UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

BYRON TYROME TODD, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant, 

v. 

USA, in corporate capacity; U.S. 

PERSON(S), named herein as John Does in 

corporate capacity; THE WORLD BANK, 

capacity as USA Alter Ego, 

 Defendants - Appellees. 

No. 15-1249 

(D.C. No. 1:15-CV-00344-LTB) 

(D. Colo.) 

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ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

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Before TYMKOVICH, Chief Judge, HARTZ and MORITZ, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

Byron Tyrome Todd, a Colorado state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district 

court’s order dismissing his second amended complaint without prejudice for failure 

to comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Todd also requests leave to proceed in forma 

 *

 After examining Todd’s brief and the appellate record, this panel has 

determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the 

determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The 

case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment 

is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, 

and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value. See 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit 

October 27, 2015

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
2 

pauperis (IFP) on appeal. We grant Todd’s motion to proceed IFP, but we affirm the 

district court’s dismissal of Todd’s complaint.1

 

We review a district court’s dismissal of a complaint under Rule 8(a) for abuse 

of discretion. United States ex rel. Lemmon v. Envirocare of Utah, Inc., 614 F.3d 

1163, 1167 (10th Cir. 2010). 

Rule 8(a) requires that a complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the 

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and . . . a demand for the relief 

sought.” Todd’s pro se status doesn’t relieve him of the duty to comply with the rules 

of civil procedure. See United States v. Ceballos–Martinez, 387 F.3d 1140, 1145 

(10th Cir. 2004). And while we construe a pro se litigant’s pleadings liberally, 

holding such pleadings to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers, 

we don’t assume an advocacy role for the pro se litigant. Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 

1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). 

After reviewing the appeal record, we conclude the district court didn’t abuse 

its discretion in dismissing Todd’s second amended complaint. In three separate 

orders, the magistrate judge informed Todd of deficiencies in his pleadings and 

explained to him how to cure those deficiencies. Yet Todd entirely failed to do so, 

ultimately filing a second amended complaint which the district court described as 

 1

 We ordinarily lack jurisdiction to review the dismissal of a complaint without 

prejudice. But we have jurisdiction here because the district court dismissed the 

entire action, not just the complaint. See B. Willis, C.P.A., Inc. v. BNSF Ry. Corp., 

531 F.3d 1282, 1296 n. 15 (10th Cir. 2008) (holding that the dismissal of a complaint 

ordinarily is a non-final, nonappealable order since amendment generally is available, 

while dismissal of the entire action ordinarily is final). 
3 

follows: “[T]he second amended complaint recites an array of statutory and commonlaw causes of action with little, if any, connection to the factual allegations. The 

allegations themselves are fanciful and delusional. Indeed, the factual allegations 

themselves are so confusing and disjointed so as to render the legal claims 

incomprehensible.” District Court Order, ECF No. 16, at 3. 

We fully agree with the district court’s summary of the second amended 

complaint and with the court’s conclusion that even a liberal construction doesn’t 

bring the amended complaint within the ambit of Rule 8(a)(2). We thus affirm the 

district court’s dismissal of Todd’s second amended complaint. However, we grant 

Todd’s motion to proceed IFP and remind him of his obligation to continue making 

payments until the filing fee is paid in full. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b). 

Entered for the Court 

Nancy L. Moritz 

Circuit Judge