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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

In Admiralty 

Complaint of Julio Salas and Monica Salas

As owners of the vessel “AZ 5368 BG” and 

her engines, tackle, appurtenances, etc., 

Plaintiffs-in-Limitation, 

For Exoneration from or Limitation of 

Liability. 

No. CV-18-08019-PCT-JJT

ORDER 

 At issue is Claimants Brandi Hart and Nathan Preuit’s Motion to Dismiss PlaintiffsIn-Limitation’s Complaint for Exoneration from or Limitation of Liability (Doc. 14, Mot.), 

which Claimant Wayne Ramos joined (Doc. 15). Plaintiffs-In-Limitation (“Plaintiffs”) 

Monica Salas and Julio Salas filed a Response (Doc. 21, Resp.). 

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

 On August 6, 2017, Plaintiffs loaned their 24-foot fiberglass “Carrera” motorboat 

(“the Vessel”) to their daughter, Nicole Salas Jahnke. (Doc. 1, Compl. ¶ 4). Jahnke and 

five friends, including Claimants Hart and Preuit, used the Vessel on Lake Havasu for a 

day of recreation. (Compl. ¶ 5.) Claimants contend that, at all relevant periods of the outing, 

Jahnke was driving the Vessel. (Mot. at 2–3.) 

 Upon the group’s return to the marina around 9:23 p.m., another speedboat 

approached—a 27-foot Eliminator Daytona watercraft (“Eliminator”) owned by Claimant 

Karen Rea and her husband Henry Rea. (Compl. ¶ 5; Doc. 18, Answ. ¶ 5.) The Eliminator 

was operated by Henry Rea. (Compl. ¶ 5; Answ. ¶ 5.) Plaintiffs allege the Eliminator was 
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traveling at around 50 miles per hour and was unlighted. (Compl. ¶ 5.) Plaintiffs also allege 

that Jahnke attempted evasive action but was unable to avoid a collision. (Compl. ¶ 5.) Hart 

and Preuit agree that Jahnke did in fact attempt evasive action, but only after Preuit shouted 

at her to warn her of the oncoming Eliminator. (Mot. at 3.) Hart and Preuit also allege that 

Jahnke had consumed alcohol at some point during the outing. (Mot. at 2.) The Eliminator 

and the Vessel collided, ejecting and seriously injuring several passengers, including Hart 

and Preuit. (Compl. ¶5, Mot. at 3.) Henry Rea was killed, and the Eliminator sank. (Compl. 

¶ 5.) All of the passengers boarded the Vessel and Jahnke operated it back to the marina, 

where emergency personnel were waiting. (Compl. ¶ 5.) 

 Plaintiffs filed their Complaint for Exoneration from or Limitation of Liability on 

February 6, 2018. (Compl.) As owners of the Vessel, they seek to either exonerate or limit 

their liability under 46 U.S.C. § 30511 (“Limitation Act”). They allege that “the net value 

of the Vessel at the end of the voyage on August 6, 2017 did not exceed [$2,500].” (Compl. 

¶ 14.) As required by the statute, some claimants1

 notified Plaintiffs that they would 

commence actions against them, and Plaintiffs allege those suits will seek more than 

$2,500. (Compl. ¶ 21.) Plaintiffs seek to exonerate their liability, or failing that, limit it to 

$2,500. Hart and Preuit now move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint. (Mot.) 

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

 A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) may 

attack either the allegations of the complaint as insufficient to confer upon the court subject 

matter jurisdiction, or the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact.” Renteria v. 

United States, 452 F. Supp. 2d 910, 919 (D. Ariz. 2006) (citing Thornhill Publ’g Co. v. 

Gen. Tel. & Elecs. Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 1979)). The burden of proof is on 

the party asserting jurisdiction to show that the court has subject matter jurisdiction. See 

Indus. Tectonics, Inc. v. Aero Alloy, 912 F.2d 1090, 1092 (9th Cir. 1990). 

 

1

 It is yet unclear who will institute actions against Plaintiffs. The Court ordered that all persons having any such claim must file them on or before July 20, 2018, but in April stayed the “institution or prosecution” of all such actions until the resolution of Plaintiffs’ 

Exoneration from or Limitation of Liability Claim. (Docs. 4; 6.) 
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 When analyzing a complaint for failure to state a claim for relief under Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 12(b)(6), the well-pled factual allegations are taken as true and construed in the light 

most favorable to the nonmoving party. Cousins v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 

2009). A plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 

face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Legal conclusions couched 

as factual allegations are not entitled to the assumption of truth, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 680 (2009), and therefore are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss for failure to 

state a claim. In re Cutera Sec. Litig., 610 F.3d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir. 2010). 

III. ANALYSIS 

 Claimants Hart and Preuit seek to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint on two grounds. 

Claimants first argue that Plaintiffs fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted 

because “Plaintiffs fail to plead any facts to support the clear recitation of the elements 

necessary to satisfy a claim under the Limited Liability Act.” (Mot. at 6.) Claimants also 

move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that 

Plaintiffs failed to prove that the accident occurred in navigable waters. (Mot. at 7–8.) The 

Court turns first to this threshold matter of jurisdiction. 

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 

 Federal district courts have jurisdiction over “[a]ny civil case of admiralty or 

maritime jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1333. As explained in H2O Houseboat Vacations Inc. 

v. Hernandez, the Ninth Circuit applies a two-prong test of “location and connection” to 

determine whether “an alleged tort involving a pleasure craft . . . forms the proper basis for 

maritime tort subject matter jurisdiction.” 103 F.3d 914, 916 (9th Cir. 1996). 

 The first prong of the test requires that the incident occurred on navigable water. Id.

The Ninth Circuit has clearly established that Lake Havasu is a navigable waterway. Id.

Claimants cite to the Code of Federal Regulations to refute this conclusion, but their 

citation is inapposite. (Mot. at 8.) The regulation states that the waters of Lake Havasu 

within Arizona, “except the portion within Havasu Lake National Wildlife Refuge” are 

“navigable waters . . . designated as State waters for private aids to navigation.” 33 C.F.R. 
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§ 66.05-100. Claimants do not establish that navigable waters somehow become 

unnavigable if they are also “State waters for private aids to navigation.” Furthermore, 

Claimants admit that the incident occurred inside the Wildlife Refuge but make no 

argument that the exception of that area from the regulation means that the Refuge is also 

excluded from the regulation’s definition of navigable waters. (Mot. at 8.) Even forgetting 

the fact that the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly found Lake Havasu to be navigable water, 

citation to this regulation does not advance the argument that Claimants attempt to make. 

 After concluding that the location of the tort was on navigable water, the Court must 

decide whether “there is a connection with maritime activity.” Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. 

Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 534 (1995). A maritime “connection” 

requires two inquiries: (1) “whether the incident involved was of a sort with the potential 

to disrupt maritime commerce;” and (2) “whether the general character of the activity 

giving rise to the incident shows a substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity.” 

Id. at 538–39. The first inquiry deals with the “potential effects” of the incident. Id. at 538. 

Here, a collision in a populated area of Lake Havasu and a sunken boat that could create a 

hazard for other vessels certainly have the “potential to disrupt maritime commerce.” Id.

The second inquiry asks “whether a tortfeasor’s activity . . . is so closely related to activity 

traditionally subject to admiralty law that the reasons for applying special admiralty rules 

would apply.” Id. at 539. The Supreme Court found that “[n]avigation of boats in navigable 

waters” clearly falls within those activities closely related to admiralty. Id. at 540 (citing 

Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668, 674 (1982)). Simply navigating the Vessel 

in Lake Havasu is enough to satisfy this second inquiry. Thus, the incident at issue meets 

the “connection” and “location” prongs of the jurisdiction test. The Court has subject 

matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1333. 

B. Failure to State a Claim 

 Claimants argue that Plaintiffs have not alleged facts sufficient to support a 

plausible claim and instead offer “only conclusory statements.” (Mot. at 5.) In fact, 

Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. In paragraphs 2 
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through 10 of their Complaint, Plaintiffs lay out the facts surrounding the incident and 

allege that they own the Vessel, loaned it to Jahnke and were otherwise not involved in the 

collision, and that Jahnke was operating it at the time of the collision. (Compl. ¶¶ 2–10.) 

The Court must take these factual allegations as true. See Cousins, 568 F.3d at 1067. 

 Even if Claimants are correct that some of Plaintiffs’ statements—such as their 

assertion that the collision “occurred without the privity or knowledge” of Plaintiffs—are 

conclusory, other allegations do provide facts that support a plausible claim. And despite 

Claimants’ implications to the contrary, dismissal is not appropriate where some

allegations are conclusory, but instead is appropriate where a complaint contains only

“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 

statements.” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678. That is not the case here. 

 The Court need not reach Plaintiffs’ argument about burden shifting in Limitation 

Act cases. (Resp. at 7.) At the merits stage, Claimants may argue that Plaintiffs were 

negligent in loaning the Vessel to Jahnke, and Plaintiffs will then be free to argue a lack of 

privity or knowledge. But that is not for the Court to decide today, and it is not necessary 

in concluding that the Complaint must survive Claimants’ Motion to Dismiss. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

 Claimants’ Motion to Dismiss is denied because the Court has jurisdiction and 

Plaintiffs provided factual allegations sufficient to survive the Rule 12(b)(6) stage. Many 

of Claimants’ arguments would be more properly raised at the merits stage of this dispute. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED denying Claimants’ Motion to Dismiss 

Plaintiffs-In-Limitation’s Complaint for Exoneration from or Limitation of Liability (Doc. 

14). 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Claimants Hart and Preuit shall file an Answer 

to the Complaint within the time limit set forth in Rule 12. 

 Dated this 12th day of February, 2019. 

Honorable John J. Tuchi 

United States District Judge