In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: June 29, 2023

S22G0527. GEORGIA CVS PHARMACY, LLC v. CARMICHAEL.

S22G0617. WELCH et al. v. PAPPAS RESTAURANTS, INC.

S22G0618. WELCH et al. v. TACTICAL SECURITY GROUP, LLC.

 BETHEL, Justice.

Collectively, these cases present an opportunity to explore the 

scope and nature of the liability faced by premises owners, occupiers,

and security contractors in cases involving personal injuries arising 

from third-party criminal conduct. Although the underlying appeals 

vary with respect to their facts and specific issues presented, the 

resolution of each appeal necessitates consideration of fundamental 

principles of premises liability under Georgia law. 

In granting certiorari in these cases, we posed the following 

questions:

1. For a claim brought under OCGA § 51-3-1 that alleges 

negligent security, to what extent, if at all, is proof that the 

underlying criminal act occurring on the premises was 

reasonably foreseeable part of the plaintiff’s burden to prove 
2

the elements of duty, breach, or proximate cause?

2. In light of the answer to the first question, is the question 

whether a criminal act occurring on the premises was 

reasonably foreseeable generally for the judge or the 

factfinder?

3. What is the legal test for determining whether a criminal act 

occurring on the premises was reasonably foreseeable? For 

example, is reasonable foreseeability determined based on 

the totality of the circumstances, or is some more specific 

showing required, such as prior, substantially similar 

crimes occurring on or near the premises?

In Case No. S22G0527, we also specifically asked the following:

4. When apportioning fault, can a rational factfinder 

determine that an intentional tortfeasor whose actions 

directly caused the plaintiff’s injuries bears no fault for those 

injuries?

Finally, in Case No. S22G0618, we posed the following question:

5. Under Georgia law, does a party rendering security services 

to the owner or occupier of property in a premises-liability 

case owe a duty of care to third parties under any of the 

bases set out in Section 324A of the Restatement (Second) of 

Torts?

Today, as discussed more fully below, we clarify that the 

reasonable foreseeability of a third-party criminal act is a 

determination linked to a proprietor’s duty to keep the premises and 
3

approaches safe under OCGA § 51-3-1, and that the totality of the 

circumstances informs whether a third-party criminal act was 

reasonably foreseeable. Moreover, the question of reasonable 

foreseeability is generally reserved to the trier of fact, but the trial 

court may resolve the issue as a matter of law where no rational 

juror could determine the issue in favor of the non-moving party. 

Additionally, with respect to Case No. S22G0527, we hold that, 

under the specific circumstances of the case before us, the verdict 

apportioning no fault to the intentional tortfeasor is not inconsistent

because, when considered in conjunction with the instructions to the 

jury, the verdict is capable of a viable construction. And with respect 

to Case No. S22G0618, we hold that a party rendering security 

services to a proprietor may owe a duty of care to third parties 

visiting the premises in accordance with the standard outlined in 

Section 324A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.

Consistent with these conclusions, we affirm the judgment of 

the Court of Appeals in Case No. S22G0527; and in Case Nos. 

S22G0617 and S22G0618, we reverse in part and vacate in part the 
4

judgments of the Court of Appeals and remand the cases for 

reconsideration consistent with this opinion. 

I. Background

In each of the cases at bar, the plaintiffs, while present as 

invitees on property owned, operated, and/or secured by the 

defendants, sustained injuries resulting from third-party criminal 

conduct. One person died as a result of his injuries. We summarize 

the relevant factual and procedural histories of the cases before us

below.1

A. Case No. S22G0527

Plaintiff James Carmichael was shot during an armed robbery 

that took place in and around his vehicle in the parking lot of a CVS 

store; Carmichael thereafter filed a premises liability claim against 

CVS. Following a trial, the jury awarded damages to Carmichael,

 1 The Court thanks the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the Georgia 

Chamber of Commerce, the Georgia Trial Lawyers Association, the Georgia 

Defense Lawyers Association, Georgians for Lawsuit Reform, the Atlanta 

Volunteer Lawyers Foundation, Retail Litigation Center, Inc., the National 

Retail Federation, the National Federation of Independent Businesses, and the 

National Association of Security Companies for their amici curiae briefs, which 

shed light on these important questions of Georgia law.
5

finding CVS ninety-five percent at fault for Carmichael’s injuries

and Carmichael five percent at fault, but apportioning no fault to 

the shooter. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that there was 

sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that 

the crime was foreseeable. The Court of Appeals further concluded

that the jury’s verdict apportioning no fault to the shooter was not 

void because the jury “‘considered’ the fault of all who potentially 

contributed,” including the shooter, and because, the court reasoned, 

the jury could have decided, based on the evidence, not to assign any 

fault to the shooter. Ga. CVS Pharmacy, LLC v. Carmichael, 362 Ga. 

App. 59, 63-67, 70-71 (1), (3) (865 SE2d 559) (2021). The Court of 

Appeals also noted that, even if the evidence was insufficient to

support the jury’s apportionment of fault, any error was harmless 

because, under its reading of OCGA § 51-12-33 (b), damages may be 

reduced only when multiple defendants are named in a case. Thus, 

the Court of Appeals concluded, CVS would not have been entitled 

to apportionment of damages. See id. at 71 (3). CVS filed a petition 

for certiorari in this Court, which we granted. 
6

B. Case Nos. S22G0617 and S22G0618

Anthony L. Welch (“Anthony”) was killed during an armed 

robbery in the parking lot of the Pappadeaux restaurant; the 

parking lot was patrolled by Tactical Security pursuant to Tactical’s

contract with Pappas Restaurants, Inc., the owner of Pappadeaux. 

Anthony’s surviving spouse, Cynthia Welch (“Welch”), filed suit2

against Pappas and Tactical (collectively, “the defendants”), raising

several claims, including one for premises liability based on the 

defendants’ alleged negligence in securing the property. The trial 

court denied the defendants’ separate motions for summary 

judgment, but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Anthony’s

shooting was not reasonably foreseeable and that the defendants’ 

liability was therefore precluded. Pappas Restaurants, Inc. v. Welch, 

362 Ga. App. 152, 154-161 (1) (a)-(b) (867 SE2d 152) (2021). Further, 

the Court of Appeals declined to hold that Tactical owed any duty to 

the Welches under Section 324A of the Restatement (Second) of 

 2 Welch filed suit in her individual capacity and as administrator of 

Anthony’s estate.
7

Torts. Id. at 162-163 (2). We thereafter granted Welch’s petitions for 

certiorari.

II. Premises Liability Claims Involving Third-Party Criminal 

Activity

Turning to the underlying legal principles, we recognize that 

the case law that has developed over the years in Georgia premises 

liability cases involving third-party criminal activity has not plotted 

a clear roadmap for parties, litigators, or trial courts. It is wellsettled that a proprietor owes its invitees a duty “to exercise 

ordinary care in keeping the premises and approaches safe.” OCGA 

§ 51-3-1.3 It is also generally accepted that, while a proprietor is 

“bound to exercise ordinary care to protect the invitee from 

unreasonable risks” of which he has knowledge, he is not an insurer 

of an invitee’s safety. See Lau’s Corp. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491, 492

 3 OCGA § 51-3-1 provides: 

Where an owner or occupier of land, by express or implied 

invitation, induces or leads others to come upon his premises for 

any lawful purpose, he is liable in damages to such persons for 

injuries caused by his failure to exercise ordinary care in keeping 

the premises and approaches safe.

In this case, CVS and Pappas, whom we refer to as “proprietors,” undisputedly 

occupy the land on which they operate their respective businesses and, thus, 

are subject to the duty imposed by this statute. 
8

(1) (405 SE2d 474) (1991). See also Martin v. Six Flags Over Georgia 

II, L.P., 301 Ga. 323, 328 (II) (801 SE2d 24) (2017) (same). Moreover,

the law recognizes that, where an invitee is injured by a third party’s

intervening criminal act, the proprietor is generally insulated from 

liability; an exception to this general rule arises, however, where the 

proprietor had sufficient reason to anticipate such criminal conduct. 

See Martin, 301 Ga. at 328 (II). We granted certiorari in these cases

in part to address the relationship between reasonable foreseeability 

and the specific elements of a premises liability claim involving 

third-party criminal activity, the respective roles of the trial court 

and the jury in that analysis, and how reasonable foreseeability 

should be determined.4

A. The reasonable foreseeability of a crime informs the

duty owed.

 4 The proprietors and several amici writing in support of the positions of 

the proprietors, in addition to arguing the points raised in our statutory and 

decisional law, present argument noting the policy consequences associated 

with holding proprietors responsible for the criminal actions of others. We 

confine our analysis to the statutory and decisional law governing these cases. 

We do so not because the questions raised in those arguments are unimportant. 

Rather, we defer those arguments to the consideration of the policy-making 

branches.
9

As a general rule, in order to recover on a premises liability

claim arising from third-party criminal conduct, a plaintiff must 

present evidence of a duty, a breach of that duty, causation, and 

damages. See Goldstein, Garber & Salama, LLC v. J.B., 300 Ga. 840, 

841-842 (1) (797 SE2d 87) (2017); Lau’s Corp., 261 Ga. at 492. In our 

first question to the parties, we asked whether and how the concept 

of reasonable foreseeability informs each of these elements – that is, 

whether reasonable foreseeability is part of the plaintiff’s burden to 

prove the elements of duty, breach, or causation. We hold that the 

reasonable foreseeability of third-party criminal conduct is properly 

considered as part of a proprietor’s duty to exercise ordinary care in 

keeping the premises and approaches safe under OCGA § 51-3-1

although considerations of foreseeability also inform other elements

of a premises liability claim, as we will discuss below.

Relying on prior decisions of this Court, Pappas and CVS both 

argue – and we agree – that reasonable foreseeability factors into 

the analysis of the duty element. More specifically, the foreseeability 

of the criminal act informs whether the proprietor’s duty of ordinary 
10

care owed pursuant to OCGA § 51-3-1 encompasses the duty to keep 

invitees safe from third-party criminal conduct. Under longstanding 

precedent, “[i]f the proprietor has reason to anticipate a criminal act, 

he or she then has a duty to exercise ordinary care to guard against 

injury from dangerous characters.” (Citation and punctuation 

omitted.) Lau’s Corp., 261 Ga. at 492 (1). See also Sturbridge 

Partners, Ltd. v. Walker, 267 Ga. 785, 786-787 (482 SE2d 339) (1997) 

(same); Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Godard, 211 Ga. 373, 377 (1) 

(86 SE2d 311) (1955) (“The petition in this case, which alleged that 

the defendants well knew that dangerous, reckless, and lawless 

characters and persons who were strangers frequented the premises 

described during the nighttime, including prowlers and hoboes, was 

sufficient to charge the defendants with the duty to anticipate the 

criminal act alleged, and to exercise ordinary care to protect its 

employees therefrom.”); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 344 cmt. f 

(1965) (“If the place or character of his business, or his past 

experience, is such that he should reasonably anticipate careless or 

criminal conduct on the part of third persons, either generally or at 
11

some particular time, [a proprietor] may be under a duty to take 

precautions against it[.]”). But “without foreseeability that a 

criminal act will occur, no duty on the part of the proprietor to 

exercise ordinary care to prevent that act arises.” Days Inns of 

America v. Matt, 265 Ga. 235, 236 (454 SE2d 507) (1995). See also 

Martin, 301 Ga. at 328 (II) (“[T]he [proprietor]’s duty extends only 

to foreseeable criminal acts.” (citation and punctuation omitted)); 

Doe v. Prudential-Bache/A.G. Spanos Realty Partners, L.P., 268 Ga. 

604, 605 (492 SE2d 865) (1997) (“It is well-settled that a landlord 

only has a duty to protect tenants from the criminal attacks of third 

parties if those attacks are foreseeable.”).5 In other words, a 

proprietor necessarily owes a duty to invitees to exercise ordinary 

care to keep his premises reasonably safe, see OCGA § 51-3-1; 

whether that duty of ordinary care embraces the specific duty to 

protect invitees against third-party criminal conduct hinges on 

 5 As stated in a familiar case, “the risk reasonably to be perceived defines 

the duty to be obeyed[.]” Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 344 (162 

NE 99) (1928).
12

foreseeability.6

Of course, a finding that third-party criminal conduct was 

reasonably foreseeable and thereby gave rise to a duty to protect 

invitees from that harm does not itself establish the proprietor’s

liability for the plaintiff’s injury. Instead, a factfinder must go on to

address the next element of negligence: to determine whether the 

proprietor acted reasonably in the face of the particular foreseeable 

risk or whether the proprietor breached its duty to do so. So, 

foreseeability bears on this separate inquiry, too, but in a relative 

sense: for example, the factfinder must weigh the likelihood and 

severity of the foreseeable harm against the cost and feasibility of 

 6 The concept of reasonable foreseeability relevant to duty is different 

from the concept of foreseeability bearing on proximate cause, and the parties’ 

arguments that reasonable foreseeability factors into the analysis of the 

proximate-causation element conflates these principles. The question of 

reasonable foreseeability relevant to duty in these cases is whether, as a 

general matter, the proprietor had reason to anticipate, and thus had a duty 

to protect invitees against, third-party criminal conduct. The question of 

foreseeability relevant to proximate cause asks whether, assuming the 

proprietor both owed and breached a duty to protect against criminal conduct, 

the kind of harm that occurred was a foreseeable result of – or, in other words, 

a “probable or natural consequence of” – that breach. Salama, 300 Ga. at 842 

(1). Or, as the inquiry is sometimes framed, whether the kind of harm that 

occurred was within the “scope of the risk” created by the proprietor’s 

negligence. See Dan B. Dobbs, Dobbs’ Law of Torts § 198 (2023). 
13

additional security measures in considering whether the duty owed 

was breached. See, e.g., Jackson v. Post Properties, Inc., 236 Ga. App. 

701, 703 (2) (2) (513 SE2d 259) (1999) (whether the extra window 

locks offered by the apartment complex were sufficient to 

demonstrate ordinary care and whether the plaintiff’s rape “was the 

result of the flimsy nature of the [builder-installed] windows” were 

issues for the jury’s determination). In such circumstances, a 

factfinder must decide whether the proprietor’s security measures 

were reasonable, even though the criminal act was reasonably 

foreseeable in the broad sense necessary to establish a duty. See 

Lau’s Corp., 261 Ga. at 494 (2). If the trier of fact deems the 

proprietor’s security measures reasonable in light of the 

circumstances, or if the plaintiff fails to present evidence that the 

security precautions employed to protect against the particular 

foreseeable risk of harm violated the applicable standard of care, 

then there was no breach of duty, and there can be no finding of 

negligence. See, e.g., Lau’s Corp., 261 Ga. at 493 (2) (“[T]o be 

negligent, the conduct must be unreasonable in light of the 
14

recognizable risk of harm.”); Martin, 301 Ga. at 335 (II) (B) n.8

(“Undertaking measures to protect patrons does not heighten the 

standard of care; and taking some measures does not ordinarily 

constitute evidence that further measures might be required.”); 

Hunter v. Rouse-Atlanta, Inc., 211 Ga. App. 131, 132 (2) (438 SE2d 

188) (1993) (“There was no evidence that any security efforts 

undertaken by appellees were otherwise below a reasonable 

standard of care[.]” (citation and punctuation omitted)); Shell Oil v. 

Diehl, 205 Ga. App. 367, 368 (1) (422 SE2d 63) (1992) (noting that 

“appellee introduced no evidence that the security precautions 

which were being employed on appellants’ business premises did not 

comply with the standard of care” or were otherwise unreasonable).

B. The jury generally decides reasonable foreseeability, but

as with any jury question, the trial court may resolve the 

issue as a matter of law where no rational juror could 

determine the issue in favor of the non-moving party.

We also asked the parties to address whether the reasonable 

foreseeability of a crime is determined by the trial court as a matter 

of law or by the jury as a matter of fact. CVS and Pappas rely on the 
15

settled understanding that the existence of a legal duty is a question 

of law for the court. The plaintiffs point to our settled law which 

holds that, in this context, the question of reasonable foreseeability 

of a criminal attack is generally decided by a jury. Each proposition 

is generally correct.

It is well established that “[t]he existence of a legal duty, which 

can arise by statute or be imposed by decisional law, is a question of 

law for the court.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Maynard v. 

Snapchat, Inc., 313 Ga. 533, 535-536 (2) (870 SE2d 739) (2022). See 

also Rasnick v. Krishna Hospitality, Inc., 289 Ga. 565, 567 (713 SE2d 

835) (2011) (“The legal duty is the obligation to conform to a 

standard of conduct under the law for the protection of others 

against unreasonable risks of harm. This legal obligation to the

complaining party must be found, the observance of which would 

have averted or avoided the injury or damage[.]”); City of Rome v. 

Jordan, 263 Ga. 26, 27 (1) (426 SE2d 861) (1993) (same). Here, the 

duty is imposed by statute. OCGA § 51-3-1 imposes on proprietors a 

legal duty to exercise ordinary care to keep the premises safe for 
16

invitees, and we have held time and again that, “[i]f there is reason 

to anticipate some criminal conduct, the landowner must exercise 

ordinary care to protect its invitees from injuries caused by such 

conduct[.]” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) See Martin, 301 Ga. 

at 328 (II). See also Sturbridge, 267 Ga. at 785-786; Lau’s Corp., 261 

Ga. at 492 (1). Because “landowners need not guard against 

imagined dangers[,]” this duty of care “extends only to foreseeable

criminal acts.” (Citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis in 

original.) Martin, 301 Ga. at 328 (II).

But because the question of whether a legal duty arises in a 

particular case turns on the presence of certain factual 

circumstances, the factfinder also has a role to play in determining 

whether a third party’s criminal attack was reasonably foreseeable. 

This determination will often turn on factual questions, such as the 

nature of the crimes, if any, that previously occurred on or near the 

premises, where and when those crimes happened, what 

information the proprietor knew about the crimes, and whether that 

information gave him reason to anticipate the harm that occurred.
17

See Sturbridge, 267 Ga. at 786. For this reason, it is well settled that 

the question of reasonable foreseeability in this context is generally 

a question for the jury to decide. See, e.g., id. at 786 (“[T]he question 

of reasonable foreseeability of a criminal attack is generally for a 

jury’s determination rather than summary adjudication by the 

courts.” (citation and punctuation omitted)); Doe, 268 Ga. at 606 

(“[Q]uestions of foreseeability are generally for a jury to decide[.]”); 

Lau’s Corp., 261 Ga. at 493 (2) (“The particular standard of care to 

be applied and whether the owner breached that standard are 

usually issues to be decided by a jury.”); Lay v. Munford, Inc., 235 

Ga. 340, 341 (219 SE2d 416) (1975) (“The question of reasonable 

foreseeability and the statutory duty imposed by [the predecessor to 

OCGA § 51-3-1], to exercise ordinary care to protect the plaintiff in 

the circumstances of this case, is for a jury’s determination rather 

than summary adjudication by the courts.”). 

Of course, as with any jury question, the trial court, in “plain 

and palpable cases,” may resolve the question of reasonable 

foreseeability as a matter of law – that is, if the court concludes on 
18

summary judgment that no rational juror could resolve the issue in 

the non-moving party’s favor. See Lau’s Corp., 261 Ga. at 493 (1) 

(“The particular standard of care to be applied and whether the 

owner breached that standard are usually issues to be decided by a 

jury. However, these issues may be decided by the court in plain and 

palpable cases where reasonable minds cannot differ as to the 

conclusion to be reached.” (citation and punctuation omitted)); see 

also Doe, 268 Ga. at 606 (determining, under the facts of the case, 

that the prior property crimes were insufficient to create a factual 

issue regarding foreseeability); Sun Trust Banks, Inc. v. Killebrew, 

266 Ga. 109, 109-110 (464 SE2d 207) (1995) (affirming grant of 

summary judgment because, in the absence of knowledge of criminal 

activity, the proprietor did not have a duty to investigate police files 

to determine whether criminal activities had occurred on its 

premises); Shadow v. Fed. Express Corp., 359 Ga. App. 772, 775 (4) 

(860 SE2d 87) (2021) (summary judgment appropriate where the 

plaintiff failed to raise a question of fact as to whether a mass 

shooting was reasonably foreseeable). But where the evidence is 
19

sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact with respect to 

whether third-party criminal conduct was foreseeable under the 

facts of a given case, then the matter is for the jury to resolve. See, 

e.g., Sturbridge, 267 Ga. at 787 (“[E]vidence of the prior burglaries 

was sufficient to give rise to a triable issue as to whether or not [the 

proprietor] had the duty to exercise ordinary care to safeguard its 

tenants against the foreseeable risks posed by the prior 

burglaries.”); Mason v. Chateau Communities, Inc., 280 Ga. App. 

106, 113-114 (633 SE2d 426) (2006) (determining that questions of 

fact existed as to whether a landlord should have reasonably 

foreseen a criminal attack upon its tenant and whether it exercised 

ordinary care in response, which were for the jury to resolve).

In short, as a matter of law, the legal duty to keep the premises 

safe is imposed by statute and has been construed to encompass a 

duty to protect against foreseeable third-party criminal acts. But

whether the third-party criminal acts were foreseeable under the 

facts of a particular case – thus triggering the duty to protect against 

them – is a question for the factfinder (unless no rational juror could 
20

find the criminal act reasonably foreseeable).

C. The reasonable foreseeability of a third-party criminal 

act is determined from the totality of the circumstances.

We next asked the parties how reasonable foreseeability itself 

is determined in this context. For reasons we explain below, we 

conclude that the pertinent question is whether the totality of the 

circumstances relevant to the premises gave the proprietor 

sufficient “reason to anticipate the criminal act” giving rise to the 

plaintiff’s injuries on the premises. This determination is not 

susceptible to a mechanical formulation and instead must be made 

on a case-by-case basis. 

In decisional law spanning almost 70 years, we have looked to 

a variety of evidence in considering whether such evidence was 

sufficient to allow a jury to decide if the criminal conduct in a given 

case was reasonably foreseeable. See, e.g., Atlantic Coast Line, 211 

Ga. at 377 (1), 382 (9) (considering whether evidence supported 

allegation that night clerk at train depot knew that “dangerous, 

reckless, and lawless characters” frequented the premises at night, 
21

which gave reason to anticipate criminal act and so was sufficient to 

charge defendants with a duty to anticipate the resulting crime and 

to exercise ordinary care to protect its employees therefrom); Lay, 

235 Ga. at 340-341 (reversing grant of summary judgment where 

defendant was “aware” that an armed robbery might occur because 

the convenience store had been the “scene of numerous armed 

robberies” and had hired a stakeout unit as a result); Lau’s Corp., 

261 Ga. at 492-493 (1) (evidence of one prior purse snatching in a 

high crime area was enough to raise triable issue as to duty in the 

context of a robbery); Days Inn, 265 Ga. at 236 (proof of one prior 

robbery committed by force was enough to raise a triable issue of 

reasonable foreseeability); Sturbridge, 267 Ga. at 787 (recent 

daytime burglaries of vacant apartments created a triable issue 

regarding the reasonable foreseeability of a rape by an intruder into 

an occupied apartment during morning hours); Doe, 268 Ga. at 606 

(property crimes in a parking garage involving vandalism and thefts

of bicycles and from vehicles did not create triable issue regarding 

the reasonable foreseeability of rape and robbery in that same 
22

parking garage); Martin, 301 Ga. at 331-332 (II) (A) (evidence that 

a park was “routinely the site of gang congregation and activity,” 

which came up in daily employee briefings at least once a week, that 

gang graffiti was present in the men’s employee locker room, and 

that a drive-by shooting had occurred at bus stop in the parking lot

were all relevant to determining reasonable foreseeability of a gang 

attack on a patron).

The facts establishing foreseeability in a particular case may 

vary, but evidence of substantially similar prior criminal activity is

typically central to the inquiry. As this Court has previously set 

forth, reasonable foreseeability can be established by evidence 

showing that the proprietor had knowledge7 of prior criminal 

 7 We clarify here that the knowledge relevant to the question of 

reasonable foreseeability is the proprietor’s knowledge. In three of our cases, 

we said that the duty was to protect against harms of which the proprietor has 

“superior knowledge.” See Tyner v. Matta-Troncoso, 305 Ga. 480, 485 n.7 (826 

SE2d 100) (2019) (“[P]laintiffs must show that the landlord had a reason to 

anticipate or foresee the harmful acts of others based on prior experience with 

substantially similar types of acts that gave the landlord superior knowledge 

of the danger posed.” (emphasis supplied)); Martin, 301 Ga. at 330 (II) (A) 

(“[T]he landowner’s duty is to protect its invitees against ‘unreasonable risks’ 

of which it has ‘superior knowledge.”) (citing Lau’s Corp., 261 Ga. at 492 (1)); 

Lau’s Corp., 261 Ga. at 492 (1). This articulation invites confusion, because 
23

activities that “occur[red] on or near the premises so that a 

reasonable person would take ordinary precautions to protect his or 

her customers or tenants against the risk posed by that type of 

activity.” Sturbridge, 267 Ga. at 786. This reflects the commonsense 

notion that knowledge of past criminal conduct can give a proprietor 

“reason to anticipate” – and thus protect against – future criminal 

conduct on the premises. See id. Whether knowledge of such past 

crimes in fact gave the proprietor reason to anticipate the criminal 

act in question – i.e., whether the act was reasonably foreseeable –

depends on the “location, nature and extent of the prior criminal 

 

“superior knowledge,” properly understood, involves the relative knowledge of 

the proprietor and the plaintiff. In order to establish that a proprietor’s 

knowledge is superior, one must show not only that the proprietor knew about 

the hazard, but also that the plaintiff did not know (or knew less) about the 

hazard (and thus could not have avoided it through the exercise of ordinary 

care). See Reid v. Augusta-Richmond County Coliseum Auth., 203 Ga. App. 

235, 239 (2) (416 SE2d 776) (1992) (“[A] proprietor is not liable for a plaintiff’s 

injuries caused by a dangerous condition on the premises if the plaintiff had 

equal or superior knowledge of the danger, and could have[,] by the exercise of 

ordinary care, avoided the danger.”). The plaintiff’s knowledge is relevant to 

the ultimate question of liability, but it has nothing to do with the proprietor’s 

knowledge – and thus, the proprietor’s duty. Determining the reasonable 

foreseeability of a crime asks simply whether the proprietor had sufficient

reason to anticipate the criminal act. See Sturbridge, 267 Ga. at 786. We do 

not read these cases as suggesting otherwise. 
24

activities and their likeness, proximity or other relationship to the 

crime in question.” Id.8 This makes good sense: if the past crimes in 

question (1) happened closer in proximity to the subject premises, 

(2) happened closer in time to the criminal conduct at issue, (3) 

happened more frequently, and (4) were more similar to the act that 

is the subject of the litigation, then all else equal, a proprietor will 

ordinarily have better and stronger reasons to anticipate that the 

particular criminal act could occur on the premises. See, e.g., id. at 

785-787 (three prior burglaries of vacant apartments at a complex, 

two of which the defendant knew about, in the months preceding the 

sexual assault inside an occupied unit created issue of fact regarding 

 8 In Sturbridge, we noted that the issue was “whether [the proprietor] 

had actual knowledge of the prior burglaries and, because of that knowledge, 

should have reasonably anticipated the risk of personal harm to a tenant which 

might occur in the burglary of an occupied apartment.” (Emphasis supplied.) 

267 Ga. at 787. CVS takes issue with the Court’s use of “might” in Sturbridge, 

arguing that the language suggests that a proprietor is responsible for crimes 

that are merely possible, as opposed to probable. But CVS has elevated 

semantics over substance. Read in context, our use of “might” in Sturbridge

does not suggest that a mere possibility of criminal activity would, standing 

alone, be sufficient to establish foreseeability. Rather, the standard is whether

the prior incident was sufficient to “attract the landlord’s attention to the 

dangerous condition which resulted[.]” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id.

at 786. 
25

foreseeability); Martin, 301 Ga. at 326-332 (I), (II) (A) (prior gang 

activity on the property within the year preceding the gang-related 

crime made that crime foreseeable). Although these characteristics 

are neither exhaustive nor required in every case, where they are 

present, the question is where the mix of evidence of past incidents 

falls on the spectrum of foreseeability. Given the importance of prior 

criminal acts to proving foreseeability, this inquiry will be part of 

the typical premises liability cases arising from third-party criminal 

conduct. 

However, we do not think the sweep of our cases in this space 

can be fairly read to impose a bright-line rule that only certain, 

specific kinds of evidence must be shown to establish foreseeability, 

especially because an inquiry under the totality of the circumstances 

is necessarily case-specific. In Martin, this Court noted that “the 

foreseeability of future criminal acts may be established by evidence 

of prior criminal acts of a ‘substantially similar’ nature,” as well as 
26

“[a]n establishment’s location in a high crime area”9 and “evidence 

that the landowner had knowledge of a volatile situation brewing on 

the premises.”10 301 Ga. at 331 (II) (A). See also Lau’s Corp., 261 Ga. 

at 493 (2) (“[A] high crime rate in a particular area may increase the 

risk of harm to patrons so that a prudent owner will take security 

 9 Both considerations of specific, similar prior crimes and a property’s 

location in a “high-crime area” are rooted in the same basic understanding: a 

criminal act’s foreseeability with respect to a particular premises depends in 

large part (but not exclusively) on the proprietor’s knowledge that certain 

criminal acts had previously occurred. Of course, even where certain similar 

crimes or a property’s location in a “high-crime area” are considered under a 

totality of the circumstances, an assertion that a business is situated in a 

“high-crime area” is not, on its own, sufficient to establish a duty to keep the 

premises safe from every conceivable crime. See Lau’s Corp., 261 Ga. at 493 (2) 

(proprietors need not warn invitees of a “generalized risk of crime”). Instead, 

as with other circumstances that may establish the reasonable foreseeability 

of a crime, the evidence presented must be sufficient to “attract the landlord’s 

attention to the dangerous condition which resulted” and thereby require the 

proprietor to take ordinary precautions to protect customers against similar 

future crimes. Sturbridge, 267 Ga. at 786.

10 Unlike premises liability claims, active negligence claims do not 

involve injuries resulting from a condition of the premises over which the 

proprietor could have exercised some degree of control or of which the 

proprietor could have warned, but rather injuries originating from the 

proprietor’s or his employee’s failure to exercise ordinary care and not to 

subject others to an unreasonable risk of harm. See Lipham v. Federated Dept. 

Stores, Inc., 263 Ga. 865, 865 (440 SE2d 193) (1994) (OCGA § 51-3-1 does not 

limit the liability of a store owner for the negligent act of his employee). See 

also Cham v. ECI Mgmt. Corp., 311 Ga. 170, 176 (2) (a) n.6 (856 SE2d 267) 

(2021) (noting that OCGA § 51-1-3 does not apply to cases of “active negligence” 

but rather to the “condition of the premises”).
27

precautions.”).11

And though, notably, two of our prior cases might be read to 

suggest a bright-line rule requiring evidence of a “substantially 

similar” prior crime, we now reject any such reading. More 

specifically, this Court’s opinions in Sturbridge and Tyner include 

language that could be understood to require that, in every case 

pertaining to a proprietor’s liability for third-party criminal acts, the 

plaintiff cannot establish reasonable foreseeability without pointing

to a substantially similar prior crime. See Sturbridge, 267 Ga. at 786 

(“[T]he incident causing the injury must be substantially similar in 

type to the previous criminal activities occurring on or near the 

premises so that a reasonable person would take ordinary 

 11 We also stress that the touchstone of premises liability remains the 

proprietor’s failure to protect against a condition on the premises that creates 

a foreseeable risk of harm. See Martin, 301 Ga. at 331-332 (II) (A); Sturbridge, 

267 Ga. at 786. This is why generalized crime statistics lacking a clear 

connection to the premises in question, taken alone, are unlikely to be helpful

in establishing a foreseeable risk of third-party criminal conduct. For the same 

reason, whatever the evidence of past crimes in the vicinity, current conditions 

or activities specific to the premises may also bear on whether the third-party 

criminal act in question was, or was not, reasonably foreseeable – at least to 

the extent that such conditions or activities may reasonably be viewed as 

attracting or discouraging such criminal activity. See, e.g., Martin, 301 Ga. at 

326-332 (I), (II) (A). 
28

precautions to protect his or her customers or tenants against the 

risk posed by that type of activity.”); Tyner, 305 Ga. at 485 n.7 

(“Cases pertaining to landlord liability for third-party criminal acts 

are also informative. In those cases, reasonable foreseeability of the 

risk is essential to proving liability; plaintiffs must show that the 

landlord had a reason to anticipate or foresee the harmful acts of 

others based on prior experience with substantially similar types of 

acts that gave the landlord superior knowledge of the danger posed.” 

(citing Walker v. Sturbridge Partners, Ltd., 221 Ga. App. 36, 40 (470 

SE2d 738) (1996) and Sturbridge, 267 Ga. 785). The Court of 

Appeals has recited this language as an essential element of 

reasonable foreseeability, as well. See, e.g., Camelot Club 

Condominium Assn., Inc. v. Afari-Opoku, 340 Ga. App. 618, 621 (1) 

(a) (i) (798 SE2d 241) (2017) (“In order to be reasonably foreseeable, 

the criminal act must be substantially similar in type to the previous 

criminal activities occurring on or near the premises so that a 

reasonable person would take ordinary precautions to protect his or 

her customers against the risk posed by that type of activity.”); 
29

Johns v. Housing Authority for City of Douglas, 297 Ga. App. 869, 

871 (678 SE2d 571) (2009) (same); Wojcik v. Windmill Lake 

Apartments, 284 Ga. App. 766, 768 (645 SE2d 1) (2007) (physical 

precedent only) (same); Mason v. Chateau Communities, Inc., 280 

Ga. App. 106, 112-113 (633 SE2d 426) (2006) (same); Walker v. St. 

Paul Apts., 227 Ga. App. 298, 300 (489 SE2d 317) (1997) (same); Doe 

v. Briargate Apartments, Inc., 227 Ga. App. 408, 409 (1) (489 SE2d 

170) (1997) (similar); Hillcrest Foods, Inc. v. Kiritsy, 227 Ga. App. 

554, 559 (1) (489 SE2d 547) (1997) (citing Sturbridge and stating, 

“[o]ur Supreme Court has reaffirmed the requirement of 

substantially similar criminal acts to establish the foreseeability of 

the proprietor”). 

Properly understood, however, Sturbridge does not hold that a 

plaintiff must point to a past crime (substantially similar or 

otherwise) to establish reasonable foreseeability. The question 

presented in Sturbridge was not whether a plaintiff had to point to 

a past crime to establish reasonable foreseeability; indeed, there is 

no dispute the plaintiff had done that. See Sturbridge, 267 Ga. at 
30

785-787. Instead, once a plaintiff had identified a past crime, the 

question was whether that crime was the same kind of crime as the 

crime at issue – there, whether the plaintiff had to identify a past, 

violent crime on the premises to establish that the rape at issue was 

reasonably foreseeable. We rejected that “restrictive and inflexible 

approach” to reasonable foreseeability. Id. at 786. Instead, we held 

that the proprietor’s knowledge of prior burglaries in that case 

created a jury question as to whether the proprietor should have 

reasonably anticipated the criminal act in question. See id. at 787.

Put simply, Sturbridge did not hold that a plaintiff was required to 

identify a past crime as a prerequisite to establishing reasonable 

foreseeability; it merely held that the past crimes that the plaintiff 

had identified there were sufficient to raise a jury question on 

reasonable foreseeability. See id.

That this is the extent of the Court’s holding is confirmed by 

Sturbridge’s language when properly viewed in context. In setting 

out the analysis for determining whether a proprietor’s duty in a 

given case extended to protecting against the risk posed by criminal 
31

activity, Sturbridge began with the familiar and well-established 

standard: “if the proprietor has reason to anticipate a criminal act, 

he or she then has a duty to exercise ordinary care to guard against 

injury from dangerous characters.” (Citation and punctuation 

omitted; emphasis supplied.) Id. at 786. That standard says nothing 

about having to identify a specific past crime, or any past crime at 

all, to establish that a proprietor had “reason to anticipate” the 

crime at issue. Id. Next, we said, “[a]ccordingly, the incident causing 

the injury must be substantially similar in type to the previous 

criminal activities occurring on or near the premises so that a 

reasonable person would take ordinary precautions to protect his or 

her customers or tenants against the risk posed by that type of 

activity.” (Emphasis supplied.) Id. (citing Matt v. Days Inns of 

America, Inc., 212 Ga. App. 792 (443 SE2d 290) (1994)). This 

explains why “the previous criminal activities” at issue must be 

“substantially similar in type” to the crime at issue to establish 

foreseeability: as we have already explained, similar past crimes –

those closer in time, proximity, and type – give a proprietor stronger 
32

reasons to anticipate that the crime at issue would happen. See id. 

But Sturbridge does not say that a plaintiff must identify a past 

crime as a requirement of proving reasonable foreseeability. Rather, 

the analysis takes the existence of such crimes as a given (“the 

incident causing the injury must be substantially similar in type to 

the previous criminal activities”) to address the question presented

by the facts of that case – i.e., are these crimes enough, based on 

their “likeness, proximity or other relationship to the crime in 

question” to give the proprietor reason to anticipate the criminal 

act? Id. at 786. That is the context in which Sturbridge used the word 

“must.”

Neither does Matt, the 1994 Court of Appeals decision that we 

cited in this discussion in Sturbridge, say otherwise. See Sturbridge, 

267 Ga. at 786 (citing Matt, 212 Ga. App. 792). In Matt, the Court of 

Appeals held that, while knowledge of an unreasonable risk of 

criminal attack was a prerequisite to recovery under OCGA § 51-3-

1, “such knowledge may be demonstrated by evidence of the 

occurrence of prior substantially similar incidents.” (Emphasis 
33

supplied.) Matt, 212 Ga. App. at 794. But Matt did not say that, in 

every instance, a prior substantially similar crime must be shown in 

order to establish the foreseeability of a criminal attack. Finally, 

again, this Court’s more recent opinion in Martin reiterates that 

“the foreseeability of future criminal acts may be established by 

evidence of prior criminal acts of a ‘substantially similar’ nature[.]”

Martin, 301 Ga. at 331 (II) (A).

For these reasons, we reject a reading of Sturbridge that 

imposes a new requirement, inconsistent with our body of law in this 

area, that necessarily requires a plaintiff to identify a past crime as 

an essential element of reasonable foreseeability, and we disapprove 

of the Court of Appeals’ decisions to the extent they apply that 

rejected reading of Sturbridge.12 

In the end, the relevant question here is the one our cases have 

asked for nearly 70 years: whether the totality of the circumstances 

 12 Contrary to the suggestion of the specially concurring opinion, we 

neither disapprove of nor overrule the holding in Sturbridge. Rather, we 

believe Sturbridge, when properly understood, is consistent with the totality of 

the circumstances analysis we describe above. 
34

establish reasonable foreseeability such that the proprietor has a 

duty to guard against that criminal activity. While evidence of

substantially similar prior crimes – crimes with a likeness, 

proximity, or other relationship to the criminal act at issue that give 

a proprietor reason to anticipate such an act occurring on the 

premises – may often be one of the most probative considerations in 

answering that question, it is not a required consideration, and

other circumstances may be relevant, too. And unless the court 

determines that no rational juror could disagree on the answer, that 

question is one for the jury. 

D. Application to the Cases on Appeal

Having clarified the relevant legal principles, we now apply 

them to the cases at hand.

(1) Case No. S22G0527

Following a shooting in the parking lot of a CVS store, 

Carmichael brought this premises liability case against CVS,

alleging that it failed to implement adequate security measures to 

protect its customers. At trial, employees who worked at the store at 
35

which Carmichael was injured testified that the store was located in 

a high-crime area and that the employees and managers considered 

the parking lot unsafe. The employees further testified that female 

employees were regularly escorted to their vehicles and that 

employees parked near the building because of the poor lighting in 

the parking lot. CVS had previously employed a security guard, and 

evidence showed that after CVS discharged the security guard, three 

crimes occurred at the premises prior to the shooting at issue in this 

case – two armed robberies of employees inside the store (one of 

which occurred fewer than thirty days before the crime at issue, and 

the other of which occurred about two years earlier) and one robbery 

of a customer in the parking lot (approximately six months before 

the crime at issue). 

CVS argues on appeal that these three prior crimes were not 

substantially similar to the one at issue in the underlying case. 

Specifically, with respect to the two in-store robberies, CVS 

attempts to distinguish the crimes on the bases that they occurred 

in the store rather than in the parking lot, were committed against 
36

employees rather than customers, and did not involve the discharge 

of a firearm. As for the parking lot robbery, CVS argues that the

crime did not involve the use of a weapon and resulted in a less 

severe injury.

These arguments are unavailing. Prior crimes need not be 

identical to the crime in question to be relevant evidence bearing on 

foreseeability. See Sturbridge, 267 Ga. at 787. Accordingly, the facts

that the two armed robberies were committed in the store (as 

opposed to in the parking lot), were committed against employees

(as opposed to customers), and did not involve the discharge of a

weapon do not, as a matter of law, establish that they were so 

dissimilar or so remote as to make them improper for consideration 

with respect to the proprietor’s duty. Viewed as part of the totality 

of the circumstances, the proximity, timing, frequency, and 

similarity of the prior acts all informed the question of reasonable 

foreseeability of the crime at issue. See Sturbridge, 267 Ga. at 786.

The in-store crimes and the parking lot robbery of a customer all 

involved confrontational attacks on persons, and a jury could 
37

rationally conclude that they were “sufficient to attract the 

[proprietor’s] attention to the dangerous condition which resulted in 

the litigated incident,” and were of the sort that could have 

prompted a “reasonable person . . . [to] take ordinary precautions to 

protect his or her customers . . . against the risk posed by that type 

of activity.” Id. at 786-787. See also Piggly Wiggly Southern, Inc. v.

Snowden, 219 Ga. App. 148, 149 (1) (a) (464 SE2d 220) (1995) 

(“Although the attack on plaintiff was far more serious, these prior 

incidents outside defendant’s store also involved confrontational 

attacks on persons, and thus, were sufficiently similar to put 

defendant on notice of the unreasonable danger of criminal attack; 

the differences were merely of degree.” (emphasis supplied)). And

taking into account the totality of the circumstances, the jury was 

authorized to consider (among other evidence) evidence that female 

employees were regularly escorted to their vehicles, that the store 

was in a high-crime area, and that employees considered the 

parking lot dangerous demonstrated CVS’s knowledge of the 

hazardous conditions in assessing whether the attack was 
38

reasonably foreseeable. Accordingly, we cannot say that no rational 

juror could find that these prior crimes gave the proprietor reason 

to anticipate a criminal attack like the one that occurred constituted 

a risk that the proprietor had a duty to account for. 

Moreover, while CVS insists that Carmichael’s injury did not 

result from a condition at the store, this argument misapprehends 

the principles of reasonable foreseeability relevant to the duty 

analysis, which must focus on the foreseeability of “the incident

causing the injury” as opposed to the foreseeability of the resulting 

injury. (Emphasis supplied.) Sturbridge, 267 Ga. at 786. Properly 

understood, CVS’s argument goes to the issue of proximate cause 

and, for reasons outlined above, lacks merit. As we have discussed, 

for purposes of determining foreseeability in the proximate 

causation (as opposed to duty) context, the relevant question is 

whether, assuming the proprietor had and breached a duty to 

protect against certain criminal conduct, the kind of harm that 

occurred was a foreseeable result, or a “probable or natural 

consequence of,” that breach. Salama, 300 Ga. at 842 (1). Here, there 
39

can be little question that a jury would be authorized to find that the 

harm to Carmichael – being shot by a robber in the parking lot – is 

the kind of harm that is a probable and natural consequence of the 

failure to take adequate security measures to protect the property, 

including the parking lot, from armed robberies. But see Lau’s Corp., 

261 Ga. at 494 (3) (“A landowner does not become an insurer of 

safety by taking some security precautions on behalf of invitees.”).

Therefore, we affirm the Court of Appeals’ judgment on these issues.

(2) Case No. S22G0617 

The claims against Pappas arise from a shooting in its parking 

lot which resulted in injuries to Welch and the death of her husband,

Anthony. The trial court denied Pappas’ motion for summary 

judgment on Welch’s claims, and the Court of Appeals reversed. 

Welch challenges that decision, arguing that she produced evidence, 

including detailed police reports regarding property crimes in the 

surrounding area, to establish that Pappas was aware of the high 

number of prior thefts (including thefts of firearms) on the property, 

which, she says, the Court of Appeals ignored. She further argues 
40

that Pappas knew of multiple break-ins at “surrounding” 

restaurants, hotels, and office complexes, as well as in the “Windy 

Hill” area, and she points to Pappas’ knowledge of an altercation 

“down the street” involving armed assailants. According to Welch, 

the Court of Appeals mischaracterized this evidence as referencing 

incidents in an undefined “‘area’ and not specifically Pappas’

property” and erroneously concluded that such information 

constituted “general crime statistics” that were insufficient to raise

a question of fact as to foreseeability of risk. 362 Ga. App. at 160-

161 (1) (b). Although much of the Court of Appeals’ analysis was 

sound, we ultimately disagree with its conclusion that the crime at 

issue was not foreseeable as a matter of law.

As an initial matter, the Court of Appeals properly grounded 

its analysis of reasonable foreseeability in the proprietor’s duty to 

protect against criminal activity. See id. at 159-160 (1). And the 

Court of Appeals recognized that evidence of substantially similar 

prior crimes is not a requirement for finding reasonable 

foreseeability, and that other evidence that the proprietor knew of 
41

the danger can inform the analysis, too. See id. at 160 (1). 

Ultimately, however, the Court of Appeals’ analysis was too 

rigid and was not consistent with a totality-of-the-circumstances 

approach to the question of reasonable foreseeability. First, rather 

than consider the evidence as a whole to determine whether the jury 

was authorized to find that the crime was reasonably foreseeable, 

the Court siloed off the evidence of similar past crimes from “other 

evidence,” such as evidence of Pappas’ knowledge. More specifically, 

the Court of Appeals first considered whether the police reports, 

testimony from Pappas’ and Tactical’s representatives, and the

opinion of Welch’s security expert were sufficient to create a factual 

question on foreseeability with respect to the prior crimes. See id. at 

160-163 (1) (a). After concluding they were not, the Court separately 

considered whether Pappas’ knowledge of the prior crimes was 

established by the frequency of the prior crimes, emails between 

Pappas and Tactical, or the testimony of Pappas’ security manager.

See id. at 163-164 (1) (b). But the proper analysis considers the 

proprietor’s knowledge of all the circumstances together to
42

determine whether the proprietor had reason to anticipate the 

criminal act at issue. See Martin, 301 Ga. at 331 (II) (A). 

Second, the Court of Appeals was too quick to exclude, as a 

matter of law, past crimes as relevant to the foreseeability analysis 

based on certain differences from the criminal act at issue and 

without considering whether crimes that were not identical might 

still put the proprietor on notice of a hazardous condition. For 

example, while specifically recognizing that it was “undisputed that 

Pappas knew that there were a large number of break-ins in its 

[parking] lot prior to the shooting,” see Pappas, 362 Ga. App. at 156 

(1) (a), it also held that evidence of those prior crimes was

insufficient to show that Pappas was on notice of the possibility of a 

shooting because “there was no evidence of violence occurring in the 

parking lot or of the use of firearms, only break-ins of unoccupied 

cars.” See id. at 161 (1) (b). However, the Court of Appeals failed to 

consider whether the frequency, proximity, or other similarities

between the prior crimes and the criminal act at issue raised a 

question of fact for the jury with respect to reasonable foreseeability. 
43

See Sturbridge, 267 Ga. at 786. Indeed, viewing the evidence in the 

light most favorable to the nonmovant,13 there was evidence of a 

large number of break-ins at the Windy Hill location (which included 

thefts of weapons from automobiles), a vehicle break-in at a property 

“down the street” that resulted in that suspect firing shots (and 

which preceded the incident at issue by a year or so), and indications

that the “suspects [we]re armed” with respect to incidents at 

surrounding properties. These were all facts a jury would have been 

authorized to consider in applying a totality of the circumstances 

analysis to determine whether it was reasonably foreseeable that 

the break-ins could escalate to a violent encounter. As such, we 

conclude that the answer to the question of reasonable foreseeability 

in this case was not so “plain and palpable” to require judgment as 

a matter of law. The Court of Appeals erred by reaching a contrary 

conclusion. See Pappas, 362 Ga. App. at 159-165 (1). Therefore, we 

 13 See Woodcraft by MacDonald, Inc. v. Georgia Cas. & Sur. Co., 293 Ga. 

9, 10 (743 SE2d 373) (2013) (On review of the grant or denial of summary 

judgment, “we must view the evidence, and all reasonable inferences drawn 

therefrom, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.” (citation and 

punctuation omitted)).
44

reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals on this issue.

III. Under the circumstances of this case, the verdict 

apportioning no fault to the intentional tortfeasor is not 

inconsistent.

In Case No. S22G0527, CVS gave notice under Georgia’s 

apportionment statute, OCGA § 51-12-33, that it intended to ask the 

jury to assign some fault for Carmichael’s injuries to the unknown 

shooter, who was not a party to the case, and at trial, the jury was 

instructed regarding apportionment to both named parties and nonparties. The jury returned a verdict in Carmichael’s favor, finding 

CVS ninety-five percent at fault and Carmichael five percent at 

fault, while also finding that the shooter bore no fault for 

Carmichael’s injuries. CVS raised no objection to the verdict before 

the jury’s release, but in a post-trial motion, CVS challenged the 

verdict as void, asserting that the jury’s failure to allocate any fault 

to the shooter conflicted with the requirements of OCGA § 51-12-

33.14 This argument was rejected in turn by the trial court and by 

 14 See Benchmark Builders, Inc. v. Schultz, 289 Ga. 329, 330 (1) (711 

SE2d 639) (2011) (“A party does not waive an objection to a verdict that is void, 
45

the Court of Appeals. We thereafter granted certiorari to consider 

whether a jury could rationally allocate fault to CVS, but no fault to

the shooter, an intentional tortfeasor, whose actions directly caused 

Carmichael’s injuries. While we posed this question in a general 

sense, as explained more fully below, we now reach the question in 

a manner limited to the specific facts of this case. And though we 

disagree with the rationale employed by the Court of Appeals below, 

we nevertheless affirm its decision. That is, under the specific 

circumstances of this case, we reject CVS’s argument that the 

verdict is inconsistent and therefore void because, when considered 

in light of the trial court’s instructions to the jury here, the verdict 

can be logically construed. 

OCGA § 51-12-33, the apportionment statute, provides that,

after the amount of damages awarded is reduced according to the 

plaintiff’s percentage of fault, the trier of fact – in this case, the jury 

– shall “apportion its award of damages among the persons who are 

 

as opposed to voidable, by failing to object to the verdict form or the verdict as 

rendered before the jury is released.” (punctuation omitted)).
46

liable according to the percentage of fault of each person.” OCGA § 

51-12-33 (b). The statute further provides that, “[i]n assessing 

percentages of fault, the trier of fact shall consider the fault of all 

persons or entities who contributed to the alleged injury or damages, 

regardless of whether the person or entity was, or could have been, 

named as a party to the suit.” OCGA § 51-12-33 (c). See also Couch 

v. Red Roof Inns, Inc., 291 Ga. 359, 362 (729 SE2d 378) (2012). We 

have already held that “‘fault,’ as used in OCGA § 51-12-33,

encompasses intentional torts.” See Couch, 291 Ga. at 365.

When reviewing a jury’s verdict, of course, we keep in mind the 

“presumption in favor of the validity of verdicts.” Pepsi Cola Bottling 

Co. v. First Nat’l Bank, 248 Ga. 114, 115 (1) (281 SE2d 579) (1981). 

See also OCGA § 9-12-4 (“Verdicts shall have a reasonable 

intendment and shall receive a reasonable construction. They shall 

not be avoided unless from necessity.”). However, a “verdict that is 

contradictory and repugnant is void” and will be set aside in a civil 
47

case.15 Anthony v. Gator Cochran Constr., 288 Ga. 79, 79 (702 SE2d 

139) (2010). See also Hilltop Terrace, Ltd. v. Baker, 261 Ga. 592, 593 

(1) (408 SE2d 704) (1991). For example, we have deemed void a 

verdict awarding damages to the plaintiff for a defendant’s trespass

while concomitantly finding that the defendant owned the land upon 

which he was found to have trespassed. See Baker, 261 Ga. at 593 

(1). See also Thompson v. Ingram, 226 Ga. 668, 671-672 (2) (177 

SE2d 61) (1970) (concluding that the verdict was contradictory

where the jury found that the defendant was liable for tearing down 

a fence on the plaintiff’s property while also finding that the 

 15 With respect to void verdicts in the civil context, our case law uses the 

terms “contradictory,” “repugnant,” and “inconsistent” interchangeably. See, 

e.g., Anthony v. Gator Cochran Constr., 288 Ga. 79, 79, 81 (702 SE2d 139) 

(2010). We note that in the criminal context, our case law ascribes a different 

meaning to “inconsistent verdicts.” Compare Owens, 312 Ga. 212, 216 (862 

SE2d 125) (2021) (“[I]nconsistent verdicts occur when a jury in a criminal case 

renders seemingly incompatible verdicts of guilty on one charge and not guilty 

on another . . . [and] are permitted to stand because the jury’s rationale is not 

apparent from the record and courts generally are not permitted to make 

inquiries into the jury’s deliberation process.” (citation and punctuation 

omitted; emphasis in original)), with McElrath v. State, 308 Ga. 104, 111 (2) (c) 

(839 SE2d 573) (2020) (Repugnant verdicts “occur when, in order to find the 

defendant not guilty on one count and guilty on another, the jury must make 

affirmative findings shown on the record that cannot logically or legally exist 

at the same time.” (emphasis in original)). 
48

property belonged to someone other than the plaintiff). Critically, 

though, “not merely any irregularity will render a verdict void.” 

Anthony, 288 Ga. at 80. Rather, “[e]ven if the verdict is ambiguous 

and susceptible of two constructions, one of which would uphold it 

and one of which would defeat it, that which would uphold it is to be 

applied.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 80-81.

Here, the trial court instructed the jury in relevant part that if 

it found “that the damages sustained by the plaintiff were caused by 

persons or entities who are not parties to the action, [the jury] shall 

consider the fault of all persons or entities whose negligence

contributed to the injury or damage.” (Emphasis supplied.) CVS did 

not object to the charge as given, and the charge is not challenged 

on appeal. In its verdict, the jury apportioned ninety-five percent of 

the fault to CVS, five percent of the fault to Carmichael, and no fault 

to the unknown shooter. 

CVS now argues that the verdict is inconsistent and thus void 

as repugnant because the jury found CVS liable for failing to keep 

Carmichael safe from an intentional tortfeasor while finding the 
49

intentional tortfeasor not at fault. The Court of Appeals rejected 

that argument, concluding that the verdict was not “indefinite, 

imperfect, ambiguous, or inconsistent” and, therefore, not void. CVS 

Pharmacy, 362 Ga. App. at 69 (3). In support of this conclusion, the 

Court of Appeals reasoned that it was sufficient that the jury 

“considered” the shooter’s fault without actually apportioning fault 

to the shooter because the “plain language of [OCGA § 51-13-33 (c)] 

does not itself require that the trier of fact assign some minimum 

percentage of fault to each party.” Id. at 70 (3). According to the 

Court of Appeals, “it is possible that the jury either found that the 

robber ended up shooting in self-defense and was worthy of no fault 

or that the jury instead assigned the amount of fault it would have 

assigned to the shooter to Carmichael[.]” Id. at 70-71 (3). 

While we agree that CVS has not shown that the verdict is 

inconsistent, the reasoning employed by the Court of Appeals in 

reaching that conclusion misses the mark. As an initial matter, we 

disagree that the apportionment statute’s use of the word “consider” 

necessarily means that a jury can comply with the statute merely by 
50

thinking about apportioning fault. While OCGA § 51-12-33 does not 

require the jury to apportion fault to each party or nonparty alleged 

to be at fault in every case, the statute does not authorize the jury 

to decline to apportion fault to a nonparty where the evidence

compels a finding that the nonparty shares some fault for the harm 

alleged. 

Further, the Court of Appeals’ attempt to rationalize the 

verdict is flawed. Because the jury determined that CVS was liable 

for the injuries Carmichael sustained at the hands of the shooter, it 

is impossible for the jury to have also found that Carmichael bore all 

of the fault for the shooting or that the shooter acted in self-defense;

a proprietor cannot be found liable for failing to protect an invitee

from injuries that the invitee sustained solely as a result of his or 

her own fault. Thus, the jury verdict appears contradictory on its 

face. Generally speaking, we have doubts that a jury could logically 

determine both that a defendant is at fault for failing to protect 

against a third party’s intentional tortious conduct and that the 

third party is not at all at fault for his intentional conduct. See 
51

Couch, 291 Ga. at 359 (1) (“[A]n assailant who evades hotel security 

to intentionally abduct, rob, and assault a hotel guest is, at the very 

least, partially at ‘fault’ for the brutal injuries inflicted by the 

assailant on that guest. As a party at fault, such an assailant must 

be included with others who may be at fault . . . for purposes of 

apportioning damages among all wrongdoing parties.”). See also

H&H Subs v. Lim, 213 Ga. App. 371, 372 (1) (444 SE2d 404) (1994) 

(holding that a verdict finding the principal liable under a theory of 

vicarious liability but finding the agent not liable was “void and 

unenforceable” because “there [wa]s no reasonable construction” 

that could uphold it); LDS Social Svcs. Corp. v. Richins, 191 Ga. 

App. 695, 698-699 (2) (382 SE2d 607) (1989) (holding that the verdict 

was repugnant where it simultaneously found that the decedent’s 

foster mother was not liable for the decedent’s death but that the 

agency which placed the decedent with the foster mother was liable).

But we need not decide that issue in this case. Indeed, when 

the verdict is considered in light of the jury instructions –

specifically, that the jury was to consider “the fault of all persons or 
52

entities whose negligence contributed to the injury or damage” – it 

is susceptible of another construction. That is, a logical jury could 

have found that an intentional tortfeasor was not negligent in 

inflicting injury upon the plaintiff. See Reeves v. Bridges, 248 Ga. 

600, 603 (284 SE2d 416) (1981) (“It is almost redundant to state that 

an essential element of an intentional tort is intent to commit the 

act.”); Roddy v. Tanner Med. Ctr. Inc., 262 Ga. App. 202, 204 (585 

SE2d 175) (2003) (“[Evidence of] negligence, without more, is not 

evidence of a reckless disregard of the rights of others, equivalent to 

an intentional tort.” (citation and punctuation omitted)). See also

Stephanie A. Giggetts, 14 Ga. Jur. § 21:5 (2023) (“Because an 

intentional tort focuses on the state of mind of the defendant, there 

can be no such thing as a negligent intentional tort.”); Restatement 

(Second) of Torts Sec. 282 cmt. d (1965) (“[Negligence] includes only 

such conduct as creates liability for the reason that it involves a risk 

and not a certainty of invading the interest of another. It therefore 

excludes conduct which creates liability because of the actor's 

intention to invade a legally protected interest of the person injured 
53

or of a third person.”). In other words, the jury could have reasonably 

believed that the unidentified shooter acted deliberately, as opposed 

to negligently, with an intent to do harm. Accordingly, because the 

verdict can be construed in a way that is consistent, we reject CVS’s 

argument that it is void due to inconsistency. We therefore affirm 

the judgment of the Court of Appeals. See Anthony, 288 Ga. at 80-

81.16

IV. A party rendering security services to the proprietor may owe 

a duty of care to third parties on the bases set out in Section 

324A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. 

In Case No. S22G0618, the trial court denied Tactical’s motion 

for summary judgment, rejecting the argument that Tactical owed 

no duty of care to the Welches and finding that questions of material 

 16 Because of our holding here, we need not reach the issue of whether 

apportionment to a nonparty would even have been permitted under the 

version of OCGA § 51-12-33 (b) in effect at the time of trial, which was limited 

in application to cases “[w]here an action [was] brought against more than one 

person for injury to person or property.” OCGA § 51-12-33 (b) (2019); see Alston 

& Bird, LLP v. Hatcher Mgmt. Holdings, LLC, 312 Ga. 350, 351 (862 SE2d 

295) (2021) (prior version of OCGA § 51-12-33 (b) not applicable in singledefendant lawsuits). Here, although more than one defendant was initially 

named, only one defendant remained at the time of trial; whether OCGA § 51-

12-33 (b) would have applied under these circumstances remains an open 

question.
54

fact remained as to whether Tactical was liable under Section 324A

of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (“Section 324A”) for the 

negligent performance of a voluntary undertaking. The Court of 

Appeals reversed, holding that Tactical was entitled to summary 

judgment because “it had no duty toward the Welches as either 

third-party beneficiaries to its contract with Pappas, or under 

[Section 324A],” which, the court reasoned, does not apply to “these 

types of premises liability claims.” Pappas Restaurants, 362 Ga. 

App. at 161-162 (2). The Court of Appeals further noted that Tactical 

was entitled to summary judgment because the crime was not 

foreseeable. Id. at 162 (2). We thereafter granted certiorari to decide 

whether, under Georgia law, a party rendering security services to 

an owner or occupier of land owes a duty of care to third parties on 

the bases set out in Section 324A. For the reasons that follow, we 

answer that question in the affirmative. We further hold that the 

scope of the duty owed may be informed by the contract between the 

security provider and the proprietor. 

This Court has described Section 324A “as an accurate 
55

statement of the common law.” Herrington v. Gaulden, 294 Ga. 285, 

287 (751 SE2d 813) (2013). See also Huggins v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. 

Co., 245 Ga. 248, 249 (264 SE2d 191) (1980) (adopting “the majority 

rule” as stated in Section 324A). Section 324A provides:

One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to 

render services to another which he should recognize as 

necessary for the protection of a third person or his things, 

is subject to liability to the third person for physical harm 

resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to 

protect his undertaking, if (a) his failure to exercise 

reasonable care increases the risk of such harm, or (b) he 

has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other to 

the third person, or (c) the harm is suffered because of 

reliance of the other or the third person upon the 

undertaking.

A party may be liable for a failure to exercise reasonable care with 

respect to a voluntary undertaking only if one or more of the 

requirements stated in Section 324A is present.

Initially, cases considering Section 324A often did so in the 

context of negligent inspection claims. See Universal Underwriters 

Ins. Co. v. Smith, 253 Ga. 588, 589-590 (III)-(IV) (322 SE2d 29) 

(1984); Huggins, 245 Ga. at 248; Davenport v. Cummins Alabama, 

Inc., 284 Ga. App. 666, 672-673 (2) (644 SE2d 503) (2007); Finley v. 
56

Lehman, 218 Ga. App. 789, 790-791 (1) (463 SE2d 709) (1995); 

Wright v. Osmose Wood Preserving, Inc., 206 Ga. App. 685, 687-688 

(1) (426 SE2d 214) (1992); Fosgate v. American Mut. Liability Ins. 

Co., 161 Ga. App. 376, 376 (288 SE2d 647) (1982); American Mut. 

Liability Ins. Co. v. Jones, 157 Ga. App. 722, 722 (278 SE2d 410) 

(1981); Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Clark, 154 Ga. App. 183, 184-187 (2) 

(267 SE2d 797) (1980); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Davidson, 

148 Ga. App. 82, 83 (2) (251 SE2d 32) (1978). But negligent 

undertaking claims brought pursuant to Section 324A are not so 

limited and can arise in other contexts. See Restatement (Second) of 

Torts § 324A cmt. b (“This Section applies to any undertaking to 

render services to another, where the actor’s negligent conduct in 

the manner of performance of his undertaking, or his failure to 

exercise reasonable care to complete it, or to protect the third person 

when he discontinues it, results in physical harm to the third person 

or his things.” (emphasis supplied)). See, e.g., Herrington, 294 Ga. 

at 288 (considering Section 324A in a medical malpractice context); 

Hyde v. Schlotzsky’s, Inc., 254 Ga. App. 192, 193 (561 SE2d 876) 
57

(2002) (considering a negligent undertaking claim under Section 

324A based on the defendant’s alleged failure to insure minimum 

standards for cleanliness and sanitation in its restaurant); Herrin

Business Products, Inc. v. Ergle, 254 Ga. App. 713, 715-716 (2) (563 

SE2d 442) (2002) (considering Section 324A in the context of a claim 

that the defendant was negligent “in failing to satisfy the duties it 

assumed in attempting to render aid” to an employee); BP 

Exploration & Oil, Inc. v. Jones, 252 Ga. App. 824, 830-832 (2) (a)-

(c) (558 SE2d 398) (2001) (considering negligence claim under 

Section 324A arising from the defendant’s handling of customer 

complaints); Beam v. Omark Indus., Inc., 143 Ga. App. 142, 144-145 

(1) (b) (237 SE2d 607) (1977) (considering Section 324A in the 

context of a products liability suit). And we see no basis in the law 

to artificially limit the common-law duties reflected in Section 324A

in negligent-security premises-liability cases.17 Cf. Adler’s Package 

 17 We therefore disapprove of language in Brown v. All-Tech Inv. Group, 

Inc., 265 Ga. App. 889, 898 (2) (a) (ii) (595 SE2d 517) (2003), to the extent it 

suggests that Section 324A does not apply to a defendant’s failure to prevent a 

violent attack.
58

Shop, Inc. v. Parker, 190 Ga. App. 68, 70-72 (1) (b) (378 SE2d 323) 

(1989) (considering Section 324A and its subsections in relation to a 

claim for negligent performance of security operations and 

ultimately concluding that the section was inapplicable to the 

claim).

The Court of Appeals has repeatedly held that the duty 

imposed upon an owner or occupier of land by OCGA § 51-3-1 is nondelegable. See Camelot Club, 340 Ga. App. at 627 (2) (b); Davidson 

v. Meticulously Clean Sweepers, LLC, 329 Ga. App. 640, 643 (1) (765 

SE2d 783) (2014); FPI Atlanta, LP v. Seaton, 240 Ga. App. 880, 886 

(5) (a) (524 SE2d 524) (1999) (physical precedent only); Johnson v. 

Kimberly Clark, 233 Ga. App. 508, 510 (504 SE2d 536) (1998); 

Griffin v. AAA Auto Club South, Inc., 221 Ga. App. 1, 2 (1) (470 SE2d 

474) (1996). But this means only that an owner “will not be excused 

from liability for an injury occurring on his property unless he 

delivered full possession and complete control of the premises to a 

third party.” (Punctuation and citation omitted.) Sherwood v. 

Williams, 347 Ga. App. 400, 402-403 (1) (a) (820 SE2d 141) (2018). 
59

The duty imposed upon an owner or occupier of land by OCGA § 51-

3-1 is inapplicable to independent contractors, such as parties 

providing security services. Cf. Davidson, 329 Ga. App. at 643 (1); 

Maddox v. Cumberland Distrib. Svcs. of Georgia, Inc., 236 Ga. App. 

170, 171 (1) (511 SE2d 270) (1999); Kelley v. Piggly Wiggly Southern, 

Inc., 230 Ga. App. 508, 509 (1) (496 SE2d 732) (1997). Accordingly, 

a party providing security services as an independent contractor 

cannot be held liable under a theory of premises liability. See 

Maddox, 236 Ga. App. at 171 (1). 

However, a party providing security services still may be held 

liable in tort for the negligent performance of voluntarily 

undertaken duties because that party has a duty to use reasonable 

care in carrying out its voluntary undertaking. See Davidson, 329 

Ga. App. at 643-646 (2); Osowski v. Smith, 262 Ga. App. 538, 540 (1) 

(586 SE2d 71) (2003); Kelley, 230 Ga. App. at 509 (1); Seaton, 240 

Ga. App. at 890 (Pope, J., concurring specially); Sims v. American 

Cas. Co., 131 Ga. App. 461, 473 (4) (206 SE2d 121) (1974). See also 

Crockett v. Uniroyal, Inc., 772 F2d 1524, 1531 (II) (11th Cir. 1985) 
60

(citing Section 324A and holding that “[o]ne who undertakes to 

perform a task must perform it in a non-negligent manner”). And 

where a contract sets forth the duties alleged to be the basis of the

negligent undertaking claim found in Section 324A, the scope of the 

duties contractually agreed upon will inform the question of whether 

a party – here, a security company – “has undertaken to perform a 

duty owed by the other to the third person.” See, e.g., Urban Svcs.

Group, Inc. v. Royal Group, Inc., 295 Ga. App. 350, 351-353 (1) (671 

SE2d 838) (2008) (determining, in the context of a Section 324A 

claim, whether the defendant had a duty to clear ice from the 

courthouse steps based on the contract between it and the General 

Services Administration). The duty to exercise ordinary care in 

performing the services assumed under a contract arises not from 

the contractual obligation but from Georgia tort law. See, e.g., Sims, 

131 Ga. App. at 469 (4) (noting that the failure to exercise ordinary 

care in performing a safety inspection one has contracted to 

undertake gives rise to common-law tort liability); ENGlobal U.S., 

Inc. v. Gatlin, 449 SW3d 269, 281-282 (III) (B) (II) (Tx. Ct. App. 2014) 
61

(noting that, under Section 324A, duty is generally understood as a 

tort obligation). 

Accordingly, the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that 

Section 324A categorically does not apply in the premises liability 

context. We therefore vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals 

on this issue, see Pappas, 362 Ga. App. at 161-163 (2), and remand 

for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.18

V. Conclusion

In rendering our decision, we are mindful of the economic and 

policy arguments advanced by the parties and the amici. But such 

considerations are reserved to the General Assembly. This Court is

 18 In what appears to be an alternative holding, the Court of Appeals 

observed that “[e]ven if [it] were to extend [Section 324A] to these types of 

premises liability claims, because the crime was not foreseeable, as discussed 

[with respect to Pappas], Tactical would be entitled to summary judgment.” 

Pappas, 362 Ga. App. at 165 (2). In support of this alternative conclusion, the 

Court of Appeals, relying solely upon its own decision in Wright v. Osmose 

Wood Preserving, 206 Ga. App. 685, 687 (1) (426 SE2d 214) (1992) (physical 

precedent only), noted that foreseeability has been identified as “the ‘common 

element’ in cases applying [Section 324A].” But Wright concerned 

foreseeability in the context of proximate cause and, thus, is inapposite here

because, as we explained in footnote 5, supra, the question of foreseeability 

relevant to proximate cause is distinct from that relevant to duty, the element 

at issue here. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals’ reliance on Wright was 

misplaced, and its alternative holding should be revisited on remand.
62

bound by what the law is and not what the parties or the members 

of this Court think it should be. As such, we are bound to affirm the 

ruling of the Court of Appeals in Case No. S22G0527. And we must

reverse in part and vacate in part the judgments of the Court of 

Appeals in Case Nos. S22G0617 and S22G0618 and remand for 

reconsideration consistent with this opinion. 

Judgment affirmed in Case No. S22G0527. Judgments reversed 

in part and vacated in part, and cases remanded with direction in 

Case Nos. S22G0617 and S22G0618. All the Justices concur, except

McMillian and LaGrua, JJ., who concur specially in Division II.

Boggs, C. J., not participating and Peterson, P. J., disqualified. 
63

MCMILLIAN, Justice, concurring specially.

I concur fully in the majority’s conclusions in Divisions III and 

IV. And I agree that a proprietor’s duty to protect its invitees 

against third-party criminal acts is defined by the foreseeability of 

the criminal act at issue. See Martin v. Six Flags Over Georgia II, 

L.P., 301 Ga. 323, 328 (II) (801 SE2d 24) (2017); Sturbridge Partners, 

Ltd. v. Walker, 267 Ga. 785, 785-86 (482 SE2d 339) (1997). However, 

while I applaud the majority’s efforts to further clarify the law of 

premises liability in Division II, I do not agree with all that is said 

in that Division. In particular, I am concerned about the breadth 

and generalized nature of the majority’s analysis, which goes far 

beyond deciding the premises liability issues presented in these 

cases. I believe the cases can and should be resolved under current 

Georgia law, and when that law is properly applied, each of these 

cases presents a jury question on the issue of foreseeability. 

Therefore, I concur only in the results of the majority’s analysis in 

Division II (D). 

I agree with much of what the majority sets out in explaining 
64

when a duty arises to exercise ordinary care to protect against 

criminal acts perpetrated by third parties. Georgia law provides that 

an intervening criminal act by a third party generally insulates a 

proprietor from liability, and an exception arises only where the 

criminal act was reasonably foreseeable. See Sturbridge, 267 Ga. at

785-86; Tara Bridge Apartments, LP v. Benson, 365 Ga. App. 647, 

649-50 (879 SE2d 531) (2022). Therefore, “[i]f the proprietor has 

reason to anticipate a criminal act, he or she then has a duty to 

exercise ordinary care to guard against injury from dangerous 

characters.” Lau’s Corp. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491, 492 (1) (405 SE2d 

474) (1991) (citation and punctuation omitted). 

We considered the issue of foreseeability in Sturbridge, where 

the plaintiff filed a premises liability claim against her landlord and 

others after she was sexually assaulted in her apartment in the 

early morning hours. The plaintiff alleged that because three prior 

daytime burglaries of empty apartments had occurred and the 

landlord was aware of two of them, her assault was reasonably 

foreseeable. We determined based on the landlord’s knowledge of the 
65

prior burglaries that “it was reasonable to anticipate that an 

unauthorized entry might occur while an apartment was occupied 

and personal harm to a tenant could result,” thus creating a jury 

issue as to “whether or not Sturbridge had the duty to exercise 

ordinary care to safeguard its tenants against the foreseeable risks 

posed by the prior burglaries.” Sturbridge, 267 Ga. at 787.19 

Because Sturbridge concerned the landlord’s knowledge of 

prior criminal acts, we discussed the issue of foreseeability in that 

context. We concluded that, where the issue of foreseeability arises 

under such circumstances, “the incident causing the injury must be 

substantially similar in type to the previous criminal activities 

occurring on or near the premises so that a reasonable person would 

take ordinary precautions to protect his or her customers or tenants 

against the risk posed by that type of activity.” Sturbridge, 267 Ga. 

at 786. We noted that whether a prior incident made the litigated 

 19 In reaching that determination, we rejected the idea that “a landlord's 

knowledge of prior criminal acts against property cannot establish the 

foreseeability of a brutal sex crime as a matter of law.” Sturbridge, 267 Ga. at 

786.
66

incident reasonably foreseeable required consideration of “the 

location, nature and extent of the prior criminal activities and their 

likeness, proximity or other relationship to the crime in question.” 

Id. But we explained that “substantially similar” does not mean that 

the two crimes need be identical; rather, “[w]hat is required is that 

the prior incident be sufficient to attract the landlord’s attention to 

the dangerous condition which resulted in the litigated incident.” Id. 

(citation and punctuation omitted). Thus, I believe that Sturbridge

requires the existence of substantially similar prior crimes, but it 

defines such crimes as those that alert the proprietor to a dangerous 

condition that later results in the incident causing the plaintiff’s 

harm. See also Tyner v. Matt-Troncoso, 305 Ga. 480, 485 n.7 (826 

SE2d 100) (2019) (“In those cases, reasonable foreseeability of the 

risk is essential to proving liability; plaintiffs must show that the 

landlord had a reason to anticipate or foresee the harmful acts of 

others based on prior experience with substantially similar types of 

acts that gave the landlord superior knowledge of the danger 

posed.”). 
67

The majority claims that “[p]roperly understood, . . . Sturbridge

does not hold that a plaintiff must point to a past crime 

(substantially similar or otherwise) to establish reasonable 

foreseeability,” because it was a “given” in Sturbridge that there 

existed past crimes committed in the area and that the context in 

which the Sturbridge Court explained that “the incident causing the 

injury must be substantially similar in type to the previous criminal 

activities” was to clarify that substantial similarity was required. 

Maj. Op. at 29-32. But that reading of Sturbridge turns on its head 

the “given” assumed by that Court – that there must be some 

evidence of past crimes in order to establish foreseeability of a 

criminal attack – and reaches the opposite conclusion that no such 

evidence of past crimes is required at all. Indeed, this Court and 

multiple decisions of the Court of Appeals have read Sturbridge as 

establishing a bright-line rule that a plaintiff must, at a minimum, 

point to substantially similar crimes to establish a proprietor’s duty 

to protect against criminal attacks. See e.g., Tyner, 305 Ga. at 485 

n.7; Maj. Op. at 28-29 (citing Court of Appeals cases).
68

So what is the upshot of the majority’s new “totality of the 

circumstances test”? The majority explains: “While evidence of 

substantially similar prior crimes – crimes with a likeness, 

proximity, or other relationship to the criminal act at issue that give 

a proprietor reason to anticipate such an act occurring on the 

premises – may often be one of the most probative considerations in 

answering that question, it is not a required consideration, and 

other circumstances may be relevant too.” Maj. Op. at 34. However, 

it is unclear what other circumstances may be relevant. Although 

purporting to craft a totality-of-the-circumstances test that includes 

consideration of whether the premises was located in a high crime 

area, even the majority acknowledges in footnote 9 that the fact that 

a business is situated in a high crime area does not alone create a 

duty in a proprietor to protect invitees from any and all crimes that 

might occur. Rather, if a proprietor has knowledge of substantially 

similar crimes on or near his business premises, the fact that the 

business is also in a high crime area can be considered in the 

foreseeability analysis, which is entirely consistent with the 
69

Sturbridge standard.

The majority also mentions that “evidence that the landowner 

had knowledge of a volatile situation brewing on the premises,” 

could also support a duty to protect against criminal attacks. Maj. 

Op. at 26 (quoting Martin, 301 Ga. at 331 (II) (A)). But it is unclear 

what a “volatile situation” may be, how a landowner can have 

knowledge about whether one is “brewing,” and how much time is 

required for a situation to be “brewing.” 

Because I believe that Sturbridge remains good law and 

requires, at a minimum, evidence of substantially similar crimes to 

establish foreseeability of a criminal attack, I would resolve the 

issue of foreseeability under Sturbridge and other comparable 

authority, without crafting a new standard in an attempt to provide 

guidance for factual situations not at issue here. We are not 

presented, for example, with a situation where the only evidence 

relative to foreseeability was that the proprietor’s business was in a 

high crime area or that a volatile situation existed, and thus we need 

not address whether the Sturbridge standard ought to be 
70

reconsidered in such situations. 

Applying the Sturbridge standard, I agree with the majority 

that the evidence presented in each of these cases is sufficient to 

raise a jury question on the issue of foreseeability. In Case No. 

S22G0527, the evidence showed that the CVS was considered to be 

in a high crime area and that the managers and employees 

considered the parking lot unsafe and took added precautions as a 

result. But the evidence also showed that within the six months 

prior to the crime, two armed robberies of employees had occurred, 

along with a “purse-snatching” of a customer in the parking lot, 

which was sufficient to raise a jury issue as to whether it was 

foreseeable that an armed confrontation with a customer could occur 

in the parking lot. And in Case No. S22G0617, given the evidence 

that the proprietor was aware of prior automobile break-ins in its 

parking lot and of armed suspects committing other crimes in the 

area, a jury must decide whether it was reasonable to anticipate that 

a customer could confront an armed person as he approached his car 
71

in the parking lot.20

The majority’s attempt to craft a standard that would not 

require the existence of prior, substantially similar crimes before 

imposing liability has the potential to increase the liability of 

proprietors, landlords, and property owners for the criminal acts of 

third parties and will most certainly result in more cases going to 

trial with the concomitant burden of attorneys’ fees and costs and 

loss of time and other resources in litigation. In other words, the way 

that the majority has crafted the “reasonably foreseeable” exception 

would all but swallow the general rule that a proprietor has no duty 

 20 In reaching this conclusion, I find it necessary to address Doe v. 

Prudential-Bache/A.G. Spanos Realty Partners, L.P., 268 Ga. 604 (492 SE2d 

865) (1997), which the majority cites but does not distinguish. In that case, a 

tenant was robbed and raped after parking her car in the garage underneath 

her apartment building. Before this incident, only property crimes involving 

thefts of bicycles, thefts from automobiles, and vandalism had occurred in the 

parking structure. This Court determined that the prior crimes did not raise a 

jury issue as to whether the landlord could have reasonably foreseen that a 

violent sexual assault would occur on the premises, because, among other 

factors, the “very nature” of the thefts and acts of vandalism committed in this 

case do not “‛suggest that personal injury may occur.” Doe, 268 Ga. at 606 

(citation and punctuation omitted). That case, unlike the cases here, involved 

no evidence of prior crimes involving a weapon or violence on the premises or 

in the area. Each of the cases here involved prior incidents with armed 

suspects, raising a jury issue as to whether the proprietor had knowledge of 

the dangerous condition that resulted in the shootings at issue.
72

to protect invitees from third-party criminal acts because essentially 

any circumstance would be sufficient to create a jury issue as to 

reasonable foreseeability and a proprietor’s duty. The bright-line 

rule in Sturbridge has been the law for over 25 years, and during 

that time period, the legislature has not seen fit to change that 

standard. To what extent and under what circumstances proprietors 

should be held liable for third-party criminal acts are decisions best 

left to the legislature, which can consider the policy and practical 

implications – especially in high crime areas – of increasing such 

liability and the cost of doing business. 

I am authorized to state that Justice LaGrua joins in this 

special concurrence. 
73

 LAGRUA, Justice, concurring.

These cases present a challenging issue regarding the scope of 

a proprietor’s liability to invitees when the criminal conduct of a 

third party causes injuries to said invitees. I write separately 

because I am concerned about the impact these laws have on those 

who reside in such “high crime areas” and who could face the harsh 

and mounting reality that businesses—faced with an increased 

exposure to liability because of the very area in which they have 

chosen to do business—will cease operations or raise their prices to 

offset the costs of additional security measures. And I wonder how 

these forced business decisions will impact the residents who would 

lose ready access to resources they need for daily life because they 

are no longer available or affordable. I would urge our General 

Assembly to consider these issues as they institute laws imposing 

premises liability on businesses in this State. 

I am authorized to state that Justices McMillian and Colvin 

join in this concurrence.
74

PINSON, Justice, concurring.

I join the Court’s opinion in full. I write to make clear the 

limited scope of the Court’s decision in Division III about the verdict 

in this case. 

In granting review of this case, we asked a narrow question 

about the verdict: whether a rational factfinder apportioning fault 

could determine that an intentional tortfeasor whose actions 

directly caused the plaintiff’s injuries bears no fault for those 

injuries. In other words, we asked whether an apportionment 

verdict like the one in this case was inconsistent. After briefing and 

argument, it became clear that this case did not present even that 

narrow question as a general matter, because the jury in this case 

was instructed to apportion only negligence, not fault generally (and 

no one objected to that instruction). As we explain in Division III, 

although it is doubtful that a jury could rationally find a proprietor 

liable for injuries caused by a criminal attack without apportioning 

some fault to the assailant, a jury asked to apportion only negligence 

could have rationally concluded that the assailant was zero-percent 
75

negligent, because intentional conduct is not negligence. So we are 

bound to conclude that, under these particular circumstances, CVS 

failed to show that the verdict was inconsistent.

Given the narrow question presented and our still narrower 

holding, we do not decide certain other questions that may warrant 

review in an appropriate case. First, we do not decide the question 

presented in its more general sense. Although the Court’s opinion 

expresses doubt that a jury could rationally find a proprietor liable 

for injuries caused by a criminal attack without apportioning some 

fault to the assailant—where the jury has been instructed to 

apportion fault and not just negligence—we have left that unpresented question for another day. Second, we do not decide 

whether, separate and apart from arguments about inconsistency, a 

jury’s verdict violates OCGA § 51-12-33 if it fails to apportion fault 

to a criminal assailant who directly inflicted the plaintiff’s injuries. 

And third, we do not decide whether a verdict that violates OCGA § 

51-12-33 is for that reason void, or merely erroneous—a 

characterization that determines whether an argument that a 
76

verdict should be set aside for violating that statute may be waived 

if that objection is not made at trial. See Benchmark Builders, Inc. 

v. Schultz, 289 Ga. 329, 330 (1) (711 SE2d 639) (2011) (“a party does 

not waive an objection to a verdict that is void, as opposed to 

voidable, by failing to object to the verdict form or the verdict as 

rendered before the jury is released”); Anthony v. Gator Cochran 

Const., Inc., 288 Ga. 79, 80 (702 SE2d 139) (2010) (same).

With this understanding of Division III, I join the Court’s 

opinion in full. I am authorized to state that Justice Bethel joins in 

this concurrence.