i

No. 13-16-00074-CV

IN THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS

CORPUS CHRISTI, TEXAS

___________________________________________

MASTERCRAFT BOAT COMPANY, LLC,

Appellant,

v.

REBECCA CHAMBERS

Appellee. 

___________________________________________

Appealed from the County Court at Law No. 3

Of Nueces County, Texas

__________________________________________________________________

APPELLEE REBECCA CHAMBER’S RESPONSE BRIEF

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Douglas A. Allison

Texas Bar No. 01083500

doug@dallisonlaw.com

Law Office of Douglas A. Allison

403 N. Tancahua

Corpus Christi, Texas 78401

Telephone: 361-888-6002

Facsimile: 361-888-6651

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE

REBECCA CHAMBERS

APPELLEE REBECCA CHAMBERS REQUESTS ORAL ARGUMENT

ACCEPTED

13-16-00074-CV

THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS

CORPUS CHRISTI, TEXAS

4/26/2016 4:34:31 PM

Dorian E. Ramirez

CLERK

 FILED IN 13th COURT OF APPEALS CORPUS CHRISTI/EDINBURG, TEXAS 4/26/2016 4:34:31 PM DORIAN E. RAMIREZ Clerk
ii

No. 13-16-00074-CV

MasterCraft Boat Company, LLC

Appellant,

v.

Rebecca Chambers,

Appellee.

______________________________________________________________________________

IDENTITY OF PARTIES & COUNSEL

_____________________________________________________________________________________

Appellant MasterCraft Boat Company, LLC

Marc Evan Kutner, Esq.

Texas Bar No. 11770575

MKutner@leggefarrow.com

Michael J. Wray, Esq.

Texas Bar No. 24052191

MWray@leggefarrow.com

Legge, Farrow, Kimmitt, McGrath & Brown, LLP

5151 San Felipe, Suite 400

Houston, Texas 77056

Telephone: 713-917-0888

Facsimile: 713-953-9470

Appellee Rebecca Chambers

Douglas A. Allison

Texas Bar No. 01083500

doug@dallisonlaw.com

Law Office of Douglas A. Allison

403 N. Tancahua

Corpus Christi, Texas 78401

Telephone: 361-888-6002

Facsimile: 361-888-6651
iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

IDENTITY OF PARTIES & COUNSEL .............................................................ii

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES.................................................................................iv

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.............................................................................. v

STATEMENT ON ORAL ARGUMENT............................................................vi

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW...............................................................vii

Issue	1:		 Whether	MasterCraft	Boat	Company	LLC	(Appellant)	did	purposefully	avail	

itself	of	the	privilege	of	conducting	activities	within	the	State	of	Texas	to	such

an	extent	so	as	to	established	minimum	contacts	sufficient	to	support	the	trial	

court’s	exercise	of	general	jurisdiction	over	Appellant. ............................................vii

Issue	2:		 Whether	MasterCraft	Boat	Company	LLC’s	(Appellant’s)	alleged	liability	in this	

case	arise	out	of	or	relates	to	Appellant’s	purposeful	activity	in	the	State	of	

Texas	so	as	to	support	the	trial	court’s	exercise	of	specific	jurisdiction	over	

Appellant. ...................................................................................................................................vii

Issue	3:		 Whether	the	trial	court’s	exercise of	jurisdiction	over	Appellant	comports	with	

traditional	notions	of	fair	play	and	substantial	justice. .............................................vii

Issue	4: Whether	the	trial	court	erred	in	failing	to	sustain	Appellant’s	objections	to	

certain	deposition	testimony,	and	whether	such	refusal,	if	any,	to	grant	

Appellant’s	objections	was	harmful	error	(if	any). ........................................................vii

STATEMENT OF FACTS..................................................................................... 1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT............................................................................ 16

ARGUMENT......................................................................................................... 18

1. Plaintiff’s	Pleadings	Support	this	Court’s	Exercise	of	Jurisdiction	--...................................18

2. Legal	Authority	in	Support	of	a	Court’s	Exercise	of	Jurisdiction	--.......................................19

3. This	Court	has	Specific	Jurisdiction	over	Appellant		--.............................................................23

4. This	Court	has	General	Jurisdiction	over	Appellant		--.............................................................24

THIS COURT’S EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION DOES NOT OFFEND 

TRADITIONAL NOTIONS OF FAIR PLAY ................................................... 29

1. The	burden	upon	Appellant		--..........................................................................................................30

2. The	interest	of	Texas	in	Adjudicating	this	Dispute	in	Texas	-- ..............................................31

3. Plaintiff’s	Interest	in	Obtaining	Convenient	/	Effiective	Relef	--...........................................31

4. Interstate	Judicial	System’s	Interest	in	Obtaining	Efficient	Resolution .............................32

5. Shared	Interests	of	States	to	Further	Social	Policies	-- ............................................................32

CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................... 33

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ........................................................................... 34
iv

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

American Type Culture Collection, Inc. v. Coleman, 83 S.W.3d 801, 807 (Tex. 

2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1191 (2003)......................................... 18, 19, 21, 24

Asahi Metal industiral Company, Ltd. v. Superior Court of California, Solano 

County, 480 U.S. 102, 113-115 (1987).......................................................... 29, 30

Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985)................ 20, 27, 29, 30

Frank A. Smith Sales, Inc., d/b/a Frank Smith Toyota v. Atlantic Aero, Inc., 31 

S.W.3d 742, 746 (Tex. App. - - Corpus Christi 2000, no pet.)...................... 18, 19

Guardian Royal Exch. Assurance, LTD. v. English China Clays, 815 S.W.2d 223 

(1991), 815 S.W.2d at 231................................................................................... 29

Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 78 S.Ct. 1228, (2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958)).... 21, 27

International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1940) ......................... 20

Kawasaki Steel Corp. v. Middleton, 699 S.W.2d 199, 203 (Tex. 1985)................. 21

M.G.M. Grand Hotel, Inc. v. Castro, 8 S.W.3d 403, 408 n.1 (Tex.App. - - Corpus 

Christi 1999, no pet) ............................................................................................ 18

McKanna v. Edgar, 388 S.W.2d 927, 930 (Tex. 1965).......................................... 18

Mi Gwang Contact Lens Co. v. Chapa, No. 13-13-00306-CV, 2015 WL 3637846 

(Tex.App.—Corpus Christi June 11, 2015)..........................................................vi

Oswalt v. Scripto, Inc., 616 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1980)............................................. 22

Retamco Operating, Inc. v. Republic Drilling Co., 278 S.W.3d 333, 337 (Tex. 

2009).................................................................................................................... 22

Schlobohm v. Shapiro, 784 S.W.2d 355, 357 (Tex. 1990). .............................. 20, 27

World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980) .................................. 30
v

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Appellee sued Appellant for strict product liability arising from the design, 

manufacture, and marketing of a boat. Appellee was a passenger on the boat, she 

fell overboard, and the unguarded propeller traumatically amputated her leg. (CR 

1:10) Appellant filed a special appearance to contest the Court’s jurisdiction. (CR 

1:43-45.) The Court denied Appellant’s special appearance by Order dated 

January 28, 2016. (R 1:108.) This accelerated interlocutory appeal ensued.
vi

STATEMENT ON ORAL ARGUMENT

There is not a need for oral argument because the issues presented have been 

authoritatively decided. See Tex. R. App. P. 39.1 (b). The Thirteenth Court of 

Appeals has issued an opinion in Mi Gwang Contact Lens Co. v. Chapa, No. 13-

13-00306-CV, 2015 WL 3637846 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi June 11, 2015), that 

is on point. 
vii

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Issue 1: Whether MasterCraft Boat Company LLC (Appellant) did 

purposefully avail itself of the privilege of conducting activities 

within the State of Texas to such an extent so as to established 

minimum contacts sufficient to support the trial court’s exercise of 

general jurisdiction over Appellant. 

Issue 2: Whether MasterCraft Boat Company LLC’s (Appellant’s) alleged 

liability in this case arise out of or relates to Appellant’s purposeful 

activity in the State of Texas so as to support the trial court’s exercise 

of specific jurisdiction over Appellant. 

Issue 3: Whether the trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction over Appellant 

comports with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. 

Issue 4: Whether the trial court erred in failing to sustain Appellant’s 

objections to certain deposition testimony, and whether such refusal, 

if any, to grant Appellant’s objections was harmful error (if any).
1

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On August 24, 2014, Rebecca Chambers was one of eight (8) passengers, 

who were on-board the Appellant MasterCraft Boat Company LLC’s (“Appellant”) 

boat owned by John “Dos” Dietz (“Defendant Dietz”). Defendant Dietz was 

captaining / operating the Appellant boat in Nueces County, Texas. Rebecca 

Chambers was sitting on the bow of the Appellant’s boat while it was underway, 

and she did suddenly and unexpectedly (from her perspective) get sucked under 

and run over by the Appellant’s boat. Rebecca Chambers was then drawn into the 

boat’s unguarded propeller --- and she suffered severe lacerations of her lower leg. 

Rebecca Chambers floated to the water’s surface and found herself in a large pool 

of her own blood. Others screamed for “Dos” Dietz to turn the boat around to 

render aid, and “Dos” Dietz complied. Rebecca Chambers was floundering in her 

effort to save herself, and she was then aided by others as the boat came back for 

her. During the rescue effort, it was determined that Ms. Chambers’ lower leg had 

been completely severed from her body -- and it could not be found. Rebecca was 

rushed to the hospital for appropriate medical care and treatments. 

Rebecca Chambers filed this legal action on or about December 8, 2014, 

against Defendant Dietz and Appellant. In response to Rebecca Chambers‘ filing 

of the action, Defendant Dietz filed a general denial. In response to Rebecca 
2

Chambers‘ filing of the action, Appellant filed a special appearance, motion to 

transfer venue, motion to dismiss on grounds of forum non conveniens, special 

exceptions, general denial, pleadings setting forth affirmative defenses, and other 

related / amended / supplemental pleadings. 

Rebecca Chambers’ current pleading on file is Plaintiff’s First Amended 

Original Petition (and such pleading was the live pleading at the point in time 

when the trial court considered Appellant’s special appearance). By this pleading, 

Rebecca Chambers has made allegations supporting this Court’s general 

jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction over the parties in this lawsuit (including 

Appellant) and the subject matter of this lawsuit. With regard to Appellant, 

Rebecca Chambers has pleaded that Appellant is subject to Texas’ courts’ 

jurisdiction in this case because: 

1. Appellant’s boat involved in this lawsuit is in the State of Texas because

of Appellant’s purposeful, multi-million dollar internet promotional 

campaign directed at the State of Texas (which campaign directly caused 

Defendant Dietz to purchase the boat made the subject of this lawsuit); 

and 

2. Appellant’s many and other continuous and systematic contacts with the 

State of Texas; to wit: systematically and continuously sending 
3

employees and managers to the State of Texas; systematically and 

continuously training service personnel to provide warranty work in the 

State of Texas (and providing such warranty work in the State of Texas); 

systematically and continuously providing recall services within the State 

of Texas; systematically and continuously training sales personnel to sell 

its boats in Texas; systematically and continuously sending its employees 

to participate in promotional events in the State of Texas; systematically 

and continuously signing contracts in Texas and/or with Texas 

individuals and/or with Texas companies; systematically and 

continuously signing contracts for services performable in Texas; 

systematically and continuously advertising in Texas; systematically and 

continuously conducting customer satisfaction surveys in Texas; 

systematically and continuously resolving disputes in Texas (whether by 

Alternate Dispute Resolution (ADR) or other); systematically and 

continuously reimbursing others for sales work / promotions in Texas; 

systematically and continuously partnering with others (individuals and 

companies) in Texas; and systematically and continuously doing business 

in the State of Texas for many years (including its payment of franchise 

taxes to the State of Texas to allow Appellant to do its business in the 

State of Texas (which has been quite profitable for Appellant)). 
4

The facts of the case do clearly demonstrate that Appellant’s relationship 

with the State of Texas. Key facts are as follows: 

1. Appellant -- and the time of the incident and for many years --

contracted with four (4) companies to serve as Appellant’s Texas 

dealerships in the State of Texas;

1

 

2. Appellant’s contracts with its authorized Texas dealers were (for the 

pertinent time period) contracts with Texas companies;2

3. Appellant’s contracts with its authorized Texas dealers were (for the 

pertinent time period) contracts performable in Texas;3

4. Appellant (‘regularly and frequently,’ and for the pertinent time 

period) obligated itself -- and continues to obligate itself -- by way of 

its warranty contracts with its Texas customers (Texas residents) to 

provide warranty services (repairs) in the State of Texas, to pay for 

warranty services in the State of Texas, and to deliver warranty 

contracts to its Texas customers in the State of Texas;4

 1 Appellant ’s authorized dealers in the State of Texas (for the pertinent time period) were: (1) Texas 

MasterCraft Ltd.; (2) Dockside Marine LLC; (3) Boat Town, Inc.; and (4) Texas Ski Ranch. See 

authorized dealership contracts (Filed under seal in the trial court); see also deposition testimony of Tim 

Oxley, (CR 1:271-275)

2 See Texas Secretary of State documents (CR 1:446-456)

3 See deposition testimony of Tim Oxley, (CR 1:314) 

4 See deposition testimony of Tim Oxley, (CR 1:309-315) (“Q. And so the [warranty] work is performable 

in Texas, if it’s -- if the boat is taken to a Texas dealership? A. Correct . . . Q. . . . the work is going to 

be performed in Texas? A. Yes. . . . Q. And the payment is going to go to the company in Texas? A. 

We reimburse the dealer in Texas. . . . Q. So that warranty contract is delivered actually [to the boat 

owner] in Texas? A. Correct). See also deposition testimony of Tim Oxley, (CR 1:356)
5

5. Appellant (for the pertinent time period) has paid substantial sums to 

honor warranty claims made in Texas (2011: $163,000.00; 2012: 

$203,000.00; 2013: $191,000.00; 2014: $194,000.00; and 2015: 

$165,000.00); 5

6. Appellant (continuously and systematically, and for the pertinent time 

period) performs its recall obligations in the State of Texas, and pays 

for its recall obligations in the State of Texas; 6

7. Appellant (for the pertinent time period) contracted in the State of 

Texas to be listed as an additional insured on Completed Products 

coverage’s negotiated and paid for in Texas -- and applicable to 

product liability cases filed in the State of Texas (thus, these are 

contracts performable in Texas for the benefit of Appellant);7

8. Appellant (though its vendor, and for the pertinent time period in 

question) developed a customer service index (“CSI”) by surveying its 

Texas customers to determine Texas customers’ satisfaction with its 

(Appellant’s) product;8 

9. Appellant’s contracts (for the pertinent time period in question) 

obligate Appellant to come into Texas and pay claims for its

 5 See deposition testimony of Tim Oxley, (CR 1:355)

6 See deposition testimony of Tim Oxley, (CR 1:316-317) 7 See deposition testimony of Tim Oxley, (CR 1:325-330)

8 See deposition testimony of Tim Oxley, (CR 1:318-322)
6

authorized Texas dealerships (“indemnity”) in the event that a product 

defect exists with the MasterCraft product (this contract term is 

performable in Texas);9

10. Appellant has negotiated and resolved disputes (including Alternative 

Dispute Resolution) in the State of Texas;10

11. Appellant has agreed to the application of Texas law to interpretation 

of provisions of their contracts with Appellant’s authorized Texas 

dealerships;11

12. Appellant ’s contracts with its authorized Texas dealers (for the 

pertinent time period) gave Appellant sole discretion to define the 

geographic area of operations for each Texas dealership;12

13. Appellant’s contracts with its authorized Texas dealers (for the 

pertinent time period) gave Appellant one hundred percent (100%) 

control over incentive programs offered by its Texas dealerships;13

14. Appellant’s contracts with its authorized Texas dealers (for the 

pertinent time period) gave Appellant the power to set sales quotas for 

Appellant boat sales in Texas;14

 9 See deposition testimony of Tim Oxley, (CR 1:331)

10 See deposition testimony of Tim Oxley, (CR 1:336-337)

11 See deposition testimony of Tim Oxley, (CR 1:339)

12 See deposition testimony of Tim Oxley, (CR 1:277-278) 

13 See deposition testimony of Tim Oxley, (CR 1:279) 

14 See deposition testimony of Tim Oxley, (CR 1:281-282) 
7

15. Appellant’s employee -- its regional sales and marketing manager --

made (for the pertinent time period) ten (10) to twelve (12) trips per 

year to the State of Texas for the purpose of meeting with and 

supporting Appellant’s authorized Texas dealerships;15

16. Appellant’s “local [Texas] rep” (a term used by Tim Oxley to describe 

Appellant’s regional sales and marketing manager) travels to the State 

of Texas regularly and systematically to: 

(a) increase Appellant’s market share; 

(b) counsel with each “local [Texas] dealer”;

(c) provide each authorized Texas dealership with product training 

(training to help Texas sales representatives distinguish and 

promote Appellant’s boats, and related training about how to close 

a deal); 

(d) encourage local (Texas) marketing events (such events typically 

including Appellant’s direct, in-person participation, and such 

events wholly controlled by Appellant); and 

(e) provide stocking and merchandizing recommendations for each 

authorized Texas dealership. 16

 15 See deposition testimony of Tim Oxley, (CR 1:291, 1:357)

16 See deposition testimony of Tim Oxley, (CR 1:288-291, 1:294-299)
8

17. Appellant routinely and systematically reimburses its “local [Texas] 

rep” (its regional sales and marketing manager), and others, for hotel 

stays in Texas, meals purchased in Texas for its employees, meals 

purchased in Texas for its customers / authorized Texas dealerships, 

rent-a-cars, cellular service bills, and internet service bills;17

18. In addition to Appellant’s regional sales and marketing manager’s 

trips to the State of Texas (10-12 / year), Appellant’s vice-president 

for global sales and marketing travels four (4) to six (6) times per year 

to the State of Texas; and Appellant’s president and CEO travels one 

(1) to (2) times per year to the State of Texas -- and all to promote 

sales and marketing in the State of Texas; 18

19. Appellant controls its authorized Texas dealership’s inventory (the 

Appellant’s boats on the sales floor, and in-stock MasterCraft parts 

and supplies);19

20. Appellant controls the days and hours of operation (for the pertinent 

time period) for its authorized Texas dealerships;20

 17 See deposition testimony of Tim Oxley, (CR 1:290-291)

18 See deposition testimony of Tim Oxley, (CR 1:357-358)

19 See deposition testimony of Tim Oxley, (CR 1: 302-303)

20 See deposition testimony of Tim Oxley, (CR 1:304)
9

21. Appellant provided and/or approved (for the pertinent time period) all 

of the promotional and/or advertising materials to use by its 

authorized Texas dealerships -- to be displayed in the State of Texas;21

22. Appellant (for the pertinent time period) markets directly into Texas 

through the internet; 22

23. Appellant (for the pertinent time period) markets directly into Texas 

through billboards, radio, and television through its authorized Texas 

dealerships; 23

24. Appellant advertises (for the pertinent time period) in trade magazines 

that are regionally targeted to the Texas markets; 24

25. Appellant paid $1,037,500.00 to “Live Nation Motor Sports, Inc.” --

a Texas corporation -- as a promotional / advertising fee for events in 

Texas25 (2008, 2009, and 2010); and agreed in its contract with Live 

Nation Motor Sports, Inc., that the agreement would “be governed by 

and construed according to the laws of the State of Texas”; 26

 21 See deposition testimony of Tim Oxley, (CR 1: 305-306)

22 See deposition testimony of Tim Oxley, (CR 1: 339)

23 See deposition testimony of Tim Oxley, (CR 1:340)

24 See deposition testimony of Tim Oxley, (CR 1: 360-361)

25 The sponsored events occurred in Texas, and other states. Appellant -- by their promotional fee -- was 

entitled to display its logo on banners, to 15 second public addresses, to two (2) scoreboard mentions, to 

two (2) jumbotron mentions, to participation in the pit party, to distribute hand-outs, to spots on CBS’s 

broadcasts, to a full page color advertisement in the event program, to 10 VIP, passes, to 20 

complimentary tickets, and more. 

26 See deposition testimony of Tim Oxley, (CR 1:364-367) see also Oxley, (CR 1: 368)(agreeing to the 

“benefits and protections” of Texas law). 
10

26. Appellant (for the pertinent time period) markets directly, and inperson (through its employees and contract employees), in the State of 

Texas at sponsored boat shows, clinics, and demonstration days and 

events;27

27. Appellant pays half (50%) of the cost of promoting boat shows and 

events in the State of Texas (as a “co-op” with its authorized Texas 

dealership);28

28. Appellant pays millions of dollars each year (for the pertinent time 

period) towards advertising (2011: $4.4 million dollars; 2012: $4.4 

million dollars; 2013: $3.4 million dollars; 2014: $4.2 million 

dollars) -- from which large sums are directed at marketing in the 

State of Texas (since Texas is Appellant ’s largest market); 29

29. Appellant is advertising in the State of Texas every day for the past 

five (5) years; 30

30. Appellant sells many boats each year into the State of Texas -- to its 

authorized Texas dealerships who are Texas companies (2011: 192 

MasterCraft boats sold to Texans; 2012: 151 MasterCraft boats sold 

to Texans; 2013: 182 MasterCraft boats sold to Texans; 2014: 136 

 27 See deposition testimony of Tim Oxley, (CR 1:340-342, 1:351) 

28 See deposition testimony of Tim Oxley, (CR 1:342-344)

29 See deposition testimony of Tim Oxley, (CR 1: 352) see also deposition of Jay Povlin, (CR 1:218-220) 

30 See deposition testimony of Tim Oxley, (CR 1: 353-354)
11

MasterCraft boats sold to Texans; and 2015: 183 MasterCraft boats 

sold to Texans); 31 and 

31. Appellant regards its cooperative efforts with its authorized Texas 

dealerships as a “partnership” (Mr. Oxley volunteered that Appellant 

does “characterize that [Texas dealership relationship] as a 

partnership”);32

The facts speak for themselves. The Appellant’s documents and sworn testimony 

of their employees make clear that Appellant has a significant relationship with 

the State of Texas. 

With these factual discoveries now made of record, some candid testimony makes 

clear Mr. Oxley’s view of his company’s (Appellant’s) relationship to the State of 

Texas. Mr. Oxley is a corporate official employed by Appellant, and he did testify, 

as follows: 

Q. MasterCraft knows they have a lot of MasterCraft boats in 

Texas, and they’re very purposeful in making sure that they’re taking 

care of those customers and honoring those warranty claims? 

A. Yes, I agree to that.33

* * * * * 

 31 See deposition testimony of Tim Oxley, (CR 1:359)

32 See deposition testimony of Tim Oxley, (CR 1: 345-346, 1:349-350)

33 See deposition testimony of Tim Oxley, (CR 1: 357)
12

Q. By MasterCraft’s advertising, I think you would agree that 

MasterCraft’s contacts with the State of Texas are continuous? 

A. Yes. 34

* * * *

Q. And systematic? 

A. Yes, using your definition of advertising where we display 

brochures. 

Q. And considering warranty practices of MasterCraft, those 

contacts with the State of Texas are also continuous? I don’t mean 

every day, but they’re very frequent, and ongoing? 

A. I agree. 

Q. And, again, they’re systematic? The warranty contracts? 

A. Yes.35

* * * * * 

Q. Is it fair to say that MasterCraft, certainly, has been -- as long as 

you’ve been with the company -- doing business in Texas.

A. Yes.

Q. On a longstanding basis? 

A. Yes. 

 34 See deposition testimony of Tim Oxley, (CR 1:370) 

35 See deposition testimony of Tim Oxley, (CR 1:371-372)
13

Q. As a part of this longstanding business of MasterCraft in Texas, 

it’s included marketing, correct? 

A. Yes. 

Q. Shipping their products to Texas, correct? 

A. Yes. 

Q. Performing services, including warranty services, in Texas?

A. Yes. 

Q. And maintained authorized dealerships in Texas. 

A. Yes. 

Q. I mean, MasterCraft definitely and very purposefully wants the 

benefits of doing business in Texas by selling their bots there, right? 

A. Yes. 

Q. MasterCraft definitely, intentionally, and purposefully wants to 

take advantage of the Texas economy and whatever monies there are 

available for luxury items, such as the ski, surf, and wakeboard boats? 

A. Yes.36 

* * * * 

 36 See deposition testimony of Tim Oxley, (CR 1:347-376) 
14

Q. And is it true that MasterCraft -- we’ve already talked about 

how they have a very specific market territory for each of their 

authorized dealers in Texas, right? 

A. Yes. 

Q. And I think that those are placed strategically so they’re not 

overlapping with each other; fair to say? 

A. Yes.37 

** * * * 

Q. Those are very strategic decisions that MasterCraft has made in 

terms of how they want and where they want their products presented 

in Texas? 

A. Yes.38

** * * * 

Q. So these contacts that we’ve talked about where MasterCraft is 

doing the advertising and the warranty claims and the different things 

that MasterCraft does throughout Texas, those are pervasive contact 

throughout the parts of the state that are your market? 

A. Yes. 39

* * * * * 

 37 See deposition testimony of Tim Oxley, (CR 1:376-377) 

38 See deposition testimony of Tim Oxley, (CR 1: 377-378)

39 See deposition testimony of Tim Oxley, (CR 1:378)
15

Q. Do you think that when you look at the things that MasterCraft 

is doing directly in Texas, sometimes its own materials, sometimes 

through its dealerships, do you think that Mastercraft’s contacts with 

the state of Texas are substantial? 

A. Yes.

Q. And purposeful for the purpose of helping sell MasterCraft 

products in Texas?

A. Yes. . . . . 

Q. I mean, MasterCraft definitely has a very specific intent to 

serve the Texas markets and sell their ski, wakeboard, and surf boats 

in Texas.

A. Yes. 40

Again, this evidence speaks for itself. This evidence is not contradicted by any of 

the documentary evidence, but rather supported by the documentary evidence. 

Additional evidence was presented to the trial court. Specifically, the 

evidence proves that Appellant even pays franchise taxes to the State of Texas. In 

2015, Appellant paid $28,843.60 in franchise taxes to the State of Texas for the 

privilege of its conducting business in the State of Texas.41 Apparently, Appellant 

has been following this appropriate practice for a number of years (i.e., paying 

 40 See deposition testimony of Tim Oxley, (CR 1:378-379)

41 See Texas Franchise Tax Payment Forms produced by Appellant , (CR 1:440-445) 
16

taxes to the State of Texas for the purpose of allowing Appellant to do business in 

the State of Texas). 

Finally, the record also contains evidence of Defendant “Dos” Dietz’s specific 

reliance upon Appellant’s (MasterCraft’s) Texas contacts for the purchase of the 

MasterCraft boat made the subject of the litigation. An affidavit42 signed by 

Defendant Dietz was a part of the evidence considered by the trial court, and such 

affidavit makes clear that Defendant Dietz purchased the boat made the subject of 

this lawsuit as a direct result of Defendant Dietz’s review and consideration of 

Appellant ’s promotional materials -- provided to Defendant Dietz via internet 

and/or boat show promotions. Defendant Dietz’s affidavit makes clear that his 

decision to purchase the MasterCraft boat made the subject of the litigation was 

“substantially driven by information that [he] obtained from the MasterCraft Boat 

Company’s promotional website (while [he] was in Texas). 

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

In this case, this trial court properly exercised its powers of both specific 

jurisdiction -- and general jurisdiction -- over Appellant . The Appellant has been 

doing business in Texas for many, many years. Appellant concedes the very 

threshold question of ‘doing business in Texas’ by its payment of franchise taxes to 

the State of Texas, and it cannot now be heard to complain of coming to Texas. 

 42 (CR 1:479-480)
17

Appellant sells its boats directly to Texas customers (including its authorized 

Texas dealerships) by the hundreds each year, advertises in Texas, honors warranty 

claims in Texas, honors recall claims in Texas, contracts in Texas, agrees to the 

application of Texas law when it is to Appellant ’s benefit, trains sales persons to 

sell its boats in Texas, trains repair persons to make repairs in Texas, and -- for 

lack of a better phrase -- does everything it can in Texas to make money from 

Texans. 

Moreover, the Appellant’s contacts with the State of Texas directly led to 

Defendant Dietz’s decision to purchase a MasterCraft boat for use in Texas. The 

affidavit of Defendant Dietz makes clear that his decision to purchase the 

MasterCraft boat was “substantially driven by information that [he] obtained from 

the MasterCraft Boat Company’s promotional website (while [he] was in Texas). 

the affidavit of Defendant Dietz states that “the actual reason that I purchased my 

MasterCraft boat was because of my internet browsing on the MasterCraft Boat 

Company’s promotional website that was accomplished while I wa in the State of 

Texas -- I just happened to thereafter locate my boat in the State of Florida.” The 

trial court’s exercise of specific jurisdiction is also supported. 

Appellant’s contacts with Texas also give rise to the trial court’s exercise of 

general and specific jurisdiction over this Appellant. Plaintiff has properly made 

those allegations that triggered the trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction over 
18

Appellant. As such, Texas law shifts the burden of proof to Appellant to negate all 

potential bases for a Texas’ court’s exercise of its jurisdiction. Appellant 

completely failed to carry its burden to negate all potential bases for the trial 

court’s exercise of jurisdiction, and thus the trial court made the proper ruling. The 

trial court’s ruling should now be upheld on appeal.

ARGUMENT

1. Plaintiff’s Pleadings Support this Court’s Exercise of Jurisdiction --

Texas jurisprudence is quite clear that “[t]he plaintiff bears the initial burden 

of pleading allegations sufficient to bring a nonresident defendant within the 

provisions of the long-arm statute.”43 No Texas Supreme Court ruling has directly 

decided the question of whether an appellate court should only consider the 

plaintiff’s petition or also fully consider “extended . . . allegations in the petition” 

(such as the plaintiff’s response to special appearance and/or supplements to 

pleadings). However, the Texas Court of Appeals (Thirteenth District of Texas), 

as a matter of actual practice, has historically considered all pleadings on file prior 

to the hearing on special appearance (including the plaintiff’s pleadings responsive 

to the defendant’s special appearance). “The meaning of the term “pleadings” 

must be limited at least so as to exclude matters not filed prior to the special 

 43 American Type Culture Collection, Inc. v. Coleman, 83 S.W.3d 801, 807 (Tex. 2002), cert. 

denied, 537 U.S. 1191 (2003); see also Frank A. Smith Sales, Inc., d/b/a Frank Smith Toyota v. 

Atlantic Aero, Inc., 31 S.W.3d 742, 746 (Tex. App. - - Corpus Christi 2000, no pet.); McKanna 

v. Edgar, 388 S.W.2d 927, 930 (Tex. 1965); M.G.M. Grand Hotel, Inc. v. Castro, 8 S.W.3d 403, 

408 n.1 (Tex.App. - - Corpus Christi 1999, no pet). 
19

appearance hearing.”44 A plaintiff’s pleading must set forth allegations sufficient 

to support a trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction, and an appellate court properly 

considers all of the plaintiff’s pleadings filed prior to the hearing on the 

defendant’s motion.45 In this lawsuit, Appellant does not seem to complain about 

the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s pleadings. To the extent that any such complaint may 

be alleged by Appellant , Plaintiff respectfully suggests that Plaintiff’s pleadings 

are more than adequate to support this Court’s exercise of jurisdiction over 

Appellant . 

2. Legal Authority in Support of a Court’s Exercise of Jurisdiction --

Of course, there is a wealth of judicial precedent to aid this Court in 

consideration of the present issues. In American Type Culture Collection, Inc. v. 

Marshall Coleman,

46 the Texas Supreme Court provides a keen summary of some 

of the threshold issues. The Texas Supreme Court is certainly capable of speaking 

for itself, and the Court’s opinion provides guidance. 

“Texas courts may assert personal jurisdiction over a 

nonresident defendant only if the Texas long-arm statute 

authorizes jurisdiction and the exercise of jurisdiction is 

consistent with federal and state due process standards.” 

Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance, Ltd. v. English China 

Clays, P.L.C., 815 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Tex. 1991). The Texas 

 44 Smith Toyota, at p. 746. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals (Texas) considered all pleadings 

filed prior to the time of the hearing on special appearance. 

45 The courts favor contemplation of all of the plaintiff’s pleadings (so long as the pleadings are 

filed prior to the hearing on the defendant’s special appearance). See Smith Toyota, at p. 746. 

46 83 S.W.3d 801 (Tex. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1191 (2003). 
20

long-arm statute reaches “as far as the federal constitutional 

requirements of due process will allow.” Id. Thus, the Texas 

long-arm statute requirements are satisfied if exercising 

jurisdiction comports with federal due process limitations. Id. 

“Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 

jurisdiction is proper if a nonresident defendant established 

“minimum contacts” with Texas and maintenance of the suit 

does not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial 

justice.” International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 

316 (1940). The purpose of the minimum-contacts analysis is 

to protect the defendant from being haled into court when its 

relationship with Texas is too attenuated to support 

jurisdiction. Schlobohm v. Shapiro, 784 S.W.2d 355, 357 

(Tex. 1990). Accordingly, we focus upon the defendant’s 

activities and expectations in deciding whether it is proper to 

call it before a Texas court. Id.” 

“The minimum-contacts analysis requires that a defendant 

“purposefully avail” itself of the privilege of conducting 

activities within Texas, thus invoking the benefits and 

protections of our laws. Burger King Corp. v.Rudzewicz, 471 

U.S. 462, 475 (1985). The defendant’s activities, whether they 

consist of direct acts within Texas or conduct outside Texas, 

must justify a conclusion that the defendant could reasonably 

anticipate being called into a Texas court. World-Wide 

Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980). . . . 

It is the quality and nature of the defendant’s contacts, rather 

than their number, that is important to the minimum-contacts 

analysis. Id. at 230 n. 11.”

“A defendant’s contacts with a forum can give rise to either 

specific or general jurisdiction. For a court to exercise specific 

jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, two requirements 

must be met: (1) the defendant’s contacts with the forum must 

be purposeful, and (2) the cause of action must arise from or 

relate to those contacts. Id. at 227. General jurisdiction . . ., 

on the other hand, allows a forum to exercise jurisdiction over 

a defendant even if the cause of action did not arise from or 

relate to a defendant’s contacts with the forum. Id. at 228. 
21

General jurisdiction is present when a defendant’s contacts 

with a forum are “continuous and systematic,” a more 

demanding minimum-contacts analysis than specific 

jurisdiction. Id. Coleman, at pp. 803-805. 

There is no reason for the undersigned to speak on those thresholds and standards 

where Texas’ high court has already spoken so clearly. If a defendant purposely 

avails itself of benefits of a forum, it only makes sense that such defendant should 

be amenable to the process of that forum. The minimum contacts analysis is less 

strict when facts support a trial court’s exercise of specific jurisdiction (as 

compared to a ‘general jurisdiction’ analysis). In the present case, an application 

of the facts (evidence) to the law demonstrates that this Court has both specific and 

general jurisdiction over Appellant . 

Additional case law provides further guidance: 

“When a corporation “purposefully avails itself of the privilege 

of conducting activities within the forum State,” Hanson v. 

Denckla, 357 U.S. [235] at 254, 78 S.Ct. [1228] at 1240 [2 

L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958)], it has clear notice that it is subject to 

suit there, and can act to alleviate the risk of burdensome 

litigation by procuring insurance, passing the expected costs on 

to customers, or, if the risks are too great, severing its 

connection with the State. Hence if the sale of a product of a 

manufacturer or distributor such as Audi or Volkswagen is not 

simply an isolated occurrence, but arises from the efforts of the 

manufacturer or distributor to serve directly or indirectly, the 

market for its product in other States, it is not unreasonable to 

subject it to suit in one of those States if its allegedly defective 

merchandise has been the source of injury to its owner or to 

others.” Kawasaki Steel Corp. v. Middleton, 699 S.W.2d 199, 

203 (Tex. 1985). 
22

“. . . a defendant has “purposefully availed itself of the 

privilege of conducting activities” in the forum state if the nonresident defendant sells its product to an independent 

distributor and “there is a reasonable expectation that the 

product will enter the forum state.” Oswalt v. Scripto, Inc., 

616 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1980). 

The Texas Supreme Court and United States Fifth Circuit opinions fall in line with 

each other (and further fall in line with the United States Supreme Court opinions 

relating to a court’s exercise of jurisdiction). The thresholds / parameters for this 

Court’s exercise of jurisdiction are quite clear. 

With definitive law and powerful evidence, fewer words may be exchanged in 

argument. On the other hand, the undersigned is professionally obligated to make 

argument on behalf of his client. As stated in Appellant ’s brief:

“The plaintiff has the initial burden to “plead sufficient 

allegations to confer jurisdiction.” Id. (citing American Type 

Culture Collection, Inc. v. Coleman, 83 S.W.3d 801, 807 

(Tex.2002)). Once that burden is met, the defendant seeking to 

avoid the court’s jurisdiction takes on the burden to negate “all 

potential bases for jurisdiction pled by the plaintiff.” Id.47

Plaintiff has properly pleaded facts in support of this Court’s exercise of 

jurisdiction over Appellant . As such, it is now Appellant ’s burden to negate all 

possible bases for this Court’s exercise of jurisdiction. Appellant -- for the 

reasons set forth herein -- cannot negate all possible bases for this Court’s exercise 

 47 Appellant ’s pleading is referencing Retamco Operating, Inc. v. Republic Drilling Co., 278 S.W.3d 333, 

337 (Tex. 2009)(citing BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 794 (Tex.2002). 
23

of jurisdiction. To the contrary, all of the law and all of the facts bode in favor of 

this Court’s exercise of jurisdiction over Appellant . 

3. This Court has Specific Jurisdiction over Appellant --

In Coleman, the high Court has made clear that for a court to exercise specific 

jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant (such as Appellant ), the claimant must 

present evidence that: 

“(1) the defendant’s contacts with the forum must be purposeful, and 

(2) the cause of action must arise from or relate to those contacts.” 

In this case, Appellant has a huge number of high quality purposeful contacts with 

the State of Texas. Mr. Oxley, Chief Financial Officer, Secretary, and Treasurer 

for Appellant since 2012, has testified that these contacts are “purposeful” (and 

have been purposeful during his eight (8) year tenure with the company). Such 

contacts with the State of Texas include, but are not limited to, boat shows in the 

State of Texas and internet promotions in contemplation of Appellant ’s clear 

desire to sell boats to Texans (one of its largest markets in the United States).48 

Defendant Dietz, on information and belief, purchased his MasterCraft boat 

because of Appellant ’s purposeful contacts (internet and/or boat show 

promotions) with the State of Texas (and its customers such as Defendant Dietz). 

Appellant ’s annual multi-million dollar advertising investment worked. 

Appellant ’s efforts caused its product (its boat) to be purchased, and brought to the 

 48 See deposition of Jay Povlin, (CR 1:218-220) 
24

State of Texas -- but for which this incident made the subject of this lawsuit would 

not have occurred. Clearly, the cause of action filed on behalf of Plaintiff ‘relates 

to Appellant ’s contacts’ with the State of Texas. 

Judicial authority supports this Court’s exercise of specific jurisdiction over 

Appellant . The Appellant has many purposeful contacts with the State of Texas 

(as noted herein). These contacts with the State of Texas were (and continue to be) 

purposeful. Some of these contacts include boat shows and internet promotional 

materials -- and these specific efforts by Appellant caused the purchase of the boat 

made the subject of this lawsuit (on information and belief). Appellant ’s 

purposeful contacts with the State of Texas “relate” to Plaintiff’s cause of action. 

Appellant has certainly not carried its burden to negate this Court’s exercise of 

jurisdiction. Thus, this Court is must properly exercise its power and authority 

over the parties made the subject of this lawsuit (including Appellant ). 

4. This Court has General Jurisdiction over Appellant --

In this case, this Court should also exercise its powers of general jurisdiction 

over Appellant . General jurisdiction is present when a defendant’s contacts with a 

forum are “continuous and systematic.”49 In this case, Appellant ’s contacts with 

the State of Texas are continuous and systematic. By way of example, but without 

 49 See Coleman, at pp. 803-805. 
25

limitation, Appellant very deliberately works and invests for its company’s sales 

and success in Texas markets. Appellant : 

1. purposefully contracts with Texas companies to be Appellant ’s authorized 

dealerships in Texas; 

2. purposefully enters into these authorized dealership contracts with Texas 

companies, performable in Texas, which are expressly (by agreement with 

Appellant ) governed by Texas law; 

3. purposefully enters into other promotional contracts with Texas promotional 

companies that are performable in Texas; 

4. purposefully contracts with its Texas customers (Texas MasterCraft boat 

owners) to provide warranty services (all these contracts performable in 

Texas);

5. purposefully agrees to perform recall services with its Texas customers (Texas 

MasterCraft boat owners) -- such recall services performable in Texas; 

6. purposefully pays money to the State of Texas (its franchise tax payments) for 

the privilege of doing its business in the State of Texas; 

7. purposefully spends millions of dollars to advertise and promote, including a 

focus on Texas with some of its selection of trade magazines, boat shows, 

Texas events, and more (especially in light of the fact that Texas is Appellant 

’s largest market (or one of them)) to sell boats to Texans; 
26

8. contracts with Texas companies (its authorized dealerships) to be listed as a 

named insured on insurance contracts performable in Texas (for claims filed 

in Texas); 

9. pays for customer satisfaction surveys of its Texas customers; 

10. indemnifies its authorized Texas dealerships in Texas; 

11. negotiates and resolves claims / disputes, in Texas, with its authorized Texas 

dealerships; 

12. strategically allocates its Texas markets to specific Texas companies for the 

sale of MasterCraft boats in Texas; 

13. controls 100% of all advertising content displayed for Appellant in Texas; 

14. sends its regional sales and marketing manager to Texas approximately ten 

(10) to twelve (12) times per year to promote sales in Texas; 

15. trains sales persons to sale its boats in Texas;

16. trains repair persons to make repairs of its boats in Texas; 

17. systematically reimburses its employees for sales related activities in Texas 

(hotel costs, rent-a-car costs, dining costs, etc.); 

18. controls its authorized Texas dealerships’ inventory on the floor, advertising, 

days and hours of operation, and more; 
27

19. markets in Texas by way of internet, boat shows, events, billboards, radio, and 

published advertising materials (some of which is directly delivered, and some 

of which flows through the authorized Texas dealerships); 

20. and more (see details of evidence listed above). 

“The purpose of the minimum-contacts analysis is to protect the defendant from 

being haled into court when its relationship with Texas is too attenuated to support 

jurisdiction.” Schlobohm v. Shapiro, 784 S.W.2d 355, 357 (Tex. 1990). Appellant 

’s relationship with the State of Texas cannot be said to be “too attenuated to 

support jurisdiction.” “The minimum-contacts analysis requires that a defendant 

“purposefully avail” itself of the privilege of conducting activities within Texas, 

thus invoking the benefits and protections of our laws.” Burger King Corp. v. 

Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985). The Appellant has “purposefully avail[ed]” 

itself of the privilege of conducting business in Texas -- and has, by its many 

contracts with Texas companies, invoked the benefits and protections of Texas 

laws. “When a corporation “purposefully avails itself of the privilege of 

conducting activities within the forum State,” Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. [235] 

at 254, 78 S.Ct. [1228] at 1240 [2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958)], it has clear notice that it is 

subject to suit . . . .” In this case, Appellant has been doing business in the State of 

Texas for years, and is on clear notice that it is subject to the laws of the State of 

Texas. , and can act to alleviate 
28

“Hence if the sale of a product of a manufacturer or distributor 

such as Audi or Volkswagen is not simply an isolated 

occurrence, but arises from the efforts of the manufacturer or 

distributor to serve directly or indirectly, the market for its 

product in other States, it is not unreasonable to subject it to suit 

in one of those States if its allegedly defective merchandise has 

been the source of injury to its owner or to others.” Kawasaki 

Steel Corp. v. Middleton, 699 S.W.2d 199, 203 (Tex. 1985). 

“. . . a defendant has “purposefully availed itself of the privilege 

of conducting activities” in the forum state if the non-resident 

defendant sells its product to an independent distributor and 

“there is a reasonableexpectation that the product will enter the 

forum state.” Oswalt v. Scripto, Inc., 616 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 

1980). 

In this case, Appellant ’s sale of boats into Texas is “not simply an isolated 

occurrence, but arises from [MasterCraft’s] efforts . . . to serve directly or 

indirectly, the market for its product . . . .” As such, Appellant is definitely subject 

to the laws of the State of Texas, and this Court’s jurisdiction. 

The Appellant has clearly failed in its burden to negate all possible bases for 

this Court’s exercise of jurisdiction. As such, this Court has jurisdiction over 

Appellant . 

In this case, there is substantial evidence to prove that Appellant is pushing 

its products in Texas (and here to stay in Texas). As noted herein above, 

Appellant contracts with its authorized Texas dealerships in Texas, sells hundreds 

of boats per year to these Texas dealerships (which are Texas companies), spends 

millions of dollars per year to market their boats (in Texas, and other states), 
29

contracts and pays warranty claims in Texas, contracts and pays recall claims in 

Texas, sends its employees to Texas on a regular and frequent schedule, pays taxes 

to the State of Texas to do business in Texas, contracts to assure applicability of 

insurance contracts to claims made in Texas, trains sales persons to sell its 

products in Texas, trains repair persons to repair its products in Texas, and more 

and more in the State of Texas. Appellant is subject to the laws of the State of 

Texas (and has agreed to be subject to such laws by the contracts it signs), and thus 

is subject to this Court’s exercise of jurisdiction. 

THIS COURT’S EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION DOES NOT

OFFEND TRADITIONAL NOTIONS OF FAIR PLAY

Even if a non-resident defendant has established minimum contacts within the 

forum state (e.g., Texas), the non-resident defendant should not be hailed into 

Texas court if to do so would violate notions of “fair play and substantial 

justice.”50 As such, this court may consider various factors when evaluating 

whether notions of “fair plan and substantial justice” are offended. The court may 

consider: (1) the burden upon the defendant; (2) the interest of the forum state in 

adjudicating the dispute; (3) the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and 

effective relief; (4) the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most 

 50 Asahi Metal industiral Company, Ltd. v. Superior Court of California, Solano County, 480 

U.S. 102, 113-115 (1987); Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476; Guardian Royal, 815 S.W.2d at 231. 
30

efficient resolution of controversies; and (5) the shared interests of the several 

states in furthering substantial social policies.51

1. The burden upon Appellant --

At the risk of stating the obvious: If Appellant can sells boat to Texans, sell 

boats to Texas companies (its authorized Texas dealerships), advertise in Texas, 

honor warranty and recall claims in Texas, enter into contracts in Texas that are 

performable in Texas, indemnify Texas companies for events in Texas, train sales 

persons to sell boats in Texas, train repair persons to repair boats in Texas, send 

their employees and managers to sell its products in Texas, and make franchise tax 

payments to the State of Texas -- then Appellant should not even be heard to 

suggest that litigating in Texas would be a burden. It would be disingenuous for 

Appellant to reep the rewards of the business in Texas, and then duck for cover 

when a claim gets filed in Texas. There is no more burden upon Appellant to 

litigate in Texas than for Appellant to conduct its business in Texas (which it has 

done for years). Appellant already has attorneys of its choosing in Houston, 

Texas, and it is no burden for such a milti-national, multi-million dollar company 

to appear in a Texas court. 

 51 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292; Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477; Asahi, 480 U.S. at 

113. 
31

2. The interest of Texas in Adjudicating this Dispute in Texas --

The State of Texas has an interest in supporting the legal rights of those 

residents of the State of Texas. This has long been the public policy supported by 

our legislature, and by our judicial system. Texas residents (such as Rebecca 

Chambers and John Dietz) have a right to expect that controversies arising in 

Texas will be adjudicated in their home courts (not in a jurisdiction or venue of 

another). 

3. Plaintiff’s Interest in Obtaining Convenient / Effiective Relef --

Plaintiff now has this claim filed against Appellant and Defendant Dietz. In 

its present posture, this multi-party dispute will be resolved in Nueces County, 

Texas (the location where the incident occurred). This makes sense. If Appellant 

’s special appearance is granted, then Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Dietz 

would be adjudicated in Texas -- but Plaintiff’s claims against Appellant would be 

adjudicated in Tennessee. 

Plaintiff’s legitimate interests to have the now-pending disputes resolved are 

served by keeping this lawsuit in Nueces County, Texas. It is more convenient and 

effeicient to the parties (certainly to Plaintiff and Defendant Deitz), and much more 

convenient and efficient than trying one case in Texas and another case in 

Tennessee. Thus, this factor bodes in favor of keeping this case in Nueces County, 

Texas (also). 
32

4. Interstate Judicial System’s Interest in Obtaining Efficient Resolution 

Both Texas and Tennessee courts must support a process that allows for the 

efficient resolution of all now-pending claims. The State of Tennessee cannot 

exercise its jurisdiction over Defendant Dietz. Both Texas and Tennessee courts 

would likely agree that Texas is the most convenient forum that may allow a 

comprehensive / efficient adjudication of the disputes made the subject of this 

lawsuit. The incident occurred in Texas. Many of the witnesses reside in Texas. 

The law enforcement personnel who investigated the incident are in Texas. The 

doctors attending to Rebecca Chambers are in Texas. Medical records are in 

Texas. Far and away, both Texas and Tennessee courts should agree that this 

dispute can most efficiently be resolved in the State of Texas. 

5. Shared Interests of States to Further Social Policies --

Both Texas and Tennessee courts have a shared interest in advancing social 

policies for their residents. Only Texas courts have this relationship to Plaintiff 

and Defendant Dietz. The Texas courts have an interest in deciding disputes that 

arise between Texas residents. 

All factors strongly support the conclusion that this Court’s exercise of its 

jurisdictional powers over Appellant would not ‘offend traditional notions of fair 

play and substantial justice.’ The incident made the subject of this lawsuit 

occurred in Nueces County, Texas. The claimant in this case is a Texas resident. 
33

One of the defendants in this lawsuit is a Texas resident. All parties have -- for 

many years -- agreed to subject themselves to the laws of the State of Texas. This 

case needs to stay in Texas (for all of the reasons set forth herein above). 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein above, this Court may properly exercise its 

powers of specific jurisdiction and general jurisdiction over Appellant . This 

Appellant has clearly been engaged in business in the State of Texas (for many 

years) -- and any pretense that Texas law somehow allows Appellant to reap the 

benefits of doing business in Texas while avoiding any consequences is flawed. 

The Appellant is subject to our Texas courts’ rule of law. 

WHEREFORE, PREEMISES CONSIDERED, Plaintiff prays that Appellant 

’s special appearance be denied, that this court maintian this case on its docket, that 

Plaintiff be granted such other and further relief to which Plaintiff may be justly 

entited (both at law and in equity), for for such other reief as is just and right. 

Respectfully submitted,

Law Office of Douglas A. Allison

403 N. Tancahua

Corpus Christi, Texas 78401

Phone: 361/888-6002

Fax: 361/888-6651
34

By: /s/ Douglas A. Allison

Douglas A. Allison

State Bar No. 01083500

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been 

forwarded on this 26th day of April, 2016, via Facsimile to the following counsel of 

record, in accordance to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.5:

Via Facsimile: (713) 953-9470

Mr. Michael J. Wray

LEGGE, FARROW, KIMMITT, MCGRATH & BROWN, L.L.P. 

5151 San Felipe, Suite 400 

Houston, Texas 77056

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

MASTERCRAFT BOAT COMPANY, LLC

Via Facsimile: (210) 340-9888

Mr. Larry J. Goldman

GOLDMAN & ASSOCIATES PLLC

10100 Reunion Place, Suite 800

San Antonio, Texas 78216

ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 

JOHN DIETZ

 /s/Douglas A. Allison 

 Douglas A. Allison
35

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(2)(B)(3), I certify that 

this document contains 7721 words.

/s/Douglas A. Allison

Douglas A. Allison