[Cite as State v. Triplett, 2022-Ohio-1371.]

COURT OF APPEALS

DELAWARE COUNTY, OHIO

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

STATE OF OHIO

Plaintiff-Appellee

-vsDARNELL A. TRIPLETT

Defendant-Appellant

JUDGES:

Hon. Earle E. Wise, Jr., P. J.

Hon. John W. Wise, J.

Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J. 

Case No. 21 CAA 06 0031

O P I N I O N 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Criminal Appeal from the Court of Common 

Pleas, Case No. 20 CR I 09 0586

JUDGMENT: Affirmed

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: April 22, 2022

APPEARANCES:

For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant

MELISSA A. SCHIFFEL KIMBERLY CORRAL

PROSECUTING ATTORNEY LINDSEY STANKOVICH

CHRISTOPHER E. BALLARD LAW OFFICE of KIMBERLY CORRAL

ASSISTANT PROSECUTOR 4403 St. Clair Avenue

145 North Union Street, 3rd Floor Cleveland, Ohio 44103-1125

Delaware, Ohio 43015
Delaware County, Case No. 21 CAA 06 0031 2

Wise, John, J.

{¶1} Appellant Darnell A. Triplett appeals his conviction on one count of 

Trafficking in Cocaine and one count of Possession of Cocaine, entered in the Delaware

County Court of Common Pleas following a jury trial.

{¶2} Appellee is the state of Ohio.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE

{¶3} The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows:

{¶4} On December 17, 2020, Appellant was indicted by the Delaware County 

Grand Jury on one count of Possession of Cocaine, in violation of R.C. §2925.11(A), and 

one count of Trafficking in Cocaine, in violation of R.C. §2925.03(A)(2), with 

accompanying forfeiture and "major drug offender" specifications. 

{¶5} On February 1, 2021, Appellant filed a Motion to Suppress.

{¶6} On February 16, 2021, the trial court held a hearing on Appellant's Motion to 

Suppress. At said hearing, the trial court heard the following testimony:

{¶7} On September 11, 2020, around 3:15 pm, Dep. Hunter was parked in his 

cruiser watching northbound traffic on Interstate 71. (Supp. T. at 9). He noticed a Dodge 

Charger that was going at least ten miles under the posted speed limit, and upon running 

the license plate, found that it was expired out of the state of Pennsylvania. (Supp. T. at 

9-10, 31). Dep. Hunter was aware at the time that Ohio had tolled the expiration of 

registrations due to COVID-19, but did not believe Pennsylvania had taken a similar 

measure. (Supp. T. at 36-37, 39, 43). Dep. Hunter pulled out of the cross-over and as 

he was catching up to the Charger, he observed it move from the center lane into the 

slow lane directly behind another motorist, which he suspected may have been to evade 
Delaware County, Case No. 21 CAA 06 0031 3

his cruiser. (Supp. T. at 10-11). The deputy observed that the Charger was going 

approximately sixty-five (65) miles per hour and it was only one car length behind the 

other motorist, which in his training and experience could cause a crash if the other 

motorist stopped or slowed down. (Supp. T. at 10-12, 40, 47).

{¶8} After Dep. Hunter initiated a traffic stop, the Charger pulled over and the 

deputy made contact with the driver, Appellant. (Supp. T. at 16). There were also two 

female passengers, one in the front passenger seat and one in the backseat. Dep. 

Hunter told Appellant he had stopped him due to the expired registration and changing 

lanes too closely to another vehicle. Appellant expressed surprise about the registration, 

saying the Charger was a rental. Dep. Hunter asked him if he had the rental agreement 

and Appellant began to rummage in the glovebox. After searching, Appellant said that 

while he did not have a paper rental agreement, he could pull it up on his e-mail. When 

asked where they were headed that day, Appellant said he was a resident of Columbus 

and they were headed to Toledo. After searching his cellphone, Appellant then said he 

would need to call someone about the rental agreement. Appellant said he had rented 

the Charger for the week. Appellant produced a registration card, which confirmed the 

registration had expired on August 31, 2020. (Supp. T. at 16-17).

{¶9} Deputy Hunter was concerned that based on the expired registration and the 

lack of a rental agreement, the Charger may be overdue to be returned to the rental 

company or stolen. He stated that in his experience, it is not uncommon for it to take two 

to three weeks before a rental car is reported stolen.

{¶10} Deputy Hunter also explained that this was the first time he had ever seen a 

rental car with an expired registration. (Supp. T. at 18). Dep. Hunter also noted that the 
Delaware County, Case No. 21 CAA 06 0031 4

Charger appeared "lived in" as it was strewn with dust and debris throughout the interior.

(Supp. T. at 19). He stated that there was also a strong odor of car air freshener. Id. The 

deputy also noted that despite there only being three occupants, there appeared to be 

five cellphones in the Charger. (Supp. T. at 20). The deputy testified that in his 

experience, "longer term" rentals are often used in drug smuggling to avoid having 

personal vehicles seized or personal information available by running license plates. 

(Supp. T. at 20-21).

{¶11} Dep. Hunter aired Appellant's identifiers to dispatch and learned that 

Appellant had an "armed and dangerous" caution due to a prior conviction, and that he 

was subject to a protection order. (Supp. T. at 22, 66). Dep. Hunter contacted Dep. Lee, 

who was en route to assist, and asked him to contact Enterprise Rent-A-Car to confirm 

the Charger was not overdue or stolen. (Supp. T. at 22). Dep. Hunter then returned to 

his cruiser and ran Appellant's information, trying to find the names of the protected 

parties on the protection order to confirm that the female passengers were not the 

subjects of the order. (Supp. T. at 23). 

{¶12} Dep. Hunter testified that at this point he was intending to have his K9 partner 

sniff the vehicle, as everything he had observed raised his suspicions that the Charger 

may contain drugs. (Supp. T. at 24). After speaking with dispatch and returning to the 

Charger to obtain identification from the two women, Dep. Hunter confirmed they were 

not the subjects of the protection order. (Supp. T. at 25). In preparation for the K9 sniff, 

Dep. Hunter had Appellant exit the Charger. Appellant was still talking on his cellphone 

in an apparent effort to find the rental agreement. Dep. Hunter then had Dep. Lee ask 

the two women out of the Charger, at which point Dep. Lee spotted some marijuana in 
Delaware County, Case No. 21 CAA 06 0031 5

the passenger door. (Supp. T. at 25 -26). At this point the deputies still had been unable 

to confirm the status of the Charger with the rental company. (Supp. T. at 70). Deps. 

Hunter and Lee searched the Charger and found some raw marijuana, as well as the 

three kilogram parcels of cocaine concealed in the upholstery. (Supp. T. at 26-27).

{¶13} Dep. Lee also testified, with his body worn camera footage admitted as 

State's Ex. 2. (Supp. T. at 71). Dep. Hunter contacted Dep. Lee and asked him to confirm 

the status of the Charger with the rental car, while Dep. Lee was en route to the traffic 

stop with another deputy that he was training. (Supp. T. at 73-74). Dep. Lee testified that 

when he asked the women out of the Charger at Hunter's behest, he noticed a raw 

marijuana "bud" in the front passenger door, after which he and Dep. Hunter searched 

the Charger and discovered the cocaine. (Supp. T. at 75, 78).

{¶14} By Judgment Entry filed February 23, 2021, the trial court denied Appellant’s 

motion to suppress finding that the R.C. §4511.34(A) traffic offense of following too 

closely justified the stop, and that there was no evidence of an unreasonably prolonged 

stop.

{¶15} On May 13, 2021, a jury trial commenced with Appellant being convicted on 

all counts, but acquitted on the forfeiture specification.

{¶16} By Judgment Entry filed May 17, 2021, the trial court sentenced Appellant to 

a mandatory sentence of 11 to 16.5 years imprisonment.

{¶17} Appellant now appeals, assigning the following error for review:

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

{¶18}“I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DENYING APPELLANT’S MOTION TO 

SUPPRESS.”
Delaware County, Case No. 21 CAA 06 0031 6

I.

{¶19}In his sole assignment of error, Appellant argues the trial court erred in 

denying his motion to suppress. We disagree.

{¶20} Appellate review of a trial court’s decision to deny a motion to suppress 

involves a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Long, 127 Ohio App.3d 328, 332, 713 

N.E.2d 1 (4th Dist.1998). During a suppression hearing, the trial court assumes the role 

of trier of fact and, as such, is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and to 

evaluate witness credibility. State v. Brooks, 75 Ohio St.3d 148, 154, 661 N.E.2d 1030 

(1996). A reviewing court is bound to accept the trial court’s findings of fact if they are 

supported by competent, credible evidence. State v. Medcalf, 111 Ohio App.3d 142, 145, 

675 N.E.2d 1268 (4th Dist.1996). Accepting these facts as true, the appellate court must 

independently determine as a matter of law, without deference to the trial court’s 

conclusion, whether the trial court’s decision meets the applicable legal standard. State

v. Williams, 86 Ohio App.3d 37, 42, 619 N.E.2d 1141 (4th Dist.1993), overruled on other 

grounds. 

{¶21} There are three methods of challenging a trial court’s ruling on a motion to 

suppress on appeal. First, an appellant may challenge the trial court’s finding of fact. In 

reviewing a challenge of this nature, an appellate court must determine whether the trial 

court’s findings of fact are against the manifest weight of the evidence. See, State v. 

Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d 19, 437 N.E.2d 583 (1982); State v. Klein, 73 Ohio App.3d 486, 

597 N.E.2d 1141 (4th Dist.1991). Second, an appellant may argue the trial court failed 

to apply the appropriate test or correct law to the findings of fact. In that case, an 

appellate court can reverse the trial court for committing an error of law. See, Williams, 
Delaware County, Case No. 21 CAA 06 0031 7

supra. Finally, an appellant may argue the trial court has incorrectly decided the ultimate 

or final issues raised in a motion to suppress. When reviewing this type of claim, an 

appellate court must independently determine, without deference to the trial court’s 

conclusion, whether the facts meet the appropriate legal standard in any given case. 

State v. Curry, 95 Ohio App.3d 93, 96,620 N.E.2d 906 (8th Dist.1994). 

{¶22}In the instant case, Appellant argues the officer lacked reasonable and 

articulable suspicion for the traffic stop. 

{¶23} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits 

warrantless searches and seizures, rendering them per se unreasonable unless an 

exception applies. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 

576 (1967). An investigative stop, or Terry stop, is a common exception to the Fourth 

Amendment warrant requirement. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 

889 (1968). Because the “balance between the public interest and the individual's right 

to personal security” tilts in favor of a standard less than probable cause in such cases, 

the Fourth Amendment is satisfied if the officer's action is supported by reasonable 

suspicion to believe that criminal activity “may be afoot.” United States v. Brignoni–

Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975); United States v. 

Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989). 

{¶24}In Terry, the Supreme Court held that a police officer may stop an individual 

if the officer has a reasonable suspicion based upon specific and articulable facts that 

criminal behavior has occurred or is imminent. See, State v. Chatton, 11 Ohio St.3d 59, 

61, 463 N.E.2d 1237 (1984). The propriety of an investigative stop must be viewed in 

light of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the stop “as viewed through the eyes 
Delaware County, Case No. 21 CAA 06 0031 8

of the reasonable and prudent police officer on the scene who must react to events as 

they unfold.” State v. Andrews, 57 Ohio St.3d 86, 87–88, 565 N.E.2d 1271 (1991); State 

v. Bobo, 37 Ohio St.3d 177, 178, 524 N.E.2d 489 (1988). The Supreme Court of the 

United States has re-emphasized the importance of reviewing the totality of the 

circumstances in making a reasonable-suspicion determination: 

When discussing how reviewing courts should make reasonablesuspicion determinations, we have said repeatedly that they must look at 

the “totality of the circumstances” of each case to see whether the detaining 

officer has a “particularized and objective basis” for suspecting legal 

wrongdoing. This process allows officers to draw on their own experience 

and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the 

cumulative information available to them that “might well elude an untrained 

person.” Although an officer's reliance on a mere “hunch” is insufficient to 

justify a stop, the likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the level 

required for probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying a 

preponderance of the evidence standard. 

{¶25} United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 

(2002), citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417–418, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 

621 (1981).

{¶26} Traffic stops based upon observation of a traffic violation are constitutionally 

permissible. Dayton v. Erickson, 76 Ohio St.3d 3, 11–12, 1996-Ohio-431, 665 N.E.2d 

1091. This Court has held that any traffic violation, even a de minimis violation, may form 

a sufficient basis upon which to stop a vehicle. State v. Bangoura, 5th Dist. No. 08 CA 
Delaware County, Case No. 21 CAA 06 0031 9

95, 2009-Ohio-3339, 2009 WL 1916902, ¶ 14, citing State v. McCormick, 5th Dist. 

No.2000CA00204, 2001 WL 111891 (Feb. 2, 2001); State v. Woods, 5th Dist. Licking 

No. 12-CA-19, 2013-Ohio-1136, 2013 WL 1209351, ¶ 60.

{¶27}In the instant case, the deputy stopped Appellant after first observing that 

the vehicle he was driving had expired Pennsylvania license plates and then observing 

him change lanes without leaving sufficient distance to the car in front of him, following 

more closely than is reasonable and prudent, in violation of R.C. §4511.34(A), which 

provides:

R.C. §4511.34 Space Between Moving Vehicles

(A) The operator of a motor vehicle, streetcar, or trackless trolley shall 

not follow another vehicle, streetcar, or trackless trolley more closely than 

is reasonable and prudent, having due regard for the speed of such vehicle, 

streetcar, or trackless trolley, and the traffic upon and the condition of the 

highway.

{¶28} “Although R.C. 4511.34(A) does not provide a specific standard for 

determining when a motorist is following another vehicle more closely than is reasonable 

and prudent, numerous courts have concluded that a motorist's failure to follow another 

vehicle at a distance greater than one car length for every ten miles per hour the 

motorist's vehicle is traveling may, in some circumstances, indicate that the motorist is 

in violation of R.C. 4511.34.” State v. Holmes, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-18-52, 2019-Ohio2485, ¶ 29, citing State v. Ward, 4th Dist. Washington No. 10CA30, 2011-Ohio-1261, ¶ 

16-17, State v. Kelly, 188 Ohio App.3d 842, 2010-Ohio-3560, ¶ 18-20 (12th Dist.), State 

v. Stokes, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 07AP-960, 2008-Ohio-5222, ¶ 24-25, State v. Meza, 
Delaware County, Case No. 21 CAA 06 0031 10

6th Dist. Lucas No. L-03-1223, 2005-Ohio-1221, ¶ 19, and United States v. Dukes, 257 

Fed.Appx. 855, 858 (6th Cir. 2007). “However, regardless of this ‘car-length’ standard, 

‘[a]s is clear, the statute is couched in relative terms, and violations depend upon the 

circumstances of a given case.’ ” Id., quoting State v. Mason-Cowan, 10th Dist. Franklin 

No. 11AP-261, 2012-Ohio-1074, ¶ 7, citing State v. Gonzalez, 43 Ohio App.3d 59, 62 

(6th Dist.1987).

{¶29} A number of appellate districts have found that violations of R.C. §4511.34 

can support a traffic stop. See State v. Holmes, 139 N.E.3d 574, 2019-Ohio-2485 (3rd 

Dist.), ¶ 29 ("numerous courts have concluded that a motorist's failure to follow another 

vehicle at a distance greater than one car length for every ten miles per hour the 

motorist's vehicle is traveling" can justify a stop for a R.C. 4511.34 violation); State v. 

Johnson, 9th Dist. Medina No. 03CA0127-M, 2004-0hio-3409, ¶¶ 9, 15 (where the 

defendant's vehicle was "travelling within one car length of a semi-truck at a speed of 

between 60 and 65 miles per hour," the arresting officer "had reasonable suspicion to 

conduct an investigatory stop" of the vehicle); State v. Bell, 12th Dist. Preble No. CA 

2001-06-009, 2002-Ohio-561, 2002 WL 205502 ("following a vehicle too closely in 

violation of R.C. 4511.34 is a reasonable basis for a traffic stop"). 

{¶30}“ ‘An officer's direct observation that a vehicle is following another vehicle 

too closely provides probable cause to initiate a lawful traffic stop.’ ” Id., quoting Kelly at 

¶ 15, citing State v. Perry, 12th Dist. Preble No. CA2004-11-016, 2005-Ohio-6041, ¶ 12.

{¶31} Upon our review of the record, we find evidence in the record, in the form of 

the deputy's testimony and the dash-cam video footage (State’s Exhibit 1), to support 

the traffic stop. The testimony and evidence support a finding that the Appellant, while 
Delaware County, Case No. 21 CAA 06 0031 11

traveling at approximately 65 mph, changed lanes and only left about one car length of 

distance between his vehicle and the vehicle in front of him, and that such action was

not “reasonable” or “prudent”.

{¶32} We also find that the expired license plate was sufficient justification to stop 

Appellant. As Deputy Hunter explained, while he was aware that Ohio had extended the 

deadline for registration renewal, he did not know if the same held true for the state of 

Pennsylvania. (Supp. T. at 43). He also stated that it is very unusual for a rental car to 

have an expired tag, and that he believed it was possible the vehicle was overdue or 

stolen and not yet in the system. (Supp. T. at 18, 38-39).

{¶33} Having found that the deputy had reasonable and articulable suspicion to 

stop Appellant's vehicle, we will next consider whether the stop was unreasonably 

prolonged.

{¶34} The Ohio Supreme Court has held:

[W]hen detaining a motorist for a traffic violation, an officer may delay 

the motorist for a time period sufficient to issue a ticket or a warning. State 

v. Keathley (1988), 55 Ohio App.3d 130, 131 [562 N.E.2d 932]. This 

measure includes the period of time sufficient to run a computer check on 

the driver's license, registration, and vehicle plates. State v. Bolden, Preble 

App. No. CA2003-03-007, 2004-Ohio-184 [2004 WL 77617], ¶ 17, citing 

Delaware v. Prouse (1979), 440 U.S. 648, 659, 99 S.Ct. 1391 [59 L.Ed.2d 

660]. “In determining if an officer completed these tasks within a reasonable 

length of time, the court must evaluate the duration of the stop in light of the 

totality of the circumstances and consider whether the officer diligently 
Delaware County, Case No. 21 CAA 06 0031 12

conducted the investigation.” State v. Carlson (1995), 102 Ohio App.3d 585, 

598–599 [657 N.E.2d 591], citing State v. Cook (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 516, 

521–522 [605 N.E.2d 70], and U.S. v. Sharpe (1985), 470 U.S. 675, 105 

S.Ct. 1568 [84 L.Ed.2d 605].

{¶35} State v. Newman, 5th Dist. Richland No. 2020 CA 0020, 2021-Ohio-197, ¶ 

27 citing State v. Batchili, 113 Ohio St.3d 403, 2007-Ohio-2204, 865 N.E.2d 1282, ¶ 12.

{¶36} To justify a continued detention beyond the normal period required to issue 

a citation, the officer must have a “reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity 

beyond that which prompted the initial stop.” Batchili, ¶ 15. “In determining whether a 

detention is reasonable, the court must look at the totality of the circumstances.” State 

v. Matteucci, 11th Dist. No. 2001-L-205, 2003-Ohio-702, ¶ 30, citing State v. Bobo, 37 

Ohio St.3d 177, 178, 524 N.E.2d 489(1988).

{¶37} A review of video footage (State’s Exhibit 1) shows that Dep. Hunter spent 

the first four minutes of the stop making initial contact with Appellant, explaining that he 

stopped him for an expired license plate and for following too closely to the vehicle in 

front him, and asking him for the vehicle registration and documentation. At 

approximately five minutes into the stop, Dep. Hunter returned to his cruiser to run 

Appellant's information through his computer and to radio Dep. Lee to contact Enterprise 

Rent-A-Car. Dep. Hunter was informed by dispatch that Appellant had an “armed and 

dangerous” caution due to a prior conviction and that he was the subject of a protection 

order. At about eight minutes into the stop, Dep. Hunter radioed dispatch to get the 

name of the protected party or parties on Appellant's protection order and then promptly 

returned to Appellant’s vehicle. At nine minutes, Dep. Hunter requested the passenger's 
Delaware County, Case No. 21 CAA 06 0031 13

identification cards to confirm that neither of the female passengers was the protected 

party. At approximately the ten-minute mark, Dep. Lee and another deputy arrived on 

scene, and Dep. Hunter spoke to Deputy Lee while Appellant continued to talk on his 

cellphone in an apparent effort to find the rental agreement. At approximately the tenand-a-half minute mark, Dep. Hunter asked Appellant to step out of the Charger, and 

Appellant continued to search for the paperwork on his cellphone. Twelve minutes into 

the stop, Dep. Hunter asked Dep. Lee to have the two women also exit the Charger, at 

which point Dep. Lee noted a raw marijuana bud in the passenger door. The deputies 

then asked Appellant and the two women if they had medical marijuana cards, and all 

three stated that they did not. (Feb. 23, 2021, Judg. Entry, 13-17). At this time, Appellant 

was still on his cell phone attempting to locate the rental car documentation.

{¶38}In State v. Guinto, 5th Dist. Ashland No. 12-COA-031, 2013-Ohio-2180, this 

Court found that a thirty-one (31) minute delay attributable to the necessity that the driver 

provide valid proof of insurance was not an unreasonable extension of the detention of 

the parties. In that case, just as in this case, the officer was “waiting on the current 

insurance card for the driver and was asking questions of the occupants based upon the 

“indicators” that the Trooper observed.” Id. at ¶ 34. See also State v. Newman, 5th Dist. 

Richland No. 2020-CA-0020, 2021-Ohio-197 (the detention lasted fifteen minutes from 

the beginning of the stop until the drug dog indicated the presence of an illegal drug).

{¶39} In this case, the detention was only about twelve (12) minutes from the 

beginning of the stop until the illegal drugs were observed. At the time the drugs were 

observed, Appellant was still on his cell phone trying to locate his rental car 

documentation for the deputy. Once the drugs were observed in the passenger door, the 
Delaware County, Case No. 21 CAA 06 0031 14

deputy had probable cause to search the vehicle for contraband and further extend the 

stop. 

{¶40} Considering the totality of the circumstances, we find that the duration of the 

stop was not unreasonable, and no violation of Appellant's Fourth Amendment rights has 

been demonstrated.

{¶41} Appellant’s assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶42} For the forgoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas, 

Delaware County, Ohio, is affirmed.

By: Wise, John, J.

Wise, Earle, P. J., and

Delaney, J., concur.

JWW/kw 0419