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Russell S. Thompson, IV (029098)

Joseph Panvini (028359)

Thompson Consumer Law Group, PLLC

5235 E. Southern Ave., D106-618

Mesa, AZ 85206 

Telephone: (602) 388-8898

Facsimile: (866) 317-2674

rthompson@consumerlawinfo.com

jpanvini@consumerlawinfo.com

Attorneys for Plaintiff

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

David Dees, on behalf of himself and all 

others similarly situated

Plaintiff,

vs.

I.Q. Data International, Inc.,

Defendant.

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Case No. 

CLASS COMPLAINT AND TRIAL BY 

JURY DEMAND

NATURE OF ACTION

1. Plaintiff David Dees (“Plaintiff”) brings this putative class action against 

Defendant I.Q. Data International, Inc.(“Defendant”) pursuant to the Fair Debt 

Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., individually and on 

behalf of all others similarly situated. 

JURISDICTION, VENUE, AND STANDING

2. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d) and 28 

U.S.C. § 1331. 

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3. Venue is proper before this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), where 

the acts and transactions giving rise to Plaintiff’s action occurred in this district, where 

Plaintiff resides in this district, and where Defendant transacts business in this district. 

4. “In determining whether an intangible harm constitutes injury in fact, both 

history and the judgment of Congress play important roles.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 

S. Ct. 1540, 1549, 194 L. Ed. 2d 635 (2016), as revised (May 24, 2016). Congress is 

“well positioned to identify intangible harms that meet minimum Article III 

requirements,” thus “Congress may ‘elevat[e] to the status of legally cognizable injuries 

concrete, de facto injuries that were previously inadequate in law.’” Id. (quoting Lujan 

v. Defs of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992).

5. “Without the protections of the FDCPA, Congress determined, the 

‘[e]xisting laws and procedures for redressing these injuries are inadequate to protect 

consumers.’” Lane v. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC, No. 15 C 10446, 2016 WL 

3671467, at *3 (N.D. Ill. July 11, 2016) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692(b)). Thus, a failure 

to honor a consumer’s right under the FDCPA constitutes an injury in fact for Article III 

standing. See Id. at *3 (holding that a consumer “has alleged a sufficiently concrete 

injury because he alleges that [Defendant] denied him the right to information due to 

him under the FDCPA.”); see also Church v. Accretive Health, Inc., No. 15-15708, 

2016 WL 3611543, at *3 (11th Cir. July 6, 2016) (holding that consumer’s § 1692g 

claim was sufficiently concrete to satisfy injury-in-fact requirement). 

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6. “[E]ven though actual monetary harm is a sufficient condition to show 

concrete harm, it is not a necessary condition.” Lane, 2016 WL 3671467 at *4 

(emphasis in original). 

PARTIES

7. Plaintiff is a natural person who at all relevant times resided in the State of 

Arizona, County of Maricopa, and City of Phoenix. 

8. Plaintiff is a “consumer” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3). 

9. Defendant, I.Q. Data International, Inc. (“Defendant”) is an entity who at 

all relevant times was engaged, by use of the mails and telephone, in the business of 

attempting to collect a “debt” from Plaintiff, as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5).

10. Defendant is a “debt collector” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). 

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

11. Plaintiff is a natural person allegedly obligated to pay a debt owed or due 

a creditor other than Defendant.

12. Plaintiff’s alleged obligation arises from a transaction in which the 

money, property, insurance, or services that are the subject of the transaction were 

incurred primarily for personal, family, or household purposes—namely, a residential 

lease agreement (the “Debt”).

13. Defendant uses instrumentalities of interstate commerce or the mails in a 

business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, and/or regularly 

collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due, or asserted to be 

owed or due, another.

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14. In connection with the collection of the Debt, Defendant mailed Plaintiff a 

letter dated December 12, 2016.

15. A true and correct copy of Defendant’s December 12, 2016 letter is 

attached to this complaint as Exhibit A.

16. Defendant’s December 12, 2016 letter was its initial communication with 

Plaintiff with respect to the Debt.

17. Among the requirements in an initial communication, a debt collector 

must meaningfully convey “the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed.” 15 

U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(2). 

18. Defendant’s December 12, 2016 letter gave the following information 

regarding the Debt: “Original Creditor: GRANITE BAY APTS (AZ).” Exhibit A.

19. It further provided that “[y]our past due account has been referred to our 

office for collection,” and informed Plaintiff to contact or make payments to Defendant. 

Id. 

20. Defendant’s December 12, 2016 letter does not clearly identify the name 

of the creditor to whom the Debt is owed.

21. Defendant’s December 12, 2016 letter states the “Original Creditor” to be 

“Granite Bay Apts (AZ),” but it does not state who the “current creditor” is, or 

otherwise indicate to whom the debt is currently owed.

22. Plaintiff, or the least sophisticated consumer, may reasonably believe that 

Defendant is the current creditor given that the letter states that the Debt has been 

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“referred to our office for collection,” and informs Plaintiff to contact or make payments 

to Defendant. 

23. Or, Plaintiff, or the least sophisticated consumer, may just as reasonably 

think that Defendant’s December 12, 2016 letter simply does not mention who the 

current creditor is. 

24. Because Defendant’s December 12, 2016 letter leaves Plaintiff, or the 

least sophisticated consumer, to guess as to the identity of the creditor to whom the debt 

is currently owed, it fails to meaningfully convey the name of the creditor.

CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS

25. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges all factual allegations above. 

26. Defendant’s December 12, 2016 letter is based on a form or template used 

by Defendant to send collection letters (the “Template”).

27. The Template fails to meaningfully convey the name of the current creditor 

to whom the alleged debt is owed, in the same manner as Defendant did with Plaintiff 

above. 

28. Defendant has used the Template to send collection letters to over 40 

individuals in the State of Arizona within the year prior to the filing of the original 

complaint in this matter. 

29. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and all others similarly 

situated. Specifically, Plaintiff seeks to represent the following class of individuals:

All persons with an Arizona address, to whom Defendant sent a letter based 

upon the Template, within one year before the date of this complaint, in 

connection with the collection of a consumer debt.

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30. The proposed class specifically excludes the United States of America, the 

State of Arizona, counsel for the parties, the presiding United States District Court Judge, 

the Judges of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and the Justices of 

the United States Supreme Court, all officers and agents of Defendant, and all persons 

related to within the third degree of consanguinity or affection to any of the foregoing 

persons. 

31. The class is averred to be so numerous that joinder of members is 

impracticable. 

32. The exact number of class members is unknown to Plaintiff at this time and 

can be ascertained only through appropriate discovery. 

33. The class is ascertainable in that the names and addresses of all class 

members can be identified in business records maintained by Defendant. 

34. There exists a well-defined community of interest in the questions of law 

and fact involved that affect the parties to be represented. These common questions of 

law and fact predominate over questions that may affect individual class members. Such 

issues include, but are not limited to: (a) the existence of Defendant’s identical conduct 

particular to the matters at issue; (b) Defendant’s violations of the FDCPA; (c) the 

availability of statutory penalties; and (d) attorneys’ fees and costs. 

35. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of those of the class he seeks to represent. 

36. The claims of Plaintiff and of the class originate from the same conduct, 

practice, and procedure on the part of Defendant. Thus, if brought and prosecuted 

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individually, the claims of the members of the class would require proof of the same 

material and substantive facts.

37. Plaintiff possesses the same interests and has suffered the same injuries as 

each class member. Plaintiff asserts identical claims and seeks identical relief on behalf 

of the unnamed class members. 

38. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class and has 

no interests adverse to or which directly and irrevocably conflict with the interests of 

other members of the class.

39. Plaintiff is willing and prepared to serve this Court and the proposed class. 

40. The interests of Plaintiff are co-extensive with and not antagonistic to those 

of the absent class members. 

41. Plaintiff has retained the services of counsel who are experienced in 

consumer protection claims, as well as complex class action litigation, will adequately 

prosecute this action, and will assert, protect and otherwise represent Plaintiff and all 

absent class members. 

42. Class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(A) and 

23(b)(1)(B). The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the class 

would, as a practical matter, be dispositive of the interests of other members of the class 

who are not parties to the action or could substantially impair or impede their ability to 

protect their interests. 

43. The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the class 

would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual 

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members of the class, which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the 

parties opposing the classes. Such incompatible standards of conduct and varying 

adjudications, on what would necessarily be the same essential facts, proof and legal 

theories, would also create and allow the existence of inconsistent and incompatible 

rights within the class. 

44. Class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) in that 

Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, 

making final declaratory or injunctive relief appropriate.

45. Class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) in that the 

questions of law and fact that are common to members of the class predominate over any 

questions affecting only individual members.

46. Moreover, a class action is superior to other methods for the fair and 

efficient adjudication of the controversies raised in this Complaint in that: (a) individual 

claims by the class members will be impracticable as the costs of pursuit would far 

exceed what any one plaintiff or class member has at stake; (b) as a result, very little 

litigation has commenced over the controversies alleged in this Complaint and individual 

members are unlikely to have an interest in prosecuting and controlling separate 

individual actions; and (c) the concentration of litigation of these claims in one forum 

will achieve efficiency and promote judicial economy.

COUNT I

VIOLATION OF 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(2)

47. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges each factual allegation contained above.

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48. Defendant’s letter does not identify of the current creditor that holds 

Plaintiff’s alleged debt. 

49. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(2) by failing to meaningfully 

convey the name of the creditor to whom the alleged debt is owed to Plaintiff in its 

initial communication or in writing within five days thereafter.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for relief and judgment, as follows: 

a) Determining that this action is a proper class action, certifying Plaintiff as a 

class representative under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 

and designating this Complaint the operable complaint for class purposes;

b) Adjudging that Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(2) with respect to 

Plaintiff and the class he seeks to represent;

c) Awarding Plaintiff and the class he seeks to represent actual damages 

pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(1);

d) Awarding Plaintiff such additional damages as the Court may allow in the 

amount of $1,000, pursuant to § 1692k(a)(2)(B)(i);

e) Awarding all other class members such amount as the Court may allow, 

without regard to a minimum individual recovery, not to exceed the lesser 

of $500,000 or one percent of the net worth of the debt collector, pursuant 

to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2)(B)(ii);

f) Awarding Plaintiff and the class he seeks to represent, reasonable 

attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in this action pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 

1692k(a)(3) and Rule 23; 

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g) Awarding Plaintiff and the class he seeks to represent, pre-judgment and 

post-judgment interest as permissible by law; and

h) Awarding such other and further relief as the Court may deem proper.

TRIAL BY JURY

50. Plaintiff is entitled to and hereby demands a trial by jury.

Dated: December 4, 2017

Respectfully submitted,

s/ Russell S. Thompson IV

Russell S. Thompson IV (029098)

Thompson Consumer Law Group, PLLC

5235 E. Southern Ave., D106-618

Mesa, AZ 85206

Telephone: (602) 388-8898

Facsimile: (866) 317-2674

rthompson@consumerlawinfo.com

s/ Joseph Panvini

Joseph Panvini (028359)

Thompson Consumer Law Group, PLLC

5235 E. Southern Ave., D106-618

Mesa, AZ 85206 

Telephone: (602) 388-8875

Facsimile: (866) 317-2674

jpanvini@consumerlawinfo.com

Attorneys for Plaintiff

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