alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-1763

DARRELL BROOKS,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

LLOYD LAYMAN SHOPE; ENTERPRISE CAR RENTAL; FORD MOTOR 

COMPANY; FORD AIR BAG MANUFACTURER,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western 

District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Frank D. Whitney, 

District Judge. (3:09-cv-00334-FDW-DSC)

Submitted: May 19, 2011 Decided: May 23, 2011

Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and AGEE and KEENAN, Circuit 

Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Darrell Brooks, Appellant Pro Se. Fred Fincher Jarrell, K&L 

GATES LLP, Charlotte, North Carolina; Robert A. Hartsoe, HARTSOE 

& ASSOCIATES, PC, Winston-Salem, North Carolina; Kirk Gibson 

Warner, SMITH, ANDERSON, BLOUNT, DORSETT, MITCHELL & JERNIGAN, 

LLP, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Darrell Brooks appeals the district court’s orders 

granting the Defendants’ motions to dismiss Brooks’s civil 

action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and denying his 

motion to alter or amend judgment. On appeal, Brooks contends 

that the district court erroneously found him to be a citizen of 

North Carolina and thus found complete diversity of citizenship 

to be lacking. We affirm.

“If the district court determines at any time that it 

lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the 

action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). When a defendant challenges 

the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact, “the 

plaintiff bears the burden of proving the truth of such facts by 

a preponderance of the evidence.” United States ex. rel. 

Vuyyuru v. Jadhav, 555 F.3d 337, 347 (4th Cir. 2009). Unless 

the jurisdictional facts are intertwined with the facts central 

to the dispute, the district court may “resolve the 

jurisdictional facts in dispute by considering evidence outside 

the pleadings, such as affidavits.” Id. at 348.

“Citizenship, like the other ingredients or elements 

of diversity jurisdiction . . . presents a preliminary question 

of fact to be determined by the trial court.” Sligh v. Doe, 596 

F.2d 1169, 1171 (4th Cir. 1979). “We review a district court’s 
3

jurisdictional findings of fact on any issues that are not 

intertwined with the facts central to the merits of the 

plaintiff’s claims under the clearly erroneous standard and any 

legal conclusions flowing therefrom de novo.” Vuyyuru, 555 F.3d 

at 348.

Mindful of these standards, we have reviewed the 

record and find no reversible error. Brooks failed to carry his 

burden of demonstrating the district court’s jurisdiction over 

the matter. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s orders. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
1 WO 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

9 United States of America, NO. CR-17-08314-001-PCT-DJH 

10 Plaintiff, 

AMENDED FINDINGS 

11 v. 

12 TomaCita Nez, 

13 Defendant. 

14 

15 A detention hearing was held in this matter on March 1, 2018. At the hearing, the 

16 Government asserted the presumption of detention pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §3142(e). 

17 Defendant objected asserting that none of the statutes charged are reflected in subsection 

18 ( e ). At the hearing, the Court found the presumption applied. 

19 ·After the hearing, upon further review of 18 U.S.C. §3142(e), it is clear the Court 

'20 was in error in finding the presumption applied. However, without considering the 

21 rebuttable presumption of detention, the Court still finds the defendant proves a flight risk 

22 and danger to the community based on the defendant's extensive criminal history, long 

23 standing history of substance and alcohol abuse, the recommendation of Pretrial Services, 

24 and the input from the victim's family. 

25 II 

26 II 

27 II 

28 II 
. - .. .; 

1 Therefore, the order detaining defendant T omacita Nez; as a flight risk and danger 

2 to the community is confirmed. 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Dated this 2nd day of March, 2018. 

United States Magistrate Judge 

- 2 -
##### 



Exhibit 10.56
 EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT
Effective as of March 14, 2007 between
AFC Enterprises, Inc. (the Company) and
James W. Lyons (Employee)
    Term of Agreement.
   Employment.
 Position.
 Time and Efforts.




---



##### 



Base Salary.
  Incentive Pay.
 Annual Plan.
 Target Incentive Pay.
 Payment of Incentive Pay.
 Termination of Employment.
 Restricted Stock Grant.
   
 2




---



##### 



Employee Benefits.
 Executive Flex Perk.
 Life Insurance.
 Disability Insurance.
   Executive Medical Benefit.
 Other Benefits.
  
 3




---



##### 



Vacation.
 Paramount Provisions
   Business Expenses.
  Termination of Employment.
 Definitions.
 Cause.
  
 4




---



##### 



Disability.
 Termination upon Death or Disability.
 Termination by the Company for other than Death or Disability or for Cause.
  Voluntary Termination by Employee or Termination for Cause.
  
 5




---



##### 



Change of Control, Change in Responsibilities.
 both
     Confidentiality and Non-Competition.
 Definitions
  
 6




---



##### 



Covenant Not-To-Disclose
     
 7




---



##### 



Covenant of Non-Disparagement and Cooperation
 Covenant Not-To-Induce
 Remedies
  
 8




---



##### 



Severability
 Ownership of Property
 No Defense
 Gross Up Payment
  
 9




---



##### 



Indemnification.
 Company Obligations
 Notice and Defense of Claim
  
 10




---



##### 



Survival
 Dispute Resolution.
 Agreement to Arbitrate
 Procedure
 Rights of Parties
  
 11




---



##### 



Employee Acknowledgment.
  Amendments.
  Successors.
  Assignment.
   
 12




---



##### 



Waiver.
  Severability.
  Survival.
  Entire Terms.
  Notices.
   
  
  
 13




---



##### 



Headings.
  Governing Laws.
    
 14




---



##### 



COMPANY:
AFC ENTERPRISES, INC.By:
    /s/ Frank J. BelattiFrank J. BelattiChairman of the BoardEMPLOYEE:/s/ James W. LyonsJames W. Lyons  
 15
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

November 19, 2018

No. 04-18-00360-CR

Deandre Jerome DORCH,

Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From the 187th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2016CR9222B

The Honorable Laura Lee Parker, Judge Presiding

O R D E R

The Appellant’s Motion to Substitute Counsel is hereby GRANTED.

_________________________________

Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 19th day of November, 2018.

___________________________________

Keith E. Hottle

Clerk of Court
[Federal Register Volume 61, Number 109 (Wednesday, June 5, 1996)]
[Notices]
[Page 28585]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 96-14154]



-----------------------------------------------------------------------


FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM

Change in Bank Control Notices; Formations of, Acquisitions by, 
and Mergers of Bank Holding Companies; Correction

    This notice corrects a notice (FR Doc. 96-13653) published on page 
27352 of the issue for Friday, May 31, 1996.
    Under the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis heading, the entry 
for Peterka Family Partnership, Miller, South Dakota, is revised to 
read as follows:
    1. Peterka Family Partnership, Miller, South Dakota; to become a 
bank holding company by acquiring 36.87 percent of the voting shares of 
M&H Financial Services, Inc., Miller, South Dakota, and thereby 
indirectly acquire First State Bank of Miller, Miller, South Dakota.
    Comments on this application must be received by June 24, 1996.

    Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, May 31, 1996.
William W. Wiles,
Secretary of the Board.
[FR Doc. 96-14154 Filed 6-4-96; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6210-01-F
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Stacey M. Biagi, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Tucson Federal Credit Union and Experian 

Information Solutions Incorporated, 

Defendants. 

No. CV-18-00083-TUC-RCC (LCK)

ORDER

 Plaintiff filed notices that a settlement had been reached with each Defendant 

(Docs. 15, 16) and, subsequently, she filed a notice of dismissal with prejudice (Doc. 18). 

 Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED that this action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, with 

each party to bear its own attorneys’ fees and costs. The Clerk of Court shall close this 

case. 

 Dated this 14th day of June, 2018. 

 

Case 4:18-cv-00083-RCC-LCK Document 19 Filed 06/14/18 Page 1 of 1
#### INA OF TEXAS, Petitioner, v. Billy Eugene BRISCOE, Respondent.

No. C-9028.

Supreme Court of Texas.

Nov. 29, 1989.

Rehearing Overruled Jan. 10, 1990.

Timothy A. Fjeldal Jeffery K. Work, Houston, for petitioner.

George Chandler, Lufkin, for respondent.

PER CURIAM

This is a workers’ compensation case. Billy Eugene Briscoe was injured on the job on July 2, 1984, when a rock struck his left leg. Briscoe was taken to a hospital where he was treated and released that same day. Briscoe returned to work after July 4 and continued to work until September. Shortly thereafter, Briscoe sought medical attention for a herniated disk in his back. Briscoe brought this suit, alleging that the injured back was caused by the accident on July 2, 1984 and that the injury to his back has left him totally or partially incapacitated.

Although the jury found that Briscoe suffered an injury, it answered “no” to questions asking whether the injury was a producing cause of total or partial incapacity. Based on this verdict, the trial court rendered a take nothing judgment against Briscoe.

In an unpublished opinion, the court of appeals reversed and remanded, holding that the jury findings on producing cause were against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. The court of appeals addressed this point by summarily stating:

> [Tjhere is no dispute he sustained some disability, albeit minor. All of the medical evidence attributed some disability to the injury. We therefore sustain this point of error....

These conclusory statements do not •comport with the correct legal standard for reviewing factual sufficiency points of error. When reversing a trial court’s judgment after concluding the supporting evidence is insufficient, the court of appeals must detail the relevant evidence and clearly state why the evidence is factually insufficient. *Pool v. Ford Motor Co.,*715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex.1986); *see also Sosa v. City of Batch Springs,*772 S.W.2d 71, 72 (Tex.1989). The court should state in what regard the contrary evidence greatly outweighs the evidence supporting the jury’s verdict. *Id.*

The court of appeals did not apply the *Pool*standard of review. It has not *787detailed the evidence nor has it stated why the contrary evidence greatly outweighs the supporting evidence. A majority of this court, without hearing oral argument, reverses the judgment of the court of appeals and remands this cause to that court for further consideration of the factual sufficiency point of error. Tex.R.App.P. 133(b).
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 10**  **- 1763** 

DARRELL BROOKS , Plaintiff

- Appellant ,
v. LLOYD LAYMAN SHOPE; ENTERPRISE CAR RENTAL; FORD MOTOR COMPANY; FORD AIR BAG MANUFACTURER , Defendants

- Appellees
.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina , at Charlotte
. Frank D. Whitney , District Judge. ( 3:09

- cv - 00334

- FDW

- DSC )

Submitted : May 19, 2011 Decided: May 23, 2011

Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and AGEE a nd KEENAN , Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by un published per curiam opinion
. Darrell Brooks, Appellant Pro Se. Fred Fincher Jarrell, K&L GATES LLP, Charlotte, North Carolina; Robert A. Hartsoe, HARTSOE & ASSOCIATES, PC, Winston

- Salem, North Carolina; Kirk Gibson Warner, SMITH, ANDERSON, BLOUNT, DORSETT, MITCHELL & JERNIGAN, LLP, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Darrell Brooks appeals the district court’s orders granting the Defendants’ motions to dismiss Brooks’s civil action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and denying his motion to alter or amend judgment. On appeal, Brooks contends that the district court erroneously found him to be a citizen of North Carolina and thus found complete diversity of citizenship to be lacking . We affirm. “If the district court determines at any time that it lacks subject

- matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). When a defendant challenge s the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact, “the plaintiff bears the burden of proving the truth of such facts by a preponderance of the evidence.” United States ex. rel. Vuyyuru v. Jadhav , 555 F.3d 337, 347 (4th Cir. 2009). Unless the jurisd ictional facts are intertwined with the facts central to the dispute, the district court may “resolve the jurisdictional facts in dispute by considering evidence outside the pleadings, such as affidavits.” Id. at 348. “Citizenship, like the other ingredie nts or elements of diversity jurisdiction
. . . presents a preliminary question of fact to be determined by the trial court.” Sligh v. Doe , 596 F.2d 1169, 1171 (4th Cir. 1979). “We review a district court’s3 jurisdictional findings of fact on any issues t hat are not intertwined with the facts central to the merits of the plaintiff’s claims under the clearly erroneous standard and any legal conclusions flowing therefrom de novo .” Vuyyuru , 555 F.3d at 348. Mindful of these standards, we have reviewed the

re cord and find no reversible error. Brooks failed to carry his burden of demonstrating the district court’s jurisdiction over the matter. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s orders. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
conte ntions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
#### STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Steven L. MANNING, Appellant. Steven L. MANNING, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent.

Nos. WD 46206, WD 48411.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.

Aug. 23, 1994.

Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer to Supreme Court Denied Oct. 4, 1994.

Application to Transfer Denied Nov. 22, 1994.

Ellen H. Flottman, Office of the State Public Defender, Columbia, for appellant.

Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen., Breck K. Burgess, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.

Before LOWENSTEIN, P.J., and BERREY and SPINDEN, JJ.

*730PER CURIAM.

ORDER

A jury convicted Steven L. Manning of two counts of kidnapping and two counts of armed criminal action. Manning appeals the convictions and the denial of his Rule 29.15 motion for postconviction relief. We affirm the judgment of convictions and the denial of the postconviction relief. Rules 30.25(b) and 84.16(b).
<PAGE>

                                                                   Exhibit 23.02



                         INDEPENDENT AUDITOR'S CONSENT



We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statement
pertaining to the 1998 Employee Stock Purchase Plan (Form S-8 No. 333-55827),
the 1998 Stock Option Plan (Form S-8 No. 333-56349), the 1997 Stock Option Plan
(Form S-8 No. 333-49561), the 1995 Stock Option Plan (Form S-8 No. 33-93048),
and the 1987 Stock Option Plan (Form S-8 No. 33-77060) of ATMI, Inc. and in the
Registration Statements pertaining to the resale of shares of common stock by
certain stockholders of ATMI, Inc. (Form S-3 No. 333-82089 and Form S-3 No.
333-94641) of our report dated May 1, 1998, relating to the consolidated
financial statements of NOW Technologies, Inc. and Subsidiaries appearing on
page 3 of this Form 10-K. It should be noted, however, that such financial
statements are not included separately in the Form 10-K.



                                         Deloitte & Touche LLP

Minneapolis, Minnesota

February 25, 2000
EXHIBIT 31.2

 

 

I, E. Lynn Wilkinson, Chief Financial Officer of Omega Flex, Inc., certify that: 

 

1.        I have reviewed this Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the fiscal quarter ended June 30, 2006, of Omega Flex, Inc. (the “registrant”); 

 

2.        Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report; 

 

3.        Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report; 

 

4.        The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have: 

 

 (a)        Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared; 

 

 (b)        Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and  

 

 (c)        Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting. 

 

5.        The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of the registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions): 

 

 (a)               All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses (if any) in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and 

 

 (b)               Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting. 

 

Date: June 30, 2006 

 

/s/ E. Lynn Wilkinson______________________

 

E. Lynn Wilkinson 

Chief Financial Officer

 

 

|   | Page 1 |
|--------|--------|
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 9

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1999
<CASH>                                       5,665,014
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                               0
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                            11,432,282
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                     0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                 23,768,975
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                               0
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                                 0
<LOANS>                                     81,198,152
<ALLOWANCE>                                  1,482,704
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             126,733,360
<DEPOSITS>                                 105,093,606
<SHORT-TERM>                                 8,497,067
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                            415,198
<LONG-TERM>                                          0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        23,235
<OTHER-SE>                                  12,704,254
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>             126,733,360
<INTEREST-LOAN>                              8,059,766
<INTEREST-INVEST>                            1,090,646
<INTEREST-OTHER>                               461,909
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                             9,612,321
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                           3,134,416
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           3,474,764
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                        6,137,557
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                  431,879
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                              (8,771)
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                              5,458,789
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              1,066,679
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                   1,066,679
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   690,295
<EPS-BASIC>                                      $0.30
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    $0.30
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                    8.24
<LOANS-NON>                                  1,499,000
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