J-A29027-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

HERMAN L. EDMONDSON 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 884 WDA 2023

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered June 30, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County Criminal Division at No(s): 

CP-25-CR-0000038-2018

BEFORE: BOWES, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and MURRAY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED: February 27, 2024

Herman L. Edmondson appeals pro se from the order denying his latest 

request for post-conviction relief. The lower court treated this as a serial 

petition under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-

46. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

The pertinent facts and procedural history are as follows: In 2018, a 

jury convicted Edmondson of conspiracy to commit aggravated assault. These 

convictions arose after Edmondson conspired with Lawrence Johnson to shoot 

two people thereby causing them serious bodily injury. On December 10, 

2018, the trial court sentenced him to an aggregate term of 84 to 164 months 

in prison. Edmondson filed a timely post-sentence motion, which was granted 

only as to a time credit issue. Edmondson appealed. On November 22, 2019, 

this Court affirmed his judgment of sentence. Commonwealth v. 
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Edmondson, 224 A.3d 791 (Pa. Super. 2019) (non-precedential decision). 

Edmondson did not seek further review. 

On November 30, 2020, Edmondson filed a timely pro se PCRA petition. 

The PCRA court appointed counsel. On April 21, 2021, PCRA counsel filed an 

amended petition. In this petition, PCRA counsel opined that the 

ineffectiveness claims raised by Edmondson in his pro se petition were 

meritless. Instead, PCRA counsel raised a claim of after-discovered evidence

based on an affidavit from Lawrence Johnson.

On May 5, 2021, the PCRA court issued a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of its 

intent to dismiss the petition without a hearing. Edmondson did not file a 

timely response. By order entered June 2, 2021, the PCRA court denied 

Edmondson’s amended petition. Edmondson did not file an appeal.

On March 24, 2023, Edmondson filed a pro se “Reinstatement of 

[Appellate] Rights Nunc Pro Tunc and Request to Pursue [PCRA] Counsel’s 

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim Pursuant to Commonwealth v. 

[Bradley].”1 By separate memorandum and order, the PCRA court denied the 

request for reinstatement of appellate rights.

2

 The PCRA court treated the 

remaining portion of Edmondson’s filing as a subsequent PCRA petition. On 

May 10, 2023, the PCRA court issued a Rule 907 notice of its intent to dismiss 

the petition without a hearing because it was untimely-filed, and Edmondson 

____________________________________________

1 Commonwealth v. Bradley, 261 A.3d 381 (Pa. 2021).

2 Edmondson did not appeal this order.
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failed to establish an exception to the PCRA’s time bar. Edmondson filed a 

pro se response. By order entered June 30, 2023, the PCRA court dismissed 

Edmondson’s petition. This appeal followed. Both Edmondson and the PCRA 

court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Edmondson raises four issues on appeal which we cite verbatim: 

I. Did the PCRA court erred as matter of law in dismissing 

PCRA petition without a hearing?

II. Was Petitioner denied his rights under Article I, Section 9 of 

the Pennsylvania Constitution and the Sixth and Fourteenth 

Amendments to the United States Constitution when PCRA 

counsel failed to properly present and preserve trial 

counsel’s ineffective assistance to the PCRA court.

III. Did the PCRA court erred as a matter of law in dismissing 

Petitioner’s claim of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness in failing 

to interview of call as a witness Lawrence “Larry” Johnson 

in violation of the 6th and 14th Amendment to the United 

States Constitution and Article I, Section 9 of the 

Pennsylvania Constitution wherein PCRA counsel failed to 

make the proper and correct argument to the PCRA court?

IV. Were the PCRA court’s factual findings and legal conclusions 

in denying Petitioner’s lack effective assistance of counsel 

and access to the PCRA process in violation of the 6th and 

14th Amendments to the United States Constitution and 

Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution?

Edmondson’s Brief at 4.

Before discussing these issues, however, we must first address whether 

the PCRA court properly considered Edmondson’s latest filing for postconviction relief as a second PCRA petition. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9542 

(providing that the PCRA “shall be the sole means of obtaining collateral relief 

and encompasses all other common law and statutory remedies for the same 
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purpose . . . including habeas corpus”); Commonwealth v. Descardes, 136 

A.3d 493, 499 (Pa. 2016) (explaining that “claims that could be brought under 

the PCRA must be brought under that Act. . . . A claim is cognizable under 

the PCRA if the . . . conviction resulted from one of seven enumerated errors 

set forth in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)”).

In his 2023 filing, Edmondson raised layered claims of ineffective 

assistance of PCRA counsel. These challenges constitute a cognizable claim 

under the PCRA. See Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(ii). Thus, the PCRA court 

properly considered Edmondson’s filing at issue here as a serial PCRA petition. 

Treating Edmondson’s latest filing as a PCRA petition, we next determine 

whether the PCRA court correctly concluded that it was untimely filed, and 

that Edmondson failed to establish a time-bar exception. The timeliness of a 

post-conviction petition is jurisdictional. Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 79 

A.3d 649, 651 (Pa. Super. 2013). Generally, a petition for relief under the 

PCRA, including a second or subsequent petition, must be filed within one year 

of the date the judgment becomes final unless the petition alleges, and the 

petitioner proves, that an exception to the time for filing the petition is met.

The three narrow statutory exceptions to the one-year time bar are as 

follows: “(1) interference by government officials in the presentation of the 

claim; (2) newly discovered facts; and (3) an after-recognized constitutional 

right.” Commonwealth v. Brandon, 51 A.3d 231, 233-34 (Pa. Super. 2012) 

(citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i-iii)). In addition, exceptions to the PCRA’s 

time bar must be pled in the petition and may not be raised for the first time 
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on appeal. Commonwealth v. Burton, 936 A.2d 521, 525 (Pa. Super. 

2007); see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (providing that issues not raised before the 

lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal). 

Moreover, a PCRA petitioner must file his petition “within one year of the date 

the claim could have been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2).

Finally, if a PCRA petition is untimely and the petitioner has not pled and 

proven an exception, “neither this Court nor the [PCRA] court has jurisdiction 

over the petition. Without jurisdiction, we simply do not have the legal 

authority to address the substantive claims.” Commonwealth v. 

Derrickson, 923 A.2d 466, 468 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation omitted).

Here, Edmondson’s judgment of sentence became final on December 

23, 2019, thirty days after he failed to file a petition for allowance of appeal 

with our Supreme Court. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3).3 Therefore, 

Edmondson had until December 22, 2020, to file a timely PCRA petition. As 

Edmondson filed the petition at issue in 2023, it is patently untimely unless 

he has satisfied his burden of pleading and proving that one of the enumerated 

exceptions applies. See Hernandez, supra.

Edmondson has failed to plead and prove any exception to the PCRA’s 

time bar. Indeed, in both his latest filing and brief he fails to acknowledge 

the statutory time restrictions, and proceeds to argue his substantive issues. 

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3 Because the thirtieth day fell on a Sunday, Edmondson had until the following 

Monday to file a timely petition for allowance of appeal. See generally, 1 

Pa.C.S.A. § 1908.
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Instead, Edmondson asserts that his March 2023 filing was actually his pro se 

response to the PCRA court’s Rule 907 notice for his November 2020 PCRA 

petition. 

Edmondson’s pro se response was filed after the PCRA court had already 

entered its order denying his 2020 PCRA petition. Thus, the 2023 filing was 

treated as a second PCRA petition. Edmondson contends that even if his 

response is treated as a second PCRA petition, “it should be treated as a timely 

filed second petition based on the newly discovered fact exception, i.e., PCRA 

counsel’s abandonment.” Edmondson’s Brief at 10. We cannot agree. 

The PCRA court held that our Supreme Court’s decision in Bradley,

supra, does not permit Edmondson to raise a claim of PCRA counsel’s 

ineffectiveness in an untimely serial PCRA Petition. The court explained:

[Edmondson] predicates his claim for PCRA relief on 

[Bradley, supra]. However, the reason for this is unclear on the 

face of the Petition. To the extent [Edmondson] implies a new 

exception to the timeliness rule was carved out by [Bradley], 

[Edmondson’s] reliance upon the case is misplaced. Bradley did 

not abrogate the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision of 

Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d 214, 223 (Pa. 1999) (claim 

of ineffective assistance of counsel does not save an otherwise 

untimely petition for review on the merits). As the majority in 

Bradley stated,”[u]nder the PCRA, ineffective assistance of 

counsel is one of the enumerated errors entitling a defend to relief 

so long as the other conditions of the PCRA are met.” [Bradley, 

261 A.3d at 390]. The jurisdictional timeliness requirement is one 

such condition of the PCRA. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1).

Rule 907 Notice, 5/10/23, at 3-4.

Our review of recent precedent supports the PCRA court’s conclusions. 

This Court has held that “[n]othing in Bradley creates a right to file a second 
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PCRA outside the PCRA’s one-year time limit as a method of raising 

ineffectiveness of PCRA counsel or permits recognition of such a right.” 

Commonwealth v. Stahl, 292 A.3d 1130, 1136 (Pa. Super. 2023). The 

Stahl court clarified that “our Supreme Court in Bradley unambiguously 

rejected the filing of a successive untimely PCRA petition as a permissible 

method of vindicating the right to effective representation by PCRA counsel.” 

Id. Therefore, Bradley does not excuse the facial untimeliness of 

Edmondson’s second PCRA petition. Additionally, PCRA counsel’s alleged 

abandonment is not a “newly-discovered” fact concerning the crime for which 

he was convicted. As such, this alleged abandonment does not satisfy a timebar exception. 

In sum, Edmondson’s latest filing is cognizable under the PCRA, but it is 

untimely, and he has failed to establish a time-bar exception. As such, both 

the PCRA court and this Court lack jurisdiction to consider his substantive 

claims. Derrickson, supra. We therefore affirm the PCRA court’s order 

denying him post-conviction relief. 

Order affirmed.
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2/27/2024