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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Alvie Copeland Kiles,

Petitioner,

v. 

David Shinn, et al.,

Respondent.

No. CV-17-04092-PHX-GMS

ORDER 

DEATH PENALTY CASE

Alvie Copeland Kiles is an Arizona State prisoner under sentence of death. Pending 

before the Court in this capital habeas proceeding is Petitioner Kiles’s motion for an order 

requiring the parties to meet and confer to establish a DNA testing protocol for the 

prosecuting county’s investigation of a woman who believes she is one of two children 

Kiles was convicted of murdering and whose body was never found. (Doc. 112.) 

Respondents have filed an opposition (Doc. 113), and Kiles has filed a reply in support of 

the motion (Doc. 114). For the reasons that follow, the Court denies the motion.

Background

In January 1989, Kiles moved in with Valerie Gunnell and her two daughters, S.G. 

and L.K., in her apartment in Yuma, Arizona. 

In 2000, Kiles was convicted of three counts of first degree murder and two counts 

of child abuse for murdering Valerie Gunnell and her two daughters. In 2006, a jury found 

three aggravating factors for each murder: (1) Kiles had been previously convicted of a 

crime involving the use or threat of violence, (2) he had been convicted of multiple 

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homicides, and (3) he had committed the offenses in an especially cruel, heinous, or 

depraved manner. See A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(2) (1989) (prior offense involving threat or use 

of violence); A.R.S § 13-751(F)(6), (F)(8) (Supp. 2008) (multiple murders and especially 

cruel, heinous or depraved).1 The jury also concluded that the two children were less than 

fifteen years old. A.R.S. § 13–751(F)(9) (defendant an adult and victim younger than 

fifteen). The jurors, however, returned a verdict of death only for the murder of Valerie 

Gunnell. The jurors could not reach a unanimous verdict regarding the imposition of a 

capital sentence for the murders of the children. The State dismissed the notice of death 

penalty regarding those murders and the superior court sentenced Kiles to consecutive life 

sentences. Kiles did not appeal those convictions or sentences. Kiles’s conviction and 

death sentence for murdering Valerie were affirmed on appeal. Kiles’s post-conviction 

proceedings concluded without relief and he noticed his intent to file a habeas petition in 

this Court on Nov. 6, 2017 (Doc. 1.) That petition has been fully briefed and is under 

advisement by this Court.

On December 14, 2022, Respondents filed a Notice of Disclosure indicating that a 

woman claiming to be S.G., a person for whom Defendant has been convicted of murder

had provided her DNA to the Yuma Police Department as potential proof that S.G. had 

never been murdered. This woman had not heard back from the Yuma Police. (Doc 111 at 

2.)

Respondents state they took steps to identify the Yuma Police Department detective 

assigned to Kiles’s case and contacted the assigned detective by both voicemail and email, 

detailing the new information and inquiring about what known DNA samples of the victims 

are still in possession of the Yuma Police Department to be compared with a known sample 

from the claimant. 

According to Kiles’ counsel Respondents have declined the invitation to meet to 

11 Arizona’s capital sentencing statutes were reorganized and renumbered to A.R.S. 

§§ 13–751 to–759. Because the renumbered statutes are not materially different, the Court 

cites the current version of the statute, unless otherwise noted.

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establish a testing procedure agreeable to both parties. They now move for an order 

requiring Respondents to do so. ” (Doc. 112 at 2.) 

Discussion

The district court has “inherent power over the administration of its business” that 

extends to regulating the conduct of the attorneys who appear before it and to promulgating 

and enforcing rules for the management of litigation. (Doc. 114 at 4.) (citing Spurlock v. 

F.B.I., 69 F.3d 1010, 1016 (9th Cir. 1995)). Nevertheless, “recognition of the need for a 

proper balance between state and federal authority counsels restraint in the issuance of 

injunctions against state officers engaged in the administration of the States’ criminal laws.

. . .” Olagues v. Russoniello, 770 F.2d 791, 804 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing City of Los Angeles 

v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 112 (1983).) As Kiles notes, Arizona’s post-conviction DNA testing 

procedures already provide that, under certain circumstances, a person convicted and 

sentenced for a felony offense “may request the forensic [DNA] testing of any evidence 

that is in the possession or control of the court or the state, that is related to the investigation 

or prosecution that resulted in the judgment of conviction, and that may contain biological 

evidence.” A.R.S. § 13-4240. Kiles suggests the State’s DNA testing statutes, both 

postconviction testing, A.R.S. § 13-4240, and advanced forensic testing, A.R.S. § 13-4241, 

provide an appropriate blueprint for testing in this case, but fails to clearly articulate why 

he cannot utilize these state statutes to provide for the safeguards he proposes. Kiles 

explicitly chooses not to invoke those procedures here and suggests reasons why he does 

not have access to the relief provided in these statutes. Nevertheless, Kiles was convicted 

of the murder of S.G., and thus it is not apparent why he cannot invoke these procedures. 

There is nothing about the text of the statutes that preclude the Petitioner from pursuing 

such relief even if Petitioner did not appeal his conviction for S.G.’s murder. And that 

murder is sufficiently related to the current death penalty habeas that it would be unlikely 

that Respondents could successfully argue that he has no interest in the results of the DNA. 

Although the Court does not yet conclude that it has sufficient inherent authority to

compel the parties to meet and confer about appropriate DNA testing procedures, the Court 

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need not need even consider the question of its inherent authority if sufficient statutory 

authority already exists by which Petitioner can obtain the relief he seeks. Pending an 

explanation as to why the Petitioner cannot invoke either of the two identified statutory 

procedures which set standards for and entitle him to compel such tests, the Court denies 

the motion without prejudice.

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED Kiles’s Motion for Order Requiring the Parties to 

Meet and Confer Regarding a DNA Testing Protocol (Doc. 112) is DENIED WITHOUT 

PREJUDICE.

Dated this 13th day of January, 2023.

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