TEED

COURT OF APPEALS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGT

a I

t fii crir rV k ON

DIVISION II

GLENDA NISSEN, an individual, 

Appellant, 

v. 

PIERCE COUNTY, a public agency; PIERCE

COUNTY PROSECUTOR' S OFFICE, a

public agency, 

Respondent. 

PROSECUTOR MARK LINDQUIST, 

Intervenor. 

No. 44852 -1 - II

PUBLISHED OPINION

HUNT, J. — Glenda Nissen appeals the superior court' s CR 12( b)( 6) dismissal of her

Public Records Act ( PRA) 1

action against Pierce County and the Pierce County Prosecutor' s

Office (County); she also appeals several other related superior court orders. At issue is whether

a government employee' s private cellular telephone call log records and text messages are

public records" subject to disclosure under the PRA. We hold that ( 1) call logs for a

government .official' s private cellular phone constitute " public records" only with regard to the

calls that relate to government business and only, if these call logs are used or retained by a

government agency; ( 2) text messages sent or received by a government official constitute

public records" only if the text messages relate to government business; and ( 3) because some

of the private cellular phone call logs and text messages Nissen requested may qualify as " public

1 Chapter 42.56 RCW. 
No. 44852 -1 - II

records," the superior court erred in granting the County' s CR 12( b)( 6) motion to dismiss her

PRA complaint. We also hold that the superior court did,not err in staying discovery until after

the CR 12( b)( 6) hearing. We reverse the superior court order granting the County' s motion to

dismiss and remand to the superior court to reinstate Nissen' s action and to develop the record.2

FACTS

I. PUBLIC RECORDS REQUESTS

Glenda Nissen is a detective with the Pierce County Sheriff' s Department ( Department) 

and a member ofthe Pierce County Deputy Sheriff' s Guild (Guild). The Department hired her in

1997; she has worked there as a detective since 2000. Mark Lindquist is the elected Pierce

County Prosecutor. Lindquist has a County- provided cellular phone, which he rarely uses, 

apparently preferring instead to use his personal cellular phone to conduct government business. 

In connection with a separate whistleblower action that Nissen filed,3

the County

produced ( 1) records showing that Lindquist generally used his County- provided cellular phone

less than 10 minutes per month, and ( 2) heavily redacted records of Lindquist' s personal cellular

phone use. These redacted personal cellular phone call logs showed: 9 work - related calls

totaling 41 minutes on August 3, 2011; 13 work - related calls totaling 72 minutes on August 2, 

2011; 10 work - related calls totaling 46 minutes on June 7, 2010; and 16 work - related text

messages on August 2 and 3, 2011. 

On June 3, 2011, Nissen submitted a PRA request asking the, County to preserve " any

and all . . . cellular telephone records" for Lindquist' s personal cellular telephone number. 

2

Therefore, we do not address Nissen' s challenge to the superior court' s other orders. 

3

Nissen' s whistleblower claim is not at issue in this appeal. 

2
No. 44852 -1 - II

Clerk' s Papers ( CP) at 29. On August 3, Nissen sent another PRA request to the County, which

stated: 

Please produce any and all of Mark Lindquist' s cellular telephone records for

number 253- 861 - [redacted here but provided in Nissen' s records request4] or any

other cellular telephone he uses to conduct his business including text messages

from August 2, 2011. 

CP at 15. 

On September 16, the County produced the first installment of requested records; on

September 28 the County was " prepared" to release the remaining records that it considered

responsive to Nissen' s request. CP at 16. The County also provided a log of exemptions that it

had used to support redacting the produced records. These claimed exemptions variably cited

RCW 42. 56.050"; " Invasion of Privacy "; " Non- Public Information, Personal Phone Calls "; 

Non- Public Information, Last 4 digits of employee' s personal phone number redacted "; 

Residential or personal wireless phone numbers, last 4 digits redacted"; " Non- Public Personal

Phone Calls "; or "Non- Public Personal Text Messages." CP at 88. 

On September 13, Nissen submitted another PRA request, which stated, " The new public

records request is for Mark Lindquist' s cellular telephone records for number 253- 861 - [redacted

4 To protect Lindquist' s privacy, the superior court redacted from its records the last four digits

of his personal cellular phone number. We issued a similar order redacting from the appellate

record the last four digits of Lindquist' s personal cellular phone number. 

3
No. 44852 -1 - II

here but stated in the records request] for June 7, [ 2010]. "

5

CP at 17. This request, however, 

omitted Nissen' s previous request' s qualifier that the records be work related. The County

responded on September 19 with heavily redacted records of Lindquist' s personal cellular phone

use and an exemption log citing the same exemptions it had previously cited when it produced

records in response to Nissen' s earlier request. 

II. PROCEDURE

On October 26, 2011, Nissen sued the County, asserting that it had claimed improper

exemptions and had wrongfully redacted records in responding to her PRA requests.6 Lindquist

intervened. The superior court entered orders ( 1) striking and sealing all court filing references

disclosing the last four digits of Lindquist' s personal cellular phone number, and ( 2) staying all

discovery pending a hearing on the County' s CR 12( b)( 6) motion to dismiss. 8

Later ruling that

private cellular phone records of elected government officials are not public records subject to

5 Although Nissen' s September 13, 2011 public records request initially requested records from

June 7, 2011," this was a typographical error that the parties clarified in subsequent

communications. Neither Nissen nor the County disputes that they understood the request to be

for records from June 7, 2010. CP at 17. 

6

Despite Nissen' s complaint' s lack of specificity, her counsel told the superior court that she

was seeking records responsive to both her August 3 and September 13, 2011 requests. 

7

As an intervenor in the superior court proceedings below, Lindquist is also involved in this

appeal, even though the superior court did not rule on his motion for temporary restraining order

and preliminary injunction. 

8

This latter order is also called the " November 23, 2011 status conference order." 

4
No. 44852 -1 - II

the PRA, the superior court granted the County' s motion to dismiss Nissen' s complaint.9 The

superior court later denied Nissen' s motion for reconsideration. 

Nissen sought direct review by the Washington State Supreme Court of the superior

court' s orders ( 1) striking and sealing Lindquist' s personal cellular phone number, ( 2) 

postponing discovery until after the hearing on the County' s motion to dismiss, ( 3) dismissing

her complaint, and ( 4) denying her motion for reconsideration. On May 1, 2013, the Supreme

Court transferred Nissen' s appeal to our court. 

ANALYSIS

Nissen argues that the PRA does not, as a matter of law, insulate Lindquist' s personal

cellular phone call logs and text messages from public records release requests, especially where

9

Although the superior court' s written order did not set forth its reasoning, its oral ruling

explained: 

I find that [ RCW] 42. 56.050, the invasion of privacy is simply that. I go back to

number one, it is not a public record. The private cell phone records of a public

elected official or a public employee are not public records. Number two. I

believe that [ Lindquist] has a right to privacy as a valid exemption; and three, I do

think that I have absolutely no power to require the third -party provider, without a

search warrant application with probable cause, to disclose records. I have no

power to do so under [ the PRA]. Whether or not [ the PRA] violates the elected

official or public official' s constitutional rights, be either state or federal, I find

that they still have those rights; that just because you run for public office does

not make you exempt in your maintaining of your right against search and seizure, 

either under the state constitution or the federal constitution, and that' s my ruling. 

Verbatim Report ofProceedings (Dec. 23, 2011) at 94 -95 ( emphasis added). 
No. 44852 -1 - II

such records contain communications about government business. 10 To the extent that an elected

public official uses a private cellular phone to conduct government business, we agree. 

I. STANDARD AND SCOPE OF REVIEW

We review de novo a superior court' s CR 12( b)( 6) dismissal of a plaintiff' s action. 

Burton v. Lehman, 153 Wn.2d 416, 422, 103 P. 3d 1230 ( 2005). Dismissal under CR 12( b)( 6) is

appropriate only " if `it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts

which would justify recovery. "' Burton, 153 Wn.2d at 422 ( quoting Tenore v. AT &T Wireless

Servs., 136 Wn.2d 322, 330, 962 P. 2d 104 ( 1998)). We presume Nissen' s allegations to be true; 

and we ' may consider hypothetical facts not included in the record. "' Burton, 153 Wn.2d at

422 ( quoting Tenore, 136 Wn.2d at 330). 

We interpret the PRA in light of the principle that full access to information concerning

the conduct of every level of government is a fundamental and necessary precondition to the

sound governance of a free society. Neighborhood Alliance of Spokane County v. Spokane

County, 172 Wn.2d 702, 714 -15, 261 P.3d 119 ( 2011). We balance this free and open

government principle against the countervailing principle that individuals, including government

employees, should be free from unreasonable searches and intrusions into their private affairs. 

1° Nissen 'similarly argues that the superior court erred in granting the County' s CR 12(b)( 6) 

motion to dismiss her complaint by " wrongly presum[ ing]" that a public official' s government - 

related records on a personal cellular phone can never be disclosed. Br. of Appellant at 9. The

County responds that the superior court properly dismissed Nissen' s complaint because, as a

matter of law, the PRA did not convert Lindquist' s personal phone records into " public records." 

Br. of Resp' t at 13. 

Nissen also argues that the trial court considered evidence outside of her complaint' s

allegations, thereby converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. 

Because we decide the underlying PRA issue on unrelated grounds, we do not further address

this summary judgment argument. 

6
No. 44852 -1 - II

WASH. CONST. art. I § 7; U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see Freedom Found. v. Gregoire, 178 Wn.2d

686, 695, 310 P. 3d 1252 ( 2013) ( "PRA must give way to constitutional mandates "). 

II. CR 12( B)( 6) DISMISSAL OF PRA CLAIM

The PRA applies only to requests for " public records," which consist of three elements: 

1). " any writing "; (2) " containing information relating to the conduct of government or the

performance of any governmental or proprietary function "; ( 3) " prepared, owned, used, or

retained by any state or local agency regardless of physical form or characteristics." RCW

42. 56.010( 3). Washington courts " liberally construe" the term " public record" as referring to

nearly any conceivable government record related to the conduct of government." O' Neill v. 

City ofShoreline, 170 Wn.2d 138, 147, 240 P. 3d 1149 ( 2010). We address each of these three

public record components in turn. 

A. Writing

Nissen' s PRA requests included two types of " writings ": ( 1) a call detail loge of

incoming and outgoing calls from Lindquist' s personal cellular phone, and ( 2) copies of text

messages sent and received by Lindquist from his personal cellular phone. Both types of records

fit within the PRA' s broad definition of a " writing" as

h] andwriting, typewriting, printing, photostating, photographing, and every other . 

means of recording . any form of communication or representation including, but

not limited to, letters, words, pictures, sounds, or symbols, or combination

thereof, and all papers, maps, magnetic or paper tapes, photographic films and

prints, motion picture, film and video recordings, magnetic or punched cards, 

discs, drums, diskettes, sound recordings, and other documents including existing

data compilations from which information may be obtained or translated. 

RCW 42.56. 010( 4). 

11 A call log includes information about the duration of a phone call, the phone number from

which a call was made or received, and, sometimes, the origin and destination of a phone call. 

7
No. 44852 -1 - II

The County does not contend that cellular phone text messages do not constitute writings. 

A copy of a text message is plainly a " communication or representation" within the meaning of

the PRA' s definition of a " writing." RCW 42. 56.010( 4). The County does argue, however, that

Lindquist' s personal cellular phone call logs do not constitute disclosable " writings" under the

PRA because a third party provider prepared them. But the PRA does not limit disclosure to

documents prepared only by government officials. 

B. Relating to Government Conduct

Lindquist admits that he conducted government work on his personal cellular phone. He

and the County concede that some of his personal cellular call logs contained records of his

government- related communications and that some of his personal cellular text messages

discussed government business. Therefore, at least some of Lindquist' s personal cellular phone

records satisfy the second element of a public record because they contain " information relating

to the conduct of government or the performance of any governmental or proprietary function." 

RCW 42.56. 010( 3). 

Nissen argues that all of Lindquist' s personal cellular phone records are public records

because he used that phone to conduct government business. Lindquist and the County contend

that not all of Lindquist' s personal cellular phone records related to government business and

that some of the information Nissen sought was purely personal. Purely personal
No. 44852 -1 - II

communications of government officials are not public records subject to PRA disclosure. 12 See

Forbes v. City of Gold Bar, 171 Wn. App. 857, 868, 288 P.3d 384 ( 2012), review denied, 177

Wn.2d 1002 ( 2013) ( purely personal emails not public records). Nor does a government

employee' s use of a single device for both work and personal communications transform all

records relating to that device into " public records." Forbes, 171 Wn. App. at 868. 

We take judicial notice that the unique nature of Lindquist' s employment as Pierce

County Prosecutor requires him to be available to fulfill "public duties 24 hours a day 7 days a

week." CP at 453. But Nissen' s broad interpretation of what constitutes a " public record "13

could conceivably subject all records of .a public prosecutor' s personal phone calls to a PRA

request, whether made on a government -owned device or on a personal device, thereby

eradicating protections for purely personal information. 

12 See also amici curiae' s argument that Lindquist' s private cellular phone records are not

public records" because they fall under the exempt categories of " personal notes, phone

messages, and personal appointment calendars." Br. of Amici Curiae of WA Fed' n of State

Empls., at 5 ( citing Yacobellis v. City of Bellingham, 55 Wn. App. 706, 712, 780 P.2d 272

1989), review denied, 114 Wn.2d 1002 ( 1990)). Yacobellis, however, excluded those records

from PRA disclosure because they were

created solely for the [ government official' s] convenience or to refresh [ the

official' s] memory, [ were] maintained in a way indicating a private purpose, 

were] not circulated or intended for distribution within agency channels, [ were] 

not under agency control, and [ could] be discarded at the writer' s sole discretion. 

Yacobellis, 55 Wn. App. at 712. Here, in contrast, neither Lindquist nor the County argues that

Lindquist' s private cellular phone call logs were created solely for his personal convenience. 

Nor does Lindquist argue that he could require his cellular phone service provider to destroy the

records at his sole discretion. Thus, Yacobellis does not necessarily exempt all of Lindquist' s

personal cellular phone records from being "public records." 

13 Despite Nissen' s argument that the public would want to know how a government employee

spends the work day, her standalone assertion is inadequate to show that a government

employee' s purely personal records, made on a private device, are " public records" subject to

disclosure. Forbes, 171 Wn. App. at 868. 

9
No. 44852 -1 - II

Nevertheless, Lindquist' s decision to forego his County- issued cellular phone in favor of

using his personal cellular phone to conduct government- related communications ( 1) rendered

his cellular phone use no longer purely personal; and ( 2) thus, potentially subjected his personal

cellular phone call detail log and text message records to agency scrutiny before release in

response to a PRA request. Lindquist' s personal cellular phone records that " relat[ e] to the

conduct of government "

14

satisfy the second element of a public record. On the other hand, the

portions of the cellular phone call logs relating to Lindquist' s personal calls and his personal text

messages do not satisfy the second, " government" element and, therefore, are not " public

records." 

The record before us on appeal, however, is inadequate to determine which portions of

Lindquist' s personal cellular phone records and which text messages satisfy the second element

of the definition of "public record." The superior court must make this determination after

developing the necessary record on remand. 

C. Used or Retained by Government Agency

The third element of a " public record" is whether Lindquist' s personal cellular phone call

logs and text messages were " prepared, owned, used, or retained by [ a] state or local agency." 

RCW 42.56. 010( 3). Lindquist is an elected official in charge of a local government agencythe

Pierce County Prosecutor' s Office. Here, we focus on the " used" or " retained" components. 

1. Text messages

Text messages relating to government business that Lindquist sent and received on his

personal cellular phone clearly were " prepared" and " used" in his capacity as a public official, 

14 RCW 42.56. 010( 3). 

10
No. 44852 -1 - II

and, therefore, satisfy the third " public record" element. That such government- business - related

text messages were contained on a personal cellular phone is immaterial. Our Supreme Court

has refused to exempt personal device communications from records subject to the PRA, stating, 

If government employees could circumvent the PRA by using their home computers for

government business, the PRA could be drastically undermined." O' Neill, 170 Wn.2d at 150. 

2. Call logs

Lindquist' s personal cellular phone call log records are more problematic. Neither

Lindquist nor the County prepared these records. Rather, Lindquist' s cellular phone provider

prepared them and apparently mailed them to him at his private address. Under the plain

language of RCW 42.56. 010( 3), Lindquist' s personal cellular phone records do not qualify as

public records" if he ( or a prosecutor' s office employee) did not review, refer to, or otherwise

use them in his capacity as a government official or if he did not store them in his government

office. The issue here is whether Lindquist used or retained his personal cellular phone call logs

in his capacity as a government official so as to satisfy the third element of the " public record" 

test.

15

More specifically, the third element of a " public record" under RCW 42. 56. 010( 3) is that

the government agency " used" the records, not the cellular phone to which the records relate. 

Thus, the more specific issue is not whether Lindquist " used" his personal cellular phone in his

capacity as a government official, but rather whether he " used" his personal cellular phone

records in that capacity. For example, Lindquist might have consulted his personal cellular

15 The County also asserts that Lindquist himself is not a " state or local agency" and, thus, his

personal cellular phone call logs are not subject to the PRA. Br. of Resp' t County at 18

emphasis omitted). We disagree. As an elected public official, Lindquist is subject to the PRA

if he owned, used, or retained records relating to government business in his official capacity. 

11
No. 44852 -1 - II

phone call logs to determine when he talked to a particular person about government business or

to track the number of calls relating to a particular governmental issue. If so, he would have

been " using" these logs in his capacity as a government official. Lindquist' s personal cellular

phone call logs also would be " public records" under RCW 42.56.010( 3) and subject to PRA

disclosure if he " retained" them in his capacity as a government official by storing them in the

prosecutor' s office or in some other government office. 

The record before us on appeal is inadequate to determine whether portions of

Lindquist' s personal cellular phone call logs relating to government business satisfy the third

element of the definition of "public record," namely whether Lindquist ( or a prosecutor' s office

employee) actually reviewed, referred to, or otherwise " used" these call logs for government

purposes. The superior court must make this determination after developing the record on

remand.

16

D. Summary

Based on our analysis of the three elements of RCW 42.56. 010( 3)' s definition of "public

record" and on Lindquist' s admission that he conducted some government work using his

personal cellular phone, at least some of Lindquist' s personal cellular phone call records and text

messages may qualify as " public records," subject to PRA disclosure, sufficient to defeat CR

12( b)( 6) dismissal. Lindquist' s personal cellular phone call logs are " public records" if (1) the

calls reflected in the logs related to government business; and ( 2) Lindquist ( or another public

16 Because we reverse the superior court' s dismissal order and remand for further development of

the record, we do not reach the question of whether Lindquist' s personal cellular phone call logs

became " public records" when he delivered them to the prosecutor' s office for the agency to

redact. 

12
No. 44852 -1 - II

employee) reviewed, referred to, or otherwise " used" these records for government purposes or

stored the records at a public office. Similarly, text messages that Lindquist sent and received on

his personal cellular phone are " public records" subject to disclosure under the PRA only if they

related to government business. But any portions of the call log records reflecting Lindquist' s

private calls are not public records and, thus, are not subject to disclosure under the PRA. 

Similarly, Lindquist' s purely private cellular phone text messages are not " public records" and

are not subject to disclosure under the PRA. 

Because we consider even hypothetical facts when reviewing a superior court' s CR

12( b)( 6) dismissal, we hold that ( 1) Nissen stated a claim that at least some of Lindquist' s

personal cellular phone call logs and text messages are subject to PRA disclosure, ( 2) it does not

appear "` beyond doubt that [ she] cannot prove any set of facts which would justify recovery, "'

17

and ( 3) the superior court erred in dismissing Nissen' s action under CR 12( b)( 6). Thus, we

reverse and remand to the superior court ( 1) to reinstate Nissen' s complaint; ( 2) to develop a

record necessary for determining which of Lindquist' s personal cellular phone text messages and

call logs, if any, pertained to the conduct of government business; and ( 3) to determine which

portions of the records Nissen requested, if any, constitute public records that must be disclosed

under the PRA. 

Because we remand to the superior court, we do not address Nissen' s and Lindquist' s

constitutional privacy arguments. Instead, we leave these arguments for the superior court, 

which will be in a better position to consider them on remand after developing the appropriate

record. 

17 Burton, 153 Wn.2d at 422. 

13
No. 44852 -1 - II

IV. ORDER ON STATUS CONFERENCE

Nissen also appeals the superior court' s November 23, 2011 status conference order, , 

arguing that ( 1) this order improperly stayed discovery pending the hearing on the County' s CR

12( b)( 6) motion, and ( 2) the superior court improperly considered declarations and matters

outside her complaint when it decided the CR 12(b)( 6) motion. The County argues that the

superior court properly stayed discovery and that its consideration of documents referenced in

Nissen' s complaint did not convert CR 12( b)( 6) review into a CR 56 summary judgment motion. 

We review a superior court' s decision to stay proceedings for an abuse of discretion. See

King v. Olympic Pipeline Co., 104 Wn. App. 338, 348, 16 P. 3d 45 ( 2000). Although we reverse

the superior court' s CR 12( b)( 6) dismissal of Nissen' s complaint, we nevertheless hold that CR

26( c)( 1) gave the superior court discretion to stay discovery until after the CR 12( b)( 6) hearing, 

which discretion the superior court did not abuse. 18

V. ATTORNEY FEES

Nissen asks us to award attorney fees and costs for both appellate and superior court

proceedings, as well as penalties under the PRA. The County does not expressly contest

Nissen' s request for attorney fees; instead, it relies on its argument that we should affirm the

superior court' s CR 12( b)( 6) dismissal. 

RCW 42.56. 550( 4) ofthe PRA provides: 

18 Because we reverse the superior court' s CR 12( b)( 6) dismissal of Nissen' s complaint, we do

not address ( 1) Nissen' s argument that, in deciding the County' s CR 12( b)( 6) motion, the

superior court improperly considered declarations and matters outside her complaint; and ( 2) 

Nissen' s motion for reconsideration. 

Because Nissen failed to present adequate argument in her opening brief, contrary to

RAP 10. 3( a)( 6), we do not address her appeal from the superior court' s November 4, 2011 order

granting motion to strike and seal or its November 23, 2011 status conference order. 

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Any person who prevails against an agency in any action in the courts seeking the

right to inspect or copy any public record or the right to receive a response to a

public record request within a reasonable amount of time shall be awarded all

costs, including reasonable attorney fees, incurred in connection with such legal

action. 

Emphasis added.) Nevertheless, our Supreme Court has held that attorney fees " should be

granted only when documents are disclosed to a prevailing party," and " where further fact

finding is necessary to determine whether the PRA was violated, the question of attorney fees

should be remanded to the trial court." O' Neill, 170 Wn.2d at 152 ( citing Concerned Ratepayers

Ass' n v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Clark County, 138 Wn.2d 950, 964, 983 P.2d 635 ( 1999)). 

Because we do not reach the question of whether the County violated the PRA, and because we

do not decide whether the County must disclose particular documents, we do not award fees. 

Instead, we leave that issue for the superior court to address on remand if appropriate. See

O' Neill, 170 Wn.2d at 152. 

We reverse the superior court' s CR 12( b)( 6) dismissal of Nissen' s PRA action against the

County. We remand to the superior court to reinstate Nissen' s action and to determine whether, 

under the specific facts of this case, Lindquist' s personal cellular phone call logs and text

messages constitute " public records" as defined in RCW 42.56.010( 3). 

We concur: 

15