[Cite as State v. Washington, 2014-Ohio-4178.] 

Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas 

 

Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed 

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: September 24, 2014 

Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Rachel Lipman 

Curran, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee, 

Michaela M. Stagnaro, for Defendant-Appellant. 

Please note: this case has been removed from the accelerated calendar. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO 

HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO 

STATE OF OHIO 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 vs. 

BRENDAN WASHINGTON, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

:

: 

: 

: 

: 

APPEAL NO. C-130213 

TRIAL NO. B-1107595B 

 

 O P I N I O N.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

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CUNNINGHAM, Presiding Judge. 

{¶1} Defendant-appellant Brendan Washington appeals from the 

judgment of the Hamilton County Common Pleas Court convicting him, after a nocontest plea, of two aggravated murders and other related offenses. Washington and 

three others killed Rudell Englemon and then killed Carrielle Conn, one of their 

group, to ensure her silence. Washington was 15 years old when he committed these 

offenses. Raising three assignments of error, Washington contends that the juvenile 

court erred in transferring jurisdiction to the common pleas court, that statements 

he made to police detectives should have been suppressed, and that his trial counsel 

was ineffective. We disagree, and affirm the judgment below. 

The Englemon Killing 

{¶2} On October 14, 2011, Washington and the 17-year-old Conn, 

accompanied by minors Dequantez Nixson and Tyshawn Barker,1 went to a Cincinnati 

apartment intending to shoot its occupant, Samuel Jeffries. Jeffries had sworn out a 

complaint against Nixson’s mother, Lakeshia Prince, for felonious assault and 

domestic violence. At Nixson’s urging, the group planned to shoot Jeffries in 

retaliation. Nixson and Barker waited in the hallway while Washington knocked on 

the door to summon Jeffries. But instead of Jeffries, Englemon answered the door. 

Conn shot Englemon. As the group fled, Nixson told them that they had shot the 

wrong man. Englemon survived for one week. 

A Second Killing to Silence Conn 

{¶3} Nixson learned that Conn had told Jeffries of their involvement in 

killing Englemon. Concerned that Conn would “snitch” to the police, on October 16, 

2011, Nixson called Conn to lure her to a deserted train track near Victory Parkway in 

Cincinnati. Nixson told police that Washington then shot Conn with his .22-caliber 

 1 We affirmed Barker’s convictions in State v. Barker, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-130214, 2014-Ohio3245. 
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revolver and passed the gun around to the group to fire additional shots into Conn’s body. 

Washington claimed that Nixson had fired the first shot and that when the gun was passed 

to him, Washington tried to shoot the fallen Conn but the revolver failed to fire. Nixson 

was later found with Conn’s red and black cellular telephone in his possession. 

{¶4} Nixson’s mother, who was at the apartment where Englemon was 

shot, identified Conn as one of the individuals involved in the first shooting. Nixson 

was brought in for questioning and admitted his involvement. He also confirmed 

Barker’s and Washington’s participation in the shootings. 

The Transfer and Trial Court Proceedings 

{¶5} The surviving perpetrators were soon apprehended. Washington was 

found in a derelict Avondale apartment building. During a two-hour interrogation 

by Cincinnati police detectives Kurt Ballman and Terry McGuffey, Washington 

admitted his role in the killings. His confession was recorded electronically and 

preserved by a DVD recording. The police filed a delinquency complaint including 

charges of murder against Washington in juvenile court on October 24, 2011. 

{¶6} The juvenile court conducted a discretionary-transfer proceeding and 

found that there was probable cause to believe Washington had committed the 

charged crimes. An evaluation assessing Washington’s amenability to rehabilitation 

in the juvenile system was prepared by clinical psychologist Dr. Kathleen Hart. The 

court heard the arguments of counsel and reviewed the evaluation and the evidence 

before it. On November 30, 2011, the juvenile court ordered that Washington be 

transferred to the jurisdiction of the common pleas court. 

{¶7} The grand jury returned a multiple-count indictment against 

Washington, Barker, and Nixson. Washington moved to suppress his statements to 

the police. Following the common pleas court’s denial of the motion, Washington 

entered pleas of no contest to all the charges. The trial court accepted his pleas and 

found him guilty of the aggravated murder and aggravated robbery of Englemon and 
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Conn, the accompanying specifications, and multiple counts of tampering with 

evidence. It imposed an aggregate sentence of 25 years’ to life imprisonment. 

The Juvenile Court Properly Transferred Jurisdiction 

{¶8} In his first assignment of error, Washington argues that the juvenile court 

erred in transferring jurisdiction over his case to the common pleas court. He challenges 

both the juvenile court’s determination that probable cause existed to believe that 

Washington had committed the charged acts, and its determination that Washington was 

not amenable to care or rehabilitation within the juvenile system. 

{¶9} Discretionary Transfer. Juvenile courts possess “exclusive 

jurisdiction” over delinquent children who commit acts that would constitute crimes if 

committed by an adult. In re M.P., 124 Ohio St.3d 445, 2010-Ohio-599, 923 N.E.2d 584, ¶ 

11, citing R.C. 2151.23(A)(1). But more than 40 years ago, this court recognized that the 

juvenile court system may not be able 

to protect the public in those cases where rehabilitation appears 

unlikely and circumstances indicate that if the charge is ultimately 

established society would be better served by the criminal process by 

reason of the greater security which may be achieved or the deterring 

effect which that process is thought to accomplish. 

In re Mack, 22 Ohio App.2d 201, 203, 260 N.E.2d 619 (1st Dist.1970). 

{¶10} R.C. 2151.12 permits juvenile courts to transfer certain juveniles to adult 

court to face criminal sanctions. There are two types of transfers under Ohio’s juvenile 

scheme: mandatory and discretionary. See State v. D.W., 133 Ohio St.3d 434, 2012-Ohio4544, 978 N.E.2d 894, ¶ 10. A juvenile court has discretion to transfer, or bind over, to an 

adult court, juvenile offenders who have committed felony-level offenses, who are at least 

14 years of age, who do not appear to be amenable to care or rehabilitation within the 

juvenile system, and who appear to be a threat to public safety. See D.W. at ¶ 10; see also

R.C. 2152.10(B) and 2152.12(B); Juv.R. 30(C). 
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{¶11} A juvenile court’s order granting transfer is not immediately appealable. 

As here, any errors alleged in the transfer proceeding must be raised in an appeal from the 

subsequent judgment of the adult court. See In re Becker, 39 Ohio St.2d 84, 314 N.E.2d 

158 (1974); see also State v. Wilson, 73 Ohio St.3d 40, 44, 652 N.E.2d 196 (1995). 

{¶12} The Probable-Cause Determination. A discretionary-transfer 

proceeding has two components: a probable-cause determination and an amenability 

determination. See In re A.J.S., 120 Ohio St.3d 185, 2008-Ohio-5307, 897 N.E.2d 629, ¶ 

38; see also State v. Whitterson, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-110207, 2012-Ohio-2940, ¶ 19. 

When, as here, the state has sought discretionary transfer, the juvenile court must first 

determine if the juvenile offender is at least 14 years of age and whether probable cause 

exists to believe that the juvenile committed the acts charged. See R.C. 2152.12(B)(1) and 

(2). 

{¶13} To establish probable cause, the state must provide credible evidence of 

every element of the charged offense. The state must produce evidence that raises more 

than a mere suspicion of guilt, but it need not provide evidence proving guilt beyond a 

reasonable doubt. See A.J.S. at ¶ 42 and 46; see also In re Moore, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. 

C-090576, C-090577 and C-090578, 2010-Ohio-3991, ¶ 22; In re D.S., 1st Dist. Hamilton 

No. C-130094, 2013-Ohio-4565, ¶ 6. Because a juvenile court’s probable-cause 

determination involves questions of both fact and law, an appellate court defers to the 

juvenile court’s determinations regarding witness credibility, but reviews de novo its legal 

conclusion as to whether the state presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate probable 

cause to believe that the juvenile committed the acts charged. See A.J.S. at ¶ 51. 

{¶14} Here, to establish probable cause for the aggravated murders charged in 

this case, the state had the burden to provide credible evidence that Washington had 

purposely, and with prior calculation and design, engaged in conduct that caused the 

deaths of Englemon and Conn. See R.C. 2903.01(A). Because the other charged offenses 

were committed during the same course of conduct, the juvenile court had the authority to 
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transfer the entire case pursuant to R.C. 2152.12(I) once it found sufficient probable cause 

to warrant transfer of the aggravated-murder charges to the adult court, and found that 

Washington was amenable to transfer. 

{¶15} Washington challenges the juvenile court’s determination that the state 

had demonstrated probable cause. He contends that there was no physical evidence, nor 

were there independent witnesses, linking Washington to the crimes, and that the state 

had relied too heavily upon the testimony of his codefendants. 

{¶16} But the state adduced ample, credible evidence on each element of the 

offenses, including Washington’s own statements to police detectives, demonstrating that 

Washington, standing next to Conn, had knocked on the door to gain access to Jeffries’ 

apartment when Conn shot Englemon. He admitted that the group had planned to shoot 

Jeffries as payback for signing a criminal complaint against Nixson’s mother. Washington 

admitted that he was with Nixson and Barker when they lured Conn onto the train tracks. 

He admitted that the group had used his .22-caliber revolver to shoot Conn. Finally, he 

admitted that he had tried to shoot her. The state met its burden to establish probable 

cause. 

{¶17} The Amenability Determination. If, as here, the juvenile court 

determines that probable cause exists, it must continue the proceeding for an 

investigation, including a mental examination of the juvenile offender. See R.C. 

2152.12(C); Juv.R. 30(C). The court must then hold a hearing to determine whether the 

child is amenable to care or rehabilitation within the juvenile system and whether the 

safety of the community may require that the child be subject to adult sanctions. See R.C. 

2152.12(B)(3). 

{¶18} In reaching its amenability determination, the juvenile court is required to 

consider certain statutory factors and decide whether the factors in favor of transfer 

outweigh the factors indicating that the case should remain in juvenile court. See R.C. 

2152.12(B)(3). R.C. 2152.12(D) lists the factors in favor of transferring jurisdiction, while 
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R.C. 2152.12(E) lists the factors in favor of retaining jurisdiction. In addition to the 

enumerated factors listed in those statutes, the juvenile court is instructed to consider “any 

other relevant factors.” R.C. 2152.12(D) and (E). The juvenile court must ensure that the 

record of its determination “indicate[s] the specific factors that were applicable and that 

the court weighed.” R.C. 2152.12(B)(3). 

{¶19} Unlike the probable-cause determination, “an amenability hearing is a 

broad assessment of individual circumstances and is inherently individualized and factbased.” M.P., 124 Ohio St.3d 445, 2010-Ohio-599, 923 N.E.2d 584, at ¶ 14. Therefore, a 

reviewing court will not reverse the juvenile court’s amenability determination unless the 

court has abused its discretion. See id., citing A.J.S., 120 Ohio St.3d 185, 2008-Ohio-5307, 

897 N.E.2d 629, at ¶ 39 and 40; see also Barker, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-130214, 2014-

Ohio-3245, at ¶ 7 and 8 (using the abuse-of-discretion standard of review where the 

juvenile-appellant challenges only the court’s amenability determination). 

{¶20} Here, Washington claims the amenability determination was flawed 

because the juvenile court “only considered” four of the 19 statutory factors—each of the 

four supporting transfer. He argues that the court failed to consider factors against 

transfer. See, e.g., R.C. 2152.12(E)(3), (5), and (6). The juvenile justice system, he argues, 

would provide “the last hope” for his rehabilitation, and the juvenile court’s focus on the 

severity of the crimes skewed its weighing of the factors. 

{¶21} Following the amenability hearing, the juvenile court determined that 

Washington was not amenable to rehabilitation within the juvenile justice system and that 

a transfer to the common pleas court was appropriate. The court stated that it had 

reviewed the detailed, six-page evaluation of Washington prepared by Dr. Hart, and all 

other evidence before it. 

{¶22} The juvenile court found that the complaint alleged Washington had 

committed acts that would be punishable as felonies if committed by an adult, and that 

Washington was 15 years old at the time of the acts charged. See R.C. 2152.12(B)(1) and 
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(2). It next considered the statutory factors in favor of and against transfer. See

2152.12(B)(3). It found four factors in favor of transfer: that Washington had used a 

firearm in both murders, that the second murder was carried out to silence “a witness to 

the first homicide,” that Washington was emotionally, physically, and psychologically 

mature enough for transfer, and that there was not sufficient time to rehabilitate him 

within the juvenile system. See R.C. 2152.12(B)(3) and 2152.(D)(5), (8), and (9). The 

court found no applicable factors against transfer and concluded that the applicable 

factors in favor of transfer outweighed any factors against. Therefore, the court found that 

there were reasonable grounds to believe that Washington was not amenable to care or 

rehabilitation within the juvenile system and that the safety of the community required 

adult sanctions. See R.C. 2152.12(B)(3). 

{¶23} Contrary to Washington’s assertion, the juvenile court’s entry indicates 

that it considered each of the statutory factors. In accordance with R.C. 2152.12(B)(3), the 

court identified only “the specific factors that were applicable and that the court weighed,” 

both in its entry and in its pronouncement at the amenability hearing. Where there is no 

statutory requirement that the juvenile court separately identify factors that are not 

applicable, it does not err if it fails to do so, as long as it has indicated, in the record, the 

factors that it weighed in favor of or against transfer. 

{¶24} At the time of the amenability hearing, Washington was 16 years old. Dr. 

Hart found that he understood the nature and severity of his situation. She found him 

alert, well oriented, rational and coherent. Her evaluation found no mental- or physicalhealth issues that would preclude transfer to the adult system. The juvenile court doubted 

whether Washington’s “relatively short time frame” remaining in the juvenile system was 

sufficient for rehabilitation commensurate with his participation in a double homicide, the 

second of which was done to prevent a witness from testifying against him. 

{¶25} Washington had had numerous prior contacts with the juvenile justice 

system. He had been adjudicated delinquent ten times in the previous two years for 
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offenses including theft, receiving stolen property, and possession of a counterfeit 

controlled substance. He had refused to participate in the court’s most recent 

rehabilitation programs. And he had been “on the run,” supporting himself and living a 

transient life in the months previous to the murders. 

{¶26} As required by R.C. 2152.12(B)(3), the record indicates “the specific 

factors that were applicable and that the court weighed,” and the reasons for transfer. See

Juv.R. 30(G). Based on the record, the juvenile court properly complied with all the 

requirements for discretionary transfer. The juvenile court’s amenability determinations 

are amply supported by the record and evince a sound reasoning process. See State v. 

Morris, 132 Ohio St.3d 337, 2012-Ohio-2407, 972 N.E.2d 528, ¶ 14, citing AAAA Ents., 

Inc. v. River Place Community Urban Redev. Corp., 50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161, 553 N.E.2d 

597 (1990). The court did not abuse its discretion. The first assignment of error is 

overruled. 

Washington’s Confession Was Voluntary 

{¶27} In his second assignment of error, Washington contends that the trial 

court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statements made to police detectives. 

Washington argues that, despite signing a waiver-of-rights form, he did not voluntarily 

and knowingly waive his right to remain silent under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 

86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Washington now argues that his young age and 

limited experience with the criminal justice system, his lack of sleep, the absence of family 

members available to him during questioning, and police trickery prevented him from 

knowingly waiving that right. 

{¶28} We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress in a two-step 

process. First, we must accept the trial court’s findings of historical fact if they are 

supported by competent, credible evidence. See State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 

2003-Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8. Then this court must make an independent 
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determination, as a matter of law, without deference to the trial court’s legal conclusions, 

whether those facts meet the applicable constitutional standards. See id. 

{¶29} The state bears the burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of the 

evidence that Washington’s waiver of rights and statement were voluntary. See State v. 

Leonard, 104 Ohio St.3d 54, 2004-Ohio-6235, 818 N.E.2d 229, ¶ 32; see also State v. 

Cedeno, 192 Ohio App.3d 738, 2011-Ohio-674, 950 N.E.2d 582, ¶ 17 (1st Dist.). The state 

sought to discharge that burden by relying on a recently enacted statute, R.C. 2933.81, 

effective July 6, 2010. To encourage the police to record the custodial interrogation of 

suspects accused of homicide or serious sex offenses, the General Assembly has provided 

that when the police make “an audio and visual recording that is an authentic, accurate, 

unaltered record” of the interrogation, the suspect’s statements made during the 

interrogation are “presumed to be voluntary.” R.C. 2933.81(A)(3) and (B). Pursuant to 

the statute, the suspect then has “the burden of proving that [his] statements * * * were 

not voluntary.” R.C. 2933.81(B). 

{¶30} Here, police detectives made a DVD recording of their custodial 

interrogation of Washington, who was then a suspect in the investigation of two 

aggravated murders. Detective Ballman testified at the motion-to-suppress hearing that 

the DVD recording was a fair and accurate record of the interrogation. The DVD disc and 

transcript were admitted into evidence. The state also offered Washington’s waiver-ofrights form into evidence. Detective Ballman testified that after he had explained each of 

his rights to him, Washington signed the waiver-of-rights form and agreed to answer 

questions. We note that Washington first signed the waiver form as Jeremy Neely, a false 

name that he had originally given to the detectives. He subsequently signed the form as 

Brendan Washington. Detective Ballman then briefly testified that that he had no reason 

to believe that Washington had not voluntarily waived his rights. The state rested. 

{¶31} Washington’s trial counsel then extensively cross-examined Detective 

Ballman, attempting to highlight factors indicating that Washington had not voluntarily 
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waived his rights. Whether a juvenile has voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived 

his Miranda rights and answered police questioning may be inferred from the totality of 

the circumstances surrounding the waiver, including the age, mentality, and prior criminal 

experience of the accused, the length, intensity, and frequency of interrogation, and the 

existence of physical deprivation or inducement. See In re Watson, 47 Ohio St.3d 86, 548 

N.E.2d 210 (1989), paragraph one of the syllabus; see also Leonard, 104 Ohio St.3d 54, 

2004-Ohio-6235, 818 N.E.2d 229, at ¶ 32. We note that Washington did not challenge the 

constitutionality of R.C. 2933.81 in the trial court, and he has not raised the issue here. 

{¶32} On cross-examination, Detective Ballman testified that he and Detective 

McGuffey had questioned Washington from 4:48 a.m. until just before 7:00 a.m. on 

October 20, 2011. While Washington was sleeping on chairs in the interview room when 

the detectives arrived, Washington remained fully awake during the ensuing questioning. 

Washington acknowledged that he could read and write, and that he was not under the 

influence of alcohol or drugs, before signing the waiver-of-rights form. He was given a 

snack to eat and was offered drink and the opportunity to use a bathroom during the 

questioning. 

{¶33} There was ample competent, credible evidence adduced at the hearing to 

support the trial court’s conclusion, announced orally on June 13, 2012, that Washington 

had been properly advised of his rights prior to making his statements and that he had 

knowingly waived those rights. A signed waiver form is “strong proof” of the validity of the 

waiver. State v. Moore, 81 Ohio St.3d 22, 32, 689 N.E.2d 1 (1998). Washington never 

asked to speak to an attorney or to family members before or during questioning. While 

Washington was only 15 years old, his age, by itself, does not render his waiver 

involuntary. See Watson, 47 Ohio St.3d at 89, 548 N.E.2d 210 (holding a 14-year-old 

aggravated-murder suspect’s statements to be voluntary); see also State v. Tibbs, 1st Dist. 

Hamilton No. C-100378, 2011-Ohio-6716 (holding a 15-year-old aggravated-murder 
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suspect’s statements to police to be voluntary). And Washington was not a neophyte in 

dealings with law enforcement and the juvenile court. 

{¶34} Finally, there is no evidence of police coercion or overreaching during the 

interrogation. Washington did not appear to be cowed by the police questioning. He 

engaged the detectives and responded to their questions in a logical manner. The 

detectives’ statements that if he did not tell the truth, they could not help him were more 

akin to an admonition to tell the truth than a promise of possible benefits and were not 

improper. See, e.g., State v. Dixon, 101 Ohio St.3d 328, 2004-Ohio-1585, 805 N.E.2d 

1042. 

{¶35} Under the totality of the circumstances surrounding the questioning, it is 

clear that Washington did not rebut the presumption, established by the DVD recording, 

that he had been properly advised of his Miranda rights and that he understood those 

rights when he signed the waiver form and answered the detectives’ questions. Based 

upon the evidence presented, we hold that the trial court was justified in denying 

Washington’s motion. The second assignment of error is overruled. 

Trial Counsel Was Not Ineffective 

{¶36} Finally, Washington argues that he was denied the effective assistance of 

counsel when his trial counsel failed to challenge Dr. Hart’s evaluation at the amenability 

hearing, failed to obtain his own psychological expert, and failed to call family members or 

friends to testify about Washington’s lack of maturity. 

{¶37} To prevail on his claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, 

Washington must first show that trial counsel’s performance was deficient, and second, 

that the deficient performance was so prejudicial that he was denied a reliable and 

fundamentally fair proceeding. See Strickland v. Washington 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 

S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); see also Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369-370, 

113 S.Ct. 838, 122 L.Ed.2d 180 (1993); State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 

373 (1989), paragraph three of the syllabus. 
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{¶38} Here, Washington’s experienced trial counsel cogently argued to the 

juvenile court that the mental-health evaluation supported a number of factors arguing 

against transfer to the adult court, including that Washington had cooperated with the 

police, that he had not been the principal actor in either murder, that he had been under 

the sway and influence of Nixson, and that Washington’s prior delinquency adjudications 

had been for relatively minor offenses and had not required rehabilitation at a residential 

facility. He also argued that there was ample time to rehabilitate the then 16-year-old 

Washington in the juvenile system, and that the Department of Youth Services could 

provide reasonable assurances of public safety. 

{¶39} The record is silent as to whether other evidence favorable to Washington 

existed. Washington had been homeless for several months before the murders. He had 

had a troubled relationship with his mother and had not seen his father in three years. A 

trial counsel’s decision whether to call witnesses falls within the rubric of trial strategy and 

will not be second-guessed by a reviewing court. See State v. Treesh, 90 Ohio St.3d 460, 

490, 739 N.E.2d 749 (2001), citing State v. Williams, 74 Ohio App.3d 686, 695, 600 

N.E.2d 298 (8th Dist.1991). Moreover, Washington’s family and emotional difficulties 

were fully detailed in Dr. Hart’s evaluation. See State v. Whitterson, 1st Dist. Hamilton 

No. C-110207, 2012-Ohio-2940, ¶ 27-28. Washington has thus failed to establish that 

counsel’s performance was deficient or that any alleged deficiency deprived him of a fair 

hearing. The third assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶40} Therefore, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 

Judgment affirmed. 

FISCHER and DEWINE, JJ., concur. 

Please note: 

 The court has recorded its own entry on the date of the release of this opinion.