Filed: 4/20/23 Harris v. Gilliam CA2/7

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

LYDIA HARRIS,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

KEVIN GILLIAM, 

Defendant; 

WASSERMAN, COMDEN & 

CASSELMAN,

Third Party Claimant and

Respondent.

 B320824

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. BC268857)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, David Sotello, Judge. Affirmed.

Dermot Givens for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Law Offices of Peter Q. Ezzell and Nancy Lucas Ezzell for 

Third Party Claimant and Respondent.

_______________________________
2

Lydia Harris and her wholly owned record company, New 

Image Media Corp., represented by the law firm then-named 

Wasserman, Comden, Casselman & Pearson, LLP (Wasserman 

firm), obtained a default judgment for $107 million against

Marion “Suge” Knight and Death Row Records in March 2005 

based on Harris’s allegation she had been the victim of a 

conspiracy to deprive her of a 50 percent ownership interest in 

Death Row Records. Seventeen years later, on March 14, 2022,

Harris, represented by Dermot Givens, Knight and Death Row 

Records’ former counsel in the litigation, moved pursuant to Code 

of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (d),

1

to set aside as 

void the judgment entered in her favor. Harris contended the 

superior court lacked jurisdiction over her 2002 lawsuit because 

the claims asserted were an asset of her bankruptcy estate and 

could only have been pursued by the bankruptcy trustee in

federal bankruptcy court—an argument previously rejected on 

multiple occasions because the bankruptcy trustee had ratified 

the 2005 judgment through settlements, approved by the 

bankruptcy court, with Knight’s and Death Row Records’ 

bankruptcy estates. The court denied Harris’s motion, finding 

nothing in Harris’s papers that indicated those prior rulings were 

incorrect. We affirm.

1

Statutory references are to this code unless otherwise 

stated.
3

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

1. Harris’s Bankruptcy Proceedings

Death Row Records was founded in 1991 by, among others, 

Knight and Harris’s former husband, Michael Harris.2 Harris on 

May 17, 1996 filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy court 

under chapter 7 of title 11 of the United States Code. She did not 

list as an asset her claimed 50 percent ownership interest in 

Death Row Records. Harris was denied a discharge on July 21, 

1997, and the case was closed without administration of any 

assets on December 15, 1999. 

2. The 2002 Death Row Litigation, Default Judgment, 

Secret Partial Settlement and the Attorney Lien

Litigation 

Harris and the Wasserman firm entered into a contingency 

fee retainer agreement in January 2002 providing the law firm 

would receive 40 percent of any recovery from Harris’s lawsuit 

asserting her ownership interest in Death Row Records. The 

lawsuit was filed in February 2002 against Knight, Death Row 

Records and others (Death Row litigation). After striking the 

answer of Knight and Death Row Records for a series of discovery 

violations, the trial court entered their default and on March 9, 

2005, following a prove-up hearing, a judgment in favor of Harris 

and New Image Media and against Knight and Death Row 

Records for $107 million ($45 million for economic damages, 

2

Lydia and Michael Harris’s marriage was dissolved in 

2005.
4

$2 million for noneconomic damages and $60 million for punitive 

damages).3 No appeal was taken from the judgment. 

Harris discharged the Wasserman firm on May 19, 2005, 

indicating on her substitution of counsel form that she would be 

representing herself in the Death Row litigation. The 

Wasserman firm filed a notice of attorney fee lien the same day. 

The following week Knight, acting through attorney 

Givens, paid Harris $1 million ($10,000 on May 20 and $990,000 

on May 27, 2005) in (partial) satisfaction of the $107 million 

judgment in the Death Row litigation. The Wasserman firm 

contended in a lawsuit filed against Harris, Givens and others 

(Wasserman, Comden, Casselman & Pearson, LLP v. Harris

(Super. Ct. L.A. County, 2005, No. BC340196) (attorney lien 

litigation)) that it was unaware of the payment to Harris when 

made and that, in providing the payment, Givens had ignored the

Wasserman firm’s attorney fee lien and interfered with its right 

to collect fees pursuant to its retainer agreement with Harris. 

Following a bench trial in July 2007 in the attorney lien 

litigation,4the court found the Wasserman firm’s lien was valid 

and the firm was entitled to its lien on any recovery in the Death 

Row litigation. The court further found that Givens, aware of the 

3

Prior to the default and default judgment, the court had 

entered judgment in favor of Interscope Records and two of its 

executives, named as defendants by Harris, after granting their 

motion for summary judgment. We affirmed that judgment on 

appeal. (Harris v. Interscope Records (June 9, 2004, B166253) 

[nonpub. opn.].)

4

Prior to the bench trial the Wasserman firm settled its 

claims with Harris. Its claims against defendants other than 

Givens were severed due to pending bankruptcy proceedings. 
5

lien, “intentionally and with malicious intent to deprive [the 

Wasserman firm] of [its] earned attorney fees, unethically 

ignored the fee lien while lying to Ms. Harris that [the 

Wasserman firm] was not entitled to [its] lien and saying 

‘obviously we won’t be paying them any money.’” After denying 

Givens’s motion for a new trial, which argued the judgment in 

the Death Row litigation and the Wasserman firm’s retainer 

agreement were invalid because the bankruptcy court had 

exclusive jurisdiction over Harris’s claim to an ownership interest 

in Death Row Records, the trial court on April 30, 2008 entered 

judgment awarding the Wasserman firm $805,752 in 

compensatory damages and $250,000 in punitive damages

against Givens. Givens did not appeal the judgment.

Beginning in November 2007, following the bench trial in 

the attorney lien case, and continuing through mid-2008, Givens 

filed a series of motions to intervene and to set aside the 

judgment in the Death Row litigation on which the Wasserman 

firm’s tort claims against him were based. Givens argued the 

Harris bankruptcy proceeding created a “judicial estoppel” that 

precluded the superior court’s exercise of jurisdiction over 

Harris’s claims.5

On June 25, 2008 the Harris bankruptcy trustee, who had 

been reappointed after learning of the 2005 judgment in the 

Death Row litigation, filed an opposition to the last of Givens’s 

successive motions to intervene. In addition to arguing that 

Givens, as a third party stranger to the litigation, had no 

5

As a condition to entering settlement discussions in 2005, 

Givens’s clients, Knight and Death Row Records, waived their 

right to attack the judgment. 
6

standing to attack the judgment, the trustee explained that 

approximately $50 million of the $107 million judgment resulted 

from post-petition claims as to which Harris was the sole real 

party in interest: “Had [Harris] listed the pre-petition claim as 

an asset, this action would still have proceeded. It would likely 

have been prosecuted jointly by [Harris] (as owner of the postpetition claims) and the Trustee (as owner of the pre-petition 

claims) as co-plaintiffs[,] and there is no reason to believe the 

result would have been any different.” The trustee noted that a 

tentative agreement had been reached between Harris and the 

trustee as to their respective interests in the judgment. 

The Wasserman firm, as lien claimant, also filed an 

opposition to Givens’s motions. Givens’s serial motions to 

intervene were all denied.

3. Additional Bankruptcy Court Proceedings

In April 2006 Knight and Death Row Records each filed 

voluntary petitions for relief in bankruptcy court under 

chapter 11 of title 11 of the United States Code. Harris filed 

proofs of claim in both bankruptcy proceedings based on the $107 

million judgment in the Death Row litigation. 

Harris’s earlier bankruptcy case was reopened on 

August 21, 2007; and, as discussed, the former trustee was 

reappointed after learning of Harris’s $107 million judgment, 

which the trustee believed may have involved rights existing 

when Harris filed her bankruptcy petition in 1996. 

Adversary proceedings were initiated by Knight as debtorin-possession and Death Row Records as debtor-in-possession in 

the Knight bankruptcy case against Harris seeking to declare the 

judgment in the Death Row litigation satisfied or to disallow the 

judgment under various theories and by Harris seeking to declare 
7

the judgment a nondischargeable debt. Following mediation the 

parties settled the dispute, effective February 6, 2008. Under the 

terms of the settlement among Harris, her former husband and 

the trustees of the Harris, Knight and Death Row Records 

bankruptcy estates, a portion of Harris’s proof of claim in the 

Knight and Death Row Records bankruptcy proceeds was 

allowed, in part as an unsecured claim and in part as a 

subordinated claim. In addition, in consideration of, and subject 

to, the terms of their agreement, the trustee of Harris’s chapter 7 

bankruptcy estate fully released the Death Row Records trustee, 

the Death Row Records estate, the Knight trustee and the Knight

estate from all claims, causes of action, obligations and liabilities. 

Harris personally agreed to a general release of all claims she 

might have relating to the matters addressed in the settlement 

agreement. The settlement was approved by the bankruptcy 

court on June 9, 2008. 

In November 2014 the bankruptcy court approved a 

settlement among Harris, the Wasserman firm, the trustee of the 

Harris estate and others that resolved the Wasserman firm’s fee 

claim. The reopened bankruptcy proceeding for Harris’s estate 

was closed on December 17, 2015. 

4. Givens’s Efforts To Assert Bankruptcy Court Jurisdiction 

over the Wasserman Firm’s Claims

In September 2007 and early 2008 Givens attempted to 

remove the attorney lien litigation to the bankruptcy court. The 

case was remanded on both occasions. 

In November 2008 Givens filed a lawsuit against the 

Wasserman firm for intentional and negligent misrepresentation, 

asserting the firm had misrepresented its authority to enter into

the retainer agreement with Harris and to pursue the Death Row 
8

litigation on her behalf because Harris’s claim to an ownership 

interest in the record label belonged to her bankruptcy estate. 

Givens dismissed the action in response to the Wasserman firm’s 

special motion to strike pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure 

section 425.16. 

In February 2015 Givens moved to set aside the judgment 

in the attorney lien litigation as void pursuant to section 473, 

subdivision (d), arguing the retainer agreement and subsequent 

attorney fee lien were invalid because Harris’s claim to an 

ownership interest in Death Row Records was a prepetition claim 

and only the Harris bankruptcy trustee was authorized to pursue

it. The court denied the motion in May 2015, and in September 

2015 it denied Givens’s motion for reconsideration. Our 

colleagues in Division Four of this court affirmed the order 

denying the motion to set aside, holding, even if the contract 

between Harris and the Wasserman firm was void or voidable, 

that would not constitute a jurisdictional defect in the 

Wasserman firm’s action against Givens. (Wasserman, Comden, 

Casselman & Pearson, LLP v. Givens (Mar. 29, 2017, B268664)

[nonpub. opn.].)6

Givens filed another lawsuit in November 2017, this time 

in federal court, seeking a declaration that the Wasserman firm 

6 Givens also contended the automatic stay in the reopened 

Harris bankruptcy case deprived the superior court of jurisdiction 

over the attorney lien litigation. The court of appeal in affirming 

the order denying Givens’s motion explained that the existence of 

an automatic stay that may have protected Harris had no bearing 

on the superior court’s jurisdiction over the Wasserman firm’s 

claims against Givens. (Wasserman, Comden, Casselman & 

Pearson, LLP v. Givens, supra, B268664.)
9

did not have standing to pursue its claim or collect its judgment 

in the attorney lien case, again based on the superior court’s 

purported lack of jurisdiction due to Harris’s bankruptcy. The 

lawsuit was dismissed with prejudice with the court 

characterizing it as “meritless and frivolous.” 

In July 2021 Givens made one more attempt to void the 

judgment in the attorney lien litigation, moving to vacate the 

judgment on the ground the bankruptcy court, not the superior 

court, had jurisdiction over the Wasserman firm’s claims that he 

interfered with the firm’s contractual rights arising from the 

Death Row litigation. The court denied the motion on 

November 1, 2021, stating it “lack[ed] merit procedurally and 

substantively,” and awarded sanctions to the Wasserman firm, 

ruling the procedural history in the Death Row litigation and the 

attorney lien litigation “clearly shows the jurisdictional claims 

pursued by Defendant Givens are not warranted by existing law 

or its modification.” 

Givens then attempted to have the Harris bankruptcy case 

reopened so California state courts would recognize the 

jurisdiction of the federal bankruptcy court. In the court’s 

December 1, 2021 ruling and memorandum of opinion denying 

the request to reopen, United States Bankruptcy Judge 

Geraldine Mund found that Givens had no standing because the 

attorney lien case in which he was a defendant never involved 

the bankruptcy estate. In addition, Judge Mund wrote, 

“Whatever rights the estate had were settled by the Trustee and 

none exist at this time. The litigation in the Harris v. Knight 

case has been concluded in the state court. There is no relief to 

be granted in the bankruptcy court . . . . [¶] This issue has been 
10

decided several times by other courts and I find no grounds to 

reopen when no relief can possibly be given.” 

5. Givens’s Attempts on Behalf of Harris To Set Aside the 

2005 Default Judgment

On June 14, 2019 Givens, who, as discussed, had previously 

represented Knight and Death Row Records in the Death Row 

litigation and then sought to intervene and set aside the 

judgment on his own behalf, moved as Harris’s counsel to set 

aside the 2005 default judgment. The trial court initially granted 

the motion on September 20, 2019, accepting the argument the 

judgment was void because Harris’s claims should have been part 

of her bankruptcy estate.7 On October 1, 2019 the Wasserman 

firm, asserting standing because of its lien on Harris’s judgment 

and explaining it had not received notice of the motion to set 

aside, asked the court to reconsider its September 20, 2019 

ruling. The court granted the motion for reconsideration on 

December 12, 2019 and vacated its earlier ruling setting aside 

the judgment, explaining the Wasserman firm had provided 

information not disclosed by Harris or Givens, including that the 

trustee of Harris’s bankruptcy estate was aware of the judgment 

and had ratified it after the fact through settlements in the 

bankruptcy cases involving the various parties, including Harris 

and Knight. 

In March 2020 the court denied Harris’s motion for 

reconsideration of the December 12, 2019 order vacating its 

September 20, 2019 ruling. It denied a second motion to set aside 

7

The superior court judge who entered the 2005 default 

judgment and denied Givens’s efforts to set aside the judgment in 

2007 and 2008 retired in 2014.
11

Knight’s and Death Row Records’ defaults in September 2020 and 

in October 2020 granted the Wasserman firm’s motion for 

sanctions. 

One day after the court awarded the Wasserman firm 

sanctions, Givens on behalf of Harris filed a new motion to set 

aside the default. The court again denied the motion, explaining, 

with a citation to its December 12, 2019 minute order, “Counsel 

Givens is well aware that the Court previously found that the 

bankruptcy trustee was aware of Harris’ pre-bankruptcy petition 

interest in the Judgment and ratified it after the fact.”8

Finally, on March 14, 2022 Givens, on behalf of Harris, 

filed the motion to set aside a void order pursuant to section 473, 

subdivision (d), which is the subject of this appeal. Harris did not 

include her motion in the record on appeal,9but, as described by 

the court in its order denying the motion, Harris again contended 

the superior court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the Death Row 

8 Harris’s appeal of the trial court’s September 9, 2020 order 

denying her motion to set aside default was dismissed for failure 

to pay the required filing fee. (Harris v. Wasserman, Comden & 

Casselman, LLP, B308872.)

9 Using the optional Judicial Council form for designating 

the record on appeal in limited civil cases, Givens requested that 

the record include an exhibit attached to Harris’s motion (the 

transcript of the bankruptcy hearing before Judge Mund) but not 

the motion itself, the Wasserman firm’s opposition memorandum 

or Harris’s reply to the opposition memorandum. The 

Wasserman firm then designated additional documents to be part 

of the clerk’s transcript, including its opposition to Harris’s 

motion but, like Givens, omitted the motion itself and Harris’s 

reply papers. 
12

litigation because the subject matter of the action—damages 

arising from Harris’s alleged ownership interest in Death Row 

Records—was property that belonged to her bankruptcy estate 

and the claims could only be asserted by the bankruptcy trustee. 

As reflected in the court’s ruling, Harris’s motion—her “new 

evidence”—was based on statements made by Judge Mund in 

connection with her December 1, 2021 ruling denying Givens’s 

motion to reopen the Harris bankruptcy case that Harris’s claims

to an ownership interest in Death Row Records were not 

“automatically abandoned” because not listed in the bankruptcy 

schedules in 1996. 

The court denied Harris’s motion on April 25, 2022.10 In its 

ruling the court explained Judge Mund’s statements were not in 

conflict with the reasoning of its own prior order rejecting 

Harris’s jurisdiction claim. Whether or not the claim to an 

interest in Death Row Records had been automatically 

abandoned, Judge Mund stated “abandonment is not the issue” 

and found the trustee “certainly knew about it.” Indeed, the 

superior court reiterated, as the bankruptcy court ruled, Harris 

and the bankruptcy trustee entered into a settlement with 

respect to the 2005 default judgment, fully resolving any possible 

10 At the outset of its ruling the court observed, “This is the 

latest groundless attempt by Plaintiff Lydia Harris and her 

current attorney Dermot Givens, who represented Defendant 

Gilliam in [the] case, to essentially void this action ab initio for 

lack of jurisdiction over alleged bankruptcy assets beyond this 

court’s authority, which, if granted could collaterally affect LASC 

Action No. BC340196 [the attorney lien litigation]—in which a 

Los Angeles Superior Court rendered a judgment of over 

$1 million against Dermot Givens . . . .” 
13

jurisdiction issue: “Plaintiff settled her claims with the 

bankruptcy estate . . . . The U.S. Bankruptcy Court concluded 

that the bankruptcy estate has settled its affairs and refused to 

reopen the bankruptcy case.” 

Harris (still represented by Givens) filed a timely notice of 

appeal. 

DISCUSSION

1. Standard of Review

Section 473, subdivision (d), provides a trial court “may, on 

motion of either party after notice to the other party, set aside 

any void judgment or order.” “[I]nclusion of the word ‘may’ in the 

language of section 473, subdivision (d) makes it clear that a trial 

court retains discretion to grant or deny a motion to set aside a 

void judgment.” (Cruz v. Fagor America, Inc. (2007) 

146 Cal.App.4th 488, 495; accord, Pittman v. Beck Park 

Apartments Ltd. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 1009, 1020.)11 The

11 Harris relies on extrinsic evidence—her 1996 bankruptcy 

filing and statements from subsequent bankruptcy proceedings—

to argue the 2005 default judgment is void. Appellate decisions 

distinguish for purposes of section 473, subdivision (d), between 

judgments void on the face of the record and those shown to be 

invalid through extrinsic evidence. (See, e.g., Pittman v. Beck 

Park Apartments Ltd., supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 1021.) These 

decisions hold a motion to set aside a judgment void on its face 

may be made at any time in the underlying action but must be 

challenged within the six-month time limit prescribed by 

section 473, subdivision (b), or by an independent action in equity

if the invalidity can be shown only through consideration of 

extrinsic evidence. (Ibid.; see OC Interior Services, LLC v. 

Nationstar Mortgage, LLC (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 1318, 1328; 

Ramos v. Homeward Residential, Inc. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th

1434, 1440.) Whether that distinction is correct is now before the 
14

reviewing court “generally faces two separate determinations 

when considering an appeal based on section 473, subdivision (d): 

whether the order or judgment is void and, if so, whether the trial 

court properly exercised its discretion in setting it aside.” (Nixon 

Peabody LLP v. Superior Court (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 818, 822.)

The trial court’s determination whether an order is void is 

reviewed de novo; its decision whether to set aside a void order is 

reviewed for an abuse of discretion. (Ibid.; see Airs Aromatics, 

LLC v. CBL Data Recovery Technologies, Inc. (2018) 

23 Cal.App.5th 1013, 1018; Cruz, at p. 496.)

2. Harris Failed To Demonstrate the 2005 Default 

Judgment Is Void

In her appellate briefs Harris argues, as she and Givens 

have repeatedly done in other fora, that her claim to an 

ownership interest in Death Row Records was an asset of her 

bankruptcy estate omitted from the schedules she filed in 1996; 

that the federal bankruptcy court had exclusive jurisdiction over 

the claim; and that, as a consequence, the trial court in 2022 

should have set aside the 2005 default judgment in the Death 

Row litigation. In support Harris asserts the December 1, 2021 

opinion of the bankruptcy court agreed her claims to an 

ownership interest remained an asset of the bankruptcy estate. 

Therefore, Harris argues, her claims were subject to the exclusive 

jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court and nothing in the record 

supports a finding the bankruptcy trustee (with the approval of 

the bankruptcy court) can ratify the superior court’s exercise of 

Supreme Court in California Capital Insurance Co. v. Hoehn, 

review granted January 25, 2023, S277510. Because we find no 

merit to Harris’s arguments on appeal, we need not address the 

timeliness of her renewed motion to vacate the judgment.
15

jurisdiction under the circumstances present here (as actually 

phrased by Harris, “can unilaterally cede the jurisdiction of a 

federal bankruptcy court to the Superior Court”). 

Contrary to Harris’s recitation, however, the bankruptcy 

court did not find Harris’s claims were currently an asset of a 

bankruptcy estate. What the court actually said was that 

Harris’s claims of ownership were not automatically abandoned 

when the bankruptcy case was closed in 1999. Crucially, the 

court added that the trustee was aware of the claims and 

“abandonment is not the issue.” In other words, as the court 

emphasized, even if some pre-petition ownership rights had at 

some point been an asset of the bankruptcy estate, the trustee 

had fully settled the rights of the bankruptcy estate with respect 

to the claims, the state court case had been concluded, and 

neither the estate nor Harris had any further interest in the 

matter—all points ignored (repeatedly) by Harris. 

That was also the analysis of the superior court on 

December 12, 2019 when it vacated the order it had “mistakenly 

entered” because Harris failed to disclose pertinent information—

that is, that the trustee of Harris’s bankruptcy estate was aware 

of the 2005 default judgment and ratified it through settlement 

agreements with Harris personally and with the trustees of the 

bankruptcy estates of Knight and Death Row Records, which 

were approved by the bankruptcy court. And the court in 

denying Harris’s March 14, 2022 motion accurately stated that 

nothing in the December 1, 2021 bankruptcy ruling was 

inconsistent with its prior analysis. In addition, the trustee’s 

2008 filing in opposition to Givens’s attempt to set aside the 

judgment on his own behalf explained that Harris’s post-petition 

claims (that is, claims relating to her ownership interest in Death 
16

Row Records that arose after May 17, 1996, worth approximately 

$50 million) were not part of the bankruptcy estate and were 

properly determined in the superior court action. 

Moreover, Harris’s argument inverts the parties’ burdens 

on appeal. Because there is a presumption in favor of the validity 

of the judgment (see, e.g., Kinney v. Superior Court (2022) 

77 Cal.App.5th 168, 177 [“‘“[a] judgment or order of a lower court 

is presumed to be correct on appeal, and all intendments and 

presumptions are indulged in favor of its correctness”’”]), it was

Harris’s obligation as appellant to demonstrate reversible error. 

(Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608–609; accord, Farnum

v. Iris Biotechnologies Inc. (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 602, 608;

Del Real v. City of Riverside (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 761, 766.) “To

demonstrate error, appellant must present meaningful legal

analysis supported by citations to authority and citations to facts

in the record that support the claim of error. [Citations.] When a

point is asserted without argument and authority for the

proposition, ‘it is deemed to be without foundation and requires

no discussion by the reviewing court.’ [Citations.] Hence,

conclusory claims of error will fail.” (In re S.C. (2006)

138 Cal.App.4th 396, 408.) 

Harris has presented nothing but a conclusory claim of

error, citing no legal authority for the proposition that

subsequent actions by a bankruptcy trustee, particularly when

expressly approved by the bankruptcy court (here, settling all

claims relating to Harris’s claimed ownership interest in Death

Row Records with Harris, Knight and Death Row and the

trustees of their bankruptcy estates), cannot effectively preclude

a subsequent challenge to a superior court judgment, even if the
17

underlying claims (or some of them) should have been pursued in

federal bankruptcy court.

Harris’s additional contention the 2005 default judgment

and the April 25, 2022 postjudgment order now on appeal were

improperly entered while an automatic stay imposed by federal

bankruptcy law was in effect is utterly frivolous.12 Harris’s 1996

bankruptcy case was closed without administration of any assets

in December 1999, three years before Harris’s initial lawsuit. It

was not reopened by motion of the trustee until August 2007—

more than two years after Harris obtained the $107 million

judgment against Givens’s clients. And the reopened bankruptcy

proceeding was again closed in December 2015, well before the

superior court’s repeated rejections of Harris’s efforts to set aside

the judgment. Not only was there no bankruptcy stay in effect at

any material time, but also the automatic stay is not applicable to

actions initiated by the debtor. (See Shah v. Glendale Federal

Bank (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1371, 1375; cf. Danko v. O’Reilly

(2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 732, 748 [“‘[T]he automatic stay operates

for the benefit of the debtor and trustee only, and gives other

12 “Upon the filing of a bankruptcy proceeding, federal 

bankruptcy law imposes an automatic stay on all state and 

federal proceedings outside the bankruptcy court against the 

debtor and the debtor’s property. (11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) & (2); 

[citation omitted].) . . . ‘The automatic stay is self-executing and 

is effective upon filing the bankruptcy petition. (See 11 U.S.C. 

§ 362(a).)’ [Citation.] Section 362(a)(3) of title 11 of the United 

States Code provides for an automatic stay of ‘any act to obtain 

possession of property of the estate or of property from the estate 

or to exercise control over property of the estate.’” (Shaoxing 

County Huayue Import & Export v. Bhaumik (2011) 

191 Cal.App.4th 1189, 1196.)
18

parties interested in property affected by the automatic stay no

substantive or procedural rights. [Citations.] If the debtor or

trustee chooses not to invoke the protections of the automatic stay,

no other party may attack any act in violation of the automatic

stay’”].) Accordingly, Harris’s position is entirely without merit.

3. Harris Forfeited Her Additional Claims Challenging the 

Trial Court’s Postjudgment Order

As further grounds for reversing the order denying her 

motion to set aside the 2005 default judgment, Harris contends 

the trial court erred in permitting the Wasserman firm to 

intervene in the Death Row litigation without adhering to the 

requirements of section 387, subdivision (c),13 and the court’s 

order was the product of racial bias. Both arguments have been 

forfeited.

As discussed, the Wasserman firm on October 1, 2019 

moved for reconsideration of the September 20, 2019 order 

setting aside the 2005 default judgment, asserting it had the 

right to seek relief because of its lien on the judgment—an 

entirely appropriate basis for intervention. (See § 387, 

subd. (d)(1)(B) [court may permit a nonparty to intervene if “[t]he 

person seeking intervention claims an interest relating to the 

property or transaction that is the subject of the action and that 

person is so situated that the disposition of the action may impair 

or impede that person’s ability to protect that interest”].) The

court granted the Wasserman firm’s motion and vacated its 

September 20, 2019 order. 

13 Section 387, subdivision (c), provides in part, “A nonparty 

shall petition the court for leave to intervene by noticed motion or 

ex parte application.” 
19

Although it is difficult to fathom how any technical 

irregularity in permitting the Wasserman firm to intervene in 

the Death Row litigation in light of its attorney lien could be 

prejudicial—a point Harris does not address—if Harris wanted to 

object to the intervention, she should have done so in connection 

with the October 1, 2019 motion and the trial court’s 

December 12, 2019 order granting reconsideration of its

September 20, 2019 order. The time for that objection has long 

since passed. In addition, even if such a procedural challenge 

were timely, because Harris failed to include a copy of her 

March 14, 2022 moving papers in the record on appeal, we cannot 

determine if the issue was properly presented to the trial court 

and thus preserved for appeal. (See Cabatit v. Sunnova Energy

Corp. (2020) 60 Cal.App.5th 317, 322 [“[i]f a party fails to raise an 

issue or theory in the trial court, we may deem consideration of 

that issue or theory forfeited on appeal”]; Rancho Mirage Country

Club Homeowners Assn. v. Hazelbaker (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 252, 

264 [“[a]s a general rule, issues not raised in the trial court

cannot be raised for the first time on appeal” (internal quotation 

marks omitted)]; accord, People v. Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th 

838, 894.)

As for the charge of racial bias, Harris contends she and 

Givens are a Black woman and man, the lawyers from the 

Wasserman firm and its counsel are White, and the court’s 

comments during the hearing on her motion and “nonsensical 

reasoning” demonstrated its bias. Because Harris did not provide 

a reporter’s transcript or settled statement, we are unable to 

evaluate any claim based on what occurred during the 

proceedings in court. (See Randall v. Mousseau (2016) 

2 Cal.App.5th 929, 935 [“Failure to provide an adequate record on
20

an issue requires that the issue be resolved against appellant. 

[Citation.] Without a record, either by transcript or settled

statement, a reviewing court must make all presumptions in

favor of the validity of the judgment”].)

14

 And, as discussed, far 

from being irrational (or nonsensical), the court’s reasoning and 

resulting ruling denying Harris’s motion to set aside were 

entirely proper.

DISPOSITION

The April 25, 2022 postjudgment order is affirmed. The 

Wasserman firm is to recover its costs on appeal.

PERLUSS, P. J.

We concur:

SEGAL, J.

FEUER, J.

14 Harris, through her counsel Givens, checked and 

separately initialed the box on the form designating the record on 

appeal electing to proceed without a record of the oral 

proceedings in the trial court. In doing so, she acknowledged the 

appellate court “will not be able to review any issues I might 

want to raise about what was said in the trial court during those 

proceedings.”