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KEN PAXTON

 Attorney General of Texas

JEFFREY C. MATEER

 First Assistant Attorney General

BRANTLEY D. STARR

 Deputy First Assistant Attorney General

JAMES E. DAVIS

 Deputy Attorney General for Civil Litigation

DAVID J. HACKER (TX Bar No. 24103323)*

 Special Counsel for Civil Litigation

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

P.O. Box 12548, Mail Code 001

Austin, Texas 78711-2548

(512) 936-1414

david.hacker@oag.texas.gov

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Texas

ADAM PAUL LAXALT

 Attorney General of Nevada

JOSEPH TARTAKOVSKY (NV Bar. No. 13796)

 Deputy Solicitor General

STATE OF NEVADA, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

100 N. Carson Street

Carson City, Nevada 89701

(775) 684-1208 

JTartakovsky@ag.nv.gov

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Nevada

* Admitted pro hac vice

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Mikkel Jordahl, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney 

General, et al.,

Defendants. 

Case No. 3:17-cv-08263-PCT-DJH

BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE THE 

STATES OF TEXAS AND 

NEVADA IN SUPPORT OF 

DEFENDANTS

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..............................................................................iii

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................... 1

BACKGROUND: ANALOGUE LAWS IN TEXAS AND NEVADA................. 2

1. Texas’s H.B. 89 (2017)............................................................................... 2

2. Nevada’s S.B. 26 (2017) ............................................................................ 2

ARGUMENT ....................................................................................................... 3

I. State and local governments regularly place myriad lawful 

requirements and restrictions on independent contractors.................... 3

II. A.R.S. § 35-393 is a classic anti-discrimination measure. ...................... 5

III. A.R.S. § 35-393 combines a State’s power to spend its own money with 

its anti-discrimination interest. ............................................................... 7

a. Debarment....................................................................................... 8

b. Investment or divestment of public funds..................................... 9

CONCLUSION.................................................................................................. 10

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases Page(s)

Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. Umbehr,

518 U.S. 668 (1996)........................................................................................ 3

Briggs & Stratton Corp. v. Baldrige,

728 F.2d 915 (7th Cir. 1984)...................................................................... 6–7

Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n, AFL-CIO v. Allied Int’l, Inc.,

456 U.S. 212 (1982)........................................................................................ 6

O’Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake,

518 U.S. 712 (1996)........................................................................................ 3

OFCCP v. Goya de Puerto Rico, Inc., Notice of Debarment, 67 Fed. Reg. 

53028-01 (Dep’t of Labor Aug. 14, 2002) ...................................................... 9

OFCCP v. Pacific Coast Feather Co., Notice of Debarment, 61 Fed. Reg. 

56248-01 (Dep’t of Labor Oct. 31, 1996) ....................................................... 9

Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va.,

515 U.S. 819 (1995)...................................................................................... 10

Trap Rock Indus., Inc. v. Kohl,

284 A.2d 161 (N.J. 1971) ............................................................................... 4

Statutes

19 U.S.C. § 4452.................................................................................................. 5

50 U.S.C. § 4607.................................................................................................. 5

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 35-392........................................................................... 5, 9, 10

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 41-2613................................................................................... 8

Cal. Gov’t Code § 7513.6..................................................................................... 9

Cal. Gov’t Code § 7513.7 ..................................................................................... 9

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-103-910 ............................................................................. 4

N.Y. State Fin. Law § 146 .................................................................................. 4

Nev. Rev. Stat. § 118.100.................................................................................... 5

Nev. Rev. Stat. § 651.070.................................................................................... 5

Nev. Rev. Stat. § 332.810.................................................................................... 4

Tex. Gov’t Code § 808.001 .................................................................................. 2

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Tex. Gov’t Code § 2156.007 ................................................................................ 4

Tex. Gov’t Code §§ 2161.001–.003...................................................................... 4

Tex. Gov’t Code § 2252.002 ................................................................................ 4

Tex. Gov’t Code § 2252.202 ................................................................................ 4

Tex. Gov’t Code § 2252.901 ................................................................................ 4

Tex. Gov’t Code § 2258.023 ................................................................................ 4

Tex. Gov’t Code § 2270.001 ................................................................................ 2

Tex. Gov’t Code §§ 2270.001–.002...................................................................... 5

Tex. Gov’t Code § 2270.0001–.0253 ................................................................... 9

W. Va. Code § 5A-3-57 ........................................................................................ 4

Regulations

48 C.F.R. § 9.406-2.............................................................................................. 9

Legislative Material

A.B. 106, § 24, 2017 Leg., 79th Sess. (Nev. 2017)............................................. 4

A.B. 280, § 5, 2017 Leg., 79th Sess. (Nev. 2017) ............................................... 4

A.B. 2941, § 1, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2006) ............................................ 10

H.B. 89, S.J. of Tex., 85th Leg., R.S. 1332 (2017) ............................................. 2

H.J. of Tex., 85th Leg. R.S. 1749–50 (2017) ...................................................... 2

House Comm. on State Affairs, Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 89, 85th Leg., 

R.S. (2017) ...................................................................................................... 2

S.B. 26, Final Passage Votes .............................................................................. 2

S.B. 26, 2017 Leg., 79th Sess. (Nev. 2017) ................................................ 3, 5, 8

Other Authorities

Constance A. Hamilton, Effects of the Arab League Boycott of Israel on 

U.S. Businesses, U.S. Int’l Trade Commission, Pub. 2827 (Nov. 1994)...... 1

Exec. Order No. 11246, §§ 212 & 301, 30 Fed. Reg. 12319 (Sept. 24, 

1965) ............................................................................................................... 9

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Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, Press Release, “65th Independence 

Day—More than 8 Million Residents in the State of Israel,” Apr. 14, 

2013 ................................................................................................................ 7

Pres. Barack Obama, Statement on Signing the Trade Facilitation and 

Trade Enforcement Act of 2015, 2016 Daily Comp. Pres. Doc. 1–2 

(Feb. 24, 2016)................................................................................................ 5

Steven Levingston, Kennedy and King: The President, the Pastor, and 

the Battle over Civil Rights 43 (2017)........................................................... 6

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INTRODUCTION

A counter-boycott law like Arizona’s may appear an innovation, but in 

fact it is only the latest stage in an effort to resist the economic warfare that 

has targeted Israel for over half a century. The first boycotts against Israel 

began with the country’s creation in 1948 and were aimed not at Israeli policy 

but Israeli existence. These embargoes were institutionalized as early as 1951, 

in the Arab League’s Central Boycott Office in Damascus.1 In 1994, the U.S. 

International Trade Commission found that the Arab League Boycott—the 

prototype of the nationality-based boycott that this Act seeks to repel—cost 

Israel’s economy $2 billion a year.2 This decades-long commercial campaign 

against an isolated democracy is the background of a lawsuit that now invokes 

a principle of free society shared by few of the boycotts’ historical instigators.

Arizona’s law, like those in Texas and Nevada, does not concern mere

criticism of Israel or its laws, leaders, or policies. It concerns economic boycotts 

that target Israelis, all Israelis, on the basis of nationality or national origin. 

This law, like many of the non-discrimination laws that undergird our society, 

counters the use of economic coercion to strike not at Israeli actions but at the 

mere fact that a company is Israeli or does business with one—the most 

extreme mode of anti-Israel boycott. More importantly, the Act does not even 

prohibit such boycotts. As this brief demonstrates, boycott supporters, outside 

of their voluntary commercial relations with the State, may act as they wish. 

So can those who oppose such boycotts: Arizona’s refusal to spend its 

money in ways that countenance this form of boycott, like similar laws passed 

in other states, is simply an application of two well-established doctrines. 

 

1 Constance A. Hamilton, Effects of the Arab League Boycott of Israel on U.S. 

Businesses, U.S. Int’l Trade Commission, Pub. 2827 (Nov. 1994) at 5, 

https://goo.gl/dRm4w1.

2 Id. at vi.

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First, States can place conduct-based conditions or qualifications on 

independent contractors who seek to obtain the business of those States. And 

second, States, among these restrictions, may disallow contractors from 

engaging in discrimination on the basis of certain well-defined protected 

characteristics. For these reasons, the Court should uphold Arizona’s law. 

BACKGROUND: ANALOGUE LAWS IN TEXAS AND NEVADA

1. Texas’s H.B. 89 (2017)

Texas enacted House Bill 89 in 2017 by bipartisan margins. The law 

passed unanimously in the House, and 26-5 in the Senate.3 Texas aims to 

“prevent taxpayer resources from supporting businesses which work to isolate 

Israel from global trade,” because “Israel is a key ally and trading partner of 

the United States and Texas.”

4 As a means to combat these “discriminatory 

practices,” Texas does not contract with a company for goods or services if that 

company refuses to deal with, terminates business activities with, or takes 

other actions intended to penalize, inflict economic harm on, or limit 

commercial relations with Israel (or someone doing business with Israel). Tex. 

Gov’t Code §§ 808.001 & 2270.001. Texas does not, however, consider business 

actions taken “for ordinary business purposes.” Id. § 808.001. Thus, Texas

targets discrimination based on national origin—discrimination against Israel 

and its people. 

2. Nevada’s S.B. 26 (2017)

Nevada’s Senate Bill 26, enacted in 2017 by a combined legislative vote 

of 58-2,5 declares that boycotts can be a “tool of economic warfare” that 

 

3 See H.B. 89, S.J. of Tex., 85th Leg., R.S. 1332 (2017); H.J. of Tex., 85th Leg. 

R.S. 1749–50 (2017).

4 House Comm. on State Affairs, Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 89, 85th Leg., R.S. 

(2017); see also Senate Comm. on Bus. & Commerce, Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 

89, 85th Leg., R.S. (2017).

5 See S.B. 26, Final Passage Votes, https://goo.gl/jFHHtb.

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threatens the “sovereignty and security of key allies and trade partners” like 

Israel and that such boycotts often are grounded in “discriminatory decisions 

on the basis of national origin.” Nevada’s response to this is to make it state 

policy to consider a company’s participation in such efforts in (1) “awarding 

grants and contracts” or in (2) receiving state investment.6 S.B. 26 applies 

strictly to refusals to do business with Israel, or persons or entities doing 

business in Israel, “on the basis of nationality, national origin or religion.”7 The 

Nevada law excludes from its purview actions that, for instance, are based on 

a “bona fide business or economic reason” or that are pursued in a 

“nondiscriminatory manner.”8 In short, Nevada’s law concerns only the most 

categorical, nationality-based boycotts of Israeli citizens and companies. With 

these extreme boycotters, alone, Nevada will not “enter into a contract.”9

ARGUMENT

I. State and local governments regularly place myriad lawful

requirements and restrictions on independent contractors.

“The Constitution accords government officials a large measure of 

freedom” “in the course of contracting for goods and services.” O’Hare Truck 

Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712, 724 (1996). Every State has 

enacted legislation imposing competitive-bidding requirements on various 

types of contracts with the government. In fact, the “examples of federal, state, 

and local statutes, codes, ordinances, and regulations could be multiplied to fill 

many volumes,” and have been means of regulating government contracts 

“since the founding of the Republic.” Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 

668, 693–94 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).

 

6 S.B. 26, 2017 Leg., 79th Sess. (Nev. 2017) (“SB 26”), prefatory clauses. 

7 S.B. 26, § 9(1). 

8 S.B. 26, § 9(2).

9 See, e.g., S.B. 26, §§ 5 & 11.

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States impose requirements and prohibitions on such state contracts. 

Both Texas and Nevada, for instance, may expressly prefer contractors that 

reside within their states’ borders. Tex. Gov’t Code § 2252.002; A.B. 280, § 5, 

2017 Leg., 79th Sess. (Nev. 2017). Texas encourages its agencies and 

institutions of higher education to increase the number of contracts awarded 

to historically underutilized businesses owned by women, veterans, and racial

minorities. Tex. Gov’t Code §§ 2161.001–.003. Texas and other States require 

that state contractors use iron or steel manufactured in the United States. Tex. 

Gov’t Code § 2252.202; see also Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-103-910; N.Y. State Fin. 

Law § 146; W. Va. Code § 5A-3-57. Texas also requires state contracts and 

subcontractors to pay a prevailing wage to workers employed in execution of 

the contract, Tex. Gov’t Code § 2258.023, and Nevada requires state vendors 

to certify that they pay their employees equal pay for equal work without 

regard to gender, A.B. 106, § 24, 2017 Leg., 79th Sess. (Nev. 2017).

States also restrict the speech and conduct of contractors to protect 

against conflicts of interests and bribery. Nevada prohibits bidders for state 

contracts from offering future employment or business opportunities to the 

governing body offering the contract. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 332.810. And Texas 

prohibits state agencies from entering into employment, professional services, 

or consulting contracts with a former or retired employee of the agency for one 

year from that person’s last date of employment. Tex. Gov’t Code § 2252.901.

States even impose moral requirements on contractors. Texas considers 

a bidder’s “character, responsibility, [and] integrity,” among other things, 

when deciding whether to award a contract. Tex. Gov’t Code § 2156.007. In

New Jersey, “the legislative mandate that a bidder be ‘responsible’ embraces 

moral integrity just as surely as it embraces a capacity to supply labor and 

materials.” Trap Rock Indus., Inc. v. Kohl, 284 A.2d 161, 166 (N.J. 1971).

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Arizona, like Texas, Nevada, and many others, have now added, to this 

long preexisting list of qualifications, a requirement that state contractors 

refuse to participate in nationality-based boycotts of Israel. See Tex. Gov’t Code 

§§ 2270.001–.002; S.B. 26, § 5, 2017 Leg., 79th Sess. (Nev. 2017); Defs.’ 

Combined Resp. to Pls.’ Mot. for Prelim. Inj. & Mot. to Dismiss, App. A, ECF 

No. 28. By doing so, the States are merely following the example set by the 

federal government since 1979. 50 U.S.C. § 4607.

A State may exercise its power, with respect to state contracting, to 

advance public policy goals—whether in promoting the hiring of the less 

privileged, supporting local businesses, or, as here, eliminating invidious 

discrimination based on historically protected characteristics. 

II. A.R.S. § 35-393 is a classic anti-discrimination measure.

Arizona’s Act is a classic anti-discrimination measure. American law

teaches that it is wrongful to lay burdens on individuals on the basis of 

immutable characteristics like race, sex, or (as here) nationality, national 

origin, or religion. This Act prohibits a business only from taking boycott 

actions “[i]n a manner that discriminates on the basis of nationality, national 

origin or religion and that is not based on a valid business reason.” Ariz. Rev.

Stat. § 35-393(1)(b). (The U.S. government, too, opposes categorical boycotts of 

Israel as “contrary to the principle of nondiscrimination.”10) 

Such laws frequently operate in commercial contexts like this one. For 

instance, Nevada (like most states) makes it unlawful for home owners to 

refuse to sell to someone on account of their origin, Nev. Rev. Stat. § 

118.100(1), or for hotels categorically to deny lodging to nationals of a certain 

country, Nev. Rev. Stat. § 651.070. These direct restrictions on private 

 

10 19 U.S.C. § 4452(b)(4)-(5); see Pres. Barack Obama, Statement on Signing 

the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015, 2016 Daily Comp. 

Pres. Doc. 1–2 (Feb. 24, 2016)

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business decisions pose no First Amendment problems. This Act is milder yet. 

Here, companies can decline to do business with a company simply because it 

has an Israeli board member or sells products in Tel Aviv. This Act just says: 

very well, but we can decline to do business with you. 

Merely labeling something a “boycott” does not itself sanctify conduct as 

“protected” speech. For example, a credit union does not have a free speech 

right to “boycott” Guatemalans by systematically withholding jobs or loans 

from them. Mr. Jordahl concedes this point, when, in his complaint, he writes

that the Act prevents contractors like him from participating in “protected

political boycotts.”11 By using the word “protected,” he acknowledges that not 

all boycotts are, in fact, protected. Their lawfulness depends on their purpose. 

Martin Luther King, Jr., saw White Citizen’s Councils boycott black businesses 

in Alabama,12 but courts today look askance on boycotts meant to bolster race 

segregation. Boycotts that oppose discrimination, by contrast, are lawful, 

because of their quite different purpose: they target businesses not because of 

their owners’ nationality (improper), but because of their owners’ conduct

(proper). Arizona’s Act only concerns this former type of illegitimate 

“boycott.”

The Supreme Court, in International Longshoremen’s Association, AFLCIO v. Allied International, Inc., 456 U.S. 212, 224-25 (1982), held that a 

boycott, though based on “political disputes,” was not immunized under the 

First Amendment against Congress’s commerce power. “Illegal boycotts,” the 

Court recognized, “take many forms.” Id. (quotations and brackets omitted). 

Likewise, the Seventh Circuit, in the context of the Arab boycott of Israel, 

rejected an attempt by companies wishing to honor the boycott to “color their 

 

11 Compl. ¶ 46 (emphasis added).

12 Steven Levingston, Kennedy and King: The President, the Pastor, and the 

Battle over Civil Rights 43 (2017).

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communications with a protected interest in political speech.” Briggs & 

Stratton Corp. v. Baldrige, 728 F.2d 915, 917 (7th Cir. 1984). These cases 

establish that commercial boycotts are not inherently protected speech. (And 

here, by contrast to the laws in Longshoremen and Briggs, Arizona’s statute 

does not regulate conduct everywhere in the private sector; it regulates 

conduct only insofar as a company seeks the benefit of contractual relations 

with Arizona.)

The real irony of Mr. Jordahl’s attempt to label categorical boycotts of 

Israel a political act is that nationality-based boycotts like the one he seeks

constitutional sanction for are based not on politics but on incidents of birth. 

And the problem with such discrimination on the basis of immutable 

characteristics is that it punishes membership in a class, often with absurd 

results. An Israeli company might be boycotted though it diverts 50% of profits 

to Palestinian human rights efforts, or even though it is owned by Palestinians 

who happen to be citizens of Israel. (Israel’s census bureau estimates the 

Israeli-Arab population at more than 1.6 million.13)

III. A.R.S. § 35-393 combines a State’s power to spend its own 

money with its anti-discrimination interest.

Mr. Jordahl has a near absolute right to express his views on Israel by 

declining to do business with Israeli companies. He can even do so for no better 

reason than the fact that those businesses are domiciled in Israel or run by 

Israeli-born CEOs. But Arizona has an equally valid right to express the views 

of other individuals—the constituents who democratically govern expenditures 

as a policy matter—that Arizona should do business with those companies. 

And it can express this view by declining to do business with boycotters. 

 

13 Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, Press Release, “65th Independence 

Day—More than 8 Million Residents in the State of Israel,” Apr. 14, 2013, 

https://goo.gl/uFaFcm.

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Mr. Jordahl says that his speech rights are “chilled” because he “fears the 

loss of his firm’s government contracts.”14 What he means is that he wants to 

engage in a nationality-based boycott and experience no consequences from it. 

But the Free Speech Clause lets government spend its own money to promote 

public interests, even when doing so works to the disfavor of some citizens. It 

happens all the time.

a. Debarment

The best analogy may be debarment laws. Debarment is the exclusion of 

a contractor from the privilege of obtaining government contracts for a certain 

period. Such laws, for instance, deny state contracts to companies who are 

found systematically to have refused to hire blacks or Hispanics. The 

government in doing so does not “chill” the right of companies to express the 

racial views or hiring preferences of its managers. It simply sends a countermessage that the state will not join hands economically with businesses who 

behave in this way.

Debarment is not taken lightly, and due process attaches, but the power 

to debar reflects the basic legal fact that there is no right to receive government 

business. (Hence state contracts are often denominated, statutorily, as 

“awards.”15) Arizona, in fact, has broad discretion to refuse to do business with 

a contractor for any “cause” related to its “responsibility” as a contractor. Ariz. 

Rev. Stat. § 41-2613(5). The privilege of beneficial commercial partnerships, as 

noted above, has always been hedged by conditions—and one of the leading 

conditions has for decades been non-participation in race- or nationality-based 

discrimination. 

 

14 Compl. ¶ 45 (chills) & ¶ 1 (fears the loss).

15 See, e.g., S.B. 26, § 13(2) (“A contract may not be awarded to a bidder who 

does not comply with the requirements set forth”).

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The United States has long vigorously exercised its debarment power 

against contractors on this ground; it will even move to debar companies based 

on their failure to adhere to or provide an affirmative-action policy.16

Companies can take controversial positions and use their dollars toward that 

end; but government, in turn, can decide that it will not subsidize 

discrimination by contributing its dollars to those companies. Debarment laws, 

in the end, are not understood to “suppress” a First Amendment right to 

engage in discriminatory practices. They are understood, rather, to entail that, 

as a result of such conduct, the company may forfeit state business. If a 

company can exert its economic leverage to try to injure Israel, Arizona can 

exert a counter-force to try to mitigate that injury.

b. Investment or divestment of public funds

The Act is codified in Title 35 of Arizona’s code, under the heading of 

“Handling of Public Funds.” Quite expectedly: this law involves only the 

disposition of public money. In the same ARS chapter, for instance, Arizona 

declares that it will not invest state retirement money in companies illegally 

doing business with state sponsors of terrorism. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 35-392.

Texas does the same. Tex. Gov’t Code § 2270.0001–.0253. California, similarly, 

makes it state policy to refrain from financial relations with (i.e., to divest

from) companies complicit in the Darfur genocide. Cal. Gov’t Code 

§ 7513.6(b)(2)(B); see also id. at § 7513.7(b)(1) & (f)(3) (divestment from Iran’s 

nuclear or defense sectors or companies linked to the Iranian government). In 

such cases, States, on matters on touching on foreign policy, engage in 

 

16 Exec. Order No. 11246, §§ 212 & 301, 30 Fed. Reg. 12319 (Sept. 24, 1965); 

48 C.F.R. § 9.406-2 (vigorously exercised); OFCCP v. Goya de Puerto Rico, 

Inc., Notice of Debarment, 67 Fed. Reg. 53028-01 (Dep’t of Labor Aug. 14, 

2002); OFCCP v. Pacific Coast Feather Co., Notice of Debarment, 61 Fed. Reg. 

56248-01 (Oct. 31, 1996) (debarment action regarding affirmative action 

policies).

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government speech by the expedient of withholding the benefit of its money 

from those whose conduct is, as a California bill put it, “inconsistent with the 

moral and political values of the people.”17 The California law may “chill” the 

expression of companies who wish to do business in, say, Khartoum—but a 

State can spend its own money “to say what it wishes.” Rosenberger v. Rector 

& Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995). Opponents of that law can 

continue to invest in Sudanese oil. The pursuit of that opportunity just means 

the loss of a different opportunity: the chance at getting investment from public 

funds. Mr. Jordahl does not appear even to challenge this half of Arizona’s law.

CONCLUSION

The movement to boycott companies and citizens based on nothing more 

than the Israeli nationality listed on their articles of incorporation or 

passports is an attempt to cause economic isolation and injury to an American 

ally. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 35-393, in response, simply provides that (1) if you 

choose to engage in this form of nationality-based discrimination, then (2) you 

may be choosing to forgo the privilege of receiving Arizona’s public money. 

Arizona has the right to boycott boycotters. Doing so does not “suppress” 

political views; it obeys them, as they have been enacted in a democratic law. 

This law simply supports a long-established principle of non-discrimination.

For these reasons, and those stated in Defendants’ brief, the Act does not 

violate the First Amendment, and Plaintiffs’ complaint should be dismissed.

 

17 See A.B. 2941, § 1, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2006).

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Respectfully submitted this 8th day of February, 2018.

ADAM PAUL LAXALT

Attorney General of Nevada

JOSEPH TARTAKOVSKY

Deputy Solicitor General

NV Bar. No. 13796

State of Nevada, Office of the 

Attorney General

100 N. Carson Street

Carson City, Nevada 89701

(775) 684-1208 

JTartakovsky@ag.nv.gov

ATTORNEYS FOR AMICUS

CURIAE NEVADA

KEN PAXTON

Attorney General of Texas

JEFFREY C. MATEER

First Assistant Attorney General

BRANTLEY D. STARR

Deputy First Assistant Attorney 

General

JAMES E. DAVIS

Deputy Attorney General for Civil 

Litigation

/s/ David J. Hacker

DAVID J. HACKER*

Special Counsel for Civil Litigation

TX Bar No. 24103323

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

P.O. Box 12548, Mail Code 001

Austin, Texas 78711-2548

(512) 936-1414

david.hacker@oag.texas.gov 

ATTORNEYS FOR AMICUS 

CURIAE TEXAS

* Admitted pro hac vice.

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on February 8, 2018, I filed the foregoing document 

with the Clerk of the Court via CM/ECF, which automatically sends notice of 

the filing to all counsel of record.

/s/David J. Hacker

DAVID J. HACKER

Case 3:17-cv-08263-DJH Document 36 Filed 02/08/18 Page 17 of 17