PUBLISH
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ VIKTORYA REZNIK, Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. INCONTACT, INC., doing business as Nice inContact, Defendant - Appellee. No. 21-4007

________________ _________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Utah (D.C. No. 1:20-CV-00104-JCB)

________________ _________________ Philip C. Patterson, Ogden, Ut ah, for Plaintiff - Appellant. M. Christopher Moon (Rick J. Sutherland, with him on the brief), Jackson Lewis PLLC, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Defendant - Appellee.

________________ _________________ Before BACHARACH , KELLY , and CARSON , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ KELLY , Circuit Judge.

________________ _________________ Plaintiff-Appellant Viktorya Reznik appeals from the dist rict court’s dismissal of her Title VII retaliation action against her former employer, Defendant-Appellee inContact, Inc. (inContact). Reznik v. in Contact, Inc., No. 20-cv-00104, 2020 WL FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### December 1, 2021 Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court Appellate Case: 21-4007 Document: 010110612497 Date Filed: 12/01/2021 Page: 12 7493200 (D. Utah Dec. 21, 2020). The distri ct court dismissed for failure to state a claim. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we

reverse. Background From January 2018 to May 2019, Ms. Rezn ik worked as a Director of Project Management for inContact, a Utah-based cor poration offering cloud-based services to companies using call centers. In April 2019, Ms. Reznik received internal complaints about racial slurs in the workplace from two native Filipino empl oyees, Jamar Go and Kristine Dalere, who worked in the company’s Manila, Philippines office. They claimed that an inContact manager, Scott Mendenhall, had repeatedly subj ected them and other native Filipino employees to racial slurs, calling them “monkeys” and “not human.” Compl. ¶ 13. Mr. Mendenhall worked in the same Salt La ke County facility as Ms. Reznik. Mr. Go and Ms. Dalere e ach told Ms. Rezn ik that Mr. Mendenhall’s harassment had become more vitriolic and more frequent. They explained that this harassment had become so extreme and pervasive that it was interfering with their performance at work as well as their physical and emotional well-being. They as ked permission to be excused from meetings Mr. Mendenhall led that were not part of their duties. Ms. Reznik first relayed these complain ts to her immediate supervisor, Vice President of Management Information System s and Trust, Gwen Shivley, who “expressed . . . shock and dismay . . . while stating that no one should be treated in that manner.” Id. ¶ 19. A few days later, Ms. Reznik shared these complaints with Human Resources (HR) Appellate Case: 21-4007 Document: 010110612497 Date Filed: 12/01/2021 Page: 23 business partner John Bishoff and HR empl oyee Chelsea Bohmer, who were similarly disturbed. Mr. Bishoff assured Ms. Rezn ik that no inContact employee would be subjected to workplace reprisal. A few we eks later, Ms. Shivley and Mr. Bishoff met with Ms. Reznik and terminat ed her employment, respectively commenting only that Ms. Reznik was “not a good culture fit” and “not a good fit.” Id. ¶¶ 25–26. Following Ms. Reznik’s term ination and administrative exhaustion, she filed her Title VII complaint in federal district court. inContact moved to di smiss and the district court granted the motion. 1 According to the district cour t, Ms. Reznik failed to state a claim because she did not show an objectively reasonable be lief that she opposed conduct unlawful under Title VII. See Re znik, 2020 WL 7 493200, at *3.
Discussion We review de novo the dismissal of a complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted. Khalik v. United Air Lines, 671 F.3d 1188, 1190 (10th Cir. 2012). In evaluating such a motion, the court must take as true “[a]ll well-pleaded facts, as distinguished from conclusory allegations,” view all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and liberally construe the pleadings. Ruiz v. McDonn ell, 299 F.3d 1173, 1181 (10th Cir. 2002) (quotation and citation omitted). To withstand a motion to dism iss, a plaintiff must plead sufficient factual allegations “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 5 50 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

1 The parties consented to a magistrate judge conducting all proceedings, including entry of final judgment. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c); Fed. R. Civ. P. 73. Appellate Case: 21-4007 Document: 010110612497 Date Filed: 12/01/2021 Page: 34 I. Title VII’s Anti-retaliation Provision Title VII’s anti-retaliation pr ovision (the opposition clau se) bars an employer from discriminating against an individual who ha s “opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice” by the statute. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). To state a prima facie case of Title VII retaliation, Ms. Reznik must pl ausibly allege “(1) th at [s]he engaged in protected opposition to discrimination, (2) that a reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially adverse, an d (3) that a causal connection existed between the protected activity and the materially a dverse action.” See Kh alik, 671 F.3d at 1193 (quotation and citation omitted). To plead the first element, Ms. Reznik need not esta blish that the conduct she opposed actually violated Title VII, only that she had both a subjective good faith and objectively reasonable belief that it did. See Crumpacker v. Kan. Dep’t of Hum. Res., 338 F.3d 1163, 1171–72 (10th Cir. 2003). Th e only issue before us is whether Ms. Reznik’s belief was objectively reasonable. 2 Although not know n at the time, Ms. Reznik concedes the legal poi nt that the racial harassmen t she opposed did not violate Title VII because its protections do not extend to aliens lik e Mr. Go and Ms. Dalere. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a). Ms. Reznik asserts th at this does not render her belief that she opposed conduct unlawful under Title V II objectively unreasonable. We agree.

2 The dissent reads our analysis as collapsing the subjective an d objective elements of this inquiry. We respectfully disagree and aim to gi ve effect to both prongs. Considering the context in which the law is applied does not mean we are conflating the subjective and objective components of this analysis. Appellate Case: 21-4007 Document: 010110612497 Date Filed: 12/01/2021 Page: 45 II. The Reasonableness Test for Ti tle VII Retaliation Claims The Supreme Court has not established how to determine when a plaintiff’s belief that he or she is opposing unlawful conduct is reasonable. But the Court did undertake a reasonableness inquiry to evalua te a retaliation claim in Clark County School District v. Breeden. 532 U.S. 268 (2001) (per curiam ). In Breeden, the Supreme Court reviewed the Ninth Circuit’s extension of protection against retaliation under the opposition clause to individuals who complained about practic es they reasonably be lieved were unlawful, even if they were not. Id. at 270. The Cour t did not rule on this standard’s propriety. Rather, it concluded that the plaintiff failed to meet the standard because no reasonable person could believe that the conduct at issue was unlawful. Id. at 270–71. Even though the Court did not explicitly endorse the Ninth Circuit’s reasonable belief standard, every circuit adopted it after Breeden, see E.E.O.C. v. Rite Way Serv., Inc., 819 F.3d 235, 240 (5th Cir. 2016), including this circuit, see Crumpacker, 338 F.3d at 1171–72. The “reasonable belief” standard in this circuit and most others requires a plaintiff show both a subjective, good faith belief and an objectively reasonable belief that he or she opposed conduct unlawful un der Title VII. See Crumpacker, 338 F.3d at 1171–72; Rite Way Serv., 819 F.3d at 240. But courts have employe d different standards to determine what constitutes an objectively reasonable belief.
A. The Substantive Law Approach inContact argues for a substantive law approach, one that gauges objective reasonableness by assessing whether the opposed c onduct is actually unlawful. See, e.g., Weeks v. Harden Mfg. Corp., 291 F.3d 1307, 1315–17 (11th Cir. 20 02); see also Munoz Appellate Case: 21-4007 Document: 010110612497 Date Filed: 12/01/2021 Page: 56 v. Selig Enters., Inc., 981 F.3d 1265, 1283–88 (11th Cir. 2020 ) (Carnes, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Courts applying this approach look to the substantive law, and they usually look no furthe r. See, e.g., Dixon v. Hallm ark Cos., Inc., 627 F.3d 849, 857 (11th Cir. 2010). This is especially tr ue when courts charge plaintiffs with substantive knowledge of the law. See Harper v. Blockbuster Ent. Corp., 139 F.3d 1385, 1388 n.2 (11th Cir. 1998). At times, this ma y include knowledge of law as interpreted by a particular court. See Weeks, 291 F.3d at 1315. Generally, conduct “close enough [to unlawfulness] to support an objectively reasonable belief” will support a Title VII re taliation claim. See Furcron v. Mail Ctrs. Plus, LLC, 843 F.3d 1295, 131 1–12 (11th Cir. 2016) (quotation and citation omitted). At some point, however, if the substantive law di rects and solely determ ines the inquiry, an objectively reasonable belief requi res an actual violation. Some courts have reasoned that an obj ective reasonableness inquiry that looks beyond the law invites subjectivity. Their concer n is that “[i]f the plaintiffs are free to disclaim knowledge of the substantive law, the reasonableness inquiry becomes no more than speculation regarding their subjectiv e knowledge.” Weeks, 291 F.3d at 1317 (quoting Harper, 139 F.3d at 1 388 n.2). But looking beyond the law to the surrounding circumstances does not automatically reduce an objective reasonableness inquiry to a subjective one. “An objective standard is judi cially administrable . . . [and] avoids the uncertainties and unfair discrepancies that can plague a judicial effort to determine a plaintiff’s unusual subjective feelings.” Bur lington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68–69 (2006). If anything, it is th e substantive law approach that may invite Appellate Case: 21-4007 Document: 010110612497 Date Filed: 12/01/2021 Page: 67 subjectivity. After all, exp ecting employees to know an individual circuit’s position on employment law is quite subjective.
B. The Supreme Court’s Decision in Breeden The Supreme Court provided an exampl e in Breeden of how to conduct a reasonableness inquiry. See 532 U.S. at 269– 71. The Court did not rule on the propriety of the reasonable, good faith interpretation at hand, id. at 270, but it did examine whether a plaintiff’s belief was reasonable under that standard — the exact ta sk in this case. Notably, the Court evaluated both the unde rlying substantive law as well as what a reasonable person would believe abou t the law. See id. at 270–71. In Breeden, the Court consider ed whether the plaintiff ha d a reasonable, good faith belief that she was acting in opposition to sexu al harassment unlawful under Title VII. Id. at 269–71. The plaintiff was reviewing job applicants’ psychological evaluations with her male supervisor and another male employ ee. Id. at 269. One applicant’s report disclosed that the person had on ce said to a co-worker, “I hear making love to you is like making love to the Grand Canyon.” Id. Th e plaintiff’s supervisor read this aloud and said, “I don’t know what that means.” Id. The other male employee replied, “Well, I’ll tell you later.” Id. And the men both chuckled. Id. To determine the reasonableness of the pl aintiff’s belief, the Court analyzed it under the law and the circumstances. First, it explained that the standard for sexual harassment under Title VII is high because it requires discriminatory treatment so severe or pervasive that it changes th e victim’s employment experien ce and environment. Id. at 270. Then, the Court evaluated what a “reasonable person could have believed Appellate Case: 21-4007 Document: 010110612497 Date Filed: 12/01/2021 Page: 78 [regarding] the single incident.” Id. at 271. The Court determined the plaintiff’s belief was not reasonable because: (1) reviewing psychological eval uations for job applicants was part of her and her male co-workers’ job requirements; (2 ) she had conceded that her co-worker’s remarks had not upset her; (3) th e incident was not close to the level of severity the law recognizes as harassment; (4 ) and an isolated, unextreme incident cannot reasonably be considered harassment. See id . The Court concluded that “[n]o reasonable person could ha ve believed that the single incident . . . violated Title VII’s standard.” Id. Breeden thus invites consideration of what the reasonable employee would think about the law considering the incident circumstance s (like job requirements) and facts (like the severity or lack thereof, the pervasiveness, and the effect of alleged discrimination) to determine objective reasonableness. See id.
C. Objective Reasonableness We adopt an objective reas onableness inquiry that cons iders the law against what a reasonable employee would believe, not “what a reasonable labor and employment attorney would believe.” Al ex B. Long, The Troublemake r’s Friend: Retaliation Against Third Parties and the Right of Association in the Workplace, 59 Fla. L. Rev. 931, 955 (2007). 3 “An employee is not an expert in hostile work environment law,” see Boyer3 In unpublished orders and judgments, this court has looked mo re strictly at the underlying substantive law. See Clark v. Cache Valley Elec . Co., 573 F. App’x 693, 701 (10th Cir. 2014); Held v. Ferrellgas, Inc., 505 F. App’x 687, 689–90 (10th Cir. 2012). However, we do not find these decisions pe rsuasive; these cases addressed much less serious facts than those at issue. In any ca se, we are not bound by them. 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A). Appellate Case: 21-4007 Document: 010110612497 Date Filed: 12/01/2021 Page: 89 Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp ., 786 F.3d 264, 290 (4th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (Wilkinson, J., concurring in part and disse nting in part), so such exper tise should not be necessary for one to benefit from Title VII protection ag ainst retaliation. Our precedent clearly establishes that the opposition clause protect s employees from retaliation “whether or not an actual [Title VII] violation has occurred.” Hansen v. SkyWest Airlines, 844 F.3d 914, 926 (10th Cir. 2016) (emphasis added). This necessitates looking be yond the substantive law. It merits considering what a reasona ble employee would u nderstand about the law and believe in the same or similar circumst ances. See Breeden, 532 U.S. at 269–71; Kelly v. Howard I. Shapiro & Assocs. Consul ting Eng’rs, P.C., 716 F.3d 10, 17 (2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam). This approach is consistent with the S upreme Court’s explanations of Title VII’s form and function. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 548 U.S. at 69. Title VII must be read “to provide broader protection for victims of retaliation than for those [of] . . . discrimination,” because “effective enfo rcement could . . . only be expected if employees felt free to approach officials with their grievances.” Id. at 66–67; see also Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 562 U.S. 170, 173–75 (2011). Further, an objective reasonableness inquiry for Title VII retaliation claims parallels the test for retaliation claims unde r the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Section 806 of Sarbanes-Oxley also provides anti-retaliation protections for employees reporting certain violations along a reasonable belief standard. See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1980.104(e) (2020). As the Department of Labor’s Administrative Review Board (ARB) has explained, an employee’s belie f must be subjectively and objectively Appellate Case: 21-4007 Document: 010110612497 Date Filed: 12/01/2021 Page: 910 reasonable. Sylvester v. Parexel Int’l LL C, No. 07-123, 2011 WL 2165854, at *11–12 (Admin. Rev. Bd. 2011) (en banc). Objectiv e reasonableness “is evaluated based on the knowledge available to the reasonable person in the same factual circumstances with the same training and experience as the aggrieve d employee.” Id. (quoting Harp v. Charter Commc’ns, Inc., 558 F.3d 722, 723 (7th Cir. 2009 )). This circuit, along with the majority of others, follows this standa rd. Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Admin. Rev. Bd., 717 F.3d 1121, 1132 (10th Cir. 2013). The similarity between the Sarbanes-Oxley and Title VII retaliation schemes is readily apparent from their codified reasona ble belief standards and same requirement that such beliefs must be subjectively and objectively reasonable. We see no reason why they should not share the same test for asse ssing objective reasonabl eness as well. In fact, in Sylvester, the ARB explained that “the objective reasonableness standard in [Sarbanes-Oxley] whistleblower claims is similar to the objective reasonableness standards application to Title VII claims.” 20 11 WL 2165854, at *11–12. We are not the first court to find Sarbanes-Oxley’s standard informative in consid ering application of Title VII’s objective reasonableness standard. See, e.g., Yazdian v. ConMed Endoscopic Tech., Inc., 793 F.3d 634, 646 (6th Cir. 2015). Other circuits have also considered a ttendant circumstances alongside the law in evaluating objective reasonablene ss in Title VII retaliation cases. See E.E.O.C. v. Rite Way Serv., Inc., 819 F.3d 235, 240 (5th Cir. 2016); Boye r-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., 786 F.3d 264, 282–83 (4 th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (maj ority opinion); Kelly v. Appellate Case: 21-4007 Document: 010110612497 Date Filed: 12/01/2021 Page: 1011 Howard I. Shapiro & Assocs. Co nsulting Eng’rs, P.C., 716 F. 3d 10, 14–17 (2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam). We find those decisions instructive. In Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., the Fourth Circuit evaluated a Title VII retaliation claim where a white employee had twice called a night club server a “porch monkey.” 786 F.3d at 269–70. “[W]ith guid ance from the Supreme Court [in Breeden],” the court considered what standard should determine when an employee’s belief that certain conduct violates Title VII is reasonabl e. Id. at 284. The court required a “lesser showing” than necessary to meet the legal standard of es tablishing an actual hostile work environment claim. Id. at 285. As in Bree den, the plaintiff’s beli ef was “based on an isolated incident.” Id. at 284. Thus, the c ourt considered the severity of the harassment, which involved factors relevant to the legal standard “used to judge whether a workplace is sufficiently hostile or abusive for purposes of a hostile environment claim — specifically, whether the discriminatory conduc t ‘is physically threat ening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance.’” Id. at 284 (quoting Harris v. Forklif t Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993)). The court deci ded that the plaintiff’s be lief was objectively reasonable because “‘porch monkey’ is a r acial epithet that is not just humiliating, but is degrading and humiliating in the extreme.” Id. at 285 (quotation and citation omitted). In E.E.O.C. v. Rite Way Serv., Inc., the Fifth Circuit also applied a test for determining the objective reasonableness of a plaintiff’s belief th at accounted for the “zone of conduct that falls short of an actua l violation but could be reasonably perceived to violate Title VII.” 819 F.3d at 242. Th e court considered several factors: (1) whether the harasser directed conduct at a specific employee; (2) whether a supervisor’s conduct Appellate Case: 21-4007 Document: 010110612497 Date Filed: 12/01/2021 Page: 1112 is involved; (3) the context of the conduct, such as understanding multiple incidents in light of one another; and (4) “the setting in which [the pl aintiff] voiced her complaint,” that is, whether the employer informed the plaintiff of its sexual harassment policies and what those policies included. See id. at 24 3–44. These factors were relevant because they drew upon conceptions (from caselaw) about what in fluences people’s reasonable beliefs in the workplac e. See id. at 242–44.
III. Ms. Reznik’s Belief That She Oppose d Conduct Unlawful Under Title VII Determining whether Ms. Reznik’s belief that she was opposing conduct unlawful under Title VII was objectively reasonable thus involves analyzing the law, the relevant attendant circumstances of Ms. Reznik’s jo b, and the severity, pervasiveness, and duration of the alleged discri mination. Given a Rule 12(b(6) motion, we accept the factual allegations of discrimination as true. Ruiz, 299 F.3d at 1181. The substantive law inquiry concerni ng the opposed conduct is simple: discrimination against aliens working for Amer ican companies in a fo reign country is not unlawful under Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (a). But our inquiry does not end there. We must evaluate the relevant attendant circumstances and consider whether an employee in those circumstances could reasonabl y believe that he or she opposed conduct unlawful under Title VII. First, supervising the two victims was a pa rt of Ms. Reznik’s job, but harassment and discriminatory treatment was not inherent in Ms. Reznik’s role as Director of Project Management. This is unlike in Breeden, where the plaintiff’s job requirement of reviewing psychiatric evaluations naturally involved dealing with and discussing Appellate Case: 21-4007 Document: 010110612497 Date Filed: 12/01/2021 Page: 1213 sensitive issues. See 532 U.S. at 271. The less highly offensive behavior and statements have to do with an employee ’s duties, the more reasonable it is for an employee to identify that as workplace-prohi bited behavior. Se e id. Second, the discrimination at issue here was severe. See Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 284–85; Rite Way Serv., 819 F.3d at 243–44. Mr. Mendenhall allegedly subjec ted Mr. Go, Ms. Dalere, and other native Filipino employees to racial slurs including statements that they were “monkeys” and “not human.” Compl. ¶ 13. Mr. Mendenha ll’s conduct was shocking enough to provoke serious dismay and disapproval from all thre e inContact employees to whom Ms. Reznik reported the discrimination. Compl. ¶¶ 19, 21 . Third, the discrimination at issue was pervasive: it “increased in vitriol and frequ ency to the point th at the harassment was interfering with [the] workpla ce performance and with [the] emotional and physical wellbeing” of the harassed employees. Id. ¶ 14. Fourth, the discrimination at issue was not isolated: it covered a span of about four months, with both its nature and consequences intensifying over that time period. Id. ¶ 13. Considering these circumstances, a reas onable employee could think that Mr. Mendenhall’s conduct toward Mr. Go and Ms. Dalere constituted racial and/or national origin discrimination that violates Title V II. A reasonable employee likely knows that discrimination based on race a nd/or national origin is unlawful, but is likely unfamiliar with Title VII’s statutory exceptions. Such an employee should not be charged with such specialized legal knowledge. See Boyer-Lib erto, 786 F.3d at 290 (Wilkinson, J., concurring in part and dissenti ng in part); Kelly, 716 F.3d at 17. Instead, we ask whether Appellate Case: 21-4007 Document: 010110612497 Date Filed: 12/01/2021 Page: 1314 an employee would r easonably believe that the con duct here constituted unlawful discrimination from an objectively reasonable person’s perspective. Discrimination based on race or national origin violates Title VII when it creates an environment that is objectively and subjec tively offensive so that a reasonable person would find it hostile and abusive, and the victim actually perceived it as such. Harris, 510 U.S. at 21–22. The objective reasonabl eness inquiry turns on such factors of how severe or pervasive the alleged discrimination is as well as its duration. See id. The discrimination alleged here wo uld violate Title VII if dir ected at covered individuals because it created a hostile and abusiv e work environmen t. See id. Therefore, it would be reasonable for an employee to think that the discrimination at issue would violate Title VII. See Boyer-L iberto, 786 F.3d at 2 85 (majority opinion) (requiring a “lesser showing” th an what is necessary to prove a hostile and abusive work environment). The facts here fi t squarely inside the “zone of conduct that falls short of an actual violation” because of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1’s exemption for aliens, “but could be reasonably perceived to violate Title VII” by anyone not familiar with the statutory exception. Rite Way Serv., 819 F.3d at 242. Therefore, Ms. Reznik’s belief that she was opposing conduct unlawful under Title VII was objectively reasonable because that conduct would be discrimination in violation of Title VII but for the statutory exception. REVERSED and REMANDED for proceedings consistent with this opinion. Appellate Case: 21-4007 Document: 010110612497 Date Filed: 12/01/2021 Page: 1421-4007, Reznik v. inContact, Inc.
CARSON , J. dissenting. We must answer only one question in th is appeal—whether Plaintiff had an objectively reasonable belief that Defendant engaged in an unlawful employment practice. Because I believe that we must measure the obj ective reasonableness of an employee’s belief that her employer has e ngaged in an unlawful employment practice against existing substantive la w, I respectfully dissent. The majority suggests that under the s ubstantive law approach, an objectively reasonable belief requires an actual Title V II violation. I disagree. See Clover v. Total Sys. Servs., Inc., 176 F. 3d 1346, 1351 (11th Cir. 1999) (stating that the conduct a plaintiff opposes need not be unlawful, but it must be close enough to support an objectively reasonable belief that it is). And, to be clea r, I do not advocate for such a standard. But I do believe that the reas onable good-faith beli ef test has both subjective and objective components. “Rea sonably objective” must mean something other than “subjective good fa ith.” Indeed, a plaintiff’ s belief “is not reasonable simply because he or she comp lains of something that app ears to be discrimination in some form.” Kelly v. Ho ward I. Shapiro & Assocs. Consulting Eng’rs, P.C., 716 F.3d 10, 15 (2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam). I read the majority’s opinion as collapsing “subjective good faith” and “obj ective reasonableness.” The Supreme Court has not told us what it means to have a reasonable goodfaith belief that underlying conduct violates Title VII. The majo rity relies on Clark County School District v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268 (2001) (per curiam), in which the Appellate Case: 21-4007 Document: 010110612497 Date Filed: 12/01/2021 Page: 152 Supreme Court considered what a reasona ble person could have believed about an alleged isolated incident of sexual harassment, to in form its opinion on how to determine objective reasonableness. The S upreme Court was clear that the plaintiff had no claim for retaliation because it had reiterated, just thre e terms prior, that sexual harassment is actionable un der Title VII only if it is so severe or pervasive as to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment. Id. at 270

− 71 (citations omitted). It me ntioned the recurring point in its opinions that simple teas ing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents will not amount to discriminatory changes in the te rms and conditions of employment. Id. at 271 (citation omitted). Thus, no reasonabl e person could have believed that the single incident violated Title VII’s standards. The majo rity adopts a standard, citing a law review article, that evaluates objec tive reasonableness from the perspective of a reasonable employee rather than a reasonabl e labor-and-employment attorney. Fair enough. But the Supreme Court in Breed en held a reasonable employee to some minimal knowledge of the law—in that case, an awareness of what it had held just three terms earlier. And to me, an awareness of an e xplicit statutory exception, excluding aliens abroad from T itle VII protection, is not specialized legal knowledge. The statutory text of Title VII expressl y excludes aliens abroad. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a). Thus, no employer reasonabl y would have unders tood that Title VII prohibited the conduct Plaint iff opposed. Measuring one employee’s subjective good-faith belief that Title VII prohib its an employer from making offensive comments about aliens abroad against th e text of Title VII, which precludes Appellate Case: 21-4007 Document: 010110612497 Date Filed: 12/01/2021 Page: 163 application to aliens abroad, I would ho ld that Plaintiff la cked an objectively reasonable belief that Defendant’s conduc t constituted unlawful discrimination and affirm the district court. Appellate Case: 21-4007 Document: 010110612497 Date Filed: 12/01/2021 Page: 17