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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Lonzell J. Threats,

Petitioner,

v. 

J.T. Shartle, Warden,

Respondent.

No. CV-17-0542-TUC-JAS (BGM)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Currently pending before the Court is Petitioner Lonzell J. Threat’s Petition Under

28 U.S.C. § 2241 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in Federal Custody (“Petition”)

(Doc. 1). Respondent has filed an Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

(“Answer”) (Doc. 14), and Petitioner replied (Doc. 23). The Petition (Doc. 1) is ripe for 

adjudication.

Pursuant to Rules 72.1 and 72.2 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure,1this matter 

was referred to Magistrate Judge Macdonald for Report and Recommendation. The 

Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court deny the Petition (Doc. 1).

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Initial Charge and Sentencing

The military court made findings of fact and conclusions of law as follows:

1. On 22 September 2010, PFC KP alleged that she was raped, forcibly 

1 Rules of Practice of the United States District Court for the District of Arizona.

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sodomized, robbed, and kidnapped after physical training on Fort Campbell. 

Private First Class P later gave a description of the perpetrator as a black 

Soldier about 5’6” or 5’7” in height weighing between 145 and 155 lbs who 

know [sic] the victim. During that afternoon, the unit provided CID with a 

list of Soldiers in the unit who were not at physical training. The agents then 

asked the unit which of those Soldiers were black males of medium size and 

height.

2. During the early afternoon of 23 September 2010, SPC Johnson told 

CID that he observed an unknown black male walking and pacing back and 

forth during physical training hours for approximately the prior two weeks.

3. In the afternoon of 23 September 2010, the accused was one of three 

Soldiers requested to go to CID for in-depth canvas interviews, because of 

the physical description of the alleged perpetrator from PFC P and a list of 

Soldiers in the unit that were not at physical training. In an abundance of 

caution, all of these Soldiers were advised of their rights, in case they became 

subjects and made statements.

4. Special Agent Manor first interacted with the accused at 

approximately 1430 hours on 23 September 2010. Neither she nor any other 

CID agent, on 23 or 24 September 2010, asked the accused about how much 

sleep he had the night prior nor whether he was on any prescription 

medication. At approximately 1442 hours, she advised the accused of his 

rights, and he waived his rights and agreed to discuss the incident without a 

lawyer.

5. After interviewing SSG Yukon Brown, CID agents asked PFC P if 

she knew SSG Brown well enough to recognize his voice. She stated that 

she did and that her attacker was definitely not SSG Brown.

6. The accused became a suspect, after he made inconsistent statements 

about when he came on post the day prior; stated that he was wearing stripped 

ACU’s [sic], which was similar to the description by PFC P and make [sic] 

other suspicious statements[.]

Answer (Doc. 14), Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law from Post-Trial Hr’g (Exh. 

“26”) (Doc. 17-6) at 000291–92.

2

On September 27, 2010, Petitioner was charged with one (1) count of attempted 

2 Page citations for Respondent’s exhibits refer to the Bates Stamp for ease of reference. 

All other page citations refer to the Case Management/Electronic Case Files (“CM/ECF”) page 

number.

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murder, one (1) count of rape, four (4) counts of robbery, two (2) counts of sodomy, four 

(4) counts of aggravated assault, and one (1) count of kidnapping. See Answer (Doc. 14), 

Charge Sheet 9/27/2010 (Exh. “50”) (Doc. 18). On December 2, 2010, Lieutenant Colonel 

Joseph B. Morse recommended that the charges and specifications in the case of Sergeant 

Threats be tried by a general court-martial. See Answer (Doc. 14), LTC Morse Memo. to

CMDR, Ft. Campbell Installation 12/2/2010 (Exh. “45”) (Doc. 18). On May 17, 2011, 

following the court-martial, Petitioner was found guilty of one (1) specification of rape, 

one (1) specification of robbery, two (2) specifications of forcible sodomy, one (1) 

specification of assault with a dangerous weapon, one (1) specification of assault 

consummated by a battery, and one (1) specification of kidnapping. Answer (Doc. 14), 

MAJ GEN McConville Memo. to CMDR 11/5/2011 (Exh. “28”) (Doc. 17-7) at 000316; 

Answer (Doc. 14), Dept. of the Army Rpt. of Result of Trial (Exh. “37”) (Doc. 17-9). 

Petitioner “was sentenced to be reduced to the grade of E1, to forfeit all pay and allowances, 

to be confined for fifty (50) years and to be dishonorably discharged from the service.” 

Answer (Doc. 14), Exh. “28” at 000316. Staff Judge Advocate Lieutenant Colonel Morse 

recommended that the findings and sentence be approved and, except for the dishonorable 

discharge, ordered executed. Answer (Doc. 14), LT COL Morse Memo. to CMDR

6/8/2011 (Exh. “34”) (Doc. 17-9) at 000388. Petitioner was also to “be credited with onehundred seventy-five (175) days confinement against the sentence to confinement.” Id.

B. Post-Trial Matters

1. Post-Trial Brief

On September 11, 2011, counsel for Petitioner made post-trial submissions 

“pursuant to [Rules for Court-Martial (R.C.M.)] 1105 and R.C.M. 1106, and Article 38(c) 

of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).” Answer (Doc. 14), CPT Moy, Defense 

Counsel, Memo. to LT COL Bovarnick 9/11/2011 (Exh. “29”) (Doc. 17-7). Petitioner 

sought disapproval of “the findings and sentence and [an] order [for] a new hearing based 

on not having effective counsel.” Id., Exh. “29” at 000319. Alternatively, Petitioner 

requested a “post-trial Article 39(a) session pursuant to R.C.M. 1102(d) to allow SGT 

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Threats to argue ineffective assistance of counsel.” Id., Exh. “29” at 000319. Petitioner’s 

ineffective assistance claim included 1) “numerous alleged failures to uncover and research 

leads”; 2) an alleged “failure to inform SGT Threats of his rights to counsel properly”; and 

3) an alleged “failure to uncover that a CID eyewitness stated that SGT Threats was not 

the attacker.” Id., Exh. “29” at 000319.

Regarding defense counsel CPT Vargas’s alleged failure to investigate, Petitioner 

first asserted that CPT Vargas did not believe that CID Agent SA Bullock threatened 

Petitioner with releasing his family’s information to the family of the victim. Id., Exh. 

“29” at 000320. Petitioner further asserted that CPT Vargas did not ask SA Bullock about 

the alleged threats on the record. Answer (Doc. 14), CPT Moy Memo. to LT COL

Bovarnick 9/11/2011 (Exh. “29”) (Doc. 17-7) at 000320. Petitioner argued that the alleged 

threats would have explained why he made statements to CID, and CPT Vargas’s 

assistance was ineffective. Id., Exh. “29” at 000320. Second, Petitioner further asserted 

that the victim “made some inconsistent statements that were not exploited by CPT 

Vargas.” Id., Exh. “29” at 000321. Petitioner alleges that this failure was ineffective 

assistance of counsel. Id., Exh. “29” at 000321. Third, Petitioner argued that “[t]he DNA 

evidence is [sic] this case is mostly weak, except for PFC P[’s] DNA on a glove allegedly 

found in SGT Threats storage area.” Id., Exh. “29” at 000321. Petitioner further argued 

that because there were two gloves found in his storage area, both left handed; one size 11 

and one size 10; one with SGT Threats’s name written inside, one without; and no 

identification by the laboratory regarding which glove had the victim’s DNA, CPT Vargas 

was ineffective for not investigating which glove contained the victim’s DNA further. 

Answer (Doc. 14), CPT Moy Memo. to LT COL Bovarnick 9/11/2011 (Exh. “29”) (Doc. 

17-7) at 000321. Petitioner reasons that if the DNA was on the unmarked glove, it would 

exonerate him. Id., Exh. “29” at 000321. Fourth, Petitioner asserted that “CPT Vargas 

failed to get into evidence that SGT Threats received an Army Emergency Relief (“AER”) 

loan of $1000.00 shortly before the incident occurred. Id., Exh. “29” at 000321.

Petitioner also alleged that “CPT Vargas stated that he believed SGT Threats was 

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guilty[,] . . . [and] continued that if SGT Threats didn’t like it he could fire CPT Vargas but 

that it would be a waste of money because of the impending trial date and that no attorney 

could get prepared in time.” Id., Exh. “29” at 000321. Petitioner further alleged that CPT 

Vargas informed him that he would have to pay for a civilian attorney, and that Petitioner 

would be unable to get another Trial Defense Service (TDS) counsel at no expense. Id., 

Exh. “29” at 000321. Petitioner asserted that CPT Vargas’s advice fell below the 

professional standard of conduct. Answer (Doc. 14), CPT. Moy Memo. to LT. COL. 

Bovarnick 9/11/2011 (Exh. “29”) (Doc. 17-7) at 000321.

Petitioner further asserted that he “was brought in to CID on 23 September primarily 

because he met a description from SPC Kevin Johnson and was not at the PT formation on 

the day in question, 22 September 2010.” Id., Exh. “29” at 000321. Petitioner alleged that 

SPC Johnson “was requested as a government witness and flew back to Fort Campbell, 

TN[,] [where] [u]pon arriving at Fort Bragg he saw SGT Threats and greeted him in the 

TDS office.” Id., Exh. “29” at 000322. Petitioner further alleged that “CPT Vargas never 

spoke to SPC Johnson[,] [and] [h]ad he done so, CPT Vargas would have realized that SPC 

Johnson would have affirmatively stated that SGT Threats was not the individual he saw 

around the barracks.” Id., Exh. “29” at 000322.

2. Letter from Petitioner

Attached to CPT Moy’s memorandum was a letter written by Petitioner to MAJ 

GEN McConville. Answer (Doc. 14), CPT Moy Memo. to LT COL Bovarnick 9/11/2011 

(Exh. “29”) (Doc. 17-7), Threats Ltr. to MAJ GEN McConville (App’x “A”) (Doc. 17-8)

at 000330–000340. Petitioner reiterated many of the claims put forth by CPT Moy on his 

behalf. See id., Exh. “29,” App’x “A.” Petitioner alleged that CPT Vargas believed that 

Petitioner was guilty and failed to follow-up on issues Petitioner sought him to investigate. 

Id., Exh. “29,” App’x “A” at 000330–000331. Petitioner further alleged that CPT Vargas 

informed Petitioner that he “could fire him & hire another attorney, but I’d be wasting 

money because of how close the trial was it wouldn’t be enough time for a new attorney to 

get up to date.” Id., Exh. “29,” App’x “A” at 000331. Petitioner stated that he had his wife 

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call the Judge Advocate General’s (JAG) office, but she was unable to obtain an 

appointment for him. Id., Exh. “29,” App’x “A” at 000331. Petitioner alleged that SA 

Bullock threatened to give information regarding Petitioner’s family to the victim’s family. 

Answer (Doc. 14), CPT Moy Memo. to LT COL Bovarnick 9/11/2011 (Exh. “29”) (Doc. 

17-7), Threats Ltr. to MAJ GEN McConville (App’x “A”) (Doc. 17-8) at 000331. 

Petitioner further alleged that CPT Vargas did not believe that this had occurred. Id., Exh. 

“29,” App’x “A” at 000331. Petitioner also alleged that SPC Johnson made a statement 

regarding a “black male that fit PFC P[’s] vague discription [sic] of her attacker” that SPC 

Johnson saw “hanging around the unit[.]” Id., Exh. “29,” App’x “A” at 000332. Petitioner 

argued that he “met the discription [sic] given by Spc. Johnson exactly.” Id., Exh. “29,” 

App’x “A” at 000332. Petitioner then alleged that SPC Johnson “was flown out 15 Mar 

2011 to back up his statement, he told the prosecuter [sic], only after finding out I was 

being accused, that I wasn’t the person he saw.” Id., Exh. “29,” App’x “A” at 000332. 

Petitioner asserted that SSG Brown was also a possible suspect, but Petitioner was targeted 

because of his clothing. Answer (Doc. 14), CPT Moy Memo. to LT COL Bovarnick 

9/11/2011 (Exh. “29”) (Doc. 17-7), Threats Ltr. to MAJ GEN McConville (App’x “A”)

(Doc. 17-8) at 000332. Petitioner also alleged that the victim’s statement was “full of 

inconsistencies” and that she “brought up a few things that was [sic] not true[.]” Id., Exh. 

“29,” App’x “A” at 000332–000333. Petitioner alleged that he told CPT Vargas that his 

“interrigation [sic] wasn’t a question asking process, it was a finger pointing, you did this 

process.” Id., Exh. “29,” App’x “A” at 000333. Petitioner also urged that the victim 

“changed parts of her story to better suit me make the already horrible charges I was facing 

worse.” Id., Exh. “29,” App’x “A” at 000334. Petitioner challenged the DNA evidence 

arguing that his DNA was not found in her vaginal swabs and that the “dna found in her 

panties, the chance of occurrence is 1 of 645 black males.” Id., Exh. “29,” App’x “A” at 

000335. Petitioner argued that the DNA evidence found on the gloves was inconsistent 

with the victim’s statement. Answer (Doc. 14), CPT Moy Memo. to LT COL Bovarnick 

9/11/2011 (Exh. “29”) (Doc. 17-7), Threats Ltr. to MAJ GEN McConville (App’x “A”)

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(Doc. 17-8) at 000336. Petitioner explained that the money he had in his wallet was due 

to receipt of a $1000.00 AER loan. Id., Exh. “29,” App’x “A” at 000337. Petitioner noted 

that he had told his defense lawyer, CPT Vargas, this information, but CPT Vargas refused 

to question a witness during trial about Petitioner’s receipt of the loan. Id., Exh. “29,” 

App’x “A” at 000337. Petitioner asserted that “[d]uring [his] confinement [he] asked Cpt 

Vargas to look into several things that would prove [he was] innocent.” Id., Exh. “29,” 

App’x “A” at 000337. Additionally, Petitioner took issue with SA Mannor having drafted 

the report regarding his interrogation alleging that she had not been present. Id., Exh. “29,” 

App’x “A” at 000337–000338. Petitioner admitted that the report was not used at trial. 

Answer (Doc. 14), CPT Moy Memo. to LT COL Bovarnick 9/11/2011 (Exh. “29”) (Doc. 

17-7), Threats Ltr. to MAJ GEN McConville (App’x “A”) (Doc. 17-8) at 000337–000338. 

Petitioner also alleged that SA Joubert was not truthful regarding questioning Petitioner 

about his dominant hand. Id., Exh. “29,” App’x “A” at 000338. Based on these allegations, 

Petitioner sought a retrial. Id., Exh. “29,” App’x “A” at 000338.

3. Post-Trial Supplement

On October 5, 2011, a post-trial hearing under Article 39(a) was recommended, so 

the military judge could “determine the legal sufficiency of the adjudged findings and 

sentence.” Answer (Doc. 14), LTC Edwards Memo. to CMDR, 101st Airborne Division 

(Air Assault) and Ft. Campbell 10/5/2011 (Exh. “28”) at 000317. On December 12, 2011, 

defense counsel submitted new information alleging that Petitioner’s prior defense counsel, 

CPT Vargas did not investigate SSG Brown as the perpetrator and therefore provided 

ineffective assistance. Answer (Doc. 14), CPT Moy Memo. to LTC Bovarnick 12/12/2011 

(Exh. “27”).

4. Post-Trial Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law

On December 21, 2011, Colonel Grammel issued his Findings of Fact & 

Conclusions of Law from Post-Trial Hearing. Answer (Doc. 14), Findings of Fact & 

Conclusions of Law from Post-Trial Hr’g (Exh. “26”) (Doc. 17-6). The court found that 

“CID agents asked PFC P if she knew SSG Brown well enough to recognize his voice[,] 

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[and] [s]he stated that she did and that her attacker was definitely not SSG Brown.” Id., 

Exh. “26” at 000292. The court noted that “[t]he accused became a suspect, after he made 

inconsistent statements about when he came on post the day prior; stated that he was 

wearing stripped ACU’s, which was similar to the description by PFC P and make [sic] 

other suspicious statements[.]” Id., Exh. “26” at 000292. The court further found that 

“Special Agent Bullock never threatened the accused[,] . . . [and] [a]t the post-trial hearing, 

the testimony of SA Bullock was more credible than the testimony of the accused.” Id., 

Exh. “26” at 000292. The court also found that CPT Vargas fully advised Petitioner of his 

rights to counsel and corresponded regularly with him. Id., Exh. “26” at 000293. The court 

noted that “CID agents confirmed with Army Community Services that the accused had 

received an Army Emergency Relief loan in the amount of $1,000.00 in September 2010.” 

Answer (Doc. 14), Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law from Post-Trial Hr’g (Exh. 

“26”) (Doc. 17-6) at 000293. The court found that CPT Vargas listened to information 

provided by Petitioner, “used some of the information, and followed certain leads[,] [but] 

[a]fter consideration, the defense counsel decided to not pursue some of the leads, because 

they were not helpful to the case.” Id., Exh. “26” at 000294. CPT Vargas considered and 

rejected follow-up regarding the victim’s statement that Petitioner was her squad leader, 

although he was not; the difference between the ammunition described by the victim and 

that found in Petitioner’s quarters; SPC Johnson’s observations; SSG Brown as a person 

of interest; and the AER loan to Petitioner. Id., Exh. “26” at 000294. The court found that 

“[t]he accused never told CPT Vargas about which hand the gloves were for or whether 

CID asked the accused about his dominant hand.” Id., Exh. “26” at 000294.

The court noted that at Petitioner’s arraignment, “the military judge advised the 

accused of his rights to counsel[,] [t]he accused stated that he understood and had no 

questions[,] . . . [and] he wanted to be represented by CPT Vargas alone.” Id., Exh. “26”

at 000294. The court further noted that CPT Vargas requested appointment of a DNA 

expert and a forensic psychologist, and both requests were granted. Answer (Doc. 14), 

Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law from Post-Trial Hr’g (Exh. “26”) (Doc. 17-6) at 

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000294–000295. The court also acknowledged that CPT Vargas filed a motion to suppress 

Petitioner’s statements based on the length and manner of the interrogation. Id., Exh. “26” 

at 000294. The court held “that the government satisfied its burden of prove [sic] by a 

preponderance of the evidence that [Petitioner’s] statements were voluntary, and the 

motion [to suppress] was denied.” Id., Exh. “26” at 000295.

The court recognized “CPT Vargas’s trial strategy was to focus on what he assessed 

to be the two main parts of the prosecution’s case against the accused – the statements to 

CID and the DNA evidence.” Id., Exh. “26” at 000295. CPT Vargas requested and was 

granted additional funding for the defense’s DNA expert. Id., Exh. “26” at 000296. CPT 

Vargas also requested assistance from his senior defense counsel, MAJ Kranz, due to the 

complexity of the case. Answer (Doc. 14), Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law from 

Post-Trial Hr’g (Exh. “26”) (Doc. 17-6) at 000296. The court noted that this request was 

granted and MAJ Kranz “assessed the case and discussed trial strategy with CPT Vargas.” 

Id., Exh. “26” at 000296. “Major Kranz detailed himself as the assistant defense counsel 

so that he would be available to assist CPT Vargas.” Id., Exh. “26” at 000296. The court

observed that “[t]he issue of a new defense counsel from TDS was never brought up before 

post-trial[;] [t]he accused never said that he wanted one or said that he was displeased with 

CPT Vargas[;] [and] [t]he accused never said that he no longer wanted CPT Vargas to be 

his attorney . . . before or during the trial.” Id., Exh. “26” at 000296. The court further 

observed that at an Article 39(a) session prior to trial, Petitioner confirmed to the military 

judge that he wished to be represented by CPT Vargas and MAJ Kranz. Id., Exh. “26” at 

000296. The court found that during trial, defense counsel cross-examined the victim 

regarding her inability to identify her assailant despite speaking with Petitioner daily prior 

to the attack; whether she told agents about starting to see spots; that she brought up her 

fiancé first; and that she did not have any bruising or other injuries to her neck. Answer

(Doc. 14), Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law from Post-Trial Hr’g (Exh. “26”) (Doc. 

17-6) at 000297. The court further found that defense counsel relitigated the voluntariness 

of Petitioner’s statements when cross-examining SA Manor, SA Bullock, SA Yeatts, SA 

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Joubert, and SA Wallace. Id., Exh. “26” at 000297. The court also found that “[w]hen 

cross-examining Ms. Lyons, one of the defense counsel’s topics was possible alternate 

causes of the petechiae found on PFC P[.]” Id., Exh. “26” at 000297. The court noted that 

CPT Vargas’s cross-examination of the DNA examiner, Ms. Courtney Tourre, “included 

the limited significance of the statistical findings for the DNA on the panties and the DNA 

on the car seat fabric swatch, as well as the absence of evidence of DNA in other locations 

where it might have been expected.” Id., Exh. “26” at 000297.

The court “applied the three-pronged test from United States v. Polk, 32 M.J. 150, 

153 (C.M.A. 1991).” Answer (Doc. 14), Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law from 

Post-Trial Hr’g (Exh. “26”) (Doc. 17-6) at 000298. The court delineated the Polk test 

noting that “[t]he first prong asks whether the allegations are true, and if they are, whether 

there is a reasonable explanation for counsel’s action in the defense of the case.” Id., Exh. 

“26” at 000298. The court found “[t]he first allegation . . . that CPT Vargas misadvised 

the accused about the accused’s rights to counsel . . . [wa]s not true.” Id., Exh. “26” at 

000298. The court found “[t]he second allegation . . . that CPT Vargas failed to explore 

on the record an additional possibility that the accused’s statements were involuntary 

because SA Bullock threatened to release personal information about SGT Threats’ family 

to the family of PFC P . . . [wa]s true.” Id., Exh. “26” at 000298. The court reviewed CPT 

Vargas’s explanation for not exploring that possibility on the record and found it 

reasonable. Id., Exh. “26” at 000298. The court found “[t]he third allegation was that CPT 

Vargas failed to exploit certain parts of PFC P[’s] testimony, specifically her description 

of the ammunition she saw[] versus the ammunition found in the accused quarters and her 

testimony about the attacker’s belief that she had a son.” Id., at Exh. “26” at 000299. The 

court reviewed CPT Vargas’s decision-making regarding the ammunition, as well as the 

victim’s testimony regarding the attacker’s belief that she had a son, as well as her 

testimony regarding her duty relationship with Petitioner. Answer (Doc. 14), Findings of 

Fact & Conclusions of Law from Post-Trial Hr’g (Exh. “26”) (Doc. 17-6) at 000299. The 

court found CPT Vargas’s explanations reasonable and his cross-examinations focused and 

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effective. Id., Exh. “26” at 000299. The court described Petitioner’s fourth allegation 

regarding CPT Vargas’s alleged failure to “draw attention to the fact that one of the two 

left-handed gloves was one size 11 with the accused’s name written on it and one was size 

10 without writing on it.” Id., Exh. “26” at 000299. The court found this allegation to be 

true, but that Petitioner’s failure to mention this to CPT Vargas before trial, as well as the

“little difference between size 10 and size 11 gloves, [that] people do not write on all their 

gloves, and [that] both gloves were found in the accused’s storage shed[,]” were reasonable 

explanations as to why defense counsel did not inquire further. Id., Exh. “26” at 000299. 

The court further observed that “there facts [we]re insignificant and would have no 

impact[.]” Id., Exh. “26” at 000299. The court described the fifth allegation as CPT Vargas 

“not successfully introduc[ing] evidence showing that the accused received an Army 

Emergency Relief loan.” Answer (Doc. 14), Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law from 

Post-Trial Hr’g (Exh. “26”) (Doc. 17-6) at 000299. The court determined this allegation 

to be true, and that CPT Vargas provided “no reasonable explanation for . . . not checking 

into the details of such a loan.” Id., Exh. “26” at 000299. The court found “[t]he sixth 

allegation . . . that CPT Vargas did not speak with or present the testimony of SPC Johnson 

. . . [wa]s true.” Id., Exh. “26” at 000300. The court noted that “Specialist Johnson 

observed an unknown black male walking back and forth during physical training hours 

for the two weeks prior to 22 September 2010[;] [h]owever, SPC Johnson did not observe 

the person with PFC P on 22 September 2010.” Id., Exh. “26” at 000300. The court further 

noted that “Specialist Johnson’s description of the person’s clothing differed from the 

description by PFC P[,]” and SPC Johnson’s description did not result in Petitioner being 

asked to go to CID. Id., Exh. “26” at 000300. The court accepted that “Captain Vargas 

read SPC Johnson’s statement and decided it was not relevant.” Answer (Doc. 14), 

Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law from Post-Trial Hr’g (Exh. “26”) (Doc. 17-6) at 

000300. The court further noted that “[t]here was also an allegation that CPT Vargas did 

not pursue whether or not the accused was PFC P[’s] actual squad leader[,] . . . which [wa]s 

true.” Id., Exh. “26” at 000300. The court found CPT Vargas’s assertion that this fact was 

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not relevant incorrect, but agreed with his statement that it would not exonerate Petitioner. 

Id., Exh. “26” at 000300. The court observed that if the victim’s assailant had been her 

squad leader, she would have been expected to recognize him. Id., Exh. “26” at 000300. 

The court further observed that “[t]his weakness in the government’s case was obvious to 

the finder of fact, and the defense counsel exploited this fact during cross-examination of 

PFC P[.]” Id., Exh. “26” at 000300. The court found CPT Vargas’s explanation 

reasonable. Answer (Doc. 14), Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law from Post-Trial 

Hr’g (Exh. “26”) (Doc. 17-6) at 000300. “Lastly, there was an allegation that CPT Vargas 

did not interview SSG Brown[,] . . . [which the court found] [wa]s true.” Id., Exh. “26” at 

000300. The court found that although “Staff Sergeant Brown was initially a person of 

interest[,] . . . investigated by CID[,] Private First Class P kn[ew] SSG Brown, and . . . said 

that [her attacker] was definitely not SSG Brown.” Id., Exh. “26” at 000300. The court 

further found that “[t]here was nothing that would indicate to a defense counsel that an 

interview with SSG Brown would be anything but futile[,]” and therefore CPT Vargas’s 

explanation was reasonable. Id., Exh. “26” at 000300.

The court described the second prong of Polk to require “if the allegations are true, 

[the court must assess] whether the accused has proven that the defense counsel’s ‘level of 

advocacy fell measurably below’ an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id., Exh. “26”

at 000300. “The only allegation that was true, without a reasonable explanation, and 

survives to the second prong[,] was the failure to further investigate the AER loan.” 

Answer (Doc. 14), Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law from Post-Trial Hr’g (Exh. 

“26”) (Doc. 17-6) at 000300. The court considered any deficiencies “in context of the 

defense counsel’s performance throughout the whole case.” Id., Exh. “26” at 000301. 

After review of defense counsel’s performance, the court found that “[t]he errors were no[t] 

so serious as to deprive the accused of a fair trial whose result is reliable.” Id., Exh. “26”

at 000301. The court further found that “[c]onsidering the advocacy of the defense counsel 

throughout the entire case, it did not fall significantly below what we ordinarily expect 

from fallible lawyers.” Id., Exh. “26” at 000301. The court observed that “[e]ven if the 

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accused had proven the second prong, the accused failed to prove the third prong[,] . . . 

[and] [t]here were no errors that were so serious as to deprive the accused of a fair trial.”

Id., Exh. “26” at 000301.

The court also considered whether “the Specification of Charge VI [f]ail[ed] to 

[s]tate an [o]ffense.” Answer (Doc. 14), Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law from 

Post-Trial Hr’g (Exh. “26”) (Doc. 17-6) at 000301. The court observed that “[t]he accused 

never challenged the sufficiency of the Specification of Charge VI during the post-trial 

phase, until the court raised the issue and requested briefs on it.” Id., Exh. “26” at 000302. 

The court concluded that “[t]he Specification of Charge VI, when liberally construed, states 

the offense of kidnapping.” Id., Exh. “26” at 000303. The court further noted that the 

“factual allegations along with the record of trial sufficiently protect the accused against 

double jeopardy.” Id., Exh. “26” at 000303.

On January 3, 2012, Petitioner petitioned for clemency seeking a reduction in his 

time of confinement. See Answer (Doc. 14), LT Moy Memo. to LTC Bovarnick 1/3/2012 

(Exh. “25”). On January 4, 2012, LTC Bovarnick adopted the June 8, 2011 advice and 

recommendations by his predecessor, found Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel 

allegations to be without merit, and recommended approval of “the findings and sentence 

and, except for that part of the sentence extending to a dishonorable discharge, order it 

executed.” Answer (Doc. 14), LTC Bovarnick Memo. to CMDR, 101st Airborne Division 

(Air Assault) and Fort Campbell 1/4/2012 (Exh. “24”). On January 4, 2012, Major General 

McConville approved and executed Petitioner’s sentence, “except for that part of the 

sentence extending to a dishonorable discharge[.]” Answer (Doc. 14), Action 1/4/2012 

(Exh. “23”); see also Answer (Doc. 14), Gen. Court-Martial Order No. 1 1/4/2012 (Exh. 

“22”) at 000181.

C. Appellate Review

1. United States Army Court of Criminal Appeals

a. Initial appeal

On February 8, 2012, the record of trial was referred to the United States Army 

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Court of Criminal Appeals (“ACCA”) for appellate review and counsel appointed. Answer 

(Doc. 14), Referral and Designation of Counsel 2/8/2012 (Exh. “21”). On January 3, 2013, 

after multiple extensions of time, Petitioner filed his appellate brief. See Answer (Doc. 

14), Br. on Behalf of Appellant (Exh. “16”) (Doc. 17); see also Answer (Doc. 14) Mot. for 

Ext. of Time (Exhs. “17,” “18,” & “19”) (Doc. 17-1). Counsel asserted that “[t]he 

government did not provide appellant with the required notice of the terminal element of 

Article 134, UCMJ, which was the basis for the Charge VI and its Specification.” Answer 

(Doc. 14), Exh. “16” at 000136. As such, counsel sought Petitioner’s kidnapping 

conviction to be set aside. Id., Exh. “16” at 000139. Counsel also argued that in light of 

this alleged error, a sentence rehearing was required. Id., Exh. “16” at 000139–000140. 

Petitioner’s counsel also directed the appellate court to issues raised in Petitioner’s 

Grostefon3 brief attached as an appendix. Answer (Doc. 14), Br. on Behalf of Appellant

(Exh. “16”), App’x “A.” Petitioner asserted four (4) grounds for relief, including 1) his 

sentence was “extreme and overly harsh”; 2) ineffective assistance of trial counsel; 3) the 

involuntary nature of his statements; and 4) insufficiency of the evidence. See Id., Exh. 

“16,” App’x “A.” Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim encompassed 

counsel’s alleged failure to a) properly advise Petitioner regarding his right to counsel; b) 

“investigate or raise the issue that appellant’s family was threatened by CID investigators”; 

c) “investigate or present any evidence that appellant had received an AER loan just prior 

to the alleged offenses”; d) “investigate or present evidence about SSG Yukon Brown at 

trial”; e) “investigate or present evidence regarding SPC Johnson seeing an individual 

lurking around the unit location prior to the alleged offenses”; and f) “file a motion to 

suppress the search and seizure of appellant as a suspect in this case.” Id., Exh. “16,”

3 United States v. Grostefon, 12 M.J. 431 (C.M.A. 1982). The Court of Military Appeals 

held that it “will require that when the accused specifies error in his request for appellate 

representation or in some other form, the appellate defense counsel will, at a minimum, invite the 

attention of the Court of Military Review to those issues and, in its decision, the Court of Military 

Review will, at a minimum, acknowledge that it has considered those issues enumerated by the 

accused and its disposition of them.” Grostefon, 12 M.J. at 436.

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App’x “A” at 000143–000146. Regarding the sufficiency of the evidence, Petitioner 

highlighted that a) “[t]here was another soldier in the unit who fit the profile and unique 

characteristics detailed by PFC KP”; b) “[o]nly one glove seized from appellant’s house 

tested positive for PFC KP’s DNA[,] . . . which was inconsistent with PFC KP’s 

testimony”; c) “Specialist Johnson saw an individual fitting the [sic] PFC KP’s description 

lurking around the unit area during PT hours during the weeks prior to the alleged 

offenses”; and d) “[t]he profiles and ratios for the DNA attributed to appellant and found

in PFC KP’s car and underwear [we]re not overwhelming.” Id., Exh. “16,” App’x “A” at 

000147–000148. Based on these alleged failures and deficiencies, Petitioner sought the 

court to set aside his findings of guilt and sentence. Id., Exh. “16,” App’x “A” at 000146,

000148.

On July 31, 2013, the Government filed its response. Answer (Doc. 14), Br. on 

Behalf of Appellee (Exh. “13”) (Doc. 17). On August 1, 2013, Petitioner formally moved 

for the admission of additional Grostefon material. Answer (Doc. 14), Mot. to Attach 

Additional Grostefon Matters (Exh. “12”) (Doc. 16). Petitioner asserted that 1) he did not 

receive effective assistance of counsel because counsel allegedly “failed to move for a 

change of venue”; and 2) the appellate court should consider additional material, including, 

“[p]ersonal matters typed by appellant[,]” excerpts from Petitioner’s letter to his individual 

military counsel, Second Platoon, Headquarters Service Company’s (“HSC”) alert roster,

and Petitioner’s Sprint telephone call log. Answer (Doc. 14), Exh. “12,” App’x “C” at 

000079. Petitioner further urged that his phone records “establish that appellant had 

contact with a member of his unit and learned of the attacks on PFC KP from his 

leadership[,] . . . [which] explains why appellant mentioned PFC KP in his initial interview 

with CID before the agent mentioned PFC KP.” Id., Exh. “12,” App’x “C” at 000080. On 

August 6, 2013, Petitioner replied and asserted that the Government’s arguments were 

speculative, further urging that the Government “failed to allege a terminal element in the 

Specification of Charge VI and there is no mention in the record prior to closing argument 

of the terminal elements.” Answer (Doc. 14), Reply Br. on Behalf of Appellant (Exh. “11”)

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(Doc. 16) at 000062, 000064.

On September 4, 2013, the United States Army Court of Criminal Appeals issued a 

Summary Disposition of Petitioner’s appeal. See Answer (Doc. 14), Summ. Disposition

(Exh. “10”) (Doc. 16). The appellate court held that “the Specification of Charge VI d[id] 

not allege the Article 134, UCMJ, terminal element of conduct that is prejudicial to good 

order and discipline (Clause 1) or of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces 

(Clause 2).” Id., Exh. “10” at 000058. As such, the ACCA found that appellant was not 

given “sufficient notice of the missing terminal element required to prove the kidnapping 

offense” and set aside the findings of guilty to Charge VI and its Specification. Id., Exh. 

“10” at 000058. The appellate court next considered whether reassessment of Petitioner’s 

sentence was appropriate. Id., Exh. “10” at 000059. The court “initially note[d] the 

evidence underlying the kidnapping charge was proper aggravation evidence which would 

have been available to the military judge regardless of it appearing on the charge sheet.” 

Id., Exh. “10” at 000059. Upon further consideration, the appellate court found “beyond a 

reasonable doubt that appellant would have received a sentence on the remaining 

convictions of no less than that approved by the convening authority.” Id., Exh. “10” at 

000059. Accordingly, the ACCA set aside the findings of guilty to Charge VI and its 

Specification, affirmed the remaining findings of guilty, and affirmed Petitioner’s 

sentence. Answer (Doc. 14), Summ. Disposition (Exh. “10”) (Doc. 16) at 000059. The 

appellate court also held that the matters personally raised by Petitioner pursuant to 

Grostefon were without merit. Id., Exh. “10” at 000057.

b. Reconsideration

On October 3, 2013, Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and to file 

additional Grostefon matters. See Answer (Doc. 14), Mot. Reconsideration and Mot. for 

Leave to File Add’l Grostefon Matters Out of Time (Exh. “9”) (Doc. 15). Petitioner sought 

reconsideration of the ACCA’s “decision affirming the remaining findings of guilty and 

the sentence[.]” Id., Exh. “9” at 000043. Petitioner also sought to raise an additional 

Grostefon matter alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel resulted in Petitioner not 

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testifying during the suppression hearing. See id., Exh. “9,” App’x “A.” Petitioner urged 

that if he had been allowed to testify, he could have testified that SA Bullock threatened 

his family’s privacy, and that when Petitioner arrived at CID, he “was wearing the same 

civilian clothing Spc. Johnson described in his statement” but not matching the victim’s 

description. Id., Exh. “9,” App’x “A” at 000046–000047. Petitioner also urged that CPT 

Vargas allegedly refused to question “the agents further as to why there [wa]s no 

documentation of the interrogation.” Id., Exh. “9,” App’x “A” at 000047. Petitioner 

asserted that his “testimony along with the agent’s inconsistencies, contradictions and lack 

of documentation would have been vital to the courts [sic] decision.” Answer (Doc. 14), 

Mot. Reconsideration and Mot. for Leave to File Add’l Grostefon Matters Out of Time

(Exh. “9”) (Doc. 15), App’x “A” at 000047. Petitioner further asserted that “[t]he DNA 

used in [his] conviction [wa]s ineffective and no justice system would have acknowledged 

the findings especially when the prosecution’s expert concluded the profiles found appear 

so frequently, they could belong to any unknown, unrelated male.” Id., Exh. “9,” App’x 

“A” at 000048. Petitioner also asserted that CPT Vargas should have argued a suggestive 

line up and attacked the victim’s statements. Id., Exh. “9,” App’x “A” at 000048–000049. 

Finally, Petitioner again pointed to SPC Johnson’s statement that Petitioner was not the 

individual SPC Johnson described to CID. Id., Exh. “9,” App’x “A” at 000048–000049.

On October 17, 2013, the United States Army Court of Criminal Appeals issued its 

Summary Disposition on Reconsideration. Answer (Doc. 14), ACCA Summ. Disp. on

Recon. 10/17/2013 (Exh. “8”) (Doc. 15). The ACCA held that “Appellant’s request for 

reconsideration is granted and we have now considered appellant’s additional Grostefon

matters in our reconsideration of this case[,] . . . [and] find these matters to be without 

merit. Id., Exh. “8” at 000041. As such, the court “again set aside Charge VI and its 

Specification and AFFIRM[ED] the remaining findings of guilty . . . [and] the approved 

sentence.” Id., Exh. “8” at 000041.

2. United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces

On December 16, 2013, counsel for Petitioner petitioned the United States Court of 

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Appeals for the Armed Forces (“CAAF”) for review. Answer (Doc. 14), Pet. for Grant of 

Review (Exh. “7”) (Doc. 15). On January 3, 2014, counsel for Petitioner filed a 

Supplement to Petition for Grant of Review. Answer (Doc. 14), Suppl. to Pet. for Grant of 

Review (Exh. “3”) (Doc. 15). In the supplement, counsel stated they had “carefully 

examined the record of trial in the case, do not admit that the findings and the sentence are 

correct in law and fact, and submit the case upon its merits to [the CAAF].” Id., Exh. “3”

at 000006. Additionally, Petitioner submitted a Grostefon brief. See id., Exh. “3,” App’x 

“A” at 000010–000024. Petitioner reiterated that he had been denied effective assistance 

of trial counsel resulted in Petitioner not testifying during the suppression hearing. Id., 

Exh. “3,” App’x “A” at 000010. Petitioner reviewed how his testimony may have changed 

the outcome of his case including alleging that 1) “SA Bullock threatened to jeopardize 

[his] family’s privacy”; 2) Petitioner was singled out because upon arriving at CID, he 

“was wearing the same civilian clothing Spc. Johnson described in his statement prepared 

an hour prior to [Petitioner’s] arrival at CID[,]” but which did not match the victim’s 

description of the attacker’s clothing; and 3) trial counsel failed to inquire regarding the 

lack of documentation from Petitioner’s interrogation. Id., Exh. “3,” App’x “A” at 

000010–000011, 000014–000021. Petitioner also reiterated that “[t]he DNA used in [his] 

conviction [wa]s ineffective and no justice system would have acknowledged the findings 

especially when the prosecution’s expert concluded the profiles found appear so frequently, 

they could belong to any unknown, unrelated male.” Answer (Doc. 14), Suppl. to Pet. for 

Grant of Review (Exh. “3”) (Doc. 15), App’x “A” at 000011. Petitioner questioned the 

victim’s statements and highlighted Spc. Johnson’s additional statement that “the unknown 

African American male he described was not [Petitioner].” Id., Exh. “3,” App’x “A” at 

000012–000013. Petitioner also alleged that his “Sixth Amendment Rights were 

violated[,] [because] [d]uring the Post Trial hearing [he] was not afforded the right to 

confront KP or Spc. Johnson.” Id., Exh. “3,” App’x “A” at 000013. Petitioner further

asserted that trial counsel was ineffective because counsel allegedly 1) failed to question 

Spc. Johnson; 2) failed to investigate a person of interest; 3) failed to look into Petitioner’s 

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AER loan; 4) failed to question CID agents regarding threatening Petitioner, their lack of 

documentation, and conflicting testimonies; 5) failed to attack the victim’s statements; 6) 

told Petitioner that he thought Petitioner was guilty; 7) did not sufficiently follow-up 

regarding the issues counsel raised. Id., Exh. “3,” App’x “A” at 000021–000023.

On January 10, 2014, the Government opposed the petition for review, relying on 

its brief before the ACCA. Answer (Doc. 14), Mem. for Clerk of Ct., CAAF 1/10/2014

(Exh. “2”) (Doc. 15). On April 22, 2014, the CAAF issued its order denying the petition 

for review. Answer (Doc. 14), CAAF Order Denying Pet. (Exh. “1”) (Doc. 15).

D. The Instant Habeas Proceeding

On November 6, 2017, Petitioner filed his Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 for a 

Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in Federal Custody (Doc. 1). Petitioner asserts one (1)

ground for relief. See Petition (Doc. 1). Petitioner alleges “actual and factual innocence 

of a statutorily ineligible sentence.” Id. at 4. In support of this claim, Petitioner asserts 

that “the DNA report states a match to 1 in 6 percentile, of a match to 1 in 14 percentile[,] 

. . . mean[ing] the DNA match was so degraded it would match 1 in 6 people to 1 in 14 

people tested, proving out Petitioner’s actual and factual innocence of the aforementioned 

charges.” Id. Petitioner further asserts that “Specialist Kevin Johnson who was specifically 

flown in to testify by the Prosecution, was told not to testify when it became known that 

said Kevin Johnson stated it was not Petitioner that he saw prior to aforementioned crimes 

were done to Private First Class KP.” Id. Petitioner also argues that his $1,000.00 Army 

Emergency Relief (“AER”) loan was verified by CID on September 28, 2010, but at the 

Article 32 Hearing on October 19, 2010, CID denied verifying the loan. Id. Finally, 

Petitioner urges that the victim’s description of her attacker did not match him. Id.

On April 30, 2018, Respondent filed his Answer (Doc. 14) and on June 13, 2018, 

Petitioner replied (Doc. 23).

. . .

. . .

. . .

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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. In General

“The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless . . . [h]e is in custody 

in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 

2241(c). “The military justice system is independent of the federal court system, with its 

own source in the constitution, its own rules of procedure and its own doctrines of 

substantive law.” Davis v. Marsh, 876 F.2d 1446, 1447 (9th Cir. 1989). “The statute which 

vests federal courts with jurisdiction over applications for habeas corpus from persons 

confined by the military courts is the same statute which vests them with jurisdiction over 

the applications of persons confined by the civil courts[,] [b]ut in military habeas corpus 

the inquiry, the scope of matters open for review, has always been more narrow than in 

civil cases.” Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 139, 73 S. Ct. 1045, 1047, 97 L. Ed. 1508 

(1953) (citations omitted). “Military law, like state law, is a jurisprudence which exists 

separate and apart from the law which governs in our federal judicial establishment.” Id.

at 140, 73 S. Ct. at 1047. Thus, “[w]hen individuals punished by courts-martial seek 

redress in the federal courts, the military justice system is thus often analogized to state 

court systems.” Davis, 876 F.2d at 1447 (citing Noyd v. Bond, 395 U.S. 683, 693–94, 89 

S. Ct. 1876, 1882–83, 23 L. Ed.2d 631 (1969); Gusik v. Schilder, 340 U.S. 128, 131–32, 

71 S. Ct. 149, 151–52, 95 L. Ed. 146 (1950)). Moreover, because “the rights of men in the 

armed forces must perforce be conditioned to meet certain overriding demands of 

discipline and duty, and the civil courts are not the agencies which must determine the 

precise balance to be struck in this adjustment[,] . . . Congress has taken great care both to 

define the rights of those subject to military law, and provide a complete system of review 

within the military system to secure those rights.” Burns, 346 U.S. at 140, 73 S. Ct. at 

1048.

“In military habeas corpus cases, even more than in state habeas corpus cases, it 

would be in disregard of the statutory scheme if the federal civil courts failed to take 

account of the prior proceedings—of the fair determinations of the military tribunals after 

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all military remedies have been exhausted.” Burns, 346 U.S. at 142, 73 S. Ct. at 1048–49. 

As such, “when a military decision has dealt fully and fairly with an allegation raised in 

that application, it is not open to a federal civil court to grant the writ simply to re-evaluate 

the evidence.” Burns, 346 U.S. at 142, 73 S. Ct. at 1049 (citing Whelchel v. McDonald, 

340 U.S. 122, 71 S. Ct. 146, 95 L. Ed. 141 (1950)); see also Roberts v. Callahan, 321 F.3d 

994, 995 (10th Cir. 2003); Lips v. Commandant, U.S. Disciplinary Barracks, 997 F.2d 808, 

810, 811 (10th Cir. 1993). “It is the limited function of the civil courts to determine 

whether the military have given fair consideration to each of [Petitioner’s] claims.” Burns, 

346 U.S. at 144, 73 S. Ct. at 1050 (citations omitted).

B. Exhaustion and Waiver

“Military prisoners must exhaust military remedies before seeking relief in federal 

court.” Davis v. Marsh, 876 F.2d 1446, 1449 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing Gusik v. Schilder, 340 

U.S. 128, 131–32, 71 S. Ct. 149, 151–52, 95 L. Ed. 146 (1950)). “The doctrine of waiver 

rests on many of the same considerations underlying the doctrines of exhaustion and 

abstention, including the respect due a parallel and independent system of justice, the 

desirability of resolving claims without the need for duplicative litigation, and the benefits 

of having constitutional decisions made in the first instance by a judge with the opportunity 

to view counsel, witnesses and jury.” Id. (citations omitted). “To obtain federal habeas 

review of claims based on trial errors to which no objection was made at trial, or of claims 

that were not raised on appeal, a state prisoner must show both cause excusing the 

procedural default and actual prejudice resulting from the error.” Lips v. Commandant, 

U.S. Disciplinary Barracks, 997 F.2d 808, 812 (10th Cir. 1993) (citing Murray v. Carrier, 

477 U.S. 478, 491, 106 S. Ct. 2639, 2647, 91 L. Ed. 2d 397 (1986); Wainwright v. Sykes, 

433 U.S. 72, 87, 97 S. Ct. 2497, 2506–07, 53 L. Ed. 2d 594 (1977)). The Ninth Circuit 

Court of Appeals has recognized that “[t]he Sykes cause-and-prejudice exception 

guarantees that the waiver rule ‘will not prevent a federal habeas court from adjudicating 

for the first time the federal constitutional claim of a defendant who in the absence of such 

an adjudications will be the victim of a miscarriage of justice.’” Davis, 876 F.2d at 1450 

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(citing Sykes, 433 U.S. at 91, 97 S. Ct. at 2508)). The Davis court thus held that “[w]hile 

the analogy between the military justice system and a state court system is not perfect, the 

two are sufficiently congruent to justify adopting an identical waiver rule.” Davis, 876 

F.2d at 1450.

“[T]he existence of cause for a procedural default must ordinarily turn on whether

the prisoner can show that some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel’s 

efforts to comply with the State’s procedural rule.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488, 

106 S. Ct. 2639, 2645, 91 L. Ed. 2d 397 (1986); see also Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 

F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1996) (petitioner failed to offer any cause “for procedurally 

defaulting his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, [as such] there is no basis on 

which to address the merits of his claims.”). In addition to cause, a habeas petitioner must 

show actual prejudice, meaning that he “must show not merely that the errors . . . created 

a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, 

infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions.” Murray, 477 U.S. at 494, 

106 S. Ct. at 2648 (emphasis in original) (internal quotations omitted). Without a showing 

of both cause and prejudice, a habeas petitioner cannot overcome a waiver and gain review 

by the federal courts. Id., 106 S. Ct. at 2649.

The Supreme Court has recognized, however, that “the cause and prejudice standard 

will be met in those cases where review of a state prisoner’s claim is necessary to correct 

‘a fundamental miscarriage of justice.’” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 111 S. Ct. 

2546, 115 L. Ed. 2d 640 (1991) (quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 135, 102 S. Ct. 

1558, 1572–73, 71 L. Ed. 2d 783 (1982)). “The fundamental miscarriage of justice 

exception is available ‘only where the prisoner supplements his constitutional claim with a 

colorable showing of factual innocence.’” Herrara v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 404, 113 S.

Ct. 853, 862, 122 L. Ed. 2d 203 (1993) (emphasis in original) (quoting Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 

477 U.S. 436, 454, 106 S. Ct. 2616, 2627, 91 L. Ed. 2d 364 (1986)). Thus, “‘actual 

innocence’ is not itself a constitutional claim, but instead a gateway through which a habeas 

petitioner must pass to have his otherwise barred constitutional claim considered on the 

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merits.” Herrara, 506 U.S. at 404, 113 S. Ct. at 862; see also Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 

298, 315, 115 S. Ct. 851, 861, 130 L Ed. 2d 808 (1995). Petitioner must establish new 

facts that “raise[] sufficient doubt about [his] guilt to undermine confidence in the result of 

the trial without the assurance that that trial was untainted by constitutional error.” Schlup, 

513 U.S. at 317, 115 S. Ct. at 862; see also Narula v. Yakubisin, 650 Fed. App’x 337 (9th 

Cir. 2016).

III. ANALYSIS

Petitioner’s sole claim for relief is that he is “actually and factually innocent” of the 

charges against him. Petition (Doc. 1) at 4. As discussed in Section II, supra, habeas relief 

is available only to those alleging a constitutional violation. “‘[A]ctual innocence’ is not

itself a constitutional claim, but instead a gateway through which a habeas petitioner must 

pass to have his otherwise barred constitutional claim considered on the merits.” Herrara, 

506 U.S. at 404, 113 S. Ct. at 862; see also Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 315, 115 S. Ct. 

851, 861, 130 L Ed. 2d 808 (1995). Petitioner has not explicitly alleged any constitutional 

violation in his Petition (Doc. 1) and has failed to establish new facts that “raise[] sufficient 

doubt about [his] guilt to undermine confidence in the result of the trial without the 

assurance that that trial was untainted by constitutional error.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 317, 

115 S. Ct. at 862; see also Narula v. Yakubisin, 650 Fed. App’x 337 (9th Cir. 2016). As 

such, Petitioner’s Petition (Doc. 1) should be dismissed. The Court will, however, give 

Petitioner’s claims their broadest construction and address each supporting argument in 

turn.

A. DNA Evidence

Petitioner asserts that “the DNA report states a match to 1 in 6 percentile, of a match 

to 1 in 14 percentile[,] . . . mean[ing] the DNA match was so degraded it would match 1 in 

6 people to 1 in 14 people tested, proving out Petitioner’s actual and factual innocence of 

the aforementioned charges.” Petition (Doc. 1) at 4. Petition did not raise this specific 

issue before the military courts, and as such it was waived.

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Petitioner cannot show cause and prejudice to overcome this waiver. “[T]he 

existence of cause for a procedural default must ordinarily turn on whether the prisoner can 

show that some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel’s efforts to 

comply with the State’s procedural rule.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488, 106 S. 

Ct. 2639, 2645, 91 L. Ed. 2d 397 (1986). In addition to cause, a habeas petitioner must 

show actual prejudice, meaning that he “must show not merely that the errors . . . created 

a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, 

infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions.” Murray, 477 U.S. at 494, 

106 S. Ct. at 2648 (emphasis in original) (internal quotations omitted). Without a showing 

of both cause and prejudice, a habeas petitioner cannot overcome the procedural default 

and gain review by the federal courts. Id. at 494, 106 S. Ct. at 2649. Here, Petitioner has 

not shown cause and cannot overcome the procedural default and gain review here. See 

Murray, 477 U.S. at 494, 106 S. Ct. at 2649. As noted above, neither has Petitioner 

demonstrated a fundamental miscarriage of justice. The record before this Court is devoid 

of evidence supporting a showing of factual innocence. As such, the Court finds that 

Petitioner’s claims are procedurally barred and he is not entitled to habeas review.

To the extent that Petitioner’s claim regarding DNA can be construed as

encompassed by one of the many arguments regarding the DNA evidence raised in one of 

his many Grostefon briefs to the military courts, it was fully and fairly considered even 

where summarily denied. Armann v. McKean, 549 F.3d 279, 292–93 (3d Cir. 2008); 

Roberts v. Callahan, 321 F.3d 994, 997 (10th Cir. 2003); see also Tillery v. Shartle, 2017

WL 4337343 at *4 (D. Ariz. September 29, 2017).

B. SPC Kevin Johnson

Petitioner asserts that “Specialist Kevin Johnson who was specifically flown in to 

testify by the Prosecution, was told not to testify when it became known that said Kevin 

Johnson stated it was not Petitioner that he saw prior to aforementioned crimes were done 

to Private First Class KP.” Petition (Doc. 1) at 4. Petitioner raised this issue to the trial 

court during post-trial proceedings. Answer (Doc. 14), CPT Moy Memo. to LT COL 

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Bovarnick 9/11/2011 (Exh. 29) (Doc. 17-7), Threats Ltr. to MAJ Gen McConville (App’x 

“A”) (Doc. 17-8) at 000332. The trial court addressed the issue in its Findings of Fact & 

Conclusions of Law. Answer (Doc. 14), Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law from 

Post-Trial Hr’g (Exh. “26”) (Doc. 17-6) at 000300. Petitioner also raised this issue within 

a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel and insufficiency of the evidence to the ACCA. 

Answer (Doc. 14), Br. on Behalf of Appellant (Exh. “16”) (Doc. 17), App’x “A” at 

000143–000148. The ACCA found Petitioner’s claims were without merit. Answer (Doc. 

14), Summ. Disposition (Exh. “10”) (Doc. 16) at 000057. Petitioner again raised the issue 

on reconsideration, and the ACCA summarily disposed of it. Answer (Doc. 14), Mot. 

Reconsideration and Mot. for Leave to File Add’l Grostefon Matters Out of Time (Exh. 

“9”) (Doc. 15), App’x “A” at 000048–000049; Answer (Doc. 14), ACCA Summ. Disp. on 

Recon. 10/17/2013 (Exh. “8”) (Doc. 15). Finally, Petitioner raised the issue to the CAAF 

in his Grostefon brief, which was summarily denied. Answer (Doc. 14), Suppl. to Pet. for 

Grant of Review (Exh. “3”) (Doc. 15), App’x “A” at 000012–000013; Answer (Doc. 14), 

CAAF Order Denying Pet. (Exh. “1”) (Doc. 15). As such, the issue was fully and fairly 

presented to the military courts and Petitioner is not entitled to review here.

C. AER Loan

Petitioner argues that his $1,000.00 Army Emergency Relief (“AER”) loan was 

verified by CID on September 28, 2010, but at the Article 32 Hearing on October 19, 2010, 

CID denied verifying the loan. Petition (Doc. 1) at 4. Petitioner mentioned the AER loan 

to the trial court during post-trial proceedings. Answer (Doc. 14), CPT Moy Memo. to LT 

COL Bovarnick 9/11/2011 (Exh. 29) (Doc. 17-7), Threats Ltr. to MAJ Gen McConville 

(App’x “A”) (Doc. 17-8) at 000337. The trial court addressed the issue in its Findings of 

Fact & Conclusions of Law. Answer (Doc. 14), Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law 

from Post-Trial Hr’g (Exh. “26”) (Doc. 17-6) at 000293, 000031–000030. Petitioner also 

raised this issue within a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel to the ACCA. Answer 

(Doc. 14), Br. on Behalf of Appellant (Exh. “16”) (Doc. 17), App’x “A” at 000143–

000146. The ACCA found Petitioner’s claims were without merit. Answer (Doc. 14), 

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Summ. Disposition (Exh. “10”) (Doc. 16) at 000057. Finally, Petitioner raised the issue as 

part of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, in his Grostefon brief to the CAAF, which 

was summarily denied. Answer (Doc. 14), Suppl. to Pet. for Grant of Review (Exh. “3”) 

(Doc. 15), App’x “A” at 000021–000023; Answer (Doc. 14), CAAF Order Denying Pet. 

(Exh. “1”) (Doc. 15). As such, the issue was fully and fairly presented to the military courts 

and Petitioner is not entitled to review here.

D. Description of Attacker

Finally, Petitioner urges that the victim’s description of her attacker did not match

him. Petition (Doc. 1) at 4. Petitioner raised this issue within a claim for insufficiency of 

the evidence to the ACCA. Answer (Doc. 14), Br. on Behalf of Appellant (Exh. “16”) 

(Doc. 17), App’x “A” at 000147–000148. The ACCA found Petitioner’s claims were 

without merit. Answer (Doc. 14), Summ. Disposition (Exh. “10”) (Doc. 16) at 000057. 

Petitioner also raised the issue to the CAAF in his Grostefon brief as part of an ineffective 

assistance of counsel claim, which was summarily denied. Answer (Doc. 14), Suppl. to 

Pet. for Grant of Review (Exh. “3”) (Doc. 15), App’x “A” at 000021–000023; Answer 

(Doc. 14), CAAF Order Denying Pet. (Exh. “1”) (Doc. 15). As such, the issue was fully 

and fairly presented to the military courts and Petitioner is not entitled to review here.

IV. CONCLUSION

The Court finds that Petitioner’s claims were fully and fairly presented to the

military courts and Petitioner is not entitled to review. Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 142, 

73 S. Ct. 1045, 1049, 97 L. Ed. 1508 (1953) (citing Whelchel v. McDonald, 340 U.S. 122, 

71 S. Ct. 146, 95 L. Ed. 141 (1950)); see also Roberts v. Callahan, 321 F.3d 994, 995 (10th 

Cir. 2003); Lips v. Commandant, U.S. Disciplinary Barracks, 997 F.2d 808, 810, 811 (10th 

Cir. 1993). To the extent that Petitioner did not present his claim regarding DNA evidence 

to the military courts, it has been waived. As such, the Court recommends the Petition 

(Doc. 1) be denied.

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V. RECOMMENDATION

For the reasons delineated above, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District 

Judge enter an order DENYING Petitioner Lonzell J. Threat’s Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 

2241 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in Federal Custody (Doc. 1).

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72(b)(2), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 

any party may serve and file written objections within fourteen (14) days after being served 

with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. Any response to a party’s objections 

shall be filed on or before March 24, 2021. No replies shall be filed unless leave is granted 

from the District Court. If objections are filed, the parties should use the following case 

number: CV-17-0542-TUC-JAS.

Failure to file timely objections to any factual or legal determination of the 

Magistrate Judge may result in waiver of the right of review.

Dated this 26th day of February, 2021.

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