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NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

No. 123,047

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

BRIAN APPELHANZ,

Appellant,

v.

CITY OF TOPEKA,

Appellee.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appeal from Shawnee District Court; MARY E. CHRISTOPHER, judge. Opinion filed August 13,

2021. Affirmed.

Bryan J. Brown, of Topeka, for appellant. 

Nicholas H. Jefferson, assistant city attorney, of Topeka, for appellee.

Before ARNOLD-BURGER, C.J., GARDNER and ISHERWOOD, JJ.

PER CURIAM: The City of Topeka issued a notice to Brian Appelhanz that his 

property did not comply with the City's sanitation code. The City later entered onto 

Appelhanz' property, removed and disposed of certain items, and billed Appelhanz for 

the cost of abatement. Appelhanz later sought an administrative hearing. The 

administrative hearing officer found the City's actions were generally proper but reduced 

the bill by $50. Appelhanz then petitioned for review in the district court. Appelhanz 

raised several issues before the district court, including alleged violations of his 

constitutional rights to due process and equal protection of the law. The district court 

found Appelhanz had no right to relief. 
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On appeal, Appelhanz argues the district court erred by applying an incorrect 

statutory framework in reviewing his claims. He also asserts the district court erroneously 

concluded that his due process challenges were moot. He further contends that the district 

court erred in denying relief on his equal protection claim without allowing for more 

briefing. Finally, Appelhanz claims the City ordinance setting forth the procedure for 

appealing an administrative order is invalid and the court should strike it. As we will 

explain more fully below, the decisions of the district court are affirmed.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On April 24, 2019, the City of Topeka (City) issued a notice to Brian Appelhanz 

to inform him that his property did not comply with the City's sanitation code. On May 

21, 2019, the City entered onto Appelhanz' property, removed and disposed of some tires 

and other items, and billed Appelhanz for the cost of abatement. After receiving the bill, 

Appelhanz sought an administrative hearing. The administrative hearing officer (AHO)

found the City's actions were generally proper but reduced the bill by $50 because the 

City charged Appelhanz for truck fees in excess of the time that the City actually used the 

work trucks. Appelhanz then petitioned for review in the district court, raising several

issues, including alleged violations of his constitutional rights to due process and equal 

protection of the law. The district court first set a briefing schedule, but ultimately 

resolved the issues without further briefing, finding that briefing and oral argument 

would not materially aid the court. 

The district court found Appelhanz had no right to relief. It held that while his due 

process arguments might otherwise carry some measure of merit, they were still moot 

because they all related to whether he received adequate notice of his right to appeal and 

Appelhanz was, in fact, able to pursue an appeal. The district court also concluded that 

his equal protection claim had no merit. Appelhanz moved to reconsider, seeking to have 
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the district court's original briefing order reinstated. The motion was denied and 

Appelhanz timely appealed. 

ANALYSIS

Our Standards of Review Are Mixed

Appelhanz' framing of the issues and briefing on appeal presents several legal 

questions which we find are largely intertwined, often not fully explained, and generally 

premised on the same factual and procedural issues. His arguments raise mixed questions 

concerning constitutional law, mootness, and to varying degrees, statutory interpretation. 

His manner of presentation does not allow us to cleanly compartmentalize issues he 

raises. Appelhanz appealed under K.S.A. 60-2101(d), which addresses challenges to the 

judicial or quasi-judicial actions exercised by an agency. A reviewing court may only 

grant relief in such an appeal if: (1) The administrative hearing officer acted outside the 

scope of his or her authority; (2) the order was not supported by substantial competent 

evidence; or (3) the order was fraudulent, arbitrary, or capricious. Denning v. Johnson 

County Sheriff's Civil Service Bd., 299 Kan. 1070, 1075, 329 P.3d 440 (2014).

To the extent that Appelhanz raises issues of statutory interpretation, mootness, or 

constitutional rights, our review is de novo. See Hodes & Nauser, MDs v. Schmidt, 309 

Kan. 610, 440 P.3d 461 (2019) (we review interpretation and application of constitutional 

provisions de novo); Nauheim v. City of Topeka, 309 Kan. 145, 149, 432 P.3d 647 (2019)

(statutory interpretation is a question of law subject to unlimited review); State v. Hilton, 

295 Kan. 845, 849, 286 P.3d 871 (2012) (mootness is a doctrine of court policy subject to 

unlimited review); State v. Wilkinson, 269 Kan. 603, 608-09, 9 P.3d 1 (2000) ("what 

process is due in a given case is a question of law.").
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We have Jurisdiction to Consider Appelhanz' Appeal

Before delving into Appelhanz' issues, we must first address the jurisdictional 

challenges raised by the City. Whether jurisdiction exists is a question of law over which 

this court's scope of review is unlimited. In re Care & Treatment of Emerson, 306 Kan. 

30, 34, 392 P.3d 82 (2017). 

The City asserts there are two reasons that we lack jurisdiction over this appeal. 

We will address each in turn.

A. Appelhanz did not fail to exhaust his administrative remedies. 

Whether a party is required to or has failed to exhaust its administrative remedies 

is a question of law which affords us unlimited review. Consumer Law Associates v. 

Stork, 47 Kan. App. 2d 208, 213, 276 P.3d 226 (2012). Although the City frames this as a 

failure of Appelhanz to exhaust administrative remedies, its underlying premise is that 

Appelhanz' request for an administrative hearing as it relates to the merits of the City's 

action, was untimely. 

In support of its claim, the City asserts that the Topeka Municipal Code (T.M.C.)

Property Maintenance Code, which it charged Appelhanz with violating, contains its own 

administrative hearing procedure at T.M.C. 8.60.111.1(a):

"An owner shall have the right to appeal the notice of violation to an Administrative 

Hearing Officer provided that a written application is submitted to the Code Official on 

or before the date designated in the notice."

The notice of violation, the City issued to Appelhanz on April 24, 2019, made it

clear that if he wanted to challenge the merits of the ordinance violation, he needed to 

request a hearing by May 7, 2019. Appelhanz did not do so. The City did not remove the 
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items from Appelhanz' property until May 21, 2019, and points out Appelhanz only 

requested a hearing after receiving a bill from the City on May 22, 2019, and then only 

challenged the amount of the bill. Topeka Municipal Code 8.60.111.1(a) only discusses 

"appeal[ing] the notice of violation," not the cost of abatement that was Appelhanz'

primary complaint.

As a result, the City argues Appelhanz' appeal as to the merits of the City's action 

was untimely, and that because it was untimely, he could not raise issues related to the 

merits of the City's abatement by couching it as a constitutional claim in his K.S.A. 60-

2101(d) appeal. In other words, he had no right to appeal the merits of the City's 

underlying action because he abandoned it when he failed to timely appeal the notice of 

violation under T.M.C. 8.60.111.1(a). Rather, he was limited to appealing the amount of 

the bill. We find the City’s argument fails for 3 reasons. 

First, the City has not persuaded us that the failure to meet an internal 

administrative filing requirement is a jurisdictional bar to constitutional claims, and the 

City cites no case to suggest it is. See Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Beshears, 18 Kan. 

App. 2d 814, Syl. ¶ 3, 860 P.2d 56 (1993) rev. denied 256 Kan. 994 (1994) ("The 

doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies will not deprive a district court of

jurisdiction in all cases. In cases where constitutional questions are in issue, the 

availability of judicial review is presumed, and a statutory administrative scheme should 

not be read as foreclosing jurisdiction unless the intent to do so is manifested by clear and 

convincing evidence.") The City only cites one case—an unpublished opinion—to 

support its position, Dahl v. City of Shawnee, No. 92,144, 2006 WL 851232 (Kan. App.

2006) (unpublished opinion). But that case dealt only with a failure to properly perfect an 

appeal under K.S.A. 60-2101(d). There is no allegation that Appelhanz' appeal to the 

district court was untimely.
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Second, Appelhanz did exhaust his administrative remedies. We pause to note that 

the City did not raise this concern before the administrative hearing judge or the district 

court and has instead decided to raise it for the first time on appeal. Although generally a 

party may raise subject matter jurisdiction at any time, here the City admitted to the 

existence of jurisdiction in its answer to Appelhanz' petition. See State v. Trotter, 296 

Kan. 898, 904, 295 P.3d 1039 (2013). In all fairness, under the jurisdiction section, 

Appelhanz' petition only alleged jurisdiction over the "Total Cost Bill." The City 

conceded in its answer that K.S.A. 60-2101(d) was the proper avenue for such an appeal. 

But Appelhanz subsequently moved to dismiss the "Total Cost Bill" in which he 

alleged that the City should not have assessed the costs of abatement because: 

1. The City did not give him notice that he could appeal the bill in violation of 

his due process rights.

2. The bill fails to give notice of what it is for—the specifics of his violation.

3. The City did not have the statutory right to charge for removal of tires.

4. Enforcement of the Sanitation Code was arbitrary and capricious.

5. The Sanitation Code itself was unconstitutionally vague and ambiguous.

During the hearing, after the AHO reiterated his claims, Appelhanz sought to 

clarify his concerns sua sponte: 

"MR. APPELHANZ: And just to be succinct, I'm talking about the total cost of 

abatement, though, not the original notice that came out, which I think you may have said 

that, but I want to make sure we're on the same page. 

"MS. ROHLF: Which part are you talking, just about the whole bill? 

"MR. APPELHANZ: Yes. Yes, for the most part."
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The representative for the City conceded that it had made an error and did not put 

the reason for the assessment of costs on the bill it sent Appelhanz, although the reason 

was on the original notice of violation. But the representative alleged the City had no 

statutory duty to advise Appelhanz of his right to appeal the bill. The AHO found that 

because the reasons for the assessment of costs was on the original notice, the notice of 

the bill he received was sufficient. She then told Appelhanz that she was limited to 

deciding whether the fees assessed were fair and "if the underlying reasons for [the]

abatement holds." (Emphasis added.) Appelhanz agreed.

"MR. APPELHANZ: Right. I know you can't rule on constitutional issues. Well, but, of 

course, it is the motion to dismiss to be sure to get it on the record. "

Yet then the AHO went on to rule on the constitutional issues. 

"HEARING OFFICER VOGELSBERG: I think that's appropriate. I mean, my—I—I—

I'm not going to grant the dismissal of the case. 'Um, you were given notice of the issue 

from April 24, 2019, 'um, so I find that at least in that initial notice of the violation the 

City properly gave you the citation of 302.1. There's—no part of the code requires the 

City to give that to you again on the actual bill, 'um, but I note that at least my finding of 

fact is that on the actual bill the cost of abatement, it does not have the notification 

listed—excuse me, the actual violation listed as you—as you are correct, at least in your 

motion to dismiss. So, 'um, I don't find that, 'um, 302.1, things being listed as rubbish is 

arbitrary and capricious. And I don't find that 302.1, the sanitation—the City's 

requirement that you maintain your premises in a clean, safe, and sanitary condition is 

vague and ambiguous. I mean, that's for me to determine, you know, whether or not some 

of this stuff is household rubbish, the coolers, the construction waste, the tires, the [scrap]

metal." 

Next, the specifics of the abatement charge related to tire removal were explored 

in detail. Appelhanz seemed to focus his argument on his belief that the City illegally 

dumped the tires and because of that the City should not have charged him anything for 

their abatement. "It's unconscionable to abate something, take property, charge 
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somebody, and then go illegally dump it." The AHO reduced the costs by $50. At no time 

did the City object to the AHO ruling on the constitutionality of the ordinance. 

Once Appelhanz petitioned for review, the City raised no concerns about a failure 

to exhaust administrative remedies or lack of jurisdiction. In fact, it conceded that it 

specifically allowed Appelhanz to raise all his issues before the AHO and the district 

court was correct to consider them. Thus, Appelhanz did exhaust his administrative 

remedies—all the claims he made before the district court were made before the AHO, 

who ruled on them.

Finally, as Appelhanz points out in his reply brief, the City promulgated publicly 

available guidance explaining how an individual can pursue an administrative appeal for 

a sanitation code violation by requesting an appeal by the date set forth in the notice or 

within 10 days of receiving the bill. In his filing, Appelhanz cites to Section 11 of the 

Property Maintenance Code Division’s Standard Operating Procedure, which may be 

based on T.M.C. 2.45.020, but he fails to cite the T.M.C. section itself. Again, the record 

reflects that the City conducted the abatement on May 21, 2019, Appelhanz received a 

notice of charges on May 31, 2019, and he filed a formal request for a hearing on June 1, 

2019. The Municipal Code afforded an avenue to appeal the costs assessed and 

Appelhanz followed each of those steps in a timely manner.

B. K.S.A. 60-2101(d) was the proper avenue for Appelhanz' appeal. 

Next, the City argues that K.S.A. 60-2101(d) does not afford Appelhanz an avenue 

of relief on administrative issues such as billing. It asserts that K.S.A. 60-2101(d) limits 

review to issues that arise out of a judicial or quasi-judicial function. Here, the City 

argues that the only matter reviewed in Appelhanz' case was the amount of the bill—a

purely administrative claim that falls outside the scope of the statute. The City contends 
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this translates into a lack of jurisdiction in the district court that likewise deprives us of 

jurisdiction to review the claim on appeal. This claim is unpersuasive for two reasons. 

First, once again, the City did not raise this issue before the district court either in 

its Answer or in its briefing. In fact, the City did just the opposite. In its answer, it 

conceded jurisdiction. "Respondent admits that K.S.A. 60-2101(d) does govern and 

provide the proper statutory framework for this action." In its "Response in Opposition to 

Petitioner's Motion to Re-establish Briefing Order," it argued that the district court 

properly considered all matters presented in conformity with K.S.A. 60-2101(d): 

"The request for the hearing was filed untimely. . . . Seemingly proving the maxim that 

'no good deed goes unpunished' the City went ahead and granted the request for hearing, 

even though it was filed 37 days after the notice of violation. However, since the hearing 

came after the abatement, the AHO heard evidence regarding the disputed bill, as well as 

the evidence pertaining to the initial violation itself. She was thus able to incorporate all 

of that evidence into her analysis. As such, the Court had a complete record to review 

regarding the AHO’s decision." 

And the City was correct to concede jurisdiction. Appelhanz raised several 

separate legal issues before the administrative hearing officer which we could properly 

characterize as judicial or quasi-judicial. For example, Appelhanz challenged whether the 

City gave him appropriate notice and whether the City's actions were arbitrary and 

capricious, and contrary to the provisions of K.S.A. 65-3424(c) and (d), concerning the 

abatement of "waste tires." Appelhanz also argued the City's sanitation code was vague 

and ambiguous. Thus, the record signifies the City's argument is unsound. 

The City cites Barnes v. Board of County Commissioners of Cowley County, 293 

Kan. 11, 21, 259 P.3d 725 (2011), as support for its assertion, but Barnes does not 

advance the City's position. Barnes involved a tax assessment. The Supreme Court was 

interpreting the application of a different provision governing county action, K.S.A. 19-
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223, not K.S.A. 60-2101(d). The Court found that Cowley County was acting in a quasijudicial capacity when it weighed and investigated the facts and determined that a 

property in the county contained dangerous structures, an open basement unfit for human 

use or habitation, and miscellaneous debris creating a nuisance. Barnes, 293 Kan. at 13. 

When the property owner did not abate the nuisance as ordered, the county did and levied 

a tax assessment against the property equal to the costs. The Supreme Court noted that 

the county had two options in this situation. "The Board could either begin judicial 

proceedings to impose a lien on the real property or it could enter a special tax 

assessment. It chose to levy the special tax assessment at issue here." Barnes, 239 Kan. at 

21. That choice was a purely administrative choice. Here, there was no tax assessment or 

any kind of property assessment at play. 

Second, the City itself describes the appeal process as an adjudication. 

"(a) Administrative hearings for the adjudication of the finding of a violation, other 

administrative action, or the imposition of a fee, charge or penalty of this chapter shall be 

conducted by a Hearing Officer appointed by the City Manager.

"(b) The person requesting the appeal may appear pro se or, at his or her own expense, by 

an attorney. An attorney who appears on behalf of any person shall file a written entry of 

appearance with the Hearing Officer.

"(c) The rules of evidence shall not apply in the conduct of the administrative hearing.

"(d) No violation, other administrative action or imposition of a fee, charge or penalty 

may be sustained by the Administrative Hearing Officer except upon proof by a 

preponderance of the evidence.

"(e) The City and the person requesting the appeal shall each be permitted one 

continuance and the Hearing Officer may, on showing of good cause, grant a continuance 

to a date certain." T.M.C. 2.45.030.
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Although the only relief the hearing officer granted in Appelhanz' case was a 

reduction of the bill—an ostensibly administrative matter—the issues raised before and 

decided by the AHO—through the acquiescence of the City—presented additional 

questions requiring judicial or quasi-judicial adjudication. 

For these reasons, Appelhanz properly appeals the decision under K.S.A. 60-

2101(d), and there is no jurisdictional bar. 

Appelhanz Cannot Show Error In The Legal Framework The District Court Used To 

Review His Claims. 

Appelhanz first argues the district court erred by reviewing his claims under the 

framework set forth in the Kansas Judicial Review Act (KJRA), K.S.A. 77-601 et seq., 

rather than the purported statutory basis for his appeal under K.S.A. 60-2101(d).

K.S.A. 60-2101(d) provides: 

"A judgment rendered or final order made by a political or taxing subdivision, or 

any agency thereof, exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions may be reversed, 

vacated or modified by the district court on appeal. If no other means for perfecting such 

appeal is provided by law, it shall be sufficient for an aggrieved party to file a notice that 

such party is appealing from such judgment or order with such subdivision or agency 

within 30 days of its entry, and then causing true copies of all pertinent proceedings 

before such subdivision or agency to be prepared and filed with the clerk of the district 

court in the county in which such judgment or order was entered. The clerk shall 

thereupon docket the same as an action in the district court, which court shall then 

proceed to review the same, either with or without additional pleadings and evidence, and 

enter such order or judgment as justice shall require. A docket fee shall be required by the 

clerk of the district court as in the filing of an original action."

But our Supreme Court has held the district court's scope of review is narrow. 
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"When an appeal is taken to the district court under K.S.A. 60-2101(d), the 

district court may not substitute its judgment for that of the political or taxing subdivision 

or agency, and the court's scope of review is limited to determining whether the 

challenged order was within the subdivision or agency's scope of authority; was 

substantially supported by the evidence; or was fraudulent, arbitrary, or capricious." 

Denning, 299 Kan. at 1075.

In contrast, K.S.A. 77-621(c), is broader and provides that a district court may 

grant relief when: 

"(1) The agency action, or the statute or rule and regulation on which the agency 

action is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied;

"(2) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any provision of 

law;

"(3) the agency has not decided an issue requiring resolution;

"(4) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law;

"(5) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or has failed to follow 

prescribed procedure;

"(6) the persons taking the agency action were improperly constituted as a 

decision-making body or subject to disqualification;

"(7) the agency action is based on a determination of fact, made or implied by the 

agency, that is not supported to the appropriate standard of proof by evidence that is 

substantial when viewed in light of the record as a whole, which includes the agency 

record for judicial review, supplemented by any additional evidence received by the court 

under this act; or

"(8) the agency action is otherwise unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious."

A thorough reading of the two provisions, in tandem, reveals that the grounds for 

review articulated under K.S.A. 60-2101(d) overlap with K.S.A. 77-621(c)(2), (c)(7), and 

(c)(8). Thus, in using the KJRA, the district court potentially considered a broader 

potential spectrum for relief. It is hard to surmise what harm, if any, could result from the 

district court considering more grounds for relief, and Appelhanz fails to explain that

point. It seems Appelhanz mistakenly interprets K.S.A. 60-2101(d) as vesting the district 
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court with the authority to review any legal claims a petitioner raises. But this conflicts 

with our Supreme Court's guidance in Denning, 299 Kan. at 1075. 

Further, even if the district court committed error in using the KJRA as its guide, 

Appelhanz invited the error by citing K.S.A. 77-621 in his petition for judicial review. In 

its order, the district court noted Appelhanz was appealing under both K.S.A. 60-2101(d)

and the KJRA. Any confusion the district court may have had as to Appelhanz' asserted 

grounds for relief stems from Appelhanz' intermingling of authority in his petition. It is 

well established a party may not invite error below and then complain of it on appeal. See 

Water Dist. No. 1 of Johnson Co. v. Prairie Ctr. Dev., 304 Kan. 603, 618, 375 P.3d 304 

(2016).

In sum, we find no error in the framework under which the district court reviewed 

Appelhanz' claim. 

The District Court Properly Denied Appelhanz' Equal Protection Claim. 

Appelhanz also argues that the district court erred in denying his equal protection 

claim without allowing for additional briefing. Upon careful review, we conclude the 

district court properly denied Appelhanz' claim because more briefing would not have 

helped advance his argument in any way. The district court soundly concluded 

Appelhanz had no valid claim and his allegations were conclusory. Thus, more briefing

would not materially aid the court. A review of Appelhanz' amended petition shows he

only incidentally raised his equal protection claim as part of a group of conclusory 

allegations designed to showcase that the City committed fraud by misrepresenting the 

number of items it disposed of and the cost for doing so. 

Before this court, Appelhanz' equal protection argument identifies no harm for 

which this court may grant relief. His substantive argument lies in the fact that 1) the City 
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billed him for the removal of items from his property and the bill contained no indication 

he had the right to appeal; 2) the administrative hearing officer suggested there was no 

further appeal right; and 3) the final administrative order did not provide any notice of his 

appeal rights and did not explain the basis for the $50 reduction of the City's bill. 

Appelhanz' complaints about not being informed or being misinformed as to his right to 

appeal are moot because Appelhanz did, in fact, file an appeal. 

As to Appelhanz' complaint about the lack of explanation surrounding the 

administrative hearing officer's reduction of the bill, he fails to fully argue, much less 

explain, how his bill was excessive or improper. He does offer the conclusory assertion 

that the order was too vague to allow for meaningful review, but he does not provide a 

corresponding, substantive argument to buttress his claim. We consider a point 

incidentally raised but not argued as deemed waived or abandoned. Russell v. May, 306 

Kan. 1058, 1089, 400 P.3d 647 (2017). Further, the transcript of the administrative 

hearing clarified the relevant bases for the administrative hearing officer's determination 

of the amount of the bill. So, a fair review of the record belies Appelhanz' claim.

Appelhanz has also seemingly abandoned the allegations of fraud in which he 

couches his equal protection claim. To the extent that he alleges any impropriety on the 

part of the City, he asserts: "[He] challenged the entire bill and the entire administrative 

law process as factually unjustifiable, manifestly unprincipled and patently 

unreasonable." But Appelhanz fails to fully flesh out any contentions of fraudulent 

conduct or improper actions by the City or the administrative hearing officer. Again, this 

is a point incidentally raised but not argued and we consider it abandoned. See Russell, 

306 Kan. at 1089. 

We conclude that, in large measure, this issue is moot and Appelhanz has waived 

the tangential issues incidentally raised because of improper briefing. See In re Marriage 

of Williams, 307 Kan. 960, 977, 417 P.3d 1033 (2018) (issues not adequately briefed 
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considered waived or abandoned); State v. Montgomery, 295 Kan. 837, 840, 286 P.3d 

866 (2012) (Kansas appellate courts rarely address moot issues or give advisory 

opinions). Appelhanz' arguments do not persuade us that reversal back to the district 

court is required. 

The District Court Correctly Determined Appelhanz' Due Process Claims Were Moot. 

Appelhanz also argues the district court erred in dismissing his due process claims 

as moot. Much like his first two issues, however, Appelhanz' due process argument lacks 

the substantive components required to allow for meaningful review. Essentially, it 

appears Appelhanz is seeking an advisory opinion on how the City and the administrative 

hearing officer should conduct future proceedings similar to what Appelhanz participated 

in. Yet this court does not render advisory opinions. See Montgomery, 295 Kan. at 840.

In its order, the district court noted its concerns about the lack of notice as to the 

relevant procedure for appeal. Appelhanz' argument effectively assumes the district 

court's concerns will go unheeded absent this court reiterating the same. His argument on 

this point is speculative. Even if Appelhanz were denied a measure of due process for 

lack of notice from the City, or proper instruction from the administrative hearing officer,

he properly presented his claims on appeal to the district court. Appelhanz suffered no 

harm as the result of any deficiencies in the proceedings below. The district court 

properly determined the issue was moot.

The Municipal Ordinance Setting Forth The Procedure For Appealing An Administrative 

Order is Not Invalid. 

Appelhanz also argues that we should declare the City ordinance prescribing the 

procedure for appeal of an administrative hearing officer's decision invalid. His argument 

for precisely why we should strike the ordinance is generally unclear. Without citing any 

particular statute or pertinent authority, he simply states that "the . . . ordinance does 
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appear to contradict Kansas law governing the Service of Process." It is also not entirely 

clear which ordinance Appelhanz' argument relates to. In his brief, he cites "Property 

Maintenance Code Division Standard Operating Procedure PMC IV. Procedure A. 

Administrative Appeals (5)," purportedly stating: 

"A property owner may appeal an Administrative Hearing Officer's order to the district 

court pursuant to K.S.A. 60-2101(d) and amendments thereto by: (1) filing a notice of 

appeal with the Code Official within 30 days of the entry of the order, and (2) filing with 

the clerk of the district court for [Shawnee County] copies of all pertinent proceedings 

associated with this action prepared by the Code Official, at the aggrieved property 

owner's request." 

Appelhanz does not identify or cite where this language is codified under the 

Topeka Municipal Code. As a result, his briefing of this issue—asking this court to 

declare invalid an ordinance to which he does not specifically cite—seems improper. 

Appelhanz fails to convince us that he is challenging an actual ordinance, rather than

mere guidelines of practice and procedure. As the City points out, Appelhanz is 

challenging the property maintenance code division's standard operating procedures, 

which is merely an administrative document. The actual Municipal Code section, T.M.C. 

8.60.111.1(f), provides: "The order may be appealed to the district court in accordance 

with K.S.A. 60-2101 and amendments thereto." Nothing about the code section appears 

contrary to statutory authority or established Kansas appellate precedent. 

Further, Appelhanz' argument on this point, to some degree, simply constitutes a 

rehashing of his complaint that the administrative hearing officer incorrectly advised him 

about any further appeal rights he might have. As another tangential point, Appelhanz 

makes a conclusory allegation of "systemic and institutional" failures of "due process in 

the City's adjudications." His allegation lacks any citation to pertinent authority or 

evidentiary support in the record.
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Appelhanz has failed to properly brief this issue by: (1) Not citing the ordinance 

he asks this court to declare invalid; (2) not citing to any authority he claims conflicts 

with the procedure allegedly prescribed by the ordinance; (3) citing administrative 

procedural guidelines rather than the actual ordinance; and (4) raising argumentative 

points and conclusory allegations not germane to the issue. We likewise consider this

issue waived or abandoned based on improper briefing. See In re Marriage of Williams, 

307 Kan. at 977. Even so, to the extent that we can delve into the merits, we conclude 

Appelhanz' arguments are unpersuasive because he is not challenging the language of the 

relevant ordinance.

Affirmed.