1 UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE D ISTRIC T OF CO LU M BIA

__________________________________________) ELOI SE T . WORMLEY, ) ) P la in t if f, ) v . ) ) Ci vilAc ti on N o. 08 -0 44 9 ( RC L) ) UNITED STAT ES O F AMERICA, e t al . , )

) De fend ant s. ) __________________________________________)
M EM OR

AN DU M OP IN ION Be fore the Court are dispositi ve motions filed by four discr ete groups of de fenda nts. Plaintiff asserts that var ious defenda nts are liable for injuries she suffe red in c onnection with her five-month over detention. Def endant Rey

nolds & Assoc iates, doingbusiness as Washington Halfw ay Homes (“ WHH”), moves [21] t o dismiss plaintiff’s neg lige nce c laim. (Plaintiff responds with a c ross motion [ 27] for summary judgme nt ag ainst WHH.) Def endants a ssociated with the fede ral g overnme nt move [53] to dismi ss (or, in the alter native, for

summary judgme nt on) plaintiff’s c onstitut ional and common-la w tort claims. Def

endants a ssociated with the District of Columbia move [38] to dismi ss (or, in the alter native, for

summary judgme nt on) pla int if f’ s c la ims un de r 4 2 U .S. C. § 19 83 and c omm on -l aw t or

t. D e fe nd ants a sso c iate d w ith Correc tions Corporation of Americ a (CCA) move to dismiss [ 14] pl aintiff’s c laims under 42 U. S.C. § 1 98 3 a

nd c omm on -l aw t or

t. For the re asons explained here in, the Court will (1) deny WHH’s motion to di smiss (and deny plaintiff’s cr oss-motion), (2) g rant in par t and deny

in part fe dera l defe ndants’ motion; (3)I t is unclear who transporte d plaintiff to the hospital. WHH maintains that it was 1 “F eder al Protective Ser

vices” (WHH’s Mot. Ex . 2 [21-3] ), while the B OP’s Notice of Escape stated that it was “D .C. Metro Police” (Pl.’s Reply in Support of Cross-Mot. for Summary J udg ment Ex . 2 [50-3] ). Plaintiff, on the other ha nd, contends that she w as brought to the hospital by

Fa irview staf

f and that the police we re the re only to “esc ort.” (Pl.’s Reply [50] .) 2 de ny wi tho ut p re

jud ic e Di str ic t de fe nd ants ’ m oti on and sta y dis c ov e ry

a s to Di str ic t de fe nd ants , and (4 ) d e ny CCAde fe nd ants ’ m oti on to d ism iss
.

I. F ACTUAL BACK GR OUND On Dec ember

15, 2005, plaintiff was se ntence d to twelve months imprisonment (six of them suspended) by

a D.C. Superior Court judg e. (WHH’s Reply Ex . 13 [43-7] (J. & C. Dec. 15, 2005).) On Ma

y 30, 2006, plaintiff was tra nsfer red f rom a prison fa cility

to Fair view Ha lfway House in D.C. (ope rate d by WHH) so that she could see k employ ment while awa iting the expiration of her sente nce ( set for June 12, 2006). (Pl.’s Opp’n to WHH’s Mot. [27] at 2, Ex. 10 [ 2 7
- 1 4 ] ( “ In s t i tu t i o n a l R e f e r r a l f o r C C C P l a c e m e n t , ” M ar . 3 , 2 0 0 6 )
. ) O nth e m o r n i n go f F r i d ay, J une 2, plaintiff c hecke d out of Fa irview to look for a job, saying that she would be ba ck by 2:30 p. m. ( WHH Mo t. E x. 2 [21 -4 ].) Whe n p la int if f d id n ot r e tur

n b y 3:0 0 p .m. , F a ir

vie w p e rs onne l, followinginstitutional policy , repor ted her to the fede ral B urea

u of Prisons (BO P) as “e scape d.” ( Id .) Plaintiff did return to F airviewat about 5:22 p.m., but she appe are d intox icated a nd was combative towa

rd F airviewstaff. (

Id. ) P la int if

f w a s th e n tr ans po rt e d to D. C. G e ne ra l H os pit a l. 1 When she retur

ned to Fa irview late r that eve ning, she was de nied re -entry to the fac ility

and instructed to turn her self in to the United States Mar shals Service (“U SMS ”) on Monda y , J une 5. ( Id .) Plaintiff stay ed at a

D.C. homeless shelter f

or the we ekend. ( Pl.’s Opp’n [27] to WHH’s Mot. at 3.)F e de ra l de fe nd ants a dmi t a s mu c h whe n th e y argue that th e iss ua

nc e of the pa ro le 2 violation detainer—r ather than some for

m relatingto her e scape—was “ a mer e mistake in for m.” (F ed. De fs.’ Mot. [53] at 20.) 3 On Monday , J une 5, def

endant Randa l Whi te, a B OP official, a cted upon the communication from F airviewby issuing a “Notice of

Escape d Fe dera l Prisoner” (he reina fter “Notice of Esca

pe”) . (Pl.’s Reply

in Support of Cross-Mot. for Summary J udg ment Ex . 2 [50-3] (Notice of Esca

pe).) The notice stated that af ter plaintiff w as take n to the hospital on J une 2 “she ha[d] y et to return to the f acility and her wher eabouts re main[ed] unknown.” ( Id. ) On June 6 plaintiff, a ve tera

n, chec ked her self into a VA hospital. (Pl.’s Opp’ n [27] to WHH’s Mot. at 3.) Wit h the assistance of hospital staff a nd D.C. Metropolitan Police, plaintiff turned he rself in at the D.C. Central De tention Fac ility (“CDF ”) on June 14, at which point she re sumed servic e of her six-month S uperior Court se ntence . ( Id . at 4.) CDF is operate d by the D.C. Depa

rtment of Correc tions (“DOC”)
. On J une 16, def

endant Sea

n McL eod of U SMS issued a “D etainer Ba sed On F eder al Parole Violation Warra

nt” to CDF for

plaintiff. (Pl.’s Opp’n to F ed. De fs.’ Mot. Ex. 3 [ 59-5] [hereinaf ter “ Detaine r”].) The D etainer instructed CDF that [t ]he United States Parole Commissi on has issued a F ederal parole violation warrant a g a i n s t[ p l a i n t i f f ]
. P r i o r t o [ p l a i n t i f

f ] ’ s r e l e a s e f

r o m[ C D F ] c u s t o dy, ple a se no tif

y [USM S] at

on c e so [USM S] may

a ssume c us tod

y of the su bje c t if n e c e s s ar y. ( Id. ) Plaintiff was not then on pa role, nor ha d she eve r bee n on parole . No such wa rra nt exi sted. 2 On J une 21, plaintiff’ s six -month sentence expired (adjusting for e scape d time and
cr ed i t ). Ho we v er , p l ai n t i ff th en we n td i re ct l y

b ef o re an o th er

S u p er i o r C o urtj u d ge f

o r v i o l at i n g a civil protection orde r in an unre lated matter . (WHH’s Reply Ex . 13 [43-7]

. ) Plaintiff wasThe re cord is uncle ar a s to whether pla intiff’s 135-da y sentenc e beg an at CTF . But what 3 is clear —and all that is rele vant, for pur poses of this litigation—is that plaintiff was he ld at CTF on the first full day

of her overde tention (Octobe r 22, 2006).

4 sentenc ed to another

135 day s for the violation ( id .) , at w hic h p oint sh e wa s a pp are ntl y transfe rre d to D.C.’s Correc tional Treatment Fac ility (“CTF ”) to ser

ve that sente nce. CTF is run 3
un de r t he a us pic e s o f D OC , b ut D OC c ontr a c ts the fa c ili ty ’s op e ra tio n a nd mana g e me nt t o Correc tions Corporation of Americ a (“ CCA”). On Octobe r 18, DOC sent de fenda nt Donna Scott of USMS a fax reg ardingplaintiff wh ic h r e a d, “ Th is i nmate ’s se nte nc e wi ll e xpir e on 10 -2 1- 20 06 . Pl e a se e xec ute the U. S.M .S. Detaine r date d 6-16-06 with a c ome-up on 10-19- 06.” (WHH’s Reply Ex . 14 [43-8] .) On October 19, unidentified USMS officer s broug ht plaintiff to the Pretty man United States Courthouse in D.C. where she wa s fing erpr inted and then, a ppare ntly , returne d to CTF. (Pl.’s Opp’n [59] to Fed. D efs.’ Mot. at 8.) Def endant B aldwin that same da y faxed CDF a

“Prisoner Remand or Or der to De liver and Rec eipt for United States Prisoner s” (known a s a “U SM-41”) ins tr uc tin gDO C to “ pla c e [pla int if f] i n tr ans it h old

pe nd ingfe de ra l de signatio n. ” (P l.’ s O pp ’n to District Def

s.’ Mot. Ex . 7 [46-10] .) When plaintiff’s 135-da y sentenc e expired on Oc tober 21, she wa s not relea sed fr om CTF. She would re main in custody , for no a ppare nt leg itimate rea son, fo r a lmo st f

ive mor e months
. On Dec ember

6, 2006, CCA—operators of CTF—sent de fenda

nt Scott a fax reg arding plaintiff: “[Pl aintiff]’s sentence was c omplete on 10/21/06. Please execute he r wa rra nt.” (WHH’s Reply

Ex . 15 [43-9] .) It seems that no ac tivity resulted f rom this fax. On J anuar

y 11,The “ To:” line on the fax rea ds “Jail” (WHH’s Reply Ex . 15 [43-9] ); the Court assumes 4 that this refe rs to CDF, the f acility direc tly maintained by

DC. Plainti ff’ s Complaint allege s that the J une 5, 2006 “N otice of Esc ape” was a lso faxed. Compl aint ¶55. 5 20 07 , a USM S of

fi c ia l f a xed the Oc tob e r 1 9, 20 06 USM -4 1 to CD F
. Th e purp os e of thi s 4 communication is unclea

r. On Mar ch 15, 2007, USMS faxed DOC a newUSM-41 instructing DOC to “lift USMS detainer date d 06-16-2006.” (Pl.’s Opp’n to District Def s.’ Mot. Ex . 6 [46- 9].) Pl aintiff wa s appar ently transfe rre d from CTF to CDF the next day . ( Id. at 5.) On Ma

rch 19, 2007, USMS fax ed “D C J ail Records” informingthem that plaintiff was “ rele ased f rom her
esca pe cha rg e on 6/21/06, the day

she ca me into DC J ail custody

for a Superior Court matter, violation of a protec tion order.” (WHH’s Reply Ex . 16 [43-10] .) Plaintiff was f inally rele ased from custody

that day , Marc h 19, 2007.

II. ST ANDAR

DS F OR DISMISSAL AND SUMM ARY JUD GM ENT A. Stand ard for Dism issal On a motion to dismi ss for failure to state a claim upon which r elief c an be grante d pursuant to Fe dera l Rule of Civil Procedur e 12(b) (6), this Court will dism iss a claim if the plaintiff fa ils to pl ead “ enoug h fac ts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Be ll At lan ticCor

p. v . Two mb ly , 127 S. Ct . 1955, 1974 (2007) ( abrog atingthe prior standa rd which
re qu ir e d a

pp e ara nc e , b e y on d a

do ub t, t hat pl a int if

f c an p ro ve no se t of

fa c ts i n s up po rt

of his claim that would entitle him to relief) . The Court must construe the a lleg ations and fa cts in the
c omp la int in t he light m os t f

avo ra ble to t he pla int if

f, and the pla int if

f w ill have the be ne fi t of

a ll infere nces that can be derive d from the f acts a lleg ed. Barr v. Clinton , 3 70 F .3 d 1 19 6, 11 99 (D .C. Cir. 2004) (citingKowal v. MCI Commc’ns Corp. , 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 ( D.C. Cir. 1994)).6

Howeve r, the Court is not require d to acc ept plaintiffs’ unsupporte d infere nces, nor “leg al conclusions ca st in the form of fa ctual alleg ations.” Kowal , 16 F.3d at 1276. Fe dera l defe ndants also move to dismiss on j urisdictional g rounds pursuant to Rules 12(b)( 1), (b) (2), ( b)(4) , and (b) (5). Rule 12(b) (1) a llows for dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, Rul e 12(b) (2) f or lac k of per sonal jurisdiction, Rule 12(b)(4) f or insufficie nt pr oc e ss, and

Rul e 12 (b )( 5) fo r i ns uf

fi c ie nt s e rv ic e of

pr oc e ss.

B. St anda r d forSum m ar y J udgm e nt Summary judgme nt should be g rante d when “ the pleading s, the discover y and disclosure materia ls on file, and any aff idavits show that there is no g enuine issue a s to any materia l fac t and that th e mov ant i s e nti tle d to jud g me nt a s a matte r o f l aw. ” F e d. R. C iv. P. 5 6( c ). Th e pa rt y seekingsummary

judgme nt bear s the initial burden of produc tion as to the absenc e of g enuine issues of mater ial fac t. Ce lote xCor p. v . Ca tre tt , 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). A g enuine issue of
m at e r i a l f a c te x i s t s i f

th e e v i d e n c e , v i e w e d

i nth e l i g h tm o s tf

av o r a b l e t o th e n o n m o v i n gp arty, “is such that a r easona

ble jury could re turn a ve rdict for the nonmoving pa

rty .” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). B ut a g enuine issue r equire s more than “ a scintilla of evidenc e” suppor ting the nonmovingparty ; “there must be evidenc e on which the jury could re asonably

find” for the nonmoving pa

rty . Id. at 252.

III . W HH’ S M OTI ON TO D ISM ISS Plaintiff asserts one c laim, neg lige nce, a g ainst defe ndant WHH. Plaintiff alleg es that WHH brea ched its duty

of ca re by not allowing he r to retur

n to the Fa irview fa cility

afte r her7

combative be havior on June 2, 2006. WHH moves [ 21] t o dismiss , claimingthat (1) it had no duty to let plaintiff return unde r the c ircumstance s and (2) even if there did exi st a duty , WHH’s alleg ed neg lige nce did not ca use plaintiff’s injury . Neither of WHH’s ar guments support dis mis sa l of

pla int if f’ s n e g lig e nc e c la im. Plaintiff does state a c laim that is plausible on its fac e. On the issue of duty , WHH may eventua lly

establish that it did not have a duty to allow plaintiff to return to the f acility afte r her be havio r. Ho we ve r, at th is e arl y sta g e in t he lit ig atio n, pla int if

f’ s c la im t o th e c ontr ary

is s til l pla us ible . Plaintiff has submitted various WHH manuals and proc edure s that she alleg es de mon str ate the e xiste nc e of a duty . ( Pl. ’s Op p’ n [27 ] toWH H’ s Mo t. E xs. 3 (“ B OP C omm un ity Correc tions Manual” as r elated to c ontrac tors) & 6 (“Stateme nt of Work”).) It is plausible that WHH had a duty

to allow plaintiff to re- enter ; that is sufficient to defe at WHH’s motion. Simi larly , WHH has not shown that it is i mplausible that its actions contributed to plaintiff’s injury (i.e., he r over detention). The Notice of Escape issued by

BO P prominently

mentions the fac t that Worml ey

did not re-e nter F airviewon the eve ning of May 2. I t is plausible that, had WHH allowed her

to re-e nter, the N otice of Esc ape w ould not have bee n filed, the improper De ta ine r w ou ld n ot h ave iss ue d, and pla int if f m ig ht h ave be e n s pa

re d h e r o rd e a l. A t th is p oint, that pl a us ibl e sc e na

ri o is a ll that is ne e de d to de fe at WH H’ s mo tio n to dis mis s. Plaintiff responded to WHH’s motion with a Cross Motion [ 29] for Summ ary J udg ment. Ho we ve r, pla int if

f’ s mo tio n n e ve r g e ts o ff

the g ro un d; a s th e pr e vio us pa ra g ra phde mon str ate s, this scenar io is li ttered w ith unresolved issues of mate rial fa ct (for example, whether

WHH’s internal policies e stablish a duty to allow individuals in pl aintiff’s position to re-e nter the fac ility). The a

bsence of g enuine issues of material fa ct is a pre requisite for summary judgme nt.Def endant doe s not directly

argue that Scott in a nonre sident, but instead argues that 5 beca use a Ma ryland addr ess was listed on the a ffidavit of se rvice , it can be inf err ed that Scott’s abode or dwellingplace is in Maryland. ( SeeDe fs .’ Mo t. [5 3] at 8 n .2 (c iti ngF e d. R. C iv. P. 4(e) (2) ( allowingservice by “lea ving a copy of ea ch at the individual’s dwe lling or usual place of abode ”)) .) Plaintiff does not re but this argument, so the Court will treat it as conce ded. 8 Acc ording ly , plaintiff’s cr oss motion s hall be denie d.

IV . F ED ER

AL DE F EN DA NT S’ M OTI ON TO D ISM ISS/ MOTION F OR SUMMAR Y JUDG MENT Plaintiff asserts numer ous claims ag ainst the fede ral de fenda nts (the United States of Americ a, B OP Direc tor Har ley L appin, B OP employ ee White, and USMS employ ees Mc L eod, Ba ldwin, and Scott). Plaintiff bring s a var iety of constitutional claims ag ainst the BO P and USMS employ ees unde r Bi v e ns v . S ix Un k no wn N am e d A ge nts , 4 03 U. S. 3 88 (1 97 1) . Sh e a lso
asser ts claims of false imprisonment and neg lige nce a g ainst the United States under the Fe dera l Tort Claims Act (F TCA). F or the re asons explained below, the Court will dismiss the Bivens
c la ims but no t th e F TCAc la ims
.

A. P ersonal Jurisdiction E xists Over All F ederal De fend ants Except White Fe dera l defe ndants argue under Fe dera l Rule of Civil Procedur e 12(b) (2), ( b)(4) , and (b)( 5) that this Court lacks persona l jurisdiction over non–D.C. residents L appin, White, McL eod, B aldwin, and Scott. The Court finds that per sonal jurisdiction does exis t over L appin, 5 McL eod, B aldwin, and Scott bec ause ( 1) they are cover ed by

the D.C. long arm statute a nd (2) thi s Co ur t’ s e xer c ise of

jur isd ic tio n c omp or

ts w ithc on sti tut ion a l du e pr oc e ss. Ho we ve r, thi s Court’s jurisdiction does not ex tend to Whit e bec ause he falls outside the long arm statute.9

F or thi s Co ur t’ s p e rs on a l juri sd ic tio n o ve r n onre sid e nt d e fe nd ants to l ie , ju ri sd ic tio n mu st be prope r under

both the D.C. longa

rm statute and the c onstitut ional require ments of due pr ocess. GTE New Media Serv ices, Inc . v. Be llSouth Corp. , 199 F.3d 1343, 1347 ( D.C. Cir. 2000). The longa rm statute, D.C. Code § 13-423(a ), lists a number of c ircumstance s under whic h a cour t can exercise jurisdiction over a nonre sident. One such c ircumstance is when the plaintiff a lleg es that the nonre sident “ca

us[ed] tortious injury

in the District of Columbia by an ac t or omission i n the District of Columbia.” Id. § 1 3- 42 3( a )( 3) . T his de sc ri be s p la int if f’ s a lle g atio ns a g a ins t defe ndants L appin, McL eod, B aldwin, and Scott, all of whom a lleg edly committed their tortious
a c ts whil e wi thi n th e Di str ic t of Col umb ia . Jur isd ic tio n o ve r t he se fo ur de fe nd ants a lso c omp or

ts with the require ments of constitutional due proce ss; the alleg ations that defe ndants committed the tortious acts while phy sically in the forum is sufficie nt. Defe ndants argue that minimum
c onta c ts c ann ot “ ari s[e ] fr om f e de ra l e mpl oy

me nt o r s up e rv iso ry

ro le s. ” B ut t

he a uth or ity de fe nd ants c ite fo r t

his po int c on c e rn s o ve rl y

e xpans ive “ min imum c onta c ts” ari sin gso le ly a s a result of fe dera l gove rnment super visory responsibilities. Se e Cla as e n v . B ro wn , 1 9 9 6 WL 79490, *2 (D.D.C. 1996) ( Kessler , J .) (notingSupreme Court pre cede nt that “an individual is not vulnera ble to beingsued in any

district solely

by virtue of be ing e mploy ed by the fe dera l g overnme nt or by

virtue of supe rvising or

trainingpersonne l on a nationwide ba sis”) ( c ite d in Def s.’ Mot. [53] at 7). The se four fede ral de fenda

nts do not warra

nt such conc erns. The y

have contac ts with the forum outside their mere supervisory roles: they

wer e phy sically

within the Di str ic t w he n th e y

too k th e a lle g e d a c tio ns . T he re fo re , b e c a us e jur isd ic tio n is pr op e r u nd e r b oth the long arm statute a

nd constitutional due proce ss, the Court may exercise pe rsonal jurisdictionIn th e a lte rn ativ e , ju ri sd ic tio n o ve r d e fe nd ants Mc L e od and B a ldw in i s p ro pe r b e c a

us e 6 both were serve d within the District of Columbia ( See Mc L e od Af f. of Se rv ic e [13]; B a ldw in Aff. of Service [12] ). Se e Bu rn ha m v . S up e rio r Co ur t of

Cal ifo rn ia , 495 U.S. 604, 610 (1990) (“ Am on gthe mos t f

ir mly e sta bli sh e d p ri nc ipl e s o f p e rs on a l juri sd ic tio n in Am e ri c an tr a dit ion

is that the cour

ts of a State have jurisdiction over nonre sidents who are phy sically prese nt in the State.”). Pla int if f a rgue s th at juri sd ic tio n o ve r L a pp in, wh o w a ive d s e rv ic e , c an b e jus tif ie d in thi s manner as we ll, but the Court is not convinced. Plaintiff mailed the waiver to L appin’s wor

k addre ss within the District. Pl aintiff ar gues that bec ause, when a w aiver is filed, the Fe dera l Rules of Civil P roce dure “ apply as if a summons and c omplaint had been se rved at the time of filing the waiver ,” F ed. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(4), the Court should consider L appin to have be en ser

ved in the District. The Court dec lines to do so because (a) the Rule does not spec ify the ef fec t that waiver has on the placeof ser

vice a nd (b) the Rules g o on to note that “[w]aiving servic e of a summons does not waive any objection to persona l jurisdiction or to venue,” id. at 4(d)( 5).

10 ov e r L a pp in, Mc L e od , B a ldw in, and Sc ott . 6 This Court may

not, however , exercise jurisdiction over Whit e. White neither lived nor worke d in the District duringthe re levant per iod. ( SeeDef s. Mot. [ 53] Ex . 2 (White Decl.); Def s.’ Reply [64] Ex . 1 (White Decl.).) The long arm statute doe s allow jurisdiction over a nonresident de fenda

nt alleg ed to have “ca

us[ed] tortious injury

in the District of Columbia by an
a c t or omi ssi on outsi de the Di str ic t of

Col umb ia ,” but on ly

“ if he re gula rl y do e s o r s oli c its business, eng ag es in any

other pe rsistent course of conduc t, or derive s substantial revenue from g oods used or c onsumed, or ser vices re ndere d, in the District of Columbia.” Id. at (a )(4) . When de a lin gwi th t

his pr ov isi on

in p art ic ula

r, it s ho uld

be re me mbe re d “ that ( a )( 4) of the D. C. long- arm statute may

indeed stop short of the oute r limit of the constituti onal spac e,” Crane v. Car r , 814 F.2d 758, 762 ( D.C. Cir. 1987). Whit e’s de clar ation establishes that he doe s not have
any of the e nume rate d c onne c tio ns wi th t he Di str ic t li ste d in

the lon g arm

statut e . B e c a

us e Whit e fa lls outsi de the lon g arm

statut e , th e Court

ne e d n ot d e c ide wh e the r h e ha s mi nim um c onta c ts with the District as re quired by constitutional due proce ss; jurisdiction would be improper noAl tho ug h c la ims a g a ins t Whi te are dis mis se d h e re fo r l a c k o f j ur isd ic tio n, tho se c la ims 7 are a lso dis c us se d b e low

to e sta bli shtw o a lte rn ate g ro un ds fo r d ism iss a l: ( 1) la c k o f a n ava ila ble Bivens r e m e dy an d

( 2 ) qu a l i f

i e d i m mun i ty. Th e Com pla int ind ic ate s th at Mc L e od , Wh ite , B a ldw in, Sc ott , a nd L a pp in a re name d in 8 their off icial and individual ca

pacities. (Complaint ¶¶10–14.) Howeve r, suits for monetar y damag es—like this one—ca nnot be brought ag ainst fede ral off icials in their offic ial capa cities unless sovere ign immunity is waived. Se e Cla rk

v . Li brar yof C ongr ess , 7 50 F .2 d 8 9, 10 3 ( D. C. Cir . 1 98 4) (S ov e re ig n immun ity
. . . b ar[s ] sui ts f

or mon e y dama g e s a g a ins t of

fi c ia ls i n th e ir official capa city absent a specific waiver

by the g overnme nt.”). So the cla ims ag ainst fede ral de fe nd ants in t

he ir of fi c ia l c a pa c iti e s mu st b e dis mis se d, le avin gthe ind ivi du a l- c a pa c ity c la ims
. 11 matter the c onclusion. Plainti ff ha s reque sted additional discover y to plumb other way s that Whit e could be roped ba ck into the long arm statute, but the Court does not be lieve such discovery to be appr opriate or

nece ssary

in this case. B ased on White’s dec larations, the Court cannot e x erc ise persona l jurisdiction over him and all claims ag ainst him shall be dismi ssed. 7

B. Biv e ns Cl a i ms Pla int if f a sse rt s a numbe r o f c on sti tut ion a l c la ims a g a ins t F e de ra l de fe nd ants in t he ir individual capac ities under Bivens v . S ix Un k no wn N am e d A ge nts , 4 0 3 U
. S
. 3 8 8 ( 1 9 7 1 )
. In 8 Bivens , th e pla int if

f a lle g e d th at f

e de ra l a g e nts ma de a

wa rr antl e ss s e arc h o f h is a

pa rtme nt i n violation of the Four

th Amendment and then a rre sted him for alleg ed nar cotics violations. The plaintiff soug ht money

damag es to compensate him for the c onstitut ional injury he had suf

fer ed. Bi v e ns allows damag es to be a war ded for

constitutional viol ations by fede ral off

icials. Id . Such
reme dies are not available in e very case . To the contra

ry , Bivens re me die s h ave be e n e xten de d to a limited number of sc enar ios, and in many case s “spec ial fac tors” counse l ag ainst further extension. Id. at 396. The Court he re de clines to extend a Bivens re me dy to p la int if

f’ s in jur ie s. Plaintiff here makes five specific Bivens c la ims : ( i) ov e rd e te nti on in v iol atio n o f t

he F if th12

Amendment; (ii) denia l of proce dural due proce ss (related to issuance of the Notice of

Escape , the Deta iner, a

nd plaintiff’s subseque nt proce ssing) ; (iii) unlawful sea rch a nd seizure (throughout her pr ocessing/overde tention); (iv) “de liberate indiffer ence ” by USMS official Scott in viol ation of the Eig hth Amendment; and (v) supervisory liability for B OP Direc tor L appin re lated to the
a c tio ns of his B OP s ub or din ate s. De fe nd ants make thr e e argume nts fo r d ism iss a l: ( 1) the statut e of limitations ex pired be fore plaintiff initiated her a ction; (2) a Bivens reme dy should not be extended to plaintiff’s circ umstances; and ( 3) the de fenda nts are pr otected by

qualified immunity
. The Court re

jects def endants’ statute of limitations arg ument, but ag ree s that a Bivens reme dy sh ou ld n ot b e e xten de d to pla int if f’ s in jur ie s. In th e a lte rn ativ e , q ua lif ie d immun ity

wo uld a lso
s h i e l d e a c hf e d e r a l d e f e n d an tf r o ml i a b i l i ty.

1. Applicable Statutes of Limit ations Do Not Bar Pl aintiff ’s Claims De fe nd ants a sse rt

that pl a int if

f’ s Bivens claims should be bar red by a one- y ear

statute of limit ations. Defe ndants’ ar gument has two par ts. First, defe ndants argue that it is appropriate for Bivens claims to be g overne d by the same statute of

limit ations as an a

nalog ous state-lawclaim. De fe nd ants the n a

rgue that pl a int if

f’ s c la ims are the re by

tim e -b arr e d. Th e Court

a g re e s w ith de fe nd ants on

the lim itatio n p e ri od , b ut b e c a us e so me lim itatio n p e ri od s w e re tol le d whil e pla int if f w a s in c arc e rate d th e Court fi nd s th at on ly

on e c omp on e nt o f p la int if f’ s Bivens claims—the due pr ocess c laim stemming fr om issuance of the Notice of

Escape—is tim e-ba

rre d.

“ Whe n a fe de ra l a c tio n c onta ins no statut e of lim itatio ns , c ourt s w ill or din ari ly loo k to analog ous provisions in st ate law as a sour ce of

a fe dera l limi tations period.” Doe v . U.S. Dep’ t of Justice , 753 F.2d 1092, 1114 ( D.C. Cir. 1985). This Circuit has endorse d that approa ch in the13

Bivens context. See id. The Court agree s with defenda nts that the proper

limit ation period for plaintiff’s cla ims is one y ear . Plaintiff’s overde tention Bivens c la ims are ana log ou s to fa lse imprisonment. The Four

th Amendment sea

rch a nd seizure claim is ana logous to fa lse arr est. To the extent that plaintiff’s claims stem from fa lse statements in the Notice of Esca pe, they are
ana log ou s to lib e l or

de fa matio n. In th e Di str ic t of Col umb ia , f

a lse imp ri so nme nt, fa lse arr e st, and libel ar e all subjec t to a one-year statute of limitations from the time the rig ht to maintain the action ac crue s. D.C. Code § 12-301(4). A ccor dingly , it is appropriate to a pply a one- y ear lim itatio n p e ri od

to p la int if

f’ s Bi v e ns c la ims
. De fe nd ants argue that be c a us e at le a st s ome of

the a c ts und e rl yingpla int if f’ s c la ims
oc c ur re d mo re tha

n o ne y e ar b e fo re pla int if f i nit iate d th is a c tio n o n M arc h 1 4, 20 08 , th e c la ims
are ba rr e d. De fe nd ant c ounte rs that th e lim itatio n p e ri od wa s to lle d d

ur inghe r i mpr iso nme nt, be g inn ingon ly

wh e n s he wa s r e le a se d f

ro m c us tod

y on Ma rc h 1 9, 20 07 . D .C. law a llo ws that “whe n a per son entitled to maintain an ac tion is, at the tim e the r ight of action ac crue s[,]
. . . imprisoned[,] he or his prope r re prese ntative may bringaction within the time limit ed af ter” the imp ri so nme nt e nd s. D. C. C od e § 1 2- 30 2. Th e e arl ie st a c t c omp la ine d o f i n p la int if f’ s Bivens claims—the issuance of the Notice of Esca pe—occ urre d on J une 5, 2006, af ter she ha d been turned a way from F airview . Plaintiff turned her self in to CDF on June 14, 2006, and was continuously

imprisoned there afte r until her re lease on Marc h 19, 2007. For all of the a lleg ed inj ur ie s th at oc c ur

re d d ur inghe r i nc arc e ratio n— i.e ., the iss ua nc e of the De ta ine r a

nd a ll subsequent proc essingor over detention of plaintiff—the statute of limitations was tolled pursuant to D.C. law. The only question that remains is whethe r the limitations period was tolled for pla intiff’sTh is s tatut e of lim itatio ns g ro un d is me re ly a n a lte rn ate g ro un d u

po n whic h th is c la im 9 could be dismissed. 14 c la ims re late d to the No tic e of Es c a pe . Pl a int if

f a rgue s th at he r i nju

ry re su lti ngfr om t

his a c t di d not beg in—and there fore her c ause of action did not acc rue—until her improper imprisonment beg an on Oc tober 22, 2006. This is true for plaintiff’s over detention claim, which a lleg es that the Notice of

Escape proxi mately

cause d her ove rdete ntion. Thus the limi tation period for plaintiff’s Notice -re lated over detention claim wa s tolled until plaintiff’s Mar ch 19, 2007 re lease
. But plaintiff’ s due proc ess claim alleg es that her rig hts were violated when the Notice of Escape was issued without proper proce ss. That injury

occur red at the moment the Notice wa s issued (June 5, 2006). At that time plaintiff had alre ady “esc aped” from the ha lfway house and ha d not y et turned he rself in to authorities; she wa s theref ore not hinder ed fr om bring ing suit at that time. The tolling statute ope rate s only if plaintiff is imprisoned “at the time the r ight of action
a c c ru e s. ” D. C. C od e § 1 2- 30 2; se e als o Fe rn an do rs v . D ist. o f Co lum bia , 382 F. Supp. 2d 63, 68 (D.D.C. 2005) ( Bates, J .) (“ In order to toll t he limitations period, plaintiff’s tort ac tion musthave
acc rued at the time of his imprisonment.”). Be cause plaintiff was not imprisoned on June 5—the day the Notice of

Escape was issued—the limitation period was not tolled duringher subse quent incar cer ation. The fa ct that plaintiff wa s technica lly classified a s an esc apee on J une 5 does not aff ect that c onclusion. See D ist. of Columbia v. Tinker , 691 A.2d 57, 65 (D.C. 1997) (“[R] eg ardle ss of the validity of [the prisoner’s] initial release from custody . . . , the fa ct re mains that at that instant his disabili ty of imprisonment was re moved.”) . Acc ording ly , plaintiff’s due proce ss claims stemming fr om the Notice of Escape are barr ed by

the one- y ear

statute of lim itatio ns . 915

2. A Bivens Re medy

Should Not Be Created For Plaintif f’s Injuries Def endants a ssert that bec ause a lternative r emedies a re a vailable to plaintiff, the Court should not create a Bivens reme dy for plaintiff’ s injury . In acc ordanc e with this Circuit’s pr e c e de nt, the Court

a g re e s. Court s “ have dis c re tio n in so me c ir c ums tanc e s to c re ate a re me dy a g a ins t f e de ra l of fi c ia ls for c onstitut ional violations, but [ they ] m ust decline to exercise that discretion whe re ‘ specia l fac tors counsel[] hesitation’ in doing so.” W ilson v. Libby , 535 F.3d 697, 704 ( D.C. Cir. 2008) (c i t i n g Bivens , 4 03 U. S. at 39 6; Sp ag no la v . M ath is , 859 F.2d 223, 226 ( D.C. Cir. 1988) (en banc) ). The e x istence of

a compr ehensive reme dial scheme can be one such f actor . W ilson , 535 F.3d at 705. The “c omprehe nsiveness” of a re medial sche me is not determined by the completene ss of the re medy aff orded, but rather it “re late[s] to the question of who should dec ide whether such a r emedy

should be provided.” Id
. (qu o t i n g Bivens , 403 U.S. at 380). I f it appea rs that the re medy

provided by

statute was intende d by

Congr ess to be suff

icient, a c ourt should stay its Bivens hand. As the D.C. Circuit observe d in W ilson v. Libby , since Bivens the Supreme Court ha s
rec og nized two additional context s where a Bivens reme dy is appropriate: employ

ment discrimination in violation of the Due Proce ss Clause, see D avis v. Passman , 442 U.S. 228 (1979), a nd cer tain Eig hth Amendment violations by prison officia ls, see Carlson v. Gre en , 446 U.S. 14 (1980). W

ilson , 535 F.3d at 705. Howeve r, “in most instances[, the Court has] found a Bivens r emedy unjustified.” W

ilkie v. Robbins , [1 2 7 S. Ct
. 2 5 8 8 , 2 5 9 7 ( 2 0 0 7 ) ]. In d e e d , in it s “ mo r e r e c e n t d e c is io n s [, the Sup re me Court

ha s] r e sp on de d c a

uti ou sly to s ug g e sti on s th at Bivens reme dies be extended into new c ontext s.” [ Schweike r v. Chilicky , 487 U.S. 412, 421 (1988).]16

Id. at 705. The Circ uit went on to note that even in the a bsence of a c omprehe nsive scheme , courts ca n still decline to c reate new Bi v e ns re me die s: In W ilk ie , th e re wa s n o c omp re he ns ive sc he me de mon str atin g“ that Co ngre ss e xpe c te d th e Judic iary

to s tay its Bi v e ns h an d , ” b u tth e C o urtd e c l i n e d t o i mp l y a Bivens reme dy

nonetheless. [ W

ilk ie , 1 27 S. Ct .] at 26 00 . T he Court he ld t hat a re me dy fo r a lle g e dly

ha ra ssi ngc on du c t of

g ov e rnme nt o ff

ic ia ls w ou ld “ c ome better, if at all, throug h leg islation [ beca use] ‘Congr ess is in a far

better position tha n a c ourt to e va luate the imp a c t of a ne w s pe c ie s o f l iti g atio n’ a g a ins t th os e who ac t on the public’s beha lf.” Id . at 2604–05. Thus, the Court ag ain made clea r that there is no “automatic e ntitlement” to a Bi v e ns reme dy reg ardle ss of “what other mea

ns there ma

y be to vindicate a

protec ted intere st.” Id . at 2597. Id . at 706. Her e, def endants a rgue that two statutory

reme dies—habe as cor

pus and the Privac y Act—counse l ag ainst ext ension of Bivens to plaintiff’s injuries. Those sc hemes off er w eak
re me dy , to be sure , b ut s ome re me dy no ne the le ss. Pla int if

f’ s h a be a s r e me dy , o f c ours e , w a s o nly available to her duringthe time of her incar cer ation—but she g ives no rea son why she did not pursue a habea s remedy

at that time. I t would seem per verse to enable pla intiff to obtain money damag es bec ause she chose not to pursue habea s remedy while incar cer ated. To the extent that plaintiff alleg es that fa lse or misleadinginformation was use d in issuance of the “Notice of Es c a pe ” or the De ta ine r, pla int if

f c ou ld c on c e iva

bly purs ue re me dy

thr ou g h th e Pr iva c y

Ac t. Th e e xiste nc e of

the se re me dia l sc he me s, buttr e sse d f or c e fu lly by the Court

of Ap pe a ls’ and the Supre me Court’s war nings a g ainst overe x tension of Bivens re me die s, le a ds the Court to decide ag ainst cre atinga Bivens reme dy for plaintiff’ s injuries. The Court is wary , for e x ample, of establishingoverde tention as an a ct for which monetar y damag es ar e ava ilable from f eder al officia ls. This seems to be a situation wher e Cong ress mig ht be better equipped to we igh thePlaintiffs do point t o one district cour t decision from a

nother Circuit which state d that 10 “[a] person subjected to illeg al incar cer ation may bringa Bivens claim.” See Lem arr v. John Doe Marshal( s) U.S. Marshals Servic e , N o . L
- 0 5
- 1 6 7 , 2 0 0 8 WL 2 0 7 8 1 5 9 ( S. D
. T e x. 2 0 0 8 ) ( A lv ar e z, J .). B ut neither Le ma rr

nor the a uthority it cited considere d whether alternative reme dial scheme s counseled a g ainst the cre ation of a Bivens re me dy . T hat f a c t se ve re ly

lim its Le ma rr ’s persua sive weight in this case . 17 long- term ef

fec ts of various possible re medial sche mes and c hoose the be st option. As for 10 plaintiff’s due pr ocess c laims, ag ain, the Court is retice nt to fashion a judg e-ma de re medy for
err ors in the proc essingand issuance of pape rwork. N or will the Court cre ate a reme dy for plaintiff’s deliber ate indiffe renc e cla ims, for the same r eason: it would constitute an
overe x tension of Bivens
. Pla int if f’ s F ourt h A me ndme nt c la im s ho uld be a dd re sse d s e pa

rate ly be c a us e c e rt a in Four th Amendment claims we re e x plicitly approve d in Bivens . H ow e ve r, pla int if f f a ils to
a c tua lly art ic ulate a

F ourt h A me ndme nt v iol atio n h e re . Pl a int if f a lle g e s th at sh e wa s su

bje c te d to unlawful sea

rch a nd seizure in violation of the Four th Amendment when she was fing erpr inted and proc essed by

USMS officers at the Pretty man United States Courthouse on Oc tober 19, 2006. But at that time plaintiff was lawf ully detained, se rvingher 135- day sentenc e ending Oc tob e r 2 1, 20 06 . A s d e fe nd ants no te , “ ‘[t ]he F ourt h A me ndme nt p ro hib iti on a g a ins t
unrea sonable sea

rch a nd seizure applies only

wher e identify

ing phy sical cha

rac teristics, such as fi ng e rp ri nts , a

re ob ta ine d a s a

re su lt o f u

nla wf ul d e te nti on

of a su sp e c t . . . . ’” (D e fs .’ Re ply at 8 (qu o t i n g U. S. v . D ion isi o , 410 U.S. 1, 4 (1973)).) Her e, plaintiff wa s lawfully detained when she was proc essed on Oc tober 19, so that incident did not constitute a F ourth Amendment violation.

3. In div idu al F

e de ra l D e fe nd an ts A reProte c te d B

yQu ali fie d I mm un ity18

In the alter

native, def

endants c ontend that plaintiff fa ils to st ate a claim upon which r elief can be g rante d beca

use the fe dera l defe ndants are shielded by qualified immunity . In assessing claims of qualifie d immunit y courts have the option of using the two-step test set for th in Saucier
v . Ka tz , 5 33 U. S. 1 94 (2 00 1) . St e p O ne a sk s, “ Take n in the light m os t f

avo ra ble to t he pa rt y
asser ting the injury , do the fa cts alleg ed show the [officia l’s] conduct violated a c onstitut ional rig ht? ” Id. at 201. I f not, then the inquiry ends. B ut if so, then Step Two asks “whether the ri g ht w a s c le arl y

e sta bli sh e d. Th is [St e p T wo ] inq uir y , it is v ita l to no te , mu st b e un de rt ake n in light of the specific context of the case , not as a broa d g ener al proposition.” Id. For Step 2,

“ [t]he re le va

nt, dis po sit ive inq

uir y in d e te rm ini ngwh e the r a ri g ht i s c le arl y

e sta bli sh e d is whether it would be clea

r to a re asonable office r that his conduct wa s unlawful in the situation he confr onted.” Id. at 202. I f the que stions in bot h Step One and Step Tw o are answe red in the
a f f i r m at i v e , th e nth e o f

f i c i a l i s n o tp r o t e c t e d

b y qu a l i f i e d i m mun i ty. In Pearson v. Callahan the Supreme Court he ld that the two Saucier steps need not
a lw ay s b e c on du c te d in

se qu e nc e , d e c idi ngthat “ [t]he jud g e s o f t he dis tr ic t c ourt s a

nd the c ourt s of appe als should be per

mitted to ex erc ise their sound discre tion in deciding which of the two prong s of the qualifie d immunit y analy sis should be addresse d first in light of the c ircumstance s in the particula

r ca se at ha

nd.” Pearson v. Callahan , 1 2 9 S
. C t . 8 0 8 , 8 1 8 ( 2 0 0 9 )
. A c c o r d i n g l y, this Court ex erc ises its discretion as to the seque nce of the inquiry

in assessingeac h of plaintiff’s fi ve c la ims
. i. Ove rdetention in Violation of the Fifth Amendme nt Plaintiff alleg es that she wa s overde tained in violation of the F ifth Amendment and that he r c on sti tut ion a l in

jur y wa s c a us e d b y de fe nd ants Mc L e od , B a ldw in, and Sc ott . Arguing f

or19

qualified immunity , defe ndants first contend that beca use some cour

ts consider ove rdete ntion a Fifth Ame ndment violation and others an E ighth Ame ndment violation, the unconstituti onality of overde tention is not clearly established. ( See M o t . at2 4 (c i t i n g Le ma rr v . J oh n D oeMa rsh al(

s) U.S. Marshals Servic e , No. L -05-167, 2008 WL2078159 (S.D. Tex. 2008) (Alvar ez, J .).) B ut assuming de fenda

nts are c orre ct as to the leg al conf lict, defe ndants do not assert that overde tention is not i n some way unconstitutional. The qualified immunity inquiry does not turn on the categ orization of the constitutional inj ury . So long as a defe ndant’s alleg ed conduc t violated someclea

rly established constitutional rig ht, that defe ndant is not entitled to qualified immunit y . Her e, none of the fe dera l defe ndants ac tually overde tained plaintiff; she a lleg es rather th atth e y caused

her o verd ete nt io n atCT F andCD F. Plaintiff alleg es that def

endant Mc L eod ca

used her to be unconstitutionally

overde tained by “illeg ally issuing an inva lid detainer f or a pa role violation war

rant a nd violating their

[si c] repor ting a nd notice duties to [plainti ff] and other f eder al ag encie s.” (Compl. ¶67.) Sauc ier Step On e a sk s whe the r M c L e od ’s c on du c t vi olate d p la int if f’ s c on sti tut ion a l r ig ht a g a ins t overde tention. Given that CTF pe rsonnel cited the Detaine r as the r eason pla intiff was not rele ased, this question ca

n be answ ere d in the aff

irmative (a lthough this deter mination is l imited to the fac ts of this case) . Howeve r, under Saucier Ste p T wo , whic h a sk s whe the r a re a so na ble of fi c e r i n M c L e od ’s po sit ion wo uld kn owthat he wa s v iol atin gpla int if f’ s r ig ht a g a ins t
ov e rd e te nti on , th e ans we r h e re mus t be “ no .” Mc L e od is e nti tle d to qu a lif

ie d immun ity

be c a us e he could not have known that his issuance of the Deta iner—e rrone ous though it may have be e n— wo uld re su lt i n p la int if

f’ s o ve rd e te nti on . T he De ta ine r d id n ot g ive CTF or CD F a uth or ityPlaintiff even a rgues this elsewhe re in this litigation. ( SeePl.’s Opp’n [46] to District 11 Def s.’ Mot. at 11–12 (“[T]he detainer issued here was a

reque st by

USMS t o detain [plaintiff] me re ly fo r p ur po se s o f n oti fy

ingUSM S of

an u pc omi ngre le a se date , th e re by a llo wi ngUSM S to assume custody

over he r; it did not authoriz e the District De fenda nts to hold her beyond her le g iti mate pe ri od

of c on fi ne me nt. ” ). ) E ve n if a de ta ine r d oe s g ive an in sti tut ion a uth or ity to de ta in a n inmate pa st the e nd

of his se nte nc e if

ne c e ssa ry —th e re c or d is un c le ar o n th is point—there would still be no rea son for McL eod to know that by issuing the De tainer he was n e c e s s ar i l y causing

unlawful ove rdete ntion. 20 to detain plaintiff past the e nd of her sentenc e. As it stated on its face , it directed CDF to notify

11 USM S pr ior

to r e le a sin gpla int if

f “ so that [US MS] c an a ssume c us tod y of [pla int if f] i f
nece ssary .” (Pl.’s Opp’n [59] Ex . 3.) B eca use McL eod could not have known that he wa s
c a u s i n ga c o n s t i tu t i o n a l v i o l at i o n , h e i s s h i e l d e d b y q u a l i f i e d i m mun i ty. Def endants B aldwin’s and Scott’s a ctions are much closer to the overde tention violation. P l a i n t i f f c l a i m s th atB a l dw i n , i np r o c e s s i n gp l a i n t i f f ’ s “ c o m e - u

p ” o nO c t o b e r

1 9 , 2 0 0 6 ( tw o d ays be fo re the be g inn ingof

pla int if f’ s o ve rd e te nti on ), “ de sp ite c le ar w arn ingsigns that [pl a int if f’ s]
case deser

ved attention, . . . fa iled to discover that [plaintiff] had completed her sentenc ing obligations to t he B OP and should have be en cle are d for r elea se.” ( Opp’n at 18.) Plaintiff claims that Scott, who coordinate d plaintiff’s Oc tober 19 proc essingand cor responde d with CTF and CDF , “neve r ar

rang ed for

[pl aintiff] to appear

befor e a c ourt or par

ticipate in any

hear ing or [si c] any kind reg ardingher c ustody status, [ and] did not determine [plainti ff’ s] l awf ul date of rele ase or whether a valid, lawf

ul detainer

exis ted for he r ar

rest by USMS.” (Opp’n at 18.) The court is baf

fled a s to the purpose of this come -up if not to proce ss plaintiff pursuant to the “par ole violation warr ant” r efe renc ed in the De tainer. The undisputed fac t that there w as no such
un de rl yingwa

rr ant s ho uld

have be e n d isc ov e re d d

ur ingthe c ome -u

p, and de fe nd ants B a ldw in and Scott have no e x cuse f or this oversig ht. Howeve r, like McL eod, it cannot be said that21

re a so na ble of fi c e rs in B a ldw in’ s and

Sc ott ’s po sit ion

wo uld have kn own th at th e ir

a c tio ns wo uld lead to plaintiff’ s overde tention. The fa ct re mains that the Deta iner g ave CTF and CDF no
a p p ar e n ta u th o r i ty t o c o n t i nu e t o h o l d p l a i n t i f f p a s tth e e x p i r at i o no f

h e r s e n t e n c e . A c c o r d i n g l y, B a l dw i nan d

S c o t tar e a l s o p r o t e c t e d

b y qu a l i f i e d i m mun i ty.

ii. Procedural DueProcess Unde r the Fifth Amendme nt Pla int if f a lle g e s th at th e fe de ra l de fe nd ants vio late d h e r c on sti tut ion a l r ig ht t o d ue pr oc e ss in connec tion with (1) issuance of the Notice of

Escape , (2) issuanc e of the Detaine r, and ( 3) her rig ht to a hear ing dur ing he r dete ntion. Bec ause the Court concludes that none of plaintiffs
a lle g atio ns , if

pr ov e n, wo uld

fo rm c on sti tut ion a l vi olatio ns on the pa rt of the fe de ra l de fe nd ants ( Saucier S t e p O n e ) , d e f

e n d an t s ar e e n t i t l e d

t o qu a l i f i e d i m mun i ty. Plaintiff claims that McL eod violated he r rig ht to due proce ss beca use he did not ensur e that plaintiff re ceive d notice of the char g es ag ainst her. How ever , it does not appea r that McL eod eve r had a

ny obligation to give suc h notice. The Detaine r itself indicate s that plaintiff’s custodian—DOC (or

perha ps CCA, but definitely

not USMS )—wa s to give notice and a copy of the Deta iner to plaintiff. (O pp’n Ex. 3.) I f notice w as not g iven, it was as a result of a

n err or of the par t of DOC or CCA, not McL eod. Plaintiff claims that all fede ral de fenda nts deprived plaintiff of

proce dural saf

eguards duringher 149- day

overde tention. (Compl. ¶75.) Plaintiff ge ts no more spec ific than a lleg ing that hear ings did not occ ur af ter plaintiff’ s leg itimate sentence ended on O ctober 21, 2006. (Opp’n at 19–20.) Plaintiff does not specify why any fede ral de fenda

nt was re sponsible forPlaintiff’s motion does detail the duties owed onc e a pa rolee is taken into fede ral 12 c u s t o dy ( see P l
. ’ s O p p ’ n[ 5 9 ] at2 0 ) , b u tp l a i n t i f f w a s n e v e r

t ak e ni n t o U S M S c u s t o dy. This is merely

an alter nate ground for

dismiss al. The pr imary

g round for

dismiss al 13 ag ainst Whi te is lack of jur isdiction. 22 ensuringsuch a he aringtook place. Even if plaintiff is c orre ct that she ha d a constitutional 12 rig ht to a hear ing, he r alleg ations, even if pr oved, would not establish that one or more of the fede ral de fenda

nts violated that rig ht, or that any of the fe dera l defe ndants should have known they wer e doingso at the time. Plaintiff claims that Whi te violated her due proc ess rig hts by

issuing a N otice of Esc ape

“ ba se d u po n th e c on sti tut ion a lly

ina de qu ate pr oc e dure s o f t he F a ir vie w [h a lf

wa y ho us e ] in cate g orizing plaintiff a s an esc apee .” (Compl. ¶76.) Plaintiff conte nds that Whi te should not have issued the Notice of Escape without a written statement of fac ts or an informa l investigation into the vera city

of F airview ’s claims. (Opp’ n at 21.) Plaintiff cites no law supporting suc h a require ment in this contex t, arguing instea d that due-pr ocess law should be extended from other prisoner situations. Follow the Saucier proce dure, the Court first determines whether the
c on du c t a lle g e d f

or ms a c on sti tut ion a l vi olatio n; t his Court , h avin gno t be e n p ro vid e d a uth or ity indicatingthat more proc ess is neede d prior to a Notice of Esca pe, conc ludes that it does not. B ut e ve n if

thi s Co ur t did c on c lud e that mo re pr oc e ss w a s n e c e ssa ry , d e fe nd ant Wh ite wo uld sti ll be entitled to qualified immunity beca use, at the time of his a ctions, the law re quiringextended proce ss was not clea

rly established. 13

iii. Deliberate I

ndifferenceas to Const itutional Violations Pla int if f’ s f ina l c on sti tut ion a l c la ims a lle g e “ de lib e ra te ind if fe re nc e ” by

de fe nd ants23

L appin and Scott. “While . . . deliberate indiffer ence entails something mor e than mer e neg lige nce, the case s are also clea r that it is satisfied by

something le ss than acts or omissions for the ver y purpose of

causingharm or w ith knowledg e that har m will result.” Farmer v . Brennan , 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1970). The more a ccur ate standa rd for deliberate indiffer ence is that of
rec klessness. Id. at 83 6 ( “ I t is
. . . f a ir to s ay that a c tin gor

fa ili ngto a c t w ithde lib e rate ind if fe re nc e to a

su bs tanti a l r isk

of se ri ou s h arm

to a pr iso ne r i s th e e qu iva le nt o f r e c kle ssl y disreg ardingthat risk.”). At the outset, defe ndants argue that no ca se establishes that “ deliberate indiffer ence ” exis ts in the Bivens context in cases that do not involve inmate hea lth and safe ty . (Reply at 12 (c i t i n g Farmer , 511 U.S. at 834 (1994).) Farmer , an Eig hth Amendment ca se, did place one lim it o n th e e xtent of

de lib e rate ind if

fe re nc e c la ims , s tatin gthat th e y wo uld be ina pp ro pr iate in
case s “whe re the decisions of prison off icials are ty

pically made in haste , under pr essure , and fre quently

without the lux ury

of a se cond cha

nce.” Farmer , 511 U.S. at 835 (interna l quotations
and c itatio ns omi tte d) . T his is n ot s uc h a c a se . D e fe nd ants c ite no oth e r c a se su pp or tin gits limit ation on the deliber ate indiffe renc e standa rd, and the Court declines to adopt such a limit ation here
. Thus the question is whether plaintiff has prope rly

alleg ed deliber ate indiffe renc e. As for defe ndant Scott, plaintiff alleg es that on De cembe r 6, 2006, Scott rec eived notice (in the for m of the fax from CCA) that plaintiff’s se ntence expired on October 21, 2006. (Compl. ¶54.) The f ax also reque sted that USMS ex ecute its parole violation war rant for plaintiff (whic h did not ex ist). (WHH’s Reply

Ex . 15 [43-9] .) Plaintiff claims that this fax provided Scott with not ice of plaintiff’s over detention. (Compl. ¶92.) In the Court’s view, these fac ts do not establish S cott’sIn her O pposition [ 46] t o District Def endants’ Motion to Dismiss, plainti ff c ites DOC 14 guidelines which see m to indicate that USM-41 “intra nsit holds” should onl y

justify custody overnight, for less than one workingday , or in some ca ses over a we ekend or

holiday . ( SeePl.’s Op p’ n [46 ] at

13 .) Ho we ve r, pla int if

f p ro vid e s n o e vid e nc e or oth e r r e a so n why

USM S sh ou ld interpre t in-transit holds as justify ing c ommitm ent only for suc h short periods. 24 rec klessness with relation to plainti ff’ s continued over detention. Had Scott investig ated plaintiff’s status—which she may well have —it would have re veale d that plaintiff was be ing held subject to the USM-41 “ in-transit hold” since he r sentenc e expired on Oc tober 21 (a pp ro ximate ly

46 da y s) . In th e Court ’s e xpe ri e nc e , s uc h in -t ra ns it h old s a

re g e ne ra lly considere d valid for 30 to 45 day s. I t cannot be sa id that Scott, upon encounteringa prisoner 14 wh o h a d b e e n h e ld o n a

n in -t ra ns it h old fo r 4 6 d ay s, sh ou ld h ave kn own th at th e pr iso ne r’ s r ig hts
wer e about to be violate d. Acc ording ly , plaintiff has fa iled to make out a c laim ag ainst Scott for deliberate indiffer ence . As fo r d e fe nd ant L a

pp in, pla int if

f a lle g e s th at L a

pp in f a ile d to “ tr a in a

nd /or su pe rv ise BO P employ ees r esponsible for e nsuringthe timely rele ase of

detainee s and inmates,” thus
c ontr ibutin gto p la int if

f’ s o ve rd e te nti on . ( Com

pl. ¶1 00 .) Pla int if

f c la ims that th e pu

bli c ity surroundingthe class a ction litigation By nu m, e t al. v . D ist ric t of Colum bia , No. 02-956 (D.D.C.), which beg an in 2002 and se ttled in 2006, put L appin on notice of the nee d to train and supervise e mploy ees on the dang ers of overde tention in CDF and CTF . But CDF and CTF a re run under the auspice s of DOC, not BO P. The most that can be r easona bly said about B OP’s involvement in plaintiff’s over detention—and a ll that plaintiff argues—is that BO P issued the

“ No tic e of

Es c a pe .” Pla int if

f s e e ms t o s ome ho w b e arguin gthat du e to C TF and CD F ’s pa st overde tentions, BOP Dire ctor L appin somehow should have known to g ive his personne l more tr a ini ngin t

he iss uin gof

No tic e s o f E sc a

pe . T his argume nt i s unc onvin c ing , a nd it f a ils to25

proper ly alleg e deliber ate indiffe renc e.

C. FT CA Cl a i ms Plaintiff asserts cla ims of neg lige nce a nd false imprisonment ag ainst the United States
un de r t he F e de ra l T or

t Cla ims Ac t ( F TCA ). De fe nd ants argue that to the e xtent th at th e se c la ims
are related to the investig atory , supervisory , or trainingresponsibilities of the various fe dera l defe ndants, they

should be dismissed because they are barr ed by

the “discr etionary

function
e xce pti on ” to t

he F TCA . T he Court

dis a g re e s a

nd wi ll n ot d ism iss pla int if

f’ s F TCAc la ims
. Th e F TCAa llo ws the Un ite d St ate s to be he ld l ia ble for injury . . . cause d by

the neg lige nt or wrong ful ac t or omission of any employ ee of

the Gover

nment while ac ting within the scope of his office or employ ment, under c ircumstance s where the United States, if a pr ivate per son, would be liable to the c laimant in acc ordanc e with the law of the place wher e the act or omission occurre d. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). The FTCA’ s discretionar y function exception excludes [a]ny c la im .
. . ba se d u

po n th e e xer c ise or

pe rf or manc e or the fa ilure to e xer c ise or per form a disc retionar

y function or duty

on the par

t of a fe dera l ag ency

or an employ ee of

the Gover

nment, whether

or not the discre tion involved be abused. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). De fenda nts argue that this exception preclude s plaintiff’s F TCA claims. The Court nee d not spend much time on defe ndants’ ar gument, howeve r, bec ause pla intiff alleg es that the United States, through its employ ees’ acts, ha s violated plaintiff’s c onstitut ional rig hts. Other cir cuits have c lear ly held that whate ver the brea dth of a g overnme nt employ ee’ s discretion, that discre tion does not include violating c onstitut ional rig hts. See, e .g., Thames Shipyard &Repair Co. v. United States , 350 F.3d 247, 254 ( 1st Cir. 2003) (“[C] ourts have r ead the Supreme Court’s discr etionary function ca ses as de nying pr otection to actions that ar e26

unauthorized bec ause the y are unconstitutional . . . .”); Medina v . United States , 259 F.3d 220, 225 (4th Cir. 2001) (notingthat in determiningthe bounds of the discr etionary function
e xce pti on , “ we be g in w iththe pr inc ipl e that f e de ra l of fi c ia ls d o n ot p os se ss d isc re tio n to vio late
c on sti tut ion a l r ig hts or

fe de ra l st atut e s” ) ( int e rn a l qu otatio n ma rk s a nd c itatio ns omi tte d) ; Pooler v. United States , 787 F.2d 868, 871 ( 3rd Cir. 1986) (“ [I ]f the complaint were that ag ents of the g ov e rnme nt i n th e c ours e of an inve sti g atio n h a d v iol ate d c on sti tut ion a l r ig hts or fe de ra l st atut e s,

. . . f e de ra l of fi c ia ls d o n ot p os se ss d isc re tio n to c omm it s uc h v iol atio ns .” ); Mye rs &Mye rs, Inc. v. U.S. Postal Serv

. , 5 27 F .2 d 1 25 2, 12 61 (2 d Ci r. 19 75 ) ( “ I t is , o f c ours e , a ta uto logy that a fede ral off

icial ca nnot have discr etion to behave unconstitutionally . . . .”). This Circuit has indicated similar sentiments. See R ed Lake B and of Chippewa Indians v. United States , 800 F.2d 11 87 , ( D. C. C ir . 1 98 6) (“ [A] de c isi on c ann ot b e sh ie lde d f

ro m li a bil ity if the de c isi onmake r i s actingwithout actual author ity . A g overnme nt official ha s no discretion to violate the binding laws, re gulations, or policies that define the extent of his official powe rs.”) . Be cause plaintiff alleg es that g overnme nt employ ees violate d her c onstitut ional rig hts, her F TCA claims do not fall within the discre tionary function exception. Be cause this is defendants’ only argument for dismiss al of plaintiff’ s FTCA c laims, defenda nts’ motion will be denie d.

V. DI STRIC T D EF EN DA NT S’ M OTI ON TO D ISM ISS Plaintiff asserts constitutional claims ag ainst the District of Columbia, DOC Direc tor Br own, and DO C office rs or e mploy ees ( collectively “District def

endants” ) under

42 U.S.C. § 1983 and common-la

w tort. District defe ndants move to dismiss [ 38] or, in the alternative, f or summary judgme nt [ 39]. Beca

use of a separ ate c lass action in this Court, however, the CourtCCA defenda nts’ initial mot ion [ 14] m istakenly asser ted that they

fac ed no fe dera l 15 claims. Their Reply

corr ecte d that err or. The Court will there fore construe the motion as se e kin gdis mis sa l of

bo th t he fe de ra l and

c omm on -l aw c la ims
. 27 e le c ts t o s tay

a ll c la ims a s to Di str ic t de fe nd ants . As District defe ndants note, plaintiff is cove red by the class c ertification in Barnes v. Di str ic t of Colum bia . Orde r [33] , Civ. No. 06-315 (D.D.C. Mar . 26, 2007) (de finingthe “Ove rdete ntion Cl ass” a s eac h person ove rdeta ined by the District of Columbia from September 1, 20 05 fo rw ard ). Di str ic t de fe nd ants re qu e st that th e Court sta y pla int if f’ s d isc ov e ry

re qu e st s o as not to interfe re w ith the Barnes litigation (seeDistrict Def s.’ Reply [57] at 13), a

nd the Court will gr ant that re quest. Also to avoid interfe renc e with Barnes , the Court will deny District defe ndants’ motion to dism iss without prejudice as to its beingref iled at a late r date
.

VI . C CADE F EN DA NT S’ M OTI ON TO D ISM ISS Pla int if f a sse rt s c la ims a g a ins t CCA , O ff ic e r T utw ile r, and

CCAe mpl oye e s ( c oll e c tiv e ly

“ CCAde fe nd ants ” ) u

nd e r b oth 42 U. S.C. § 1 98 3 a

nd c omm on -l aw n e g lig e nc e and fa lse imp ri so nme nt t

he or ie s. CCAde fe nd ants mov e to d ism iss a ll c la ims
. 15 A. Section 1983 Claim s Cannot Be Dism issed Pla int if f’ s § 19 83 c la ims , b ro ught a g a ins t CCAde fe nd a nts un de r t

he the or y that CCA was pe rfor

ming a traditional g overnme ntal function and its employ ees w ere actingunder c olor of state law, c annot be dismissed. Plaintiff’s various § 1983 a lleg ations all relate to her unde rlying cla im th at s he w as o verd eta in ed atCT F. CCAde fe nd ants make thr e e ma in a rgume nts fo r d ism iss a l of the § 1 98 3 c la ims . F ir st, th e y ar gu e th e c l a i m s ar e f o r e c l o s e d b y Correctional Service

s Corp. v. Malesko , 534 U.S. 61Malesko he ld t hat Bi v e ns v . S

ix Un k no wn F e de ra l Na rc oti cs A ge nts , 403 U.S. 388 16 (1971), did not extend to suit s ag ainst private c orre ctional cor porations. It did not affec t the re a c h o f 4 2 U .S. C. § 19 83 , und e r whic h th e se c la ims a re br ou g ht. 28 (2001). B ut beca

use Malesko only

fore closed suits ag ainst private c orre ctional cor porations
a c tin gun de r c olo r o f f

e de ra l la w— no t un de r s tate law, a s is a lle g e d h e re—th is a rgume nt f a ils
. 16 CCA defenda

nts then argue that a pr ovision of the Prison L itigation Refor m Act—42 U.S.C. § 19 97 e (a )—

pr oh ibi ts s uc h li tig atio n whe n th e pla int if f h a s f a ile d to e xha

us t ava ila ble administrative re medies. B ut this t oo fails. The pr ovision states that “[n] o action shall be broug ht with respec t to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other F eder al law, by a prisoner

confine d in any

jail, prison, or other c orre ctional fa cility until such
a dmi nis tr ativ e re me die s a s are ava ila ble are e xha

us te d. ” 42 U. S.C. § 1 99 7e (a ). Ev e n if thi s provision does cove r the substanc e of pla intiff’s over detention claim, it does not cove r plaintiff herse lf. Plaintiff broug ht this claim not whil e she w as “c onfined in” a ny prison, but rather

afte r she had be en re lease d; likewise, at that time she wa s not a “prisone r” unde r the de finition in t he statute, see42 U.S.C. § 1997e(h) (“ [T] he ter m ‘prisoner’ means a

ny person inca

rce rate d or detained in a

ny fac ility . . . .”). CCA defenda

nts’ final ar gument for dismissal of the § 1983 cla ims ag ainst them is that CCA and its employ ees ha d no leg al rig ht to relea se plaintiff. De fenda nts cite D.C. law, which specifie s that “[a]n i nmate conf ined in the CTF sha ll be deeme d to be at all times in the leg al custody of the De partment of Corr ections. Only the Depa rtment of Corre ctions shall have
a uth or ity to t ra ns fe r o r a ssi g n inmate s into o r o ut o f t he CTF .” D. C. C od e § 2 4- 26 1. 03 (a ). Thus , defe ndants argue, they

had no leg al rig ht or ability to provide plaintiff the r elief she reque sted. Howeve r, as plaintiff note s, this argument is called into question by provisions in the contrac t29

betwee n D.C. and CCA which spec ify that “‘if the Oper ator [CCA] believes that an inmate has be e n e rr on e ou sly

a ssi g ne d to the CTF or

wa rr ants tr ans fe r, it m ay

re qu e st h is o r h e r t

ra ns fe r i n
a c c or da nc e wi th D OC po lic ie s and pr a c tic e .’ ” (D e fs .’ Op p’ n [24 ] at 8 ( qu oti ngEx. 1 ). ) T his provision does not resolve the issue of whe ther de fenda nts could have r emedied pla intiff’s situation, but i t does rende r plausible plaintiff’ s claims that defe ndants could have—and per haps should have—infor

med DOC of plaintiff’ s inquiries reg ardingher inc arc eration, an act whic h po ssi bly c ou ld h ave re su lte d in

he r r e le a se . T his is e no ugh f or pla int if f’ s § 19 83 c la ims to
surv ive de fe nd ants ’ m oti on to d ism iss
. B. Com m on-Law Claim s (Negligence and False Im prisonme nt) Cannot Be Dism issed Plaintiff’s common-law c laims will notbe dismissed here either. A g ain, to survive de fe nd ants ’ m oti on

to d ism iss , p la int if

f n e e d o nly

make a c la im f or re lie f t hat is pla us ibl e on its fac e. Plaintiff has done so here , and def endants’ motion will be denied. Plaintiff’s neg lige nce c laim alleg es that CCA defe ndants brea ched the ir duty to plaintiff by failingto respond to her

inquiries about the re asons for he r inca rce ration and f

ailing to infor

m DOC of her

pleas, whic h plaintiff claims could have shortene d or pre vented he r orde al. Plaintiff claims that her phy sical custody by CCA was sufficie nt to give r ise to a duty of ca re ( Pl.’s Opp’n to CCA Defs.’ Mot. at 5 (c iting Restateme nt (2d) of Tor ts § 314A(4) ( “ One who i s r equi r ed b y l aw t o t ake orv ol unt ar i l yt akes t he c us t odyof ano t herun derci r cum s t ances s uch as t o d epr i v e t he other of his norm al opportuniti es f or prot ection is under a si m il ar duty[ to t ake r easona ble action to pro te c t the m aga inst u nre a son a ble risk of ph y sic a l ha rm ] to th e oth e r.”))) a nd tha t C C A de f e nd a nts’ f ailure t o look into her st atus orr espond to her inquir ybreache d that dutyand ca used plainti f f ’s i n j u r y. He r f

a lse imp ri so nme nt c la im a lle g e s th at th e pr ima fa c ie e le me nts of

the c la im a

re me t;30

that is, that plaintiff was (1) detained a g ainst her will (2) unla wfully , see Fanie l v. Chesapeak e & Potomac Tel. Co. , 404 A.2d 147, 150 (D.C. 1979). De fe nd ants c onte st b oth

the ne g lig e nc e and

fa lse imp ri so nme nt c la ims wi th t he same argument they

used for the § 1983 claims—that they had no leg al authority

to relea se plaintiff. Ho we ve r, a g a in, pla int if

f p la us ibl y c la ims that de fe nd ants did have a uth or ity to r e sp on d to plaintiff’s inquiries, investig ate he r cla ims, and inform DOC of he r situation, which may have preve nted at lea st some of her ove rdete ntion. The Court need not at this st ag e dete rmine whe ther CCAde fe nd ants in f

a c t ow e d a

duty to p la int if

f o r whe the r p la int if

f w a s in fa c t un lawf

ull y detained. Plaintiff doe s state a c laim that could pla us ibl ye n t i t l e h e r

t o r e l i e f
. A c c o r d i n g l y, plaintiff’s common-la

w claims ag ainst CCA defenda nts cannot be dismissed. F ina lly , w ithre g ard

to t he ne g lig e nc e c la im i n p art ic ula r, pla int if f a rgue s th at McAllister
v . D ist ric t of Colum bia , 653 A.2d 849, 852 (D.C. 1995), which g rante d summary judgme nt for the cor rec tional defe ndant af

ter findingthat the plaintiff fa iled to establish the exis tence a duty
. Contrary to defe ndants’ asse rtions, that case in no way mandates that this claim be dismis sed. All that plaintiff must do at this s tag e—fa ced w ith defenda nts’ Motion to Dism iss—is st ate a claim for r elief that is plausible on its fac e. Plaintiff’s cla im—that the ordinary duty of ca re, tog e the r w ithOf

fi c e r T utw ile r’ s o ff

e rs of a ssi sta nc e , s up po rt

the e xiste nc e of

a duty —is sufficie nt to defeat defe ndants’ motion.

CO NC LU SION F or the fo re g oin gre a so ns , th e Cou rt wi ll d e ny WHH ’s mot ion

(a nd de ny pla int if f’ s c ro ssmotion), gr ant in part a

nd deny in part fe dera l defe ndants’ motion, deny without prejudice31

Di str ic t de fe nd ants ’ m oti on and sta y dis c ov e ry

a s to Di str ic t de fe nd ants , a nd de ny CCA defe ndants’ motion. A sepa rate order shall issue this date.
Signed by Roy ce C. L amber

th, Chief J udg e, on F ebrua ry 24, 2009.