This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Reports. Please 1 see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. 2 Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated 3 errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does 4 not include the filing date. 5

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 6 NATALIA GUTIERREZ BARTON, 7 Petitioner-Appellee, 8

v. NO. 29,501 9 RAY HUNTER BARTON, III, 10 Respondent-Appellant. 11 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY 12 Angela Jewell, District Judge 13 Standridge Law Firm, P.C. 14 Scott Aaron 15 Albuquerque, NM 16 for Appellee 17 The Family Law Firm, P.C. 18 Felissa M. Garcia 19 Albuquerque, NM 20 for Appellant 21 MEMORANDUM OPINION 22 VIGIL, Judge. 232 Respondent appeals from the district court final decree of dissolution of 1 marriage. [DS 2] We issued a calendar notice proposing to summarily dismiss this 2 appeal for lack of a final order. Respondent filed a timely memorandum in 3 opposition. After due consideration, we dismiss this appeal. 4 DISCUSSION 5 This Court’s jurisdiction lies from final, appealable orders. See Kelly Inn 6 No. 102, Inc. v. Kapnison , 113 N.M. 231, 234-40, 824 P.2d 1033, 1036-42 (1992). 7 Whether an order is final is a jurisdicti onal question that this Court is required to 8 raise on its own motion. Khalsa v. Levinson , 1998-NMCA-110, ¶ 12, 125 N.M. 9 680, 964 P.2d 844. An order is final if all issues of law and fact necessary to be 10 determined have been determined and the case disposed of by the district court to 11 the fullest extent possible. See Kelly Inn , 113 N.M. at 236, 824 P.2d at 1038. 12 In our calendar notice, we noted th at the dissolution decree from which 13 Respondent has appealed does not appear to resolve the underlying proceedings to 14 the fullest extent possible. The petition for dissolution of marriage requested the 15 district court to determine issues of child custody and child support. [RP 1-3] 16 However, those issues appear to remainopen for future resolution. The decree 17 provides that the district court “reserves jurisdiction over the issues of time18 sharing, custody and child support” and that the parties should adhere to an interim 19 order with respect to time-sharing until further order of the court. [Id. 329] The 203 decree directs the parties to confer aboutchild support and contemplates a hearing 1 if the parties are not able to stipulate to an agreement. [Id. 330] We noted that this 2 language clearly indicates an intention on the part of the district court to render a 3 conclusive decision on time-sharing, child custody, and child support in the future. 4 However, the decree does not contai n language certifying it under Rule 1- 5 054(B)(1) NMRA. Under such circumst ances, we thought it would be imprudent 6 to treat the district court order as final. See Thornton v. Gamble , 101 N.M. 764, 7 768, 688 P.2d 1268, 1272 (Ct. App. 1984) (“When a petition for dissolution of 8 marriage is filed requesting relief in morethan one area (divorce, custody, support, 9 alimony, and property or any combination thereof), the court must adjudicate all 10 issues raised by the pleadings or determin e that there is no just reason for delay 11 before its decision will be final e nough to allow appellate review.”); Angel v. 12 Widle , 86 N.M. 442, 443, 525 P.2d 369, 370 (1974) (holding that a temporary 13 custody order was not a final judgment, and therefore dismissing the appeal). 14 In response, Respondent urges us to cons true the decree as final with respect 15 to the issues he seeks to appeal, spousal support and ownership of the Lexus 16 vehicle, because the decree clearly indi cates on its face that the district court 17 intended them to be final. [MIO 2-3, 6] Respondent further contends that he did 18 not appeal any of the issues related tochild custody or child support because the 19 decree makes clear that issues of child custody and child support are not final for 204 purposes of appeal. [MIO 7] Respondent’s acknowledgment that the district court 1 has not resolved the issues of child support and child custody persuades us that the 2 decree is not final for the purposes of appeal, particularly in the absence of 3 certification language. 4 As we acknowledged in our calendar no tice, the reservation of continuing 5 jurisdiction in domestic relations cases is standard practice, which does not 6 typically deprive this Court of authority to consider appeals. See Thornton , 101 7 N.M. at 768, 688 P.2d at 1272 (“[A] divorce court may reserve continuing 8 jurisdiction . . . [s]uch a reservation does not destroy the finality of a judgment.”). 9 However, the ability to reserve jurisdicti on does not “make all interlocutory orders 10 in domestic relations cases final for purposes of appeal.” Id. In this case, even 11 though the district court retained jurisdiction over child support and child custody, 12 the district court has not entered a final, appealable order with respect to those 13 issues. Thus, the decree is not pr actically final as Respondent argues. 14 We agree with Respondent that a final decision does not necessarily mean 15 the last possible order in a case. [MIO 3] However, we reject Respondent’s 16 assertion that our disposition creates confusion about when to file a notice of 17 appeal in a domestic relations case. [MIO4-6] If an order resolves all matters 18 raised in a petition or motion, it is final for the purposes of appeal, even though the 19 order may be subject to modification. See Thornton , 101 N.M. at 768, 688 P.2d at 205 1272. Thus, a party who wants to appeal su ch an order must file a notice of appeal 1 within thirty days. SeeRule 12-201 NMRA. However, if all issues are not 2 resolved, the party should request the district court to include language certifying 3 the order under Rule 1-054(B)(1). Our re view of such interlocutory orders is 4 subject to discretion. 5 We have a “strong policy in New Mexico disfavoring piecemeal appeals.” 6 See Kelly Inn , 113 N.M. at 239, 824 P.2d at 1041. In this case, the district court 7 has not resolved all matters raised in the petition to the fullest extent possible. We 8 remain persuaded that by reserving judgment with respect to the core issues 9 advanced in the petition, the decree is interlocutory in nature, such that no right of 10 immediate appeal exists. Cf. Khalsa v. Levinson , 2003-NMCA-018, ¶ 29, 133 11 N.M. 206, 62 P.3d 297 (characterizing interim orders as interlocutory, non-final 12 orders). Accordingly, we conclude that this appeal should be dismissed for lack of 13 a final, appealable order. 14 IT IS SO ORDERED. 15

16 MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judge 17 WE CONCUR: 18

19 ROBERT E. ROBLES, Judge 206 1 TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge 2