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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America,

Plaintiff/Respondent,

v. 

Ernesto Felix,

Defendant/Movant.

No. CV-18-00148-TUC-JGZ

No. CR-11-03280-TUC-JGZ

ORDER 

Pending before the Court is Petitioner Ernesto Felix’s Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, 

or Correct Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (Doc. 1.1) The Government responded.

(Doc. 13.) Felix did not file a reply. Dispositive of this action is whether Felix is entitled 

to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations for filing a § 2255 Motion because of alleged 

memory issues. Upon consideration of the record and the parties’ arguments, the Court 

will deny Felix’s § 2255 Motion as untimely filed.

I. Background

In September 2011, a grand jury indicted Felix and co-defendants Luis Corral, 

Gerardo Cota-Soto, Jesus Bautista-Sanchez, and Carmen Valdivia-Salazar charging one 

count of Conspiracy to Possess with Intent to Distribute Methamphetamine and Cocaine in 

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(viii) and 21 U.S.C. 

§841(b)(1)(A)(ii)(II); two counts of Possession with Intent to Distribute Methamphetamine 

in violation of 21 U.S.C. §841(a)(1) and 21 U.S.C. §841(b)(1)(A)(viii); and one count of

 

1 Unless otherwise indicated, documents cited are filed in CV 18-148-TUC-JGZ.
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Possession with Intent to Distribute Cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §841(a)(1) and 21 

U.S.C. §841(b)(1)(A)(ii)(II). (CR 11-3280-TUC-JGZ (CR 11-3280), Doc. 12.) The 

charges arose from events occurring on August 24 and 25, 2011. (Id.) During the course 

of this action, Felix was represented by a succession of appointed counsel.

In January 2013, Felix, during first representation, pleaded guilty to Count 3 of the 

indictment alleging possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. (CR 11-3280, 

Docs. 131, 220.) During the colloquy, Felix stated that he did “not remember what 

happened” regarding the events leading to his arrest, he understood the charges against 

him, and he agreed that the government could prove the factual basis set forth in the plea 

agreement. (CR 11-3280, Doc. 220, pp. 6, 13, 15–20.

2

) The plea agreement provided for 

a range of 63 to 108 months of imprisonment. (Id. at 19.)

On May 7, 2013, Felix’s counsel notified the Court that Felix was not safety valve 

eligible and that counsel needed to confer with Felix about continuing with his guilty plea 

or withdrawing from it.3 (Doc. 13, p. 4.) On that same date, Felix filed a request for new 

counsel, claiming that current counsel was ineffective because he did not “adequately 

explain[] facts regarding papers he aggressively expects me to sign” or answer Felix’s 

questions, and counsel lacked interest demonstrated by his disregard of Felix’s “objections 

and assertions with regard[] to my case.” (Id.; CR 11-3280, Doc. 180.) The Court granted 

Felix’s request and appointed new counsel. (Doc. 13, p. 4.) 

At a June 12, 2013 status conference, Felix’s second counsel requested additional 

time to consider matters pertinent to sentencing and to have Felix examined to determine 

competency, indicating that Felix “may have a diminished capacity to understand things.” 

(CR 11-3280, Doc. 372, p. 4.) On June 15, 2013, Felix’s counsel filed a Motion to

Determine Competency stating “that there is a good faith question as to Mr. Felix’s present 

competency, based on a mental disease or defect, to either assist in his own defense at trial 

 

2 Reference to page numbers of cited filings correlate to the page number assigned 

by the Court’s electronic filing system (CM/ECF) that appears at the top of each page of 

the document.

3 Because Felix was not safety valve eligible, he faced a mandatory minimum 

sentence of 10 years’.
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or be competent at sentencing. There were issues of comprehension that arose at the change 

of plea hearing in January, 2013. Also, mental health questions are mentioned in the PSR. 

Finally, Mr. Felix has always been in special education classes, and he has used and abused 

many types of drugs to self-medicate.” (CR 11-3280, Doc. 215, p. 2.) The Court granted 

the requested evaluation.

Psychologist James P. Sullivan, Ph.D., evaluated Felix on September 2013 and 

January 2014 to determine competency. (CR 11-3280, Docs. 255, 256.) Felix’s 

performance on cognitive testing was “consistent with feigning of competency related 

impairment.” (CR 11-3280, Doc. 256, p. 2.) Dr. Sullivan’s testing also indicated that Felix 

was feigning or exaggerating a mental disorder. (Id. at 3.) Since the tests showed Felix 

was “clearly feigning,” Dr. Sullivan was unable to complete the evaluation because any 

further testing would have been invalid and unreliable. (Id.) Dr. Sullivan concluded that 

“it is essentially impossible to determine whether Mr. Felix does indeed suffer from 

authentic impairment in . . . [cognitive and mental] areas. Obtained results indicate that 

Mr. Felix is either wholly fabricating impairment (malingering) or exaggerating authentic 

impairment (symptom embellishment). It is not possible to definitely determine which.” 

(Id.) 

Dr. Sullivan also noted that Felix’s school transcripts from 1988 to 1998 showed 

“poor to failing performance which appears to have worsened over time.” (Id. at 4.) 

Although Dr. Sullivan could not “definitely determine the etiology of this poor school 

performance[,]” he stated that “authentic cognitive impairment is certainly a possibility.” 

(Id.) 

At a January 27, 2014 status conference, defense counsel stated that in light of Dr. 

Sullivan’s report, it appeared that Felix was competent to be sentenced. The Court agreed 

that based on Dr. Sullivan’s report, Felix did not appear to have a competency issue that 

would prevent going forward.

At a March 17, 2014 status conference, Felix’s counsel advised that Felix wanted to 

withdraw from the plea agreement because when the plea was entered, the parties thought 
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Felix was safety valve eligible and they have since determined he was not. (CR 11-3280, 

Doc. 366, p. 2.) Defense counsel also acknowledged Dr. Sullivan’s opinion that Felix “was 

exaggerating or fabricating and . . . [the Doctor] couldn’t come to good conclusions about 

the origins of his mental health issues because I guess his testing was clouded by what he 

thought was malingering.” (Id. at 3.) Defense counsel also stated that whether Felix was 

“exaggerating or malingering, I think Mr. Felix has some mental problems, so I have a hard 

time explaining things to him and a hard time getting him to understand.” (Id. at 6–8.) The 

matter was continued to give Felix time to confer with counsel concerning whether he 

should withdraw from the plea agreement. (Id. at 7–8.) On that same date, the Court set a 

sentencing hearing, which was later continued to April 16, 2014.4 (Doc. 13, pp. 5–6.) 

At sentencing on April 16, 2014, Felix’s counsel stated that Felix did not want to go 

forward with the plea agreement and sentencing because “he didn’t understand what was 

going on and he did not validly plead guilty.” (CR 11-3280, Doc. 367, pp. 7–8.) Pertinent 

to the instant § 2255 Motion, Felix stated that he thought his girlfriend and co-defendant

“Carmen drugged me, and if I committed this crime—because I think I didn’t commit this 

crime at all.” (Id. at p. 8.) The Court discussed with Felix his signed plea agreement and 

the factual basis he admitted when he had pleaded guilty. (Id. at 9–12.) The Court 

informed Felix that his attorney could request that Felix be allowed to withdraw from the 

guilty plea, and if he made that request, the Court would be required to assess whether the 

plea was involuntarily made. (Id. at 13.) In a sidebar with counsel, the Court expressed 

concern whether Felix had a good understanding of the potential sentence he faced. (Id. at 

14.) Felix’s counsel stated that “Dr. Sullivan says he’s exaggerating, but Dr Sullivan says 

he can’t tell if there’s an underlying mental health issue because he’s exaggerating so much. 

So, you know, he doesn’t have a full deck, as far as I’m concerned.” (Id. at 15.) Felix’s 

counsel also stated that “what he tells me is he was told by . . . [first defense counsel] just 

to say yes or admit it and he didn’t really know what he was doing.” (Id. at 16.) 

 

4 On April 1, 2014, the Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s Findings and 

Recommendation concerning Felix’s January 10, 2013 guilty plea, and accepted Felix’s 

guilty plea. (CR 11-3280, Doc. 268.)
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Following the sidebar, the Court asked Felix about his discussions with his prior 

counsel concerning the mandatory sentencing range and reminded Felix “that was part of 

the reason for his discontinuing representation. You were unhappy with him and unhappy 

with that, and he asked to withdraw.” (Id. at 19.) Felix responded that he didn’t remember. 

(Id. at 20.) 

Counsel then addressed sentencing. In doing so, the prosecutor set forth the basis 

for the government’s decision to charge Felix with a crime that provided for a minimum 

mandatory sentence. (Id. at 20–23.) When Felix was asked whether he wanted to say 

something for the Court to consider before sentencing him, Felix stated that he did not 

remember what happened concerning the crime, he did not do “this”, and “I think these 

people set me up to whatever happened, honestly.” (Id. at 24.) 

The Court found Felix guilty of possession with intent to distribute approximately 

7.1 kilograms of methamphetamine by virtue of his guilty plea to that charge. (Id. at 24.) 

The Court sentenced Felix to ten years’ imprisonment followed by five years of supervised 

release. (Id. at 27.) During the sentencing, Felix stated that his first attorney did not tell 

him “about the stash house” and he told his attorney he “did not know anything . . . about 

that.” (Id. at 26.) He stated that it was not “fair that everybody got 63, 60-something 

months and I’m getting more time if I didn’t do anything. . . . Like I said, I don’t remember 

a lot of things.” (Id. at 28.) Felix also stated that he “didn’t commit this crime.” (Id. at 

29.) Felix asserted that he did not agree to his sentence. (Id. at 29.) 

The Court next explained that under the terms of the plea agreement, Felix had the 

option to withdraw from the agreement because he received a sentence greater than that 

contemplated in the agreement. (Id. at 30.) The Court also advised: “If you did withdraw, 

then you have the right to appeal your sentence if you chose to do so.” (Id.) Felix stated 

that he wished to appeal. (Id.) The Court considered Felix to have withdrawn from the 

plea agreement and advised Felix of the right to appeal his conviction and sentence. (Id.) 

Felix stated he understood. (Id. at 31.) 

The following day, April 17, 2014, the Court set an April 21, 2014 hearing for 
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continuation of sentencing. (CR 11-3280, Doc. 276.) At the April 21, 2014 hearing, the 

Court again explained to Felix that he could withdraw from the plea agreement and the 

plea because he received a sentence greater than 108 months of imprisonment. (CR 11-

3280, Doc. 368, p. 2–3.) The Court also advised that the charges still carried the same 

mandatory minimum sentences. (Id. at 3.) The matter was continued so Felix could confer 

with counsel. (Id. at 5.)

On April 23, 2014, Felix withdrew his plea of guilty against his counsel’s advice.

(CR 11-3280, Doc. 369, p. 5.) Counsel also stated that Felix was not receiving his 

medication for mental health issues at the prison and the Court directed counsel to contact 

the Marshals Service to obtain more information. (Id. at p. 11.) The Court vacated the 

Judgment and Commitment and set a new plea deadline and trial date. (Doc. 13, p. 6.)

On October 1, 2014, Felix requested new counsel because he did not feel current 

counsel was working toward his best interests. (Id.) The Court granted the request and 

appointed the third defense counsel, who was soon replaced by fourth appointed counsel 

because of a conflict. (Id. at 6–7.) After some continuances, a plea deadline was set for 

January 16, 2015, and trial was set for February 2, 2015. (Id. at 7.)

In January 2015, the Court granted defense counsel’s motion to extend the plea 

deadline because Felix wanted to accept a plea offered by the government. (Id.) At the 

January 23, 2015 change of plea hearing, Felix pleaded guilty to possession with intent to 

distribute 3.1 kilograms of methamphetamine as charged in a January 23, 2015 

Information. (CR 11-3280, Docs. 229, 331, 370.) Felix stated that he was feeling 

“nervous” and “scared” but that he did not have difficulty understanding what was being 

discussed. (CR 11-3280, Doc. 370, p. 8.) Felix stated that he agreed with the factual basis. 

(Id. at 5–6.) He stated that he had a learning disorder and always had problems reading 

and memorizing. (Id. at 9.) When the Court questioned Felix about mental health 

treatment, he responded that he had treatment for “[s]ome hallucinations.” (Id. at 6–7.) 

Felix stated that he understood the plea agreement after his counsel read it to him word for 

word and no one forced him to enter into the agreement. (Id. at 9–10.) Defense counsel 
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indicated that Felix was competent to plead guilty, stating: “I’ve been aware that [Felix] 

has difficulty processing information, but I have no doubt he’s legally competent to do this, 

Judge.” (Id. at 10.) 

The March 2015 presentence report (PSR) indicated that other than substance abuse 

services, Felix had not been under the care of mental health professionals. (CR 11-3280, 

Doc. 335, p. 14.) The report stated that during the presentence interview, Felix “appeared 

to have consistent problems remembering dates, names of family members, and staying 

focused on questions asked of him.” (Id. at 14–15.) The PSR noted Dr. Sullivan’s findings 

that Felix was either wholly fabricating or exaggerating authentic impairment. (Id. at 15.) 

The PSR also noted Felix’s reported daily marijuana use beginning in 1991 when he was 

16 years of age, and drinking up to six beers a day beginning 1993. (Id.) In 1996, he 

started using cocaine daily, and in 2003 he began using methamphetamine, ultimately using 

it once a week. (Id.) Felix reported completing school through the 10th grade. (Id.)

On April 2, 2015, the Court sentenced Felix to 80 months’ imprisonment followed 

by three years of supervised release. (Doc. 13, p. 8.) At sentencing Felix stated that he 

“guess[ed]” he was satisfied with his attorney’s representation “[u]nder the circumstances” 

and mentioned that in some instances his attorney did not show up for court and did not 

keep him informed of hearing dates. (CR 11-3280, Doc. 371, p. 2, 7–8.) The Court made 

several findings including that Felix had some issues regarding cognitive functioning and 

a substantial substance abuse problem given his admission to the arresting officer that he 

used methamphetamine daily,

5

and he tended to minimize his responsibility which was

represented by his not remembering. (Id. at 25–26.) The Court also found that Felix 

knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his appeal rights. (Id. at 30.)

The Judgment was entered on April 7, 2015. (CR 11-3280, Doc. 341). Felix had 

14 days from the entry of judgment to file an appeal. Fed. R. App. 4(b)(1)(A). Felix did 

not file an appeal. (Doc. 13, p. 10.)

 

5 The Court also stated that whether or not Felix’s substance abuse was “the cause 

of the cognitive difficulties or there are other causes, there’s clearly some difficulty 

functioning.” (CR 11-3280, Doc. 371, p. 26.)
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On March 20, 2018, Felix filed the instant motion, together with his declaration and 

supporting exhibits, seeking to vacate his conviction. (Doc. 1.) Felix contends he is 

entitled to relief because his “court-appointed attorneys were ineffective for a variety of 

reasons, principally, for failing to inform this court of the truth of Movant’s mental 

condition” and ignoring “his obvious mental condition and documented short-term and 

long-term memory loss.” (Id. at 24–25.) Felix contends that his “series of court-appointed 

attorneys failed to ensure that he was sufficiently competent to properly navigate these 

legal proceedings.” (Id. at 22.) 

Felix’s allegations of counsels’ ineffective representation concerning his mental 

condition is predicated upon Felix’s assertion that “at all times during the events leading 

up to his” arrest and throughout his court case, “he was suffering from a severe mental 

condition, including short-term and long-term memory loss, which rendered his actions 

involuntary.” (Id. at 18 (emphasis omitted); see also id. at 43–44.) Felix claims that when 

he made the “undercover purchase” resulting in his arrest, he had been undergoing medical 

treatment. (Id. at 18.) He believes that prior to his arrest, his girlfriend and co-defendant, 

Carmen Valdivia-Salazar, and her son-in-law drugged him causing his memory issues, and 

that they and others set him up. (Id. at 36–47.)

Felix states that when he pleaded guilty, he was “scared and confused, and not in 

my right mind to make decisions like that—which I expressly mentioned to the judge.” 

(Id. at 52.) He asserts his appointed counsel “effectively coerced him into signing a plea 

agreement with the threat of a lengthy prison sentence” despite knowing that his mental 

state prevented him from fully appreciating “the events as they were unfolding, much less 

admit guilt to the crime” alleged. (Id. at 24.) Felix attaches a 2018 bar complaint he filed 

against his fourth appointed counsel who represented him during the 2015 change of plea 

and sentencing proceedings. In the bar complaint, Felix asserts that fourth counsel was

ineffective for numerous reasons, including that counsel failed to appear for hearings, did 

not explain the plea agreement, failed to correct errors in the plea agreement, and did not 
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obtain Felix’s medical records or blood samples as Felix requested.

6

 (Id. at 65–66.) Felix 

also stated in the bar complaint that he told fourth counsel that “I couldn’t remember what 

had happened in this case because people were drugging me, which is why I needed drug 

[sic] samples to see what drug people had been giving me” and that his “girlfriend, Carmen 

Valdivia, had said that she would have me thrown in jail and then take all of my property.” 

(Id. at 66.)

II. Discussion

Respondent contends, and the Court agrees, that the instant Motion is barred by the 

statute of limitations. Generally, motions filed pursuant to § 2255 must be brought within 

one year of the date the conviction becomes final. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1). Felix’s 

conviction became final on April 21, 2015. Felix did not file his § 2255 motion until almost 

three years later on March 20, 2018. 

Felix concedes that his Motion is untimely. He argues that he is entitled to equitable 

tolling of the statute of limitations from the time he entered his guilty plea to the filing of 

the instant Motion due to his short-term and long-term memory loss. (Doc. 1, p. 24.) Felix 

claims that he has a documented history of memory loss and when he was arrested he had 

been undergoing medical treatment. (Id. at 22, 24.) Felix states, without support, that at 

his sentencing “it was stated that it would take a period of at least two years for Movant to 

recover his memory.” (Id. at 24.) Felix claims that now, after “several years” of treatment 

in prison, he has “partially recover[ed]” his memory and that he filed the instant motion 

with the assistance of other inmates.7 (Id. at p. 22; see also id. at 43 (Felix still does not 

remember much about the day of his arrest).) Felix submits medical records showing that

on November 14, 2011, which was a few months after his arrest, he was prescribed 

Wellbutrin. (Id. at 57.) On November 23, 2011, he was referred to neurology for evaluation 

 

6 The State Bar of Arizona responded in February 2018 that it would not take action 

at that time because Felix’s allegations involved issues of ineffective assistance of counsel 

which is a legal issue requiring a court determination. (Doc. 1, p. 67.) 

7 The Court notes that although Felix indicates that he has “partially” recovered his 

memory and that he did not completely remember the day of his arrest (Doc. 1, pp. 22, 43), 

he also states that “it took me over a year to recover completely.” (id. at 47.)
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based on his reported history of long and short term memory loss.8 (Id. at 58.) 

The Court concludes that Felix fails to make the requisite showing that he is entitled 

to equitable tolling of the limitations period. A movant is entitled to equitable tolling only 

upon a showing “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some 

extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing.’” United States 

v. Buckles, 647 F.3d 883, 889 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 

(2010)); see also United States v. Battles, 362 F.3d 1195, 1196–97 (9th Cir. 2004) (there 

is no reason to distinguish between § 2255 motions and cases filed under § 2254 for 

purposes of the equitable tolling analysis). When a movant seeks equitable tolling on the 

basis of mental impairment, he must show that: (1) his mental impairment was “so severe” 

that he was either “unable rationally or factually to personally understand the need to timely 

file” or his “mental state rendered him unable personally to prepare a habeas petition and 

effectuate its filing” and (2) he was diligent in “pursuing the claims to the extent he could 

understand them, but that the mental impairment made it impossible to meet the filing 

deadline under the totality of the circumstances, including reasonably available access to 

assistance.” Bills v. Clark, 628 F.3d 1092, 1100 (9th Cir. 2010) (footnote omitted). “[T]he 

second prong considers whether the petitioner’s impairment was a but-for cause of any 

delay.” Bills, 628 F.3d at 1100. “In sum, the petitioner must show diligence in seeking 

assistance with what he could not do alone.” Stancle v. Clay, 692 F.3d 948, 959 (9th Cir. 

2012) (citing Bills, 628 F.3d at 1100). The Bills test “reiterates the stringency of the overall 

equitable tolling test: the mental impairment must be so debilitating that it is the but-for 

cause of the delay, and even in cases of debilitating impairment the petitioner must still 

demonstrate diligence.” Yow Ming Yeh v. Martel, 751 F.3d 1075, 1078 (9th Cir. 2014) 

(citing Bills, 628 F.3d at 1100). Felix bears the burden of demonstrating that equitable 

tolling applies. Battles, 362 F.3d at 1197. Where the movant fails to establish the first 

prong necessary for equitable tolling, the court need not determine whether he showed 

 

8 On November 23, 2011, Felix also reported a history of heavy alcohol abuse and 

use of cocaine and marijuana and that he became sober three months earlier. (Doc. 1, p.

58.) He stated he was undergoing psychiatric treatment at COPE Community Services for 

visual and auditory hallucinations. (Id.) 
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diligence. See Orthel v. Yates, 795 F.3d 935, 939 n. 3 (9th Cir. 2015).

Felix fails to satisfy the first prong necessary for equitable tolling because he neither 

argues nor establishes that his alleged memory issues were so debilitating that he could not 

rationally or factually understand the need to timely file a § 2255 motion or that he was 

unable to personally prepare the motion and effectuate its filing. Although the case record

reflected that Felix had some difficulty in mental functioning, Felix fails to establish that 

he suffered from a severe mental impairment that prevented him from timely filing. The 

medical records Felix submits merely show that he was prescribed Wellbutrin and was 

referred for evaluation based on his complaints of memory issues. Felix claims that a 

statement was made at sentencing that it would take him two years to recover his memory, 

but the transcript does not support this claim. (See CR 11-3280, Doc. 371.) Instead, the 

case record reflects Dr. Sullivan’s opinion that Felix was “either wholly fabricating 

impairment (malingering) or exaggerating authentic impairment (symptom 

embellishment)” and it was impossible to determine which. (CR 11-3280, Doc. 256, p. 3.) 

In light of Dr. Sullivan’s report, defense counsel conceded, and the Court concluded, that 

Felix was competent. Thus, the Court concludes Felix has not demonstrated that he 

suffered from a severe mental impairment that prevented him from timely filing his § 2255 

motion.9 

Felix also fails to state facts demonstrating that his mental illness “made it 

impossible under the totality of the circumstances to meet the filing deadline despite [his] 

diligence.” Bills, at 1093. See also Holland, 560 U.S. at 635 (“The diligence required for 

equitable tolling purposes is ‘reasonable diligence,’ . . . not ‘maximum feasible 

diligence.’”) (citations omitted). The record is clear that during the course of the criminal 

proceeding, Felix was aware of the grounds supporting his § 2255 Motion. During the 

criminal proceeding, Felix maintained that he did not remember what happened concerning 

his conduct leading to arrest. (CR 11-3280, Doc. 220, pp. 6, 14 & Doc. 367, p. 28 & Doc. 

 

9 Aside from allegations of mental impairment discussed above, Felix provides no 

other basis for this Court to find that an extraordinary circumstance prevented Felix from 

timely filing his § 2255 Motion. 
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371, p. 14.) He also told the Court that he thought his girlfriend had drugged him,

10 and 

that he was set up by others, including his co-defendants.

11

 (CR 11-3280, Doc. 367, pp. 8, 

24 & Doc. 371, pp. 13–15.) Additionally, throughout the criminal proceeding, Felix was 

capable of assisting, claims he complained about his various counsels’ conduct and 

successfully sought appointment of new counsel three times. On this record, Felix’s 

Motion is wholly devoid of any facts demonstrating reasonable diligence under the 

circumstances in timely pursuing a § 2255 motion. Because Felix fails to establish both 

prongs necessary for equitable tolling, his § 2255 Motion is untimely.

III. Conclusion

Felix’s Motion was filed beyond the statute of limitations as specified in 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2255. Because Felix has not established that he is entitled to equitable tolling of the 

statute of limitations, his § 2255 Motion must be dismissed as untimely filed.

IV. Denial of Certificate of Appealability

Before Felix can appeal this Court’s judgment, a certificate of appealability (COA) 

must issue. See 28 U.S.C. §2253(c); Fed. R. App. P. 22(b)(1). The district court may issue 

a certificate of appealability “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the 

denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). The court must indicate which 

specific issues satisfy this showing. See 28 U.S.C. §2253(c)(3). With respect to claims 

rejected on the merits, a petitioner “must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the 

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). For procedural rulings, a COA will issue only if 

reasonable jurists could debate whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a 

constitutional right and whether the court’s procedural ruling was correct. Id. Upon review 

of the record in light of the standards for granting a certificate of appealability, the Court 

concludes that a certificate shall not issue, as the resolution of the petition is not debatable 

 

10 Felix even obtained his own blood test when his counsel refused to arrange for 

one. (Doc. 1, p. 51.) 

11 Like his comments to the Court during the criminal action, Felix’s similar 

statements in his Motion in support of equitable tolling are based upon mere supposition. 
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among reasonable jurists.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that:

1. Felix’s Motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct 

Sentence (Doc. 362 in CR 11-3280-UTC-JGZ) and Doc. 1 in CV 18-148-TUC-JGZ is 

DENIED AND DISMISSED with prejudice.

2. A Certificate of Appealability is DENIED.

3. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment accordingly in CV 18-148-TUCJGZ and close the file.

Dated this 4th day of November, 2019.