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WO NOT FOR PUBLICATION 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Garland E Williams, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

United States of America, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. CV-18-00007-PHX-JJT

ORDER 

 At issue is pro se Plaintiff Garland E Williams’s Application to Proceed in District 

Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs (Doc. 2). Having determined that Plaintiff is 

unable to pay the Court’s fees, the Court would grant the Application. However, as set 

forth below, upon screening Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 1, Compl.) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2), the Court finds that the Plaintiff fails to state a claim. Thus, the Court 

dismisses the Complaint. 

I. LEGAL STANDARD 

A. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) 

 For cases in which a party is permitted to proceed in forma pauperis—that is, the 

party lacks the means to pay court fees—Congress provided that a district court “shall 

dismiss the case at any time if the court determines” that the “allegation of poverty is 

untrue” or that the “action or appeal” is “frivolous or malicious,” “fails to state a claim on 

which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune 

from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Section 1915(e) applies to all in forma pauperis
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proceedings. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2000). “It is also clear that 

section 1915(e) not only permits but requires a district court to dismiss an in forma 

pauperis complaint that fails to state a claim.” Id. at 1127. “The standard for determining 

whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for 

failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). 

B. Sufficiency of a Claim 

 A complaint must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The complaint must contain “sufficient 

factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 

544, 570 (2007)). A dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim can be based 

on either (1) the lack of a cognizable legal theory or (2) insufficient facts to support a 

cognizable legal claim. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 

1990). The Court is to construe a pro se plaintiff’s complaint “liberally” and afford the 

plaintiff “the benefit of any doubt.” Watison, 668 F.3d at 1112 (citation omitted). 

II. ANALYSIS 

 In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that the Honorable Ivan L. R.. Lemelle, Senior 

District Court Judge in the Eastern District of Louisiana, deprived Plaintiff’s right to 

procedural due process by “neglect[ing] . . . plaintiff’s submitted motions.” (Compl. at 5.) 

Plaintiff also names the Clerk of Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana as a 

Defendant. Although largely unintelligible, the acts alleged in Plaintiff’s Complaint 

appear to stem from a case litigated before Judge Lamelle, Williams v. Department of 

Children & Family Services, No. 16-cv-15866 (E.D. La.). 

 Judges enjoy absolute immunity from suits for damages brought based on a 

“judicial act,” such as those acts “involved in resolving disputes between parties.” 

Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 225–27 (1988). In addition to “protecting the finality of 

judgments” and “discouraging inappropriate collateral attacks,” judicial immunity 
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“protect[s] judicial independence by insulating judges from vexatious action prosecuted 

by disgruntled litigants.” Id. at 225 (citing Bradley v. Fished, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 348 

(1871)). Thus, this immunity extends even to court clerks, who “have absolute quasijudicial immunity from damages for civil rights violations when they perform tasks that 

are an integral part of the judicial process.” Mullis v. U.S. Bankr. Court for the Dist. of 

Nev., 828 F.2d 1385, 1390 (9th Cir. 1987). 

 Plaintiff’s Complaint challenges the rulings in Plaintiff’s prior case in the Eastern 

District of Louisiana, which are “paradigmatic judicial acts.” See Forrester, 484 U.S. at 

227. Thus, absolute judicial immunity bars any claim for damages against either 

Defendant. Id. Although Plaintiff may be unhappy with the outcome of those 

proceedings, this Court is not a proper venue to challenge the correctness of those rulings. 

Because Defendants enjoy absolutely immunity, Plaintiff’s Complaint cannot be cured. 

Therefore, the Court will dismiss the Complaint with prejudice. 

 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 1) with 

prejudice. 

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying as moot Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed 

in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs (Doc. 2) and Plaintiff’s Motion to 

Allow Electronic Filing (Doc. 4). 

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk of the Court to close this case. 

 Dated this 13th day of February, 2018. 

Honorable John J. Tuchi

United States District Judge