J-S14028-23

2023 PA Super 133

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

CLINTON REED KUHLMAN 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1063 WDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 22, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Beaver County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-04-CR-0000160-2021

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

OPINION BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED: July 27, 2023

Appellant, Clinton Reed Kuhlman, appeals pro se from the aggregate, 

mandatory judgment of sentence of 25 to 50 years’ incarceration, imposed 

after he was convicted, following a non-jury trial, of 58 counts of possession 

of child pornography, 18 Pa.C.S. § 6312(d), and one count of criminal use of 

a communication facility, 18 Pa.C.S. § 7512(a). After careful review, we 

affirm.

The facts and procedural history of this case stem from another case in 

which Appellant was convicted, in 2015, of five counts of sexual abuse of 

children (dissemination of photographs, videotapes, computer depictions and 

films), 18 Pa.C.S. § 6312(c), ten counts of sexual abuse of children (child 

pornography), 18 Pa.C.S. § 6312(d), and one count of criminal use of a 

communication facility. For these convictions, Appellant was sentenced to an 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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aggregate term of incarceration of one year less one day to two years less one 

day, followed by ten years’ probation. 

In 2016, Appellant was released and began serving his term of

probation. Shortly after his release, Probation Officer Chris Sturgeon (“P.O.

Sturgeon”) met with Appellant to review the written rules of his supervision,

which included the following:

1. You must successfully enroll in and complete a [c]ourt[-

]approved sexual offender treatment/counseling program. During 

the course of your therapy, you must complete any and all 

assessments or evaluations required by your treatment provider 

which may include a polygraph examination. You will comply with 

all conditions and recommendations of your treatment provider.

You will pay all fees associated with the treatment program.

6. You will not own, possess, or view any photographs, magazines, 

movies, websites, e-mails, D.V.D.[]s or videotapes depicting nude 

or partially nude men, women, or children. You will not access 

any sexually explicit telephone services. I understand that Beaver 

County Adult Probation Department has the authority to search 

and seize any materials that exist on my person, place, residence 

and/or vehicle without warrant if there is reasonable suspicion 

that these types of materials exist.

8. Access to the Internet is limited to legitimate and business

purposes only. You will submit to a search of your computer or

any computer that you have access to for any violations 

throughout your supervision. Your computer may be seized for 

the purpose of this search and if any information on your computer 

violates the Laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the 

search may cease, and the proper law enforcement agencies will 

be notified.

9. You may be subjected to and agree to Remote Internet

Monitoring. You will pay all fees associated with this program.

Commonwealth’s Brief at 8-9.
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In 2020, a sexual-offender evaluation of Appellant was completed by 

Julia Lindemuth, who is an approved therapist for sexual offenders by the 

Sexual Offender Assessment Board.

1

 

On February 13, 2020, ... Lindemuth emailed P.O. Sturgeon 

expressing concern that [Appellant] had unmonitored access to 

the internet and could potentially be viewing child pornography. 

In her email, Lindemuth advised P.O. Sturgeon that [Appellant]

was cooperative, but minimized his responsibility and continued 

to claim that he did not know viewing child pornography was 

illegal. She further advised the probation officer that unmonitored 

internet access was potentially problematic for an online offender. 

[] Lindemuth told P.O. Sturgeon that Lindemuth is also employed 

as an evaluator by the Sexual Offender Board, a position that 

requires her to use her expertise to determine whether a 

defendant meets the criteria of a violent sexual offender.

[Appellant] had told her he could not access the internet due to 

his illness. He also reported that he did not use the internet but 

would assist his mother on the computer. Furthermore, the 

therapist recommended [that] the probation officer ... do a home 

visit and take a look at the computer history of [Appellant].

After receiving this information, P.O. Sturgeon obtained 

permission from the head of Beaver County Adult Probation, Don 

Neill, to do a field visit of [Appellant’s] residence in order to follow 

up on the concerns of the therapist. On February 18, 2020, P.O. 

Sturgeon went to [Appellant’s] residence at 813 Coleman Drive at 

10:30 a.m. where he lived with his elderly mother. Present was 

fellow probation officer Ian Thomas and the Chief of Police of 

Rochester Township. After several minutes[,] [Appellant]

answered the door. P.O. Sturgeon explained that she was there 

to look at [Appellant’s] computers to see if he was currently 

viewing any form of pornography. [Appellant] was cooperative, 

consented to the field visit, and provided P.O. Sturgeon access to 

his Android phone and the locations of the two computers inside 

his residence. 

____________________________________________

1 Appellant’s evaluation was delayed due to the fact that he had extensive

brain surgery to remove a tumor. See Commonwealth’s Brief at 9.
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[Appellant’s] residence had a main floor, containing a kitchen, 

living room, and a couple of sitting areas, as well as a partially 

finished basement. The first computer was located on the main 

floor of the residence and, after review, [P.O.] Sturgeon testified 

that there was nothing inappropriate on that computer. 

When [P.O.] Sturgeon asked [Appellant] where his bedroom was,

[Appellant] led her downstairs to a partially finished basement. 

The basement was partitioned, with the left-hand[]side containing 

[Appellant’s] bedroom and the right-hand[]side containing a 

utilities area. The second computer was located in an area of 

[Appellant’s] bedroom. When the probation officers examined the 

computer, they immediately began to see “pornography and child 

sex abuse images” on the computer. Upon viewing the images, 

P.O. Sturgeon testified that the probation officers immediately 

stopped the search and contacted their supervisor to advise them

of the potential violation of [Appellant’s] rules of supervision. 

[Appellant] was detained for violation of his supervision rules.

Subsequently, the Pennsylvania State Police obtained a search 

warrant to search [Appellant’s] computer. The forensic 

examination of that computer revealed 58 photographs of child 

pornography on [Appellant’s] computer. 

Id. at 10-12 (citations to the reproduced record omitted).

Appellant was subsequently charged with 58 counts of possession of 

child pornography and one count of criminal use of a communication facility. 

On August 12, 2021, he filed a pretrial motion to suppress, arguing that the 

evidence supporting his charges was the product of an illegal search and 

seizure because P.O. Sturgeon lacked reasonable suspicion that his computer 

contained contraband. On April 5, 2022, the trial court conducted a 

suppression hearing. On April 26, 2022, the court issued an order and opinion 

denying Appellant’s suppression motion. The case proceeded to a non-jury 

trial, at the close of which Appellant was convicted of all charges. He was 

sentenced on August 22, 2022, to the aggregate term set forth supra. 
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On September 14, 2022, Appellant, who at the time was represented by 

counsel, filed the instant, pro se appeal challenging his judgment of sentence.

On September 21, 2022, counsel for Appellant filed a second appeal, docketed 

at 1109 WDA 2022, challenging the same judgment of sentence at the same 

trial court docket.2 As the appeals appeared duplicative, this Court, on 

November 1, 2022, entered a Rule to Show Cause Order at the instant appeal 

directing pro se Appellant to show cause why this appeal should not be 

dismissed as duplicative to the appeal at 1109 WDA 2022.

On November 10, 2022, Appellant filed an application requesting that

the appeal at 1109 WDA 2022 be dismissed. Appellant explained he had

requested counsel withdraw immediately after sentencing, but that counsel

had failed to do so and instead filed the appeal at 1109 WDA 2022. Because

of this, Appellant requested the unwanted appeal at 1109 WDA 2022 be

dismissed as duplicative. Therefore, on November 18, 2022, this Court 

entered an order dismissing the appeal at 1109 WDA 2022 as duplicative to 

the instant appeal.

After Appellant filed his notice of appeal, the trial court directed him to 

file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal

and he timely complied. The trial court filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion, indicating 

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2 We note that counsel was permitted to withdraw by this Court, at 1109 WDA 

2022, on November 10, 2022, following an October 25, 2022 trial court order 

which permitted counsel to withdraw following a hearing pursuant to 

Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998).
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that it was relying on its April 26, 2022 suppression opinion to address 

Appellant’s claims. 

Herein, Appellant states three issues for our review:

1. Whether the trial court err[ed in denying the suppression 

motion (evidence seized from [Appellant’s] computer) as [P.O.] ...

Sturgeon did not have a reasonable suspicion that the computer 

contained contraband or that [Appellant] violated the conditions 

of his supervision in violation of 42 Pa.C.S.[] §[]9912(d)(2), 

Pennsylvania Const. Art. 1[]§[]8 and/or U.S. Const. Amend. 4?

2. Whether the Commonwealth committed [p]rosecutorial 

[m]isconduct during the suppressi[on] hearing and violate[d 

Appellant’s] 14th [A]mendment rights to due process[ w]hen [it]

presented, used or should have known the testimony from [P.O.] 

... Sturgeon, pursuant to Julia Lindemuth, was false[?]

3. Whether the trial court err[ed] by relying on [P.O.] ...

Sturgeon[’s] perjuried [sic] and false testimony to deny the 

suppression motion[,n]amely, the testimony surrounding Julia 

Lindemuth[?]

Appellant’s Brief at 2.

In Appellant’s first issue, he contends that the trial court erred by 

denying his motion to suppress.

An appellate court’s standard of review in addressing a challenge 

to the denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining 

whether the suppression court’s factual findings are supported by 

the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those 

facts are correct. Because the Commonwealth prevailed before 

the suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the 

Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as 

remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as 

a whole. Where the suppression court’s factual findings are 

supported by the record, the appellate court is bound by those 

findings and may reverse only if the court’s legal conclusions are 

erroneous. Where the appeal of the determination of the 

suppression court turns on allegations of legal error, the 

suppression court’s legal conclusions are not binding on an 
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appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if the suppression

court properly applied the law to the facts. Thus, the conclusions 

of law of the courts below are subject to plenary review.

Commonwealth v. Smith, 164 A.3d 1255, 1257 (Pa. Super. 2017) (cleaned 

up).

Instantly, Appellant contends that the evidence of child pornography 

recovered from his computer should have been suppressed because P.O. 

Sturgeon lacked reasonable suspicion to search the computer. According to 

Appellant, the sole basis for the search was Lindemuth’s email, which he 

claims used only vague and uncertain language that showed a “mere 

suspicion, not reasonable suspicion.” Appellant’s Brief at 14. He argues that, 

unlike other cases where we found reasonable suspicion to search a 

parolee/probationer, here, there was no “specific and articulable facts based 

off of ... personal knowledge and observations of criminal activity and 

probation violations” to show that P.O. Sturgeon had reasonable suspicion to 

search his computer. See id. at 15-16 (citing Commonwealth v. Banks, 

249 A.3d 1146 (Pa. Super. 2021) (unpublished memorandum) (concluding 

that reasonable suspicion existed to search Banks, who had committed parole 

violations on other occasions, based on a call from his cousin informing Banks’ 

parole officer that Banks was selling narcotics out of his home, that he had 

firearms, and there were known gang members going in and out of his 
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residence);3 Commonwealth v. Moore, 805 A.2d 616 (Pa. Super. 2002) 

(finding that a probation officer had reasonable suspicion to stop and search 

Moore after receiving a tip from a known, reliable informant that Moore had 

crack cocaine on his person and was located in an area of high drug activity, 

and the officer observed Moore in that location)). Appellant insists that, unlike 

in Banks or Moore, here, “Lindemuth[’]s email did not specify or articulate 

facts of criminal activity or probation violations to establish reasonable 

suspicion.” Appellant’s Brief at 16. Therefore, he contends that the court 

should have granted his motion to suppress the evidence found on his 

computer.

In rejecting Appellant’s suppression argument, the trial court reasoned 

as follows:

The aim of probation and parole is to rehabilitate and reintegrate 

a lawbreaker into society as a law-abiding citizen. 

Commonwealth v. Chambers, 55 A.3d 1208, 1212 (Pa. Super.

2012). The institution of probation and parole assumes a 

probationer or parolee is more likely than the ordinary citizen to 

violate the law. Commonwealth v. Moore, 805 A.2d 616, 619 

(Pa. Super. 2002). Consequently, probationers and parolees have 

limited Fourth Amendment rights because of a diminished 

expectation of privacy. Id. See also Chambers, supra (stating

probationers’ and parolees’ Fourth Amendment constitutional 

rights are virtually indistinguishable). The Superior Court 

explained that probation officers, like parole officers[,]

[a]re in a supervisory relationship with their offenders. The 

purpose of this supervision is to assist the offenders in their 

____________________________________________

3 Pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 126, unpublished, nonprecedential memorandum decisions of the Superior Court filed after May 1, 

2019, may be cited for their persuasive value. Pa.R.A.P. 126(b).
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rehabilitation and reassimilation into the community and to 

protect the public. Supervision practices shall reflect the 

balance of enforcement of the conditions of parole and case 

management techniques to maximize successful parole

completion through effective reentry to society. As such, 

probationers and parolees are subject to general and 

individual rules of conduct and supervision described at 

sentencing and/or in the parole agreement.

Commonwealth v. Smith, 85 A.3d 530, 536 (Pa. Super. 2014). 

See also Commonwealth v. Cruz-Rivera, 249 A.3d 1125 (Pa. 

Super. 2021).

The statute governing the supervisory relationship between 

probation officers and probationers and the rights of the 

probationers, in effect at the time of the search in this case,

provided in relevant part:

42 Pa.C.S.[]§[]9912, the statute governing probationers, states 

in pertinent part:

(a) General rule.-- Officers are in a supervisory relationship 

with their offenders. The purpose of this supervision is to 

assist the offenders in their rehabilitation and reassimilation 

into the community and to protect the public.

(b) Searches and seizures authorized. --

(1) Officers and, where they are responsible for 

the supervision of county offenders, State 

parole agents may search the person and 

property of offenders in accordance with the 

provisions of this section.[]

***

(2)(iii) Nothing in this section shall be construed 

to permit searches and seizures in violation of 

the Constitution of the United States or section 

8 of Article I of the Constitution of 

Pennsylvania.[]

***

(d)(2) A property search may be conducted by an officer if 

there is reasonable suspicion to believe that the real or other 

property in the possession of or under the control of the
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offender contains contraband or other evidence of violations 

of the conditions of supervision.[]

***

(d)(6) The existence of reasonable suspicion to search shall 

be determined in accordance with constitutional search and 

seizure provisions as applied by judicial decision. In

accordance with such case law, the following factors, where 

applicable, may be taken into account:

(i) The observations of officers.

(ii) Information provided by others.

(iii) The activities of the offender.

(iv) Information provided by the offender.

(v) The experience of the officers with the offender.

(vi) The experience of officers in similar

circumstances.

(vii) The prior criminal and supervisory history of the

offender.

(viii) The need to verify compliance with the

conditions of supervision.

In Commonwealth v. Wilson, 67 A.3d 736 (Pa. 2013), the

Supreme Court explained:

Section 9912(d)(2) is a specific provision addressing a

narrow circumstance: the conditions under which a county

probation officer may conduct a warrantless search,

including a requirement that the probation officer must

possess reasonable suspicion that the property contains

contraband or other evidence of violations of the

probationer’s terms of probation. The provision is clear and

unambiguous and lists no exception. The reason for the

restrictions ... are obvious: searches implicate constitutional

rights (even though the Fourth Amendment rights of

probationers are diminished).

[Id. at 744.] 
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***

“The policy behind [Section 9912] is to assist the offenders in their

rehabilitation and reassimilation into the community and to

protect the public.” Moore, supra at 620 (emphasis [omitted]).

“Essentially, Section 9912 authorizes county probation officers to

search a probationer’s person or property, if there is reasonable

suspicion to believe the probationer possesses contraband or

other evidence of violations of the conditions of supervision.” 

Chambers, supra at 1214[] (citing 42 Pa.C.S.[ §] 9912(d)(1)(i),

(d)(2)). “Reasonable suspicion to search must be determined

consistent with constitutional search and seizure provisions as

applied by judicial decisions; and in accordance with such case

law, enumerated factors, where applicable, may be taken into

account.” [Id.] (citing 42 Pa.C.S.[ §] 9912(d)(6)).

In establishing reasonable suspicion, the fundamental inquiry is

an objective one, namely, whether the facts available to the officer

at the moment of the intrusion warrant a [person] of reasonable

caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate. This

assessment, like that applicable to the determination of probable

cause, requires an evaluation of the totality of the circumstances,

with a lesser showing needed to demonstrate reasonable suspicion

in terms of both quantity or content and reliability. Moore, supra

at 619-20[] (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 

“[T]he threshold question in cases such as this is whether the

probation officer had a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity or

a violation of probation prior to the ... search.” In re J.E., 907

A.2d 1114, 1119 (Pa. Super. 2006). Accordingly, the fact that a

probationer signs a consent form permitting warrantless searches

as a term of his probation is insufficient to permit a search absent

reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing. Id. at 1120. Rather, the

probationer’s signature acts as acknowledgment that the

probation officer “has a right to conduct reasonable searches of

[the probationer’s] residence listed on the [probation] agreement

without a warrant.” Commonwealth v. [] Williams, [692 A.2d 

1031, 1036] ... ([Pa.] 1997).

The [c]ourt finds in light of the totality of the circumstances that

P.O. Sturgeon had reasonable suspicion regarding whether

[Appellant] was using the internet for non-legitimate business

purposes and whether he was in possession of child pornography

as prohibited under the Rules for Sexual Offenders. In this case,
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P.O. Sturgeon was supervising [Appellant] with knowledge that he

had been convicted of [five] counts of distribution of child

pornography, [ten] counts of possession of child pornography, and

[one] count of criminal communications facility.

The [c]ourt also finds critical that ... Lindenmuth--the boardcertified therapist for [Appellant’s] sexual offender treatment--

evaluated [Appellant] for sexual offender treatment in light of her

clinical judgement and experience. Based upon this expert

evaluation, ... Lindemuth was concerned that [Appellant] had

unmonitored access to a computer. ... Lindemuth was further

concerned that [Appellant] continued to minimize his

responsibility for distribution and possession of child pornography

by continuing to state that he did not know that it was illegal to

view child pornography. [Appellant’s] evasive explanations,

viewed in the light of ... Lindenmuth’s professional experience,

reasonably put the therapist on notice that [Appellant] could be

the violating the rules of supervision. These red flags resulted in

... Lindemuth[’s] emailing P.O. Sturgeon, expressing her

concerns[,] and recommending that inspection of [Appellant’s] 

computers be conducted to determine whether he was in

compliance with the sex offender rules of Beaver County

Probation. The same day [P.O.] Sturgeon received the email, she

received authorization from [the Head of Adult Probation,] Don

Neill[,] to do the home inspection.

The [c]ourt further notes, in assessing the totality of the 

circumstances, that when P.O. Sturgeon went to [Appellant’s] 

residence, [Appellant] answered the door and was informed by 

the probation officer why she was there. She explained 

specifically why she wanted to inspect his home, and [Appellant] 

gave full permission to allow her to enter his residence. The 

[c]ourt further notes that it was [Appellant], rather than anyone 

else, who informed the probation officer that there was one 

computer upstairs and a second computer in his basement 

bedroom.

The [c]ourt also notes the limited basis of the search. When the 

probation officers went downstairs to [Appellant’s] bedroom, and 

they initially saw the pornographic images which were apparent 

from their face, they immediately stopped the search and 

contacted their supervisor, who then contacted the Pennsylvania 

state police.
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Finally, the [c]ourt finds persuasive that the search warrant is 

otherwise uncontested by both the Commonwealth and the 

[d]efense. Considering this evidence in light of the totality of the 

circumstances, the [c]ourt concludes that there was reasonable 

suspicion to conduct the warrantless search.

Trial Court Opinion, 4/26/22, at 7-11.

We agree with the trial court that P.O. Sturgeon had reasonable 

suspicion to search Appellant’s computer based on the totality of the 

circumstances known to her. Namely, Appellant was serving probation for 

committing crimes of possessing and disseminating child pornography using 

the internet. Lindemuth notified P.O. Sturgeon that she felt Appellant was 

minimizing his responsibility for those crimes and being evasive, which raised

‘red flags’ for her when she discovered that Appellant had unmonitored 

internet access. Appellant’s probation conditions expressly permitted P.O. 

Sturgeon to conduct a warrantless search of Appellant’s person and residence,

and Appellant consented to P.O. Sturgeon’s entry into his home. Further, 

Appellant informed P.O. Sturgeon where his two computers were located after 

she explained to him why she was there. The totality of these circumstances 

show that P.O. Sturgeon possessed reasonable suspicion that contraband or 

evidence of a probation violation would be found on Appellant’s computer, and 

that her search thereof was within the bounds of her authority as Appellant’s 

probation officer. See Commonwealth v. Sperber, 177 A.3d 212 (Pa. 

Super. 2017) (finding a parole officer had reasonable suspicion to search 

Sperber’s person, car, and phone where police had an anonymous tip and 

reports from other parolees that Sperber had a smart phone and was 
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accessing social media; Sperber had been previously convicted of childpornography offenses; Sperber’s conditions of parole provided for warrantless 

searches of his person and property; and Sperber voluntarily consented to the 

search). Thus, Appellant’s first issue is meritless. 

In Appellant’s next issue, he claims that the Commonwealth committed 

prosecutorial misconduct and “violated his due process rights by presenting 

P.O. Sturgeon[’s] perjured testimony at the [s]uppression hearing and trial....” 

Appellant’s Brief at 21-22. According to Appellant, in February of 2021, he 

was found to be in violation of his probationary term by “refusing and fail[ing] 

to complete the sexual offender program ordered by the” trial court, yet at 

the suppression hearing in this case, P.O. Sturgeon “testified that [Appellant] 

was compliant with the program.” Id. at 25-26. Appellant claims that P.O. 

Sturgeon’s suppression-hearing testimony was patently false, given the 

evidence that she knew he had previously been found to be in violation of his 

probationary term. Because the Commonwealth introduced this ostensibly 

perjured testimony, Appellant claims that it committed prosecutorial 

misconduct.

Relatedly, Appellant contends in his third issue on appeal, that this 

alleged fabrication by P.O. Sturgeon should have caused the trial court to 

reject her suppression-hearing testimony as incredible. Because P.O. 

Sturgeon’s testimony was the only evidence to support the legality of the 

search of his computer, Appellant claims that the court erred by denying his 

motion to suppress.
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Appellant’s arguments are waived. He does not cite to where he 

objected to P.O. Sturgeon’s at-issue, suppression-hearing testimony, and/or 

raised his prosecutorial-misconduct claim before the trial court. See Pa.R.A.P. 

302(a) (“Issues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised 

for the first time on appeal.”). Moreover, Appellant cannot now argue that 

the trial court erred in relying on P.O. Sturgeon’s testimony in denying his 

motion to suppress where no objection to that evidence was lodged. 

Accordingly, Appellant’s second and third issues are waived and/or meritless.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/27/2023
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