1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Joanne Doris Hamel, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Commissioner of Social Security 

Administration, 

Defendant. 

No. CV-18-00173-PHX-GMS

ORDER 

 Plaintiff Joanne Doris Hamel appeals the decision of the Administrative Law Judge 

(“ALJ”) of the Social Security Administration denying her disability insurance benefits. 

(Doc. 17). For the following reasons the decision of the ALJ is vacated, and the case is 

remanded for further proceedings. 

INTRODUCTION 

Joanne Hamel has been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) and 

borderline personality disorder. In May 2014, she applied for social security disability 

insurance benefits, alleging a disability onset date of February 11, 2014. The claim was 

denied in October 2014 and upon reconsideration in January 2015. Hamel filed a request 

for a hearing in February 2015, and a hearing was held in May 2016, at which she testified. 

Following the hearing, an ALJ issued a written decision denying benefits. 

The ALJ followed the required five-step analysis for determining disability. At step 

one, the ALJ determined that Hamel had not engaged in substantial gainful activity after 

the alleged onset date. At step two, the ALJ concluded that Hamel’s post-traumatic stress 
- 2 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

disorder and borderline personality disorder both constitute severe impairments. At step 

three, the ALJ determined that none of Hamel’s impairments (or any combination thereof) 

met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525, and 404.1526. The ALJ then made a residual functional 

capacity (“RFC”) finding. The ALJ determined that Hamel “has the residual functional 

capacity to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels but with the following nonexertional limitations: the claimant would have mild limitation in interaction with the 

public, moderate limitation in interaction with supervisors and marked limitation in her 

interaction with co-workers.” (Tr. 23). The ALJ also concluded that Hamel could perform 

unskilled work. 

In making his RFC finding, the ALJ considered testimony from Hamel about the 

severity of her symptoms, as well as medical opinions from various physicians that had 

treated or evaluated Hamel’s conditions. Regarding Hamel’s symptom testimony, the ALJ 

accepted her testimony insofar as it was consistent with his RFC finding, but concluded 

that “any allegation of greater limitation simply cannot be supported by the overall medical 

evidence. The treatment records indicated Ms. Hamel’s symptoms were controlled with 

compliance to medication and regular treatment.” (Tr. 27). As for the opinions of various 

physicians, the ALJ gave little weight to the opinion of Mehmud Ahmed, M.D., Hamel’s 

treating physician; substantial weight to the opinion of Jose Abreu, Ph.D., a consultative 

examining physician; little weight to a second opinion from Dr. Ahmed; and reduced 

weight to the opinion of Eugene Campbell, Ph.D., a state agency medical consulting 

physician. 

At step four, the ALJ concluded that Hamel is unable to perform any past relevant 

work. Finally, at step five, the ALJ determined that there are jobs that exist in significant 

numbers in the national economy that Hamel can perform. Hamel did not therefore qualify 

as disabled and was not entitled to benefits. 

The Social Security Administration Appeals Council denied Hamel’s request for 

review of the ALJ’s decision in November 2017. Hamel now appeals the ALJ’s decision, 
- 3 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

arguing that the ALJ erred by (1) rejecting the opinions of Dr. Ahmed while according 

substantial weight to Dr. Abreu, and (2) rejecting Hamel’s testimony regarding the severity 

of her symptoms. 

DISCUSSION 

I. Standard of review 

Courts apply a “highly deferential standard of review” when entertaining appeals 

from the decisions of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration. Valentine 

v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 690 (9th Cir. 2009). The ALJ’s decision must 

be affirmed if it is supported by substantial evidence and is free of legal error. Luther v. 

Berryhill, 891 F.3d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 2018). “Substantial evidence is more than a mere 

scintilla but less than a preponderance.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “It means 

such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.” Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664, 674 (9th Cir. 2017). “[T]he 

Commissioner's findings are upheld if supported by inferences reasonably drawn from the 

record, . . . and if evidence exists to support more than one rational interpretation, [the 

Court] must defer to the Commissioner's decision.” Batson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 

359 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 2004). 

II. Analysis 

A. The ALJ did not sufficiently justify his decision to discount Hamel’s 

symptom testimony.

Evaluating a claimant’s symptom testimony requires two steps. First, the ALJ must 

determine whether there is a medically determinable physical or mental impairment that 

could reasonably be expected to produce the claimant’s symptoms. Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 

F.3d 1154, 1163 (9th Cir. 2014). “Once a claimant produces objective medical evidence 

of an underlying impairment, an ALJ may not reject a claimant’s subjective complaints 

based solely on [the] lack of objective medical evidence to fully corroborate the alleged 

severity of [the symptoms.]” Moisa v. Barnhart, 367 F.3d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 2004) 

(original alterations omitted). The proper question is whether the impairment(s) “could 

reasonably be expected to produce [the] pain or other symptoms.” Batson, 359 F.3d at 
- 4 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

1196. 

To discredit the testimony of a claimant about her symptoms, an ALJ must give 

specific, clear, and convincing reasons. Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 488–89 

(9th Cir. 2015). An ALJ does not satisfy that burden by merely reciting the medical 

evidence that the ALJ used to support her residual capacity determination. Id. at 489. 

“General findings are insufficient; rather, the ALJ must identify what testimony is not 

credible and what evidence undermines the claimant’s complaints.” Ghanim, 763 F.3d at 

1163. 

Here, the ALJ failed to specify what testimony from Hamel he found not credible. 

Instead, the ALJ used general language: “[T]he claimant’s statements concerning the 

intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely consistent 

with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record for the reasons explained in this 

decision.” (Tr. 24). The ALJ then summarized the medical evidence in the case. Finally, 

the ALJ concluded his assessment of Hamel’s testimony by stating that “any allegation of 

greater limitation [than the RFC] simply cannot be reasonably be supported by the overall 

medical evidence. The treatment records indicated Ms. Hamel’s symptoms were controlled 

with compliance to medication and regular treatment.” (Tr. 27). This conclusory 

statement, not specifically identifying testimony from Hamel that the ALJ found not 

credible (and the reasons for that conclusion), is not a specific, clear, and convincing reason 

for discounting Hamel’s testimony regarding the severity of her symptoms. See BrownHunter, 806 F.3d at 493–94. This error by the ALJ was not harmless, because “the ALJ 

made only a general credibility finding without providing any reviewable reasons why [he] 

found [Hamel’s] testimony to be not credible.” Id. at 494. 

However, because there are potential inconsistencies in the medical evidence with 

some of Hamel’s testimony, the appropriate remedy is remand to the ALJ for further 

consideration. See Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1105 (9th Cir. 

2014) (“Where . . . an ALJ makes a legal error, but the record is uncertain and ambiguous, 

the proper approach is to remand the case to the agency.”). 
- 5 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

B. The ALJ properly weighed the various medical opinions. 

The ALJ’s weighing of medical opinions is governed by regulation. 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1527(c). The regulations create a hierarchy of deference to medical opinions from 

various sources. At the top of that hierarchy are the opinions of treating sources. Id. (c)(2). 

When the treating doctor's opinion is uncontradicted, the ALJ can reject those conclusions 

only for clear and convincing reasons. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). 

But when the opinion of a treating or examining physician is contradicted, an ALJ may 

reject the contradicted opinion for “specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by 

substantial evidence in the record.” Carmickle v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 

1155, 1164 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

Here, the opinions of Dr. Ahmed were contradicted by the opinion of Dr. Abreu, the 

state agency examining physician. Thus, to justify his decision, the ALJ needed only to 

articulate specific and legitimate reasons, supported by substantial evidence. Id. He did 

so by discussing the two separate opinions submitted by Dr. Ahmed and pointing to 

medical evidence that is inconsistent with Dr. Ahmed’s conclusion. 

Dr. Ahmed’s first opinion, dated May 1, 2014, was that Hamel has marked 

limitations in understanding and memory, and extreme limitations in her ability to sustain 

concentration and patience. He also opined that she had moderate and marked limitations 

in social interactions, and extreme limitations in her ability to adapt. All of this would, in 

Dr. Ahmed’s opinion, result in interference with her ability to work on a regular and 

sustained basis at least 20% of the time, and she would be absent in excess of twenty days 

each month. The ALJ pointed out, however, that during Hamel’s visit with Dr. Ahmed 

that same month, Hamel reported that her mood, anxiety, and hallucinations were all 

improving, even while she still had some symptoms. The ALJ concluded from this 

evidence that Hamel’s limitations were not as severe as indicated by Dr. Ahmed’s opinion. 

While this evidence may be reasonably be interpreted another way, the ALJ’s evaluation 

should be upheld “[w]here evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation.” 

tre v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). 
- 6 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Likewise, the ALJ appropriately weighed Dr. Ahmed’s second opinion, dated 

August 26, 2016. In that opinion, Dr. Ahmed stated that Hamel had no useful ability to 

function and that she was unable to meet competitive standards on nearly every area of the 

questionnaire. He also opined that Hamel would be unable to perform all tasks, and that 

she would be absent more than four days a month due to her impairments or because of 

treatment. Yet treatment notes from Hamel’s providers—while noting that she was still 

suffering some symptoms—state that Hamel’s symptoms were being treated effectively: 

“[g]radually her major depressive symptoms are stable.” (Tr. 486). The physician also 

noted that Hamel was continuing to work with psychiatrists to adjust medications and 

dosages. The ALJ rationally concluded that this medical evidence conflicted with 

Dr. Ahmed’s opinion regarding Hamel’s limitations. This constitutes a specific and 

legitimate reason supported by substantial evidence, so the ALJ’s weighing of Dr. Ahmed’s 

opinion was appropriate. See Carmickle, 533 F.3d at 1164. 

The ALJ also appropriately weighed the opinion of Dr. Abreu. Dr. Abreu examined 

Hamel in June 2016. After the examination, Abreu diagnosed borderline personality 

disorder. He noted that Hamel reported visual and auditory hallucinations, that she was 

aggressive at times, and that she slept excessively, preventing her from working. 

Dr. Abreu’s conclusion was that Hamel has mild limitations in interaction with the public, 

moderate limitations in interaction with supervisors, and marked limitation in her 

interaction with co-workers. These findings, the ALJ concluded, were in line with the 

medical treatment evidence, which demonstrated both that Hamel suffered from symptoms, 

and that those symptoms were improved through medication and treatment. Thus, the ALJ 

awarded Dr. Abreu’s opinions substantial weight, and adopted his findings within the 

ALJ’s RFC finding. The ALJ appropriately weighed this opinion by indicating that it was 

consistent with the medical evidence in the case. Again, though Hamel argues that the 

evidence the ALJ points to can be interpreted in ways other than the way in which the ALJ 

interpreted it, the ALJ’s rational interpretation where more than one exists must be upheld 

by the Court. See Burch, 400 F.3d at 679. 
- 7 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Hamel does not challenge the ALJ’s weighing of various other opinions, so the 

Court does not address those conclusions. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 517 n.13 (9th 

Cir. 2001). 

CONCLUSION 

Because the ALJ made a legal error, but there are potential inconsistencies in the 

medical evidence with some of Hamel’s testimony, the appropriate remedy is to remand 

for further consideration. See Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1105. 

 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the decision of the ALJ denying benefits is

VACATED and this case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this 

opinion. 

 Dated this 5th day of March, 2019.