[Federal Register Volume 61, Number 108 (Tuesday, June 4, 1996)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 28423-28427]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 96-13772]



=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

49 CFR Part 571

[Docket No. 74-09; Notice 45]
RIN 2127-AF46


Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Child Restraint Systems

AGENCY: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), 
Department of Transportation.

ACTION: Final rule.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: This rule, and a companion rule issued by the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA), address the use of child harnesses and backless 
child restraints in aircraft. This document amends a provision in 
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 213, ``Child Restraint 
Systems,'' that permits those restraints to be certified for use in 
both motor vehicles and aircraft.
    Under the current FAA regulations, aircraft-certified child 
restraints may be used on aircraft. However, because testing has raised 
FAA's concerns about the safety of using harnesses and backless child 
restraint systems on the types of seats found in aircraft, FAA is 
publishing a rule in today's Federal Register that prohibits the use of 
booster seats, and vest- and harness-type child restraint systems on 
aircraft during take off, landing and movement on the surface, even if 
these restraints are certified for aircraft use.
    In view of the FAA's determination that harnesses and booster seats 
are unsuitable for use during significant portions of a flight, the 
agency believes continuing to permit the certification of those 
restraints for aircraft use would be inconsistent and likely confusing 
to the public. Accordingly, this rule no longer permits those 
restraints to be certified for aircraft use, and instead requires 
manufacturers to label these restraints as not certified for use in 
aircraft.

DATES: This rule is effective on September 3, 1996.
    Petitions for reconsideration of the rule must be received by July 
19, 1996.

ADDRESSES: Petitions for reconsideration should refer to the docket and 
number of this document and be submitted to: Administrator, Room 5220, 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 400 Seventh Street SW., 
Washington, D.C., 20590.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For nonlegal issues: Dr. George 
Mouchahoir, Office of Vehicle Safety Standards (telephone 202-366-4919, 
fax 202-366-4329). For legal issues: Ms. Deirdre Fujita, Office of the 
Chief Counsel (telephone 202-366-2992, fax 202-366-3820). Both can be 
reached at the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 400 
Seventh Street SW., Washington, D.C., 20590. For information on FAA's 
rule, contact Ms. Donell Pollard (AFS-203), Air Transportation 
Division, Flight Standards Service (telephone 202-267-3735), Federal 
Aviation Administration, 800 Independence Avenue SW., Washington, D.C., 
20591.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This document amends the provision in 
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 213, ``Child Restraint 
Systems,'' that permits child restraint systems to be certified for use 
in both motor vehicles and aircraft. This rule complements an FAA rule, 
published elsewhere in today's Federal Register, that withdraws 
approval for the use of booster seats and vest- and harness-type child 
restraint systems on aircraft, and prohibits airlines from permitting a 
child to be restrained in such a restraint during take off, landing, 
and movement on the surface, even if the restraint is certified for 
aircraft use. The notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) on which this 
NHTSA rule is based was published at 60 FR 30696 (June 9, 1995).
    Harnesses and booster seats are types of child restraint systems 
regulated by Standard 213. A harness typically consists of a vest or a 
series of straps that form a vest-like garment, that attaches at the 
back of the harness to a vehicle seat's lap belt. Harnesses are 
generally intended for children who weigh from 25 to 50 pounds. Some 
require the use of a tether strap to supplement the lap belt. The 
restraint that the FAA refers to as a ``booster seat'' is a ``backless 
child restraint system'' under Standard 213. (See definitions of 
``booster seat'' and ``backless child restraint system'' in S4 of FMVSS 
213.) A ``backless child restraint system'' is one of two types of 
booster seat.<SUP>1 A backless child restraint has a structural element 
(typically a shield) designed to restrain forward motion of the child's 
torso in a frontal crash. Backless child restraint systems are 
generally intended for children weighing from 30 to 60 pounds. Backless 
child restraint systems are also known as ``backless booster seats'' or 
``shield-type'' booster seats.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ The other type of booster seat is the ``belt positioning 
seat,'' which is intended for use by children weighing from 30 to 60 
pounds, and designed for use with a lap/shoulder belt system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Background

    Standard 213 permits manufacturers to certify their restraints 
<SUP>2 for aircraft use if they are certified for use in motor vehicles 
and meet an additional requirement, an inversion test. The provisions 
permitting such certification were added to the standard in 1984 (49 FR 
34357; August 30, 1984), partly in response to suggestions of the 
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) that DOT simplify its 
standards for the performance of child restraints on aircraft by 
combining all technical requirements into a single standard (NTSB 
Safety Recommendations A-83-1, February 24, 1983). Prior to the 
amendment, FAA had its own child restraint standard, Technical Standard 
Order C100 (TSO C100). TSO C100 and FMVSS 213 had different performance 
requirements, methods of certification and testing procedures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \2\ The ``belt positioning'' booster seat is not eligible for 
such certification. FMVSS No. 213 does not permit these restraints 
to be certified for aircraft use because aircraft passenger seats 
typically lack shoulder belts. See amendment of FMVSS 213 to permit 
manufacture of belt-positioning child seats (59 FR 37167; July 21, 
1994).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the 1984 rulemaking, NHTSA and FAA concluded that the DOT child 
restraint requirements should be consolidated in FMVSS 213 and that a 
TSO C100 inversion test was the only performance requirement from the 
FAA standard that needed to be incorporated into FMVSS 213. In the 
inversion test, the combination of a child restraint, test dummy and 
aircraft passenger seat is rotated forward at a specified speed to an 
inverted position and held there, and later rotated sideways at the 
same speed and held. During the test, the child restraint must not fall 
out of the aircraft safety belt and the test dummy must not fall out of 
the child restraint.
    Prior to the 1984 rulemaking, a manufacturer wishing to designate a 
child restraint model as suitable for use in aircraft had to submit 
information to FAA to obtain its approval of the model. As a result of 
this pre-1984 approval process, there was a disparity between the 
number of child restraints available

[[Page 28424]]

for use in motor vehicles and the number available for use in aircraft. 
In 1984, approximately 28 models of child restraints were produced 
under FMVSS 213 for use in motor vehicles. The child restraint 
manufacturers obtained TSO authorizations for only five of the 28 
models, or only 16 percent of the total production of child restraints.
    The lack of FAA approval of most motor vehicle child restraints for 
use in aircraft aroused several safety concerns. One was that some 
families traveling by air were discouraged from taking unapproved child 
restraints with them and thus did not have them available for use at 
their destination to protect their children while the family was 
driving. The other concern was that those families who nevertheless 
took their unapproved child restraints on trips had to stow the 
restraints in the aircraft cargo compartment, and thus were not able to 
use them to protect their children during the flight.
    The effect of the 1984 rulemaking was to speed certification of 
child restraints for use in aircraft, and thereby increase the 
availability of aircraft-certified child restraints. Since then, 
manufacturers have been able, under FMVSS 213, to certify their child 
restraints for aircraft use by ensuring that they pass all of the 
standard's motor vehicle requirements and the inversion test. As a 
result, there has been a tremendous increase in the number of child 
restraints certified for use in aircraft.
    FAA complemented NHTSA's rulemaking by amending its Federal 
Aviation Regulations (FARs)(14 CFR Parts 91, 121, 125 and 135) to 
provide for the in-flight use of aircraft-certified child restraints. 
The amendments required the air carriers to allow the use of any child 
restraint having a label indicating that it is certified to FMVSS 213, 
manufactured under the standards of the United Nations, or approved by 
a foreign government, as long as the restraint can be secured to a 
forward-facing passenger seat. An infant or child who is accompanied by 
a parent, guardian, or properly designated attendant and who is 
properly placed in a device that meets the labeling requirements of the 
FARs and that, in turn, is properly secured in an approved aircraft 
seat using the safety belt, has been considered by FAA to comply with 
its regulations requiring each person to occupy an approved seat during 
takeoff and landing.
    There are currently many different types of child restraint systems 
that are certified as complying with FMVSS 213's motor vehicle and 
aircraft requirements, and thus permitted by FAA for use on aircraft. 
In addition to harnesses and shield boosters, these systems included 
``infant seats,'' which position an infant so that the baby faces 
toward the rear of the motor vehicle or aircraft; and ``convertible'' 
child seats, which convert so that they can be used rear-facing with 
infants and forward-facing with toddlers. In addition, there are 
restraint systems that are certified for use in airplanes by foreign 
countries.

FAA Withdrawal of Approval

    Elsewhere in today's Federal Register, FAA is withdrawing approval 
for the use of booster seats and vest- and harness-type child restraint 
systems on aircraft, and prohibiting airlines from permitting a child 
to be restrained in such a restraint during take off, landing, and 
movement on the surface. The FAA is also emphasizing the existing 
prohibition in all aircraft against the use of lap held child 
restraints, such as belly belts.<SUP>3
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \ 3\ Belly belts restrain a small child on the lap of an adult 
and consist of a short loop of webbing with buckle hardware on the 
ends. The belt is buckled around the child's abdomen and is secured 
to the adult's safety belt by routing the adult's safety belt 
through a small loop of webbing sewn on the belly belt. Belly belts 
are certified for airplane use by the Civil Aviation Authority of 
the United Kingdom. However, belly belts cannot meet the performance 
requirements of FMVSS 213 and therefore have not been certified for 
use in the United States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    FAA's action responds to research by its Civil Aeromedical 
Institute (CAMI). The CAMI research is discussed in a report entitled, 
``The Performance of Child Restraint Devices in Transport Airplane 
Passenger Seats,'' a copy of which has been placed in NHTSA rulemaking 
docket 74-09, notice 41. (Persons wishing to obtain a copy of the 
report should contact FAA at the address given in the ``For Further 
Information'' section at the beginning of this final rule document.) 
CAMI dynamically tested six types of restraining devices: child 
harnesses, booster seats, rear-facing infant seats, convertible child 
restraint systems, airplane seat lap belts, and belly belts. The first 
four devices were evaluated for their ability to fit and adjust to an 
airplane passenger seat and lap belt. The lap belt was evaluated for 
its ability to secure test dummies representative of children two and 
three years old. Fit and adjustment was not considered an issue for the 
installation of the belly belt. All of the devices were evaluated for 
their performance in aircraft seats with and without ``breakover'' seat 
backs (a breakover feature allows the seat back to rotate forward 
easily when impacted by an occupant from behind). They were also 
evaluated, using anthropomorphic test dummies representing children, 
for their ability to limit occupant head excursion, head and chest 
accelerations and abdominal forces. In addition, the test program 
evaluated the effect that the impact load of an ``aft row occupant'' 
had on the performance of a child restraint located in an aircraft seat 
immediately in front of the aft row occupant. The aft row occupant 
impact load was generated in tests called ``double row tests,'' using 
an adult test dummy placed in the aft row seat.

Booster Seat Tests

    CAMI tested four models of shield-type booster seats in six dynamic 
tests, three of which involved single row tests, and the other three, 
double row tests. With regard to fit and adjustment of the booster 
seats to the airplane seat chosen for testing purposes, CAMI found that 
three had fit and adjustment problems. One booster seat had problems 
fitting an airplane seat because of the limited width between arm rests 
on the passenger seat. This may have occurred because of the difference 
in width between the representative aircraft seat (about 20 inches 
wide) used in FMVSS 213 and the aircraft seat (17.25 inches wide) used 
in the CAMI testing. Two booster seats had incompatibility problems 
between the buckle/webbing path molded in the front shield and the 
airplane web path and buckle position of the lap belt on the airplane 
passenger seat used by CAMI. In fact, the webbing could not be 
installed over the front shield in accordance with the positioning 
instruction of the booster seats' manufacturers. CAMI also found that 
one of the four booster seats failed structurally, and two of the 
others allowed forward head excursion in excess of the 32-inch distance 
permitted by FMVSS 213.
    CAMI also found a problem with the loads that the child dummies 
restrained in the tested booster seats experienced when the boosters 
were on a seat with a breakover seat back and exposed to loads from the 
aft row occupant. Its tests showed that loads from an aft row adult 
occupant resulted in an increase in abdominal loading of the dummy in a 
booster seat, as compared to the abdominal loading of a dummy in an 
aircraft lap belt with an adult aft-row occupant. The CAMI study states 
that, when placed in a seat with a breakover seat back, the booster 
seat encounters problems because:

    With no back shell, the typical booster seat does not provide 
protection from the forces transmitted by the airplane seat back 
during horizontal impact conditions. Traditionally, restraint 
systems in airplanes have been designed to avoid loads transmitted 
to the soft tissues of the abdomen. A child

[[Page 28425]]

restrained in a booster seat may be forced against the rigid shield 
due to the seat back breakover action. For the intended size of 
children in booster seats, the load path of these breakover forces 
may include the abdominal region.

    It is to be noted that CAMI also found that the abdominal loads on 
a child dummy placed in a shield-type booster seat secured to an 
airplane seat with a locked seat back were higher than on a child dummy 
secured in a typical airplane seat lap belt with a locked seat back. 
The FAA recognized, however, that there are no accepted criteria to 
assess the relationship between differences in measured levels of 
abdominal loadings and any resulting risk of abdominal injury, and the 
type and severity of such injury.

Harness Tests

    CAMI tested one type of harness restraint. The restraint consisted 
of a torso vest with straps over the shoulders and around the waist, 
and a crotch strap. The shoulder and abdomen straps were attached to a 
rectangular metal plate on the back of the restraint. The airplane lap 
belts were routed through a loop of webbing attached to the metal back 
plate on the restraint.
    The restraint was tested with a three-year-old test dummy in two 
single row tests. CAMI found incompatibility problems between the 
harness and the airplane seat lap belts:

    With the lap belts adjusted to the minimum length, the [harness] 
could be moved forward approximately 7 inches before tension was 
developed in the belts. This was considered unsatisfactory for 
testing.

    CAMI also found grossly excessive excursion of the child 
anthropomorphic test dummy (ATD) restrained in the harness:

    The ATD moved forward and over the front edge of the seat 
cushion and proceeded to submarine toward the floor. Elasticity in 
the webbing of the harness and the lap belts then heaved the ATD 
rearward. The force pulling the ATD back into the seat appeared to 
be applied by the Gz [crotch] strap directly through the pubic 
symphysis of the pelvic bone.

    Based on this finding, CAMI concluded that a harness performs 
poorly in protecting the child occupant.

Proposal and Comments

    Based on these test results, the FAA proposed to withdraw approval 
for the use of harnesses and booster seats on aircraft. 60 FR 30690, 
June 9, 1995. At the same time, NHTSA issued an NPRM to amend FMVSS 213 
to require manufacturers to label harnesses and backless booster seats 
as not for aircraft use. The standard already requires that belt-
positioning booster seats be so labeled. The agency issued the proposal 
on the basis that, in view of the FAA's determination that harnesses 
and booster seats are unsuitable for use during significant portions of 
a flight, continuing to permit the certification of those restraints 
for aircraft use would be inconsistent and likely confusing to the 
public.
    NHTSA received one comment on its rulemaking proposal. The 
commenter was the Air Transport Association of America (ATA), 
representing its U.S. passenger carrying airline members. The ATA 
comment responded to both the NHTSA and FAA proposals. FAA received 
nine other comments on its proposal.
    With regard to ATA's comment on the agencies' proposals, except as 
noted below, ATA focused mainly on issues relating to the proposed FAA 
provisions for implementing the contemplated ban. The commenter 
particularly directed its comments toward what ATA believed were 
potential difficulties the airlines (``carriers'') may experience in 
enforcing it. ATA believed carriers should not be placed in the role of 
``policing compliance'' with the proposed requirements, suggesting 
instead ``a more informational role.'' ATA was concerned that some 
passengers might insist on using a banned restraint, and might be 
confused by the fact that their restraint might be certified for 
aircraft use. (NHTSA's rule will affect restraints that are 
manufactured on or after the effective date of the rule. Restraints 
that were manufactured before the effective date and that were 
certified for aircraft use bear a label that the restraint is so 
certified.) ATA stated that,

    It has been the practice of several airlines that when 
confronted with an appropriately labeled device that is not actually 
approved for use (e.g., belly belts) to advise the passenger of that 
fact and to attempt to discourage the use of the device. For the 
most part, these efforts are successful. In the unusual case, 
however, where a passenger insists upon the use of the device (often 
citing the ``appropriate label'' as allowing this use) the practice 
is to avoid confrontation and permit the use if that is the only 
remaining alternative. In light of the new increasing numbers of 
devices with regard to which this type of experience is to be 
expected, the rule obviously must take into account the 
practicalities of this real world experience and provide for this 
type of situation without threat of penalty to the carrier. 
(Emphasis in text.)

    For FAA's response to this and other comments from the ATA on 
requirements proposed by FAA, readers should refer to the FAA final 
rule (published concurrently with this rule, in today's Federal 
Register). That document also discusses FAA's responses to the other 
nine comments on its NPRM, including those from industry groups, 
aviation authorities, air carriers and child restraint manufacturers.
    ATA's comment was pertinent to NHTSA in two respects. First, it 
provides support for NHTSA's rulemaking, in that it indicates that 
confusion is not only likely, but has in fact resulted from a 
discrepancy between a manufacturer's assertion about the suitability of 
a restraint for aircraft and the FAA's determination that it is not. By 
preventing manufacturers from labeling booster seats and harnesses as 
appropriate for aircraft use, NHTSA's rule will reduce the potential 
for confusion to the extent possible.
    In addition, ATA also stated that it believed that ``before final 
action is taken on this rulemaking,'' FAA and NHTSA must explain how 
this rulemaking relates to a ``larger issue.'' While ATA was unclear 
defining the ``larger issue,'' it appears that ATA is concerned about 
possible fit and adjustment problems between the airplane seat and 
restraint systems that can continue to be certified for and used in 
aircraft, in the aftermath of today's rule. For example, the CAMI 
report found that some forward facing convertible restraints could not 
be secured satisfactorily in the airplane passenger seat used for 
testing purposes.
    FAA and NHTSA believe this issue was addressed in the NPRMs. As 
discussed there, in view of the problems revealed by the CAMI testing, 
NHTSA and FAA will consider a separate rulemaking to assess the need to 
improve FMVSS 213's requirements for aircraft-certified child 
restraints other than harnesses and booster seats. The agencies are 
developing possible requirements and procedures that could improve the 
assessment of the performance of child restraint systems in the 
aircraft environment. Among other issues, the agencies will consider 
whether the seat assembly used under FMVSS 213 in testing child 
restraints for aircraft use sufficiently represents an aircraft 
passenger seat.<SUP>4 The agencies are proceeding with this assessment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \4\ Child restraints certified as complying with FMVSS 213's 
aircraft requirements are currently tested on a ``representative 
aircraft passenger seat'' (S7.3 of FMVSS 213). FMVSS 213 also 
specifies that FAA approved aircraft safety belts are used to test 
child restraints that are certified to the aircraft requirements.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 28426]]

Other Issues

    In undertaking the current rulemaking, NHTSA recognized that a rule 
restricting the use of child restraints in aircraft could affect the 
use of the restraints in motor vehicles. In the 1984 rulemaking that 
allowed child restraints to be certified for use in motor vehicles and 
aircraft, NHTSA recognized that parents might not use child restraints 
to transport their children in a vehicle to and from the airport if the 
child restraint could not be used on the aircraft. The data indicated 
that child safety was not a critical issue for aircraft in terms of the 
number of child deaths or injuries, but that it was a large problem for 
motor vehicles. Many State laws that require the use of child seats in 
motor vehicles do not cover all the ages of children that might use 
booster seats. NHTSA was concerned that, if booster seats may not be 
used on aircraft, and if parents are not willing to stow them with 
their luggage, there is a possibility that the restraints could be left 
home altogether and thus not used to restrain a child in the vehicle. 
It was suggested that the number of child injuries in motor vehicle 
accidents might increase because of this non-use.
    In issuing the NPRM, NHTSA reached a tentative conclusion that 
restricting the use of booster seats and harnesses on aircraft would 
not adversely affect motor vehicle safety by increasing the numbers of 
unrestrained children in vehicles. While NHTSA requested comments on 
how it should assess this issue, no comment was received. The agency 
has decided to proceed with this rulemaking in view of the lack of 
information indicating that the rulemaking will reduce the use of child 
restraints during the ground portion of a trip. However, the agencies 
will monitor the situation for a possible degradation of motor vehicle 
safety.
    After considering ATA's comment on the rulemaking and other 
pertinent information, NHTSA has decided to adopt the requirements 
proposed in the NPRM, without change. This amendment to Standard 213 
will remove the possibility that a restraint could be certified for 
aircraft use despite the fact the FAA has prohibited such use of that 
restraint. This amendment reduces the likelihood of confusion and 
misunderstanding on the part of consumers, and makes the FAA and NHTSA 
requirements consistent.
    However, for clarification purposes, NHTSA emphasizes the following 
points about the use and performance of child restraints. First, there 
are significant differences between the seating environment of motor 
vehicles and that of aircraft. Because of those differences, the 
problems encountered with child restraint use in aircraft are not 
encountered with child restraint use in motor vehicles. Therefore, 
notwithstanding this rule, the use of harnesses and booster seats in 
motor vehicles continues to be important for child safety.
    The problems reported by CAMI, i.e., the combined effects of 
aircraft seatback breakover designs and aft occupant impacts, are not 
encountered in motor vehicles. The seat back in a motor vehicle is 
designed to remain fixed in a crash and not ``breakover'' in the manner 
of an airplane seat. Also, a vehicle seat containing a child restraint 
is less likely to be impacted from the rear by an adult than is an 
aircraft seat containing a child restraint. There are several reasons 
for this. First, child restraints are recommended for use in the rear 
instead of front vehicle seating positions. Thus, if a child restraint 
is installed as recommended, there will not, in most cases, be any 
passenger rearward of the child restraint who could impact and load the 
seat containing the child restraint in the event of a frontal crash. 
Exceptions would be in vehicles, such as vans and some station wagons, 
which have three rows of seats. Second, if there were a passenger 
seated behind the seat containing a child restraint, and that person 
were sitting in an outboard seating position, the person most likely 
would have a lap/shoulder belt system available for use. Most aircraft 
lack shoulder belts. If the vehicle passenger were restrained by that 
belt system, the person would not load the seat with the child 
restraint in the manner observed in the CAMI study. Third, given the 
number of persons typically carried in a motor vehicle, it is unlikely 
there would be an adult seated behind a child in a child restraint, 
regardless of the number or pattern of seats in the vehicle.
    Further, harnesses and other child restraints are tested under 
FMVSS 213 on a seat assembly that is representative of a motor vehicle 
seat, and that is equipped with a safety belt representative of the lap 
belt in the center rear seating position. In its compliance testing, 
the agency has not found a problem between the vehicle lap belt and a 
child harness such as that found by CAMI between an airplane lap belt 
and a harness. In addition, NHTSA has not found in its compliance 
testing the type of fit and adjustment problems between booster seats 
and the vehicle seats that CAMI found between booster seats and the 
aircraft seats.
    Booster seats could fit better on motor vehicles than aircraft in 
part because of the design of the belt restraints with which the 
boosters are attached to the automobile. The position of the buckle for 
an aircraft seat belt assembly is very different from that of a buckle 
for a vehicle seat belt assembly. An aircraft seat belt assembly is 
designed so that when it is buckled, the buckle is located midway 
between the anchorages, in front of the user's abdomen. A motor vehicle 
lap/shoulder belt or lap-only belt is designed so that the buckle is 
located to the side of the user's torso, near the hip, when the belt is 
buckled.
    Another reason for believing that the problems reported by CAMI are 
not indicative of the performance of child restraints in motor vehicles 
is the difference between the crash pulse used by CAMI and the crash 
pulse used in FMVSS 213 testing. In its testing of head excursion, head 
and chest acceleration and abdominal forces, CAMI used a crash pulse 
appropriate for aircraft. FMVSS 213 testing, by contrast, involves the 
use of a motor vehicle crash pulse.

Compliance Date

    The compliance date for this rule is in 90 days. There is good 
cause for this short compliance date. It is the same as that of FAA's 
rule that withdraws approval of boosters and harnesses for use on 
aircraft. The effective date for the agencies' rules should be 
identical since the two rulemaking actions complement each other. FAA 
seeks to restrict the use of boosters and harnesses on aircraft as 
expeditiously as possible to address what that agency has concluded to 
be a possible safety problem. NHTSA's rule minimizes the potential for 
confusion and misunderstanding on the part of consumers, by preventing 
manufacturers from certifying boosters and harnesses for aircraft use 
when in fact FAA does not approve of those restraints for such use. 
Given the above, a 90-day effective date is in the public interest.

Rulemaking Analyses and Notices

Executive Order 12866 (Regulatory Planning and Review) and DOT 
Regulatory Policies and Procedures

    NHTSA has evaluated the impacts of this rule and has determined 
that it is significant within the meaning of the Department of 
Transportation's regulatory policies and procedures. The rulemaking 
action is significant because of the substantial public interest in 
issues involving child seats on aircraft. Further, this rule is a 
significant regulatory action under E.O. 12866.

[[Page 28427]]

    While this action is significant because of the public interest 
associated with it, NHTSA concludes that this rule will have minimal 
impacts. In 1991, there were an estimated 1,200,000 booster seats 
produced. The consumer cost of a label is estimated to be $0.09 to 
$0.17, and total annual costs of a separate label range from $108,000 
to $204,000.
    However, adding a sentence to the existing label, most likely the 
course of action taken in response to this rulemaking, would cost much 
less. This cost might be $0.01 per label, resulting in a total annual 
cost of $12,000. Fewer harnesses are produced than booster seats. The 
label on a harness is typically cloth, and sewn on to the restraint. 
Assuming that 10,000 to 50,000 harnesses are produced annually, the 
cost of a label will probably be over $1.00. However, even with this 
cost, the cost of the labeling requirement is minimal. Moreover, there 
is a possible economic benefit of this rule. Since booster seats and 
harnesses will no longer be permitted to be certified for aircraft, 
there will be no need to perform the inversion test. Thus, testing 
costs to the child restraint manufacturer will be slightly reduced.
    Further, the agency believes sales of booster seats and harnesses 
will be minimally affected, if at all, by the prohibition against their 
certification for aircraft use. NHTSA believes almost all consumers 
decide to purchase a child restraint based on their intent to use the 
restraint in a motor vehicle, not in aircraft.

Regulatory Flexibility Act

    NHTSA has considered the effects of this rule under the Regulatory 
Flexibility Act. For the reasons noted above and below, I hereby 
certify that this rule will not have a significant economic impact on a 
substantial number of small entities. The agency knows of 13 
manufacturers of child restraints (not counting vehicle manufacturers 
that produce and install built-in restraints), 7 of which are 
considered to be small businesses (including Kolcraft, which with an 
estimated 500 employees, is on the borderline of being a small 
business). This number does not constitute a substantial number of 
small entities. Regardless of this number, NHTSA does not believe this 
rule will have a significant impact on small businesses. As noted 
above, this rulemaking will have a minimal effect on labeling costs and 
no effect on child restraint sales.

Executive Order 12612 (Federalism)

    This rulemaking action has been analyzed in accordance with the 
principles and criteria contained in Executive Order 12612. The agency 
has determined that this rule will not have sufficient federalism 
implications to warrant the preparation of a Federalism Assessment.

National Environmental Policy Act

    NHTSA has analyzed this rulemaking action for the purposes of the 
National Environmental Policy Act. The agency has determined that 
implementation of this action will not have any significant impact on 
the quality of the human environment.
    Executive Order 12778 (Civil Justice Reform)
    This rule will not have any retroactive effect. Under section 49 
U.S.C. 30103, whenever a Federal motor vehicle safety standard is in 
effect, a state may not adopt or maintain a safety standard applicable 
to the same aspect of performance which is not identical to the Federal 
standard, except to the extent that the state requirement imposes a 
higher level of performance and applies only to vehicles procured for 
the State's use. 49 U.S.C. 30161 sets forth a procedure for judicial 
review of final rules establishing, amending or revoking Federal motor 
vehicle safety standards. That section does not require submission of a 
petition for reconsideration or other administrative proceedings before 
parties may file suit in court.

List of Subjects in 49 CFR Part 571

    Imports, Motor vehicle safety, Motor vehicles.
    In consideration of the foregoing, NHTSA amends 49 CFR Part 571 as 
set forth below.

PART 571--[AMENDED]

    1. The authority citation for Part 571 continues to read as 
follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 322, 30111, 30115, 30117 and 30166; 
delegation of authority at 49 CFR 1.50.

    2. Section 571.213 is amended by revising S5.5.2(n) to read as 
follows:


Sec. 571.213  Standard No. 213; Child restraint systems.

* * * * *
    S5.5.2 * * *
    (n) Child restraint systems, other than belt-positioning seats, 
harnesses and backless child restraint systems, may be certified as 
complying with the provisions of S8. Child restraints that are so 
certified shall be labeled with the statement ``This Restraint is 
Certified for Use in Motor Vehicles and Aircraft.'' Belt-positioning 
seats, harnesses and backless child restraint systems shall be labeled 
with the statement ``This Restraint is Not Certified for Use in 
Aircraft.'' The statement required by this paragraph shall be in red 
lettering and shall be placed after the certification statement 
required by S5.5.2(e).
* * * * *
    Issued on May 20, 1996.
Ricardo Martinez,
Administrator.
[FR Doc. 96-13772 Filed 6-03-96; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-59-P