UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ESTATE OF YAEL BOTVIN, : by and through its Administrator : Russell Ellis, et al ., : : Plaintiffs, : Civil Action No.: 05-0220 (RMU) : v. : Re Document No.: 26 : ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN : et al. , : : Defendants. : MEMORANDUM OPINION
D ENYING THE P LAINTIFFS ’ M OTION FOR R ELIEF U PON R ECONSIDERATION OF AN I NTERLOCUTORY O RDER ; D ENYING W ITHOUT P REJUDICE THE P LAINTIFFS ’ S UPPLEMENTAL M OTION FOR D EFAULT J UDGMENT I. INTRODUCTION This matter is before the court on the plain tiffs’ motion for relief upon reconsideration of an interlocutory order and the plaintiffs ’ supplemental motion for default judgment. 1 The plaintiffs have brought suit against the Islami c Republic of Iran, the Iranian Ministry of Information and Security and the Iranian Re volutionary Guard under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602 et seq . Through this action, the plaintiffs seek to hold the defendants responsible for a 1997 terrorist attack perpetrated by Hamas operatives in Jerusalem, Israel. In February 2010, the court ruled that District of Columbia choice of law rules dictated the application of Israel i law to the plaintiffs’ substan tive causes of action. Noting that

1 In the plaintiffs’ submission, which they title “supplemental motion for entry of default judgment,” the plaintiffs argue that the court erred in a previous interlocutory ruling and that the court should enter default judgment in their favor. See infra Part III. Accordingly, the court construes the plaintiffs’ submission as constitu ting two distinct motions: one for relief upon reconsideration of an interlocutory ruling and one for default judgment.2 the plaintiffs had not establishe d the defendants’ liability under Is raeli law, the court denied the motion for default judgment without prejudice. In their most recent submission, the plaintiffs ask the court to revisit its previous choice of law ruling and conclude that California law, rather than Israeli law, governs this case. Furthermore, the plaintiffs assert that even if Israeli law governs both li ability and damages, the plaintiffs are entitled, under Israe li law, to a default judgment. Because the plaintiffs have failed to demonstrat e that the court erred in its earlier choice of law ruling, the court denies the plaintiffs’ motion for re lief upon reconsideration and concludes that Israeli law governs this case. Furthermore, because the plaintiffs have not established to the court’s satis faction that the defendants are liable under Israeli law for the tortious conduct alleged in the complaint, the court denies the plaintiffs’ renewed motion for default judgment without prejudice.

II. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND The plaintiffs’ claims stem from an Iranian -sponsored triple-suicide bombing at an Israeli pedestrian mall on September 4, 1997. 2 Compl. ¶ 18. The attack, conducted by Hamas operatives, resulted in the deat h of fourteen-year-old Yael Botv in, daughter of plaintiff Julie Goldberg-Botvin and sister to pl aintiffs Tamar and Michal Botv in. Mem. Order (Sept. 24, 2007)
at 1. In October 2006, the plaintiffs filed a motion in which they requested that the court enter a default judgment against the defendants, after ta king judicial notice of th e findings of fact and conclusions of law in Campuzano v. Islamic Republic of Iran , 281 F. Supp. 2d 258 (D.D.C.

2 More detailed summaries of the relevant facts and procedural history may be found in prior decisions of this court. See Mem. Op. (Feb. 16, 2010) at 2-3; Mem. Order (Mar. 24, 2009) at 1-2; Mem. Order (Sept. 24, 2007) at 1-2.3 2003), a case arising out of the same terrorist attack at issue here. See Pls.’ Mot. to Take Judicial Notice ¶¶ 8-10. The court granted th e plaintiffs’ request for judicial notice, but declined to enter a default judgment, as the plaintiffs had failed to establish other vital elements of their claims.
See Mem. Order (Sept. 24, 2007) at 2-3. The court denied the plaintiffs’ subsequent motion for default judgment, filed in March 2008 on similar grounds. See generally Mem. Order (Mar. 27, 2009). In response to the plaintiffs’ third motion for defa ult judgment, filed in May 2009, the court concluded that the plaintiffs had established the court’s subject matter jurisdicti on over the dispute and personal jurisdiction over the defendant s pursuant to the FSIA. See Mem. Op. (Feb. 16, 2010) at 4-7. The court also concluded that under the District of Columbia’s choice of law rules, the plaintiffs’ substantive claims were gove rned by Israeli law. Id. at 7-11. Because the plaintiffs had not established the defendants’ liabili ty under Israeli law, having addr essed their claims to California law instead, the court denied withou t prejudice the plaintiffs’ motion. Id. at 11-12. The plaintiffs now move fo r relief upon reconsideration of the court’s choice of law ruling, arguing that either Californi a or District of Columbia la w should govern both liability and damages, or at the very least, th e issue of damages. Pl s.’ Mot. at 4. Alternatively, the plaintiffs contend that even if Is raeli law governs both liabili ty and damages, they are nonetheless entitled to a default judgment and substant ial damages under Israeli law. See id. at 10. The court now turns to the plaintiffs’ arguments and the relevant legal standards.4 III. ANALYSIS A. The Court Denies the Plaintiffs’ Motion for Relief upon Reconsideration of an Interlocutory Order 1. Legal Standard for Relief Upon Reco nsideration of an Interlocutory Order A district court may revise its own interlocut ory decisions “at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and th e rights and liabilities of all the parties.” F ED
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. P. 54(b); see also Childers v. Slater , 197 F.R.D. 185, 190 (D.D .C. 2000) (citing the Advisory Committee Notes to Federal Rule of Ci vil Procedure 60(b)). The standard for the court’s review of an interlocut ory decision differs from the sta ndards applied to final judgments under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e) and 60(b). Compare Muwekma Tribe v. Babbitt , 133 F. Supp. 2d 42, 48 n.6 (D.D.C. 2001) (noting that “motions for [relief upon] reconsideration of interlocutory orders, in contra st to motions for [relief upon] rec onsideration of final orders, are within the sound discreti on of the trial court”) and United Mine Workers v. Pittston Co. , 793 F. Supp. 339, 345 (D.D.C. 1992) (d iscussing the standard applicable to motions to grant relief upon reconsideration of an interlocutory order) with LaRouche v. Dep’t of Treasury , 112 F. Supp. 2d 48, 51-52 (D.D.C. 2000) (analyzing the defendant’s motion for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)) and Harvey v. Dist. of Columbia , 949 F. Supp. 878, 879 (D.D.C. 1996) (ruling on the plaintiff’s motion to alter or amend judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e)). A motion pursuant to Rule 59(e), to alter or amend a judgment af ter its entry, is not routinely granted. Harvey , 949 F. Supp. at 879. The primary reasons for altering or amending a judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b) are an intervening change of contro lling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice. Id. ; Firestone v. Firestone , 76 F.3d5 1205, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (per curiam); F ED
. R. C IV . P. 60(b); LaRouche , 112 F. Supp. 2d at 51-52. By contrast, relief upon reconsideration of an interlocutory decision pursuant to Rule 54(b) is available “as justice requires.” Childers , 197 F.R.D. at 190. “As justice requires” indicates concrete considerations of whether th e court “has patently misunderstood a party, has made a decision outside the adversarial issues pres ented to the [c]ourt by th e parties, has made an error not of reasoning, but of apprehension, or wh ere a controlling or significant change in the law or facts [has occurred] since the submission of the issue to the court.” Cobell v. Norton , 224 F.R.D. 266, 272 (D.D.C. 2004) (inter nal citation omitted). These c onsiderations leave a great deal of room for the court’s discretion and, accordingly, the “as justice requires” standard amounts to determining “whether [relief upon] re consideration is necessary under the relevant circumstances.” Id. Interlocutory orders “may always be reconsidered prior to final judgment” and are not “subject to the law of the case doctrine.” Filebark v. U.S. Dept. of Transp. , 555 F.3d 1009, 1013 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting Langevine v. Dist. of Columbia , 106 F.3d 1018, 1023 (D.C. Cir. 1997)). A ruling is subject to the more lenient “inter locutory” standard of reconsideration if no appeal will lie, as the order or decision “adjudicat es fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties.” See F ED
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. P. 54 (a)-(b). Orders denying default judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2) are not cons idered “appealable final order[s],” and are thus interlocutory. Adult Film Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Thetford , 776 F.2d 113, 115 (5th Cir. 1985). Therefore, this court is free to reconsider its previous order denying default judgment.6 2. The Court Properly Determined That Israeli Law Governs the Plaintiffs’ Claims Under District of Columbia Choice of Law Provisions As the court noted in its February 20 10 ruling, the FSIA provisions under which the plaintiffs bring suit do not provide a federa l cause of action agai nst foreign states. 3 Mem. Op. (Feb. 16, 2010) at 7; see also Oveissi v. Is lamic Republic of Iran , 573 F.3d 835, 840 (D.C. Cir. 2009). Thus, the plaintiffs are “required to identif y, and to bring claims pu rsuant to, some other ‘cause of action arising out of a specific source of law.’” Oveissi , 573 F.3d at 840 (quoting Acree v. Republic of Iraq , 370 F.3d 41, 59 (D.C. Cir. 2004)). Claims brought under state statutory and common law, as well as forei gn law, may satisfy this requirement. See id. at 840, 844. To determine which body of law governs the plaintiffs’ claims, the court applies the District of Columbia’s choice of law rules. See id. at 842. The court’s prior choice of law analysis relied extensively on Oveissi , which contains this Circuit’s most recent application of District of Columbia choice of law provisions to tort claims arising from an extra-terr itorial terrorist attack. See Mem. Op. (Feb. 16, 2010) at 8-11. In
Oveissi , the Circuit determined that under District of Columbia choice of law rules, French law governed tort claims brought by an American citi zen whose grandfather had been assassinated in a terrorist attack. Oveissi , 573 F.3d at 842. In reaching its conc lusions, the Circuit noted that the alleged tortious conduct occurred in France, th e victim was an Iranian national domiciled in France, the plaintiff was also a French domiciliar y at the time of the attack and the assassination was not intended to affect the United States or national interests. See id. at 842-44. Relying on Oveissi , this court determined that Israel i law governs the plaintiffs’ claims, as the plaintiffs and the victim were domic iled in Israel, where the bombing occurred. See Mem.

3 The plaintiffs bring suit under 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) (2006), rather than the more recent § 1605A. See Mem. Op. (Feb. 16, 2010) at 3 n.2. Section 1605A, unlike its predecessor, establishes a substantive federal cause of action against foreign states. See Oveissi v. Islamic Republic of Iran , 573 F.3d 835, 844 (D.C. Cir. 2009).7 Op. (Feb. 16, 2010) at 10. The court noted that unlike the victim in Oveissi , the decedent in this case was an American citizen, but concluded that the distinction was not dispositive, given the lack of evidence that the terrorist attack “was targeted specifically at U.S. nationals or was otherwise intended to aff ect the United States.” Id. In their motion for relief upon reconsideration, the plaintiffs argue that the court wrongly concluded that Israeli law gove rns the plaintiffs’ claims. See Pls.’ Mot. at 5-11. First, the plaintiffs assert that the court erred in rely ing so extensively on th e Circuit’s reasoning in Oveissi because the Circuit “did not mandate strict adherence” to the c hoice of law analysis articulated in that decision. Id. at 9. To support this contention, the plaintiffs rely on a passage in Oveissi in which the Circuit states that it is “not setti ng forth a general choice-of-law rule for terrorism cases, but merely applying the District of Colu mbia’s rules to the facts of a case filed under former § 1605(a)(7).” See id. (quoting Oveissi , 573 F.3d at 844). The plaintiffs, however, misconstrue the Ci rcuit’s admonition, which merely cautioned that the ruling in Oveissi resulted from the application of esta blished District of Columbia choice8 of law principles, 4 and was not intended to create a speci al body of law governing all terrorism

cases. See Oveissi , 573 F.3d at 844 (distinguishing terrorism cases filed under the more recent § 1605A, which creates a federal cause of action, renderi ng state choice of law an alysis irrelevant). Therefore, the Circuit’s statement that it was “n ot setting forth a general choice-of-law rule for terrorism cases” has no impact on this court’ s earlier analysis, as this case, like Oveissi , involves claims brought under § 1605(a)(7) and is governed by District of Columbia choice of law provisions. See id. ; see also Pls.’ Mot. at 5-8. The plaintiffs also contend that the court er red in directing the appl ication of Israeli law to their claims because Oveissi recognizes a unique national inte rest in applying domestic law to terrorist attacks on U.S. nationals . Pls.’ Mot. at 9. The plain tiffs argue that the result in Oveissi , in which the victim was a French national, should not dictate the outcome of this case, in which the victim was a U.S. citizen. See id. at 9-10.

4 The District of Columbia’s choice of law fra mework calls on the court to conduct a threshold inquiry to ensure that a “true conflict” exists between the laws of interested jurisdictions. See Gov’t Emp. Ins. Co. v. Fetisoff , 958 F.2d 1137, 1141 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (citing Eli Lilly & Co. v. Home Ins. Co. , 764 F.2d 876, 882 (D.C. Cir. 1985)). Should a “true conflict” exist, the court must then determine which jurisdiction has the most compelling interest in having its laws applied, utilizing the “government interests analysi s” and the “most significant relationship” tests. See Oveissi , 573 F.3d at 842-43 (citing Hercules & Co. v. Shama Rest. Corp. , 566 A.2d 31, 40-41 & 41 n.18 (D.C. 1989)). In Oveissi , however, the Circuit bypassed the threshold “true conflict” inquiry, focusing its analysis solely upon which jurisdiction had the most compelling interest. See Oveissi , 573 F.3d at 842. This court followed suit in its earlier choice of law ruling, declining to address the threshold inquiry of whether a “true conflict” existed among the various jurisdictions. See Mem. Op. (Feb. 16, 2010) at 7-11. In their motion for relief upon reconsideration, the plaintiffs do not challenge the court’s omission of the threshold inquiry. See generally Pls.’ Mot. At any rate, it is far from clear that California or the District of Columbia constitute “interested” jurisdictions for the purposes of the analysis, given that the plaintiffs and victim only briefly resided in California and were domiciled in Israel, the injuries and tortious conduct alleged did not occur in California and the Dist rict of Columbia’s sole interest is that of the forum state. See Gov’t Emp. Ins. Co. , 958 F.2d at 1141 (citing Eli Lilly , 764 F.2d at 882) (requiring multiple “interested” jurisdictions to trigger “true conflict” inquiry); see also Oveissi , 573 F.3d at 842-43 (refusing to co nduct rigorous choice of law analysis based on the “slight” interest of a state in which the plaintiff was bor n and briefly resided). Accordingly, the court declines to revisit this aspect of its earlier ruling.9 As acknowledged in Oveissi and this court’s earlier ru ling, the United States has a “strong interest in applying its domestic law to terrorist attacks on its nationals.” Ovessi , 573 F.3d at 843 (quoting Dammarell v. Islamic Republic of Iran , 2005 WL 756090, at *20 n.16 (D.D.C. Mar. 29, 2005)); Mem. Op. (Feb. 16, 2010) at 10. As discussed in this court’s earlier ruling, however, this “strong intere st” does not amount to a categor ical rule that domestic law applies whenever a U.S. citizen is injured abroad , regardless of the circumstances of the incident or the extent of the victim’s conn ections to the domestic jurisdiction. 5 Mem. Op. (Feb. 16, 2010). To the contrary, Oveissi indicates that the interest of the United States in applying domestic law to an extra-territorial terrorist atta ck is far more compelling when the attacks have been directed at U.S. citizens “by reason of th eir nationality” or were directed against state interests. Oveissi , 573 F.3d at 843 (quoting Dammarell , 2005 WL 756090, at *20 & n.16). Thus, in its prior ruling the court declined to give dispositive wei ght to the victim’s nationality, as the plaintiffs and victim were domiciled in Israel at the ti me of the attacks, the attacks occurred in Israel, California’s in terest arose solely from the fact that the plaintiff was born and briefly resided there and the plaintiffs had produc ed “no evidence that the terrorist attack was targeted specifically at U.S. nationals or was ot herwise intended to affect the United States.” Mem. Op. (Feb. 16, 2010) at 10.

5 Indeed, prior decisions that have applied domestic law, rather than foreign law, to claims arising from state-sponsored terrorist attacks have gene rally considered the “unique interest” of the United States determinative when the plaintiff is domiciled in a domestic jurisdiction, citing the “paramount” interest of domiciliary states in providing relief to their residents. See Price v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya , 384 F. Supp. 2d 120, 133 (D.D.C. 2005) (applying the laws of the state in which each plaintiff w as domiciled, based on the dual interests above); Dammarell v. Islamic Republic of Iran , 2005 WL 756090, at *19-21 (D.D.C. Mar. 29, 2005) (applying the law of the state of domicile, after recognizing that the unique interest of the United States in applying domestic law to actions involvi ng state-sponsored terrorist attacks abroad heightened the “often paramount” interest of th e jurisdiction of domicile in “guaranteeing redress to its citizens”). By contrast, the victim and pl aintiffs in the current case were and are domiciled in Israel. See, e.g. , Pls.’ Mot., Ex. 9 (Aff. of Michal Botvin) ¶¶ 4, 12; Pls.’ Mot., Ex. 11 (Aff. of Tamar Botvin) ¶¶ 5-6; Pls.’ Renewed Mot. for Default J. at 8.10 In their most recent submission, the plaintiffs have provided no persuasive evidence that the suicide bombings in question were directed at state interests or specifically targeted American citizens based on their citizenship. See Pls.’ Mot. at 9-10. Although the plaintiffs suggest that the U.S. government has concluded that the attack in question was designed to disrupt the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, see id. , that assertion is based on a single, unsubstantiated statement on a website, which broadly references multiple attacks and does not offer support for its conclusion. See id. (citing Violence in Opposition to the Middle East Peace Negotiations – 1993 to Present , R EWARDS FOR J USTICE , http://www.rewardsforjustice.net/index.cfm?p age=MEP_Victims&language=english (“Rewards for Justice Website”)). 6 Moreover, even if the attack was intended “to disrupt peace negotiations and to modify the attitudes of the leaders engaged in them,” the website does not suggest that the attack was intended to influence the attitudes of American officials, see Rewards for Justice Website, who served only as facil itators to the negotiations rather than direct participants, see Pls.’ Mot. at 9-10. In short, the plaintiffs have presented no evidence that the bombing of a pedestrian market in Jerusalem designed to disrupt Israeli peace negotiations was directed at U.S. citizens or targeted U.S. state interests. See Oveissi , 573 F.3d at 843 (finding that “if any country was the object of the attack, it was France”); cf. Price v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya , 384 F. Supp. 2d 120, 123-24 (D.D.C. 2005) (notin g the unique U.S. interest in the abduction and torture of two U.S. citizens, alleged to be covert operatives for the Central Intelligence Agency, an act intended in part to provide Libyan officials with the identities of other operatives); Dammarell , 2005 WL 756090, at *1 (concludi ng that U.S. interests predominated in a case arising out of a dire ct assault on the U.S. embassy in Beirut).

6 The “Rewards for Justice” website appears to be a website operated by the U.S. Department of State that offers rewards for inform ation about international terrorism. http://www.rewardsforjustice.net (last visited Mar. 18, 2011).11 Although the United States, like the rest of the world, has a compelling interest in facilitating the Middle East peace process, the court cannot simply presume that any violence resulting in harm to a U.S. citizen in that region equates to an attack on state security or interests. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, th e court cannot conclude that these unfortunate events were directed against Yael Botvin by reason of her nationality or that the “unique interest” of the United States outweighs the interest of Israel with respect to the terrorist attack at issue merely because the victim was a U.S. citize n. The court therefore finds no reason to amend its prior choice of law analysis , and concludes that Israeli la w most appropriately governs the plaintiffs’ claims. 3. Damages Are Most Appropriat ely Determined by Israeli Law Alternatively, the plaintiffs argue that even if Israeli law governs the issue of liability, California or District of Columb ia law should govern the issue of damages. Pls.’ Mot. at 11. Much like they did in arguing that domestic la w should govern the entire case, the plaintiffs assert that the United States has a strong intere st in applying domestic damages law to suits involving terrorist attacks against U.S. nationals. Id. District of Columbia choice of law rules pe rmit courts to apply the laws of different jurisdiction to different causes of acti ons and issues within a single case. Hercules , 566 A.2d at 41-43 (quoting R ESTATEMENT (S ECOND ) OF C ONFLICT OF L AWS § 145 cmt. d (1971 & Supp. 1988)); see also Keene Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am. , 597 F. Supp. 934, 938 (D.D.C. 1984) (citing James v. Powell , 225 N.E.2d 741, 746-47 (N.Y. 1967)) (noting th at District of Columbia choice of law principles may be applie d separately to the issues i nvolving damages, as “[s]tates’ interests in compensatory damages differ from t hose involved in punitive damages”). The court must evaluate the interest of each jurisdiction with respect to the distinct issues to be adjudicated.12 Hercules , 566 A.2d at 41 (quoting Estrada v. Potomac Elec. Power Co. , 488 A.2d 1359, 1361 (D.C. 1985)); see also R ESTATEMENT (S ECOND ) OF C ONFLICT OF L AWS § 145(1) cmt. d (1971) (“Each issue is to receive separate consideration if it is one which would be resolved differently under the local law rule of two or more potentially in terested states.”). In this case, the plaintiffs ha ve failed to explain why the inte rest of the United States in applying domestic law to the issue of damages out weighs Israel’s interest in the matter, given that the attack occurred in Isra el, the victim was domiciled in Isr ael and the plaintiffs reside in Israel. See supra Part III.A.2. Indeed, the sole authorit y the plaintiffs rely on to support this argument, Dammarell , concluded that the U.S. interest in applying domestic law to a case involving an extra-territorial attack on American victims predominated, not because the victims were U.S. nationals, but because the attack wa s carried out against an American embassy and diplomatic personnel and, as a result, impli cated state interests. 2005 WL 756090, at *20 & n.16. As already discussed, the plaintiffs have produced no satisfactory evidence that the suicide bombing at issue was intended as an attack against state interests. See supra Part III.A.2. Thus, Israeli law most appropriately governs the limited issue of da mages, as well as liability. In sum, the court finds no reason to amend or alter its prior interl ocutory ruling directing the application of Israeli law to issues of both liability and da mages. The plaintiffs’ motion for relief upon reconsideration is thus denied. B. The Court Denies Without Prejudice the Plaintiffs’ Motion for Default Judgment 1. Legal Standard for Default Judgment Against a Foreign State A court shall not enter a default judgment against a foreign state “unless the claimant establishes his claim or right to relief by evidence satisfactor y to the court.” 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e); see also Roeder v. Islamic Republic of Iran , 333 F.3d 228, 232 (D.C. Cir. 2003). This13 “satisfactory to the court” standard is identical to the standard for en try of default judgments against the United States under Federa l Rule of Civil Procedure 55(d). 7 Hill v. Republic of Iraq , 328 F.3d 680, 684 (D.C. Cir. 2003). In evaluating th e plaintiffs’ proof, the court may “accept as true the plaintiff[s’] uncontroverted evidence,” Elahi v. Islamic Republic of Iran , 124 F. Supp. 2d 97, 100 (D.D.C. 2000), including proof by affidavit, Weinstein v. Islamic Republic of Iran , 184 F. Supp. 2d 13, 19 (D.D.C. 2002). 2. Legal Standard for Establishing the Law of a Foreign Jurisdiction Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 44.1 provides that when determining the law of a foreign jurisdiction the court may “consider any releva nt material or source, including testimony, whether or not submitted by a party or admissibl e under the Federal Rules of Evidence.” F ED
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. P. 44.1. Most often, foreign law is establis hed through “written or oral expert testimony accompanied by extracts from foreign legal material.” Ganem v. Heckler , 746 F.2d 844, 854 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Such expert testimony is intende d to aid the court in determining the content of the law, not in applying that law to the facts of the case. Minebea Co. v. Papst , 444 F. Supp. 2d 68, 182 (D.D.C. 2006). The court, however, need not uncritically accept such expert testimony and may “engage in its own research . . . [or] reexamine and amplif y material that has been presented by counsel in

7 Rule 55(d) states that “[a] default judgment may be entered against the United States, its officers, or its agencies only if the claimant establishes a clai m or right to relief by evidence that satisfies the court.” F ED

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. P. 55(d).14 partisan fashion.” 8 F ED
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. P. 44.1 advisory committee’s note. Indeed, the court retains the authority to conduct an independent inquiry and to “reject even uncontradicted expert testimony.” Rutgerswarke AG v. Abex Corp. , 2002 WL 1203836, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. June 4, 2002) (citing Curtis v. Beatrice Foods Co. , 481 F. Supp. 1275, 1285 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff’d , 633 F.2d 203 (2d Cir. 1980)); accord Abdelhamid v. Altria Group, Inc. , 515 F. Supp. 2d 384, 395 n.60 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (quoting Guidi v. Inter-Continental Hotels Corp. , 2003 WL 1907901, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2003)). Nevertheless, should the parties fail to provide an “adequate statement of the law,” the court is not obligated to indepe ndently remedy the deficiency. Minnebea , 444 F. Supp. 2d at 185; see also McGhee v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. , 871 F.2d 1412, 1424 n.10 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing Twohy v. First Nat’l Bank , 758 F.2d 1185, 1193 (7th Cir. 1985)) (noting that “nothing requires the court to conduct its own res earch into obscure sources”); F ED
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. P. 44.1 advisory committee’s note (authorizing the co urt to conduct independent rese arch, but explicitly allowing the court to “insist on a comple te presentation by counsel”). In the absence of sufficient

8 Some Circuits have observed that although Rule 44.1 grants courts broad authority to conduct independent research, it does not im pose a duty on them to do so. See Baker v. Booz Allen Hamilton, Inc. , 2009 WL 5125672, at *3 (4th Cir. Dec. 28, 2009) (citing Carey v. Bahama Cruise Lines , 864 F.2d 201, 205 (1st. Cir. 1988)); Bel-Ray Co. v. Chemrite Ltd. , 181 F.3d 435, 440 (3d. Cir. 1999) (citing Carey , 864 F.2d at 205). At least one Circuit, however, has suggested that courts should conduct a more active inquiry, partic ularly when relying on expert testimony to establish foreign law. See Bodum USA, Inc. v. La Cafetiere, Inc. , 621 F.3d 624, 629 (7th Cir. 2010) (stating a preference for independent inves tigation, as reliance on expert testimony still requires the court to discount th e inevitable “adversary’s spin”); id. at 632 (Posner, J., concurring) (stating that courts are rarely justified in rely ing on expert testimony to establish foreign law); but see id. at 638 (Wood, J., concurring) (stating that Rule 44.1 “establishes no hierarchy for sources of foreign law,” as American jurists cannot be expected to appreciate the nuances of a foreign legal system). The possibility of a court bei ng led astray by partisan expert testimony is heightened in cases like this one, in which adversarial briefing is lacking. See Ruiz-Troche v. Pepsi Cola of P.R. Bottling Co. , 161 F.3d 77, 85 (1st Cir. 1998) (noting that the veracity of expert testimony is generally tested through the a dversarial process, including competing expert testimony and cross-examination). Thus, the court concludes that it must at least conduct sufficient independent research to guard against erroneous or exaggerated claims by partisan experts.15 information about the foreign law, “the forum will usually decide the case in accordance with its own local law except when to do so would not meet the needs of the case or would not be in the interests of justice. 9 R ESTATEMENT (S ECOND ) OF C ONFLICT OF L AWS § 136 cmt. h (1971). 3. The Plaintiffs Have Not Established th e Defendants’ Liability Under Israeli Law to the Court’s Satisfaction The plaintiffs assert that because the defendants provided material support that allowed Hamas to carry out the suicide bombing, they are, under Israeli law, vicar iously liable for the assault that resulted in the death of Yael Botvin. 10 See Pls.’ Mot. at 11-16. The plaintiffs further contend that as a result, the defendants may also be held liable for wrongf ul death and direct and derivative mental injury. 11 See id. at 11-20. The sufficiency of the plaintiffs’ evidence concerning these claims is considered below. a. Vicarious Liability for Assault The plaintiffs first assert th at under Israeli law, the defenda nts are vicariously liable for the actions of the Hamas operatives who perp etrated the September 4, 1997 suicide bombing, based on the findings of fact a nd conclusions of law made in Campuzano , which have been

9 In this case, the court has instru cted the plaintiffs to apply Isr aeli law instead of the law of the forum. See Mem. Op. (Feb. 16, 2010) at 10-11. Thus, should the plaintiff fail to sufficiently establish the foreign law, it would not meet the needs of the case or be in the interests of justice to allow forum law to control.

10 The plaintiffs also assert a separate surv ival claim for battery under Israeli law. See Pls.’ Mot. at 14. According to the plaintiffs’ own experts, how ever, Israeli law does not recognize battery as a distinct cause of action. See Pls.’ Mot., Ex. 1 (Aff. of Ovad ya Gabbay and Michael Deborin (“Pls.’ Expert Aff.”)) ¶¶ 8-9, 13 n.3. Rather, Israeli has codified a single tort of assault, which may be proved by establishing one of two sets of elements, roughly corresponding to the American torts of battery and assault. See Civil Wrongs Ordinance (New Version), 5728-1968, 2 LSI 5, §23 (1972) (Isr.); Pls.’ Expert Aff. ¶ 13 n.3. Thus, the plaintiffs cannot assert distinct claims for both battery and assault under Israeli law.

11 “Mental injury” is an Israeli tort similar to intentional infliction of emotional distress. See Pls.’ Expert Aff. ¶ 17.16 adopted in this case. 12 See Pls.’ Mot. at 12. Acco rding to the plaintiffs, these findings establish that the defendants provided training and material support to Hamas, the organization responsible for the bombing, rendering the defendants vicariously liable for the resulting injuries under Israeli law. Id. In support of this assertion, the plaintiffs have submitted an expert affidavit from two experienced practitioners of Israeli tort law. See generally Pls.’ Mot., Ex. 1 (Aff. of Ovadya Gabbay and Michae l Deborin (“Pls.’ Expert Aff.”). The modern Israeli judicial system gene rally functions as a common law regime, though it retains vestiges of its civil law origins. See Yoram Shachar, History and Sources of Israeli
Law , in I NTRODUCTION TO THE L AW OF I SRAEL 1, 6-9 (Amos Shapira & Keren C. DeWitt-Arar eds., 1995); Pls.’ Expert Aff. ¶ 7. The primary source of Israeli tort law is the Civil Wrongs Ordinance (New Version) (“CWO”), enacted in 1968, which codifies the rules governing liability, defenses and damages. Ariel Porat, Tort Law , in I NTRODUCTION TO THE L AW OF I SRAEL 127, 127 (Amos Shapira & Keren C. DeWitt-Arar eds., 1995). Article 14 of the CWO embodies the principle of vicarious liability. Pls.’ Expert Aff. ¶ 34-35. It provides that “[a]ny person who employs an agent . . . to do any act or class of acts on his behalf shall be liable for anything done by such agent in the performance of, and for the manner in which such agent does such act or class of acts.” CWO (N ew Version), 5728-1968, 2 LSI 5, §14 (1972) (Isr.). An agency relationship is recognized when a party acts as the surrogate,

12 This court previously took notice of the “findings and conclusions” of Campuzano , a case in which the court held that the Republic of Iran a nd the other defendants were liable for the same suicide bombing at issue here. See Mem. Order (Sept. 24, 2007) at 2. As the plaintiffs appear to acknowledge, however, the court in Campuzano considered the defendants’ liability primarily under the rubric of § 1605(a)(7) and the Flatow Amendment, see Campuzano , 281 F. Supp. 2d at 269-70, which no longer embody a substantive cause of action, see Cicippio-Puleo v. Islamic Republic of Iran , 353 F.3d 1024, 1032-33 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (noting that satisfying the requirements of § 1605(a)(7) and the Flatow Amendment serves only to establish jurisdiction). Although Campuzano addressed several common law claims brought by some of the plaintiffs, it made no finding of vicarious liabilit y independent of the statutory analysis, nor did it apply Israeli law. See id. at 270-71. Thus, the legal conclusions made in Campuzano and adopted here do not establish the vicarious liability of the defendants under Israeli law.17 or “long arm,” of the defendant. Israel Gilead, Tort Law , in T HE L AW OF I SRAEL : G ENERAL S URVEYS 275, 437 (Itzhak Zamir & Sylviane Colombo eds., 1995); see also Pls.’ Expert Aff. ¶¶
33-36. Despite the questionable relevance of the legal conclusions in Campuzano , the findings of fact made in that case and adopted here pr ovide a sufficient basis to determine whether an agency relationship existed between the defendants and those who directly pe rpetrated the attack. See Campuzano , 281 F. Supp. 2d. at 261-62. The Campuzano court noted that the bombing was carried out by Hamas operatives and that Hamas its elf had claimed responsibility for the attack. Id. The court also found that at the time of the bombing, Iran, th rough the Ministry of Information and Security, funneled milli ons of dollars to Hamas each year. Id. at 261. Furthermore, the Iranian Revolutionary Guar d, the military wing of the Ministry, provided “professional military and terrorist training” to Hamas operatives. Id. at 262. As a result, the U.S. Department of State identified Ir an as a state sponsor of terrorism. Id. The court noted that the perpetrators of the September 4, 1997 attack had personally received terrorist training from the Revolutionary Guard, and concluded that th e bombing would not have occurred without the material support provided by the defendants. Id

. In sum, the defendants provided Hamas w ith crucial funding, support and training necessary to allow Hamas to conduct terrorist attacks, including the one that resulted in the death of Yael Botvin. See id. at 261-62. As a result, the suicide bombers operated as surrogates for the defendants when performing that particular “class of acts,” – i.e. , the terrorist attacks, establishing an agency relationship between the Hamas operatives and the defendants under Israeli law. See Gilead, supra , at 437 (noting that the court may consider which party supplied the tools and incurred the costs, as well as the degree of integrati on and control among the18 parties). The defendants, as principals, are liable under Israeli law for “anything done by [the] agent in the performance of . . . [such] class of acts.” 13 See CWO (New Version), 5728-1968, 2 LSI 5, §14 (1972) (Isr.). The CWO, however, also codifies several limitations on the vicarious liability doctrine set forth in Article 14. See Gilead, supra , at 363. Article 25, in particular, provides that “[n]otwithstanding anything contained in this Or dinance, no principal or employer will be liable for any assault committed by his agent or employee unless he has expressly authorized or ratified such assault.” CWO (New Version), 5728-1968, 2 LSI 5, §25 (1972) (Isr.). This provision appears to limit the liability of “principals” es tablished under Article 14, but is not discussed in the plaintiffs’ most recent memorandum, nor is it addressed in the expert testimony submitted by the plaintiffs. See generally Pls.’ Mot.; Pls.’ Expert Aff. Although the findings of fact in Campuzano plainly establish th at Iran provided the material support that made the su icide bombing possible, the court in Campuzano did not find that the defendants expressly authorized or ratified the attack. 281 F. Supp. 2d at 261-62, 269- 79. Nor have the plaintiffs here offered any additional evidence of Ira n’s ratification of the attack, or any evidence that Iran’s official stat e policy of supporting terrorist activities by Hamas constitutes express authorization or ratification under Israeli law. See generally Pls.’ Mot.; Pls.’ Expert Aff. Indeed, the plainti ffs have failed to provide the cour t with any information regarding

13 The factual findings in Campuzano also suggest that the defendants might be liable for the attack under Article 12 of the CWO, which states that “any person who joins or aids in, authorises, counsels, commands, procures, or ratifies any act do ne or to be done . . . by any other person, shall be liable for such act or omission.” CWO (New Version), 5728-1968, 2 LSI 5, §12 (1972) (Isr.). Because the plaintiffs have not asserted th e defendants’ liability unde r Article 12, the court will not address this potential theory of liability. See Pls.’ Mot. at 12 (arguing for vicarious liability based solely on Article 14); see generally Pls.’ Expert Aff. (making no mention of Article 12).19 what is required to satisfy the “express au thorization or ratific ation” requirement. See generally Pls.’ Mot.; Pls.’ Expert Aff. As already noted, the court is not obligated to remedy deficien cies in the presentation of foreign law offered by the plaintiffs. See F ED
. R. C IV
. P. 44.1 advisory committee’s note (declaring the court “free to in sist on a complete presentation by counsel”). For these reasons, the plaintiffs have not established to the court’ s satisfaction that the de fendants are vicariously liable for the alleged assault. b. Wrongful Death The plaintiffs also contend that the defendants are liable under the Israeli wrongful death statute because the death of Yael Botvin wa s caused by a tortious assault for which the defendants are responsible. See Pls.’ Mot. at 13. The plaintiffs claim that because Yael Botvin would have been entitled to recover for her inju ries had she not died, he r dependents are entitled to compensation under the CWO. Id. Article 78 of the CWO establis hes a right of recovery for he irs similar to the American tort of wrongful death. See Pls.’ Expert Aff. ¶ 24(b). The article provides that [w]here the death of any person is cau sed by any civil wrong and such person would, if death had not ensued, have been entitled at the time of his death under the provisions of this Ordinance to co mpensation in respect of bodily injury caused to him by such civil wrong, the spouse, parent and child of such deceased person will be entitled to compensation fr om the person responsible for such civil wrong. CWO (New Version), 5728-1968, 2 LSI 5, §78 (1972) (Isr.). The provision makes clear that wrongful death liability attaches only when the offender is responsible for an unde rlying “civil wrong.” See id. Thus, to establish the defendants’ liability for wrongful death, the plaintiffs would have to establish that the defendants are responsible for the civil wrong that resulted in Yael Botvin ’s death – namely, the assault perpetrated by20 members of Hamas. See id. The court has, however, already ru led that the plaintiffs have failed to establish that the defendants are vicariously liable for that assault under Israeli law. See supra Part III.B.3.a. Accordingly, the plaintiffs have fa iled to establish their right to relief for wrongful death under Israeli law. c. Direct and Indirect Mental Injury Claims The plaintiffs also contend that they are en titled to damages for “mental injury,” a tort similar to intentional infliction of emotional distress. 14 See Pls.’ Mot. at 17. The plaintiffs allege that the victim suffered direct mental injur y, compensable under Isra eli law, based on the substantial harm inflicted by the physical attack. See Pls.’ Mot. at 17; Pls.’ Expert Aff. ¶ 19. The plaintiffs also argue that the victim’s mother and two si ster suffered derivative mental injury, based on their close relati onship to the victim, the trauma associated with learning of the injurious event and the se verity of their loss. See Pls.’ Expert Aff. ¶¶ 21-23. Mental injury, unlike the previous cau ses of action, is judicially defined. See id. ¶ 17. The Supreme Court of Israel has he ld that to recover for mental in jury, the mental injury must be the result of tort ious conduct. See CA 444/87 Munhar Alsouche v. Dehan , ¶ 20 [1990] (Isr.) (limiting liability for mental injuries to those inju ries that were a reasonably foreseeable result of tortious conduct); Pls.’ Expert Aff. ¶ 16 (noting that recovery for emotional distress requires tortious conduct, whether inten tional or negligent). Both dire ct and indirect victims of the “tortfeasor’s wrongdoing” can recover from the tortf easor for harms sustained. Pls.’ Expert Aff. ¶ 18. The plaintiffs allege that the assault perp etrated by Hamas constitutes the prerequisite tortious conduct necessary to give rise to a mental injury claim. See id. ¶ 20; Pls.’ Mot. at 17-20.

14 Unlike intentional infliction of emotional distress, the tort of mental injury allows victims to recover even if the injury w as caused by a negligent act. See Pls.’ Expert Aff. ¶ 16.21 Again, however, the plaintiffs have failed to estab lish that the defendants can be held vicariously liable for the assault under Article 25. See supra Part III.B.3.a. In the absence of evidence sufficiently demonstrating the defendants’ vicari ous liability under Israeli law for the assault perpetrated by Hamas, the court declines to hold th e defendants liable for the mental injuries of the victim and the remaining plaintiffs.

IV. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the court denies th e plaintiffs’ motion to amend or alter an interlocutory order, and denies without prejudice the plaintiffs’ motion for declaratory judgment. An Order consistent with this Memorandum Opini on is separately and contemporaneously issued this 25th day of March, 2011.

RICARDO M. URBINA United States District Judge