J-S09035-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

WILLIAM SCOTT BEATTY, JR.

Appellant No. 1256 MDA 2015

Appeal from the PCRA Order June 23, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-38-CR-0000842-2010

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., LAZARUS, J., and JENKINS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY JENKINS, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 05, 2016

William Scott Beatty, Jr. (“Appellant”) appeals from the order entered 

in the Lebanon County Court of Common Pleas, which dismissed his petition 

filed for relief pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).1 We 

affirm.

The PCRA court set forth the relevant facts and procedural history of 

this appeal as follows:

On May 26, 2010, [Appellant] was charged at this action 

number[2] with 96 counts which included corrupt 

organizations,[3] dealing in proceeds of unlawful 

____________________________________________

1 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.

2 CP-38-CR-0000842-2010 (“the 2010 docket”).

3 18 Pa.C.S. § 911(b)(3).
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activities,[4]robbery,[5]simple assault,[6] possession of 

instrument of crime [(“PIC”)],[7]conspiracy,[8] burglary[9]

and theft[10]for numerous incidents which occurred 

between 2007 and August, 2009. On April 4, 2011, an

amended information was filed which reduced the charges 

to 87 counts. On June 23, 2010, the Commonwealth filed a 

motion to consolidate this action with another action, [CP38-CR-00001745-2009 (“the 2009 docket”)], which was 

already pending against [Appellant] at the time. [The 

2009 docket] involved burglary, conspiracy, and [PIC] 

charges with regard to a residential burglary which 

occurred on September 9, 2009. [Appellant’s] coconspirators were the same in both actions. Brian 

Deiderick, Esquire (“Defense Counsel”) was appointed to 

represent [Appellant] in both matters. Defense Counsel 

took no action to oppose the consolidation of [Appellant’s] 

two cases.

On November 1, 2010, [Appellant] pled guilty to the 

charges in [the 2009 docket]. A jury trial was commenced 

for the charges in this action on April 5, 2011. On the first 

day of trial, after proceedings had already commenced, 

[Appellant] decided to plead nolo contendere to all 87 

counts. His plea was entered on that date. On May 18, 

2011, [Appellant] appeared for sentencing and made an 

oral request to withdraw his guilty plea. The court denied 

____________________________________________

4 18 Pa.C.S. § 5111(a)(1).

5 18 Pa.C.S. § 3701(a)(1).

6 18 Pa.C.S. § 2701(a)(3).

7 18 Pa.C.S. § 907(a).

8 18 Pa.C.S. § 903.

9 18 Pa.C.S. § 3502(a).

10 18 Pa.C.S. § 3921(a).
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his request and imposed an aggregate sentence of over 

forty years.

PCRA Court Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion, filed June 24, 2015, at 3-4 (“PCRA 

Court Opinion”) (some capitalization omitted).

On May 26, 2011, Appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition. That same 

day, the court dismissed Appellant’s PCRA petition because his judgment of 

sentence was not yet final. The court appointed counsel and conducted a 

hearing on January 31, 2012 with respect to the 2009 docket.11 On 

February 4, 2012, Appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition regarding the 2010 

docket. On April 8, 2013, the PCRA court dismissed both petitions, however, 

the PCRA court’s opinion only addressed issues raised with respect to the 

2009 docket. Appellant appealed to this Court. On February 4, 2014, this 

Court affirmed the order denying relief for the 2009 docket, but vacated and 

remanded the order denying relief on the 2010 docket.

On July 29, 2014, the PCRA court conducted a hearing on Appellant’s 

PCRA petition regarding the 2010 docket that is presently before us. On 

June 23, 2015, the PCRA court denied Appellant’s petition. On July 20, 

2015, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. The next day, the PCRA 

court ordered appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained on 

of appeal, and he timely complied on August 5, 2015.

____________________________________________

11 Because we do not have the record for the 2009 docket, it is unclear 

whether Appellant filed an additional PCRA petition with respect to the 2009 

docket or if the PCRA court ruled on his previously dismissed petition.
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Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

[1.] WAS TRIAL COUNSEL INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO 

COMMUNICATE ADEQUATELY WITH APPELLANT, TO 

INFORM HIM OF THE FACTS AND EVIDENCE THAT WOULD 

BE PRESENTED AGAINST HIM AT TRIAL, AND TO WORK 

WITH APPELLANT IN DEVELOPING AN ADEQUATE DEFENSE 

OR A KNOWING AND INFORMED BASIS FOR A PLEA?

[2.] WAS TRIAL COUNSEL INEFFECTIVE FOR OBTAINING 

TRIAL CONTINUANCES AGAINST APPELLANT’S EXPRESS 

INSTRUCTIONS THAT HE NOT CONTINUE TRIAL?

[3.] WAS TRIAL COUNSEL [] INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING 

TO PERFORM AN ADEQUATE INVESTIGATION[, WHERE,] 

HAD HE DONE SO, APPELLANT WOULD HAVE BEEN ABLE 

TO PRESENT ARGUABLY MERITORIOUS MOTIONS TO 

SUPPRESS EVIDENCE AND SEVER, AS WELL AS MOTIONS 

IN LIMINE BEFORE TRIAL, THUS RESULTING IN AN 

UNKNOWING, INVOLUNTARY, AND UNINFORMED 

DECISION TO ENTER A NOLO CONTENDERE PLEA[?]

Appellant’s Brief at 4.

In his combined issues, Appellant argues his trial counsel was 

ineffective and he is entitled to a new trial. We disagree.

Our standard of review regarding PCRA relief is well-settled. “[W]e 

examine whether the PCRA court’s determination is supported by the record 

and free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Fears, 86 A.3d 795, 803 

(Pa.2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “The scope of 

review is limited to the findings of the PCRA court and the evidence of 

record, viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party at the trial 

level.” Commonwealth v. Spotz, 84 A.3d 294, 311 (Pa.2014) (citation 

omitted). “It is well-settled that a PCRA court’s credibility determinations 

are binding upon an appellate court so long as they are supported by the 
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record.” Commonwealth v. Robinson, 82 A.3d 998, 1013 (Pa.2013) 

(citation omitted). However, this Court reviews the PCRA court’s legal 

conclusions de novo. Commonwealth v. Rigg, 84 A.3d 1080, 1084 

(Pa.Super.2014) (citation omitted). 

This Court follows the Pierce12 test adopted by our Supreme Court to 

review claims of ineffective assistance of counsel:

When a petitioner alleges trial counsel’s ineffectiveness in 

a PCRA petition, he must prove by a preponderance of the 

evidence that his conviction or sentence resulted from 

ineffective assistance of counsel which, in the 

circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the 

truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of 

guilt or innocence could have taken place. We have 

interpreted this provision in the PCRA to mean that the 

petitioner must show: (1) that his claim of counsel’s 

ineffectiveness has merit; (2) that counsel had no 

reasonable strategic basis for his action or inaction; and 

(3) that the error of counsel prejudiced the petitioner-i.e., 

that there is a reasonable probability that, but for the error 

of counsel, the outcome of the proceeding would have 

been different. We presume that counsel is effective, and it 

is the burden of Appellant to show otherwise.

Commonwealth v. duPont, 860 A.2d 525, 531 (Pa.Super.2004) (internal 

citations and quotations omitted). “If an appellant fails to prove by a 

preponderance of the evidence any of the Pierce prongs, the Court need not 

address the remaining prongs of the test.” Commonwealth v. Fitzgerald, 

979 A.2d 908, 911 (Pa.2010) (citation omitted). 

____________________________________________

12 Commonwealth v. Pierce, 527 A.2d 973 (Pa.1987).
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In his first and third issues, Appellant contends his trial counsel was 

ineffective for failing to adequately investigate his case or communicate with 

him, for failing to develop a better defense, and for failing to suppress 

evidence, which caused him to enter into an unknowing, involuntary nolo 

contendere plea. These claims merit no relief.

“An appellant’s claim for ineffective assistance of counsel in connection 

with advice rendered regarding whether to plead guilty[13]is cognizable 

under the PCRA pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(ii).” Commonwealth 

v. Lippert, 85 A.3d 1095, 1100 (Pa.Super.2014), appeal denied, 95 A.3d 

277 (Pa.2014). “Allegations of ineffectiveness in connection with the entry 

of a guilty plea will serve as a basis for relief only if the ineffectiveness 

caused the defendant to enter an involuntary or unknowing plea.” 

Commonwealth v. Hickman, 799 A.2d 136, 141 (Pa.Super.2002) (citing 

Commonwealth v. Allen, 732 A.2d 582 (Pa.1999)). Whether a plea was 

voluntary “depends on whether counsel’s advice was within the range of 

competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.” Commonwealth v. 

Lynch, 820 A.2d 728, 733 (Pa.Super.2003), appeal denied, 835 A.2d 709 

(Pa.2003) (quoting Hickman, 799 A.2d at 141). 

____________________________________________

13 “It is well established that a plea of nolo contendere is treated as a guilty 

plea in terms of its effect upon a given case.” Commonwealth v. V.G., 9 

A.3d 222, 226 (Pa.Super.2010) (citing Commonwealth v. Leidig, 850 A.2d 

743, 745 (Pa.Super.2004)).
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Thus, to establish prejudice, the defendant must show that 

there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 

errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have 

insisted on going to trial. The reasonable probability test is 

not a stringent one; it merely refers to a probability 

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.

Lippert, 85 A.3d at 1100 (quoting Commonwealth v. Barndt, 74 A.3d 

185, 191–92 (Pa.Super.2013)).

The PCRA court reasoned:

Defense Counsel provided [Appellant] with a great deal of 

discovery materials prior to trial and met with him on 

numerous occasions in order to go over that material and 

to develop a trial strategy. [Appellant] complains that he 

was not provided with phone records, the video and color 

copies of the photographs provided in discovery. Defense 

Counsel explained that he did not provide the phone 

records to [Appellant] as both of them had determined 

that the item was too voluminous and was not relevant to 

the charges in this action, Defense Counsel had no way to 

show the video to [Appellant] while he was incarcerated 

and made the decision not to spend the funds necessary to 

obtain color prints due to the trial strategy to which the 

two subsequently agreed. [Appellant] provides no 

explanation of his assertion that he would not have pled 

nolo contendere had he received these materials.

Defense Counsel thoroughly explained the legal concepts 

regarding [Appellant’s] charges and reviewed the jury 

instructions for all of the offenses, thereby apprising 

[Appellant] of all of the elements and of the proof required 

of the Commonwealth at trial. This review also opened up 

a dialogue between [Defense] Counsel and [Appellant] as 

to whether they would challenge specific elements or the 

charge as a whole at trial. Defense Counsel met with 

[Appellant] on numerous occasions to discuss these 

matters. [Appellant] charges that Defense Counsel 

misrepresented the case to him. However, [Appellant’s] 

own version of the information provided by Defense 

Counsel indicates that he was merely explaining the law to 
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[Appellant] as it could be applied to the facts of this case. 

It appears that [Appellant] simply did not like or agree 

with the status of the law on these matters.

Defense Counsel reviewed voluminous discovery materials 

which had resulted from an extensive investigation by law 

enforcement. He arranged to have the motion filed to 

obtain the grand jury testimony, but decided that it would 

not be useful at trial because the witness involved would 

not be called to testify at trial by the Commonwealth. After 

reviewing all of the aspects of the case, Defense Counsel 

determined that there were no valid bases upon which to 

file pretrial motions or motions in limine. He noted that he 

would request offers of proof as to certain Commonwealth 

witnesses at trial. [Appellant] was not prejudiced in any 

manner by Defense Counsel’s failure to oppose severance; 

[Appellant] was tried individually at the trial of this matter.

* * *

Based on these facts, we find that [Appellant] was 

provided with fully effective legal representation in this 

matter and that his plea of nolo contendere was entered 

knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently. 

PCRA Court Opinion, at 15-18.

The PCRA court’s determination is supported by the record and free of 

legal error. Appellant failed to show a reasonable probability that, but for 

counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded nolo contendere. See Lippert, 

supra. Thus, Appellant’s first and third issues merit no relief.14

____________________________________________

14 Although Appellant asserted his innocence to some of the charges against 

him at the PCRA hearing on July 29, 2014, he failed to preserve his 

innocence claim in his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. Moreover,

Commonwealth v. Carrasquillo, 115 A.3d 1284, 1285 (Pa.2015) provides

“a bare assertion of innocence is not, in and of itself, a sufficient reason to 

require a court to grant [a] request [to withdraw a guilty plea before 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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In Appellant’s remaining issue, he argues his trial counsel was 

ineffective for continuing Appellant’s trial against Appellant’s express wishes. 

Although Appellant claims he did not approve of the continuances, he fails to 

allege the continuances prejudiced his case in any way. Thus, this 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails. See Fitzgerald, supra.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 2/5/2016

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

sentencing]” and also provides guidelines for what a defendant must 

demonstrate in order to withdraw his guilty plea:

[W]e are persuaded by the approach of other jurisdictions 

which require that a defendant’s innocence claim must be 

at least plausible to demonstrate, in and of itself, a fair 

and just reason for presentence withdrawal of a plea. 

...[T]he proper inquiry on consideration of such a 

withdrawal motion is whether the accused has made some 

colorable demonstration, under the circumstances, such 

that permitting withdrawal of the plea would promote 

fairness and justice. 

Id. at 1885, 1292. In this case, although Appellant indicated he was not 

guilty of some of the charges, he pled nolo contendere to 87 counts after a 

full colloquy and failed to make a colorable demonstration that withdrawal of 

his plea would promote fairness and justice. See id.