UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

No. 97-4573

CHRISTOPHER ROBERT GRIFFIN, a/k/a

Dakeem,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Greenville.

James C. Fox, District Judge.

(CR-97-1-F)

Submitted: March 3, 1998

Decided: March 23, 1998

Before HAMILTON and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and

BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

J. Douglas McCullough, STUBBS, PAHL & PERDUE, P.A.,

Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Jane H. Jackson, Assistant

United States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Christopher Robert Griffin pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute

and to possess with intent to distribute cocaine base in violation of 21

U.S.C. § 846 (1994). The court sentenced Griffin to imprisonment for

197 months, followed by supervised release for five years. Griffin

appeals his conviction and sentence. Griffin's attorney filed a brief in

accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), addressing whether the district court properly imposed Griffin's sentence

under the Sentencing Guidelines. Counsel asserts that there are no

meritorious grounds for appeal. Griffin was informed of his right to

file a pro se supplemental brief, and he responded with a motion for

appointment of new counsel. In his motion, Griffin alleges that the

record will support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel

because his attorney failed to object to the presentence report and

failed to advise him properly in accepting the plea agreement.

Because our review of the entire record reveals no reversible error, we

affirm.

Griffin's attorney raises as a potential claim that the extent of the

district court's departure for substantial assistance under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5K1.1 (1995), was insufficient. However, the extent of the district court's downward departure is not

reviewable on appeal. See United States v. Hill , 70 F.3d 321, 324-25

(4th Cir. 1995).

In his motion for appointment of new counsel, Griffin contends

that his attorney was ineffective because he failed to object to parts

of the presentence report and counsel improperly advised Griffin

about accepting the plea agreement. A claim of ineffective assistance

of counsel is cognizable on direct appeal only where counsel's deficient performance appears plainly on the face of the record. See

United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 120 (4th Cir. 1991). Any

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error on the part of counsel in Griffin's case is not plain on the face

of the record. The presentence report accurately calculates Griffin's

sentencing guideline range, and the district court conducted a very

thorough Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 colloquy, which shows that Griffin's

guilty plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily. Cf. Boykin v.

Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969). Accordingly, Griffin's claims of

ineffective assistance of counsel are not appropriate for review on

direct appeal.

In accordance with Anders, we have examined the entire record in

this case and find no reversible error. We therefore affirm the conviction and sentence. We also deny Griffin's motion for appointment of

new counsel. This court requires that counsel inform his client in writing of his right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for

further review. If the client requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may

move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel's motion must state that a copy thereof was served on the client.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court, and

oral argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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