IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

John Podest, :

:

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 1785 C.D. 2016

: Submitted: May 26, 2017

Workers’ Compensation Appeal :

Board (General Dynamics), :

:

Respondent :

General Dynamics, :

:

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 1816 C.D. 2016

: Submitted: May 26, 2017

Workers’ Compensation Appeal :

Board (Podest), :

:

Respondent :

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge

HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY

SENIOR JUDGE COLINS FILED: September 1, 2017

Before this Court is the petition for review of John Podest (Claimant) 

from an October 6, 2016 order of the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board 

(Board) affirming a March 31, 2016 decision and order of a Workers’ 

Compensation Judge (WCJ) granting a suspension petition brought by General 
2

Dynamics (Employer), Claimant’s former employer, on the grounds that Claimant 

had voluntarily retired from the labor market. Also before this Court is the petition 

for review of Employer from a May 21, 2015 order of the Board that reversed a 

November 6, 2013 decision and order of the WCJ, which had granted Employer’s 

modification petition on the grounds that a suitable job offer had been made to 

Claimant and he had refused the job. We conclude that the WCJ’s determination 

that Claimant had voluntarily left the workforce was supported by substantial 

evidence, and we therefore affirm the Board’s order affirming the WCJ’s grant of 

the suspension petition. In light of our resolution of Claimant’s appeal, we need 

not address Employer’s appeal of the reversal of the grant of its modification 

petition.

On October 30, 2009, while working for Employer as an inspector of 

mortar shells, Claimant sustained a workplace injury of a bilateral shoulder 

strain/sprain, which Employer recognized as a work injury under the Workers’ 

Compensation Act1through a medical-only notice of compensation payable. 

(11/6/13 WCJ Decision, Findings of Fact (F.F.) ¶¶1, 4; Nov. 29, 2012 Hearing 

Transcript (H.T.) at 16, Reproduced Record (R.R.) 357.) At the time of his injury, 

Claimant was employed at an average weekly wage of $1,037.37 with a 

compensation rate of $691.58. (11/6/13 WCJ Decision, F.F. ¶2.) On December 

16, 2009, the parties entered into a supplemental agreement recognizing that 

Claimant was disabled from November 2, 2009 to November 9, 2009 and returned 

to work on November 9, 2009 in a light-duty status with a loss of wages and 

receiving partial disability benefits. (Id., F.F. ¶3.) On May 25, 2010, the parties 

entered into a supplemental agreement recognizing that Claimant had again 

 

1 Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S. §§ 1–1041.1, 2501–2708.
3

become totally disabled as a result of the October 30, 2009 work injury and with

compensation reinstated as of the date of the agreement. (Id., F.F. ¶4.)

On February 16, 2012, Employer filed a petition to modify or suspend 

Claimant’s workers’ compensation benefits as of November 2, 2011 based on 

Claimant’s failure to return to work despite a notice of ability to return to work and 

Employer’s offer of suitable work made available to Claimant. (Id., F.F. ¶5.) 

Employer later verbally amended the suspension petition during a deposition of 

one of its fact witnesses to also seek a suspension of Claimant’s benefits based on 

his voluntary withdrawal from the workforce.

2

 (Rakowicz Dep. at 16, R.R. 85.)

On November 6, 2013, the WCJ issued a decision granting 

Employer’s modification petition, as of January 10, 2012, based on the job offer 

made for a light-duty, paint-mask cleaner position at Employer. The WCJ 

determined that the testimony of Lucian P. Bednarz, M.D., who performed an 

independent medical examination (IME) of Claimant, that Claimant was able to 

perform light-duty work and specifically the paint-mask cleaner job was more 

credible than that of Claimant’s medical expert, Kurt Moran, M.D. (11/6/13 WCJ 

Decision, F.F. ¶¶26, 29, 30, Conclusions of Law (C.L.) ¶¶2, 3.) The WCJ also 

 

2

In addition to the modification/suspension petition filed by Employer, Claimant filed a review 

petition seeking to add additional injuries and a petition to review benefit offset based on 

Employer’s filing of a notice of workers’ compensation benefit offset following Claimant’s 

election to receive a disability pension. In the November 6, 2013 decision, the WCJ granted the 

review petition in part adding the injuries of aggravation of bilateral shoulder arthritis and denied 

the petition to review benefit offset, concluding that Employer was entitled to an offset of 

Claimant’s full monthly pension benefit amount and a recoupment for pension benefits received 

prior to the decision. Claimant appealed the WCJ’s decision regarding the petition to review 

benefit offset and the Board affirmed the WCJ’s determination. Neither party appealed from the 

WCJ’s decision on the review petition and the review petition and petition to review benefit 

offset were not addressed in the WCJ’s March 31, 2016 remand decision or the October 6, 2016

Board opinion.
4

concluded, based on the testimony of Claimant and Dr. Moran, that Claimant could 

not perform a medium-duty 120HE welder feed position that was also offered to 

Claimant by Employer. (Id., F.F. ¶¶27, 30.) Therefore, the WCJ determined that 

Employer was entitled to a modification of Claimant’s compensation rate to $82.43 

computed based on the difference between the average weekly wage of Claimant’s 

pre-injury position and the average weekly wage of the paint-mask cleaner 

position. (Id., C.L. ¶3.) The WCJ dismissed Employer’s suspension petition. (Id., 

Order.)

Both Claimant and Employer appealed the WCJ’s decision to the 

Board. In a May 21, 2015 opinion and order, the Board concluded that the 

testimony of Employer’s Supervisor of Health and Safety Services demonstrated 

that only one job was offered to Claimant and it would have required him to 

perform both the paint-mask cleaner and 120HE welder feed job duties; as the 

WCJ determined that Claimant could not perform the medium-duty welder feed 

duties, the WCJ erred in granting the modification petition. (5/21/15 Board 

Opinion at 5-7.) However, the Board also determined that the WCJ failed to 

address Employer’s argument that Claimant’s benefits should be suspended based 

on his voluntary departure from the labor market and therefore remanded to the 

WCJ for a ruling on Employer’s suspension petition. (Id. at 7-8.)

On remand, in a March 31, 2016 decision and order, the WCJ granted 

Employer’s suspension petition as of January 10, 2012. The WCJ concluded that 

Employer had met its burden of showing that the totality of the circumstances 

demonstrated that Claimant had voluntarily quit the labor market. (3/31/16 WCJ 

Decision, F.F. ¶11, C.L. ¶¶2, 3.) Specifically, the WCJ noted as factors in support 

of the finding that Claimant left the workforce that Claimant elected to receive a 
5

disability, rather than a regular, pension, the fact that the disability pension was 

approved by Claimant’s union rather than Employer, Claimant’s decision to 

believe the opinion of Dr. Moran over that of Dr. Bednarz, who opined that 

Claimant was capable of light-duty employment, and the fact that no evidence was 

presented that Claimant ever intended to continue in the workforce. (Id., F.F. ¶11, 

C.L. ¶2.) Claimant appealed the WCJ’s decision, and the Board affirmed. Both 

Claimant and Employer petitioned for review of the Board’s determination with

this Court, and the appeals were consolidated by a November 18, 2016 order.

On appeal, Claimant argues that the WCJ erred in granting 

Petitioner’s suspension petition in its March 31, 2016 decision by placing the 

burden on Claimant to prove that he was continuing to seek employment when the 

burden should be placed on the employer to demonstrate that the claimant 

voluntarily withdrew from the labor market under the totality of the circumstances 

test of City of Pittsburgh v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Robinson), 67 

A.3d 1194 (Pa. 2013). Claimant contends that the WCJ and Board additionally 

erred by not recognizing that the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) under 

which Claimant worked at Employer required him to apply for a disability pension 

if he is found totally and permanently disabled by a doctor. In addition, Claimant 

argues that the WCJ erred by relying on the opinion of Dr. Moran over Dr. 

Bednarz when Dr. Bednarz did not provide his opinion that Claimant could return 

to work until approximately two years after Claimant applied for the disability 

pension. Thus, Claimant asserts that a proper review of the totality of the 

circumstances in fact shows that he did not voluntarily quit the labor market. In its 

appeal, Employer argues that the Board improperly reversed the WCJ’s 

modification of Claimant’s workers’ compensation benefits in the November 6, 
6

2013 decision because evidence put forth by Employer, including the testimony of 

its Supervisor of Health and Safety Services and the text of the job offer, shows 

that Claimant was offered a light-duty paint-mask cleaner position, which Claimant 

refused. Because the WCJ has the exclusive authority to make findings of fact and 

resolve disputes in the evidence, Employer argues that the Board exceeded its 

authority by reversing the WCJ’s grant of the modification petition when 

substantial, competent evidence supported the WCJ’s determinations. We first 

address Claimant’s appeal.

3

Ordinarily, where a claimant has been forced into retirement as a 

result of a work-related injury, the claimant may continue to receive workers’ 

compensation benefits. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority v. 

Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Henderson), 669 A.2d 911, 913 (Pa. 

1995); City of Philadelphia v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Rooney), 

730 A.2d 1051, 1053 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999). However, when a claimant voluntarily 

leaves the labor market, rather than being forced into a compulsory retirement as a 

result of an injury, the claimant is not entitled to benefits under the Act and the 

employer has grounds to seek a suspension of benefits. Henderson, 669 A.2d 911, 

913 (Pa. 1995); Turner v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (City of 

Pittsburgh), 78 A.3d 1224, 1228 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013). 

To establish that the claimant has voluntarily left the workforce, the 

employer must demonstrate, by the totality of the circumstances, that the claimant 

 

3

This Court’s review of an appeal from a determination by the Board is limited to determining 

whether an error of law was committed, whether the WCJ’s necessary findings of fact are 

supported by substantial evidence and whether Board procedures or constitutional rights were 

violated. Chesik v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Department of Military and

Veterans’ Affairs), 126 A.3d 1069, 1074 n. 5 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015).
7

has chosen not to return to work. Robinson, 67 A.3d at 1209. A claimant’s receipt 

of a pension does not create a rebuttable presumption that the claimant has retired 

from the workforce but does create a presumptive inference that the claimant has 

decided to leave the job market. Id. at 1205-06, 1209; Chesik v. Workers’ 

Compensation Appeal Board (Department of Military and Veterans’ Affairs), 126 

A.3d 1069, 1076 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015). Other evidence that the employer may 

present to show a departure from the labor market include the claimant’s own 

statements relating to voluntary withdrawal and the claimant’s efforts or nonefforts in seeking employment. Robinson, 67 A.3d at 1210; Turner, 78 A.3d at

1231. When the employer presents sufficient evidence that claimant has 

voluntarily withdrawn from the labor market, the burden shifts to the claimant to 

show that he is seeking employment following retirement or that he was forced 

into retirement because of the work injury. Robinson, 67 A.3d at 1209-10; 

Henderson, 669 A.2d at 913.

The record reveals the following circumstances relevant to the 

determination of whether Claimant voluntarily left the workforce. Claimant 

testified that he was injured on October 30, 2009 and that he returned to work 

shortly thereafter and attempted to perform a series of modified jobs at Employer 

with no success. (Nov. 29, 2012 H.T. at 16, 40-41, R.R. 357, 381-82.) Claimant 

stopped working entirely and began receiving total disability benefits on April 30, 

2009, and he has not applied for work anywhere else since that date. (Apr. 29, 

2013 H.T. at 31-32, R.R. 282-83; Nov. 29, 2012 H.T. at 42, R.R. 383.) In April 

2010, Claimant began treatment with Dr. Moran, who operates an internal 

medicine, primary care and pain management practice. (Moran Dep. at 6-7, R.R. 

11-12.) Dr. Moran referred Claimant to an orthopedist, Dr. Glazer, who examined 
8

Claimant several times during April and May of 2010 to determine if Claimant 

would be a candidate for surgery, which Claimant elected not to pursue. (Moran 

Dep. at 9, 12, 21, R.R. 14, 17, 26; Nov. 29, 2012 H.T. at 30, R.R. 371.) At Dr. 

Glazer’s request, Claimant was referred for a functional capacity evaluation, which 

was performed by Penn Therapy and Fitness on June 14, 2010. (Moran Dep. at 10, 

R.R. 15.) According to the report of the evaluation, Claimant was functioning in 

the light classification of work, which would allow him to exert 20 pounds of force 

on an occasional basis, 10 pounds of force on a frequent basis and would restrict

repetitive motions of the upper extremities to an occasional basis. (Moran Dep., 

Ex. 2 at 2, R.R. 55.)

Dr. Bednarz, who is board certified in physical and rehabilitation 

medicine, performed his first IME of Claimant on May 12, 2010. (Bednarz Dep. at 

3, 7, R.R. 113, 117.) In his report issued following the IME, Dr. Bednarz 

concluded that Claimant “is clearly capable of returning to full time gainful 

employment but currently requires medical restrictions in the light to medium duty 

range.” (Bednarz Dep., Ex. 1 at 4, R.R. 136.) Dr. Bednarz performed two 

additional IMEs of Claimant on December 1, 2010 and November 2, 2011 and 

stated in the reports that Claimant was able to perform light-to-medium duty work. 

(Bednarz Dep. at 3, Ex. 2 at 4, Ex. 3 at 4, R.R. 113, 141, 147.) Dr. Bednarz 

testified at his deposition that Claimant’s condition was consistent during each of 

the three examinations with Claimant showing no progressive or neurological

problems that would prevent him from working besides the limitations related to 

his range of motion deficits in his shoulders. (Bednarz Dep. at 9, 11, 14, R.R. 119, 

121, 124.)
9

Claimant applied for Social Security Disability (SSD) benefits on July 

27, 2010, and the SSD benefits were granted by a Social Security Administration

administrative law judge (ALJ) at a February 13, 2012 hearing. (Ex. D-7, Notice 

of Decision at 1, R.R. 159.) In a February 21, 2012 decision, the ALJ found

Claimant to be disabled as of May 1, 2010 based on “multiple disorders of both 

shoulders and depression.”4 (Id.) At some point subsequent to Claimant’s SSD 

application, he also applied for a disability pension administered by his union, the 

International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers; the disability 

pension was ultimately awarded and Claimant began receiving the pension of 

$1,016 per month on March 21, 2012, with an effective date of May 1, 2011. (Ex. 

D-4, Dec. 18, 2012 Union Letter, R.R. 151; Joint Stipulation ¶¶2, 5, R.R. 163-64; 

Apr. 29, 2013 H.T. at 35, R.R. 286.) Claimant testified that his union instructed

him that he was required to apply for the disability pension under the terms of the 

CBA because he had been found to be disabled by a doctor. (Apr. 29, 2013 H.T. at

35-37, R.R. 286-88; Nov. 29, 2012 H.T. at 55, R.R. 396.) Article 14(i)(3) of the 

CBA states:

Benefits stop at normal retirement eligibility under the 

[union] pension plan, early retirement and disability 

retirement. If an employee is found to be totally and 

permanently disabled by a doctor, he must apply for [the 

union] Disability Pension. Benefits will be maintained 

then if employee is denied the disability pension. 

 

4

SSD benefits are available to those who are unable “to engage in any substantial gainful 

activity” because of a medically determinable impairment which lasts for twelve months or more

and is so severe that the individual “is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, 

considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial 

gainful work which exists in the national economy.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A), (2)(A).
10

Workers [sic] Compensation benefits terminate at age 

when employee would become eligible for normal 

retirement.

(Ex. C-3, CBA Art. 14(i)(3), R.R. 4.) Claimant testified that he had in fact been 

found totally disabled by a doctor and that he applied for the disability pension 

because he “listened to [his] treating physician,” but Claimant did not identify 

which doctor found him totally disabled or produce any report in which he was 

found disabled. (Apr. 29, 2013 H.T. at 36, R.R. 287; Nov. 29, 2012 H.T. at 58, 

R.R. 399.) On June 11, 2012, Employer sent Claimant a letter notifying him that it

had become aware that he was receiving a union disability pension and determined 

that this was a voluntary quit under the CBA that terminated Claimant’s 

employment and seniority with Employer effective on the date of the letter. (Ex. 

C-2, June 11, 2012 Employer Letter, R.R. 1.)

On December 6, 2011, Employer issued a Notice of Ability to Return 

to Work based on Dr. Bednarz’s November 2, 2011 IME report in which he opined 

that Claimant was able to return to work in a light-to-medium duty capacity. (Ex.

D-1, Notice, R.R. 69.) Employer sent Claimant a letter on January 6, 2012 which 

offered him one of two positions within the restrictions set by Dr. Bednarz as either 

a paint-mask cleaner or a 120HE welder feed. (Rakowicz Dep. at 4-5, Ex. 1, R.R. 

73-74, 107-09.) Claimant informed Employer that he would have to check with 

Dr. Moran before accepting either position, and he ultimately informed Employer

that he could not take either job. (Rakowicz Dep. at 6, R.R. 75; Nov. 29, 2012 

H.T. at 46-48, R.R. 387-89.) At his deposition, Dr. Moran testified that he had 

rejected the jobs offered by Employer to Claimant because they were beyond the 

restrictions he had set for Claimant. (Moran Dep. at 16-19, R.R. 21-24.) Dr. 

Moran stated that Claimant was restricted from performing any job that was 
11

classified as more strenuous than light-duty work, and specifically that Claimant 

could not lift objects greater than 5 pounds on any more than a semi-frequent basis 

or perform any repetitive motions at all with his shoulders or arms. (Moran Dep. at 

15-16, 18, R.R. 20-21, 23.) Dr. Moran did not offer an opinion that Claimant was 

totally and permanently disabled or that he was incapable of performing any type 

of employment in the future. 

Our review of the record demonstrates that there is substantial 

evidence to support the WCJ’s determination that Claimant voluntarily retired 

from the labor market. It is undisputed that Claimant applied for a union disability 

pension following his workplace injury and his last day of work at Employer. 

While Claimant’s receipt of the pension alone does not establish a rebuttable 

presumption of a voluntary withdrawal from the workforce, Employer is entitled to 

a permissive inference that Claimant has retired from work that must be considered 

within the context of the totality of the circumstances. Robinson, 67 A.3d at 1205-

06, 1209; Chesik, 126 A.3d at 1076. The WCJ also found probative of Claimant’s 

actual retirement from the labor market that the pension was approved by 

Claimant’s union, rather than Employer, and was only available after a finding of a 

permanent and total disability. The pension here was notably different than the 

pension before the Court in Robinson, which required only a showing that the 

employee could not perform her time-of-injury job and allowed the employee to 

discontinue receipt of disability pension payments and return to work upon an 

improvement in condition. See Robinson, 67 A.3d at 1205, 1210; see also City of 

Pittsburgh v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Robinson), 4 A.3d 1130, 

1137 & n.3 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010) (en banc) (plurality), aff’d, 67 A.3d 1194 (Pa. 

2013). 
12

As the WCJ stated in his decision, other evidence also weighed in 

favor of a suspension of Claimant’s benefits based on voluntary retirement, 

including Claimant’s admission during testimony at a WCJ hearing that he had not 

submitted any applications for work anywhere following his last day at Employer 

on April 30, 2009 despite the clearance to return to work by Dr. Bednarz in a 

modified position. Furthermore, Claimant began receiving SSD benefits after he 

ceased working at Employer. Claimant applied for SSD benefits on July 27, 2010,

which notably occurred after Dr. Bednarz issued his first IME report in which he 

stated that Claimant was capable of returning to work in a light-to-medium duty 

range and the functional capacity evaluation was completed at the request of 

Claimant’s treating orthopedist that concluded that Claimant could return to work 

in a light-duty position. When Claimant finally was awarded SSD benefits in 

February 2012, the ALJ stated that Claimant was disabled not only as a result of 

the condition of his shoulders but also based on depression, which Dr. Moran 

explained during his deposition was not related to his workplace injury. (Moran 

Dep. at 13, R.R. 18; Ex. D-7, Notice of Decision at 1, R.R. 159.) As this Court has 

stated, a claimant’s receipt of SSD benefits for reasons other than a work-related 

medical condition provides evidence to support a finding of a voluntary withdrawal 

from the labor market. Burks v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (City of 

Pittsburgh), 36 A.3d 639, 643 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012).

Claimant argues that the WCJ erred by not considering the mandatory 

language of Article 14 of the CBA, which states that “[i]f an employee is found to 

be totally and permanently disabled by a doctor, he must apply for [the union]

Disability Pension.” (Ex. C-3, CBA Art. 14(i)(3), R.R. 4.) Claimant argues that 

once he was found totally and permanently disabled in the SSD decision he was 
13

therefore required to apply for the union disability pension and this decision should 

not therefore be seen as a voluntary step towards leaving the workforce. 

Notwithstanding Claimant’s argument to the contrary, there is nothing in the 

WCJ’s March 31, 2016 decision that indicates that the WCJ disregarded the 

language of the CBA. The WCJ recited the language of Article 14 of the CBA in 

the Findings of Fact and noted Claimant’s testimony that he felt compelled to 

apply for the disability pension based on his SSD application and conversations 

with his union. (Mar. 31, 2016 WCJ Decision, F.F. ¶5.) Though the WCJ did not 

specifically reject the CBA language in announcing his conclusion that Claimant 

had voluntarily withdrawn from the workforce, the WCJ was not required to 

address every piece of evidence presented by either party, but instead was only 

required to generally set forth the findings necessary to resolve the issues before 

him. Montgomery Tank Lines v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board 

(Humphries), 792 A.2d 6, 13 n.10 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002). 

Furthermore, Claimant’s argument that he suffered a totally and 

permanently disabling work injury necessitating his disability pension application 

does not find support in the record. In the SSD decision, the Social Security 

Administration ALJ found that Claimant could not perform his “past relevant work 

or other work existing in significant numbers in the national economy” based both 

on Claimant’s work-related shoulder injuries and also his depression, which has 

not been recognized as a work injury. (Ex. D-7, Notice of Decision at 1, R.R. 

159.) Claimant did not present a medical opinion to demonstrate that he had a 

permanent total disability arising from his shoulder injuries and there is nothing

else in the record to show that Claimant’s shoulder condition alone caused him to 

be totally disabled. While Dr. Moran testified that Claimant’s work restrictions 
14

were permanent, (Moran Dep. at 19, R.R. 24), Dr. Moran did not testify that 

Claimant was totally disabled as a result of work injuries and Dr. Moran and Dr. 

Bednarz, along with Penn Therapy and Fitness, which performed the functional 

capacity evaluation, were in agreement that Claimant was capable of returning to 

work in at least a light-duty capacity. 

Finally, Claimant argues that the WCJ improperly placed the burden 

of proof on him to show his efforts to continue to seek employment when the 

burden properly rests on the employer to prove the claimant’s voluntary decision to 

leave the workforce. We disagree. The WCJ accurately explained that receipt of a 

disability pension does not by itself show voluntary retirement and that the 

employer bears the burden of proof to demonstrate voluntary withdrawal from the 

workforce by a totality of the circumstances under Robinson. (3/31/16 WCJ 

Decision, F.F. ¶¶9, 10.) The WCJ then listed the circumstances upon which he 

relied in concluding that Claimant voluntarily quit the labor force and stated that 

no evidence was presented that Claimant ever made an attempt to find employment 

or planned to continue to work in any capacity. (Id., F.F. ¶11, C.L. ¶2.) This 

holding is consistent with the burden shifting scheme outlined in Robinson wherein

our Supreme Court explained that it would be a “prohibitive” burden to require the 

employer to prove that the claimant has no intention to continue working. 67 A.3d 

at 1209-10 (quoting Henderson, 669 A.2d at 913). In Robinson, the Court made 

clear that the employer may offer evidence of the claimant’s efforts or non-efforts 

to seek employment to meet its prima facie burden and also that the claimant may 

rebut a finding of voluntary retirement by demonstrating that he is seeking 

employment following retirement or that he was forced into retirement because of 

the work injury. 67 A.3d at 1209-10.
15

Accordingly, we conclude that the WCJ did not err in concluding that 

Claimant voluntarily retired from the labor market and in granting Employer’s 

suspension petition as of January 10, 2012. In light of this holding, we need not 

address Employer’s argument on appeal challenging the Board’s May 21, 2015 

order reversing the WCJ’s November 6, 2013 decision granting Employer’s 

modification petition, which would have reduced Claimant’s compensation rate 

from $691.58 to $82.43 per week, effective January 10, 2012.

The order of the Board is affirmed.

____________________________________

JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

John Podest, :

:

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 1785 C.D. 2016

:

Workers’ Compensation Appeal :

Board (General Dynamics), :

:

Respondent :

General Dynamics, :

:

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 1816 C.D. 2016

:

Workers’ Compensation Appeal :

Board (Podest), :

:

Respondent :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 1

st day of September, 2017, the order of the 

Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board in the above-captioned matter is affirmed.

____________________________________

JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge