### UNITED STATESDISTRICT COURT FORTHE DISTRICT OFCOLUMBIA

MILTONJOSEPH TAYLOR, Plaintiff,


### v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Defendant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) 

### Civil Action No. 07-1682 (RJL)


## ----------------------------) MEMORANDUM OPINION This matter comes before the Court onthe defendant's motionto dismiss the plaintiffs pro se complaint or, in the alternative, for summaryjudgment. Because the complaint, even when liberally construed, does not state a claim upon whichreliefmay be granted, the defendant's motion will be granted and the complaint will be dismissed. BACKGROUND PlaintiffMilton JosephTaylor received a Notice ofProposed Revocation dated August 9, 2007, from the District ofColumbia's Office ofAttorney General Child Support Services Division ("Notice"). See CompI. at 1 & Ex. 1. The Notice stated in pertinent part: You are hereby notified that your District ofColumbiadriver's license and/or vehicle registration is subject to revocation because ofyour failure to comply with a subpoena or warrantrelating to a paternity or child support proceeding. Under D.C. Code 22S.01(a) (2002 Supp.) [sic]], a driver's license orvehicle registration issued to an individual who fails to comply with a subpoena or warrantrelating to a paternity or child supportproceeding shall be revoked. Based on your failure to comply, your driver's license and/or vehicle registration will be revoked 30 days from the date ofthis letter. ] The correct cite is D.C. Code 

### §46-22S.01(a).To avoid revocation, you must either obtain a Certificate ofCompliance orrequest a hearing within 30 days ofthe date ofthis letter. 

## * * * * You are also entitled to a hearing on this proposed action. To request a hearing, you must write or visit CSSD [Child Support Services Division] within 30 days of the date ofthis letter and state the reason for your objection. Ifthe revocation is ordered after ahearing, your license and/or registration will be revoked unless you obtain a Certificate ofCompliance within 30 days after the order is issued. Id., Ex. 1. The notice also gave additional information on where to go or write to obtain a Certificate ofCompliance orto request a hearing. Receipt ofthis notice gave rise to the plaintiffs complaint, wherein he "'PROTEST[s], the constitutionality ofthe D.C. Code § 22S.01(a)." Id. at 4. Using his complaintto argue, plaintiffcontends that the challenged provision allows "executive officials" to "impose a punishment," in violation ofthe constitution's due process clause, doublejeopardyclause and its separation ofpowers doctrine, 

### id. at 5, and emphasizes that "[t]hepowerto impose a sentence belongs to thejudicial branch," 

### id. at 6. The plaintiffalleges that he has suffered mental anguish because ofthe Notice, id. at 10, and demands three million dollars in compensation, id. at 11. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss on multiple grounds, including failure to state a claim upon which reliefmay be granted or, in the alternative, for summaryjudgment. In his response, which the Court construes as an opposition, the plaintiffseeks to "amend and supplement additional facts," and identifies additional statutes
- all federal- thathe challenges
on various constitutional grounds.



### - 2 -DISCUSSION Rule 12(b)(6) ofthe Federal Rules ofCivil Procedure authorizes dismissal ofacomplaint that fails to state a claim upon which reliefcan be granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). On such
a motion, a court construes aprose complaint liberally. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). A court considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motionto dismiss assumes all factual to be true,
evenifthey are doubtful. BellAtl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007); Kowal v. MCI Communc'ns Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (noting that a court must construe the complaint "liberally inthe plaintiffs' favor" and "grantplaintiffs the benefit ofall inferences that canbe derived from the facts alleged"). A court need not, however, "accept inferences drawnbyplaintiffs ifsuch inferences are unsupported by the facts set out in the complaint. Nor must [a] court accept legal conclusions cast inthe form offactual allegations." Kowal, 16 F.3d at 1276. "While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations,
... a plaintiffs obligation to provide the grounds ofhis entitle[ment] to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation ofthe elements ofa cause ofaction will not do[.]" Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1964-65 (internal citations and quotations omitted) (alteration in original). "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,
... on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true ...." ld at 1965 (citations and footnote omitted). Plaintiffasserts a due process challenge to D.C. Code § 46-225.01, asserting that it is unconstitutional because it permits a driver's license to be revoked without an opportunityto be heard on the matter. See Compl. at 2. Plaintiffis wrong. Subsection (c)(1) ofD.C. Code § 46- 225.01 expressly requires that before the driver's license is revoked, an affected party must
- 3 -receive 30 days notice ofthe proposed action and notice that the party has a right to a hearing. D.C. Code 

### §46-225.01(c)(1). Indeed, the Notice plaintiffreceived and appended to his complaint expressly notified plaintiffofhis right to a hearing, and advised the plaintiffwhere and howto request such a hearing. In light ofthese facts, plaintiffhas failed to state a claim for a due process violation. Plaintiffalso asserts that D.C. Code § 46-225.01 violates his protection against double jeopardy and, relatedly, fails to maintain the separation ofpowers required bythe constitution. The constitution's doublejeopardyclause applies onlyto successive criminal proceedings. The Double Jeopardy Clause provides that no "person [shall] be subject for the same offence to be twice put injeopardy oflife or limb." We have long recognized that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit the imposition ofall additional sanctions that could, in commonparlance, be described as punishment.

. .. The Clause protects only against the imposition ofmultiple criminal punishments for the same offense,
... , and then only when such occurs in successiveproceedings
.... 

### Hudson v. 

### US, 522 U.S. 93, 98-99 (1997). Plaintiffs contention in this complaint appears to be based on confusion between a criminal sentence orpunishment, and other adverse actions by a governmental authority that do not amount to criminal punishment. The revocation ofa driver's license under D.C. Code 

### §46- 225.01 is not a criminal punishment. Rather, it is an administrative forfeiture that does not implicate the doublejeopardyclause. The plaintiffs underlying proceeding for child support payments was not a criminal matter, and any proceeding to enforce the child supportpayments or sanctions for failure to pay the ordered child support cannot, by definition, constitute double jeopardy. Moreover, the fact that the D.C. law confers onthe executive branch the authority to revoke a driver's license "is prima facie evidence that [the legislature] intended to provide a civil
- 4 -sanction" rather than a criminal one. Hudson,522 U.S. at 103. Indeed, "revocation ofa privilege voluntarily granted" such as a driver's license, has long been viewed by the Supreme Court as a "remedial sanction," rather than a criminal sanction, and not "subjectto the procedural rules governing criminal prosecutions." Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399 (1938). Thus, plaintiffhas also failed to state a claim for a violation ofhis constitutional protection against doublejeopardy. The related claim that plaintiffis entitled to ajudicial hearing on this matter because revocation is in the nature ofa criminal punishment fails for the same reason: the proposed license revocation is not a criminal punishment. In his opposition to the defendant's motion to dismiss, the plaintiffseeks to "amend and supplement additional facts" to include similar constitutional challenges to several federal statutes. The defendant in this action, the District ofColumbia, is notresponsible for any federal statutes and need not answer for their constitutionality. Thus, plaintiffs attempt in this action to challenge the constitutionality offederal statutes must also fail because he cannot state any such claims against this defendant upon which reliefmay be granted. Accordingly, those claims are also dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which reliefmaybe granted. CONCLUSION Forthe reasons stated, the complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which reliefmay be granted. A separate order accompanies this memorandum opinion.

# ~rt~L**CHARD~** 

# Date.,/ 1C1

# I CI

# ~ United States District Judge



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