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NON -PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

PENNSYLVANIA 

v. 

MANFRED PHILLIP MAROTTA, No. 3407 EDA 2015 

Appellant 

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence, October 8, 2015, 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County 

Criminal Division at No. CP- 09 -CR- 0001335 -2015 

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., OTT AND FITZGERALD,* JJ. 

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED NOVEMBER 08, 2016 

Manfred Phillip Marotta appeals from the October 8, 2015 aggregate 

judgment of sentence of 4 to 23 months' imprisonment, followed by a 

consecutive term of 2 years' probation, after he was found guilty of two 

counts of indecent assault -- without the complainant's consent.' After careful 

review, we affirm. 

The trial court summarized the relevant facts and procedural history of 

this case as follows: 

The charges against [a]ppellant stemmed from 

his conduct towards two alleged victims; E.S., his 

niece, and H.M., a former manager at one of the 

Dunkin Donuts shops owned by [a]ppellant. At trial, 

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. 

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3126(a)(1). 
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both E.S. and H.M. testified as to [a]ppellant's 

conduct towards them. 

E.S. testified that [a]ppellant started giving 

backrubs and massages to her when she was 18 or 

19 years old, and that this eventually progressed 

into more intimate contact. (Notes of testimony, 

6/29/15 at 27 -28.) E.S. lived with [a]ppellant, and 

relied on him for income and stability, as she also 

worked at one of his Dunkin Donuts shops. (Id. at 

20 -21, 29 -35.) At the bench trial, E.S. testified: 

I would come down after work and I 

would be stressed out, and he would 

want to calm me down or find an answer 

to help me relax or de- stress, and he 

would say, come over here, you look 

stressed out, you need to relax. And 

then he would rub my back, and then 

progressively it got to [sic] pull my pants 

down and he would rub my butt. And 

then sometimes he would like spread my 

legs apart and rub in between my thighs, 

and a few of the times he had put his 

fingers in my vagina and touched around 

my vagina and inside of it. 

(Id. at 28.) E.S. also stated that she never wanted 

her uncle to touch her in a sexual manner, and that 

she was intimidated by his physical size. (Id. at 29, 

32.) Further, E.S. stated that [a]ppellant touched 

her vagina about ten times and put his fingers inside 

of her between five and six times. (Id. at 34.) 

E.S. decided to come forward about [a]ppellant 

touching her when she heard that he may have 

touched another worker at Dunkin Donuts, H.M., and 

felt that her coming forward could help prevent 

anyone else from being victimized in the future. (Id. 

at 36 -37.) E.S. testified that she never felt like her 

uncle's touching of her was okay or right. (Id. at 

44 -45.) Further, E.S. stated that she never wanted 

her uncle to touch her in a sexual way and there 

were times where she felt like she couldn't just get 

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up and walk away, largely due to the potential 

consequences of her doing so, i.e. not having a place 

to live, not having a job, not having support, and 

losing her family. (Id. at 119 -120.) 

H.M. also testified at trial on June 29, 2015. 

H .M. was a manager at Dunkin Donuts after E.S. 

held this position. (Id. at 132.) As manager of one 

of [a]ppellant's Dunkin Donuts, H.M. had to drop 

money off at [a]ppellant's house at the end of every 

shift, and she was not comfortable with this 

arrangement. (Id. at 139.) H.M. testified that there 

were two incidents where [a]ppellant touched her. 

(Id. at 140 -141.) In regard to the first incident, 

H .M. testified: 

Well, the one night I went to his house 

for training and I was sitting next to him 

in front of the computer, and I felt really 

uncomfortable because it was just me 

and him at the house, first of all, so I felt 

like that was uncomfortable and 

unnecessary. And then I was sitting 

training with him, and he was rubbing 

the inside of my leg while I was sitting 

next to him training. 

(Id. at 141.) H.M. clarified that [a]ppellant was 

rubbing "the inside [of her legs] towards like where 

[her] vagina is." (Id.) 

In regard to the second incident, H.M. testified 

that she went to [a]ppellant's house "to drop off the 

money after [her] shift at work, and [she] put it on 

the table, and then [[a]ppellant] looked at [her] and 

told [her] that [she] looked stressed out ... [and] 

then he pointed - he brought [her] over to his 

bedroom and pointed to his bed and said, lay (sic) 

down." (Id. at 145.) H.M. stated that she "didn't 

feel like [she] had a choice [but to listen to 

[a]ppellant] because [she was] much smaller than 

him and much weaker, so [she] was intimidated, and 

[she] did it." (Id.) H.M. went on to explain that 

after [a]ppellant told her to lay (sic) face down on 

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the bed, he asked to take her shirt off, asked to take 

her bra off, started massaging her, and eventually 

pulled her pants down and started massaging the 

skin of her butt under her underwear. (Id. at 146- 

149.) Appellant was breathing deeply in a sexual 

manner the entire time, and H.M. stated that she 

was "very intimidated" and "very scared." (Id. at 

148, 165, 176.) H.M. elaborated that: 

[She] felt like if [she] would have gotten 

up and ran out of the house, something 

might have happened to [her]. [She] 

didn't feel safe. It was only [her] and 

[[a]ppellant] in the house, and [she] was 

under pressure. [She] didn't know how 

to act, [she] was only 19 years old ... [.] 

(Id. at 147.) It was also noted by H.M.: 

I didn't want any of that to ever happen 

to me. I wouldn't have ever asked for 

that, and I would never want some man, 

who is that much older and who's my 

boss to want to be treating me like that. 

I would never want that. 

(Id. at 183.) 

The second day of trial was on June 30, 2015, 

and [a]ppellant's counsel, Mr. Geday, started off the 

proceedings by raising a corpus delicti issue in 

regard to evidence that he anticipated would be 

introduced by the Commonwealth. (Notes of 

testimony, 6/30/15 at 4 -5.) Appellant's counsel 

argued that the evidence presented so far in the trial 

was insufficient to establish that the crimes charged 

had occurred, and therefore that no subsequent 

statements by [a]ppellant should be admissible and 

considered. (Id.) In response, the [trial c]ourt 

found that based on the record there was sufficient 

evidence to warrant testimony involving any 

statements that [a]ppellant may have made. (Id. at 

7.) 

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On the second day of trial there was testimony 

from Detectives David Kemmerer and Robert McLeod 

regarding statements made by [a]ppellant. (See id. 

at 2.) Detective McLeod read into the record an 

apology letter written by [a]ppellant to E.S., in which 

[a]ppellant stated that he admitted to touching her. 

(Id. at 50.) Further, Detective Kemmerer testified 

as to his interviews with [a]ppellant, during which 

[a]ppellant admitted to touching E.S.'s vagina and 

stated that he was sexually attracted to her. (Id. at 

78 -79.) 

At the close of trial, before beginning 

argument, the [trial c]ourt, after hearing all of the 

evidence, asked if the Commonwealth was still 

alleging the same time frames as stated on the 

criminal information with respect to the charges 

brought in regard to H.M. (Id. at 188.) The 

Commonwealth initially alleged a timeframe between 

January and the end of March of 2013. In response 

to the [trial c]ourt's inquiry, and based on H.M.'s 

testimony, the Commonwealth requested to be 

granted leave to amend the timeframe on the 

criminal information to include April of 2013. (Id.) 

Appellant's counsel objected to this, saying that it 

was too late for the Commonwealth to make 

modifications to the criminal information after 

evidence had closed, and that allowing amendment 

amounted to an impermissible retroactive change to 

the charges. (Id. at 188 -189.) The Commonwealth 

countered that criminal informations are typically 

broadly construed, that the change did not impact an 

element of the offense, and that the Commonwealth 

was not seeking to substantively change any of the 

crimes being charged. (Id.) The [trial c]ourt 

ultimately stated that amendment of criminal 

informations is generally allowed as long as there is 

no inherent unfairness to the defendant and that 

under the circumstances the Commonwealth would 

be allowed to amend the criminal information to 

include April of 2013 as a potential time period with 

respect to the counts regarding H.M. (Id. at 190- 

191.) 

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Trial court opinion, 12/24/15, at 2 -5 (citation formatting corrected; 

footnotes omitted). 

Appellant was charged with multiple counts of aggravated indecent 

assault and indecent assault in connection with these incidents.2 On 

June 29, 2015, appellant waived his right to a jury and proceeded to a bench 

trial. Following a two -day trial, appellant was found guilty of two counts of 

indecent assault -- without the complainant's consent on June 30, 2015. 

Appellant was found not guilty of the remaining charges. As noted, 

appellant was sentenced to an aggregate term of 4 to 23 months' 

imprisonment, followed by a consecutive 2 years' probation, on October 8, 

2015. At sentencing, the trial court directed that appellant: 

[(1)] have no contact with the victims or their 

families[;] ... [(2)] obtain an independent 

psychological evaluation geared toward looking into 

predatory sexual behavior and ... abide by all the 

treatment conditions following that 

recommendation[; and (3)] have no contact with 

anyone under 22 years of age which is unsupervised 

and where you will be alone with that person. 

Notes of testimony, 10/8/15 at 74 -75. 

2 Specifically, appellant was charged with one count each of 18 Pa.C.S.A. 

§§ 3125(a)(1) (aggravated indecent assault -- without the complainant's 

consent), 3125(a)(2) (aggravated indecent assault -- forcible compulsion), 

3125(a)(3) (aggravated indecent assault -- threat of forcible compulsion), and 

two counts each of 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3126(a)(1) (indecent assault -- without 

the complainant's consent), 3126(a)(2) (indecent assault -- forcible 

compulsion), and 3126(a)(3) (indecent assault -- threat of forcible 

compulsion). 

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Appellant did not file any post- sentence motions. On November 9, 

2015, appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. On November 16, 2015, the 

trial court ordered appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained 

of on appeal pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(b). 

Appellant filed his Rule 1925(b) statement on December 7, 2015, and the 

trial court issued its Rule 1925(a) opinion on December 24, 2015. 

Appellant raises the following issues for our review: 

I. Whether the Honorable Trial Court erred by 

finding [a]ppellant guilty of Indecent Assault 

when the Commonwealth failed to Prove 

Beyond a Reasonable Doubt all Requisite 

Elements of Indecent Assault as Defined in 

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3126(a)(1), specifically that 

[a]ppellant ever had indecent contact with the 

complaining witness or that such contact was 

without consent? 

II. Whether the Honorable Trial Court erred by 

admitting into evidence and considering 

[a]ppellant's statements prior to the 

Commonwealth establishing the corpus 

delicti of a crime, or the fact that a crime 

occurred at all? 

III. Whether the Honorable Trial Court erred by 

permitting the Commonwealth to amend the 

Bills of Information after the trial concluded to 

conform to the evidence that was presented 

during trial, i.e., to extend the permissible date 

range by a month, especially because 

[a]ppellant was never on notice of the new 

date range prior to trial? 

IV. Whether the Honorable Trial Court erred by 

imposing a condition of sentence upon 

[a]ppellant that he have no unsupervised 

contact with anyone under the age of 22? 

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Appellant's brief at 4 (numeration corrected). 

Appellant first argues that there was insufficient evidence to sustain 

his conviction for two counts of indecent assault because the Commonwealth 

failed to prove that he "had indecent contact with the complaining witnesses 

without their consent." (Id. at 13, 15 -19.) This claim is meritless. 

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, 

we must determine whether the evidence admitted 

at trial and all reasonable inferences drawn 

therefrom, viewed in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth as verdict winner, is sufficient to 

prove every element of the offense beyond a 

reasonable doubt. As an appellate court, we may 

not re -weigh the evidence and substitute our 

judgment for that of the fact -finder. Any question of 

doubt is for the fact -finder unless the evidence is so 

weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no 

probability of fact can be drawn from the combined 

circumstances. 

Commonwealth v. Thomas, 988 A.2d 669, 670 (Pa.Super. 2009), appeal 

denied, 4 A.3d 1054 (Pa. 2010) (citations omitted). 

A person will be found guilty of indecent assault: 

if the person has indecent contact with the 

complainant, causes the complainant to have 

indecent contact with the person or intentionally 

causes the complainant to come into contact with 

seminal fluid, urine or feces for the purpose of 

arousing sexual desire in the person or the 

complainant and ... the person does so without the 

complainant's consent[.] 

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18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3126(a)(1). The phrase "indecent contact" is defined as "any 

touching of the sexual or other intimate parts of the person for the purpose 

of arousing or gratifying sexual desire, in either person." Id. § 3101. 

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth, the verdict winner, we find that there was ample evidence 

for the trial court, as fact -finder, to conclude that appellant was guilty of 

indecent assault -- without the complainant's consent. At trial, E.S. testified 

that appellant touched her vagina on approximately ten occasions, and "put 

his fingers inside of [her]" between five or six times. (Notes of testimony, 

6/29/15 at 34.) E.S. indicated that she did not want appellant to touch her 

in this sexual manner and did not feel it was "okay." (Id. at 29, 44 -45.) 

H.M., in turn, testified that appellant had rubbed or massaged the inside of 

her legs, back, and buttocks on multiple occasions. (Id. at 140 -141, 148- 

149.) H.M. further testified that she did not want appellant to engage in 

such "inappropriate" conduct, noting that "I would never want some man, 

who is that much older and who's my boss to want to be treating me like 

that[.]" (Id. at 183.) Moreover, both E.S. and H.M. testified that they were 

intimidated by appellant because he was larger in size and held a position of 

authority over them. (Id. at 30 -32, 176, 183 -184.) 

Additionally, the Commonwealth introduced the testimony of 

Detectives David Kemmerer and Robert McLeod regarding various 

inculpatory statements appellant made following his arrest. Specifically, 

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Detective McLeod read into the record an apology letter written by appellant 

to E.S., wherein he stated that he touched E.S. (Notes of testimony, 

6/30/15 at 50.) Detective Kemmerer, in turn, testified that during his 

interview of appellant, appellant acknowledged touching E.S.'s vagina and 

stated that he was sexually attracted to her. (Id. at 78 -79.) 

It is well established that the testimony of a complainant, even 

standing alone, is sufficient to convict in sex offense prosecutions. See 

Commonwealth v. Castelhun, 889 A.2d 1228, 1232 (Pa.Super. 2005). 

Based on the totality of evidence presented in the case sub judice, we 

conclude that appellant's claim that there was insufficient evidence to 

sustain his convictions for indecent assault must fail. 

Appellant next argues that the trial court erred in admitting his 

inculpatory statements because the Commonwealth failed to establish "the 

corpus delicti of a crime, or the fact that a crime occurred at all." 

(Appellant's brief at 20.) We disagree. 

Our standard of review for a challenge to the corpus delicti rule is 

well settled. 

The corpus delicti rule is a rule of evidence. 

Our standard of review on appeals challenging an 

evidentiary ruling of the trial court is limited to a 

determination of whether the trial court abused its 

discretion. The corpus delicti rule places the 

burden on the prosecution to establish that a crime 

has actually occurred before a confession or 

admission of the accused connecting him to the 

crime can be admitted. The corpus delicti is 

literally the body of the crime; it consists of proof 

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that a loss or injury has occurred as a result of the 

criminal conduct of someone. 

Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 39 A.3d 406, 410 -411 (Pa.Super. 2012), 

appeal denied, 63 A.3d 1244 (Pa. 2013) (citation, internal quotation 

marks, and emphasis omitted). 

Courts in this Commonwealth have recognized that Pennsylvania law 

requires courts to apply the corpus delicti rule in two distinct phases: 

In the first phase, the court determines whether the 

Commonwealth has proven the corpus delicti of the 

crimes charged by a preponderance of the evidence. 

If so, the confession of the defendant is admissible. 

In the second phase, the rule requires that the 

Commonwealth prove the corpus delicti to the 

factfinder's satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt 

before the factfinder is permitted to consider the 

confession in assessing the defendant's innocence or 

guilt. 

Commonwealth v. Otterson, 947 A.2d 1239, 1249 (Pa.Super. 2008), 

appeal denied, 958 A.2d 1047 (Pa. 2008), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1238 

(2009), quoting Commonwealth v. Reyes, 870 A.2d 888, 894 n.4 (Pa. 

2005). 

Instantly, we discern no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial 

court in rejecting appellant's corpus delicti claim. The record establishes 

that the corpus delicti of the indecent assaults was sufficiently proven by 

the Commonwealth prior to the admittance of appellant's inculpatory 

statements. As discussed, the Commonwealth sought to introduce the 

inculpatory statements at issue, over appellant's objection, on June 30, 
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2015, the second day of trial. Prior to this time period, the trial court had 

already heard extensive testimony from both E.S. and H.M. on the first day 

of trial that was consistent with the indecent assaults having occurred. 

Accordingly, we conclude that the corpus delicti of the indecent 

assaults was sufficiently proven and the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in admitting appellant's inculpatory statements into evidence. 

Additionally, as the evidence was sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable 

doubt that appellant had indecent contact with both E.S. and H.M. without 

their consent, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

considering appellant's admissions in reaching its verdict. See Otterson, 

947 A.2d at 1249. 

Appellant next argues that the trial court "erred by permitting the 

Commonwealth to amend the Bills of Information after the trial concluded to 

conform to the evidence that was presented during trial, i.e., to extend the 

permissible date range by a month, especially because [he] was never on 

notice of the new date range prior to trial." (Appellant's brief at 21.) 

Amendments to a criminal information are governed by Pennsylvania 

Rule of Criminal Procedure 564, which provides as follows: 

The court may allow an information to be amended 

when there is a defect in form, the description of the 

offense(s), the description of any person or any 

property, or the date charged, provided the 

information as amended does not charge an 

additional or different offense. Upon amendment, 

the court may grant such postponement of trial or 

other relief as is necessary in the interests of justice. 

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Pa.R.Crim.P. 564. 

We have explained that the purpose of Rule 564 is to inform a 

defendant of the charges filed against him so that he may properly prepare a 

defense. Commonwealth v. Sinclair, 897 A.2d 1218, 1223 (Pa.Super. 

2006). Allowing the amendment of the information is not proper where 

doing so prejudices the defendant. Id. 

This court must consider the following factors in determining whether 

an amendment results in prejudice to the defendant: 

(1) whether the amendment changes the factual 

scenario supporting the charges; (2) whether the 

amendment adds new facts previously unknown to 

the defendant; (3) whether the entire factual 

scenario was developed during a preliminary 

hearing; (4) whether the description of the charges 

changed with the amendment; (5) whether a change 

in defense strategy was necessitated by the 

amendment; and (6) whether the timing of the 

Commonwealth's request for amendment allowed for 

ample notice and preparation. 

Commonwealth v. Veon, 109 A.3d 754, 768 (Pa.Super. 2015), appeal 

granted in part, 121 A.3d 954 (Pa. 2015) (citation omitted). 

Upon review, we agree with the trial court's determination that 

appellant was not prejudiced by the Commonwealth's decision to amend the 

bill of information in this case. The trial court's December 24, 2015 opinion 

comprehensively discusses and properly disposes of this issue, and 

therefore, we adopt the following rationale of the trial court as our own: 

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Here, it was not error to allow the 

Commonwealth to amend the bill of information to 

extend the timeframe in which the incidents were 

alleged to have occurred by a period of one month, 

because the amendment did not change or add any 

charges brought against [a]ppellant, and therefore 

did not prejudice [a]ppellant as he was always on 

notice of the charges against him. Just as in 

[Commonwealth v. 1.F., 800 A.2d 942 (Pa.Super. 

2002), appeal denied, 812 A.2d 1228 (Pa. 2002)], 

in the present case the Commonwealth amended the 

bill of information to "merely change[] the date" by a 

period of one month, and "neither additional charges 

nor a different set of events were added to the 

information ... [and] the offenses set forth in the 

amendment[] involved the same ... elements and 

the same factual situations as specified in the 

original information[]." [Id. at 945.] Accordingly, 

we suggest that it was not error to allow the 

Commonwealth to amend the bill of information to 

extend the time frame alleged in regard to the 

incidents involving H.M. by a period of one month. 

Trial court opinion, 12/24/15 at 13 (citation formatting amended). 

Lastly, appellant argues that the trial court "erred by imposing a 

condition of sentence upon [a]ppellant that he have no unsupervised contact 

with anyone under the age of 22." (Appellant's brief at 23 (capitalization 

omitted).) Appellant avers this condition "is unreasonable because it is so 

broad, unrelated to [his] rehabilitative needs ..., and unduly restricts his 

liberty." (Id. at 25.) Where an appellant challenges the discretionary 

aspects of his sentence, as is the case here, the right to appellate review is 

not absolute. See Commonwealth v. Allen, 24 A.3d 1058, 1064 

(Pa.Super. 2011). Rather, an appellant challenging the discretionary 

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aspects of his sentence must invoke this court's jurisdiction by satisfying the 

following four -part test: 

(1) whether the appeal is timely; (2) whether 

Appellant preserved his issue; (3) whether 

Appellant's brief includes a concise statement of the 

reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal with 

respect to the discretionary aspects of sentence; and 

(4) whether the concise statement raises a 

substantial question that the sentence is appropriate 

under the sentencing code. 

Commonwealth v. Carrillo -Diaz, 64 A.3d 722, 725 (Pa.Super. 2013) 

(citations omitted). 

"[I]ssues challenging the discretionary aspects of sentence must be 

raised in a post- sentence motion or by presenting the claim to the trial court 

during the sentencing proceedings. Absent such efforts, an objection to a 

discretionary aspect of a sentence is waived." Commonwealth v. 

Barnhart, 933 A.2d 1061, 1066 -1067 (Pa.Super. 2007) (citations and 

internal quotation marks omitted); see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (stating, 

"[i]ssues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for 

the first time on appeal[] "). 

Instantly, appellant failed to file a post- sentence motion raising his 

sentencing claim, or point to the place in the record that indicates he 

objected to the sentencing condition that he was to have no unsupervised 

contact with anyone under the age of 22. Consequently, we find that 

appellant's final claim is waived. See Barnhart. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

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Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, 

Prothonotary 

Date: 11/8/2016 

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