United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted March 18, 2005

 Decided January 22, 2007

Before

Hon. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge

Hon. RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge

Hon. MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ] Appeal from the United

 Plaintiff-Appellee, ] States District Court

 ] for the Southern District

No. 03-2549 v. ] of Indiana, Indianapolis

 ] Division.

ANDREW S. WHITE, ] 

 Defendant-Appellant. ] No. 02 CR 165

 ] 

 ] John Daniel Tinder,

 ] Judge.

Andrew White was found guilty of possession of firearms as a convicted felon,

and the district court sentenced him to 115 months’ imprisonment. After this court

upheld White’s conviction and sentence, United States v. White, 368 F.3d 911 (7th

Cir. 2004), the Supreme Court granted certiorari and remanded his case to us for

further consideration in light of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). We

ordered a limited remand pursuant to the procedures set forth in United States v.

Paladino, 401 F.3d 471, 483-84 (7th Cir. 2005), to allow the district court an

opportunity to consider whether it would have imposed the same sentence with the

knowledge that the guidelines are not mandatory.

The district court has now replied that it would today impose the same

sentence, knowing of the guidelines’ advisory status. The parties were offered the

opportunity to respond before we finally resolved the appeal, and only the appellant

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

 Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 03-2549 2

has responded. Counsel for White acknowledges that the district court accorded

White a full opportunity to present reasons why a lower sentence was appropriate

and that the district court provided very extensive explanations and analysis in

order to permit meaningful appellate review. The appellant argues, however, that

the district court simply erred in determining that such a lengthy sentence was

necessary. Instead, he contends that the concept of marginal deterrence leads to a

conclusion that the sentence was unreasonably excessive. If the statutory

maximum of 120 months for violations of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) is to be reserved for the

worst offense and offenders, White argues that his sentence of only five months less

than the maximum is excessive on the grounds that the weapons themselves were

not stolen or otherwise illegal, the number of weapons was small, the weapons were

not used in connection with another crime, and no violence was threatened or

accomplished with the weapons. In order to allow room for more egregious

violations, White believes his sentence should have been placed lower on the scale. 

White’s sentence is within the properly calculated guideline range and

therefore presumptively reasonable. See United States v. Mykytiuk, 415 F.3d 606,

608 (7th Cir. 2005). The district court thoroughly considered the factors listed in 18

U.S.C. § 3553(a) and all of the arguments raised by White in pro se submissions and

by his counsel. United States v. Gama-Gonzales, 469 F.3d 1109, 1110-11 (7th Cir.

2006). Judge Tinder reasonably concluded that such a sentence was necessary in

light of White’s extensive criminal history, which demonstrated increasing

disregard for the law and the safety of others, the fact that the firearms were in the

house while children were present, and White’s continued disregard of the law

including that the offense was committed while he was on probation, there was

marijuana in the house, and he was in possession of identity information stolen

from his former employer. Because the district court would have imposed the same

sentence post-Booker, and because that sentence is reasonable, we conclude that

White’s sentence was not the result of plain error. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the

judgment of the district court.