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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Leslie A. Merritt, Jr.,

Plaintiff,

v. 

State of Arizona, et al.,

Defendants.

No. CV-17-04540-PHX-DGC

ORDER 

The Court has ruled that Plaintiff’s damages on his state law false arrest and 

imprisonment claims are limited to the six-day period between his arrest and the 

indictment. Doc. 278 at 34-35. Plaintiff has filed a motion challenging this ruling, which 

is in effect a motion for reconsideration although Plaintiff does not style it so. Doc. 342. 

Defendant State of Arizona has filed a response. Doc. 366. For reasons stated below, the 

Court will deny the motion.

I. Legal Standard.

Motions for reconsideration are disfavored and rarely granted. See Northwest 

Acceptance Corp. v. Lynnwood Equip., Inc., 841 F.2d 918, 925-26 (9th Cir. 1988); 

Resolution Tr. Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 873 F. Supp. 1386, 1393 (D. Ariz. 1994). 

A motion for reconsideration will be denied absent a showing of manifest error or a 

showing of new facts or legal authority that could not have been brought to the Court’s

attention earlier with reasonable diligence. LRCiv 7.2(g)(1); see United Nat’l Ins. Co. v. 

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Spectrum Worldwide, Inc., 555 F.3d 772, 780 (9th Cir. 2009). The motion may not repeat 

previously made arguments. LRCiv. 7.2(g)(1); see Motorola, Inc. v. J.B. Rodgers Mech. 

Contractors, 215 F.R.D. 581, 582 (D. Ariz. 2003) (reconsideration cannot “be used to ask 

the Court to rethink what it has already thought”). Mere disagreement with an order is an 

insufficient basis for reconsideration. Ross v. Arpaio, No. CV 05-4177-PHX-MHM, 2008 

WL 1776502, at *2 (D. Ariz. 2008).

II. Discussion.

Plaintiff makes several arguments in support of his request for reconsideration. 

Doc. 342. None has merit.

A. An Indictment’s Effect on a False Arrest Claim.

Plaintiff contends that the Court never addressed in its summary judgment order 

how the indictment applies to his state law false arrest claim. Doc. 342 at 1. Plaintiff is 

mistaken.

Defendants argued that the grand jury’s probable cause finding defeats all of 

Plaintiff’s claims, including his false arrest claims. Doc. 264 at 11. The Court disagreed

because “[p]robable cause to arrest Plaintiff was required six days before the grand jury 

indictment – when Defendants arrested Plaintiff without a warrant.” Doc. 278 at 6 (citing 

Reams v. City of Tucson, 701 P.2d 598, 601 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985) (probable cause for an 

arrest must be evaluated by “the facts as they existed at the time of the arrest, and not 

afterward”)). The Court made clear, however, that absent a showing that the indictment 

was procured fraudulently, “a post-arrest indictment ‘cuts off the length of detention, and 

thus damages, stemming from a false arrest[.]’” Id. (quoting Jones v Cannon, 174 F.3d 

1271, 1286 n.8 (11th Cir. 1999)).

1

1 See also Martin v. Marinez, 934 F.3d 594, 602 (7th Cir. 2019) (noting that “false 

arrest does not permit damages incurred after an indictment”); Caraffa v. Tempe (AZ) 

Police Dep’t, No. CV-19-05492-PHX-MTL (ESW) 2019 WL 6841743, at *2 (D. Ariz. 

Dec. 16, 2019) (“Reflective of the fact that false imprisonment consists of detention 

without legal process, a false imprisonment ends once the victim becomes held pursuant 

to such process[.]”) (citation omitted; emphasis in original); Pierre v. City of Rochester, 

No. 16-CV-6428 CJS, 2018 WL 10072453, at *11 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2018) (“[A] claim 

for false arrest only pertains to the period between arrest and arraignment or indictment, 

whichever occurs first.”); Mohajerin v. Pinal Cty., No. CV-07-1746-PHX-DGC, 2007 WL 

4358254, at *4 (D. Ariz. Dec. 7, 2007) (“The operative word in this context is ‘false,’ not 

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Because Plaintiff’s evidence failed to raise a genuine issue of fact on whether the 

indictment was procured by fraud or bad faith, the Court held that “damages on the arrestrelated claims . . . will be limited to the period between Plaintiff’s arrest on September 18, 

2015, and his indictment on September 24, 2015.” Doc. 278 at 34-35. The Court 

accordingly granted “summary judgment on the state law false arrest and imprisonment 

claims (Counts 5 and 6) with respect to any pre-indictment damages[.]” Id. at 42. Contrary 

to Plaintiff’s assertion, the Court addressed in its summary judgment order how the 

indictment applies to the state law false arrest claim. See id.; see also Doc. 382 at 11 (“The 

parties should seek to agree on a stipulation that can be read to the jury to explain that 

Plaintiff’s false arrest claim extends only from the date of his arrest to September 24, 2015 

(the date of his indictment), and should present it to the Court before the final pretrial 

conference.”).

B. The Presumption of Probable Cause from an Indictment.

Plaintiff further contends that Arizona law does not recognize a presumption of 

probable cause from an indictment. Doc. 342 at 2 (citing Reams, 701 P.2d at 601). Based 

on the Restatement of Torts (Second) § 644(2), decisions from other jurisdictions, and 

Arizona’s grand jury statute (A.R.S. § 21-413), the Court concluded in its previous order 

“that the Arizona Supreme Court would hold that an indictment creates a presumption of 

probable cause[.]” Doc. 278 at 18. Plaintiff provides no basis to reconsider this ruling.

C. Liability and the Chain of Causation for False Arrest. 

Plaintiff asserts that to avoid liability for false arrest, “a defendant must break the 

chain of causation by showing that the legal process (or some other event) was not only an 

intervening cause but also a ‘superseding cause.’” Doc. 342 at 3. But the indictment in 

this case does not render Defendant immune from liability on the false arrest claim. The 

Court has made clear that “[w]hile a post-arrest indictment ‘cuts off the length of detention, 

‘imprisonment’ – a false imprisonment claim ends when the detention is validated by legal 

process, not when the imprisonment itself ends.”); Gurley v. Nat’l Wholesale Liquidator 

Warehouse, No. CIV.05-5405 (KSH), 2007 WL 2509672, at *4 n.4 (D.N.J. Aug. 30, 2007) 

(“[D]amages for a false arrest claim cover the time of detention up until issuance of process, 

i.e., indictment, arraignment or a preliminary hearing, but not more.”). 

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and thus damages, stemming from a false arrest, the indictment does not absolve 

[Defendant] from liability for an initial arrest made without probable cause.’” Doc. 278 

at 6 (quoting Jones, 174 F.3d at 1286 n.8).

Plaintiff’s reliance on Reams is misplaced. Doc. 342 at 2. The court of appeals held 

in Reams that the indictment was not relevant to whether the police had probable cause to 

arrest the plaintiff because “[a]fter-the-fact judicial participation cannot validate an 

unlawful arrest.” 701 P.2d at 602. As noted, the Court did not conclude that the indictment 

validated Plaintiff’s arrest. Rather, the Court held that damages stemming from the arrest 

are limited to the period between the arrest and the indictment, absent evidence of fraud in 

the indictment’s procurement. Doc. 278 at 6, 18. Reams did not address whether a 

subsequent indictment cuts off damages from a false arrest.2

D. Fourth Amendment False Arrest Claims.

Plaintiff claims that the Fourth Amendment permits post-indictment damages where 

the ongoing detention was based on fabricated or false evidence. Doc. 342 at 4 (citing 

Manuel v. City of Joliet, Ill., 137 S. Ct. 911, 914 (2017)). But the remaining false arrest 

claim is brought “pursuant to Arizona common law,” not under the Fourth Amendment. 

Doc. 8 ¶ 135 (Count 5). The Court granted summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Fourth 

Amendment false arrest claim on qualified immunity grounds. Doc. 278 at 35-37; see 

Doc. 8 ¶¶ 106-12 (Count 6). Plaintiff cites no authority for the proposition that his state 

law false arrest claim “continues under the Fourth Amendment[.]” Doc. 342 at 5.3

The Supreme Court explained in Manuel that pretrial detention can be unlawful

“when legal process itself goes wrong – when, for example, a judge’s probable-cause 

2 Cf. Evans v. Chalmers, 703 F.3d 636, 647 (4th Cir. 2012) (explaining that 

“subsequent acts of independent decision-makers (e.g., prosecutors, grand juries, and 

judges) may constitute intervening superseding causes that break the causal chain between 

a defendant-officer’s misconduct and a plaintiff’s unlawful seizure”); Barts v. Joyner, 865 

F.2d 1187, 1195 (11th Cir. 1989) (“The intervening acts of the . . . grand jury . . . break the 

chain of causation unless plaintiff can show that these intervening acts were the result of 

deception or undue pressure by the defendant policemen.”).

3

 Plaintiff’s citation to State v. Hernandez, 417 P.3d 207 (Ariz. 2018), is inapposite 

because the case involved a motion to suppress, not the common law tort of false arrest.

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determination is predicated solely on a police officer’s false statements.” 137 S. Ct. at 918. 

Plaintiff asserts that Detective Baroldy misled the grand jury about the bullet having lodged 

in the BMW’s tire before Plaintiff’s gun was in the pawn shop. Doc. 342 at 6; see Doc. 270 

at 14. But “the grand jury was clearly told when and where the [BMW’s] tire deflated and 

that Plaintiff’s gun was in the pawn shop more than three hours earlier.” Doc. 278 at 26. 

No jury reasonably could “find that Defendants deliberately lied to the grand jury, 

particularly when they had ballistics evidence – which had not been challenged at the time 

of the grand jury proceeding – that Plaintiff’s gun had fired the bullet that hit the BMW.” 

Id. at 27. Plaintiff has failed to meet his high burden of showing that “the grand jury’s 

indictment was induced through fraud, malice, or bad faith.” Id. And it is well established 

that “[t]he validity of an indictment is ‘not subject to challenge on the ground that the grand 

jury acted on the basis of inadequate or incompetent evidence.’” Id. at 28 (quoting United 

States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 344 (1974)); see United States v. Jensen, 93 F.3d 667, 

669 (9th Cir. 1996) (a defendant “may not properly challenge an indictment, sufficient on 

its face, on the ground that the allegations are not supported by adequate evidence”).

III. Timeliness of Plaintiff’s Motion.

Absent good cause, a motion for reconsideration must be filed no later than 14 days 

after the filing of the order that is the subject of the motion. LRCiv 7.2(g)(2). Plaintiff 

filed the present motion more than three months after the Court issued its summary 

judgment order, and Plaintiff presents no good cause for the delay. The motion also will 

be denied as untimely. See Sullivan v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, No. CV-16-02608-PHXDJH, 2017 WL 6029577, at *1 (D. Ariz. Feb. 10, 2017) (denying the plaintiffs’ motion for 

reconsideration as untimely under LRCiv 7.2(g)(2) where they did not establish the 

requisite good cause).

IV. Conclusion.

Plaintiff has not shown that the Court manifestly erred in limiting his damages on 

the state law false arrest and imprisonment claims to the period between his arrest and the

indictment. Nor has Plaintiff identified new facts or legal authority that could not have 

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been brought to Court’s attention earlier with reasonable diligence. His motion is also 

untimely. 

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for post-indictment damages (Doc. 342) 

is denied.

Dated this 17th day of September, 2020.

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