IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Thomas Scantling, :

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 2701 C.D. 2015

: Submitted: June 24, 2016

Pennsylvania Board of :

Probation and Parole, :

Respondent :

BEFORE: HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge

HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

HONORABLE JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BY JUDGE BROBSON FILED: September 15, 2016 

Petitioner Thomas Scantling (Scantling) petitions for review of an 

order of the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole (Board). The Board 

denied Scantling’s administrative appeal of the Board’s August 14, 2015 order, 

which formally recommitted Scantling as a convicted parole violator and 

recalculated his maximum release date. Scantling’s counsel, 

Nicholas E. Newfield, Esquire (Counsel), filed a motion for leave to withdraw as 

counsel. Counsel asserts that the issues raised by Scantling in his petition for 

review are frivolous and lacking in any merit. We now deny Counsel’s motion for 
2

leave to withdraw and provide Counsel with an opportunity to submit an amended 

request for leave to withdraw.1

When no constitutional right to counsel is involved in a probation and 

parole case, an attorney seeking to withdraw from representing a prisoner may file 

a no-merit letter, as compared to an Anders brief.2 In Hughes v. Pennsylvania 

Board of Probation and Parole, 977 A.2d 19 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009), this Court held 

that a constitutional right to counsel in a parole and probation matter arises only 

when the prisoner’s case includes:

[a] colorable claim (i) that he has not committed the 

alleged violation of the conditions upon which he is at 

liberty; or (ii) that, even if the violation is a matter of 

public record or is uncontested, there are substantial 

reasons which justified or mitigated the violation and 

make revocation inappropriate, and that the reasons are 

complex or otherwise difficult to develop or present.

 

1 Because we are denying Counsel’s petition but permitting him to file an amended 

no-merit letter, we will not provide a recitation of the facts involved in this matter, other than to 

note generally that Scantling was on parole when he was arrested and charged with new crimes 

in August 2014. The Board lodged a warrant to commit and detain Scantling at that time.

2

In Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), the United States Supreme Court held 

that, in order for a criminal defendant’s counsel to withdraw from representing his client in an 

appeal, counsel must assert that the case is completely frivolous, as compared to presenting an 

absence of merit. An appeal is completely or “wholly” frivolous when there are no factual or 

legal justifications that support the appeal. Craig v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Prob. and 

Parole, 502 A.2d 758, 761 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1985). However, in Commonwealth v. 

Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), our Supreme Court held that in matters that are collateral to an 

underlying criminal proceeding, such as parole matters, a counsel seeking to withdraw from his 

representation of a client may file a “no-merit” letter that includes information describing the 

extent and nature of the counsel’s review, listing the issues the client wants to raise, and 

informing the Court of the reasons why counsel believes the issues have no merit.
3

Hughes, 977 A.2d at 25-26 (quoting Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973)). 

The record in this matter contains no suggestion by Scantling that he did not 

commit the crime for which he received a new criminal conviction, nor does 

Scantling suggest any reasons constituting justification or mitigation for his new 

criminal conviction. Thus, Scantling only has a statutory right to counsel under 

Section 6(a) of the Public Defender Act, Act of December 2, 1968, P.L. 1144, as 

amended, 16 P.S. § 9960.6(a)(10). 

In order to satisfy the procedural requirements associated with 

no-merit letters, counsel must: (1) notify the parolee that he has submitted to the 

Court a request to withdraw; (2) provide the parolee with a copy of counsel’s 

no-merit letter; and (3) advise the parolee that he has the right to obtain new 

counsel and to submit to the Court a brief of his own, raising any arguments that he 

may believe are meritorious.3 Reavis v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Prob. and 

Parole, 909 A.2d 28, 33 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006). In seeking to withdraw, this Court 

has consistently required an attorney to include the following descriptive 

information in a no-merit letter: (1) the nature and extent of counsel’s review of 

the case; (2) the issues the parolee wants to raise; and (3) the analysis counsel used 

in reaching his conclusion that the issues are meritless. Zerby v. Shanon, 

964 A.2d 956, 961 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009). 

Consequently, before considering whether Scantling’s appeal has no 

merit and proceeding to make an independent review of the merits of the case, we 

 

3 Counsel served Scantling with his petition for leave to withdraw and his brief. In a 

letter addressed to Scantling, counsel advised Scantling of his right to retain counsel and to file a 

brief on his own behalf. Thus, counsel has complied with these requirements. 
4

must first evaluate Counsel’s no-merit letter to determine whether it complies with 

the requirements for withdrawal applications. Counsel’s no-merit letter adequately 

summarizes Scantling’s conviction and parole history and his conviction following 

the grant of parole. In his administrative appeal, Scantling alleged that the Board 

failed to conduct a timely revocation hearing and improperly relied on hearsay 

evidence in finding that Scantling violated his parole. (C.R. at 97.) Further, 

Scantling argued that the Board erred in its calculation of his maximum date. (Id.) 

Specifically, Scantling alleged that the Board failed to give him credit for time 

served due to the Board’s detainer, where Scantling was granted unsecured bail on 

his most recent charges. (Id.)

Counsel, however, does not adequately address the issues raised by 

Scantling. Regarding the timeliness and hearsay issues, Counsel, in his no-merit 

letter, stated the following:

You allege that the Board failed to conduct a timely 

revocation hearing in the above matter; and the Board 

improperly relied upon hearsay and/or other inadmissible 

evidence in relation to the revocation hearing that was 

held. The Board’s [r]evocation hearing was held on 

May 15, 2015. You alleged that the conviction date on 

the new offense, DUI, was November 13, 2104 (sic). 

Review of said record indicates that the (sic) you were 

sentenced by the Philadelphia Municipal Court on 

February 24, 2015. The effective date of this sentence as 

indicated in the sentence as February 24, 2015, with 

immediate parole to follow. Thus the minimum sentence 

of 72 hours would have been completed on 

February 27, 2015. At the [r]evocation hearing you 

alleged that the conviction date was 

November 13, 2014, which appears to be the date that the 

plea was entered, in which the Philadelphia Municipal 

Judge ordered a presentence investigation be prepared to 

assist in sentencing that was scheduled on 

February 24, 2015. 
5

Once again, through counsel, you objected to the timing 

of the revocation hearing. It appears from the reproduced 

record that the appropriate documentation was presented 

at the revocation hearing to support the conviction. The 

parole agent provided testimony that the verification was 

not received until April 27, 2015. Furthermore, you 

acknowledged the conviction at the revocation hearing. 

(No-merit letter at 1-2; Internal citations omitted). 

Counsel references Scantling’s claims of error but merely alludes that 

those claims of error are without merit. Counsel provided factual details 

surrounding Scantling’s claims, yet did not provide a legal discussion citing case 

law or statutory provisions that would deem Scantling’s claims to be meritless. 

This legal discussion is required of Counsel, even if the reason that supports the 

Board’s decision is widely known and patently obvious. This type of explanation 

and/or discussion assists the Court in its evaluation of the merit (or lack thereof) of 

Scantling’s claims regarding timeliness and the Board’s improper reliance on 

hearsay evidence. Although all of these issues may ultimately prove to lack merit 

of any kind, in order to satisfy the requirements set forth in Zerby, Counsel was 

required to fully discuss those issues and why the applicable law does not provide 

relief to Scantling. Consequently, we must deny Counsel’s petition for leave to 

withdraw as counsel. Counsel has two options. Counsel may file an amended 

no-merit letter that fully analyzes the issues Scantling has raised. Alternatively, 

Counsel may submit a brief on the merits of the petition for review.

Accordingly, we deny Counsel’s petition for leave to withdraw.

 

 P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Thomas Scantling, :

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 2701 C.D. 2015

:

Pennsylvania Board of :

Probation and Parole, :

Respondent :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 15th day of September, 2016, the motion for leave to 

withdraw as counsel filed by Nicholas E. Newfield, Esquire, is DENIED. Counsel 

shall submit either an amended no-merit letter or a brief on the merits of the 

petition for review filed by Petitioner Thomas Scantling within thirty days of the 

date of this order. If Counsel submits an amended no-merit letter, the Court will 

again address that request along with the merits of the petition for review. If 

Counsel submits a brief on the merits, Respondent may submit a revised brief, at 

its discretion, but must do so within thirty days of the date Counsel files a brief on 

the merits.

 

 P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge