IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

February 17, 2022 Session

WESTLEY MUREL HALL v. MEGAN LEIGH HALL

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Sumner County

No. 83CC1-2019-CV-176 Joe H. Thompson, Judge

___________________________________

No. M2021-00757-COA-R3-CV

___________________________________

In this post-divorce action, the trial court conducted a hearing with respect to the 

mother’s request to relocate to Ohio with the parties’ minor child, a request which the 

father opposed. Following a bench trial, the trial court entered an order permitting 

relocation and modifying the parties’ permanent parenting plan to provide the father with 

more co-parenting time. The trial court also granted an award of attorney’s fees to the 

mother. The father has appealed. Based on the trial court’s failure to render sufficient 

findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning its award of attorney’s fees to the 

mother, we vacate the attorney’s fee award and remand the case to the trial court for entry 

of an order containing written findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning the 

basis for its decision to award attorney’s fees to the mother and the reasonableness of the 

amount awarded. The trial court’s judgment is affirmed in all other respects.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court

Affirmed in Part, Vacated in Part; Case Remanded

THOMAS R. FRIERSON, II, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which D. MICHAEL 

SWINEY, C.J., and KRISTI M. DAVIS, J., joined.

Heather G. Parker, Murfreesboro, Tennessee, for the appellant, Westley Murel Hall.

Audrey Lee Anderson, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Megan Leigh Hall.

OPINION

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Westley Murel Hall (“Father”) and Megan Leigh Hall (“Mother”) were divorced 

by decree of the Sumner County Circuit Court (“trial court”) on March 18, 2019. The 

05/24/2022
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parties had one child during their marriage, L.H. (“the Child”), who was born in 2015. 

The parties’ Marital Dissolution Agreement (“MDA”) and Permanent Parenting Plan 

order (“PPP”) were incorporated by reference into their divorce decree. The PPP 

provided, inter alia, that Mother would be the primary residential parent of the Child with 

Father enjoying ninety-five days of co-parenting time per year, to be exercised primarily 

on alternating weekends. 

On July 10, 2020, Mother filed a petition seeking the trial court’s permission to 

relocate with the Child to Ohio. Mother averred that she was engaged to marry a man 

who lived in Ashville, Ohio, approximately 316 miles away from Mother’s Tennessee 

residence. Mother also stated that upon receiving her notification of intent to move to 

Ohio, Father had objected to her relocation with the Child such that the parties were 

unable to agree upon a new co-parenting schedule.

Father filed an answer opposing Mother’s relocation to Ohio with the Child and 

asked that her petition be dismissed. Father concomitantly filed a counter-petition 

seeking to modify the PPP. Father asserted that when the PPP was adopted, the Child 

had not yet begun to attend school. Father averred that the Child would begin 

kindergarten in August 2020. Father also stated that his employment had changed and 

now afforded him a better schedule. Father accordingly postulated that a material change 

in circumstance had occurred warranting a modification to the PPP. Father sought a 

greater share of co-parenting time with the Child as well as a resultant change in his child 

support obligation. Mother responded to the counter-petition, denying that a material 

change in circumstance had occurred.

The trial court conducted a bench trial concerning Mother’s petition to relocate 

and Father’s petition to modify the PPP on December 22, 2020, via video conference. In 

addition to considering testimony from both parties, the trial court also heard testimony 

from Mother’s current husband, Mother’s former sister-in-law, and the Child’s paternal 

grandmother. Subsequently, on February 1, 2021, the trial court entered an order 

permitting Mother’s relocation with the Child. In support, the trial court reviewed the 

testimony in light of the factors contained in Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-6-

108(c)(2), finding, inter alia, that (1) neither parent believed the other to be a “bad” 

parent, (2) Mother had enjoyed more co-parenting time with the Child since the parties’ 

divorce, and (3) Father was a good provider who had chosen a profession requiring him 

to work numerous hours.

According to the trial court’s findings, no evidence was presented demonstrating 

that the Child’s physical, educational, or emotional development would be impacted by 

relocation. The court further found that the parties were not a “high conflict couple” and 

that they had exhibited their ability to work together for the Child’s benefit. The court 

also determined that although the proposed relocation would not enhance the Child’s or 

Mother’s emotional state or education, the move would augment their quality of life 
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financially because Mother’s husband earned a good income that improved Mother’s 

financial situation. 

Although recognizing that Father’s family support system was in Tennessee, the 

trial court found that there was no disingenuous reason for either party’s position 

concerning the proposed relocation. While noting Father’s frustration that the Child 

might relocate, the court opined that “sometimes moving away is the best thing for a 

parent to make them the best parent they can be.” Additionally, the court found that 

Mother’s new husband had a daughter, with whom he enjoyed equal co-parenting time, 

and that Mother was experiencing a toxic relationship with her family in Tennessee. 

The trial court awarded Father ninety-seven days of co-parenting time per year and 

ordered that the parties share equally in transportation responsibilities. The court 

reserved the issues of child support and attorney’s fees. The court entered a new 

permanent parenting plan (“modified PPP”) implementing the modified parenting 

schedule on March 2, 2021. The modified PPP also provided that Father would pay 

$815.00 per month in child support to Mother. The respective child support worksheet 

was attached. Meanwhile, each party’s attorney filed an affidavit of attorney’s fees at the 

trial court’s direction. The court took the issue of attorney’s fees under advisement.

On April 1, 2021, the trial court entered an order awarding attorney’s fees to 

Mother in the amount of $12,548.80. Father filed a motion to alter or amend on April 29, 

2021, arguing that the award of attorney’s fees was improper. The trial court denied 

Father’s motion by order dated June 21, 2021, although the court did grant Father 

additional time within which to pay such fees. Father timely appealed.

II. Issues Presented

Father presents the following issues for our review, which we have restated 

slightly:

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by allowing Mother to 

relocate to Ohio with the Child.

2. Whether the trial court erred by denying Father’s request to increase 

his co-parenting time.

3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by failing to award 

Father a downward deviation in child support for extraordinary 

travel expenses.

4. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in its award of

attorney’s fees to Mother.
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III. Standard of Review

We review a non-jury case de novo upon the record with a presumption of 

correctness as to the findings of fact unless the preponderance of the evidence is 

otherwise. See Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d); Bowden v. Ward, 27 S.W.3d 913, 916 (Tenn. 

2000). We review questions of law de novo with no presumption of correctness. See

Bowden, 27 S.W.3d at 916 (citing Myint v. Allstate Ins. Co., 970 S.W.2d 920, 924 (Tenn. 

1998)); see also In re Estate of Haskins, 224 S.W.3d 675, 678 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006). In 

addition, the trial court’s determinations regarding witness credibility are entitled to great 

weight on appeal and shall not be disturbed absent clear and convincing evidence to the 

contrary. See Morrison v. Allen, 338 S.W.3d 417, 426 (Tenn. 2011); Jones v. Garrett, 92 

S.W.3d 835, 838 (Tenn. 2002).

As this Court has explained concerning issues of parental relocation:

In July 2018, the Tennessee General Assembly amended 

Tennessee’s relocation statute, Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-

108. According to our research, this Court has applied the amended statute 

in only two other cases, Dungey [v. Dungey], [No. M2020-00277-COA-R3-

CV,] 2020 WL 5666906 [(Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 23, 2020)] and Schaeffer [v. 

Patterson], [No. W2018-02097-COA-R3-JV,] 2019 WL 6824903 [(Tenn. 

Ct. App. Dec. 13, 2019)]. In these cases, we explained that the previous 

relocation statute “often required courts to conduct an analysis of whether 

the parents were spending ‘substantially equal intervals of time’ with the 

child and whether the parent seeking relocation demonstrated a ‘reasonable 

purpose’ for the proposed move.” Dungey, 2020 WL 5666906, at *2; see 

also Schaeffer, 2019 WL 6824903, at *4-5. The amendment removed the 

“substantially equal intervals of time” and “reasonable purpose” criteria 

from the trial court’s analysis. Dungey, 2020 WL 5666906, at *2. As 

noted in Dungey, the current version of the statute “restore[s] a significant 

amount of discretion to trial courts and does not contain a presumption 

either for or against relocation.” Dungey, 2020 WL 5666906, at *2 n.1.

Franklin v. Franklin, No. W2020-00285-COA-R3-CV, 2021 WL 5500722, at *2 (Tenn. 

Ct. App. Nov. 24, 2021). Inasmuch as parental relocation decisions involve “significant” 

trial court discretion, these decisions should be reviewed pursuant to an abuse of 

discretion standard. “An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court . . . appl[ies] an 

incorrect legal standard, reaches an illogical result, resolves the case on a clearly 

erroneous assessment of the evidence, or relies on reasoning that causes an injustice.” 

Gonsewski v. Gonsewski, 350 S.W.3d 99, 105 (Tenn. 2011). 
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Concerning permanent parenting plan modifications, our High Court has 

elucidated as follows:

A trial court’s determinations of whether a material change in 

circumstances has occurred and whether modification of a parenting plan 

serves a child’s best interests are factual questions. See In re T.C.D., 261 

S.W.3d 734, 742 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007). Thus, appellate courts must 

presume that a trial court’s factual findings on these matters are correct and 

not overturn them, unless the evidence preponderates against the trial 

court’s findings. See Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d).

Because decisions regarding parenting arrangements are factually 

driven and require careful consideration of numerous factors, trial judges, 

who have the opportunity to observe the witnesses and make credibility 

determinations, are better positioned to evaluate the facts than appellate 

judges. Massey-Holt v. Holt, 255 S.W.3d 603, 607 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007).

Thus, determining the details of parenting plans is “peculiarly within the 

broad discretion of the trial judge.” Suttles v. Suttles, 748 S.W.2d 427, 429 

(Tenn. 1988) (quoting Edwards v. Edwards, 501 S.W.2d 283, 291 (Tenn.

Ct. App. 1973)). “It is not the function of appellate courts to tweak a 

[residential parenting schedule] in the hopes of achieving a more reasonable 

result than the trial court.” Eldridge v. Eldridge, 42 S.W.3d 82, 88 (Tenn.

2001). A trial court’s decision regarding the details of a residential 

parenting schedule should not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Id. 

. . . A trial court abuses its discretion in establishing a residential parenting 

schedule “only when the trial court’s ruling falls outside the spectrum of 

rulings that might reasonably result from an application of the correct legal 

standards to the evidence found in the record.” Eldridge, 42 S.W.3d at 88.

Armbrister v. Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d 685, 692-93 (Tenn. 2013) (other internal citations 

omitted).

Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-6-108(f) (2021) provides that “[e]ither parent in a 

parental relocation matter may recover reasonable attorney fees and other litigation 

expenses from the other parent in the discretion of the court.” As such, this Court must 

review the trial court’s decision to award such fees under the abuse of discretion 

standard. See Lima v. Lima, No. W2010-02027-COA-R3-CV, 2011 WL 3445961 at *9 

(Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 9, 2011). Decisions concerning child support are also reviewed 

pursuant to an abuse of discretion standard. See Richardson v. Spanos, 189 S.W.3d 720, 

725 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).
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IV. Parental Relocation

Father contends that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing Mother to 

relocate with the Child to Ohio, arguing that relocation was not in the Child’s best 

interest. According to Father, the trial court ignored facts presented at trial that affected 

the best interest analysis, such as quality time the Child enjoyed with Father and her 

extended family, all of whom resided in Tennessee. Father urges this Court to consider 

his proof that he often spent time with the Child outside of the time allotted to him in the 

PPP and that the Child enjoyed significant relationships with all of her grandparents. 

Father posits that the trial court placed great emphasis on the Child’s relationship with 

her stepfather and stepsister, both of whom the Child had only known for a short period

by the time of trial.

The parental relocation statute, codified at Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-6-108 

(2021), provides as follows in pertinent part:

(c)(1) If a petition in opposition to relocation is filed, the court shall 

determine whether relocation is in the best interest of the minor 

child.

(2) In determining whether relocation is in the best interest of the minor 

child, the court shall consider the following factors:

(A) The nature, quality, extent of involvement, and 

duration of the child’s relationship with the parent 

proposing to relocate and with the nonrelocating 

parent, siblings, and other significant persons in the 

child’s life;

(B) The age, developmental stage, needs of the child, and 

the likely impact the relocation will have on the child’s 

physical, educational, and emotional development, 

taking into consideration any special needs of the 

child;

(C) The feasibility of preserving the relationship between 

the nonrelocating parent and the child through suitable 

visitation arrangements, considering the logistics and 

financial circumstances of the parties;

(D) The child’s preference, if the child is twelve (12) years 

of age or older. The court may hear the preference of a 

younger child upon request. The preference of older 
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children should normally be given greater weight than 

those of younger children;

(E) Whether there is an established pattern of conduct of 

the relocating parent, either to promote or thwart the 

relationship of the child and the nonrelocating parent;

(F) Whether the relocation of the child will enhance the 

general quality of life for both the relocating parent 

and the child, including, but not limited to, financial or 

emotional benefit or educational opportunity;

(G) The reasons of each parent for seeking or opposing the 

relocation; and

(H) Any other factor affecting the best interest of the child, 

including those enumerated in § 36-6-106(a).

In its February 1, 2021 order, the trial court found as follows with respect to the 

applicable factors listed above:

Pursuant to the factors set forth in the statute at T.C.A. § 36-6-

108(c)(2), the Court further finds that with respect to factor (A) [the court]

hasn’t heard any evidence that leads [it] to believe that Mom believes 

[Father] is a bad dad. Also, there was no evidence that Dad believes 

[Mother] is a bad mom. Further, the Court does not see the relationship 

between the Mother and her parents is a healthy one. The Court also finds 

that from a mathematical standpoint the Mother has had more parenting 

time with [the Child] than the Father has since their divorce. The Court 

finds that the Father has a good job, is a good provider, and has chosen a

profession where he works a lot. As a result of that, Mom is going to have 

more time with [the Child].

On factor (B) the Court finds that the parties’ minor child does not 

have any special needs and [the court] hasn’t heard anything that would 

impact the physical, educational, and emotional development of the minor 

child by a relocation to Ohio. On Factor (C) the Court will address

preserving the relationship between the Dad and the minor child through 

suitable visitation arrangements later in this Order.

Factor (D) is not an issue in this case because of the age of [the

Child]. The Court sees the parties as not a high conflict couple and that 
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they work together for the benefit of [the Child]. Therefore Factor (E) is 

also not an issue in this case.

The Court does find that with respect to Factor (F) the relocation to 

Ohio will not emotionally or educational[ly] enhance the general quality of 

life for the Mother and the minor child, however clearly financially the 

relocation does enhance the quality of life for the Mother and the minor 

child due to Mother’s husband’s ability to generate a good income for 

himself and the family. The Court sees that on her own the Mother does 

not have the financial earning power that she did either when she was with 

[Father] or now that she’s with [her current husband].

When the Court looks at Factor (G) it does understand that the 

Father [is] opposing the move to Ohio and the reason he points to is 

because his support system is here in Tennessee. The Court does not 

believe there is any disingenuous reason for either party with respect to the 

relocation.

The last factor, (H) the Court finds it worrisome that although it is 

frustrating when parents move away from each other, sometimes moving 

away is the best thing for a parent to make them the best parent they can be. 

The Court sees this relocation as first, mom’s new husband has a daughter 

with 50/50 parenting time and second, the Mom is in a toxic relationship

with her family.

Based on the evidence presented concerning the statutory factors, the trial court 

determined that allowing relocation was in the Child’s best interest.

Following our thorough review of the evidence presented in light of the best 

interest factors outlined above, we conclude that the evidence preponderates in favor of

the trial court’s findings. Respecting Factor A, Mother presented proof that she 

maintained a significant and close bond with the Child based on the fact that she had been 

the Child’s primary caregiver, especially since the time of the parties’ divorce, which 

occurred when the Child was eighteen months old. Mother testified that Father had only 

exercised forty-nine days of co-parenting time in 2019 and had exercised sixty-six days 

of co-parenting time in 2020, due in part to his demanding work schedule. Mother 

acknowledged, however, that Father was a good parent, that he loved the Child, and that 

the Child loved him. Neither party took issue with regard to the other parent’s ability to 

care for the Child. The parties also recognized the Child’s significant bond with her 

grandparents, all of whom lived in Tennessee. In addition, Mother and her current 

husband related that the Child enjoyed a close and loving relationship with her stepfather 

and stepsister, the latter of whom was a mere two months older than the Child. As the 

court found, however, Mother had enjoyed significantly greater co-parenting time and 
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thus more involvement in the Child’s life and activities during the previous few years. 

We determine this fact to weigh heavily in the analysis of Factor A.

Respecting Factor B, no proof was presented that the Child had any special needs 

or that the relocation would have a significant impact on her physical, educational, or 

emotional development. The Child was six years of age at the time of trial and had only 

been attending kindergarten for a matter of months. Mother introduced evidence that 

although the elementary school the Child would attend in Ohio was comparable to the 

school she attended in Tennessee with regard to test scores, it was a smaller school with a 

lower student-to-teacher ratio, which Mother believed would benefit the Child based on 

her personality traits. Mother also presented testimony demonstrating that the Child 

could continue to participate in dance classes and other extracurricular activities in Ohio.

Concerning Factor C, the trial court fashioned a parenting plan that afforded the 

Father ninety-seven days of co-parenting time annually, which was a larger percentage of 

time than Father had exercised while the Child was residing in Tennessee. The court 

developed a co-parenting schedule that contemplated not only the Child’s school holidays 

but also Father’s work schedule and travel logistics in an attempt to provide Father 

significant time with the Child while also accommodating the Child’s and the parties’ 

schedules. The trial court clearly attempted to craft a parenting plan that would allow 

Father to maintain his relationship with the Child through visitation, and we agree that it 

does by reason of the fact that it will permit Father more co-parenting time with the Child 

than he has enjoyed in the past.

As the trial court noted, it did not hear testimony from the Child regarding her 

preference due to her young age. As such, Factor D is of no consequence. With respect 

to Factor E, Father proffered no evidence that Mother had attempted to thwart his 

relationship with the Child. In fact, Father conceded during his testimony at trial that he 

and Mother worked well together concerning the Child and co-parenting responsibilities.

Regarding Factor F, Mother presented proof that the Child’s quality of life would 

be enhanced by the relocation in that Mother could earn a slightly greater income from 

employment in Ohio and Mother’s new husband would also contribute his significant 

income and assets to the family unit. With respect to Factor G, the trial court found no 

disingenuous motive undergirding Mother’s desire to relocate, and the evidence supports 

that determination. Mother testified that the reason she sought to relocate was predicated 

on her desire to reside with the Child, her husband, and her stepdaughter so that they 

could all be together as a family unit. Mother related that after discussing the situation 

with her husband, the couple decided that, on balance, it would prove easier for Mother to 

relocate because of her co-parenting arrangement, which provided her a much greater 

percentage of time with the Child than it provided Father, while her husband’s coparenting arrangement provided him fifty percent time with his child, a schedule that

would be more difficult to accommodate were he to move to Tennessee. This Court has 
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previously held that although not dispositive of a relocation dispute, a desire to live with 

one’s spouse is “an appropriate desire that takes into account the children’s best interest.” 

Schaeffer v. Patterson, No. W2018-02097-COA-R3-JV, 2019 WL 6824903, at *11 

(Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 13, 2019) (quoting Fichtel v. Fichtel, No. M2018-01634-COA-R3-

CV, 2019 WL 3027010, at *17 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 10, 2019)).

When Mother was questioned concerning whether she had endeavored to relocate 

in order to be away from her family, Mother replied that she had not.1 Despite the 

volatility of that relationship in recent years, Mother indicated that she had never kept her 

family from seeing the Child and, instead, had encouraged the relationship between her 

parents and the Child. The Child’s paternal grandmother testified that Father allowed the 

Child to spend time with her and her husband during the weekends that Father enjoyed 

co-parenting time.

Finally, with respect to Factor H, which directs us to consider “[a]ny other factor 

affecting the best interest of the child, including those enumerated in § 36-6-106(a),” we 

find it significant that the parties had demonstrated that they could work together to 

support the Child’s well-being. As the trial court determined, Mother and Father were 

“not a high conflict couple,” and we commend them for their ability to co-parent well. 

We also find it commendable that both parties exhibited committment to maintaining the 

Child’s relationship with the other parent as well as grandparents and other family 

members. Based on the proof presented in light of the statutory factors, we conclude that 

the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Mother to relocate to Ohio with the 

Child. Following our thorough review of the record, we cannot conclude that the trial 

court “appl[ied] an incorrect legal standard, reache[d] an illogical result, resolve[d] the 

case on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or relie[d] on reasoning that 

cause[d] an injustice.” See Gonsewski, 350 S.W.3d at 105. We therefore affirm the trial 

court’s decision to permit Mother’s relocation with the Child.

V. Modification of Permanent Parenting Plan

Father asserts that he presented proof demonstrating that a material change in 

circumstance had occurred since entry of the parties’ original PPP, warranting a 

modification of the respective co-parenting schedule. Father complains that he was not 

granted sufficient co-parenting time in the trial court’s modified PPP. Mother urges that 

the modified PPP should be affirmed because (1) the trial court thoughtfully considered 

the schedules of the Child and the parties when fashioning it and (2) the court provided 

more co-parenting time to Father than he enjoyed under the original PPP.

 

1 Mother presented evidence that her family, particularly her parents, were opposed to her marriage to her 

current husband and had tried to control Mother’s actions, both verbally and physically, after she began 

dating him. The trial court characterized Mother’s relationship with her family as “toxic,” and the proof 

supports that finding.
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Respecting this issue, Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-6-108 provides in pertinent 

part:

(c)(3) If, upon consideration of factors in subdivision (c)(2), the court finds 

that relocation is in the best interest of the minor child, the court 

shall modify the permanent parenting plan as needed to account for 

the distance between the nonrelocating parent and the relocating 

parent.

* * *

(d) In fashioning a modified parenting plan under subdivisions (c)(3) 

and (4), the court shall consider and utilize available alternative 

arrangements to foster and continue the child’s relationship with and 

access to the other parent. 

Pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-6-108(c)(3), the trial court was authorized to

modify the parties’ PPP following the court’s determination that relocation was in the 

best interest of the Child; therefore, the court properly granted modification in this action. 

The sole question, then, is whether the trial court fashioned a modified PPP that 

“consider[ed] and utilize[d] available alternative arrangements to foster and continue the 

child’s relationship with and access to the other parent.” Following our review of the 

modified PPP, we conclude that the trial court appropriately did so here.

The trial court’s modified PPP awarded Father ninety-seven days of co-parenting 

time with the Child, which was an increase from the ninety-five days he had been

awarded in the original PPP and more co-parenting time than he had exercised annually 

during the previous two years. Father’s co-parenting time was established to be exercised 

on alternating weekends as well as during the Child’s breaks from school. The court 

ordered that Father could pick up the Child from school on alternating Fridays and keep 

the Child until Mother arrived to retrieve her on Sunday afternoons. In addition, Father 

was awarded every Father’s Day holiday with the Child as well as alternating fall and 

spring school breaks and alternating July Fourth and Thanksgiving holidays. Father was 

also awarded one-half of the Child’s winter break and five weeks during the summer.

Father protests that he should have been awarded all three-day weekends 

corresponding with school holidays that fall on a Monday, such as Labor Day and 

Presidents’ Day, as he suggested in his proposed parenting plan. When the trial court 

questioned Father during trial concerning his employment schedule, however, Father 

indicated that he “work[s] every holiday” unless the holiday were to fall on his regular 

days off, which he testified were Friday after 3:00 a.m., all day on Saturday, and Sunday

until 7:00 p.m. Father’s proposed parenting plan also suggested that he be awarded co-
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parenting time during every fall and spring school break but only for four weeks during 

summer. 

Upon review, we conclude that the trial court’s modified PPP appears targeted 

toward balancing the Child’s time with each parent during holidays and breaks through 

the school year while awarding Father co-parenting time for the majority of the Child’s 

summer break (five weeks in total). Although Father did not receive precisely the 

amount of co-parenting time that he had requested, he was awarded an increase in his coparenting time with the Child. Moreover, the residential schedule fashioned by the court 

thoughtfully contemplated Father’s work schedule and other considerations. We reiterate 

that determining the details of parenting plans is “peculiarly within the broad discretion 

of the trial judge.” Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d at 692 (quoting Suttles v. Suttles, 748 S.W.2d 

427, 429 (Tenn. 1988)). “It is not the function of appellate courts to tweak a [parenting 

plan] in the hopes of achieving a more reasonable result than the trial court.” Eldridge v. 

Eldridge, 42 S.W.3d 82, 88 (Tenn. 2001). We conclude that the trial court did not abuse 

its discretion in crafting the modified PPP, and we affirm the trial court’s allocation of 

co-parenting time.

VI. Child Support Deviation

Father urges that the trial court erred by failing to award Father a downward 

deviation in his child support obligation to account for the extraordinary travel expenses

he would incur in picking up and transporting the Child for his co-parenting time because 

of Mother’s relocation. We recognize that Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-6-108(d) 

provides:

In fashioning a modified parenting plan under subdivisions (c)(3) 

and (4), the court shall consider and utilize available alternative 

arrangements to foster and continue the child’s relationship with and 

access to the other parent. The court shall also assess the costs of 

transporting the child for visitation, and determine whether a 

deviation from the child support guidelines should be considered in 

light of all factors, including, but not limited to, additional costs 

incurred for transporting the child for visitation.

(Emphasis added.)

In this case, Father presented no evidence concerning additional costs that he 

would incur in transporting the Child for his co-parenting time. Furthermore, at the 

conclusion of the hearing, the trial court tasked the parties with preparing an appropriate 

child support worksheet for the court’s approval, considering the provisions of the 

modified PPP and the evidence introduced at trial. The trial court ultimately adopted a 

child support worksheet that contains no deviations and indicates that it was prepared by 
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Mother’s counsel. The record does not demonstrate that any objection to the worksheet 

was lodged by Father thereafter, given that this issue was not mentioned in Father’s April 

2021 motion to alter or amend or in any other subsequent motion. As such, we conclude 

that Father has waived this issue by failing to bring it to the trial court’s attention and 

failing to proffer evidence thereon. See, e.g., Rountree v. Rountree, 369 S.W.3d 122, 134 

(Tenn. Ct. App. 2012) (finding that an issue on appeal was waived because of the party’s

failure to present proof concerning that issue at trial).

VII. Award of Attorney’s Fees

Finally, Father asserts that the trial court erred in its award of attorney’s fees to 

Mother. Following its initial ruling concerning relocation, the trial court requested both 

parties’ counsel to file attorney’s fee affidavits and stated that the court would review

those affidavits and make a determination regarding an award of fees. After the filing of 

affidavits by both counsel, the trial court entered an order on April 1, 2021, awarding 

attorney’s fees to Mother in the amount of $12,548.80, the full amount requested in 

Mother’s counsel’s affidavit. Although Father argued that this award of attorney’s fees 

was improper in his subsequent motion to alter or amend, the trial court denied Father’s 

motion by order dated June 21, 2021. The trial court did, however, grant Father 

additional time within which to pay such fees. Importantly, neither of the trial court’s 

orders concerning attorney’s fees provided factual findings or legal conclusions 

concerning the award of attorney’s fees to Mother.

Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-6-108(f) provides in pertinent part: “Either 

parent in a parental relocation matter may recover reasonable attorney fees and other 

litigation expenses from the other parent in the discretion of the court.” As such, 

attorney’s fee awards in relocation matters are typically reviewed for an abuse of 

discretion. See Lima, 2011 WL 3445961, at *9. Father argues that when determining

that Mother should be awarded attorney’s fees, the trial court failed to consider applicable 

factors, including whether Mother was the prevailing party, whether each party had the

ability to pay his or her own attorney’s fees, and whether Father acted in good faith in his 

opposition to Mother’s petition to relocate. See, e.g., Dale v. Dale, No. M2018-01999-

COA-R3-CV, 2019 WL 7116204, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2019); Fichtel, 2019 

WL 3027010, at *26. 

Inasmuch as the trial court failed to make findings of fact and conclusions of law 

concerning its decision to award attorney’s fees to Mother, we are hampered in our 

ability to review the court’s decision. See Kathryne B.F. v. Michael B., No. W2013-

01757-COA-R3-CV, 2014 WL 992110, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 13, 2014) (holding 

that “the lack of explanation in the court’s order [regarding attorney’s fees] stymies our 

ability to review the court’s decision for an abuse of discretion”). The same is true 

regarding whether the amount of the attorney’s fee award was reasonable. See First 

Peoples Bank of Tenn. v. Hill, 340 S.W.3d 398, 410 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2010) (“Where a 
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trial court awards a fee, but there is nothing in the record to indicate that the trial court 

actually evaluated the amount of the fee to see if it is reasonable in light of the 

appropriate factors, the correct approach is to vacate the award and ‘remand [the] case to 

the trial court for a new determination of an attorney’s fee award under [Supreme Court 

Rule 8, RPC 1.8] and the applicable case law.’” (quoting Ferguson Harbour Inc. v. Flash 

Market, Inc., 124 S.W.3d 541, 553 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003))). Ergo, based on the trial 

court’s failure to render sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law, the appropriate 

remedy is to vacate the attorney’s fee award and remand the case to the trial court for 

written findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning its decision to award 

attorney’s fees to Mother and the reasonableness of the amount awarded. See Sibley v. 

Sibley, No. M2015-01795-COA-R3-CV, 2017 WL 2297652, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 

25, 2017).

We also note that in the conclusion of Mother’s appellate brief, she has asked this 

Court to award her attorney’s fees incurred in defending against Father’s appeal. 

Inasmuch as Mother failed to raise this as an issue in her statement of issues, however, 

we determine that Mother has waived this issue on appeal. See Gibson v. Bikas, 556 

S.W.3d 796, 810 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2018) (explaining that a party’s request for attorney’s 

fees on appeal would not be considered because it had not been raised as an issue in the 

statement of the issues); Ethridge v. Estate of Ethridge, 427 S.W.3d 389, 395 (Tenn. Ct. 

App. 2013) (“Issues not raised in the statement of the issues may be considered 

waived.”).

VIII. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the trial court’s attorney’s fee award and 

remand the case to the trial court for entry of an order containing written findings of fact 

and conclusions of law concerning its decision to award attorney’s fees to Mother and the 

reasonableness of the amount awarded. The trial court’s judgment is affirmed in all other 

respects. Costs on appeal are assessed one-half to the appellant, Westley Murel Hall, and 

one-half to the appellee, Megan Leigh Hall.

S/Thomas R. Frierson, II

_________________________________

THOMAS R. FRIERSON, II, JUDGE