J-S27026-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

AKEEM LEE 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1112 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence March 24, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0001812-2012, 

CP-51-CR-0001816-2012

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., OTT, J. and PLATT, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED JUNE 20, 2017

Akeem Lee appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed on March 

24, 2016, in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas. The trial court 

sentenced Lee to an aggregate term of six to 12 years’ imprisonment, 

following his non-jury conviction of attempted murder1and related charges 

for a January 2012 shooting. On appeal, Lee challenges the sufficiency of 

the evidence supporting his conviction of attempted murder, and the trial 

court’s denial of his motion to dismiss based upon a violation of his speedy 

trial rights. For the reasons below, we affirm.

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 See 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 901, 2502. 
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The facts underlying Lee’s conviction are summarized by the trial court 

as follows:

On January 5, 2012, at approximately 8:00 p.m., 

complainant #1 got into a physical altercation with a female 

classmate outside of Carnell Elementary School in Philadelphia, 

Pennsylvania. Complainant #1’s older brother, complainant #2, 

broke up [the] fight between the two (2) younger girls. As 

complainant #2 attempted to separate the girls, the female 

classmate that was fighting threatened that she was going to tell 

her cousin, [Lee], to shoot complainant #2 (complainant #1’s 

brother).[2]

After the altercation, complainant #1 walked back to her 

residence on Langdon Street with her brother’s friend. Later 

that same evening, complainant #1 was home with only her two 

(2) younger siblings and her brother’s friend, when she heard a 

knock at the front door. As minor complainant #1 opened the 

door, [Lee], co-defendant, the female classmate, and another 

female classmate, barged into the home. [Lee] grabbed minor 

complainant #1 by her shirt and yelled, “where your brother at?” 

[Lee] pushed minor complainant #1 to the ground and her 

classmates began to hit her. While the classmates were fighting 

complainant #1, [Lee] pulled a handgun out of his pocket and 

ran upstairs yelling, “if I find anyone in here, it’s a rap.” [Lee] 

came back downstairs with the handgun touching the back of the 

head of complainant #2’s friend. [Lee] forced the friend out of 

the home while the other intruders followed; complainant #1 

and her younger siblings were left alone in the house. Several 

hours later, complainants’ mother returned home from work. 

Once the mother learned what had transpired, she escorted the 

children to the Northeast Detectives’ Division so that the children 

could provide statements.

Subsequent to the intruders leaving the residence, 

complainant #2 was standing in front of a pharmacy located at 

Oxford and Frontenac Streets in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 

when a white Chrysler pulled up in front of him. [Lee] jumped 

____________________________________________

2 At the time of the incident, both complainants were minors. Complainant 

#1 was 13 years old, and complainant #2 was 15 years old. See N.T., 

11/10/2015, at 19, 127.
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out of the car and began to hit complainant #2. A physical 

altercation ensued. Two (2) women jumped out of the car and 

also began hitting complainant #2. [Lee] stopped fighting, ran 

back to the car, and returned to the fight with a black handgun. 

[Lee] fired approximately six (6) shots at complainant #2. 

Complainant #2 started to run and felt the bullets whiz by his 

head, but he escaped unharmed. On January 10, 2012, 

complainant #2 provided a statement to the Northeast 

Detectives.

Trial Court Opinion, 9/21/2016, at 2-4 (record citations omitted).

Lee was subsequently arrested and charged with attempted murder, 

aggravated assault, recklessly endangering another person, firearms not to 

be carried without a license, and carrying a firearm on a public street in 

Philadelphia.3 On March 16, 2015, Lee filed a petition for dismissal of the 

charges pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 600. The trial court denied Lee’s motion 

following a hearing immediately preceding trial on November 10, 2015. 

After the Commonwealth presented its case-in-chief, the trial was continued 

until January 22, 2016. Following additional testimony that day, the court 

entered a verdict of guilty on all charges. Lee was sentenced on March 24, 

2016, to a term of six to 12 years’ imprisonment for attempted murder, and 

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3 See 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 907/2502, 2702, 2705, 6106, and 6108, respectively. 

Lee’s co-defendant, Ebony Hinton, was charged with burglary, conspiracy 

and related offenses for the break-in at the complainants’ home. She was 

convicted of multiple offenses and sentenced to an aggregate term of 12 to 

24 months’ imprisonment, followed by five years’ probation. See Docket 

No. CP-51-CR-0001815-2012.
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concurrent prison terms on the remaining charges. This timely appeal 

follows.4

In his first issue, Lee contends the evidence was insufficient to support 

his conviction of attempted murder. Specifically, he asserts the 

Commonwealth failed to present any evidence he possessed the specific 

intent to kill complainant #2. See Lee’s Brief at 11. Further, he claims no 

witness observed him firing a weapon, and complainant #2’s testimony that 

he heard bullets “whizz by” his head was insufficient to demonstrate Lee 

“was firing a handgun at a vital part of the complainant’s body.” Lee’s Brief 

at 12.

Our review with respect to a sufficiency of the evidence challenge is 

well-settled:

The standard we apply ... is whether viewing all the evidence 

admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, 

there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every 

element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying 

[the above] test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute 

our judgment for the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the 

facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need 

not preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts 

regarding a defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder 

unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter 

of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the combined 

circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of 

proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt 

____________________________________________

4 On July 6, 2016, the trial court ordered Lee to file a concise statement of 

errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Lee complied 

with the court’s directive, and filed a concise statement on July 25, 2016.
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by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in 

applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and 

all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the 

trier of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and 

the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part 

or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Truong, 36 A.3d 592, 597 (Pa. Super. 2012) (en banc) 

(quotation omitted), appeal denied, 57 A.3d 70 (Pa. 2012).

“A conviction for attempted murder requires the Commonwealth to 

prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had the specific intent 

to kill and took a substantial step towards that goal.” Commonwealth v. 

Blakeney, 946 A.2d 645, 652 (Pa. 2008), citing 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 901, 2502, 

cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1177 (2009). Moreover, we must bear in mind: 

“The Commonwealth may establish the mens rea ... specific 

intent to kill, solely from circumstantial evidence.” Further, our 

Supreme Court has repeatedly determined that “[t]he use of a 

deadly weapon on a vital part of the body is sufficient to 

establish the specific intent to kill.”

Commonwealth v. Tucker, 143 A.3d 955, 964 (Pa. Super. 2016) (internal 

citations omitted), appeal denied, ___ A.3d ___, 2017 WL 401331 (Pa. Jan. 

30, 2017).

Our review of the trial transcript reveals ample evidence to support the 

trial court’s verdict. Lee accompanied his co-defendant and two juveniles 

who forced their way into the complainants’ home looking for complainant 

#2. Complainant #1 testified Lee grabbed her chest, pushed her up against 

the wall, and asked where her brother was. N.T., 11/10/2015, at 35. When 

she told him she did not know, Lee then proceeded up the stairs, with a gun 
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in his hand, and stated: “If I find somebody in here, it’s a rap[,]” meaning 

he intended to shoot someone. Id. at 38-39. Lee then came back down the 

stairs, holding a gun to the head of complainant #2’s friend. See id. at 39-

40. 

Later that evening, Lee and his cohorts tracked down complainant #2 

on the street and began punching him.5 See id. at 134. Lee then ran back 

to his car and retrieved a black handgun. Complainant #2 indicated Lee was 

pointing the gun in his direction when Lee began shooting. See id. at 141. 

He stated:

I ran. I heard like six shots. Two went by my head, and the 

rest went either onto the pavement or into cars. I ran like two

blocks and hid in someone's bushes.

Id. at 134-135.

Accordingly, the evidence presented at trial demonstrated: (1) Lee 

made threatening comments at the complainants’ home while searching for 

complainant #2 and brandishing a firearm; (2) complainant #2 told police 

Lee was “pointing the firearm in [his] direction” when he fired the weapon; 

and (3) Lee fired six shots near complainant #2’s head. See id. at 38-39, 

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5 At trial, complainant #2 testified he did not remember any of the events in 

question, and did not know either of the co-defendants. See N.T., 

11/10/2015, at 132 (complainant #2 stated: “I blocked this stuff out. I 

don’t want to be here. I don’t want to testify.”). The Commonwealth 

introduced his version of the events and identification of Lee via his 

statement to police and testimony at the preliminary hearing. See id. at 

131-145.
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134-135, 141. This evidence was sufficient to establish Lee possessed the 

specific intent to kill, and took a substantial step toward that goal. See 

Commonwealth v. Manley, 985 A.2d 256, 272 (Pa. Super. 2009) 

(evidence that appellant fired multiple shots at the victim, five of which 

struck the victim although not in a vital organ, was sufficient for the jury to 

infer the appellant had a specific intent to kill), appeal denied, 996 A.2d 491 

(Pa. 2010). See also Commonwealth v. Chambers, 980 A.2d 35, 47 (Pa. 

2009) (“[I]t is well-established in Pennsylvania law that the specific intent to 

kill can be formed in a fraction of a second, and may be found whenever the 

defendant acts with a conscious purpose to bring about the death of the 

victim.”), cert. denied, 560 U.S. 928 (2010). Therefore, no relief is 

warranted on Lee’s first issue.

Next, Lee contends the trial court erred in denying his petition for 

dismissal of the charges based on a violation of his speedy trial rights 

pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 600. 

Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 600 was designed 

“to protect a defendant’s speedy trial rights, as well as society’s 

right to effective prosecution of criminal cases.” The Rule 

mandates, inter alia, that a defendant must be tried on criminal 

charges no later than 365 days after the criminal complaint is 

filed. Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(A)(1, 3).7

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7 We note that a new Rule 600 was adopted, effective July 

1, 2013, “to reorganize and clarify the provisions of the 

rule in view of the long line of cases that have construed 

the rule.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 600, Comment. However, because 

the criminal complaint in this case was filed prior to the 

new rule, we will apply the former version of Rule 600. 

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This straightforward calculation is known as the 

mechanical run date. However, those periods of delay caused by 

a defendant are excluded from the computation of the length of 

time of any pretrial incarceration. Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(C). 

Following these exclusions, if any, we arrive at an adjusted run 

date by extending the mechanical run date to account for these 

exclusions. Any other delay that occurs, despite the 

Commonwealth’s due diligence, is deemed excusable and results 

in further adjustments to the effective run date. Pa.R.Crim.P. 

600(G)

After the expiration of the 365–day period, but before trial, 

a defendant may move for dismissal of the charges with 

prejudice. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(G). Thereafter, the trial court 

is required to hold a hearing to determine whether the 

Commonwealth “exercised due diligence and [whether] the 

circumstances occasioning the postponement were beyond the 

control of the Commonwealth,” in which case, the motion should 

be denied. Id. When considering whether the Commonwealth 

acted with due diligence, we note:

“[T]he Commonwealth must do everything reasonable 

within its power to guarantee that a trial begins on time,” 

and the Commonwealth has the burden of demonstrating 

by a preponderance of the evidence that it exercised due 

diligence. “As has been oft stated, [d]ue diligence is factspecific, to be determined case-by-case; it does not 

require perfect vigilance and punctilious care, but merely a 

showing the Commonwealth has put forth a reasonable 

effort.”

Commonwealth v. Dixon, 140 A.3d 718, 722–723 (Pa. Super. 2016) 

(internal case citations omitted) appeal denied, ___ A.3d ___, 2016 WL 

6094188 (Pa. Oct. 19, 2016). We review an order denying a Rule 600 

motion for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 723.

Here, the trial court, in its opinion, provided a detailed analysis of each 

delay, and the reason for the delay. See Trial Court Opinion, 9/21/2016, at 

6-8. The court determined which delays were attributable to the 
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Commonwealth, and which ones constituted excludable or excusable time. 

See id. Our review of the criminal docket supports the trial court’s findings, 

and, accordingly, we rest on the court’s thorough opinion. 

Moreover, we note Lee’s analysis of his Rule 600 claim consists solely 

of the following paragraph:

In the instant case, the mechanical run date began on 

January 6, 2012, with the filing of the criminal complaint. There 

is no dispute with the trial court’s analysis that approximately 

eighteen (18) months of excludable time are attributed to [Lee] 

or co-defendant or defense counsel. However, since almost four 

(4) years transpired before the matter came to trial on 

November 10, 2015, it is clear that 365 days had elapsed taking 

into account excludable time and excusable delay.

Lee’s Brief at 14. Lee does not discuss any of the specific time periods which 

the trial court determined were excusable delay as a result of the 

Commonwealth’s due diligence, but rather simply asserts the four-year delay 

must be violative of Rule 600. We remind Lee that “[i]t is not the obligation 

of this Court ... to formulate [his] arguments for him.” Commonwealth v. 

Johnson, 985 A.2d 915, 924 (Pa. 2009), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 906 (2010). 

Accordingly, based on Lee’s “limited development of the argument,” we 

could also find this issue waived. Commonwealth v. Cornelius, 856 A.2d 

62, 77 (Pa. Super. 2004), appeal denied, 895 A.2d 548 (Pa. 2006). 

Therefore, Lee’s second issue warrants no relief.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 6/20/2017