* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case,

res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disf avors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Filed 5/7/96 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________________ SHELIA MAYFIELD, ) ) Plaintiff-Appellant, ) ) v. ) No. 95-6431 ) (D.C. No. CIV-95-178-C) LARRY A. FIELDS, GARY PARSONS, MARY ) (W.D. Oklahoma) PUNCHES, JACKIE BARNETT, MARTIN ) CONWAY, KATHY HALE, and DEBBIE ) BARBY, ) ) Defendants-Appellees. )

__________________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

_________________________ Before BRORBY, EBEL and HENRY , Circuit Judges.

__________________________ After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Plaintiff Shelia Mayfield brought this § 1983 action against Larry A. Fields, the Director of the Oklahoma Department of Corrections; Gary Parsons, the Regional Director; Mary Punches, the Warden of the William S. Key Correctional Center; correctionalofficers Martin Conway and Kathy

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Hale; former correctional officer Debbie Barby; and Sargent J ackie Barnett. The crux of Ms. Mayfield's complaint is that the defendants violated her Fourth Am endment rights by performing a strip search to determine whether she had contraband on her pers on before allowing her to visit an inmate at the correctional center.
The district court granted summary judgment in the defendants' favor on the following grounds: (1) Ms. Mayfield voluntarily signed a written "consent to s earch" form after going over the form with Sgt. Barnett; (2) the officers had reasonable suspici on to believe Ms. Mayfield was attempting to bring contraband into the correctional center based on information provided by a confidential informant; (3) the defendants had qualified immunity. The defendants also sought summary judgment on Eleventh Amendment grounds, but the district court found it unnecessary to reach this issue.
Ms. Mayfield now contends the district court erred in granti ng summary judgment in defendants' favor. We disagree. We have held that prison officials may perform a strip search as a precondition for allowing an individual to visit an inmate if they have reasonable suspicion the individual is attempting to bring contraband into the facility. Romo v. Champion , 46 F.3d 1013, 1020 (10th Cir.), cert. denied , 116 S. Ct. 387 (1995). If the officers had reasonable suspicion, it is irrelevant whether the individual validly consented to the search. Id. Here, the district court concluded, and we agree, that it is undisputed that (1) after visi ting an inmate in January 1994, Ms. Mayfield was given a verbal warning because she had tried to bring contraband into the facility; and (2) a week before the strip search occurred, a confidential inform ant told correctional officer Conway

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that Ms. Mayfield planned to bring contraband into the facility . Although it is disputed whether the confidential informant had or had not provided information in the past, thisdisputed factual issue is not material, and therefore does not preclude summary judgment. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) ("Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment"). In light of the undisputed evidence, we find no fault with the district court's conc lusion the officers had reasonable suspicion that Ms. Mayfield was attempting to bring contraba nd into the facility. Given our conclusion, it is unnecessary to address Ms. Mayfield's remaining contentions.

AFFIRMED. Entered for the Court: WADE BRORBY United States Circuit Judge