In the

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 22-1970 

MICHAEL A. LEISGANG, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v.

KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant-Appellee. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Wisconsin. 

No. 3:21-cv-40 — Barbara B. Crabb, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED APRIL 11, 2023 — DECIDED JUNE 26, 2023 

____________________ 

Before SCUDDER, ST. EVE, and LEE, Circuit Judges. 

SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. Michael Leisgang applied for Social Security benefits based on a number of conditions that he 

alleged left him disabled and unable to work. An administrative law judge denied his claim following an evidentiary hearing where a vocational expert testified that, despite his limitations, Leisgang could perform certain widely available jobs. 

Leisgang now claims that the ALJ should have done more to 

ensure the soundness of the vocational expert’s methodology. 
2 No. 22-1970 

But he forfeited the issue by failing to object at the hearing. 

And because substantial evidence otherwise supports the 

ALJ’s determination, we affirm. 

I 

Michael Leisgang suffers from depression, anxiety, and a 

personality disorder, among other conditions. He believes 

these impairments prevent him from working. So he sought 

supplemental security income as well as disability insurance 

benefits in 2019. 

The ALJ held an evidentiary hearing and applied the familiar five-step test to determine whether Leisgang was disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4); see also Fetting v. Kijakazi, 

62 F.4th 332, 336–37 (7th Cir. 2023) (describing the five steps). 

The primary focus on appeal concerns the ALJ’s analysis at 

the fifth and final step. The ALJ had concluded that Leisgang 

could perform the full range of work subject to several limitations. He could undertake only simple, routine, and repetitive 

work; he could not work at a rapid, production-rate pace; he 

could tolerate few changes in routine work settings; and he 

could interact only occasionally with supervisors, coworkers, 

and the public. Those limitations precluded Leisgang from 

performing his past work. So, at the fifth and final step of the 

analysis, the ALJ considered whether Leisgang could perform 

other jobs available in significant numbers in the national 

economy. 

To answer the question, the ALJ sought assistance from a 

vocational expert. The VE testified that someone with Leisgang’s limitations could work as a kitchen helper, 

sweeper/cleaner, or hospital cleaner. The VE estimated that 

there were meaningful numbers of each job across the 
No. 22-1970 3

country. By his approximation, there were 309,000 kitchen 

helper jobs, 1,300,000 sweeper/cleaner jobs, and 453,000 hospital cleaner jobs nationwide. If these job titles seem unusual 

and outdated, that is because they are. The VE identified job 

titles using a dictionary published by the Department of Labor in 1977 and not revised since 1991. The Social Security Administration began working on a new resource in 2008, and 

the judiciary continues to await its release—indeed, eagerly 

so. See Chavez v. Berryhill, 895 F.3d 962, 965–66 (7th Cir. 2018) 

(emphasizing that the Social Security Administration is long 

overdue to develop a modernized, reliable, and data-driven 

system for estimating job numbers). 

On cross-examination, Leisgang’s attorney asked the VE 

how he came up with his job-number estimates. The VE said 

the primary data came from the Occupational Employment 

Quarterly, which applies the equal distribution method to estimate the distribution of job numbers within a larger group 

of occupations. See id. at 966 (discussing the equal distribution method). When Leisgang asked if the VE believed the 

equal distribution method was reliable, the VE reported that 

it was the only method he had available. 

Leisgang asked no further questions about the VE’s methodology. He never objected to the VE’s methodology, either 

during the hearing or after. Nor did he offer anything (by way 

of argument or evidence) to suggest the VE’s methodology 

might be unreliable. 

The ALJ determined that Leisgang was not disabled and 

therefore denied him benefits. She found that Leisgang

could—consistent with the VE’s testimony and subject to 

identical occupational limitations—perform several jobs 

available in significant numbers across the country.
4 No. 22-1970 

The district court affirmed the ALJ’s decision. Leisgang

now appeals. 

II 

We will affirm an ALJ’s factual findings so long as they are 

supported by “substantial evidence.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is not a demanding standard. “It means—

and means only—such relevant evidence as a reasonable 

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” 

Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). 

A 

Leisgang asks us to consider whether substantial evidence 

supports the ALJ’s findings that there are meaningful numbers of jobs he can perform across the country. But Leisgang

forfeited this issue by failing to object to the VE’s methodology. We require parties to object to issues and preserve arguments for a reason—first and foremost, to ensure that all sides 

develop the record they wish to subject to appellate review. 

See Hacker v. Dart, 62 F.4th 1073, 1082 (7th Cir. 2023). 

Our case law is clear that this principle holds true in the 

Social Security context. See Fetting, 62 F.4th at 337–38; see also 

Liskowitz v. Astrue, 559 F.3d 736, 744 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[The 

claimant] forfeited this argument by failing to object to the 

VE’s testimony during the hearing.”). As we explained in 

Fetting, a claimant must object to the VE’s testimony or otherwise indicate that the testimony is unreliable during the administrative hearing (or after, in a posthearing brief) to preserve his objection. See 62 F.4th at 337. The claimant’s objections, we emphasized, must also be specific enough to “indicate that [the claimant] believed the methodology was 
No. 22-1970 5

unreliable.” Id. at 338. General objections or vague questions 

about the VE’s methodology are, without more, insufficient. 

See id. 

Fetting makes good sense when we consider the nature of 

Social Security hearings. ALJs are tasked with resolving a 

large volume of cases, most of which are accompanied by 

lengthy, factually complex records. ALJs play a significant 

role developing the record and the facts—including by deciding whether to seek assistance from a VE on job-number estimates at the fifth step of the inquiry. See Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 

1152; Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 409–10 (1971). 

What all this means as a practical matter is that the ALJ is 

better suited than we are to unpack and untangle objections 

and concerns regarding the VE’s methodology in the first instance. And the ALJ is best positioned to do so when the 

claimant identifies those objections and concerns expressly, 

allowing the proper development of the evidentiary record in 

real time. For the same reasons, several other circuits generally require claimants to exhaust their arguments at the administrative level, with a limited exception for constitutional 

claims arising out of the Appointments Clause. See Ramsey v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 973 F.3d 537, 545–47 (6th Cir. 2020) (collecting cases imposing a general exhaustion requirement from 

the First, Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits); see also Shaibi v. 

Berryhill, 883 F.3d 1102, 1109 (9th Cir. 2017) (“We now hold 

that when a claimant fails entirely to challenge a vocational 

expert’s job numbers during administrative proceedings before the agency, the claimant forfeits such a challenge on appeal, at least when that claimant is represented by counsel.”). 

Be careful not to overread what we are saying. Fetting did 

not displace the ALJ’s duty at step five to “hold the VE to 
6 No. 22-1970 

account for the reliability of his job-number estimates,” 

Chavez, 895 F.3d at 970, or the general rule that a claimant cannot waive the substantial evidence standard, see Biestek, 139 

S. Ct. at 1155. Nor did Fetting shift the burden of proof at this 

stage of the inquiry from the agency—where it belongs—to 

the claimant. See Chavez, 895 F.3d at 970. 

Rather, Fetting stands for the limited principle that a claimant may not start objecting to unquestioned and uncontradicted VE testimony in federal court after the closure of the 

administrative record. See Fetting, 62 F.4th at 337 (citing 

Brown v. Colvin, 845 F.3d 247, 254 (7th Cir. 2016)). To be sure, 

the ALJ still cannot accept testimony from a VE that is facially 

implausible or incoherent. See Brace v. Saul, 970 F.3d 818, 822–

23 (7th Cir. 2020). 

But that does not describe Leisgang’s situation. The VE 

testified that he used the Occupational Employment Quarterly, which applies the equal distribution method to estimate 

job numbers. No doubt we have sharply criticized the equal 

distribution method many times before. See Chavez, 895 F.3d

at 966 (identifying the “illogical assumption” underlying the 

equal distribution method and its “distorting effects”). But 

nothing about the VE’s testimony in this case indicated, by 

itself, that the ALJ could not put some “modicum of confidence” in the VE’s job-number estimates. Id. at 969. 

Leisgang therefore had to object or otherwise indicate that 

the VE’s methodology was unreliable in order to flesh out and 

preserve the issue for our review. He failed to do so. Instead, 

he posed only a few general questions to the VE, none of them 

hinting the VE’s methodology might be problematic. When 

the ALJ eventually cut off a different line of questioning directed to the VE, Leisgang did not register an objection for the 
No. 22-1970 7

record before moving on. Consistent with Fetting, Leisgang 

cannot start questioning the VE’s estimates now. 

B 

One final issue requires our attention. 

Leisgang contends that the ALJ gave short shrift to reports 

submitted by two of his doctors. One of those doctors, Dr. Susan Donahoo, concluded that Leisgang would have “some 

difficulty following a schedule, working without being distracted by others and handling a normal workweek without 

symptoms.” The ALJ found the report persuasive but did not 

adopt Dr. Donahoo’s precise wording in characterizing Leisgang’s limitations. As Leisgang sees it, that means that the 

ALJ “selectively” considered the report, requiring remand. 

Myles v. Astrue, 582 F.3d 672, 678 (7th Cir. 2009). 

Not so. Far from disregarding portions of the report, the 

ALJ adopted the same essential limitations proposed by Dr. 

Donahoo. The ALJ credited Dr. Donahoo’s determination that 

Leisgang would have moderate limitations associated with 

his mental disorders. More specifically, the ALJ agreed with 

the thrust of Dr. Donahoo’s findings: that Leisgang could 

“perform[ ] simple work activity in a routine work setting, 

with some difficulty interacting with others.” The ALJ then 

adopted limitations consistent with these findings. That was 

enough. Nothing required the ALJ to stick to the exact words 

that Dr. Donahoo used—words the ALJ rightly noted were 

“vague.” 

Substantial evidence also supports the ALJ’s treatment of 

a report submitted by Dr. Wendy Yim, who opined that Leisgang needed “extreme” limitations and could not handle 

even low-stress jobs. The ALJ properly concluded that Dr. 
8 No. 22-1970 

Yim’s own past treatment notes, where she concluded Leisgang’s mental status examinations were unremarkable, contradicted her findings in her subsequent report. See Karr v. 

Saul, 989 F.3d 508, 512 (7th Cir. 2021) (explaining an ALJ can 

discount a treating physician’s opinion that is “inconsistent 

with other objective evidence in the record”). 

That was not the only evidence undercutting Dr. Yim’s 

opinion: the ALJ summarized treatment history showing 

Leisgang’s mental health had markedly improved over time. 

And Leisgang himself testified at the hearing that his psychotropic medications generally controlled his symptoms. On 

this record, we cannot find fault with the ALJ’s conclusion 

that Dr. Yim’s opinion was unpersuasive. 

Seeing no error, we AFFIRM.