UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ In re: LARRY WAYNE PARR, Debtor.

------------------------------ LARRY WAYNE PARR, Appellant,

v. SIMON E. RODRIGUEZ, Appellee. No. 19-1053 (BAP No. 18-084-CO) (Bankruptcy Appellate Panel)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________ Before BRISCOE , McHUGH , and MORITZ , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ This appeal arises from a July 21, 2015 order (the Conversion O rder) in which the bankruptcy court for the Di strict of Colorado converted Lar ry Parr’s Chapter 11 bankruptcy case to Chapter 7.

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel ha s determined unanimously to honor the parties ’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir . R. 34.1(G). The case is there fore submitted without oral argument. T his order and judgment isn’t binding precedent, except under the doctrines of la w of the case, res judicata, an d collateral estoppel. But it may be cited for i ts persuasive value. See Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### June 26, 2019
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 Almost three years after the ba nkruptcy court entered the Conve rsion Order, Parr challenged that order via a pro se motion for relief from judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60. 1 The bankruptcy court denied Parr’s motion , and Parr appealed t o the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Tenth Circuit (the BAP). The BAP affirmed. Proceeding pro se, Parr now appeal s the BAP’s decision affirmin g the bankruptcy court’s order denying his Rule 60 motion. 2 For the reasons discussed below, we affirm. Background Parr filed for Chapter 11 bankr uptcy on April 21, 2015. As of t hat date, Parr’s brother “held unliquidated clai ms against” Parr arising from th e brothers’ dispute over their mother’s probate est ate. Aplt. App. 7. Parr’s brothe r liquated those claims in state court, obtained a judgm ent against Parr for more than $2,000,000, and filed a motion to convert Parr’s Chapter 11 case to Chapter 7. The bank ruptcy court granted the motion to convert and appointed a Chapter 7 trustee (the Tr ustee). Parr’s brother then sought and obtained a judgme nt exempting th e $2,080,871.20 state-court judgment from Parr’s discharge.

1 Parr styled his motion as a “Ve rified Demand to Revert Movant’ s Chapter 7 to Chapter 11 Due to [the Convers ion Order] being Void of Law.” Aplee. Supp. App. 10. But the bankruptcy cou rt construed Parr’s “[d]emand” a s a Rule 60 motion. Id. And because Parr doesn’t challenge that construction on appeal, we do the same. Cf. Barnett v. Hargett , 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999) (explaining that “[t]he task of sorting th[r]ough pro se p leadings is difficult at best ” and declining to “interfere with” district court’ s reasonable interpretation of such pleadings). 2 As the bankruptcy court and the BAP did before us, we liberall y construe Parr’s pro se filings. See Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer , 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005). But we won’t act as his advocate. See id.3 After determining that Parr’s “ homestead had significant nonexe mpt equity,” the Trustee obtained the bankrupt cy court’s approval to sell Pa rr’s homestead and then distributed a portion of t he resulting proceeds to Parr un der Colorado’s homestead exemption. Aplt. App. 8; see also Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-41-201. Parr appealed the order approving the sale to the BAP, which dismiss ed his appeal for lack of standing. We affirmed. See Parr v. Rodrig uez (In re Parr) , 732 F. App’x 714, 715 (10th Cir. 2018) (unpublished)

. In the meantime, Parr sought re lief from the Conversion Order u nder Rule 60. Although the bankruptcy court con ducted an evidentiary hearing on Parr’s Rule 60 motion, Parr declined to present any evid ence, make any argumen ts, or testify on his own behalf at that hearing. Ins tead, Parr rested solely on docu ments he had previously filed with the bankr uptcy court. But the bankruptcy court declined to “scour” these documents to “deter mine which facts or legal theo ries Parr relie[d] upon.” Aplee. Supp. App. 3. Conse quently, it denied Parr’s Rule 60 motion for failure to prosecute. Parr then appealed to the BAP. T here, he argued he was entitled to relief from the Conversion Order under Rule 60(b)(3) and Rule 60(d)(3) beca use of fraud. And he also asserted, inter alia, th at he was entitled to relief un der Rule 60(b)(4) because (1) the bankruptcy court lacked authority to convert the case u nder 11 U.S.C. § 1112(c); (2) Parr’s brother lacked standing to seek conversio n; and (3) the Conversion Order resulted in a v iolation of Colorado’s homestea d exemption.4 The BAP rejected Parr’s arguments and affirmed the bankruptcy c ourt’s order. Parr appeals.
Discussion Generally speaking, “we review [the] bankruptcy court’s decisio ns independently, examining legal de terminations de novo and factu al findings for clear
error.” FB Acquisition Prop. I, LLC v. Gentry ( In re Gentry) , 807 F.3d 1222, 1225 (10th Cir. 2015). But to the ex tent Parr challenges the bankrup tcy court’s order denying his Rule 60 motion, our s tandard of review varies depen ding on the contours of the argument at issue. Compare, e.g. , Servants of Paraclete v. Does , 204 F.3d 1005, 1009 (10th Cir. 2000) (explaining that we typically “ review the district court’s denial of a Rule 60(b) motion for abuse of discretion”), with, e.g. , Wilmer v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Leavenworth Cty. , 69 F.3d 406, 409 (10th Cir . 1995) (noting that we review de novo district court’s finding that judgment is void f or lack of jurisdiction under Rule 60(b)(4)). On appeal, Parr first asserts th at because he didn’t ask the ba nkruptcy court to convert his case, the C onversion Order is void in the absence o f any evidence that Parr was “a moneyed, business, o r commercial corporation.” § 11 12(c); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4) (allowing cour t to provide relief from fina l judgment if “the judgment is void”). 3 But as the BAP explained, t his argument misconstrues

3 On appeal, Parr forcefully ar gues that a Rule 60(b)(4) motion “may be brought at any time.” Aplt. Br. 7 (quoting Spitznas v. Boone , 464 F.3d 1213, 1225 (10th Cir. 2006)). But we see no indication that the BAP or the bankruptcy court concluded otherwise. Instead, th e BAP found only that to the ex tent Parr sought relief5 § 1112(c); that provision only prohibited the bankruptcy court from converting Parr’s case in the absence of a r equest from Parr if, as a threshold matter , Parr was a farmer or a corporation. See § 1112(c) (“The court may not convert a case . . . if the debtor is a farmer or a corporation that is not a moneyed, business, or commercial corporation, unless the debtor r equests such conversion.” (emph asis added)). Critically, Parr doesn’t assert on appeal that he was a farmer or a corporation. Nor does he point to any record evide nce that would support such an assertion. Accordingly, he fails to estab lish that § 1112(c) applies here, let alone that it renders the Conversion Order void. In his second Rule 60(b)(4) argum ent, Parr assert s that his br other lacked standing to request conversion b ecause his brother was only “on e [c]reditor.” Aplt. Br. 4. According to Parr, this re nders the Convers ion Order voi d under 11 U.S.C. § 303 because it means that “thr ee or more entities” didn’t req uest conversion. § 303(b)(1). But as the Truste e points out, § 303 says nothing about conversion. Instead, it describes how “[a ]n involuntary case may be commenced .” § 303(a) (emphasis added); compare § 303(b)(1) (discussing requirements for commencing involuntary case), with § 1112 (discussing requirement s for converting case). Thus, Parr’s § 303(b)(1) argument fail s. And so too does Parr’s relat ed assertion that “[t]he

from the July 21, 2015 Conversion Order under Rule 60(b)(3)—rat her than under Rule 60(b)(4)—his April 13 , 2018 motion was untimely. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1) (providing that Rule 60(b)(3) motion “must be made . . . no mor e than a year after the entry of the judgment or order” challenged). Parr neither ident ifies any error in the BAP’s conclusion nor renews his Rule 60(b)(3) argument on appea l. Accordingly, we do not address that a rgument further.6 [a]ttorneys who benefitted from [the Conversion Order]” were aw are of the alleged § 303(b)(1) defect and therefo re “committed fraud on” the bankr uptcy court by failing to alert it to this issue. Aplt. Br. 9–10; see also Rule 60(d)(3) (noting that Rule 60 doesn’t “lim it a court’s power to . . . set aside a jud gment for fraud on the court”). Next, in his third and final Rule 60(b)(4) argument, Parr alleg es that the Conversion Order is void because that order (and the subsequent sale of his property) violated both Colorado’s homes tead exemption and Parr’s due-pro cess rights. But as the BAP noted, Parr separately “exhausted his appellate rights of the bankruptcy court’s orders allowing the sale of the homestead and valuing t he homestead exemption,” and those orders a re now “final.” Aplt. App. 18; see also Parr , 732 F. App’x 714. Further, Parr fails to explain in his opening brief how the Conversion Order—as opposed to the actual s ale of his property or the orde r that authorized that sale—violated Colorado’s homestead exemption. Cf. Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A) (requiring appellant’s opening bri ef to contain “appellant’s co ntentions and the reasons for them”). Likewise, he fails to provide c itations to the record demonstra ting that he presented his due-proce ss theory to the bankruptcy cour t or the BAP. Cf. 10th Cir. R. 28.1(A) (“For each i ssue raised on appeal, all bri efs must cite the precise references in the record where t he issue was raised and ruled o n.”). And we see no indication that he did so. Nor do we see any indication that he is making a plain-error argument on appeal. Thus, given P arr’s failure to comply with t hese procedural rules, we treat this entire argument as inadequately briefed and decli ne to consider it. See7 Richison v. Ernest Grp., Inc. , 634 F.3d 1123, 113 1 (10th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he failure to argue for plain error and its a pplication on appeal . . . marks the end of the road for an argument for reversal not fir st presented to the district co urt.”); Bronson v.
Swensen , 500 F.3d 1099, 11 04 (10th Cir. 2007) (“[W]e routinely have declined to consider arguments that are not r aised, or are inadequately pre sented, in an appellant’s opening brief.”); Garrett , 425 F.3d at 840–41 (“[W ]hen a pro se litigant fails to comply with [Rule 28] , we cannot fill the void by craf ting arguments and performing the necessary legal re search.” (first alteration in original) (quoting
Anderson v. Hardman , 241 F.3d 544, 545 (7th Cir. 2001))). Finally, Parr asserts that the b ankruptcy court abused its disc retion in declining to address the merits of his ar guments and in denying his Rule 60 motion based solely on his failure to prosecu te. But for the reasons discuss ed above, we conclude that Parr’s arguments are either inadequately briefed or fail o n their merits. Thus, even assuming the bankruptcy court abused its discretion in fai ling to reach the merits of those arguments, Parr fails to demonstrate that the b ankruptcy court’s error prejudiced him. See Shinseki v. Sanders , 556 U.S. 396, 410 (2009) (noting that in civil cases, “the party seeking reversal normally must explain why the erroneous ruling caused harm”). Accordingly, we d ecline to reverse on this basis. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 61 (“At every stage of th e proceeding, the court must d isregard all errors and defects that do not affect any pa rty’s substantial rights.”).
Conclusion8 Because Parr fails to demonstrat e the bankruptcy court committe d reversible error in denying his Rule 60 motion, we affirm.

Entered for the Court

Nancy L. Moritz Circuit Judge