UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-4688

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

CALVIN LEVAR DIXON, a/k/a Booga, a/k/a Calvin Dion,

 Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Charleston. Patrick Michael Duffy, Senior

District Judge. (2:10-cr-00277-PMD-4)

Submitted: June 11, 2014 Decided: June 24, 2014

Before DIAZ and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior Circuit 

Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Bradley M. Kirkland, BRADLEY M. KIRKLAND, LLC, Columbia, South 

Carolina, for Appellant. Sean Kittrell, Assistant United States 

Attorney, Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Calvin Levar Dixon pleaded guilty, pursuant to a 

written plea agreement, to one count of conspiracy to possess 

with intent to distribute 280 grams or more of crack cocaine, 

500 grams or more of cocaine, 1000 grams or more of heroin, a 

quantity of marijuana, as well as maintaining a place for 

distribution, three counts of possession with intent to 

distribute heroin, one count of possession with intent to 

distribute crack cocaine, and one count of unlawful possession 

of a firearm by a convicted felon. He received a 264-month 

sentence of imprisonment. Counsel has filed a brief pursuant to 

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), finding no 

meritorious grounds for appeal but questioning whether Dixon’s 

guilty plea was knowing and voluntary and whether the district 

court imposed a reasonable sentence. Dixon filed a pro se 

supplemental brief raising ineffective assistance of counsel 

related to the guilty plea hearing. The Government declined to 

file a brief or raise the appeal waiver. Finding no error, we 

affirm.

Prior to accepting a plea, a trial court must conduct 

a plea colloquy in which it informs the defendant of, and 

determines that the defendant comprehends, the nature of the 

charge to which he is pleading guilty, any mandatory minimum 

penalty, the maximum possible penalty he faces, and the rights 
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he is relinquishing by pleading guilty. Fed. R. Crim. P. 

11(b)(1); United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 116 (4th Cir. 

1991). Additionally, the district court must ensure that the 

defendant’s plea was supported by an independent factual basis, 

was voluntary, and did not result from force or threats. Fed. 

R. Crim. P. 11(b)(2)-(3); DeFusco, 949 F.2d at 119-20. Because 

Dixon did not seek to withdraw his guilty plea or otherwise 

preserve any allegation of Rule 11 error, this court reviews his

plea colloquy for plain error. United States v. Martinez, 277 

F.3d 517, 525 (4th Cir. 2002); see Henderson v. United States, 

133 S. Ct. 1121, 1126 (2013) (discussing plain error standard). 

Our review of the record indicates that the district court 

substantially complied with Rule 11 in accepting Dixon’s plea. 

Accordingly, we conclude that Dixon’s plea was knowing and 

voluntary and was supported by an adequate factual basis, and, 

consequently, that the plea was final and binding. See United 

States v. Lambey, 974 F.2d 1389, 1394 (4th Cir. 1992) (en banc).

We review a sentence for reasonableness, applying an 

abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 

38, 46 (2007). The court first reviews for significant 

procedural error, and if the sentence is free from such error, 

it then considers substantive reasonableness. Id. at 51. 

Procedural error includes improperly calculating the Sentencing 

Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines range as mandatory, 
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failing to consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) factors, and 

failing to explain adequately the selected sentence. Id. The 

district court must make an “individualized assessment” by 

applying the relevant § 3553(a) factors to the case’s specific 

circumstances. United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328 (4th 

Cir. 2009). The individualized assessment need not be elaborate 

or lengthy, but it must be adequate to allow meaningful 

appellate review. Id. at 330. Substantive reasonableness is 

determined by considering the totality of the circumstances, and 

if the sentence is within the properly-calculated Guidelines 

range, we apply a presumption of reasonableness. United 

States v. Strieper, 666 F.3d 288, 295 (4th Cir. 2012).

In imposing Dixon’s sentence, the district court 

correctly calculated the Guidelines range, did not abuse its 

discretion in granting a variance for a 1:1 ratio of powder to 

crack cocaine, and specifically considered the advisory nature 

of the Guidelines, the § 3553(a) factors, and Dixon’s individual 

circumstances. Accordingly, we conclude that Dixon’s 264-month 

sentence is both procedurally and substantively reasonable.

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the 

record, including Dixon’s pro se claim of ineffective assistance

of counsel, and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We 

therefore affirm Dixon’s conviction and sentence. This court 

requires that counsel inform Dixon, in writing, of the right to 
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petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further 

review. If Dixon requests that a petition be filed, but counsel 

believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel 

may move in this court for leave to withdraw from 

representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof 

was served on Dixon. We dispense with oral argument because the 

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 

materials before this court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

AFFIRMED