United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Argued November 15, 2006

Decided November 22, 2006

Before

Hon. WILLIAM J. BAUER , Circuit Judge

 Hon. DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge

Hon. TERENCE T. EVANS, Circuit Judge

No. 05-4386

OMAR A. OROZCO, et al.,

Petitioners,

v.

ALBERTO R. GONZALES, Attorney

General of the United States,

Respondent.

Petition for Review of an Order of

the Board of Immigration Appeals

Nos. A95 592 040 - A95 592 044

ORDER

Omar Orozco, with his wife and three daughters, petition for review of the

Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision to deny his application for asylum,

withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. 

Because the IJ’s findings that Orozco was incredible and that the incidents he

recounted did not rise to the level of persecution are supported by substantial

evidence, we deny the petition. 

Orozco, a Colombian national, entered the United States on a six-month visa

in May 2001. His wife, Josephina Onate, and their three daughters entered the

United States also on six-month visas in December 2001. The family remained in

the United States past their visas’ expirations. In May 2002, Orozco sought

UNPUBLISHED ORDER

Not to be cited per Circuit Rule 53
No. 05-4386 Page 2

*

“Sapo” is a pejorative term that literally means frog but is used to describe a

collaborator or a snitch. 

asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under CAT with his wife and daughters

as riders on his application. Orozco contends that he was persecuted and will likely

face future persecution from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC,

the “Fuerzas Armadas de Colombia”), a left-wing guerilla group, that targets rightwing groups, politicians, professionals, and landowners. He believes he was

targeted on account of both his status as a veterinarian who assists wealthy cattle

ranchers in the rural state of Cesar (his wife also owns Santa Rita, one of the

largest ranches in Cesar) and his membership in the Liberal Party (one of the two

ruling parties in the Colombian government). Since the 1990s, he has attended

Liberal Party meetings, hosted one in his home, and often discussed Liberal Party

politics with ranchers, encouraging them to vote for Liberal Party candidates.

Orozco testified that he had several threatening encounters with FARC. He

testified that: (1) in the 1990s he was stopped a couple of times a year and asked to

show his identity papers at illegal FARC checkpoints (roadblocks manned by FARC

guerillas) when making his veterinary rounds in Cesar; (2) in 2000 FARC guerillas

entered a farm where he was working, would not allow anyone on the farm to leave

for several hours, questioned him about his work as a veterinarian, and told him his

life would be in danger if he returned to the farm; (3) in February 2001 an unknown

man (purportedly a FARC guerilla) approached him at Santa Rita and told him that

another unknown person wanted to speak to him; and (4) in May 2001, he received

two threatening phone calls (also purportedly from FARC). In the first of the two 

calls, an unidentified man said, “Be careful sapo* because we are going to kill you.” 

And two days later, the same male voice called and warned, “Watch it son of a bitch

because we are going to kill you.” He reported the calls to the police, went to

Bogota3 for two weeks, and then fled to the United States.

Orozco’s wife also testified. She stated that in August of 2001, a worker at

Santa Rita told her that several FARC guerillas entered the ranch in the afternoon,

asked for Orozco, and then stole hundreds of heads of cattle. Her family sold the

ranch out of fear in 2004.

The Immigration Judge denied Orozco’s petition for asylum. He found

Orozco’s claim unconvincing and not credible due to several “material”

discrepancies between his affidavit and his oral testimony. For example, the IJ

noted Orozco’s explanation in his affidavit that, “I often had my Liberal Party card

in my wallet and, when [FARC guerillas] saw it, I had to listen to their lectures

about why the Liberal Party’s ideologies were wrong.” But at his removal hearing,

Orozco twice denied carrying a Liberal Party card while in Colombia, and admitted
No. 05-4386 Page 3

that the statement in his affidavit was a “confusion.” The IJ found that this

inconsistency discredited Orozco’s assertion that he was persecuted on account of

his political opinion. The IJ then found that regardless of Orozco’s credibility, the

threats and incidences he described were not severe enough to amount to past

persecution or support a well-founded fear of future persecution. Nor did Orozco

establish, the IJ added, that the threats he received were on account of his

membership in a “social group.” The IJ concluded that “veterinarians who assist

wealthy cattle ranchers” do not qualify as a social group under the Immigration and

Nationality Act because they do not share immutable characteristics or

characteristics fundamental to their identities.

The BIA issued a short opinion in which it explained that it “affirm[s] the

decision of the immigration judge with the exception of her [sic, the IJ Robert

Vinikoor, is a “him”] statement regarding the burden of proof.” The BIA concluded

that the IJ’s adverse credibility finding was not clearly erroneous, and that even

had Orozco been credible, the unfulfilled threats he recounted failed to constitute

past persecution or support a well-founded fear of future persecution.

On appeal, Orozco challenges only the IJ’s denial of his petition for asylum;

therefore we need not consider whether the IJ properly found him ineligible for

withholding of removal or for relief under CAT. See Wang v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d

993, 997 (7th Cir. 2006). We review an asylum claim under the deferential

“substantial evidence” standard, which means that after considering the record as a

whole, if we find “reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence” supporting the

IJ’s decision, we must affirm. Feto v. Gonzales, 433 F.3d 907, 911 (7th Cir. 2006). 

To reverse, the evidence must compel a different conclusion, see Prela v. Ashcroft,

394 F.3d 515, 518 (7th Cir. 2005); a simple difference of opinion will not suffice. 

Capric v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1075, 1086 (7th Cir. 2004).

Orozco argues that the inconsistencies in his testimony that the IJ identified

were too minor and immaterial to support an adverse credibility finding. Orozco

contends that since the record was replete with evidence of his political activity, the

IJ should not have discredited his claim that he was being targeted on account of

his political opinion merely because of the “misunderstanding” over the Liberal

Party card.

An IJ must support credibility findings with “specific, cogent reasons” that

have a “legitimate nexus to the finding.” Giday v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 543, 550 (7th

Cir. 2006). Minor inconsistencies are not a proper basis for an adverse credibility

finding, Uwase v. Ashcroft, 349 F.3d 1039, 1043 (7th Cir. 2003); rather, the

discrepancies must go to the heart of an applicant’s claim. Giday, 434 F.3d at 550.
No. 05-4386 Page 4

Here the IJ cogently supported his conclusion that the inconsistencies in

Orozco’s testimony were material to his claims. As the IJ explained, the heart of

Orozco’s claim hinges on FARC’s knowledge of his affiliation with the Liberal Party. 

But Orozco has not pointed to anything in the record other than his discredited

statement regarding his Liberal Party card to show that FARC was even aware of

his political opinions. His political activities over the last 15 years were fairly

minor; they consisted mostly of informally speaking with farmers to encourage

them to vote for the Liberal Party.

Orozco next argues that even if the IJ found this aspect of his testimony not

to be credible, other evidence in the record still established that he was persecuted

in the past or had a well-founded fear of future persecution. Without elaboration,

he insists that the unfulfilled threats he described receiving, coupled with the

evidence he submitted demonstrating FARC’s sophistication, should have compelled

the IJ to conclude that he had been persecuted.

An applicant for asylum bears the burden to establish that he has been

persecuted in the past or has a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of

race, religion, nationality, membership in a social group, or political opinion. 8

U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A); Sosnovskaia v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 589, 593 (7th Cir. 2005). 

We have repeatedly explained that persecution “must rise above the level of

harassment.” Pela v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 515, 518 (7th Cir. 2005); Nakibuka v.

Gonzales, 421 F.3d 473, 476 (7th Cir. 2005). Although we have not foreclosed the

possibility that extraordinary threats—those “of a most immediate and menacing

nature”—might in themselves amount to persecution, “in general, unfulfilled

threats do not.” Hernandez-Baena v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 720, 723 (7th Cir. 2005).

The IJ properly concluded that the unfulfilled threats Orozco received were

not severe enough to amount to persecution. The threats were few in number,

spread out over several years, involved no physical contact, and were never acted

upon. In fact, the facts of this case strikingly resemble those in Hernandez-Baena,

where we recently concluded that verbal “death warrants” from FARC did not

amount to persecution. Hernandez-Baena, 417 F.2d at 723. Even much more

severe conduct has been held not to compel a finding of persecution. See, e.g.,

Dandan v. Ashcroft, 339 F.3d 567, 573-74 (7th Cir. 2003) (detention for three days

without food and beatings that caused facial swelling); Prela, 394 F.3d at 518

(multiple interrogations by police, detention for twenty-four hours, harassment for

money, and beating that injured hands).

And in support of his claim that he established a well-founded fear of future

persecution, Orozco offers nothing more than his bare assertion that FARC will

continue targeting him if he returns to Colombia. But past conduct that does not

constitute persecution cannot form the basis for a well-founded fear of future

persecution. Ciorba v. Ashcroft, 323 F.3d 539, 545-46 (7th Cir. 2003).
No. 05-4386 Page 5

Orozco finally contends that the IJ and the BIA incorrectly concluded that he

was not (or will not be) targeted on account of his membership in a “social group.” 

Specifically, he argues that the BIA failed to consider his circumstances in light of

Tapiero de Orejuela v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2005), where we held that

“educated, landowning cattle farmers” constituted a social group being persecuted

by FARC. See id. at 672. But Orozco failed to establish that the threats he received

amounted to persecution or support a well-founded fear of future

persecution—regardless of whatever enumerated class he considers himself a part

of—and thus we need not consider this argument further. Moreover, Tapiero de

Orejuela is distinguishable because Orozco himself insisted that he was not

targeted on account of his family’s status. He stated in his affidavit that “being

associated with [his wife’s family] was not enough to warrant FARC attention, for

none of [her] family ever experienced FARC threats personally.”

Orozco’s other arguments have been considered but do not require discussion. 

The petition for review is DENIED.