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### STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee, UNPUBLISHED May 16, 2017

v No. 332041 Berrien Circuit Court RONALD DUANE ROSEBURGH, LC No. 2015-003170-FH

Defendant-Appellant.

Before: M ARKEY , P.J., and M URPHY and M ETER , JJ.

P ER C URIAM

. Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of possession of counterfeit currency in violation of MCL 750.254. He was sentenced as a fourth-offense habitual offender to imprisonment from 12 months t o 10 years. Defendant appeals by right, and we affirm.

Defendant argues that the evide nce presented at trial was insu fficient to support his conviction. A challenge to the sufficiency of evidence in supp ort of a criminal conviction is a question of law reviewed de novo. People v Meissner , 294 Mich App 438, 452; 812 NW2d 37 (2011); People v Hawkins , 245 Mich App 439, 457; 628 NW2d 105 (2001). We review the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution to determ ine whether rational jurors could find that the essential elements of each crime were proven beyo nd a reasonable doubt. People v Carines , 460 Mich 750, 757; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). Circumstantial evide nce and reasonable inferences drawn from such evide nce can constitute satisfactory proof of the elements of a crime. Id . We will not resolve witness credibility questions or interfe re with the fact-finder’s determination of the weight of evidence. People v Eisen , 296 Mich App 326, 331; 820 NW2d 229 (2012). The trier of fact, not a n appellate court, determi nes what inferences may be fairly drawn from the evidence and the weight to be accorded th em. People v Hardiman , 466 Mich 417, 428; 646 NW2d 158 (2002).

Defendant was convicted of possession of counterfeit money in violation of MCL 750.254, which provides in relevant part: Any person who . . . shall have in his possession, any false, a ltered, forged or counterfeit bill or note . . . with intent to utter or pass the same, or to render the same current as true, knowing the same to be false, forged or c ounterfeit, shall be guilty of a felony, punishable by imprisonment . . . .-2- To sustain a conviction for vi olating MCL 750.254, the prosecut ion must prove that: (1) “defendant had in his possession a counterfeit bill or bills,” (2) defendant “intended to ‘utter’ or ‘pass’ or ‘render’ those bills as true,” and (3) defendant knew “that [the] bills are counterfeit.” People v Harrison , 283 Mich App 374, 381; 768 NW2d 98 (2009). “To ‘utter’ means to put something into circulation. To utter and publish means to offe r something as if it is real, whether or not anyone accepts it as real. To ‘render’ is to transmit o r deliver.” Id . (quotation marks and citation omitted). Jurors can infer a defendant’s intent from, among other things, his words and acts, and other circums tantial evidence. Hawkins , 245 Mich App at 458.

Defendant’s sole argument on appe al is that there was insuffic ient evidence to establish he intended to utter or pass the counterfeit money he possessed . We disagree. Defendant was arrested in relation to a 911 complaint and brought to the Berr ien County Jail where he was processed. The arresting offi cer searched defendant and found six $50 bills in one of his pockets. That money was placed in an envelope with a copy of a receipt signed by defendant and placed in a safe for later placement into an inmate bank ac count. The jail’s clerk who sets up inmate accounts noticed that defendant’s money, the six $50 bil ls, did not feel like real money and lacked the ordinary security features one usually finds on United States currency. A detective confirmed defendant’s b ills were counterfeit. Later that same day, after the detective informed defendant of his Miranda 1 rights, defendant agreed t o a recorded interview.

During the interview, defendant initially denied that he knew that the $50 bills were counterfeit or where he got them. Later, however, defendant ch anged his story and admitted to the detective that he knew the bills were fake and that he boug ht them for $100 from a man he knew. Defendant told the detective that the night before, when he knew the police would be coming to arrest him, he retrieved the counterfeit bills from u nder his mattress and intended to use them to pay his bond. Defe ndant admitted that he called h is girlfriend on the phone and said that his bond was $750, but he had the $300 fr om under his matt ress, so she did not need to bring the entire amount. Defendant also admitted in the interview th at earlier that day he yelled this same thing to her in the courtroom at his arraignment on other charges.

At trial, the prosecution’s witnesses testified to these facts . The recorded interview was admitted into evidence at trial and played back for the jurors during the detective’s trial testimony. Defendant argues on appeal that his statements in t he recorded interview could not prove he intended to pass the counterfeit money because those s tatements were contradictory. That argument lacks merit. Tri ers of fact “can infer a defenda nt’s intent from his words, acts, means, or the manner used to commit the offense.” Harrison , 283 Mich App at 382, citing Hawkins , 245 Mich App at 458. The triers of fact alone are to assess the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be accorded the evidence at trial. Id . All evidentiary conflicts are resolved in favor of the prosecution. People v Kanaan , 278 Mich App 594, 619; 751 NW2d 57 (2008). The jurors in this case, having heard and considered defendant’s co ntradictory statements, reasonably could conclude from the evidence adduced at trial that defendan t knew the six $50 bills he possessed were counterfeit and that he intended to pass those b ills as true to pay his bond.

1 Miranda v Arizona , 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966).-3- Consequently, viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecut ion, we conclude that the evidence at trial was sufficient to allow rational triers of fa ct to find that defendant (1) possessed counterfeit bills, (2) intended to pass those bills for payment of his bond, and (3) knew that the bills were counterfeit. Thus, sufficient evidence was presente d at trial to establish each of the elements of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt.

We affirm.

/s/ Jane E. Markey /s/ William B. Murphy /s/ Patrick M. Meter