United States Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit

______________________ 

CONFEDERACION DE ASOCIACIONES

AGRICOLAS DEL ESTADO DE SINALOA, A.C.,

CONSEJO AGRICOLA DE BAJA CALIFORNIA,

A.C., ASOCIACION MEXICANA DE

HORTICULTURA PROTEGIDA, A.C., ASOCIACION 

DE PRODUCTORES DE HORTALIZAS DEL YAQUI

Y MAYO, SISTEMA PRODUCTO TOMATE,

Plaintiffs-Appellants

v.

UNITED STATES, FLORIDA TOMATO EXCHANGE,

Defendants-Appellees

______________________ 

2020-2232, 2020-2299, 2020-2300

______________________ 

Appeals from the United States Court of International 

Trade in Nos. 1:19-cv-00203-JCG, 1:19-cv-00206-JCG, 

1:20-cv-00036-JCG, Judge Jennifer Choe-Groves. 

______________________ 

Decided: April 14, 2022

______________________ 

DEVIN S. SIKES, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld 

LLP, Washington, DC, argued for plaintiffs-appellants. 

Also represented by SPENCER STEWART GRIFFITH, YUJIN

KIM MCNAMARA. Also argued by JAMES P. DURLING, Curtis, 

Mallet-Prevost, Colt & Mosle LLP, Washington DC; 

JEFFREY M. WINTON, Winton & Chapman PLLC, 

Case: 20-2232 Document: 72 Page: 1 Filed: 04/14/2022
2 CONFEDERACION DE ASOCIACIONES v. US

Washington, DC.

DOUGLAS GLENN EDELSCHICK, Commercial Litigation 

Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, argued for defendant-appellee 

United States. Also argued by ROBERT R. KIEPURA. Also 

represented by BRIAN M. BOYNTON, PATRICIA M.

MCCARTHY, FRANKLIN E. WHITE, JR.; EMMA T. HUNTER, Office of the Chief Counsel for Trade Enforcement & Compliance, United States Department of Commerce, 

Washington, DC. 

MARY JANE ALVES, Cassidy Levy Kent USA LLP, Washington, DC, argued for defendant-appellee Florida Tomato 

Exchange. Also represented by JAMES R. CANNON, JR.,

ULRIKA K. SWANSON, JONATHAN M. ZIELINSKI. 

 ______________________ 

Before DYK, PROST, and TARANTO, Circuit Judges.

DYK, Circuit Judge. 

Confederacion de Asociaciones Agricolas del Estado de 

Sinaloa, A.C.; Consejo Agricola De Baja California, A.C.;

Asociacion Mexicana de Horticultura Protegida, A.C.; Asociacion de Productores de Hortalizas del Yaqui y Mayo; and 

Sistema Producto Tomate (collectively “CAADES” or “the 

growers”) appeal a final decision of the Court of International Trade (the “Trade Court”). The Trade Court dismissed CAADES’s claims as either being moot or not ripe, 

though characterizing the dismissal as being for failure to 

state a claim. 

We hold that we have jurisdiction over CAADES’s challenges to the government’s termination of the parties’ 2013 

suspension agreement (“the 2013 agreement”) and the 

2019 suspension agreement (“the 2019 agreement”) and 

that those claims are not moot. However, on the merits we 

conclude that the 2013 agreement’s termination was not 

invalid for failing to comply with statutory termination 

Case: 20-2232 Document: 72 Page: 2 Filed: 04/14/2022
CONFEDERACION DE ASOCIACIONES v. US 3

requirements or because of allegedly improper political influence and that the 2019 agreement is not invalid on 

grounds of duress. 

As for CAADES’s claims that the October 2019 final 

antidumping determination is invalid, we conclude that 

the challenge is not premature and that the Trade Court 

has jurisdiction to hear those claims. We remand for further proceedings pursuant to our opinions in Bioparques de 

Occidente v. United States, No. 2020-2265, and Red Sun 

Farms v. United States, No. 2020-2230. 

BACKGROUND

I. History of the Tomato Investigations and Suspension 

Agreements 

This appeal arises out of a less-than-fair-value investigation concerning fresh tomatoes from Mexico. In April 

1996, the Department of Commerce (“Commerce”) began 

an antidumping duty investigation to determine whether 

Mexican tomatoes were being imported into the United 

States and sold at less than fair value. After Commerce 

issued a preliminary affirmative dumping determination,

Commerce and the exporters responsible for substantially 

all of the imports of fresh tomatoes from Mexico negotiated 

and entered into a 1996 agreement (pursuant to 19 U.S.C. 

§ 1673c(c)) that suspended the investigation, terminated

the collection of cash deposits or bonds, and ended the suspension of liquidation of entries of the subject tomatoes.

So began a cycle in the more-than-two decades that followed, in which old agreements were terminated and new 

agreements were executed. The growers withdrew from 

the 1996 suspension agreement in 2002, which led to a new 

agreement that same year, then withdrew from the 2002 

agreement in 2007, which led to a new agreement the following year, then withdrew from the 2008 agreement in 

2013, which led to a new agreement the same year. The 

Case: 20-2232 Document: 72 Page: 3 Filed: 04/14/2022
4 CONFEDERACION DE ASOCIACIONES v. US

terms of the parties’ past suspension agreements were similar—the one notable exception being that the 2013 agreement was the first to include a clause permitting either 

party to withdraw from the agreement at will upon ninety 

days’ notice. Previous agreements permitted only the 

growers to withdraw from the agreement without cause.1 

For the first time, the agreement, in section VI.B, provided: 

“The signatories or the Department may withdraw from 

this Agreement upon ninety days written notice to the 

other party.” J.A. 353 (emphasis added).

II. Commerce’s Termination of the 2013 Agreement

In November 2018, the Florida Tomato Exchange 

(“FTE”)—a group representing U.S.-based tomato growers 

and distributors—sent a letter to Commerce requesting

that Commerce terminate the 2013 suspension agreement 

under section VI.B’s withdrawal clause and resume the antidumping investigation. The FTE alleged that the agreement had not effectively eliminated dumping. Forty-eight 

members of Congress, led by Florida Senator Marco Rubio, 

subsequently signed on to a February 1, 2019, letter that 

also urged Commerce to terminate the agreement for the 

same reasons.

Five days later, Commerce notified the Mexican growers that it intended to withdraw pursuant to section VI.B, 

and indicated that it would resume its antidumping investigation if the parties failed to reach a new agreement by

May 7, 2019. When the parties missed that deadline, Commerce resumed its investigation and re-imposed cash deposit requirements on imported Mexican tomatoes. During 

the resumed investigation, Commerce issued a July 2019 

preliminary dumping determination. CAADES alleges 

1 The majority of the grower-signatories remained 

the same during the 1996–2013 suspension agreement proceedings. 

Case: 20-2232 Document: 72 Page: 4 Filed: 04/14/2022
CONFEDERACION DE ASOCIACIONES v. US 5

that the cash deposit requirements resulted in severe financial strain for many of its members, causing several of 

them to go out of business. It was under these alleged financially-strained conditions that CAADES and the agreement’s other signatories negotiated a new suspension 

agreement. 

On September 19, 2019, more than seven months after 

Commerce withdrew from the 2013 agreement, the parties

executed a new agreement. Like past agreements, the 

2019 agreement suspended the underlying antidumping 

investigation and terminated Commerce’s cash deposit requirement, and the signatories agreed to sell the imported 

subject tomatoes at or above a minimum reference price. It 

also allowed both the government and the Mexican growers

to withdraw at any time with ninety days’ notice. No party 

has withdrawn from the 2019 agreement. 

III. Commerce’s Continued Investigation

Section 1673c(g) of Title 19 provides that Commerce 

may continue a suspended investigation “within 20 days 

after the date of publication of the notice of suspension” at 

the request of the foreign exporters or an interested party, 

which includes domestic manufacturers, producers, and 

wholesalers. See § 1677(9)(C). After the 2019 agreement 

took effect, the FTE asked Commerce to continue its antidumping investigation pursuant to § 1673c(g). Commerce 

did so, and in October 2019, it issued a final affirmative 

determination that increased the dumping margins for all 

of the subject Mexican growers and exporters over the 

dumping margins reflected in the July 2019 preliminary 

determination. An antidumping duty order incorporating 

these new rates could not issue while the 2019 agreement 

remained in place, but such an order would issue immediately if either Commerce or the signatories withdrew from 

the agreement. See § 1673c(i)(1)(C). 

Case: 20-2232 Document: 72 Page: 5 Filed: 04/14/2022
6 CONFEDERACION DE ASOCIACIONES v. US

These combined events led CAADES to file three separate complaints in the Trade Court,2 each of which raised 

identical claims that fall into three categories: (1) a challenge to Commerce’s decision to terminate the 2013 agreement for allegedly violating 19 U.S.C. § 1673c(i)’s statutory 

requirements3 and for being based on improper political influence, and a related challenge alleging that the resumption of the investigation following this improper 

termination was invalid (counts 1–3); (2) a challenge to the 

validity of the 2019 agreement on grounds of duress

(count 4); and (3) a challenge to Commerce’s final affirmative determination for failing to abide by statutory deadlines, unlawfully calculating final margins, and depriving 

the growers of individual rates (counts 5–7). CAADES’s 

complaints asked the Trade Court to declare the final determination and the 2019 agreement unlawful, null, and 

void, and to reinstate the 2013 agreement. The government moved to dismiss on grounds of mootness, ripeness, 

and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 

granted. 

The Trade Court granted the government’s motion and

dismissed CAADES’s complaints “for failure to state a 

claim.” J.A. 4. Despite the Trade Court’s characterization 

of its dismissal as being for failure to state a claim, it concluded that the claims with respect to the 2013 and 2019 

2 CAADES’s complaints are identical in all respects 

except for the alleged jurisdictional grounds. Two of the 

complaints alleged that the Trade Court had jurisdiction 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) because the claims were reviewable under 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(2)(B)(iv). All of the complaints alleged that the Trade Court had jurisdiction under

28 U.S.C. § 1581(i)(4) (now 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i)(1)(D)). 

3 CAADES’s challenge also relied on Commerce’s 

regulation, 19 C.F.R. § 351.209(a), which is no different

from the statute itself. 

Case: 20-2232 Document: 72 Page: 6 Filed: 04/14/2022
CONFEDERACION DE ASOCIACIONES v. US 7

agreements “became moot” when CAADES “voluntar[ily] 

sign[ed]” the 2019 agreement, “a new agreement which superseded the [] 2013 Suspension Agreement.” J.A. 17. According to the Trade Court, CAADES’s decision to 

voluntarily enter into the 2019 agreement “undercut[]

[CAADES’s] assertion that Commerce unlawfully terminated the 2013 Suspension Agreement.” Id. The Trade 

Court also held that CAADES could not challenge the 2019 

agreement while at the same time “receiv[ing] its benefits 

and protections.” Id. With respect to the final determination, the Trade Court characterized the challenge as not 

ripe for review because a duty order incorporating the increased dumping margins would “have no effect so long as 

the 2019 Suspension Agreement is in place.” J.A. 19. 

CAADES appeals. The Trade Court had jurisdiction under 

the residual provision of § 1581(i)(1)(D), and we have jurisdiction to review the Trade Court’s final decision pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5). 

DISCUSSION

We review the Trade Court’s dismissal of the complaints de novo. Amoco Oil Co. v. United States, 234 F.3d 

1374, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing Ponder v. United States, 

117 F.3d 549, 552 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). In doing so, “we must 

take all of the factual allegations in the complaint as true.” 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–56 (2007)). 

I. 2013 Termination Claims

A. Jurisdiction

We first address the claim that the 2013 agreement 

was improperly terminated. Neither party challenges our 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5) or the Trade 

Court’s jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i)’s residual 

clause, but we must nonetheless address this issue given 

our “special obligation to ‘satisfy [ourself] not only of [our] 

Case: 20-2232 Document: 72 Page: 7 Filed: 04/14/2022
8 CONFEDERACION DE ASOCIACIONES v. US

own jurisdiction, but also that of the lower court[].’” Bender 

v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986) 

(quoting Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U.S. 237, 244 (1934)). 

Each of CAADES’s three complaints alleged that 

§ 1581(i)(4)’s residual jurisdiction clause (now codified as 

§ 1581(i)(1)(D)) authorized the Trade Court’s review of 

Commerce’s termination of the 2013 agreement. That provision grants the Trade Court jurisdiction to hear “any civil 

action commenced against the United States . . . that arises 

out of any law of the United States providing for . . . administration and enforcement” of the trade laws. 

§ 1581(i)(1)(D).

Residual jurisdiction under § 1581(i) is not available if 

the determination the plaintiff seeks to challenge is already reviewable by the Trade Court under § 1516a(a), or 

by a binational panel under § 1516a(g). § 1581(i)(2)(A), (B). 

The issue then, is whether either of those provisions permits the Trade Court’s review of Commerce’s decision to 

terminate a suspension agreement. 

In prior, related preliminary injunction proceedings, 

the Trade Court held that it had jurisdiction to hear 

CAADES’s challenges to the termination of the 2013 agreement under the residual clause in § 1581(i)(1)(D) because 

“the particular agency action at issue [was] Commerce’s 

withdrawal from the 2013 Suspension Agreement,” 

“§ 1516a does not identify Commerce’s decision to withdraw from a suspension agreement as reviewable,” and the 

challenge “pertain[ed] to the administration and enforcement of a matter” arising out of the trade laws. Confederacion de Asociaciones Agricolas del Estado de Sinaloa v. 

United States (CAADES I), 389 F. Supp. 3d 1386, 1394–95

(Ct. Int’l Trade 2019). 

We agree with the Trade Court’s reading of the statute. 

A decision by Commerce to terminate a suspension agreement is absent from the list of reviewable determinations 

Case: 20-2232 Document: 72 Page: 8 Filed: 04/14/2022
CONFEDERACION DE ASOCIACIONES v. US 9

identified in § 1516a(a)(2)(B). The termination of a suspension agreement is not a “determination . . . to suspend an 

antidumping duty . . . investigation,” nor is it a “final determination resulting from a continued investigation” under § 1516(a)(2)(B)(iv). So too, a decision to terminate a 

suspension agreement is not reviewable by a binational 

panel under § 1516a(g), as that list of reviewable determinations refers back to § 1516a(a)(2)(B). See

§ 1516a(g)(1)(A), (B). We have jurisdiction under the residual provision. 

B. Mootness 

The Trade Court held that CAADES’s challenges to the 

government’s termination of the 2013 agreement are moot 

because the court lacked the ability to reinstate the 2013 

agreement after the parties voluntarily entered into the 

2019 agreement. On appeal, CAADES contends that its 

challenges to the 2013 agreement’s termination are not 

moot because the Trade Court retained the ability to reinstate the 2013 agreement if the 2013 agreement was improperly terminated.

The mootness doctrine arises from Article III’s limit on 

the exercise of federal judicial power to live cases and controversies. See Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 577 U.S. 

153, 160–61 (2016). Moot cases are those in which “the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” U.S. Parole 

Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 396 (1980) (quoting 

Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969)). A case 

becomes moot and must be dismissed only when “‘it is impossible for a court to grant any effectual relief whatever’ 

to [the plaintiff] assuming it prevails.” Mission Prod. Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 1652, 1660 (2019) 

(quoting Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U.S. 165, 172 (2013)). If 

“there is any chance” a court can grant the plaintiff’s requested relief if it prevails on the merits, no matter how 

Case: 20-2232 Document: 72 Page: 9 Filed: 04/14/2022
10 CONFEDERACION DE ASOCIACIONES v. US

“uncertain or even unlikely” that chance may be, the “suit 

remains live.” Id. 

We reject the Trade Court’s characterization of the 

claims as moot; if the growers were to prevail on their 

claims relating to the termination of the 2013 agreement

and their contentions concerning the appropriate relief, the 

Trade Court could reinstate the 2013 agreement. See CSC 

Sugar LLC v. United States, 413 F. Supp. 3d 1318, 1326 

(Ct. Int’l Trade 2019) (vacating amendment to suspension 

agreement because notice and comment process “substantially prejudiced” the challenger). The government did not 

sustain its “heavy” burden to establish mootness, County of 

Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979) (quoting 

United States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953)), 

and it was improper for the Trade Court to dismiss these 

claims on grounds of mootness. 

C. The Merits

We next consider the merits of CAADES’s claims that 

the 2013 agreement was improperly terminated. The 

Trade Court appears to have concluded that CAADES 

failed to state a claim for improper termination of the 2013 

agreement because the 2019 agreement was a replacement

agreement that superseded the 2013 agreement and barred 

any challenge to the 2013 agreement. We note that the 

terms of the 2019 agreement do not state that the parties

surrendered their ability to sue for improper termination 

of the 2013 agreement by entering into the 2019 agreement. But we need not decide whether entering into the 

2019 agreement implicitly foreclosed CAADES’s challenges 

to the 2013 agreement’s termination because those challenges independently fail on the merits.

1 

In support of its argument that the government improperly terminated the 2013 agreement, CAADES 

Case: 20-2232 Document: 72 Page: 10 Filed: 04/14/2022
CONFEDERACION DE ASOCIACIONES v. US 11

contends that the government lacked the authority to terminate the 2013 agreement because it failed to make “either of the determinations required by . . . 19 U.S.C. 

§ 1673c(i), and by 19 C.F.R. § 351.209(a)” prior to termination. J.A. 74. Section 1673c(i) provides that Commerce 

“shall” withdraw from a suspension agreement if it finds 

that the agreement “is being, or has been, violated, or no 

longer meets the requirements of” § 1673c(b) or (c),4 and if 

4 The 2013 agreement was issued pursuant to 

§ 1673c(c), which requires agreements eliminating injurious effect to satisfy the following factors: 

(1) General rule

If the administering authority determines that extraordinary circumstances are present in a case, it 

may suspend an investigation upon the acceptance 

of an agreement to revise prices from exporters of 

the subject merchandise who account for substantially all of the imports of that merchandise into the 

United States, if the agreement will eliminate completely the injurious effect of exports to the United 

States of that merchandise and if— 

(A) the suppression or undercutting of price 

levels of domestic products by imports of 

that merchandise will be prevented, and

(B) for each entry of each exporter the 

amount by which the estimated normal 

value exceeds the export price (or the constructed export price) will not exceed 15 

percent of the weighted average amount by 

which the estimated normal value exceeded the export price (or the constructed 

export price) for all less-than-fair-value 

Case: 20-2232 Document: 72 Page: 11 Filed: 04/14/2022
12 CONFEDERACION DE ASOCIACIONES v. US

the agreement also fails to meet the requirements of 

§ 1673c(d).5 The requirements of the regulation, 

§ 351.209(a), are no different. Termination is required if 

the agreement fails to remedy price discrimination found 

by the agency in a preliminary or final determination. 

But Commerce here based its withdrawal from the 

2013 suspension agreement not on § 1673c(i), but on section VI.B of the 2013 agreement. The government’s “general authority to make[] contracts” includes the “power to 

choose with whom and upon what terms the contract[] will 

be made . . . unless Congress has placed some limit on it.” 

Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 580 (1963), abrogated 

in part on other grounds by California v. United States, 438 

U.S. 645, 673–74 (1978); see also United States v. Winstar 

Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 884 (1996) (“[T]he Government’s practical capacity to make contracts . . . [is] ‘the essence of sovereignty’ itself.” (quoting United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 

27, 51–52 (1938))). In the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 

Congress “narrowly circumscribed” Commerce’s “authority” to enter into suspension agreements, S. Rep. 96-249, at 

entries of the exporter examined during the 

course of the investigation.

5 Section 1673c(d) applies to all suspension agreements and imposes the following requirements: 

(d) Additional rules and conditions

The administering authority may not accept an 

agreement under subsection (b) or (c) of this section 

unless— 

(1) it is satisfied that suspension of the investigation is in the public interest, and

(2) effective monitoring of the agreement by 

the United States is practicable. . . . 

Case: 20-2232 Document: 72 Page: 12 Filed: 04/14/2022
CONFEDERACION DE ASOCIACIONES v. US 13

71 (1979), but it did not “fetter [Commerce’s] discretion” to 

control the content of such agreements “in clear and unequivocal terms,” Arizona, 373 U.S. at 581, apart from the 

requirement that the agreement provide appropriate remedies for the dumping. See § 1673c(b)–(d). 

Section 1673c(i) mandates Commerce’s withdrawal 

from a suspension agreement in certain circumstances, but 

it does not limit Commerce’s ability to contract for the right 

to withdraw under other circumstances. There is no other 

provision or policy in the antidumping statute that suggests the government lacks the authority to contract for the 

ability to withdraw from a suspension agreement, and 

CAADES cites no such provision or policy. Thus, this is not

a situation in which a government contract is impermissible because it conflicts with the provisions or policies of a 

governing statute. See, e.g., Chamber of Com. v. Reich, 74 

F.3d 1322, 1338–39 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 

This court previously rejected an identical challenge to 

Commerce’s withdrawal from the 2013 agreement in reviewing the Trade Court’s denial of a preliminary injunction in a related proceeding. See In re Confederacion de 

Asociaciones Agricolas del Estado de Sinaloa, 781 F. App’x

982 (Fed. Cir. 2019). There, CAADES sought to prevent 

the government from ordering the suspension of the liquidation of entries of Mexican tomatoes, resuming its antidumping investigation, and requiring cash deposits or 

bonds for imports following the 2013 agreement’s termination.6 See id. at 984. After the government published 

6 During the preliminary injunction hearing at the 

Trade Court, the growers conceded that Commerce’s withdrawal from the 2013 Agreement was proper. CAADES I, 

389 F. Supp. 3d at 1396 n.1 (“Judge: Do you believe that 

there is a basis for any party to withdraw from the Suspension Agreement, just on voluntary withdrawal? Mr. 

Case: 20-2232 Document: 72 Page: 13 Filed: 04/14/2022
14 CONFEDERACION DE ASOCIACIONES v. US

notice that it intended to terminate the suspension agreement and resume its antidumping investigation, the growers filed suit in the Trade Court, challenging the 

agreement’s termination. In upholding the Trade Court’s 

denial of the growers’ request for a preliminary injunction, 

we concluded that the “petitioners [were] unlikely to succeed on the merits of their challenge” to the 2013 agreement’s termination in part because § 1673c(i)’s 

requirements apply only when Commerce bases its withdrawal from a suspension agreement on § 1673c(i). Id. at 

986. The panel concluded that the government was not required to comply with § 1673c(i) because “Commerce stated 

that it was basing its withdrawal from the suspension 

agreement on the withdrawal provision,” (section VI.B) 

“not on [§ 1673c(i)].” Id. Similarly here, we see no reason 

why Commerce’s withdrawal from the suspension agreement pursuant to the agreement’s terms exceeded its authority or was otherwise statutorily improper. 

2 

CAADES also challenges Commerce’s termination of 

the 2013 agreement on the ground that the government’s 

decision was based on improper political influence. That 

improper influence, according to CAADES’s complaints, 

stemmed from the FTE’s November 2018 letter requesting 

that Commerce terminate the suspension agreement because it was ineffective, as well as the February 2019 letter 

from Senator Rubio and forty-seven other members of 

Koslowe: Yes, there is. And we don’t challenge that. The 

Agreement itself says on 90 days written notice either side 

can withdraw. Judge: And there doesn’t have to be a violation, or—? Mr. Koslowe: Nope. Judge:—a finding that it 

doesn’t meet the requirements of the Act? Mr. Koslowe: 

No.” (citing TRO and PI Hr’g Oral Arg. at 10:05–10:30)). 

Case: 20-2232 Document: 72 Page: 14 Filed: 04/14/2022
CONFEDERACION DE ASOCIACIONES v. US 15

Congress urging Commerce to terminate the agreement for 

the same reason.7

There is no impropriety in considering an interested 

party’s public request for agency action. See, e.g., Nat’l

Parks Conservation Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 835 F.3d 

1377, 1386 (11th Cir. 2016). Nor is there impropriety in

legislators urging an agency to take action on the merits 

based on the ineffectiveness of a prior agency action to remedy a particular problem that affects their constituents. 

Under these circumstances, the Supreme Court’s decision 

in Department of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551

(2019), expressly forecloses a challenge based on alleged 

political influence. This is particularly so where, as here,

the face of the agency decision does not identify that it was 

motivated by any improper consideration. 

Department of Commerce concerned the Secretary of

Commerce’s decision to “reinstate a question about citizenship on the 2020 decennial census questionnaire.” Id. at 

2562. The Secretary attributed the agency’s decision to reinstate the question to a December 2017 “request of the Department of Justice” to Commerce that “sought improved 

data about citizen voting-age population for purposes of enforcing the Voting Rights Act.” Id. But the “administrative 

record show[ed] that DOJ’s request to add a citizenship 

question originated not with the DOJ, but with the Secretary himself.” Id. at 2594 (Breyer, J., concurring in part). 

It revealed “that the Secretary was determined to reinstate 

a citizenship question from the time he entered office; 

7 CAADES’s complaints pled that the “pressure 

placed on [Commerce] by Senator Rubio’s letter and the 

fact that FTE (representatives of the domestic industry) 

wanted to pressure the Mexican Growers to agree to a suspension agreement more favorable to FTE’s interests,” 

J.A. 71, were impermissible.

Case: 20-2232 Document: 72 Page: 15 Filed: 04/14/2022
16 CONFEDERACION DE ASOCIACIONES v. US

instructed his staff to make it happen”; and “subsequently 

contacted the Attorney General himself to ask if DOJ 

would make the [voting-age data] request.” Id. at 2574 

(majority opinion). The challengers’ complaint also alleged 

that, although not the disclosed basis for its decision, the 

agency’s action was in part motivated by the partisan political benefits that the question would have on 2020 redistricting. 

The Supreme Court held that Commerce’s decision was

invalid because it relied on a DOJ request when in fact that

request was solicited by Commerce itself. Id. at 2575–76. 

The Court’s decision thus rested on its determination that 

the agency’s reasoning was pretextual. Id. at 2575 (“[W]e 

cannot ignore the disconnect between the decision made 

and the explanation given.”). 

With regard to the allegation that Commerce’s decision 

was based on political motivation, the Court first explained 

its reluctance to look behind the face of an agency’s decision, recognizing that “judicial inquiry into ‘executive motivation’ represents ‘a substantial intrusion’ into the 

workings of another branch of Government and should normally be avoided.” Id. at 2573 (quoting Arlington Heights 

v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 268 n.18 (1977)). 

That an agency’s decision might have been based on “other 

unstated reasons” is not a reason to invalidate it. Id. 

Second, the Court explained that speculation about alleged improper political influence is not a ground for invalidating agency action: 

[A] court may not set aside an agency’s policymaking decision solely because it might have been influenced by political considerations or prompted by 

an Administration’s priorities. Agency policymaking is not a “rarified technocratic process, unaffected by political considerations or the presence of 

Presidential power.” Such decisions are routinely 

Case: 20-2232 Document: 72 Page: 16 Filed: 04/14/2022
CONFEDERACION DE ASOCIACIONES v. US 17

informed by unstated considerations of politics, the 

legislative process, public relations, interest group 

relations, foreign relations, and national security 

concerns (among others).

Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). 

In the present case, the complaints supply no basis for 

a determination of pretext like the one in Department of 

Commerce. Nor was Senator Rubio’s letter an improper 

communication. The congressional letter, which apparently expressed the same concerns as the FTE letter, is a 

familiar form of officeholder communication to an agency 

based on the merits of a proposed agency action. It does 

not constitute an attempt to influence agency action by considerations other than the merit or lack of merit of the proposed action and the effects on interested parties.8 So too, 

there is also nothing on the face of the agency decision to 

suggest that it was based on any impropriety. Speculation 

as to improper motive provides no basis to look behind 

Commerce’s stated reason for withdrawal. We conclude 

that there is no plausible claim upon which the Trade 

Court could have granted CAADES’s requested relief, and 

we affirm the dismissal of counts 1 and 2. 

II. 2019 Agreement Claims

We turn to the claims concerning the 2019 agreement, 

which CAADES argues is voidable on grounds of duress. 

A. Jurisdiction

The government and the FTE argue that, while 

§ 1516a(a)(2)(B)(iv) (“subsection (B)(iv)”) grants jurisdiction over challenges to Commerce’s “determination . . . to 

8 Even assuming that, under statute, Commerce was 

obligated to place this letter in the record, CAADES has 

not shown that this error was harmful.

Case: 20-2232 Document: 72 Page: 17 Filed: 04/14/2022
18 CONFEDERACION DE ASOCIACIONES v. US

suspend an antidumping duty . . . investigation,” the challenges were not timely because § 1516a(a)(2)(A) requires 

parties seeking to challenge a suspension agreement under 

subsection (B)(iv) to file a summons “[w]ithin thirty days 

after the date of publication in the Federal Register of” notice of the suspension agreement, “and within thirty days 

thereafter a complaint.” Oral Arg. 24:33–24:45; FTE Br. 

13–14. Commerce published notice of the 2019 agreement 

on September 24, 2019, and CAADES filed its earliest summons on November 22, 2019, outside of the thirty-day limit. 

But this is not a subsection (B)(iv) challenge to Commerce’s “determination . . . to suspend an antidumping 

duty . . . investigation.” The “true nature” of CAADES’s 

challenges is not to Commerce’s “determination . . . to suspend,” but rather to the actions allegedly undertaken by 

Commerce to coerce CAADES to execute the agreement. 

Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. United States, 544 F.3d 1289, 1293 

(Fed. Cir. 2008) (“[W]e must look to the true nature of the 

action in a district court in determining jurisdiction.”). Because these challenges are not properly characterized as 

subsection (B)(iv) challenges, we conclude that CAADES’s 

duress claims are properly within the residual jurisdiction 

provision and are not time-barred. 

A. Mootness 

To the extent that the Trade Court held that 

CAADES’s duress claims were somehow moot, we conclude 

that they were not. Here, as with the 2013 agreement termination challenge, success on the merits would lead to 

meaningful relief. 

A. The Merits

The Trade Court appears to have held that CAADES 

could not challenge the suspension agreement while continuing to accept its benefits. We need not address the 

Case: 20-2232 Document: 72 Page: 18 Filed: 04/14/2022
CONFEDERACION DE ASOCIACIONES v. US 19

Trade Court’s theory because we conclude that CAADES 

has failed to allege a cognizable claim for duress. 

The Trade Court’s obligation to accept the complaints’ 

allegations of duress as true does not excuse the requirement that those allegations comprise “a plausible legal theory.” Hutchinson Quality Furniture, Inc. v. United States, 

827 F.3d 1355, 1361 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing Fifth Third 

Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. 409, 425–26 (2014)). To 

render the agreement invalid for duress, CAADES was required to show that “(1) it involuntarily accepted [the government’s] terms, (2) circumstances permitted no other 

alternative, and (3) such circumstances were the result of 

[the government’s] coercive acts.” Rumsfeld v. Freedom 

NY, Inc., 329 F.3d 1320, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (internal 

quotation marks omitted) (quoting Dureiko v. United 

States, 209 F.3d 1345, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). 

That CAADES felt “forced” to sign the 2019 agreement, 

J.A. 60, and that several Mexican growers went out of business while the cash deposit requirement was imposed may 

satisfy the “involuntary” and “no other alternative” requirements. But CAADES also had an obligation to plead 

facts showing that its entry into the 2019 agreement was 

coerced.

When a party claims that the government has committed the allegedly coercive act, proof of coercion requires 

“[s]ome wrongful conduct” on the part of the government 

beyond “[e]conomic pressure” or “the threat of considerable 

financial loss.” Freedom NY, 329 F.3d at 1330 (quoting 

Johnson, Drake & Piper, Inc. v. United States, 531 F.2d 

1037, 1042–43 (Ct. Cl. 1976)); see also Liebherr Crane Corp. 

v. United States, 810 F.2d 1153, 1158–59 (Fed. Cir. 1987) 

(holding that illegal action by the government in violation 

of a statute or regulation may support allegations of duress); Sys. Tech. Assocs., Inc. v. United States, 699 F.2d 

1383, 1387–88 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (same); David Nassif 

Case: 20-2232 Document: 72 Page: 19 Filed: 04/14/2022
20 CONFEDERACION DE ASOCIACIONES v. US

Assocs. v. United States, 644 F.2d 4, 12 (Ct. Cl. 1981) 

(same). Specifically, the party must show either government “action in violation of a statute or regulation,” 

“breach of an express provision of [a] contract without a 

good-faith belief that the action was permissible,” or a violation of the “covenant of good faith and fair dealing implicit in every contract.” Freedom NY, 329 F.3d at 1330. 

The alleged coercion here was the resumption of the investigation, which according to CAADES was unlawful because the termination of the 2013 agreement was not in 

accordance with the statute or was a breach of contract.9 

As we have discussed, the government’s termination of the 

2013 agreement did not violate a statute or regulation. Nor 

was it invalid on grounds of improper political influence. 

So too, the government’s termination of the 2013 agreement did not breach any of the 2013 agreement’s express 

contractual provisions because the at-will termination 

clause permitted “[t]he signatories or the Department [to] 

withdraw . . . upon ninety days written notice to the other 

party.” J.A. 353 (emphasis added).

There is therefore no plausible claim upon which the 

Trade Court could have found coercion or granted 

CAADES’s requested relief, and we affirm the dismissal of 

count 4. 

II. Claims as to the Final Dumping Determination

In counts 5–7 of the complaints, CAADES also challenges the final determination resulting from Commerce’s 

continued investigation. The Trade Court held that these 

claims were not ripe for review until a final antidumping 

order had issued. In Bioparques de Occidente v. United 

9 CAADES did not plead that the government 

breached the duty of good faith and fair dealing in terminating the contract. 

Case: 20-2232 Document: 72 Page: 20 Filed: 04/14/2022
CONFEDERACION DE ASOCIACIONES v. US 21

States, No. 2020-2265, we today conclude that materially 

identical challenges are justiciable “under Supreme Court 

authority—in particular, MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, 

Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007),” and in Red Sun Farms v. United 

States, No. 2020-2230, we conclude that the Trade Court 

has statutory jurisdiction over such challenges. 

In count 3, CAADES also challenges Commerce’s resumption of the antidumping investigation following the 

2013 agreement’s termination. There is no independent jurisdiction over challenges to that interim decision.10 See

§ 1516a(a)(1), (2)(a), (b); 33 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur 

R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 8361 (2d ed.)

(“[J]udicial review is available only for ‘final’ agency actions.”); see also Automated Merch. Sys., Inc. v. Lee, 782 

F.3d 1376, 1380–81 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (agency decision to initiate or continue proceedings cannot be reviewed until issuance of final order); Gov’t of People’s Republic of China v. 

United States, 483 F. Supp. 2d 1274, 1281 (Ct. Int’l Trade 

2007) (holding appellants could challenge Commerce’s decision to initiate an investigation after publication of the 

final determination). We accordingly affirm the Trade 

Court’s dismissal of count 3, reverse the dismissal of counts 

5–7, and remand for further proceedings. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the Trade 

Court had jurisdiction over CAADES’s challenges to the 

termination of the 2013 agreement and the 2019 agreement, and that those claims are not moot. On the merits, 

10 Congress contemplated that decisions such as “a 

preliminary affirmative antidumping . . . determination or 

a decision to exclude a particular exporter from an antidumping investigation,” would be reviewable “only in connection with the review of the final determination.” H.R. 

Rep. No. 96-1235, at 48 (1980). 

Case: 20-2232 Document: 72 Page: 21 Filed: 04/14/2022
22 CONFEDERACION DE ASOCIACIONES v. US

we hold that CAADES’s challenges as to termination of the 

2013 agreement were properly dismissed for failure to 

state a claim. We also hold that CAADES’s claims that the 

2019 agreement was invalid for duress failed to state a 

claim upon which relief can be granted. We affirm the dismissal of counts 1–4. We reverse the Trade Court’s holding

that CAADES’s challenges to the final determination were

not yet ripe for review and find that the Trade Court has 

jurisdiction to hear these claims. We remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion and our opinions in Bioparques de Occidente v. United States, No. 2020-2265, and 

Red Sun Farms v. United States, No. 2020-2230. 

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND 

REMANDED

COSTS

No costs. 

Case: 20-2232 Document: 72 Page: 22 Filed: 04/14/2022