VANESSA WALKER and BEATE WRIG HT, P laintif fs,
v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,

Defendan t. UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE DIS TRICT OF COLUM BIA

Civil Action 10-0965 (HHK )

MEMORAN DUM OP INION AND ORDER Plaintiffs Vanessa

Walker and B eate Wright, on behalf of their minor c hildren, bringthis 1 action ag ainst the District of Columbia, seekingattorney s’ fe es pursua nt to the I ndividuals with Disabilities Education Act (“ I DEA” ), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq . Plaintiffs aver that they are entitled to attorney s’ fe es bec ause the y wer e the pr evailingparties in administrative a djudications of their I DEA c laims ag ainst the D.C. Public Schools (“DCPS ”). B efor e the Court is the District’s motion to dis miss for failure to state a c laim [ #3], which argues that plaintiffs we re not preva iling par

ties beca use they voluntarily

settled their cla ims before any administrative adjudication took place . Upon consider ation of the motion, the opposition thereto, and the r ecor d of this case , the Court conclude s that the motion mustbe g rante d in part and de nied in part.

Walker and Wrig ht were initially acc ompanied by

Penny Smothers, for whom this 1 action wa s previously

captioned, but she voluntarily dismiss ed her

claim on J uly

15, 2010. See Notice of Voluntary

Dismissal by

Penny Smothers [ #4].I. BACKG ROUND

The I DEA wa s enac ted in 1975 to ensure that children with disabilities have a cce ss to a “fr ee a ppropriate public education.” 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)( A). The I DEA re quires states a nd the District of Columbia to provide var ious “proce dural saf eguards,” id . § 1415(a) , including a complaint proce ss, id . § 1415(b)( 6), with the rig ht to an “impartial due proce ss hear ing” befor e the state or loc al educ ation ag ency . Id . § 1415(f) (1). During the course of “a ny administrative proce eding ” under

the I DEA, pa

rents have “the r ight to be a ccompa nied and a dvised by

counsel.” Id . § 1415(h)( 1). “A ny

party ag g rieve d” by

the final outcome of the a dminist rative pr ocess may seek judicia l reviewin a state c ourt or fe dera l district court. Id . § 1415(i)(2) (A). T he re viewing court, “ in its di scre tion, may awa rd re asonable attorney s’ fe es as pa rt of the c osts to the parents of a child with a disability

who is the preva iling par ty .” Id . § 1415(i)(3) (B ). Plaintiffs are pa

rents of minor c hildren with disabilities (as define d by the I DEA). Compl. ¶¶ 9, 10. Plainti ffs e ach f iled an administrative c omplaint ag ainst DCPS , asser ting that the District had f

ailed to provide pla intiffs’ childre n with the “fr ee a nd appropr iate public education” g uara

nteed by the I DEA. See Compl. Ex s. B, C. Walker’ s complaint was re solved by a settlement a g ree ment with DCPS . The pa rties submitted the proposed settlement a g ree ment to the administrative hea

ringoffice r, who a

pproved it and or dere d that it take ef fec t by April 27, 2009. See Compl. Ex . B at 12–15. Wright’s complaint wa s simil arly resolved by

mutual ag ree ment; before any

adjudication occ urre d, the par ties ag ree d on a plan f

or addr essing Wright’s g rieva nces a nd that Wright would withdraw the complaint. The he aringoffice r thus dismiss ed the complaint without prejudice

. See Compl. Ex . C at 8–9. Plaintiffs now seek c ompensation for attorney s’ fe es that they expended in pursuing their
2administrative complaints ag ainst DCPS . They alleg e that they

wer e “pr evailingparties” at the administrative level suc h that they are entitled to compensation under I DEA. Compl. ¶¶ 9, 10. The District ha s moved to dismis s their claims on the g round that, having resolved the ir complaints via voluntary

ag ree ments betwee n the par ties, plaintiffs wer e not “pr evailingparties” within the meaningof the statute.
II. LEGAL STANDARD Under Fe dera l Rule of Civil Procedur e Rule 12(b) (6), a defe ndant may

move to dismiss a complaint, or a por

tion thereof, f

or fa ilure to state a c laim upon which re lief may be g rante d. F E D . R. C I V . P. 12(b)( 6). Although a complaint need not c ontain detailed f actua l alleg ations, it must recite f

acts suff icient to at least “ raise a

rig ht to relief a

bove the spe culative leve l . . . on the assumption that all the alleg ations in the complaint are true (e ven if doubtful in fa ct).” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A “ pleadingthat offe rs ‘labe ls and conc lusions’ or ‘a f ormulaic re citation of the e lements of a c ause of action will not do.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal , —U.S.—, 129 S. C t. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555). When resolving a 2 motion to di smiss under Rule 12(b)(6) , the Court may consider only

the fa cts alleg ed in the complaint, any

documents either

attache d to or incorpor ated by the complaint, and matter s of which it may

take judicial notice

. See E EOC v. St. Francis Xavie r Parochial Sch. , 117 F.3d 621, 624 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

Plaintiffs are thus incor

rec t when they

asser t that a motion to dis miss shoul d not 2 be g rante d “unless it appea rs beyond doubt that the plaintiff ca n prove no se t of fac ts in support of his claim which would e ntitle him t o relief .” Pl.’s Opp’n to De f.’s Mot (“ Pl.’s Opp’n”) at 4. That standar d, which wa s articulate d in Conley v. G ibson , 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957), wa s abrog ated by Twombly and Iqbal

. See Twombly , 550 U.S. at 562–63.

3III. ANALYSIS

As used in the I DEA, “ ‘the ter m preva iling par

ty [i s] a lega l term of ar

t’ that requir es more than a chievingthe desire d outcome; the par ty seekingfee s must also have ‘be en aw arde d some relief

by the cour t.’” District of Columbia v. Straus , 590 F.3d 898, 901 ( D.C. Cir. 2010) (quoting Buck

hannon Bd. &Care Home, I nc. v. W . Va. Dep’ t of Health & Human Re s. , 532 U.S. 598, 603 (2001)) (alter ation in orig inal). Thus, I DEA c omplainants are not entitled to attorney s’ fee s if their complaints ar e re solved by “private settlements re ache d prior to administrative hear ings.” Alegria v. District of Columbia , 391 F.3d 262, 263 ( D.C. Cir. 2004). Conversely , a party who obtains a fa

vorable , materia l chang e in the par ties’ re lationship by

“an e nforc eable judgme nt or consent or der” has pre vailed and is e ntitled to recove r fe es. Id .; see Bush e x rel. A.H. v. D istrict of Columbia , 579 F. Supp. 2d 22, 28–29 (D.D .C. 2008). Consequently , whether plaintiffs here are entitled to attorney s’ fe es depe nds on whether the ag ree ments they

rea ched with DCPS wer e “pr ivate settlements” in the me aningof Alegria , or conse nt decr ees that
rec eived “ some offic ial judicial approva l . . . and some leve l of continuing judicial oversig ht.” Bush , 579 F. Supp. 2d at 29 (quoting T.D. v. LaGrange Sch. D ist. No. 102 , 349 F.3d 469, 479 (7th Cir. 2003)) (inter

nal quotation marks omitted); see Alston v. D istrict of Columbia , 2006 WL 752938, at *1 (D.D .C. Mar. 22, 2006) ( rea ding Alegria to require that “a judicia lly enfor cea ble order . . . be ente red in fa

vor of” the par

ty seekingfee s). A. Wright Was Not a P revailing P arty Below Under Buck

hannon and Alegria , it is clear that Wrig ht is not entit led to attorney s’ fe es under the I DEA. As r ecor ded in the hea ringoffice r’s orde r, “f

ollowing introduc tory

and

4preliminary matters,” the parties discusse d and agree d to a plan for resolvingtheir dispute. See Compl. Ex . C at 8. Acc ording ly , the hea ringoffice r wrote : “B ased on the above a g ree ment, and following discussion with counsel . . . this matter is hereby dismiss ed without prejudice .” Id. at 9. This lang uag e does not sug g est any approva l or continuing oversig ht on the part of the Hea ringOffic er. N or did the hea ringoffice r appe ar to incor porate into the “orde r for

dismiss al” any of the ter ms of the settlement. When prese nted with a He aringOffic er’ s Deter mination (“H OD”) that included almost identical languag e, the Bush court he ld that the complainant wa s not the preva iling par

ty
. See B ush , 579 F. Supp. 2d at 29 (“ [T] he re cord r efle cts that the hea ring office r did no more than dismiss the complaint without prejudice. . . . B eca use the he aring office r’s de cision require s no further oversig ht, the court c oncludes that plaintiff . . . w as not the preva iling par

ty .”); see also Goldring v. District of Col umbia , 2005 WL3294005, at *3 (D.D .C. May 26, 2005) (f

inding no pr evailingparty status where “the he aringoffice r simply noted that the ca se wa s dismis sed”) ; Abraham v. District of Columbia , 338 F. Supp. 2d 113, 120 n.8 (D.D.C. 2004) ( “It would be insufficie nt for an H OD mer ely to mention the exi stence of a settlement ag ree ment or to dismiss t he cla im as moot due to settlement.”). The Court sees no basis to rea ch a dif

fer ent conc lusion here. Ac cording ly , Wright’s c laim will be dismi ssed. B. Walker Was the P revailing P arty Below Walker’s c ase is diffe rent. As the H ear ing O ffice r explained, the par ties “ente red into [a] . . . proposed se ttlement ag ree ment,” which the y prese nted to the Hea

ringOffic er. Compl. Ex . B at 12. The of

fice r then issued he r dete rmination, which re ad, in per tinent part: Upon consideration of Petitioner’s reque sts for a due proce ss hearing, the Response there to
. . . and the terms of the Settlement Ag ree ment, i t is this 19th day of April 2009 here by : 5ORDERED that the Settlement Ag ree ment is he reby approve d and shall take eff ect not later than A

pril 27, 2009[.] Id . at 14. This languag e constitutes “a judicially enfor cea ble orde r . . . in favor of

” Walker. Alston , 2006 WL752938, at *1; see also Dist. of Columbia v. Jeppse n ex re l. Jeppse n , 514 F.3d 1287, 1290 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (a party preva ils upon “obtaining a judicial reme dy

that vindicates its claim of rig ht”). First, the HO D expressly

“appr ove[s] ” the se ttlement agree ment rea ched by the par ties, and orde rs that the agree ment take e ffe ct by a ce rtain date . In fac t, the entire te x t of the settlement ag ree ment is included in the body of the HO D. See Compl. Ex . B at 12–13. Even in the abse nce of

an express command that DCPS “under take or ref rain fr om some conduct consistent with [ the I DEA],” Abraham , 338 F. Supp. 2d at 120 n.8, the Court see s but one fea sible rea ding of

the HOD: the “ settlement ag ree ment is . . . incorporated into [ the] HOD,” id

. at 120, and the pa

rties ar e re quired to abide by its terms. See R ufo v. Inmate s of the Suffolk Cnty. Jail , 502 U.S. 367, 378 (1992) (de scribinga conse nt decr ee a s “an a g ree ment that the par ties desire a nd expect will be ref

lected in, a

nd be enf orce able a s, a judicial dec ree ”); Goldring , 2005 WL3294005, at *3 (the involveme nt of, and a pproval by , the hea

ringoffice r in a settlement ag ree ment is probative of whether a plaintiff c an cla im prevailingparty status). Second, the se ttlement ag ree ment, as laid out in the HOD, pr ovides Walker with much of the re lief that she soug ht on behalf of her c hild. See Sm

yth ex rel. Smyth v . Rivero , 282 F.3d 268, 282 n.11 (4th Cir. 2002) (a putative pre vailing pa

rty must “demonstrate that it has rece ived some of the re lief it sought in bring ing the lawsuit in the first place ”); compare Compl. Ex . B at 8 (see king a

private pla ceme nt, and tutoring , transportation, and counselingservice s), with i d. at 13

6(agree ing that DCPS would provide a private pla ceme nt, transportation, and one -on-one tutoring) . In essenc e, then, Walker eff ectively obtained a c onsent dec ree that was a pproved by 3 the hea ringoffice r and inc orpora ted into the HOD a

nd that provided he r with the re lief she soug ht. See Straus , 590 F.3d at 901 (for pr evailingparty status, “(1) the re must be a ‘cour t-order ed cha

ng e in the leg al re lationship’ of the par ties; (2) the judg ment must be in favor of the pa rty seekingthe fe es; and (3) the judicial pronounc ement must be ac companied by judicial relief

.” (quoting Thomas v. Nat’l Sci. Found ., 330 F.3d 486, 492–93 ( D.C. Cir. 2003))). Walker has thus stated a

claim for r elief, a

nd the District’s motion to dism iss will be denied as to her c laim.
IV. CONCLUSION For the fore g oing r easons, the D istrict’s motion to di smiss [ #3] m ust be g rante d in part and denie d in part. Acc ording ly , it is t his 14 day of Jul y 2011 here by 4 t h ORDERED that defe ndant’s motion to dism iss is GR ANTED as to the cla ims of plaintiff B eate Wright and DENIED as to the cla ims of plaintiff Vane ssa Walker.
Henr y H. Kenne dy , J r. United States District J udg e
The fa ct that the HOD was not for mally captioned a s a “c onsent dec ree ” is not 3 signific ant. See Sm

yth , 282 F.3d a

t 281 (“We doubt that the Supreme Court’ s g uidance in Buck hannon was intende d to be interpre ted so restric tively as to requir e that the wor ds “conse nt decr ee” be used e x plicitly . . . . We will assume, then, that an orde r conta ining a n ag ree ment rea ched by

the par ties may be func tionally

a conse nt decr ee f

or purpose s of [determining preva iling par

ty status] .”) Be cause the Court does not understa nd the par ties to seek attorne y s’ fe es on the 4 g rounds that the ter

ms of the HODs e ntitle them thereto, it does not addre ss the District’s arguments as to that issue, or as to the Court’s jurisdiction to enfor ce pr ivate contr acts. 7