COURT OF APPEALS

DECISION

DATED AND FILED

July 19, 2023

Samuel A. Christensen

Clerk of Court of Appeals

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further editing. If 

published, the official version will appear in 

the bound volume of the Official Reports. 

A party may file with the Supreme Court a 

petition to review an adverse decision by the 

Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 

and RULE 809.62. 

Appeal No. 2023AP254 Cir. Ct. No. 2022ME214

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS

DISTRICT II

IN THE MATTER OF THE MENTAL COMMITMENT OF P.J.L.:

RACINE COUNTY,

 PETITIONER-RESPONDENT,

 V.

P.J.L.,

 RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from orders of the circuit court for Kenosha County: 

DAVID P. WILK, Judge. Affirmed. 
No. 2023AP254

2

¶1 NEUBAUER, J.1 P.J.L., referred to herein by the pseudonym Paul, 

appeals from orders involuntarily committing him to a locked inpatient facility for 

six months and ordering the involuntary administration of medication during that 

time. Paul argues that Racine County (the County) did not meet its burden under 

WIS. STAT. § 51.20 of proving that he is dangerous by clear and convincing 

evidence. For the reasons that follow, this court concludes that the County met its 

burden and thus affirms the orders.

BACKGROUND

¶2 Mount Pleasant police emergently detained Paul on August 2, 2022,

after being dispatched to his residence and observing him with “blood all over his 

face, arms, legs and feet” and “severe cuts above both ears and one in the back of 

his head,” possibly from trying to cut his hair with a hand razor. The responding 

officer reported that Paul “was non-verbal and only expressed he did not want 

medical treatment or to talk to us” and that Paul’s mother reported that he had 

“stated he wanted to take over the world.” Paul was transported to a local 

hospital. On the way, he was reported to be “not verbal and had numerous 

pre attack postures and violent tendency signs showing.” At the hospital, Paul 

“remained mainly non-verbal and urinated over the bed and floor.” 

¶3 Another officer who helped transport Paul from the hospital to the 

Winnebago Mental Health Institute (WMHI) reported that Paul “started shouting 

at officers and displayed a boxer stance, demanding officers to tase him” while at 

the hospital and “began aggressive behavior again and demanded to be tased” 

 

1

 This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 752.31(2)(d) (2021-22). 

All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2021-22 version unless otherwise noted.
No. 2023AP254

3

upon reaching WMHI. Paul was also reported to have urinated on the floor at 

WMHI while saying, “this is my fucking hospital, I’m marking my territory.” 

¶4 On August 5, 2022, the circuit court for Racine County found 

probable cause to believe that Paul was mentally ill, a proper candidate for 

treatment, and dangerous to himself or others.2 The court continued Paul’s 

detention pending a final hearing, ordered involuntary medication, and transferred 

the case to the circuit court for Kenosha County, the county in which Paul lived. 

That court appointed two psychiatrists, Dr. Marshall Bales and Dr. Sangita Patel, 

to examine Paul and prepare reports that were filed with the court. 

¶5 In his report, Dr. Bales wrote that he had reviewed records from 

WMHI, documents related to Paul’s emergency detention, including the police 

report, and had spoken with WMHI staff members but not Paul, who had declined 

to participate. The report summarized the events that occurred shortly after Paul’s 

mother bailed him out of jail and led to his initial detention:

However, after being at her home for only a day, she 

quickly noted he was psychiatrically unstable. He had cuts 

on the back of his head from attempting to cut his own hair. 

He also had self-inflicted cuts on his body possibly related 

to his long-standing delusion of worm infestation or 

parasites that he believed were in him. He spoke of 

wanting to conquer the world. He was threatening once. 

He attempted to cook something with bizarre ingredients 

and started a small kitchen fire, which the family was able 

to put out. He had three police contacts in a short time. He 

was threatening with police and had “numerous preattack 

postures.” 

 

2

 The Honorable Wynne P. Laufenberg made the probable cause determination.
No. 2023AP254

4

¶6 Since being admitted to WMHI, Bales wrote, “[Paul] has been 

threatening and scaring other patients. He will urinate on the floor in front of 

everyone, claiming he is marking his territory. He threatened a peer. He has been 

agitated at times and isolative at other times. He has repeatedly been 

uncooperative with examiners.” Bales also wrote that Paul “has not clearly been 

suicidal” but that “his self-injurious cutting behavior and setting a kitchen fire are 

obviously dangerous. He has repeatedly been threatening to others in this manic 

and psychotic state.” 

¶7 Based upon his brief interaction with Paul and the other information 

he reviewed, Bales opined that Paul suffered from schizoaffective disorder with 

mania and psychotic features and was a proper candidate for treatment. Bales also 

opined that Paul was dangerous under the second standard in WIS. STAT.

§ 51.20(1)(a)2.b. because he posed “[a] substantial probability of physical harm to 

other subjects” and under the third standard in § 51.20(1)(a)2.c. because Paul 

showed “[s]uch impaired judgment, manifested by evidence of a pattern of recent 

acts or omissions, that there is a substantial probability of physical impairment or 

injury to [himself] or other individuals.” 

¶8 On August 15, 2022, the circuit court held a final hearing.3 The 

County called Bales as its only witness and introduced his report into evidence. 

Bales testified that he was present when police initially brought Paul in and 

“definitely feared for [his] safety” at that time because Paul “pulled open his 

trousers and he yelled and screamed and then urinated a large amount of urine on 

 

3

 The Honorable David W. Wilk presided at the final hearing and entered the orders from 

which Paul appeals.
No. 2023AP254

5

the floor.” Bales described Paul as appearing “very angry” and testified that he 

noticed “clumps” of Paul’s hair missing and “a whole bunch of dried blood around 

his head.” 

¶9 Based on his own observations and reports from another doctor that 

Paul had been “psychotic,” “manic,” “delusional,” and “agitated,” Bales testified 

that Paul suffers from schizoaffective disorder, which he agreed was “a substantial 

disorder of mood, thought, or perception.” He agreed that Paul’s disorder is “a 

condition that impairs judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize reality, or ability 

to meet ordinary demands of life,” explaining that Paul accidentally starting the 

kitchen fire and cutting himself because of a “delusion that there w[ere] worms or 

bugs in his head” were “related to [the fact] that he was psychotic.”

¶10 As to dangerousness, Bales testified that Paul’s “cutting himself to 

where he had all this blood and bleeding” met the third standard set forth in WIS.

STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.c. Bales did not testify, as he had indicated in his report, that 

Paul was dangerous under the second standard in § 51.20(1)(a)2.b. Finally, Bales 

confirmed that Paul was a proper subject for treatment and was substantially likely 

to become a proper subject for treatment if the treatment he was receiving was 

withdrawn. When asked for the basis for this opinion, Bales said that when Paul 

was released from jail, his mother “took him home and he was—it was—excuse 

the word—it was a disaster. She did the best she could, but he’s either dangerous 

or in danger.” Bales recommended that Paul remain confined in an inpatient,

locked unit and that he be medicated involuntarily because he had previously 

failed to take medication voluntarily.

¶11 On cross-examination, Bales acknowledged that Paul spent five or 

six months in solitary confinement at the Kenosha jail before he was emergently 
No. 2023AP254

6

detained, a setting that Bales said “can exacerbate or flare an untreated underlying 

mental illness.” Bales also agreed that Paul’s mental state had improved since he 

had started receiving medication and that he might be able to be transitioned to an 

outpatient setting within “[a] week or two.” In addition, Bales confirmed that Paul 

was not a risk for suicide and had not, to Bales’s knowledge, “expressed any 

threats of harm to any other individual other than himself,” though “he did cause 

other patients to fear him as [Bales] did.” 

¶12 Paul also testified at the hearing. He said the isolated conditions in 

which he was kept for six months at the jail “[d]eteriorated” his mental health and 

led him to stop taking medication. He also testified that the toilet in his cell did 

not always work, which forced him to “urinate outside [of his] cell” and defecate 

on his food tray after meals. He explained that he cut his hair after being released 

from jail using a dull knife or razor but that he did not feel suicidal or homicidal at 

that time. He stated he was receiving “five meals a day” at WMHI, had sufficient 

access to a toilet, and was taking medication via pill rather than long-lasting 

injection “because I know that I’m here on a day-by-day basis until I was able to 

reach a courtroom.” 

¶13 Based upon the evidence presented at the hearing and “the contents 

of the court file,” the circuit court concluded that Paul met the three requirements 

for involuntary commitment under WIS. STAT. § 51.20. First, the court determined

that Paul was mentally ill based on Bales’s diagnosis of schizoaffective disorder, 

which “results in psychotic manic and delusional thought processes.” Next, the 

court determined that Paul was a proper subject for treatment, relying on Bales’s 

testimony that Paul’s condition was treatable. 
No. 2023AP254

7

¶14 Finally, as to the requirement of dangerousness, the circuit court 

referred to the second standard set forth in WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.b., under 

which a person is deemed dangerous if he 

[e]vidences a substantial probability of physical harm to 

other individuals as manifested by evidence of recent 

homicidal or other violent behavior, or by evidence that 

others are placed in reasonable fear of violent behavior and 

serious physical harm to them, as evidenced by a recent 

overt act, attempt or threat to do serious physical harm.

The court determined that the County had established dangerousness under this 

standard. The court began by referring to Bales’s observation that Paul “was 

agitated, he was exhibiting violent behavior, he urinated on the floor, he had cut 

out clumps of his own hair, [and] had dried blood” on his head when he first 

arrived at WMHI, and Bales’s testimony that “he feared for his own safety.” 

Then, after invoking the second standard, the court stated that Bales had “observed 

... violent behavior” and had “reported the incidents of threats to other residents” 

at WMHI. The court explained that it did not consider Paul’s hair-cutting as “an 

example of dangerousness” because Dr. Bales had testified that it was only 

possible that that behavior was the result of Paul having a delusion about “worm 

infestation” or parasites in his head. The court went on, however, to conclude that 

the County had established dangerousness under the second standard “by evidence 

of violent behavior. Including overt acts that the Doctor observed. The urination, 

the attempts to threaten other people in Winnebago, all of which is contained with 

the Doctors reports ....” Following the hearing, the circuit court entered orders 
No. 2023AP254

8

imposing the six-month commitment and continuing involuntary medication and 

treatment.4 

DISCUSSION

¶15 A person may be committed involuntarily under WIS. STAT.

§ 51.20(1)(a) if the government establishes that the person is mentally ill, a proper 

subject for treatment, and dangerous. Portage County v. J.W.K., 2019 WI 54, 

¶17, 386 Wis. 2d 672, 927 N.W.2d 509. Because involuntary commitment 

significantly restricts a person’s liberty, due process requires the government to 

establish the elements for commitment by clear and convincing evidence. 

Waupaca County v. K.E.K., 2021 WI 9, ¶27, 395 Wis. 2d 460, 954 N.W.2d 366; 

see also WIS. STAT. § 51.20(13)(e). This court defers to the circuit court’s factual 

findings unless they are clearly erroneous but reviews de novo whether those facts 

satisfy the statutory standard for dangerousness. See Waukesha County v. J.W.J., 

2017 WI 57, ¶15, 375 Wis. 2d 542, 895 N.W.2d 783. This court also accepts

“reasonable inferences from the facts available to the circuit court.” Outagamie 

County v. Melanie L., 2013 WI 67, ¶38, 349 Wis. 2d 148, 833 N.W.2d 607.

¶16 Paul concedes that the County established that he is mentally ill and 

a proper candidate for treatment. His appeal focuses on the third requirement—

dangerousness. Paul does not challenge the circuit court’s factual findings related 

to that element, but instead argues that those findings did not establish 

dangerousness under the second standard, WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.b. “Thus, we 

 

4

 After the commitment and medication orders were entered, the circuit court for 

Kenosha County transferred this case back to the circuit court for Racine County pursuant to a 

stipulation between the parties. 
No. 2023AP254

9

review the evidence presented at the final hearing and the circuit court’s findings 

to decide whether there was clear and convincing evidence that [Paul] was 

dangerous as defined under [§] 51.20(1)(a)2.b.” See Marathon County v. D.K., 

2020 WI 8, ¶44, 390 Wis. 2d 50, 937 N.W.2d 901.

¶17 As referenced above, a finding of dangerousness under the second 

standard requires proof that an individual “[e]vidences a substantial probability of 

physical harm to other individuals.” WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.b. A “substantial 

probability” means “much more likely than not.” D.K., 390 Wis. 2d 50, ¶35. The

statute also specifies that the “substantial probability of physical harm” must be 

“manifested by evidence of”:

(1) The individual’s “recent homicidal or other violent behavior,” or

(2) “[A] recent overt act, attempt or threat to do serious physical harm” that 

places other individuals “in reasonable fear of violent behavior and 

serious physical harm.”

Id., ¶36; § 51.20(1)(a)2.b. To phrase the statute a different way, the County’s 

burden was to establish that “it is much more likely than not that [Paul] will cause 

physical harm to other individuals,” see D.K., 390 Wis. 2d 50, ¶42, through 

evidence of Paul’s “recent homicidal or other violent behavior” or a recent “act, 

attempt or threat to do serious physical harm” that placed others “in reasonable 

fear of violent behavior and serious physical harm,” see § 51.20(1)(a)2.b. Medical 

experts who provide evidence in involuntary commitment proceedings need not 

parrot statutory language, but their “testimony and conclusions ‘should be linked 

back to the standards in the statute.’” D.K., 390 Wis. 2d 50, ¶54 (quoting Melanie 

L., 349 Wis. 2d 148, ¶97).
No. 2023AP254

10

¶18 Paul contends that the evidence cited by the circuit court in finding

him dangerous—the portions of Bales’s report and testimony about Paul urinating 

on the floor and threatening others at WMHI—does not satisfy the second 

standard. As to the urination incident, Paul argues that Bales did not explain how 

that act created a substantial probability of physical harm to anyone. In addition, 

he contends that Bales’s testimony that Paul threatened other patients was too 

vague because he did not identify any specific words or acts that were threatening 

or when the threats occurred. Paul also contends that Bales contradicted his report 

when he testified at the final hearing that he was not aware of Paul expressing 

threats of harm to others. Finally, Paul acknowledges that Bales testified that Paul 

“caused other patients to fear him” but emphasizes that Bales “did not identify any 

specific instance in which another patient feared [Paul] or what action by [Paul] 

provoked such fear.” 

¶19 This court disagrees with Paul and concludes that the evidence 

introduced at the hearing clearly and convincingly established that he was 

dangerous under the second standard. Bales’s report recounted Paul’s threats and 

“preattack postures” towards police when he was first detained on August 2.

Bales also relayed that Paul was brought in yelling and screaming, with dried 

blood on his head, and urinated on the hospital floor while claiming to be 

“marking his territory.” He testified that Paul’s behavior caused him to fear for 

his safety. Given Paul’s appearance and behavior, it was reasonable for Bales to 

fear that Paul would act violently towards him and cause him serious physical 

harm. This reasonable fear supports a finding that Paul evidenced a “substantial 
No. 2023AP254

11

probability of physical harm to other individuals.” See WIS. STAT.

§ 51.20(1)(a)2.b.; D.K., 390 Wis. 2d 50, ¶41.5

¶20 To be sure, the County could have done a more thorough job 

presenting evidence at the hearing that would have established a stronger link 

between Paul’s behavior and the second standard. Specifically, the County could 

have: (1) called Dr. Patel to testify about the psychotic and violent behavior that 

preceded Paul’s initial detention as well as the multiple examples of Paul acting in 

a threatening and violent manner towards patients and staff at WMHI that are 

noted in her report and to explain why, in her opinion, those incidents showed that 

Paul was dangerous; or (2) elicited more detailed testimony from Bales as to the 

behavior that precipitated his initial detention and the threats Paul made against 

other patients at WMHI and why, in his view, those threats could give rise to a

“reasonable fear of violent behavior and serious physical harm” and establish a 

“substantial probability” that Paul would physically harm other individuals. See

WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.b. In addition, in announcing its findings, the circuit 

court could have cited the descriptions of Paul’s violent and threatening behavior 

that are discussed in detail in Patel’s report.6

¶21 In recent years, our supreme court and this court have reminded 

counsel who handle involuntary commitment proceedings of the need to make a 

 

5

 Because this court concludes that Paul’s conduct on August 2, 2022, was sufficient to 

establish dangerousness, it need not address Bales’s references to Paul’s subsequent threats 

against other patients at WMHI.

6

 Although the County did not introduce Patel’s report into evidence at the hearing, the 

circuit court could still consider and rely upon it in issuing Paul’s initial commitment and 

medication orders. See Outagamie County v. L.X.D.-O., 2023 WI App 17, ¶34, 407 Wis. 2d 441, 

991 N.W.2d 518.
No. 2023AP254

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detailed and thorough record given the significant infringement on a person’s 

constitutionally-protected liberty interest that involuntary commitment can 

impose. See, e.g., D.K., 390 Wis. 2d 50, ¶55 (“A commitment is no trivial matter. 

Taking more time at the circuit court can save years of uncertainty on appeal.”); 

Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. L.J.F.G., No. 2022AP1589, 

unpublished slip op. ¶16 n.3 (WI App Apr. 12, 2023) (observing that many 

appeals under WIS. STAT. chs. 55 and 51 “could be avoided entirely if counties 

would take just a little more time and care to ask a few additional thoughtful 

questions or otherwise present additional evidence—such as reports, for 

example—that would help to more clearly satisfy statutory standards”). The 

author of this opinion endorses those remarks and urges counsel, where 

appropriate, to devote the additional time and care needed in commitment hearings 

when making an evidentiary record to support a commitment order.

¶22 For the reasons stated above, the circuit court correctly concluded 

that the County had carried its burden of establishing that Paul was dangerous 

under WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.b.

By the Court.—Orders affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.

RULE 809.23(1)(b)4.