Filed 7/26/21 P. v. Sandoval CA4/1

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COURT OF APPEAL FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

VICTOR SANDOVAL,

Defendant and Appellant.

 D077538

 (Super. Ct. No. SCN403638)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, 

Brad A. Weinreb, Judge. Affirmed and remanded with directions.

Russell S. Babcock, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for the 

Defendant and Appellant. 

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters and Julie L. 

Garland, Assistant Attorneys General, Steve Oetting and Heather Bushman

Arambarri, Deputy Attorneys General, for the Plaintiff and Respondent. 

A jury convicted Victor Sandoval of arson. (Pen. Code,1 § 451.) The 

court sentenced him to three years’ probation and ordered him to pay certain

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2

fines, fees and assessments, starting one year after sentencing at $35 per 

month.

Sandoval contends: (1) insufficient evidence supported his arson 

conviction; (2) his counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object 

to certain testimony; (3) the court erroneously failed to order a mental 

competency examination under section 1368 despite signs that he was 

mentally ill; (4) the court erroneously instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 

372 regarding flight; and (5) the court erroneously imposed the fines, fees and 

assessments without determining his ability to pay them, in violation of his 

constitutional rights and under People v. Duenas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157.

We affirm the judgment and remand with directions set forth below.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In August 2019, a woman saw Sandoval carrying “an armful of 

branches” near a wooded area. She watched him for approximately five 

minutes as he added leaves from one pile of branches to another. She saw 

smoke and flames rise from one pile. She called 911. 

Another passerby noticed smoke rising from some nearby trees and saw

Sandoval moving away from the area. The man videotaped Sandoval, and 

asked if he had started the fire. Sandoval denied doing so. Afterwards, 

Sandoval walked away and “was being casual like nothing happened.” The 

man called 911. He also extinguished the fire. The video recording was 

played for the jury.

An Oceanside Police Department arson detective who investigated the 

fire described the surrounding area as “about a ten-acre preserve area where 

there’s just nothing built on it. In close proximity, you have a lot of homes. 

On any given corner, you have multifamily homes, single-family homes. Very 

dry wooded area. A lot of under—undergrowth that’s dead, easily 
3

combustible, and it could easily be set on fire.” The detective testified that a

charred tree trunk indicated this incident involved not “just the smoldering 

fire. It was a fire that was burning quite well.” 

The Defense Case

At trial, Sandoval was asked if he “intentionally” started the fire, and 

he replied, “Yeah,” explaining that his “goal was to smell that church-type of

smell” by putting eucalyptus branches on the fire to “get an incense effect.” 

Sandoval testified: “I was careful because I was thinking to myself that I 

could have burned acres, create damage or—so I clean around the—around 

the tree like eight-feet [sic] radius, and then I started a fire.” Defense counsel 

asked Sandoval, “Why did you select to start [the fire] next to a tree?” He 

replied, “Because that tree would help me to avoid the—the wind, because I 

checked the direction of the wind and the wind was heading—it was blowing 

towards east, and then the tree was—was blocking me from the fire to 

spread.” He added, “And so I was kind of supervising the fire.” Sandoval 

testified he extinguished the fire by stepping on it. But he acknowledged the 

fire was still smoking when he walked away: “I just put it out and then I 

walked away. And then when I walked away, I saw this man videotaping . . .

me and asking me: [‘]Did you start a fire?[’] And I said [‘]no,[’] because there 

was no more fire.” Sandoval said he did not have to answer the man, who

was not an “officer or anything like that.”

In closing, defense counsel argued Sandoval was not guilty of arson but 

rather of the lesser included offense of unlawfully starting a fire: “[Sandoval] 

told the officer that he set the fire to smell eucalyptus because that has a 

spiritual effect on him. And Mr. Sandoval did so recklessly. He did not do it 

with a malicious intent. He did not do it with a wrongful intent. When he set 

that pile of brush on fire to smell the eucalyptus, he got his spiritual effect, 
4

and then he believed he put out the fire and he walked away.” Defense 

counsel added: “Even though [Sandoval] cleared that area, he ignored the 

risk because he went ahead and he started the fire. And ignoring the risk is 

a gross deviation from what a reasonable person would do.”

DISCUSSION

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence Challenge

Sandoval contends insufficient evidence supported his arson conviction: 

“The crux of the issue in this case is that while [Sandoval] did intend to burn 

eucalyptus leaves, there is no evidence that he intended the fire to spread out 

to burn forest land or woods. . . . [H]ere, there is a complete absence of 

malice because the uncontroverted evidence is that [he] only attempted to 

burn eucalyptus leaves, attempting to extinguish them after his ceremony, 

and he did not intentionally do damage to the woodlands.” He further 

requests that this court “consider exercising its discretion” and reduce his 

conviction to the lesser included offense of unlawfully causing a fire to forest 

land. (§ 452.)

A. Applicable Law

“ ‘In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine 

“whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements 

of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] ‘ “[O]ur role 

on appeal is a limited one.” [Citation.] Under the substantial evidence rule, 

we must presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact that 

the trier of fact could reasonably have deduced from the evidence. [Citation.] 

Thus, if the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, the 

opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also reasonably 
5

be reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant reversal of the 

judgment.’ ” (In re V.V. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1020, 1026.)

“A person is guilty of arson when he or she willfully and maliciously 

sets fire to or burns or causes to be burned . . . any structure, forest land, or 

property.” (§ 451.) Arson requires only a general criminal intent; “the 

specific intent to set fire to or burn or cause to be burned the relevant 

structure or forest land is not an element of arson.” (People v. Atkins (2001) 

25 Cal.4th 76, 84.) Thus, there must be a general intent to willfully commit 

the act of setting on fire under such circumstances that the direct, natural, 

and highly probable consequences would be the burning of the relevant 

structure or property. (In re V.V., supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 1029.) In the 

context of arson, the definition of “maliciously” does not require a “specific 

intent to do a further act or achieve a future consequence.” (Id. at p. 1027.) 

Rather, “arson’s ‘willful and malice requirement ensures that the setting of 

the fire must be a deliberate and intentional act, as distinguished from an 

accidental or unintentional ignition or act of setting a fire.’ ” (Id. at p. 1029.) 

“[M]alice will be presumed or implied from the deliberate and intentional 

ignition or act of setting a fire without a legal justification, excuse, or claim of 

right.”2 (Id. at p. 1028.)

2 The court instructed the jury on arson with CALCRIM No. 1515: “To 

prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant set fire to or burned forest land; [¶] AND [¶] 2. He acted 

willfully and maliciously. [¶] To set fire to or burn means to damage or 

destroy with fire either all or part of something, no matter how small the 

part. [¶] Someone commits an act willfully when he or she does it willingly 

or on purpose. [¶] Someone acts maliciously when he or she intentionally 

does a wrongful act or when he or she acts with the unlawful intent to 

defraud, annoy, or injure someone else. [¶] Forest land means brush-covered

land, cut-over land, forest, grasslands, or woods.”
6

B. Analysis

As set forth above, substantial evidence showed that Sandoval

intentionally started the fire. He testified to doing so. Further, a witness 

saw him adding leaves to a fire. Another witness videotaped Sandoval as he 

was leaving the area, and captured his denial that he had started the fire. 

The detective testified the fire was burning “quite well,” and posed a threat to 

the neighborhood. Based on this evidence and the court’s instructions, the 

jury could reasonably conclude that the malice element was met here because

Sandoval did not ignite the fire accidentally or unintentionally. (In re V.V. 

supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 1029.) His claim that he did not intend to set the 

woodlands on fire is unavailing, as arson does not require the specific intent 

“to do a further act or to achieve a future consequence.” (People v. Booker

(2011) 51 Cal.4th 141, 177.) 

For the same reason, we decline Sandoval’s invitation to reduce his 

conviction to the lesser included offense.3 The jury evaluated the evidence 

and court instructions and declined to find that he acted merely recklessly 

and unintentionally when he set the fire and walked away while it was still 

smoking. (Accord, In re V.V., supra, 51 Cal.4th at pp. 1032-1033; People v. 

3 The court instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 1532 about the crime 

of unlawfully causing a fire under section 452: “A person acts recklessly 

when (1) he or she is aware that his or her actions present a substantial and 

unjustifiable risk of causing a fire, (2) he or she ignores that risk, and (3) 

ignoring the risk is a gross deviation from what a reasonable person would 

have done in the same situation. [¶] To set fire to or burn means to damage 

or destroy with fire either all or part of something, no matter how small the 

part. [¶] Forest land means brush-covered land, cut-over land, forest, 

grasslands, or woods. [¶] Property means personal property or land other 

than forest land. [¶] Arson and unlawfully causing a fire require different 

mental states. For arson, a person must act willfully and maliciously. For 

unlawfully causing a fire, a person must act recklessly.”
7

Green (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 369, 379.) We have no basis for rejecting the 

jury’s verdict based on the trial record.

II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim

Sandoval contends he received ineffective assistance of counsel, who 

failed to object to the arson detective’s testimony regarding a whiskey can 

that appeared like a Molotov cocktail and was found near the fire.

A. Background

On direct examination, the detective testified regarding the can that 

“there was some stuffing material that was sticking out of [the can] as if it 

was being turned into maybe a makeshift Molotov cocktail.” He described 

such an item as “some combustible material fluid that’s placed in some type 

of container with a fuse attached to it that . . . you could light the fuse and, 

when you throw the bottle or container, the material or the fluids,

combustible material could be gas. It could be just about anything that is on 

fire. When it hits, it sprays around and starts a quick fire.”

On cross-examination, defense counsel asked the detective about the 

can:

“[Defense Counsel:] And you described a whiskey container that was 

empty; is that correct?

“[The Detective:] Yes.

“[Defense Counsel:] And as far as you know, that whiskey container 

was not used to start the particular fire that is being discussed today; is that 

correct?

“[The Detective:] As far as I know, it had no use in the fire.”

B. Applicable Law

To prove counsel provided ineffective assistance, a defendant must 

show both that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of 
8

reasonableness under prevailing professional norms, and the deficient 

performance prejudiced him. (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 

687.) “Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential. 

It is all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel’s assistance 

after conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, 

examining counsel’s defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that 

a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable. [Citation.] A fair 

assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to 

eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances 

of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s 

perspective at the time. Because of the difficulties inherent in making the 

evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct 

falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” (Id. at p. 

689.) We accord great deference to counsel’s tactical decisions. (People v. 

Jones (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1229, 1254.)

“Defendant must also show that if counsel’s performance fell below 

acceptable standards in some respect, a reasonable probability exists that a 

more favorable outcome would have been reached absent the deficient 

performance. [Citation.] That probability must be one sufficient to 

undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial.” (People v. Karis (1988) 46 

Cal.3d 612, 656.) In considering a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, it 

is not necessary to determine “ ‘whether counsel’s performance was deficient 

before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the 

alleged deficiencies . . . . If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim 

on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, 

that course should be followed.’ ” (In re Fields (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1063, 1079, 

quoting Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 697.) 
9

C. Analysis

We dispose of this argument on the ground that Sandoval has failed to 

show prejudice. Defense counsel on cross-examination specifically raised the 

issue of the whiskey can and the detective confirmed that it was not used to

start the fire. With that strategy, defense counsel highlighted for the jury 

that the reference to Molotov cocktails was immaterial to the facts of this 

case. Therefore, counsel blunted any prejudice that the Molotov cocktail 

reference might have presented. In light of the ample evidence set forth 

above that Sandoval started the fire intentionally, he has not shown that he 

would have received a different result absent the detective’s challenged 

testimony; therefore, this claim fails.

III. Mental Competency Hearing

Sandoval contends the trial court violated his state and federal 

constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial by failing to sua sponte 

order a mental competency hearing under section 1368 despite the fact he 

showed “strong signs during the trial that [he] was suffering from a mental 

disease or impairment that would have made it impossible for him to assist 

in his defense.” He alternatively contends his counsel provided ineffective 

assistance by failing to request a mental competency hearing.

A. Background

Sandoval bases his claims on two statements he made during his 

testimony: First, he said: “I started [the fire] in order for me to show people 

how to bring the Holy Spirit down, you know, trying to burn—make fire and 

suffocate it with green eucalyptus and make the neighborhood smell like—

holy smokes, you know, like it has an effect on me that creates a—makes me 

believe that Holy Spirit comes down to us and helps us out.”
10

Second, Sandoval said he used eucalyptus leaves because “[t]hat’s how 

you—how you get the smell on—out of—smells like church, cause you’ve 

got—you got to add the green leaves of eucalyptus on top of the fire, so it’ll 

get like oil out of those leaves and bring some like brown smoke, and that’s 

the one that creates the odor of the Holy Spirit.”

Third, Sandoval relies on his manner of greeting the judge at the 

March 9, 2020 sentencing hearing: “Your Honor—a warm physical and 

spiritual manner, I would have burned bridges to recovery. Anyways, I need 

a decision that you make in this case will be the right [sic].”

B. Applicable Law

“[T]he conviction of an accused when he is legally incompetent violates 

due process.” (People v. Medina (1990) 51 Cal.3d 870, 881.) “[A] competency 

hearing is required whenever substantial evidence of the accused’s 

incompetence has been introduced.” (Id. at p. 882.) “A defendant is mentally 

incompetent . . . if, as a result of a mental health disorder or developmental 

disability, the defendant is unable to understand the nature of the criminal 

proceedings or to assist counsel in the conduct of a defense in a rational 

manner.” (§ 1367, subd. (a).) “It shall be presumed that the defendant is 

mentally competent unless it is proved by a preponderance of the evidence 

that the defendant is mentally incompetent.” (§ 1369, subd. (f).)

“When . . . a competency hearing has already been held and the 

defendant was found to be competent to stand trial, a trial court is not 

required to conduct a second competency hearing unless ‘it “is presented with 

a substantial change of circumstances or with new evidence” ’ that gives rise 

to a ‘serious doubt’ about the validity of the competency finding.” (People v.

Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 33.) “More is required than just bizarre actions 

or statements by the defendant to raise a doubt of competency.” (Ibid.) “[A] 
11

reviewing court generally gives great deference to a trial court’s decision 

whether to hold a competency hearing.” (Ibid.) “ ‘ “An appellate court is in 

no position to appraise a defendant’s conduct in the trial court as indicating 

insanity, a calculated attempt to feign insanity and delay the proceedings, or 

sheer temper.” ’ ” (Ibid.)

If a doubt arises in the mind of the judge as to the mental competence 

of the defendant, he or she shall state that doubt on the record and inquire of 

defense counsel whether counsel believes the defendant is mentally 

competent. (§ 1368, subd. (a).) “ ‘Evidence of incompetence may emanate 

from several sources, including the defendant’s demeanor, irrational 

behavior, and prior mental evaluations.’ ” (People v. Murdoch (2011) 194 

Cal.App.4th 230, 236; see People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 847.) But to 

be entitled to a competency hearing, a defendant must exhibit more than a 

preexisting psychiatric condition that has little bearing on the question of 

whether the defendant can assist defense counsel. (In re Sims (2018) 27 

Cal.App.5th 195, 208.)

A defense counsel’s failure to move for a competency hearing may 

violate the defendant’s right to effective assistance “when ‘there are sufficient 

indicia of incompetence to give objectively reasonable counsel reason to doubt 

the defendant’s competency, and there is a reasonable probability that the 

defendant would have been found incompetent to stand trial had the issue 

been raised and fully considered.’ ” (Stanley v. Cullen (9th Cir. 2011) 633 

F.3d 852, 862.) However, an attorney “is not ineffective for failing to raise 

the issue of competence where there may be some evidence raising a doubt, 

but that evidence is not substantial.” (People v. Mickel (2016) 2 Cal.5th 181, 

200.) C. Analysis
12

Contrary to Sandoval’s argument, his challenged statements made 

during the trial regarding the Holy Spirit and his wish to elicit the smell of 

church do not provide substantial evidence of his mental incompetency.

Although bizarre or seemingly irrelevant comments may indicate some form 

of mental illness, they do not necessarily indicate incompetency for trial 

purposes. (People v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, 1064.) “Bizarre 

statements or actions, taken in isolation, do not require a court to hold a

competency hearing.” (In re Sims, supra, 27 Cal.App.5th at p. 209.) 

Sandoval’s statements did not alert the court about a possible need for a 

mental competency examination. Sandoval has pointed to nothing in the 

record indicating that he was unable to understand the proceedings against 

him or assist in his defense. 

Further, as shown by defense counsel’s closing arguments, she did not 

regard Sandoval’s trial statements as signs of mental illness; rather, she used 

them to support her argument that Sandoval set the leaves on fire for its 

“spiritual effect,” and not out of malice, and thus the jury should not find him 

guilty of arson, but only of the lesser included offense. This was a tactical 

defense that was incompatible with a request for a section 1368 hearing.

Accordingly, we conclude Sandoval has “failed to show affirmative evidence 

that counsel could have had ‘no rational tactical purpose’ for these decisions, 

[thus he] has not demonstrated constitutionally deficient performance on this 

record.” (Mickel, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 198, 200.)

IV. Flight Instruction

Sandoval contends the trial court erred by instructing the jury

regarding flight with CALCRIM No. 372 because there was insufficient 

evidence that he actually fled or otherwise sought to avoid arrest or 

prosecution. 
13

A. Background

The court instructed the jury regarding flight with CALCRIM No. 372:

“If the defendant fled or tried to flee immediately after the crime was 

committed, that conduct may show that he was aware of his guilt. [¶] If you 

conclude that the defendant fled or tried to flee, it is up to you to decide the 

meaning and importance of that conduct. However, evidence that the 

defendant fled or tried to flee cannot prove guilt by itself.”

B. Applicable Law

The trial court has a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury on all general 

principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence. (People v. 

Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 73.) The trial court is not required, however, to 

give the jury a pinpoint instruction if it is argumentative, duplicative of other 

instructions, or is not supported by substantial evidence. (People v. Hartsch

(2010) 49 Cal.4th 472, 500.)

“A claim of instructional error is reviewed de novo. [Citation.] An 

appellate court reviews the wording of a jury instruction de novo and assesses 

whether the instruction accurately states the law. [Citation.] In reviewing a 

claim of instructional error, the court must consider whether there is a 

reasonable likelihood that the trial court’s instructions caused the jury to 

misapply the law in violation of the Constitution. [Citations.] The 

challenged instruction is viewed ‘in the context of the instructions as a whole 

and the trial record to determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood the 

jury applied the instruction in an impermissible manner.’ ” (People v. 

Mitchell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 561, 579.) Instructional error requires reversal of 

the judgment only if it resulted in a miscarriage of justice, meaning it is 

reasonably probable the defendant would have fared better in the absence of 

the error. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13; Code Civ. Proc., § 475; People v. Watson
14

(1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836; see People v. Cavitt (2004) 33 Cal.4th 187, 209 

[erroneous limiting instruction subject to Watson harmless error analysis].)

For the court to give an instruction regarding flight as evincing 

consciousness of guilt, there need only be some evidence in the record that, if 

believed by the jury, would sufficiently support the suggested inference. 

(People v. Coffman & Marlow (2004) 34 Cal. 4th 1, 102.) Flight does not

require an actual escape or the physical act of running from the scene as long 

as the defendant acts with the purpose of avoiding observation or arrest. 

(People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 522; People v. Bradford (1997) 14 

Cal.4th 1005, 1055.) Moving after committing a crime can support a flight 

instruction. (People v. Simon (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 841, 851-852)

C. Analysis

Sandoval claims it is unclear whether defense counsel properly objected 

to the flight instruction in the trial court. The People counter that defense 

counsel did not object to that instruction. We need not resolve this issue 

because the claim fails on the merits. Sufficient evidence of flight was 

presented by a witness who saw Sandoval walking away from the fire while it 

was still burning. When the witness asked Sandoval if he had started the 

fire, he denied doing so. The witness proceeded to extinguish the fire. 

Sandoval admitted that he walked away from the fire while it was still 

smoking. By leaving the scene while the fire burned, and later denying his 

role in starting the fire, Sandoval evinced consciousness of guilt that 

supported the flight instruction.

In any event, we conclude that any error was harmless. CALCRIM No. 

372 expressly informed the jury that, if it found Sandoval fled or tried to flee 

the scene, it was the sole judge of “the meaning and importance” of that 

conduct. And the trial court properly instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 
15

200 that some jury instructions might be inapplicable. In other words, as the 

jury was told to decide for itself what facts supported flight, and if it decided 

the evidence that Sandoval walked away from the fire was irrelevant, it knew 

to disregard the flight instruction. (See People v. Silveria (2020) 10 Cal.5th 

195, 245 [reviewing court must presume jury understood and followed 

instructions].) With CALCRIM No. 200, the trial court mitigated the 

potential for prejudice even if the court erroneously gave the flight 

instruction. (People v. Vega (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 484, 503.) In light of the 

overwhelming evidence of Sandoval’s guilt set forth above, we conclude it was 

not reasonably probable he would have received a more favorable result 

absent the flight instruction.

V. Fines, Fees and Assessments

Sandoval contends this court should vacate the fines, fees and 

assessments because they violate his constitutional rights to due process and 

equal protection and against excessive fines and contradict Duenas, supra, 30 

Cal.App.5th 1157. 

At the April 2020 sentencing hearing, the court imposed the following 

fines, fees and assessments: (1) $820 state surcharge fine (§ 1465.7, subd. 

(a)); (2) $300 restitution fine (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)); (3) $154 criminal justice 

administration assessment (Gov. Code, § 29550.2); (4) $40 court operations 

assessment (§ 1465.8); (5) $30 criminal conviction assessment (Gov. Code, 

§ 70373); (6) suspended $300 probation revocation fine (§ 1202.44); and (7) 

$500 in direct restitution fines to the victims (§ 1202.4, subd. (f)(3)(G)).

When defense counsel requested the court stay the fines, fees and 

assessments pending an ability to pay hearing, the court ordered Sandoval to 

start payments of $35 monthly on May 9, 2020, with this proviso: “If 

[Sandoval] has an inability to pay, is not employed and . . . has made gainful
16

opportunities to be employed and does not have the ability, he can come back 

to court and seek resolution of that issue at that time.”

In light of the fact the court expressly stayed its ruling on the fines,

fees and assessments for one year, which time expired during the pendency of 

this appeal, we need not address this claim on the merits. Rather, we permit 

Sandoval on remand to file a proper motion in the trial court to address his 

inability to pay the fines, fees and assessments as that court’s ruling allowed.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed and the matter remanded with directions 

that the superior court permit Sandoval to file a motion challenging his 

ability to pay the imposed fines, fees and assessments. 

O’ROURKE, J.

WE CONCUR:

HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

GUERRERO, J.