### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON A ugus t 20
, 200 8 S es sio n

KI NA CRIDER, I NDIVI DUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF AND AS NEXT F RIEND OF HER TWO CH ILDREN 

### , JAZ MYN CR IDER AND 

### PRECIO US CRIDER; ON BE HAL F OF AND AS NEXT FRIEND OF AL L M INOR ITY C HILD RE N EN ROL LE D IN THE 

### P AR IS 

### S P ECIAL 

### S CHOOL 

### D IS TRICT 

### ; AND 

### C Y N TH IA BOYSO N,
INDI VIDUA LLY AND ON BEH ALF OF AND AS NEXT F RIEND OF HER CHI LD 

### , BRE A ROB BINS

v. THE C OUN TY OF HEN RY , T ENN ESSE E

An Appeal from the C ircuit Court f or Henry County No. 2358 Donald E . Parish, Jud ge

No. W2007-02630-C OA-R3-C V - Filed Dec ember 30, 2008

This case a d d r e s s e s th e a ll o c a ti o n o f f u n d s r e c e iv e d b y a

c o u n ty f r o m th e T e n n e s s e e V a lle y Au tho ri ty. Th e Te nn e sse e Va lle y Au tho ri ty is e xe mpt e d fr om state ta xatio n, bu t make s p a yme nts to the county in lieu of taxes. Historically, the county has ea rmarke d these funds f

or educ ation and has allocated a portion of them to the specia l school districts within t he county. I n 2003, howeve r, the county decide d to pha se out the allocation of f unds to the special sc hool districts. S ubsequently, the plaintiffs in this action, pare nts of children in a specia l sc hool district located in the county, sued the county
, ar g u in g th a t th e c o u n ty ’ s d e c is io n to s to p s e n d in g f u n d s to th e s p e c ia l s c h o o l d istric t violated seve ral statutory provisions. The tria l court grante d summary judgment to the county. The plaintiffs now appe al. We aff irm, concluding that the c ase is contr olled by t h e d ec i s i on in Oak Rid ge City Sc hoo ls v . And

e rso n Cou nty , 67 7 S.W .2 d 4 68 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . 1 98 4) , a ndthat th e c ou nty is e nti tle d to su mma

ry jud gme nt.
Tenn. R. App . P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Cir cuit Court is Aff irme d

H OL LY M. K I RBY , J., delivere d the opi nion of t he C ourt, in which A LA N E. H I G H ERS , P.J., W.S., and D AVI D R. F ARMER , J., joined.

Rich ar d L

. D u n la

p , Pa r is
, T e n n e s s e e , a n d Ch ar le s L

. T r o tt e r , H u n ti n g d o n , T e n n e s s e e , f o r the

app e lla nts , K ina

Cr ide r, e t. a l.

Lee M. Gree r, II I, Paris, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellee, the County of Henry, Te nnessee

.
OP IN IONFor fi s ca l ye ar 2002- 2003, t he Count y r ec ei ved $687, 771. 00 f r om TV A
, a nd t he Co u n t y r ec ei ved $829, 026. 00 1

f r om t he TV A f or fi s ca l ye ar 2003- 2004.

-2- This is the second appe al in this case. The backgr ound fac ts and proce dural history are set out in our memorandum opinion in the first appe al, Cri de r v . Co unty of

He nry , No. W2005- 00223- COA-R3-CV, 2005 WL 2007163 ( Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 19, 2005).
Plaintiff/Appellant Kina Crider (“Ms. Crider ”) and her c hildren ar e Af rican -American residents of H enry County, Tenne ssee. Ms. Crider ’s c hildren attend the Paris Special School District (“PSSD”) located in Henry County (“County”). The PSS D was cre ated by the Tenne ssee Ge nera l Assembly in 1919 by private a ct. See 19 19 Te nn

. Pr iv. Ac ts c h. 15 0. Th e PSSD is a dis tin c t e nti ty

a ndis n ot a ff

ili a te d w iththe Ci ty o f P ari s, Te nn e sse e . I t op e rate s th re e e le me nta ry sc ho ols
, educating children fr om kindergarten through the eighth grade , and owns the r eal pr operty on whic h the sc ho ols are situate d. Pur su a nt t o th e private a c t cr e a tin g it, the PSSD is auth oriz e d to imp os e its own taxes f

or purpose s of funding the PSSD. See id. Statist ica l d at a i n d icates that 26% of the students attending the PSS D ar e minority students. In contra st, 3% of the students attending the Cou nty sc ho ols in kind e rg art e n th ro ug h e igh th g ra de are min ority stu de nts

.
Th e Te nn e sse e Va lle y A uth ority (“ TV A” ) wa s cr e a te d b y th e Un ite d St a te s Co ng re ss w ith the passage of the Te nnessee Valley Authority Act of 1933. See 16 U. S.C. § 83 1 ( 20 04 ). Con gr e ss expre ssly e xempted TVA “fr om ta xation in any manner or form by any State, county, municipality, or any subdivision or district there of.” 16 U .S.C. § 831 l

. Appar ently awa re that TVA’s a cquisition of la ndto u se fo r i ts o pe ratio ns wo uld de prive loc a l go ve rn me nts of a sig nif ic a nt s ou rc e of

pr op e rty ta x r e ve nu e , Co ng re ss p ro vid e d a s f oll ow s:

In orde r to r ender financ ial assistance to those States and local governme nts in whic h the power operations of the Corporation ar e ca rried on and in which the Corporation ha s a c qu ir e d p ro pe rt ie s p re vio us ly s ub je c t to State a ndloc a l ta xatio n, th e bo ardis authorize d and dire cted to pay to said States, and the c ounties therein, f or ea ch fisca l year , . . . perc entages of the gross proc eeds de rived fr om the sale of pow er by the Corporation for the prec eding fiscal ye ar a s here inafter provided, togethe r with such

a dd iti on a l amo un ts a s may b e paya ble pu rs ua nt t o th e pr ov isi on s h e re ina ft e r s e t f orth

. . . .
Id. In ac cordance w ith this statute, TVA pr ovided funds to t he C ounty in lieu of t axes. In turn, the 1 County earmar

ked these funds for use in funding its school syst em. In a pproximately 19 8 6 , the County adopted a resolution direc ting that a portion of t he TVA funds be allocated to the PSSD. For the 2002-2003 a cade mic school yea r, the PSSD rece ived approximate ly $289,000 from the County. The City of Paris also re ceive d payments fr om the TVA in lieu of taxation; none of the City’s funds

wer e used to provide financ ial assistance to the PSS D. On Ju n e 1 6
, 2 0 0 3, the County Comm ission passed a re solution t o repe al its prior 1986 resolution to provide funding to the PSSD from funds the County rece ived fr o m t he TVA
, implementing a plan to “phase out” the funding to the PSS D. For the 2003-2004 school yea r, the County provided $75,000.00 to the PSS D; for the 2004- 2205 school yea r, it provided $75,000; andThe Count y di d not c hal l enge t he Pl ai nt i f f s ’ a bi l i t y t o a s s er t a pr i vat e r i ght of a ct i on. 2

-3- for the 2005- 2006 school yea r, it provided $75,000. No f unds were to be provided to the PS SD after the 20 05 -2 00 6 s c ho ol y e a r. Th e re a ft e r, a s a

re su lt o f the Cou nty ’s a c tio n, the P S SD r a ise d it s pr op e rty tax ra te fr om $.2 3 pe r $10 0 of as se sse d pro pe rty va lue to $ .4 6 p e r $ 10 0 o f a sse sse d p ro pe rty
va lue . T he PSSD a lso inc re a se d its tu iti on fo r n on -d ist ri c t stud e nts fr om $ 50 to $ 10 0 p e r a c a de mic year

. On July 21, 2005, Ms. Crider, indi vidually, on behalf of her two children, and on behalf of all children e nrolled in the PSS D, filed a lawsuit against the County in the Circuit Court of Henry County. Af

ter numer ous amendments to her complaint, Ms. Crider allege d that the County’s actions in eliminating funding for th e P S S D fr om the TVA payments violated ce rtain provisions of the T en n es s ee E ducation Finance Act of 1977, c odified at sec tion 49-3-301 et seq . of the Te nnessee Code; the Tenne ssee Huma n Rights Act, specifica lly section 4-21-501 of the Tenne ssee Code; a nd

c e rt a in p ro vis ion s o f the Te nn e sse e Con sti tut ion

. Th e Cou nty did no t file a n an sw e r o r o the rw ise

re sp on d to Ms. Cr ide r’ s c omp la int

. On May 26, 2004, Ms. Crider filed a motion for summary judgment. In support, she f iled her state ment of material fac ts and numerous a ffidavits. On Oc tober 27, 2004, the County filed a brief in opposition to Ms. Cr i d er ’s s u m m ary judgment motion. Ms. Crider moved to strike the County’s brief, a nd the motion to st rike wa s denied.

On Octobe r 28, 2004, the trial c ourt held a he aring on Ms. Crider’ s m otion for summary jud gme nt. At the c on c lus ion of the he ari ng , th e tr ia l ju dg e tol d th e pa rt ie s th a t he wa s d e ny ing Ms. Crider’s motion for summary judgment as to all of her claims. On No v em b er 2 3 , 2004, the trial court e ntere d an orde r re flec ting its o ra l ruling. Ms. Crider appe aled the de nial of her motion for summary judgment. The a ppeal wa s dismis sed, bec ause the order from which Ms. Cride r appe aled was not a f

inal order

. See Crider , 2005 WL 2007163, at *5.

There afte r, on De cembe r 14, 2005, Plaintiff/Appellant Cynthia Boyson, individually and on behalf of her child, Brea D obbins, and on beha lf of and a s next frie nd of all minority children enrolled in the PSSD, was admitted as a n additional party plaintiff. 2

On Au gu st 20
, 20 07
, the Cou nty fi le d a mot ion fo r s umm ary jud gme nt, a lon g w itha ff ida vit s in support thereof . The County asserted that no materia l issues of fac t w ere disputed, and that it was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law on the Plaintiffs’ claims for relief

. On September

20, 2007, the trial court hear d oral ar g u m en t on the County’s moti on for summary judgment. At the conc lusion of the hearing, the trial court issued its oral ruling granting the Cou nty ’s mot ionfo r s umm ary jud gme nt:

Th e plaint iffs bas e the ir

a c tio n o n tw o th e orie s a s h a ve be e n a rg ue d th is morning . . . [w]hic h may be c hara cterized a s the statutory allocation theory and the

rac ial discrimination theory.-4- As to the allocation theory, summary j udgment is granted a s a matter of law pursuant to the plain langua ge of TCA 49- 3-315, and the opinion of the Court of Ap p ea l s in . . . Oa k

Ri dg e [Ci ty Sc ho ols ] v . A nd e rso n Co un ty , 677 S.W.2d 468 [(Te nn. Ct. App. 1984)]. In t h at case , the Court of Appe als held that the TVAPILOT progr am, . . . payme nt i n li e u o f t a xe s b e ing the a c ro ny m, p a id to a Cou nty ne e d n ot b e sh are d w ith a spec ial school district. It is as close to a spotted c ow sort of c ase to this situation as you’ll gene rally find. As [to] the pla intiff’s theory w hich sounds in the nature of the a ppropriation of pub l i c fu n d s for the pur pose of a ccomplishing a ra ce- based r esult, which is the second the ory, this require s the Court to make more of a fa ct-ba sed dete rmination. Th e Cou rt

ha s e sse nti a lly a sti pu la tio n to the e ff e c t that H e nry Co un ty h a s c ho se n to use the payments which it rec eives fr om TVA in lieu o f t ax es t o fund the school sy ste m of He nry Coun ty onl y an d to not sha re a ny of tho se fu nd s withthe se pa rate school system operated by the [PSSD].

. . . The parties ask the court to decide this Motion for the Summary Judgment as to the second the ory of invidious rac e discrimination on the existing rec ord. Acc ordingly, the Court gr ants the def endant’ s Motion for Summary Judgment on the

rac ial discrimination theory, because the pl aintiff has f ailed to support that allegation with any – any mate rial fa cts that would lead the Court to that conclusion. Henry County was never under a legal obli gation to share the TVA PILOT funds with the [PSS D] and its de cision to c ease sharing does not, on this r ec o rd, appea r to have been ba sed on any r acia lly discriminatory motive. Acc ordingly, the Motion of He nry County for Summary Judgment is granted entirely. There fo re , the def endant’ s [sic] Motion to Dismiss t he Motion of Henry County for Summary Judgment is consequently denie d.

Thus, the trial court held that the County was not obliged t o use any pa rt of the f unds it rece ived from TVAto fund the PSS D, citing Oa k Ri dg e Sc hoo ls v . And

e rso n Cou nty , 677 S.W.2d 468 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984), in support of i ts conclusion. In addition, the trial court held that the Plaintiffs ha d s ub mit ted i ns uf

fi c ie nt e vid e nc e to s up po rt the a lle gatio n th a t th e Cou nty ’s de c isi on to c e a se fundi n g th e PS SD w a s mo ti v a te d b y r a c ia l d is c r im in a ti o n

. O n N o v e mb e r 9
, 2 0 0 7
, th e trial court enter ed an order incorporating its oral ruling. From this order, the Plaintiffs now a ppeal, c hallenging the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the County. On app e a l, the Pla int if

fs arg ue that the gr a nt of su mma ry jud gme nt wa s not ap propr ia te beca use the County’s adoption of the June 16, 2003 resolution to phase out the sharing of TVA PILOT (payment in lieu of taxes) funds violated (1) the Education Reform Act of 2001, in particula rThes e s t at ut es w er e ac t ual l y pa r t of t he Educa t i on I m pr ovem ent A ct of 1992. 3

O n a p p e a l, th e P la in tiffs d o n o t ch a llen g e th e tria l c o u rt’s g ra n t o f su m m a ry ju d g m e n t t o th e C o u n ty o n th e ir 4

th e o ry o f re c o v e ry b a se d o n ra c ia l d isc rim in a tio n

. -5- Sections 49-3-352 a nd 49-3-354 of the Tenne ssee Code A nnotated; and (2) the Paris Special School 3 District Private Ac ts of 1919, Chapter No. 150, a s amende d, House Bill No. 281. 4

W e re vie w the tr ia l c ou rt ’s gr a nt of su mma ry j ud gm ent de novo with no presumption of

corr ectne ss. Wa rre n v . Es tate of Kir k , 9 54 S.W .2 d 7 22
, 72 3 (T e nn

. 19 97 ). Sum mary jud gme nt i s appropri at e wh ere “the ple adings, depositions, answer s to interrogatorie s, and admissions on file, together w ith the affida vits, if any, show that there is no genui n e i ssue as to any material fa ct and that th e mov ing pa

rty is e nti tle d to a

jud gme nt a s a

ma tte r o f l a w. ” Te nn . R. Civ . P. 56 .0 4. W e mus t view the e vidence in a light most favor able to the nonmoving party, giving that party the bene fit of all rea sonable infe renc es. Warren , 954 S.W.2d at 723 (quoti ng Bain v . W e lls , 936 S.W.2d 618, 622 (T e nn . 1 99 7) ). On ce th e movin g p arty d e mon str a te s th a t no ge nu ine iss ue s o f m a te ri a l f a c t e xis t, the non-moving party must demonstrate, by aff idavits or ot herw ise, that a disputed issue of mate rial fac t exists for trial. By rd v . Ha ll , 847 S.W.2d 208, 211 (Tenn. 1993)

.
We f irst addre ss the Plaintiffs’ argume nt that the County’s refusal to share TV A PILOT funds with the PSS D vi olates Tennessee Code Annotated §§ 49-3-352 and 49- 3-354. In a nalyzing this iss ue, it is instructive to review the law as it existed be fore the passage of these statutes.
Chapter 3 of

Title 49 of the Te nnessee Code Annotated a ddresse s “Finance s” for education. Under the statutory sche me, a Loc al Education Agency ( “LEA” ) is define d as “any county, city, or specia l school district, unified school district, school d is tr ic t o f an y me tropolitan form of gove rnment or any othe r school system established by la w. ” T .C.A. § 49-3-302(11) (2002). Te nnessee Code An no ta te d § 49 -3- 315, re fe rr e d to a s “ the app ortio nme nt s ta tut e ,” se ts o ut h ow e a c h L EA is t o distribute the funds it rec eives for education:

(a) For ea ch L E A t here shall be levied f or cur rent ope ration and ma intenance not

mo re t h an o n e (1) sc hool tax for a ll such grade s as may be inc luded in the LEA. Eac h LEA shall place in one (1) separ ate school fund all school reve nues for curr ent school operation purposes rec eived f rom t h e s t ate, c ounty and other political subdivisions , if any. . . . All school funds for cur rent ope ration and ma intenance purposes c ollected by a n y co u n t y . . . shall be apportioned by the county trustee

a mon g th e LE As the re in o n th e ba sis of the W FTE ADA [we igh te d f ull -t ime equivalent a vera ge daily attendance] maintained by ea ch, during the c urre nt school year

. . . .
T. C.A . § 49 -3 -3 15 (a ) ( 20 02 ). Th e statut e de sc ri be s in de ta il the ma nn e r in w hic h s uc h f un ds mus t be appr opriated. See T.C.A. § 49-3-315( b), (c ).-6-

In Oa k Ridg e City Sc hoo ls v . And e rso n Cou nty , cited by the tria l court below, the plaintiff city school system was located within the def en d an t co u n t y. The c ity school system filed a decla ratory judgment a ction against the county, seeking a decla ration that the county wa s require d to p a y th e c ity sc ho ol s ys te m it s pr o r ata share of the TVA P IL OT re ce i v ed by the county. In support of its claim, the city cited the ma n d at o ry languagein the apportionment statute quoted above, spe cifica lly relying on the provision that “[a ]ll school funds . . . collec ted by any c ounty . .

. sh allbe apportioned by the county trustee among the LEAs the rein . . . .” T.C.A. § 49-3-315 (empha sis a dded). Oak Ridge
, 677 S.W.2d at 469. The tria l court dismissed the plaintiff city school system’s complaint. It found that TVAwas a fede ral e ntity, and theref ore that fu n d s p aid to the defe ndant county we re not “re ceive d from the state, county [or] political subdivision.” Id. Th e c ity school system appea led, ar guing that the statute mandate d that the fun d s b e allocate d among the school districts in the county based on their aver age daily attendanc e. Id. at 470. The a ppellate c ourt disagree d with the position of t he city school system, relying on Cong e r v . M ad iso n Cou nty , 581 S.W.2d 632 (Tenn. 1979), in which the Tenne ssee Supreme Court held t hat t he st atute re quired the apportionment of f

unds only when the funds w ere rec eived by the county “fr om the state, county a nd other political subdivisions . . . .” Oak Ridge
, 677 S.W.2d at 470-71. The reasoning in Congerwas quoted in Oak Ridge :
By i ts v e ry ph ra se olo gy , th is s ta tut e [§ 49 -6 05 , now § 4 9- 3- 31 5] c a nn ot b e app lic able to F e de ra l Re ve nu e Sha

ri ng Fun ds , the so ur c e of wh ic h is the Fe de ra l G ov e rn me nt. Money re ceive d from the Federa l Government obviously is not money receive d from

a state , c ou nty , o r oth e r p oli tic a l subdivision . The political fa cts of life a re that the Federa l Governme nt is in no sense a “political subdivision.”
The ap p o r ti o n me n t p r o v is io n f o r “ [ a ] ll s c h o o l f

u n d s f o r c u rr e n t o p e r a ti o n s and maintenanc e purpose s collecte d by any county” simply refer s to all funds collecte d

or re c e ive d f

ro m th e state , c ou nty , or oth e r po lit ic a l su bd ivi sio n. It a dd s no thi ng to the scope and exte nt of the def inition of the funds embrac ed within the statute.

Section 49-605 [now, § 49- 3 -3 1 5 ], T

. C.A., embrac es all funds re ceive d from the state, raise d b y lo c a l ta xatio n, or de ri ve d f

ro m app ro pria te bo ndiss ue s. It is inapplicable to Fede ral Reve nue Sharing Funds, which may or may not be used f

or
sc ho ol p ur

po se s.

Id. (quoting Conger , 581 S.W .2 d at 639 ) (e mph a sis in or igi na l)

. Th us , fol low ing the re a so nin g in Conger , the O a k Ridge cou rt he ld that th e app ortio nme nt s ta tut e didno t r e qu ir e the c ou nty to allocate the TVA PILO T funds among the schools bec ause the funds wer e re ceive d from the f eder al governme nt, not from a “state, county [or ] other political subdivision” of the State. Id.
Notably, the city school system in Oak Ridge arg ue d tha t its situatio n wa s d ist ing uis ha ble from that in Conger be c aus e the TV A PIL OT fu nd s we re de ri ve d fr om fe de ra lly a c qu ir e d p ro pe rty that otherwise w ould have be en subjec t to local taxation. The TV A PI L OT funds represe nted property tax reve nues that would have been paid had TVA not a cquire d the property; hence the funds should not be treate d as “f eder al funds,” but should be tre ated in ef fec t as local property t ax re venues under the apportionment statute. The Oak Ridge c ou rt re je c te d th is a

rg ume nt, fi nd ing that th e plainT h at st atu t e p ro v i d es: 5

( a) Ther e i s he r eby es t abl i s hed w i t hi n t he gene r al f und of e ac h LE A a s pec i al r eve nue ac count t o be k n o w n a s th e “ d e d ic a te d e d u c a tio n fu n d .”

(b ) A ll a p p ro p ria tio n s fr o m a ll so u rc e s to fu n d p u b lic e d u c a tio n w il l b e d e p o sited in th is a c c o u n t. M o n e y i n t h e d e d i c a t e d e d u c a t i o n f u n d s h a l l b e i n v e s t e d a s p r o v i d e d b y l a w.

( c) A ny f un d bal ance re m ai ni ng u nexp ended at t he end of a fi s cal y ear i n t he genera l f un d of t he l ocal
pu bl i c e du cat i on s yst em s hal l be car r i ed f orw ar d i nt o t he s ub s equen t fi s cal year

. Such fund bal ance shall be av ai l ab l e t o offs et s h o rt fal l s o f bu d g et ed reven u es or, s u b j ect t o t h e p rov i si o n s o f § 49- 2- 301( b) ( 1) ( W )
, s hal l be a vai l abl e t o m ee t unf o res een i ncr ea s es i n ope r at i ng e xpens es

. A ny

acc um ul at ed f

un d bal ance i n exces s o f t hree p er cent (3% ) o f

t he bu dg et ed annu al operat i ng expenses f or t he cur r ent fi s ca l ye ar m ay be budget ed an d expe nded f or a ny e duca t i on pur pos es , but m us t be

re c o m m e n d e d b y th e b o a rd o f e d u c a tio n p rio r to a p p ro p ria tio n b y th e lo c a l l e g islativ e b o d y

. . . .

T. C. A

. § 49- 3- 352.

-7- la ng ua ge in the statut e didno t pe rm it s uc h a n in te rp re ta tio n, a ndthat, f or pu rp os e s o f a

pp ortio nme nt, the TV A PI LO T f

un ds we re re c e ive d f

ro m th e fede ral go ve rn me nt. As didthe Sup re me Cou rt in Conger , the Oak Ridge court suggeste d that “[t]he city’s prayer f or re lief must be addr essed to the Ge n era l Assembly.” Id. at 471. Acc ordingly, the appe llate court in Oak Ridge a f f irme d the trial court’s dismissal of the Plaintiff’s complaint, concluding that the county was not re quired to shar e TVA PILOT f

unds under the a

pportionment statute. Id.
Thus the holding in Oak Ridge ind ic a te s tha t fun ds re c e ive d by the Cou nty fr om T VAwo uld not be co n s i d er ed to be “rec eived f rom the state, c ounty [or] othe r political subdivision,” and, there fore , that the County is not obl iged under Section 49-3-315( a) to give a portion of those funds to the PSS D. The Plaintiffs ar gue that the holding in Oak Ridge is i na pp lic able in this c a se be c aus e subsequent legislation, namely Te nnessee Code Annotated §§ 49-3-352 and 49-3-354, supe rsede d and re peale d by implication the apportionment statute construe d in Oak Ridge

. Repea l by impli cation is disfavore d, and “c ourts must resolve any possibl e conflict betwee n
a c ts in f a v o r o f e a c h o th e r ‘ s o a s to p r o v id e a h ar mo n io u s o p e r a ti o n o f the laws.’” Kn ox Coun ty Educ. Ass’n v. Knox Cou nty Bd. of Edu c. , 60 S.W.3d 65, 74 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) ( quoting Cro nin v . Ho we , 906 S.W.2d 910, 912 (Tenn. 1995)). Kee ping in mind this principle of statutory construction, we will examine the statutes upon whic h the Plaintiffs rely.

W e fi rs t a dd re ss S e c tio n 4 9-3 -35 2, e na c te d in19 92 . Se c tio n 4 9- 3- 35 2 e sta bli sh e s a “dedic ated e ducation fund” within the general fund of each LEA, and governs the manage ment of the de dic a te d e du c a tio n fu nd a ndre qu ir e s th a t “ [a ]l l a pp ro pria tio ns fr om a ll s ou rc e s to fu ndpu bli c education will be deposited in [the dedic ated e ducation fund] acc ount.” T.C.A. § 49-3-352 ( 2002). 5 Section 49-3-352, then, is not contra ry to the apportionment statute; it simply addresses the ma nner in which a LEAshould manage its educ ational funds.

The Plaintiffs also argue that the apportionment statute construed in Oak Ridge was re peale d by implication by the enac tment of Section 49-3-354( c). By w ay of bac kground, we note that, in theT h e d iffe re n c e s in th e se fu n d in g fo rm u la s a re irre le v a n t t o th e issu e s o n a p p e a l. 6

-8- Education Improvement Ac t of 1992, the Genera l Assembly adopted the Basic Education Program (“BEP”) f unding formula to fund e lementary an d s ec o n d ary e ducation, re placing the Te nnessee Fou nd a tio n Pr og ram f

un din g f ormul a that ha d p re vio usly bee n u se d. To pr e ve nt the c ha ng e in 6 systems from resulting in less money to s c h o o l s y s te ms , the Legislature enac ted Section 49-3-354( c):

(c) T e n n e s s e e f

o u n d a ti o n p r o g r a m ap p r o p r ia tions to LEAs for the 19 90 -1 99 1 s c ho ol y e ar s ha ll b e a ba se , a ndno LE A s ha ll r e c e ive in subsequent y ea rs from the BEP [Basic Educ ation Program] a lesser

a mou nt o f f

un ds , a dju ste d fo r c ha ng e s in s tud e nt e nr oll me nt, than it

rec eived in the 1990- 1 9 9 1 s chool yea r under the Tenne ssee fo un datio n p ro gr a m.

T. C.A . § 49 -3 -3 54 (c ) ( 20 02 ). Th e Pla int if fs arg ue that Se c tio n 4 9- 3- 35 4( c ) p ro hibits th e Cou nty from paying the PSSD less tha n it did during the 1990-1991 school yea r, whe n the PSS D re ceive d TV A PI LO T f

un ds . V ie we d in c on te xt, ho we ve r, Se c tio n 49 -3 -3 45 (c ) a pp e ars to a dd re ss an e nti re ly separ ate issue – the differ ence betwee n amounts rec eived by LEAunder the new BEP, as compa red to the am ounts rece ived under the forme r Tenne ssee f

oundation progra m. The statute does not purport to a ddress the overa ll manne r of apportionment. Thus, this provision is likew i s e not inconsistent with the apportionment statute interpre ted in Oak Ridge

. In 2001, the Le gislature took ac tion to “clean up” the statutory sche me by expl ic itlyrepe aling

certain statutes that had bee n rende red obsolete as a r esult of the 1992 replace ment of the Te nnessee foundation progra m w ith the BEP. Despite the Legislature ’s purposef ul a ction, t h e appropriation statut e wa s n ot e xp lic itl y re pe a le d. Un de r al l of the se c ir c ums ta nc e s, we mus t r e je c t th e Pla int if

fs ’ argume nt that the apportionment statute wa s impli citly repe aled by this subsequent legislation.

The Plaintiffs next ar gue that the holding in Oak Ridge is n ot a pp lic able in this c a se be c aus e Se c tio n 5 of

the 19 19 Pr ivate Ac t th a t e sta bli sh e d th e PSSD re qu ir e s th a t th e PSSD re c e ive its pr o
ra ta sh are of

a ll s c ho ol f

un ds , w hic h wou ld inc lud e the TV A PIL OT fu nd s. Se c tio n 5 of the Pr ivate Ac t pr ov ide s: BE I T FU RTH ER E NA CTE D, Th a t th e Cou nty Tr us te e sh a ll a

pp ortio n to the sa id [PSS D], for

the maintenanc e of sc hools therein, the per capita or prorata share of

all

sc hoo l f unds here afte r in his hands acc ording to the proportion which the s ch ool census of said Special S chool Dis trict, bear s eac h year to that of Henry County, and the County Trustee sha ll apportion said Special School District its prorata shar e of the Stat e school fund paid to said county by the State.

19 19 Te nn . Priv. Ac ts c h. 15 0, se c

. 5 (e mph a sis a dd e d) . T he Pla int if fs arg ue that th is l a ng ua ge in the Private Ac t require s that, once the County decide s to use t he TVA PILOT funds for e ducation, tho se fu nd s th e n be c ome “ sc ho ol fu nd s” that mus t be app ortio ne d to the PSSD un de r the 19 19 Ac t.-9-

W e re je c t th is a

rg ume nt f

or se ve ral reas on s. Fir st, it w a s n ot m a de to the tr ia l c ou rt in opposition t o the County’s motion for summary judgment. Ordinarily, “issues not raised at trial may not be raised f

or the fir st tim e on appe al.” State Dep’t Hum an Servs. v. Def riece , 937 S.W.2d 954, 960 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996). Re gardle ss, the plain language of the 1919 Act applies only to school funds “paid to said c ounty by the State.” He arke ning back to the Oak Ridge case , funds “pa id . . . by the St at e” wo u l d not include TVA PILO T funds. In a ny event, inter preting Section 5 of the Private Ac t to require a

pportionment of the TVAPILOT funds to the PSS D would cr eate a conf lict betwee n the 1919 Private Ac t and the apportionment st atute, a law of gener al applica bility enacted in 1977. It is well-settled that “private ac ts are held to have be en super seded a s far as is nece ssary to give effec t to a genera l statutory plan of statewide applica bility.” Stra de r v . W

or d , 508 S.W.2d 539, 547 (Tenn. 1974). Kee ping in mind all of t hese considerations, we must conc lude that the 1919 Private Ac t, requiring apportionment of “all school funds” applies to school funds rece ived from the State, not fede ral funds r ecei v ed fr om the TVA a s a payme nt in lieu of taxes. This interpre tation gives eff ect to both the private a ct and the statute, resulting in a “ha rmonious operation of the laws.” Knox Coun ty , 60 S.W.3d at 74 (quoting Cro nin , 906 S.W.2d at 912). Consequently, we must reje ct the Pla int if

fs ’ a rg ume nt t hat Se c tio n 5 of

the 19 19 Pr ivate Ac t r e qu ir e s th a t th e Cou nty app ro pria te to the PSSD its pr

o r ata share of TVA PILO T funds.

In sum, we c onclude, as di d the trial court, that the rea soning in Oak Ridge is d ir e c tly

app lic able to the ins tant c a se . T hu s, He nry Co un ty i s n ot re qu ir e d to s ha re TV A PI LO T f

un ds wi th the PS S D, b ec au s e those funds w ere not rec eived f rom the “state , county [or] other political subdivision.” Theref

ore, the trial court did not err in granting sum mary judgm ent to the County on the Pla int if

fs ’ c ha lle ng e to the Cou nty ’s re so lut ionto p ha se ou t th e sh ari ng of TV A PI LO T f un ds

.
The decision of t he trial c ourt is affirmed. Costs on appeal a re to be taxed to Appe llants Kina Crider a nd Cynthia Boyson and their sureties, for which exe cution may issue, if nec essary.

___________________________________ HOLLY M. K IRBY, JUDGE