[Cite as State v. Lenard, 2018-Ohio-3365.]

Court of Appeals of Ohio 

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA 

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

No. 105998

STATE OF OHIO

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE 

vs. 

RICHARD LENARD 

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 

JUDGMENT: 

AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED IN PART; 

AND REMANDED 

Criminal Appeal from the 

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Case Nos. CR-15-599742 and CR-16-602457-A 

BEFORE: Keough, J., E.T. Gallagher, P.J., and Celebrezze, J. 

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: August 23, 2018 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Joseph V. Pagano 

P.O. Box 16869 

Rocky River, Ohio 44116 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Michael C. O’Malley 

Cuyahoga County Prosecutor 

By: Jonathan Block 

Assistant County Prosecutor 

The Justice Center, 9th Floor 

1200 Ontario Street 

Cleveland, Ohio 44113 
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J.: 

{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Richard Lenard, appeals his convictions and sentence. For the 

reasons that follow, we affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings. 

I. Procedural History and Facts

{¶2} In Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-15-599742, Lenard was named in a six-count indictment 

charging him with securing writings by deception, identity fraud, tampering with records, theft, 

and two counts of forgery. An elderly and value specification was attached to some of the 

counts. In Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-16-602457, Lenard was named in a three-count indictment 

charging him with burglary, grand theft, and securing writings by deception. A value 

specification was attached to two of the counts. The cases stem from real estate transactions in 

Euclid and Parma where Lenard acted as the seller or an agent to the seller. The cases were 

consolidated over objection and tried before a jury where the following evidence was presented; 

additional facts will be discussed within the relevant assignments of error. 

A. The Euclid Property

{¶3} In early 2015, Philip Ray Bentley (“Philip”) wanted to make a property investment 

as part of his wife’s retirement plan (collectively, “the Bentleys”). Philip testified that he found 

a home in Euclid, Ohio listed on Craigslist, and called the contact — Ryan Smith. According to 

Philip, Smith told him that he was selling the home on behalf of his uncle. Smith gave Philip 

the combination to the lockbox on the home’s door, and Philip went to the property with his son. 

 According to Philip, the house had extensive water damage and black mold. Nevertheless, 

Philip offered Smith $13,000 to purchase the residence, which Smith accepted. 

{¶4} The Bentleys met Smith at a restaurant in Twinsburg for Philip’s wife, Blanche, to 

sign a purchase agreement. Blanche testified that she did not really understand the document, 
but just signed it after her husband reviewed it and advised her to sign. She stated that she 

voluntarily signed the purchase agreement on April 25, 2015, and it was her understanding that 

they were buying a house. 

{¶5} At the suggestion of Smith, the Bentleys used General Title Services. Michael Gray 

from the title company contacted Philip, and based on the conversation, Philip believed that a 

title search of the property would be performed. A few days later, Smith called the Bentleys to 

arrange a meeting at his Beachwood office for the payment of $3,000 earnest money. Philip 

testified that he met with a woman named Maria and presented her with a $3,000 check made 

payable to General Title Services. Subsequently, Smith contacted Philip and advised that the 

contract on the house was ready to close. Philip was instructed to bring two checks to closing 

— one for $771 payable to General Title Services, and the other for $10,000 payable to Riviera 

Funding. 

{¶6} On May 11, 2015, the Bentleys met with Maria and a notary public. The checks 

were given to Maria, and Blanche voluntarily signed the closing disclaimer after Philip reviewed 

the documents and advised her to sign them. According to Philip, he was told by Smith, Gray, 

and Maria that there were no liens on the property, and that the lien listed on the closing 

disclaimer had been removed. Philip testified that based on these assertions, he believed the 

house passed the title search. The Bentleys both testified that they believed they purchased the 

Euclid property after this meeting. 

{¶7} The Bentleys invested $4,000 to start repairing their home. A few weeks later, 

however, the Bentleys received a foreclosure notification regarding the property. Philip called 

Smith, who told him there was no need for concern because the notification involved his uncle’s 

credit card. Later, however, Philip discovered an $80,000 lien on the property and that the true 
owner was Bank of America. He stated that he tried to contact Smith again, but Smith’s 

telephone number was no longer in service. The Bentleys had to abandon the property. 

{¶8} Believing that the sale of the house was fraudulent, Philip started his own 

investigation and discovered that Riviera Funding was owned by Richard Lenard. After 

speaking with the notary who was present at closing, he learned that a man named “Richard” was 

involved in flipping houses. Based on this information, Philip searched for a “Richard Lenard” 

on Facebook, and his search revealed a Richard Lenard whom he recognized and knew as “Ryan 

Smith.” The Bentleys subsequently filed a report with Beachwood police. 

{¶9} Detective Allan Baumgartner testified that he investigated the Bentleys’ complaint 

against Ryan Smith a.k.a. Richard Lenard. As part of his investigation, he reviewed auditor 

records and the documents provided by the Bentleys that the seller, Antoun Saydeh (“Saydeh”) 

signed. He contacted Saydeh and questioned him about the details of the property, reviewed 

documentation that Saydeh allegedly signed, and presented Saydeh with surveillance 

photographs taken from Huntington Bank. Based on his investigation, Detective Baumgartner 

believed the real estate transaction was fraudulent. 

{¶10} Saydeh testified that in early 2005 he was contacted by the bank regarding his 

Euclid property. He was advised that if he signed a quitclaim deed, his property foreclosure 

would be completed. Saydeh testified that he met with Richard Kelly (“Kelly”), who presented 

him with a quitclaim deed, which he signed. Surveillance still-photographs showed Saydeh at 

Huntington Bank with the man he knew as Kelly. When presented with documents pertaining 

to lead-based paint and residential property disclosures, and a standard purchase agreement, 

Saydeh testified that the signature on the documents was not his. He stated that he did not sign or 
authorize anyone to sign those documents on his behalf. At trial, Saydeh identified Lenard as 

the man he knew as Kelly. 

{¶11} Maria Mhoon testified that she was hired by Lenard to facilitate real estate 

transactions. At Lenard’s request, she would meet with individuals, present them with 

documentation to sign, and collect any checks. Specific to the Bentleys, she stated that she met 

with the Bentleys at Lenard’s instruction and presented them with documentation to sign. She 

stated she accepted checks from them and also presented them with a check. Mhoon testified 

that she gave all signed documents and checks to Lenard. 

B. The Parma Property

{¶12} In 2014, Milolijub Matic (“Matic”) wanted to purchase a home for his daughter and 

granddaughter. He saw an internet advertisement regarding a home for sale in Parma, Ohio. 

He met with Richard Lenard, managing member of AMC Financial, who showed him the 

property and subsequently negotiated an agreement to purchase the home. Matic agreed to a 

land-sale contract to purchase the home for $34,000, with $15,000 as a down payment with an 

agreement to pay $1,000 per month for one year. At the end of the year, a balloon payment of 

$7,900 was required. Matic presented Lenard with a cashier’s check for $15,150 payable to 

Cleveland Title Agency, and then made the monthly $1,000 payments payable to AMC Financial. 

{¶13} When Lenard requested the balloon payment at the end of September 2015, Matic 

became suspicious because he received documentation from Lenard that he did not remember 

signing. Matic consulted with attorney Alex Rakic, who advised him that Midland Bank had a 

lien against the property. The bank ultimately took possession of the Parma property. Matic 

testified that he had to purchase the property from the bank to become the rightful owner. As 
part of the police investigation, Matic was presented with a photo array from which he identified 

Lenard as the man who sold him the home. 

{¶14} Attorney Rakic testified that his research revealed the presence of a lien on the 

property, that the land-contract agreement between AMC Financial and Matic was never 

recorded with the county auditor’s office, and that AMC Financial was not a registered company 

with the Ohio secretary of state. 

{¶15} At the close of the state’s case, the trial court granted Lenard’s Crim.R. 29 motion 

for acquittal on the burglary offense as charged in Count 1 in CR-16-602457 (Parma case). The 

jury found Lenard guilty of the remaining counts of grand theft and securing writings by 

deception, including the furthermore specifications attendant to both counts that the value of the 

property was $7,500 or more but less than $150,000. 

{¶16} In CR-15-599742 (Euclid case), the jury found Lenard not guilty of identity fraud 

and one count of forgery, but guilty of the remaining counts — securing writings by deception, 

tampering with records, theft, and forgery. In each of those counts, the jury found that the 

value of the property was $7,500 or more but less than $37,500, but found that the victim was not 

an elderly person, making the offenses fourth-degree felonies. 

{¶17} The trial court sentenced Lenard to 12 months in CR-15-599742 to be served 

consecutively to 12 months imposed in CR-16-602457. The sentences were also ordered 

consecutive to cases unrelated to this appeal — CR-15- 597800 (16 months), CR-15-602350 (6 

years), and CR-15-602274 (7 years) — for a total sentence of 16 years and 4 months. 

Additionally the court ordered restitution in the amount of $13,000 to the Bentleys, and $27,000 

to Matic. 

{¶18} Lenard now appeals, raising eight assignments of error. 
II. Other Acts Evidence

{¶19} Prior to trial, the state filed a notice of intent to introduce other acts evidence 

pursuant to Evid.R. 404(B), specifically to introduce testimony through Detective David Sword, 

that Lenard used an alias in these cases that he also used in a prior real estate transaction in North 

Royalton where theft was alleged. The state maintained that the evidence would show a pattern 

of activity and an intent to defraud. The defense objected, contending that the evidence would 

be unduly prejudicial. The trial court granted the state’s request, but limited the testimony only 

to the North Royalton matter. In his first assignment of error, Lenard contends that the trial 

court erred by allowing this testimony. 

{¶20} “The trial court has broad discretion in the admission and exclusion of evidence, 

including evidence of other acts under Evid.R. 404(B).” State v. Kirkland, 140 Ohio St.3d 73, 

2014-Ohio-1966, 15 N.E.3d 818, ¶ 67, citing State v. Morris, 132 Ohio St.3d 337, 

2012-Ohio-2407, 972 N.E.2d 528, ¶ 22. Reviewing courts should be “slow to interfere” unless 

the trial court “clearly abused its discretion and the defendant has been materially prejudiced 

thereby[.]” State v. Hymore, 9 Ohio St.2d 122, 128, 224 N.E.2d 126 (1967). “Abuse of 

discretion” is an “‘unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable use of discretion, or as a view or 

action that no conscientious judge could honestly have taken.’” Kirkland at ¶ 67, quoting State 

v. Brady, 119 Ohio St.3d 375, 2008-Ohio-4493, 894 N.E.2d 671, ¶ 23. 

{¶21} Evid.R. 404(B) provides that evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is permitted 

to show proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or the 

absence of mistake or accident. Additionally, R.C. 2945.59 provides that: 

[i]n any criminal case in which the defendant’s motive or intent, the absence of 

mistake or accident on his part, or the defendant’s scheme, plan, or system in 
doing an act is material, any acts of the defendant which tend to show his motive 

or intent, the absence of mistake or accident on his part, or the defendant’s 

scheme, plan, or system in doing the act in question may be proved, whether they 

are contemporaneous with or prior or subsequent thereto, notwithstanding that 

such proof may show or tend to show the commission of another crime by the 

defendant. 

{¶22} In deciding whether to admit other acts evidence, trial courts should conduct a 

three-step analysis: 

The first step is to consider whether the other acts evidence is relevant to making 

any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more or less 

probable than it would be without the evidence. * * * The next step is to consider 

whether evidence of the other crimes, wrongs, or acts is presented to prove the 

character of the accused in order to show activity in conformity therewith or 

whether the other acts evidence is presented for a legitimate purpose, such as 

those stated in Evid.R. 404(B). The third step is to consider whether the 

probative value of the other acts evidence is substantially outweighed by the 

danger of unfair prejudice. 

State v. Williams, 134 Ohio St.3d 521, 2012-Ohio-5695, 983 N.E.2d 1278, ¶ 20. 

{¶23} Applying this test to the challenged testimony, we find no abuse of discretion by 

the trial court. First, Lenard’s use of the same fictitious name in a prior real estate transaction in 

North Royalton is relevant to refute Lenard’s defense that he was an innocent party receiving the 

blame for actions the Bentleys, Saydeh, and Matic knowingly undertook. The testimony 

demonstrated that Lenard had knowledge of his actions. The evidence was also introduced for a 
valid purpose — to prove identity, an absence of mistake, and provided context in identifying 

Lenard. 

{¶24} Finally, the probative value is not outweighed by any unfair prejudice, and Lenard 

fails to identify how he was prejudiced by this testimony. The trial court mitigated any potential 

prejudice by providing prior to Detective Sword’s testimony a limiting instruction that ordered 

the jury to not consider other acts evidence for any improper purpose. (Tr. 803-804.) The court 

also gave the jury a final instruction regarding other acts evidence. (Tr. 1000-1001.) It is 

presumed that the jury followed these limiting instructions. See State v. Jones, 135 Ohio St.3d 

10, 2012-Ohio-5677, 984 N.E.2d 948, ¶ 194. 

{¶25} Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing this other acts 

testimony. Lenard’s first assignment of error is overruled. 

III. Pretrial Identification

{¶26} Lenard contends in his second assignment of error that the trial court erred by 

admitting Matic’s pretrial identification when he was unable to identify Lenard in court. Lenard 

makes two arguments: (1) that the admission of the photo array was improper because the exhibit 

was not authenticated; and (2) Matic’s pretrial identification was unduly suggestive. 

{¶27} Matic’s inability to identify Lenard at trial is irrelevant. Generally, there is no 

requirement that a witness must make an in-court identification of a defendant in criminal cases 

because the accused’s identity can be established through direct or circumstantial evidence. In re 

A.W., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103269, 2016-Ohio-7297, ¶ 28, citing State v. Collins, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 98350, 2013-Ohio-488, ¶ 19; State v. Lawwill, 12th Dist. Butler No. 

CA2007-01-014, 2008-Ohio-3592, ¶ 11. 
{¶28} Evid.R. 901 requires the authentication or identification of evidence as a condition 

precedent to admissibility. Testimony of a witness with knowledge “that a matter is what it is 

claimed to be” is sufficient to authenticate the purported evidence. Evid.R. 901(B)(1). Courts 

have interpreted this subsection of the rule to allow “any competent witness who has knowledge 

that a matter is what its proponent claims may testify to such pertinent facts, thereby establishing, 

in whole or in part, the foundation for identification.” State v. Black, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 16 

MA 0085, 2018-Ohio-1342, ¶ 14, quoting TPI Asset Mgt. v. Conrad-Eiford, 193 Ohio App.3d 

38, 2011-Ohio-1405, 950 N.E.2d 1018, ¶ 15 (2d Dist.). We review the court’s ruling on the 

adequacy of authentication for an abuse of discretion. State v. Bowling, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 

93052, 2010-Ohio-3595, ¶ 33, citing State v. Easter, 75 Ohio App.3d 22, 26-27, 598 N.E.2d 845 

(4th Dist.1991). 

{¶29} In this case, Matic testified that state’s exhibit No. 75 was the photo array he was 

shown at the Parma police station after making his report. He recalled that he was asked to 

identify the person who sold him the Parma property. Matic testified that he made a circle 

underneath the identified photograph. And Detective John Porec testified that he investigated 

the report made by Matic regarding the sale of the Parma real estate. He stated that he met with 

Matic, and a blind administrator presented Matic with a photo array that included Lenard’s 

picture. According to Detective Porec, Matic identified Lenard from the photo array. The 

photo array was therefore properly admitted. 

{¶30} Lenard also contends on appeal that the photo array identification was unduly 

suggestive. This argument was not a basis for Lenard’s objection below, thus waiving all but 

plain error on appeal. We find no plain error because Detective Porec explained how the photo 

lineup was created, and the lineup was presented to Matic through the use of a blind 
administrator. Matic selected the individual he believed to be Lenard based on his interactions 

with Lenard during the purchase of the Parma property. The totality of circumstances 

demonstrate that the identification was reliable. Moreover, Matic was subject to 

cross-examination during trial and any alleged defect or unreliability with his photo array 

identification could have been questioned. 

{¶31} Accordingly, Lenard’s second assignment of error is overruled. 

IV. Sufficiency of the Evidence

{¶32} Lenard contends in his third assignment of error that his convictions are not 

supported by sufficient evidence, and the trial court erred by denying his motions for acquittal. 

{¶33} A Crim.R. 29 motion challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. The test for 

sufficiency requires a determination of whether the prosecution met its burden of production at 

trial. State v. Bowden, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 92266, 2009-Ohio-3598, ¶ 12. An appellate 

court’s function when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction 

is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, 

would convince the average mind of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. 

Murphy, 91 Ohio St.3d 516, 543, 747 N.E.2d 765 (2001). “‘The relevant inquiry is whether, 

after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact 

could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.’” State 

v. Walker, 150 Ohio St.3d 409, 2016-Ohio-829, 82 N.E.3d 1124, ¶ 12, quoting State v. Jenks, 61 

Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus 

A. The Euclid Property 
{¶34} Lenard was convicted of three offenses pertaining to the Euclid property — 

securing writings by deception in violation of R.C. 2913.43(A), tampering with records in 

violation of R.C. 2913.42(A)(1), and theft in violation of R.C. 2913.02(A)(3).1 

{¶35} Lenard contends that insufficient evidence was presented to support his convictions 

regarding the property because (1) Philip did not sign any of the Euclid property documents, (2) 

the documents that Blanche voluntarily signed disclosed (a) the lien and the pending foreclosure 

action on the Euclid property and (b) that only a quitclaim deed, rather than a warranty deed, 

would be executed; (3) Saydeh voluntarily signed a quitclaim deed as provided for in the 

purchase agreement; and (4) any statements regarding the status of the lien on the property was 

made by Mhoon and thus, cannot be attributed to him. We discern from these statements that 

Lenard contends that the state failed to prove the element of deceit. 

{¶36} Pursuant to R.C. 2913.01(A), “deception” is defined as 

knowingly deceiving another or causing another to be deceived by any false or 

misleading representation, by withholding information, by preventing another 

from acquiring information, or by any other conduct, act, or omission that creates, 

confirms, or perpetuates a false impression in another, including a false 

impression as to law, value, state of mind, or other objective or subjective fact. 

{¶37} In Count 1, Lenard was convicted of securing writings by deception, which 

pursuant to R.C. 2913.43 prohibits a person, by the use of deception, to cause another to execute 

any writing that disposes of or encumbers property, or by which a pecuniary obligation is 

incurred. In Count 4, Lenard was convicted of theft, which pursuant to R.C. 2913.02(A)(3), 

 1

We need not address the finding of guilt as to the forgery charge in Count 5 because that offense merged 

with the theft offense in Count 4, and the state elected that Lenard be sentenced on Count 4. See State v. Ramos, 

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103596, 2016-Ohio-7685, ¶ 14 (when counts in an indictment are allied offenses and there is 

sufficient evidence to support the offense on which the state elects to have the defendant sentenced, the reviewing 

court need not consider the sufficiency of the evidence on the count that is subject to merger because any error would 

be harmless); State v. Rucker, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 105628, 2018-Ohio-1832, ¶ 35. 
provides that “[n]o person, with purpose to deprive the owner of property or services, shall 

knowingly obtain or exert control over either the property or services * * * (3) By deception.” 

{¶38} Lenard’s contention that Philip did not sign any of the real estate documents is 

irrelevant because both Philip and Blanche were the named victims. Sufficient testimony and 

evidence was presented to prove that Blanche signed the real estate documents pertaining to the 

Euclid property. 

{¶39} Lenard’s “buyer beware” or “caveat emptor” defense does not apply. In a civil 

context, caveat emptor only applies when the seller or vendor does not engage in fraud, despite 

defects being open and discoverable. See Layman v. Binns, 35 Ohio St.3d 176, 177, 519 N.E.2d 

642 (1988). “An action for fraud may be grounded upon the failure to fully disclose facts of a 

material nature where there exists a duty to speak.” Id. at 178. 

{¶40} Although the documents Blanche signed disclosed the lien on the property and that 

no title search would be performed, the jury saw that the documents contained two noticeably 

different font and type sizes. The substantially smaller font size contained disclosures and the 

disclaimers. Specific to the standard purchase agreement, the smaller font size reads that the 

Title company does not “agree to or offer” any title services, including “title search(s).” The 

disclaimer also stated that the buyer was “told by a representative at General Title Services LLC 

of these facts.” Blanche and Philip both testified that no one from General Title told them a title 

search would not be performed. The closing disclaimer also contains in the smaller font size 

that a mortgage and foreclosure existed on the property. Viewing the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the state, the jury could reasonably find that these documents presented by Lenard 

were deceptive. 
{¶41} The state demonstrated that Lenard lied and deceived the Bentleys through the 

entire real estate transaction. He lied about his name and that he was selling the property for his 

uncle. He presented documentation to the Bentleys that he knew to be false. Even though the 

documentation arguably disclosed all the defects in title, the evidence demonstrated that Lenard 

had no authority to sell the property. Any statements made by Mhoon are attributed to Lenard 

because she was acting at his direction at all times. Moreover, even though the quitclaim deed 

was recorded, this does not make Lenard’s actions lawful or legal; Lenard took the Bentleys’ 

money through deception and false pretenses. 

{¶42} In Count 3, Lenard was convicted of tampering with records in violation of R.C. 

2913.42(A)(1), which provides that “[n]o person, knowing the person has no privilege to do so, 

and with purpose to defraud or knowing that the person is facilitating a fraud, shall * * * (1) 

Falsify, destroy, remove, conceal, alter, deface, or mutilate any writing, computer software, data, 

or record.” 

{¶43} Lenard knew he was not a representative of the bank, and that Saydeh did not have 

authority to sell the property because Saydeh had surrendered the property to the bank through a 

bankruptcy years prior. Moreover, sufficient evidence was presented that Lenard did not have 

permission to sign Saydeh’s name to the residential property forms, the standard purchase 

agreement, or the lead-based paint addendum. Accordingly, sufficient evidence was presented 

to prove the offenses regarding the Euclid property. 

{¶44} Lenard also contends that the degrees of the offenses were not supported by the 

jury verdicts. A furthermore specification was attached to Counts 1 and 4, wherein it was 

alleged that Lenard committed these offenses against an elderly person and the value was 

between $7,500 and $37,500. A finding of both would enhance an otherwise fifth-degree felony 
to a felony of the third degree. The jury found that the victim was not elderly but that the value 

was between $7,500 and $37,500. Lenard maintains that the specification was an all-or-nothing 

specification to warrant enhancing the degree of the offenses, meaning that the jury had to find 

that the victim was elderly and the value of the property. We disagree. 

{¶45} In State v. Jennings, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99631, 2013-Ohio-5428, this court 

modified a defendant’s theft conviction that contained a specification that the victim was elderly 

and that the value of the property was between $1,000 and $7,500. Adding the furthermore 

clause enhanced the degree of the theft offense from a first-degree misdemeanor to a 

fourth-degree felony. This court found that the state failed to prove that the victim was an 

elderly person as defined under R.C. 2913.01(CC), but that the state presented sufficient 

evidence of the theft offense and the value of the property being between $1,000 and $7,500. 

Accordingly, this court modified the conviction to a fifth-degree felony, thus not applying an 

“all-or-nothing” approach to the specification. 

{¶46} Our review of the record shows that the jury was asked to make two independent 

findings under the furthermore specification attendant to Counts 1 and 4 — whether the state 

proved that the victim was elderly and the value of the amount pilfered was between $7,500 and 

$37,500. The jury’s finding that the value was over $7,500, but under $37,500, was sufficient to 

enhance the degree of the offense from a fifth-degree felony to a felony of the fourth degree. 

B. The Parma Property

{¶47} Regarding the Parma property, Lenard was convicted of two offenses — securing 

writings by deception in violation of R.C. 2913.43(A); and theft in violation of R.C. 

2913.02(A)(3). Lenard contends that insufficient evidence was presented to support his 

convictions regarding the property because the documents that Matic signed voluntarily disclosed 
a lien on the property, he moved into the residence, and he made payments pursuant to the terms 

of the installment contract. Again, Lenard maintains no deception occurred. 

{¶48} The record reflects that Lenard employed the same tactics with Matic as he did 

with the Bentleys. He held himself out as the seller of the home, when in fact, he was not the 

owner. Lenard’s false and deceptive statements induced Matic into signing a fictitious 

agreement to purchase real estate. Matic testified that he was not made aware of the lien on the 

property, and that he paid Lenard over $27,000 for property that Lenard did not own. 

{¶49} Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, sufficient evidence 

was presented supporting Lenard’s convictions in both cases. Accordingly, the assignment of 

error is overruled. 

V. Manifest Weight of the Evidence

{¶50} In his fourth assignment of error, Lenard contends that his convictions are against 

the manifest weight of the evidence. 

{¶51} In contrast to a sufficiency argument, a manifest weight challenge questions 

whether the state met its burden of persuasion. Bowden, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 92266, 

2009-Ohio-3598, ¶ 12. A reviewing court “weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, 

considers the credibility of witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the 

evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the 

conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 

388, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). A conviction should be reversed as against the manifest weight of 

the evidence only in the most “exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the 

conviction.” Id.
{¶52} Although we review credibility when considering the manifest weight of the 

evidence, we are cognizant that determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses and the 

weight of the testimony are primarily for the trier of fact. State v. Bradley, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga 

No. 97333, 2012-Ohio-2765, ¶ 14, citing State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 227 N.E.2d 212 

(1967). The trier of fact is best able “to view the witnesses and observe their demeanor, 

gestures, and voice inflections, and use these observations in weighing the credibility of the 

proffered testimony.” State v. Wilson, 113 Ohio St.3d 382, 2007-Ohio-2202, 865 N.E.2d 1264, 

¶ 24. The jury may take note of any inconsistencies and resolve them accordingly, “believ[ing] 

all, part, or none of a witness’s testimony.” State v. Raver, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 02AP-604, 

2003-Ohio-958, ¶ 21, citing State v. Antill, 176 Ohio St. 61, 67, 197 N.E.2d 548 (1964). 

{¶53} Lenard contends that his convictions pertaining to the Euclid property are against 

the manifest weight of the evidence because Saydeh was not credible. Specifically, he argues 

that Saydeh executed a quitclaim deed even though he surrendered the property to Bank of 

America two years earlier in his bankruptcy proceeding. The jury was in the best position to 

view Saydeh’s credibility and determine the weight to be given to his testimony based upon the 

circumstances and facts presented at trial. 

{¶54} Lenard also contends that his convictions are against the manifest weight of the 

evidence for the same reasons he raised in his sufficiency challenge — the buyers knew what 

they were signing and were on notice of the liens. For the same reasons previously discussed, 

Lenard used deception to induce the Bentleys and Matic into executing documents to purchase 

real estate that Lenard had no authority to sell. Lenard’s culpability cannot be diminished by the 

victims’ innocent role in these cases. 
{¶55} This is not the exceptional case where the jury clearly lost its way and created such 

a manifest miscarriage of justice that Lenard’s convictions must be reversed and a new trial 

ordered. The jury’s verdict of finding Lenard not guilty of certain offenses and specifications 

reveal that the jury reviewed the evidence, listened to the testimony, and held the state to its 

burden. Accordingly, Lenard’s fourth assignment of error is overruled. 

VI. Authentication of Business Records

{¶56} “‘Hearsay’ is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at 

the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Evid.R. 

801(C). Pursuant to Evid.R. 802, hearsay is inadmissible unless it falls within one of the 

exceptions listed in Evid.R. 803. 

{¶57} Evid.R. 803(6) provides the “business records exception” to the hearsay rule and 

states that the following records are not excluded by the hearsay rule: 

memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, or 

conditions, made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a 

person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business 

activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to make the 

memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony 

of the custodian or other qualified witness or as provided by Rule 901(B)(10), 

unless the source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation 

indicate lack of trustworthiness. (Emphasis added). 

This rule allows the admission of business records if they are made in the course of a regularly 

conducted business activity because the courts presume that such records are trustworthy given 

the self-interest to be served by the accuracy of such entries. Weis v. Weis, 147 Ohio St. 416, 

425-426, 72 N.E.2d 245 (1947). 

{¶58} In his fifth assignment of error, Lenard contends that the trial court erred by 

admitting and allowing Jim McKinley to authenticate business documents that he did not 

personally obtain and because he was not the records custodian. Lenard contends that the trial 
court abused its discretion in admitting the documents because McKinley did not prepare the 

exhibits and was not familiar with how the records were made or stored. We disagree; 

McKinley was a qualified witness under Evid.R. 803(6). 

{¶59} The phrase “other qualified witness” does not necessarily mean that the witness 

must have firsthand knowledge of the transaction giving rise to the record. State v. Sherrills, 8th 

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 89844, 2008-Ohio-1950, ¶ 31; citing State v. Vrona, 47 Ohio App.3d 145, 

547 N.E.2d 1189 (9th Dist.1988). 

Rather, it must be demonstrated that the witness is sufficiently familiar with the 

operation of the business and with the circumstances of the record’s preparation, 

maintenance, and retrieval, that he can reasonably testify on the basis of this 

knowledge that the record is what it purports to be, and that it was made in the 

ordinary course of business consistent with the elements of Rule 803(6). 

Sherrills at id., citing State v. Shaheen, 3d Dist. Hancock No. 5-97-03, 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 

3487 (July 29, 1997), citing State v. Patton, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-91-12, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 

997 (Mar. 5, 1992). 

{¶60} McKinley testified that for the past 16 years he has worked in the field of financial 

investigations. Previously, he worked for Huntington Bank, but currently he works for U.S. 

Bank as a financial crimes investigator. He testified that as part of his investigative duties, he 

orders financial documentation through the bank’s systems and reviews surveillance videos. 

{¶61} McKinley stated that still photos can be taken from video, and information on the 

photograph will depict the branch where the video was taken, the time, and date. He testified 

that the surveillance videos are electronically stored at U.S. Bank’s central office in Minnesota, 

but that he can access these videos kept in their ordinary course of business through the computer 

network system. McKinley then identified the still photographs taken from the surveillance 

video at two U.S. Bank locations, one taken on May 11, 2015 and the other on April 28, 2015. 
He also identified the account documents for two accounts of which Lenard is the account holder 

— General Title Services and Riviera Funding L.L.C. According to McKinley, these documents 

are kept in U.S. Bank’s ordinary course of business to which he has access. 

{¶62} Based on McKinley’s experience and duties at U.S. Bank, we find no abuse of 

discretion in allowing him to identify and authenticate the still photographs and account records. 

He did not testify about the contents of the documents, but only identified them as U.S. Bank 

records. 

{¶63} Even assuming that McKinley lacked the ability to authenticate the records, Lenard 

has failed to demonstrate how he was prejudiced by the admission of the records. His defense 

theory was that the buyers knew what they were voluntarily signing and therefore, no deception 

occurred. He did not argue mistaken identity or that he was not the owner of General Title or 

Riviera Funding. 

{¶64} Moreover, even if the records were excluded, other overwhelming admissible 

evidence was presented to support Lenard’s convictions. Accordingly, any error would be 

harmless. See Crim.R. 52(A) (“any error, defect, irregularity, or variance which does not affect 

substantial rights shall be disregarded”); State v. Williams, 6 Ohio St.3d 281, 290, 452 N.E.2d 

1323 (1983) (a reviewing court may overlook an error where the remaining admissible evidence, 

standing alone, constitutes “overwhelming” proof of a defendant’s guilt). Lenard’s fifth 

assignment of error is overruled. 

VII. Discovery Violation

{¶65} Saydeh testified during trial that he was shown photographs of Lenard through an 

email with a detective. At side-bar, defense counsel indicated that the emails between Detective 

Baumgartner and Saydeh were not provided to him through discovery. Accordingly, counsel 
requested that either Saydeh’s testimony be stricken or a mistrial be granted. Following the 

discussion, it was apparent that the prosecutor was also unaware of the email correspondence. 

Copies of the emails in which Saydeh made a photo identification of Lenard and compared his 

signatures were provided to the defense. The trial court determined that the least restrictive 

sanction for the discovery violation was a continuance, and asked defense counsel how much 

time he needed to review the documents and prepare. Counsel indicated he did not need 

additional time and withdrew the motion, but reiterated his dissatisfaction with the detective 

about withholding the information from all parties. 

{¶66} In his sixth assignment of error, Lenard contends that the trial court erred by 

denying his request to dismiss or strike Saydeh’s testimony based on the Crim.R. 16 violation. 

Because the motion for a mistrial or to strike the testimony was withdrawn, the assignment of 

error will be reviewed for plain error. In order to prevail under a plain error analysis, the 

appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that the outcome of the trial clearly would have been 

different but for the error. State v. Long, 53 Ohio St.2d 91, 97, 372 N.E.2d 804 (1978). Notice 

of plain error “is to be taken with the utmost caution, under exceptional circumstances and only 

to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice.” Id. at paragraph three of the syllabus; Crim.R. 

52(B). 

{¶67} In this case, the trial court did not commit plain error. First, counsel withdrew his 

motion after reviewing the emails. Additionally, the court offered counsel time to review the 

documents and prepare accordingly; counsel declined the continuance. Finally, Lenard fails to 

demonstrate that the outcome of the trial clearly would have been different. The emails between 

the detective and Saydeh contained a photo identification and signature comparisons — 
identifications that Saydeh also made at trial. Accordingly, Lenard’s sixth assignment of error is 

overruled. 

VIII. Restitution Order

{¶68} Lenard contends in his seventh assignment of error that the trial court erred by 

ordering restitution that is not supported by evidence of actual economic loss. 

{¶69} A trial court has discretion to order restitution in an appropriate case and may base 

the amount it orders on a recommendation of the victim, the offender, a presentence investigation 

report, estimates or receipts indicating the cost of repairing or replacing property, and other 

information, but the amount ordered cannot be greater than the amount of economic loss suffered 

as a direct and proximate result of the commission of the offense. R.C. 2929.18(A)(1). A trial 

court is required to conduct a hearing on restitution only if the offender, victim, or survivor 

disputes the amount of restitution ordered. Id.; State v. Lalain, 136 Ohio St.3d 248, 

2013-Ohio-3093, 994 N.E.2d 423, ¶ 27 

{¶70} Prior to ordering restitution, “a sentencing court must engage in a ‘due process 

ascertainment that the amount of restitution bears a reasonable relationship to the loss suffered.’” 

State v. McLaurin, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103068, 2016-Ohio-933, ¶ 13, quoting State v. 

Borders, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2004-12-101, 2005-Ohio-4339, ¶ 36. “The court must 

determine the amount of restitution to a reasonable degree of certainty, ensuring that the amount 

is supported by competent, credible evidence.” McLaurin at ¶ 13, citing State v. Warner, 55 

Ohio St.3d 31, 69, 564 N.E.2d 18 (1990). Although the decision to impose restitution is 

discretionary with the court, its determination of the amount of loss is a factual question that we 

review under the competent, credible evidence standard. State v. Warner, 55 Ohio St.3d 31, 69, 
564 N.E.2d 18 (1990); State v. Didion, 173 Ohio App.3d 130, 2007-Ohio-4494, 877 N.E.2d 725, 

¶ 20 (3d Dist.). 

{¶71} Lenard objected at sentencing to the restitution order, contending that no 

documentation was presented to the court during sentencing to support the restitution order. On 

appeal, Lenard makes a general statement, without explanation, that the restitution order does not 

bear a reasonable relationship to the actual loss suffered. 

{¶72} Our review of the record demonstrates that the court considered trial testimony 

regarding the amounts paid to Lenard for the purchase of real estate. In State v. Kingsbury, 8th 

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102973, 2016-Ohio-590, this court reviewed a restitution order that was 

based on evidence not presented at a restitution hearing but on the testimony and documentary 

evidence presented at trial. Therefore, as long as competent and credible evidence was 

presented during trial upon which a restitution order could be based, a separate restitution hearing 

may not be required. 

{¶73} Nevertheless, we find that the restitution amount is not supported by the record, 

and that the court did not consider Lenard’s ability to pay. In Kingsbury, this court concluded 

that competent and credible evidence was presented to support a restitution award, but the 

amount of restitution was not supported by the record. Id. at ¶ 18. This court found that this 

unsupported amount, albeit likely a mathematical error, coupled with the trial court’s failure to 

consider Kingsbury’s present and future ability to pay the restitution ordered, amounted to plain 

error. Id. at ¶ 20. 

{¶74} In this case, the documentation at trial showed that the Bentleys issued three 

separate checks totaling $13,771 to entities owned by Lenard. The evidence demonstrated that 

Lenard deposited those checks into his respective business accounts. However, the evidence 
also showed that a cashier’s check was presented to Blanche in the amount of $400 allegedly 

from Saydeh. Additionally, testimony was presented that the Bentleys spent approximately 

$4,000 in renovating the property. These amounts, if deemed relevant, were not considered by 

the trial court in making the restitution order. 

{¶75} Additionally, although Matic testified that he paid AMC Financial $27,000 towards 

the purchase of the Parma property, the documentation at trial showed that Matic issued 

numerous personal checks totaling only $11,000, and a cashiers check to Cleveland Title Agency 

for $15,150. Additionally, the land contract depicts that an additional $100 deposit was paid. 

When added together, these amounts do not equal the restitution order of $27,000. Moreover, 

additional evidence was presented that Matic had to purchase the property from the bank in 

order to obtain ownership. Whether Matic suffered any additional economic loss as a direct and 

proximate cause of the commission of Lenard’s offenses during this subsequent purchase was not 

considered. 

{¶76} Finally, the trial court failed to consider Lenard’s present and future ability to pay 

prior to ordering restitution as required pursuant to R.C. 2929.18. This court has previously held 

that a court’s failure to make this consideration amounts to plain error. See, e.g., State v. Burns, 

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 95465, 2011-Ohio-4230. We recognize that this issue was not raised on 

appeal; however, because the record does not support the trial court’s restitution order and the 

issue of restitution will be revisited on remand, this court finds that the trial court’s failure to 

make this consideration is further grounds for reversal. 

{¶77} Accordingly, the assignment of error is sustained. The restitution orders are 

vacated, and the cases are remanded to the trial court to conduct a restitution hearing and 

consider Lenard’s present and future ability to pay. 
IX. Consecutive Sentences

{¶78} In his eighth assignment of error, Lenard contends that his sentence is contrary to 

law and that consecutive sentences were not properly imposed. 

A. Contrary to Law

{¶79} Our review of felony sentences is governed by R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), which allows 

“an appellate court [to] vacate or modify a felony sentence on appeal only if it determines by 

clear and convincing evidence that the record does not support the trial court’s findings under 

relevant statutes or that the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.” State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio 

St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, 59 N.E.3d 1231, ¶ 1, 21. A sentence is not clearly and convincingly 

contrary to law “where the trial court considers the purposes and principles of sentencing under 

R.C. 2929.11 as well as the seriousness and recidivism factors listed in R.C. 2929.12, properly 

applies post-release control, and sentences a defendant within the permissible statutory range.” 

State v. A.H., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98622, 2013-Ohio-2525, ¶ 10. 

{¶80} Lenard’s sentences are not contrary to law. In CR-15-599742, he was sentenced to 

12-month concurrent sentences on each of Counts 1, 3, and 4, all felonies of the fourth degree. 

A 12-month sentence is within the permissible range for fourth-degree offenses. R.C. 

2929.14(A)(4). 

{¶81} Additionally, the sentence is not contrary to law because the trial court stated on 

the record that it considered all relevant seriousness and recidivism factors (tr. 1066) and the 

court included in its sentencing journal entry in each case that it considered all required factors 

and that prison is consistent with the purpose of R.C. 2929.11. See, e.g., State v. Kamleh, 8th 

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97092, 2012-Ohio-2061, ¶ 61, citing State v. Payne, 114 Ohio St.3d 502, 

2007-Ohio-4642, 873 N.E.2d 306, ¶ 18 (trial court’s statement that it considered the required 
statutory factors, without more, is sufficient to fulfill its obligations under the sentencing 

statutes). Accordingly, the trial court’s sentence is not contrary to law. 

B. Consecutive Sentences

{¶82} Consecutive sentences may be imposed only if the trial court makes the required 

findings pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). State v. Bonnell, 140 Ohio St.3d 209, 

2014-Ohio-3177, 16 N.E.3d 659, ¶ 20-22. Under the statute, consecutive sentences may be 

imposed if the trial court finds that (1) consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public 

from future crime or to punish the offender, and (2) consecutive sentences are not 

disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender’s conduct and to the danger the offender poses 

to the public. In addition, the court must find that any of the following applies: 

(1) the offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses while awaiting 

trial or sentencing, while under a sanction, or while under postrelease control for a 

prior offense; 

(2) at least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one or more 

courses of the conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of the offenses was 

so great or unusual that no single prison term for any of the offenses committed as 

part of the courses of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender’s 

conduct; or 

(3) the offender’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that consecutive 

sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime by the offender. 

{¶83} In order to impose consecutive sentences, the trial court must both make the 

statutory findings mandated under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) at the sentencing hearing and incorporate 

those findings into its sentencing entry. Bonnell at the syllabus. 

{¶84} In this case, the record reflects that the trial court both made the statutory findings 

at the sentencing hearing and incorporated those findings into the sentencing entry. However, 

Lenard does not challenge whether the court made the findings, but rather contends they are 
unsupported by the record. Specifically, he contends that the record does not support that the 

harm was so great or unusual because (1) the victims voluntarily signed the documents that 

disclosed the liens and foreclosure actions; (2) any “alleged harm * * * was preventable by 

reading the documents”; and (3) Blanche paid only $13,000 for a house that had a much higher 

market value. These arguments are absurd. 

{¶85} Lenard chose to hold himself out as a person who had the authority to market and 

sell these properties. But for his deceitful actions, the victims would not have been harmed. 

Moreover, the Bentleys paid $13,000 for a house that they never owned, still do not own, and is 

not in their possession; the market value of the house is irrelevant. Accordingly, Lenard’s 

sentence is not contrary to law and consecutive sentences were properly imposed. The 

assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶86} Judgment affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded to the trial court to 

conduct a restitution hearing and consider Lenard’s present and future ability to pay at that 

hearing. 

It is ordered that the parties share equally the costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common pleas 

court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s conviction having been affirmed, 

any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for execution of 

sentence and a restitution hearing. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the 

Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
 

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, JUDGE 

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, P.J., and 

FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., J., CONCUR