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Anne Chapman (#025969)

anne@mscclaw.com

MITCHELL | STEIN | CAREY | CHAPMAN, PC

One Renaissance Square

2 North Central Avenue, Suite 1450

Phoenix, AZ 85004

Telephone: (602) 388-1232

Louis S. Fidel (#025479)

PICCARRETA DAVIS KEENAN FIDEL PC

2 East Congress Street, Suite 1000

Tucson, AZ 85701-1782

Telephone: (520) 622-6900

Email: lfidel@pd-law.com

Christopher B. Dupont (#014158)

TRAUTMAN DUPONT, PLC

PO Box 431

Phoenix, Arizona 85001

Telephone: (602) 770-8942

dupontlaw333@gmail.net

Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America,

Plaintiff,

vs. 

1. Natalie Renee Hoffman

(Counts 1-3)

2. Oona Meagan Holcomb,

(Counts 2-3)

3. Madeline Abbe Huse,

(Counts 2-3)

4. Zaachila I. Orozco-McCormick

(Counts 2-3)

Defendants.

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No. 17-00339MJ-TUC-BGM

MOTION TO DISMISS CHARGES 

PURSUANT TO THE RELIGOUS 

FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT

Evidentiary Hearing Requested

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Pursuant to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (“RFRA”) and 

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(1), Defendant Natalie Hoffman by and 

through undersigned counsel hereby requests that the Court dismiss Count 1 of the 

Information against her, alleging that she Operated a Motor Vehicle in a Wilderness 

Area. Also, pursuant to RFRA and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(1), all 

Defendants request that the Court dismiss Count 2 of the Information against them, 

alleging that they Entered a National Wildlife Refuge Without a Permit. Also, pursuant 

to RFRA and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(1), all Defendants request that 

the Court dismiss Count 3 of the Information against them, alleging that they 

abandoned, discarded or otherwise left personal property in a National Wildlife Refuge.

Defendants sincerely hold religious beliefs about the sanctity of human life that 

compel them to actively provide aid to strangers in need who are likely to die if such aid 

were not provided; in this case, migrants crossing through the western deserts of 

Arizona. While exercising their sincerely-held beliefs, Defendants were issued criminal 

citations by the federal government. Long-established federal law protects their 

exercise of these beliefs and requires dismissal of the charges against them. 

Specifically, RFRA and implementing caselaw protect Defendants from being 

prosecuted for providing humanitarian aid in the Cabeza Prieta National Wildlife 

Refuge pursuant to these sincerely held moral and spiritual beliefs. Defendants’ 

exercise of their sincere religious beliefs is substantially burdened by the Government’s 

actions, and the Government cannot show that such actions are the least restrictive 

means of furthering a compelling governmental interest. Therefore, the charges against 

Defendants should be dismissed. This Motion is supported by the following 

Memorandum of Points and Authorities. Defendants request an evidentiary hearing on 

this motion.

. . .

. . .

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

A. Factual Background

The Government’s Information (Dkt. 1) alleges that on August 13, 2017, Ms. 

Hoffman used a motor vehicle in a wilderness area designated by federal law, the 

Cabeza Prieta National Wildlife Refuge (“Cabeza Prieta”), without lawful authority in 

violation of 50 C.F.R. § 35.5. The information also alleges that, on August 13, 2017, all 

Defendants were in Cabeza Prieta without a permit in violation of 50 C.F.R. § 26.22(b)

and abandoned property in violation of 50 C.F.R. § 27.93. 

a. The West Affidavit

The Government filed an Affidavit (Dkt. 17) (“West Affidavit”) from Michael 

West, a Federal Wildlife Officer of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service. The 

West Affidavit alleges Ofc. West received information of individuals in an area of 

Cabeza Prieta called Charlie Bell Pass/Well.1 Ofc. West received photos showing a 

non-government vehicle being operated in the area. He received additional photos 

showing the vehicle driving out of the wilderness area, then driving back into it. Upon 

arrival at Charlie Bell Pass, Ofc. West observed a green Ford F150 unattended and 

legally parked off the roadway. He recorded the vehicle license plate and observed 

there was not a valid permit displayed on the dash. The vehicle was registered to The 

Unitarian Universalist Church of Tucson.

Ofc. West observed several plastic crates containing individual 1-gallon jugs of 

water and several wrapped containers of cans of beans in the vehicle. He then observed 

a white vehicle parked in the distance past the designated wilderness boundary at the top 

of Charlie Bell Pass, and fresh tire tracks going towards Charlie Bell Well. 

Ofc. West approached Charlie Bell Well and observed “a large stash” of crates 

containing water and beans matching the items in the green F150. He drove past 

Charlie Bell Well and located a white Dodge truck, which was unattended and parked 

 

1 Defendants assume the allegations in the West Affidavit to be true for purposes of this 

motion only.

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off the roadway west of the well. The vehicle was also registered to The Unitarian 

Universalist Church of Tucson. Ofc. West observed there was no permit displayed and 

the vehicle contained additional jugs of water and cans of beans in the bed of the truck. 

He failed to locate any persons in the immediate area.

Subsequently, Ofc. West observed four individuals walking out of the desert 

towards the truck. He made contact and Defendant Hoffman identified herself as the 

driver of the vehicle and that they were part of the group No More Deaths. Ofc. West 

alleges Defendants told him they did not have permits. Defendants admitted leaving the 

“stash” of water and food at Charlie Bell Well. They said they had left it there to 

lighten the load of the truck while driving on the rough roads. They told him they 

intended to pick it up on their way out. Defendants told Ofc. West they intentionally 

did not obtain valid permits. They did not want to sign a piece of paper which they 

knew they would not abide by because of their intent to leave humanitarian aid items in 

the desert. 

Ofc. West told Defendants they needed to leave the refuge by the route they took 

in. They told him they wanted to drive further west to leave more food and water for 

people. He again told them they needed to leave, so they did. Defendants attempted to 

collect the water and food left at Charlie Bell Well as they passed by. Ofc. West told 

them he would collect the items and transport them off the refuge. 

There are no allegations in the West Affidavit that any of the Defendants’ actions 

or conduct negatively impacted any of the flora or fauna in Cabeza Prieta in any way.

b. No More Deaths: A Ministry of the Unitarian Universalist Church

Defendants volunteer with the humanitarian aid group No More Deaths. This 

organization was founded by various religious leaders in Tucson and embraces faithbased principles; its mission is to “end death and suffering in the Mexico-US 

borderlands” by upholding fundamental human rights. See “About No More Deaths” 

http://forms.nomoredeaths.org/about-no-more-deaths/. (Last visited Sept. 6, 2018.) 

Since 2008 the organization has been an official ministry of the Unitarian Universalist 

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Church in Tucson (“UUCT”). Through this ministry, the UUCT has been nationally 

recognized for its advocacy to end the human rights crisis at the border. 

In furtherance and consistent with the religious principles of the Church and 

individual adherents like Defendants, the No More Deaths mission maintains a yearround humanitarian presence in the deserts of southwestern Arizona. As one of its 

principal functions, “[v]olunteers hike the trails and leave water, food, socks, blankets 

and other supplies [for migrants].” See http://forms.nomoredeaths.org/about-no-moredeaths/. Id. The volunteers map out the sites where they leave the water and other 

supplies; the location of water and food drops correlates to locations and areas where 

human remains have been documented. The volunteers then return to the same sites to 

monitor which of the supplies have been consumed and remove and/or replace the 

supplies. They also remove any other trash that might have been deposited in the area. 

No More Deaths Volunteers adhere to the principle of “taking out more than they 

leave.” Id.

The humanitarian crisis addressed by No More Deaths is well-documented as 

hundreds of migrants die every year from exposure and injury while crossing from 

Mexico in the southern Arizona desert. From January 2016 through February 6, 2018, 

824 recorded migrant deaths have occurred. See International Organization for 

Migration, “Migrant Deaths Remain High Despite Sharp Fall in US-Mexico Border 

Crossings in 2017,” Feb. 6, 2018, available at https://www.iom.int/news/migrantdeaths-remain-high-despite-sharp-fall-us-mexico-border-crossings-2017 (last visited 

August 31, 2018). This figure only includes known deaths. Migrant deaths are not 

always recorded, and government agents and humanitarian groups continue to find 

unidentified human remains in remote desert areas. 

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The following map shows that where Defendants were conducting their search 

and rescue operation on August 13, 2017 is directly within an area where many migrant 

human remains have been found in the past.2

B. Relevant Procedural History

Defendants sought an order compelling the Government to disclose, inter alia,

discovery relevant to Defendants’ defense under RFRA. (See Dkt. 43, Defs.’ Mot. to 

 

2 Attached as Exhibit 1 is an Affidavit from Legal Intern Robert Posey (“Posey Aff.”) 

which provides foundation for the creation of this map. Mr. Posey used Arizona’s 

OpenGIS Initiative to obtain a map of the remains of Deceased Migrants found in the 

Cabeza Prieta Wildlife Refuge, which can be found at 

http://www.humaneborders.info/app/map.asp. (last visited August 31, 2018) Posey Aff. 

at ¶ 4. Mr. Posey took a snapshot of this map and then used the Defendants’ GPS 

coordinates as noted in Fish and Wildlife Services Citation (No. 97720) to mark the 

location of Defendants on the map in comparison to where human remains had been 

found. Id. at ¶¶ 5-6. 

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Compel.) In conjunction with the Motion to Compel, Defendants Holcomb, Huse, and 

Orozco-McCormick filed a Notice of Declaration in Support of Religious Freedom 

which provided detail on the beliefs they held which formed the basis of their decision 

to work with No Mas Muertos. (See Dkts. 55, 57, 61). The Government moved to 

strike the declarations. 

On June 1, 2018, the Court declined to strike the Defendants’ Declarations but 

denied the Motion to Compel. (See Dkt. 68, 6/01/18 Order.) The Court’s 6/1/18 Order 

made certain observations regarding the merits of Defendants’ RFRA defense. As 

discussed below, the Court’s observations overlooked some of the pertinent law 

governing RFRA claims and certain relevant facts of this matter.

C. Law and Analysis

In order to ensure broad protection for religious liberty, RFRA provides that the:

Government shall not substantially burden a person’s sincere exercise of 

religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability 

[unless] it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person: (1) is 

in furtherance of a compelling government interest; and (2) is the least 

restrictive means of furthering that compelling government interest. 

See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a), (b). In RFRA, Congress intentionally chose “the most 

demanding test known to constitutional law” to protect the exercise of religious beliefs. 

City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 534 (1997). RFRA extended both the baseline 

constitutional protections of the Free Exercise Clause and the pre-RFRA statutory 

limitations on the federal government’s ability to burden the constitutionally-protected 

exercise of religious conscience. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751,

2761-62 (2014). Under RFRA, the federal government may not “substantially burden” 

a person’s religious exercise, even where the burden results from a religiously neutral, 

generally applicable law that might be constitutionally valid under Smith, unless the 

imposition of such a burden is the least restrictive means to serve a compelling 

governmental interest. Id.

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Congress amended and strengthened RFRA in 2000 by means of the Religious 

Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc, et seq. 

RLUIPA mandates that statutory protections on religious exercise like RFRA “shall be 

construed in favor of broad protection of religious exercise, to the maximum extent 

permitted by the terms of this chapter and by the Constitution.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc3(g).

RFRA unquestionably applies to Title 50, Code of Federal Regulation, as it 

applies “to all Federal law, and the implementation of that law, whether statutory or 

otherwise, and whether adopted before or after November 16, 1993.” Id. § 2000bb-3(a). 

RFRA’s application is “universal” across all federal law. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 

516.

RFRA authorizes any “person whose religious exercise has been burdened” in 

violation of the statute to “assert that violation as a claim or defense in a judicial 

proceeding and obtain appropriate relief.” The procedural vehicle to move for dismissal 

is Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(1), which allows a party to “raise by pretrial motion any 

defense, objection, or request that the court can determine without a trial on the merits.” 

A charge in a complaint may be dismissed if it is subject to a defense that may be 

decided solely on issues of law. United States v. Tawahongva, 456 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 

1125 (D. Ariz. 2006).

a. The Government Cannot Meet Its Burden to Survive Dismissal Under 

RFRA.

A RFRA claim requires a court to engage in a burden shifting analysis. Gonzales 

v. O Centro Espiritu Beneficente Uniao de Vegetal (“UDV”), 546 U.S. 418, 428-29 

(2006). The defendant must first demonstrate that the government (1) substantially 

burdened (2) a sincere (3) exercise of religion. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a), (c). If the 

defendant satisfies her prima facie case, then the burden shifts to the government to 

demonstrate that the burden “(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental 

interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that government interest.” Id.

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§ 2000bb-1(b). To “demonstrate” under RFRA means to “meet[] the burden of going 

forward with the evidence and of persuasion.” Id. § 2000bb-2(3).

Here, Defendants satisfy their prima facie case under prevailing law to show that 

the Government’s action has substantially burdened their “sincere exercise of religion,”

as that term is defined by RFRA jurisprudence. The burden therefore shifts to the 

Government who cannot demonstrate it acted in furtherance of a government interest 

and that its actions were the least restrictive means of furthering that government 

interest. Accordingly, dismissal is warranted pursuant to RFRA.

i. Defendants Entered Cabeza Prieta to Exercise Their Sincere 

Religious Belief to Protect and Save Human Life.

RFRA’s definition of the “exercise of religion” includes “any exercise of 

religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.” Id. §§ 

2000bb-2(4), 2000cc-5(7)(A). “A determination of what is a ‘religious’ belief or 

practice entitled to constitutional protection may present a most delicate 

question.” Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215, (1972). Religious beliefs often 

address fundamental questions about life, purpose and death—they often prescribe a 

particular manner of acting, or way of life, that is “moral or ethical.” United States v. 

Meyers, 95 F.3d 1475, 1483 (10th Cir. 1996). A moral or ethical belief structure “may 

create duties often imposed by some higher power, force or spirit—that require the 

believer to abnegate elemental self-interest.” Id.

The question of whether beliefs are religious in nature, for the purposes of 

RFRA, is a mixed objective and subjective question. See Eternal Word Television 

Network, Inc. v. Sec'y of U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 818 F.3d 1122, 1144 

(11th Cir. 2016). “Hobby Lobby made clear that there is a subjective aspect to this 

inquiry: courts must accept a religious adherent's assertion that his religious beliefs 

require him to take or abstain from taking a specified action.” The objective inquiry 

requires courts to consider whether the government actually “puts” the religious 

adherent to the “choice” of incurring a “serious” penalty or “engag[ing] in conduct that 

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seriously violates [his] religious beliefs.” Holt v. Hobbs, ––– U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. 853, 

862, 190 L.Ed.2d 747 (2015).

Because of the subjective nature of the inquiry into the adherent’s beliefs, the 

“function of the judiciary in determining whether beliefs are to be accorded first 

amendment protection” is “limited.” Patrick v. LeFevre, 745 F.2d 153, 157 (2d Cir. 

1984) (reviewing Supreme Court authority); See also Emp. Div. Dept. of Human 

Resources of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 887 (1990), superseded by statute on other 

grounds (“What principle of law or logic can be brought to bear to contradict a 

believer’s assertion that a particular act is ‘central’ to his personal faith?”); Eatman v. 

United Parcel Service, 194 F.Supp.2d 256, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“Courts [are] 

congenitally incapable of judging the religious nature of an adherent’s beliefs based on 

their content”).

The Ninth Circuit has held: “The task is to decide whether the beliefs professed . 

. . are in [the person’s] own scheme of things, religious.” United States v. Ward, 989 

F.2d 1015, 1018 (9th Cir. 1992) (emphasis added); see also Patrick, 745 F.2d at 

157 (the judiciary’s “competence extends to determining ‘whether the beliefs professed 

by a [claimant] are sincerely held and whether they are, in his own scheme of 

things, religious.’”). “Religious beliefs . . . are those that stem from person’s ‘moral, 

ethical, or religious beliefs about what is right and wrong’ and are ‘held with the 

strength of traditional religious convictions.’” Ward, 989 F.2d at 1018 (quoting Welsh

v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 339 (1970)).3 This inquiry is understood to be, without 

qualification, a highly “subjective definition of religion, which examines an individual’s 

 

3 Welsh, like United States v. Seeger, was a statutory interpretation case. However, 

these cases were constitutionally motivated, and the Ninth Circuit is among the courts 

that have applied them to the constitutional definition of religion. See Ward, 989 F.2d 

at 1018 n.2 (“Courts regularly use the Welsh test to determine whether belief is 

‘religious for First Amendment free exercise purposes.”).

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inward attitudes towards a particular belief system.” Patrick, 745 F.2d at 157

(emphasis added).4 

The defendant must also establish their beliefs are sincerely held. This element 

is a question of fact, proven by the credibility of the party asserting a religion-based 

defense. Meyers, 95 F.3d at 1482. United States v. Zimmerman, 514 F.3d 851, 854 (9th 

Cir. 2007) (stating that sincerity is “a question of fact”); Patrick v. LeFevre, 745 F.2d 

153, 157 (2nd Cir. 1984) (the sincerity analysis “demands a full exposition of facts and 

the opportunity for the factfinder to observe the claimant’s demeanor during direct and 

 

4 The belief system in question does not have to be tied to a traditional organized 

religion. In Seeger, the Supreme Court granted conscientious objector status to 

someone who objected to war on grounds that were not tied to traditional or organized 

religion, and that did not involve belief in a supernatural God or a Supreme Being.

Instead, he had a profound “ethical belief in intellectual and moral integrity ‘without 

belief in God, except in the remotest sense.’” United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 

166 (1965). In Ward, the defendant “[did] not describe his beliefs in terms ordinarily 

used in discussions of theology or cosmology” and “at one point use[d] the term 

‘atheistic[.]’” 989 F.2d at 1018. Yet, given the conviction of his beliefs and the risks he 

was willing to assume to adhere to them, the Court held his beliefs were religious. Id. 

Here, however, the No More Deaths organization is tied to an organized religion. It is a 

ministry of the UUCT and reflects and furthers the religious principles of that religion. 

Unitarian Universalist Association (UUA) congregations affirm and promote seven 

Principles, which are held as strong values and moral guides. “The Principles are not 

dogma or doctrine, but rather a guide for those of us who choose to join and participate 

in Unitarian Universalist religious communities.” The Seven Principles are written into 

the UUA Bylaws. The First Principle is “the inherent worth and dignity of every 

person.” https://www.uua.org/beliefs/what-we-believe/principles/1st. The Reflection on 

the First Principle states: “Reverence and respect for human nature is at the core of the 

Unitarian Universalist (UU) faith . . . . Unitarian Universalists affirm the inherent worth 

and dignity of each person as a given of faith—an unshakeable conviction calling us to 

self-respect and respect for others.” Id. The UU Second Principle is “Justice, Equity 

and Compassion in human relations.” https://www.uua.org/beliefs/what-webelieve/principles/2nd. The Reflection on the Second Principle states: “Justice, equity, 

and compassion in human relations points us toward something beyond inherent worth 

and dignity. It points us to the larger community. It gets at collective responsibility. It 

reminds us that treating people as human beings is not simply something we do one-onone, but something that has systemic implications and can inform our entire cultural 

way of being.” Id. 

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cross- examination”). In making this determination, the Court may not decide whether 

the claimant’s belief is true. Yellowbear v. Lampert, 741 F.3d 48, 54 (10th Cir. 2014). 

The Court merely must ask whether the claimant is seeking to perpetrate a fraud on the 

court—whether she actually holds the belief she claims to hold. Id. The question of 

“sincerity” is “exceedingly amorphous,” Patrick, 745 F.2d at 157, and appears to 

overlap with the test for what is “religious” inasmuch as that test examines the private 

and subjective (i.e., one’s “own scheme of things”). Seeger, 380 U.S. at 185. 

However, sincerity remains a discrete element in RFRA and Free Exercise 

analysis. As distinguished from separating what (in the claimant’s scheme of things) is 

religious from what (in that same scheme) is secular, “[s]incerity analysis seeks to 

determine an ‘adherent's good faith’ in the expression of their belief.” Patrick, 745 F.2d 

at 157. Sincerity analysis “provides a rational means of differentiating between those 

beliefs that are held as a matter of conscience and those that are animated by motives of 

deception and fraud,” and requires a factfinder “to delve into the claimant’s most veiled 

motivations.” Id. Because the sincerity of a religious belief is a factual issue, an 

evidentiary hearing is usually required. United States v. Adeyemo, 624 F. Supp. 2d 

1081, 1086-87 (N.D. Cal. 2008).

The Court’s 6/01/18 Order observed, without citation to any facts of record, that 

“Defendants’ proclaimed moral, ethical, and spiritual belief to assist humans in need of 

basic necessities appear to be a simple recitation ‘for the purpose of draping religious 

garb over [political or philosophical activity[.]’” Dkt. 68 at 5:19-21. (citing United 

States v. Christie, 825 F.3d 1048, 1056 (9th Cir. 2016)). However, the fact that a 

religious belief or act may overlap with a certain political ideology does not make the 

belief political rather than religious in nature. 

For example, in Hobby Lobby, the claimants’ opposition to contraceptive 

coverage mirrored conservative political beliefs about abortion and the Affordable Care 

Act. Yet at no time did the Court find that the beliefs of the RFRA claimants were 

political rather than religious in nature. Similarity, the religiosity of Defendants’ beliefs 

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should not be questioned merely because they happen to overlap with some secular 

political views regarding immigration.

More importantly, the Court’s observation overlooks the relevant law discussed 

above that holds Courts are “congenitally incapable of judging the religious nature of an 

adherents beliefs” based on their content because the inquiry involves “a highly 

subjective definition of religion,” which examines “an individual’s inward attitudes 

towards a particular belief system.”

5 Eatman, 194 F. Supp. 2d at 268; Patrick, 745 F.2d 

at 157. The Court’s observation also entirely overlooks significant detail provided in 

Defendants’ sworn declarations wherein each Defendant discuss the basis of their 

profound spiritual, moral and ethical beliefs in the sanctity of human life. To each 

Defendant, in their own scheme of things, these beliefs are held as sincerely as any 

other religious belief. It is these beliefs that compelled Defendants to seek to render 

humanitarian aid on behalf of No More Deaths on the day they were given criminal 

citations.

Defendant Natalie Hoffman resides in Tucson and is a certified Emergency 

Medical Technical. In the past, she has volunteered providing support and care on the 

Navajo Reservation for housebound elderly residents and at a Holistic Medical Clinic. 

Ms. Hoffman has been involved with No More Deaths since June 2014, mostly as a 

 

5 Moreover, Christie, the case relied upon by the Court, is distinguishable and is 

actually inapposite to the Court’s observation. In Christie, the Court had to decide 

whether the Government could prosecute two ministers of the “Hawaii Cannabis 

Ministry” who admitted to using and distributing large quantities of cannabis, but who 

claimed that they were exercising their sincerely held religious belief that cannabis was 

to be celebrated as a sacrament. 825 F.3d at 1052. The Ninth Circuit observed that the 

Defendants were required to demonstrate that their “religious beliefs” were not merely a 

subterfuge to “drape religious garb over commercial activity or straightforward drug 

trafficking.” Id. at 1056. The Court noted how “a fair-minded observer might question 

how plausible each of [the defendants’] assumptions really is[.]” But, like the trial 

court, in addressing the defendants’ RFRA defense, the Ninth Circuit assumed without 

deciding that the defendants had satisfied their burden to demonstrate a sincerely held 

religious belief. Id. Christie demonstrates just how limited a court’s role should be in 

determining the religious nature of a defendant’s particular belief because of the 

inherently subjective nature of the inquiry.

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volunteer but also at one time as a paid Logistics Coordinator. Ms. Hoffman believes in 

the church’s teachings of “the inherent worth, dignity and equality of every human 

being” and also believes “we all have an individual and collective responsibility to ease 

suffering and death where we find it, even in the West Desert of Arizona.” Ms. 

Hoffman writes:

I firmly believe I am morally, ethically, and spiritually bound to 

offer assistance to human beings in need of basic necessities . . . . 

My spiritual and ethical and moral beliefs compel me to engage in 

such humanitarian efforts regardless of the personal risks to my own 

comfort and physical well-being. These are the beliefs that 

compelled me, even after suffering severe dehydration to the stage of 

hospital intervention in the past, to work in the Cabeza Prieta 

Wilderness on August 13, 2017. 

Declaration of Natalie Hoffman, attached as Exhibit 2. 

Defendant Oona Meghan Holcomb is a graduate student at St. Catherine’s 

University, studying Holistic Health and Public Health in Global Health. She traveled 

to Tucson to work with No More Deaths; her goal was to provide aid to people at risk of 

dying in the desert. Her work with No More Deaths is motivated by her “belief that 

every person has a right to an existence in which they can live and thrive, regardless of 

their situation in life.” Ms. Holcomb “firmly believes she is morally, ethically, and 

spiritually bound to offer assistance to human beings in need of basic necessities.” 

Declaration of Oona Holcomb, Dkt. 55, Ex. 1. 

Defendant Madeline Huse learned about No More Deaths while working with the 

South Texas Human Rights Center, which has a similar mission. She traveled to 

Tucson to support No More Death’s aim to end death and suffering in the Mexico-US 

borderlands by providing aid to people dying in the desert. Her work with No More 

Deaths is motivated by her belief that “people should have access to basic needs of life, 

and [she] is obliged as a service to humanity to try to provide these necessities to other 

human beings in need.” Ms. Huse believes “in the power of good and the greater ideals 

of love and compassion. This is in accord with the First Principal of the Unitarian 

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Universalist Church—that [she] use those gifts given to [her] to offer love, heal injury 

and support [her] fellow human beings.” Declaration of Madeline Huse, Dkt. 57, Ex. 1.

Defendant Zaachila Orozco-McCormick became aware of No More Deaths’ 

humanitarian aid work through online research and personal connections. She traveled 

to Tucson from her home state of Washington to volunteer during summer 2017. She 

notes:

I have a strong and abiding moral, ethical and spiritual belief that 

every person has a right to basic human necessities such as food and 

water and shelter, regardless of their status, even if that means taking 

the shirt off my back or the food off my plate . . . My work in 

support of the No More Deaths Ministry was in furtherance of my 

moral, ethical and spiritual beliefs. 

Declaration of Zaachila Orozco-McCormick, Dkt. 61, Ex. 1.

Based on the detail in the sworn Declarations, there can be no doubt6that 

Defendants were adhering to, what in their own scheme of things, amounts to a 

sincerely-held “religious belief” for purposes of RFRA analysis.

7

 Moreover, binding 

RFRA precedent provides the Court cannot substitute its own belief structure in 

determining whether Defendants’ beliefs are religious for purposes of RFRA.

Defendants travelled from various parts of the United States to volunteer with No 

More Deaths. They did so in the heat of the summer in the brutal southwestern desert. 

They committed to the arduous task of hiking in the Sonoran Desert in the middle of 

summer for one purpose—to render humanitarian aid to help save the lives of migrants 

who had crossed the border. 

 

6

Indeed, the Defense will be asking the government to stipulate to this aspect of the 

case in an attempt to streamline the proceedings. If the Government refuses to stipulate, 

each Defendant will testify in line with his or her declaration at the evidentiary hearing.

7 The Defendants’ sincere spiritual belief in the inherent worth of every human being 

and the corresponding duty to provide life-saving care to fellow human beings in 

distress is a common core-belief in a number of well-known religions including 

Christianity, Judaism, Mormonism, and Islam. Every religious tradition has as one of 

its core tenants the notion that human life possesses a kind of dignity that deserves 

protection and preservation, including a command to provide aid to persons in the 

greatest need. 

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Defendants did not volunteer for political reasons. Each of the Defendants 

volunteered with No More Deaths as a matter of a spiritual calling. No More Deaths’ 

humanitarian mission is in furtherance of, and is consistent with, the religious principles 

of the UUCT and its individual adherents. 

Each of the Defendants came to Tucson to help save lives due to their own strong 

moral or ethical belief system in the sanctity of human life, which is based on deeplyheld principles of what is right and wrong. Each of the Defendants were adhering to 

these sincere and strongly-held principles when they went into Cabeza Prieta on August 

13, 2017, to render aid and save lives in the middle of a wilderness that was well-known 

and documented as an area where many migrants had lost their lives in the past. 

ii. The Government’s Prosecution of Defendants Substantially 

Burdens the Free Exercise of Their Sincerely-Held Religious 

Beliefs.

To meet their burden under RFRA, Defendants must demonstrate that the

Government’s actions substantially burdened the free exercise of Defendants’ sincere 

religious beliefs. The Court’s 6/01/18 Order observed that “denial of vehicle access by 

Defendants to portions of the Cabeza Prieta National Wildlife Refuge does not 

‘affirmatively compel[] [the Defendant], under threat of criminal sanction, to perform 

acts undeniably at odds with fundamental tenets of [his] religious beliefs.’” Dkt. 68 at 

5:5-8 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 218 (1972)). The Court’s observation

reflects an incomplete and premature analysis of the relevant law.

A substantial burden does not only exist when a person is forced to perform 

affirmative acts at odd with his/her religious beliefs. The Ninth Circuit has recognized 

that a substantial burden also exists when an individual is “coerced to act contrary to 

their religious beliefs by the threat of civil or criminal sanctions.” Navajo Nation v. 

U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1069, 1069-70 (9th Cir. 2008) (emphasis added). 

This substantial burden exists when a person is “coerce[d] . . . into a Catch-22 situation: 

exercise of their religion under fear of civil or criminal sanction.” Snoqualmie Indian 

Tribe v. F.E.R.C., 545 F. 3d 1207, 1214 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Smith, 494 U.S. at 898

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(A State that makes criminal an individual’s religiously motivated conduct burdens that 

individual’s free exercise of religion in the severest manner possible, for it “results 

in the choice to the individual of either abandoning his religious principle or facing 

criminal prosecution.”).

A substantial burden exists when a government action either: (1) requires a 

person to do something her religious beliefs prohibit; (2) prohibits her from doing 

something her religious beliefs require; or (3) substantially pressure her to modify her 

religious beliefs or practices—such as by conditioning a significant benefit on violating 

her religious beliefs. Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind., 450 U.S. 707, 717-718 (1981). 

Indeed, the Department of Justice’s own guidance underscores that “[e]xcept in the 

narrowest circumstances, no one should be forced to choose between living out his or 

her faith and complying with the law.” Office of the Attorney General, Federal Law 

Protections for Religious Liberty, Oct. 6, 2017, at 1.

Here, the Government’s actions substantially burdened Defendants’ ability to 

exercise their sincerely-held religious beliefs. The law prohibited Defendants from 

entering Cabeza Prieta, an area historically known for containing migrants in serious, 

critical need of aid. Defendants were also aware that migrant human remains had been 

found before in the area. Defendants could not render the aid they were compelled to 

render without a motor vehicle. 

Thus, Defendants faced an intractable dilemma. On the one hand, they could fail 

to respond to the urgent need to enter Cabeza Prieta to render humanitarian aid. This

failure to respond would risk death or injury to the people needing the aid, a choice that 

is anathema to Defendants’ sincerely-held moral and spiritual principles and belief in 

the sanctity of human life. Or, on the other hand, Defendants could face prosecution by 

the federal government for entering Cabeza Prieta in a vehicle to render humanitarian 

aid and potentially save lives. This is precisely the kind of “Catch 22” situation that 

RFRA’s notion of substantial burden was intended to capture. Under prevailing law, 

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this dilemma and the ensuing prosecution substantially and impermissibly burdened

Defendants’ exercise of their sincerely held moral and ethical beliefs. 

There must be a causal link between the sincere belief and the conduct at issue

when a defendant invokes the Free Exercise clause as a defense to criminal prosecution. 

See Guam v. Guerrero, 290 F.3d 1210, 1222-23, (9th Cir. 2002) (defendants had 

sincerely-held belief in using marijuana but had failed to demonstrate that anything in 

Rastifarianism required the distribution and importation of marijuana); United States v. 

Bauer, 84 F.3d 1549, 1559 (9th Cir. 1996) (same); United States v. Manneh, 645 F. 

Supp. 2d 98, 108 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). Here, there is a nexus between Defendants’ actions 

and the criminalized conduct.

The Court’s 6/01/18 Order observes that Cabeza Prieta only encompasses 13.4% 

of the total border. (Dkt. 68 at 5:15-17.) The Court apparently relies on this fact to 

observe that “even if the Court accepts that Defendants attestations are truly religious 

beliefs, there has been no showing that the exercise of the same has been substantially 

burdened by the narrowly limited access in the Cabeza Prieta National Wildlife 

Refuge.” Id. at 5:22-25. 

The Court’s observation overlooks the nature of the border wall and the realities 

of humanitarian crisis in Cabeza Prieta. While Cabeza Prieta may span only a 

percentage of the entire USA-Mexico border, the Court must consider that the full 

length of the wildlife refuge has no physical barrier whatsoever to prevent people from 

crossing into the United States on foot. The government has erected tall metal fences in 

and around border cities like Nogales, San Diego, and El Paso, or in areas close to 

major highways in order to deter foot traffic across the border. This has funneled 

migrant crossers into remote, hostile wilderness areas like Cabeza Prieta, where there is 

no physical barrier to entry. Cabeza Prieta is an area where people cross into the United 

States on foot and, as has been well-documented, may die from exposure to the harsh 

environment. 

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The No More Deaths mission specifically works in Cabeza Prieta because of the 

significant and demonstrable loss of life there and the corresponding need for 

humanitarian aid. The Pima County Office of the Medical Examiner and the Colibri 

Center for Human Rights and Humane Borders have documented the locations where

people die of exposure and dehydration. These findings are publicly documented and 

accessible by an interactive map which can be found here: 

http://www.humaneborders.info/app/map.asp (last visited August 31, 2018) It is 

obvious from this data that death and suffering are rampant in the Cabeza Prieta 

Wilderness.

Moreover, the Court’s observation runs contrary to governing Ninth Circuit law 

which holds that the Government’s action cannot compel a person to act contrary to 

their religious beliefs. See Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d 1058, at 1069-70; Snoqualmie 

Indian Tribe, 545 F. 3d at 1214. Even if there are other areas of the Arizona/Mexico 

border where Defendant might enter unrestricted (or indeed have entered unrestricted) 

to render humanitarian aid in exercise of their sincere religious beliefs, the Government 

may not compel Defendants to choose between acting contrary to their sincerely held 

belief that they must enter Cabeza Prieta to migrants crossing through that land and 

criminal prosecution. This would present Defendants with the exact “Catch 22” 

substantial burden situation that RFRA and implementing courts have made 

impermissible.

iii. It Would Have Been Futile for Defendants to Apply for a 

Permit.

The Court’s 6/01/18 Order observed there “was no denial based on any purported 

religious belief” because it is “undisputed” that Defendants did not attempt to obtain 

permits or a special use permit for access to Cabeza Prieta. (Dkt. 68 at 5:2-5.) Once 

again, the Court’s observation fails to consider relevant law on the issue.

In cases where the charges arise from a failure to obtain a permit, a defendant 

may still make an “as-applied” challenge under RFRA to the permitting system if they 

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can demonstrate that applying for a permit would have been futile. United States v. 

Antoine, 318 F.3d 919, 922 n.4 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v. Friday, 525 F. 3d 938, 

953 (10th Cir. 2008). Defendants can demonstrate that applying for permits would have 

been futile because changes the Government recently made to the permit— in violation 

of the issuing agency’s own rules and regulations—appeared to expressly forbid

Defendants from rendering humanitarian aid in Cabeza Prieta in exercise of their 

religious beliefs. 

Defendants had applied for and possessed permits in the past. Defendant 

Hoffman had a permit for another area (“the bombing range”) in 2015, but was not 

aware whether that permit also covered Cabeza Prieta. Defendant Huse had obtained a 

permit the prior December, but it had expired by the date of the incident. Defendants 

Holcomb and Orozco had never obtained or applied for a permit. However, 

Defendants’ relative status regarding permits is irrelevant because an unlawful change 

to the plain language of the permits in 2017 appeared to expressly forbid Defendants 

from rendering the humanitarian aid they went into Cabeza Prieta to dispense. 

The permit, which is an annual pass, was amended without following proper 

agency procedures to require the holder to agree in writing that they are responsible for 

removing “any and all personal property or possessions that they bring into [the area].” 

See Permit, attached as Exhibit 3. They must also “agree to remove from [the area] all 

personal property or possessions, including not limited to . . . water bottles, water 

containers, food, food items, food containers, blankets, clothing, footwear, [and medical 

supplies][.]” Id. As noted in the West Affidavit (Dkt. 18 at 5:9-10): “To obtain these 

permits, one must read, complete and sign certifying that they have read the agreement 

for [Cabeza Prieta and other covered areas].” 

Each permit holder must acknowledge an understanding that their permit may be 

suspended or revoked if they are found to be in violation of these requirements. Each 

permit holder also must acknowledge they understand they “may be subject to judicial 

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penalties to include fines, civil action, and debarment for failure to remove all personal 

property or possessions from [the area].” 

The language prohibiting the leaving of personal property to include water 

bottles, blankets, medical supplies, etc., was added by the Fish and Wildlife Service to 

the permit in 2017 without following the proper agency procedures. This addition made 

it futile for Defendants to apply for permits because the permit appeared to expressly 

forbid them from performing the humanitarian aid they wanted to render in Cabeza 

Prieta in exercise of their sincerely-held religious beliefs. In other words, in order to 

obtain a permit, Defendants would have been required to forego their religious mission 

to render humanitarian aid to migrants.

As noted, one of No More Deaths’ central practices is “[v]olunteers hike the 

trails and leave water, food, socks, blankets and other supplies [for migrants].” 

Undertaking this volunteer work is what each of the Defendants was engaged in during

Summer 2017, including on August 13, 2017, when they were intending to leave water 

and other supplies for migrants in the area. 

It would have been futile for Defendants to acquire a permit to enter the area if 

the permit forbade them, under penalty of law, to do precisely what they intended to do 

when they entered Cabeza Prieta. The futility of acquiring a permit means Defendants 

can make an as-applied challenge under RFRA to the laws they are alleged to have 

violated, even though they might not have possessed permits. 

iv. Prosecuting Defendants Under C.F.R. Title 50 Does Not Serve 

a Compelling Government Interest in the Least Restrictive 

Means.

Because Defendants have satisfied their prima facie case, the burden shifts to the 

Government to demonstrate that the burden upon Defendants’ sincerely-held religious 

belief: “(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least 

restrictive means of furthering that government interest.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b). 

RFRA requires the Government to demonstrate that the compelling interest test 

is satisfied through application of the law to the specific person whose exercise of 

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religion is being substantially burdened. UDV, 546 U.S. at 430-31. A reviewing court 

must therefore scrutinize the asserted harm of granting specific exemptions to particular 

religious claimants Id.; accord, Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2779. Courts must look to 

the government’s “marginal interest” in enforcing the law in question against the 

specific individual. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2779. This is true even in areas where 

the government interest is paramount. UDV, 546 U.S. at 431.

A compelling interest for purposes of RFRA is an interest of the highest order. 

UDV, 546 U.S. at 433, Yoder, 406 U.S. 215. Whether a proffered government interest 

qualifies as a compelling interest is a question of law. Tawahongva, 456 F. Supp. at 

1132. To show such a particularized interest, the government bears the burden of 

submitting “additional proof that the specific RFRA claimants’ particular activities” 

would result in a compelling interest being “meaningfully compromised.” United States 

v. Christie, 825 F.3d 1048, 1057 (9th Cir. 2016) (emphasis added). This is an “onerous 

burden.” O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao Do Vegetal v. Ashcroft, 282 F. Supp. 2d 

1236, 1262 (D.N.M. 2002), aff’d 389 F.3d 973 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc), aff’d and 

remanded, UDV, 546 U.S. 418.

It is well-established that assertions of a generalized government interest are 

insufficient to satisfy this analysis. See UDV, 546 U.S. at 430 (government’s asserted 

interest in uniform enforcement of Controlled Substances Act insufficient to justify 

prosecution of religious organization for its member’s use of Schedule 1 hallucinogen in 

their religious rituals). The Court must look beyond broadly formulated interests 

justifying the general applicability of government mandates to scrutinize the asserted 

individual harm. Id. at 420 (emphasis added). 

1. Prosecuting Defendants Under CFR Title 50 For 

Entering Cabeza Prieta To Render Humanitarian Age 

Does Not Serve Any Compelling Government Interest

Defendants have been prosecuted under Section 16 of the United States Code and 

Title 50 of the Code of Federal Regulations. In analyzing a regulation, the court starts 

with the language of the regulation but also looks to the context and purpose of the 

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regulation. United States v. Banks, 514 F.3d 959 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. 

Hughes, 292 F.3d 1228, 1231 (9th Cir. 2002). Cabeza Prieta is part of the National 

Wildlife Refuge System (“System”). See West Affidavit (Dkt. 17) at 6:25-27. 

Congress designated the Secretary of the Interior to administer the System and issue 

regulations to manage it. See 16 U.S.C. § 460k-3; § 668dd(a)(1). 

A mission of the System is to “ensure that the biological integrity, diversity, and 

environmental health of the System are maintained for the benefit of present and future 

generations of Americans,” id. § 668dd(a)(4)(B), to “plan and direct the continued 

growth of the System in a manner that is best designed to accomplish the mission of the 

System, to contribute to the conservation of the ecosystem of the United States,” id. § 

688dd(a)(4)(C), and ensure the mission and purposes of the System are carried out, id. § 

668dd(a)(4)(D). Additionally, Congress has provided that no person shall disturb or 

injure any property, including natural growth, in the System or “enter, use or otherwise 

occupy any such area for any purpose . . . unless such activities are permitted either 

under subsection (d) [which provides for permits] or by express provision of the law[.]” 

Id. § 668dd(c). 

50 C.F.R. § 35.5 provides: “except as specifically provided and subject to 

existing private rights, there shall be . . . no use of motor vehicles [within the System.]” 

50 C.F.R. § 26.22(b) provides “a permit shall be required for any person entering under 

a national wildlife refuge, unless otherwise provided under the provisions of subchapter 

C [of Title 50, Chapter I].” As noted by the Ninth Circuit, there is little doubt that the 

overarching purpose of [Section 16, U.S.C. and Title 50, C.F.R.] is the conservation, 

management, and restoration of wildlife and natural habitats. United States v. Millis, 

621 F.3d 914, 917 (9th Cir. 2010). 

Defendants do not dispute that Section 16 of the United States Code and Title 50 

of the CFR promote an important interest. However, that interest is not served by 

Defendants’ prosecution. Under RFRA, the Government must show that prosecuting 

Defendants under the specific circumstances of this case serves the interests of “the 

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conservation, management, and restoration of wildlife and natural habitats.” In other 

words, the Government must show the interests of the National Wildlife Preservation 

System were “meaningfully compromised” when these four Defendants travelled

without permits by motor vehicle through Cabeza Prieta on a pre-established road to 

leave food and water for migrants in need. See Christie, 825 F.3d at 1057. The 

Government cannot meet that burden here. There is no evidence that this occurred. 

There is no evidence that Defendants’ conduct negatively impacted the conservation, 

management, and restoration of wildlife and natural habitats. 

Although Ofc. West observed that Defendants had left food and water at Charlie 

Bell Well, Defendants told him they had left the items there only temporarily to ease the 

weight in their truck and were intending on collecting the items on their way out. 

Indeed, Defendants attempted to collect the items on the way out of Cabeza Prieta, but 

Ofc. West prevented them from doing so.

8

 Even if the items had been left there for 

some period of time, there is no evidence that this would have affected the flora or 

fauna of the Wilderness Area. Besides, as discussed, No More Deaths volunteers 

always return to areas where they left food and water to remove anything previously left 

there. No More Deaths Volunteers adhere to the principle of “taking out more than they 

leave.” See http://forms.nomoredeaths.org/about-no-more-deaths/. 

v. Other Less Restrictive Means Exist Which Would Still 

Promote the Government’s Interest While Leaving 

Defendants’ Free From Prosecution

The least-restrictive-means standard is “exceptionally demanding.” Hobby 

Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2780. “[T]he government must show that [its] objectives cannot be 

advanced through use of a regulation that is less intrusive of the [the defendant’s] 

religious practices, and that refusing his exemption is, therefore, the least restrictive 

 

8 Although not specifically within the scope of this motion, the Government has another 

issue with the Abandonment of Property charge. Leaving items temporarily at Charlie 

Bell Well does not rise to the level of “abandoning” them. See https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/abandon (defining “abandon” as “to give up with the intent of 

never again claiming a right or interest in”). 

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means of [serving the Government’s compelling interest].” Tawahongva, 456 F. Supp. 

2d at 1135. The Ninth Circuit has held the Government can meet its burden of showing 

a system is the least restrictive means if “it demonstrates that it actually considered and 

rejected the efficacy of least restrictive means before adopting the challenged practices.” 

Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 999 (9th Cir. 2005) (reaching conclusion under 

RLUIPA). 

The Court must examine whether the Government’s compelling interest could 

still be safeguarded if a religious exemption for the adherent at question were allowed. 

United States v. Adeyemo, 624 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1091 (N.D. Cal. 2008). The 

Government must show that granting a religious exemption to the defendant would 

result in the compromised ability of the Government to safeguard the compelling 

interest at issue. Compare id. (Government showed that granting religious exemption to 

law which criminalizing transport, possession, or import of leopard skins would result in 

compromised ability of the Government to safeguard conservation and survival of 

endangered leopards), with UDV, 546 U.S. at 439 (Government failed to demonstrate 

how granting religious exemption so sect could use a tea using hallucinogen in religious 

ceremonies would seriously compromise Government’s ability to enforce Controlled 

Substance Act). The government is not allowed to make a “slippery-slope” argument 

and speculate that granting an exemption to certain Defendants would lead to other 

possible RFRA claims. UDV, 546 at 435-36; Christie, 825 F.3d at 1060-61.

Here, then, the Government must show that it could not have granted these four 

Defendants an exemption to the permit requirement and the “no vehicles” requirement

(or an exemption from prosecution) to allow Defendants to enter Cabeza Prieta to 

render humanitarian aid without that specific exemption “meaningfully compromising” 

the Government’s interest in conserving, managing, and restoring of wildlife and natural 

habitats. The Government cannot meet this showing under the facts of this case. 

There have been no allegations or evidence that these four Defendants’ actions 

harmed any wildlife or habitat or interfered with conservation, management, or 

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restoration of any plant, animal, or habitat. Neither the West Affidavit, the Information, 

nor any other Government filing in this matter, contain any allegations that Defendants’ 

actions on August 13, 2017, impacted the conservation, management, and restoration of 

wildlife and natural habitats, which are the goals of the statutes and regulations 

Defendants have been cited under. Defendants, like all No More Death volunteers, used 

roads already in existence and used by others so they were not creating new roads. As 

of 2008, Cabeza Prieta Refuge contained almost 8,000 miles of roads, most of them 

attributable to the activities of federal agents. See U.S. Dep’t of Interior, Vehicle Trails 

Associated with Illegal Border Activities on Cabeza Prieta National Wildlife Refuge

(July 2011), at 2, attached as Exhibit 4. 

Moreover, leaving water and/or food, either temporarily for the short period of 

time demonstrated here, or for some longer period of time, would not have any 

environmental impact. No More Deaths’ volunteers customarily return to the locations 

where they drop off water and supplies to remove them, thus ensuring no environmental 

impact from their humanitarian activities. Likewise, volunteers also remove trash each 

time they are in the desert.

Because these four Defendants’ activities in Cabeza Prieta did not have any 

negative impact on the flora or fauna there, there is no reason why the Government 

could not have given these Defendants an exemption to render aid in the area. Such an 

exemption would not impact the compelling interest served by Title 50. Accordingly, 

under prevailing RFRA law, the Government cannot meet “the least restrictive means” 

tests and fails to meet its burden.

CONCLUSION

RFRA protects Defendants from being prosecuted for providing humanitarian aid 

pursuant to their sincerely held moral, ethical and spiritual beliefs. Therefore, the 

charges against them should be dismissed.

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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 10th day of September, 2018. 

MITCHELL | STEIN | CAREY | CHAPMAN, PC

By: /s/ Anne M. Chapman

Anne M. Chapman

Attorneys for Defendants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on September 10, 2018, I electronically transmitted a PDF version 

of this document to the Clerk of Court, using the CM/ECF System, for filing and for 

transmittal of a Notice of Electronic Filing to the following CM/ECF registrants:

Nathaniel J. Walters, Esq. (email: Nathaniel.walters@usdoj.gov)

Anna R. Wright, Esq. (email: anna.wright@usdoj.gov) 

Assistant U.S. Attorney

United States Courthouse

405 W. Congress Street, Ste. 4800

Tucson, AZ 85701

Attorneys for Plaintiff

/s/ Julie Greenwood

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