If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

FOR PUBLICATION

May 6, 2021

9:00 a.m.

v No. 355046

Jackson Circuit Court

THOMAS EMERSON MEEKER, LC No. 19-001610-FH

Defendant-Appellee.

Before: JANSEN, P.J., and RONAYNE KRAUSE and GADOLA, JJ.

JANSEN, P.J.

The prosecution appeals by leave granted1the trial court’s order granting defendant’s 

motion to dismiss the charge of possession of methamphetamine, MCL 333.7403(2)(b)(i), and 

allowing defendant to withdraw his guilty plea. We affirm. 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On May 27, 2019, defendant was under the influence of methamphetamine and began 

experiencing medical issues as a result. Defendant’s mother called 911, and first responders and 

law enforcement responded. At that time, defendant was in possession of 0.38 grams of 

methamphetamine for his personal use. While defendant was receiving medical treatment, he bit 

a first responder’s arm. 

Defendant was charged with possession of methamphetamine and assaulting, resisting, or

obstructing a police officer, MCL 750.81d(1). Defendant initially pleaded guilty to both offenses

during a plea hearing on November 15, 2019. In support of his plea, defendant admitted that on 

May 27, 2019, while under the influence of methamphetamine and experiencing medical issues, 

he bit a medical first responder on the arm while he was attempting to treat him. Defendant also 

admitted to possessing 0.38 grams of methamphetamine at the time that he bit the first responder. 

 

1 People v Meeker, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered November 13, 2020 (Docket 

No. 355046).
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In exchange for defendant’s plea, the prosecutor agreed not to object to defendant’s request for 

“7411 status.” This is a reference to MCL 333.7411, under which a person who has not previously 

been convicted of a controlled substance offense may plead guilty, but then have further 

proceedings deferred and be placed on probation, and the person will then be discharged upon 

successful completion of that probation. See Carr v Midland Co Concealed Weapons Licensing 

Bd, 259 Mich App 428, 430-431; 674 NW2d 709 (2003).

Following defendant’s plea, the question arose as to whether defendant’s bond should be 

revoked because he continued to test positive for drug use. Defendant became agitated, and 

repeatedly indicated that he was “clean,” that he was having chest pains, and that needed to go to 

the hospital. The trial court then decided to revoke bond and remand defendant to jail to “dry out.” 

Defendant began to resist the court officer. He also declared that he wanted to kill himself and, 

therefore, needed to go to the hospital. He further announced that he was in withdrawal and needed 

to go to the hospital. The trial court advised defendant that he would be evaluated by the nurse 

and doctor at the jail. Defendant then kicked one of the deputies escorting him out of the court 

room. The trial court held a second hearing on December 6, 2019 for defendant to reaffirm his 

guilty plea. Defendant reaffirmed his plea on the record. The trial court agreed to release 

defendant on bond so that he could be placed in the Tri-Cap treatment program in Saginaw.

Defendant was scheduled to be sentenced on May 21, 2020. Defendant opened the hearing 

with a request to adjourn proceedings to allow trial counsel time to prepare a motion to withdraw 

defendant’s plea to the possession of methamphetamine charge on the ground that defendant was 

immune under the “Good Samaritan Law as it pertains to drug overdoses.” The trial court granted 

the request.

On June 10, 2020, defendant moved to dismiss Count I of his information under MCL 

333.7403(3)(a), or the “Good Samaritan law.” The prosecution filed its response on August 27, 

2020. The parties disagreed as to whether defendant was “incapacitated” for purposes of 

subsection 3(a). The trial court heard arguments on the motion on September 1, 2020. Following 

a review of video that memorialized the first responders’ interactions with defendant and the close 

of arguments, the trial court granted defendant’s motion from the bench, and made the following 

findings:

In making a decision on this matter I’m looking at Black’s Law Dictionary, 

which gives the definition of incapacity. “Any person who is in impaired by reason 

or [sic] mental illness, mental deficiency, physical illness or disability, advanced 

age, chronic use of drugs, chronic intoxication, to the extent he lacks sufficient 

understanding or capacity to make or communicate responsible decisions 

concerning his person who is deemed incapacitated.” Now, as pointed out by [the] 

prosecution . . . is that the person has to actually be incapacitated. The problem is 

that that requires the person making a call to have accurately analyzed what they 

are observing that they are believing isn’t causing the person life to be in danger, 

because of some type of incapacity. Here we had the mother calling who by her 

statements just in the video has seen him high multiple times and when the officers 

first get there he’s somewhat in a not a comatose state but a not very responsive 

just starring off in space. She indicates he’s been sitting like that all day. In her 

mind even having seen him or I shouldn’t say in her mind, based on what she 
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articulated that she has seen him because she was telling you got some bad stuff, 

you’re going to kill yourself if you keep using like you’ve been using. There were 

some other comments that she made. I think from her perspective when she makes 

that call she does so in good faith thinking that he needs help right away and this is 

a mother who has seen her son stoned many times and even tells him you’re going 

to end up dead if you don’t quit using the shit. Therefore, I’m going to allow you 

to withdraw his plea. 

The trial court also dismissed Count I of the information. This appeal followed. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court reviews de novo issues of statutory interpretation, which involve a question of 

law. People v Rydzewski, 331 Mich App 126, 132; 951 NW2d 356 (2020). This Court reviews 

for an abuse of discretion the trial court’s decision to grant a motion to withdraw a plea agreement. 

Id. at 137. This Court also reviews for an abuse of discretion the trial court’s decision to dismiss 

charges. People v Morrison, 328 Mich App 647, 650; 939 NW2d 647 (2019). “An abuse of 

discretion occurs when a trial court’s decision falls outside the range of reasonable and principled 

outcomes. A trial court necessarily abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law.” 

Rydzewski, 331 Mich App at 132 (quotation marks and citation omitted). This Court reviews for 

clear error the trial court’s factual findings. Id. at 137. A trial court’s findings are clearly 

erroneous if this Court “is left with a definite and firm conviction that the trial court made a 

mistake.” People v Reese, 491 Mich 127, 139; 815 NW2d 85 (2012) (quotation marks and citation 

omitted).

III. ANALYSIS 

On appeal, the prosecution argues that the trial court’s determination that the GoodSamaritan law required the dismissal of the possession of methamphetamine charge is predicated 

on a misapplication of MCL 333.7403(3). The prosecution argues that subsection 3(a) requires 

the defendant to have been “incapacitated,” not merely a third party’s subjective good faith belief 

that the person is incapacitated. The prosecution submits that the trial court’s construction of MCL 

333.7403(3)(a) is at odds with its plain language and adds a requirement not included by the 

Legislature. We disagree. 

As observed by this Court in Morrison: 

[a] person shall not knowingly or intentionally possess controlled 

substances or their analogues. MCL 333.7403(1). However, in certain 

circumstances, if an individual overdoses on a controlled substance, that individual 

may not be in violation of the statute. As provided in the Good Samaritan law:

An individual who seeks medical assistance for himself or herself or 

who requires medical assistance and is presented for assistance by 

another individual if he or she is incapacitated because of a drug 

overdose or other perceived medical emergency arising from the use 

of a controlled substance or a controlled substance analogue that he 
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or she possesses or possessed in an amount sufficient only for 

personal use and the evidence of his or her violation of this section 

is obtained as a result of the individual's seeking or being presented 

for medical assistance. [MCL 333.7403(3)(a) (emphasis deleted).]

When interpreting a statute, a court's goal is to give effect to the 

Legislature's intent by first looking to the plain language of the statute. People v 

Lowe, 484 Mich 718, 721-722; 773 NW2d 1 (2009). If the statutory language is 

unambiguous, the court must apply the language as written, and further analysis is 

neither required nor permitted. People v Borchard-Ruhland, 460 Mich 278, 284;

597 NW2d 1 (1999). A court must presume that each word has some meaning and 

should avoid constructions that render a part of the statute “surplusage or nugatory.” 

Id. at 285. A court may not look to the statute's purpose or its public-policy 

objectives unless the statutory language is ambiguous or unclear. People v Pinkney, 

501 Mich 259, 272; 912 NW2d 535 (2018). When a court looks to public policy 

without first analyzing the plain language, the court “ ‘runs counter to the rule of 

statutory construction directing us to discern legislative intent from plain statutory 

language.’ ” Id., quoting Perkovic v Zurich American Ins Co, 500 Mich 44, 53; 893 

NW2d 322 (2017). [Morrison, 328 Mich App at 650-651.] 

The sole question presented by this case is whether defendant was incapacitated for 

purposes of subsection 3(a). There is no caselaw, published or otherwise, construing the term 

“incapacitated” as employed in the Good-Samaritan law. Because the statute does not define the 

term, this Court may consult dictionary definitions. Oakland v Co Road Comm’rs v Michigan 

Property & Guaranty Ass’n, 456 Mich 590, 604; 575 NW2d 751 (1998). The term “incapacitated 

commonly means “made incapable of or unfit for normal functioning.” Black’s Law Dictionary

(8th ed) defines the term “incapacitated person” as “[a] person who is impaired by an intoxicant, 

by mental illness or deficiency, or by physical illness or disability to the extent that personal 

decision-making is impossible.” It defines the term “incapacity” as a “[l]ack of physical or mental 

capabilities.” Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed).

2

 Similarly, the Merriam-Webster Collegiate 

Dictionary (11th ed, 2003), defines the term “incapacity” as “the quality or state of being 

incapable” and a “lack of physical or intellectual power or of natural or legal qualifications.” 

 

2 We acknowledge our Supreme Court has instructed that under MCL 8.3a, “undefined statutory 

terms are to be given their plain and ordinary meaning, unless the undefined word or phrase is a 

term of art. We consult a lay dictionary when defining common words or phrases that lack a 

unique legal meaning. Robinson v Detroit, 462 Mich 439, 456; 613 NW2d 307 (2000). This is 

because the common and approved usage of a nonlegal term is most likely to be found in a standard 

dictionary, not in a legal dictionary. Horace v City of Pontiac, 456 Mich 744, 756; 575 NW2d 762 

(1998).” People v Thompson, 477 Mich 146, 151-152; 730 NW2d 708 (2007) (footnote omitted). 

While “incapacitated” is not necessarily a legal term of art, but rather a common word used in the 

English language, the parties stipulated to the Black’s Law Dictionary definition of the word in the 

trial court, and so we use the same. 
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We conclude that the record evidence in this case clearly indicates that defendant was 

rendered unfit for normal functioning and was impaired by an intoxicant. Body camera video 

footage shows that during the incident underlying these charges, defendant was conscious and 

minimally responsive, able to provide first responders with his middle name and his birth date, and 

knew that it took 10 dimes to make a dollar. Defendant also could follow simple commands. He 

presented a finger so that his pulse and blood-oxygen could be determined. He also presented an 

arm so that his blood pressure could be measured. Clearly, defendant was not totally incapacitated, 

i.e., unconscious. Nevertheless, there is nothing in the plain language of subsection 3(a) that 

requires total incapacitation. Moreover, there was ample record evidence to sustain a conclusion 

that defendant was incapacitated within the plain meaning of the term and, hence, for purposes of 

subsection 3(a). Defendant’s mannerisms, facial expressions, and eyes were those of an individual 

under the influence of a mind-altering substance. His attention was unfocused. Defendant often 

stared out into space. His gaze wandered around the porch where he sat. He acted like he was 

seeing things unseen by the others on the porch. He talked to himself. At one point, he repeatedly 

stated “I found it” for no apparent reason. He called 911 while two police officers were standing 

in front of him and speaking to him. Further, his mother reported that he had been sitting and 

staring all day–sometimes at the wall, sometimes at his phone. Both defendant and his mother 

indicated that defendant had used “bad meth” or some other substance or substances. Defendant’s 

mother, the two responding police officers, and the two responding paramedics all believed that 

defendant needed to go to the hospital because of his level of intoxication. One of the responding 

police officers can be heard stating several times that defendant was stoned out of his mind and 

out of it.

On the basis of the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court did not err by finding 

defendant was incapacitated for purposes of MCL 333.7403(3)(a), and therefore did not abuse its 

discretion by permitting defendant to withdraw his plea and dismiss the possession of 

methamphetamine charge. 

Affirmed. 

/s/ Kathleen Jansen

/s/ Amy Ronayne Krause

/s/ Michael F. Gadola