2019 UT App 189

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

Appellee,

v.

RYAN ANDREW GROVER,

Appellant.

Opinion

No. 20180378-CA

Filed November 21, 2019

Third District Court, Salt Lake Department

The Honorable Amber M. Mettler

No. 171911268

Teresa L. Welch and Dayna K. Moore, Attorneys

for Appellant

Sean D. Reyes and Thomas Brunker, Attorneys

for Appellee

JUDGE DAVID N. MORTENSEN authored this Opinion, in which 

JUDGES MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER and JILL M. POHLMAN

concurred.

MORTENSEN, Judge:

¶1 Around midnight, two cars raced down Little 

Cottonwood Canyon, doing 62 in a 40. An officer attempted to 

stop the drivers—one of whom was Ryan Andrew Grover—but 

Grover sped off while the other driver stopped and later gave

Grover’s name and phone number to the officer. The officer 

arrested Grover at his house the next day for failing to stop, and 

the jury convicted him. Grover contends that the evidence is 

insufficient to prove that he knowingly received the officer’s 

signal to stop. But Grover’s contention collides with the jury’s 
State v. Grover

20180378-CA 2 2019 UT App 189

reasonable inference that Grover indeed knew the officer was 

signaling for him to stop. We affirm.

BACKGROUND1

¶2 Around midnight on a fall evening, an officer was driving 

up Little Cottonwood Canyon when he saw two cars racing 

down the canyon toward him. Upon estimating that their speeds 

were 60 miles per hour (MPH) in the 40-MPH zone, the officer 

employed his radar gun and detected that Grover was driving 62 

MPH. Intending to stop the cars, the officer activated his 

emergency lights when the cars were about 150 feet in front of 

him. There were no other cars on the road. With the officer’s 

brightly flashing red and blue lights in the night’s dark sky, the 

second driver slammed on his brakes and pulled over about 

forty feet before reaching the officer. But Grover continued 

speeding. As Grover passed the officer, the officer heard Grover 

rev his engine and estimated that Grover accelerated to about 75 

MPH. The officer made a U-turn and pursued Grover, but he 

had to discontinue his chase due to a department policy against 

pursuing fleeing suspects in the canyons at dangerously high 

speeds.

¶3 The officer then returned to the other driver’s car to 

investigate. After some questioning, the driver indicated that 

Grover was his friend and agreed to tell the officer who Grover 

was, disclosing Grover’s name and phone number. The driver 

 

1. “When reviewing a jury verdict, we examine the evidence and 

all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light most 

favorable to the verdict, and we recite the facts accordingly. We 

present conflicting evidence only when necessary to understand 

issues raised on appeal.” State v. Tulley, 2018 UT 35, ¶ 4 n.1, 428 

P.3d 1005 (cleaned up).
State v. Grover

20180378-CA 3 2019 UT App 189

then asked, “Is there anything else I can do?” The officer 

responded, “[Y]ou should probably call your buddy and tell him 

to come back here.” The driver called Grover and told him that 

the officer was there and that he should come back, but Grover 

refused to return.

¶4 The next day, the officer went to Grover’s home. Upon 

arriving, the officer noticed the same car that he had seen the 

night before racing down the canyon now parked in the 

driveway. Grover answered the door, and the officer asked him 

why he did not stop the night before. Grover replied, “Was that 

you?” The officer confirmed that it was and again asked why 

Grover did not stop. Grover said he didn’t feel he was doing 

anything wrong. The officer countered by asking Grover why, if 

he had not done anything wrong, he did not stop. Grover replied 

this time, “I didn’t want to waste my time.”

¶5 The officer arrested Grover, and the State charged him

with one count of failure to respond to an officer’s signal to stop. 

At trial, the State called two witnesses—the other driver and the 

officer—who testified about these events. Defense counsel 

moved for a directed verdict, but the district court denied the 

motion. Grover neither called any witnesses nor did he testify. 

The jury convicted Grover, and he now appeals.

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶6 The lone issue on appeal is whether there was sufficient 

evidence for the jury to conclude that Grover knowingly 

received an officer’s signal to stop. “On a sufficiency of the 

evidence claim we give substantial deference to the jury.” State v. 

Ashcraft, 2015 UT 5, ¶ 18, 349 P.3d 664. “We review the evidence 

and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it in the 

light most favorable to the verdict of the jury.” State v. Nielsen, 

2014 UT 10, ¶ 30, 326 P.3d 645 (cleaned up). “We may reverse a 
State v. Grover

20180378-CA 4 2019 UT App 189

verdict only when the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently 

inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds 

must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant 

committed the crime of which he or she was convicted.” Id. ¶ 46 

(cleaned up).

ANALYSIS

¶7 In its case against Grover, the State had to prove that 

Grover knowingly received an officer’s signal to stop. State v. Bird, 

2015 UT 7, ¶ 26, 345 P.3d 1141. A person engages in conduct 

knowingly “when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or the 

existing circumstances . . . [or] when he is aware that his conduct 

is reasonably certain to cause the result.” Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-

103(2) (LexisNexis 2017). Grover contends that the jury’s verdict 

was based on speculation and unreasonable inferences. We 

disagree. 

¶8 “It is a well-settled rule that circumstantial evidence alone 

may be sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused.” Salt Lake 

City v. Carrera, 2015 UT 73, ¶ 11, 358 P.3d 1067 (cleaned up).

“[T]he difference between an inference and speculation depends 

on whether the underlying facts support the conclusion. A jury 

draws a reasonable inference if there is an evidentiary 

foundation to draw and support the conclusion.” Id. ¶ 12. “A 

jury’s inference is reasonable unless it falls to a level of 

inconsistency or incredibility that no reasonable jury could 

accept.” State v. Ashcraft, 2015 UT 5, ¶ 18, 349 P.3d 664 (cleaned 

up). We conclude that the jury reasonably inferred that Grover

was aware of the officer’s signal for him to stop.

¶9 Grover specifically argues that he could not have 

reasonably known that the officer intended for him to stop 

because the officer was traveling in the opposite direction, 

stopped another car, and did not contact him until the following 
State v. Grover

20180378-CA 5 2019 UT App 189

day. However, this ignores the significant countervailing 

evidence upon which the jury could reasonably base its 

inference.

¶10 Grover’s initial reaction indicated that he was aware of 

the officer’s signal for him to stop. As Grover passed the officer

with his brightly flashing emergency lights—something that 

would be very difficult not to notice on that dark night—Grover 

did not simply continue at his current, excessive speed. Instead, 

he accelerated so significantly that the officer heard his engine 

rev and estimated that Grover increased his speed to 75 MPH. 

This was approximately 13 MPH faster than Grover was driving

when the officer first turned on his lights and a total of 35 MPH 

over the speed limit. And even after the officer completed his 

U-turn and began to pursue him, Grover continued driving 

down the canyon at such a dangerously high speed that the 

officer had to cease his pursuit. These circumstances lead to a

reasonable inference that Grover saw the officer’s lights and was 

aware that a law enforcement officer was signaling for him to 

stop. Cf. State v. Lowe, 2005 ME 23, ¶ 12, 868 A.2d 168 (holding 

that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to infer that the 

defendant knowingly failed to stop despite an officer’s signal 

when the officer was going in the opposite direction, activated 

his lights, turned around to follow the defendant, and the 

officer’s emergency lights were visible in the defendant’s 

rearview mirror).

¶11 Grover’s later responses to the situation also provided 

evidence of his awareness that the officer signaled for him to 

stop. At the officer’s direction, the other driver called Grover on 

the phone and told him that the officer was there and that 

Grover should come back. But Grover refused to return. And the 

next day, when asked by the officer why he did not stop, Grover 

never claimed to be unaware of the officer or the meaning of his 

signal. Rather, Grover asked, “Was that you?” And only after 

being asked again, Grover said he did not feel he was doing 
State v. Grover

20180378-CA 6 2019 UT App 189

anything wrong and “didn’t want to waste [his] time” by

stopping. Grover’s claims of innocence conflict with the facts 

that he was driving 22 MPH over the speed limit initially and 

increased his speed to approximately 35 MPH in excess of the 

speed limit as he passed the officer’s flashing lights. Under these 

circumstances, a more reasonable inference—and the one the 

jury made—is that Grover was aware that the officer signaled for 

him to stop.

¶12 Even though Grover argues that the facts support an 

alternative inference—that he thought the officer was 

responding to an unrelated emergency—his argument 

incorrectly veers around our standard of review and the facts of 

this case. On a sufficiency of the evidence review, we consider 

whether no reasonable jury could infer what this jury did, not 

whether there is another plausible inference. Ashcraft, 2015 UT 5, 

¶ 18 (“A jury’s inference is reasonable unless it falls to a level of 

inconsistency or incredibility that no reasonable jury could 

accept.” (cleaned up)). Moreover, Grover’s suggested theory is

dubious under these circumstances. Again, Grover’s initial 

reaction was to accelerate and speed away from the officer in 

pursuit, rather than pull over and allow the officer to arrive 

more easily at the supposed unrelated emergency. And there 

was no evidence of any other cars on the road except the racers.

Nor was there any evidence of an unrelated emergency.

CONCLUSION

¶13 We hold that there is sufficient evidence to support the 

jury’s conclusion that Grover knowingly received the officer’s 

signal to stop, and we therefore affirm his conviction.