File 9/3/24 In re M.L. CA2/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re M.L., a Person Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

B331509

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. 

No. 23CCJP00138E) 

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF 

CHILDREN AND FAMILY 

SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

LATOYA L.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Pete R. Navarro, Juvenile Court Referee. 

Affirmed.
2

Anne E. Fragasso, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, 

Assistant County Counsel, and David Michael Miller, Deputy 

County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 

_________________________________

Latoya L., the former legal guardian of minor M.L., appeals 

an order of the juvenile court adjudicating M.L. a juvenile court 

dependent. She contends (1) insufficient evidence supported the 

court’s Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 300, subdivision 

(b)(1) jurisdictional finding that she failed or was unable 

adequately to protect or supervise M.L., and (2) the juvenile court 

should have exercised jurisdiction under section 601, subdivision 

(a), rather than section 300. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

I. Latoya’s Probate Legal Guardianship of M.L.

In July 2021, Latoya filed a petition in the probate court to 

be appointed 14-year-old M.L.’s legal guardian. In her petition, 

Latoya stated that she was a friend of M.L.’s mother, who had 

been incarcerated since 2018; the identity of M.L.’s father was 

unknown; and M.L.’s maternal grandmother, who was the child’s 

previous legal guardian and with whom the child had resided in 

Nevada, passed away in April 2021.

The probate court in July granted Latoya temporary 

guardianship until December 2021. In October 2021, Latoya 

requested that the guardianship be terminated. The probate 

court denied the request and instead appointed Latoya M.L.’s

1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare 

and Institutions Code.
3

legal guardian and extended the temporary letters of 

guardianship. Latoya petitioned the probate court again in 

February 2022 to terminate the legal guardianship. The probate 

court denied the request without prejudice in April 2023. 

II. The Referral and Investigation

In May 2023, Latoya reported to the Los Angeles County 

Department of Children and Family Services (Department) that 

she had been granted temporary legal guardianship of M.L. but 

did not wish to be the child’s permanent legal guardian because 

the child engaged in assaultive behavior with teachers and 

students and at home. The Department interviewed Latoya, who 

said she could no longer care for M.L. Although Latoya had been 

trying to terminate the guardianship, her termination request 

had been denied because the child did not have another 

caregiver. M.L. was diagnosed with attention deficit 

hyperactivity disorder, oppositional defiant disorder, and 

disruptive mood dysregulation disorder. The child spit in 

Latoya’s face, destroyed Latoya’s property, and threw milk at a 

teacher. Although Latoya resided with M.L. in Nevada, they 

visited Los Angeles weekly. On the day of the Department’s first 

interview of Latoya in May 2023, Latoya had brought M.L. to a 

Los Angeles hospital because the child threatened to kill herself,

banged her head on a car window, and threatened to jump out of 

the car. The child had five prior hospitalizations. Latoya could 

no longer care for M.L. due to the child’s behavioral and mental 

health issues and was not interested in any services to have the 

child continue in her care or remain in her home. Latoya gave 

the Department consent to detain M.L. and place her in 

protective custody. 
4

The Department interviewed M.L. at the hospital. The 

child was crying and upset that Latoya no longer wanted to care 

for her. Latoya had told M.L. multiple times that she would not 

be able to care for M.L. due to the child’s behavioral issues. The 

minor admitted she had banged her own head on the car window 

and attempted to jump out of the vehicle. When M.L. was four 

years old, her half-brother sexually abused her. M.L. had not 

lived with her mother since she was eight years of age. When she 

lived with her mother, her mother’s boyfriend would hit the child 

on her arm and leg. M.L. also saw him hit her mother. M.L. said 

that Latoya recently hit her with a belt for refusing to take her 

medication, being disrespectful, and having behavior problems at 

school. The child attempted to run away from home but was 

picked up by law enforcement several hours later. 

M.L. told the Department she attended a school in Nevada 

for children with behavioral issues. The Department interviewed 

a counselor at the school, who said M.L. hit other children, yelled 

at teachers, and threw things when she was upset. The 

Department also contacted the Department of Juvenile Justice 

Services in Nevada. A probation officer said M.L. was on 

informal probation on an assault charge. The child also had two 

prior misdemeanor cases, one for obstructing a peace officer and 

another for harassment. 

The hospital provided the Department with discharge 

papers showing “[p]sychiatric problem” as the reason for M.L.’s 

May 2023 emergency department visit. The child had been 

discharged with a diagnosis that included “[s]uicidal ideation.” 

In another interview with Latoya later in May 2023, Latoya 

denied hitting M.L. with a belt or using physical discipline.
5

II. The Sustained Dependency Petition and Detention

In May 2023, the Department filed a dependency petition 

on behalf of M.L. pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b)(1). As 

subsequently interlineated and sustained, the petition alleged, in 

count b-1, that Latoya was unable and unwilling to provide M.L.

with ongoing care and supervision due to the child’s behavioral 

issues, and such inability and unwillingness placed the child at 

risk of serious physical harm. 

The juvenile court ordered M.L. detained on May 24, 2023. 

III. The June 2023 Jurisdiction and Disposition Report

A social worker reinterviewed M.L. in June 2023. M.L.

again said she was physically abused by Latoya. The child never 

wanted to return to Latoya. 

The social worker also talked to Latoya in June 2023. 

Latoya asked how she would be able to care for M.L. without 

resources. Latoya said that she “did the best with [her] abilities” 

but M.L. “came with a lot of trauma.” A lot of M.L.’s behavior 

came from that trauma. M.L. would “scratch herself and selfharm.” Latoya said that M.L. “wouldn’t have gotten this bad, if I 

had resources.” She further stated, “The system is unfair to the 

caregiver, if I have lack of knowledge with a child with behavioral 

issues.” Latoya said she would have to leave or call off work and 

“it started being a lot.” Latoya again denied abusing M.L. and 

said that “[M.L.] doesn’t understand the consequences” of her 

statements claiming abuse. Latoya started feeling unsafe and 

put cameras in her home. She stated, “No one wanted to care for 

[M.L.]” 

The Department reported that there were no relatives at 

the time to assess for placement. It observed that Latoya had 

filed requests to terminate her legal guardianship at various 
6

times and assessed Latoya as having neither “the knowledge nor 

appropriate support to deal with a child with trauma.” 

IV. The Jurisdiction Hearing and Subsequent Events

At the jurisdiction hearing on June 15, 2023, the juvenile 

court sustained count b-1 of the petition.

2 On June 21, 2023, 

Latoya petitioned the juvenile court to terminate her probate 

legal guardianship under section 728,3 and the juvenile court 

signed an order terminating the guardianship on July 25, 2023.4

DISCUSSION

Latoya contends the juvenile court’s section 300,

subdivision (b)(1), jurisdictional finding that she failed or was 

unable to adequately protect M.L. from the risk of serious 

physical harm to the child should be reversed because (1) it was 

not supported by substantial evidence, and (2) the juvenile court 

erred by not exercising jurisdiction under section 601 instead. 

We disagree. 

2 The juvenile court struck counts alleging that M.L. had no 

parent to provide care and basic necessities of life.

3 Section 728, subdivision (a), authorizes the juvenile court to 

terminate the probate guardianship of a child who is the subject 

of a section 300 petition.

4 At the jurisdictional hearing, Latoya’s counsel told the 

juvenile court that M.L. had a delinquency case in Nevada for her 

behavior. In July 2023, the juvenile court stated that “the 

probation and the [district attorney’s] office” in Nevada agreed to 

dismiss the Nevada delinquency action with the understanding 

that the juvenile court in this case would have jurisdiction. 
7

I. The Appeal Is Moot

As a preliminary matter, we consider whether Latoya’s 

appeal is moot. “A court is tasked with the duty ‘ “to decide 

actual controversies by a judgment which can be carried into 

effect, and not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract 

propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot 

affect the matter in issue in the case before it.” ’ [Citation.] A 

case becomes moot when events ‘ “render[ ] it impossible for [a]

court, if it should decide the case in favor of plaintiff, to grant

him any effective relief.” ’ [Citation.] For relief to be ‘effective,’

two requirements must be met. First, the plaintiff must 

complain of an ongoing harm. Second, the harm must be 

redressable or capable of being rectified by the outcome the 

plaintiff seeks.” (In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 276.) “In this 

context, relief is effective when it ‘can have a practical, tangible 

impact on the parties’ conduct or legal status.’ ” (Id. at p. 277.)

Latoya does not appeal or otherwise challenge the juvenile 

court’s guardianship termination order—an order that she had 

herself requested—and does not argue that M.L. should be 

returned to her care. To the contrary, in her June 21 termination 

request, Latoya stated she was “no longer willing to provide care 

for the child, does not wish to receive reunification services, and 

does not wish to continue as the child’s legal guardian[ ].” 

Latoya’s appeal thus appears to be moot. 

Latoya contends the juvenile court’s jurisdiction finding 

that she failed or was unable to adequately protect M.L. is the 

equivalent of “[v]illainizing” her. Latoya essentially contends 

that her ongoing harm is that the finding is stigmatizing. 

Regardless of whether that were true, however, “stigma alone is 

not enough to avoid mootness.” (In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at 
8

p. 278.) We nonetheless will exercise our discretion to consider 

Latoya’s appeal on the merits. (See id. at p. 282 [“[e]ven when a 

case is moot, courts may exercise their ‘inherent discretion’ to 

reach the merits of the dispute”].)

II. Substantial Evidence Supported the Juvenile Court’s 

Finding of Jurisdiction over M.L. Under Section 300, 

Subdivision (b)(1)

A. Governing law and standard of review

Section 300, subdivision (b)(1), provides in part that a child 

is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court if “[t]he child has 

suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, 

serious physical harm or illness, as a result of . . . [¶] . . . [t]he 

failure or inability of the child’s parent or guardian to adequately 

supervise or protect the child.” 

“ ‘In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence 

supporting the jurisdictional findings and disposition, we 

determine if substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, 

supports them. “In making this determination, we draw all 

reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the findings 

and orders of the dependency court; we review the record in the 

light most favorable to the court’s determinations; and we note 

that issues of fact and credibility are the province of the trial 

court.” ’ ” (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773; see In re I.C.

(2018) 4 Cal.5th 869, 892; see In re J.S. (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th

678, 685.) “ ‘ “We do not reweigh the evidence or exercise 

independent judgment, but merely determine if there are 

sufficient facts to support the findings of the trial court.” ’ ” (In re 

I.J., at p. 773.) 
9

B. Substantial evidence supported the court’s 

jurisdictional finding

At the jurisdiction hearing, Latoya acknowledged that M.L.

self-harmed, injured others, and “desperately need[ed]” services 

that the juvenile court could provide. Latoya argued, however, 

that she should not be held accountable for M.L.’s behavior when, 

after the child’s prior legal guardian passed away, she had 

merely stepped in to help and “did what she could,” but did not 

have enough resources to aid M.L. 

On appeal, Latoya similarly contends the juvenile court’s 

section 300, subdivision (b)(1) jurisdictional finding was not 

supported by substantial evidence because the evidence showed 

Latoya did “everything possible, within her means, to help 

[M.L.],” including seeking hospitalizations and providing therapy 

and medication, but the child “needed more.” As in the juvenile 

court, Latoya does not seriously dispute that M.L. was at risk of 

physical harm. Rather, her argument is essentially that the 

jurisdictional finding should be reversed because there was 

insufficient evidence that she was at fault or to blame for the risk 

of harm to the minor. 

The Supreme Court rejected a nearly identical argument in 

In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622 (R.T.). In that case, R.T., a 14-

year-old child, repeatedly ran away from home and skipped 

school. R.T.’s mother tried without success to supervise and 

protect R.T. and sought support from the Department and law 

enforcement. The mother later arranged for the child to live with 

the maternal grandparents because the grandfather worked with 

troubled youth, but R.T. threw a chair at him. The Department 

filed a section 300, subdivision (b)(1) petition alleging R.T. was at 

substantial risk of serious physical harm due to the mother’s 
10

failure or inability to adequately supervise or protect her. (R.T., 

at p. 625.) R.T.’s mother argued subdivision (b)(1) jurisdiction 

was unwarranted because she had done “everything possible” to 

control her daughter’s behavior and was not at fault for the risk 

of harm to the child. (R.T., at p. 633.) 

The Supreme Court agreed that the mother did not create 

the danger to R.T.—to the contrary, the mother had made 

“concerted (and at times desperate) efforts to protect and 

discipline R.T.” (R.T., supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 633.) The court 

nonetheless found that the record supported the juvenile court’s 

exercise of jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b). It 

explained: “Whether it was [the child’s] misbehavior and 

disobedience, or mother’s inability to supervise or protect [the 

child], . . . does not matter here. The basis for jurisdiction under 

section 300[, subdivision] (b)(1) is whether the child is at 

‘substantial risk’ of ‘serious physical harm or illness.’ [Citation.] 

As mother admits, ‘[t]here is no doubt that [the child] . . . was at 

substantial risk of serious harm.’ In that regard, given the 

substantial risk of harm that [the child] faced, there is little 

question that mother was unable to ‘adequately’ supervise or 

protect [the child].” (R.T., at pp. 634–635.) Holding that 

dependency jurisdiction under subdivision (b)(1) is authorized 

“without a finding that a parent is at fault or blameworthy for 

her failure or inability to supervise or protect her child,” the court 

affirmed the assertion of jurisdiction over the child. (R.T., at pp. 

624, 637.) 

Here, there was substantial evidence that M.L. was at risk 

of serious physical harm: She had threatened to kill herself and 

engaged in other behavior showing a desire for self-harm. There 

was also substantial evidence that, as she herself acknowledged, 
11

Latoya lacked the resources to adequately protect M.L. and was 

unwilling to continue to care for the child as a result of the child’s 

behavioral issues. Thus, regardless of whether there was any 

evidence that Latoya was at fault or blameworthy for her 

inability to protect M.L. from risk of harm, there was 

nevertheless substantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s 

section 300, subdivision (b)(1), jurisdictional finding. 

III. Latoya Fails To Show the Juvenile Court Erred by 

Exercising Jurisdiction Under Section 300 Rather 

Than Section 601

Latoya contends the juvenile court erred by exercising 

jurisdiction over M.L. under section 300 rather than section 601, 

subdivision (a), which she asserts was “more appropriate for 

addressing the child’s needs.” (See § 601, subd. (a) [a minor 

between the ages of 12 and 17 “who persistently or habitually 

refuses to obey the reasonable and proper orders or directions of 

the minor’s parents, guardian, or custodian, or who is beyond the 

control of that person” “is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile 

court which may adjudge the minor to be a ward of the court”].) 

She argues an assessment should have been, but was not, made 

pursuant to section 241.1 by “the agencies involved” whether 

jurisdiction should be exercised under section 601 as opposed to 

section 300.

Under section 241.1, “[w]henever a minor appears to come 

within the description of both Section 300 and Section 601 or 602, 

the county probation department and the child welfare services 

department shall . . . initially determine which status will serve 

the best interests of the minor and the protection of society.” 

(§ 241.1, subd. (a).) The minor may not be designated as a dual 

status child—a “minor simultaneously both a dependent child 
12

and a ward of the court”—unless certain requirements are met. 

(§ 241.1, subds. (d), (e).) The failure to adhere to section 241.1, 

however, is not jurisdictional and does not deprive the juvenile 

court of jurisdiction over a minor. (In re M.V. (2014) 

225 Cal.App.4th 1495, 1509–1510.) Moreover, the failure to 

object to the absence of a section 241.1 assessment results in 

forfeiture. (In re M.V., at p. 1508.) 

As the Department points out, Latoya did not argue in the 

juvenile court that jurisdiction should be exercised under 

section 601 rather than section 300 and did not object to the 

absence of any section 241.1 assessment. She has thus forfeited 

the issue. In any event, the Supreme Court held in R.T., supra, 

3 Cal.5th 622 that a minor can be within the jurisdiction of both

sections 300 and 601; in such a case, the juvenile court will 

determine which kind of jurisdiction “ ‘will serve the best 

interests of the minor and the protection of society.’ ” (R.T., at p. 

635.) Latoya has not demonstrated that M.L. would have been 

better served had the juvenile court taken jurisdiction under 

section 601, rather than section 300. And, as the Supreme Court 

in R.T. stated, “[M]other’s preferred approach [that is, exercising 

jurisdiction under section 601 rather than under section 300] 

would bring with it demonstrably negative repercussions for [the 

child]: ‘the delinquency finding carries with it a stigma that may 

follow the minor throughout his or her life.’ ” (R.T., at p. 636.)
13

DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding is affirmed. 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

BERSHON, J.

*

We concur:

EDMON, P. J.

EGERTON, J.

 Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, assigned 

by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the 

California Constitution.