Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 101 / Thursday, May 23, 1996 / Notices 25871

(Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance No.

83.516, Disaster Assistance)

William C. Tidball,

Associate Director, Response and Recovery

Directorate.

[FR Doc. 96–13016 Filed 5–22–96; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6718–02–P

FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS

AUTHORITY

Notice of Oral Argument and

Opportunity To Submit Amicus Curiae

Briefs

AGENCY: Federal Labor Relations

Authority.

ACTION: Notice of oral argument and

opportunity to submit briefs as amici

curiae in a proceeding before the

Federal Labor Relations Authority in

which the Authority is required to

interpret and apply 5 U.S.C. 7116(a) (1)

and (3).

SUMMARY: The Federal Labor Relations

Authority gives notice that it is

scheduling oral argument and providing

an opportunity, pursuant to 5 CFR

2429.9 and .26, for all interested persons

to submit briefs as amici curiae on

significant issues arising in a case

pending before the Authority. The

Authority is considering this case

pursuant to its responsibilities under

the Federal Service Labor-Management

Relations Statute, 5 U.S.C. 7101–7135

(1994) and its regulations set forth at 5

CFR part 2423 (1996). The proceeding

concerns the extent to which an agency

is obligated to furnish facilities and

services, under 5 U.S.C. 7116(a) (1) and

(3), to a labor organization that is

seeking to represent the agency’s

employees.

ORAL ARGUMENT: The Authority will

hold oral argument at 10:00 a.m. on

Wednesday, July 10, 1996, in the

Second Floor Agenda Room, 607 14th

Street, NW., Washington, D.C. 20424–

0001. Only the parties to the case will

be provided an opportunity to be heard

at oral argument, and attendance at the

oral argument will be limited because of

space constraints. Persons interested in

attending the oral argument should

notify the Office of Case Control by 5

p.m. on Friday, July 5, 1996. Telephone:

FTS or Commercial (202) 482–6540.

BRIEFS: Briefs submitted in response to

this notice will be considered if

received by mail or personal delivery in

the Authority’s Office of Case Control by

5 p.m. on Friday, June 28, 1996. Placing

submissions in the mail by this deadline

will not be sufficient. Extensions of time

to submit briefs will not be granted.

ADDRESSES: Mail or deliver briefs to

James H. Adams, Acting Director, Case

Control Office, Federal Labor Relations

Authority, 607 14th Street, NW., Suite

415, Washington, D.C. 20424–0001.

FORMAT: All briefs shall be captioned

‘‘Social Security Administration,

Baltimore, Maryland, Case No. 3–CA–

10859, Amicus Brief’’ and shall contain

separate, numbered headings for each

issue discussed. An original and four (4)

copies of each brief must be submitted,

with any enclosures, on 81⁄2×11 inch

paper. Briefs must include a signed and

dated statement of service that complies

with the Authority’s regulations

showing service of one copy of the brief

on all counsel of record or other

designated representatives. 5 CFR

2429.27 (a) and (c). The designated

representatives are: Elaine Kaplan,

National Treasury Employees Union,

901 E Street, NW., Washington, D.C.

20004; Laurence Evans, Office of the

General Counsel, Federal Labor

Relations Authority, 1525 22nd Street

NW., Suite 400, Washington, D.C.

20037; Charles A. Hobbie, American

Federation of Government Employees,

AFL–CIO, 80 F Street, NW.,

Washington, D.C. 20001; and Ed Novak,

Social Security Administration, West

High Rise Building, Room G–I–10, 6401

Security Boulevard, Baltimore, MD

21235.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

James H. Adams, Acting Director, Case

Control Office, Federal Labor Relations

Authority, 607 14th Street, NW., Suite

415, Washington, D.C. 20424–0001,

Telephone: FTS or Commercial (202)

482–6540.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The case

presenting the issues on which oral

argument will be heard and amicus

briefs are being solicited is before the

Authority on remand from the United

States Court of Appeals for the District

of Columbia Circuit. The Authority’s

decision that was reviewed by the court

is Social Security Administration, 45

FLRA 303 (1992). The court’s decision

is NTEU v. FLRA, 986 F.2d 537 (D.C.

Cir. 1993). Copies of these decisions

will be provided, upon request, by mail

or facsimile. However, the following

summary is offered.

Non-employee organizers of the

National Treasury Employees Union

(NTEU) sought a permit from the Social

Security Administration (SSA) to

distribute literature on the public

sidewalks of SSA’s headquarters

complex at Woodlawn, Maryland. The

headquarters complex, including the

sidewalks, is the property of the General

Services Administration (GSA) but,

pursuant to a delegation of authority, is

managed by SSA. At the time of its

permit request, NTEU had not filed a

petition seeking to represent any of

SSA’s employees at the Woodlawn

complex. SSA denied the request. NTEU

alleged that, by the denial, SSA violated

5 U.S.C. 7116(a) (1) and (3).

The Authority determined that SSA,

whose employees were exclusively

represented by the American Federation

of Government Employees, did not

violate either 5 U.S.C. 7116(a)(3) or, in

turn, 5 U.S.C. 7116(a)(1), when it denied

NTEU’s request for a permit. Instead,

the Authority concluded that SSA

would have violated 5 U.S.C. 7116(a)(3)

if it had granted the permit.

The court found that the Authority’s

application of section 7116(a)(3) raised

Constitutional concerns. Accordingly,

the court remanded the case to the

Authority to consider whether an

alternative construction of the Statute

can be fashioned that avoids the First

Amendment implications raised by the

Authority’s original decision. In

particular, the court directed the

Authority to determine whether the

sidewalks and other outside areas of

SSA’s Woodlawn complex constitute

SSA’s ‘‘facilities,’’ within the meaning

of section 7116(a)(3). Following the

court’s remand, the Authority remanded

the case to the Regional Director for

development of a sufficient record.

Social Security Administration, 47

FLRA 1376 (1993), reconsideration

denied, 48 FLRA 539 (1993).

In light of the court’s order on

remand, the Authority invites interested

persons to address, inter alia, the

following questions. Certain of the

questions (1–3) are based specifically on

the court’s decision remanding the case.

In view of the court’s more general

direction that the Statute be construed

to avoid Constitutional concerns,

question 4 examines whether and how

the approach suggested by the court

would apply to hypothetical cases

varying certain facts presented in this

case. Questions 5 and 6 concern

alternative approaches to the one

suggested by the court to resolve the

issues present in this case. Questions 7

and 8 pose more general questions

regarding the correct interpretation of

section 7116(a)(3). The last question

asks how resolution of the issues under

section 7116(a)(3) affects whether SSA

also violated section 7116(a)(1) of the

Statute by interfering with rights of nonemployee organizers to conduct

organizing activity.

Interested persons are invited to

respond to any or all of the following

questions:

1. If the Authority were to conclude,

as the court suggests, that SSA was not
25872 Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 101 / Thursday, May 23, 1996 / Notices

acting as an employer but instead was

acting as GSA’s ‘‘building manager’’

when it denied NTEU’s request for a

permit, then what, if any, would be the

effect of Authority precedent holding

that a non-employer agency can be

found to have interfered with protected

rights on the issue of whether SSA

violated the Statute? See Headquarters,

Defense Logistics Agency, Washington,

D.C., 22 FLRA 875, 883–84 (1986).

2. Is it relevant and, if so, how is it

relevant whether non-labor

organizations have been granted access

to the areas for which NTEU sought the

permit?

3. Is it relevant and, if so, how is it

relevant that the ‘‘facilities’’ to which

NTEU sought access were external,

quasi-public areas?

4. If GSA were the employing agency

at the Woodlawn complex and NTEU

were seeking a permit for purposes of

organizing GSA employees, how would

the Constitutional concerns identified

by the court be avoided by the

‘‘facilities’’ analysis it suggested?

5. The Authority, relying on the ruling

announced in Department of the Army,

United States Army Natick Laboratories,

Natick, Mass., 3 A/SLMR 193 (1973)

(Natick), has interpreted section

7116(a)(3) as prohibiting an agency from

allowing a rival union, lacking

equivalent status to an incumbent labor

organization, access to the agency’s

facilities and services. How and why

would such access always constitute

unlawful sponsorship, control, or

assistance under section 7116(a)(3)?

6. Is the approach used by the

predecessor to the Authority, the

Federal Labor Relations Council, to

resolve similar issues under Executive

Order 11491, as amended, more

consistent with the Statute than the

approach set forth in Natick? The

Council’s approach analyzed whether

the agency conduct constituted control

of, or interference with a union’s

independence. See Grissom AFB, 6

FLRC 406 (1978).

7. Is the portion of section 7116(a)(3)

that refers to furnishing customary and

routine services and facilities an

exception to the prohibition on

sponsorship, control, or assistance of a

labor organization or are there any

situations where it creates a requirement

that such services and facilities be

furnished? For example, in order to

avoid ‘‘sponsoring’’ an incumbent labor

organization, would an agency be

required under any circumstances to

furnish ordinary facilities and services

to a rival?

8. What meaning should be attributed

to the phrase ‘‘having equivalent status’’

in section 7116(a)(3)?

a. Should this term be applied

differently depending upon whether the

employees in the agency from whom

assistance is sought are represented by

a labor organization?

b. Does an agency violate section

7116(a)(3) by furnishing, or failing to

furnish, facilities and services to all

nonincumbent labor organizations on an

impartial basis?

c. Should the Authority reconsider its

precedent that ‘‘a petitioning union

acquires equivalent status for the

purposes of section 7116(a)(3) when an

appropriate Regional Director

determines, and notifies the parties, that

the petition includes a prima facie

showing of interest and merits further

processing[]’’? U.S. Department of

Defense Dependents School, Panama

Region, 44 FLRA 419, 425 (1992).

9. If the Authority were to conclude

on remand that section 7116(a)(3) did

not require SSA to reject NTEU’s

request for a permit, would:

a. Section 7116(a)(3) require that SSA

grant NTEU’s permit request?

b. SSA’s denial of the permit to

NTEU’s non-employee organizers

violate 5 U.S.C. 7116(a)(1)?

c. it result in manifest injustice to

hold SSA liable for a violation of either

section 7116(a)(3) or section 7116(a)(1)

based on approaches not previously

articulated?

Dated: May 20, 1996.

For the Authority.

James H. Adams,

Acting Director, Case Control Office.

[FR Doc. 96–13043 Filed 5–22–96; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6727–01–P

FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION

[Docket No. 96–11]

Haewoo Air & Shipping Co., Ltd. (d/b/

a Haewoo Shipping Co., Ltd.); Possible

Violations of Section 10(b)(1) of the

Shipping Act of 1984; Order of

Investigation

Haewoo Air & Shipping Co., Ltd.

d/b/a Haewoo Shipping Co., Ltd.

(‘‘Haewoo’’) is a non-vessel-operating

common carrier located in Seoul, Korea.

Haewoo maintains a tariff on file with

the Commission which provides for

service between various Asian countries

and the United States.

A review of Haewoo’s tariff showed

that it contained only one commodity

rate in addition to Cargo, N.O.S. rates.

A review of invoices and freight

payments for shipments moving under

Haewoo bills of lading from June 5,

1994, to January 19, 1995, indicated that

Haewoo did not charge the rates

contained in its tariff. On February 3,

1995, additional commodity rates were

filed by Haewoo in its tariff.

Section 10(b)(1) of the Shipping Act

of 1984 (‘‘1984 Act’’), 46 U.S.C. app.

1709(b)(1), provides that no common

carrier may charge, demand, collect, or

receive greater, less, or different

compensation for the transportation of

property or for any service in

connection therewith than the rates and

charges in its tariffs. In regard to the

activities of Haewoo, it appears that

Haewoo charged less than its applicable

tariff rates for the transportation of at

least 36 shipments between June 5,

1994, and January 19, 1995, in violation

of section 10(b)(1) of the 1984 Act.

Section 11 of the 1984 Act, 46 U.S.C.

app. 1710, sets forth the Commission’s

authority to investigate violations of the

1984 Act. In the event violations are

found, section 13 of the 1984 Act, 46

U.S.C. app. 1712, provides that the

Commission may assess civil penalties

and suspend tariffs as remedies for

violations of section 10(b)(1). Section

14(a) of the 1984 Act, 46 U.S.C. app.

1713(a), empowers the Commission to

issue orders relating to violations of the

1984 Act.

Now therefore it is ordered, that

pursuant to sections 10, 11, 13 and 14

of the 1984 Act, an investigation is

hereby instituted to determine:

1. Whether Haewoo violated section

10(b)(1) of the 1984 Act by charging,

demanding, collecting, or receiving

greater, lesser, or different

compensation for the transportation of

property or for any service in

connection therewith than the rates and

charges that are shown in its tariffs;

2. Whether, in the event Haewoo

violated the 1984 Act, civil penalties

should be assessed against Haewoo and,

if so, the amount of such penalties;

3. Whether, in the event violations are

found, an appropriate cease and desist

order should be issued; and

4. Whether, in the event violations are

found, Haewoo’s tariff should be

suspended for a period of time not to

exceed 12 months.

It is further ordered, That a public

hearing be held in this proceeding and

that this matter be assigned for hearing

before an Administrative Law Judge

(‘‘Presiding Officer’’) of the

Commission’s Office of Administrative

Law Judges in compliance with Rule 61

of the Commission’s Rules of Practice

and Procedure, 46 CFR 502.61. The

Hearing shall include oral testimony

and cross-examination at the discretion

of the Presiding Officer only after

consideration has been given by the

parties and the Presiding Officer to the

use of alternative forms of dispute