COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Humphreys, O’ Brien and Senior Judge Bumgardner

DELJUAN CURRY MEMORANDUM OPINION * v. Record No. 1930-15-2 PER CURIAM APRIL 12, 2016 HOPEWELL DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF HOPEWELL W. Allan Sharrett, Judge (Brad P. Butterworth, on briefs), for appellant. Appellant submitting on briefs. (Joan M. O’Donnell; W. Ed ward Tomko, III, Guardian ad litem for the minor children; Ol d Towne Lawyers, LLP; Novey & Tomko, on brief), for appellee. Appellee and Guardian ad litem submitting on brief.

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opin ion is not designated for publication. Deljuan Curry (father) appeals the orders termin ating his parental rights to his two children. Father argues that the trial cour t erred in terminating his parental rights because (1) there was no evidence that he abused or neglected one of the children and (2) the evid ence was insufficient to support termination pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(B), (C)(2), and (E)(iv). Upon reviewing the record and briefs of the parties, we conclude th at the trial court did not er r. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the trial court.
BACKGROUND We view the evidence in the light most favor able to the prevailing party below and grant to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom. See Logan v. Fairfax Cty. Dep’t of Human Dev., 13 Va. App. 123, 128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 463 (1991).UNPUBLISHED- 2 - Father and Sharnice Cromartie (mother) ar e the biological parent s to the two children who are the subject of this appeal. 1 The older child was born in September 2013. On December 9, 2013, mother took the child to the pediatrician for a perceived upper re spiratory infection. The pediatrician noticed swelling in the child’s right leg and recommended he have x-rays at John Randolph Hospital. The x-rays revealed a fracture in the child’s tibia. The Hopewell Department of Social Services (the Department) was notified. The child was taken to MCV Hospital for further testing. Dr. Robin Foster was the at tending physician at MCV Hospital. Dr. Foster noticed the swelling in the child’s right leg and ordered additional x-rays. Dr . Foster determined that the tibia was fractured two to three weeks earlier. Th e child also had healed fractures in his right and left clavicle. Dr. Foster estimated that the in juries to the clavicle we re approximately four to six weeks old. Dr. Foster reviewed the child’s medical record s. There were no indications that the child was injured at birth. At the child’s check-ups in September 2013, the pediatrician did not note any swelling or injury to the child’s body. On October 14, 2013, mother told the pediatrician about a “bump” on the child’s clavicle. The pedi atrician referred her to an orthopedist, but the orthopedist never saw the ch ild. On November 10, 2013, the child went to John Randolph Hospital because he had an abscess in the groi n area. When the medical staff at John Randolph was unable to insert an IV, the child was transferred to Chippenham Hospital, where he was treated. The notes from both hospitals did not indicate the child’s leg was swollen.

1 Mother has four older children. Father is not the biological pare nt to the four older children.- 3 - Dr. Foster concluded, with a reasonable degr ee of medical certainty, that the child was a victim of physical abuse. The tibia fracture was a non-accidental injury. There was no organic reason for the child’s multiple broken bones. The Department learned that father and moth er were the child’s primary caregivers. The mother told the Department that the child’s cl avicles may have been broken during the birthing process. She also stated that the child’s tib ia may have been broken at John Randolph Hospital when they brought him in for the abscess. Ho wever, the medical reco rds do not support these theories. On January 14, 2014, the Department filed petit ions alleging abuse and neglect in the Hopewell Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court (the JDR court). The Department placed the child in foster care. 2 Since the child has been in fost er care, he has not had any broken bones. The JDR court found that the child was an abus ed or neglected child. The initial foster care plan required the father to participate in a psychological evaluation, individual counseling, parenting classes, and supervised visitations. He also was required to obtain and maintain housing and employment. Father participated in the psychological evaluation, but not the individual counseling. He particip ated in the parenting classes and attended most of the visits. He did not obtain independe nt housing or employment. In December 2014, mother gave birth to the second child who is the subject of this appeal. The parents did not tell the Department that mother was pregnant or that she had the baby. Once the Department learned that moth er had given birth, it obtained an emergency removal order, and the child was placed in foster care.

2 Mother’s four older children also were placed in foster care.- 4 - The JDR court terminated mother’s and fath er’s parental rights to both children and approved the foster care plans w ith the goal of adoption. Both pa rents appealed the JDR court’s orders to the circuit court. On November 2, 2015, the parties appeared before the circuit court. Father denied harming the child. He testified th at the child did not act like he was in pain. Father stated that he told the staff at Chippenham Hospital that he thought the child was injured at John Randolph Hospital. He thought the docto r at Chippenham Hospital who reported that the child did not have any physical problems, other th an the abscess, was lying. After hearing all of the evidence and argument, the circuit court ente red orders terminating mother’s and father’s parental rights to the two child ren pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(B), (C)(2), and (E)(iv). This appeal followed. 3
ANALYSIS
I. Father argues that the evidence was insufficien t to prove that he harmed or neglected the child. “Where, as here, the court hears the evidence ore tenus , its finding is en titled to great weight and will not be disturbed on appeal unle ss plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.” Martin v. Pittsylvania Cty. Dep’t of So c. Servs., 3 Va. App. 15, 20, 348 S.E.2d 13, 16 (1986) (citation omitted). “It is well established that the trier of fact ascertains a witness’ credibility, determines the weight to be given to their testimony, and ha s the discretion to accept or reject any of the witness’ testimony.” Street v. Street, 25 Va. App. 380, 387, 488 S.E.2d 665, 668 (1997) (en banc) (citation omitted).

3 Mother also appealed the circuit court’s or ders terminating her parental rights. See Cromartie v. Hopewell Dep’t of So c. Servs., Record No. 1943-15-2.- 5 - The circuit court had an opportuni ty to see and hear all of th e witnesses. Father denied harming the child; however, he and the mother were the child’s primary ca regivers. Dr. Foster testified that the child’s broken bones were not a ccidental. She concluded that the child was a victim of physical child abuse. The pediatrician recommended th at the child see an orthopedist after mother said there was a “bump” on the chil d’s clavicle, but the parents did not take the child to the orthopedist. The November 2013 records from John Randolph Hospital and Chippenham Hospital do not indicat e that the child had any injuri es, other than the abscess. Based on the totality of the evidence, the trial court did not err in concluding that the child’s parents harmed him.
II. Father argues that the trial court erred in te rminating his parental ri ghts pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(B), (C)(2), and (E)(iv). When considering termination of parental ri ghts, “the paramount c onsideration of a trial court is the child’s best interests.” Logan, 13 Va. App. at 128, 409 S.E.2d at 463. Code § 16.1-283(E)(iv) states that a court may terminate a parent’s parental rights if it is in the best interests of the child and there is clear and convincing evidence that “the parent has subjected any child to ag gravated circumstances.” Code § 16.1-283(E) defines a ggravated circumstances as torture, chronic or severe abuse, or chronic or severe sexual abuse, if the victim of such conduct was a child of the parent or a child with whom the parent resided at the time such conduct occurred, including the failure to protect such a child from such conduct, which conduct or failure to pr otect: (i) evinces a wanton or depraved indifference to human lif e, or (ii) has resulted in the death of such a child or in serious bodily injury to such a child. The statute further defines chronic abuse as “recurri ng acts of physical abus e which place the child’s health, safety and well- being at risk.” Id. The statute defines serious bodily injury as “bodily injury- 6 - that involves substantial risk of death, extreme p hysical pain, protracted and obvious disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ or mental faculty.” Id. The circuit court specifically held that the child was subjected to aggravated circum stances, as defined in Va. Code § 16.1-283E, while in the care of his pa rents, . . . in that the child was residing with the parents at the time of his injuries; the severity of the child’s injuries in cludes a failure to protect by the parents; the nature of the injuries resulted in serious bodily injury to such a child. The evidence supports the trial court’s findings . At different times, th e child suffered from a fractured tibia and fractured clavic les, while in the parents’ care. Dr. Foster determined, with a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that the fr actured bones were non-accidental and a result of physical child abuse. Code § 16.1-283(E)(iv) applies to “any” ch ild who has been subjected to aggravated circumstances. Since the ol der child was subjected to a ggravated circumstances, Code § 16.1-283(E) also applies to the younger child. The trial court did not err in te rminating father’s parental rights to his children pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(E). When a trial court’s judgment is made on alternative grounds, we need only consider whether any one of the alternatives is sufficient to sustain the judgment of the trial court, and if so, we need not address the other grounds. See Fields v. Dinwiddie Cty. De p’t of Soc. Servs., 46 Va. App. 1, 8, 614 S.E.2d 656, 659 (2005) (the Court affirmed termination of parental rights under one subsection of Code § 16.1-283 and did not need to address termination of parental rights pursuant to another subsection). Therefore, we will not consider whether the trial court erred in terminating father’s parental right s pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(B) and (C)(2).- 7 - CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the tr ial court’s ruling is affirmed. Affirmed.