### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT KNOXVI LLE N ove m be r 17, 200 5 S es sio n
ANGELA McDANI EL v . CAROLINA NATI ONAL TRANSPORT , ET AL 

### .

Appeal f romthe Circ uit Court for Knox County No. 2-176-03 Har old Wimber ly, Jud ge

No. E2005-00541-COA- R3-CV - F ILED JANUARY 23, 2006

I n this action arising from a vehicular acc ident, the issues prese nted ar e whe ther the tria l court er red in allowing into evide nce de position testimony of a Def endant pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 32.01, and whether the amount of t he jury verdic t was supported by materia l evidenc e. W e hold the trial
c ou rt didno t err

in i ts d isc re tio na

ry de c isi on to a dmi t th e de po sit ion te sti mon y , a ndthat th e re is materia l evidenc e supporting t he duly approve d jury verdic t. Consequently , we a ffirm the judg ment of the trial c ourt.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Ci r c uit

Co ur t A ffirm e d; Case Re m anded

S HAR ON G. LEE , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which C H A RLES D. S US ANO , J R . and D. M I CH A EL S WI NEY , J J ., joined.
Dallas T. Rey nolds, I I I , Knoxvi lle, Tenne ssee, for t he Appellants, Carolina National Tr ansport and Robert K. Corpre w.

W. Z a ne Da nie l, K no xvill e , T e nn e sse e , f or the Ap pe lle e , A ng e la

Mc Da nie l.

OP IN ION

I. Fac tua l an d P

ro c e dur al B ac kg ro und

On Marc h 21, 2002, Ang ela Mc Daniel’ s vehicle w as re ar- ended by a t ractor-tra iler truck driven by Robert K. Corpre w on I nterstate 40 in or near downtown Knoxville. Mr. Corprew’ s truck
was re ar- ended by

another trac tor-tra iler, driven by Reg inald Davis, in the ac cident. On Ma rch 20, 2003, Ms. Mc Daniel broug ht this action for injuries sustained in the ac cident ag ainst Mr. Corprew , Carolina Na tional Transport ( the alleg ed owne r of Mr. Corprew ’s truck and the company for whic h Mr. Corpre w was alleg ed to be ac ting a s ag ent or e mploy ee) , Mr. Davis, a nd National Carriers, I nc. (the c ompany

for whic h Mr. Davis wa s alleg ed to be a cting as ag ent or e mploy ee)

.-2-

Carolina Na tional and National Car riers a nd their r espec tive drivers a nswere d, eac h Def endant a lleg ing, among other thi ng s, the fault of the other in the a ccide nt. Carolina National a nd Mr. Corprew filed a cross-c laim a g ainst National Carrie rs and Mr. Davis. All parties stipulated that Ms. McDanie l was without fault in the ac cident. The case was tried befor e a jury on November 2 and 3, 2005.

The jury returne d a verdic t f inding the Def

endants e ach 50% at fault and awa rding damag es to Ms. McDa niel in the amount of $200,000. The trial court approved the ve rdict. Carolina N ational and Mr. Corpr ew then f

iled a motion for a ne w trial or, in the alt ernative, a re mitti tur, which wa s denied by the trial court.

II. Issu es Prese nted

Caro lin a Natio na l a ndMr . Co rp re w a pp e a l, r a isi ng the fo llo wi ng iss ue s: (1) Whether

the trial court erre d in allowing N ational Carr iers and Mr . Davis to introduce the deposition testimonyof Mr. Da vis at trial, pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 32.01.
(2) Whether

the trial court err ed in ref

using to sug g est a remitti tur of t he jury verdic t or g rant
a ne w t ri a l.

Natio na l Ca

rrie rs a ndMr . D a vis ha ve pa id the ir po rt ion of the jud g me nt to M s. Mc Da nie l, and they are not involved in this appea l

. III . Ad missio n of

De po sit ion Te sti mony
We first addre ss the contention that t he trial court err ed in allowing the deposition testimony of Mr. Da vis. I s s u es re g arding whether a trial c ourt has cor

rec tly construed a nd applied the g overning Tenne ssee Rules of Civil Procedure and Te nnesse e R u l es o f Evidence in making an admissibi l i t y

deter mination address themselve s to the trial court’s discr etion, and we revie w such issues under the “abuse of discre tion” standard. De Lap p v . P ra tt , 1 52 S.W. 3d53 0, 53 8 ( Te nn . Ct

. App. 2004). “ [T] rial courts a re acc orded a wide deg ree of latitude in the ir deter mination of whether to a dmit or exclude evidenc e, even if such evidenc e would be re levant.” Id; Dic key v. Mc Cord, 63 S.W .3d 714, 723 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). A s our Supreme Court noted in Eldridge v. Eldridge,

Under the abuse of discre tion standard, a tr ial court' s ruling “ will be upheld s o long as rea sonable mi nds can disa g ree as to proprie ty of the decision made .” Sta te v. Sco tt, 33 S.W .3d 746, 752 (Tenn.2000) ; State v. Gi l l iland, 22 S.W .3d 266, 273 (Tenn.2000) . A trial court abuses its discre tion only when it “applies an inc orre ct leg al standar d,
or re ache s a dec ision which is ag ainst logic or reasoning that cause s an injustice to the party

complaining .” State v. Shirley, 6 S.W .3d 243, 24 7 ( Te nn .1 99 9) . T he abu se of disc re tio n s ta nd arddo e s n ot p e rm it-3- the app e lla te c ou rt

to s ub sti tut e its jud g me nt f or that of the tr ia l c ou rt

. Myint v. Allstate Ins. Co., 970 S.W .2d 920, 927 (Tenn.1998)

. Eldridge v. Eldridge, 42 S.W .3d 82, 85 (Tenn. 2001) (interna l brac kets omitted).

Tenne ssee Rule of Civil Procedur e 32.01, the a pplicable a nd g overning rule re g arding thi s is su e , s ta te s a s f

oll ow s in re le va nt p art :
At the trial or upon the he ar i n g o f a motion or an interloc utory proce eding , any part or all of a deposition, so far as admissible under the rules of evidenc e applied as thoug h the witness wer e then pr esent and testify ing, ma y

be used a g ains t any

party who was pr esent or
re pr e se nte d a t th e takin g of the de posit ion or

wh o h a d r e a so na

ble
no tic e the re of

, in a c c or da nc e wi th a ny

of the fo llo wi ng pr ov isi on s: * * * (2) The deposition of a party or of a ny one who a t the time of taking the deposition was an of

fice r, direc tor, or m anag ing ag ent, or a person desig nated unde r Rule 30.02(6) or 31.01 to t estify

on behalf

of a pu b l i c or private cor poration, partnership or a ssociation, g ov e rn me nta l a g e nc y or in div idu a l pr op ri e tor sh ip w hic h is a pa rt y may be used by an adv erse party for any purpose

.

* * * (4) I f only

part o f a depositi on is offer ed in evidenc e by a party , an adver se party

may require the i n t ro duction at that time of any other pa rt wh ic h o u g h t

i n f ai rn e ss t o b e c on sid e re d c on te mpo ra ne ou sly wi th it

. [E mp h a s is a d d e d ].

I n their brief

, Carolina Transport a nd Mr. Corprew arg ue that “the da y befor e trial, c ounsel fo r N a tio na l [Carrie rs ] an d M r. Da vis a dv ise d c ou ns e l f or Caro lin a a ndCor

pr e w tha t he int e nd e d to prese nt the testimonyof Da vis via discovery deposition be cause he was unable to obta in Mr. Davis’s prese nce at trial.” The morning of trial, Carolina Transport and Mr. C orpre w moved in limine to exclude the deposition of Mr. Da vis. There is no t ra n s cr i p t o f t h e pre sentation of the motion in limine , n o r o f ar g u m e n t o f c o u n s e l r e g ar d i n g t h e m o t i o n , n o r o f t h e t r i a l c o u r t ’ s c o m m e n t s , i f a n y, in ruling on the motion. I t is appare nt, however , that the trial court denied the motion.

I n the pre sentation of her

case in chief, Ms. McD aniel int roduce d a portion of Mr. Da vis’s de po sit ion

. I n the pr e se ntatio n of the ir c a se in c hie f, Caro lin a Natio na l a nd Mr. Co rpr ew als o prese nted ce rtain excerpts fr om Mr. Davis’s de position, after whic h counsel for National C arriers and Mr. Da vis presente d other portions of the de position which he arg ued should in fairne s s be considere d contempora neously with the portions presente d by Carolina Na tional and Mr. Corpre w.
After the close of p ro o f, co u n s el for Ca rolina Na tional and Mr. Corpre w made a n offe r of pr oo f r e g ard ing the mot ion s in limine ma de pr ior to t ri a l, s ta tin g a s f

oll ow s in re le va nt p art :-4- Then last but no t l ea s t, Defe ndant Corpre w and Car olina National
mov e d p ri or

to t ri a l to ba r a dmi ssi on of [the ] de po sit ion of Mr . D a vis

. Def ense a rg ued that it wa s i n v i o lation of [Tenn. R. Ci v. P.] 32.01. The witness wa s not unavailabl e as contemplated by the Rule, beca use his absenc e, thoug h h e may be, ac cording to counsel, more t h an 1 0 0 m i l es aw ayi n T ex as s o m ew h er e, t h at ’s o f h i s o wn ch o o s i n g. So h e in e sse nc e pr oc ur e d his ow n ab se nc e , an d he sh ou ldn ’t be able to take adva ntag e of the exception reg arding unavailability

.
THE COURT : Th e n we no te d sin c e pla int if f’ s c ou ns e l int e nd e d to
rea d portions of the deposition that that same Rule also a llows the other side to rea d other portions to e x plain those portions, and that’s
w h a tw e w o u n d u p d o i n g , i n t h e C o u r t ’ s o p i n i o n a n yw a y.
We initi ally

note that Tenn. R. Civ. P. 32.01(2) provides that “ [t ]he deposition of a party ...may

be used by an adverse party for any purpose.” Se e Ne lm s v . Te nn e sse e Fa rm e rs M ut. In s. Co., 61 3 S. W.2 d 4 81 , 4 83 -8 4 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 1 97 8) ; Ball v. Ove rton Square, Inc., 731 S.W .2d 536, 53 9 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 1 98 7) ; McLe mo re v . P owe ll , 96 8 S.W. 2d 79 9, 80 2 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 1 99 7) ; Dargi v. Terminix Int’ l. Co., 23 S.W .3d 342, 345 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2 000). I t is appare nt from the trial court’s comments on the rec ord that at some point dur ing the motion in limine hearing, c ounsel for Ms. M c D a n ie l in f

o r me d th e c o u r t th a t h e in te n d e d to r e a d in to e v id e n c e c e r ta in p o r tions of Mr. Davis’ de position. At t he hea ring of Carolina N ational’s motion for a ne w trial or r emittitur, the trial
c ou rt state d, “ c le arl y the pla int if f co uldre a d p ortio ns of

thi s d isc ov e ry

de po sit ion . H a vin g do ne that, the Cou rt de te rm ine d th a t th e oth e r p ortio ns that w e re re a d b y the oth e r p art ie s in c lud ing thi s defe ndant [National Transport] could appr opriately be re ad in this trial.”

The trial c ourt held the “rule of completene ss” found at subsection (4) of Rule 32.01 to be
app lic able un de r these c ir c ums ta nc e s. Th is r ule pr ov ide s th a t “ [i]f o nly pa rt of a de po sit ion is offe red in e vidence by

a party , an adve rse pa

rty may require the introduction at that time of any other part whic h oug ht in fairness to be c onsidered contempora neously with it.” Tenn. R. Civ. P. 32.01(4). Once Ms. McDanie l introduced pa rts of t he Davis deposition, either Defe ndant could have re quired other pa rts of the deposition tha t oug ht in fairne ss to be considere d simult aneously with the ear lier parts. L ikewise, onc e Carolina N ational and Mr. Corpr ew introduc ed parts of the deposition, the trial court prope rly allowed National Transport and Mr. Da vis, adverse parties to Carolina N ational and Mr. Corpre w, to rea d other pa rts of the de position, i n keeping with the rule.

I t is therefor e cle ar f

rom the t ransc ript and the tria l court’s c omments that it properly allowed
c ou ns e l f or Natio na l T ra ns po rt

a ndMr

. Da vis to re a d int o e vid e nc e c e rt a in p ortio ns of Mr . D a vis ’ deposition pursuant to the rule of completene ss. Although Car olina National ar g ues in its brief that the trial court er re d in allowing N ational Carr iers and Mr . Davis “to utiliz e the e ntire discovery deposition of Davis during the trial,” only certain port i o n s o f it were rea d into evidence . Further, althoug h Carolina Na tional arg ues that the t rial court wrong ly found Mr. Da vis to be an “unava ilable” witness pur suant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 32.01(3), there is no indi cation in the re cord tha t-5-

th e tria l c o u r t ma d e s u c h a f in d in g , o r th a t it b a s e d it s ru li n g u p o n s u b s e c ti o n ( 3 ) o f Ru le 3 2

. 0 1

. We do not find that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the de position t estimony under Te nn. R. Civ. P . 32.01.

IV . Jury V erdict
We now turn to the arg ument that the trial court erre d in refusing to sugg est a re mitti tur or g ra nt a ne w t ri a l. C aro lin a

Natio na l a ndMr . Co rp re w a sse rt that th e $2 00,0 00 ve rd ic t w a s so excessive as to be be y ond the upper limit of the ra ng e of r easona bleness in this case.

As alre ady

noted, this case w as tried before and decided by a jury

. A finding of fa ct made by a jury in a civil case will be set aside by this court “only if there is no material evide nce to support the ver dict.” Te nn. R. App. P. 13(d). As reg ards the issue of remittitur, our Supreme Court has stated
a s f oll ow s: when the question of remittitur is raised, the Court of Appe als has the

duty to review the p ro o f o f damag es and the authority to reduc e an e xce ssi ve a wa

rd . B ut w he n th e tr ia l jud g e ha s app ro ve d th e ve rd ic t, the re view in the Court of Appea ls is subject to the rule that if there is any materia l evidence to support the aw ard, it should not be disturbed.

Foster v. Amc on Int’l, Inc ., 6 2 1 S

. W

. 2 d 1 4 2 , 1 4 6 (T en n

. 1 9 8 1 )( q u o t i n g Ellis v. W hite Freightliner Corp., 60 3 S.W. 2d 12 5, 12 9 (T e nn

. 19 80 ))

. Th is de fe re nti a l sta nd ardse rv e s to pr e se rv e the pr inc ipl e that “ the a mou nt of

c omp e ns a tio n in a

pe rs on a l in

jury c a se is p ri mari ly

fo r the jury , a ndthat ne xt to the jury , the most competent per son to pa ss on the matter is the tria l judge who pre sided at the trial and hea rd the e vidence .” Foster, 621 S.W .2d at 143-44. Thus, to sa feg uard the constitutional right to t ri a l by jury , w e are re qu ir e d to “ take the str on g e st l e g iti ma te vie w of a ll the e vid e nc e to u ph old the ve rd ic t, t o a ssu me th e truth o f a ll tha t te nd s to su pp ort it , to dis c arda ll t o th e c on tr ary , a ndto allow all re asonable infere nces to sustain the ve rdict.” Poole v. The Kroger Co., 604 S.W .2d 52, 54 (Tenn. 1980) (interna l quotation marks omitted).

Our review of the record supports the conclusion that there is materia l evidence supporting the $200,000 award to Ms. McDa niel. Ms. McDanie l’s car , struck in the re ar by a tra ctor-tr ailer truck on the inter state, sustained some $7,000 in damag e. She we nt to the emerg ency room, wher e she wa s treate d for a

modera tely

sever e ce rvica l strain or whiplash injury . She prese nted the testimonyof two treating phy sicians. Dr. Fred H urst , wh o trea ted her , described his treatment a t leng th and testified that som e ten months afte r t he accident, “my impression was that of bone pain, ins omn ia , a ndde pr e ssi on ov e r c hr on ic pa in s y nd ro me , h a vin g be e n h urtin g no w for te n mo nth s, cer vical strain, lumbosac ral stra in, deg ener ative ce rvica l bone disease .”-6-

Dr . H ur st t e sti fi e d th a t th e me dic a tio ns pr e sc ri be d f or he r i nju ri e s c a us e d M s. Mc Da nie l to suffe r stomach a nd abdominal pain, which r equire d him to prescribe further medication for

her. D r. Hu rs t f urthe r t e sti fi e d a s f

oll ow s: Q: Do y ou have a n opinion, i n y o u r o pinion, as to how much imp a ir me nt o r d isa

bil ity sh e ha s a s a

re su lt o f this ?
A: Well, because of the a dded ef fec t on her ne rv es an d o n her g a str oin te sti na l sy ste m, ga striti s, be c a us e sh e wi ll l ike ly ha ve to
c on tin ue to take a nti -i nf la mma tory me dic a tio ns , a nd tho se me dic a tio ns do ir

ri ta te on e ’s sto ma c h, a ndbe c a us e of he r i na bil ity to sle e p f ro m ti me to time be c a us e of the pa in, I de te rm ine d th a t in my o p i n i o n t h a ts h e o u g h tt o h a v e ab o u t2 5 p e r c e n td i s ab i l i t y. Q: Dr. Hur st, what do y ou think her prog nosis for the future is as far
a s w ha t sh e is g oin g to b e able to d o o r h ow she’s g oin g to h a ve to live with this pain? I s there anything she can do for it? I s there a ny kind of operation she can ha ve?
A: Well, two and a half y ear s after the wreck – ac tually

more than two and a ha lf y ear s – she still has the pain, and the pa in I cannot se e g etting a ny

better. S o wh at i s of conc ern to me is that she ha sn’t
rea lly improved with a ll that medic ine and or thopedic surg ery

has had to offer her. And I think that this is – of course , I don’t have a cry stal ball. None of us do. But I think this is a chronic pain sy ndrome that this woman unfortunate ly wi l l suffe r for

an undete rmined leng th of t i m e, an d L o rd o n l y

k n o ws fo r h o w l o n g.

Ms. Mc Daniel was 39 y ear s old at the time of the trial. She testified tha t she had wor ked as
a mana g er f

or L evi Strauss “until L evi’s left town” in 1998. She was e arning approximately $54,000 pe r y e ar i n h e r p os iti on wi th L e vi Str a us s. Af te r the c omp a ny

c los e d a ndle ft

the Kn oxvil le are a , M s. McDa niel went to s chool and r etra ined to be an inde pendent insura nce a g ent, ea rned he r license , and beg an tra ining with a c ompany to do insurance sales. I n J anuary of 2002, she wa s hired by Ba nkers L ife & Casualty

as an inde pendent insura nce a g ent.

Ms. McDanie l beg an selling insurance for B anker s L ife & Casualty in ear l y Fe bruary

of 20 02 . Sh e te sti fi e d th a t in the se ve n w e e ks be tw e e n th a t ti me a ndthe a c c ide nt, sh e e arn e d a lit tle over $8,000, w orking on pure c ommissi on. She pres en t ed the testimony of Roy Steve Ruth, her tr a ine r a ndsu pe rv iso r at B a nk e rs , w ho state d a s f oll ow s: Q: After she ca me to work ther e, tell this Court and jury what ty pe of worke r she wa s and how she w orked be fore

.-7- A: Well, she started of

f v er y , v ery

well. When she ca me out of her training , that’s ac tually . . .what I call hands on, y ou know, y ou g o out in the field and help them produce

. And she was rea ll y p ro d uctive, doing r eal we ll, on the road to being a re al g ood, succe ssful ag ent.

***
Q: And af ter that [the acc ident] t ell us what differe n ce y ou noticed, Mr. Ruth, after

that happene d.
A: Well, when she was able to come back to work, she, y ou know – I ’m talking about coming back a nd try to come bac k to work

. She was veryu n c o mf

o r ta b le , c o u ld n ’ t s it

. T h is jo b , it ’ s n o t r e a ll y w h at y ou call phy sically

[si c] labor, but, y ou know, y ou do a lot of bending
ov e r, ta lki ng on the ph on e , ra isi ng y ou r arm up a nd do wn , c on sta ntl y movin g, an d talking f

or seve ral hours at a time try ing to se t
app oin tme nts . So ou tsi de of that, i t’ s st re nu ou s. I

no tic e d h e r s tr e ss le ve l w a s r e a lly

hig h. She wa s in a lot of pa in. She did n’ t f e e l w e ll.

. . .She g ot to the point that she just wasn’t comfortable working . She
was c ry ing, upse t, felt bad, looked ba d. She rea lly did.

***
Q: You know she w orked there up until af ter this a ccide nt happene d. But did they

ultimately

have to let he r g o?

A: Yeah. Her employ ment just we nt dow nhill because she could not pe rf or m. I me a n s he re a lly

c ou ldn ’t . Sh e c ou ldn ’t

do the ta sk s.

***
Q: And was she, i n y our opi nion, g oing to be a very g ood worke r or g oing to be –
A: Ye a h. Yo u o nly

ha ve abo ut o ne ou t o f 10 0 suc c e ssf ul a g e nts

. You’ll run through ag ents, y ou know, one rea lly succe ssful. And she was on the r oad to being that one. She wa s doing w ell.

After her e mploy ment wi t h Ba nkers wa s terminated, Ms. McD aniel attempted to wor k ind e pe nd e ntl y

in the ins ur a nc e sa le s fi e ld. She e arn e d on ly app ro xima te ly $8 ,6 79 .1 9 in 20 03 in this capa city

.-8-

Ms. Mc Da nie l ha d no his tory of ba c k or ne c k inj ury pr ior to the a c c ide nt. Af te r the a c c ide nt, she wa s unable to participate in ac tiviti es she ha d previously enjoy ed, such a s water

skiing, wor

king out at the g y m, and g arde ning. H er me dical bills for injuries re s u l t i ng from the a ccide nt totaled approximately

$16,249.31.

Practica lly

none of the above -desc ribed e vidence was c halleng ed or c ontradicte d by either Def endant a t trial. Ba sed upon the for eg oi n g and the recor d as a w hole, we hold ther e is materia l evidenc e supporting the duly approve d jury

verdic t, and that the amount of $200,000 is not bey ond the upper limi t of the ra ng e of r easona bleness whe n considering the injuries and pe cuniary losses suffe red by

Ms. McDanie l resulting f rom the ac cident.

We the re fo re a ff

ir m th e jury

ve rd ic t a ndthe jud g me nt of the tr ia l c ou rt in a ll r e sp e c ts. Cos ts on appea l are assessed to the A ppellants, Carolina National Transport a nd Robert K. Corpre w.

_________________________________________ SHARON G. LEE, J UDGE