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Russell S. Thompson IV (029098)

Joseph Panvini (028359)

Thompson Consumer Law Group, PLLC

5235 E. Southern Ave., D106-618

Mesa, AZ 85206

Telephone: (602) 388-8898

Facsimile: (866) 317-2674

rthompson@consumerlawinfo.com

Attorneys for Plaintiff

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Evelyn Rinkleib,

Plaintiff,

vs.

Computer Credit, Inc.,

Defendant.

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Case No. 

COMPLAINT AND TRIAL BY JURY 

DEMAND

NATURE OF ACTION

1. Plaintiff Evelyn Rinkleib (“Plaintiff”) brings this action against Defendant 

Computer Credit, Inc. (“Defendant”) pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 

(“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq.

JURISDICTION, VENUE, AND STANDING

2. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d) and 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1331. 

3. Venue is proper before this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), where 

the acts and transactions giving rise to Plaintiff’s action occurred in this district, where 

Plaintiff resides in this district, and where Defendant transacts business in this district. 

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4. “In determining whether an intangible harm constitutes injury in fact, both 

history and the judgment of Congress play important roles.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 

S. Ct. 1540, 1549, 194 L. Ed. 2d 635 (2016), as revised (May 24, 2016). Congress is 

“well positioned to identify intangible harms that meet minimum Article III 

requirements,” thus “Congress may ‘elevat[e] to the status of legally cognizable injuries 

concrete, de facto injuries that were previously inadequate in law.’” Id. (quoting Lujan v. 

Defs of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992)). 

5. “Without the protections of the FDCPA, Congress determined, the 

‘[e]xisting laws and procedures for redressing these injuries are inadequate to protect 

consumers.’” Lane v. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC, No. 15 C 10446, 2016 WL 

3671467, at *3 (N.D. Ill. July 11, 2016) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692(b)). Thus, a failure to 

honor a consumer’s right under the FDCPA constitutes an injury in fact for Article III 

standing. See id. at *3 (holding that a consumer “has alleged a sufficiently concrete 

injury because he alleges that [Defendant] denied him the right to information due to him 

under the FDCPA”); see also Church v. Accretive Health, Inc., No. 15-15708, 2016 WL 

3611543, at *3 (11th Cir. July 6, 2016) (holding that consumer’s § 1692g claim was 

sufficiently concrete to satisfy injury-in-fact requirement). 

6. “The FDCPA does create an informational right which did not exist prior to 

its enactment, and that right is tied to the harm which a consumer may suffer if not 

provided with that information. Consequently, the deprivation of that information is, in 

most cases, sufficient to confer Article III standing. That was the law before Spokeo, and 

that law was not based on an erroneous understanding of Article III like the one corrected 

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by Spokeo, but by application of well-settled principles of standing jurisprudence 

which Spokeo did not change (and, in fact, upon which Spokeo relied).” Hagy v. Demers 

& Adams, LLC, No. 2:11-CV-530, 2017 WL 1134408, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 27, 2017).

7. “[E]ven though actual monetary harm is a sufficient condition to show 

concrete harm, it is not a necessary condition.” Lane, 2016 WL 3671467 at *4 (emphasis 

in original). 

THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT

8. Congress enacted the FDCPA in order to eliminate “abusive debt collection 

practices by debt collectors [and] to insure that those debt collectors who refrain from 

using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged.” Clark v. 

Capital Credit & Collection Servs., Inc., 460 F.3d 1162, 1179-80 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing 

15 U.S.C. § 1692(e)). 

9. To protect consumers and ensure compliance by debt collectors, “the 

FDCPA is a strict liability statute.” McCollough v. Johnson, Rodenburg & Lauinger, 

LLC, 637 F.3d 939, 948 (9th Cir. 2011).

10. Strict liability enhances “the remedial nature of the statute,” and courts are 

“to interpret it liberally” to protect consumers. Clark, 460 F.3d at 1176.

11. “In addition, by making available to prevailing consumers both statutory 

damages and attorneys’ fees, Congress ‘clearly intended that private enforcement actions 

would be the primary enforcement tool of the Act.’” Id. (quoting Baker v. G.C. Servs. 

Corp., 677 F.2d 775, 780-81 (9th Cir. 1982)).

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12. Violations of the FDCPA are assessed under the least sophisticated 

consumer standard which is “‘designed to protect consumers of below average 

sophistication or intelligence,’ or those who are ‘uninformed or naïve,’ particularly when 

those individuals are targeted by debt collectors.” Gonzales v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 

660 F.3d 1055, 1061 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Duffy v. Landberg, 215 F.3d 871, 874-75 

(8th Cir. 2000)). 

13. “An FDCPA Plaintiff need not even have actually been misled or deceived 

by the debt collector’s representation; instead, liability depends on whether the 

hypothetical ‘least sophisticated debtor’ likely would be misled.” Tourgeman v. Collins 

Fin. Servs., Inc., 755 F.3d 1109, 1117-18 (9th Cir. 2014) (emphasis in original). 

14. “[B]ecause the FDCPA is a remedial statute aimed at curbing what 

Congress considered to be an industry-wide pattern of and propensity towards abusing 

debtors, it is logical for debt collectors—repeat players likely to be acquainted with the 

legal standards governing their industry—to bear the brunt of the risk.” Clark, 460 F.3d at 

1171-72; see also FTC v. Colgate–Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 393 (1965) (“[I]t does 

not seem unfair to require that one who deliberately goes perilously close to an area of 

proscribed conduct shall take the risk that he may cross the line.”) (internal quotations 

omitted).

PARTIES

15. Plaintiff is a natural person who at all relevant times resided in the State of 

Arizona, County of Pima, and City of Tucson. 

16. Plaintiff is a “consumer” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3). 

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17. Defendant is an entity who at all relevant times was engaged, by use of the 

mails and telephone, in the business of attempting to collect a “debt” from Plaintiff, as 

defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5).

18. Defendant is a “debt collector” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). 

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

19. Plaintiff is a natural person allegedly obligated to pay a debt asserted to be 

owed or due a creditor other than Defendant.

20. Plaintiff’s alleged obligation arises from a transaction in which the money, 

property, insurance, or services that are the subject of the transaction were incurred 

primarily for personal, family, or household purposes—namely, personal medical 

services through Aspen Dental (the “Debt”).

21. Defendant uses instrumentalities of interstate commerce or the mails in a 

business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts.

22. Defendant regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, 

debts owed or due, or asserted to be owed or due, another.

23. On February 24, 2017, Plaintiff visited Aspen Dental for a dental visit.

24. Plaintiff’s February 24, 2017 visit to Aspen Dental was classified as a 

preventative—or prophylaxis—visit. 

25. Plaintiff’s policy with her insurance provider states that Plaintiff will not 

have to make any payments—including a co-pay—if the visit is a preventative one.

26. Therefore, Plaintiff was fully covered by her insurance for her visit to 

Aspen Dental. 

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27. Despite Plaintiff’s insurance coverage, Aspen Dental sent Plaintiff an 

invoice on March 3, 2017, which stated that she owed $18.

28. On April 10, 2017, a representative of Aspen Dental told Plaintiff to 

disregard the bill for now, and that they would call Plaintiff later to confirm whether 

Plaintiff, in fact, owed the Debt.

29. Plaintiff and Aspen exchanged phone calls over the next two months 

without confirming that Plaintiff did not owe the Debt.

30. Defendant sent Plaintiff a letter dated June 12, 2017 in connection with the 

collection of the Debt. 

31. A true and correct copy of Defendant’s June 12, 2017 letter is attached to 

this complaint as Exhibit A.

32. Defendant’s June 12, 2017 letter was its initial communication with 

Plaintiff with respect to the Debt. 

33. Defendant’s June 12, 2017 letter attempted to collect $18 and states that 

Defendant’s “records indicate that this debt is your responsibility.” Exhibit A.

34. Defendant’s statement in its letter implied that it had medical or other 

records in its possession that would demonstrate Plaintiff owed the Debt.

35. This statement is misleading, where, upon information and belief, 

Defendant had no such records.

36. Shortly after receiving Defendant’s June 12, 2017 letter, Plaintiff spoke 

with a manager at Aspen Dental who apologized for the mistaken billing on the Debt and 

stated that she fixed the issue. 

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37. Thus, Plaintiff does not owe this Debt. 

38. Defendant’s attempt to collect the Debt from Plaintiff is unfair, false and 

misleading.

39. Defendant did not have the authority to collect the Debt from either an 

agreement in Plaintiff’s relevant contract for dental services or through relevant law.

COUNT I

VIOLATION OF 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A)

40. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges each factual allegation above.

41. The FDCPA creates a broad, flexible prohibition against the use of 

misleading, deceptive, or false representations in the collection of debts. See 15 U.S.C. § 

1692e. See Hamilton v. United Healthcare of Louisiana, Inc., 310 F.3d 385, 392 (5th 

Cir. 2002) (citing legislative history reference to the FDCPA’s general prohibitions which 

“will enable the courts, where appropriate, to proscribe other improper conduct which is 

not specifically addressed”).

42. “[I]t is well established that ‘[a] debt collection letter is deceptive where it 

can be reasonably read to have two or more different meanings, one of which is 

inaccurate.” Gonzales v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 660 F.3d 1055, 1062 (9th Cir. 2011) 

(citing Brown v. Card Serv. Ctr., 464 F.3d 450, 455 (3d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation 

omitted)).

43. Included as an example of conduct that violates section 1692e is the false 

representation of the character, amount, or legal status of a debt. 15 U.S.C. § 

1692e(2)(A).

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44. Thus, the plain-language of the FDCPA makes it clear that under the strict 

liability framework, any false representation as to the amount of the debt is sufficient to 

show a violation of the FDCPA. See Randolph v. IMBS, Inc., 368 F.3d 726, 730 (7th Cir. 

2004) (“§ 1692e(2)(A) creates a strict-liability rule. Debt collectors may not make false 

claims, period.”); see also Turner v. J.V.D.B. & Associates, Inc., 330 F.3d 991, 995 (7th 

Cir. 2003) (“under § 1692e ignorance is no excuse”). 

45. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A) by falsely representing the 

character, amount, or legal status of Plaintiff’s alleged debt.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for relief and judgment, as follows: 

a) Adjudging that Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A);

b) Awarding Plaintiff statutory damages, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 

1692k(a)(2)(A), in the amount of $1,000.00;

c) Awarding Plaintiff actual damages, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(1);

d) Awarding Plaintiff reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in this 

action pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3); 

e) Awarding Plaintiff pre-judgment and post-judgment interest as permissible 

by law; and

f) Awarding such other and further relief as the Court may deem proper.

COUNT II

VIOLATION OF 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10)

46. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges each factual allegation above.

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47. Congress, recognizing that it would be impossible to foresee every type of 

deceptive collection misbehavior, expressly included in the FDCPA a catchall provision, 

prohibiting “[t]he use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt 

to collect any debt or to obtain information concerning a consumer.” 15 U.S.C. § 

1692e(10). 

48. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10) by using false, deceptive, or 

misleading representations or means in connection with the collection of any debt.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for relief and judgment, as follows: 

a) Adjudging that Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10);

b) Awarding Plaintiff statutory damages, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 

1692k(a)(2)(A), in the amount of $1,000.00;

c) Awarding Plaintiff actual damages, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(1);

d) Awarding Plaintiff reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in this 

action pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3); 

e) Awarding Plaintiff pre-judgment and post-judgment interest as permissible 

by law; and

f) Awarding such other and further relief as the Court may deem proper.

COUNT III

VIOLATION OF 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(1)

49. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges each factual allegation above.

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50. The FDCPA prohibits the use of unfair or unconscionable means to collect 

debts, including, but not limited to, the attempt to collect amounts to which the debt 

collector is not legally entitled to collect. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692f, 1692f(1). 

51. Debt collectors may not collect any amount if either “(A) state law 

expressly prohibits collection of the amount or (B) the contract does not provide for 

collection of the amount and state law is silent.” FTC Staff Commentary on the FDCPA, 

53 Fed. Reg. 50,097, 50,108 (Dec. 13, 1988)

52. “[W]hen state law does not affirmatively authorize or prohibit service 

charges, a service charge may only be imposed if the customer expressly agreed to it in 

the contract which gives rise to the debt.” Weast v. Rockport Fin., LLC, 115 F. Supp. 3d 

1018, 1022 (E.D. Mo. 2015) (citing Pollice v. Nat’l Tax Funding, L.P., 225 F.3d 379, 

407–08 (3d Cir. 2000); Tuttle v. Equifax Check, 190 F.3d 9, 13 (2d Cir. 1999)). 

53. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(1) by collecting, or attempting to 

collect, an amount from Plaintiff that is not expressly authorized by the agreement 

creating the debt nor permitted by law.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for relief and judgment, as follows: 

a) Adjudging that Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(1);

b) Awarding Plaintiff statutory damages, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 

1692k(a)(2)(A), in the amount of $1,000.00;

c) Awarding Plaintiff actual damages, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(1);

d) Awarding Plaintiff reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in this 

action pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3); 

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e) Awarding Plaintiff pre-judgment and post-judgment interest as permissible 

by law; and

f) Awarding such other and further relief as the Court may deem proper.

TRIAL BY JURY

54. Plaintiff is entitled to and hereby demands a trial by jury.

Dated: November 28, 2017

Respectfully submitted,

s/ Russell S. Thompson IV

Russell S. Thompson IV (029098)

Thompson Consumer Law Group, PLLC

5235 E. Southern Ave., D106-618

Mesa, AZ 85206

Telephone: (602) 388-8898

Facsimile: (866) 317-2674

rthompson@consumerlawinfo.com

s/ Joseph Panvini

Joseph Panvini (028359)

Thompson Consumer Law Group, PLLC

5235 E. Southern Ave., D106-618

Mesa, AZ 85206

Telephone: (602) 388-8875

Facsimile: (866) 317-2674

jpanvini@consumerlawinfo.com

Attorneys for Plaintiff

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