IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 19-1431

Filed April 29, 2020

IN THE INTEREST OF K.C.,

Minor Child,

H.M., Mother,

Petitioner-Appellee,

K.R.C., Father,

Respondent-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Floyd County, Karen Kaufman Salic, 

District Associate Judge.

A father appeals the termination of his parental rights in a proceeding 

brought under Iowa Code chapter 600A. AFFIRMED.

Judith O’Donohoe of Elwood, O’Donohoe, Braun, White, LLP, Charles City, 

for appellant father.

Ann M. Troge, Charles City, for appellee mother.

Marilyn Dettmer of Dettmer Law Firm, Charles City, attorney and guardian 

ad litem for minor child.

Considered by Bower, C.J., and Greer and Ahlers, JJ.
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AHLERS, Judge.

The father of the child appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating 

his parental rights under Iowa Code chapter 600A (2019). His primary arguments 

relate to challenges to the juvenile court’s findings that the mother proved 

abandonment and it was in the best interest of the child to terminate his rights. He 

also claims it was error for the juvenile court to consider the guardian ad litem’s 

report to the court and to deny his request to leave the record open so he could

depose a witness and submit the transcript of that deposition. Finding no error, 

we affirm.

I. Standard of Review.

We review termination proceedings under chapter 600A de novo. See In re

R.K.B., 572 N.W.2d 600, 601 (Iowa 1998). As in all termination proceedings, our 

primary concern is the child’s best interest. See Iowa Code § 600A.1; R.K.B.,

572 N.W.2d at 601. Though the juvenile court’s fact findings are not binding, we 

give them weight. See R.K.B., 572 N.W.2d at 601. This is especially true with 

regard to credibility findings. See id.

II. Background Facts and Proceedings.

In terms of background facts, we start by noting the juvenile court issued a 

thorough and detailed ruling setting forth factual findings and legal conclusions. 

Upon our de novo review, we are in substantial agreement with all significant 

factual findings made by the juvenile court. We will attempt to highlight some of 

the most significant details.

The father was in the United States Air Force stationed in Wyoming and 

married to the mother when the child was born in 2005. For the first eighteen 
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months of the child’s life, both parents were extensively involved in caring for the 

child in Wyoming. In the spring of 2007, due to marital difficulties, the mother and 

the child moved to California where the mother’s parents lived. The mother filed 

for divorce in California, and the marriage was dissolved in December 2007. The 

divorce decree gave the mother custody of the child, left visitation up to the 

agreement of the parties, and ordered the father to pay child support. Until the 

termination hearing, the last time the father saw the child in person was while the 

divorce was pending in 2007. For the next two years after the divorce, the father 

maintained some communication with the child through the mother and would send 

Christmas and birthday gifts. This ended in the fall of 2009 after the father, while 

speaking to the child on the phone, heard the child refer to the mother’s boyfriend 

(now husband) as “daddy.” Thereafter, the father’s contact with the child and the 

mother became largely nonexistent. However, the mother kept the father 

continually apprised of her whereabouts, phone number, and email address as the 

mother, her husband, and the child moved to the state of Washington and then 

Iowa.

The mother and father eventually remarried others and each had a son with 

their respective new spouses. The father claims that in 2011 he had a 

conversation with the mother in which they agreed that, to avoid confusing the 

child, they would wait until the child was ten years old and then have a conversation 

explaining who the father was, since the child’s stepfather was the only father of 

whom she had memory. The mother denies such an agreement. Regardless of 

whether such an agreement was reached, based on his claimed belief there was 
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such an agreement, the father made essentially no effort to have any contact or 

relationship with the child for the next several years.

During the period from approximately 2011 to 2015, the father was stationed 

or deployed at various locations in Germany, Turkey, Africa, and England. During 

this time, he claims his military duties prevented him from having the opportunity 

to call, write to, Skype with, or send a card or gift to the child. He uses this claim, 

along with the claimed agreement to wait until the child was ten before introducing 

himself to her, as a reason for why he made no effort to contact the child in any 

meaningful way during this time. We share the juvenile court’s skepticism that the 

father’s military duties completely prevented him from doing any of those things. 

While we acknowledge the fact the father’s military service severely restricted his 

ability to physically visit the child as well as his ability to routinely communicate 

with the child in other ways due to deployments in areas with limited internet 

access or ability to make telephone calls, we are not persuaded such military 

service prevented all telephone, email, and mail communication options for years 

on end.

The conclusion the father’s military service did not prevent all 

communication is bolstered by the events surrounding the father’s son with his 

second wife. During this same time period when he was making no discernible 

effort to have any type of relationship with the child in this case, the father was 

divorced from his second wife, with whom he had a son, and married his third wife,

with whom the father lived in England. It came to the father’s attention that the 

son’s mother had severe drug problems that had resulted in the son being removed 

from his mother’s care. The father managed to arrange leave and transportation 
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back to Pennsylvania to fight court battles there that ultimately resulted in the father 

gaining custody of his son, having the son’s mother’s parental rights terminated, 

and having the son move to England to live with the father and his current wife. 

While we understand the fact the father was able to gain such leave based on the 

emergency nature of the proceedings, we find it telling that the father could 

manage to obtain leave and return to the United States to address the son’s issues, 

but he could not manage to make a telephone call, send an email, or send a letter 

to the child in this case. He also made no effort to arrange to see the child while 

he was back in the United States.

Sometime between 2012 and 2015, the mother and the father began to 

communicate about the child. Contrary to the father’s hope such communication 

would center around reintroducing him into the child’s life, as the father expected 

based on his purported belief there was an agreement to do so, the mother focused 

those conversations on requesting the father’s consent to termination of his 

parental rights. The father ultimately refused to consent. In doing so, he 

continually acknowledged the mother and the stepfather were serving as the 

parent figures for the child and he had no interest in disrupting that relationship. 

He merely wanted to be able to talk to the child. The mother highlighted the 

inducement that terminating his parental rights would end his child support 

obligation, which the father had been satisfying fully throughout the child’s life, but 

this did not persuade the father to consent.

In approximately 2017, the father returned to the United States, moving to

Texas with his current wife, his son (who had been adopted by his current wife), 

and the current wife’s daughter. He left the military in 2018. Even upon return to 
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the United States, the father made no discernible effort to communicate with or 

see the child. His stated reason for this was he did not want to disrupt the child’s 

relationship with the mother and stepfather, and, given the mother’s continual 

request for his consent to termination of his parental rights, he feared reaching out 

would cause the mother to start termination proceedings. To some degree, his 

fear was warranted. In March 2019, the child, who was thirteen years old at the 

time and had recently been given her first cell phone, tracked the father down on 

Facebook and initiated a messaging conversation with him. Both the father and 

the child seemed to enjoy the interaction. When the child shared this information 

with the mother, the mother began crying. Credibly claiming she did not want the 

child on Facebook at such a young age, the mother blocked the child’s access to 

Facebook entirely, not just access to the father. When the mother informed the 

father of this fact, the father did not disagree with the mother’s decision to block 

the child’s access to Facebook, but he requested an alternative method of 

contacting the child. The mother did not provide an alternative method. Instead, 

she filed this termination proceeding.

III. Discussion.

A. Statutory Grounds.

The petition seeking termination of the father’s parental rights alleged 

grounds of abandonment pursuant to Iowa Code section 600A.8(3)(b).1 One of 

 

1

Iowa Code section 600A.8(3)(b) sets forth following ground for termination:

If the child is six months of age or older when the termination hearing 

is held, a parent is deemed to have abandoned the child unless the 

parent maintains substantial and continuous or repeated contact with 

the child as demonstrated by contribution toward support of the child 
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the challenges to the father and the court in a case such as this is overcoming the 

mental hurdle of the use of the term “abandoned.” That term has inherent negative 

connotations of very broad scope. See Abandon, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 

2019) (defining “abandon” as “[t]o cease having (an idea, attitude, or belief); to give 

over or surrender utterly.”). The father can naturally ask how he can be found to 

have abandoned the child when he was fulfilling half of the parenting duties for the 

first eighteen months of the child’s life, paid the agreed amount of child support 

faithfully for twelve years after the parents ended their marriage, maintained an 

interest in the child, and knew the child was in good hands in a known location. 

This situation would not be what many people think of when they envision a parent 

“abandoning” a child. However, abandonment in the context of this proceeding is 

a term defined by statute. The statutory definition is much more limited in scope 

than a common understanding of the concept of abandonment. Under the statute, 

in addition to providing for the child’s financial support, a parent must also maintain 

 

of a reasonable amount, according to the parent’s means, and as 

demonstrated by any of the following:

(1) Visiting the child at least monthly when physically and 

financially able to do so and when not prevented from doing so by 

the person having lawful custody of the child.

(2) Regular communication with the child or with the person 

having the care or custody of the child, when physically and 

financially unable to visit the child or when prevented from visiting 

the child by the person having lawful custody of the child.

(3) Openly living with the child for a period of six months within 

the one-year period immediately preceding the termination of 

parental rights hearing and during that period openly holding himself 

or herself out to be the parent of the child.

The phrase “to abandon a minor child” means a parent “rejects the duties 

imposed by the parent-child relationship . . . which may be evinced by the person, 

while being able to do so, making no provision or making only a marginal effort to 

provide for the support of the child or to communicate with the child.” Iowa Code 

§ 600A.2(20).
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substantial and continuous or repeated contact with the child in the manner 

described in section 600A.8(3)(b)(1)-(3). If the parent does not act as described, 

the “parent is deemed to have abandoned the child.” Iowa Code § 600A.8(3)(b); 

see also, e.g., In re W.W., 826 N.W.2d 706, 710-11 (Iowa Ct. App. 2012) (finding 

a mother abandoned her children after she did not see, communicate with, or 

financially support them for seven years); In re G.A., 826 N.W.2d 125, 129-30 

(Iowa Ct. App. 2012) (finding a father abandoned his child—who was almost five 

years old when the mother filed the petition—after he did not have or request 

contact with the child in more than one year); In re C.A.V., 787 N.W.2d 96, 101-02 

(Iowa Ct. App. 2010) (finding a father abandoned his child after he had no contact 

with the child for three years, even though he had repeated contact during the 

child’s first thirteen months of life and he was current on his child support 

obligations at the time of the hearing).

In this case, there is no question the father fulfilled his financial support 

obligations, as he paid all agreed-upon support obligations in a timely manner. 

However, under the statute, financial support alone is not enough. See C.A.V., 

787 N.W.2d at 102 (“[The father’s] contributions to his child’s financial well-being 

do not overcome his complete abstention from fostering her physical, social, and 

emotional development.”). In this case, the father did not meet his obligations for 

maintaining substantial and continuous or repeated contact with the child. The 

evidence clearly and convincingly established the father did not visit the child 

monthly, did not maintain regular communication with the child or the mother, and 

did not openly live with the child for a period of six months within the one-year 
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period immediately preceding the termination hearing. See Iowa Code 

§ 600A.8(3)(b)(1)-(3). 

The lack of communication and contact by the father was not caused by 

efforts by the mother to prevent such communication or contact. The father simply 

did not try. We are mindful of the fact the father’s military duties made 

communication more challenging than for a non-military person, and the father’s 

military assignments may have resulted in there being months when he could not 

have maintained contact. He could and would be excused for those periods of 

time. However, the father’s military duties did not prevent him from all 

communication and contact for the nearly twelve-year period during which the 

father had little to no contact with the child or the mother about the child. We, like 

the juvenile court, find it unlikely to the point of unbelievable that the father was 

unable to send letters, cards, gifts, or emails or make periodic phone calls for 

twelve years. In his brief, the father attempts to blame the mother for the lack of 

contact. These claims are not supported by the record. The father’s brief implies 

the father was powerless and helpless to forge a relationship with the child, while 

the record demonstrates the father made no meaningful effort. Even by the 

father’s own admissions, when the child was approximately three to five years old, 

he agreed to take a hiatus until the child was ten before being “introduced” to her. 

He claims the agreement for him to be reintroduced at age ten was breached when 

the mother began pestering him to consent to termination of his parental rights. 

Besides the fact the mother denies there was any such agreement, the fact the 

father voluntarily agreed to have no communication with or about the child for five 

to seven years demonstrates abandonment as contemplated by the statute. Even 
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after the father discovered the breach of the alleged agreement, the father still took

no action to reinitiate contact with the child in any significant way. Under the 

circumstances of this case, we find no error in the juvenile court’s determination 

that the statutory grounds for abandonment were established by clear and 

convincing proof. See id.

B. Best Interest of the Child.

Finding the statutory grounds for termination of parental rights have been 

met does not end the discussion, however, as private termination proceedings 

under Iowa Code chapter 600A involve a two-step process. In re B.H.A., 938 

N.W.2d 227, 232 (Iowa 2020). In addition to proving grounds for termination, the 

filing party must prove by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the 

best interest of the child. Id.

The father cites In re Q.G., 911 N.W.2d 761 (Iowa 2018), in support of his 

argument it is not in the child’s best interest to terminate his parental rights. It is 

understandable the father cites Q.G., as the father in that case engaged in horrible 

parenting. The father in Q.G. had been a methamphetamine abuser, physically 

assaulted his wife (the mother of the children at issue) on two occasions, and 

endangered one of the children during one of the physical assaults. 911 N.W.2d 

at 762-65. He also possessed an illegal fully-automatic rifle and was attempting

to make illegal silencers for one or more firearms. Id. At the time of the termination 

hearing, he was in prison on state charges of domestic abuse assault, child 

endangerment, and possession of methamphetamine and also on federal charges 

of possession of a firearm while unlawfully using a controlled substance. Id. In 

the time before and after entering prison, the father blamed the mother for his 
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situation and threatened revenge. Id. at 765-66. In spite of all that, the father and 

the mother entered a stipulation in their dissolution of marriage proceedings a few 

months before the termination-of-parental-rights proceedings were started in 

which the parties agreed to the father’s visitation and contemplated modification of 

that visitation once he was released from prison. Id. at 767. In the meantime, the 

mother started a relationship with another man who the children referred to as 

“daddy” and who intended to adopt the children. Id. Although the juvenile court 

terminated the father’s parental rights of the father to the five-year-old and threeyear-old children, the supreme court reversed based on the best-interest-of-thechild prong. Id. at 774. The supreme court noted the best-interest test has both 

backward-looking and forward-looking components. Id. at 771. The supreme 

court balanced the father’s poor past behavior with his current and anticipated 

future behavior. Id. at 771-74. After such balancing, the supreme court found the 

father’s progress in prison; his approaching release date; and the parties’ divorce 

stipulation, which provided for current and future visitation; offset the negative 

factors sufficiently to cause it to conclude it was not in the children’s best interest 

to terminate the father’s parental rights. Id. at 774; but see B.H.A., 938 N.W.2d at

233 (stating the conclusion in Q.G. “is constrained by exceptional circumstances 

and should not be relied upon as an endorsement of protecting an incarcerated 

parent’s rights at the expense of a child’s best interest”).

This case is distinguishable from Q.G. Here, the child was nearly fourteen 

years old, as opposed to the five-year-old and three-year-old children involved in 

Q.G. The children in Q.G. had a stepfather who wanted to adopt them who had 

been involved in their lives for less than two years. Here, we have a stepfather 
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who wants to adopt who has, for all intents and purposes, been the child’s only 

father figure for a long time, having been in the child’s life since she was two years 

old. Additionally, while the father here is, by all accounts, a good father to his other 

child and is otherwise a responsible person—in contrast to the drug-addled, 

abusive, incarcerated father in Q.G.—those details make it even less excusable 

for him to have had no meaningful role in the child’s life since the child was 

approximately eighteen months old. While the father in Q.G. exhibited horrible 

parenting, it was for a limited period of time and the supreme court held out hope, 

based on his continued interest in the children and his progress while in prison, the 

father would be able to positively contribute to the children’s lives. Id. Here, the 

twelve-year period over which the father did nothing meaningful to show an interest 

in or be a part of the child’s life supports the juvenile court’s finding that termination 

of parental rights of the father is in the child’s best interest.

C. Other Issues.

As previously noted, the father raises two additional issues relating to the 

record. The first additional issue is the father’s argument it was error for the 

juvenile court to consider the guardian ad litem’s report when the report was not 

offered into evidence. We find this argument to be without merit for two reasons. 

First, at the beginning of the hearing, the juvenile court noted the guardian ad litem 

filed a report and was not intending to appear for the hearing and further noted the 

court’s understanding that this was done “with the consent of the parties.” The 

juvenile court then asked whether its understanding was correct, to which the 

attorneys for both parties stated, “Yes, Your Honor.” Based on this exchange, it 

appears the father consented to consideration of the guardian ad litem’s report. 
13

Second, on our de novo review, whether we consider or do not consider the 

guardian ad litem’s report, the result is the same. Even if the father did not consent 

to the juvenile court’s consideration of the guardian ad litem’s report and we did 

not consider it, it would not change the outcome. See Erickson v. Blake, No. 15-

0251, 2016 WL 1130578, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 23, 2016) (“To the extent any 

evidence was improperly considered by the district court, reversal is not required 

given our de novo review of the record on appeal.”). Therefore, this issue does 

not warrant reversal.

The second additional issue is the father’s claim the juvenile court erred by 

not keeping the record open to allow the record to be supplemented by deposition 

testimony from the father’s mother. We review a court’s decision on whether to 

keep the record open for an abuse of discretion. See Sun Valley Iowa Lake Ass’n 

v. Anderson, 551 N.W.2d 621, 634 (Iowa 1996). The supplemental testimony the 

father sought to introduce concerned disputed testimony related to a claimed offer 

to allow the paternal grandmother to see the child, which fell through, and who was 

responsible for the failed visit. We agree with the reasons given on the record by 

the juvenile court for the refusal to keep the record open and find no abuse of 

discretion. While all the reasons given by the juvenile court supported the decision 

to not keep the record open, we particularly note that the evidence related to a 

collateral issue that would not have been helpful in deciding the issues in this case 

(i.e., the paternal grandmother’s efforts to see the child rather than the father’s 

efforts). Similarly, even if such evidence related to the mother’s credibility, it would 

not have changed the outcome. On our de novo review, even if the record had 

been left open and the paternal grandmother’s testimony established the mother 
14

had never offered to allow the child to visit the grandmother, had unilaterally 

retracted such an offer, or had testified untruthfully about such collateral events, it 

would not change our decision in this matter. See Erickson, 2016 WL 1130578, at 

*1. Therefore, this issue also does not warrant reversal.

IV. Conclusion.

On our de novo review, we find the statutory grounds for termination of 

parental rights of the father have been established by clear and convincing 

evidence. In addition, termination of parental rights has been established to be in 

the child’s best interest by clear and convincing evidence. Therefore, we affirm 

the juvenile court.

AFFIRMED.