IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

Inthe Matterofthe Dependency of V.W. (DOB: 10/06/05); I.W. (DOB: 05/20/07); K.W. (DOB: 09/12/08); and P.K. (DOB: 05/18/11), Minor Children. FELICIA KIRKLAND, Appellant,

v. STATE OF WASHINGTON, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL AND HEALTH SERVICES, Respondent. No. 73000-2-I (consolidated with Nos. 73001-1-1, 73002-9-1, 73003-7-1, 73004-5-1, 73005-3-1, 73006-1-1, 73007-0-1) DIVISION ONE

UNPUBLISHED FILED: January 19, 2016

UD

CO COX, J. - Felicia Kirkland appeals the trial court orderterminating her 

### parental rights to P.K., K.W., I.W., and V.W. She contends that the trial court committed reversible error by failing to include on the termination order a 

### statement addressing sibling relationships inaccordance with RCW 13.34.200(3). She also argues thatthe statutory "best interests of the child" standard in RCW 13.34.190 is unconstitutionally vague. But Kirkland fails to 

### demonstrate any prejudice from the trial court's alleged failure to address sibling relationships or thatthe best interests standard is unconstitutional as applied to the facts of her case. We therefore affirm the trial court's order.No. 73000-2-1 (consolidated with Nos. 73001-1-1, 73002-9-1, 73003-7-1, 73004-5-1, 73005-3-1, 73006-1-1, and 73007-0-l)/2
The relevantfacts are unchallenged on appeal. Felicia Kirkland is the mother of P.K. (born 2011), K.W. (born 2008), I.W. (born 2007), and V.W. (born 2005). During 2010 and 2011, the trial courtfound allfour children dependent as to Kirkland based on concerns about herdrug use, erratic behavior, mental health issues, neglect ofthe children, periods ofincarceration, and failure to 

### comply with court-ordered substance abuse treatment. Among otherthings, the dispositional orders required Kirkland to participate inmental health counseling, a parenting assessment and parenting coaching, random urinalysis, and consultation with a public health nurse. 

### The Department ofSocial and Health Services (Department) offered Kirkland numerous services designed to address her parental deficiencies, 

### including mental health counseling, a parenting assessment and extensive 

### parenting coaching, Parent Child Interactive Therapy (PCIT), a fostercare assistance program for child reunification, rental assistance, and various in-home services. In2012, the Departmentfound that Kirkland had made sufficient progress to return the children to her care. 

### The Department removed the children again inFebruary 2013, after an incident inwhich Kirkland threatened to shoot several people at a gas station. 

### Kirkland's participation in services diminished, she visited the children only 

### intermittently, and her behaviorbecame increasingly volatile. Kirkland's outbursts ofanger and unpredictable behavior severely affected the children's

-2-No. 73000-2-1 (consolidated with Nos. 73001-1-1, 73002-9-1, 73003-7-1, 73004-5-1, 73005-3-1, 73006-1-1, and 73007-0-l)/3
emotional stability. The Department petitioned for termination of Kirkland's 

### parental rights. Following an eight-day trial in July 2014, the courtfound that despite years of services, Kirkland had been unable to correct her parenting deficiencies and that her inability to regulate her mental condition prevented her 

### from providing a safe and healthy environmentfor the children. The court concluded thatthe Department had proved the six statutory termination factors in 

### RCW 13.34.180 by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence,1 and thattermination

was in the children's best interests.2 Kirkland appeals. RCW 13.34.200(3) and Sibling Relationships Kirkland contends that the termination order must be reversed because the trial courtfailed to include a statement addressing the children's sibling 

### relationships inaccordance with RCW 13.34.200(3). RCW 13.34.200(3) 

### provides that "[a]norderterminating the parent-child relationship shall include a statement addressing the status ofthe child's sibling relationships and the nature

1Under RCW 13.34.180(1)(a)-(f), the court must determine by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that: (1) the child is dependent, (2) the court has entered a dispositional order, (3) the childhas been removed from the parent's custody for at least six months pursuantto a dependency finding, (4) allnecessary services which could correctthe parental deficiencies have been offered, (5) there is little likelihoodthatthe parental condition can be remedied in the nearfuture, and (6) continuation of the parent and childrelationship clearly diminishes the child's prospects for early integration into a stable and permanent home. 2See RCW 13.34.190(1)(b). The court also terminated the parental rights of Ira Washington, the father ofthree ofthe children.No. 73000-2-1 (consolidated with Nos. 73001-1-1, 73002-9-1, 73003-7- 73004-5-1, 73005-3-1, 73006-1-1, and 73007-0-l)/4
and extent ofsibling placement, contact, or visits."3 This provision reflects the legislature's intent to recognize the importance ofemotional ties formed by siblings with each other, especially inthose circumstances which warrant court intervention into family relationships. It is the intent ofthe legislature to encourage the courts and public agencies which deal with families to acknowledge and give thoughtful consideration to the quality and nature of sibling relationships when intervening in family relationships. It is notthe intent ofthe legislature to create legal obligations or responsibilities between siblings and other family members whether by blood or marriage, step families, foster families, or adopted families that do not already exist. Neither is it the intent ofthe legislature to mandate sibling placement, contact, or visitation ifthere is reasonable cause to believe that the health, safety, orwelfare of a child or siblings would bejeopardized. Finally, it is not the intent ofthe legislature to manufacture or 

### anticipate family relationships which do not exist atthe time ofthe court intervention, or to disrupt already existing positive family 

### relationships."141 Contrary to Kirkland's allegations, the trial court's extensive written 

### findings of fact included specific information aboutthe nature and quality of sibling relationships, contacts, and placements. Among otherthings, thefindings identified all of Kirkland's six children and the nature oftheir current placements. Kirkland's parental rights to hertwo older children, who are 17 and 15, were 

### terminated shortly afterthey were born. The maternal grandmotheradopted both ofthese children, who were serving sentences asjuvenile offenders at the time ofthe termination trial. The trial court noted conflicting evidence on whetherthe
3(Emphasis added.) In its trial brief, the State acknowledged that compliance with RCW 13.34.200(3) is mandatory. 4In re Welfare ofA.G.. 155 Wn. App. 578, 596-97, 229 P.3d 935 (2010) (quoting Laws of 2003, ch. 227, § 1), review granted and reversed on othergrounds following remand. 160Wn. App. 841, 248 P.3d 611 (2011).

-4-

### No. 73000-2-1 (consolidated with Nos. 73001-1-1, 73002-9-1, 73003-7-1, 

### 73004-5-1, 73005-3-1, 73006-1-1, and 73007-0-l)/5

two olderchildren posed a risk to the younger children. The findings also document the mother's inconsistent, hostile, and chaotic visits with the four 

### youngerchildren, which left them angry, upset, and inneed of stabilizing relationships. Kirkland's arguments suggestthat RCW 13.34.200(3) mandates a separate and discrete entry about sibling relationships on the termination order. Although a separate statement may be the preferred approach, the statute does not directthe trial courtto follow any specific format. Kirkland does not address the trial court's written findings on sibling relationships orargue thatthey are insufficientto satisfy the spirit, if not the letter, of RCW 13.34.200(3). But even ifthe termination orderfailed to comply with RCW 13.34.200(3), Kirkland has not cited any authority supporting her requestfor automatic reversal. The trial court concluded that the Department had established the six statutory termination factors in RCW 13.34.180(1)(a)-(f) by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence, and thattermination was inthe children's best interest.5 On appeal, Kirkland has not challenged the sufficiency ofthe evidence to support these conclusions. Nor has she alleged that the failure to comply with RCW 13.34.200(3) affected the court's assessment ofthe evidence to supportthe statutory termination factors or the decision to terminate her parental rights.

5 See RCW 13.34.190.

### No. 73000-2-1 (consolidated with Nos. 73001-1-1, 73002-9-1, 73003-7-1, 73004-5-1, 73005-3-1, 73006-1-1, and 73007-0-l)/6

Because Kirkland fails to demonstrate any prejudice resulting from the alleged error, reversal ofthe termination order is notwarranted.6 Due Process and RCW 13.34.190 Kirkland also contends that RCW 13.34.190, which requires the trial court to find thattermination is inthe "best interests ofthe child,"7 is unconstitutionally 

### vague. She argues thatthe statute violates due process because itprovides no guidelines to reduce the risk ofarbitrary application. 

### An appellate court reviews the constitutionality of a statute de novo.8 The statute is presumed to be constitutional, and the party challenging the 

### presumption bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubtthatthe
statute is unconstitutional.9 

### When considering a vagueness challenge, the court firstdetermines "ifthe 

### statute inquestion is to be examined as applied to the particular case or to be reviewed on itsface."10 But a vagueness challenge to a statute thatdoes not 

### involve FirstAmendment rights must be evaluated "in light of the particular facts of each case."11

6See Thomas v. French. 99 Wn.2d 95, 104, 659 P.2d 1097 (1983) (errorwithout 

### prejudice is not grounds for reversal). In lightof our decision, we need notaddress the State's contention that Kirkland failed to preserve the alleged errorfor review. 7RCW 13.34.190(1 )(b). 8In re Dependency of K.R.. 128Wn.2d 129, 142, 904 P.2d 1132 (1995). 9In re Welfare ofA.W.. 182 Wn.2d 689, 701, 344 P.3d 1186(2015). 10 Citv of Spokane v. Douglass. 115Wn.2d 171, 181-82, 795 P.2d 693 (1990). 11 Id. at 182.

### No. 73000-2-1 (consolidated with Nos. 73001-1-1, 73002-9-1, 73003-7-1, 73004-5-1, 73005-3-1, 73006-1-1, and 73007-0-l)/7



### Termination proceedings do not involve First Amendment rights.12 Kirkland makes no meaningful argumentthatthe "best interests" standard is 

### vague as applied to the facts of her case. Because Kirkland's challenge to RCW 13.34.190 is purelyfacial, we decline to consider it.13 Kirkland has failed to satisfy herburden of proving thatthe statute is unconstitutional. We affirm the orderterminating Kirkland's parental rights.

# &5%JWE CONCUR:

12 See Inre Welfare of H.S.. 94 Wn. App. 511, 524, 973 P.2d 474 (1999) 

### (vagueness challenge to RCW 13.34.180(5)); In re Dependency ofC.B.. 79 Wn.App. 686, 689, 904 P.2d 1171 (1995) (challenge to former RCW 13.34.190(2)). 13See Douglass. 115 Wn.2d at 182.