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### STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

UNPUBLISHED In re W. N. JOHNSON, Minor. March 5, 2015

No. 320222 Wayne Circuit Court Family Division LC No. 10-496636-NA

Before: G LEICHER , P.J., and S ERVITTO and R ONAYNE K RAUSE , JJ.

P ER C URIAM

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AFTER REMAND

On August 21, 2014, we vacated the circuit court’s terminationof respondent-mother’s parental rights after determin ing that respondent was denied he r right to counsel in the prior appeal brought by the child’s guardian ad litem (LGAL). In re Johnson , unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued August 21, 2014 (Docket No. 320222) ( Johnson II ). By order of October 27, 2014, we ret ained jurisdiction to consider the propriety of the circuit court’s ultimate resolution. In re Johnson , unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered October 27, 2014 (Docket No. 320222). With the assistance of appointed counsel, respondent has now fought the Department of Human Services (DHS’s) allegations tha t termination of her parental rights is in the best interests of her minor child, WNJ. The c ircuit court terminated respondent’s rights on December 1, 2 014, based on the lack of a parent-child bond and respondent’s continued failure to secure a legal source of income and suitable housing . We affirm.

I. RELEVANT PROCEEDINGS

Respondent has a long history with Child Protective Services ( CPS) and the DHS. In April 2007, the CPS substantiated a medical neglect claim raise d against respondent in connection with the death of her eldest child. Since that time , the agencies have provided services to respondent for extended periods. These included su bstance abuse treatment and counseling, domestic violence co unseling, individual counseling and anger management, educational services, housing and employment assistance, psycho logical and psychiatric evaluations, and parenting classes. Despite these services, re spondent lost custody of her second child to the child’s father, and the court terminated her right s to her third child while she was pregnant with WNJ.

CPS removed WNJ from respondent’s care when the child was four months old after discovering that the family house was unsafe and unsuitable for habitation. The DHS then-2- provided respondent with another round of services including pa renting classes and counseling. The circuit court declined to immediately terminate respondent’ s parental rights and gave her the opportunity to benefit from servi ces. This Court reversed that decision and ordered the termination of respondent’s rights, In re Johnson , unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued November 14, 2013 (Docket No. 316211) ( Johnson I ), but it was later discovered that respondent lacked counsel during the appellate process. As a result of this error, respondent lost visitation rights and the benefit of services f or 10 months. Supervised visitation was reinstated upon this Court’s opinion in Johnson II

. As ordered by this Court, the circuit court conducted a conti nued best-interest hearing on remand and accepted updated evidence to augment its decision-ma king process. The foster care worker testified that respondent’s supervised parenting time se ssions with WNJ were restarted in early October 2014. Respondent visited with WNJ for 1-1/2 hour s twice each week, missing only two visits while suffering from strep throat. The foster care worker and WNJ’s infant mental health therapist attended one visit each week and provid ed guidance to respondent.

The foster care worker, therapist, and foster mother testified that WNJ, who was 26 months old by the time of the c ontinued hearing, had exhibited speech and developmental delays since Johnson II issued. Doctors had diagnosed WNJ with “Kawaski disease,” whi ch the witnesses claimed caused WNJ to suffer extreme and unpredictabl e allergic reactions to environmental stimuli. With treatment, WNJ will eventually ove rcome this disease, but her diagnosis was too new for doctors to make even short-range pred ictions. Genetic testing had also revealed a chromosomal disorder. The evidence is unclear but WNJ may possess an extra X chromosome. Either condition or both could contribute to the v arious delays and health problems experienced by the child.

The witnesses testified that WNJ’s special needs required a hi gh level of attention. WNJ had recently begun preschool through a special education progra m in the Plymouth-Canton school district. She was scheduled to begin a series of medica l tests to ascertain the effect of Kawaski disease and the chromosomal defect on her body. WNJ al so demands a lot of attention and requires constant supervision.

Witnesses further described that respondent had completed seve ral services between April and November 2013. She had submitted to a psychiatric ev aluation, began taking psychotropic medication, and appeared to be doing well. Respon dent had completed parenting classes, domestic violence and substance abuse counseling, and had tested clean at various random drug screenings. However, the infant mental health ther apist testified that respondent did not show an improvement in pa renting skills before the Nove mber 2013 termination and never progressed to unsupervised parenting time. While respond ent accepted some guidance regarding activities during her parenting time sessions, she wa s resistant to any suggested changes in her parenting style or techniques.

A persistent problem throughout the proceedings had also been respondent’s failure to secure stable housing and a legal source of income. By the tim e of the continued hearing, respondent reported that she was cleaning houses and doing hair without a license, both for cash under the table. Respondent also asserted that she was working part-time in a factory through a-3- temp agency. She claimed that she attempted to secure proof of employment, but the temp agency would not provide it.

Ultimately, the court found termination of respondent’s parent al rights to be in WNJ’s best interests. The court acknow ledged that respondent loved h er child very much. However, the court continued, “We have a child with special needs who is given a lot of one-on-one attention and mother is having a difficult time getting to her own needs at this point in time.” Specifically, despite having nearly a year without the rigors o f parenting and therapeutic services and the need to find time for visitation, respondent still had been unable to secure housing and income. While respondent showed a commitment to attending her parenting time sessions following this Court’s remand, “that’s just not enough,” the co urt opined. Respondent had to “benefit from the services” for continued reunification efforts to be in the child’s best interests. Given respondent’s history, the court determined that she was “ not in a position . . . to parent the child independent of intensive se rvices, and those services hav e been ongoing for years.” Although a 10-month “hiatus” had been caused by court errors, t here was no reason to believe that respondent’s return to services would be any more successf ul than prior attempts.

II. BEST INTEREST ANALYSIS

The circuit court previously found termination supportable und er MCL 712A.19b(3)( l ) based on “[r]espondent’s admission that she failed to comply wi th a parent-agency agreement for reunification with another child, and that her parental rights to [another child] were terminated in May 2012, together with the court records from that proceeding. ” Johnson I, unpub op at 1. Respondent has never challenged t hat conclusion. On remand, an d as ordered by this Court, the circuit court focused solely on the best interests of the child to determine whether termination of respondent’s parental rig hts was required.

“[W]hether termination of parental rights is in the best inter ests of the child must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence.” In re Moss , 301 Mich App 76, 90; 836 NW2d 182 (2013). The trial court should we igh all the evidence availabl e to it in determining the child’s best interests. In re Trejo , 462 Mich 341, 356-357; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). Relevant factors in this consideration include “the child’s bond to the parent, the parent’s parenting ability, the child’s need for permanency, stability, and finality, and the a dvantages of a foster home over the parent’s home.” In re Olive/Metts , 297 Mich App 35, 41-42; 823 NW2d 144 (2012) (citations omitted).

The evidence presented by the DHS supports that although respo ndent loves her child, she and WNJ do not share a bond. Through no fault of her own, respondent was unable to visit her child for a 10-month period. During that time, young WNJ f orgot her mother. As a result, WNJ looks to the familiar adults supervising the visits, rather than her mother, for comfort and instruction. As attested to by the witnesses, the bond did not seem to improve over the course of the visits since early October 2014.

The DHS also established that despite respondent’s efforts, sh e had not improved her parenting skills to the point she could adequately care for a t oddler with special needs. The witnesses noted that respondent had completed several services before Johnson I demanded termination in November 2013. Although she had shown some prog ress during that six-month-4- period of services, the witnesse s opined that respondent had no t benefited to the point where she could have started unsupervise d visits, let alone take custody of her child. Moreover, the AprilNovember 2013 round of services was cumulative to similar servi ces that respondent had repeatedly participated in since April 2007. As respondent had not adequately benefited from the services provided over a seven-year period, the court did n ot err in determining that it was against WNJ’s interests to require her to wait and see if respo ndent could improve if given even more time.

Moreover, WNJ has been in foste r care since she was four month s old. She is now nearly 2-1/2 years old. She needs permanency and stability. Yet, res pondent still cannot provide for the child. Even with prior employment and housing assistance, respondent has floated between the homes of friends and relatives, unable to secure a suitable residence for the child. Although respondent claims she has obtained employment, she could produc e no proof for the foster care worker. As noted by the circuit court, respondent’s inability to stabilize her own life is evidence of a conclusion reached in an earlier psychological evaluation: that respondent displays “weakness in identifying critical issues and providing adequate solutions.”

Ultimately, respondent faced an uphill battle in challenging t he DHS’s evidence that termination was in the child’s best interests after a 10-month gap in services and visitation. The circuit court based its termina tion decision not only on the up -to-date information at the November 2014 best-interest hearing, but also on respondent’s p erformance in services between April and November 2013. A pre ponderance of the evidence esta blished that respondent could not adequately provide for WNJ’s special needs within a reasona ble time and that termination of respondent’s parental rights was in the child’s best interests. Accordingly, we discern no error in the December 2014 termination decision.

We affirm.

/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher /s/ Deborah A. Servitto /s/ Amy Ronayne Krause