alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
[Federal Register Volume 61, Number 99 (Tuesday, May 21, 1996)]
[Notices]
[Page 25493]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 96-12702]



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FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
[Dkt. C-3650]


Devro International plc, et al.; Prohibited Trade Practices, and 
Affirmative Corrective Actions

AGENCY: Federal Trade Commission.

ACTION: Consent order.

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SUMMARY: In settlement of alleged violations of federal law prohibiting 
unfair or deceptive acts or practices and unfair methods of 
competition, this consent order requires, among other things, the 
respondents to divest, within three months to a Commission-approved 
acquirer, the assets they use to produce collagen sausage casings in 
the United States and Canada. If the transaction is not completed in 
the prescribed time, the Commission may appoint a trustee to divest the 
assets.

DATES: Complaint and Order issued April 3, 1996.\1\

    \1\ Copies of the Complaint, the Decision and Order, and 
Commissioner Azuenaga's statement are available from the 
Commission's Public Reference Branch, H-130, 6th Street & 
Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20580.
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SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On Tuesday, December 19, 1995, there was 
published in the Federal Register, 60 FR 65328, a proposed consent 
agreement with analysis In the Matter of Devro International plc, et 
al., for the purpose of soliciting public comment. Interested parties 
were given sixty (60) days in which to submit comments, suggestions or 
objections regarding the proposed form of the order.
    Comments were filed and considered by the Commission. The 
Commission has ordered the issuance of the complaint in the form 
contemplated by the agreement, made its jurisdictional findings and 
entered an order to divest, as set forth in the proposed consent 
agreement, in disposition of this proceeding.

    (Sec. 6, 38 Stat. 721; 15 U.S.C. 46. Interpret or apply sec. 5, 
38 Stat. 719, as amended; sec. 7, 38 Stat. 731, as amended; 15 
U.S.C. 45, 18)
Donald S. Clark,
Secretary
[FR Doc. 96-12702 Filed 5-20-96; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6750-01-M
[Federal Register Volume 61, Number 92 (Friday, May 10, 1996)]
[Notices]
[Pages 21537-21538]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 96-11751]



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DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
Fiscal Service
[Dept. Circ. 570, 1995 Rev., Supp. No. 12]


Surety Companies Acceptable on Federal Bonds; Capital Reinsurance 
Company

    A Certificate of Authority as an acceptable reinsurer on Federal 
Bonds is hereby issued to the following company under Sections 9304 to 
9308, Title 31, of the United States Code. Federal bond-approving 
officers should annotate their reference copies of the Treasury 
Circular 570, 1995 Revision, on page 34450 to reflect this addition:
    Capitol Reinsurance Company. BUSINESS ADDRESS: 1325 Avenue of the 
Americas, New York, NY 10019. PHONE: (212) 974-0100. UNDERWRITING 
LIMITATION b/: $27,928,000. INCORPORATED IN: Maryland.
    Certificates of Authority expire on June 30 each year, unless 
revoked prior to that date. The Certificates are subject to subsequent 
annual renewal as long as the companies remain qualified (31 CFR, Part 
223). A list of qualified companies is published annually as of July 1 
in Treasury Department Circular 570, with details as to underwriting 
limitations.
    Copies of the Circular may be obtained by calling the U.S. 
Department of the Treasury, Financial Management Service, computerized 
public bulletin board system (FMS Inside Line) at (202) 874-6817/7034/
6953/6872 or by purchasing a hard copy from the Government Printing 
Office (GPO), Washington, DC, telephone (202) 512-0132. When ordering 
the Circular from GPO, use the following stock number: 048-000-00489-0.
    Questions concerning this Notice may be directed to the U.S. 
Department of the Treasury, Financial Management Service, Funds 
Management Division, Surety Bond Branch, 3700 East-West Highway, Room 
6F04, Hyattsville, MD 20782, telephone (202) 874-6507.


[[Page 21538]]


    Dated: April 18, 1996.
Charles F. Schwan III,
Director, Funds Management Division, Financial Management Service.
[FR Doc. 96-11751 Filed 5-9-96; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4810-35-M
#### David S. SHAIN, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent.

No. 64408.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division One.

Feb. 15, 1994.

Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer to Supreme Court Denied March 15, 1994.

Application to Transfer Denied April 26, 1994.

David C. Hemingway, St. Louis, for appellant.

Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen., Traci J. Sanders, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.

Before CRANDALL, P.J., and REINHARD and CRIST, JJ.

*ORDER*

PER CURIAM.

Movant appeals the dismissal of his Rule 24.035 motion as untimely. We find no error of law appears. Rule 84.16(b)(5). Further, we find an opinion in this case would have no precedential value and affirm by summary order. Rule 84.16(b). A memorandum has been provided to the parties for their use only.
[Federal Register Volume 61, Number 17 (Thursday, January 25, 1996)]
[Sunshine Act Meetings]
[Page 2334]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 96-1291]








COMMODITY CREDIT CORPORATION

TIME AND DATE: 2:00 p.m., February 5, 1996.

PLACE: Room 104-A, Jamie Whitten Building, U.S. Department of 
Agriculture, Washington, D.C.

STATUS: Open.

MATTERS TO BE CONSIDERED:

    1. Special open meeting of October 11, 1994.
    2. Memorandum re: Update of Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC)-
owned inventory.
    3. Memorandum re: CCC's financial condition report.
    4. Memorandum re: Availability of CCC stocks for donation 
overseas under Section 416(b) of the Agricultural Act of 1949, as 
amended, for Fiscal Year 1995 and Amendments, and in Fiscal Year 
1996.
    5. Resolution re: Amendment of bylaws of the CCC.
    6. Resolution re: Amendment of Dockets requiring only a change 
in nomenclature.
    7. Resolution re: Termination of obsolete CCC Board dockets.
    8. Resolutions re: Ratification of commodities available for 
Public Law 480 during Fiscal Years 1995 and 1996.
    9. Docket CZ-161a, Revision 7, re: Policies for collection, 
settlement, and adjustment of certain claims by or against the CCC.

CONTACT PERSON FOR MORE INFORMATION: Greg Billings, Secretary, 
Commodity Credit Corporation, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Room 3090 
South Building, P.O. Box 2415, Washington, D.C., 20013; telephone (202) 
690-4085.

    Dated: January 19, 1996.
Greg Billings,

Secretary, Commodity Credit Corporation.

[FR Doc. 96-1291 Filed 1-23-96; 11:11 am]

BILLING CODE 3410-05-P
IV 

111TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. RES. 249 

Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that the Department 

of Veterans Affairs should take full responsibility for financing the health 

care benefits earned by veterans with service-connected disabilities. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MARCH 17, 2009 

Mrs. LUMMIS submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the 

Committee on Veterans’ Affairs 

RESOLUTION 

Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that 

the Department of Veterans Affairs should take full responsibility for financing the health care benefits earned 

by veterans with service-connected disabilities. 

Whereas the Federal Government has a moral responsibility 

to provide health care to veterans with service-connected 

disabilities; 

Whereas any abdication of this responsibility constitutes an 

affront to disabled veterans across the United States; and 

Whereas many disabled veterans purchase supplemental insurance coverage for themselves and their families to 

meet health care needs not covered by the benefits they 

earned through their military service: Now, therefore, be 

it 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with BILLS
2 

•HRES 249 IH 

1 Resolved, That it is the sense of the House of Rep2 resentatives that— 

3 (1) the Department of Veterans Affairs should 

4 take full responsibility for financing the health care 

5 benefits earned by veterans with service-connected 

6 disabilities; 

7 (2) the purchasing of supplemental health in8 surance by a veteran should not be grounds for re9 ducing the Federal Government’s obligation to such 

10 veteran; and 

11 (3) the Department of Veterans Affairs should 

12 not implement policies that discourage disabled vet13 erans from purchasing supplemental health insur14 ance coverage for themselves and their families. 

Æ 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with BILLS
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TRINETTE G. KENT (State Bar No. 025180)

KENT LAW OFFICES

3219 E. Camelback Rd., #588

Phoenix, AZ 85018

Telephone: (480) 247-9644

Facsimile: (480) 717-4781

E-mail: tkent@kentlawpc.com

Of Counsel to:

Credit Repair Lawyers of America

22142 West Nine Mile Road

Southfield, MI 48033

Telephone: (248) 353-2882

Facsimile: (248) 353-4840

Attorneys for Plaintiff,

Shawn Roth

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Shawn Roth,

Plaintiff,

vs.

Healthcare Collections-I LLC,

 

Defendant.

Case No.: 2:17-cv-03956-JJT

Hon. John J. Tuchi

STIPULATION FOR DISMISSAL 

WITH PREJUDICE

Plaintiff and Defendant Healthcare Collections-I, LLC, (hereinafter referred to 

as “HCI”), through counsel undersigned and pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii), hereby 

stipulate that the above-captioned action may be dismissed with prejudice against 

Case 2:17-cv-03956-JJT Document 14 Filed 01/11/18 Page 1 of 2
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Defendant HCI, only, with each party to bear its own attorneys’ fees and costs, in 

accordance with the form of dismissal order filed concurrently herewith.

DATED: January 11, 2018 KENT LAW OFFICES

By: /s/ Trinette G. Kent 

Trinette G. Kent 

Attorneys for Plaintiff

JENNINGS, HAUG & 

CUNNINGHAM, L.L.P.

/s/ Robert J. Lamb w/ permission

James L. Csontos

Robert J. Lamb

Attorneys for Defendant

Case 2:17-cv-03956-JJT Document 14 Filed 01/11/18 Page 2 of 2
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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

State of Arizona, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

James Russell Myers, 

Defendant.

No. CR-17-8296 DGC 

ORDER 

 James Russell Myers has attempted to remove his state criminal case to this Court. 

Doc. 1. The Court will remand the case to state court. 

 Generally, “a federal court should abstain from interfering with ongoing state 

criminal proceedings[.]” Gedo v. Idaho, No. CV 09-00166-E-BLW, 2009 WL 2848850, 

at *1 (D. Idaho Aug. 28, 2009) (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-45 (1971)). A 

state prosecution may be removed to federal court under the narrow circumstances set 

forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1442-43. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446, the federal court must 

examine the defendant’s removal papers “to determine whether removal is appropriate, 

and the court has the authority to remand a case, sua sponte, for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction.” Gedo, 2009 WL 2848850, at *1. 

 Because Myers does not assert that he is a federal officer or a member of the 

United States armed forces, §§ 1442 and 1442a do not apply. 

 Section 1443(1) is strictly construed against removal as “it is considered an 

encroachment on state court jurisdiction.” Johnson v. Washington, No. C07-0696-MJP, 
- 2 - 

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2007 WL 2377141, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 15, 2007). It authorizes removal where the 

defendant “is denied or cannot enforce in the courts of such State a right under any law 

providing for the equal civil rights of citizens of the United States[.]” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1443(1). “This generally requires a state law or constitutional provision that denies the 

defendant an opportunity to raise a federal right.” Hollander v. S.F. County Super. Ct., 

No. C 09-519 SI (pr), 2009 WL 975428, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2009) (citing Johnson v. 

Mississippi, 421 U.S. 213, 220 (1975)). Myers has identified no state law or 

constitutional provision that denies him the opportunity to raise a federal right in state 

court, nor has he shown that he will be unable to enforce a federal right in state court. 

 Section 1443(2) authorizes removal “[f]or any act under color of authority derived 

from any law providing for equal rights, or for refusing to do any act on the ground that it 

would be inconsistent with such law.” 28 U.S.C. § 1443(2). The Supreme Court has 

construed this provision as conferring “‘a privilege of removal only upon federal officers 

or agents and those authorized to act with or for them in affirmatively executing duties 

under any federal law providing for equal civil rights.’” Gedo, 2009 WL 2848850, at *1 

(quoting City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 824 (1966)). This case does not 

fall within that category. 

IT IS ORDERED that all pending motions are denied and the Clerk shall remand 

this case to Yavapai County Superior Court. 

 Dated this 30th day of November, 2017.
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In
connection with the Quarterly Report of Summer Infant, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10Q for the period ending March 31, 2007 (the Report), as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof, I Joseph
Driscoll, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify pursuant to Sec. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | 1. | The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13 (a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and
| | -- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2. | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | -- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                        |  |  |  |             
|----------------------- |  |  |  | ------------
|/s/ Joseph Driscoll     |  |  |  |             
|Joseph Driscoll         |  |  |  | May 11, 2007
|Chief Financial Officer |  |  |  |
```

[Federal Register Volume 61, Number 102 (Friday, May 24, 1996)]
[Notices]
[Pages 26170-26171]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 96-13070]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
[Docket No. ER94-1101-002]

Kansas City Power & Light Company; Notice of Filing

May 20, 1996.
    Take notice that on January 23, 1996, Kansas City Power & Light 
Company tendered for filing a letter containing the revised service 
schedule in the above-referenced docket.
    Any person desiring to be heard or to protest said filing should 
file a motion to intervene or protest with the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, N.E., Washington, D.C. 20426, 
in accordance with Rules 211 and 214 of the Commission's Rules of 
Practice and Procedure (18 CFR 385.211 and 18 CFR 385.214). All such 
motions

[[Page 26171]]

or protests should be filed on or before May 29, 1996. Protests will be 
considered by the Commission in determining the appropriate action to 
be taken, but will not serve to make protestants parties to the 
proceeding. Any person wishing to become a party must file a motion to 
intervene. Copies of this filing are on file with the Commission and 
are available for public inspection.
Lois D. Cashell,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 96-13070 Filed 5-23-96; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-M
```
#### Larry L. PORTER, Respondent, v. DIRECTOR OF REVENUE, State of Missouri, Appellant.

No. 63910.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division One.

Oct. 26, 1993.

Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen., James A. Chenault, III, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Mo. Dept, of Revenue, Jefferson City, for appellant.

John Brooks Gourley, Clayton, for respondent.

CRIST, Judge.

On March 13, 1993, Respondent, Larry Porter, filed his petition to obtain hardship driving privileges. He alleged his license was revoked for one year for driving with a blood alcohol content of .13 percent or more and requested hardship driving privileges. *669The trial court granted hardship driving privileges and the Director of Revenue (Appellant) now appeals.

On appeal, Appellant contends the trial court incorrectly granted hardship driving privileges to Respondent, because he was ineligible to receive them under §§ 302.309-3(5)(i) and 302.525.2(2), RSMo Supp.1992. Those statutes provide a driver may not receive hardship driving privileges if his or her license has been revoked for one year because of “prior alcohol related enforcement contacts during the immediately preceding five years.” Section 302.525.2(2); § 302.309.-3(5)(i). Respondent has failed to file a brief in this matter.

The record before us indicates the trial court did not consider Respondent’s driving record in reaching its decision to grant hardship driving privileges. In his petition, Respondent alleged he had *obtained*a certified copy of his driving record for the proceeding five years. It appears, however, Respondent did not attach his driving record to his petition or file it with the trial court. Respondent’s driving record does not appear in the legal file we have received from Appellant. The docket entries do not reveal the driving record was ever filed or a hearing conducted where such driving record was admitted. If a hearing was ever had, no record of these proceedings was made. Further, Respondent did not allege in his petition whether or not he had received prior alcohol related enforcement contacts in the past five years.

On appeal, Appellant supplies a copy of Respondent’s driving record. It reveals pri- or alcohol related enforcement contacts. Even so, without proof the trial court considered this evidence, we cannot reverse on the grounds averred by Appellant. We do, however, reverse and remand because there is no evidence the trial court considered Respondent’s extensive driving record before it granted him hardship driving privileges. *See, True v. Director of Revenue,*773 S.W.2d 241, 243[3] (Mo.App.1989) (court should only grant hardship driving privileges after obtaining adequate information about driver’s driving record).

Reversed and remanded for a new hearing on Respondent’s application for hardship driving privileges.

CRANDALL, P.J., and REINHARD, J., concur.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Jesus Castro, Appellant.

Judgment of resentence, Supreme Court, New York County (Harold Rothwax, J.), rendered on November 5, 1986, unanimously affirmed. Application by appellant’s counsel to withdraw as counsel is granted. *(See, Anders v California,*386 US 738; *People v Saunders,*52 AD2d 833.) We have reviewed this record and agree with appellant’s assigned counsel that there are no nonfrivolous points which could be raised on this appeal. Concur—Ross, J. P., Asch, Kassal, Wallach and Rubin, JJ.
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America,

Plaintiff,

v. 

Johnathon David Sharp,

Defendant.

No. CR-17-50192-PHX-DGC

DETENTION ORDER

On December 18, 2019, Defendant appeared before this Court on a petition for 

revocation of supervised release. The issue of detention was submitted to the Court. The 

Court considered the petition and file in determining whether Defendant should be released 

on conditions set by the Court.

The Court finds that Defendant, having previously been convicted and placed on 

supervised release, and having appeared before the Court in connection with a petition to

revoke his supervised release, has failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that 

he is not likely to flee or pose a danger to the safety of the community if released pursuant 

to Rule 46(d), and Rule 32.1(a)(6), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and 18 U.S.C. §

3143.

 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant be detained pending further 

proceedings. 

Dated this 18th day of December, 2019.

Honorable Eileen S. Willett

United States Magistrate Judge
#### STATE of Missouri, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. James AYERS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17486.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District, Division Two.

Nov. 2, 1992.

Ellen H. Flottman, Columbia, for defendant-appellant.

William L. Webster, Atty. Gen., Breck K. Burgess, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for plaintiff-respondent.

PREWITT, Judge.

Following jury trial defendant was convicted of assault in the first degree and armed criminal action. On appeal his contentions include that the trial court erred in not requiring the prosecuting attorney to present a racially neutral explanation for *873the peremptory strikes of three black venirepersons.

Plaintiff responds that defendant’s claim was not timely raised because it was voiced after his peremptory challenges. The contention was raised before the venirepersons were excused and the jury sworn. Plaintiff also asserts that the circumstances surrounding the exercise of the state’s challenges “undercut any inference of discrimination”.

The case was tried before *Powers v. Ohio,*— U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991), was decided. It held that a white defendant has standing to challenge a venireperson’s exclusion from the jury on the basis of race, extending the holding of *Batson v. Kentucky,*476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). Defendant’s objection to the three strikes of black venirepersons was denied in the trial court because defendant was “white”, the trial judge concluding this was “not really a *Batson*case since we don’t have a black defendant.”

The contention that the objection was not timely raised is disposed of by *State v. Parker,*836 S.W.2d 930 (Mo. banc 1992). See also *State v. Starks,*834 S.W.2d 197 (Mo. banc 1992). *Parker*determined that a *Batson*challenge is timely if raised before the venire is excused and the jury sworn. *Parker*set forth the procedure to be followed by the trial court when a timely *Batson*objection is made.

Even if there were circumstances here giving a possible racially neutral explanation this does not mean that the challenges were not made because of race. The *Parker*opinion noted that the removal of one person for racial reasons is a violation of the equal protection clause regardless of how the jury was eventually composed, and the state’s failure to use all of its challenges against minorities does not insulate from scrutiny strikes directed against the minority venirepersons.

In accordance with *Parker,*this case must be remanded to the trial court for a hearing consistent with the holding of *Parker to*determine whether the prosecutor used the strikes in a discriminatory manner. The trial court shall then certify to this court the record of its proceedings and determination.

FLANIGAN, C.J., and MONTGOMERY, P.J., concur.