Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 108 / Tuesday, June 4, 1996 / Rules and Regulations 28423

1The other type of booster seat is the ‘‘belt

positioning seat,’’ which is intended for use by

children weighing from 30 to 60 pounds, and

designed for use with a lap/shoulder belt system.

2The ‘‘belt positioning’’ booster seat is not

eligible for such certification. FMVSS No. 213 does

not permit these restraints to be certified for aircraft

use because aircraft passenger seats typically lack

shoulder belts. See amendment of FMVSS 213 to

permit manufacture of belt-positioning child seats

(59 FR 37167; July 21, 1994).

(3) This section does not prohibit the

certificate holder from providing child

restraint systems authorized by this or,

consistent with safe operating practices,

determining the most appropriate

passenger seat location for the child

restraint system.

Issued in Washington, D.C., on May 24,

1996.

David R. Hinson,

Administrator.

[FR Doc. 96–13771 Filed 6–3–96; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–13–M

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

National Highway Traffic Safety

Administration

49 CFR Part 571

[Docket No. 74–09; Notice 45]

RIN 2127–AF46

Federal Motor Vehicle Safety

Standards; Child Restraint Systems

AGENCY: National Highway Traffic

Safety Administration (NHTSA),

Department of Transportation.

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: This rule, and a companion

rule issued by the Federal Aviation

Administration (FAA), address the use

of child harnesses and backless child

restraints in aircraft. This document

amends a provision in Federal Motor

Vehicle Safety Standard No. 213, ‘‘Child

Restraint Systems,’’ that permits those

restraints to be certified for use in both

motor vehicles and aircraft.

Under the current FAA regulations,

aircraft-certified child restraints may be

used on aircraft. However, because

testing has raised FAA’s concerns about

the safety of using harnesses and

backless child restraint systems on the

types of seats found in aircraft, FAA is

publishing a rule in today’s Federal

Register that prohibits the use of booster

seats, and vest- and harness-type child

restraint systems on aircraft during take

off, landing and movement on the

surface, even if these restraints are

certified for aircraft use.

In view of the FAA’s determination

that harnesses and booster seats are

unsuitable for use during significant

portions of a flight, the agency believes

continuing to permit the certification of

those restraints for aircraft use would be

inconsistent and likely confusing to the

public. Accordingly, this rule no longer

permits those restraints to be certified

for aircraft use, and instead requires

manufacturers to label these restraints

as not certified for use in aircraft.

DATES: This rule is effective on

September 3, 1996.

Petitions for reconsideration of the

rule must be received by July 19, 1996.

ADDRESSES: Petitions for reconsideration

should refer to the docket and number

of this document and be submitted to:

Administrator, Room 5220, National

Highway Traffic Safety Administration,

400 Seventh Street SW., Washington,

D.C., 20590.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For

nonlegal issues: Dr. George Mouchahoir,

Office of Vehicle Safety Standards

(telephone 202–366–4919, fax 202–366–

4329). For legal issues: Ms. Deirdre

Fujita, Office of the Chief Counsel

(telephone 202–366–2992, fax 202–366–

3820). Both can be reached at the

National Highway Traffic Safety

Administration, 400 Seventh Street SW.,

Washington, D.C., 20590. For

information on FAA’s rule, contact Ms.

Donell Pollard (AFS–203), Air

Transportation Division, Flight

Standards Service (telephone 202–267–

3735), Federal Aviation Administration,

800 Independence Avenue SW.,

Washington, D.C., 20591.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This

document amends the provision in

Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard

No. 213, ‘‘Child Restraint Systems,’’ that

permits child restraint systems to be

certified for use in both motor vehicles

and aircraft. This rule complements an

FAA rule, published elsewhere in

today’s Federal Register, that withdraws

approval for the use of booster seats and

vest- and harness-type child restraint

systems on aircraft, and prohibits

airlines from permitting a child to be

restrained in such a restraint during take

off, landing, and movement on the

surface, even if the restraint is certified

for aircraft use. The notice of proposed

rulemaking (NPRM) on which this

NHTSA rule is based was published at

60 FR 30696 (June 9, 1995).

Harnesses and booster seats are types

of child restraint systems regulated by

Standard 213. A harness typically

consists of a vest or a series of straps

that form a vest-like garment, that

attaches at the back of the harness to a

vehicle seat’s lap belt. Harnesses are

generally intended for children who

weigh from 25 to 50 pounds. Some

require the use of a tether strap to

supplement the lap belt. The restraint

that the FAA refers to as a ‘‘booster

seat’’ is a ‘‘backless child restraint

system’’ under Standard 213. (See

definitions of ‘‘booster seat’’ and

‘‘backless child restraint system’’ in S4

of FMVSS 213.) A ‘‘backless child

restraint system’’ is one of two types of

booster seat.1 A backless child restraint

has a structural element (typically a

shield) designed to restrain forward

motion of the child’s torso in a frontal

crash. Backless child restraint systems

are generally intended for children

weighing from 30 to 60 pounds.

Backless child restraint systems are also

known as ‘‘backless booster seats’’ or

‘‘shield-type’’ booster seats.

Background

Standard 213 permits manufacturers

to certify their restraints 2 for aircraft use

if they are certified for use in motor

vehicles and meet an additional

requirement, an inversion test. The

provisions permitting such certification

were added to the standard in 1984 (49

FR 34357; August 30, 1984), partly in

response to suggestions of the National

Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) that

DOT simplify its standards for the

performance of child restraints on

aircraft by combining all technical

requirements into a single standard

(NTSB Safety Recommendations A–83–

1, February 24, 1983). Prior to the

amendment, FAA had its own child

restraint standard, Technical Standard

Order C100 (TSO C100). TSO C100 and

FMVSS 213 had different performance

requirements, methods of certification

and testing procedures.

In the 1984 rulemaking, NHTSA and

FAA concluded that the DOT child

restraint requirements should be

consolidated in FMVSS 213 and that a

TSO C100 inversion test was the only

performance requirement from the FAA

standard that needed to be incorporated

into FMVSS 213. In the inversion test,

the combination of a child restraint, test

dummy and aircraft passenger seat is

rotated forward at a specified speed to

an inverted position and held there, and

later rotated sideways at the same speed

and held. During the test, the child

restraint must not fall out of the aircraft

safety belt and the test dummy must not

fall out of the child restraint.

Prior to the 1984 rulemaking, a

manufacturer wishing to designate a

child restraint model as suitable for use

in aircraft had to submit information to

FAA to obtain its approval of the model.

As a result of this pre-1984 approval

process, there was a disparity between

the number of child restraints available
28424 Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 108 / Tuesday, June 4, 1996 / Rules and Regulations

3Belly belts restrain a small child on the lap of

an adult and consist of a short loop of webbing with

buckle hardware on the ends. The belt is buckled

around the child’s abdomen and is secured to the

adult’s safety belt by routing the adult’s safety belt

through a small loop of webbing sewn on the belly

belt. Belly belts are certified for airplane use by the

Civil Aviation Authority of the United Kingdom.

However, belly belts cannot meet the performance

requirements of FMVSS 213 and therefore have not

been certified for use in the United States.

for use in motor vehicles and the

number available for use in aircraft. In

1984, approximately 28 models of child

restraints were produced under FMVSS

213 for use in motor vehicles. The child

restraint manufacturers obtained TSO

authorizations for only five of the 28

models, or only 16 percent of the total

production of child restraints.

The lack of FAA approval of most

motor vehicle child restraints for use in

aircraft aroused several safety concerns.

One was that some families traveling by

air were discouraged from taking

unapproved child restraints with them

and thus did not have them available for

use at their destination to protect their

children while the family was driving.

The other concern was that those

families who nevertheless took their

unapproved child restraints on trips had

to stow the restraints in the aircraft

cargo compartment, and thus were not

able to use them to protect their

children during the flight.

The effect of the 1984 rulemaking was

to speed certification of child restraints

for use in aircraft, and thereby increase

the availability of aircraft-certified child

restraints. Since then, manufacturers

have been able, under FMVSS 213, to

certify their child restraints for aircraft

use by ensuring that they pass all of the

standard’s motor vehicle requirements

and the inversion test. As a result, there

has been a tremendous increase in the

number of child restraints certified for

use in aircraft.

FAA complemented NHTSA’s

rulemaking by amending its Federal

Aviation Regulations (FARs)(14 CFR

Parts 91, 121, 125 and 135) to provide

for the in-flight use of aircraft-certified

child restraints. The amendments

required the air carriers to allow the use

of any child restraint having a label

indicating that it is certified to FMVSS

213, manufactured under the standards

of the United Nations, or approved by

a foreign government, as long as the

restraint can be secured to a forwardfacing passenger seat. An infant or child

who is accompanied by a parent,

guardian, or properly designated

attendant and who is properly placed in

a device that meets the labeling

requirements of the FARs and that, in

turn, is properly secured in an approved

aircraft seat using the safety belt, has

been considered by FAA to comply with

its regulations requiring each person to

occupy an approved seat during takeoff

and landing.

There are currently many different

types of child restraint systems that are

certified as complying with FMVSS

213’s motor vehicle and aircraft

requirements, and thus permitted by

FAA for use on aircraft. In addition to

harnesses and shield boosters, these

systems included ‘‘infant seats,’’ which

position an infant so that the baby faces

toward the rear of the motor vehicle or

aircraft; and ‘‘convertible’’ child seats,

which convert so that they can be used

rear-facing with infants and forwardfacing with toddlers. In addition, there

are restraint systems that are certified

for use in airplanes by foreign countries.

FAA Withdrawal of Approval

Elsewhere in today’s Federal Register,

FAA is withdrawing approval for the

use of booster seats and vest- and

harness-type child restraint systems on

aircraft, and prohibiting airlines from

permitting a child to be restrained in

such a restraint during take off, landing,

and movement on the surface. The FAA

is also emphasizing the existing

prohibition in all aircraft against the use

of lap held child restraints, such as belly

belts.3

FAA’s action responds to research by

its Civil Aeromedical Institute (CAMI).

The CAMI research is discussed in a

report entitled, ‘‘The Performance of

Child Restraint Devices in Transport

Airplane Passenger Seats,’’ a copy of

which has been placed in NHTSA

rulemaking docket 74–09, notice 41.

(Persons wishing to obtain a copy of the

report should contact FAA at the

address given in the ‘‘For Further

Information’’ section at the beginning of

this final rule document.) CAMI

dynamically tested six types of

restraining devices: child harnesses,

booster seats, rear-facing infant seats,

convertible child restraint systems,

airplane seat lap belts, and belly belts.

The first four devices were evaluated for

their ability to fit and adjust to an

airplane passenger seat and lap belt. The

lap belt was evaluated for its ability to

secure test dummies representative of

children two and three years old. Fit

and adjustment was not considered an

issue for the installation of the belly

belt. All of the devices were evaluated

for their performance in aircraft seats

with and without ‘‘breakover’’ seat

backs (a breakover feature allows the

seat back to rotate forward easily when

impacted by an occupant from behind).

They were also evaluated, using

anthropomorphic test dummies

representing children, for their ability to

limit occupant head excursion, head

and chest accelerations and abdominal

forces. In addition, the test program

evaluated the effect that the impact load

of an ‘‘aft row occupant’’ had on the

performance of a child restraint located

in an aircraft seat immediately in front

of the aft row occupant. The aft row

occupant impact load was generated in

tests called ‘‘double row tests,’’ using an

adult test dummy placed in the aft row

seat.

Booster Seat Tests

CAMI tested four models of shieldtype booster seats in six dynamic tests,

three of which involved single row tests,

and the other three, double row tests.

With regard to fit and adjustment of the

booster seats to the airplane seat chosen

for testing purposes, CAMI found that

three had fit and adjustment problems.

One booster seat had problems fitting an

airplane seat because of the limited

width between arm rests on the

passenger seat. This may have occurred

because of the difference in width

between the representative aircraft seat

(about 20 inches wide) used in FMVSS

213 and the aircraft seat (17.25 inches

wide) used in the CAMI testing. Two

booster seats had incompatibility

problems between the buckle/webbing

path molded in the front shield and the

airplane web path and buckle position

of the lap belt on the airplane passenger

seat used by CAMI. In fact, the webbing

could not be installed over the front

shield in accordance with the

positioning instruction of the booster

seats’ manufacturers. CAMI also found

that one of the four booster seats failed

structurally, and two of the others

allowed forward head excursion in

excess of the 32-inch distance permitted

by FMVSS 213.

CAMI also found a problem with the

loads that the child dummies restrained

in the tested booster seats experienced

when the boosters were on a seat with

a breakover seat back and exposed to

loads from the aft row occupant. Its tests

showed that loads from an aft row adult

occupant resulted in an increase in

abdominal loading of the dummy in a

booster seat, as compared to the

abdominal loading of a dummy in an

aircraft lap belt with an adult aft-row

occupant. The CAMI study states that,

when placed in a seat with a breakover

seat back, the booster seat encounters

problems because:

With no back shell, the typical booster seat

does not provide protection from the forces

transmitted by the airplane seat back during

horizontal impact conditions. Traditionally,

restraint systems in airplanes have been

designed to avoid loads transmitted to the

soft tissues of the abdomen. A child
Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 108 / Tuesday, June 4, 1996 / Rules and Regulations 28425

4Child restraints certified as complying with

FMVSS 213’s aircraft requirements are currently

tested on a ‘‘representative aircraft passenger seat’’

(S7.3 of FMVSS 213). FMVSS 213 also specifies that

FAA approved aircraft safety belts are used to test

child restraints that are certified to the aircraft

requirements.

restrained in a booster seat may be forced

against the rigid shield due to the seat back

breakover action. For the intended size of

children in booster seats, the load path of

these breakover forces may include the

abdominal region.

It is to be noted that CAMI also found

that the abdominal loads on a child

dummy placed in a shield-type booster

seat secured to an airplane seat with a

locked seat back were higher than on a

child dummy secured in a typical

airplane seat lap belt with a locked seat

back. The FAA recognized, however,

that there are no accepted criteria to

assess the relationship between

differences in measured levels of

abdominal loadings and any resulting

risk of abdominal injury, and the type

and severity of such injury.

Harness Tests

CAMI tested one type of harness

restraint. The restraint consisted of a

torso vest with straps over the shoulders

and around the waist, and a crotch

strap. The shoulder and abdomen straps

were attached to a rectangular metal

plate on the back of the restraint. The

airplane lap belts were routed through

a loop of webbing attached to the metal

back plate on the restraint.

The restraint was tested with a threeyear-old test dummy in two single row

tests. CAMI found incompatibility

problems between the harness and the

airplane seat lap belts:

With the lap belts adjusted to the

minimum length, the [harness] could be

moved forward approximately 7 inches

before tension was developed in the belts.

This was considered unsatisfactory for

testing.

CAMI also found grossly excessive

excursion of the child anthropomorphic

test dummy (ATD) restrained in the

harness:

The ATD moved forward and over the front

edge of the seat cushion and proceeded to

submarine toward the floor. Elasticity in the

webbing of the harness and the lap belts then

heaved the ATD rearward. The force pulling

the ATD back into the seat appeared to be

applied by the Gz [crotch] strap directly

through the pubic symphysis of the pelvic

bone.

Based on this finding, CAMI

concluded that a harness performs

poorly in protecting the child occupant.

Proposal and Comments

Based on these test results, the FAA

proposed to withdraw approval for the

use of harnesses and booster seats on

aircraft. 60 FR 30690, June 9, 1995. At

the same time, NHTSA issued an NPRM

to amend FMVSS 213 to require

manufacturers to label harnesses and

backless booster seats as not for aircraft

use. The standard already requires that

belt-positioning booster seats be so

labeled. The agency issued the proposal

on the basis that, in view of the FAA’s

determination that harnesses and

booster seats are unsuitable for use

during significant portions of a flight,

continuing to permit the certification of

those restraints for aircraft use would be

inconsistent and likely confusing to the

public.

NHTSA received one comment on its

rulemaking proposal. The commenter

was the Air Transport Association of

America (ATA), representing its U.S.

passenger carrying airline members. The

ATA comment responded to both the

NHTSA and FAA proposals. FAA

received nine other comments on its

proposal.

With regard to ATA’s comment on the

agencies’ proposals, except as noted

below, ATA focused mainly on issues

relating to the proposed FAA provisions

for implementing the contemplated ban.

The commenter particularly directed its

comments toward what ATA believed

were potential difficulties the airlines

(‘‘carriers’’) may experience in enforcing

it. ATA believed carriers should not be

placed in the role of ‘‘policing

compliance’’ with the proposed

requirements, suggesting instead ‘‘a

more informational role.’’ ATA was

concerned that some passengers might

insist on using a banned restraint, and

might be confused by the fact that their

restraint might be certified for aircraft

use. (NHTSA’s rule will affect restraints

that are manufactured on or after the

effective date of the rule. Restraints that

were manufactured before the effective

date and that were certified for aircraft

use bear a label that the restraint is so

certified.) ATA stated that,

It has been the practice of several airlines

that when confronted with an appropriately

labeled device that is not actually approved

for use (e.g., belly belts) to advise the

passenger of that fact and to attempt to

discourage the use of the device. For the most

part, these efforts are successful. In the

unusual case, however, where a passenger

insists upon the use of the device (often

citing the ‘‘appropriate label’’ as allowing

this use) the practice is to avoid

confrontation and permit the use if that is the

only remaining alternative. In light of the

new increasing numbers of devices with

regard to which this type of experience is to

be expected, the rule obviously must take

into account the practicalities of this real

world experience and provide for this type of

situation without threat of penalty to the

carrier. (Emphasis in text.)

For FAA’s response to this and other

comments from the ATA on

requirements proposed by FAA, readers

should refer to the FAA final rule

(published concurrently with this rule,

in today’s Federal Register). That

document also discusses FAA’s

responses to the other nine comments

on its NPRM, including those from

industry groups, aviation authorities, air

carriers and child restraint

manufacturers.

ATA’s comment was pertinent to

NHTSA in two respects. First, it

provides support for NHTSA’s

rulemaking, in that it indicates that

confusion is not only likely, but has in

fact resulted from a discrepancy

between a manufacturer’s assertion

about the suitability of a restraint for

aircraft and the FAA’s determination

that it is not. By preventing

manufacturers from labeling booster

seats and harnesses as appropriate for

aircraft use, NHTSA’s rule will reduce

the potential for confusion to the extent

possible.

In addition, ATA also stated that it

believed that ‘‘before final action is

taken on this rulemaking,’’ FAA and

NHTSA must explain how this

rulemaking relates to a ‘‘larger issue.’’

While ATA was unclear defining the

‘‘larger issue,’’ it appears that ATA is

concerned about possible fit and

adjustment problems between the

airplane seat and restraint systems that

can continue to be certified for and used

in aircraft, in the aftermath of today’s

rule. For example, the CAMI report

found that some forward facing

convertible restraints could not be

secured satisfactorily in the airplane

passenger seat used for testing purposes.

FAA and NHTSA believe this issue

was addressed in the NPRMs. As

discussed there, in view of the problems

revealed by the CAMI testing, NHTSA

and FAA will consider a separate

rulemaking to assess the need to

improve FMVSS 213’s requirements for

aircraft-certified child restraints other

than harnesses and booster seats. The

agencies are developing possible

requirements and procedures that could

improve the assessment of the

performance of child restraint systems

in the aircraft environment. Among

other issues, the agencies will consider

whether the seat assembly used under

FMVSS 213 in testing child restraints

for aircraft use sufficiently represents an

aircraft passenger seat.4 The agencies are

proceeding with this assessment.
28426 Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 108 / Tuesday, June 4, 1996 / Rules and Regulations

Other Issues

In undertaking the current

rulemaking, NHTSA recognized that a

rule restricting the use of child

restraints in aircraft could affect the use

of the restraints in motor vehicles. In the

1984 rulemaking that allowed child

restraints to be certified for use in motor

vehicles and aircraft, NHTSA

recognized that parents might not use

child restraints to transport their

children in a vehicle to and from the

airport if the child restraint could not be

used on the aircraft. The data indicated

that child safety was not a critical issue

for aircraft in terms of the number of

child deaths or injuries, but that it was

a large problem for motor vehicles.

Many State laws that require the use of

child seats in motor vehicles do not

cover all the ages of children that might

use booster seats. NHTSA was

concerned that, if booster seats may not

be used on aircraft, and if parents are

not willing to stow them with their

luggage, there is a possibility that the

restraints could be left home altogether

and thus not used to restrain a child in

the vehicle. It was suggested that the

number of child injuries in motor

vehicle accidents might increase

because of this non-use.

In issuing the NPRM, NHTSA reached

a tentative conclusion that restricting

the use of booster seats and harnesses

on aircraft would not adversely affect

motor vehicle safety by increasing the

numbers of unrestrained children in

vehicles. While NHTSA requested

comments on how it should assess this

issue, no comment was received. The

agency has decided to proceed with this

rulemaking in view of the lack of

information indicating that the

rulemaking will reduce the use of child

restraints during the ground portion of

a trip. However, the agencies will

monitor the situation for a possible

degradation of motor vehicle safety.

After considering ATA’s comment on

the rulemaking and other pertinent

information, NHTSA has decided to

adopt the requirements proposed in the

NPRM, without change. This

amendment to Standard 213 will

remove the possibility that a restraint

could be certified for aircraft use despite

the fact the FAA has prohibited such

use of that restraint. This amendment

reduces the likelihood of confusion and

misunderstanding on the part of

consumers, and makes the FAA and

NHTSA requirements consistent.

However, for clarification purposes,

NHTSA emphasizes the following

points about the use and performance of

child restraints. First, there are

significant differences between the

seating environment of motor vehicles

and that of aircraft. Because of those

differences, the problems encountered

with child restraint use in aircraft are

not encountered with child restraint use

in motor vehicles. Therefore,

notwithstanding this rule, the use of

harnesses and booster seats in motor

vehicles continues to be important for

child safety.

The problems reported by CAMI, i.e.,

the combined effects of aircraft seatback

breakover designs and aft occupant

impacts, are not encountered in motor

vehicles. The seat back in a motor

vehicle is designed to remain fixed in a

crash and not ‘‘breakover’’ in the

manner of an airplane seat. Also, a

vehicle seat containing a child restraint

is less likely to be impacted from the

rear by an adult than is an aircraft seat

containing a child restraint. There are

several reasons for this. First, child

restraints are recommended for use in

the rear instead of front vehicle seating

positions. Thus, if a child restraint is

installed as recommended, there will

not, in most cases, be any passenger

rearward of the child restraint who

could impact and load the seat

containing the child restraint in the

event of a frontal crash. Exceptions

would be in vehicles, such as vans and

some station wagons, which have three

rows of seats. Second, if there were a

passenger seated behind the seat

containing a child restraint, and that

person were sitting in an outboard

seating position, the person most likely

would have a lap/shoulder belt system

available for use. Most aircraft lack

shoulder belts. If the vehicle passenger

were restrained by that belt system, the

person would not load the seat with the

child restraint in the manner observed

in the CAMI study. Third, given the

number of persons typically carried in

a motor vehicle, it is unlikely there

would be an adult seated behind a child

in a child restraint, regardless of the

number or pattern of seats in the

vehicle.

Further, harnesses and other child

restraints are tested under FMVSS 213

on a seat assembly that is representative

of a motor vehicle seat, and that is

equipped with a safety belt

representative of the lap belt in the

center rear seating position. In its

compliance testing, the agency has not

found a problem between the vehicle

lap belt and a child harness such as that

found by CAMI between an airplane lap

belt and a harness. In addition, NHTSA

has not found in its compliance testing

the type of fit and adjustment problems

between booster seats and the vehicle

seats that CAMI found between booster

seats and the aircraft seats.

Booster seats could fit better on motor

vehicles than aircraft in part because of

the design of the belt restraints with

which the boosters are attached to the

automobile. The position of the buckle

for an aircraft seat belt assembly is very

different from that of a buckle for a

vehicle seat belt assembly. An aircraft

seat belt assembly is designed so that

when it is buckled, the buckle is located

midway between the anchorages, in

front of the user’s abdomen. A motor

vehicle lap/shoulder belt or lap-only

belt is designed so that the buckle is

located to the side of the user’s torso,

near the hip, when the belt is buckled.

Another reason for believing that the

problems reported by CAMI are not

indicative of the performance of child

restraints in motor vehicles is the

difference between the crash pulse used

by CAMI and the crash pulse used in

FMVSS 213 testing. In its testing of head

excursion, head and chest acceleration

and abdominal forces, CAMI used a

crash pulse appropriate for aircraft.

FMVSS 213 testing, by contrast,

involves the use of a motor vehicle

crash pulse.

Compliance Date

The compliance date for this rule is in

90 days. There is good cause for this

short compliance date. It is the same as

that of FAA’s rule that withdraws

approval of boosters and harnesses for

use on aircraft. The effective date for the

agencies’ rules should be identical since

the two rulemaking actions complement

each other. FAA seeks to restrict the use

of boosters and harnesses on aircraft as

expeditiously as possible to address

what that agency has concluded to be a

possible safety problem. NHTSA’s rule

minimizes the potential for confusion

and misunderstanding on the part of

consumers, by preventing

manufacturers from certifying boosters

and harnesses for aircraft use when in

fact FAA does not approve of those

restraints for such use. Given the above,

a 90-day effective date is in the public

interest.

Rulemaking Analyses and Notices

Executive Order 12866 (Regulatory

Planning and Review) and DOT

Regulatory Policies and Procedures

NHTSA has evaluated the impacts of

this rule and has determined that it is

significant within the meaning of the

Department of Transportation’s

regulatory policies and procedures. The

rulemaking action is significant because

of the substantial public interest in

issues involving child seats on aircraft.

Further, this rule is a significant

regulatory action under E.O. 12866.
Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 108 / Tuesday, June 4, 1996 / Rules and Regulations 28427

While this action is significant

because of the public interest associated

with it, NHTSA concludes that this rule

will have minimal impacts. In 1991,

there were an estimated 1,200,000

booster seats produced. The consumer

cost of a label is estimated to be $0.09

to $0.17, and total annual costs of a

separate label range from $108,000 to

$204,000.

However, adding a sentence to the

existing label, most likely the course of

action taken in response to this

rulemaking, would cost much less. This

cost might be $0.01 per label, resulting

in a total annual cost of $12,000. Fewer

harnesses are produced than booster

seats. The label on a harness is typically

cloth, and sewn on to the restraint.

Assuming that 10,000 to 50,000

harnesses are produced annually, the

cost of a label will probably be over

$1.00. However, even with this cost, the

cost of the labeling requirement is

minimal. Moreover, there is a possible

economic benefit of this rule. Since

booster seats and harnesses will no

longer be permitted to be certified for

aircraft, there will be no need to perform

the inversion test. Thus, testing costs to

the child restraint manufacturer will be

slightly reduced.

Further, the agency believes sales of

booster seats and harnesses will be

minimally affected, if at all, by the

prohibition against their certification for

aircraft use. NHTSA believes almost all

consumers decide to purchase a child

restraint based on their intent to use the

restraint in a motor vehicle, not in

aircraft.

Regulatory Flexibility Act

NHTSA has considered the effects of

this rule under the Regulatory

Flexibility Act. For the reasons noted

above and below, I hereby certify that

this rule will not have a significant

economic impact on a substantial

number of small entities. The agency

knows of 13 manufacturers of child

restraints (not counting vehicle

manufacturers that produce and install

built-in restraints), 7 of which are

considered to be small businesses

(including Kolcraft, which with an

estimated 500 employees, is on the

borderline of being a small business).

This number does not constitute a

substantial number of small entities.

Regardless of this number, NHTSA does

not believe this rule will have a

significant impact on small businesses.

As noted above, this rulemaking will

have a minimal effect on labeling costs

and no effect on child restraint sales.

Executive Order 12612 (Federalism)

This rulemaking action has been

analyzed in accordance with the

principles and criteria contained in

Executive Order 12612. The agency has

determined that this rule will not have

sufficient federalism implications to

warrant the preparation of a Federalism

Assessment.

National Environmental Policy Act

NHTSA has analyzed this rulemaking

action for the purposes of the National

Environmental Policy Act. The agency

has determined that implementation of

this action will not have any significant

impact on the quality of the human

environment.

Executive Order 12778 (Civil Justice

Reform)

This rule will not have any retroactive

effect. Under section 49 U.S.C. 30103,

whenever a Federal motor vehicle safety

standard is in effect, a state may not

adopt or maintain a safety standard

applicable to the same aspect of

performance which is not identical to

the Federal standard, except to the

extent that the state requirement

imposes a higher level of performance

and applies only to vehicles procured

for the State’s use. 49 U.S.C. 30161 sets

forth a procedure for judicial review of

final rules establishing, amending or

revoking Federal motor vehicle safety

standards. That section does not require

submission of a petition for

reconsideration or other administrative

proceedings before parties may file suit

in court.

List of Subjects in 49 CFR Part 571

Imports, Motor vehicle safety, Motor

vehicles.

In consideration of the foregoing,

NHTSA amends 49 CFR Part 571 as set

forth below.

PART 571—[AMENDED]

1. The authority citation for Part 571

continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 322, 30111, 30115,

30117 and 30166; delegation of authority at

49 CFR 1.50.

2. Section 571.213 is amended by

revising S5.5.2(n) to read as follows:

§ 571.213 Standard No. 213; Child restraint

systems.

* * * * *

S5.5.2 * * *

(n) Child restraint systems, other than

belt-positioning seats, harnesses and

backless child restraint systems, may be

certified as complying with the

provisions of S8. Child restraints that

are so certified shall be labeled with the

statement ‘‘This Restraint is Certified for

Use in Motor Vehicles and Aircraft.’’

Belt-positioning seats, harnesses and

backless child restraint systems shall be

labeled with the statement ‘‘This

Restraint is Not Certified for Use in

Aircraft.’’ The statement required by

this paragraph shall be in red lettering

and shall be placed after the

certification statement required by

S5.5.2(e).

* * * * *

Issued on May 20, 1996.

Ricardo Martinez,

Administrator.

[FR Doc. 96–13772 Filed 6–03–96; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–59–P