Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 100 / Wednesday, May 22, 1996 / Notices 25647

Rachel Murphy Samuel at (202) 586–

3279.

Issued in Washington, DC on May 16,

1996.

JoAnne Whitman,

Deputy Advisory Committee Management

Officer.

[FR Doc. 96–12821 Filed 5–21–96; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6450–01–P

Electrometallurgical Treatment

Research and Demonstration Project

in the Fuel Conditioning Facility at

Argonne National Laboratory—West;

Finding of No Significant Impact

(FONSI)

AGENCY: Department of Energy.

ACTION: Finding of no significant

impact.

SUMMARY: The United States Department

of Energy has prepared an

environmental assessment, DOE/EA–

1148 (finalized on May 15, 1996), on the

proposed Electrometallurgical

Treatment Research and Demonstration

Project in the Fuel Conditioning Facility

at Argonne National Laboratory—West.

The Proposed Action is to conduct a

research and demonstration project

involving electrometallurgical

processing of up to 100 Experimental

Breeder Reactor–II driver assemblies

and 25 Experimental Breeder Reactor–II

blanket assemblies in the Fuel

Conditioning Facility at Argonne

National Laboratory—West.

Electrometallurgical processing involves

the dissolution of spent nuclear fuel by

use of an electric current in a molten

salt mixture. The uranium in the fuel is

collected at the cathode and

subsequently melted to form a metal

ingot; the structural metals and some

fission products are retrieved

undissolved from the anode and are cast

into a metal ingot; and eventually most

fission products and all transuranic

elements are isolated in a ceramic waste

form. The number of driver fuel

assemblies covered by the Proposed

Action would provide the minimum

fission product loading (3 percent)

necessary to evaluate the effectiveness

of the removal of fission products from

the electrorefiner salt and their

concentration in the ceramic waste

form. In addition, the 25 blanket

assemblies proposed would provide a

sufficient quantity of material to

evaluate the higher efficiency

electrorefining necessary to process the

much larger blanket assemblies. The

Proposed Action would require

approximately three years, and is

designed to address demonstration goals

for electrometallurgical treatment

technology outlined by the National

Research Council in a 1995 report to the

Department. In accordance with the

Council on Environmental Quality

requirements contained in 40 CFR Parts

1500–1508, the environmental

assessment examined the environmental

impacts of the Proposed Action and

potential alternatives.

The Department distributed a draft

environmental assessment for public

review and comment from February 5,

1996 to March 22, 1996 (61 FR 3922,

January 29, 1996), and conducted public

meetings on the draft assessment in

Idaho Falls, Idaho on February 21, 1996,

and Washington, D.C. on February 27,

1996. In response to several requests,

the Department reopened the public

review period until May 3, 1996 (61 FR

16471, April 15, 1996).

The Department has considered all

comments on the draft environmental

assessment, including comments

submitted by 5 members of Congress, 17

organizations, and 53 individuals.

Those comments and the Department’s

responses are presented in an appendix

to the final environmental assessment

entitled, ‘‘Comment Response

Document.’’ A summary of the major

public comments and the Department’s

responses is provided under

Supplementary Information below.

The Department has decided to

proceed with the proposed

demonstration. Even if successful,

however, the demonstration will not

automatically lead to the treatment of

more Experimental Breeder Reactor–II

spent nuclear fuel or to other broader

applications of electrometallurgical

technology. The Department will not

make any significant additional use of

the electrometallurgical refining

technology without first preparing an

environmental impact statement.

Specifically, the Department will not

use this technology to treat the

remaining Experimental Breeder

Reactor–II spent fuel or make another

production-scale use of the technology

without preparing an environmental

impact statement.

The Department would exercise its

authority to prevent proliferation

sensitive information and technology

advances resulting from the proposed

demonstration from becoming available

to potential proliferant-risk countries,

including exercising its authority under

the Atomic Energy Act, the Nuclear

Nonproliferation Act of 1978 and the

Department’s implementing regulations.

Based on the analysis in the

environmental assessment, which is

incorporated herein by reference, and

after consideration of all the comments

received as a result of the public review

process, the Department of Energy has

determined that the Proposed Action

does not constitute a major Federal

action significantly affecting the quality

of the human environment within the

meaning of the National Environmental

Policy Act of 1969. Therefore, an

environmental impact statement is not

required.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Persons requesting additional

information regarding the

Electrometallurgical Treatment Project

or a copy of the environmental

assessment should contact: Mr. Robert

G. Lange, Associate Director for

Facilities (NE–40), Office of Nuclear

Energy, Science and Technology, U.S.

Department of Energy (GTN), 19901

Germantown Road, Germantown,

Maryland 20874.

Mr. Lange may also be reached by

calling (301) 903–2915.

Persons requesting general

information on the Department of

Energy’s National Environmental Policy

Act process should contact: Ms. Carol

M. Borgstrom, Director, Office of NEPA

Policy and Assistance (EH–42), U.S.

Department of Energy, 1000

Independence Avenue SW.,

Washington, DC 20585.

Ms. Borgstrom may also be reached by

calling (202) 586–4600, or by leaving a

message at (800) 472–2756.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

The Department of Energy is

responsible for managing spent nuclear

fuel in its inventory, including spent

nuclear fuel from the Experimental

Breeder Reactor-II. The Department

manages 25.5 metric tons (heavy metal)

of Experimental Breeder Reactor-II fuel

at Argonne National Laboratory-West

and the Idaho Chemical Processing

Plant, both located at the Idaho National

Engineering Laboratory near Idaho Falls.

The Department has a legally binding

commitment to remove spent nuclear

fuel from the State of Idaho by the year

2035, including fuel from the

Experimental Breeder Reactor-II. The

Experimental Breeder Reactor-II fuel is

unlikely to be suitable for direct

disposal in a geologic repository

because it is saturated with sodium,

which is a reactive material.

Experimental Breeder Reactor-II spent

fuel may also be unsuitable for direct

disposal in a geologic repository

because of criticality concerns

associated with fuels containing highlyenriched uranium.

The Department has identified

electrometallurgical treatment as a

promising technology to treat
25648 Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 100 / Wednesday, May 22, 1996 / Notices

Experimental Breeder Reactor-II spent

nuclear fuel to make it suitable for

repository disposal, but an appropriate

demonstration is needed to provide

sufficient information for the

Department to evaluate the feasibility of

the technology. At the Department’s

request, the National Research Council

conducted an independent assessment

of the potential application of

electrometallurgical technology to treat

spent nuclear fuel from the

Experimental Breeder Reactor-II. In its

1995 report, the Council recommended

that the Department proceed to

demonstrate the feasibility of

electrometallurgical technology using

Experimental Breeder Reactor-II spent

nuclear fuel. A successful

demonstration of the

electrometallurgical technology on a

sufficient sample of the Experimental

Breeder Reactor-II spent nuclear fuel,

combined with research and testing of

the resulting waste forms, is expected to

provide information the Department

needs to determine whether to propose

applying this technology to the

remainder of the Experimental Breeder

Reactor-II spent nuclear fuel or other

spent nuclear fuel.

Proposed Action

The Proposed Action is to conduct a

research and demonstration project

involving electrometallurgical

processing of up to 100 Experimental

Breeder Reactor-II driver assemblies and

25 Experimental Breeder Reactor-II

blanket assemblies in the Fuel

Conditioning Facility at Argonne

National Laboratory-West.

Electrometallurgical processing involves

the dissolution of spent nuclear fuel by

use of an electric current in a molten

salt mixture. The uranium in the fuel is

collected at the cathode and

subsequently melted to form a metal

ingot; the structural metals and some

fission products are retrieved

undissolved from the anode and are cast

into a metal ingot; and eventually most

fission products and all transuranic

elements are isolated in a ceramic waste

form. The number of driver fuel

assemblies covered by the Proposed

Action would provide the minimum

fission product loading (3 percent)

necessary to evaluate the effectiveness

of the removal of fission products from

the electrorefiner salt and their

concentration in the ceramic waste

form. In addition, the 25 blanket

assemblies would provide a sufficient

quantity of material to evaluate the

higher efficiency electrorefining

necessary to process the much larger

blanket assemblies. The Proposed

Action would require approximately

three years, and is designed to address

demonstration goals for

electrometallurgical treatment

technology outlined by the National

Research Council in its 1995 report.

The one hundred driver assemblies

involved in the Proposed Action would

require multiple batch operations of the

processing equipment in a remote,

radioactive hot cell with an inert argon

atmosphere. These operations would be

sufficient to demonstrate the overall

dependability and predictability of the

process, considering equipment

reliability, repair and maintenance, and

operability of linked process steps. In

addition, processing 100 driver fuel

assemblies is expected to produce

waste-form samples with representative

radioactive waste loadings in quantities

sufficient for testing. It is expected that

the testing of these samples will assist

in the development and characterization

for future repository acceptance of the

two process waste forms (ceramic and

metal) produced by the

electrometallurgical processing

technique.

In order to evaluate higher efficiency

electrorefining, 25 blanket assemblies

would be processed in a second

electrorefiner to be installed in the Fuel

Conditioning Facility hot cell. Testing of

the electrorefining concept with

nonradioactive surrogate materials and

construction of the second electrorefiner

are currently underway at the Argonne

National Laboratory-East site near

Chicago, Illinois. Under the Proposed

Action, this electrorefiner would be

transported to Argonne National

Laboratory-West, installed in the Fuel

Conditioning Facility hot cell, and used

to process the 25 blanket assemblies.

This processing would require about

seven batch operations in the high

efficiency electrorefiner. These

operations would demonstrate a oneday throughput of approximately 160

kilograms (353 pounds) per batch.

The Fuel Conditioning Facility is a

small research facility, and its material

handling equipment could not sustain

the continued preparation of spent

nuclear fuel for operation of the highefficiency electrorefiner at a throughput

equivalent to a production operation.

Even though a production-scale

operation in the Fuel Conditioning

Facility is not possible with existing

equipment, however, this demonstration

would show the feasibility of batch

operation electrorefining at a capacity

approaching 200 kilograms per day (441

pounds per day) of radioactive

Experimental Breeder Reactor-II spent

nuclear fuel in a suitably designed and

equipped facility, as recommended by

the National Research Council. Seven

batch operations should be sufficient to

evaluate the reliability of the equipment

and to meet the intent of the National

Research Council’s recommendation

regarding high-efficiency

electrorefining.

Alternatives Analyzed

The environmental assessment

analyzed in detail the following

alternatives to the Proposed Action:

1. Conducting the research and

demonstration project in a facility at an

alternative location, i.e., the Test Area

North Hot Shop at the Idaho National

Engineering Laboratory;

2. Conducting an equipment

performance verification project by

treating 50 driver assemblies and 10

blanket assemblies in the Fuel

Conditioning Facility; and

3. Taking no action, i.e., placing all

the Experimental Breeder Reactor-II

spent nuclear fuel in interim storage,

and not demonstrating the

electrometallurgical treatment

technology.

Alternative 1, Demonstration at an

Alternative Facility and Location,

would result in higher program cost and

extensive additional waste generated

from required facility modifications and

relocation of the nuclear materials

presently stored in the Test Area North

Hot Shop to allow for the appropriate

reconfiguration of that facility to

accommodate electrorefining

equipment. This alternative would also

require the transportation on public

highways of spent nuclear fuel and the

electrometallurgical equipment from the

Argonne National Laboratory-West to

the Test Area North Hot Shop, which

would not be necessary for the Proposed

Action.

Alternative 2, Equipment Performance

Verification, is very similar to the

Proposed Action in terms of its

environmental impacts. However, this

alternative would not fully satisfy the

purpose and need for Department of

Energy action because this alternative

would not provide sufficient quantities

of fission products, transuranics, and

sodium impurities to test the

electrorefiner under conditions

comparable to production-scale

operation and to address the

recommendations of the National

Research Council.

Alternative 3, No Action, is also

similar to the Proposed Action in that

the environmental impacts that would

result from packaging and storing all the

Experimental Breeder Reactor-II spent

nuclear fuel would be small. However,

the No-Action Alternative would not

provide the information and data

needed to determine whether to
Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 100 / Wednesday, May 22, 1996 / Notices 25649

continue the development of this

technology as a potential management

option for the disposal of Experimental

Breeder Reactor-II sodium-bonded spent

nuclear fuel.

Alternatives Considered But Not

Analyzed in Detail in the

Environmental Assessment

Demonstration of a technology other

than electrometallurgical processing

was not analyzed in detail because there

are no other ‘‘innovative’’ spent nuclear

fuel treatment technologies that have

reached a stage of development to

warrant testing by the Department of

Energy with irradiated fuel. The

environmental assessment discussed,

but did not analyze in detail, the

following alternative treatment

technologies:

• Chloride Volatility: This very high

temperature process would convert

spent nuclear fuel to chloride

compounds in a gaseous state, from

which the constituents could be

separated into appropriate streams for

further treatment. Demonstration of

chloride volatility technology would

require development of very high

temperature, corrosion-resistant

equipment. This technology has not

reached a stage of development suitable

for demonstration with spent nuclear

fuel.

• Glass Material Oxidation and

Dissolution: This treatment concept

would dissolve spent nuclear fuel using

a system of lead and lead oxide with the

intent of incorporating most spent

nuclear fuel constituents in a glass

waste form. It too has not reached a

stage of development suitable for

demonstration with spent nuclear fuel.

• Plasma Arc Process: This extremely

high temperature process would use an

electric arc to melt spent nuclear fuel,

allowing the constituents to separate

into glass and metal phases. However,

this technology is still in the early stages

of research and development and is not

currently suitable for demonstration

with spent nuclear fuel.

• Hot, Water-Saturated Carbon

Dioxide and Alcohol/Water Rinsing

Processes: These processes, which

would react the sodium to form sodium

carbonate, would require extensive

development to safely control the

reactions and to stabilize the products of

the reactions before they could be

considered ready for a demonstration

with sodium-bonded fuel.

• Low-Temperature Vacuum

Distillation: This process would

evaporate the sodium from around the

uranium fuel. It would not work for the

Experimental Breeder Reactor-II driver

fuel, however, because from 20 to 40

percent of the sodium in the driver fuel

has been absorbed into the porous metal

fuel alloy.

In addition, the environmental

assessment considered, but did not

analyze in detail, existing technologies

that would require some development

and modification. These technologies

include:

• Mechanical Processing: This

process has been used on some

Experimental Breeder Reactor-II blanket

fuel assemblies to strip away the layer

of metallic sodium under the fuel’s

cladding. Considerable development of

optical and control systems would be

required for safe and reliable remote

operation of a high-power laser to

remove the fuel cladding in a

radioactive hot cell environment. The

sodium adhering to the cladding

material, as well as the uranium, would

be contaminated by cesium-137 during

the cutting process and would require

additional treatment and perhaps

creation of a new waste form for

disposal purposes. Mechanical

processing would not work for the

driver fuel assemblies, however,

because from 20 to 40 percent of the

sodium in the driver assemblies has

been absorbed within the fuel, and

therefore could not be removed except

by dissolving or melting the fuel.

• Plutonium Uranium Extraction

(PUREX) Processing at the Idaho

Chemical Processing Plant: Modifying

this reprocessing plant to dissolve the

modern Experimental Breeder Reactor-II

spent nuclear fuel would require

changes in the dissolution process.

These changes would be necessary

because the zirconium in the modern

Experimental Breeder Reactor-II fuel

alloy inside a stainless steel cladding

would require chemical additives to

control the dissolution reaction safely.

In addition, the plant would have to be

restarted to carry out the demonstration.

Because of excessive cost and the

development required, processing of

Experimental Breeder Reactor-II spent

nuclear fuel at the Idaho Chemical

Processing Plant is not a reasonable

alternative to the proposed limited

demonstration of electrometallurgical

treatment technology.

• Dissolution and Vitrification: This

process, which would dissolve spent

nuclear fuel in acid (initial stage of

PUREX process) and then vitrify it in

borosilicate glass, would require a major

modification to the existing dissolution

process at the Savannah River site in

order to be used in a demonstration

with Experimental Breeder Reactor-II

fuel. This modification would be similar

to the modification that would be

required for the Idaho Chemical

Processing Plant discussed above.

Further, the fuel would have to be

packaged and shipped to Savannah

River, which would be inconsistent

with the Records of Decision (60 Fed.

Reg. 28680, June 1, 1995 and 61 Fed.

Reg. 9441, March 8, 1996) for the

Programmatic Spent Nuclear Fuel

Management and Idaho National

Engineering Laboratory Environmental

Restoration and Waste Management

Environmental Impact Statement. These

decisions require the regionalization of

the type of spent fuel that would be

involved in the demonstration to the

Idaho National Engineering Laboratory.

Treatment at a Location Outside of the

Idaho National Engineering Laboratory

The Department also considered

electrometallurgical treatment at a

location outside of the Idaho National

Engineering Laboratory. This alternative

would require the removal,

decontamination and relocation of

existing equipment to a newly

constructed hot cell facility where the

demonstration project would be

conducted. This is not considered a

reasonable alternative for a limited

demonstration, because of the excessive

cost and time involved for these

preparative activities. This alternative

would also be contrary to the Records of

Decision for the Programmatic Spent

Nuclear Fuel Management and Idaho

National Engineering Laboratory

Environmental Restoration and Waste

Management Environmental Impact

Statement.

Spent Fuel, Byproduct, and Waste

Material Management

The Proposed Action would generate

process wastes from the treatment

operations and incidental wastes from

the normal support operations of a hot

cell facility. The process wastes include

the fuel assembly hardware, metal waste

form and ceramic waste form. The

incidental wastes include operational

wastes such as broken equipment, rags,

packaging materials and other

miscellaneous items. After use of the

demonstration equipment has been

completed, decommissioning wastes

would include the disposal of the

process equipment and process fluids

such as the electrorefiner salt and

cadmium. These materials would be

categorized and disposed of according

to existing Department of Energy orders

and the Argonne National Laboratory

radioactive waste management

procedures. Two uranium byproducts

would be recovered from the

demonstration: low-enriched uranium

blended down from the highly-enriched

uranium in the driver fuel assemblies,
25650 Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 100 / Wednesday, May 22, 1996 / Notices

and depleted uranium from the blanket

fuel assemblies. The uranium

byproducts would be characterized

according to the level of residual

contamination. Adequate storage

locations exist at Argonne National

Laboratory-West to accommodate the

small volume of spent nuclear fuel,

waste materials, and byproduct

uranium.

These materials, except the metal

waste form and ceramic waste form, are

currently produced at the Argonne

National Laboratory-West site and

would continue to be produced under

all alternatives. The metal waste form

and ceramic waste form, which would

be classified as high level waste, would

contain the fission products from the

spent nuclear fuel and would be stored

in the Radioactive Scrap and Waste

Facility at Argonne National LaboratoryWest. Both the high-level waste forms

and the spent nuclear fuel elements are

highly radioactive, requiring identical

double containment and shielding, as

well as special handling procedures.

Because processing assemblies would

result in waste forms that are more

compact, less storage volume would be

required for the waste forms and

uranium byproducts of the treated

assemblies than for the untreated spent

nuclear fuel assemblies. Under the

Proposed Action, the Radioactive Scrap

and Waste Facility storage requirement

would be 38 liners (vertical

underground storage cylinders).

Byproduct uranium ingots would total

0.15 cubic meters (5.3 cubic feet) in

volume [equivalent to two Radioactive

Waste and Scrap Facility canisters

(engineered storage containers with

welded tops that fit into the storage

liners)]. The Equipment Performance

Verification Alternative (see

Alternatives Analyzed, above) would

require 59 Radioactive Waste and Scrap

Facility storage liners and storage space

for 0.07 cubic meters (2.5 cubic feet) of

uranium byproduct ingots (equivalent to

one Radioactive Waste and Scrap

Facility canister). A larger number of

storage liners would be required in this

alternative because more spent fuel

would have to be stored. The No-Action

Alternative would require 81

Radioactive Waste and Scrap Facility

storage liners. The number of storage

liners required under the Demonstration

in the Alternative Facility at the Test

Area North Hot Shops at the Idaho

National Engineering Laboratory is the

same as the Proposed Action because

only the location of the treatment

process is different.

Low level radioactive wastes would

be generated by routine facility

operations under all alternatives,

ranging in volume from 20 cubic meters

(700 cubic feet) in the Proposed Action

to 70 cubic meters (2475 cubic feet) in

the No-Action Alternative. Fifty cubic

meters (1750 cubic feet) of transuranic

waste would be generated in the action

alternatives.

Comparisons of waste that would be

generated under the Proposed Action

and the current Idaho National

Engineering Laboratory inventory of

similar waste are shown in Table 1.

Adequate waste storage capacity exists

for all alternatives.

Environmental Consequences of the

Proposed Action

Surface Water Impacts: As described

in Section 4.3.5 of the environmental

assessment, the Proposed Action would

not produce liquid effluents, so there

would not be any impacts to surface

waters or groundwater from effluents.

To prevent potential releases to surface

or subsurface waters resulting from

spills of hazardous materials used in

buildings, the Fuel Conditioning

Facility and other buildings are

designed, constructed and maintained

to contain these materials.

TABLE 1. COMPARISONS OF WASTE GENERATED UNDER THE PROPOSED ACTION

Waste streams Proposed Action (m3)

Current

INEL

inventory*

(m3)

Percent of

INEL inventory (%)

High level waste ................................................................................................................................... 0.52 10,000 0.0052

TRU waste ............................................................................................................................................ 50 65,000 0.092

Low level waste .................................................................................................................................... 20 9,500 0.21

Mixed waste ......................................................................................................................................... 1 1,100 0.10

Greater than class C waste ................................................................................................................. 1.4 9,100 0.015

Environmental restoration waste** ....................................................................................................... 192 320,000 0.06

*Source: ‘‘Intergration of EM activities at the INEL,’’ Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, March 31, 1995.

**Waste that would be generated from decommissioning activities following the demonstration.

Land Impacts: Land use at Argonne

National Laboratory-West has been

dedicated to nuclear reactor and spent

fuel research since 1955. All activities

associated with the Proposed Action

would take place on previously

disturbed land and within existing

structures.

Cultural Resources: All activities

associated with the Proposed Action

would be conducted within existing

facilities. No archeological or historic

sites and structures would be affected.

Threatened or Endangered Species:

There are no known threatened or

endangered species or sensitive habitats

that would be affected by the Proposed

Action.

Nonradioactive Air Emissions: As

summarized in Section 4.1.1.1 of the

environmental assessment, potential

impacts from nonradioactive releases

associated with the Proposed Action are

very small. A small amount of

refrigerant gas (freon R–22) may escape

from the argon cell cooling system at the

Fuel Conditioning Facility and electrical

equipment cleaning will also contribute

a small amount. No adverse

consequences would be expected to

result from the estimated total

refrigerant gas release of about 90

kilograms (200 pounds) per year, which

is small (400 times less) compared with

the 36,000 kilograms per year (40 tons

per year) Idaho regulatory threshold for

‘‘significant’’ release of volatile organic

compounds.

Radioactive Air Emissions: As

summarized in Section 4.1.1.2 of the

environmental assessment, potential

offsite doses from routine operations

during this Proposed Action are quite

small, less than 1.1×10¥6 rem per year

to the maximally exposed individual.

This is more than a factor of 9,000 less

than the 0.01 rem per year annual dose

limit imposed by the National Emission

Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutents

program. No increased radiation levels,

above background, would be detectable

at the Argonne National LaboratoryWest site or at the Idaho National

Engineering Laboratory site boundary.
Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 100 / Wednesday, May 22, 1996 / Notices 25651

Worker Health Effects (Normal

Operating Conditions): As described in

Section 4.1.2 of the environmental

assessment, under the Proposed Action,

the average exposure of workers to

radiation is small, and is not expected

to increase to levels above those of the

No-Action Alternative. The average

annual exposure for a worker in the

Fuel Conditioning Facility directly

involved in the project is estimated to

be 0.06 rem per year, and 0.03 rem per

year for those not directly involved.

These numbers are less than the 0.35

rem per year annual natural background

radiation in the surrounding Eastern

Snake River Plain. The probability of a

single additional latent cancer fatality

among workers involved in the project

from the increased exposure is

estimated to be one chance in 1,000.

Transportation Impacts:

Transportation risks at the Idaho

National Engineering Laboratory are

small and would not be increased as a

result of this Proposed Action. The

Argonne National Laboratory-West

workers travel over public highways to

reach work. Since the Proposed Action

would not require an increase in the

total number of employees, there is no

increase in transportation risk for

employees. Likewise, there would be no

increase in waste shipments over public

highways from Argonne National

Laboratory-West facilities to the

Radioactive Waste Management

Complex (such shipments are associated

with routine facility operations and

would also be required for the NoAction Alternative). High-level waste,

spent nuclear fuel and low-enriched

uranium transfers between Argonne

National Laboratory-West facilities do

not use public highways. The net

number of transfers within the Argonne

National Laboratory-West site would not

increase as a result of the Proposed

Action.

Socioeconomic Impacts: As described

in Section 4.3.2 of the environmental

assessment, it is not anticipated that the

Proposed Action would have any

measurable socioeconomic impacts on

the area surrounding the Idaho National

Engineering Laboratory. Any additional

research personnel hired to help plan,

conduct and interpret the experiments

would be more than offset by a

reduction in force that has been

occurring due to shutdown of

Experimental Breeder Reactor-II. No net

additional personnel would be hired as

a result of the Proposed Action.

Procurements of materials or services

required for the Proposed Action would

be minimal, and would be very small

compared to the overall Idaho National

Engineering Laboratory budget.

Potential Environmental Impacts of

Facility Accidents: As described in

Section 4.2 of the environmental

assessment, the Final Safety Analysis

Report (Revision 0, May 1, 1995) for the

Fuel Conditioning Facility evaluated the

consequences of a broad range of

potential facility accidents which could

possibly release radioactivity to the

environment.

The largest radiological risk to an

individual worker from any of the

reasonably foreseeable accidents would

be an increase of 3 chances in 10,000 of

death by cancer due to radiation

exposure following an accidental spent

fuel transfer cask drop outside the

facility. (The estimated probability of

this accident is in a range from 1 chance

in 100 to 1 chance in 10,000.) Since this

accident would involve spent nuclear

fuel, it would apply to each of the

alternatives, including the No-Action

Alternative. If such an accident

occurred, up to 600 workers might be

exposed to radiation, resulting in

approximately 0.2 latent cancer

fatalities; an estimated 0.003 latent

cancer fatalities among the off-site

population (within 50 miles of the site)

could occur. This accident also

represents the largest risk to the

maximally exposed (public) individual,

with an increase of 1 chance in 20

million of developing a fatal cancer if

the accident did occur. The probability

of developing a nonfatal cancer would

be 1 chance in 2 million for the

maximally exposed individual worker

and 1 chance in 100 million for the

maximally exposed individual member

of the public.

An air cell exhaust system flow

reversal accident represents the largest

risk from an accident that distinguishes

the action alternatives, including the

Proposed Action, from the No-Action

Alternative. (The probability of this

accident is estimated to be between 1

chance in 10,000 and 1 chance in 1

million.) If this accident occurred, an

individual worker would have 1 chance

in 400,000 of developing a fatal cancer.

A member of the public at the site

boundary receiving the maximum dose

would have 1 chance in 20 million of

contracting a fatal cancer as a result of

such an accident.

Consequences of Beyond-Design-Basis

Accidents: Beyond-design-basis

accidents are those accidents with

probabilities of occurrence estimated to

be between 1 in a million and 1 in 10

million. As described in Section 4.2.1.2

of the environmental assessment, two

beyond-design-basis accidents have

been evaluated for the modified Fuel

Conditioning Facility. The first accident

is a metal fire occurring simultaneously

with small breaches in the argon cell

confinement and with concurrent

failure of abatement by the two separate

stages of high-efficiency particulate air

filtration provided by the safety exhaust

system. The second accident, an aircraft

crash into the facility, is described in

detail in DOE/ID–10471, ‘‘Accident

Assessments for Idaho National

Engineering Laboratory Facilities.’’

The airplane crash accident assumes

that a large commercial jet crashes into

the Fuel Conditioning Facility, resulting

in penetration of the argon cell and a

fire in the facility involving aviation

fuel. This accident would result in a

radiation dose of 250 person-rem among

the potentially exposed population

within an 80 kilometer (50 mile) radius.

The estimated increase in latent cancer

fatalities is 0.13, or approximately 1

chance in 8, of an additional cancer

fatality. The corresponding increase in

nonfatal cancers is estimated to be

0.025, or 1 chance in 40, of an

additional nonfatal cancer. Based on

conservative estimates (i.e., estimates

that tend to overstate the impacts), 2

radiation-induced cancer fatalities

among 600 potentially-exposed workers

would result.

In the metal fire accident, a fire in the

hot process metal is assumed to start

after sufficient oxygen enters through

argon cell breaches resulting from a

beyond-design-basis earthquake. This

accident would result in a radiation

dose of 74 person-rem among the

population within an 80 kilometer (50

mile) radius. The estimated increase in

latent cancer fatalities is 0.037, or

approximately 1 chance in 24, of an

additional cancer fatality among

potentially exposed members of the

public. Based on conservative estimates,

three radiation-induced cancer fatalities

among workers would result.

Taking account of the potential

consequences and probabilities of

occurrence, the accident risks associated

with the Proposed Action are small.

Natural Hazards: As described in

Section 4.2.2 of the environmental

assessment, the Fuel Conditioning

Facility Final Safety Analysis Report

provides a discussion of natural

phenomena hazards. The principal

potential natural hazard is earthquakes.

The air cell, argon cell, general building

and safety equipment building were

analyzed and were confirmed to

maintain structural integrity during and

after the design-basis earthquake (0.21 g

acceleration). All structures can easily

accommodate the straight wind loading

of 95 mph and the snow loading of 40

pounds per square foot.

Spent Nuclear Fuel, Uranium ByProducts and Waste Management
25652 Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 100 / Wednesday, May 22, 1996 / Notices

Impacts: As discussed in Section 4.5 of

the environmental assessment, using a

common comparison basis for

estimating waste volumes for each

alternative, implementation of the

Proposed Action would result in a net

decrease in the combined volume of

high-level waste and spent nuclear fuel

at Argonne National Laboratory-West.

For the volume of high level wastes

generated by the process, adequate

storage capacity currently exists on-site.

The Proposed Action would increase

the volume of low-enriched uranium

and high-level radioactive waste stored

at the Argonne National LaboratoryWest site. The increased volumes,

however, would occupy a small

percentage of the available storage

space.

Compared to the No-Action

Alternative, the Proposed Action would

also result in a net decrease in the

amount of low-level waste generated

and shipped to the Idaho National

Engineering Laboratory Radioactive

Waste Management Complex, because

some of the waste generated from

normal facility operations would be

characterized as transuranic waste.

Therefore, the reduction in low-level

waste volumes would be offset by a net

increase in the amount of transuranic

waste. Argonne National LaboratoryWest and the Idaho National

Engineering Laboratory Radioactive

Waste Management Complex have

adequate interim storage capacity to

accommodate the transuranic waste,

which would be less than one-tenth of

one percent of the current inventory at

the Idaho National Engineering

Laboratory.

The amounts of mixed waste and

nonradioactive waste generated under

the Proposed Action are the same as

would be expected under the No-Action

Alternative. Existing, adequate storage

capacity exists for any of the wastes that

would be generated.

Cumulative Impacts: A cumulative

impact is the result of the incremental

impact of the Proposed Action added to

all other past, present, and reasonably

foreseeable future actions. Cumulative

impacts associated with Idaho National

Engineering Laboratory spent nuclear

fuel, environmental restoration, and

waste management activities have been

described and analyzed in Volume 2,

Section 5.15 of the Spent Nuclear Fuel

and Idaho National Engineering

Laboratory Environmental Impact

Statement. As discussed in Section 4.3

of the environmental assessment, the

environmental impacts of the Proposed

Action would be small and would add

only a small increment to past, present

or reasonably foreseeable impacts at the

Idaho National Engineering Laboratory.

Therefore, the Proposed Action would

not result in significant cumulative

impacts.

Environmental Justice: As discussed

above and described in Section 4.6 of

the environmental assessment, the

potential environmental impacts

calculated for activities associated with

the Proposed Action are small, and

present little or no risk to any segment

of the surrounding population.

Therefore, the impacts also do not

constitute disproportionately high or

adverse impacts on any minority or lowincome population.

Consistency with United States

Nonproliferation Policy: It is the policy

of the United States not to encourage the

civil use of plutonium. The proposed

demonstration project would not

separate plutonium from the processed

Experimental Breeder Reactor-II fuel.

Moreover, the technology employed is

not capable of separating plutonium.

Even with extensive modification, the

technology would not be capable of

separating plutonium that would be

suitable for a proliferant nuclear

weapons program. Further, by removing

and then blending down the highly

enriched uranium in the Experimental

Breeder Reactor-II driver fuel, the

project supports the United States goal

of seeking to eliminate, where possible,

the accumulation of stockpiles of highly

enriched uranium. As a result, the

proposed demonstration project is

consistent with United States

nonproliferation policy.

Principal Concerns Raised During

Public Comment Period: As noted

above, a draft environmental assessment

was available for public comment from

February 5, 1996 through May 3, 1996.

The Department carefully considered all

comments received and prepared a

detailed ‘‘Comment Response

Document,’’ which is an appendix to the

final environmental assessment. The

following discussion summarizes the

principal concerns raised by

commentors and the Department’s

responses.

Reprocessing: Some commentors

suggested that the proposed

demonstration of electrometallurgical

treatment technology is ‘‘reprocessing’’

because it involves the separation of

spent nuclear fuel constituents, could

involve the future reuse of the separated

materials, and/or has evolved from a

technology that was originally intended

to support the now-terminated Integral

Fast Reactor project. As a result, some

commentors suggested that the

Department’s National Environmental

Policy Act regulation (10 CFR Part 1021,

Appendix D to Subpart D) requires the

preparation of an environmental impact

statement for the proposed

demonstration program.

It is important to note that preparation

of an environmental impact statement is

not automatically required by Appendix

D, which is entitled ‘‘Classes of Actions

That Normally Require Environmental

Impact Statements’’ (emphasis added).

At most, the inclusion of a class of

actions in Appendix D establishes a

presumption that activities falling

within that class are generally ‘‘major’’

activities requiring the preparation of an

environmental impact statement. That

presumption is overcome when an

evaluation of a specific proposal

indicates that it is not a ‘‘major’’ activity

and would not produce any significant

environmental impacts.

The particular provision of Appendix

D at issue originated in 1990, when the

Department issued a Notice of Proposed

Rulemaking (55 Federal Register 46444,

November 2, 1990) that eventually was

promulgated in 1992 as 10 CFR Part

1021. Among the new classes of actions

proposed as ‘‘normally requiring

Environmental Impact Statements’’ was

the ‘‘siting, construction, operation, and

decommissioning of reprocessing

facilities.’’ The preamble to the

proposed rule described this provision’s

intended scope as one of several new

classes of activity ‘‘related to the siting,

construction and operation of major

nuclear facilities’’ (emphasis added). It

is apparent from this preamble language

that the Department regarded the scale

of the proposed activity and its potential

for significant impacts, not the

designation of an activity as

‘‘reprocessing,’’ as the important factor

in establishing the need for an

environmental impact statement.

Unlike the large reprocessing facilities

existing at the time the regulations were

promulgated, the proposed

demonstration project does not generate

large volumes of liquid high-level waste

or have other significant impacts. The

Proposed Action is simply a

demonstration of electrometallurgical

treatment technology involving

equipment whose size and configuration

cannot accommodate full-scale

treatment activities. As demonstrated in

the environmental assessment, the

demonstration project would generate

640 kilograms (0.52 cubic meters, or

approximately the size of a three-drawer

file cabinet) of solid high-level waste in

metal or ceramic form, but no liquid

high-level waste. In light of these

minimal impacts, it was appropriate for

the Department to prepare an

environmental assessment to assist in

determining whether to prepare an

environmental impact statement.
Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 100 / Wednesday, May 22, 1996 / Notices 25653

Indeed, the Department does not

regard the proposed treatment process

as ‘‘reprocessing’’ as that term has been

used historically and is used in the

Department’s National Environmental

Policy Act regulations. The purpose of

the Department’s historical reprocessing

activities was to recover plutonium and

highly-enriched uranium from spent

nuclear fuel for reuse in defense-related

activities, including weapons

production. These activities required

large production-scale buildings and

ancillary facilities. The Department of

Energy regulations implementing the

National Environmental Policy Act were

drafted with these reprocessing

activities in mind. In contrast, the much

smaller-scale proposed demonstration of

electrometallurgical technology would

not involve the separation of plutonium

from fission products or the reuse or

recycling of any separated materials for

defense-related purposes.

As noted in Section 2.3 of the

environmental assessment, this

technology does separate spent nuclear

fuel constituents into certain groups.

For driver spent nuclear fuel, these

groups are (1) highly-enriched uranium

(which would promptly be blended

with depleted uranium to form lowenriched uranium), (2) a mixture of

fission products and plutonium, and (3)

cladding metal. For the blanket fuel,

these groups are (1) low-enriched

uranium, (2) a mixture of fission

products and plutonium, and (3)

cladding metal.

With regard to the potential reuse of

separated materials, the treatment of the

100 driver assemblies would result, after

blending, in approximately 1400

kilograms (3080 pounds) of lowenriched uranium. As described in

Section 2.3 of the environmental

assessment, this low-enriched uranium

would be stored at Argonne National

Laboratory-West until a decision is

made regarding its ultimate disposition.

The disposition of this material would

be consistent with future departmental

decisions regarding other similar

materials, but it would not involve reuse

for defense-related purposes. Potential

disposition options for this material

include its sale to the commercial

nuclear industry for use as power

reactor fuel.

For all of these reasons, the

Department of Energy does not believe

that the proposed demonstration of

electrometallurgical technology

constitutes ‘‘reprocessing’’ within the

meaning of 10 CFR Part 1021, Appendix

D to Subpart D, even if it does fall

within some broader definitions of

‘‘reprocessing’’ that are used in other

contexts.

Nonproliferation: Some commentors

suggested that the proposed

demonstration project is contrary to the

nonproliferation policy of the United

States regarding materials that could be

used by other countries or groups to

construct nuclear weapons. The United

States policy on nonproliferation is

contained in Presidential Decision

Directive 13, a classified document. On

September 27, 1993, at the time

Presidential Decision Directive-13 was

signed, an unclassified press release

summarizing its contents was issued.

Among other things, the summary states

that the United States does not

encourage the civil use of plutonium,

and accordingly the United States does

not itself engage in plutonium

reprocessing for either nuclear weapons

or nuclear power purposes. As

described in Section 4.7 of the

environmental assessment, the

electrorefining equipment that would be

a part of the proposed demonstration

project is not capable of separating

plutonium from spent nuclear fuel. The

plutonium contained in the spent

nuclear fuel, along with other actinides

and most constituent fission products,

would be immobilized in the zeolite

ceramic waste form. Thus, because it

does not separate plutonium, the

proposed demonstration is consistent

with the nonproliferation policy of the

United States.

Some of the commentors suggested,

however, that with adjustment to or

refinements of either of the

electrorefiners that would be a part of

the Proposed Action, this technology

could be made to separate plutonium for

weapons use. During the Integral Fast

Reactor Program, which was canceled in

1994, the Department attempted to

develop an electrorefiner that included

a liquid cadmium cathode to collect and

concentrate plutonium and all other

transuranic elements present in the

spent nuclear fuel. Successful

application of this process would have

resulted in a plutonium product

contaminated or mixed with uranium,

other transuranic elements, and rare

earth fission products. Development of

the cathode progressed only to the point

where the technical feasibility of the

concept was established. No prototype

or working model was ever

commissioned for the Fuel Conditioning

Facility.

As conceived, however, the liquid

cadmium cathode would have produced

a metal-alloy product containing up to

70 percent plutonium; this plutonium

alloy could have been obtained only

after subsequent processing in a hightemperature vacuum furnace. The

balance of materials remaining in the

plutonium product after electrorefining,

but prior to subsequent processing,

would be those most difficult to

separate from plutonium by any

chemical means: uranium, americium,

neptunium, curium, and the rare earth

fission products. This plutonium metalalloy product would have high

transuranic content, a high heat source,

a high neutron radiation source, and a

high gamma radiation source, any one of

which would make design of a weapon

extremely difficult. Neutron and gamma

radiation sources would be three to four

orders of magnitude higher than

weapons-grade or reactor-grade

material. These levels of radiation are

lethal and would require handling of the

material by remote means. As a result of

the high heat, neutron, and gamma

radiation sources, and the transuranic

contamination, any attempt to use

plutonium in this form for weapons

purposes would add significant

difficulties to any potential proliferant’s

efforts.

The Department requested a study by

the Defense Technologies Engineering

Division of Lawrence Livermore

National Laboratory to determine the

feasibility of misusing

electrometallurgical technology in order

to produce plutonium that could be

used in a proliferant nuclear weapons

program. While the report from that

study is classified, an unclassified

presentation on the conclusions from

the report was given to the Department

by Lawrence Livermore National

Laboratory in March 1994 and is

summarized in Section 4.7 of the

environmental assessment. The

unclassified presentation stated that the

report concluded that significant new

process inventions and new weapons

designs would be required before

material resulting from the process

could be used in a nuclear weapons

program. The major problems for

prospective weapons designers would

be:

(a) the actinides collected with the

fission products would result in a very

high heat output, which would

complicate and might even preclude the

design of even a simple nuclear device

due to the heat output’s effect on high

explosive and plutonium components;

(b) radiation levels from the material

would be incapacitating and lethal to

individuals coming in contact with the

material for the purpose of weapons

fabrication; (c) designing processes to

deal with these radiation levels would

significantly complicate a proliferant’s

development and deployment programs

and production activities; and (d) over

time, high radiation fields would
25654 Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 100 / Wednesday, May 22, 1996 / Notices

negatively impact material behavior and

electronic circuitry.

Some of the commentors also

suggested that, because this technology

separates highly-enriched uranium from

the Experimental Breeder Reactor-II

driver spent nuclear fuel, use of the

technology would violate United States

policy on nonproliferation. While it is

correct that the technology would

separate the highly-enriched uranium

from the driver spent nuclear fuel,

under the proposed demonstration

project the highly-enriched uranium

would be melted in the casting furnace

and combined with depleted uranium to

produce low-enriched uranium (less

than 20 percent enrichment) without

ever leaving the argon cell. This

blending-down activity would, in fact,

be part of the spent nuclear fuel

treatment process. Blending down

would be done to reduce costs

associated with the higher levels of

security required for safeguarding

highly-enriched uranium. Also, it

should be noted that this technology is

incapable of increasing the level of

enrichment of uranium contained in

spent nuclear fuel being treated.

Therefore, this technology would not be

useful to a nation seeking to enrich

uranium to weapons-grade level.

However, because the technology

permits the separation of highlyenriched uranium, which could, in the

wrong hands, pose a proliferation risk,

the Department would exercise its

authority to prevent proliferation

sensitive information and technology

advances resulting from the proposed

demonstration from becoming available

to potential proliferant-risk countries,

including exercising its authority under

the Atomic Energy Act, the Nuclear

Nonproliferation Act of 1978 and the

Department’s implementing regulations.

Separating the highly-enriched uranium

from Experimental Breeder Reactor-II

spent nuclear fuel and blending it down

to less than 20 percent enrichment is

consistent with United States

nonproliferation policy.

Appropriate Level of National

Environmental Policy Act Review:

Several commentors suggested that the

Proposed Action is part of a larger

program, and that the Department must

prepare an environmental impact

statement that analyzes the larger

program, including full-scale

implementation of electrometallurgical

treatment. Commentors further

expressed concern that the Proposed

Action would prejudice the

Department’s choice of options under a

larger program, either because of the

commitment of resources that would be

invested in studying the

electrometallurgical technology, or

because the proposed demonstration

would set a precedent for the

technology’s further, broader

application.

The Department does not agree with

these assertions. The Department has no

current proposal to apply the

technology more broadly. The

Department prepared this

environmental assessment to assess the

environmental impacts of a proposal to

apply electrometallurgical treatment

technology only to a limited number of

Experimental Breeder Reactor-II spent

nuclear fuel assemblies sufficient for the

purpose of further research and

development as recommended by the

National Research Council. The

Department needs the information from

the proposed demonstration to

determine whether electrometallurgical

treatment is a feasible technology for

treating the remainder of the

Experimental Breeder Reactor-II spent

nuclear fuel or other spent nuclear fuel

requiring processing for disposal. Only

after data from such a demonstration are

analyzed can the Department assess

whether to propose a broader

application of the technology. In the

absence of a proposal for broader

application, no ‘‘program’’ or broader

activity exists to be analyzed.

The Department has decided to

proceed with the proposed

demonstration. Even if successful,

however, the demonstration would not

automatically lead to the treatment of

more Experimental Breeder Reactor-II

spent nuclear fuel or to other broader

applications of electrometallurgical

technology. The Department will not

make any significant additional use of

the electrometallurgical refining

technology without first preparing an

environmental impact statement.

Specifically, the Department will not

use this technology to treat the

remaining Experimental Breeder

Reactor-II spent fuel or make another

production-scale use of the technology

without preparing an environmental

impact statement.

Public Comment Process: Several

commentors suggested that the

Department did not allow the public

proper and timely access to the

documents referenced in the draft

environmental assessment. The draft

environmental assessment was

transmitted for public review and

comment on January 29, 1996, with an

initial comment period from February 5

to March 22. References cited in the

draft environmental assessment

originally were not sent to the public

reading rooms, but were available upon

request from the Department of Energy

document manager in Idaho.

In the course of public hearings in

Idaho Falls, Idaho, on February 21,

1996, a commentor requested that the

documents referenced in the draft

environmental assessment be made

available in the Department’s public

reading rooms and that the public

comment period be extended by another

two months. The Department agreed to

place the references in the public

reading rooms but deferred the decision

on extending the comment period. A

member of the Department of Energy

panel stated that he would ‘‘* * * try

to have them (the references) in the

public reading rooms within the next

week.’’ Thirty-seven of the 48 references

were reproduced and sent to each of the

nine public reading rooms by March 8.

The Department believed the remaining

11 references were already in the

reading rooms as references to the

Department of Energy Programmatic

Spent Nuclear Fuel Management and

Idaho National Engineering Laboratory

Environmental Restoration and Waste

Management Programs Environmental

Impact Statement (DOE/EIS–0203–F).

On March 25, another commentor

brought to the Department’s attention

the fact that not all documents were in

the public reading rooms in

Washington, D.C. and in Idaho Falls. In

response, the missing documents were

sent directly to the commentor, and

duplicates were placed in the reading

rooms. The comment response period

was extended to April 5.

In response to additional comments

that not all documents had been found

in the public reading rooms, an

inventory of each of the reading rooms

was taken by Department of Energy or

Argonne National Laboratory personnel

on April 6. Missing documents were

provided, and all documents were

personally verified by Department of

Energy or Argonne National Laboratory

personnel to be in place in the reading

rooms on April 8. Further, an additional

document and reference location was

established in the main library of the

University of California at Irvine. On

April 15, 1996, the public comment

period was reopened until May 3. The

Department believes that making the

reference documents available to the

public and reopening the comment

period have allowed an adequate

opportunity to review and comment on

the environmental assessment and to

consult the reference documents.

Finding

Based on the analysis in the

environmental assessment and after

considering all comments received
Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 100 / Wednesday, May 22, 1996 / Notices 25655

through the public review process, the

Department of Energy has determined

that the Electrometallurgical Treatment

Research and Demonstration Project in

the Fuel Conditioning Facility at

Argonne National Laboratory - West

does not constitute a major Federal

action significantly affecting the quality

of the human environment within the

meaning of the National Environmental

Policy Act of 1969. Therefore, an

environmental impact statement is not

required.

Issued in Washington, D.C., this 15th day

of May 1996.

Terry R. Lash,

Director Office of Nuclear Energy, Science

and Technology U.S. Department of Energy.

[FR Doc. 96–12861 Filed 5–21–96; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6450–01–P

Final Environmental Impact Statement

for the Plutonium Finishing Plant

Stabilization, Hanford Site, Richland,

Benton County, Washington

AGENCY: U.S. Department of Energy.

ACTION: Notice of availability.

SUMMARY: The U.S. Department of

Energy (DOE), Richland Operations

Office, announces the availability of the

Plutonium Finishing Plant Stabilization

Final Environmental Impact Statement

(DOE/EIS–0244–F). The Final

Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)

was prepared pursuant to the National

Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of

1969, the Council on Environmental

Quality Regulations for Implementing

the Procedural Provisions of NEPA (40

Code of Federal Regulations [CFR] Parts

1500–1508), and DOE’s Implementing

Procedures (10 CFR Part 1021). The

continued presence of relatively large

quantities of chemically reactive

materials in their present form and

location within the Plutonium Finishing

Plant (PFP) Facility poses an

unacceptable long-term risk to workers,

the public, and the environment. DOE

has identified the need to expeditiously

and safely reduce radiation exposure to

workers and the risk to the public;

reduce future resources needed to safely

manage the facility; and remove,

stabilize, store, and manage plutonium,

pending DOE’s future use and

disposition decisions.

DOE’s preferred alternative is removal

of readily retrievable plutonium bearing

material in hold-up at the PFP Facility

and stabilization of these and other

plutonium-bearing materials at the PFP

Facility through the following four

treatment processes: 1) ion exchange,

vertical calcination and thermal

stabilization of solutions; 2) thermal

stabilization of oxides, fluorides, and

process residues in a continuous

furnace; 3) repackaging of metals and

alloys; and 4) pyrolysis of polycubes

and combustibles. In addition, DOE is

evaluating other alternatives for

stabilizing or immobilizing these

materials as well as a ‘‘no action’’

alternative.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Requests for copies or questions

concerning the PFP Stabilization EIS

should be directed to: Mr. Ben F.

Burton, U.S. Department of Energy,

Richland Operations Office, Attn: PFP

Stabilization EIS, P.O. Box 550, MSIN

B1–42, Richland, Washington 99352,

(888) 946–3700.

For general information on DOE’s EIS

process and other matters related to

NEPA, please contact: Ms. Carol

Borgstrom, Director, Office of NEPA

Policy and Assistance (EH–42), U.S.

Department of Energy, 1000

Independence Avenue,

S.W.,Washington, DC 20585, (202) 586–

4600 or (800) 472–2756.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background, Purpose and Need for

Agency Action. In the late 1980s, the

halt in the production of weapons-grade

plutonium froze the existing PFP

Facility manufacturing pipeline in a

state that was unsuited for long-term

storage. On January 24, 1994, the

Secretary of Energy commissioned a

comprehensive assessment to identify

and prioritize the environmental, safety,

and health vulnerabilities that arise

from the storage of plutonium in DOE

facilities and determine which are the

most dangerous and urgent. The DOEwide assessment, commonly referred to

as The Plutonium Vulnerability Study,

identified environmental, safety, and

health vulnerabilities at the PFP

Facility. These included storage of

unstable forms of plutonium, a potential

for criticality accidents, and seismic

weaknesses.

Scoping. A Notice of Intent to prepare

the EIS and hold public scoping

meetings in Spokane, Richland, and

Bellevue, Washington, and Hood River

and Portland, Oregon, was published by

DOE in the Federal Register on October

27, 1994. A subsequent Notice of Intent

was published by DOE in the Federal

Register on November 23, 1994,

announcing additional meetings in

Portland, Oregon, and Seattle,

Washington. The Notice of Intent

invited oral and written comments and

suggestions on the proposed scope of

the EIS, including environmental issues

and alternatives, and invited public

participation in the NEPA process.

Overall, scoping comments were

received that assisted in identifying

major issues for subsequent in-depth

analysis in the Draft EIS. As a result of

the scoping process, an Implementation

Plan for the PFP Stabilization EIS was

developed to provide guidance for

preparing the Draft EIS and record the

results of the scoping process.

Public Hearing. On December 5, 1995,

a Notice of Availability was published

in the Federal Register (60 FR 62244)

which formally announced the release

and availability of the Draft EIS. The

public hearing date, time, and location

were also published and public

comment was requested. A public

meeting on the Draft EIS. The public

hearing date, time, and location were

also published and public comment was

requested. A public meeting on the Draft

EIS was held in Pasco, Washington, on

January 11, 1996. While the comment

period officially ended on January 23,

1996, DOE accepted comments through

February 15, 1996. Both oral and written

comments were received during the

comment period.

Notice of Limited Reopening of Public

Comment Period. On May 3, 1996, a

Notice of Limited Reopening of Public

Comment Period was published in the

Federal Register (61 FR 19914) which

formally announced the release and

availability of a supplementary

alternative which involves

immobilization of a portion of the

inventory of the plutonium-bearing

materials in cement at the PFP Facility.

Comments on the analysis of potential

impacts described in the supplementary

information have been solicited during

a 21-day comment period that will end

May 24, 1996. Comments received will

be considered in the preparation of the

Record of Decision.

AVAILABILITY OF FINALS EIS: Copies of

the Final EIS have been distributed to

Federal, state, and local officials and

agencies, as well as organizations and

individuals known to be interested in or

affected by the proposed project.

Additional copies may be obtained by

contacting Mr. Burton as provided in

the section of this notice entitled

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT.

Copies of the Final EIS, including

appendices and reference material will

be available for public review at the

locations listed below. Comments

received in response to this Federal

Register notice will be considered in the

preparation of the Record of Decision.

U.S. Department of Energy,

Headquarters, Freedom of Information

Reading Room, Forrestal Building,

1000 Independence Avenue, SW.,

Washington, DC 20585, (202) 586–

3142