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ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION III 

No. CV-17-257

JENNIFER ANNE HENDERSON

 APPELLANT

V.

SHANE MATTHEW JOHNSTON

 APPELLEE

Opinion Delivered November 15, 2017

APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI

COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, 

FOURTEENTH DIVISION 

[NO. 60DR-10-5147] 

HONORABLE VANN SMITH, 

JUDGE

REVERSED AND REMANDED

DAVID M. GLOVER, Judge

 

Jennifer Henderson and Shane Johnston are the parents of D.J., who was born in 

2004. Jennifer appeals from the trial court’s December 15, 2016 order, contending 1) the 

trial court clearly erred in limiting retroactive child support to November 3, 2010, when 

Shane filed his petition for paternity rather than extending it back to 2008, when Shane 

stopped providing support for D.J., and 2) the trial court clearly erred in abating Shane’s 

entire child support obligation for the two-year period when Jennifer took D.J. to Great 

Britain. We agree and reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this 

opinion so the trial court can recalculate the total amount of child support owed to add the 

appropriate amounts for 1) the period between 2008 (when Shane stopped providing 

support) and November 3, 2010, and 2) the period September 2012 through the end of 

2014, which should not have been abated.
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D.J. was born in 2004. Although never married, Jennifer and Shane lived together 

on and off until 2006 or 2007. It is undisputed that from D.J.’s birth in 2004 until the parties 

permanently separated, support for D.J. was shared by the parties and that thereafter Shane 

continued to provide support for D.J. until sometime in 2008. Jennifer makes no claims for 

child-support arrearages for that period of time.

On November 3, 2010, Shane petitioned the trial court to establish that he is D.J.’s 

father. On December 22, 2011, the parties entered an agreed order, which, among other 

things, established Shane’s paternity; awarded primary custody of D.J. to Jennifer; set out 

visitation, including transportation and exchange points for Jennifer’s anticipated move out 

of state; provided for telephone communications; set Shane’s prospective child-support 

obligation at $90/week (based on his unemployment income) and ordered him to notify 

Jennifer once he became employed so his child-support obligation could be recalculated; 

and reserved the issues of recalculating Shane’s child-support obligation once he secured 

employment and determining his child-support arrearages because he had not provided the 

necessary financial information to do so at the time of the agreed order.

When the December 22, 2011 agreed order was entered, Jennifer had married 

someone else. Her husband was in the military and subject to relocation, so the order 

identified out-of-state visitation. As it turned out, Jennifer’s husband was reassigned out of 

country and relocated to Great Britain, where they lived from September 2012 through the 

end of 2014. Shane alleged in his contempt motion that Jennifer relocated to Great Britain 

without telling him and without giving him any contact information. In the spring of 2015, 

Jennifer and D.J. returned to the United States. It is undisputed that since that time Shane 
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has received his visitation with D.J. As part of the instant proceedings he asked for an 

abatement of his child-support obligation for the period Jennifer had D.J. in Great Britain. 

On May 16, 2014 (amended November 14, 2014), Shane filed a motion for 

contempt against Jennifer. On June 2, 2014, Jennifer filed a counter-motion for contempt 

against Shane. In her counter-motion, Jennifer also asked the trial court to calculate Shane’s

retroactive child support and arrearages and to recalculate his child-support obligation in 

light of him getting a job, which had been contemplated by the December 22, 2011 agreed 

order. The matter was heard on November 10, 2016. His contempt motion was 

withdrawn, and her contempt motion was denied. Thus, they are not at issue.

 The trial court entered its order from the November 10 hearing on December 15, 

2016. The court awarded Jennifer retroactive child support to November 3, 2010, which 

was the date Shane petitioned the court to establish his paternity; recalculated Shane’s childsupport obligation to $303 biweekly, to begin November 1, 2016 (based on his current net 

monthly income of $2,067, which the court stated was not a deviation from the familysupport chart); abated Shane’s entire child-support obligation for the period of September 

2012 through the end of 2014 (based on Jennifer’s move to Great Britain without notice to 

Shane and her failure to allow contact with Shane during that period); and concluded that 

Shane’s total child-support obligation was $12,580, after giving him credit for the amounts 

he had paid. 

During the November 10, 2016 hearing, Shane provided his W-2 forms and testified 

about his income and the support he had provided for D.J. He acknowledged that as of 

October 28, 2016, he was behind at least $10,065. He testified about the events during the 
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time D.J. was in Great Britain and how he was deprived of contact with D.J., but that from 

the time D.J. returned from Great Britain until the present, he had no complaints about 

visitation. 

For her first point of appeal, Jennifer contends that the trial court clearly erred in 

failing to award her child-support arrearages for the period between 2008, when Shane 

stopped providing voluntary support for D.J., to November 3, 2010, when Shane filed his 

petition to establish paternity. We agree. 

As part of its calculation of retroactive child support and arrearages, the trial court 

started the applicable time period with Shane’s November 3, 2010 petition to establish 

paternity. D.J. was born in 2004, but Jennifer did not seek child support before 2008 (when 

Shane stopped providing voluntary support for the child). We find error in the November 

3, 2010 starting point chosen by the trial court. Our Supreme court explained in Akins v. 

Mofield, 355 Ark. 215, 132 S.W.3d 760 (2003), that a parent has a legal duty to support his 

or her minor children, regardless of the existence of a support order or the other parent’s 

request for support, and child support is an obligation owed to the child, not the parent. 

Administrative Order No.10 and its predecessor child-support guidelines set out the 

presumptively correct amount of child support for retroactive child support for those years 

in which the guidelines were in place, beginning February 5, 1990. Id. Our court has 

repeatedly upheld a trial court’s order awarding retroactive child support from the date of 

the child’s birth to the date of judgment. Walden v. Jackson, 2016 Ark. App. 573, 506 S.W.3d 

904; see also Ark. Code Ann. § 9-10-111(a) (Repl. 2015), (cited in Walden.) 
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Here, Jennifer did not seek child support before the time in 2008 when Shane 

stopped voluntarily providing support for D.J. That was because they had shared the child’s 

expenses while living together, and after they separated, Shane had continued to contribute 

to D.J.’s support until sometime in 2008. In addition, Shane never disputed his paternity, 

even though he did not seek to have it established until the November 3, 2010 petition. 

Accordingly, the trial court erred by not also including the applicable period prior to 

November 3, 2010, in calculating retroactive child support. 

For her remaining point of appeal, Jennifer contends the trial court also erred in 

abating Shane’s child-support obligation for the period she was living with D.J. in Great 

Britain (September 2012 through the end of 2014) instead of including that period of time 

in the recalculation of his child-support obligation since he became employed with the 

railroad on October 29, 2012. We agree. 

The December 22, 2011 agreed order was entered at a time Shane was unemployed. 

He was instructed to inform Jennifer when he secured employment so that his child-support 

obligation could be recalculated using his employment income amount rather than his 

unemployment income amount. Shane got a job on October 29, 2012, but did not inform 

Jennifer. He testified about his income for the years 2013, 2014, 2015, and for 2016 through 

October 15, 2016. He acknowledged the need to recalculate his support obligation in light 

of his employment but asked the trial court to abate his support obligation for the time D.J. 

was in Great Britain. The trial court granted that request. It was error to do so. 

Our court has long held that child-support obligations and visitation are completely 

separate issues. See, e.g., Walden, supra; Newton v. Office of Child Support Enf’t, 2013 Ark. 
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App. 53; Lyons v. McInvale, 98 Ark. App. 433, 256 S.W.3d 512 (2007). As explained in these 

cases, when the custodial spouse interferes with visitation, the remedy is to seek court 

enforcement of visitation—not to withhold child support. Child support is an obligation 

owed to the child independent of the noncustodial parent’s relationship or visitation with 

the child. Walden, supra. A parent’s child-support obligation does not depend on the parent’s 

relationship or visitation with the child. Id. 

We find error in the trial court’s conclusion that child support was to be calculated 

from the November 3, 2010 filing date of Shane’s petition to establish paternity, and we 

also find error in the abatement of Shane’s child-support obligation for the period D.J. was 

in Great Britain (September 2012 through the end of 2014). Thus, we reverse and remand 

this matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded. 

GLADWIN and HIXSON, JJ., agree.

Lightle, Raney, Streit & Streit, LLP, by: Jonathan R. Streit, for appellant.

Satterfield Law Firm, by: Guy “Randy” Satterfield, for appellee.