UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. No. 98-4864

KEENAN LEVIRT HUGHES,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria.

Claude M. Hilton, Chief District Judge.

(CR-98-224-A)

Submitted: September 28, 1999

Decided: October 14, 1999

Before NIEMEYER, LUTTIG, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

Kenneth Michael Robinson, THE ROBINSON LAW FIRM, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Helen F. Fahey, United States Attorney,

Rebeca Hidalgo Bellows, Assistant United States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.

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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).
OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Keenan Levirt Hughes appeals from a 151 month sentence following his conviction for conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute and to distribute crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C.A.§ 846 (West Supp.

1999). Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

Hughes contends that the district court erred when it did not, sua

sponte, hold an evidentiary hearing on the admissibility of his confession and did not, in the absence of a request from defense counsel,

give a specific instruction on the jury's consideration of the confession. While 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a) (1994) requires that a district court

hold an evidentiary hearing on the admissibility of a confession prior

to its admission at a jury trial, the district court did not err because

Hughes did not timely move to suppress the statement. See United

States v. Wilson, 895 F.2d 168, 172-73 (4th Cir. 1990) (per curiam).

Although this court has held that the failure of a trial court to give a

specific instruction regarding the jury's consideration of the confession constitutes plain error, we will not reverse a conviction on this

basis if the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See id.;

United States v. Sauls, 520 F.2d 568, 570 (4th Cir. 1975); see also

Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 288-89 (1991). In light of the

substantial evidence against Hughes and the court's general instruction to the jury on the credibility of witnesses and the weight that they

were to accord each witness's testimony, we find that the error in this

case was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, Hughes'

claim that his attorney's representation was ineffective for failing to

move to suppress the confession and for failing to request a specific

instruction concerning the confession is not cognizable on direct

appeal because the record does not conclusively establish that he is

entitled to relief. See United States v. Hoyle , 33 F.3d 415, 418 (4th

Cir. 1994).

Hughes also seeks to invalidate his conviction on the basis that the

Government's inquiries into the past drug distribution activities and

prior arrest and conviction history of a defense witness were

improper. The Government concedes that most of its questions were

improper, but argues that none merit reversal of Hughes' convictions.

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We agree. The government cannot use artful cross-examination to

introduce evidence that would otherwise be inadmissible. See United

States v. Hall, 989 F.2d 711, 716 (4th Cir. 1993). Where, however,

a district court sustains a defense objection to an improper government question, the witness does not answer, and the defense does not

move for a mistrial, this court will not reverse a conviction unless the

prejudice resulting from the improper question was of such a magnitude that the defendant was denied a fair trial. See United States v.

Lamarr, 75 F.3d 964, 969 (4th Cir. 1996).

Hughes' counsel objected and the court sustained the objection to

the Government's questions about Rosan Abdul Rahim's length of

incarceration while awaiting trial on unrelated charges and whether

Rahim had ever distributed drugs. In light of the substantial evidence

against Hughes, and in light of the curative instruction that was given

by the court, see Hall, 989 F.2d at 717, we find that any error caused

by the Government's cross-examination of Rahim with respect to

these two questions was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

We further find that questions regarding Rahim's pending charges

and previous arrests and convictions did not constitute plain error. See

United States v. France, 164 F.3d 203, 207 (4th Cir. 1998), cert.

denied, ___ U.S. ___, 119 S.Ct. 2351 (1999). We have considered the

Government's questioning to which the defense lodged no objection

and conclude that none of these questions, when considered together

and in light of the entire record, was prejudicial to such an extent that

outcome of the proceeding was affected. See id. Thus, because this

aspect of the Government's cross-examination of Rahim did not

affect Hughes' substantial rights, we find no reversible error.

Accordingly, we affirm Hughes' conviction and sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument

would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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