UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ DARNELL PITTMAN, SR., Petitioner - Appellant,

v. JACK FOX, Warden, Respondent - Appellee.

––––––––––––––––––– –––––––––––––––– DARNELL PITTMAN, SR, Petitioner - Appellant,

v. JACK FOX, Warden, Respondent - Appellee.

––––––––––––––––––– –––––––––––––––– DARNELL PITTMAN, SR., Petitioner - Appellant,

v. JACK FOX, Warden, Respondent - Appellee.

––––––––––––––––––– –––––––––––––––– DARNELL PITTMAN, SR., No. 18-1178 (D.C. No. 1:17- CV-02842-CMA) (D. Colo.)

No. 18-1180 (D.C. No. 1:17- CV-02319-CMA) (D. Colo.)

No. 18-1185 (D.C. No. 1:17- CV-02968-CMA) (D. Colo.) FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### April 3, 2019
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 Petitioner - Appellant,

v. JACK FOX, Warden, Respondent - Appellee. No. 18-1214 (D.C. No. 1:16-CV-02570-STV) (D. Colo.)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________ Before McHUGH , BALDOCK , and O’BRIEN , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ Darnell Pittman, Sr., a federal p risoner appearing pro se, seek s appellate review of the district court’s rulings and judgmen ts in four se parate cases arising under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. We have c ombined the appeals for dispo sition only. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a), an d construing Pittman’s pro se fi lings liberally, see Yang v. Archuleta , 525 F.3d 925, 927 n.1 (10th Cir. 2008), we affirm in each appeal. In No. 18-1078, we grant Pittman’s application to proceed on appeal without prepayment of costs orfees.

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel ha s determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in t he determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is t herefore ordered submitted without oral ar gument. This order and judgme nt is not binding precedent, except under the doctr ines of law of the case, res j udicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, howev er, for its persuasive value c onsistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 a nd 10th Cir. R. 32.1.3 I. No. 18-1214 1 A. Background In 2016, Pittman filed a pro se § 2241 application for a writ o f habeas corpus against his warden, challenging a prison misconduct report he r eceived while incarcerated at a United States Penitentiary, Coleman I. Pittm an had a hearing before a disciplinary hearing officer (DHO), Aaron Rich, who found Pit tman had committed the charged offense. As a sanc tion, DHO Rich disallowed 27 day s of good conduct time (GCT) and 90 days of telepho ne privileges. In his applica tion, Pittman asserted there were due process violations at the disciplinary hearing, and he sought expungement of the misconduct repor t. The case wa s eventually assigned to Magistrate Judge Scott T. Varhola k and was fully briefed by Feb ruary 2017. 2 In August 2017, Pittman filed a pe tition for a writ of mandamus in this court seeking to expedite the resoluti on of his habeas case. In October 2017, Magistrate J udge Varholak decided to appoint c ounsel for Pittman pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3 006A, and he set the matter fo r an evidentiary hearing. The magistrate judge det ermined that on the record th en before the court, he could not resolve a factual dis pute whether prison officials ha d forged Pittman’s signature on a form containing a handwritten waiver of his righ ts to have a staff

1 We address these appeals in o rder of analytical convenience.

2 The parties consented to the m agistrate judge conducting all p roceedings in the case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).4 representative and to present a witness at the prison disciplin ary hearing, and whether any constitutional due process vi olation resulting from the all eged failure to obtain a valid waiver of those rights was harmless. 3 An Assistant Federal Public Defender entered her appearance on Pittm an’s behalf later that month. In November 2017, the warden file d a Notice of Expungement of I ncident Report, suggesting the case had become moot because the miscond uct report had been removed from Pittman’s reco rd and his GCT credit had been restored. Through counsel, Pittman opposed the wa rden’s suggestion of mootness, a lleging the warden had not provided suffic ient documentation that Pittman’s GCT cr edit had been restored. A few weeks later, on January 2, 2018, a second Assi stant Federal Public Defender entered an appearance on behalf of Pittman. On Januar y 4, the warden filed documentation showing the GCT cr edit had been restored and expl aining why that did not result in a net reducti on in Pittman’s projected releas e date—he had lost more GCT in 2015 and 2016 and he had d ropped a GED cla ss, which redu ced the number of days of GCT he could earn. The same day, the parties filed a Stipulation of

3 Among those factual disputes w ere (1) the DHO’s declaration su bmitted in the case contained contradictor y statements about when and how Pittman’s alleged waiver was obtained, including th at he waived his rights when h e was presented with the notice of the hearing; howev er, the notice clearly indicate d Pittman wished to have both a representative and w itnesses; (2) the lack of any i ndication by the DHO how Pittman’s alleged “waiver came about or in what form—oral o r written—it was allegedly provided,” R., Vol. II at 15; (3) the lack of evidenc e authenticating a copy of the notice form that containe d an undated, handwritten waive r and a signature, neither of which were mentioned in the DHO’s declaration; and ( 4) the copy of the notice form Pittman had submitte d did not contain the handwritt en waiver and signature.5 Dismissal Without Prejudice pursu ant to Federal Rule of Civil P rocedure 41(a)(1)(A)(ii). In a minute orde r filed the next day, January 5, Magistrate Judge Varholak ordered the district c ourt clerk to close the case, no ting the parties had stipulated to dismissal of the c ase and stating that pursuant t o Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii), “no order of dismissal is nece ssary.” R., Vol. II at 69. On April 16, 2018, Pittman filed a pro se Motion for Reconsider ation Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Proce dure 60(b)(1). Pittman alleged t hat his court-appointed counsel acted without authority whe n she entered into the stipu lated dismissal without his knowledge or consent . Pittman then argued he was p rejudiced by counsel’s act because his curre nt release date had not been aff ected by the expungement of the incident repor t and the restoration of the 2 7 GCT days. He also challenged at length the historic calculation of his GCT credit s, disallowances, and forfeitures the warden had attached to hi s January 4 filing. Noting that Pittman was still re presented by counsel, the distr ict court struck the motion because it did not com ply with the court’s local rul e, D.C.COLO.LAttyR 5(a)(5), prohi biting litigants represented by c ounsel from filing documents pro se. The court also determined the motion did not comply with D.C.COLO.LCivR 5.1(a)’s require ment that “each pleading and doc ument filed in a civil action shall be formatted, signed, and filed electronical ly in CM/ECF as prescribed by the Electronic Ca se Filing Procedures,” and that an exception in those procedures for filings by unrepr esented prisoners did not apply to Pittman because he had counsel. The court instruct ed Pittman that if he wanted to challenge his sentence6 on grounds not raised in his § 2241 application, he had to file a separate action after exhausting administrative re medies. Pittman appeals.
B. Discussion 4 On appeal, Pittman argues Magist rate Judge Varholak abused his discretion in relying on the two local rules to strike the Rule 60(b)(1) moti on because the two Assistant Federal Public Defende rs who entered appearances on h is behalf were the magistrate judge’s former collea gues, and the three conspired t o mishandle Pittman’s case in retaliation for the manda mus petition he filed. Pittma n contends that because

4 The warden argues that we lack jurisdiction over this appeal b ecause Pittman filed his Rule 60(b)(1) motion mo re than three months after the district court’s minute order acknowledging the pa rties’ stipulated dismissal of the case, and therefore it was outside the 60-day period for filing a notice of appeal, see Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B)(iii) . The warden points to our case law exp laining that “when Rule 60(b)(1) is used to challe nge a substantive ruling by the district court, we have required that such a motion be f iled within the time frame requ ired for the filing of a notice of appeal,” Cashner v. Freedom Stores, Inc. , 98 F.3d 572, 578 (10th Cir. 1996), and where such a motion is not filed within that time fr ame, we lack “jurisdiction to cons ider the motion,” Gillon v. Bureau of Prisons , 393 F. App’x 550, 553–54 (10th Cir. 2010). This rule does not apply here, however, because in his Rule 60( b)(1) motion, Pittman did not challenge a substa ntive ruling by the district court. Instead, he asserted an argumen t we discussed in Cashner —that “an attorney in the litigation ha[d] acted without authority from a party.” Cashner , 98 F.3d at 576. We distinguished a Rule 60(b)(1) mo tion advancing th at sort of mis take—a mistake by the parties—from one requesting reconsideration of a judge’s “s ubstantive mistake of law or fact in the fin al judgment or order,” id. , and our relevant discussion concerned whether a Rule 60(b)(1) motion as serting a judicial mistake had to be filed within the time limit for taking an appeal, id. at 578. There is no indication in either Cashner , or in Gillon ’s nonbinding interpretation of Cashner , that a Rule 60(b)(1) motion asserting a party’s litigation mi stake, such as unauthorized at torney action, must be filed within the time frame for t aking an appeal in order to pr eserve appellate jurisdiction to review the dist rict court’s dis position of it.7 Magistrate Judge Varholak closed the case on January 5, 2018, h e was permitted to file the Rule 60(b)(1) motion pr o se based on a different local rule, D.C.COLO.LAttyR 15(g)(4)(B), sta ting that appointment of counse l terminates when a case is dismissed. We disagre e with each of these contention s. First, although Pittman contends t here is circumstantial evide nce of a conspiracy to compromise his cas e in retaliation for the mandam us petition he filed, he points to nothing other than the allegation that the magistr ate judge and the two appointed attorneys had previously worked together in the same office. This conclusory allegation, which sug gests Magistrate Judge Varholak was biased against him, is insufficient to raise h is accusation above mere specula tion, and we therefore reject it. See Leatherwood v. Allbaugh , 861 F.3d 1034, 1050 (10th Cir. 2017) (noting that “speculation, beliefs, c onclusions, innuendo, suspicion, o pinion, and similar non-factual matters” are “almostalways insufficient to establi sh bias” (internal quotation marks omitted)). More over, although Pittman may disp ute the resulting calculation of his release date, he obtained the relief he requ ested—expungement of the incident report and restorat ion of his GCT credits—which la rgely renders moot his claim of a conspiracy aga inst him or j udicial bias. Second, “[w]e review a district c ourt’s application of its loca l rules for abuse of discretion.” McInnis v. Fairfield Cmtys., Inc. , 458 F.3d 1129, 114 7 (10th Cir. 2006). We disagree with Pittman that the magistrate judge abus ed his discretion in relying on D.C.COLO.LAttyR 5(a)(5 ) and D.C.COLO.LCivR 5.1(a) ra ther than D.C.COLO.LAttyR 15(g)(4)(B). The last of these local rules pro vides that “[a]n8 attorney appointed under this rule shall represent the unrep resented party from the date of the Entry of Appearance until . . . the case is dismiss ed.” D.C.COLO.LAttyR 15(g)(4)(B) (em phasis added). But Pittman’s co unsel were not appointed under that local rule, which concerns the court’s Civ il Pro Bono Program,

see D.C.COLO.LAttyR 15(a). Counse l was appointed under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A. And an appointment under § 3006A does not end when a district c ourt case is dismissed or, in this instance, closed. See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(c) (“A person for whom counsel is appointed shall be represented at every stage o f the proceedings from his initial appearance before the United States magistrate judge or the court through appeal , including ancillary matters.” ( emphasis added)). We therefor e conclude that the magistrate j udge did not abuse his discretion in construing the local rules to prohibit Pittman’s pro se filing. Cons equently, we af firm the magistrate judge’s order striking Pittm an’s Rule 60(b)(1) motion.
II. No. 18-1178 A. Background In January 2016, while incarcerat ed at Coleman I, Pittman was i ssued an incident report charging him wi th threatening another with bodi ly harm. The report alleged as follows: A correcti onal officer making rounds notic ed the window in Pittman’s cell was covered with a towel. Pittman uncovered the window and began cursing and demanded to use the telephone. When the officer to ld him the telephone was in use elsewhere, Pittman b ecame more agitated and indicate d he would break the window and set off the fire suppression system. Pittman th en said, “Goodman9 isn’t a hard name to find, you think I can’t get to you? I’ll get to you and your family. You better check my pape rwork, you know what I’m back here for.” R. at 171 (internal quotation marks omitted). When the incident report was deli vered to Pittman, he denied ev er speaking to the officer, instead accusing the officer of coming to his “doo r talking shit to [him] about [another correctional officer].” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). On further investigation by the Un it Disciplinary Committee (UDC), Pittman was advised of his right s and given the opport unity to make a state ment to the investigating officer. He “state d he had no comment other than what he already said.” R. at 172. The UDC referred the matter to a DHO for a further hearing. Be fore the DHO hearing, Pittman was transferred from Coleman I to Coleman II ( they are both in the same complex), where he was issu ed an allegedly “manipulated ve rsion of the original UDC incident report,” R. at 7 (capitalization omitted) , and was led to believe the original UDC report, which i ncluded the names of two witnes ses he wanted to present at a disciplinary hearin g, had been lost. Pittman appe ared for a second UDC hearing, where he reiterated his request for the two witnesses and stated he could not identify those witnesses withou t staff assistance. The UDC aga in referred the matter to a DHO for further hearing. DHO Rich—the same DHO who held the disciplinary hearing leading to the case underlying appeal No. 18-12 14—held a hearing. According t o DHO Rich’s report, Pittman was given advan ce written notice of the charge (a copy of the incident10 report) and written notice of his rights at the hearing. Altho ugh Pittman initially asked to present two witnesses a nd for a staff representative t o assist him at the hearing, he waived both. He refu sed to sign a waiver but allow ed a prison staff member to sign it for him and i ndicated he was ready to proceed with the hearing. He denied the charge but prese nted no evidence. The DHO consid ered Pittman’s statement that he was not guilty but found the officer was spec ific in his testimony about the statements Pittman had made, and therefore found the greater weight of the evidence supported finding Pittman guilty of a lesser charge—be ing insolent to a staff member. The DHO therefor e disallowed 14 days of GCT and imposed other sanctions. In November 2017, while his fir st § 2241 was still pending befo re Magistrate Judge Varholak, Pittman filed a pr o se § 2241 application, clai ming the DHO hearing violated his Fifth Amendment due process rights. Pittman alleg ed as follows: At the hearing, Pittman informed DHO Ri ch that he was unwilling to pro ceed with the hearing without a staff represent ative and his witnesses, and h e requested another opportunity to obtain the names of those witnesses. DHO Rich t old Pittman that unless he provided the names of his witnesses, the hearing woul d go on. Pittman responded that it was not his fau lt the original UDC paperwork had been lost when he was transferred from Coleman I t o Coleman II, and that due to t he transfer, he had been separated from his witnesse s and required a staff represen tative to assist him in gathering them. DHO Rich denie d that request and proceeded wit h the hearing without obtaining Pittman’s consen t to do so in the absence of a staff representative11 and witnesses. Pittman asked the court to expunge his discipli nary conviction and restore his GCT credits. On February 17, 2018, M agistrate Judge Gordon P. Gallagher orde red the defendant warden to show cause w hy the § 2241 application shoul d not be granted. He further ordered “that within t wenty-one days of [the warden’ s] answer to the show cause order [Pittman] may file a reply.” R. at 85. He also en tered an order drawing the case to district judge Chris tine M. Arguello and Magistrate Judge Kathleen M. Tafoya. Pittman filed a motion objecting to the order drawing the case to Judge Arguello and Magistrate Judge Taf oya, claiming that was error. Pointing out that the § 2241 case he had before Magist rate Judge Varholak (i.e., the case underlying appeal No. 18-1214) had been termi nated within 12 months of the instant case, Pittman suggested the instant c ase should have been assigned to Magistrate Judge Varholak under D.C.COLO.LCivR 4 0.1(d)(1), which provides: “If an unrepresented party in a new case already has a case pending or had a case te rminated within 12 months of the new filing, the new case shall be assigned to the judicial officers who were assigned the earlier case.” Pittman also filed a motion r equesting an indeterminate extension of time to file a “Reply in Rebuttal to Respondent’s Order to Show Cause,” noting that he had a cast on his dominant hand, wh ich also had nerve damage, and that he had an even worse nerve problem in his othe r hand. Supp. R. at 5 (some cap italization omitted). Pittm an created both motio ns by cutting individual words from various sour ces and pasting them to a she et of paper.12 While those motions were pending, t he warden sought an extensio n of time to file his response to the show-cau se order, which the district c ourt granted. The court then struck Pittman’s motion obj ecting to the order drawing the case pursuant to D.C.COLO.LCivR 7.1(i), 5 and denied his motion for an extension of time to submit a reply, stating that the “Order to Show Cause applies to Respond ent only.” R. at 90. The warden filed his response on March 22, 2018. With the resp onse, the warden provided DHO Rich’s sworn declaration. In relevant part , DHO Rich testified that when Pittman elec ted to waive a staff representa tive and witnesses at the hearing but refused to sign that he had done so, DHO Rich wrote on the hearing notice form: “‘I request to waiv e the staff rep and witness. . . . [R]efused to sign but willing to waive.’” R. at 105 (quoting R. at 174). DHO Rich f urther testified that Lieutenant P. Burns, who was pres ent at the hearing as an escor t, “witnessed both statements via signature.” Id. ; see also R. at 174 (signature of “P. Burns” accompanying waiver signed by DHO Rich). The warden later subm itted a sworn declaration from Lieutenant Burns attesting to the same facts. Pittman filed two motions on Ma rch 30, 2018. In one, he sought leave to file a supplemental pleading in which h e again argued the case should be assigned to Magistrate Judge Varholak under D. C.COLO.LCivR 40.1(d)(1). In the other, he asked the court to reconsider its denial of his motion for an e xtension of time to reply to the warden’s answer, explaini ng that he was not seeking more time to file a reply

5 Under D.C.COLO.LCivR 7.1(i), the district court may strike a f iling that is “verbose, redundant, ungramm atical, or unintelligible.”13 to the show-cause order but to the warden’s response, and that although his cast had been recently removed, h e still had nerve dam age and lack of st rength in his hand. While those motions were pending , Pittman filed a reply to the warden’s response on April 12, which was 21 days afterthe warden file d his response to the show-cause order. Soon thereafter, the district c ourt summarily denied Pittman’s motions to file a supplemental pleading and to rec onsider granting an extension o f time to file a reply to the warden’s response. The d istrict court also declined to consider Pittman’s reply because the court found it untimel y. The court then denied the § 2241 application, crediting the warden’s evidence that Pittman had waived the opp ortunity to call witnesses and have a staff repres entative, and concluding that Pittman had put forth no evidence supporting his contra ry, conclusory assertion. Pit tman appeals.
B. Discussion 1. Motion regarding assignment of case We first address Pittman’s chal lenge to the district court’s de nial of his motion for leave to file a supplemental pleading arguing that his case should be assigned to Magistrate Judge Varholak. 6 Pittman contends his § 2241 action met the

6 In his opening brief, Pittman men tions that the district court struck his motion objecting to the order d rawing the case to Judge Arguell o and Magistrate Judge Tafoya based on D.C.COLO.LCi vR 7.1(i). But he has not ad vanced any argument that the district erred in doing so. He has therefore waived appellate review of that ruling. See Becker v. Kroll , 494 F.3d 904, 913 n .6 (10th Cir. 2007) (“An issue or argument insuffici ently raised in the opening bri ef is deemed waived.”).14 requirements of D.C.COLO.LCivR 40.1(d), thereby mandating reass ignment of his case to Magistrate Judge Varhol ak. He argues the district cour t’s failure to do so was prejudicial error because Magist rate Judge Varholak was familia r with the same alleged procedural irregulariti es surrounding the validity of P ittman’s purported waiver of his rights to have a st aff representative assist him and to present witnesses at the DHO hearing. He posits tha t because his case was not re assigned, the warden was able to submit new and allege dly false evidence in this cas e to better support the contention that he validly wai ved his rights at the hearing. 7
“We review a district court’s a pplication of its local rules fo r abuse of discretion.” McInnis , 458 F.3d at 1147. As Pittman points out, we have “recognized that local rules are binding in some circumstances.” Hernandez v. George , 793 F.2d 264, 266 (10th Cir. 1986). But we have “al so recognized that d istrict courts have discretion in applying local rules.” Id. On balance, we have concluded that “although district judges must fo llow local rules when adherenc e furthers the policies underlying the rules, they hav e discretion in applying and inte rpreting local rules.”
Id. at 267

7 Pittman also argues the distri ct court’s denial of his motion for leave to file a supplemental pleading was an abus e of the court’s discretion to allow supplemental pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(d). But bec ause he did not invoke Rule 15(d) in that moti on, we decline to consider it. See Daigle v. Shell Oil Co. , 972 F.2d 1527, 1539 (10th Cir. 1992) (“As a general rule we r efuse to consider arguments raised for the first ti me on appeal unless sovereign immunity or jurisdiction is in question.”).15 Pittman observes that the purpos e of a district court’s local rules is to facilitate the court’s operation. We agree . As we have stated, “[l]ocal rules are primarily housekeeping rules; their purpo se is to facilitate operation of the court.” Hernandez , 793 F.2d at 266. Local Rule 40.1( d) is clearly designed to aid judicial efficiency, not to confer any rights on an unrepre sented litigant regarding ass ignment of his case. But assuming, for the sake of ar gument, that it was more effici ent for Magistrate Judge Varholak to handle the case , the only harm was to the dis trict court, because it is beyond dispute that c ases must be decided on their own facts

. See, e.g. , Juarez v. Kennecott Copper Corp. , 225 F.2d 100, 102 (10th Cir . 1955) (“[E]ach case must stand upon its own facts[.]”) . The facts surrounding the valid ity of Pittman’s alleged waiver of his rights at the disci plinary hearing in each of the se two cases are materially different ( compare R. at 105, 174, 228, with supra , note 3), and Pittman had an equal opportunity in this case to advance arguments that his waiver was invalid. We therefore conclude t hat D.C.COLO.LCivR 40.1(d) did not require the district court to assign this c ase to Magistrate Judge Varholak , either at the time the order drawing the case to Judge Arguello and Magistrate Judge T afoya was entered, or at Pittman’s later urging. C onsequently, the district courtdid not abuse its discretion in denying Pittman’s m otion to file a supplemental p leading seeking reassignment.
2. Motions for extension o f time and to reconsider We next address Pittman’s challe nge to the district court’s den ial of his motion for an extension of time to rep ly to the warden’s response to t he § 2241 petition and16 his motion for reconsideration of that ruling. Whether these rulings were in error is moot because, as the warden con cedes, and we agree, Pittman’s r eply was filed within the 21-day time-limit the district court set in its orde r to show cause. The warden filed his response on Marc h 22, 2018, and Pittman filed his reply on April 12, exactly 21 days later. Conseque ntly, the district court erred in refusing to consider the reply because it was untimel y. We therefore proceed to con sider whether the district court’s refusal to cons ider the reply w as harmless. A nd as we will explain, we conclude that it was harmless , because even considering the reply, and further assuming Pittman was deprived of his due process rights at the hearing, Pittman fails to establish that staff represen tation or the testimony of his witnesses would have aided his defense or affected the outcome. Therefore, any due process violation was itself harmless. See Grossman v. Bruce , 447 F.3d 801, 805 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding that “errors made by prison offi cials in denying witness testim ony at official hearings are subject to harmless error review”).
3. Harmless error and the merits Federal inmates must be afforded due process before their GCT c an be revoked. Wolff v. McDonnell , 418 U.S. 539, 557 (1974); Howard v. U.S. Bureau of
Prisons , 487 F.3d 808, 812 (10th Cir. 2007). But “the full panoply of rights due a [criminal] defendant . . . does not apply” in prison disciplina ry proceedings resulting in the loss of GCT. Wolff , 418 U.S. at 556. Instead, such a proceeding satisfies due process if it affords the inmate (1) written notice of the viol ation at least 24 hours before the hearing, (2) an opportunity to call witnesses and pr esent documentary17 evidence (if consistent with ins titutional safety and correctio nal goals) to an impartial decision-maker, and (3) a writte n statement by the fact-finder of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action. Id. at 563–66, 571. Additionally, where an inmate is illiterate or the issues so complex that the inmate would likely be unable “to collect and present th e evidence necessary for an ad equate comprehension of the case,” he shoul d be allowed assistan ce from either anoth er inmate or a prison staff member. Id. at 570. Pittman argues the district cour t erred in finding he had not s ubmitted any evidence in support of his conclu sory assertion that he did not waive his rights to a staff representative and to pre sent witnesses. H e asserts that his § 2241 application adhered to the requirements of R ule 2(c) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, which can be made applicable to § 2241 applications, see Rule 1(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases (hereafter, H abeas Rule). In relevant part, Habeas Rule 2(c) directs that a habeas petition must “specify all the grounds fo r relief available to the petitioner,” Habeas Rule 2(c)(1) , and must “state the facts sup porting each ground,” Habeas Rule 2(c)(2). We need not resolve whether the d istrict court erred in deeming Pittman’s allegations regarding the waiver of his Wolff rights conclusory, or in determining that the warden’s evidence refuted those allegations. Instead, we w ill assume, for purpose of argument and without deciding, that Pittman was deni ed his due process rights to a staff representative and witnesses and turn the foc us to whether the record18 shows Pittman suffered prejudi ce as a result of the assumed due process violation. 8
See Howard , 487 F.3d at 813 (concluding tha t where prisoner failed to dem onstrate “how further testimony would have aided his defen se,” he suffer ed no prejudice, and any error in excluding testimony at disciplinary hearing “was h armless”); cf. Chesson v. Jaquez , 986 F.2d 363, 366 (10th Cir. 1993) (explaining, in a 42 U.S.C . § 1983 case, that a prisoner cannot maint ain a due process claim for f ailure to permit witness testimony unless he als o shows that the testimony “would have a ffected the outcome of his case”). In both his application and his reply to the warden’s response, Pittman provided only conclusory stateme nts regarding the putative test imony of the witnesses he would have present ed. In his § 2241 application, Pittman identified his two witnesses by name; one was his cell mate at th e time of the incident, and the other was housed in the neigh boring cell. He did not indicate what their testimony would be other than to say they would testify on his “behalf.” R. at 11. In his reply, he asserted that his “witnesses would have testified that [Pitt man made] no threatening or insolent comment( s) towards any staff.” R. at 2 12. But DHO Rich’s decision turned on the specific ity of the reporting officer’s a ccount of the incident. Without some specific details of the testimony the witnesses wo uld have provided, Pittman has not shown their test imony would have aided his defe nse or affected the

8 The district court did not rel y on this basis to deny Pittman’ s application, but we may “affirm on any ground for which there is a sufficient re cord to permit conclusions of law.” Grossman , 447 F.3d at 805 n.2.19 outcome of the proceeding. And on appeal, Pittman identifies o nly one role a staff representative would have filled—to obtain the witnesses. Cons equently, Pittman has not shown prejudice resulting from the assumed due process viol ation. We therefore conclude the district court’s failure to consider his reply was harmless, as was any due process violation.
III. No. 18-1180 A. Background In December 2015, while housed at Co leman I, Pittman was issued an incident report alleging he threatened ano ther with bodily harm. Accord ing to the report, Pittman refused to release his hand restraints and yelled at a correctional officer, “you’re fucking with the wrong one ,” “go ask Washburn about fuc king with me,” and “I’ll do to you the same thing I did to Washburn.” R. at 157 ( internal quotation marks omitted). After relinquish ing the hand restraints, Pittm an added, “You ain’t that big, go ahead and roll the door and come in the cell.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). When the incide nt report was delivered to Pitt man, he was advised of his right to remain silent, a nd he did not request any witne sses. He also denied the allegations against him, stating “I did not threaten that man, I said he was big and I give him what he is looking for .” R. at 158. The matter was r eferred to the UDC, where Pittman again denied the a llegations against him. The UD C referred the matter to a DHO with a recommenda tion that Pittman be sanctione d. The same DHO as in the two prev iously discussed cases, Aaron Ri ch, held a hearing on January 13, 2016. Acco rding to DHO Rich’s report, P ittman was given20 advance written notice of the c harge (a copy of the incident re port) and written notice of his rights at the hearing, a nd although Pittman initially as ked to present a witness and for a staff representative to assist him at the hearing, he waived both at the time of the hearing. The Notice of D isciplinary Hearing form shows Pittman had requested three witnesses, each o f whom would testify that “the officers came harassing inmate Pittman and Pi ttman never said anything to the m.” R. at 164 (some capitalization omitted). At the bo ttom of the notice is a hand written statement: “I request to waive the staff rep an d witness above,” accompanied by an illegible signature. Id. DHO Rich’s report provides furthe r details: Pittman indicated he was ready to proceed with the hearing, denied the charge, and stated the off icer was lying. DHO Rich considered Pittman’s allega tion that the reporting officerwas lying but found that “the staff members’ state ment and observations” were “more credible.” R. at 162 (capitalization and boldi ng omitted). DHO Rich found th e reporting officer’s observations more credible because they were “specific” and “ma de strictly in the performance of his duties.” Id. (capitalization and bo lding omitted). DHO Rich further found that the reporting officer had no reason to false ly accuse Pittman, whereas Pittman “had much to lose by accepting responsibility o r being truthful.” Id. (capitalization and bolding om itted). DHO Rich found the great er weight of the evidence supported finding Pittman had committed the offense of threatening another with bodily harm. He therefore d isallowed 27 days of GCT and i mposed 60 days of disciplinary segregation.21 In September 2017, wh ile his first case was still pending befor e Magistrate Judge Varholak, Pittman filed a § 2241 application asserting DH O Rich had violated his Fifth Amendment due process rights. He alleged he was not present for the disciplinary hearing and DHO Rich never notified or informed hi m why he was unable to attend the hearing. He also advanced a seemingly con tradictory allegation—that the prison’s sp ecial housing unit’s (SHU) staff visitor log book did not reflect that DHO Rich ever en tered the SHU, where Pittman w as housed, between January 10 and January 16, 2018, s o “[i]t would have been virtu ally impossible for [him] to have conducted a hear ing” in the SHU on January 13. R . at 7. Pittman further alleged he had requested staff representation and sever al witnesses, but he was not given an opportunity to pr esent his witnesses or favora ble documentary evidence. On January 15, 2018, Magistrate Judge Gallagher ordered the war den to show cause within 21 days why the § 22 41 application should not be g ranted. He further ordered “that within twenty-one d ays of [the warden’s] answer t o the show cause order [Pittman] may file a reply .” R. at 136. The same day, M agistrate Judge Gallagher entered an order dra wing the case to Judge Arguello a nd Magistrate Judge Tafoya. The warden filed a response on Fe bruary 5, 2018, exactly 21 day s after the show-cause order was filed. Wit h the response, the warden prov ided a sworn declaration from DHO Rich. In re levant part, DHO Rich explaine d that during disciplinary hearings, he require s all inmates to be restrained “for fundamental22 correctional reasons.” R. at 148 n.2. He stated that because Pittman’s hands were restrained behind his back, DHO Rich wrote the phrase indicatin g Pittman waived witnesses and a staff representative. Pittman then signed his name while his hands were still restrained behind hi s back, which accounted for the difference in the signature’s appearance from Pi ttman’s normal signature. DHO Ri ch also explained that in weighing the evidence, i t was not just Pittman’s word a gainst the reporting officer’s word, “but . . multiple staff mem bers corroborated t he reporting staff member’s statement.” R. at 149. 9 Per the court’s order, Pittman’s optional reply was due on February 26, 2018. He did not file a reply by that date, but he did make two filin gs before that date, both of which were composed in a cut- and-paste fashion. The first w as a letter to the district court clerk stating that his hand was in a cast and th at although it was no longer broken, the doctors were keeping him casted to “punish” him and “stop [his] suit speech protest.” R. at 166. He did not request any speci fic relief, and there is no court ruling regarding it. Pitt man’s second filing prior to th e due date for his optional reply was a “Motion Re questing Relief,” in which he as ked the court to summarily grant him relief due t o the warden’s alleged failure to timely file the response to the show-cause order. R. at 169. He noted he had not received any notification that the court had granted an extension of time to file a response to the

9 In support of that expl anation were two mem os completed by oth er staff members bearing the date of the incident and setting forth corr oborating statements. See R. at 159, 160.23 show-cause order. He also explai ned that since December 14, 20 17, he had been physically unable to access the court due to his broken hand, a nd prison officials had repeatedly denied him an opport unity to inform the court of tha t fact. The district court denied the motion, finding the warden’s response was time ly filed. After the due date for his repl y had passed, Pittman filed two motions identical to those he filed in the case underlying appeal No. 18-1178. T he first asked that the case be assigned to Magistrate Ju dge Varholak pursuant to D.C.C OLO.LCivR 40.1(d)(1). The second requested a n indeterminate extension of time to file a reply “in Rebuttal to Respondent’s Orderto Show Cause,” noting that he still had a cast on his dominant hand, which also ha d nerve damage, and that he had an even worse nerve problem in his other ha nd. R. at 174. The district cour t struck the order seeking reassignment pursuant to D.C.COLO.LCivR 7.1(i), and it denied the motion for an extension of time, stati ng that the “Order to Show Cause applies to Respondent only.” R. at 176. Pittman later filed two more mo tions that also were identical t o motions he filed in the case underlying appe al No. 18-1178: a motion for leave to file a supplemental pleading, arguing th at the case shoul d be assigned to Magistrate Judge Varholak, and a motion asking the court to reconsider its denia l of his motion for an extension of time to reply to th e warden’s answer. In yet anot her motion filed in early April 2018, he sought leav e to file a motion for equitabl e tolling of the deadline for his reply to the warden’s re sponse. In his attached propos ed motion for equitable tolling, he argued that his broke n, casted hand had prevented h im from completing24 and filing documents in this c ase, and that in December 2017, p rison officials (1) falsely represented that the y had informed the court of thi s fact and (2) had denied his request for assistance in fi ling motions and grievances “wi thout explanation.” R.
at 190. On April 6, 2018, while those th ree motions were pending, Pittm an filed a reply to the warden’s response to the show-cause order. Pittma n attached a copy of the SHU staff visitor log book for the month in which his heari ng was held. Soon thereafter, the district c ourt summarily denied Pittman’s pending motions for leave to file a supplemental pleading, reconsideration of a n extension of time to file a reply to the warden’s r esponse, and leave to file a moti on requesting equitable tolling. The district court dec lined to consider the reply Pit tman filed because the court found it untimely. In the same order, the district court also denied the § 2241 ap plication on the merits. It first rejected Pittm an’s assertion that DHO Rich de nied him the right to be present at the disciplinary hear ing. The court noted Pittman h ad provided no documentary evidence to support hi s allegation that the SHU sta ff visitor log book did not show DHO Rich had entered the SHU on the date of the he aring. The district court found the warden had prese nted “far more than the requisi te ‘some evidence’” that Pittman was present at th e hearing. R. at 231. The court then detailed that evidence: (1) DHO Rich had testified in his declaration that P ittman was present for the entire hearing; (2) DHO Rich ’s report, which was written wi thin one week of the hearing, clearly stated he had v erbal exchanges with Pittman an d quoted Pittman as25 saying the accusing officer had li ed; and (3) Pittman’s signatu re appeared after DHO Rich’s revision to the Notice of Discipline Hearing waving witn esses and a staff representative, and DHO Rich testi fied that Pittman had asked h im to make that revision at the hearing. The c ourt concluded it had no reason, nor had Pittman suggested any reason, “to believe that DHO Rich’s testimony and the accompanying documentary evidence [was] not credible.” Id. The court next credited the ward en’s evidence that at the heari ng, Pittman had waived the opportunity to call wi tnesses and have a staff repre sentative. The court found that the Notice of Disci pline Hearing form confirmed DHO Rich’s testimony that Pittman asked h im to write the waiver on the bottom of the form and then signed it, because the form contained “a hand-written revision in blue ink” stating “‘I request to waive the staff rep and witness above,’” and Pittman ’s signature appeared below that “in a different handw riting style and in black ink.” R. at 232 (quoting R. at 148). The court concluded that the record therefore refu ted Pittman’s “conclusory assertion that he wa s denied the opportunity to cal l witnesses and have a staff representative,” reiterate d that it had no reason to doub t DHO Rich’s credibility or the supporting evidence, and adde d that “[t]here is unquesti onably ‘some evidence’ to support DHO Rich’s conclusion.” R. at 232–33. Pi ttman appeals.
B. Discussion 1. Motion regarding transfer of case We first address Pittman’s chal lenge to the district court’s de nial of his motion for leave to file a supplemental pleading arguing that his case should be assigned to26 Magistrate Judge Varholak. 10 That motion and the propos ed supplemental pleading were identical to those he filed in the case underlying appeal No. 18-1178, and as in that case, the district court summarily denied the motion. Lik ewise, the substance of his appellate challenge to the de nial of that motion is materia lly identical to the argument he raised in appeal No . 18-1178. We therefore reject it for the same reasons set forth in our dis cussion in No. 18-1178.
2. Motions for extension of time and to reconsider We next consider Pittman’s cha llenge to the district court’s or ders denying his motion for an extension of time to file a reply and his motion for reconsideration of that denial. Our review is for a buse of discretion, taking int o consideration the relevant procedural “rule and the facts before the district cou rt.” Rachel v. Troutt , 820 F.3d 390, 394 (10th Cir. 2016). “A district court abuses i ts discretion when it renders a judgment th at is arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, ormanifestly unreasonable,” or where it “exceed ed the bounds of permissible choice, given the

10 In his opening brief, Pittman men tions that the district court struck his motion objecting to the order d rawing the case to Judge Arguell o and Magistrate Judge Tafoya based on D.C.COLO.LCi vR 7.1(i). But he has not ad vanced any argument that the district erred in doing so. He has therefore waived appellate review of that ruling. See Becker , 494 F.3d at 913 n.6 (“ An issue or argument insufficiently raised in the ope ning brief is deemed waived.”). Pittman also argues the district court’s denial of hi s motion for leav e to file a s upplemental pleading was an abuse of the court’s discreti on to allow supplemental pleadi ngs under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(d). But b ecause he did not invoke Rule 1 5(d) in that motion, we decline to consider it. See Daigle , 972 F.2d at 1539 (“As a g eneral rule we refuse to consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal unles s sovereign immunity or jurisdiction is in question.”).27 facts and the applicable l aw in the case at hand.” Carter v. Bigelow , 787 F.3d 1269, 1278 (10th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). Alth ough “[i]t is preferable that the district cour t set forth its reasons for de nying a motion that calls for the exercise of its discre tion[,] . . . a failure of explan ation is harmless when the record reveals the apparent rea son or reasons justifying the de nial.” Hill v. SmithKline Beecham Corp. , 393 F.3d 1111, 1116 (10th Cir. 2004). Pittman contends the district c ourt’s rationale for denying Pit tman’s motion for an extension of time to file a re ply—that the court’s show-caus e order “applie[d] to Respondent only,” R. at 176—rest s on a misunderstanding that he wanted more time to reply to the show- cause order itself rath er than to the ward en’s response to it. But the court’s alleged confusion is understandable given that Pitt man’s request for more time to file a reply contained a grammatical error—he asked formore time to “reply in rebuttal to Respondent’s Order to Show Cause,” R. at 174 (emphasis added) (some capitalization omitted). “Respondent ” refers to the warden, bu t it was the court that issued the show-cause order, not the warden. Based on the ambi guity Pittman’s grammatical error introduced, it was within the bounds of permi ssible choice in the circumstances, and therefore not a n abuse of discretion, for th e district court to construe the motion as seeking an extension of time to reply to the court’s show-cause order and to deny it on the basis that the court had ordered only the warden to respond to the show-cause order. Pittman next argues that the distr ict court’s summary denial of his motion for reconsideration of his motion fo r an extension of time violates the spirit of Federal28 Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b)(1) , which governs extensions of ti me “for good cause.” He argues that having a broke n writing hand constituted good ca use. We need not reach that issue, however, because in neither motion did Pittma n specify how long of an extension he required. He th erefore failed to comply with t he district court’s local rule requiring a motion for an e xtension of time to state, amon g other things, “the length of the requested extensi on,” D.C.COLO.LCivR 6.1(b). We therefore see no abuse of discretion in the distr ict court’s denial of the motio n for reconsideration, even though the court gave no reason for doing so. See Hill , 393 F.3d at 1116 (“[A] failure of explanation is harmle ss where the record reveals the apparent reason or reasons justifying the denial.”). 3. Equitable tolling Pittman claims the district cour t should have granted his moti on for leave to file a motion for equitable to lling because, in denying his mot ion for an extension of time to file his reply, “the cour t refused to allow [him] an op portunity to file a rebuttal response,” thereby lead ing him to believe that filing his § 2241 application was “all that would be required by him.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 11 (capitalization omitted). In support, Pittman rel ies on the Supreme Court’s te aching that equitable tolling may be appropriate “where the court has led the plainti ff to believe that she had done everything required of her.” Baldwin Cty. Welcome Ctr. v. Brown , 466 U.S. 147, 151 (1984) (per cur iam). We disagree. The distr ict court’s rationale for denying Pittman’s motion for an extension of time to file h is reply, discussed above, does not suggest t he court would have refused either a t imely reply or a29 motion for an extension of time to reply filed before Pittman’s response was due. Pittman filed neither. We therefo re see no abuse of discretion in the district court’s summary denial of Pittman’s moti on for leave to file a motion f or equitable tolling. See Hill , 393 F.3d at 1116.
4. Merits Having concluded the district c ourt did not abuse its discreti on in denying Pittman’s various efforts to ga in additional time to file his r eply, we now turn to Pittman’s arguments on the merits . “When reviewing the denial of a habeas petition under § 2241, we review the distr ict court’s legal conclusions de novo and accept its factual findings unless clearly erroneous.” al-Marri v. Davis , 714 F.3d 1183, 1186 (10th Cir. 2013). We first consider Pittman’s cha llenge to the district court’s determinations that the warden had present ed “far more than th e requisite ‘some evi dence’” that Pittman was present at the hearing, R. a t 231, and that Pittman had pre sented no documentary evidence to support his allegatio n that the SHU staff visitor l og book did not show DHO Rich had entered the SHU on th e date of the hearing. Pittm an argues that because Habeas Rule 2(c) only re quires a habeas applicant to “s tate the facts supporting each ground [for relief], ” the applicant is not requ ired to present documentary evidence, but only to “state facts that point to a real possibility of constitutional error,” Mayle v. Felix , 545 U.S. 644, 655 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). But 28 U.S.C. § 2248 provides that allegations set out in “an answer to an order to show cause in a habeas corpus proceeding, if not traversed , shall be30 accepted as true except to the ex tent that the judge finds from the evidence that they are not true.” § 2248 (empha sis added). Although Pittman subm itted the staff visitor log book with his reply, the dis trict court did not consider it because the court found, correctly, that Pittman’s reply was untimely. Pittman points t o nothing else that might “traverse[]” the allegations in the warden’s response to the show-cause order regarding whether the DHO held a hearing at which Pittman was p resent. Therefore, § 2248 permitted the district cour t to “accept as true” the war den’s allegations unless the court found “from the eviden ce” they were “not true.” § 22 48. The district court effectively accepted the warden ’s allegations by finding no rea son to disbelieve DHO Rich’s testimony that Pittman wa s present for the entire hearin g and the supporting documentary evidence the warden had submitted. Regarding his waiver of a staff representative and witnesses, Pittman argues the district court applied a too lenient, “some evidence” stand ard when it stated there was “unquestionably ‘some eviden ce’ to support DHO Rich’s concl usion.” R. at 233. The court drew this standard from Superintendent, Massac husetts Correctional Institution v. Hill , 472 U.S. 445 (1985), where the Supreme Court held that “revocation of good time does notcomport with the minimum requ irements of procedural due process unless th e findings of the prison discip linary board are supported by some evidence in the record,” id. at 454 (emphasis a dded) (citation and internal quotation marks omitte d). Pittman claims the districtcourt was instead required to assess whether proc edural due process was satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence.31 We need not decide which standard applies because the district court’s reference to “some evidence” be ars no discernable relationship to the court’s analysis of the waiver issue. At the conc lusion of that analysis, the c ourt said there was “‘some evidence’ to support DHO Rich’s conclusion .” R. at 233 (emphasis added). But DHO Rich expressed no “conclu sion” regarding the waiver’s v alidity; he merely provided factual testimony. The “ some evidence” standard would have clearly applied to an analysis of DHO Ri ch’s determination that Pittman had committed the charged violation. Pittman, how ever, did not contest the resul t of the hearing, so the court never performed such an ana lysis. Therefore, the referen ce to “some evidence” at the conclusion of the court’s waiver analysis is at most a m isstatement. At the very least, the reference does not show the district court erre d in crediting the warden’s evidence or in determin ing that the evidence refuted P ittman’s conclusory assertions regarding his waiver. We discern one additional merits argument in Pittman’s opening brief. He suggests the allegations in his § 2241 application, which he si gned under penalty of perjury, squarely contradicted t he warden’s evidence concerning the fact of the hearing and would have warranted a judgment in his favor after an evidentiary hearing. Aplt. Opening Br. at 3 . We construe this as an argum ent that the district court should have held an evide ntiary hearing, which, in his § 2241 application, Pittman suggested was necessary . But “[c]onclusory allegations will not suffice to warrant a hearing,” Andrews v. Shulsen , 802 F.2d 1256, 1266 (10th Cir. 1986), and the allegations in Pittman’s § 2241 application concerning whet her a hearing32 occurred were conclusory allega tions that Pittman attempted to bolster by declaring them in a sworn pleading. Furth ermore, Pittman never indicated what testimony at an evidentiary hearing would ha ve provided. “District courts a re not required to hold evidentiary hearings i n collateral attacks without a firm idea of what the testimony will encompass and how it will support a movant’s claim.” United States v. Cervini , 379 F.3d 987, 994 (10th Cir. 2004) . We therefore reject his ar gument that the district court should have held an evidentiary hearing.
IV. No. 18-1185 A. Background In March 2016, while housed at C oleman I, Pittman was issued an incident report alleging that he threaten ed another with bodily harm. T he report stated that while a correctional officer wa s making rounds, Pittman stopped him and said, “you guys think you’re safe but when I have my guys meet you in the parking lot you’ll see! . . . “[Y]ou have down time you need to go on the computerand check out Heartless Felons Ohio, you’ll se e what we do! SIS don’t have m e here for no reason and as long as you have children you’re valuable!” R. at 113. The report noted that “Heartless Felons Ohio is one o f the largest organized threat g roups in the state prison system. It’s built on ex tortion and violence, using its might to commit slayings, robberies, home invasi ons, [and] drug and gun sales.” Id. When the report was delivered to Pittman, he was advised of his right to remain silent and he requested no witnesses. The ma tter was referred to the UDC, wh ere Pittman asserted33 that he “did not threaten anyone,” id. The UDC referred the matter to the DHO and recommended “appropriate sanctions.” Id. DHO Wendy White held a disciplinar y hearing. According to the DHO’s report, Pittman indicated he had no documentary evidence to pre sent, but he requested witnesses and a staff representative. He denied the charge, stating it was “a lie” and the reporting officer knew it was “a lie.” R. at 1 10 (capitalization omitted). “He asked me if I’ve done state time and I told him how things go down in the state joint vs. the federa l system. I didn’t stop him at m y door. He stopped as I was talking to an inmate at my door and he asked me why I was s o angry.” Id. (capitalization omitted). Pittman ’s first witness was an inmat e who stated that he saw the officer come to the door of Pittman’s cell and “start on Mr . Pittman about writing [the officer] up,” and that he di d not hear Pittman make any th reatening comments or say anything about the Heartless Felons Ohio. Id. (capitalization omitted). The second witness, yet another inma te, who was apparently housed i n a cell across the hall from Pittman, stated that t he officer was speaking to Pitt man “respectfully” and “asked him if he had ever been t o a certain prison before.” Id. (capitalization omitted). “Pittman an swered him and they w ere just talking res pectfully. . . . I know he didn’t say anything threatening.” Id. (capitalization omitted). The staff representative, who spoke with P ittman prior to the hearing and was present for the entire hearing, made no comments on Pittman’s behalf. DHO White considered Pittman’s de nial but gave greater weight t o the officer’s account because he was clear and sp ecific in his repo rt, and Pittman’s34 credibility was suspect based on his history of the same charge and his “pattern of refusing to accept re sponsibility during D HO hearings,” and bec ause he had “much to lose by accepting responsibility o r being truthful.” R. at 111 (capitalization omitted). DHO White found the officer to be more credible because his obs ervations were made in the line of duty, he ha d no reason to make false accusa tions against Pittman, and Pittman had not provided any evidence that the officer “con spired to falsely accuse [Pittman].” Id. (capitalization omitted). DHO White believed the first inmate witness did not hear the entire conversation because Pittman cl aimed he told the officer about the Heartless Felons Ohio as he was explaining th e differences between the state and federal systems, but the witness stated he never heard anything said about that group. The DHO believe d the other inmate witness th ought it was a respectful conversation because voices were not raised, or beca use he did not hear the entire conversation due to poor acoustics in the SHU, which wou ld make it hard for an inmate across the hall to hea r everything Pittman was saying without raising his voice. Consequently, DHO White f ound Pittman guilt y of “conduc t which disrupts, . . . most like threatening a nother with bodily harm.” Id. (capitalization omitted). She disallowed 27 days of GCT and imposed other sanctions. In December 2017, while his first case was still pending before Magistrate Judge Varholak, Pittman filed a § 2241 application, asserting a Fifth Amendment due process violation and alleging DHO White was not an impartial d ecision-maker but misrepresented the testimony. P ittman alleged that at the hear ing, he told the DHO the charging officer first asked him why he had filed a grievan ce against the officer,35 next asked if Pittman had ever s pent time in state prison, and then asked why Pittman was so angry. Pittman claimed h e told the DHO he answered thos e questions by saying that he did not want to d iscuss the grievance he had fil ed against the officer, that he had spent time in stat e prison, and that if the officer called “exercising my grievance exhaustion being angry , I don’t have an answer for yo ur third question.” R. at 7 (capitalization omitted). Pittman further alleged he t old DHO White the officer had fabricated the char ges in retaliation for filing th e grievance less than a week earlier, but when he provide d a copy of the grievance to t he DHO, she said she would not need it because Pittman would not be able to prove th e officer fabricated the charge due to the na ture of the grievance. Pittman also alleged that his sec ond inmate witness made it cle ar he observed the entire encounter and, cont rary to the DHO’s account of that testimony, the witness said “that the chargi ng officer’s tone of voice was hos tile,” R. at 9 (capitalization omitte d). Pittman asserted the DHO did not que stion either witness and excused them without allowi ng Pittman’s staff representativ e to question them, and she formed her opinion that h is first inmate witness did no t hear the entire conversation without affording th e witness a chance to testify about such an opinion. Pittman further denied ever sta ting to the DHO that he discusse d with the charging officer the differences between t he state and federal systems o r that he told the charging officer to look up the H eartless Felon gang. Pittman faulted the DHO for saying “voices were not raised” because she was not present. R . at 12 (internal quotation marks omitted).36 Magistrate Judge Gallagher ordere d the warden to show cause why the § 2241 application should not be grant ed. He further ordered “that wi thin twenty-one days of [the warden’s] answer to the show cause order [Pittman] may file a reply.” R. at 87. The same day, Magistrat e Judge Gallagher entered an ord er drawing the case to Judge Arguello and Ma gistrate Judge Tafoya. Pittman then filed the same cut -and-paste motion he filed in tw o of the other cases discussed above, requesting an indeterminate extension of time to file a reply “in Rebuttal to Respondent’s Orderto Show Cause” due to his ha nd injury. R. at 88. The district court denied that motion, stating, as it did in th e other two cases, that the “Order to Show Cause applies to Respondent only.” R. at 90. The warden filed his response to t he § 2241 application on Marc h 19, 2018. Pittman then filed two motions i dentical to motions he filed in two of his other cases: a motion for leave to file a suppl emental pleading, arguing tha t the case should be assigned to Magistrate Judge Var holak, and a motion asking the court to reconsider its denial of his motion for an e xtension of time to reply to t he warden’s answer. While those motions were pending , Pittman filed his reply to th e warden’s response on April 12, 2018, which was 24 days after the response was fil ed and therefore beyond the 21-day court-set deadline. Soon thereafter the district cour t denied Pittman’s § 2241 appl ication and his pending motions for leave to file a supplemental pleading and f or reconsideration of an extension of time to file a re ply. The district court decli ned to consider the reply Pittman filed because the court found it to be untimely. On th e merits, the court37 construed Pittman’s lone due-pro cess claim as asserting that DH O White discounted the testimony of Pittman’s witne sses and introduced her own spe culation. The court concluded this did not violate Wolff ’s requirement that a pr isoner “should be allowed to call witnesses and present doc umentary evidence in his defen se,” 418 U.S. at 566. The court found it undisputed t hat DHO White received testimony from Pittman’s witnesses and concluded that Wolff did not require DHO White “to credit all testimony received.” R. at 152. The court further dete rmined that “some evidence” supported DHO White’s assessment of the witnesses’ testimony be cause she clearly explained why she did not cred it their testimony—it “could not be reconciled with [Pittman’s] own admissions and w ith the physical space in which they allegedly overheard the incident.” Id. The court noted Pittman had not alleged how DHO White erred in assessing “the wit nesses’ testimony” or “why herassumptions were flawed.” Id. The court’s ultimate conclusion was that the record refuted P ittman’s “conclusory assertion that he wa s denied . . . his due process rights at the hearing.”
R. at 152–53.
B. Discussion 1. Motion regarding transfer of case We first address Pittman’s chal lenge to the district court’s de nial of his motion for leave to file a supplemental pleading in which he argued th at his case should be38 assigned to Magistrate Judge Varholak. 11 That motion and the proposed supplemental pleading were identi cal to those he filed in the c ase underlying appeal No. 18-1178, and as in that case , the district court summarily denied the motion. Furthermore, the substance of h is appellate challenge to the de nial of that motion is materially identical to the argum ent he raised in appeal No. 18 -1178. We therefore reject his challenge for the subs tantially the same reasons setforth in our discussion in No. 18-1178 and for the add itional reason that the main thru st of Pittman’s argument for assignment to Magis trate Judge Varholak—that he wa s familiar with the warden’s alleged e ffort to falsely claim Pittman had waived his rights to a staff representative and witnesses—is absent from this case, where Pi ttman was represented by a staff member and presented witnesses.
2. Motions for extension of time and to reconsider We next consider Pittman’s cha llenge to the district court’s or ders denying his motion for an extension of time to file a reply and his motion for reconsideration of that denial. Those motions and th e court’s orders denying them are materially

11 Although Pittman states the dist rict court struck this motion, the district court denied it. See R. at 153. (“FURTHER ORDERED t hat Applicant’s Request for Leave to File Supplemental Pleadi ng (Doc. # 15) is DENIED.”). Pittman’s misstatement is apparently based on his confusion of this motio n with the motions objecting to the case-assignment orders he filed in two of the other cases presently under our consideration, both of w hich the district court struc k. He did not file such a motion in this case. He also a rgues the district court’s den ial of his motion for leave to file a supplemental pl eading was an abuse of the court ’s discretion to allow supplemental pleadings under Fede ral Rule of Civil Procedure 15 (d). But because he did not invoke Rule 15(d) in tha t motion, we decline to conside r it. See Daigle , 972 F.2d at 1539 (“As a general rule we refuse to consider argu ments raised for the first time on appeal unless sove reign immunity or jurisdiction is in question.”).39 identical to those filed in the case underlying appeal No. 18-1 180. Likewise, the substance of his appellate challe nge to the denials of those mo tions is materially identical to the argument he rai sed in appeal No. 18-1180. We therefore reject his challenge for the same reasons s et forth in our discussion in N o. 18-1180 and for the additional reason that his moti on regarding the supplemental pl eading and his motion for reconsideration totaled ei ght neatly handwritten pages and were filed on March 30, 2018, almost two week s prior to the court-set deadlin e for his optional reply (which itself was only el even neatly handwritten pages), thus undermining his contention that he needed more ti me to file his reply due to co ntinued difficulty writing. 12
3. Merits As noted above, in reviewing the denial of a § 2241 application , “we review the district court’s legal c onclusions de novo and accept its f actual findings unless clearly erroneous.” al-Marri , 714 F.3d at 1186. “[T]he re quirements of due process are satisfied if some evidence supports the decision by the [DH O] to revoke good time credits,” Hill , 472 U.S. at 455, and if “the d ecisionmaker [is] impartial,” Gwinn v. Awmiller , 354 F.3d 1211, 1219 (10th Cir . 2004). Importantly, determini ng whether some evidence supports t he DHO’s decision “does not req uire examination of the entire record, independen t assessment o f the credibility of witnesses, or

12 Pittman also argues the district court erred in denying his mo tion for equitable tolling, but he did notfile such a motion in this ca se or raise an argument for equitable tolling in any ot her filing. We therefore do notaddress his argument on this point.40 weighing of the evidence. Inste ad, the relevant question is wh ether there is any evidence in the record that could supp ort the [DHO’s] conclusion.” Hill , 472 U.S. at 455–56 (emphasis added). Pittman takes issue with the distr ict court’s view that he fail ed to allege how the DHO erred in assessing the w itnesses’ testimony or why her assumptions were wrong. He points to the allegati on in his § 2241 application t hat DHO White misrepresented the second inmate witness’s testimony about the officer’s tone of voice (i.e., respectful vs. hos tile). He also a sserts the DHO misrepresented his own statement at the hearing. We se e no reversible error because “ [t]here was some evidence supporting the [DHO’s] finding, and it is not our job to address the validity of that evidence.” Mitchell v. Maynard , 80 F.3d 1433, 1445 (10th Cir. 1996). Pittman complains he was never placed on notice that his witnes ses would have to explain why they were ab le to hear the conversation, an d he faults the DHO for not asking any questions of th e witnesses. He argues the D HO had no basis to make findings regarding what the witnesses were able to hear wi thout asking them about it, and that her determinat ion about what they were or we re not able to hear is evidence of bias. But Pittman was given the opportunity to pre sent his witnesses, and our role “is limited to wheth er the three steps mandated by Wolff were followed and whether there was some evidence to support the disciplinary [de cision.]” Id. ; see also Taylor v. Wallace , 931 F.2d 698, 701 (10th Cir. 1991) (“Wolff does not require the confrontation and cross-exam ination of witnesses in prison disciplinary proceedings.”). Furthermore, the DHO made factual and credibil ity findings based41 on the witnesses’ testimony and, a s she explained in her sworn declaration submitted with the warden’s response, herexperience with the prison’s ac oustic environment. Those are tasks for a factfinder. See Miller v. Eby Realty Grp. LLC , 396 F.3d 1105, 1112 (10th Cir. 2005) (“One of th e primary roles of the factfin der is to assess credibility in deciding how to vi ew the evidence.”). We theref ore reject Pittman’s contention that DHO White was biased. See Tonkovich v. Kan. Bd. of Regents , 159 F.3d 504, 518 (10th Cir. 1998) (“[B]ecause honesty and inte grity are presumed on the part of a tribunal, there must be some substantial count ervailing reason to conclude that a decisionmaker is actually biased with respect t o factual issues being adjudicated.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Finally, Pittman suggests the d istrict court should have held an evidentiary hearing. But Pittman never move d for an evidentiary hearing, a nd unlike the case underlying appeal No. 18-1180, h e never suggested in any of his timely filings that an evidentiary hear ing was necessary. 13 He has therefore forfei ted his argument that the court should have held one. See Fairchild v. Workman , 579 F.3d 1134, 1144 (10th Cir. 2009) (explaining th at a § 2254 movant “is required to properly request an

13 In his reply to the warden’s re sponse to the show-cause order, Pittman suggested an evidentiary hearin g was necessary. The reply, how ever, was untimely, and the district court pr operly disregarded it.42 evidentiary hearing in the distr ict court, because we ordinaril y do not decide issues raised for the first time on appeal”). 14
V. Conclusion We affirm the district court’s judgments in Nos. 18-1178, 18-11 80, and 18-1185, and we affirm the distric t court’s order striking Pitt man’s Rule 60(b)(1) motion in No. 18-1214. In No. 18- 1178, we grant Pittman’s appl ication to proceed on appeal without prepayment of c osts or fees, and we remind Pi ttman of his obligation to pay the full amoun t of those costs and fees. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (excusing only prepayment of costs and fees).

Entered for the Court

Bobby R. Baldock Circuit Judge

14 Even if we considered the argum ent preserved, Pittman only sai d he “would be able to present evidence . . . that would clearly expose” th e DHO’s bias. R. at 140 (capitalization omitted). That is insufficient to merit an evi dentiary hearing. See Cervini , 379 F.3d at 994 (“Dist rict courts are not r equired to hold ev identiary hearings in collateral attacks wi thout a firm idea of what the testimony will encompass and how it will s upport a movant’s claim.”).