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Case No. 2:18-cv-00242-DGC

Thomas A. Saenz* (Cal. Bar. No. 159430)

Andrés Holguin-Flores* (Cal. Bar No. 305860)

MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL

DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND

634 South Spring Street, 11th Floor

Los Angeles, California 90014

Telephone: (213) 629-2512

E-mail: tsaenz@maldef.org aholguin-flores@maldef.org

*admitted pro hac vice

Nina Perales* (Tex. Bar No. 24005046)

MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL

DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND

110 Broadway St., Suite 300

San Antonio, TX 78205

Telephone: (210) 224-5476

E-mail: nperales@maldef.org

*admitted pro hac vice

Daniel R. Ortega, Jr. (Ariz. Bar No. 005015)

ORTEGA LAW FIRM, P.C.

361 East Coronado Rd., Suite 101

Phoenix, AZ 85004-1525

Telephone: (602) 386-4455

Facsimile: (602) 386-4480

E-mail: danny@ortegalaw.com

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

Don Bivens (Ariz. Bar. No. 005134)

Patricia Lee Refo (Ariz. Bar. No. 017032)

SNELL & WILMER, LLP

One Arizona Center

400 E. Van Buren St., Suite 1900

Phoenix, Arizona 85004-2002

Telephone: 602.382.6000

Facsimile 602.382.6070

Email: dbivens@swlaw.com

prefo@swlaw.com

Donald B. Verrilli, Jr.* (D.C. Bar. No. 

420434)

Michael B. DeSanctis* (D.C. Bar No. 

460961)

Christopher M. Lynch *(D.C. Bar No. 

1049152)

MUNGER, TOLLES & OLSON LLP

1155 F St. NW-- 7th Floor

Washington, DC 20004

Telephone: (202) 220-1100

Email: michael.desanctis@mto.com

*pro hac vice application forthcoming

Case 2:18-cv-00242-DGC Document 33 Filed 11/02/18 Page 1 of 21
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Peter J. Kadzik* (D.C. Bar No. 964007)

VENABLE LLP

600 Massachusetts Ave. NW

Washington, DC 20001

Telephone: (202) 344-4147

Email: PJKadzik@Venable.com

*pro hac vice application forthcoming

Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Jane V.; John A.; John E.; Jane F.; John D.; 

John M.; Jane N.; and John W.; 

individually and on behalf of all others 

similarly situated,,

Plaintiff,

v.

Motel 6 Operating L.P., a limited 

partnership; G6 Hospitality LLC, a limited 

liability company, dba Motel 6; and Does 

1-10,

Defendant.

No. 2:18-cv-00242-DGC

JOINT MOTION FOR AN ORDER 

(1) GRANTING PRELIMINARY 

APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION 

SETTLEMENT, (2) 

CONDITIONALLY CERTIFYING 

SETTLEMENT CLASS, (3) 

APPOINTING CLASS 

REPRESENTATIVES AND CLASS 

COUNSEL, (4) APPROVING 

NOTICE PLAN, AND (5) SETTING 

FINAL APPROVAL HEARING

Case 2:18-cv-00242-DGC Document 33 Filed 11/02/18 Page 2 of 21
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1 Case No. 2:18-cv-00242-DGC

I. INTRODUCTION

The Parties seek preliminary approval of their proposed class action settlement.1

 

The settlement results from negotiations between the Parties and the use of a respected 

mediator, and resolves Plaintiffs’ claims for significant relief. Specifically:

• Defendants will pay (a) $50 in damages to guests at Motel 6’s Operated 

Locations whose Guest Information was shared with Federal Immigration 

Authorities, up to a class-wide total of $1,000,000; (b) $1000 in damages to 

each Class Member questioned by Federal Immigration Authorities during 

his or her stay, up to a class-wide total of $1,000,000; and (c) an amount of 

at least $7,500 to each Class Member who was placed in immigration 

removal proceedings in connection with their encounter with Federal 

Immigration Authorities during his or her stay, up to a class-wide total of 

$5,600,000.

• Defendants will maintain a policy, enforceable through a two year consent 

decree, that they shall not share Guest Information with Federal Immigration 

Authorities without a judicially enforceable warrant or subpoena, except in 

exigent circumstances.

The proposed settlement satisfies all the criteria for preliminary approval under 

federal law. Accordingly, Plaintiffs request that the Court conditionally certify the 

proposed Settlement Class, and the Parties request that the Court preliminarily approve the 

settlement, approve and direct distribution of notice in the form presented in the exhibits 

filed with this motion, and approve the schedule for the Final Approval Hearing.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On January, 24, 2018, Plaintiffs filed a class action complaint in the United States 

District Court for the District of Arizona against Motel 6 Operating L.P. and G6 

Hospitality LLC (“Defendants”). ECF. No. 1. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants employed 

 

1 All initial-capped words refer to the terms and definitions in the settlement agreement 

(“Agreement”). 

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2 Case No. 2:18-cv-00242-DGC

a corporate policy at motels they own and operate to provide Guest Information at the 

request of Federal Immigration Authorities. Id. Plaintiffs’ putative class action complaint 

challenges Defendants’ alleged policy as discriminatory, unconstitutional, and violative of 

state laws protecting consumers. On May 8, 2018, Defendants filed an answer and 

defenses to the class action complaint, denying any wrongdoing or violation of the law. 

ECF. No. 23. 

The Agreement is the product of vigorous, adversarial, and competent 

representation of the Parties and substantive negotiations throughout the pendency of this 

litigation. The Parties began negotiations in earnest on or about March 8, 2018, when the 

Parties met to discuss their views of the case. Declaration of Andres Holguin-Flores 

(“Holguin-Flores Decl.”) ¶ 6. On June 15, 2018, the Parties engaged in a day-long 

mediation with Martin F. Scheinman, Esq., an independent and respected neutral, as a 

professional mediator, which resulted in a tentative settlement. Agreement, attached as 

Exhibit A to [Proposed] Order, § IV.C. No trial date has been set and the Parties have not 

appeared for a Case Management Conference.

Plaintiffs’ counsel believe they could make a strong showing of why they should 

succeed on the merits of their claims. Based on diligent effort, Plaintiffs’ counsel has been 

aware of the attendant strengths, risks, and uncertainties of their case during the course of 

this litigation and settlement negotiations. Holguin-Flores Decl. ¶ 8. Defendants, on the 

other hand, vigorously deny any wrongdoing or liability and contend that they would be 

wholly successful in defeating Plaintiffs’ claims at or before trial. Defendants deny that 

they had or employed a policy and/or practice that was discriminatory, unconstitutional or 

violative of any state laws. Agreement § XIV.A.

While both sides robustly contest the issues, the Parties appreciate the costs and 

uncertainty attendant to any litigation and have agreed to the proposed Agreement. Id. 

Plaintiffs’ counsel entered into the Agreement after considering, among other things: (i) 

the substantial benefits to Class Members under the terms of the settlement; (ii) the 

uncertainty and expense of being able to prevail through trial and on appeal; (iii) the 

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attendant risks, difficulties, and delays inherent in complex actions such as this; and (iv) 

the desirability of consummating this settlement promptly to provide substantive relief to 

Class Members without unnecessary delay and expense. Holguin-Flores Decl. ¶ 8.

III. SUMMARY OF THE SETTLEMENT

A. Proposed Class Definitions and Monetary Relief

For purposes of equitable relief and monetary damages under Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure 23(b)(2) and (b)(3), respectively, the classes represented by Plaintiffs and the 

monetary damages they will be provided are as follows:

• A Primary Class, consisting of all persons who stayed at an Operated 

Location between February 1, 2017, and November 2, 2018, and whose 

Guest Information was provided to Federal Immigration Authorities by 

Defendants’ employees, except those who file a timely request to opt-out of 

the monetary damages provisions. Defendants will pay $50 to each member 

of the Primary Class who is not also a member of either Class 2 or Class 3 

who makes a legitimate claim, up to a class-wide total of $1,000,000.

• Class 2, consisting of all persons who are not members of Class 3 who were 

questioned and/or interrogated by Federal Immigration Authorities at an 

Operated Location as a result of a Primary Class member’s Guest 

Information being provided to Federal Immigration Authorities, except those 

who file a timely request to opt-out of the monetary damages provisions. 

Defendants will pay $1,000 to each member of Class 2 who makes a 

legitimate claim, up to a class-wide total of $1,000,000.

• Class 3, consisting of all persons who were placed in immigration removal 

proceedings in connection with their encounter with Federal Immigration 

Authorities at an Operated Location as a result of a Primary Class member’s 

Guest Information being provided to Federal Immigration Authorities, 

except those who file a timely request to opt-out of the monetary damages 

provisions. Defendants will pay each class member of Class 3 who makes a 

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legitimate claim an amount not less than $7,500, to be determined by the 

claims administrator in consultation with Class Counsel, up to a class-wide 

total of $5,600,000.

Agreement § VII.A.1 & XII.A.1-3. Claims will be evaluated as to membership in the 

Primary Class based on whether it can reasonably be determined from Defendants’ records 

and the information provided in the claim form that the claimant’s Guest Information was 

provided to Federal Immigration Authorities. Id. § XII.N.1. Membership in Class 2 or 

Class 3 will be based on whether it can reasonably be determined from Defendants’ 

records and information provided in the claim form that their encounter with Federal 

Immigration Authorities at an Operated Location was a result of a Primary Class 

Member’s Guest Information being provided to Federal Immigration Authorities. Id. at § 

XII.N.3.

Any unclaimed funds dedicated to Classes 2 and 3 remaining in the Settlement 

Account will be included in a cy pres fund to be distributed to a non-profit organization or 

organizations approved by the Court. Id. at § XII.P. The Parties have agreed to propose 

Florence Immigrant & Refugee Rights Project, Northwest Immigrant Rights Project, 

National Immigrant Justice Center, and TheDream.US, allocating 40% to each of the 

former two and 10% to each of the latter two. Holguin-Flores Decl. ¶ 9.

B. Equitable Relief

a. Injunctive Relief

Defendants agree to injunctive relief whereby they institute, implement, and 

maintain the following practices and procedures (“the Policy”): First, Defendants must 

establish a 24-Hour Hotline to assist their employees when the employees receive any 

request for Guest Information from Federal Immigration Authorities. Agreement § 

X.A.1.a. Second, Defendants must not share Guest Information with Federal Immigration 

Authorities unless they provide a judicially enforceable warrant or subpoena, or if it is 

necessary to prevent a significant crime, or where there is a credible reason to believe that 

a guest, employee or other individual is in immediate danger and is at risk of serious 

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bodily injury or death. Id. at § X.A.1.b.i. Third, Defendants must establish a brand 

standard prohibiting Franchised Properties from providing Guest Information to Federal 

Immigration Authorities, except in the same exigent circumstances described above. Id. at 

§ X.A.1.b.v. Fourth, all warrants or subpoenas presented by Federal Immigration 

Authorities must be sent to the Defendants’ legal department or other individuals who have 

been trained to comply with the Policy. Id. at § X.A.1.b.ii. Fifth, Defendants must create 

an online mechanism for Guests to report when they believe that the Policy has been 

violated in any manner. Id. at § X.A.1.b.iv.

Defendants will also train employees at Operated Locations who have the ability to 

make a guest list available to understand their responsibilities with regard to the above 

Policy. Id. at § X.A.2.ii. The Agreement provides that this equitable relief will be entered 

as a two-year consent decree, providing the Court with jurisdiction to enter all orders 

necessary to implement the relief provided. Id. at §§ VI, VII.

b. Dispute Resolution and Enforcement Procedures

The Parties have agreed that Martin F. Scheinman, Esq., is to be appointed as 

Settlement Administrator with authority to resolve all disputes arising under the 

Agreement. Id. at § X.B.1-2. The Parties have also agreed to extensive dispute resolution 

procedures. See generally id. at § X.B.3-7.

C. Costs of Notice and Attorneys’ Fees

Defendants agree to pay the costs of notice to class members and claims 

administration, not to exceed $1,000,000.00. Arden Claims Service will conduct class 

notice and claims administration in consultation with the Parties, and will invoice 

Defendants directly for its fees and costs. Agreement § XII.A.5-6. Defendants have 

further agreed to pay Class Counsel an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees, litigation 

expenses, and costs in the amount of $300,000.00. Id. at §XIII.A.

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IV. THE COURT SHOULD CONDITIONALLY CERTIFY THE CLASS2

A proposed class may be certified for settlement purposes if it satisfies Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 23(a), “namely: (1) numerosity, (2) commonality, (3) typicality, and (4) 

adequacy of representation.” Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 

1998). In consumer class actions, doubts on certifying a class should be resolved in favor 

of certification. See City P’ship Co. v. Jones Intercable, Inc., 213 F.R.D. 576, 581 (D. 

Colo. 2002).

Additional requirements for class settlements will take effect under amendments to 

Rule 23 effective December 1, 2018. Under the amendments, notice must be directed to 

class members who would be bound by the proposal if approval of the settlement and 

certification of the class are shown to be likely. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1)(B) (Dec. 2018). 

The court must consider whether “the class representatives and class counsel have 

adequately represented the class,” “the proposal was negotiated at arm’s length,” “the 

relief provided for the class is adequate,” and the proposal treats class members equitably 

relative to each other. Id. 23(e)(2). The settlement here meets the requirements of both the 

current and amended versions of the rule.

A. The Proposed Class Satisfies Rule 23(a)

1. Numerosity

Rule 23(a)(1) requires the class to be “so numerous that joinder of all members is 

impracticable.” Generally, classes of forty or more are sufficiently numerous. Harris v. 

Palm Springs Alpine Estates, 329 F.2d 909 (9th Cir. 1964). Defendants stipulate that the 

Primary Class contains thousands of members. Given the number of requests that Federal 

Immigration Authorities made for Guest Information it would be reasonable to conclude 

 

2 Defendants submit that if this case were litigated, they would defeat class certification, 

and do not join this section of the brief or any part of this motion insofar as it argues that 

the law or facts warrant certification, except with respect to their stipulation as to the size 

of the Primary Class. Solely for purposes of settlement, however, they do not oppose the 

motion for conditional certification and Part IV of this Memorandum.

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that this element is satisfied for Class 2 and Class 3 as well.3 See Newberg on Class 

Actions § 3.3 (4th ed.2002) (where “the exact size of the class is unknown, but general 

knowledge and common sense indicate that it is large, the numerosity requirement is 

satisfied”). Therefore, the classes are sufficiently numerous such that joinder of all 

individual claimants would be impracticable. 

2. Commonality

Rule 23(a)(2) requires “questions of law or fact common to the class.” “All 

questions of fact and law need not be common,” however: “The existence of shared legal 

issues with divergent factual predicates is sufficient, as is a common core of salient facts 

coupled with disparate legal remedies....” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1019. “In the Ninth 

Circuit, the requirements of Rule 23(a)(2) are construed ‘permissively.’” Quintero v. 

Mulberry Thai Silks, Inc., No. C 08-02294 MHP, 2008 WL 4666395, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 

22, 2008) (quoting Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1019). In addition, all class members must “‘have 

suffered the same injury.’” Wal-Mart Store, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011) 

(internal citation omitted). All class members here are (1) individuals whose Guest 

Information was provided to Federal Immigration Authorities in the form of guest lists that 

did not differentiate between or categorize guests or (2) individuals who were interrogated 

and/or placed in immigration removal proceedings as a result of Guest Information being 

provided to Federal Immigration Authorities. See supra Part III.A; see generally ECF No. 23 

at 1-2. Class Members and subclass members therefore share a common injury and set of 

legal issues. See id.

3. Typicality

Rule 23(a)(3) sets a “permissive standard”; named plaintiffs’ claims are typical if 

they are “reasonably co-extensive with those of absent class members.” Hanlon, 150 F.3d 

at 1020. Representative plaintiffs must also be a member of the class they seek to 

represent. Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 156 (1982). Here, the proposed 

 

3 The Parties cannot estimate the number of members of Class 2 or Class 3.

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Class Representatives have claims typical to the Settlement Class, because Defendants’ 

records indicate that six are members of the Primary Class (all except Jane F. and Jane N.); 

in addition, one is a member of Class 2 (Jane F.), and seven are members of Class 3 (all 

except Jane F.). See Compl. ¶¶ 17-43.

4. Adequacy of Representation

Rule 23(a)(4) requires that Class Representatives “fairly and adequately protect the 

interests of the class.” This requires resolving two issues: (1) whether the Class 

Representative has interests in conflict with the proposed Class; and (2) the qualifications 

and competency of proposed class counsel. In re Live Concert Antitrust Litig., 247 F.R.D. 

98, 118 (C.D. Cal. 2007). Regarding qualifications of counsel, the Court should analyze 

“(i) the work counsel has done in identifying or investigating potential claims[;]... (ii) 

counsel’s experience in handling class actions, other complex litigation, and the types of 

claims asserted in the action; (iii) counsel’s knowledge of the applicable law; and (iv) the 

resources that counsel will commit to representing the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(1)(A). 

Plaintiffs do not have interests that conflict with the proposed Settlement Classes. 

Plaintiffs allege that they, like all Class Members, contracted for hospitality services and 

had their Guest Information disclosed to Federal Immigration Authorities or were 

interrogated and/or placed in immigration removal proceedings as a result of Guest 

Information being provided to Federal Immigration Authorities. Compl. ¶¶ 46-58, 65. 

Plaintiffs’ counsel is amply qualified, as is evidenced by their thorough investigation and 

detailed Complaint and their extensive work in successfully mediating and negotiating the 

proposed Settlement. Holguin-Flores Decl. ¶¶ 3, 6-10, 12-21. Plaintiffs’ counsel has 

numerous years’ experience and demonstrated success in bringing class action claims. 

They will more than adequately protect Class Members’ interests. Holguin-Flores Decl. ¶¶ 

12-21. Plaintiffs respectfully request the Court order that Plaintiffs’ counsel shall be Class 

Counsel pursuant to Rule 23(g)(1) and designate the Plaintiffs as Class Representatives for 

their respective classes (see supra Part IV.A.3). 

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B. The Proposed Class Also Satisfies Rule 23(b)(2)

Certification under Rule 23(b)(2) is appropriate where defendants have acted on 

“grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding 

declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” 

Here, all Class Members are individuals whose Guest Information was provided to 

Federal Immigration Authorities in the form of guest lists that did not differentiate between 

or categorize guests, or individuals who were interrogated and/or placed in removal 

proceedings as a result of Guest Information having been provided to Federal Immigration 

Authorities. Supra Part III.A. The proposed injunctive relief prohibits Defendants from 

providing such information to Federal Immigration Authorities, and establishes additional 

policies and procedures as well as a mechanism for receiving and processing guest 

complaints. Supra Part III.B.

Plaintiffs’ request for monetary relief in this case is “incidental” to the Complaint’s 

primary claims for injunctive relief, as Plaintiffs’ primary objective is the injunctive relief 

establishing specific policies to ensure the conduct at issue will not recur. Dukes, 564 U.S. 

at 360; see Agreement § X.A. The monetary damages are secondary in that the 

compensation flows directly out of Defendants’ conduct that affected all class members. 

See Dukes, 564 U.S. at 364-65. The Court, therefore, should conditionally certify the 

Settlement Class under Rule 23(b)(2) for settlement purposes.

C. The Proposed Class Also Meets the Requirements of Rule 23(b)(3)

Certification under Rule 23(b)(3) is appropriate “whenever the actual interests of 

the parties can be served best by settling their differences in a single action.” Hanlon, 150 

F.3d at 1022. Certification under Rule 23(b)(3) requires: (A) questions of law or fact 

common to the class predominate over questions affecting only individual members; and 

(B) a class action is superior to resolution by other available means. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

23(b)(3); True v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 749 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1062 (C.D. Cal. 2010).

The predominance test is satisfied when common questions “present a significant 

aspect of the case and they can be resolved for all members of the class in a single 

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adjudication.” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1022. Here, Plaintiffs allege that Class Members are 

entitled to the same legal remedies, premised on the same alleged wrongdoing. Further, 

damages can be measured with a common methodology that is directly connected to the 

alleged wrong as described in the Agreement. See Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 

34–38 (2013). 

Class treatment is also the superior means to adjudicate Plaintiffs’ claims. When 

analyzing superiority, the court should consider: “(1) the interest of members of the class 

in individually controlling the prosecution ... of separate actions; (2) the extent and nature 

of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by ... members of the 

class; and (3) the desirability ... of concentrating the litigation ... in the particular forum.” 

True, 749 F. Supp. 2d at 1062.4

 There are currently no other, duplicative class action cases 

here, but resolving any similar claims in one proceeding will preserve efficiency for the 

parties and judicial economy. It is neither economically feasible, nor judicially efficient, 

for thousands of potential Class Members to pursue their small claims against Defendants 

on an individual basis, Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 338-339 (1980), 

and continued litigation without class certification could potentially “dwarf potential

recovery.” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1023.

V. THE CRITERIA FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL ARE SATISFIED

A. Standard of Review

It is well-settled that the law strongly “favors settlements... where complex class 

action litigation is concerned.” In re Syncor ERISA Litig., 516 F.3d 1095, 1101 (9th Cir. 

2008). Preliminary approval of a class settlement “is committed to the sound discretion of 

the trial judge,” but courts must give “proper deference to the private consensual decision 

of the parties,” because “the court’s intrusion upon what is otherwise a private consensual 

agreement negotiated between the parties . . . must be limited to the extent necessary to 

reach a reasoned judgment that the agreement is not the product of fraud[,] ... 

 4 A fourth factor—the difficulties of managing the class action—is not considered when 

certification is used only for purposes of settlement. Id. at n.12.

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overreaching[,] ... or collusion,” and is fair, reasonable, and adequate. Hanlon, 150 F.3d 

at 1026-27; see also Knight v. Red Door Salons, Inc., No. 08-1520 SC, 2009 WL 248367, 

at *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2009) (“The recommendations of Plaintiff’s counsel should be 

given a presumption of reasonableness.”) (citation and quotations omitted).

At the preliminary approval stage, a final analysis of the settlement’s merits is not 

required; “[p]reliminary approval of a settlement and notice to the proposed class is 

appropriate [i]f [1] the proposed settlement appears to be the product of serious, informed, 

noncollusive negotiations, [2] has no obvious deficiencies, [3] does not improperly grant 

preferential treatment to class representatives or segments of the class, and [4] falls 

with[in] the range of possible approval[.]” Vasquez v. Coast Valley Roofing, Inc., 670 F. 

Supp. 2d 1114, 1125 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (citation and internal quotations omitted); accord 

Horton v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 266 F.R.D. 360, 363 (D. Ariz. 2009) (Campbell, J.); see 

also Fed R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2)(B)-(D) (Dec. 2018). All of the above factors are amply 

satisfied here.

A. Arm’s Length Negotiations and Settlement

If the terms of the settlement are fair, courts generally assume the negotiations were 

proper. See In re GM Pick-up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 785-86 

(3d Cir. 1995). As set forth below, there can be no question that the terms are fair. The 

Parties’ negotiations were also vigorous and contested, with both parties represented by 

experienced counsel. The Parties engaged in a series of informal, arm’s length discussions 

over a period of months before enlisting the services of an independent, professional 

mediator. Holguin-Flores Decl. ¶¶ 6-7. A full-day mediation resulted in a tentative 

settlement. Agreement § IV.C. These lengthy negotiations before a third party 

demonstrate that the Settlement was anything but collusive. See, e.g., Adams v. Inter-Con 

Sec. Sys., Inc., No. C-06-5428 MHP, 2007 WL 3225466, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2007) 

(“The assistance of an experienced mediator ... confirms that the settlement is noncollusive.”). 

B. No Obvious Deficiencies or Preferential Treatment

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The Agreement provides relief to all Class Members who Defendants’ records show 

had their Guest Information disclosed to Federal Immigration Authorities, and provides 

additional relief to Class Members who were questioned by Federal Immigration 

Authorities as a result of that disclosure. It provides for even more relief to those placed in 

removal proceedings in connection as a result of that disclosure. Any persons who qualify 

for membership in Classes 2 and 3 are entitled to the same relief as the Class 

Representatives who are also within their subclass. Accordingly, the Agreement does not 

give preferential treatment to the Class Representatives. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2)(D) 

(Dec. 2018).

C. Fair, Reasonable and Adequate Proposed Settlement

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e), the Court must determine whether the 

proposed settlement is “fundamentally fair, adequate, and reasonable.” Class Plaintiffs v. 

Seattle, 955 F.2d 1268, 1276 (9th Cir. 1992). The Ninth Circuit has established several 

factors that should be weighed when assessing whether a proposed settlement is fair, 

adequate and reasonable: (1) the strength of Plaintiff’s case; (2) the risk, expense, 

complexity, and likely duration of further litigation; (3) the risk of maintaining class action 

status throughout trial; (4) the amount offered in settlement; (5) the extent of discovery 

completed and the stage of the proceedings; (6) the experience and views of counsel; and 

(7) the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement. Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 

1026.5

 “Given that some of these factors cannot be fully assessed until the court conducts 

its fairness hearing, a full fairness analysis is unnecessary at [the preliminary approval] 

stage[.]” West v. Circle K Stores, No. CIV.S-04-0438 WBS GGH, 2006 WL 1652598, at 

*9 (E.D. Cal. June 13, 2006) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Although though 

these factors govern final approval, their review demonstrates that the Agreement merits 

preliminary approval.

 

5 See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2)(C)&(D) (Dec. 2018). An additional factor is any 

agreement made in connection with the proposal. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2)(C)(4)&(e)(3) 

(Dec. 2018). There is no agreement between the Parties not included in the materials filed 

with this motion.

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1. The Strength of Plaintiffs’ Case

“The Court cannot and need not determine the merits of the contested ... issues at 

this stage, and to the extent courts assess this factor, it is to determine whether the decision 

to settle is a good value for a relatively weak case or a sell-out of an extraordinary strong 

case.” Misra v. Decision One Mortg. Co., No. SA CV 07-0994 DOC (RCx), 2009 WL 

4581276, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2009) (internal citation and quotations omitted). 

Plaintiffs’ counsel conducted a thorough investigation and engaged in intensive settlement 

discussions. As a result, they negotiated with ample knowledge of the strengths and 

weaknesses of their case. Holguin-Flores Decl. ¶ 8. While Plaintiffs are confident in the 

strength of their claims, they recognize that Defendants have factual and legal defenses 

that, if successful, would defeat or substantially impair the value of their claims. See, e.g., 

ECF. No. 23. “The Settlement eliminates these and other risks of continued litigation, 

including the very real risk of no recovery....” In re Nvidia Derivs. Litig., No. C-06-

06110-SBA (JCS), 2008 WL 5382544, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2008).

2. Expense of Litigation; Risk of Maintaining Class Action Status

Plaintiffs’ claims involve complex issues under the United States Constitution as

well as state law. The costs and risks associated with continuing to litigate this action 

would require extensive resources and court time, including expert testimony and Daubert 

motions. Moreover, a trial involving the claims of potentially thousands of potential class 

members who stayed at numerous, geographically dispersed locations would require the 

presentation of dozens of witnesses at a minimum. Any result would likely be appealed. 

In contrast, the proposed Agreement will yield a certain, substantial, and prompt recovery 

for the class. “Avoiding such a trial and the subsequent appeals in this complex case 

strongly militates in favor of settlement....” Nat’l Rural Telecomms. Coop v. DirecTV, 

221 F.R.D. 523, 527 (C.D. Cal. 2004); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2)(C)(i) (Dec. 2018).

While Plaintiffs believe class treatment is appropriate, there is a genuine risk that 

Plaintiffs may not be able to maintain class action status through trial. If the settlement is 

not approved, Defendants will vigorously oppose class certification, including potentially 

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seeking decertification or appealing the certification. Settlement eliminates these risks and 

“there is much less risk of anyone who may have actually been injured going away emptyhanded.” In re Omnivision Techs., Inc., 559 F. Supp. 2d, 1036, 1041-42 (N.D. Cal. 2007). 

3. Adequacy and Amount of Recovery

The Agreement provides generous monetary relief for Class Members and achieves 

everything the Plaintiffs sought in their putative class action Complaint. Class Members 

who had no direct interaction with Federal Immigration Authorities during their stay at 

Motel 6 will receive $50 (which is within the range many Motel 6 rooms cost for a night), 

while Class Members who were questioned by Federal Immigration Authorities during 

their stay at Motel 6 but were not subsequently placed in removal proceedings will receive 

$1,000—far more than the value of their room for what could have been no more than a 

relatively short period of inconvenience. Agreement § XII.A.1-2. Finally, those who were 

placed in legal proceedings and forced to defend their presence in the United States will 

receive a minimum of $7,500. Id. at § XII.A.3. These payments will be achieved without 

the delay or expense associated with further litigation. Further, any unclaimed funds 

allocated to the groups that directly interacted with Federal Immigration Authorities will 

be donated to organizations who, among other things, provide legal representation to 

immigrants forced to defend their presence in the United States. This monetary relief 

provides a significant recovery to the Settlement Class.6

The monetary awards will be distributed to Class Members who make claims 

determined to be valid by the Claims Administrator based on criteria identified supra Part 

III.A. The Claims Administrator shall request additional information where claim forms 

are not complete, and claimants shall be able to appeal a denial of their claim to the Claims 

 

6 Further, the injunctive relief provided for in the Settlement provides significant additional 

value, as it will prevent the alleged practices that Plaintiffs claim harmed consumers from 

reoccurring. See Riker v. Gibbons, No. 3:08-cv-00115-LRH-VPC, 2010 WL 4366012, at 

*4 (D. Nev. Oct. 28, 2010) (approving settlement for injunctive relief that “achieve[d] the 

goals of the lawsuit”).

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Administrator. These procedures ensure that funds will be broadly distributed among 

Class Members. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2)(C)(ii) (Dec. 2018).

Finally, the proposed attorneys’ fees award is miniscule in relation to the award to 

the class, which is more than twenty times higher. The award will not come out of funds 

allocated to the class, and will not be paid until after this Court has finally approved the 

proposal and any potential appeals are concluded. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23()(2)(C)(iii) (Dec 

2018).

4. The Stage of the Proceedings

“[I]n the context of class action settlements, formal discovery is not ... necessary ... 

where the parties have sufficient information to make an informed decision about 

settlement.” Linney v. Cellular Alaska P’Ship, 151 F.3d 1234, 1239 (9th Cir. 1998) 

(citation and internal quotations omitted). This is especially true “where there has been 

sufficient information sharing and cooperation in providing access to necessary data....” 

Misra, 2009 WL 4581276, at *8. The Parties engaged in significant substantive 

discussions over a period of approximately four months before reaching a tentative 

settlement. Holguin-Flores Decl. ¶¶6-7, 9. These discussions followed extensive 

investigation by Plaintiffs’ counsel, and involved the Parties stipulating to key facts and 

figures critical to reaching settlement. Id. at ¶¶ 6-7. Plaintiffs’ counsel had sufficient 

information to make an informed decision about the terms of the Agreement.

5. The Experience and Views of Counsel

“Parties represented by competent counsel are better positioned than courts to 

produce a settlement that fairly reflects each party’s expected outcome in litigation.” In re 

Pacific Enters. Secs. Litig., 47 F.3d 373, 378 (9th Cir. 1995). Thus, “the Court should not 

without good cause substitute its judgment for [counsel’s].” Boyd v. Bechtel Corp., 485 F. 

Supp. 610, 622 (N.D. Cal. 1979). Here, “[i]n addition to being familiar with the present 

dispute, Plaintiff[s’] counsel has considerable expertise in . . . class action litigation.” 

Knight, 2009 WL 248367, at *4. Both MALDEF and the Ortega Law Firm have 

considerable experience litigating federal class actions, including before this Court, e.g., 

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Valenzuela v. Ducey, No. CV-16-03072-PHX-DGC, 2018 WL 3069464 (D. Ariz. June 21, 

2018), and the Parties agreed to the proposed Agreement after vigorous negotiations on the 

terms and with the benefit of an experienced mediator. Supra Part II. Simply stated, there 

is nothing to counter the presumption that counsel’s recommendation is reasonable.

D. The Proposed Form of Class Notice and Notice Plan Satisfy Rule 23

If the Court’s prima facie review of the relief offered and notice provided by the 

Agreement are fair and adequate, it should order that notice be sent to the class. Manual 

for Complex Litig., Fourth, § 21.632 at 321. Notice of a class action settlement must be 

“the best notice that is practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to 

all members who can be identified through reasonable effort.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B). 

“Notice is satisfactory if it generally describes the terms of the settlement in sufficient 

detail to alert those with adverse viewpoints to investigate and ... be heard.” Churchill 

Vill., L.L.C. v. Gen. Elec., 361 F.3d 566, 575 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal quotations and 

citation omitted).

The proposed notice plan constitutes the best notice practicable. See Agreement § 

XII.D. The notices are neutral, and written in an easy-to-understand clear language in both 

English and Spanish, giving potential class members (1) basic information about the 

lawsuit; (2) a description of the benefits provided by the settlement; (3) an explanation of 

how Class Members can obtain those benefits; (4) an explanation of how Class Members 

can exercise their right to opt-out or object to the settlement; (5) an explanation that any 

claims against Defendants that could have been litigated in this action will be released if 

the Class Member does not opt out; (6) the names of counsel for the Class and information 

regarding attorney’s fees; (7) the fairness hearing date; and (8) the settlement website 

where additional information can be obtained. See [Proposed] Order Exs. B-E.

The notice plan involves direct mailings to the individuals identified by Defendants’ 

records as potential Class Members. Agreement § XII.C.1. Notice will also be provided 

in English and Spanish on MALDEF’s Facebook and Twitter accounts. Id. at § XII.C.2. 

Further information will be available on a website established by the Claims 

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Administrator. Settlement Class members will have 60 days from mailing to opt out or 

object and an additional 15 days after submitting opt out requests to rescind those requests. 

See id. at § XII.F. This is sufficient time to give the Settlement Class members the 

opportunity to comment on and take part in the settlement. Cf. Torrisi v. Tucson Elec. 

Power Co., 8 F.3d 1370, 1375 (9th Cir. 1993) (approving class notice sent thirty-one days 

before objections deadline and forty-five days before final approval hearing).

The Parties propose the following timeline:

Event Date

Preliminary Approval Granted Day 1 

Class Settlement Website Activated

Parties Provide Lists of Potential Class 

Members to Claims Administrators

Day 20

Notice is Posted to Facebook and Twitter Day 30 

Notice is Mailed Day 60

Last Day to Postmark Opt Out or 

Objection

30 days before Final Approval Hearing 

[Preferably Day 120]

Parties to File Motion for Final Approval 21 days before Final Approval Hearing 

[Preferably Day 129]

Last Day to Submit a Claim and to 

Rescind Opt Out As set by the Court [Preferably Day 135]

Parties to File Brief Replying to 

Objections

Objectors File Notice of Intent to Appear

7 days before Final Approval Hearing 

[Preferably Day 143]

Final Approval Hearing As set by the Court [preferably Day 150]

Completion of All Review of Claims and 

Appeals by Claims Administrator

Last Day to Submit a Claim +171 

[Preferably Day 306]

Accordingly, the Parties request the Court schedule the Final Approval Hearing 150 

days after the order granting preliminary approval, or as soon thereafter as practical.

VI. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Parties respectfully request the Court grant the relief 

requested herein.

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18 Case No. 2:18-cv-00242-DGC

DATED this 2nd day of November, 

2018.

MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL 

DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND, 

INC.

By: /s/ Andrés Holguin-Flores

Thomas A. Saenz

Andrés Holguin-Flores

Nina Perales

Daniel R. Ortega, Jr.

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

SNELL & WILMER, LLP

By: /s/ Patricia Lee Refo with permission

Don Bivens

Patricia Lee Refo

MUNGER, TOLLES & OLSON, LLP

Donald B. Verrilli, Jr.

Michael B. DeSanctis

Christopher M. Lynch

VENABLE LLP

Peter J. Kadzik

Attorneys for Defendants

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Case No. 2:18-cv-00242-DGC

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on November 2, 2018, I electronically transmitted the attached

documents to the Clerk’s Office using the CM/ECF System for filing and transmittal of a Notice 

of Electronic Filing to all ECF registrants in this matter.

DATED: August 31, 2018

/s/ Andres Holguin-Flores

MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE

AND EDUCATIONAL FUND

Case 2:18-cv-00242-DGC Document 33 Filed 11/02/18 Page 21 of 21