ 

product is manufactured by a foreign manufacturer but distributed in the U.S. without the 

authorization of and in competition with the U.S. trademark owner”).

VI. Plaintiff Cleary has Shown that it has a Copyright that was Infringed

As Cooshie admits, Plaintiff has shown a valid copyright registration for its diaper 

designs. (Cooshie Ex. 12). Even if Cooshie does claim that it is somehow protected by the 

first sale doctrine for illegally purchasing Plaintiff’s copyrighted (and trademarked) 

products without Plaintiff’s agreement, this is incorrect under the Givenchy holding and its 

connection to the findings in Katzel. Givenchy at 484. The Katzel import protection is 

basically the same as the Copyright Act, such that U.S. companies can sue third parties for

importing lawfully obtained foreign manufactured goods without the authorization of the 

company in America. Id. It is clear that the Givenchy holding is the appropriate one here 

instead of any analysis related to the first sale doctrine. Cooshie only claims that Plaintiff 

has not demonstrated that it ever did anything with regard to Plaintiff’s products. Now 

that Plaintiff has established that Cooshie has, at the most minimal level, helped Rearz to 

import Plaintiff’s products into the United States and Canada for sale, Cooshie does 

violate Plainitff’s copyrights. There is no excuse for Cooshie’s actions, nor does it relate to 

///

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any claim that Cooshie could therefore legally sell out from under Plaintiff any items that 

were its copyright protected materials. 

VII. Plaintiff’s Claim for Tortious Interference does not Fail as a Matter of 

Law

For Plaintiff to show that there was tortious interference with a business expectancy 

it must show that it has a valid business expectancy. This business expectancy is 

established simply by the fact that Plaintiff had contracted to have Mimosa produce 

diapers for it and that these diapers were being sold by Plaintiff to gain economic benefit 

as reflected in Plaintiff’s yearly income figures. (Ex. 5 and Rearz Ex. 3). Also, Plaintiff 

needs to show that Cooshie knew about its business expectancy; this is demonstrated in

Cooshie acting as the American distributor of Plaintiff’s products for Rearz and through

Rearz, fully admitting to having purchased these diapers from Mimosa. (Rearz MSJ pg. 3, 

lines 22-23). It therefore becomes immediately clear that Cooshie intentionally caused 

termination of Plaintiff’s business expectancy simply by knowing that it possessed 

Plaintiff’s products that had been illegally purchased from Plaintiff’s manufacturer and/or 

importing those products into the United States for sale in its own store and online. When 

a party purchases the products of another party, it is clear that both parties cannot receive 

the benefit of the purchased goods. Plaintiff clearly could not sell any diaper purchased by 

Rearz and/or Cooshie and then resold, since Cooshie possessed the products instead of 

Plaintiff. Finally, as is shown in the affidavit of Steve Pandi, each diaper that Plaintiff sells 

is sold for approximately $2.00 and since Rearz purchased approximately 80,000 of 

Plaintiff’s diapers, Plaintiff therefore has suffered $160,000 in damages. (Ex. 1). Also, 

Plaintiff’s damages stem from the approximately eight to nine months that Plaintiff lost its

opportunities to purchase products from any manufacturer, plus Cooshie having redirected 

Plaintiff’s own clients from purchasing from Plaintiff to then purchasing from Cooshie. 

(Ex. 1). For these reasons, Plaintiff’s claim for tortious interference with business 

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expectancy does not fail as a matter of law and Plaintiff should instead recover its 

damages at trial. 

VIII. Plaintiff’s Conversion Claim Does not Fail as a Matter of Law

The only argument that Cooshie relies on for its assertion that Plaintiff’s conversion 

claim should fail as a matter of law is that it believes that no conversion happened because 

of its claim that Plaintiff has no protectable intellectual property interests. As shown 

above, Plaintiff has both a protectable trademark and copyright over its products, and the 

diapers produced because of a contractual relationship between Plaintiff and Mimosa were 

not products that Cooshie or Rearz had any right to purchase from Mimosa at any time, 

even if it is believed that Plaintiff ever terminated its business relationship with Mimosa. 

(Ex. 1). Also as stated above, this conversion clearly harmed Plaintiff in the approximate 

amount of $160,000 since Plaintiff no longer had ability to sell its products. (Ex. 1).

IX. Plaintiff and Cooshie Both have Proved Plaintiff’s Unjust Enrichment 

Claim

Cooshie’s own admissions in its Motion for Summary Judgement demonstrate that 

it enriched its own position by, at least, helping to purchase and import Plaintiff’s 

protected goods from Plaintiff’s manufacturer. This point is demonstrated through 

Plaintiff’s disclosures of its financial harm suffered in 2017, the same year that Rearz and 

Cooshie bought Plaintiff’s supply of diapers on June 26, 2017. (Rearz Ex. 5). This is also a 

direct connection to Plaintiff’s shown reduction in sales from $146,767.16 in 2016 to 

$89,997.46 in 2017, (Ex. 1; Rearz Ex. 3). Finally, since all of the products bought by 

Rearz and Cooshie and then brought to the United States were the property of Plaintiff—

both through a contractual relationship with Mimosa, and through the protectable 

intellectual property rights that Plaintiff still has on these products to this date—there is no 

justification in the law that Cooshie can allege to overcome Plaintiff’s rights. Plaintiff can 

only be made whole again through a reversal of this unjust enrichment, because return of 

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the diapers that Cooshie helped to sell in the United States is impossible and because the 

time of deprivation of Plaintiff’s products has also led Plaintiff to lose money and sales. 

X. Plaintiff, and Not Cooshie, is Entitled to Costs and Attorneys’ Fees

Pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 505, Plaintiff should be awarded attorneys’ fees as the 

prevailing party in responding to Cooshie’s Motion for Summary Judgement. Also, 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927, Plaintiff should be sanctions where Cooshie’s only intent to 

file its motion was to distract the proceedings in this matter from the real facts in bad faith. 

Fink v. Gomez, 239 F.3d 989, 992 (9th Cir. 2001). Plaintiff should be awarded its fees and 

costs against Cooshie and its counsel for purposefully misleading the Court and 

multiplying the proceedings in this case in the lead up to trial. Lahiri v. Universal Music

and Video Distribution Corp., 606 F.3d 1216, 1218-19 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing 28 U.S.C. §

1927).

As Plaintiff has shown in this Response, Cooshie’s claims that it has never worked 

with Rearz related to Plaintiff’s products is simply a fabrication used to distract the Court 

from the actual issues at hand. Since Plaintiff has now demonstrated both that it does have 

protectable intellectual property rights, and that there are genuine issues of material fact 

that should go to trial in this matter, it and not Cooshie should be awarded reasonable costs 

and attorneys’ fees for having to respond to Cooshie’s Motion for Summary Judgment. 

Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff asks the Court to deny Cooshie’s Motion for 

Summary Judgement in the entirety, and to find that Plaintiff’s case against Cooshie can 

continue to trial. Plaintiff asks the Court to find that it successfully demonstrated that 

multiple issues of material fact exist and therefore that proceeding to trial is required. 

Plaintiff finally requests that Plaintiff be awarded it reasonable costs and attorneys’ fees.

///

///

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DATED this 15th day of July 2019.

WELSH LAW GROUP, PLC

 By /s/ J. Taylor Swick

Kenneth W. Welsh, Jr.

J. Taylor Swick

Attorneys for Plaintiff

ORIGINAL filed and a copy of 

the foregoing mailed July 15, 

2019 to:

Anderson J. Duff, Esq.

Revision Legal PLLC- New York, NY

244 5th Ave., Suite 2230

New York, NY 10001

anderson@revisionlegal.com

Attorneys for Rearz Incorporated 

and Cooshie Tooshiez LLC

Kenneth Michael Motolenich-Salas, Esq. 

MotoSalas Law PLLC

16210 North 63rd Street

Scottsdale, AZ 85254

ken@motosalaslaw.com

Attorneys for Rearz Incorporated

/s/ Kendrick Stallings

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Adult Printed Diapers LLC,

Plaintiff,

vs.

Rearz Incorporated, et al.,

 Defendants.

No. CV-18-00370-PHX-SMB

PLAINTIFF ADULT PRINTED 

DIAPERS, LLC’S EXHIBITS 1

THROUGH 5

(Assigned to the Honorable Susan 

M. Brnovich)

1. Affidavit of Steve Pandi.

2. Photograph of Cooshie as distributor for Rearz from Cooshie’s website.

3. Photograph of Cooshie distributing for Rearz.

4. Images of messages and photographs of Cooshie’s customers in the United States 

buying Rearz products.

5. Contract between Plaintiff and Mimosa Factory.

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