UNITED STATES CO URT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. MAURICE TROTTER, a/k/a Mo, Defendant-Appellant. No. 13-3147 (D.C. Nos. 2:04-CR-20140-CM-1 & 2:11-CV-02493-CM) (D. Kan.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before HARTZ , BALDOCK , and BACHARACH , Circuit Judges.
Maurice Trotter appeals from the distri ct court’s decision denying a motion to suppress items seized from a storage locker and from the district court’s amended judgment, which resentenced him to 120 m onths’ imprisonment and a ten-year term of supervised release. We vacate Mr. Trotter’s sentence and remand for resentencing. We affirm the de nial of the motion to suppress.

* After examining the briefs and appella te record, this pa nel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not mate rially assist the de termination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctr ines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cite d, however, for its persuasi ve value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### August 21, 2014
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court- 2 - I. Mr. Trotter was convicted of distri bution and possession with intent to distribute significant quantities of cocaine powder and crack cocaine as well as conspiracy to possess with intent to distribu te those substances. He was sentenced in 2005 to 168 months’ imprisonment to be followe d by ten years of supe rvised release. We affirmed the judgment on direct appeal, but the Supreme Court granted Mr. Trotter’s petition for certiorari, vacate d our decision, and remanded for further consideration in light of its recent opinion in Kimbrough v. United States , 552 U.S. 85 (2007). This court in turn remanded to th e district court to cl arify the basis for its sentencing decision. The district court issued an order clar ifying its decision. When Mr. Trotter’s attorney did not file an appeal, he filed a pro se notice of app eal, which this court dismissed as untimely. Mr. Trotter then sought collateral revi ew through a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion, arguing that his attorney was ineffective for failing to f ile a timely a ppeal from the district court’s clarificati on order. The district cour t agreed. As a remedy, the district court entered an amended judgment on May 29, 201 3, imposing a sentence of 120 months 1 , with a ten-year term of supervised release. Th e district court explained that this remedy would allow Mr. Trotter to appeal his sentence , as well as other

1 Mr. Trotter had previously filed tw o motions for sentence reductions under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) and been gran ted relief in 2011 and then in 2012.- 3 - issues he had identified. Mr. Trotter timely filed a notice of appeal from the amended judgment.
II. Mr. Trotter first argues that the distri ct court erred in sentencing him to ten years of supervised release because th e court sentenced hi m under the 2005 version of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii). He conte nds that he should have been sentenced under the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (FSA), which applies to all sentences imposed after its effective date of August 3, 2010. See Dorsey v. United States , 132 S. Ct. 2321 (2012). We agree, as does the gove rnment. Under the FSA, his term of supervised release should be ei ght years, instead of ten y ears. We therefore vacate Mr. Trotter’s sentence and re mand for resentencing. Mr. Trotter next argues that the distri ct court erred in denying the motion to suppress evidence seized from a storage unit. We conclude that he has waived this issue. First, there is some question whether Mr. Trotter properly raised the suppression issue in district court. The motion to suppr ess was filed by his brother and codefendant, Mardell Trotter. Althoug h Mr. Trotter filed a motion to join in some of Mardell’s other pretrial motions, he did not ask to join in the motion to suppress. At the hearing on the motion to suppress, however, Mr. Trotter’s attorney did state that she had “joine d in [the motion] basically for the result purposes.” R., Vol. 2 at 353. Perhaps this could constitute an adequate request to join in the motion to suppress, but even assuming that to be the case, Mr. Trotter’s attorney went on to- 4 - concede that her client did not have standi ng to challenge the sear ch of the locker. See id . (“Even though I’ve joined in basically for the result purposes, my client actually doesn’t have standing in this matter . It’s [Mardell Tr otter’s counsel’s] issue.” (emphasis added)). By conceding in the district court that he did not have standing to move to suppress the evidence seized from the storage locker, Mr. Trotter has waived any argument on appeal that hi s Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the search. We will therefore not disturb the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress. III. We vacate Mr. Trotter’s sentence and re mand for resentencing. We affirm the denial of the motion to suppress.

Entered for the Court

Harris L Hartz Circuit Judge