PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 14-1772

DEBORAH HANSLER,

Appellant

v.

LEHIGH VALLEY HOSPITAL NETWORK,

_____________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civ. No. 5-13-cv-03924)

District Judge: Honorable James Knoll Gardner

_____________

Argued on January 13, 2015

Before: AMBRO, FUENTES, and ROTH, Circuit Judges

(Filed: August 19, 2015)

Samuel A. Dion, Esq. [ARGUED]

Dion & Goldberger

1845 Walnut Street

Suite 1199

Philadelphia, PA 19103

Counsel for Appellant
2

Darren M. Creasy, Esq.

Karyn Dobroskey Rienzi, Esq.

A. James Johnston, Esq.

Andrea M. Kirshenbaum, Esq. [ARGUED]

Post & Schnell

1600 John F. Kennedy Boulevard

Four Penn Center, 14th Floor

Philadelphia, PA 19103

Glenn Guanowsky, Esq.

Lehigh Valley Hospital

Department of Legal Services

1200 South Cedar Crest Boulevard

P.O. Box 689

Allentown, PA 18103

Counsel for Appellee

OPINION

FUENTES, Circuit Judge.

Deborah Hansler requested intermittent leave from her 

former employer, Lehigh Valley Health Network (“Lehigh 

Valley”), under the Family Medical Leave Act of 1993 

(“FMLA” or the “Act”), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq.

1

Specifically, Hansler submitted a medical certification 

 

1 The case name incorrectly refers to Lehigh Valley Health 

Network as Lehigh Valley Hospital Network.
3

requesting leave for two days a week for approximately one 

month. As alleged in the complaint, the medical certification 

refers to the length of her requested leave but not the nature 

or duration of her condition. A few weeks later, after she took 

several days off work, Lehigh Valley terminated Hansler’s 

employment without seeking any clarification about her 

medical certification, as required by law. Lehigh Valley cited

excessive absences and informed her that the request for leave 

had been denied. Hansler sued Lehigh Valley for violations of 

the Medical Leave Act, and the District Court dismissed the 

complaint on the basis that the medical certification 

supporting Hansler’s request for leave was “invalid.” We 

conclude that, by alleging that Lehigh Valley terminated her 

instead of affording her a chance to cure any deficiencies in 

her medical certification, Hansler has stated a claim that 

Lehigh Valley violated the Medical Leave Act. Accordingly, 

we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

I.

Hansler was hired by Lehigh Valley in 2011 to work 

as a technical partner. In early March 2013, Hansler began 

experiencing shortness of breath, nausea, and vomiting. At 

the time, the cause of these symptoms was unknown. On 

March 13, Hansler’s physician completed a medical 

certification form “requesting intermittent leave at a 

frequency of 2 times weekly starting on March 1, 2013 and 

lasting for a probable duration of one month– or until about 

April 1, 2013.” App. 44. Hansler submitted the certification to 

Lehigh Valley as part of a formal request for leave under the 

Medical Leave Act. As a result of her condition, Hansler was 

unable to work on March 13, 14, 23, 24, and 25.
4

Without seeking further information about the medical 

certification from either Hansler or her physician, Lehigh 

Valley terminated Hansler at the end of her shift on March 

28. The basis for Hansler’s termination was absenteeism, 

including the five days she took off in March. Hansler 

reminded Lehigh Valley that she had requested time off under 

the Medical Leave Act, but Lehigh Valley informed her, for 

the first time, that her request had been denied. Following the 

last of her absences, Hansler learned of a letter dated March 

26 explaining that her request for “leave of absence (FMLA) 

for the period of 3/1/13-3/11/13” was denied because her 

“condition presently does not qualify as a serious health 

condition under the criteria set forth by the [Medical Leave 

Act].” App. 45. In early April 2013, after her dismissal, 

Hansler received a diagnosis of diabetes and high blood 

pressure. She alleges that these previously undiagnosed and 

untreated conditions are what caused her March absences.

Hansler sued Lehigh Valley under the Medical Leave 

Act for interfering with her substantive rights to medical 

leave and for terminating her in retaliation for seeking leave.

In her complaint, Hansler alleges she has chronic serious 

health conditions and argues that Lehigh Valley improperly 

denied her request for leave without providing her an 

opportunity to cure her medical certification. The District 

Court granted Lehigh Valley’s motion to dismiss for failure to 

state a claim. It concluded that Hansler’s request for leave 

was defective because her medical certification indicated that 

her condition would last only one month, but the Medical 

Leave Act requires that a chronic serious health condition 

persist for an “extended period of time.” The District Court 

held that because the certification showed that Hansler was 

not entitled to leave, Lehigh Valley was not required to afford 
5

Hansler a cure period and was permitted to terminate Hansler 

for her subsequent absences. That Hansler was later 

diagnosed with diabetes and high blood pressure was of no 

consequence. According to the Court, “[a]lthough the timing

of events for plaintiff was, without question unfortunate, the 

fact remains that her diagnosis with diabetes and high blood 

pressure did not occur until after her leave request was denied 

and she was fired by defendant.” Hansler v. Lehigh Valley 

Health Network, No. 13-cv-03924, 2014 WL 1281132, at *10 

(E.D. Pa. Mar. 28, 2014). Hansler filed this appeal.

2

II.

Congress passed the Medical Leave Act “to balance 

the demands of the workplace with the needs of families” and 

“to entitle employees to take reasonable leave for medical 

reasons.” 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b). The Medical Leave Act

 

2 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 

and we have jurisdiction to review the District Court’s final 

order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review 

over a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss under 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Pearson v. Sec’y 

Dep’t of Corr., 775 F.3d 598, 601 (3d Cir. 2015). To survive 

a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must 

allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible 

on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 

(2007). A court must accept all factual allegations in the 

complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor 

of the plaintiff. Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 

231 (3d Cir. 2008).
6

carries out these objectives by providing that eligible 

employees are entitled to 12 workweeks of leave during any 

12-month period if the employee has a “serious health 

condition” that makes the employee unable to perform the 

functions of her position. Id. § 2612(a)(1)(D). After a worker

returns from leave, the worker is entitled to be reinstated to 

her previous position or an equivalent one. Id. § 2614(a)(1).

A “serious health condition” is one that involves 

inpatient care in a hospital or “continuing treatment by a 

health care provider.” Id. § 2611(11). In its implementing 

regulations, the Department of Labor defines “[c]ontinuing 

treatment by a health care provider” to include “chronic 

serious health condition[s]” that (i) “[r]equire[] periodic visits 

(defined as at least twice a year) for treatment by a health care 

provider,” (ii) “[c]ontinue[] over an extended period of time,”

and (iii) “[m]ay cause episodic rather than a continuing period 

of incapacity (e.g., asthma, diabetes, epilepsy, etc.).” 29 

C.F.R. § 825.102.

Prior to taking leave, an employee must give her 

employer notice of the request for leave, “stat[ing] a 

qualifying reason for the needed leave.” Id. § 825.301(b). An 

employer may require its employees to support their requests 

for leave with a certification issued by a health care provider. 

29 U.S.C. § 2613(a). A “sufficient” medical certification must 

state (1) the date on which the serious health condition began,

(2) the probable duration of the condition, (3) relevant 

medical facts, (4) a statement that the employee is unable to 

perform the functions of her position, (5) the dates and 

duration of any planned medical treatment, and (6) the 

expected duration of the intermittent leave. Id. § 2613(b).
7

Significantly, the Department of Labor’s regulations 

govern how employers are to respond to perceived 

deficiencies in employee notices generally, and in medical 

certifications in particular. While an employee seeking 

FMLA leave must “state a qualifying reason for the needed 

leave” and fulfill notice requirements, the employee “does not 

need to expressly assert rights under the Act or even mention 

the FMLA.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.301(b). Instead, in “any 

circumstance where the employer does not have sufficient 

information about the reason for an employee’s use of leave, 

the employer should inquire further of the employee . . . to 

ascertain whether leave is potentially FMLA-qualifying.” Id.

§ 825.301(a). In addition, an employer “shall advise an 

employee whenever the employer finds a certification 

incomplete or insufficient, and shall state in writing what 

additional information is necessary to make the certification 

complete and sufficient.” Id. § 825.305(c). A certification is 

“incomplete” if the “employer receives a certification, but one 

or more of the applicable entries have not been completed.” 

Id. A certification is “insufficient” if the “employer receives a 

complete certification, but the information provided is vague, 

ambiguous, or non-responsive.” Id. If the employer 

determines that a certification is either incomplete or 

insufficient, it may deny the requested leave on the basis of 

an inadequate certification. But it may only do so if it has 

“provide[d] the employee with seven calendar days (unless 

not practicable under the particular circumstances despite the 

employee’s diligent good faith efforts) to cure any such 

deficiency.” Id.; see Hansen v. Fincantieri Marine Grp., LLC, 

763 F.3d 832, 837 (7th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he regulations do not 

authorize the employer to deny FMLA leave where the 

employee fails to provide a complete and sufficient 

certification but is not given the opportunity to cure the 
8

deficiency.”).

A.

Hansler’s first claim is that Lehigh Valley interfered 

with her rights under the Medical Leave Act by failing to 

afford her a chance to cure deficiencies in her medical 

certification. This claim is based on statutory text providing

that employers may not “interfere with, restrain, or deny the 

exercise of or attempt to exercise” rights granted under the 

Act. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1). Moreover, “[a]ny violations of 

the Act or of these regulations constitute interfering with” the 

exercise of an employee’s rights. 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(b). To 

assert an interference claim, an employee must establish, 

among other things, that she was denied benefits under the 

Act. Ross v. Gilhuly, 755 F.3d 185, 191-92 (3d Cir. 2014).

The District Court held that Hansler was not entitled to 

leave or a cure period because her certification was “invalid” 

and “negative on its face.” The Court reasoned that while 

Hansler’s certification requested leave for one month, this 

was not an “extended period of time,” and, therefore, her 

condition did not qualify as a chronic serious health 

condition. In other words, her certification was not merely 

insufficient or incomplete—it demonstrated that she did not 

have a chronic serious health condition.

Hansler does not argue on appeal that her certification 

established the “extended period of time” requirement, and 
9

we do not decide that issue here.3Instead, Hansler maintains

she was entitled to the cure period set forth in the regulations 

because the certification was insufficient, rather than negative 

on its face. We agree.

The regulations make no reference to negative 

certifications, the basis on which the District Court rejected 

Hansler’s claim. Instead, they provide that whenever an 

employer finds a certification “incomplete” or “insufficient,”

the employer shall so advise the employee and provide seven 

days to cure the deficiencies. 29 C.F.R. § 825.305(c). A 

negative certification is a judicially crafted concept with roots 

in a decision from the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. See 

Stoops v. One Call Commc’ns, Inc., 141 F.3d 309 (7th Cir. 

1998). In Stoops, the employee’s physician provided a 

medical certification stating that the employee was “not 

 

3 A chronic serious health condition is one that, among other 

things, “[c]ontinues over an extended period of time.” 29 

C.F.R. § 825.102. Neither the Act nor the regulations provide 

further clarity as to what “extended period of time” means. 

We have found that a three-year duration for an employee’s 

condition constitutes an extended period of time. See 

Victorelli v. Shadyside Hosp., 128 F.3d 184, 189 (3d Cir. 

1997). Other courts have held that chronic illnesses “must 

exist for well more than a few weeks.” Taylor v. Autozoners, 

LLC, 706 F. Supp. 2d 843, 852 (W.D. Tenn. 2010) (quoting 

Flanagan v. Keller Prods., Inc., No. 00-542-M, 2002 WL 

313138, at *7 (D.N.H. Feb. 25, 2002)). We will assume here, 

and Hansler does not argue otherwise, that a condition lasting 

for one month does not satisfy the “extended period of time” 

requirement.
10

presently incapacitated and would not have to work 

intermittently or on a reduced work schedule.” Id. at 311. The 

Seventh Circuit described this as a “negative certification” 

because a serious health condition is one that prevents an 

employee from performing his job, but the employee’s 

physician in Stoops explicitly stated that the employee could 

perform his job functions. Id. at 312-13. “Where an employer 

. . . requests from the employee and receives a physician’s 

certification that indicates that an employee’s serious health 

condition does not require him to miss work, the employer 

may rely on that certification.” Id. at 313.

Following Stoops, several other Courts of Appeals 

have discussed or alluded to negative certifications. In 

Hoffman v. Professional Med Team, the employee, like the 

one in Stoops, submitted a certification from a physician 

stating she would not need to work intermittently or on a lessthan-full schedule as a result of her condition. Hoffman, 394 

F.3d 414, 416 (6th Cir. 2005). The Sixth Circuit explained 

that, “[t]o be valid, a certification must show that the 

employee’s serious health condition makes her unable to 

perform job functions.” Id. at 419. In Branham v. Gannett 

Satellite Information Network, Inc., the Sixth Circuit referred 

to a negative certification as one “indicating that [the 

employee] does not have a serious health condition that 

prevents her from performing her job.” 619 F.3d 563, 572 

(6th Cir. 2010). Similarly, the First Circuit found that an 

employer was justified in denying leave where the medical 

certification stated that the employee was “not incapacitated”

and “disavowed the need for any leave.” Tayag v. Lahey 

Clinic Hosp., Inc., 632 F.3d 788, 793 (1st Cir. 2011).
11

We need not decide whether in certain circumstances a 

medical certification may be negative because, even if we 

were to agree with the cases finding negative certifications, 

we still would not find those cases persuasive here. The 

certifications in those cases contained affirmative statements 

from the employees’ physicians that the employees would not 

miss any work. To qualify for FMLA leave, however, an 

employee must have a “serious health condition,” defined as a 

physical or mental condition involving either inpatient care or 

continuing treatment involving a period of incapacity or 

treatment for incapacity. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2611(11), 

2612(a)(1)(D); 29 C.F.R. § 825.102. Thus, the certifications 

in those cases were facially incompatible with entitlement to 

FMLA leave.

In contrast, the certification here—which requested 

“intermittent leave at a frequency of 2 times weekly . . . and 

lasting for a probable duration of one month,” App. 44—did 

not on its face disqualify Hansler from FMLA eligibility. 

Rather, because a “sufficient certification” for intermittent 

leave under 29 U.S.C. § 2613(b) must address both “the 

expected duration of the intermittent leave” and the “probable 

duration of the condition,” and because the certification here 

failed to specify whether the “probable duration of one 

month” referred to the duration of the leave request, the 

duration of the medical condition, or both, the certification 

was not a “negative certification,” but was instead “vague, 

ambiguous, or non-responsive,” meeting the definition of 

“insufficient.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.305(c); see Kauffman v. Fed.

Express Corp., 426 F.3d 880, 886-87 (7th Cir. 2005) 
12

(rejecting argument that certification was negative where 

physician omitted the incapacity’s expected duration).4

In short, we hold today simply that when a 

certification submitted by an employee is “vague, ambiguous, 

or non-responsive” (or “incomplete,” for that matter) as to 

any of the categories of information required under 29 U.S.C. 

§ 2613(b), the employer “shall advise [the] employee . . . 

what additional information is necessary to make the 

certification complete and sufficient” and “must provide the 

employee with seven calendar days . . . to cure any such 

deficiency.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.305(c). The plain and mandatory 

language of the statute and regulations requires no less.

Lehigh Valley’s additional arguments in support of a 

negative certification are unavailing. It emphasizes that the 

Medical Leave Act is not a forward-looking statute and “does 

not require an employer to be clairvoyant.” Lichtenstein v. 

Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., 691 F.3d 294, 303 (3d Cir. 

2012) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 

According to Lehigh Valley, the short duration of Hansler’s 

symptoms prior to her leave request provided no basis for it to 

 

4 Lehigh Valley maintains that Hansler waived her argument 

concerning a distinction between the length of the requested 

leave and the expected duration of her condition by not 

raising it before the District Court. See Brennan v. Norton, 

350 F.3d 399, 415 n.12 (3d Cir. 2003). We disagree. 

Although Hansler did not mention this nuance in 29 U.S.C. 

§ 2613(b), she did argue generally, with a supporting case and 

citations to regulations, that her certification was insufficient 

and that Lehigh Valley should have given her a chance to 

cure. Accordingly, Hansler has preserved the issue for appeal.
13

know that Hansler was suffering from a prolonged and 

chronic illness. This argument would carry more force if the 

issue at stake was notice. See Ross, 755 F.3d at 191-92

(explaining that to state a claim for interference, a plaintiff 

must give notice to the defendant of his or her intention to 

take leave). But no one disputes notice; Hansler provided 

Lehigh Valley with a certification specifically requesting 

leave under the Act. Thus, nothing in this opinion burdens 

employers with the troublesome task of predicting, on their 

own, the nature and trajectory of their employees’ illnesses. 

The relevant question here is not whether Lehigh Valley 

could have known Hansler was suffering from a chronic 

condition at the time she requested leave; instead, it is 

whether the certification was insufficient and/or incomplete. 

Receipt of an insufficient or incomplete certification triggers 

certain regulatory obligations on an employer that are 

unrelated to its understanding of the employee’s health 

condition. 

Similarly, Lehigh Valley maintains that Hansler’s 

post-termination diagnoses of diabetes and high blood 

pressure foreclose her ability to establish that she had a 

chronic serious health condition at the time she requested 

leave. See Navarro v. Pfizer Corp., 261 F.3d 90, 96 (1st Cir. 

2001) (explaining that operative time for determining whether 

a particular condition qualifies as a serious health condition is 

the time that leave is requested or taken). Again, this misses 

the point. That Hansler was diagnosed with her illnesses after 

she was fired does not affect the determination of whether her 

medical certification was insufficient.

Having concluded that Hansler plausibly alleges her 

certification was insufficient rather than negative, the next 
14

question is whether she states a claim for interference under 

the Act. Upon receipt of her insufficient certification, Lehigh 

Valley was required to (1) advise Hansler that her 

certification was insufficient, (2) state in writing what 

additional information was necessary to make it sufficient, 

and (3) provide her with an opportunity to cure before 

denying her request for leave. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.305(c).

Lehigh Valley ignored these requirements and, instead, 

terminated Hansler without first notifying her that the request 

for leave had been denied. Assuming that she can prove she 

was denied benefits to which she was otherwise entitled, 

Hansler may premise her interference claim on these alleged 

regulatory violations.

Though our Court has not yet ruled on this issue,

several district courts in this circuit have found interference 

claims following an employer’s breach of its obligations

under § 825.305 where the employee established entitlement 

or likely entitlement to FMLA benefits.

5 The few relevant

 

5 See Patel v. Saint Vincent Health Ctr., No. 12-298, 2015 

WL 630260, at *13 (W.D. Pa., Feb. 12, 2015) (“[Employer] 

interfered with Plaintiff’s FMLA rights by not informing her 

that the certification submitted by [the physician] was 

incomplete and insufficient.”); Herco v. Se. Pa. Transp. 

Auth., No. 10-796, 2011 WL 294493, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 25, 

2011) (finding interference claim based on employee’s 

submission of an incomplete medical certification and 

employer’s failure to request additional information); 

Marrero v. Camden Cnty. Bd. of Soc. Servs., 164 F. Supp. 2d 

455, 466 (D.N.J. 2001) (“[T]ermination is not an appropriate 

response for an inadequate certification. [The regulations] 
15

decisions from the Courts of Appeals suggest that qualifying 

employees who allege harm arising from the employers’

failure to provide a cure period may assert a cause of action 

for interference. See Kauffman, 426 F.3d at 886-87; Darst v. 

Interstate Brands Corp., 512 F.3d 903, 910 (7th Cir. 2008); 

Sorrell v. Rinker Materials Corp., 395 F.3d 332, 337 (6th Cir. 

2005).

Moreover, we find support for an interference claim 

based on this Court’s precedent concerning notice 

interference. In Conoshenti v. Public Service Electric & Gas 

Co., the plaintiff’s claim was based on his employer failing to 

advise him of his substantive rights under the Act in violation 

of regulatory requirements.

6 364 F.3d 135, 142 (3d Cir. 

2004). The plaintiff there insisted that, if he had received the 

necessary information, “he would have been able to make an 

informed decision about structuring his leave and would have 

structured it, and his plan of recovery, in such a way as to 

preserve the job protection afforded by the Act.” Id. at 142-

43. We held this was a viable theory of recovery, explaining 

that the plaintiff “will show an interference with his right to 

 

provide[] that where an employer finds a certification 

incomplete, it must give the employee a reasonable 

opportunity to cure any deficiencies.”).

6 The regulations contain a number of provisions requiring 

employers to provide employees with notice of their rights 

and obligations. See generally 29 C.F.R. § 825.300. For 

example, an employer covered by the Act must include a 

notice in its employee handbooks explaining benefits and 

leave rights. Id. § 825.300(a)(3).
16

leave under the FMLA . . . if he is able to establish that this 

failure to advise rendered him unable to exercise that right in 

a meaningful way, thereby causing injury.” Id. at 143. Put 

another way, we found a cause of action for notice

interference in the event plaintiff was able to show prejudice 

as a result of the violation. Id. at 144; see also Ruder v. 

Pequea Valley Sch. Dist., 790 F. Supp. 2d 377, 394 (E.D. Pa. 

2011) (finding interference claim where the defendant’s 

failure to advise plaintiff of his eligibility to take leave 

“rendered him unable to exercise his rights”); Schaar v. 

Lehigh Valley Health Servs., Inc., 732 F. Supp. 2d 490, 496-

97 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (finding interference claim where plaintiff 

alleged that “had she been informed that FMLA was an 

option for her absence, she would have taken her absence as 

FMLA leave”).

The logic of Conoshenti naturally extends to an 

employer’s failure to comply with its regulatory obligations 

following receipt of an insufficient or incomplete medical 

certification. Just like employers must advise their employees 

of their rights under the Act, 29 C.F.R. § 825.300, they also 

must advise their employees of deficiencies in their medical 

certifications and provide them with an opportunity to cure, 

id. § 825.305(c). These modest burdens imposed on 

employers help ensure that employees are equipped with at 

least basic information about the Act’s requirements and have 

an opportunity to exercise their rights in a meaningful way. 

And to encourage employer compliance, the regulations 

provide injured employees with a cause of action for 

interference. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(b) (“Any violations of 

the Act or of these regulations constitute interfering with, 

restraining, or denying the exercise of rights provided by the 
17

Act.”). If we were to find otherwise, employees would be left 

without a remedy.

Based on the facts alleged in the complaint, we 

conclude that Hansler states a claim for interference under 29 

U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1). She alleges that, in violation of the 

regulations, Lehigh Valley failed to identify deficiencies in 

her medical certification and failed to provide her with an 

opportunity to cure. Hansler alleges she was prejudiced by 

these failures because, “[h]ad [Lehigh Valley] properly 

requested that [her] physician provide more information to 

show a serious health condition, [her] physician would have 

been [in] a position to provide the full diagnosis of [her]

chronic health conditions.” App. 45. Instead of having the 

chance to exercise her rights in a meaningful way and

demonstrate her entitlement to leave, Lehigh Valley fired her. 

As such, Hansler sufficiently alleges she was prejudiced as a 

result of Lehigh Valley’s regulatory violations. Indeed, 

Lehigh Valley does not appear to dispute a finding of 

prejudice, instead focusing its efforts on arguing that Hansler 

was not entitled to a cure period in the first instance—an 

argument we have rejected. Appellee Br. at 8 (“While it may 

be true that, had Hansler been given more time, she would 

have been able to offer additional information, this simply is 

not relevant to whether Hansler was entitled, under the 

FMLA regulations, to a cure period.”).

Not only is our conclusion dictated by precedent as 

well as the statutory and regulatory text, but we believe the 

cure period makes abundant sense in this context. Faced with 

nascent symptoms from a yet-to-be diagnosed condition, an 

employee’s physician may need some additional time to 

provide the required elements of a sufficient certification, 
18

including more specific information regarding relevant 

medical facts and the probable duration of the condition, the 

planned medical treatment, and the intermittent leave. 29 

U.S.C. § 2613(b). As this case illustrates, for an employee 

with an emerging condition, the difference between a medical 

certification that supports leave and one that is deficient 

might be a matter of days.7

B.

Hansler’s second claim is that Lehigh Valley 

terminated her in retaliation for seeking leave. Retaliation 

claims arise out of the Medical Leave Act’s prohibition on 

employers “discharg[ing] or in any other manner 

discriminat[ing] against any individual for opposing any 

practice made unlawful.” 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2); see 29 

 

7 The sine qua non of eligibility for leave is not a diagnosis, 

but a qualifying health condition to which a physician may 

attest by providing the specified categories of information, 

such as “appropriate medical facts . . . regarding the 

condition,” the “probable duration of the condition,” and, 

where intermittent leave is requested, “the expected duration 

of the intermittent leave.” 29 U.S.C. § 2613(b). Where a 

certification is incomplete or insufficient as to any one of the 

categories, nothing in the statute or the implementing 

regulations prevents the cure period from functioning as a 

grace period for the employee to obtain such information; on 

the contrary, they compel it. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.305(c). And 

if the employee happens to learn the name of her condition in 

the interim, that may well provide additional support for her 

request, but it surely does not negate the validity of the grace 

period.
19

C.F.R. § 825.220(c) (prohibiting employers from 

“discriminating or retaliating against an employee or 

prospective employee for having exercised or attempt[ing] to 

exercise FMLA rights”). To state such a claim, Hansler must 

allege (1) she invoked her right to leave, (2) she suffered an 

adverse employment decision, and (3) the adverse action was 

causally related to her invocation of rights. See Lichtenstein, 

691 F.3d at 301-02.

The District Court dismissed Hansler’s retaliation 

claim, finding she did not make a “valid” request for leave. 

This conclusion flowed from our holding that “firing an 

employee for a valid request for FMLA leave may constitute 

interference with the employee’s FMLA rights as well as 

retaliation against the employee.” Erdman v. Nationwide Ins. 

Co., 582 F.3d 500, 509 (3d Cir. 2009). The District Court 

reasoned that because her leave request was “premised upon 

the existence of a serious chronic health condition and her 

medical certification was a negative certification with respect 

to such a condition, [Hansler’s] leave request was not a valid 

request entitling her to FMLA leave and, accordingly, may 

not form the basis for an FMLA retaliation claim.” Hansler, 

2014 WL 1281132, at *13.

As we disagree with the underpinnings of this 

conclusion—i.e., the certification was negative and Hansler 

was not entitled to benefits under the Act—we hold that 

Hansler’s claim should not be dismissed at this stage. Hansler 

alleges she attempted to invoke her right to leave, she was not 

advised of deficiencies in her medical certification, she was 

not provided a cure period, and she was fired a few weeks 

later as a result of her leave request. Through discovery, 

Hansler might be able to show that Lehigh Valley had a 
20

retaliatory motive and that the stated reason for termination 

was pretextual. See Lupyan v. Corinthian Colls. Inc., 761 

F.3d 314, 325-26 (3d Cir. 2014); Lichtenstein, 691 F.3d at 

309-10.

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the order of the 

District Court and remand for further proceedings consistent 

with this opinion.