alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
WRITTEN AGREEMENT BETWEEN JORGE EMILIO ZEDAN AND DOUGLAS HAFFER

The undersigned, in relation to the Letter of Intent dated March 11, 2000,
signed by Douglas P. Haffer, as President of World Wide Wireless Communications,
Inc., and Jorge Emilio Zedan, President of El Salvador Telecom SA, DE C.V. and
through which World Wide Wireless Communications Inc. agreed to pay the sum of
three million five hundred thousand dollars in United States currency, of which
to date World Wide Wireless has paid one million dollars, in exchange for
twenty-five percent of the later company, they agree as follows:

1.   The parties mutually voluntarily agree to leave without effect the
     relationship set forth in the Letter of Intent, ceasing and terminating it
     and in effect extinguishing all rights and obligations set forth in that
     document;
2.   As a result of the foregoing, if either party has taken positions in
     incorporation of World Wide Wireless, Inc or in the books of SALTEL either
     party is authorized to make revisions and/or modifications as is necessary
     to abide by this agreement;
3.   Without prejudice to the foregoing, World Wide Wireless Communications
     through its President and Jorge Emilio Zedan agree that a way to resolve
     this recession, is that the World Wide Wireless Communications agrees to
     sell and to transfer to Jorge Emilio Zedan the stock that constitutes the
     25 percent of the social capital of SALTEL and the shares that are
     registered in the name of World Wide Wireless Communications Inc.
4.   Before any of the mentioned events in paragraph two and three occurs, Jorge
     Emilio Zedan will have to pay World Wide Wireless Communications, the
     amount of one million dollars, under the following conditions a) within 180
     days; at 10% annual interest. Form of Payment: Five hundred thousand
     dollars shall be paid within 90 days and an additional five hundred
     thousand shall be paid within 180 days, of July 1, 2000. Warranty: These
     payments shall be guaranteed by a national financial institution, Argentine
     or International with the understanding that this warranty will be
     processed in the least amount of time possible without exceeding 30 days.
     If there is breach of any of the foregoing obligations, the entire amount
     is due immediately.
5.   Both parties agree that World Wide Communications, Inc. should have to
     announce to the public the contents of this agreement, this announcement
     will have to be done in a way that doesn't affect the position and image of
     SALTEL or the stockholders. World Wide Communications, Inc. should consult
     SALTEL regarding the terms of any announcement.

     In good faith, we are signing the present in the city of San Salvador on
     July 1, 2000.

     WORLD WIDE WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS

     BY       DOUGLAS HAFFER

     BY       JORGE EMILIO ZEDAN
## F IRST 

## D ISTRICT 

## C OURT OF 

## A PPEAL 

## S TATE OF 

## F LORIDA

_____________________________
No. 1D 17

- 1300

_____________________________
M ARY R OSS , Appellant,

v.

T RINA C ASON , Appellee.

_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Levy County

. David P. Kreider , Judge

. September 6, 2018

P ER C URIAM

.
A FFIRMED

.
R O BERTS , K ELSEY , and M.K. T HOMAS , JJ., concur

.

_____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331

.

_____________________________

Sonya Rudenstine, Gainesville
, for Appellant.2 Jennifer Cates Lester of Dell Salter, Gainesville
, for Appellee.
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-51298

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff–Appellee,

v.

ADAM DANIEL SHEPHERD,

Defendant–Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 5:12-CR-643-1

Before WIENER, OWEN, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Adam Daniel Shepherd was convicted of one charge of failing to register

as a sex offender and was sentenced to serve 24 months in prison and 30 years

on supervised release. In this appeal, he challenges only the term of supervised

release, arguing that it is unreasonable and amounts to plain error because it is

more than needed to achieve the sentencing goals of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and

because the district court failed to properly weigh his prior offenses, the abuse

he suffered as a child, and his ignorance concerning his obligation to register. 

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

October 17, 2013

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

 Case: 12-51298 Document: 00512411300 Page: 1 Date Filed: 10/17/2013
No. 12-51298

Under Shepherd’s view, the 30-year term of supervised release exaggerates the

severity of his offenses and the danger he presents to the public. 

As Shepherd acknowledges, his failure to raise his reasonableness

challenge in the district court results in application of the plain error standard

in this appeal. See United States v. Allison, 447 F.3d 402, 405 (5th Cir. 2006).

Under this standard, one must show a clear or obvious error that affected his

substantial rights. Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009). This

court has discretion to correct a plain error but will do so only if it seriously

affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the proceedings. See id.

The record reflects that the district court properly considered the nature

and circumstances of the offense as well as Shepherd’s history and

characteristics in determining his sentence. See § 3553(a). There is no

indication that the district court failed to account for a sentencing factor that

should have been accorded substantial weight, gave substantial weight to an

“irrelevant or improper factor,” or made “a clear error of judgment in balancing

[the] sentencing factors.” See United States v. Cooks, 589 F.3d 173, 186 (5th Cir.

2009). Shepherd’s arguments amount to no more than a disagreement with the

district court’s weighing of the pertinent factors and the propriety of the

sentence imposed, which does not suffice to show error, plain or otherwise, in

connection with his sentence. See United States v. Ruiz, 621 F.3d 390, 398 (5th

Cir. 2010).

AFFIRMED.

2

 Case: 12-51298 Document: 00512411300 Page: 2 Date Filed: 10/17/2013
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Res. 740 Introduced in House (IH)]

111th CONGRESS
  1st Session
H. RES. 740

  Recognizing the valuable contributions of the extension offices of 
                        land-grant universities.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           September 14, 2009

  Mr. Boswell (for himself, Mr. Braley of Iowa, Mr. King of Iowa, Mr. 
Latham, and Mr. Loebsack) submitted the following resolution; which was 
                referred to the Committee on Agriculture

_______________________________________________________________________

                               RESOLUTION

 
  Recognizing the valuable contributions of the extension offices of 
                        land-grant universities.

Whereas the Morrill Acts established land-grant universities to teach 
        agriculture, home economics, mechanical arts, and other practical 
        professions;
Whereas the Smith-Lever Act of 1914 established a partnership between land-grant 
        universities and the United States Department of Agriculture, thereby 
        codifying land-grant university extension services;
Whereas land-grant university extension services increasingly play an important 
        role in addressing urban, suburban, and rural needs;
Whereas there are approximately 2,900 local and regional extension offices of 
        land-grant universities nationwide performing educational outreach 
        services;
Whereas land-grant university extension services provide useful, practical, and 
        research-based information to agricultural producers, small business 
        owners, youth, consumers, and others in rural areas and communities of 
        all sizes; and
Whereas extension offices provide services in six major areas--4-H youth 
        development, agriculture, leadership development, natural resources, 
        family and consumer sciences, and community and economic development: 
        Now, therefore, be it
    Resolved, That the House of Representatives recognizes the valuable 
contributions of the extension offices of land-grant universities.
                                 <all>
```
#### John D. LOCKHART, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent.

No. WD 50524.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.

Oct. 10, 1995.

Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer to Supreme Court Denied Dec. 5,1995.

David Simpson, Office of the State Public Defender, Columbia, for appellant.

Jeremiah Nixon, Atty. Gen., Fernando Bermudez, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.

Before BERREY, P.J., and ULRICH & ELLIS, JJ.

*ORDER*

PER CURIAM:

Appeal from denial of Rule 24.035 motion.

Affirmed. Rule 84.16(b).
IV 

111TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. RES. 628 

Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that the United States 

should pursue the global elimination of obstacles to the proliferation 

of technologies and services that science has proven are necessary to 

address the most pressing environmental problems of our time. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JULY 10, 2009 

Mr. DREIER (for himself and Mr. KUCINICH) submitted the following 

resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs 

RESOLUTION 

Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that 

the United States should pursue the global elimination 

of obstacles to the proliferation of technologies and services that science has proven are necessary to address 

the most pressing environmental problems of our time. 

Whereas addressing the critical global environmental issues of 

our time is of paramount importance; 

Whereas advanced technology will be central to addressing 

these environmental and energy challenges; 

Whereas advanced technology represents a key element of 

American comparative advantage in the worldwide marketplace; 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HRES 628 IH 

Whereas the U.S. should strengthen and reform its policies 

to encourage the use of environmental technologies and 

services; 

Whereas obstacles to the global proliferation of environmental 

technologies and services limits their accessibility and affordability; 

Whereas these obstacles thwart our policy of encouraging the 

use of these types of products and services; 

Whereas eliminating these obstacles would make these types 

of products and services more accessible and more affordable; 

Whereas the resulting increased use of these types of products and services would reduce environmental damage, increase the efficiency of energy consumption, reduce our 

dependence on fossil fuels, enhance our national security, 

reduce costs for consumers, and increase job creation; 

Whereas full participation by the developed and developing 

worlds in this effort is essential in order to realize the 

necessary level of global proliferation of environmental 

technologies and services to achieve the above-stated 

goals; and 

Whereas the U.S. can pursue regional efforts to eliminate 

these obstacles to the global proliferation of environmental technologies and services as a way to build momentum for a global agreement: Now, therefore, be it 

1 Resolved, That it is the sense of the House of Rep2 resentatives that— 

3 (1) the U.S. should pursue the global elimi4 nation of obstacles to the proliferation of tech5 nologies and services that science has proven are 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with BILLS
3 

•HRES 628 IH 

1 necessary to address the most pressing environ2 mental problems of our time; and 

3 (2) the U.S. has the ability and the obligation 

4 to provide global leadership in advancing this effort. 

Æ 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with BILLS
#### STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Ben STOVALL, Appellant.

No. 56746.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division One.

Feb. 20, 1990.

Steven M. Davis, Hillsboro, for appellant.

William Lyman Johnson, Hillsboro, for respondent.

*853CRIST, Judge.

Defendant appeals his conviction, following a bench trial, for driving while his license was revoked. Before trial, the judge had refused to disqualify himself. We reverse and remand.

The prosecutor charged defendant by information with Operating a Motor Vehicle while his Drivers License was Revoked. § 302.321, RSMo 1986. On January 26, 1989, the first date set for trial, defendant entered a plea of guilty to the amended charge of Driving Without a Valid License. § 302.020, RSMo 1986. The trial judge refused to accept the plea and reset the ease for trial on February 16, 1989.

Defendant immediately filed a request for a change of judge under Rule 32.07. The motion, filed on January 26, twenty-one days before the new trial date, was denied. On February 16, the trial judge still refused to disqualify himself. He allowed the State to withdraw its amended charge over defendant’s objection. The trial was held on the original charge and defendant was found guilty.

Defendant claims he was entitled to a change of judge because his request was timely filed pursuant to Rule 32.07. The State has not filed a brief.

A timely request for a change of judge under Rule 32.07 leaves the trial judge without discretion. He must disqualify himself. *State v. Hornbuckle,*746 S.W.2d 580, 584[1] (Mo.App.1988). Rule 32.07(b) states: “In misdemeanor eases the application [for a change of judge] must be filed not later than ten days before the *date set for trial.”*(Emphasis added.) The question in this case is which date, January 26 or February 16, is the “date set for trial” as contemplated by the rule.

The timeliness of the motion must be considered with respect to the date of the actual trial regardless of any continuances. *Harmon v. Schultz,*723 S.W.2d 945, 947 (Mo.App.1987) (applying prior Rule 51.05(b)). The term “trial” has been interpreted to mean “trial on the merits.” *Reproductive Health Services, Inc. v. Lee,*660 S.W.2d 330, 347[22] (Mo.App.1983). A guilty plea has been considered a ‘ trial” when accepted by the trial court. *State ex rel. O’Brien v. Murphy,*592 S.W.2d 194, 195 [2] (Mo.App.1979). *See Fraijo v. Superior Court,*34 Cal.App.3d 222, 109 Cal.Rptr. 909 (1973); *Smith v. Municipal Court,*71 Cal.App.3d 151, 139 Cal.Rptr. 121 (1977).

Here, the “trial on the merits” was held on February 16,1989. While it is true a trial was set for January 26, no “trial on the merits” took place because the plea was rejected. Therefore, defendant’s request for a change of judge was timely filed more than ten days before the “date set for trial,” February 16, 1989. The trial judge should have disqualified himself. Rule 32.07(e).

Reversed and remanded for a new trial.

GARY M. GAERTNER, P.J., and REINHARD, J., concur.
#### STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. John GARNER, Appellant. John GARNER, Movant-Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent.

Nos. 63952, 67729.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division One.

March 26, 1996.

Emmett D. Queener, Office of the State Public Defender, Columbia, for Appellant.

Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Attorney General, Fernando Bermudez, Assistant Attorney General, Jefferson City, for Respondent.

Before REINHARD, P.J., and KAROHL and GRIMM, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant-movant appeals after consecutive sentences on five felonies which include life imprisonment without possibility of parole for murder, fifteen years for burglary and three, ten year terms for assault first degree and two charges of armed criminal action. He also appeals denial of Rule 29.15 relief after an evidentiary hearing.

Defendant has briefed and argued one point on each appeal. The direct appeal issue involves testimony of a victim regarding defendant’s threats to kill another victim. This evidence was received without objection, particularly, without objection that it constituted evidence of bad acts or uncharged crimes. Obviously, the trial court did not err in allowing the testimony in the absence of *388an objection. Further, the evidence would be admissible as proof of premeditation and intent in a first degree murder case. The sentences are affirmed.

Movant’s claim of ineffective assistance is based on his contention defense trial counsel was ineffective in closing argument. Counsel argued defendant’s trial testimony may have been untrue regarding his motive for going to the home of his ex-wife. He testified he went to see his children. His attorney argued that his motive was to cause trouble, to scare his victims, but not to assault or murder. Rejection of this claim was not clearly erroneous. Rule 29.15(j). The argument was consistent with defense strategy that the assault and killing were not premeditated. Throughout the trial the defense emphasized defendant was not guilty of first degree murder or first degree assault because he did not intend the consequences of his actions. Defendant’s testimony suggested to his trial counsel that this strategy represented the only available defense. The explanation of trial counsel, at the motion hearing, supports denial of relief.
#### George Michael WALLACE, Petitioner, v. Hon. Charles B. LESTER, Chief Judge; and Entire Court Of Appeals, Respondents.

No. 92-SC-984-OA.

Supreme Court of Kentucky.

Jan. 21, 1993.

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS

Petitioner’s request for an order in the nature of mandamus to require the Court of Appeals to immediately rule upon his pending appeal is denied. After reviewing the docket, it is evident that this matter is proceeding in a timely manner in the Court of Appeals and the issuance of a writ of mandamus is uncalled for.

ENTERED: January 21, 1993.

/s/ Robert F. Stephens Chief Justice
#### Daniel H. OWSLEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent.

No. WD 51886.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.

June 4, 1996.

Rebecca L. Kurz, Assistant Appellate Defender, Kansas City, for appellant.

Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Attorney General, Jill C. LaHue, Assistant Attorney General, Jefferson City, for respondent.

Before LAURA DENVIR STITH, P.J., and ULRICH and SMART, JJ.

*ORDER*

PER CURIAM:

Daniel H. Owsley appeals from the denial of his Rule 24.035 motion for postconviction *503relief without an evidentiary hearing. Mr. Owsley contends that he was induced to plead guilty because counsel misled him into believing that he would be sentenced to concurrent terms of ten years on each of two counts of first degree robbery and three years on each of two counts of armed criminal action. In fact, he was sentenced to fifteen years and five years on these counts, respectively, each sentence to be served concurrently with the other sentences then imposed.

We have reviewed the briefs of the parties and the record on appeal and find no error. Because a published opinion reciting the detailed facts and restating the applicable principles of law would have no precedential value, we affirm by this summary order under Rule 84.16(b), but have furnished the parties with a memorandum opinion, for their information only, setting forth our reasoning.
```
[Federal Register Volume 61, Number 88 (Monday, May 6, 1996)]
[Notices]
[Page 20293]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 96-11188]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Iowa, North Dakota and Utah; Relinquishment of Sealed Source and 
Device Evaluation Authority and Reassumption by the Commission

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Notice of reassumption of sealed source and device evaluation 
authority from the states of Iowa, North Dakota, and Utah.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: Notice is hereby given that effective June 1, 1996, the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission will reassume regulatory authority for 
sealed source and device evaluations in the Agreement States of Iowa, 
North Dakota, and Utah in response to requests from those States to 
relinquish that authority.

EFFECTIVE DATE: June 1, 1996.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Stephen Salomon, Office of State 
Programs, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-
0001. Telephone: (301) 415-2368. Internet: [email protected]

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Currently, Iowa, North Dakota, and Utah have 
agreements with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) which grant 
these States authority to regulate specific categories of radioactive 
materials formerly regulated by NRC. These agreements have been entered 
into pursuant to Section 274b of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as 
amended. Recently, the NRC received letters from North Dakota Governor 
Edward T. Schafer (September 25, 1995), Iowa Governor Terry E. Branstad 
(January 22, 1996), and Utah Governor Michael O. Leavitt (January 16, 
1996), each requesting to relinquish his State's authority to evaluate 
sealed sources and devices, and that the NRC reassume this authority. 
The requested NRC action would involve reassertion of regulatory 
authority by NRC over activities currently regulated by these States 
pursuant to their agreements with NRC. The Governors note there has 
been little or no need to conduct such evaluations in the past and 
given no future prospects for device evaluations, they do not believe 
they can continue to justify the costs to the State to maintain this 
authority.
    The Commission has agreed to these requests and has notified these 
Agreement States that effective June 1, 1996, the NRC will reassume 
authority to evaluate and approve sealed source and device applications 
within these States. Iowa, North Dakota, and Utah will retain authority 
to regulate the manufacture and use of sealed sources and devices 
within the respective State in accordance with its Section 274b 
agreement with the NRC.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 30th day of April, 1996.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
John C. Hoyle,
Secretary of the Commission.
[FR Doc. 96-11188 Filed 5-3-96; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
```