SUMMARY

September 12, 2019

2019COA146

No. 18CA2308, Packard v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office —

Limitation of Actions; Labor and Industry — Workers’ 

Compensation — Notices and Procedures — Notice of Injury 

A division of the court of appeals holds that section 8-43-

103(2), C.R.S. 2018, is a statute of limitations applicable to the 

Workers’ Compensation Act of Colorado. It requires a claimant 

seeking disability or indemnity benefits to file a “notice claiming 

compensation” within two years of discovering the work-related 

nature of the claimant’s injuries, or within three years if the 

claimant can establish a reasonable excuse for late filing and the 

employer suffered no prejudice as a result. Id. To satisfy the 

statutory requirement, the “notice claiming compensation” must 

notify the Division of Workers’ Compensation and the opposing 

party of a claimant’s intent to seek compensatory benefits. Id. 

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions 

constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by 

the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be 

cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division. 

Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion 

should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.
Consequently, documents which do not provide this information —

including an employer’s first report of injury or notice of contest, a 

claimant’s service of interrogatories or claimant’s counsel’s entry of 

appearance, or the Division’s assignment of a claim number — do 

not satisfy the Act’s statute of limitations for claiming 

compensation. 
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2019COA146

Court of Appeals No. 18CA2308

Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado

WC No. 4-925-466

Joseph Packard,

Petitioner,

v.

Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado and City and County of 

Denver, Colorado, 

Respondents.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division IV

Opinion by JUDGE ROMÁN

J. Jones and Martinez*, JJ., concur

Announced September 12, 2019

Law Office of O’Toole and Sbarbaro, P.C., Neil D. O’Toole, Denver, Colorado, for 

Petitioner

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Evan P. Brennan, Assistant Attorney 

General, Denver, Colorado, for Respondent Industrial Claim Appeals Office

Kristin M. Bronson, City Attorney, J.P. Moon, Assistant City Attorney, Stephen 

J. Abbott, Assistant City Attorney, Denver, Colorado, for Respondent City and 

County of Denver

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. 

VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2019. 
1

¶ 1 In this workers’ compensation action, we are asked to address 

whether certain documents constitute a “notice of injury” such that 

claimant, Joseph Packard, beat the statute of limitations of the 

Workers’ Compensation Act of Colorado (Act), set forth in section 8-

43-103(2), C.R.S. 2018. We agree with the Industrial Claim Appeals 

Office (Panel) that neither a notice of contest nor a first report of 

injury satisfies the statute of limitations and that to satisfy the 

statutory mandate a document must notify the Division of Workers’ 

Compensation (Division) and the opposing party that a claimant is 

“claiming compensation” within the meaning of the statute. We 

therefore affirm the Panel’s final order.

I. Background

¶ 2 Claimant is a firefighter for the City and County of Denver. In 

July 2013, he was diagnosed with melanoma of the trunk. On July 

24, 2013, he advised the City of his cancer diagnosis and asserted 

his belief that the melanoma was related to or caused by his work 

as a firefighter for the City. The City filed its first report of injury 

with the Division on August 5, 2013. The next day, the City filed a 

notice of contest indicating it needed to further review the claim and 

claimant’s medical records. 
2

¶ 3 On August 7, 2013, the Division notified claimant that a notice 

of contest had been filed. The Division’s form letter to claimant 

included the following language:

Because your claim for benefits has been 

denied, you may file for an expedited hearing 

and have an Administrative Law Judge decide 

if benefits should be awarded. You must file 

an Application for Expedited Hearing within 

forty-five (45) days from the date on the Notice 

of Contest form. If you request a hearing after 

this date, your hearing will be held between 80 

and 100 days after a hearing date is set.

* * * * *

If you have not filed a Workers’ Claim for 

Compensation, you may wish to do so.

¶ 4 One year after claimant’s diagnosis, Dr. Annyce Mayer, a 

physician with National Jewish Health Medical, concluded that 

claimant was at maximum medical improvement (MMI) “with a 10% 

whole person impairment.” She opined that there is “increasing 

epidemiologic evidence for increased risk of melanoma in 

firefighters, particularly in [claimant’s] age group.” Weighing 

claimant’s occupational and nonoccupational risk factors for 

developing melanoma, Dr. Mayer concluded that “his increased risk 

for melanoma due to non-occupational risk factors does not 
3

establish the ‘cause’ for his developing malignant melanoma on a 

medically probable basis.” 

¶ 5 In May 2017, Dr. Mayer followed up her initial opinion with a 

supplemental report. She concluded that claimant’s “melanoma 

meets the medical requirements of the Colorado Firefighter 

Presumption Statute, [section] 8-41-209, C.R.S. [2018,] . . . and 

that his underlying risk factors do not render it more probable that 

his melanoma arose from a source outside of the workplace, to a 

reasonable degree of medical probability.” She also opined that 

claimant’s melanoma remained in remission. 

¶ 6 Claimant filed an application for hearing on October 6, 2017, 

seeking medical and temporary total disability benefits. The City 

eventually admitted compensability, but asserted a statute of 

limitations defense, arguing that the claim was barred because 

claimant filed his application more than four years after learning of 

his melanoma and reporting it to the City. 

¶ 7 An administrative law judge (ALJ) concluded that the 

Division’s assignment of a claim number to the claim, along with 

the City’s filing of the first report of injury and a notice of contest,
4

demonstrated that the City was on notice of the claim before the 

running of the statute of limitations. 

¶ 8 But the Panel rejected this conclusion and set aside the ALJ’s 

order. The Panel instead held that neither the first report of injury 

nor the notice of contest satisfied claimant’s statutory obligation to 

file a “notice claiming compensation.” Likewise, the Panel held, the 

Division’s assignment of a claim number to the case could not 

“substitute for the filing of a workers’ claim for compensation.” The 

Panel observed that none of these actions — the filing of the first 

report of injury, the filing of the notice of contest, or the assignment

of a claim number — indicated whether “the claimant had missed 

any time from work, was alleging any permanent impairment, or 

was seeking medical treatment.” In short, the Panel held, the forms 

did not put the City or the Division on notice that claimant was 

claiming compensation for his occupational disease. 

II. Statute of Limitations

¶ 9 Claimant contends that the Panel misinterpreted the 

applicable statute of limitations, section 8-43-103(2). He argues 

that the City had adequate notice of his intent to pursue 

compensation through the Division’s assignment of a claim number 
5

to the case, the City’s filing of the first report of injury and notice of 

contest, and his filing of several documents. He identifies several 

documents his counsel filed on his behalf on February 4, 2015, 

which, he asserts, fulfilled his notice obligation: (1) a notice 

pursuant to section 8-41-203(4), C.R.S. 2018,1 stating that his 

injuries arose “from an injury and/or occupational disease 

occurring on 7/24/2013”; (2) a notice of objection to verbal 

communications with claimant, treating physicians, or healthcare 

providers; (3) combined ongoing production requests and 

interrogatories; (4) an objection to admissions; and (5) his counsel’s 

entry of appearance. We are not persuaded that the Panel 

misinterpreted or misapplied the statute. 

A. Applicable Statute: C.R.S. 8-43-103

¶ 10 The Act imposes notice requirements and a general statute of 

limitations which applies to nearly all requests for compensation 

and benefits pursued thereunder. See § 8-43-103. The relevant 

portions of the statute provide as follows:

 1 Section 8-41-203(4), C.R.S. 2018, requires a claimant who 

believes another party may be liable for any claimed injuries to 

notify the affected employer of such belief and identify any third 

party who may be so liable.
6

(1) Notice of an injury, for which compensation 

and benefits are payable, shall be given by the 

employer to the division and insurance carrier, 

unless the employer is self-insured, within ten 

days after the injury . . . . If no such notice is 

given by the employer, as required by articles 

40 to 47 of this title, such notice may be given 

by any person. Any notice required to be filed 

by an injured employee . . . may be made and 

filed by anyone on behalf of such claimant and 

shall be considered as done by such claimant 

if not specifically disclaimed or objected to by 

such claimant in writing filed with the division 

within a reasonable time. Such notice shall be 

in writing and upon forms prescribed by the 

division for that purpose and served upon the 

division by delivering to, or by mailing by 

registered mail two copies thereof addressed 

to, the division at its office in Denver, 

Colorado. Upon receipt of such notice from a 

claimant, the division shall immediately mail 

one copy thereof to said employer or said 

employer’s agent or insurance carrier.

(2) The director and administrative law judges 

employed by the office of administrative courts 

shall have jurisdiction at all times to hear and 

determine and make findings and awards on 

all cases of injury for which compensation or 

benefits are provided by articles 40 to 47 of 

this title. . . . [T]he right to compensation and 

benefits provided by said articles shall be 

barred unless, within two years after the injury 

. . . a notice claiming compensation is filed with 

the division. This limitation shall not apply to 

any claimant to whom compensation has been 

paid or if it is established to the satisfaction of 

the director within three years after the injury 

or death that a reasonable excuse exists for 
7

the failure to file such notice claiming 

compensation and if the employer’s rights have 

not been prejudiced thereby, and the 

furnishing of medical, surgical, or hospital 

treatment by the employer shall not be 

considered payment of compensation or 

benefits within the meaning of this section; 

but, in all cases in which the employer has 

been given notice of an injury and fails, 

neglects, or refuses to report said injury to the 

division as required by the provisions of said 

articles, this statute of limitations shall not 

begin to run against the claim of the injured 

employee . . . until the required report has 

been filed with the division.

Id. (emphasis added). 

B. Rules of Statutory Construction and Standard of Review

¶ 11 When we analyze a provision of the Act, “we interpret the 

statute according to its plain and ordinary meaning” if its language 

is clear. Davison v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 84 P.3d 1023, 1029 

(Colo. 2004). “[W]e give effect to every word and render none 

superfluous because we ‘do not presume that the legislature used 

language idly and with no intent that meaning should be given to 

its language.’” Lombard v. Colo. Outdoor Educ. Ctr., Inc., 187 P.3d 

565, 571 (Colo. 2008) (quoting Colo. Water Conservation Bd. v. 

Upper Gunnison River Water Conservancy Dist., 109 P.3d 585, 597 

(Colo. 2005)).
8

¶ 12 We review an issue of statutory construction de novo. Ray v. 

Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 124 P.3d 891, 893 (Colo. App. 2005), 

aff’d, 145 P.3d 661 (Colo. 2006). Although we defer to the Panel’s 

reasonable interpretations of the statute it administers, Sanco 

Indus. v. Stefanski, 147 P.3d 5, 8 (Colo. 2006), we are “not bound 

by the Panel’s interpretation” or its earlier decisions, United Airlines 

v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 2013 COA 48, ¶ 7; Olivas-Soto v. 

Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 143 P.3d 1178, 1180 (Colo. App. 2006). 

“[T]he Panel’s interpretation will be set aside only if it is inconsistent 

with the clear language of the statute or with the legislative intent.” 

Support, Inc. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 968 P.2d 174, 175 

(Colo. App. 1998).

C. Law Governing the Act’s Statute of Limitations

¶ 13 To be timely under the Act, section 8-43-103(2) mandates that

a claim for workers’ compensation must be filed within two years of 

the alleged injury by filing a “notice claiming compensation.” A 

“notice claiming compensation” is commenced when a claimant 

notifies the division of his or her alleged injuries and intent to 

pursue compensation. See Pinkard Constr. Co. v. Schroer, 487 P.2d 

610, 612 (Colo. App. 1971) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(f)) 
9

(supplemental report of injury prepared, signed, and filed by the 

claimant with Industrial Commission was sufficient to constitute a 

notice claiming compensation even though the claimant did not use 

prescribed form). Accordingly, to timely commence his action, 

claimant had to file a notice with the Division advising it of the 

nature of his claim and his intent to seek compensation.

¶ 14 “[T]he limitation period commences when the claimant, as a 

reasonable person, should recognize the nature, seriousness, and 

probable compensable character of the injury.” City of Durango v. 

Dunagan, 939 P.2d 496, 498 (Colo. App. 1997); see also City of 

Boulder v. Payne, 162 Colo. 345, 351, 426 P.2d 194, 197 (1967); 

City of Colorado Springs v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 89 P.3d 504, 

506 (Colo. App. 2004).

¶ 15 In other words, section 8-43-103(2) requires that claims for 

workers’ compensation be filed within two years of a claimant’s 

discovery of a work-related injury. The two-year statute of 

limitations deadline may be extended for one additional year, but 

only if the claimant establishes a reasonable excuse for failing to 

timely file and that the employer was not prejudiced by the 

claimant’s late filing. See Silsby v. Tops Drive In Rest.-Dutton 
10

Enters., Inc., 160 Colo. 549, 551, 418 P.2d 525, 526 (1966) (“A 

‘legally justifiable’ excuse is one which the Commission . . . finds to 

be reasonably sufficient to excuse the delay.”). 

D. The Statute of Limitations Applies and Bars Claimant’s Claim

¶ 16 Claimant informed the City that there was a connection 

between his work fighting fires and his melanoma shortly after his

2013 diagnosis. Dr. Mayer strongly suggested such a connection in 

her 2014 report. As Dunagan and Payne make clear and the 

parties do not dispute, the statute of limitations commenced 

running in 2013 because claimant knew then the nature of his

illness and its connection to his work. See Payne, 162 Colo. at 351, 

426 P.2d at 197; Dunagan, 939 P.2d at 498. Based on claimant’s 

admission that he knew in 2013 that his firefighting duties may 

have caused his melanoma, he needed to file his claim by 2015 to 

comply with the two-year statute of limitations, or by 2016 if he 

could establish a reasonable excuse for failing to file within two 

years. Because he did not file his application for a hearing with the 

Division until October 2017, section 8-43-103(2) barred his claim.

¶ 17 Claimant argues, however, that the City’s filing of a first report 

of injury and a notice of contest, as well as the Division’s 
11

assignment of a claim number, satisfied his obligation to file a 

notice claiming compensation. He also points to the documents his 

counsel filed on his behalf on February 4, 2015, as evidence that 

the City and the Division were on notice of his intent to litigate his 

claim and pursue compensation. He asserts that because Colorado 

is a “notice pleading” state, no further notice was required of him.

We are not persuaded, for three reasons. 

¶ 18 First, none of the documents to which claimant points — not 

the notice of contest, the first report of injury, nor any of the 

documents his counsel filed — indicated that claimant was 

“claiming compensation” within the meaning of section 8-43-103(2). 

Nor did any of the identified documents provide an impairment 

rating or indicate that claimant had sustained a permanent 

impairment. Section 8-43-103(2) expressly excludes from the 

definition of “compensation” “the furnishing of medical, surgical, or 

hospital treatment by the employer.” It is therefore limited to 

claims for disability (also known as indemnity) benefits based on 

partial or total impairment. See Hussion v. Indus. Claim Appeals 

Office, 991 P.2d 346, 347 (Colo. App. 1999) (“[T]he term

‘compensation,’ as used in the Act, may refer to benefits paid for 
12

both temporary and permanent disabilities or impairments.”). 

Disability and medical benefits are thus treated differently by the 

legislature in this section, a distinction evident in other sections of 

the Act, as well, which often “treat medical benefits separately from 

indemnity benefits.” Support, Inc., 968 P.2d at 176 (use of the term 

“compensation” in the forfeiture clause of section 8-43-402, C.R.S. 

2018, did not apply to medical benefits so claimant did not forfeit 

her right to ongoing medical benefits because of a felony 

conviction); see also Wild W. Radio, Inc. v. Indus. Claim Appeals 

Office, 905 P.2d 6, 9 (Colo. App. 1995) (rejecting the employer’s 

contention that reduction in “compensation” under section 8-42-

112, C.R.S. 2018, for a safety violation or intoxication applies to 

medical benefits). None of the documents claimant points to 

specifies that claimant was seeking compensation as that term is 

defined in section 8-43-103. Consequently, none satisfied section 

8-43-103(2)’s requirement of providing notice that claimant was 

“claiming compensation.”

¶ 19 The Panel reached this same conclusion. In reaching its 

decision, the Panel followed a decades-old decision issued by this 

court. In that decision, a division of this court held that an 
13

employer’s first report of injury was insufficient “to constitute a 

notice of claim.” Martin v. Indus. Comm’n, 43 Colo. App. 521, 524, 

608 P.2d 366, 369 (1979). The division observed that the 

employer’s notice of injury filed with the Industrial Commission 

“was merely a report of the accident, and, while it may contain 

information such as the name of the worker and the date and 

details of the accident, it [did] not assert that a compensable injury 

ha[d] occurred nor give notice that compensation [wa]s expected.” 

Id.

¶ 20 Since Martin, the Panel has consistently ruled that a first 

report of injury form filed by an employer does not satisfy the 

statutory requirement that claimants file a notice claiming 

compensation. 

¶ 21 We agree with the Panel that neither a first report of injury nor 

a notice of contest constitutes a “notice claiming compensation” 

within the meaning of section 8-43-103(2). The Act requires 

employers to file a report — not a claim — containing information 

mandated by the director of the Division “upon forms prescribed by 

the division for that purpose.” § 8-43-101(1), C.R.S. 2018. If an 

employer “fails, neglects, or refuses to report said injury to the 
14

division” by providing the mandated information on the prescribed 

division form, “this statute of limitations shall not begin to run 

against the claim of the injured employee.” § 8-43-103(2) (emphasis 

added). “‘Claim’ is a term of art which is defined broadly as ‘the 

aggregate of operative facts which give rise to a right enforceable in 

the courts.’” Kieckhafer v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 2012 COA 

124, ¶ 15 (quoting Dinosaur Park Invs., L.L.C. v. Tello, 192 P.3d 513, 

516 (Colo. App. 2008)). Under the express statutory language, 

then, the statute of limitations continues to run even when an 

employer files a first report of injury form. 

¶ 22 Similarly, a notice of contest contains no information about a 

claimant’s claim for indemnity or disability benefits. It simply 

advises the Division and the claimant that an employer or insurer 

believes a claim may not be covered for any number of reasons. 

Thus, nothing in section 8-43-103 suggests that an employer’s 

filing of a first report of injury or notice of contest absolves a 

claimant’s burden to file a “notice claiming compensation.” 

¶ 23 Because the Panel’s interpretation is consistent with the clear 

language of the statute, we perceive no basis for straying from it 

here. See Kilpatrick v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 2015 COA 30, ¶ 
15

31 (“[W]e defer to the Panel’s ‘reasonable interpretations’ of its own 

regulations, and only set aside the Panel’s interpretation ‘if it is 

inconsistent with the clear language of the statute or with the 

legislative intent.’” (quoting Zerba v. Dillon Cos., 2012 COA 78, 

¶ 37)). 

¶ 24 We also reject claimant’s assertion that the assignment of a 

claim number constituted a notice of claim. Contrary to claimant’s 

suggestion, we see nothing in the assigning of a claim number by 

the Division that satisfies a claimant’s obligation to notify the 

Division and the employer of his intent to seek compensation. 

Neither party receives or provides any information concerning 

benefits, impairment, or disability through the assignment of a 

claim number. Thus, the critical information conveyed when “a 

notice claiming compensation is filed with the division” is not 

provided by the assignment of a claim number. See § 8-43-103(2).

¶ 25 Second, claimant’s proposed construction would render the 

statute of limitations meaningless, a result which is also prohibited. 

See Pineda-Liberato v. People, 2017 CO 95, ¶ 39 (“We cannot, 

however, interpret statutory provisions so as to render any of their 

words or phrases meaningless or superfluous.”); Berthold v. Indus. 
16

Claim Appeals Office, 2017 COA 145, ¶ 32. As the City points out, 

claimant’s proposed construction would completely vitiate the 

statute of limitations because the statute would not commence 

running if an employer failed to file a first report of injury but would 

stop running as soon as an employer filed a first report of injury. In 

other words, if the statutorily required first report of injury served 

to satisfy the statute of limitations, a claimant would have 

unlimited time within which to file an application for hearing

because the statute would never be triggered — if the employer filed 

a first report of injury — or would always be tolled — if the 

employer failed to file the required report. Permitting a first report 

of injury to satisfy the statute of limitations would thus improperly 

render the statute of limitations meaningless and without effect. 

Pineda-Liberato, ¶ 39; Berthold, ¶ 32.

¶ 26 And, third, we agree with the City and the Panel that section 

8-43-103(1) imposes filing obligations on employers, while section 

8-43-103(2) applies to claimants. As we read the statute, 

subsection (1) requires employers to file a first report of injury, 

providing the timeline within which employers must take that 

action. In contrast, subsection (2) — the statute of limitations 
17

subsection — states that it “shall not apply to any claimant to 

whom compensation has been paid,” suggesting that the converse is 

also true: the subsection applies to any claimant who has not 

received compensation. See § 8-43-103(1), (2). Because the 

legislature put the parties’ obligations in separate subsections of 

the statute, we conclude that the legislature did not intend for a 

document that subsection (1) requires an employer to file — the 

first report of injury — to satisfy a claimant’s obligation under

subsection (2).

¶ 27 The case on which claimant relies in support of his position, 

Colorado Auto Body, Inc. v. Newton, 160 Colo. 113, 414 P.2d 480 

(1966), is distinguishable. Claimant cites Newton for the 

proposition that a “mere irregularity” in a filing form does not 

prevent a claim from proceeding. Id. at 122, 414 P.2d at 485. 

When the deficiency is only as to form, there can be a waiver of a 

statute of limitations defense based on inadequate notice of a claim. 

Id. However, in Newton, the notice, albeit “irregular,” and the 

hearing both occurred before the expiration of the statute of 

limitations. Because the hearing had been held within the 

statutory time limit, the supreme court held that the employer had 
18

waived any objection to the “technical deficiencies” in the notice. 

Id.

¶ 28 Accordingly, we conclude that although employer filed a first 

report of injury and a notice of contest, claimant nonetheless had to 

file a timely claim for compensation — such as an application for 

hearing — with the Division to ensure that his claim was not barred 

by the statute of limitations. It is undisputed that claimant did not 

file his application for hearing until more than four years after his 

melanoma diagnosis and his notice to the City and the Division that 

he believed his cancer was work related. By then, both the 

applicable two-year statute of limitations, as well as the additional 

year permitted for a reasonable excuse, had lapsed. See § 8-43-

103(2). We therefore agree with the Panel’s conclusion that 

claimant’s claim is barred by the statute of limitations.

III. Claimant’s Remaining Arguments

¶ 29 In addition to his primary contention that the Panel 

misinterpreted and misapplied the statute, claimant raises several 

other contentions. They are as follows: 

(1) The Panel’s order disregarded the Act’s mandate “to assure 

the quick and efficient delivery of disability and medical 
19

benefits to injured workers.” See § 8-40-102(1), C.R.S. 

2018. He points out that the firefighter cancer 

presumption statute, section 8-41-209, does not contain a 

statute of limitations, and that, by imposing a limit on 

firefighters, the Panel frustrated the legislature’s intent. 

(2) The City should have been required to show prejudice 

before the statute of limitations was applied.

(3) The City’s notice of contest form should have estopped it 

“from asserting a violation of [section] 8-43-103 because it 

informed [claimant] that the only requirement for moving 

forward with his claim was to apply for hearing.” 

None of these arguments persuade us to reach a different result.

A. Effectuating the Act’s Purpose

¶ 30 The stated goal of the Act is “to assure the quick and efficient 

delivery of disability and medical benefits to injured workers at a 

reasonable cost to employers, without the necessity of any 

litigation.” § 8-40-102(1). “In construing the language of the [Act], 

we have previously held that the Act is ‘intended to be remedial and 

beneficent in purpose, and should be liberally construed in order to 
20

accomplish these goals.’” Ray, 145 P.3d at 668 (quoting Davison, 

84 P.3d at 1029). 

¶ 31 Claimant contends that the Panel violated these principles 

when it barred his claim on statute of limitations grounds. He 

argues that barring his claim thwarts the legislature’s intent that 

firefighters be compensated for their work-related cancers. Further, 

he contends, the firefighter cancer presumption statute under 

which he asserted his claim, section 8-41-209, contains no specific 

statute of limitations. 

¶ 32 Although claimant correctly distills the Act’s stated purpose 

and goal, that purpose does not negate the specific statute of 

limitations set out in section 8-43-103(2). A declaration of 

legislative intent “cannot override a statute’s elements.” People in 

Interest of T.B., 2016 COA 151M, ¶ 42, aff’d, 2019 CO 53. As to 

claimant’s contention that section 8-41-209 does not expressly set 

forth a statute of limitations, claimant does not point us to any 

provision in the Act that includes its own statute of limitations, and 

we know of none. Rather, section 8-43-103(2) makes clear that, 

with the exception of certain injuries caused by radioactive 

materials, it applies to all claims for “compensation and benefits 
21

provided by . . . articles [40 to 47 of this title].” Thus, by its express 

language, section 8-43-103(2) applies to section 8-41-209.

¶ 33 For these reasons, we conclude that the Panel did not violate 

the Act’s legislative declaration.

B. Prejudice

¶ 34 Claimant next contends that the City should have been 

required to show prejudice before his claim was dismissed as time

barred. He argues that the prejudice provision in section 8-43-

103(2) applied and cites to Newton and Colorado Fuel & Iron Corp. v. 

Industrial Commission, 129 Colo. 287, 269 P.2d 696 (1954), in 

support of his position. Claimant is mistaken.

¶ 35 Section 8-43-103(2) does require an employer to show 

prejudice if a claimant is seeking to file a claim for compensation 

within a year of the expiration of the two-year statute of limitations. 

It states that the two-year statute of limitations “shall not apply . . . 

if it is established to the satisfaction of the director within three 

years after the injury . . . that a reasonable excuse exists for the 

failure to file such notice claiming compensation and if the 

employer’s rights have not been prejudiced thereby.” § 8-43-103(2) 

(emphasis added). Contrary to claimant’s assertion, this provision 
22

only applies when a claimant files a claim after the two-year statute 

of limitations has expired but before a third year has elapsed. It 

does not apply to claims filed outside that three-year limit.

¶ 36 Nor do the cases claimant cites support his position. Colorado 

Fuel & Iron concerned a claim filed outside the then-applicable 

one-year statute of limitations, but before the expiration of the 

additional grace year which, like the current version of the statute, 

granted claimants one additional year within which to file a claim 

for compensation if they showed “that a reasonable excuse exists 

for the failure to file such notice claiming compensation, and the 

employer’s rights have not been prejudiced thereby.” 129 Colo. at 

290, 269 P.2d at 697. It therefore did not involve the assertion of a 

claim for compensation beyond the extra one-year window. 

¶ 37 Newton is likewise distinguishable. It held that the statute of 

limitations did not bar a claim because the referee’s order joining 

the employer to the workers’ compensation action sufficiently 

notified the employer and its insurer of the claim for compensation. 

Because that order was issued only five months after the accident 

at issue occurred, the employer and insurer were notified that the 

claimant was “claiming compensation” well within the statute of 
23

limitations. Newton, 160 Colo. at 116-17, 414 P.2d at 482. 

Therefore, it, too, does not support claimant’s contention.

¶ 38 Prejudice is not a statutorily required factor for application of 

the statute of limitations after the time period has fully expired, and 

we decline to read such a provision into section 8-43-103(2). See 

Kraus v. Artcraft Sign Co., 710 P.2d 480, 482 (Colo. 1985) (The 

appellate courts of this state have “uniformly held that a court 

should not read nonexistent provisions into the . . . Act.”); see also 

Kieckhafer, ¶ 16. 

C. Estoppel

¶ 39 Last, claimant contends that the City should have been 

estopped from asserting a statute of limitations defense because the 

notice of contest form it filed “informed [claimant] that the only 

requirement for his moving forward with his claim was to apply for 

hearing.” Claimant points to language on the form which advises 

claimants that they “may request an expedited hearing on the issue 

of compensability by filing an Application for Hearing and Notice to 

Set and a Request for Expedited Hearing with the Office of 

Administrative Courts.” We are not persuaded that this language 

estopped the City from raising the statute of limitations.
24

¶ 40 True, a party may be equitably estopped from asserting the 

statute of limitations. See Thurman v. Tafoya, 895 P.2d 1050, 1058

(Colo. 1995). But claimant had to establish several factors to 

successfully invoke the doctrine.

To invoke the doctrine of equitable estoppel, a 

party who relies to his detriment on an 

affirmative promise must show that the 

promisor may have reasonably expected to 

induce action or forbearance of a material 

character. Moreover, the claimant must show 

that reasonable reliance on these assertions 

discouraged the claimant from bringing suit 

within the applicable time period. A party, 

however, may not rely on the mere 

non-committal acts of another in order to 

establish equitable estoppel.

Id. at 1058 (citations omitted).

¶ 41 As both the City and the Panel point out, claimant has not 

established these elements. In particular, claimant has not shown

that (1) the City made any “affirmative promise” to him; (2) the City 

“reasonably expected” him to rely on its (undisclosed) promise; (3) 

he was discouraged from pursuing his claim because he relied on 

the City’s unidentified promises; or (4) he relied on that language 

when he delayed filing his claim. See id. The City’s notice of 

contest was filed on a Division-prepared form. The City did not 
25

draft any of the boilerplate language contained therein, including 

the instructions for requesting an expedited hearing. Because the 

City never expressly directed the boilerplate language to claimant, 

he cannot now claim it constituted a promise from the City to him 

or that the City had any expectation that he would rely on it to his 

detriment.

¶ 42 More importantly, claimant admits that he filed his claim for 

compensation late because “the filing of an Application for Hearing 

awaited the decisions of the Colorado Supreme Court concerning 

burdens of proof under [section] 8-41-209.” He thus implicitly 

concedes that his decision to file his application for hearing after 

the statute of limitations had expired was unrelated to the 

advisement addressing expedited hearings in the City’s notice of 

contest form, and he cannot now claim that language in the notice 

of contest induced him to delay filing his claim. In the absence of 

any detrimental reliance, claimant cannot establish equitable 

estoppel.

¶ 43 Accordingly, we reject this contention, as well.

IV. Conclusion

¶ 44 The order is affirmed.
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JUDGE J. JONES and JUSTICE MARTINEZ concur.