*

 After an examination of the briefs and the record, we have concluded that

oral argument is unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the

record. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted April 5, 2005*

Decided April 6, 2005

Before

Hon. KENNETH F. RIPPLE, Circuit Judge

Hon. MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

Hon. ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge

No. 04–3490

CHARLES E. BRADFORD,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

MAXWELL TREE EXPERT CO.,

INC.,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of

Indiana, Fort Wayne Division

No. 1:03–CV–177

Roger B. Cosbey, 

Magistrate Judge.

O R D E R

Charles Bradford filed this lawsuit alleging that Maxwell Tree Expert

Company failed to rehire him because of his race, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981

and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Bradford, an African-American

landscape foreman, and Jeff Feasel, a fellow-landscaper who is white, were fired

after company owner Gregory Maxwell smelled marijuana in the van that the two

of them had used for the day. Several days later, Feasel returned to the office to

gather his personal effects, and while he was there confronted Maxwell’s wife and

the company’s business manager, Gina Maxwell, and told her that he was

wrongfully terminated because he had not been smoking marijuana. Gina referred

him to Gregory, who rehired Feasel after he passed a drug test. Bradford

attempted unsuccessfully to contact Gina Maxwell about his termination; he visited

UNPUBLISHED ORDER

Not to be cited per Circuit Rule 53
No. 04–3490 Page 2

the office and then called several times (the parties dispute the precise number) but

did not reach her. Whenever he called, Bradford spoke to the receptionist but did

not tell her why he wished to speak to Gina; the one time that the receptionist

inquired of his purpose, Bradford replied that he wanted to discuss matters

pertaining to his insurance plan and pension. Since he did not reach Gina, he

never protested his termination nor offered to take a drug test, as Feasel had. 

The district court granted summary judgment to the company. It concluded

that Bradford failed to provide direct evidence of a discriminatory failure to rehire

or to establish a prima facie case of discrimination through the indirect method. 

Further, the court noted, Bradford did not demonstrate that Maxwell’s stated

reason for refusing to rehire him—that, unlike Feasel, he did not request

reinstatement or pass a drug test—was pretextual.

On appeal, Bradford, who is proceeding pro se, first argues that the

performance of his counsel in the district court was inadequate. But this is not a

reason to disturb the district court’s judgment, because there is no Sixth

Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel in a civil case. See Stanciel v.

Gramley, 267 F.3d 575, 581 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. 7108 W. Grand Ave.,

Chicago, Ill., 15 F.3d 632, 635 (7th Cir. 1994). If Bradford’s counsel was deficient,

Bradford may seek recourse against him in a malpractice action, but he cannot do

so in this appeal.

Next Bradford broadly challenges the district court’s judgment by asserting

that there was a “lack of evidence to justify a summary judgment.” We have

reviewed the record, however, and are satisfied that the district court reached the

correct result. Bradford failed to provide direct evidence that he was not rehired

because of his race; his general allegations of past racist remarks by Gregory

Maxwell are vague and unsupported by evidence in the record, and they bear no

apparent connection to the company’s decision not to rehire him. See Adams v.

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 324 F.3d 935, 939 (7th Cir. 2003). Bradford also could not

prove discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting formula,

because the uncontested evidence shows that he and Feasel, the white employee

who received better treatment, were not similarly situated. See Radue v. KimberlyClark Corp., 219 F.3d 612, 617–18 (7th Cir. 2000) (proving that employees are

similarly situated entails showing that they “engaged in similar conduct without

such differentiating or mitigating circumstances as would distinguish their conduct

or the employer’s treatment of them”). Unlike Feasel, Bradford did not confront the

Maxwells, contest his termination, or pass a drug test. 

Since Bradford cannot prove discrimination through the direct or indirect

method, his claim must fail. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.