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*********************************************** 
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. MONDAY J. ORTIZ

(AC 39391)

DiPentima, C. J., and Lavine and Pellegrino, Js.

Syllabus

Convicted, on conditional a plea of nolo contendere, of the crimes of possession of a sawed-off shotgun and possession of a weapon in a motor

vehicle, the defendant appealed to this court, claiming that the trial

court improperly denied his motion to suppress certain evidence seized

during a warrantless search of his van. The police had been dispatched

to an apartment complex to investigate a report of an assault and had

been told that the suspect was in his apartment with a shotgun. After

they arrived, officers were approached by an unidentified man, who

told them that the person they were looking for was sitting with a

shotgun in a gray van in the parking lot. Upon locating the van, the

officers did not see the defendant or the shotgun in the van and learned

that the plate did not belong to the van and that there was no information

on record for the vehicle identification number. Certain of the officers

returned inside the building, where they encountered the defendant and

placed him under arrest. Officers again looked into the tinted windows

of the van and saw the barrel of a shotgun, as well a box with bullets

spilling out of it. Upon seeing the shotgun, the police used a key fob

seized from the defendant to unlock the van and seized the gun. Held

that the trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion to suppress

the evidence seized from the van, that court having properly determined

that the warrantless search of the van and seizure of the shotgun were

justified under the plain view doctrine: the warrantless seizure of contraband that is in plain view is reasonable under the constitution if the

initial intrusion that enabled the police to view the item seized was

lawful and the police had probable cause to believe that the item was

contraband, and here, because the officers’ second look into the defendant’s vehicle was merely a continuation of their ongoing investigation

into witness reports of a suspect who had committed an assault, was

armed with a shotgun, and had been seen sitting with a shotgun in a

van in the parking lot, the officers were lawfully in the private parking

lot, and although the defendant claimed that once he was placed in

handcuffs in the police cruiser, the police were no longer permitted to

search his van, the defendant did not dispute that the officers were

lawfully present in the residential parking lot near his apartment when

they first looked into his van because they were responding to an emergency call reporting an assault on the premises, the officers had not yet

located the shotgun described by the witnesses, and it was reasonable

for them to believe that the shotgun was located in the defendant’s van

and to return to the parking lot in order to retrieve the weapon; moreover,

the incriminating character of the object viewed was immediately apparent, as the trial court credited the officers’ testimony that they could

see the barrel of a shotgun and bullets protruding from a box on the

floor of the van, and the totality of the facts were sufficient to warrant

a person of reasonable caution to believe that the weapon described

by witnesses might be found in the van and for the officers to infer that

there was a fair probability the defendant had stored the shotgun in his

van prior to his apprehension.

Argued February 22—officially released June 12, 2018

Procedural History

Information charging the defendant with the crimes

of assault in the third degree, possession of a sawedoff shotgun, and possession of the weapon in a motor

vehicle, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial

district of Fairfield, geographical area number two,

where the court, Holden, J., denied the defendant’s

motion to suppress certain evidence; thereafter, the
defendant was presented to the court, E. Richards, J.,

on a conditional plea of nolo contendere to possession

of a sawed-off shotgun and possession of the weapon

in a motor vehicle; judgment of guilty in accordance

with the plea; subsequently, the state entered a nolle

prosequi as to assault in the third degree, and the defendant appealed to this court. Affirmed.

Alice Osedach, assistant public defender, for the

appellant (defendant).

Timothy J. Sugrue, assistant state’s attorney, with

whom, on the brief, were John C. Smriga, state’s attorney, and Richard L. Palombo, Jr., senior assistant

state’s attorney, for the appellant (state).
Opinion

PELLEGRINO, J. The defendant, Monday J. Ortiz,

appeals from the judgment of conviction rendered by

the trial court following a plea of nolo contendere to

the charges of possession of a sawed-off shotgun in

violation of General Statutes § 53a-211 and possession

of a weapon in a motor vehicle in violation of General

Statutes § 29-38 (a). On appeal, the defendant claims

that the trial court improperly denied his motion to

suppress evidence seized during a warrantless search

of his vehicle. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the

judgment of the trial court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. At approximately 2 p.m. on November 22, 2013, Bridgeport Police Officer Kenneth Ruge

was dispatched to the YMCA building on State Street

in Bridgeport to investigate a report of an assault. The

alleged assault took place at the Harrison Apartments,

which are located in the same building as the YMCA.

The dispatcher relayed to Ruge that the suspect was

in his apartment with a shotgun. Ruge arrived at the

building approximately four minutes later and was met

shortly thereafter by Sergeant Joseph Szor and Officer

Tyrone Teele. The three officers parked their patrol

cars in front of the building on State Street and walked

into the lobby area of the YMCA through the main

entrance. While they were speaking with the receptionist, Samuel Sanchez approached the officers and identified himself as the victim of the assault.

Sanchez, who worked at the YMCA in the maintenance department, told the officers that the defendant,

a resident of the apartment building, came up from

behind him and punched him in the back of the head.

The officers observed injuries to the back of Sanchez’s

head and called for medical assistance for him. Sanchez

described the defendant as a ‘‘shorter, medium build,

bald Hispanic male’’ and reported that he lived in apartment 417 and owned a shotgun.

As they were speaking to Sanchez, an unidentified

man approached the officers and told them that the

person they were looking for was sitting with a shotgun

in a gray van in the parking lot. Ruge transmitted this

information over his radio while the unidentified man

showed them to a side door leading to the residential

parking lot; the man waited for them at the door. Around

the same time, Officers David Neary and Garrett Waddel

arrived and, having heard Ruge’s update over the radio,

proceeded to the parking lot to meet the other three

officers. The parking lot was fenced in, located on private property and required a key card to access it.

Posted signs indicated that the lot was for permitted

residents of the Harrison Apartments only. When the

officers arrived, there was only one gray van parked in

the residential lot.
The five officers went to the van and looked into it

to see if anyone was inside. Although the windows of

the van were tinted, the officers’ ability to see inside

the vehicle was not impeded. None of the officers saw

the defendant or a shotgun in the van. The officers ran

a license plate check on the van and learned that the

plate did not belong to the van and that there was no

information on record for the vehicle identification

number.

Ruge, Szor and Teele returned to the apartment building to continue their investigation, while Neary and

Waddel stayed behind in the parking lot by the van.

The unidentified man held the door open so that the

three officers could reenter the building from the parking lot. The officers took the elevator to the fourth floor

and approached apartment number 417. They knocked

on the door for several minutes and received no answer.

The officers then returned to the elevator and, as the

elevator doors opened, a Hispanic male matching the

description given by Sanchez exited the elevator and

walked directly to the door of apartment 417.

The officers stopped the man before he could open

the door and asked his name; he identified himself as

the defendant. He was then placed under arrest, handcuffed, and searched incident to the arrest. The officers

seized a key fob, a 12 gauge shotgun shell, a screwdriver

and a box cutter from the defendant’s person. When

asked if they could search his apartment, the defendant

refused and told the officers to get a warrant.

The officers took the defendant in the elevator back

to the first floor and outside to be placed in the back

of Ruge’s patrol car. Ruge and Teele remained with

the defendant. Meanwhile, Szor took the key fob and

returned to the parking lot. Along with Neary and Waddel, Szor approached the van again to look for a shotgun.

Neary cupped his hands and peered through the tinted

windows again and saw the barrel of a shotgun as well

as a box with bullets spilling out of it. He stated aloud

that he thought he saw the barrel of a gun. Waddel then

looked and saw the gun also. Szor approached, pressed

his face to the window, and saw the barrel of the weapon

sticking out of a box on the backseat floor of the van.

All three officers recalled cupping their hands to shield

the sun while looking into the tinted windows of the

van. Upon seeing the shotgun, Szor used the defendant’s

key fob to unlock the van and seized the shotgun.

The defendant subsequently was charged by information with one count of possession of a sawed-off shotgun, one count of possession of a weapon in a motor

vehicle, and one count of assault in the third degree in

violation of General Statutes § 53a-61 (a) (1). On March

2, 2016, the defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained by the police as a result of the search

of his vehicle.1 On March 9, 2016, the trial court, Holden,
J., conducted a motion to suppress hearing and heard

arguments from both parties. On March 10, 2016, Judge

Holden denied the motion to suppress in an oral decision, finding that there was ‘‘probable cause [for the

officers] to believe that the car contained contraband

or evidence pertaining to a crime.’’ On the same date,

following the court’s denial of the motion to suppress,

the defendant entered conditional pleas of nolo contendere on the gun-related charges, reserving his right to

appeal the denial of his motion to suppress.2 The court,

E. Richards, J., also made a finding that the motion to

suppress would have been dispositive of the gun-related

charges. On May 12, 2016, Judge Richards sentenced

the defendant to a total effective term of five years

incarceration, execution suspended after fifteen

months, followed by three years of probation. This

appeal followed.3

The sole issue in this appeal is whether the seizure

of the sawed-off shotgun from the defendant’s vehicle

was the product of an illegal, warrantless search in

violation of the defendant’s rights under the state and

federal constitutions to be free from an unreasonable

search and seizure. Specifically, the defendant argues

that the warrantless search of his vehicle and the seizure

of the sawed-off shotgun found within the vehicle was

not justified under any of the following exceptions to

the warrant requirement: (1) the search was incident

to a lawful arrest of a recent occupant of a motor vehicle; (2) there was probable cause to believe that the

vehicle contained contraband; and (3) the contraband

was in plain view to the officers. In response, the state

claims that the court correctly determined that the seizure of the shotgun was justified under the plain view

doctrine. Because we agree with the state that the officers’ plain view of the shotgun justified their seizure

of it, we need not address the defendant’s alternative

arguments.4

We begin our analysis by setting forth the appropriate

standard of review. ‘‘Our standard of review of a trial

court’s findings and conclusions in connection with a

motion to suppress is well defined. A finding of fact

will not be disturbed unless it is clearly erroneous in

view of the evidence and pleadings in the whole record

. . . . [W]here the legal conclusions of the court are

challenged, we must determine whether they are legally

and logically correct and whether they find support in

the facts set out in the memorandum of decision . . . .’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Winfrey,

302 Conn. 195, 200–201, 24 A.3d 1218 (2011).

‘‘Whether the trial court properly found that the facts

submitted were enough to support a finding of probable

cause is a question of law. . . . The trial court’s determination on the issue, therefore, is subject to plenary

review on appeal. . . . Because a trial court’s determination of the validity of a . . . search [or seizure] impli-
cates a defendant’s constitutional rights . . . we

engage in a careful examination of the record to ensure

that the court’s decision was supported by substantial

evidence. . . . However, [w]e [will] give great deference to the findings of the trial court because of its

function to weigh and interpret the evidence before it

and to pass upon the credibility of witnesses.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) State v. Brown, 279 Conn.

493, 514, 903 A.2d 169 (2006).

We next set forth the applicable constitutional principles. ‘‘The fourth amendment to the United States constitution protects the right of the people to be secure

in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against

unreasonable search and seizures . . . . U.S. Const.,

amend. IV; see also Conn. Const., art. I, § 7. Ordinarily,

police may not conduct a search unless they first obtain

a search warrant from a neutral magistrate after establishing probable cause. . . . Under both the federal

and state constitutions, a warrantless search and seizure is per se unreasonable, subject to a few well

defined exceptions. . . . These exceptions have been

jealously and carefully drawn . . . and the burden is on

the state to establish the exception.’’ (Citations omitted;

internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Wilson, 111

Conn. App. 614, 622, 960 A.2d 1056 (2008), cert. denied,

290 Conn. 917, 966 A.2d 234 (2009).

‘‘In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 464–73,

91 S. Ct. 2022, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564 (1971), the United States

Supreme Court articulated what has become known as

the plain view exception to the warrant requirement.

The warrantless seizure of contraband that is in plain

view is reasonable under the fourth amendment if two

requirements are met: (1) the initial intrusion that

enabled the police to view the items seized must have

been lawful; and (2) the police must have had probable

cause to believe that these items were contraband or

stolen goods.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State

v. Eady, 249 Conn. 431, 436–37, 733 A.2d 112, cert.

denied, 528 U.S. 1030, 120 S. Ct. 551, 145 L. Ed. 2d

428 (1999).

It is well settled that ‘‘objects such as weapons or

contraband found in a public place may be seized by

the police without a warrant. The seizure of property

in plain view involves no invasion of privacy and is

presumptively reasonable, assuming that there is probable cause to associate the property with criminal activity.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Texas v.

Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 738, 103 S. Ct. 1535, 75 L. Ed. 2d

502 (1983). ‘‘A different situation is presented, however,

when the property in open view is situated on private

premises to which access is not otherwise available for

the seizing officer. . . . [P]lain view provides grounds

for seizure of an item when an officer’s access to an

object has some prior justification under the [f]ourth

[a]mendment. Plain view is perhaps better understood,
therefore, not as an independent exception to the [w]arrant [c]lause, but simply as an extension of whatever

the prior justification for an officer’s access to an object

may be.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) Id., 738–39.

‘‘[T]he plain view doctrine is grounded on the proposition that once police are lawfully in a position to observe

an item first-hand, its owner’s privacy interest in that

item is lost; the owner may retain the incidents of title

and possession but not privacy. . . . [I]f contraband is

left in open view and is observed by a police officer

from a lawful vantage point, there has been no invasion

of a legitimate expectation of privacy and thus no search

within the meaning of the [f]ourth [a]mendment—or at

least no search independent of the initial intrusion that

gave the officers their vantage point.’’ (Citation omitted;

internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Brown,

supra, 279 Conn. 520–21; see also State v. Kuskowski,

200 Conn. 82, 85, 510 A.2d 172 (1986) (where defendant’s

car was parked in public boat launch area, officer had

right to stand beside car, peer in, and subsequently

seize contraband in plain view). Additionally, the police

need not have discovered the evidence inadvertently in

order to seize contraband in plain view. See State v.

Eady, supra, 249 Conn. 437 n.7 (‘‘inadvertence is not

required if the items seized fall under the category of

contraband, stolen property or objects dangerous in

themselves’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]).

The defendant does not dispute that the officers were

lawfully present in the residential parking lot when they

first looked into the defendant’s vehicle because they

were responding to the emergency call reporting an

assault on the premises. The defendant asserts, however, that once he was arrested and placed into the

back of the police cruiser, the officers were no longer

lawfully present because they were trespassing on private property and, therefore, they needed a warrant to

look into his vehicle a second time.

We conclude that the officer’s subsequent look into

the defendant’s vehicle was a mere continuation of their

ongoing investigation. See State v. Langley, 128 Conn.

App. 213, 225, 16 A.3d 799 (‘‘[a] search warrant is not

required where evidence discovered in plain view is

seized as part of a continuing police investigation’’

[internal quotation marks omitted]), cert. denied, 302

Conn. 911, 27 A.3d 371 (2011); accord State v. Magnano,

204 Conn. 259, 269, 528 A.2d 760 (1987).

In the present case, when the officers arrived at the

Harrison Apartments, they were actively investigating

reports of a suspect who had committed an assault and

was armed with a shotgun. Two witnesses indicated to

the police that the defendant had a shotgun: The victim

told police that they could find the defendant in his

apartment with a shotgun, and the unidentified man

indicated that the suspect was sitting with a shotgun
in his van in the parking lot. The officers did not see

anyone with a shotgun in the van. Neary and Waddel

remained with the van while the other officers apprehended the defendant as he was returning to his apartment. They did not find a weapon on his person, but

they did find a 12 gauge shotgun shell in his pocket.

Although the defendant had been arrested and placed

in the back of the police cruiser, the police still had

not located the shotgun described by the two witnesses.

It was reasonable for the officers to believe, therefore,

that the shotgun was located in the van and to return

to the parking lot to retrieve the weapon. At the time

the officers looked into the van for a second time, they

were continuing their investigation into the assault; specifically, they were looking for the shotgun described

by the two witnesses.

We find no meaningful distinction between the first

and second time the police looked into the defendant’s

van. The second look into the defendant’s van constituted no greater intrusion upon the defendant’s privacy

or possessory interest than did their initial view. See

State v. Eady, supra, 249 Conn. 444–45 (‘‘the initial

lawful entry by a government agent, who was entitled

to seize contraband observed in plain view . . . eliminated the defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy

in the contraband and thereby permitted the subsequent

entry by a second government agent to do that which

the first could have done’’ [citations omitted]); see also

United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 117, 104 S. Ct.

1652, 80 L. Ed. 2d 85 (1984) (‘‘[o]nce frustration of

the original expectation of privacy occurs, the [f]ourth

[a]mendment does not prohibit governmental use of

the now nonprivate information’’). Because the plain

view doctrine focuses on whether the initial intrusion

was lawful, we reject the defendant’s argument that the

officers’ intrusion somehow became unlawful during

the ongoing investigation. We conclude, therefore, that

the officers’ second look into the defendant’s vehicle

was merely a continuation of their ongoing investigation

into the assault, and therefore, the officers were lawfully present in the private parking lot.

The second element of the plain view doctrine

requires that the incriminating character of the object

viewed was immediately apparent. ‘‘The immediately

apparent requirement of the plain view exception is

satisfied if, at the time of discovery of the contraband

or evidence, there is probable cause to associate the

property in plain view with criminal activity without

further investigation.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Eady, supra, 249 Conn. 439. ‘‘[Our Connecticut courts] consistently have held that [t]he quantum of

evidence necessary to establish probable cause exceeds

mere suspicion, but is substantially less than that

required for conviction. . . . While probable cause

requires more than mere suspicion . . . the line

between mere suspicion and probable cause necessarily
must be drawn by an act of judgment formed in light

of the particular situation and with account taken of all

the circumstances.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

State v. Brown, supra, 279 Conn. 521.

‘‘Probable cause, broadly defined, [comprises] such

facts as would reasonably persuade an impartial and

reasonable mind not merely to suspect or conjecture,

but to believe that criminal activity has occurred. . . .

In other words, because [t]he probable cause determination is, simply, an analysis of probabilities . . .

[p]robable cause requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing

of such activity.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

State v. Jones, supra, 320 Conn. 70–71. ‘‘It is axiomatic

that [t]he probable cause test then is an objective one.

. . . The United States Supreme Court has endorsed

an objective standard, noting that evenhanded law

enforcement is best achieved by the application of

objective standards of conduct, rather than standards

that depend on the subjective state of mind of the officer.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Eady, supra, 249 Conn. 440–41, citing

Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 138, 110 S. Ct. 2301,

110 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1990). ‘‘The determination of whether

probable cause exists under the fourth amendment to

the federal constitution, and under article first, § 7, of

our state constitution, is made pursuant to a totality of

circumstances test.’’ State v. Orellana, 89 Conn. App.

71, 80, 872 A.2d 506, cert. denied, 274 Conn. 910, 876

A.2d 1202 (2005). ‘‘Under the [Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S.

213, 231–32, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983)]

test, a court must examine all of the evidence relating

to the issue of probable cause and, on the basis of that

evidence, make a commonsense, practical determination of whether probable cause existed.’’ State v. Orellana, supra, 80–81.

In light of this objective standard, we need only look

to the evidence presented relating to the officers’ knowledge to determine whether, on the basis of that knowledge, a reasonable person would have had probable

cause to believe that the shotgun viewed by the officers

from outside of the defendant’s vehicle was the weapon

described by the two witnesses. The trial court credited

the testimony of the five officers and relied on that

testimony in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress. The court found that: (1) the police were dispatched to the YMCA and adjoining apartment complex

to investigate a reported assault; (2) the dispatcher indicated that the suspect was in his apartment with a

shotgun; (3) upon arrival, the police spoke with the

victim, who identified the defendant as his assailant

and told them that the defendant owned a shotgun; (4)

an unidentified man told police that the defendant was

in the residential parking lot sitting in his van with a

shotgun; (5) the officers looked in the windows of the

van but did not see the defendant or a shotgun inside;
(6) the officers apprehended the defendant and during

the search of his person, the key to the vehicle in question was found in his pocket, along with a 12 gauge

shotgun shell; (7) the officers again looked inside the

van and could see the barrel of a shotgun and bullets

protruding from a box on the floor of the van; and (8)

the officers used the key to access the defendant’s van;

and (9) they seized the sawed-off shotgun from the

backseat of the van. See, e.g., State v. Wilson, supra,

111 Conn. App. 624–25.

The state claims that those facts established probable

cause to seize the defendant’s shotgun once the police

viewed it from outside the van. We agree. ‘‘[A] police

officer is certainly entitled to utilize his training and

experience in ascertaining probable cause’’; (internal

quotation marks omitted) id., 625; and in this case, we

conclude that the totality of the facts are sufficient to

‘‘warrant a [person] of reasonable caution in the belief’’

that the weapon described by two witnesses might be

found in the van. (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

State v. Badgett, 200 Conn. 412, 430, 512 A.2d 160, cert.

denied, 479 U.S. 940, 107 S. Ct. 423, 93 L. Ed. 2d 373

(1986). It was reasonable for the officers to infer that

there was a fair probability the defendant had stored

the shotgun in his vehicle prior to his apprehension.

We conclude, therefore, that the shotgun inside the

defendant’s van was immediately apparent to the

officers.5

Accordingly, we conclude that the warrantless search

of the defendant’s vehicle and the seizure of the items

found within were constitutionally valid pursuant to

the plain view doctrine, and, thus, the court properly

denied the defendant’s motion to suppress.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 We note that the defendant did not challenge in the trial court, or on

appeal, the legality of his arrest or the fruits of the search of his person

incident to that arrest.

2 At the defendant’s plea hearing, the state entered a nolle prosequi on

the assault in the third degree charge.

3 On January 20, 2017, Judge Holden issued a written memorandum of

decision outlining his rationale for denying the motion to suppress, namely,

that there was probable cause to believe that the vehicle contained contraband and that the shotgun was seized pursuant to the plain view of the

officers.

4 The defendant also raises a state constitutional claim that the plain view

doctrine did not justify the warrantless search of his van under article first,

§ 7, of the Connecticut constitution. The defendant has not provided any

independent analysis of the plain view doctrine under the Connecticut constitution, nor does he apply the facts of this case to pertinent Connecticut

case law. ‘‘[F]or this court judiciously and efficiently to consider claims of

error raised on appeal . . . the parties must clearly and fully set forth their

arguments in their briefs. We do not reverse the judgment of a trial court

on the basis of challenges to its rulings that have not been adequately briefed.

. . . The parties may not merely cite a legal principle without analyzing the

relationship between the facts of the case and the law cited. . . . [A]ssignments of error which are merely mentioned but not briefed beyond a statement of the claim will be deemed abandoned and will not be reviewed by

this court.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Hodkoski, 146 Conn.

App. 701, 712 n.10, 78 A.3d 255 (2013). Accordingly, we decline to review
the defendant’s state constitutional claim.

Additionally, because we determine that the officers’ seizure of the shotgun was justified under the plain view doctrine, we do not reach the defendant’s claim that, under article first, § 7, of the Connecticut constitution, a

residential parking lot is part of the constitutionally protected curtilage of

an individual’s home.

5 Even if we were to hold that the officers’ search of the vehicle was

unreasonable, which we do not, the shotgun inevitably would have been

discovered through the inventory procedures of the police department.

‘‘Under the inevitable discovery rule, evidence illegally secured in violation

of the defendant’s constitutional rights need not be suppressed if the state

demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that the evidence would

have been ultimately discovered by lawful means. . . . To qualify for admissibility the state must demonstrate that the lawful means which made discovery inevitable were possessed by the police and were being actively pursued

prior to the occurrence of the constitutional violation. . . . The inevitable

discovery rule applies in a situation in which . . . the police would have

legally discovered the evidence eventually.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Vallejo, 102 Conn. App. 628, 640, 926 A.2d

681, cert. denied, 284 Conn. 912, 931 A.2d 934 (2007).

In the present case, the van was towed from the parking lot and impounded

for the misuse of license plates and because no information could be found

on the VIN number. Ruge testified that it was the Bridgeport police department policy to conduct an inventory search of vehicles that had been towed.

See id. (‘‘[A]n inventory search is a well-defined exception to the warrant

requirement. . . . In the performance of their community caretaking functions, the police are frequently obliged to take automobiles into their custody.

. . . A standardized procedure for making a list or inventory as soon as

reasonable after reaching the stationhouse not only deters false claims but

also inhibits theft or careless handling of articles taken from the arrested

person.’’ [Internal quotation marks omitted.]). The police would have found

the shotgun when they inventoried the vehicle after they towed the van.

Therefore, the inevitable discovery doctrine provides an alternative ground

for affirmance.