alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**Exhibit 32.2**

 

**CERTIFICATIONPURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

In connection with theQuarterly Report of Summer Infant, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Qfor the period ending September 30, 2010 (the “Report”), as filed with theSecurities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof, I Joseph Driscoll,Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify pursuant to Sec. 906 of theSarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

 

1.                   The Report fully complieswith the requirements of section 13 (a) or 15(d) of the SecuritiesExchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

 

2.                   The information contained inthe Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial conditionand results of operations of the Company.

 

 
| /s/ Joseph Driscoll     |                    |
|-------------------------|-------------------------|
| Joseph Driscoll         | November 10,  2010 |
| Chief Financial Officer |                    |

 

----
#### Herbert Fuller, Plaintiff, *v.*Fred E. Stuart et al., Defendants.

Supreme Court, Special Term, Nassau County,

May 14, 1956.

*457
      *James J. McIntosh, Jr.,*for Fred E. Stuart, defendant appearing specially.

*Louis Winer*and *Abraham Brinn*for plaintiff.

Percy D. Stoddart, J.

Motion by the defendant Fred E. Stuart, appearing specially, to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the cause of action is barred by the Statute of Limitations.

On July 13, 1952 the plaintiff was struck by a motor vehicle driven by the defendant Fred E. Stuart. On April 12, 1956 a summons and complaint were purportedly served upon Fred E. Stuart.

Obviously, as more than three years (Civ. Prac. Act, § 49) have elapsed since the date of the accident, a cause of action for personal injuries is barred unless the statute is tolled. It appears that between the date of the accident and the date of the alleged service of process the movant was absent from the State on five separate occasions with each period of absence being in excess of four months. Under section 19 of the Civil Practice Act such absences would not be considered as part of the three years were it not for subdivision 1 of section 19 of the Civil Practice Act and sections 52 and 52-a of the Vehicle and Traffic Law. It is provided in section 19 insofar as pertinent, ‘‘ But this section does not apply in either of the following cases: 1. While a *designation*or appointment, voluntary or *involuntary,*made in pursuance of law, of a resident or nonresident person, corporation, or private or *public officer*on whom a summons may be served within the state for another resident or non-resident person or corporation with the same legal force and validity as if served personally on such person or corporation within the state, remains in force.” (Italics supplied.) By sections 52 and 52-a of the Vehicle and Traffic Law service of process may be made on the Secretary of State in accident cases involving a nonresident operator of a motor vehicle or one who is resident but is absent from the State for more than 30 days. Therefore, as the movant was either present in the State or absent for intervals making operative sections 52 and 52-a, process should have been served upon him personally within the three-year period or upon the public officer provided in the statute.

Accordingly, the motion is granted.

Settle order on notice.
```

[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 593 Engrossed in House (EH)]

<DOC>
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
118th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 593

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 
To rename the Department of Veterans Affairs community-based outpatient 
clinic in Hinesville, Georgia, as the ``John Gibson, Dan James, William 
                 Sapp, and Frankie Smiley VA Clinic''.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. NAME OF DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS COMMUNITY-BASED 
              OUTPATIENT CLINIC, HINESVILLE, GEORGIA.

     The Department of Veterans Affairs community-based outpatient 
clinic in Hinesville, Georgia, shall after the date of the enactment of 
this Act be known and designated as the ``John Gibson, Dan James, 
William Sapp, and Frankie Smiley VA Clinic''. Any reference to such 
clinic in any law, regulation, map, document, record, or other paper of 
the United States shall be considered to be a reference to the John 
Gibson, Dan James, William Sapp, and Frankie Smiley VA Clinic.

            Passed the House of Representatives November 13, 2023.

            Attest:

                                                                 Clerk.
118th CONGRESS

  1st Session

                               H. R. 593

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

To rename the Department of Veterans Affairs community-based outpatient 
clinic in Hinesville, Georgia, as the ``John Gibson, Dan James, William 
                 Sapp, and Frankie Smiley VA Clinic''.
```
#### STATE of Missouri, Plaintiff/Respondent, v. Johnny WALTON, Defendant/Appellant. Johnny WALTON, Movant/Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent/Respondent.

Nos. 65190, 67425.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division One.

Feb. 20, 1996.

Lew Kolias, Office of the State Public Defender, Columbia, for appellant.

Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen., David R. Truman, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.

Before REINHARD, P.J., and KAROHL and DOWD, JJ.

*ORDER*

PER CURIAM.

Defendant appeals after he was convicted by a jury of second degree robbery, § 569.030, RSMo 1986. The court sentenced him as a class X offender to a prison term of twenty-five years. Defendant also appeals the denial of his Rule 29.15 motion for post-*419conviction relief following an evidentiary hearing. We affirm.

We have reviewed the record and find the claims of error are without merit; the judgment of the motion court is based on findings of fact that are not clearly erroneous. An opinion would have no precedential value nor serve any jurisprudential purpose. The parties have been furnished with a memorandum for their information only, setting forth the reasons for this order affirming the judgment pursuant to Rules 30.25(b) and 84.16(b).
[Federal Register Volume 61, Number 98 (Monday, May 20, 1996)]
[Notices]
[Page 25211]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 96-12564]



-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Corps of Engineers


Availability of Surplus Land and Buildings Located at Defense 
Distribution Depot, Ogden, Utah (DDOU)

AGENCY: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, DOD.

ACTION: Notice of availability.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: This notice identifies the surplus real property located at 
Defense Distribution Depot, Ogden, Utah (DDOU). DDOU is located one 
mile from Interstate 15. Commercial and military airports and a rail 
network are in close proximity.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Fore more information regarding a 
particular building or parcel (i.e., acreage, floor plans, existing 
sanitary facilities, exact street address), contact Ms. Kathleen 
Mallis, Base Transition Coordinator at (801) 399-7971; Mr. Steve 
Sugimoto, Base Transition Officer, at (801) 399-7845; or Ms. Susan 
Krinks, Reality Specialist, (916) 557-6994.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This surplus property is available under the 
provisions of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 
1949 and the Base Closure Community Redevelopment and Homeless 
Assistance Act of 1994.
    The surplus real property totals 1,077 acres and includes 10 office 
buildings, 68 storage buildings, and 156 other buildings. The current 
range of uses include industrial, storage, commercial, and housing 
facilities. DDOU is listed as a National Priority List site by the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency.
    Future uses may be limited to those described above.
    Notices of interest must be submitted within 90 days from the date 
of this notice. Notices of interest should be forwarded to Ogden Local 
Redevelopment Authority, Attention: Mr. Michael D. Pavich, 2484 
Washington Boulevard, Suite 320, Ogden, Utah 84401-2319.
Gregory D. Showalter,
Army Federal Register Liaison Officer.
[FR Doc. 96-12564 Filed 5-17-96; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3710-EZ-M
EXHIBIT 32.4



CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICER OF

UCFH I FINANCE, INC.

PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350



In connection with the quarterly report of UCFH I Finance, Inc. (the
Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ending July 3, 2005 filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Michael J. Short, certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant
to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:



|(1) | the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
|--- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|(2) | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
|--- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



Dated: August 15, 2005



By:

/s/ MICHAEL J. SHORTMichael J. ShortTreasurer (Principal Financial Officer)




33
[Federal Register Volume 61, Number 18 (Friday, January 26, 1996)]
[Notices]
[Pages 2498-2499]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 96-1285]



-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
[Docket No. GT96-43-000]


Northwest Pipeline Corporation; Notice of Proposed Changes in 
Service Agreement

January 22, 1996.
    Take notice that on January 16, 1996, Northwest Pipeline 
Corporation (Northwest) tendered for filing and acceptance a 
replacement Rate Schedule T-1 service agreement between Northwest and 
Pacific Interstate Transmission Company (PITCO) dated July 24, 1995, to 
become effective February 1, 1996.
    Northwest states that this service agreement reflects the 
conversion from Mcf to MMBtu for PITCO's contract demand, as more fully 
explained in Northwest's August 31, 1995 filing in Docket No. RP95-409. 
It supersedes the service agreement with PITCO dated January 18, 1988.
    Any person desiring to be heard or protest this filing should file 
a motion to intervene or protest with the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission, 888 First Street, N.E., Washington, DC 20426, in accordance 
with Sections 

[[Page 2499]]
385.214 and 385.211 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations. All such 
motions or protests must be filed as provided in Section 154.210 of the 
Commission's Regulations. Protests will be considered by the Commission 
in determining the appropriate action to be taken, but will not serve 
to make protestants parties to the proceeding. Any person wishing to 
become a party must file a motion to intervene. Copies of this filing 
are on file with the Commission and are available for public inspection 
in the Public Reference Room.
Lois D. Cashell,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 96-1285 Filed 1-25-96; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-M
Exhibit 32.1

Certification of Principal Executive Officer pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002.

In connection with the Quarterly Report of pSivida Corp. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the
quarter ended March 31, 2010, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Paul Ashton, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify that to the best of my knowledge:



| | 1. | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | -- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2. | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | -- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Date: May 13, 2010



|                |  |                                      
|--------------- |  | -------------------------------------
|/s/ Paul Ashton
|Name:           |  | Paul Ashton                          
|Title:          |  | President and Chief Executive Officer
|                |  | (Principal Executive Officer)
### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 13

- 40961 Summary Calendar

KENNETH CRISSUP , Plaintiff

- Appellant

v. HONORABLE THOMAS GREENWELL; JAMES ODELL; MARK W. STOLLEY , Defendant s
- Appellees

Appeal s from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. 2:13

- CV

- 137

Before REAVLEY, JONES, and PRADO, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Kenneth Crissup, Texas prisoner # 1258732, appeals the dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against Judge Thomas Greenwell, James Odell, and Mark Stolley. We aff irm. Crissup alleged that the defendants conspired to deprive him of his due process rights and conspired to provide false information to Texas appellate

* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5 , the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED May 16, 2014 Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Case: 13-40961 Document: 00512633622 Page: 1 Date Filed: 05/16/2014No. 13

- 40961
courts concerning his criminal trial. Additionally, he alleged that Greenwell exhibited bias against him and created false documents that became part of the trial record, that Odell presented false information to the state courts, and that Stolley

– his defense attorney

– provided ineffective assistance of counsel. Crissup has abandoned his claims based on § 1983. See Yohey v. Collins , 985 F.2d 222, 224

- 25 (5th Cir. 1993 ). He now identifies subsections (2) and (3) of 42 U.S.C. § 1985 as statutory bas e s for his action. We review this claim for plain error. See Crawford v. Falcon Drilling Co. , 131 F.3d 1120, 1123

- 29 (5th Cir. 1997) ; Forbush v. J.C. Penney Co. , 98 F.3d 817, 822 (5th Cir. 1996 )

. On plain error review, we may exercise our discretion to grant relief if Crissup establishes an error that is clear or obvious, that affects his substantial right s, and that seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the proceedings. See Crawford , 131 F.3d at 1123

- 29 ; Alaniz v. Zamora

- Quezada , 591 F.3d 761, 776 (5th Cir. 2009). The complaint’s claims involving the Due Process Clause and st ate court proceedings do not implicate s ubsection s 2 and 3 of § 1985

. See Montoya v. FedEx Ground Package System, Inc. , 614 F.3d 145, 149 (5th Cir. 2010). Thus, Crissup has not shown that there was any error at all, much less clear or obvious error, in denying him § 1985 relief

. See id. ; Alaniz , 591 F.3d at 776

. Crissup has abandoned, by failing to brief it, his claim that the district court abused its discretion by denying a new trial. See Yohey , 985 F.2d at 224

- 25

. Additionally, Crissup fails to s how that the district court abused its discretion with regard to discovery. See Siegert v. Gilley , 500 U.S. 226, 23 1

- 32 (1991)

. AFFIRMED.

2 Case: 13-40961 Document: 00512633622 Page: 2 Date Filed: 05/16/2014
Exhibit
32





CERTIFICATIONS
PURSUANT TO


SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


(18
U.S.C. SECTION 1350)





In
connection with the Annual Report of Impart Media Group, Inc., a Nevada
corporation (the "Company"), on Form 10-KSB for the transition period ended
September 30, 2008, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the
"Report"), Joe Martinez, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, and Alan
Chaffee, Principal Financial Officer of the Company, do hereby certify, pursuant
to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. § 1350), that to his
knowledge:





(1) The
Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2) The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.




/s/ Joe Martinez





By: Joe
Martinez


Its:
Chief Executive Officer, Director




/s/ Alan Chaffee





By: Alan
Chaffee


Its:
Chief Financial Officer





April 3,
2009





[A signed
original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to
Impart Media Group, Inc. and will be retained by it and furnished to the
Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon
request.]
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America,

Plaintiff,

v. 

Melbourne Dazen, Jr.,

Defendant.

No. CR-17-08288-PCT-SPL

ORDER

On March 22, 2022, Defendant appeared before this Court for a Detention and 

Preliminary Revocation Hearing on the Petition for Revocation of Supervised Release 

(Doc. 61). The matter was taken under advisement.

With regard to the Preliminary Revocation Hearing, Defendant’s Motion to Strike 

Allegation A1 is denied. The Court has considered the testimony of Senior U.S. Probation 

Officer Joseph Wagoner and all the information presented. The Court finds the 

government has met its burden of proof and probable cause exists that Allegations A1 and 

A2 were committed, and that the defendant committed Allegations A1 and A2.

With regard to the Detention Hearing, the Court has considered the proffers of 

counsel. The Court finds that the Defendant has failed to establish by clear and convincing 

evidence that he is not likely to flee or pose a danger to the safety of the community if 

released pursuant to Rule 46(d), and Rule 32.1(a)(6), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 

and 18 U.S.C. § 3143. 

///

Case 3:17-cr-08288-SPL Document 66 Filed 03/22/22 Page 1 of 2
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IT IS ORDERED that Defendant shall be detained pending further proceedings in 

this matter. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED setting an Admit/Deny Hearing for April 1, 2022 

at 2:30 p.m. before Magistrate Judge John Z. Boyle in Courtroom 302 at the Sandra Day 

O’Connor U.S. Courthouse, 401 West Washington Street, Phoenix, Arizona 85003.

Dated this 22nd day of March, 2022.

Honorable Eileen S. Willett

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 3:17-cr-08288-SPL Document 66 Filed 03/22/22 Page 2 of 2
#### STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Robert O. BAILEY, Appellant. Robert O. BAILEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent.

Nos. 66514, 68237.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division Three.

Oct. 31, 1995.

Emmett D. Queener, Office of the State Public Defender, Columbia, for appellant.

Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen., Aundreia R. Alexander, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.

Before SMITH, P.J., and GARY M. GAERTNER and RHODES, JJ.

*ORDER*

PER CURIAM.

In this consolidated action, Defendant appeals from his conviction of second degree burglary and stealing, and from the denial of his Rule 29.15 motion. We affirm.

An extended opinion would serve no prece-dential value. However, the parties have been furnished with a memorandum opinion for their information only, setting forth the reasons for this order. The judgment is affirmed pursuant to Rules 84.16(b) and 30.25(b).
#### Moe Brand, Plaintiff, *v.*Saul Gromet, Defendant.

Supreme Court, Special Term, Bronx County,

January 20, 1956.

*Kanton, Fixel & Rose*for plaintiff.

*Raphael P. Russakow*for defendant.

Francis X. Conlon, J.

This is a motion to strike out various defenses as insufficient. Such a motion searches the record and requires consideration of the sufficiency of the complaint. Although the Statute of Frauds might bar recovery in a suit to recover brokerage commissions, the statute does not bar an action in *quantum meruit*to recover the reasonable value of services performed at defendant’s request *(Gibson*v. *Archer Prods.,*281 App. Div. 661; *Potter*v. *Emerol Mfg. Co.,*275 App. Div. 265; *Elsfelder*v. *Cournand,*270 App. Div. 162, 165; *Smith*v. *Graham,*279 App. Div. 1051; N. Y. L. J., Nov. 22, 1955, p. 4, col. 1; *Spring*v. *Moncrieff,*N. Y. L. J., Sept. 6, 1955, p. 7, col. 2). The case of *Graymount*v. *Schlemmer*(204 Misc. 667, affd. 283 App. Div. 859) is clearly distinguishable. The affirmance there was expressly on the ground that the answering papers had presented no triable issue. Furthermore, in the *Graymount*case *992there was no proof of circumstances from which a liability to pay the value of the services rendered could be implied. It is true that an agreement void under the Statute of Frauds may not form the foundation of a recovery in *quantum meruit (Potter*v. *Emerol Mfg. Co., supra).*Although the present complaint does allege a promise to pay, such allegation is not essential to plaintiff’s recovery, for the allegation that the services were performed at defendant’s request is sufficient to make out a good cause of action in *quantum meruit,*on the theory of an implied promise to pay. The allegation of an express promise to pay may, perhaps, be subject to a motion to strike it from the complaint, but the pleading is nevertheless sufficient.

The action being in *quantum meruit,*the defenses of the Statute of Frauds are insufficient. *(Smith*v. *Graham, supra.)*The defense that a real estate broker’s license was required is also insufficient. *(Weingast*v. *Rialto Pastry Shop,*243 N. Y. 113.)

Motion granted.