NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

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No. 13-4577

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

ERIC CHAMBERS,

 Appellant 

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On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. No. 12-cr-00102)

District Judge: Hon. William W. Caldwell

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Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

January 21, 2015

Before: FISHER, JORDAN, and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges.

(Filed: January 22, 2015)

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OPINION

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 This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 

does not constitute binding precedent.
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JORDAN, Circuit Judge.

Eric Chambers appeals both his conviction in the United States District Court for 

the Middle District of Pennsylvania for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and 

the resulting 200-month prison sentence. We will affirm. 

I. Background

In September 2011, Chambers was allegedly involved in an attempted homicide in 

Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. After the victim identified Chambers as the shooter, police 

sought and obtained a warrant for his arrest. On January 9, 2012, the Harrisburg police 

received an anonymous tip that Chambers was in nearby Swatara Township.1 

Investigation determined that Chambers was at the Red Roof Inn on Eisenhower 

Boulevard in Room 151, which had been rented by Takia Jones, one of Chambers’s

friends. Officers arrived at the scene, summoned Chambers out of the hotel, and he 

exited without incident. At the time of the arrest, the only other occupant of Room 151 

was Tanisha Washington, another of Chambers’s friends. Harrisburg police officers then 

sought and obtained a search warrant for the hotel room and Chambers’s car. In the 

underlying affidavit, officers averred that the victim of the 2011 Harrisburg shooting had 

 

1 Although Chambers says that the Swatara Police Department received the tip, a

search warrant affidavit states that the “Harrisburg Police received information” about 

Chambers. (Compare Opening Br. at 8 (citing App. at 24) with App. at 23.) The District 

Court’s opinion on Chambers’s suppression motion also states that “a confidential 

informant told Harrisburg police that Defendant was in a hotel room in Swatara 

Township.” (App. at 28.) Elsewhere, however, the record indicates that “Corporal 

Milsteen” of the Swatara Police Department “informed D platoon of an intelligence call,” 

(App. at 24) and that Officer Scott Gibson of the Swatara Police Department testified at 

trial that he was “told of an intelligence call” regarding Chambers. (App. at 81.) 

Ultimately, the identity of the police department that received the tip is irrelevant to the 

issues before us.
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identified Chambers as the shooter, that there was an active warrant for his arrest, and 

that Chambers had been arrested at the Red Roof Inn. A fair implication of the affidavit 

was that the gun had never been recovered. 

During the ensuing search of the hotel room, the police located a Ruger .40 caliber 

semi-automatic firearm in a bag of potato chips in a trash can. The gun was loaded with 

nine rounds of ammunition in the magazine and one round of ammunition in the 

chamber. The police also recovered from the trash can another magazine loaded with ten 

rounds of ammunition. A holster fitting the gun was located in Chambers’s car, which 

had been parked outside the hotel room. 

While in prison after his arrest, Chambers made a number of recorded phone calls

to his girlfriend Kenya Scott, in which he made coded references to the gun and his 

unsuccessful attempts to hide it after the police arrived. A grand jury returned an 

indictment charging Chambers with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922.2 Chambers filed a motion to suppress the firearm. The 

District Court denied that motion without a hearing, and Chambers sought

reconsideration, which was also denied. Following a two-day jury trial, he was 

convicted. He then filed a motion for judgment of acquittal, challenging the sufficiency 

of the evidence adduced at trial. The District Court denied that motion too. After 

conducting a sentencing hearing and concluding that the Armed Career Criminal Act 

enhancement applied, the Court sentenced Chambers to 200 months in prison. 

 

2 The indictment also charged Chambers with one count of receiving stolen 

firearms, but the government dismissed that charge prior to trial. 
4

Chambers timely appealed, challenging the denial of his motion to suppress and 

motion for judgment of acquittal, and the sentence imposed. 

II. Discussion3

A. The Motion to Suppress

Chambers argues that the District Court improperly denied his motion to suppress 

because there was insufficient probable cause to support the warrant, the police acted 

outside their authority in obtaining the warrant, and the Court erred in denying an 

evidentiary hearing on the motion. Those arguments are unpersuasive. 

A search warrant is valid if supported by probable cause that particular contraband 

or evidence will be found in a particular place. United States v. Golson, 743 F.3d 44, 53 

(3d Cir. 2014). A court must “uphold the warrant as long as there is a substantial basis 

for a fair probability that evidence will be found.” United States v. Conley, 4 F.3d 1200, 

1205 (3d Cir. 1993). Here, although the information contained in the affidavit was thin, 

the magistrate was presented with sufficient evidence to conclude that there was a fair 

 

3 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231 and we have 

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the denial of a motion to suppress 

for clear error as to the underlying facts, but exercise plenary review as to the District 

Court’s legal conclusions. United States v. Kennedy, 638 F.3d 159, 163 (3d Cir. 2011). 

We review the denial of a hearing on a suppression motion for an abuse of discretion and 

will reverse “only in rare circumstances.” United States v. Hines, 628 F.3d 101, 104-05 

(3d Cir. 2010). We review de novo the denial of a motion for acquittal, viewing the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the government, and we will sustain the verdict if 

any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of a crime beyond a 

reasonable doubt. United States v. Freeman, 763 F.3d 322, 343 (3d Cir. 2014); United 

States v. Dent, 149 F.3d 180, 187 (3d Cir. 1998). Finally, we exercise plenary review 

over a challenge to the application of the Armed Career Criminal Act – the sole 

sentencing issue raised on appeal. United States v. Jones, 332 F.3d 688, 690-91 (3d Cir. 

2003). 
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probability that the weapon related to the September 2011 shooting would be found in 

Room 151 – namely, that Chambers had shot another man with a firearm that had never 

been recovered and it was reasonable to assume that he would have kept the firearm with 

him. United States v. Jones, 994 F.2d 1051, 1056 (3d Cir. 1993) (search warrant for 

residence seeking firearms was supported by probable cause because “firearms, are ... 

the type[] of evidence likely to be kept in a suspect’s residence”); United States v. 

Steeves, 525 F.2d 33, 38 (8th Cir. 1975) (“[P]eople who own pistols generally keep them 

at home or on their persons”); Bastida v. Henderson, 487 F.2d 860, 863 (5th Cir. 1973) 

(“A very likely place to find [the pistols] would either be on the persons of the assailants 

or about the premises where they lived.”).

Second, Chambers argues that the police exceeded their authority under the 

Municipal Police Jurisdiction Act, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8953, thereby invalidating 

the search warrant, because the shooting occurred in Harrisburg, was investigated by 

Harrisburg police, and Harrisburg police obtained the search warrant, but the warrant was 

approved by a Swatara magistrate and executed in Swatara Township. Even if

Chambers’s interpretation of the Municipal Police Jurisdiction Act were correct, 

however, he does not explain how a violation of state law would be relevant to the federal

constitutional analysis required here. Cf. Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 176-78 (2008) 

(holding that state law is immaterial for Fourth Amendment search analysis and refusing 

to suppress evidence obtained illegally under state law after warrantless arrest because 

“the arrest rules that the officers violated were those of state law alone, and as we have 

just concluded, it is not the province of the Fourth Amendment to enforce state law. That 
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Amendment does not require the exclusion of evidence obtained from a constitutionally 

permissible arrest.”). 

Finally, Chambers’s argument that the District Court erred in not holding a 

hearing on his suppression motion fails because – contrary to his protestations to the 

contrary – there were no material facts in dispute. United States v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050, 

1067 (3d Cir. 1996) (to warrant a suppression hearing, a defendant’s moving papers must 

demonstrate a colorable claim for relief – that is, “[t]here must be issues of fact material 

to the resolution of defendant’s constitutional claim”). The questions of “material fact”

to which Chambers points – who else had access to Room 151, which police force 

received the anonymous tip, and the contents of that tip – relate primarily to the 

sufficiency of evidence at trial, but do not undermine the fair probability that the weapon 

used in the attempted homicide would be located in the hotel room. 

B. The Motion for a Judgment of Acquittal

Chambers’s argument that there was insufficient evidence to establish constructive 

possession of the handgun and thus to convict him also fails. Chambers says that the 

evidence shows, at most, mere proximity to the gun, and he notes that his nephew and 

another man named “Mighty” had been in the room at some earlier point. But, there was 

more than mere proximity in this case.

“‘A person who, although not in actual possession, knowingly has both the power 

and the intention at a given time to exercise dominion or control over a thing, either 

directly or through another person or persons, is then in constructive possession of it.’” 

United States v. Blackston, 940 F. 2d 877, 883 (3d Cir. 1991) (quoting Black’s Law 
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Dictionary 1047 (5th ed. 1979)). While it is true that dominion and control are not 

established by mere proximity or mere association with a person who controls the item,

id., the government introduced evidence tying Chambers to the weapon. The gun was 

found in an empty bag of potato chips purchased for Chambers and in a hotel room that 

Chambers occupied. Ms. Jones, the woman who rented the room, testified that she 

bought the bag of chips for Chambers. The other occupant of the room at the time of the 

arrest, Ms. Washington, is not suggested by anyone to have possessed the gun, and both 

Ms. Washington and Ms. Jones testified under oath that neither the gun nor the holster 

belonged to them. Chambers’s nephew also testified that the gun was not his. Most, 

significantly, the government introduced recorded phone conversations in which 

Chambers referred to the gun as “the toy,” stating that he had it in the room, that it was 

listed on the inventory slip, that he was arraigned and charged because of “the toy,” and 

that he attempted to hide it but that the police found it. The government also introduced a 

holster that had been found in Chambers’s car and that fit the gun. Viewing the evidence 

in the light most favorable to the government, a rational trier of fact could certainly have

found that Chambers constructively possessed the gun. See United States v. Dent, 149 

F.3d 180, 187 (3d Cir. 1998). Thus, the District Court properly denied Chambers’s

motion for a judgment of acquittal. 

C. The Legality of Chambers’s Sentence

Chambers challenges the application of the Armed Career Criminal Act 

enhancement in his case, which resulted in a 15-year mandatory minimum term of 

imprisonment. He advances three arguments: (1) he did not have three prior “serious” 
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drug convictions; (2) the predicate offenses included offenses more than 15 years old;

and (3) the facts giving rise to the Armed Career Criminal Act enhancement should have 

been submitted to a jury. All three are meritless. 

“The Armed Career Criminal Act ... provides that a defendant convicted of 

possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of [18 U.S.C.] § 922(g), is 

subject to a mandatory sentence of 15 years of imprisonment if the defendant has three 

prior convictions ‘for a violent felony or a serious drug offense.’” James v. United 

States, 550 U.S. 192, 195 (2007) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1)). The Act defines a 

serious drug offense as “an offense under State law, involving manufacturing, 

distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance 

... for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed by 

law.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii); accord United States v. Gibbs, 656 F.3d 180, 182 (3d 

Cir. 2011). 

Here, the District Court determined that Chambers had three serious drug 

convictions, namely two prior convictions for possession with the intent to deliver crack 

cocaine in 1998 and one conviction for the unlawful delivery of crack cocaine in 1999. 

Under Pennsylvania law, possession with the intent to deliver crack cocaine and unlawful 

delivery of crack cocaine are punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of ten 

years. 35 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 780-113(f)(1.1). Those convictions are thus “serious” 

drug offenses under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). Chambers argues that because the convictions 

involved small drug quantities and because he received relatively short sentences, they do 

not meet the “common sense understanding” of “serious.” That argument is foreclosed 
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by the unambiguous text of the statute, which provides the definition we must apply. 

United States v. Pawlowski, 682 F.3d 205, 211 (3d Cir. 2012) (“Where the language is 

plain and unambiguous, ‘the sole function of the court is to enforce it according to its 

terms.’” (quoting United States v. Sherman, 150 F.3d 306, 313 (3d Cir. 1998))). 

Accordingly, the District Court properly concluded that the Armed Career Criminal Act 

enhancement applies.

Chambers also argues that two of his convictions are outside the 15-year lookback period for criminal history and thus should not have been used to calculate his 

criminal history category score. He was released from the initial prison term on each of 

those offenses more than 15 years ago, but because parole was revoked on both offenses, 

his re-incarceration extended into the 15-year look-back period. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1, App. 

Note 1; U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(e). 

Finally, Chambers’s argument that the jury, rather than the District Court, should 

have found facts relating to his prior convictions for sentencing purposes is undermined

by controlling precedent. In Apprendi v. New Jersey, the Supreme Court held that 

“[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime 

beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved 

beyond a reasonable doubt.” 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (emphasis added); see also 

Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 246-47 (1998) (prior conviction that 

increases maximum penalty need not be treated as element of offense and proven to a 

jury); United States v. Blair, 734 F.3d 218, 227 (3d Cir. 2013) (“Alleyne do[es] nothing to 
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restrict the established exception under Almendarez-Torres that allows judges to consider 

prior convictions.”). The Court was thus fully empowered to make the findings it did. 

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of conviction of the 

District Court.