J-S11026-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

DARRYL THOMAS 

Appellant

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1251 WDA 2021

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered September 30, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-11-CR-0001743-2019

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., OLSON, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED: JUNE 27, 2022

Appellant, Darryl Thomas,

1 appeals from the order entered September 

30, 2021 denying his petition filed pursuant to the Post-Conviction Relief Act

(PCRA).

2

 We affirm.

On August 11, 2020, Appellant entered into a negotiated guilty plea to 

aggravated assault and receiving stolen property3 encompassing two separate 

docket numbers: CP-11-CR-0001743-2019 (“1743-2019”) and 

____________________________________________

1 We have amended the caption to correct the spelling of Appellant’s name 

and to conform our caption with the certified record and the caption employed 

before the PCRA court. See Pa.R.A.P. 907(a) (directing the prothonotary of 

the appellate court to docket an appeal under the caption given in the trial 

court). 

2 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.

3 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2702(a)(1) and 3925(a), respectively.
J-S11026-22

- 2 -

CP-11-CR-0001741-2019 (“1741-2019”).

4

 See PCRA Court Opinion, 9/30/21, 

at 1. The written plea agreement, signed by Appellant, included the following 

terms:

4) The Commonwealth recommends and [Appellant] agrees that 

the [o]ffense [g]ravity [s]core is 10 with no [d]eadly [w]eapon 

[e]nhancement for [count 1 of docket 1743-2019, relating to 

aggravated assault as a felony of the first degree] with a standard 

guideline range of 42-54 months.

5) The Commonwealth recommends and [Appellant] agrees that 

the [o]ffense [g]ravity [s]core is [nine] for [count 2 of docket 

1741-2019, relating to receiving stolen property as a felony of the 

second degree] with a standard guideline range of 30-42 months.

6) The Commonwealth recommends that the above sentences run 

concurrently with one another for a total sentence of 42-120 

months of incarceration in a [s]tate [c]orrectional [i]nstitute.

7) The Commonwealth further recommends that the sentence on 

the above-captioned case numbers shall run consecutively to any 

sentence imposed on [Appellant’s] state parole violation 

[docketed separately].

Id.; see also Rule 590(B) Disposition Agreement, 8/11/20. After conducting 

an on-the-record colloquy and reviewing the numerous written guilty plea 

documents signed by Appellant, the trial court accepted Appellant’s guilty plea 

as knowing and voluntary. See N.T. Plea/Sentencing, 8/11/20; Guilty Plea 

Form, 8/11/20; Guilty Plea Explanation of Defendant’s Rights, 8/11/20; Rule 

590(B) Disposition, 8/11/20. Appellant waived the preparation of a 

presentence investigation (“PSI”) report and asked to proceed straight to 

____________________________________________

4 The PCRA petition before us on review raises claims for collateral relief 

pertaining to docket number 1743-2019 only.
J-S11026-22

- 3 -

sentencing because his prior record score had previously been calculated and 

the sentence was negotiated. See PCRA Court Opinion, 9/30/21, at 2. The 

trial court sentenced Appellant pursuant to the plea agreement, including 

credit for time served. Id. Appellant did not file post-sentence motions or a 

direct appeal.

On July 8, 2021, Appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition, his first. The 

PCRA court appointed counsel who filed an amended PCRA petition on July 12, 

2021. Within the amended PCRA petition, Appellant claimed that plea counsel 

provided ineffective assistance of counsel which rendered his plea involuntary 

and unknowing and failed to file requested post-sentence motions or a direct 

appeal regarding several pre-trial rulings. Amended PCRA Petition, 7/12/21,

at 2-3. Appellant also asked the PCRA court to direct a recalculation of his 

credit for time served. Id. at 8. The PCRA court convened an evidentiary 

hearing on September 27, 2021 at which Appellant and plea counsel testified. 

The PCRA court denied Appellant’s amended PCRA petition on September 30, 

2021. This appeal followed.5

Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

1. [Whether the PCRA court erred in finding that Appellant entered 

a valid guilty plea where Appellant claims that plea counsel never 

explained the plea agreement, Appellant was unaware of the 

applicable sentencing guidelines, and counsel failed to present a 

PSI report to the court?]

____________________________________________

5 Both Appellant and the PCRA court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
J-S11026-22

- 4 -

2. [Whether] the trial court erred in denying the Appellant’s PCRA 

petition in regards to his request that [plea] counsel failed to file 

a number of post-sentence motions that he requested[?]

3. [Whether] the trial court erred in denying the Appellant’s PCRA 

petition in regards to his request for credit for time served from 

November 6, 2019 to August 11, 2020[?]

Appellant’s Brief at 4 (extraneous capitalization omitted).

Before we address the merits of Appellant’s issues, we must determine 

whether Appellant waived appellate review by failing to ensure that the 

certified record contained the notes of testimony from the September 27, 

2021 PCRA hearing. The Commonwealth argues that it is Appellant’s duty to 

ensure a complete record before this Court, and the absence of the PCRA 

hearing transcript warrants waiver. See Commonwealth’s Brief at 7-8. The 

Commonwealth concedes, however, that this Court “could potentially reach 

the merits if it relies on the findings of the [PCRA] court and documents 

submitted as exhibits[.]” Id. at 8. 

Our Rules of Appellate Procedure require an appellant to request a 

transcript of any proceeding essential to the consideration of his or her appeal. 

See Pa.R.A.P. 1911(a) (“The appellant shall request any transcript required 

under this chapter in the manner ... prescribed by Rules 4001 et seq. of the 

Pennsylvania Rules of Judicial Administration.”). While Pa.R.A.P. 1911(c) 

provides the general form for a request for transcript, Pa.R.J.A. 4007 requires 

all transcript requests to be set forth on a standardized form that must be filed 

with a district court administrator or other enumerated entities. Compare
J-S11026-22

- 5 -

Pa.R.A.P. 1911(c), with Pa.R.J.A. 4007. This Court may only consider 

materials within the certified record to resolve issues on appeal; therefore, 

where an appellant fails to properly request a transcript necessary for 

resolution of a claim, that claim must be deemed waived for the purpose of 

appellate review. See Commonwealth v. Houck, 102 A.3d 443, 456 (Pa. 

Super. 2014); see also Pa.R.A.P. 1911(d) (authorizing an appellate court to 

“take such action as it deems appropriate” including dismissing the appeal, 

when an appellant fails to request required transcripts).

The certified record does not contain the notes of testimony for the 

September 27, 2021 PCRA hearing. Our review reveals, however, that counsel 

for Appellant requested a hearing transcript within the notice of appeal. See

Notice of Appeal, 10/18/21; see also Pa.R.A.P. 1911(c) (setting forth the 

format for a request for transcript that “may be endorsed on, incorporated 

into, or attached to the notice of appeal[.]”). A transcript request within a

notice of appeal, while compliant with Pa.R.A.P. 1911, does not comport with 

the requirements of Pa.R.J.A. 4007, which refers to the use of a standardized 

form provided by the Court Administrator or a form prepared by the judicial 

district and approved by the Court Administrator.

6

 For this reason, it appears 

____________________________________________

6 We hasten to note that PCRA counsel clearly understood the proper 

procedure, as he utilized the correct standardized form to request several 

transcripts at an earlier juncture in this case. See Request for Transcripts, 

8/2/21. 
J-S11026-22

- 6 -

that Appellant’s transcript request did not result in the transcription of the 

PCRA hearing.

Notwithstanding Appellant’s failure to follow certain procedures in 

requesting the PCRA hearing transcript, we decline to find that waiver is 

appropriate. The certified record includes the notes of testimony and exhibits 

from Appellant’s guilty plea, the exhibits introduced at the PCRA hearing, and 

the PCRA court’s detailed recitation of the testimony elicited at the PCRA 

hearing within its September 30, 2021 opinion. Accordingly, we conclude that, 

in the circumstances of this case, the certified record is sufficient to allow 

meaningful review of Appellant’s claims despite the absence of the PCRA 

hearing transcript. Therefore, we will address the merits of Appellant’s claims.

In reviewing the grant or denial of PCRA relief, an appellate court 

considers whether the PCRA court’s conclusions are supported by 

the record and free of legal error. Moreover, the factual findings 

of a post-conviction court, which hears evidence and passes on 

the credibility of witnesses, should be given deference. A PCRA 

court passes on witness credibility at PCRA hearings, and its 

credibility determinations should be provided great deference by 

reviewing courts. Indeed, one of the primary reasons PCRA 

hearings are held in the first place is so that credibility 

determinations can be made.

* * *

[An appellate court] will not disturb the findings of the PCRA court 

if they are supported by the record, even where the record could 

support a contrary holding. [The reviewing court’s] scope of 

review is limited to the findings of the PCRA court and the evidence 

on the record of the PCRA court’s hearing, viewed in the light most 

favorable to the prevailing party.
J-S11026-22

- 7 -

Commonwealth v. Flor, 259 A.3d 891, 910-911 (Pa. 2021) (quotation 

marks, citations, and corrections omitted).

In his first issue, Appellant argues that plea counsel’s ineffectiveness 

caused him to enter an invalid guilty plea. Specifically, he contends that plea 

counsel failed to explain to him the terms of the plea agreement or the 

applicable sentencing guidelines.7 Appellant’s Brief at 9. 

In order to obtain relief based on an [ineffective assistance of 

counsel] claim, a petitioner must establish: (1) the underlying 

claim has arguable merit; (2) no reasonable basis existed for 

counsel’s actions or failure to act; and (3) petitioner suffered 

prejudice as a result of counsel’s error such that there is a 

reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would 

have been different absent such error. Trial counsel is presumed 

to be effective, and [an a]ppellant bears the burden of pleading 

and proving each of the three factors by a preponderance of the 

evidence.

The right to constitutionally effective assistance of counsel 

extends to counsel’s role in guiding his client with regard to the 

consequences of entering into a guilty plea. Allegations of 

ineffectiveness in connection with the entry of a guilty plea will 

____________________________________________

7 Within his first issue, Appellant also states plea counsel was ineffective 

because a PSI report was not presented to the trial court. See Appellant’s 

Brief at 9. Appellant did not present argument on this claim with pertinent 

discussion, references to the record, or citations to supporting legal 

authorities. Consequently, he waived this aspect of his claim. See 

Commonwealth v. Reid, 235 A.3d 1124, 1191 n.35 (Pa. 2020) (“where an 

appellate brief fails to provide any discussion of a claim with citation to 

relevant authority or fails to develop the issue in any other meaningful fashion 

capable of review, that claim is waived.”) (citation omitted). We further note 

that the certified record establishes that Appellant waived the introduction of 

a PSI report, that the court imposed a negotiated sentence, and that the facts 

ordinarily included within a PSI report were placed upon the record prior to 

sentencing. Under these circumstances, Appellant has not shown how he was 

prejudiced by plea counsel’s alleged error since he has not demonstrated how 

any proceeding would have been different if a PSI report had been presented. 
J-S11026-22

- 8 -

serve as a basis for relief only if the ineffectiveness caused the 

defendant to enter an involuntary or unknowing plea. Where the 

defendant enters his plea on the advice of counsel, the 

voluntariness of the plea depends on whether counsel’s advice 

was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in 

criminal cases. Thus, to establish prejudice, the defendant must 

show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 

errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted 

on going to trial. The reasonable probability test is not a stringent 

one; it merely refers to a probability sufficient to undermine 

confidence in the outcome.

 

[Central] to the question of whether a defendant’s plea was 

entered voluntarily and knowingly is the fact that the defendant 

know[s] and understand[s] the nature of the offenses charged in 

as plain a fashion as possible. A guilty plea is not a ceremony of 

innocence, it is an occasion where one offers a confession of guilt. 

Thus, a trial judge and, by extension, plea counsel is not required 

to go to unnecessary lengths to discuss every nuance of the law 

regarding a defendant’s waiver of his right to a jury trial in order 

to render a guilty plea voluntary and knowing.

Commonwealth v. Barndt, 74 A.3d 185, 191- 193 (Pa. Super. 2013) 

(cleaned up; quotation marks and citations omitted). Moreover,

[o]ur law presumes that a defendant who enters a guilty plea was 

aware of what he was doing. He bears the burden of proving 

otherwise.

* * *

The longstanding rule of Pennsylvania law is that a defendant may 

not challenge his guilty plea by asserting that he lied while under 

oath, even if he avers that counsel induced the lies. A person who 

elects to plead guilty is bound by the statements he makes in open 

court while under oath and may not later assert grounds for 

withdrawing the plea which contradict the statements he made at 

his plea colloquy.

* * *

A defendant who elects to plead guilty has a duty to answer 

questions truthfully. We cannot permit a defendant to postpone 

the final disposition of his case by lying to the court and later 

alleging that his lies were induced by the prompting of counsel.
J-S11026-22

- 9 -

Commonwealth v. Yeomans, 24 A.3d 1044, 1047 (Pa. Super. 2011) 

(citations omitted). “The law does not require that the defendant be pleased 

with the outcome of his decision to enter a plea of guilty: All that is required 

is that his decision to plead guilty be knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently 

made.” Commonwealth v. Timchak, 69 A.3d 765, 770 (Pa. Super. 2013) 

(internal citations and brackets omitted).

Instantly, Appellant entered extensive documentation in connection with 

his guilty plea. Appellant signed three separate documents specifying the 

terms of the plea agreement, including the charges, elements of each charge, 

maximum penalties, and standard range of the sentencing guidelines. See

Guilty Plea Form, 8/11/20; Guilty Plea Explanation of Defendant’s Rights, 

8/11/20; Rule 590(B) Disposition, 8/11/20. Appellant confirmed at his plea 

hearing that he discussed the above information with plea counsel, fully 

understood the charges contained in his plea, and was satisfied with the 

representation of plea counsel. See Guilty Plea Explanation of Rights, 

8/11/20, at 4, 6, and 10. Furthermore, at the plea hearing, Appellant 

acknowledged that he completed the aforementioned documents, went over 

the same with his attorney, and had no questions. See N.T. Plea/Sentencing 

Hearing, 8/11/20, at 5-6. Moreover, he responded affirmatively to the trial 

court’s question, “[d]o you understand the plea agreement, which you’ve 

entered into with the [district attorney’s] office?” Id. at 7-8. 
J-S11026-22

- 10 -

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Appellant entered a knowing, 

voluntary, and intelligent guilty plea. Appellant is bound by the statements 

he made during his oral and written guilty plea colloquies and may not now 

contradict those statements to seek relief. See Yeomans, supra. 

Accordingly, the PCRA court did not err in denying Appellant’s petition on this 

claim.

Appellant next argues that plea counsel was ineffective in failing to file 

a number of requested post-sentence motions. Appellant’s Brief at 15. 

Specifically, Appellant argues that he requested plea counsel to challenge the 

trial court’s denial of a suppression motion, a Rule 600 motion, and the court’s 

ruling on a change of venue request. Id.

At the PCRA hearing, Appellant testified that he asked to withdraw his 

guilty plea since the day he entered it. See PCRA Court Opinion, 9/30/21, at 

5. Plea counsel testified, however, that Appellant did not voice any request 

on the day of his plea. Id. at 4. The PCRA court credited plea counsel’s 

following testimony:

Following sentencing, [plea counsel] indicated that he received 

two letters[8]from [Appellant]; however, neither was dated, and 

[counsel] cannot recall when he obtained either. The first 

referenced being sentenced to “42-84 months on paper, but he 

only sentenced me to 30-84 months in court.” Because 

[Appellant] was factually incorrect, [plea counsel] did not take any 

action. In his second letter, [Appellant] requested a sentence 

____________________________________________

8 Both letters from Appellant to plea counsel are included within the certified 

record as Commonwealth Exhibit No. 4 and Commonwealth Exhibit No. 5 of 

the September 27, 2021 PCRA hearing.
J-S11026-22

- 11 -

modification to attend Peniel, a local 13-month inpatient drug and 

alcohol treatment program. However, [plea counsel] likewise 

deemed said request non-meritorious, as [Appellant] had received 

a state incarceration sentence, thus depriving the [trial c]ourt of 

jurisdiction to send [Appellant] to Peniel.

Id. at 4-5 (record citation omitted). The PCRA court thus concluded:

[Appellant] criticizes [plea counsel’s] failure to file post-sentence 

motions or direct appeal. However, [plea counsel] could not recall 

specifically being requested to file either. In fact, in the two items 

of correspondence from [Appellant] received post-sentence, 

[Appellant does not make such a request]. Moreover, as 

discussed supra, and as testified to by [plea counsel], because 

both letters contained factual inaccuracies, he did not act upon 

either. Overall, we find that [Appellant] is simply dissatisfied with 

the length of his closed sentence, and is now attempting to have 

same lessoned. Thus, [Appellant’s] allegation of ineffectiveness 

in this regard must [] fail.

Id. at 7 (record citation omitted).

Appellant’s issue merits no relief. As the PCRA court opined, Appellant 

failed to demonstrate that he specifically asked plea counsel to file a 

post-sentence motion or direct appeal. Even if he properly requested such 

filings, Appellant failed to demonstrate the arguable merit of the claims he 

purported to raise. “[U]pon entry of a guilty plea, a defendant waives all 

claims and defenses other than those sounding in the jurisdiction of the court, 

the validity of the plea, and [] the legality of the sentence imposed.” 

Commonwealth v. Jabbie, 200 A.3d 500, 505 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation 

and quotation marks omitted). None of the challenged motions affect the 

jurisdiction of the court, validity of Appellant’s plea, or legality of Appellant’s

sentence. Consequently, plea counsel cannot be held ineffective for failing to 
J-S11026-22

- 12 -

raise a meritless issue. Commonwealth v. Montalvo, 204 A.3d 274, 286 

(Pa. 2019). 

In his final issue, Appellant claims that the PCRA court erred in denying 

his request for credit for time served. See Appellant’s Brief at 18. Where a 

PCRA petitioner challenges the legality of a trial court’s failure to award credit 

for time served while imposing sentence, such claim is cognizable under the 

PCRA. See Commonwealth v. Perry, 563 A.2d 511, 513 (Pa. Super. 1989). 

In contrast, where the “alleged error is thought to be the result of an 

erroneous computation of a sentence by the [Department] of Corrections, 

then the appropriate vehicle for redress would be an original action in the 

Commonwealth Court[.]” Id. at 512-513.

Within his appellate brief, Appellant frames his argument as a challenge 

to the trial court’s failure to award credit for time served. See Appellant’s 

Brief at 18-19 (citing legal authority involving trial court’s failure to award 

credit for time spent in custody prior to sentencing). This argument is contrary 

to the argument Appellant developed in his amended PCRA petition.9 See

Amended PCRA Petition, 9/13/21, at 8. In his amended PCRA petition, 

Appellant averred “that he never received credit for time served” and 

requested that the PCRA court “direct the [r]ecords [o]ffice at the Cambria 

____________________________________________

9 Moreover the record belies Appellant’s argument. The trial court awarded

Appellant credit for time served at sentencing. See N.T. Plea/Sentence 

Hearing, 8/11/20, at 13 (trial court including credit for time served within its 

sentence); Sentence Order, 8/11/20 (same). 
J-S11026-22

- 13 -

County Prison to recalculate his time served [] to determine whether or 

not he properly received his credit.” Id. (emphasis added). Clearly,

Appellant’s grievance is the calculation of his time, and the proper venue for 

his claim is with the Commonwealth Court. Perry, supra. Thus, the PCRA 

court properly denied Appellant’s PCRA claim in this regard.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 6/27/2022