### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03- 10 -00 030 -CV

The Uni ve r sit y I nt e r sc hol as ti c Le ag ue , A ppe lla nt
v. South west Of

fi cials Association, Inc., d/ b/a T exas Association of S ports Off icials , Appellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 98TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. D-1- GN-09- 0040 92 , HO NORAB LE RHO NDA HURLEY , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

O P I N I O N
The Unive rsity

I nterschola stic L eague (“ the UI L ”) a ppeals fr om the tria l c o u

r t’ s o rder de nying its ple a to the jur isd ic tio n in a su it br ou g ht by Te xas As so c ia tio n of Spo rt s O ffici a ls (“TA SO”). In its suit for de clar atory and injunctive re lief, TASO see ks to prevent t he UI Lfrom imp le me nti ngits pla

n to be g in r e g ulatin g the of fi c ia tin g of

hig h s c ho ol v a rs ity sp orts in T e xas. TASO also see ks damag es base d on a cla im that the UI Lhas t o rt i o u s ly interfe red w ith TASO’s contra c tu a l r e lati o n s w it

h it s me mb e r s . B e c a

u s e w e c o n c lu d e th a t T A SO ’ s c la im s a r e b a r r e d by
sovere ign immunity , we r ever se the orde r of the tr ial court a nd dismiss this suit for wa nt of jurisdiction.
BACK GR OUND

Th e UI Lis a

n o rg a nizatio n g ov e rn inge xtra c ur ri c ula r athl e tic a

nd a c a de mic c on te sts in all Texas public schools and certain private parochial schools. According to the education code,T h e “N o P as s No Play ” policy dictates that a

student rec eiving a g rade lower tha n the 1 equivalent of a 70 on a scale of 100 in any aca demic cla ss shall be suspended f rom UI L -sponsored activities or other

wise sanc tioned by

the UI Lor the student’s sc hool district. See Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 33.081(c ) (West Supp. 2 0 0 9 ). Section 33.091 of the e ducation code require s high sc hool athletes to ag ree to submit to random testing for the pr esenc e of illeg al steroids as a co n d i t i o n of participation in UI L -sponsored a thletic contests. See id. § 33.091 (West Supp. 2009). T h e a m e n d e d

r u l e d o e s n o tp r o h i b i to f

f i c i a l s f r o m r e g i s t e r i n g w i t h b o t h T A S O a n d t h e U IL. 2 Offic ials who do not reg ister with the UI Lrema in free to officiate non-var sity sporting e vents and i n d i v i d u al -s p o rt co n t es t s s u ch as t en n i s , go l f, s wi m m i n g, an d wr es t l i n g. 2 th e U I L “ is a p a rt o f T h e U n iv e r s it y o f T e xa s a t A u s ti n . ” T e x. E d u c . Co d e A n n . § 33.083(b) (We st 2 00 6) . In a dd iti on to a dmi nis te ri nge xtra c ur ri c ula r a c tiv iti e s, the UI Lis char ge d b y statut e with enforc ing c erta in reg ulatory scheme s, including the “No Pass No Play ” policy applicable to stude nt athletes and the preve ntion of illega l steroid use. See id. §§ 33.081(c) , .091 1 (West Supp. 2009).

TASO is a profe ssional trade a ssociation made up of approximately 12,000 Texas sp or ts o ff ic ia ls, or g a nize d in 19 6 loc a l cha pte rs a c ro ss the state . Ac c or din g to i ts p le a din g s, TA SO reg isters sports officia ls, provides educ ational mater ials and tra ining, pr omotes the profe ssional interests of Te x as sports offic iants, advocates on beha lf of its members, a nd co n d u ct s formal disciplinary

hear ings a

nd oversig ht of its members. Until rece ntly , section 1204 of the U I Lrules (“ R u l e 1204”) provided that membe r
s c h o o l s s h o u l d

u s e T A S O

- r e g i s t e r e d

s p o rt s o f

f i c i a l s f o r U IL- s p o n s o r e d

s p o rt i n g e v e n t s . In No ve m b e r

2 0 0 9 , h o w e v e r , t h e U I La m e n d e d R u l e 1 2 0 4 t o p r o v i d e t h a to n l y t h o s e s p o rt s o f

f i c i a ls wh o r e g ist e r a

nd pa y du e s to the UI Lmay

of fi c ia te UI L -s po ns or e d v a rs ity te a m- sp or

t c on te sts
. In

2 response to the amendment to Rule 1204, TASO filed sui t, arguing that the UI L was (1) attempting to exercise an una

uthorized deleg ation of powe r, (2) improperly imposing an oc cupation tax, andTASO’s tortious-interfere nce c laim was base d in part on an a lleg ation that the UI Lhad 3 p e r s u a d e d

c e rt a i n l o c a l T A S O c h a

p t e r s t o tu r

n o v e r c o l l e c t e d m e m b e r s h i p d

u e s t o t h e U IL. A n in te r lo c u to r

y a p p e a l f r o m a n o r d e r d e n y in g a p le a to th e ju r is d ic ti o n “ s ta

y s all other 4 proce eding s in the trial court pending resolution of the appea l.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 5 1. 01 4( b) (We st 2 00 8) ; see also id. § 51.014(a) (8). In the abse nce of a wr it of injunction, the trial co u rt ’s t em p o ra ry

re s t ra i n i n g o rd er wo u l d h av e ex p i re d wh i l e t h e i n t er l o cu t o ry ap p ea l wa s p en d i n g. 3 (3) tortiously

interfe ring with the contra ctual rel at i o n ships between T ASO and its individual
me mbe rs . TASO soug ht a temporar y restra ining order and injunctive relief to pr event the UI Lfrom 3 implem en t ing the chang es to Rule 1204, as we ll as a dec laration that the UI L ’s ac tions were unauthorized, illeg al, and void. TASO further soug ht actua l and consequential dama g es re sulting from its claim of tortious interfe renc e with contra ctual re lationships.

After the trial cour

t gr anted TA SO’s reque st for a te m p o ra ry restra ining or der, the UI Lfiled a ple a to the jurisdiction on the basis of sover eign i m m u n ity . The trial c ourt denied the plea, a nd the UI L

filed the pre sent interlocutory appea l. TASO then filed a pe tition for wr it of injunction in thi s Court, seekingt o ex t en d t h e terms of the temporar y restra ining or der to c over the pe nd e nc y

of the int e rl oc uto ry

a pp e a l. T h is Court gra

nted the petition and issued a w rit of 4 injunction, incorporating the terms of the tem p o ra ry restraining or der. See I n re Texas Ass’n of S po rts Of fic ial s , N o. 03 -1 0- 00 02 9- CV , 2 01 0 T e x. Ap p. L EX I S 85 6 ( Te x. Ap p. —A us tin Fe b. 5, 2010, orig . proce eding ) (mem. op.)
. STA ND AR

D O F RE VI EW A plea to the jur isdiction is a dilatory plea that seeks dismissal of a c ase f or lac k of subject-matter

jurisdiction. Harris County v. Syke s , 136 S.W .3d 635, 638 (Tex. 2004). I n an appe al from a ple a to the jurisdiction, we “ revie w the fa ce of appe llants’ pleading s to determine whe ther4

they show a lack of

jurisdiction or whether the pleading s, if liberally construed, f

avor[] j urisdiction.” At mo s En e rg

y Cor p. v . A bb ott , 127 S.W .3d 852, 855 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, no pet.). Whether
a t ri al court ha s subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law we revie w de novo. W es tb rook v. Pe nley , 231 S.W .3d 389, 394 (Tex. 2007). I f the pleading s do not affir matively demonstrate the trial court’s jurisdiction but do not aff irmatively demonstrate incurable defe cts in jurisdiction, the issue is one of pleading sufficie ncy and the plaintiffs should be afforde d the opportuni ty to amend. Texas Dep’t of

Parks & W

ildlif e v. M iranda , 1 3 3 S
. W
. 3 d 2 1 7 , 2 2 6 -2 7 (T ex . 2 0 0 4 ). I f t h e p l ea d i n gs aff irmatively

neg ate jurisdiction, then a ple a to the jurisdiction may be g rante d without allowing a n opportunity

to amend. Id. a t 22 7. Un le ss a ple a de d jur isd ic tio na l f a c t is c ha lle ng e d a

nd c on c lus ive ly neg ate d , i t m u s t b e take n as true f or purpose s of deter

mining subjec t-matter jurisdiction. City of Au sti n v . Le

gg e tt , 257 S.W .3d 456, 462 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008, pet. denied). I n revie wing a plea to the jurisdiction, we consider the pleading s and, whe n nece ssary to resolve the jur isdictional issues raised, r eleva

nt evidence submitt ed by

the par ties. See M

iranda , 133 S.W .3d at 227.
DI SCU SSIO N On a pp e a l, t he UI La rgue s th at th e tr ia l c ourt la c ks jur isd ic tio n o ve r T ASO ’s su it beca use the UI Lis entitled to sovereig n immunit y and bec ause sove reig n immunit y h as n o t been waived w ith respec t to TASO’s claims. The UI L al so argues that the trial c ourt lacks jurisdiction be c a us e TA SO d oe s n ot h a ve sta nd ingto a sse rt

its c la ims
. En tit le me nt to S

ov e re ign Im mu nit

y I n its first issue on appea l, the UI L asser ts that the trial cour

t erre d in denying its plea to the jurisdiction because the UI Lis a g overnme ntal entity entitled to sove reig n immunit y . TASO,5

on the other ha

nd, ar g ues that the UI Lis a private, voluntar y association and the ref

ore is not protec ted by

sovere ign immunity . Whil e other courts have addre ssed the UI L ’s leg al s tatus for purposes such a s fede ral a ntitrust law, see Sae nz v. UIL , 4 8 7 F. 2 d 1 0 26, 1028 (5th Cir. 1973) (holding that UI Lis gove rnmental e ntity immune from antitrust liability ), and the now defunc t appea l-bond re q u i re ment, see U IL v. Marone

y , 681 S.W .2d 285, 286 (Tex. App.—Austin 1984, writ ref ’d) ( holding that UI Lis not gove rnmental e ntity excused from appeal-bond r equire ment), the qu es t i o n o f t h e U I L ’s l ega l s t at u s u n d er t h e c u rr en ts t at u t o ry

s ch em e f

o r p u rp o s es o f s o v er ei gn immunit y appea rs to be an issue of

first impression. Sov e re ig n im mun ity

de pr ive s a tr ia l c ourt

of su bje c t- ma tte r j ur isd ic tio n f or laws uit s in w hic h th e Sta te or

c e rt a in g ov e rn me ntal units have be e n s ue d unle ss t he Sta te c on se nts to s uit
. Miranda , 1 3 3 S
. W
. 3 d

at 2 2 4
. T h e d e f

i n i t i o n o f “ go v ern m en t al u n i t ” f o r p u rp o s es o f s o v er ei gn immunit y under the Texas Tort Claims Act, see Tex. Ci v. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 101.001-.109 (We st 2 00 5 & Sup p. 20 09 ), inc lud e s, in r e le va nt p a rt : (A ) t his state a nd a ll the se ve ra l ag e nc ie s of g ov e rn me nt that c oll e c tiv e ly c on sti tut e the g ov e rn me nt of thi s sta te , inc lud ing oth e r ag e nc ie s bea ri ngdif fe re nt d e sig natio ns , and all depar

tments, bur eaus, boa

rds, commissions, offices, a g encie s, councils, and c ourt s;

. . . (D) a ny other institution, age ncy , or orga n of gover

nment the s tatus and authority of which ar e der ived from the C o n s t i t u tion of Texas or from laws pa ssed by the leg islature under

the constitution.
Id. § 101.001(3).6 I n s up po rt of its po sit ion that the UI Lis n ot p ro te c te d b y so ve re ig n im mun ity , T ASO argues that no statutory

or constitutional provision specifica lly cre ates the U I L . Whil e this is true, section 33.083 of the e ducation code , entitled “Interschola stic L eagues,” spe cifica lly addre sses the
ex i s t en ce an d

s t at u s o f t h e U I L , s t at i n g: ( b ) T h e [U I L ] is a part of T he Unive rsity of Texas at Austin and must submit i ts rules and proc edure s to the commissioner [of education] for appr oval or disapproval. The funds belong ing to the [UI L ] shall be dep o s i t ed wi th The Univer sity of Texas at Au sti n f or the be ne fi t of

the le a g ue a nd

sh a ll b e su

bje c t to a ud its by Th e Un ive rs ity of T e xa s a t Au s ti n , T h e U n iv e r s it y o f T e xa s Sy s te m, a n d

th e s tate a

u d it o r . Co p ie s of annua l audits shall be furnished, on r equest, to member s of the leg islature.
T e x. E d u c . C o d e A n n . § 3 3
. 0 8 3 ( b ) ( e mp h a s i s a d d e d) ; s ee a lso id. § 5.001(3) ( West S upp. 2009) (def ining “ Commi ssioner” a s “the c ommissi oner of education”). Ba sed on the plain languag e of se ction 33.083, the UI L is a compone nt part of The University

of Texas at Austin (“U T-Austin”). See State v . Shumake , 19 9 S
. W
. 3 d 279, 284 (Tex. 2006) (holding that leg islative intent should be disce rned, w hen possible, from plain mea ning of words c hosen). The University of Texas was c reated by the Texas Constit ution, see Te x. Con st.
a rt . V I I , § 10 , an d it is wel l set tle d th a t st a te un ive rs iti e s a re g ov e rn me nta l e nti tie s su bje c t to
sovere ign immunity
. See Ben Bolt-Palito Bl a n co Consol. Indep. Sch. D ist. v. Texas Political Subdivisions Prop./C

as. Joint Self-Ins. Fund , 212 S.W .3d 320, 3 2 4 (T ex . 2006) (“ The State’s
so ve re ig n im mun ity

e xten ds to v a ri ou s d ivi sio ns of state g ov e rn me nt, inc lud inga g e nc ie s, bo a rd s, hospitals, and universities .” ) ( e mph a sis a dd e d) ; see also Ax tell v. Unive rsity of Tex. , 69 S.W .3d 261, 267 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.) (a ffirming g rant of U T-Austi n’s plea to jurisdiction base d
on sovere ign immunity).7 TASO contends, howeve r, that section 33.083 is not disposit ive as to the UI L ’s leg al status , c iti ngc a se s in

wh ic h c ourt s o f a

pp e a ls, inc lud ing thi s Co ur t, h a ve he ld t

hat th e UI Lis n ot a g overnme ntal entity for purposes of ex emption from the now de funct a ppeal- bond require ment. See Maroney , 6 81 S.W. 2d

a t 28 6; UIL v. Pay ne , 635 S.W .2d 754, 757 (Tex
. App.—Amar illo 1982, no writ). At the outset, we note t hat neither Maroney nor Payne specific ally addre sses the issue of the UI L ’s entitlement to sovere ign immunity
. Fur ther, the curr ent version of education c ode sec tion 33.083, wh i ch provides that the UI L“is a pa rt” of U T-Austin, did not ex ist when Maroney and Payne wer e dec ided. I n Maroney , this Court rejected the UI L ’s ar g ument that it was a part of UTAustin, noting that the rele vant statutory provision at that time stated, “The [UI L ], which is a part of [UT-Austin], m ust submit its rules and proc edure s to the State Boa rd of Education for appr oval.” 68 1 S. W.2 d at 28 7; se e als o Act of June 30, 1 9 8 4 , 6 8 th L eg ., 2d C.S., ch. 28, art. I V, par t F, § 2, 1984 Te x. G e n . L a w s 1 1 7 , 1 6 8
. T h e Co u rt h e ld th a t t h is s tatuto r

y la n g u a g e w a s n o t “ c o n c lu s ive
rec og nition” of the UI L ’s status as a pa rt of the univer sity , but was “simply to identify

or make
c e rt a in t he pa rt ic ula r o rg a nizatio n w hic h h a d th e duty to s ub mit its ru le s a nd pr oc e dure s to the Sta te Boa rd of Educ atio n fo r ap proval.” Maroney , 681 S.W .2d at 287. Afte r this Court’s decision in Ma roney , the education code wa s amende d to its current ve rsion, which def initively states, “The [UI L ] i s a pa rt of [UT -Aus tin ].” Te x. Ed

uc . Co de Ann. § 3 3. 08 3( b) ; see also Act of Ma y 29, 1989, 71st L eg ., R.S., ch. 813, § 5.01, 1989 T ex . Ge n . L aws 3678, 3710, recodified by Act of Ma y 2 7 , 1 9 9 5 , 7 4 t h L e g . , R
. S
. , c h
. 2 6 0 , § 1 , s e c . 3 3
. 0 8 3 , 1 9 9 5 T e x. G e n . L a w s 2 2 0 7 , 2 3 4 8. As a result of this chang e, the rele vant lang uag e of the statute ca n no longe r be r ead a s merely a mea ns of identifying the UI L , as it is now a clea r statement that the U I Lis in fact “a part of” UT-Austin.Be cause the s tatutory provision describe d by

this Court i n Maroney

wa s n ot e na c te d unti l 5 1984, it appear s that the court in Payne did not have the benef it of any leg islative pronounce ment reg arding the UI L ’s re lationship to UT-Austin. See Act of J une 30, 1984, 68th L eg ., 2d C.S., ch. 28, art. I V, par

t F, § 2, 1984 Te x . Gen. L aws 117, 168. 8 See National Liab. & Fire Ins. Co. v. Allen , 15 S.W .3d 525, 527 (Tex. 2000) (“We pr esume that the L eg islature intended the plain meaning of its words.”)
. Fur ther, in ame nding the s t atut e, the leg islature not only

stated that the UI Lis a part of UT-Austin, but also added the re quirements that the UI Ldeposit its funds with and be subject to audits by UT-Austin, fur

ther indicating the leg islature’s i n t ent to classify the UI Las a pa

rt of UT- Austin. Compare Act of June 30, 1984, 6 8 th L e g . , 2 d C. S. , c h
. 2 8 , a rt. I V , p a rt F , § 2 , 1 9 8 4 T e x. G e n . L a w s 1 1 7 , 1 68, with Act of May 29, 1989, 71st L eg ., R.S., ch. 813, § 5.01, 1989 Tex. Gen. L aws 3678, 3710.

I n Payne , the cour

t held that the UI Lwas not exempt from the appe al bond require ment beca

use it prese nted n o au t h o rity to establish its publ ic entity status, noting that the UI L ’s asser

tion that it was a part of

UT-Austin appeare d for the first time in a post-submission brief. 63 5 S. W.2 d at 75 7. Th e c ourt the n we nt on to c on c lud e that the UI L ’s status a s a pa rt of UT -Aus tin
wa s n ot e sta

bli sh e d o n th e re c or d, statin g , “ [W]e d o n ot b e lie ve that th e [UI L ] ca n in c or po rate its e lf int o th e Uni ver sity

of Te xas s y ste m by

c us tom a nd us a g e or a t th e be he st o f a

sin g le un ive rs ity office r.” Id. I n the present case , the UI L does not rely on custom or usag e, but on sec tion 33.083(b) 5 of t he education code, which formally classifies the UI L as a component part of UT-Austin. Given the manner

in which Maroney and Payne can be distinguished fr om the pres en t ca s e, we do not
co n s i d er t h em t o b e p er s u as i v e a u t h o r i t y o n t h e i s s u e o f w h et h er t h e U I Li s s u

b j ec tt o s o v er ei gn i m m u n i t y.9 I n addition to its statutorily rec og nized status as a component pa rt of UT- Austin, the UI Lis a lso su

bje c t to le g isl a tiv e ov e rs ig ht i n way s th a t are inc on sis te nt w ithpr ivate e nti ty status
. Section 33.083 of the e ducation code require s the UI L to submit its rules and proce dures for a pproval by the commissioner of e ducation, deposit its funds with U T-Austin, and submit to state audits. See Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 33.083(b). Section 33.083(d) require s the UI L to provide annua l financia l repor ts to the ex ecutive a

nd leg islative branc hes of state g overnme nt. See id. § 33.083(d). Spe c if ic a lly : The [UI L ] shall fil e annua lly wi t h t h e go vernor

and the pr esiding office r of e ach ho us e of the le g isl a tur e a com plet e a nd de ta ile d w ri tte n r e po rt

a c c ounti ngfo r a ll funds re ceive d and disbursed by the [ UI L ] during the preceding fiscal y ear . The for m of the a nnual re port and the r eporting time are as provided by the Gene ral Ap pr op ri a tio ns Ac t.
Id. Section 33.084 of the e ducation code cre ates an “intersc holastic league advisory council,”
com p o s ed o f m ember s of the State B oard of Education, the state leg islature, the UI Lleg islative council, public school boa rds, and thre e member s of t he public. See id. § 33.084(a) (West 2006). This advisory

council re views UI Lrules and makes re commendations re g ardingthe rules to the g ov er n o r, t he leg islature, the UI Lleg islative council, and the State Boa rd of Educ ation. Id. § 33.084(e)
. Notably , the educ ation code a l so g rants the UI Lrulemakingauthority with respec t to cer tain state educ ation policies, as we ll as the authority to impose sanctions for nonc ompliance. See id. § 33.081(b) ( West S upp. 2009) (pr oviding that students enr olled in Texas school districts are subject to UI Lrules re g ardingparticipation in ex trac urricula r ac tiviti es when under supervision of10

sc ho ol o r d istri c t) ; id. § 3 3
. 0 8 1 ( c ) ( s t a t i n g t h a t s t u d e n t s f a i l i n g t o m e e t“ N o P a s s N o P l a y” require ments shall be suspended f rom participation “or sanc tioned b y t h e s chool district or the [UI L ]”) ; id. § 33.091(b), ( d) (West Supp. 2009) (re quiring UI Lto adopt rul es enforcingstatutory sch e me f o r p r e v e n ti n g il le g a l s te r o id u s e b y s tu d e n t a th le te s , in c lu d in g “ r u le s f o r the annua l
a dmi nis tr a tio n o f a

ste ro id t e sti ngpr og ra

m” ); id. § 33.203 (West Supp. 2009) (providing that failure to a c c ur a te ly

a nd tr ut hfu ll y a ns we r q

ue sti on s o n f

or m pr ov ide d b y

UI La s c on dit ion

fo r s po rt s pa rt ic ipatio n s ub

je c ts s ig ne r o f f

or m “ to pe na lti e s d e te rm ine d b y the [UI L ]”) ; id. § 33.206(c) (We st Su pp . 2 00 9) (s ta tin g that sc ho ol c a mpu s fa ili ng to c omp ly wi th s ta tut or

y sa fe ty re qu ir e me nts in c onducting extracurr icular activities “shall be subject to the rang e of penalties deter mined by the [UI L ]”) ; id. § 33. 20 9 (We st Supp . 200 9) (r e qu ir ingUI Lto i nc or po ra te statut or y sa fe ty re qu ir e me nts int o U I Lc on sti tut ion

a nd ru le s) ; see also id. § 33.091(c) (re quiring UI Lto develop educ ational pr og ra m f or stu de nt athl e te s r e g a rd inghe a lthe ff e c ts o f s te ro id u se ); id. § 3 3
. 0 9 1 ( f ) ( a u t h o r i z i n g U IL to increa se member ship fees to off set cost of implementing steroid-pre vention prog ram). I n addition t o ex p re s s l y authorizing the U I Lto adopt and enf orce rules for implementing state education policies, the leg islature has a lso ex erc ised a mea sure of authority over the rulemaking pow er of

the UI L . When the legi s l at u re s ubstantially revised the education code during the 1995 regular session, it include d a sunset provision for a ll UI Lrules adopte d prior to the eff ective da te of the ne w leg islation, further indicating that the l egislature c onsiders the UI L ’s rulemaking power to be a public matter subject to leg islative oversig ht. See Act of May 27, 1995, 7 4 t h Le g . , R
. S
. , c h
. 2 6 0 , § 1 , s e c . 3 3
. 0 8 3 , 1 9 9 5 T e x . G e n . Law s 2 2 0 7 , 2 3 4 8 ( “ E a c h r u l e o f t h e [ U IL]I n sup po rt of its po sit ion , T ASO a rgue s th a t du ri ngthe 20 03 le g isl a tiv e se ssi on , a sin g le 6 le g isl a tor , in

a n atte mpt

to p a ss a

bil l th a t w ou ld a

bo lis h th e UI L , a

rgue d b e for e the Ho us e Commi ttee on Public Education that the UI Ldoes not leg ally exis t, has no leg islative oversig ht, and is not subject t o sunset revie w. See Hea ring s on Tex. H.B
. 580 Be fore the House Comm. on P ub. Ed uc ., 78 th L e g ., R.S. (A

pr il 1 , 2 00 3) (s ta te me nt o f Re p. Joe Ni xon)
. F ir st, the state me nt of a sin g le leg islator does not deter

mine leg islative intent. AT& T Com mc ’n s of Te x ., L.P

. v . S

ou thw este rn Be ll Tel. Co. , 1 36 S.W. 3d

51 7, 52 9-3 0 (Tex. 20 06 ). Se c on d, the pr op os e d b ill wa s le ft pe nd ingin c omm itt e e . T hir d, a

le g isl a tiv e mand a te of

fo rm a l su

ns e t r e vie w i s n ot a

pr e re qu isi te to g ov e rn me nta l e nti ty status
. Th is Court , fo r e xamp le , is fr e e fr om s un se t r e vie w, a s is Th e Un ive rs ity of Texas Sy stem. See Sunset Advisory Commi ssion, Gu ideto t

he Su ns e t P ro c ess 1 (De c. 2009). 11 adopted be fore September 1, 1995, e x pires August 3 1 , 1 996, unless rea dopted by the league and approve d by

the State B oard of

Education after Septe mber 1, 1995.” ). 6 TA SO ar g ue s tha t th e UI L ’s ru le makin g a nd e nf or c e me nt a

uth or ity ov e r c e rt a in s ta te
e du c a ti o n p o l i c i e s h a s n o b e a r i n g o n t h e i s s u e o f w h e t h e r t h e U I L i s a s t a t e a g e n c y su bje c t to
sovere ign immunity

beca use, ac cordingto TASO, the UI L ’s obligation to comply with the education code is no diff

ere nt from a g as station’s obligations to comply with reg ulations promulgated by the Te xas C omm iss ion

on En vir on me nta l Q ua lity . We dis a g re e . A g a s st a tio n, or a ny oth e r p ri vate entity subject to state st at u t o ry o r reg ulatory require ments, lacks the ty pe of r ulemaking power g ra nte d to the UI L un de r the e du c a tio n c od e . Th e UI L is e xpre ssl y a uth or ize d— e ve n r e qu ir e d— to adopt rules e nforc ing state educ ation policies, and is furthe r authorized to assess sanctions for noncompliance . The scope and importance of the UI L ’s rulemakingpower is refle cted in the f

act that the leg islature has e x erte d sunset control over UI Lrules, see id. , as well as the educ ation code provision requiringthat all UI Lrules be a pproved by

the commissioner of e ducation, see Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 33.083(b)
.12 I n Ala mo W

o r kforce Dev elopment, I

nc. v. V ann , the cour

t was pre sented with the question of whethe r a nonpr ofit corpor ation tasked with planning , overse eing , and eva luating the de li v e r y o f p u b li c ly f u n d e d w o r k f o r c e tr a in in g a n d

s e r v ic e s w a s s u

b je c t t o s o v e r e ig n im mu

n it y . 21 S.W .3d 428, 430 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2000, no pet.). I n rea ching its conclusion that the workfor ce board was a gover nment ag ency entitled to immuni ty , the cour t emphasized the fac t that the boar d was c harg ed with ad m inistration of state workf orce development pr og rams cr eate d by statute. Id. at 432-33. The c ourt deter mined that beca

use loca l workfor ce boa

rds wer e conte mplated by statu t e an d ac ted as a

rms of the State in ca

rry ing out state workfor ce policie s, they wer e g overnme ntal entities protecte d by sovere ign immunity
. Id. Simi la rl y , th e UI L is re qu ir e d und e r the e du c a tio n co de to ac t as an a rm of the Sta te in c arr y ing out c erta in e ducation policies. See, e .g. , Tex. Educ. Code Ann. §§ 33.081(c), .083, .091. The UI L also enjoy s g reater statutory rec og nition than the workfor ce boa rd in Vann , g ive n th a t it

is
e xpre ssl y c ha

ra c te ri zed by e du c a tio n co de se c tio n 3 3. 08 3 a s a pa rt of UT -Aus tin , w hic h d e ri ve s it s authority direc tly from the Te x as Constitut ion. See Te x. Con st. a rt . V I I , § 10 ; see also W hitehead

v . Un iv e rsi ty of T

e x . H e alt h S c i. C tr. , 854 S.W. 2d 17 5, 18 0 (T e x. Ap p. —Sa n A nto nio 19 93 , n o w ri t) (h old ingthat w he re he a lth sc ie nc e c e nte r wa s cha ra c te ri zed by e du c a tio n co de a s par t of U niv e rs ity of Te xas s y ste m, i t wa s pr ote c te d by so ve re ig n immun ity ). Whil e the UI Lmay

no t ha ve sp e c if ic a lly been c reated by statute, it derives its status and authority from state la

w. See Te x. Civ . Pr a c . & Re m. Code Ann. § 101.001(3) (D).

We note also that fede ral courts have vie wed the U I Las a state ag ency immune from
a nti tr us t li a bil ity a nd have c on sid e re d a c tio ns of the UI L to be state a c tio n f or c on sti tut ion a l pu

rp os e s. See Cornerstone Christian Schs. v. UI L , 5 63 F .3 d 1 27 , 1 35 -3 6 ( 5th Cir . 2 00 9) (r e vie wi ngUI Lru leOne might argue that the mandatory venue pr ovision constitut es a w aiver of immunity

for 7 suits aga inst the UI Lreg ardingthe interpre tation or enfor ceme nt of i ts rules or r eg ulations. But see Too k e v . Ci ty of M e x ia , 1 97 S.W. 3d

32 5, 33 2- 33 (T e x. 20 06 ) ( ho ldi ngtha t w a ive r o f i mmunit

y mus t 13 to determine w hether

it violated constituti onal rig hts to free exercise of relig io n , d u e p roce ss, and
e qu a l pr otect io n) ; Saenz , 487 F.2d at 1027 (holding that UI Lis gove rnmental e ntity immune from
a nti tr us t li a bil ity ); Blue v. U

IL , 503 F. Supp. 1030, 1034 (N.D . Tex. 1980) (conc luding that UI Lrules

“ c on sti tut e state a c tio n fo r the purp os e s of the F ourt e e nth Am e ndme nt a nd Se c tio n 1 98 3” ); se e als o Sullivan v. UIL , 6 16 S.W. 2d 17 0, 17 2 ( Te x. 19 81 ) ( “ Al l pu bli c sc ho ols a re e lig ibl e fo r m e mbe rs hip in the [ UI L ], and it s conduct has been he ld to constitut e state a ction.”). But see Payne , 635 S.W .2d at 7 5 7 n . 5 (c i t i n g Blue and noting that state ac tion is “a diffe rent a nd far broade r co n ce p t than the jurisdictional question before this court,” in refer ence to question of whether UI Lwas state a g ency exempt from appea l-bond requir ement). In S a e nz , th e F if

th C ir c uit state d th a t “ the UI Lc le a rl y is imb ue d w itha mpl e c ha

ra c te ri sti c s to wa

rr a nt t he tr ia l c ourt ’s de te rm inatio n th a t th e or g a nizatio n is an ag ency of the State of T exas,” and ther efor e immune f rom antitrust liability , citing, a mong othe r things, the f

a c ts th a t th e U I L is “ a n in te g r a l p a rt o f [U T
- A u s ti n ]” a n d th a t it s “ e mp lo y e es ar e employ ed and pa id by

the Univer sity .” 487 F .2d at 1027-28. We a ls o f

in d it s ig n if

ic a n t th a t th e e d

u c a ti o n c o d e in c lu d e s a ma n d a to r y venue provision requiring that all suits ag ainst the UI Lbe filed in Tr avis County
. See Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 67.26 (West 2002) (“V enue f or suits broug ht ag ainst the [UI L ] o r for suits invol ving the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o r

e n f o r c e m e n to f

t h e r u l e s o r r e g u l a t i o n s o f

t h e [ U IL ] s h a l l b e i n T r a v i s C o u n t y, Texas.”). This provision is located in chapte r 67 of the e ducation code , entitled, “The University of Texas at Austin,” furthe r re flec ting the le g islature’s intent to classify the UI Las par

t of UT-Austin. See id. §§ 67.01-.62 (West 2002 & Supp. 2009). Notably , in addition to creating mandatory venue 7be c le a r a

nd un a mbi g uo us ); SE

Ra nc h H old ing s, Ltd . v . Ci ty of D e l R io , No. 04-06-00640- CV, 2007 Tex. App. L EXI S 6939, at *8-9 (Te x . App.—San Antoni o Aug
. 29, 2007, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (holdin g th a t c o n tr a c t l a n g u a g e p r o v id in g ma n d a to r y v e n u e f o r r e s o luti o n o f

d is p u te s d id

not repr esent c lear

and ambig uous waiver

of immunity ). The le g islative history of sec tion 67.26 states that the mandator

y venue pr ovision became nece ssary in light of the f

acts that after e nactment of extracurr icular e ligibility

rules, ther e we re “ numerous suits filed in state district courts re g arding [UI L ] eligibility ruling s,”and that these suits had “the eff ect of disrupting the pla

nned extracur

ricular activities.” See Ho us e Com m. o n St a te Af fa ir s, B ill Ana ly sis , T e x. H. B . 6 3, 69 th L e g ., 3d C.S. (1986). This Court has pre viously been pr esente d with case s in which students have challeng ed the int e rp re ta tio n o r e nf

or c e me nt of a UI L ru le in co nn e c tio n with a fi nd ing of ine lig ibi lity

to p a rt ic ipate in ext rac urricula

r ac tiviti es. See U

IL v. Hatten , No. 03-03-00691- CV, 2004 Tex. App. L EXI S 3372, a t *1- 2 (T e x. Ap p. —A us tin Ap r. 15 , 2 00 4, no pe t.) (m e m. o p. ); UIL v. Buc hanan , 848 S.W .2d 298, 300 (Tex. App.—Austin 1993, no writ). The pr ese n t ca s e, however, is not a c halleng e to the interpre tation or enfor ceme nt of a UI Lrule in the c ontext of an e ligibility ruling , but instead repr esents an ultra

vires cla im based on the UI L ’s plan to be g in reg ulating spor ts officiants. The ultra vires nature of TASO’s claims will be addre ssed more fully in our discussion of wh et her sovere ign immunity

was wa ived. 14 for suit s against t he UI L , chapte r 67 identifies a number of othe r entities that, like the UI L , are component par

ts of UT-Austin. See id. §§ 67.23 (providing t h at T ex as M emorial Museum is “a n integ ral pa

rt of [UT-Austin]”); .51 (providing that McDona ld Observatory is part of U T-Austin); .61 (providing that The Unive rsity of Texas Marine Science I nstitut e is par t o f UT-Austin). The mandatory

venue provision applicable to the U I Lis reminiscent of other venue pr ovisions requiring or allowing suits aga inst gove rnmental e ntities to be broug ht in Travis County
. See ge nerally T e x. Civ. P rac . & Re m. Code Ann. § 15.014 (West 2002) (mandamus pe tition ag ainst head of depar tment of st ate g overnme nt must be filed in Travis County); Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 554.007 (West 2004) (public employ ee of

state gover

nmental entit y bring ing whistleblower claim may sue in county

wher e
c a us e of a c tio n a ro se or Tr a vis County

); id. § 2001.038 (West 2008) (ag ency rule c halleng es under the Ad min istrativ e Pr oc e dure Ac t mu st b e br ou g ht i n T ra vis County

); id. § 2001.176 (W est 2008) (p e tit ion fo r jud ic ia l re vie w of state a g e nc y a c tio n in c on te ste d c a se pr oc e e din g mus t be fi le d in Tr a vis County , unless otherwise pr ovided by statute). In a 1 9 9 4 opinion, the supreme c ourt included the15

UI L ’s mandator

y venue pr ovision in a list of st atutes that “minimiz [e] the litigation costs that taxpay ers must bea

r by providing state age ncies with a convenient venue in which to litigate.” K.D.F. v. Re x , 87 8 S. W. 2 d

5 8 9 , 5 9 5 & n . 5 ( T e x. 1 9 9 4 )
. Pr io r to th e e n a c tm e n t o f

th e ma n d a to r y v e n ue provision, the San Antonio c ourt of civil a ppeals upheld a tra

nsfer of venue to Travis County based on the trial cour

t’s implied finding that the U I L“is an a g ency of the State of T exas.” Lopez v. UIL , No. 16275, 1980 Tex. App. L EXI S 3158, at *9-10 (Tex. Civ. App.—S an Antonio Mar. 12, 1980, no writ) (not de signated for publication).

The Ope n Records D ivision of the Attorney Gene ral’s O ffice h as i s sued opinions
re qu ir ingthe UI Lto r e le a se its re c or ds un de r t he Te xas P ub lic I nf

or ma tio n A ct, wh ic h a

pp lie s to p u b li c in f o r mati o n th a t i s c o ll e c te d , a s s e mb le d , o r ma in ta in e d

b y o r f o r a g o v e r n me n ta l body
. See Tex. Att’y

Gen. ORD- 3753 (2003) ( “[W ]e con clude that the UI Lmust promptly rele ase the information to the re questor.”) ; Tex. Att ’y Gen. ORD- 3469 (1999) ( ruling that “the signature at issue must be relea sed” by

UI Lpursuan t t o Public I nformation Ac t); see also Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 552.002(a) (West 2004) (def ining “ public information” f or purpose s of Act)
. F in a ll y , w e a d dr e s s T A SO ’ s r e li a n c e o n UI L v. Gree n , in

wh ic h th e Cor

pu s Ch ri sti court of a ppeals he ld that the trial court had jurisdiction over a suit ag ainst the UI Land its office rs fo r i nju nc tiv e re lie f i n c on ne c tio n w itha n e lig ibi lity ru lin g re la te d to c e rt a in s tud e nt- a thl e te s. 5 8 3 S
. W.2d 907, 909 (Tex. App.—C orpus Christi 1979, no writ). The cour t in Gree n n e v er deter mined that the UI L was not a g overnme nt entity subject to sovere ign immunity
. See id. Rather, it held that the State’s consent to suit was not r equire d beca use the UI Land its office rs “we re not sued in t his a c tio n in the ir c a

pa c iti e s a s a g e nts of

the Sta te ” a nd

be c a us e the pla int if

fs “ a lle g e d lo ss o f t

he ir civil and c o nstitut ional rig hts.” Id. (c i t i n g Ma rit inev . B oa rd of R e ge nts , 578 S.W .2d 465, 473Be cause the UI L ’s state e ntity status is e stablished as a matter of law by the re levant leg al 8 authorities, we ne ed not addr ess TASO’s a rg ument t h at the UI Limproperly attempts to introduce e v id e n c e o f it s s tate e n ti ty s tatu s f o r th e f ir s t ti me o n a

p peal. See gen e ra lly

Em plo y e es R e t. S

y s. v . P utn am , LLC , 294 S.W .3d 309, 323 (Tex. App.—Austin 2009, no pet.) (holding that trial court ne e d n ot a llo w d isc ov e ry

be fo re ru lin g on ple a to jur isd ic tio n whe re pa rt y ’s status a s p ub lic e nti ty was c onclusively

resolved a s matter of la

w). In resolving the matter s b efor e us in this appeal, we do not consider a

ny evidentiar

y materia ls that were not included in the trial cour t’s rec ord, including a ny ma te ri a ls that w e re pr od

uc e d f or the fi rs t ti me on

a pp e a l and a tta c he d to a

pp e llate br ie fs
. To t h e ex t en t t h at TAS O also ar g ues that we do not have jurisdiction over this appeal 9 beca use the UI Lis not a g overnme ntal unit entitled to an int erloc utory appea l from an order de ny ing its plea to the jurisdiction, this arg ument fails as well. See Tex. Ci v. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a) (8) ( West 2008) (providing for inter locutory appea l from order gra

nting or denying ple a to jurisdiction by

g overnme ntal unit as defined by section 101.001(3) of civil prac tice and r emedies cod e); see also id. § 1 0 1
. 0 0 1 ( 3 ) ( We s t 2 0 0 5 )
. T h e U I L qu a li f ie s a s a “ g o v e r

n me n ta l u n it ” under 16 (Tex. Civ. App.—Ty ler 1979, writ ref ’d n.r.e.) (holding that State’s conse nt to suit was not re quired for c laim ag ainst state age ncy for de privation of veste d proper ty interest)) . Wit hout addre ssing the merits of the c ourt’s conc lusion that the UI L was not sue d in its ca pacity as an a g ent of the State, w e note t hat Gree n do e s n ot s tand fo r t he pr op os iti on

that th e UI Lis n ot a

g ov e rn me nta l e nti ty , b ut i n fac t sugg ests the opposite, g iven the court’s application of sove reig n-immunity principles to an a ction broug ht ag ainst the UI Land its office rs. See id.

Whil e “ [w]e a

r e c a r e f u l no t to e xten d th e bla

nk e t of so ve re ig n im mun ity

to e ve ry e nti ty which at first blush ex hibits t he cha rac teristics of a g overnme ntal unit,” Vann , 21 S.W .3d at 433, we
a re de a lin g he re wi th a

n e nti ty that is re qu ired by st atute to i mpl e me nt s ta te e du c a tio n p oli c ie s, g rante d rulemaking and enforce ment power over such policies, subjected to ex tensive over sight fr om the leg islativ e an d ex ecutive br anche s, and statutorily classified a s a compone nt part of a g overnme ntal unit that was cre ated by the Texas Constit ution. For th es e re as o n s , we hold that the U IL i s a g o v e r n m e n t a l u n i ts u

b j e c tt o s o v e r e i g n i m m u n i t y. T h e U I L ’ s f i r s t i s s u e o n a

p p e a l is 8 sustained. 9section 101.001(3) both as a part of UT- Austin, which derive s its authority direc tly from the Te x as Constit ution, and beca

use it derives its own status and a uthority fr o m the educa

tion code. See id. § 101.001(3)(D ) (d ef

i n ing “ g overnme ntal unit” to include any “instituti on, ag ency , or org an of g overnme nt the status and authority of which a

re de rived fr om the C o n s t i t u tion of Texas or from laws passe d by

the leg islature under

the constitution”).

17 W aiv e r o f So v e re ign Im mu nit

y Be ca u s e the UI Lis entitled to sovereig n immunit y from suit, the trial cour

t lacks jurisdiction over TASO’s c laims ab s en t an express waiver of that immunity
. See Shum ake , 199 S.W .3d at 283. I n its second issue on appe al, the UI Largues t hat the trial c ourt err ed in deny ing its ple a to t he jur isd ic tio n b e c a

us e so ve re ig n im mun ity

ha s n ot b e e n w a ive d wi th res pect to TA SO’ s c la ims
.

I n order to determine w hether

immunit y

has bee n waived, w e must first d i s cu ss the nature of TASO’s claims. I n its live pleading , TASO asser ts cause s of action for (1) “illeg al attempt to exerc is e a n u n a

u th o r iz e d d e le g a ti o n o f

p o w e r , ” ( 2 ) “ il le g a l o c c u p a ti o n tax, ” a n d

( 3 ) “ to rtious interfe renc e with contra ctual re lationships.” Wi th respec t to its t o rt cl aim , TASO has not pleade d fac ts that fall under a

ny waiver of immunit y found in the Texas T ort Claims Ac t. See Tex. Ci v. Prac. & Re m. Code Ann. §§ 101.001-.109. TASO c on ce d es on appeal that sover eig n immunit y has not be e n w a ive d f

or thi s c la im, statin g , “ TA SO h a s a lle g e d a c a us e of a c tio n f or tor tio us int e rf

e re nc e wi th
a con tr a c t in

the e ve nt t

he UI Lis n ot a

state e nti ty .” I n li g ht o f o ur de te rm inatio n th a t th e UI Lis a
s t a t e e n t i ty, w e h o l d

t h a tT A S O ’ s t o rtc l a i m i s b a r r e d b y s o v e r e i g n i m m u n i t y. Acc ordi ng to TASO’s petition, its remaining c laims for dec laratory and injunctive relief are based on the alleg ation that th e UIL ’s plan to beg in reg ulating the sports officiating profe ssion is “an illeg al and imprope r usurp at i o n of powe r” be cause “ther e exists no l eg islative18

enac tment that would give the UI Lany authority to oversee or reg ulate any trade or prof

ession.” (E mph a sis in o ri g ina l.) TA SO f ur the r a lle g e s: [T]he UI L , w ith ou t any

g ra nt of le g isl a tiv e or oth e r a uth or ity , n owse e ks imp ro pe rl y a nd ill e g a lly to u surp a nd

wh oll y take ov e r t

he fu nc tio n o f TA SO, to ta x a nd re g ulate its ind e pe nd e nt sp or

ts of fi c ia l me mbe rs , a nd oth e rw ise to a c t w ho lly ou tsi de the ro le o f a n y a u t h o r i t y v e s t e d

i n t h e U IL b y t h e l e g i s l a tu r e o r a n y o t h e r b o dy.
T A S O r e p e a t s s i m i l a r

a l l e g a t i o n s t h r o u g h o u ti t s p e t i t i o n , s t a t i n g t h a t“ [ t ] o t h e e x t e n tt h a tt h e U IL
ma int a ins that it

is a g ov e rn me nta l ag e nc y or a rm of the g ov e rn me nt, the le g isl a tur e ha s not g ive n it the power or authority

to compel the pay

ment of fe es, or to tax, reg ulate, require r eg istration, or ac t
a s th e so le or

e xclu siv e tr a de a sso c ia tio n o f a n in de pe nd e nt p ro fe ssi on .” Ac c or d i n g l y , T ASO ’s c la ims for de clar atory

and injunctive re lief re prese nt ultra vires claims, alleg ing that the UI Lhas excee ded the scope of its authority

by attempting to r eg ulate and “ tax” an independe nt profession. A suit complaining that a g overnme nt offic er “ac ted without leg al authority ” and seekingto compel the off

icial “to comply with statutory or constitutional provisions” is an ultra vires suit that is not protected by sovere ign immunity
. City of El Paso v. He inrich , 284 S.W .3d 366, 372 (Tex. 2009). Sovereig n immunit y does not a ct as a bar to ultra vires suits, not bec ause immunity has been w aived, but bec ause “ u lt ra vires s u i ts do not attempt to ex ert c ontrol over the state—they
a tte mpt to r e a sse rt

the c on tr ol of

the state.” Id. “Stated another way , these suits do not se ek to alter g overnme nt policy

but rather

to enforc e existi ng policy .” Id. ; se e als o Te x as Nat ur al R es. Conservation Comm’n v. I T-Davy , 74 S.W .3d 849, 855 (Tex. 2002) (“[S] uits to compel state office rs to a c t w ith in t

he ir of fi c ia l c a pa c ity do no t a tte mpt to su

bje c t the Sta te to l ia

bil ity .” ). Ho we ve r, the se ultra vi re s s u i t s “must be broug ht ag ainst the state ac tors in their offic ial capa city ” bec ause theWhil e TASO contends that sovere ign immuni ty is waived unde r the Unifor m Decla ratory 10 J udg ments Act (UD J A), see Tex. Ci v. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 37.001-37.011 (West 2008), the UDJA is not a g ener al waive r of sove reign im munity and does not “ extend a trial court’ s jurisdiction.” Texas Natu r al Res. Conservation Comm’n v . IT-Davy , 74 S.W .3d 849, 855 (Tex. 2002). A dec laratory -j u d gment action is mere ly a proc edura l device f

or dec iding matter s alre ady within a

trial court’ s subject-matter jurisdiction. Se e Te

x as As s’ n of B us ine

ss v . Te x as Ai r Control Bd. , 852 S.W .2d 440, 444 (Tex. 1993). I n its response to the UI L ’s pl ea to the jur isdiction, TASO describes its suit as “see king 11 a decl arat ion th a t th e UI Lis w ith ou t any ve ste d a uth or ity to t a ke ov e r t

he pr of e ssi on of sp or ts officiating, a

nd that no body

has dele g ated to it the authority to tax or re g ulate sports off icials.” 19 g overnme ntal entity

itself rema ins imm une fr om suit. Heinrich , 284 S.W .3d at 373. I n the pre sent
case , TASO broug ht its ultra vi res claims ag ainst the UI Lrathe r than a state ac tor in his or her of

ficial capa city
. Under

the supreme court’s holding in Heinrich , TASO’s cla ims are ba rre d by
s o v e r e i g n i m m u n i t y. 10

For the first time on appea l, T ASO char acte rizes its suit a s a “r ule cha lleng e” to the validity of the amendments to UI LRule 1204. Even view ing T ASO’s claims in this light, the fa ct 11
re ma ins that it s c ha lle ng e to R ule 12 04 is b a se d o n an all eg a tio n th a t th e UI La c te d u ltr a vir e s in amending the rule to a llow it to reg ulate and c ollect dues from sports officia ls. TASO’s cla ims are, in substance, ultra

vires cla ims. Se e Te

x as De p’ t of In s. v . R econ veyan ce Se rv s. , 306 S.W .3d 256, 258-59 (Te x . 2010) (determining party ’s claims wer e, “in substance,” ultra vires cla ims because they

w e r e b a s e d

o n a l l e g a t i o n s t h a ta g e n c y a c t e d b e y o n d i t s s t a tu t o r

y a uth or ity); se e als o Ci ty

of A us tin v. Austin Gas Light & Coal Co. , 7 S.W. 20 0, 20 3 ( Te x. 18 87 ) (h old ing that city a c te d ultr a vir e s in attempting to e x erc ise taxi ng power not a uthorized by

Texas Consti tution). TASO, however , argues that soverei gn immunit y does not bar de clar atory -judg ment actions cha lleng ing the validity of leg islative pronounce ments when the r eleva nt gove rnmental enti ties must be made par ties to suchWe e xpre ss no op ini on on the me ri ts of TA SO’ s ult ra vir e s c la ims , in c lud ingwh e the r, in 12 t h e e v e n tt h a tT A S O b r o u g h tt h e s e c l a i m s a g a i n s t a g o v e r n m e n t o f f i c e r a c t i n g i n a n o f

f i c i a l c a p a c i t y, it c ou ld “ a lle g e , a

nd ult imate ly

pr ov e , th a t th e of

fi c e r a c te d w ith ou t le g a l a uth or ity or fa ile d to perf orm a pure ly

minist eria l act.” City of El Paso v. He inrich , 284 S.W .3d 366, 372 (Tex. 2009).

20 challeng es. See H

einrich , 284 S.W .3d at 373 n.6 (c iting Te x . Civ. P rac . & R em . Code Ann. § 37.006(b)) . Section 37.00 6 (b ) o f t h e UDJ A provides that in “a ny proce eding that involves the validity of a municipa l ordinance or fr anchise ,” the municipality must be made a party and that if a

“ statut e , or din a nc e , or fr a nc his e is a lle g e d to be un c on sti tut ion a l,” the a tto rn e y g e ne ra l is e nti tle d to be he a rd . T e x. Civ . Pr a c . & Re m. C od e Ann. § 3 7. 006(b ). U I LRul e 12 04 , h ow e ve r, re pr e se nts neither a “municipal ordina

nce or fra nchise,” nor a “statute,” and there fore is not subject to section 37.006(b). F urther, institutions of high er education, such as UT-Austin, are not g overne d by the Administrative Procedur e Ac t (APA), see Tex. Gov’ t Code Ann. § 2001.003(7)( E) (West 2008), a nd the r e f o r e a r e n o ts u

b j e c tt o t h e A P A ’ s l e g i s l a t i v e g r a n to f s u b j e c t
- m a t t e r

j u r i s d i c t i o n f

o r s uit s challeng ing a g ency

rules. See id. § 2001.038 (allowing validity or applica bility of ag ency

rule to be de te rm ine d in

a c tio n f or de c larator

y jud g me nt a

nd re qu ir ingtha

t a g e nc y be ma de pa

rt y to a c tio n) ; see also Texas De

p’t of Pub. Safety v. Salazar , 304 S.W .3d 896, 903-04 (Te x . App.—Austin 2009, no pet.). B eca

use there is no statute requiring that the UI Lbe made a par ty to sui t s ch al l en gi n g the
va lid ity of its ru le s, the UI L ’s immun ity is n ot w a ive d w ithre sp e c t to TA S O’s su it alle g ingthat it exceede d its authority

in amending Rule 1204. Se e Too k e v . Ci ty of M e x ia , 197 S.W .3d 325, 342-43 (Tex. 2006) (holding that immunit y is not waived absent clea r leg islative intent to do so). TASO’s
c ha lle ng e to Rule 12 04 re ma ins a n ultr a vir e s cla im tha t must be br ou g ht ag a ins t a stat e a c tor in h is
o f f i c i a l c a p a c i t y. 1221 T AS O a rgu es t h at i n t h e e v en t t h i s C o u rt d et er m i n es t h at i t s s u i ti s b arre d b y s o v er ei gn immunit y , it should be affor ded the oppor tunity to amend its pleading s and c u re t h e jurisdictional defe ct by naming a state of

ficial a s a par

ty to suit. See M

iranda , 133 S.W .3d at 226-27 (holding that if ple a din g s d o n ot a ff

ir ma tiv e ly ne g a te jur isd ic tio n, plai nti ff sh ou ld b e a ff

or de d o pp or

tun ity to amend) . Under

the circ ums t an ce s prese nted her e, howe ver, the jurisdictional defe ct in TASO’s pleading s cannot be cure d by amendment b ec au s e t h e sol e def endant is immune from suit. The op p ortunity

to amend plea dings to c ure a jurisdictional defe ct has not bee n extended to the opportunity

to substit ute a state-e ntity defe ndant with a state actor acting in a n officia l capa city

in an ultra vires c laim that would othe rwise be bar red by sovere ign immunity
. Se e Re c on v e y an c e Se rv

s. , 306 S.W .3d at 259 (dismissing ultra vire s suit for want of jurisdiction where state entity , rathe r than state off icial, was sole de fenda

nt). Be cause TASO broug ht its ul tra vires claims ag ainst the UI L rathe r t han a state offic ial acting in an offic ial capa city , TASO’s suit is barr ed by sovere ign immuni ty and the trial court e rre d in d e nyingthe UI L ’s ple a to t he jur isd ic tio n. We r e ve rs e the tr ia l c ourt ’s or de r a nd dis mis s th is s uit for wa nt of jurisdiction. Standing I n light of our conclusion that TASO’s suit is ba rre d by sovere ign immunit y , we ne ed not rea ch the UI L ’s third issue on appe al, in which it argues that the trial c ourt lacke d subject-matter jur isd ic tio n o ve r t

his su it b e c a

us e TA SO d id n ot h a ve sta nd ingto b ri ngits c la ims
.22 CO NC LU SION We r e ve rs e the tr ia l c ourt ’s or de r de nying the ple a to t he jur isd ic tio n a

nd dis mis s th is
cause for wa

nt of jurisdiction.

Diane M. H enson, Jus tice Be fore J ustices Patterson, Pury ear and He nson Reverse d and Dismissed Filed: August 27, 2010