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******************************************************ANTHONY SANTANIELLO v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION (AC 35369)
DiPentima, C. J., and Beach and Prescott, Js. Argued May 29—officially released September 2, 2014 (Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of

Tolland, Cobb, J.)
Albert J. Oneto IV

, assigned counsel, for the appellant (petitioner). Timothy F. Costello, assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Gail P. Hardy, state’s attorney, andErikaL. Brookman, assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (respondent).Opinion BEACH, J. The petitioner, Anthony Santaniello, appeals from thejudgment ofthe habeas court denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, the petitioner claims that the habeas court erred in concluding that he did not meet his burden ofproofto establishineffectiveassistance ofappellate counsel. We affirm the judgment of the habeas court.
The petitioner had been convicted in two underlying criminal cases, which had been consolidated for trial. The first alleged, primarily, sexual assault. The second, ultimately the subject of this appeal, alleged that the petitionerattemptedto murderthevictim1 inthe sexual assault case to prevent her from testifying against him. The facts regarding the petitioner’s underlying conviction ofattempted murder, as set forth in our opinion in the directappealfromthose convictions, are asfollows: ‘‘Followingthe [petitioner’s] arrest [inthesexualassault case], he was incarcerated atthe Cheshire Correctional Institute, where he shared a cell with Thomas Marra from May 13 until July 30, 2002. In August, 2002, Marra contacted George Nobile, aninspectorwiththe division of criminaljustice, informing Nobile that he had a cell mate who wanted to have a witness killed. Nobile and

a supervisor, Gregory Dillon, met with Marra on September4, 2002, and Marrainformedthemthatthe [petitioner] wanted to have the victim killed so that she could not testify against him. Marra provided a letter writtenbythe [petitioner] andexplainedthecodewords used in the letter. Subsequently, Marra also provided Nobile and Dillon with further correspondence from and to the [petitioner] concerning the [petitioner’s] desire to have the victim killed.
‘‘On October 9, 2002, Marra telephoned the [petitioner] and told him he could put the [petitioner] in contact with an assassin. Nobile then assumed the undercoverrole ofthe assassin and contactedthe [petitioner] on October 14 and 18, 2002. Nobile set up a meetingwiththe [petitioner] forthemorningofOctober 21, 2002, but the [petitioner] did not appear for that meeting.
‘‘The [petitioner] was arrested on October 25, 2002, and was held at the Bridgeport Correctional Center, where he shared a cell with Andre Holeman. The [petitioner] told Holeman that he was facing sexual assault charges and that he had wanted the victim killed so that she could not testify against him. He also told Holeman about Marra and his arranging ameeting with

an assassin. He further explained to Holeman that he

wassupposedtopaytheassassin$7500tokillthevictim but that he did not have the funds and, therefore, was considering killing the victim himself. The [petitioner] also asked Holeman to telephone the [petitioner’s] attorney to report that the [petitioner] had been set upby Marra. In an amended long form information, the [petitioner] was charged with attempt to commit murder, inciting injury to another person and intimidating

a witness (attempted murder case).’’ State v. Santaniello, 96 Conn. App. 646, 650–51, 902 A.2d 1, cert. denied, 280 Conn. 920, 908 A.2d 545 (2006).
The cases were consolidated, and, following a trial, thejury found the petitioner guilty of sexual assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a70 (a) (1), kidnapping in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-92 (a) (2) (A), attemptto commit murder in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49 (a) (2) and 53a-54a, inciting injury to another person in violation of General Statutes § 53a-179a (a), and intimidating awitness in violation ofGeneral Statutes § 53a151a (a) (1). The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of forty-two years incarceration. This court affirmed his convictions on direct appeal. Id., 649.
The petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which he later amended through counsel. The amended petition alleged, inter alia, that his appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance because he failed to raise on direct appeal a claim of insufficient evidence with respect to the attempted murder conviction. After a hearing, the habeas court concluded that thepetitionerhadfailedtomeethisburdenofestablishing deficient performance of appellate counsel and, accordingly, denied the petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Initsmemorandum ofdecision, the courtnoted that the petitioner had failed to produce any testimony from his appellate counsel or an expert in support of his claim. The court granted the petitioner certification to appeal. This appeal followed.
‘‘Our review of the judgment of the habeas court is carefully circumscribed. The underlyinghistoricalfacts found by the habeas court may not be disturbed unless the findings were clearly erroneous.

. . . Whether the representation a [petitioner] received

. . . was constitutionally inadequate is a mixed question of law and fact.

. . . As such, that question requires plenary reviewbythis courtunfetteredbythe clearlyerroneous standard.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Vivo v. Commissioner of Correction, 90 Conn. App. 167, 173, 876 A.2d 1216, cert. denied, 275 Conn. 925, 883 A.2d 1253 (2005).
‘‘To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a habeas petitioner must satisfy the twopronged test articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). Stricklandrequiresthatapetitionersatisfyboth

a performance prong and a prejudice prong.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Small v. Commissioner of Correction, 286 Conn. 707, 712–13, 946 A.2d 1203, cert. denied sub nom. Small v. Lantz, 555 U.S. 975, 129 S. Ct. 481, 172 L. Ed. 2d 336 (2008). In order to satisfythe performance prong, the petitioner must show that ‘‘appellate counsel’s representation fellbelow an objective standard of reasonableness considering all of the circumstances.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Johnson v. Commissioner of Correction, 131 Conn. App. 805, 808, 29 A.3d 166 (2011). In order to satisfy the prejudice prong, the petitioner must demonstrate that ‘‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for appellate counsel’s failure to raise the issue on appeal, thepetitionerwouldhaveprevailedinhis directappeal, i.e., reversal ofhis conviction or granting ofanewtrial.

. . . [T]o determine whether a habeas petitioner had a reasonable probability of prevailing on appeal, a reviewing court necessarily analyzes the merits of the underlying claimed errorin accordance withthe appropriate appellate standard for measuring harm.’’ Small

v. Commissioner ofCorrection, supra, 722.
The petitioner argues that his appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance by bringing four relatively weak claims on direct appeal and failing to raise a relatively stronger claim thatthere was insufficient evidence to support the petitioner’s conviction of attempted murder. The respondent, the Commissioner ofCorrection, arguesthatthe courtproperly deniedthe petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel because (1) the petitioner failed to present the testimony of his appellate counsel at the habeas trial; (2) the petitioner failed to offer into evidence in the habeas trial the entire evidentiary record from the trial

on his underlying convictions; and (3) on the merits, there was sufficient evidence supporting the petitioner’s conviction of attempted murder; thus, his ineffective assistance of counsel claim would have failed in any event. We conclude that the habeas court did not have an adequate record on which to address the petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.
The petitioner did not present, as exhibits in the habeas trial, the full record of the criminal trial. Evidence admitted in the underlying criminal case such as letters from the petitionerto Marra, aletterfrom Marra to the petitioner, and an address book seized from the petitioner’s house were not offered as exhibits at the habeastrial.2Toconsiderproperlyaclaimthatappellate counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to raise a sufficiency of the evidence claim on direct appeal, the habeas court must, in order to evaluate the performance and prejudice prongs, assess the strength of the potential sufficiency claim and examine all the evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. SeeStatev. O’Neil, 65 Conn. App. 145, 152, 782 A.2d209 (2001) (setting out standard of review for sufficiency claim), aff’d, 262 Conn. 295, 811 A.2d 1288 (2003); see also State v. Allan, 311 Conn. 1, 25, 83 A.3d 326 (2014); State v. Robert H

., 273 Conn. 56, 81, 866 A.2d 1255 (2005).As a logical proposition, it is impossible for a habeas court to determine that there was a strong claim of insufficient evidence without having been provided all ofthe arguably relevant evidence on the issue in question. Ifomissions exist, acourt3necessarilymustspeculate astowhatismissing, andwhetheritmatters. Thisis notto suggestthat, in all such cases, all ofthe evidence submitted in the entire trial must be presented. The evidence regarding a particular count may constitute only a small portion of the trial. But if one party contends on review that evidence relevant to a sufficiency issue was not presented to the habeas court and that contention is not contradicted, and it is not entirely clear that there was sufficient evidence to support the underlying conviction, based on a review of the evidence that was presented, the habeas court does not have a sufficient record4 on which to decide the claim ofineffective assistance ofappellate counsel. As urged by the respondent, we conclude, on alternate grounds, that the habeas court properly denied the petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Because it did not have before it a sufficient record on which to evaluate the merits of the claim,5 the habeas court could not properly have addressed that claim.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the otherjudges concurred.

1 In accordance with our policy ofprotecting the privacy interests ofthe victims of sexual abuse, we decline to identify the victim or others through whomthevictim’sidentitymaybeascertained. SeeGeneralStatutes § 54-86e.

2 Therespondentassertedinhisbriefthattheseitems ofrelevantevidence

were entered into evidence as exhibits at the criminal trial but not at the habeas trial. The record in the habeas case confirms that none of these items were admitted into evidence at the habeas trial. The petitioner agrees that some of the evidence presented at the criminal trial was not before the habeas court.
3 The authority cited in this opinion regarding the necessity for inclusion of all the relevant evidence has been derived from cases on direct appeal rather than from those seeking collateral relief. When a habeas court is considering whether a sufficiency claim ought to have been raised, the necessity of presenting a complete record is especially compelling.

4 We note that this issue was presented to us in the briefing process. Cf. Blumberg Associates Worldwide, Inc

. v. Brown & Brown of Connecticut, Inc., 311 Conn. 123, 84 A.3d 840 (2014).

5 We need not decide whether testimony by the appellate counsel or an expert was required in the circumstances of this case.