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Filed 9/11/24 P. v. Saddozai CA1/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on 

opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 

8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for 

purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

SHIKEB SADDOZAI,

Defendant and Appellant.

 

 A166721

 (San Mateo County Super. Ct. No. 

16-NF001414A)

In an earlier appeal, this court remanded Shikeb 

Saddozai’s case for resentencing under Penal Code section 1385, 

subdivision (c)1, which grants trial courts discretion to dismiss an 

enhancement in the interest of justice. (See People v. Saddozai

(Mar. 16, 2021, A154894) [nonpub. opn.].) On remand, Saddozai 

unsuccessfully sought dismissal of a five-year enhancement for a 

prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)). He contends

in this appeal that the trial court erred in declining to dismiss the 

enhancement. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

A.

Saddozai’s convictions relate to an incident in which he 

stalked, burglarized, and attempted to murder his ex-girlfriend, 

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2

Jane Doe, days after he was released from prison in February 

2016 for another offense. (See People v. Saddozai, supra,

A154894.)

2 

Doe endured years of verbal and physical abuse by 

Saddozai. (People v. Saddozai, supra, A154894.) She was able to 

leave the relationship after Saddozai fled the United States

pending criminal charges in 2015 and was later caught and 

sentenced to prison. (Ibid.) While he was incarcerated, Doe sent 

Saddozai a letter ending their relationship, moved out of their 

shared home, and did not give him her new address. (Ibid.)

Upon his release in 2016, Saddozai repeatedly called and 

texted Doe and persuaded Doe to meet him. (People v. Saddozai, 

supra, A154894.) Angry that Doe had ended their relationship, 

Saddozai struck Doe in the face and tried to choke her. (Ibid.) 

Police interrupted the attack after a bystander called 911, but 

they let Saddozai leave when Doe told them they were having a 

loud, verbal argument. (Ibid.)

Using software to disguise his telephone number and voice, 

Saddozai subsequently persuaded Doe to tell him her address by

calling her on the phone and pretending to be a police officer. 

(People v. Saddozai, supra, A154894.) He broke into her 

apartment and waited for Doe to come home, at which point he 

chased her with a knife, called her a “ ‘cheat,’ ” and yelled “ ‘I’m 

gonna get you.’ ” (Ibid.) Saddozai pursued Doe out of her 

apartment, to the building’s leasing office, where Doe took refuge. 

(Ibid.) When Saddozai was unable to force the door open, he ran 

to the apartment complex’s pool, where another resident saw him 

holding a knife and heard him repeatedly say, “ ‘I want to kill the 

bitch.’ ” (Ibid.)

2 Because the parties rely on the summary of facts 

contained in this court’s earlier decision in People v. Saddozai,

supra, A154894, we do so as well.
3

B.

A jury found Saddozai guilty of attempted willful, 

deliberate, and premeditated murder (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a)); first 

degree burglary (§ 460, subd. (a)); stalking (§ 646.9, subd. (a)); 

misdemeanor exhibiting a deadly weapon (§ 417, subd. (a)(1));

misdemeanor possession of burglar's tools (§ 466); and 

misdemeanor battery of a person the defendant formerly dated (§ 

243, subd. (e)(1)). (People v. Saddozai, supra, A154894.) The jury

also found true enhancements for use of a deadly weapon (§ 

12022, subd. (b)(1)) and a prior serious felony (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)). 

(People v. Saddozai, supra, A154894.) 

The trial court sentenced him to an aggregate term of 33 

years to life in prison. (People v. Saddozai, supra, A154894) The 

sentence included a five-year enhancement for a prior serious 

felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)), which was based on a 2002 

conviction for arson. The sentence also included a one-year 

enhancement for use of a deadly weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)), 

and a one-year enhancement for a prior sexually violent offense 

(§ 667.5, subd. (b)).

In Saddozai’s earlier appeal, this court affirmed his 

convictions but remanded for the trial court to determine whether 

to strike the five-year enhancement under amendments to section 

1385. (People v. Saddozai, supra, A154894.)

C.

Section 1385, subdivision (c)(1), provides that “the court 

shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice 

to do so,” unless dismissal is prohibited by an initiative statute. 

Section 1385, subdivision (c)(2), in turn, provides that in 

“exercising its discretion” to dismiss a sentencing enhancement 

under that subdivision, “the court shall consider and afford great 

weight to evidence offered by the defendant to prove that any of 

the [enumerated] mitigating circumstances . . . are present.” (See 
4

also People v. Walker (Aug. 15, 2024, S278309) ___ Cal.5th ___

[2024 WL 3819098, pp. *1, 4] (Walker).) Further, “[p]roof of the 

presence of one or more of these circumstances weighs greatly in 

favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds that 

dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety. 

‘Endanger public safety’ means there is a likelihood that the 

dismissal of the enhancement would result in physical injury or 

other serious danger to others.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2).)

Three mitigating circumstances enumerated in the statute 

are relevant here. First, where multiple enhancements are 

alleged in a single case, “all enhancements beyond a single 

enhancement shall be dismissed.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(B).) 

Second, if an enhancement could result in a sentence longer than 

20 years, “the enhancement shall be dismissed.” (§ 1385, subd. 

(c)(2)(C).) Third, the fact that an enhancement is based on a 

prior conviction that is over five years old is also a mitigating 

factor. (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(H).)

D.

On remand, Saddozai requested dismissal of the five-year 

enhancement, relying on the mitigating circumstances in section 

1385, subdivisions (c)(2)(B), (c)(2)(C), and (c)(2)(H).3 He 

contended there was little danger to public safety given the 

length of his overall sentence, and he estimated that, if the 

enhancement were dismissed, he would likely not be eligible for 

parole until age 63 (approximately 18 years from the 

resentencing hearing). He also asserted that, due to his physical 

disabilities, including his use of a walker, “his ability to commit 

certain types of offenses might be” lessened, limiting the public 

safety risk.

3 Saddozai conceded in trial court that dismissal of his 

enhancement under section 1385, subdivision (c)(2), was “not 

mandatory.”
5

After weighing the aggravating and mitigating 

circumstances, the trial court concluded it would not be in the 

interest of justice to strike the five-year enhancement. The court 

explained that Saddozai’s “background, character, and prospects 

do not support any mitigation of his sentence.” (See Cal. Rules of 

Court, rule 4.421 (circumstances in aggravation).) The court

noted that Saddozai had previous convictions for false 

imprisonment in a crime involving sexual assault from 2005 as 

well as for sexual penetration of a minor in 2015. (See Cal. Rules 

of Court, rule 4.421(b)(1)-(2).) The court emphasized that “[t]he 

instant offense was committed during the first few days after he 

was released from prison and put on parole.” (See Cal. Rules of 

Court, rule 4.421(b)(4).) Saddozai “showed no respect for the 

rights of the others in the criminal justice system. While he was 

out on bail and facing trial on the sexual penetration case, he fled 

the country. . . .[¶] He continually violated restraining orders. He

tried to get the victim in this case . . . to commit perjury.” (See 

Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(6), (b)(5).) Finally, the trial 

court reasoned that “the facts show that he has repeatedly been, 

and would be if released, a threat to others.” (See Cal. Rules of 

Court, rule 4.421(b)(1).) The court noted that Saddozai had 

attempted to kill and terrorized Jane Doe, “had terrorized other 

victims in other crimes,” and was described as a “ ‘ticking time 

bomb’ ” by his parole officer. As a result, “if he was given the 

opportunity to be released into society, he will continue to 

victimize the victim and the community.”

DISCUSSION

Saddozai contends, and the People do not dispute, that 

three mitigating circumstances under section 1385, subdivision 

(c)(2), are applicable here because multiple enhancements were 

alleged, the application of an enhancement could result in a 

sentence longer than 20 years, and the enhancement is based on 

a prior conviction that is more than five years old. (See § 1385, 
6

subds. (c)(2)(B), (c)(2)(C), (c)(2)(H).) Saddozai argues that, as a 

result, the trial court erred in denying his request to dismiss his 

enhancement. Reviewing his legal arguments de novo (see 

Walker, supra, ___ Cal.5th at p. ___ [2024 WL 3819098, p. *3]), 

we disagree.

A.

As an initial matter, Saddozai asserts that because 

mitigating factors are applicable to his case, the only remaining 

question under section 1385, subdivision (c)(2), is whether 

dismissal of the enhancement would pose a risk of physical injury 

or other serious danger to others. Because he cannot be released 

from prison unless the Board of Parole Hearings determines he is 

no longer a public safety risk, he says, the trial court erred in 

declining to dismiss the enhancement. But Saddozai’s premise—

that when a mitigating factor is present, public safety is the only 

remaining relevant consideration—is incorrect.

In Walker, our Supreme Court held that public safety is not 

the only consideration that may justify imposition of an 

enhancement when a mitigating circumstance applies under 

section 1385, subdivision (c)(2). (See Walker, supra, ___ Cal.5th 

at pp. ___ [2024 WL 3819098, pp. *4-5].) Walker explained that 

when a mitigating circumstance is present, the trial court retains 

discretion to determine whether an enhancement should be 

dismissed, taking into account aggravating and mitigating 

circumstances traditionally deemed relevant in arriving at a 

sentence in furtherance of justice. (Id., at p. ___ [2024 WL 

3819098, p. *4]; see also Cal. Rules of Court, rules 4.421

(circumstances in aggravation), 4.423 (circumstances in 

mitigation).) Section 1385, subdivision (c)(2), directs the trial 

court to give “great weight” to evidence that any mitigating factor 

is present. (See Walker, at pp. ___ [2024 WL 3819098, pp. *5-6].)

As a result, the trial court “must” dismiss an enhancement when 

a mitigating factor enumerated in section 1385, subdivision (c)(2), 
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applies, unless there is substantial evidence of countervailing 

circumstances sufficient to outweigh the mitigating factor. 

(Walker, at pp. ___ [2024 WL 3819098, pp. *1, 5].) Even when a 

mitigating circumstance is present, the ultimate question for the 

trial court under section 1385, subdivision (c), remains whether 

dismissal of an enhancement would be “in the furtherance of 

justice.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(1); see also Walker, at p. ___ [2024 WL 

3819098, p. *6].)

Here, the trial court discussed circumstances implicating 

several aggravating factors in addition to public safety. Walker 

permits this. Because Saddozai does not take issue with the 

factors themselves, we shall not consider them further. 

B.

Saddozai’s main contention is that the trial court erred as a 

matter of law in denying his request to dismiss his five-year

enhancement because he cannot be released unless the Board of 

Parole Hearings first concludes he will not endanger society if 

released from prison. He maintains that, where an individual

cannot be released from prison without a grant of parole, the 

dismissal of an enhancement has no bearing on whether the 

individual would pose a serious danger to others if released. We 

are unable to discern any such categorical rule from the text of 

section 1385, subdivision (c)(2).

To be sure, review by the Board of Parole Hearings is a 

relevant consideration. As People v. Gonzalez (2024) 103 

Cal.App.5th 215 (Gonzalez) explains, in cases involving 

indeterminate sentences, the trial court should take into account 

the need for a grant of parole before release when determining 

whether dismissal of an enhancement would pose a public safety 

risk. (See id., at pp. 230-231.) The fact that parole will be denied

if the board determines that individuals serving indeterminate 

sentences “will pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society if 

released” (Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 2281, subd. (a); see also Pen. 
8

Code § 3041, subd. (b)(1)) lessens the risk that a reduced sentence 

will negatively impact public safety. (See Gonzalez, at p. 230.) 

Future review by the board is thus one consideration, among 

others, relevant to determining whether dismissal of an 

enhancement would endanger public safety. (See id., at pp. 228-

229.)4

But Saddozai takes it a step further. He argues that, in a 

case involving an indeterminate sentence, dismissal of an 

enhancement has zero impact on public safety because a future 

grant of parole would be required before release. 

We find no support in the text of section 1385, subdivision 

(c)(2), for this contention. As Walker reflects, section 1385, 

subdivision (c), grants to trial courts the ultimate discretion to 

determine whether dismissal of an enhancement would advance

justice. (Walker, ___ Cal.5th at p. ___ [2024 WL 3819098, p. *6].) 

The statute entrusts the decision whether dismissing an 

enhancement would endanger public safety to the “court,”

making no mention of the Board of Parole Hearings. (§ 1385, 

subd. (c)(2); see also Gonzalez, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 228, 

fn. 10 (emphasizing that “[w]e do not suggest that a trial court is 

permitted to delegate its judgment regarding a defendant’s future 

threat to public safety to the Board of Parole Hearings”). And 

section 1385, subdivision (c), makes no reference to a bright line 

rule providing that dismissal of an enhancement is always 

consistent with public safety in cases involving indeterminate 

sentences. (Cf. Walker, ___ Cal.5th at p. ___ [2024 WL 3819098, 

p. *4] (noting that “[i]f the Legislature envisioned a rebuttable 

presumption, it could have said so . . . expressly”).) Nor is the 

4 Here, the trial court was well aware that Saddozai could 

not be released without a parole grant, as defense counsel argued 

at the resentencing hearing that whether the enhancement was 

dismissed would impact the year that Saddozai was “eligible for 

parole.”
9

fact that the case involves an indeterminate sentence one of the 

mitigating factors listed in the statute. (§ 1385, subds. (c)(2)(A)-

(I).)

Under section 1385, subdivision (c), the trial court may 

determine, based on the defendant’s background, record, and 

other circumstances, that a reduced sentence will not sufficiently 

safeguard the public because the defendant requires additional 

time to fully rehabilitate. (See People v. Mendoza (2023) 88 

Cal.App.5th 287, 299.) Where, as here, the sentence is an 

indeterminate one, the defendant’s particular circumstances 

could potentially lead the court to conclude that a longer sentence 

is needed for rehabilitation before a parole hearing would have 

any chance of a successful outcome.

We therefore reject Saddozai’s contention that, as a matter 

of law, the trial court erroneously “assumed that its decision 

whether to dismiss the . . . enhancement would have some 

bearing on whether [Sadozzai] would pose a danger to public 

safety at some point in the future.”

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

BURNS, J. 

WE CONCUR:

JACKSON, P. J.

SIMONS, J.

People v. Saddozai (A166721)