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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Samuel Rane Wilson, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Commissioner of Social Security 

Administration, 

Defendant. 

No. CV-17-08252-PCT-SMB 

ORDER 

At issue is the denial of Plaintiff Samuel Rane Wilson’s Application for 

Supplemental Security Income Benefits by the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) 

under the Social Security Act (“the Act”). Plaintiff filed a Complaint (Doc. 1) with this 

Court seeking judicial review of that denial, and the Court now addresses Plaintiff’s 

Opening Brief (Doc. 13, “Pl.’s Br.”), Defendant Social Security Administration 

Commissioner’s Opposition (Doc. 14, “Def.’s Br.”), and Plaintiff’s Reply (Doc. 17, 

“Reply”). The Court has reviewed the briefs and Administrative Record (Doc. 12, R.) and 

now reverses the Administrative Law Judge’s decision (R. at 21–33) as upheld by the 

Appeals Council (R. at 1–3). 

I. BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff filed an application for Supplemental Security Income Benefits on 

December 2, 2013 for a period of disability beginning January 2, 2013. (R. at 21.) 

Plaintiff’s claim was denied initially on July 2, 2014 (R. at 22), and on reconsideration on 

November 19, 2014 (R. at 22). Plaintiff then testified at a video hearing held before an 
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Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) on May 10, 2016. (R. at 21.) On August 15, 2016, the 

ALJ denied Plaintiff’s Application.(R. at 33.) On September 20, 2017, the Appeals Council 

denied a request for review of the ALJ’s decision. (R. at 1–3.) On November 21, 2017, 

Plaintiff filed this action seeking judicial review of the denial. 

 The Court has reviewed the medical evidence in its entirety and finds it unnecessary 

to provide a complete summary here. The pertinent medical evidence will be discussed in 

addressing the issues raised by the parties. In short, upon considering the medical records 

and opinions, the ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s disability based on the following alleged 

impairments: schizoaffective disorder; personality disorder; posttraumatic stress disorder; 

degenerative disc disease of the lumbar and thoracic spine; osteoarthritis of the right hand 

and right hip; obesity; asthma; hyperlipidemia; marijuana dependence; and polysubstance 

disorder. (R. at 23.) 

 Ultimately, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff “does not have an impairment or 

combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed 

impairments in 20 CFR Part 404.” (R. at 24.) The ALJ then found that Plaintiff has the 

residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to “perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 

416.967(b)” in a role such as housekeeper or laundry worker. (R. at 27, 33.) 

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

In determining whether to reverse an ALJ’s decision, the district court reviews only 

those issues raised by the party challenging the decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 

517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001). The court may set aside the Commissioner’s disability 

determination only if the determination is not supported by substantial evidence or is based 

on legal error. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence is 

more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance; it is relevant evidence that a reasonable 

person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion considering the record as a whole. 

Id. To determine whether substantial evidence supports a decision, the court must consider 

the record as a whole and may not affirm simply by isolating a “specific quantum of 

supporting evidence.” Id. As a general rule, “[w]here the evidence is susceptible to more 
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than one rational interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s 

conclusion must be upheld.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002) 

(citations omitted).

To determine whether a claimant is disabled for purposes of the Act, the ALJ 

follows a five-step process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). The claimant bears the burden of 

proof on the first four steps, but the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five. Tackett 

v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). At the first step, the ALJ determines whether 

the claimant is presently engaging in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1520(a)(4)(i). If so, the claimant is not disabled and the inquiry ends. Id. At step two, 

the ALJ determines whether the claimant has a “severe” medically determinable physical 

or mental impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). If not, the claimant is not disabled 

and the inquiry ends. Id. At step three, the ALJ considers whether the claimant’s 

impairment or combination of impairments meets or medically equals an impairment listed 

in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of 20 C.F.R. Part 404. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If so, 

the claimant is automatically found to be disabled. Id. If not, the ALJ proceeds to step four. 

Id. At step four, the ALJ assesses the claimant’s RFC and determines whether the claimant 

is still capable of performing past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If so, the 

claimant is not disabled and the inquiry ends. Id. If not, the ALJ proceeds to the fifth and 

final step, where he determines whether the claimant can perform any other work in the 

national economy based on the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work experience. 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If so, the claimant is not disabled. Id. If not, the claimant is 

disabled. Id. 

III. ANALYSIS 

 Plaintiff raises two arguments for the Court’s consideration: (1) the ALJ erred by 

rejecting the opinion of Dr. Courtney Keckich, Plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist; and (2) the 

ALJ erred by discrediting Plaintiff’s symptom testimony. (Pl.’s Br. at 1.) 
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A. The ALJ Erred by Rejecting Dr. Keckich’s Opinion 

While “[t]he ALJ must consider all medical opinion evidence,” there is a hierarchy 

among the sources of medical opinions. Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 

2008). Those who have treated a claimant are treating physicians, those who examined but 

did not treat the claimant are examining physicians, and those who neither examined nor 

treated the claimant are nonexamining physicians. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th 

Cir. 1995). “As a general rule, more weight should be given to the opinion of a treating 

source than to the opinion of doctors who did not treat the claimant.” Id. 

Given this hierarchy, if the treating physician’s evidence is controverted by a 

nontreating or nonexamining physician, the ALJ may disregard it only after “setting forth 

specific, legitimate reasons for doing so that are based on substantial evidence in the record.” 

Murray v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 499, 502 (9th Cir. 1983). “The ALJ can meet this burden by 

setting out a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, 

stating his interpretation thereof, and making findings.” Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 

751 (9th Cir. 1989). “Substantial evidence means more than a mere scintilla, but less than a 

preponderance.” Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995). 

 Here, in Dr. Keckich’s assessment of Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity on 

February 27, 2015, she opined that because of Plaintiff’s mental limitations, Plaintiff would 

be “off task” over 30% of an eight-hour workday. (R. at 910.) As a result of the Plaintiff’s 

mental impairments, Dr. Keckich estimated Plaintiff would miss five days, or more, of 

work per month and would be unable to complete an eight-hour workday five days, or 

more, per month. (R. at 910.) Conversely, Drs. Foster-Valdez and Campbell concluded 

Plaintiff was “able to meet all of the basis mental demands of competitive, remunerative, 

unskilled work [with] limited social contact.” (R. at 80, 93.) The ALJ assigned “[l]ittle 

weight” to Dr. Keckich’s opinion (R. at 31), finding, like Drs. Foster-Valdez and Campbell, 

Plaintiff could “perform simple, routine tasks and make simple work-related decisions in a 

work setting with few changes and free from fast-paced production requirements” (R. at 

27). And, although Plaintiff “should have no contact with the public,” the ALJ found 
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Plaintiff could have “occasional and superficial contact with coworkers, such that he 

[could] work in proximity to, but not in tandem with, others.” (R. at 27.) For the reasons 

that follow, the ALJ erred in rejecting Dr. Keckich’s assessment. 

 The ALJ disregarded Dr. Keckich’s assessment because she found it was 

“inconsistent” with Dr. Keckich’s treatment records and progress notes. (R. at 31.) 

Specifically, in a progress note dated February 26, 2014, Dr. Keckich noted the following: 

Plaintiff reported he was doing “‘better with his meds’”; he said he was “not as irritable, 

[and, except for his wife,] not yelling at people anymore”; he said he didn’t realize he was 

being mean to his wife until she told him, and she only had to tell him once; he reported 

“doing better with sleep”; and he cut his use of cannabis by “about 50%.” (R. at 829.) 

Similarly, on April 3, 2014, Dr. Keckich noted the following: Plaintiff felt his injection 

was helping his mental symptoms “significantly”; he was participating in an art group; and 

he participated in a dual diagnosis group until he recognized that a group member triggered 

his agitation, at which time he reported his agitation to his case manager rather than 

immediately acting on it, which was a “significant” improvement. (R. at 825.) According 

to the ALJ, these observations were inconsistent with the “extreme limitations” Dr. 

Keckich included in her assessment and, therefore, supported the weight the ALJ assigned 

to Dr. Keckich’s opinion. (R. at 31.) 

 Dr. Keckich’s assessment was not inconsistent with her treatment records and 

progress notes. (R. at 911.) “Reports of ‘improvement’ in the context of mental health 

issues must be interpreted with an understanding of the patient’s overall well-being and the 

nature of [his] symptoms.” Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1017 (9th Cir. 2014). Here, 

although Dr. Keckich observed improvements in Plaintiff’s condition, she believed 

Plaintiff suffered from “fairly severe psychiatric illness” and “paranoia.” (R. at 833.) 

Alongside the improvements she described in her progress notes from February 26, 2014, 

and April 3, 2014, she included the following observations of Plaintiff: slumped posture; 

intermittent and avoidant eye contact; euthymic mood; constricted affect; concrete thought 

process; borderline intelligence; difficulty acknowledging his psychological problems; 
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impaired judgment; failure to take his medications; chronic low level of functioning; 

substance abuse; slowed activity; underproductive speech; impaired attention and 

concentration; and impaired ability to abstract. (R. at 826, 831–32.) Further, in a progress 

note from January 15, 2014, Dr. Keckich documented an incident that took place on the 

same day in which Plaintiff “stormed out” of his appointment with Dr. Keckich 

prematurely after Dr. Keckich refused to prescribe him twenty milligrams of Valium daily 

for anxiety. (R. at 835–36.) On his way out of the facility, Plaintiff cursed and threatened 

to “slit [Dr. Keckich’s] throat.” (R. at 836.) 

Furthermore, “[reports of improvement] must . . . be interpreted with an awareness 

that improved functioning while being treated and while limiting environmental stressors 

does not always mean that a claimant can function effectively in a workplace.” Garrison, 

759 F.3d at 1017. Here, in an addendum to her assessment, Dr. Keckich noted that Plaintiff 

“still does not demonstrate ability to control behavior in a stressful situation (sometimes 

even in an unstressful situation).” (R. at 911.) Indeed, it would be difficult to conclude that 

Plaintiff’s typical day challenged him with stressors like those he would face in a 

workplace. Plaintiff testified that on a typical day, he wakes up, drinks coffee, smokes 

cigarettes, and watches The Price is Right, Family Feud, and Celebrity Name Game with 

his wife. (R. at 55.) Afterward, he goes for a walk, eats lunch that his wife prepares for 

him, and spends time at a friend’s house, where he watches television and engages in 

“chitchat.” (R. at 56.) Moreover, at the time of Dr. Keckich’s assessment, Plaintiff was 

receiving weekly home visits from clinic staff, participating in a narcotics anonymous 

group weekly, engaging in daily contact with his sponsor, and visiting with psychiatry 

every three weeks. (R. at 911.) 

 Thus, although there may be legally sufficient reasons for rejecting Dr. Keckich’s 

assessment and finding Plaintiff is not disabled, it becomes clear that Dr. Keckich’s 

assessment is not inconsistent with her treatment records and progress notes when the 

improvements she observed are viewed in the proper context and not in isolation. 
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Accordingly, the ALJ failed to provide a legitimate reason for rejecting Dr. Keckich’s 

opinion. 

B. The ALJ Gave Sufficient Reasons for Discounting Plaintiff’s Symptom 

Testimony 

 While credibility is the province of the ALJ, an adverse credibility determination 

requires the ALJ to provide “specific, clear and convincing reasons for rejecting the 

claimant’s testimony regarding the severity of the claimant’s symptoms.” Treichler v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 775 F.3d 1090, 1102 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Smolen v. Chater, 80 

F.3d 1273, 1281 (9th Cir. 1996)). 

 Plaintiff testified that he was unable to work because he is “shizoaffective” and has 

“auditory hallucinations, . . . PTSD, . . . [and] antisocial personality disorder.” (R. at 46.) 

According to Plaintiff, he is unable to act appropriately around others because the voices 

in his head “tell [him] . . . to be crazy,” namely “[n]ot to listen to people” and “act like a 

baby.” (R. at 47–48.) For the reasons that follow, the ALJ did not err in discounting 

Plaintiff’s symptom testimony. 

 The ALJ provided three specific, clear, and convincing reasons for rejecting 

Plaintiff’s testimony regarding the severity of his symptoms. First, Despite Plaintiff’s 

testimony that he was unable to act appropriately around other people because of his mental 

impairments (R. at 49), Plaintiff talked to his pastor every day on the telephone and saw 

him once a week (R. at 29–30, 57–58). On occasion, Plaintiff and his pastor talked over 

coffee at a shop near Plaintiff’s house (R. at 30, 58.); Plaintiff did not report any difficulty 

acting appropriately around the shop’s employees or guests. (R. at 30.) 

Second, although the Plaintiff testified that he has auditory hallucinations “[e]very 

day” from “the time [he] wake[s] up to the time [he] go[es] to sleep” (R. at 47), he 

repeatedly denied experiencing auditory hallucinations since he was released from prison 

(R. at 832, 838, 843, 847, 850, 854, 866, 874, 883). 

Lastly, Plaintiff had a history of malingering. (R. at 30.) Plaintiff argues this was 

not a clear and convincing reason for rejecting Plaintiff’s symptom testimony because the 

evidence of malingering the ALJ relied on was dated before the alleged period of disability 
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began. (Pl.’s Br. at 18.) In assessing a Plaintiff’s credibility, an ALJ may consider a 

Plaintiff’ reputation for truthfulness. See Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1284 (9th Cir. 

1996). Here, the ALJ did not find Plaintiff was malingering during the alleged period of 

disability based on evidence of malingering dated outside the relevant period. Rather, the 

ALJ found Plaintiff’s history of malingering undermined his reputation for truthfulness 

and, in turn, his symptom testimony. (R. at 30.) 

Accordingly, the ALJ did not err in discounting Plaintiff’s symptom testimony. 

C. Credit-as-True Rule Does Not Apply 

Plaintiff asks that the Court apply the “credit-as-true” rule, which would result in 

remand of Plaintiff’s case for payment of benefits rather than further proceedings. (Pl.’s 

Br. at 22–23.) The credit-as-true rule only applies in cases that raise “rare circumstances” 

that permit the Court to depart from the ordinary remand rule under which the case is 

remanded for additional investigation or explanation. Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. 

Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1099–102 (9th Cir. 2014). These rare circumstances arise when 

three elements are present. First, the ALJ must fail to provide legally sufficient reasons for 

rejecting medical evidence. Id. at 1100. Second, the record must be fully developed, there 

must be no outstanding issues that must be resolved before a determination of disability 

can be made, and further administrative proceedings would not be useful. Id. at 1101. 

Further proceedings are considered useful when there are conflicts and ambiguities that 

must be resolved. Id. Third, if the above elements are met, the Court may “find[] the 

relevant testimony credible as a matter of law . . . and then determine whether the record, 

taken as a whole, leaves ‘not the slightest uncertainty as to the outcome of [the] 

proceeding.’” Id. (citations omitted). 

The Court has reviewed the record and agrees with Defendant that the record is not 

fully developed and that uncertainty remains as to whether Plaintiff is disabled under the 

Act. The reason the ALJ provided for discrediting the opinion of Dr. Keckich was not 

legitimate. In light of this, the ALJ must reanalyze her opinion without considering that 

reason. 
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Accordingly, the Court will remand this matter to the ALJ for further development 

of the record and a disability determination. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED remanding this matter to the Social Security 

Administration for further proceedings consistent with this Order. Specifically, the ALJ 

must reanalyze the opinion of Dr. Keckich without considering the invalid reason provided 

for discrediting it. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk of the Court to enter judgment 

accordingly and close this case. 

Dated this 17th day of July, 2019.