IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

Izabella Shealy, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) C.A. No.: N21C-01-068 PEL

v. )

)

Boston Scientific Corporation, )

)

Defendants. )

Submitted: April 8, 2021

Decided: June 1, 2021

OPINION AND ORDER

ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS

DENIED IN PART/GRANTED IN PART

Robert J. Leoni, Esquire, Shelby & Leoni, 221 Main Street Wilmington, DE 19804,

Attorneys for Plaintiff. Shanin Specter, Esquire, Lee B. Balefsky, Esquire Tracie L. 

Palmer, Esquire, Kline & Specter, P.C., 1525 Locust Street Philadelphia, PA 19102, 

of Counsel - Attorney for Plaintiff.

Colleen Shields, Esquire and Alexandra D. Rogin, Esquire Eckert, Seamans, Cherin 

& Mellott LLC, 221 Main Street, Stanton, DE 19804, Attorneys for Defendant

Jones, J.
2

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, Izabelle Shealy, has brought suit against the Defendant, Boston 

Scientific Corporation (“Boston Scientific”), alleging numerous claims sounding in 

strict liability, negligence, and breach of various warranties. Plaintiff’s claims arise 

out of personal injuries she claims to have suffered from a mesh device that was 

surgically implanted in her. Plaintiff alleges that this mesh device was defectively 

designed and manufactured by Boston Scientific. The Defendant has moved to 

dismiss the Complaint on the following grounds: (1) the Complaint fails to satisfy 

the pleading requirements of the Superior Court; (2) the failure to warn claims are 

barred by the learned intermediary doctrine; (3) any design or manufacturing defect

claim should be dismissed for failure to specify a defect; (4) the breach of warranty

claim fails because Plaintiff has failed to allege how or when the alleged 

representations of the warranty were made; (5) there is no allegation that the 

Defendant’s device was the proximate cause of Plaintiff’s injuries; and (6) 

Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages should be stricken because she has not 

alleged sufficient facts to support a punitive damages claim under either Delaware 

or New York law. The parties appear to agree the substantive law of New York 

controls this action. For purposes of this motion the Court will accept that New York 
3

law applies.

1

 For the reasons set forth below, Boston Scientific’s Motion to Dismiss 

is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

BACKGROUND

The background of this case is taken from the factual allegations set forth in 

Plaintiff’s Complaint, which this court must accept as true in deciding the motion to 

dismiss.

Plaintiff is a resident of New York. On January 7, 2019, Plaintiff underwent 

implantation of a pelvic mesh device manufactured by Defendant called the Obtryx.

The surgery was performed in Santa Monica, California. As a result of the implant 

Plaintiff has suffered pain, erosion, urinary problems, dyspareunia, organ 

perforation, and vaginal scarring related to complications from Defendant’s product.

This included an additional surgery to remove eroded mesh performed at UCLA 

Medical Center on July 12, 2019. Plaintiff’s Complaint was filed on January 11, 

2021. The Complaint asserted claims against Defendant based on Negligence (Count 

I), Breach of Warranty (Count II), and Failure to Warn (Count III). 

Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss the action on February 23, 2021. The 

parties have fully briefed the Motion to Dismiss and this Opinion represents the 

Court’s decision on that Motion. 

1 Plaintiff is a resident of New York. The two medical procedures related to the mesh implant occurred in California. 

This Court’s review of California law suggests that the result reached in this opinion is the same if the Court applied 

California law to this analysis.
4

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under Superior Court Rule 12(b)(6), the Court may dismiss a claim for failure 

to state a claim upon which relief can be granted only where the plaintiff cannot 

recover under any reasonably conceivable set of circumstances or facts susceptible 

of proof that may be inferred from the allegations. The Court accepts the well-pled 

allegations of the complaint as true and draws “all reasonable information that 

logically flow from those allegations in favor of the non-moving party.”

2 Under 

Delaware law, in order to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a 

complaint need only give general notice of the claim asserted and will not be 

dismissed unless it is clearly without merit, either as a matter of law or fact.3 A

Court can dismiss for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted only if 

“it appears with reasonable certainty that the plaintiff could not prove any set of facts 

that would entitle her to relief.”

4

Under Del. Super. Ct. Civ. Rule 9(b) a plaintiff must plead negligence with 

particularity. The purpose of Rule 9(b) is to apprise the adversary of the acts or 

omissions by which it is alleged that a duty has been violated so that an opponent is 

able to prepare a defense.5 Under Rule 9(b) it is usually necessary to allege only 

2 Tanesha Maretta Williams v. Newark Country Club, 2016 WL 6781221 at 1 (Del.Super., November 2, 2016); 

William L. Spence Jr., v. Allison J. Funk, et al., 396 A.2d 967, 968 (Del. 1978); Richard Clinton, et al. v. Enterprise 

Rent-a-Car Co., et al., 977 A.2d 892, 895 (Del. 2009).

3 Wilen v. Pollution Control Industries, Inc., Del. Ch. C.A. No 7254-NC (Consolidate). Harnett, V.C. (Oct 15, 

2984). 

4 Rammuno v. Cawley, 705 A 2d 1029, 1034 (Del 1998).

5 Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. of Maryland v. Chesapeake Utilities Corp., 436 A2d 314, 338 (Del 1981). 
5

sufficient facts out of which a duty is implied and a general averment of failure to 

discharge that duty.6

FAILURE TO WARN CLAIMS

Defendant alleges that the learned intermediary doctrine bars all failure to 

warn claims contained in Count III of Plaintiff’s Complaint.

7

 Under the learned 

intermediary doctrine a “medical professional acts as an ‘learned intermediary’ 

between the manufacturer [of a medical device] and the patient” and the 

manufacturer is relieved of any responsibility to directly warn the patient.8 Thus, a 

manufacturer’s duty to warn in this context only extends to the physician. However,

the learned intermediary doctrine does not compel dismissal of claims that warning 

labels were insufficient, since these claims are premised on Defendant’s failure to 

provide proper warnings to Plaintiff’s prescribing medical professionals, and not on 

Defendant’s failure to warn Plaintiff directly. 9

In the instant case Plaintiff has alleged the following in her Complaint: 

• Defendant has known and continue to know that some of 

the predicate products for the Pelvic Mesh Products had 

high failure and complication rates, resulting in the recall of 

some of these predicate Device; that there were and are 

differences between the Defendant’s Pelvic Mesh Products 

and some or all of the predicate products, rendering them 

unsuitable for designation as predicate products; that 

significant differences exist and exited between the Pelvic 

Mesh Products and their predecessors and predicate 

products, such that the disclosures to the FDA were and are 

6 State Farm Fire & Cas., Co v. Gen. Elec. Co., 2009 WL 5177156 (Del. Super., 2009).

7 Bukowski v. CooperVision Inc., 592 NY.2d 807, 809 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993).

8 Banker v. Hoehn., 718 N.Y. S.2d 438, 440 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000).,

99 See Martin v. Hacker., 83 N. Y 2d 1, 9 (N.Y. 1993).
6

incomplete and misleading; and that the Pelvic Mesh 

Products were and are causing numerous patients severe 

injuries and complications. The Defendants suppressed 

information and failed to accurately and completely 

disseminate or share this and or critical information with the 

FDA, health care providers, or the patients. As a result, the 

Defendants actively and intentionally misled and continue 

to mislead the public, including the medical community, 

health care providers and patients, into believing that the 

Pelvic Mesh products and the procedure for implantation 

was and are safe and effective, leading to the prescription 

for and implantation of the Pelvic Mesh products into the 

Plaintiff. (Id. at ¶ 12).

• Causation: After, and as a result of the implantation of the 

Medical Devices, Plaintiff Izabella Shealy suffered serious 

bodily injuries, including, but not limited to erosion and 

other injuries similar to the ones described in the FDA’s 

Public Health Advisory of October 20, 2008. (¶ 48).

• Causation: These injuries would not have occurred but for 

the defective nature of the products implanted and/or 

Defendant’s wrongful conduct. (Id. at ¶ 49.)

• As a result of having the Medical Devise implanted into her, 

Izabella Shealy has experienced significant mental and 

physical pain and suffering, and she has sustained 

permanent injury. (Id.. at ¶ 50.)

At this stage of the proceedings, the above allegations lead this Court to 

conclude that the Plaintiff has sufficiently pled a failure to warn claim. The 

Complaint clearly indicates that the Defendant mislead the medical community and 

the Plaintiff’s injuries would not have occurred but for the Defendant’s wrongful 

conduct. By reasonable inference from the facts alleged, this would include the 

treating physician electing another product had they not been misled. While the 

Complaint could have been more clearly drafted by containing a specific allegation 

that the doctor who implanted the Obtryx would not have done so had they received
7

a proper warning, the Complaint is sufficient (although barely) at this stage of the 

proceedings to withstand a motion to dismiss on the learned intermediary doctrine 

and the proximate cause requirements that follow from that doctrine. At the motion 

to dismiss stage there is a reasonable set of facts that exist that could place liability 

against the defendant for failure to warn. 

Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is DENIED with respect to the 

failure to warn claim described in Count III of the Complaint. 

BREACH OF WARRANTY CLAIM

Defendant next seeks to dismiss Plaintiff’s Count II for breach of warranty. 

Defendant argues that the Complaint “does not describe any representation that 

Boston Scientific made to [Plaintiff] or her prescribing physician” or where or how 

such a representation was made.

10 An express warranty is an “affirmation of fact or 

promise made by the seller to the buyer which relates to goods and becomes part of 

the basis of the bargain.”

11 To state a claim for breach of an express warranty under 

New York law, a plaintiff must prove “that an express warranty existed, was 

breached, and that plaintiff had relied on that warranty.”

12 The Plaintiff must allege 

where, when or how the alleged promise or statement was provided to her or her 

physicians.13

10 Def.’s Mot. To Dismiss at 7. 

11 N.Y. U.C.C. S 2-313(1)(a); See Friedman v. Medtronic, Inc. 345 N.Y.S.2d 637, 643 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973).

12 Reed v. Pfizer, Inc., 839 F.Supp.2d 571, 578 (E.D.N.Y. 2012).

13 Fisher v. APP PHARMACEUTICALS, LLC, et al., 783 F.Supp.2d 424, 431 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
8

Plaintiff argues that she has pled the breach of warranty claim adequately,

pointing to Paragraph 17 of the Complaint. In that section of the Complaint, she 

alleges: “Defendant provided incomplete, insufficient, and misleading training and 

information to physicians, in order to increase the number of physicians utilizing the 

Pelvic Mesh Products, and thus increased the sales and also leading to the 

dissemination of inadequate and misleading information to patients, including 

plaintiff.” The Plaintiff also points to paragraphs 5-8, 24, 25 and 46-50 of the 

Complaint. These paragraphs contain, among other allegations, the following:

• “...these products contain a monofilament polypropylene 

mesh intended for the treatment of stress urinary 

incontinence. Despite claims that this material is inert, the 

emerging scientific evidence suggests that this material is 

biologically incompatible with human tissue and promotes 

an immune response in a large subset of the population 

receiving Defendant’s Pelvic Mesh Products containing this 

material.” (¶ 5).

• Defendant’s Pelvic Mesh Products have been and continue 

to be marketed to the medical community and to patients as 

safe, effective, reliable, medical device; implanted by safe 

and effective, minimally invasive surgical techniques for 

the treatment of medical conditions, primarily pelvic organ 

3 prolapse and stress urinary incontinence, and as safer and 

more effective as compared to the traditional products and 

procedures for treatment, and other competing Pelvic Mesh 

Products. (¶ 6).

• The Defendant has marketed and sold the Pelvic Mesh 

Products to the medical community at large and patients 

through carefully planned, multifaceted marketing 

campaigns and strategies. These campaigns and strategies 

include, but are not limited to, aggressive marketing to 

health care providers at medical conferences, hospitals, 

private offices, and include the provision of valuable cash 

and non-cash benefits to health care providers. Also utilized 
9

are documents, brochures, and websites, offering 

exaggerated and misleading expectations as to the safety 

and utility of the products. (¶ 7). 

• Defendant failed to undertake their duties to properly know 

the qualities of their product and in representations to 

Plaintiff and/or to Plaintiff’s healthcare providers, to and 

concealed and intentionally omitted [] material information

(¶ 24).14

• These injuries would not have occurred but for the defective 

nature of the products implanted and/or Defendant’s 

wrongful conduct. (¶ 49). 

These allegations, taken together, are sufficient to allege an express breach of 

warranty claim. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is DENIED with respect to the 

breach of warranty claims detailed in Count II of the Complaint. 

REMAINING NELIGENCE CLAIMS

Defendant alleges that the remaining negligence claims found in Count I of 

the Complaint which are not based on a failure to warn theory are not adequately 

pled. With respect to the design and manufacturing defect claims found in Count I, 

Defendant maintains that Plaintiff’s allegations fail to establish the existence of a 

defect or to tie any particular defect to her injuries. According to Defendant, the 

Plaintiff does little more than assert the bare elements of a negligence claim.

Plaintiff has alleged the following in her complaint:

• Moreover, these products contain a monofilament polypropylene mesh 

intended for the treatment of stress urinary incontinence. Despite claims 

that this material is inert, the emerging scientific evidence suggests that 

this material is biologically incompatible with human tissue and 

promotes an immune response in a large subset of the population 

receiving Defendant’s Pelvic Mesh Products containing this material. 

This immune response promotes degradation of the pelvic tissue and can 

14 The Complaint contains eleven specific pieces of allegedly omitted material information in this paragraph.
10

contribute to the formation of severe adverse reactions to the mesh. (¶

5).

• Defendant’s Pelvic Mesh Products have been and continue to be 

marketed to the medical community and to patients as safe, effective, 

reliable, medical device; implanted by safe and effective, minimally 

invasive surgical techniques for the treatment of medical conditions, 

primarily pelvic organ prolapse and stress urinary incontinence, and as 

safer and more effective as compared to the traditional products and 

procedures for treatment, and other competing Pelvic Mesh Products. (¶

6)

• The Defendant has marketed and sold the Pelvic Mesh Products to the 

medical community at large and patients through carefully planned, 

multifaceted marketing campaigns and strategies. These campaigns and 

strategies include, but are not limited to, aggressive marketing to health 

care providers at medical conferences, hospitals, private offices, and 

include the provision of valuable cash and non-cash benefits to health 

care providers. Also utilized are documents, brochures, and websites, 

offering exaggerated and misleading expectations as to the safety and 

utility of the products. (¶ 7)

• Contrary to the Defendant’s representations and marketing to the 

medical community and to the patients themselves, the Defendant’s 

Pelvic Mesh Products have high failure, injury, and complication rates, 

fail to perform as intended, require frequent and often debilitating reoperations, and have caused severe and irreversible injuries, conditions, 

and damage to a significant number of women, including the Plaintiff, 

making them defective under the law. The defects stem from any or all 

of the following:

a. the use of polypropylene material in the Mesh itself and the 

immune reaction that results, causing adverse reactions and 

injuries; 

b. the design of the Pelvic Mesh Device to be inserted 

transvaginally into an area of the body with high levels of 

bacteria, yeast, and fungus that adhere to the mesh causing 

immune reactions and subsequent tissue breakdown and adverse 

reactions and injuries;

c. biomechanical issues with the design of the mesh that create 

strong amounts of friction between the mesh and the underlying 

tissue that subsequently cause that tissue to degrade resulting in 

injury
11

d. the use and design of anchors in the Pelvic Mesh Products 

which when placed correctly are likely to pass through and injure 

major nerve routes in the pelvic region. 

d. degradation of the mesh itself over time which causes the 

internal tissue to degrade resulting in injury.

e. the welding of the mesh itself during production which

creates a toxic substance that contributes to the degradation of 

the mesh and host tissue alike.

f. the design of trocars, as Device to insert the Pelvic Mesh 

Products into the vagina, are defective because the device 

requires tissue penetration in nerve rich environments which 

results frequently in the destruction of nerve endings causing 

pain and other injuries. (¶ 8)

These allegations, taken together, are sufficient to state claims for failure to 

warn and sufficiently plead that defects in the Obryx device were the proximate 

cause of the Plaintiff’s injuries.

MANUFACTURING DEFECT

To state a claim for a manufacturing defect under New York law, a plaintiff 

must allege that (1) the product was defective due to error in the manufacturing 

process and (2) the defect was the proximate cause of Plaintiff’s injury.15 Defendant 

alleges that any claims premised on a manufacturing defect fail because Plaintiff: 

(1) concedes that the devices at issue were in the condition intended by Boston 

Scientific when they Boston Scientific’s possession (Compl. ¶18); (2) fails to 

identify a particular design defect in the devices; and (3) fails to plead that any 

alleged defect plausibly caused her injuries. Defendant is correct that the Plaintiff 

has alleged that the devices at issue were in the condition intended by Boston 

15 Williamson v. Stryker Corp., 2013 WL 3833081, at 4 (S.D.N.Y. July 23, 2013).
12

Scientific when they left Boston Scientific’s possession. There is no alternative 

pleading in the complaint that relates to a manufacturing defect that is premised on

an allegation that the Obtryx device was in the condition other then what Boston 

Scientific intended when it left the company’s possession. On this basis,

Defendant’s motion to dismiss claims based on a manufacturing defect is 

GRANTED.

16

DESIGN DEFECT

To state a cause of action for a design defect, Plaintiff must allege that the 

product was unreasonably dangerous for its intended use and must allege with 

sufficient specificity how the design of the product was defective.17 According to 

Boston Scientific, Plaintiff has not done this. In paragraph 5 and 6 of the Complaint 

(set forth above) plaintiff alleges that Defendant designed the Obtryx to contain 

polypropylene, a material they knew was incompatible with tissues found in the 

human body. The Complaint further alleges that Plaintiff’s tissue rejected the 

Obtryx, causing her injury. These allegations are sufficient to allege a design defect

in the Obtryx. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss with respect to Plaintiff’s claim for 

design defect is DENIED. 

16 See Zetz v. Boston Scientific, 398 F Supp 3rd 700 (E.D. Cal 2019).

17 Tears v. Bos. Sic Corp., 344 F Supp 3rd 500, 510 (S.D.N.Y 2018).
13

PUNITIVE DAMAGES CLAIM

Plaintiff’s Complaint contains a demand for punitive damages. Defendant 

seeks to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages. Defendant argues that

Plaintiff’s allegations that Boston Scientific acted in a “willful disregard for 

Plaintiff’s safety cannot sustain a request for punitive damages”. Defendant also 

seeks to strike Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages on the grounds that the other 

claims in the Complaint should be dismissed. Plaintiff’s Complaint specifically 

alleges the following:

• Despite emerging scientific evidence that polypropylene is 

incompatible with human tissue, Defendant continues to market the 

Obtryx to the medical community. (Compl. At ¶ 5-6.)

• Contrary to the Defendant’s representations and marketing...the 

Defendant’s products suffer from high failure, injury, and 

complication rates, fail to perform as intended, require frequent and 

often debilitating reoperations, and have caused severe reversible 

injuries. (Id. at ¶ 8.)

• The Defendant has chronically underreported and withheld 

information about the propensity of Defendant’s pelvic Mesh Products 

to fail and cause injury and complications, and have misrepresented

the efficacy and safety of the product, through various means and 

media, actively and intentionally misleading the FDA, the medical 

community, patients, and the public at large. (Id. at ¶. 9-10.)

• Defendants “failed to accurately and completely inform the FDA, 

health providers and the patients. (Id. at ¶ 11.)

• Defendant continues to mislead the public into believing their products 

are safe and effective. Id.

At the motion to dismiss stage these allegations are sufficient for a punitive

damage claim to survive, as other causes of action have survived the instant motion 
14

to dismiss. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is DENIED with respect to Plaintiff’s 

claim for punitive damages. 

CONCLUSION

In summary, the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED with respect 

for the claims for a manufacturing defect as described above. Defendant’s Motion 

to Dismiss is DENIED with respect to all other claims found in the Complaint. 

/s/Francis J. Jones

Francis J. Jones, Judge

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