UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ) REGINALD L. MCCOY, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 10-1973 (RLW) ) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, ) et al. ) ) Defendants. ) ) MEMORANDUM OPINION The Court, per Judge Emmet G. Sullivan, has vacated the orde r granting Plaintiff in forma pauperis status and has required full payment of the filing fee in this action by March 1, 2011. Order, ECF No. 14. Plaint iff now moves to Court to eith er permit supplementation of his complaint or to reconsider its vacation orde r. Motion Requesting Permission for Leave to Supplement Initial Complaint with Discussion of PLRA of 1996 and Reque st for Grant of IFP Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 15(d); in the Alternative, Motion for Reconsideration, ECF No. 18 [hereinafter Mot.]. This motion will be denied.

Plaintiff cites Federal Rule of Civil Proce dure 15(d) as the primary basis for his motion, proposing “to supplement initial complaint with di scussion of [the Prison Litigation Reform Act] of 1996 and request for grant of [ in forma pauperis ] status.” Id. at 1. That rule, which concerns supplemental pleadings, provides: “On motion a nd reasonable notice, the court may, on just terms, permit a party to serve a supplemental pl eading setting out any tran saction, occurrence, or event that happened after the date of the pleading to be supplemented.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d). A discussion of the Prison Litigation Reform Act—the provisions of which concerning actions in2 forma pauperis are codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1915—and a request to proceed in forma pauperis have nothing to do with claims made in a compla int. They are instead the proper subject only of motions to grant or rescind the in forma pauperis status of a plaintiff and related affidavits. See § 1915(a)(1)–(2). Plaintiff’s proposed suppl ementation would therefore not set out any transaction, occurrence, or event th at happened after the date of Plai ntiff’s complaint. Plaintiff’s motion to supplement under Rule 15( d) will therefore be denied. Alternatively, Plaintiff moves the Court to r econsider its decision to vacate the order granting Plaintiff in forma pauperis status. “While this Court has discretion to reconsider interlocutory orders, the Supreme Court has admonished th at ‘courts should be loathe to do so in the absence of extraordinary circumstances su ch as where the initial decision was clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice.’” In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig. , No. 99-mc-197, 2000 WL 34230081, *1 (D.D.C. July 28, 2000) (quoting Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp. , 486 U.S. 800, 817 (1988) (internal quotation omitted)). “Thus, in light of the need for finality in judicial decision-making, a court shou ld grant a motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory order only when the movant demonstrat es (1) an intervening ch ange in the law; (2) the discovery of new evidence not previously available; or (3) a clear error of law in the first

order.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). Plaintiff attempts to demonstrate this third point. First, Plaintiff argues that he does qualify for the imminent-danger exception to the threestrikes rule of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g): “This is a hostile Unit an d poses imminent danger of serious physical harm and injury at any time. Cell mates kill and assault each other daily.” Mot. at 2. Assuming arguendo the truth of Plain tiff’s statement, it has nothing to do with Plaintiff’s claim. The imminent-danger exception only applies where “the action is connected to the imminent danger.” Alston v. F.B.I. , No. 09-cv-1397, 2010 WL 4313686, *2 (D.D.C. Nov. 2, 2010).3 Plaintiff’s action under the Freedom of Informa tion Act (FOIA) is wholly unconnected to the generalized allegations of danger Plaintiff allegedly faces in prison. See Compl., ECF No. 1. In other words, whether Defendants improperly withhe ld records in response to Plaintiff’s FOIA request bears no relation to whether Plai ntiff faces danger from prison violence. Second, Plaintiff argues that th e three-strikes rule contrave nes Congressional intent to permit the indigent to proceed in forma pauperis : “[T]o rely on the ‘t hree strike’ rule and disregard Congress’ original inte nt for meritorious claims is to denigrate the wisdom of the legislation.” Mot. at 5. But the Court need not attempt to divine the intent, much less the wisdom, of Congress in this case, because the text of th e legislation is clear: Litigants who have accumulated three strikes by repeatedly filing claims that are frivolous, that are malicious, or upon which no relief may be granted, no longer enjoy the privilege of filing another claim without prepayment of filing fees. § 1915(g); Qi-Zhuo v. Meissner , 70 F.3d 136, 140 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“Where . . . the plain language of the statute is clear, the court gene rally will not inquire further into its meaning.”). Third and finally, Plaintiff contends that the three-strikes provision is unconstitutional because it “violates Plaintiff [sic] right to access to the court.” Mo t. at 2. But application of the three-strikes provision does not“divest[] a prisoner of hi s right to bring a claim.” Ibrahim v. District of Columbia , 208 F.3d 1032, 1036 (D.C. Cir. 2000). Rath er, it “merely specifies that, after having three times filed suits or appeals that were dismissed on one of the enumerated grounds, a prisoner must pay his ow n way like any other litigant.” Id. Plaintiff’s motion for

reconsideration will therefore be denied in a separate order to issue this April 7, 2011.

/s/ ROBERT L. WIKLINS United States District Judge