1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Rafeeq Qadeer Salahuddin,

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-17-04270-PHX-GMS

ORDER 

 Pending before the Court is Magistrate Judge Bridget S. Bade’s Report and 

Recommendation (“R&R”) on the merits of Petitioner Rafeeq Qadeer Salahuddin’s 

Petition for the Writ of Habeas Corpus. The accepts the R&R. 

BACKGROUND 

 Because no party has objected to the procedural background provided by Magistrate 

Judge Bade, the Court will adopt it as an accurate account. (Doc. 17 at 1–4). Magistrate 

Judge Bade recommends that Salahuddin’s petition be denied as untimely. (Doc. 17 at 9). 

Salahuddin objects to the conclusions of the R&R, arguing that it mischaracterizes the 

grounds for relief stated in his petition, wrongly ignores the fact that a state-created barrier 

prevented him from filing his claim in a timely fashion, and contends that Martinez v. Ryan, 

should excuse his untimeliness. But because the R&R correctly analyzed his claims, his 
- 2 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

petition for habeas corpus is denied. 

DISCUSSION

I. Legal Standard 

This court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or 

recommendations made by the magistrate.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). “[T]he district judge 

must review the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations de novo if objection is 

made, but not otherwise. United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) 

(en banc) (emphasis in original). District courts are not required to conduct “any review at 

all . . . of any issue that is not the subject of an objection.” Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 

149 (1985). 

II. Analysis 

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) “imposes 

a one-year statute of limitation on habeas corpus petitions filed by state prisoners in federal 

court.” Jenkins v. Johnson, 330 F.3d 1146, 1149 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal citations omitted). 

This one-year period runs from the latest of four possible dates, two of which are relevant 

here. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1). Typically, the one-year statute of limitations runs from “the 

date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final.” Id. But because Salahuddin’s 

conviction became final before the effective date of AEDPA, he had a one-year grace 

period beginning in 1996 in which he could have filed a timely challenge. See Patterson 

v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001) (“AEDPA’s one-year grace period for 

challenging convictions finalized before AEDPA’s enactment date . . . ended on April 24, 

1997 in the absence of statutory tolling.”). AEDPA also permits the statute of limitations 

to run from “the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State 

action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2244(d)(1)(B). AEDPA’s statute of limitations is also subject to equitable tolling. 

Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645 (2010). But equitable tolling is not frequently 

available. To qualify, a petitioner must demonstrate “that he has been pursuing his rights 

diligently and . . . that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” Pace v. 
- 3 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005). 

Here, Salahuddin presents two arguments for why the Court should not conclude 

his petition is untimely. First, he argues that the Arizona Supreme Court’s decision on his 

original appeal represented an external impediment that prevented him from bringing his 

claims, and that impediment was not lifted until he was informed of new developments in 

the law around September 2013. Then, he argues that equitable tolling should apply 

because of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Martinez. Because neither 

argument is successful, the petition is untimely. 

1. External Impediment 

Salahuddin argues that the Arizona Supreme Court created an impediment when it 

determined that his counsel had waived objections to the jury selection panel. While this 

ruling was adverse, it did not create an impediment to him filing any challenge that he 

wished to in federal court. Salahuddin now claims that this impediment did not lift until 

he was informed about developments in the law in September 2013. (Doc. at 8). But 

whether Salahuddin was informed of developments in precedent has little bearing on what 

the Arizona Supreme Court did when it ruled on his direct appeal. 

 2. Martinez Does Not Apply To AEDPA’s Timeliness Requirement. 

Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012), does not apply here. Martinez recognized a 

narrow set of circumstances in which the procedural default of a claim of ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel can be excused because of the ineffectiveness of counsel in PCR 

proceedings. Cook v. Ryan, 688 F.3d 598, 607 (9th Cir. 2012). But that is not the issue 

here. Martinez does not apply to tolling the limitations of § 2244(d). Other courts have 

also reached this conclusion. See Lambrix v. Sec’y, Florida Dept. of Corr., 756 F.3d 1246, 

1249 (11th Cir. 2014) (“the equitable rule in Martinez applies only to the issue of cause to 

excuse the procedural default of an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim that 

occurred in a state collateral proceeding and has no application to the operation or tolling 

of the § 2244(d) state of limitations for filing a § 2254 petition”); Madueno v. Ryan, No. 

CV-13-01382-PHX-SRB, 2014 WL 2094189, at *7 (D. Ariz. May 20, 2014) (“Martinez 
- 4 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

has no application to the statute of limitations in the AEDPA which governs Petitioner's 

filing in federal court.”). Thus, Salahuddin cannot user Martinez to overcome AEDPA’s 

one-year statute of limitations. 

Because Salahuddin’s petition for the writ of habeas corpus is untimely, his 

objections regarding Magistrate Judge Bade’s characterization of the grounds of his 

petition are moot. 

 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Magistrate Judge Bade’s Report and 

Recommendation (Doc. 17) is accepted. 

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner Salahuddin’s Petition for the Writ of 

Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) is DENIED AND DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The Clerk 

of Court is directed to terminate this action and enter judgment accordingly. 

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules 

Governing Section 2254 Cases, in the event Petitioner files an appeal, the Court declines 

to issue a certificate of appealability because reasonable jurists would not find the Court’s 

procedural ruling debatable. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). 

 Dated this 8th day of April, 2019.