In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 00-1079

Arthur Ozlowski,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

William J. Henderson, Postmaster General,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Illinois.

No. 99 C 756--Charles P. Kocoras, Judge.

Argued September 19, 2000--Decided January 17, 2001

 Before Bauer, Manion, and Kanne, Circuit Judges.

 Manion, Circuit Judge. Arthur Ozlowski sued his

former employer, William Henderson, the

Postmaster General of the United States, alleging

that the United States Postal Service had failed

to accommodate his disabilities in violation of

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. sec.

791, et seq. The Postal Service filed a motion

for summary judgment and Ozlowski filed a crossmotion for partial summary judgment. The district

court granted the Postal Service’s motion and

denied Ozlowski’s cross-motion. Ozlowski appealed

to this court, and we affirm.

I. Facts

 Since 1969, Ozlowski has been afflicted with

arachnoiditis, a degenerative spinal disease. As

a result of this disease, over the years Ozlowski

has had several knee surgeries, including two

knee replacements. The disease is progressive and

over time caused increasing difficulties to

Ozlowski, finally culminating in the events

giving rise to this lawsuit. 

 Ozlowski began working with the Postal Service

in 1975 as a senior computer operator at the

Chicago Bulk Mail Center ("BMC"). In 1986, he

became supervisor of process control systems. He

continued working in a variety of computerrelated positions until late 1992 or early 1993
when the Postal Service reorganized as part of a

national plan and eliminated his supervisory

position. After the reorganization, in October,

1993, Ozlowski was offered his former job as

senior computer operator but at the same pay he

was currently receiving. He claims that he

refused that offer because he wanted a position

more commensurate with his experience. Ozlowski

was eventually assigned to be supervisor of

distribution operations at the Fox Valley

facility in Aurora, Illinois. However, Ozlowski

did not report to work at Fox Valley, but instead

asked to be temporarily assigned elsewhere while

he awaited knee surgery. His request was granted

and he was assigned to work at the Irving Park

facility. In November, 1993, Ozlowski underwent

surgery on his right knee. After his recovery,

Ozlowski asked to be detailed to the BMC. Again,

Ozlowski’s request was granted and he was

detailed to the BMC’s in-plant support group,

where he performed various computer-related

duties. During this time, Ozlowski was taking a

number of medications which caused him to

occasionally fall asleep at work. Although he

never requested any particular accommodations

while he worked at the BMC, postal officials were

aware that Ozlowski had orthopedic problems and

other ailments.

 In early 1996, the Postal Service informed

Ozlowski that his temporary detail at the BMC

would be terminated and told him to report to his

permanently assigned position at Fox Valley. It

was at this time that Ozlowski informed the

Postal Service of his limitations due to his

worsened medical condition and specifically asked

for a reasonable accommodation. According to one

of Ozlowski’s treating physicians, Ozlowski could

only work in sedentary occupations, could not

stand, walk, squat, stoop or kneel for prolonged

periods of time and could not drive for more than

20 or 30 minutes at a stretch. 

 On January 18, 1996, he wrote a letter to John

Wawrzyniec, a plant manager at the BMC, Ann

O’Banner, a plant manager at Fox Valley, and

Cynthia Kellogg, a human resources manager,

requesting that his temporary detail at the BMC

be continued indefinitely because of his medical

condition. On February 7, 1996, he wrote to Wally

Zobel, a manager at the BMC, requesting a

transfer to that facility. He also wrote

additional letters to Ann O’Banner, first

notifying her that he would not be able to report

to work there and next requesting paid medical

leave based on his physical limitations.

 During this time, Ozlowski underwent two knee

replacement surgeries, the left knee in March,

1996 and the right knee in May, 1996. Although
his doctors said he could return to work with

limitations, Ozlowski never returned to work with

the Postal Service after these surgeries.

 On July 19, 1996, O’Banner wrote to Ozlowski

presenting him with four options: (1) disability

retirement, (2) regular retirement, (3)

reassignment to another position, and (4)

voluntary termination. In response, Ozlowski

wrote to O’Banner on July 25, 1996 inquiring

about the status of his request for reasonable

accommodation, stating that "[a]s you are aware,

I requested reassignment to the Bulk Mail Center.

My request has been ignored." For her part,

O’Banner contacted Wawrzyniec and inquired about

the status of Ozlowski’s request. O’Banner

testified that she did not attempt to place

Ozlowski herself because he had informed her

that, based on his medical restrictions, he could

not travel the distance to Fox Valley. After

speaking with Ozlowski and receiving a note from

Wawrzyniec, she believed Ozlowski was going to

pursue disability retirement. Shortly thereafter,

in August 1996, Ozlowski did choose the first

option O’Banner had presented and applied for

disability retirement, which the Postal Service

granted effective October, 1996. On September 25,

1996, Ozlowski filed a formal complaint with the

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and on

January 11, 1999, the EEOC issued its final

decision. Ozlowski then filed a complaint in

district court, which is the basis for the

present appeal.

II. Discussion

 "We conduct de novo review of a district court’s

decision involving cross-motions for summary

judgment," Hendricks-Robinson v. Excel Corp., 154

F.3d 685, 692 (7th Cir. 1998), viewing all of the

facts, and drawing all reasonable inferences from

those facts, in favor of the nonmoving party. Id.

Summary judgment is proper if the record shows

that "there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that [a] moving party is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id.

(quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)). See also Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986).

 Ozlowski filed suit under the Rehabilitation Act

of 1973 claiming that the Postal Service had

failed to reasonably accommodate his physical

limitations. The Rehabilitation Act provides that

no "qualified individual with a disability . . .

shall, solely by reason of her or his disability,

be . . . subjected to discrimination . . . by the

United States Postal Service." 29 U.S.C. sec.

794(a). The standards used to determine whether a

violation of this section has occurred are those

used to interpret the Americans with Disabilities
Act ("ADA"). 29 U.S.C. sec. 794(d); Gile v.

United Airlines, Inc., 95 F.3d 492, 497 (7th Cir.

1996). The ADA defines "discrimination," in part,

as "not making reasonable accommodations to the

known physical or mental limitations of an

otherwise qualified individual with a disability

who is an . . . employee, unless such covered

entity can demonstrate that the accommodation

would impose an undue hardship on the operation

of business." 42 U.S.C. sec. 12112(b)(5)(A).

Reassignment to a vacant position is a form of

reasonable accommodation. 42 U.S.C. sec.

12111(9)(B). Federal regulations promulgated

under the ADA make clear, however, that an

applicant for a vacant position "must be

qualified for, and be able to perform the

essential functions of, the position sought with

or without reasonable accommodation." 29 C.F.R.

pt. 1630. app.

 The ADA regulations also state that, to

determine the appropriate reasonable

accommodation, the employer may need to "initiate

an informal, interactive process with the

qualified individual with a disability in need of

the accommodation." 29 C.F.R. sec. 1630.2(o)(3);

Hansen v. Henderson, 233 F.3d 521, 523 (7th Cir.

2000) (employer has the burden of exploring with

the worker the possibility of a reasonable

accommodation). However, the failure to engage in

the interactive process by itself does not give

rise to relief. Rehling v. City of Chicago, 207

F.3d 1009, 1015-16 (7th Cir. 2000). Instead, we

must first look at whether there is a genuine

issue of material fact regarding the availability

of a vacant position to accommodate Ozlowski. If

there were such a position, only then do we

consider whether the failure to provide that

accommodation was due to a breakdown in the

interactive process. See Baert v. Euclid

Beverage, Ltd., 149 F.3d 626, 632 (7th Cir.

1998). It is the plaintiff’s burden to show that

a vacant position exists for which he was

qualified. Rehling, 207 F.3d at 1015; McCreary v.

Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 132 F.3d 1159, 1165 (7th

Cir. 1997). The district court found that the

Postal Service was not liable for failure to

accommodate by reassignment because Ozlowski had

failed to submit evidence demonstrating that a

vacant position existed for which he was

qualified.

 On appeal, Ozlowski argues that he identified

several open positions for which he was qualified

and that he could have performed regardless of

his limitations. In order to be "qualified," the

employee must "(1) satisfy the legitimate

prerequisites for that alternative position, and

(2) be able to perform the essential functions of

that position with or without reasonable
accommodations." Dalton v. Subaru-Isuzu

Automotive, Inc., 141 F.3d 667, 678 (7th Cir.

1998). Except as specifically discussed below,

Ozlowski does not provide any evidence of his

qualifications in comparison to the legitimate

prerequisites for any of the positions he

identified or any evidence that such positions

were vacant, other than his own conclusory

statements./1 Conclusory allegations and selfserving affidavits, if not supported by the

record, will not preclude summary judgment.

Haywood v. North Am. Van Lines, Inc., 121 F.3d

1066, 1071 (7th Cir. 1997).

 For example, Ozlowski contends that there was a

schemes analyst position for which he was

qualified. While that position was currently

filled on a temporary detail, Ozlowski believed

the person detailed to that position could have

been transferred to another position and he could

have then filled what would become a vacant spot.

Wawrzyniec testified in his deposition that he

did not believe Ozlowski could safely perform the

duties of a schemes analyst, which included

hanging and changing signs and climbing ladders.

Ozlowski contends that the Postal Service had

accommodated another employee by assigning her a

scooter and another employee to assist her and

that the Postal Service should have done the same

for him.

 Even if we assume that the schemes analyst

position had been vacant,/2 given Ozlowski’s

physical limitations, he was not qualified for

the position. While it is true that an employer

may redistribute marginal functions of a job to

other employees, an employer is not required to

reallocate essential functions "that the

individual who holds the job would have to

perform, with or without reasonable

accommodation, in order to be considered

qualified for the position." 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630,

app. See Hansen, at 523-24; Malabarba v. Chicago

Tribune Co., 149 F.3d 690, 700 (7th Cir. 1998);

Cochrum v. Old Ben Coal Co., 102 F.3d 908, 912

(7th Cir. 1996). 

 As the district court noted, the bulk of a

schemes analyst’s job involves maintaining mail

sorting schemes and performing scheme changes.

This includes hanging and changing signs

indicating a change of schemes and climbing

ladders in order to place and replace the signs.

Given Ozlowski’s physical limitations, he could

not have performed these functions. Even if the

Postal Service made an accommodation to a

previous employee by assigning her a helper to

essentially perform her job, the Postal Service

was not required to do so for her and likewise

was not required to do so for Ozlowski.
 Next, Ozlowski contends that a computerized

printout produced by the Postal Service in

response to interrogatories identifies a number

of vacant positions within his restricted

commuting area that were vacant in 1996. The

Postal Service now disputes whether this list

accurately identifies positions which were vacant

during 1996. However, even if we assume that the

list contains every position vacant during the

time period in which Ozlowski requested a

reasonable accommodation, he presented no

evidence, other than his own statements, that he

was qualified to perform any of these positions.

 Lastly, Ozlowski contends that there was a

vacant mail flow controller position for which he

was qualified. This is his most persuasive

argument because Wawrzyniec admitted that the

position was vacant and that Ozlowski was

qualified to fill it. However, Wawrzyniec was

doubtful that Ozlowski could have climbed the

stairs to get to the work station and also

expressed concern that Ozlowski’s drowsiness

problem made it unsafe for him to perform the

job. Indeed, Wawrzyniec stated that he made no

attempt to find another place for Ozlowski after

his detail ended because he thought there were no

jobs that Ozlowski could safely perform.

 Ozlowski argues that, if he had been asked, he

would have told Wawrzyniec that he no longer had

problems with drowsiness and could walk up the

necessary flights of stairs. Wawrzyniec admitted

that he did not ask Ozlowski in 1996 about his

drowsiness problem, about whether he was still

taking medications, or about whether he could

walk up the stairs.

 While we think it would have been prudent for

Wawrzyniec to have communicated more effectively

with Ozlowski, there is an independent reason

that we decline to find that the Postal Service

failed to provide a reasonable accommodation.

Wawrzyniec stated that, while the mail-flow

controller position was vacant, there was an

informal hold on filling that position pending

the installation of a new computer system

nationwide which could change or even reduce job

requirements. We do not believe that a reasonable

accommodation means that an employer is required

to fill a position which, based on a reason

wholly independent of the employee’s disability,

it had chosen not to fill. Such a position is not

"vacant." Cf. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n

v. Humiston-Keeling, Inc., 227 F.3d 1024, 1028

(7th Cir. 2000) (ADA does not require employer to

reassign a disabled employee to a vacant position

where there is a better applicant, provided it is

the employer’s policy of giving vacant job to

best applicant). Even if Wawrzyniec had the
authority to fill the position regardless of the

informal hold, the position would have been

temporary until the arrival of a new computer

system. The Postal Service was not obligated to

place Ozlowski in such a position in order to

accommodate him. See McCreary, 132 F.3d at 1165

("Occasional opportunities to work in another

department are not equivalent to a vacancy for a

permanent position.").

 Ozlowski also appeals the district court’s

denial of his cross-motion for summary judgment,

which was based on the ADA rather than on the

Rehabilitation Act. The ADA specifically excludes

government employers. 42 U.S.C. sec.

12111(5)(B)(i). Nevertheless, since

Rehabilitation Act claims are analyzed under the

same standards as those used for ADA claims, the

district court considered Ozlowski’s arguments in

granting summary judgment for the Postal Service.

We do likewise and conclude that the district

court properly denied Ozlowski’s cross-motion.

III. Conclusion

 Since Ozlowski failed to identify a vacant

position at the Postal Service for which he was

otherwise qualified, the district court properly

granted summary judgment under the Rehabilitation

Act of 1973. Accordingly, we affirm.

/1 Wawrzyniec did admit in his deposition that there

were some positions for which he thought Ozlowski

had the technical skills, but there is no

evidence that these positions were vacant.

/2 We note that an employer is not required to bump

a current employee in order to provide reasonable

accommodation. See Gile v. United Airlines, Inc.,

95 F.3d 492, 499 (7th Cir. 1996). We also note

that, at the time of his deposition in September,

1998, Ozlowski believed the same person still

occupied the position he desired.