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Filed 10/12/23 P. v. Jackson CA1/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or 

ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and 

Respondent,

v.

LANTZ LAVELLE JACKSON,

Defendant and 

Appellant.

 A166273

 (San Mateo County

 Super. Ct. No. SC080271A)

Lantz Jackson appeals from the denial of his motion to apply excess 

custody credits to his period of parole. He contends the trial court erred in 

concluding it lacked jurisdiction to grant the motion. We disagree and

therefore conclude the appeal must be dismissed.

BACKGROUND

In 2014, Jackson pleaded no contest to robbery (Pen. Code, § 211)1 and

admitted seven alleged prior convictions with prison terms (§ 667.5, 

subd. (b)), one of which was for a serious/violent felony conviction (§ 667, 

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless 

otherwise indicated.
2

subd. (c)(9), 1192.7, subd. (c)(19).)2 On July 10, 2014, the trial court 

sentenced him to a prison term of 13 years, consisting of three years for the 

robbery, doubled to six years due to the prior serious felony conviction 

(§ 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)), a consecutive five years for the section 667, 

subdivision (a), enhancement,

3 and consecutive one-year terms for two of the 

prior prison enhancements (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). The court stayed the terms 

for the remaining prison priors. 

On May 18, 2022, the parties executed a “Stipulation for Recall and 

Resentencing” pursuant to former section 1171.1, which had become effective 

January 1, 2022 (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 3), and has since been renumbered 

section 1172.75 (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 12).4 The new legislation, with an 

exception not relevant here, invalidated enhancements imposed pursuant to 

section 667.5, subdivision (b), prior to January 1, 2020, and provided for trial 

courts to recall the sentences of and resentence affected defendants. 

(§ 1172.75.) The parties stipulated that the two one-year section 667.5, 

subdivision (b), enhancements must be stricken and Jackson sentenced to a 

total prison term of 11 years. They further stipulated that the court should 

award the original presentence credits as listed in the abstract of judgment 

(actual 168, conduct 25, total 193), and that the court’s minutes and amended 

2 The facts of Jackson’s offense are not relevant to the issues on appeal 

and need not be recited. 

3 The reporter’s transcript reflects the court imposing five years for the 

“667.8 prior.” This was an error either by the court or in transcription; the 

court was obviously referring to the five-year section 667, subdivision (a), 

enhancement that the amended information alleged, Jackson admitted and 

the abstract of judgment records. The amended information did not contain 

any section 667.8 allegation and section 667.8 does not provide for a five-year 

enhancement. 

4 This opinion will refer to the statute by its current number.
3

abstract of judgment should specify “actual post-conviction credits as 2,871 

days as of May 18, 2022” and “CDCR [California Department of Corrections 

and Rehabilitation] to calculate post-conviction conduct credits.” An 

amended abstract of judgment was filed the same day, reflecting a total 

sentence of 11 years and stating, “Credits as of 5/18/22; 2871 post-conviction[] 

actual credits” and “CDCR to calculate post conviction conduct and total 

credits.” 

On June 27, 2022, Jackson filed a motion to apply excess credit to his 

parole term. The People opposed the motion, arguing the trial court did not 

have jurisdiction and, even if it did, should not exercise its discretion to 

reduce the parole period. After a hearing on September 22, 2022, the trial 

court denied the motion based on lack of jurisdiction. Jackson appealed.

5 

DISCUSSION

Jackson contends the trial court erred in failing to exercise its 

jurisdiction to compute and apply custody credits at resentencing. He relies 

on “the long-established rule that, in the ordinary situation of original 

sentencing, excess presentence credits can reduce any period of parole. 

(See In re Sosa (1980) 102 Cal.App.3d 1002.)” (People v. Morales (2016) 

63 Cal.4th 399, 405 (Morales).) As Morales observed, “[a] statute expressly so 

states. Section 2900.5, subdivision (a), provides that presentence custody 

shall be credited toward the sentence. . . . Section 2900.5, subdivision (a), 

provides: ‘If the total number of days in custody exceeds the number of days 

of the term of imprisonment to be imposed, the entire term of imprisonment

5 Although his briefs provide no details, Jackson is apparently now on 

parole: He asks this court to “order that he be awarded 2,871 days of 

confinement credit and that any excess beyond what he served prior to his 

release must be applied by CDCR to shorten his period of parole.” 
4

shall be deemed to have been served.’ (Italics added.) To eliminate any 

possible ambiguity, subdivision (c) of section 2900.5 provides: ‘For the 

purposes of this section, “term of imprisonment” includes any period of 

imprisonment imposed as a condition of probation or otherwise ordered by a 

court in imposing or suspending the imposition of any sentence, and also 

includes any term of imprisonment, including any period of imprisonment 

prior to release on parole and any period of imprisonment and parole, prior to 

discharge, whether established or fixed by statute, by any court, or by any 

duly authorized administrative agency.’ (Italics added.)” (Morales, at p. 405.)

The People do not contest Jackson’s right to have excess custody credits 

applied to his parole term if he has any such credits but argue the trial court 

properly denied the motion because, since the abstract of judgment after 

resentencing had already been filed, the court lacked jurisdiction to modify 

Jackson’s sentence. “Generally, once a judgment is rendered and execution of 

the sentence has begun, the trial court does not have jurisdiction to vacate or 

modify the sentence. [Citations.]” (People v. Torres (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 

1081, 1084.) Moreover, the People argue that Jackson has not demonstrated 

error because the record does not show he is in fact entitled to any excess 

credits, and that his claim must be addressed to the prison authorities, not 

the trial court, because it involves postsentence custody credits rather than 

presentence credits.

Jackson contends that several statutes, “taken together,” show the trial 

court erred in concluding it lacked jurisdiction over his motion. One is 

section 1237.1, which requires that claims of error in calculating presentence 

credits be presented to the trial court before they can be raised on appeal.

Next, Jackson maintains that section 1170, subdivision (a)(3), mandates 

application of “any ‘in-custody credits’ (pre-or post-conviction)” to the parole 
5

term. Additionally, Jackson points to language in section 1172.75, 

subdivision (d), providing that resentencing generally “shall result in a lesser 

sentence than the one originally imposed.” (§ 1172, subds. (d)(1), (d)(3).)6 

None of these statutes, separately or collectively, directly address the 

trial court’s jurisdiction over the motion at issue here. Sections 1170, 

subdivision (a)(3), and 1172.75 do not address jurisdiction at all. 

Section 1170, subdivision (a)(3), provides that where “preimprisonment 

credit” is equal to or exceeds the sentence imposed, the entire sentence shall 

be deemed to have been served and the defendant “shall not be actually 

delivered” into custody. Jackson relies on the immediately following 

statement that, “[t]he court shall advise the defendant that they shall serve 

an applicable period of parole, postrelease community supervision, or 

mandatory supervision . . . unless the in-custody credits equal the total 

sentence, including both confinement time and the period of parole, 

postrelease community supervision, or mandatory supervision.” (Italics 

added.) Even if Jackson is correct in taking this language to include credit 

for prison time as well as “preimprisonment” credit, it bears on his 

entitlement to an offset of credit against parole, not the trial court’s 

jurisdiction to order such an offset after the abstract of judgment has been 

filed. With respect to section 1172.75, subdivision (d), Jackson points to 

6 Jackson separately cites former section 1171.1, which was the 

number assigned to the statute that is now section 1172.75 prior to its 

renumbering in 2022. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 12.) He also cites former 

section 1171, which was renumbered section 1172.7 in 2022. (Id., ch. 58, 

§ 11.) This statute invalidated sentence enhancements imposed prior to 

January 1, 2018, pursuant to Health and Safety Code section 11370.2, and 

contains provisions for recall of sentence and resentencing parallel to those of 

section 1172.75.
6

provisions stating that resentencing “shall result in a lesser sentence than 

the one originally imposed as a result of the elimination of the repealed 

enhancement, unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that 

imposing a lesser sentence would endanger public safety,” and the court is 

allowed, but not required, to consider “postconviction factors.” (§ 1172.75, 

subd. (d)(1), (d)(3).) Again, to the extent this language pertains to application 

of excess credits to reduce a parole term, it bears on the defendant’s 

substantive right, not the trial court’s jurisdiction subsequent to filing of the 

abstract of judgment. 

Section 1237.1 provides that “[n]o appeal shall be taken by the 

defendant from a judgment of conviction on the ground of an error in the 

calculation of presentence custody credits, unless the defendant first presents 

the claim in the trial court at the time of sentencing, or if the error is not 

discovered until after sentencing, the defendant first makes a motion for 

correction of the record in the trial court” and further specifies that “[t]he 

trial court retains jurisdiction after a notice of appeal has been filed to correct 

any error in the calculation of presentence custody credits upon the 

defendant’s request for correction.” Jackson urges that “resentencing, as in 

this case, should logically be treated the same as an original sentencing 

hearing, given the decisional latitude afforded the trial court when striking 

prison priors and reforming the prison term.”

Even if we assume the jurisdiction granted by section 1237.1 applies to

resentencing as well as original sentencing (the argument implied by 

Jackson’s argument although not expressly elaborated), the present case is 

problematic. The statute is aimed at “mathematical or clerical error” in the 

calculation of presentence credits; it was intended to avoid “ ‘utilization of the 

formal appellate process for a minor ministerial act.’ ” (People v. Delgado 
7

(2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 761, 765-766, quoting Assem. Com. on Public Safety, 

Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 354 (1995-1996 Reg. Sess.) p. 3.) Jackson did not 

seek correction of an error in the court’s calculation of presentence credit; he 

sought an order directing the CDCR to fulfill its responsibility to calculate his 

post-sentence credits and, if his credits exceeded his revised term of 

imprisonment, apply the excess to reduce his parole period. The parties’ 

stipulation did not address excess credits or the parole period, and Jackson 

did not ask the court, in recalling his sentence and resentencing him, to 

include any such orders to the CDCR.

The orders sought by Jackson’s motion cannot properly be 

characterized as “minor ministerial acts.” The application of excess credits to 

reduce a period of parole, expressly required by section 2900.5 in the context 

of original sentencing and presentence credit, is not necessarily the rule after 

resentencing. For example, where the legislation providing for resentencing 

indicates a period of parole is to follow the reduced sentence, excess credits 

will not be applied to the period of parole. (Morales, supra, 63 Cal.4th at 

p. 403 [excess credits not applied to reduce parole period after resentencing 

under section 1170.18 (Prop. 47)]; People v. Lamoureux (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 

136, 145 (Lamoureux) [trial court not required to “automatically” apply excess 

credits to offset parole period after resentencing under section 1170.95

(Sen. Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.))]; People v. Wilson (2020) 

53 Cal.App.5th 42, 46 (Wilson) [trial court not required to “mechanically” 

apply excess credits to parole period after section 1170.95 resentencing].)7 In 

7 Morales focused on the difference in language between 

section 2900.5, which states both that “the person is entitled to credit for time 

served” and that “the credit can reduce or eliminate the period of parole,” and 

section 1170.18, subdivision (d), which states that “the person is to receive 
8

the present case, although the People now agree that Jackson would be 

entitled to offset excess credits against his parole period if he in fact has 

excess credits, in the trial court the People opposed Jackson’s motion on the 

merits as well as on jurisdictional grounds. Jackson’s motion sought orders 

that would require a judicial determination, not just a ministerial act within 

the purview of section 1237.1.

The fact that the motion sought application of potential postsentence 

conduct credits is critical for another reason. As Jackson’s motion (and the 

parties’ stipulation) implicitly acknowledged,8 unlike presentence credits, 

which are calculated by the trial court at the time of sentencing, postsentence 

credit for time served and is subject to parole.” (Morales, supra, 63 Cal.4th at 

p. 406.) The court concluded that the “electorate was informed, and it 

intended, that a person who benefitted from [Proposition 47] by receiving a 

reduced sentence would be placed on parole for one year after completion of 

the reduced sentence, subject to the court’s discretion to release the person 

from that parole.” (Id. at p. 403.) Morales observed that “if excess credits can 

reduce or eliminate the period of parole, the court’s discretion will be 

curtailed or eliminated.” (Id. at p. 405.) Morales also found that “[t]he 

purpose behind section 2900.5—to equalize treatment of those who can and 

those who cannot post bail—is irrelevant” in the resentencing context. (Id. at 

p. 408.)

Lamoureux and Wilson interpreted section 1170.95, subdivision (g), 

which similarly provides that the resentenced person “shall be given credit 

for time served” but also authorizes the trial court to order that the person be 

“subject to parole supervision for up to three years following the completion of 

the sentence.” Both applied Morales’s reasoning in concluding trial courts 

were not required to apply excess credits to reduce the parole period. 

(Lamoureux, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at pp. 142-145; Wilson, supra, 

53 Cal.App.5th at pp. 48-53.)

8 As earlier indicated, the stipulation called for, and the amended 

abstract of judgment provided, an award of the same presentence credits as 

stated in the original abstract of judgment (actual and conduct) as well as 

actual post-conviction credits, but for the CDCR to calculate post-conviction 

conduct credits.
9

conduct credits must be calculated by CDCR. (People v. Mendoza (1986) 

187 Cal.App.3d 948, 954 (Mendoza); see People v. Buckhalter (2001)

26 Cal.4th 20, 30-31.)9 Accordingly, “[t]he defendant must exhaust all 

administrative remedies before seeking review” of a claim for worktime 

credits and, if a dispute remains, then seek relief by means of a petition for 

writ of habeas corpus. (Mendoza, at pp. 954-955.) 

Jackson did not make any showing that he had exhausted all 

administrative remedies. Defense counsel told the court at the hearing that 

CDCR had “imputed the credits” but stated, “with all my attempts in trying 

to contact, for example, the parole department, the parole department has 

not responded back to me when asked why isn’t the excess credit being 

applied.” Aside from this statement about “informal” requests, the record 

does not reflect what steps, if any, were taken to have the issue dealt with 

administratively, or why further efforts would be futile. Jackson’s assertion 

that he “cannot be tasked with both complying with parole terms and 

continuing to knock on various administrative doors of bureaucracy to get 

that to which he is entitled” does not suffice. And, in any event, even if 

Jackson had shown he followed applicable procedures for having his claim 

addressed by CDCR, this would not confer jurisdiction on the trial court to 

entertain the postjudgment motion he filed.

9 “Presentence credit evaluation requires factual findings based on 

information uniquely under the control of the trial courts. Trial courts do not 

have the same information available to calculate postsentence credits. Such 

information is determined by the prison authorities. One-for-one worktime 

credits must be calculated initially by the prison authorities who are 

authorized to grant them in the first instance.” (Mendoza, supra, 

187 Cal.App.3d at p. 954.) The resentencing trial court must, however, 

calculate the defendant’s actual postsentence custody credits. (People v. 

Buckhalter, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 23; § 2900.1.)
10

Jackson asks us to construe his appeal as a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus if we determine his claim can only be pursued by such means. (See

Mendoza, supra, 187 Cal.App.3d at p. 955.) We decline to do so. Jackson’s 

motion did not assert, much less show, he in fact had any excess credits. The 

motion simply argued that “[w]hatever credits beyond 11 years that the 

defendant completed should be applied to his parole term” and, at the 

hearing, defense counsel asked the court to order CDCR to “re-calculate the 

credits and, if there are any, apply the excess credits” toward the parole term. 

(Italics added.) Jackson’s reply brief in this court asserts that, “on the face of 

things, [he] may be entitled to termination of parole right now.” (Italics 

added.) Absent any showing that Jackson in fact has excess credits to be 

applied to his parole term or has exhausted administrative procedures for 

obtaining the relief he seeks, treating his appeal as a writ petition is 

unwarranted.

The trial court correctly determined that it lacked jurisdiction over 

Jackson’s motion. “If the trial court does not have jurisdiction to rule on a 

motion to vacate or modify a sentence, an order denying such a motion is 

nonappealable, and any appeal from such an order must be dismissed. 

[Citations.]” (People v. Torres, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 1084.)10

DISPOSITION

The appeal is dismissed.

10 The People’s brief argues this appeal should be dismissed because it 

was taken from an unappealable order, then in its “conclusion” asserts the 

judgment should be affirmed. Under the rule stated in the text, dismissal is 

the appropriate action.
11

STEWART, P.J.

We concur.

RICHMAN, J.

MILLER, J.

People v. Jackson (A166273)