J-S15014-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: A.C.M., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: A.M., FATHER No. 2019 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Decree entered May 27, 2015, 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Family Court,

at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000608-2013

FID# 51-FN-001963-2011

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E, OLSON, and PLATT,

*

JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED MARCH 03, 2016

A.M. (“Father”) appeals from the decree entered May 27, 2015, in the 

Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, which involuntarily 

terminated his parental rights to his minor daughter, A.C.M. (“Child”), born 

in August of 2007.1, 2 We affirm. 

The trial court summarized the relevant factual and procedural history 

of this matter as follows. 

Father has a long history of being in and out of jail. Father has 

been found guilty or pleaded guilty for different criminal offenses 

 

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 That same day, the trial court entered a separate decree confirming the 

consent of Child’s mother, K.E., to the adoption of Child. K.E. is not a party 

to the instant appeal.

2 We note that the certified record in this case was originally due on July 27, 

2015. However, this Court did not receive the record from the trial court 

until well past the due date, on October 9, 2015. As a result, the briefing 

schedule in this matter was delayed by over two months.
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going back to 1995. ... Father was not incarcerated at the time 

Child was born. Father was arrested shortly thereafter on 

November 25, 2008. Father estimates the last time[] he saw 

Child was in 2009. The family became known to [the 

Philadelphia Department of Human Services (“DHS”)] on July 19, 

2011, when an Order of Protective Custody (“OPC”) was 

obtained. Child was adjudicated dependent on August 2, 2011. 

Child currently remains in the same foster home [that she was 

placed in] when she was adjudicated. At the adjudication 

hearing, the trial court ordered DHS to conduct a Parent Location 

Search for Father (“PLS”). Father’s whereabouts [were] 

unknown. However, Father had been released from 

incarceration in June 2011, and he was living in a halfway house. 

Father was re-arrested in December of 2011. From June 2011 

to December 2011, Father did not attempt to visit his Child. 

[The] DHS case record indicates that Father was not part of the 

Child’s life since the time Child was born. Father became known 

when he contacted DHS in 2012. At the Permanency Review 

hearing on April 24, 2012, the trial court found that Father was 

incarcerated. Again, at the Permanency Review hearing on 

October 23, 2012, Father was still incarcerated. [I]n December 

2012, Father was sentenced for his December 2011 arrest. 

Father received a sentence of thirty months to seventy-two 

months confinement. Furthermore, on February 11, 2013, 

Father was sentenced to one to two years for escape, another 

offense resulting from his arrest [in] December 2011. 

Throughout this case, the trial court has found reasonable efforts 

on behalf of DHS. 

Trial Court Opinion, 10/7/2015, at 1-2 (citations to the record omitted).

On October 10, 2013, DHS filed a petition to involuntarily terminate 

Father’s parental rights to Child. A termination hearing was held on May 27, 

2015, during which the trial court heard the testimony of Father and DHS 

social worker, Ms. Barbara Forrest. Following the hearing, the trial court 

entered its decree terminating Father’s parental rights to Child involuntarily. 

Father timely filed a notice of appeal on June 26, 2015, along with a concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal. 
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Father now raises the following claim for our review. “Whether the 

trial court erred in terminating Father, [A.M.’s], parental rights, where the 

trial record established [DHS] failed to make reasonable efforts towards the 

goal of reunification.” Father’s brief at 2 (unnecessary capitalization 

omitted).

We consider Father’s claim mindful of our well-settled standard of 

review.

The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases 

requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and 

credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported 

by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate 

courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law 

or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an 

abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial 

court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely

because the record would support a different result. We have 

previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that often 

have first-hand observations of the parties spanning multiple 

hearings.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks 

omitted). 

Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated 

analysis. 

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory 

grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if 

the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants 

termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in 
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the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): 

determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the 

standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the 

needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the 

emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention 

paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such 

bond.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted). 

In this case, the trial court terminated Father’s parental rights 

pursuant to Sections 2511(a)(1), (2), and (b). We need only agree with the 

trial court as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well as Section 

2511(b), in order to affirm. In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 

2004) (en banc), appeal denied, 863 A.2d 1141 (Pa. 2004). Here, we 

analyze the court’s decision to terminate under Sections 2511(a)(2) and (b), 

which provide as follows.

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

***

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child 

to be without essential parental care, control or 

subsistence necessary for his physical or mental 

well-being and the conditions and causes of the 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will 

not be remedied by the parent.

***

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the 

child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on 
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the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, 

furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be 

beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition 

filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not 

consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions 

described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the 

giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (b).

We first address whether the trial court abused its discretion by 

terminating Father’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2).

In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 

2511(a)(2), the following three elements must be met: (1) 

repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) 

such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused the child to 

be without essential parental care, control or subsistence 

necessary for his physical or mental well-being; and (3) the 

causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will 

not be remedied.

In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation 

omitted). “The grounds for termination due to parental incapacity that 

cannot be remedied are not limited to affirmative misconduct. To the 

contrary, those grounds may include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to 

perform parental duties.” In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super. 

2002) (citations omitted). “[A] parent’s incarceration is relevant to the 

section (a)(2) analysis and, depending on the circumstances of the case, it 

may be dispositive of a parent’s ability to provide the ‘essential parental 

care, control or subsistence’ that the section contemplates.” In re A.D., 93 

A.3d 888, 897 (Pa. Super. 2014) (discussing In re Adoption of S.P., 47 

A.3d 817 (Pa. 2012)).
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Instantly, the trial court found that Father’s incarceration has rendered 

him incapable of providing Child with essential parental care, control, and 

subsistence, and that Father will be unable to remedy the causes of his 

parental incapacity. Trial Court Opinion, 10/7/2015, at 6. The court 

observed that Father may not be released from incarceration until 2017, and 

that, even if Father is paroled at an earlier date, he will not immediately be 

able to care for Child. Id. 

Father argues that the trial court erred by terminating his parental 

rights because DHS failed to provide him with reasonable reunification 

efforts. Father’s brief at 6-7. Father emphasizes that he has attempted to 

build a relationship with Child by sending her cards and gifts, and by 

requesting visits and phone contact. Id. According to Father, he “was 

striving to do anything he could within his confines to prevent termination of 

his rights.” Id. at 7. 

After a thorough review of the record in this matter, we conclude that 

the trial court did not abuse its discretion by involuntarily terminating 

Father’s parental rights to Child. Initially, we reject Father’s claim that his 

parental rights should not have been terminated because DHS failed to 

provide him with reasonable reunification efforts. Our Supreme Court 

recently held that reasonable reunification efforts are not necessary to 

support a decree terminating parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2).

We have discussed the Court’s decision as follows.
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In In re D.C.D., ___ Pa. ___, 105 A.3d 662 (2014), our 

Supreme Court analyzed the language of Section 2511(a)(2) of 

the Adoption Act, as well as Section 6351 of the Juvenile Act, 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 6351. The Court reasoned that, while “reasonable 

efforts may be relevant to a court’s consideration of both the 

grounds for termination and the best interests of the child,”

neither of these provisions, when read together or individually, 

requires reasonable efforts. The Court also concluded that 

reasonable efforts were not required to protect a parent’s 

constitutional right to the care, custody, and control of his or her 

child. 

In re Adoption of C.J.P., 114 A.3d 1046, 1055 (Pa. Super. 2015) (some 

citations omitted). Thus, even if Father were correct that DHS failed to 

provide reasonable reunification efforts in this case, he would not be entitled 

to relief.

Moreover, our review of the record confirms that DHS presented clear 

and convincing evidence in support of its termination petition. During the 

termination hearing, DHS social worker, Barbara Forrest, testified that there 

was no indication in the DHS record that Father was involved in Child’s life 

prior to her placement in foster care. N.T., 5/27/2015, at 48-49. In 

addition, Child never visited with Father during her forty-six months in care. 

Id. at 44. Ms. Forrest acknowledged that Father has sent letters and cards 

to Child in the past, but she was not sure if Father had sent anything to 

Child recently. Id. at 41. Father also has requested visits and phone calls 

with Child. Id. at 48, 50. Concerning Father’s incarceration, Ms. Forrest 

noted that Father was denied parole in April of 2015. Id. at 44. 

Father testified that he has been incarcerated since December of 2011, 

and that his maximum sentence will expire in December of 2017. Id. at 15, 
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21, 23. However, Father stated that he will be interviewed by the parole 

board in August of 2015, and that he has “a very good chance” of being 

paroled. Id. at 15, 34. Father explained that he has not seen Child since 

2009, but that he has repeatedly requested visits, pictures, and phone 

contact with Child. Id. at 19-21, 25, 30-31, 34. Father indicated that he 

also has written numerous letters to Child and sent her Christmas presents. 

Id. at 19, 24-25, 34. 

Finally, counsel for DHS provided the trial court with a copy of Father’s 

criminal record, which was entered into evidence as DHS Exhibit 53. 

Father’s criminal record reveals that he has a lengthy history of convictions 

and incarcerations dating back to 1996. DHS Exhibit 53, at 1. That year 

alone, Father pled guilty to seventeen separate offenses, including robbery 

and aggravated assault. Id. at 1-3. Between 2007 and 2009, Father was 

convicted of, or pled guilty to, an additional eight offenses. Id. at 3-4, 7. In 

2013, Father pled guilty to an additional three offenses, including another 

aggravated assault. Id. at 4-5. 

Accordingly, the record supports the conclusion of the trial court that 

Father’s incarceration renders him incapable of providing Child with essential 

parental care, control, or subsistence necessary for Child’s physical or 

mental well-being. Moreover, Father cannot, or will not, remedy his parental 

incapacity. Father has an extensive criminal history, which spans 

approximately twenty years. Father has been incarcerated since 2011, and 
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it is not clear when Father will be released. While it appears that Father has 

written letters to Child and attempted to have contact with her during his 

incarceration, these efforts do not make up for the fact that Father is either 

unwilling or incapable of curbing his criminal tendencies. It was proper for 

the court to conclude that Child should no longer be denied permanency. 

See M.E.P., 825 A.2d at 1276 (“A child's life simply cannot be put on hold in 

the hope that the parent will summon the ability to handle the 

responsibilities of parenting.”) (citations omitted).

We next consider whether the trial court abused its discretion by 

terminating Father’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(b).3 We have 

discussed our analysis under Section 2511(b) as follows.

Subsection 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of parental 

rights would best serve the developmental, physical, and 

emotional needs and welfare of the child. In In re C.M.S., 884 

A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005), this Court stated, 

“Intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability are 

involved in the inquiry into the needs and welfare of the child.” 

In addition, we instructed that the trial court must also discern 

the nature and status of the parent-child bond, with utmost 

attention to the effect on the child of permanently severing that 

bond. Id. However, in cases where there is no evidence of a 

bond between a parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no 

bond exists. In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-63 (Pa. Super. 

2008). Accordingly, the extent of the bond-effect analysis 

necessarily depends on the circumstances of the particular case. 

Id. at 63.

 

3 While Father does not discuss Section 2511(b) in the argument section of 

his brief, we will nonetheless consider this issue. See In re C.L.G., 956 

A.2d 999, 1010 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc) (considering Section 2511(b) 

despite the appellant’s failure to challenge the trial court’s analysis).
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In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. Super. 2010). 

Here, the trial court observed that Child has no relationship with 

Father. Trial Court Opinion, 10/7/2015, at 7. In contrast, the court found 

that Child has a strong bond with her foster mother, and that removing Child 

from the care of her foster mother would be contrary to Child’s best interest. 

Id. The court concluded that adoption would best serve Child’s needs and 

welfare. Id. 

We again discern no abuse of discretion. Ms. Forrest testified that 

Child has resided with the same pre-adoptive foster mother since she was 

placed in foster care in 2011. Id. at 39. Child’s siblings reside in the same 

foster home. Id. Child is “extremely bonded” to her foster mother, and 

refers to her as “mom.” Id. Ms. Forrest believed that Child would suffer 

irreparable harm if she were removed from her current placement. Id. Ms. 

Forrest indicated that she has mentioned the possibility of visiting Father to 

Child, but that Child does not express any interest in having visits. Id. at 

40-41, 47-48. Ms. Forrest reported that she provided Child with cards and 

letters from Father, and that Child was “fine with that . . . .” Id. However, 

Child has not written back to Father. Id. at 42. Ms. Forrest opined that 

Child is not bonded with Father, that Child would not suffer irreparable harm 

if Father’s parental rights are terminated, and that termination of Father’s 

parental rights would be in Child’s best interest. Id. at 45.
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Thus, the record confirms that Child is bonded with her pre-adoptive 

foster mother. In contrast, Father has not seen Child since at least 2009, 

when she was about two years old. Child has displayed no interest in 

visiting Father. It is clear that Father and Child do not share a bond, and 

that Child’s needs and welfare will best be served by terminating Father’s 

parental rights, and permitting Child to be adopted.

Accordingly, because we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion by involuntarily terminating Father’s parental rights to Child, we 

affirm the decree of the trial court pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2) and 

(b).

Decree affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/3/2016