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ASH 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Emily Noelle Mihaylo, et al., 

Petitioners, 

v. 

Shane Russell-Jenkins, et al., 

Respondents. 

No. CV 18-08004-PCT-GMS (JZB) 

ORDER 

On January 11, 2018, James Joseph Knochel filed, as “next friend” of Petitioner 

Emily Noelle Mihaylo, a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254 (Doc. 1), paid the filing fee, and sought a Temporary Restraining Order and “ExParte Evidentiary Hearing” (Doc. 2), as well as the appointment of counsel (Doc. 3). Mr. 

Knochel alleged that Petitioner had been ordered into treatment at a mental health 

facility, that she was being compulsorily medicated, and that the medications were 

making her condition worse but that she was being “brainwash[ed]... into thinking she’s 

benefitting from her treatment.” (Doc. 1 at 24).1

 On January 24, 2018, Petitioner sent a 

letter (Doc. 8) to the Court — which the Clerk of Court has docketed as a Motion to 

Dismiss (Doc. 8) — stating that 

“at no time did I file this claim and I would like it to be removed. I believe 

that my ex-boyfriend used my information to file this claim. The reason he 

 

1

 The Petition also alleges that Petitioner’s mental illness should be a bar to her 

recent conviction for the “strict liability offense” of drug possession (Doc. 1 at 26), that 

her bail was excessive (Id. at 27), and that her attorney provided ineffective assistance 

(Id. at 30). 
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filed this claim is unknown to me. Moving forward[,] I would like to have this case dismissed, thrown out, and terminated all together.” 

On January 26, 2018, Mr. Knochel filed a “Response” to the Motion, suggesting 

that the Motion had not been written by Petitioner, or at least not by her “of her own free 

will,” and that the Motion otherwise is “evidence of [Petitioner’s] status as a vulnerable 

person, and as further justification for the necessity of appointed counsel for Mihaylo.” 

(Doc. 9). 

 Under Article III, a federal court cannot consider the merits of a legal claim unless 

the person seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of the court establishes the requisite standing 

to sue. Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 154 (1990). A litigant demonstrates 

standing by showing that she has suffered an injury in fact that is fairly traceable to the 

challenged action and is redressable by a favorable judicial decision. Steel Company v. 

Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, ___, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 1017 (1998). 

 The Supreme Court recognized in Whitmore that a habeas petitioner may 

demonstrate standing as a “next friend.” 495 U.S. at 163. A next friend does not himself 

become a party to the habeas petition, “but simply pursues the cause on behalf of the 

detained person, who remains the real party in interest.” Id. The Court set out “at least 

two firmly rooted prerequisites to ‘next friend’ standing”: 

First, a next friend must provide an adequate explanation—such as inaccessibility, mental incompetence, or other disability—why the real party in interest cannot appear on his own behalf to prosecute the action. Second, the next friend must be truly dedicated to the best interests of the 

person on whose behalf he seeks to litigate and it has been further 

suggested that a next friend must have some significant relationship with the real party in interest. The burden is on the next friend clearly to establish the propriety of his status and thereby justify the jurisdiction of the court. 

Id. at 163–64 (citations omitted). 

 Given the conflicting accounts between Mr. Knochel’s filings and Petitioner’s 

Motion to Dismiss, Mr. Knochel has failed to establish that he should be allowed to bring 

this action as Petitioner’s “next friend.” That is, Mr. Knochel has not presented sufficient 

evidence to support that Petitioner is unable to appear on her own behalf to prosecute this 
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action; indeed, it appears that Petitioner is capable of appearing on her own behalf, as 

evidence by the Motion to Dismiss. Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 164–166; Demosthenes v. 

Baal, 495 U.S. 731, 736-37 (1990). Further, given that Petitioner herself has indicated 

that she has no interest in this action or, it seems, with Mr. Knochel, he has failed to 

clearly establish the propriety of his status vis a vis Petitioner so as to justify this Court’s 

jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss the Petition and this action without 

prejudice. If Petitioner wishes to bring her own habeas action in the future, she remains 

free to do so. 

 IT IS ORDERED:

(1) The Petition for Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) and this case are dismissed 

without prejudice. The Clerk of Court must enter judgment accordingly and close this 

case. 

 (2) The “Motion for Ex-Parte Evidentiary Hearing in Support of ‘Next Friend,’ 

and for a Temporary Restraining Order” (Doc. 2), Motion for Appointment of Counsel 

(Doc. 3) and Motion to Dismiss Case (Doc. 8) are denied as moot. 

(3) Pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, in the 

event Petitioner files an appeal, the Court declines to issue a certificate of appealability 

because reasonable jurists would not find the Court’s procedural ruling debatable. See 

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). 

Dated this 7th day of February, 2018. 

Honorable G. Murray Snow

United States District Judge