If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

UNPUBLISHED

November 30, 2023

v No. 362819

Wayne Circuit Court

ROY LORENZO WILLIAMS-BEY, LC No. 21-001710-01-FH

Defendant-Appellant.

Before: GLEICHER, C.J., and JANSEN and HOOD, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Following a bench trial, the trial court found defendant Roy Lorenzo Williams-Bey guilty 

of aggravated stalking, MCL 750.411i(2), and sentenced him as a third-offense habitual offender, 

MCL 769.11, to serve 2 to 10 years in prison. Williams-Bey now appeals as of right his conviction 

and sentence. We affirm his conviction but vacate his sentence and remand to the trial court for 

resentencing.

I. BACKGROUND

This arises out Williams-Bey’s repeated harassment of the victim, ST, including during, 

and in violation of, a personal protection order (PPO). Williams-Bey and ST had known each 

other for more than 10 years as of trial, were in an off-and-on relationship, and shared a minor 

child (a daughter) together. ST gave birth to their daughter in 2012. In March 2017, there was a 

custody dispute that, according to ST, “got pretty nasty in the end,” though ST indicated that their 

relationship had “deteriorated” even before their daughter was born. On July 2, 2018, ST obtained 

a PPO against Williams-Bey because he refused to comply with a court order limiting his contact 

with ST. Though the order limited his contact with her to child exchanges at a police station, 

Williams-Bey would follow ST from the police station and appear uninvited at her residence and 

her mother’s residence. ST testified that his behavior “[t]errified” her. The PPO against WilliamsBey was in effect from July 2, 2018, through December 31, 2018.

On the morning of December 12, 2018, between “dropping the kids off at school” and 

“going to work,” ST went to a Dunkin’ Donuts in Detroit, “not far” from her son’s daycare. ST 

had her son with her inside the Dunkin’ Donuts. While at the counter inside, ST received a phone 
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call from a blocked number. She answered the call and knew “[i]mmediately” that it was 

Williams-Bey. He “breathed into the phone” and told ST “you can run but you can’t hide. I’m 

always goin’ be able to find you.” ST looked outside and saw Williams-Bey’s car (a black 

Mercedes) backed into a parking spot, allowing him to see into the Dunkin’ Donuts. ST indicated 

that she saw Williams-Bey “[p]retty much during, simultaneously” with the phone call she 

received. ST thought Williams-Bey “might have tried to get [her] to [go] out to his car,” but she 

told him to come inside. She was “a regular” at the Dunkin’ Donuts and she wanted to have 

witnesses present for any interaction with Williams-Bey. He refused to go inside, however,

stating, “Naw bitch . . . . I could have got you but this [is] a Green Light location.”

1

 ST called 

the police, but Williams-Bey left after his phone call with ST and before the police arrived. Seeing 

Williams-Bey at the Dunkin’ Donuts made ST feel “[t]errified,” “exhausted, “disbelief,” 

“frustration,” and “fear . . . .”

The court admitted the surveillance footage into evidence and the video was played in 

court. Williams-Bey denied that it was his vehicle shown in the video. He testified that although 

he owned a vehicle similar to the one in the video, he had gifted it to his son and was no longer 

driving it. He indicated he had purchased a different vehicle and that his son could not drive the 

vehicle because he was too young. According to Williams-Bey, the vehicle was parked at his 

home on the day of this incident.

Williams-Bey also sent text messages to ST over several months in 2018. These text 

messages ranged from derogatory to threatening in nature. Williams-Bey conceded that the text 

messages came from his phone number but denied that they were sent in 2018 with the intent to 

harass or intimidate ST. He instead insisted that the text messages related to the custody battle 

and were sent in 2017. ST testified that she made a police report about these text messages.

The trial court, in rendering its verdict, indicated it would not consider many of the text 

messages because they were sent before the PPO went into effect. It did, however, consider three 

text messages ST received during the period of the stalking allegations. These included two 

received in September 2018 and one received in October 2018, which, according to the trial court’s 

recitation of the content of the text messages,2stated, respectively:

[September 2018.] Your concern is with [H].

[3]

 Your concern with [H] is 

you hung up on me when I called you to discuss our daughter. You feel the need 

to always conference someone into our business. Yo daddy don’t run shit over here 

 

1

“Project Green Light Detroit” is a Detroit Police Department (DPD) surveillance program, 

through which Detroit commercial properties consent to DPD installing real-time camera 

connections that send surveillance video footage from the property locations directly to DPD.

2 The text messages are not in the lower court file but the trial court read the content of the messages 

when it rendered its verdict at trial. Neither party disputes the trial court’s recitation of the content 

of the three relevant text messages.

3

It is unclear from the record whether “H” refers to Williams-Bey and ST’s daughter or ST’s 

father.
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nor does his old ass want to see me. I’ll deal with him myself. You don’t have the 

heart into what matters the most.

[September 2018.] [T]here is every time I feel like you—the money you 

manage to fuck it up, but my bills are paid zero balance so I can collect my 

unemployment—and never leave the house. You on the other hand have to be so 

difficult. Continue to take care of Alex while my daughter and—hates you. Oh 

yeah or you didn’t.

[October 2018.] [B]itch I was trying to be nice to yo ass by taking you to 

lunch to discuss our course of action for our kids, shaking my head. Never again. 

And she texted back leave us alone. He says be on time with my daughter. Now 

carry on. Call—goodnight. [Footnote added.]

At the end of the third day of trial, the trial court found Williams-Bey guilty of aggravated 

stalking, concluding that the evidence “overwhelmingly support[ed]” ST’s version of events. The 

court found that Williams-Bey sent the September 2018 and October 2018 text messages in 

violation of the PPO then in effect, and that he went to Dunkin’ Donuts to harass or intimidate ST. 

The trial court also found that Williams-Bey’s contacts with ST caused her to suffer emotional 

distress, and that his conduct would cause a reasonable person to feel intimidated, threatened, or 

harassed. It further found that Williams-Bey committed the stalking in violation of a restraining 

order of which he had actual notice.

Williams-Bey’s presentence investigation report (PSIR) recommended a guidelines 

minimum range of 7 to 34 months. This was based on a total prior record variable (PRV) score of 

45 points and a total offense variable (OV) score of 15 points, with OV 10 being the only variable 

scored. These scores placed Williams-Bey in PRV Level D and OV Level II.

At sentencing, ST gave her victim-impact statement describing the effect of WilliamsBey’s conduct on her life and how she has adapted since his conviction, including the fear he used 

to “bully and intimidate” her and the fact that she was attending counseling as a result. The parties 

argued over the proper scores for OVs 4, 5, and 19. Over defense counsel’s objections, the court 

assessed 10 points for OV 4, 15 points for OV 5, and 10 points for OV 19 (in addition to the 15

points for OV 10 recommended in the PSIR). This brought Williams-Bey’s total OV score to 50 

points, moving him to OV Level V and resulting in a guidelines minimum range of 14 to 43 

months. The trial court sentenced Williams-Bey as a third-offense habitual offender to serve 2 to 

10 years in prison for his aggravated-stalking conviction. This appeal followed. 

II. THE PROSECUTION PRESENTED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE ESTABLISHING 

AGGRAVATED STALKING

Williams-Bey argues that the prosecution did not present sufficient evidence establishing

that he was involved in the incident at Dunkin’ Donuts in December 2018 or that he sent text 

messages to ST when the PPO was in effect. We disagree.

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
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We review de novo a challenge to whether sufficient evidence supports a conviction. 

People v Speed, 331 Mich App 328, 331; 952 NW2d 550 (2020). When determining in the context 

of a bench trial whether the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to support a conviction, we 

“must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether a 

rational trier of fact could find that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a 

reasonable doubt.” People v Kanaan, 278 Mich App 594, 618; 751 NW2d 57 (2008). In doing 

so, however, we “will not interfere with the trier of fact’s role of determining the weight of the 

evidence or the credibility of witnesses.” Id. at 619. In a bench trial, “[f]actual findings are 

sufficient as long as it appears that the trial court was aware of the issues in the case and correctly 

applied the law.” People v Legg, 197 Mich App 131, 134; 494 NW2d 797 (1992).

B. LAW AND ANALYSIS

“Aggravated stalking consists of the crime of stalking . . . and the presence of an 

aggravating circumstance . . . .” People v Threatt, 254 Mich App 504, 505; 657 NW2d 819 (2002) 

(quotation marks and citations omitted). MCL 750.411i(2) governs aggravated stalking and

provides, in relevant part: 

(2) An individual who engages in stalking is guilty of aggravated stalking 

if the violation involves any of the following circumstances:

(a) At least 1 of the actions constituting the offense is in violation of a 

restraining order and the individual has received actual notice of that restraining 

order or at least 1 of the actions is in violation of an injunction or preliminary 

injunction. [MCL 750.411i(2)(a).]

MCL 750.411i(1)(e) defines “stalking” as “a willful course of conduct involving repeated or 

continuing harassment of another individual that would cause a reasonable person to feel 

terrorized, frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed, or molested and that actually causes the 

victim to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed, or molested.” A “[c]ourse 

of conduct” is “a pattern of conduct composed of a series of 2 or more noncontinuous acts 

evidencing a continuity of purpose.” MCL 750.411i(1)(a).

Conduct constitutes “harassment” when it is “directed toward a victim” and “includes, but 

is not limited to, repeated or continuing unconsented contact that would cause a reasonable 

individual to suffer emotional distress and that actually causes the victim to suffer emotional 

distress.” MCL 750.411i(1)(d). It does not, however, “include constitutionally protected activity 

or conduct that serves a legitimate purpose.” Id. “Unconsented contact,” in turn, means “any 

contact with another individual that is initiated or continued without that individual’s consent or 

in disregard of that individual’s expressed desire that the contact be avoided or discontinued.” 

MCL 750.411i(1)(f). Relevant here, “unconsented contact” includes “[f]ollowing or appearing 

within the sight of that individual,” “[a]pproaching or confronting that individual in a public place 

or on private property,” “[c]ontacting that individual by telephone,” or “[s]ending mail or 

electronic communications to that individual.” MCL 750.411i(1)(f)(i), (ii), (v), and (vi).

Taken together, these definitions form six elements. See MCL 750.411i(1) and (2). See 

also M Crim JI 17.25. The prosecution must prove: first, that Williams-Bey committed two or 
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more willful, separate acts of unconsented contact; second, that the contact would cause a 

reasonable individual to suffer emotional distress; third, that the contact actually caused ST to 

suffer emotional distress; fourth, that the contact would cause a reasonable individual to feel 

terrorized, frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed or molested; fifth, that the contact actually 

caused ST to feel terrorized frightened, intimated, threatened, harassed, or molested; and finally, 

at least one act of unconsented contact was committed in violation of a court order (among other 

aggravating factors that elevate the offense from stalking to aggravated stalking). See MCL 

750.411i(1) and (2). See also M Crim JI 17.25. 

The prosecution presented sufficient evidence permitting a reasonable factfinder to 

conclude that Williams-Bey engaged in aggravated stalking. ST had a PPO against Williams-Bey 

that was in effect from July 2, 2018, through December 31, 2018. She testified that on December 

12, 2018, Williams-Bey appeared outside of the Dunkin’ Donuts she was inside with her son. ST’s 

testimony established that Williams-Bey called her from a private number, and harassed and 

threatened her. This call and his conduct violated ST’s PPO against him. Though Williams-Bey 

claimed that the Mercedes outside the Dunkin’ Donuts was not his and that he was at home 

sleeping at the time, the trial court found that Williams-Bey went to the Dunkin’ Donuts in 

December 2018 to harass or intimidate ST, thereby rejecting Williams-Bey’s version of events and 

concluding otherwise. We will not disturb that credibility determination on appeal. See Kanaan, 

278 Mich App at 619.

Williams-Bey contended below that he did not have notice of the PPO against him, noting 

that the signature on the PPO shown to him on cross-examination was not his. This Court has, 

however, previously declined to construe “actual notice” as the equivalent of “personal service” 

for purposes of MCL 750.411i(2)(a). See Threatt, 254 Mich App at 506-507. The prosecution 

therefore did not have to prove that Williams-Bey was personally served with a copy of the PPO 

to provide actual notice. Instead, it simply had to present evidence that Williams-Bey had 

knowledge of the PPO. Id. Here, ST testified that she paid to have the PPO served on WilliamsBey by the Oakland County Sheriff’s Office. The prosecution also presented evidence that an 

officer served Williams-Bey with the PPO on July 2, 2018. Williams-Bey acknowledged at trial 

that ST had a PPO against him, though he could not recall the year in which she obtained it.

Viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence was sufficient to support a 

finding that Williams-Bey had actual notice of the PPO, which he violated when he texted ST and 

appeared at the Dunkin’ Donuts. The prosecution therefore presented sufficient evidence

supporting a finding that Williams-Bey committed aggravated stalking when he “[violated] . . . a 

restraining order” and that he had “received actual notice of that restraining order . . . .” MCL 

750.411i(2)(a).

The prosecution also presented sufficient evidence establishing that Williams-Bey engaged 

in stalking within the meaning of MCL 750.411i(1)(e). Williams-Bey repeatedly harassed ST

when he appeared at the Dunkin’ Donuts and contacted and threatened her by telephone, and when 

he sent her threatening text messages. See MCL 750.411i(1)(d) (defining “harassment”); MCL 

750.411i(1)(f)(i), (v), and (vi) (defining “unconsented contact” as including “appearing within the 

sight of that individual,” “[c]ontacting that individual by telephone,” and “[s]ending mail or 

electronic communications to that individual,” respectively). ST testified that she reported 

Williams-Bey’s PPO violations to the police because she was scared and “needed somebody to 

watch [her] back.” Her testimony supports the trial court’s finding that Williams-Bey’s willful, 
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separate, nonconsensual communications with her would “cause a reasonable person to feel 

terrorized, frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed, or molested” and that the communications 

actually caused her “to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed, or molested.” 

MCL 750.411i(1)(e). We therefore conclude that sufficient evidence supported Williams-Bey’s 

aggravated stalking conviction.

III. SENTENCING

Williams-Bey also argues that he is entitled to resentencing because the trial court 

improperly scored OVs 4 and 5. The prosecution concedes that the trial court improperly assessed 

15 points for OV 5. We disagree with respect to OV 4, but agree with respect to OV 5. Because 

the scoring error with respect to OV 5 affects Williams-Bey’s appropriate guidelines range, he is 

entitled to resentencing. See People v Francisco, 474 Mich 82, 89-91; 711 NW2d 44 (2006).

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“This Court reviews for clear error a trial court’s findings in support of a particular score 

under the sentencing guidelines but reviews de novo whether the trial court properly interpreted 

and applied the sentencing guidelines to the findings.” People v McFarlane, 325 Mich App 507, 

531-532; 926 NW2d 339 (2018). Clear error exists when we are definitely and firmly convinced 

the trial court made a mistake. People v Abbott, 330 Mich App 648, 654; 950 NW2d 478 (2019).

Under the sentencing guidelines, the trial court’s factual determinations “must be supported by a 

preponderance of the evidence.” People v Hardy, 494 Mich 430, 438; 835 NW2d 340 (2013).

B. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY SCORED OV 4

Williams-Bey argues that the trial court erred by assessing 10 points for OV 4 because the 

evidence did not support a finding that ST suffered serious psychological harm. We disagree.

OV 4 addresses “psychological injury to a victim.” MCL 777.34(1). A sentencing court 

is required to “[s]core 10 points if the serious psychological injury may require professional 

treatment,” though “the fact that treatment has not been sought is not conclusive.” MCL 777.34(2). 

For example, “[t]he trial court may assess 10 points for OV 4 if the victim suffers, among other 

possible psychological effects, personality changes, anger, fright, or feelings of being hurt, unsafe, 

or violated.” People v Armstrong, 305 Mich App 230, 247; 851 NW2d 856 (2014). “[T]he scoring 

of OV 4 cannot,” however, “be based on the assumption that people typically suffer psychological 

injury when they are victims of the type of crime in question; and while relevant, a victim’s fear 

during the crime does not by itself justify the scoring of OV 4.” People v Lampe, 327 Mich App 

104, 114; 933 NW2d 314 (2019) (emphasis in original).

“When calculating sentencing guidelines, the trial court may consider all record evidence, 

including the presentence investigation report (PSIR), plea admissions, and testimony.” People v 

Montague, 338 Mich App 29, 55; 979 NW2d 406 (2021). It “may also consider victim-impact 

statements, and may make reasonable inferences from evidence in the record.” Id. Though not 

required for scoring OV 4, evidence that a victim actually sought counseling may also be 

considered. See People v Davenport (After Remand), 286 Mich App 191, 200; 779 NW2d 257 

(2009).
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The trial court did not clearly err by assessing 10 points for OV 4. ST wrote a victimimpact statement that she read at Williams-Bey’s sentencing hearing. She indicated that the 

purpose of her statement was “to illustrate the fear, distrust, manipulation and perversion” 

Williams-Bey used “to bully and intimidate [her],” “[r]obbing [her] of [her] peace, safety, 

independence and most importantly a healthy environment to raise a newborn child and toddler.” 

ST also stated that she was in therapy “working daily on the healing process.” See Davenport, 

286 Mich App at 200. Williams-Bey dismisses ST’s participation in therapy as being an “upbeat 

revelation” that does not warrant a conclusion that she suffered serious psychological injury. He 

also contends that there was a “considerable lapse of time” between his 2018 conduct and his 2022 

sentencing, contending below that ST could have been in therapy for “many other reasons.” 

Contrary to Williams-Bey’s suggestion, however, a victim need not seek therapy for OV 4 to 

appropriately be assessed 10 points. See MCL 777.34(2). But a victim’s participation in therapy 

is a relevant consideration. Davenport, 286 Mich App at 200. Here, ST’s victim-impact statement 

indicated, in the context of discussing Williams-Bey’s conduct, that she had been attending therapy 

“working daily on the healing process.” Nothing in the record or in ST’s statement suggests she 

was in therapy related to anything other than Williams-Bey’s conduct; indeed, she mentioned her 

participation in therapy in the context of discussing the effect Williams-Bey’s conduct has had on 

her life. We therefore reject any suggestion that ST may have been attending therapy for some 

other reason. ST’s statement also supports a score of 10 points for OV 4 because she indicated 

that Williams-Bey’s conduct caused her to be fearful and deprived her of feelings of safety, 

independence, and peace. The trial court therefore did not clearly err by assessing 10 points for 

OV 4.

C. THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY SCORED OV 5

Williams-Bey argues, and the prosecutor concedes, that the trial court erred by assessing

15 points for OV 5. We agree.

OV 5 relates to “psychological injury to a member of a victim’s family.” MCL 777.35(1). 

“OV 5 is [only] scored when a homicide or homicide-related crime causes psychological injury to 

a member of a victim’s family.” People v Calloway, 500 Mich 180, 184; 895 NW2d 165 (2017). 

See also id. at 184 n 11 (contrasting scoring of OV 4 and OV 5). This case did not involve homicide 

or a homicide-related crime. The trial court therefore erred as a matter of law by assessing 15 

points for OV 5.

This scoring error entitles Williams-Bey to resentencing. He was in Crime Class E and 

had a prior record variable (PRV) score of 45 points, placing him in PRV Level 4. See MCL 

777.66. The trial court assessed 10 points for OV 4, 15 points for OV 5 (erroneously), 15 points 

for OV 10, and 10 points for OV 19. Williams-Bey’s total OV score was thus 50 points, putting 

him in OV Level V. Reducing Williams-Bey’s total OV score by 15 points for the erroneous 

scoring of OV 5 reduces his total OV score to 35 points, changing his OV Level to IV. This 

reduces his sentencing guidelines range from 14 to 43 months to 12 to 36 months. See MCL 

777.66 and MCL 777.21(3)(b). Williams-Bey is thus entitled to resentencing. Francisco, 474 

Mich at 89-91.

We affirm Williams-Bey’s conviction, but vacate his sentence and remand to the trial court 

for resentencing consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
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/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher 

/s/ Kathleen Jansen 

/s/ Noah P. Hood