IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

)

STATE OF DELAWARE )

)

v. ) I.D. No. 0907019543A

)

LEONARD M. TAYLOR, )

)

Defendant. )

)

Submitted: March 20, 2016

Decided: April 26, 2016

On Defendant Leonard Taylor’s Second Amended Motion for 

Postconviction Relief.

DENIED.

ORDER

Elizabeth R. McFarlan, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Department of 

Justice, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for the State.

Patrick J. Collins, Esquire, Collins & Associates, Wilmington, Delaware, 

Attorney for Defendant. 

COOCH, R.J.

This 26th day of April, 2016, upon consideration of Defendant’s 

Second Amended Motion for Postconviction Relief, it appears to the Court 

that1:

1. On May 4, 2009, a body was found in a wooded 

area in Carney[s] Point, New Jersey, shot three 

times in the head. The victim had trash bags over 

his head and legs and did not have any 

 

1 Unless otherwise indicated, all of the facts in this case are quoted verbatim from 

Defendant’s direct appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court. Taylor v. State, 44 A.3d 923, 

2012 WL 1377589, at* 1–4 (Del. Apr. 17, 2012) (TABLE) (internal citations omitted). 
2

identification on his person when he was 

discovered. The victim was later identified by 

fingerprints as Sven Hinds (“Hinds”).

2. In late January 2009, Hinds along with two 

associates, Dharrion Newton (“Newton”) and 

[Ricardo] Rimpal [(“Rimpal”)], migrated from the 

State of New York to the Delaware area to pursue a 

clothing line and t-shirt business. The t-shirt 

business was primarily a front for the real purpose 

of illegal narcotic sales. The fourth member of this 

drug sales operation was Taylor, who provided 

clientele for the drug operation as well as access to 

heroin, while Hinds had several contacts for 

cocaine. The “business” was conducted in both the 

State of Delaware and the State of Maryland.

3. The four business associates spent a great deal of 

time in different hotels in the Newark area, from 

which they were able to both create and sell t-shirts 

along with engage in the sale of narcotics. The 

police were able to determine that Taylor had rented 

several vehicles from American Auto Rental, which 

was located in Edgewood, Maryland. Specifically, 

from April 7, 2009[,] through May 5, 

2009, Taylor had rented a 2006 Toyota Avalon. The 

rented Avalon was equipped with a GPS unit which 

had a daily self-check device that allowed the 

business owner of the vehicle to be able to locate 

the vehicle on a daily basis. On May 2, 2009[,] and 

May 3, 2009, the 2006 Avalon was located at a 

shopping center in Newark, Delaware. Located next 

to that shopping center was a Super Eight Motel at 

268 East Main Street, Newark, Delaware.

4. Business records from the Super Eight Motel 

revealed that Taylor had rented two rooms at the 

motel from April 17, 2009[,] through May 6, 2009, 

specifically rooms 219 and 115. The Newark Police 

Department executed a search warrant on Room 

219, where several blood stains were found on the 

carpet and the carpet padding in the center of the 

room. A DNA analysis was completed on the blood 

sample contained in the carpet from Room 219, and 

was matched to Hinds, the victim.
3

5. Throughout the investigation, which included 

several police agencies in three different states, 

there was no physical evidence to identify who 

murdered Hinds. The murder weapon was never 

located, there was no DNA evidence that identified 

the perpetrator or perpetrators, and there was no 

identifying fingerprint evidence to link to the 

individual or individuals who murdered Hinds.

6. Believing that the murder was not random or 

committed in the course of a robbery, the police 

theorized that the murder was committed by 

someone who knew and associated with Hinds and 

had a motive to commit the murder. The police 

were ready to focus their investigation on 

identifying a person who met those criteria.

7. As a result, the investigation focused on 

interviewing Hinds' business associates as well as 

other people who spent time with Hinds' business 

associates. Newton and Rimpal were both 

interviewed several times and each gave several 

contradictory versions to the police as to what 

occurred on the evening of May 2, 2009, and who 

was involved. Newton and Rimpal both lied to the 

police numerous times in their statements to law 

enforcement and routinely explained that the basis 

for their lies was fear of retaliation from Taylor and 

or Hinds and their associates and families. 

However, the one feature common to all of their 

respective statements prior to trial was 

that Taylor was the person in Room 219 on May 2, 

2009, and that when they (Rimpal and Newton) 

arrived in the room that evening, Hinds was lying 

dead on the floor.

8. The trial began on January 10, 2011. One of the 

State's key witnesses was Rimpal, who testified that 

on the night of the murder, he received a phone call 

from Taylor asking for Rimpal to purchase a few 

items from Wal–Mart. Those items included latex 

gloves, peroxide, and a container/storage bin, and 

were all commonly used as part of the t-shirt 

business. Rimpal was with Sheena Testerman 

(“Testerman”) at the time of the phone call and trip 

to Wal–Mart. She testified consistently with Rimpal 

regarding the products purchased at Wal–Mart. 
4

Rimpal testified that he drove from the Wal–Mart to 

the Super Eight motel with Testerman. As they 

exited the vehicle, Testerman went to the first floor 

motel room and Rimpal proceeded upstairs. Rimpal 

testified as he entered the upstairs motel room, 

Newton and Taylor were in the room and he did not 

see Hinds. However, as he entered the room he saw 

Hinds' feet between the two beds on the floor. 

Rimpal testified that he saw a small pistol tucked 

in Taylor's waistband and then later saw Hinds with 

a gunshot in his temple.

9. During his testimony, Rimpal acknowledged that in 

prior interviews with law enforcement he was not 

truthful and also minimized his involvement in the 

murder of Hinds. He explained the basis for his 

actions was that he was afraid of the repercussions 

from back where he lived. Rimpal further testified 

before the jury, over objection by Taylor's trial 

counsel, that the basis for his fear was that he had 

been assaulted on a couple of occasions, 

insinuating Taylor had something to do with these 

assaults. Trial counsel for Taylor objected at sidebar 

and asked for a mistrial due to the clear implication, 

made by Rimpal, that Rimpal was assaulted three 

times and Taylor had something to do with it. The 

trial judge denied the motion for mistrial and 

instead gave the jury a curative instruction.

10. Rimpal also provided the State with information 

regarding motive. Rimpal testified that Taylor and 

Hinds dealt with each other and often engaged in 

mutual childish “hazing.” Rimpal also testified that 

Hinds ordered him to do nasty things 

to Taylor's mother. In furtherance of Rimpal's desire 

to create a motive for the State, he testified how he 

informed Taylor of Hind's instructions regarding 

threatening Taylor's mother and 

destroying Taylor's father's property. Rimpal also 

told the jury that Taylor was aware that Hinds did 

not like him and Taylor was putting up a front and 

dealing with it. Rimpal was not arrested or charged 

for anything in connection with the murder of 

Hinds.

11. Newton testified for the State regarding his 

recollection of what occurred the evening of Hinds' 
5

murder. Newton testified, consistent with Rimpal, 

that they both entered the room separately, 

that Taylor was in the motel room with a pistol, and 

Hinds was on the floor. Newton also testified that 

he and Rimpal, along with Taylor, all cleaned up 

the room where Hinds was murdered, and that they 

all placed trash bags on Hinds body and transported 

the body to New Jersey where it was dumped in a 

wooded area.

12. Newton acknowledged that throughout his time in 

Delaware and Maryland he smoked a great deal of 

marijuana. Newton also testified that in prior 

interviews with law enforcement he was not truthful 

and also minimized his involvement in the murder 

of Hinds. The basis for his actions, he explained, 

was that he was afraid of the repercussions from 

back where he lived, because there was a motto, 

“snitches get stitches.” For that reason, he was 

worried for the sake of himself and his family. As a 

result of the numerous lies and false statements to 

the police, Newton was charged with hindering 

prosecution in February 2010. Newton pled guilty 

to that felony[-]level offense. His sentencing was 

scheduled for the month after Taylor's trial, in 

February 2011.

13. Eric Briggs was a prison snitch who testified to 

statements made by Taylor while both were 

incarcerated in Harford County, Maryland. On 

January 19, 2011, before Briggs 

testified, Taylor's counsel filed a Motion to 

Exclude Taylor's statements to Briggs. After

hearing oral arguments on the [M]otion prior to 

Briggs' testimony, the trial judge 

denied Taylor's Motion to Exclude.

14. Briggs testified that Taylor told him that Taylor shot 

the victim three times in the head and then drove the 

body and dumped it in the woods in New Jersey. 

Briggs also claimed that Taylor told him that the 

victim was planning on taking over his drug 

business and had threatened harm 

to Taylor's mother. Briggs corroborated several 

facts concerning Taylor's drug operation, which 

Newton and Rimpal previously testified to. In his 

testimony, Briggs confirmed that in his July 20, 
6

2009 interview he was told by law enforcement to 

find out more detailed incriminating statements 

from Taylor. Briggs also testified that the purpose 

of gaining more detailed statements 

from Taylor was to then report back to the police 

with the hope of receiving a “break.”

15. Defendant was convicted of non-capital Murder First Degree 

and Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a 

Felony. Defendant filed a pro se “Motion of Acquittal” on 

February 8, 2011.2 Defendant’s trial counsel moved to 

withdraw the following week.3 Trial counsel’s Motion to 

Withdraw was granted on March 30, 2011, and the Court 

appointed conflict counsel to represent Defendant in his appeal 

to the Supreme Court.4 On June 2, 2011, Defendant was 

sentenced to life imprisonment, plus five years for Possession 

of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony.

5

 A timely

notice of appeal was filed with the Delaware Supreme Court.6 

Defendant’s conviction and sentence were affirmed on April 

17, 2012.7

16. On April 29, 2013, Defendant filed a pro se Motion for 

Postconviction Relief.8 This Court appointed counsel to 

represent Defendant. Appointed counsel then filed an 

Amended Motion for Postconviction Relief, asserting

ineffective assistance of both trial and appellate counsel. In 

October 2014 both trial and appellate counsel submitted 

separate affidavits in response to the claims of ineffective 

assistance of counsel. Defendant then filed a Second Amended 

Motion for Postconviction Relief, reflecting newly-provided 

record evidence of a PowerPoint slide that had been used by the 

 

2 A7.

3

Id. 

4

Id. 

5 A53–56. 

6 A8. 

7

Taylor v. State, 44 A.3d 923, 2012 WL 1377589, at* 1 (Del. Apr. 17, 2012) (holding the 

Superior Court acted within its discretion in giving a curative jury instruction rather than 

granting a mistrial for a witness’s statement that he had been assaulted by Defendant and 

the State’s use of a cellmate to gather information about the murder did not violate the 

due process clause of the Delaware Constitution). 

8 A10.
7

State in its summation, the State filed a Response. Defendant 

elected not to file a reply to the State’s Response. 

17. Defendant’s Amended Motion is controlled by Superior Court 

Criminal Rule 61.9 Before addressing the merits of this 

Amended Motion, the Court must address the procedural 

requirements.10

18. A motion for postconviction relief can be procedurally barred 

for time limitations, successive motions, procedural defaults, 

and former adjudications.11 If a procedural bar exists, the Court 

will not consider the merits of the postconviction claim unless 

the Defendant can show that, pursuant to Rule 61(d)(2), the 

procedural bars are inapplicable.

19. None of these procedural bars apply to Defendant’s Second

Amended Motion. Although a claim for relief that is not 

asserted in the proceedings leading up to judgment of 

conviction is procedurally barred, Defendant alleges ineffective 

assistance of both his trial and appellate counsel, which he 

could not have brought until now.

20. Defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is 

reviewed under the United States Supreme Court decision in 

Strickland v. Washington.

12

 To determine whether a defendant 

was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of 

counsel, Strickland established a two-prong test.13 First, a 

defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient 

because the representation fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness. 14 Second, the defendant must then show he 

 

9

Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61. Since Defendant filed his Motion for Postconviction Relief on 

April 29, 2013, Defendant’s Motion is governed by the version of Rule 61 that became 

effective on July 1, 2005, and not the current version of the Rule. 

10 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990).

11 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1)-(4).

12 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 

13 Ploof, 75 A.3d at 820 (“While the Sixth Amendment is not directly applicable to the 

State of Delaware, the United States Supreme Court has applied the Sixth Amendment to 

the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.”).

14 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. 
8

was prejudiced by the deficient performance.15 “This requires 

showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the 

defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.”16

21. When evaluating whether counsel’s representation fell below an 

objective standard of reasonableness, a court must “eliminate 

the ‘distorting effects of hindsight’ and ‘indulge a strong 

presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range 

of reasonable professional assistance.’”

17

 Also, to establish 

prejudice a defendant must show “a reasonable probability 

that[] but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different.”18 “A reasonable 

probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence 

in the outcome,” which is a lower standard than “more likely 

than not.”

19

 Finally, when reviewing trial counsel’s 

performance under Strickland, there is “a strong presumption 

that the representation was professionally reasonable.”20

22. Defendant raises four claims for relief in his Second Amended 

Motion. His first assertion is that trial counsel was ineffective 

because he allegedly failed to advise the State that Defendant

was willing to plead “no contest” to the charge of manslaughter. 

Defendant acknowledges that the State offered him a plea 

agreement to the charge of manslaughter, but with that offer he 

would have had to plead “guilty.”21 Defendant claims that he 

asked his trial counsel if he could plead “no contest,” and trial 

counsel told him that was not possible without consulting the 

State.22 Defendant claims that “[t]rial counsel did not even 

know [Defendant’s] plea options, because he never discussed 

[Defendant’s] no contest plea proposal with the State.”23 

Finally, Defendant claims that this deficient performance by 

trial counsel prejudiced him, because if he was able to secure a 

 

15 Id. at 687. 

16 Id.

17 Ploof, 75 A.3d at 821 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). 

18 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 

19 Id. at 693-94. 

20 Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736, 753 (Del. 1990).

21 Second Amended Mot. for Postconviction Relief at 27 (Jan. 30, 2016). 

22 Id.

23 Id. at 28. 
9

no contest plea to manslaughter, “his sentence would have been 

vastly less, even at its maximum, than the one he is currently 

serving.”24

23. However, in the affidavit of trial counsel Eugene J. Maurer, 

Esquire it seems clear that Defendant was made aware of his 

plea options and neither suffered ineffective assistance of 

counsel nor any prejudice at the hands of his counsel. In trial 

counsel’s affidavit he states, “[Defendant] was brought to the 

courthouse in Dover on November 17, 2010[,] for the sole 

purpose of what counsel believed was going to be an 

acceptance of the plea that had been extended by the State.”25 

After Defendant ultimately rejected the proposed plea offer, 

trial counsel sent a letter to Defendant the following day 

memorializing the previous day’s events. Trial counsel therein

stated:

Through my efforts I was able to persuade 

the prosecution to extend a [p]lea [o]ffer to you 

which would have resulted in your being 

incarcerated for a period of five years in connection 

with a plea to Manslaughter. As part of the plea, 

the State would drop [the] charges of Murder in the 

First and Second Degrees and Possession of a 

Firearm During the Commission of a Felony. The 

State would have recommended 25 years in jail, 

suspended after five years for six months Home 

Confinement followed by 18 months at Level III 

Probation. You initially indicated to me that you 

were unwilling to accept the plea due to the fact that 

you were not given any guarantees or assurances 

that the bargained-for sentence would be that which 

would be imposed. You did, however, indicate 

quite clearly to me that if I could provide you with 

those assurances, you would in fact accept the 

State’s [p]lea [o]ffer.

Acting upon that, I went back to the 

Prosecutor’s Office and spoke with them and, 

specifically, was able to have them agree to an 

immediate sentencing which, for the most part, 

 

24 Id. at 29. 

25 Trial Counsel’s Aff. In Connection with Pet’r’s Mot. for Postconviction Relief at ¶ 6. 

D.I. 87. 
10

would have precluded any additional sentence 

above and beyond that which was negotiated. Even 

more so, I met with the Judge on November 17 in 

the presence of the Prosecutors and went over the 

terms of the [p]lea [a]greement with him. He 

indicated that, as long as the State was in agreement 

with the recommendation, which they were, he 

would follow the negotiated plea resolution. I also 

indicated to you that I’ve been practicing in front of 

this Judge and in Dover for quite some period of 

time, and I have never seen the Judge or the Court 

disregard a [p]lea [a]greement of this nature.

I, therefore, came back to you after the 

[Truth in Sentencing] documents were signed and 

indicated the above to you and told you that the 

five-year sentence was a guarantee. For reasons 

which are bewildering to me, you then indicated 

that you did not “trust the system” and, in 

particular, you were concerned by the fact that the 

parents of the victim were present and wanted to 

speak in memory of their son, who was assassinated 

by three bullets in his head, and I further indicated 

to you that their presence would not make a 

difference in the terms of the sentence that was 

[going to be] imposed. In short, I told you without 

hesitation that the five-year prison sentence was a 

“done deal” and that the Judge would impose it. Of 

course, you would have been given credit for time 

served and also you would be able to obtain “good 

time” during the period of time when you were 

incarcerated. We figured that you would be out of 

prison in approximately two and one-half years. I 

must say that this is probably the best plea that I 

have ever been able to negotiate for an individual 

charged with Murder in the First Degree. 

Notwithstanding the above, as is our right, you 

rejected the plea and now wish to go to trial. . . .

Please understand something[:] You are 

never required to accept any type of [p]lea [o]ffer 

and you certainly have the right to go to trial no 

matter how good the offer is. What bothers me is 

that fact that you allowed me to go forward and do 

all of these things on your behalf when it now 

appears that you never had any intention of 

accepting such a plea in the first place. If you had 

simply told me flat out that you did not wish to do 
11

that, then I would not have gone to all the trouble 

that I did to try to make the five-year plea a reality 

for you. In that sense, and for reasons which are not 

at all clear to me, it appears that you were 

manipulating me toward your own ends and for 

reasons which, again, are entirely unclear to me. . . .

I simply wanted to put all of these things 

“on the record,” if you will, so, if things don’t go 

well for you at trial, I am quite sure that I will be the 

first one at whom you point a finger for not having 

represented your interests adequately. I wanted to 

make clear that you were provided with every 

opportunity to accept the plea which would have 

eliminated the potential of a mandatory life 

sentence and that you knowingly and intelligently 

rejected that [p]lea [o]ffer.26 

24. Given the letter trial counsel sent to Defendant the day after he 

rejected any plea offer from the State, it does not appear that 

trial counsel acted ineffectively, nor does it appear that 

Defendant suffered any prejudice due to trial counsel’s actions. 

Contrary to Defendant’s assertion that if he had been offered a 

“no contest” plea that “there is no reason to believe that he 

would not have accepted the offer,” it appears that he likely still 

would have rejected it. Defendant was originally charged with 

Murder First Degree, which would require him to serve a 

mandatory life sentence. When offered the option to plead

guilty to manslaughter and have the State cap its 

recommendation at five years Level V, he first agreed to accept 

the offer. Then, for reasons that were “bewildering” to trial 

counsel, Defendant then changed his mind and refused to accept 

the State’s favorable offer. 

25. Since Defendant originally went to the courthouse to accept a 

plea agreement from the State; signed the Truth-in-Sentencing 

Guilty Plea form; and allowed his trial counsel to extensively 

negotiation such a favorable plea agreement, his assertion that 

he likely would have plead no contest to the charges but would 

not have plead guilty is hardly credible. Therefore, Defendant’s

 

26 Letter attached to Trial Counsel’s Aff. In Connection with Pet’r’s Mot. for 

Postconviction Relief D.I. 87. 
12

assertion that his counsel was ineffective for failing to 

communicate with the State about his willingness to plead no 

contest does not meet the first prong under Strickland. 

26. Next, Defendant argues that the State’s case against him was 

based primarily “around the testimony of several 

accomplices.”27 Therefore, Defendant contends that trial 

counsel was ineffective for failing to request an accomplice 

testimony instruction and appellate counsel Brian J. Chapman, 

Esquire was ineffective for failing to raise that failure on 

appeal. In 2010 the Delaware Supreme Court ruled that trial 

counsel was ineffective in Smith v. State because trial counsel 

failed to request an accomplice testimony instruction.28 The 

Court reasoned that trial counsel should have requested an 

accomplice testimony instruction because the normal pattern 

instruction on witness credibility and arguments to the jury 

about an accomplice’s credibility were not enough to guard 

against the accomplice’s possible ulterior motivation for 

testifying.29

27. Defendant states that three of the witnesses who testified 

against him at trial testified to being both accomplices in drug 

dealing and accomplices to the murder of Hinds. Defendant

contends that this testimony was “central” to the State’s case 

against him and provided details in the case that were not 

corroborated by other evidence. Defendant states that “[m]ost 

of the other evidence corroborating the story that [Defendant] 

killed Hinds came from a prison snitch and a woman who first 

claimed to merely have ‘assumed’ [Defendant] was the 

murderer.”30 

28. Defendant places great emphasis on the 2010 Delaware 

Supreme Court decision in Smith v. State.

31

 Although the 

Delaware Supreme Court has since overruled the holding in 

Smith, this Court must apply the case law that was controlling 

 

27 Second Amended Mot. for Postconviction Relief at 31 (Jan. 30, 2016).

28 991 A.2d 1169, 1175 (2010). 

29 Id. at 1177–78. 

30 Second Amended Mot. for Postconviction Relief at 36 (Jan. 30, 2016).

31 991 A.2d 1169 (Del. 2010) overruled by Brooks v. State, 40 A.3d 346 (Del. 2010). 
13

at the time of the trial.32 Defendant asserts that since the 

testimony was uncorroborated by other evidence and it was 

central to the State’s case, trial counsel’s failure to request 

accomplice testimony instruction constituted ineffective 

assistance of counsel. Furthermore, Defendant contends that 

his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this 

issue on appeal.

29. Trial counsel stated in his affidavit that “[i]t was not the 

defense’s strategy to even suggest to the jury that Newton, 

Rimpal, and Testerman were accomplices to the homicide with 

which [Defendant] was charged.”33 Instead, it was “defense’s 

position that [Defendant] was not involved in the acts giving 

rise to the homicide and was not guilty of the offenses.”34 

During a prayer conference where the issue was raised, trial 

counsel advocated against any such instruction because it did 

not comport with his trial strategy. Trial counsel stated:

Your Honor, I think, without citing the case 

law, obviously the Court is very familiar with it, 

that there has to be some evidence in the record to 

support the giving of the instruction. I think the 

State’s theory of the case as presented to the jury is 

that [] Taylor committed this homicide and 

committed it alone and that Mr. Newton and Mr. 

Rimp[al] helped him after the fact.

My argument would never be that [] Taylor 

was an accomplice to either Mr. Rimp[al] or Mr. 

Newton. I think I am free, based on the record, to 

argue that that Mr. Newton or Mr. Rimp[al] could 

have committed this homicide either themselves or 

together while maintaining that [] Taylor did not. 

So I don’t believe that, under the case law, there’s 

sufficient evidence in the record to support the 

 

32 Hoskins v. State, 102 A.3d 724, 732 (Del. 2014) (“Thus, for cases decided before 

Brooks, our analysis on postconviction review of a Bland claim is governed by the case 

law controlling at the time of the trial.”). 

33 Trial Counsel’s Aff. In Connection with Pet’r’s Mot. for Postconviction Relief at ¶ 8. 

D.I. 87. 

34 Id. 
14

giving of an accomplice liability instruction. And I 

would object to such an instruction.35

30. The Court agreed with trial counsel’s argument and found no 

rational basis in the evidence to support an accomplice 

testimony instruction. Since it was the defense strategy to 

separate Defendant from the witnesses and suggest that one or 

both of them actually killed Hinds, it does not make sense to 

then expect trial counsel to implicate Defendant as an

accomplice to the murder with an accomplice jury instruction. 

31. Furthermore, Defendant has failed to demonstrate that he 

suffered any prejudice. By arguing against an accomplice 

instruction, counsel was free to argue that the witnesses 

conspired against him, not with him, to commit the murder. 

Similarly, since trial counsel was not ineffective for not 

requesting an accomplice instruction, appellate counsel was not 

ineffective for not raising this claim on appeal. 

32. The third claim raised by Defendant is that trial counsel was 

ineffective for failing to object to a PowerPoint slide donning

his face and the word “Guilty” in bold, red letters. The slide 

also had the names of all of the witnesses and the word 

“Evidence” pointing at the photo of Defendant with red 

arrows.

36

 Defendant contends that “[t]here is no reason to 

combine a visual of [him] with the word ‘Guilty’ embossed 

overtop in a PowerPoint slide except to stimulate emotion and 

prejudice.”37 Therefore, Defendant argues that his trial counsel 

was ineffective for failing to object to the slide and his appellate 

counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the claim on appeal. 

33. A recent Delaware Supreme Court opinion discussed a similar 

situation and provided some guidance to the Bar on 

 

35 Tr. of prayer conference attached to Trial Counsel’s Aff. In Connection with Pet’r’s 

Mot. for Postconviction Relief. D.I. 87. 

36 Defendant also states that the State used another slide that depicted Hinds’ body with 

the word “Guilty” written over it during closings arguments. However, Defendant’s

counsel has been unable to find any record of this PowerPoint slide. Therefore, this 

Court will only consider the PowerPoint slide of which there is a record. 

37 Second Amended Mot. for Postconviction Relief at 42 (Jan. 30, 2016).
15

“PowerPoint presentations and their acceptable boundaries in 

criminal prosecutions.”38 The Delaware Supreme Court stated:

As a general matter, PowerPoint presentations are 

not inherently good or bad. Rather, their content and 

application determines their propriety. This Court 

does not seek to discourage the use of technology in 

closing arguments to summarize and highlight 

relevant evidence for the benefit of the jury. But 

slides may not be used to put forward impermissible 

evidence or make improper arguments before the 

jury. A PowerPoint may not be used to make an 

argument visually that could not be made orally. 

While prosecutors are given latitude in making 

closing arguments, his or her comments must be 

limited to properly admitted evidence and any 

reasonable inferences or conclusions that can be 

drawn therefrom. The prosecutor may neither 

misstate the law nor express his or her personal 

opinion on the merits of the case or the credibility 

of witnesses. A defendant should timely object to 

improper comments or slideshow presentations, so 

that the trial court is offered an opportunity to 

address any objections.39

34. Trial counsel acknowledges that the best practice would have 

likely been to object to the use of the PowerPoint slide, as 

counsel was also the trial counsel in Spence v. State.

40

 

However, trial counsel states that his decision not to object 

“may” have been strategic.41 Appellate counsel also stated in 

his affidavit that he was not ineffective in his representation on 

 

38 Spence v. State, 129 A.3d 212, 220 (Del. 2015). 

39 Id. at 223 (internal citations omitted). 

40 Trial Counsel’s Aff. In Connection with Pet’r’s Mot. for Postconviction Relief at ¶ 12. 

D.I. 87.

41 Id. (“Counsel would note as an aside that he had objected once during [the State’s] 

opening summation and twice during [the State’s] rebuttal summation. Counsel has 

always felt that repetitive objections during summations could redound to the defendant’s 

detriment and that may be the reason why no additional objection was made to the 

[P]ower[P]oint. The State’s position that the defendant was guilty was fairly obvious. 

However, if given the opportunity again, counsel would have objected to this 

presentation.”). 
16

appeal because after a review of the transcripts and trial 

material, he raised the issues he felt had merit on appeal.42

35. The Court does not find that this slide was impermissible; 

therefore, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object 

and appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to bring the 

issue on appeal. When evaluating individual PowerPoint slides 

to determine whether they are permissible, it is important to 

recognize what the Supreme Court stated in Spence: 

It would be, no doubt, perilous for this Court to 

attempt to derive specific rules regarding visual 

aids. For example, use of the color red is not always 

prejudicial. Use of capitalized letters does not 

necessarily constitute “shouting.” The word 

“guilty,” when presented as a written word in a 

visual aid, does not always constitute an improper 

expression of a prosecutor's opinion of guilt.43

The PowerPoint slide that was used in Defendant’s trial is 

factually distinguishable from the impermissible slide used in 

Spence. The slide used by the State in Spence displayed an 

image of the victim’s bloody body.44 The slide also featured 

the words “Terror,” “Fear,” and “Murder.”45 By contrast, the 

slide used by the State in Defendant’s trial displayed the word 

“Guilty” over an image of him. There is no blood and 

Defendant does not appear to be injured or unpresentable. It 

also contained the names of the witnesses and the word 

“Evidence” around Defendant’s photograph, with arrows 

pointing towards Defendant. The implication seems to be that 

all of the witness’ testimony and evidence lead to Defendant. 

36. Unlike the impermissible slide in Spence, this slide was not 

meant to inflame the jury’s emotions. Instead, the State was 

using the slide to visually illustrate what it was otherwise 

stating during its closing arguments: that Defendant was guilty 

of murdering Sven Hinds. In fact, Defendant’s trial counsel has

 

42 Appellate Counsel’s Aff. In Resp. to Am. Mot. for Postconviction Relief at 3 (Oct. 27, 

2014). D.I. 86. 

43 Spence v. State, 129 A.3d at 223 n. 40. 

44 Id. at 223. 

45 Id. 
17

conceded in his affidavit and letter attached to the affidavit that 

it was “fairly obvious” that Defendant was guilty of the crime.46 

The letter that was attached to the affidavit was sent to 

Defendant on November 18, 2010, approximately three weeks 

before Defendant’s trial. 

37. The State’s closing argument lasted approximately 90 minutes. 

During that time, the State discussed all of the evidence it 

presented during the case, including witness testimony. At the 

end of the State’s closing, it declared, “Leonard Taylor is guilty 

of the murder of Sven Hinds. And when you look at the 

evidence, the State is confident that you will return a verdict of 

guilty against Leonard Taylor for the murder of Sven Hinds.”47 

The slide that the State used visually depicted the conclusion 

the State was attempting to convey. The slide listed the 

witnesses that testified against Defendant and had red arrows 

that pointed towards a photograph of him indicating that he was 

guilty. There were no misstatements of law, no personal 

opinions given about witness credibility, and no impermissible 

evidence offered. Therefore, the slide was not impermissible 

and neither trial nor appellate counsel was ineffective for failing 

to challenge it. 

38. Furthermore, even if the slide was improper, which the Court 

holds that it was not, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing 

to object under the Hughes test.48 The three-prong analysis 

under Hughes considers: (1) the closeness of the case; (2) the 

centrality of the issue affected by the error; and (3) the steps 

taken to mitigate the effects of the error.49 

 

46 See Trial Counsel’s Aff. In Connection with Pet’r’s Mot. for Postconviction Relief at ¶ 

12 (“The State’s position that the defendant was guilty was fairly obvious.”); Letter 

attached to Trial Counsel’s Aff. In Connection with Pet’r’s Mot. for Postconviction 

Relief (“[Y]ou seem[] to feel that your chances of winning this case at trial are better than 

I perceive[] them to be. . . . [T]here was a good chance that you could be convicted of 

Murder in the First Degree.”). 

47 A329. 

48 Hughes v. State, 437 A.2d 559, 572 (Del. 1981) (quoting Dyson v. U.S., 418 A.2d 127, 

132 (D.C. 1980). See also Spence, 129 A.2d at 219 (“To determine whether the 

misconduct prejudicially affected the defendant, we apply the three factors identified 

in Hughes v. State.”). 

49 Hughes, 437 at 572. 
18

39. The first prong is easily met. Trial counsel advised Defendant 

several times that in trial counsel’s opinion this was not a close 

case and it was “fairly obvious” Defendant was guilty of the 

crime. From the Court’s review of the evidence, it also 

concludes that the State had a strong case. Second, this slide 

was not at the center of the State’s case. The State presented 

five witnesses who testified against Defendant. The State then 

gave a closing statement that lasted 90 minutes. At the very 

end of the closing argument, the State displayed this slide. All 

that Defendant claims the State said was “Leonard Taylor is 

guilty of the murder of Sven Hinds. And when you look at the 

evidence, the State is confident that you will return a verdict of 

guilty against Leonard Taylor for the murder of Sven Hinds.”50 

Therefore, the slide was not the centerpiece of the State’s case, 

it was a visual summation of the evidence against Defendant. 

Finally, there does not appear to be any steps taken to mitigate 

the effects of the alleged error; however, given the strength of 

the first two factors, trial counsel’s failure to object to the slide 

and appellate counsel’s failure to raise the issue on appeal was 

harmless error, if error at all. 

40. Last, Defendant claims that he is entitled to relief because of the 

cumulative prejudicial effect of the errors that he asserts in his 

Second Amended Motion. However, since Defendant has 

failed to demonstrate any prejudice from the alleged errors, 

there can be no cumulative effect. 

Therefore, Defendant’s Second Amended Motion for Postconviction 

Relief is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

______________________

Richard R. Cooch, R.J.

oc: Prothonotary

cc: Investigative Services 

 

50 A329.