### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE D ec em be r 15, 200 4 S es sio n

ST A TE OF TE N N ES SE E v

. JO SE P H A N GE L S IL V A , III

Appeal f romthe Circ uit Court for Bedf ord County Nos. 15289 Charles Lee , Judge

No. M2003- 03063-CCA -R3-C D - F iled May 25, 2005

On J uly 21, 2003, the Gra nd J ury for Bedf ord C ounty returne d an indi ctment aga inst the defendant char g ing him with one c ount of ag g ravated rape. After a jury trial, the defendant wa s convicted a s char g ed on Oc tober 1, 2003 a nd sentenc ed o n Oc t o b er 2 7 , 2003, to twenty -two (22) y ear s in the Depa rtment of Corre ction. The defe ndant now appea ls this conviction. He arg ues that (1) the trial

cour t erred in denying the Def endant’ s motion for a new trial wher e ther e is evidenc e that a jur or failed to disclose to the tria l court af ter voir dire that she had ha d a conversation with t he Def endant’ s brother a nd knows the brother persona lly ; and (2) t h at t h e S tate violated Jencks v. Un ite d St a te s, 35 3 U .S

. 65 7 (19 57), a ndB ra dy v. Ma ryla nd , 3 73 U. S. 8 3 ( 19 63 ), by faili ng to d is c lo s e e v id e n c e o f

th e v ic ti m’ s p r e tria l s tate me n t w h ic h c o n tain e d e xc u lp a to r y in f o r mati o n

. We

c on c lud e that th e se iss ue s a re wi tho ut m e ri t a nda ff

ir m th e jud g me nt o f the tr ia l c ou rt

. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Trial Court is Aff irm ed

J E R R Y L. S MI TH , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which J OHN E VE R E TT W I LLI A M S and N OR MA M C G EE O G LE , J J ., joined.

F a n n i e J

. H arr i s , N a s h v i l l e , T e n n e s s e e f o r t h e ap p e l l a n t , J o s e p h A n g e l S i l v a , III

. Paul G. Summers, Attorney Gene ral & Reporter ; Eliz abeth T. Ry an, Senior Counsel; Mike McCowen, District Atto rn eyGene ral; Michae l D. Randles and Ann F iler, Assistant District Attorney s Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.

OP IN ION

Fa ctual B ackg round

On May 14 , 200 3, the vic tim , B on nie Jea n T ho ma so n, we nt t o T C’ s Sp ort’ s B ar i n Unionville. Her nie ce’ s boy friend dr opped her off at the bar a lone betwe en 7:30 and 8:00 p.m. The-2-

victim was supposed to ca ll her niec e to g ive her a ride home. The victim was living with her sister at the time.

When she arrived at the ba r, the victim immediately

order ed a be er. She continued drinking and talking with a man at the ba r throug hout the evening

. Ar o und 11:00 p.m. to 12:00 a.m., the victim decided she wanted t o go h o m e. S he did not have e noug h money for c ab fa

re and did not want to ca ll her niece because i t would cost money

. She asked the man she ha d been ta lking to at the bar if he wa s g oing ne ar he r niec e’s house , and he s ai d n o

. Soon after this exchang e, the Def endant of fer ed the victim $12

. 0 0 fo r ca b fare. The Def endant then of

fer ed to g ive her

a ride home. The D efe ndant and the vic tim did not know ea ch other prior to this conversation.

The De fenda nt and the victim g ot in his car and beg an driving . The victim and the D efe ndant

wer e chatting, and the victim was not pay ing attent i on to where they wer e g oing. T he De fendant pu lle d o ve r t o u ri nate . Wh e n h e g ot b a c k inthe c ar, he g ra bb e d th e vic tim ’s he a d a ndpu t it on his still exposed penis and tried to forc e her to fellate him. The D efe ndant broke the victim’s neckla ce
a ndtor e of

f h e r b ra . H e g ra

bb e d th e vic tim

fr om the pa ssenger’s sea t a ndpu lle d h e r t ow ardhim

. Her jeans we re dow n, and she f elt him vag inally

penetr ate he r. The vic tim’s he ad was hitting the ba c k w ind sh ie ld a s the De fe nd a nt ha d int e rc ou rs e wi th he r. She pr op pe d h e rs e lf up on he r h a nd s to preve nt this fr om ha

ppening and broke the ring on her f inge r. The D efe ndant also bit her shoulder

.
The De fenda nt t h en flipped the victim over to pe netrate her anally . He hit her

in the head

so ha rdthat he r u pp e r p la te of

de ntu re s w a s kno c ke d f

ro m he r mou th. He r f

lip fl op sh oe s a lso c a me
o ff h erfe et d u ri n g t h e e p i s o d e. At s o m e p o i n t , s h e a l s o l o s th ern o s e r i n g.

After raping the victim, the Def endant pushe d the victim out of the passeng er door and drove

away . He lef

t her standing in a p ar k i n g l o t , half-dr essed, a nd missing her bra, f lip-flops, upper denture and nec klace

. She stopped at a hotel and aske d the cler k to call her

sister. When her sister did not answer the phone, the victim beg an to walk towa rd Unionv i l l e. S he wa s picked up by an driver of an eig hteen- whee ler who drove her to Unionville. When she arrived in Unionville, an older g entleman g ave he r a ride t o her sist er’ s house. Her sister found her crying on the front por ch. The victim told her sister she had be en ra ped.

Th e vic tim wa s t h e n t ak e n t o t h e h o s p i t a l

. A r ap e k i tw a s p e r f o r m e d

. D r

. A l l e n H on ig examined the vi ctim and observed mul tiple marks on her ba ck which w ere bruises and c ontusions that wer e consistent with being bitten. Both the vag inal and ana l swabs and the sme ar slide take n as part of the victim’s rape kit showed the pre sence of spermatozoa.
The police beg an an investigation of t he case. A detective went to TC’s and spoke with the barte nder. The barte nder w as able to tell the detective the Def endant’ s name, whe re he worke d, and the make and color of his ve hicle. The d etective located the Def endant’ s car

at his place of employ ment and saw a bra with a torn strap on the rea r floorboar d behind the driver ’s seat. Another office r ca me out to hel p t h e d et ective. They informed the D efe ndant of the c omplaint, and the office rs aske d for pe rmission to search the De fe ndant’s ca r. The of fice r found the uppe r denture-3-

plate, the f

lip-flops, the g old necklac e and the nose ring inside the ca r. The Defe ndant then voluntarily

went to the police de partment. He ad m i t t ed t o g iving a woman a ride and ha ving

consensua l va g inal, anal and oral sex with her. He also admitted to leaving the woman stra nded on the side of the r oad.

On Ju ly 2 1
, 2 0 0 3
, th e G r a n d Ju r y f o r B e d f o r d Co u n ty r e tu r n e d a n in d ic tm e n t a g a inst the Def endant c harg ing him with one c ount of ag g ravated ra pe. Af ter a jury trial, the D efe ndant was convicted a s char g ed on Oc tober 1, 2003, a nd sentenc ed on Oc tober 27, 2003, to twenty -two (22) y ear s in the Depa

rtment of Corre ction.

A juror, Ly nette Noteboom, L y nette L ocke at the t ime of t rial, was rele ased for cause during the voir dire be cause she knew the Def endant a n d his brother. Sometime afte r the trial wa s conclude d, M s. Noteboom ca me to defe nse counse l with information about another juror, Wina Goodwin, who sat on the D efe ndant’s jury . Ms. Noteboom felt that the i nformation would have some bea ring on the Def

endant’ s case

.

Th e De fe nd a nt f

ile d two mot ion s to se t a sid e the jury ve rd ic t onOc tob e r 2 7, 20 03 . H e a lso filed a motion for a new trial on November 14, 2003. The trial c ourt held a he aring on the motion fo r n e w t ri a l on No ve mbe r 2 0, 20 03 . T he te sti mon y a t th e he ari ng c on c e rn e d th e jur or iss ue , a s w e ll

as testimony by the victim’s c ousin disputing much of the victim’s te stimony at t ri al

. The Def endant’ s brother, Jacob Silva, was not pre sent during the jury s el ec t i o n an d did not know that J uror Goodw in was on the pa nel. On the f irst or second day of the trial, but definitely afte r the jury had bee n selec ted, J acob ran into Juror Goodwin in the hall of the c ourthouse. She aske d him what he wa s doing the re. J acob replied that his brother was on trial in the courtroom. J acob knew Juror Goodwin bec ause she is his ex -g irlfriend’ s aunt, and Juror Goodwin works at a c onvenienc e store that J acob f

reque nts. April Newman is Juror Goodwin’s niec e and is the ex-g irlfriend of J acob. She

a n d J a c o b h a v e a

b ab y t o g e t h e r , a n d a tt h e t i m e o f t h e t r i a l w e r e i n a d i s p u t e r e g ar d i n g t h e b ab y. There was no c ourt involvement in the dispute betwee n Ms. Newman and J acob.

After the hea ring , the trial court denied the D efe ndant’s motion for a ne w trial on De cembe r 8, 20 03 . T he De fe nd a nt f ile d a tim e ly no tic e of app e a l.

AN AL YSI S

The De fenda nt bring s two issues for our r eview: (1) whether t he trial court err ed in denying the De fe nd a nt’ s mo tio n f or a ne w t ri a l w he re the re is e vid e nc e that th e jur or in qu est io n f

a ile d to disclose to the trial court afte r voir dire that she had ha d a conve rsation with the Def endant’ s brother

a ndthat sh e ha s a

re la tio ns hip wi th h im; a nd(2 ) w he the r the Sta te vio la te d Jen c ks v. Un ite d St a te s, 353 U.S. 657 (1957), and Br ady v. Mary land, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by failing to disclose evidenc e, during discovery , of the victim’s pre trial statement which c ontained exculpatory information.

Alleged Juror M iscondu ct-4-

The De fenda nt’s first issue is that the trial court e rre d in deny ing his motion for ne w trial beca use Juror Goodwin is the aunt of the former girlfrie nd of t he Defendant’s brother. This issue

was included in the Def

endant’ s motion for new trial and was an issue addre ssed at the hearing on the Def endant’ s motion. Followin g t h e hea ring , the trial court filed its opinion. The trial court’s fi nd ing s w e re a s f

oll ow s:

Th e De fe nd a nt a lle g e s mi sc on du c t on thepa rt of Juro r Wi na

Go od win. [ footno te omi tte d] Juro r Wina Go od wi n is the bio log ic a l a un t of Ap ri l Ne wm an. Apr il Newma n and Jacob Silva, the brother of the De fendant, are the unmarried par ents of a child. J acob Sil va was a potential witness in Def endant’ s trial. April Newma n and Jac ob Silv a

ha ve ha d d if

fi c ult y ov e r v isi ta tio n a ndc hil d s up po rt iss ue s.

Bo t h J uror Wina Goodwin and A pril Newma n acknow ledg ed the biolog ical relationship. Each furthe r testified that ther e has been no social intera ction betwee n them other than c hance meeting s. On at lea st two occa sions be fore Def endant’ s trial April New man introduce d J acob Sil va to J uror Wina Goodwin as he r boy friend. These introductions occur red on c hance meeting s betwee n J uror Wina Goodwin and April Ne wm an , o n ce at a Goodwill Store Store [sic] and anothe r time at a drivethroug h window at a c onvenienc e mar ket where J uror W ina Goodwin wa s employ ed. J acob Silva had a lso patronized the business where Wina Goodwin was employ ed. Jac ob Silv a

c la ime d to ha ve g ive n Juro r Wina Go od wi n the ph on e nu mbe r of Ap ri l Newma n upon her request at her plac e of e mploy ment. J uror Wina Goodwin denie d

ever reque sting or r ece iving April Newman’ s phone number f rom J acob Silva.

During vo i r di re, a ll potential jurors, including Wina Goodwin, we re a sked by the state’s attorney

if they kn ew any one by

the name of

J acob Silva. Juror Wi na Goodwin indicated she did not. J acob Silva wa s not present during voir dire a nd was

never exhibi ted to the venire

.
On a r ece ss during the Defenda nt’s trial, J uror W ina Goodwin observe d J acob Silva in the hallway

of the courthouse and inquired as to w hy he was prese nt. J acob Silva informed Juror Wina Goodwin that his brother was the Def endant. Althoug h J acob Silv a no w c laim s that

Juro r Wi na

Go od wi n h old s a nim os ity tow ardhim

a ndhis fa mil ybe c a u s e o f h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p w i th A p r i l N e w m a n , h e i n e xp l i c i t l y f a i l e d to inf orm a ny on e that Jur or

Wina Go od wi n s ho uldno t si t on h is bro the r’ s tria l un til afte r the ve rdict wa s rende red.

J uror Wina Goodwin ac knowledg ed that she was familiar with J acob Silva’s f ace and associate d the fa ce w ith April Newma n

. Howeve r, she de nied she re called Jacob Silv a ’ s n a me a n d o n ly a s s o c iate d Ja c o b Si lv a w ith th e D e f e n d a n t u p o n le ar n ing of J acob Silva’s r elationship with the Defe ndant in the hallway of the courthouse. Juror Wina Goodwin testified that she did not answer the states [si c] attorney ’s question-5-

beca use she did not re cog nize the name. She further testified that she did not report her ne w foun d knowledg e bec ause suc h knowledg e would not have aff ecte d her

ve rd ic t. F urthe r, Juro r Wina Go od wi n te sti fi e d that he r re la tio ns hip wi th April Newma n in no way aff

ecte d her judgment in rea ching a verdict in Defe ndant’s trial

a ndthat sh e ne ve r i nf

orme d a ny

oth e r j ur or

of a ny of the se ma tte rs

.
After observing the demeanor of the w itnesses at Def endant’ s motion for

new tria l he ari ng , th e Cou rt

a c c re dit s Jur or

Wina Go od wi n’ s te sti mon y

in e ve ry re sp e c t.

The trial court did not ref

ere nce the testimony of April Newma n, the juror’ s niece and Jacob Silva’s ex-girlfriend. Howe ver, w e fe el that it is important to our review to include a portion of he r te sti mon y a t th e he ari ng . H e r t e sti mon y is a s f oll ow s:
Q. All rig ht. Do y ou know Wina Goodwin? A. Do I

know Wina Goodwin? Q. Yes. Ga

rre tt. Do y ou know Ms. Goodwin, Wina Goodwin? A. Ye s.

. . . . Q. How is she re lated to y ou? A. She is mybiologica l father ’s sister. Q. Th a t w ou ld m ake he r y ou r a un t? A. Ye s. Q. Do y ou and Ms. Goodwin have a re lationship? A. No. Q. Yo u d on ’t

ha ve a ny re la tio ns hip a t a ll? A. No. Q. You don’t see her? A. I have se en her

at the store that she works at and at a y ard sa le that I went to. Other tha n that, I

don’t see he r as we ll as I don’t see my

biologica l father

. Q. I s Ms. Goodwin awa re that y ou have a

child with J acob? A. Ye s. Q. Ho w d oe s sh e kn ow that? A. I went to her

y ard sa le not knowing it was her’ s. That is how she met her

.

. . . . Q. Where wa s the y ard sa le? A. At her house on Gar rett Road. Q. Do y ou kn ow wh a t he r a dd re ss i s? A. No , I

do no t.

. . . . Q. At that time y ou discussed y our relationship of the child with Ms. Goodwin? A. Uh-huh. Q. Who was prese nt for that conve rsation? A. J ust me and her

.-6-

. . . . Q. What did y ou tell Ms. Goodwin? A. I didn’t even know at first that she was my aunt until she – I pulled up, and she wa s talking to me a

bout it. That is when my biologica l mother – biologic al fathe r’s mother c ame out ther e and w as a s k i n g me questions about Dean, and how I kn e w a bo ut the y ardsa le , a ll o f that. It w a s a ll j us t c oin c ide nta l.

. . . . Q. Now, y ou said this happened in – somew here in J une of this y ear ? A. I am gu es s t i m at i n g. Q. Di d y ou e ve r t e ll Ja c ob abo ut y ou me e tin g wi th y ou r a un t? A. Ye s. Q. Whe n d id y ou do that? A. Well, Idon’t know if it wa s the time – off and on, and on and off . I t might ha ve be e n a

mon th l a te r. I

do n’ t kn ow . I

c a n’ t r e me mbe r. I

tol d h im. Q. Di d –

wh a t di d y ou te ll Ja c ob abo ut y ou r a un t? A

. J u s t th a t I a c c id e n tl y f o u n d o u t

– f

o u n d o u t w h e r e my d a d li v e d

. Ihaven’ t

se e n h im a ll o f m y

lif e , ma y be sin c e I wa s 3 y e ars old . I

tol d h im a

bo ut m e e tin g his

mom , th e y

wa nt ed me to com e by

a ndse e the m. I

ha d a be a uti fu l da

ug hte r, jus t

conver sation.

I n St a te v. Akins , 8 67 S.W. 2d35 0, 35 5 ( Te nn . Cri m. A pp . 1 99 3) , th is c ou rt a na ly zedthi s very issue in depth. I n Akins, we stated:

Article I , Section 9 of the Te nnessee Constit ution, like the Sixt h Amendment to the United States Constit ution, provides the ac cu s ed wi th the rig ht to trial “by an impartial jury .” The jury

selec tion process must be car efully g uarde d to ensure that

eac h defe ndant has a fair trial and that the verdict is determined by an impartial trier of fa ct. The Tennessee Constit ution g uarantees every acc used “a trial by a jury fre e of . . . disqualification on ac co u n t o f som e bias or pa rtiality toward one side or the other of the litigation.” Toombs v. State, 270 S.W.2d 649, 650 (Tenn. 1954).

Bia s in a juror is a “lea ning of the mind; propensity or pre possesion towards a n object or view, not leaving the mind indiffere nt; [ a] bent; [ for] inclination.” Durha m v. State, 182 Tenn. 577, 188 S.W.2d 555, 559 (1945). J urors wh o h av e prejudg ed

certain issues or who have had life e x perie nces or associations which ha ve swa y ed them “in response to those natura l and human instincts common to mankind,” id. 188 S.W .2d at 559, interfe re w ith the underpinning s of our justice sy stem.

The essential function of voir dire is to allow the impaneling of a f air a nd impartial jury thr ou g h q ue sti on s w hic h p e rm it the int e lli g e nt e xer c ise of c ha lle ng e s b y

c ou ns e l. 47 Am. J ur. 2d, J ury § 195 (1969). Traditionally
, our S tate has shown gr eat r espec t and def ere nce to the voir dire process. Our legislature had given parties in criminal-7-

and civil ca ses “an absolute right t o examine prospec tive jurors.” Te nn. Code Ann. § 22-3-101 ( 1980 Repl.). . . . Since full knowledg e of the fac ts which might be ar upon a juror’ s qualifications i s essential to t he intellige nt exercise of pe remptory and

cause challeng es, jurors are obligated to ma ke “full and truthful answe rs . . . neither f a l s e l y s t a t i n g a n y f

a c tn o r c o n c e a l i n g a n y m a t e r i a l m a t t e r

. ” 4 7 A m

. J u r

. 2 d
, J u r y § 208 (1969).

Tenne ssee follows the common-law rule by which cha lleng es of juror qualifications fa ll w ith in g e ne ra lly

tw o d is tin c t c la sse s. Th os e c ha lle ng e s b a se d o n d e fe c ts i n statut ory e lig ibi lit y

re qu ir e me nts are c a lle d p ro pt er d e fe c tum , w hic h li te ra lly translated me ans “on a ccount of defe ct.” See Bla ck’s L aw Dic tionary 1098 (5 Ed.

th 1979). The other

class of c halleng es, propter aff ectum (“ on acc ount of prejudice ”), id. , is ba se d u po n b ia s o r p re jud ic e “ a c tua lly

sh ow n to e xi st or

pr e su me d to e xist from cir cumstance s.” Durha m v. State, 188 S.W .2d 555, 559 (Tenn. 1945) (quoting 1 Bouvie r’s L aw Dic tionary 451 (Rawle’ s 3d rev. 8 ed. (1914) ). Propter de fec tum th challeng es must be made prior to verdict, but propte r af fec tum challeng es may

be made a ft er v erdict. St ate v. F urloug h, 797 S.W .2d 631, 652 (Tenn. Crim. App.)
, pe rm . to app e a l de nie d, (T e nn . 1 99 0) . Thu s, wh e n a jur or c on c e a ls or mis re pr e se nts information tending to indicat e a la ck of impartiality , a cha lleng e may be made as here in a motion for new trial.

. . . .
[ A ] d e f e n d a n tb e ar s t h e b u r d e n o f p r o v i d i n g a

p r i m a f a c i e c a s e o f

b i a s o r p ar t i a l i t y. See State v. Tay lor, 669 S.W .2d 694, 700 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983) , perm. to appe al den i ed , (Tenn. 1984) . When a juror willfully conce als (or f

ails to disclose) information on voir dire w hich re flec ts on the juror’s lac k o f i m partiality , a presumpt i o n o f prejudice arises. Durha m v. State, 188 S.W .2d 555, 559 (Tenn. 19 45 ). Sile nc e on the jur or ’s pa rt wh e n a sk e d a

qu e sti on re aso nab ly

c a lc ulate d to produce an answ er is tantamount to a ne g ative answ er. 47 Am. J ur. 2d § 208 (1969) (counse l has a rig ht to rely on silence a s a neg ative answ er) ; see Hy att v. State, 430 S.W .2d 129, 130 (Tenn. 1967)

. . . . There fore
, failure to disclose information in the fa c e of a mat e ri a l qu e sti on re a so na bly c a lc ulate d to pr od uc e the a ns we r o r f a lse disclosu r e s g iv e r is e to a p r e s u mp ti o n o f b ia s a n d p ar ti a li ty , H y a tt v

. St a te , 430 S.W .2d 129 (Tenn. 1967); Toombs v. State, 270 S.W .2d 649 (Tenn. 1954) ; Durham v. State, 188 S.W .2d 555 (Tenn. 1945) , “the theory being that a prejudicial bias has b e e n imp lan te d in th e mi n d w h ic h w il l p r o b ab ly in f lu e n c e th e ju d g me nt.” 188 S.W .2d at 558.

Akins, 867 S.W .2d at 356-57.-8-

But, the que stion must be material and one to whic h counsel would re asonably be expected to give substantial weig ht. I nsignific ant nondisclosures will not g i v e ri s e to a pre sumption of prejudice . See F urloug h, 797 S.W .2d at 653. The te st is whether a rea sonable, impartial pe rs on
wo uldha ve be lie ve d th e qu e sti on , a s a sk e d, c a lle d f or a jur or re sp on se un de r the c ir c ums ta nc e s.

Howeve r, Tenne ssee c ourts have r outin el y ref used re lief in post-verdic t propter a ffe ctum challeng es in ca ses wher e there was a casua l r elationship not disc losed during voir dire or the re cord failed to re veal a n inhere ntly prejudicia l relationship or a false answe r. See Tay lor, 669 S.W .2d 694 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993) (determining that wher e there was no false answer or conc ealment, ther e was no inher ently

prejudicia l rel at i o n s hip); Furloug h, 797 S.W .2d 631 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990) (finding of ca sual relationship, case re verse d on other g rounds).

A pane l of this Court dealt with a simil ar issue in State v. Sammy D. Childers, No. W2002- 00006-CCA-R3-CD, 2003 WL 214444 (Tenn. Crim. App., at J ackson, Jan. 30 , 2003), perm. app. denied, ( Tenn., May

27, 2003). I n S am m y D. C h i lders, the de fendant arg ued that ther e had be en juror misconduct be cause o n e o f t he jurors ha d failed to disclose a prior ac quaintance with the vic tim

. Sa mmy D. Chi lde rs , 20 04 WL 21 44 44
, a t *1 . A t th e he ari ng on the mot ionfo r n e w t ri a l, the juror in question testified that she kne w the victim beca use he ha d been the best man in a friend’s wedding and she ha d been on a boat wit h the vi ctim one ti me. I d. at *2. She also stated that she was not good f riends with him and never discussed the case with the victim. I d. On appea l w e conc luded th a t th e p r o o f w a s th a t th e ju r o r in q u e s ti o n d idn o t h a v e a c lo s e a c q u a in tan c e w ith th e v ic ti m. We also stated that ther e wa s no evidenc e of bias or partiality

. There fore
, we affirme d the trial court’s de nia l of the mot ion fo r n e w t

ri a l.

The fa cts in the ca se sub judice a re ve ry simil ar. A t first blush, it m ight seem t h at J acob Silv a ’s e x-g ir lf

ri e nd ’s a un t w ou ld h a ve a bia s a g a ins t th e De fe nd a nt’ s fa mil y

. Ho we ve r, it is c le arl y
e vid e nt fr om the te sti mon y a t the mot ion fo r ne w tr ia l that A pril N e wm a n a ndJuro r G oo dw in d id not have a ny thing a

pproac hing a

close familial relationship. Miss Newma n testified that she ha d had no contac t with her biolog ical father or his family since she w as three (3) y ear s old. Miss Newman didno t e ve n kno w that Jur or Go od wi n w a s h e r a

un t un til sh e we nt t o a

y ardsal e he ld b y

Ms. Goodwin.

J uror Goodw in testified that she had met the De fendant’s brother in pa ssing at a conve nience store, but did not remembe r his na me. I t is clea r from J uror Goodwin’s testimony that she did not

rea liz e that Miss Newman’s boy friend w as the De fendant’s brother. B oth J uror Goodw in and J acob Silv a te sti fi e d th a t w he n s he ran in to him in the ha ll, sh e a sk e d h im w hat he wa s d oin g the re . H e tol d her at that time that he was the D efe ndant’s brothe r. Clear ly , J uror Goodw in had only a ca sual acquaintance w ith the defe ndant’s brothe r.

The trial c ourt acc redited the testimony of J uror Goodwin. J uror Goodwin testified that the fac t that the Def

endant’ s brother was her biologica l niece ’s ex-boy friend did not af fec t her judg ment in any way . Finding s of fa ct made by the t rial court are g iven t he weight of a jury verdic t. State v. Bur g in, 668 S.W .2d 668, 669 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1984) . We find that the evidenc e pre sented at the-9-

hearing supports the findings of t h e t ri al court. The relationship between Jacob Silva and J uror Goodwin was a

casua l re lationship at best. There is no evidence of an inhe rently prejudicia l relationship. W e conc lude that the State has ove rcome the pre sumption of prejudice.

Th e re fo re , th is i ssu e is w ith ou t me ri t.

Je nc ks a nd Br ady Iss ue

Th e De fe nd a nt a

rg ue s th a t th e Sta te vio la te d the ru le s ann ou nc e d in J e nc ks v. Un ite d St a te s, 35 3 U .S. 65 7 ( 19 57 ), a ndB ra dy v. Ma ryla nd , 373 U. S. 83 ( 19 63 ), wh ic h p ro vid e that th e Sta te mus t tu r n o v e r r e c o r d e d w it n e s s s tate me n ts ma d e to th e p o li c e a n d th a t th e St a te mu s t p rovide the defe ndant with any

favor able e vidence which is materia l to either g uilt or punishment. The Def endant spe cifica lly

points to a written report taken by Detec tive Brian Crews indicating that the victim did not know her attacke r’s name and that she had told Patrolman B ill L og ue and Ser g eant Jaso n Wil lia ms a de sc ri pti on of the a tta c ke r a s “ sh ort, s toc ky , w ith da rk skin, a ndda

rk ha ir , p os sib ly be ing of Hi sp a nic orig in, wi tho ut a Spa nis h a c c e nt. ” Th e De fe nd a nt a lso c omp la ins that th e State did not turn over that Detec tive Crews lea rned that the Def

endant a dmitted he had conse nsual sex with the victim and that the vi ctim stated in her initial statements that she wa s also in the company of at lea st one other man w ho was a truck drive r the same morning that the i ncident occurre d. The De fe nd a nt a

rg ue s th a t th e la c k o f this inf orma tio n h a mpe re d his abil ity to c ro ss- e xami ne the vic tim at trial.

Alleg ed B rady Violation

I n Br ady v. Mary land, the Supreme Court held that “suppre ssion by the prosec ution of evidenc e fa vorable to an acc used upon reque st violate s due proce ss w here the evidenc e is materia l either to g uilt or to punishm ent, irre spective of t h e go o d fa i t h or bad f

aith of the prose cution.” B ra dy , 3 73 U. S. at 87 ; se e a lso Ha rt ma n v . St a te , 8 96 S.W. 2d94, 10 1 (Ten n. 19 95 ). I n o rd e r t o
e sta bli sh a du e pr oc e ss v iol a tio n u nd e r B ra dy , f ou r p re re qu isi te s mu st b e me t:

1. Th e de fe nd a nt mus t ha ve re qu e ste d th e info rm ati on (u nle ss the e vid e nc e is obviouslyexculpatory , i n which ca se the state is bound to re lease the information, wh e the r r e qu e ste d o r n ot) ; 2. Th e state mus t ha ve su pp re sse d th e inf orma tio n; 3. The information must have bee n favor able to the a ccuse d; and 4. The information must have bee n materia l.

Sta te v. Ed g in, 90 2 S. W.2 d 3 87 , 3 89 (T e nn . 1 99 5) . T he burd e n o f p ro vin g a B ra dy vio la tio n r e sts with the defe ndant, and the violation must be prove n by a pre ponderance of

the evidenc e. I d.

Whe n d e te rm ini ng the ma te ri a lit y of un di sclo se d in fo rm a tio n, a re vie wi ng c ou rt

mus t

e sta bli sh wh e the r “ in [the ] ab se nc e [of the inf orma tio n, the de fe nd a nt] r e c e ive d a fair tr ia l, understood as a

trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence .” Ky les v. Whit ley , 514 U.S. 419,-10-

43 4 ( 19 95 ). I n othe r wo rd s, e vid e nc e is co ns ide re d mat e ri a l only if the re is a r e a so na ble pr ob abil ity that had the e vidence been disc losed to the defe nse, the re sults of the proce eding would have be en differ ent. Edg in, 902 S.W .2d at 390-91.

The De fenda nt in this case filed a motion for discovery on J uly 24, 2003. I n that motion he reque sted any

exculpatory

materia ls that t h e State had in its possession. On Aug ust 5, 2003, the State responde d that any

exculpatory

evidenc e, if a ny

exis ted, would be pr ovided to the def endant when it bec ame known to the State. T he State did not g ive any exculpatory

evidenc e to the de fe nd a nt p ri or

to the tr ia l.

The De fenda nt arg ues that the State viol ated his rig hts by not turning over the written police report, not divulging the fac t that the Def endant a dmitted he had conse nsual sex with t he victim, and t h at t h e v i ct i mwa s i n t h e c o m p an y o f a n o t h erm an , a t ru ckd ri v er , t h e n i gh to f t h e i n ci d en t

. Al t h o u gh the De fe nd a nt r e qu e ste d a ny e xcu lpatory

inf ormat io n, the re is n o d isp ute that th e inf orma tio n in question was not turned ove r to the def ense. H oweve r, the De fend an t m ust also prove that the information was both fa vorable to him and material.

We first analy ze whether the victi m ’s d escription of her attac ker w as fa vorable to the Def endant a nd materia l for trial purpose s. The victim told the office rs that she did not know her attacke r’s na me and described him a s “short, stocky
, with da rk skin, and dark hair, possiblybeing of Hispanic origin, without a Spanish ac cent.” The Defendant arg ues t hat he was bald the ni g ht of the at ta c k

a n d th a t h e d o e s n o t h a v e d ark s k in
, a s s h o w n b y

th e p o li c e li n e

- u p p h o togr aph. Ob vio us ly , th e vic tim ’s de sc ri pti on of he r atta c ke r woul d b e c on sid e re d f a vo ra ble e vid e nc e if

it dif fe re d s ig nif

ic a ntl y fr om the De fe nd a nt’ s a c tua l app e aranc e

. Ho we ve r, to b e ma te ri a l, the re mus t be a r easona

ble proba bilitythat the outcome of

the t rial would have been differe nt if the information in question had bee n provided to the De fendant. We conclude that the i nformation complained of

wo uld no t hav e a l t e r e d t h e o u t c o m e o f t h e tr i a l f

o r t w o ( 2 ) r e a s o n s

. F i r s t , t h e D e f e n d a n tc r o sse xami ne d th e vic tim

a s w e ll a s a

la w en fo rc e me nt of

fi c e r co nc e rn ing a

sim ila r d e sc ri pti on the vic tim g ave to a nurse at the hospital. There fore
, the Def endant obviously had identica l information about the victim’s description of her attac ker a nd was able to cross-e x amine her with respec t to it, and she admitted she had g ive such a description. I n addition, there w as over whelming evidenc e to support the Def endant’ s conviction. The of fice rs found the vic ti m ’s m i ssing be longing s and her denture s in the Def endant’ s car

and the De fendant admitted that he did indeed ha ve sexual relations with the victim. There is ove rwhe lming evide nce t o s u p p o r t the Def endant’ s conviction without the inclusion of the vi cti m’ s des cripti on of he r atta c ke r g ive n to po lic e . F or thi s r e a so n, we c on c lud e that th is information is not material as de fined Edg in.

The De fenda nt also arg ues that fa ilure to disc lose two other piece s of information violated his constituti onal rig hts as set out in Bra dy . These two pie ces of information ar e a statement made to the police by

the Def endant that he had conse n s u al s exual relations with the victim and information that the victim was a lso in the company of a truck driver the nig ht of the incident. As wi th the vic tim ’s de sc ri pti on , th e fi rs t tw o f a c tor s se t out in Edg in ha ve be e n met . We no w turn to whether this information was fa vorable to the Def endant a nd materia l at trial

. T h e fac ts that the-11-

Def endant a dmitted to the police that he had c onsensual sexual relations with the vi ctim and that the vic tim wa s in the c omp a ny of a no the r m a n c a nn ot b e c on sid e re d f a vo ra ble to the De fe nd a nt i n th is situation beca

use t he Defenda nt’s theory at trial wa s that he and the victim eng ag ed in conse nsual

se xua l r e la tio ns

.

Mo re ov e r, the fa c t th a t th e vic tim wa s a ro un d a no the r m a n th e sa me nig ht o f the inc ide nt i s not releva nt to whether the Def endant r aped the victim, whe n he admitted to having sexual relations with the victim, and made no c laim that someone else ha d rape d her. Finally , as noted a bove, the

ov e rw he lmi ng pr oo f a g a ins t th e De fe nd a nt b e lie s a ny notio n th a t di sc los ur e of the se fa c ts w ou ld have a ltered the results of the tria l.

Alleg ed Jencks Violation

The De fenda nt further

arg ues that the State violated the provisions o f R u l e 2 6

. 2(e) of the Tenne ssee Rules of Criminal Proce dure, a lso known as the J encks Act, by failing to provide the de fe nd a nt w ith the vic tim ’s de sc ri pti on of he r atta c ke r. I n p e rt ine nt p art , the ru le re a ds a s f oll ow s:

Production of Statements of Witnesses.--

(a) Motion for Production. After a witness other than the defe ndant has testified on dir e c t e xami natio n, the tr ia l c ou rt , o n mot ion of a pa rt y wh o did no t c a ll the wi tne ss, shall order

the attorne y

for the state or the defe ndant and his attorney , as the c ase ma y be, to produce
, for the examination and use of the moving party , any statement of the witness that is in their possession and t h at re l ates to the subjec t matter conc erning which the witness ha s testified.

. . . . (e ) S a nc tio n f

or F a ilu re to Pro du c e Sta te me nt. I f the oth e r part y e le c ts not to c omp ly with an orde r to deliver a

statement t o the moving pa rty , the court shall order that the te sti mon y of the wi tne ss b e stric ke n fr om the re c or d a nd that the tr ia l pr oc e e d, or , if it i s th e a tto rn e y

fo r the state wh o e le c ts n ot t o c omp ly , s ha ll d e c lare a mis tr ia l if require d by

the intere st of justice.

Tenn. R. Crim. P. 26 (a) & (e)

.
We have r eviewe d the re cord at trial, including the Def endant’ s discovery

motion. We have been una ble to find a re quest for Rule 26.2 materia l in the Defenda nt’s discovery motion. Following the victim’s t es t i m o n y , the def endant f ailed to make a

reque st for any

J encks material. The De fe nd a nt a lso faile d to re qu e st an y Jenc ks ma te ri a l af te r h e c ro ss- e xami ne d th e vic tim a nda g a in afte r the t es t i m o n y of De tective Cre ws’ during whose testimony the Def endant c laims to have learned of the description of t he attacker for the first time. The De fendant also failed to make any objection at trial to not being provided the information. Rule 26.2(e) sanctions do not apply when-12-

the “party who did not call the witness” f ails to request Jencks materia l. See Rule 26.2(a) . Nor do they result when “ the other pa rty ” is not order ed to produc e the state ments. See Rule 26.2(e ).

Any err or which resulted from the S tate’s oversig ht in not providing the Def endant with the phy sical desc ription of the attac ker co u l d h av e b een c ured by the Def endant. The Def

endant obviouslyrea liz ed that the de scription had not been disclosed prior to the close of the State’s proof

. A f ina l ju dg me nt s ha ll n ot b e se t a sid e fo r f a ilu re to c omp ly

wi th a Rul e 26.2 or de r u nle ss, considering the entire ty

of the re cord, “ er ro r i n v o l v ing a substantial rig ht more proba bly than not aff ecte d the j udg ment or would result i n prejudice to the j udicial process.” Te nn. R. App. P. 36(b). As we have st ated above, we conclude that the absence from trial of the vic tim’s description of her attacke r would not “more probably than not a ffe ct the judg ment” or c ause “ substantial prejudice .” The De fenda nt was obviously familiar with a simi lar de scription, the Def endant a dmitted to having

consensua l sex ual re lations with the vict i m an d the evidenc e of the Def endant’ s g uilt was

overw helming.

CO NC LU SION

F or the fo re g oin g re a so ns , w e a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f the tr ia l c ou rt

.

___________________________________ J ERRY L . SMI TH, JUDGE