### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 6 -00 423 -CR NO. 03-06-00424- CR NO. 03-06-00425- CR

Cha r le s Spa r ks , A ppe lla nt

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 403RD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NOS. D-1-D C-05 -9040 27 , D -1-DC -05-90 4031 , & D-1-D C-05 -9040 32 HO NORAB LE B RENDA KENNEDY , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N
I n three case s consolidated for trial, a jury

convicted Cha

rles Sparks of

the offe nses of se xua l ass a

ult of a c hil d, a g g ra

vate d sexua l ass a

ult of a c hil d, ind e c e nc y wi th a ch ild by c on ta c t, and indec ency

with a child by

exposure. See Tex. Penal C ode Ann. § 21.11(a) (1), ( 2) (West 2003), §§ 22 .0 11 (a )( 2) , 2 2. 02 1( a )( 1) (B ) ( Wes t S up p. 20 07). Ea c h c a se inv olv e d a dif fe re nt v ic tim and conta ined multiple counts. I n cause number D-1-DC-05-904027, punishment was a ssessed at 6 8 y e ar s ’ i mp r i s o n m e n tf o r c o u n tI ( s e x u a l a s s a

u l t o f a c h i l d ) , 4 0 y e ar s ’ i mp r i s o n m e n t f o r c o u n tII (i nd e c e nc y

wi th a c hil d b y c on ta c t) , a

nd 30 y e ars ’ imp ri so nme nt fo r c ount I I I(i nd e c e nc y wi th a c hil d by exposure). I n cause number D-1-DC-05-904031, punishment was assessed at li fe imprisonment for c ount I (ag g ravated sexual assault of a child) a nd 50 y ear s’ imprisonment for count I I I(indec ency with a child by

exposure) (c ount I I , involving indec ency with a child by

contac t, was not submit ted2

to the jury

). In cause number D- 1-DC-05-904032, punishment wa s assessed at life imprisonment for c ount I(ag g ravated sexual assault of a c hild), 60 y ear s’ imprisonment for count I I(indec ency with a child by

contac t), and 50 y ear s’ imprisonment for c o unt I I I(indec ency with a child by exposure). I n eig hteen issues on a ppeal, Spar

ks challeng es the leg al and f actua l sufficienc y

of the evidenc e, and c ontends that the district c ourt abused its discr etion in de ny ing his motion to sever the thr e e c a se s a nd in re mov ing him fr om the c ourt ro om d ur ingthe State ’s c los ingargume nt. We w ill
a ff ir m th e jud g me nts of

the dis tr ic t c ourt
.

BACK GR OUND Th e jur y he ard e vid e nc e that, i n Apr il 2 00 4, De tecti ve Ka thy He c tor of the Au sti n Pol ic e De pa

rtme nt i nv e sti g a te d a re po rt of se xua l a bu se inv olv ingthr e e g ir ls, A. A. , C. J., and A. M. The a buse alleg edly

occur red in 1999 a

nd 2000. Detec tive Hec tor first interview ed Cathy Spence, A .A.’s mother a

nd C.J .’s aunt, who ha d r e po rt e d th e a

bu se to th e po lic e . H e c tor ne xt me t se pa

ra te ly wi th e a c h v ic timto t a ke the ir state me nts . Ca

mil le Ha be rm an, a vic timse rv ic e s c ouns e lor wi th t he Au sti n Pol ic e De pa

rtme nt, te sti fi e d th a t sh e me t w ith the vic tim s pr ior to t he ir int e rv ie ws wi th H e c tor

and e xpla ine d to the g ir ls the i mp ort ance of te lli ngthe tr uth . H e c tor

te sti fi e d th a t du

ri ngthe int e rv ie ws , s he a sk e d th e g ir ls open-e nded questions and that “ they wer e ver y g ood about being very particula r on [t he] details” of what happe ned to them. Hec tor believe d that the lang uag e used by the g irls was ag e appropr iate, and their stories did not seem re hear sed. He ctor a dded, “The main thing I reme mber is that they wer e
ve ry sh y and the y we re ve ry

straightfo rw ard

wi th m e .” He c tor

te sti fi e d th a t a ll thr e e vic tim s identified S p ar k s as the per petrator. After

interviewingthe victims, Hector “ decide d to go a head3

with t h e case.” He ctor late r interview ed Tra cy Spence, A .A.’s adult sister, a nd Marg are t Moore, A.M.’s mother, other witnesses to w hom the victims had repor ted the abuse . After

completing her inv es t i gat i o n , He ct o r f

i l edt h re e s ex u al as s au l tch ar ges aga i n s tS p ar k s , t wo o f w h i ch we re aggr av ated b ec au s e o f t h e ag e of two of the victims at the time of the alleg ed assa ults. See T e x. Pe n a l Code Ann. § 22.021(a )(1) , (2)( B)
.

Eac h victim testified at trial, along with severa l witnesses to whom the victims had repor ted t he abuse. Be cause Sparks’s is sues on appea l do not require an extensive discussion of the f a c t s , w e s h a l l b r i e f

l y s u m m ar i z e t h e r e l e v an tt e s t i m o n y. A. A. te sti fi e d that wh e n sh e wa s a pp ro xima te ly

13 y e ars old , s he wo uld

of te n v isi t the home of he r aunt, Cathy Spence, a

nd her c ousin, C.J . During this ti m e, S p arks, Spence’s boy friend, a lso lived at the house. A.A. testi fied that when she would visit, S parks would sometimes “horse play ” and “ wre stle” with her a nd C.J
. T h e “wrestling ” would take place on Spence’ s bed wh ile Spe nc e wa s o ut o f t he ho us e . L a te r t

hat same y e ar, A. A. liv e d w ithSpe nc e fo r a pp ro xima te ly two wee ks. During this time, A.A. ex plained, Sparks would c ome into her room at night and touc h her sex ual body parts with his sex ual body parts. A.A. te stified that this happened “ so many times,”

“ may be a g oo d three ti mes out of

a we e k, ” e ve n th ou g h s he so me tim e s “ ma de c omm e nts fo r i t to stop.” On one oc casion, a ccor ding to A. A. , t h e t ouching esca lated into penetr ation. On another
occa sion, Spar

ks “fla shed” A.A. while he was in the kitche n and she w as wa lking throug h the living room. A.A. a lso testified that there w ere occa sions when Sparks would touch her brea sts while she
was watching t el ev i s i o n . The jury also hea rd testimony

from Tra cy

Spence, to whom A.A . had repor ted the abuse
.T h e ju r y h e ar d e v id e n c e th a t Sp ar k s w e n t to p r is o n in 2 0 0 1 o n c h ar g e s u n r e la ted to the 1 se xua l a bu se a lle g a tio ns . Dr. Nauert testified that the Child Assessment P rog ram is a c linic that perfor ms medical 2 evaluations for children w ho are suspected of having been phy sically

or sexually

abused. 4 C.J. t e sti fi e d th a t w hen sh e wa s a pp ro xima te ly

nin e y e ars old , Sp ark s w ou ld sometimes “ra ssle” or w restle with her. This activity included what C.J . descr ibed as “ g oosing.” Whe n a sk e d to e xpla in wh a t she me ant by “ g oo sin g ,” C.J. e xpla ine d, “ He wo uld be on top of me jus t g oin g up and

do wn ,” and

his “ pr ivate are a ” wo uld be ru bb inga g a ins t he r “ pr ivate are a .” C.J. a lso
rec alled an inc ident when Sparks “would just ope n my door and f

lash himself.” How ever , acc ording to C.J ., the majority

of the incide nts happene d while she was s l ee p i n g. C.J . testified that on
occa sions when her

mother would be out of t he house, Sparks would enter C.J .’s bedr oom, remove her cl o th in g , an d

p e n e tr a te h e r . C. J. e xp la in e d th at t h is “ h a p p e n e d f r e qu e n tl y , . . . h e w o u ld

stay g one duringthe day , and he w ould come when my mom would leave to g o to work.” When a sked how many nights a wee k this happened, C.J. recalled, “ Almost every night.” C.J . testified that the abuse stopped in 2001 whe n Sparks was no long er livingat the house. O nc r o s s - e xam i n a t i o n , C
. J. 1 testified that she did not know exactly how many

times Sparks penetr ated he r, but she thoug ht it was
m o r e t h an5 0 t i m e s . T h e j u r y a l s o h e ar d t e s t i m o n y

f r o m C
. J. ’ s m o t h e r , C a t h y

S p e n c e , t o w h o m C
. J. ha d f ir st r e po rt e d th e a

bu se , a nd Dr . B e th N a

ue rt , a pe diatri c ian a

nd me dic a l di re c tor

of the Chi ld As se ssm e nt P ro g ra

m, w h o i n t e r

v i e w e d an d c o n d u c t e d a p h y s i c a l e xam i n a t i o no f

C
. J. 2 A. M. te sti fi e d th a t Sp ark s li ve d w ith he r a nd he r m oth e r w he n s he wa s a pp ro xima te ly 12 y e ars old , b e g inn ingin 1 99 8 o r 1 99 9. A. M. e xpla ine d th a t du ri ng th at ti me, Spa

rk s w ou ld repe atedly

touch her brea sts and rub up ag ainst her while he was “hug g ing” her. A.M. also testified5

that in the su mme r o f 20 00 , wh e n A. M. ’s mot he r wa s ou t of tow n, Spa

rk s p e ne tr a te d h e r f

or the fi rs t tim e . Af te r that inc ide nt, A. M. re c a lle d, Spa rk s pen e tr a te d he r “p ro ba bly lik e tw o o r t

hr e e tim e s”
a we e k. Whe n a sk e d w he n th is s top pe d hap pen ing , A .M . te sti fi e d, “ Whe ne ve r h e we nt t o ja il [in 2001], t hat’s whe n it stopped happenin g. ” The jury also hea rd testimony

from A.M.’s mother , Marg are t Moore, to whom A.M. had r eporte d the abuse
.

Following the testimony

of the victim s and the witnesses t o whom they had re ported the abuse , the jury

hear d evidenc e fr om psy cholog ist W illiam C arte r. Dr
. C ar t er did not have persona l knowledg e of the fa ct s surrounding these pa rticular c ases, but he te stified that he had expertise in the dy

namics of child sexual a

buse, including the outcry proce ss a nd the cha

rac teristics of sexual-abuse pe rpetra

tors. Cart er te stified that “in about 80 per cent of case s the perpe trator of
a bu se is s ome ho w c on nected to the fa mil y and it f re qu e ntl y is a ma le that’ s a sso c ia te d w itha du lt fema les in the family .” Carte r ex plained that in these cases it is difficult for a child to come for

war d with abuse alleg ations, beca use the child is conce rned a bout how the mother will rea ct and whe ther the mother will take the male’s side. The ref ore, a ccor ding to Car

ter, it is “not at all uncommon” for children to wa it weeks, months, or eve n y ear s to report the a buse. Cart e r a lso te sti fi e d that pe rp e tr a tor s o f a bu se “ se le c t th e ir

vic tim s c are fu lly

be c a us e the y wa nt to be su c c e ssf

ul. Th e y wa

nt to c on tr ol the vic tim .” Cart e r e xpla ine d that the a bu se wi ll often e scalat e as the per

petrator bec omes incre asing ly confide nt that the child will not report the
a bu se . A dd iti on a lly , a c c or din g to C art e r, the lon g e r the a bu se oc c ur s, the mor e he lpl e ss t he vic tim fee ls a nd the more difficult it is for the child to disclose what ha s happene d to her. Car ter testified extensively

about the char acte ristics of cr edible abuse alleg ations, and he e x plained how the outc ry6

become s more cre dible when the victim pr ovides sensory “cor e deta ils” about the abuse —i.e., what she fe lt, what she saw, a

nd what s h e h ea rd during the incide nt. During his redire ct examination, Carter added that when eva luating abuse alleg ations, he pay s attention not only “to the wor ds that the child s ay s and the details she offers,” but also to how eag er or reluc tant she is to tell, whose idea it was to tell, and whethe r re porting the abuse makes the c hild feel “ emotionally strained.” Af ter the State r ested its case -in-chie f, Sparks testified in his def ense. Spar

ks admitted that he had pr eviously been convicted of the off enses of burg lary , attempted burg lary , and burg lary of a habitation. Sparks also admitted to being diag nosed with para noid schizophrenia, but he cla imed that he stopped takingmedication for the disorder

in 2003
. Sparks denied a ll of the
a lle g a tio ns and

te sti fi e d th a t he “ lov e d a ll tho se kid s w itha ll o f my he art .” He c la ime d th a t th e g ir ls
wer e lying a

bout the abuse. When a sked why they wer e lying, Sparks testified, “Due to my falling out with Cathy

Spence a nd my falling out with Ma

rg are t Moor e.” Sparks asser ted that Spence a

nd Mo or e we re “ ve ry g oo d fr ie nd s, ” de sp ite the fa c t th a t he a dmi tte d to havin g se xua l r e la tio ns hip s w ith both of t hem. Sparks allege d that while he was in prison, the women c ame up with a pla n to exact “re veng e” on Spar

ks for bre aking up with them. Acco rdi ng to Sparks, this plan included
manip ulatin g the thr e e g ir ls i nto te lli nglie s a bo ut w hat Sp ark s d id t o th e m. On c ro ss -ex ami natio n, Spa

rk s a dmi tte d to a

pr ior se xua l r e la tio ns hip wi th M a ri e Str ou d, a y oungwo man wh o, a c c or din g to Spa rk s, wa s 22 wh e n sh e g a ve bir th to his so n. Th e Sta te
c a lle d Stro ud

a s a re bu tta l wi tne ss. Str ou d te sti fi e d that sh e g re w up in fo ste r c are and ha d h e rs e lf been a victim of sexual assault prior to meeting Sparks. S troud rec ounted how she me t Sparks when she wa s 16 and he w as 36. Acc ording to Stroud, S parks a pproac hed her

while she wa s waiting at7

a bus stop and offere d her a ride, which she acce pted. Stroud testified t hat whil e she was sti ll 16, the two beg an a se x ual re lationship that continued until S parks we nt to prison in 2001. At age 18, Str ou d r e c a lle d, sh e be c a me pr e g na nt wit h Spark s’ s son. Str ou d fur the r te sti fi e d tha t Sp ark s w ou ld talk to her a

bout C.J ., and that he ma de comments a bout C.J .’s phy sical appe ara nce a n d how she looked while she slept. Stroud explained that Sparks’s re marks a b o u t C
. J
. “made me conc erne d beca us e I d i dn’t think he should be looking at her.” Stroud added, “ And beinga victim of sexual assault my self, I

didn’t think that was appropr iate.” W i t h r e g ard to t he c ha rg e s in vo lvi ngA. A. , th e jur y c on vic te d Sp ark s o f s e xua l a ssa ult of a c hild, indec ency with a child by contac t, and indece ncy

with a child by

exposure. Wit h reg ard to the char g es involving C.J ., the jury convicted Sparks of ag g ravated sexual assault of a c hild and indece ncy with a child b y ex p osure. F inally , with reg ard to the c harg es involving A .M., the jury convicted Spar

ks of ag g ravated sexual assault of a c hild, indecenc y with a child by

contac t, and indece ncy with a child by exposure. I n eac h of the three indictments, there we re f ive enha nceme nt para g raphs a lleg ing a

total of eleve n prior fe lo n y convictions . The jury found the e nhance ment
a lle g a tio ns to b e tr

ue . A s me nti on e d e arl ie r, the jur y a sse sse d va

ri ou s te rm s of imp ri so nme nt a g a ins t Sparks, including two life sentenc es for the ag g ravated sexual a ssault c harg es. This appe al followed.
DI SCU SSIO N Evid entiary suff

iciency I n his first throug h six teenth issues, Sparks c halleng es the leg al and f actua l sufficie ncy

of the evidenc e supporting e ach c ount in each c ase f or which he rec eived a

conviction. Howeve r, Sparks doe s not separately addre ss eac h case or ea ch count. I nstead, Sparks a sserts that8

the evidenc e in i t s en t i rety is leg ally insufficient be cause “ther e is only the testimony

of the thre e victims who a

re testify ing to e vents that happene d three to f ive y ear s befor e the trial of this case .” Simi larly , Sparks asser

ts that the evidenc e is fac tually insufficient because “ther e is only the suspect te sti mony of the three all eged vic tim s. ” Th e te sti mony of the vic tim s is “ su sp e c t,” a c c or din g to Sparks, because of his past romantic relationships with Cathy Spence a nd Marg are t Moore. Sparks
a s s e rt s t h a tt h e g i r l s ’ a l l e g a t i o n s w e r e “ l i e s b r o u g h tf o rt h a b o u th i m a s a

r e s u l to f a c o n s p i r a c y” betwee n Spence a

nd Moore. When there is a challeng e to the leg al suffic iency of the e vidence to sustain a criminal
c on vic tio n, we c on sid e r w he the r a ra tio na l tr ie r o f f

a c t c ou ld h a ve fou nd the e sse nti a l e le me nts of the off ense be y ond a re asonable doubt. Vo do c ho ds k yv . S tat e , 15 8 S. W.3 d 5 02 , 5 09 (T e x. Cr im. App. 2005). We re view all the evidenc e in the light most fa vorable to the verdic t a

nd assume that the tr ie r of fact resol ve d c on fl ic ts i n th e te sti mony , w e ig he d th e e vid e nc e , a nd dr e w r e a so na

ble in f e r e n c e s in a ma

n n e r th a t s u

p p o rts th e v e r d ic t. Se e Ro lle rso n v . S tat e , 227 S.W .3d 718, 724 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Sh am s v . S tat e , 195 S.W. 3d 34 6, 34 7 (T e x. Ap p. —A us tin 20 06 , p e t.
re f’ d ) ( ci t i n g Gr iff

in v . S tat e , 614 S.W .2d 155, 159 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981)). I t is not necessar y that
ever y fac t point directly

and indepe ndently

to the defe ndant’s g uilt, but it is enough if the conclusion is war rante d by the combined and cumulative forc e of all the i ncriminating circ umstances. Hooper

v . S tat e , 214 S.W .3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We must consider a ll the evidence , rig htly or wrong ly admitted, that the trier of fac t w as permitted to consider
. Se e Con ne r v. S tat e , 67 S.W .3d 192, 197 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).9 I n a fact ua l su ff

ic ie nc y re vie w, we vie w the e vid e nc e in a ne utr a l li g ht a

nd a sk wh e the r a jur y wa s r a tio na lly

jus tif ie d in fi nd ingg uil t be y on d a reas on a ble do ub t. See W

atson
v . S tat e , 204 S.W .3d 404, 414 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). We t h en deter mine whether

the evidenc e supporting the verdic t is so wea k that the verdict is clear ly wrongand manife stly

unjust or whether the ver dict i s aga i n s t t he g reat weig ht and pre pondera nce of the conf licting e vidence
. Id . at 415. We will not reverse a case on a fac tual sufficie ncy challeng e unless we can sa y , with some objective ba s is in th e r e c o r d , th a t th e g r e a t w e ig h t an d p r e p o n d e r an c e o f th e e v id e n c e c o n tr a d ic ts the jury ’s verdic t. Id . at 417.

A p e rs on c omm its the off

ens e of se xua l a ssa

ult of a c hil d if he int e nti on a lly
or kn ow ing ly

c a us e s th e pe ne tr a tio n o f t he anu s or sex ual orga

n o f a c hil d b y any me a ns . Te x. Pe na l Co de Ann. § 22. 01 1( a )( 2) (A ). A pe rs on c omm its the of fe ns e of a g g ra vate d s e xua l a ssa

ult
o f a ch i l d i f h e sexually

assaults a c hild y oung er tha n 14 y ear s of ag e. Id . § 22.021(a) (1), ( 2)(B ). A per son commits the offense of indece ncy with a child by contac t if he eng ag es in sexual contact with the child or causes t he child to eng ag e in s exual contact. Id
. § 2 1. 11 (a )( 1) . Ape rs on c omm its the offe nse of indec ency

with a child by

exposure if, with intent to arouse or g ratify the sexual desire
o f an y p e r s o n , h e e xp o s e s h is an u s o r an y p art o f h is g e n it a ls , kn o w in g th e c h il d is prese nt. Id
. § 21.11(a) (2)( A).

F or a ll o f t he a bo ve of fe ns e s, th e te sti mony

of the c hil d v ic tima lon e is l e g a lly sufficie nt to support a conviction. See Te x. Cod e Cr im. Pr oc . A nn . a rt
. 38 .0 7 (We st 2 00 5) ; Ga rc ia
v . S tat e , 5 63 S .W .2 d 92 5, 92 8 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 78 ); Le e v . S tat e , 186 S.W .3d 649, 655 (T e x. Ap p. —D a lla s 20 06 , p e t. r e f’ d) ; He llu ms v . S tat e , 8 31 S.W. 2d

54 5, 54 7 ( Te x. Ap p. —A us tin10

19 92 , n o p e t.) . In th is c a se , al l thr e e vic tim s te sti fi e d th a t Sp ark s ma de se xua l c on ta c t w iththe m,
e xpos e d h ims e lf

to t he m, and pe ne tr a te d th e m. T he jur y c ou ld h a ve ratio na lly

c re dit e d th e ir testimony , espec i al l y when considering the spec ific deta ils the girls provide d about the abuse , including w hen it happene d, wher e it happene d, and how of ten i t h ap p en ed. The victims each te sti fi e d to a

sim ila r p a tte rn of be havior . F ir st, a c c or din g to t he g ir ls, Spa

rk s w ou ld e ng a g e in
se e min g ly

ha rm le ss b e havio r—

hu g g ingor

wr e stl ingwi th t

he vic tim s. Th e n, he wo uld se xua lly
c on ta c t th e vic tim s and

e xpos e him se lf to the m. F ina lly , the c on ta c t and e xpos ur e wo uld

e sc a la te into penetration. A.A. testified that she wa s penetrated on ce, w hile C.J . and A.M. testified that Sparks re peate dly

penetr ated them
. T h e v ic tims also provided sensory “cor e deta ils” about what they saw, he ard, a

nd felt duringand immediately following the abuse
. As for Spar

ks’s complaint that th e v ictims were te stify ing to e vents that occ urre d

“ thr e e to f ive y e ars be fo re tr ia l,” Dr . Ca rt e r t e sti fi e d that wh e n the pe rp e tr a tor of the a bu se is a ma le wh o h a s a r ela ti on sh ip wit h th e vic tim ’s mot

he r, it i s “ no t a t a ll unc omm on ” fo r c hil dr e n to wa it
wee ks, months, or even y ear s to r eport the a buse. B ased on this testimony , among other e vidence , the jury could have rationally

disreg arde d th e lapse of time betwe en the a buse and the repor

ting of the a buse. Additio nally , the jury hear d testimony

from the witnesse s to whom the g irls had repor ted the abuse : Detec tive Kathy Hec tor, Tra cy

Spence, Cath y Spence, D r. B eth Naue rt, and Marg are t Moore. The jury could have rationally

acc epted their

testimony . Viewing the a bove
e vid e nc e in t

he lig ht m os t f

a vo ra ble to t he ve rd ict, we ho ld t

he e vid e nc e is l e g a lly

su ff ic ie nt t o
su pp or t th e c on vic tio ns .11 When consideringthe evidenc e in a ne utral light, we rea ch the same conc lusion
re g ard ing the fa c tua l su ff

ic ie nc y of the e vid e nc e . At tr ia l, S pa rk s d e nie d th e a lle g a tio ns a g a ins t hi m. He c la ime d th a t Sp e nc e and Mo or e , see kin g “ re ve ng e ” fo r wh a t Spar ks c la ime d w a s h is d e c isi on to br e a k u p w iththe m, h a d ma

nip ulate d th e g ir ls i nto lyinga bo ut t he abu se. S par

ks re -u rg e s th is
argume nt o n a

pp eal , esse nti a lly

a sk ingthi s Co ur

t to fi nd that hi s te sti mony

is c re dib le , w hil e the testimony

of the v i ctims and those who cor roborated their testimony is not. However , the jury is th e s o le ju d g e o f th e c r e d ib il it y o f th e w it

n e s s e s an d th e w e ig h t to b e g iv e n th e evide nce, and may choose to be lieve all, some, or none of it. Ma rg ra v es v . S

tat e , 34 S.W .3d 912, 919 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 00 ); Ra c ha l v . S tat e , 9 1 7 S
. W
. 2 d 7 9 9 , 8 0 5 ( T e x. C r i m . A p p . 19 96 ); Skille rn
v . S tat e , 8 90 S.W. 2d

84 9, 87 9 ( Te x. Ap p. —A us tin 19 91 , p e t. r e f’ d)
. Thus , the jur y is p e rm itt e d to b e li e v e o r d is b e li e v e an y p art o f th e te s ti mo n y o f an y w it n e ss. Jon es v . S

tat e , 984 S.W .2d 254, 258 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). The jury could have rationally chosen to be lieve the testimony of the vic tim s and dis be lie ve Spa rk s’ s tes tim on y . As e xpla ine d a bo ve , in a dd iti on to t he vic tim s, mul tip le witnesses testified for

the State. Even w ere the jury to discount the testimony of Cathy Spence a nd Moore, the jur

y would still have the testimony of Tra cy Spence, to whom A.A . first repor ted the abuse, D r. B eth Na u er t , wh o i nterview ed and pe rfor med a phy sical exam on C.J ., and De tective Kathy Hec tor, who interview ed all three victims. On the other hand, Sparks’ s theory of a c onspiracy betwee n the victims’ mother s finds no support in the evidenc e other than his testimony

alone. The jury could have rationally found t hat S parks’ s theory was c ontradicte d by the testimony

of Spence and Moore , both of whom testified that they had a some what anta g onistic relationship with eac h other prior

to learningabout the abuse . Acc ording to their testimony , this antag onism resulted f romThe State’s motion to consolidate is not included in the re cord. 3 Al t h o u gh t h e j u d ge’ s ru l i n gs d o n o tap p ea r i nt h e r ec o rd , t h e p ar t i es co n c u r r e d d u ri n g a 4 pretria l he aring befor e the district court that the visiting judg e g rante d the motion to consolidate and denied the motion to sever
. 12 the ir kn ow le dg e that Spar ks ha d be e n da tin g bo th of the m at ap pr oximate ly the same tim e . F or thi s and other rea sons, the ju ry

could have acc epted Spenc e and Moor e’s testimony while re jecting S p ar k s ’ s t e s t i m o n y.

We o ve rr ule Spa rk s’ s f ir st t hr ou g h s ixte e nth

iss ue s.
Motion to seve r

I n his sevente enth i ssue, S parks contends that the district court a bused its discretion in d e nying h is mo ti on to s e ve r t he thr e e c a se s th a t w e re fi le d a g a ins t hi m. A t so me po int pr ior to trial, appar ently on the State’s motion, the case s were consolidated. On J une 9, 2006, Sparks filed 3 a motion to sever, whic h was de nied. 4

On the morning trial was set to be g in, Sparks re- urg ed his motion to sever, asse rting that he wa s entitled to severa nce be cause t h e t h re e ca s es did not arise “out of the same c riminal episode.” Sparks further arg ued that consolidation would unfairly prejudice his defe nse bec ause of the po ssi ble e ff

e c t th a t mu lti ple a lle g a tio ns of se xua l mi sc on du c t in vo lvi ngthr e e dif fe re nt v ic tim s
c ou ld h a ve on

the min ds of the jur or s. Th e State re sp on de d th a t c on so lid a tio n w a s a pp ro pr ia te beca use the sepa

ra t e o u t cries occur

red w ithin day s of ea ch other , the assaults alleg edly occur red wi thi n th e same y e ar, and

tw o o f the vic tim s w e re liv ingin t he same ho us e wh e n th e y

we re a lle g e dly assaulted. The State also argued that consolidation promoted “judicia l economy ” bec ause the case s13

invol v ed “the same witnesse s, the same of fice rs, and the sa

me doctors’ testimony .” The district court de nied the motion to sever.

A def endant may

be prose cuted in a sing le cr iminal action for all offe nses ar ising out of the same “cr iminal episode.” Tex. Penal C ode Ann. § 3.02(a) (West 2003). A “c riminal episode” is de fined as the commission of two or more offe nses if “the offe ns es ar e t h e r epeated commis s i o n o f t h e s ame or simil ar of fense s.” Id . § 3.01(2) ( West 2003). As a g ener al rule, if a defe ndant timely

objects to the consolidation of the of fense s , h e i s entitled to severa nce. Se e id
. § 3.04(a) (West Supp. 2007); Lan e v . S tat e , 174 S.W .3d 376, 380 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2005, pet. re f’d) . Howeve r, t he defenda nt’s rig ht to sever ance does not apply to a prosec ution for offe nses desc ribed by

section 3.03(b)
. See Tex. Pena l Code Ann. § 3.04(c)
. Section 3.03(b) include s sexual offenses c ommitt ed ag ainst a victim y oung er tha n 17 y ear s of ag e. Id . § 3.03(b)( 2) (West Supp. 2007). I n s u ch ca s es , the def endant is not entitled to sever ance unless the def endant makes a showing that he would be “unfa irly prejudice d” by

consolidation. Lane , 174 S.W .3d at 380. We reviewthe trial cour

t’s denial of a defe ndant’s motion for sever ance for a buse of discr etion. See Sa laz ar v . S tat e , 127 S.W .3d 355, 365 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2003, pet. re f’d)
.

“ Th e re is n o p re sump ti on th at t he j oi nd er of case s i nv ol vi ng agg rava ted sex ual ass a ult ag ainst differ ent childre n is unfairly prejudicia l.” Id
. Spa

rk s mus t e xpla in “ ho w the joi nd e r w ou ld
cause him unfair pr ejudice.” See Lane , 174 S.W .3d at 380. At the hea ring befor e the district cour t on the motion to sever, Sparks a sserted that the jury co uld not be fair a nd impartial toward a defe ndant who had be en ac cused of three sexual assaults. Sparks also cl ai med that only case s in v o l v i n g a s i n g l e v i c t i m c o u l d b e c o n s o l i d a t e d
. I n h i s b r i e f , S p ar k s ’ s ar g u m e n t o n t h i s is su e is14

limit ed to t he following statement: “In this procee ding, thr ee c lear ly weak case s were consolidated to e nh anc e the pr e

jud ic ia l natur e of

the c a se s to pr e

jud ic e the jur

y a g a ins t” Spa

rk s. Spa rk s f a ils to elabor ate on how c onsolidation of these ca ses re sulted i n u n fa ir prejudice , or on how the district court’s de cision to deny

sever ance rose to the leve l of an a buse of discr etion. Fur thermore , Sparks cites to only a si n gl e case in which a

trial court’ s denial of a motion to sever

was found to be an abuse of discre tion. Se e W he at v . S tat e , 160 S.W .3d 631, 636-37 (Tex. App.—Waco), vacate d , 178 S.W .3d 382 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). I n W heat , the def

endant wa s char g ed with two counts of indec ency with a child (eac h involving a dif fer ent victim) and one count of sexual a ssault of a child (involving one of the victims who w as also involved with the indec ency alleg ations). 160 S.W.3d at 632. The defe ndant moved to s ev er t h e i n d ecency char g es fr om the se xua l a ssa

ult c ha rg e , b e c a us e he int e nd e d to ple a d g uil ty to the ind e c e nc y c ha rg e s and no t g uil ty to the sexual assault charg e. Id . at 632- 3 3
. T h e trial court denied the motion for se vera nce. Id
. at 633. The court of a

ppeals re verse d, attributing sig nificanc e to the def endant’ s differ ent pleas. Id
. at 636-37. The court e x presse d conce rn that the “ d ef en s ive theorie s may

chang e” de pending on wh et h er t h e i n d ec en cy ch ar ges t o wh i ch t h e d ef en d an tp l ea d edgu i l t y

an d t h e s ex u al as s au l tch ar ge to which the def

endant plea ded not g uilty wer e tried se parately

or tog ether
. Id . at 636. T h e c o u r t a ls o e xp la in e d th a t th e r e w e r e d if f e r e n t p r o c e d

u r a l c o n s e qu e n c es for
eac h plea:
Th e bif ur c a tio n s ta tut e [arti cle 37 .0 7 § 2( a ), c od e of c ri min a l pr oc e dure ] “i s applicable only

to pleas of not g uilty

befor e a jur

y .” The statute “ha s no application to a trial befor e the court on a plea of not guilty .” Thus, once a g uilty plea ha s been enter ed, the trial is not to be bifurcated, but r ather a unitary proce dure is to be use d, r e g ar d l e s s o f

w h e t h e r t h e g u i l t y p l e a

i s e n t e r e d

b e f o r e a t r i a l j u d g e o r

a j u r y.15

Id . at 635 (interna l citations omitted). There fore , the court held, the defe ndant was a lso prejudiced by being subjected to a

bifurca ted trial for

an off ense to whic h he plea ded g uilty
. Id . at 636-37. I n summary , the defe ndant in W heat satisfied hi s burden of showing unfair pr ejudice. The c ourt explained:
Prior to voir dire and he aringof t h e pleas, the trial judg e wa s informed that Wheat was see king a

sever ance beca

use he intended to plead guilty to counts one and thr ee and it would be pre

judicial for the jur

y to hear his guilty pleas a long w ith count two. The trial judg e eve ntually allowed the State to tell the potential juror s that Wheat int e nd e d to ple a d guil ty

to c ounts on e and

thr e e . Th e tr ia l judg e a lso he ard the g uil ty p l e a s i nf r o n to f t h e j u r

y, w h i c h f o r c e d W h e a tt o u s e an“ u n u s u a l ” d e f e n s i v e t h e o r

y. Once the trial judge was informed that Wheat intende d to plead g uilty to counts one and thre e, he should have conduc ted unitary proce eding s on those two counts. Wheat was unfa irly

prejudice d on count two by the unauthorized bifurc ated tria l on the g uilty pleas for counts one a

nd three
. Id
. I n this case, Spar ks failed to make a similar showing of unfa ir prejudice . The re cord on this iss ue consists of the district cour t’s pretria l hear ing on Spar ks’s motion to sever, and the trial its e lf . T he re c or d d oe s n ot inc lud e any pr oc e e din g s b e fo re the vis iti ngjud g e . T he re c or d r e fl e c ts that at the hea

ring befor e the district c ourt, Sparks reque sted sever ance of the case s by victim. The
rec ord also re flec ts that at t rial, S parks pleaded not guilty to all of the cha

rg es ag ainst him, and that his de fe ns ive the or

y a g a ins t e a c h v ic tim ’s a lle g a tio ns wa s th e same —h e de nie d th e a lle g a tio ns in their entire ty

and cla imed that eac h victim was ly ing a s a re sult o f m an i pulation by Spence a nd Mo or e . T he re c or d doe s not re fl e c t tha t, pr ior to c on so lid a tio n, Spa

rk s in te nd e d to ple a d guil ty to the alleg ations by

one of the victims but not guilty to the alleg ations by the other victims. Nor does the record reflec t that, had the case s been severe d, Sparks would have asser ted diffe rent de fensive16

the or ie s fo r e a c h v ic tim . O n th is r e c or d, the re is n o b a sis fo r u s to c on c lud e that Sp ark s w a s unf a ir ly prejudice d by

consolidation. Ad dit ion a lly , e ve n if

the dis tr ic t c ourt

ha d g ra nte d Sp ark s’ s mo tio n t o sev er, it i s l i k el y t h at t h e e v i d en ce re l at i n g t o al l t h re e v i ct i m s wo u l d h av e b ee nad m i t t edi nea ch t ri al
. Al t h o u gh evidenc e of othe r cr imes is not admissi b l e t o p ro v e the cha rac ter of a

person to show he acte d in conformity

there with, it may

be admissible for othe r purpose s. See Tex. R. Evi d. 404(b). One suc h purpose is re butting a de fensive the ory . S e e M a t th e ws v . S

t a te , 1 5 2 S
. W
. 3d 723, 731 (Tex. App.—Ty ler 2004, no pe t.); Salazar , 127 S.W .3d at 365. Sparks’s de fensive the ory was that
eac h victim was ly ing. Simi lar alleg ations by other victims would rebut that theor y . There fore , even had the case s been tried separ ately , “it is probable that the t estimony of t he other victims would have been a dmissibl e to re fute the de fensive the ory that eac h complainant, for whateve r re ason, conc octed the story .” Ma tth e ws , 152 S.W .3d at 731. Fur thermore , beca

use of the a lleg edly

simil ar patterns of abuse in e ach c ase, a n d b ec au se two of the vic tims were living toge ther, it is also likely that the testimony of the other victims would have been admissible to show oppor tunity , intent, prepa

ration, or plan. See Te x. R. E v id
. 4 0 4 ( b )
. F o r th e s e r e a s o n s , w e c o n c lu d e th a t th e d is tr ic t c o u rt d id not abuse its discre tion in deny ing Spar ks’s motion to sever. We overrule Sparks’s seve nteenth issue. Sparks ’s re m oval f

rom the court room I n Sp ark s’ s e ig hte e nth

iss ue , h e a sse rt s th a t th e dis tr ic t c ourt de nie d him “d ue pr oc e ss of law a nd due cour se of law ” by removing him from the c ourtroom during the State’s closingTh e S tat e as se rt s th a t Sp ark s f a ile d to pr e se rv e e rr or

on thi s is su e by

no t ob je c tin g to 5 his re mov a l a t th e tim e it o c c ur re d. Ho we ve r, be c a

us e a de fe ndant ’s ri ght to be pr e se nt i n the c ourt ro om “ mus t be imp le me nte d b y the jud ic ia l sy ste m un le ss ex press ly wa ive d, ” it “ is not subject t o ordinary

prese rvation-of

-er ror r ules.” Se e Kesse l v . S

tat e , 161 S.W .3d 40, 45 n.1 (Tex. A pp.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2004, pet. ref ’d). Be cause it doe s not a

ppear from the re cord that Sparks expressly

waived his rig ht to be prese nt in the courtroom, we shall consider this issue. 17 argume nt. We reviewa trial c ourt’s dec ision t o re m o v e a defe ndant from the c ourtroom for

5 abuse of discretion. Se e Kesse l v . S tat e , 161 S.W .3d 40, 47 (Tex. A pp.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2004, pet. re f’d) . As the Supreme Court ha s expl ained,
I t is essential to the proper admini stration of criminal justice that dig nity , order , and deco rum be the ha llmarks of all cour t proce eding s in our country . The fla g rant disreg ard in the c ourtroom of e lementar y standards of

proper conduct should not and cannot be tolerated. We believe tr ial judge s confr onted with disruptive, c on tum a c iou s, stu

bb or nly de fi ant d e fe nd ants mus t be g ive n s uf fi c ie nt d isc re tio n to me e t th e c ir c ums tanc e s o f e a c h c a se . N o o ne fo rm ula fo r m a int a ini ngthe a

pp ro pr ia te courtroom atmosphere will be best in all situations. We think there ar e at lea st three constitut i o n al l y

permissible way s for a trial judg e to handle a n obstreper ous defe ndant . . . : (1) bind and g aghim, thereby keepinghim prese nt; (2) cite him for c on te mpt ; ( 3) take him

ou t of the cour tr oo m un til he pr omi se s to c on du c t hi mse lf p r o p e r l y.
Illinois v. Allen , 397 U.S. 337, 344-45 (1970).

Sparks’s re moval from the c ourtroom occ urre d immediately afte r the following
ou tbu rs t di re c te d at th e pr os e c uto r d ur inghe r c los ingargume nt:
The Def endant: Tell them about this DNA that I passed. That’s what y ou do. Th e Court : Yo u’ re g oin g to h a ve to b e —y ou ’r e g oin g to have to b e qu ie t,

sir. Th e De fe nd ant: Di d th e DN A o n [A .M .], and it came ba c k n e g a tiv e . Te ll

the m.18

The Court: Wil l y ou have him re moved? The De fenda

nt: You paid Mar ie Stroud to come and lie. The Court: Remove him from the c ourtroom, please
. The De fenda

nt: You tried to g et my wife to c ome and lie. You want to hit me. I

don’t ca re. Yo ul y i n g. Yo ukn o w w h at y o uar e d o i n g. (D e fe nd ant o ut)
The re cord doe s not refle ct when Spar ks returne d to the courtroom. How ever , Sparks was pr esent wh e n th e dis tr ic t c ourt

la te r r e a d a

no te fr om t

he jur y duri ngthe jur

y ’s de lib e ra

tio ns . Sparks contends that, rathe r than re moving him from the c ourtroom, the district cour t sh ou ld h a ve pr ov ide d h im w ith“ a str on g a dmo nis hme nt .
. . or so me oth e r a c tio n s ho rt of his
remova l from the cour

troom.” Howe ver, the re co rd reflects that the district cour t had alre ady , on multipl e occa sions, a dmonished Sparks about his c ourtroom behavior
. First, prior to Dr . Naue rt’s te sti mony , Sp ark s wa s con fe rr ing wi th co un se l whe n the dis tr ic t cou rt a dmo nis he d Sp ark s, “ Exc us e me, excuse me. You ne ed to lower y our voice .” The ne x t incident occu rre d during a voir dire examination of A.M. outside the prese nce of

the jury . After

A.M. answe re d a q u estion, Sparks interjec ted, “Not true .” A f ew moments later, the f

ollowing e x chang e occ urre d:
T h e D ef en d an t : Yo u r H o n o r, m ay Is ay s o m et h i n g? The Court: No.19

(C o u n s el an d

d ef en d an tco n fe rr i n g) The De fenda

nt [ to A.M.]: You alwa y s remembe r God don’t like—y ou g ot to pay fo r t he m li e s. The Witness [ A.M.]: You g ot to pay for yours, too. Deputy Sheriff: Can y ou g ive us a minute, Judge? The Court: Yea h. . . . The Def endant: Pay for them lies. You made them up, y ou g ot to pay

fo r t he m. Y ou ’l l pr ob a

bly a ll g o s tr a ig ht t o h e ll. Sparks was th e nb r ie f

ly r e mo v e d f r o m t h e c o u rtr o o m. Wh e nth e ju r y r e tu r n e d , d e f e n s e c ounsel objected to Spar

ks’s absenc e, and Sparks was re turned to the c ourtroom prior to the r esumption of A.M.’s cr oss-examination.

Sparks continued his disruptive behavior during his cross-e x amination. Following a question by

the State about Sparks’s theory that A.A. was manipulated by Spence, Sparks claimed that he ha d le tte rs to p rov e th at A.A . w a s ly inga bo ut t he se xua l a

bu se a lle g a tio ns . T he Sta te objected that Sparks was be ing non- responsive, a nd while the district cour t was consider ing the ob je c tio n, Spa

rk s to ld t he dis tr ic t c ourt , “ L e t me int ro du c e my le tte rs , and Ig ua ra nte e y ou , I

c an w a lk
ou t of he re .” Th e State re pe a te d it s o bje c tio n, a nd the dis tr ic t cou

rt a dmo nis he d Spark s to “ re fr a in from re fer ring to things that ar en’t in evide nce.” Sparks replied, “B ut, J udg e, first of a ll, she led the witness.” The district court admonished Spar ks, “Excuse me. I ’m not ha ving a discussion with y ou. I ’m te lli ngy ou .” Spa

rk s the n c on tin

ue d ans we ri ng the State ’s qu e sti on s in a mann e r t hat th e State char acte rized as non-re sponsive, and the district c ourt told Spar ks, “You ne ed to be quiet a nd answe r the questions.” Howe ver, Sparks continued arg uing with the prosecutor and refe rringto the alleg ed20

letters and “ lies.” The district cour t ag ain told Sparks, “You ne ed to be quiet.” Sparks then addre ssed the prosec utor, telling her, “You led ever y witness in here .” Af

ter this rema

rk, the district
c ourt a dmo nis he d Spark s tha t fur the r out burs ts wo uld no t be tole rate d: “ Mr . Sp ark s. Mr . Sp a rk s, y ou wi ll j us t ha

ve to a ns we r the qu e sti on that y ou are a sk e d. An d if y ou c on tin ue to h a ve ou tbu

rs ts, y ou’ll be re moved from the c ourtroom.”

T h u s , t h e record r efle cts that prior to Sparks’s r emoval fr om the courtroom dur ing the State’s closing argument, the district c ourt had alre ady repe atedly

admonished Sparks to beha ve. Despite these numerous warn i n gs , S p arks persisted in his disruptive behavior. Prior to re moving him, the district court provided Spa rk s with one final wa rning . I t went unhee ded. The ref ore, w e conclude that the district court did not abuse its discre tion in temporarily re m oving Spar ks from the c ourt ro om. We overrule Sparks’s eig hteenth issue.
CO NC LU SION Havingoverr

u l ed S p ar k s’s issues on appea l, we af firm the judg ments of the dis tr ic t c ourt
.

__________________________________________ Bob Pembe rton, J ustice Be fore J ustices Patterson, Pury ear and Pember

ton Affir med Filed: Apr il 17, 2008 Do No t Pu

bli sh