United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit 

Chicago, Illinois 60604 

Submitted April 23, 2019*

Decided April 24, 2019 

Before 

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge 

DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge 

AMY C. BARRETT, Circuit Judge

No. 18-2587 

KEENAN BROWN, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

WAL-MART STORES, INC., 

 Defendant-Appellee.

 Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Northern District of Illinois, 

Eastern Division. 

No. 17 C 393 

Ronald A. Guzmán, 

Judge. 

O R D E R 

Keenan Brown, a former associate in the bakery department at a Wal-Mart store 

in New Lennox, Illinois, sued the company under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 

1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, asserting that he was fired because of his 

race, color, and sex, and in retaliation for filing internal complaints over incidents with 

coworkers. The district court entered summary judgment for Wal-Mart, and we affirm. 

 

*

 We have agreed to decide this case without oral argument because the briefs 

and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would 

not significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C). 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION 

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 
No. 18-2587 Page 2 

Brown, who is African American, did not get along with his colleagues in the 

bakery department. A month into his employment, he was confronted about his job 

performance by a coworker. She called him “rug rat” and “boy,” and, when Brown 

pointed his finger at her, she slapped his hand. Brown reported the incident to a 

manager, who told him that it would be addressed. Brown also filed a complaint about 

the incident with Wal-Mart’s ethics office. Two weeks later, Brown filed a second 

complaint against his coworker as well as the bakery department’s supervisor, who, he 

believed, retaliated against him for his earlier complaint by assigning him additional 

duties. Wal-Mart investigated Brown’s complaints, concluded that the coworker had 

acted inappropriately by slapping his hand, and reprimanded her. But Wal-Mart 

concluded that Brown’s claims of retaliation were not substantiated. Meanwhile, 

Wal-Mart granted Brown’s request to be transferred to the electronics department. 

Shortly after his transfer, however, Brown was tardy for his shift. His tardiness 

meant that he had accumulated a certain number of unauthorized absence “points” 

that, under company policy, subjected him to termination. The next day his new 

supervisor fired him for accruing too many unauthorized absences. 

After receiving a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC, Brown brought this suit 

asserting discrimination based on his race, color, and sex, as well as retaliatory 

discharge for filing two internal complaints against his colleagues. 

The district court ultimately entered summary judgment for Wal-Mart on all 

claims. Regarding Brown’s discrimination claims, the court found that the record was 

“devoid” of any evidence that he had been discriminated against based on his sex, 

color, or race. See Ortiz v. Werner Enters., Inc., 834 F.3d 760, 765 (7th Cir. 2016). As for 

Brown’s retaliation claim, the court determined that he had not pointed to evidence 

from which it could be inferred that his discharge was caused by his internal complaints 

about his coworker and the bakery department’s supervisor. 

On appeal, Brown first argues that he introduced sufficient evidence from which 

it could be inferred that his coworker discriminated against him and that the reason for 

his discharge was merely a pretext to discriminate.1 Tracking the McDonnell Douglas 

Corporation v. Green framework, 411 U.S. 792, 802–03 (1973), Brown argues that he was 

 

1 Brown also alludes in his brief to age discrimination, but he did not raise this 

claim before either the EEOC or the district court and therefore has forfeited it. See 

Poullard v. McDonald, 829 F.3d 844, 855 (7th Cir. 2016). 
No. 18-2587 Page 3 

meeting Wal-Mart’s legitimate performance expectations because his absences had been 

authorized by Wal-Mart management. See David v. Bd. of Trs. of Cmty. Coll. Dist. No. 508, 

846 F.3d 216, 224 (7th Cir. 2017). But he offered no evidence to dispute Wal-Mart’s 

employment records reflecting that he had accrued four and a half points for his 

unauthorized absences—and Wal-Mart’s policy is to discharge new hires, like Brown, if 

they accrue four or more points within six months of being hired. 

Brown also asserts, generally, that Wal-Mart treated him differently from his 

similarly situated coworker in the bakery department who slapped his hand and was 

the subject of his complaints but not fired. But here too he failed to point to evidence to 

suggest that she was “directly comparable to [him] in all material respects.” Coleman v. 

Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 846 (7th Cir. 2012) (internal quotations and citations omitted). He 

did not introduce evidence, for instance, to reflect that she received more than four 

points for being absent or tardy but was not fired, or that she was a new hire (she was 

not, she had been working for Wal-Mart for five years). 

As for his claim of retaliation, Brown argues that the district court overlooked 

evidence that Wal-Mart ignored his complaints and chose to selectively enforce its 

policies to fire him but not his coworker. But as the district court determined, Brown 

cannot point to evidence of a causal connection between his discharge and his internal 

complaints, given the absence of any evidence that the supervisor was aware of the 

complaints. See Cervantes v. Ardagh Grp., 914 F.3d 560, 566–67 (7th Cir. 2019). The 

electronics department supervisor who fired Brown provided a declaration asserting 

that he was unaware that Brown had filed any complaints prior to his termination, and 

Brown presented no evidence to the contrary. 

We have considered Brown’s remaining arguments, and none has merit. 

AFFIRMED