STATE OF VERMONT

ENVIRONMENTAL COURT

Appeal of Teitscheid }

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Docket No. 124-7-04 Vtec

Decision and Order on Appellees' Motion for Summary Judgment

Appellant Ralph J. Teitscheid appealed from a decision of the Planning Commission of the Town 

of Cornwall, granting a subdivision permit to Appellees Berringer. Appellant represents himself; 

Appellees Hoyt and Nancy Berringer are represented by F. Rendol Barlow, Esq.; and the Town 

is represented by James C. Foley, Jr., Esq. 

Appellees' motion to dismiss was denied by entry order on November 29, 2004, as was 

Appellant's motion for reconsideration of his motion for stay. In that entry order, the Court 

mistakenly ruled that additional information, including the subdivision regulations, would be 

necessary before the Court could rule on the motion for summary judgment. In fact, the 

apparently-missing information had been provided with the motion for summary judgment, but 

had been misplaced in the Court's files. In that order, the Court also gave the Town until 

December 2, 2004, to file any memorandum if it wished to be heard on the question of whether a 

subdivision permit is required. The Town's attorney has informed the Court that the Town does 

not intend to file a memorandum, and the matter is ready for the Court's consideration.

The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted. In 2002 Appellees purchased 

approximately 145 acres of land, of which approximately 117 acres lies to the north of Clark 

Road and approximately 28 acres lies to the south of Clark Road. Clark Road is a town road, 

providing public access to Vermont Route 30.

Appellant asserts that a small portion of the land purchased by Appellees lying to the north of 

Clark Road instead belongs to him and, presumably, that it was or should have been excluded 

from the sale to Appellees. We will refer to the land as "the land purchased by Appellees" (and 

not as ' Appellees' land' ) to make clear that a small portion of that land is claimed by Appellant 

as belonging to him and excluded from Appellees' land. 

Clark Road has been in existence as a town road in its present location with respect to the land 

purchased by Appellees since before the adoption of the Cornwall Subdivision Regulations. Its 

use as a town road functionally separates that portion of the land purchased by Appellees lying to 

the north of the road from that portion of the land purchased by Appellees lying to the south of 

the road. Each portion meets all the minimum lot size and other dimensional requirements under 

the applicable zoning regulations, but even if they did not, their functional separation in the 

present case would allow them to be treated as separate existing parcels under the zoning and 
subdivision regulations. See, Wilcox v. Village of Manchester Zoning Bd. of Adj., 159 Vt. 193, 

198 (1992).

Because they are functionally separate parcels, no subdivision permit should have been required 

for Appellees to sell the portion of the land purchased by them and lying to the north of Clark 

Road, and to retain the portion of the land purchased by them and lying to the south of Clark 

Road. The fact that the definition of 'ubdivision' refers to the division of a parcel of land " with or 

without streets" into two or more lots does not change this result. Some subdivisions are laid out 

with proposed private or public streets at the time of dividing up the lots for sale; the presence of 

those streets does not insulate the proposal from being considered in its entirety a subdivision. As 

discussed in Wilcox, the fact that a street is laid out " as lines on a plan" does not necessarily 

answer the question; it is necessary to determine whether the roadway functionally prevents the 

use of the two segments as a single parcel. 

We emphasize that this decision does not decide the size or shape of or Appellant' s claim to 

some portion of the land purchased by Appellees lying to the north of Clark Road. As explained 

in the conferences and again in the November 29, 2004 entry order, if Appellant claims some of 

that land, he may wish to consider filing that claim in Superior Court. If Appellees sell the land 

lying to the north of Clark Road, it is possible that Appellant may continue to make that claim 

against any purchasers of that land, but that will be for the Superior Court to decide. This court 

does not have jurisdiction over boundary or private property disputes.

Based on the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED and ADJUDGED that Appellees' Motion for 

Summary Judgment is GRANTED. No subdivision permit was required for Appellees to sell 

whatever land they own north of Clark Road as a single parcel. Appellant remains free to file any 

claim he may have to any portion of that land in Superior Court. The Environmental Court 

hearing scheduled for January 13, 2005, is hereby cancelled. This decision and order concludes 

the above-captioned appeal.

Done at Barre, Vermont, this 2nd day of December, 2004.

___________________

Merideth Wright 

Environmental Judge