Present: All the Justices 

FRANCESCA AMOS 

 OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 

v. Record No. 972018 September 18, 1998 

NATIONSBANK, N.A. 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK 

Charles E. Poston, Judge 

Francesca Nicole Amos brought suit against NationsBank, N.A. 

(NationsBank) to recover damages for personal injuries she 

sustained when she fell on ice located on NationsBank’s premises. 

A jury returned a verdict in favor of Amos. The trial court, 

however, set aside the verdict and entered final judgment in favor 

of NationsBank. Amos appeals from that judgment. Because we find 

the evidence insufficient as a matter of law to establish that 

NationsBank had a duty to remove ice and snow from its premises at 

the time of Amos’ fall, we will affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

 Amos was an invitee on NationsBank’s premises when she fell. 

Therefore, NationsBank owed her the duty of using ordinary care to 

maintain its premises in a reasonably safe condition and to warn 

her of any hidden dangers. Wynne v. Spainhour, 215 Va. 16, 17, 

205 S.E.2d 634, 635 (1974). However, a business establishment, 

landlord, common carrier or other inviter may wait until the end 

of a storm and a reasonable time thereafter before removing ice 

and snow from an outdoor entrance, walk, platform or steps. 

Walker v. The Memorial Hospital, 187 Va. 5, 13, 45 S.E.2d 898, 902 
(1948). Accord FAD Ltd. Partnership v. Feagley, 237 Va. 413, 415, 

377 S.E.2d 437, 438 (1989); Mary Washington Hosp., Inc. v. Gibson, 

228 Va. 95, 101, 319 S.E.2d 741, 744 (1984). In other words, 

NationsBank “had no duty to remove the ice during the time 

moisture was falling and freezing on the ground.” Feagley, 237 

Va. at 415, 377 S.E.2d at 438. 

 As plaintiff, Amos bears the burden of establishing that, at 

the time of her fall, NationsBank had the duty to clear its 

premises of ice and snow. Burns v. Johnson, 250 Va. 41, 44, 458 

S.E.2d 448, 450 (1995). Whether NationsBank’s duty had arisen at 

that time is a “pure question of law” to be decided by the court. 

Id. at 45, 458 S.E.2d at 451; The Chesapeake and Potomac Tel. Co. 

of Va. v. Bullock, 182 Va. 440, 445, 29 S.E.2d 228, 230 (1944). 

Thus, the issue before this Court is whether Amos presented 

sufficient evidence to prove that, at the time of the accident, 

the storm had ended and a reasonable time thereafter had elapsed. 

When a trial judge disapproves a verdict, that verdict is not 

entitled to the same weight as a verdict that has been approved. 

Deskins v. T.H. Nichols Line Contractor, Inc., 234 Va. 185, 186, 

361 S.E.2d 125, 125 (1987). However, we must still consider the 

evidence in the light most favorable to Amos, who was the 

recipient of the verdict. Id. We must also accord Amos “the 

benefit of all substantial conflict in the evidence, as well as 

all reasonable inferences that could be drawn therefrom.” 

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Kendrick v. Vaz, Inc., 244 Va. 380, 384, 421 S.E.2d 447, 450 

(1992). We will review the evidence using these principles. 

At trial, Amos testified that, on February 2, 1996, around 

1:20 p.m., she left the building where she worked in downtown 

Norfolk and walked across the street to the NationsBank building 

for the purpose of opening an account. Amos described the weather 

conditions at that time as being “cold” with a “light drizzle” 

falling and the temperature as having dropped significantly since 

the morning hours. 

Upon reaching the NationsBank complex, Amos ascended stairs 

that lead from the street level up to an outside pedestal or plaza 

area, walked approximately halfway across the plaza, and “slipped 

a little.” Amos stated that the plaza’s surface “looked wet, just 

looked like it was raining” but that it did not “look like ice.” 

She also testified that she saw no signs, ropes, cones, salt or 

chemicals alerting her to the presence of ice. Amos testified 

that she then walked more cautiously, but that she slipped and 

fell after three or four more steps and landed on her back. As a 

result of her fall, Amos fractured her right ankle. 

 Amos presented evidence from two bystanders, Ronald Dew and 

Tina Sutton, who worked in the NationsBank building and assisted 

Amos after she fell. Both Dew and Sutton testified regarding the 

weather conditions when Amos fell as well as the weather 

conditions earlier that day. Dew stated that, when he arrived at 

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the NationsBank building about 8:30 a.m., the weather conditions 

were “[v]ery icy” and “[v]ery windy and cold.” Dew further 

testified that, at the time Amos fell, it was “[s]till windy and 

cold, icy” and that a “lot of ice . . . a lot of packed snow” was 

on the plaza. Sutton also testified that, when she arrived at 

work around 8:30 a.m., the temperature was “extremely cold” and 

that there had been “some ice or some kind of freezing condition 

the day before.” Sutton described the weather conditions when 

Amos fell as “cold . . . very, very cold.” 

NationsBank presented two witnesses who corroborated Amos’ 

evidence that the weather conditions at the NationsBank building 

on the day Amos fell were cold, windy, and icy. One of the 

witnesses also described the area where Amos fell as covered with 

“ice with little piles of slush here and there.” 

 Finally, Jeffrey B. Lawson testified for NationsBank as an 

expert witness in the field of meteorology. Lawson confirmed that 

“a significant ice storm” began in the Norfolk area about 3:00 

a.m. on February 2, 1996 and did not begin to abate until 2:41 

p.m. that day. Lawson stated that “it continued to rain, 

continued to have a temperature below freezing all throughout the 

morning and all through the early parts of the afternoon.” He 

further explained that the Norfolk area had freezing rain “through 

about 2:50 in the afternoon” and that the storm formed “a thick 

layer of ice throughout the day that didn’t let up except for a 

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few hours in the late afternoon and then started up again in the 

evening.” Records reviewed by Lawson from the National Oceanic 

and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) also indicate that there was 

“freezing rain” from 10:37 a.m. to 1:50 p.m. and “freezing 

drizzle” at 2:50 p.m. in the Norfolk area on February 2, 1996. 

 Following the jury’s verdict in favor of Amos, NationsBank 

moved to set aside that verdict on the grounds that it did not 

have a duty to remove ice or snow from its premises until after 

the storm subsided and that all the evidence, including Amos’ 

testimony, demonstrated that the storm was still ongoing when she 

fell. After considering briefs filed by both parties, the trial 

court granted the motion and entered final judgment for 

NationsBank in an order dated July 1, 1997. In a letter opinion, 

the trial court characterized the storm as “raging” at the time of 

Amos’ fall and determined that “[t]he overwhelming evidence 

presented at trial [was] conclusive that at the time of [Amos’] 

injury, an ice storm was in progress, moisture was falling, and 

the moisture was freezing on the ground.” Accordingly, the court 

held that NationsBank “had no duty at the time of [Amos’] injury

to remove the ice on the pedestal to the building.” 

However, Amos maintains on appeal that she presented 

sufficient evidence to establish that NationsBank owed her the 

duty to clear its premises. Specifically, Amos relies on the fact 

that the witnesses who testified about the weather conditions in 

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downtown Norfolk at the time of her fall failed to mention, 

observe, or describe an ongoing ice storm or freezing 

precipitation. Amos contends that the absence of such testimony 

proves that the storm had ended. We disagree. 

The absence of any affirmative testimony with regard to an 

ongoing storm or freezing precipitation is an insufficient premise 

upon which to base a conclusion that the ice storm had ended. 

Just as no witness conclusively stated that the storm was ongoing, 

not a single witness affirmatively said that the storm was over. 

Rather, the evidence actually adduced at trial and the reasonable 

inferences which may be drawn therefrom indicate that the storm 

had not yet passed when Amos fell. Amos herself testified that, 

at the time of her accident, a “light drizzle” was falling. 

Furthermore, the meteorologist confirmed that, on the day in 

question, the Norfolk area had a “significant ice storm” with 

“freezing rain” lasting until approximately 2:50 p.m., more than 

an hour after Amos’ accident. According to the meteorologist, the 

storm created a “thick layer of ice” and did not abate “except for 

a few hours in the late afternoon.” The NOAA records also show 

that freezing rain and drizzle occurred in the Norfolk area until 

2:50 p.m. 

Nevertheless, Amos posits that the trial court erroneously 

characterized the storm as “raging" based on her testimony that a 

“light drizzle” was falling when she fell. However, a storm does 

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not have to be “raging” in order for a business inviter to wait 

until the end of the storm before removing ice and snow from its 

premises. We have previously held that a storm was ongoing when 

there was a “fairly continuous condition of freezing rain or 

sleet” falling during a four and one-half hour time period, 

Walker, 187 Va. at 11, 45 S.E.2d at 901, and when “moisture was 

falling and freezing on the ground.” Feagley, 237 Va. at 415, 377 

S.E.2d at 438. 

Thus, we agree with the trial court that the evidence 

overwhelmingly shows that, at the time of Amos’ fall, there was an 

ongoing ice storm with precipitation falling and freezing on the 

ground. We, therefore, hold that the trial court properly set 

aside the jury’s verdict because Amos failed to present sufficient 

evidence to establish that NationsBank had a duty to remove ice 

and snow from its premises at the time of her fall. 

 Moreover, the cessation of a storm alone does not give rise 

to an inviter’s duty to clear its premises. Rather, the storm 

must have ceased and a reasonable time period must have passed. 

“[C]hanging conditions due to the pending storm render it 

inexpedient and impracticable to take earlier effective action, 

and . . . ordinary care does not require it.” Walker, 187 Va. at 

13, 45 S.E.2d at 902. Thus, the complete inquiry is whether the 

storm had ended, and if so, whether a reasonable time period had 

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passed. Amos failed to present sufficient evidence to satisfy 

this standard. 

 Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the circuit 

court. 

Affirmed. 

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