T he H onorabl e Jon P

. M cCal l a, Chi ef U ni t ed St at es D i s t r i ct Jud ge fo r the W es t er n D i s t r i ct of T enn es s ee, * si t t i ng by desi gnat i o n. -1-

NOT RECOMMENDED F OR PUBL I CATI ON

File Na me: 10a0286n.06 No. 08-3700 U N IT E D S T A T E S C O U R T O F A P P E A LS F O R T H E S IX T H C IR C U IT

UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA, Plaintiff-Appellee , v. RO B E RT WH I T E L A W, De fe nd ant- Ap pe lla

nt.

__________________

_ _ _ ________________ )

) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEALFROM THE U NI TED STATES DI STRI CT COURT FOR THE S O U T H E R

N D IS T R IC T O F O H IO

OPI NI ON

Before: BOGG S a n d GI L MA N, Ci rc u i t J u d g es ; a n d Mc CA L L A, Ch i ef Di s tr i ct Judge. * RONALD LEE GILMAN, Cir cuit Judge. R o b er t W h i t el aw p l edn o co n t es tt o t h e c h ar ge of conspiringto possess and distribute 1,0 0 0 k i l o gra m s or more of marijuana . Be fore Whit elaw ent e r e d h is p le a , th e g o v e r

n me n t f il e d a n o ti c e p u r s u an t t o 2 1 U

. S. C. § 8 5 1 , s e e k in g ane n hance d sentenc e due to Whit elaw’ s prior conviction for a felony drug offe nse. This notice ha d the ef fec t of incre asing the mandator

y minimum sentenc e that Whitelaw fa ced f rom 10 y ea rs of imprisonment to 20 y ear s. Whi telaw none theless pled no contest without a plea a g ree ment. At the conc lusion of Whit elaw’ s sentenc in g

h e a r in g , th e d is tric t c ourt imposed the 20-y ear mandatory

minimum sentenc e.No. 08-3700

United States v. W

hitelaw

-2- Whit elaw now

seeks to invalidate his c onviction and sentence, challeng ing the propriety of the § 851 notice, disputing the quantity of drug s attributed to him, and objecting to the finding that he had a supervisory

role in the c onspiracy . For the re asons set for

th below, we AF F IRM the judgme nt of the district court. I. BACKG ROUND I n May 2006, Whit elaw w as cha rg ed with participating in a drugconspirac y involving 100 kilogr ams or more of marijuana . A superse ding in d i ctm ent was issued f our months later that up g ra de d th e c ha

rg e to a dr ug c on sp ir a c y inv olv ing 1, 00 0 kil og ra ms or mor e of mari

jua na . Sho rt ly afte r th e s u p erseding indictment wa s issued, three of Whit elaw’ s coconspirators ag ree d to plead g uilty an d c o o p e r a te w it

h th e g o v e r

n me n t. Wh it e la

w , h o w e v e r , e v a d e d

ar r e s t u n ti l Au g u s t 2 0 0 7. B e fo re his arr a ig nme nt t

he fo llo wi ng mon th, the g ov e rnme nt fi le d a n oti c e , p ur su ant t o 2 1 U .S. C. § 851 , inf or min g Whit e law that the g ov e rnme nt int e nd e d to see k an e nh anc e d sen te nc e du e to h is prior fe lony

drug conviction. Be cause of this notice and the se verity of the c harg e, Whitelaw fa ced a mandatory

minimum sentenc e of 20 y ear s of imprisonment if convicted. Whit elaw r ejec ted a plea ag ree ment that would have r equire d him to cooperate with the g ov e rnme nt a

nd that w ou ld h a ve re su lte d in a re c omm e nd e d se nte nc e of 17 y e ars of

imp ri so nme nt. I nstead, he opted to plead no c ontest. The district cour t acc epte d t h i s p l ea ove r the g overnme nt’s objection. At his ple a hear ing, the court asked Whit elaw a series of questions about the rig hts that he w as wa i v i ng and the potential c harg es that he f ace d. I n particula

r, the c ourt inquired whe ther Whit elaw u

n d e r s tood that “there [was] a mandatory minimum of 20 y ear s imprisonment.” Whi telaw responde d: “Yes, I

understand.”No. 08-3700

United States v. W

hitelaw

-3- I n addition, the g overnme nt presente d a fe dera l ag ent who testified to the fac tual basis of the char g es ag ainst Whi telaw. The ag ent spec ified that all three of Whitelaw’s coc on s p i ra t o rs had “state d th a t [d

u r in g th e p e r io d c o v e r e d in th e s u p e r s e d in g in d ic tm e n t] th e y c o n s p ir e d with . . . Whit elaw to tra

nsport multipl e shipments of marijuana , totaling more than 1000 kilo gra m s , from Arizona to Columbus , Ohio for dist ribution,” and he further informed the court that W hitelaw had a prior f elony drug conviction. At t he conc lusion of the ag ent’s testimony , the cour t eng ag ed in the following exchang e with Whitelaw: T H E C O U R T : T h an k y o u . Mr. Whitelaw, did y ou hear what Ag ent

H e u f e l d e r s a i d ? THE DEF ENDAN T: Yes, Your Honor, I did. TH E CO UR T: I s w hat he sa id c on c e rn ingy our a c tiv ity c or re c t? THE DEF ENDAN T: No contest, Your Honor. THE COURT: And would y ou—is there any thing that y ou would—Iam not su re h o w t o s ay

t h i s . I s t h e r e an y

th i n g t h a ty o uw o uld disag ree with or not contest? Or you would contest? I s there an y t h i n g t h a ty o u

w o u l d c o n t e s ti nt h e f

a c t s ? THE DEF ENDAN T: Idon’t know how I could, Your Honor . Not from the position

of no conte st, Idon’t know how I could. After receivi ng these swor

n statements from Whitelaw, the district cour t acc epted his plea

of no contest. A Presentenc e Report (PSR) wa s then prepa red by the U.S. Probation Of fice

. The PSR st ated that th e a pp lic a ble U. S. Se nte nc ing Gu ide lin e s ra ng e wa s 12 1 to 15 1 mo nth s o f i mpr iso nme nt, wi th a mandatory

minimum sentenc e of 10 y ear s. But beca use of the § 851 notice of Whitelaw’s priorNo. 08-3700

United States v. W

hitelaw

-4- conviction filed by

the g overnme nt, the PSRfurther noted that t

h e ma n d a tory minimum sentenc e that Whit e la w f a c e d w a s in

fa c t 20 y e ars of

imp ri so nme nt. Whit e law ra ise d a numbe r of ob je c tio ns to the PSR , many

of which c ontested the va lidity of the g overnme nt’s § 851 notice. Af ter he aring arguments from Whitelaw and the g overnme nt, the district court over ruled Whitelaw’s objec tions

and se nte nc e d h im t o th e mand ator y min imum of

20 y e ars ’ i mpr iso nme nt. Whit elaw now

appea ls, raising the same a rg uments that he raised at sentenc ing. T hese a re whether (1) the § 851 notice is de fec tive for failing to r efe r specific ally to the superse ding indictment in the c a s e , ( 2 ) th e g o v e r n me n t w a s b ar

r e d f r o m f il in g a § 8 5 1 n o ti c e b e c a

u s e Wh it e la

w pled no contest, (3) the notice is void bec ause the trial court failed to a sk Whit elaw if he aff irmed or de nied his previous conviction, (4) § 851 repr esents an unc onstitut ional deleg ation of pow e r to th e executive br anc h, (5 ) § 85 1 in te rf

e re s w iththe jud ic iary ’s po we r t o is su e se nte nc e s, (6 ) § 85 1 in te rf e re s w ith the g rand jury ’s power

to indict, (7) § 851 violates a cr iminal defenda nt’s rig ht to a jury

trial, and (8) § 851 undermines the Sente ncing Guidelines. Whitelaw also contends that the district c ourt err ed i ne n h an c i n g h i s o f

f e n s e l e v e l b y

d e t e r m i n i n g t h a th e w a s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r c o n s p i r i n g t o d i s t ri bu te more than 1,000 kilog rams of ma rijuana a nd that he had a

supervisory

role in the c onspiracy

. II. AN AL YSI S A. Validity of

the gover nm ent’s § 851 notice We reviewthe suffic iency of a § 851 notice d e n o v o. United States v. Ode neal , 517 F.3d 40 6, 41 5 ( 6th

Cir . 2 00 8) . Se c tio n 8 51 pr ov ide s in re le va nt p art : No pe rs on

wh o s tand s c on vic te d o f a n off e ns e un de r t

his pa rt sh a ll b e se nte nc e d to inc re a se d p un ish me nt b y

re a so n o f o ne or mor e pr ior c on vic tio ns , unle ss b e fo re tr ia l,No. 08-3700

United States v. W

hitelaw

-5- or be fo re e ntr

y of a ple a of g uil ty , th e Un ite d Stat e s atto rn e y fi le s an in fo rm a tio n w ith the cour t (and ser ves a c o p y o f s uch information on the person or c ounsel for the person) stating in wr iting the pr evious convictions to be re lied upon. 21 U.S.C. § 851(a)(1) . The statute a lso require s a def endant to file a written objec tion if he “de nies

any a lle g a tio n o f t

he inf or matio n o f p ri or

c onvic tio n, or

cla im s that

any c on vic tio n a lle g e d is invalid.” 21 U.S.C. § 851(c)( 1). F inally , § 851 mandates that, before imposin g a sente nce, the dis tr ic t c ourt

mus t a sk the de fe nd ant whe the r h e a ff ir ms o r d e nie s his pr e vio us c on vic tio n. 21 U. S.C. § 851(b). A district c ourt may not e nhance the def endant’ s sentence under § 851 unle ss these steps

are satisfied, United States v. King , 127 F.3d 483, 487 ( 6th Cir. 1997), althoug h the cour t’s failure to conduct the c olloquy

require d by

§ 851 is subject to the harmless-e rror standard, United States v. Denk ins , 367 F.3d 537, 548- 49 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that the distr i ct court’s f ailure to a sk a defe ndant, as re quired by

§ 851(b), whe ther he admitted or denie d the fact of his prior c onviction was harmless). 1. The

§ 8 51 not

ic e ’s fa ilureto re

fe re nc ethe

sup e rse din

g in dic tment Whit elaw f

irst argues that the g overnme nt’s § 851 notice is fata lly flawe d beca

use it ref err ed to “the indictment” r ather than to the superseding

indictment. He asse rts that th e n o t i ce must be strictly construed a

nd, beca use he ple d no contest t o the charg e in the s uperse ding indictment, not the orig inal indictment, the notice is ina pplicable. The g overnme nt r esponds that t h e o ri g inal indictment in W hitelaw’s c ase had b een r eplac ed by the superse ding indictment we ll before Whit elaw w as ar

re s t ed and a

rra igne d. As such, the g overnme nt argues that “[e]very appea ranc e Whit elaw ma de in fe dera l court in this case w as base d upon t h e ch ar ges i n the superse ding indictment,” and thus the e rror in the notice’s wor ding w as inconseque ntial.No. 08-3700

United States v. W

hitelaw

-6- This court has pr eviously

explained that when a defe ndant contests the spec ificity of a § 851 notice, “the proper

inquiry is whether the g overnme nt’s information provided the de fenda nt

rea sonable notice of its intent to rely on a par ticular c onviction and a mea ningf ul opportunity

to be hear d.” King , 127 F.3d at 488-89 (alter ation, citation, and int erna l quotation marks omi tted). I n the prese nt case , there is no question that the § 851 notice provided W hitelaw with rea sonable notice and an opportunity

to be hea rd. The g overnme nt f

iled the notice more than two months before Whit elaw pled no contest a

nd near ly nine months before his sentencing . Fur thermo re , W hitelaw make s no

argume nt t

hat th e te rm ino log y

us e d b y the g ov e rnme nt in the § 8 51 no tic e a c tua lly c on fu se d h im. And eve n if he had, such an argument would be meritless. The superseding indictment in the pre sent

case was filed w ell befor e Whitelaw was a rre sted an d t h u s was the only indictment that was eve r

re le va nt t o h im. Th is a

rgume nt i s th e re fo re wi tho ut m e ri t. 2. No -c ont

est p le as and

§ 8 51 not

ic es Whit elaw ne x t contends that § 851 does not per mit noti ces to b e filed in ca ses wher e the de fe nd ant ple a ds no c on te st, no tin g that the statut e state s th a t su c h n oti c e s mu st b e fi le d “ be fo re tr ia l, or bef ore e ntry of a ple a of guilty .” See 21 U.S.C. § 851(a)(1) . The g overnme nt responds by arguing that rea ding the statute in the manner sug g ested by W h i t el aw m akes little sense, a nd that the lang uag e “be fore trial, or bef ore e ntry of a ple a of guilty ” simply ref ers to the appropriate timing of a § 851 notice. I f the statute we re intende d to exclude no-contest plea s, the g overnme nt contends that it would state that such noti ces ma y be filed “ on ly

befor e trial, or be fore entry of a ple a of g uilty .”No. 08-3700

United States v. W

hitelaw

-7- We believe t h at t h e gover nment’s interpre tation of the statute is the more r easona ble one. I f the statute we re intended to exclude the us e of § 851 notices in ca ses wher e the de fenda nt pleads

no c on te st, it l ike ly

wo uld have be e n wr itt e n in

a mor e e xplic it m ann e r. F ur the rm or e , a

no -c on te st plea is g ener ally considere d to be a hy brid form of a guilty

plea be cause it avoids a trial, re quires the defe ndant to waive va

rious trial rig hts, and result s i n t he imposition of criminal liabilit y . United States v. He ller , 579 F.2d 990, 992 n.1 (6th Cir. 1978) (a no-c ontest plea “ waive[s] non-jurisdictional de fe c ts to the c on vic tio n” ); Pharr v. United States , 4 8 F .2 d 7 67 , 7 70 (6 th C ir . 1 93 1) (“ F or a ll prac tical purposes, the plea of nolo c ontender e is one of g uilt.”). Given the similarity betwee n a nocontest plea

and a g uilty plea, we conclude t hat construing § 851 to apply in one circumstance but not the other (w ithout an expl icit cong ressional di re ct i v e to do s o) would cr eate a unjustified disparity and would be inconsistent w ith the pur pose of the statute—to impose longe r sentenc es on repe at offender s like Whit elaw. See Negusie v. Holder , 129 S. Ct . 1159, 1171 (2009) ( Stevens, J ., c on c ur ring) (e xpla ini ngthat “ statut or y int e rp re tatio n is a

mul tif a c e te d e nte rp ri se , r ang ingfr om a prec ise construc tion of statutory lang uag e to a de te rm ina tio n o f w h a t p o l i c ybe st e ffe c tua te s st atu tor y objective s ” (e mphasis added) ). 3. The district court’s failu re to ask Whit elaw wheth er he adm itted or de nied the fact of his prior conviction Whit elaw’ s third assertion is that the district c ourt err ed by failing to inquire direc tly whether he admitted or de nied the fa ct of his prior c onviction, a re quirement set forth in 21 U .S.C. § 851(b). The re cord r evea ls, and the g overnme nt a dmits, that the district c ourt did not ex plicitly ask whe ther Whit elaw a dmitted or denied the f act of his prior conviction.No. 08-3700

United States v. W

hitelaw

-8- B ut “ [t]his [c]o ur

t ha s r e pe a te dly

fo un d the fa ilure to inq

uir e un de r § 85 1( b) to b e ha rm le ss when a defe ndant receive s adequate not ice of the g overnme nt’s intent to use the prior c onviction at sentenc ing and fails to file an obje ction under § 851( c).” United States v. Fields , No. 08-5334, 2009 WL44 07 63 6, a t *3 (6 th C ir . D e c . 4 , 2 00 9)

. Whit e law, a s no te d a bo ve , re c e ive d mor e tha

n a de qu a te notice of the gover

nment’s i ntent to use hi s prior conviction at sentencing . Fur thermore , the re cord shows no evidenc e that he filed an objection to the notice under § 851(c)

. The district c ourt’s fa ilure to expl icitly

ask Whitelaw whethe r he a dmitted or denied the fac t of his pr ior conviction is there fore harmless. See D enkins , 3 67 F .3 d at 54 8- 49 ; Fields , 2009 WL 4407636, at *3. 4. Im

proper delegation of authori ty to the exec utive branch Whit elaw ne x t argues that § 851 violates the principle of separation of power s by allowing “the e x ecutive br anch to set criminal penalties.” Unfortunately for W hitelaw, this court has a lrea dy reje cted his a

rg ument in the case of United States v. Crayton , 357 F.3d 560 ( 6th Cir. 2004), which expli citly holds that “§ 851 does not violate the pr inciple of sepa ration of powe rs. The discr etion a prose cutor exercises in de termining whether an enhanc ed statutory maxi mum applies under § 851 is s imi lar t o th e ini tia l di sc ret io n th e pr os e c uto r h a s in de c idi ngwh ic h c ha

rg e s to br inga g a ins t a defe ndant, discretion that is obviously constitutional.” Id. at 572. As controlling prec edent, Crayton mandates the reje ction of Whitelaw’s sepa ration-of -powe rs ar g ument. Se e Sa lm i v . S e c ’y of H e alt h & Hu ma n S

e rv s. , 7 74 F .2 d 6 85 , 6 89 (6 th C ir . 1 98 5) (h old ingthat a pr ior pu bli sh e d d e c isi on

of thi s court is binding on a ll subsequent panels “ unless an inconsistent dec ision of th e Un ited States Supreme Court re quires modification of t he dec ision or this C ourt sitting en ba nc over rules the pr ior decision”)

.No. 08-3700

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-9- 5. Interference

with the judi ciary’s se ntencing pow er Whit elaw’ s fifth assertion is that § 851 gives the pr osecution too much powe r to set sentenc es and thus “is an imper

missibl e intrusion on the judiciary ’s power to se ntence .” Ag ain, the holding of Crayton defe ats Whit elaw’ s argument. This court in Crayton explained that the prosec ution has the power

to determine w hich cha

rg es to bring and, if a

pplic ab l e, wh et her to see k an enha nced statutory minimum sentenc e under § 851. Crayton , 357 F.3d at 572. The rig ht of the g overnme nt to seek a n enhanc ed sentenc e pursuant to § 851 no mor e limits t he judiciar y ’s sentenc ing pow er tha

n the statutory

mi n im u m a n d ma xim u m p u n ishme nts for var ious feder al cr imes limi t that power, w hich depend on the char g es broug ht by the prosec ution and the statutes ena cted by Congr ess. In e f f e c t , t h e j u d i c i ar

y’ s “ p o w e r

t o i mp o s e a

j u s ts e n t e n c e , ” a s W h i t e l a w p u t s i t , i s a l w ays cabine d by

the dec isions of the leg isla t i v e an d ex ecutive br anche s. The powe rs g rante d to the prosec ution by

§ 851 fit well within t h i s framework a nd do not impermissibl y intrude on the judiciary ’s power

to sentence

. See, e .g. , Un ite d S tates v . LaBo nte , 520 U.S. 751, 762 ( 1997) (“I nsofar a s p r o s e c u to r s , a s a

p r a c ti c a l m a tt e r , ma

y b e a b le to d e te r

mi n e w h e th e r

a p artic ular defe ndant will be subject to the enha nced statutory

maxi mum, any

such discre tion would be simil ar to t he dis c re tio n a

pr os e cut or exer c ise s w he n h e de c ide s w hat, i f a ny , c ha rg e s to br inga g a ins t a criminal suspec t.”). 6. Interference

with the grand j ury’s power to indi ct Whit e law n e xt argue s tha t § 85 1 inte rf e re s with the g ra

nd jur y ’s po we r to ind ic t. Th is c la im i s c l e ar l y w i t h o u t

m e r i t , s i n c e a § 8 5 1 n o t i c e c anb e f i l e d o n l y after

the g rand jury ’s indictment has issued. I n this case, f

or example, Whit elaw w as indicted we ll before the g overnme nt filed its § 851No. 08-3700

United States v. W

hitelaw

-10- notice. F urthermor e, a § 851 notice affec ts only the s entenc e to which a defe ndant is subject, no t the

c ha rg e s b ro ug ht a g a ins t th e de fe nd ant a s a re su lt o f t

he g ra nd jur y ’s ind ic tme nt. 7. Inte rf

e re nc ewith the

pe tit jury ’s po we r to de c ide

the fa c ts Whit elaw’ s seventh cla im is t hat § 851 “interf ere s with [t he] petit jury ’s power to decide the fa c ts that cou ld be us e d f

or se nte nc ing ” and

thu s v iol a te s h is Si xth A me ndme nt r ig ht t o a jur y tr ia l. But S upreme Court prec edent holds to the contra ry . I n Apprendi v. New Je rsey , 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000), the Supre me Court held that, “[o]t her tha n the fa ct of a

pri o r co n v i ct i on, any

fac t that incre ases the pe nalty

for a crime be y ond the prescribed statutory maxi mum must be submitted to a jury , and prove d bey ond a re asonable doubt.” The Supre me C ourt has thus expli citly car ved out an

e xce pti on in i ts Si xth A me ndme nt j ur isp ru de nc e by ho ldi ng that pr ior c on vic tio ns may be us e d to incre ase the statutory

rang e that a de fenda

nt fac es without a jury

deter mining the exist ence of such p r io r c o n v ic ti o n s b e y o n d a r e a s o n a b le d oubt. S

ee C rayton , 357 F.3d at 571 n.8 (“ Apprendi specific ally states t hat a jury need not decide prior convictions for a defe ndant to rec eive a

n enhanc ed sentenc e.”)

. Fur thermore , Ap

pr e nd i a p p l i e s o n l y t o s t a tu t o r

y maximums

. See A

pprendi , 530 U.S. at 490 (h o l d i n g that “any

fac t that increa ses the pena lty for a crime b e y o n d th e p r es c r i b e d

s t a t u tor y maximum must be submitt ed to a jury ” (empha sis added)) . I n the pre sent ca se, the § 851 notice had t h e e f f e c to f i n c r e a s i n g o n l y t h e s t a tu t o r y minimum that Whi te law f a c e d, no t the statut or

y ma ximum

. H e r e , th e s tatuto r

y maxim u m is f ar h ig h e r th an th e 2 0

- y e ar s e n te n c e h e r e c e iv e d

. See 21 U. S.C. § 841(b)( 1)(A) (fixing the maximum penalty for f eder al cr imes involving 1,000 kilog rams or more of mari jua na a s li fe imp ri so nme nt) . Wh ite law’ s Si x th A me ndme nt c la im i s th e re fo re g ro un dle ss.No. 08-3700

United States v. W

hitelaw

-11- Se e Cho nto s v . B e rg

hu is , 585 F.3d 1000, 1002 ( 6th Cir. 2009) (“ Apprendi ’s ru le do e s not a pp ly to judicial fac tfinding that increa ses a mini mum sentenc e so long as the sente nce doe s not ex cee d the applicable statutory

maxi mum.”). 8. Underm inin g of the Sentencing Gu idelines Whit elaw’ s final ar g ument attacking § 851 is that the statute “under mines the deve lopment of the sente ncing g uidelines and Cong ress’s state d go al of uniformity .” This ar g ument—that one fede ral statute is somewhat inconsi s t en t wi th the purposes of a nother fe dera l statute—does not provide Whitelaw with a leg al basis for r elief f rom a § 851 noti ce. I ndeed, ma ny fede ral sente ncing policies are somewhat inconsistent with ea ch other . The disparities in the statutory sentenc ing rang es for cra ck-c ocaine offe nses verses powder -coc aine offense s stand as one fre quently discussed example. See Kimbrough v . United States , 552 U.S. 85, 97-98 (2007) (discussing the cr ack/powde r

coca ine sentenc ing dispa

rity and how it frustrates the g oals of the Sentenc ing Re form Act). As such, Whit elaw is makingan ar g ument as to g ener al s entenc ing policy , which does not e ntitle him t o relief in this particular c ase. B. The qu antity of mar ijuana attributabl e to Whitelaw I n addition to his contesting of the g overnme nt’s § 851 notice, W h i t el aw c laims that the district court erred by

deter mining that he w as re sponsible for conspiringto distribute more than 1,000 kilog r a ms o f

ma r ij u an a . H e a ls o c o n te n d s th a t h e d id n o t a dmi t t o th e e xis te n c e o f s u ch evidenc e. W h i t e l aw h a s w a i v e d t h i s ar g u m e n t

. S p e c i f i c a l l y , b y p l e a d i n g n o c o n t e s t , W hit e la w i s preve nted from contesting the sufficie ncy of the evidenc e ag ainst him. This is beca use a de fenda

ntNo. 08-3700

United States v. W

hitelaw

-12- who pleads no c ontest waives a ll “non-jurisdictional defe cts to t h e co n v i ct ion.” United States v. Heller , 57 9 F .2 d 99 0, 99 2 n. 1 (6 th Cir

. 19 78 ). “ L ike a ple a of g uil ty , a ple a of [ no con test ] constitutes a waiver of all so-ca lled ‘non-jurisdictional defec ts’ or, m ore a ccur ately , any claims not log ic a lly inc on sis te nt w iththe iss ue of fa c tua l gu ilt , as we ll a s th e ri g ht t o c on te st the fa c tua l me ri ts of t he charg es aga inst him.” United States v. Fre ed , 688 F.2d 24, 25 ( 6th Cir. 1982). Whi telaw’ s claim that there was n o ev i d ence that he conspire d to distribute more than 1,000 kilog rams of marijuana is ex actly

the kind of cla im—one that seeks “to contest the fac tual merits of the c harg es ag ainst him”—that a def

endant may

not challeng e af

ter e nteringa plea

of no conte st. See id. C. Whi te law’ s se nt e nc ing e nhanc e m e nt for his s upe r vis or y r ole The fina l issue on appea l is W hitelaw’s c halleng e to the district cour t’s finding that he play ed a super visory ro l e in t he conspira cy . This finding w as used by the cour t to give Whitelaw a

twolevel enha

nceme nt under the Sente ncing Guidelines. We f ind thi s is su e to b e moo t. T he fa c tua l fin din g that White law pla y e d a su pe rv iso ry ro le has no ef fec t on hi s m an d atory

minimum sentenc e. Eve n with the two-leve l enhanc ement that result e d f r o m t h is f a c tu a l f in d in g , Wh it e la

w ’ s Se n te n c in gG u id e li n e s r an g e o f 1 3 5 to 1 6 8 months of imprisonment, see U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manua l C h

. 5 , p t

. A, was still well under the statutory minimum sentenc e of 20 y ear s’ imprisonment (240 months) that was applica ble afte r the g overnme nt filed its § 851 notice. As a re sult, even if we wer e to ag ree wi t h W h i t el aw t h at the district court er

red by finding that he had a

supervisory

role in the conspirac y

(and w e re ach no suc h conclusion), his sentenc e would be una ffe cted be cause there is no reve rsible er ror with re g ard to theNo. 08-3700

United States v. W

hitelaw

-13- g ov e rnme nt’ s § 85 1 n oti c e or Whit e law’ s c on vic ti on . We t hu s f ind no ba sis to i nv a lid a te Whit elaw’ s 20-y ear

mandatory

minimum sentenc e.

III . C ON CL USI ON For all of the re asons set for

th above, we AF F IRM the judg ment of the district cour t.