Hon. Austin F. Anderson 

Criminal Dlstrfct Attorney 

San Antonio j, Texas Opinion No, V-1409 

Ret Responsibility of the 

Criminal District Attorney to represent the 

plaintiff in a child 

support proceeding under House Bill 192, Acts 

52nd Leg,.,, RISI 1951” 

(Articles 2328b-1 to 

Dear Mr. Anderson: 2328b-3, VcC,S~) 

Your requeet for an opinion presents for 

determination the following questions: 

1, Is the Criminal Metrict Attorney 

of Bexar County required to represent the 

plaintiff fn a child support case filed in 

a district court of Bexar County under, 

House Bill 192, Acts 52nd Leg,, R,Ss 1951, 

ch. 377, ps 643? 

2, It not, what procedure is the district court to follow in obtaining representation for the plaintiff In this State? 

Your faetwl situation relates to’s petltlon, forwarded to Rexar County from the State of 

Ohio, wherein support and maintenance is sought pursuant to Sections 8007-1 to 8007-lp,, Qeneral Code of 

Ohio, referred to as the Reciprocal Act for Support 

of Dependent 8 l The State of Texas has a slmllar 

law known as the Uniform Reciprocal Rnforcement of 

Support Act, which was enacted into law by House 

R,,S, 1951, ch, 377, pw 643 

'ih':t"stg32!~4;t rz3%:5, V,C>S,), Section 12 thereof provides 88 follows: 

“When a court ‘of this State, acting as 

a responding state, receives from the court 

of an initiating state the aforesaid copies, 
Hon. Austin F. Anderson, page 2 (V-1409) 

it shall (1) docket the cause, (2) notify 

the District or County Attorney, (3) set 

a time and place for a hearing, and (4) 

take such action as is necessary In accordance with the laws of this State to obtain 

jurisdiction.” 

In the brief accompanying your opinion request, you have pointed out that this statute does 

not expressly state that the district or county attorney, upon notification, shall represent the plaintiff in a civil proceeding In the district court of 

this State, but you reach the conclusion that the duty 

of representation Is necessarily Implied. Upon considering the background and provisions of the statute, 

we agreir with your conclusion. 

The Texas statute, as well as the Ohio law 

Is patterned after the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcemen t 

of Support Act adopted by the National Conference of 

Commissioners on Uniform State Laws at its 1950 meeting. The avallability of the remedies afforded by the 

statute depends upon the enactment of a similar reciprocal statute In each of the interested states. The 

only change which the Legislature of Texas made in the 

text of the act as drafted by the National Conference 

(except for the omission of a.setitIon on uniformity of 

interpretation) was the exclusion of alimony for a 

former wife from the duty of support. Section 12 of 

the act drafted by the National Conference reads as 

follows: 

“When the court of this state, acting 

as a responding state, receives from the 

court of an initiating state the aforesaid 

copies, It shall (1) docket the cause, (2) 

notify the here insert the name of the official charged with the duty of carrying 

on the proceeding&, (3) set a time and 

place for a hearing, and (4) take such action as is necessary In accordance with the 

laws of this state to obtain jurisdiction.V’ 

(Handbook of National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 1950, p. 175.1 

It Is clear from this provision that the legislature in each state enacting the Uniform Law was to 

designate an official to be “charged with the duty of 
Hon. Austin F. Anderson, page 3 (V-1409) 

carrying on the proceedings.’ The Texas Legislature-has designated the “District or County Attorney”; and we are of the view that the legislative 

intent was to charge the official the duty of 

representing the obligee in the Te s court.. If 

the Legislature has the power to impose this duty 

upon the district or county attorney, it would follow that your first question should be answered in 

the affirmative. 

A proceeding filed under Part III of the 

Reciprocal’ Enforcement of Support Act is, we think, 

clearly a civil proceeding and except with respect 

to claims for reimbursemen& under Section 8, it 1s 

an action between private individuals in which 

neither the ixiitiating state nor the responding 

state is a party. 

The Constitution of this State imposes 

‘upon the county or district attorney the duty to 

represent the State in all cases in the district 

and inferior courts. Tex, Const., Art. V, Sec. 21, 

It Is established that this constitutional duty cannot be abridged by the Legislature. The question 

confronting us, however, is whether the Legislature 

may enlarge the duties of these officers beyond those 

expressIg imposed by the Constitution. We have been 

unable to find any case directly in point; but in 

Zucaline Medicine Co. v. Standard Inv. Co., 25 S.W. 

d 259 [Tex, Civ. App. 1930 f ) the court 

held that the Leaislature c&~rdr~&~~e’&on members 

of the iudiciary~duties other than- those- imposed by 

;itution. Also see Jones v. Alexander, 122 

hY, 

we are of the opinion that the Constitution does not 

prohibit the imposition of additional duties upon 

the district or oounty attorney. 

The enforcement of a duty to provide support has long been recognized as a matter of concern 

to the public as well as to the individual directly 

benefited thereby. The inte,rest of the public la 

based not only on the criminal aspect of the failure 

to support but also on the attendant consequences to 

society and the likelihood of the dependent’s becoming a charge upon public charity. An example of the 

recognition of the public nature of the duty Is found 

in Section 13-A of Article 2338-1, V.C,S., which gives 
Hon. Austin F. Anderson, page 4 (V-1409) 

the, juvenile court the-authority to enter a judgment against a parent SOT tne support of a delinquent child. Indeed, the imposition upon the district or county attorney of duties incidentally 

involving the enforcement of a civil right of support is not novel in this State. Our statutes, 

while not authorizing the institution of an itiependant civil suit for maintenance and support, 

permit the enforcement of the civil obligation as 

an adjunct to a criminal prosecution instituted 

by the district or county attorney. Art. 604, v. 

P.C.; F,x D t Tavlor 137 Tex. 505 155 S.W.2d 358 

(19411. Sgci the enhorcement of tie duty of support is a matter of public as well as private concern, and since the officers of this State will be 

performing services only in instances in which reciprocal services will be accorded to this State, 

we are unable to say that the expenditure of public 

funds in compensating these officers and their 

assistants for the services would not be for a public purpose. 

In view of the foregoing, we are of the 

opinion that Section 12 of House Bill 192 validly 

imposes upon the Criminal District Attorney of 

Bexar County the duty of representing the obligee 

in the proceeding to which you have referred. 

Since we have answered your first question in the affirmative it becomes unnecessary to 

answer your second ques c ion or to discuss the propriety of the court’s proceeding with the case without representation for the obligee. 

SUMMARY 

The Criminal. District Attorney of 

Bexar’ County is required~ to represent 

the obligee In a support, proceeding instituted in another state and filed in 
Ron. Austin F, Ando?so~~, page 5 W-1409) 

a district court o? Bexar County under 

Section 12 of the Uniform Reciprocal 

Enforcement of Support Act (H.B. 192, 

Acts 52nd Leg. R,S. 1951 ch. 377, p: 

643; Arts, 2328b-1 to 2328b-3, V.C.S.). 

Yours very truly, 

APPROVED: PRICE DAARIEL 

Attorney General 

so C. Davis, Jr, 

County Affairs Wvision 

E, Jacobson 

Reviewing ASSistant 

Charles D, Mathews 

First Assistant 

BW:MRW:mh 

2? 7 SW 

Mary p Wall 

Assistants