RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)

File Name: 18a0224p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

PREMIUM FREIGHT MANAGEMENT, LLC,

Plaintiff,

v.

PM ENGINEERED SOLUTIONS, INC.,

Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant,

BOSAL INDUSTRIES-GEORGIA, INC.,

Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee.

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Nos. 16-4324/17-3832/3841

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Ohio at Toledo.

No. 3:14-cv-02635—Jack Zouhary, District Judge.

Argued: July 25, 2018

Decided and Filed: October 10, 2018

Before: COLE, Chief Judge; SUTTON and LARSEN, Circuit Judges.

_________________

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Gary J. Mouw, VARNUM LLP, Grand Rapids, Michigan, for Appellant/CrossAppellee. Henry S. Weinstock, NOSSAMAN LLP, Los Angeles, California, for 

Appellee/Cross-Appellant. ON BRIEF: Gary J. Mouw, Matthew T. Anderson, VARNUM 

LLP, Grand Rapids, Michigan, for Appellant/Cross-Appellee. Henry S. Weinstock, 

NOSSAMAN LLP, Los Angeles, California, Jeffrey P. Mueller DAY PITNEY LLP, Hartford, 

Connecticut, for Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

COLE, C.J., delivered the opinion of the court in which SUTTON, J., joined, and 

LARSEN, J., joined in part. LARSEN, J. (pp. 11–15), delivered a separate opinion concurring in 

part and dissenting in part.

>
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_________________

OPINION

_________________

COLE, Chief Judge. Federal courts sitting in diversity may question the wisdom of state 

laws, but they are powerless to change them. For better or worse, Connecticut imposes liability 

for breaches of contract when attended by deception. Unhappy with flanges purchased under a 

contract with PM Engineered Solutions, Inc. (“Powdered Metal”), Bosal Industries-Georgia, Inc. 

(“Bosal”) decided to switch suppliers and terminate the contract. After a five-day bench trial, the 

district court found that the termination was not only wrongful in breach of the contract, but that 

it was deceptive in violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act. Because 

Connecticut law applies and the district court’s findings rest on a permissible view of the 

evidence, we affirm except as to the calculation of postjudgment interest on damages.

I. BACKGROUND

Powdered Metal was itching to get into the automotive industry. The powdered metal 

flange was its ticket. Through an independent sales representative, it offered to supply the part to 

Bosal. After welding the flanges onto exhaust pipes, Bosal would sell the assembled part to a 

third manufacturer, DMAX, who would then use the flange to mount the exhaust system to 

diesel engines sold to General Motors. 

The parties entered into a contract, which took the form of a quote accepted by Bosal. 

Powdered Metal agreed to supply 90,000 flanges per year with a monthly output of 7,500 

flanges, which were to be delivered to Bosal in Connecticut. Connecticut was also the state 

where Powdered Metal operated and manufactured the flanges. Initial orders would not be 

fulfilled until sixteen weeks after the flange specifications were finalized in early June 2014. 

This lead time would allow Powdered Metal to make any necessary arrangements to fulfill the 

orders, such as obtaining raw materials and training employees. 

Sixteen weeks was not soon enough. Due to mounting pressure from DMAX, Bosal 

demanded delivery of the first batch of flanges by late June 2014 and an increased monthly 
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output moving forward. This was not an idle demand. Failure to comply with its demands 

would put a kink in the supply chain and shut down the General Motors assembly line. And if it 

did not comply, Bosal warned that it, DMAX, or General Motors would “crush” Powdered Metal 

with litigation or chargebacks of a million dollars a day. Powdered Metal gave in to Bosal’s 

demands. 

Manufacturing problems quickly emerged. Cracks in the flanges began to appear in early 

July and production temporarily moved from Connecticut to Illinois in August after a machine 

press failed on two occasions. After the cracks became more prevalent in later shipments, Bosal 

instructed Powdered Metal in mid-October to halt production so that it could identify the root 

cause of the cracked flanges. 

Two months passed without a word from Bosal. Its silence gave rise to speculation. In a 

late October email to Powdered Metal from its parent company, PSM Industries, Inc., one 

executive surmised that Bosal “went deep and silent” because it “went back to an earlier design 

with . . . a stamped flange” and switched suppliers. (Trial Ex. 97, Appx. 0037.) But there was 

still a belief that new orders would come in after completing the root cause investigation. 

As it turned out, Bosal had switched suppliers. It had been talking with suppliers in 

secret as early as late September and by mid-October, the same time it halted production at 

Powdered Metal, it had already finalized its decision to switch to a different supplier and to 

terminate the contract with Powdered Metal. Meanwhile, Bosal told Powdered Metal it was 

completing a root cause investigation, accepted additional flanges, and applauded it for its 

“continued support to return to a normalized situation where we can fill the pipeline.” (Trial Ex. 

48, Appx. 0030.) It did not notify Powdered Metal of its decision to terminate the contract, 

however, until December 12. 

Powdered Metal then brought a claim against Bosal under the Connecticut Unfair Trade 

Practices Act. After a five-day bench trial, the district court found that Bosal’s termination of the 

contract was not only wrongful, but that its conduct in doing so was “clearly misleading and 

intentional”—and thus deceptive in violation of the Act. (R. 123, PageID 4129–30.) The district 

court awarded Powdered Metal $784,360 in attorneys’ fees under the Act, $51,550 in discovery 
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sanctions, and $216,934.44 in damages for a related breach-of-contract claim, including 

postjudgment interest on damages at the Connecticut statutory rate of ten percent. Both parties 

appealed.

II. ANALYSIS

We review the district court’s findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de 

novo in an appeal from a judgment entered after a bench trial. Byrne v. United States, 857 F.3d 

319, 326 (6th Cir. 2017). Mindful of our deference to factual findings, we conclude that the 

district court did not err in holding that Bosal’s wrongful termination of the contract violated the 

Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act based on its finding of attendant deception. Nor was its 

determination of fees and damages an abuse of discretion apart from its calculation of 

postjudgment interest.

A. Choice of Law

As an initial matter, we agree with the district court that Connecticut law is the proper 

choice of law, so that Powdered Metal’s claim properly arises under the Connecticut Unfair 

Trade Practices Act. 

We are presented here with a choice between Connecticut and Michigan law. In 

choosing between them, we must apply the choice-of-law rules of Ohio as the forum state, which 

has adopted the two-step approach set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. 

Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941); Morgan v. Biro Mfg. Co., 

474 N.E.2d 286, 288 (Ohio 1984). The first step is to determine if there is an actual conflict 

between the substantive laws of the states involved. Glidden Co. v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 

861 N.E.2d 109, 115 (Ohio 2006). Only if they conflict must we proceed to the second step to 

choose between them. Morgan, 474 N.E.2d at 288–89.

There is no real dispute that the two states’ laws conflict. Connecticut recognizes the 

type of claim brought against Bosal, while Michigan forecloses it. Michigan, like Connecticut, 

prohibits unfair trade practices under the Michigan Consumer Protection Act. Compare Mich. 

Comp. Laws § 445.903(1), with Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-110b. Unlike Connecticut law, however, 
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it does not apply to the type of business transaction at issue here. Instead, it applies only to “the 

conduct of a business providing goods, property or services, primarily for personal, family or 

household purposes.” Slobin v. Henry Ford Health Care, 666 N.W.2d 632, 634 (Mich. 2003) 

(quoting Mich. Comp. Laws § 445.902(d)).

The dispute is one of choice. For claims sounding in tort, as here, we must choose the 

law of the state with “the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties.” 

Restatement § 145(1); see Bailey Employment Sys., Inc. v. Hahn, 655 F.2d 473, 475 (2d Cir. 

1981). To make that determination, we are instructed to consider:

(1) the place of business of the parties;

(2) the place where the injury occurred;

(3) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred;

(4) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered; and

(5) any factors under Section 6 that we may deem relevant to the action.

Morgan, 474 N.E.2d at 289 (citing Restatement § 145(2)). These factors are to be evaluated 

according to their relative importance to the issue presented. Id. (citing Restatement § 145).

As is often the case in multistate disputes, many of the location-based factors point in 

opposite directions. Powdered Metal’s principal place of business is in Connecticut, while 

Bosal’s is in Michigan. And Powdered Metal suffered financial injuries in Connecticut, while 

Bosal’s conduct causing those injuries occurred primarily in Michigan. No matter how Bosal 

puts it, the place of business of nonparty entities, like General Motors, has no place in an inquiry 

that expressly looks to the location of “the parties.” Restatement § 145(2)(c). 

The remaining factors point in the direction of applying Connecticut law. The 

relationship between the parties is centered in Connecticut. It is true that Powdered Metal 

initiated the relationship through an independent sales representative in Michigan. But it did not 

remain centered there for long. The remainder of the relationship centered around the purchase 

of flanges under the contract, nearly all of which were manufactured in Connecticut. They were 

also delivered there. Under the law of both states, “title passes to the buyer at the time and place 
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at which the seller completes his performance with reference to the delivery of goods.” Mich. 

Comp. Laws § 440.2401(b); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42a-2-401. Because the contract specifies 

“F.O.B. (Watertown, CT.),” Powdered Metal completed performance—and ownership of the 

flanges transferred to Bosal—in Connecticut. (Trial Ex. 5, Appx. 0020.)

Taking into account the interests of each state in having its own law applied under 

Section 6 of the Restatement confirms that Connecticut law should apply. Restatement § 6(2)(c). 

Michigan unquestionably has an interest in protecting its businesses from excessive liability for 

unfair trade practices. See In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Illinois on May 25, 1979, 644 

F.2d 594, 613–14 (7th Cir. 1981). But the state with the “strongest interest” in regulating unfair 

trade practices, whether liability is imposed or foreclosed, is the state where the harm occurred. 

See Pilgrim v. Universal Health Card, LLC, 660 F.3d 943, 946 (6th Cir. 2011). Because the 

harm occurred in Connecticut, it is Connecticut that has the strongest interest.

The parties do not contend that any other Section 6 factor is relevant, save for one. Bosal 

contends that applying Michigan law would provide “certainty, predictability, and uniformity of 

result” in its disputes with other suppliers. Restatement § 6(f). As we see it, the only uniformity 

concern in applying Connecticut law is that Bosal may be subject to liability in some disputes, 

but not others. That is not the sort of variation that concerns us. Uniformity concerns come into 

play when applying different laws to the same contract. Mill’s Pride, Inc. v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 300 

F.3d 701, 710 (6th Cir. 2002). And there is no indication that Bosal’s unspecified contracts with 

other suppliers include the same terms as the one with Powdered Metal, especially given that it 

was Powdered Metal that drafted the contract.

B. Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act

The wrongful termination of the flange contract, paired with Bosal’s attendant deception, 

violated the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act. The Act prohibits any person from 

engaging in “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce.” 

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-110b(a). To prevail, a plaintiff must prove: (1) an unfair or deceptive act 

or practice, (2) an ascertainable loss, and (3) causation—that the loss was realized as a result of 

the improper act or practice. Id. § 42-110g(a). 
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Under the Act, deceptive conduct extends to simple breaches of contract when 

accompanied by intentional misrepresentations. Naples v. Keystone Bldg. & Dev. Corp.,

990 A.2d 326, 337–38 (Conn. 2010) (collecting cases). On this point, the parties agree. The 

disagreement centers not on a question of law, but on whether the contract was breached and 

whether Bosal made an intentional misrepresentation as part of that breach. We review the 

district court’s factual findings on these issues for clear error. Byrne, 857 F.3d at 326.

The termination was wrongful in breach of the contract because Bosal’s two-month delay 

failed to provide reasonable notice of termination. It is true that the contract does not specify a 

precise end date, so that it is terminable at will. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42a-2-309(2). Under 

Connecticut law, however, contracts of indefinite duration still require “reasonable notification” 

of termination. Id. § 42a-2-309(2). 

Through its silence and secret dealings, Bosal also intentionally misled Powdered Metal 

into believing that it planned to fulfill the contract. It did so by accepting additional flanges from 

Powdered Metal and, on October 6, highlighting Powdered Metal’s “continued support to return 

to a normalized situation where we can fill the pipeline,” all the while knowing that it had 

already decided to switch suppliers. (Trial Ex. 48, Appx. 0030.) Indeed, an internal email 

suggests that Bosal decided to switch suppliers as early as September 19, 2014 (Trial Ex. 207, 

Appx. 0237–0239) and had reached an agreement with a new supplier (SSI) by October 3, 2014 

(Trial Ex. 29, Appx. 0078–0079.) Although the district court’s opinion does not explicitly 

reference these emails, we may affirm on any grounds supported by the record. See Lawrence v. 

Chancery Court of Tennessee, 188 F.3d 687, 691 (6th Cir. 1999). If that were not enough, Bosal 

indicated on October 13 that it was halting production not because of its decision made by that 

time to terminate the contract, but “due to the ongoing root cause analysis.” (Trial Ex. 26, Appx. 

0076.) And, as the district court found, Bosal and Powdered Metal continued to engage in root 

cause analysis until December, even starting a new phase of the analysis called density testing 

“after Bosal decided to switch flange suppliers.” (R. 123, PageID 4125.) Instead of dispelling 

the belief that new orders would come in after completing the analysis, Bosal chose to conceal its 

decision to terminate the contract even as it strung Powdered Metal along during this period.
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Bosal would have us interpret its silence as reasonable notification of termination, 

pointing to a late October email from PSM Industries to Powdered Metal surmising the same. In 

that email, one executive speculated that it “[l]ooks like they went back to an earlier design 

with . . . a stamped flange” and switched suppliers. (Trial Ex. 97, Appx. 0037.) But one 

executive’s speculation does not amount to knowledge, let alone notice of termination. And 

even if that interpretation were permissible, the district court’s interpretation after a five-day 

bench trial that it did not amount to notice is equally so. “Where there are two permissible views 

of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.” Anderson v. 

City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985). It is with that principle in mind that we 

also reject Bosal’s contention that its representations were anything other than intentionally 

misleading.

Finally, Powdered Metal has met its minimal burden to show that it suffered an 

ascertainable loss as a result of the deception. A plaintiff need only prove that the deceptive 

conduct was the proximate cause of a loss that is “capable of being discovered, observed or 

established.” Hinchliffe v. Am. Motors Corp., 440 A.2d 810, 815 (Conn. 1981). As the district 

court found, the deception deprived Powdered Metal of the remaining value of the contract and 

potential customers. The remaining value of the contract may not extend beyond the reasonable 

notification period and Powdered Metal declined to seek damages for lost customers. But these 

shortcomings merely serve to limit or foreclose its ability to recover damages. Powdered Metal 

may still recover reasonable attorneys’ fees under the Act. Serv. Rd. Corp. v. Quinn, 698 A.2d 

258, 265 (Conn. 1997).

C. Attorneys’ Fees

The district court acted within its discretion in awarding attorneys’ fees to Powdered 

Metal. See Conn. Gen. Stat § 42-110g. The amount is challenged by both parties, so it should 

come as no surprise that Bosal argues for less, while Powdered Metal argues for more. We 

ordinarily defer to a district court’s determination of a fee award and will overturn its decision 

only if it abuses its discretion. Hayes v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 895 F.3d 449, 452 (6th Cir. 2018).
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Fees awarded for unsuccessful breach-of-contract and unfair trade practice claims are a 

major source of heartburn for Bosal. But the district court was permitted to do so because there 

is no reasonable basis for segregating the time expended on them. Fabri v. United Techs. Int'l, 

Inc., 387 F.3d 109, 130 (2d Cir. 2004) (interpreting Connecticut law). To the contrary, the 

claims were intertwined because they all arose from a single contract premised on the same 

dispute. Cf. Jacques All Trades Corp. v. Brown, 752 A.2d 1098, 1105 (Conn. App. Ct. 2000) 

(denying attorneys’ fees for an unsuccessful breach-of-contract claim where the unfair trade 

practices claim related to a different contract).

For its part, Powdered Metal complains of reductions in the hourly attorney rates and 

total fee amount. But the district court acted well within its discretion. In reducing rates for outof-district attorneys, the district court balanced a set of competing presumptions—that the 

prevailing district rate and the higher rate paid by Powdered Metal are reasonable—against 

relevant factors under Connecticut law, including the lack of difficulty in the issues presented. 

See Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc., 2015 WL 5787019, at *2-3 (D. Conn. Sept. 30, 

2015), vacated in part on other grounds, 866 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Steiger v. J.S. Builders, 

Inc., 663 A.2d 432, 435-36 (Conn. App. Ct. 1995). It was reasonable for the district court to then 

reduce the total fee amount by twenty percent, rather than parse the billing records for 

unrecoverable fees. Powdered Metal failed to exclude fees that even it agreed were not 

recoverable. It is not the role of the district court to serve as its green-eyeshade accountant. Fox 

v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826, 838 (2011).

Powdered Metal has no shortage of complaints. It challenges numerous other aspects of 

the fee award, including fees for paralegals, litigation support staff, and work on this appeal, in 

addition to fees for a discovery sanction. We find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s 

reasoned determination of the fees within these categories.

D. Postjudgment Interest

We agree with both parties that the district court made a mistake of law in calculating 

postjudgment interest on damages flowing from Powdered Metal’s separate breach-of-contract 

claim according to Connecticut’s statutory rate of ten percent. In diversity cases, federal law 
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controls postjudgment interest under 28 U.S.C. § 1961. Estate of Riddle ex rel. Riddle v. S. Farm 

Bureau Life Ins. Co., 421 F.3d 400, 409 (6th Cir. 2005). Interest shall be calculated from the 

date of the judgment according to the weekly average one-year constant maturity Treasury yield 

for the preceding calendar week. 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a).

III. CONCLUSION

We affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the district court.
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________________________________________________________

CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART

________________________________________________________

LARSEN, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part. I agree with the 

majority that the district court erred in applying Connecticut’s statutory postjudgment interest 

rate rather than the federal rate required under 28 U.S.C. § 1961. I also agree that the 

Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA) applies to Powdered Metal’s unfair trade 

practices claim. But I do not think the district court made findings sufficient for us to review its 

decision that Bosal violated CUTPA. I would vacate that part of the opinion and remand the 

case for the district court to reconsider the issue and provide more detailed findings.

The district court correctly noted that a CUTPA violation requires: (1) an unfair or 

deceptive act or practice; (2) an ascertainable loss; and (3) causation. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-

110(g)(a). Unsurprisingly, “not every contractual breach rises to the level of a CUTPA 

violation.” Naples v. Keystone Bldg. & Dev. Corp., 990 A.2d 326, 337 (Conn. 2010) (quotation 

omitted). Instead, liability lies where there is a breach plus some other aggravating 

circumstance. See Ulbrich v. Groth, 78 A.3d 76, 101 (Conn. 2013). The Connecticut Supreme 

Court has explained: “CUTPA was intended to provide a remedy that is separate and distinct 

from the remedies provided by contract law when the defendant’s contractual breach was 

accompanied by aggravating circumstances.” Id.

In my view, the district court did not make findings sufficient to support its determination 

that Bosal violated CUTPA. The entirety of the district court’s analysis regarding the CUTPA 

violation—a single paragraph—stated: 

Admittedly, aggressive business tactics do not necessarily equal an unfair trade 

practice. In this case, Bosal’s pattern of troubling conduct—for example, its 

unilateral demands and belligerent posturing regarding the ramp-up and 

accelerated production—culminated in its wrongful termination of the flange 

contract. This Court concludes Bosal’s actions in terminating the contract rise to 

the level of unfair conduct. This is highlighted by the two-month delay in 

notifying [Powdered Metal] that Bosal had switched to a different flange supplier, 

thus allowing [Powdered Metal] to believe Bosal planned to fulfill the contract. 

Bosal’s actions were clearly misleading and intentional. Because of Bosal’s 
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action, [Powdered Metal] was deprived of the remaining value of the flange 

contract, and it was also prevented from supplementing its business with new 

orders from other customers.

Bosal Indus.-Georgia v. PM Engineered Solutions, Inc., No. 3:14 CV 2635, 2016 WL 6216140, 

at *8 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 25, 2016).

I agree with the majority that we owe deference to the district court’s factual findings, 

especially where, as here, the court held a five-day bench trial in a complex case. See Byrne v. 

United States, 857 F.3d 319, 326 (6th Cir. 2017). But a close examination of the district court’s 

analysis does not support its conclusion that Bosal’s tactics amounted to unfair or deceptive trade 

practices. Although the district court referenced Bosal’s “pattern of troubling conduct” 

regarding the ramped-up production schedule, the district court had previously concluded, 

regarding that same conduct, that while it “acknowledge[d] Bosal’s aggressive tactics,” it did 

“not find Bosal improperly intimidated [Powdered Metal].” Bosal Indus.-Georgia, 2016 WL 

6216140, at *7. The court found that Powdered Metal had “presented no evidence that Bosal 

threatened any ‘illicit action’ if [Powdered Metal] refused to comply with its demands, but 

instead warned [Powdered Metal] that it (and possibly DMAX or GM) would go after [Powdered

Metal] with charge-backs or litigation.” Id. Finding no “duress” or “improper[] intimidat[ion],” 

the district court found that Powdered Metal “chose to stick it out and continue production.” Id. 

If the district court did not believe that Bosal’s actions leading up to the termination were 

improper and also found that Powdered Metal had agreed to operate under the ramped-up 

production schedule, how then do these actions support a finding of an unfair or deceptive trade 

act? The district court did not explain.

The only other “troubling conduct” the district court referenced was that, for two months, 

Bosal failed to notify Powdered Metal that it had switched to a different supplier. But failing to 

provide reasonable notice was the breach itself. See id. And a CUTPA violation requires a 

breach plus aggravating circumstances. See Ulbrich, 78 A.3d at 101; see also Boulevard Assocs. 

v. Sovereign Hotels, Inc., 72 F.3d 1029, 1038 (2nd Cir. 1995) (“[A] simple breach of contract 

does not offend traditional notions of fairness . . . [and] therefore did not violate CUTPA.”) 

(collecting cases). The district court had to identify some aggravating behavior—beyond its 
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breach of the contract—to find that Bosal violated CUTPA, but none appears. Although the 

district court concluded that Bosal took some unidentified “actions” that were “clearly 

misleading and intentional,” it failed to explain what they were or how they misled. 

The majority suggests three ways in which Bosal might have “intentionally misled 

Powdered Metal into believing that it planned to fulfill the contract.” First, the majority states 

that Bosal “accept[ed] additional flanges from Powdered Metal” even after it had decided to 

switch suppliers. Even accepting this as true,1 where the breach consists of failure to provide 

“reasonable notice” of termination of an at-will contract, it will always be the case that the 

breaching party will have continued to behave, until notice is given, as if the contract would be 

ongoing. That is the breach; something more is required for that breach to become an unfair 

trade practice. 

Second, the majority faults Powdered Metal for communicating its “‘continued support to 

return to a normalized situation where we can fill the pipeline,’ all the while knowing that it had 

already decided to switch suppliers.” But the district court never found that this statement was 

false or misleading. Indeed, the district court’s opinion does not reference this statement at all. 

And it is not even clear that the statement was made after Powdered Metal had decided to 

terminate the contract. The email the majority references was sent on October 6, 2014, but the 

 

1

It is not clear that the district court actually found that Powdered Metal accepted additional flanges after it 

had decided to switch suppliers. In determining that Bosal had breached the contract, the district court stated: 

Bosal decided to terminate the contract and switch to another flange supplier in mid October 2014 

after purchasing roughly 34,000 flanges. It provided [Powdered Metal] no notice of any alleged 

breach at that time. The only possible documented notice of breach that Bosal provided, at any 

time, was its SCAR reports, dated July and September 2014. But Bosal continued to order and 

accept additional flanges even after this point. The SCAR reports included no suggestion that 

Bosal intended to end its contractual relationship with [Powdered Metal]. 

Bosal Indus.-Georgia, 2016 WL 6216140 at *7. The most natural reading of this passage is that Bosal “continued to 

order and accept additional flanges even after” the July and September 2014 SCAR reports, not after it had “decided 

to terminate the contract and switch to another flange supplier in mid October.” At a minimum, the passage does 

not clearly indicate that the district court found the latter. The district court found as a fact that “Bosal last ordered 

flanges from PMES in October 2014, before the testing was completed.” Id. at *4. As record support for this 

finding, the district court cited testimony referring to an October 13 email, which asked Powdered Metal “to 

immediately stop machining” and to “confirm when the new batch of material is due to arrive.” Even if this email 

indicates a new order, rather than an inquiry about an existing order, October 13 is not clearly after PMES decided

to switch suppliers in mid-October. At best the timeline is uncertain, and I would remand for the district court to 

clarify.
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district court found that “Bosal decided to terminate the contract and switch to another flange 

supplier in mid October.” Id. at *7. At the very least, the timing is unclear, and it should be for 

the district court to clarify.

Finally, the majority suggests that Bosal lied when it “indicated that it was halting 

production not because of its decision made by that time to terminate the contract, but ‘due to the 

ongoing root cause analysis.’” But, again, the district court did not find that Bosal’s statement 

was false. As to timing, the email referenced here was sent on October 14, 2014, which is not 

clearly after Bosal’s decision to terminate the contract, made, according to the district court, “in 

mid October.” Id. And the district court made no findings that the root cause analysis, which 

everyone concedes actually took place, was somehow a sham. 

In sum, each of the majority’s three attempts to fortify the district court’s unexplained 

finding of a CUTPA violation falls short. The district court found that “Bosal decided to 

terminate the contract and switch to another flange supplier in mid October,” id., but none of the 

“intentionally mis[leading]” actions identified by the majority clearly took place after that date. 

The most that can be said in support of the verdict is that the record is unclear. I would 

accordingly vacate that portion of the district court’s opinion and remand for the district court to 

take another look.

The majority does not believe a remand is necessary. Instead, the majority concludes that 

“an internal email suggests that Bosal decided to switch suppliers as early as September 19, 2014 

and had reached an agreement with a new supplier (SSI) by October 3, 2014.” In other words, 

the majority reasons, the CUTPA violation can be sustained because, on its own reading of the 

record, Bosal had decided to switch suppliers in mid September, or early October. There is just 

one problem: that is not what the district court found. The district court found that Bosal 

decided to switch suppliers “in mid October.”2 The majority does not conclude that this finding 

was clearly erroneous. But, in order to sustain the district court’s ultimate conclusion of a 

CUTPA violation, the majority substitutes its own findings of fact for those of the district court. 

 

2

In one part of the opinion, the district court had stated that Bosal had decided to switch suppliers “by midOctober.” Id. at *5 (emphasis added). Later, the district court said that Bosal decided to terminate the contract “in

mid-October.” Id. at *7 (emphasis added). Any ambiguity is just more reason to allow the district court to clarify.
Nos. 16-4324/

17-3832/3841

Premium Freight Mgmt., et al. v. PM Engineered Solutions, Inc. Page 15

The majority sustains the CUTPA violation by concluding that Bosal had arrived at a 

final decision to switch suppliers earlier than the district court found. But the evidence the 

majority cites does not require that conclusion. The September 19 email shows only that Bosal 

had concerns about Powdered Metal as a supplier and that at least one person was of the opinion 

they should switch suppliers or start a second source. And while the October 3 email shows that 

Bosal was in serious talks with another supplier and wanted them to begin certain work, Bosal 

still clarified in that email what would happen in the event Bosal cancelled this work, suggesting 

that this new supplier relationship may not have been concrete. All the October 3 email 

definitively shows is what the district court said regarding this same email, that “Bosal was 

exploring its options with other suppliers,” id. at *4, which surely is not always the same as 

having reached a final decision to terminate an at-will contract. I do not dispute that, at least the 

October 3 email could support the finding the majority makes—but it most certainly does not

compel it. And so, I do not believe these emails can sustain the majority’s implicit conclusion 

that the trial court’s mid-October date was clearly in error.

Here the district court’s conclusory finding that Bosal’s actions were “misleading and 

intentional” is insufficient. I would vacate and remand for the district court to identify which 

statements or actions rose to this level and to explain why, and so I respectfully dissent. Because 

I would vacate the district court’s determination that Bosal violated CUTPA, I would also vacate 

the district court’s award of attorney’s fees under CUTPA pending its resolution of that claim.