## VIRGINIA:

**In the Supreme Court of Virginia held at the Supreme Court Building in the**

**City of Richmond on Thursday**  **the 18th**  **day of July** 

**, 2024** 

**.**

P resent : Goodwyn, C.J., Powell, Kelsey, McCullough, Russell, and Mann, JJ.

PAUL RAMSEY WHITE, III, PETITIONER

,

against Record No. 240105

CHADWICK DOTSON, DIRECTOR,

VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, RESPONDENT

.

UPON A PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Upon consideration of the petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed February 9 , 202 4 , the

rule to show cause, the respondent’s motion to dismiss, and petitioner’s reply, the Court is of the

opinion that the motion should be granted and the petition should be dismissed.

Petitioner is in the custody of the Virginia Department of Corrections (“VDOC”) serving

an active sentence of nine years ’ imprisonment . Petitioner challenges VDOC ’s failure to use the

date of his arrest on one of the charges that predicates his current incarceration as the starting

point for his accrual of Earned Sentence Credit (“ ESC ”)

. Petitioner explains th at instead of using

the date of his arrest

, a VDOC policy uses a date well after his arrest as the starting point for his

accrual of ESC at the rates set by Code § 53.1

- 202.3(B)

, 1 thus wrongly withholding a significant

amount of ESC from him

.

In his petition, petitioner contends that several statutory provisions demonstrate he is entitled

to ESC under Code § 53.1

- 202.3(B)

, at a rate of fifteen days for every thirty days served

,

beginning on the date of his arrest

. Petitioner points primarily to the fact that

, when Code

§ 53.1

- 202.3(B) became effective in July 2022, it was made “ ‘ retroactive[] to the entire sentence

of any person who is confined in a state correctional facility and participating in the [ESC]

system on July 1, 2022

. ’ ” Anderson v. Clarke , 302 Va. 400, 405

- 06 (2023) ( quoting 2020 Acts

1 VDOC uses an inmate’s Custody Responsibility Date (“CRD”) as the date from which

an inmate is eligible to earn ESC at the statutorily prescribed rates set by Code § 53.1

- 202.3(B).

An inmate’s CRD is “the date on which the inmate becomes state responsible whether located in

a jail or a [V]DOC institution.”2 ch. 50 (Spec. Sess. I) ). Further, petitioner relies on his interpretation of portions of Code

§ § 53.1

- 116,

- 187, and

- 202.2(A) to bolster his contention that he is statutorily entitled to ESC

from the date of his arrest

.

The Court rejects petitioner’s claim because the plain language of Code § 53.1

- 202.2(A)

reveals petitioner’s eligibility to earn ESC under Code § 53.1

- 202.3(B) did not begin upon his

arrest. The issue raised by petitioner is, in essence, one of statutory interpretation. The Court is

bound by a statute’s plain language unless that language is ambiguous or applying it would lead to

an absurd result

. Morgan v. Commonwealth , 301 Va. 476, 482 (2022). Also , when interpreting a

statute, the Court’s primary obj ective is to determine and effectuate the General Assembly’s intent

as it is expressed through the language of the operative statute. See Commonwealth v. Delaune , 302

Va. 644, 655 (2023)

.

T he operative statute is Code § 53.1

- 202.2

, which is titled “Eligibility for earned sentence

credits.” As it has since its initial codification approximately three decades ago, Code § 53.1

-

202.2(A) defines who “shall be eligible to earn” ESC under Code § 53.1

- 202.3 ; it extends that

eligibility to persons convicted of a qualifying felony offense and “sentenced to serve a term of

incarceration in a state or local correctional facility.” The subsection then provides that “[s]uch

eligibility shall commence upon the person’s incarceration in any correctional facility following

entry of a final order of conviction by the committing court.”

Accordingly, contrary to petitioner’s contentions, Code § 53.1

- 202.2(A) dictates that a

prisoner qualifies to start earning ESC upon his sentencing to serve a term of incarce ration for a

qualifying felony and his incarcerat ion following a final order of the committing court.

Petitioner does not contend he met, nor did he meet, t hose criteria on the date of his arrest

,

November 21, 2017

.

The nine

- year sentence petitioner is currently satisfying is based on a March 23, 2020

order sentencing petitioner to twenty years’ imprisonment with twelve years suspended and an

October 6, 2020 order revoking petitioner’s previously suspended eleven

- year sentence and

resuspend ing all but one year. See Code § 53.1

- 186 (“For the purpose of determining allowances

for good conduct, the term of confinement of a person convicted of a felony and sentenced to the

Department whose sentence is partially suspended shall be that portion of the sentence which

was not suspended.”). Accordingly, petitioner fails to establish th at VDOC has transgressed any

statutory directives by ignoring the date of his arrest when calculating his ESC

. There is no3 statutory support for the contention that petitioner is entitled to ESC under § 53.1

- 202.3(B) from the

date of his arrest.

In other portions of his petition, petitioner contends th at VDOC has violated his

constitutional right to due process by not granting him ESC under Code § 53.1

- 202.3(B) from

the date of his arrest. 2 The Court rejects this claim. As explained above, petitioner has not

demonstrate d he is statutorily entitled to the ad ditional ESC he demands

. See Anderson

, 302 Va.

at 415

- 16 (explaining that habeas petitioner’s due process claim failed, in part, because he did

not have a “cognizable interest” in the additional ESC he argued he was wrongly denied). Nor

does petitioner h ave a constitutionally based right to receive sentencing credit

, like ESC, for his

good behavior while incarcerated. See id. at 415 (“ [T]he United States Supreme Court

recognized that . . . the Constitution itself does not guarantee good

- time credit for satisfactory

behavior while in prison.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Accordingly, petitioner ’s invocation of due process protections fails because he has not

established a deprivation of a legitimate, protected interest in his life, liberty, or property

. See

Olim v. Wakinekona

, 461 U.S. 238, 250 (1983) ( d ue “[ p ] rocess is not an end in itself. Its

constitutional purpose is to protect a substantive interest to which the individual has a legitimate

claim of entitlement.”); see also Singleton v. Cecil , 176 F.3d 419, 424 (8th Cir. 1999) (“ Merely

labeling a governmental action as arbitrary and capric ious, in the absence of the deprivation of

life, liberty, or property, will not support a substantive due process claim.”); Hawkins v.

Freeman

, 195 F.3d 732, 750 (4th Cir. 1999) (“ Nor . . . can liberty interests protected by the

substantive component of th e due process clause be found except in the Constitution itself; they

cannot be created by state law. ”).

In other portions of his petition, petitioner contends the VDOC’s failure to grant him ESC

under Code § 53.1

- 202.3(B) from the date of his arrest violates his constitutional right to equal

protection of the laws

. Petitioner argues that the manner in which the VDOC determines when a

2 Although petitioner summarily invokes the “Virginia Constitution,” he “does not

reference or cite any Virginia cases or other authorities interpreting” the Virginia Constitution

and he “does not offer any comment or argument regarding [its] adoption.” Anderson , 302 Va.

at 413 n.8. Accordingly, for the purposes of resolving this case, we assume without deciding that

the due process and equal protection guarantees of the Virginia Constitution are no gre ater than

those of the federal constitution. Id

.4 prisoner begins earning ESC

, at Code § 53.1

- 202.3(B)’s rates

, disproportio nately disadvantages

prisoners, like him, whose criminal proceedings are relatively prolonged due to their exercising

protected trial rights or circumstances beyond their control.

The Court rejects this claim because petitioner has not alleged facts demonstrat ing that

VDOC’s facially neutral p ractices have “treat ed [ him] differently than others similarly situated

as a result of intentional or purposeful discrimination.” Reynolds v. Quiros , 990 F.3d 286, 300

(2d Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted) ; s ee also Green Genie, Inc. v. City of Detroit

,

63 F.4th 521, 527 (6th Cir. 2023) (describing as “a bedrock background principle of equal

protection law: the unequal application of a facially neutral law is not a denial of equal protection

unless there is shown to be present in it an element of intentional or purposeful discrimination”)

(internal quotation marks omitted) ; Plaintiff A v. Park Hill Sch. Dist. , 97 F.4th 586, 592 (8th Cir.

2024) (“Plaintiffs and their comparators must be similarly situated in all relevant respects.”)

(internal quotation marks omitted)

.

Accor dingly, the petition is dismissed and the rule is discharged.

This order shall be published in the Virginia Reports and certified to the petitioner and

counsel for the respondent.

A Copy,

Teste:

Clerk