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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Lora J Green, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Commissioner of Social Security 

Administration, 

Defendant. 

No. CV-18-08018-PCT-DLR 

ORDER 

Plaintiff Lora Green seeks judicial review of the Commissioner of the Social 

Security Administration’s decision to deny her application for a period of disability and 

disability insurance benefits. Plaintiff argues that the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ’”) 

improperly weighed the opinion of Plaintiff’s treating medical provider, gave too much 

weight to the state agency examiner and physicians, and improperly discounted her 

symptom testimony. 

The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and reviews only those 

issues raised by the party challenging the ALJ’s decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 

503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001). The ALJ’s determination will be upheld unless it contains 

harmful legal error or is not supported by substantial evidence. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 

625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). Having reviewed the parties’ briefs and the administrative record, 

the Court affirms. 

1. The ALJ gave specific and legitimate reasons, supported by substantial evidence 
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in the record, for affording little weight to the opinion of Plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr. 

Venger. See Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). Dr. Venger opined that 

Plaintiff could never lift or carry more than 5 pounds, stoop, squat, climb, or crawl; could 

occasionally grasp, pull, push, and do fine manipulation with her hands; is unable to sit or 

stand/walk more than 1 hour in an 8-hour workday; and has total restriction with respect to 

being around moving machinery or occupational driving. Dr. Venger also noted that 

Plaintiff is in constant pain, exacerbated by the physical demands of caring for her mentally 

challenged child. The ALJ reasonably discounted Dr. Venger’s assessment because it was 

not supported by Dr. Venger’s own treatment records. See Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 

1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005). For example, with respect to Plaintiff’s cervical and thoracic 

spine, Dr. Venger found Plaintiff non-tender to palpitation, had no spasms, full range of 

motion, normal muscle strength and tone, and no pain with neck movement. Dr. Venger 

also observed minimal pain in Plaintiff’s lumbosacral spine upon flexion, extension, and 

bending. The ALJ also reasonably discounted Dr. Venger’s opinion because it was based 

to a large extent on Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, which the ALJ found not entirely 

credible. See Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2008). 

 2. The ALJ did not assign improper weight to state agency reviewers. Dr. 

Schellenberg, the state agency consultative examiner, opined that Plaintiff did not suffer 

from any limitations. State agency physicians Drs. Griffith and Painton found Plaintiff not 

disabled, noting little evidence supporting the severity of her spinal disorders. The ALJ 

gave legally adequate reasons for assigning partial weight to these opinions. For example, 

the ALJ assigned partial weight to Dr. Schellenberg’s opinion because it is based on 

objective testing and observations Dr. Schellenberg made during his examination, and 

because his opinion is consistent with the record as a whole. The ALJ gave partial weight 

to the opinions of Drs. Griffith and Painton because their opinions are well-explained and 

supported by the medical evidence. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(3)-(4). 

3. The ALJ provided the requisite specific, clear, and convincing reasons for 

discounting Plaintiff’s testimony concerning the severity of her symptoms. See Smolen v. 
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Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1281 (9th Cir. 1996). Plaintiff reported that she is bed ridden several 

days a week due to extreme pain, has difficulty with buttons and tying shoes, needs help to 

get out of the bathtub, is unable to shave or put on makeup, and needs reminders to take 

her medication and tend to her personal needs. The ALJ reasonably found that Plaintiff’s 

testimony was inconsistent with the objective medical evidence. See Rollins v. Massanari, 

261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001). For example, despite Plaintiff’s contention that her 

impairments had a significant impact on her ability to stand and walk, medical evidence 

reflected that Plaintiff’s gait and station repeatedly were observed as normal and that 

Plaintiff was prescribed no assistive devices. The ALJ also noted that the record contains 

no electrodiagnostic evidence consistent with Plaintiff’s reported inability to stand, sit or 

walk during an 8-hour work day. The ALJ also reasonably discounted Plaintiff’s testimony 

because her part-time work and daily activities are not limited to the extent one would 

expect given the severity of Plaintiff’s claimed symptoms. See Bray v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. 

Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1221 (9th Cir. 2009). For example, Plaintiff worked part-time for 

the Census Bureau since 2007 with no change in her work duties, and she is the primary 

caregiver for her adult daughter, who is non-verbal and has Angelman syndrome. 

Because the ALJ’s decision is free of harmful legal error and reasonably supported 

by the evidence, 

IT IS ORDERED that the Commissioner’s decision is AFFIRMED. The Clerk of 

Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly and terminate this case. 

Dated this 28th day of March, 2019. 

Douglas L. Rayes 

United States District Judge