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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Lydia Albarran, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Commissioner of Social Security 

Administration, 

Defendant. 

No. CV-17-04451-PHX-DGC 

ORDER 

 Plaintiff Lydia Albarran seeks review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the final 

decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, which denied her disability insurance 

benefits and supplemental security income under §§ 216(i) and 223(d) of the Social 

Security Act. The Court finds that the administrative law judge’s (“ALJ”) decision is 

based on reversible legal error and will remand for an award of benefits. 

I. Background. 

 Plaintiff is a 35 year old female who previously worked as a customer complaint 

clerk, a loan officer, and an electrologist. A.R. 69. Plaintiff applied for disability 

insurance benefits and supplemental security income on November 26, 2013, alleging 

disability beginning on August 1, 2012. A.R. 75-76 (initial disability onset date of 

September 1, 2011); A.R. 44 (amending disability onset date). On May 19, 2016, 

Plaintiff and a vocational expert testified at a hearing before an ALJ. A.R. 41. On 

June 23, 2016, the ALJ issued a decision that Plaintiff was not disabled within the 
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meaning of the Social Security Act. A.R. 24-34. This became the Commissioner’s final 

decision when the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review on 

October 4, 2017. A.R. 1-6. 

II. Legal Standard. 

 The Court reviews only those issues raised by the party challenging the ALJ’s 

decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001). The Court may set 

aside the determination only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or is based on 

legal error. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence is 

more than a scintilla, less than a preponderance, and relevant evidence that a reasonable 

person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Id. In determining whether 

substantial evidence supports a decision, the Court must consider the record as a whole 

and may not affirm simply by isolating a “specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Id.

(citation omitted). As a general rule, “[w]here the evidence is susceptible to more than 

one rational interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s 

conclusion must be upheld.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002). 

 Harmless error principles apply in the Social Security context. Molina v. 

Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2012). An error is harmless if there remains 

substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s decision and the error does not affect the 

ultimate nondisability determination. Id. “The burden is on the party claiming error to 

demonstrate not only the error, but also that it affected [her] substantial rights.” Ludwig 

v. Astrue, 681 F.3d 1047, 1054 (9th Cir. 2012). 

III. The ALJ’s Five-Step Evaluation Process. 

 To determine whether a claimant is disabled for purposes of the Social Security 

Act, the ALJ follows a five-step process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). The claimant bears 

the burden of proof on the first four steps, and the burden shifts to the Commissioner at 

step five. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). To establish disability, 

the claimant must show that (1) she is not currently working, (2) she has a severe 

impairment, and (3) this impairment meets or equals a listed impairment or (4) her 
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residual functional capacity (“RFC”) prevents her performance of any past relevant work. 

If the claimant meets her burden through step three, the Commissioner must find her 

disabled. If the inquiry proceeds to step four and the claimant shows that she is incapable 

of performing past relevant work, the Commissioner must show at step five that the 

claimant is capable of other work suitable for her RFC, age, education, and work 

experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). 

 At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff met the insured status requirements of the 

Social Security Act through September 30, 2016, and she has not engaged in substantial 

gainful employment since September 1, 2011. A.R. 26. At step two, the ALJ determined 

that Plaintiff has the following severe impairments: dysfunction of the major joints, 

fibromyalgia, and anxiety disorders. Id. At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff does 

not have an impairment that meets the severity of one of the listed impairments. A.R. 27. 

At step four, the ALJ found Plaintiff has the RFC to perform sedentary work with some 

limitations, but she could not perform her past relevant work. A.R. 29-33. At step five, 

the ALJ concluded, considering Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and RFC, 

that she was able to perform other work that exists in significant numbers in the national 

economy, such as document preparer, cashier, or call-out operator. A.R. 34. 

IV. Analysis. 

Plaintiff makes two arguments: (1) the ALJ erred by rejecting the opinion of 

Plaintiff’s treating physician, and (2) the ALJ erroneously discredited Plaintiff’s 

symptom testimony. Doc. 11 at 9-25. 

A. Medical Opinion Evidence. 

 The Commissioner is responsible for determining whether a claimant meets the 

statutory definition of disability and need not credit a physician’s conclusion that the 

claimant is “disabled” or “unable to work.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1). But the 

Commissioner generally must defer to a physician’s medical opinion, such as statements 

concerning the nature or severity of the claimant’s impairments, what the claimant can 

do, and the claimant’s physical or mental restrictions. § 404.1527(a)(1), (c). 
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 In determining how much deference to give a physician’s medical opinion, the 

Ninth Circuit distinguishes between the opinions of treating physicians, examining 

physicians, and non-examining physicians. See Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th 

Cir. 1995). Generally, an ALJ should give the greatest weight to a treating physician’s 

opinion and more weight to the opinion of an examining physician than a non-examining 

physician. See Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1040-41 (9th Cir. 1995); see also 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(1)-(6) (listing factors to be considered when evaluating opinion 

evidence, including length of examining or treating relationship, frequency of 

examination, consistency with the record, and support from objective evidence). 

 The ALJ must provide clear and convincing reasons for rejecting the 

uncontradicted opinion of a treating or examining physician. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830. 

Under this standard, the ALJ may reject a treating or examining physician’s opinion if it 

is “conclusory, brief, and unsupported by the record as a whole or by objective medical 

findings,” Batson v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 2004) 

(citation omitted), or if there are significant discrepancies between the physician’s 

opinion and her clinical records, Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 

2005). 

 When a treating or examining physician’s opinion is contradicted by another 

doctor, it can only be rejected for “specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by 

substantial evidence in the record.” Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31. To satisfy this 

requirement, the ALJ must set out “a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and 

conflicting clinical evidence, stating his interpretation thereof, and making findings.” 

Revels v. Berryhill, 874 F.3d 648, 654 (9th Cir. 2017) (quotation marks and citation 

omitted). Under either standard, “[t]he ALJ must do more than state conclusions. He 

must set forth his own interpretations and explain why they, rather than the doctors’, are 

correct.” Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1012 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation and internal 

quotation omitted). 
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 Dr. Julius Charlie, who treated the Plaintiff in 2013, determined that Plaintiff is 

unable to work a forty hour week schedule. A.R. 340. Dr. Charlie opined that Plaintiff 

could sit for less than two hours a day, stand and walk for less than two hours a day, lift 

and carry less than ten pounds, and needs to alternate between sitting, standing, and 

walking every five minutes. Id.; A.R. 31. Dr. Charlie opined that Plaintiff experienced 

moderately severe symptoms and should expect to miss more than six days of work per 

month. A.R. 340; A.R. 31. The ALJ did not expressly find other medical opinions in the 

record contradicted Dr. Charlie’s statement, but the Court can infer from the record that 

Dr. Charlie’s assessment differed from non-examining physicians in regards to Plaintiff’s 

ability to lift and carry, climb stairs and ramps, climb ladders and ropes, and sit for long 

periods of time. See A.R. 31; A.R. 109; see also Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664, 676 

(9th Cir. 2017) (the Court may infer from the record that an opinion is contradicted). 

Accordingly, to properly reject Dr. Charlie’s decision, the ALJ must state “specific and 

legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record.” Lester, 81 F.3d 

at 830-31. 

 The ALJ summarized and apportioned weight to eight opinions in the record. 

A.R. 31-32. The ALJ gave Dr. Charlie’s treating source assessment “little weight,” but 

failed to explain why. A.R. 31-32. Because the ALJ’s opinion lacks findings and 

interpretations of the clinical medical evidence, it does not state specific and legitimate 

reasons for rejecting Dr. Charlie’s assessment. See, e.g., Trevizo, 871 F.3d at 676-77 

(“Far from ‘setting out a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting 

clinical evidence, stating [her] interpretation thereof, and making findings,’ the ALJ 

pointed to nothing in [the treating physician’s] notes or elsewhere in the clinical record 

that contradicted the treating physician’s opinions.”) (internal citation omitted)); Winans 

v. Bowen, 85 F.2d 643, 647 (9th Cir. 1987) (“[The ALJ’s c]onclusion is not supported by 

substantial evidence because no specific reasons were given.”); see also Brown-Hunter, 

806 F.3d at 495 (“Although the ALJ’s analysis need not be extensive, the ALJ must 
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provide some reasoning in order for us to meaningfully determine whether the ALJ’s 

conclusions were supported by substantial evidence.”). 

 The Commissioner concedes that the ALJ’s opinion lacks specific and legitimate 

reasons for rejecting Dr. Charlie’s statement. See Doc. 15 at 4. The Commissioner 

argues, nonetheless, that the Court can infer that the ALJ found Dr. Charlie’s assessment 

inconsistent with Plaintiff’s medical records because, ”[w]hen weighing the medical 

opinions in this case, the ALJ discounted those opinions, like Dr. Charlie’s, that were 

inconsistent with the record.” A.R. 32-32; Doc. 15 at 5-6; see also Magallanes, 881 F.2d 

at 755 (the reviewing court may draw specific and legitimate inferences from the ALJ’s 

opinion). The Commissioner also emphasizes the greater weight the ALJ gave to the 

consultative exams because they were “consistent with the medical record” (Doc. 15 at 

6), and that the ALJ stressed the “weight of the medical record” supported the residual 

functional capacity assessment (A.R. 32). 

 The Commissioner offers several examples of inconsistent evidence within 

Dr. Charlie’s treatment records. Doc. 15 at 6-7. But it is not the job of the Court to take 

a general finding – in this case, an unspoken conflict between the medical records and the 

treating physician’s opinion – and “comb the administrative record to find specific 

conflicts.” Burrell, 775 F.3d. at 1138. The Court declines the Commissioner’s invitation 

to scour the records for inconsistencies never identified by the ALJ. See Bray v. Comm’r 

of Soc. Sec. Admin, 554 F.3d 1219, 1225 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Long-standing principles of 

administrative law require us to review the ALJ’s decision based on the reasoning and 

factual findings offered by the ALJ – not post hoc rationalizations that attempt to intuit 

what the adjudicator may have been thinking.”). 

 An ALJ can reject a treating physician’s statement if it is “unsupported by the 

record as a whole or by objective medical findings.” Burrell v. Colvin, 775 F.3d 1133, 

1140 (9th Cir. 2014). But specific evidence must support this finding. Id. at 1138; 

Spendlove v. Comm’r, No. CV-17-08157-PCT-DGC, 2018 WL 3633744, at *3 (D. Ariz. 

July 31, 2018) (ALJ did not properly reject doctor’s opinion where he did not identify 
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any specific inconsistency within the notes). Here, on medical opinions for which the 

ALJ did give an explanation, he merely stated that the opinion was either consistent or 

inconsistent with the medical records, never detailing what medical records support or do 

not support the opinions. A.R. 31-32. For example, the ALJ afforded great weight to the 

postural limitations established by a non-examining DDS doctor, Dr. Griffith, but 

provided no explanation as to why the postural limitations are more consistent with the 

medical records than Dr. Charlie’s. A.R. 31. 

 Nor can the Court discern the ALJ’s reasons for rejecting Dr. Charlie’s opinion by 

looking to how he dealt with the opinions of other doctors. His reasoning for other 

doctors generally was not revealed, and, in some cases, appears to be contradictory. For 

example, Dr. Sharon Steingard opined that the claimant had trouble with simple threestep tasks, limited persistence, and “she was likely to be distracting to people around her 

as she would fidget due to pain.” A.R. 32. Dr. Karen Mansfield-Blair, by contrast, 

concluded that Plaintiff had the ability to “understand, remember, and carry out simple 

one to three step instructions and to engage in simple work-like procedures,” that “[s]he 

would have few difficulties with sustained concentration and persistence,” and that “[s]he 

was expected to interact appropriately with co-workers and supervisors.” Id. And yet the 

ALJ gave “great weight” to both of them. Id. 

 The ALJ’s error with respect to Dr. Charlie would be harmless if the Court could 

“conclude from the record that the ALJ would have reached the same result absent the 

error.” Molina, 674 F.3d at 1115; see also Marsh v. Colvin, 792 F.3d 1170, 1172 (9th 

Cir. 2015). Dr. Charlie opined that Plaintiff could not work full time or sit, stand, or walk 

for long portions of the day. A.R. 340. The vocational expert testified that an individual 

needing to lie down for one to three hours over the course of the work day would not be 

able to perform Plaintiff’s “past work and other work.” See A.R. 71. The Court cannot 

conclude that the ALJ would have reached the same conclusions had he properly 

evaluated Dr. Charlie’s opinion. The ALJ’s error was not harmless. 
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B. Plaintiff’s Symptom Testimony. 

 In evaluating a claimant’s symptom testimony, the ALJ must engage in a two-step 

analysis. First, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant presented objective medical 

evidence of an impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce the symptoms 

alleged. Revels, 874 F.3d at 655 (citing Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1014). The claimant is not 

required to show that her impairment could reasonably be expected to cause the severity 

of her alleged symptoms, only that it could reasonably have caused some degree of the 

symptoms. Id. Second, if there is no evidence of malingering, the ALJ may reject the 

claimant’s symptom testimony only by giving specific, clear, and convincing reasons. 

Id.1

 The ALJ described Plaintiff’s symptom testimony: 

The claimant alleged she had chronic pain and fatigue in the function report 

dated February 26, 2014. She explained she had her family help her with 

cleaning. She explained she had difficulty with sleeping. She explained 

she needed help preparing meals. She explained she could drive. She had 

no difficulties handling her finances. She alleged difficulties with lifting, 

squatting, bending, standing, reaching, walking, sitting, kneeling, stair 

climbing, memory, completing tasks, and concentration. She explained she 

could walk half a block before having to stop and rest for up to five minutes 

before resuming walking. She explained she had difficulty following 

written instructions when she was in pain. She did not report difficulty 

getting along with authority figures. In the function report dated September 

21, 2014, she did not note problems with memory or with completing tasks. 

 The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments could 

reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms, but that Plaintiff’s statements 

 

1

 The Commissioner argues the Court should uphold the finding unless it is “inherently 

incredible or patently unreasonable.” Doc. 15 at 2 (citing Retlaw Board. Co. v. Nat’l 

Labor Relations Bd., 53 F.3d 1002, 1005 (9th Cir. 1995)). The Commissioner asserts that 

“[a]n ALJ’s credibility finding need only be ‘sufficiently specific to permit the 

[reviewing] court to conclude that the ALJ did not arbitrarily discredit a claimant’s 

testimony.” Doc. 15 at 2 (citing Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 345 (9th Cir. 1991)). 

But the Bunnell decision did not overrule the requirement for clear and convincing 

evidence. At most, it added the word “specific” to that requirement. See Burrell, 773 

F.3d at 1136-37. The Commissioner’s argument does not change the Court’s analysis. 
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concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of these symptoms were not 

entirely consistent and credible. See A.R. 30. The ALJ provided two reasons to support 

his finding (A.R. 30-31), and Plaintiff disputes both (Doc. 14 at 19-24). 

1. First Reason. 

 The ALJ first found that Plaintiff’s daily activities were inconsistent with her 

testimony: 

Despite the claimant’s allegations of pain and fatigue, she was able to care 

for her daughter each day. She helped get her to school and helped with 

homework. She reported being able to ride her bike with her daughter in 

October 2012. These actions were inconsistent with the extent of the 

claimant’s pain as alleged. 

A.R. 30. 

 An ALJ may reject a claimant’s symptom testimony if it is inconsistent with the 

claimant’s daily activities. See Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2005). 

But “ALJs must be especially cautious in concluding that daily activities are inconsistent 

with testimony about pain, because impairments that would unquestionably preclude 

work and all the pressures of a workplace environment will often be consistent with 

doing more than merely resting in bed all day.” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1016. Thus, an 

ALJ may use a claimant’s daily activities to discredit symptom testimony only if the 

activities contradict the claimed limitations, or the claimant “spend[s] a substantial part of 

[her] day engaged in pursuits involving the performance of physical functions that are 

transferable to a work setting.” Orn, 495 F.3d at 639. 

 The ALJ relied on the Plaintiff’s Function Report where she recounted her daily 

activities, including: getting her daughter ready for school, helping her daughter with 

homework, feeding her daughter, and playing with her daughter (reading or coloring). 

See A.R. 214. The ALJ also relied on a physical therapy report from October, 2012, 

which stated, “[Patient] reported pain is better today and feels pretty good. [Patient] 

stated she has been able to do more at home and has been riding her bike with her 

daughter more since starting therapy.” A.R. 306. 
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 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to demonstrate how these activities are 

inconsistent with her testimony, and contends that “[r]eliance on the limited activities 

cited by the ALJ is particularly inappropriate when considering the severity of claimant’s 

fibromyalgia, which is marked by ‘ups’ and ‘downs’ in symptom severity.” Id. 16; see 

also Revels, 874 F.3d at 663. The Court agrees. The ALJ did not find that Plaintiff spent 

a substantial part of her day performing these activities. Nor did the ALJ explain why 

Plaintiff’s activities were inconsistent with her claimed limitations. Further, statements 

in the same Function Report indicate that Plaintiff often receives assistance from her 

family members. A.R. 214-17. The Court cannot conclude that this is a clear and 

convincing reason to reject Plaintiff’s symptom testimony. 

 2. Second Reason. 

 The ALJ reasoned that “inconsistent allegations concerning the claimant’s 

symptoms made it difficult to understand how limiting her condition was in actuality.” 

A.R. 31. The ALJ points to three pieces of evidence: 

[1] In the claimant’s adult Function Reports, dated February 26, 2014 and 

September 21, 2014, there were inconsistent allegations concerning the 

claimant’s memory, understanding, and ability to follow instructions. 

However she reported issues concerning her memory, understanding, and 

ability to follow instructions to the consultative examiner Sharon Steingard 

October 10, 2014. 

[2] She did not describe psychiatric problems in visits to Valley Arthritis 

Care. . . . 

[3] The claimant was noted as not taking her anxiety medication in April 

2016. This was inconsistent with the allegations of the extent and severity 

of the claimant’s anxiety. 

A.R. 30-31. 

 The Court may consider inconsistencies in a claimant’s testimony when evaluating 

the nature, severity, and effect of the claimed symptoms. Thomas, 278 F.3d at 958-59. 

But it is error to reject a claimant’s testimony merely because symptoms wax and wane. 

Id. at 1018. Examples from the record can show clear and convincing evidence, but “the 
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data points [an ALJ chooses] must in fact constitute examples of a broader development 

to satisfy” the standard. Diedrich v. Berryhill, 874 F.3d 634, 642 (9th Cir. 2017) 

(absence of mental health symptoms in one record not sufficient); Thomas, 278 F.3d at 

1018 (finding some mental health symptoms came and went while others persisted the 

whole period of disability). 

 The ALJ’s first reason notes that Plaintiff has given inconsistent reports about her 

memory, understanding, and ability to follow instructions. See A.R. 30. Plaintiff 

complained about memory issues in her consultative examination in October, 2014 (see

A.R. 496), but did not check the boxes indicating issues with memory, understanding, or 

following instructions in her Function Reports of February 26, 2014 and September 21, 

2014 (A.R. 218; A.R. 245). The ALJ also noted that Plaintiff performed well on a 

memory test and exhibited the ability to follow simple one- to three-step instructions. 

A.R. 28. These inconsistencies constitute a clear and convincing reason for questioning 

Plaintiff’s claims regarding her memory and understanding. See Carmickle v. Comm’r, 

Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1161 (9th Cir. 2008) (An ALJ may rely on 

contradictory medical evidence to discredit symptom testimony so long as he makes 

“specific findings justifying his decision.”); Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 750 (9th Cir. 

2007) (inconsistencies between claimant’s allegations of knee pain and tests showing 

normal knee function constituted substantial reasons to doubt credibility of claimant’s 

testimony); Fruits v. Colvin, No. CV-12-02448-PHX-DGC, 2013 WL 5655563, at *7 (D. 

Ariz. Oct. 17, 2013) (clear and convincing evidence where the ALJ noted specific 

medical records that conflicted with plaintiff’s alleged impairments). 

 The ALJ’s second reason – Plaintiff’s failure to report depression symptoms in her 

Valley Arthritis Care records – is not clear and convincing. In over one hundred pages of 

medical records, Plaintiff reported symptoms of depression on some occasions and not on 

others. Compare A.R. 343-45; A.R. 365-67; A.R. 378; A.R. 447; A.R. 453-54; A.R. 503-

24 (reporting symptoms of depression), with A.R. 346-48; A.R. 369-77; A.R. 382-93. 

Her failure to report symptoms on some occasions does not constitute clear and 
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convincing evidence that she lacked the symptoms when she clearly reported them on 

many other occasions. 

 The ALJ’s third reason – Plaintiff’s failure to take her anxiety medication – is 

clear and convincing. Doc. 15 at 4. An ALJ may consider “unexplained or inadequately 

explained failure to seek treatment or to follow a prescribed course of treatment” when 

evaluating credibility. Molina, 674 F.3d at 1112 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Tommasetti v. 

Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2008)). Plaintiff fails to explain why she stopped 

taking anxiety medication on the date indicated in the record. See Fair v. Bowen, 885 

F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989) (a claimant’s failure to assert a good reason for not 

following a prescribed treatment can cast doubt on the claimant’s testimony). 

 In summary, the ALJ provided clear and convincing reasons for discrediting 

Plaintiff’s claims regarding her memory and understanding and the severity of her 

anxiety, but erred in failing to provide sufficient reasons for discounting the rest of her 

symptoms. See Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1284 (9th Cir. 1996) (“The ALJ must 

state specifically which symptom testimony is not credible and what facts in the record 

lead to that conclusion.”). This error was not harmless. Plaintiff’s physical limitation 

testimony – which was not properly discredited by the ALJ – conflicts with the RFC 

determination on which the ALJ based his ultimate finding of nondisability. The 

improperly discredited testimony could have affected the finding of nondisability. 

V. Scope of Remand. 

 The ALJ erred in his consideration of Dr. Charlie’s medical opinion and Plaintiff’s 

physical symptom testimony. Plaintiff contends that, crediting Dr. Charlie’s opinions and 

her testimony as true, the Court must remand for an award of benefits. Doc. 14 at 11, 17. 

Defendant counters that the appropriate remedy is a remand for further proceedings. 

Doc. 15 at 7-8. 

 “When the ALJ denies benefits and the Court finds error, the Court ordinarily 

must remand to the agency for further proceedings before directing an award of benefits.” 

Leon v. Berryhill, 880 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2017). Under a “rare exception” to this 
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rule, the Court may remand for an immediate award of benefits after conducting a threepart inquiry: 

First, we ask whether the ALJ failed to provide legally sufficient reasons 

for rejecting evidence, whether claimant testimony or medical opinion. 

Next, we determine whether there are outstanding issues that must be 

resolved before a disability determination can be made, and whether further 

administrative proceedings would be useful. When these first two 

conditions are satisfied, we then credit the discredited testimony as true for 

the purpose of determining whether, on the record taken as a whole, there is 

no doubt as to disability 

Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Leon emphasized that the Court has 

discretion to remand for further proceedings even if it reaches the third step. Id. “Where 

an ALJ makes a legal error, but the record is uncertain and ambiguous, the proper 

approach is to remand the case to the agency.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). 

 The ALJ failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting Dr. Charlie’s 

medical opinion and Plaintiff’s physical symptoms, and, if credited as true, these would 

require the ALJ to enter an award of benefits. See A.R. 71 (testimony of Social Security 

administration’s vocational expert, concluding that Plaintiff would be precluded from 

doing any work if she suffered the limitations described in Dr. Charlie’s opinion). The 

Court’s independent evaluation of the record as a whole does not reveal any substantial 

grounds for doubting that Plaintiff is disabled. The Court concludes that remand for an 

award of benefits is the appropriate remedy in this case. 

IT IS ORDERED that the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 

is vacated and this case is remanded for an award of benefits based on Plaintiff’s 

application dated November 26, 2013, with a finding of disability beginning August 1, 

2012. The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly and terminate this action. 

Dated this 24th day of October, 2018.