### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON Jul y 12, 200 6 S es sio n RIC HAR D H ALE AU STIN v. S TAT E OF TEN NES SEE Appeal f romthe Cr im inal Cou rt for Shelby Coun ty No. B58357-A C. Cr eed Mc Ginley, Judge

No. W2005-02591-C CA-R 3-CO - F iled Dece m ber 13, 2006

The pe titioner, Richard Hale Austin, was sentenc ed to death by a Shelby Countyjury

on Marc h 5, 1999. I n October 2004, the petit ioner’s counsel fil ed a pe tition for writ of er ror c or am no bis on the basi s of newly

discovere d evidenc e in the form of rec anted testimony . Wit hout holding an evidentiary

hearing, the c or

am no bis c ou rt

dis mis se d th e pe tit ion , an d the pe tit ion e r n ow bring s th is app e a l c ha lle ng ing the a c tio n. Up on re vie w, we a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f the low e r c ou rt

. Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 ; J udgm e nt of t he Cr im ina l C our t i s A ffirm e d.
J A M ES C UR WO OD W I TT , J R ., J ., delivere d the opin ion of the court, in which J ER R Y L. S MI TH and J OHN E VE R E TT W I L L I AMS , J J ., joined.
Robert L . Hutton, Memphis, Tennessee , for the A ppellant, Richard H ale Austin.
Rob e rt E. Coo pe r, Jr., Attorne y

Ge ne ra l & Re po rt e r; Ma

rk E. Da vid so n, As sis ta nt A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; Wil liam L . Gibbons, District Attorney Gene ral; and John Campb el l , As s istant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the Appellee , State of Tenne ssee. OP IN ION
I n 1977, a Shelby

Countyjury

convicted thepetitioner of a cce ssory befor e the f

act to the first deg ree murder of J ulian Watkins. The fo l l owing fac ts formed the ba sis for the petitioner’s c onviction:

I n early 1977, the [Memphis Police Depa rtment] suspected illeg al g ambling at [the pet i tioner’s] pool hall and employ ed [J ulian] W atkins, a re serve de pu ty sh e ri ff , to inv e sti g a te . B a se d o n Watkin s’ te sti mon y , th e [S]ta te obtained indictments and a rre st warr ants for [ the petitioner], his wife, and sev er al em p l o y ee s an d as s o ci at es , i n cl u d i n g T erryC as t ee l , t h e m an ager of the po ol h a ll. Watkin s w a s to be the c hie f w itn e ss a g a ins t th e m.-2- After their arrests, [ the petit ioner], [ J ack Cha rles] Blanke nship, and Casteel m e t

. D u r i n g t h e i r

m e e t i n g , [ t h e p e t i t i o n e r ] a n d B l a n k e n s h i p s p o k es e p a r at e l y, [an d th e pe tit ion e r] the n a sk e d Ca ste e l to drive B la nk e ns hip to Watki ns ’ house. Castee l and B lankenship did not find Watkins there , but returne d on the morning of May 23, 1977, when Bla nkenship killed Watkins. After the murder, Blanke nship was see n with a larg e sum of money . The police arr ested him on May

24, 1977. Bla nkenship pleade d g uiltyand wa s sentenc ed to life in prison. [The petitioner] and Casteel wer e indi ct ed for murde r. Their trials wer e sever ed af ter Casteel ag ree d to testify for the State that [ the petitioner] hired him to kill Watkin s.
Au sti n v . B e ll , 126 F.3d 843, 845 n.1 ( 6 Cir. 1997). th
The Te nnessee Supreme Court af firmed the c onviction and death se ntence on direc t appea l. See Sta te v . A us tin , 618 S.W .2d 738 (Tenn. 1981) , cert. de nied , 4 54 U. S. 11 28 , 10 2 S. Ct. 980 (1981). This court denied the pe titioner’s multipl e re quests fo r p o s t co n v i ction relief

. See Ri c ha rd H. Au sti n v . S tate , No. 02C01-9310-CR-00238 (Te nn. Crim. App., J ackson, May 3, 1995) (fourth petition for post conviction relief and first petition for writ of habe as cor pus – consolidated), perm. app. denied

(T e nn . 1 99 5) ; Ri c ha rd

Au sti n v . S tate , N o. 02 C01 -9 10 2- CR- 00 00 9 ( Te nn . Crim. App., J ackson, A ug . 14, 1991) (third pe tition for post c onviction relief) , perm. app. de nied (Tenn. 19 91 ); Ri c ha rd

Ha le Au sti n v . S tate , No

. 1 7 (T enn. Crim. App., J ackson, D ec. 10, 1986) (sec ond petition for post conviction relief ), perm. app. de nied

(T e nn . 1 98 7) ; Ri c ha rd

Ha le Au sti n v . S tate , No . 3 3 ( Te nn . Crim. Ap p. , Jac ks on , A pr . 1 7, 19 85 ) ( fi rs t pe tit ionfo r p os t c on vic tio n re lie f andfi rs t petition f or wr i t o f error c or

am no bis – consolidated), perm. app. de nied (Tenn. 1985) . The petitioner then filed a

petition seekin g a fe d er al writ of habeas c orpus and moved f or summary judgme nt. The fe dera l district court partially g rante d relief on the issue of inef fec tive assistance of counsel a nd jury

instruction gr ounds. See Au sti n v. Be ll , 9 38 F . Su pp . 1 30 8 ( M. D. Te nn . 1 99 6) (f ir st fe de ra l w ri t of

ha be a s cor pu s and mot ionfo r s umm ary jud g me nt –

c on so lid a te d) ; se e als o Austin v. Be ll , 927 F. Supp. 1058 (M.D. Te nn. 1996) (a mended f eder al writ of ha

beas c orpus) (de ny ing r elief on subsequent is sues ra ised by petitioner in an a mended ha beas c orpus petition). The State a ppeale d the district court’s ruling that trial counsel wa s ineffe ctive and that the rea sonable doubt instruction was unconstitut ional. The S ix th Circuit Court of Appeals reve rsed the district court on all grounds relating to the guilt phase of the petit ioner’s trial, but it affirmed the finding that trial counsel wa s ineffe ctive at the sente ncing phase. See Au sti n v . B e ll , 126 F.3d 843 ( 6 Cir. 1997), cert. de nied , 523 th U. S. 1 07 9, 11 8 S. Ct. 15 26 a nd52 3 U .S. 10 88 , 1 18 S. Ct . 1 54 7 ( 19 98 ). Th e c ou rt re ma nd e d th e c a se to the She lby

Cou nty Cr imi na l Co urt f

or a ne w se nte nc ing tr ia l. On Ma rc h 5, 19 99 , a

She lby Cou nty jury se nte nc e d th e pe tit ion e r t o d e a th

. Th e pet ition e r a pp e a le d, a ndthi s c ou rt

a ff ir me d th e de a th sentenc e on Mar ch 6, 2001. See Sta te v . R ic ha rd Ha le Au sti n , No. W1 9 9 9 -0 0 2 8 1 -C CA-R3-DD (Tenn. Crim. App., Jackson, Mar

. 6 , 2001), aff’d , 87 S.W .3d 447 (Tenn. 2002) , cert. de nied , 538 U.S. 1001, 123 S. C t. 1899 (2003).M r. B l ankenshi p had not t est i f i ed i n t he p roce ed i ngs agai nst t he p et i t i o ner unt i l he t est i f i ed i n t he re- sent enci ng 1 h e a rin g . P rio r to th e p e tit io n e r’s 1 9 7 7 tr ia l, the p e tit io n e r’s c o u n se l o b ta ine d a sta te m e n t f ro m M r. B la n k e n sh ip w h e re in M r
. Bl a n k e n s h i p d e n i e d t h a t t h e pe t i t i on e r h a d h i r e d h i m t o k i l l t h e v i c t i m. -3- I n October

2004, the petit ioner filed his Petition for Writ of Error Cor am Nob is . The pe tit iona lle g e d th a t onSe pte mbe r 1 4, 20 04 , one of the pe tit ion e r’ s att orne y s, wh o r e pr e se nte d h im a t th e re -s e nte nc ing tr ia l, r e c e ive d a te le ph on e c a ll f ro m Mr . B la nk e ns hip ’s wi fe . M s. B la nk e ns hip inf orme d c ou ns e l t hat he r h us ba nd , w ho is i nc arc e rate d inEa st T e nn e sse e , in str uc te d h e r t o te ll c ou ns e l th a t he lie d during the pe tit ion e r’ s re -s e nte nc ing he ari ng be c aus e his la wy e r i nf orme d h im that if he imp lic a te d the pe tit ion e r in the Watkin s’ mur de r, he c ou ld p os sib ly re c e ive e arl y

re le a se from prison. Counsel’s aff idavit, attache d to the c or am no bis pe tit ion , s ta te d th a t Mr . B la nk e ns hip

“ h a d f o r 2 0 y e ar s c o n s i s t e n t l y

d e n i e d t h a t [ t h e p e t i t i o n e r ] h a d h i r e d h i m t o c o m m i tt h e m u r d e r
. ” It further stated that Mr. Blankenship, previous to the re- sentenc ing he aring testimony , “provide d two sworn stateme nts[ ] and a fede ral de position t o that eff ect.” At the re -sentenc ing he aring , howeve r, 1 Mr. B lankenship testified that the pe titioner was involved in the Watkins’ murder.

After rec eiving the telephone call, the petitioner’s counsel sent Private I nvestig ator Gl ori Sh e ttl e s to int e rv ie w Mr . Bl a nk e ns hip a t Northw e st Cor re c tio na l Co mpl e x. Mr . B la nk e ns hip c on fi rmed th e in formatio n inhis wi fe ’s te le ph on e c a ll t o th e pe tit ion e r’ s c ou ns e l. M s. She ttl e s’ aff idavit, attache d to the c or

am no bis petition, stated that Mr. Bla nkenship informed he r that he lied at the petiti oner’ s re- sentenc ing hearing. H is counsel alleg edly informed him that he would r ece ive assistance from the State in his early rele ase eff orts if he testified falsely , implicating the pe titioner in the Watkins’ murder. The ref ore, he chang ed his story of appr ox imately

2 0 y ea rs. M r. B lanke nship tol d M s. She ttl e s th a t he is u na wa re of his c ou ns e l’ s mo tiv e s f

or a dv isi ng him

to provide fa lse testimony

. He further informed her that he has r ece ived “no spe cial conside ration since providing [t he] testimony .”

I n its response to the petition, the State arg ued, in essenc e, that this testimonywas not newly discovere d evidenc e and that the petitioner filed the pe tition outside the one- y ear statute of limit ations period.

The coram no bisc o u r

t, w ithout holdi ng an evide ntiary hearing, issued a

written orde r denyin g th e p e ti ti o n o n N o v e mb e r 8 , 2 0 0 5

. T h e c o u r t r

u le d th a t e v e n ta

k in g th e p e ti ti o n e r ’s alleg ations as t rue, he was not entitled to relief unde r sec tion 40-26-105. See T.C.A. § 40-26-105 (2003). The court found that Mr. Blankenship’s re-sente ncing hearing testimonywas c orrobor ated by Terry Casteel’s testimony , that nothing indicated that Mr. B lankenship’s re -sentenc ing te stimony wa s f a lse oth e r tha n his re c a ntatio n, a nd that “[t]he re is ab so lut e ly no thi ng in the re c or d to su g g e st the pre sent testimony

of [Mr.] Bla nkenship is true as oppose d to the [ re- sentenc ing] testimony .” The court al s o h eld, i mplicitly , if not expressly , that no differ ent re sult would have bee n achie ved had Mr. B lankenship testified diff ere ntly in the re- sentenc ing he aring . Thus, the court held that Mr. B la nk e ns hip ’s re c a nte d te sti mon y “ do e s no t c on sti tut e ne wl y dis c ov e re d e vid e nc e wh ich woul d entitle the petitioner to re lief.”-4- The pe titioner now appe als the lower court’s de nial of his petiti o n . I nitially , he asserted one ba sis for er

ror, a rg uing that Tennesse e Code Annotated sec tion 40-26-105 mandate s the
c or am no bis court to conduc t an evidentiary hearing. See T.C.A. § 40-26-105. The State responde d by asserting that the statute does not mandate a hea ring and that t he petitioner f iled the petition outside the one-y ear

statute of limitations. I n his reply brief, the petitioner poi nts out that the coram no bis c ou rt

didno t rule on the statut e of lim itatio ns iss ue
. Th e pe tit ion e r f urthe r a sse rt s th a t if

thi s c ou rt de c ide s th is i ssu e , d e sp ite the low e r c ou rt ’s failu re to do so , th e n h e is e nti tle d to a he ari ng to e sta bli sh that hi s d ue pr oc e ss rig hts pr e c lud e the app lic a tio n o f the statut e of lim itatio ns
. A writ of err or c or am no bis is an extraordinary reme dy by which a trial court may provide re lief fr om a judg ment under na rrow and limit ed cir cumstance s. State v. Mix on , 983 S.W .2d 661, 668 (Tenn. 1999). The reme dy is a vailable by statute to a criminal defendant in Tennessee

. See T. C.A . § 40 -2 6- 10 5. Th is s ta tut e pr ov ide s, in p e rt ine nt p art :

Up on a sh ow ing by

the de fe nd a nt that th e de fe nd a nt w a s w ith ou t f ault in failing to prese nt certain evidenc e at the proper t ime, a writ of er ror [ coram no bis ] wil l li e fo r s ub se qu e ntl y or ne wl y dis c ov e re d e vid e nce r elatin g to m at t ers whic h wer e litigated at the tria l if the judg e dete rmines that such evidenc e may

have r esulted in a diff

ere nt judgment, ha d it been pre sented at the trial. The issue sha ll b e t ried by the court without the intervention of a jury , and if the de cision be in favor of the pe t itioner, the judg ment complained of shall be set aside and the de fendant shall be g rante d a new trial in that cause

. Id

. Reca nted testimony may qualify as newly discovere d evidenc e. Mixon , 983 S.W .2d at 672. A new trial should be granted on t he basis of ne wly discovere d rec anted testimony , howeve r, on ly if : ( 1) the tr ia l c ou rt

is r e a so na

bly we ll satis fi e d that the te sti mon y g ive n b y the ma te ri a l w itn e ss was fa lse and the ne w testimony is true; (2) the petitioner was rea sonably diligent in discove ring the new e vidence , or wa s surprised by the fa lse testimony , or was una ble to know of the f

alsity of the te sti mon y un til a ft e r the tr ia l; a nd (3 ) the jury mig ht h a ve re a c he d a

dif fe re nt c on c lus ionha d th e truth b ee n told. Id . at 673 n.17. The c ourt may g rant a petition for writ of e rror c oram no bis if it de te rm ine s th a t if

the ne wl y dis c ov e re d e vid e nc e ha d b e e n in tr od uc e d at tria l, “the re is a ‘r e a so na ble probability ’ that the re sult of the proce eding would have be en diffe re nt.” State v. W orkman , 111 S.W. 3d10 , 1 7- 18 (T e nn . Crim. Ap p. 20 02 ). Th e de c isi on to g rant o r d e ny the pe tit ionlie s w ith in the sound discre tion of the trial court. See T. C.A . § 40 -2 6- 10 5; Sta te v . H ar t , 911 S.W .2d 371, 375 (T e nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 95 ). Th e re fo re , w e wi ll n ot o ve rturn th e de c isi on of th e tr ial court

abs e nt a showing of abuse of discre tion.

We hold t h at the c or

am no bis c ou rt

didno t a bu se its dis c re tio n w he n s umm ari ly denying the petition without an evidentiary hearing be cause the first and third prong of the MixonM r. B l ankenshi p gave t he f i rs t s wo rn t est i m o ny i n a f ed eral co urt de p o si t i o n, whi ch h e r ecanted i n t he 2
p et i t i o ner’ s re- sent enci ng heari ng. -5- f a c to r s f o r d e te r mi n in g th e v ia

b ilityof a coram no bis petition had not been met. See M ixon , 983 S.W .2d at 673 n.17.

Fi rs t , we re v i ew the Mixon r e q u ire me n t the trial judg e must be re asonably assure d that the recante d testimony was false and that the new statement i s true. We acknow ledg e that, once a
c or am no bis petitioner a l l eges in his petit ion that the trial testimony was fa lse and that the ne w statement is true a nd buttresses his petition with the witness’ aff idavit, a hea

rin g m ay well be nece ssary to determine the issue beca use, without a hea

ring , the petitioner wo u l d h ave no opportunity

to present the live te stimonyof the re canting witness so that the c or am no bis c ou rt

c ou ld fathom his or her

cre dibilit y . Not even an aff idavit of the re canting witness attache d to the petition c a n c on ve y

the pe rmutatio ns of

c re dib ili ty , s uc h as de me a no r, that li ve te sti mon y c on ve y s. Th us , when a petition makes such a claim of a witness’ rec antation, which, if true , could re sult in coram no bis relief

, the petitioner may

well be e ntitled to an opportunityto prove his alleg ations.
T h at s ai d , we n ev er t h el es s d i s ce rn n o ab u s e o f d i s cr et i o n i n u s i n g Mixon ’s first fa ctor as a basis for dism issing the pe tition. I nitially , we note that the petitioner did not bolster his petition with any sworn statement of Mr. Bla nkenship; he mere ly alleg ed via a sworn statement from third parties that Mr. B lankenship, without the impr i m at u r o f an oath, had disclaimed his sworn r esentenc ing he aring testimony

. S e e Ha rt , 9 1 1 S.W .2d at 375 (stating that an af fidavit “must be rele vant, m aterial and germane to the g rounds ra ised in the [ c or am no bis ] petit ion; and the af fiant must have per sonal knowledg e of the statements containe d in the aff idavit”). More o v er, a s the
cor am no bis c o u r t p o in te d o u t, th e r e c o r d is d e v o id o f a n y c laim o f c o rr o b o r a ti o n that Mr. Bla nkenship’s re cantation is t ruthful and that his re -sentenc ing he aring testimonywas fa lse. To the contra ry , c o
- d e f e n d an t T e r

r y Ca s te e l’ s r e
- s e n te n c ing hearing te stimony , acc ording to the c or am no bis c o u r t , c o rr o b o r a t e d “ a l m o s te v e r y d e t a i l ” o f M r
. B l a n k e n s h i p ’ s r e
- s e n t e n c i n g h e ar i n g t e s t i m o n y. Finally , we ag ree with the c or am no bis court’s view that bec ause Mr . Bla nkenship rec anted sworn testimonynot once but twice , his appea ranc e at a c or

am no bis hearing c ould not alone establish the 2 truth of the most rec ent re cantation.

Second, we hold that the lower c ourt ac ted w i t h i n i t s discretion in dismissi ng the petition on the alternate g round that differ ent testimony by Mr. B lankenship would not have aff ecte d the impositi on of the de ath sentenc e. The court opined th at “[ e]ven tak[ing] all alleg ations . . . as true, . . . the pe titioner is not entitl ed to r elief . . . .” The c ourt pointed to Mr. Casteel’s te stimony which cor roborated M r. Bla nkenship’s testimony . Also, the petitioner vig orously impeache d Mr. B la nk e ns hip , h is o wn wi tne ss, via a sw orn de po sit ion re nd e re d in a fe de ra l ha be a s c or pu s a c tio n, in which deposition Mr

. Bla nkenship had denied the petitioner’s involvement in the victim’s murder. The re -sentenc ing jury fully hear d about M r. Blankenship’s prior sworn claim that the petitioner wa s not involved. We believe the impea chment re ndere d Mr. Bla nkenship’s testimony ineffe ctual, that the jury wo uldha ve fo un d M r. Ca ste e l’ s te stimon y mor e app e a lin g , a ndmor e ov e r that th e re su lt would not have c hang ed had Mr . Bla nkenship testified diffe rently

. See Pe rv is Ty ro ne Pa y ne v . S tate ,-6-

No. 02C01-9703-CR-00131, slip op. at 34 (Tenn. Crim. App., J ackson, J an. 15, 1998) (holding that petitioner suffe red n o p re j u dice by being denied a c or

am no bis hearing be cause “[t] here is no question as to the conf

idence in the jury ’s ver dict”).
Furthermore , the c or

am no bis court c orre ctly

denied the petition without holding an evidentiary

hearing. Similar to habe as cor p u s hearings, c or am no bis evidentiary

hearings a

re not mandated by

statute in e very case as the petitioner a rg ues. Specific ally , a “ha beas c orpus petition may be dis m i s s ed without a hearing, and without the appointment of counsel f or a he aring ” if the petition does not alleg e fa cts showing that the petitioner is entitled to relief

. State ex re l. Edmondson v. He nderson , 2 2 0 T en n
. 6 0 5 , 6 0 9 , 4 2 1 S

. W

. 2 d 6 3 5 , 6 3 6 (T en n
. 1 9 6 7 ) ( ci t i n g State ex rel. Byrd v. Bomar , 214 Tenn. 476, 381 S.W.2d 280 (Tenn. 1964)) . L ikewise, a c or am no bis pe tit ionmus t st a te a cla im for c or

am no bis relief

and satisfy

the t hreshold st atutory require ments befor e the c ourt holds an evide ntiary

hearing to determine whether the petitioner is entitled to c or am no bis relief . I n Ha rri s v . S tate , 1 02 S.W. 3d58 7 ( Te nn . 2 00 3) , t he Ten nes se e Sup re me Cou rt state d, “ Un lik e mot ion s to reope n, [ c or

am no bis ] claims are not easily resolved on the fac e of the petition and often require a hearing.” Id . at 593 (e mphasis added) . This lang uag e re veals that some pe titions may be dismissed wi tho ut a he ari ng . M or e ov e r, re ma nd ing a c a se wh ic h faile d f a c ia lly to m e e t st atut ory

re qu ir e me nts for a n evidentiary

hearing w ould be an exerc ise in futility , and the inter ests of judicial ec onomy and eff iciency are better se rved by

disposing of the case prior to a he aring

. See P ervis T yrone Pay ne , s lip op. at 34; cf

. Da nn y Ra y Me e k s v . S tate , N o. M2 00 5- 00 62 4- CCA -R 3- HC , s lip op . at 4 ( Te nn . Crim. App., Nashville, De c. 1, 2005) (holding that petitioner i s not entitled to a habea s corpus e videntiary hearing w hen the pe titioner failed to state a cog nizable claim for ha

beas c orpus re lief).
L a st, be c aus e the pe tit ioner ’s c or am no bis pe tit ionfails wi th r e sp e c t to the ne wl y discovere d evidenc e statutory require ment, we de cline to re ach the statute of limitations i ssue.
Ba sed on the for eg oing analy sis, the judgment of the lower court is af

firmed.

___________________________________ J AMES CURW OOD WI TT, J R., J UDGE