UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

_______________________________________ ) MARY E. CHAMBERS, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 14

- 2032 (RBW) ) DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ) ) Defendant. )

_____________________ __________________)
MEMORANDUM OPINION The plaintiff, Mary E. Chambers, brings this civil action against the defendant, the District of Columbia (the “ District”) , alleging that she was unlawfully discrimi nated against on the basis of her gender and retaliated against for filing a charge of discrimination against the District with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) in 2011 , in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) , 42 U.S.C. §§ 2 000e

– 2 to

– 17 (201 2 )

. See Second Amended Complaint (“ 2d Am. Compl.”) at 1, 8

– 10

. 1 Currently before the Court is the Defendant’ s Motion for Summary Judgment (“Def.’ s Mot.”) . Upon careful consideration of the parties’ submissions, 2 the Court concludes for the following reasons that it must grant the District’s motion for summary judgment

.

1 The plaintiff also alleges that she was s ubjected to a hostile work environment. See 2d Am. Compl. at 1 & ¶¶ 1 2, 18

. However, on April 6, 2017, the Court dismissed the plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim with prejudice “because the allegation of other facts consistent with the [ Second Amended Compl aint] could not possibly cure the [failure to exhaust administrative remedies].” Chambers v. District of Columbia , 249 F. Supp. 3d 66, 71 (D.D.C. 2017) (Walton, J. ) (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, the Court need not add ress the plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim because, as the District notes, “th[is] claim is not part of this litigation.” Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of the District of Columbia’s Motion for Summary Judgment (“Def.’s Mem.”) at 9 n.4.

2 In addition to the filings already identified, the Court considered t he following submissions in rendering its decision: (1) the District of Columbia’s Statement of Material Facts as to Which There is N o Genuine Dispute (contin ued . . .)2 I. BACKGROUND At all relevant times, t he plaintiff was employed as a Support Enforcement Specialist in the Interstate Unit of the Child S upport Services Division at the Dist rict’s Office of the Attorney General. See 2d Am. Compl. ¶ 3. The plaintiff alleges that during her employment, the Office of the Attorney General discriminated against her based on her sex [ ], and retaliated against her because she opposed [the] Distri ct[’s] . . . discriminatory employment practices ” in a number of
ways. Id. ¶ 10. S he claims that (1) “a male co

- worker, who had communication and performance issues with customers, was not disciplined, while [she] . . . was disciplined because she had fi led a [prior] charge of employment discrimination with the EEOC” in August 2010 , id. ; (2) the District allegedly “permit t [ ed ] male employees to transfer to other departments

. . . [,] but denied [the] [p]laintiff

. . . the same opportunity to transfer , ” i d

. ; (3) the District “permit t [ ed] male employees to . . . receive incentive awards and special awards[,] but denied [the] [p]laintiff

. . . the same opportunity . . . to receive incentive awards and special awards , ” i d. ; ( 4 ) the District

“ assigned [the] [p] laintiff .

. . an excessive amount of cases compared to other employees in the unit , ” i d. ; ( 5 ) when she “ was away from the office [on medical leave] . . . [between] O ctob er 2011 [and] February 2012 [,] . . . [the] District[’s] . . . Family Medical Leave Act [(“FMLA”)] Coordinator, Tarifah Coaxum[,] willfully delayed the processing of [the] [p]laintiff [’s]

. . . medical leave , ” i d. ¶ 1 2 ; (6) the Distric t “ failed and refused to allow [the] [p]laintiff . . . to transfer to the other unit to alleviate the stress that she was experiencing , ” i d. ¶ 1 3 ; (7) the

(. . . continued) (“Def.’s Facts”); (2) Plaintiff Mary Elizabeth Chambers ’ [ s] Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant District of Columbia’s Motion for Summary Judgment (“Pl.’s Opp’n”); (3) Plaintiff Mary Elizabeth Chambers’ [s] Statement of Material Facts as to Which There is a Genuine Dispute (“Pl.’s D isputed Facts”); (4) Plaintiff Mary Elizabeth Chambers’ [s] Statement of Material Facts as to Which There is N o Genuine Dispute (“Pl.’s Undisputed Facts”); (5) Defendant District of Columbia ’s Reply Memorandum (“Def.’s Reply”); and (6) the Defendant’s Response to [the] Plaintiff’s Statement of Material Facts as to Which There is N o Genuine Issue (“Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Facts”).3 District “refus [ed] to authorize the performance of a desk audit f or her [ ] Support Enforcement Specialist position , ” i d. ¶ 1 4 ; and (8) the District “continued its discrimination and retaliation against her b y willfully failing and refusing to properly process her pay checks

. ” Id. ¶ 1 5; see also i d. ¶ 1 6

. On March 4, 2011, the plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC , claiming that she was “discriminated against based on [her] sex [ ] and reta liated against.” Def.’s Mot., Exhibit (“Ex.”) 6 ( Charge of Discrimination No. 570

- 2011

- 00598 ) at 1

. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that (1) a male co

- worker who “had weekly communication problems and performance issues with customers” was not discip lined, but when she had a “single incident with a customer,” she “was suspended for [four] days ” ; (2) this same male co

- worker was granted a transfer to another department , while the plaintiff was “ d enied [a] transfer in the past ” ; and (3) her “caseload wa s taken from [her] and [she] was reassigned to another unit without being given proper training

. ” I d. , Ex. 6 (Charge of Discrimination No. 570

- 2011

- 00598 ) at 1

. On November 20, 2014, the plaintiff initiated this civil action

. 3 Complaint at 1. Thereaft er, the Court granted the Distr ict’s motion to dismiss “ the plaintiff’s claims of discrimination based on her age

. . . because the plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies

. . . , a deficiency that cannot be cured ,” Chambers v. District of Columbia ( Chambers
I ) , 249 F. S upp. 3d 66, 72 (D.D.C. 2017), but dismissed without prejudice “ the plaintiff’s claims of retaliation

. . . because the plaintiff failed to plead a prima facie case ,” id. On June 23, 2017, the plaintiff filed her Second Amen ded Complaint, see 2d Am. Compl . at 1, and after discovery

3 The pla intiff ’ s original c omplaint named the District of Columb ia Office of the Attorney General and Irvin Nathan, in his prior official capacity as the Attorney General of the District of Columbia , as the defendants , and was filed in the United States District Court for the District of M aryland

. See Compl aint at 1. After the case was transferred to this Court, the plaintiff amended her complaint and named only the District as the defendant

. See Amended Complaint at 1. Although the plaintiff initially represent ed herself, she is now represented by counsel.4 concluded on May 29, 2018, see Min. Order (Apr. 18, 2018), the District filed its motion for summary judgment, which is the subject of this Memorandum Opinion.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A court may grant a Rule 56 motion for summar y judgment only if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A fact is material if it ‘might affect the outcome of the suit under t he governing law,’ and a dis pute about a material fact is genuine ‘if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’” Steele v. Schafer , 535 F.3d 689, 692 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, I nc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986 )). When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, “[t]he evidence of the non

- movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in [her] favor.” Anderson , 477 U.S. at 255. “Credibility determinations, th e weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge . . . ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Id. The movant has the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and that the n on - moving party “fail[ed] to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). In respond ing to a motion for summary judgment, the non

- moving party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 586 (19 86). Accordingly, unsupport ed allegations or conclusory statements are not sufficient to defeat summary judgment, see Ass ’ n of Flight Attendants

- CWA v. U.S. Dep ’ t of Transp. , 564 F.3d 462, 465

– 66 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. FDA , 185 F.3d 898, 908 (D.C. Ci r. 1999) (“[C] onclusory5 allegations unsupported by factual data will not create a triable issue of fact.” ( citations and internal quotation marks omitted) ), and the non

- moving party “must set forth specific facts showing that the re [are] genuine issue[s] f or trial , ” Anderson , 477 U.S. at 256

. Therefore, “ [t] he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [non

- moving party’s] position [is] insufficient” to withstand a summary judgment motion ; rather, “there must be [some] evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [non

- movant].” Id. at 252.
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS The District argues that “summary judgment in favor of the District is appropriate[] ” because (1) “[the] [p]laintiff failed to exhaust her administr ative remedies,” and ( 2 ) “[n]o jury coul d find that the District violated Title[] VII by not giving [the] [p]laintiff a lateral transfer.” Def. ’ s Mot. at 1. 4 In response, the plaintiff argues that “ [t]here are numerous genuine material facts that are in dispute

. ” Pl.’s Opp’n at 1 . H owever, the plaintiff’s opposition to the District’s motion for summary judgment is “strikingly deficient

. ” Richardson v. D.C. Dep ’ t of Youth

4 The Di strict also argues that “[the] [p]laintiff has no factual support for her [ 42 U.S.C. § ] 1981(a) claim

. ” Def.’s Mot. at 1. However, although the Court previously misconstrued the plaintiff’s Amended Complaint as alleging a violation of subsection (a) of § 1981 due to an oversight , see Chambers I , 249 F. Supp. 3d at 67 n.1, it seems that the plaintiff is not bringing a claim under subsection (a) of § 1981, but rather, “is pursuing the damages provided for by 42 U.S.C. § 1981a

— a separate section of the [Unit ed States] Code that allows a complaining party to recover compensatory and punitive da mages under certain circumstances against a respondent who engages in unlawful intentional discrimination,” Charles v. District of Columbia , 164 F. Supp. 3d 98, 100 (D.D .C. 2016), aff’d sub nom. Charles v. D.C. Dep’t of Youth Rehab. Servs. , 690 F . App’x 14 (D.C. Cir. 2017); see Dyson v. District of Columbia , 808 F. Supp. 2d 84, 88 n.5 (D.D.C. 2011) (“[The] defendant confuses [42 U.S.C. §] 1981a with 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a), w hich is an entirely different statute prohibiting discrimination in the making a nd enforcement of contracts. . . . Section 1981a, on the other hand, provides remedies for claims brought under certain sections of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, including Title VI I.”); compare 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (“All persons within the jurisdiction of t he United States shall have the same right in every State

. . . to make and enforce contracts, . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens

. ”) , with id. § 1981a (“In an action brought . . . against a [defendant] who engaged in unlawful intentional discrimin ation[,] . . . the complaining party may recover compensatory and punitive damages.”). Therefore, the Court need not address w hether the plaintiff is entitled to damages under § 1981 a b ecause , as discussed later in this Memorandum Opinion, no ne of the plaintiff ’ s claims alleged in the Second Amended Complaint survive summary judgment

.6 Rehab. Servs. , 271 F. Supp. 3d 113, 116 (D.D.C. 2017)

. 5 Notably, the plaintiff fa ils to respond to any of the arguments advanced by the District in its motion for summary judgme nt , but rather relies on factually unsupported conclusory assertions as support for her legal arguments , 6 which

are insufficient to survive summary judgment

. S ee Greene v. Dalton , 164 F.3d 671, 675 (D.C. Cir. 1 999) (“Because [the plaintiff ’ s] claim [under Title VII] rest[ed] entirely upon a conclusory representation, the district court was right to dismiss it.”). 7 Notwithstanding these deficiencies ,

5 Interestingly, t he plaintiff in Richardson was represented by the same attorney who represents the p laintiff in this case. See 271 F. Supp. 3d at 11 4. The Court is tr oubled by counsel’s less than ideal pattern of behavior

. Earlier this year, the Court directed that “the plaintiff’s counsel show cause to the Court as to why the Court should not hold hi m in contempt for allegedly making false representations to the Cour t,” Order at 2 (Jan. 9, 2019), ECF No. 57, after the plaintiff’s counsel, in his request for an extension of time to respond to the District’s motion for summary judgment, represented that he had “conferred with [the] [ ] District . . . and [that the] [ ] District . . . stated that it d[id] not have any objections to [the] [p]laintiff[’s] . . . request,” Motion to Extend Plaintiff Mary E[l]izabeth Chambers’ Memorandum in Opposition to Motio n for Summary Judgment Until January 19, 2019 at 2 , when, in fact, he did “not reach out to [the District’s counsel] . . . prior to filing” the request for an extension and the District “did not provide consent to [the] [p]laintiff’s request,” Response to Plaintiff’s Consent Motion to Extend Dea dline to File Her Opposition to Defendant’[s] Motion for Summary Judgment at 2 . Although the Court is sympathetic to the plaintiff’s counsel’s me dical circumstances, it remains apprehensive about the explanation off ered by the plaintiff’s couns el in response to the Court’s show cause Order, particularly in light of the exhibit that the plaintiff’s counsel submits purportedly justifying his alleged misrepresentations to the Court. Nevertheless, because these alleged misrepresentations can be att ributed to a misunderstanding, the Court will discharge the plaintiff’s counsel ’ s obligation s pursuant to the Court ’ s prior show cause Order

.
6 The plaintiff’s opposition is replete with unsupported conclusory statements. S ee, e.g. , Pl.’s Opp’n at 21 ( claiming that she “has made out a prima facie case of sex (female) discrimination” because she “has shown that she is a female, that she [ ] requested and was qualified for a transfer[, and was ] treated different[ly] tha[n] her m[ a]le co

workers”); id. at 22 ( declaring that the plaintiff not only has “presented a prima f acie case of employment discrimination based on sex (female),

. . . and retaliation,” which, as she claims, defeats the District’s motion for summary judgment, but also has presented “evidence of pretext [that] is sufficient to obtain judgment [in favor of her]”); id. at 28

– 29 (same); id. at 22 ( stating that she “has established a prima facie case of retaliation because she participated in protected activity by filin g complaints of discrimination with the EEOC and [the] District . . . knew and was provided with the charges of employment discrimination”); id. at 28 (same); id. at 24 ( reiterating that she “can prove a prima facie case of employment discrimination based on sex (female) and retaliation for her opposition to [the] District[’s] . . . discriminator y employment practices and her participation in the filing of a charge of employment discrimination with the EEOC against [the] District”); id. at 25 ( maintaining t hat she “has made [a] prima facie showing of discrimination based on [sex] (female)” because she can establish that “(a) she is a female; (b) she was qualified for [a] transfer; (c) [the] District . . . had openings in various units and allowed male employ ees to transfer to those units; (d) [the] District . . . refused to allow [the] [p]laintiff . . . to transfer to those units; (e) took an adverse action against her based on her sex by continuing to refuse her requests for transfers; and (f) [the] District . . . continued to transfer its male employees to other units even when they did not request a transfer”)

.
7 The Court notes that t he plaintiff, i n support of her opposition to the District’s summary judgment motion, submits a t wenty

- page affidavit in addition to a number of depositions . However, h er proffered affidavit does not raise any genuine is sue as to any material fact that defeat s the District’s motion for summary judgmen t because it either addresses claims that are not alleged in the Second Am ended Complaint, see, e.g. , Pl.’s Opp’n, Ex. A (Affidavit of (contin ued . . .)7 the Court i ndependently reviewed the evidence currently in the record, drew “all justifiable inferences

. . . in [ the plaintiff’s ] favor ” as it is required to do, Anderson , 477 U.S. at 255, and construed liberally the arguments set forth in the plaintiff’s opposition , but nevertheless concludes that the District is e ntitled to judgment as a matter of law

. A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies The District argues that the “[p]laintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies for discrete acts of alleged unlawful d iscrimination and retaliation ,” Def.’s Mem. at 11, and therefore, “ she cannot now sue for those claims,” id. , and “[t]he District is “entitled to judgment on [the se ] c laim [s], ” id. at 9

. 8 The plaintiff, without any evidentiary support , argues that she “di d exhaust [her] administrative remedies,” Pl.’s Opp ’n, Ex. A (Affidavit of Mary Elizabeth Chambers ( “ Chambers Aff. ” ) ) ¶ 3; see also id. at 26 (claiming that she “has shown that . . . the

(. . . continued) Mary Elizabeth Chambers ( “ Chambers Aff. ” ) ) ¶ 11 (“I have been threatened by two co

- workers.”); id. , Ex. A ( Chambers Aff. ) ¶ 61 (claiming that a co

- wor ker “submitted one false incident report [abo ut] me ”), fails to allege facts relevant to the District’s arguments as to why its entitled to summary judgment, see , e.g. , id. , Ex. A ( Chambers Aff. ) ¶ 58 ( “ [The] District . . . did not have a non

- discriminatory reason for recommending my suspension becau se the allegations against me were false and fabricated

. Indeed, the a llegations were pretextual and determined to be false. ” ) ; id. , Ex. A ( Chambers Aff. ) ¶ 77 (“The evidence reflects that I was assigned and carried more cases that my co - workers. This ev idence along with the evidence regarding the dis criminatory treatment I have receive would indeed be more than enough for a reasonable jury to believe that CSSD did assign me more cases than my co

workers.”) , or, similar to her opposition, contains “conclu sory allegations unsupported by factual data , ” s ee, e.g. , id. , Ex. A ( Chambers Aff. ) ¶ 16 (“I disagree that no jury would find that [the] District . . . otherwise retaliated against me.”) ; id. , Ex. A ( Chambers Aff. ) ¶ 3 (“I did exhaust my administrative re me dies. Therefore, [the] District[’s] . . . allegation that I did not exhaust my administrative remedies is false and unworthy of any real belief.”); id. , Ex. A ( Chambers Aff. ) ¶ 43 (“I did exhaust my administrative remedies not in th e format the OAG was looking for.”) , which do “not create a triable issue of fact , ” Pub. Citizen Health Research Group , 185 F.3d at 908 . Instead, the plaintiff’s affidavit is more akin to a “self

- serving affidavit [] ” that “alone will not protect the non

- moving party from summ ary judgment.” Carter v. George Wash. Univ. , 180 F. Supp. 2d 97, 111 (D.D.C. 2001), aff’d , 387 F.3d 872 (D.C. Cir. 2004) ; see als o Arrington v. United States , 473 F.3d 329, 343 (D.C. Cir. 2006) ( stating that “summary judgment ‘is most lik ely when a plaint iff ’ s claim is sup ported solely by the plaintiff ’ s own self

- serving testimony, unsupported by corroborating evidence, and undermined either by other credible evidence, physical impossibility or other persuasive evidence that the plaintiff has deliberately committed perjury” ( citation omitted ))

.
8 The District also argues that that “[n]o jury could find that the District otherwise retaliated against [the] [p]laintiff for filing the March 2011 Complaint of Discrimination,” and “[n]o jury co uld find that the proposed suspension of [the] [p]laintiff violated Title VII.” Def.’s Mot. at 1. However, the Court need not address either argument because the Court, for the reasons set forth later in th is Memorandum O pinion, see P art III , infra , concludes that the p laintiff has timely exhausted her administrative remedies as to only one of the claims alleged in the Second Amended Complaint, specifically the claim that the District allegedly denied the plaintiff’s request for a transfer.8 charges of employment discrimination were filed within a reasonably p eriod of time after the [ ] action was taken against her” ) , and in furtherance of her argument, states that she , “ [i]n fact, . . . filed a charge of employment discrimination,” id. , Ex. A ( Chambers Aff. ) ¶ 3. However,

c ontrary to the plaintiff’s argument that the District does not dispute that she indeed file d a charge of discrimination , the District argues that the plaintiff either failed to exhaus t her administrative remedies as to certain claims by failing to include it in her charge of discrimination o r failed to timely file her charge of discrimination within the requisite filing period , s ee Def.’s Mem. 8

– 11 . And, b ased on the evidence currently in the record , t he Court agrees with the District and finds that the only allegation in the Second Amended Complaint for which the plaintiff has timely exhausted her administrative remedies is that the District denied the plaintiff a transfer. 9
This Circuit has made clear that “Title VII ‘[c]omplainants must timely exhaust the[ir] administrative remedies befo re b ringing their claims to court.’ ” Payne v. Salazar , 619 F.3d 56, 65 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (alterations in original) ( quoting Bo wden v. United States , 106 F.3d 433, 437 ( D.C. Cir. 1997) ). To exhaust her administrative remedies, a plaintiff is required to “ file a ch arge of discrimination with the EEOC within 180 days o f the alleged unlawful employment practice, ” Lattisaw v. District of Columbia , 118 F. Supp. 3d 142, 154 (D.D.C. 2015), unless she “has initially instituted proceedings with a State or local agency with authority to grant or seek relief from such practice , ” in which case she must file a charge within 300 days , see 42 U.S.C. §
2000e

– 5(e)(1)

. However, r egardless of whether an aggrieved party initially instituted proceedings with a State or local agency, th e 300

- day filing period applies “where a worksharing

a greement exists between the EEOC and a local fair employment practices agency.” Carter v.

9 The District does not cont est that the plaintiff has timely exhausted her administrative remedies with respect to this claim.9 George Wash. Univ. , 387 F.3d 872, 877, 879 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1601.13(a)(4)(ii)(A)); cf. 42 U .S.C. § 2000e

– 8(b) (authorizing the EEOC to “cooperate” and “enter into written agreements” with the State or local agency “charged with the administration of . . . employment practices law”). Therefore, because “ the EEOC has entered into [ a ] worksharing agreement [] with

. . . the [ District’s Office of Human R ights ( “DCOHR”) ] , ” Schuler v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP , 514 F.3d 1365, 1372 (D.C. Cir. 2008); see Carter , 387 F.3d at 879, “[i]n the District of Columbia, a plaintiff has 300 days to file a charge with the EEOC,” Proctor v. District of Columbia , 74 F. Supp. 3d 436, 455 (D.D.C. 2014) (citing Carter , 387 F.3d at 879); see Craig v. District of Columbia , 74 F. Supp. 3d 349, 361 (D.D.C. 2014) (“Ordinarily, . . . a plaintiff alleging a violation of Title VII must file an EEOC charge within 180 days of t he date that the allegedly discriminatory act occurred[;] [i]n the District of Columbia . . . a ‘worksharing agreement’ between the EEOC and the [DCOHR] results in the automatic cross

filing of an EEOC compl aint with the [DCOHR], thereby extending the fili ng deadline for plaintiffs in the District to 300 days. ” (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e

– 5(e)(1) and Carter , 387 F.3d at 879)); Slate v. Pub. Def. Serv. for the D.C. , 31 F. Supp. 3d 277, 294

– 95 (D.D.C. 2014) (same );
Cruz

- Packer v. District of Columbia , 539 F. Sup p. 2d 181, 189 (D.D.C. 2008) (“Under a formal work

- sharing agreement, filing a formal charge with the EEOC satisfies any requirement to file a formal charge with the District’s OHR, and vice

- versa.”). The C ourt recognizes that other members of this Court h ave interpreted 42 U.S.C. § 2000e

– 5(e)(1) to require that a plaintiff , in the District of Columbia, first initiate a proceeding with the DCOHR regardless of the existence of a worksharing agreement, and hav e thus declined to apply the 300

- day limitations p eriod in cases where the plaintiff, rather than filing a charge with the DCOHR , had her claim automatically cross

- filed with the DCOHR by having i nitiat ed10 proceedings only with the EEOC. See Epps v. Potoma c Elec. Power Co. , Civ. Action No. 18

- 1423 (CKK) , 2019 WL 2423712, at *4 (D.D.C. June 10, 2019) (finding that the plaintiff may not “take advantage of the 300

- day limitations period simply by having a claim automatically cross

filed with a state or local a gency” (collecting cases) ) ; Ashraf

- Hassan v. Emb assy of Fr. i n the
U.S. , 878 F. Supp. 2d 164, 170

– 71 (D.D.C. 2012) (concluding that the plaintiff must “pursue her grievances through the state’s administrative processes” to “invoke the longer presentment wi ndow” or otherwise “must file her claims within t he 180

- day window to be timely”); Bowers v. District of Columbia , 883 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 2011) (“Although plaintiff’s EEO charge lists the local agency, the [DCOHR] as the ‘State or local Agency,’ noth ing indicates that plaintiff initially filed her claim with [DCOHR], a prerequisite to qualifying for the 300

- day window instead of the 180

- day window.”). 10 However, this Court finds the reasoning of those cases to be incompatible with this Circuit’s opini on in Carter , which held that the plaintiff

— who had filed a charge with only the EEOC, and not the DCOHR, before suing in federal court

— “had

10 In rendering their decisions regarding the applicability of the 300

- day period, the courts in Epps and Ashraf

Hassan rel ied on Simpkins v. Washington Metr opoli tan Area Transit Auth ority , see Epps , 2019 WL 2423712, at *4 ( citing Simpkins v. Wash. Met ro. Area Transit Auth. , No. 96

- 7188 , 1997 WL 702349, at *3 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 10, 1997)); Ashraf

- Hass an , 878 F. Supp. 2d at 171 (same), an unpublished opinion witho ut precedential value, see F.V. Vit. R s. 32.1(b)(1)(A), 36 (e) (2)

. In Simpkins , this Circuit found that “[b]y its terms, Title VII grants a 300

- day filing period only when the would

- be pl aintiff “has initially instituted proceedings with a State or local a gency,” and “h[e]ld that because [the plaintiff] never filed a complaint with the DCOHR, nor has she alleged a work[

- ]sharing agreement between the DCOHR and the EEOC such that her EEOC f iling satisfied the local filing requirement, she had only 180 days w ithin which to file charges with the EEOC.” 1997 WL 702349 , at *3 . In its reasoning, the Circuit relied on Mohasco Corp. v. Silver , in which “[t]he Supreme Court [ ] explained that the purpose of the longer filing period in ‘deferral states’ (i.e., thos e with a local agency empowered to address discrimination) is ‘to prevent forfeiture of a complainant’s federal rights while parti cipating in state proceedings,’” to conclude that “[i]f the complainant is not participating in a state proceeding, then there is no reason to extend the 180

- day filing period.” Id. (quoting Mohasco Corp. v. Silver , 447 U.S. 807 , 821 (19 80 ) ); see also id. (stating that “[t] o allow a Title VII litigant the benefit of the extended limitations period merely because she fortuitously works in a deferral state would ignore the plain language of the statute and its legislative purpose” (quoting Kocian v. Getty Ref. & Mktg. Co. , 707 F.2d 748, 751 (3 d Cir. 1983)).11 up to 300 days to file with the [EEOC].” 3 87 F.3d at 879. Accordingly, the Court finds that a plaintiff, in the D istrict of Columbia , has 300 days to file a charge with the EEOC. 11 Moreover, “ [ e ] ach incident of discrimination and each retaliatory adverse employment decision constitutes a separate actionable ‘unlawful employment practice’” and “starts a new clock fo r filing charges alleging that act.” Nat’l R.R. Pas senger Corp. v. Morgan , 536 U.S. 101,
113

– 14 (2002)

. Thus “[t]o be actionable, a discrete act

— an event that takes place at a particular point in time

— must occur within the filing period,” Dickens v. Dep' t of Consumer & Regulatory Affairs , 298 F

. App ’ x. 2, 3 (D.C. Cir. 2008) ( internal quotation marks om itted ), and “discrete discriminatory acts are not actionable if time barred, even when they are related to a cts alleged in timely filed charges,” Morgan , 53 6 U.S. at 113. Here, as the District correctly ar gues , “[t]he Second Amended Complaint includes several allegations [of discrimination and retaliation] that are not in the [plaintiff’s] [charge of discriminati on]

. ” Def.’s Mem. at 9

. In her charge of disc rimination, the p laintiff asserted that (1) a male co

- worker who “had weekly communication problems and performance issues with customers” was not disciplined, but when she had a “single incident with a custo mer,” she “was suspended for [four] days,” and ( 2) this same male co

- worker was granted a transfer to another department, while the plaintiff and a female co

- worker were denied transfers .” Def.’s M ot

. , Ex.

11 The Court notes that this conclusion does not affect its prior decisi on that “the plaintiff’s age discrimination and hostile work environment claims must be dismissed.” Chambers I , 249 F. Supp. 3d at 71. Al though the Court stated that these claims must be dismissed “because the plaintiff did not file a charge of discrimin ation alleging age discrimination and a hostile work environment within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory incident ,” id. at 70 (emphas is added) , whether the plaintiff filed her charge within a specified period (either 180 or 300 days) was not at issue ; rather , the determinative factor in dismissing the plaintiff’s age discrimination and hostile work environment claims was that her “ch arge not only lack[ed] the words ‘hostile work environment’ [and ‘age discrimination,’] but also lack[ed] any factual al legations supporting such [ ] claim[s],” id. (s econd, fourth, and fifth alteration s in original).12 6 (Charge of Discrimination No. 570

- 2011

- 00598) a t 1. 12 On the other hand, the plaintiff , in her Second Amended Complaint, alleges that the District “ discriminated against her based on her sex [ ], and retaliated against her because she opposed [the] District[’s] . . . discriminatory employment practice s ” by (1) disciplining her , see 2d Am. Compl. ¶ 10 (alleging that “a male

co - worker, who had communication and performance issues with cust omers, was not disciplined, while [she] . . . was disciplined because she had filed a charge of employment discrimination ”); see also Pl.’s Opp’n a t 2 (claiming tha t the District discriminated against her when it “ subjected [her] to discipline that was more harsh than similarly situated males who committed similar infractions or greater infractions ” ); (2) “pe rmitting male employees to transfer to other departments . . . [,] but den[ying] [the] [p]laintiff .

. . the same opportunity to transfer to other units,” id. ; ( 3 ) “permitting male employees to transfer to . . . receive incentive awards and special awards . . . [,] but den[ying] [the] [p]laintiff .

. . the same op portunity . . . to receive incentive awards and special awards,” 2d Am. Compl. ¶ 10 ; (4) “ assign [ing] [the] [p]laintiff . . . an excessive amount of cases compared to other employees in the unit,” id. ; (5) “ dela y [ing] the processing of [the] [p]laintiff[’s ] . . . medical leave,” i d. ¶ 1 2 ; (6) “ fail [ing] to allow [the] [p]laintiff . . . to transfer to [ ] [an] other unit . . . to accommodate [the] [p]laintiff[’s] . . . stress related illnesses,” id

. ¶ 1 3 ; (7) “ refus [ing] to authorize the performance of a desk audit for her [ ] Support Enforcement Specialist position,” i d. ¶ 1 4 ; and (8) “ refusing to properly process her pay checks,” i d. ¶ 1 5; see also i d. ¶ 1 6 (alleging that the District “refus[ed] to prope rly process her pay check for the pay period of March 2 4, 2014 ”) ; Pl.’s Opp’n at 2 (claiming that the District

12 The plaintiff’s charge of discrimination also includes the contention that the plaintiff ’s “caseload was taken from [her] and [she] was reassigned to anot her unit without being given proper training.” Def.’s Mot ., Ex. 6 (Charge of Discrimination No. 570

- 2011

- 00598) at 1. However, the plaintiff, in her Second Amended Complaint, does not alle ge that she was discriminated against on this basis. Therefore, t he Court need not consider this contention.13 discriminated against her when it “ delayed [ ] the misprocessing of her paychecks ”). 13 The only
two claims that the plaintiff alleges in the Sec ond Amended Complaint that she also included in her char ge of discrimination are her allegations regarding the District ’s disciplining her 14 and denying her the opportunity to transfer. C ompare Def

. ’ s Mot. , Ex. 6 (Charge of Discrimination
No. 570

- 2011

- 00598) at 1 , with 2d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 10

– 16. Therefore, the Co urt concludes that the plaintiff did not exhaust her administrative remedies with respect to the remaining acts that form the basis for her sex discrimination and retaliation claims

. The Court al so agrees with the District that the plaintiff did not timel y exhaust her administrative remedies under Title VII with respect to her claim that the District discriminated and retaliated against her when she “was suspended for [four] days , ” Def.’s Mot ., Ex . 6 (Charge of Discrimination No. 570

- 2011

- 00598) at 1; see also Def. ’ s Mem. at 10 , despite including it in her charge of discrimination, see Def. ’ s Mot. , Ex. 6 (Charge of Discrimination No. 570

- 2011

- 00598 ) at 1. 15 To b e actionable in this Court, the plaintiff must have f iled her charge within 300

13 In her opposition, t he plaintiff claims t hat the District discriminated against her when it “denied an audit of her time and attendance sheets ,” and “denied [her] the opportunity to receive donated time from her coworkers.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 2. However, nowhere in her Second Amended Complaint does the plaintiff allege that the District denied her an audit of her time and attendance sheets or an opportu nity to receive donated time. See generally 2d Am. Compl. Therefore, these claims

— raised for the first time in an opposition to a motion for summary judgment

— are not properly before the Court. See McKinney v. United States , 75 F. Supp. 3d 266, 279 (D.D. C. 2014). And, in any event, even if the Court were to cons ider these additional claims, the Court concludes that the plaintiff has failed to exhaust her administrative remedies with respect to these claims as well for the same reasons that the Court conc ludes that the plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrativ e remedies as to her remaining claims.

14 The Court, drawing “ all justifiable inferences . . . in [the plaintiff’s] favor” as it is required to do, Anderson , 477 U.S. at 255, construes the plaintiff’s co ntention in her charge of discrimination that she “wa s suspended for [four] days ” when she had a “single incident with a customer,” Def.’s M ot ., Ex. 6 (Charge of Discrimination No. 570

- 2011

- 00598) at 1, to constitute the “discipline” that the plaintiff all eges in her Second Amended Complaint, see 2d Am. Comp l. ¶ 10 (alleging that “a male co

- worker, who had communication and performance issues with customers, was not disciplined, while [she] . . . was disciplined because she had filed a charge of employment discrimination with the EEOC ”) , in light of the plain tiff’s statement that she was suspended and disciplined despite a male co

worker who “had weekly communication problems and performance issues with customers” was not. See Def.’s Mot ., Ex. 6 (Charge of Discrimination No. 570

- 2011

- 00598) at 1; 2d Am. Compl . ¶ 10

.
15 The Court notes that the plaintiff ’ s claims are untimely regardless of whether the applicable filing period is 180 days or 300 days because even a ssuming that the applicable time limitation for filing a charge of discrimination was (contin ued . . .)14 days of May 6, 20 10, the date on which the plaintiff received the Advanced Written Notice of Proposed Suspension. See Def.’s Mot., Ex. 6 (Charge of Discrimination No. 570

- 2011

- 00598) at 1; s ee also Gordon v. Office of the Archit ect of the Capitol , 928 F. Supp. 2d 196, 204 (D.D.C. 2013) (holding that Title VII’s notification rule directs that “the limitations period begins to run on the date” that a given employment decision is “made and communicated to [the employee] ”); cf. Powe ll v. Castaneda , 390 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9 (D.D.C. 2005) (calculating the start of the statute of limitations when the plaintiff received the notice of proposed removal). Therefore, as the District correctly notes, the “[p]laintiff had until March 2, 2011 to f ile a claim with the EEOC.” Def.’s Mem. at 1 0. However, the plaintiff did not file her charge of discrimination until March 4, 2011

. See Def.’s M ot ., Ex. 6 (Charge of Discrimination No. 570

- 2011

- 00598) at 1. The plaintiff argues that the District’s “al legation that [she] did not exhaust [her] adm inistrative remedies is false and unworthy of any real belief,” Pl.’s Opp’n, Ex. A ( Chambers Aff. ) ¶ 3, but she fails to providing any evidence that supports her exhaustion argument. And, she does not claim , nor can the Court discern , that any applicable equi table exception should apply to excuse her failure to timely exhaust her administrative remedies

. S ee generally Pl.’s Opp’n

. Accordingly, the Court agrees with the District that the plaintiff “failed to file he r claim within the requisite time frame,” De f.’s Mem. at 10, and concludes that summary judgment must be entered in favor of the District with respect to the plaintiff’s claim regarding the alleged four

- day suspension as well

. 16

(. . . continued) 300 days , th e filing of the plaintiff’s charge of discrimination on March 4, 2011, fell beyond the 300

- day period, albeit by two days.

16 Even if the plaintiff’s cla im that the District discriminated against her when it suspended her for four days had been timely ex hausted, because the plaintiff “complain[s] about a proposed [suspension] that never materialized and never ‘affect[ed] the terms, conditions, or privilege s of employment or future employment opportunities such that a reasonable trier of fact could find ob jectively tangible harm[,]’ [i]t follows that the proposed [suspension] was not (contin ued . . .)15 B. The Plaintiff ’ s Claim of Dis crimina tion and Retaliation Based on Transfe r Denials The District also argues that the “[p] laintiff cannot show that denying her request for a transfer

. . . was a prohibited personnel action ,” id. at 11 , because there is no evidence that the
Di strict’s failure to transfer the plaintiff either “ con stituted an adverse action for purposes of her discrimination claim , ” id. at 13, or “was an adverse personnel action to support her retaliation claim ,” id. The plaintiff claims that she can establish t hat the District “ took an adverse action against her b ased on her sex by continuing to refuse her requests for transfers , ” Pl.’s Opp’n at 25; see also id. at 25 (maintaining that she “ was subjected to several adverse employment actions by [the] District ”) ; id. at 22

– 23 (stating that the District “took employm ent actions that were continuously adverse to [her] by refusing to transfer her to her requested unit in which [ she ] could properly perform her assignments ” ); id. at 27, 29 (same, with the exc eption that the District allegedly “ continually fail [ed] and ref us [ed] to transfer her to the Intake Unit ” ). For the following reasons, t he Court concludes that the District is entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiff’s claim that the District allegedly discriminated and retaliated against her by denyi ng her the opportunity to transfer. Under Title VII, it is an “ unlawful employment practice for an employer

. . . to discriminate against any [employee] with respect to [her] compensation, terms, conditio ns, or privileges of employment, because of [her] race, color, relig ion, sex, or national origin.” 42

(. . . continued) materially adverse for discrimination purposes.” Saunders v. Mills , 172 F. Supp. 3d 74, 97 (D.D.C. 2016) (third alteration in original) (quoting Forkkio v. Powell , 306 F.3d 11 27, 113 1 (D.C. Cir. 2002) ); see Pl. ’s Opp ’n at 8 ( “ [T] he suspension was rescinded by an arbitrator

. ” ); Def. ’s Mem . at 20 ( “ The arbitrator

. . . found that [the District] failed to meet it [s] burden [,] . . . [and] [c] onsequently, [ the District] was prohibit ed from imposing the four

- day suspension

. ” ); Def.’s M ot ., Ex. 5 (Opinion and Award of Barbara B. Franklin, Arbitrator) ( vacating the four

- day suspension after finding that it was unwa rranted because there was insufficient evidence to support the claims aga inst the plaintiff); see also Tyson v. Brennan , No. 18

- 5033, 2018 WL 5927921, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 7, 2018) (“[A] suspension that is proposed but not actually served by the employee does not constitute an adverse employment action. ”); Baloch v. Kempthorne , 550 F.3d 1191, 1198 n.4, 1199 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (declining “to find adverse actions where the suspension is not actually served” ).16 U.S.C. § 2000e

– 2(a)(1). To state a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII, a plaintiff must establish “that (1) [s]he is a member of a pro tected class, (2) [s]he suffered an adverse emplo yment action , and (3) the unfavorable action gives rise to an inference of discrimination (that is, an inference that [her] employer took the action because of his membership in the protected class).” Forkk io v. Powell , 306 F.3d 1127, 1130 (D.C. Cir. 2002 ) (emphasis added) (citing Brown v. Brody , 199 F.3d 446, 452 (D.C. Cir. 1999)); see also Swierkiewicz v. Sorema
N.A. , 534 U.S. 506, 510 (2002)

. It is also unlawful under Title VII for an employer to retali ate against an employee who either “ has opposed a ny practice made an unlawful employment practice by [Title VII], or

. . . [having] made a charge

. . . under [Title VII].” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e

– 3(a)

. To establish a prima facie case of retaliation , a plaintiff must show “(1) that [s]he engaged
in [ a ] s tatut orily protected activity; (2) that [s]he suffered a materially adverse action by h[er] employer; and (3) that a causal link connects the two.” Jones v. Bernanke , 557 F.3d 670, 677 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (emphasis added) ; see also Hamilton v. Geithner , 666 F.3d 1344, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 2012)

. I n the absence of direct evidence of an alleged unlawful employment action , as is the situation here, claims of discrimination and retaliation arising under Title VI I are analyzed under the three

- part framework of McDonnell Dou glas Corp. v. Green

. See Jackson v. Gonzales , 496 F.3d 703, 706 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (citing McDonnell Doug las Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792 , 802

– 05 (1973) ); Morgan v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. , 328 F.3d 647, 65 1 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (applying the Mc Donnell Doug las framework to a Title VII retaliation claim)

. Under this framework, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing her prima facie case of discrimination and retaliation

. See McDonnell Douglas , 411 U.S. at 80 2; Vickers v. Powell , 493 F.3d 186 , 194 (D.C. Cir. 2007)

. If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, “[t]he burden then17 must shift to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory [or non

- retaliatory] reason fo r ” its actions. McDonnell Douglas , 411 U.S. at 80 2; see V ickers , 493 F.3d at 194

. Once the employer offers a legitimate, nondiscriminatory justification for its action, “the McDonnell Douglas framework

— with its presumptions and burdens

— disappears, and the sole remaining issue is discrimination [or retaliation] vel non .” Jackson , 496 F.3d at 707 ( citation and internal quotation marks omitted) ; see Vickers , 493 F.3d at 194

. After the employer makes such a showing, “the plaintiff must prove that a reasonable jury could infer that the employer ’ s given explanation was pretextual and that this pretext shielded discriminatory motives.” Jackson , 496 F.3d at 707 ( cita tions omitted). However, this Circuit has clarified that [i] n a Title VII disparate

- treatment suit where an employee has suffered an adverse [ ] action and an employer has asserted a legitimate, non

- discriminatory [or non

- ret aliato ry ] reason for the decisio n, the district court need not

— and should not

— decide whether the plaintiff actually made out a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas . Rather,

. . . the district court must resolve one central question: Has the employee produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the employer ’ s asserted non

- discriminatory reason was not the actual reason and that the employer intentionally discrimi n ated against the employee on the basis of

. . . sex [.] Brady v . Office of Sergeant at Arms , 520 F.3d 490, 494 (D.C. Cir. 2008) ; see Talavera v. Shah , 638 F.3d 303, 308 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (applying the Brady framework in the context of a gender discriminatio n and retaliation case )

. However, while an employee need not establish a prima facie of dis crimination or re taliation a t the summary judgment stage, she must still , a t a minimum, demonstrate that she suffered an adverse employment action. See Brady , 520 F.3d at 493; see also Dorns v. Geithner , 692 F. Supp. 2d 119, 131 (D.D.C. 2010) (W alton, J.) (“Title VII

. . . requires that plaintiff suffered some adverse employment action

. ”); Nurriddin v. Goldin , 382
F. Supp. 2d 79, 102 (D.D.C. 2005) (“[T]he necessary threshold element for any Title VII discrimination claim [is] an adverse employment action.”).18 T he standard for what constitutes an adverse action differs under Title VII ’ s anti

discrimination and anti

- retaliation provision s
. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White , 548 U.S. 53, 57 (2006). Title VII ’ s anti

- discrimina tion provision protects an individual only from employment

- related discrimination , and a plaintiff claiming that she was discriminated against must prove that she “suffered an adverse em ployment action .” Forkkio , 306 F.3d at 1130 (emphasis added). “ [ A ] n ad verse employment action [ is ] a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a dec ision causing significant change in benefits.” Douglas v. Donovan , 559
F. 3d 549, 552 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (emphasis added) ( citations omitted). A plaintiff will be found to have suffered “an adverse employment action if [s]he experiences materially adverse

c onsequences affecting the terms, conditions, or privileges of emp loyment or future employment opportunities such that a reasonable trier of fact could find objectively tangible harm.” Forkkio , 306 F.3d at 1131 (emphasis added) (citing Brown , 199 F.3d at 4 57); see also Stewart v. Evans , 275 F.3d 1126, 1134 (D.C. Cir. 20 02) (“An employment decision does not rise to the level of an actionable adverse action . . . unless there is a tangible change in the duties or working conditions constituting a material emp loyment disadvantage.”); Ames v. Nielsen , 286 F. Supp. 3d 70, 83 (D.D.C. 2017 ) ( “ [E] mployment actions that do not obviously cause a significant change in employment status

— such as a decision causing a significant change in benefits

— require the plaintiff to ‘ go the further step ’ of demonstrating how the decision caused objectively tangible harm

. ” (quoting Douglas , 559 F.3d at 553 ) ). On the other hand, “‘[a]dverse actions’ in the retaliation context encompass a broader sweep of actions than those in a pure discrimination claim , ” Baloch v. Kempthorne , 550 F.3d 1191, 1198 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2008) , such that they “need not be employme nt

- related or even occur19 in the workplace, nor must they result in a materially adverse change in the terms or conditions of [ one’s ] employment , ” Nurriddin v. Bolden , 40 F. Supp. 3d 104, 116 (D.D.C. 2014) (emphasis added) ( alteration in original) ( citation and internal quotation marks omitted) ; see also Gardner v. District of Columbia , 448 F. Supp. 2d 70 , 76 (D.D.C. 2006) ( explaining t hat, under Title VII ’ s anti

- retali a tion provision, “ [a] dverse actions can include actions that do not adversely affect promotion opportunities or that do not create tangible , economic loss ” )

. “ Nonethele ss, the alleged retaliatory action must produce a n in jury or harm ” in order to be actionable , and that “injury or harm must be material, meaning that it could dissuade[] a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Nurriddin , 40 F. Supp. 3d at 116 ( alteration in original) ( int e rnal citations and quotation marks omitted); s ee also Burlington N. , 548 U.S. at 67 (“The anti retaliation provision [of Title VII] protects an individual not from all retaliation, but from retaliation that produces an injury or harm.”)

. However, for ex ample, “[a]n employee’s decision to report discriminatory behavior cannot immunize that employee from those petty slights or minor annoyances that often take place at work and that all employees experience.” Burlington N. , 548 U.S. at 68 (citation omitted ). The denial of “a transfer involving no diminution in pay and benefits,” i.e., a lateral transfer, does not rise to the level of an adverse action “unless there are some other materially adverse consequences affecting the terms, conditions, or privileges of [an employee ’ s] employment or her future employment opportunities such that a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the plaintiff has suffered objectively tangible harm .” Brown v. Brody , 199 F.3d 446, 457 (D.C. Cir. 1999) ; see also Geleta v. Gray , 645 F.3d 408, 411 (D.C. Cir. 2011)

. For example, a reassignment of duties may be materially adverse if it places the employee in a position with “significantly different

— and diminished

— supervisory and programmatic20 responsibilities , ” Czekalski v. Peters , 475 F.3d 360, 364 (D.C. Cir. 2007) , or “ fewer opportunities for compensation and advancement,” Caudle v. District of Columbia , 804 F. Supp. 2d 32, 43 (D.D.C. 2011)

. Here, t he Court finds that the plaintiff has failed to show that a genuine issue of material fact e x ists as to whether she suffered an adverse action under Title VII ’ s anti

- discrimination or anti

- retaliation provisions a s a result of the District’s denial of her request to be transferred

. The plaintiff disputes the District’s contention that “ [ t ] here is also no evidence that [the] [p]laintiff suffered a loss in pay,” Def.’s Mem. at 13; see Pl.’s Opp’n at 26, and argues that “the evidence is clear” that “she has been harmed

. . . because she has been prevented from receiving a promotion as a Support Enfor cement Specialist and will now be delayed in receiving a within grade increase , ” Pl.’s Opp’n at 22 , 26 . However, she has neither produced no r cited a single piece of evidence supporting her positions

. In fact, the record is completely devoid of evidence f rom which a reasonable juror could conclude that she su ffered any harm, let alone any material adverse consequences that “ affect[ed] the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment or future employment opportunities such that a reasonable trier of fact could find objectively tangible harm.” Forkkio , 306 F. 3d at 1131 (citations omitted). And, because “the necessary threshold element for any Title VII discrimination [or retaliation] claim [is] an adverse [ ] action ,” Nurriddin , 382 F. Supp. 2d at 102 , t he plaintiff’s unsupported conclusory arguments are insu fficient to satisfy her burden of showing that she suffered an adverse action , and her failure
to establish the requisite material adversity is fatal to her discrimination and retaliation claims ,

s ee Brady , 520 F.3d at 493

. Accordingly, the Court conclude s that the District’s denial of the plaintiff’s transfer request does not constitute an adverse action either under Title VII’s anti

discrimination or anti

- retaliation provision s and therefore finds t hat the District is entitled to21 summary jud gment on the plaintiff’s claim that she was subjected to discrimination and retaliation when the District denied her a transfer.
IV. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that , with the e xception of her claim that the District dis criminated and retaliated against her by denying her a lateral transfer, the plaintiff failed to timely exhaust her administrative remedies by either not including all of the claims alleged in her Second Amended C omplaint in her charge of discrimination fi led with the EEOC or not timely filing the charge of discrimination within the requisite 300

- day period . The Court further concludes that the plaintiff failed to establish that she suffered harm as a result of th e District’s alleged denial of a transfer. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the District’s summary judgment motion must be granted.
SO ORDERED this 2 4th day of Ju ly , 2019. 17

REGGIE B. WALTON United States District Judge

17 The Court will contemporaneously issue an Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion.