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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Alvie Copeland Kiles, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-17-04092-PHX-GMS

DEATH-PENALTY CASE 

ORDER 

 Pending before the Court are Respondents’ Motion to Set Reasonable Page Limits 

for Habeas Petition, Answer, and Reply (Doc. 11), and Motion to Preclude Juror Contact 

(Doc. 13).1

 The motions are fully briefed. (Docs. 20–21, 23–24.) The Court addresses the 

motions as follows. 

1. Page Limits 

 Respondents ask the Court to set “reasonable page limits on the habeas petition, 

answer, and reply,” with a limit of 150 pages for the petition and answer and 75 pages for 

the reply. (Doc. 11 at 6.) They argue that the Court has discretion to set such limits and 

cite as examples the page-limits imposed by other federal courts, and by a Magistrate 

Judge in a non-capital case in this Court. (Id. at 3.) However, the District of Arizona has 

not placed page limits on capital habeas petitions, and the issue is being reviewed as a 

 

1

 Respondents filed a third motion asking the Court to preclude the defense team from contacting the victims in this case. (Doc. 12.) Consideration of this motion was 

stayed pending the resolution in a separate case involving a constitutional challenge to the Arizona statute on which Respondents rely in their motion to preclude victim contact. That case was resolved and briefing has resumed on Respondents’ third motion. The 

Court will address the motion by separate order. 
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matter of District Court policy. See Morris v. Ryan, No. CV 17-00926-PHX-DGC (Sep. 

28, 2017) (Doc. 16). The Court is unwilling to impose page limits on an ad hoc basis, 

therefore Respondents’ motion is denied. 

2. Juror Contact 

Respondents ask the Court to preclude Petitioner’s “defense team from contacting 

trial jurors absent leave of Court based on a threshold showing of good cause.” (Doc. 13 

at 1, 4.) Petitioner contends that habeas counsel must be allowed to interview jurors in 

order to competently investigate claims alleging juror misconduct and extraneous 

influences upon the jury, as well as counsel’s failure to investigate such issues. (Doc. 20 

at 1–2.) This Court grants Respondents’ motion in part based on the following 

considerations. 

 There is no statute, rule, or law prohibiting federal habeas counsel from 

interviewing jurors to discover admissible evidence of juror misconduct, or requiring a 

showing of good cause prior to contacting jurors. See Harrod v. Ryan, No. CV-16-02011-

PHX-GMS, 2016 WL 6082109, at *2 (D. Ariz. Oct. 18, 2016). 

 Nonetheless, there are safeguards in place that address the long-recognized and 

very substantial concerns supporting the protection of jury deliberations from intrusive 

inquiry. Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 127 (1987); see also Traver v. Meshriy, 

627 F.2d 934, 941 (9th Cir. 1980) (explaining that because evidence concerning the 

manner at which a jury arrived at its verdict is inadmissible to test the validity of a 

verdict, “the practice of counsel in propounding questions on these subjects to jurors after 

trial should be discouraged”). Rule 606(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence is grounded 

in the common-law rule against admission of jury testimony to impeach a verdict. Rule 

606(b) allows jury testimony only in limited circumstances to show that (1) extraneous 

prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury’s attention, (2) an outside 

influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror, or (3) there was a mistake in 

the verdict form. Fed. R. Evid. 606(b); see Tanner, 483 U.S. at 121. 
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 The Supreme Court recently recognized another exception to the no-impeachment 

rule. In Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 869 (2017), the Court held that 

“where a juror makes a clear statement that indicates he or she relied on racial stereotypes 

or animus to convict a criminal defendant, the Sixth Amendment requires that the noimpeachment rule give way in order to permit the trial court to consider the evidence of 

the juror’s statement and any resulting denial of the jury trial guarantee.” The Court 

explained that “[n]ot every offhand comment indicating racial bias or hostility will justify 

setting aside the no-impeachment bar to allow further judicial inquiry.” Id. Instead, “the 

statement must tend to show that racial animus was a significant motivating factor in the 

juror’s vote to convict.” Id. The Supreme Court acknowledged that the “practical 

mechanics of acquiring and presenting such evidence will no doubt be shaped and guided 

by state rules of professional ethics and local court rules, both of which often limit 

counsel’s post-trial contact with jurors.” Id.

 Ninth Circuit law makes clear that, generally, interviewing jurors about their 

deliberative process is both improper and unethical.2 Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Mely, 219 

F.2d 199, 202 (9th Cir. 1954) (“We do hold for future guidance that it is improper and 

unethical for lawyers . . . to interview jurors to discover what was the course of 

deliberation of a trial jury.”); see also Harrod, 2016 WL 6082109, at *2. Counsel shall 

adhere to the applicable ethical rules and shall abide by their declaration that they “will 

make clear to jurors that they are under no obligation to speak with counsel, and counsel 

will not harass jurors.” (See Doc. 20 at 10.) To the extent counsel pursue a proper and 

ethical course of investigation into juror conduct that falls within the allowed exceptions 

 

2

 This Court’s Local Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 83.2(e), subjects attorneys practicing in this Court to the Rules of Professional Conduct of the Arizona Supreme Court. In addition to the requirements above, those rules require that a lawyer “shall not . . . communicate with a juror or perspective juror after discharge of the jury if . . . the 

juror has made known to the lawyer a desire not to communicate; or . . . the 

communication involves misrepresentation, coercion, duress or harassment.” Ariz. R. 

Sup. Ct. 42, E. R. 3.5. 
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listed above, it is not necessary to impose a good cause standard because counsel are 

ethically obligated not to pursue inadmissible evidence about the jurors’ deliberations. 

 Finally, while Arizona law does not prohibit post-verdict contact with jurors, the 

Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure protect juror privacy, and this Court will require 

counsel to abide by those protections. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 18.3 (requiring 

confidentiality of juror biographical information). 

 For the reasons set forth above, 

IT IS ORDERED DENYING Respondents’ request to impose page limitations 

(Doc. 11). 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED GRANTING Respondents’ Motion to Preclude 

Juror Contact (Doc. 13) to the extent it would prevent Petitioner from using the 

information deemed confidential under Arizona Criminal Rule 18.3 to locate and 

interview jurors. Petitioner is, however, not otherwise restricted from using other publicly 

available information for locating the juror’s in this case. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED GRANTING Respondents’ Motion to Preclude 

Juror Contact to the extent it would prevent Petitioner from questioning jury members on 

matters not admissible in evidence absent further authorization of this Court. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED DENYING Respondents’ Motion to Preclude 

Juror Contact to the extent it would prevent Petitioner from questioning jurors’ 

concerning extraneous influences on the jury, or whether a juror made a clear statement 

that indicates racial animus was a significant motivating factor in a juror’s vote to 

convict. 

 Dated this 6th day of April, 2018. 

Honorable G. Murray Snow

United States District Judge