United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

No. 02-2304

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v.

TERRENCE WARNER GLAUM, a/k/a Smitty,

a/k/a Terrence Glaum, a/k/a Terry W. Case,

Defendant, Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE

[Hon. D. Brock Hornby, U.S. District Judge]

Before

 Torruella, Howard, Circuit Judges,

and Schwarzer,* Senior District Judge.

Lisa M. Sheehan for appellant.

F. Mark Terison with whom Paula D. Silsby, United States

Attorney was on brief for appellee.

January 28, 2004

 

*Of the Northern District of California, sitting by

designation.
-2-

HOWARD, Circuit Judge. Defendant Terrence Glaum

appeals from his conviction and sentence for participating in a

marijuana distribution conspiracy. He raises several claims of

error. We affirm.

I. Background

We state the facts in the light most favorable to the

jury’s verdict. See United States v. Diaz, 300 F.3d 66, 69 (1st

Cir. 2002).

A. Glaum Joins the Conspiracy 

The conspiracy underlying this prosecution operated to

distribute Mexican-grown marijuana throughout the United States.

The head of the conspiracy was a man known only as “Jefe.” He

raised large crops of marijuana for shipment across the border. An

individual known as the “Old Man” or “Dad” worked under Jefe as his

chief distributor. The Old Man received large shipments of

marijuana from Jefe to distribute to other dealers, including

Anthony Salsberry, who operated out of San Diego. Salsberry, in

turn, would distribute the marijuana to other smaller dealers, who

would sell the drugs to users. Among Salsberry’s customers were an

individual in New York, Ralph Martino, and two individuals in

Maine, Ronnie Kerrigan and Paul Sekenski.

As part of his operation, Salsberry employed Glaum’s exwife, Sheila Case, to assist him in shipping the marijuana. In the

middle of 2000, Case asked Salsberry if he could put Glaum “to
1 Martino later rejected the second ton because of its poor

quality. 

-3-

work.” Salsberry agreed and provided Glaum with approximately

fifty pounds of marijuana to sell in Arizona. In addition to his

work distributing marijuana, Glaum assisted Salsberry in packaging

the drugs. Working out of his garage, Glaum weighed, “shrink

wrapp[ed]” and “vacuum seal[ed]” marijuana to prepare it for

shipment. As compensation, Salsberry paid Glaum “a percentage” of

the profits.

At approximately the same time that Glaum started working

for Salsberry, the Old Man offered Salsberry a two-ton load of

marijuana to distribute. After a portion of the load was smuggled

across the border, Salsberry obtained a sample to send to Martino

to gauge his interest in purchasing the load.

In mid-October 2000, after receiving word from Martino

that he was interested, Salsberry met with Jefe and the Old Man in

San Diego to discuss the Martino deal. At this meeting, Jefe and

the Old Man told Salsberry that only one ton would be available

immediately and that the other ton would be placed “on hold”.1

Salsberry concluded the meeting by telling his superiors that he

would organize the transportation of the load to Martino.

Salsberry knew that Martino could arrange to transport

the shipment himself, but Salsberry preferred to find an alternate

method so that he could charge Martino a higher fee. In a
-4-

subsequent conversation with Glaum, Salsberry learned that Glaum

had access to several trucks which could be used to ship the

marijuana to New York. 

Soon after this conversation, Salsberry attended another

meeting with Jefe and the Old Man. This time Glaum also attended,

and Salsberry introduced him to the heads of the organization. At

this meeting, Salsberry assured the Old Man and Jefe that Glaum was

capable of organizing the transportation for the Martino deal but

that he could not begin the transport for two weeks. The

participants therefore agreed that for two weeks the deal would

remain “on hold.” 

B. Salsberry’s Arrest and Cooperation

On November 14, 2000, during the two-week hiatus in the

Martino deal, Salsberry was arrested after one of his drivers

turned him in to authorities. After his arrest, Salsberry was

incarcerated in San Diego. From jail, Salsberry called Glaum to

check on the Martino deal and to inform him of his status. While

Salsberry was incarcerated, he spoke to Glaum nearly every day.

During these calls, Glaum assured Salsberry that “he wouldn’t let

[him] down” and that he “wanted to keep things going.” The two

eventually agreed that Glaum would carry on Salsberry’s business

while Salsberry was in jail.

On November 18, 2000, Glaum sent his attorney, Phil

Gagnon, to meet with Salsberry in jail. Gagnon served as an
-5-

intermediary between Glaum and Salsberry, meeting with Salsberry on

several occasions. At one of their meetings, Salsberry provided 

Gagnon with Ronnie Kerrigan’s and the Old Man’s telephone numbers.

On January 17, 2001, Salsberry decided to cooperate with

the government. Soon afterwards, Drug Enforcement Agency ("DEA")

Agent Paul Wolf traveled from Maine to California to debrief

Salsberry. As part of his cooperation agreement, Salsberry agreed

to remain in contact with Glaum and Gagnon and to provide Glaum

with Wolf’s pager number. Eventually, Salsberry gave Glaum the

pager number, pretending that it belonged to Paul Sekenski.

C. The Sting Operation

Wolf returned to Maine from meeting with Salsberry on 

January 19, 2001. Two days later, he received an electronic page

from Glaum. In their introductory call, Glaum identified himself

as a friend of Salsberry and asked Wolf if he wanted “to discuss

doing some business.” Glaum said that he soon would be traveling

to Maine to bring drugs to Ronnie Kerrigan and that he would be

able to deliver drugs to Wolf at that time. Wolf told him that he

would have to “check [him] out” before placing an order. Glaum

invited Wolf to call him when he was ready to deal.

On January 24, 2001, Wolf called Glaum. After Glaum

explained how he had become associated with Salsberry, Wolf

broached the subject of the Martino deal. Wolf asked Glaum if he

knew Martino. Glaum stated that he knew “of him” but that he knew
-6-

“Dad real well.” At the conclusion of the conversation, Glaum

offered to send Wolf a small shipment of marijuana.

On January 30, 2001, Wolf and Glaum negotiated the

smaller shipment that they had initially discussed on January 24th.

Glaum agreed to send Wolf a ten-pound load. Wolf, in turn, rented

a "mail drop" box to receive the shipment at a Mail Boxes Etc. in

Saco, Maine. On February 10, 2001, Wolf provided the address to

Glaum, and Glaum told him to expect the drugs to arrive in a

package appearing to contain candles. 

On February 13, 2001, Glaum and Wolf again discussed the

ten-pound shipment. This time they discussed payment. Wolf agreed

to send half of the money immediately and to pay the rest when they

met. In their next conversation, on February 18, 2001, they

discussed the possibility of a larger shipment. Glaum offered to

send a sample of the larger shipment or to bring it to Maine when

he visited Kerrigan. He told Wolf that he had just obtained “three

hun[dred]” pounds of marijuana and that the drugs were “Dad’s

thing” and were “all Dad.” 

Wolf received the ten-pound shipment on February 20,

2001. Wolf called that day to inform Glaum that the shipment had

arrived. The next conversation between Wolf and Glaum took place

on February 22, 2001, during which Wolf told Glaum that Martino was

“kinda anxious” about the larger deal.
2 During this meeting, Glaum admitted that he had been

smuggling marijuana from Mexico since he was eighteen years old and

that he had sent “300 or 400 hundred in the mail without any

problems.” 

-7-

At this point, Wolf arranged for DEA Agent Ralph Caruso

to pose as Martino, in order to expand the investigation. On

February 25, 2001, Wolf told Glaum that he had shared some of the

ten-pound shipment with Martino and that, as a result, Martino

wanted to meet to finalize the deal. Wolf asked Glaum if he could

give Martino his telephone number. Glaum agreed.

The investigation then shifted to San Diego. Caruso and

DEA Agent Judy Gustafson, who was posing as Martino’s girlfriend,

met with Glaum on February 29, 2001. Glaum told Caruso that he had

arranged to transport the drugs. At their next meeting on March 1,

2001, Glaum insisted that Caruso provide immediate payment for the

one-ton shipment.2 The DEA was unwilling to provide such a large

payment to Glaum and accordingly shifted its focus to Gagnon, in

the hope that it could arrange the Martino deal through him. After

numerous attempts over several months, the agency abandoned this

effort because Gagnon refused to take a “proactive” role in

organizing the deal. 

Because Caruso was unable to make progress through either

Glaum or Gagnon, the DEA decided that Wolf should reinitiate

contact with Glaum, and on July 16, 2001, Wolf placed a call to

Glaum. During this call, Wolf asked Glaum about obtaining new
-8-

shipments of marijuana. Glaum stated that he had quality marijuana

available but that he was upset that he had not been paid for

earlier shipments to Maine. He also said that he had a new person

working in Bangor, Maine to oversee some of his affairs. 

Wolf and Glaum proceeded to discuss the logistics for

sending smaller shipments. Glaum suggested sending forty-pound

lots on the same day to two different addresses. He said that he

had been shipping between 400 and 500 pounds of marijuana every two

weeks and that, in some weeks, he had sent 600 pounds. Glaum also

explained that he had formed a shipping company called “Simply

Shipping” through which he trafficked drugs. Glaum noted that his

associate in Bangor, Eugene Monroe, had “probably about a hundred

pounds of marijuana” on hand, and suggested that Wolf meet with him

to set up a deal.

D. “Dealing” with Monroe

The day after Wolf’s conversation with Glaum, he received

an electronic page from Monroe. Monroe explained to Wolf that he

was working with Glaum and that, going forward, Glaum wanted Monroe

and Wolf to handle “the account” themselves. 

On July 24, 2001, Monroe met Wolf at a restaurant in

Waterville, Maine. Monroe said that Glaum had taken over the

business after Salsberry was incarcerated. He also explained that,

because of difficulties that Glaum had encountered working with

Ronnie Kerrigan, Glaum had hired him to oversee the Maine
3 Monroe delivered only twenty pounds of marijuana.

-9-

operations. Monroe described the method for shipping the drugs.

The drugs would arrive from Simply Shipping in boxes with religious

logos so as to dampen suspicions about their contents. Wolf

provided Monroe with an address at a Mail Boxes Etc. in

Scarborough, Maine, where Glaum could send the drugs. Monroe

showed Wolf a sample of the available marijuana. After seeing the

sample, Wolf placed an order for 100 pounds. Monroe responded

that, prior to delivering such a large amount, he would have to

check on availability with Glaum.

Later that day, Monroe contacted Wolf and told him that,

even though Glaum had 120 pounds of marijuana in his possession,

only forty pounds were available to him. Monroe said that he would

bring twenty five pounds to the same restaurant where they earlier

had met and that Glaum would ship the rest.

On the afternoon of July 25, 2001, Monroe and Wolf met in

the restaurant parking lot. Monroe placed the drugs in the

backseat of Wolf’s car.3 The next morning, Wolf received a call

from the Mail Boxes Etc. informing him that he had received two

boxes from “Faith Unity World Service” sent by Simply Shipping.

Both boxes contained vacuum sealed bricks of marijuana. 

After receiving the shipment, Wolf called Monroe to tell

him that it had arrived. Monroe stated that Glaum had just

received another 400 pounds of marijuana to distribute. On July
-10-

30, 2001, Monroe and Wolf made plans for Wolf to receive an

additional twenty five pounds of drugs. The two agreed to meet in

Brunswick, Maine, the following day. Monroe was arrested just as

Wolf arrived at the meeting spot. At approximately the same time,

Glaum was arrested in San Diego.

E. Trial and Sentence

Glaum was charged in a single-count indictment with

conspiracy to distribute and to possess with the intent to

distribute 1,000 or more kilograms of marijuana, see 21 U.S.C. §§

846 and 841(a)(1). After a five-day trial, the jury convicted

Glaum but specifically found that he was responsible for only

between 100 and 999 kilograms of marijuana. At sentencing,

however, the district court determined that Glaum was responsible

for 1,052 kilograms of marijuana. The court sentenced Glaum to 121

months of imprisonment and four years of supervised release. Glaum

timely appealed from the conviction and sentence.

II. Discussion

Glaum raises six main issues on appeal. First, he claims

that the government failed to prove his participation in the single

conspiracy alleged in the indictment. Second, he claims that he

was entrapped. Third, he claims that the district court

incorrectly instructed the jury on his entrapment defense. Fourth,

he claims that the district court erred in its drug quantity

calculations. Fifth, he claims that a portion of the drug quantity
-11-

attributed to him should have been excluded because of sentencing

manipulation. Sixth, he claims that the district court erred by

declining to grant him credit for acceptance of responsibility. We

address these claims seriatim.

A. Single Conspiracy

Glaum argues that the government failed to prove that he

was involved in the single conspiracy described in the indictment.

The indictment alleged that, from the fall of 2000 until his

arrest, on July 31, 2001, Glaum participated in a single conspiracy

with Salsberry and others to distribute marijuana. Glaum asserts

that the evidence established two separate conspiracies. The first

involved Salsberry and concluded when Salsberry agreed to become a

government agent; the second involved Monroe and concluded when

Glaum was arrested. 

 Whether a given body of evidence proves one conspiracy

or multiple conspiracies is an issue of fact. See United States v.

Portela, 167 F.3d 687, 696 (1st Cir. 1999). Thus, on appeal, we

review the jury’s single-conspiracy determination by asking whether

the finding was rational given the evidence. Id. We have

identified a non-exclusive list of factors to guide this inquiry:

(1) was there evidence of a common purpose? (2) were the various

elements of the plan interdependent? and (3) was there some degree

of overlap among the participants? See United States v. RiveraRuiz, 244 F.3d 263, 268 (1st Cir. 2001); Portela, 167 F.3d at 695.
-12-

Here, there was sufficient evidence to find Glaum guilty

of participating in the charged single conspiracy. There was

evidence that, in the fall of 2000, Glaum conspired with Salsberry

to sell drugs. See Portela, 167 F.3d at 695 (goal of selling drugs

for profit satisfies common goal requirement). After agreeing to

join with Salsberry, Glaum performed several acts to further the

goals of the conspiracy, including weighing and preparing drugs for

shipment and sale and meeting with Salsberry’s suppliers.

Following Salsberry’s arrest, Glaum agreed to assume Salsberry’s

role in the business and proceeded to honor this agreement, unaware

that Salsberry had agreed to become a government agent. 

 Glaum contends that the charged conspiracy ended when

Salsberry became a government agent. See id. at 699-700

(explaining that a conspiracy cannot exist where one of the members

is a government agent because a conspiracy requires the existence

of two “genuine” parties). But the Portela rule has no relevance

here because there was evidence that Glaum continued to work with

other members of the conspiracy after Salsberry agreed to cooperate

with the DEA. See United States v. Giry, 818 F.2d 120, 126 (1st

Cir. 1987) (noting that the rule providing that government agents

do not count as co-conspirators is relevant “only in situations

where the conspiracy involve[d] one defendant and a government

informer”) (internal quotations omitted). For example, Glaum told

Wolf that he knew “Dad real well” and that the marijuana in his
4 Glaum also argues that his conviction must be overturned

because the jury found him responsible for a smaller amount of

marijuana than was alleged in the indictment. There is no merit to

this argument. The amount of drugs for which a defendant is

responsible is not an element which the government must prove to

obtain a conviction. See United States v. Goodine, 326 F.3d 26,

32-33 (1st Cir. 2003). 

-13-

possession was “all Dad” and was “Dad’s thing.” The jury easily

could have concluded that Glaum’s statements were references to his

on-going work with the Old Man (whose other alias was "Dad").

There was thus sufficient evidence that Glaum continued to receive

marijuana from the supply end of the conspiracy after Salsberry’s

departure from the organization. 

There was also sufficient evidence to conclude that Glaum

continued to work with the distribution end of the conspiracy. In

conversations with Wolf, Glaum described his continued work with

Ronnie Kerrigan, including his plans to travel to Maine to bring

him drugs. In addition, Eugene Monroe testified that Glaum ushered

him into the conspiracy only after Glaum encountered difficulties

working with Kerrigan. Glaum’s continuing relationship with

Kerrigan permitted the jury to conclude that he continued to deal

with distributors that he had met through his involvement in the

charged single conspiracy.4

 B. Entrapment

Glaum’s second claim challenges the jury’s decision to

reject his entrapment defense. Like the single-conspiracy issue

discussed above, we review this claim under the sufficiency of the
-14-

evidence rubric. See United States v. LaFreniere, 236 F.3d 41, 45

(1st Cir. 2001). Thus, we consider the evidence in the light most

favorable to the government, asking whether a rational jury could

have rejected Glaum’s entrapment defense. United States v. Tom,

330 F.3d 83, 89 (1st Cir. 2003).

The entrapment defense is two-pronged. It requires proof

of (1) improper government inducement to commit the crime, and (2)

lack of predisposition by the defendant to engage in criminal

conduct. See United States v. Gamache, 156 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir.

1998). To present an entrapment defense, the defendant must make

an initial prima facie showing of proof raising the issue. See

Tom, 330 F.3d at 89. It is undisputed that Glaum made this initial

showing. 

At this point, the burden shifts to the government to

prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not

entrapped. Id. Sufficient evidence that the government did not

improperly induce the crime or that the defendant was predisposed

towards criminal conduct defeats the entrapment defense. See

United States v. Capelton, 350 F.3d 231, 242 (1st Cir. 2003). We

focus here on predisposition, considering: (1) the character or

reputation of the defendant; (2) whether the initial suggestion of

criminal activity was made by the government; (3) whether the

defendant was engaged in criminal activity for profit; (4) whether

the defendant showed reluctance to commit the offense; and (5) the
-15-

nature of the inducement offered by the government. See United

States v. Nishnianidze, 342 F.3d 6, 17 (1st Cir. 2003). 

Here, there was evidence to support the conclusion that

Glaum was predisposed to criminal conduct. Glaum emphasized to

the DEA agents his prior work distributing drugs, including that he

had been distributing marijuana, imported from Mexico, since he was

eighteen years old. He also had been working with Salsberry in

packaging and distributing drugs for several months before the

DEA’s involvement, and had agreed to run the trafficking business

in Salsberry’s absence. Thus, there was ample evidence showing

that Glaum had the character and reputation of a drug dealer. See

United States v. Panet-Collazo, 960 F.2d 256, 259-60 (1st Cir.

1992) (statement by defendant that he “worked with cocaine a lot”

shows defendant’s predisposition to engage in criminal conduct).

In addition, after the DEA infiltrated the conspiracy,

Glaum continued to act as an eager participant. After receiving

Wolf’s pager number from Salsberry, Glaum contacted Wolf almost

immediately and, in their first conversation, offered to do “some

business.” Thereafter, Glaum never expressed reluctance to work

with Wolf in organizing additional transactions because of their

illegality. Moreover, the evidence that Glaum received “a

percentage” of the profits from Salsberry leaves little doubt that

Glaum engaged in drug dealing for profit.
-16-

C. Entrapment Instruction

Glaum next claims that, even if the evidence was

sufficient to defeat his entrapment defense, the district court

incorrectly instructed the jury on entrapment. Relying on United

States v. Brooks, 215 F.3d 842, 845 (8th Cir. 2000), Glaum argues

that the jury should have been instructed that, for purposes of

entrapment, the government was responsible for all of Salsberry’s

conduct whether or not it was aware of the conduct.

In formulating its instructions, a district court is not

required to parrot the language proffered by the parties. See

United States v. Nivica, 887 F.2d 1110, 1124 (1st Cir. 1989).

Within wide margins, the district court retains the choice of the

precise words to be used in explaining the applicable law to the

jury. See United States v. Paniagua-Ramos, 251 F.3d 242, 245 (1st

Cir. 2001). Our role is to determine "whether, taken as a whole,

the court's instructions fairly and adequately submitted the issues

in the case to the jury." Tom, 330 F.3d at 91.

The district court instructed that "[t]o show that

[Glaum] was not entrapped the government must establish beyond a

reasonable . . . doubt that a law enforcement officer or Anthony

Salsberry, after he began cooperating with law enforcement, did not

persuade or talk [Glaum] into committing the crime." (Emphasis

supplied). The district court also instructed that, for purposes

of entrapment, "it does not matter whether the government was aware
5 In addition, Glaum contends that Apprendi v. New Jersey,

530 U.S. 466 (2000), forbids the district court from sentencing him

for drug quantities in excess of the quantity found by the jury.

He acknowledges that we have previously rejected this argument, see

United States v. Lopez-Lopez, 282 F.3d 1, 22 (1st Cir.), cert.

denied, 536 U.S. 949 (2002); United States v. Martinez-Medina, 279

F.3d 105, 122 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 921 (2002), but

urges us to reconsider. We decline his invitation. See United

States v. Rodriguez, 311 F.3d 436, 438-39 (1st Cir. 2002), cert.

denied, 123 S.Ct. 1607 (2003). Relatedly, Glaum asks us to declare

21 U.S.C. § 841 facially unconstitutional because it conflicts with

Apprendi. We also rejected this argument in Lopez-Lopez, 282 F.3d

at 22-23, and will not reconsider it here.

-17-

of Anthony Salsberry's communications either directly or indirectly

with [Glaum]." The court's instruction captured the essence of the

instruction requested by Glaum. There was no error. See United

States v. Dray, 901 F.2d 1132, 1141 (1st Cir. 1990).

D. Drug Quantity Calculation

Glaum's fourth claim of error is that the district court

credited unreliable evidence in coming to its drug quantity

calculation.5 Notwithstanding the jury’s determination that Glaum

was responsible for less than 1,000 kilograms of marijuana, the

court concluded that he was responsible for 2,320 pounds (1,052

kilograms) of marijuana. In reaching this total, the district

court relied, inter alia, on statements by Glaum that (1) he had

300 pounds of marijuana in his possession on February 18, 2001, (2)

he dealt between 400 and 500 pounds of marijuana every two weeks

(the court took the minimum possible amount of 800 pounds for a

single two-week period), (3) in some weeks, he distributed up to

600 pounds, and (4) that Monroe had approximately 100 pounds
-18-

available on July 16, 2001. The court also relied on statements

from Monroe that Glaum had 120 pounds in his possession on July 24,

2001 and another 400 pounds in his possession on July 25, 2001. 

The district court determines drug quantity under a

preponderance of the evidence standard. See United States v.

Laboy, 351 F.3d. 578, 582 (1st Cir. 2003). We disturb a drug

quantity determination only in cases of clear error. See United

States v. Batista, 239 F.3d 16, 21 (1st Cir. 2001). In cases such

as this, where "the amount [of drugs] seized does not represent the

scale of the offense, the court. . . approximate[s] the quantity of

the controlled substance." U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, cmt. (n.12). In

making such a determination, the district court need only make "a

reasoned approximation" of the quantity involved. United States v.

Huddleston, 194 F.3d 214, 224 (1st Cir. 1999).

As set forth above, the district court relied on

statements made by Glaum and Monroe during the course of the DEA’s

investigation. We recently observed that "the most damning

evidence of drug quantity [is] the defendant's own admissions."

United States v. Cyr, 337 F.3d 96, 100 (1st Cir. 2003). In any

event, the court acted reasonably in crediting Monroe's and Glaum’s

admissions. Glaum has simply not offered a substantial reason for

upsetting the district court’s primary role in making credibility

determinations. See United States v. Picanso, 333 F.3d 21, 27 (1st

Cir. 2003) ("The appraisal of amount depends on inference drawing
6 Additionally, Glaum argues that the district court

erroneously relied on drug quantities from both the "first"

conspiracy involving Salsberry and the "second" conspiracy

involving Monroe in reaching the total. Our conclusion that the

evidence supported the jury's determination that there was only one

conspiracy disposes of this argument. See supra, at 11-13.

-19-

and . . . credibility and we are not only loath but forbidden to

substitute our own de novo assessment for that of the judge who

tried the case and heard the evidence first hand."); Huddleston,

194 F.3d at 224 (noting, in context of reviewing district court’s

drug quantity calculation, that “credibility calls are grist for

the trial court mill”).6

E. Sentencing Manipulation

Glaum next claims that some portion of the drugs should

have been excluded from the quantity calculation because of

sentencing manipulation. Specifically, he claims that government

agents, including Salsberry, coerced him to participate in

additional deals in order to increase his sentence.

"[W]here government agents have improperly enlarged the

scope or scale of the crime, the sentencing court has ample power

to deal with the situation . . . by excluding the tainted

transaction from the computation of relevant conduct." United

States v. Montoya, 62 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1995) (internal

quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). However,

to prevail on a sentencing manipulation claim, the defendant must

establish "extraordinary misconduct by the government." Id. at 4
7 Glaum also argues that he was predisposed to commit only

small drug transactions and that the DEA manipulated him into

attempting larger transactions. We are unpersuaded. Evidence

concerning the defendant's predisposition is of marginal relevance

to a sentencing manipulation claim. See Montoya, 62 F.3d at 4. In

any event, Glaum's attempt to cast himself as a small-time drug

dealer until the DEA's investigation is not the only (or even the

most plausible) reading of the record. The evidence showed that,

prior to the DEA investigation, Glaum worked to organize

transportation of a one-ton shipment of marijuana.

-20-

(internal quotations and citations omitted). "[G]arden variety

manipulation claims" do not suffice. Id.

The district court rejected Glaum's sentencing

manipulation claim because the DEA's continued pursuit of Glaum

permitted the DEA to further infiltrate the conspiracy. The

court's analysis was reasonable. We have rejected sentencing

manipulation claims where the government extended the scope of its

investigation into the defendant's conduct because it reasonably

believed that further investigation would permit it to identify

additional drug dealers. See Capelton, 350 F.3d at 246 (rejecting

sentencing manipulation claim where government extended

investigation in order to identify additional drug dealers); United

States v. Terry, 240 F.3d 65, 71 (1st Cir. 2001) (rejecting

sentencing manipulation claim where government acted in good faith

when it extended duration of investigation to identify other

members in drug network). So too here, as the government’s efforts

resulted in Monroe's arrest.7 
-21-

F. Acceptance of Responsibility

Finally, Glaum claims that the district court erred by

refusing to grant him a reduction in his sentence for acceptance of

responsibility. See U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1. He contends that he is

entitled to such a reduction because, before trial, he admitted

responsibility for the offense of which he was eventually

convicted.

Glaum was initially indicted for participating in a

conspiracy involving 100 or more kilograms of marijuana.

Subsequently, a superseding indictment was issued charging Glaum

with participating in a conspiracy involving 1,000 or more

kilograms of marijuana. After this superseding indictment was

issued, Glaum offered to plead guilty to the original charge. The

government refused this offer. Glaum contends that, because the

jury found him guilty only of the original charge, he should

receive credit for accepting responsibility. The district court

rejected this argument because it found Glaum responsible for over

1,000 kilograms of marijuana, and Glaum denied responsibility for

these additional quantities. 

To earn an acceptance of responsibility reduction, a

defendant must, inter alia, "truthfully admit the conduct

comprising the offense of conviction." See U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 cmt.

(n. 1(a)). In addition, he must "truthfully [admit] or not falsely

[deny] any additional relevant conduct for which [he] is
8 Glaum's decision to pursue an entrapment defense is also

inconsistent with acceptance of responsibility. See Capelton, 350

F.3d at 245 (noting that acceptance of responsibility reduction

will rarely be appropriate where defendant pursues entrapment

defense).

-22-

accountable." Id.; see also United States v. Hernandez Coplin, 24

F.3d 312, 317 (1st Cir. 1994). The district court's rejection of an

acceptance of responsibility claim is entitled to considerable

deference and can be overturned only on a showing of clear error.

See Capelton, 350 F.3d at 245. 

Throughout the presentence process, Glaum denied

responsibility for the relevant conduct attributed to him by the

district court. At his sentencing, he told the court that "[w]hat

they're saying I did, that's a crock of crap." Glaum’s comment is

certainly not indicative of a criminal defendant accepting

responsibility for his conduct. See U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 cmt. (n.

1(a)) ("A defendant who falsely denies, or frivolously contests,

relevant conduct that the court determines to be true has acted in

a manner inconsistent with acceptance of responsibility."); see

also United States v. Gonzalez, 12 F.3d 298, 300 (1st Cir. 1993).8

Because Glaum persisted in denying his participation in a

conspiracy involving 1,000 or more kilograms of marijuana, the

district court's rejection of his acceptance of responsibility

request was not clearly erroneous. 
-23-

III. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the

conviction and sentence of defendant Terrence Glaum.