Hon. M. H. Barton

CountyAttorney Rusk County Henderson, Texas OpinionNo. O-7240 Re: Is a county chamber of commerceexempt from the payment of franchise tax?

Dear Sir:

You request the opinion of this departmentupon

request opinion department the questionpresented in your letter of May 21, fromwhich questionpresented for the basic facts upon which our opinion is predicatedwe opinion predicated quote as follows:

"Iwould appreciatean opinion on the following question.

"A Chamber of Commerce organized for the exclusive benefit of a particular city or town is exempt from FranchiseTax as shown by Article 7094, R.C.S., 1925.
"TheRusk County Chamber of Commerce is organized for theparticular benefits of the entire county of Rusk,which is a subdivision of the State of Texas, the same as a city or town is a subdivision of the State of Texas. Will you kindly give me your opinion as towhy a county Chamber of Commerce is not exempt, it being a subdivision of the State of Texas the same as a city or town."

We think itmust be conceded that if the Rusk County Chamber of Commerce is exempt from the payment of franchise taxes assessed against corporationsby virtue of Article 7084, V,R.C.S., itmust be by the provisions of Art. 7094,V.R.C.S., which we quote In full as follows:

"The franchise tax imposedby this chapter shall not apply to any insurance compaw, surety, guaranty or fidelity company,Hon. M. H. Barton, page 2

or any transportationcompany, or any sleeping, palace car and dining car companywhich is now required to pay ,anannual taxmeasured by their gross receiptd, or to corporations ' having no capital stock and organized for the exclusivepurpose of promoting the public interest of any city or town, or to corporations organized for the purpose of religiousworship,
or for providingplaces of burial not for private profit, or corporationsorganized for the purpose of holding agricultural fairs and encouragingagriculturalpursuits, or for strictly educationalpurposes, or for purely public charity."
By careful reading of Art. 7094, supra,we think it must be further conceded that if it affords an exemption from the payment of franchise taxes as imposed generally by Art. 7084 upon corporations,itmust be by virtue of thatportion of said articlewhich provides: "Corporationshaving no capital stock and organized for the exclusive purpose of promoting the public interest of any city or town." Does the Rusk County Chamber of Commerce fallwithin this exemption? We are of the opinion that it does not. We interpret this language to mean that the organizationmust be for the exclusive purpose of promoting the public interest ,ofa particular city or town, and not one designed, as&bviously the Rusk County Chamber of Commerce is, to promote the public interest of the county as a whole. We do not feel justified to accordby construction
an intentionnot clearly expressed by the Legislature or by reasonable implication follows from the languageused. To render the exemption expressed inArt. 7094, supra, applicable to the Rusk County Chamber of Commerce,we would have to add "county" after "city or town" in the above quoted portion of the statute. We cannot extend the exemptionby addingwhat the Legislaturehas omitted.

In the case of McCallum, Secretary of State, v. Associated Retail CreditMen of Austin, 41 S.W.(2d) 45, Judge Critz of the Commission of Appeals said:

"The rule is thatwhere a tax is leviedby a general law and one claims an exemption therefrom by reason of some exemption statute,he must bring himselP clearlywithin the exemption. In other words, an intentionon the part of the Legislature to grant an exemption from the taxingpower will
never be implied from language thatwill admit of any other reasonable construction. Such an intentionmust be expressed in clear and unambiguousHon. M. H. Barton, page 3

terms, or must appearby necessary implication from the languageused. Cooley on Taxation, vol. 2, par.672 and notes; Morris v. Lone Star Chap. No. 6, Royal Arch ,Masons,68 Tex. 698."

We think that had it been the intentionof the Legislature to apply this exemption to counties aswell as cities and towns, itwould have expresslymentioned "counties', and this it does not do. We believe that itwas the intention of the Legislature to apply this exemption to chambersof commerce organized for the exclusive purpose of promoting the public interest of a particular city or town,which would exclude its application to a county, andyou are accordingly
so advised.

Yours very truly

ATTORNEYGENERAL OF TEXAS

BY L. P. Lollar

Assistant LPL:AMM:BT Approved May 31, 1946 CarlosAshley First Assistant Attorney General Approved Opinion Committee By BWB, Chairman