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WO

NOT FOR PUBLICATION 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Maria Bruner, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

City of Phoenix, 

Defendant. 

No. CV-18-00664-PHX-DJH

ORDER 

 This matter is before the Court on Defendant’s Motion for a More Definite 

Statement (Doc. 13). Plaintiffs filed a Response (Doc. 17), and Defendant filed a Reply 

(Doc. 18). 

I. BACKGROUND 

On February 28, 2018, Maria Bruner and Laura Cerda (collectively “Plaintiffs”), 

two Hispanic women, filed their Complaint, which asserted claims pursuant to Title VII of 

the Civil Rights Act of 1964 of racial harassment, sexual harassment, and retaliation by 

their employer, the City of Phoenix (“Defendant”). (Doc. 1). Plaintiffs have been 

employed by Defendant since 2005. (Id. ¶¶ 10, 19). Plaintiff Bruner alleges that she has 

been subjected to discriminatory harassment based on her race and gender since May of 

2011, and Plaintiff Cerda alleges that she has been subjected to harassment since 2010. 

(Id. ¶¶ 13, 22). Plaintiff Bruner alleges that despite repeatedly complaining about the 

discriminatory misconduct to Defendant over the past five to six years, the discriminatory 

harassment continued. (Id. ¶¶ 17, 18). Similarly, Plaintiff Cerda alleges repeatedly 
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complaining to the Defendant of the co-worker’s racial slurs against her and her family, 

and the Defendant “did not do anything about it. . . .” (Id. ¶ 27). 

Plaintiffs are both married to African-Americans, and the co-worker allegedly 

harassed Plaintiffs by using discriminatory racial epithets, including: “nigger,” “nigger 

lover,” and “mayate.”1

 (Id. at 2-3). For example, the co-worker told other employees “not 

to interact with [Plaintiff] Bruner because [she] ‘only dated niggers. . . .’” (Id. ¶ 14 

(emphasis in the original)). Additionally, Plaintiff Cerda alleges that when looking at a 

photo of her son on her desk, the co-worker stated, “how much she dislikes ‘mayates’ . . . 

and how she could not believe that someone would ‘date out of their race’ . . . .” (Id. ¶ 24). 

As for their sexual harassment claims, Plaintiff Bruner claims the co-worker falsely 

accused her of being a swinger who “engaged in extramarital sexual affairs” at work. (Id.

¶ 16). Likewise, Plaintiff Cerda asserts the co-worker spread false rumors that she cheated 

on her husband, “having sex in the workplace.” (Id. ¶ 26). 

 Plaintiffs claim they suffered, and continue to suffer, a negative impact on their 

employment and psychological well-being. (Id. at 3-4). Plaintiffs allege that after they 

notified Defendant of the discrimination, Defendant subsequently falsely accused them of 

misconduct and subjected them to unwarranted investigations. (Id. ¶ 33). Both Plaintiffs 

filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) in August 

2017, and each received a right to sue letter on approximately November 30, 2017. (Id. 

¶¶ 34, 35). 

II. LEGAL STANDARDS 

A motion for a more definite statement pursuant to Rule 12(e) Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure is only proper if the pleading “is so vague or ambiguous that the party cannot 

reasonably prepare a response.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(e). Rule 12(e) provides a party with the 

opportunity to point out “the defects complained of and the details desired.” Id. However, 

a motion for a more definite statement, also known as a Rule 12(e) motion, is “ordinally 

restricted to situations where a pleading suffers from unintelligibility rather than want of 

 

1

 Derogatory Spanish term for African-Americans. 
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detail, and if the requirements of the general rule as to pleading are satisfied and the 

opposing party is fairly notified of the nature of the claim such motion is inappropriate.” 

Castillo v. Norton, 219 F.R.D. 155, 163 (D. Ariz. 2003) (quoting Sheffield v. Orius Corp., 

211 F.R.D. 411, 414-15 (D. Or. 2002)); see also Resolution Trust Corp. v. Dean, 854 F. 

Supp. 626, 649 (D. Ariz. 1994) (“Rule 12(e) is designed to strike at unintelligibility rather 

than want of detail.”). 

As pleadings in federal court are only required to fairly notify the opposing party of 

the nature of the claim, Rule 12(e) motions are disfavored and not to be used to test a case 

by requiring the opponent to allege certain facts or withdraw from his or her allegations. 

See Castillo, 219 F.R.D. at 163 (citing Resolution Trust Corp., 854 F. Supp. at 649). If the 

details sought by a Rule 12(e) motion are obtainable through discovery, the motion should 

be denied. See Sheffield, 211 F.R.D. at 415 (“A motion for a more definite statement is not 

to be used to assist in getting facts in preparation for trial as such; other rules relating to 

discovery, interrogatories and the like exist for such purposes.”) (internal quotation and 

citation omitted)). While a 12(e) motion is only appropriate when the complaint “does not 

provide defendants with a fair opportunity to frame a responsive pleading,” the decision to 

grant or deny the motion is generally left to the discretion of the district court. McHenry 

v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 1996). 

The Rule 12(e) standard should be viewed in conjunction with the liberal pleading 

requirements of Rule 8. Castillo, 219 F.R.D. at 159. Rule 8 requires a complaint contain 

a “short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 

8(a)(2). In order to meet this threshold, the complaint only needs enough allegations to 

inform defendants of the claims made against them. McKeever v. Block, 932 F.2d 795, 

798 (9th Cir. 1991). 

III. DISCUSSION 

In the instant Motion, Defendant contends that Plaintiffs failed to identify: (1) the 

specific claims they are asserting and (2) the timing of the alleged harassment and 

retaliatory adverse employment actions that gave rise to their claims. (Doc. 13 at 1). 
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First, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs failed to assert the specific claims in their 

Complaint, which rendered the Complaint “‘vague and ambiguous.’” (Doc. 13 at 4). The 

Court disagrees. Under Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint need only contain a short, plain statement 

of each claim to put defendants on sufficient notice of the allegations against them. Here, 

the Complaint provides that Plaintiffs are asserting claims to “stop and remediate racial 

harassment, sexual harassment and retaliation in the workplace. . . .” (Doc. 1 ¶ 1). 

Moreover, Plaintiffs provided specific details regarding the discriminatory racial epithets 

and conduct that they were allegedly subjected to. (Doc. 1 at 2-4). Although Plaintiffs’ 

Complaint did not provide a comprehensive list of every racial slur or discriminatory act 

they were subjected to, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have put forth enough details to 

provide Defendant with a fair idea of the basis of the Complaint and the legal grounds 

claimed for recovery. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506, 514 (holding a complaint 

in an employment discrimination lawsuit need not contain specific facts establishing a 

prima facie case; it only needs to contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing 

that the pleader is entitled to relief); Castillo, 219 F.R.D. at 163 (finding that plaintiff’s 

complaint fairly notified defendant of the nature of the claims, even though the complaint 

did not contain details regarding who discriminated against him, when the discrimination 

occurred, or the exact circumstances surrounding the misconduct). 

Second, Defendant also argues that Plaintiffs’ Complaint is “vague and ambiguous” 

regarding the timing of events giving rise to their claims. (Doc. 13 at 1-3). The Court 

again disagrees. Specific dates are not required. See Sheffield, 211 F.R.D. at 415 (finding 

it is not necessary for a plaintiff to plead specific dates). The Complaint need only provide 

Defendant with a general timeframe of when the alleged events occurred; the specific 

details are determined through the discovery process. See id. Here, Plaintiff Cerda alleges 

she was subjected to discriminating slurs and harassment consistently from 2010 to when 

Plaintiffs initiated this lawsuit on February 28, 2018. (Doc 1 ¶¶ 22, 27). Likewise, Plaintiff 

Bruner claims she suffered discriminatory harassment which started in May 2011 by a coworker and continued until the Complaint was filed. (Id. ¶¶ 13, 15). Plaintiff Cerda’s 
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allegations, though not as specific as Plaintiff Bruner’s, still meets the Rule 8 pleading 

standard. Moreover, Defendant’s own Motion even refers to the Plaintiffs’ timeframe of 

events; thus, Defendant acknowledges that Plaintiffs provided a general timeframe of the 

alleged discrimination. For example, Defendant’s motion recognizes that Plaintiff Bruner 

had been subjected to discriminatory harassment based on her race and gender since last 

May 2011, and Plaintiff Cerda since 2010. (Doc. 13 at 2). Moreover, Defendant’s motion 

also recognizes Plaintiffs’ five to six year timeline of Defendant’s alleged retaliatory 

actions against Plaintiffs. (Id.) The Court finds Plaintiffs’ Complaint has provided a 

sufficient timeline regarding the timing of their claims. See McKeever, 932 F.2d. at 798 

(finding Rule 8 does not require a complaint to have a timeframe when the events 

occurred); Sheffield, 211 F.R.D. at 415 (finding that a complaint need only set forth the 

approximate dates on which the alleged events occurred; it does not need to provide the 

specific dates) (citation omitted). 

IV. CONCLUSION 

Plaintiffs’ Complaint is not “so vague or ambiguous” that Defendant cannot 

reasonably prepare a response. The Court finds that Plaintiffs’ Complaint provided 

sufficient identifying information to place Defendant on notice of the nature of their claims. 

Defendant can use the appropriate available discovery tools to gather more specific 

information, including gathering information to determine whether Plaintiffs have 

complied with all applicable statutes of limitations. See Sheffield, 211 F.R.D. at 415 

(holding that if defendant would like more specific details, then it should use its own 

sources and the available discovery tools); Castillo, 219 F.R.D. at 164 (“Where the 

information sought is available through the discovery process, a Rule 12(e) motion should 

be denied.”) (citation omitted). Therefore, the Court will deny Defendant’s Motion for a 

More Definite Statement. Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for More Definite Statement (Doc. 13) 

is DENIED; 

... 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant, who has been served, must file an 

Answer on or before March 1, 2019. 

Dated this 20th day of February, 2019. 

Honorable Diane J. Humetewa

United States District Judge