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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for an Award of Attorneys’ Fees 

Under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) (Doc. 24). 

On October 2, 2018, this Court granted the parties’ Stipulated Motion for Remand 

(Docs. 19, 20). On remand, Plaintiff was awarded $67,811.501in back benefits due, and a 

Notice of Award was issued on August 20, 2019 (Doc. 24–1). Plaintiff now seeks an award 

of $16,952.88 in attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) (Doc. 24). 

The Social Security Act provides that the Court may award reasonable attorneys’ 

fees for representation before the Court, not to exceed twenty-five percent of past-due 

benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A). The Supreme Court in Gisbrecht v. Barnhart provides 

district courts with guidance on how to evaluate such Section 406(b) contingent-fee 

requests for reasonableness. 

1 The Social Security Administration send Plaintiff an initial payment of $50,858.62 

and withheld $16,952.88 in potential attorneys’ fees for a total of $67,811.50 in back 

benefits due.

Donna McClellan,

 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

Commissioner of Social Security 

Administration,

Defendant. 

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No. CV-18-08026-PCT-SPL

ORDER
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Most plausibly read, . . . § 406(b) does not displace contingentfee agreements as the primary means by which fees are set for 

successfully representing Social Security benefits claimants in 

court. Rather, § 406(b) calls for court review of such 

arrangements as an independent check, to assure that they yield 

reasonable results in particular cases.

Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 807 (2002). In determining whether such a fee award 

is reasonable under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), the Court may look to factors including the 

character of the representation, the results achieved, delay, and proportionality. Gisbrecht, 

535 U.S. at 808; Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 1148, 1151 (9th Cir. 2009).

Defendant does not object to the motion (Doc. 25). Upon review, the Court finds 

the request for $16,952.88 is twenty-five percent of Plaintiff’s past-due benefits and does 

not exceed the statutory cap. In addition, the instant record provides no indication of 

substandard performance, dilatory litigation tactics, or disproportionality.2 Accordingly, 

this Court concludes that a consideration of the Gisbrecht factors warrants a finding that 

the fee requested is reasonable.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Motion for an Award of Attorneys’ Fees 

Under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) (Doc. 24) is granted.

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2 The fee request results in an effective hourly rate of $1,215.26 (Doc 24 at 11). “In 

cases of this type, the Ninth Circuit sitting en banc has approved effective hourly rates of 

$519, $875, and $902 without finding that they are unreasonable.” Young v. Colvin, No. 

CV–11–538–PHX–SMM, 2014 WL 590335, at *2 (D. Ariz. 2014) (citing Crawford, 586 

F.3d at 1153); see also Claypool v. Barnhart, 294 F.Supp.2d 829, 833–34 (S.D. W. Va. 

2003) (finding Defendant’s argument that an effective hourly rate of $1,433.12 for 12.56 

hours of work represents a windfall to the attorney to be without merit); Palos v. Colvin, 

No. CV 15–04261–DTB, 2016 WL 5110243, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2016) (approving 

a hourly rate of $1,546.39); Villa v. Astrue, No. CIV–S–06–0846 GGH, 2010 WL 118454, 

at *1 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2010) (approving a rate in excess of $1,000 per hour and noting that 

“[r]educing § 406(b) fees after Crawford is dicey business.”). Taking into account the risk 

inherent in contingent-fee arrangements, the Court concludes the hourly rate is reasonable.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Counsel is awarded $16,952.88 in accordance 

with 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). Upon receipt of this sum, Counsel shall refund the previously 

awarded EAJA fees of $2,800.88 to Plaintiff.

Dated this 22nd day of October, 2019.

Honorable Steven P. Logan

United States District Judge