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Russell S. Thompson IV (029098)

Joseph Panvini (028359)

Thompson Consumer Law Group, PLLC

5235 E. Southern Ave., D106-618

Mesa, AZ 85206

Telephone: (602) 388-8898

Facsimile: (866) 317-2674

rthompson@consumerlawinfo.com

Attorneys for Plaintiff

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

David Dees,

Plaintiff,

vs.

GC Services, LP,

Defendant.

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Case No. 

COMPLAINT AND TRIAL BY JURY 

DEMAND

NATURE OF ACTION

1. Plaintiff David Dees (“Plaintiff”) brings this action against Defendant GC 

Services, LP (“Defendant”) pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 

(“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq.

JURISDICTION, VENUE, AND STANDING

2. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d) and 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1331. 

3. Venue is proper before this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), where 

the acts and transactions giving rise to Plaintiff’s action occurred in this district, where 

Plaintiff resides in this district, and where Defendant transacts business in this district. 

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4. “In determining whether an intangible harm constitutes injury in fact, both 

history and the judgment of Congress play important roles.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 

S. Ct. 1540, 1549, 194 L. Ed. 2d 635 (2016), as revised (May 24, 2016). Congress is 

“well positioned to identify intangible harms that meet minimum Article III 

requirements,” thus “Congress may ‘elevat[e] to the status of legally cognizable injuries 

concrete, de facto injuries that were previously inadequate in law.’” Id. (quoting Lujan v. 

Defs of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992)). 

5. “Without the protections of the FDCPA, Congress determined, the 

‘[e]xisting laws and procedures for redressing these injuries are inadequate to protect 

consumers.’” Lane v. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC, No. 15 C 10446, 2016 WL 

3671467, at *3 (N.D. Ill. July 11, 2016) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692(b)). Thus, a failure to 

honor a consumer’s right under the FDCPA constitutes an injury in fact for Article III 

standing. See id. at *3 (holding that a consumer “has alleged a sufficiently concrete 

injury because he alleges that [Defendant] denied him the right to information due to him 

under the FDCPA”); see also Church v. Accretive Health, Inc., No. 15-15708, 2016 WL 

3611543, at *3 (11th Cir. July 6, 2016) (holding that consumer’s § 1692g claim was 

sufficiently concrete to satisfy injury-in-fact requirement). 

6. “The Supreme Court has held time and again that the violation of a 

statutory right to receive information one is entitled to receive creates a concrete injury 

sufficient to confer standing on a plaintiff.” Zia v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 210 F.Supp.3d 

1334, 1343 (S.D. Fla. 2016).

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7. “The FDCPA does create an informational right which did not exist prior to 

its enactment, and that right is tied to the harm which a consumer may suffer if not 

provided with that information. Consequently, the deprivation of that information is, in 

most cases, sufficient to confer Article III standing. That was the law before Spokeo, and 

that law was not based on an erroneous understanding of Article III like the one corrected 

by Spokeo, but by application of well-settled principles of standing jurisprudence 

which Spokeo did not change (and, in fact, upon which Spokeo relied).” Hagy v. Demers 

& Adams, LLC, No. 2:11-CV-530, 2017 WL 1134408, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 27, 2017).

8. “[E]ven though actual monetary harm is a sufficient condition to show 

concrete harm, it is not a necessary condition.” Lane, 2016 WL 3671467 at *4 (emphasis 

in original).

THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT

9. Congress enacted the FDCPA in order to eliminate “abusive debt collection 

practices by debt collectors [and] to insure that those debt collectors who refrain from 

using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged.” Clark v. 

Capital Credit & Collection Servs., Inc., 460 F.3d 1162, 1179-80 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing 

15 U.S.C. § 1692(e)). 

10. To protect consumers and ensure compliance by debt collectors, “the 

FDCPA is a strict liability statute.” McCollough v. Johnson, Rodenburg & Lauinger, 

LLC, 637 F.3d 939, 948 (9th Cir. 2011).

11. Strict liability enhances “the remedial nature of the statute,” and courts are 

“to interpret it liberally” to protect consumers. Clark, 460 F.3d at 1176.

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12. “In addition, by making available to prevailing consumers both statutory 

damages and attorneys’ fees, Congress ‘clearly intended that private enforcement actions 

would be the primary enforcement tool of the Act.’” Id. (quoting Baker v. G.C. Servs. 

Corp., 677 F.2d 775, 780-81 (9th Cir. 1982)).

13. Violations of the FDCPA are assessed under the least sophisticated 

consumer standard which is “‘designed to protect consumers of below average 

sophistication or intelligence,’ or those who are ‘uninformed or naïve,’ particularly when 

those individuals are targeted by debt collectors.” Gonzales v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 

660 F.3d 1055, 1061 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Duffy v. Landberg, 215 F.3d 871, 874-75 

(8th Cir. 2000)).

14. “An FDCPA Plaintiff need not even have actually been misled or deceived 

by the debt collector’s representation; instead, liability depends on whether the 

hypothetical ‘least sophisticated debtor’ likely would be misled.” Tourgeman v. Collins 

Fin. Servs., Inc., 755 F.3d 1109, 1117-18 (9th Cir. 2014) (emphasis in original). 

15. “[B]ecause the FDCPA is a remedial statute aimed at curbing what 

Congress considered to be an industry-wide pattern of and propensity towards abusing 

debtors, it is logical for debt collectors—repeat players likely to be acquainted with the 

legal standards governing their industry—to bear the brunt of the risk.” Clark, 460 F.3d at 

1171-72; see also FTC v. Colgate–Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 393 (1965) (“[I]t does 

not seem unfair to require that one who deliberately goes perilously close to an area of 

proscribed conduct shall take the risk that he may cross the line.”) (internal quotations 

omitted).

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PARTIES

16. Plaintiff is a natural person who at all relevant times resided in the State of 

Arizona, County of Maricopa, and City of Phoenix.

17. Plaintiff is a “consumer” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3).

18. Defendant is an entity who at all relevant times was engaged, by use of the 

mails and telephone, in the business of attempting to collect a “debt” from Plaintiff, as 

defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5).

19. Defendant is a “debt collector” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6).

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

20. Plaintiff is a natural person allegedly obligated to pay a debt asserted to be 

owed or due a creditor other than Defendant.

21. Plaintiff’s alleged obligation arises from a transaction in which the money, 

property, insurance, or services that are the subject of the transaction were incurred

primarily for personal, family, or household purposes—namely, residential satellite TV 

services (the “Debt”).

22. Defendant uses instrumentalities of interstate commerce or the mails in a 

business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts.

23. Defendant regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, 

debts owed or due, or asserted to be owed or due, another.

24. In connection with the collection of the Debt, Defendant sent Plaintiff a 

letter dated July 9, 2017.

25. A true and accurate copy of the July 9, 2017 letter is attached as Exhibit A.

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26. Defendant’s July 9, 2017 letter was its initial communication with Plaintiff 

with respect to the Debt.

27. Upon receiving the letter, Plaintiff sent Defendant a written dispute of the 

Debt dated July 19, 2017.

28. A true and accurate copy of Plaintiff’s July 19, 2017 letter to Defendant is 

attached as Exhibit B.

29. Plaintiff mailed the July 19, 2017 letter via certified mail.

30. A true and accurate copy of the Certified Mail Receipt is attached as 

Exhibit C.

31. Defendant received Plaintiff’s dispute letter on July 21, 2017.

32. Plaintiff’s letter also stated to Defendant: “You are also required to cease 

and desist from contacting me in this and any related matters unless it is by United States 

Mail, and only for the purpose of informing me that you are terminating all efforts to 

collect or that you are taking specific court or legal action.”

33. Despite receipt of Plaintiff’s timely written dispute and cease 

communication directive, Defendant placed a telephone call to Plaintiff on August 1, 

2017.

34. During the ensuing telephone conversation, Plaintiff advised Defendant that 

he had mailed a written dispute of the Debt.

35. Despite such advisement, Defendant continued seeking payment from 

Plaintiff and threatened that the Debt would be reported on Plaintiff’s credit reports.

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36. Defendant did not obtain and mail to Plaintiff verification of the Debt prior 

to the August 1, 2017 telephone call.

37. In connection with the collection of the Debt, Defendant sent Plaintiff a 

subsequent letter dated August 8, 2017.

38. A true and accurate copy of Defendant’s August 8, 2017 letter is attached 

as Exhibit D.

39. Defendant’s August 8, 2017 letter falsely represents that the consumer has 

an additional 30-day period to dispute the debt, when 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a) provides only 

one 30-day period from the initial communication within which the consumer may 

exercise their dispute rights.

40. Plaintiff, or the least sophisticated consumer, may well wonder what good 

it would do to dispute the debt, especially when Defendant ignored his original dispute 

and simply continued its collection activity.

COUNT I

VIOLATION OF 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b)

41. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges each factual allegation above.

42. A key provision of the FDCPA is § 1692g, which requires a debt collector 

to send, within five days of its initial communication with a consumer, a written notice 

which provides information regarding the debt and informs the consumer of his or her 

right to dispute the validity of the debt, and/or request the name and address of the 

original creditor, within 30 days of receipt of the notice. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a). 

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43. Congress adopted “the debt validation provisions of section 1692g” to 

guarantee that consumers would receive “adequate notice” of their rights under the 

FDCPA. Wilson v. Quadramed Corp., 225 F.3d 350, 354 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Miller v. 

Payco–General Am. Credits, Inc., 943 F.2d 482, 484 (4th Cir. 1991)).

44. This validation requirement is a “significant feature” of the law that aimed 

to “eliminate the recurring problem of debt collectors dunning the wrong person or 

attempting to collect debts which the consumer has already paid.” See Hernandez v. 

Williams, Zinman & Parham PC, 829 F.3d 1068, 1070 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing S. Rep. No. 

95-382, at 4 (1977)).

45. “To satisfy section 1692g’s requirements, the notice Congress required 

must be conveyed effectively to the debtor.” Terran v. Kaplan, 109 F.3d 1428, 1432 (9th 

Cir. 1997) (quoting Swanson v. Southern Oregon Credit Serv., Inc., 869 F.2d 1222, 1227 

(9th Cir. 1988)) (internal citations omitted).

46. If a consumer requests validation, “the debt collector shall cease collection 

of the debt . . . until the debt collector obtains verification” and mails such verification to 

the consumer. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b).

47. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b) by continuing collection activity 

after Plaintiff had timely sent a written dispute of the Debt, without obtaining verification 

of the debt or a copy of a judgment, and mailing the same to Plaintiff.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for relief and judgment, as follows:

a) Adjudging that Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b);

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b) Awarding Plaintiff statutory damages, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 

1692k(a)(2)(A), in the amount of $1,000.00;

c) Awarding Plaintiff actual damages, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(1);

d) Awarding Plaintiff reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in this 

action pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3); 

e) Awarding Plaintiff pre-judgment and post-judgment interest as permissible 

by law; and

f) Awarding such other and further relief as the Court may deem proper.

COUNT II

VIOLATION OF 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10)

48. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges each factual allegation above.

49. The FDCPA broadly prohibits the use of any false, deceptive, or misleading 

representations or means in connection with the collection of a debt. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e; 

1692e(10).

50. The FDCPA provides specific rights for consumers in section 1692g—

“Nothing in the statute suggests that debt collectors have discretion to relax these 

requirements.” Bishop v. Ross Earle & Bonan, P.A., 817 F.3d 1268, 1274 (11th Cir. 

2016).

51. Misrepresentation of the consumer’s rights under the FDCPA, such as 

leading the consumer to believe that they may exercise their dispute rights outside the 

initial 30-day period, or otherwise causing the consumer confusion, is an actionable 

misrepresentation under 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. Christopher v. RJM Acquisitions LLC, No. 

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CV-13-02274-PHX-JAT, 2015 WL 437541, at *8 (D. Ariz. Feb. 3, 2015) (“the 

unsophisticated debtor standard is very low, and the most naïve, uninformed person could 

conceivably be confused as to his or her options after receiving the second letter. The 

Court therefore finds that Defendant violated § 1692e(10) by sending two letters to the 

same person, each representing that Plaintiff had thirty days from receipt of the letter to 

dispute the debt.”).

52. The consumer must dispute the debt within 30 days from their receipt of the 

initial communication in order for the FDCPA to require the debt collector to obtain and 

send the consumer verification prior to continuing collection efforts.

53. If the consumer disputes the debt after the 30-day period from the initial 

communication has expired, the debt collector is not required to send the consumer 

verification.

54. By stating that the consumer has an additional 30-day period in which he or 

she may dispute the debt, Defendant’s August 8, 2017 letter is misleading and has the 

capacity to confuse the consumer as to his or her rights and options.

55. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10) by sending Plaintiff multiple 

letters, each of which represented that the consumer had 30 days to dispute the debt or 

request verification.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for relief and judgment, as follows:

a) Adjudging that Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10);

b) Awarding Plaintiff statutory damages, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 

1692k(a)(2)(A), in the amount of $1,000.00;

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c) Awarding Plaintiff actual damages, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(1);

d) Awarding Plaintiff reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in this 

action pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3); 

e) Awarding Plaintiff pre-judgment and post-judgment interest as permissible 

by law; and

f) Awarding such other and further relief as the Court may deem proper.

COUNT III

VIOLATION OF 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(c)

56. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges each factual allegation above.

57. “A debt collector who has received a cease communications order from a 

debtor must not contact the debtor unless it has received a clear waiver of that order,” and 

then only to the extent of that waiver. Clark v. Capital Credit & Collection Servs., Inc., 

460 F.3d 1162, 1172 (9th Cir. 2006).

58. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(c) by communicating with Plaintiff 

in connection with the collection of a debt, after Plaintiff had sent written notice to 

Defendant to cease communication.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for relief and judgment, as follows:

a) Adjudging that Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(c);

b) Awarding Plaintiff statutory damages, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 

1692k(a)(2)(A), in the amount of $1,000.00;

c) Awarding Plaintiff actual damages, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(1);

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d) Awarding Plaintiff reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in this 

action pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3); 

e) Awarding Plaintiff pre-judgment and post-judgment interest as permissible 

by law; and

f) Awarding such other and further relief as the Court may deem proper.

TRIAL BY JURY

59. Plaintiff is entitled to and hereby demands a trial by jury.

Dated: November 22, 2017

Respectfully submitted,

s/ Russell S. Thompson IV

Russell S. Thompson IV (029098)

Thompson Consumer Law Group, PLLC

5235 E. Southern Ave., D106-618

Mesa, AZ 85206

Telephone: (602) 388-8898

Facsimile: (866) 317-2674

rthompson@consumerlawinfo.com

s/ Joseph Panvini

Joseph Panvini (028359)

Thompson Consumer Law Group, PLLC

5235 E. Southern Ave., D106-618

Mesa, AZ 85206 

Telephone: (602) 388-8875

Facsimile: (866) 317-2674

jpanvini@consumerlawinfo.com

Attorneys for Plaintiff

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