IV 

111TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. RES. 333 

Recognizing non-proliferation options for nuclear understanding to keep 

everyone safe (NO NUKES). 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

APRIL 2, 2009 

Ms. WOOLSEY (for herself, Ms. LEE of California, Mr. CONYERS, and Mr. 

FATTAH) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the 

Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committee on 

Armed Services, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned 

RESOLUTION 

Recognizing non-proliferation options for nuclear 

understanding to keep everyone safe (NO NUKES). 

Whereas nuclear weapons are inherently indiscriminate and 

represent a disproportionate use of force; 

Whereas, since the end of the Cold War, the United States 

has squandered a superb opportunity to diminish the role 

of nuclear weapons in foreign and military affairs and 

failed to verifiably eliminate existing stocks of nuclear 

weapons as well as prevent new nuclear dangers from 

arising, and consequently the threat of nuclear disaster 

remains unacceptably high; 


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•HRES 333 IH 

Whereas United States foreign policy is eroding the network 

of security treaties that have helped to stem the spread 

of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, thus decreasing security for Americans and non-Americans alike; 

Whereas the United States has a vital security interest in 

promoting the nonproliferation and disarmament of nuclear weapons, since the only genuine and permanent security from the threat of the use of nuclear weapons is 

their elimination under strict and effective international 

control; 

Whereas the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 

Weapons (NPT) (21 UST 483) entered into force and 

became part of United States law on March 5, 1970; 

Whereas more countries (a total of 188) have ratified the 

NPT than any other arms limitation and disarmament 

agreement, a testament to the significance of the NPT; 

Whereas the United States has undertaken, in accordance 

with article VI of the NPT, to ‘‘pursue negotiations in 

good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of 

the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear 

disarmament’’; 

Whereas the long-term viability of the nonproliferation goal 

is at risk if the United States fails to implement its article VI obligations; 

Whereas the United States agreed, in connection with the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995, to the ‘‘determined pursuit’’ of ‘‘systematic and progressive efforts to 

reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal 

of eliminating those weapons’’, including a pledge to complete negotiations on a ‘‘universal and internationally and 


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•HRES 333 IH 

effectively verifiable Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban 

Treaty no later than 1996’’; 

Whereas, on July 8, 1996, the International Court of Justice, 

in response to a request for an advisory opinion from the 

United Nations General Assembly, concluded that— 

(1) ‘‘the threat or use of nuclear weapons would 

generally be considered contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict’’; 

(2) ‘‘there exists an obligation to pursue in good 

faith and bring to conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control’’; and 

(3) ‘‘[t]he legal import of [the NPT article VI] obligation . . . is an obligation to achieve a precise result— 

nuclear disarmament in all its aspects—by adopting a 

particular course of conduct, namely, the pursuit of negotiations on the matter in good faith’’; 

Whereas, from April 24 to May 19, 2000, the United States 

and all NPT parties participating in the 2000 NPT Review Conference unanimously agreed to 13 steps for the 

systematic implementation of article VI, including— 

(1) an unequivocal undertaking to eliminate their 

nuclear arsenals; 

(2) prompt ratification of the Comprehensive Test 

Ban Treaty; 

(3) full implementation of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II (START II) (ratified on January 26, 

1996) and conclusion of negotiations on the Strategic 

Arms Reduction Treaty III (START III) as soon as possible, while preserving and strengthening the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (23 UST 3435; entered into force on 

October 3, 1972); 


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(4) taking concrete measures to reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons; 

(5) taking irreversible measures toward total nuclear 

disarmament; 

(6) increasing transparency regarding nuclear weapons capabilities; and 

(7) diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in security policies; 

Whereas the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), 

signed on May 24, 2002 (ratified on March 6, 2003), by 

President George W. Bush, fails to incorporate key elements of the START II and START III agreements regarding the destruction of delivery vehicles and the dismantlement of warheads, and it fails to provide new 

verification procedures necessary to effect transparent, 

meaningful, and permanent reductions crucial to the denuclearization process; 

Whereas the SORT called for a decrease in the number of 

deployed strategic nuclear warheads, but projected storage of thousands of strategic warheads, including many 

capable of quick redeployment; 

Whereas rather than affirming the United States obligations 

under the NPT, the January 9, 2002, Department of Defense Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) called for a New 

Strategic Triad consisting of nuclear and conventional offensive strike systems integrated with active and passive 

defenses and a revitalized defense infrastructure with new 

capabilities; 

Whereas the NPR— 

(1) projected indefinite retention of a large, modern, 

and diverse nuclear force totalling many thousands of 

weapons; 


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(2) maintains and expands the role of nuclear weapons in United States national security policy, including 

the use of nuclear weapons in ‘‘immediate, potential, or 

unexpected contingencies’’; 

(3) reiterated Administration plans not to support 

ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; 

(4) pledged to increase readiness to resume nuclear 

testing and proceed with development of a Ballistic Missile Defense; and 

(5) called for the development of new nuclear weapons capabilities for a wide range of missions, including 

nuclear earth-penetrating weapons to strike hardened and 

deeply buried targets, and low-yield nuclear warheads; 

Whereas rather than affirming the United States obligations 

under the NPT, the September 2002 National Security 

Strategy of the United States set forth an aggressive policy of preventive self-defense in which ‘‘America will act 

against . . . emerging threats before they are fully 

formed’’; 

Whereas rather than affirming the United States obligations 

under the NPT, the December 2002 National Strategy to 

Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) stated 

that ‘‘The United States . . . reserves the right to respond with overwhelming force—including through resort 

to all of our options—to the use of WMD against the 

United States, our forces abroad, and friends and allies’’, 

with both ‘‘conventional and nuclear response’’ capabilities; 

Whereas the above-detailed policies and programs of the 

United States are— 

(1) antithetical to United States obligations under 

the NPT; 


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(2) contrary to fundamental requirements of international law, because the United Nations Charter does 

not permit preventive war; 

(3) counterproductive, because United States reliance on nuclear weapons encourages other countries to 

acquire them, ultimately increasing the likelihood that a 

nuclear weapon will be used against the United States; 

(4) dangerous, because the assertion of the United 

States of a right to engage in preventive war encourages 

other countries to assert the same right; and 

(5) immoral, because they place a threat of mass destruction, and the assertion of a right to initiate war, at 

the core of United States foreign policy; 

Whereas nonproliferation strategies based on internationally 

accepted standards of behavior, ranging from treaties to 

enforcement mechanisms such as on-site inspections, 

technical surveillance, intelligence sharing, and the destruction of all such weapons of mass destruction, are designed to prevent the proliferation and development of all 

forms of WMD, so that hostile countries and entities either are unable to procure WMD or are required not to 

use WMD; 

Whereas nonproliferation strategies emphasizing reciprocity 

and cooperation that are consistent with international law 

have been used successfully for the last 50 years, while 

counterproliferation strategies based primarily on the 

unilateral use of force, outside the framework of international organizations and agreements, are likely to lead 

to the disintegration of existing arms control and nonproliferation mechanisms and a renewed, more complex 

arms race; and 


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Whereas former United States national security officials 

Henry Kissinger, Sam Nunn, George Schultz, and Bill 

Perry called for establishing a goal for the global elimination of nuclear weapons: Now, therefore, be it 

1 Resolved, That the House of Representatives— 

2 (1) requests the President to inform Congress 

3 and the Secretary General of the United Nations re4 garding the efforts and measures the United States 

5 has taken with respect to— 

6 (A) implementation and observance of arti7 cle VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 

8 Nuclear Weapons (NPT) (21 UST 483); 

9 (B) implementation and observance of 

10 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 

11 52/38O and subsequent resolutions related to 

12 the July 1996 advisory opinion of the Inter13 national Court of Justice, which called upon all 

14 countries to fulfill their nuclear disarmament 

15 obligation by commencing multilateral negotia16 tions leading to the early conclusion of a nu17 clear weapons convention; 

18 (C) implementation and observance of 

19 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 

20 55/33C and subsequent resolutions welcoming 

21 the outcome of the 2000 NPT Review Con22 ference, and affirming that ‘‘a nuclear weapon 


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1 free world will ultimately require the underpin2 ning of a universal and multilaterally negotiated 

3 legally binding instrument’’; and 

4 (D) nuclear disarmament; 

5 (2) calls on the President to implement and ob6 serve all NPT obligations and commitments and to 

7 revise national policies on nuclear weapons accord8 ingly; and 

9 (3) urges the President, in the interests of pro10 tecting and advancing human, national, and global 

11 security, to— 

12 (A) declare unconditionally that the United 

13 States will not use nuclear weapons first, and 

14 that pending their elimination, nuclear weapons 

15 serve only to deter a nuclear attack by a hostile 

16 country or other entity; 

17 (B) initiate and conclude multilateral nego18 tiations on sweeping, verifiable, and irreversible 

19 steps that countries with nuclear capability 

20 shall take to reduce and eventually eliminate 

21 strategic and tactical nuclear weapons and their 

22 delivery systems; 

23 (C) begin verifiable and irreversible reduc24 tions in the United States strategic and tactical 

25 nuclear weapons and their delivery systems; 


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1 (D) cooperate with the Russian Federation 

2 to remove from deployment nuclear weapons 

3 that presently are operational and ready to be 

4 launched on short notice; 

5 (E) reaffirm the moratorium on nuclear 

6 testing and work for ratification of the Com7 prehensive Test Ban Treaty at the earliest pos8 sible date; 

9 (F) terminate all efforts aimed at enhanc10 ing the military capabilities of the United 

11 States nuclear arsenal, including research and 

12 development for both low-yield nuclear weapons 

13 and the ‘‘robust nuclear earth penetrator’’ 

14 (commonly referred to as ‘‘bunker-busters’’); 

15 (G) terminate all plans for upgrades to ex16 isting weapons research and production facili17 ties, and construction of new facilities, includ18 ing those for plutonium pit manufacturing and 

19 tritium production; 

20 (H) terminate the declared United States 

21 policy of preventive warfare as a response to 

22 threats from weapons of mass destruction 

23 (WMD); 

24 (I) obtain the approval of the Senate or 

25 the entire Congress as a condition for withVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:45 Apr 03, 2009 Jkt 079200 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\HR333.IH HR333

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1 drawal from and termination of both existing 

2 and future security treaties; 

3 (J) terminate development of ballistic mis4 sile defenses and initiate multilateral negotia5 tions to eliminate ballistic missiles; and 

6 (K) support initiatives and multilateral ne7 gotiations to ban weapons in outer space. 

Æ 


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