1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

JOYLYN BISHOP , Plaintiff,

v.

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION , Defendant. Civil Action No. 19

- 01396 (CKK)

MEMORANDUM OPINION Plaintiff , appearing pro se and in forma pauperis , is a resident of Rockville, Maryland. Since the ca se has been before this Court, P laintiff has been completely unresponsive. Therefore, this matter will be dismissed for failure to prosecute pursuant to District of Columbia Local C ivil Rule (“ LCvR ”) 83.23.
I . BACKGROUND The C omplaint is far from a model in clarity, but as it can be understood, she sues the U.S. General Services Administration for alleged violations of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2671, et seq ., and/or Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e

- 16. See Compl.,
ECF No. 1

- 1 , at 6

– 7. This matter was originally filed in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia (“Superior Court”)

. S ee Bishop v. General Services Administration , Ci vil Action No. 2019 CA
002603 B. On May 14, 2019, Defendant removed the Superior Court matter to this Court pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1442(a)(1) and 1446. See Notice of Removal (“NOR”) , ECF No. 1 at 2. The

matter was then assigned to the undersigned on Ma y 16 , 2019, and on May 17, 2019, the Court denied Plaintiff’s pending M otion for Preliminary I njunction an d a Temporary Restraining O rder.2 S

ee May 17, 2019 Ord., ECF No. 3; see also NOR Ex. B , ECF No. 1

- 2

. Shortly thereafter, Defendant proposed a briefing s chedule for dispositive motions. S ee ECF No. 4. Defendant filed an amended briefing s chedule , ECF No. 5, on May 28, 2019. The Court adopted t he amended briefing s chedule, ordering that: (1) Defendant file a motion to dismiss on or before June 3 , 2019, (2) Plaintiff shall file an o pposi tion on or before July 3, 2019, and (3) Defendant shall file a reply on or before July 24 , 2019. See Jun. 4, 2019 Minute Order. Defendant filed a timely Motion to Dismiss , ECF No. 6, on June 3, 2019. On June 4, 2019, the Court formally advised Plaintiff of her obligations to respond to the Motion to Dismiss under the Federal Ru les of Civil Procedure and the Local Civil R ules of this
Court. See Jun. 4, 2019 Order (“Fox Neal Ord.”), ECF No. 7 ; s ee also Neal v. Kelly , 963 F.2d 453, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Fox v. Strickland , 837 F.2d 507, 509 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Plaintiff was forewarned that if she failed to file a timely response, the Court would rule on the M otion without the benefit of her position. Id. The Court also issued an Order Establishing Procedures ( “Ord. Est. Proc.”), EC F No. 8, on June 10, 2019, which again warned Plaintiff of the consequences of such inaction. Plaintiff’s deadline elapsed, and no opposition or other response was filed , n or ha s anything responsive been filed to date. On July 24, 2019, Defendant filed a Notice (“Not.”) , ECF No. 14, chronicling its continued attempts to communicate with Plaintiff. Defendant proffers that the parties spoke by telephone on June 5, 2019, and Defendant’s counsel reminded Plaintiff of the Court’s Order requiring her to file

an opposition to Defendant’s Motion. Not. ¶ 4. Defendant indicates th at it has been unable to reach P laintiff since that phone call. Id. ¶ 6. Defendant also states that P laintiff was unreachable by email and that all of the mailings sent to Plaintiff have been returned as undeliverable. Id.3 The Court, likewise, h as received undeliverable returned mailing s directed to Plaintiff

. See ECF Nos. 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15 , 17, 18. Plaintiff’s address of record is 11418 Rockville , Rockville,
MD 20852 . Plaintiff provides that exact address , and only that address, throughout the Superior Court record. S ee NOR Ex. A, ECF No. 1

- 1 at 1; see also NOR Ex. B, ECF No. 1

- 2 at 2. 1 She has never updated her address or any other contact information with the Court. The Clerk of this Co urt, upon receiving P laintiff’s returned mail, and on its own volition, attempted to resend copies of the returned documents to 11418 Rockville Pike , Rockville, MD
20852

. See ECF Nos. 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 , 17 (emphasis added)

. However, it appears that the additional service attempts have also proved unsuccessful

. See ECF No. 15, 17

. On January 17, 2020, the Court directed Plaintiff to show cause, by February 21, 2020, why this case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. See Order to Show Cause , ECF No. 16. The Court t ook efforts to ensure that the O rder was sent to any plausible iteration of Plaintiff’s address. See id. at 3

– 4; see also ECF Nos. 17, 18. Plaintif f has now failed to respond to the Order to Show C ause. II. LEGAL STANDARD
Pursuant to District of Columbia Local Civil Rule 83.23, “[a] dismissal for failure to prosecute may be ordered by the Court upon motion by an adverse party, or upon the Court’s own

m otion.” “A Rule 41(b) dismissal is proper if, in view of the entire procedural history of the case, the litigant has not manifested re asonable diligence in pursuing the cause.” Bomate v. Ford Motor
Co ., 761 F.2d 713, 714 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (per curiam). “A leng thy period of inactivity may . . . be enough to justify dismissal,” at least when “the plaintiff has been previously warned that [s he]

1 ECF generated page numbers are referenced.4 must act with more diligence, or if [she] has failed to obey the rules or court orders.” Smith

– Bey v. Cripe , 852 F.2d 592, 594 (D.C. Cir. 1988). The authority to dismiss suits for failure to prosecute has long been recognized as “necessary in order to prevent undue delays in the disposition of pending cases and to avoid congestion” in the courts. Link v. Wabash R.R. Co ., 370 U.S. 626, 629

– 30 (1962). Further, “[t]he court’s authority to dismiss a case for failure to prosecute or failure to follow the cou rt’s orders is not discarded simply because a plaintiff is proceeding pro se .” Allen v. United States , 277 F.R.D. 221, 223 (D.D.C. 2011). Although a pro se plaintiff is afforded some latitude in prosecuting his case, “such leeway does not constitute a lice nse for a plaintiff filing pro se to ignore the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,” a court’s local rules, or a court’s orders. Moore v. Robbins , 24 F. Supp. 3d 88, 97 (D.D.C. 2014) (in ternal quotation marks omitted) (citing Jarrell v. Tisch , 656 F. Supp. 237, 239 (D.D.C. 1987 ) ). Additionally, in this Court, litigants must provide their full residence address. See D.C. LCvR 5.1(c)(1). If a party is appearing pro se , a telephone number must be provided. Failure to provide contact information may resu lt in the dismissal of the case. Additionally, n otice of a change in address or telep hone number of a pro se party must be filed within 14 days of the change. Unless changed by notice filed with the Clerk, the address and telephone number of a party noted

o n the ir first filing shall be conclusively taken as the last known address an d telephone number of the party. Id.
III. DISCUSSION Plaintiff has been completely absent from this litigation since its removal to th is Court, over nine months ago. She ha s not singularly filed anything. She has failed to respond to Defendant’s Motion to D ismiss, to several of this Court’ s O rders, and to the painstaking attempts5 by Defendant to communicate with her. Plaintiff has also failed in her duty to provide the Cou rt with the most basic and fundamental contact information, namely, her address, and there is no independent obligation for this Court or the opposing party to research same . Regardless, Defendant and the Court have expended considerable efforts to locate her mailing address

. Plaintiff has nonetheless failed to respond or comply in any manner. Given Plaintiff’s failure to comply with this Court’s directives and her “lengthy period of inactivity,” Smith

– Bey v. Cripe , 852 F.2d at 594, dismissal for failure to prosecute is appropriate. Plaintiff has “not manifested reasonable diligence in pursuing” this matter. Bomate , 761 F.2d at
714. Despite ample opportunity, she has done nothing to suggest that she intends to continue with her claims and as such, they will be dismissed. Despite Plaintiff’s abject failure to pursue this case, the C ourt is mindful of the that the sanctions must be proportionate to the misconduct and that less drastic sanctions other than outright dismissal must be considered. See Bonds v . District of Columbia , 93 F.3d 801, 809 (D.C. Cir. 1996). For that reason , this Court has provided Plaintiff with ample prior opportunity to respond, and now dismisses the C omplaint without prejudice, which is less Draconian than treating an unopposed mo tion to dismiss as conceded or reaching the substance of a motion to dismiss without the benefit of any opposing argument, both of which typically result in a decision on the merits. See James v. Nationstar Mortgage , LLC, 323 F.R.D. 85 , 86 (D.D.C. 2017) ( citations omitted).
IV. CONCLUSION Plaintiff’s inaction in this matter justifies dismissal without prejudice given that she has been previously warned that s he mu st act with more diligence, has failed to obey the rules or Court Orders , has failed to cooperate with D efendant or respond to its motion, and has offered no excuse6 for these inadequacies. See Angellino v. Royal Family Al

- Saud , 688 F.3d 771, 777 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. denied , 568 U.S. 1087 (2013)

. For all of these reasons, the Court will d eny Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss without prejudice but will dismiss the C omplaint without prejudice pursuant to D.C. LCvR 83.23 . A separate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

________/s/__________________ COLLEEN KOLLAR

- KOTELLY Date: February 28, 2020 United States District Judge