* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of

law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of

orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and

conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

1

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

Filed 5/24/96TENTH CIRCUIT

LARRY MUKES,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

DOLORES RAMSEY, JACK COWLEY,

LINDA BRANHAM, STEVE

BENNETT, AND JOHN DOE,

Defendants-Appellees.

Case No. 95-6364

(D.C. CIV-95-726-W)

(Western District of Oklahoma)

 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

 

Before BRORBY, EBEL, and HENRY, Circuit Judges.

 

Plaintiff-appellant Larry Mukes, a prisoner in the custody of the Oklahoma

Department of Corrections (DOC) appearing pro se, appeals the dismissal of his 42

U.S.C. § 1983 action against DOC officials, a corrections officer, and a DOC counselor. 

Mr. Mukes charged that the defendants had violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights to

due process and equal protection in a disciplinary proceeding against him arising from an

incident in which Mr. Mukes hit defendant Branham with a water hose. The district court
1After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined that oral

argument would not materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a);

10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.

2

dismissed the action on the grounds that the claims against Ramsey and Cowley were

time-barred, see Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12 § 95(3) (West 1996), and that Branham and

Bennett had not been served within 120 days of filing of the complaint, see Fed. R. Civ.

P. 4(m). We affirm.1

I. BACKGROUND

Mr. Mukes was convicted at a disciplinary hearing of battery and received

punishment of 30 days’ disciplinary segregation, loss of 365 earned credits, and a fifteen

dollar fine. His final administrative appeal was denied on October 31, 1991. He filed this

action on February 2, 1995, and the matter was assigned to a magistrate judge pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). Subsequently, defendants Ramsey and Cowley filed a Motion

to Dismiss/Motion for Summary Judgment, arguing in part that the statute of limitations

had expired. Mr. Mukes failed to respond to this motion, despite the magistrate judge’s

filing an order advising him that his failure to respond would result in the motion being

deemed confessed. The magistrate judge therefore recommended that summary judgment

be awarded to Cowley and Ramsey. The magistrate also found that the complaint had not

been successfully served on defendants Bennett and Branham within 120 days of filing,

and that, in any event, the action as to those defendants was also time-barred.

Mr. Mukes filed an objection to the magistrate’s report, though he did not dispute
3

that his action was barred by the statute of limitations. The district court adopted the

magistrate’s Report and Recommendation, granting the motion to dismiss by Cowley and

Ramsey and sua sponte dismissing the action against Bennett and Branham.

II. DISCUSSION

In a § 1983 action, the relevant statute of limitations is the state’s statute applicable

to personal injury actions. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276-79 (1985). In Oklahoma,

the statute of limitations for § 1983 claims is two years. Meade v. Grubbs, 841 F.2d

1512, 1522-24 (10th Cir. 1988); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12 § 95(3). The district court’s

finding that this action was initiated more than two years after the statute of limitations

began to run is not clearly erroneous.

Mr. Mukes claims for the first time on appeal that he initiated this action on

October 20, 1992. However, because he failed to raise this below, or to allege any facts

to support this new claim, he cannot raise it here. See Hinds v. General Motors Corp.,

988 F.2d 1039, 1045 (10th Cir. 1993) (issues not raised in trial court are waived on appeal

unless plain error is demonstrated). He also argues for the first time that his incarceration

constitutes a “disability,” which tolls the statute of limitations, although he fails to cite

any authority for the proposition that the mere status of incarceration tolls the time for

filing a § 1983 claim. Moreover, because none of the exceptions to the rule prohibiting

new issues on appeal are present here, see Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 928 F.2d 966, 970

(10th Cir. 1991) (citing exceptions including: jurisdictional issues, sovereign immunity,
4

and questions of law whose resolution is necessary to prevent a miscarriage of justice),

neither of these arguments can now be raised.

Finally, Mr. Mukes argued below that he was unable to find current addresses for

Branham and Bennett and that he had sought the assistance of the clerk of the Eastern

District of Oklahoma in attempting to serve them. Failure to effect proper service within

120 days of filing a complaint is grounds for dismissal of the complaint, in the absence of

“good cause” for the failure. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m); Espinoza v. United States, 52 F.3d

838, 840-41 (10th Cir. 1995). The district court found that Mr. Mukes had made an

insufficient showing of justification for his failure to serve Linda Branham. With respect

to Steve Bennett, the court concluded that because the claim against him would have been

time-barred “additional attempts at service would not promote any interest of justice or

serve any useful purpose.” Rec. doc. 11 at 3. We find this reasoning to be sound and we

adopt it with respect to the action against Branham as well as that against Bennett.

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the order of the district court.

The mandate shall issue forthwith.

Entered for the Court,

Robert H. Henry

Circuit Judge