COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Elder, Lemons and Senior Judge Cole 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

DAVID C. WOODRUFF AND 

 ANNE T. WOODRUFF 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 0114-98-2 JUDGE LARRY G. ELDER 

 DECEMBER 22, 1998 

HARLIE E. GREENE, BUILDING OFFICIAL 

 FOR LOUISA COUNTY, FLETCHER W. 

 HARKRADER, III, ESQ., BROOKING 

 BUILDERS, INC. AND STATE BUILDING 

 CODE TECHNICAL REVIEW BOARD 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LOUISA COUNTY 

Jay T. Swett, Judge 

 Darren Marshall Hart (Marvin Alan Rosman; 

Marvin Alan Rosman & Associates, on briefs), 

for appellants. 

 (Fletcher W. Harkrader, III; Harkrader & 

Harkrader, on brief), for appellees Harlie E. 

Greene, Building Official for Louisa County 

and Fletcher W. Harkrader, III, Esq. 

Appellees Harlie E. Greene, Building Official 

for Louisa County and Fletcher W. Harkrader, 

III, Esq., submitting on brief. 

 No brief or argument on behalf of appellee 

Brooking Builders, Inc. 

 No brief or argument on behalf of appellee 

State Building Code Technical Review Board. 

 David C. and Anne T. Woodruff appeal the ruling of the trial 

court denying their motion under Code § 8.01-271.1 for the 

imposition of sanctions against Harlie E. Greene, a building 

official for Louisa County, and Greene's attorney, Fletcher W. 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code § 17-116.010, 

this opinion is not designated for publication. 
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Harkrader, III. On appeal, the Woodruffs contend that the trial 

court erred in not sanctioning Greene and Harkrader under Code 

§ 8.01-271.1 because they (A) misrepresented in their petition 

for appeal the record before the State Building Code Technical 

Review Board (TRB) and failed timely to withdraw, correct or 

revise these misrepresentations, even after the Woodruffs 

notified them of same; (B) misstated the law as set out in and 

incorporated into the Uniform Statewide Building Code (USBC); 

(C) failed to conduct a review of the standard of review on 

appeal until after filing their petition for appeal; and 

(D) imposed the petition for appeal for the improper purpose of 

delaying and increasing the Woodruffs' litigation costs. For the 

reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court's denial of the 

Woodruffs' motion for sanctions in part, reverse in part and 

remand to the trial court for the imposition of sanctions. 

 Code § 8.01-271.1 provides: 

 The signature of an attorney or party 

constitutes a certificate by him that (i) he 

has read the pleading, motion, or other 

paper, (ii) to the best of his knowledge, 

information and belief, formed after 

reasonable inquiry, it is well grounded in 

fact and is warranted by existing law or a 

good faith argument for the extension, 

modification, or reversal of existing law, 

and (iii) it is not interposed for any 

improper purpose, such as to harass or to 

cause unnecessary delay or needless increase 

in the cost of litigation. . . . 

* * * * * * * 

 

 If a pleading, motion, or other paper is 

signed or made in violation of this rule, the 

court, upon motion or upon its own 
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initiative, shall impose upon the person who 

signed the paper or made the motion, a 

represented party, or both, an appropriate 

sanction, which may include an order to pay 

the other party or parties the amount of the 

reasonable expenses incurred because of the 

filing of the pleading, motion, or other 

paper or making of the motion, including a 

reasonable attorney's fee. 

In determining whether one's conduct in signing a document 

violated Code § 8.01-271.1, the trial court applies an objective 

standard of reasonableness. See Nedrich v. Jones, 245 Va. 465, 

471, 429 S.E.2d 201, 204 (1993). Therefore, whether the facts or 

law would actually support the judgment sought is not 

dispositive, as long as the factual and legal arguments were 

objectively reasonable. See id. at 472, 429 S.E.2d at 204. 

"However, if it is clear that [the party's] claim had no chance 

of success under existing law" and he did not argue for an 

extension of the existing law, his conduct should have been 

punished. Tullidge v. Board of Supervisors, 239 Va. 611, 614, 

391 S.E.2d 288, 290 (1990). On appeal of such a determination to 

this Court, we apply an abuse of discretion standard. See

Nedrich, 245 Va. at 472, 429 S.E.2d at 204. 

 A. 

MISREPRESENTATION OF FACTS 

 The Woodruffs contend Greene and Harkrader misrepresented 

the testimony from the prior hearing and that their conduct 

constituted failure to conduct a reasonable inquiry into whether 

the petition for appeal was well grounded in fact. Greene and 
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Harkrader stated repeatedly in the petition for appeal that "[n]o 

one has asserted that a drip cap serves as flashing as required 

by [CABO § R-503.8],"1

 when, in reality, Greene himself had 

testified at the hearing before the TRB that "the piece of wood 

mold[ing] with a drip edge" would "qualify as flashing . . . in 

accordance [with] 503.8 . . . if it's painted and caulked." 

 We agree that Greene's and Harkrader's assertions on brief 

were at odds with Greene's testimony before the TRB and violated 

the provisions of Code § 8.01-271.1. Furthermore, Greene and 

Harkrader failed to respond to the Woodruffs' letter of October 

9, 1997, which specifically notified them of this inconsistency. 

 Finally, Greene and Harkrader failed specifically to discuss 

this issue on brief to this Court and chose not to present oral 

argument on this or any other issue. Although none of these 

actions were required, they tend to indicate that Greene's and 

Harkrader's actions were more than mere mistake. Therefore, we 

agree with the Woodruffs' contention that the trial court abused 

its discretion in denying the motion for sanctions on this point. 

 The Woodruffs also contend that Greene and Harkrader should 

be sanctioned for failing to withdraw or amend the petition after 

being notified of its misstatements of fact. However, Code 

§ 8.01-271.1 deals only with one's original endorsement of a 

document and imposes no penalty for failing to withdraw or 

 1CABO is an acronym for the 1 & 2 Family Dwelling Code of 

the Council of American Building Officials. 
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correct it. Therefore, we cannot conclude that the trial court 

erred in denying the Woodruffs' motion for sanctions on this 

related point. 

 B. 

MISSTATEMENT OF THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW 

 The Woodruffs contend next that Greene and Harkrader failed 

to conduct reasonable inquiry into whether their assertions were 

warranted by existing substantive law. Greene and Harkrader 

argued repeatedly in the petition for appeal that "the language 

of R-503.8 [does not] state[] that flashing is required to be 

installed over drip caps" and contended that any decision by the 

TRB requiring flashing over drip caps would be "contrary to the 

law." However, the Woodruffs cite to the official "Application 

and Commentary" accompanying CABO § R-503.8, which provides 

examples of flashing and includes a diagram of "flashing 

[installed] over drip cap." The Application and Commentary was 

made part of the record before the TRB, contend the Woodruffs, 

and Greene and Harkrader should have been aware of these 

requirements. 

 We disagree. The relevant commentary to CABO § R-503.8 

clearly shows flashing installed over a drip cap as one example 

of the proper installation of flashing. However, it remains 

arguable that the installation of flashing over a drip cap is not 

required by § R-503.8 and the related commentary if the drip cap 

has been painted and caulked. Therefore, we cannot conclude that 
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the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion for 

sanctions on this issue. 
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 C. 

PERCEPTION OF STANDARD OF REVIEW ON APPEAL 

 The Woodruffs contend that Greene and Harkrader also failed 

to conduct reasonable inquiry regarding whether the appeal was 

warranted by existing procedural law. In their motion for 

sanctions, the Woodruffs asserted that Greene bore the burden on 

appeal of "demonstrating an error of law such that when 

considering the record as a whole, a reasonable person 

necessarily would come to a different conclusion . . . than the 

TRB." They emphasized that "Greene failed even to offer this 

standard of review to the [circuit court]" and that, in 

withdrawing the appeal, Harkrader admitted to the circuit court 

that "we came to the decision this week that we could not meet 

the standard of [review on] appeal and that we should withdraw 

the appeal." The Woodruffs assert that this statement 

constitutes a concession that the appeal was not warranted by 

existing law and that Greene and Harkrader failed properly to 

evaluate this issue prior to filing the petition for appeal. 

 We disagree. Although the wiser course in an appeal is to 

recite the proper standard of review and to discuss its 

application to that particular appeal, we cannot conclude the 

failure to do so warrants the imposition of sanctions. 

Furthermore, we are unwilling to hold that the withdrawal of a 

petition, because of a party's unilateral decision that its 

evidence is insufficient to satisfy the standard of review, 
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constitutes a concession that the appeal was not warranted by 

existing law as that phrase is used in Code § 8.01-271.1. 

Finally, we cannot conclude under the facts of this case that 

Greene's and Harkrader's appeal to the circuit court was not 

"warranted by existing law." As set out above, the issue is not 

whether the appeal "actually was warranted by existing law"; 

rather it was "whether, after reasonable inquiry, [Greene and 

Harkrader] could have formed [an objectively] reasonable belief 

that the [appeal] was warranted by existing law." See Nedrich, 

245 Va. at 471-72, 429 S.E.2d at 204. Therefore, we hold that 

the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the 

motion for sanctions on this issue. 

 D. 

 FILING PETITION FOR APPEAL FOR IMPROPER PURPOSE 

 Finally, the Woodruffs contend that Greene's delay of one 

hundred nine days in issuing the notice of violation to Brooking 

ordered by the TRB, when coupled with the lack of merit of the 

petition and the fact that the Woodruffs notified them of this 

lack of merit, shows that Greene and Harkrader filed the petition 

for appeal either to impose delay or to increase unduly the 

Woodruffs' litigation costs. 

 Although these things are factors which the trial court was 

entitled to consider in determining whether the petition for 

appeal was filed for an improper purpose, none compel the 

conclusion that Greene and Harkrader entertained any improper 
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purpose. Therefore, absent other evidence of improper purpose, 

we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in 

denying the Woodruffs' motion for sanctions on these grounds. 

 For these reasons, we affirm the ruling of the trial court 

in part and reverse in part based on our conclusion that Greene 

and Harkrader failed to conduct a reasonable inquiry into whether 

the appeal was well grounded in fact. We remand to the trial 

court for the imposition of sanctions and an award of attorney's 

fees associated with the appeal. 

 Affirmed in part,

reversed in part

and remanded.