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Michigan Supreme Court 

Lansing, Michigan 48909 

C hief Justice Justices 

Maura D. Corrigan	 Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Marilyn Kelly 

Clifford W. Taylor Opinion Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman 

FILED MARCH 12, 2002
 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
 

Plaintiff-Appellant,


Cross-Appellee,
 

v	 No. 118774
 

WILLIAM EMERY LeBLANC,
 

Defendant-Appellee,


Cross-Appellant.
 

PER CURIAM
 

A circuit court jury convicted the defendant of thirddegree criminal sexual conduct, but the Court of Appeals
 

reversed on the ground that the defendant had been denied
 

effective assistance of trial counsel. Because the circuit
 

court’s findings of fact were not clearly erroneous and its
 

conclusions of law are correct, we agree with the circuit
 

court that the defendant's trial attorneys were not
 

ineffective. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the
 
Court of Appeals and reinstate the judgment of the circuit
 

court.
 

I
 

In early 1998, the defendant was charged with one count
 

of third-degree criminal sexual conduct for having sexual
 

intercourse with his wife’s daughter----his stepdaughter. MCL
 

750.520d(1)(a). The stepdaughter says that a number of sexual
 

assaults occurred, culminating on a Sunday afternoon in May
 

1997, when sexual relations occurred in the defendant’s truck,
 

as they parked on a rural road.
 

The defendant has consistently denied the charge. He
 

maintains that the criminal allegation is the complainant’s
 

revenge for parental discipline of an unruly teenager. At
 

trial, he supplemented that defense with alibi testimony,
 

seeking to demonstrate that he was working on the Sunday
 

afternoons when this assault might have occurred.
 

This matter was tried before a Leelanau Circuit Court
 

jury in the late summer of 1998. The jurors believed the
 

complainant, and thus found the defendant guilty as charged.
 

In October 1998, the court sentenced the defendant to term of
 

six to fifteen years in prison. Two months later, the court
 

denied the defendant’s motion for new trial.
 

After the defendant appealed, the Court of Appeals
 

granted his motion to remand,1 so that he could file another
 

1 Unpublished order, entered September 13, 1999 (Docket


No. 217281).
 

2
 
motion for new trial. On remand, the circuit court conducted
 

a Ginther2 hearing to determine whether the defendant had been
 

denied effective assistance by the two attorneys who
 

represented him at trial. After taking testimony from several
 

witnesses, the circuit court denied the motion.
 

Following the remand, the Court of Appeals reversed the
 

defendant’s conviction, agreeing with his contention that he
 

had been denied effective assistance.3
 

The prosecuting attorney has applied for leave to
 

appeal.4
 

II
 

In People v Mitchell, 454 Mich 145, 155-156; 560 NW2d 600
 

(1997), we explained the principles of law that govern an
 

inquiry whether there has been a denial of effective
 

assistance:
 

The benchmark case describing the standard for


claims of actual ineffective assistance of counsel
 

in Michigan is People v Pickens, [446 Mich 298,


318; 521 NW2d 797 (1994)], which held that the


right to counsel under the Michigan Constitution


does not justify a more restrictive standard than


that applied under the United States Constitution


and adopted the Supreme Court's test in Strickland
 

[v Washington, 466 US 668; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed


2d 674 (1984)]. That test requires the greatest


level of factual inquiry into the actual conduct of


the defense and its effect on the outcome of the
 

2 People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436, 443-444; 212 NW2d 922
 

(1973).
 

3
 Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued February 20,


2001 (Docket No. 217281).
 

4 The defendant has also applied, seeking leave to appeal


as cross-appellant. We deny the defendant’s application.
 

3
 
trial. It places the burden on the defendant to


show, with regard to counsel's performance,
 

“that counsel made errors so serious that
 

counsel was not functioning as the
 

‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the


Sixth Amendment . . . [and] that the


deficient performance prejudiced the
 

defense. This requires showing that


counsel's errors were so serious as to
 

deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a


trial whose result is reliable. Unless a
 

defendant makes both showings, it cannot


be said that the conviction or death
 

sentence resulted from a breakdown in the
 

adversary process that renders the result


unreliable. [Id. at 687.]”
 

In applying this test, "a court must indulge a


strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls


within the wide range of reasonable professional


assistance . . . ." Id. at 689. [C]ases decided
 

under the Strickland/Pickens test require the
 

defendant to "overcome the presumption that, under


the circumstances, the challenged action 'might be


considered sound trial strategy.'" Strickland at
 

689.
 

Accord, People v Toma, 462 Mich 281, 302-303; 613 NW2d 694
 

(2000).
 

III
 

In conducting an appellate review of the manner in which
 

these principles were applied by the circuit court and the
 

Court of Appeals, we begin by locating the proper standard for
 

such review. Whether a person has been denied effective
 

assistance of counsel is a mixed question of fact and
 

constitutional law. A judge first must find the facts, and
 

then must decide whether those facts constitute a violation of
 

the defendant’s constitutional right to effective assistance
 

of counsel. 


4
 
 

As we have explained in other contexts, a trial court’s
 

findings of fact are reviewed for clear error. MCR 2.613(C),
 

6.001(D); cf. MCR 7.211(A)(3)(a). See, generally, Grievance
 

Administrator v Lopatin, 462 Mich 235, 247, n 12; 612 NW2d 120
 

(2000); In re Trejo Minors, 462 Mich 341, 356-357; 612 NW2d
 

407 (2000); McDougal v McDougal, 451 Mich 80, 87; 545 NW2d 357
 

(1996); Sparks v Sparks, 440 Mich 141, 151-152; 485 NW2d 893
 

(1992); Mazur v Blendea, 409 Mich 858; 294 NW2d 827 (1980).
 

Questions of constitutional law are reviewed by this
 

Court de novo. Tolksdorf v Griffith, 464 Mich 1, 5; 626 NW2d
 

163 (2001); People v Dunbar, 463 Mich 606, 615; 625 NW2d 1
 

(2001); Blank v Dep’t of Corrections, 462 Mich 103, 112; 611
 

NW2d 530 (2000).
 

IV
 

In the present case, the Court of Appeals concluded that
 

a review of the record had persuaded it that “trial counsel’s
 

performance undermines confidence in the reliability of the
 

result. Mitchell, supra.” That conclusion rested on three
 

principal bases----failure to introduce testimony from a
 

defense expert, failure to conduct a proper voir dire of
 

prospective jurors, and failure to object to rebuttal
 

testimony. However, we conclude that in each instance the
 

circuit court, not the Court of Appeals, correctly resolved
 

the issue whether the defendant was denied effective
 

assistance.
 

5
 
A
 

Expert Testimony
 

The prosecution relied in part on the testimony of an
 

expert in treating teenage sexual abuse victims.5 The expert
 

testified that young victims often delay reporting the crime
 

because of embarrassment, concern for the family, and other
 

reasons. The import of her testimony was that the behavior of
 

the complainant in this case was consistent with the behavior
 

often exhibited by such victims. 


Defense counsel had subpoenaed an expert who was prepared
 

to offer countering testimony. However, defense counsel did
 

not call her to testify at trial.6
 

At trial, the prosecution expert properly refrained from
 

offering an opinion regarding the defendant’s guilt.7
 

However, the Court of Appeals found her testimony to have been
 

quite significant, and criticized defense counsels' failure to
 

call the defense expert. Saying that the record belied the
 

claim that the decision not to call her was strategic, the
 

Court characterized defense counsels' preparation as
 

“inadequate,” and concluded, “our confidence in the
 

5 The defendant disputes her expertise.
 

6
 It appears that both the prosecution expert and the


would-be defense expert had counseled the complainant in this


matter. However, defense counsel apparently did not seek to


review the records of the defense expert. 


7 People v Beckley, 434 Mich 691, 727-729, 734, 744; 456
 

NW2d 391 (1990); People v Peterson, 450 Mich 349, 369; 537


NW2d 857 (1995).
 

6
 
reliability of the result has been undermined, Mitchell,
 

supra, and a new trial based on ineffective assistance is
 

warranted.”
 

The contrary conclusion of the circuit court was
 

explained in the opinion it issued after the remand
 

proceedings. The circuit court noted several minor matters
 

regarding which the would-be defense expert could have
 

challenged the prosecution expert, but concluded that these
 

were fairly inconsequential. The principal issue, obviously,
 

was whether the defense attorneys had committed a serious
 

mistake in deciding to forgo the testimony of the expert whom
 

they had subpoenaed. Concerning this question, the circuit
 

court stated:
 

When [one of the defense attorneys] testified


[at the remand hearing], he stated that his
 

approach in examining [the prosecution expert] was


to attack her credibility by showing that she was


part of the police team and that she had a


relationship counseling and treating the
 

complainant. Thus she would not be objective in


the juries’ eyes. He went on to testify that he did


not call [the defense expert] because in his


experience a battle of the experts in cases of this


type tends to favor of [sic] the prosecution.


Merely calling a defense expert on these issues


tells the jury that such experts are important and


are to be believed and actually tends to increase


in the [jurors’] eyes the importance of these


expert witnesses in [defense counsel’s] view. So he


decided not to call [an expert].
 

As a tactical decision, even in retrospect,


this Court cannot say that [defense counsel’s] plan


about expert witnesses was wrong. During trial on


August 26, 1998, under cross-examination by


[defense counsel], the victim was asked what [the


prosecution expert] had told her about the behavior


of sexual abuse victims, implying she had been


coached by [the expert]. He went on to bring out
 

7
 
by questioning the victim that [the expert] was


involved with the prosecution team in planning how


the trial was conducted. The defense team’s
 

approach to [the prosecution expert] was to show


that she was not objective and that therefore her


testimony to the jury could not be believed. This
 

is a legitimate and reasonable tactical decision by


an attorney as to how to handle the other side’s


expert witness.
 

This is a sound reading of the events that unfolded at
 

trial----certainly there is no clear error in the circuit
 

court’s findings of fact. One can posit theories under which
 

the defense might have been advanced by using the expert
 

testimony of the woman whom the attorneys had subpoenaed.
 

However, as explained in Mitchell, the inquiry is not whether
 

a defendant’s case might conceivably have been advanced by
 

alternate means.
 

As noted above, our task on appeal is to examine de novo
 

the constitutional issue whether, on facts properly found by
 

the circuit court, the defendant was denied effective
 

assistance. In the phrasing of Mitchell, we determine whether
 

“counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not
 

functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the
 

Sixth Amendment” and that “the deficient performance
 

prejudiced the defense,” i.e., “counsel's errors were so
 

serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial
 

whose result is reliable.” Id. at 156, quoting Strickland,
 

466 US 687. On the present record, the decisions made by
 

defense counsel concerning use of an expert witness were well
 

8
 
within the bounds of sound professional representation,8 and
 

did not come close to depriving the defendant of a fair trial.
 

Again, the central issue in this case is a mixed question
 

of fact and law. We have found the circuit court’s findings
 

of fact not to be clearly erroneous, and we conclude, on those
 

facts, that the decisions regarding use of an expert witness
 

did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.
 

B
 

Voir Dire
 

The defendant is a Native American, who was employed as
 

a police officer. During voir dire, defense counsel did not
 

ask the prospective jurors whether any of them harbored
 

prejudice against Native Americans or police officers.
 

The circuit court observed that “[u]nnecessary voir dire
 

about racial matters might have the effect of making race an
 

issue when it was not,” and concluded that, “[i]n this case,
 

defense counsels’ conscious decision not to inquire about race
 

during voir dire was sound trial strategy.” These conclusions
 

were supported with a detailed discussion of the testimony
 

presented by the defendant at the Ginther hearing.
 

Here, too, the Court of Appeals disagreed with the
 

conclusion reached by the circuit court. Acknowledging that
 

8 As indicated, the Court of Appeals implied that defense


counsel did not really make a reasoned decision, but
 

contrarily that poor preparation led to the failure to call


the defense expert. It is evident that the circuit court
 

credited the testimony of the defense attorneys at the remand


hearing, and we see no error in that determination.
 

9
 
“[t]he mere fact that a complainant and the victim are of
 

different races does not make race a bona fide issue,” the
 

Court nonetheless held that “inquiry into any potential bias
 

or prejudice against defendant was crucial where a conviction
 

was based, in large part, on the credibility of the
 

witnesses.” Thus, “[w]hile defendant was unable to
 

demonstrate that race was a bona fide issue in the case, we
 

conclude that the failure to inquire into bias or prejudice
 

based on occupation and race undermines the reliability of the
 

verdict.” The Court added that, “[b]ecause the jury’s verdict
 

was contingent on the credibility of defendant and the victim,
 

any bias or prejudice by the jury could have served as the
 

basis of the verdict.”
 

Again, we have been shown no clear error in the circuit
 

court’s findings of fact. In addition, our de novo
 

application of constitutional principles to those facts yields
 

the same result as that reached by the circuit court. 


As the circuit court noted, the defendant failed to
 

produce evidence that failure to conduct voir dire on the
 

topic of race, even if a serious mistake, led to any prejudice
 

against the defense. At the Ginther hearing, a defense expert
 

on juries offered the opinion that the populace of northern
 

Michigan is prejudiced against Native Americans, although she
 

presented no corroborative studies. Her "investigation" was
 

limited to conversations with two attorneys (one who had
 

appeared for the defendant in connection with postconviction
 

10
 
proceedings in the present case, and one who had represented
 

the defendant’s tribe in treaty-related matters) and a
 

personal friend. The court aptly observed, “As a study of
 

juror prejudice in northern Michigan, this hardly suffices to
 

support her opinion.”
 

The expert talked about survey findings in Minnesota,
 

which evidently showed a degree of opposition in the non-


Indian community to the treaty-based rights of Indians to
 

engage in certain hunting, fishing, and gaming activities not
 

open to the general populace. In this regard, the circuit
 

court stated:
 

From her testimony, the court deduced that the


[Minnesota survey] questions related to the jurors’


opinions of special rights that were secured to


tribes pursuant to treaty, court decision, and


otherwise respecting hunting, fishing and casino


gambling. This case, however, had no aspect of


controversy over hunting, fishing rights, casino


gambling, or any other issue related to the rights


of tribes and their members. The fact that a
 

substantial number of Minnesota jurors, according


to [the expert’s] testimony, disapprove or have


reservations about the special rights of tribes and


their members to hunt and fish under historic
 

treaties as interpreted by the federal courts or


about the special rights of tribes to conduct
 

gambling operations does not equate with personal


prejudice against Indians. To conclude that those
 

answers make the jurors racially prejudiced would


be as foolish as concluding that former Michigan


Supreme Court Justice and now [United States Court


of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit] Judge James Ryan


is racist because he dissented in a recent case in
 

which the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that


commercial fishing boats operated by tribal members


had the right to use municipal marinas in Leelanau


County. See [Grand Traverse Band v Dep’t of
 

Natural Resources], 141 F3d 635 (CA 6, 1998). That
 

a juror might express reservations about the
 

propriety of the rights in question would not


indicate that juror is racially prejudiced and
 

11
 
would be of little relevance unless the case grew


out of a situation involving those treaty rights.
 

Next, the court discussed testimony concerning some
 

specific incidents of racial bias against Native Americans in
 

northern Michigan. Here the court said that “it would be
 

ignoring the obvious to suggest that there is no prejudice
 

against Native Americans in northern Michigan or in any part
 

of Michigan for that matter.” However, the court went on to
 

say that, “[e]ven if this court could take judicial notice of
 

that fact, it would also have to take judicial notice of the
 

apparent widespread support in the public for Native
 

Americans.”
 

The court also discussed testimony concerning (a) the
 

close attention paid by the jury to the complainant’s
 

testimony, (b) the reaction of some jurors to a smudging
 

ceremony at the courthouse,9 and (c) a question at the
 

preliminary examination concerning whether anyone in the
 

audience resided in Peshawbestown.10 As the court noted, each
 

of these had a ready and benign explanation.
 

In its opinion of reversal, the Court of Appeals wrote:
 

[E]ven when requested, an inquiry into racial


prejudice is constitutionally required only where


race is a bona fide issue in this matter. Ristaino
 

9 Smudging is a Native American custom, in which herbs


are burned to create a cleansing smoke, for the purification


of persons, places, or objects. See, generally,


http://www.bmcc.org/Bimaadzwin/Traditions/smudging.htm.
 

10 Many members of the Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and


Chippewa Indians reside in the Leelanau County community of


Peshawbestown.
 

12
 
v Ross, 424 US 589, 594; 96 S Ct 1017; 47 L Ed 2d


258 (1976).
 

Nothing in the record before us suggests that race was a
 

bona fide issue in the present case, as the Court of Appeals
 

itself acknowledged. While the defendant and the complainant
 

were of different racial backgrounds, that circumstance by
 

itself is not sufficient to conclude that race is a bona fide
 

issue in a case, requiring, as a constitutional matter,
 

particular inquiry at voir dire. Both sides tried this case
 

as a fact-specific dispute involving events that did or did
 

not occur within a particular family. Simply put, this case
 

was not about race. 


The circuit court’s findings of fact are not clearly
 

erroneous, and we agree with its conclusions of law. On the
 

record of this case, the defense lawyers did not withhold
 

effective assistance of counsel when they did not inquire
 

during voir dire about bias against Native Americans.
 

There is also an issue about failure to inquire about
 

prejudice against police officers, but the circuit court
 

properly noted that the record contains no evidence of bias
 

against police officers in Leelanau County or among the
 

persons hearing this particular case. Again, the record does
 

not support the conclusion that the failure to inquire during
 

voir dire constituted ineffective assistance.
 

C
 

Rebuttal Testimony
 

A third ground on which the Court of Appeals found
 

13
 
 

ineffective assistance was defense counsels’ failure to object
 

to certain rebuttal evidence. 


The issue arose in this manner: In support of his alibi,
 

the defendant testified that he was working on the dates when
 

the assault might have occurred. In the course of this
 

direct-examination testimony, he referred to the department
 

logs, which documented his daily activities as an officer. On
 

cross-examination, he was asked whether he had ever falsified
 

his daily logs. He denied doing so. On rebuttal, the
 

prosecutor called a department sergeant who testified, without
 

objection, that the defendant falsified his log one day in
 

July 1996 by recording a ninety-minute lunch break as though
 

it had lasted only sixty minutes. 


The Court of Appeals held, in effect, that counsel was
 

obliged to object to this testimony:
 

MRE 608(b) provides that specific instances of


conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking


credibility, other than conviction of a crime, may


not be proved by extrinsic evidence. See also
 

Lagalo v Allied Corp (On Remand), 233 Mich App 514,
 

518; 592 NW2d 786 (1999). Once defendant denied
 

falsification of any daily log, the prosecutor was


“stuck” with that answer. Wischmeyer v Schanz, 449


Mich 469, 477-478; 536 NW2d 760 (1995).


Furthermore, there was no dispute, based on the


victim’s work schedule, that any alleged sexual


abuse would have occurred after, not during,


defendant’s work shift. Therefore, our confidence


in the reliability of the verdict in light of


defense counsel’s failure to object to this
 

specific instance of conduct, coupled with other


errors in the trial, require reversal.
 

The Court of Appeals also found error in failing to
 

object to other portions of the rebuttal testimony, including
 

14
 
matters that the Court characterized as “inconsequential” and
 

not proper impeachment.
 

In its opinion on remand, the circuit court characterized
 

the disputed rebuttal testimony as harmless, saying that
 

“[t]he only possible exception might be the [sergeant’s]
 

testimony . . . .” It analyzed that portion of the record in
 

this manner:
 

When the defendant testified at [trial], he


relied on the logs he maintained of his working


time as a police officer for the Grand Traverse


Band. He relied on those time logs to show that he


could not have picked the victim up at her place of


employment at [a restaurant] in Leland on the


likely day in question. The accuracy of his


employment time log was key to corroborating his


statement that he did not and could not have driven
 

the victim home from work, and stopped to commit


the offense, on that day. He specifically


testified that he never falsified his time logs.
 

It was in rebuttal to that testimony that the


prosecution offered [the sergeant] to testify that


in fact on a prior occasion he had caught the


defendant falsifying his time logs. By relying


upon his time logs to corroborate his statement


that he could not have committed the crime on the
 

day in question and by specifically testifying that


these time logs he never altered, the defendant


opened the door to this rebuttal evidence and it


was admissible.
 

In finding that the rebuttal testimony was improperly
 

admitted, and that counsel therefore was ineffective for
 

failing to object, the Court of Appeals relied, as noted
 

above, on MRE 608(b):
 

Specific instances of the conduct of a
 

witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting
 

the witness' credibility, other than conviction of


crime as provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by


extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the
 

discretion of the court, if probative of
 

15
 
truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on


cross-examination of the witness (1) concerning the


witness' character for truthfulness or
 

untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for


truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness
 

as to which character the witness being crossexamined has testified. [Emphasis supplied.]
 

As the Court of Appeals correctly observed, it has long
 

been the law of this state that a cross-examining attorney
 

must accept the answer given by a witness regarding a
 

collateral matter. People v Hillhouse, 80 Mich 580, 585; 45
 

NW 484 (1890); Hamilton v People, 46 Mich 186, 188; 9 NW 247
 

(1881). However, the law in this realm has nuances, including
 

the rule, noted in People v Vasher, 449 Mich 494, 504; 537
 

NW2d 168 (1995), that impeachment can be proper on matters
 

“closely bearing on defendant's guilt or innocence.”
 

The present issue is whether defense counsels’ failure to
 

object constituted ineffective assistance. Our examination of
 

the record persuades us that there was no ineffective
 

assistance in this regard. First, as the circuit court
 

observed, the existence of the logs was an element of the
 

defendant’s own testimony on direct examination. Further, the
 

gist of his testimony was that these were essential police
 

records, accurately maintained. In light of the alibi
 

defense, it is far from clear that the defendant’s inaccurate
 

entry on another occasion was entirely a “collateral matter.”
 

Further, we must weigh the strategic decisions made by
 

16
 
the experienced attorneys11 who represented the defendant. If
 

counsel had objected to the prosecution's question about
 

alteration of the logs, the counter-productive effect might
 

have been to communicate to the jury that the defense was
 

seeking to hide significant inaccuracies in the logs
 

maintained by the defendant. By allowing the rebuttal
 

evidence (of a single occasion when the defendant stretched
 

his lunch thirty minutes), counsel let the jury learn that the
 

problem was slight. Counsel went on, during closing argument,
 

to use this testimony to the defendant’s advantage, noting
 

that the sergeant was “keeping an eye” on the defendant’s
 

record keeping. This is the sort of professional judgment and
 

careful advocacy, all done in the heat of trial, that we will
 

not second-guess at this distance.
 

Again, this subissue reveals no clearly erroneous
 

findings of fact by the circuit court. Our de novo review of
 

the constitutional question leads, for the reasons stated
 

above, to the conclusion that the defendant was not denied the
 

effective assistance of trial counsel.
 

D
 

Cumulative Error
 

The Court of Appeals closed its opinion with this:
 

The cumulative effect of a number of errors
 

may amount to error requiring reversal. People v
 

11 The defendant retained two attorneys, each of whom had


twenty-five years of experience. Each had worked both as a
 

prosecutor and a defense attorney, and had tried hundreds of


felonies.
 

17
 
 

Cooper, 236 Mich App 643, 659-660; 601 NW2d 409


(1999). After a thorough review of the record on


appeal, we conclude that the cumulative effect of


counsel’s errors undermines the confidence in the
 

reliability of the verdict and a new trial is
 

warranted. Id.; Mitchell, supra.
 

It is true that the cumulative effect of several errors
 

can constitute sufficient prejudice to warrant reversal where
 

the prejudice of any one error would not.12 However, for the
 

reasons stated above, this is not a case involving multiple
 

errors by counsel.
 

Rather, this is a case in which two experienced attorneys
 

provided a vigorous and effective defense for the accused.
 

After examining the full record of this case, we are mindful
 

of what we said in Mitchell: 


In the real world, defending criminal cases is


not for the faint of heart. Lawyers must fulfill
 

ethical obligations to the court, zealously


advocate the client's best interests (which
 

12 People v Bahoda, 448 Mich 261, 292, n 64; 531 NW2d 659


(1995), clarifies the meaning of the phrase “cumulative
 

error.”
 

In making this determination, only actual


errors are aggregated to determine their cumulative


effect. United States v Rivera, 900 F2d 1462, 1471


(CA 10, 1990) (en banc) ("Impact alone, not
 

traceable to error, cannot form the basis for


reversal"). 


That is, individual claims of error either have merit or


they do not. A ruling or action that is almost wrong does not


become an error on the ground that, in the same case, other


rulings or actions were almost wrong, too. Thus, “cumulative


error,” properly understood, actually refers to cumulative


unfair prejudice, and is properly considered in connection


with issues of harmless error. Only the unfair prejudice of


several actual errors can be aggregated to satisfy the


standards set forth in People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 774;


597 NW2d 130 (1999).
 

18
 
includes establishing that they, and not the
 

client, are in charge of making the professional


decisions), and protect themselves against


grievances and claims of malpractice. Lawyers will


inevitably make errors in the process, but, because


both cases and attorneys come in an infinite


variety of configurations, those errors can only


rarely be defined "with sufficient precision to


inform defense attorneys correctly just what
 

conduct to avoid." Strickland at 693. Thus, the


Sixth Amendment guarantees a range of reasonably


competent advice and a reliable result. It does
 

not guarantee infallible counsel. [454 Mich 170­

171.]
 

V
 

For these reasons, we conclude that the defendant was not
 

denied effective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, we
 

reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the
 

judgment of the circuit court. MCR 7.302(F)(1).
 

CORRIGAN, C.J., and WEAVER, TAYLOR, YOUNG, and MARKMAN, JJ.,
 

concurred.
 

19
 
 

________________________________ 

v 

S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
 

SUPREME COURT
 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
 

Plaintiff-Appellant,


Cross-Appellee,
 

No. 118774
 

WILLIAM EMERY LeBLANC,
 

Defendant-Appellee,


Cross-Appellant.
 

CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting). 


Although I might disagree with the Court of Appeals
 

conclusion, as other members of this Court do, that is not a
 

reason to issue a per curiam reversal. The Court of Appeals
 

applied the correct legal standard for ineffective assistance
 

claims to the facts and had a plausible basis in the record
 

for its conclusion that trial counsel was ineffective. I do
 

not think the unpublished decision of the Court of Appeals is
 

clearly erroneous and would deny leave.
 

KELLY, J., concurred with CAVANAGH, J.