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Russell S. Thompson IV (029098)

Joseph Panvini (028359)

Thompson Consumer Law Group, PLLC

5235 E. Southern Ave., D106-618

Mesa, AZ 85206

Telephone: (602) 388-8898

Facsimile: (866) 317-2674

rthompson@consumerlawinfo.com

Attorneys for Plaintiff

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Vanessa Spencer,

Plaintiff,

vs.

Convergent Outsourcing, Inc.,

Defendant.

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Case No. 

COMPLAINT AND TRIAL BY JURY 

DEMAND

NATURE OF ACTION

1. Plaintiff Vanessa Spencer (“Plaintiff”) brings this action against Defendant 

Convergent Outsourcing, Inc. (“Defendant”) pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection 

Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq.

JURISDICTION, VENUE, AND STANDING

2. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d) and 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1331. 

3. Venue is proper before this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), where 

the acts and transactions giving rise to Plaintiff’s action occurred in this district, where 

Plaintiff resides in this district, and where Defendant transacts business in this district. 

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4. “In determining whether an intangible harm constitutes injury in fact, both 

history and the judgment of Congress play important roles.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 

S. Ct. 1540, 1549, 194 L. Ed. 2d 635 (2016), as revised (May 24, 2016). Congress is 

“well positioned to identify intangible harms that meet minimum Article III 

requirements,” thus “Congress may ‘elevat[e] to the status of legally cognizable injuries 

concrete, de facto injuries that were previously inadequate in law.’” Id. (quoting Lujan v. 

Defs of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992)). 

5. “Without the protections of the FDCPA, Congress determined, the 

‘[e]xisting laws and procedures for redressing these injuries are inadequate to protect 

consumers.’” Lane v. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC, No. 15 C 10446, 2016 WL 

3671467, at *3 (N.D. Ill. July 11, 2016) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692(b)). Thus, a failure to 

honor a consumer’s right under the FDCPA constitutes an injury in fact for Article III 

standing. See id. at *3 (holding that a consumer “has alleged a sufficiently concrete 

injury because he alleges that [Defendant] denied him the right to information due to him 

under the FDCPA”); see also Church v. Accretive Health, Inc., No. 15-15708, 2016 WL 

3611543, at *3 (11th Cir. July 6, 2016) (holding that consumer’s § 1692g claim was 

sufficiently concrete to satisfy injury-in-fact requirement). 

6. “The Supreme Court has held time and again that the violation of a 

statutory right to receive information one is entitled to receive creates a concrete injury 

sufficient to confer standing on a plaintiff.” Zia v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 210 F. Supp. 3d 

1334, 1343 (S.D. Fla. 2016).

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7. “The FDCPA does create an informational right which did not exist prior to 

its enactment, and that right is tied to the harm which a consumer may suffer if not 

provided with that information. Consequently, the deprivation of that information is, in 

most cases, sufficient to confer Article III standing. That was the law before Spokeo, and 

that law was not based on an erroneous understanding of Article III like the one corrected 

by Spokeo, but by application of well-settled principles of standing jurisprudence 

which Spokeo did not change (and, in fact, upon which Spokeo relied).” Hagy v. Demers 

& Adams, LLC, No. 2:11-CV-530, 2017 WL 1134408, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 27, 2017).

8. “[N]umerous other courts, including courts in this circuit and from around 

the country, have rejected Spokeo-based standing challenges in the context of FDCPA 

violations.” Neeley v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, No. 115CV01283RLYMJD, 

2017 WL 3311045, at *2 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 2, 2017) (citing Pogorzelski v. Patenaude & 

Felix APC, No. 16-C-1330, 2017 WL 2539782, at *4, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89678, at 

*11 (E.D. Wis. June 12, 2017)) (collecting cases).

9. “[E]ven though actual monetary harm is a sufficient condition to show 

concrete harm, it is not a necessary condition.” Lane, 2016 WL 3671467 at *4 (emphasis 

in original). 

THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT

10. Congress enacted the FDCPA in order to eliminate “abusive debt collection 

practices by debt collectors [and] to insure that those debt collectors who refrain from 

using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged.” Clark v. 

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Capital Credit & Collection Servs., Inc., 460 F.3d 1162, 1179-80 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing 

15 U.S.C. § 1692(e)). 

11. To protect consumers and ensure compliance by debt collectors, “the 

FDCPA is a strict liability statute.” McCollough v. Johnson, Rodenburg & Lauinger, 

LLC, 637 F.3d 939, 948 (9th Cir. 2011).

12. Strict liability enhances “the remedial nature of the statute,” and courts are 

“to interpret it liberally” to protect consumers. Clark, 460 F.3d at 1176.

13. In addition, by making available to prevailing consumers both statutory 

damages and attorneys’ fees, Congress “clearly intended that private enforcement actions 

would be the primary enforcement tool of the Act.” Baker v. G.C. Servs. Corp., 677 F.2d 

775, 780-81 (9th Cir. 1982); see also Tourgeman v. Collins Fin. Servs., Inc., 755 F.3d 

1109, 1118 (9th Cir. 2014). 

14. Violations of the FDCPA are assessed under the least sophisticated 

consumer standard which is “‘designed to protect consumers of below average 

sophistication or intelligence,’ or those who are ‘uninformed or naïve,’ particularly when 

those individuals are targeted by debt collectors.” Gonzales v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 

660 F.3d 1055, 1061 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Duffy v. Landberg, 215 F.3d 871, 874-75 

(8th Cir. 2000)). 

15. “An FDCPA Plaintiff need not even have actually been misled or deceived 

by the debt collector’s representation; instead, liability depends on whether the 

hypothetical ‘least sophisticated debtor’ likely would be misled.” Tourgeman, 755 F.3d 

at 1117-18 (emphasis in original). 

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16. “[B]ecause the FDCPA is a remedial statute aimed at curbing what 

Congress considered to be an industry-wide pattern of and propensity towards abusing 

debtors, it is logical for debt collectors—repeat players likely to be acquainted with the 

legal standards governing their industry—to bear the brunt of the risk.” Clark, 460 F.3d at 

1171-72; see also FTC v. Colgate–Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 393 (1965) (“[I]t does 

not seem unfair to require that one who deliberately goes perilously close to an area of 

proscribed conduct shall take the risk that he may cross the line.”) (internal quotations 

omitted).

PARTIES

17. Plaintiff is a natural person who at all relevant times resided in the State of 

Arizona, County of Maricopa, and City of Phoenix. 

18. Plaintiff is a “consumer” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3). 

19. Defendant is an entity who at all relevant times was engaged, by use of the 

mails and telephone, in the business of attempting to collect a “debt” from Plaintiff, as 

defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5).

20. Defendant is a “debt collector” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). 

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

21. Plaintiff is a natural person allegedly obligated to pay a debt asserted to be 

owed or due a creditor other than Defendant.

22. Plaintiff’s alleged obligation arises from a transaction in which the money, 

property, insurance, or services that are the subject of the transaction were incurred 

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primarily for personal, family, or household purposes—namely, personal phone services 

with Verizon Wireless (the “Debt”).

23. Defendant uses instrumentalities of interstate commerce or the mails in a 

business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts.

24. Defendant regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, 

debts owed or due, or asserted to be owed or due, another.

25. In connection with the collection of the Debt, Defendant sent Plaintiff a 

letter dated September 22, 2017.

26. A true and correct copy of the September 22, 2017 letter is attached to this 

complaint as Exhibit A. 

27. Defendant’s September 22, 2017 letter was Defendant’s initial 

communication with Plaintiff with respect to the Debt.

28. Defendant’s September 22, 2017 letter stated that the amount owed was 

$1,526.27, along with a collection cost of $274.72, for a total balance of $1,800.99 on the 

Debt.

29. After receiving Defendant’s September 22, 2017 letter, Plaintiff sent 

Defendant a letter disputing the Debt.

30. Plaintiff’s dispute letter also requested: “If there have been any other 

changes or adjustments since the last billing statement from the original creditor, please 

provide full verification and documentation of the amount you are trying to collect. 

Explain how that amount was calculated. In addition, explain how the other changes or 

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adjustments are expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by 

law.”

31. In response to Plaintiff’s written dispute, Defendant sent Plaintiff a letter 

dated October 25, 2017, and enclosed a Verizon bill.

32. A true and correct copy of Defendant’s October 25, 2017 letter, with 

enclosure, is attached to this complaint as Exhibit B.

33. In Defendant’s October 25, 2017 letter, Defendant check-marked a line 

stating that “[t]his debt is valid, attached is verification of the debt.” Exhibit B. 

34. Defendant’s October 25, 2017 letter further states that “[t]his is an attempt 

to collect a debt . . . .” Id. 

35. Defendant’s October 25, 2017 letter identifies the total balance of the Debt 

as $1,800.99.

36. Defendant also attached Plaintiff’s final Verizon bill to its October 25, 2017 

letter as purported verification of the Debt.

37. The Verizon bill lists that the total amount due on the Debt was $1,526.27.

38. However, Defendant did not provide any verification or otherwise explain 

the basis for the $274.72 collection cost portion of the Debt. 

39. Yet, Defendant’s October 25, 2017 letter attempted to collect the total of 

$1,800.99, including the $274.72 in collection costs. 

40. Upon receipt of Defendant’s October 25, 2017 letter, Plaintiff was left 

unsure of the basis for the $274.72, and was unable to determine why or how those fees 

had accrued.

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COUNT I

VIOLATION OF 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b)

41. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges each factual allegation above.

42. A key provision of the FDCPA is § 1692g, which requires a debt collector 

to send, within five days of its initial communication with a consumer, a written notice 

which provides information regarding the debt and informs the consumer of his or her 

right to dispute the validity of the debt, and/or request the name and address of the 

original creditor, within 30 days of receipt of the notice. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a). 

43. Congress adopted “the debt validation provisions of section 1692g” to 

guarantee that consumers would receive “adequate notice” of their rights under the 

FDCPA. Wilson v. Quadramed Corp., 225 F.3d 350, 354 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Miller v. 

Payco–General Am. Credits, Inc., 943 F.2d 482, 484 (4th Cir. 1991)).

44. This validation requirement is a “significant feature” of the law that aimed 

to “eliminate the recurring problem of debt collectors dunning the wrong person or 

attempting to collect debts which the consumer has already paid.” See Hernandez v. 

Williams, Zinman & Parham PC, 829 F.3d 1068, 1080 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing S. Rep. No. 

95-382, at 4 (1977)).

45. If a consumer requests validation, “the debt collector shall cease collection 

of the debt . . . until the debt collector obtains verification” and mails such verification to 

the consumer. Id.

46. “[A] debt collector may satisfy its obligation to obtain and to furnish 

verification by providing a copy of the original bill from the creditor. However, where, 

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as in this case, the amount set forth on that original bill differs from the amount the debt 

collector is attempting to collect, merely providing a copy of that bill does not satisfy the 

obligation imposed by § 1692g(b).” Lamb v. M & M Associates, Inc., No. C-3-96-463, 

1998 WL 34288694, at *9 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 1, 1998); see also Haddad v. Alexander, 

Zelmanski, Danner & Fioritto, PLLC, 758 F.3d 777, 785-86 (6th Cir. 2014).

47. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b) by continuing collection of a 

disputed portion of Plaintiff’s Debt without providing adequate verification of that 

portion of the debt, after having received a timely written dispute from Plaintiff.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for relief and judgment, as follows: 

a) Adjudging that Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b);

b) Awarding Plaintiff statutory damages, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 

1692k(a)(2)(A), in the amount of $1,000.00;

c) Awarding Plaintiff actual damages, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(1);

d) Awarding Plaintiff reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in this 

action pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3); 

e) Awarding Plaintiff pre-judgment and post-judgment interest as permissible 

by law; and

f) Awarding such other and further relief as the Court may deem proper.

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TRIAL BY JURY

48. Plaintiff is entitled to and hereby demands a trial by jury.

Dated: March 12, 2018

Respectfully submitted,

s/ Russell S. Thompson IV

Russell S. Thompson IV (029098)

Thompson Consumer Law Group, PLLC

5235 E. Southern Ave., D106-618

Mesa, AZ 85206

Telephone: (602) 388-8898

Facsimile: (866) 317-2674

rthompson@consumerlawinfo.com

s/ Joseph Panvini

Joseph Panvini (028359)

Thompson Consumer Law Group, PLLC

5235 E. Southern Ave., D106-618

Mesa, AZ 85206 

Telephone: (602) 388-8875

Facsimile: (866) 317-2674

jpanvini@consumerlawinfo.com

Attorneys for Plaintiff

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