Illinois Official Reports 

Appellate Court

People v. Darr, 2018 IL App (3d) 150562

Appellate Court 

Caption

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. 

DAVID C. DARR, Defendant-Appellant.

District & No. Third District

Docket No. 3-15-0562

Filed

Rehearing denied

January 10, 2018

February 6, 2018

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Tazewell County, No. 14-CF-153; 

the Hon. Paul P. Gilfillan, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed in part and vacated in part.

Remanded with directions. 

Counsel on

Appeal

Michael J. Pelletier, Peter A. Carusona, and Dimitri Golfis, of State 

Appellate Defender’s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.

Stewart J. Umholtz, State’s Attorney, of Pekin (Patrick Delfino, 

Lawrence M. Bauer, and Justin A. Nicolosi, of State’s Attorneys 

Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.
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Panel PRESIDING JUSTICE CARTER delivered the judgment of the court, 

with opinion.

Justices Holdridge and Wright concurred in the judgment and opinion.

 OPINION 

¶ 1 Defendant, David C. Darr, appeals following his conviction on three counts of predatory 

criminal sexual assault of a child and two counts of criminal sexual assault. He argues that an 

accumulation of errors resulted in a fundamentally unfair trial and requests that this court 

vacate his convictions and remand for a new trial. Alternatively, defendant argues that his 

pro se posttrial claims of ineffective assistance of counsel warranted a preliminary Krankel

inquiry, which the circuit court failed to conduct. Finally, defendant argues that the circuit 

court erred in imposing the public defender fee without first conducting the requisite hearing 

on defendant’s financial circumstances. We affirm defendant’s convictions and sentence and 

vacate the public defender fee. 

¶ 2 FACTS 

¶ 3 In a bill of indictment filed April 17, 2014, the State charged defendant with three counts of 

predatory criminal sexual assault of a child (counts I to III) (720 ILCS 5/11-1.40(a)(1) (West 

2014)) and three counts of criminal sexual assault (id. § 11-1.20(a)(3)).1 Counts I to III 

referenced events occurring between December 29, 2006, and December 28, 2012. Count I 

alleged that defendant knowingly made contact with the vagina of C.J. with his penis. Count II 

alleged defendant knowingly made contact with the vagina of C.J. with his fingers. Count III 

alleged defendant knowingly made contact with the mouth of C.J. with his penis. 

¶ 4 Prior to trial, the State filed a motion to admit other-crimes evidence pursuant to section 

115-7.3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/115-7.3 (West 2014)). 

Specifically, the State sought to introduce evidence of defendant’s prior conviction for 

predatory criminal sexual assault of a child committed in 1996. In addition to the certified 

conviction, the evidence would include the testimony of the victim in that case, J.M.; 

testimony of Dennis Minton, to whom defendant admitted J.M.’s allegations were true; a 

written admission by defendant; and a letter written by defendant to the prosecutor in that case 

further admitting to the offense. The State later orally amended its motion to include testimony 

from J.S., who would testify that defendant had sexual contact with her when she was seven or 

eight years old. The court granted the State’s motion.

¶ 5 The evidence at trial established that C.J. was born on December 29, 1999. C.J.’s mother is 

Colleen R. Colleen’s two sisters (C.J.’s aunts) are Sondra B. and Karen O. In addition to C.J., 

Colleen has two other daughters and one son. One of the other daughters is defendant’s 

biological child. Colleen and defendant entered into a relationship in 2002 or 2003. 

Approximately three years later, defendant moved in with Colleen in a house located on North 

Main Street in North Pekin. Colleen’s four children, including C.J., also lived at the house. 

 

1The State dropped the third count of criminal sexual assault prior to the commencement of 

defendant’s trial. 
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Defendant’s two older daughters from a different relationship—Kayla and Erica—would live 

periodically at the house. 

¶ 6 The evidence further established that defendant was born on February 3, 1967. Prior to his 

relationship with Colleen, defendant was married to Delta V. (also known as Delta Darr). Delta 

was the cousin of Colleen, Sondra, and Karen. It was through Delta’s marriage that the sisters 

originally knew defendant. Delta has two nieces, J.M. and J.S., who were born in 1984 and 

1986, respectively. 

¶ 7 Sondra testified that she had a close relationship with C.J. Sondra lived in Missouri until 

C.J. was approximately 12 years old, and C.J. would often visit for weeks at a time. When 

Sondra moved back to North Pekin, C.J. and her sisters would often spend weekends at 

Sondra’s home. Sondra testified that C.J. had always been an outgoing child and was 

“happy-go-lucky.” When C.J. was 12 years old, however, Sondra began to notice a change in 

C.J.’s personality. She noticed that C.J. did not like to be around any adults and did not like to 

play with other children. She preferred to be alone. Sondra described C.J. as becoming “very 

withdrawn.”

¶ 8 Toward the end of March 2014, C.J. stayed at Sondra’s house during her spring break. 

March 30 was a Sunday; C.J. was to return to school the next day. Though the plan had been 

for C.J. to return home that evening, she asked Sondra if she could spend the night and have 

Sondra drive her to school in the morning. Sondra called Colleen, but Colleen decided that C.J. 

needed to come home to get ready for school. Sondra testified that she repeatedly told C.J. to 

get ready to return home, but C.J. continued to procrastinate. 

¶ 9 C.J. eventually went to the front porch of Sondra’s home, where Sondra’s sister-in-law, 

Sherry H., was sitting. Sondra testified that C.J. had been on the porch with Sherry for 

approximately five minutes when the two came back into the house, C.J. crying. Sondra had 

never seen C.J. that upset. Sherry told Sondra that they needed to speak privately, so they went 

to the basement with C.J. Sondra testified that she asked C.J. what was wrong, and that C.J. 

responded, “Aunt Sondra, I’m scared, I don’t want to go home. [Defendant is] messing with 

me.”

¶ 10 At this point, defense counsel objected on hearsay grounds. The State responded, “it’s 

[offered] for the effect on the listener and what she did in response to it. [C.J.] will testify to all 

of this.” The court sustained the objection in part, stating:

“With regard to the hearsay objection, the jury will be instructed, just as they were 

moments ago, any claimed statement by [C.J.] at this point in time is not to be taken by 

you as the truth of the matter that that occurred for what she said. Rather, that statement 

is coming in for the limited purpose of showing what impact it had on this witness here. 

 As counsel indicated and as other counsel has as well, [C.J.] will be testifying on 

first hand information allegations later.”

¶ 11 Sondra reiterated that C.J. told her that defendant “was messing with her.” They talked in 

the basement for approximately 25 to 30 minutes. C.J. pleaded to not be taken home. Sherry 

called Karen, who then came to Sondra’s house. Karen, Sondra, Sherry, and C.J. went to the 

North Pekin Police Department. 

¶ 12 Michael Sea of the North Pekin Police Department testified that he was off duty on the 

night of March 30, 2014. Around 10 p.m., he received a phone call from Karen, who was a 

friend of Sea’s wife. Sea testified, “Karen called me and stated that her niece [C.J.] had ***
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talked to her and stated that she had been molested.” He clarified that Karen had specifically 

told him that C.J. said defendant had molested her. Sea knew C.J. because she was of similar 

age to his own daughters and had been to his house several times. He also knew defendant. Sea 

called Bryon Martin, also of the North Pekin Police Department, because Sea knew Martin was 

familiar with the family. 

¶ 13 Sea went to the police station at approximately 10:15 p.m. He noticed that C.J. was upset 

and crying or, as he put it, “not her normal self.” Sea remained at the police station while 

Martin spoke with C.J., but Sea himself was not formally a part of the investigation. He 

testified that an agent of the Department of Child and Family Services (DCFS) came to the 

station and established a safety plan, which included removing C.J. from her home. 

¶ 14 Martin testified that he was at home on the night of March 30, 2014, when he received a 

telephone call from Sea. Regarding that phone call, Martin testified, “He told me that [C.J.] 

was ready to talk about [defendant] touching her.” Martin arrived at the police station around 

10:15 p.m., where he noticed that C.J. was visibly upset. Martin spoke with Karen, Sherry, 

Sondra, and C.J. Martin testified that his conversation with C.J. was brief because after she 

made an allegation of sexual abuse he terminated the interview and arranged for a child 

advocacy center (CAC) interview. 

¶ 15 Martin testified that Colleen eventually arrived at the station. Martin informed her that C.J. 

had made an allegation of sexual abuse against defendant. He testified that Colleen had no 

emotional reaction to the news. Martin explained that under the DCFS safety plan, Colleen’s 

three daughters would go to Karen’s house and Colleen’s son would go to Sondra’s house. 

¶ 16 On April 4, 2014, Jeff Jackson of the North Pekin Police Department arrested defendant. 

Jackson informed defendant that he was being charged with predatory criminal sexual assault. 

Martin was present for the arrest and defendant’s subsequent transport. Martin testified that no 

questions were asked of defendant while he was in the squad car, but defendant did enquire as 

to “why it was predatory.” When Martin explained that the charge was “based upon the 

timeline,” defendant “said something about her being over 13.”

¶ 17 C.J. testified that she lived in the home on North Main street in North Pekin with Colleen 

and defendant for approximately 11 years. She testified that on the night of March 30, 2014, 

she told Sondra that defendant had molested her. Soon thereafter, Karen arrived at Sondra’s 

house, and they all went to the police station. At the police station, C.J. told officers “that over 

the past couple of years, [defendant] had been coming in my room. He’s been asking me to do 

things and everything else.” C.J. did not go into full detail with the officers that night but went 

into more detail in the CAC interview conducted a few days later. 

¶ 18 C.J. testified that her first encounter with defendant occurred at her mother’s house. C.J. 

was in the bathroom and heard a knock on the door. She opened the door to find defendant 

standing before her. C.J. testified, “He just told me to back into the bathroom, and he took 

pictures of my butt.” Further, she testified, “He had me lean over the toilet, and he pulled my 

pants down and took pictures of my butt.” C.J. testified that she was “[l]ike 7, almost 8” years 

old when that happened. 

¶ 19 C.J. immediately told Karen about the bathroom incident, and Karen took C.J. to Colleen. 

After C.J. told Colleen what had happened, Colleen and Karen spoke to each other privately. 

Later, a DCFS agent came to the home. C.J. testified that she told the DCFS agent what 

happened but stated that defendant had not touched her. She told the DCFS agent this because 

she did not want to be taken away from her mother. 
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¶ 20 Later, when C.J. was approximately eight years old, defendant began going into C.J.’s 

bedroom at night. C.J. explained, “He’d unbutton my pants and he’d stick his hands in my 

vagina.” She clarified that defendant’s finger or fingers went inside her vagina. C.J. testified 

that defendant’s behavior was continuous from the time she was eight years old until she 

alerted authorities. She estimated it had occurred at least 100 times. Though C.J. shared a 

bedroom with her two younger sisters, she believed they were asleep during the encounters. 

¶ 21 C.J. also testified that when she was 11 or 12 years old, she went to her mother’s bedroom 

to retrieve cigarettes for her mother, and defendant followed her. She continued, “He came in 

and like closed the door like halfway and had me lay on my mom’s bed and pulled down my 

shorts and he got on top of me and had sex with me.” C.J. confirmed that defendant put his 

penis in her vagina and moved back and forth. She testified that this was not the first time 

defendant had put his penis in her vagina. He had done the same thing in her bedroom when 

she was nine years old. 

¶ 22 C.J. recalled another incident as well: 

“[C.J.]: I was in the bathroom getting ready to go to bed, and he came in and had me 

sit on the toilet. 

 [STATE]: About how old were you then? 

 [C.J.]: 13 maybe, and he—

 [STATE]: Were you 13 or were you younger? 

[C.J.]: I might have been younger.”

C.J. further explained that on that occasion, defendant placed his penis inside her mouth and 

moved it back and forth. He later told her to clean her mouth. On cross-examination, C.J. 

estimated she was “[l]ike 11 or 12” when the incident in the bathroom occurred.

¶ 23 C.J. testified that her mother had instituted a rule that none of the children in the house 

were to be alone with defendant. C.J. testified that she had been living with her father since she 

came forward, but she missed living with her mother. In the time that defendant was molesting 

her, C.J. did not tell anyone because she continued to fear that she would be taken from her 

mother. 

¶ 24 Colleen testified that she continued to live on North Main Street in North Pekin and had 

lived there for more than 25 years. She testified that defendant moved into that home in 2005, 

when C.J. was five or six years old. When defendant moved in, Colleen established a rule that 

he would never babysit or be alone with the four children. The rule was crafted because 

Colleen knew defendant was a registered sex offender and also knew he had been convicted of 

an offense. Defendant’s two daughters, Erica and Kayla, were now in their twenties and would 

occasionally stay at the house. 

¶ 25 Colleen recalled the incident in which Karen told her that defendant had taken photographs 

of C.J.’s buttocks. Colleen confronted defendant the next day but did not find the pictures on 

his phone. Defendant continued to live at the house after the incident. 

¶ 26 Colleen did not receive a telephone call on the night of March 30, 2014. After C.J. had not 

returned from Sondra’s house for some time, Colleen and defendant got into a vehicle with the 

intent of finding her. Because her home is directly adjacent to the North Pekin police station, 

however, Colleen immediately noticed Karen’s van in the police station parking lot. Before 

Colleen could head to the police station, defendant exited the vehicle. He told Colleen he was 

going to go to his sister’s house because “he had a feeling something was wrong.”
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¶ 27 Karen testified that she had known C.J. since C.J.’s birth. Karen and C.J. had always had a 

close relationship, largely because C.J. spent so much time at Karen’s house when she was 

growing up. Karen described C.J. as “[v]ery talkative, outgoing, [and] vibrant” when she was a 

young child. But as C.J. became older, she became more withdrawn and introverted. Karen 

began noticing these changes in C.J.’s personality when she was seven years old.

¶ 28 Karen recalled the incident in the bathroom at the North Main Street house to which C.J. 

had referred. Karen testified that she was at the house doing her laundry that evening. She 

eventually fell asleep in the front room of the house but woke up at approximately 5 a.m. Karen 

went toward the back of the house to use the bathroom, where she noticed defendant exiting 

the room. Defendant shut the bathroom door behind him and remained standing in front of it. 

When Karen told defendant she needed to use the bathroom, defendant told her C.J. was using 

it.

¶ 29 Defendant eventually relented, and Karen entered the bathroom. She saw C.J. crying. 

Karen testified, “She was really upset. She had said that [defendant] tried to take a picture of 

her bottom and told me that he pushed her on her back to have her bend over the toilet seat so 

he could take the picture.” Defendant was wearing a black flip phone on his belt. Karen 

immediately took C.J. to Colleen’s bedroom, where C.J. told her Colleen what had happened. 

When Colleen failed to notify the police, Karen did so. From that time forward, Karen saw 

significantly less of C.J. because Colleen did not want the children to see Karen with such 

regularity. Karen testified that she began seeing more of C.J. again in 2014. 

¶ 30 On March 30, 2014, Karen received a telephone call from Sherry, Sondra’s sister-in-law. 

Based on that telephone call, Karen called Sea, then she went to pick up C.J. from Sondra’s 

house. When she arrived, she saw that C.J. was crying. Karen took C.J. to the police station, 

where they both spoke with the officers. 

¶ 31 Dennis Minton of the North Pekin Police Department testified regarding an incident that 

occurred in 1996 and he investigated in 1998. Minton testified that he came to interview J.M., 

who told him that she had been home with defendant when defendant placed his mouth on her 

vagina then placed his penis in her vagina. The incident occurred when J.M. was 11 years old. 

Defendant was her uncle. 

¶ 32 Minton subsequently went to defendant’s home, where he was living with Delta, his wife at 

the time. Minton transported defendant from his home to the police station. Minton testified 

that during the ride “[defendant] asked me if this was about [J.M.], and I told him it was, and he 

said that he was glad that it was going to be over with.” Minton eventually relayed J.M.’s 

accusations to defendant, and defendant told Minton “it was basically true.” Minton testified 

that defendant explicitly admitted to having sexual intercourse with J.M. Defendant later 

provided a written confession, which was submitted into evidence at the present trial. 

Defendant was placed under arrest for predatory criminal sexual assault of a child and 

ultimately pled guilty. 

¶ 33 J.S., J.M.’s sister, testified that when she was 10 or 11 years old, her aunt Delta was 

married to defendant. Around that time, J.S. recalled an incident that occurred while she was at 

Delta’s house. She testified, “I remember being in a doorway and having [defendant] pull my 

pants down and licking me in my vagina.” Referring to a separate incident, J.S. testified, 

“[T]here was a time after that that we were laying in bed and he had me touch his penis.” In 

April 2014, shortly after defendant had been arrested, J.S. saw defendant while she was at 
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Erica’s house. Defendant told her that if she was confronted by detectives, she should tell them 

she did not know anything. 

¶ 34 Erica, defendant’s daughter, testified for the defense. She stated that defendant was diligent 

about following the rule against his being alone with the children. Erica testified that when she 

stayed at the house on North Main Street, she either slept in the young girls’ bedroom or on the 

couch. She would frequently stay awake until the early morning hours. She never saw 

defendant get up in the middle of the night. 

¶ 35 At the close of proofs, the parties engaged in closing arguments. In its argument, the State 

pointed out that the victim must be “under 13 years of age when the act was committed” in 

order to sustain a conviction for predatory criminal sexual assault. With regard to count III, the 

State argued “[C.J.] told you she was 11 or 12 years old she thought.” In his responsive 

argument, defense counsel pointed out that C.J. originally testified that she was 13 when that 

incident took place or, alternatively, that she was unsure of her exact age. 

¶ 36 Later, in the State’s rebuttal argument, the State declared:

“It is unfortunate that [C.J.], a girl who, when she sat here yesterday, a 15-year-old 

teenager, I submit was quite different when she was six, seven, eight years old. You put 

your eyes in the eyes of a young child and imagine, as she told us, imagine what it was 

like to be subjected to the actions that she was subjected to. 

 How was she able to survive that? *** [T]he evidence shows, that she survived it 

by keeping her mouth shut because—and maybe it’s not understandable to some 

people, I submit respectfully it is understandable from her seven, eight, nine-year-old 

mind, the most important thing was to keep her family together, stay with her mother. 

 You saw her mother. The evidence shows that she will not win mother of the year 

by any stretch of the imagination. But to [C.J.], that was her only mother and she didn’t 

want to be taken away from her. And now, because of this man’s actions, she is away 

from her mother.”

The State further addressed in its rebuttal argument C.J.’s age during the incident alleged in 

count III. The State argued: 

“[Defense] [c]ounsel talked about Count 3 and he said that [C.J.] said, well, that 

happened when I was 13. He is right. When I, of course, asked that question, she said 

that she thought she was 13. And I then asked her well, were you actually younger than 

that? She says well 12[.] [B]ut the evidence shows that when she was asked by counsel 

on cross-examination, she said, no, that happened when I was 11 or 12 in response to 

his [question]. And that was her answer that she never changed.”

¶ 37 Following arguments, the court delivered instructions to the jury. In delivering those 

instructions, the court stated, “A person commits the offense of predatory criminal sexual 

assault of a child when he knowingly commits an act of sexual penetration when he is 17 years 

of age or older and the victim is 13 years of age or under when the act was committed.” 

Immediately thereafter, the court read the elements of the offense with respect to count I, 

including, “And third proposition, that C.J. was under 13 years of age when the act was 

committed.” Before proceeding to the elements of count II, the court stated: 

“I am just going to read the definition of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child 

once more. And that’s when a person knowingly commits an act of sexual penetration 
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when he is 17 years of age or older and the victim is under 13 years of age when the act 

was committed.”

The court then read the elements that needed to be proven on each of the remaining counts. In 

reciting the propositions for count II and count III, the court stated on each occasion that the 

State must prove C.J. was “under 13 years of age when the act was committed.”

¶ 38 The written instructions provided to the jury also indicated, with respect to each of the first 

three counts, that the State was obligated to prove C.J. was under 13 years old. In sum, the 

phrase “under 13 years of age” appears four separate times within the written instructions.

¶ 39 The jury found defendant guilty on all counts. 

¶ 40 On August 7, 2015, defendant filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and 

for a new trial. The circuit court denied the motion the same day. The court then sentenced 

defendant to life sentences on each of the three counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a 

child and 20-year sentences of imprisonment on each of the criminal sexual assault counts. All 

sentences would be served consecutively. At the end of the sentencing hearing, defense 

counsel raised the issue of the public defender fee. Counsel then discussed with the court his 

hours and the amount of defendant’s posted bond. The court ordered defendant to pay a $750 

public defender fee, which appeared with the imposed sentences on the written judgment 

order. 

¶ 41 The common law record contains a fully handwritten document prepared pro se by 

defendant, bearing a Tazewell County clerk file stamp of August 7, 2015. The top of the 

document reads “In the Appeallate [sic] Court of Illinois,” while the caption reads, in part, 

“Appeal from the circuit court of the Tazewell County.” The heading directly beneath the 

caption reads, “I David C. Darr comes [sic] to you in this appeal with the request of a new trail 

[sic] on the grounds of ineffective counsel.” Throughout the document, defendant lists a 

number of grievances he had with defense counsel. The document was never addressed in 

court. The final page of the pro se document is defendant’s notice of appeal.

¶ 42 ANALYSIS 

¶ 43 Defendant raises a number of issues on appeal. First, he contends that a number of errors at 

his trial had the cumulative effect of depriving him of his due process right to a fair trial. 

Separately, he argues that the circuit court erred in failing to conduct a preliminary Krankel

inquiry into the pro se claims of ineffective assistance of counsel he made in his August 7, 

2015, filing. Finally, defendant contends the circuit court erred in imposing the public defender 

fee without first conducting a hearing on defendant’s financial circumstances or ability to pay.

¶ 44 I. Cumulative Error 

¶ 45 Defendant has identified a total of eight alleged errors that he claims had the cumulative 

effect of depriving him of a fair trial. Those eight errors may be grouped into four broader 

categories: (1) hearsay statements, (2) violation of the confrontation clause, (3) prosecutorial 

misconduct in closing arguments, and (4) legally erroneous jury instructions. We will further 

detail defendant’s contentions of error in the corresponding sections below.

¶ 46 At the outset, defendant acknowledges that he failed to preserve for review each of the 

alleged errors. Defendant briefly argues, without citation to authority, that “[w]hether each of 

the individual errors has been forfeited is irrelevant to a cumulative-error claim.” Defendant 
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also asserts that “the State has not argued that [defendant’s] cumulative-error claim is 

forfeited.” We reject defendant’s position. We are aware of no authority—and defendant has 

cited no such authority—to support the contention that, by combining multiple unpreserved, 

forfeited errors, a defendant may transform his claim into one that is preserved or not forfeited. 

¶ 47 Alternatively, defendant argues that this court address his argument under the rubric of 

plain error. The doctrine of plain error provides a limited exception to the general rule of 

forfeiture. People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167, 177 (2005). The first step in any plain error 

analysis is to determine whether a clear or obvious error occurred. See People v. Piatkowski, 

225 Ill. 2d 551, 565 (2007). 

¶ 48 If a reviewing court determines that a clear or obvious error occurred at the trial level, the 

burden is placed on the defendant to demonstrate that the error was prejudicial. People v. 

Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d 598, 613 (2010). This differs markedly from ordinary review of 

preserved errors, in which, upon the finding of error, it is the State’s burden to prove that the 

error was not prejudicial, and was therefore harmless. People v. McLaurin, 235 Ill. 2d 478, 495 

(2009) (“[W]here the defendant has made a timely objection and properly preserved an error 

for review, the reviewing court conducts a harmless-error analysis in which the State has the 

burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice. [Citation.] However, where the defendant fails 

to make a timely objection and therefore forfeits review, the reviewing court will examine the 

record only for plain error. In a plain-error review, the burden of persuasion remains on the 

defendant.”).

¶ 49 In plain-error review, the defendant may demonstrate prejudice in one of two ways. First, 

under what is commonly known as first-prong plain error, a defendant may demonstrate that 

the evidence at trial was so closely balanced that the error in question threatened to impact the 

result of the trial. People v. Sebby, 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 51. The showing of prejudice under the 

first prong has often been referred to as a showing that the error was “ ‘actually prejudicial.’ ” 

Id. (quoting Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 193)).2

¶ 50 Under what has come to be known as the second prong of plain error, a defendant may 

show that an error is so grave that prejudice must be presumed, regardless of how closely 

balanced the evidence was at trial. Id. ¶ 50. To show that an error is reversible under the second 

prong, a defendant must demonstrate that the error “was so serious it affected the fairness of 

the trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process.” Id.

¶ 51 In the present case, defendant does not argue that the errors raised are actually prejudicial 

under the first prong. Instead, defendant contends that the accumulation of errors resulted in a 

fundamentally unfair trial, warranting reversal under the second prong. Notably, defendant 

does not claim that any of the errors alleged had the individual effect of depriving him of a fair 

trial. Thus, our analysis must proceed as follows. First, we must determine which of the eight 

alleged errors actually constitute “clear or obvious” errors. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d at 565. 

Then, we must determine whether the cumulative impact of those errors “affected the fairness 

 

2Our supreme court has recognized that the term “actual prejudice” does not imply that there must 

be a direct showing that an error specifically impacted the decision of a fact finder. Instead it refers to a 

higher likelihood that such was the case. As the court put it, “The defendant need not prove that the 

error in the instruction actually misled the jury. *** We deal with probabilities, not certainties; we deal 

with risks and threats to the defendant’s rights. When there is error in a close case, we choose to err on 

the side of fairness, so as not to convict an innocent person.” Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 193. 
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of the trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process.” Sebby, 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 50. 

¶ 52 A. Hearsay Statements 

¶ 53 The Illinois Rules of Evidence define hearsay as “a statement, other than one made by the 

declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the 

matter asserted.” Ill. R. Evid. 801(c) (eff. Jan. 1, 2011). Hearsay is generally inadmissible, 

except in those circumstances in which the rules of evidence dictate otherwise. Ill. R. Evid. 802 

(eff. Jan. 1, 2011). Under the definition provided in Illinois Rule of Evidence 801(c), it is 

axiomatic that an out-of-court statement that is offered into evidence for reasons other than to 

prove the truth of the matter asserted is not hearsay. See Ill. R. Evid. 801(c) (eff. Jan. 1, 2011). 

One common admissible purpose for which such statements may be offered is to show the 

effect of the statement on the listener. E.g., People v. Gonzalez, 379 Ill. App. 3d 941, 954 

(2008) (“an out-of-court statement offered to prove its effect on a listener’s mind or to show 

why the listener subsequently acted as he did is not hearsay and is admissible”). Illinois Rule of 

Evidence 105 dictates that when certain evidence is admissible “for one purpose but not 

admissible *** for another purpose is admitted, the court, upon request, shall restrict the 

evidence to its proper purpose or scope and instruct the jury accordingly.” Ill. R. Evid. 105 (eff. 

Jan. 1, 2011).

¶ 54 Defendant has identified three statements3 from witnesses at his trial that he characterizes 

as inadmissible hearsay, the admission of which he claims constituted error. First, Sea testified 

that Karen told him that C.J. told Karen defendant had molested C.J. Second, Martin testified 

that Sea told him C.J. was “ready to talk” about defendant molesting her. Third, Karen testified 

that C.J. told her defendant had pushed on her back to make her bend over the toilet seat so 

defendant could take a photograph of her buttocks. 

¶ 55 To be sure, each of the statements identified by defendant refer to statements made by 

persons other than the person testifying. However, in each instance, the statements were 

offered for reasons other than the truth of the matter asserted. Specifically, the person 

testifying was explaining the effect the statement had on him or her, that is, how the statement 

moved the testifying party from point A to point B. 

¶ 56 For example, Sea’s testimony that Karen told him C.J. told her defendant molested her was 

not offered to prove that defendant molested C.J., but as part of a narrative showing why Sea 

called Martin and commenced an investigation. Martin’s testimony regarding his conversation

with Sea was offered for the same reason, to show how Martin got from his home to the police 

station and interviewed C.J. Karen’s testimony regarding C.J.’s accusation that defendant had 

taken photographs of her buttocks was offered not to prove that the incident happened, but to 

show why Karen confronted Colleen and subsequently fell out of major contact with C.J. in the 

years in which defendant committed his crimes. 

¶ 57 Perhaps more obviously, C.J.’s statement to Karen, to which Karen testified, is a clear 

example of an excited utterance. Illinois Rule of Evidence 803(2) provides that “[a] statement 

relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of 

 

3Defendant technically claims that a fourth statement—Minton’s testimony regarding what J.M. 

said to him—also constituted inadmissible hearsay. However, he also argues that the same testimony 

was a violation of the confrontation clause. Accordingly, we will address defendant’s entire argument 

relating to Minton’s testimony in subsection B.
- 11 - 

excitement caused by the event or condition” is not excluded by the hearsay rule. Ill. R. Evid. 

803(2) (eff. Apr. 26, 2012). “For the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule to apply, 

‘there must be an occurrence sufficiently startling to produce a spontaneous and unreflecting 

statement, there must be an absence of time for the declarant to fabricate the statement, and the 

statement must relate to the circumstances of the occurrence.’ ” People v. Connolly, 406 Ill. 

App. 3d 1022, 1025 (2011) (quoting People v. Sutton, 233 Ill. 2d 89, 107 (2009)). Here there 

can be no doubt that the incident in question was sufficiently startling, and Karen testified that 

she entered the bathroom immediately after defendant left, while C.J. was still in tears. 

¶ 58 Defendant points out that the circuit court did not explicitly limit the admission of those 

particular statements to the purposes listed above. While discussing his fourth claim of hearsay 

(see supra ¶ 54 n.3), defendant asserts: 

“Given that the jury was never instructed that this testimony was admitted for a limited 

purpose, it cannot be said that the testimony was only admitted for that purpose. 

Because the jury was not given such an instruction, it cannot be assumed that the jury 

did not consider J.M.’s out-of-court statement for the truth of the matter asserted.”

¶ 59 We wholly reject defendant’s position. Illinois Rule of Evidence 105 makes clear that the 

onus is on the party seeking limited admission to request an instruction to that effect. Ill. R. 

Evid. 105 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011) (“[T]he court, upon request, shall restrict the evidence to its 

proper purpose or scope and instruct the jury accordingly.” (Emphasis added.)). Defendant 

made no such request in regards to these particular statements. Further, defendant’s argument 

is logically unsound in that it would provide a windfall to defendants who fail to object at trial. 

Under defendant’s position, out-of-court statements that are quite clearly offered at trial for 

reasons other than the truth of the matter would necessarily be declared inadmissible hearsay 

on appeal if the defendant had failed to object or request a limiting instruction. Such a result 

would be absurd. 

¶ 60 Finally, it should be noted that the circuit court implicitly did deliver a limiting instruction. 

Early in the State’s case, the defense objected to Sondra’s testimony that C.J. had told her 

defendant was “messing with” her. The court then issued the following limiting instruction: 

“[A]ny claimed statement by [C.J.] at this point in time is not to be taken by you as the truth of 

the matter that that occurred for what she said. Rather, that statement is coming in for the 

limited purpose of showing what impact it had on this witness here.” See supra ¶ 10. It is 

reasonable that defense counsel, going forward, did not object and seek a limiting instruction 

each and every time a person testified about what C.J. told them. It is also reasonable that the 

jury was capable of applying that limiting instruction to future testimony. 

¶ 61 Because we find that the statements in question did not constitute hearsay, it follows that 

there was no clear or obvious error committed in the admission of those statements. 

¶ 62 B. Confrontation Clause 

¶ 63 Defendant next contends that Minton’s testimony regarding what J.M. told him as part of 

his 1998 investigation was testimonial in nature. He thus argues that because J.M. did not 

testify at trial, the admission of J.M.’s statement through Minton’s testimony was a violation of 

his confrontation clause right. Separately, defendant also argues that Minton’s testimony 

constituted hearsay. In response, the State argues that Minton’s testimony regarding J.M.’s 

statements to him was not hearsay because it was not offered for the truth of the matter 

asserted. In reply, defendant disagrees with the State’s characterization (see supra ¶ 57) and 
- 12 - 

also insists that the State’s argument is unresponsive to his confrontation argument. In essence, 

defendant asserts that a violation of the confrontation clause turns only on whether J.M.’s 

statement was made out-of-court and was testimonial in nature, regardless of whether it was 

hearsay. 

¶ 64 The confrontation clause of the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution 

provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right *** to be 

confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. Const., amend. VI. In application, the clause 

provides that “[t]estimonial statements of witnesses absent from trial” are barred unless the 

defendant has had prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. Crawford v. Washington, 

541 U.S. 36, 59 (2004); see also In re Rolandis G., 232 Ill. 2d 13, 24 (2008) (“[T]he 

[Crawford] Court held that testimonial out-of-court statements may be admitted as evidence at 

trial only if the declarant testifies or the declarant is unavailable and the defendant has had a 

prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.”).

¶ 65 Some cases, such as Rolandis G. thus refer exclusively to “testimonial out-of-court 

statements” as the target of the confrontation clause. See also, e.g., People v. Ousley, 235 Ill. 

2d 299, 303 (2009). This is the language upon which defendant relies in his briefs. More cases, 

however, refer to “testimonial hearsay” as the type of evidence barred by the confrontation 

clause. E.g., Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 823 (2006). Other cases, meanwhile, used 

those or similar phrases seemingly interchangeably. E.g., Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 

419 (2007); Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51, 53. Indeed, our own supreme court has on separate 

occasions used both phrases to describe the holding in Crawford. Compare People v. Stechly, 

225 Ill. 2d 246, 250 (2007) (“[T]he United States Supreme Court decided [Crawford], which 

held that the testimonial hearsay statements of a witness who is absent from trial may not be 

admitted against a criminal defendant ***.” (Emphasis added.)), with Sutton, 233 Ill. 2d at 110 

(“In Crawford, the United States Supreme Court held that testimonial out-of-court statements

may be admitted as evidence at trial only if the declarant testifies ***.” (Emphasis added.)).

¶ 66 It is apparent that courts have used phrases like “testimonial out-of-court statements” and 

“testimonial hearsay” to have the same functional meaning. However, as this case 

demonstrates, the two formulations are far from identical. As discussed above, not every 

out-of-court statement (by a nontestifying declarant) is hearsay. See supra ¶¶ 53-56. For 

example, when an out-of-court statement is offered not for the truth of the statement, but for 

some other purpose, it is not hearsay. Ill. R. Evid. 801(c) (eff. Jan. 1, 2011). Thus, to say the 

confrontation clause bars testimonial out-of-court statements is far broader than to say it bars 

testimonial hearsay. 

¶ 67 Despite its conflicting language on the confrontation clause, the United State Supreme 

Court has addressed the present issue directly. In a parenthetical within a footnote to its 

opinion in Crawford, the Court wrote, “The [Confrontation] Clause also does not bar the use of 

testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted.” 

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n.9. In 2010, our supreme court recognized the distinction drawn in 

the Crawford footnote and thus held: “[W]e need only consider whether a statement was 

testimonial if the statements at issue were, in fact, hearsay statements offered to prove the truth 

of the matter asserted.” People v. Williams, 238 Ill. 2d 125, 142 (2010). 

¶ 68 Minton’s testimony regarding J.M.’s accusations against defendant was not hearsay. J.M.’s 

accusations were not offered for their truth but to illustrate why Minton got defendant and 

transported him to the police station. Further, J.M.’s statements served as the basis for 
- 13 - 

defendant’s first admission to the offense, as after Minton relayed them to defendant, 

defendant agreed “it was basically true.” Because J.M.’s statements to Minton were not offered 

to prove the truth of the matter asserted, there can be no confrontation clause violation 

stemming from their admission. Id. 

¶ 69 C. Prosecutorial Misconduct in Closing Argument 

¶ 70 Defendant raises three contentions of error relating to the State’s closing argument, 

characterizing each as an instance of prosecutorial misconduct. The three comments to which 

defendant takes exception are: (1) “You put your eyes in the eyes of a young child and 

imagine, as she told us, imagine what it was like to be subjected to the actions that she was 

subjected to,” (2) “You saw [C.J.’s] mother. The evidence shows that she will not win mother 

of the year by any stretch of the imagination. But to [C.J.], that was her only mother and she 

didn’t want to be taken away from her. And now, because of [defendant’s] actions, she is away 

from her mother,” and (3) “And I then asked her well, were you actually younger than that? 

She says well 12.” Defendant argues that the first two comments were error in that they were 

solely intended to inflame the passions of the jury. He contends the final comment was a 

misstatement of the evidence. 

¶ 71 It is well-settled that prosecutors are afforded wide latitude in making their closing 

arguments. People v. Wheeler, 226 Ill. 2d 92, 123 (2007). However, “[c]losing argument must 

serve a purpose beyond inflaming the emotions of the jury.” Id. at 128; see also People v. 

Halteman, 10 Ill. 2d 74, 84 (1956) (“[I]t is improper for the prosecutor to make statements the 

only effect of which is to inflame the passions or develop the prejudices of the jury without 

throwing any light upon the issues ***.”). As the language of the prevailing cases make clear, 

the inflaming of the jury’s passions is not directly barred; rather, any commentary that does so 

must also serve a different, proper purpose. E.g., People v. Blue, 189 Ill. 2d 99, 128 (2000) 

(“[A]rgument that serves no purpose but to inflame the jury constitutes error.”). It is, of course, 

error for a prosecutor to misstate the evidence. See People v. Jackson, 2012 IL App (1st) 

102035, ¶¶ 16-17. 

¶ 72 Both of the comments that defendant claims served only to inflame the passions of the jury 

also served purposes far more important to the State’s case. Because C.J. herself was the only 

direct witness to defendant’s conduct, the State had to rely on circumstantial evidence to 

corroborate her story. As part of that strategy, the State introduced evidence that both Sondra 

and Karen had noticed a marked difference in C.J.’s personality from the time she was a young 

child to the time she was a teenager, a period roughly correlating to defendant’s crimes. In 

asking the jury to put themselves in C.J.’s shoes, the State was evoking the inference that being 

the victim of repeated sexual abuse would explain why C.J. transformed from being outgoing 

to withdrawn. Indeed, the State prefaced the comment selected here by defendant by saying “I 

submit [C.J.] was quite different when she was six, seven, eight years old.”

¶ 73 Similarly, the State’s reference to C.J.’s mother was plainly an attempt to bolster C.J.’s 

credibility. As defendant’s conduct occurred over a period of approximately seven years, the 

State was tasked with providing a reason that C.J. had not come forward sooner. C.J.’s 

testimony showed that she did not wish to be separated from her mother. The State recognized 

that although the jury was unlikely to consider Colleen a particularly good mother, that would 

not negate C.J.’s desire to stay with her. Further, in stating that C.J. now was separated from 

Colleen “because of [defendant’s] actions,” the State was illustrating that C.J.’s concerns with 
- 14 - 

coming forward were not unfounded. 4 As each of the first two comments identified by 

defendant served a purpose other than to inflame the passions of the jury, we find that neither 

constituted error. See Blue, 189 Ill. 2d at 128. 

¶ 74 Finally, to determine if the State did misstate the evidence with regard to C.J.’s testimony 

about her age, we must compare that testimony with the prosecutor’s summary. During her 

direct examination, C.J. and the State engaged in the following exchange: 

“[STATE]: About how old were you then?

 [C.J.]: 13 maybe, and he—

 [STATE]: Were you 13 or were you younger? 

[C.J.]: I might have been younger.”

Thus, C.J.’s testimony on direct examination regarding the conduct charged in count III was 

that she might have been younger than 13 years old.5 In its rebuttal argument, the State 

accurately relayed that C.J. originally testified that she was 13 years old during that incident. 

The State continued, “And I then asked her well, were you actually younger than that? She says 

well 12.”

¶ 75 The State recounted that C.J. testified she was 12 years old, when she actually testified that 

she “might have been younger” than 13 years old. To be sure, this misstatement of the evidence 

by the State was merely technical in nature. This is especially true considering the State needed 

only to prove C.J. was younger than 13 years old, as opposed to proving a specific age. See 720 

ILCS 5/11-1.40(a)(1) (West 2014). Nevertheless, at this point in our analysis, we are not 

considering the potential impact of an error, only whether clear or obvious error occurred. 

Because the “clear or obvious” descriptor is a measure of an error’s conspicuousness, rather 

than its magnitude, we conclude that such an error did occur when the prosecutor misstated 

C.J.’s testimony.

¶ 76 D. Jury Instruction Error 

¶ 77 Finally, defendant argues that the circuit court committed error when it orally instructed 

the jury that predatory criminal sexual assault is committed when, inter alia, the victim is “13 

years of age or under.” See supra ¶ 37. The State does not contest that this instruction was 

error. Indeed, a victim must be younger than 13 years old to sustain a conviction for predatory 

criminal sexual assault of a child. 720 ILCS 5/11-1.40(a)(1) (West 2014). Accordingly, the 

circuit court committed a clear and obvious error. 

 

4

In passing, defendant also argues that the State misstated the evidence in that C.J. was not 

separated from Colleen “because of [defendant’s] actions” but because of Colleen’s decisions. This 

argument is reductive. The evidence showed that C.J. was removed from the house by DCFS 

immediately upon making her accusations against defendant. It is reasonable to infer that her continued 

absence from the house is related. Whether the continued separation is “because of” defendant’s actions 

or Colleen’s decisions is ultimately semantic, as the two are clearly intertwined. 

5We note here that on cross-examination, C.J. testified that she was “11 or 12” years old when that 

incident occurred. 
- 15 - 

¶ 78 E. Prejudice 

¶ 79 Defendant argues that the accumulation of errors at his trial rendered the trial 

fundamentally unfair. While defendant initially raised eight contentions of error as part of his 

arguments, we have concluded that only two of those eight instances actually constituted clear 

or obvious error for the purposes of our plain error analysis. 

¶ 80 In reference to the first of these errors—the State’s misstatement regarding C.J.’s age—we 

begin by noting that defendant does not argue that this type of error alone is a second-prong 

error, nor is this court aware of any cases suggesting that a misstatement of evidence in closing 

argument is a second-prong error. As to the cumulative error claim, we find that the State’s 

“error” was so minor and technical in nature that any contribution the error made toward 

rendering defendant’s trial unfair was de minimis at best. 

¶ 81 As to the second error found by this court, defendant asserts that the provision of 

conflicting jury instructions “is a grave error that is not harmless and deprives the defendant of 

a fair trial.” Of course, this argument parrots the second-prong standard. See Sebby, 2017 IL 

119445, ¶ 50. Our analysis therefore turns on whether the provision of conflicting instructions 

in this case affected the fairness of the trial or undermined the judicial process, such that the 

error would be reversible under the second prong. Id.

¶ 82 Defendant relies primarily on People v. Ayers, 331 Ill. App. 3d 742, 750 (2002), in which 

the First District held, “Where conflicting instructions are given, one of which is a correct 

statement of the law and the other is an incorrect statement of the law, the error is not harmless 

and constitutes grave error.” In support, the Ayers court cited to People v. Haywood, 82 Ill. 2d 

540, 545 (1980), in which our supreme court wrote, “[T]he rule in Illinois is that when 

conflicting instructions are given, one of which is a correct statement of law and the other is an 

incorrect statement of law, the error is not harmless.” Ayers, 331 Ill. App. 3d at 750 (citing 

Haywood, 82 Ill. 2d at 545). In turn, the Haywood court cited to its decision in People v. 

Jenkins, 69 Ill. 2d 61, 66 (1977), in support of the same proposition. Haywood, 82 Ill. 2d at 545 

(citing Jenkins, 69 Ill. 2d at 66). Importantly, each of these three cases involved conflicts 

present in the written pattern instructions presented to the jury. 

¶ 83 In People v. Alvine, 173 Ill. 2d 273, 290 (1996), the supreme court made clear that the harm 

in conflicting jury instructions derives from the potential that such a conflict undermines the 

jury’s function. The court wrote: 

“While this court has previously held that jury instructions should be considered as a 

whole and not in isolation [citation], this proposition rests on the assumption that the 

jury instructions clearly and properly inform the jurors of the law. [Citations.] But 

when inconsistent instructions are presented to a jury, the jury’s ability to perform its 

function is inhibited because the jury has not been adequately apprised of the law to be 

applied. [Citations.] When the instructions are confusing and create a situation in 

which the jurors believe they are forced to choose between conflicting elements within 

the instructions, as here, the instructions as a whole cannot be considered curative of 

the confusion.” Id. 

¶ 84 As the erroneous instruction in the present case was given orally, rather than in the written 

jury instructions, Haywood and Jenkins are not controlling. Moreover, when the jury 

instructions are considered as a whole, it is clear that there was absolutely no possibility that 

the jury was confused or would have felt compelled to choose between two different 

instructions. The circuit court’s single misstatement was followed immediately by numerous 
- 16 - 

correct instructions as to the same element, both orally and in writing. The written instructions 

taken to the jury room were accurate. Further, the emphasis of both parties’ closing arguments 

made clear that a conviction for predatory criminal sexual assault required the victim to be 

under 13 years of age at the time of the offense. 

¶ 85 In sum, the circuit court’s erroneous instruction in this case was made orally, only once, 

and immediately corrected numerous times. This stands in stark contrast to the uncorrected, 

contradictory written instructions that our supreme court had held to undermine the fairness of 

a trial. A single instance of a circuit court misspeaking, when that misstatement is immediately 

and repeatedly corrected, does not result in an unfair trial, and certainly does not challenge the 

integrity of the judicial process. Accordingly, defendant’s cumulative plain error argument is 

rejected, and his convictions are affirmed. 

¶ 86 II. Krankel

¶ 87 Defendant next argues that if this court does not vacate his convictions pursuant to his 

cumulative error argument, it should instead remand so the circuit court may hold a 

preliminary Krankel inquiry. He maintains that his pro se filing in the circuit court, though 

styled as an appeal, nevertheless contained explicit assertions of ineffective assistance of 

counsel, thus mandating the preliminary Krankel inquiry. 

¶ 88 When a defendant makes pro se posttrial claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, the 

circuit court must conduct an initial inquiry into those claims. People v. Jolly, 2014 IL 117142, 

¶ 29 (citing People v. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181 (1984)). If, after the inquiry, the court finds the 

claims lack merit, it may dismiss them; if the court finds possible neglect of the case, the court 

should appoint new counsel to fully pursue the ineffectiveness claims. Our supreme court has 

recently held that “an express claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is all that is necessary 

to trigger a Krankel inquiry.” People v. Ayres, 2017 IL 120071, ¶ 21. 

¶ 89 As a general matter, “[w]hen the notice of appeal is filed, the appellate court’s jurisdiction 

attaches instanter, and the cause is beyond the jurisdiction of the trial court.” People v. Bounds, 

182 Ill. 2d 1, 3 (1998). Any ruling made by the circuit court in the absence of jurisdiction is 

void. People v. Flowers, 208 Ill. 2d 291, 306 (2003). 

¶ 90 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 606(b) (eff. Dec. 11, 2014) holds that “[w]hen a timely 

posttrial or postsentencing motion directed against the judgment has been filed *** any notice 

of appeal filed before the entry of the order disposing of all pending postjudgment motions 

shall have no effect and shall be stricken by the trial court.” The rule further provides that 

“[t]his rule applies whether the timely postjudgment motion was filed before or after the date 

on which the notice of appeal was filed.” Id. Accordingly, when a timely posttrial or 

postsentencing motion directed against the judgment is filed, even after a notice of appeal is 

filed, the notice must be stricken. E.g., People v. Rowe, 291 Ill. App. 3d 1018, 1020 (1997) 

(“[T]he timely filing of a postsentencing motion (i.e., within 30 days of the judgment) acts as 

an implicit motion to dismiss the notice of appeal and renders the notice of appeal 

ineffectual.”). Under section 116-1(b) of the Code, a defendant must bring a motion for a new 

trial within 30 days of the return of a verdict. 725 ILCS 5/116-1(b) (West 2014). 

¶ 91 In People v. Patrick, 2011 IL 111666, our supreme court considered the intersection of the 

common law Krankel procedures and the procedural mandates set forth in the Code and 

supreme court rules. The court noted a clear distinction between the two, writing: 
- 17 - 

“[T]he State’s attempt to graft the statutory requirement in section 116-1(b) onto a 

common law remedy is fundamentally flawed. A pro se posttrial motion alleging 

ineffective assistance of counsel is not a new trial motion as outlined in section 116-1. 

Rather, it is part of a separate common law procedure developed in a line of cases 

beginning with Krankel.” Id. ¶ 30. 

The court concluded that a defendant raising pro se ineffectiveness of counsel claims is 

exempt from the 30-day requirement of section 116-1(b). Id. ¶ 42. 

¶ 92 While the Patrick court ruled that Krankel claims were exempt from certain procedural 

requirements, it emphasized that the jurisdictional rules relating to notices of appeal were still 

applicable, writing, “We note that once a notice of appeal has been filed, the trial court loses 

jurisdiction of the case and may not entertain a Krankel motion raising a pro se claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel.” Id. ¶ 39. Further, in carving out the Krankel exception to 

section 116-1(b), the court reiterated that the notice of appeal rules still apply: “[A]n exception 

to [the 30-day requirement] is if a defendant is seeking a new trial based on claims of 

ineffective assistance of counsel and the claim is raised before a notice of appeal is filed.” 

(Emphasis added.) Id. ¶ 42. 

¶ 93 In the present case, defendant did not raise his ineffectiveness claims before the notice of 

appeal was filed. In fact, he filed the two contemporaneously, apparently as a single filing. 

Once the notice of appeal was filed, the circuit court lost jurisdiction; had it conducted any sort 

of Krankel inquiry at that point, any resulting ruling would be void. Flowers, 208 Ill. 2d at 306. 

¶ 94 We must next consider whether Rule 606(b) is applicable to defendant’s Krankel claim. If 

that rule is applicable, and defendant’s filing may be considered a timely posttrial motion, the 

effect of that filing would be the striking of the notice of appeal and return of jurisdiction to the 

circuit court so that it may rule upon defendant’s claims.

¶ 95 We find that in the present case, Rule 606(b) does not act to undermine the notice of appeal 

and return jurisdiction to the circuit court. We base this holding primarily on the court’s 

decision in Patrick, which calls into doubt whether that rule has any import on a Krankel claim. 

First, Patrick stands generally for the proposition that statutory procedural rules should not be 

grafted onto the common law Krankel remedy. Patrick, 2011 IL 111666, ¶ 30. More 

importantly the Patrick court explicitly stated that when a notice of appeal is filed, “the trial 

court loses jurisdiction of the case and may not entertain a Krankel motion.” Id. ¶ 39. The court 

made no reference to Rule 606(b) or any potential that a Krankel motion might render the 

notice of appeal ineffectual such that the circuit court retained jurisdiction.6

¶ 96 Finally, the Patrick court’s repeated references to the notice of appeal, when the notice of 

appeal was not at issue in that case, were far more than mere dicta. The court recognized that in 

divorcing Krankel claims from the requirements of section 116-1(b) of the Code, it was 

removing those claims from the auspices of the primary posttrial timeliness rule in criminal 

procedure. So as to make clear that Krankel claims were still bound by some timeliness 

requirements, the court repeatedly invoked the filing of the notice of appeal as, essentially, the 

 

6Our conclusion here only applies to those situations where a defendant makes his Krankel claims 

contemporaneously with the filing of the notice of appeal, or, by logical extension, where a defendant 

makes those claims after the notice of appeal has been filed. We express no opinion on the procedure to 

be followed where a defendant raises pro se claims of ineffective assistance of counsel clearly prior to 

the filing of the notice of appeal. 
- 18 - 

final deadline to make such claims. To hold that Krankel claims should still be ruled upon after 

the notice of appeal has been filed is not only contrary to the spirit and letter of Patrick, but it 

would essentially leave no rule governing the timeliness of such claims. 

¶ 97 Defendant points out that the defendant in Ayres, our supreme court’s most recent 

contribution to Krankel jurisprudence, also filed his pro se claims of ineffectiveness 

contemporaneously with his pro se notice of appeal. In that case, the supreme court held that 

the circuit court had erred by failing to conduct a preliminary Krankel inquiry. Ayres, 2017 IL 

120071, ¶¶ 6, 24. Though the issue of the notice of appeal was not addressed by the supreme 

court, defendant would argue that the court’s grant of relief to Ayres implies a finding that the 

circuit court would have jurisdiction to conduct a Krankel inquiry. 

¶ 98 Defendant’s argument ignores a key factual distinction between Ayres and the present case. 

In Ayres, the defendant’s attorney filed a timely postsentencing motion on September 26, 

2013. Id. ¶ 6. In turn, the defendant’s pro se notice of appeal and contentions of ineffective 

assistance of counsel were filed on September 30, 2013. People v. Ayres, 2015 IL App (4th) 

130996-U, ¶ 6. Thus, it was not the defendant’s Krankel claim that negated his notice of appeal 

and allowed the circuit court to retain jurisdiction by operation of Rule 606(b), but counsel’s 

earlier timely filed postsentencing motion. That motion clearly triggered Rule 606(b), such 

that the circuit court in that case still had jurisdiction to entertain the defendant’s Krankel

claim, even after he filed his notice of appeal. 

¶ 99 The same is not true in this case. When defendant filed his notice of appeal, even 

contemporaneously with his ineffectiveness claims, he had perfected his appeal and deprived 

the circuit court of jurisdiction. Accordingly, the circuit court did not err in failing to conduct a 

preliminary Krankel inquiry, as it was without jurisdiction to do so. Of course, the court’s 

failure to address defendant’s ineffectiveness claims would not prevent him from raising those 

same claims on appeal. However, defendant has not done so. 

¶ 100 III. Public Defender Fee 

¶ 101 Finally, defendant contends that the circuit court erred in imposing the public defender fee 

without first conducting a hearing on defendant’s financial circumstances and ability to pay. 

The State concedes that such a hearing is a prerequisite to the imposition of the public defender 

fee and concedes that the hearing was not held in this case. The parties do, however, dispute the 

proper remedy. 

¶ 102 Payment for court-appointed counsel is governed by section 113-3.1(a) of the Code. 725 

ILCS 5/113-3.1(a) (West 2014). That section expressly provides for a hearing in which the 

court shall consider defendant’s financial circumstances in determining the amount to be paid. 

Id. Our supreme court has held that the hearing is mandatory. People v. Gutierrez, 2012 IL 

111590, ¶ 26 (“Pursuant to statute, a public defender fee may be imposed only by the circuit 

court after notice and a hearing on the defendant’s ability to pay. We again remind the trial 

courts of their duty to hold such a hearing before imposing these fees, and we trust that we will 

not have to speak on this issue again.”). We accept the State’s concession that the public 

defender fee must be vacated and remand the matter with directions that the circuit court enter 

an order vacating the fee along with an updated costs sheet. 

¶ 103 Defendant contends that vacatur of the fee should be the end of the matter. The State, 

however, argues that the circuit court should, on remand, hold the hearing on defendant’s 

ability to pay. The parties agree that the issue of remand turns on whether the circuit court can 
- 19 - 

be described as having held “some sort of a hearing” on the matter. People v. Somers, 2013 IL 

114054, ¶ 15. 

¶ 104 We agree with defendant and find that there was not “some sort of hearing” on the issue. In 

People v. Moore, 2015 IL App (1st) 141451, ¶ 39, the First District reached the same 

conclusion on remarkably similar facts, writing: 

“Although insufficient to satisfy section 113-3.1(a) requirements, the trial court in 

Somers did have ‘some sort of hearing’ when it delved into the area of defendant’s 

financial circumstances by asking about his employment and his ability to work. In *** 

this case, there were no questions whatsoever posed to defendant regarding his 

financial status, his employment, his ability to work, or his ability to pay. The trial 

court did not address defendant at all. In addition, there is no indication that in 

imposing the fee, the trial court consulted the presentence investigation report or any 

affidavit that defendant may have filled out regarding his assets after requesting the 

services of the public defender. In short, there was no ‘sort of hearing.’ ”

We adopt the reasoning of the Moore court completely. On remand, the circuit court should 

vacate the public defender fee previously imposed and may not conduct a hearing on the matter 

or reimpose the fee. 

¶ 105 CONCLUSION 

¶ 106 The judgment of the circuit court of Tazewell County is affirmed in part, vacated in part, 

and remanded with directions. 

¶ 107 Affirmed in part and vacated in part. 

¶ 108 Remanded with directions.