* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 98-60318

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

ISAAC COLEMAN, also known as Ike,

Defendant-Appellant.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Mississippi

(97-CR-150)

--------------------

January 21, 2000

Before POLITZ, JONES, and WIENER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Defendant-Appellant Isaac Coleman argues that because (1) he

was not aware that he was being stopped by law enforcement

officials and (2) he did not assault the officers with the intent

to create a substantial risk of harm to them, the d istrict court

erred at sentencing in increasing his offense level pursuant to

U.S.S.G. § 3A1.2(b).

The preponderance of the evidence presented at sentencing and

in the presentence report (PSR) reflects that Coleman was stopped

by officers wearing clothing identifying them as policemen and that2

the officers made their official status known to Coleman as they

approached his vehicle. Additionally, Coleman’s subsequent conduct

of abandoning his vehicle and not reporting the incident to the

police further indicated that he was aware that he was being

pursued by law enforcement officers.

The preponderance of the evidence also reflects that Coleman

struck one of the officers causing him injury, and that Coleman

recklessly operated his vehicle in a manner which subjected all the

officers present to a substant ial risk of bodily harm. S ee §

3A1.2, comment. (n.5, n.6). The district court’s imposition of the

enhancement under § 3A1.2(b) was a correct appl ication of the

guidelines and its factual findi ngs were not clearly erroneous.

See United States v. Montoya-Ortiz

, 7 F.3d 1171, 1179 (5th Cir.

1993).

Coleman also argues that the district court erred in

increasing his offense level pursuant to § 2D 1.1(b)(1) for

possession of a weapon. The preponderance of the evidence shows

that the weapon was found in Coleman’s bedroom in the house where

he had conducted a drug transaction with a confidential informant.

Also, large amounts of drugs and drug paraphernalia were found in

the house. The cash given to Coleman by the confidential informant

was discovered in close proximity to the gun. The evidence did not

reflect that it was clearly improbable that the w eapon was

connected to the drug-trafficking offense. The district court was

correct in making the adjustment under § 2D1.1(b)(1). S ee §3

2D1 .1(b)(1), comment. (n.3); U nited States v. Mitchell

, 31 F.3d

271, 277 (5th Cir. 1994).

Coleman further argues that the district court plainly erred

at sentencing in dete rmining the amount and type of drugs

attributable to him. Coleman did not make these objections in the

district court and, thus, this issue is subject to review for plain

error only. U nited States v. Calverley

, 37 F.3d 160, 162 (5th Cir.

1994) (en banc). As this is a challenge to the district court’s

factual findings and the sentence imposed on Coleman was within the

statutory range, his claim does not rise to t he level of plain

error. See Robertson v. Plano City of Texas , 70 F.3d 21, 23 (5th

Cir. 1995).

Finally, Coleman argues that the district court plainly erred

in failing to advise him at the time of his guilty plea that he was

subject to an enhanced sentence under the guidelines. The district

court advised Coleman of the mandatory minimum and the maximum

penalty that he could receive. Coleman was also advised that the

Sentencing Guidelines would be considered at sentencing. The

district court’s advice was sufficient under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11

and did not constitute plain error.

Coleman’s conviction and sentence are

AFFIRMED.