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David A. Chami, AZ #027585

PRICE LAW GROUP, APC

8245 N. 85th Way

Scottsdale, AZ 85258

T: (818) 600-5515

F: (818) 600-5415

david@pricelawgroup.com

Haytham Faraj , CA #291416

Admitted pro hac vice

LAW OFFICES OF HAYTHAM FARAJ

1935 W Belmont Ave.

Chicago, IL 60657

T: (312) 635-0800

F: (202) 280-1039

haytham@farajlaw.com

Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Mussalina Muhaymin as Personal 

Representative of the Estate of 

Muhammad Abdul Muhaymin Jr., 

Plaintiff,

v.

City of Phoenix, an Arizona Municipal 

Corporation, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.: CV-17-04565-PHX-SMB

PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTION TO 

DEFENDANTS’ NOTICE OF 

VIOLATIONS OF ARIZ. R. PROF. 

COND. E.R. 4.2 & 3.6, AND LOCAL 

RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 83.8 

AND 

PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO 

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR 

SANCTIONS
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Plaintiff, Mussalina Muhaymin as Personal Representative of the Estate of 

Muhammad Abdul Muhaymin, Jr. (“Plaintiff”), hereby raises objection to Defendants 

City of Phoenix, Antonio Tarango, Oswald Grenier, Kevin McGowan, Jason Hobel, 

Ronaldo Canilao, David Head, Susan Heimbigner, James Clark, Dennis Leroux, Ryan 

Nielsen and Steven Wong’s (“Defendants”) Notice of Violations of Ariz. R. Prof. Cond. 

E.R. 4.2 & 3.6, and Local Rule of Civil Procedure 83.8, and submits her Opposition to 

Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions [doc. 330] (“Motion”).

I. INTRODUCTION

In its third attempt at bullying Plaintiff into not exercising her free speech rights, 

Defendants once again ask the Court to impose draconian sanctions for nonexistent 

violations of the Court’s protective order. This time, Defendants go one step further, 

seeking dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims in whole, or, in the alternative, entry of a “gag 

order,” because Plaintiff dared to petition her local government for change, a right 

expressly protected by both the United States and Arizona Constitutions. 

Defendants’ illicit use of taxpayer dollars in an effort to silence political opponents 

has approached the level of unbelievable. Not only do Defendants falsely accuse Plaintiff 

of disclosing confidential information, but they also purposefully mischaracterize 

statements made by Plaintiff’s counsel, taking the same out of context, and fail to address 

official comments to the Arizona Rules of Professional Conduct, directly on point, which 

are adverse to Defendants’ position. 
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Defendants are not entitled to sanctions as a result of Plaintiff’s decision to exercise 

her constitutionally protected rights of free speech and petition. For these reasons, 

described below, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court deny Defendant’s Motion.

II. OBJECTION TO IMPROPER NOTICE

Defendants’ insistence on reraising previously adjudicated issues is improper. 

Defendants’ Motion represents the second time that Defendants have referenced social 

media posts from a year ago in an effort to relitigate this Court’s denial of Defendants’ 

original meritless motion for sanctions. See doc. 179 (Defendants’ motion for protective 

order regarding “public postings”); doc. 188 (Order denying same); doc. 234, pgs. 3-4 

(Defendants’ second motion for sanctions); doc. 271 (Order denying same). If Defendants 

wish to relitigate the Court’s prior orders, they are required to comply with LRCiv 7.2(g). 

Defendants have failed to do so. Therefore, the inclusion of discussion (dubbed “notice” 

by Defendants) regarding already litigated issues is inappropriate and should not be 

considered by the Court.

III. OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SANCTIONS

Defendants advances three lines of argument as to why this Court should issue 

sanctions. First, Defendants argue that a letter, sent to Plaintiff’s city representatives,

wherein she demanded political accountability and change regarding the unnecessary 

death of her brother, somehow violated the Arizona Rules of Professional Conduct. This 

argument fails as a matter of constitutional law.

Second, Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s (and Plaintiff’s counsel’s) recent 

interview regarding the progress of this case was violative of this Court’s Protective Order 
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because mention was made regarding the fact that one of the Defendant Officers received 

a promotion after the killing of Mr. Muhaymin. Defendants go so far as to proclaim that 

this information must have come from the unnamed officer’s employment file. This is 

verifiably false, as such information was already public knowledge, and, furthermore, the 

promotion of a public official is per se “public information,” which is freely available to 

the Arizona public, and required to be so by statute.

Third, Defendants assert that the statements made by Plaintiff’s counsel during 

media interviews were violative of the Arizona Rules of Professional Conduct. This is 

also false. Plaintiff’s counsel did not discuss the specifics of the civil suit against the 

Defendant Officers. Instead, they discussed a political call for their elected representatives 

or City of Phoenix officials to spearhead a reopening of the criminal investigation into the 

death of Plaintiff’s brother. This is political speech and is therefore protected by the First 

Amendment.

A. Plaintiff’s Letter, Sent To Her City Representatives, Which 

Called For Political Change, Was Expressly Protected By The 

First Amendment Of The United States Constitution, And 

Furthermore Did Not Violate The Arizona Rules Of 

Professional Conduct

As an initial matter, Plaintiff notes that communication between herself and her 

government, whether through an attorney or otherwise, is expressly protected by the 

United States and Arizona Constitutions. See U.S. Const. amend. I (guaranteeing the right 

to petition the government); see also Ariz. Const. art. 2, §5(same). This alone is dispositive 

of Defendants’ request that Plaintiff, a citizen of the United States, be punished or 

otherwise sanctioned for petitioning change from her own local government.
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Furthermore, by the very terms and comments of the rule cited by Defendants, the 

letter sent to Plaintiff’s city representatives did not violate the Arizona Rules of 

Professional Conduct. The governing rule states that 

In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of 

the representation with a party the lawyer knows to be represented by another 

lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or 

is authorized by law to do so.

Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. ER 4.2 (emphasis added). Interestingly, Defendants stop their analysis 

of the Arizona rules here and switch to citing the ABA model rules. In so doing, 

Defendants skip the first comment to ER 4.2 which directly addresses Plaintiff’s conduct 

here, unequivocally stating that 

parties to a matter may communicate directly with each other and a lawyer 

having independent justification for communicating with the other party is 

permitted to do so. Communications authorized by the law include, for 

example, the right of a party to a controversy with a government agency 

to speak with government officials about the matter.

Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. ER 4.2, cmnt. [1] (emphasis added). 

Defendants’ failure to cite the above-quoted comments, and reliance instead on the 

ABA model rules (as opposed to the rules actually enacted in Arizona) is an obvious 

attempt to mislead the Court and likely in and of itself violative of the professional rules 

of conduct and Counsel’s duty of candor to the court. Ariz. R. Prof’l. Cond. 3.3. As noted, 

Plaintiff’s communication with her government is not only expressly protected by both 

the United States and Arizona Constitutions, but also directly provided for by the 

governing professional rules.
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B. Neither Plaintiff Nor Her Counsel Disclosed Confidential 

Information To The Media 

None of the information discussed by Plaintiff or her counsel, either to the media 

or in the open letter to the City of Phoenix, is confidential, and all of the information 

contained therein is public record. Defendants object primarily to discussion by Plaintiff’s 

counsel of the undisputed fact that one of the Defendant Officers received a promotion 

after Mr. Muhaymin’s death. This has been public knowledge for years.1 Furthermore, 

this information came from a 2019 Phoenix New Times exposé regarding overtly racist 

statements posted by Phoenix police on social media.2 The story clearly identifies one of 

the defendant officers by name and states that he is now a Sergeant. 

Furthermore, employment information of Arizona’s public servants, including law 

enforcement officers, is public record, which is presumptively available to the Arizona 

public. “Arizona law defines 'public record' broadly and creates a presumption requiring 

the disclosure of public documents.” Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ariz. v. Ariz. Dep't of 

Child Safety, 377 P.3d 339, 344 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2016) (citing A.R.S. § 39). “[D]ocuments 

having a ‘substantial nexus' with a government agency's activities qualify as public 

records.” Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ariz., 377 P.3d at 344 (quoting Griffis v. Pinal 

County, 215 Ariz. 1, 4 (Ariz. 2007)). The rank of law enforcement officers certainly has a 

1 See Body cam video released in 2017 police killing of Muhammad Muhaymin Jr: 'Allah? He's 

not going to help you', Religion News Service (2020), https://religionnews.com/2020/08/20/bodycam-video-muhammad-muhaymin-police-please-allah-help-cant-breathe-black-muslim/ (last 

visited May 4, 2021); 

2 Meg O'Connor, At Least Two Phoenix Cops to Be Disciplined Over Facebook Posts Phoenix 

New Times (2019), https://www.phoenixnewtimes.com/news/phoenix-police-sergeants-officersdisciplined-facebook-posts-muslims-11373173 (last visited May 6, 2021).
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“substantial nexus” to government activities, as it dictates the relative authority of 

personnel on the police force, and identifies those public servants to whom the public may 

go with complaints about subordinates.

This presumption of disclosure is only rebutted by statutory exception or where 

documents are “of a purely private or personal nature” Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ariz., 

377 P.3d at 344 (citing Griffis, 215 Ariz. at 4); See also Scottsdale Unified School Dist. v. 

KPNX BC, 191 Ariz. 297, 299 (Ariz. 1998) (holding that a public employee’s date of birth 

was purely private information, and therefore not public record). It cannot reasonably be 

argued that a change in a police officer’s rank is “purely private or personal.” Officers are 

public servants, and the responsibilities and authorities inherent in positions of different 

rank have nothing to do with an officer’s personal or private life. 

Defendants desperate attempts to muzzle Plaintiff and her Counsel are evident. As 

none of the information discussed by Plaintiff or her counsel with the media is 

confidential, Defendants’ arguments regarding sanctions for violation of the Court’s 

protective order fail.

C. Plaintiff’s Call For Political Action Did Not Violate The Rules 

Of Professional Conduct

Because it is patently obvious that (1) sanctioning Plaintiff for petitioning her local 

government would be a violation of both the United States and Arizona Constitutions, and 

(2) no confidential information has been disclosed by Plaintiff or her counsel in the brief 

(and expected for a case of this magnitude) media encounters that have occurred, 

Defendants throw one final Hail Mary, asserting that discussion by Plaintiff’s counsel 
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about the failure of a criminal investigation, referencing nothing more than publicly 

available body camera footage, somehow prejudices the adjudication of this case. This is 

ridiculous.

First, it should be noted that the vast majority of discussion during the seconds of 

interview given by Plaintiff’s counsel was confined to the topic of Plaintiff’s ongoing 

political call for a reinvestigation into the death of her brother. Most of the points 

discussed specifically pertained to public record facts about the circumstances 

surrounding Mr. Muhaymin’s death, and how those facts (established by bodycam footage 

released to the public by Defendants years ago) supported a reopening of the criminal 

case.3 The sole mention of this case made by Plaintiff’s counsel was an aside noting the 

trial date, the availability of appeal, and the fact that an immense amount of time has 

passed since Mr. Muhaymin died.4

Second, contrary to Defendants’ mischaracterizations, nothing Plaintiff’s counsel 

said was false. Defendants draw attention to a single sentence, taken out of context, where 

Plaintiff’s counsel noted that “not a single county politician or person in power has seen 

fit to call for an investigation.” Motion, pg. 13. What Defendants intentionally fail to note, 

however, is that the entirety of the brief interview was focused on Plaintiff’s public call 

that someone within the government structure initiate a reopening of the case. The quoted 

statement was made in regards to such a reinvestigation. Plaintiff’s counsel was not stating 

3

See https://kjzz.org/content/1679631/hearing-scheduled-wrongful-death-case-against-phoenixpolice; https://www.abc15.com/news/local-news/investigations/family-implores-phoenixcouncil-to-act-in-in-custody-death-of-muhammad-muhaymin

4

Id.
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(as is obvious when actually viewing the interview footage) that an investigation never 

took place, and Defendants’ attempt to twist the words said in order to gain a litigation 

advantage is incredibly inappropriate.

Third, Defendants escalate their mischaracterization by asserting that “Plaintiff’s 

counsel told potential jurors that Defendant Officers murdered Mr. Muhaymin and no one 

is willing to hold them responsible.” Motion, pg. 13. As mentioned at the hearing on 

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, this sort of editorializing is why Plaintiff 

attaches entire transcripts to the record, so that the Court may view the underlying facts 

for itself and discover Defendants’ falsehoods. At no point in any of the interview footage 

the word “murder” ever used or even insinuated. 

Fourth, Defendants take issue with the fact that the interviews were given after the 

guilty verdict was announced in the trial of Derek Chauvin. This tired argument has been 

trotted out by Defendants in prior filings, and it is no more appealing now than it was the 

first two times. The fact that there exists a renewed national interest in police brutality, 

and the fact that Mr. Muhaymin and Mr. Floyd died in similar fashion, simply cannot be 

blamed on Plaintiff or her counsel. Defendants, as public servants subject to all the 

scrutiny that such a position rightly brings, are not entitled to muzzle Plaintiff or to limit 

her First Amendment right to speak out for change.

D. The Draconian Sanctions Requested By Defendants Are 

Unjustifiable

Neither Plaintiff nor her attorneys have committed a single sanctionable action 

in the prosecution of this case. They have not “engage[d] in abusive litigation practices” 
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(Roadway v. Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 765, 100 S. Ct. 2455 (1980)), nor have 

they “engaged in conduct utterly inconsistent with the orderly administration of justice” 

(Wyle v. R.J. Reynolds Industries, Inc., 709 F. 2d 585, 589 (9th Cir. 1983)). The acts of 

petition Plaintiff’s government and adding Plaintiff’s voice to the current political 

movement by responding to news outlets (wherein this case was only briefly mentioned, 

and wherein no confidential information was discussed) certainly do not rise to the level 

of atrocity contemplated by Roadway (447 U.S. at 765) and Wyle (709 F. 2d at 589). 

Further, Defendants have not been prejudiced by the actions of Plaintiff or her 

attorneys. Defendants make hyperbolic arguments regarding the effect of the secondslong statements made to the media discussing Plaintiff’s political call for a 

reinvestigation and assert that the same impairs Defendants’ ability to have a fair trial. 

This is ridiculous. First, simple prominence does not produce prejudice per se. Skilling 

v.United States, 561 U.S. 358, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2902, 177 L. Ed. 2d 619 (2010). 

Defendants must make a stronger showing than conclusory speculation about what 

potential jurors might have heard in the news. Second, as mentioned above, to the extent 

that the current political climate affects the jury pool, the fault does not lie with Plaintiff. 

Again, neither she nor her attorneys had anything to do with the murder of George Floyd 

and asking this Court to dismiss Plaintiff’s suit because of outside political pressure is 

incredibly inappropriate. 

Third, Plaintiff and her attorneys were fully within their rights under 

Ariz.R.Prof.Cond. 3.6(c) to give statements to the media. As this issue has been fully 

briefed before this Court on multiple occasions, Plaintiff reincorporates her position and 
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arguments set forth at doc.183 at pgs. 9-13 regarding the City of Phoenix’s January 2017 

release of body camera footage and narrative. In sum, Defendants utilized the City of 

Phoenix’s position as a public entity, and the easy access to media coverage afforded by 

that position, to preemptively release a narrative, replete with patent inaccuracies, in an 

attempt to spin popular opinion before Ms. Muhaymin even had an opportunity to file 

suit. It is ironic that Defendants again (falsely) accuse Plaintiff of the exact same tactic.

Finally, as noted, a shift in the political winds resulting in a revived social 

awareness of Mr. Muhaymin’s death is not grounds for issuance of any sanctions, much 

less those requested by Defendant. That dismissing Plaintiff’s lawsuit because she 

exercised her First Amendment right is inappropriate is self-apparent, and Defendants’ 

insistence on continually requesting that the Court adjudicate this case outside the merits 

is inappropriate. Further, Defendants’ request for a “gag order” is unconstitutional on 

its face. The City of Phoenix, as a public entity, is expressly requesting an order from 

this Court quashing Plaintiff’s political speech. As described above, Plaintiff is entitled 

to involve herself in the current movement for political change in Phoenix, and to seek 

alterations to the policies established by the public police department. Defendants are 

not entitled to silence Plaintiff or her attorneys in their political efforts simply because 

she is suing the City of Phoenix for the death of her brother, caused by the very policies 

she seeks to see changed.
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IV. CONCLUSION

Defendants’ Motion represents yet another unconstitutional attempt to silence 

Plaintiff in her exercise of free political speech, requesting that the Court either dismiss 

Plaintiff’s claims or enter a “gag order” which would restrict her constitutional right to 

petition her government. Defendants request this draconian remedy based on nothing 

more than a political letter, sent to Plaintiff’s local government representatives, and a 

few seconds of interview given regarding that letter. No confidential information has 

been disclosed, and no prejudice to Defendants has occurred. This Court should not 

legitimize Defendants’ continued attempt at bullying Plaintiff into silence. For these 

reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court deny Defendants’ Motion.

Respectfully submitted this 7th day of May 2021.

PRICE LAW GROUP, APC

By: /s/ David A. Chami 

David A. Chami, AZ #027585

david@pricelawgroup.com

Attorneys for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on May 7, 2021, I electronically filed the foregoing with the 

Clerk of the Court using the ECF system, which will send notice of such filing to all 

attorneys of record in this matter.

/s/Florence Lirato