### I N THE UNI TED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FI F TH CI RCUI T

No. 12-10843

SULLO & BOBBITT P.L.L.C.; BARRY L. BOBBITT, Plaintiffs - Appellants
v. GREG ABBOTT, Attorney General of Texas, Defendant - Appellee

A ppeal from the United States District Court f or the Northern District of Texas USDC No. 3:11-CV-1926

Before GARZA, SOUTHWICK, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Attorney Barry L

. Bobbitt and his law firm, Sullo & Bobbitt P.L.L.C. (collectively “Bobbitt”), brought this a c t i on in district c ourt s eeking a declaratory judgm e n t that the Texas civil barratry statute, u nder w hich a p erson charged with a m isdemeanor may s eek damages agains t a n attorney who solicits his business within 30 d ays of h is arrest, is unconstitutional. Bobbitt appeals the district court’s d ismissal based on his lack of standing, and c o ntends sovereign U n i t e d S t a te s C o u r t o f A p p e al s

F i f t h C i rc u i t 

### F I L E D J uly 22, 2013 Ly l e W . Cay ce Clerk

* Purs uant to 5 T H C I R

. R. 47. 5, the court has determ ined that this op inion s hould not be p ublis hed and is not p reced ent excep t und er the lim ited circum s tances s et forth in 5 T H C I R

. R. 47. 5. 4. Case: 12-10843 Document: 00512315429 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/22/2013No. 12-10843

immunity also does not apply to bar the s uit. We AFFIRM based o n the absence of standing. We do not address the issue of sovereign immunity.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY B o b b itt p ra c tice s la w in T e x a s. M u c h o f h i s le g a l w o rk in v o lv e s d e fe n d in g in d iv i d u a ls ch a rg e d w ith m isd e m e a n o r o ffe n se s. B o b b itt a d v e r tise s th ro u g h d ire ct m a il so licita tio n s to crim in a l d e fe n d a n ts w ith in 3 1 d a y s o f th e ir a rre sts,

w h ich h e a ck n o w le d g e s i s a v io la tio n o f a T e x a s crim in a l b a rra try sta tu te

. S ee T E X

. P E N A L C O D E A N N

. § 3 8 .1 2 (d ) ( 2 ) ( C )

. H e cla im s to h a v e in cu rre d o v e r $ 1 b illio n in p o t e n t ia l l ia b ility u n d e r th e T e x a s c i v il b a rra t ry sta tu te

. S ee T E X

. G O V ’ T C O D E A N N

. § 8 2 .0 6 5 1 (c). A s w ill b e d e ta ile d b e lo w , th a t sta tu te a llo w s a p o te n tia l c lie n t w h o h a s b e e n so licite d in v io la t io n o f t h e c rim in a l b a rra try sta tu te to su e th e o ffe n d in g a tto rn e y
. T h e $ 1 b illio n is ca lcu la te d b y u sin g t h e sta tu to ry c iv il p e n a l ty o f $10, 0 00 per so licita tio n a n d th e n u m b e r o f so licita tio n s th e la w firm h a s se n t. T E X

. G O V ’ T C O D E A N N . § 8 2 .0 6 5 1 (d )

. In 1 9 9 4 , a f

e d e ra l co u rt e n jo in e d e n fo rce m e n t o f p ro v isio n s o f th e crim in a l b a rra try sta tu te th a t p r o h ib ite d s o l i citin g a ccid e n t v ictim s a n d a rre ste e s b y

m a il “ b e fo re t h e 3 1 s t d a y a fte r th e d a te ” o f a n a c cid e n t o r a rre st. T E X

. P E N A L C O D E A N N

. § 3 8 .1 2 (d )(2 )(A ) , (C ); M o o re v
. M

o ra les , 8 4 3 F

. S u p p
. 1 1 2 4 , 1 1 3 3 (S .D

. T e x
. 1 9 9 4 ). T h e A t to rn e y G e n e ra l d id n o t co n te st o n a p p e a l th e d istrict co u rt’s d e cisio n a s to th e re strictio n o n w r i t te n so licita tio n o f a rre ste e s. S ee § 3 8 .1 2 (d ) (2 ) ( C )

. T h a t is th e o n ly p o rtio n o f t h e sta tu te a t issu e h e re
. T h e A t to rn e y G e n e ra l issu e d a fo rm a l o p in io n th a t th is se ctio n is u n co n stitu tio n a l

. T e x
. A tt’y G e n
. O p
. J C

- 0 0 2 2 , 1 9 9 9 W L 1 5 6 2 9 8 , a t * 1 , * 3 -4 ( 1 9 9 9 ). W h ile th is

a p p e a l w a s p e n d in g , t h e T e x a s le g isla tu re re p e a le d S e c tio n 3 8 .1 2 (d )(2 )( C ),

e ffe c tiv e S e p te m b e r 1 , 2 0 1 3

. 2 0 1 3 T E X

. S E S S

. L A W S E R V

. C h

. 3 1 5 (H .B

. 1 7 1 1 ). W e d o n o t c o n sid e r th e le g i sla tiv e a ctio n to h a v e m a d e th is la w su it m o o t, a s lia b ility fo r so licita tio n s m a d e p rio r to th e d a te o f re p e a l te ch n ica lly re m a in

.

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T h e civ il b a rra try sta tu te , e n a cte d in 2 0 1 1 , p ro v id e s th a t p e rso n s w h o a re

so licite d b y la w y e r s in a m a n n e r p ro h ib ite d b y la w o r e th ics ru le s m a y file a civ i l a ctio n a g a in st th e p e rso n w h o co m m itte d b a rra try : A p erson who was s olicited by conduct violating the l aws of this state o r the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct of t h e State B ar of T exas r egarding barratry by attorneys or other persons, but who did not enter into a c o n t ract as a result of that conduct, may file a civil action against any person who c ommitted barratry. T E X

. G O V ’ T C O D E A N N

. § 8 2 .0 6 5 1 (c). A su cce ssfu l p la i n t i f f “ s h a ll r e c o v e r fro m

e a ch p e rso n w h o e n g a g e d in b a rra try : (1 ) a p e n a l ty in th e a m o u n t o f $ 1 0 ,0 0 0 ; (2 ) a ctu a l d a m a g e s c a u se d b y th e p ro h ib i t e d co n d u ct; a n d (3 ) r e a s o n a b le a n d

n e ce ssa ry a tto rn e y ’s fe e s .” Id

. § 8 2 .0 6 5 1 (d ). T h u s, t h e sta tu te incorporates by reference the prohibitions created elsewhere, i nclud i n g t h e n o w r e p e a led Section 38.12(d)(2)(C) of t he Texas Penal Code. A s n o t e d , th e re p e a l i s n o t e ffe ctiv e u n til S e p te m b e r 1 , 2 0 1 3

. B o b b itt b ro u g h t th is a ctio n p u rsu a n t to 4 2 U .S .C

. § 1 9 8 3 , ch a l l e n g in g t h e civ i l b a rra try sta tu te

. H e so u g h t a d e cla r a tio n th a t th e sta tu te

u n co n s titu tio n a lly re stricts co m m e rcia l sp e e ch

. H e n a m e d a s a d e fe n d a n t G re g A b b o tt, th e T e x a s A tto rn e y G e n e ra l, in h is o f ficia l ca p a city

. H e a l s o b r o u g h t cla im s a g a in st o th e r d e fe n d a n ts th a t a re n o t a t is s u e h e r e
. F o r h is cla im

a g a in st th e A tto r n e y G e n e ra l, B o b b i tt co n t e n d e d th a t a d e cla ra tio n fro m t h e d istrict co u rt w o u ld “se rv e th e p u rp o se o f d i sco u ra g in g ” p r iv a te litig a n ts fro m

su in g u n d e r th e civ il b a rra try sta t u te

. T h e A tto rn e y G e n e r a l fil ed a mot i o n to d ism i ss B o b b itt’s cla im u n d e r R u l e 1 2 (b )(1 ), co n t e n d in g B o b b itt la ck e d s ta n d in g , a n d u n d e r R u le 1 2 (b )(6 ),

co n t e n d in g so v e re ig n im m u n ity b a r r e d t h e s u i t

. T h e d istrict co u rt d ism isse d th e c l a i m a g a in st th e A tto rn e y G e n e r a l fo r la ck o f sta n d in g w ith o u t re a ch in g th e q u e stio n o f so v e re ig n im m u n ity

.

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B o b b i tt m o v e d to se v e r th e d ism issa l o f th e cla im a g a in st th e A tto r n e y G e n e ra l fro m h is se p a ra te c la im s a g a in st o th e r d e fe n d a n t s. T h e d istrict co u rt tre a t e d t h e m o t io n a s o n e fo r e n try o f fin a l ju d g m e n t a s to h is cla im s a g a in s t th e A tto rn e y G e n e ra l u n d e r R u le 5 4 (b ), a n d g ra n t e d t h a t re lie f. B o b b i t t a p peals fro m the judgment dismissing his claim against the Attorney General. DISCUSSION Dismissal f

or lack o f s u bject matter jurisdiction u nde r R ule 1 2(b)(1) is reviewed de novo ; the plaintiff bears the burden of proving jurisdiction. Choice Inc. o f Tex. v
. G reenstein , 6 91 F.3d 710, 7 14 (5th Cir. 2012). Subject matter jurisdicti o n i n cludes the “irreducible c o nstitutional m inimum of standing.” Lujan v. Defenders o f Wildlife , 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). A plaintiff f irst must d e m o n strate he suffered “injury in fact–an invasion of a l e gally prote c t e d interest which is (a) concrete and particularized

. . . and ( b) actual o r imminent, not conjectu r al or hypothetical.” Id. (internal c i tations a nd quotation marks omitted). Second, standing r e q uires a c ausal connection between the conduct complained of and the injury plaintiff suffered. Id. “Third, it m ust be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that t he injury will b e redressed by a favorable decision.” Id. at 561 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The distri c t c o u r t a s s u m e d a r g u e n d o t h a t B o b b i t t h a d d e m onstrated injury in fact. It dismissed the claim because he h ad not shown a causal relationship between any action taken by, or available to, t h e A ttorney General, and the asserted injury. Because the civil barratry statute pro v ides a p r ivate cause of action, the district court concluded the Attorney General could cause Bobbitt no injury under t hat law. Similarly, it found Bobbitt’s injury c o uld not be r e dressed in this action because a declaration a s to the statute’s unconstitutionality made against the Attorney General could not p revent private litigants from filing civil barratry claims against B obbitt in state court, or control whether a state court would adjudicate such claims.

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All three elements laid out in Lujan must be present for a p l aintiff to have standing to sue; if a s ingle element is m i ssing, our inquiry has ended and the

case must be d ismissed. To demonstrate in j u r y in f act, Bobbitt must show an injury that is both “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent.” K.P.

v. L eBlanc , 627 F .3d 115, 122 (5th Cir. 2 010). He contends the existence of the civil barratry s tatute has harmed him in two w ays that meet the injury-in-fact standard. First, it has h ad a chilling e ffect on his commercial speech; second, it has subjected him to over $1 b illion in civil d amages due to the statute’s $10,000 penalty and the vast number of prohibited solicitations he has mailed. The district court stated in a footnote that it “ appear[ed] t hat the element of i n jury-in-fact is satisfied.” We disagree. The cases the district court relied on to reach that conclusion are r eadily distinguishable. In one, this court ruled a chiropractor who challenged a portion of the c r i m i n a l b a r r a t r y s t a t u t e r e s t ricting solicitation to accident v i ctims had shown injury in fact because he acted and intended to act in a manner that violated the statute. McKinley v. Abbott , 643 F.3d 403, 407 ( 5th Cir. 2011) (analyzing T E X

. P E N A L C O D E A N N

. § 38.12(d)(2)(A)). That subpart of Section 38.12 was not s u b j e c t t o a federal court ruling or an Attorney General opinion s tating it was uncons t i t utional and unenforceable. B o t h o bstacles exist for the section o f the civil barratry statute that Bob b i t t challenges. Moore , 8 4 3 F

. S u p p
. a t 1 1 3 3 ; T e x
. A tt’y G e n
. O p
. J C -0 0 2 2 , 1 9 9 9 W L 1 5 6 2 9 8 , a t * 1 , * 3 -4 (1 9 9 9 )

. W h ile t h e p la in tiff in M c K in ley c o u ld sh o w a

co n c re te i n j u r y t h a t w a s a ctu a l a n d im m in e n t b e ca u se h e w a s v i o l a tin g a crim in a l sta tu te still e n fo rce d b y th e s t at e, Bo b b itt fe a r s b e in g su e d fo r b re a k in g

a la w th a t h a s tw ice b e e n d e cla re d in v a lid

. As in effect until repealed in September 2013, the civil barratry statute provides a private c ause o f action for individuals s olicited in a manner that violates “the laws of this state.” T E X

. G O V ’ T C O D E A N N

. § 82.0651(c). C i vil liability for barratry, i n other word s , d epends upon t h e unlawfulness of the

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defendant attorney’s actions pursu a n t t o t he criminal barratry statute. The M o o r e decision, as w ell as t h e 1999 Attorney General’s opinion, declared t he criminal barratry statute unconstitutional. Neither of those opinions i s binding

on this cour t , a n d we do n ot offer any v iew on the s tatute’s constitutionality. These significant d eclarations of invalidity, though, weaken the likelihood that Bobbitt could be successfully sued under the statute. There i s nothing in this record to suggest that any suit will b e filed. There is no evidence that any Texas attorney has ever been su e d u n d e r the civil barratry statute, nor was any assertion to t h at effect made to the district court. Indeed, Bobbitt alleged before the district court that a Texas law firm had run

an a dvertisement soliciting cl i ents t o sue attorneys u nder the civil barratry statute in 2011, yet he h as n ot alleged t hat any s uch suits have been filed. No claims could be made based on solicitations made after the date of repeal. The Supreme Court recently determined standing was a bsent in a related situation: plaintiffs alleged a federal s tatute might result i n the G overnment intercepting plaintiffs’ private communications. C lapper v
. Amnesty Int’l USA , 133 S.Ct. 1138, 1148 (2013). There w as no evidence t hat their communications had b een t argeted under the stat u te or that t he Government had e ver sought authorization to do s o. Id. Because plaintiffs presented no evidence that they or their foreign contacts would be subject to G o vernment surveillance, their allegations o f injury were “necessarily conjectural” and n ot sufficient to confer standing. Id. at 1149. Bobbitt presents a similarly insufficient case for standing. For Bobbitt to suffer t he $1 billion i n potential d a m a g e s he posits, he would not on l y have to b e subject to civil barratry litigation but also have a reasonable chance o f losing such litigation. In McKinley , i t w a s s ufficient for plaintiff to all e ge the injury of p otentially being prosecuted for the offense of criminal barratry; such p rosecution, i n a nd of itself, was a “ concrete injury that [was] actual and imminent.” 643 F .3d at 407. Bobbitt’s injury is neither actual

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nor imminent to the degree that exi s t ed in McKinley

. To the contrary, it is merely c onjectural. See Clapper , 133 S .Ct. a t 1 1 4 9

. A statement solely of abstract legal possibility but not of meaningful f actual potential is insufficient to confer standing. A “threatened inj u r y m u s t b e certainly impending to constitute injury in fact,” and claiming “ possible f

u t u r e i n jury” does n ot meet plaintiff’s b urden. Id. at 1147 (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphases in original). Bobbitt i s subject to potential lawsuits with mini m a l c h a n ces of success; injury is not certainly impending. Two other cases w ere cited b y t h e district court in d etermining Bobbitt had likely met his burden of showing injury in fact. In our view, they support that he has not done so. In one, this court noted that a “real and immediate threat of future injury” can confer s t a nding at least in t he c ontext of a plaintiff’s seeking an injunction, as o p posed to the declaratory judgment. K.P., 627 F.3d at 122-23. As explained a bove, the threat Bobbitt c omplai n s o f is neither real

nor immediate. I n the final precedent, we expla i n ed that a p l aintiff in a declaratory action may e stablish injury in fact “by e stablishing actual present harm or a significant possibility o f future h arm,” a nd i f he relies on future harm he must be “ immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury.” Roark & Hardee LP v. C ity of A u s t i n , 522 F.3d 533, 542 (5th Cir. 2008) (emphasis in original) (internal q uotation marks and citations omitted). Once again, because there is no indication on this r ecord that B obbitt is likely to suffer any injury due to the c ivil b arratry statute, the potential for such injury is neither significant nor an immediate danger. To the extent that Bobbitt alleges he is injured by a chilling of his speech, the same logic applies. Absent a real threat of a successful suit that hinders the solicitation of business f rom criminal defendants, his commercial speech is unaffected by the barratry s tatut e
. We also suggest that anyone who has

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voluntarily and k n o w i n g l y s p o k e n i n a manner causing t he accumulation of what is said to be a b illion d ollars of potential claims is not much chilled in speaking. Because Bobbitt has not suffered an i njury in fact, we need n ot address the questions of causation or redressability. AFFIRMED.

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