* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3. NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.GERARDO DEJESUS SANCHEZRAMIREZ, Defendant - Appellant. No. 11-30170 D.C. No. 2:10-cr-06041-FVS-1

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington Fred L. Van Sickle, Senior District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted July 11, 2012 Seattle, Washington Before: REINHARDT, KLEINFELD, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges. Gerardo Sanchez-Ramirez entered a conditional guilty plea to possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 210 months. He appeals the denial of his motion to suppress and his sentence. We affirm. 

# FILED

AUG 08 2012 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2 Sanchez-Ramirez contends, first, that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress. He argues that the a ffidavit in support of the search warrant failed to provide probable cause for the warrant because: (1) Gomez, the individual transporting the methamphetamine to the confidential informant, did not identify the specific address of his supplier, refe rring only to a house in Pasco, Washington; and (2) the police did not perform a field te st to confirm that the substance seized was methamphetamine, instead stating in th e affidavit simply that the substance seized was believed to be methamphetami ne. We review de novo the denial of a motion to suppress, and review for clear error the finding of the issuing judge that a warrant is supported by probable cause, giving “great deference” to that finding. United States v. Hill , 459 F.3d 966, 970 (9th Cir. 2006). The probable cause determination will be affirmed so long as there is a “substantial basis” for the conclusion that probable cause existed. United States v. Crews , 502 F.3d 1130, 1135 (9th Cir. 2007). Here, a confidential informant contact ed Gomez to order methamphetamine. Gomez, who was under surveillance, was observed entering his car fifteen minutes after the order was made, driving to a hous e in Pasco, entering the house, exiting a few minutes later, and driving back to his own house. He was later apprehended as he exchanged the methamphetamine with a middle-man. Gomez confessed that he3 was transporting methamphetamine, that he ha d done so in the past, and that he had obtained the methamphetamine from his supplier at a house in Pasco. He stated that he made no stops other than his house and a gas station. This was all consistent with the observations of the police during the surveillance conducted on Gomez. Given the totality of the circumstances , there was probable cause to believe that evidence of methamphetamine distribution would be found at the house in Pasco. Although Gomez failed to identify th e specific address of the house, he had visited only one place in Pasco that day, as corroborated by his confession and police surveillance. Moreover, although the police did not perform a field test to confirm that the substance seized from Gomez and the middle-man was, in fact, methamphetamine, there were other facts supporting that conclusion: the confidential informant ordered methamphe tamine, Gomez confirmed that it was methamphetamine, and the police, me mbers of the drug enforcement unit, reasonably believed that the substance wa s methamphetamine. A field test was not necessary in these circumst ances. Therefore, there was a “substantial basis” for concluding that there was probable cause to search the house in Pasco for evidence of methamphetamine distribution. Sanchez-Ramirez also contends that the di strict court erred in failing to order the government to move for a third offe nse level reduction under the United States4 Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.) § 3E1. 1(b). Sanchez-Ramirez argues that the reason cited by the government for withholding the motion for a third offense level reduction, that he reserved his right to appeal, is an impermissible reason under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b). This argument is foreclosed by United States v. Johnson , 581 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2009), where we held that the expenditure of resources in anticipating and preparing for an appealis an appropriate consideration under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b), and that the district court did not err in failing to order the government to move for the third offense level reduction when, as is the case here, a defendant has reserved his right to appeal. AFFIRMED.