RECORD IMPOUNDED

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-4712-18T1

N.L.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

M.B.,

Defendant-Respondent.

Submitted November 18, 2020 – Decided

Before Judges Alvarez and Geiger.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Morris County, 

Docket No. FV-14-0799-19.

Bell & Shivas, P.C., attorneys for appellant (Paula 

Ortega and Brian C. Laskiewicz, on the brief).

Respondent did not file a brief.

PER CURIAM

Plaintiff N.L. filed a complaint under the Prevention of Domestic 

Violence Act of 1991, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35, and obtained a temporary 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

December 18, 2020
2

A-4712-18T1

restraining order (TRO). It was dissolved, and she was denied a final restraining 

order (FRO), after a May 22, 2019 hearing. The complaint alleged defendant 

M.B. had committed acts of harassment, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4, by email and texts.

We reverse because we find N.L. established by a preponderance of the

evidence the necessary predicate acts, and the need for an FRO in order to 

prevent future harassment, pursuant to Silver v. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. 112 

(App. Div. 2006). Exercising original jurisdiction, we further direct the court 

immediately enter an FRO in accordance with this decision. The FRO shall 

restrain M.B. from contact with N.L., N.L.'s mother L.L., stepfather R.T., and 

M.N. and K.C., part-time caretakers for the parties' children. See N.J.S.A. 

2C:25-29(b)(7) (authorizing restraint from contact with a victim's family 

members and employees—"others with whom communication would be likely 

to cause annoyance or alarm to the victim.").

The parties were divorced June 30, 2015. M.B. sent the texts and emails 

that N.L. asserted constituted harassment between November 2018 and March 

2019, nearly four years later. M.B. readily acknowledged sending 

approximately 330 messages, which are reproduced in over ninety-three pages 

of N.L.'s appendix. Additional messages were sent; not all the offending 

communications were moved into evidence. The messages that were introduced 
3

A-4712-18T1

at trial are offensive, belligerent, argumentative, and otherwise disturbing in 

tone, including foul language and name-calling. 

M.B. had agreed in an earlier civil restraint order not to enter N.L.'s home

when she was not present, but resumed doing so during this five-month period, 

allegedly because the nanny and the children allowed or invited him into the 

house. The parties have a domestic violence history, and although not clear 

from the record, at least one, if not two, prior civil restraining orders. 

In the course of the texts and emails, M.B. touched upon his unemployed

status, emotional struggles, and homelessness. He was self-represented at the 

hearing.

During the trial, M.B. made several unsworn, lengthy statements while 

cross-examining witnesses. These statements included derogatory remarks 

about N.L. and the recitation of his grievances against her and her family going 

back to the day after their wedding nearly twenty years before. M.B. said, for 

example, that the officer who responded to an altercation that eventually resulted 

in the first TRO told him that he "felt terrible about what they were doing to 

[him], but . . . this is just what women do, and they do it because they can." 

When cross-examined by N.L.'s counsel, M.B. denied having been hospitalized 
4

A-4712-18T1

for mental health issues, insisting the hospitalization occurred so he could obtain 

medical treatment.

The judge did not find the "fairly lengthy stack of [emails], or text 

messages, rather, dating back to November of last year" to be harassment. 1 He 

found instead that the communications were domestic contretemps under 

Corrente v. Corrente, 281 N.J. Super. 243 (App. Div. 1995), and Peranio v. 

Peranio, 280 N.J. Super. 47 (App. Div. 1995). He drew a distinction between 

the texts and emails, finding that they were dissimilar, and that only the emails 

were offensive while the texts were inoffensive. The judge appeared to conclude 

that since N.L. attempted to appease M.B. or be conciliatory in some of her 

responses, that she was unaffected, and that therefore the messages were not 

harassing. Some tangentially touched upon M.B.'s contacts with the children, 

thus the judge found nothing unusual about them. Some were sent in the early 

morning hours, including the email mentioned in the complaint.

We reproduce a fraction of the messages for comparison:

1

 The judge barred N.L.'s mother from testifying about an incident not 

mentioned in the complaint. This was not correct—the parties' past history 

places current events into a much needed context, and their witnesses are 

permitted to testify about them. J.D. v. M.D.F., 207 N.J. 458, 470 (2011) (it is 

proper for a trial court to "elicit a fuller picture of the circumstances either to 

comply with the statutory command to consider the previous history, see

N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)(1)," or to inform the court of a defendant's intent).
5

A-4712-18T1

Language from email Parallel text message

You are the only true failure ....in the 

eyes of our children and certainly in 

the eyes of God...scratch that. Your 

God is the God of Prada, Gucci, and 

Van Cleef and Arpels.

You couldn't of gone about it in a 

more horrible way. I was good to you. 

Our family was everything. All I did 

was lose a job. There was a financial 

crisis. 600k guys lost their jobs. Not 

all their wives through [sic] them to 

the curb like trash.

Money. There's more to [life] [N.L.]. 

. . .

YOU owe me an apology you crazy 

bitch. 

Apologize. This is not sufficient

Sorry.

I'm leaving

I'm not at rink. I'm done being nice 

with all the shuttle services. You have 

always treated me terribly and your 

"apology" is inadequate, like usual.

Who the fuck do you think you are? 

You think your corporate bullshit

means anything to me? lol. You are 

the worst of the worst . . . . and you 

can suck the dark underside of my ball 

sack. Fuck you [N.L.]!

You are a bullshit artist.

You have introduced OUR children to 

how many men? 3, 4, 5? If you forgot 

no worries I have their names.

Good luck on finding your fo[u]rth 

guy. Be careful introducing our 

children again. I am monitoring 

closely. 

You're averaging a minimum of one 

guy per year. Fun times? You will find 

out. You had it good. You should be 

ashamed.
6

A-4712-18T1

you are a coward and would NEVER 

TELL THE TRUTH. You are a lier

[sic] and a coward.

Inform the children coward.

I will not be driving this week. Make 

other plans.

You NEVER have said ONE NICE 

THING TO SAY ABOUT YOUR 

HUSBAND OF 15 years and the 

FATHER OF YOUR CHILDREN. 

The more you have shown me, post 

divorce, the more I realize you are just 

not a nice person. You are cold, 

calculated, and well, for lack of a 

better word, boring. And you are SO 

BORING. . . . You are the true failure, 

failure as a human being, and you will 

see this on judgment day, my dear. 

God knows what's in your heart . . . 

you can't fool HIM. No androids

accepted there. Only HE knows the 

ice water in your veins. 

You've continued to do nothing. 

You've shown me less than that. It's 

up to you to change. My guess, you 

are completely unable being anything 

else than an [sic] cold hearted android.

Maybe you should [o]f learned the 

"golden rule" from your fat mother.

Your fat mother is called and I'm not 

told. How dare you.

Shame on you. If you even loved me 

for a second you couldn’t of been such 

a lying bitch. . . . but you showed your 

true colors.

We have never spoken in over 3 years. 

You had a responsibility and you 

failed not only me but [our] family. 

Texting will never be an appropriate 

medium going forward. You showed 

your true colors again.

The judge found M.B.'s entries into N.L.'s home when she was not present

to be excusable because the prior civil restraint the parties had entered into 

referred to N.L.'s former address. Since N.L. had moved to a different home, 

the judge opined that the order did not prevent M.B. from entering N.L.'s home 

uninvited. Further, M.B. had argued that the children or the nanny invited him 
7

A-4712-18T1

in. The judge also found that N.L.'s iteration to M.B. that, although she 

understood his reasons, she did not want him to enter her home to be ambiguous,

and that thus M.B. could not have known he was unwelcome. 

Now on appeal, N.L. raises the following points:

POINT I

THE DISMISSAL OF PLAINTIFF’ S COMPLAINT 

FOR A FINAL RESTRAINING ORDER WAS 

“MANIFESTLY UNSUPPORTED BY OR 

INCONSISTENT WITH THE COMPETENT, 

RELEVANT AND REASONABLY CREDIBLE 

EVIDENCE AS TO OFFEND THE INTERESTS OF 

JUSTICE” AND SHOULD BE REVERSED.

A. Purpose Of The Domestic Violence Act Is To 

Prevent Emotional Abuse And Assure Victims 

Such As Plaintiff Of Their Right To Be Left 

Alone.

B. Perpetrators Of Domestic Violence Such As 

Defendant Do Not Comply With Expected Social 

Boundaries And Seek To Disturb And Interfere

With The Victim's Right To Be Left Alone.

POINT II

THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT MISAPPLIED THE 

LAW BY FAILING TO EVALUATE THE 

PREDICATE ACTS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 

UNDER THE TOTALITY OF THE 

CIRCUMSTANCES AND THE PAST HISTORY OF 

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE OF THE PARTIES AND 

ADDITIONALLY FAILED TO MAKE FINDINGS OF 

CREDIBILITY.
8

A-4712-18T1

POINT III

THE TRIAL COURT’S LEGAL CONCLUSIONS 

WERE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE FACTS 

ESTABLISHED AT TRIAL BY PLAINTIFF.

A. It Is Incontrovertible That Plaintiff Proved By A 

Preponderance Of Evidence That Defendant 

Harassed Plaintiff When Defendant Sent Plaintiff 

A Three Page E-Mail At 2:00 A.M. On April 30, 

2019, Containing Coarse And Offensive 

Language Directed At Plaintiff Causing Her 

Alarm.

B. Plaintiff Proved By A Preponderance Of 

Evidence That Defendant Harassed Plaintiff 

When Defendant Sent Plaintiff Numerous Text 

Messages From November 2018 to March 2019, 

Containing Offensive and Abusive Language 

When Evaluated Under The Totality Of 

Circumstances Of The Past History Of Domestic 

Violence.

C. Plaintiff Proved By A Preponderance Of 

Evidence That Defendant Harassed Plaintiff 

When Defendant Accessed And Copied 

Plaintiff's Private Text Messages With Her 

Boyfriend Causing Her Alarm.

D. Plaintiff Proved By A Preponderance Of 

Evidence That Defendant Harassed Plaintiff 

When Defendant Berated Plaintiff In Public In 

Front of Parents And Faculty During Their 

Daughter's School Event Causing Her Alarm.

E. Contrary To The Facts Adduced At Trial, The 

Court Misapplied The Law By Determining That 

The Defendant's Conduct Constituted Ordinary 
9

A-4712-18T1

Domestic Contretemps. Such A Conclusion Is 

Inapposite Where There Is A History Of 

Domestic Violence, The Parties Are Not Engaged 

In A Divorce Proceeding, And There Was Prior 

Physical Violence.

F. Plaintiff Proved By A Preponderance Of 

Evidence That Defendant Harassed Plaintiff 

When Defendant Entered Plaintiff's Home On 

April 24, 2019 And On Numerous Occasions 

Without Her Consent Causing Her Alarm. In 

Addition The Court Should Interpret Paragraph 

Five Of The Parties Civil Restraints Consent 

Order De Novo To Prohibit The Defendant From 

Entering Plaintiff's Current Address.

POINT IV

THE TRIAL COURT DECISION SHOULD BE 

REVERSED BECAUSE PLAINTIFF ESTABLISHED 

BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE 

THAT SHE WAS ENTITLED TO A FINAL 

RESTRAINING ORDER TO PROTECT THE 

PLAINTIFF FROM FUTURE ACTS OF ABUSE.

The statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(a), defines harassment as the making of "a 

communication or communications anonymously or at extremely inconvenient 

hours, or in offensively coarse language, or any other manner likely to cause 

annoyance or alarm[.]" In subsection (c), harassment is also defined as a "course 

of alarming conduct or repeatedly committed acts with purpose to alarm or 

seriously annoy such other person." N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(c).
10 A-4712-18T1

Because we consider the proofs in this matter to have been so 

overwhelming as to readily meet the statutory definitions, we do not address 

N.L.'s points of error individually. N.L. established by a preponderance of the

evidence that M.B. made numerous communications with the purpose of 

alarming or seriously annoying N.L., did so in an offensive manner, over a 

period of months, and occasionally during inconvenient hours. That nearly four 

years after the divorce, in message after message. M.B. continued to focus his 

communications on repeatedly insulting N.L., continuously arguing with her 

over minor issues, perseverating on the dissolution of the marriage and 

expressing rage over past events, is a course of alarming conduct.

Family courts are ordinarily afforded broad discretion in decision-making

because it is assumed they "possess special expertise in the field of domestic 

relations." Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 412 (1998). A ruling is only 

overturned if "manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, 

relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice." 

Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414, 428 (2015) (quoting Cesare, 154 N.J. at 412). 

When a trial court is "'clearly mistaken' or 'wide of the mark'" an appellate court 

may "intervene and make its own findings to ensure that there is not a denial of 

justice." N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 104 (2008) 
11 A-4712-18T1

(quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. G.L., 191 N.J. 596, 605 (2007)). 

A trial court must have a rational basis for any decision. A.M.C. v. P.B., 447 

N.J. Super. 402, 416 (App. Div. 2016). 

Silver established a two-prong analysis requiring a judge to first ask if a 

plaintiff has proven, by a preponderance of the credible evidence, that defendant 

has committed one or more of the predicate acts set forth in N.J.S.A. 

2C:25-19(a). Silver, 387 N.J. Super. at 125. If so, a judge is then required to 

determine whether an FRO is necessary to protect the victim. Id. at 126. 

Here, the Family Part judge was clearly mistaken in finding M.B.'s 

messages were mere domestic contretemps. In the interest of justice, we find 

they constituted the predicate offense of harassment. 

The need for an FRO was established by the pattern of abusive conduct, 

"a classic characteristic of domestic violence," corroborated by M.B.'s conduct 

in the courtroom. Id. at 128 (citing Cesare, 154 N.J. at 397-98). Not finding it 

necessary to deny authorship of the texts and messages, M.B. instead somewhat 

apologized for one communication, denying that he typically used obscenities 

when communicating with N.L. Instead of addressing the offensive language

he used, M.B. instead launched into several lengthy diatribes justifying his 

conduct. 
12 A-4712-18T1

Evaluating the factors set forth in the statute, we are satisfied that an FRO 

is necessary to prevent further abuse. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. at 127. N.L. is 

absolutely entitled to be free of harassment from anyone. That the parties have 

been divorced for years, and M.B. nonetheless continues his angry hyperfocus 

on his former wife, speaks to the necessity to protect her by issuing an FRO.

Furthermore, judges are entitled to maintain order and control their 

courtrooms at their discretion. D.G. ex. rel. J.G. v. N. Plainfield Bd. of Educ., 

400 N.J. Super. 1, 26 (App. Div. 2008) (citing Ryslik v. Krass, 279 N.J. Super. 

293, 297 (App. Div. 1995)). A judge has the power to ensure that proceedings 

are conducted in a manner which neither inflicts additional injury on a victim, 

as arguably occurred here, nor harms the trial process. See State v. Castoran, 

325 N.J. Super. 280, 285 (App. Div. 1999). 

A judge must not allow a disruptive litigant "to profit from his own 

wrong[.]" Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 350 (1970). From our review of the 

transcript, it is apparent M.B. conducted himself in a manner that was 

disrespectful of N.L. and her family. It was also disrespectful of the domestic 

violence process as a whole.

We do not ignore the difficulty of conducting a bench trial with selfrepresented litigants. But parties have the right to expect to be treated with 
13 A-4712-18T1

respect and dignity when in the courtroom. See J.D., 207 N.J. at 481. The judge 

had a host of techniques available to prevent what occurred here, which was that 

M.B. dominated the courtroom to the detriment of N.L., who had come to court

armed with significant proofs, looking for protection. The judge should have 

exercised his discretion so as to ensure the proceedings did no further harm to 

the complainant. 

Given the added injury no doubt inflicted on N.L. because of the manner 

in which the proceedings were conducted, we choose to exercise original 

jurisdiction. Original jurisdiction is employed only where the record is 

adequate, making a remand unnecessary, and supports only one conclusion. See

New Jerseyans for Death Penalty Moratorium v. D.O.C., 370 N.J. Super. 11, 18 

(App. Div. 2004); Ladenheim v. Klein, 330 N.J. Super. 219, 224 (App. Div. 

2000). It is exercised in order to avoid extremely burdensome and unnecessary 

litigation. Price v. Himeji, LLC, 214 N.J. 263, 294-96 (2013). 

M.B. did not challenge authorship of the texts and emails introduced into 

evidence, making a remand unnecessary; the record supports only one 

conclusion. To require N.L. to go through the trial process again would be 

extremely burdensome to this domestic violence litigant. Having reached the 

conclusion that both prongs of Silver were met, i.e. predicate acts and a need to 
14 A-4712-18T1

protect, we remand for the ministerial purpose of the entry of an FRO barring 

M.B. from contact with N.L., her mother, stepfather, and the children's 

caretakers as named in the complaint.

Reversed, remanded for the entry of an order in accord with this decision.