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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Thomas Paul Solomon, Sr.,

Plaintiff,

v. 

Commissioner of Social Security 

Administration,

Defendant.

No. CV-18-00306-PHX-DWL

ORDER 

Pending before the Court is the motion for an award of attorneys’ fees under 42 

U.S.C. § 406(b), (Doc. 26), submitted by Plaintiff’s counsel, David Chermol (“Counsel”), 

which the Commissioner does not oppose1(Doc. 28). Counsel seeks $38,792.00 in 

§ 406(b) fees. (Doc. 26 at 2.)

The client-attorney fee agreement provides for a contingency fee—Plaintiff agreed 

that the attorneys’ fee would be 25% of all past-due benefits awarded to her. (Doc. 22-2 

at 2.) This is unsurprising, as 25% contingency fee agreements are nearly ubiquitous in 

the context of social security appeals. Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 802–04 (2002).

Section 406(b) “calls for court review” of contingency fee agreements. Id. at 807. 

“Congress has provided one boundary line: Agreements are unenforceable to the extent 

that they provide for fees exceeding 25 percent of the past-due benefits.” Id. “Within the 

25 percent boundary . . . the attorney for the successful claimant must show that the fee 

1 The Commissioner “has no direct financial stake in the answer to the § 406(b) 

question” because the fees, if granted, will be taken out of Plaintiff’s past-due benefits, and 

therefore the Commissioner’s role “resembl[es] that of a trustee for the claimants.” 

Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 798 n.6 (2002).

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sought is reasonable for the services rendered.” Id.

The Court must next determine whether it is appropriate to reduce Counsel’s 

recovery “based on the character of the representation and the results the representative 

achieved” by assessing, for example, whether Counsel is “responsible for delay” or 

whether “the benefits are large in comparison to the amount of time counsel spent on the 

case.”2 Id. at 808. “Because the SSA has no direct interest in how much of the award goes 

to counsel and how much to the disabled person, the district court has an affirmative duty 

to assure that the reasonableness of the fee is established.” Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 

1142, 1149 (9th Cir. 2009). “It must be remembered that every dollar that goes to the 

attorney comes out of an award that otherwise should be going to a person whom the law 

has said is exceedingly needy.” Ashing v. Astrue, 798 F. Supp. 2d 1143, 1147 (C.D. Cal. 

2011).

Counsel attached the Notice of Award provided by the SSA, which does not 

indicate the amount of past-due benefits (Doc. 26-1), making it impossible to verify that 

the award sought does not exceed 25% of this amount.3 Counsel notes that the $38,792.00

he seeks is the amount withheld by the SSA, and because the SSA stated that it “cannot 

withhold more than 25 percent of past-due benefits” (id. at 1), Counsel assumes that the 

amount of past-due benefits must be $155,168.00. (Doc. 26 at 2.) The Commissioner did 

not oppose this assumption (Doc. 28), and therefore the Court might ordinarily accept it. 

Dunnigan v. Astrue, 2009 WL 6067058, *9 (D. Or. 2009), report and recommendation 

adopted, 2010 WL 1029809 (D. Or. 2010) (“Although evidence of the precise amount or 

2 This determination does not equate to use of the lodestar method. Crawford v. 

Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 1149 (9th Cir. 2009) (“The lodestar method under-compensates 

attorneys for the risk they assume in representing SSDI claimants and ordinarily produces 

remarkably smaller fees than would be produced by starting with the contingent-fee 

agreement. A district court’s use of the lodestar to determine a reasonable fee thus 

ultimately works to the disadvantage of SSDI claimants who need counsel to recover any 

past-due benefits at all.”).

3 This is, unfortunately, a recurring problem. See, e.g., Vega v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. 

Admin., 2:18-cv-01552-DWL, Doc. 26 at 2 (“The Social Security Administration’s Notice 

of Award . . . does not ever identify the amount of past-due benefits awarded to Plaintiff.”); 

Hires v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 2010 WL 2720821, *1 (D. Ariz. 2010) (“[T]he notice 

does not set forth the total amount of the award. . . . Therefore, we are unable to verify the 

calculation.”).

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an estimate supported by the record of the past-due benefit is the better method of 

establishing this element of the attorney’s § 406(b) burden, the record in this case supports 

accepting [the plaintiff’s] attorney’s representation as adequate for conducting its 

reasonableness assessment.”).

However, the award sought here is quite large, and the Court is concerned about not 

having any verification of the amount of past-due benefits, let alone a chart of some kind 

breaking down the periods of time in which the benefits accrued, as is sometimes submitted 

with these fee requests. 

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Counsel’s motion for an award of attorneys’ fees under 42 

U.S.C. § 406(b) (Doc. 26) is denied without prejudice. Counsel must, within 21 days of 

this order, submit additional evidence establishing the amount of past-due benefits. Such 

evidence should ideally consist of paperwork from the SSA confirming the size of the 

benefit award. Alternatively, if Counsel is unable to obtain such paperwork after making 

a diligent effort to do so, Counsel may submit a declaration setting forth the steps taken to 

obtain verification paperwork from the SSA. If and when Counsel submits the required 

additional evidence, the Court will proceed to analyze the reasonableness of the requested 

award. 

Dated this 29th day of July, 2021.

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