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# United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit

No. 14-2504

M I GU E L P E RE Z -F U E NT E S , Petitioner,

v.

L ORE TTA E. L YN C H

, Att or ney General of the United Stat es, Responden t.

Peti tio n fo r Review o f an Order of the Bo ard o f Immi gratio n Appe als. No. A2 00 -1 40 -9 87

A RGU E D S E PT E MB E R 20, 2016

— D E C I D E D N OV E MB E R 22, 2016

Before B AU E R

, P O S N E R , and E AST E R

B R O O K , Circ uit Judges. B AU E R , Cir cui t Judge. Petiti oner Migue l Perez-Fuente s, a nati v e a nd ci tizen of Mex i co, seeks rev i ew of the Board of Immi gr ation Appe a l s’ deci si on affi rmi ng the deni al of hi s appli cati on for canc ellation of remov al. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b ). The Board a ff ir med the deni al based on the Immi gr ation Judge’s alter nate deter minati on that Perez-Fuente s di d not establi sh the requis i te hardshi p for canc ellation. See 8 U.S.C.2 No. 14-2504 § 1229b(b )(1) (D)

. Perez-Fuente s challen ges sev eral aspects of hi s hearin g. He contends that the IJ i mproper ly excluded evidenc e and fai led t o dev elop the recor d as required by 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b) (1) and 8 C.F .R. § 1 2 4 0

. 3 2 (b)

. W e di smi ss Pe r ez-Fuentes’ petiti on for rev i ew , in par t for lack of jurisdi ction, and d eny the r emainder of the pet i tion.

I. BACKGRO UND Perez-Fuente s e nt ered the Uni ted St ates from Mex i co wi thout inspec tion; the date of hi s entry is no t clear

. PerezFuentes came to the atte nti on of the Department of Homeland Security aft e r se v eral arr ests. On July 19, 2011, DHS serv ed Perez-Fuente s wi th a Notice to Appear , ch a rg ing that he w as
remov able for being present in the Uni ted St ates wit ho ut inspec tion un der 8 U.S .C. § 1182(a)(6) (A)(i ). On Sept ember 13, 2011, P e r e z-Fuentes proceeded pro se, but wi th the a id of an interpr eter , at the fi rst hearin g. He testifi ed that he i s a parent of a daughter , Esmeralda, who i s a Uni ted States c i tizen. Furt her , he testifi ed that he fi rst entered the Uni ted States in 1995 for a period of tim e, and ret urned to the Uni ted St ates after a departur e someti me in 1998. After he told the IJ about an arr est, he w as instructed to prov i de a li st of hi s arr ests a nd the di sposi tions, and the court recor ds. The IJ prov i ded Perez-Fuente s wi th an appli cati on for canc ellation of
remov al and informed hi m of the requirements. On Nov ember 22, 2011, Perez-Fuente s conceded remo v abi li ty and fi led an appli cati on for canc ellation of remov al. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b ). Cancellati on of remov al i s a di screti onary form of r eli ef av ai lable to cert ain nonpermanent resid ents. T o quali fy , an appli cant mus t meet four statuto ry cri ter i a: he mus tNo. 14-2504 3
establi sh co nt inuous physi cal presence for ten y ears i mmedi

ately pr eceding the date of hi s appli cati on; hav e “go od mor al character” duri ng that period; show he w as not convic ted of certain offenses; and, prove that hi s remov al w ould “result i n
e x ce ptional and ext remely unus ual har dshi p” to a quali fyi ng relat i v e. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b )(1)

. The appli cant has the burden of establi shing each of these cri ter i a. Adame v
. Hol d e r, 762 F .3d 667, 669 (7th Ci r
. 2014). F ina l l y , ev en i f the appli cant sati sfi es these condi tions, the IJ ret ains dis cretion t o gr ant or deny the appli cati on. 8 U.S.C. § 1 2 2 9 b(b )(1) ; see also Adame, 762 F .3d at 670–71 (“[T ]he IJ ‘ may canc el remov al’; i t does not say that the judge must do so.”). After four conti nuanc es ov er an 18-month period, the IJ held the final hearin g on the merits of Perez-Fuente s’ appli cation on January 28, 2013. Perez-Fuente s testifi ed in supp or t of hi s appli cati on. Among other questi ons, the IJ asked Per ezFuentes, “Okay

, w ell, what ha rdshi ps do y ou feel y our daughter w ould face i f, i f y ou had to leav e the Uni ted St ates?” Perez-Fuente s testifi ed that he financi ally sup p o r ted hi s daughter and she w ould need money for clothes and food. He also testifi ed that hi s daughter w as in goo d health. The IJ asked Perez-Fuente s about whether hi s gi rl fri e n d, Raquel Ochoa—an undocu mented no n-c i tizen and the mother of Perez-Fuente s’ daughter—w ould mo ve to Mex i co wi th hi m and about her

w or k hi stor y

. After sev eral other questi ons reg arding his daughter and Ochoa, the IJ inqui red further: “W ell, do y ou thi nk y our chi ld w ould face any hardshi ps other than financi al ha r d shi ps i f y ou had to leav e?” Perez-Fuente s answered, “W ell, y es, becau se she’s sti ll v ery li ttle, but ev en being l i ttle she’s v ery close to me.”4 No. 14-2504
Addi tionally

, Perez-Fuente s had tw o wi tnesses testif y and prov i ded v arious documents, inclu ding tax ret urns and sev en untranslated wri tte n statements. Perez- Fuentes called Blanca Rui z to t esti fy as a character w i tness on hi s behal f. Rui z i s the wi fe of Miguel Rui z, a former employ er o f Perez-Fuente s. He also called Ochoa to testif y on hi s be ha l f. The IJ asked Ochoa sev eral questi ons, inclu ding questi ons about t he numb er of chi ldren she had wi th Perez-Fuente s, the age of their daughter

, whether their daughter w as in goo d he a l th , and whether she w ould stay wi th hi m i f he w as required to depart. A ft er Rui z and Ochoa’s testim ony , the IJ asked PerezFuentes wh e t her he had any other wi tnesses. Perez-Fuente s sai d that he di d, “but not anybody that

... kn[ew] [hi m] as w ell as [Rui z and Ochoa].” At the conclu si on of the hearin g, the IJ deni ed PerezFuentes’ ap p l i c a tion, and or dered hi m removed to Mex i co. The IJ found that Perez-Fuente s “fai led to meet any of the requirements nec essary for canc ellation of remov al,” and that he di d not meri t c ancellati on of remov al as a matter of di screti on. As to the physi cal presence r equi rement, the IJ noted that PerezFuentes testifi ed that he arr i v ed in 1997, but that at a prev i ous hearin g he stated that he ret urned t o Mex i co in 1998. The IJ conclu ded that Perez-Fuente s fai led to present documentary evidenc e to su pport hi s cl ai m that h e w or ked c ontinu ously in the United Stat es. The IJ also found that Perez- F ue nt es di d not establi sh the goo d moral character requirement. Th e IJ n ot e d sev eral arr ests, includ ing a recent arr est for domesti c batt ery ; hi s t hi rd arr est for that offense. The I J found that Perez-Fuente s and Ochoa’sNo. 14-2504 5

c onfl i c ti n g te s tim ony surroundi ng the recent offe n s e s u gg e s te d he w as not tellin g the tr uth. The IJ beli ev ed that Perez-Fuente s underrepo rt ed hi s income for tax purposes, especi ally in li ght of hi s inabi li ty to explain how he recently purchas ed a ho me for $100,000 in cash

, whi le only repo rt ing a net income of $7,000. In addit io n, the IJ found that, ev en assu ming that PerezFuentes had met the conti nuous physi cal presence and goo d moral character requirements, he had fai led to prove that hi s
remov al w ould result in “ exceptional and ext remely unus ual hardshi p” to hi s daughter , Esmeralda. The IJ found that PerezFuentes presented “virtually no evidenc e” showing what hardshi p hi s daught e r w ould face other than “separation ha rdshi p and financi al hardshi p” i f Perez-Fuente s w as r e qui red t o depart

. On June 9, 2014, the Board affi rmed the or der of remov al and deni al of canc ellation of remov al. The Board conclu ded that there w ere no due process violati ons, that t he IJ fully dev eloped the recor d, and that Perez-Fuente s had a full oppor tuni ty to pr e se nt hi s case. The Board affi rmed the I J’s alter nate deter minati on that Perez-Fuente s had no t est a bli shed that hi s remov al to Mex i co w ould result in “exceptional and ext remely u nu s u a l h a rd s hip ” to hi s daughter

. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b )(1) (D)

. The Board noted that Perez- 1 Fuentes di d not assert that hi s daughter has any seri ous health i ssu es or speci al needs in sch ool, and that she li v es wi th Ochoa.

P erez-Fuentes retained counsel on his appeal to the Bo ard, as wel l as his 1 appeal to this C our t.6 No. 14-2504
The Board also noted t hat Ochoa w as in goo d health and that Perez-Fuente s w as healthy and that there i s no reason why he could not w or k in Mex i co and send money back to hi s daughter a nd Ochoa. Lastly

, the Board found that the IJ consi dered all of the evidenc e indi vidu ally and cu mu l ativ ely , and affi rmed that, in the aggr egat e, the se har dshi ps do not reach the hi gh threshold necess ary to demonstrate eli gib i li ty for canc ellation of re mo v al. Accordi ngly , the Board di smi ssed the appeal. Perez-Fuente s fi led a tim ely petiti on for r eview in thi s Court.

II. DISCUSSION Generally

, w e lack jurisd i cti on to rev i ew deni als of di scretionary reli ef in i mmi gr ation proceedings, inclu ding c ancellation of remov al. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)( 2)(B) ; Adame, 762 F .3d at 670. But, under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)( 2)(D ), w e ret ain jurisdi cti on to r eview c onsti tutional c lai ms an d questi ons of law rai sed in
a petiti on for rev i ew

. Delgado v
. Holder, 674 F .3d 759, 765 (7th Ci r . 2012). Perez-Fuente s clai ms that the IJ fai led to fo l low statuto ry and reg ulator y requirements whi le conduc tin g Perez-Fuente s’
remov al hearin g. Mor e speci fi cally , he cont ends that he w as prev ented from receiving a full and fai r hearin g becau se the “IJ arbi tr arily r ej e ct ed evidenc e, fai led to use proper legal standards, and fai led to fully dev elop the recor d as required by 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b) (1) and 8 C

. F

. R

. § 1240.32(b) .” Sinc e “[t]he proc edural suffi ci ency of an i mmi gr ation hearin g i s a legal questi on,” Boya nivskyy v
. Gonza les , 450 F .3d 28 6 , 2 9 1 (7th Ci r
. 2006), some of Perez-Fuente s’ chal lenges are r eview able.No. 14-2504 7
A. Developing the Rec ord Perez-Fuente s contends that he w as deni ed a full and fai r hearin g becau se the IJ breached hi s duty to dev elop the recor d by asking Perez-Fuente s and Ochoa only a few questi ons about the potent i al hardshi p hi s daughter , Esmeralda, w ould face. IJs
are authorized to “interro ga te, e xa mine, and cross-examine the ali en and any wi tnesses” during remov al proceedings. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b) (1). “The i mmi gr ation judge shall re c e iv e a n d a d duce material and r e l e v ant evidenc e, rule upon objections, and oth erwi se reg ulate the course of the hearin g.” 8 C.F .R. § 1240.32(b)

. Here, the recor d shows that the IJ eli ci ted testim ony from Perez-Fuente s and Ochoa concer ning the potent i al hardshi p Esmeralda w ould face. For example, the IJ asked, “Okay , w ell, what hardshi ps do y ou feel y our daughter w ould face i f, i f y ou had to leav e the Uni ted St ates?” In respon se , Perez-Fuente s testifi ed that his d a ug ht er relies on hi m to prov i de her food and clot he s. After sev eral relat ed follow-up questi ons, the IJ asked Perez-Fuente s a questi on int e nded to eli ci t testim ony concerning other potent i al h a rdshi ps: “W ell, do y ou thi nk y our chi ld w ould face any hardshi ps other than financi al hardshi ps i f y ou had to leav e?” Perez-Fuente s a ns w ered, “W ell, y es, becau se she’s sti ll v ery li ttle, but ev en being li ttle she’s v ery close to me.” Based on the recor d, Perez-Fuente s cannot contend that the IJ fai led to dev elop the recor d by not asking more q ue st io ns. Hi s answers essenti ally conv ey ed to the IJ that the potent i al hardshi p Esmeralda w ould face i s not “sub stanti ally di fferent from, or bey ond, that whi ch w ould be normally expected from8 No. 14-2504
the deport a t ion of an ali en wi th close fami ly members in the Uni ted St ates.” Cruz-Moya ho v
. Holder, 703 F .3d 991, 995 (7th Ci r
. 2012 ) (q uo t ing In re Monreal, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56, 65 (BIA 2001)) ( alter ations omi tte d). Perez-Fuente s has not shown that he w as prej udi ced. Although Perez-Fuente s li sts questi ons that the IJ could hav e asked, he has not prov i ded us wi th answers to those questi ons
or any other concrete information that mi ght hav e affec ted the

o ut co me of the proceeding. See El-Gaz awy v
. Holder, 690 F .3 d 852, 86 0 (7t h Ci r
. 2012) (“[A]pp li cant’s fai lure to allege excl uded testim ony that w ould potent i ally affec t outcome of hearin g w as fatal to d ue process clai m”). Furt her , the IJ conclu ded that had Perez- F ue nt es establi shed all of the requirements for canc ell a tion of remov al, the IJ could hav e deni ed the appli cati on as a matter of di screti on. W e d o not beli ev e that the recor d before us supp or ts a conclu si on that the IJ violated any statu t e o r reg ulati on in reg ards to the manner in whi ch the IJ eli ci ted test imo ny concerning the pot entialhardshi ps Es meralda w ould face. B. Exclusi on of E vidence Perez-Fuente s arg ues t hat the IJ i mproper ly excluded evidenc e by: (1) fai ling to call tw o of Perez-Fuente s’ wi tnesses; and, (2) i gnor ing sev en untranslated sta te m e nts

. Pe re z-Fuentes contends that he w as prej udi ced becau se the excluded evidence had the potent i al to affec t t he outcome of the proceeding
. “An i mmi gr ation judge has the authority to narro w the focus of a hearin g and exclude i rr elev ant evidenc e, but he may not ‘bar complete chu nks of or al testim ony that w ould supp or t t he a p pli cant's clai m.’” Delgado , 674 F .3d at 768 (quoti ngNo. 14-2504 9
Barrada s v
. Holder, 582 F .3d 759, 766 (7th Ci r
. 2 0 0 9 ))

. If the excluded evidence i s central to the petiti oner’ s case in such a
w ay that i t w ould change the outcome of the hearin g, then thi s Court mus t find that the petiti oner di d not hav e a meaningful oppor tuni ty t o be heard. Id. 1. T wo Witnes ses W e may rev i ew a final or d e r of remov al only i f the nonci tizen “has exhausted all admini strat i v e remedies av ai lable to the [non-c i tizen] as of right.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)( 1). So me fai lure to exhaust clai ms may be “ov erlo oke d,” but when a nonci tizen’s clai m i s “based on a procedural fai ling that the Board could hav e r e medi ed, there by obviating the consti tutional clai m, then the fai lure to exhaust wi ll not be excused.” Ghaffar

v
. Mukasey, 551 F

. 3 d 651, 655 (7th Ci r
. 2008). “The duty to exhaust inclu des the obli gation to fir st present to the [Board] any arg ument again st the remov al or der as to whi ch the Board i s empow ered t o gr ant the alien m eaningful reli ef.” Id. Here, Perez-Fuente s fai led to ex haus t hi s admini strat i v e remedies as to the arg ument that t he IJ i mproper ly excluded tw o wi tnesses. W

e acknowledge that Perez-Fuente s proceeded pro se before the IJ, but he w as repr e se nt ed by couns el on hi s appeal to t he Board. P erez-Fuente s’ bri ef to t he Board neither menti ons the tw o wi tnesses, nor the exc ha ng e betw een the IJ and Perez-Fuente s in r egar ds to whether he had any other wi tnesses. Perez-Fuente s fai led to rais e thi s speci fi c arg ument before the Board, and there fore he di d not exhaust hi s admini str ativ e remedies

. Thus, he cannot rais e i t now for the fi rst tim e.10 No. 14-2504
8 U.S.C. § 1252; see also Mur ato ski v
. Holder, 622 F .3d 824, 831 (7th Ci r . 2010). 2
2. Seven Untranslat ed W rittenStatement s “A clai m that the [Board] has co mplet ely i gnor ed the evidenc e put fort h by a petiti oner i s an allegation of legal

err or .” Iglesias v
. Mukas e y, 5 4 0 F .3d 528, 531 (7th Ci r
. 2008). Perez-Fuente s contends that the IJ i gnor ed sev en untranslated wri tte n statements becau se the lette rs w ere in Spani sh and the IJ di d not instruct the interpr eter to read the lett e r s int o the

recor d. Ci tin g to Niam v
. Ashcroft, 354 F .3d 652, 658–61 (7th Ci r
. 2004), P erez-Fuente s ar gues t hat the absenc e of any refer ence to the un t r a ns lated lette rs by ei ther the IJ or the Board leav es a “y awning v oid.” In t he or al deci si on, the IJ stated: “After careful consi der

ation of the recor d in i ts entiret y , I find the respondent has fai led to meetany of the r equi rements necess ary for cancellation of r emov al.” Perez-Fuente s do es no t ci te t o any ev i dence in the recor d that indi cates the IJ, in fact, i gnor ed these lette rs; he indi cates that the IJ only mentio ne d that the lette rs w ere untranslated. In addi tion, Perez-Fuente s argues that s ince the IJ di d not refer ence the lette rs in hi s deci si on, i t i s evidenc e that

Even i f Perez-Fuentes’ arg ument was reviewab l e, i t l acks meri t. At the 2 hearing, the IJ ask ed Perez-Fuentes whether he had any other witnesses. In respo nse , P e rez-Fuentes i ndic ated tha t he di d, “but not any b od y tha t

... kn[ew] [hi m] as wel l as [Ruiz and Ochoa].” In l i ght of this respo nse, PerezFuentes’ cl aim tha t the IJ exclude d the t wo wi t ne sses i s i naccura tel y chara cteri zed. The IJ di d not refuse to hear addi tio nal testimo ny. Instead, the IJ gav e Perez-Fuentes a reasonab l e opp or tunity to hav e the two witnesses testi fy.No. 14-2504 11
the IJ di d not consi der the lette rs. How ev er , the IJ i s no t required to menti on each pi ece of evidenc e in i ts deci si on; the IJ need only consider the evi dence. See Boa di v
. Holder, 706 F .3d 854, 859 (7th Ci r
. 2013). But, under these ci rcums tances, giv en the need for a tr anslator and the prox i mi ty in tim e betw een the IJ’s receip t of the lette rs and the IJ’s or al deci si on, i t i s unli kely that the IJ could hav e consi dered the lette rs be fo re render ing i ts deci si on. Nev ert heless, ev en if t he I J di d not consi der the sev en untranslated wri tte n statements, Perez-Fuente s w ould hav e to establi sh that the i gnor ed lette rs w ere central to hi s clai ms, and t ha t t he lette rs “may hav e had the potent i al to change the outcome of the hearin g.” Delgado , 674 F .3d at 768 (ci tin g Galicia

v
. Gonza les , 422 F .3d 529, 540 (7th Ci r
. 2005)). Perez-Fuente s ci tes to speci fi c details in the untranslated lette rs tha t a re relev ant to the conti nuous p hysi cal pr esence and goo d moral character requirements but does not ci te to any speci fi c details in the lette rs as havin g any information reg ardin g the “exceptional and ext remely unus ual har dshi p” requirement. I n fact, he does not arg ue that the lette r s co nt a in any information reg ardin g the hardshi p require me nt

. Whi le the lette rs may hav e been central to some of his claim s, they do not hav e the potent i al to “ ch a ng e the outcome of the hearin g.” As seen abov e, Perez-Fuente s’ only cha llenge relat ed to the hardshi p requirement fai led. C. Remaini ng Challenges There i s no need to further consi der Perez-Fuente s’ remain

ing challen ges concerning the goo d moral character and conti nuo us physi cal presence requirements. Perez-Fuente s12 No. 14-2504
fai led to establi sh the requis i te hardship r e q ui rement for

ca ncellati on of remov al. See Aparicio-Brito v
. L ynch , 824 F

. 3 d 674, 686 (7th Ci r . 2016) (c i tation omi tte d).

III. CONCLUSION For the foreg oin g reasons, w e DISMI SS Perez-Fuente s’ petiti on fo r rev i ew in part for lack of jurisdi cti on and DENY the re mainder of hi s peti tion for rev i ew
.