- 1 - 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

Stacy M. Gabriel (#015071) 

Andrew S. Ashworth (#016356) 

GABRIEL & ASHWORTH, P.L.L.C. 

10105 E. Via Linda, Suite 103, No. 392 

Scottsdale, Arizona 85258 

(480) 368-2790 

stacy@gabrielashworth.com 

Rosemary Alito (pro hac vice) 

Meghan Meade (pro hac vice) 

Laura Scully (pro hac vice) 

K&L GATES LLP

One Newark Center, Tenth Floor 

Newark, New Jersey 07102 

(973) 848-4000 

ralito@klgates.com 

mmeade@klgates.com 

Counsel for Defendant Lockheed Martin Corporation 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Stacy Wallace, 

 Plaintiff, 

 vs. 

Lockheed Martin Corporation, 

 Defendant. 

Case No. 2:18-cv-00463 

DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

Oral Argument Requested 

Plaintiff Stacy Wallace admitted in this action she engaged in a physical, 

amorous relationship with her direct supervisor for months and a consensual 

romantic relationship with one of Defendant Lockheed Martin Corporation’s 

(“LMC’s”) customers, a Lieutenant Colonel in the U.S. Air Force, whom she at 

first falsely accused of raping her. Her employment as a manager with LMC 

ultimately ended because of this irresponsible, dishonest behavior wholly 

Case 2:18-cv-00463-DGC Document 19 Filed 03/01/19 Page 1 of 14
- 2 - 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

unbefitting of someone in her position, which even Plaintiff conceded violated 

LMC’s leadership requirements. Her acknowledgment that she engaged in the 

misconduct that gave rise to her failure to be reinstated to her manager role 

completely forecloses her claims in this action under the Family and Medical 

Leave Act (“FMLA”). 

After LMC launched an investigation into Plaintiff’s reckless behavior, she 

requested and used FMLA leave, which she exhausted over the course of nearly a 

year. LMC’s investigation substantiated the allegations as to her serious 

misconduct. In early March 2016, members of a committee at LMC determined 

that, based on the investigation findings, Plaintiff could not be returned to her 

leadership position at LMC. 

Months after LMC’s committee had already recommended that Plaintiff not 

be reinstated to her leadership role, in June 2016, Plaintiff started to raise questions 

about her FMLA leave, which she took on an intermittent basis from January 29, 

2016 to January 28, 2017. As her alleged protected activity came after LMC’s 

disciplinary decision, LMC could not possibly have retaliated against her. While 

Plaintiff’s admitted transgressions undermined her ability to serve in any 

leadership capacity at LMC at the location where she worked, after she exhausted 

her FMLA leave LMC offered her the opportunity to apply for a non-managerial 

position elsewhere. She failed to avail herself of this offer, and her employment 

was terminated in April 2017 as a result of this choice, not on account of her 

FMLA leave or any FMLA-related protected activity. 

Case 2:18-cv-00463-DGC Document 19 Filed 03/01/19 Page 2 of 14
- 3 - 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

For the reasons set forth more fully below, LMC respectfully moves for 

summary judgment dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims in this action, for interference 

with her rights under the FMLA and retaliation for exercising those rights. 

1. Undisputed Facts 

A. Plaintiff’s Job History

LMC employed Plaintiff as a Computer Systems Security Analysis 

Manager at Luke Air Force Base (“Luke”) from 2014 until April 2017 (para. 1).1

In this capacity, Plaintiff was responsible for securing the F-35 system and its data, 

and required a secret security clearance to perform her job duties (para. 2). Several 

LMC employees reported to Plaintiff (para. 3). Plaintiff directly reported to Darin 

Crowley and in turn to Mark Cheeks (para. 4). While she had a dotted-line 

reporting relationship to David Sellers, Sellers did not have the authority to hire or 

fire Plaintiff and was not in her chain of command (para. 5). In addition, Plaintiff 

directly reported to LMC’s customers, including the U.S. government (para. 6). 

B. Plaintiff’s Violation of Company Policies 

On January 27, 2016, the LMC Ethics Department (“Ethics”) received a 

complaint from Sellers that, among other allegations, Plaintiff and her direct 

supervisor, Crowley, were engaged in a consensual romantic relationship, and that 

Plaintiff and a civilian U.S. Air Force employee Lieutenant Colonel had been or 

were engaged in a personal if not romantic relationship (para. 7). Plaintiff was 

subsequently placed on paid administrative leave pending the investigation (para. 

 

1

 “Para.” refers to the paragraphs in the Statement of Facts in Support of 

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. 

Case 2:18-cv-00463-DGC Document 19 Filed 03/01/19 Page 3 of 14
- 4 - 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

8). Meanwhile, on January 26, 2016, Crowley resigned from his employment with 

LMC (para. 9). 

Plaintiff admitted at her deposition that she engaged in an inappropriate 

relationship with her supervisor (para. 10). She conceded that she had a “personal 

relationship” with him from late November 2015 to January 2016 (para. 11). She 

acknowledged that she loved him (para. 12). Plaintiff further admitted that her 

relationship with Crowley became physical while he was still her supervisor (para. 

13). She conceded that having Crowley as her “‘boss, friend, part-time more than 

friend’” when he was her supervisor violated LMC’s full spectrum leadership 

requirements (para. 14). 

She admitted that they had a “close, personal relationship evident in late 

September/October 2015 time frame based on text messages,” including many 

“say[ing] ‘miss you’ and ‘love you’” and one mentioning they “they agreed they 

were ‘endless lovers,’” and including “early morning and late night exchanges” 

(para. 15). For example, Plaintiff texted Crowley, “‘You are always on my mind.’” 

(para. 16). Plaintiff admitted replying “Yes. I am” when Crowley texted her, “Are 

you lustful” (para. 17)? When Crowley texted her “‘Pool or hot tub next week,’” 

she responded, “‘Both.’” According to her, this exchange was because “I need 

water. I have physical pain. I need a lot of water. And so Darin [Crowley]’s 

suggestion to me often was: Go walk laps. Go swim laps” (para. 18). 

In response to Crowley texting Plaintiff, “‘You come to my being. It is 

soulful. Connected. Mind, body and spirit,’” she texted, “Yes.” Shortly thereafter 

he texted: “‘I want to bite you’” (para. 19). Plaintiff maintained these 

Case 2:18-cv-00463-DGC Document 19 Filed 03/01/19 Page 4 of 14
- 5 - 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

communications could have been a song lyric or “could just be speaking of being a 

human being on this earth” (para. 19). 

She did not deny that Crowley texted her, “‘You need to get home. I am 

having a party in my pants and you’re invited,’” to which she replied, “‘LOL. Just 

saw your texts” (para. 20). Regarding sleeping with Crowley, she explained, “if I 

slept in the same bed with him, then it was not any physical, romantic way,” but 

also admitted that their relationship “went from friendship to something more and . 

. . it crossed the line” and was more than a boss-subordinate relationship (para. 

21). Crowley himself likewise admitted that he had a romantic relationship and 

affair with her, which involved kissing, hugging, overnight visits, and sleeping in 

the same bed (para. 22). 

Plaintiff also told LMC that she had a consensual romantic relationship with 

one of LMC’s customers, a Lieutenant Colonel in the U.S. Air Force, whom she at 

first falsely accused of raping her (para. 23). She acknowledged that her 

representation that the Lieutenant Colonel had raped her was a very serious 

criminal allegation, and this representation was a lie (para. 24). According to 

Plaintiff, she made this lie because Sellers and another LMC employee pressured 

her and “I wanted to appease Dave [Sellers]. I don’t really know what it was for. I 

was hoping that I wouldn’t be around for whatever it was for” (para. 25). In the 

course of doing so, Plaintiff admitted, “I said a lot of things that were not true . . . I 

said a lot of things in this that were not true,” referring to her conversation with 

Sellers about the Lieutenant Colonel and the Lieutenant Colonel’s alleged efforts 

Case 2:18-cv-00463-DGC Document 19 Filed 03/01/19 Page 5 of 14
- 6 - 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

to discourage her from reporting the Lieutenant Colonel’s rape of her, which never 

actually occurred (para. 26). 

Ethics conducted a thorough investigation, which concluded on February 

16, 2016 (para. 27). The LMC employee conducting the investigation, Marie 

Walsh, was not involved in the approval or provision of Plaintiff’s FMLA leave 

benefits, which were administered by the Lockheed Martin Leave and Disability 

Center, managed by third-party administrator Sedgwick Claims Management 

Services, Inc (para. 28). Ethics found that the allegations about Plaintiff’s 

relationships with Crowley and the Lieutenant Colonel were substantiated and that 

Plaintiff had violated company policies (para. 29). Ethics also found the charge 

that she used improper language substantiated, noting that Plaintiff “admitted 

making comments about ‘blowing’ someone.” (para. 29). Plaintiff was advised of 

the investigation conclusions against her on February 26, 2016 (para. 30). 

Ethics presented its conclusions to LMC’s Administrative Review 

Committee (“ARC”) for determination as to what, if any, discipline the 

investigation findings warranted (para. 31). In early March 2016, the ARC 

recommended Plaintiff be terminated from her position (para. 32). 

C. Plaintiff’s FMLA Usage 

At the time of the ARC decision, Plaintiff was on intermittent FMLA leave 

retroactive to January 29, 2016 (para. 33). So as to avoid even the suggestion of 

interference with Plaintiff’s enjoyment of her FMLA benefits, LMC postponed 

Plaintiff’s termination from her position until after she had exhausted her FMLA 

leave (para. 34). LMC told Plaintiff that she would be informed of any discipline 

Case 2:18-cv-00463-DGC Document 19 Filed 03/01/19 Page 6 of 14
- 7 - 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

she would face as an outgrowth of the investigation after she used up all of her 

FMLA leave or no longer needed FMLA leave (para. 35). 

Plaintiff first requested FMLA leave on January 29, 2016, which she sought 

for “anxiety and depression” (para. 36). She was requested to complete and return 

a medical certification form (para. 37). However, the form Plaintiff submitted was 

insufficient, so she was asked to submit complete paperwork in order to process 

her FMLA request (para. 38). On March 28, 2016, Plaintiff’s request for 

intermittent FMLA leave was retroactively approved for the period January 29, 

2016 through July 28, 2016 (para. 39). Plaintiff was paid during this period of 

FMLA leave (para. 40). Plaintiff subsequently requested an extension of her 

intermittent FMLA leave, which was granted through January 28, 2017 (para. 41). 

Meanwhile, during the summer of 2016, while taking her intermittent 

FMLA leave (para. 41), Plaintiff repeatedly asked about her return to work (paras. 

43-44), despite the fact that she was previously told LMC would not discuss 

discipline with her while she was on FMLA leave (para. 35). On January 20, 2017, 

Plaintiff sought another extension of her FMLA leave (para. 42). By letter dated 

January 23, 2017, she was advised that she did not qualify for further leave 

because she did not meet the FMLA’s 1,250 hours requirement, having only 

worked 899.00 hours within the 12-month period preceding the leave sought (para. 

42). On February 13, 2017, she emailed Cheeks, Senior Manager, about the denial 

of her extended FMLA leave and asked what could be done about her ineligibility 

(para. 45). On April 13, 2017, Plaintiff’s then-attorney sent a letter to LMC’s 

Case 2:18-cv-00463-DGC Document 19 Filed 03/01/19 Page 7 of 14
- 8 - 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

CEO, asserting, among other claims, that her FMLA rights were violated (para. 

46). 

D. Plaintiff’s Employment is Terminated After She Fails to Pursue a NonManagement Position at LMC 

On March 15, 2017, after Plaintiff’s FMLA leave benefits had been 

completely exhausted, LMC invited Plaintiff to apply to any open, non-leadership 

positions at locations other than Luke by April 15, 2017 and explained that, if 

Plaintiff did not find a new position by April 15, she would be administratively 

separated (para. 47). Plaintiff chose not to pursue any such opportunities. LMC 

thus terminated her employment effective April 19, 2017 (para. 48).2

 

2. Standard on Motion for Summary Judgment 

A court must grant summary judgment where “the movant shows that there 

is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment 

as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “‘Only disputes over facts that might 

affect the outcome of the suit . . . will properly preclude the entry of summary 

judgment.’ Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The 

disputed evidence must be ‘such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for 

the nonmoving party.’ Id. at 248.” Agilysys, Inc. v. Vipond, No. 04-2023-PHXDGC, 2006 WL 2620103, at *2 (D. Ariz. Sept. 13, 2006) (citations omitted). 

“Summary judgment may be entered against a party who ‘fails to make a showing 

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and 

 

2

 Plaintiff brought two charges before the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity 

Commission, both of which resulted in findings of no probable cause (para. 49). 

Case 2:18-cv-00463-DGC Document 19 Filed 03/01/19 Page 8 of 14
- 9 - 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.’ Celotex, 477 U.S. at 

322.” Id. LMC satisfies this standard and summary judgment is therefore 

appropriate. 

3. Plaintiff’s FMLA Interference Claim Is Meritless 

Having admitted to engaging in the serious misconduct predating her 

FMLA leave that gave rise to the end of her employment, Plaintiff’s FMLA 

interference claim is unviable. To state a claim for interference with FMLA rights, 

Plaintiff must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that she (1) took 

protected leave; (2) suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) the adverse 

action was causally related to her FMLA leave. Foraker v. Apollo Group, Inc., 427 

F. Supp. 2d 936, 941 (D. Ariz. Apr. 12, 2006).3

 Plaintiff cannot demonstrate the 

third requisite element. To establish causation, she must show that the “‘taking of 

 3

 Alternatively, a plaintiff “may show interference by presenting evidence 

that the employer pressured the employee to reduce leave time or misinformed an 

employee as to her FMLA rights, ‘thus discouraging her from using FMLA 

leave.’” Cheeks v. Gen. Dynamics, No. CV-12-01543-PHX-JAT, 2014 WL 

11514328, at *1 (D. Ariz. Nov. 18, 2014) (citation omitted). Here, this approach is 

unavailable to Plaintiff, as she actually was permitted to use all of the FMLA leave 

to which she was entitled (paras. 39-42), even though LMC had grounds to 

terminate her employment earlier based on the findings of misconduct reviewed by 

the ARC (para. 32). Her FMLA benefits only ended because she did not work the 

required hours to be eligible for further leave (para. 42). The cessation of her 

FMLA benefits also cannot be the basis of an interference claim. See Escriba v. 

Foster Poultry Farms, Inc., 743 F.3d 1236, 1243 (9th Cir. 2014) (noting that 

demonstrations plaintiff was “eligible for the FMLA’s protections” as well as 

“entitled to leave under the FMLA” are among the elements required to establish a 

claim for FMLA interference). In particular, failure to work the necessary hours to 

be eligible for FMLA leave forecloses an FMLA interference claim. Kohama v. 

McCabe, 197 F. App’x 535, 537 (9th Cir. 2006) (affirming summary judgment 

dismissal of FMLA interference claim for, among other reasons, “[t]here is no 

evidence in the record that [plaintiff] worked the requisite number of hours to be 

an eligible employee . . . .”). 

Case 2:18-cv-00463-DGC Document 19 Filed 03/01/19 Page 9 of 14
- 10 - 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

FMLA-protected leave constituted a negative factor in the decision to terminate 

[her].’” Buckman v. MCI World Com, No. CV-06-2005-PHX-DGCJJ, 2008 WL 

928000, at *3 (D. Ariz. Apr. 4, 2008), aff'd sub nom. Buckman v. MCI World Com 

Inc., 374 F. App'x 719 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). Moreover, as this Court 

has explained: 

[t]he right to reinstatement under the Act is not limitless. The FMLA 

does not entitle the employee to any rights, benefits, or positions he 

or she would not have been entitled to had he or she not taken leave. 

It simply guarantees that an employee’s taking leave will not result 

in adverse employment actions. . . . Once a plaintiff has shown that 

she has not been reinstated to her previous position, the burden shifts 

to the employer ‘to show that [it] had a legitimate reason to deny an 

employee reinstatement.’ 

Fox v. Primary Fin. Servs. LLC, No. CV-13-00116-PHX-DGC, 2014 WL 814969, 

at *2 (D. Ariz. Mar. 3, 2014) (citations omitted). See also Sanders v. City of 

Newport, 657 F.3d 772, 778–79 (9th Cir. 2011) (“All the circuits that have 

considered the issue have relied on DOL regulations to hold that the FMLA 

provides an employee with only a limited right to reinstatement.”) (citations 

omitted); Fleming v. IASIS Healthcare Corp., 151 F. Supp. 3d 1043, 1055 (D. 

Ariz. 2015) (rejecting the argument that if employee requests FMLA leave, 

employer, regardless of employee misconduct, must either retain employee or face 

trial for interference with FMLA rights). 

In this case, LMC had a legitimate reason for not restoring Plaintiff to her 

position at Luke as Computer Systems Security Analysis Manager with several 

direct reports; namely, her admitted inappropriate relationship with her supervisor, 

false accusation of rape against one of LMC’s clients and consensual romantic 

Case 2:18-cv-00463-DGC Document 19 Filed 03/01/19 Page 10 of 14
- 11 - 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

relationship with this client, a Lieutenant Colonel in the U.S. Air Force, in 

violation of not only common sense but also LMC’s policies (paras. 10-15, 21-26, 

29-32). Her demonstrated failure to exercise basic leadership skills by choosing to 

compromise the team’s overall success in favor of her own personal and/or 

romantic relationships wholly undermined her qualifications to hold any leadership 

position, especially at Luke where her own actions damaged her reputation and 

trust among coworkers. The reason for not reinstating her is entirely unrelated to 

Plaintiff’s FMLA leave. Notably, the reason for not restoring Plaintiff is also 

uncontested. She herself admitted the truth of the circumstances underlying the 

decision not to reinstate her (paras. 10-11, 13-15, 21, 23-26). Ultimately, her 

employment was terminated not because she took FMLA leave, but because she 

failed to secure a non-leadership position at a location other than Luke (paras. 47-

48). As such, her tenure as Computer Systems Security Analysis Manager and 

employment at LMC ended for legitimate reasons, and her FMLA interference 

claim fails. 

Relevant case law further supports this conclusion. The Ninth Circuit case 

of Zsenyuk v. City of Carson is especially instructive. Zsenyuk asserted a dozen 

alleged adverse actions and supplied no direct evidence of causation except for 

temporal proximity between his FMLA leave and the first three supposed adverse 

actions. 99 F. App’x 794, 796 (9th Cir. 2004). All of these actions occurred after 

his return from FMLA leave, but were part of an investigation into his behavior 

that started before he asked for and took FMLA leave. In affirming the lower 

court’s grant of summary judgment to the employer, the court concluded: 

Case 2:18-cv-00463-DGC Document 19 Filed 03/01/19 Page 11 of 14
- 12 - 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

“Zsenyuk has offered no evidence that the conduct of and result of the 

investigation were influenced by his exercise of rights under the FMLA, and his 

assertion of temporal proximity is undermined—if not nullified—by the fact that 

the investigation pre-dated his leave.” Id. This case is no different. As in Zsenyuk, 

here, the investigation into Plaintiff’s conduct was initiated before she applied for 

and took FMLA leave. The investigation commenced on January 27, 2016 (para. 

7), and Plaintiff requested leave days later on January 29, 2016 (para. 36). The 

conduct giving rise to the investigation likewise took place at least months before 

Plaintiff began her FMLA leave (para. 15). Accordingly, the same result is 

warranted in this case: dismissal due to lack of the requisite causality. 

Additionally, in Valtierra v. Medtronic Inc., the district court dismissed a 

facility specialist’s FMLA claim on summary judgment where—like here—the 

plaintiff admitted engaging in the misconduct for which he lost his job. In 

Valtierra, the court reasoned that “no reasonable juror could conclude but that [the 

employer] discharged Valtierra for misconduct and violation of company policies 

after Valtierra admitted that he signed off on 12 [preventative maintenance items] 

as completed yet not having performed the work. . . even if Valtierra had already 

applied to [the company] for prospective FMLA leave (which Valtierra had not 

done) . . . .” Valtierra v. Medtronic Inc., 232 F. Supp. 3d 1117, 1128 (D. Ariz. 

2017). Thus, regardless of timing, Plaintiff’s admissions that she had an 

inappropriate relationship with her supervisor and falsely accused her customer of 

rape when in fact they had a consensual romantic relationship entirely undercut her 

Case 2:18-cv-00463-DGC Document 19 Filed 03/01/19 Page 12 of 14
- 13 - 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

FMLA claim. Such conduct was a legitimate reason for not restoring Plaintiff to 

her job and her FMLA interference claim therefore fails. 

4. Plaintiff’s FMLA Retaliation Claim Is Equally Unavailing 

Plaintiff’s FMLA retaliation claim is equally unsustainable, as any 

protected activity occurred well after the decision had already been made that 

Plaintiff could not remain in her leadership position. In the Ninth Circuit, courts 

construe FMLA retaliation claims as prohibiting employers from discriminating 

“against any individual for opposing any practice made unlawful by the [FMLA].” 

Bachelder v. Am. W. Airlines, Inc., 259 F.3d 1112, 1124 (9th Cir.2001). 

There could be no causal connection between any complaints Plaintiff made 

related to her FMLA and her termination. Significantly, the ARC determined that 

termination from her position was appropriate discipline in early March 2016, 

(para. 32), which undisputedly predated any opposition Plaintiff may have 

expressed on how LMC handled her FMLA leave. See Clark Cty. Sch. Dist. v. 

Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 272 (2001) (assessing a retaliation claim under Title VII, 

court held an employer “proceeding along lines previously contemplated, though 

not yet definitively determined, is no evidence whatever of causality”). Plaintiff 

only raised questions about her FMLA leave starting in June 2016, and she did not 

make a formal complaint until April 2017 (paras. 43-46). Even if these 

communications were protected activity, they could not have influenced a decision 

already made months prior in March 2016 (para. 32). Also, in March 2017, months 

after Plaintiff started questioning LMC’s administration of her leave, LMC invited 

Plaintiff to apply for a non-management position outside Luke (para. 47). If LMC 

Case 2:18-cv-00463-DGC Document 19 Filed 03/01/19 Page 13 of 14
- 14 - 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

had a retaliatory motive as Plaintiff alleges, it would not have offered her this 

opportunity, but instead would have summarily terminated her employment. 

Accordingly, any alleged protected activity on Plaintiff’s part played no part in 

LMC’s decision to terminate her employment, and her FMLA retaliation claim is 

meritless. 

CONCLUSION 

Lockheed Martin Corporation respectfully requests that this Court enter 

summary judgment in its favor and against Plaintiff, and that this Court enter such 

other and further relief as it deems just and proper. 

Dated: March 1, 2019 

Counsel for Defendant 

Lockheed Martin Corporation 

/s/ Rosemary Alito 

Rosemary Alito 

Meghan Meade 

Laura Scully 

K&L Gates LLP 

One Newark Center, Tenth Floor 

Newark, NJ 07102 

Rosemary.alito@klgates.com 

Meghan.meade@klgates.com 

Laura.scully@klgates.com 

Case 2:18-cv-00463-DGC Document 19 Filed 03/01/19 Page 14 of 14