IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 07–1634

Filed May 21, 2010

NATIONWIDE AGRI-BUSINESS INSURANCE COMPANY,

Appellant,

vs.

JIM GOODWIN, DOUG STALLEY, Personal Representative of the 

ESTATE OF KLEVER BRIONES, On Behalf of Himself and the Estate, 

and CORINA DE PALACIOS,

Appellees.

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, 

Jeffrey A. Neary, Judge.

Insurer appeals adverse summary judgment ruling holding insurer 

had coverage under its automobile liability policy for claim made against 

insured who had loaned rental vehicle to another at time of accident. 

REVERSED AND REMANDED. 

John B. Grier of The Grier Law Firm, Marshalltown, for appellant.

Jeffrey A. Sar of Baron, Sar, Goodwin, Gill & Lohr, Sioux City, for 

appellee Jim Goodwin.

James J. Biscoglia of LaMarca & Landry, P.C., Des Moines, for 

appellees Doug Stalley, Estate of Klever Briones, and Corina De Palacios.
2

TERNUS, Chief Justice.

In this declaratory judgment action, the district court ruled the 

appellant, Nationwide Agri-Business Insurance Company, had coverage 

under an automobile liability insurance policy for claims made against 

its insured, Jim Goodwin, arising out of an accident that occurred when 

Goodwin loaned a vehicle he had rented to his uncle, Jack Jolin. 

Nationwide claims on appeal there is no coverage because Goodwin was 

not “using” the vehicle at the time of the accident so as to fall within the 

definition of “insured,” and in any event, coverage was excluded by a 

provision excluding liability of an insured using a vehicle without a 

reasonable belief he is entitled to do so. Nationwide also asserts there is 

no genuine issue of material fact with respect to Goodwin’s reasonable 

expectations claim, and it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on 

that claim. We hold the exclusionary provision precludes coverage for 

the damage claims made against Goodwin, and as a matter of law, 

Goodwin’s reasonable expectations claim has no merit. Therefore, we 

reverse the district court’s summary judgment in favor of Goodwin and 

remand this case for entry of summary judgment in favor of Nationwide.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

Jim Goodwin rented an automobile from Alamo Rent-A-Car. On 

the second page of the rental contract signed by Goodwin, the following 

provision appeared: “NO ADDITIONAL DRIVERS ARE AUTHORIZED TO 

DRIVE THE VEHICE WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE DRIVERS LISTED 

BELOW.” No additional persons were listed. The “rental agreement 

jacket” contained additional terms and defined “authorized drivers” and 

“prohibited uses.” In relevant part, it stated: 

Authorized Drivers: I am the authorized driver if I 

have a valid driver’s license, am named on the front of the 

rental agreement and meet all of your rental requirements. 
3

An additional authorized driver is authorized only if they pay 

an additional driver charge and that person has a valid 

driver’s license and is named on the front. ALL OTHER 

DRIVERS ARE UNAUTHORIZED. I am responsible for any 

losses or damages which occur while the vehicle is in the 

possession of any driver. 

Prohibited Uses and Violations: The following uses of 

the Vehicle are strictly prohibited by you. The vehicle may 

not be used: 

. . . . 

(G) if the driver is anyone other than a[n] authorized 

driver . . . . 

Goodwin signed the rental agreement, stating he agreed to the terms in 

the agreement as well as the terms on the rental agreement jacket.

During the rental period, Goodwin allowed Jolin to operate the 

rental car for Jolin’s personal use. Goodwin admitted in response to 

requests for admissions that “Jack Jolin’s use of the rental vehicle was in 

violation of the terms and provisions of the rental agreement.” He also 

admitted that “[a]t the time [he] lent the vehicle to Jack Jolin, [he] did not 

believe he was authorized by the rental agreement to lend the vehicle to 

Jack Jolin.” Tragically, while Jolin was operating the rental car with 

Goodwin’s permission, Jolin struck two pedestrians, killing one, Klever 

Briones, and seriously injuring Briones’ wife, Corina De Palacios. 

Goodwin was not a passenger in the rental car at the time of the 

accident.

As a result of the accident, the injured party and the personal 

representative of the estate of the deceased party brought a claim for 

damages against Goodwin, the rental car company, Jolin, and Goodwin’s 

personal automobile insurance carrier, Nationwide. Nationwide, in turn, 

filed a petition against these parties requesting a declaratory judgment 

that it had no duty to defend or indemnify Goodwin.1

 1Nationwide also contended its policy provided no coverage to Jolin. That issue 

is not part of this appeal.

 Nationwide 
4

claimed the policy definition of “insured,” which included the named 

insured when using any auto, did not encompass Goodwin because 

Goodwin was not using the rental car when he loaned it to Jolin.2

Nationwide and Goodwin filed motions for summary judgment, 

each claiming there was no genuine dispute as to any material facts, and 

judgment should be rendered as a matter of law. The district court 

granted Goodwin’s motion for summary judgment and denied 

Nationwide’s motion. The court ruled Goodwin was using the rental 

vehicle when he loaned it to Jolin and so qualified as an insured under

the policy. The court also decided the exclusion did not apply because 

“Alamo’s provision in its agreement with Goodwin is only a means to 

protect Alamo in the case of an accident, and the provision was not 

intended to limit the scope of Goodwin’s own insurance coverage.” 

Therefore, the court concluded, “Goodwin had a reasonable belief he was 

entitled to use the car in this manner as a matter of law.” Having found 

coverage under the policy, the court did not address Goodwin’s 

reasonable expectations argument. 

Nationwide also cited an exclusion for any insured “[u]sing a vehicle 

without a reasonable belief that the ‘insured’ is entitled to do so.” In his 

answer, Goodwin relied on the doctrine of reasonable expectations, 

claiming he “reasonably expected there to be coverage for any car rented 

by him.”

Nationwide filed this appeal, arguing the district court erred in 

concluding there was coverage under its policy. Goodwin argues there is 

coverage under the terms of the policy, and in any event, he is entitled to 

 2The policy also provided coverage for an insured’s “ownership” and 

“maintenance” of any auto. Goodwin acknowledges he did not own the rental vehicle 

and was not engaged in maintenance of the vehicle at the time of the accident. 
5

coverage under the doctrine of reasonable expectations. We conclude

that, assuming Goodwin’s loaning of the vehicle to his uncle constituted 

use within the meaning of the policy definition of “insured,” the policy 

exclusion applies because, as a matter of law, Goodwin could not have 

had a reasonable belief he was entitled to use the vehicle in this manner. 

We also hold Nationwide is entitled to summary judgment on Goodwin’s 

claim based on the doctrine of reasonable expectations. For these 

reasons, we reverse the district court’s judgment and remand for entry of 

a declaratory judgment that Nationwide has no duty to defend or 

indemnify Goodwin in the suit brought against him by De Palacios and 

the Briones Estate.

II. Scope of Review.

A ruling on a motion for summary judgment is reviewed for the 

correction of errors of law. Thomas v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 749 

N.W.2d 678, 681 (Iowa 2008). “To obtain a grant of summary judgment 

on some issue in an action, the moving party must affirmatively establish 

the existence of undisputed facts entitling that party to a particular 

result under controlling law.” Interstate Power Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 

603 N.W.2d 751, 756 (Iowa 1999). 

The moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law 

“if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and 

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show 

that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact.” An 

issue of fact is “material” only when the dispute involves 

facts which might affect the outcome of the suit, given the 

applicable governing law. The requirement of a “genuine” 

issue of fact means the evidence is such that a reasonable 

jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. 

Wallace v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Dirs., 754 N.W.2d 

854, 857 (Iowa 2008) (quoting Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981(3)) (citations 

omitted). If the only conflict concerns the legal consequences flowing 
6

from undisputed facts, entry of summary judgment is appropriate. 

Garofalo v. Lambda Chi Alpha Fraternity, 616 N.W.2d 647, 650 (Iowa 

2000). 

III. Governing Legal Principles.

The crux of the disagreement in this case centers on the 

appropriate construction and interpretation of the Nationwide policy. 

The construction of an insurance policy is the process of 

determining the policy’s legal effect; interpretation is the 

process of determining the meaning of the words used in the 

policy. “When the parties offer no extrinsic evidence on the 

meaning of policy language, the interpretation and 

construction of an insurance policy are questions of law for 

the court.” 

Thomas, 749 N.W.2d at 681 (quoting Lee v. Grinnell Mut. Reins. Co., 646

N.W.2d 403, 406 (Iowa 2002)) (citation omitted). “In the construction of 

insurance policies, the cardinal principle is that the intent of the parties 

must control; and except in cases of ambiguity this is determined by 

what the policy itself says.” A.Y. McDonald Indus., Inc. v. Ins. Co. of N. 

Am., 475 N.W.2d 607, 618 (Iowa 1991). “The test for ambiguity is an 

objective one: ‘Is the language fairly susceptible to two interpretations?’ ” 

Iowa Fuel & Minerals, Inc. v. Iowa State Bd. of Regents, 471 N.W.2d 859, 

863 (Iowa 1991). “Only when the policy language is susceptible to two 

reasonable interpretations do we find an ambiguity.” Kibbee v. State 

Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 525 N.W.2d 866, 868 (Iowa 1994).

This court has held that “[a]n insurer assumes a duty to define any 

limitations or exclusionary clauses in clear and explicit terms.” Hornick

v. Owners Ins. Co., 511 N.W.2d 370, 374 (Iowa 1993). “Thus, when an 

exclusionary provision is fairly susceptible to two reasonable 

constructions, the construction most favorable to the insured will be 

adopted.” Thomas, 749 N.W.2d at 682. “Nonetheless, if there is no 
7

ambiguity, the court ‘will not “write a new contract of insurance” ’ for the 

parties.” Id. (quoting Stovers v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 189 N.W.2d 

588, 591 (Iowa 1971)) (citation omitted). “If exclusionary language is not 

defined in the policy, we give the words their ordinary meaning.” Farm & 

City Ins. Co. v. Gilmore, 539 N.W.2d 154, 157 (Iowa 1995). “An exclusion 

that is clear and unambiguous must be given effect.” Id.

IV. Policy Coverage.

Nationwide agreed to “pay damages for ‘bodily injury’ or ‘property 

damage’ for which any ‘insured’ becomes legally responsible because of 

an auto accident.” An “insured” is defined as “[y]ou or any ‘family 

member’ for the . . . use . . . of any auto.” “You” refers to “[t]he ‘named 

insured’ shown in the Declarations.” Goodwin is a “ ‘named insured’ 

shown in the Declarations.” Thus, Goodwin is an “insured” if he was 

using the auto at the time of the accident. Goodwin argues that he was 

using the rental car at the time of the accident because he “gave Jolin 

authorization and permission for [the] specific trip” that Jolin was on 

when Jolin hit the pedestrians. He asserts “[t]he word ‘use’ in [the] policy 

includes [his] act of permitting Jolin to drive the rented auto.” We 

assume, without deciding the issue, that Goodwin is correct: He was 

using the vehicle within the meaning of the insuring clause when he 

allowed Jolin to drive it.

Nationwide contends that, even if Goodwin was using the vehicle at 

the time of the accident so as to qualify as an insured, coverage is 

precluded by the following exclusion that appears in the insurance 

contract between Nationwide and Goodwin: “We do not provide Liability 

Coverage for any ‘insured’ . . . [u]sing a vehicle without a reasonable 

belief that the ‘insured’ is entitled to do so.” Nationwide asserts Goodwin 

did not have a reasonable belief that he was entitled to allow Jolin to 
8

drive the rental car. We agree the determinative issue is whether 

Goodwin had a reasonable belief he was entitled to use the vehicle in this 

manner, i.e., loan it to Jolin.

Nationwide relies on the terms of the rental car agreement to 

support its contention that Goodwin could not have reasonably believed 

he was entitled to loan the rental car to his uncle. The rental agreement 

contained the following pertinent language: 

Prohibited Uses and Violations: The following uses of 

the Vehicle are strictly prohibited by you. The vehicle may 

not be used: 

. . . . 

(G) if the driver is anyone other than a[n] authorized 

driver . . . . 

(Emphasis added.) As noted previously, it is undisputed that Jolin was 

not an authorized driver, that “Jolin’s use of the rental vehicle was in 

violation of the terms and provisions of the rental agreement,” and that 

“[a]t the time Jim Goodwin lent the vehicle to Jack Jolin, Goodwin did 

not believe he was authorized by the rental agreement to lend the vehicle 

to Jack Jolin.” Goodwin claims his noncompliance with the terms of the 

rental agreement should have no impact on his insurance coverage with 

Nationwide, as the rental agreement only governed the rights and 

responsibilities of Goodwin and Alamo as to each other. 

Although we have not previously applied the exclusion in question 

to a situation involving a rental car, we considered a nearly identical 

exclusion in Gilmore, 539 N.W.2d at 157–58, a case involving a second 

permittee. In that case, the insurer relied on a provision “stating 

coverage is not provided for any person ‘[u]sing a vehicle without a 

reasonable belief that that person is entitled to do so.’ ” 539 N.W.2d at 

157. Like the policy here, the policy at issue in Gilmore did not define 
9

the terms “entitled” or “reasonable belief.” Id. Therefore, we looked to 

the ordinary meaning of these terms and, concluding there was more 

than one reasonable interpretation, adopted the interpretation most 

favorable to the insured. Id. (concluding exclusion was ambiguous 

because “entitled” could refer to “legal right or authority” or to “ ‘consent’ 

or ‘permission’ ”). Relying on the ordinary meaning of these terms, we 

held “coverage is excluded when a person is using a vehicle without a 

reasonable belief that he or she had permission of the owner or apparent 

owner to do so.” Id. (emphasis added).

As our decision in Gilmore makes clear, whether an insured had a 

reasonable belief he was entitled to use a borrowed or rented vehicle in a 

particular way depends upon the scope of the permission given by the 

owner of the vehicle. See Van Zwol v. Branon, 440 N.W.2d 589, 593

(Iowa 1989) (rejecting “initial permission” rule, which holds “ ‘that when 

permission to use a vehicle is initially given, subsequent use short of 

actual conversion or theft, remains permissive within the meaning of the 

omnibus clause, even if such use . . . was outside any limitation placed 

upon the initial grant of permission’ ” (quoting Milbank Mut. Ins. Co. v. 

U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 332 N.W.2d 160, 162 (Minn. 1983))); cf. Grinnell 

Mut. Reins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 558 N.W.2d 176, 180–83 

(Iowa 1997) (considering permissive use under omnibus clause of 

uninsured motorist coverage); Schneberger v. Glenn, 176 N.W.2d 782, 

785 (Iowa 1970) (“Where the owner of a vehicle involved in an accident 

has specifically and expressly forbidden his first permittee to delegate 

authority for its use to anyone, then no implied authority to third parties 

or second permittees can be found.”). Here, the owner of the vehicle was 

Alamo, and therefore, we must examine the scope of Alamo’s consent to 

Goodwin’s use of the rental car to determine whether Goodwin could 
10

have reasonably believed his use here was authorized. For this reason, 

we reject Goodwin’s argument that the rental agreement is irrelevant to 

the determination of coverage under the Nationwide policy.

Goodwin also claims the exclusion is ambiguous. He argues that 

“if Nationwide intended to take away coverage for cars rented by their 

insureds when those insureds let others use them contrary to a rental 

agreement, it could have said so in clear and explicit terms.” Because 

Nationwide failed to clearly and explicitly exclude coverage for such 

situations, Goodwin asserts, “the matter must be resolved against 

Nationwide Insurance as a matter of law.” Similarly, he cites to 

Nationwide’s failure to define “reasonable belief” or “entitled,” asserting 

nothing could be “more ambiguous [than] to not define the terms of an 

exclusion.” 

These arguments misperceive the legal principles governing the 

interpretation of ambiguous policy provisions. The fact that an exclusion 

could be more specifically tailored to a particular set of facts does not 

mean the insurer cannot rely on a generally worded exclusion that 

encompasses various factual scenarios. In addition, the rule that 

ambiguities must be resolved against the insurer is not applied in a 

vacuum. A court interpreting and applying an ambiguous exclusion 

must give the terms of the exclusion their common meaning and adopt 

that interpretation of the exclusion most favorable to the insured. Here, 

the only alternative interpretation suggested by Goodwin is that 

“[p]erhaps the exclusion was only intended to apply to actual operators.” 

But Goodwin has failed to identify what language in the exclusionary 

provision can reasonably be interpreted to support such a limited 

application of the exclusion. In fact, the exclusion applies to an 

“insured” using the vehicle, and the term “insured” is defined in the 
11

policy to include the named insured––Goodwin. In summary, Goodwin 

has failed to identify a reasonable interpretation of the exclusionary 

language that is more favorable to an insured than the meaning we gave 

to this provision in Gilmore. Therefore, Goodwin’s claim for coverage 

must be judged against this meaning: “coverage is excluded when a 

person is using a vehicle without a reasonable belief that he or she had 

permission of the owner or apparent owner to do so.”3

Turning to the facts of the present case, we think the conclusion is 

inescapable that Goodwin could not have reasonably believed that he 

was entitled to use the vehicle in the manner he did, i.e., loaning the 

vehicle to an unauthorized driver. Goodwin did not own the vehicle Jolin 

was driving at the time of the accident, and so Goodwin did not 

necessarily have the full array of rights that accompany ownership. 

Goodwin’s rights to the vehicle were obtained from Alamo. Therefore, we 

look to the rental agreement to determine the scope of Goodwin’s right to 

use the vehicle, as the rental agreement defined the parameters of the 

permissive use granted to Goodwin by Alamo. As this agreement made 

clear, Goodwin did not have Alamo’s permission to loan the vehicle to an 

unauthorized driver. In other words, Goodwin was not entitled to loan 

the rental car to Jolin because he did not have “permission of the owner 

. . . to do so.” Id. 

 Gilmore, 539 

N.W.2d at 157.

 3The Briones Estate and De Palacios argue coverage would be lost under this 

interpretation of the policy should a lessee use a valet parking service at a hotel or 

restaurant. Although we do not decide whether the posited situation would be covered, 

we note the brief surrender of the vehicle to another for purposes of valet parking is 

qualitatively different from loaning the vehicle to another person for that person’s use. 

Hence, whether an insured might reasonably believe he was entitled to allow another 

person to park his rental car for him poses a different question than the issue

presented here.
12

We also conclude that to the extent Goodwin believed he could let 

unauthorized persons drive the rental car under circumstances such as 

those presented here, such a belief was not reasonable. As Goodwin

readily admitted, Jolin’s operation of the rental vehicle violated the 

restrictions placed on Goodwin’s use of the vehicle by its owner. More 

importantly, Goodwin admitted he did not believe he was authorized by 

the rental company to loan the vehicle to Jolin. Based on these 

undisputed facts, we do not think a reasonable jury could find that

Goodwin had a reasonable belief he was entitled to loan the vehicle to 

Jolin. Therefore, as a matter of law, the exclusion applies, and coverage 

is precluded.

V. Reasonable Expectations.

Goodwin contends that, even if coverage does not exist under the 

terms of the policy, he is entitled to coverage under the doctrine of 

reasonable expectations. This doctrine applies “if the exclusion (1) is 

bizarre or oppressive, (2) eviscerates terms explicitly agreed to, or (3) 

eliminates the dominant purpose of the transaction.” Farm Bureau Mut. 

Ins. Co. v. Sandbulte, 302 N.W.2d 104, 112 (Iowa 1981). “However, as a 

prerequisite to the applicability of this doctrine, the insured must prove 

‘circumstances attributable to the insurer that fostered coverage 

expectations’ or show that ‘the policy is such that an ordinary layperson 

would misunderstand its coverage.’ ” LeMars Mut. Ins. Co. v. Joffer, 574 

N.W.2d 303, 311 (Iowa 1998) (quoting Benavides v. J.C. Penney Life Ins. 

Co., 539 N.W.2d 352, 357 (Iowa 1995)); accord Monroe County v. Int’l Ins. 

Co., 609 N.W.2d 522, 526 (Iowa 2000) (noting reasonable expectations 

doctrine “is a narrow doctrine that is primarily employed when the 

insurance coverage provided eviscerates terms explicitly agreed to or is 
13

manifestly inconsistent with the purpose of the transaction for which the 

insurance was purchased”).

In the summary judgment proceedings, Goodwin filed his own 

affidavit that set forth his expectations of coverage. He did not, however, 

reveal any statements or other circumstances attributable to Nationwide, 

other than the policy provisions discussed above, that fostered his 

coverage expectations. See Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Corrigan, 697 

N.W.2d 108, 118 (Iowa 2005) (rejecting reasonable expectations 

argument in part because there was no evidence of any conduct by the 

insurer that generated an expectation of coverage by the insured). 

Focusing, then, on the policy itself, we think an ordinary layperson 

would not misunderstand the coverage provided, and limited, by these 

policy provisions. See Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co. v. Chubb Custom Ins. 

Co., 780 N.W.2d 735, 743 (Iowa 2010) (rejecting reasonable expectations 

argument, concluding “the clarity of the exclusions in question” 

supported the conclusion “a reasonable person could not have 

understood coverage would exist”). 

Goodwin does not identify in his affidavit any way in which he 

misunderstood the policy exclusion. He merely quotes the insuring 

clause from the policy and then states that he “expect[ed] that this 

language means just what it says.” But insurance policy provisions are 

not interpreted in isolation. See Thomas, 749 N.W.2d at 682; Grinnell 

Mut. Reins. Co. v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co., 494 N.W.2d 690, 692 (Iowa 

1993), called into doubt on other grounds by Corrigan, 697 N.W.2d at 113 

n.1. The insuring clause must be read in conjunction with the policy 

exclusions. Cf. Harlan v. Valley Ins. Co., 875 P.2d 471, 472–73 (Or. Ct. 

App. 1994) (holding in determining whether driver was insured under 

terms of policy, exclusion of person using vehicle without a reasonable 
14

belief person was entitled to do so must be considered). If the policy is 

not considered as a whole, exclusions would never be enforceable 

because by definition exclusions limit the coverage that would otherwise 

be provided by the insuring clause. Goodwin’s abstract understanding 

that any use of the rental vehicle by him would be covered by the policy 

does not give rise to reasonable expectations of coverage. See Essex Ins. 

Co. v. Fieldhouse, Inc., 506 N.W.2d 772, 777 (Iowa 1993) (holding 

insured’s “general assertion that it expected a liability policy to cover 

such negligent acts [as insured was alleged to have committed]” would 

not support application of reasonable expectations doctrine). Therefore, 

as a matter of law, Goodwin is not entitled to coverage under this theory. 

See Shelter Gen. Ins. Co. v. Lincoln, 590 N.W.2d 726, 729 (Iowa 1999) 

(holding when insured has failed to show circumstances attributable to 

the insurer that fostered coverage expectations or that an ordinary 

layperson would misunderstand the exclusion, summary judgment 

against the insured is appropriate). 

VI. Summary and Disposition.

There is no dispute that Goodwin’s loaning of the rental vehicle to 

his uncle was prohibited by the owner of the vehicle. There is also no

disagreement that Goodwin knew this use of the rental vehicle was 

unauthorized. We conclude there is no genuine issue that Goodwin did 

not have a reasonable belief he was entitled to use the rental vehicle by 

loaning it to an unauthorized driver. Therefore, as a matter of law, there 

is no coverage under the Nationwide policy due to the exclusion of 

coverage when the insured is “[u]sing a vehicle without a reasonable 

belief that the ‘insured’ is entitled to do so.”

In addition, Goodwin has failed to place in the record any facts 

that would support coverage under the doctrine of reasonable 
15

expectations. He has identified no conduct attributable to Nationwide 

that fostered coverage expectations under the circumstances presented 

here, nor has he convincingly explained how an ordinary layperson 

reading the pertinent policy provisions would misunderstand the 

coverage provided. Therefore, as a matter of law, he cannot rely on the 

doctrine of reasonable expectations. 

The district court erred in granting Goodwin’s motion for summary 

judgment and in denying Nationwide’s motion for summary judgment. 

We reverse the district court’s judgment in favor of Goodwin and remand 

this case for entry of a declaratory judgment that Nationwide has no duty 

to defend or indemnify Goodwin for the claims arising out of Jolin’s use 

of the vehicle Goodwin rented from Alamo.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.