[Cite as State v. Gaskins, 2012-Ohio-2699.]

STATE OF OHIO, MAHONING COUNTY 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

SEVENTH DISTRICT 

STATE OF OHIO, 

 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, 

V. 

ROGER GASKINS, 

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

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 CASE NO. 11 MA 4 

OPINION 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS: Criminal Appeal from Mahoning County 

Area Court #5, Mahoning County, Ohio 

Case No. 10CRB371 

JUDGMENT: Reversed 

Conviction vacated 

APPEARANCES: 

For Plaintiff-Appellee Attorney Mark R. Fortunato 

3296 Stones Throw Avenue 

Poland, Ohio 44514 

For Defendant-Appellant Roger Gaskins, Pro-se 

143 S. Elm Street 

Columbiana, Ohio 44408 

JUDGES: 

Hon. Gene Donofrio 

Hon. Joseph J. Vukovich 

Hon. Cheryl L. Waite 

 

 

 Dated: June 12, 2012 
[Cite as State v. Gaskins, 2012-Ohio-2699.]

DONOFRIO, J. 

{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Roger Gaskins, appeals from a Mahoning County 

Area Court #5 judgment affirming his conviction for failing to comply with the City of 

Canfield Property Maintenance Code. 

{¶2} Appellant owns rental property in the City of Canfield at 22 Hood Drive. 

On June 20, 2010, Joseph Warino, the City Manager, issued a citation stating that 

appellant violated the city’s property maintenance code ordinance “by allowing 

conditions of exterior property areas [to] deteriorate the appearance of the 

neighborhood.” Exactly when appellant received this notice is not entirely clear. 

{¶3} The matter proceeded in the Mayor’s Court. The Mayor found appellant 

guilty of the alleged violation. 

{¶4} Appellant appealed the Mayor’s decision to the trial court. There he 

argued that the city failed to provide him with notice of the alleged violation. 

{¶5} The matter proceeded to a de novo trial. The court found that the city 

provided appellant with proper notice as to the existence of the alleged property 

maintenance code violation and that appellant’s wife provided appellant’s residential 

address to the city where further notice was sent. As such, the court found that the 

city was entitled to assess the lawn cutting costs against appellant’s Hood Drive 

property. It ordered that upon the city’s recoupment of the lawn cutting costs, the 

underlying minor misdemeanor citation would be dismissed. 

{¶6} Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on January 3, 2011. 

{¶7} Appellant raises two assignments of error, the first of which states: 

 THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED APPELLANT’S RIGHT 

TO DUE PROCESS UNDER THE U.S. AND OHIO 

CONSTITUTIONS BY FINDING THAT THE CITY OF CANFIELD 

HAD ISSUED THE PROPER NOTICE REQUIRED TO 

SUBJECT THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT TO THE 

REQUIREMENTS OF THE CITY’S PROPERTY MAINTENANCE 

ORDINANCE. 

{¶8} Canfield City Ordinance 1387.21, titled “NOTICE OF VIOLATION: 
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LEGAL SERVICE,” provides in pertinent part: 

(a) Whenever the City Manager or other designated official 

finds any dwelling structure or premises, or any part thereof, to 

be in violation of the provisions of this Code, the City Manager or 

other designated official shall give or cause to be given or mailed 

to the owner, agent or operator of such structure or premises a 

written notice stating the violation. Such notice shall order the 

owner, agent or operator within the stated reasonable time but 

not less than five days, to repair or improve the structure or 

premises concerned. Such delivery or mailing shall be deemed 

legal service of notice. Upon receipt of a written objection within 

the stated time period, the City Manager or other designated 

official may extend the time for compliance until such objection 

has been considered. In the event of non-compliance after five 

days, or any extension thereof granted by the City Manager, the 

City may pursue remedial action * * *. 

(b) If the owner or other person having charge of the land is a 

nonresident of the City whose address is known, the notice shall 

be sent to that address by certified mail. If the address of the 

owner or other person having charge of the land is unknown, it is 

sufficient to publish the notice once in a newspaper of general 

circulation in the County. (Emphasis added.) 

{¶9} Appellant argues that because he does not reside within the Canfield 

city limits, the City Manager was required to serve him notice by certified mail. He 

states that his residence, while it does have a Canfield mailing address, is outside the 

city limits. He claims that he did not receive proper notice. Had he received proper 

notice, appellant states, he would have cut his grass immediately. Instead, he claims 

he was denied the opportunity to rectify the problem with the Hood Drive grass and 
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was instead subject to the instant case against him. 

{¶10} Appellant further argues that the City Manager’s notice that was sent to 

“Amanda Gaskins” at his Lisbon Street address was not sufficient. First, he points 

out that the notice must be sent to the property owner or to a person having charge 

of the property. He states that his wife, Amanda Frost, neither owns nor is in charge 

of the Hood Drive property. Second, he notes that the notice was not sent by 

certified mail. And third, he points out that the City Manager testified the notice was 

sent to Amanda Gaskins on the same day that he sent the crew to mow the grass, 

thereby depriving appellant of the opportunity to remedy the situation. 

{¶11} Pursuant to the city’s ordinance, if the owner of the property at issue 

resides outside the city limits, the City Manager must give notice of a citation by 

either certified mail or publication. If the owner resides within the city limits, notice 

may be sent by regular mail. 

{¶12} As to the issue of service of the citation, City Manager Joseph Warino 

stated that he first sent a letter to 22 Hood Drive, but there was no response. (Tr. 8). 

Warino stated that he waited approximately one month and then dispatched a crew 

to cut the grass. (Tr. 8). That same day, Warino stated, appellant’s wife called and 

asked Warino to provide her with a copy of the notice to another address. (Tr. 8). 

Subsequently, Warino stated, he mailed a copy to the address provided by 

appellant’s wife, 10534 Lisbon Road. (Tr. 9). 

{¶13} Warino agreed with appellant that appellant was not a resident of the 

city at the Hood Drive address. (Tr. 11-12). He also testified that he did not publish a 

notice in any newspapers. (Tr. 12). 

{¶14} Appellant testified the notice that was sent to Lisbon Road was sent to 

“Amanda Gaskins” and it was not sent by certified mail. (Tr. 13). He stated that his 

wife’s name is “Amanda Frost” and she does not own or maintain the Hood Drive 

property. (Tr. 13). Appellant testified that the Lisbon Road address is a Canfield 

mailing address located in Green Township. (Tr. 13). 

{¶15} Given the above evidence, the city did not issue appellant proper notice 
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of the citation. Appellant testified that while his mailing address is a Canfield 

address, it is actually located in Green Township. And Warino agreed that appellant 

was not a city resident at the Hood Drive address. Thus, the city should have given 

notice to appellant by certified mail or by publication. 

{¶16} Appellant apparently received notice at some point. Although he takes 

issue with the fact that notice was sent to his wife, who does not own the Hood Drive 

property, and the fact that the notice was sent by regular mail, he must have received 

it because he appeared in the Mayor’s Court to defend himself. However, this notice 

was too late. Warino testified that he sent the notice to Lisbon Road on the same 

day he dispatched crews to cut the Hood Drive grass. Thus, appellant was denied 

the five-day opportunity to remedy the problem himself or to object to the citation. 

{¶17} Moreover, the city seems to admit that it did not provide notice in 

accordance with the ordinance. In its brief, it states that the notice “was sufficient, 

hypertechnicalities aside” and “any technical error by the City” cannot be considered 

fundamental. (Appellee’s Brief p. 9). 

{¶18} The notice ordinance sets out how notice is to be given. The city was 

required to technically follow its own ordinance. It failed to do so. 

{¶19} Accordingly, appellant’s first assignment of error has merit. 

{¶20} Appellant’s second assignment of error states: 

 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY MAKING A FINDING OF 

GUILTY THAT WAS MANIFESTLY AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF 

THE EVIDENCE. 

{¶21} Due to the merit of appellant’s first assignment of error, his second 

assignment of error is now moot. 

{¶22} For the reasons stated above, the trial court’s judgment is hereby 
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reversed and appellant’s conviction is vacated. 

Vukovich, J., concurs. 

Waite, P.J., concurs.