i i i i i i



### MEM ORA ND UM OP INION
No
. 04 -0 7- 00 44 6- CR Al e jand ro Carb a ja l GARZA J r. , Appellant
v . STA TE of

Te xas , Appellee F ro m th e 79 th Jud ic ia l D ist ri c t Co ur t, Jim We lls County , T e xas Tr ia l Co ur

t N o. 06 -0 7- 11 91 5- CR Honora ble Richard C. Ter

rell , J udg e Presiding Opinion by : Kar en Ang elini , J ustice Sitt ing: Kar en Ang elini , J ustice

Rebec ca Simmons , J ustice Steven C. Hilbig , J ustice Deliver ed and F iled: Fe bruar y 25, 2009 AFF I RMED A j ur y fo un d A le

jand ro Carb a ja l G arza Jr. g uil ty of mur de ri ngJavi e r S anc he z in the c ours e of committing or attempting to commit a kidnapping . Gar z a wa s sentence d to life imprisonment wi tho ut p aro le . G arza

a pp e a ls h is c a

pit a l murd e r c on vic tio n in fo ur iss ue s. We a ff

ir m.04
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- 2- I. B ACKG ROUND On the m o rn i n g of January 2, 2006, Sanchez’s body was found on a

roadside ne ar the
rese rvoir in Al i ce , T exas. Sanchez had bee n shot five times. Garza wa s char g ed with Sanche z’s
m u r d e r an d p l e d n o tg u i l t y. At tr ial , a c c omp lic e wi tne ss Jame s Mi c ha e l D e nn is t e sti fi e d a g a ins t G arza . A c c or din g to Dennis, Sanchez was stay ing at his sister’ s house in A lice on J anuar y 1, 2006. Dennis hea

rd Sanche z
wa s “ l o o k i n g t o s c o r e a l i t t l e b i t o f c o c a i n e . ” B e t w e e n 9 : 0 0 an d 1 0 : 0 0 p . m . , D e n n i s w e n t to S an ch ez ’s s i s t er ’s h o u s e, wo k e S an ch ez u p , an d o ff er edh i m s o m e c o ca i n e. L at er t h at ev en i n g, Dennis and Sanc hez met Garza twice at the Astromatic Car Wash on U.S. Hig hway 281 and boug ht
coca ine from him. At the sec ond meeting , Gar za was joined b y Alfre d “Casper ” Gonzales a nd Alonzo “L owrider ” Gonzalez. When Dennis ca lled Gar za a third time to ar ra n ge t o b uy more
coca ine, Garza told Dennis and Sanche z to meet him at a more remote loc ation, the Richardson Wate r We ll
. D e n n is an d

Sa n c h e z w e n t to th e w e ll an d w a it e d f o r a b o u t f if te e nmi n u te s , b u t G a r za did not show up. Whil e De nnis and Sanche z were dr iving ba ck fr om the well toward town, a g old Ex pedition pulled out in front of De nnis’s car causinghim to come to a stop. A black truc k then pulled up behind Dennis’s c ar, trapping it. Garza, Casper , L owrider , and anothe r man identified only as Dito, exit ed the two ve hicles holding g uns. Garza, Caspe r, and L owrider pulled San chez from the passeng er s eat. Dennis saw Ga rza had a silver g un in his hand “it may have be en a 9, a

.45,
so me thi ngin t

hat – t hat are a .” Ga

rza he ld o pe n th e re ar p a sse ng e r d oo r t o the fir st v e hic le , w hil e L ow ri de r grabb ed S anc he z an d tr ie d to pu shhim int o th e ve hic le . D e nn is t he n h e ard wh a t “ c ou ld04
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- 3- have be e n a

sma ll c a lib e r ha

nd g un po p, ” sa

w Sanc he z’s bo dy “ bu c kle ba c k, ” and saw L ow ri de r p us h him into t he bac kseat of the Ex pedition. Dennis was lef t alone in his car
. Dennis fur

ther testified that after

Sanchez was taken, he w ent t o Gar za’s home t o buy more
coca ine. B etwee n 2:00 and 3:00 a.m., he sa w Garza on his cell phone and he ard him say “B ro, we took car e of our

business.” He also hea

rd L owrider

say he “ic ed that fool, thre e to the dome,” which
acc ording to Dennis meant that “ he killed him” with “thre e shots to the head.” De nn is t e sti fi e d he ra

n int o Ga rza and his lawy e r the ne xt d ay . G arza tol d D e nn is h e ha d ju st be e n to the sh e ri ff

’s of fi c e , b ut t hat he did n’ t tell the sh e ri ff any

thi ng a bo ut San c he z. Garza a lso sa id that if Dennis knew

what wa s g ood for him, he wouldn’ t say any thing e ither. Dennis also ac knowledg ed he gave numerous stateme nts to poli ce a bout Sanchez’s kidnapping and murde r. I n one of the se statements, Dennis told police that afte r Sanche z was taken, he followed the Ex pedition to the rese rvoir, wher e he saw Gar za, L owrider , and Casper s h o ot Sanchez. At trial, De nnis said this part of his statement was untrue
. I n closing arguments, the State argued Sanche z was first abducte d and later fata lly shot, and Gar za aided and a ssisted in the kidnapping and murder. The S tate further a rg ued Ga rza was dire cted to k ill Sanc he z by Me xica n Maf ia g ang le a de r, Ol ive r G on zal e z. T he jur y wa s c ha rg e d th a t it

c ou ld convict Ga

rza under t h e l aw of

parties. The jury

returne d a g uilty

verdic t, and Garza was automatically

sentenc ed to life imprisonment as re q u i re d b y law. See T EX . P EN . C ODE ANN . § 12.31(a) (Ve rnon 2003).04
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- 4- II. A C C OM PL I C E W ITN ESS C ORRO B ORAT I ON /C OM P L I CI T Y AS A P A R TY I n h is thi rd is su e, Garza argue s th e e vid e nc e wa s le g a lly ins uf fi c ie nt t o s up po rt

his conviction bec ause the State failed to provide independe nt corrobor ation of Dennis’s testimony , and the evidenc e did not establish his complicity as a party . Dennis, who was also indicted for Sanchez’s murder, w as an a ccom p l i ce w itness as a matter of law. Se e He rro n v . S

tat e , 86 S.W .3d 621, 631 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). “A c onviction cannot be ha d upon the testimony of an a ccomplice unless co rr o borate d by other e vidence tending to connec t the defendant with the offe nse committed; the corr oboration is not sufficie nt if it merely

shows the commission of the offe nse.” T EX . C R IM . P R OC . C ODE ANN . art. 38.14 (Ve rnon 2005). However , it is not necessa ry for the c orrobor ating evidenc e to direc tly connec t the d ef en d an t t o the cr ime. Cat

he yv . S tat e , 9 9 2 S
. W
. 2 d

4 6 0 , 4 6 2 ( T e x. C r i m . A p p . 1 9 9 9 )
. N o r i s it
neces s ar y for the c orrobor ating evidenc e to be suff icient in itself to establish guilt beyond a
rea sonable doubt. Id
. “The re must simply be some non-ac complice e vidence which tends to connec t appellant to the c ommissi on of the off ense a lleg ed in the indictment.” Cas til lo v . S tat e , 221 S.W .3d 689, 691 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (emphasis in orig inal). To dete rm i n e if there is sufficient
corr oborating evidenc e, an appellate court e liminates the acc omplice testimony from conside ration and then e x amines the re st of the rec ord to se e if there is e vidence that tends to connec t the defe ndant with the commission of the crime. So lom on v . S tat e , 49 S.W .3d 356, 361 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). I n this case, other evidenc e admitt ed at trial tended to c orrobor ate De nnis’s testimony . Two other witnesse s, Priscilla Salinas and C hristy Ann C antu, t estified about Gar za’s actions on t he nig ht Sanchez was killed. Priscilla Salinas testified she w as at Ga rza’s hou s e fr o m about 8:30 p.m. on04
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- 5- J anuar y 1, 2006, until the early

morning on J anuar

y 2, 2006. Acc ording to Salinas, Garza re ceive d
s ev er al p h o ne ca lls on his cell phone on J anuar y 1, 2006. Gar za left his house betwe en 10:40 and 11:30 p.m. with Casper and L owrider , and S alinas saw that he had a si lver gun sticking out of the top of his pa nts ne ar h is s tom a c h. Sa lin a s fur the r t e sti fi e d th a t G a

rza c a me ho me aro un d 2 :00 a .m. on J anuar y 2, 2006, al o n g with Casper a nd L owrider

in a g old Ex pedition. About a month later, Ga rza tol d Sa lin a s th a t if

a ny on e a sk e d h e r wh e re he wa s o n th e nig ht S anc he z wa s k ill e d, sh e sh ou ld say that he neve r left his house. Christy Ann Cantu, Oliver Gonza l ez’s fianc é, also testified. A ccor ding to Cantu, she w as at home in B eeville with Gonzalez on J anuar y 1 and 2, 2006, and she o v er h ea rd t wo cell phone
c o n v e r s a ti o n s b e tw e e nG o n za le z an d G ar za . Ca

n tu s a id s h e c o u ld

h e ar both G o n za le z an d

G a r za talking be cause Gonzalez was using the speake r option on his cell phone. I n the first conve rsation, wh ic h to o k

p la c e o nJa n u ar

y 1 , 2 0 0 6 , G ar za

to ld G o n za le z th a t S an c h e z h a d b e e nb a d

- mouthing G o n za le z. Ca

n tu s a id w h e n s h e h e ar d

th is s h e kn e w s o me th in g b a d w a s g o in g to h a

p p e nto Sa

n c h e z, but she didn’t rea liz e it would be as bad as it turned out to be. In the sec ond conver sation, which took place betwee n 2:00 a

nd 2:30 a .m. on J anuar

y 2, 2006, Cantu hear d Gar za te ll Gonzalez that they had

“ do ne the thi ng ” and

that Sanc he z ha d “ loo ke d u p at the sk y be fo re he ha d g ott e n s ho t.” Ga rza ’s c e ll phone re cords we re a lso a dmitted into evidenc e, and the se re cords support Cantu’s te stimony about the ca lls between G arza a nd Gonzalez. Ba sed on the testimony

of Salinas and Cantu, the State prese nted sufficie nt non-ac complice
corr oborating evidenc e tendingto connec t Garza with Sanche z’s kidnapping a nd murder.04
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- 6- G ar z a a l s o c o n t e n d s t h e e v i d e n c e w a s l e g a l l y i n s u f f i c i e n t t o s u

p p o rth i s c o mp l i c i t y a s a

p a rt y. We disag ree . “A pe rson is c riminally responsible for an offe nse committed by the conduct of another if [] ac tin g wi th int e nt to pr omo te or a ssi st the c omm iss ion of the of fe ns e , h e so lic its , e nc oura g e s, direc ts, aids, or attempts to aid the other pe rson to commit the offense .” T EX . P EN A L C ODE ANN . § 7.02(a) (2) ( Ver

non 2003). “Evide nce i s s u ff i ci ent t o convict under

the law of

parties whe n the defe ndant is phy sically prese nt at t he commis sion of t he offense and encour ag es i ts commissi on by words or othe r ag ree ment.” Ra ns om v . S tat e , 920 S.W .2d 288, 302 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) . Direc t evidenc e of co m p l i ci t y

is not necessa

ry ; the State may

use circ umstantial evidence to prove the defe ndant’s re sponsibili ty as a pa rty to the offe nse. River a v . S tat e , 1 2 S. W. 3 d

5 7 2 , 5 7 5 ( T e x. App.—San Antonio 2000, no pet.). I n considering whether the acc used participated as a party , the court may look to events that occ urre d befor e, during , or af ter the of fense was c ommitt ed. Lively v. Sta te , 940 S.W .2d 380, 383 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997), aff’d , 9 68 S.W. 2d 36 3 ( Te x. Cr im. App. 1998). Ba sed on the testimony of Dennis, Salinas, and Cantu, there was sufficie nt evidence for a rational trier

of fa ct to have f

ound Gar za was gu i l t y

as a pa rty to Sanchez’s kidnapping and murder. I ssue three is overrule d. III . T R I A L J UDGE ’ S R EM A R K S I n his first issue on a

ppeal, Ga rza contends the tr ial judge abused his discre tion and exhibi ted bias ag ainst him by making cer tain rema rks and by

admonishing de fense counsel in fr ont of the jury in violation of the fede ral and state constitutions and Article 38.05 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedur e. In response , the State ar g ues t he trial judg e ac ted within his discretion in making r emar ks04
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- 7- to expedite and maintain control of the tr ial. Additionally , the State ar g ues the trial judg e’s admonishments of defe nse counse l did not indi cate the trial judg e’s view s about the ca se. A t ri a l ju dg e mus t r e fr a in f

ro m makin g any

re mark c a lc ulate d to c on ve y

to the j ur

y his opinion of the ca se. See T EX . C R IM . P R OC . C ODE ANN . art. 38.05 (V ernon 1979) . Article 38.05 of the Te xas C od e of

Cr imi na l Pr oc e dure pr ov ide s: I n ruling upon the admis sibili ty of evidence, the judge shall not discuss or comment upon the we i gh t o f the same or its bear ing in the c ase, but shall simply decide wh e the r or no t it i s a dmi ssi ble ; nor shall he, at any st age of the proce eding prev ious to t he re tur n o f th e v e rd

ic t, m ak e an yre ma rk cal cul at e d to c on v e

yto t he jur yhis op ini on of t

he c as e . Id . (empha sis added). Ne ve rt he le ss, a tr ia l ju dg e ha s b ro a d d isc re tio n in ma int a ini ngc on tr ol a

nd e xpe dit ingtr ia l. J as pe r v . S tat e , 61 S.W .3d 413, 421 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). A trial judg e may interjec t to corre ct
a mis state me nt o r m isr e pr e se ntatio n o f p re vio us ly a dmi tte d tes tim on y , a nd may imp os e re a so na

ble lim itatio ns on

the e xami natio n o f w itn e sse s. Id
. Even a trial judg e’s i rritation at defense c ounsel does not “tr an s l at e to an indication as to the judge ’s views a bout the defe ndant’s g uilt or i n n ocenc e.” Id
. A b s e n t a

c le ar s h o w in g o f

b ia s , a tr ia l j u d g e ’ s a c ti o n s ar e a s s u me d to h a v e been
corr ect. Br um it v . S

tat e , 206 S.W .3d 639, 645 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Gene rally , a par

ty ’s fa ilure to timely and specific ally object to a trial judg e’s r emar ks waives any err or. Re se nd e z v . S tat e , 160 S.W .3d 181, 189-90 (Te x . App.—Corpus Christi 2005, no pet.); T EX . R. A PP . P. 33.1(a) . I n Bl ue v . S tat e , howeve r, a plura lity of the Te x as Court of Criminal Appea ls held an objec tion was unnec essar y to pr eser ve a complaint about a trial judg e’s r emar ks04
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- 8- that tainted t he presumption of i nnocenc e in front of the venire a nd constituted fundamenta l error of constitutional dimension. 41 S.W .3d 129, 131 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (plurality op.). I n this case, Ga

rza complains of t he following rema rks: “Counsel, that’s an imprope r qu e sti on . I

wi ll not a llo w it;” “ Couns e l, y ou a sk e d th a t qu e sti on mor e tha n o nc e . L e t’ s k e e p g oin g ;” “That’s not much of an obje ction, and it’s over ruled;” “ Ex cuse me, Counsel. L et’s not cove r the
same te rr ito ry . You g ot som e ne w te rr ito ry , tha t’ s fin e ;” “ Couns e l–c ouns e l–c ouns e l, you de a l w ith convictions here ;” and “ Ex cuse me , Counsel. The term is ‘r easona ble doubt.’” These r emar

ks did not rise to the level of fundame ntal err or of constitutional dim ension and, thus, tim ely

and spec ific objec tions were r equire d to preser ve any complaint for a

ppellate r eview. Gar za failed to object, thereby waiving this complaint. See Resende z , 16 0 S. W.3 d at 18 9- 90 ; T EX . R. A PP . P. 33.1(a)
. But even if Gar za ha d proper ly objected at trial, we would ove rrule this issue. The re cord doe s not c lear ly show bias on the par t of the trial judg e. None of the c halleng ed re marks
wer e ca lculated to conve y to the jury

the trial judg e’s opinion of the c ase. To the contra ry , most of the re marks we re ma de to control or expedite the trial, or to c orre ct misstatements of the law. I ssue one is there fore overr

uled. IV. P R OSECU TOR I A L M I S CONDU CT I n his second issue, Garza ar g ues the State violated his due pr ocess r ights whe n it eng ag ed in prosecutor ial misconduct by (1) using coer ced w itness statements and cr eatinga fa lse impression
a t t r i a l , ( 2 ) v i o l a t i n g t h e t r i a l c o u rt ’ s l i m i n e o r d e r s , ( 3 ) n o td i s c l o s i n g a w i t n e s s “ p o t e n t i a l l y” favor able to the de fense , and (4) making an improper jury argument.04
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- 9- An appe llate cour

t review s claims of prose cutorial misconduct on a case by case basis. Stahl
v . S tat e , 7 49 S.W. 2d

82 6, 83 0 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 88 ). Th e re vie w is n ot l imi te d to on ly the fa c ts of eac h case , but a lso the probable eff ect on juror’s minds. Ho dge v . S tat e , 488 S.W .2d 779, 781-82 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973). Prosecutorial misconduc t has been found whe re the prosec utor’s ac tions deliberately

violated an e x press c ourt order and whe re the prosec utor’s misconduct was so blatant
a s to bor de r on be ingc on tum a c iou s. Stahl , 749 S.W .2d at 831 (c i t i n g Lan dr yv . S tat e , 706 S.W .2d 105, 111 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985)). Ge n er al ly , a def endant is re quired to pre serve a prose cutorial misconduct complaint by (1) makinga timely

and spec ific objec tion (2) re questing an instruction to disreg ard the matter improper ly place d befor e the jury ; a

nd (3) moving for mistrial. Se e Pe nr y
v . S tat e , 903 S.W. 2d

71 5, 76 4 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 95 ); id . (noting that in case s in which the Court of C riminal Appea ls reve rsed for prosecutorial m isconduct def endant ha d objected to pr osecutor’ s conduct) ; T EX . R. A PP . P. 33.1(a)
.

A. Use of Coerc ed Statem ents and C reating a Fal

se Im pression Gar za argues t he prosecutor eng ag ed in misconduct when he used Dennis’s statements at trial bec ause the statements wer e obtained by police co er cion. Addit ionally , Gar za argues the pr os e c uto r c re a te d a fa lse imp re ssi on in fr on t of the jur y be c a us e he qu e sti on e d D e nn is a bo ut h is two i n ca rc er at i o n s in the Texas Depar tment of Criminal J ustice, but did not question him about incar cer ations in othe r fac iliti es. Gar za did not obje ct to this conduc t at trial, and ther efor e, has not prese rve d t h i s compl aint for a ppellate r eview. See Pe nr y , 9 03 S.W. 2d

a t 76 4; Stahl , 749 S.W .2d
a t 83 1; T EX . R. A PP . P. 33.1(a)
.04
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- 10- B. V iol ations of Li mine O rd e rs T h e tr ia l c o u rt’ s li mi n e o r d e r s r e qu ir e d c o u n s e l to a p p r o a c h th e b e n c h b e f

o re e liciting “extraneous c rime or misconduc t evidence ” and “ra ce or ethnicity evidenc e as it re late[d] to ga ng memberships.” To suppor t his arg ument that the prosec utor “fr equently ” violated the tr ial court’s lim ine or de rs , G arza

c ite s tw o e xamp le s o f t he p ro se c uto r n ot a

pp ro a c hin g the be nc h p ri or to specific questioning. I nth e f ir s t e xa mp le , th e p r o s e c u to r aske d p o li c e o f f ic e r Re x Ra mo n , w h o ar

r e s te d G a r za
a ft e r he wa s indi c te d for Sanc he z’s mur de r, “ Ho w ar e y ou fa mil iar w ith[the de fe nd ant]?” and “ Di d y ou have a

n occa sion to see [t he defe ndant] last summer? ” The rec ord shows the que stions were asked at the beg inning of Ram o n ’s t estimony , and all counse l approa ched the bench be fore the witness answe red the questions. The recor d does not show a de liberate attempt by the prosec utor to elicit evidence of extraneous miscond u ct , or of r ace or ethnicity as it relate d to ga

ng memberships, in violation of the limine orders; nor does it show conduct so blatant as to borde r on contumacious. Additionally , in light of the f act that de fense co u nsel objecte d and counse l
a p p r o a c h e d

t h e b e n c h , t h e p r o s e c u t o r ’ s c o n d u c th a d n o e f f e c to nt h e j u r

y. I n the sec ond example, the prosec utor asked another witness, J uan Manue l “Nini” Sanche z J r., if Ga rza had a ny tattoos or beca

me a membe r of the Me x ica n M afia afte r Sanche z’s murder. Notably , the re cord shows the se questions wer e asked afte r def ense c ounsel had a lrea dy

questioned po lic e of fi c e r E nr iqu e Sa e nz o n th e same iss ue s, and Ga rza did no t ob je c t to the se qu e sti on s at tr ia l. Acc ording ly , nothing is pre serve d for a ppellate r eview. See Pe nr

y , 9 03 S.W. 2d

a t 76 4; T EX . R. A PP . P. 33.1(a)
.04
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- 11- C. N on- Di sc los ure of Wit ne ss “ Po te ntia lly ” Fa v orab le

to t he De fe nse Ga rza ne xt co mpl a ins of the pr os e c uto r’ s fa ilure to dis c los e Rol and o Ren e Ga rza , a w itn e ss he cha rac terizes as “pote ntially ” favorable to his defense . Gar za raised this complaint at the he aring on his moti on for new t rial and called Rolando as a witness. Ac cordingto Rolando’s testimony , he
me t w iththe pr os ecutor

bo th b e fo re and

a ft e r G arza ’s tr ia l. A t th e me e tin g be fo re Ga rza ’s tr ia l, which Rolando said took place in April 2007, Rolando told the prosecutor that he was at a par ty on J anuar y 6, 2006, and he he ard L owrider and C asper say they had murdered Sanc hez. At the meeting afte r Ga rza’s trial, which Rolando sa id took place in August 2007, Rolando told the prose cutor he had hea rd De nnis brag g ing that he had murdered Sanchez. The trial c ourt denied G arza’s motion fo r n e w tri a l. Sup pr e ssi on by the pr os e c uti on of e vid e nc e fa vo ra ble to a de fe nd ant v iol a te s d

ue pr oc e ss if the evide nce is material either to guilt or punishment, w ithout re g ard to the g ood or bad faith of the prosec ution. Brady v. M aryland , 3 73 U. S. 8 3 (1 96 3) . Apr os e c uto r’ s d uty to r e ve a l Brady materia l to the defe nse attac hes whe n the i nformation comes into the State’s possession. Harm v. Sta te , 183 S.W .3d 403, 407 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Bradydo e s n ot requ ir e the pr os e c uto r t o disclose evidenc e fa

vorable to the defe ndant that the State does not have in its possession and is not known to exis t. Ha

fda hl v. Sta te , 805 S.W .2d 396, 399 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990), overruled on other grounds , Ma dd

e n v . S tat e , 799 S.W .2d 683, 686 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). To establish a Bradyvio la tio n, a de fe nd ant m

us t satis fy

thr e e re qu ir e men ts : ( 1) the State failed to disclose e vidence ; (2) the withheld e vidence is favora ble to the def

endant; and ( 3) the withheld evidenc e is materia l, that is, there was a re asonable probability that had the e vidence been04
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- 12- disclosed to the def

ense, the outcome of the trial would h ave be en diffe rent. W e bb v . S tat e , 232 S.W. 3d 10 9, 11 4 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 07 ); Litt le v . S tat e , 991 S.W .2d 864, 866 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). We reviewthe trial cour t’s denial of a

motion for new t rial for an abuse of discre tion. See Sa laz ar v . S tat e , 38 S.W .3d 141, 148 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). When reviewinga trial c ourt’s denial of a

motion for new tria l, we do not substitute our judgme nt for that of the trial cour t, but rathe r, we consider w hether the t rial court’s decision was arbitra ry or unre asonable
. Le wis v . S tat e , 91 1 S. W.2 d 1 , 7 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 95 ). Thus , if the re is c on fl ic tin g e vid e nc e on an is su e of

fa c t, we de fer to the trial court’ s cre dibilit y deter mination. Id .; Qu inn v . S tat e , 958 S.W .2d 395, 402 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Her e, the tria l court wa s not require d to believe Rolando’s testimony that he met with the dis tr ic t a tto rn e y

in A pr il 2 00 7 a

nd to ld h im a

bo ut C a sp e r’ s and

L ow ri de r’ s c omm e nts a t th is meeting . I n response to questioning fr om the trial court, the pr osecutor a cknowledg ed that he had
me t w ithRol and o s e ve ra l ti me s; h ow e ve r, the pro secu to r state d h e did no t r e c a ll m e e tin g wi th Rolando in April 2007, and he be lieved all of his meeting s with Rolando occurr ed af ter Ga rza’s trial was completed. Thus, t he trial c ourt could have deter mined the evidenc e in question did not
c ome int o the State ’s po sse ssi on un til a ft e r Ga rza ’s tr ia l wa s ove r an d the re fo re no du ty to d isc los e attache d. Additionally , the trial cour t could have c oncluded Ga rza did not establ i s h Rolando’s testimony was favora

ble to him and materia l. See W ebb , 232 S.W .3d at 115 (quoting Hampton v. Sta te , 86 S.W .3d 603, 612 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) ) (“ Under Brady , the defendant bears the bur den04
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- 13- of showing that, in lig ht of all the evidenc e, it is rea sonably probable that the outcome of the trial would have be en diffe rent ha d the prosec utor made a timely disclosure.” ). In this case, Rolando testified he heard L owrider and Casper

admit to murdering Sanchez; he did not prese nt evidence that Gar za did not participate in m u rd er i n g Sanchez. The State’ s theory at trial wa s that Garza, L owrider , and Casper

all participated in Sanchez’s murde r, and muc h of the evidence admitted at trial supported this theory . Thus, the trial cour t could have conclude d that even if the defe nse had been told about Rolando, ther e wa s n o reasonable pr obability that the re sult of the proce eding
wo uld have be e n d if

fe re nt. Id
. (“The mere possibili ty that an item of undisclosed e vidence might have he lpe d th e defens e, or mig ht h a ve a ff

e c te d th e ou tc ome of

the tr ia l, d oe s n ot e sta

bli sh materia lity

in the constitutional sense.”). B ased on the rec ord pre sented at the motion for new tria l hear ing, w e conc lude the trial c ourt did not abuse its discretion in deter mining Ga

rza did not establish a Bradyviolation. D. Impro pe r J ury Arg ument I n c los inga rgume nt, the pr os e c uto r r e fe rr e d to e vid e nc e tha t G arza and his lawy e r t old Dennis he should “ [k] eep his mouth shut” about Sanchez. Garza char acte rizes this prosecutorial mi s c o n d u c t c o mp la in t a s anim

p r o p er attack o nG ar za ’ s d e f e n s e c o u n s e l. N e v e rth e le s s , G a r za made no suc h objection at trial. Thus, Ga rza’s fi n al p ro secutoria l misconduct complaint is not p reserved f

or our r eview. See T EX . R. A PP . P. 33 .1 (a ); Va le nc ia v . S tat e , 946 S.W .2d 81, 82-83 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (“B efor e a de fenda nt will be permitted to complain on ap peal a bout an
err oneous jury

argument or that an instruction to disreg ard could not ha ve cur ed an e rrone ous jury argument, he will have to show he objected a nd pursued his objec tion to an adver se ruling .”).04
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- 14- V. I N EF FE C TI V E A SSI STA N C E O F C OU N SEL I n h is f ourt h is su e , G arza

a lle g e s h e re c e ive d ine ff

e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of tr ia l c ouns e l be c a

us e duri ngvo ir

dir e , v e nir e me mbe rs we re no t a sk e d q ue sti on s a bo ut t he ir a bil ity to co ns ide r t

he fu ll
ra ng e of punis hme nt, sp e c if

ic jur y ins tr uc tio ns we re no t requ est e d, and c e rt a in o bje c tio ns to
e vid e nc e and

argume nt w e re no t ma de
. Ga rza ra ise d a

n in e ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l c la im i n his moti on for new t rial, but offe red no evidence in support of his claim. I n response to this i ssue, the State argue s the re c or d is void of any sh ow ing tha t tria l couns e l’ s p e rf

or manc e wa s d e fi c ie nt. To preva il on a claim of inef fec tive assistance claim , a def endant must show that: (1) counsel’s pe rfor

mance was de fi ci en t an d (2) the de ficient pe rfor mance prejudice d his defense
. Ga rza v . S

tat e , 2 1 3 S
. W
. 3 d

3 3 8 , 3 4 7 (T ex . C ri m . Ap p . 2 0 0 7 ) ( ci t i n g Strickland v. W ashington , 4 6 6 U
. S
. 6 6 8 , 6 8 7 ( 1 9 7 4 ) )
. T o s h o w d e f i c i e n tp e r f

o r m an c e , t h e d e f

e n d an tm u s tp r o v e b y a preponde ranc e of the evidenc e that counse l’s repr esentation fell below the standa rd of pr ofessional
norms. Id
. To demonstrate prejudice , the defendant must show a re asonable probability that, but fo r co un se l’ s unp ro fe ssi on a l e rr or s, the re su lt o f t he pr oc e e din g wo uld

have be e n d if

fe re nt. Id . The burden to e stablish both require ments is on the defe ndant. Bo ne v . S tat e , 7 7 S. W. 3 d

8 2 8 , 8 3 3 ( T e x. Crim. App. 2002). Appellate r eview of

trial counsel’ s repr esentation is hi g hly defe rential a

nd presumes that
c o u n s e l’ s a c ti o n s f

e ll w it h in th e w id e r an g e o f

r e a s o n a b le an d p r o f e s s io n a l a s s is ta

nce. Id. “ If counsel’s r easons f

or hi s conduct do not appea r i n the record and there is at l east the possibility that the conduc t could have been g rounded in leg itimate trial strateg y , we will def er to c ounsel’s decisions and deny relief on an ineffe ctive assistance claim on direc t appea l.” Ga rza , 213 S.W .3d at 348. Additionally , an appe llate cour t analy zes an ineffec tive assistance of counsel claim using04
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- 15- a totality of the re prese ntation standard. Ex parte Nailor , 149 S.W .3d 125, 130 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). The sta

ndard f or re viewing trial counsel’ s perf ormanc e “ha s never

been inter

prete d to mean that the acc used is e ntitled to err orless or per fec t counsel.” Ex pa rteW e lbo rn , 785 S.W .2d 391, 393 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). Gar za’s primary argument focuse s on trial counsel’s f ailure to a sk members of the venire if they could consider

the full rang e of punishment. As the State points out in it s briefing , howeve r, the jury never made a

punishment determination in this case. Ga rza was indicted f

or ca pital murder and the State did not pursue the de ath pena lty . An instruction on a lesser included off

ense w as not
re qu e ste d, and

the jur y wa s c ha rg e d s ole ly

on the of fe ns e of c a pit a l murd e r. Un de r t

he se circ umstances, a

finding of guilt car

ried with it an automatic sentenc e of life imprisonment without parole
. See T EX . P EN . C ODE ANN . § 12.31(a) (Ve rnon 2003). Thus, on this rec ord, i t appea rs i t was
un ne c e ssa

ry to que sti on ve nir e me mbe rs on the ir a bil ity to c on sid e r t

he fu ll r ang e of

punis hme nt. Gar za acknow ledg es this point, but nonetheless asserts trial c ounsel should have a sked the
ve nir e me mbe rs a

bo ut t he ir a bil ity to c on sid e r t

he fu ll r ang e of

punis hme nt t o r e ve a l po ssi ble bia s. A s s u p p o rt f o r h is a s s e rti o nth a t t

r ia l c o u n s e l’ s p e r f

o r ma n c e w a s d e f

ic ie n t i nth is r e g ar d , G a r za
c ite s W alk e r v . S tat e , a ca se in which this court he ld the defe ndant was de nied ef fec tive assistance
o f c o un s e l b a s e d

o nth e to ta li ty

o f th e r e p r e s e n tati o np r o v id e d
. 1 9 5 S. W. 3 d 2 5 0 , 2 6 2
- 6 3 ( T e x. App.—San Antonio 2006, no pet.). In W alker , we conclude d that one aspec t of trial counsel’s de fi c ie nt r e pr e se ntatio n w a s h is f a ilure to ask membe rs of the ve nir e any

qu e sti on s, and

in particula r, any questions about possible bias. Id . at 256-57. He re, the rec ord shows trial counse l
c on du c te d v oir

dir e , a sk ingthe me mbe rs of the ve nir e a

va ri e ty of qu e sti on s, and so me of the se qu e sti on s a dd

re sse d p os sib le bia s. Thus , tr ia l c ouns e l’ s p e rf or manc e in the pr e se nt c a se is r e a dil y distinguishable f

rom trial counse l’s defic ient repr esentation in W alker
.04
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- 16- Ga rza ’s a dd iti on a l c omp la int s a dd re ss t ri a l c ouns el’ s p e rf

or manc e wi th r e sp e c t to
e v id e n ti ar y matt e r s an d p art of th e St a te ’ s c lo s in g ar g u me n t. A s to s o me o f th e s e c o mp la in ts , G a r za does not specif

y the objections that should have be en made by trial counsel. As to other complaints, it is apparent that the e vidence in question was non-objec tionable, or that a n instruction to disreg ard w ould have be en unnec essar y beca use the evidenc e wa s elicited outside
o f t h e p rese nce of

the jury . As to still other c omplaints, there is at lea st a possibili ty that trial counsel’s c onduct could have been pa rt of a r easona

ble trial strate g y . Thus , G arza

ha s n ot ove rc ome the str on g pr e su mpt ion of e ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l, and has not made the re quired showingthat trial counsel’ s repr esentation fell below the standa rd of prof essional norms. Fa ilure to make the require d showing of either defic ient perf

orm ance or suffic ie nt p r e

ju d ic e d e feats an ineff

ective a ssistance of c ounsel claim. Tho mp so n v . S tat e , 9 S.W .3d 808, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). I ssue four is ove rruled. VI . C ONCL US I ON The judg ment of the trial c ourt is affir med.

Kar en Ang elini , J ustice
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