Note: Decisions of a three-justice panel are not to be considered as precedent before any tribunal. 

ENTRY ORDER

SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2012-362

APRIL TERM, 2014

Lisa Mangini } APPEALED FROM:

}

} Superior Court, Windsor Unit,

 v. } Family Division

}

}

Richard E. Hardie } DOCKET NO. 67-2-08 Wrdm

Trial Judge: William D. Cohen

In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

Wife appeals a final divorce order issued by the family division of the superior court, 

arguing that the court abused its discretion by inequitably dividing the marital property and by

not awarding her maintenance. We reverse and remand the matter for the court to reconsider the 

property distribution and maintenance.

The parties married in 2001, when wife was in her early forties and husband in his late 

forties. No children were born of the marriage. The parties separated in 2007, when wife moved 

into what had had been the parties’ vacation home in Weathersfield, Vermont, which husband 

purchased in 2002. What had been the marital home is located in New Jersey.

The Weathersfield property has been the subject of other legal proceedings. Husband 

refinanced the property on three occasions, the last in 2008. In her February 2008 divorce filing, 

wife claimed the property as her primary residence and asked the court to award it to her free and 

clear of any encumbrances. In January 2011, the mortgagee commenced a foreclosure action on 

the property, naming only husband as a defendant. Despite not being named in the action, wife 

filed an answer and affirmative defense claiming that she had established a homestead interest in 

the property before husband had refinanced it in 2008, thereby making the 2008 mortgage 

inoperative to convey her homestead interest. The mortgagee responded that wife did not have a 

homestead interest in the property because she possessed neither a legal nor an equitable title to 

the property. The civil division of the superior court granted summary judgment to wife, and 

husband appealed. We recently reversed that decision, concluding that wife had no legal or 

equitable title to, and therefore no homestead interest in, the property. See Brattleboro Savings 

& Loan Ass’n v. Hardie, 2014 VT 26, ¶¶ 17, 19.

Meanwhile, on May 20, 2011, following a March 17, 2011 hearing, the family division of 

the superior court made brief oral findings and conclusions in support of its final divorce order. 

The court first concluded that, although wife was entitled to approximately $15,000 in

maintenance arrearages based on a temporary order requiring husband to pay wife $2500 per 
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month in maintenance, it would not award ongoing maintenance beyond June 2011. In so ruling, 

the court noted the parties’ high standard of living during the marriage, husband’s reduced 

income, wife’s minimal efforts to obtain work during the previous two years, and wife’s 

employability. In making these general findings, the court did not specify the income or 

expenses for either party so as to enable this Court to evaluate whether the court acted within its 

broad discretion in declining to award maintenance.

Regarding the property division, the family court explained what property it was 

awarding to whom, but provided no reasoning for its decision and did not indicate the statutory

factors upon which it was basing its decision. Essentially, apart from personal property, the 

court awarded wife the Weathersfield property and husband the rest of the marital estate, 

including the marital home and other real property, as well as his entire retirement account. 

Regarding the Weathersfield property, the court made wife responsible for all debts and 

encumbrances associated with the property.

The ensuing July 1, 2011 final judgment order, which was prepared by husband’s 

attorney, contained no findings or conclusions, but confirmed the court’s decision from the 

bench. The order awarded wife the Weathersfield property free and clear of any interest by 

husband but subject to all debt associated with the property, including the 2008 mortgage. Wife 

was ordered to indemnify husband against any debt from the property and to refinance the 

property within six months so as to remove defendant’s name from the existing mortgage.

On August 31, 2012, in response to post-judgment motions from both parties, the court 

confirmed that it had intended to award wife the Weathersfield property subject to the 2008 

mortgage and promissory note. The court noted that wife knew the property was “underwater,” 

but nonetheless wanted to live there and save the house from foreclosure “because she felt 

(correctly) that she had a reasonable defense to the foreclosure proceedings. In other words, 

[wife] asked for the risk, because she saw the potential benefits.” The court further explained as 

follows:

As a result, the court agreed to “award” [wife] the house, along 

with the accompanying note and mortgage, thus assigning to [wife]

the benefits and risks of her choice. It was then up to [wife] to see 

what she could do in terms of defending against the pending 

foreclosure action (she was successful) and refinancing the debt 

obligation (success to be determined). The court notes that [wife] 

is not without leverage in the refinancing negotiations: she holds 

title to a house free and clear, and the bank is holding unsecured 

debt. In the final analysis, the court is persuaded that the equitable 

reasons that justified the award of the house to [wife] in the first 

instance (along with the accompanying note and mortgage) remain 

intact.

Wife appeals, arguing that the family court abused its discretion: (1) by inequitably 

dividing the marital property, not awarding her maintenance, and failing to make adequate 

findings to support its decision; (2) by requiring her to assume the note and mortgage obligations

on the Weathersfield property; and (3) by requiring her to indemnify husband against obligations 

associated with that property. Husband responds that the court’s property division and refusal to 

award maintenance was within its discretion, given the relatively short, childless marriage and 
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the fact that virtually all of the martial assets were either brought into the marriage by him or 

earned by him during the marriage.

We conclude that the matter must be remanded for the family court to reconsider the 

property division and maintenance not only because of its failure to explain a highly unequal 

distribution of marital property but also to take account of this Court’s recent decision 

concluding that wife cannot avoid the 2008 mortgage based on her claimed homestead 

exemption. In distributing the marital property, the court made few findings, did not consider the 

statutory factors set forth in 15 V.S.A. § 751, and provided no rational for its decision. For this 

reason alone, its decision must be reversed. Dreves v. Dreves, 160 Vt. 330, 333 (1993) (stating 

that family court’s discretion in distributing marital property is not unlimited, and thus court’s 

findings must provide clear statement of what was decided and why). The court did not account 

for the parties’ total assets, or acknowledge what percentage of those assets is going to wife, let 

alone provide an explanation for its property division. Wife contends, and husband does not 

dispute, that the court awarded husband at least ninety percent of the marital estate. Given this 

apparent disparity in the respective awards, it was particularly critical for the court to explain its 

rationale for the unequal distribution. Wade v. Wade, 2005 VT 72, ¶ 20, 178 Vt. 189 (stating 

that large disparity in property division requires careful examination of evidence and findings “to 

assure that the family court made adequate findings and acted within its wide discretion in 

awarding one spouse the vast majority of the marital assets”); Dreves, 160 Vt. at 335 (stating that 

“our need for some understanding of the trial court’s rationale is paramount” when there is 

significant disparity in property award); Daitchman v. Daitchman, 145 Vt. 145, 150 (1984) 

(stating that significantly unequal property award justifies closer look to ensure legislatively 

mandated equitable division of property pursuant to statutory factors). Husband contends that 

the distribution is fair because he brought in or earned the vast majority of those assets, but the 

family court did not explicitly rely upon this rationale in making its decision.

Rather, as indicated above, the court appears to have awarded wife the marital home 

under the assumption—or at least presumed likelihood—that she ultimately would obtain the 

property free and clear of the 2008 mortgage. As the court stated, it was assigning her the risks

or benefits of the property, depending on how the legal proceedings concerning the property 

were resolved. In short, wife would get either the lady or the tiger, and, as it turned out, she got 

the tiger, resulting in husband receiving ninety-plus percent of the marital assets. Because the 

civil division of the superior court had already granted wife summary judgment on her 

homestead exemption claim—a ruling that the family court deemed correct but that we reversed 

on appeal—the family court may have assumed that wife would receive a much larger portion of 

the marital estate than she wound up receiving. In any event, we decline to uphold a property 

distribution in which a principal part of the marital estate is not valued with any precision.

In light of our rejection of wife’s homestead exemption claim, the family court on 

remand may establish the actual value of the mortgaged Weathersfield property at the time of the 

parties’ divorce, reconsider the division of marital property, and make findings and conclusions

that explain its rationale based on the relevant statutory factors. Because we are reversing its 

property award, the court must also reconsider maintenance in light of the new division of 

marital property. See Harris v. Harris, 162 Vt. 174, 185 (1994) (declining to consider family 

court’s refusal to award maintenance because court would have to reconsider maintenance in 

light of reversal of property division); Dreves, 160 Vt. 330, 335 (stating that where property 

division is reversed, maintenance ruling should also be reexamined because of interrelationship 

between property and maintenance awards). In sum, while we do not disturb the family court’s 
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decree of divorce and award of maintenance arrears to wife, we reverse its rulings on property 

division and ongoing maintenance.

Reversed and remanded.

BY THE COURT:

_______________________________________

Paul L. Reiber, Chief Justice

_______________________________________

Marilyn S. Skoglund, Associate Justice

_______________________________________

Geoffrey W. Crawford, Associate Justice