24214 Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 94 / Tuesday, May 14, 1996 / Rules and Regulations

digital avionics systems to HIRF must be

established.

It is not possible to precisely define

the HIRF to which the airplane will be

exposed in service. There is also

uncertainty concerning the effectiveness

of airframe shielding for HIRF.

Furthermore, coupling of

electromagnetic energy to cockpitinstalled equipment through the cockpit

window apertures is undefined. Based

on surveys and analysis of existing HIRF

emitters, an adequate level of protection

exists when compliance with the HIRF

protection special condition is shown

with either paragraphs 1 or 2 below:

1. A minimum threat of 100 volts per

meter peak electric field strength from

10 KHz to 18 GHz.

a. The threat must be applied to the

system elements and their associated

wiring harnesses without the benefit of

airframe shielding.

b. Demonstration of this level of

protection is established through system

tests and analysis.

2. A threat external to the airframe of

the following field strengths for the

frequency ranges indicated.

Frequency Peak

(V/M)

Average

(V/M)

10 KHz–100 KHz ...... 50 50

100 KHz–500 KHz .... 60 60

500 KHz–2000 KHz 70 70

2 MHz–30 MHz ......... 200 200

30 MHz–100 MHz ..... 30 30

100 MHz–200 MHz ... 150 33

200 MHz–400 MHz ... 70 70

400 MHz–700 MHz ... 4,020 935

700 MHz–1000 MHz 1,700 170

1 GHz–2 GHz ........... 5,000 990

2 GHz–4 GHz ........... 6,680 840

4 GHz–6 GHz ........... 6,850 310

6 GHz–8 GHz ........... 3,600 670

8 GHz–12 GHz ......... 3,500 1,270

12 GHz–18 GHz ....... 3,500 360

18 GHz–40 GHz ....... 2,100 750

As discussed above, the proposed

special conditions would be applicable

initially to the K–C Aviation modified

Dassault Aviation, Mystere Falcon 50.

Should K–C Aviation apply at a later

date for a change to the supplemental

type certificate to include another

model incorporating the same novel or

unusual design feature, the special

conditions would apply to that model as

well under the provisions of

§ 21.101(a)(1).

Conclusion

This action affects only certain design

features on the Dassault Aviation,

Mystere Falcon 50 airplane. It is not a

rule of general applicability and affects

only the manufacturer who applied to

the FAA for approval of these features

on the airplane.

The substance of these special

conditions for this airplane has been

subjected to the notice and comment

procedure in several prior instances and

has been derived without substantive

change from those previously issued. It

is unlikely that prior public comment

would result in a significant change

from the substance contained herein.

For this reason, and because a delay

would significantly affect the

certification of the airplane, which is

imminent, the FAA has determined that

prior public notice and comment are

unnecessary and impracticable, and

good cause exists for adopting these

special conditions immediately.

Therefore, these special conditions are

being made effective upon issuance. The

FAA is requesting comments to allow

interested persons to submit views that

may not have been submitted in

response to the prior opportunities for

comment described above.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 25

Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting

and recordkeeping requirements.

The authority citiation for these

special conditions is as follows

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701,

44702, 44704.

The Special Conditions

According, the following special

conditions are issued as part of the

supplemental type certification basis for

the K–C Aviation modified Dassault

Aviation, Mystere Falcon 50 series

airplanes.

1. Protection from Unwanted Effects

of High-Intensity Radiated Fields

(HIRF). Each electrical and electronic

system that performs critical functions

must be designed and installed to

ensure that the operation and

operational capability of these systems

to perform critical functions are not

adversely affected when the airplane is

exposed to high-intensity radiated

fields.

2. For the purpose of these special

conditions, the following definition

applies: Critical Functions. Functions

whose failure would contribute to or

cause a failure condition that would

prevent the continued safe flight and

landing of the airplane.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on May 3,

1996.

Stewart R. Miller,

Acting Manager, Transport Airplane

Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service,

ANM–100.

[FR Doc. 96–12085 Filed 5–13–96; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–13–M

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 95–NM–127–AD; Amendment

39–9614; AD 92–10–13 R1]

RIN 2120–AA64

Airworthiness Directives; McDonnell

Douglas Model DC–9–80 Series

Airplanes and Model MD–88 Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation

Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: This amendment revises an

existing airworthiness directive (AD),

applicable to certain McDonnell

Douglas Model DC–9–80 series

airplanes and Model MD–88 airplanes,

that currently requires a revision to the

FAA-approved Airplane Flight Manual

(AFM) to specify that the autothrottles

must be disconnected if engine surge

(stall) is detected during takeoff. That

AD was prompted by results of an

accident investigation, which revealed

that the digital flight guidance computer

(DFGC) on these airplanes can

incorrectly identify an engine surge or

stall as being an engine failure. This can

cause the autothrottles to unclamp and

automatically advance the thrust levers

during takeoff. The actions specified by

that AD are intended to prevent

automatic advance of the thrust lever on

a surging engine during takeoff, which

could cause engine failure. This

amendment provides for an optional

terminating action for the AFM revision.

DATES: Effective June 13, 1996.

The incorporation by reference of

certain publications listed in the

regulations is approved by the Director

of the Federal Register as of June 13,

1996.

ADDRESSES: The service information

referenced in this AD may be obtained

from McDonnell Douglas Corporation,

3855 Lakewood Boulevard, Long Beach,

California 90846, Attention: Technical

Publications Business Administration,

Department C1–L51 (2–60). This

information may be examined at the

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA),

Transport Airplane Directorate, Rules

Docket, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW.,

Renton, Washington; or at the FAA,

Transport Airplane Directorate, Los

Angeles Aircraft Certification Office,

3960 Paramount Boulevard, Lakewood,

California; or at the Office of the Federal

Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW.,

suite 700, Washington, DC.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Robert Baitoo, Aerospace Engineer,

Propulsion Branch, ANM–140L, FAA,

Transport Airplane Directorate, Los

Angeles Aircraft Certification Office,

3960 Paramount Boulevard, Lakewood,
Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 94 / Tuesday, May 14, 1996 / Rules and Regulations 24215

California; telephone (310) 627–5245;

fax (310) 627–5210.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: A

proposal to amend part 39 of the Federal

Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39)

by superseding AD 92–10–13,

amendment 39–8247 (57 FR 19249, May

5, 1992), which is applicable to certain

McDonnell Douglas Model DC–9–80

series airplanes and Model MD–88

airplanes, was published in the Federal

Register on October 18, 1995 (60 FR

53888). That action proposed to require

the installation of a modified digital

flight guidance computer (DFGC),

which, when accomplished, would

terminate the requirement for the AFM

revision.

Interested persons have been afforded

an opportunity to participate in the

making of this amendment. Due

consideration has been given to the

comments received.

Support for the Proposal

Three commenters support the

proposed rule.

Requests To Withdraw the Proposal

Several commenters request that the

FAA withdraw the proposed rule or

retain the proposed installation as an

optional terminating action for the AFM

revision. The commenters contend that

the requirements of the proposed AD

provide no additional safety over

existing AD 92–10–13; the safety of the

affected airplanes is ensured by the

currently installed hardware and the

procedural changes that are required by

the existing AD. One commenter,

Honeywell, states that both AD 92–10–

13 and the proposed AD achieve the

same goal of preventing forward throttle

movement in the event of an engine

surge or stall. AD 92–10–13 achieves

this goal by requiring the pilot to

recognize the surge condition and to

manually disconnect the autothrottles.

The proposed AD accomplishes this in

a different manner—by forcing the

DFGC autothrottles to remain in the

clamp mode. Because the engine surge

condition is easily and unambiguously

recognized in the cockpit and the

resultant action required by AD 92–10–

13 (disconnecting the autothrottle) is

likewise clear and easily accomplished,

the correct execution for the subject

condition is assured. The commenters

also state that accomplishment of the

requirements of the proposed AD would

pose an immense cost to some

operators. The commenters contend that

such expense is unnecessary when an

equivalent, alternative means is

available.

The FAA does not concur with the

requests to withdraw the final rule.

However, the FAA has determined that,

based on the information provided by

the commenters, the currently installed

hardware and the procedural changes

required by the existing AD do provide

a long term and adequate level of safety.

While the manufacturer has advised the

FAA that the new DFGC (part number

4034241–972) was incorporated on all

production Model DC–9–80 series

airplanes as of July 1995, the FAA has

determined that the installation should

be provided in this AD as an optional

terminating action for the AFM revision.

Therefore, this action revises AD 92–10–

13 to add a new paragraph (c) that

provides for installation of the new

DFGC’s as an optional terminating

action for the AFM revision.

Other Changes to the Final Rule

The FAA also has clarified the

applicability of this rule to specify that

only airplanes equipped with digital

flight guidance computers (DFGC)

having part numbers prior to 4034241–

972 are subject to the requirements of

the AD. This change will exclude

airplanes on which the terminating

installation has been accomplished

previously or in production.

Conclusion

After careful review of the available

data, including the comments noted

above, the FAA has determined that air

safety and the public interest require the

adoption of the rule with the changes

previously described. The FAA has

determined that these changes will

neither increase the economic burden

on any operator nor increase the scope

of the AD.

Cost Impact

There are approximately 1,117

McDonnell Douglas Model DC–9–80

series airplanes and Model MD–88

airplanes of the affected design in the

worldwide fleet. The FAA estimates that

643 airplanes of U.S. registry will be

affected by this AD.

The AFM revision that is currently

required by AD 92–10–13 takes

approximately 1 work hour per airplane

to accomplish, at an average labor rate

of $60 per work hour. Based on these

figures, the cost impact on U.S.

operators of this current requirement is

estimated to be $38,580, or $60 per

airplane.

The cost impact figure discussed

above is based on assumptions that no

operator has yet accomplished any of

the requirements of this AD action, and

that no operator would accomplish

those actions in the future if this AD

were not adopted.

Should an operator elect to

accomplish the optional terminating

action that is provided by this AD action

(the removal of DFGC’s having part

number 4034241–971 and installation of

DFGC’s having part number 4034241–

972), it would take approximately 1

work hour per airplane to accomplish,

at an average labor rate of $60 per work

hour. Required parts will cost

approximately $2,000 per airplane (that

is, $1,000 per DFGC, and 2 DFGC’s per

airplane). Based on these figures, the

cost impact of the optional terminating

action is estimated to be $2,060 per

airplane.

Should an operator have an airplane

equipped with DFGC’s having part

numbers other than (lower than)

4034241–971, additional actions may be

necessary prior to accomplishing the

optional terminating action. Those

additional actions involve

modification(s) of the DFGC’s to bring

them to the level of configuration of

DFGC’s having part number 4034241–

971. Depending on the current

configuration of the DFGC’s installed on

the airplane, the highest costs associated

with modifying a DFGC to a part

number 4034241–971 configuration

(excluding subsequent modification to

the part number 4034241–972

configuration) could be as much as

$92,000 per airplane (that is, $46,000

per DFGC, and 2 DFGC’s per airplane).

Regulatory Impact

The regulations adopted herein will

not have substantial direct effects on the

States, on the relationship between the

national government and the States, or

on the distribution of power and

responsibilities among the various

levels of government. Therefore, in

accordance with Executive Order 12612,

it is determined that this final rule does

not have sufficient federalism

implications to warrant the preparation

of a Federalism Assessment.

For the reasons discussed above, I

certify that this action (1) is not a

‘‘significant regulatory action’’ under

Executive Order 12866; (2) is not a

‘‘significant rule’’ under DOT

Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44

FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and (3)

will not have a significant economic

impact, positive or negative, on a

substantial number of small entities

under the criteria of the Regulatory

Flexibility Act. A final evaluation has

been prepared for this action and it is

contained in the Rules Docket. A copy

of it may be obtained from the Rules

Docket at the location provided under

the caption ADDRESSES.
24216 Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 94 / Tuesday, May 14, 1996 / Rules and Regulations

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation

safety, Incorporation by reference,

Safety.

Adoption of the Amendment

Accordingly, pursuant to the

authority delegated to me by the

Administrator, the Federal Aviation

Administration amends part 39 of the

Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR

part 39) as follows:

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS

DIRECTIVES

1. The authority citation for part 39

continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 USC 106(g), 40113, 44701.

§ 39.13 [Amended]

2. Section 39.13 is amended by

removing amendment 39–8247 (57 FR

19249, May 5, 1992), and by adding a

new airworthiness directive (AD),

amendment 39–9614, to read as follows:

92–10–13 R1 McDonnell Douglas:

Amendment 39–9614. Docket 95–NM–

127–AD. Revises AD 92–10–13,

Amendment 39–8247.

Applicability: Model DC–9–80 series

airplanes and Model MD–88 airplanes

equipped with digital flight guidance

computers (DFGC) having part numbers prior

to 4034241–972; certificated in any category.

Note 1: This AD applies to each airplane

identified in the preceding applicability

provision, regardless of whether it has been

modified, altered, or repaired in the area

subject to the requirements of this AD. For

airplanes that have been modified, altered, or

repaired so that the performance of the

requirements of this AD is affected, the

owner/operator must request approval for an

alternative method of compliance in

accordance with paragraph (d) of this AD.

The request should include an assessment of

the effect of the modification, alteration, or

repair on the unsafe condition addressed by

this AD; and, if the unsafe condition has not

been eliminated, the request should include

specific proposed actions to address it.

Compliance: Required as indicated, unless

accomplished previously.

To prevent automatic thrust lever advance

on a surging engine during takeoff, which

could cause engine failure, accomplish the

following:

(a) Within 30 days after May 20, 1992 (the

effective date of AD 92–10–13, amendment

39–8247), revise the Limitations Section of

the FAA-approved Airplane Flight Manual

(AFM) to include the following statement.

This may be accomplished by inserting a

copy of this AD in the AFM.

‘‘LIMITATIONS SECTION

Autothrottles must be disconnected if

engine surge (stall) is detected during

takeoff.’’

(b) Within 30 days after May 20, 1992 (the

effective date of AD 92–10–13, amendment

39–8247), revise the Procedures Section of

the FAA-approved AFM to include the

following statement. This may be

accomplished by inserting a copy of this AD

in the AFM.

‘‘PROCEDURES SECTION

CAUTION

During takeoff, the Digital Flight Guidance

Computer (DFGC) engine failure logic is

armed if (1) the flight director pitch axis is

in takeoff mode, (2) the aircraft is above 400

feet radio altitude, and (3) both engine

pressure ratios (EPRs) are below the goaround EPR limit. If the DFGC detects an EPR

drop greater than or equal to 0.25 EPR and

7% N1 from the same engine, as compared to

the other engine, the engine failure logic is

satisfied and the DFGC will change the

Thrust Rating Panel (or indicator) thrust limit

to Go-Around (GA). This will cause the

autothrottle system to unclamp and enter

normal EPR limit (EPR LIM) mode where the

throttles will maintain the higher engine EPR

at the selected go-around thrust rating EPR

LIM. Such an EPR and N1 drop may also

result from an engine surge (stall). Advancing

thrust levers on a surging engine will hinder

surge recovery and may result in eventual

engine failure.

If an engine surge (stall) is detected during

takeoff:

(1) Disconnect autothrottles.

(2) Reduce thrust on affected engine (idle if

necessary).

(3) Shut down the affected engine if surging

and popping continues.

(4) If affected engine surging or popping

stops, accomplish the following:

A. Place ignition switch to GRD START &

CONTIN.

B. Place ENG anti-ice switches to ON.

C. Place PNEU X-FEED VALVE lever OPEN

on affected side.

D. Place AIR FOIL anti-ice switches ON.

E. Advance affected throttle slowly.

(5) If engine surging or popping returns, turn

the ENG anti-ice switch OFF.

(6) After normal operation has been

established, the autothrottles may be reengaged.

Note: A NO MODE light may be

annunciated due to abnormal bleed

configuration.’’

(c) Replacement of both DFGC’s having a

part number prior to 4034241–972, with

DFGC’s having part number 4034241–972, in

accordance with McDonnell Douglas Service

Bulletin MD80–22–111, dated May 23, 1995,

constitutes terminating action for the

requirements of this AD. Once the

replacements are accomplished, the AFM

revisions required by paragraphs (a) and (b)

of this AD may be removed.

Note 2: McDonnell Douglas Service

Bulletin MD80–22–111, dated May 23, 1995,

references Honeywell Service Bulletin

4034241–22–44, dated May 22, 1995, as an

additional source of service information.

Note 3: Paragraph 1.B of McDonnell

Douglas Service Bulletin MD80–22–111,

dated May 23, 1995, specifies certain

concurrent actions that affect airplanes

equipped with DFGC’s having part numbers

prior to 4034241–971.

(d) An alternative method of compliance or

adjustment of the compliance time that

provides an acceptable level of safety may be

used if approved by the Manager, Los

Angeles Aircraft Certification Office (ACO),

FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate.

Operators shall submit their requests through

an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance

Inspector, who may add comments and then

send it to the Manager, Los Angeles ACO.

Note 4: Information concerning the

existence of approved alternative methods of

compliance with this AD, if any, may be

obtained from the Los Angeles ACO.

(e) Special flight permits may be issued in

accordance with sections 21.197 and 21.199

of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR

21.197 and 21.199) to operate the airplane to

a location where the requirements of this AD

can be accomplished.

(f) The replacement shall be done in

accordance with McDonnell Douglas Service

Bulletin MD80–22–111, dated May 23, 1995.

This incorporation by reference was

approved by the Director of the Federal

Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a)

and 1 CFR part 51. Copies may be obtained

from McDonnell Douglas Corporation, 3855

Lakewood Boulevard, Long Beach, California

90846, Attention: Technical Publications

Business Administration, Department C1–

L51 (2–60). Copies may be inspected at the

FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601

Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at

the FAA, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification

Office, Transport Airplane Directorate, 3960

Paramount Boulevard, Lakewood, California;

or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800

North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700,

Washington, DC.

(g) This amendment becomes effective on

June 13, 1996.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on May 6,

1996.

Darrell M. Pederson,

Acting Manager, Transport Airplane

Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. 96–11823 Filed 5–13–96; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–13–U

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 95–NM–95–AD; Amendment

39–9617; AD 96–10–10]

RIN 2120–AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Jetstream

Model 4101 Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation

Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: This amendment adopts a

new airworthiness directive (AD),

applicable to certain Jetstream Model

4101 airplanes, that requires inspections

of the handrail assembly at the main

entrance door to detect loose or missing

rivets, abnormal movement between the

handrail pivot-tube and the spigot that

attaches to the bearing assembly, and