25092 Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 97 / Friday, May 17, 1996 / Notices

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Record of Decision for the Final

Environmental Impact Statement on a

Proposed Nuclear Weapons

Nonproliferation Policy Concerning

Foreign Research Reactor Spent

Nuclear Fuel

AGENCY: Department of Energy.

ACTION: Record of decision.

SUMMARY: DOE, in consultation with the

Department of State, has decided to

implement a new foreign research

reactor spent fuel acceptance policy as

specified in the Preferred Alternative

contained in the Final Environmental

Impact Statement on a Proposed

Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation

Policy Concerning Foreign Research

Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel (the Final

EIS, DOE/EIS–218F of February 1996),

subject to additional stipulations

specified in Section VII of this Record

of Decision. The new policy applies

only to aluminum-based and TRIGA

(Training, Research, Isotope, General

Atomics) foreign research reactor spent

nuclear fuel and target material

containing uranium enriched in the

United States. The purpose of the

acceptance policy is to support the

broad United States’ nuclear weapons

nonproliferation policy calling for the

reduction and eventual elimination of

the use of highly enriched (weaponsgrade) uranium in civil commerce

worldwide.

EFFECTIVE DATE: The new policy set forth

in this Record of Decision is effective

upon being made public May 13, 1996,

in accordance with DOE’s NEPA

implementation regulations (10 CFR

§ 1021.315).

ADDRESSES: Copies of the Final

Environmental Impact Statement on a

Proposed Nuclear Weapons

Nonproliferation Policy Concerning

Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear

Fuel (DOE/EIS–0218F, the Final EIS)

and this Record of Decision are

available in the public reading rooms

and libraries identified in the Federal

Register Notice that announced the

availability of the Final EIS (61 FR 6983,

February 23, 1996), or by calling 1–800–

736–3282 (toll free).

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For

information on the management of

foreign research reactor spent nuclear

fuel or this Record of Decision contact:

Mr. Charles Head, Program Manager,

Office of Spent Fuel Management (EM–

67), U.S. Department of Energy, 1000

Independence Avenue, SW,

Washington, DC 20585, Telephone (202)

586–9441.

For information on DOE’s National

Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)

process, contact: Ms. Carol Borgstrom,

Director, Office of NEPA Policy and

Assistance (EH–42), U.S. Department of

Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue,

SW, Washington, DC 20585, Telephone

(202) 586–4600, or leave message at 1–

800–472–2756.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Synopsis of the Decision

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)

and the Department of State jointly

issued the Final Environmental Impact

Statement on a Proposed Nuclear

Weapons Nonproliferation Policy

Concerning Foreign Research Reactor

Spent Nuclear Fuel (the Final EIS, DOE/

EIS–218F) on February 16, 1996. In this

Final EIS, DOE and the Department of

State considered the potential

environmental impacts of a proposed

policy to manage spent nuclear fuel

from foreign research reactors. After

consideration of the Final EIS, public

comments submitted on the Draft EIS

and concerns expressed following

issuance of the Final EIS, DOE, in

consultation with the Department of

State, has decided to implement the

proposed policy as identified in the

Preferred Alternative contained in the

Final EIS, subject to additional

stipulations specified in Section VII of

this Record of Decision. This

implementation will involve acceptance

of approximately 19.2 MTHM (metric

tonnes of heavy metal) of foreign

research reactor spent fuel and

approximately 0.6 MTHM of target

material into the United States over a 13

year period, beginning on the effective

date of the policy. The spent fuel will

be received from abroad through the

Charleston Naval Weapons Station in

South Carolina (about 80%) and the

Concord Naval Weapons Station in

California (about 5%). Most of the target

material and some of the spent fuel

(about 15%) will be received overland

from Canada. Shipment through

Charleston is expected to begin in the

summer of 1996 and through Concord in

mid-1997. Shipments from Canada have

not been scheduled at this time. The

Final EIS demonstrates that the spent

fuel and target material could be safely

transported overland within the United

States by either truck or rail, and DOE

has decided that either transportation

mode may be used. Nevertheless, based

on initial input from the public near the

ports of entry indicating a preference for

shipment by rail, DOE will generally

seek to use rail for shipments from the

ports of entry to DOE facilities at the

Savannah River Site in South Carolina

and the Idaho National Engineering

Laboratory in Idaho. The particular

mode of transportation to be used will

be determined after further discussions

between DOE and State, Tribal and local

officials. After a limited period of

interim storage, the spent fuel will be

treated and packaged, or chemically

separated, at the Savannah River Site

and Idaho National Engineering

Laboratory as necessary to prepare it for

transport to a final disposal repository.

II. Background

Beginning in the 1950’s, as part of the

‘‘Atoms for Peace’’ program, the United

States provided nuclear technology to

foreign nations for peaceful applications

in exchange for their promise to forego

development of nuclear weapons. A

major element of this program was the

provision of research reactor technology

and the highly enriched uranium (HEU)

needed in the early years to fuel the

research reactors. Research reactors play

a vital role in important medical,

agricultural, and industrial applications.

Nevertheless, the highly enriched

uranium initially used in the fuel

elements for these reactors can also be

used in nuclear weapons. In the past,

after irradiation in the research reactor,

the used fuel elements (often referred to

as ‘‘spent nuclear fuel’’ or ‘‘spent fuel’’)

were transported to the United States,

where they were chemically separated

to extract the uranium still remaining in

the spent nuclear fuel. In this way, the

United States maintained control over

disposition of the HEU that it provided

to other nations.

Before 1964, bilateral agreements with

the countries operating research reactors

provided for the lease of the enriched

uranium, with explicit provision for the

return of the spent nuclear fuel to the

United States. After 1964, most

agreements provided for the sale of this

material to the foreign nation, and the

United States began to operate under a

policy known as the ‘‘Off-Site Fuels

Policy’’, under which the United States

continued to accept, temporarily store,

and chemically separate the spent

nuclear fuel.

Research reactors have become the

major civilian users of HEU. To further

reduce the danger of nuclear weapons

proliferation, the United States in 1978

initiated the Reduced Enrichment for

Research and Test Reactors (RERTR)

program, which was aimed at reducing

the use of HEU in civilian programs by

promoting the conversion of foreign and

domestic research reactors from HEU

fuel to low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel

(LEU cannot be used directly in nuclear

weapons). As part of the RERTR

program, DOE developed LEU fuel and
Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 97 / Friday, May 17, 1996 / Notices 25093

worked with foreign research reactor

operators to convert their reactors to run

on such fuel.

The foreign research reactor operators

who converted to LEU fuel did so in

support of nuclear weapons

nonproliferation objectives, even though

such conversions were expensive and

generally resulted in reduced reactor

capabilities and increased operating

costs. From the beginning of the RERTR

program, foreign research reactor

operators made it clear that their

willingness to convert their research

reactors to LEU fuel was contingent

upon the continued acceptance by DOE

of their spent nuclear fuel for

disposition in the United States.

The United States accepted foreign

research reactor spent nuclear fuel until

the ‘‘Off-Site Fuels Policy’’ expired (in

1988 for HEU fuels and 1992 for LEU

fuels). At that time, DOE committed to

conduct an environmental review of the

impacts of extending the program for

accepting foreign research reactor spent

nuclear fuel. In 1991, DOE issued an

environmental assessment of the

potential environmental impacts of the

proposed extension. DOE received

numerous comments from the public

stating that a new, long-term policy

should not be implemented until an EIS

had been prepared. DOE decided in

mid-1993 to prepare an EIS to evaluate

the impacts of implementing a new

foreign research reactor spent nuclear

fuel acceptance policy.

On October 21, 1993, DOE published

a Notice of Intent (NOI) (58 FR 54336)

to prepare an environmental impact

statement on a proposed policy for the

acceptance of foreign research reactor

spent nuclear fuel containing uranium

enriched in the United States. The NOI

announced public scoping meetings and

requested public comments and

suggestions for DOE to consider in its

determination of the scope of the EIS.

Nine public scoping meetings were held

in November and December 1993. DOE

received a total of 2,215 scoping

comments from 493 commentors.

On April 21, 1995, DOE published a

Notice of Availability (60 FR 19899) of

the Draft EIS. The Draft EIS analyzed

three Management Alternatives for

implementing the proposed action:

Management Alternative 1—Accept and

manage foreign research reactor spent

nuclear fuel in the United States;

Management Alternative 2—Facilitate

the management of foreign research

reactor spent nuclear fuel overseas;

and

Management Alternative 3—A hybrid,

or combination, of elements from the

first two Management Alternatives.

During the 90-day public comment

period (April 21, 1995 to July 20, 1995),

about 900 individuals attended 17

public hearings held in or near

candidate ports, management sites, and

in Washington, DC. In addition to oral

comments, DOE received approximately

5,040 written comments contained

within approximately 1,250 comment

documents on a wide range of policy,

economic, and technical issues. Many

commentors supported the United

States’ nuclear weapons

nonproliferation policy objective of

seeking to reduce the use of HEU (i.e.,

nuclear weapons-grade uranium) in

civil commerce. However, the

comments also reflected a wide range of

views as to which Management

Alternative should be adopted. Some

commentors supported management of

the spent nuclear fuel in the United

States. Other commentors questioned

the need to accept spent nuclear fuel

from allies of the United States and

those countries that appear to have the

capability to manage their own spent

nuclear fuel abroad. These commentors

generally believed that such spent

nuclear fuel should be managed

overseas. With regard to implementation

of the policy in the United States, some

commentors preferred the use of

military ports, a practice DOE has

followed in the recent past based on

strong public preference. Risks during

transport, including those from

terrorism, a sunken cask, severe

shipboard fires, and the level of

emergency preparedness at ports were

frequently raised as matters of concern.

In consideration of public comments,

DOE added information to the Final EIS,

including: clarification of the proposed

United States policy on accepting spent

nuclear fuel from allies; examination of

the consequences of sabotage or terrorist

attack; safety of transportation casks; reexamination of the shipboard fire

analysis; and general descriptions of

transportation and emergency response

regulations and management activities

related to safe transport of the spent fuel

and target material. In addition, the

Naval Weapons Station at Charleston,

South Carolina was analyzed along with

the other terminals of the port of

Charleston that had been included in

the Draft EIS.

On February 23, 1996, the U.S.

Environmental Protection Agency

published a Notice of Availability (61

FR 6983) of the Final Environmental

Impact Statement on a Proposed

Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation

Policy Concerning Foreign Research

Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel (DOE/EIS–

0218F of February 1996), after DOE had

distributed approximately 3,000 copies

of the EIS and/or the EIS Summary to

government officials and interested

groups and individuals.

DOE has prepared this Record of

Decision in accordance with the

regulations of the Council on

Environmental Quality for

Implementing NEPA (40 CFR Parts

1500–1508) and DOE’s NEPA

Implementing Procedures (10 CFR Part

1021). This Record of Decision is based

on DOE’s Final Environmental Impact

Statement on a Proposed Nuclear

Weapons Nonproliferation Policy

Concerning Foreign Research Reactor

Spent Nuclear Fuel (the Final EIS). In

making the decisions announced in this

Record of Decision, DOE, in

consultation with the Department of

State, considered environmental

impacts and other factors, such as

nuclear weapons nonproliferation

policies; public comments received on

the Draft EIS and concerns expressed

following issuance of the Final EIS;

analysis of impacts and alternatives in

the DOE Programmatic Spent Nuclear

Fuel Management and Idaho National

Engineering Laboratory Environmental

Restoration and Waste Management

Programs Final Environmental Impact

Statement (DOE/EIS–0203–F of April

1995, the ‘‘Programmatic SNF&INEL

EIS’’) and the Records of Decision for

that EIS (60 FR 28680, June 1, 1995 and

61 FR 9441, March 8, 1996).

III. Policy Considerations

A key goal of United States’ nuclear

weapons nonproliferation policy is to

reduce international civil commerce in

HEU, since HEU can be used directly in

the production of nuclear weapons. The

proposal by DOE and the Department of

State to adopt a policy to manage

foreign research reactor spent nuclear

fuel containing uranium enriched in the

United States is intended to support

efforts by the United States to convert

foreign research reactors from HEU to

LEU fuels (the latter cannot be used

directly in nuclear weapons) and to gain

worldwide acceptance of the use of LEU

fuels in new research reactors.

Failure of the United States to manage

foreign research reactor spent nuclear

fuel could have a number of adverse

consequences. Foreign governments and

research reactor operators have

participated in the RERTR program in

large part because the United States

previously accepted the spent nuclear

fuel from their research reactors. The

United States has not accepted HEU

spent nuclear fuel for more than seven

years, with the exception of recent

limited shipments made after

completion of the Environmental

Assessment of Urgent-Relief Acceptance
25094 Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 97 / Friday, May 17, 1996 / Notices

of Foreign Research Reactor Spent

Nuclear Fuel (DOE/EA–0912, April

1994). As a result, several foreign

research reactor operators are running

out of space to store their spent nuclear

fuel, and others will run out soon.

Under such conditions, the foreign

research reactor operators must either

shut down their reactors, construct new

storage facilities, or ship the spent

nuclear fuel offsite for storage or

reprocessing. Many of the reactor

operators do not have the option of

increasing their storage capacities due to

local regulatory restrictions. Moreover,

construction and licensing of new

storage facilities cannot be

accomplished in time to support

continued operations. The most realistic

near-term option for a limited number of

the reactor operators (particularly those

in countries with power reactor

programs that have an infrastructure to

accept the return of the radioactive

waste generated during reprocessing) is

to ship their spent nuclear fuel offsite

for reprocessing.

The current practice followed in

overseas reprocessing of research reactor

spent fuel results in separated HEU that

is placed back into commerce (some or

all of it may be refabricated into new

HEU research reactor fuel), a result that

undermines United States’ nuclear

weapons nonproliferation goals.

Furthermore, none of the foreign

reprocessing facilities have the

capability to reprocess the new, high

density LEU fuel developed under the

RERTR program. Thus, in the absence of

action to resolve the question of the

disposition of spent nuclear fuel, many

foreign research reactor operators who

could reprocess to control their spent

fuel inventory would likely continue to

use, or convert back to, fuel containing

HEU. In such a case, the foreign

research reactor operator community as

a whole would have little incentive to

convert their reactors to LEU fuels. This

would have the effect of encouraging the

foreign research reactor operators to use

HEU (weapons-grade uranium) as fuel

for their reactors, would increase the

amount of HEU in international

commerce, and would inevitably

increase the opportunity for diversion of

HEU into a nuclear weapons program.

DOE and the Department of State do

not seek to indefinitely accept or

otherwise manage spent nuclear fuel

from foreign research reactors. Rather,

the purpose of the new policy is to

recover as much HEU that originated in

the United States as possible from

international commerce, while

providing the foreign research reactor

operators and their host countries time

to convert the reactors to LEU fuel and

to make their own arrangements for

disposition of subsequently generated

LEU spent nuclear fuel. The foreign

research reactor operators and host

countries must be prepared to

implement their own arrangements for

disposition of their spent nuclear fuel

after the policy expires (i.e., after 10

years of spent fuel generation following

the effective date of the policy).

IV. Alternatives Evaluated in the Final

EIS

DOE evaluated the following

alternatives for management of the

foreign research reactor spent nuclear

fuel:

A. Management Alternative 1: Accept

and Manage Foreign Research Reactor

Spent Nuclear Fuel in the United States

Under Management Alternative 1,

foreign research reactor spent nuclear

fuel containing uranium enriched in the

United States would be transported to

the United States in casks designed to

comply with international regulations

that are essentially identical to those

promulgated by the U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission (NRC) and

certified by the U.S. Department of

Transportation. In accordance with the

Record of Decision for the Programmatic

SNF&INEL Final EIS, all of the

aluminum-based foreign research

reactor spent nuclear fuel accepted by

DOE (about 18.2 MTHM) would be

managed at the Savannah River Site in

South Carolina, and the TRIGA

elements (about 1 MTHM) would be

managed at the Idaho National

Engineering Laboratory, pending

ultimate disposition.

The basic implementation elements of

Management Alternative 1 provide the

foundation for the analyses of impacts

presented in the EIS. They are:

Policy Duration. The policy duration

would be 10 years. Spent nuclear fuel

that is currently being stored or that is

generated during a 10 year policy period

would be accepted. Actual shipments of

spent nuclear fuel to the United States

could be made for a period of 13 years,

starting from the effective date of policy

implementation. A five year policy

duration and an indefinite duration for

acceptance of HEU (with a ten year

duration for LEU) were also analyzed as

alternatives in the EIS.

Amount of Foreign Research Reactor

Spent Nuclear Fuel. The amount of

foreign research reactor spent nuclear

fuel that would be accepted under the

basic implementation of Management

Alternative 1 is up to about 19.2 MTHM

in up to approximately 22,700

individual spent nuclear fuel elements.

These spent nuclear fuel elements

would be received from 41 countries.

Alternative amounts of spent nuclear

fuel considered as implementation

alternatives were: receipt of spent fuel

only from countries that do not have

high-income economies, acceptance of

HEU spent fuel only, and acceptance of

target material in addition to spent fuel.

Marine Transport. Under the basic

implementation alternative, the spent

fuel and target materials would be

transported by sea in either chartered or

regularly scheduled commercial ships.

DOE estimates that 721 cask loads of

foreign research reactor spent nuclear

fuel (a cask load is one spent fuel

shipping cask loaded with spent fuel)

would be sent to the United States by

ship over a 13-year acceptance period

under Management Alternative 1.

Acceptance of an additional 15 cask

loads of target material by sea is also

analyzed.

Potential Port(s) of Entry for Foreign

Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel.

The following potential ports of entry

were selected for analysis because they

met basic criteria designed to identify

the most appropriate ports for use in

accepting foreign research reactor spent

fuel:

Charleston, SC (includes Charleston

Naval Weapons Station and Wando

Terminal, Mt. Pleasant)

Concord Naval Weapons Station, CA

Galveston, TX

Hampton Roads, VA (includes

Terminals at Newport News, Norfolk,

and Portsmouth, VA)

Jacksonville, FL

Military Ocean Terminal Sunny Point,

NC

Portland, OR

Savannah, GA

Tacoma, WA

Wilmington, NC

Ground Transport. The basic

implementation of Management

Alternative 1 would involve

transporting casks containing foreign

research reactor spent nuclear fuel by

truck, rail, or barge from the ports of

entry or Canadian border crossings to

potential management sites.

Foreign Research Reactor Spent

Nuclear Fuel Management Sites. The

analysis considered five potential

management sites selected to be

consistent with the management sites

evaluated in the Programmatic

SNF&INEL EIS (i.e., the Savannah River

Site in South Carolina, the Idaho

National Engineering Laboratory, the

Oak Ridge Reservation in Tennessee, the

Hanford Site in Washington State, and

the Nevada Test Site). The Record of

Decision for the Programmatic

SNF&INEL EIS subsequently eliminated
Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 97 / Friday, May 17, 1996 / Notices 25095

the last three sites from consideration as

management sites for spent nuclear fuel

from foreign research reactors.

Storage Technologies. During the first

few years, storage would take place in

existing storage facilities that use either

wet or dry storage technologies. Under

the basic implementation of

Management Alternative 1, any new

storage capacity that would be built

would be dry storage. Wet storage was

also evaluated as an alternative to dry

storage.

Near-Term Conventional Chemical

Separation in the United States. As an

alternative to storage of the spent fuel in

the United States, the Final EIS

evaluated chemical separation of foreign

research reactor spent nuclear fuel and

target material in existing facilities at

the Savannah River Site or the Idaho

National Engineering Laboratory. The

HEU could be blended down to LEU to

preclude its use in nuclear weapons.

The resulting high-level waste could be

vitrified and managed onsite until a

geologic repository becomes available.

Developmental Treatment and/or

Packaging Technologies. As another

alternative for management of the spent

fuel, the Final EIS discussed a potential

development program that DOE could

conduct leading to a decision on

whether to construct and operate a new

treatment and/or packaging facility. The

objective of this technical strategy

would be to treat, package, and store

spent nuclear fuel in a manner suitable

for direct placement into a geologic

repository without necessarily

separating the fissile materials, while

meeting or exceeding all applicable

safety and environmental requirements.

Financing Arrangements. Under the

basic implementation of Management

Alternative 1, high-income-economy

countries would be charged a

competitive fee. The United States

would bear the full cost of transporting

and managing foreign research reactor

spent nuclear fuel received from other

countries. The Final EIS also evaluated

alternatives in which:

1) All countries would be subsidized;

2) All countries would be charged a

full-cost recovery fee; or

3) Countries with high income

economies would be charged a full-cost

recovery fee, while other countries

would be subsidized.

Location for Taking Title. Under the

basic implementation of Management

Alternative 1, the United States would

take title to spent nuclear fuel from

foreign research reactors at the limit of

United States territorial waters or

continental border (for shipments from

Canada). The Final EIS also evaluated

alternatives in which the United States

would take title prior to shipment, at the

ports of entry, or at the DOE

management sites.

Ultimate Disposition. The Nuclear

Waste Policy Act of 1982 (as amended)

authorizes disposal of the foreign

research reactor spent nuclear fuel in a

geologic repository. DOE is working

with staff from the Nuclear Regulatory

Commission to ensure that the spent

fuel management actions it is

undertaking for all of its spent fuel, and

actions that would be undertaken for

any additional foreign research reactor

spent fuel to be accepted, will allow

either direct emplacement of the spent

fuel in a geologic repository or

acceptance of the spent fuel in a treated

form at a geologic repository.

Decisions regarding the actual

disposal of DOE’s spent nuclear fuel

would follow appropriate

environmental review under the

National Environmental Policy Act.

B. Management Alternative 2: Facilitate

the Management of Foreign Research

Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel Overseas

Under this Management Alternative,

two subalternatives were analyzed. In

the first subalternative, DOE and the

Department of State would provide

assistance, incentives, and coordination

for spent fuel storage at one or more

locations overseas, with appropriate

storage technologies, regulations, and

safeguards. In the second subalternative,

DOE and the Department of State would

provide nontechnical assistance,

incentives, and coordination to foreign

research reactor operators and

reprocessors to facilitate reprocessing of

spent nuclear fuel overseas in facilities

operated under international

inspections and safeguards. Facilities

operated by the United Kingdom

Atomic Energy Authority at Dounreay,

United Kingdom, and by Cogema at

Marcoule, France might be used for this

purpose. After reprocessing, the

recovered HEU would be blended down

to LEU at these same facilities. The

wastes resulting from this reprocessing

would be sent to the country in which

the spent nuclear fuel was irradiated. If

the reprocessing wastes could not be

sent to the country in which the spent

nuclear fuel was irradiated, such wastes

would be accepted by the United States

for storage and ultimate geologic

disposal. It is important to note that the

foreign reprocessing facilities do not

have the capability to reprocess the

new, high density, LEU fuel developed

under the RERTR program.

C. Management Alternative 3: A

Combination of Elements from

Management Alternatives 1 and 2

(Hybrid Alternative)

Under Management Alternative 3,

DOE and the Department of State would

combine elements from Management

Alternatives 1 and 2 to develop new

alternatives for management of foreign

research reactor spent nuclear fuel in

the United States or abroad. For

example, DOE and the Department of

State could combine partial storage or

reprocessing overseas with partial

storage or chemical separation in the

United States. Implementation

alternatives for the portion of the spent

nuclear fuel from foreign research

reactors to be managed in the United

States would be the same as those for

Management Alternative 1.

D. No Action Alternative

In the No Action Alternative, the

United States would neither manage

foreign research reactor spent nuclear

fuel containing uranium enriched in the

United States, nor provide technical

assistance or financial incentives for

overseas storage or reprocessing. In this

case, there would be no foreign research

reactor spent nuclear fuel shipments to

the United States and no assistance to

foreign countries for managing foreign

research reactor spent nuclear fuel

overseas.

E. Preferred Alternative

Under the Preferred Alternative

(which is a combination of the

implementation elements of

Management Alternative 1), DOE would

accept and manage in the United States

up to 19.2 MTHM of foreign research

reactor spent nuclear fuel in up to

approximately 22,700 individual spent

fuel elements and up to an additional

0.6 MTHM of target material. This spent

fuel and target material would come

from the following countries:

Table 1—High-income economy

countries:

Australia

Austria

Belgium

Canada

Denmark

Finland

France

Germany

Israel

Italy

Japan

Netherlands

Spain

Sweden

Switzerland

Taiwan
25096 Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 97 / Friday, May 17, 1996 / Notices

United Kingdom

Table 2—Other Countries:

Argentina

Bangladesh

Brazil

Chile

Colombia

Greece

Indonesia

Iran

Jamaica

Malaysia

Mexico

Pakistan

Peru

Philippines

Portugal

Romania

Slovenia

South Africa

South Korea

Thailand

Turkey

Uruguay

Venezuela

Zaire

The types of Foreign Research Reactor

Spent Nuclear Fuel and Target Material

that would be accepted under the

Preferred Alternative are as follows:

• Spent nuclear fuel (HEU and/or

LEU) from research reactors operating

on LEU fuel or in the process of

converting to LEU fuel when the policy

becomes effective.

• Spent nuclear fuel (HEU and/or

LEU) from research reactors that operate

on HEU fuel when the policy becomes

effective but that agree to convert to

LEU fuel. (Spent nuclear fuel would not

be accepted from research reactors that

could convert to LEU fuel but do not

agree to do so.)

• Spent nuclear fuel (HEU) from

research reactors having lifetime cores,

from research reactors planning to shut

down by a specific date while the policy

is in effect, and from research reactors

for which a suitable LEU fuel is not

available.

• Spent nuclear fuel (HEU and/or

LEU) from research reactors that are

already shut down.

• Unirradiated fuel (HEU and/or LEU)

from eligible research reactors would be

accepted as spent nuclear fuel. (This

material could be a particular nuclear

weapons proliferation concern because

it is not highly radioactive and thus can

be handled manually. Thus could allow

it to be stolen more easily.)

For research reactors with both HEU

and LEU spent nuclear fuel available for

shipment, LEU spent nuclear fuel would

not be accepted until all HEU spent

nuclear fuel has been accepted, unless

there are extenuating circumstances

(e.g., deterioration of one or more LEU

elements sufficient to cause a health or

safety problem if acceptance were

delayed). Spent nuclear fuel (HEU and/

or LEU) would not be accepted from

new research reactors starting operation

after the date of implementation of the

policy.

The duration of the policy under the

Preferred Alternative would be 10 years.

Shipments of spent nuclear fuel to the

United States could be made for a

period of up to 13 years, starting from

the effective date of policy

implementation, as long as the spent

nuclear fuel had already been

discharged prior to the beginning of the

policy period or is discharged during

the policy period. The additional three

years in the shipping period were

included to provide time for the

radiation levels of the last spent fuel

discharged during the 10 year policy

period to decay enough to allow its

transportation, to provide time for

logistics in arranging for shipment of the

last spent fuel discharged, and to allow

for potential shipping delays.

The aluminum-based foreign research

reactor spent nuclear fuel (about 18.2

MTHM) and target material (about 0.6

MTHM) would be transported to and

managed at the Savannah River Site and

the TRIGA foreign research reactor

spent nuclear fuel (about 1 MTHM)

would be transported to and managed at

the Idaho National Engineering

Laboratory, in accordance with the

Records of Decision for the

Programmatic SNF&INEL EIS and the

settlement agreement reached between

DOE and the State of Idaho [Public

Service Co. of Colorado v. Batt, No. CV

91–0035–S-EJL (D. Id.) and United

States v. Batt, No. CV–91–0054–S-EJL

(D. Id.)]. According to this agreement,

DOE could accept up to 61 TRIGA spent

nuclear fuel shipments from foreign

research reactors prior to December 31,

2000 for management at the Idaho

National Engineering Laboratory. Before

DOE would accept any shipments, the

Governor of Idaho would be notified

and the Secretary of Energy would

certify that the shipments are necessary

to meet national security and

nonproliferation requirements.

The foreign research reactor spent

nuclear fuel and target material would

be shipped by either chartered or

regularly scheduled commercial ships

from the foreign ports to the United

States.

Although all of the candidate ports

listed in Management Alternative 1

above would be appropriate ports to use

for receipt of the spent fuel and target

material shipments, DOE would prefer

to use the military ports in proximity to

the spent nuclear fuel management sites

(i.e., Charleston Naval Weapons Station

and the Concord Naval Weapons

Station) to take advantage of the

characteristics of these ports to increase

the safety and security of the spent fuel

transportation process. (Note: Section

VII of this notice designates these two

ports as the ports of entry.)

DOE would take title to the foreign

research reactor spent nuclear fuel and

target material that is shipped by sea

after it is unloaded from the ship at the

port of entry, and to the spent nuclear

fuel and target material shipped solely

overland (i.e., from Canada) at the

border crossing between Canada and the

United States.

The foreign research reactor spent

nuclear fuel and target material would

be transported from the United States

ports to the management sites by truck

or rail.

The financing arrangement under the

Preferred Alternative would be to charge

high-income-economy countries a

competitive fee and for the United

States to bear the full cost associated

with acceptance of spent fuel and target

material from other countries. The fee

policy for countries with high-income

economies would be established in a

Federal Register notice to allow DOE

flexibility to adjust the fee policy to

account for inflation, or further

development of spent nuclear fuel

management practices in the United

States.

For the aluminum-based foreign

research reactor spent nuclear fuel, the

following three-point management

strategy would be implemented:

1. New Technology Development/ Dry

Storage. DOE would embark

immediately on an accelerated program

at the Savannah River Site to identify,

develop, and demonstrate one or more

non-reprocessing, cost-effective

treatment and/or packaging technologies

to prepare the foreign research reactor

spent nuclear fuel for ultimate disposal.

The purpose of any new facilities that

might be constructed to implement

these technologies would be to change

the foreign research reactor spent

nuclear fuel into a form that is suitable

for geologic disposal, without

necessarily separating the fissile

materials, while meeting or exceeding

all applicable safety and environmental

requirements.

In conjunction with the examination

of new technologies, variations of

conventional direct disposal methods

would also be explored. After treatment

and/or packaging, the foreign research

reactor spent nuclear fuel would be

managed on site in ‘‘road ready’’ dry

storage until transported off-site for

continued storage or disposal. DOE
Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 97 / Friday, May 17, 1996 / Notices 25097

would select, develop, and implement,

if possible, one or more of these

treatment and/or packaging technologies

by the year 2000. DOE is committed to

avoiding indefinite storage of this spent

nuclear fuel in a form that is unsuitable

for disposal.

2. Potential Chemical Separation/Wet

Storage. Despite DOE’s best efforts, it is

possible that a new treatment and/or

packaging technology may not be ready

for implementation by the year 2000. It

may become necessary, therefore, for

DOE to use the F-Canyon at the

Savannah River Site to chemically

separate some foreign research reactor

spent nuclear fuel elements, while the

F-Canyon is operating to stabilize at-risk

materials in accordance with the

Records of Decision (60 FR 65300,

December 19, 1995 and 61 FR 6633,

February 21, 1996) issued after

completion of the Interim Management

of Nuclear Materials Final

Environmental Impact Statement (DOE/

EIS–0220 of October 1995). Under

current schedules, this chemical

separation of foreign research reactor

spent fuel could take place between the

years 2000 and 2002. In that event, the

foreign research reactor spent nuclear

fuel would be converted into LEU and

wastes. The high-level radioactive

wastes would be vitrified in the

Savannah River Site Defense Waste

Processing Facility, while other wastes

(all low level) would be solidified in the

Savannah River Site Saltstone facility.

In order to provide a sound policy basis

for making a determination on whether

and how to utilize the F-Canyon for

chemical separation tasks that are not

driven by health and safety

considerations, DOE will commission or

conduct an independent study of the

nonproliferation and other (e.g., cost

and timing) implications of chemical

separation of spent nuclear fuel from

foreign research reactors. The study will

be initiated in mid-1996 and will be

completed in a timely fashion to allow

a subsequent decision about possible

use of the F-Canyon for chemical

separation of foreign research reactor

spent nuclear fuel to be fully considered

by the public, the Congress and

Executive Branch agencies. Pending

disposition of the foreign research

reactor spent nuclear fuel by either a

new treatment and/or packaging

technology or chemical separation in

the F-Canyon, the spent nuclear fuel

would be placed in existing wet storage

at the Savannah River Site.

3. Spent Nuclear Fuel Monitoring

(Wet Storage). DOE would conduct a

program of close monitoring of any

foreign research reactor spent nuclear

fuel and target material that would be

accepted for storage in existing wet

storage facilities. DOE is presently

unaware of any technical basis for

believing that this spent nuclear fuel

cannot be safely stored until one or

more of the treatment and/or packaging

technologies becomes available.

Nevertheless, if health and safety

concerns involving any of the foreign

research reactor spent nuclear fuel

elements are identified prior to

development of an appropriate

treatment and/or packaging technology,

DOE would use the F-Canyon to

chemically separate the affected spent

nuclear fuel elements, if it is still

operating to stabilize at-risk materials.

Because the F-Canyon is only

configured to handle LEU, under no

circumstances would it be possible to

produce separated HEU that is suitable

for a nuclear weapon. Instead, depleted

uranium would be added to the foreign

research reactor spent nuclear fuel near

the beginning of the chemical

separations process, so that only LEU

would be produced when the uranium

is separated from the fission products.

The trace quantities of plutonium in the

spent nuclear fuel would be left in and

solidified along with the high-level

radioactive wastes. This would further

the President’s policy to discourage the

accumulation of excess weapons-grade

fissile materials, to strengthen controls

and constraints on these materials and,

over time, to reduce worldwide stocks.

The TRIGA foreign research reactor

spent nuclear fuel would be stored at

the Idaho National Engineering

Laboratory in the Fluorinel Dissolution

and Fuel Storage facility (wet storage) or

preferably in the dry storage Irradiated

Fuel Storage Facility and the CPP–749

dry storage area. After 2003, all foreign

research reactor spent nuclear fuel at the

Idaho National Engineering Laboratory

would be managed in accordance with

specific provisions of the settlement

agreement between DOE and the State of

Idaho, until transported off-site for

ultimate disposition. Depending on the

nature of any new treatment and/or

packaging technology that might be

developed, the TRIGA spent nuclear

fuel would also be processed using such

a new technology, if necessary for

disposal.

V. Environmentally Preferable

Alternatives

CEQ regulations (40 CFR 1505.2)

require identification of the

environmentally preferred alternative(s).

The analysis of alternatives presented in

the EIS indicates that the three

Management Alternatives and the

Preferred Alternative (a modification of

subelements of Management Alternative

1) would have only small impacts on

the human environment on or around

the DOE management sites, the

populations near the cask transportation

routes, or the affected ports of entry.

Using conservative assumptions (i.e.,

assumptions that tend to overestimate

risks), the only measurable potential

impacts from incident-free operations

are associated with low radiation

exposure to workers near the loaded

transportation casks, particularly during

transportation cask loading or

unloading, or near the spent fuel during

storage, and, to a much lesser degree, to

the general population in and around

the ports of entry and the transportation

routes. These conservatively calculated

impacts are extremely small, and are

well within regulatory standards for

health and safety.

Although the impacts would be small

for each alternative considered, there

are differences among the estimated

impacts for the various alternatives.

Besides the no-action alternative and

overseas storage subalternative of

Management Alternative 2, which

would generate no direct environmental

impact in the United States because

they would result in no activity in the

United States, the lowest impacts in the

United States would be associated with

implementing the proposed policy

overseas under the overseas

reprocessing subalternative of

Management Alternative 2. In the

overseas reprocessing subalternative,

the foreign research reactor spent fuel

would be reprocessed overseas and only

the vitrified reprocessing wastes would

be accepted in the United States. This

alternative would have a very small

environmental impact in the United

States since only a small volume of

waste in an inert, vitrified form would

enter the United States. This would

require only a small amount of

transportation, handling, and storage in

the United States and therefore would

result in very little radiation exposure in

the United States. Hence, Management

Alternative 2 is the environmentally

preferred alternative, next to the no

action alternative. Both of the other

alternatives, the hybrid alternative and

the basic implementation of

Management Alternative 1, would have

relatively higher, but still extremely

low, radiation exposure impacts because

of the acceptance of a greater volume of

material in the United States, resulting

in more shipments and increased

handling and storage requirements.

Among the Implementation

Alternatives to Management Alternative

1 discussed in the Final EIS, accepting

foreign research reactor spent fuel into

the United States only from developing
25098 Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 97 / Friday, May 17, 1996 / Notices

nations (i.e., the ‘‘Other Nations’’ listed

in Table 2 above) would present the

lowest radiological risk in the United

States. This is because this

subalternative would deal with the least

amount of spent fuel. The remaining

subalternatives and implementation

alternatives discussed in the EIS

(including the acceptance of target

material in addition to spent fuel, a

policy duration of five years instead of

ten years, use of wet storage, and

chemical separation) do not measurably

change the overall potential radiation

exposure impact. The chemical

separation subalternative would

generate slightly higher accident and

incident-free radiological exposure risk

to the general population, but once

again, this is a small variation within

the overall small impacts from each of

the alternatives.

Implementation of the Preferred

Alternative would result in relatively

higher, but still extremely low,

environmental and health impacts

because of the acceptance of the target

material (in addition to the maximum

amount of spent fuel), resulting in the

maximum number of shipments and

increased handling and storage

requirements, and because of the

potential chemical separation of a

limited amount of spent fuel.

VI. Comments on the Final EIS

After issuing the Final EIS, DOE and

the Department of State received

approximately 35 letters commenting on

the Preferred Alternative. These

included letters from Governor Beasley

of South Carolina, Senators Feinstein of

California and Glenn of Ohio,

Congressmen Baker and Miller of

California, and Clyburn of South

Carolina, California State officials,

mayors and other local officials from the

areas around the Charleston Naval

Weapons Station and the Concord Naval

Weapons Station, and several members

of the public. Many of the comments

covered issues previously addressed in

the Final EIS, such as the following:

• Why is the new spent fuel and

target material acceptance policy

required?

• How were the preferred ports of

entry chosen?

• Why are military ports preferred?

• Has DOE adequately considered the

risks associated with shipments through

the Concord Naval Shipyard due to its

proximity to the highly populated San

Francisco Bay area and the potential for

seismic activity?

• What kinds of training and other

assistance would be provided by DOE to

prepare local jurisdictions to deal with

the spent fuel shipments?

All of these issues are covered in the

Final EIS, either in the body of the EIS

or in the responses to comments

submitted on the Draft EIS. In the

interests of brevity, readers are

requested to refer to the Final EIS for

information on these issues. In addition,

individual responses will be sent to

each of the commentors.

The comments on the Final EIS also

raised several new issues (i.e., issues not

raised during public review of the Draft

EIS), as follows:

A. Many commentors from the area

around the Concord Naval Weapons

Station were concerned that the cost of

services required from local police or

other city and county departments (e.g.,

services associated with emergency

response, crowd control, etc.) to prepare

for or respond to events associated with

the spent fuel shipments would unfairly

be left to the local communities to fund.

The comments stated that DOE should

provide funding to cover these

additional expenses. To address this

concern, DOE has replied that it is

willing to enter into an appropriate

agreement to reimburse local agencies or

provide the incremental resources,

either in kind or financial, that would

be necessary to enable emergency

response personnel to respond to an

incident involving the proposed

shipments of spent fuel, to provide for

public safety in situations that are

attributable to the shipment of spent

fuel from foreign research reactors, and

to allow a greater level of assurance of

the protection of the health and safety

of the public.

B. Several individuals commented

that the Final EIS did not identify the

specific local streets and roads over

which the spent fuel shipments would

travel and did not include site-specific

analyses of the risk of the shipments

through the ports of entry. DOE replied

that the Final EIS does estimate the

potential radiological and other healthrelated impacts (e.g., traffic accidents) of

transporting the spent fuel through the

ports of entry (see, for example, Volume

1, Table 4–7 in Section 4.2.2.3 of the

Final EIS). However, the Final EIS did

not address specific characteristics of

local streets since local street, or rail,

conditions could well change between

the time the Final EIS was written and

the time the shipments would be made.

As a result, the actual route that would

be taken for the overland transportation,

whether by truck or rail, would be

chosen closer to the time the

transportation takes place. Selection of

the actual route would be accomplished

in consultation with the affected States,

Tribes, local officials, and the carrier,

and considering the conditions of the

potential shipment routes at that time.

Any route that is chosen would have to

meet specific requirements imposed by

the Department of Transportation,

taking into account specific

characteristics of local streets. Thus,

when potential impacts are estimated,

certain assumptions can be made about

the transportation route, without

knowing the actual route. Indeed,

because the Final EIS analyses are

conservative (i.e., they tend to overstate

the transportation risks), changes in

local conditions would be unlikely to

result in changes in transportation risks

that would exceed those analyzed in the

Final EIS. The Final EIS contains

enough information to accurately assess

the foreseeable impacts so that the

public and Government decision makers

are adequately informed of potential

consequences.

The same can be said about

emergency services, personnel,

emergency preparedness and facilities

(i.e., specific circumstances may change

between issuance of the Final EIS and

the time an actual shipment would take

place). For this reason, DOE is required

to prepare a detailed Transportation

Plan in cooperation with State, Tribal

and local officials before a shipment is

made. The Transportation Plan would

specify details concerning how the

shipments will be carried out and the

routes to be used, planned shipment

schedules, roles and responsibilities of

emergency response personnel for

jurisdictions along the transportation

route, emergency plans and

communications strategies. The

Transportation Plan would also discuss

any training to be carried out in

preparation for the shipments, and

would identify any equipment or other

resources required to allow local

responders and law enforcement

personnel to be adequately prepared for

the shipments. This procedure ensures

that local officials would be well

informed and prepared to handle any

contingency before a shipment would be

made.

C. One commentor questioned

whether an alternate West Coast port

would be required if scheduling

conflicts occurred at the Concord Naval

Weapons Station. DOE explained that

this issue had been discussed with the

Commander of the Naval Weapons

Station and that he had informed DOE

that they currently have about 20%

slack time available, and that this

should be more than adequate to

accommodate 5 shipments over 13

years.

D. Recently, new information has

come to light regarding the ability of the

F and H Canyons (chemical separations
Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 97 / Friday, May 17, 1996 / Notices 25099

facilities used at the Savannah River

Site) to withstand a severe earthquake.

One commentor requested that DOE

delay issuance of the Record of Decision

on the proposed acceptance policy until

completion of an on-going detailed

safety analysis of the facilities. The

commentor noted that the Preferred

Alternative in the Final EIS would allow

chemical separation under certain

circumstances, and that chemical

separation followed by vitrification of

the high-level radioactive wastes

remains the one proven means of

stabilizing spent fuel and preparing it

for ultimate disposition.

In response, DOE explained that, until

the on-going analysis is complete, it will

not be known with certainty whether

the new information will result in a

significant change in the range of

potential impacts of chemical separation

described in the Final EIS. Analysis to

date, however, provides reasonable

assurance that completion of the seismic

analysis will soon demonstrate that

chemical separation in the F and H

Canyons remains a viable alternative for

management of spent fuel. DOE had not

contemplated chemical separation of

foreign research reactor spent fuel, if at

all, until approximately the year 2000,

and the Canyons will not be used if the

seismic analysis indicates that they pose

an unacceptable risk. Chemical

separation however, may never need to

be pursued because the Preferred

Alternative provides for an aggressive

new program to develop and implement

new treatment and/or packaging

technologies to prepare the spent fuel

for ultimate disposition without the use

of the F and H Canyons. In light of these

factors, and in order to encourage the

research reactor operators not to

withdraw from the Reduced Enrichment

for Research and Test Reactors program

(and resume or continue using HEU

fuels), DOE and the Department of State

believe it is necessary to issue the

Record of Decision now, rather than

awaiting completion of the seismic

analysis. Because research reactors are

the major users of HEU in civil

programs, it is essential that they

support the Reduced Enrichment for

Research and Test Reactors program if

the United States is to achieve the goal

of eventually eliminating the use of

HEU in civil commerce, thereby

reducing the threat of nuclear weapons

proliferation worldwide.

DOE further notes that the Final EIS

discusses the potential impacts of

chemical separation as merely one

means of managing the foreign research

reactor spent fuel. Under the Preferred

Alternative, chemical separation would

be considered only after completion of

a study of the impacts of chemical

separation on United States nuclear

weapons nonproliferation policy, and

then only if DOE is not ready to

implement a new technology to prepare

the spent fuel for ultimate disposition in

approximately the year 2000 (see

Section IV.E.). Even if both chemical

separation and a new technology were

not available in the year 2000, the Final

EIS fully analyzes the potential impacts

of storing the spent fuel in wet and dry

storage facilities for up to 40 years, so

that the full range of reasonable

alternative management options is

covered in the Final EIS. Therefore, the

decision of whether to accept foreign

research reactor spent fuel into the

United States does not depend on the

availability of chemical separation as a

management option.

E. Several commentors objected to the

fact that DOE spent Government funds

to print and mail the Final EIS (or its

Summary) to members of the public.

DOE explained that the regulations

implementing the National

Environmental Policy Act require

agencies to provide a copy of a Final EIS

to any individual who submits

‘‘substantive’’ comment on the draft of

that EIS. DOE limited the cost of

printing and mailing to the greatest

extent possible by mailing only the

Summary of the Final EIS to

commentors from locations other than

Augusta, Georgia, and the States of

California, Idaho, and South Carolina

who had not specifically requested a

copy of the full Final EIS (all

individuals and organizations who were

sent only a Summary were offered an

opportunity to receive the entire Final

EIS).

VII. Decision

DOE, in consultation with the

Department of State, has decided to

implement a new foreign research

reactor spent fuel acceptance policy, as

specified in the Preferred Alternative in

the Final EIS, subject to the additional

stipulations noted below. In summary,

implementation of the new foreign

research reactor spent fuel acceptance

policy will involve acceptance of

aluminum-based spent fuel, TRIGA

spent fuel, and target material

containing uranium enriched in the

United States, as defined in the Final

EIS. This material will be accepted from

the 41 countries listed in Section III of

this notice. The spent fuel acceptance

will involve approximately 19.2 MTHM

(metric tonnes of heavy metal) of foreign

research reactor spent fuel in up to

22,700 separate spent fuel elements and

approximately 0.6 MTHM of target

material. This amount of material is the

amount that is currently in storage at the

foreign research reactors, plus that

which DOE estimates will be discharged

over the next ten years. Shipments of

this spent fuel into the United States

will be accepted over a 13 year period,

beginning on the effective date of the

policy. The foreign research reactor

spent nuclear fuel will be shipped by

either chartered or regularly scheduled

commercial ships. The majority of the

spent fuel will be received from abroad

through the Charleston Naval Weapons

Station in South Carolina (about 80%)

and the Concord Naval Weapons Station

in California (about 5%). Most of the

target material and some of the spent

fuel (about 15%) will be received

overland from Canada. Shipment

through Charleston will begin in the

summer of 1996 and through Concord in

mid-1997. Shipments from Canada have

not been scheduled at this time. After a

limited period of interim storage, the

spent fuel will be treated and packaged

at the Savannah River Site and the

Idaho National Engineering Laboratory

as necessary to prepare it for

transportation to a final disposal

repository.

DOE will apply the following

additional stipulations to

implementation of the new spent fuel

acceptance policy:

A. DOE will reduce the number of

shipments necessary by coordinating

shipments from several reactors at a

time (i.e., by placing multiple casks [up

to eight] on a ship). DOE currently

estimates that a maximum of

approximately 150 to 300 shipments

through the Charleston Naval Weapons

Station and five shipments through the

Concord Naval Weapons Station will be

necessary during the 13 year spent fuel

acceptance period.

B. Target material containing uranium

enriched in the United States will be

accepted only if a reactor operator

wishing to ship target material formally

commits to convert to the use of LEU

targets, when such targets become

available (a program to develop LEU

targets is underway as an adjunct to the

RERTR program). To demonstrate this

commitment, DOE will require that the

affected reactor operators enter into an

agreement with DOE that sets forth the

milestones and schedule for the

conversion. Reactor operators currently

operating on HEU fuel will be required

to enter into a similar agreement

regarding conversion of their reactors to

operate on LEU fuel.

C. The Final EIS demonstrates that the

spent fuel and target material could be

safely transported overland within the

United States by either truck or rail, and

DOE has decided that either
25100 Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 97 / Friday, May 17, 1996 / Notices

transportation mode may be used.

However, based on input from the

public in the vicinity of the ports of

entry, there appears to be a strong

preference for the use of rail. Therefore,

DOE will seek to use rail for shipments

from the ports of entry to DOE facilities

at the Savannah River Site in South

Carolina and the Idaho National

Engineering Laboratory in Idaho,

pending further discussions with the

States, Tribes and local jurisdictions

along the proposed transportation

routes.

D. During the period starting with

initial implementation of the new spent

fuel acceptance policy through

approximately the end of 1999, the

Department will aggressively pursue

one or more new technologies that

would put the foreign research reactor

spent fuel in a form or container that is

eligible for direct disposal in a geologic

repository.

Should a new treatment or packaging

technology not be ready for

implementation by the year 2000, DOE

has under active consideration chemical

separation of some of the foreign

research reactor spent fuel in the

F-Canyon at the Savannah River Site,

where it would be blended down to LEU

and potentially placed under

International Atomic Energy Agency

safeguards. The Department intends to

conduct a study that will look in more

depth at the issues associated with a

decision to chemically separate this

spent fuel. Issues to be considered

include minimizing any potential

proliferation risks, cost and timing. The

State of South Carolina will be invited

to participate in the study.

A subsequent Record of Decision will

be issued at approximately the end of

1999 (or sooner if possible) to announce

DOE’s future management plans for the

foreign research reactor spent fuel and

target material based on the results of

the Department’s program to develop

the new treatment and/or packaging

technologies by that time (including any

necessary environmental reviews), and

the study discussed above.

Staff from the Nuclear Regulatory

Commission have agreed to undertake

an independent review of any new

technology, or application of existing

technologies, that DOE proposes to

develop, to provide a high degree of

confidence that implementation of such

a technology would produce a product

that will be acceptable for disposal in a

geologic repository.

VIII. Use of All Practicable Means To

Avoid or Minimize Harm

Implementation of this decision will

result in low environmental and health

impacts. However, DOE will take the

following steps to avoid or minimize

harm wherever possible:

A. DOE will use current safety and

health programs and practices to reduce

impacts by maintaining worker

radiation exposure as low as reasonably

achievable and by meeting appropriate

waste minimization and pollution

prevention objectives.

B. DOE will require that the shipping

contractors implement a system to keep

records of which ships are used to

transport foreign research reactor spent

fuel and target materials and which ship

crew members, port workers and land

transportation workers are involved in

the shipments. DOE will include a

clause in the contract for shipment of

the spent fuel and target material

requiring that other ship crew members,

port workers and land transportation

workers be used if any worker in these

categories could approach a 100 mrem

dose in any year (the regulatory limit set

in 10 CFR Part 20 for radiation exposure

to a member of the general public).

C. DOE will reduce the risk associated

with shipment of the spent fuel by

shipping multiple casks per shipment,

up to a maximum of eight, whenever

possible, thus reducing the total number

of shipments.

D. DOE will implement a process of

detailed transportation planning,

involving States, Tribes and local

jurisdictions through which the

shipments will pass, to ensure that all

organizations that would respond to an

accident involving a foreign research

reactor spent fuel shipment will be fully

prepared and informed prior to any

shipment taking place.

E. DOE will conduct the program to

identify and develop an improved

means of treating and/or packaging the

foreign research reactor spent fuel with

the intent of providing a technology to

be used to prepare the spent fuel for

geologic disposal that has less

environmental impacts than the

technologies that are currently available.

Items A, C, D, and E above will be

accomplished under existing business

practices in the normal course of

implementing the new spent fuel

acceptance policy. For item B, DOE will

prepare a Mitigation Action Plan under

the provisions of DOE’s NEPA

implementation procedures (10 CFR

1021.331).

IX. Basis for the Decision

The elements of the decision

discussed in Section VI above (i.e., the

Preferred Alternative with additional

stipulations) have been selected based

on the following considerations:

A. Management Alternative.

The various management alternatives

considered are discussed in Section 2 of

the Final EIS. The analyses in Section

4 of the Final EIS demonstrate that the

impacts on the environment, involved

workers, and the citizens of the United

States from implementation of any of

the management alternatives or

implementation alternatives analyzed

(other than beneficial impacts

associated with support for United

States nuclear weapons nonproliferation

policy) would be small and within

applicable regulatory limits, and would

not provide a basis for discrimination

among the alternatives. As a result, the

process for selection of the elements of

the action to be taken focused on

programmatic considerations:

1. DOE, in consultation with the

Department of State, concluded that the

No Action Alternative and Management

Alternative 2, Implementation

Alternative 1a (Overseas Storage) would

be unacceptable since these alternatives

are not consistent with United States

nuclear weapons nonproliferation

policy objectives.

2. DOE, in consultation with the

Department of State, also believes that

Management Alternative 2,

Implementation Alternative 1b

(Overseas Reprocessing) would not

provide an incentive for reactor

operators to switch to LEU fuel or

continue using LEU fuel. Since there is

no overseas reprocessing capability for

the new, high density LEU fuel

developed by the RERTR program,

foreign research reactor operators would

have to continue using HEU fuel in

order to be able to rely on reprocessing

as a spent fuel management approach.

In addition, reprocessing could result in

the continued production of HEU,

which could then be made available in

civil commerce. Furthermore, the two

countries that provide reprocessing

require that the resulting wastes be

returned to the countries of origin.

Many of the countries in which the

foreign research reactors are located do

not have the technical or regulatory

infrastructure to manage these wastes.

Finally, the United States would not be

able to impose conditions on the reactor

operators or reprocessing firms to assure

that its nuclear weapons

nonproliferation objectives would be

met.

3. The sample hybrid alternative

(Management Alternative 3) analyzed in

the Draft EIS involved partial

reprocessing overseas coupled with

partial management in the United

States. Even though the use of overseas

reprocessing would be more limited in
Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 97 / Friday, May 17, 1996 / Notices 25101

this alternative, many of the concerns

raised above with regard to reprocessing

would apply. Because of these concerns

and uncertainties, DOE and the

Department of State do not believe it

would be prudent to rely on the use of

overseas reprocessing to meet United

States’ nuclear weapons

nonproliferation objectives.

DOE, in consultation with the

Department of State, has concluded that

a modification of the basic

implementation of Management

Alternative 1 as specified in the

Preferred Alternative balances policy,

technical, cost and schedule

requirements, and provides the

strongest support for United States’

nuclear weapons nonproliferation

policy objectives because all aspects of

the alternative will be under the control

of DOE, either directly or through the

spent nuclear fuel acceptance contracts

with the reactor operators.

B. Management Technology

The alternative spent nuclear fuel

management technologies considered

are discussed in Sections 2.2.2.7 and

2.6.5 of the Final EIS. The approaches

fall into four broad categories, as

follows:

Wet Storage. Wet storage is a proven

technology, that has been used for

decades to safely store research reactor

spent fuel from both domestic and

foreign reactors. The impacts of

continued use of wet storage would be

small, and completely within applicable

regulatory limits. Furthermore, DOE

currently has wet storage facilities in

operation at the Savannah River Site

and the Idaho National Engineering

Laboratory that can be used for storage

of foreign research reactor spent nuclear

fuel. The water chemistry of the wet

storage pools is carefully controlled to

minimize the possibility of degradation

and allow continued safe operation of

the pools.

Dry Storage. Dry storage is also a

proven technology that would also have

no more than small impacts, completely

within applicable regulatory limits. It is

the storage medium that is being

selected at all commercial power reactor

sites where additional storage capacity

is being built. Dry storage capacity

could be provided at the management

sites in time to meet the program’s

projected needs, if initial spent nuclear

fuel receipts were placed into the

available wet storage.

Chemical Separation. Chemical

separation is also a proven technology,

the impacts of which would be small,

and completely within applicable

regulatory limits. However, DOE is

phasing out its chemical separation

activities and is currently conducting

chemical separations only at the

Savannah River Site to stabilize

materials for health and safety reasons.

Because these chemical separations

facilities could be used to treat the

foreign research reactor spent nuclear

fuel, they provide a contingency to be

considered pending availability of an

alternate means of treating and/or

packaging the spent nuclear fuel prior to

ultimate disposition.

New Technologies. In order to prepare

the spent fuel for ultimate disposition,

some form of treatment and/or

packaging may be required. Several

promising new technologies, as well as

variations of existing technologies, have

been proposed and are under

evaluation. Relatively simple

technologies appear to be feasible,

although they require more

development work to confirm their

viability and the cost of their

implementation. This development will

take place before DOE makes a decision

on implementation of any of the new

technologies.

In order to effectively accept and

manage the foreign research reactor

spent nuclear fuel in the United States,

DOE, in consultation with the

Department of State, developed the

three point strategy for management of

aluminum-based spent nuclear fuel

discussed in the description of the

Preferred Alternative (see Section IV.E.).

This strategy draws on the strengths of

each of the spent nuclear fuel

management technologies discussed

above, while avoiding sole reliance on

any of them. Due to the relatively more

robust nature of the TRIGA spent

nuclear fuel, DOE believes that minimal

additional development may be needed

to prepare it for storage and final

disposition. Accordingly, the decision

specified in this Record of Decision is

to place the TRIGA spent nuclear fuel in

existing dry storage facilities at the

Idaho National Engineering Laboratory.

However, the analysis to determine

what treatment, if any, will be necessary

to qualify the TRIGA spent fuel for

geologic disposal will continue and the

appropriate treatment, if any, will be

identified and implemented.

DOE will issue a second, separate

Record of Decision at approximately the

end of 1999 (or sooner if possible) to

provide assurance to the States hosting

the DOE spent fuel management sites

that DOE will place sufficient priority

on the new technology development

effort, and to ensure that the decision on

which spent fuel management approach

to adopt for use past the year 2000

receives appropriate scrutiny by

Executive Branch agencies, Congress

and the public.

C. Duration of the Policy

The alternatives for the duration of

the policy that were considered are

discussed in Sections 2.2.2.1 and 2.2.2.2

of the Final EIS. In analyzing these

alternatives, DOE concluded that the 5-

year option is unlikely to provide

sufficient time for the reactor operators

to arrange for alternative spent nuclear

fuel disposal mechanisms, and thus

might result in some reactor operators

refusing to participate in the program to

convert or continue to use LEU fuel.

That would substantially undermine the

goal of eliminating civil commerce in

HEU.

On the other hand, the analysis

determined that there was insufficient

benefit to be gained from extending

acceptance of all foreign research

reactor spent fuel containing HEU into

the indefinite future because such an

approach would be unlikely to provide

sufficient incentive for other countries

to proceed expeditiously with

development of alternative

arrangements for disposal not involving

the United States.

The approach selected provides the

incentive needed to gain the reactor

operators’ cooperation, while specifying

a definite cut-off point. This alternative

provides sufficient lead time to allow

the reactor operators to make other

arrangements for disposition of their

spent nuclear fuel, and provides

sufficient time to accept all spent

nuclear fuel containing HEU enriched in

the United States.

D. Amount of Material to Manage

The alternative amounts of material

that might be covered by the proposed

policy are described in Sections 2.2.1.3

and 2.2.2.1 of the Final EIS. DOE, in

consultation with the Department of

State, concluded that management of

spent nuclear fuel only from countries

that do not have high income economies

would strongly encourage the

resurgence of the use of HEU in the

high-income economy countries, as well

as opening the United States, fairly or

unfairly, to charges that it was not living

up to commitments under the Treaty on

the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear

Weapons. Management of only spent

nuclear fuel containing HEU would

penalize those reactors that have already

converted to the use of LEU fuel, and

would provide an incentive for reactors

to continue to use HEU fuel, or switch

back to its use.

DOE, in consultation with the

Department of State, concluded that

management of all of the aluminum-
25102 Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 97 / Friday, May 17, 1996 / Notices

based and TRIGA foreign research

reactor spent nuclear fuel currently in

storage or projected to be discharged

during the policy period, and target

material containing uranium enriched

in the United States, will provide the

best support for United States’ nuclear

weapons nonproliferation policy.

Implementation of this approach will

provide an opportunity for removal of

all United States origin HEU from civil

commerce and will provide an incentive

for the continued conversion to and use

of LEU as fuel for foreign research

reactors, in place of HEU.

DOE added the stipulation specifying

that target material will be accepted

only from foreign research reactors

whose operators who formally agree to

switch to use of LEU targets, when such

targets become available, to provide an

additional incentive for the reactor

operators to make the switch to LEU

targets.

E. Marine Transport

The alternative approaches to marine

transport of foreign research reactor

spent nuclear fuel are discussed in

Section 2.2.1.5 of the Final EIS. The

analyses in the Final EIS demonstrate

that the impacts to the environment,

workers, or the public from transport of

the spent nuclear fuel using any of these

types of ships would be small, and

within applicable regulatory limits. The

analyses do not identify any difference

in the small impacts that would result

from the use of purpose-built vs. general

purpose ships. In addition, ‘‘military

transports’’ are in fact the same type of

ship as chartered commercial cargo

ships and are crewed by civilians, use

of ‘‘military transports’’ would not

actually result in any difference in

impacts. DOE, after consultation with

the Department of State, believes that

use of actual warships would be

unnecessary from a security standpoint.

The approach selected by DOE, after

consultation with the Department of

State, (use of chartered or commercial

ships) provides maximum flexibility for

marine transport.

DOE has decided to specify the

additional stipulation on reduction of

the number of shipments as a means of

responding to public concerns regarding

the risk of the shipments and to reduce

shipping costs.

F. Ground Transport

The ground transportation

alternatives (i.e., truck, rail and barge)

are discussed in Section 2.2.1.7 of the

Final EIS. The analyses in the Final EIS

demonstrate that the impacts to the

environment, workers, or the public,

from any of these modes of ground

transport (counting barge as a mode of

‘‘ground transport’’) would be small and

within the applicable regulatory limits.

Furthermore, the differences in

potential impacts between the truck, rail

and barge alternatives were not

significant.

Both the truck and rail transportation

options have been used successfully to

transport foreign research reactor spent

nuclear fuel in the past. Truck transport

was the predominant mode used for

over twenty years, until the old ‘‘OffSite Fuels Policy’’ lapsed in 1988. Rail

was the mode used for both shipments

under the Environmental Assessment of

Urgent-Relief Acceptance of Foreign

Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel.

Since neither of the ports of entry (see

item H below) can reasonably provide

barge transport to either of the

management sites, barge transport was

not included in the preferred

alternative.

The Final EIS demonstrates that the

spent fuel and target material could be

safely transported overland within the

United States by either truck or rail, and

DOE has decided that either

transportation mode may be used.

However, there appears to be a strong

preference by some members of the

public in the port areas for the use of

rail. Therefore, in response to this

preference, DOE has decided that it will

seek to use rail for shipments from the

ports of entry to DOE facilities at the

Savannah River Site in South Carolina

and the Idaho National Engineering

Laboratory in Idaho as a general matter,

subject to further discussions with the

States, Tribes and local jurisdictions

along the proposed transportation

routes.

G. Title Transfer Location

The alternative points at which DOE

might take title to the spent nuclear fuel

and target material are discussed in

Sections 2.2.1.4 and 2.2.2.4 of the Final

EIS.

The point at which title will be

transferred has no effect on the physical

processes that would take place, and

thus will not have any effect on the

impacts on the environment, workers, or

the public. The Price-Anderson Act

would provide liability protection in the

unlikely event of a nuclear accident in

the United States, whether or not DOE

has taken title to the spent nuclear fuel

at the time of such an accident. As a

result, DOE, after consultation with the

Department of State, concluded that the

selection of the title transfer location

could be made solely on programmatic

considerations.

Acceptance of title at the foreign

research reactor sites could make the

United States Government liable for any

accident that might occur in the country

of origin, or on the high seas. DOE has

been unable to identify any advantage to

the United States of taking title outside

the United States. Taking title at the

limit of United States territorial waters

would make the title transfer depend

solely on when the ship enters United

States waters, which could be difficult

for DOE to control in certain

circumstances (e.g., during a storm).

Acceptance of title when the foreign

research reactor spent nuclear fuel

actually enters the land mass of the

United States (the approach selected)

provides the most certainty for

implementation. The approach selected

ensures that liability for accidents

during the transportation process

outside the United States will remain

with the reactor operators, while

reinforcing in the minds of the public

that the United States Government will

be accountable in the unlikely event of

an accident within United States

territory.

H. Ports of Entry

The alternative ports of entry

considered are discussed in Sections

2.2.1.6 and 3.2 of the Final EIS. The

analyses in the EIS demonstrate that the

impacts on either the environment,

workers, or the public due to use of any

of the potential ports of entry analyzed

would be small and within applicable

regulatory limits.

Although any one or all of the ten

ports of entry described in the Final EIS

would be acceptable ports of entry,

DOE, in consultation with the

Department of State, concluded that

foreign research reactor spent nuclear

fuel marine shipments to the United

States should be made via the military

ports (selected from among those

analyzed in the Final EIS and found

acceptable) in closest proximity to the

spent nuclear fuel management sites

(i.e., the Charleston Naval Weapons

Station and the Concord Naval Weapons

Station). DOE will seek to transport

multiple casks per ship to keep the total

number of shipments as small as

possible, as well as to reduce risks and

costs.

Use of military ports will provide

additional confidence in the safety of

the shipments due to the increased

security associated with the military

ports. This could also require much of

the spent nuclear fuel to be shipped via

chartered ships because commercial

ships do not schedule stops at military

ports. Use of chartered ships will

increase the cost of shipping spent

nuclear fuel. This additional cost will be

borne by the reactor operators for
Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 97 / Friday, May 17, 1996 / Notices 25103

shipments from high-income economy

countries, and by the United States for

reactor operators from other countries.

The additional cost will be kept to a

minimum by shipping as many casks as

possible on each ship (up to a maximum

of eight per ship).

I. Management Sites

The question of which sites should be

used for management of all of DOE’s

spent nuclear fuel was addressed in the

Programmatic SNF&INEL Final EIS,

including consideration of the potential

receipt of the foreign research reactor

spent nuclear fuel. The initial Record of

Decision for the Programmatic

SNF&INEL Final EIS (60 FR 28680, June

1, 1995), specifies that any aluminumbased foreign research reactor spent

nuclear fuel accepted in the United

States will be managed at the Savannah

River Site; and that the remaining

foreign research reactor spent nuclear

fuel will be managed at the Idaho

National Engineering Laboratory. This

decision was not affected by the second

Record of Decision for the Programmatic

SNF&INEL Final EIS (61 FR 9441,

March 8, 1996). The site for

management of the target material was

left to be decided under the Final

Environmental Impact Statement on a

Proposed Nuclear Weapons

Nonproliferation Policy Concerning

Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear

Fuel (i.e., the Final EIS). All of the target

material currently in DOE’s possession

is managed at the Savannah River Site.

The approach selected (i.e.,

management of target material at the

Savannah River Site) is not inconsistent

with the decision specified in the

Records of Decision for the

Programmatic SNF&INEL Final EIS.

The analyses in the Final EIS

demonstrate that the impacts to either

the environment or the public through

use of any of the sites for management

of the foreign research reactor spent

nuclear fuel and target material would

be small, and well within applicable

regulatory limits.

J. Financing Arrangement

The alternative financing

arrangements are discussed in Sections

2.2.1.2 and 2.2.2.3 of the Final EIS. The

financing arrangement selected will

have no effect on the physical processes

that will take place, and thus will not

have any direct environmental effects.

However, it could affect how many

foreign research reactor operators elect

to ship spent nuclear fuel to the United

States. For instance, if DOE and the

Department of State were to charge a

full cost recovery fee to all reactors,

some of the reactors in high-income

countries and many, if not all, of the

reactors in other countries would not

have the financial resources to

participate. This would reduce the

amount of spent fuel to be accepted and

also reduce the potential environmental

impacts that would be associated with

shipment and management of the spent

fuel, but would result in an increased

risk of diversion of highly enriched

uranium into a foreign nuclear weapons

program. On the other hand, if the

United States subsidized all of the

reactors, the United States would bear

the full financial burden, even for

reactors that can afford to pay their fair

share.

DOE, in consultation with the

Department of State, concluded that, to

encourage that reactor operators in

countries with other-than-high-incomeeconomies to participate in the program,

the United States should subsidize

receipt of their spent nuclear fuel. DOE

and the Department of State also

concluded that DOE should strive to

recover as much of the cost of managing

the spent nuclear fuel as possible from

high-income economy countries. DOE

concluded that it will announce the fee

policy in a Federal Register notice

(separate from this Federal Register

notice announcing the Record of

Decision), so that the fee policy may be

changed from time to time as necessary

to reflect changes in cost or new

information that may be relevant to the

policy.

Such an approach will recover as

much as possible of the United States’

expenses for management of spent

nuclear fuel from high-income economy

countries (without encouraging any of

them to resort to reprocessing of their

spent nuclear fuel), will encourage

participation by other countries, and

will provide a mechanism through

which to account for changes in cost

and future definition of program details.

X. Conclusion

DOE, in consultation with the

Department of State, has decided to

implement a new foreign research

reactor spent fuel and target material

acceptance policy, as specified in the

Preferred Alternative contained in the

Final EIS, subject to the additional

stipulations noted in Section VII and

including the mitigation activities

identified in Section VIII. This new

policy is effective upon being made

public, in accordance with DOE’s NEPA

implementation regulations (10 CFR

§ 1021.315). The goals of this policy are

to support the United States’ nuclear

weapons nonproliferation policy calling

for the reduction, and eventual

elimination, of HEU from civil

commerce, and to encourage foreign

research reactors to switch from HEU

fuels to alternative LEU fuels developed

under the RERTR program. In reaching

this decision, DOE has considered the

concerns expressed by the Department

of State, the Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, the Arms Control and

Disarmament Agency, the National

Security Council, and the International

Atomic Energy Agency concerning the

need for such a policy. A critical result

of implementing this policy will be the

continued viability and vitality of the

RERTR program because foreign

research reactor operators will have a

continued incentive to participate.

Similarly, implementation of programs

similar to the RERTR program in Russia,

the other newly-independent states of

the former Soviet Union, China, South

Africa, and other countries, and the

establishment of a world-wide norm

discouraging the use of HEU depends on

a commitment by the United States to

action such as that embodied in the new

foreign research reactor spent fuel and

target material acceptance policy. At the

same time, the impacts on the

environment, workers, and the public

from implementing the acceptance

program are estimated to be small and

well within applicable regulatory limits.

The decision process reflected in this

Notice complies with the requirements

of the National Environmental Policy

Act (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.) and its

implementing regulations at 40 CFR

Parts 1500–1508 and 10 CFR Part 1021.

Issued in Washington, D.C., this 13th day

of May, 1996.

Hazel R. O’Leary,

Secretary of Energy.

[FR Doc. 96–12420 Filed 5–16–96; 8:45 am]

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