IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

William G. Hastings, Jr., :

:

Petitioner :

: No. 104 C.D. 2021

 v. : Submitted: March 11, 2022

:

Unemployment Compensation :

Board of Review, :

:

Respondent :

BEFORE: HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

BY JUDGE WOJCIK FILED: April 13, 2022

William G. Hastings, Jr. (Claimant) petitions for review of the order of 

the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (Board) affirming the decision 

of a Referee that denied Claimant’s application for benefits under Section 402(b) of 

the Unemployment Compensation (UC) Law (Law)1 because he resigned from his

employment without a necessitous and compelling reason. We affirm.

The relevant findings of fact made by the Board, are as follows. See

Certified Record (CR) at 138-39, 155. Claimant worked for Kravitch Machine 

1 Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex. Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended, 43 P.S. 

§802(b). Section 402(b) provides, in pertinent part, that “[a]n employe shall be ineligible for 

compensation for any week . . . [i]n which his unemployment is due to voluntarily leaving work 

without cause of a necessitous and compelling nature . . . .” Id.
2

Company (Employer) as a full-time machine operator from January 12, 2019, to 

March 20, 2020. Employer’s business involves the provision of tools to public 

utility companies. On March 20, 2020, Claimant’s last day of work, Employer called 

its employees into a meeting to advise them that the Governor had issued a directive 

regarding the new coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic, and that Employer was 

making several inquiries about whether it was considered to be an essential service. 

Claimant expressed skepticism and became upset about the uncertainties 

surrounding the Governor’s directive. Employer told its employees that they could 

either stay at work until more information was gathered, or they could leave and go 

home, but stay close to the telephone because Employer would call with information 

about whether it would have to shut down its operations. Ultimately, Employer was 

designated as an essential service, and it was able to remain open. After Claimant 

expressed continuing frustration, Employer told him that he could leave until the 

matter was further settled. Claimant went home and did not return to work. 

Although Claimant has several medical conditions, Claimant did not confer with his 

physician to see whether he should continue working during the pandemic directive. 

Claimant also did not ask Employer for other work or an accommodation. Because 

Claimant did not return to work, and did not contact Employer any further, Employer 

sent Claimant a letter dated March 25, 2020, advising Claimant that he was no longer 

employed.

On March 25, 2020, Claimant submitted an online application for 

benefits. CR at 15-22. On July 22, 2020, the Department of Labor and Industry’s 

Office of Unemployment Compensation Benefits issued a Notice of Determination 

(Determination) in which it found that Claimant was not ineligible for benefits under 

Section 402(b) of the Law because “[C]laimant quit for personal reasons . . . in order 
3

to self[-]quarantine with his family due to [COVID]-19. [He] has pre[]existing 

health conditions that make him at high risk for contracting the virus.” Id. at 37. On 

August 3, 2020, Employer appealed the Determination to a Referee alleging, inter 

alia, that at the time of separation, Claimant did not notify Employer that he quit; 

Claimant did not discuss the reasons for leaving his employment; Claimant made no 

effort to resolve any issues with Employer prior to leaving; and Claimant did not 

inform Employer of any preexisting medical conditions. Id. at 44-53.

Before the Referee, Employer’s owner, Nick Kravitch (Owner) 

testified, in pertinent part:

[O]n July 17[, 2020,] I received an Employer 

questionnaire, and one of the things that was mentioned in 

the course was Number 8. It says, prior to separation, did 

[]Claimant discuss the situation with you or make any 

other attempts to resolve the situation which caused him [] 

to voluntarily quit or t[ake] a leave of absence, and the 

answer is no. Prior to him leaving, he didn’t even discuss 

anything with me. . . . This meeting [on January 8, 2020,]

was held at approximately 9 a.m. with [Claimant] in 

attendance, with [Owner], HR/personnel Margo Kravitch 

[Owner’s Wife], [and] plant supervisor William 

Hildebrand[.] [Claimant] was reminded that he’s missed 

21 days during the year of 2019. . . . [Claimant] was given 

notice that any further absentee days would require a 

medical excuse. . . . During this meeting then, we gave 

him every opportunity to supply us with medical 

documents -- documents from doctors. . . . I need a 

document like that. I have no document. I did not have 

any medical doctors, all the 14 months he was there --

when he left on March 20th, I did not have any 

documents. . . . And in the last, you know, six weeks 

before he left, we were talking about the coronavirus at 

different times. Nowhere in that period of time did he say, 

hey, I got this condition and if I get the coronavirus I’m 

going to die or something like that. He never mentioned 

that.
4

* * *

Prior to the separation, []Claimant did not discuss the 

situation with me or make any other attempts to resolve 

the situation which caused him to voluntarily quit as 

indicated in the Employer Questionnaire. . . . The PA 

Department of Health has given us a strategy to work with. 

We’ve developed our own strategy, and it’s obviously 

worked because we’ve had four months of -- or five or six 

months or whatever, we haven’t had anybody with the 

coronavirus. Okay. We had followed certain strategies 

that allowed us to work safely throughout this time without 

anybody getting the virus. Okay. Now, had he come to 

me -- now, the thing is, I -- and I’m saying it again and 

again, and my wife mentioned it, he never c[a]me to me. 

If he comes to me -- and I’m a reasonable man. We have 

20,000 square f[ee]t. We have two 5,000[-]square-foot 

buildings, two 3,000[-]square-foot buildings, one [2,500] 

square-foot building on 100 acres of rural Pennsylvania 

three miles from []his house. So I could have put him in 

his own building if we had to. I could give him his own 

building. . . . He could have also worked outside. He 

could have worked a different shift. If he was really 

concerned about it, I would say, hey, you know, you could 

work 6:00 to 2:00 or 3:00 or whatever. And he’s a good 

worker, and I would trust [him] that way. Okay? Now, he 

could also work from home. . . . So there w[ere] many 

alternatives to explore. So when they said, whenever the 

examiner said []Claimant has no alternatives to exhaust, 

that’s totally ridiculous. In conclusion, [Claimant] left on 

March 20th of his own free will. He was not told or 

encouraged to leave. A meeting at 10:30 a.m. with all the 

employees was called to discuss that we are an essential 

business. [Claimant] became immediately enraged and 

badgered and bucked me during this meeting in front of all 

the employees. During this meeting, [Claimant] clearly 

stat[ed] he’s not concerned for his health prior to leaving 

the meeting. [Claimant] accused me of trying to kill 

[another elderly employee,] Steve. [Claimant] left 

company-issued tools that he was required to leave prior 

to quitting without being asked to leave the tools. 

[Claimant] left without discussing any health issues or 

trying to resolve any of his health concerns.
5

CR 123-24, 126, 131-32.

Likewise, Owner’s Wife testified before the Referee, in relevant part, 

as follows:

[]Claimant had been bullying [Owner] during this initial 

morning meeting. As []Claimant walked away from this 

meeting with another employee in my direction, it 

appeared to me that he was attempting to badger and 

coerce another employee to go home along with him. In 

order to d[iffuse] the situation, since []Claimant only lived 

three miles away, I said to [him] if he felt uncomfortable 

maybe he should go home, meaning, in accordance with 

the meeting he just walked out of, he could go home 

temporarily until we reconvened for [Owner’s] meeting 

later in the day. He knew and I knew that [Owner] was 

going to call him back once we reconvened to clarify if we 

were essential and would remain open and work. 

[]Claimant did not go home. The timesheet has him in at 

two and a half hours. This was at 20 after 8:00 in the 

morning. He didn’t go home until he quit at 10:30. He 

immediately said to me, no, I’ll go to work. I said, okay, 

let’s get to work, hoping to move [him] along to his 

workstation and d[iffuse] any pressure on the other 

employees. . . . I thought this was a settled issue because 

he stayed, but I understand now that []Claimant is saying 

I gave him carte blanche to go home at any time for health 

reasons. That was not the case. I clearly did not. Health 

reasons were never discussed. The conversation was 

about whether we were essential or not. For him to state 

later that he left because I said he could go home regarding 

his health makes no sense. If I gave him permission to go 

home because of his health and his health was an issue to 

him, he would have left at that moment. Nothing changed 

between the meetings. He left in the second meeting 

around 10:30, right after [Owner] announced that we were 

an essential business. While he was leaving in a rage, he 

stated that he was not concerned for his health in front of 

the entire group. This is why the UC Law encourages 

communication between the employer and employee. 

[]Claimant left in a rage, making no effort to resolve any 

issues.
6

CR at 128-29.

Ultimately, on September 1, 2020, the Referee issued a Decision/Order 

in which she determined that Claimant had voluntarily left work without cause of a 

necessitous and compelling nature for doing so and, therefore, was ineligible for 

benefits under Section 402(b). See CR at 138-42. On September 12, 2020, Claimant 

appealed the Referee’s Decision/Order to the Board. See id. at 144-48.2 On January 

27, 2021, the Board issued an Order disposing of Claimant’s appeal that states:

The [Board], after considering the entire record in 

this matter, concludes that the determination made by the 

Referee is proper under the [Law]. While the Board is 

sensitive to [C]laimant’s health concerns related to the 

COVID-19 pandemic, the Board finds that [C]laimant 

made no efforts to discuss his health concerns with 

[E]mployer and made no efforts to explore any solutions 

or alternatives with [E]mployer, to allow him to safely 

continue work with [E]mployer. Therefore, the Board 

adopts and incorporates the Referee’s findings and 

conclusions, and enters the following order:

The decision of the Referee is affirmed.

CR at 155. Claimant then filed the instant petition for review of the Board’s Order 

affirming the Referee’s Decision/Order that he is ineligible for benefits under 

Section 402(b) of the Law.

2 Specifically, Claimant stated the following basis for his appeal:

I disagree with the determination and am filing this appeal because 

many of the “Findings of Fact” are inaccurate or do not apply to my 

situation. In Findings of Fact (FOF) #7 and #9, it clearly states that 

my employer told me I could go home and that they would notify 

me of any further findings or matters. They did not. The section 

that was denied, Section 402(b), assumes I quit or voluntarily left 

my employment. I neither quit nor voluntarily left.

CR at 148.
7

On appeal,3 Claimant contends that the Board erred in affirming the 

Referee’s Decision/Order that he is ineligible under Section 402(b) because he was 

working in an unsafe work environment because COVID-19 protocols/procedures 

were not in place at the time that he quit. Claimant also asserts that he had an 

immunocompromised condition that put him at high risk if he contracted COVID19. As a result, due to the lack of COVID-19 protocols/procedures, Claimant 

contends that he was forced to quit his employment due to his health.

However, as this Court has recently explained:

To show a necessitous and compelling reason under 

Section 402(b) of the Law, a claimant must show that (1) 

circumstances existed which produced real and substantial 

pressure to terminate employment; (2) such circumstances 

would compel a reasonable person to act in the same 

manner; (3) the claimant acted with ordinary common 

sense; and (4) the claimant made a reasonable effort to 

preserve her employment. Solar Innovations, Inc. v. 

Unemployment Comp[ensation Board] of Rev[iew], 38 

A.3d 1051, 1056 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012). Whether the reason 

for [the c]laimant’s concerns were inadequate safety 

measures by [the e]mployer or fears related to her and/or 

her father’s health, or both, [the c]laimant’s burden to

make a reasonable effort to preserve her employment 

required her to give notice to [the e]mployer as to her 

concerns and health conditions and allow [the e]mployer 

the opportunity to modify her work conditions. This is the 

case even where there is a real and serious safety concern, 

see Iaconelli v. Unemployment Compensation Board of 

Review, 423 A.2d 754, 756 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1980), or where 

a claimant has a medical condition which endangers her, 

see St. Clair Hospital v. Unemployment Compensation 

Board of Review, 154 A.3d 401 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017). Once 

3 Our scope of review is limited to determining whether constitutional rights were violated, 

whether an error of law was committed, and whether necessary findings of fact are supported by 

substantial evidence. Kirkwood v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 525 A.2d 841, 

843-44 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1987).
8

communicated, an employer must have a reasonable 

opportunity to make accommodations with respect to the 

work conditions and/or medical condition. See Blackwell 

v. Unemployment Comp[ensation Board] of Rev[iew], 555 

A.2d 279, 281-82 & n.6 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1989).

Lundberg v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 29 

C.D. 2021, filed October 14, 2021), slip op. at 3.4

As stated above, both the Referee and the Board found as fact that 

Claimant failed to notify Employer of his medical condition or his concerns 

regarding the lack of safety in the workplace with respect to COVID-19. As outlined 

above, both Owner’s and Owner’s Wife’s testimony before the Referee amply 

support these findings of fact.5 As a result, the Board properly determined that 

4

See Pa. R.A.P. 126(b) (“As used in this rule, ‘non-precedential decision’ refers to . . . an 

unreported memorandum opinion of the Commonwealth Court filed after January 15, 2008. [] 

Non-precedential decisions . . . may be cited for their persuasive value.”).

5 We will not accede to Claimant’s request to review the Board’s credibility determinations 

based on his testimony or that of his wife before the Referee. As this Court has stated:

[I]t is well settled that the Board is the ultimate finder of fact in 

unemployment compensation proceedings. Thus, issues of 

credibility are for the Board which may either accept or reject a 

witness’ testimony whether or not it is corroborated by other 

evidence of record. Findings of fact are conclusive upon review 

provided that the record, taken as a whole, contains substantial 

evidence to support the findings. This Court must examine the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the party [that] prevailed 

before the Board, and to give that party the benefit of all inferences 

that can be logically and reasonably drawn from the testimony.

Chapman v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 20 A.3d 603, 607 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011)

(citations omitted). See also Wise v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 111 A.3d 

1256, 1262 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015) (“It is irrelevant whether the record contains evidence to support 

findings other than those made by the fact finder; the critical inquiry is whether there is substantial 

evidence in the record to support the findings actually made . . . .”). As outlined above, the Board’s 

findings are amply supported by evidence in the certified record of this case, and these findings 

support the Board’s determination that Claimant is ineligible for benefits under Section 402(b).
9

Claimant is ineligible for benefits under Section 402(b) of the Law. See Lundberg, 

slip op. at 4 (“[The c]laimant’s failure to give [the e]mployer notice of her concerns 

or an explanation of her reasons for resigning at the time she did so negated any 

opportunity for [the e]mployer to ameliorate the situation.”); id. (“While one can 

sympathize with [the c]laimant’s fears in the face of the chaos attendant to the early 

stages of the COVID-19 pandemic, the law does not excuse her of the duty to inform 

[the e]mployer of her safety concerns and health problems and afford [the e]mployer 

the opportunity to mitigate and/or accommodate them.”).

Accordingly, the Board’s order is affirmed.

MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

William G. Hastings, Jr., :

:

Petitioner :

: No. 104 C.D. 2021

 v. : 

:

Unemployment Compensation :

Board of Review, :

:

Respondent :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 13th day of April, 2022, the order of the 

Unemployment Compensation Board of Review dated January 27, 2021, is 

AFFIRMED.

__________________________________

MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge