In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 15‐1208

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

RONALD DOUGLAS,

Defendant‐Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Illinois.

No. 3:14‐CR‐30069‐001 — David R. Herndon, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 22, 2015 — DECIDED NOVEMBER 25, 2015

____________________

Before FLAUM, WILLIAMS, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Appellant Ronald Douglas was

convicted of failing to register as a sex offender. He does not

challenge his conviction or his prison sentence of thirty

months, but he challenges several conditions of his five‐year

term of supervised release. We affirm.

   
2 No. 15‐1208

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Douglas has two prior convictions for criminal sexual

abuse of children. He was convicted in 1992 of aggravated

criminal sexual abuse of a young relative when he was

babysitting her and other children. For that first offense,

Douglas was sentenced to two years of probation but was

also required to register as a sex offender under the Sex Of‐

fender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). In 1997,

he was sentenced to one year of unsupervised probation for

failing to register as a sex offender.

In 1999, Douglas was convicted of aggravated criminal

sexual abuse. The victim was another young relative. The

crime occurred while Douglas was babysitting her and her

brothers overnight at his home. That time he was sentenced

to four years in prison.

After he was paroled in 2000, Douglas registered as a sex

offender until January 2009. He let his registration lapse,

then registered again in 2011 and 2012 but not after that. He

has claimed he was confused about whether he was required

to register for only ten years or for the rest of his life. Doug‐

las was never given a notice that he was no longer required

to register.

The present offense, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a),

stems from Douglas’s move in 2012 from Illinois to Tennes‐

see without notifying his Illinois probation officer and with‐

out registering as a sex offender in Tennessee. After Douglas

was convicted in this case for his failure to register, the dis‐

trict court sentenced him to thirty months in prison, five

years of supervised release, a $100 special assessment, and a

fine of $250.
No. 15‐1208 3

As part of the federal sentence, the district court imposed

several special conditions of supervised release, including

requirements that Douglas undergo assessment as a sex of‐

fender, stay out of establishments that primarily sell alcohol,

avoid knowing association with felons, allow a U.S. Proba‐

tion Officer to visit him at any time, and answer truthfully

any questions asked by the probation officer. All of the chal‐

lenged conditions had been set forth in the Probation Office’s

recommendations for sentencing that were filed with the

presentence report and provided to the defense well in ad‐

vance of the sentencing hearing. In the district court, Doug‐

las did not object to any of these conditions, but he challeng‐

es them on appeal as unjustified restrictions on his liberty.  

II. Analysis

A. Standard of Review

Over the past two years, this Court has addressed condi‐

tions of supervised release in an unusually large number of

appeals. See, e.g., United States v. Kappes, 782 F.3d 828, 848

(7th Cir. 2015) (collecting cases). We recently explained:

Under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d), a sentencing court

has discretion to impose appropriate condi‐

tions of supervised release, to the extent that

such conditions (1) are reasonably related to

factors identified in § 3553(a), including the na‐

ture and circumstances of the offense and the

history and characteristics of the defendant; (2)

involve no greater deprivation of liberty than is

reasonably necessary for the purposes set forth

in § 3553(a); and (3) are consistent with the pol‐

icy statements issued by the Sentencing Com‐
4 No. 15‐1208

mission. Policies emphasized by the Sentencing

Commission include deterrence, rehabilitation,

and protecting the public.

United States v. Armour, 804 F.3d 859, 867 (7th Cir. 2015),

quoting United States v. Ross, 475 F.3d 871, 873 (7th Cir. 2007).

When a defendant has objected to a condition of super‐

vised release in the district court, we review for an abuse of

discretion, but if no timely objection was raised in the district

court, we review only for plain error. Armour, 804 F.3d at

867; Kappes, 782 F.3d at 844; Ross, 475 F.3d at 873. “The sen‐

tencing judge is in a superior position to find facts and judge

their import under § 3553(a) in the individual case and dis‐

trict courts have an institutional advantage over appellate

courts in making these sorts of determinations ... .” Kappes,

782 F.3d at 844, quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51–

52 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). This reasoning

extends to the conditions of supervised release.

In this case, Douglas received advance notice that the dis‐

trict court might impose all of the challenged conditions of

supervised release. They were filed with the presentence re‐

port as recommendations of the probation officer. Douglas

did not register any objections to the conditions at the sen‐

tencing hearing. When such advance notice is not provided

and the court springs the conditions of supervised release on

the defense at the sentencing hearing itself, as for example in

United States v. Thompson, 777 F.3d 368, 378–79 (7th Cir. 2015),

we will not fault a defendant or his counsel for failure to ob‐

ject. On the other hand, when ample notice is given, as it was

in this case, and the defense raises no objection to the pro‐

posed conditions of supervised release, it is appropriate to

review on appeal only for plain error.
No. 15‐1208 5

“To correct a plain error, the appellant must establish that

there is: ‘(1) an error or defect (2) that is clear or obvious (3)

affecting the defendant’s substantial rights (4) and seriously

impugning the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of ju‐

dicial proceedings.’” United States v. Cary, 775 F.3d 919, 923

(7th Cir. 2015), quoting United States v. Goodwin, 717 F.3d 511,

518 (7th Cir. 2013). We address the conditions in turn.  

B. The Challenged Conditions

1. Sex‐Offender Assessment and Potential Treatment

The first challenged condition orders Douglas to submit

to a sex‐offender assessment upon release from prison. If the

assessment recommends sex‐offender treatment, he will be

required to “comply with the sex‐offender specific treatment

that is recommended.” The district court explained that it

was imposing this condition based on Douglas’s recidivism

in sexual abuse of children and the belief that he “will not be

rehabilitated in prison and will need close supervision while

on supervised release, as history demonstrates [and] con‐

gress mandates.”

Douglas argues that requiring a sex‐offender assessment

is not justified because his sex offenses occurred so long ago

and he is now sixty years old. He relies on United States v.

Johnson, 756 F.3d 532, 540–42 (7th Cir. 2014) to support his

argument. In Johnson, we set aside a supervised release con‐

dition for sex‐offender treatment, finding no link between

the defendant’s misdemeanor sex offense fifteen years earlier

and the applicable § 3553(a) factors for the drug and firearm

offenses at issue. 756 F.3d at 541. There was no suggestion

that the defendant had engaged in any sexual misconduct

since the single misdemeanor. The government had not ex‐
6 No. 15‐1208

plained why sex‐offender treatment was needed to rehabili‐

tate the defendant or to protect the public. We further noted

that other circuits have “upheld sex‐offender treatment con‐

ditions when the sexual misconduct was so recent as to be a

contemporary characteristic of the defendant’s offender pro‐

file at the time of sentencing; they have vacated such condi‐

tions if the defendant’s last incident of sexual misconduct is

so remote in time that it does not support any present need

to rehabilitate the defendant or protect the public.” Id., quot‐

ing United States v. Evans, 727 F.3d 730, 734 (7th Cir. 2013).

Johnson is instructive, but the significant factual differ‐

ences persuade us that the district court did not commit a

plain error here. First, the condition here calls only for sex‐

offender assessment, not treatment. Sex‐offender treatment

will be ordered only if recommended based on the assess‐

ment. Second, Douglas is a repeat sex offender. The seven

years that passed between his first and second convictions

for sexually abusing children in his care suggest that the

passage of time did not sufficiently reduce the risk of recidi‐

vism for this defendant. There is also no indication in this

record that Douglas has undergone sex‐offender assessment

before, let alone treatment. Third, unlike Johnson, the district

court explained sufficiently why this condition is appropri‐

ate based on Douglas’s criminal sexual conduct and the need

to protect the public. We find no plain error in the district

court’s decision to order this first‐ever assessment for a de‐

fendant who has twice been convicted of sexually abusing

children in his care.

Douglas raises two additional points regarding this con‐

dition. He worries that allowing the entity performing the

assessment to provide any follow‐up treatment poses a con‐
No. 15‐1208 7

flict of interest, and he argues that if treatment is ordered, he

is being ordered to comply with unspecified and unknown

restrictions. Neither challenge is ripe for prudent disposition

at this time. Neither could be addressed based on anything

other than speculation unless and until Douglas and the

court know whether sex‐offender treatment will be ordered

and if so with what restrictions. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2),

a sentencing judge “may modify, reduce, or enlarge the con‐

ditions of supervised release, at any time prior to the expira‐

tion or termination of the term of supervised release.” If and

when these other issues that trouble Douglas become ripe,

he may raise any challenges to them under § 3583(e)(2).

2. Establishments That Sell Primarily Alcohol

The district court also ordered that Douglas “not enter or

patronize establishments where intoxicants are the primary

item of sale, such as bars, lounges, and night clubs.” When

imposing the condition, the court pointed out that Douglas

committed at least one of his sexual crimes when he was

abusing alcohol. The court also said that “Douglas’s primary

problem is his alcohol abuse,” and that “it’s quite clear, from

the notations throughout his criminal history and other

places in the presentence report, that he has a serious alcohol

abuse problem.”

While acknowledging a connection between his alcohol

use and his past sexual crimes against children, Douglas

contends that this condition imposed on top of conditions to

refrain from alcohol use and to comply with testing and

treatment for alcohol abuse is not sufficiently justified. He

also argues that the condition will hinder his ability to work

because he has often worked in restaurants.
8 No. 15‐1208

We find no plain error. As required by 18 U.S.C. §

3583(d), this condition is reasonably related to factors identi‐

fied in § 3553(a), particularly the history and characteristics

of the defendant. The district judge could reasonably find

that this condition will impose no greater deprivation of lib‐

erty than is reasonably necessary for the purposes of super‐

vised release. See Armour, 804 F.3d at 867, quoting Ross, 475

F.3d at 873. The condition does not prohibit Douglas from

entering, patronizing, or working in restaurants. It applies

only to establishments where alcohol is the primary item of

sale. The condition will bar Douglas from working in liquor

stores, bars, lounges, and nightclubs, but it should leave am‐

ple room to seek work, including restaurant work he has

done before.

3. Conditions for Effective Supervision

Douglas also challenges the conditions that he must

“permit a probation officer to visit him at any time at home

or elsewhere,” “not knowingly associate with any persons

engaged in criminal activity and shall not knowingly associ‐

ate with any person convicted of a felony, unless having first

been granted permission to do so by the probation officer,”

and that “truthfully and completely answer all verbal ques‐

tions of the probation officer and ... follow the instructions

of the probation officer.” Douglas argues that these condi‐

tions will unduly restrict his constitutional liberties while he

is on supervised release.

We reject these challenges. We are talking about super‐

vised release, not complete release. This is not the first time

Douglas has been under court‐ordered supervision. By the

time he was sentenced in this case, Douglas had put together

a record of resistant and criminal conduct that earned these
No. 15‐1208 9

conditions. The judge explained that these conditions were

imposed to “assure that the probation officer is able to insure

compliance from a defendant who’s resistant to comply with

his requirements under the sex‐offender registration laws

and who is a recidivist generally ... .” These conditions of

supervision were imposed to “do more for protecting the

public as we go down the road.”

The Supreme Court has made clear that persons on pro‐

bation, parole, supervised release, or other forms of criminal

justice supervision short of full‐time custody are not entitled

to the full range of constitutional liberties. “To a greater or

lesser degree, it is always true of probationers (as we have

said it to be true of parolees) that they do not enjoy ‘the ab‐

solute liberty to which every citizen is entitled, but on‐

ly ... conditional liberty properly dependent on observance

of special [probation] restrictions.’” Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483

U.S. 868, 874 (1987), quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,

480 (1972). “These same goals require and justify the exercise

of supervision to assure that the restrictions are in fact ob‐

served.” Griffin, 483 U.S. at 875. “Supervision, then, is a ‘spe‐

cial need’ of the State permitting a degree of impingement

upon privacy that would not be constitutional if applied to

the public at large.” Id. In light of these considerations, we

address each challenged condition in turn.

a. Probation Officer Visits

The district court must take care to ensure that super‐

vised release conditions are supported by the applicable

§ 3553(a) factors. See Kappes, 782 F.3d at 845; United States v.

Siegel, 753 F.3d 705, 707–08 (7th Cir. 2014); Ross, 475 F.3d at

873. In United States v. Thompson, this Court held that a con‐

dition of supervised release permitting the probation officer
10 No. 15‐1208

to visit at any time at home or elsewhere was “too broad in

the absence of any effort by the district court to explain why

[it is] needed.” 777 F.3d 368, 379–80 (7th Cir. 2015); see also

Kappes, 782 F.3d at 850–51; United States v. Sewell, 780 F.3d

839, 850–52 (7th Cir. 2015); United States v. Sandidge, 784 F.3d

1055, 1068–69 (7th Cir. 2015) (vacating similar conditions).

On the other hand, when the court provides an adequate ex‐

planation and the condition is related to the goals of proba‐

tion and rehabilitation, we have upheld similar conditions.

See Armour, 804 F.3d at 870 (holding similar condition rea‐

sonably related to rehabilitation and protecting the public);

United States v. Monteiro, 270 F.3d 465, 469 (7th Cir. 2001)

(upholding condition permitting a warrantless search at any

time because it related to goals of rehabilitation and protec‐

tion).

Here, the district court explained sufficiently why these

conditions for supervised release were necessary. Douglas

has been very resistant to supervision, as shown by his recid‐

ivism, continued failure to register, and alcohol abuse while

on supervised release. This stringent visiting condition will

enable close supervision, without loopholes. If it turns out

that the visiting condition is abused, Douglas can seek relief,

but as a rule, United States Probation Offices are not so over‐

staffed that they have time to waste on pointless harassment.

The problem in Thompson, where no explanation was pro‐

vided, is not present here. This condition of supervised re‐

lease reflects the court’s careful consideration advised in

Siegel and Thompson and applies the statutory sentencing fac‐

tors set forth in § 3553(a). To the extent Douglas argues the

judge’s explanation of his reasons for imposing this condi‐

tion was not sufficient, recall that Douglas did not object to

it. Given Douglas’s well‐documented record of trouble with
No. 15‐1208 11

the criminal justice system, including similar forms of non‐

custodial supervision, we have no doubt the judge could

have explained his reasons in even greater and more com‐

pelling detail. The court did not plainly err by requiring

Douglas to permit visits by the probation officer at any time.

b. Associating with Felons

In Thompson, we found fatally vague a condition forbid‐

ding the defendant from “associat[ing] with any person con‐

victed of a felony, unless granted permission to do so by the

probation officer.” 777 F.3d at 376–77. We reached this con‐

clusion because there was no stated requirement that the de‐

fendant know that a person was a convicted felon. Id. at 377.

In Thompson, we said that, “to protect himself [the defend‐

ant] would have to submit the name of any person he met to

his probation officer” and that the word “association” was

unclear. Id. Similarly, in Kappes, we found the condition for‐

bidding a defendant from “associating with any persons en‐

gaged in criminal activity and associating with any person

convicted of a felony, unless granted permission to do so by

the probation officer ... fatally vague because it appears to

impose strict liability and does not define ‘associate.’” 782

F.3d at 848–49 (internal quotation marks and alterations

omitted).

The strict liability concerns from Thompson and Kappes

are not present here. The condition imposed for Douglas

states that he shall not knowingly associate with any persons

engaged in criminal activity or with any person convicted of

a felony. The condition also specifies that Douglas may seek

permission from his probation officer if he wants to associate

with convicted felons. Consider, for example, the possibility

that he might want to associate with others with felony rec‐
12 No. 15‐1208

ords in a job, a church, or an alcohol abuse treatment pro‐

gram. Similarly, if Douglas genuinely did not understand

what is meant by “associate,” he should have raised the is‐

sue with the district court. He did not. With the knowledge

requirement and ample room for exceptions, the district

court did not plainly err by imposing this condition.

c. Answer Questions

Finally, Douglas argues that the supervised release condi‐

tion requiring him to answer the probation officer’s ques‐

tions violates his Fifth Amendment privilege against self‐

incrimination. We disagree.

The Supreme Court has held that a probationer’s “gen‐

eral obligation to appear and answer questions truthfully

did not in itself convert ... otherwise voluntary statements

into compelled ones.” Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 427

(1984). The Court compared a probationer’s duty to answer

questions by a probation officer to an ordinary witness’s du‐

ty to answer questions under oath at a trial or before a grand

jury. If a witness is asked a question that will elicit incrimi‐

nating evidence, the witness himself must ordinarily assert

the privilege against self‐incrimination. See id.

So too here. Douglas may invoke the privilege against

self‐incrimination if he wishes not to incriminate himself. If

he chooses not to invoke the privilege and answers, his re‐

sponses will be considered voluntary. This condition does

not eliminate Douglas’s right to invoke the privilege against

self‐incrimination and was not imposed in error.

In Thompson, this court held that conditions providing

that “the defendant shall answer truthfully all inquiries by

the probation officer and that he shall permit a probation of‐
No. 15‐1208 13

ficer to visit him or her at any time at home or elsewhere”

were too broad in the absence of any effort by the district

court to explain why they were needed. 777 F.3d at 379–80

(internal quotation marks and alterations omitted); see also

Sewell, 780 F.3d at 851; Sandidge, 784 F.3d at 1068–69.

Here, unlike in Thompson, the district court explained suf‐

ficiently why Douglas needs close supervision. He has re‐

peatedly failed to follow the law and to report information

(e.g., his relocation to Tennessee) to those supervising him.

The district court explained the need for this condition based

on Douglas’s recidivism, resistance to supervision, and lack

of rehabilitation. The district court did not plainly err by im‐

posing this condition.

For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s judgment,

with the challenged conditions of supervised release, is

AFFIRMED.