### TEXA S COU RT O F AP PEAL S, THIR D DISTRIC T, AT AU STIN
NO. 03-00-00130-CV Melody F ickl

e, Appel lant v. Alle n Lee Fickl

e, Appellee

FROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TOM GREEN COUNTY, 119TH JUDICIAL DIS TRICT

NO. B-99-0296-F, HONORAB LE CURT STE IB, JUDGE PRESI DING
Melody Fi

ckl e (“Mel

ody”) ap pe al s th

e tri al cou rt’ s f i na l de cre e of divo rc e aw ar ding appelle e, Al

l en Lee Fi ckl e (“ Al l en”), the ri ght to establ i sh

the p ri mary resi dence o f t he co up le’ s o nly chi ld, Brianna Nico le Fickle ( “Brianna ”) . Ap pellant contends thatthe tri al cou rt ab us ed i ts d i screti on in awardin g Al le n t he r ight to det ermin

e Brianna’s primary

residence. We will

affi rm the t rial court ’s decree. BACKGROUND

Melody an

d Al le n m arried on Ma

y 29, 1993. Soon af

ter, Melody j oine d the Uni ted Stat es Ai r Force and the coupl e m oved to Goodfel

l ow Ai r Force Bas e i n Sa n A nge l o, Texa s. O n Decem ber 19, 199 4, the i

r daug hter B ri an na wasborn . Bria

nna was even tuall y di agnosed as a “ special needs” c hi ld b ecause of s

peech an d em ot iona l de vel opmen t pro blem s. Melody be cam e di ssatis fi

ed wi th h er f am i l y ’s si tua ti on at G oodf el l ow a n d sub se qu en

tl y re qu ested

a tou r of du ty ov er se as wi th t he ho pe o f lat er o bt aining a s t at es ide as sig nment at a d iffe re n t l o ca t io n. Me lo dy c o nse qu en t ly2

pe rformed

a tour of d

uty i n K orea f or one y ear—f rom M arch

1998 th rough Marc h 19 99. Be f

ore leaving for Kor ea, Melo dy was Brianna ’s pr imary car egiver but Allen share d t he child- re ar ing responsibi

li ties. Aft er Me lo dy le ft fo rhe rt o ur o f du t y, A llen a ss ume d t he r o le of excl usi ve caregi ver for Bri ann

a. Melody

returned to San

An gel o in Marc h 19 99 an d f i l ed f or di vorce shortly there af ter. InM ay 1999, the trial

court appoin

ted Melody

and A ll en j oint temporary

ma nagi ng conserv

at ors , wher eby Briann a moved back and f

ort h between them on a m onthly basi s. In August 19 99 , th e parties wai

ved a j ury tri al

and the t r ial cou

rt h ea rd e vi de nc e on the meri ts. In i ts f i na l de cre e of div orce si gned Novem

ber 1, 1999 , the c ourt appoi

nted Mel ody and A l l en j oin t ma na gi ng c onse rva tors of Br i an n a. A s on

e of A l l en ’s ri gh ts a n d d uti es , the tr i al cou rt g av e h im t he authority to establi sh Brianna’s pr imar y re sid en ce . Me lo dy n o w a pp ea ls t he t r ial c o ur t ’s de cr ee , co mpla ining o nly o f t his ruli ng. DISCUSSI ON

Melody does notco nt est t he ap po intment of t he pa re nt s as jo int manag ing conservato rs. Thus, she a ckno wledg es t hat eithe r Allen o r Me lod y must ha ve the res pon si bi l i ty of est ablishing

their dau ghter ’s primar y re sid en ce an d t ha t t he t r ial c o ur t co uld pr o pe r ly mak e t his dec ision. She ass erts, however, that t he trial cou rt ab us ed i ts d i screti on b y rel y i ng on impe r miss ible fac t o r s in awardin

g Al le n the right to establ

is h Briann a’s pri ma ry resi dence. In particul

ar, Melody co nt ends t hat t he t rial co ur t violat ed t he Fo ur t eent h Amendment of t he Un i ted State s C ons

ti tution and se cti on 1 53. 003 of

the Tex asFa m i l y Code, w hi ch proh i bi ts d i scri m i na ti on on the ba sis of sex or ma rital status i n de term i ni ng c onse rva torshi p of a ch i l d. See U.S. C o nst . ame nd . XI V; T ex . Fa m.3

Code An n. § 153.002 (West 1996). Melody further contends that the trial cou rt ab us ed i ts d i screti on because th e ev i den ce

pr es en ted sh owe d th at a wa rd i n g cus tody

to Al len “was clearly

not in the best i ntere sts of

Brian na Fi ckl e.” A l thou gh Me l ody arg ue s tw o se

pa rate poi nts of err or, b oth of

Melody’s argu

men ts are su bsum ed by t he allega t ion t hat t he t rial co ur t abus ed it s discr et ion whe n it aw ar ded Allen the right to determ

i ne Brian na ’spri mary resi den ce. In a review appl

yi ng an abuse of dis cretion standard, in suf fi ci ency of t he ev i den ce i s n ot an i n de pen den t groun d of com pl ai n t; i nstead, th e app el

l ate court cons i ders t he su ffi ciency o f the evidenc e su ppo rt ing t he r ulingas one rel ev ant fact or in asses sing whether the t rial court ab use d i

ts di scre tion . In re Driver, 8 95 S .W. 2d 8 75, 877 (T ex. App. —T exar kana 199 5, no writ ); see also Beaumont Bank, N.A. v. Buller , 806 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Tex . 1991) . The trial court is gi ven wi de latitude in

deter mi ni ng the bestin

terest of a m

in or chil d. Gillesp ie v. Gilles

pie , 644 S.W.2d 449 , 4 51 ( Te x. 1 982 ). The de cis io n c o nc er ning co nse r va t o r ship of a c hi l d i s addr es se d to th e s oun

d di screti on of the trial court when

it si ts as trier of f act. Jeff ers v. Wallace , 6 15 S .W. 2d 2 52, 253 (T ex. Ci v. A pp.—D al l as 1 981, n

o wri t). T he ap pe llat e c o ur t will not dis turb the trial

court ’s orderconc ern

i ng a j oin t ma na gi ng c onse rva torshi p un l ess the tri al court cle ar ly ab use d i ts di scre tion . Gillesp ie , 644 S.W.2d at 451. We aff ord t hi s def

erence to the trial courtb ec au se

i t i s i n th e b est pos i

ti on to obs er ve t he de meano r a nd pe rso nalities o f the wit nesse s, a nd can “feel the for ces , p ow er s, a nd influences t hat canno t be disc er ned bymerel y readi ng th e rec ord.” Id. Thu s, w e will not hold t hat t he co ur t ab us ed it s d isc r et io n a s lo ng as t he r ec o r d c o nt ain s s o me4

evi dence of a subs t ant ive and pr oba t ive ch arac ter to support the tria l court’s deci sion. Valdez v. Valdez , 93 0 S .W .2d

72 5, 7 31 (Tex . A

pp .—H ouston

[1 st D i st. ] 1 99 6, n

o wr i t)
. Melody re qu es t ed t hat t he t ria l co ur t mak e fi n din gs of f act and concl

usi ons of l

aw. See Tex. R. Ci

v. P. 296. It did so. The trial court concl

uded that, “[b]ased

on s ec ti on 1 53. 002of t he Fam il y Code, the best i

ntere sts of

the chi l d sh al l al way s b e the pri mary cons i derati

on of the c ourt in determi ni ng the i ssues of

conservat orship a

nd p ossessi

on of and ac cess to the child.” See Te x. Fa m. Co de Ann. § 153.00 2 (West 199 6). Th e c ourt f oun d a s a matte r of f ac t, “ Th e b es t i

nte res ts of t he chi ld di ctate t hat t he pa re nt s be a ppo inted joint man ag ing co nse r va t o r s, bu t t ha t t he fat he rsho uld ha ve the exc l usi ve ri ght to determ

i ne the p ri mary resi den ce of the chi l d.” Melody pres en ts no s upport f or her b ald as serti

on tha t the tri al courtvi ol ate d s ec ti on 153.003 of t he Texas F am

il y C ode and the Fourteenth Am endm ent of the Uni

ted St at es Co nst itu t ion. She directs us to no pro of in the reco rd in support of these con ten ti on s. Furthe

rm ore, the r ecord does n ot i

nd i ca te that the tri

al cou rt m ad e i ts dete rm i na ti on on an y one f ac tor, i m pe rm i ss i bl e or ot herwi se. Bo t h par t ies t est ifi ed fu lly co ncer ningthe issue, along wi th ot her witnesses. The

record contai ns evi den ce ten di ng to su pport t he t r ial c o ur t ’s de cis io n t ha t it was in Briann a’s best in terest f orA l l en to determ i ne her pri mary resi den ce. W hi l e Al l en wasnot Bri

an na ’spri mary care gi ver be f ore Melody lef t fo rKo r ea , he as su med t ha t po sit io n a ft er Me lo dy l ef t. Allen se r ve d a s B r ian na ’s so le caregi ver from March 1998 th rough Marc h 19 99 an d as her j oin t temp orary

man ag i ng con serv ator f rom May 1999 to Novem

ber 1999. Al

le n testifi ed that Bria

nna is hi s “n umb er one priori

ty” an d that he bel ie ves h e “can provide that stabi

li ty that she n

eeds and tha

t continui ty an d di sc ipli ne and structur e. ” Mel ody ’s testim ony c onceded that Al

le n possesse s adequate parentin g skill s and that5

Melody wo uld no t have left fo rKo r ea ha d s he no t be lieve d t ha t Allen co uld h an dl e th e r es ponsi b i l i ty of car ingfor Briann

a. Another witness t est ifi ed t hat Brianna ’s beha vior pr oblems impr ove d du ring the y ear A l l en had pri mary resp onsi bi l i ty f or her. Melody points to no evi dence that t he t r ial c o ur t co nsid er ed impe r miss ible f ac t o r s in re aching its decisi on. Furthermore, t he r eco rd co nt ains evide nce o f a subs t ant ive and p ro bat ive char act er t ending to support the tri al court’s deci sion. See Valdez , 930 S.W.2d at 731. Therefore,
w e c anno t say t hat t he t rial co ur t abus ed it s discr et ion in gr ant ing Allen the r ight t o d et er mine the prim ary res ide nce of B rian

na. Mel ody’s points of e

rror ar e accordin

gly overruled. CONCLU SION Having overruled appel

la nt’s poin ts of error, we af

fi rm the tri al

co ur t’s decree awardin g appelle e the righ

t t o establish the ch

il d’s pri ma ry resi dence.

Mari ly n A boussie, Chief J

ustice Bef ore Chi ef J

ustice A boussie, Justices

Jones an d Yeakel Af fi rmed File d: Novem

ber 30, 2000 Do No t Publis

h