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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

William Martin, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Weed Incorporated, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. CV-18-00027-TUC-RM

ORDER 

 Pending before the Court are Defendant Weed, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 13) 

and Motion to Amend (Doc. 33) and Plaintiff William Martin’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 

20). The Motions are suitable for determination without oral argument. 

I. Standard of Review 

A complaint must include a “short and plain statement . . . showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). While Rule 8 does not require indepth factual allegations, it does require more than “labels[,]” “conclusions,” or “a 

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). There must be sufficient “factual 

content [to] allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 

for the misconduct alleged.” Id. 

 Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) may be “based on the lack of a cognizable legal 

theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” 

Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). When reviewing a 
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motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a court takes “all factual allegations set forth 

in the complaint . . . as true and construed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs.” Lee v. 

City of L.A., 250 F.3d 668, 679 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

However, only well-pleaded facts are given a presumption of truth. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 

679. Conclusory allegations—that is, allegations that “simply recite the elements of a 

cause of action” without supplying underlying facts to support those elements—are not 

“entitled to the presumption of truth.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). 

 If a complaint falls short of meeting the necessary pleading standards, a district 

court should dismiss with leave to amend unless the deficiencies of a pleading “could not 

possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 

896, 926 (9th Cir. 2012) (“We have adopted a generous standard for granting leave to 

amend from a dismissal for failure to state a claim . . . .”). Failing to give leave to amend 

when a plaintiff could include additional facts to cure a complaint’s deficiencies is an 

abuse of discretion. AE ex rel. Hernandez v. County of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 636 (9th 

Cir. 2012). 

II. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss1

A. First Amended Complaint 

The First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) contains the following allegations 

pertaining to Defendant Weed, Inc. On or around October 1, 2014, Plaintiff and 

Defendant entered into a Consulting Agreement (“Agreement”) under which Plaintiff was 

to be available to consult with Defendant’s officers and directors on specified projects 

until September 30, 2015. (Doc. 29, ¶ 9.) As compensation for Plaintiff’s services under 

the Agreement, Defendant was to issue Plaintiff 1,200,000 shares of common stock in 

 1

 Defendant’s Motion targets the original Complaint, which is no longer operative. Generally, a motion to dismiss that targets an inoperative complaint is moot because an amended complaint supersedes the original, the latter being treated as nonexistent. Ramirez v. County of San Bernardino, 806 F.3d 1002, 1008 (9th Cir. 2015). 

Defense counsel indicated during a telephonic conference held on March 23, 2018, that 

he believes the Motion is not moot in this case, and Plaintiff’s counsel agreed that the Motion may not be moot. Because the amendments made in the operative First Amended Complaint do not affect Defendant’s statute-of-limitations arguments, the Court will construe the Motion as one to dismiss the First Amended Complaint. To require a new Motion would only needlessly delay this action. 
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Weed, Inc. (Id. ¶ 10.) The shares were to be transferred in two issuances: the first 

issuance of 500,000 shares within 30 days of execution of the Agreement and the second 

issuance of 700,000 shares within 30 days of April 1, 2015. (Id.) Plaintiff was issued the 

initial 500,000 shares. (Id. ¶ 11.) 

 Plaintiff performed consulting services under the Agreement for the full term of 

the Agreement. (Id. ¶ 12.) Despite demand made in December 2017, Defendant has 

failed and refused to issue Plaintiff the additional 700,000 shares of common stock. (Id.

¶ 14.) The shares were originally valued at $0.05 per share, but were worth $10.52 per 

share as of the filing of the Complaint. (Id. ¶ 13.) Plaintiff alleges, among other claims, 

claims for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing and conversion. 

B. Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claim for breach of the covenant of good faith 

and fair dealing (“bad-faith claim”) is barred by the statute of limitations. As a threshold 

matter, the parties dispute whether a 2-year or 6-year limitations period applies. 

Defendant cites an Arizona case in which a 2-year limitations period was applied to a 

bad-faith claim arising out of an insurance contract. See Taylor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. 

Ins. Co., 893 P.2d 39 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994), vacated on other grounds, 913 P.2d 1092 

(Ariz. 1996). Defendant concedes it found no case in which a court applied a 2-year 

limitations period outside the insurance context, but argues there is no reason to believe a 

different limitations period should apply. Plaintiff argues that his bad-faith claim sounds 

in contract rather than tort, and thus the 6-year limitations period for breach-of-contract 

claims should apply. 

 The Court finds that a 2-year limitations period applies. Plaintiff correctly points 

out that Arizona case law recognizes a distinction between bad-faith claims sounding in 

tort and bad-faith claims sounding in contract. See Wells Fargo Bank v. Ariz. Laborers, 

Teamsters & Cement Masons, 38 P.3d 12, 29 (Ariz. 2002) (en banc) (explaining that a 

“special relationship” between the parties is required for bad-faith claims sounding in 

tort, but not for bad-faith claims sounding in contract). However, Plaintiff cites no 
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authority showing that distinction bears on the statute of limitations. The few cases 

available all apply a 2-year limitations period regardless of the context. See Taylor, 913 

P.2d at 1094 (applying 2-year limitations period to bad-faith claim arising out of 

insurance contract); Serrano v. Serrano, No. 1 CA–CV 10–0649, 2012 WL 75639, at *6 

(Ariz. Ct. App. Jan. 10, 2012) (applying 2-year limitations period to bad-faith claim 

arising out of partnership agreement to operate a restaurant); Stockwell v. Myers, No. CV13-00782-PHX-ROS, 2014 WL 12729574, at *1–3 (D. Ariz. Mar. 24, 2014) (applying 2-

year limitations period to bad-faith claim arising out of business venture to buy and sell 

real estate). 

 Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s bad-faith claim accrued in September 2015 at 

the latest, when the Agreement would have terminated pursuant to its terms. Plaintiff 

disagrees, arguing that he did not discover his claim until December 2017, when his 

demand for the shares was refused. Taking the FAC’s allegations as true and drawing all 

reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiff, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s bad-faith 

claim accrued in September 2015 at the latest and that it is barred by the statute of 

limitations. 

The discovery rule—under which a claim “does not accrue until the plaintiff 

knows or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should know the facts underlying the 

[claim]”—applies to contract claims. Gust, Rosenfeld & Henderson v. Prudential Ins. 

Co. of Am., 898 P.2d 964, 966 (Ariz. 1995) (en banc). Simply stated, neither Plaintiff’s 

alleged injury nor its cause was difficult to detect. Plaintiff asserts entitlement to 700,000 

shares of stock that, pursuant to the Agreement, were payable no later than May 1, 2015. 

A reasonable person would have discovered the facts underlying the claim (i.e., that 

Defendant was refusing to transfer the shares) when he or she did not receive the shares 

by that deadline. Cf. HSL Linda Gardens Properties, Ltd. v. Freeman, 859 P.2d 1339, 

1340–41 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993) (applying discovery rule where plaintiff had no reason to 

know of defendant’s breach of land-purchase contract until plaintiff tried to sell the land 

7 years later). Assuming for the sake of argument that a reasonable person would not 
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have discovered the claim by non-receipt of the shares, non-receipt by the deadline would 

have prompted a reasonable person to diligently investigate, and even the most cursory 

investigation would have revealed the facts underlying the claim. Giving Plaintiff the 

benefit that waiting until September 2015 to investigate was reasonable, his claim must 

fail. Plaintiff waited more than 2 years after the termination date to make inquiries, 

which is objectively unreasonable. 

 Therefore, Plaintiff’s claim accrued in September 2015 at the latest, when the 

Agreement would have terminated on its own and a reasonable person would have 

discovered the facts underlying the claim. Under the 2-year limitations period applicable 

to his bad-faith claim, Plaintiff was required to file suit no later than September 2017. 

Plaintiff filed suit on January 19, 2018; it is therefore apparent from the face of the FAC 

that his claim is barred. See Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 682 (9th Cir. 

1980) (“If the running of the statute is apparent on the face of the complaint, the defense 

may be raised by a motion to dismiss.” (citations omitted)). Because the statute of 

limitations is absolute, amendment would be futile. See Deutsch v. Turner Corp., 324 

F.3d 692, 718 n.20 (9th Cir. 2003) (amendment is futile if the claim will be barred by the 

statute of limitations). Consequently, the bad-faith claim will be dismissed with 

prejudice. 

 C. Conversion 

 Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s conversion claim is barred under the 2-year 

statute of limitations. See Tissicino v. Peterson, 121 P.3d 1286, 1290 (Ariz. Ct. App. 

2005) (citing Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-542(5)) (setting forth the statute of limitations). 

Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s conversion claim accrued in September 2015 at the 

latest, when the Agreement would have terminated on its own, and that the claim is 

untimely because the Complaint was filed more than two years later. Plaintiff responds 

that his claim is saved by the discovery rule. Plaintiff further contends that Defendant’s 

retention of the stock is a continuing tort that has not yet fully accrued. See Floyd v. 

Donahue, 923 P.2d 875, 879 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996) (describing the continuous tort 
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doctrine). 

 Taking the FAC’s allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in 

Plaintiff’s favor, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s conversion claim is barred by the 

statute of limitations. The discovery rule does not save Plaintiff’s claim. As explained 

above, a reasonable person would have discovered the facts underlying the claim no later 

than September 2015; under no reasonable interpretation of the facts could a jury 

conclude otherwise. Nor does the continuing tort doctrine save Plaintiff’s claim. The 

continuing tort doctrine applies to tort claims “based on a series of related wrongful acts.” 

Cruz v. City of Tucson, 401 P.3d 1018, 1023 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2017) (citing Watkins v. 

Arpaio, 367 P.3d 72, 75 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2016)). It does not apply here, where the claim is 

predicated on a single act that took place in 2015. 

It is apparent from the face of the FAC that Plaintiff filed suit more than 2 years 

after his claim accrued. Therefore, Defendant’s Motion will be granted with respect to 

Plaintiff’s conversion claim. The conversion claim will be dismissed with prejudice 

because amendment would be futile. See Deutsch, 324 F.3d at 718 n.20. 

III. Plaintiff’s Motion to Dismiss2

A. Amended Counterclaim3

 Defendant’s Amended Counterclaim contains the following allegations. In 

October 2014, Plaintiff represented to Defendant that Michael Ryan was interested in 

becoming a consultant for Defendant and that Ryan had the skills and abilities to provide 

valuable consulting services. (Doc. 30 at 6, ¶¶ 8, 9.) In October 2014, Plaintiff 

encouraged and persuaded Defendant to retain Ryan as a consultant. (Id. ¶¶ 10, 11.) In 

reliance on Plaintiff’s representations that Ryan was interested in becoming a consultant 

and had the skills and abilities to provide valuable consulting services, Defendant offered 

 2

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targeting the Amended Counterclaim. 3

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to retain Ryan as a consultant. (Id. ¶ 12.) Plaintiff’s representations concerning Ryan 

were material false statements of fact that Defendant reasonably relied upon by offering 

to retain Ryan. (Id. at 6–7, ¶¶ 13, 14.) Defendant would not have offered to retain Ryan 

had Plaintiff not misrepresented Ryan’s interest or abilities. (Id. at 7, ¶ 15.) 

 Based upon Defendant’s reasonable reliance on Plaintiff’s material 

misrepresentations, Defendant executed a consulting agreement with Ryan in October 

2014. (Id. ¶ 16.) Pursuant to the consulting agreement, Defendant compensated Ryan by 

issuing 50,000 shares of common stock in Weed, Inc. (Id. ¶¶ 18, 19.) At the time 

Plaintiff misrepresented Ryan’s interest and abilities, Defendant did not know that 

Plaintiff was indebted to Ryan; that Plaintiff had intended the shares of stock to satisfy 

his debt to Ryan; that Plaintiff had told Ryan he would not have to provide any consulting 

services to Defendant; and that, when the consulting agreement was executed, Ryan did 

not intend to provide consulting services to Defendant. (Id. at 7–8, ¶¶ 20, 21, 22, 23.) 

 Defendant did not learn of Plaintiff’s misrepresentations, concealment, and fraud 

until 2017. (Id. at 8, ¶ 24.) Despite receiving 50,000 shares of stock, Ryan did not 

provide any consulting services to Defendant. (Id. ¶ 25.) Defendant was damaged as a 

result of Plaintiff’s misrepresentations, concealment, and fraudulent inducement to enter 

into the consulting agreement with Ryan. (Id. ¶ 26.) Based on the foregoing allegations, 

Defendant asserts a claim of fraud/concealment against Plaintiff. 

B. Discussion 

 1. Elements of Fraud 

 Plaintiff argues that Defendant failed to allege the elements of fraud. Fraud 

requires: 

 (1) [a] representation; (2) its falsity; (3) its materiality; (4) the 

speaker’s knowledge of its falsity or ignorance of its truth; (5) [the 

speaker’s] intent that it should be acted upon by the person and in 

the manner reasonably contemplated; (6) the hearer’s ignorance of 

its falsity; (7) [the hearer’s] reliance on its truth; (8) [the hearer’s] 

right to rely thereon; and (9) [the hearer’s] consequent and 

proximate injury. 
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KB Home Tucson, Inc. v. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co., 340 P.3d 405, 412 (Ariz. Ct. App. 

2014) (alterations in original) (quoting Neilson v. Flashberg, 419 P.2d 514, 517–18 (Ariz. 

1966)). Specifically, Plaintiff argues that (1) Defendant failed to allege Plaintiff had 

knowledge that his representations were false, and (2) the alleged representations are 

non-actionable expressions of opinion. Defendant argues that it repeatedly alleged that 

Plaintiff knew his affirmative representations were false and that Plaintiff overlooks 

certain omissions that constitute actionable fraud in the form of concealment or 

nondisclosure (e.g., Plaintiff was indebted to Ryan and told Ryan he would not have to 

provide Defendant any consulting services). 

 Accepting all material allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in 

Defendant’s favor, the Court finds that Defendant has adequately alleged the elements of 

fraudulent misrepresentation. Plaintiff allegedly told Ryan he would receive shares of 

stock in Weed, Inc. without having to provide any consulting services. Plaintiff allegedly 

told Defendant that Ryan was interested in becoming a consultant for Weed, Inc. and had 

the skills to provide valuable consulting services. Assuming there is evidence that 

Plaintiff was indebted to Ryan and told Ryan he would not have to perform, one may 

reasonably infer that Plaintiff knew his representations were false when made. 

 Plaintiff correctly points out that a fraud claim may not be based upon an 

expression of opinion. See Page Inv. Co. v. Staley, 468 P.2d 589, 591 (Ariz. 1970). 

Viewed in isolation, Plaintiff’s representations that Ryan “was interested in becoming a 

consultant” and “had the skills and abilities to provide valuable consulting services” 

could be interpreted as statements of opinion. However, “magic language is not 

necessary in pleading fraud, as long as the pleading, considered as a whole, can be 

construed to plead the nine elements.” Hall v. Romero, 685 P.2d 757, 761 (Ariz. Ct. App. 

1984) (citing Spudnuts, Inc. v. Lane, 641 P.2d 912, 914 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982)). Plaintiff 

allegedly “encouraged” and “persuaded” Defendant to retain Ryan as a consultant, all 

while intending that Ryan not provide any consulting services. Viewing the pleading as a 

whole, Plaintiff’s alleged statements go beyond mere expressions of opinion. They are 
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more akin to “statements concerning future events . . . [that] were made with the present 

intention not to perform,” which can constitute actionable fraud. Staheli v. Kauffman, 

595 P.2d 172, 175 (Ariz. 1979). 

 Defendant argues that it has also adequately alleged fraud in the form of 

nondisclosure. Nondisclosure constitutes actionable fraud only if the party failing to 

disclose owes a duty to speak. Wells Fargo Bank, 38 P.3d at 35–36. Defendant suggests 

that Plaintiff’s status as a shareholder in Weed, Inc. created a duty to disclose as a matter 

of law. However, only majority shareholders owe a fiduciary duty to act fairly to the 

owned company. Pioneer Annuity Life Ins. Co. ex rel. Childers v. Nat’l Equity Life Ins. 

Co., 765 P.2d 550, 555 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988); see Wash. Nat’l Tr. Co. v. W. M. Dary Co., 

568 P.2d 1069, 1072 (Ariz. 1977). There are no allegations that Plaintiff was a majority 

shareholder. 

Defendant also suggests that the Agreement created a duty to disclose. However, 

the Court must limit its review to facts alleged in the complaint, to the contents of 

documents attached to the complaint, and to documents incorporated by reference in the 

complaint. Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1076 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Hal Roach 

Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555 n. 19 (9th Cir. 1989)). 

Defendant does not allege any facts relating to the Agreement, nor did Defendant attach 

the Agreement to its Amended Counterclaim or incorporate it therein by reference.4

 

Therefore, the Court may not use the existence or contents of the Agreement to find that 

Defendant has stated a claim for nondisclosure.5

 Since there are no facts indicating the 

 4

 As is generally the case with counterclaims, Defendant set forth its fraud 

claim in the same document as its Answer to the FAC. In its Answer, Defendant admits 

the existence and terms of the Agreement. However, courts do not consider the answer’s 

admissions and denials when considering a motion to dismiss a counterclaim. Inst. of Cetacean Research v. Sea Shepherd Conservation Soc’y, 153 F. Supp. 3d 1291, 1319 (W.D. Wash. 2015); Finato v. Keith Fink & Assocs., No. 2:16–CV–06713–RGK–AJW, 

2017 WL 3075510, at *2 (C.D. Cal. May 17, 2017). 5

 The Court may also consider the contents of a document even though the plaintiff does not allege the document’s contents, if (1) the plaintiff’s claim depends on the document; (2) the defendant attaches the document to its motion to dismiss; and (3) 

the document’s authenticity is not disputed. Knievel, 393 F.3d at 1076. This mechanism 

may not be used to consider the Agreement because the first two requirements are not satisfied. 
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existence of a relationship between the parties (special or otherwise) that would create a 

duty to disclose, the Court finds that Defendant has failed to allege fraud in the form of 

nondisclosure. See Universal Inv. Co. v. Sahara Motor Inn, Inc., 619 P.2d 485, 487 

(Ariz. Ct. App. 1980) (“special relationship,” e.g., a confidential relationship where one 

relies on the other’s trustworthiness, gives rise to a duty to disclose). 

Finally, Defendant contends that it has alleged fraud in the form of active 

concealment. The Court agrees. Unlike simple nondisclosure, active concealment does 

not require the existence “of a fiduciary, statutory, or other legal duty to disclose.” Wells 

Fargo Bank, 38 P.3d at 21. Active concealment is “characterized by deceptive acts or 

contrivances intended to hide information, mislead, avoid suspicion, or prevent further 

inquiry into a material matter.” Id. at 35–36 (quoting United States v. Colton, 231 F.3d 

890, 899 (4th Cir. 2000)). Plaintiff argues that Defendant failed to allege that he took any 

action to conceal his agreement with Ryan. However, Plaintiff overlooks that his alleged 

representations may constitute concealment. Id. at 36 (quoting William L. Prosser, 

Handbook of the Law of Torts § 106, at 695 (4th ed. 1971) (active concealment includes 

“[a]ny words . . . which create a false impression covering up the truth, or which remove 

an opportunity that might otherwise have led to the discovery of a material fact . . . .”)). 

Plaintiff allegedly misrepresented that Ryan was interested in consulting and was able to 

provide valuable consulting services. Assuming the truthfulness of these allegations and 

giving them a liberal construction, they show that Plaintiff performed a “deceptive act” 

intended to hide information, mislead, or prevent inquiry into a material matter. 

Specifically, whether Ryan actually intended to perform consulting services was material 

to Defendant’s decision to retain him as a consultant. By allegedly misrepresenting that 

Ryan was interested in performing such services, it can reasonably be inferred that 

Plaintiff intended to hide that Ryan would not perform, mislead Defendant into believing 

that Ryan would perform, or prevent Defendant from inquiring into whether Ryan would 

perform. This is sufficient to state a claim at this stage. 

. . . . 
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 2. Economic Loss Rule 

Plaintiff argues that the fraud claim is barred by the economic loss rule, which 

limits “a contracting party to contractual remedies for the recovery of economic losses 

unaccompanied by physical injury to persons or other property.” Flagstaff Affordable 

Hous. Ltd. v. Design All., Inc., 223 P.3d 664, 667 (Ariz. 2010) (en banc); see Sullivan v. 

Pulte Home Corp., 306 P.3d 1, 3 (Ariz. 2013). Plaintiff contends that any representations 

by him were made pursuant to his consulting obligations under the Agreement and that, 

accordingly, Defendant is precluded from seeking tort remedies for economic loss caused 

by those representations. Defendant argues that the economic loss rule applies only in 

products liability and construction defect cases and that Plaintiff’s allegedly tortious 

conduct is unrelated to performance of the Agreement. 

As an initial matter, Defendant has not pled any facts concerning the Agreement, 

nor has Defendant attached the Agreement to its Amended Counterclaim or incorporated 

it therein by reference. Therefore, it would be improper to dismiss Defendant’s claim 

based on a contractual relationship that is mentioned nowhere in the Amended 

Counterclaim. Inst. of Cetacean Research, 153 F. Supp. 3d at 1319. The Motion will be 

denied on that ground. 

Additionally, even were it proper to consider Defendant’s fraud claim in view of 

the parties’ Consulting Agreement, the Court disagrees that the claim is barred by the 

economic loss rule. “The economic loss doctrine may vary in its application depending 

on context-specific policy considerations.” Flagstaff Affordable Hous., 223 P.3d at 669. 

Courts should consider the underlying policies of tort and contract law when determining 

whether the rule applies to a particular case. Where the policy underlying contract law 

(to uphold contracting parties’ expectations) outweighs the policy underlying tort law (to 

promote the safety of people and property), the economic loss rule bars tort claims. Id. 

Where, on the other hand, tort law preponderates, the economic loss rule should not be 

applied. Id. at 668. 

The economic loss rule has been applied to contract-related fraud claims. In Cook 
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v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 258 P.3d 149, 150, 153 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011), an Arizona 

appellate court applied the economic loss rule to a fraudulent inducement claim arising 

out of a service contract to exterminate termites.6

 The plaintiffs alleged they were 

induced to enter into the contract by the defendant’s promises to successfully eradicate 

the termites and repair new termite damage (although neither promise was in the 

contract). Id. at 150. The defendant was unsuccessful, so the plaintiffs filed suit. Id. at 

151. After weighing the policies underlying contract and tort law, the court declined to 

impose tort liability, reasoning that the plaintiffs should be limited to contractual 

remedies because they were seeking money for the defendant’s failure to adequately 

perform the contract. Id. at 153. 

In an unpublished case, Maricopa Investment Team, LLC v. Johnson Valley 

Partners LP, No. 1 CA–CV 12–0047, 2012 WL 5894849, at *1–3 (Ariz. Ct. App. Nov. 

23, 2012), an Arizona appellate court applied the economic loss rule to a fraudulent 

inducement claim arising from failure to perform under a settlement agreement. When 

the defendant failed to pay the plaintiff the sum due under the agreement, the plaintiff 

filed suit alleging that the settlement agreement was induced by the defendant 

misrepresenting its ability to pay. Id. at *2. The court found no strong policy reason to 

impose tort liability because nonpayment of the settlement was a risk that was anticipated 

and bargained for, demonstrated by the contractual remedies available for breach by 

nonpayment. Id. at *2–3. 

The District of Arizona refused to apply the economic loss rule to a fraudulent 

inducement claim in Jes Solar Co. v. Matinee Energy, Inc., CV 12-626 TUC DCB, 2015 

WL 10943562, at *1–5 (D. Ariz. Nov. 2, 2015). The parties entered into a series of 

contracts under which the defendant agreed to pay the plaintiff to construct a power plant. 

Id. at *1–2. The plaintiff advanced hundreds of thousands in costs that were not 

reimbursed, and the project was never built, so the plaintiff filed suit alleging that the 

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service contract, belies that argument. 
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defendant was engaged in a fraudulent scheme and intended at the inception of the 

contracts to not perform. Id. at *2. After weighing the relevant policies, the district court 

determined that tort liability was appropriate because the risk of loss was not bargained 

for, distinguishing cases such as Cook. Id. at *3–4. Inducing the plaintiff to enter into 

the contracts was the means by which the defendant stole the plaintiff’s money, so 

protecting the parties’ expectations under the contracts was not a persuasive reason to 

apply contract law. Id. at *5. 

Assuming the truthfulness of Defendant’s allegations, this case is more analogous 

to Jes Solar Co., where the risk of injury was not bargained for or allocated. The purpose 

of the Agreement was for Plaintiff to provide valuable consulting services to Weed, Inc. 

It is reasonable to infer that Defendant did not anticipate or bargain for the risk that 

Plaintiff would use Weed, Inc. to satisfy his personal debts, while intending that Weed, 

Inc. receive nothing in return. Thus, there is no strong policy reason to limit Defendant 

to its contractual remedies. Cases like Cook and Maricopa Investment Team are 

distinguishable because the plaintiffs in those cases bargained for the risks which formed 

the basis of their fraud claims. That is, the injuries in Cook (i.e., the defendant’s failure 

to eradicate the termites) and Maricopa Investment Team (i.e., the defendant’s failure to 

make all payments) were easily foreseeable, and thus there was good reason to limit the 

parties to their contractual remedies. Conversely, Plaintiff’s allegedly fraudulent conduct 

was not a foreseeable risk of the Consulting Agreement. The economic loss rule does not 

apply in these circumstances. See Jes Solar Co., 2015 WL 10943562, at *4–5. 

IV. Defendant’s Motion to Amend 

 On April 2, 2018, Defendant timely sought leave to file a second amended 

counterclaim, which adds a claim against Plaintiff for breach of contract. Plaintiff does 

not oppose. Defendant’s Motion will be granted. 

IT IS ORDERED: 

1. Defendant Weed, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 13) is granted. Plaintiff 

William Martin’s claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing (Count 
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Three) and claim for conversion (Count Four) are dismissed with prejudice.

2. Plaintiff William Martin’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 20) is granted in part 

and denied in part. The Motion is granted to the extent that Defendant Weed, Inc.’s 

claim for fraudulent nondisclosure is dismissed without prejudice. The Motion is 

denied to the extent that Defendant has stated claims for fraudulent misrepresentation and 

fraudulent concealment.

3. Defendant Weed, Inc.’s Motion to Amend (Doc. 33) is granted. Defendant 

shall file its Second Amended Counterclaim within five (5) days of the filing date of this 

Order.

 Dated this 30th day of May, 2018.