### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON A s s i gne d on B r i e f

s D e c e m be r 3, 2002
TO N Y BLA N D v . STA TE O F TEN N ESSEE
Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for Shelby Coun ty No. P -25954 Car olyn Wad e Blackett , Judge

No. W2002-01784-C CA-R 3-P C - F iled Janu ary 6, 2003

The pe titioner challeng es the dismissal of his petition f o r p ost-conviction re lief by the Shelby Co un ty Cr im in a l C o urt, w h ic hd is mi s s e d th e p e tition based u

p o nth e s tatute o f

li mi tati o n s
. We a ff ir m. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Cr im inal Cou rt A ff irm ed
J OE G. R I L EY , J ., delivere d the opinion of the cour t, in which T H O M A S T. W O O D A LL and A L AN E. G L EN N , J J ., joined.
Ross A. S ampson, Memphis, Tenne ssee (in post-conviction court), for the appellant, Tony Bla nd; and Tony Bla nd, Pro Se(on appe al).
Pa ul G. Summe rs , Atto rn e y Ge ne ra l and Re po rt e r; Chr ist ine M. L a pp s, As sis tant Atto rn e y

Ge ne ra l; Wil liam L

. Gibbons, District Attorney Gene ral; and G ail Ann VerMaas, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee
.

OP IN ION Petitioner pled guilty

on M ay 7, 1990, to the offe nses of sellingcoca ine and a g g ravated burg lary , and on J une 19, 1990, the trial court se ntence d him to concurre nt, probated se ntence s of three y ear s and four y ear s, respe ctively

. His probation was r evoked on O ctober 4, 1991; he serve d his sentenc es i n the Tennessee Depar tment of C orre ction; and he was paroled on J anuar y 30, 1992. He wa s subsequently

indicted in the S tate of Missi ssippi, and the two Tenne ssee c onvictions were alleg edly used as a basis to declar e him a habitual of fende r under

Mississ ippi law.
Pe tit ion e r f

ile d a pe tit ion fo r po st- c onvic tio n re lie f on De c e mbe r 6, 20 01 , a lle g inghis guil ty pleas we re unknowingly and invol untarily enter ed and he was deprive d of the e ffe ctive assistanc eT he po s t

- convi ct i on cour t appo i nt ed coun s el upon t he f i l i ng o f the p eti t i on, an d couns el f i l ed an amended 1 p e tit io n . T h e re c o rd d o e s n o t re flec t wh y a p p o inte d c o u n se l i s n o t re p r e s e n ti n g p e tit io n e r o n a p p e a l. W e tak e this op po r t un i t y t o n ot e t he ob l i gat i on of appo i nt ed couns el t o c ont i nu e t o r epre s ent a po s t

- convi ct i on pet i t i oner on appeal up o n d en i al o f

reli ef b y t he p o st

- co nv i cti o n c o urt. D rum m er v. S t ate, 6 S .W .3d 5 2 0 , 5 2 3 (T en n. C rim. A p p
. 1 9 9 9 ) (also a Shel by C ount y cas e)

. H owever , d ue t o t he na t ur e o f t he na r r ow i s s ue pres ent ed i n t hi s appeal , we env i s i on no pr act i cal reason t o f

urt her add res s t hi s short co m i ng. -2- of c ouns e l. T he po st- c onvic tio n c ourt dis mis se d th e pe tit ion ba se d u po n th e statut e of

lim itatio ns
. Th is pro s eappea l ensued. 1

STATUT E OF LIMITATIONS A petition for post -convic tion relief must be filed within one y ear of t he final action of the highe st state appellate court to which a n appea l is taken, or, if no a ppeal is t ak en , within one y ear of the date on which the judgment beca me final, or c onside ra t i o n of the pe tition i s barr ed. Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-3 0 -202(a). Time is of the e ssence in claiming post-c onviction relief, a nd compliance with the o n e-year statute is an eleme nt of the right to file a petition. Id. Th e statut e itself provides thre e exceptions to the one-year statute of li mitations: (1) whe n a new constitutional ri g ht h a s b e e n re c ognize d; (2 ) wh e n the pe tit ion e r' s inno c e nc e ha s bee n est a bli sh e d by ne w s c ie nti fi c e vid e nc e ; or

(3 ) whe n a

pr e vio us c onvic tio n th at e nh anc e d th e pe tit ion e r' s sen te nc e ha s b e e n h e ld invalid. Id. § 4 0- 30 -2 02 (b ). Th e po st- c onvic tio n c ourt mus t a lso c on sid e r a n o the rw ise untim e ly petition if the application of the statute of limit ations would be a denial of due proce ss. SeeSe a ls v. State, 23 S.W .3d 272, 278-79 (Te nn. 2000). The pe tition was filed more than eleve n y ear s afte r the judgme nt be came final. None of the three statutory

exceptions apply

to the l ate- filed petit ion. Fur thermore , the petitioner’s c ontention that “compe lling circumstance s of hi s prese nt situation being inca rce rate d in the State of Mississippi ma de it i mpo ssi ble fo r h im t o kno w the laws of Te nn e sse e or ke e p u p w iththe c ha

ng e in l aw .
. . [so a s to r a is e ] th is is s u e in a ti me ly ma nn e r ” d o e s n o t c r e ate a d u e p r o c e s s av e nu e of r elief. See Guillermo Matiaz J uan v. State, No. 03C01-9708-CR-00318, 1999 Tenn. Crim. App. L EXI S 140, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 18, 1999, at Knoxvil le), perm. to appeal de nied (Tenn. July 12, 1999) (holdingignor ance of the lawdoes not bar a pplication of the post-conviction statute of limitations); Wil liam Ly

nn J ohnson v. State, No. 02C01-9605-CR-00136, 1997 Tenn. Crim. App. L EXI S 555, at **8-9 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 10, 1997, at J ackson) , perm. to app. denied (Tenn. Sept. 15, 1997) (holdingthat incar cer ation in a federa l prison without acce ss to Tennessee leg al re source s does not fall within the statutory

exceptions nor the due pr ocess e x ception). A ppli ca t i o n o f t h e statute of lim itatio ns in t

his c a se do e s n ot v iol ate du e pr oc e ss. Ac c or din g ly , w e a ff

ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he po st- c onvic tio n c ourt

.

____________________________________ J OE G. RI L EY, JUDGE