### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT KNOXVI LLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs N ove m be r 16, 200 4
CHA RLE S ED WAR D O VER BY v. ST ATE OF TEN NES SEE

Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for Bradley County

No. 01-225 Car roll L. Ross, Jud ge

No. E2004-00962-CC A-R3- P C - F iled Fe bruary 24, 2005

The petitioner, Charles Edwar d Over by , was convicted by a jury in the Br adley Count yC ri m inal Court of second de g ree murder, the ft over $1,000, the ft under $500, a g g ravated assau l t , and po sse ssi on of

mari juana . He re c e ive d a

tot a l e ff e c tiv e se nte nc e of

thi rt y -f ive y e ars inc arc e ratio n in the Te nn e sse e De pa

rt me nt o f C or

re c tio n. Sub se qu e ntl y , th e pe tit ion e r f ile d a pe tit ion fo r p os tconviction re lief, alleg ing that his trial counsel was ineffe ctive. The post-conviction cour t dismi ssed the petition, finding that counsel wa s not ineffe ctive. On a ppeal, the pe titioner challeng es this ruling and additionally

contends that he should have be en eva luated for compete n cy prior to the
c omm e nc e me nt o f t

he po st -conv ic tio n h e ari ng . U po n o ur re vie w o f there c or d a ndthe pa rt ie s’ briefs, w e af

firm the judg ment of the post-c onviction court.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Cr im ina l C our t i s A ffirm e d.

N OR MA M C G EE O G LE , J ., delivere d the opi nion of t he court, in which D AVI D H. W EL L ES and D A V ID G. H AYES , J J ., joined.

A

. W a yn e C ar t e r , C l e v e l a n d , T e n n e s s e e , f o r t h e ap p e l l a n t , C h ar l e s E d w ar d O v e r b y. Paul G. Summers, Attorney Gene ral a nd Reporter ; Seth P. Kestner, As s is ta n t A tt o rn ey

Gene ral; Jerry N. Estes, District Attorney Gene ral; and Sandr a Dona g hy , Assistant D i strict Attorney , for the appellee , State of Tenne ssee.
OP IN ION

I. F ac tu al B ac kgr ound

Th e pr oo f at the pe tit ion e r’ s tr ia l wa s su mma ri zed by the po st- c on vic tio n c ou rt a s f oll ow s:
On June 3, 19 97 , th e [pe tit ion e r] s tol e a st ate ve hic le in Geor g ia from the r esidenc e of Sergea n t Thomas Keith Swinford of the Geor g ia Depa

rtment of Natural R esourc es. [ The pe titioner] was-2- seen by Swinford’s son and later identified by him as t he per son who stole the vehicle

. There wer e seve ral fir earms in S erg eant Swinford’ s vehicle w hen it was stolen.
[Th e pe tit ion e r] the n d ro ve the Georg ia state ve hic le to B ra dle y Cou nty , T e nn e sse e , w he rehe wa s o bs e rv e d b y se ve ra l pe op le who testified at tria l to his bi zarre be havior. At one point, he stopped at the home of Roy Gra nt Bre edlove, a juvenile, and offere d him some marijuana . Br eedlove testified that [the pe tit ion e r] a

pp e are d to be “ tir e d or str un g ou t” fr om the loo k in his e y e s.
J amie F owler w as visi t i n g with his friend, Roy Allen Hampt on , inB ra dle y

Cou nty , Ten ne sse e , o n th e date of the the ft

. They had g one to school toge ther, worke d toge ther at a car pet mill for
sever al y ear s, and wer e wor king on F owler’ s vehicle at the Hampton
r e s i d e n c e w h e n [ t h e p e t i t i o n e r ] p u l l e d i n t o t h e d r i v e w a y. [The petitioner] pointed a handgun at the two men and a sked, “Where ’s my

kids at? ” Ha mpton told [ the petit ioner] that the residenc e wa s his and that there wer e no kids the re. [The petitioner] ins ist e d th a t hi s kid s we re the re , a nd , a ft e r f urthe r e xch a ng e of

wo rd s, he po int e d th e g una t H a mpt on a ndsh ot h im.

Fowle r esca

ped around the corne r of the house, w ent inside, and ca lled 911. Hampton later died as a result of the wounds inflicted b y th e g u n s h o t. A t th e tria l in th is c a u s e , F o w le r id e ntified [the petitioner] as the person w ho shot his friend.

Severa l friends and family members testified to the be havior of [the petitioner] throughout his life, and the re w as testimonythat he had suff ere d a hea d injury

in an automob ile acc ident when he was y oung . There was also testimony that, at the time of the c rime, [the pe tit ion e r] h a d b e e n ta

kin g larg e a mou nts of

a mph e ta min e s. A [p] sy chiatrist also testified that [the petitioner] was suffe ring from major depre ssion with psy chosis and mix ed substance abuse. O ther medic al per sonnel testified as to the ment al condition
o f [th e p e ti ti o n e r ]. Part of [the petitioner’s] defense a[t] trial was that he was suffe ring from insanity

at the ti me of the crimes. The jury hear d that-3- t e s t i m o n y i n t h e c a s e , i n c l u d i n g [ t h e p e t i t i o n e r ’ s ] d e f e n s e o f i n s a n i t y, a ndc on vic te d h im o f [the fo re g oin g ] of fe ns e s. Following the petitioner’s c onvictions, the t rial court imposed a tot al effec tive sentenc e of thirty -five y ear s. On direc t appea l, this court affirmed the j u d gm en t s o f t he trial c ourt. See State v. Char les Edwar d Over

by , No. E1999-00253- CCA-R3 -C D, 2000 WL 246225, at *1 (Te nn. Crim. App. at Knoxvi lle, Mar. 6, 2000)

. Subsequently , the petitioner, a cting pro se, f iled a petition f

or post-conviction relief

, alleg ing
sever al i n s t an ce s o f i n ef

fe ct i v e a s s i s t an ce o f c o u n s el , i n cl u d i n g co u n s el ’s i n ef fe ct i v en es s in pursuing a def ense of insanity when the e vidence did not support such a de fense and in fa iling to interview the me n ta l h e a lth e xp e r ts p rio r to tria l. T h e p o s t- c o n v ic ti o n c o u r t ap p o in te d c o u n s e l to a s sist the pe tit ion e r. Cou ns e l di d n ot f ile a n a me nd e d p e tit ion fo r p os t- c on vic tio n r e lie f, c ho os ing ins te a d to proce ed on the ba sis of the petitioner’s origina l pro se petition.

On J uly 3, 2002, the day schedule d for a hearing on the petit ioner’s post-c onviction petition, post-conviction counse l raised a n issue of the pe titioner’s compete ncy . Specifica lly , counsel stated that prior to the petitioner’s trial, the petitioner had been found incompete nt to stand trial; however , following treatment the petitioner wa s found to be compe tent and wa s convicted by a jury

. Counsel
mov e d fo r a n e va luatio n of the pe tit ion e r’ s c omp e te nc y to a ssi st i n th e po st- c on vic tio n p ro c e e din g s, statin g :
Since I ’ve been involved in this [ post-conviction] case, whic h

is I g ue ss ma y

be a lit tle ov e r a y e ar no w, I ’v e ha d tw o t ele phon ic
conver sations with [ the petitioner], and then we met last night at the ja il h e re in B ra dle y Co un ty . A ndI ha ve to a dv ise the Cou rt , I ’m a lit tle c on c e rn e d abo ut his abil ity to a ssi st me in pr e pa ri ng fo r t his hearing. Wh en we talked, ther e’s just a number of issues that he doesn’t re member or

doesn’t know about , t hings that he should know about in discussing the case

.

. . . .
I t’ s a

dif fe re nc e – I

int e rv ie we d h im o ve r the ph on e a c ou ple of times, and ther e’s a differ ence how I can perc eive thing s – when I see the m fac e to fa ce tha n when I do it on the phone. The post-c onviction court re marke d that “counse l obviously afte r seeing [t he petitioner] since he g ot he re is ve ry

c on c e rn e d a

bo ut h is a bil iti e s. So b a se d o n h is p ri or pr ob le ms, I ’m

inc lin e d to g rant h is motion [ for a n evaluation] , beca use I thi n k just in an abundanc e of c aution, we ne ed all of that
s q u ar ed aw ayb ef

o re we ac t u al l y

p ro ce ed

. ” T h e t ri al c o u r t e n t e r ed an o rd erau t h o ri z i n g a competenc y

evaluation of the petitioner.W e co m m end t he p o st

- co nvi ct i o n co urt , po st

- co nvi ct i o n co unsel , and t he Stat e o n t hei r t rem e n d o u s and 1 d e d ic a te d e ff

o rts to o b ta in a n e v a lua tio n fo r th e p e tit io n e r.

T he pet i t i on f

i l ed by t he s t at e ment al he al t h a ut hor i t i es was not i ncl uded i n t he r ecor d f or our r evi ew. 2

-4- The pe titioner’s ca se was set for a hearing on te n separ ate oc casions betwe en Jul y 3, 2002,
a ndJanu ary 9, 20 04

. Th e re c or d re fl e c ts that on e a c h o c c a sio n, the pa rt ie s d isc us se d e ff

orts t o o btain
an eva luation for the pe titioner. All attempts we re thwarte d beca use the menta l health authorities 1
c la ime d tha t the y we re no t auth orize d b y statut e to p e rf

orm po st- c on vic tio n c omp e te nc y e va luatio ns

. Ultimately , the post-conviction court overrule d the petitioner’s motion for mental eva luation, noting that

the state mental health authorities filed a petition to vacate the orde r

[for evaluation of the petitioner] unde r R u l e 1 3. . . .[ ] Therefor e, 2 ba se d o n Ru le 13 , w hic h s pe c if ic a lly e xclu de s p a y me nt f

or po stc on vic tio n e xperts in no n- c apit a l c a se s, a nda ft e r c on su ltatio n w ith the Public Defe nder’ s Confere nce, A ttorney Gene ral’s Confe re n ce, a ndAd min ist

rativ e Of fi c e of th e Cou rt s, thi s Co urt f ind s th a t said evaluation is not authorized by statute. Subsequently , an evide ntiary hearing was held on the m erits of the petit ioner’s pro se petition for post-c onviction relief . At the hea ring , the petitioner testified, “ I fee l pretty

g ood today . . . . I

take my me dic ine re g ula

r, a nd it’ s just g ot me c le are d up. ” He state d tha t he wa s in be tte r m e nta l he a lth at t he post-convic tion hearing than he ha d been at trial because he w as see ing doc tors reg ularly . The pe tit ion e r ma int a ine d that he un de rs too d th e po st- c on vic tio n p ro c e e din g s a ndkn e w that he wa s in
c ou rt “ [t]o h a ve a

po st- c on vic tio n to se e if

it’ s, it , an y

pa rt of the tr ia l di dn ’t

g o rig ht the la st t ime or it wasn’t tried right. I f it’s not tried rig ht, I g et another

trial.” The pe titioner asserte d that he could not remember the proof that wa s adduce d at trial, nor could he unde rstand the tria l proce eding s as they happ ened. As one of his issues, the petitioner complained that the determination t hat he was competent to stand trial was made five mont hs befor e trial beg an; howeve r, he w as not ree valu at ed for competenc y immediately

prior to trial. The pe tit ion e r t e sti fi e d tha t he co uld no t re me mbe r his tr ia l tes tim on y or the te sti mon y

of oth e r w itn e sse s. Ad dit ion a lly , th e pe tit ion e r m a int a ine d th a t hi s tria l cou ns e l wa s ine ff e c tiv e by pu rs uin g a

de fe ns e of insanity

when a ll the mental health experts involved ag ree d that a def ense of insanity

could not be supported. Finally , the petitioner maintaine d that he would not havepled g uiltyto second de g ree murder, but he would have ple d g uiltyto a lesser offe nse. The pe titioner’s trial counse l testified that from the be g inning of his rep re sentation of the petitioner, the pe titioner would say “spontane ous nonsensical thing s, and he a dmit t ed h e was on dr ug s at th e tim e [of the of

fe ns e s].” B e c a us e the kil lin g wa s “ no ns e ns ic a l,” c ou ns e l auto ma tic a lly
c on sid e re d p ur su ing a n in sa nity de fe ns e

. Mo re ov e r, c ou ns e l ass e rt e d th a t no oth e r d e fe ns e wo uld have be en succ essful bec ause of the streng th of the State’s proof

.-5-

Tria l c ou ns e l te sti fi e d th a t in iti a lly he be lie ve d the pe tit ion e r w a s c omp e te nt t o s ta ndtr ia l. Ho we v er , t h e p et i t i o n er ’s fa m i l y ad v i s ed co u n s el o f t h e p et i t i o n er ’s “ b i z a r r e” an d “t h re at en i n g” b e h a v i o r ; t h e r e f

o r e , c o u n s e l p e t i t i o n e d t h e c o u r tt o h a v e h i me v a l u a t e d f o r c o m p e t e n c y a n d i n s a n i t y. Trial counse l rec alled that “the initial determination that he was n o t co m p et ent to stand trial was ba se d u po n n ot n e c e ssa

ri ly

. . . a nythi ng oth e r tha n d e pr e ssi on

. . . . [H]e wa s too , too de pr e sse d to function prope rly .” Ultimately , the petitioner wa s rende red c ompetent to stand trial.

Counsel rec alled that the menta l health ex perts who evaluated the petitioner ha d conclude d that he suff

ere d from paranoid schizophrenia. Trial c ounsel asserted that “their rec ords wer e a lot strong er in his beha lf than their testimony in court.” H e asse rted that the e x perts “ba ckpeda led” a nd “downplay ed” the petition er ’s d i agnosis during their trial testimony , attributing the petitioner’s behavior to “drug induced psy chosis.”
Reg arding his prepar ation of the e x pert wi t n esses, trial c ounsel maintained that “ we ha d a problem g etting them here at the appropriate time, and f or most of them, I

just had to shoot from the hip. But I , I

did have a ll of their re cor d s , and all their, a ll the data. I f the, if the data, the medica l
rec ords had not suppor t ed o u r p o sition, Iwould not have e ven subpoena ed them to start with.” Counsel admitted that he did not interview the experts prior to trial. Howe ver, he asserted that he had “quite a

time to talk” with the experts “during the pende ncy of the trial.”

Trial counse l conce ded that all of the experts testified that despite the pe titioner’s mental illness, an insanity

defe nse could not be supported. Counsel maintained that he “ didn’t rea liz e” that
wo uldbe the po sit ion of a ll the e xpe rt s. Cou ns e l sta te d tha t if he ha d r e a lize d th a t th e e xpe rt s w ou ld opine that the insanity

defe nse could not be supported,
[t ]hen there would have been no further proof, a nd if I

had chose n not to call them, and then I

don’t thin kthat would have be en a g ood str a te g y
. . . . I

rr e sp e c tiv e of

wh a t the y

mig ht s a y

abo ut the ult imate issue in the case, every one of them had rec ords, indisputable rec ords that indicated pr oblems wi t h [ t he petitioner], that one could infe r mental hea lth pro b l ems. And we had no other way of introducing th a t o th e r th e m th r o u g h th e s e me n ta l h e a lth p r o f e s s io n a ls

. . . . [W] e couldn’t have broug ht out not onlytheir clinica l conclusio ns otherwise, and we couldn’t have broug ht out all this biz arr e beha vior and re cords that c o me in throug h the hea rsay exceptions of the medical r ecor ds. S o t h er e was e very rea son to procee d forwa

rd, no matter what they

wer e g oing to say

on the ultimate issue. Additionally , counsel re called that the only plea offe red by the State was for the offe nse of second de g ree murder. Counsel did not believe that the State was willing to a cce pt a plea on a lesser offe nse

. F u r th e r , c o u n s e l s tate d th a t th e r e w a s n o th in g to lo s e b y g o in g to tria l b e c a u s e the petitioner’s medic al re cords r aised “ a viable de fense ” of insanity

.-6-

Ba sed upon the for eg oing pr oof, the post-c onvicti o n co urt denied the petition for re lief, finding that “[t] here has bee n no showing in this case t h at t h e re prese ntation by counsel wa s not within the require d ‘ra ng e of c ompetency ’ demanded by Strickland.” On a

ppeal, the pe titioner contests both the post-conviction court’s denial of a mental evaluation prior to the post-convic tion hearing and the denial of

post-conviction re lief.

II. Ana lys is

A. Post-Conviction C ompetency Evaluation
First, we will address the petitioner’s complaint reg arding the pos t-conviction court’s failure to order a competencyevaluation prior to the post-conviction hea ring . I nitially , we note that the po st- c on vic tio n c ou rt ’s de nia l of the re qu e st fo r a co mpe te nc y e va luatio n is re vie we d f

or a n a bu se of dis c re tio n. Se e State v. Sc ott , 3 3 S. W.3 d 7 46 , 7 52 (T e nn . 2 00 0) . As we state d e arl ie r, the po stc on vic tio n c ou rt ov e rr

ule d the pe tit ion e r’ s mot ion fo r a c omp e te nc y

e va luatio n, fi nd ing “ that sa id evaluation is not authorized by statute.” On appeal, the petitioner ha s failed to provideany citation of authority

to support his claim that an indige nt, non-ca pital, post-conviction petitioner is entitled to a co mpe te nc y

he ari ng to d e te rm ine wh e the r h e is a ble to a ssi st w ith the pr e se ntatio n o f h is p os tconviction claims. Ge ner al l y , s uch an omission constitutes a waive r of the c ontested issue. See Te nn

. Ct. Cr im. Ap p. R. 10 (b ); Te nn

. R. A pp . P. 27 (a )( 7) . N e ve rthe le ss, we wi ll b ri e fl y a dd re ss this issue.

I n d e nying re lie f, the po st- c on vic tio n c ou rt re lie d up on Rul e 13 of the Rul e s o f the Sup re me Court. The court noted that Rule 13 does not authorize a c ourt to order expert service s for a noncapital post-c onviction petitioner. Our review revea ls that the post-conviction court’s assessment
o f Ru le 1 3 is c o rr e c t. See J ohn Pau l S e a ls v
. St a te , N o

. E 2 0 0 1

- 0 1 7 5 6

- CC A

- R3

- PC , 2 0 0 2 WL 14 82 77 2, a t *3 (T e nn . Crim. Ap p. a t Kno xvill e , J uly 11 , 200 2) . H ow e ve r, thi s c ou rt ha s p re vio us ly indicated that a co m p et en cy hearing may be orde red by

a court for a non- capital post-c onviction petitioner under

Rule 28 of the Rules of th e Supreme Court. See Jesse C. Minor v. State, No. M2001-00545-CCA-R10-PC, 2001 W L 1545498, at *8 (Te nn. Crim. App. at Nashvi l l e, De c. 5, 2001). Rule 28 provides that a cour t may

“make [] . . . order s as ar e nec essary to the eff

icient manag ement of the case .”
Reg ardless, even if the post-c onviction court had the authority to order a

competenc y evaluation, we conc lude that in the instant case the petitioner ha s failed to show that a competenc y e va luatio n w a s n e e de d. Th e peti tio ne r t e sti fi e d at th e po st- c on vic tio n h e ari ng that he “ fe lt p re tty g oo d” a ndwa s ta

kin g me dic ine re g ula

rl y to i mpr ov e his me nta l he a lth . T he pe tit ion e r a lso
ma int a ine d tha t he und e rs too d the po st- c on vic tio n p ro c e e din g a ndwa s a ble to t e sti fy

a s to the iss ue s. Mo re ov e r, we no te that po st- c on vic tio n c ou ns e l c ho se to p ro c e e d u nd e r the pe tit ion e r’ s pr o se po stconviction petition, appar ently finding no need to file an ame nded petition. Finally , we note that the only ineffe ctive assistanc e issue t h e p et i tioner has c hosen to pursue on a ppeal c oncerns trial counsel’s de cision to pursue an insanity defe nse. This issue did not require the petitioner’s testimony . We conclude that the petitioner is not entitled to relief on this issue.-7- B. Ineff ective A ssistance of Counsel

To be successful in his claim for post-c onviction relief, the petitioner must prove a ll factua l alleg ations contained in his post-conviction petition by clea r and c onvincing evidenc e. See Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-30-110( f) (2003). “‘Clea r and convincing evidenc e means e vidence in which there is n o s e r io u s o r s u b s tan ti a l d o u b t ab o u t th e c o rr e c tn e s s o f th e c o n c lu s io n s d r a w n f r om the
e vid e nc e .’ ” Sta te v. Ho lde r, 15 S.W. 3d 90 5, 91 1 (T e nn

. Cr im. Ap p. 19 99 ) ( qu oti ng Ho dg e s v . S. C. To of & Co. , 8 33 S.W. 2d89 6, 90 1 n .2 (T e nn

. 19 92 ))

. I ssu e s re g ard ing the c re dib ili ty of wi tne sse s, the weig ht and value to be acc orded the ir testimony , and the f actua l questions raised by the evidenc e adduce d at trial ar e to be r esolved b y t h e p o s t-conviction court as the trier of fa ct. See He nley

v. S t at e, 9 6 0 S

. W

. 2 d 5 7 2 , 5 7 9 (T en n

. 1 9 9 7 ). T h er ef o re , we af fo rd th e p o s t -c o n v i ct i o n co u rt ’s fi n d i n gs of fa ct the we ight of

a jury verdic t, with suc h finding s being conclusive on a ppeal a bsent a showing that the evidenc e in the re cord pr eponder ates a g ainst those finding s. I d. at 578.

“To e stablish ineffec tive assistance of counse l, the petitioner bea rs the burde n of proving both that counsel’s pe rformance was de ficient a nd that the deficiency prejudice d the defense.” Goad v. State, 938 S.W .2d 363, 369 (Tenn. 1996) (citi n g S t rickland v. Washing ton, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct

. 2052, 2064 (1984))

. I n evaluating whether the petitioner has met this burden, this court must determine whe ther c ounsel’s per formanc e wa s wit h i n t he rang e of c ompetence require d of attorney s in criminal ca ses. See B axter v. Rose, 523 S.W .2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975) . A claim of ineffe ctive assistance of counsel is a mix ed question of law and fa ct. See State v. B urns, 6 S.W.3d 453, 461 (Tenn. 1999) . We will review the post-c onviction court’s finding s of fa ct de novo with a presumption that those finding s are corr ect. See Fields v. State, 40 S.W .3d 450, 458 (Tenn. 2001)

. Howeve r, we will review the post-conviction court’s conclusions of law purely de novo. I d. The pe titioner al l ege s o n appeal that “it is unthinkable that trial counsel would pursue a defe nse and ne ver interview the ve ry witnesses intended to be used in support of the de fense .” As
we ha ve no te d, in the in sta nt c a se , tria l c ou ns e l pu rs ue d a de fe ns e of

ins a nit y . Se ve ra l e xpe rt s testified that the petitioner suf fer ed fr om a mental illness; however , the experts did not find that the petitioner could not appr eciate the wr ong fulness of his conduct as a r esult of his mental illness. Trial counsel testified that he did not interview the experts prior to trial, but he did revie w the petitioner’ s medical r ecor ds. Furthe r, counse l briefly spoke with the experts during trial. Trial c ounsel ave rre d that his decision to pr esent the testimony of the experts w ithout intervie wing them befor ehand w as based, in pa

rt, on trial strateg y . Additionally , counsel maintaine d that he did not want to alert the experts to the questi ons he would ask during trial, fea ring that the experts would plan answe rs which
wer e more damag ing to the pe titioner. Counsel chose to rely primarily upon the petitioner’s me ntal he a lthre c or ds to su pp ort the pe tit ion e r’ s c la ims of me nta l il lne ss. We w ill no t no w s e c on d- g ue ss counsel’s de cision. See J ohnson v. State, 145 S.W .3d 97, 120 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2004). Moreove r, the proof of

the petitioner’s g uilt at trial was over whelming . There fore , we ca n d i s cern no app re c ia ble pr e judi ce su ffere d b y

the pe tit ion e r a s a

re su lt o f c ou ns e l’ s st

rate g y . T his iss ue is wi tho ut m e ri t.-8- III. Conclusi on Finding no reve rsible er

ror, we aff

irm the judg ment of the post-c onviction court.

___________________________________ NORMA McGEEOGLE, J UDGE