1 10-5116-pr Covington v. New York City Police Department et al. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 

### SUMMARY ORDER Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Ci tation to a summary order filed on or after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate Pr ocedure 32.1 and this court’s Lo cal Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a document filed with this court, a pa rty must cite either the Federal Appendix or an electronic database (with the notation “summary order”). A party citinga summary order must serve a copy of it on any party not represented by counsel. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the 1 Daniel Patrick Moynihan United St ates Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street , in the City of New York, on 2 the 27 thday of March, two thousand twelve. 3 Present: 4 JOSEPH M. McLAUGHLIN, 5 ROBERT D. SACK, 6 DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, 7 Circuit Judges

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_____________________________________________ 9 RONNIE COVINGTON, 10 Plaintiff-Appellant , 11 v. No. 10-5116-pr 12 NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al., 13 Defendants-Appellee s. 14

_____________________________________________ 15 For Plaintiff-Appellant: RONNIE C OVINGTON, pro se, Romulus, N.Y. 16
For Defendants-Appellees: SCOTT SHORR, Seni or Counsel, Appeals Division (Michael A. 17 Cardozo, Corporation Counsel of the City of New York, and 18 Francis F. Caputo, on the brief ), for Michael A. Cardozo, 19 Corporation Counsel of the Cityof New York, New York, N.Y. 202 Appeal from a judgment of the United States Di strict Court for the Eastern District of New 1 York (Gleeson, J. ). 2 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION , it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED , and DECREED 3 that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED

. 4 Plaintiff-Appellant Ronnie Covi ngton (“Covington”), proceeding pro se , appeals from a 5 November 16, 2010 judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New 6 York (Gleeson, J. ), on remand from this court, dismissing his false arrest claim brought pursuant to 7 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts, proceedings below, and 8 specification of issues on appeal. 9 Upon de novoreview, see Shakur v. Selsky , 391 F.3d 106, 112 (2d Cir. 2004), we find that 10 the district court correctly concluded, under Wallace v. Kato , 549 U.S. 384, 388-89 (2007), that the 11 statute of limitations for Covington’s false arre st claim accrued on February 19, 1990, the date he 12 was arrested and formally charged. Covington’s claim, which is deemed filed on June 2, 1994, is 13 therefore time-barred, unless equitable tolling applies. 14 Contrary to Covington’s argument, this case does not present rare and exceptional 15 circumstances that would warrant equitable tolling of the statute of limitations for his false arrest 16 claim. See Walker v. Jastremski , 430 F.3d 560, 564 (2d Cir. 2005) (expl aining that we have applied 17 equitable tolling only in “rare and exceptional circumstances, where we found that extraordinary 18 circumstances prevented a party from timely performing a required act, and that the party acted with 19 reasonable diligence throughout the period he sought to toll”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 20 The record here reveals no extraordinary circ umstances that prevented the timely filing of 21 Covington’s false arrest claim. Covington could have filed a complaint asserting the false arrest 223 claim after his 1990 arrest, or even after the 1991 dismissal of the case, which would have been 1 within the limitations period estab lished by then-controlling case law. See Singleton v. City of New 2 York , 632 F.2d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 1980) (concluding that th e date plaintiff was arrested was the date 3 on which his claim for false arrest accrued, as that was “the time at which plaintiff knew of [the] 4 injury” serving as the basis for his claim). Further, Covington did not act with reasonable diligence 5 in pursuit of his claim, but instead commenced his action nearly three years after his criminal case 6 was dismissed. 7 Because Covington cannot demonstrate that equitable tolling is justified in this case, his false 8 arrest claim is time-barred and the district court properly dismissed it. Accordingly, it is hereby 9 ORDERED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED

. 10 To the extent that Covington moves to petition for panel rehearing of this court’s 1998 order 11 denying reinstatement of all of C ovington’s claims other than his cl aim for false arrest, that motion 12 is hereby DENIED . A petition for panel rehearing must be filed within 14 days after entry of the 13 challenged order. SeeFed. R. App. P. 40(a)(1). Covington did not file the present motion until 14 August 2011, which is well past the permissible time to do so, and he offers no explanation that 15 would excuse that delinquency. 16 FOR THE COURT: 17 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk 18 19