1 de Haan Law Firm, PLLC

2 101 E Pennington

3 Suite 201

4 Tucson, Arizona 85701

5 Telephone: (520) 358-4089

6 Facsimile: (520) 628-4275

7 Stuart P. de Haan, State Bar No. 26664

8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Michelle Shortt and The Satanic Temple

 Plaintiffs,

vs.

City of Scottsdale, 

Defendant,

 Case No. 18-cv-00621-DGC___

PLAINTIFFS’ RESPONSE AND CROSSMOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, WITH 

INCORPORATED BRIEFING

10

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1 ARGUMENT

2 A reasonable jury can only come to one conclusion. The City disparaged Ms. Shortt’s

3 religious faith and precluded her from participating in the blessing ceremony, specifically 

4 because of her religion. This violates both the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment 

5 and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

6 1: The Establishment Clause prohibits governmental disparagement 

7 of a religious faith.

8 The Establishment Clause prohibits governmental selection of an “unfavored” religious 

9 faith. Here, the indisputable evidence shows that the City excluded TST, alone, from 

10 participating in the religious ceremony. As if that violation was insufficiently clear, the City 

11 made specific and disparaging statements about TST. There is no question about the facts. 

12 There is no question about the law. Plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment.

13 Historical and policy framework of the Establishment Clause

14 The Revolutionary generation emphatically applied the logic of secular liberty to the 

15 condition of religion and the churches. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244-46, 102 S. Ct. 1673, 

16 1683-84 (1982) (citations omitted). If Parliament lacked the authority to tax unrepresented 

17 colonists, then the newly independent States should be powerless to tax their citizens for the 

18 support of a denomination to which they did not belong. Id. 

19 The force of this reasoning led to the abolition of most denominational establishments at 

20 the state level by the 1780s and led to the inclusion of the Establishment Clause in the First 

21 Amendment in 1791. Id. The constitutional prohibition of denominational preferences is 

22 inextricably connected with the continuing vitality of the Free Exercise Clause. Id. 

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1 Madison once noted: “Security for civil rights must be the same as that for religious rights.” 

2 Id. Madison’s vision–freedom for all religion being guaranteed by free competition between 

3 religions–naturally assumed that every denomination would be equally at liberty to exercise 

4 and propagate its beliefs. Id.

5 But such equality would be impossible in an atmosphere of official denominational 

6 preference. Id. Free exercise thus can be guaranteed only when legislators–and voters–are 

7 required to accord to their own religions the very same treatment given to small, new, or 

8 unpopular denominations. Id.

9 As Justice Jackson noted in another context, “there is no more effective practical guaranty 

10 against arbitrary and unreasonable government than to require that the principles of law which 

11 officials would impose upon a minority must be imposed generally.” Id. (citing Railway Express 

12 Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring)).

13 1.1: The City cannot choose “acceptable” legislative prayers.

14 Legal framework

15 The clearest command of the Establishment Clause is that one religious denomination 

16 cannot be officially preferred over another. Id. While the unique history of legislative prayer 

17 requires some special consideration; it does not exempt the City from its constitutional 

18 obligation to refrain from discrimination. See Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 585-86, 

19 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1824 (2014) In Town of Greece, it was important that “the town at no point 

20 excluded or denied an opportunity to a would-be prayer giver.” Id. 

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1 Discrimination is not the only thing barred by the Establishment Clause. The Clause also 

2 prohibits governmental disparagement of a faith. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 794-95, 103 

3 S. Ct. 3330, 3337-38 (1983); Lynch v. Donnelly , 465 U.S. 668, 673, 104 S.Ct. 1355, 79 L.Ed.2d 

4 604 (1984).

5 The City may argue that, “technically,” the councilmembers’ statements were made in their 

6 individual capacities and not as government representatives. This would be ill-advised. Courts 

7 “regularly take into account the statements of governmental officials involved in a policy’s 

8 enactment.” Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Chino Valley Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 896 

9 F.3d 1132, 1149 (9th Cir. 2018).

10 This is no judicial activism. Rather, “the Framers intended the Establishment Clause to 

11 require governmental neutrality in matters of religion, including neutrality in statements 

12 acknowledging religion.” McCreary Cty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 878, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2743-

13 44 (2005) (emphasis added).

14 Analysis

15 The most obvious constitutional violation is the contemporaneous, public, and surprisingly 

16 candid statements of governmental officials. Their scorn of TST is palpable: “Personally, I 

17 like having the prayers, do NOT want the Satanists, and I think this is taking equality too far;” 

18 “I wish (and intend) my deliberations on Council to be blessed and guided by God alone;” 

19 and “I do not welcome a Satanist group.” Material facts at ¶¶ 12-14. The Mayor explained 

20 why it was not “good enough” for the governing members of the City to simply not participate 

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1 in the invocation: “We’re standing up to this ridiculing of religion. Some things are worth 

2 fighting for.” Doc 1-1 at p. 22.

3 These statements incur the highest culpability because they were made with full 

4 understanding that TST is protected by the Constitution. Id. at ¶ 11 (The Mayor and the City 

5 Manager told Ms. Kuester, “to treat them the way I would treat any other organization.”) See 

6 also id., ¶¶ 12-13.

7 There is no room for disagreement in law or fact. The Establishment Clause prohibits 

8 official disparagement of a religion. The City officially–and expressly–disparaged TST on the 

9 basis of its religious beliefs and refused it equal participation in the ceremony. This is verboten. 

10 Summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs is appropriate.

11 1.2: The City’s “policy” is a mere pretext

12 When it became clear that TST was no mere “sideshow,” Doc. 1-1 at p. 22, the City 

13 scrambled to create what it considered a facially valid pretextual reason that TST, alone, could 

14 be precluded. Its best efforts are insufficient. A constitutionally valid policy must be neutral, 

15 both as applied, and as to religion. Even if the Court entertains this obvious pretext with some 

16 consideration, it still fails as a matter of law because this “policy” is neither.

17 Legal framework

18 In a case predating Town of Greece, the Ninth Circuit considered a constitutionally19 permissible, neutral, policy. Rubin v. City of Lancaster, 710 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2013). 

20 Preliminarily, it should be addressed that Rubin is still good law. Rubin, like Town of Greece, 

21 holds that legislative prayer need not be nonsectarian (i.e., saying, “Jesus,” does not by itself 

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1 violate the Establishment Clause). Compare Rubin, 710 F.3d at 1094 with Town of Greece, 572 

2 U.S. at 582.

3 Rubin is instructive because it provides a constitutionally permissible policy. Under that

4 policy, the City of Lancaster proactively maintains a database of all religious congregations. 

5 The Clerk regularly reviewed the Yellow Pages, searched the internet, and consulted the 

6 chamber of commerce and the newspaper. Importantly, the Clerk did not probe the faith, 

7 denomination, or other religious belief of a congregation before adding its name to the list.

8 Next, each group receives a mailer, inviting participation in the invocation. The mailer 

9 cautions that the participants are not to “disparage any faith or belief different from that of 

10 the invocational speaker.” Id. As in Town of Greece, no person who has volunteered to pray 

11 was turned down, and no government official ever attempted to influence the Clerk’s selection 

12 or scheduling of volunteers.

13 In interpreting Marsh, the Rubin court finds the “touchstone of the analysis should be 

14 whether the government has placed its imprimatur, deliberately or by implication, on any one 

15 faith or religion.” Id. at 1096. Here, the City’s messages to the public as well as publicly 

16 published articles, clearly and unambiguously described in detail its approval of certain 

17 religions over TST. See material facts at ¶¶ 11-13.

18 In giving the policy its blessing, the Ninth Circuit considered a few factors. First, the Rubin

19 Court found that Lancaster took “every feasible precaution” to ensure its own 

20 evenhandedness. Id., 710 F.3d at 1097-98. It codified a litany of neutrality-enforcing 

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1 safeguards, prohibited governmental inquiry into the contents of any prayer to be offered, and 

2 “never removed a congregation’s name from the list of invitees or refused to include one.” Id. 

3 Moreover, volunteers were limited to three, nonconsecutive, meetings per year. Id. Last, 

4 Lancaster stressed that the invocation “shall not be implemented or construed in any way to 

5 affiliate the City Council with, nor express . . . preference for, any faith or religious 

6 denomination.” Id.

7 Analysis

8 The City’s “policy” does it no favors for two reasons. First, it is an obvious pretext. The 

9 contemporaneous statements by the City betray the true reason Plaintiffs were excluded. 

10 Second, this “policy” has zero neutrality-enforcing safeguards. Unlike in Rubin, the list was 

11 “handed down” from years prior and unmaintained. Unlike in Rubin, there are no disclaimers 

12 or cautions. Unlike in Rubin, there was an inquiry into the speaker–which is why TST was 

13 denied.

14 Third, it is not neutrally applied. Thirty-eight of the City’s invitees lie outside the bounds 

15 of Scottsdale. Doc. 32-4 at pp. 2-7. What distinguishes TST from these 38 “acceptable” 

16 speakers from outside Scottsdale? The City has no answers. The only proffered explanation 

17 is that TST is “unique.” Material facts at ¶ 18. But this “distinction” only arouses 

18 constitutional suspicion.

19 Most offensively, this “policy” is entirely undefined and unwritten. What procedures are 

20 required to apply? When does a congregation have a “substantial connection” to the 

21 Scottsdale community? Who makes that determination? What do they base the determination 

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1 on? What appeal rights does a rejected applicant have? None of these basic questions have 

2 any answers. Exhibit 2 (deposition of Brian Biesemeyer) at 6:23-9:22.

3 The simple truth is that this “policy” was created about six weeks after the rescheduling. 

4 See material facts at ¶ 15. This “policy” has only been applied to preclude one religion, TST. 

5 See id. at ¶ 5 (everyone else was proactively invited); Exhibit 1 at 7:23-25 and Exhibit 2 at 

6 7:22-24 (nobody else was denied). By precluding TST, the City has distinguished itself from 

7 all cases that upheld legislative prayers: the City cannot deny equal participation in this religious 

8 ceremony consistent with the Equal Protection Clause. E.g. Rubin, Town of Greece.

9 This is not the first time the judiciary has considered a government categorically excluding

10 a faith from legislative prayer. It appears to be an issue of first impression for the Ninth 

11 Circuit, but the Eleventh Circuit and the Fourth Circuit have both considered the question of 

12 whether it violates the First Amendment. For obvious reasons, each finds it does.

13 In Pelphrey v. Cobb Cty., 547 F.3d 1263, 1282 (11th Cir. 2008), the Eleventh Circuit upheld 

14 Establishment Clause liability because the County “categorically excluded” wide swaths of 

15 faiths. Similarly, the Fourth Circuit has found that “the Framers sought to prevent 

16 government from choosing sides on matters of faith and to protect religious minorities from 

17 exclusion or punishment at the hands of the state.” Lund v. Rowan Cty., N.C., 863 F.3d 268, 

18 275-76 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (cert. denied, 201 L. Ed. 2d 1123) Time and again, the dictate 

19 of the Establishment Clause is made clear: government cannot use religion as an instrument 

20 of division. Id. at 272.

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1 This is precisely what the City did. The City permitted religion to operate as an instrument 

2 of division by singling out TST for exclusion. This, they cannot do. The Court should grant 

3 Plaintiffs summary judgment.

4 1.3: Only Judeo-Christians were invited prior to TST’s request

5 The City claims to have “invited” non-Judeo-Christians to give invocations. Doc 32 at p. 

6 5. (emphasis in original). The City goes on to clarify that it thinks adherents of Islam are “non7 Judeo-Christian.” Id. at pp. 7-8. Any imam would beg to differ. See, generally, Aaron W. 

8 Hughes (2012). “Abrahamic Religions: On the Uses and Abuses of History.” Oxford 

9 University Press. pp. 57–75.

10 First, the State has presented no evidence to suggest that any non-Judeo-Christians were 

11 ever invited. The only non-Judeo-Christian religion presented in the exhibits is an indigenous 

12 American representative. Doc. 32-5 at p. 70 (on November 16–eight months after TST was 

13 excluded). The meeting minutes give no indication on how this presentation came to be.

14 Further, it is offensive to point to a singular instance of one non-Abrahamic religion being 

15 “allowed” to participate as proof-positive that “all” non-Abrahamic religions are fairly 

16 represented. 

17 And, even if the City did invite Mr. Johnson–there is no evidence of that–it does not save 

18 the City from the fact that it officially singled out TST for disparagement and discrimination. 

19 Plaintiffs’ cause of action accrued on March 23, 2016, when they were excluded from 

20 participation in the ceremony. Mr. Johnson’s invocation, being after that, is irrelevant at best.

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1 The argument isn’t even good for the City. All it does is show that the City realized it was 

2 violating the First Amendment by limiting inclusion to one “flavor” of religion, to the 

3 exclusion of all others. Had Plaintiff raised this argument, it would be barred by Rule 407 as 

4 a “subsequent remedial measure.” See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 

5 U.S. 520, 540, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 2230-31 (1993) (courts consider the true governmental objective 

6 “from both direct and circumstantial evidence.”)

7 By pointing to this token non-Abrahamic speaker, the City has only revealed that it re8 evaluated the constitutional permissibility of its invocation procedure after TST brought the 

9 issue to light. Also, inviting other minority religions to the exclusion of TST only proves that 

10 the City is singling out TST, alone, for exclusion.

11 1.4 This is about discrimination, not sectarianism. You can say “Jesus” 

12 without offending the Constitution. But you cannot preclude someone else 

13 from saying “Satan.”

14 The City repeatedly states that it can permissibly invite speakers to say “Jesus Christ” 

15 without offending the Establishment Clause. City’s brief at pp. 4-11. That is not the issue. 

16 The City incurred liability because they “decided to keep our traditional invocations and we’ve 

17 decided to send this Satanist sideshow elsewhere.” Statement of material facts at ¶ 20. The 

18 City did not incur liability because its speakers were saying “Jesus.” It incurred liability because 

19 it precluded TST an equal opportunity to say “Satan.”

20 2: The Equal Protection Clause prohibits governmental 

21 discrimination on the basis of religion.

22 The City’s actions also incur Equal Protection liability. We added the Equal Protection 

23 claim because Establishment Clause jurisprudence is in a state of “disarray,” to put it lightly. 

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1 See Rowan Cty. v. Lund, 138 S. Ct. 2564 (2018) (the same Lund as above) (Thomas, J., dissenting

2 from denial of cert.); see also Gellman, Susan & Looper-Friedman, Susan, “Thou Shalt Use 

3 the Equal Protection Clause for Religion Cases (Not Just the Establishment Clause),” Journal 

4 of Constitutional Law 10:4, 702.

5 In dissenting from the denial of certiorari, Justices Thomas and Gorsuch highlight the very 

6 problem with exclusively relying on the Establishment Clause in religious freedom cases.

7 There is no clear test. Sometimes, the focus is whether a “reasonable observer” would think 

8 a government practice endorses religion. Id. Other times, the question is whether a practice 

9 is supported by “history and tradition.” Id Sometimes, the Lemon test applies. See Lemon v. 

10 Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 91 S. Ct. 2105 (1971). Other times, it doesn’t. Marsh, above.

11 This is all too confusing for practitioners and courts alike–to say nothing of our clients. 

12 There is an easier way. The Equal Protection clause gives all the same freedom benefits as the 

13 Establishment Clause, with none of the confusing jurisprudence. 

14 2.1: The City cannot enact special disabilities on a “suspect class”

15 Legal framework

16 The Equal Protection Clause directs that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be 

17 treated alike. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-17, 102 S. Ct. 2382, 2394 (1982). This Clause was 

18 intended as a restriction on state legislation inconsistent with elemental constitutional 

19 premises. Acts are presumptively unconstitutional if they disadvantage a “suspect class.” Id.

20 A suspect class is one historically “relegated to such a position of political powerlessness 

21 as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process. Id., 457 U.S. 

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1 at 217, fn. 14. Legislation imposing special disabilities upon groups disfavored by virtue of 

2 circumstances beyond their control suggests the kind of “class or caste” treatment that the 

3 Fourteenth Amendment was designed to abolish. Id. Religion is a suspect class. Ass'n of 

4 Christian Sch. Int'l v. Stearns, 362 F. App'x 640, 646 (9th Cir. 2010).

5 If a suspect class is disadvantaged by a governmental action, the government must show 

6 that its classification has been “precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.” 

7 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216-17, 102 S.Ct. 2394-95. If it fails, then the act is unconstitutional as 

8 against the Equal Protection Clause. Id.

9 Establishment Clause jurisprudence borrows from the Equal Protection requirement that 

10 statutory requirements be “neutral as applied.” See Walz v. Tax Com. of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 

11 696, 90 S. Ct. 1409, 1425 (1970). Discriminatory intent lies in the heart of an Equal Protection 

12 Clause violation. Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 119, 101 S. Ct. 1584, 1596 (1981). 

13 Discriminatory intent can be evidenced by contemporaneous statements made by the 

14 decisionmaking body. Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 540, 113 S.Ct. 2230-31. It can also be deduced by 

15 the specific series of events leading to the enactment of the policy, and the history of the policy 

16 itself. Id.

17 Analysis

18 Here, the City selected a particular class of people for special and negative treatment on 

19 the basis of their religion. This is most abundantly clear by simply reading the 

20 contemporaneous, spite-filled, statements made by the City Councilmembers and the Mayor. 

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1 There is no room for confusion. These governmental decisionmakers were specifically 

2 addressing only one group for exclusion. The “Satanists.”

3 Under this Equal Protection analysis, the City’s “policy” of requiring a “substantial 

4 connection with Scottsdale” is laid bare for what it really is: a vehicle for generally 

5 discriminating against non-Abrahamic religions and specifically TST. 

6 The events that led up to the city manager’s “research” into the City’s “long-standing 

7 policy” give further weight to this finding. It was not until TST asked to be included in the 

8 invocation ceremony that the City began expanding its invitations to include two imams and 

9 one Native American spiritualist in a two-and-a-half year period.

10 The majoritarian political process had a hand in the City’s decision. One church sent 

11 “thousands of emails” which crashed the City’s servers. Exhibit 1 at 25:18-22. In all, the City 

12 received about 15,000 emails objecting to TST’s equal participation in the ceremony. Id. This, 

13 alone, establishes Plaintiffs’ reliance on the Court for extraordinary protection.

14 Further, the “neutral-as-applied” analysis reveals this “policy” for the pretext that it is. Ms. 

15 Shortt practices her faith outside the city limits of Scottsdale, but so do 38 of the 

16 “permitted” speakers. There is no constitutionally permissible distinction between the two. 

17 Yet, it is Ms. Shortt, alone, who is precluded.

18 Finally, the Equal Protection Clause requires the City to show a “compelling governmental 

19 interest” in excluding TST. None has been offered. And even if the City creates one, 

20 doubtlessly just in time for their response/reply deadline, the City will not be able to show 

21 that the “policy” is narrowly tailored to serve the “compelling interest.”

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1 2.2: No binding precedent exempts legislative prayer from Equal 

2 Protection

3 The City argues that “equal protection analysis does not apply to individual claims of 

4 exclusion from the opportunity to give an invocation.” Doc. 32 at p. 12. The City exclusively 

5 relies on nonbinding authority. See id. (string citing five cases; four of which are district court 

6 cases, and none of which lie in the Ninth Circuit). Conspicuously missing from the City’s brief

7 is any argument for why its cited cases are even persuasive. Plaintiffs decline the City’s 

8 invitation to do all the arguing for it. The Equal Protection analysis applies because the City 

9 enacted a special disability upon a suspect class and coupled it with contemporaneous 

10 statements that the disabilities were enacted because of Plaintiffs’ minority religious beliefs.

11 2.3: Plaintiffs are similarly situated as the “permitted” speakers

12 The City argues that Plaintiffs cannot show that they are “arguably indistinguishable” from 

13 what the City deemed “acceptable” speakers. Doc. 32 at p. 13. Stated differently, the City has 

14 alleged a policy, refused to define its terms, and expects Plaintiffs to “disprove” why the policy 

15 should not apply to specifically exclude TST. We’ll do our best. Despite the City’s claims, TST 

16 does have members who live in Scottsdale. Exhibit 3.

17 The City’s argument puts it in an unwinnable position. Because this “policy” is not 

18 objectively defined, it is entirely in the arbitrary discretion of the City to determine what arises

19 to a “substantial” connection. Under the Equal Protection analysis, it is the City’s obligation 

20 to show that the policy is “neutral;” it is not the Plaintiffs’ job to define and apply the City’s 

21 arbitrary “policy.”

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1 The City cannot show that its policy is “neutral” because it failed to perform any 

2 investigation into TST. Simultaneously, that very inquiry would have run afoul of the “neutral 

3 as applied” framework. The City never investigated any other religions. Thus, this argument 

4 damns the City for not performing its investigation and would have damned the City if it had.

5 2.4: The test requires the City show a “compelling” interest, not a 

6 “reasonable” one

7 The City conflates the relevant test as requiring Plaintiffs to show that the relevant interest 

8 is “unreasonable.” Doc. 32 at p. 14. That is not the test. Under Plyler, the City must show 

9 that it has a “compelling” interest and that the policy is “narrowly tailored” to suit that interest.

10 The City’s proffered interest is limiting speakers to those “who serve the community and 

11 represent the citizens and patrons of Scottsdale.” As with the “invitation” problem, above, 

12 there is no evidence to evidence that claim. What has the “acceptable” speakers done, which 

13 TST hasn’t? The City has nothing to prove any allegations. This is just a last-minute flailing 

14 attempt to bolster the policy.

15 2.5: There is evidence that the policy was inconsistently applied

16 Last, the City argues there is no evidence that other groups were not subject to the same 

17 policy. Doc. 32 at p. 14. This is patently untrue. Both deposition transcripts lay bare that it 

18 was TST, alone, who was subjected to the City’s scrutiny into “substantial ties.” Exhibit 1 at 

19 7:23-7:25 and 10:16-23 and Exhibit 2 at 7:22-7:24.

20 CONCLUSION

21 The indisputable fact is that the City exclusively invited Abrahamic religions, all but two 

22 being Christian, to pray over city council meetings. This was not clearly a constitutional 

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1 problem until TST requested participation in the ceremony. The City denied TST equal 

2 participation in the ceremony and governmental officials recited the very clear reason why. 

3 To paraphrase: “We do NOT want Satanists; we want (and intend) to be blessed and guided 

4 by God alone.” This sentiment was amplified by the 15,000 emails which crashed City servers.

5 This accrued a constitutional cause of action under the Establishment and Equal 

6 Protection Clauses. The City then further evidenced that constitutional cause of action by 

7 “permitting” two imams and one token non-Abrahamic religion to participate.

8 The City’s “policy” affords it no protection. First, this “policy” cannot retroactively cure 

9 the circumstances in which it was created. The contemporaneous statements by governmental 

10 officials and the events leading up to the “policy” unequivocally require a finding that the 

11 policy is a pretext.

12 But even when looking past the obviously pretextual nature of the policy, it lacks any 

13 safeguards. In every respect, this policy is unlike Rubin. This list is unmaintained, it permits 

14 inquiry into the religious beliefs of the speaker, it has no limits on consecutive speaking, and–

15 most importantly–it rejected TST.

16 From an Equal Protection perspective, the City has enacted special disabilities on a suspect 

17 class. No other religions were required to show “substantial ties.” The requirement that TST, 

18 alone, do so was a special disability. It was a further special disability that TST, alone, was 

19 precluded from equal participation in the prayer ceremony. Ms. Shortt was not the only 

20 speaker whose congregation lies outside of the city limits of Scottsdale. Thirty-eight other 

21 “permissible” speakers did, too. The City has offered no religiously-neutral distinction.

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1 The City must show that its policy of requiring TST, alone, to show “substantial ties to the 

2 community” is narrowly tailored to suit a compelling governmental interest. If and when it 

3 fails, the Court should find an Equal Protection violation.

4 As relief, the Court should grant a declaratory judgment that the City has violated the 

5 Establishment Clause and the Equal Protection Clause, grant a permanent injunction which 

6 prohibits the City from prohibiting any religious invocations before City Council meetings, 

7 grant nominal damages to Plaintiffs, and grant judgment for attorney’s fees and costs.

Respectfully submitted on March 29, 2019,

On behalf of Plaintiffs

By /s/ Stuart P. de Haan and /s/ Matthew A. Kezhaya

Stuart P. de Haan, 

AZ Bar No. 026664

Matthew A. Kezhaya, 

AR Bar No. 2014161 (pro hac vice)

Attorney for Plaintiffs Attorney for Plaintiffs

de Haan Law Firm, PLLC

100 N Stone Avenue, Suite 512

Tucson, Arizona 85701

1202 NE McClain Rd

Bentonville AR 72712

phone (520) 358-4089 (479) 431-6112

fax (520) 628-4275 (479) 282-2892

email stu.dehaan@gmail.com matt@kezhaya.law

8 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

9 I certify that on March 29, 2019 I electronically transmitted this document to the Clerk’s 

10 Office using the CM/ECF system for filing and transmittal of a Notice of Electronic Filing to 

11 the appropriate CM/ECF registrants. 

/s/ Stuart de Haan

12

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