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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Wells Fargo Bank NA,

Plaintiff,

v. 

Wyo Tech Investment Group LLC, et al.,

Defendants.

No. CV-17-04140-PHX-DWL

ORDER 

Pending before the Court is a motion to strike filed by CWT Canada II Limited 

Partnership, Resource Recovery Corporation, and Jean Noelting (collectively, the 

“Judgment Creditors”). (Doc. 228.) Wyo Tech Investment Group LLC (“Wyo Tech”) 

opposes the motion to strike and also seeks the undersigned judge’s recusal under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 455(a). (Doc. 231.) For the following reasons, both motions will be denied.

BACKGROUND

This is a civil interpleader action in which Wyo Tech and the Judgment Creditors

have asserted competing claims to a sum of money, $546,282.55, that was previously 

deposited in Wyo Tech’s bank account at Wells Fargo. On October 31, 2018, this case 

was transferred to the undersigned judge. (Doc. 93.) In the 11 months since the 

reassignment, the undersigned judge has issued numerous rulings, some of which are 

discussed in detail below.

On August 22, 2019, a group of non-party subpoena recipients filed a motion for 

recusal. (Doc. 204.) 
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On August 27, 2019, the Court issued an order denying the motion. (Doc. 209.) In 

a nutshell, the Court concluded that recusal wasn’t warranted because “the reasons 

identified in the Subpoenaed Individuals’ motion—(1) issuing discovery rulings with 

which they apparently disagree, (2) being friends with a lawyer who has a brother who has 

a law partner who is serving as local counsel in this case, (3) working for the [U.S. 

Attorney’s Office] at the same time that a different [attorney in that office], separated by 

three levels of supervisors, was pursuing an unrelated criminal investigation involving a 

non-party, and (4) having a phone call four years ago with a non-party about an unrelated 

matter—would not cause a reasonable person to question the undersigned judge’s 

impartiality.” (Id. at 9.) 

This order also included a footnote concerning the timeliness of the recusal motion. 

Specifically, the Court “note[d] that, had Wyo Tech attempted to file a recusal motion at 

this late juncture of the case, such a motion would have been untimely. . . . Here, because 

the only entities formally seeking recusal are the Subpoenaed Individuals (who had no prior 

involvement in this case), their motion will not be denied on timeliness grounds. That said, 

the motion is predicated on information that likely came from Wyo Tech and [Dennis] 

Danzik (and that Wyo Tech’s counsel, Wilenchik & Bartness, must have known at the time 

this case was reassigned to the undersigned judge). The Subpoenaed Individuals would 

have no other way of knowing about non-public criminal investigations that didn’t result 

in charges. Further, the proposed order granting the recusal motion was emailed to the 

Court’s chambers email address by Wyo Tech’s counsel, not by the Subpoenaed 

Individuals’ counsel. Such coordination raises the possibility that Wyo Tech is using the 

Subpoenaed Individuals as a stalking horse to evade the time limits on recusal motions.” 

(Id. at 6 n.5, citation omitted.)

On September 12, 2019, Wyo Tech (through its counsel, Dennis Wilenchik of the 

law firm Wilenchik & Bartness) filed a document entitled “Supplement To Clarify The 

Record Re: Denial Of Motion For Recusal Filed By Non-Parties” (hereinafter “the 

Supplement”) (Doc. 227.) In the Supplement, Wyo Tech “takes issue with certain 
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gratuitous statements” in the order denying the recusal motion. (Id. at 1.) First, Wyo Tech 

disputes that it “was fully aware of all of the facts set forth in the Subpoenaed Parties’ 

recusal motion” at the time this case was reassigned to the undersigned judge in October 

2018. (Id. at 2.) Specifically, Wyo Tech asserts that it “only just recently” learned of the 

familial relationship between a friend of the undersigned judge and an attorney who works 

for the law firm that is representing the Judgment Creditors in this case. (Id.) Second, 

Wyo Tech characterizes as “presumptuous and insulting” the suggestion in the order that 

Wyo Tech had anything to do with the Subpoenaed Parties’ decision to file the recusal 

motion, arguing that “[u]ndersigned counsel was not even aware of it.” (Id. at 2-3.)

On September 13, 2019, the Judgment Creditors filed a motion to strike the 

Supplement. (Doc. 228.) First, the Judgment Creditors argue the Supplement is 

procedurally improper because it is “functionally a post-decision objection” to the order 

denying the recusal motion, yet “a party is not authorized by any statute, rule, or court order 

to submit additional argument or facts merely to ‘clarify the record.’” (Id. at 1-2.) Second, 

the Judgment Creditors argue that the premise underlying the Supplement—that Wyo Tech 

had nothing to do with the Subpoenaed Individuals’ decision to file the recusal motion—

is false. (Id. at 2-3.) In support of this claim, the Judgment Creditors enclose a series of 

emails they recently obtained via a subpoena to a Wyo Tech investor. (Doc. 229 at 2 ¶ 2.) 

These emails show that, on August 16, 2019, Mr. Wilenchik sent an email to other attorneys 

at Wilenchik & Bartness, asking, “[C]an u [sic] send me a draft objection we can ask [the 

Subpoenaed Individuals’ counsel] to file?” (Doc. 229-1 at 4.) Mr. Wilenchik’s email 

added, “Also we shd [sic] file our own.” (Id.) In response, one of those attorneys wrote: 

“See attached. We are setting up a meeting with [the Subpoenaed Individuals’ counsel] 

for Monday to discuss this and the motion for recusal as you requested.” (Doc. 229-1 at 

3.) Mr. Wilenchik then forwarded this email chain to Wyo Tech’s CEO, who in turn 

forwarded it to a distribution list of at least 12 individuals (all of whom appear to be Wyo 

Tech investors). (Doc. 229-1 at 2.) At the top of this email, also sent on August 16, 2019, 

Wyo Tech’s CEO wrote in part: “[W]e are going to file a motion to have a Judge recuse 
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himself . . . .” (Id.)

On September 16, 2019, Wyo Tech filed a “Response To . . . Motion To Strike And 

. . . Motion For Recusal.” (Doc. 231.) Wyo Tech begins by arguing that the Court’s earlier 

rulings in this case were erroneous and constitute proof of bias. (Id. at 2-4.) Next, Wyo 

Tech argues the motion to strike should be denied because the “Supplement is not 

prohibited by any statute, rule, or court order” and the Judgment Creditors have not 

“pointed to any authority to support that assertion.” (Id. at 4-6.) Wyo Tech also argues 

that the emails enclosed as an exhibit to the motion to strike (which show that Wyo Tech 

and its counsel were involved in the preparation of the earlier recusal motion) do not 

contradict any of the assertions in the Supplement: “Wyo [Tech] and its counsel have never 

actually ever denied . . . that they agreed with and assisted [the Subpoenaed Individuals’ 

counsel] in representing his clients based on providing him with the relevant facts and 

evidence, from which he then decided . . . to file the recusal motion.” (Id. at 4 n.3.) 

Furthermore, Wyo Tech contends the Judgment Creditors acted improperly in attaching 

the emails to the motion because they “are clearly attorney-client privileged 

communications which were obviously inadvertently disclosed by Wyo [Tech].” (Id.) 

Finally, Wyo Tech makes its own recusal request under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). (Id. at 7-10.) 

It incorporates the arguments contained in the earlier recusal motion and also contends that 

certain “newly discovered information” supports its request. (Id.) 

DISCUSSION

I. Motion To Strike

The first motion before the Court is the Judgment Creditors’ motion to strike. (Doc. 

228.) It is governed by LRCiv 7.2(m)(1), which provides that “a motion to strike may be 

filed only if it is authorized by statute or rule, such as Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 

12(f), 26(g)(2) or 37(b)(2)(A)(iii), or if it seeks to strike any part of a filing or submission 

on the ground that it is prohibited (or not authorized) by a statute, rule, or court order.”

On the one hand, the Court agrees with the Judgment Creditors that the elements of 

LRCiv 7.2(m)(1) are satisfied here. The Court is not aware of any “statute, rule, or court 
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order” that would authorize a litigant to file a “supplement” whose sole purpose is to 

criticize an order, issued 16 days earlier, that denied a motion which hadn’t been filed by 

that litigant. Thus, the Supplement filed by Wyo Tech could be stricken under LRCiv 

7.2(m)(1).

Nevertheless, the Court will decline to grant the Judgment Creditors’ motion. 

“Motions to strike,” at least in the Rule 12(f) context, “are viewed with disfavor and are 

not frequently granted.” Operating Engineers Local 324 Health Care Plan v. G & W 

Constr. Co., 783 F.3d 1045, 1050 (6th Cir. 2015).1 There are sound reasons for this 

disfavored status. Motions to strike often needlessly run up the cost of litigation and 

squander judicial resources, and there is a quick, simple, and cost-free alternative to 

striking an irrelevant pleading—ignoring it. Cf. AIRFX.com v. AirFX LLC, 2012 WL 

129804, *1 (D. Ariz. 2012) (“Defendant moves to strike plaintiffs’ reply . . . , arguing that 

the reply raises new arguments . . . . [A] motion to strike in this case is unnecessary, as we 

do not consider new arguments raised in a reply.”). For these reasons, some district courts 

have concluded that “[a] motion to strike should not be granted unless the matter to be 

stricken clearly could have no possible bearing on the subject of the litigation. If there is 

any doubt whether the portion to be stricken might bear on an issue in the litigation, the 

court should deny the motion.” Platte Anchor Bolt, Inc. v. IHI, Inc., 352 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 

1057 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (citation omitted). Thus, the Court will decline to strike the 

Supplement. 

Wyo Tech should not, however, construe this outcome as an invitation to keep filing 

procedurally-improper documents. This is the second time Wyo Tech has filed an 

unauthorized “supplement” in this case. (Docs. 176, 227.) Any similar future filing will 

be stricken by the Court, without the need for a motion by the Judgment Creditors.

 

1 See generally S. Gensler, 1 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules and 

Commentary, Rule 12, at 314-15 (2018) (“[M]otions to strike under Rule 12(f) are 

generally viewed with disfavor, perhaps because experience with dubious Rule 12(f)

motions has led courts to view them skeptically. Thus, while courts acknowledge that 

motions to strike can serve legitimate ends, they certainly do not encourage lawyers to file 

them.”). 
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II. Motion For Recusal

The second motion before the Court is Wyo Tech’s motion for recusal, which is 

incorporated into its response to the motion to strike. (Doc. 231.)2 

A. The Prior Rulings

Wyo Tech’s first argument is that the Court’s previous rulings in this case were not 

just wrong, but so obviously wrong that they must have been motivated by a secretlyharbored bias and sense of antipathy toward Wyo Tech and Danzik. (Doc. 231 at 1-4, 9.)

This argument is baseless. Although the Court is hesitant to comment on its 

previous rulings—they speak for themselves—Wyo Tech’s decision to advance such an 

argument in its recusal motion triggers a need to address it. 

1. April 9, 2019 Ruling

The first ruling with which Wyo Tech apparently disagrees is the Court’s April 9, 

2019 order, which concluded that the Judgment Creditors should be entitled to conduct 

discovery in this case. 

As background, in February 2019, the parties notified the Court (via a joint letter) 

that they had a disagreement concerning the enforceability of a particular subpoena. (Doc. 

101.) Two days later, the Court held a telephonic hearing to address the dispute. (Doc. 

103.) At the outset of the hearing, the Court stated it was “tentatively inclined to quash the 

subpoena” at Wilenchik & Bartness’s request, based on one of the cases cited in the joint 

letter, but also noted that “[i]n Shepardizing that case just recently in preparing for this 

hearing, [the Court] found several other cases by federal courts in New York” that also 

touch upon the availability of discovery in restraining-notice cases. (Doc. 106 at 2-4.) The 

 

2 Wyo Tech asks that “this matter be immediately transferred to another judge for an 

independent hearing on both the Motion to Strike and its Motion for Recusal.” (Doc. 231 

at 1-2.) But a recusal “motion is addressed to, and must be decided by, the very judge 

whose impartiality is being questioned.” In re Bernard, 31 F.3d 842, 843 (9th Cir. 1994). 

See also United States v. Sibla, 624 F.2d 864, 868 (9th Cir. 1980) (“[S]ection 455 includes 

no provision for referral of the question of recusal to another judge . . . .”); United States 

v. Balistrieri, 779 F.2d 1191, 1202-03 (7th Cir. 1985) (“Section 455 clearly contemplates 

that decisions with respect to disqualification should be made by the judge sitting in the 

case, and not by another judge. It requires the judge to disqualify himself when any one of 

the statutory conditions is met. It makes no provision for the transfer of the issue to another 

judge.”).
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Court ultimately took the matter under advisement, rather than ruling from the bench, so it 

could further review the newly-discovered cases. (Id. at 17.) About a week later, the 

Court issued an order explaining that, “[a]lthough the Court initially hoped to rule on the 

discovery dispute promptly, the Court has concluded, after further consideration, that the 

issues presented by this dispute are intertwined with broader unresolved issues in the case. 

Accordingly, the Court will order the parties to file supplemental briefing.” (Doc. 109 at 

1.) This order then summarized three interrelated legal issues and gave the parties an 

opportunity to address those issues via 10-page briefs. (Id. at 5-11.) 

On April 9, 2019, after reviewing the parties’ supplemental briefs (Docs. 113, 114) 

and after hearing oral argument (Docs. 118, 121), the Court issued a lengthy order that, 

among other things, concluded the Judgment Creditors should be entitled to conduct 

discovery. (Doc. 119.) 

2. May 1, 2019 Ruling

Another apparent source of Wyo Tech’s opprobrium is the Court’s May 1, 2019 

ruling that Wyo Tech had forfeited its ability to raise overbreadth objections to the 

Judgment Creditors’ document requests and interrogatories.

As background, on April 30, 2019, the parties informed the Court (via joint letter) 

of another discovery dispute. (Docs. 125, 126.) This time, the dispute concerned Wyo 

Tech’s failure to provide timely responses to the Judgment Creditors’ document requests 

and interrogatories, which were served on Wyo Tech on February 3, 2019. (Id.) In a 

nutshell, Wyo Tech initially agreed to comply with these requests by April 5, 2019 but 

missed this deadline. When the Judgment Creditors followed up on April 10, 2019 (after 

the issuance of the order confirming the Judgment Creditors’ right to conduct discovery), 

Wyo Tech responded by agreeing to make its production by April 22, 2019. (Id.) 

Unfortunately, Wyo Tech ignored this deadline, too. (Id.) On April 23, 2019, the Judgment 

Creditors made another follow-up attempt and Wyo Tech responded by agreeing to make 

its production by April 25, 2019. (Id.) However, Wyo Tech ignored this deadline, too, 

and failed to produce anything. (Id.) Finally, on April 30, 2019, Wyo Tech argued for the 
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first time that certain individual document requests and interrogatories were objectionable 

because they were overbroad. (Id.) 

On May 1, 2019, following a telephonic hearing, the Court issued an order 

concluding that Wyo Tech had forfeited any overbreadth objections by failing to timely 

assert them. (Doc. 128.) Specifically, the Court ruled that, under Rules 33 and 34 of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Wyo Tech was required to raise any overbreadth 

objections by no later than the deadline for production, so its assertion of those objections 

on April 30, 2019 came too late. (Doc. 130 at 4-5, 26-29.) However, notwithstanding that 

ruling, the Court then sua sponte ordered the Judgment Creditors to narrow one of their 

requests for production, in an effort to avoid undue expense to Wyo Tech, and also gave 

some additional time for Wyo Tech to comply. (Id. at 29-32.) The Court also effectively 

rejected the Judgment Creditors’ request for costs and attorneys’ fees under Rule 37(a)(5), 

explaining that “[e]ven though [the Court was] ruling against Wyo Tech here and . . .

ordering them to comply, [it did] understand that there was some nuance here in terms of 

the overall posture of the case.” (Id. at 32-33.) 

3. May 29, 2019 Ruling

Another apparently disputed ruling is the Court’s order of May 29, 2019, which 

denied the Judgment Creditors’ request to hold Wilenchik & Bartness in civil contempt. 

The background for this ruling is that, as part of the April 9, 2019 order, the Court 

ruled that Wilenchik & Bartness and another law firm, Beus Gilbert (“the firms”), were 

required to comply with a subpoena seeking certain non-privileged payment records. (Doc. 

119 at 11-13.) The order gave the firms until April 26, 2019 to make the production.3 (Id.

at 19.) As with the previous dispute, however, this deadline was blown. Accordingly, on 

May 13, 2019, the Judgment Creditors filed a motion for an order to show cause why the 

firms shouldn’t be held in civil contempt. (Doc. 131.) Two days later, the firms filed a 

 

3 During the hearing on April 8, 2019, the Court asked Wilenchik & Bartness how 

long it would take for the relevant records to be identified and produced. (Doc. 121 at 41-

42.) Counsel indicated that two-and-a-half weeks would be sufficient. (Id.) That is why 

the Court selected a production date of April 26, 2019.
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response explaining that they’d arranged for a paralegal to send responses to the subpoenas 

on April 26, 2019 and were under the misimpression (until they received the Judgment 

Creditors’ motion) that the responses had been sent and were acceptable. (Doc. 134.) This 

response also asserted that Beus Gilbert “has never received any funds from either Wyo 

Tech or Inductance and therefore has no documents in its possession responsive to the 

[Judgment Creditors’] subpoena whatsoever” and that “by the time the Court reads this 

Response, [Wilenchik & Bartness] will have provided [the Judgment Creditors] with all 

remaining records in its possession showing payments received from Wyo Tech and 

Inductance and how those funds have been applied to various client matters.” (Id. at 5 & 

n.2.) 

Unfortunately, these statements were false. Several hours after the response was 

filed, the Judgment Creditors filed an amended motion for an order to show cause. (Doc. 

135.) Included with this motion were (1) a copy of a $20,000 check from Inductance to 

Beus Gilbert dated March 15, 2018 (Doc. 135-13 at 2), which contradicted the firms’ claim 

that Beus Gilbert had never received any such payments, and (2) documents showing that 

“Inductance paid Wilenchik $100,000 on April 9, 2018 and $100,000 on August 21, 2018” 

and that “Wilenchik did not produce these checks, or any documents showing these 

payments, and instead falsely represented that its May 14 production—which did not 

include documents showing these payments—included ‘all payments’ it received from 

Inductance and Wyo Tech at any time.” (Doc. 135 at 7.) 

Based on this submission, the Court issued an order setting a show-cause hearing. 

(Doc. 136.) This order noted that “[t]he Court has significant concerns about [the] 

discovery conduct of Wilenchik and Beus Gilbert” arising “from the substance of the 

discovery responses and the seeming inaccuracy of certain statements contained in the 

firms’ brief to the Court.” (Id. at 4.) A few days before the hearing, the firms filed another 

brief. (Doc. 140.) In the introductory paragraph of this brief, authored by Wilenchik & 

Bartness, the firms stated that they “wish to apologize sincerely to both the Court and 

opposing counsel for this incident, and fully acknowledge that mistakes were made here 
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regarding the Subpoenas responses.” (Id. at 2.) The brief went on to acknowledge that a 

Wilenchik & Bartness attorney had engaged in “negligent mishandling,” which the brief 

chalked up to “an unfortunate combination of events at Wilenchik & Bartness over the past 

few months—in other words a ‘perfect storm’ or ‘comedy of errors’ (meant in the sense 

that is without even the slightest hint of humor).” (Id. at 4.)

The show-cause hearing took place on May 29, 2019. (Doc. 155 [minute entry]; 

Doc. 157 [transcript].) At the outset of the hearing, the Court took a moment to personally 

address Mr. Wilenchik, express its condolences to the Wilenchik family concerning the 

recent illness of Mr. Wilenchik’s son, and inform the Judgment Creditors’ counsel that 

“I’ve had cases with Mr. Wilenchik before, and I know him and his son.” (Doc. 157 at 4.) 

On the merits, after a different Wilenchik & Bartness attorney argued that the false 

statements and production failures should be considered a product of negligence (id. at 4-

14), the Court stated: “[F]undamentally my overall objective here is I just want to make 

sure all the discovery gets provided and the case gets back on track. . . . [I] give full credit 

to the idea that this was not an intent to mislead, it was negligence, it was a mistake. I 

appreciate all of that.” (Id. at 14.) Next, the Court stated that it believed the Judgment 

Creditors should be compensated for the time spent briefing the show-cause issue and then 

asked the Wilenchik & Bartness attorney if he was aware of any mechanisms for imposing 

a cost award “without making a formal contempt finding.” (Id. at 18.) Later in the hearing, 

the Judgment Creditors’ attorney stated that the briefing costs related to the show-cause 

issue were “probably in the neighborhood of $25,000.” (Id. at 33.) At the conclusion of 

the hearing, the Court expressly declined to hold either law firm in civil contempt. (Id. at 

41.) The Court also stated that the Judgment Creditors’ request for $25,000 in fees was 

too high and held that “no more than $10,000 would be appropriate here to provide 

reasonable compensation for the fees that [the Judgment Creditors have] incurred.” (Id. at 

47.) Following these rulings, Mr. Wilenchik stated: “[T]hank you for the sympathy.” (Id.

at 48.)

...
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4. June 27, 2019 Ruling And Related Rulings

Wyo Tech also appears to take issue with a civil contempt order issued on June 27, 

2019. 

As background, in February 2019, the Judgment Creditors served Rule 45 

subpoenas on seven non-parties. (Doc. 159.) These subpoenas required the recipients to 

produce documents and/or appear for depositions by the end of March 2019. (Id.) When 

none of the recipients bothered to respond, the Judgment Creditors sent follow-up letters 

to them in mid-April 2019. (Id.) Nobody responded to these letters, either. (Id.) As a 

result, on June 19, 2019, the Judgment Creditors filed a motion for an order to show cause 

why the seven subpoena recipients shouldn’t be held in civil contempt. (Id.) In support of 

the motion, the Judgment Creditors filed a declaration averring that a different subpoena 

recipient had “received a copy of a letter from Wyo Tech’s counsel, Wilenchik & Bartness, 

. . . claiming that the nonparty subpoenas . . . were invalid because [the Judgment Creditors] 

did not give [Wilenchik & Bartness] notice of the subpoenas before service.” (Doc. 160 

¶ 17.) The Judgment Creditors also submitted evidence showing that they had, in fact, 

given proper notice of service to Wilenchik & Bartness. (Doc. 160 ¶ 17; Doc. 169-2.) In 

response, the Court scheduled a show-cause hearing for June 27, 2019 and ordered the 

Judgment Creditors to serve each of the subpoena recipients with a copy of the order setting 

the show-cause hearing. (Doc. 161.)

On June 27, 2019, the show-cause hearing occurred as scheduled. (Doc. 166 

[minute entry]; Doc. 172 [transcript].) Notably, none of the seven subpoenaed parties 

chose to attend this hearing or submit briefs in advance of the hearing. (Id.) However, an 

attorney from Wilenchik & Bartness—who made clear that he was only Wyo Tech’s 

counsel and was not representing any of the subpoenaed parties—did appear. (Doc. 172 at 

6.) Among other things, this attorney acknowledged that Wilenchik & Bartness had 

received notice of the subpoenas in February 2019 and simply overlooked the notice 

because “Mr. Wilenchik’s inbox is substantially full.” (Id. at 9.) The attorney also 

confirmed that Wilenchik & Bartness had sent the letter discussed in the Judgment 
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Creditors’ declaration (i.e., the letter to Wyo Tech incorrectly stating that the subpoena 

recipients could ignore the subpoenas due to a lack of proper notice) and was unable to say 

whether Wilenchik & Bartness had ever corrected this misstatement after learning that 

proper notice had, in fact, been provided. (Id. at 9-11.) 

Following the hearing, the Court issued an order holding the seven subpoena 

recipients in civil contempt. (Doc. 167.) This order also imposed a daily fine of $250 

against each subpoena recipient “beginning on June 27, 2019 and lasting until the nonparty fully complies with the subpoena(s) at issue.” (Id. at 2.)

The next relevant contempt-related activity occurred on August 2, 2019, when the 

Judgment Creditors filed a motion for an order to show cause why additional sanctions 

should not be imposed. (Doc. 183.) In this motion, the Judgment Creditors stated that six 

of the seven contemnors had come into compliance but nevertheless urged the Court to 

order their immediate imprisonment because they hadn’t paid the daily fines imposed by 

the contempt order. (Id.) As for the remaining contemnor, an entity called Danzik Applied 

Sciences (“DAS”), the Judgment Creditors argued that although DAS had made a 

production attempt, it was incomplete, so DAS’s manager (Dennis Danzik’s wife, 

Elizabeth Danzik) should be immediately imprisoned, too. (Id.)

On August 6, 2019, the Court issued an order denying the Judgment Creditors’ 

motion in significant part. (Doc. 186.) As for the six contemnors who had come into 

compliance following the issuance of the June 27, 2019 contempt order, the Court declined 

to impose any further sanctions and faulted the Judgment Creditors for overreaching: “[I]t 

certainly doesn’t seem necessary to issue a bench warrant for their arrest.” (Id. at 4.) As 

for DAS, the Court declined to accept the Judgment Creditors’ assertion that DAS’s 

production effort was incomplete and instead gave DAS an opportunity to defend the 

production’s sufficiency at a hearing. (Id. at 4-5.)

Finally, on August 30, 2019, the Court held a hearing concerning DAS’s alleged 

noncompliance. During this hearing, DAS’s counsel acknowledged that DAS’s prior 

production effort may have been incomplete but urged the Court to afford DAS more time 
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to come into compliance. The Court agreed with this approach, specifically declined to 

“impose any further sanctions against non-party Elizabeth Danzik,” and ordered the 

Judgment Creditors and DAS to meet and confer about obtaining a complete production. 

(Doc. 219 at 1.)

5. August 27, 2019 Ruling

In the Supplement, Wyo Tech argues that footnote five in the order denying the 

earlier recusal motion—the footnote in which the Court noted that Wyo Tech may have 

helped coordinate the filing of that motion (Doc. 209 at 6 n.5)—constitutes further proof 

of bias. (Doc. 227.) 

As it turns out, this footnote hit the bullseye. The emails attached to the Judgment 

Creditors’ motion to strike establish, beyond a shadow of a doubt, that Wyo Tech’s counsel 

was personally involved in the development and filing of the recusal motion.4 

...

 

4 Wyo Tech argues that the emails revealing Wilenchik & Bartness’s involvement in 

the earlier recusal motion are “clearly attorney-client privileged communications which 

were obviously inadvertently disclosed by Wyo [Tech] and should have been returned to 

[Wilenchik & Bartness] immediately.” (Doc. 231 at 4 n.3.) Notably, Wyo Tech does not 

provide any legal citations in support of this claim. Moreover, the declaration from the 

Judgment Creditors explains that the emails were produced by a Wyo Tech investor—

presumably, one of the twelve individuals who is identified in the distribution list at the 

top of the email—in response to a Rule 45 subpoena. (Doc. 229 ¶ 2 [“This email chain 

was produced earlier this week by a nonparty in response to one of the subpoenas we served 

in this action.”].) Thus, it wasn’t inadvertently produced by Wyo Tech in response to a 

request for production. And the fact the email was intentionally forwarded to a Wyo Tech 

investor by a Wyo Tech representative suggests it has lost whatever privileged character it 

may have once enjoyed. Wilenchik & Bartness acknowledged earlier in this case that it 

only represents Wyo Tech, not the company’s third-party investors (Doc. 172 at 6), and 

even wrote a letter to the Wyo Tech investors in February 2019 in which it “stress[ed] to 

you [investors] that we do not represent you and you should obtain counsel to advise you.” 

(Doc. 191-18.) Accordingly, when Wyo Tech’s CEO chose to forward the email chain 

(which included a series of internal emails between Wilenchik & Bartness attorneys) to a 

distribution list of third-party investors, any privilege was likely waived. Cf. Southern 

Union Co. v. Southwest Gas Corp., 205 F.R.D. 542, 551 (D. Ariz. 2002) (noting that the 

proponent of a privilege claim “must prove that the communication was made in 

confidence and subsequently maintained as confidential” and finding that proponent 

couldn’t meet this burden because “there [was] undisputed evidence that third parties, 

Merrill Lynch employees, were present during the meeting at which the alleged protected 

communications took place”). See generally Weil v. Investment/Indicators, Research & 

Management, 647 F.2d 18, 24 (9th Cir. 1981) (“[I]t has been widely held that voluntary 

disclosure of the content of a privileged attorney communication constitutes waiver of the 

privilege as to all other such communications on the same subject.”).
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6. Summary

In the Court’s view, the foregoing summary is helpful in analyzing Wyo Tech’s 

argument that the rulings to date in this case show “that Judge Lanza’s ability to be 

impartial is questionable at best,” that “this Court has granted unusual latitude” to the 

Judgment Creditors, and that “the Court’s prior statements and rulings . . . show potential 

if not actual bias that would cause any reasonable lay person to question Judge Lanza’s 

impartiality.” (Doc. 231 at 2, 9.)

For example, although Wyo Tech appears to view the April 9, 2019 order 

(authorizing discovery) as a manifestation of bias, it should be noted that this 19-page order 

was issued only after a request for supplemental briefing and that the order carefully 

considers all of the parties’ arguments, includes dozens of case citations, and also cites

several different law review articles and practice guides. One would hope that a reasonable 

layperson would view it as a sincere attempt to properly rule on the disputed legal issues 

in this case. 

As for the May 1, 2019 order (holding that Wyo Tech forfeited its overbreadth 

objections), this was a common-sense outcome compelled by the plain language of Rules 

33 and 34. If anything, the undersigned judge resolved close calls in Wyo Tech’s favor by 

sua sponte modifying one the Judgment Creditors’ requests for production and effectively 

rejecting the Judgment Creditors’ fee request.

As for the May 29, 2019 order (declining to hold Wilenchik & Bartness in civil 

contempt), it is almost unfathomable that Wyo Tech could view this as proof of bias. The 

hearing was predicated by Wilenchik & Bartness missing a production deadline, then 

making demonstrably-false statements to the Court and Judgment Creditors about the 

contents of its belated production. Nevertheless, the Court chose not to make a contempt 

finding, even though the facts may have warranted one. And the Court ultimately reduced 

the Judgment Creditors’ fee request from $25,000 to $10,000, even though Wilenchik & 

Bartness didn’t proffer any reason why the $25,000 figure should be considered inflated.

As for the June 29, 2019 civil contempt order and related rulings, the Court imposed 
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sanctions only after the subpoena recipients (1) didn’t bother to respond to the subpoenas, 

(2) didn’t bother to respond to follow-up letters from the Judgment Creditors concerning 

the subpoenas, (3) ignored the subpoenas because Wilenchik & Bartness had incorrectly 

told them the subpoenas were invalid (a miscalculation caused by Wilenchik & Bartness’s 

failure to monitor its own email account and compounded by the firm’s failure to correct 

its incorrect advice after learning it was wrong), (4) didn’t bother to submit any briefs in 

response to the show-cause order, and (5) didn’t bother to show up for the show-cause 

hearing. This was remarkably brazen conduct and the decision whether to make a civil 

contempt finding wasn’t a close (or even reasonably debatable) call. Moreover, the Court 

rejected the Judgment Creditors’ later request for an imprisonment sanction and declined 

to impose further sanctions against DAS even after it became clear that DAS’s belated 

production effort was incomplete. The Court is struggling to understand how these rulings 

could be viewed as proof of bias.

Finally, as for the footnote in the August 27, 2019 order, making accurate

observations about Wyo Tech’s and Wilenchik & Bartness’s involvement in the 

preparation of the earlier recusal motion does not constitute proof of judicial bias.

B. Newly Discovered Information

Wyo Tech also argues that “newly discovered information” demonstrates that 

recusal of the undersigned judge is required under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). (Doc. 231 at 7-10.) 

This argument fails for several interrelated reasons.

First, the request is untimely. In the earlier order, the Court observed that any 

recusal request by Wyo Tech would likely be considered untimely. (Doc. 209 at 6 n.5.) In 

support of this view, the Court cited E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 967 F.2d 

1280, 1295 (9th Cir. 1992), which holds that “[i]t is well established in this circuit that a 

recusal motion must be made in a timely fashion” and explains that “[t]he absence of such 

a requirement would result in . . . a heightened risk that litigants would use recusal motions 

for strategic purposes,” and United States v. Rogers, 119 F.3d 1377, 1380 (9th Cir. 1997), 

which emphasizes that “a party having information that raises a possible ground for 
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disqualification cannot wait until after an unfavorable judgment before bringing the 

information to the court’s attention.” 

These are the exact circumstances presented here. Indeed, Wyo Tech acknowledges 

it is seeking recusal in part because it doesn’t agree with the rulings that have been issued 

in the 11 months since this case was reassigned to the undersigned judge. 

Nor would it be accurate to characterize all of the information discussed in Wyo 

Tech’s Supplement and motion as “newly discovered.” Most of that information relates to 

the undersigned judge’s time at the U.S. Attorney’s Office and is predicated on the 

inaccurate theory that the undersigned judge personally led a criminal investigation of 

Danzik and formed a negative view of Danzik based on that investigation. Putting aside 

the specific problems with some of the newly-proffered information (which are addressed 

below), Wilenchik & Bartness was Danzik’s attorney during the time period in question.5 

It strains credulity to believe that none of this information was known to Wilenchik & 

Bartness and Wyo Tech at the time of this case’s reassignment in October 2018. This is a 

textbook case of a litigant being aware of information at the start of a case, saying nothing, 

and then belatedly seeking recusal after becoming dissatisfied with the judge’s rulings—a 

practice that is corrosive to the rule of law and specifically prohibited by Ninth Circuit 

precedent. Cf. United States v. Sierra Pacific Indus., 759 F. Supp. 2d 1198, 1205-06 (E.D. 

Cal. 2010) (“[A] judge must take care not to recuse out of an abundance of caution when 

it appears that a party may be seeking recusal out of dissatisfaction after sustaining adverse 

rulings.”). 

Indeed, in the Supplement, Wyo Tech only purports to identify one piece of 

information that its counsel didn’t learn about until recently: the fact that one of the 

undersigned judge’s friends (a former colleague from the U.S. Attorney’s Office) is the 

 

5 This statement is based on the assertion in the Subpoenaed Individuals’ earlier 

recusal motion (which, as has now become clear, Wilenchik & Bartness helped develop) 

that “[t]he law firm of Wilenchik & Bartness . . . represented Dennis Danzik with respect 

to the USAO-Arizona’s investigation of him.” (Doc. 204 at 3.) Additionally, Wilenchik 

& Bartness stated in an earlier brief in this case that “[t]he instant case [was] one of several, 

approximately seven (7) litigation cases relating to Mr. Dennis Danzik . . . in some form 

or another, which [Wilenchik & Bartness] is handling.” (Doc. 140 at 6.)
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brother of an attorney who works at the same law firm that is serving as the Judgment 

Creditors’ local counsel in this case. (Doc. 227 at 2.) But as discussed in the earlier order, 

this is an invalid basis for seeking a judge’s recusal. Wyo Tech tellingly does not cite any 

cases holding (or even suggesting) that recusal is required when a judge’s friend’s brother’s 

co-worker is serving as an attorney in a pending case and it would be ludicrous if that were 

the rule. In fact, the ABA ethics opinion enclosed as an exhibit to the Supplement—which 

Wyo Tech somehow proffers as support for its position—specifically recognizes that 

recusal isn’t required under these circumstances. Doc. 227-1 at 2 (“In short, judges need 

not disqualify themselves if a lawyer or party is an acquaintance, nor must they disclose 

acquaintanceships to the other lawyers or parties.”).6 

Second, the newly-proffered information does not, on the merits, come close to 

triggering a need for recusal. When evaluating this information, it is helpful to begin by 

summarizing the legal standards governing a recusal request predicated on a judge’s prior 

activity while in government service. Those standards are set out in detail in the order 

denying the earlier recusal motion. (Doc. 209 at 4-7.) Specifically, the order explained 

that “recusal is necessary only when a judge, while in prior government practice, 

participated in the actual ‘proceeding’ or ‘particular case in controversy’ that is now 

pending before that judge. This means that a judge who was once an Assistant U.S. 

Attorney (‘AUSA’) cannot, after appointment to the bench, preside over a criminal case 

that he or she personally investigated or prosecuted while at the USAO. But this isn’t a 

criminal case—it’s a civil interpleader action, Danzik isn’t even a party, and the narrow 

issue to be resolved is whether the Judgment Creditors are entitled to funds that had been 

deposited in Wyo Tech’s account. Section 455(b)(3) doesn’t apply in this circumstance.” 

(Id. at 4-5, citations omitted). The order further noted that 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) doesn’t 

 

6 Wyo Tech’s motion can be read as suggesting, in various places, that the 

undersigned judge is a close personal friend of both of the brothers at issue. (Doc. 231 at 

5 [alluding to “the relationships between Judge Lanza and the . . . brothers”]; id. at 8 

[alluding to “the . . . brothers’ relationship and the Court’s acknowledgement of that 

friendship”].) This is inaccurate. The friendship is with the former colleague from the 

U.S. Attorney’s Office, not with the former colleague’s brother (the attorney who has a coworker who is serving as local counsel in this case).
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supply a different or less stringent test. (Id. at 9, citing United States v. Champlin, 388 F. 

Supp. 2d 1177, 1183 (D. Haw. 2005)).

This backdrop is important because Wyo Tech’s newly-proffered information 

relates to the same alleged criminal investigation of Danzik by the U.S. Attorney’s Office 

that was addressed in the earlier order. And as discussed in that order, the prior 

investigation is not the same “proceeding” or “particular case in controversy” as the current 

civil interpleader action. 

Third, the newly-proffered information is flawed for other reasons. Wyo Tech’s 

recusal motion is supported by two exhibits. The first is a declaration from Anthony Ker. 

(Doc. 231-1.) The Ker declaration can be divided into three parts. In paragraphs 5-7, Ker 

provides a summary of various phone conversations he allegedly had with Jean Noelting 

(one of the Judgment Creditors) between mid-2015 and July 2019. Ker contends that, 

during these conversations, Noelting admitted that the Judgment Creditors hired the law 

firm serving as local counsel in this case because of its political connections in Arizona, 

admitted that the Judgment Creditors have “powerful friends . . . at the ‘Southern District’ 

in New York,” admitted that he (Noelting) had “in-person discussions with U.S. Attorneys 

at the DOJ in Arizona, specifically a ‘Mr. Sexton’ and his boss ‘Dominic Lanza,’” and 

admitted that he (Noelting) had personally visited with “‘them downtown’ at the DOJ in 

Arizona and spoke to the person at the DOJ in charge of the FBI.” (Id., citation omitted.) 

Next, in paragraph 8, Ker provides a summary of an undated conversation between Ker 

and Danzik during which Danzik allegedly “told [Ker] he had contact with Dominic Lanza 

via political connections . . . and as a whistleblower.” (Id.) Finally, in paragraph 9, Ker 

contends that “RDX’s legal counsel [from] the law firm Gibson and Dunn, personally 

knows Dominic Lanza” and that this attorney “told [Ker] [he] spoke to the DOJ in 2015 

about RDX, Danzik, Noelting, and the CWT Parties.” (Id.) The second exhibit is an 

unauthenticated copy of an email that Danzik purportedly sent to an attorney at Gibson, 

Dunn & Crutcher in September 2015. (Doc. 231-2.) 

These exhibits are unpersuasive for several reasons. As an initial matter, Ker fails 
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to disclose in his declaration (and Wyo Tech fails to disclose in its motion) that Ker is 

embroiled in contentious litigation against the Judgment Creditors in a different lawsuit, 

before a different judge, in which Ker stands accused of aiding and abetting Danzik’s fraud

and in which Ker attempted to sue the Judgment Creditors for defamation. CWT Canada 

II Ltd. P’ship v. Danzik, 2019 WL 79001, *3 (“[One of the Judgment Creditors] sued . . . 

Ker, alleging that [he] knew of and aided in Danzik’s fraudulent theft scheme. Ker filed a 

counterclaim to that suit.”); id. at *10 (“The Court will grant CWT’s motion for summary 

judgment with respect to Ker’s defamation counterclaims.”). Wilenchik & Bartness has 

represented both Danzik and Ker in that case. Id. 

This potential bias bears upon an overarching flaw of the Ker declaration—it is all 

hearsay. Ker does not have personal knowledge of any of the matters described in his 

declaration and instead purports to summarize conversations he had with others. The 

hearsay issue is particularly problematic because most of the alleged conversations 

involved Noelting, with whom Ker is adverse. Moreover, many of the alleged 

conversations with Noelting involved topics (such as why the Judgment Creditors hired 

certain law firms or whether the Judgment Creditors have political connections in the 

Southern District of New York) that have no apparent relevance to why recusal is being 

sought here. Finally, with respect to Noelting’s alleged statements about prior meetings 

and phone calls with government officials in Arizona, the undersigned judge has no 

recollection of ever meeting with Noelting or speaking with Noelting on the phone. Any 

hearsay suggestion to the contrary in the Ker declaration is, to the best of the undersigned 

judge’s recollection, mistaken.7 

Next, paragraph 8 of the Ker declaration states that Danzik told Ker he once spoke 

to the undersigned judge in the capacity of a “whistleblower.” (Doc. 231-1 at 4.) Similarly, 

the unauthenticated email states that Danzik had just spoken to the undersigned judge and 

 

7 Moreover, even if such a call theoretically had occurred, this would merely show 

there were two fleeting phone calls in 2015 (instead of the one addressed in the earlier 

recusal order) that were so unmemorable they didn’t trigger any associations when this 

case was transferred in October 2018. 
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the conversation was “[a]ll positive.” (Doc. 231-2 at 2.) But both of these items are fully 

consistent with, and indeed corroborate, the earlier order’s description of the 2015 

conversation with Danzik: “The undersigned judge does not . . . recall this conversation as 

involving Danzik trying to explain why he shouldn’t be charged with crimes (which is how 

the Subpoenaed Individuals characterize it in their motion). It is inconceivable that the 

target of a criminal investigation, let alone a sophisticated white-collar target represented 

by Wilenchik & Bartness, would affirmatively call the USAO, without an immunity 

agreement in place, to discuss the merits of a pending investigation. Instead, the 

undersigned judge’s vague recollection is that Danzik called because he wanted the USAO 

to pursue an investigation of crimes allegedly committed by others.” (Doc. 209 at 8.) 

Paragraph 8 and the email therefore add nothing to the recusal analysis.

Finally, as for paragraph 9 of the Ker declaration, it alleges that the undersigned 

judge “personally knows” a lawyer at the law firm of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher who has 

represented Ker’s company and who told Ker that he met with unspecified Department of 

Justice officials (but not the undersigned judge) in 2015 about matters involving Danzik 

and some of the parties in this case. This is about as compelling as the theory that a judge 

must recuse from any case in which a friend’s brother’s co-worker is serving as local 

counsel. The undersigned judge worked at Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher from 2003 to 2008 

before joining the U.S. Attorney’s Office. It is global law firm with approximately 1,200 

attorneys. Unsurprisingly, the undersigned judge still knows some of the attorneys who 

work there. This doesn’t trigger a need to recuse whenever one of those acquaintances 

handles a different but tangentially-related matter involving some of the same parties. Doc. 

227-1 at 2 (“In short, judges need not disqualify themselves if a lawyer or party is an 

acquaintance, nor must they disclose acquaintanceships to the other lawyers or parties.”).

***

The undersigned judge fully agrees with, and has carefully considered, the Ninth 

Circuit’s exhortation that “[i]f it is a close case, the balance tips in favor of recusal.” United 

States v. Holland, 519 F.3d 909, 912 (9th Cir. 2008). Nevertheless, the law is equally clear 
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that “courts have a ‘strong duty to sit’ when there is no legitimate reason to recuse” and

that a judge should not recuse “based on unsupported, irrational, or highly tenuous 

speculation; were he or she to do so, the price of maintaining the purity of appearance 

would be the power of litigants or third parties to exercise a negative veto over the 

assignment of judges.” Melendres v. Arpaio, 2009 WL 2132693, *12 (D. Ariz. 2009) 

(citations omitted). 

There is no legitimate reason for recusal here. The undersigned judge had a fleeting 

contact with Danzik in 2015 that was so insubstantial his name didn’t ring a bell when this 

case was reassigned in October 2018. In the 11 months since then, the Court has issued 

many rulings in a hard-fought case. Due to apparent disagreement with those rulings, Wyo 

Tech has now filed a recusal motion that is predicated on dubious legal theories (i.e., a 

judge must recuse whenever a friend’s sibling’s co-worker is serving as counsel or 

whenever the judge is acquainted with a lawyer who is handling a different case involving 

some of the same parties), questionable hearsay, and information that was mostly known 

to Wyo Tech’s counsel at the time of the case reassignment. It would be unfair to the 

Judgment Creditors, corrosive to the rule of law, and an abdication of the judicial oath to 

recuse under these circumstances.

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that:

(1) The Judgment Creditors’ motion to strike (Doc. 228) is denied;

(2) Wyo Tech’s motion for recusal (Doc. 231) is denied; and

(3) Any future “supplement” filed by Wyo Tech without authorization will be 

summarily stricken.

Dated this 27th day of September, 2019.