[Cite as Drummond v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr. , 2021-Ohio-2408.]

{¶1} On February 10, 2021, Defendant filed a motion for summary judg ment. On February 23, 2021, Plaintiff filed a timely response. On March 3, 2021, Defendant filed a reply. Pursuant to L.C.C.R. 4(D), the motion for summary jud gment is now before the Court for a non-oral hearing. For the reasons stated below, De fendant’s motion for summary judgment shall be granted.

Standard of Review {¶2} Motions for summary judgment are reviewed under the standard se t forth in Civ.R. 56(C), which states, in part: Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, written admissions, af fidavits, transcripts of evidence, and written stipulations of fact, if a ny, timely filed in the action, show that there is no genuine issue as to any ma terial fact and that the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. No evidence or stipulation may be considered except as st ated in this rule. A summary judgment shall not be rendered unless it appears from the evidence or stipulation, and only from the evidence or stipulation,

that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary DEBRA DRUMMOND

Plaintiff

v.

OHIO DEPARTMENT OF REHABILITATION AND CORRECTION

Defendant Case No. 2020-00161JD

Judge Patrick E. Sheeran Magistrate Holly True Shaver

DECISIONCase No. 2020-00161JD -2- DECISION

judgment is made, that party being entitled to have the evidenc e or stipulation construed most strongly in the party’s favor. “[T]he moving party bears the initial responsibility of informi ng the trial court of the basis for the motion, and identifying those portions of the record be fore the trial court which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact on a material element of the nonmoving party’s claim.” Dresher v. Burt , 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 292, 662 N.E.2d 264 (1996). To meet this initial burden, the moving party must be able to point to evidentiary materials of the type listed in Civ.R. 56(C). Id . at 292-293. {¶3} If the moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmoving par ty bears a reciprocal burden outlined in Civ.R. 56(E), which states, in pa rt: When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as pro vided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere alleg ations or denials of the party’s pleadings, but the party’s response, by affidavit or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If the party does not so re spond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the party.

Background {¶4} Plaintiff, a 58-year-old, African American female employee of D efendant, claims that Defendant unlawfully discriminated against her base d upon her race and age in violation of R.C. 4112 when it failed to promote her to a Program Administrator 2 (PA2) position at Defendant’s Ohio State Penitentiary (OSP) and , instead, selected Abbey Palmer, a 33-year-old, white female. Complaint, ¶¶ 1, 5- 15. Plaintiff has worked for Defendant for twenty-three years and is currently a Correct ional Lieutenant at OSP making a wage of $32.06 per hour. Id. at ¶ 2. Plaintiff was first hired by Defendant as a Corrections Officer in 1997 and has since served in various pos itions, including operational and administrative support in Defendant’s Northeast Ohio Regional Office.

Id. at ¶ 4.Case No. 2020-00161JD -3- DECISION

{¶5} On June 17, 2018, Plaintiff submitted her application for an op en PA2 position at OSP. 1 Id. at ¶ 5. The PA2 position is a permanent, classified, and exemp t position with a starting wage of $25.50 per hour. Id. Despite being aware that the PA2 position was in a separate and different chain of command, Plai ntiff viewed it as a promotion because it had more res ponsibility, a more consistent schedule, and more autonomy in a decision-making c apacity. Drummond Deposition, p . 24. {¶6} The PA2 position “works under administrative direction & requir es thorough knowledge of management principles/techniques, supervisory prin ciples/techniques & agency policies & procedures to provide program direction by re lieving the Warden of administrative duties to ensure institutional compliance of PRE A (Prison Rape Elimination Act) & the ACA (American Correctional Association) accreditation standards.” Complaint, Ex. 2. The posted external qualificati ons included: (1) “completion of undergraduate core program in business admin istration, management science or public administration” and two years of training or experience in a supervisory, administrative and/or managerial position; or (2) (a) “completion of undergraduate core program in academic field commensurate with program area to be assigned per approved Position Description on file” and two yea rs training or experience in a supervisory, administrative and/or ma nagerial position or a staff position involving planning, research and/or policy/procedure development; or (b) four years training or experience in business administration management science or pub lic administration; or (c) one year experience “as Program Administrator 1. 63122.”; o r (d) “equivalent of Minimum Class Qualifications for Employment noted above.” Id.

1 Defendant’s personnel system also refers to this position as a n “Operations Compliance Manager”. For clarity and consistency, the Court will refer to this position as the Program Administrator 2 (PA2).Case No. 2020-00161JD -4- DECISION

{¶7} In general, applications are reviewed by Defendant’s regional o ffice in Columbus, Ohio. See Hammond Deposition, pp. 19, 23-25. Once applications for the PA2 position were submitted, they were screened by Dan Lipperma n and Kimberly

Freeman. See Defendant’s Responses and Objections to Plaintiff’s First Set o f Interrogatories and Requests for Production, Interrogatory No. 19; Hammond Depo., pp. 27-28. Lipperman is a Program Administrator 3 and was the subj ect matter expert regarding the PA2 position. Id. at Interrogatory No. 6. Freeman is a Human Capital Management Senior Analyst from Defendant’s central human resour ces department selected to screen applications. Id. Fourteen applicants were screened for the PA2 position. See Complaint, Ex. 3; see also Lipperman Deposition, Ex. 8. {¶8} Of these applicants, Lipperman recommended six be scheduled for an interview: Plaintiff, Palmer, Garry Galloway, Reena Gordon, Sha wntae Jackson, and

Lisa Remmick. 2 Lipperman Depo., p. 73, Ex. 9-11. Lipperman recommended Remm ick and Jackson be scheduled for an interview despite noting that t hese candidates possessed educational degrees that were “unrelated”. 3 Id. at p. 75-77, Ex. 11. Lipperman also recommended Jackson and Galloway despite noting that they did not meet all the direct work experience requirements. Id. Lipperman did not note that Palmer’s educational degree in sociology was unrelated and he n oted her to have met

2 The Court notes that there is no definitive demographic inform ation provided for all the applicants who were offered interviews. The only evidence in t he record regarding the demographic information of the other applicants is Plaintiff’s perception t hat the applicants selected for an interview included two other black females, besides herself, one white ma le, and Palmer, a white female. See Drummond Depo., p. 55. The only information in the record rega rding the age of the applicants is Plaintiff’s birthdate and the alleged ages of Plaintiff and Pal mer contained in Plaintiff’s Complaint. See id. at p. 57; see Complaint, ¶¶ 1, 15.

3 Plaintiff claims there was an office rumor that Lisa Remmick w as the first choice for the PA2 position, and she would have been selected but she declined to interview due to family reasons. Drummond Depo., pp. 90-91. Plaintiff admits that she believed Remmick was qualified for the PA2 position and it would have been possible for Remmick to be sele cted over her. Id. at p. 91.Case No. 2020-00161JD -5- DECISION

all the direct work experience requirements. 4 Id. at Ex. 10. Likewise, Plaintiff met all the direct work experience and educational requirements. Id. at Ex. 9. {¶9} Nevertheless, with respect to the review of Palmer’s applicatio n specifically, Lipperman and Freeman came to different conclusions regarding P almer’s qualifications. See Defendant’s Responses and Objections to Plaintiff’s First Set o f Interrogatories and Requests for Production, Interrogatory No. 19. Freeman provided a Subject Matter Expert Summary indicating that Palmer met the in itial minimum qualifications but to not proceed with an interview of Palmer b ecause she had an unrelated degree and no supervisory experience. See Lipperman Depo., Ex. 8. As a result of the disagreement, Kim Fullen, a Human Capital Managem ent Manager of Defendant, subsequently reviewed Palmer’s application because s he reviews “applications for open positions when there [is] a difference o f opinion between screeners as to whether a candidate met the minimum qualificati ons.” Kim Fullen Affidavit, ¶ 3. After her review, Fullen determined that Palme r “did meet the minimum qualifications for the Program Administrator 2 position at the Ohio State Penitentiary”

and included her in the list of candidates to be interviewed fo r the position. Id. at ¶ 14;

see also Defendant’s Responses and Objections to Plaintiff’s First Set o f Interrogatories and Requests for Production, Interrogatory No. 19; see also Horton Deposition, pp. 38- 40 (“Katrett Huckleby * * * said that her boss in Columbus seen it and said that [Palmer] was eligible to be interviewed * * * [t]hat she met the minimum s.”). {¶10} In preparation for the interviews, Marla Hammond, the former Di rector of Personnel, and Katrett Huckleby, a Human Capital Management Man ager, verified the information provided in the interview packets. See Defendant’s Responses and Objections to Plaintiff’s First Set of Interrogatories and Requ ests for Production,Interrogatory Nos. 6, 21. Huckleby provided Hammond a revised version of

4 Palmer states that she believed her sociology degree “fit publ ic administration”. Palmer Depo., p. 47.Case No. 2020-00161JD -6- DECISION

the Subject Matter Expert Summary indicating that Palmer was sl otted for an interview; however, the document still reflects a “no” under the column la beled “Proceed (Yes or No)”. See Lipperman Depo., Ex. 14; Defendant’s Responses and Objections t o Plaintiff’s First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Produ ction, Interrogatory No. 6. This version of the Subject Matter Expert Summary was then revi sed. See Lipperman, Depo., Ex. 16. In the revised version, the printed “No” is rep laced with a handwritten “Yes” in the column labeled “Proceed (Yes or No)”. See id . It is believed that

Hammond is the individual who made this final correction. See Bowen Deposition, p. 29; see also Defendant’s Responses and Objections to Plaintiff’s First Set o f Interrogatories and Requests for Production, Interrogatory Nos. 6, 20. Although Hammond cannot specifically recall making this change, she admi ts that if she did make the change, it would have been at the direction of someone abov e her who made the decisions regarding which candidates got interviews. See Hammond Depo., pp. 42-45. Upon review, it appears this version of the Subject Matter Expe rt Summary was the copy included in the interview packet. See Horton Depo., p. 34, 37, 39-40; Lipperman Depo., pp. 87-88. {¶11} To conduct interviews and review the interview packets, a three -member panel was assembled, which included Lipperman, Hammond, and Tho mas Horton, the

Corrections Warden’s Assistant 2. See Complaint, ¶ 9; Richard Bowen Depo., pp. 12, 14; Lipperman Depo., pp. 13, 26; Horton Depo., pp. 37; Palmer D eposition, p. 12; Hammond Depo., pp. 12, 16; Defendant’s Responses and Objections to Plaintiff’s First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production, Interrogato ry No. 6. Following the interviews, the interview panel discussed how the interviews we nt with Warden Richard Bowen. Lipperman Depo., p. 119; Bowen Depo., p. 16; Horton Dep o., p. 44. The interview panel unanimously decided to recommend Palmer for the PA2 position because she had the best interview. Horton Depo., p. 44; Lippe rman Depo., p. 112- 126, Ex. 58. According to Lipperman, Palmer stood out because of her previousCase No. 2020-00161JD -7- DECISION

managerial experience with developing new policies at a private prison and her work with staff ethics. Lipperman Depo., p. 112, Ex. 20. Subsequen tly, Warden Bowen received and reviewed a written summary of the interview panel’ s recommendation. Bowen Depo., p. 13; Hammond Depo., p. 59. Bowen then made the final recommendation to Regional Director Todd Ishee that Palmer be a ppointed to the PA2 position based on the following reasons: Ms. Palmer holds a Bachelor of Arts Degree from Hiram College i n Sociology. She has over 6 years training and experience working in the fie ld of Corrections in various roles to include General Activities Therapist 2, Cor rection Officer and

Staff & Ethics Liaison. As a Staff & Ethics Liaison at Core Ci vic start up facility, she acted as liaison between the organization, contractors and community, implemented policies & procedures, maintained ACA files, and de veloped & trained staff on policy and post orders. In addition, she has worked directly with

line and executive level staff. Bowen Depo., p. 13-14, Ex. 25. Ultimately, “Todd Ishee, Region al Director, made the

final selection based on the recommendations from the interview panel and the Warden” on July 25, 2018. See Defendant’s Responses and Objections to Plaintiff’s First Set o f Interrogatories and Requests for Production, Interrogatory No. 6; see also Bowen Depo., p. 55-56, Ex. 25. {¶12} Plaintiff asserts that Palmer should not have been selected ove r her for the PA2 position because Palmer was not truthful in her interview a nd was not as qualified given her lack of auditing experience. Drummond Depo., p. 29-3 2. Plaintiff states there is a culture within the department to hire whomever they want r egardless of whether the individual is qualified. Id. at p. 89. Plaintiff claims that Palmer was selected because Hammond and Horton had a pre-existing social relationship with Palmer. Id. at pp. 51- 52. Despite these contentions that Palmer had a social relatio nship with Hammond and Horton, Palmer states she knew Hammond from her previous employ ment at CoreCivicCase No. 2020-00161JD -8- DECISION

and she only knew Horton from her employment at OSP. Palmer De po., pp. 12-13. Similarly, Plaintiff states that she felt she was not selected because she was not friends

with Horton. Id. at p. 79; see also Bowen Depo., Ex. 37, 39. However, Hammond recalled Plaintiff not performing well in her interview because she struggled answering questions and seemed extremely nervous. Hammond Depo., pp. 52- 55. {¶13} Additionally, Plaintiff believes the interview panel saw her as an older,

African American who has been with OSP awhile and she should “m ove aside and let someone else have the job”, such as Palmer, who is a younger, w hite applicant who was “just starting out with her family”. Id. at pp. 57-58. Plaintiff claims that the interview panelists discriminated against her and selected Palmer “just b ecause they could.” Id. at p.83-87. Specifically, Plaintiff believes that Lipperman an d Horton racially discriminated against her because they are white males and woul d believe Palmer was more entitled to the PA2 position because she is white. Id. at p. 54. {¶14} However, Plaintiff admits that these are her personal beliefs, and she does not have any first-hand knowledge of the thoughts of the interv iew panelists. Id . at p. 58. Additionally, Plaintiff states that she is aware that Ward en Bowen made the final recommendation regarding Palmer’s appointment to the PA2 positi on, and she admits that she does not believe Bowen discriminated against her becau se of her race or age.

Id. at pp. 57, 61. Plaintiff also admits that no one from the inte rview panel made any comments regarding her age or race. Id. at pp. 51, 53, 54, 58. Moreover, Plaintiff claims that when she asked Horton and Hammond why Palmer was se lected for the PA2 position over her, they both stated that Palmer had more ex perience and brought more experience from the outside. Id. at pp. 66, 68. {¶15} Following Palmer’s appointment to the PA2 position, Palmer did not start the job immediately because she was on medical leave due to her pregnancy. Bowen Depo., pp. 56-57, Ex. 30; Horton Depo., pp. 45-50; Palmer Depo. , p.10. While Palmer was on medical leave, Horton appointed Plaintiff to a Temporary Work LevelCase No. 2020-00161JD -9- DECISION

assignment as the Program Administrator 2 from August 2018 to N ovember 2018. Complaint, ¶ 4; Horton Depo., p. 52; Bowen Depo., p. 60; Drummo nd Depo., p. 26; see Lipperman Depo., Ex. 28. Plaintiff believes she was offered th is assignment because “they know that they should have given me the job in the first place.” Drummond Depo., p. 26. However, Bowen stated that Horton offered Plaintiff the assignment so that she could get more experience. Drummond Depo., p. 69; Bowen Depo., p. 60. Nevertheless, Horton stated that Plaintiff was able to perform the duties of the temporary work level assignment. Horton Depo., pp. 52-53.

Law and Analysis {¶16} R.C. 4112.02 provides, in pertinent part, that: “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice: (A) For any employer, because of the r ace, color, * * * age * * * of any person, to discharge without just cause, to refuse to hi re, or otherwise to discriminate against that person with respect to hire, tenure, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, or any other matter directly or indir ectly related to employment.” Generally, Ohio courts look to federal anti-discr imination case law when examining employment discrimination cases made under state law. Nelson v. Univ. of

Cincinnati , 10th Dist. Franklin No. 16AP-224, 2017-Ohio-514, ¶ 31. “‘To prevail in an employment discrimination case, a plaintiff must prove discrimi natory intent’ and may establish such intent through either direct or indirect methods of proof.” Dautartas v. Abbott Labs., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 11AP-706, 2012-Ohio-1709, ¶ 25, quoting Ricker

v. John Deere Ins. Co., 133 Ohio App.3d 759, 766 (10th Dist.1998). In this case, Plaintiff seeks to establish discriminatory intent through the indirect method, which is subject to the burden shifting analysis established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Nist v. Nexeo Solutions, LLC, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 14AP-854, 2015-Ohio-3363, ¶ 31. “Under McDonnell Douglas , a plaintiff must first present evidence from which a reasonable [trier of fact] could conclude that there existsCase No. 2020-00161JD -10- DECISION

a prima facie case of discrimination.” Turner v. Shahed Ents., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 10AP-892, 2011-Ohio-4654, ¶ 11-12. {¶17} The same prima facie and burden-shifting analysis is used in de termining both age and race discrimination. Howard v. Contech Constr. Prods. , 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2003-01-018, 2003-Ohio-6546, citing Plumbers & Steamfitters Joint Apprenticeship Commt. v. Ohio Civ. Rights Comm. , 66 Ohio St.2d 192, 421 N.E.2d 128 (1981). Plaintiff must show that she: (1) was a member of a pr otected class at the time of the alleged discrimination; (2) was subjected to an adverse employment action; (3) was otherwise qualified for the position; and, (4) that after P laintiff was rejected, a person who did not belong to the protected class was selected. McDonnell Douglas Corp. at 802. With respect to age discrimination claims, the statut orily protected class is 40 years of age or older. See R.C. 4112.14(A). “If the plaintiff meets her initial burden,

the burden then shifts to the defendant to offer ‘evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for’ the adverse action.” Turner

, supra , at ¶ 14. {¶18} “The employer meets its burden of production by submitting admi ssible

evidence that ‘ taken as true, would permit the conclusion that there was a nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action,’ and in doing so rebuts the presumption of discrimination that the prima facie case establi shes.” You v. Ne. Ohio

Med. Univ. , 10th Dist. Franklin No. 17AP-426, 2018-Ohio-4838, ¶ 46, quoti ng St. Mary’s

Honor Ctr. v. Hicks , 509 U.S. 502, 509 (1993). “If the defendant meets its burden , the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that th e defendant’s proffered reason was actually a pretext for unlawful discrimination.” Turner, supra , at ¶ 14. {¶19} Upon review, Plaintiff has established that she was a 58-year-o ld, African American female when she applied for the PA2 position with Defe ndant; that she was qualified for the position and selected for an interview; and t hat Abbey Palmer, a 33- year-old, white female, was selected for the position. The Cou rt notes that, although neither the job applications nor the other Civ.R. 56 evidence p rovided definitiveCase No. 2020-00161JD -11- DECISION

demographic information regarding the race or age of plaintiff, Palmer, or the other applicants, Defendant does not dispute that Plaintiff can estab lish her prima facie case for either her race or age discrimination claims. Therefore, v iewing the record in a light most favorable to plaintiff, the Court finds that Plaintiff has stated a prima facie case of employment discrimination based on race and age. {¶20} The burden of production then shifts to Defendant to demonstrat e a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for not selecting Plaintif f for the PA2 job position. Here, Defendant claims that it selected Palmer to fill the PA2 position because Palmer performed the best in her interview process. All three intervi ew panelists—Horton, Lipperman, and Hammond—unanimously agreed that Palmer had the b est interview and recommended her for the PA2 position. Lipperman specifical ly recalled Palmer stood out because of her previous managerial experience with de veloping new policies at a private prison and her work with staff ethics. Additional ly, Hammond recalled that Plaintiff struggled to answer questions in her interview. Then , after a discussion with the interview panelists, Warden Bowen ultimately recommended Pa lmer be appointed to the PA2 position based on her experience and education, whic h was approved by Regional Director Ishee. Thus, the Court finds that Defendant has shown a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for not hiring Plaintiff for the PA2 p osition. {¶21} Now, the burden shifts back to Plaintiff to establish that Defe ndant’s reasons for selecting Palmer for the PA2 position were pretext for unlawful discrimination. In seeking summary judgment, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s employment discrimination claims fail as a matter of law becaus e Plaintiff provided no evidence to show that Defendant’s nondiscriminatory reason for selecting Palmer was pretext for discrimination. In response, Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s motion should be denied because a genuine issue of material fact exists regar ding whether Palmer was qualified to be selected for an interview. Specifically, P laintiff contends that Palmer was not qualified because she had a degree unrelated to the edu cation required by theCase No. 2020-00161JD -12- DECISION

stated minimum qualifications and Palmer embellished her auditi ng experience on her application, which indicates Defendant’s reasons for selecting Palmer were pretext for discrimination. The Court disagrees. {¶22} Although the Court acknowledges that there was an initial disag reement regarding Palmer’s qualification for an interview, the disagree ment was ultimately resolved when Fullen reviewed Palmer’s qualifications and made the final decision to include Palmer in the interview list. With specific regard to Palmer’s education, Palmer stated that she believed her sociology degree satisfied the min imum qualifications. While Palmer’s degree in sociology does not appear on its face to unequivocally be an “undergraduate program in business administration, management s cience or public administration,” the Court finds that this is an imprecise stan dard and does not support finding that Defendant’s reasoning for selecting Palmer was pre textual absent additional evidence. Additionally, Lipperman recommended other applicants for an interview despite noting that their educational degrees were unrelated, o ne of which Plaintiff acknowledged could have been selected over her for the PA2 posi tion because Plaintiff believed her to be qualified for the job. Furthermore, Plainti ff provides no evidence

besides her own belief that P almer embellished her auditing exp erience in her application. Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not produced evidence sufficient to reasonably doubt the employer’s explanation for s electing Palmer. See Ceglia v. Youngstown State Univ. , 2015-Ohio-2125, 38 N.E.3d 1222, ¶ 27 (10th Dist.). {¶23} Once Palmer was included among the qualified candidates to be interviewed, Defendant had the discretion to use its subjective judgment “to choose among equally qualified candidates, provided the decision is no t based upon unlawful

criteria.” See Rafaei v. Ohio State Univ. Hosp. , 10th Dist. Franklin No. 10AP-1193, 2011-Ohio-6727, ¶ 33. As explained above, Defendant has establ ished that it has a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for selecting Palmer for t he PA2 position. Although Plaintiff states that it is her belief that the interview panel ists discriminated against herCase No. 2020-00161JD -13- DECISION

“just because they could,” she provides no evidence to support these contentions. Indeed, Plaintiff contends that Palmer was really selected base d on her pre-existing relationships with both Horton and Hammond. While the Court ac knowledges that Palmer did know Hammond prior to applying for the PA2 position, there is no evidence that Palmer had a social relationship with either Hammond or Ho rton outside the workplace. Additionally, there is no evidence that Palmer had any kind of prior relationship with the individuals from defendant’s central offi ce who selected which applicants would get an interview. Even if such evidence was p resent, an employer may “make hiring decisions based on its familiarity and persona l relationships with

candidates.” McDaniels v. Plymouth-Canton Cmty. Sch., 755 Fed.Appx.461, 470 (6th Cir.2018). Thus, Plaintiff cannot establish an inference of di scrimination based on race or age with her perceptions of favoritism. See Morris v. Shinseki , 18 F.Supp.3d 923, 9634-935 (S.D.Ohio 2014); Thomas v. McDonald , 169 F.Supp.3d 170, 185 (D.D.C.2016); Potts v. Catholic Diocese , 159 Ohio App.3d 315, 2004-Ohio- 6815, 823 N.E.2d 917, ¶ 26 (7th Dist.). Additionally, when Plaintiff ask ed those on the interview panel why Palmer was selected for the position instead of her, Plaintiff stated that they told her that it was based on Palmer’s outside experience. Mor eover, Plaintiff admitted that neither Horton, Hammond nor Lipperman made any remarks reg arding her race or age. Furthermore, Plaintiff acknowledged that Warden Bowen mad e the final decision regarding which candidate would be appointed to the PA2 positio n, and Plaintiff

admitted that she did not believe Warden Bowen would discrimina te against her. {¶24} Plaintiff has provided no other argument or Civ.R. 56 evidence to demonstrate that Defendant’s decision to select Palmer was pret extual. See Boggs v.

Scotts Co. , 10th Dist. Franklin No. 04AP-425, 2005-Ohio-1264, ¶ 10 (“To establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact, the non-moving p arty must do more than simply resist the allegations in the motion.”). Consequently, the Court finds that, even construing the evidence most strongly in favor of Plaintiff, no genuine issue of materialCase No. 2020-00161JD -14- DECISION

fact exists as to pretext. Accordingly, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is

GRANTED.

PATRICK E. SHEERAN Jud g e[Cite as Drummond v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr. , 2021-Ohio-2408.]

{¶25} A non-oral hearing was conducted in this case upon Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth in the decision fi led concurrently herewith, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED an d judgment is rendered in favor of Defendant. All previously scheduled event s are VACATED. Court costs are assessed against Plaintiff. The clerk shall serve up on all parties notice of this judgment and its date of entry upon the journal.

PATRICK E. SHEERAN Jud g e

Filed May 24, 2021 Sent to S.C. Reporter 7/14/21 DEBRA DRUMMOND

Plaintiff

v.

OHIO DEPARTMENT OF REHABILITATION AND CORRECTION

Defendant Case No. 2020-00161JD

Judge Patrick E. Sheeran Magistrate Holly True Shaver

JUDGMENT ENTRY