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WO

NOT FOR PUBLICATION 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Darrell Floyd, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v. 

IDS Property Casualty Insurance Company, 

et al.,

Defendants.

No. CV-18-00400-PHX-DJH

ORDER 

Before the Court is Defendant IDS Property Casualty Insurance Company’s1

(“IDS”) Motion in Limine (Doc. 49) to which Plaintiffs filed a Response (Doc. 55). 

I. LEGAL STANDARD 

“Although the Federal Rules of Evidence do not explicitly authorize in limine 

rulings, the practice has developed pursuant to the district court’s inherent authority to 

manage the course of trials.” Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 40 n.4 (1984). The Ninth 

Circuit has explained that motions in limine “allow parties to resolve evidentiary disputes 

ahead of trial, without first having to present potentially prejudicial evidence in front of a 

jury.” Brodit v. Cabra, 350 F.3d 985, 1004–05 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). 

Generally, motions in limine that seek exclusion of broad and unspecific categories of 

evidence are disfavored. See Sperberg v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 519 F.2d 708, 

712 (6th Cir. 1975). Motions in limine are “entirely within the discretion of the Court.” 

Jaynes Corp. v. American Safety Indem. Co., 2014 WL 1154180, at *1 (D. Nev. March 20, 

 

1

IDS is the only named Defendant in this action. The other defendants are fictitious 

individuals, partnerships, or corporations. 
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2014) (citing Luce, 469 U.S. at 41–42). Moreover, “[a] motion in limine is not the proper 

vehicle for seeking a dispositive ruling on a claim, particularly after the deadline for filing 

such motions has pass.” Hana Fin., Inc. v. Hana Bank, 735 F.3d 1158, 1162 (9th Cir. 

2013) (citing Dubner v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 266 F.3d 959, 968 (9th Cir. 2001), aff’d, 574 

U.S. 418 (2015). 

Motions in limine are “provisional” in nature. Goodman v. Las Vegas Metro. Police 

Dep’t, 963 F. Supp. 2d 1036 (D. Nev. 2013), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, and dismissed in 

part on other grounds, 613 F. App’x 610 (9th Cir. 2015). The Court issues its rulings on 

motions in limine based on the record currently before it. Therefore, rulings on such 

motions “‘are not binding on the trial judge [who] may always change his [or her] mind 

during the course of a trial.’” Id. (quoting Ohler v. United States, 529 U.S. 753, 758 n.3 

(2000) (noting that in limine rulings are always subject to change, especially if the evidence 

unfolds in an unanticipated manner)). “‘Denial of a motion in limine does not necessarily 

mean that all evidence contemplated by the motion will be admitted to trial. Denial merely 

means that without the context of trial, the court is unable to determine whether the 

evidence in question should be excluded.’” Id. (quoting Ind. Ins. Co. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 326 

F. Supp. 2d 844, 846 (N.D. Ohio 2004)).

II. DISCUSSION

In this Motion in Limine, IDS seeks an order precluding Plaintiffs’ liability expert, 

Mr. Flood, from offering testimony regarding: (1) opinions that were not disclosed in his 

expert report, (2) whether Plaintiffs’ medical care was reasonable and necessary and what 

the value of Plaintiffs’ claim is, (3) the relevant standards in Arizona regarding insurance 

claim handling, and (4) the motives and intent of individual IDS representatives. 

A. Opinions Not Included in Mr. Flood’s Expert Report

IDS asks this Court to limit the testimony of Mr. Flood to the content of his Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 26(a)(2)(B) report. Rule 26 requires expert reports to 

contain “a complete statement of all opinions the witness will express and the basis and 

reasons for them.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B)(i). Rule 37(c)(1) generally forbids the use 
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at trial of any information that is not properly disclosed, unless it is substantially justified 

or harmless. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1); Goodman v. Staples The Office Superstore, LLC, 

644 F.3d 817, 827 (9th Cir. 2011). Plaintiffs generally agree that experts may not offer 

new opinions beyond the scope of their reports; however, Plaintiffs note that IDS has not 

identified any undisclosed opinions that it wishes to preclude and therefore they are unable 

to address IDS’s concerns. The Court agrees. 

IDS has not asked this Court to rule on the admissibility of any particular statement 

or subject of testimony. It is unclear to this Court what statements from Plaintiffs’ expert 

IDS seeks to bar. To the extent IDS seeks a broad ruling precluding Dr. Flood from

testifying beyond a dry recitation of his report, its request is denied. See Harrelson v. 

Dupnik, 2014 WL 2510530, at *4 (D. Ariz. Mar. 12, 2014) (finding that Rule 26(a)(2)(B)

“does not limit an expert’s testimony simply to reading his report[;]” rather Rule 

26(a)(2)(B) “contemplates that the expert will supplement, elaborate upon, [and] explain 

and subject himself to cross-examination upon his report in his oral testimony.”) (internal 

quotation and citation omitted), report and recommendation adopted as modified, 2014 

WL 2510569 (D. Ariz. June 4, 2014). However, IDS may raise objections during trial, and 

the Court will issue rulings as appropriate. 

B. Opinions Regarding Reasonable and Necessary Medical Care and Value 

of Plaintiffs’ Injury Claim

IDS also seeks to exclude Mr. Flood’s opinions regarding the reasonableness of 

necessity of Plaintiffs’ medical care and the value of Plaintiffs’ claim. IDS argues that 

“[t]he value of a bodily injury claim, including what medical expenses may be casually

[sic] related and what general damages should be awarded, are peculiarly within the 

province of juries.” (Doc. 49 at 2). IDS further argues that “Mr. Flood is not a medical 

expert, and has no basis for providing opinion evidence that will help a jury determine what 

portion of Plaintiff’s medical expenses are reasonable and necessary as a result of the 

subject accident.” (Id. at 3). Plaintiffs contend that they “do not intend for Mr. Flood, 

their liability expert, to testify as a medical expert regarding the reasonableness or necessity 
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of medical treatment.” (Doc. 55 at 2). As IDS did not identify a specific statement or 

opinion by Mr. Flood that is outside his expertise, the Court finds that at this time, this 

request is too speculative and vague. IDS can object to specific testimony or evidence at 

the appropriate time during trial. 

C. Opinions Regarding Arizona Law on Good Faith Claims Handling

IDS also seeks to exclude Mr. Flood’s opinions regarding the relevant standards in 

Arizona regarding insurance claim handling. IDS argues that “[i]t is the job of this Court, 

not Plaintiff’s expert, to tell the jury what Arizona law requires of insurance companies[, 

and] [a]ny such opinions from Plaintiff’s expert are not helpful to the jury and should be 

excluded.” (Doc. 49 at 3). Plaintiffs contend that “Mr. Flood is competent and expected 

to testify, as has been disclosed, regarding his knowledge, training and experience of 

industry standards, including claims in Arizona, and his opinions that [IDS] deviated from 

those standards in this case.” (Doc. 55 at 3). 

Expert evidence is admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence (“Evidence Rule”) 

702 if the expert’s “specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the 

evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” Fed. R. Evid. 702. Accordingly, courts generally 

hold that an insurance claims handling expert in a bad faith case may testify as to whether 

the insurer’s conduct was reasonable based on industry practices and norms. See, e.g.,

Hangarter v. Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 373 F.3d 998, 1016 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding

that an expert did not improperly embrace the issue of bad faith under Rule 704(a) by 

testifying as to the relevant industry standards and the defendant's failure to comport with 

these standards); Fidelity Nat’l Financial, Inc. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburg, 

PA, 2014 WL 1286392, at *10 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2014) (“[A claims handling] expert can 

inform the jury about the industry standards based on his experience and knowledge of the 

insurance industry.”); Home Ins. Co. v. Gates McDonald & Co., 2004 WL 5486631, at *6 

(C.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2004) (“[N]othing prevents experts from testifying on whether conduct 

by an insurer was reasonably prudent in light of the insurer’s duties to its insured.”).

Again, IDS has not asked this Court to rule on the admissibility of any particular 
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statement or opinion. To the extent IDS seeks a broad ruling precluding Mr. Flood from 

testifying to the relevant standards in Arizona regarding insurance claim handling, its 

request is denied. The Court will not preclude Mr. Flood from testifying regarding the 

relevant industry standards for Arizona insurance claim handling or describing how IDS’s

procedures deviated from these standards. However, IDS may raise objections during trial, 

and the Court will issue rulings as appropriate. 

D. Opinions Regarding the Intent and Motives of IDS Representatives

Finally, IDS argues that Mr. Flood should be precluded from testifying to the intent 

and motives of IDS’s representatives because such testimony would be unhelpful to the 

jury. (Doc. 49 at 3). Plaintiffs contend that Mr. Flood will not testify regarding the motives 

and intent of individual IDS representatives. (Doc. 55 at 3). Accordingly, as IDS does not 

identify a particular statement or opinion that should be precluded and Plaintiffs represent 

that Mr. Flood will not testify regarding the intent or motives of individual IDS 

representatives, the Court denies IDS’s request. However, IDS may raise objections during 

trial, and the Court will issue rulings as appropriate.

III. FINAL PRETRIAL CONFERENCE 

The Court has reviewed the parties’ Joint Proposed Final Pretrial Order (Doc. 50-1) 

and prior to the Final Pretrial Conference, set for November 12, 2019, at 3:00 p.m., the 

parties shall meet and confer regarding their availability for a 4-5 day trial in December 

2019 or January 2020. However, the parties should be aware that the Court is unavailable 

December 9th-11th, 20th, and 23rd-26th. Additionally, the parties shall be prepared to 

discuss whether a referral to a magistrate judge for a settlement conference would be 

beneficial. Plaintiffs shall also be prepared to discuss the necessity for each identified 

witness (Doc. 50-1 at 18-20), many of whom appear to be duplicative. 

Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant IDS’s Motion in Limine (Doc. 49) is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties shall meet and confer prior to the 

Final Pretrial Settlement Conference regarding their available trial dates for December 
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2019 and January 2020 and shall be prepared to indicate whether a referral to a magistrate 

judge for a settlement conference would be beneficial. 

IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that Plaintiffs shall be prepared to discuss at the Final 

Pretrial Conference the expected testimony and necessity of each identified witness. 

Dated this 30th day of October, 2019.

Honorable Diane J. Humetewa

United States District Judge