IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 19-10278

MICHAEL JAMISON,

 Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

FLUOR FEDERAL SOLUTIONS, L.L.C.,

a South Carolina Limited Liability Company, 

 

Defendant - Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 3:16-CV-441

Before KING, JONES, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Plaintiff Michael Jamison appeals the district court’s dismissal of his 

third amended complaint, which alleged retaliation by his former employer, 

Fluor Federal Solutions (FFS)1, for engaging in activity protected by the False 

Claims Act’s (FCA) whistleblower provision. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h); Jamison v. 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

1 Jamison was hired by Del-Jen, Inc. (DJI), which merged with FFS, making FFS DJI’s 

successor-in-interest. Red Br. at 4. For clarity, we refer to the defendant-appellee as FFS.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

December 10, 2019

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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No. 19-10278

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Fluor Fed. Sols., LLC, No. 3:16-CV-0441-S, 2019 WL 460304, at *10 (N.D. Tex. 

Feb. 6, 2019). “Under the whistleblower provision of the FCA, Appellant was 

required to show that he engaged in protected activity, that Appellee knew he 

was engaged in protected activity, and that he was discharged because of it.” 

Sealed Appellant I v. Sealed Appellee I, 156 F. App’x. 630, 634 (5th Cir. 2005). 

The district court determined that Jamison did not plausibly plead that any 

FFS employee had knowledge of his asserted protected activities, an essential 

element of Jamison’s whistleblower claim. See City of Clinton, Ark. v. Pilgrim’s 

Pride Corp., 632 F.3d 148, 153 (5th Cir. 2010) (“[P]laintiffs must allege facts 

that support the elements of the cause of action in order to make out a valid 

claim.”). For the reasons explained in the district court’s opinion, we affirm 

this holding.

Next, Jamison argues that the district court did not consider all of the 

types of protected activity in which he allegedly engaged. He claims that the 

court below treated his complaint as if his protected activity was limited to the 

filing of a qui tam action. But, in fact, the district court assumed that other 

alleged conduct, such as Jamison’s internal complaints and police reports, did 

qualify as protected activity under the FCA. Proceeding upon this assumption, 

the court then analyzed whether Jamison plausibly alleged the second element 

of an FCA retaliation claim—that FFS was aware of his protected activity—

and determined his pleading failed at this stage of the inquiry. Thus, 

Jamison’s claim that the district court failed to fully consider his alleged 

protected activity is without merit.

Jamison also appeals the district court’s order denying without prejudice 

his motion to compel discovery and contends that the district court improperly 

limited the matters that he could plead. Jamison, however, does not cite any

legal authority to support these claims. These claims are thus abandoned. 

Carl E. Woodward, L.L.C. v. Acceptance Indem. Ins. Co., 743 F.3d 91, 96 (5th 

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Cir. 2014); United States v. Upton, 91 F.3d 677, 684 n.10 (5th Cir. 1996) 

(“[C]laims made without citation to authority or references to the record are 

considered abandoned on appeal.”).

Finally, Jamison contends that the district court abused its discretion by 

denying him a fourth—and unrequested—chance to amend his pleadings. “A 

party who neglects to ask the district court for leave to amend cannot expect to 

receive such a dispensation from the court of appeals.” See U.S. ex rel. Willard 

v. Humana Health Plan of Texas Inc., 336 F.3d 375, 387 (5th Cir. 2003). 

Further, “[l]eave to amend properly may be denied when the party seeking 

leave has repeatedly failed to cure deficiencies by amendments previously 

allowed and when amendment would be futile.” Id. (affirming dismissal with 

prejudice where relator had two opportunities to amend his complaint). Not 

only has Jamison been given multiple chances to remedy his pleading 

deficiencies, but, at this stage, it appears that any further opportunities to 

amend will be futile as “there is no indication in [Jamison]’s briefs to this court 

that he will be able to allege” that FFS had knowledge of any protected activity 

undertaken by Jamison. Id. Consequently, the district court did not abuse its 

discretion when it “presume[d]” that Jamison had “pleaded his best case at this 

point” and dismissed his suit with prejudice. See Bosarge v. Miss. Bureau of 

Narcotics, 796 F.3d 435, 443 (5th Cir. 2015) (stating that, “[i]n the analogous 

Rule 12(b)(6) context, our court has ordered the district court to dismiss 

insufficient pleadings where the plaintiff has had an opportunity to plead his 

best case” and affirming dismissal when plaintiff had failed to meet the 

pleading standard after being given three opportunities to do so).

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

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