alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 15.8  UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN
DISTRICT OF NEW YORK  X:ARGENTINIAN
  RECOVERY COMPANY LLC,
  :W.R. HUFF ASSET MANAGEMENT CO., LLC,
  :
  
  SUMMARY
  ORDERTHE HUFF ALTERNATIVE INCOME FUND, L.P.,
  :and WRH PARTNERS GLOBAL SECURITIES LP,
  ::
  
  04 Civ. 3619
  (AKH)Appellants,
  ::-against-
  ::BOARD OF
  DIRECTORS OF MULTICANAL S.A.,
  ::Appellee.
  ::XARGENTINIAN
  RECOVERY COMPANY LLC,
  :W.R. HUFF ASSET
  MANAGEMENT CO., LLC,
  :THE HUFF
  ALTERNATIVE INCOME FUND, L.P.,
  :and WRH PARTNERS
  GLOBAL SECURITIES LP,
  ::
  
  05 Civ. 1968
  (AKH)Appellants,
  ::-against-
  ::BOARD OF
  DIRECTORS OF MULTICANAL S.A.,
  ::Appellee.
  ::XARGENTINIAN
  RECOVERY COMPANY LLC,
  :W.R. HUFF ASSET
  MANAGEMENT CO., LLC,
  :THE HUFF
  ALTERNATIVE INCOME FUND, L.P.,
  :and WRH PARTNERS
  GLOBAL SECURITIES LP,
  ::
  
  05 Civ. 1969
  (AKH)Appellants,
  ::-against-
  ::MULTICANAL S.A.,
  ::Appellee.
  ::X  ALVIN K. HELLERSTEIN, USDJ:  The
parties appeared before me for oral argument on March 30, 2005.  For the reasons stated on the record at oral
argument, it is hereby  1


ORDERED,
that In re Board of Directors of Multicanal S.A., 307 B.R. 384 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2004), which held that rights under the Trust Indenture
Act did not preclude the grant of relief to a foreign debtor under section 304
of the Bankruptcy Code (the Code), 11 U.S.C. § 304, is affirmed;  ORDERED,
that the analysis in In re Board of Directors of Multicanal S.A., 314
B.R. 486, 501 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2004), to the extent it held that
the Multicanal board satisfied the requirement of a foreign representative
under section 304(a) of the Code, 11 U.S.C. § 304(a), is
affirmed;  ORDERED,
that the Order of the Bankruptcy Court (I) Granting Section 304 Petition
and Issuing Permanent Injunction and (II) Dismissing Involuntary Petition,
dated January 6, 2005, is affirmed to the extent that it denied Appellants
involuntary petition for bankruptcy under section 303 of the Code, 11
U.S.C. § 303; and  ORDERED,
that judgment on the outstanding issues relating to the petition under section 304
of the Code, 11 U.S.C. § 304, is reserved until May 31, 2005 at 4 p.m.,
500 Pearl Street, Courtroom 14D.  All
tentative rulings made during oral argument, to the extent not directly
addressed in this order, shall be carried forward until such date.  SO
ORDERED.  Dated:
  New York, New YorkApril 5, 2005/s/  Alvin K. HellersteinALVIN
  K. HELLERSTEINUnited
  States District Judge  2
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Dismissed, Emergency Motion for 

Temporary Relief Denied as Moot, and Memorandum Opinion filed 

July 29, 2014.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-14-00576-CR

IN RE KHAI LE, Relator

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

County Criminal Court at Law No. 13

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 1881713

MEMORANDUM OPINION

On July 15, 2014, relator Khai Le filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in 

this court. See Tex. Gov’t Code § 22.221; see also Tex. R. App. P. 52. In the 

petition, relator contends that she is illegally restrained for an alleged violation of 

conditions of community supervision, because the trial court lost jurisdiction over 

the underlying proceedings and the continued prosecution of relator will violate the 

constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. Also on July 15, 2014, relator 
2

filed an emergency motion for temporary relief. See Tex. R. App. P. 52.8(b)(3), 

52.10.

We are unable to consider relator’s petition, because this court has no 

original habeas corpus jurisdiction in criminal law matters. See Tex. Gov’t Code 

§ 22.221(d) (providing original habeas jurisdiction to the Courts of Appeals where 

a relator’s liberty is restrained by virtue of an order, process, or commitment issued 

by a court or judge in a civil case); see also Lewis v. State, 191 S.W.3d 225, 229 

(Tex. App.—San Antonio 2005, pet ref’d); Watson v. State, 96 S.W.3d 497, 500 

(Tex. App.—Amarillo 2002, pet ref’d); Ex parte Hearon, 3 S.W.3d 650, 650 (Tex. 

App.—Waco 1999, orig. proceeding) (mem. op., per curiam). Original jurisdiction 

to grant a writ of habeas corpus in a criminal case is vested in the Court of 

Criminal Appeals, the district courts, the county courts, or a judge of those courts. 

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.05. 

Accordingly, we dismiss relator’s petition for writ of habeas corpus for want 

of jurisdiction. We also deny as moot relator’s emergency motion for temporary 

relief.1

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Chief Justice Frost and Justices Jamison and Donovan.

Do Not Publish — Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).

 1 Relator previously filed a petition for writ of mandamus and writ of prohibition pertaining to her 

assertion that the trial court has lost jurisdiction over the underlying proceedings. See In re Khai Le, Nos. 

14-14-00446-CR and 14-14-00447-CR. Relator’s petition for writ of mandamus and writ of prohibition 

remains pending with this court; this opinion only disposes of relator’s newly-filed petition for writ of 

habeas corpus and corresponding motion for temporary relief in No. 14-14-00576-CR.
Exhibit 32.1

JMP GROUP INC.

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF
EXECUTIVE OFFICER PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002.

In connection
with the periodic report of JMP Group Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ended March 31, 2010, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the Report), I, Joseph A. Jolson, Chief Executive Officer
of the Company, hereby certify as of the date hereof, solely for purposes of Title 18, Chapter 63, Section 1350 of the United States Code, that to the best of my knowledge:



| | (1) | the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and
| | --- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company at the dates and for
the periods indicated.
| | --- | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                  |  |                        
|----------------- |  | -----------------------
|Date: May 6, 2010 |  | /s/ Joseph A. Jolson   
|                  |  | Joseph A. Jolson       
|                  |  | Chief Executive Officer

This certification accompanies
this Report on Form 10-Q pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not be deemed filed by the Company for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the Exchange Act).
Such certification will not be deemed to be incorporated by reference into any filing under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, or the Exchange Act, except to the extent that the Company specifically incorporates it by reference.
1 Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-30830 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus STEVEN B. TENCER,

Defendant-Appellant.

- - - - - - - - - - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana

USDC No. 92-570-C

- - - - - - - - - - October 19, 1998 Before DAVIS, DUHÉ, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 1 Court-appointed counsel for Steven B. Tencer has filed a brief

as required by Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 ( 1967). Our independent review of the brief and the record discloses no nonfrivolous issue. Accordingly, counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED. Counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein
and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. See 5 TH C IR . R. 42.2.
MICHEAL B. MURRAY

DISTRICT ATTORNEY

35TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TEXAS

BROWN AND MILLS COUNTIES 

200 S. BROADWAY, COURTHOUSE

BROWNWOOD, TEXAS 76801

(325) 646-0444 FAX: (325) 643-4053

CHRIS BROWN

FIRST ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY

ELISHA BIRD

ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY

J. CHRISTINA NELSON

ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY

 March 18, 2015 

The Court of Criminal Appeals 

Supreme Court Building 

201 West 14th Street, Room 106 

Austin, Texas 78701 

Re: Robert Thornburgh, PD-0230-15

To the Honorable Court of Criminal Appeals: 

The State has received Robert Thornburgh Jr.’s Petition for Discretionary Review. In 

lieu of filing a formal response, the State would simply ask this Court to refuse to review this 

case because Petitioner has failed to provide an appropriate reason for review under Rule 66.3 of 

the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. As this Court is aware, refusal of a petition for 

discretionary review does not constitute endorsement or adoption of the reasoning employed by 

the court of appeals. Aguilar v. State, 830 S.W.2d 612, 613 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (en banc). 

 Should this Court choose to grant review, the State requests notice and time to respond to 

the merits of the claims presented by Petitioner. 

Sincerely yours, 

/S/ Elisha Bird 

Elisha Bird 

Assistant District Attorney 

cc: Erika Copeland, Attorney for Petitioner, ecopeland63@yahoo.com 

PD-0230-15

COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

AUSTIN, TEXAS

Transmitted 3/18/2015 3:59:54 PM

Accepted 3/19/2015 9:53:29 AM

ABEL ACOSTA

CLERK
CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER

PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF
THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 (18 U.S.C. 1350)

Exhibit 32.2

In connection with this Report on Form 10-Q for the three months ended December 31, 2015 (the Report) of
PennantPark Investment Corporation (the Registrant), as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof, I, Aviv Efrat, Chief Financial Officer of the Registrant, hereby certify, to the best of my knowledge, that:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
as amended; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial
condition and results of operations of the Registrant.



|               |  |                        
|-------------- |  | -----------------------
|/s/ Aviv Efrat
|Name:          |  | Aviv Efrat             
|Title:         |  | Chief Financial Officer
|Date:          |  | February 3, 2016
#### The City of Cape Girardeau, Respondent, v. Frank E. Burrough, Appellant.

St. Louis Court of Appeals,

January 13, 1891.

Jurisdiction, Appellate. The defense in this case, which was a suit for the collection of taxes, was, that the assessment was invalid, because made against an estate and not against a person, and because there was no evidence of ownership on the part of the person against whose estate the assessment was made. *Held*that the cause involved thé construction of the revenue laws of this state, and that the supreme court alone had jurisdiction of the appeal.

*299
      *Appeal from the Cape Girardeau Court of Common Pleas.*— Hon. Maurice Cramer, Judge.

*Transferred to the Supreme Court.*

*Frank F.*Burrough, for appellant.

*Sam. M.*Green, for respondent.

Rombauer, P. J.

This is a proceeding to obtain judgment against certain town lots in the city of Cape Girardeau for delinquent taxes of the year 1886. The proceeding is under the revenue'laws of the state. The defense rests exclusively on the provision, that the taxes were assessed to “Burrough, J. H., Est.” (meaning estate of J. H. Burrough), and, hence, were assessed to no owner whatever, and that, even if the word estate could be rejected as surplusage, yet it is not shown that J. H. Burrough ever was the owner, or had any interest in the land, and, hence, the assessment, under the ruling in *Abbott v.*Lindenbower, 42 Mo. 162, and *State ex rel. v.*Railroad, 82 Mo. 683, is utterly void. The plaintiff, who obtained judgment below, claims that, under the provisions of section 6853 of the Revised Statutes, 1879, the assessment is valid notwithstanding this defect, if defect it be, since the defendant now proceeded against is admittedly the true owner.

It will be thus seen at a glance that the case involves the construction of the revenue laws of this state, and that the supreme court has exclusive appellate jurisdiction thereof. It is, therefore, ordered that the case be transferred to the supreme court, and that the clerk forthwith send the transcript of the record therein, with a copy of this order of transfer, to said court.

All the judges concur.
[Federal Register Volume 61, Number 119 (Wednesday, June 19, 1996)]
[Notices]
[Pages 31117-31118]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 96-15486]



-----------------------------------------------------------------------

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
[Docket No. C-3594]


Eli Lilly and Company, Inc.,; Prohibited Trade Practices, and 
Affirmative Corrective Actions

AGENCY: Federal Trade Commission.

ACTION: Consent order.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: In settlement of alleged violations of federal law prohibiting 
unfair or deceptive acts or practices and unfair methods of 
competition, this consent order requires, among other things, and 
Indiana producer of pharmaceutical products to: ensure that the 
acquired company, PCS Health Systems (PCS), maintains an open 
formulary; appoint an independent Pharmacy and Therapeutics (P&T) 
Committee of health care professionals to objectively evaluate drugs 
for

[[Page 31118]]

inclusion in the PCS open formulary; and, ensure that PCS accepts all 
discounts, rebates or other concessions offered by Eli Lilly's 
competitors for drugs that are accepted for listing on the open 
formulary, and to accurately reflect such discounts in ranking the 
drugs on the formulary. Pursuant to the modification of the proposed 
consent agreement, Eli Lilly would only need to obtain prior approval 
for an exclusive distribution agreement with McKesson Corporation. In 
addition, the consent order prohibits PCS and Eli Lilly from sharing 
proprietary or other non-public information, such as price data, 
obtained from Eli Lilly competitors whose drugs may be placed on a PCS 
formulary.

DATES: Complaint and Order issued July 28, 1995.\1\

    \1\ Copies of the Complaint, the Decision and Order, and 
statements from the Commission and Commissioner Azcuenaga are 
available from the Commission's Public Reference Branch, H-130, 6th 
Street & Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20580.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Michael McNeely, FTC/S-3231, Washington, D.C. 20580 (202) 326-2904.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On Monday, November 28, 1994, there was 
published in the Federal Register, 59 FR 60815, a proposed consent 
agreement with analysis In the Matter of Eli Lilly and Company, Inc., 
for the purpose of soliciting public comment. Interested parties were 
given sixty (60) days in which to submit comments, suggestions or 
objections regarding the proposed form of the order.
    Comments were filed and considered by the Commission. The 
Commission has ordered the issuance of the complaint in the form 
contemplated by the agreement, made its jurisdictional findings and 
entered an order to cease and desist, as modified, in disposition of 
this proceeding.

(Sec. 6, 38 Stat. 721; 15 U.S.C. 46. Interpret or apply sec. 5, 38 
Stat. 719, as amended; sec. 7, 38 Stat. 731, as amended; 15 U.S.C. 
45, 18)
Donald S. Clark,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 96-15486 Filed 6-18-96; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6750-01-M
**UN PUBLISHED** 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 12** 
**- 7**  **638**

ROBERT ALEX ZANDER ,

P laintiff

- Appellant ,

v.

HARLEY LAPPIN; KIM WHITE; GERALDO MALDONADO, JR.; RONALD W. RIKER; TRACY W. JOHNS; JOSEPH P. YOUNG; KENNETH MOTTERN ,
Defendants

- Appellee s
.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina , at R aleigh

. Louise W. Flanagan , District Judge. ( 5:08

- ct

- 03117

- FL )

Submitted : January 3 1 , 2013 Decided: February 7, 2013

Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER , and KING , Circuit Judges.

Affirm ed by un published per curiam opinion

.

Robert A lex Zander , Appellant Pro Se. Michael Bredenberg, FEDERAL MEDICAL CENTER, Butner, North Carolina; Seth Morgan Wood, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM:

Robert A. Zander appeals the district court ’ s order
dismissing without prejudice for failure to exhaust

administrative remedi es his complaint filed pursuant to Bivens
v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics , 403

U.S. 388 (1971). * We have reviewed the record and find no
reversible error. Accordingly, although we grant leave to
proceed in forma pauperis, we affirm for the reasons stated by

the district court. Zander v. Lappin , No. 5:08

- ct

- 03117

- FL
(E.D.N.C. Aug. 1, 2012) . We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the

materials before th is court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.

AFFIRMED

* We vacated the district court’s prior order dismissing Zander’s complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and remanded to the district court for further findings. See Zander v. Lappin , No. 10

- 6484, 415 F. App’x 491 (4th C ir. 2011)

.
---

EXHIBIT 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED
PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Jason Dussault, hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that:

|(1) | the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Dussault Apparel
      Inc. for the period ended April 30, 2009 (the "Report") fully complies
      with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange
      Act of 1934; and
|--- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|    |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
|(2) | the information contained in the Report fairly presents,
      in all material respects, the financial condition and results of
      operations of Dussault Apparel Inc.                                                                 

Dated: June 18, 2009



| | /s/
      Jason Dussault             
| | -------------------------------------
| | Jason Dussault                       
| | Chief Executive Officer and President
| | (Principal Executive Officer)        
| | Dussault Apparel Inc.                

A signed original of this written statement required by
Section 906, or other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise
adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version
of this written statement required by Section 906, has been provided to Dussault
Apparel Inc. and will be retained by Dussault Apparel Inc. and furnished to the
Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

---
Exhibit 23.01


                         CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS


We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements on
Form S-8 (Nos. 33-77060, 33-93048, 333-49561, 333-56349, 333-55827, and
333-46222) and the Registration Statements on Form S-3 (Nos. 333-76378,
333-82089, 333-94641, 333-31982, and 333-46224) of our report dated January 25,
2002, with respect to the consolidated financial statements and schedule of
ATMI, Inc. included in this Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended
December 31, 2001.

                                                          /s/ ERNST & YOUNG LLP


Stamford, Connecticut
March 25, 2002
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF TEXAS

NO. WR-94,278-01

EX PARTE JOHNNIE EDISON CARTER, Applicant

ON APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

CAUSE NO. 15-22215-A IN THE CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT

FROM JEFFERSON COUNTY

Per curiam. SLAUGHTER, J., filed a concurring opinion. 

O P I N I O N

Applicant originally pleaded guilty to aggravated assault and was placed on deferred

adjudication community supervision for a period of ten years. Later, he was adjudicated guilty and

sentenced to twenty years’ imprisonment. The Ninth Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction. 

Carter v. State, No. 09-20-00175-CR (Tex. App.—Beaumont June 8, 2022) (not designated for

publication). Applicant filed this application for a writ of habeas corpus in the county of conviction,

and the district clerk forwarded it to this Court. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 11.07.

Applicant contends that appellate counsel failed to timely inform Applicant that his

conviction had been affirmed and advise him of his right to file a pro se petition for discretionary

review. Based on the record, the trial court has determined that appellate counsel’s performance was
2

deficient and that Applicant would have timely filed a petition for discretionary review but for

counsel’s deficient performance.

Relief is granted. Ex parte Wilson, 956 S.W.2d 25 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997); Ex parte Crow,

180 S.W.3d 135 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Applicant may file an out-of-time petition for

discretionary review of the judgment of the Ninth Court of Appeals in cause number 09-20-00175-

CR. Should Applicant decide to file a petition for discretionary review, he must file it with this

Court within thirty days from the date of this Court’s mandate.

Copies ofthis opinion shall be sent to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice–Correctional

Institutions Division and the Board of Pardons and Paroles.

Delivered: November 16, 2022

Do not publish
Court of Appeals

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA,____________________

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:

A18E0050. VISIONARY LEARNING ACADEMY, INC. v. BRIGHT FROM

THE START; GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF CARE AND LEARNING.

On May 11, 2018, Visionary Learning Academy, Inc. (“VLA”) moved this

Court pursuant to Court of Appeals Rules 40 (b) for an extension of time to file an

application for discretionary appeal from an April 10, 2018 order of the Superior

Court of Fulton County affirming an agency decision. 

Pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-35 (d), VLA’s application was due on May 10.

Although VLA filed a motion for reconsideration of the superior court’s order (which

was denied on May 10), the filing of such a motion does not toll the time for filing

a discretionary application. In the Interest of A. R. B., 209 Ga. App. 324, 325 (1) (433

SE2d 411) (1993). To be timely, a discretionary application must be filed within 30

days of entry of the order sought to be appealed. OCGA § 5-6-35 (d). The

requirements of OCGA § 5-6-35 are jurisdictional, and this Court cannot accept an

application for appeal not made in compliance therewith. Prison Health Servs., Inc.

v. Georgia Dep't of Admin. Servs., 265 Ga. 810, 811 (1) (462 SE2d 601) (1995).

“No extensions of time will be granted to file a discretionary application unless

a motion for extension is filed on or before the application due date.” Court of

Appeals Rule 30 (i). Because VLA failed to meet the prerequisites for obtaining an

May 11, 2018
extension of time to file its application for discretionary appeal, this Rule 40 (b)

motion is hereby DENIED. 

Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk’s Office, Atlanta,____________________

I certify that the above is a true extract from

the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court

hereto affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

05/11/2018