UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-4209

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

ERNEST WALKER,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern 

District of West Virginia, at Beckley. Irene C. Berger, 

District Judge. (5:01-cr-00140-1)

Submitted: January 28, 2014 Decided: February 11, 2014

Before DUNCAN, KEENAN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Mary Lou Newberger, Federal Public Defender, Jonathan D. Byrne, 

Appellant Counsel, Rhett H. Johnson, Assistant Federal Public 

Defender, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant. R. Booth 

Goodwin II, United States Attorney, William B. King, II, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Charleston, West Virginia, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Ernest Walker appeals from the thirty-six-month 

sentence imposed upon revocation of his supervised release. He 

contends that this sentence was plainly unreasonable. We 

affirm.

We will affirm a sentence imposed after revocation of 

supervised release if it is within the prescribed statutory 

range and not plainly unreasonable. United States v. Crudup, 

461 F.3d 433, 439-40 (4th Cir. 2006).* First we consider whether 

the sentence imposed is procedurally or substantively 

unreasonable. Id. at 438. In this initial inquiry, we take a 

more deferential posture concerning issues of fact and the 

exercise of discretion than undertaken for the reasonableness 

review for Guidelines sentences. United States v. Moulden, 478 

F.3d 652, 656 (4th Cir. 2007). If we find the sentence 

procedurally or substantively unreasonable, we must then decide 

whether it is “plainly” so. Id. at 657.

Here, the district court correctly calculated and 

considered the advisory policy statement range, considered the 

 * Although Walker requests that we reexamine the “plainly 

unreasonable” standard in light of decisions from other circuit 

courts applying a “reasonableness” standard of review, we 

decline to do so. United States v. Bullard, 645 F.3d 237, 246 

(4th Cir. 2011) (one panel of this court cannot overrule the 

decision of another panel).
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relevant factors, and gave the parties an opportunity to present 

argument. The sentence was procedurally reasonable. See United 

States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010). The 

court also sufficiently explained its reasons for imposing a 

sentence within the policy statement range. See Crudup, 461 

F.3d at 440. 

Walker contends that, in determining the sentence, the 

district court improperly relied on the need for the sentence 

imposed to provide just punishment for the offense. Because 

Walker did not object in the district court to the explanation 

of his sentence, we review for plain error. United States v. 

Hargrove, 625 F.3d 170, 183-84 (4th Cir. 2010); see United 

States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-34 (1993). 

The district court’s consideration of the need to 

impose just punishment was in conjunction with its consideration 

of the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (2012). “Although

§ 3583(e) enumerates the factors a district court should 

consider when formulating a revocation sentence, it does not 

expressly prohibit a court from referencing other relevant 

factors omitted from the statute.” United States v. Webb, 738 

F.3d 638, 641 (4th Cir. 2013). Because the district court 

properly considered the need for punishment in conjunction with 

the enumerated factors, we find no plain error by the district 

court. See id. at 642 (concluding that reference to non-
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enumerated factor does not render revocation sentence 

procedurally unreasonable when considered in conjunction with 

enumerated 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) factors). 

Accordingly, we conclude that the thirty-six-month 

revocation sentence—which is not greater than the statutory 

maximum and is within the policy statement range of Chapter 7 of 

the Guidelines—is not plainly unreasonable. We therefore affirm 

the revocation judgment. We dispense with oral argument because 

the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 

materials before this court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

AFFIRMED