1 Local Rule 47.5.1 provides: "The publication of

opinions that have no precedential value and merely decide

particular cases on the basis of well-settled principles of law

imposes needless expense on the public and burdens on the legal

profession." Pursuant to that rule, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_____________________

No. 95-60177

Summary Calendar

_____________________

Richard Marbel Nortei,

Petitioner,

VERSUS

Immigration and Naturalization Service,

Respondent.

____________________________________________________

On petition for Review of an order of 

the Board of Immigration Appeals 

United States Department of Justice 

(A28 552 705)

_____________________________________________________

October 3, 1995

Before DAVIS, BARKSDALE and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM1:

Richard Marbel Nortei (Nortei) petitioned this court for

review of the decision of Board of Immigration Appeals refusing

to suspend his deportation and refusing to reinstate the
No. 95-60177

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Immigration Judge's grant of three months time during which

Nortei would have been allowed voluntarily to depart the U.S.

I.

The Immigration and Naturalization Service issued an order

to show cause charging Richard Marbel Nortei, a native of Ghana,

with deportability from the United States under § 241(a)(1)(B) of

the Immigration Act of 1990, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1)(B), for having

remained within the United States longer than permitted by his

nonimmigrant visa. [R. 230-32.] Nortei conceded deportability

at his deportation hearing and was found deportable. [Id at 233-

34, 47.] Nortei applied for suspension of deportation and,

alternatively, voluntary departure. [Id. at 47, 151-55.] The

Immigration Judge (IJ) denied his request for suspension of

deportation, but granted Nortei three months in which to depart

voluntarily. [Id. at 34-44.] Nortei appealed to the Board of

Immigration Appeals (BIA), which affirmed the findings of the IJ,

dismissed Nortei's appeal, but granted him only thirty days in

which to depart voluntarily. [Id. at 2-3.] Nortei timely filed

a petition of review with this court.

II.

To be eligible for suspension of deportation, an alien must

have been physically present in the United States for a

continuous period of at least seven years immediately preceding
No. 95-60177

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the application; be a person of good moral character; and be a

person whose deportation would, in the opinion of the Attorney

General, result in extreme hardship to the alien or to his

spouse, parent, or child who is a citizen of the United States or

an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence. 8 U.S.C.

§ 1254(a)(1); Hernandez-Cordero v. I.N.S., 819 F.2d 558, 560 (5th

Cir. 1987) (en banc). The alien bears the burden of

demonstrating eligibility for a suspension of deportation, and

even if the requirements are met, the Attorney General retains

discretion to refuse to suspend deportation. Hernandez-Cordero,

819 F.2d at 560. 

"The BIA, as the Attorney General's delegate, is therefore

empowered to decide what constitutes `extreme hardship' and to

apply that standard to each individual case." Id. at 562. The

Attorney General's discretion to suspend deportation is

"unfettered". Perales v. Casillas, 903 F.2d 1043, 1051 (5th Cir.

1990). "Suspension of deportation is a matter of discretion and

administrative grace, not mere eligibility; discretion must be

exercised even though statutory prerequisites must be met." Id.

This court reviews the BIA's finding regarding extreme

hardship only for abuse of discretion. Id. at 561-63. In this

highly subjective determination, the BIA has broad, "unfettered"

discretion to define extreme hardship narrowly. Id. Thus,

"[s]ubstantive review of a no `extreme hardship' determination is
No. 95-60177

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strictly limited. . . ." Id. at 562. Accordingly, this court

may find that the BIA abused its discretion only in a case in

which "the hardship is uniquely extreme, at or closely

approaching the outer limits of the most severe hardship the

alien could suffer and so severe that any reasonable person would

necessarily conclude that the hardship is extreme." Id. at 561,

563.

Although this court will undertake virtually no substantive

review of the BIA's finding on the issue of "extreme hardship,"

it "may still scrutinize the BIA's decision for procedural

regularity." Procedural review is limited to a determination

whether the BIA considered the relevant factors establishing

extreme hardship. Id. at 563. The BIA "ordinarily" satisfies

"its procedural responsibilities by demonstrating that it has

considered all the relevant factors of an `extreme hardship'

determination, both individually and collectively." Id.

However, the BIA has no duty to "write an exegesis on every

contention. What is required is merely that it consider the

issues raised, and announce its decision in terms sufficient to

enable a reviewing court to perceive that it has heard and

thought and not merely reacted." Id. (quoting Osuchukwu v.

I.N.S., 744 F.2d 1136, 1142-43 (5th Cir. 1984)). This court

lacks "the authority to determine the weight, if any, to be

afforded each factor." Id. (internal quotation omitted).
No. 95-60177

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2 The IJ found that Nortei had maintained a continuous

physical presence in the United States for seven years and was of

good moral character. [R. 33-43] These issues are not in

dispute.

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A.

Nortei argues that the BIA failed to consider and give due

weight to the hardship that would be suffered by his stepdaughter, U.S. citizen son, and estranged spouse.2 [Blue brief

7-9] Nortei did not raise before the BIA his contention that the

IJ failed to consider hardship faced by his step-daughter. 

Accordingly, this court lacks jurisdiction to review the issue. 

Ozdemir v. I.N.S., 46 F.3d 6, 8 (5th Cir. 1995). We therefore

turn to Nortei's remaining contentions.

The BIA noted Nortei's limited contact with his U.S. citizen

son and his substantial family ties in Ghana. [R. 2] The BIA

also adopted the IJ's reasoning and analysis, in which the IJ

acknowledged Nortei's testimony as to his relationship with his

son, but noted the absence of testimony from the mother of his

child as to hardships that she or his son would face if Nortei

was deported. [Id. at 41] The IJ also noted that Nortei's good

physical condition would not prevent him from finding work in

Ghana. Because the BIA adequately considered all the factors

relevant to its determination of no "extreme hardship", it did

not err in its procedural responsibilities.
No. 95-60177

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B.

Nortei argues that the BIA did not give sufficient weight to

the hardship that would be suffered by his estranged permanentresident spouse and his U.S. family if he were deported. [Blue

brief, 7-8] He contends that satisfactory employment would elude

him in his native Ghana and foreclose his ability to continue to

support both his family in the U.S. and his two children who

reside in Ghana. [Blue brief, 8-9] He argues that the financial

and emotional hardship caused by his deportation would constitute

"extreme hardship" to himself and his family. [Id. at 9] 

Nortei has not demonstrated that the BIA abused its

discretion when it found that his deportation would not result in

"extreme hardship". Mere economic and social hardship, which any

alien would experience upon return to his native country, is

insufficient to establish that the hardship is "uniquely

extreme." See Vargas v. I.N.S., 826 F.2d 1394, 1397 (5th Cir.

1987); Hernandez-Cordero, 819 F.2d at 563-64; Youssefinia v.

I.N.S., 784 F.2d 1254, 1262 (5th Cir. 1986) (economic and social

difficulties alien and United States-born child might experience

as a result of Iran's then-current cultural upheaval do not

amount to extreme hardship). Nortei and his wife have lived

apart since 1989. [R. 60, 75] Although he has voluntarily

contributed $200 each month to support his child, he offers no

testimony from his wife as to the hardship his deportation would
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cause her. [Id.] He has limited contact with his son, who he

visits for about 24 hours every other weekend. [Id. at 60-61,

88-89] Nortei has significant family relations in Ghana: his

parents, his brothers and sisters, and two children. [Id. at 61-

62, 64-65] Considering these examples of evidence that supported

the BIA's conclusion, this court finds no abuse of the BIA's

discretion in its refusal to suspend Nortei's deportation based

upon the conclusion that deportation would not result in "extreme

hardship."

C.

Lastly, Nortei contends that the BIA's grant of only thirty

days voluntary departure, rather than, as Nortei requested in the

alternative of suspension of deportation, reinstatement of the

three months granted by the IJ, was arbitrary, capricious, and an

abuse of discretion. [Blue brief, 17] He also argues that the

BIA's failure to explain its denial of his request for threemonths voluntary departure was an abuse of its discretion. [Id.]

 While it is true that the BIA offered no explanation for

its grant of thirty days rather than three months for Nortei's

voluntary departure, it is true as well that Nortei has succeeded

in remaining in the U.S. nearly three years after the IJ granted

him three-months voluntary departure. [R. 44] Moreover, Nortei
No. 95-60177

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offered the BIA no reasons explaining why he requires three

months in order to depart voluntarily. Considering these

circumstances, the BIA's action did not constitute an abuse of

discretion.

III.

For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Board of

Immigration Appeals is 

AFFIRMED.