Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1604-CR-774 | February 27, 2017 Page 1 of 7

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Suzy St. John

Marion County Public Defender

Appellate Division

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Kelly A. Loy

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Corey G. Brown,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

February 27, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

49A02-1604-CR-774

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court

The Honorable Ronnie Huerta, 

Commissioner

Trial Court Cause No.

49G19-1512-CM-45735

May, Judge.
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[1] Corey G. Brown challenges his conviction of Class A misdemeanor resisting 

law enforcement.1 He notes the charging information and sentencing order 

reference Indiana Code Section 35-44.1-1-3(a)(2), and he argues the evidence 

presented did not prove the elements in that subsection. As the language in the 

charging information put Brown on notice the State was alleging resisting law 

enforcement as defined in Indiana Code Section 35-44.1-1-3(a)(1), and as the 

State presented evidence to prove all the elements thereof, we affirm but 

remand for the trial court to correct the clerical errors.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On December 24, 2015, Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department Officer 

Shawn Smith was called to a Speedway station regarding a disturbance with a 

customer. En route, Officer Smith received a report the customer had left the 

Speedway premises and was headed west on foot. The description of the 

customer was a black male in black clothes with yellow gloves.2 

[3] Officer Smith located a man matching the description. The man, later 

identified as Brown, began cursing when Officer Smith approached him. 

Brown would not stop walking when Officer Smith ordered him to stop. 

Brown testified, “police are always fucking with me. You don’t have to - - - you 

 

1

Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1 (2014).

2 Officer Smith testified the gloves were “rubber style yellow gloves like cleaning gloves.” (Tr. at 8.)
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don’t have any reason to stop me.” (Tr. at 9.) Officer Smith told Brown to 

stand by the police car so Officer Smith could conduct a pat down. Brown put 

his hands in his pockets, so Officer Smith pulled Brown’s hands behind his back 

in an attempt to handcuff Brown, but Brown began to physically resist. Brown 

“clenched his fists and stared [sic] to pull his arms back down to his side and 

back around the front of him[.]” (Id. at 16.) Brown began “pulling and walking 

away.” (Id. at 17.) As they struggled, Officer Smith and Brown ended up on 

the ground in the street. Officer Smith, with the assistance of another officer, 

was then able to subdue Brown. 

[4] The State charged Brown with Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement, 

Class B misdemeanor battery,3 and Class B misdemeanor battery by bodily 

waste.4 On March 17, 2016, the State dismissed the battery charges. At a 

bench trial, Brown made a Trial Rule 41(B) motion to dismiss because the 

officer’s attempts to handcuff Brown “went beyond the scope of the officer’s 

lawful duty.” (Id. at 31.) The trial court denied the motion, finding it was “a 

good stop.” (Id. at 34.) Brown was found guilty of resisting law enforcement 

and sentenced to 180 days.

Discussion and Decision

 

3

Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(b)(1) (2014).

4

Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(b)(2) (2014).
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[5] Brown claims the State did not present sufficient evidence to prove Indiana 

Code Section 35-44.1-3-1(a)(2). We agree.5 However, that is not the end of our 

analysis. As the State points out, the reference to subsection (a)(2) in the 

charging information and the sentencing order appear to have been a scrivener’s 

error. 

[6] The resisting law enforcement statute states:

A person who knowingly or intentionally:

(1) forcibly resists, obstructs, or interferes with a law 

enforcement officer or a person assisting the officer while 

the officer is lawfully engaged in the execution of the 

officer’s duties;

(2) forcibly resists, obstructs, or interferes with the 

authorized service or execution of a civil or criminal 

process or order of a court; or

(3) flees from a law enforcement officer after the officer 

has, by visible or audible means, including operation of the 

law enforcement officer’s siren or emergency lights, 

identified himself or herself and ordered the person to stop;

commits resisting law enforcement, a Class A misdemeanor[.]

 

5 As Brown notes, subsection (a)(2) criminalizes interference with process servers. As Officer Smith was not 

a process server, Brown is correct the evidence did not prove he had resisted service of process or a court 

order.
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Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1 (2014).

[7] The language used to charge Brown with resisting law enforcement states:

On or about December 24, 2015, COREY GILBERT BROWN 

did knowingly or intentionally forcibly resist the authorized 

lawful duties and service of Officer Shawn Smith, IMPD, while 

said Officer was engaged in his lawful duties, by twisting and 

pulling arms away from restraint[.]

(App. Vol. II at 19.) That charging information cites “I.C. 35-44.1-3-1(a)(2).” 

(Id.) 

[8] Brown notes the charging language contains the words “authorized” and 

“service” as in subsection (a)(2). However, it also contains the words “engaged 

in” and “duties” from subsection (a)(1) and, more importantly, does not 

reference the words “process” or “order” as required for subsection (a)(2). The 

charging information states Brown twisted and pulled his arms away to forcibly

resist a law enforcement officer doing his duties. Although the State cited 

subsection (a)(2) in the charging information the charging language tracks 

subsection (a)(1). 

[9] Be that as it may, Brown cannot be convicted of a crime without notice of the 

charge. I.C. § 35-34-1-2(a)(4). “Clear notice serves the dual purposes of 

allowing an accused to prepare his defense and of protecting him from being 

placed twice in jeopardy for the same offense.” Wright v. State, 658 N.E.2d 563, 

565 (Ind. 1995). Thus, the information is to be “in writing and allege the 

commission of an offense by . . . setting forth the nature and elements of the 
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offense charged in plain and concise language without unnecessary repetition.” 

Ind. Code § 35-34-1-2(a)(4). The information is to “state the offense in the 

language of the statute or in words that convey a similar meaning.” Truax v. 

State, 856 N.E.2d 116, 123 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). “Defects or imperfections in a 

charging instrument are grounds for reversal only where they prejudice the 

substantial rights of the defendant.” Alvers v. State, 489 N.E.2d 83, 86 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 1986), reh’g denied, trans. denied. 

[10] At trial, Brown did not contend he was confused or misled about the charge

against him. In fact, at the end of the State’s evidence, Brown asserted a Trial 

Rule 41(B) motion to have the charges dismissed on the basis that Officer 

Smith’s actions “went beyond the scope of the officer’s lawful duty,” (Tr. at 31), 

and that element of resisting law enforcement exists only in the subsection 

(a)(1) definition. Thus, although the State cited the wrong statute in the 

information, Brown had notice of the crime alleged so that he could prepare his 

defense, and we find no reversible error. See Hestand v. State, 491 N.E.2d 976, 

980 (Ind. 1986) (no error when citation incorrect but information language 

adequately informed defendant of the charges). As the State proved the 

elements of resisting law enforcement as charged,6 we affirm Brown’s 

conviction. 

 

6 Brown does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to prove he resisted law enforcement as charged. 

Officer Smith testified Brown had “clenched his fists and stared [sic] to pull his arms back down to his side 

and back around the front of him as [Officer Smith] was trying to pull them behind his back.” (Tr. at 16.) 

Brown continued to “pull[] and walk[] away,” (id. at 17), resulting in the two men ending up in “the middle 
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Conclusion

[11] As the language in the charging information put Brown on notice he was being 

charged under Indiana Code Section 35-44.1-1-3(a)(1), we find no error in his 

conviction. However, we remand for the trial court to correct the sentencing 

order to indicate the proper statutory citation. See Willey v. State, 712 N.E.2d 

434, 446 (Ind. 1999) (remanding to trial court “for correction of the clerical 

errors”). Accordingly, we affirm and remand.

[12] Affirmed and remanded.

Najam, J., and Bailey, J., concur. 

 

of the street.” (Id.) This evidence was sufficient to prove the crime alleged in the charging information. See, 

e.g., Johnson v. State, 833 N.E.2d 516, 518 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (“turning away and pushing away” sufficient 

evidence to prove Johnson resisted law enforcement).