NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 18-2750

___________

CYNTHIA M. YODER,

Appellant

v.

GOOD WILL STEAM FIRE ENGINE COMPANY NO. 1, t/b/a Good Will Ambulance; 

JSDC LAW OFFICES; JAMES SMITH; DIETERICK CONNELLY; CHABAL YAHN; 

SEEBER TOMASKO; JAMES D. YOUNG

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-18-cv-02693)

District Judge: Honorable Juan R. Sanchez

____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

October 11, 2018

Before: VANASKIE, COWEN and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: October 16, 2018)

___________

OPINION*

___________

PER CURIAM

 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.
2

Cynthia Yoder appeals pro se from the District Court’s order dismissing her 

complaint against the Good Will Steam Fire Engine Company, JSDC Law Offices, and 

several of its attorneys. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.

In her complaint, Yoder alleged that the Good Will Steam Fire Engine Company 

failed to submit to Medicare a bill for ambulance services provided to her father, Rance 

Strunk. The bill went unpaid, and, ultimately, the Good Will Steam Fire Engine 

Company, through its attorneys, JSDC Law Offices, initiated a lawsuit in state court 

against Strunk. In response, Yoder sued Good Will Steam Fire Engine Company, but 

that state court case was dismissed as frivolous. Yoder asserted that, although she has 

power of attorney for her father, she was “being prohibited to act on Mr. Strunk’s behalf” 

in the state court litigation. Separately, Yoder appeared to challenge a sheriff’s sale of 

her family’s home, asserting that it violated her constitutional rights, as well as those of 

her father, her mother, and her son. 

The District Court sua sponte dismissed the complaint, holding that Yoder lacked 

standing to raise claims on behalf of her family members, and that, even if her family 

members were named as plaintiffs, Yoder could not represent them in federal court. With 

respect to claims asserted on Yoder’s own behalf that challenged state court judgments, 

the District Court held that they were barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. To the 

extent that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not apply, the District Court stated that it 

could not “discern any plausible basis for a claim that Yoder could bring against the 

Defendants that would fall within this Court’s jurisdiction.” In addition, the District 
3

Court held that Yoder’s request to enjoin the sheriff’s sale was moot. Finally, the District 

Court concluded any amendment of the complaint would be futile. Yoder appealed. 

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and exercise plenary review over 

the District Court’s sua sponte dismissal of Yoder’s complaint for failure to state a claim. 

See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). We may affirm on any basis 

supported by the record. See Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per 

curiam). 

We agree with the District Court that Yoder could not assert claims on behalf of 

her family members, over whom she claims to have power of attorney. Indeed, it is well 

settled that an individual proceeding pro se may not represent third parties in federal 

court. See Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 672 (3d Cir. 2010) (per curiam); see also

Mariana v. Fisher, 338 F.3d 189, 205 (3d Cir. 2003) (stating that “prudential standing 

requires that a litigant assert his or her own legal interests rather than those of a third 

party.”). And although power of attorney may confer certain decision-making rights 

under state law, it is sufficient by itself to allow a non-lawyer to litigate on behalf of 

another in federal court. See Simon v. Hartford Life, Inc., 546 F.3d 661, 664-65 (9th Cir. 

2008). To the extent that Yoder’s claims were based on injuries she allegedly suffered as 

a result of state court rulings entered against her before she commenced her federal suit, 

the District Court properly determined that the claims were barred under the RookerFeldman doctrine.1

 See Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 

 

1

It is not clear from Yoder’s complaint whether the state court proceedings are ongoing. 

If they are, Younger abstention would likely be required. See Anthony v. Council, 316 
4

F.3d 159, 165 (3d Cir. 2010) (stating that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprives lower 

federal courts of jurisdiction over suits that are essentially appeals from state-court 

judgments). In addition, Yoder suggested that the sheriff’s sale violated her Fifth and 

Fourteenth Amendment rights, but none of the named defendants are state actors. See

West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (“[t]o state a claim under [42 U.S.C.] § 1983, a 

plaintiff must allege a violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the 

United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person 

acting under color of state law.”). Furthermore, to the extent that Yoder sought to raise 

claims under state law, there is no basis for diversity jurisdiction because all parties are 

citizens of Pennsylvania. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Finally, we agree that amendment of the 

complaint would be futile. See Jablonski v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 863 F.2d 288, 

292 (3d Cir. 1988) (explaining that “amendment of the complaint is futile if the 

amendment will not cure the deficiency in the original complaint or if the amended 

complaint cannot withstand a renewed motion to dismiss”).

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.

 

F.3d 412 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that Younger abstention is required if there are 

continuing state proceedings which are judicial in nature, which implicate important state 

interests, and which afford an adequate opportunity for the appellant to present her 

federal claims).