ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS 

GREG ABBOTT 

August 26,2004 

The Honorable Tempie T. Francis 

Motley County Attorney 

Post Office Box 7 

Matador, Texas 79244 

Opinion No. GA-0241 

Re: Whether an attorney appointed county attorney 

pro tern is disqualified from acting as criminal 

defense counsel in an adjoining county under Code 

of Criminal Procedure article 2.08 (RQ-0190-GA) 

Dear Ms. Francis: 

Article 2.08 of the Code of Criminal Procedure states: “District and county attorneys shall 

not be of counsel adversely to the State in any case, in any court, nor shall they, after they cease to 

be such officers, be of counsel adversely to the State in any case in which they have been of counsel 

for the State.” TEX. CODE GRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 2.08 (Vernon 1977). You ask a number of 

questions, the essence of which is whether the disqualification in article 2.08 applies to an attorney 

who has been appointed county attorney pro tern in individual cases, but who in fact performs all of 

the functions and duties of a constitutional county attorney.’ 

You state that an attorney appointed county attorney pro tern in an adjoining county 

represents criminal defendants in Motley County. Although you do not elaborate, you state that the 

facts are “exactly [as] described” in a letter submitted to this office by Barry L. Macha, Criminal 

District Attorney in Wichita County? Consequently, for context, we will assume the facts as related 

in the Macha Letter. 

The Macha Letter concerned Mr. Paul Scott, an attorney with a general civil and criminal 

defense practice in Wilbarger County. Macha Letter, supra note 2, at 1. In 2002, the Baylor County 

Commissioners Court approached Mr. Scott about serving as the county’s attorney pro tern. Id. 

Baylor County does not currently have an elected county attorney. Id. Mr. Scott agreed to prosecute 

all misdemeanors andjuvenile matters for Baylor County for $2600 per month, with the arrangement 

terminable at will by either party. Id. at 1,3. It is unclear whether the Baylor County Commissioners 

‘See Letter from Honorable Tempie T. Francis, Motley County Attorney, to Nancy Fuller, Chair, Opinion 

Committee, Office of the Attorney General (Mar. 4, 2004) (on file with Opinion Committee, also available of 

http://www.oag.state.tx.us) [hereinafter Request Letter]. 

2SeeLetterfromHonorableBarryL. Macha, WichitaCounty CriminalDishictAttomey, to OpinionCommittee, 

Off& of the Attorney General (Feb. 24,2004) (on tile with Opinion Committee) [hereinafter Macha Letter]. 
The Honorable Tempie T. Francis - Page 2 (GA-0241) 

Court issued a general order appointing Scott as “Baylor County Attorney Pro Tern,” but in each case 

Scott tiled a copy of his oath and a court order appointing Scott as county attorney pro tern for that 

case. Id. at 1. ARer entering into this arrangement with Baylor County, Scott continued his criminal 

defense practice in counties other than Baylor County? Id at 4. 

All of your questions revolve around two issues: (1) whether, as a matter of statutory 

construction, the disqualification in article 2.08 applies to an attorney who has been appointed county 

attorney pro tern in individual cases; and (2) whether the disqualification in article 2.08 applies to 

an attorney who does not hold the office of constitutional county attorney but who has assumed all 

of the functions and duties of that office. See Request Letter, supra note 1, at 1-2. 

I. Amlicable Law 

The prohibition of article 2.08 expressly applies to “[d]istrict and county attorneys.” Under 

the Texas Constitution, the office of county attorney is a four-year elected position. TEX. CONST. 

art. V, § 21. If the position is vacant, the county commissioners court may appoint a county attorney 

to serve until the next general election. Id. Generally, county attorneys represent the state in district 

and inferior courts, but when the county is in a district having a district attorney, the county 

attorney’s duties are regulated by the Legislature. Id. Baylor County is located in the 50th Judicial 

District, and is served by a district attorney. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. $5 24.152(a), 43.129 (Vernon 

2004). However, the Government Code provides for a Baylor County county attorney, who 

represents the state in misdemeanor cases. Id. 5 45.112. 

Some county attorneys are prohibited from engaging in a private civil or criminal law practice 

by chapter 46 ofthe Government Code, the Professional Prosecutors Act. Id. $5 46.001-,007. The 

act “applies to all county prosecutors.” Id. 5 46.002. A “countyprosecutor”under the act is defined 

as “a constitutional county attorney who does not have general felony jurisdiction and who is not a 

state prosecutor.” Id. 5 46.001(l). A county attorney who receives a salary in excess of a statutory 

benchmark, and such a county attorney’s assistants, may not engage in the private practice of law. 

Id. 5 46.005(a), (c). County attorneys who do not receive a salary in excess of the benchmark are 

not subject to the prohibition in the Professional Prosecutors Act against maintaining a private law 

practice. See Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. GA-0094 (2003) at 3. 

By statute, a court may appoint a substitute for an attorney for the state on a pro tern, or 

temporary, basis. Article 2.07 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides for the terms of the 

appointment: 

‘This office received a request for an opinion on this issue from Mr. Scott. See Letter from Paul Scott, Baylor 

County Attorney Pro Tern,, to Office of the Attorney General (Oct. 3 1,2003) (on file with Opinion Committee). This 

office closed the tile without an opinion because the issue was before a trial court on a motion to disqualify Mr. Scott. 

This office generally does not render opinions on matters that are in litigation before the courts. See Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. 

Nos. GA-0182 (2004) at 3, JM-803 (1987) at 5. You have informed us that Mr. Scott withdrew as counsel before the 

trial court rendered a decision, and that the matter is no longer the subject ofpending litigation. Request Letter, supra 

note 1, at l-2. 
The Honorable Tempie T. Francis - Page 3 (GA-0241) 

(a) Whenever an attorney for the state is disqualified to act in 

any case or proceeding, is absent from the county or district, or is 

otherwise unable to perform the duties ofhis office, or in any instance 

where there is no attorney for the state, the judge of the court in which 

he represents the state may appoint any competent attomeyto perform 

the duties of the office during the absence or disqualification of the 

attorney for the state. 

(b) Except as otherwise provided by this subsection, if the 

appointed attorney is also an attorney for the state, the duties of the 

appointed office are additional duties of his present office, and he is 

not entitled to additional compensation. Nothing herein shall prevent 

a commissioners court of a county from contracting with another 

commissioners court to pay expenses and reimburse compensation 

paid by a county to an attorney for the state who is appointed to 

perform additional duties. 

(b-l) An attorney for the state who is not disqualified to act 

may request the court to permit him to recuse himself in a case for 

good cause and upon approval by the court is disqualified. 

(c) Ifthe appointed attorney is not an attorney for the state, he 

is qualified to perform the duties of the office for the period of 

absence or disqualification of the attorney for the state on filing an 

oath with the clerk ofthe court. He shall receive compensation in the 

same amount and manner as an attorney appointed to represent an 

indigent person. 

(d) In this article, “attorney for the state” means a county 

attorney, a district attorney, or a criminal district attorney. 

(e) In Subsections (b) and (c) of this article, “attorney for the 

state” includes an assistant attorney general. 

(f) In Subsection (a) of this article, “competent attorney’ 

includes an assistant attorney general. 

(g) An attorney appointed under Subsection (a) of this article 

to perform the duties of the office of an attorney for the state in a 

justice or municipal court may be paid a reasonable fee for 

performing those duties. 

TEX. CODE GRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 2.07 (Vernon Supp. 2004). 
The Honorable Tempie T. Francis - Page 4 (GA-0241) 

Under article 2.07(a), a court may appoint an attorney to assume county attorney duties pro 

tern when the county attorney “[ l] is disqualified to act in any case or proceeding, [2] is absent from 

the county or district, or is otherwise unable to perform the duties ofhis office, or [3] in any instance 

where there is no attorney for the state.” Id. art. 2.07(a). The last circumstance, when there is no 

attorney for the state, does not authorize a judicial court to till a vacancy by appointing an acting 

county attorney, because that would usurp the commissioners court’s constitutional appointment 

authority. SeeMoorev. State, 119 SW. 858,859 (Tex. Crim. App. 1909); see also Tex. Att’yGen. 

Op. No. JM-1246 (1990) at 3 (court may not appoint a district attorney pro tern to till a vacancy in 

derogation of the governor’s constitutional appointment authority). An attorney pro tern assumes 

the duties and authority of the regular prosecuting attorney, “and in effect replaces the latter in 

performing germane functions of officeforpurposes contemplated by the appointment.” State v. 

Rosenbaum, 852 S.W.2d 525, 529 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (Clinton, .I. concurring) (emphasis 

added); see also Stephens v. State, 978 S.W.2d 728,731 (Tex. App.-Austin 1998, pet. ref d). 

II. Analvsis 

Article 2.08 of the Code of Criminal Procedure prohibits a county attorney fTom appearing 

“of counsel adversely to the State in any case, in any court .” TEX. CODE GRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 2.08 

(Vernon 1977). The stricture prevents a county attorney from representing a party adverse to the 

state in any court in the state. Exparte Ramsey, 642 S.W.2d 483, 484 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) 

(article 2.08 would preclude a county attorney t?om appearing in a court of another county to 

challenge a contempt order). Representing a criminal defendant constitutes being “of counsel 

adversely to the State.” Id. (stating as a general rule that a county attorney’s “representation of a 

defendant in a criminal case may normally fall within the general provisions of Chapter Two”). 

No reported court decision has determined whether article 2.08 would also apply to an 

attorney appointed as a county or district attorney pro tern. Although an attorney appointed county 

attorney pro tern performs the duties of that office, and for purposes of the appointment replaces the 

county attorney, the constitutional office of county attorney and a pro tern appointment under article 

2.07 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are distinct. See Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. GA-0005 (2002) 

at 3 (pro tern attorney appointed for specific case does not have authority to alter terms of local 

agreement on forfeited property). By its plain terms, article 2.08 disqualifies district and county 

attorneys, i.e., constitutional district and county attorneys, from acting as counsel adversely to the 

state in any court. Attorneys appointed pro tern to perform the duties of a county or district attorney 

are not included. Although the Legislature could have written article 2.08 to also apply to an 

attorney appointed pro tern, it did not do so. We may “add words into a statutory provision only 

when necessary to give effect to clear legislative intent.” Fitzgerald v. Advanced Spine Fixation 

Sys., Inc., 996 S.W.2d 864,867 (Tex. 1999). Moreover, we may consider the consequences of a 

particular construction and will presume a feasible result was intended. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. 

55 311.021(2)-(4), ,023 (Vernon 1998). If an attorney who accepts even one pro tern appointment 

for a single case cannot engage in criminal defense in any court in the state, then article 2.08 would 

effectively exclude the most qualified private attorneys ~ those with an ongoing defense practice - 

from accepting any pro tern appointments. Consequently, we conclude that article 2.08 applies to 
The Honorable Tempie T. Francis - Page 5 (GA-0241) 

county attorneys under the constitution, but not to attorneys appointed to perform the duties of the 

office pro tern. 

Under the constitution and the statutes, whether an appointed attorney is a constitutional 

county attorney (and therefore subject to article 2.08) depends on the source of the appointed 

attorney’s authority. Under article V, section 21, the county commissioners court has the authority 

to appoint a county attorney to till a vacancy until the next general election. See TEX. CONST. art. 

V, § 21. Neither the constitution nor statutes authorize a commissioners court to appoint a county 

attorney on an “at will” basis, Nor does a commissioners court have the authority to appoint a 

county attorney pro tern under article 2.07 of the Code of Criminal Procedure; that authority belongs 

to the judicial courts. See TEX. CODE CNM. PROC. ANN. art. 2.07(a) (Vernon Supp. 2004). The 

judicial court also would not have the authority to appoint an acting county attorney, but it would 

have the authority to appoint a county attorney pro tern in individual cases, as was apparently done 

as described in the Macha Letter. See Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. JM-925 (1988) at 6.4 Consequently, 

the attorney described in the Macha Letter would not be a constitutional county attorney. 

You have suggested that an attorney appointed county attorney pro tern who performs all 

duties of a constitutional county attorney should be considered a “de facto” constitutional county 

attorney and subject to the prohibition in article 2.08. Request Letter, supra note 1, at 2. To 

illustrate your point you cite the circumstances described in the Macha Letter, which we agree are 

not consistent with either the office of county attorney under article V, section 2 1 of the constitution, 

or with a pro tern appointment under article 2.07. Under the constitution, a county attorney must 

either be elected or appointed to serve until the next general election. TEX. CONST. art. V, 8 21. On 

the other hand, an attorney pro tern must be compensated “in the same amount and manner as an 

attorney appointed to represent an indigent person,” not by a monthly or annual salary. See TEX. 

CODE GRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 2.07(c) (Vernon Supp. 2004). 

The de facto offtcer doctrine has been used to preclude a defendant appealing a conviction 

from collaterally attaching the prosecutor’s authority to prosecute. See Cook v. State, 176 S.W.2d 

941,943 (Tex. Crim. App. 1944). However, no court has applied that doctrine to disqualification 

under article 2.08. To apply the doctrine here would require, as a matter of first impression, that we 

(1) construe article 2.08 as disqualifying “de facto” county attorneys and (2) formulate a standard 

for ascertaining whether a pro tern appointee has become a “de facto” county attorney. We believe 

that a court would reject such an expanded construction of article 2.08, and instead determine 

whether a county attorney pro tern is disqualified from criminal representation by applying 

professional conflict of interest principles. See, e.g., TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF’L CONDUCT 

1.06(b)(2), reprinted in TEX. GOV’TCODEANN., tit. 2, subtit. G app. A (Vernon 1998) (TEx. STATE 

BAR. R. art. X, 9 9) (requiring an attorney to determine whether representation of one client 

“reasonably appears to be or become[s] adversely limited by the lawyer’s or law firm’s 

responsibilities to another client”). We note that although the Texas Supreme Court’s Professional 

‘In Attorney General Opinion JM-925, this office determined that a county attorney of one county serving as 

county attorney pro tern in another county pursuant to an interlocal agreement had the duty to sign an information that 

initiates prosecution. It is unnecessary for us to revisit that issue here. 
The Honorable Tempie T. Francis - Page 6 (GA-0241) 

Ethics Committee has extended the prohibition against practicing criminal law to partners and others 

associated with a county or district attorney, it has not done so on the basis of a construction of the 

language of article 2.08, but on the basis of professional ethics rules and canons. See, e.g., Tex. 

Comm. on Prof 1 Ethics, Gp. 539,65 TEX. B.J. 368 (2002), Op. 419,47 TEX. B.J. 1370 (1984), Gp. 

345 (1968), Op. 318 (1966). Under the disciplinary rules, whether a pro tern appointment conflicts 

with a particular criminal representation would be determined under the circumstances. See Tex. 

Comm. on Prof 1 Ethics, Gp. 345 (1968) (concluding that disqualification of a former assistant 

district attorney must be decided on circumstances of the particular case). 
The Honorable Tempie T. Francis - Page 7 (GA-0241) 

SUMMARY 

Article 2.08 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not 

disqualify an attorney appointed by a court as county attorney pro tern 

from representing criminal defendants in an adjoining county. 

BARRY R. MCBEE 

First Assistant Attorney General 

DON R. WILLETT 

Deputy Attorney General for Legal Counsel 

NANCY S. FULLER 

Chair, Opinion Committee 

William A. Hill 

Assistant Attorney General, Opinion Committee