CORE/3505308.0002/156339359.1 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Carrie M. Francis (020453)

Stefan M. Palys (024752) 

Michael Vincent (029864)

STINSON LLP

1850 North Central Avenue, Suite 2100 

Phoenix, Arizona 85004-4584 

Tel: (602) 279-1600 

Fax: (602) 240-6925 

Email: carrie.francis@stinson.com

stefan.palys@stinson.com

michael.vincent@stinson.com 

Attorneys for Defendants 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Jeremy Thacker, No. 2:18-cv-00063-PHX-DGC

DEFENDANTS’ RESPONSE TO 

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION IN LIMINE 

NO. 3 – GLOBERANGER AS 

“SUBSTANTIALLY EQUIVALENT” 

JOB 

Plaintiff,

v.

GPS Insight, LLC; Robert J. Donat, 

Individually and as Trustee of The 

Robert Donat Living Trust Dated April 

19, 2017, 

Defendants.

The Court should deny Plaintiff’s motion as procedurally improper. First, Plaintiff 

never disclosed this legal theory. See MIDP protocols, General Order 17-08 at (B)(4). 

Second, the motion is really a belated summary judgment motion, albeit with the facts 

drawn in Plaintiff’s favor. In fact, the parties already briefed this issue on summary 

judgment. (Docs. 112 at 10, 127 at 21, 133 at 10; accord Doc. 171-1 at 8-11).1

 The Court 

should deny the motion for these procedural reasons alone. Third, it does not have the 

conferral certificate. The Court should also see this motion for what it really is: an effort 

to keep out the reasons why he was fired, rather than a challenge to whether one of his 

 

1

 Plaintiff’s motion better develops what had been a one-liner in the summary judgment 

briefing. Doc. 127 at 21:5 (undeveloped argument that GlobeRanger was not substantially 

equivalent). In fact, in that briefing Plaintiff “request[ed] that the Court find as a matter 

of law that the position [at GlobeRanger] was not substantially similar in terms of pay 

and/or opportunity for growth.” Id. at 21:22. The Court did not reach the issue in its 

summary judgment ruling. (Doc. 151). 

Case 2:18-cv-00063-DGC Document 186 Filed 12/05/19 Page 1 of 5
2 

CORE/3505308.0002/156339359.1 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

three subsequent employers is substantially equivalent. Plaintiff earned $97,032.74 per 

year on average at GPSI, where he sold GPS tracking services.2 (Doc. 112-3, ¶ 18) After 

he was fired, he worked at GlobeRanger where he sold a technology product for airlines 

to track equipment, and earned $90,000/year in base pay plus commissions and bonuses. 

After he was fired from GlobeRanger, he worked at NAVEX Global where he sold 

software for $85,000 in base pay plus commissions. After he was fired from NAVEX, 

he now has a job at T2 Systems selling a technology product for parking, and earns 

$100,000 in base pay plus commissions. Though the pay at each is in line with his pay at 

GPSI, and though he sold different products at each company, Plaintiff solely challenges 

whether GlobeRanger was substantially equivalent to GPSI based on supposed 

differences in product type and pay – he does not challenge NAVEX or T2. (Doc. 171-1 

at § D(1)(e), p.8-11) The reality is that Plaintiff does not want the jury to hear why 

GlobeRanger fired him: secretly recording conversations with other employees, having a 

bad attitude that impacted other employees, and refusing to work. (Doc. 112 at 11-12) 

Wanting to keep that out does not make GlobeRanger dissimilar. 

Plaintiff engages in trickery to conclude that GlobeRanger’s pay was not 

equivalent to GPSI. Again, he starts by inflating his GPSI salary based on a single sale 

(see note 2), then takes what his quota supposedly was at GPSI3 – not what his real sales 

ever were. Then he presents his “quota” at GlobeRanger as $90,000 when in fact that 

was his base pay. (GlobeRanger 30(b)(6) at 47, Exhibit A hereto) The chart from which 

he claims the “highest contemplated bonus[] of $44,531” is all he could earn is actually 

just a chart giving an example of how various bonuses would work based on a 

 

2

 This average is pulled up by a single good sale Plaintiff had to Amerisure. (Doc. 112-

3, ¶ 19) Plaintiff’s motion, and his damages in this case, assumes that he would have 

repeated that one success ad infinitum, which is how a salesperson who earned between 

$60-90,000 per year at GPSI (id., ¶¶ 18-19) now claims $3.5 million in damages. (Doc. 

171-1, at 7). Defendants believe that sale was an aberration. (Doc. 112-3, ¶ 19). 

3

 Plaintiff double dips using Amerisure. First he uses it to puff up his base pay, then 

assumes he would repeat the same sale every month for the rest of the year as the basis 

for his claim that his “quota . . . was expected to be $900,000 in annualized monthly 

recurring revenue, with a top possible commission of $378,000.” 

Case 2:18-cv-00063-DGC Document 186 Filed 12/05/19 Page 2 of 5
3 

CORE/3505308.0002/156339359.1 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

hypothetical sale. (GlobeRanger 30(b)(6) at 204 (“let me give a plain example. If he had 

. . . closed a $100,000 deal, you can see the numbers here that walk through exactly how 

much he would have been paid . . . .”))4

Plaintiff next claims that GlobeRanger terminated all employees by June 2018. In 

fact, GlobeRanger folded its operations into its parent company and offered productive 

salespeople jobs there. (GlobeRanger 30(b)(6) at 121-125). A jury could conclude that 

Plaintiff had that opportunity available to him had he done what he was supposed to at 

GlobeRanger. But even accepting Plaintiff’s premise, this “issue” does not go similarly 

but to whether GlobeRanger wages would be deducted from his damages after June 2018. 

Plaintiff next complains that GlobeRanger is dissimilar because it involved the 

aerospace industry, with which he had no prior experience. Notably Plaintiff does not 

claim experience with NAVEX’s software or T2’s parking product, yet does not challenge 

those jobs. The fact is that Plaintiff was given a choice of three fields to go into at 

GlobeRanger and he picked aviation, rather than a field that would entail government 

sales as at GPSI, such as selling products to police departments. (GlobeRanger 30(b)(6) 

at 108-111). 

Finally, Plaintiff claims GlobeRanger required “significant travel” versus GPSI 

which “required minimal travel.” (Mot. 2) Putting aside that Plaintiff does not quantify 

the difference in travel so the Court could actually resolve the claim – the claim is amazing 

because part of the reason GlobeRanger fired Plaintiff was for not traveling, while 

Plaintiff himself attempts to use his travel at GPSI to explain his issues there. 

(GlobeRanger 30(b)(6) Depo. 78, 190; Carrie Race Depo. 42, Exhibit B hereto). 

Plaintiff’s arguments – if not waived for failure to disclose them as the MIDP 

Order required – are really fact issues for the jury to resolve. 

 

4

 Plaintiff complains there was not a sales plan until shortly before GlobeRanger fired 

him. GlobeRanger testified the “lack” of a sales plan did not prevent Plaintiff’s colleagues 

from doing what they were supposed to do. (GlobeRanger 30(b)(6) at 169 (“I’d be 

interested to meet the salesperson who says until I have a commission plan written down 

I can’t build a pipeline and I can’t sell anything.”)). 

Case 2:18-cv-00063-DGC Document 186 Filed 12/05/19 Page 3 of 5
4 

CORE/3505308.0002/156339359.1 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 5th day of December, 2019. 

 STINSON LLP 

By: s/ Michael Vincent

 Carrie M. Francis

Stefan M. Palys 

Michael Vincent 

1850 North Central Avenue, Suite 2100 

Phoenix, Arizona 85004-4584

 

SCHNEIDER & ONOFRY, PC

By: s/ Timothy B. O’Connor [with permission]

 Timothy B. O’Connor

365 East Coronado Road 

Phoenix, Arizona 85004

 

Attorneys for Defendants

Case 2:18-cv-00063-DGC Document 186 Filed 12/05/19 Page 4 of 5
5 

CORE/3505308.0002/156339359.1 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I hereby certify that on December 5, 2019, I caused the foregoing document to be 

filed electronically with the Clerk of Court through ECF; and that ECF will send an 

e-notice of the electronic filing to: 

Joshua W. Carden 

JOSHUA CARDEN LAW FIRM, P.C. 

16427 North Scottsdale Road, Suite 410 

Scottsdale, AZ 85254 

joshua@cardenlawfirm.com 

Attorney for Plaintiff 

Timothy B. O’Connor, Esq. 

SCHNEIDER & ONOFRY, P.C. 

365 East Coronado Road 

Phoenix, Arizona 85004 

toconnor@soarizonalaw.com

Attorneys for Defendant Robert Donat 

I hereby certify that on December 5, 2019, a courtesy copy will be e-mailed to: 

Judge David G. Campbell 

United States District Court 

Sandra Day O’Connor U.S. Courthouse, Suite 623 

401 West Washington Street, SPC 58 

Phoenix, Arizona 85003-2161 

s/ Lindsay Petrowski

Case 2:18-cv-00063-DGC Document 186 Filed 12/05/19 Page 5 of 5