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CARL SHELDEN, Plaintiff,

v. THE UNITED ST ATES, Defendant. No. 17-1507 C 

# FILED Filed : November 16, 2017
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## NO'J 

## 1 6 2017 U

.S

. COURT OF FEDERAL CLAIMS Pro Se; Sua Sponte Dismissal; Lack of Subject Matter ofJurisdiction; Claims Against State Officials and Agencies; Civil Rights Claims ; Tott Claims; Constitutional Claims

### ~~**~~ ~~~~)**  OPINION AND ORDER 

### SMITH, Senior Judge On October 13, 2017, plaintiff, proceedingpro se, filed a complaint in this Court seeking various forms ofrelief. Plaintiffs Complaint asserts, inter alia, that certain states, governmental agencies, and individuals have been conspiring against the plaintiff and committing tortious acts against his family over a span of 34 years . Specifically, Mr

. Shelden names the State of California, State ofFlorida, State ofArizona, the Buckeye Police Department ofArizona, a judge on the Buckeye City Court, the Federal Bureau oflnvestigation, and the U.S

. Department of Justice as defendants. Plaintiffis seeking injunctive relief and money damages in the amount of $24 billion

. Upon sua sponte review, this Court finds plaintiffs allegations do not give rise to any cause of action over which this Court has subject-matterjurisdiction. The Court has no authority to decide plaintiffs case, and therefore must dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(h)(3) of the Rules ofthe United States Court ofFederal Claims ("RCFC"). 

### I

. Background Mr. Shelden filed a complaint on October 13, 2017 for "crimes against humanity" alleging that the named defendants, in their personal and official capacity, have repeatedly violated plaintiffs constitutional rights, committed heinous crimes, and have constantly harassed and tortured the plaintiff and his family. Complaint (hereinafter " Compl. ") at 4. In plaintiffs first claim for relief, Mr. Shelden alleges that defendants have violated his First, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment rights under the U.S

. Constitution

. Compl. at 53. In



### 7017 1450 ODDO 1346 0867

### plaintiffs second claim for relief, Mr. Shelden contends that the defendants have refused to investigate, prosecute, and prevent crimes against humanity and civil rights violations against a protected minority. Comp!. at 59. In plaintiffs third claim for relief, Mr. Shelden states that the defendants have obstructedjustice and committed anti-trust violations. Comp!. at 73. As a result ofdefendants' alleged conduct, Mr. Shelden is seeking $24 billion in damages, including"

...compensatory damages, actual damages, consequential damages (UCC § 2-l7(2)(a)), double damages twice, exemplary (punitive) damages, incidental damages

...." Comp!. at I06. Fmther, Mr. Shelden requests that the Court assist the plaintiff's son with enforcing an order in his divorce case, assist the plaintiffin acquiring a passport, grant him access to "state, federal, or other records held by U.S. corporations," and provide general injunctive relief "due to loss ofpast and present health insurance, harm to business reputation, loss ofearning capacity, etc." Id at 107-109. 

### II. Standard of Review This Comt'sjurisdictional grant is primarily defined by the Tucker Act, which provides this Court the power "to render anyjudgment upon any claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act ofCongress or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States

... in cases not sounding in tort." 28 U.S.C. § 

### 1491(a)(l) (2012) (emphasis added). Although the Tucker Act expressly waives the sovereign immunity ofthe United States against such claims, it "does not create any substantive right enforceable against the United States for money damages." United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 398 (1976). Rather, in order to fall within the scope ofthe Tucker Act, "a plaintiffmust identify a separate source of substantive law that creates the right to money damages." Fisher v. United States, 402 F.3d 1167, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en bane in relevant part). "Courts have an independent obligation to determine whether subject-matterjurisdiction exists

...." Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 94 (2010). If

### the Court lacks jurisdiction, it cannot proceed with the action and must dismiss the case. Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006). RCFC 12(h)(3) provides: "If

### the court determines at any time that it lacks subjectmatterjurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action." In determining whether subject matter jurisdiction exists, the Court will treat factual allegations in the complaint as true and will construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Estes Express Lines v. United States, 739 F.3d 689, 692 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Further, pleadings from prose plaintiffs are held to more lenient standards than pleadings drafted by lawyers. Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980); see also Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). This leniency, however, does not extend to saving a complaint that lies outside ofthis Comt'sjurisdiction. "Despite this permissive standard, apro se plaintiffmust still satisfy the comt'sjurisdictional requirements." Trevino v. United States, 113 Fed. Cl. 204, 208 (2013), ajj'd, 557 F. App'x 995 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (citations omitted). Prose or not, the plaintiff still has the burden of establishing by a preponderance ofthe evidence that this Court has jurisdiction over its claims. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994).

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### III. Discussion In this case, Mr. Shelden fails to establish by a preponderance ofthe evidence that this Comi has jurisdiction over his claims. In 

### Anderson v. United States, the Court explained that the United States Comi ofFederal Claims lacks "jurisdiction over any claims alleged against states, localities, state and local government entities, or state and local government officials and employees; jurisdiction only extends to suits against the United States itself." 117 Fed. Cl. 330, 331 (2014). Therefore, this Comi lacks jurisdiction over all ofMr. Shelden's claims against states, local government entities, and local government officials, and all claims against those parties must be dismissed. Regarding the numerous constitutional violations alleged by Mr. Shelden, he argues that these violations "are compensateable under 

### Bivens v. Unknown NamedAgents of Federal Bureau a/Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)." Comp!. at 58. Under 

### Bivens, the Supreme Court held that, in certain situations, a plaintiffmay bring claims against government officials in their individual capacities for violations ofconstitutional rights. 

### See Brown v. United States, 105 F.3d 621, 624 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (citing 

### Bivens, 403 U.S. 388). However, as noted above, the Tucker Act does not provide this Court withjurisdiction over claims against individual federal officials. 

### Id. at 624. Additionally, Mr. Shelden's First, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment claims are not properly before this Court. With the exception ofthe Takings Clause ofthe Fifth Amendment, a provision which is not pertinent to this Complaint, these amendments are not money-mandating and therefore not subject to the jurisdiction ofthis Court. 

### See United States v. Connolly, 716 F.2d 882, 887 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ("[T]he [F]irst [A]mendment, standing alone, cannot be so interpreted to command the payment ofmoney.") (citations omitted); 

### Brown, 105 F.3d at 623 (holding that the Fourth Amendment does not mandate payment and therefore such claims are not within the jurisdiction ofthe court) (citations omitted); 

### Carruth v. United States, 224 Ct. Cl. 422, 445 (1980) (no jurisdiction based on Fifth Amendment Due Process or Equal Protection); 

### Milas v. United States, 42 Fed. Cl. 704, 710 (1999) (holding that the Comi lacks jurisdiction over Sixth Amendment claims because the Sixth Amendment is not money-mandating) (citations omitted), aff'd, 217 F.3d 854 (Fed. Cir. 1999). The Court also lacks jurisdiction over plaintiffs statutory claims against the United States. Mr. Shelden alleges violations ofthe Civil Rights Act and attempts to invoke 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but only federal district courts havejurisdiction to hear claims alleging civil rights violations. Comp!. at 62; 

### see Jones v. United States, 104 Fed. Cl. 92, 99(2012); 

### Marlin v. United States, 63 Fed. Cl. 475, 476 (2005) (citing 

### Wildman v. United States, 28 Fed. Cl. 494, 495 (1993) ("[T]he Court does not have jurisdiction to consider civil rights claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, or 1985 because jurisdiction over claims arising under the Civil Rights Act resides exclusively in the district courts.")). Fmihermore, the Comi lacks jurisdiction to hear plaintiff's tort claims against the United States. The Tucker Act explicitly excludes tort claims against the United States from this Court'sjurisdiction. 

### "It is well settled that the United States Court ofFederal Claims lacks-and its predecessor the United States Claims Court lacked-jurisdiction to ente1iain t01t claims." 

### Shearin v. United States, 992 F.2d 1195, 1197 (Fed. Cir. 1993); 

### see also Sellers v. United States,
- 3 -110 Fed. Cl. 62, 66 (2013). United States district courts have exclusivejurisdiction to hear tm t claims against the United States, including all claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 267 1-80, which plaintiffcites to in his Complaint. Compl. at 59 ; 

### see also 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(l). Here, Mr

. Shelden alleges that the defendants are responsible for "[p] sychological assaults, isolation, harassment, stress, trauma-infliction as a result ofdomestic hate crime conspiracy and gang-stalking. " Compl. at 64-65

. These claims of assault, harassment, and conspiracy sound in tort and, thus , are outside ofthis Court'sjurisdiction. 

### See, e.g., Moore v. United States, 419 F. App'x 1001, 1002 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (assault claim sounded in tort) ; 

### Kortlander v. United States, 107 Fed. Cl. 357, 368 (2012) (slander and harassment sounded in tmt) ; 

### Cox v. United States, 105 Fed. Cl. 213 , 218 (2012) (harassment, fraud, and breach of fiduciary duty sounded in tort); 

### Gant v. United States, 63 Fed. Cl. 31 1, 316 (2004) (conspiracy, fraud , and negligence sounded in tort)

. In his third claim for relief, Mr. Shelden asse1ts multiple violat ions ofthe Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO") and antitrust violations under 18 U.S.C. § 1964 and chapter 15 ofthe U .S. Code. Comp !. at 76-82. The RICO Act is not a moneymandating statute and actions involving racketeering claims vest exclusively in the federal district courts. 

### See Julian v. United States, 658 F. App'x 1014, 106-17 (Fed. Cir. 2016); 

### Stanwyck v. United States, 127 Fed. Cl. 308, 315 (2016) (The RICO Act "provides for a civil action within the exclusive federal jurisdiction ofU.S. district courts, and not this court. " ). Fmther, "[c] laims for violations ofthe antitrust laws are not within the scope ofthe Tucker Act." 

### Smith v. United States, 34 Fed. Cl. 313, 32 1 (1995). Lastly, Mr. Shelden's requests for various forms of assistance and injunctive relief are not properly before the Comt because " [t]he Tucker Act does not provide independentjurisdiction over ... claims for equitable relief." 

### Taylor v. United States, 11 3 Fed. Cl. 171, 173 (2013). Accordingly, the Comt lacks subject-matterjurisdiction over all ofplaintiffs claims for relief, and plaintiffs Complaint must be dismissed. 

### IV. Conclusion For the reasons set forth above, pla in

tiffs Complaint is, 

### sua sponte, DISMISSED pursuant to RCFC 12(h)(3) for lack of jurisdiction. The Clerk is hereby directed to enter judgment consistent with this opinion. IT IS SO ORDERED.

# ~ Loren A. Smith, Senior Judge

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