1The Honorable James M. Rosenbaum, United States District Judge for the

District of Minnesota, sitting by designation.

2The Honorable Robert T. Dawson, United States District Judge for the

Western District of Arkansas, sitting by designation.

3Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 46(b), the Chief Judge certified the existence of a

judicial emergency necessitating the designation of a panel consisting of fewer than

two members of the Court of Appeals.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

__________

Nos. 00-3499 and 00-3501

__________

Ace Construction, *

*

Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States 

* District Court for the Eastern 

* District of Missouri

v. *

*

City of St. Louis, *

*

Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant. *

__________

Submitted: June 14, 2001

 Filed: August 28, 2001 

__________

Before LOKEN, Circuit Judge, and ROSENBAUM1 and DAWSON,2 District

Judges.3

__________

DAWSON, District Judge.
4This case was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge by consent of the

parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

2

Ace Construction (“Ace”) appeals from the magistrate judge’s4 Order and

Amended Judgment of August 23, 2000, denying it a jury trial on the issue of

damages after finding that the City of St. Louis (“the City”) violated Ace’s

procedural due process rights. The City cross-appeals from the magistrate judge’s

denial of its motions for summary judgment and for judgment as a matter of law. 

For the reasons stated herein, we REVERSE and REMAND.

I. Background.

Ace purchased the property in question on March 29, 1974 while it was

zoned for commercial use. On September 29, 1992, the property was rezoned for

residential use pursuant to the enactment of a city ordinance. Ace contends it had

no notice of the adoption of the rezoning ordinance.

Ace brought an action in federal court which was voluntarily dismissed on the

grounds of lack of ripeness. It then filed an action in the Missouri Circuit Court of

the City of St. Louis which was dismissed because Ace did not have standing to

challenge the ordinance. The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District

affirmed the magistrate judge’s decision, and the Missouri Supreme Court denied

review. Ace then commenced the present action in the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Missouri. 

Ace brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming that the City

violated its procedural due process rights by rezoning property with insufficient

notice and that the rezoning decreased the value of its property. After trial, the
3

magistrate judge concluded that the City violated Ace’s procedural due process

rights and awarded Ace $1.00 in nominal damages. In an amended judgment, the

magistrate judge voided the rezoning ordinance. 

II. Discussion.

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine recognizes that lower federal courts lack

subject matter jurisdiction over challenges to state court judgments. See District of

Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75

L.Ed.2d 206 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416, 44 S.Ct. 149,

68 L.Ed. 362 (1923); Lemonds v. St. Louis County, 222 F.3d 488, 492 (8th Cir.

2000). Jurisdictional issues under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine may be addressed

for the first time on appeal and may be raised sua sponte. Lemonds at 492 (8th Cir.

2000). 

Federal district courts are prohibited from exercising jurisdiction over appeals

from state court decisions and general constitutional claims that are “inextricably

intertwined” with specific claims already adjudicated in state court. Id. at 492-93. 

A general federal claim is inextricably intertwined with a state court judgment “if

the federal claim succeeds only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the

issue before it.” Id. at 493 citing Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc. 481 U.S. 1, 25, 107

S.Ct. 1519, 95 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (Marshall, J., concurring). If the federal court can

only provide relief by determining that the state court was wrong, it is, in effect, an

appeal of the state court judgment which is prohibited. Id.

Ace’s claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine if the requested

federal relief would void the state court’s judgment or amount to basically a reversal

of the state court’s holding. Id. (citations omitted). The state court complaint
4

sought to declare the city ordinance in question void as the ordinance lacked any

rational basis and was passed without proper notice to Ace. The state court held

that Ace did not have standing under Missouri law to challenge the ordinance,

because Ace did not have the specific intent to use the property for purposes barred

by the ordinance. 

In its complaint filed in federal court, Ace alleged that its procedural due

process rights were violated by the failure of the City to provide proper notice to

Ace prior to passing the ordinance and by failing to void it after Ace learned of it. 

The magistrate judge found that Ace’s procedural due process rights were violated

and awarded it nominal damages. Ace then filed a motion to amend the judgment

by requesting the magistrate judge declare the ordinance void, which the magistrate

judge did in an amended judgment. Ace’s federal claim is essentially a due process

challenge to the constitutionality of the ordinance. This claim is inextricably

intertwined with the state court judgment, because, to succeed on this claim, Ace

would have to establish that it has standing to challenge the constitutionality of the

ordinance. This would basically necessitate a reversal of the state court’s ruling that

Ace lacked such standing. 

III. Conclusion.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the magistrate judge is reversed

and remanded with instructions to dismiss Appellant’s claims for want of

jurisdiction.
5

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.