26208 Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 102 / Friday, May 24, 1996 / Notices

decision was proper. Therefore, he

concluded summary disposition of this

matter would not be appropriate.

However, the Respondent did not deny

that his state Physician’s and Surgeon’s

Certificate had been revoked, or that he

was, therefore, without authority to

hand controlled substances in the State

of California.

On November 15, 1995, Judge Bittner

issued her Opinion and Recommended

Decision, (1) finding that the Board had

revoked the Respondent’s Physician’s

and Surgeon’s Certificate and that,

therefore, the Respondent was without

authority to handle controlled

substances in California, (2) granting the

Government’s Motion for Summary

Disposition, and (3) recommending that

the Respondent’s DEA Certificate of

Registration be revoked. On December

18, 1995, the Respondent filed a Petition

for Reconsideration of Recommendation

of Administrative Law Judge to Revoke

Respondent’s DEA Certificate of

Registration, and by ruling dated

December 21, 1995, Judge Bittner

denied his petition. On January 11,

1996, Judge Bittner transmitted the

record of these proceedings and her

opinion to the Deputy Administrator.

The Deputy Administrator has

considered the record in its entirety,

and pursuant to 21 CFR 1316.67, hereby

issues his final order based upon

findings of fact and conclusions of law

as hereinafter set forth. The Deputy

Administrator adopts, in full, the

Opinion and Recommended Decision of

the Administrative Law Judge, and his

adoption is in no manner diminished by

any recitation of facts, issues and

conclusions herein, or of any failure to

mention a matter of fact or law.

The Deputy Administrator finds that

the parties do not dispute that (1) the

Board revoked the Respondent’s

Physician’s and Surgeon’s Certificate by

an order effective October 9, 1995, and

(2) consequently, the Respondent is

without authority to handle controlled

substances in the State of California.

The Drug Enforcement

Administration does not have statutory

authority under the Controlled

Substances Act to register or maintain

the registration of a practitioner who is

not duly authorized to handle

controlled substances in the state in

which he conducts his business. 21

U.S.C. 802(21), 823(f), and 824(a)(3).

This prerequisite has been consistently

upheld. See Dominick A. Ricci, M.D., 58

FR 51,104 (1993); James H. Nickens,

M.D., 57 FR 59,847 (1992); Roy E.

Hardman, M.D., 57 FR 49,195 (1992);

Myong S. Yi, M.D., 54 FR 30,618 (1989);

Bobby Watts, M.D., 53 FR 11,919 (1988).

Further, the Deputy Administrator

finds that Judge Bittner properly granted

the Government’s motion for summary

disposition. Here, the parties did not

dispute that the Respondent was

unauthorized to handle controlled

substances in California.Therefore, it is

well-settled that when no question of

fact is involved, a plenary, adversary

administrative proceeding involving

evidence and cross-examination of

witnesses is not obligatory. See

Dominick A. Ricci, M.D., 58 FR at

51,104 (finding it well-settled that

where there is no question of material

fact involved, a plenary, adversarial

administrative hearing was not

required.); see also Phillip E. Kirk, M.D.,

48 FR 32,887 (1983), aff’d sub nom Kirk

v. McMullen, 749 F. 2d 297 (6th Cir.

1984); Alfred Tennyson Smurthwaite,

M.D., 43 FR 11,873 (1978); NLRB v.

International Association of Bridge,

Structural and Ornamental Ironworkers,

AFL–CIO, 549 F.2d 634 (9th Cir. 1977).

Also, the Deputy Administrator finds

that Judge Bittner appropriately denied

the Respondent’s petition for

reconsideration. The Respondent

asserted that, since he was licensed to

practice medicine in Hawaii, the ‘‘issue

of whether [his] DEA registration should

be revoked is not moot,’’ and that the

hearing in this matter should proceed as

scheduled. However, as Judge Bittner

noted, the Order to Show Cause

proposed to revoke the Respondent’s

registration to handle controlled

substances at his California place of

business, and thus, the status of the

Respondent’s licenses in other

jurisdictions has no bearing on the

pending matter. On that basis, Judge

Bittner denied the Respondent’s

petition, and the Deputy Administrator

concurs with her decision.

Accordingly, the Deputy

Administrator of the Drug Enforcement

Administration, pursuant to the

authority vested in him by 21 U.S.C. 823

and 824, and 28 CFR 0.100(b) and 0.104,

hereby orders that DEA Certificate of

Registration BC0495122, issued to YingMing Chang, M.D., be, and it hereby is,

revoked, and any application to renew

this registration is hereby denied. This

order is effective June 24, 1996.

Dated: May 17, 1996.

Stephen H. Greene,

Deputy Administrator.

[FR Doc. 96–13050 Filed 5–23–96; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4410–09–M

[Docket No. 94–36]

Jeffrey Patrick Gunderson, M.D.;

Revocation of Registration

On March 11, 1994, the Deputy

Assistant Administrator (then Director),

Office of Diversion Control, Drug

Enforcement Administration (DEA),

issued an Order to Show Cause to

Jeffrey Patrick Gunderson, M.D.,

(Respondent) of Brunswick, Georgia,

notifying him of an opportunity to show

cause as to why DEA should not revoke

his Certificate of Registration,

BG1368516, under 21 U.S.C. 824(a), and

deny any pending applications for

registration as a practitioner under 21

U.S.C. 823(f), for the following reasons:

(1) On August 3, 1992, the

Respondent was arrested in St. Paul,

Minnesota, for felony possession of

LSD, a Schedule I controlled substance,

and, at the time of his arrest, he had in

his possession LSD, marijuana, and

Didrex;

(2) On September 9, 1992, the

Respondent pled guilty in state court to

a felony charge of possession of a

controlled substance, and was convicted

of this offense in November of 1992;

(3) In April of 1993, the Respondent

was observed inhaling cocaine several

hours prior to reporting for duty as an

emergency room physician;

(4) On several occasions during 1993,

the Respondent discussed plans to

purchase and distribute cocaine with

confidential informants; and

(5) During recent undercover

operations, the Respondent was in

possession of cocaine and LSD.

On April 15, 1994, the Respondent,

through counsel, filed a timely request

for a hearing, and following prehearing

procedures, a hearing was held in

Atlanta, Georgia, on October 26, 1994,

before Administrative Law Judge Mary

Ellen Bittner. At the hearing, both

parties called witnesses to testify and

introduced documentary evidence, and

after the hearing, counsel for both sides

submitted proposed findings of fact,

conclusions of law and argument. On

October 31, 1995, Judge Bittner issued

her Opinion and Recommended Ruling,

recommending that the Respondent’s

DEA Certificate of Registration be

revoked and any pending applications

for registration be denied. On December

1, 1995, Judge Bittner transmitted the

record of these proceedings to the

Deputy Administrator, after noting that

neither party had filed timely

exceptions to her decision. However, on

December 20, 1995, Judge Bittner

transmitted the Respondent’s request for

consideration of exceptions filed on

December 18, 1995. A copy of Judge
Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 102 / Friday, May 24, 1996 / Notices 26209

Bittner’s letter and the Respondent’s

exceptions were transmitted to

Government counsel, who did not

respond.

The Deputy Administrator has

considered the record in its entirety,

including the Respondent’s exceptions,

and pursuant to 21 CFR 1316.67, hereby

issues his final order based upon

findings of fact and conclusions of law

as hereinafter set forth. The Deputy

Administrator adopts, in full, the

Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law,

and Recommended Ruling of the

Administrative Law Judge his adoption

is in no matter diminished by any

recitation of facts, issues and

conclusions herein, or of any failure to

mention a matter of fact or law.

The Deputy Administrator finds that,

pursuant to stipulations made by the

parties before Judge Bittner, the

following facts are not in dispute: (1)

Lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) is a

Schedule I hallucinogenic substance

pursuant to 21 CFR 1308.11; (2)

Marijuana is a Schedule I

hallucinogenic substance pursuant to 21

CFR 1308.11; and (3) Didrex is the trade

name for a stimulant containing

benzphetamine hydrochloride, a

Schedule III substance pursuant to 21

CFR 1308.13.

The Deputy Administrator also finds

that the Respondent is primarily an

emergency room physician, and that at

the time of the events at issue, he lives

and worked on St. Simons Island,

Georgia. He is licensed to practice his

specialty in the State of Georgia. The

Respondent is registered with DEA as a

practitioner, and he has been assigned

DEA registration number BG1368516.

It is undisputed that the Respondent

was arrested early in the morning on

August 18, 1992, in St. Paul, Minnesota.

The relevant portions of the arrest report

state that: (1) The arresting officer

followed the Respondent because he

made a turn over the center median after

driving out of a Denny’s Restaurant

parking lot; (2) the arresting officer

noted that when the Respondent got out

of his car, his eyes were red and his

speech was slurred; (3) arresting officer

asked the Respondent to sit in the patrol

car because the Respondent had stated

he was lost, could not find his hotel,

and did not have his driver’s license; (4)

when the arresting officer asked the

Respondent what was in his pockets,

the Respondent pulled out, among other

things, a bag containing marijuana and

a piece of tin foil containing a white

sheet of paper with 43 ‘‘hits’’ of LSD;

and (5) when the arresting office asked

what the sheet of paper was, the

Respondent replied, ‘‘something I’m not

supposed to have,’’ and that ‘‘it’s some

kind of psychedelic drug.’’ The

Respondent was arrested and charged

with felony possession of a controlled

substance.

Also, at the time of his arrest, the

Respondent had in his possession a

prescription bottle containing Didrex

with a label noting that the prescription

had been written by the Respondent for

a third party, LW. The Respondent later

explained that LW was his girlfriend,

that he had used her suitcase for his trip

to St. Paul, and that the prescription

bottle was in her suitcase when he

borrowed it.

Before Judge Bittner, the Respondent,

testified that at the time of his arrest, he

was in Minnesota for a reunion of his

college football team, that he had been

to a party and then to a restaurant, and

that he was on his way back to his hotel

to get his luggage and to leave for the

airport. The Respondent stated that he

had found the LSD and the marijuana

while cleaning out the rental car prior

to turning it in at the airport, that he had

put it in his pocket, and that he was

arrested with the substances in his

pocket. He also testified that the

prescription bottle had fallen out of his

girlfriend’s suitcase, that he had found

the bottle while cleaning out the truck

of the car, and that he had put it in his

pocket.

On September 9, 1992, the

Respondent pled guilty to possession of

LSD in state court. On November 17,

1992, pursuant to a state statute

permitting a stay of adjudication, the

Respondent was sentenced to five years’

probation, fined more than $4,200.00,

and ordered (1) to verify completion of

chemical treatment; (2) to abstain from

(the consumption of) non-prescription

drugs; and (3) to follow all

recommendations of the Georgia

Professional Licensing Board.

The Respondent testified before Judge

Bittner that, after his arrest in

Minnesota, he had returned to Georgia

and had reported for work. After about

a week at work, he told his supervisor

and other supervisory hospital staff

about his arrest, and he agreed with

them that he should voluntarily submit

to a screening procedure. The

Respondent stated that he went to

Willingway Hospital (Willingway) for

an evaluation, and that the was advised

on the first day of the evaluation that he

had a drinking problem and should

enter the hospital’s twenty-eight day

treatment program. The Respondent

entered the program and was discharged

on October 18, 1992. However, the

Respondent testified that after a lengthy

delay, Willingway Hospital submitted

an inaccurate evaluation report to the

Georgia Board of Medical Examiners

(Board) in December of 1992.

By letter dated July 15, 1993, the

Georgia Department of Law advised the

Respondent that the Georgia Attorney

General took the position that state

statutes required the suspension of his

medical license for at least three months

because of his entry of a guilty plea for

possession of LSD in Minnesota.

Further, the letter noted that the

Impaired Physician’s Committee

recommended that the Respondent’s

license be placed on probation with the

usual terms and conditions for an

impaired physician. As an alternative,

the letter provided that, if the

Respondent voluntarily submitted to an

evaluation at Anchor Hospital (Anchor),

and if Anchor concluded that the

Respondent was not impaired, then the

Board would not require a probationary

period.

According to a discharge summary,

the Respondent was evaluated at

Anchor from August 30, 1993, until

September 2, 1993. The summary

concluded that ‘‘no definitive diagnosis

of alcohol or substance dependence can

be made.’’

After notice and a hearing, the Board

issued a final decision on July 11, 1994,

finding that the Respondent had entered

a plea to a felony charge of possession

of LSD and was sentenced in Minnesota.

The hearing officer noted that pursuant

to Minnesota law pertinent to the

Board’s proceedings, ‘‘conviction’’

includes entering a ‘‘plea of guilty

* * * regardless of whether the

adjudication of guilt or sentence is

withheld or not entered thereon * * *.’’

Thus, the Respondent’s entry of a guilty

plea provided grounds for the Board’s

sanction. Consequently, the Board

suspended the Respondent’s license to

practice medicine in Georgia for three

months and then placed his license on

probation for four years following the

suspension. Also, as part of the terms of

the probation, the Respondent (1) was to

be subject to random drug screening at

the request of the Board, and (2) was to

abide by all State and Federal laws

relating to drugs. The Respondent

testified before Judge Bittner that he was

still fulfilling these probationary

requirements.

A DEA task force officer (Officer)

testified before Judge Bittner, stating

that in the Spring of 1993, the

Brunswick, Georgia, Police Department

initiated an investigation of the

Respondent, and that she participated in

an undercover capacity. She testified

that she had been assigned to the task

force for approximately three and a half

years. Specifically, the Officer testified

that on April 21, 1993, she accompanied
26210 Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 102 / Friday, May 24, 1996 / Notices

a confidential informant (CI) to a tavern

on St. Simon’s Island to meet the

Respondent, and that several hours later

the CI, the Respondent, and the Officer

went to the Respondent’s residence. The

Officer testified that, while there, she

observed the Respondent use cocaine

approximately two or three times, and

she observed him search for some LSD,

which he told her he had placed on his

kitchen counter. The Officer testified

that she saw the Respondent take ‘‘the

cocaine out of a plastic bag, pour it into

his hand and snort it out of his hand

* * *’’ She stated she knew the

substance was cocaine ’’just from the

appearance of it, through my

experience; the way it was consumed.

Also the fact that (the Respondent) did

kiss me on the lips and it number out

my face.’’ Regarding the LSD, the Officer

testified that on April 29, 1993, the CI

telephone the Respondent, and in that

taped conversation, the Respondent

stated that he had found the LSD.

The Officer further testified that on

July 21, 1993, the CI, wearing a

recording device, went to another

residence owned by the Respondent,

under the surveillance of the Officer and

other law enforcement personnel.

According to the transcript of this

transaction with the Respondent, the CI

asked the Respondent if he would be

interested in some ‘‘kilos’’ for ‘‘17 a

key,’’ and the Respondent replied that

he did not have that much money, and

that his friends in the police department

had warned him ‘‘to be real careful’’

because the police were watching him.

The CI said that his source wanted a

down payment of $4,000.00, to which

the Respondent answered, ‘‘Damn! I

wish! I could (sic) I need to make some

money, somewhere,’’ and that he would

think about it. The Respondent also

said, ‘‘I know four people that have been

busted. I don’t know who’s turning

everybody in but somebody is * * *. I

don’t do it around nobody anymore.’’

The Respondent also informed the CI

that he would be in Savannah, Georgia,

the next weekend because his son was

playing in a baseball game, and he

suggested getting together with the CI on

Friday night to ‘‘party up there.’’

However, before Judge Bittner, the

Respondent testified that he did not

agree to be involved ‘‘in a kilogram deal

* * * of controlled substances with the

CI.’’

The Officer further testified that on

July 23, 1993, the Respondent met with

the CI and another informant

(Informant), at the Radisson Hotel in

Savannah. The transcript of the tape

recording made during that meeting

revealed that, among other things, the

Informant said he had recently ‘‘got a

pretty big * * * shipment from

Columbia,’’ and that the Respondent

replied ‘‘we may be able to do

something,’’ but that he would have to

talk to a ‘‘friend,’’ and ‘‘I’d like to make

some money myself.’’ Later, the

Respondent expressed concern, stating

‘‘I just can’s deal with it with my job

and stuff. You know I don’t have time

to do too much * * *. But, uh, I

certainly would like to * * *.’’ The

Respondent also stated that, ‘‘I’m

certainly, uh, not opposed to making

some money.’’ The respondent also

stated that he had connections in

Minnesota through his high school and

college friends, and he asked the

Informant if he would ‘‘be around

tonight’’ for a drink.

Finally, the Officer testified that in

August of 1993, the CI visited the

Respondent, and in the course of that

conversation, he asked the Respondent

if he was going to buy cocaine from the

Informant. The Officer testified that the

Respondent replied that ‘‘his connection

was retired, that he thought he could get

cocaine distributed through, and he was

no longer in the drug business. And so

he had no way of getting rid of the

cocaine.’’ Significantly, Judge Bittner

wrote that ‘‘[the] Officer appeared

candid and to exhibit good recall[,] and

I therefore credit her testimony.’’

The Respondent testified before Judge

Bittner, stating that he first met the

Officer on April 23, 1993, that he had

not seen the CI for almost a year, and

that he had invited the CI to his home

in the hope of getting him to repay a

loan. The Respondent denied using

cocaine that evening.

The Respondent also testified that,

when he knew the CI before, ‘‘he never

talked about drugs * * *’’ but ‘‘all of a

sudden every time [the CI] called me

* * * He was just, I mean, continually

talking about drugs and * * I didn’t

know if he had just changed or what

was going on.’’ The Respondent also

testified concerning the July 23, 1993

conversation, stating that he thought the

CI was going to repay a loan, but that,

when the Respondent went to the CI’s

room, he ‘‘realized the position [he] was

in—I mean, standing here with some

Columbian [the Informant] and I didn’t

know if he had a gun or what else, he

was talking about selling me drugs—all

I wanted to do was to get out of the

room.’’ However, the Respondent

testified that later that evening, he went

in a cab to a bar with the Informant, and

that after the Informant became

inebriated, the Respondent left him in

the bar. Later the same evening, the

Respondent invited the Informant up to

his room. The Respondent testified that,

while the Informant was in his room, he

was trying to ‘‘grab’’ his girlfriend, and

then the Respondent testified that ‘‘I

told him specifically, word for word, I

said, I don’t know what [the CI] told you

why I’m here. I said, I’m here to see my

son play baseball and to get the $400.00

from [the CI] and then I threw [the

Informant] out of my room.’’

Finally, the Respondent testified that

in August of 1993, he called a local

police officer and told him that the CI

had continued to call him and talk

about drugs. Also in the record is an

affidavit from a sergeant of the

Brunswick Police Department, which

corroborated the Respondent’s

testimony concerning his call to the

police. The Respondent also testified

that from August 18, 1992, until the date

of the hearing, he had not purchased,

sold, or used any controlled substances.

However, the Deputy Administrator

notes Judge Bittner’s statement that:

At the outset, I note that I did not find (the)

Respondent to be a credible witness. He did

not appear forthright or candid, portions of

his testimony are contradicted by the

documentary evidence (,) and he appeared

primarily concerned with tailoring his

testimony to suit his defense. As noted

above, I found [the] Officer ( ) to be a

credible witness. Consequently, where (the)

Respondent’s testimony conflicts with that of

(the) Officer ( ), I credit the latter.

The Respondent also offered into

evidence letters from colleagues,

attesting to his professional credentials,

and his exemplary abilities as an

emergency room physician. Other

physicians who had monitored his

practice also wrote, stating that he was

complying with his conditions of

probation. One of these letters was from

the medical director of the Respondent’s

physicians’ group, who wrote that ‘‘at

no time do I feel that (the Respondent)

has ever been in an impaired position.’’

He also noted that the Respondent had

negative drug test results on November

6, 1993, November 19, 1993, January 7,

1994, and February 21, 1994.

Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 823(f) and

824(a)(4), the Deputy Administrator may

revoke a DEA Certificate of Registration

and deny any pending application for

registration as a practitioner, if he

determines that the continued

registration would be inconsistent with

the public interest. Further 21 U.S.C.

824(a)(2) provides that conviction of a

felony relating to any controlled

substance is also grounds for revoking a

DEA registration.

First, as to the Respondent’s

‘‘conviction’’, the Respondent argued

that he should not be considered

‘‘convicted’’ because, pursuant to his

plea bargain, and under Minnesota law,

if he successfully completes his
Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 102 / Friday, May 24, 1996 / Notices 26211

probation, the case will be dismissed.

However, the Deputy Administrator

agrees with Judge Bittner, who wrote,

‘‘that provision of State law does not

determine what is a ‘‘conviction’’ within

the meaning of the Controlled

Substances Act. This agency has

previously held that a guilty plea is a

conviction for purpose of these

proceedings. Eric A. Baum, M.D., 53

Fed. Reg. 47272 (DEA 1988). I therefore

find that (the) Respondent’s conviction

constitutes grounds for revoking his

DEA registration pursuant to 21 U.S.C.

824(a)(2).’’

Judge Bittner also found that the

Respondent’s continued registration was

contrary to the public interest. In

determining the public interest, Section

823(f) provides that the following

factors be considered:

(1) The recommendation of the

appropriate State licensing board or

professional disciplinary authority.

(2) The applicant’s experience in

dispensing, or conducting research with

respect to controlled substances.

(3) The applicant’s conviction record

under Federal or State laws relating to

the manufacture, distribution, or

dispensing of controlled substances.

(4) Compliance with applicable State,

Federal, or local laws relating to

controlled substances.

(5) Such other conduct which may

threaten the public health or safety.

These factors are to be considered in the

disjunctive; the Deputy Administrator

may rely on any one or a combination

of factors and may give each factor the

weight he deems appropriate in

determining whether a registration

should be revoked or an application for

registration denied. See Henry J.

Schwarz, Jr., M.D., 54 FR 16422 (1989).

In this case, the Deputy Administrator

finds relevant factors one, four, and five

in determining whether continuing the

Respondent’s registration would be

inconsistent with the public interest. As

to factor one, ‘‘recommendation of the

appropriate State licensing board,’’ the

record contains no direct

recommendation from the Board to the

DEA on this matter. However, it is

significant that, after notification of the

Respondent’s entry of a guilty plea to

possession of LSD in Minnesota, the

Board suspended the Respondent’s

medical license for three months and

placed it on probation for an additional

four years.

As the factor four, the Respondent’s

‘‘(c)ompliance with applicable State,

Federal, or local laws relating to

controlled substances,’’ and factor five,

‘‘(s)uch other conduct which may

threaten the public health or safety,’’ the

Deputy Administrator agrees with Judge

Bittner’s finding, given her credibility

assessment of the Respondent and the

Officer, that the Government has shown,

by a preponderance of the evidence, that

the Respondent consumed cocaine and

searched for LSD in the presence of the

officer on April 21, 1993. Although the

Respondent argued that he would not

engage in such conduct, given that he

was providing random urine samples for

drug screening, the Deputy

Administrator finds his argument

unpersuasive. The record shows that the

first negative drug screening result was

reported on November 6, 1993, and that

the Board did not even issue its decision

ordering random screening until July 11,

1994. Thus, there was no evidence of

record showing that the Respondent was

required to participate, or was

voluntarily participating in, random

drug testing on April 21, 1993.

Next, the Respondent testified that he

was an unwilling participant in the CI’s

plan to distribute cocaine. However, the

Deputy Administrator finds that the

record supports an opposite conclusion.

The transcripts of the Respondent’s

conversation with the CI and the

Informant indicate the Respondent’s

actual desire to participate in the plan.

The Respondent’s reply to the CI’s

information concerning the 17 kilogram

of cocaine transaction was ‘‘I wish!

* * * I need some money * * *’’ Such

a response showed his willingness to

participate, if he had had the resources

for the downpayment needed to obtain

the controlled substance. Further, the

Respondent’s conversation with the

Informant indicated that he did not

participate in this proposed transaction

because of a lack of means to distribute

the controlled substance. The Deputy

Administrator agrees with Judge

Bittner’s conclusion, that ‘‘(t)hese

statements are not those of someone

who is uncertain as to why he is a party

to a drug-related conversation.’’

As to rehabilitation, the Deputy

Administrator acknowledges the

Respondent’s evidence of his

professional competency as an

emergency room physician. Also, the

Deputy Administrator notes that the

Respondent argued that rehabilitative

evidence exists, such as (1) a lack of

positive urinalysis results, (2) the fact

that he had never been in trouble before

his illegal conduct in Minnesota, (3) the

lack of substantiation of the allegations

of drug or alcohol abuse, and (4) the

Respondent’s report of the CI’s conduct

to the local police. However, the Deputy

Administrator also notes Judge Bittner’s

credibility finding, after observing the

Respondent testify before her. Also,

although the more recent drug testing

evidence may show that the

Respondent, while on probation and

subject to random drug screening tests,

has abstained from personal

consumption of illegally obtained

controlled substances, the Deputy

Administrator is still concerned about

the Respondent’s willingness to

participate in conversations concerning

illegal drug transactions to others.

Further, the Respondent showed no

remorse concerning his prior

documented misconduct. Rather, in his

testimony before Judge Bittner, the

Respondent continued to deny any

intentional wrongdoing. In previous

cases, when a Respondent failed to

admit to the full extent of his

involvement in documented misconduct

involving controlled substances, the

Deputy Administrator has then doubted

such a Respondent’s commitment to

compliance with the Controlled

Substances Act in future practice. See,

e.g., Prince George Daniels, D.D.S., 60

FR 62,884 (1995). Given the totality of

the circumstances in this case, the

Deputy Administrator agrees with Judge

Bittner’s conclusion that he

‘‘Respondent is not in a position to

accept the responsibilities inherent in a

DEA registration, and that his continued

registration would be inconsistent with

the public interest.’’

The Respondent filed exceptions to

Judge Bittner’s opinion, taking

exception with her finding concerning a

felony ‘‘conviction’’ in Minnesota. The

Deputy Administrator notes the

Respondent’s concern and made

findings accordingly in this order. The

remaining exceptions are of record and

require no further comment.

Accordingly, the Deputy

Administrator of the Drug Enforcement

Administration, pursuant to the

authority vested in him by 21 U.S.C.

823, and 28 C.F.R. 0.100(b) and 0.104,

hereby orders that DEA Certificate of

Registration BG1368516, previously

issued to the Respondent, be, and it

hereby is, revoked, and that any

pending applications to renew the same

are hereby denied. This order is

effective June 24, 1996.

Dated: May 17, 1996.

Stephen H. Greene,

Deputy Administrator.

[FR Doc. 96–13051 Filed 5–23–96; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4410–09–M