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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

United States of America, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Ryan Patrick Michell, 

Defendant. 

No. CR-17-01690-001-PHX-GMS

ORDER 

 Pending before the Court is Defendant Ryan Patrick Michell’s Motion to Suppress 

(Doc. 31). The Court denies the motion. 

BACKGROUND

 Federal law enforcement attested to the following facts in an application for a 

search warrant of Defendant Ryan Patrick Michell’s property. On October 24, 2017, 

Defendant Michell contacted an undercover law enforcement officer via an online, 

hidden-service market in an attempt to purchase potassium cyanide and dimethyl 

mercury. Over the next few weeks, Defendant Michell and the officer discussed various 

aspects of the chemicals, such as price, quantity and purity. Mr. Michell stated that he 

planned to use the chemicals for gold extraction, and he eventually purchased one 

hundred grams of potassium cyanide, which he purchased using Bitcoin. Mr. Michell 

had the potassium cyanide delivered to his home, addressing the package to “K.F.”, 

which are the initials of the property’s previous tenant. 
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 The warrant application also requested a search for firearms and ammunition. In 

1996, Arizona law enforcement arrested Mr. Michell for aggravated assault. Although 

Mr. Michelle was a minor at the time, his case was transferred to adult court, and 

Mr. Michell pled guilty and received a two-year prison sentence. In April 2015, 

Mr. Michell posted two pictures on his Facebook account in which he was shooting a 

rifle. In May 2016, Mr. Michell posted another picture of a rifle and included this 

caption, “Went out to practice with my AR-10 today! . . . It is a great addition to our 

collection.” (Doc. 36, Exh. 1, SW ¶ 30). 

 On December 1, 2017, Magistrate Judge Bridget Bade authorized a warrant for 

law enforcement to search Defendant Ryan Patrick Michell’s one-story home for items 

associated with chemical weapons and firearms and ammunition. 

DISCUSSION

I. Legal Standard

 The Fourth Amendment requires that search warrants be based “upon probable 

cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularity describing the place to be 

searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” The duty of a reviewing court is simply 

to ensure that the issuing judge had a “substantial basis” for concluding that probable 

cause existed under the totality of the circumstances. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 214 

(1983). The task of the issuing judge is “to make a practical, common-sense decision 

whether . . . there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be 

found in a particular place.” Id. When interpreting seemingly innocent conduct, the 

court issuing the warrant is entitled to rely on the training and experience of police 

officers. United States v. Gil, 58 F.3d 1414, 1418 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. 

Arrellano—Rios, 799 F.2d 520, 523 (9th Cir. 1986) (“The experience of a trained law 

enforcement agent is entitled to consideration in determining whether there was probable 

cause.”). The issuing judge considers “the totality of the circumstances” in its decision. 

United States v. Ocampo, 937 F.2d 485, 490 (9th Cir. 1991). In borderline cases, 

preference will be accorded to warrants and to the decision of the judge issuing it. United 
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States v. Krupa, 658 F.3d 1174, 1179 (9th Cir. 2011). 

II. Analysis 

A. Chemical Weapons 

 The warrant application listed 18 U.S.C. § 229(a) in Attachment B of the warrant 

as a basis for its search. (Doc. 36, Exh. 1 at 6). This section prohibits the use of 

chemical weapons and makes it unlawful “to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, 

transfer directly or indirectly, receive, stockpile, retain, own, possess, or use, or threaten 

to use, any chemical weapon . . . .” The statute defines “toxic chemical” as “any 

chemical which through its chemical action on life processes can cause death, temporary 

incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals.” Id. at § 229F(8)(A). The 

statute allows for ownership of such chemicals for “[p]urposes not prohibited by this 

chapter,” which encompasses “[a]ny peaceful purpose related to an industrial, 

agricultural, research, medical, or pharmaceutical activity or other activity.” Id. at 

§ 229F(7)(A); see also Bond v. U.S., 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2092 (2014) (citing to a 

prosecution of potassium cyanide possession as an example of a prosecution under 18 

U.S.C. § 229 of an extremely dangerous substance). The warrant application included a 

section on 18 U.S.C. § 229 where it described the prohibited use of chemical weapons, 

the definition of a toxic chemical, and the definition of prohibited use of these chemicals. 

(Doc. 36, Exh. 1, SW ¶¶ 34–37). The warrant application also described the potential 

malicious use of potassium cyanide and dimethyl mercury. (Doc. 36, Exh. 1, SW ¶¶ 24–

25). Mr. Michell argues that because the mere purchase and possession of potassium 

cyanide is not a crime, the government lacked probable cause that Mr. Michell would use 

the potassium cyanide as a chemical weapon. 

 A series of legal acts may provide the basis for probable cause of illegal acts. As 

the Ninth Circuit has described, innocent acts, which “if reviewed separately, might be 

consistent with innocence,” may establish probably cause if “considered as a totality, 

would likely create a fair probability of suspicion in any person of average acumen and 

experience.” United States v. Ocampo, 937 F.2d 485, 490 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting 
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United States v. Hoyos, 892 F.2d 1387, 1393 (9th Cir. 1989)). 

 In the warrant application, the FBI Special Agent testified that Mr. Michell 

participated in the following activities. Mr. Michell used a hidden service website to 

solicit the purchase of potassium cyanide and dimethyl mercury, even though these 

chemicals are available at much cheaper prices in public forums. (Doc. 36, Exh. 1, SW

¶¶ 4–6, 25). Mr. Michell used the essentially non-traceable Bitcoin cryptocurrency to 

purchase the chemicals. (Doc. 36, Exh. 1, SW ¶ 17). Mr. Michell used the initials of a 

former tenant of his property for shipping the potassium cyanide. (Doc. 36, Exh. 1, SW

¶¶ 17–18). Mr. Michell ensured that his communication with the seller was secured and 

encrypted. (Doc. 36, Exh. 1, SW ¶ 15). Although Mr. Michell stated that he planned to 

use the chemicals for gold extraction, he did not own or participate in a laboratory 

business or metal extraction business. (Doc. 36, Exh. 1, SW ¶¶ 11, 21). The undercover 

agent did not ship dimethyl mercury to Mr. Michell, but Mr. Michell repeatedly asked to 

purchase it and said that he would “continue to regularly buy” dimethyl mercury. (Doc. 

36, Exh. 1, SW ¶¶ 11–16). Dimethyl mercury is highly toxic and a single drop may 

threaten someone’s life. (Doc. 36, Exh. 1, SW ¶ 23). Contrary to Mr. Michell’s claims, 

dimethyl mercury is not used for gold extraction. It has few legitimate applications and is 

primarily used for chemical research. (Doc. 36, Exh. 1, SW ¶ 23). Mr. Michell 

purchased one hundred grams of potassium cyanide, which is enough to poison many 

individuals if mixed in a drinkable liquid. (Doc. 36, Exh. 1, SW ¶ 24). Although an 

individual may legally possess potassium cyanide, the affiant, who is experienced as the 

Phoenix Division Weapons of Mass Destruction Coordinator, said that these activities 

established probable cause that Mr. Michell was illegally acquiring, possessing, or using 

a toxic chemical for a prohibited purpose. (Doc. 36, Exh. 1, SW ¶¶ 1–2). 

 Magistrate Judge Bade rightfully considered the totality of the circumstances and 

relied on the training and experience of law enforcement when interpreting otherwise 

legal conduct. United States v. Ocampo, 937 F.2d 485, 490 (9th Cir. 1991); United States 

v. Gil, 58 F.3d 1414, 1418 (9th Cir. 1995). In review of the above facts, Judge Bade had 
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a substantial basis to authorize the search of Defendant Michell’s for materials associated 

with chemical weapons. 

 B. Firearms and Ammunition

 The warrant application also listed 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) as a basis for its search. 

This section prohibits certain individuals, including those who have “been convicted in 

any court of . . . a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” from 

possessing any firearm or ammunition. The warrant application stated that Mr. Michell 

was convicted of three felony violations before he posted photographs on the internet of 

himself shooting rifles. (Doc. 36, Exh. 1, SW ¶ 26–28, 31). On review, the government 

admitted that this statement was inaccurate, and that only one of the felony convictions 

occurred before the photographs were posted on the internet. 

 To challenge a warrant on the basis of a false statement, a defendant must show 

that the false statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause. Franks v. 

Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 172 (1978). The mistake is immaterial if “there remains 

sufficient content in the warrant affidavit to support a finding of probable cause” after the 

mistake is set aside. Id.

 Although Mr. Michell rightfully points out that he was convicted of the last two of 

his felony convictions after the photographs were taken, the first of these felony 

convictions occurred in 1996 when Mr. Michell was convicted of aggravated assault and 

received a two year sentence. (Doc. 36, Exh. 2). Independent of the subsequent felonies, 

this felony conviction made Mr. Michell a prohibited possessor, and the mistake in the 

warrant application is immaterial. The photographs of him shooting a rifle and the 

caption that he had an AR-10 battle rifle therefore support a substantial basis for a 

warrant searching his residence for evidence that Mr. Michell was a felon in illegal 

possession of a firearm or ammunition. 

/ / / 

/ / / 

/ / / 
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant Ryan Patrick Michell’s Motion to 

Suppress (Doc. 31) is DENIED. 

 Dated this 5th day of June, 2018. 

Honorable G. Murray Snow

United States District Judge