COURT OF APPEALS

DECISION

DATED AND FILED

July 11, 2023

Samuel A. Christensen

Clerk of Court of Appeals

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further editing. If 

published, the official version will appear in 

the bound volume of the Official Reports. 

A party may file with the Supreme Court a 

petition to review an adverse decision by the 

Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 

and RULE 809.62. 

Appeal No. 2021AP1446 Cir. Ct. No. 2019CV8112

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS

DISTRICT I

QUINTANA S. LEE,

PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,

V.

NATIONWIDE INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA,

DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.

APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Milwaukee County: 

CHRISTOPHER R. FOLEY, Judge. Affirmed. 

Before Brash, C.J., Dugan and White, JJ. 

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent 

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3). 
No. 2021AP1446

2

¶1 PER CURIAM. Quintana S. Lee appeals from an order of the 

circuit court granting summary judgment in favor of Nationwide Insurance 

Company of America and dismissing the complaint that Lee filed against 

Nationwide alleging breach of contract, a claim for statutory interest, and bad faith 

after Nationwide denied a claim that Lee made under her homeowner’s insurance 

policy.

1

 

¶2 Upon review, we conclude that the property did not meet the 

definition of a “residence premises” under the policy because Lee did not reside at 

the property. Therefore, the property was not covered under the homeowner’s

insurance policy Lee obtained through Nationwide. Accordingly, we affirm the 

circuit court’s order.

BACKGROUND

¶3 Following the death of her mother, Lee inherited a duplex in 

Milwaukee located at 3420 North 13th Street. At the time Lee inherited the 

property, there were two tenants. Lee evicted the tenants in August 2018, and the 

property was left with extensive damage, including broken windows, holes in the 

walls, and dog feces throughout the property. 

¶4 Lee alleged that she began repairing the property for the stated 

purpose of being able to live there in the future. According to Lee, she paid the 

overdue property taxes; made repairs to the roof, chimney, windows and front 

porch; connected the gas and electrical utilities; and moved a couch, a table and a 

 

1

 The record is inconsistent with regard to the spelling of Lee’s name, and we use the 

spelling provided in the caption.
No. 2021AP1446

3

television into the property. While she was repairing the property, however, Lee 

continued to reside at a residence on Meinecke Avenue in Milwaukee. 

¶5 Lee obtained a homeowner’s insurance policy for the property from 

Nationwide dated September 18, 2018, and for which Lee made two of twelve 

premium payments. In her application for the policy, Lee indicated that the 

property was her primary residence, that the property was not going through 

extensive remodeling or additions, and that the condition of the property was 

“excellent.” She further indicated that she obtained the property by purchasing the 

property for $77,000. 

¶6 The insurance policy issued to Lee insured the dwelling on the

“residence premises.” The policy then defined “residence premises” as “[t]he one 

family dwelling where you reside,” “[t]he two, three or four family dwelling 

where you reside in at least one of the family units,” or “[t]hat part of any other 

building where you reside.” The policy also contained a provision stating that 

vandalism and malicious mischief was not covered by the policy. 

¶7 On or around October 21, 2018, a fire broke out at the property, 

resulting in fire and smoke damage throughout the property. Reports subsequently

prepared by the Milwaukee Fire Department, Analytical Forensic Associates, and 

NEFCO Fire Investigations found that there was evidence of gasoline throughout 

the property and a ladder to a second-story window where the fire was thought to 
No. 2021AP1446

4

have originated, and these findings indicated that the fire was intentionally set. 

However, Nationwide never accused Lee of being involved in the fire.

2

 

¶8 Lee submitted a claim to Nationwide for the damage caused by the 

fire, and Nationwide denied her claim on July 11, 2019, because it determined that

the fire appeared to have been intentionally set and the property was vacant and 

unoccupied at the time of the fire. Accordingly, Nationwide took the position that 

the property was not a “residence premises” covered by the policy and, in the 

alternative, that the vandalism and malicious mischief exclusion applied.

¶9 As a result of the denial, Lee filed a complaint against Nationwide, 

alleging breach of contract, a claim for interest under WIS. STAT. § 628.46 (2021-

22),3and bad faith.4 Both parties subsequently moved for summary judgment.5 In 

its motion, Nationwide argued that the property was not covered under the policy

because it was not a “residence premises” within the meaning of the policy and, in 

the alternative, that the vandalism and malicious mischief exclusion applied and 

excluded the property from coverage. By contrast, Lee argued that the property 

was a residence premises covered under the policy because she intended to reside 

 

2

 Based on information contained in the record, it is possible that the former tenants were 

involved with starting the fire at the property. However, for our purposes, we need not address 

the cause of the fire further, and we do not express an opinion about who may be responsible for 

the fire.

3

 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2021-22 version unless otherwise 

noted.

4

 The complaint named two additional defendants—the former tenants—that have since 

been dismissed from the case. 

5

 Pursuant to a motion for bifurcation, the circuit court bifurcated Lee’s breach of 

contract claim from her bad faith claim, and Lee’s bad faith claim was stayed pending the 

outcome of her breach of contract claim. Thus, the motions for summary judgment only pertain

to Lee’s breach of contract claim.
No. 2021AP1446

5

at the property in the future and, to that end, she was repairing the property. She 

additionally argued that she could maintain another residence—her apartment on 

Meinecke Avenue—in addition to the property, without negating coverage for the 

property under the policy. She further argued that the vandalism and malicious 

mischief exclusion did not apply to the fire that occurred at the property because 

“fire” was considered distinct from “vandalism and malicious mischief” in the 

policy.

¶10 In a written decision, the circuit court agreed with Nationwide and 

found that there was no coverage for the property under the policy because the 

property was not a residence premises given that Lee was not residing at the 

property. In reaching its decision, the circuit court stated that Lee did not reside at 

the property under the plain and ordinary meaning of the policy language 

interpreted in a way that an insured would interpret the language. Indeed, the 

circuit court stated that while it “d[id] not doubt it was Ms. Lee’s intention to 

reside there in the future and there was some less than nominal presence to that 

end, ... it is undisputed she never resided in those premises.” The circuit court 

also “summarily indicate[d]” that the vandalism and malicious mischief exclusion 

applied to the fire that occurred at the property. Thus, the circuit court granted 

Nationwide’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed Lee’s complaint.

¶11 Lee now appeals.

DISCUSSION

¶12 On appeal, Lee raises the same two main arguments. First, she 

argues that the property was a “residence premises” covered by the policy she had 

through Nationwide. Second, she argues that the exclusion for vandalism and 

malicious mischief does not apply to the fire that occurred at the property. We 
No. 2021AP1446

6

disagree, and we conclude that the property was not a residence premises covered 

by the policy because Lee did not reside at the property any time before or at the 

time of the fire. As a result of our conclusion, we do not address Lee’s remaining 

argument that the exclusion for vandalism and malicious mischief does not apply

to the fire that occurred at the property. See State v. Blalock, 150 Wis. 2d 688, 

703, 442 N.W.2d 514 (Ct. App. 1989) (“[C]ases should be decided on the 

narrowest possible ground[.]”). 

¶13 Summary judgment shall be granted “if the pleadings, depositions, 

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if 

any show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 

party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” WIS. STAT. § 802.08(2). 

“Whether the circuit court properly granted summary judgment is a question of 

law that this court reviews de novo.” Racine Cnty. v. Oracular Milwaukee, Inc., 

2010 WI 25, ¶24, 323 Wis. 2d 682, 781 N.W.2d 88 (citation omitted). 

¶14 In this case, whether summary judgment was properly granted 

requires that we review the insurance policy that Lee obtained through 

Nationwide. “The interpretation of the language in an insurance policy presents a 

question of law, which this court reviews independently.” Marnholtz v. Church 

Mut. Ins. Co., 2012 WI App 53, ¶10, 341 Wis. 2d 478, 815 N.W.2d 708. “We 

first look to the language of the agreement.” Id. If the language is unambiguous, 

we apply the language as it is written. Id. “[I]f the word or phrase is reasonably 

susceptible to more than one interpretation,” the language is considered 

ambiguous, and we resolve any ambiguity “against the insurer and in favor of the 

insured seeking coverage.” Id. Overall, the interpretation of language in an 

insurance policy “should advance the insured’s reasonable expectations of 

coverage.” Id. (citation omitted). “However, we do not interpret insurance 
No. 2021AP1446

7

policies to provide coverage for risks that the insurer did not contemplate or 

underwrite and for which it has not received a premium.” American Fam. 

Mut. Ins. Co. v. American Girl, Inc., 2004 WI 2, ¶23, 268 Wis. 2d 16, 673 

N.W.2d 65

¶15 Turning to the insurance policy here, the parties’ dispute focuses on 

whether the property meets the definition of a “residence premises” and is, 

therefore, covered under the policy. Lee argues that she intended to reside at the 

property in the future and that she was repairing the property for the purpose of 

eventually living there. She indicates that she made repairs to the roof and 

chimney, replaced some windows, fixed the front porch, paid the property taxes, 

evicted two tenants, moved a couch, a table and a television into the property, and 

turned on the electric and gas utilities. Lee further argues that there was no 

requirement that the property be her primary or only residence in order to qualify 

as a residence premises under the policy, and she argues that, should this court 

conclude that the property is not a residence premises, coverage for any damage to 

the property under the insurance policy she paid for would be rendered “entirely 

illusory.” 

¶16 By contrast, Nationwide argues that Lee’s future intent to reside at 

the property does not transform the property into a residence premises within the 

meaning of the policy. Instead, Nationwide emphasizes that Lee had no 

permanent or continuous presence at the property given that she had never slept at 

the property, cooked a meal there, or engaged in any activities commonly 

understood as the activities of a person engaged in living at the property. 

Nationwide further argues that Lee’s argument that she could maintain an 

additional residence is irrelevant because the policy does not require that Lee 
No. 2021AP1446

8

reside at the property as her only or primary residence, but she did need to reside

there in some capacity. 

¶17 Nationwide also argues that any coverage under the policy was not 

“entirely illusory” because it believed that, based on Lee’s application, it was 

insuring the property as Lee’s primary residence. In fact, Nationwide asserts that 

Lee misrepresented that she was currently using the property as her primary 

residence in her application and that the property was not undergoing any 

extensive remodeling or additions. Nationwide further highlights that Lee 

misrepresented on her application that she purchased the property for $77,000, as 

opposed to inheriting the property, and that Lee misrepresented that the property 

was in excellent condition, when in fact it was only assessed for $31,900 and had, 

for example, broken windows, holes in the walls, and dog feces throughout the 

property. With the parties’ arguments in mind, we turn to the language of the 

policy.

¶18 The policy that Lee obtained through Nationwide provides coverage 

for the dwelling on the “residence premises.” The residence premises is then 

defined as (1) “[t]he one family dwelling where you reside”; (2) “[t]he two, three 

or four family dwelling where you reside in at least one of the family units”; or 

(3) “[t]hat part of any other building where you reside.” (Emphasis added.) 

“Reside” is not itself defined in the policy. Consequently, we turn to dictionaries 

and relevant case law to determine its definition. See Acuity v. Bagadia, 2008 WI 

62, ¶22, 310 Wis. 2d 197, 750 N.W.2d 817 (stating that when a term in an 

insurance policy is not defined in the policy “we consult dictionaries and the 

relevant case law that has addressed the issue”).
No. 2021AP1446

9

¶19 The dictionary defines “reside” in part as “to dwell permanently or 

continuously” and “express[es] the idea that a person keeps or returns to a 

particular dwelling place as his [or her] fixed, settled, or legal abode.” Reside, 

WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INT’L DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1993). The synonyms for 

“reside” include live, dwell, and stay. Id. 

¶20 In its brief, Nationwide provides additional definitions for reside, 

including those from the Merriam-Webster Dictionary and the Cambridge 

Dictionary. Merriam-Webster defines “reside” as “to dwell permanently or 

continuously: occupy a place as one’s legal domicile,” and the Cambridge 

Dictionary defines reside as “to live in a place.” Reside, MERRIAM-WEBSTER

DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/reside (last visited 

June 13, 2023); Reside, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY,

https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/reside (last visited June 13, 

2023). As the circuit court stated in summing up the definitions of reside, 

“Definitions of reside or residence (and dwell) almost invariably include reference 

to ‘live in.’” Ultimately, to reside requires a sense of permanent or continuous use 

of the property for activities commonly required for living and requires a 

continuous presence at the property. 

¶21 In fact, this court has previously interpreted “reside” in the context 

of the domestic abuse statute and concluded that “[t]he plain meaning of reside 

implies a continuous arrangement.” Petrowsky v. Krause, 223 Wis. 2d 32, 35-36, 

588 N.W.2d 318 (Ct. App. 1998). There, we analyzed whether the parties—an 

unmarried couple—were members of the same household for purposes of the 

domestic abuse statute when they maintained separate residences, but “stayed 

together under one roof” when they took trips. Id. at 33-34. There, “[h]ousehold 

member” was defined in the statute as “any person ‘currently or formerly residing
No. 2021AP1446

10

in a place of abode with another person.’” Id. at 35 (emphasis added; citation 

omitted). We concluded that the parties were not members of the same household

because the couple’s trips did not amount to residing together given that the trips 

were not “a continuous living arrangement.” Id. at 36-37. 

¶22 Applying the definition of “reside” here, we conclude that Lee did 

not reside at the property such that it meets the definition of a “residence 

premises” covered by the policy. Lee failed to maintain any permanent or 

continuous presence at the property such that we could conclude that she was 

residing at the property. Lee never slept at the property, she had minimal 

belongings at the property consisting of a couch, a table, and a television, and she 

generally spent very little time at the property from the time that she inherited it 

until the time of the fire. Indeed, Lee continued to use her Meinecke Avenue 

address during the time period in which she claims to have been residing at the 

property.6 In short, Lee had no permanent or continuous presence at the property

such that she could be said to have been living at the property and, thus, residing 

there. Accordingly, we conclude that the property does not amount to a residence 

premises within the meaning of the policy.

¶23 Furthermore, we likewise find irrelevant Lee’s argument that her

residence on Meinecke Avenue should not, by itself, defeat coverage for the 

property under the policy because the policy does not require that Lee be primarily 

or only residing at the property, as Lee’s argument would require. Rather, the 

policy requires that Lee reside at the property in some capacity by maintaining a 

 

6

 In fact, Lee used her address on Meinecke Avenue as her address for the August 

evictions of the tenants and for the complaint filed in this case. 
No. 2021AP1446

11

permanent or continuous presence at the property, and whether the property was 

an only, primary, or even secondary dwelling is irrelevant for our purposes. Thus, 

we conclude that Lee’s lack of any permanent or continuous presence at the 

property, as opposed to her additional address on Meinecke Avenue, defeats 

coverage in this instance.

¶24 We further reject Lee’s reliance on Johnson v. Mt. Morris Mutual

Insurance Co., 2012 WI App 3, 338 Wis. 2d 327, 809 N.W.2d 53, to argue that 

coverage exists for a property undergoing repairs for the purpose of someday 

serving as a residence. Johnson interpreted WIS. STAT. § 632.05(2)7and the 

definition of the word “occupy.” See id., ¶¶1, 7. There, we interpreted occupy in 

terms of possession and “use” of a dwelling “even if that use is not actually living 

in the dwelling.” Id., ¶¶15-16. Here, neither § 632.05(2), nor the definition of 

“occupy” is at issue. Rather, we are confronted with the definition of “residence 

premises” and the word “reside” as a precondition for coverage under an insurance 

policy. 

¶25 Moreover, we observe that Johnson is factually dissimilar to Lee’s 

case because we recognized there that while the Johnsons “had never spent the 

night in the home,” they had been on the property “on an almost [] daily basis” for 

the two-month period prior to the fire that destroyed their home. Id., ¶3. Thus, we 

 

7

 WISCONSIN STAT. § 632.05 provides in part: 

Total Loss. Whenever any policy insures real property that is 

owned and occupied by the insured primarily as a dwelling and 

the property is wholly destroyed, without criminal fault on the 

part of the insured or the insured’s assigns, the amount of the 

loss shall be taken conclusively to be the policy limits of the 

policy insuring the property.
No. 2021AP1446

12

concluded that the Johnsons “occupied” the home because they were consistently 

“using” the dwelling “even if that use is not actually living in the dwelling.” Id., 

¶¶1, 15-16. By contrast, the record lacks any evidence that Lee maintained a daily 

presence at the property similar to the presence maintained by the Johnsons. Thus, 

we conclude that Johnson does not apply to this case, and we do not discuss Lee’s 

reliance on Johnson further.

CONCLUSION

¶26 In sum, we conclude that the property was not covered by the policy, 

and therefore, we affirm the circuit court’s order granting summary judgment in 

favor of Nationwide and dismissing Lee’s complaint. The property was not a 

“residence premises” within the meaning of the policy, and therefore, it was not 

afforded coverage under the policy.

By the Court.—Order affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT. RULE

809.23(1)(b)5.