Hon. M. H. Barton 

County Attorney 

Rusk County 

Henderson, Texas 

Opinion No. O-7240 

Re: Is a county chamber of 

commerce exempt from the 

payment of franchise tax? 

Dear Sir: 

You request request the opinion opinion of this department department upon 

the question question presented presented in your letter of May 21, from which 

for the basic facts upon which our opinion opinion is predicated predicated we 

quote as follows: 

"I would appreciate an opinion on the following question. 

"A Chamber of Commerce organized for the 

exclusive benefit of a particular city or town 

is exempt from Franchise Tax as shown by Article 

7094, R.C.S., 1925. 

"The Rusk County Chamber of Commerce is 

organized for the particular benefits of the 

entire county of Rusk, which is a subdivision 

of the State of Texas, the same as a city or 

town is a subdivision of the State of Texas. 

Will you kindly give me your opinion as to why 

a county Chamber of Commerce is not exempt, it 

being a subdivision of the State of Texas the same 

as a city or town." 

We think it must be conceded that if the Rusk County 

Chamber of Commerce is exempt from the payment of franchise 

taxes assessed against corporations by virtue of Article 7084, 

V,R.C.S., it must be by the provisions of Art. 7094, V.R.C.S., 

which we quote In full as follows: 

"The franchise tax imposed by this 

chapter shall not apply to any insurance compaw, surety, guaranty or fidelity company, 
Hon. M. H. Barton, page 2 

or any transportation company, or any sleeping, palace car and dining car company which 

is now required to pay ,an annual tax measured 

by their gross receiptd, or to corporations ' 

having no capital stock and organized for the 

exclusive purpose of promoting the public 

interest of any city or town, or to corporations 

organized for the purpose of religious worship, 

or for providing places of burial not for private profit, or corporations organized for the 

purpose of holding agricultural fairs and encouraging agricultural pursuits, or for strictly 

educational purposes, or for purely public charity." 

By careful reading of Art. 7094, supra, we think it 

must be further conceded that if it affords an exemption from 

the payment of franchise taxes as imposed generally by Art. 

7084 upon corporations, it must be by virtue of that portion 

of said article which provides: "Corporations having no capital 

stock and organized for the exclusive purpose of promoting 

the public interest of any city or town." Does the Rusk County 

Chamber of Commerce fall within this exemption? We are of the 

opinion that it does not. We interpret this language to mean 

that the organization must be for the exclusive purpose of 

promoting the public interest ,of a particular city or town, 

and not one designed, as &bviously the Rusk County Chamber of 

Commerce is, to promote the public interest of the county as a 

whole. We do not feel justified to accord by construction 

an intention not clearly expressed by the Legislature or by 

reasonable implication follows from the language used. To 

render the exemption expressed in Art. 7094, supra, applicable 

to the Rusk County Chamber of Commerce, we would have to add 

"county" after "city or town" in the above quoted portion of 

the statute. We cannot extend the exemption by adding what 

the Legislature has omitted. 

In the case of McCallum, Secretary of State, v. 

Associated Retail Credit Men of Austin, 41 S.W.(2d) 45, Judge 

Critz of the Commission of Appeals said: 

"The rule is that where a tax is levied by a 

general law and one claims an exemption therefrom 

by reason of some exemption statute, he must bring 

himselP clearly within the exemption. In other 

words, an intention on the part of the Legislature 

to grant an exemption from the taxing power will 

never be implied from language that will admit of 

any other reasonable construction. Such an intention must be expressed in clear and unambiguous 
Hon. M. H. Barton, page 3 

terms, or must appear by necessary implication 

from the language used. Cooley on Taxation, vol. 

2, par.672 and notes; Morris v. Lone Star Chap. 

No. 6, Royal Arch ,Masons, 68 Tex. 698." 

We think that had it been the intention of the 

Legislature to apply this exemption to counties as well as 

cities and towns, it would have expressly mentioned "counties', 

and this it does not do. We believe that it was the intention 

of the Legislature to apply this exemption to chambers of commerce organized for the exclusive purpose of promoting the 

public interest of a particular city or town, which would exclude its application to a county, and you are accordingly 

so advised. 

Yours very truly 

ATTORNEYGENERAL OF TEXAS 

BY L. P. Lollar 

Assistant 

LPL:AMM:BT 

Approved May 31, 1946 

Carlos Ashley 

First Assistant 

Attorney General 

Approved Opinion Committee 

By BWB, Chairman