UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-2065

BRIAN BAKER,

Plaintiff – Appellant,

v.

CITY OF CHESAPEAKE,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Raymond A. Jackson, District 

Judge. (2:14-cv-00318-RAJ-DEM)

Submitted: March 17, 2016 Decided: April 8, 2016

Before KING, FLOYD, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Margaret Mary Looby, Chesapeake, Virginia; Shannon Beth Bayona, 

TAYLOR BAYONA LAW GROUP, PC, Chesapeake, Virginia, for 

Appellants. Ryan C. Samuel, Dana E. Sanford, OFFICE OF THE CITY 

ATTORNEY, Chesapeake, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Brian Baker appeals the grant of summary judgment in favor 

of the City of Chesapeake, Virginia (“the City”). Baker 

alleged, among other things, that the City discriminated against 

him and failed to accommodate his disability, in violation of 

the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 to 12213 

(2012) (“ADA”), discriminated against him on account of his 

Caucasian race, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights 

Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2012) (“Title VII”), and 

wrongfully retaliated against him, in violation of the ADA and 

Title VII. On appeal, Baker argues that the district court 

erred in granting summary judgment because genuine issues of 

material fact remain as to whether the City (1) discriminated 

against him due to his disability, (2) retaliated against him 

for reporting disparate treatment, and (3) failed to accommodate 

his disability.1 We affirm.

We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, drawing 

all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. 

Butler v. Drive Auto. Indus. of Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 404, 407 

(4th Cir. 2015). Summary judgment is only appropriate when 

“there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 

 1 As the City observed in its brief, Baker does not pursue 

his Title VII claim of race discrimination on appeal.
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movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(a). In opposing summary judgment, “the nonmoving 

party must rely on more than conclusory allegations, mere 

speculation, the building of one inference upon another, or the 

mere existence of a scintilla of evidence.” Dash v. Mayweather, 

731 F.3d 303, 311 (4th Cir. 2013).

First, a plaintiff has two means of showing disability 

discrimination under the ADA: (1) “through direct and indirect 

evidence,” or (2) “through the McDonnell Douglas [2] 

burden-shifting framework.” Jacobs v. N.C. Admin. Office of the 

CT’s., 780 F.3d 562, 572 (4th Cir. 2015). We have long observed 

a strict distinction between claims proceeding with direct 

evidence of discrimination and those proceeding under the 

McDonnell Douglas framework. See Hill v. Lockheed Martin 

Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 284-85 (4th Cir. 2004) (end

banc), abrogated on other grounds by Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. 

Ctr. v. Nasser, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2533 (2013). 

Yet before the district court, Baker proceeded only under 

the McDonnell Douglas framework in seeking to prove 

discrimination. Consequently, in the absence of exceptional or 

extraordinary circumstances that would justify reviewing the 

 2 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 

(1973).
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issue on the merits, Baker has waived his right to contend on 

appeal that his direct evidence of discrimination precluded 

summary judgment. See Holland v. Big River Minerals Corp., 181 

F.3d 597, 605 (4th Cir. 1999) (“Generally issues that were not 

raised in the district court will not be addressed on appeal.”); 

see also Foster v. Univ. of Maryland-Eastern Shore, 787 F.3d 

243, 250 n.8 (2015) (holding that discussion of direct-evidence 

discrimination claim limited to footnote in opening brief was 

insufficient to warrant appellate review).

To make a prima facie showing of disability discrimination

under McDonnell v. Douglas, a plaintiff must demonstrate that 

(1) he has a disability, (2) he is qualified for his former 

position, and (3) the employer discharged him because of his 

disability. Jacobs, 780 F.3d at 572. 

After reviewing the record, we concur with the district 

court’s assessment of Baker’s case: he presented insufficient 

evidence causally linking his discharge with his disability. 

While Baker disputes the City’s proffered rationale for his 

termination, he points to no evidence causally connecting his 

disability to his dismissal; therefore, this claim fails.

Next, Baker asserts that the district court erred in 

granting summary judgment on his retaliation claim. To make out 

a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must show that 

(1) he engaged in “protected activity,” (2) the employer “took 
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adverse action” against him, and (3) “that a causal relationship 

existed between the protected activity and the adverse 

employment activity.” Foster, 787 F.3d at 250 (internal 

quotation marks omitted).

On appeal, Baker argues that the City “took adverse action”

against him by terminating his employment, which he deems the 

final event in a causal chain linking back to a complaint of 

disparate treatment. But before the district court, Baker cited 

only a letter of reprimand as the City’s “adverse action” 

supporting his claim of retaliation. His “causal chain” theory 

is completely absent from the district court record; therefore,

we hold that Baker has waived the right to present this claim on 

appeal. See Holland, 181 F.3d at 605.

Finally, to establish a claim under the ADA for a failure 

to accommodate, a plaintiff must show that (1) he suffered a 

disability; (2) his employer knew of the disability; (3) with 

reasonable accommodations, he was otherwise qualified to perform 

the essential functions of the job; and (4) his employer refused 

to make such reasonable accommodations. Wilson v. Dollar Gen. 

Corp., 717 F.3d 337, 345 (4th Cir. 2013).

Our review of the record reflects that the City never 

refused a request for accommodation. As the district court 

properly concluded, without evidence of such a refusal, we
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cannot say that the City failed to accommodate Baker’s

disability.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of 

summary judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the 

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 

materials before this court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

AFFIRMED