Filed 12/29/20 In re Amira A. CA2/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re AMIRA A. et al., Persons

Coming Under the Juvenile 

Court Law.

 B301682

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. DK10281A-B)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF 

CHILDREN AND FAMILY 

SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

HANIA A.,

Defendant and Appellant;

MARIA T.,

Respondent.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles 

County. Steven E. Ipson, Judge Pro Tempore. Affirmed.
2

Daniel G. Rooney, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel, and David Michael 

Miller, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Liana Serobian, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, 

for Respondent.

_________________________

Hania A. (father) appeals an order granting full legal and 

physical custody of Noah A. (Noah) to Maria T. (mother), allowing 

mother to move Amira A. (Amira)1 and Noah (collectively minors) 

to Minnesota,

2 and restricting father’s visitation. He contends 

that the order must be reversed because he was denied 

procedural due process. Because he has not demonstrated that 

he preserved the issue for review, or that he suffered prejudice, 

we affirm.

1 Amira is sometimes referred to as Amirah in the appellate 

record.

2 The juvenile court did not expressly rule that mother could 

move minors to Minnesota. At most, its orders gave mother 

implied permission. An implied order in a juvenile dependency 

case can be reviewed on appeal. (In re Kristin W. (1990) 222 

Cal.App.3d 234, 246.)
3

FACTS

Background

The Department of Children and Family Services 

(Department) filed a petition pursuant to Welfare and 

Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a), (b) and (j)3 on 

behalf of minors. After it was amended by interlineation and 

certain counts were dismissed without prejudice, it alleged that 

minors were exposed to a risk of harm due to father’s mental 

state, his use of inappropriate physical discipline, and his history 

of domestic violence with mother. 

The petition was sustained on December 16, 2015. 

The Contested Review Hearing

The juvenile court held a contested section 364 review 

hearing review on January 6, 2017, April 14, 2017, April 26, 

2017, May 4, 2017, June 1, 2017, January 24, 2018, June 8, 2018, 

August 17, 2018, August 24, 2018, and October 19, 2018. 

Multiple witnesses testified.

The Department recommended that the juvenile court 

terminate jurisdiction and grant mother and father joint legal 

and physical custody of minors. The Department’s attorney

noted that the case involved allegations of father’s inappropriate 

discipline of Amira, domestic violence, father’s 2015 conviction for 

spousal injury, and father’s diagnosis of posttraumatic stress 

disorder and obsessive-compulsive disorder. When the juvenile 

court asked if there was a presumption against joint custody in 

cases involving domestic violence, the Department’s attorney

stated, “There is, your honor, but the Department believes that

. . . based on all the testimony by the therapist and other 

3 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and 

Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
4

witnesses, that . . . father has been rehabilitated.” Per the 

Department’s attorney, the Department did not see the “case as a 

child safety case but rather a family law dispute between the 

parents.” She stated, “[The Department] believes that there is no 

child safety concern here. And that the parents need to resolve 

their differences through Family Court.” 

Father’s attorney joined the Department’s argument and 

asked the juvenile court to follow the recommendation of joint 

legal and physical custody. Mother’s attorney argued that father 

failed to complete the case plan, there was an ongoing risk of 

harm, and he should not be given shared custody of the minors. 

Minors’ attorney argued that the juvenile court should grant the 

parents joint legal and physical custody of Noah and, as to Amira, 

grant joint legal custody but sole physical custody to mother. 

The juvenile court granted mother sole legal and physical 

custody of Amira, and granted father monitored visits. With 

respect to Noah, the juvenile court awarded mother and father 

joint legal and physical custody with the proviso that Noah’s

primary residence be with mother.4 The minute order stated that 

mediation was on January 15, 2019, and a Family Law Order 

was due on January 18, 2019. It stated, “Termination of 

jurisdiction is stayed pending the receipt of the Juvenile Custody 

Order[.]”

The Continuing and Uncontested Review Hearings; 

Intervening Incidents

On June 7, 2019, the parties appeared for the ongoing 

review hearing. The juvenile court entered the following orders:

4 Father appealed in case No. B294507. That appeal was 

later dismissed as moot.
5

“Father is to have monitored visits [once] per week . . . at a 

[Department] office. . . . The [juvenile court] modifies its prior 

orders as to . . . Noah to reflect [that mother] . . . [shall] have sole 

legal and sole physical custody and [f]ather [shall] have 

monitored visits as reflected above, based upon [f]ather’s] conduct 

in [c]ourt] this date. All prior orders remain in full force and 

effect as to . . . Amira.”

5

Mother and minors traveled to Minnesota on July 8, 2019. 

Several weeks later, mother’s attorney submitted a walk-on 

request seeking the juvenile court’s approval for mother to move 

to Minnesota with minors. At an August 16, 2019, hearing, the 

juvenile court informed the parties that it was inclined to allow 

mother to move. Father’s attorney wanted to argue, and the 

juvenile court stated, “It is too late to hear the matter now.” The 

matter was continued to August 23, 2019, and then to 

September 3, 2019. In the meantime, father filed a section 388 

petition to change the June 7, 2019, order modifying custody and 

giving mother sole legal and physical custody of Noah.

On September 3, 2019, the juvenile court denied the section 

388 petition because it did not state new evidence or a change of 

circumstances. The juvenile court indicated that it was inclined 

5 The juvenile court later stated: “My recollection of that 

incident does show that the father certainly acted in a way that 

was inappropriate. My recollection is he somewhat jerked up out 

of his seat. Began yelling, lunged in the direction of the mother 

and her counsel, and was waving and pointing his finger. That’s 

my recollection. [¶] I don’t recall the specific words, but the voice 

was an elevated voice that was hostile towards that part of the 

table, those persons at that part of the table. I was alarmed by 

the father’s behavior.” 
6

to allow mother and minors to remain in Minnesota pending a 

further order. 

On September 19, 2019, the parties convened again for the 

ongoing review hearing. The juvenile court vacated all prior 

orders. The Department recommended that the juvenile court 

grant sole legal and physical custody of both minors to mother. 

Its attorney explained the basis of the recommendation, stating,

“[F]ather has not benefited from the programs that he was 

ordered to do, such as counseling and anger management, as 

evidenced by the in-court conduct that led the [juvenile court] to 

vacate findings.” The juvenile court stated that its indicated 

ruling was to grant sole legal and physical custody to mother and 

monitored visits to father as agreed by mother and father.6

No witnesses were called to testify. 

Father’s attorney argued that father’s behavior on June 7, 

2019, was a one-time occurrence and stated, “So we believe it 

would be inappropriate at this time to make the orders that have 

been made[.]” He asked the juvenile court to set the matter for a 

hearing to determine if father’s outburst in court was an 

aberration. 

Also, father’s attorney presented argument, inter alia, 

regarding visitation and the impact of mother moving the minors 

to Minnesota. He cited In re Marriage of LaMusga (2004) 32 

6 “Under section 362.4, the juvenile court may, when it 

terminates jurisdiction over a case, issue an order ‘determining 

the custody of, or visitation with, the child.’ The juvenile court’s 

section 362.4 order may be enforced or modified by the family 

court. [Citations.] Custody and visitation orders issued under 

section 362.4 are sometimes referred to as ‘family law’ orders or 

‘exit’ orders.” (In re Ryan K. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 591, 594, 

fn. 5.)
7

Cal.4th 1072 (LaMusga) as requiring a court to consider various 

factors before allowing a custodial parent to move a child away. 

He requested that mother’s move-away issue go to the Family 

Law Court for a decision. If the juvenile court was not so 

inclined, father’s attorney requested a continuance of a week or 

two to consider the matter in light of LaMusga. The juvenile 

court terminated jurisdiction and granted mother sole legal and 

physical custody of minors. It further stated, “I don’t believe 

. . . father has benefited from programs. Monitored visits to 

. . . father with any agreed-upon monitor. If no monitor is agreed 

upon, a paid professional monitor paid for by . . . father. [¶] The 

[juvenile] court will allow phone calls and Skype calls, a 

minimum of four times a week.” It ordered the calls to take place 

at 8:00 p.m. in the time zone in which minors resided. 

Father appealed on October 21, 2019, from the denial of his 

section 388 petition, the order terminating jurisdiction, and the 

custody orders. The dates of the orders were December 18, 2018, 

January 15, 2019, January 18, 2019, March 26, 2019, March 28, 

2019, April 12, 2019, May 3, 2019, June 7, 2019, June 20, 2019, 

August 16, 2019, August 23, 2019, September 3, 2019, 

September 19, 2019, and September 20, 2019. 
8

DISCUSSION

Father contends that the juvenile court denied his right to 

procedural due process by modifying the custody order, 

restricting his visitation with minors, and approving mother’s 

move without holding contested hearings. We presume that he 

contends that due process entitled him to call and cross-examine 

witnesses before the juvenile court ruled.

I. Due Process; Standard of Review.

Under state and federal law, due process entitles a party to 

notice and an opportunity to be heard. The opportunity to be 

heard must be at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. 

(Today’s Fresh Start, Inc. v. Los Angeles County Office of 

Education (2013) 57 Cal.4th 197, 212.) 

Due process requirements vary, “as not every context to 

which the right to procedural due process applies requires the 

same procedure. . . . Consequently, due process is a flexible 

concept, as the characteristic of elasticity is required . . . to tailor 

the process to the particular need. [Citations.] Thus, not every 

situation requires a formal hearing accompanied by the full 

rights of confrontation and cross-examination. [Citation.]” (Ryan 

v. California Interscholastic Federation-San Diego Section (2001) 

94 Cal.App.4th 1048, 1072.) 

“It is axiomatic that due process guarantees apply to 

dependency proceedings. [Citations.] Parties to such proceedings 

have a due process right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, 

at least at the jurisdictional phase. [Citation.]” (Ingrid E. v. 

Superior Court (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 751, 756–757.)

The denial of procedural due process is a legal question 

subject to de novo review. (Severson & Werson, P.C. v. SepehryFard (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 938, 944.) If there is a violation of 
9

due process, reversal is not required if it was harmless beyond a 

reasonable doubt. (In re Enrique G. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 676, 

686–687.)

II. Modified Custody Order. 

Father did not preserve his objection to the modified 

custody order because he did not raise it below.

“A prerequisite to raising an issue for appellate review is 

an objection in the trial court. . . . The rule also requires the 

objection be made on the same grounds urged on appeal.” (People 

v. Derello (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 414, 428.) In People v. Partida

(2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 435, the court “held that constitutional 

arguments raised for the first time on appeal are not forfeited if 

they do not invoke reasons different from those the trial court 

was asked to apply, but merely assert that the trial court’s act or 

omission, to the extent erroneous for the reasons actually 

presented to that court, ‘had the additional legal consequence of 

violating’ the Constitution. [Citation.]” (People v. Farley (2009) 

46 Cal.4th 1053, 1095.)

In his reply brief, father cites In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 

1287, 1293 & fn. 2 (S.B.) to support a theory that he preserved 

his constitutional objection by consistently raising the issues of 

visitation, custody and minors’ residency, and by opposing the 

juvenile court’s rulings on those matters. He essentially contends 

that if he objected to a ruling on one specific ground, that 

operates as a placeholder so that he can raise any other 

conceivable ground on appeal. On page 1293, S.B. only states the 

accepted and unremarkable proposition that the forfeiture rule 

applies in dependency matters. (Id. at p. 1293.) Footnote 2 

provides: “Although the loss of the right to challenge a ruling on 

appeal because of the failure to object in the trial court is often 
10

referred to as a ‘waiver,’ the correct legal term for the loss of a 

right based on failure to timely assert it is ‘forfeiture,’ because a 

person who fails to preserve a claim forfeits that claim. In 

contrast, a waiver is the ‘“‘intentional relinquishment or 

abandonment of a known right.”’ [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 1293, 

fn. 2.) Nothing in S.B. establishes that a due process objection is 

preserved when a party objects to or otherwise opposes rulings on 

other grounds. We therefore conclude that S.B. does not aid 

father’s appeal.

III. Visitation.

Insofar as father suggests that the September 19, 2019, 

order restricted his visitation without a contested hearing, he has 

not demonstrated that he objected at the September 19, 2019

hearing to a violation of his procedural due process rights, i.e., a 

denial of the opportunity to call or cross-examine witnesses. Nor 

did he demonstrate that he sought a hearing to introduce new 

evidence. Regardless, he has not attempted to demonstrate that 

he suffered prejudice. Finally, at the September 19, 2019, 

hearing, father’s attorney had ample opportunity to argue

visitation issues.

IV. Approval of Mother’s Move.

Father suggests that he was denied procedural due process 

because he was not given a separate hearing to present new 

evidence regarding mother’s move. He did not raise a due 

process objection below, so the issue is forfeited. Nor has he 

attempted to show prejudice. Also, at the September 19, 2019, 

hearing, father did not inform the juvenile court that he had new 

evidence to introduce. 
11

V. Other Issues.

To the degree father raises issues other than procedural 

due process, we have not considered them. In his introduction, 

he states only that he was denied due process without contested 

hearings. In his argument, he has just two headings, each of 

which pertains to due process. Each point should appear under a 

separate heading or it need not be considered by the reviewing 

court. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B); Heavenly Valley v. 

El Dorado County Bd. of Equalization (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 

1323, 1345, fn. 17.)

DISPOSITION

The orders are affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

__________________________, J.

ASHMANN-GERST

We concur:

__________________________, P. J.

LUI

_________________________, J.

CHAVEZ