* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept

under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicat a, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order andjudgment may be cited under the terms and conditions 10th Cir. R . 36.3.



### UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Filed 4/18/96 TENTH CIRCUIT

ERNEST TRUMAN STANTON, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. KATIE DOLTON, ARISTEDES ZAVARAS, and ROY ROMER, Defendants-Appellees. No. 95-1294 (D.C. No. 95-S-1390) (Dist. Colo.)



### ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before SEYMOUR , Chief Judge, McKAYand LUCERO , Circuit Judges.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously that oral argument wouldnot materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is t herefore ordered submitted without oral argument. Mr. Ernest Truman Stanton filed this pro se action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, naming prison officials Kathie Dolton, Aristedes Zavaras, and Roy Romer as defendants. Mr . Stanton-2-

alleged Ms. Dolton placed conditions on his employm ent as an inmate law clerk, increased the workload at his fac ility, thereby limiting his time to conduct legal research, and qu estioned him regarding his medical condition, all in violation o f his due process rights. Mr. Stanton further alleged Ms. Do lton placed him in segregation and placed arbitrary and caprici ous conditions on his employment, both in violation of his equal p rotection rights. Mr. Stanton also alleged the law library w as inadequate because the materials were archaic and outdated, inviolation of his right of timely access to the courts. The dist rict court dismissed Mr. Stanton’s claims against Mr. Zavaras and Mr. Romer because he did not allege their personal participat ion, and dismissed his claims against Ms. Dolton as legally frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). Mr. Stanton appeals, an d we affirm. We review a district court’s determination of frivo lousness under section 1915(d) for an abuse of discretion. Denton v. Hernandez , 504 U.S. 25, 34 (1992). A complaint may be deeme d frivolous “where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams , 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Legally frivolous claims include “claims of infringement ofa legal interest which clearly does not exist.” Id. at 327. In the present case, Mr. Stanton does not identify a statute or regulation that entitles him to a prison job and“[w]ithout such a statute, prisoners do not have a constitutio nal right to-3-

employment.” Templeman v. Gunter , 16 F.3d 367, 370 (10th Cir. 1994). Accordingly, Mr. Stanton’s constitutional c laims regarding his inmate law clerk position are without merit. “The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees state inmates the right to ‘adequate, ef fective, and meaningful’ access to the courts.” Petrick v. Mayn ard , 11 F.3d 991, 994 (10th Cir. 1993)(quoting Bounds v. Smith , 430 U.S. 817, 822 (1977)). States must affirmatively assure all inmates “assistance in the preparation and filing of legal papers.” Id. States may fulfill this duty by providing law libra ries or assistance from persons trained in the law. Id. “Although this constitutional obligation does not require states t o afford inmates unlimited access to a library, and there ex ists no rigid or static formula to assess whether a prison librar y’s resources pass constitutional muster, states must provide inm ates with ‘a reasonably adequate opportunity’ to present their l egal claims.” Id. (citations omitted). Mr. Stanton alleged in his complaint that most of t he legal materials in the law library are “archaic and outda ted,” as well as various other constitutional violations. We agr ee with the district court that these allegations, without more , are vague and conclusory and therefore without merit. See Petrick , 11 F.3d at 995-96 (“Of course, a prisoner must do more thanmake a mere conclusory allegation of need for unspecified or un limited1 Mr. Stanton raises the following issues for the fi rst time

on appeal: (1) he was transferred, subsequent to th e district court’s order, to a facility without a law library; however, he also states he received law library time subsequent to his transfer, Aplt. Br. at 4; (2) with respect to the f acility at issue in the complaint, the law library was intermi ttently opened and closed during the period from December 1994 thr ough June 1995, Aplt. Br. at 4, and did not contain certain l egal materials which he listed in his brief, Aplt. Br. at 10; and (3) he was discriminated against on the basis of his religion. -4- materials. . . . The prisoner must also articulate a need for the requested material with sufficient particularity so that the prisoner’s need may be balanced against legitimate penological interests.”). We note Mr. Stanton stated in his co mplaint he receives approximately seven and one-half hours perweek of law library time as well as access to a paralegal durin g day-shift hours. Mr. Stanton raises additional factual and legal iss ues for the first time 1 which we decline to consider on appeal. See Oyler v. Allenbrand , 23 F.3d 292, 299 n.8 (10th Cir. 1994). We therefore AFFIRM the judgment of the district co urt. The mandate shall issue forthwith.

ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephanie K. Seymour Chief Judge