Illinois Official Reports

Appellate Court

People v. Araiza, 2020 IL App (3d) 170735

Appellate Court 

Caption

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. CAMILE ARAIZA, Defendant-Appellee.

District & No. Third District 

No. 3-17-0735

Rule 23 order filed

Motion to 

published allowed

Opinion filed

August 5, 2020

August 27, 2020

August 27, 2020

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Will County, No. 17-DT-1026; the 

Hon. Carmen Julia Lynn Goodman, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed.

Counsel on

Appeal

James W. Glasgow, State’s Attorney, of Joliet (Patrick Delfino, David 

J. Robinson, and Gary F. Gnidovec, of State’s Attorneys Appellate 

Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.

Scott Pyles and Stephen D. White, of Rathbun, Cservenyak & Kozol, 

LLC, of Joliet, for appellee.
- 2 -

Panel JUSTICE CARTER delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Presiding Justice Lytton and Justice O’Brien concurred in the 

judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶ 1 Defendant, Camile Araiza, was issued two traffic citations for driving under the influence 

of alcohol (DUI)—one for driving under the influence of alcohol (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2) 

(West 2016)) and one for driving with a breath alcohol content over 0.08 (id. § 11-501(a)(1)). 

Defendant was subsequently notified of the statutory summary suspension of her driving 

privileges. Defendant filed a petition to rescind the summary suspension, arguing in part that 

the traffic stop was invalid. The trial court granted defendant’s petition to rescind. The State 

appeals. We affirm.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 On September 9, 2017, Officer Nicholas Clesceri of the Romeoville Police Department 

initiated a traffic stop of defendant’s vehicle. Defendant was arrested for DUI and subsequently 

received confirmation of a six-month, statutory summary suspension of her driver’s license. 

On September 28, 2017, defendant filed a petition to rescind the summary suspension, arguing, 

among other things, that she was not violating any law, regulation, or ordinance when she was 

stopped by Clesceri. On October 23, 2017, a hearing on defendant’s petition to rescind took 

place, at which Clesceri testified and a video from Clesceri’s squad car was entered into 

evidence. 

¶ 4 At the hearing, Clesceri testified that on the night of September 9, 2017, he stopped directly 

behind defendant’s vehicle, in a left turn lane (on westbound 135th Street in Romeoville, 

Illinois). Clesceri testified there was another car “approximately two car lengths” in front of 

defendant’s vehicle in the left turn lane. Clesceri testified that when the red light changed to a 

green left-turn arrow, the car in front of defendant’s vehicle proceeded to turn left, but 

defendant’s vehicle just “sat there.” He testified there had been no oncoming traffic when the 

light changed to the green left-turn arrow. He further testified that after the light cycled to a 

green light, defendant initially did not move her vehicle but then made a left turn onto Route 

53 southbound, running over the rumble strip in front of the median on Route 53 and making 

a wide left turn directly into the right southbound land of Route 53. He also testified that when 

defendant was completing the left turn, the passenger-side wheels of her vehicle nearly came 

in contact with the right-hand curb on Route 53. 

¶ 5 The video was played for the trial court, showing that Clesceri had pulled behind 

defendant’s vehicle in the left turn lane, at which time defendant was stopped behind another 

vehicle at a red light. A green left-turn arrow signal appeared on the stoplight for eight seconds, 

but defendant’s vehicle did not move. During those eight seconds, it took two seconds for a 

vehicle traveling southbound (on Route 53) to clear the intersection. Another two seconds 

lapsed before the driver of the vehicle in front of defendant’s vehicle began to drive forward 

and turn left. During the remaining four seconds before the traffic light’s green arrow signal 

changed to a yellow signal, defendant’s vehicle did not move forward at all. When the stoplight 

cycled through a yellow light and then a red light, which took 10 seconds, defendant still did 
- 3 -

not move her vehicle forward, although there appeared to be approximately one car length of 

space before the white stop line at the intersection for her to do so. After the signal changed to 

a solid green light, defendant did not immediately make a left-hand turn. She waited for two 

vehicles to pass through the intersection in the opposite direction—eastbound on 135th Street. 

Once those vehicles passed and the intersection was clear, defendant immediately proceeded 

forward and made a left turn onto Route 53. 

¶ 6 The video showed that on the south side of the intersection, on Route 53, a raised median 

divided the two southbound lanes of Route 53 from the northbound traffic of Route 53. Both 

ends of the median were painted bright yellow, with an unpainted, slightly raised portion of 

concrete—a rumble strip—extending from the north end of the median toward the intersection.

¶ 7 In regard to the median and the rumble strip, Clesceri testified:

“On Route 53, this is, is a raised median at that point. And then just in front of the 

raised median, extending a little bit further, is an area that some people call a rumble 

strip but it is designed to alert a vehicle driving over it, it makes a noise when you do 

that, that you are approaching the median. That [r]umble strip is within a solid yellow 

line. That means it is not to be driven over.” 

¶ 8 Contrary to Clesceri’s testimony, it appears from the video that the rumble strip was not 

“within a solid yellow line.” The median was raised several inches and painted yellow on each 

end. The rumble strip was not painted and was only slightly raised. 

¶ 9 In the video, it appears that as defendant made the left turn, the driver-side tires of her 

vehicle passed over the rumble strip, and she passed through the left lane (of the two 

southbound lanes of Route 53) and established her vehicle to travel within the right lane (of 

southbound Route 53). As defendant completed the turn, she drove in the righthand portion of 

the right lane (of Route 53) and remained within that lane. The passenger-side tires of her 

vehicle did not hit the right curb when she was completing the turn, and she did not leave the 

right lane of Route 53. 

¶ 10 Clesceri initiated a traffic stop of defendant’s vehicle based on his observations. Clesceri 

requested defendant’s license and proof of insurance, which defendant provided. Clesceri 

returned to his squad car and wrote defendant a citation for failing to obey a traffic control 

device, specifically the left turn arrow signal, in violation of section 306(a)(2) of the Illinois 

Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11-306(a)(2) (West 2016)). After Clesceri returned to defendant’s 

vehicle, he detected a “strong odor” coming from defendant’s breath, observed a “slight 

reddening of the conjunctiva” of defendant’s eyes, and noticed that defendant slurred the word 

“citation.” He testified there “may have been” other slurred words but defendant slurring the 

word “citation” stuck out in his memory vividly. After administering field sobriety tests and a 

portable breath test, Clesceri arrested defendant for DUI. 

¶ 11 After the evidence was presented at the hearing on defendant’s petition to rescind the 

summary suspension of her driving privileges, the trial court stated, “oftentimes people want 

to make sure that the intersection is clear even if the arrow is green.” The trial court found that 

the evidence did not show that defendant had driven erratically, noting that defendant had 

ensured that the intersection was clear before she proceeded through the green light. The trial 

court granted defendant’s petition to rescind for the lack of reasonable grounds for the traffic 

stop and the arrest. 
- 4 -

¶ 12 The State appealed.

¶ 13 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 14 On appeal, the State argues that the trial judge erred in granting defendant’s petition to 

rescind the summary suspension of defendant’s driving privileges. The State argues that the 

trial court erred in concluding that the traffic stop was improper because the trial court used an 

incorrect legal standard in coming to that determination. Defendant argues the trial court did 

not err. 

¶ 15 “A statutory summary suspension hearing is a civil action where the defendant motorist, as 

the petitioner, requests the judicial rescission of a suspension, and the State is placed in the 

position of a civil defendant.” People v. Tibbetts, 351 Ill. App. 3d 921, 926 (2004). In a petition 

to rescind, the motorist may challenge the propriety of the traffic stop leading to his or her DUI 

arrest. People v. Wood, 379 Ill. App. 3d 705, 707 (2008). In reviewing a trial court’s decision 

on a petition to rescind a statutory summary suspension, the trial court’s factual findings and 

credibility assessments will be reversed only if the findings are against the manifest weight of 

the evidence, while its conclusion as to whether the rescission was warranted is reviewed 

de novo. People v. Brantley, 2016 IL App (5th) 150177, ¶ 15. 

¶ 16 Both the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, section 6, of the 

Illinois Constitution of 1970 protect individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. 

Const., amend. IV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 6. The due process clause of the fourteenth 

amendment of the United States Constitution extends this constitutional guarantee to searches 

and seizures conducted by State officials. People v. Gaytan, 2015 IL 116223, ¶ 20. Generally, 

a stop of a vehicle based on a suspicion of violation of the law constitutes a seizure within the 

meaning of the fourth amendment and is subject to the fourth amendment’s reasonableness 

requirement. Id. In People v. Hackett, our supreme court stated the following summary of the 

principles governing the constitutionally of traffic stops:

“Vehicle stops are subject to the fourth amendment’s reasonableness requirement. 

[Citations.] ‘ “As a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable 

where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.” ’

[Citation.] However, as this court has observed, though traffic stops are frequently 

supported by ‘probable cause’ to believe that a traffic violation has occurred, as 

differentiated from the ‘less exacting’ standard of ‘reasonable, articulable suspicion’ 

that justifies an ‘investigative stop,’ the latter will suffice for purposes of the fourth 

amendment irrespective of whether the stop is supported by probable cause. [Citations.] 

A police officer may conduct a brief, investigatory stop of a person where the officer 

can point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences 

from those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion. [Citation.] The officer’s belief ‘need 

not rise to the level of suspicion required for probable cause.’ [Citation.] The distinction 

between these two standards may or may not be relevant, depending upon the facts of 

the case under consideration and the Vehicle Code provision at issue.” People v. 

Hackett, 2012 IL 111781, ¶ 20.

¶ 17 In this case, Clesceri indicated that defendant committed a traffic violation for failing to 

obey a traffic control device—the green arrow signal—because defendant failed to make a left 

turn after the turn arrow signal appeared. Section 11-305(a) of the Illinois Vehicle Code 

provides that “[t]he driver of any vehicle shall obey the instructions of any official traffic-
- 5 -

control device applicable thereto.” 625 ILCS 5/11-305(a) (West 2016). Section 11-306(a)(2) 

of the Illinois Vehicle Code, provides:

“Vehicular traffic facing a green arrow signal, shown alone or in combination with 

another indication, may cautiously enter the intersection only to make the movement 

indicated by such arrow, or such other movement as is permitted by other indications 

shown at the same time. Such vehicular traffic shall yield the right of way to pedestrians 

lawfully within an adjacent crosswalk and to other traffic lawfully using the 

intersection.” Id. § 11-306(a)(2). 

¶ 18 In construing a statute, the primary objective is to give effect to the legislature’s intent. 

Gaytan, 2015 IL 116223, ¶ 23. The best indicator of the legislature’s intent is the statutory 

language, given its plain and ordinary meaning. Id. In determining legislative intent, a court 

may consider the purpose and necessity for the law and the consequences that would result 

from construing the statute one way or the other. Id. The construction of a statute is a question 

of law that is reviewed de novo. Id.

¶ 19 Although section 11-305(a) of the Illinois Vehicle Code indicates that a motorist “shall 

obey the instructions of any official traffic-control device applicable thereto,” section 11-

306(a)(2) more specifically describes the “instruction” of a green arrow signal. 625 ILCS 5/11-

305(a), 11-306(a)(2) (West 2016). Section 11-306(a)(2) indicates that a motorist facing a green 

arrow signal “may cautiously enter the intersection” to make the movement indicated by such 

arrow and “shall yield” the right of way to pedestrians lawfully within an adjacent crosswalk 

and to other traffic lawfully using the intersection. Id. § 11-306(a)(2). A brief or momentary 

delay in proceeding through an intersection upon a traffic light changing to a green arrow does 

not violate section 11-306(a)(2) of the Illinois Vehicle Code where the plain language of the 

statute does not require a motorist to do so within any specified amount of time and mandates 

that the motorist yield the right of way to pedestrians in a crosswalk and other traffic lawfully 

within the intersection. See id.; see also People v. Kelly, 344 Ill. App. 3d 1058, 1061-62 (2003) 

(interpreting the language of section 11-306(a)(1), which provides “ ‘[v]ehicular traffic facing 

a circular green signal may proceed straight through or turn right or left,’ ” (quoting 625 ILCS 

5/11-306(a)(1) (West 2000)) as allowing reasonable time for the motorist to react to the signal 

change and ascertain it would be safe to proceed; holding a 20-second delay upon a traffic light 

changing to a green light was not a reasonable delay and violated the statute). 

¶ 20 In this case, defendant’s vehicle did not move during the eight-second duration of the green 

left turn arrow signal. During that time, the intersection initially was not clear of traffic and the 

car in front of defendant’s vehicle did not move. After four seconds elapsed, the intersection 

was clear, and the vehicle in front of defendant’s vehicle proceeded forward and made a left 

turn. Only four seconds remained before the traffic light changed to a yellow signal. Based on 

the language of the statute, we conclude that defendant not proceeding with a left turn during 

these four seconds did not violate section 11-306(a)(2) of the Illinois Vehicle Code. 

¶ 21 The State argues that this court should reverse the trial court’s order granting the rescission 

of defendant’s summary suspension because the trial court applied the incorrect legal standard. 

The correct standard to be applied when determining whether an investigatory stop was 

justified is not the constitutional requirement of “probable cause” to arrest or search 

(synonymous with this state’s statutory standard of “reasonable grounds”), but the lesser 

standard of whether the officer had a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity. 

People v. Repp, 165 Ill. App. 3d 90, 94 (1988). 
- 6 -

¶ 22 Here, the State claims that Clesceri was justified in conducting a brief, investigatory stop 

of defendant’s vehicle because he had a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity based on the 

following observations: defendant’s vehicle remained in place during the green arrow signal; 

defendant did not move her car forward at all (toward the white stop line) while the traffic light 

cycled through a yellow and red signal; defendant waited a few seconds after the light changed 

to a green signal before making a left turn; and, in executing the left turn, defendant made a 

sharp, sudden, and wide left turn into the right-hand lane of Route 53, driving over the rumble 

strip of the median and nearly hitting the right curb of Route 53. However, after viewing the 

video recording evidence, the trial court found the evidence showed that defendant ensured the 

intersection was clear before making the left turn and had not driven erratically when making 

the left turn. Our review of the video indicates the trial court’s findings were not against the 

manifest weight of the evidence. Additionally, we note that, contrary to Clesceri’s testimony, 

the video indicated the rumble strip was not marked in a manner prohibiting a motorist making 

a left turn onto Route 53 from driving over it and defendant did not make any sudden or erratic 

movements when completing the left turn. Therefore, there were no specific, articulable facts 

to create a reasonable suspicion that defendant committed or was about to commit a crime to 

justify the traffic stop. See id. (for a stop to be valid, the officer must have had knowledge of 

specific, articulable facts which, when combined with the rational inferences therefrom, create 

a reasonable suspicion that the person in question either has committed or is about to commit 

a crime). Accordingly, based on the record in this case, the trial court did not err in granting 

defendant’s petition to rescind.

¶ 23 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 24 The judgment of the circuit court of Will County is affirmed. 

¶ 25 Affirmed.