RECORD IMPOUNDED

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-4827-16T4

NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD

PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

A.C.,

Defendant-Appellant,

and

O.P., Sr.,

Defendant.

______________________________________

IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP

OF O.P., Jr., and E.P.,

Minors.

_______________________________________

Submitted October 15, 2018 – Decided

Before Judges Haas, Sumners and Mitterhoff.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

October 22, 2018
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A-4827-16T4

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Hudson County, 

Docket No. FG-09-0245-15.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Andrew R. Burroughs, Designated Counsel, 

on the briefs).

Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for 

respondent (Jason W. Rockwell, Assistant Attorney 

General, of counsel; Jessica M. Steinglass, Deputy 

Attorney General, on the brief).

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian, 

attorney for minors (Lisa M. Black, Designated 

Counsel, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant A.C.1appeals from the Family Part's June 28, 2017 judgment 

of guardianship terminating her parental rights to her son, O.P., Jr. (Ollie), born 

in July 2013, and her daughter, E.P. (Erin), born in December 2014.2 Defendant 

contends that the Division of Child Protection and Permanency (Division) failed 

to prove each prong of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15-1(a) by clear and convincing 

 

1

 We refer to the adult parties by initials, and to the children by fictitious names, 

to protect their privacy. R. 1:38-3(d)(12).

2

 The judgment also terminated the parental rights of the children's father, O.P., 

Sr., who has not filed an appeal from that determination.
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evidence. The Law Guardian supports the termination on appeal as it did before 

the trial court.

Based on our review of the record and applicable law, we are satisfied that 

the evidence in favor of the guardianship petition overwhelmingly supports the 

decision to terminate defendant's parental rights. Accordingly, we affirm 

substantially for the reasons set forth in Judge Lourdes I. Santiago's thorough 

and thoughtful, fifty-six-page written decision rendered on June 28, 2017. 

We will not recite in detail the history of the Division's involvement with 

defendant. Instead, we incorporate by reference the factual findings and legal 

conclusions contained in Judge Santiago's decision. We add only the following 

comments.

We are satisfied that commencing with the Division's first contact with 

defendant in January 2014, the Division provided multiple opportunities for her 

to reunify with her children and address her long-standing mental health issues. 

The Division assumed custody of Ollie, a child with special needs, when he was 

six months old because defendant was not taking him to his medical 

appointments. When Erin was born just eleven months later, the Division was 

granted custody of the baby because defendant was homeless and unable to care 
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for her. Both children were placed with the same resource family in March 

2015, where they have thrived.3

Although defendant was cooperative with the Division and participated in 

the services it provided to her in the years that followed, the unanimous opinion 

of the mental health experts who testified at trial was that defendant had not, 

and could not in the foreseeable future, overcome the cognitive deficits that 

prevented her from safely parenting the children. One of the Division's two 

expert psychologists, Dr. Karen Wells, diagnosed defendant with post-traumatic 

stress disorder (PTSD) and mixed personality disorder with dependent and 

borderline personality characteristics. Dr. Wells opined that defendant was 

unable to parent both children independently. The other expert psychologist, 

Dr. Charles Daly, provided a similar diagnosis, and also opined that defendant 

"was not able to serve as a custodial parent in a safe and caring way for her 

children." The opinions expressed by the Division's experts were confirmed by 

Dr. Elizabeth Smith, an expert psychologist, presented by the Law Guardian. 

Dr. Smith determined "it would not be safe to reunify the children with" 

 

3

 The foster parents are committed to adopting the children.
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defendant, and that the children "would be at risk of harm" due to her ongoing 

mental health issues.4

All three psychologists conducted bonding evaluations between defendant 

and the two children, and between the children and the foster parents. Each 

opined that, at best, the children had only "an insecure bond" with defendant, 

and would not suffer any lasting harm if that bond were terminated. On the 

other hand, all three experts testified that the children were firmly bonded to the 

foster parents, and viewed them as their psychological parents. The experts also 

agreed that the children would suffer enduring and permanent harm if their 

relationship with the foster parents was severed. 

Defendant did not testify at trial and did not offer any expert testimony 

contradicting the opinions expressed by Dr. Wells, Dr. Daly, and Dr. Smith.

In her opinion, Judge Santiago reviewed the evidence presented and 

concluded that (1) the Division had proven all four prongs of the best interests 

test by clear and convincing evidence, N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a); and (2) 

termination of defendant's parental rights was in the children's best interests. In

this appeal, our review of the trial judge's decision is limited. We defer to her 

 

4

 The Division also provided the testimony of a psychiatrist, who offered a 

similar diagnosis of defendant, but this expert did not conduct a bonding 

analysis.
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expertise as a Family Part judge, Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 413 (1998), 

and we are bound by her factual findings so long as they are supported by 

sufficient credible evidence. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.M., 189 

N.J. 261, 279 (2007) (citing In re Guardianship of J.T., 269 N.J. Super. 172, 188 

(App. Div. 1993)).

After reviewing the record, we conclude that Judge Santiago's factual 

findings are fully supported by the record and, in light of those facts, her legal 

conclusions are unassailable. We therefore affirm substantially for the reasons 

that the judge expressed in her well-reasoned opinion.

In so ruling, we note, as did Judge Santiago, that defendant made some 

progress in her personal life prior to the trial, especially in terms of securing 

housing through a government program, and by maintaining employment. 

However, as amply demonstrated by the unrebutted expert testimony, defendant 

still suffered from a mental illness which prevented reunification. As the judge 

explained, although defendant

engaged in recommended services and treatment, it 

became clear that [defendant] suffered from poor 

judgment not only in the selection of romantic partners, 

but was also exhibiting an inability to manage and 

handle stressful situations and meeting the demands of 

child care and daily living. Reports from treatment 

providers and programs reported that despite her 

compliance in attending treatment sessions such as 
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individual and domestic violence counseling and 

therapeutic visitation, that she had underlying cognitive 

issues which were prohibiting her from executing on 

what she was learning.

After a lengthy period of time engaging in 

treatment, it became apparent that [defendant]'s 

underlying issues would require long term treatment in 

cognitive behavioral therapy, that if successful "may" 

help her learn and implement what she has learned. The 

[c]ourt has considered uncontroverted psychological 

and psychiatric evaluations from several credible 

experts that opine that she cannot safely parent these 

children at this time. It is unclear whether continued 

treatment with [cognitive behavioral therapy] will 

assist [defendant] in remediating these major issues and 

how much time would be needed before she could 

engage in unsupervised and safe parenting. These two 

children have already been in [and] out of home 

placement for three years and permanency for [Ollie] 

and [Erin] cannot be further delayed.

We discern no basis for disturbing Judge Santiago's reasoned 

determination on this point. Children are entitled to a permanent, safe and 

secure home. We acknowledge "the need for permanency of placements by 

placing limits on the time for a birth parent to correct conditions in anticipation 

of reuniting with the child." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. C.S., 367 

N.J. Super. 76, 111 (App. Div. 2004). As public policy increasingly focuses on 

a child's need for permanency, the emphasis has "shifted from protracted efforts 

for reunification with a birth parent to an expeditious, permanent placement to 
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promote the child's well being." Ibid. (citing N.J.S.A. 30:4C-11.1). That is 

because "[a] child cannot be held prisoner of the rights of others, even those of 

his or her parents. Children have their own rights, including the right to a 

permanent, safe and stable placement." Ibid.

The question then is "whether the parent can become fit in time to meet 

the needs of the children." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. F.M., 375 N.J. 

Super. 235, 263 (App. Div. 2005); see also N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. 

v. P.P., 180 N.J. 494, 512 (2004) (indicating that even if a parent is trying to 

change, a child cannot wait indefinitely). After carefully considering the 

testimony of the mental health professionals who evaluated defendant, Judge 

Santiago reasonably determined that, despite defendant's progress in some areas, 

she was still unable to parent the two children, and would not be able to do so 

for the foreseeable future. Under those circumstances, we agree with the judge 

that any further delay of permanent placement would not be in the best interests 

of the children.

Affirmed.