2023 IL App (1st) 210116-U

No. 1-21-0116 

Order filed February 23, 2023 

Fourth Division

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the 

limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

______________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

JAMES SARDIN, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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Appeal from the

Circuit Court of

Cook County. 

No. 92 CR 4156 

Honorable 

Timothy J. Joyce, 

Judge, presiding. 

PRESIDING JUSTICE LAMPKIN delivered the judgment of the court.

Justices Rochford and Martin concurred in the judgment. 

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The circuit court properly denied defendant leave to file a fifth successive pro se 

petition for relief pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 

et seq. (West 2020)), when defendant failed to establish cause. 

¶ 2 Defendant James Sardin appeals from the circuit court’s denial of leave to file a successive 

pro se petition for relief pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et 
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seq. (West 2020)). On appeal, he contends that he adequately alleged cause and prejudice for his 

failure to raise his proportionate penalties claim in his initial postconviction petition. We affirm.1

 

¶ 3 Following a 1996 bench trial, defendant was found guilty of the first degree murders and 

armed robberies of two victims and sentenced to mandatory life imprisonment without the 

possibility of parole. 

¶ 4 The facts of this case are detailed in our prior orders, and we recite them here to the extent 

necessary to our disposition of this appeal. At trial, the evidence established that on July 31, 1991, 

defendant and three other men robbed a liquor store. During the robbery, the two victims, store 

employees, were fatally shot. In his statement to an assistant State’s Attorney, defendant, who was 

21 years old at the time of the offense, stated that he shot the firearm. We affirmed on direct appeal. 

See People v. Sardin, No 1-96-1729 (1998) (unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 

23). 

¶ 5 On March 15, 1999, defendant filed a first pro se postconviction petition, which the circuit 

court summarily dismissed. We affirmed. See People v. Sardin, No. 1-99-2024 (2001)

(unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23). 

¶ 6 On December 8, 2000, defendant filed a pro se successive postconviction petition which 

the circuit court dismissed. We granted defendant’s motion to dismiss the appeal from that order. 

See People v. Sardin, No. 1-01-0971 (Sept. 20, 2002) (dispositional order). 

1 In adherence with the requirements of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 352(a) (eff. July 1, 

2018), this appeal has been resolved without oral argument upon the entry of a separate written 

order. 
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¶ 7 On May 11, 2002, defendant filed a second pro se successive postconviction petition. On 

November 9, 2004, the circuit court granted the State’s motion to dismiss. We affirmed. See People 

v. Sardin, No. 1-04-3724 (2007) (unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23). 

¶ 8 On May 26, 2010, defendant filed a pro se document titled “Motion to Vacate Judgment 

as ‘Void’ and Set Aside Conviction,” which the circuit court treated as a petition for relief from 

judgment and dismissed on September 9, 2010. We affirmed the circuit court’s judgment, and 

granted appointed counsel’s motion to withdraw filed pursuant to Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 

551 (1987). See People v. Sardin, 1-10-3049 (2012) (unpublished summary order under Illinois 

Supreme Court Rule 23(c)).

¶ 9 On July 8, 2011, defendant sought leave to file a third pro se successive postconviction 

petition. On September 16, 2011, the circuit court denied defendant leave to file the petition for 

failure to meet the requirements of the cause and prejudice test. We granted appointed counsel’s 

motion to withdraw filed pursuant to Finley and affirmed the judgment of the circuit court. See 

People v. Sardin, No. 1-11-3261 (2013) (unpublished summary order under Illinois Supreme Court 

Rule 23(c)). 

¶ 10 On October 22, 2012, defendant sought leave to file a fourth pro se successive 

postconviction petition, which the circuit court denied. We affirmed the judgment of the circuit 

court, and granted appointed counsel’s motion to withdraw filed pursuant to Finley. See People v. 

Sardin, No. 1-13-0473 (2014) (unpublished summary order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 

23(c)). 

¶ 11 On July 7, 2020, defendant sought leave to file the instant, fifth, pro se postconviction 

petition. Defendant alleged that his mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without the 
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possibility of parole violated the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution as 

applied to him, an intellectually disabled defendant. He further alleged the petition met the 

requirements of the cause and prejudice test because this claim could not have been raised prior to 

Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), which held that mandatory life imprisonment for juveniles 

and “intellectually disabled defendants” violated the eighth amendment. He argued the protections 

of Miller and its progeny should be applied to him, as he was 21 years old at the time of the offense

and had a “mental [and] intellectual disability.” Defendant requested a new sentencing hearing 

where his “abusive and toxic developmental history” of physical, sexual, and psychological abuse, 

domestic violence, and “household substance abuse” could be considered. Defendant attached

educational records, portions of the sentencing transcript, a Chicago police department document 

detailing his criminal history, correspondence with the court, and caselaw.

¶ 12 On December 7, 2020, the circuit court denied defendant leave to file the instant petition, 

noting that because defendant was 21 years and 11 months old at the time of the offenses, he could 

not avail himself of the protections outlined in Miller. Regarding defendant’s proportionate 

penalties clause argument, the court recognized the “developing” nature of the law, but relied on 

People v. Coty, 2020 IL 123972, to deny him relief.

¶ 13 On appeal, defendant contends that the circuit court erred in denying him leave to file the 

successive pro se postconviction petition when he adequately alleged cause and prejudice. 

Defendant argues that he established cause because there was previously “no societal consensus 

that a life sentence *** for a young adult shocks the conscience.” He argues that he established 

prejudice because he was an “emerging adult with incomplete brain development” at the time of 

the offense and the Miller factors were not considered at sentencing. 
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¶ 14 The State responds that defendant, who was 21 years old at the time of the offense, was not 

a “youthful offender” and cannot claim the protections of Miller. The State further argues that 

defendant failed to meet the requirements of the cause and prejudice test.

¶ 15 The Act provides a procedural mechanism through which a criminal defendant can assert 

that his federal or state constitutional rights were substantially violated in his original trial or 

sentencing hearing. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(a)(1) (West 2020); People v. Davis, 2014 IL 115595, ¶ 13. 

“[T]he Act contemplates the filing of only one post-conviction petition,” and this statutory bar is 

relaxed only when “fundamental fairness so requires.” People v. Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d 444, 

456, 458 (2002); see also 725 ILCS 5/122-3 (West 2020) (“[a]ny claim of substantial denial of 

constitutional rights not raised in the original or an amended petition is waived”). 

¶ 16 Leave to file a successive petition is granted when a defendant shows cause for his failure 

to bring the claim in his initial postconviction petition and prejudice resulting from that failure. 

725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2020). To demonstrate cause, a defendant “must show some objective 

factor external to the defense that impeded his ability to raise the claim in his initial postconviction 

proceeding,” People v. Jackson, 2021 IL 124818, ¶ 30. To demonstrate prejudice, the defendant 

must show that the claimed error so infected his trial that the resulting conviction violated due 

process. Id. A defendant must satisfy both elements of the cause and prejudice test in order to 

obtain leave to file a successive postconviction petition. Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d at 464. We 

review the denial of leave to file a successive postconviction petition de novo. People v. Robinson, 

2020 IL 123849, ¶ 39. 

¶ 17 In the case at bar, defendant’s proportionate penalties claim relies on caselaw interpreting 

the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution as applied to juveniles and the extension 
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of those protections to young adult offenders through the proportionate penalties clause of the 

Illinois Constitution. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (finding that the eighth 

and fourteenth amendments prohibited the “imposition of the death penalty on offenders who were 

under the age of 18 when their crimes were committed”); Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479 

(2012) (finding that “the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in 

prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders”); Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 

190, 212 (2016) (determining that Miller applied retroactively to cases on collateral review); 

People v. Horshaw, 2021 IL App (1st) 182047, ¶ 69 (noting that “young adult offenders” may 

bring a successive postconviction claim “alleging that their sentences in excess of 40 years 

imposed without consideration of the Miller factors are unconstitutional as applied to them under 

the proportionate penalties clause”).

¶ 18 The proportionate penalties clause states that “[a]ll penalties shall be determined both 

according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful 

citizenship.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11. A penalty violates the proportionate penalties clause 

when it is, relevant here, “cruel, degrading, or so wholly disproportionate to the offense as to shock 

the moral sense of the community.” People v. Miller, 202 Ill. 2d 328, 338 (2002). 

¶ 19 As discussed, a defendant establishes cause by showing “some objective factor external to 

the defense that impeded his ability to raise the claim in his initial postconviction proceeding.”

Jackson, 2021 IL 124818, ¶ 30. Here, defendant alleged that he could not have brought this claim 

sooner because it relies on evolving caselaw and scientific research regarding young adult 

offenders and “societal judgment” on how to sentence “emerging adults.” 
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¶ 20 Defendant relies on Horshaw, which found “that [the] defendant’s motion for leave to file 

a successive postconviction petition established a prima facie showing of cause by identifying an 

objective factor that impeded his ability” to earlier raise a claim that his 66-year aggregate sentence 

was an unconstitutional de facto life sentence as applied to him under, relevant here, the 

proportionate penalties clause. Horshaw, 2021 IL App (1st) 182047, ¶¶ 31, 124. There, the State 

did not dispute that the defendant had established cause “based on the retroactive application of 

Miller to cases on collateral review.” Id. ¶ 122. In the case at bar, however, the State does not 

concede that defendant has established cause. 

¶ 21 Ultimately, defendant’s claim is foreclosed by our supreme court’s holding in People v. 

Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010, ¶ 74, that “Miller’s announcement of a new substantive rule under the

eighth amendment does not provide cause for a defendant to raise a claim under the proportionate 

penalties clause.” The court explained that: 

“Illinois courts have long recognized the differences between persons of mature age and 

those who are minors for purposes of sentencing. Thus, Miller’s unavailability prior to 

2012 at best deprived [the] defendant of ‘some helpful support’ for his state constitutional 

law claim, which is insufficient to establish ‘cause.’ [citation].” Id. 

¶ 22 Therefore, defendant’s argument regarding “cause” for his failure to raise his proportionate 

penalties claim in his initial postconviction petition is foreclosed by Dorsey. See People v. French, 

2022 IL App (1st) 220122, ¶ 25 (“Based on Dorsey’s clear holding, defendant cannot establish 

cause for his failure to raise his proportionate penalties claim in his initial postconviction 

petition.”); People v. Figueroa, 2022 IL App (1st) 172390-B, ¶¶ 37-40 (concluding that Dorsey

was “entirely dispositive,” and the defendant had not established cause for his failure to raise his 
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proportionate penalties claim in an earlier proceeding); People v. Ruddock, 2022 IL App (1st) 

173023, ¶ 72 (“The supreme court’s reasoning in Dorsey also establishes that the defendant *** 

cannot satisfy the cause prong of the cause-and-prejudice test *** with respect to his proportionate 

penalties claim under the Illinois Constitution.”); People v. Hemphill, 2022 IL App (1st) 201112, 

¶ 31 (“It follows that, based on the supreme court’s reasoning in Dorsey, defendant *** cannot 

satisfy the cause prong of the cause-and-prejudice test for bringing a successive postconviction 

petition with respect to his proportionate penalties claim under the Illinois Constitution.”). 

¶ 23 We decline to depart from this well-reasoned precedent. Under Dorsey, we are bound by 

our supreme court’s determination that Miller and its progeny do not provide a defendant with 

cause for failing to raise a proportionate penalties claim in an initial postconviction petition. See 

People v. Artis, 232 Ill. 2d 156, 164 (2009). 

¶ 24 Defendant argues, however, that when he filed his prior postconviction petitions, courts 

were “affirmatively rejecting” challenges to adult sentences based upon the proportionate penalties 

clause and there was “no societal consensus” that a life sentence or lengthy imprisonment for a 

young adult “shock[ed] the conscience.”

¶ 25 People v. Haines, 2021 IL App (4th) 190612, is instructive. In that case, the defendant was

18 years old when he committed a murder that resulted in a 55-year prison term. Id. ¶ 1. On direct 

appeal, the court rejected the defendant’s argument that his “ ‘sentence was excessive because the 

trial court failed to consider mitigating factors such as [his] youth, nonviolent criminal history, and 

drug addiction.’ ” Id. ¶¶ 7-8 (quoting People v. Haines, No. 4-06-0549 (2007) (unpublished order 

under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23)). In 2008, the defendant filed a postconviction petition 
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raising claims unrelated to his sentence. Id. ¶ 10. The circuit court denied him relief following an 

evidentiary hearing, and that judgment was affirmed on appeal. Id. ¶¶ 10-11. 

¶ 26 In 2019, the defendant sought leave to file a successive postconviction petition raising both 

a proportionate penalties challenge and an eighth amendment challenge to his sentence. Id. ¶ 12. 

The defendant alleged that his de facto life sentence failed to account for his youth and 

rehabilitative potential and, therefore, violated the Illinois Constitution’s proportionate penalties 

clause. Id. The defendant argued his 18-year-old brain more resembled a 17-year-old’s brain and, 

therefore, the protections of Miller applied. Id. 

¶ 27 The court affirmed on appeal, determining that the defendant’s claim was barred by res 

judicata, as it was the same claim raised in his direct appeal, “dressed *** up *** in constitutional 

clothing.” Id. ¶¶ 21-22. The court further found, relevant here, that the defendant failed to show 

cause to justify a successive postconviction petition. Id. ¶¶ 24-57. 

¶ 28 The court examined whether the “nonexistence” of Miller and its progeny “really was cause 

for [the] defendant’s failure to raise his present claim in the initial postconviction petition. Id. ¶ 26. 

The court acknowledged that the “previous unavailability of a legal or factual basis for the claim 

can qualify as cause.” Id. ¶ 43. However, 

“If, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, a claim can be built out of existing legal 

materials, the defendant has to build the claim without waiting for someone else in another 

case to do so. Defendants cannot wait until a claim falls ready-made into their lap. Some 

assembly may be required. Ease of argument is not the standard. ‘[T]he question is not 

whether subsequent legal developments have made counsel’s task easier, but whether at 

the time of the default the claim was “available” at all.’ [citation].” Id. ¶ 45.
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¶ 29 The court noted that this was consistent with Illinois law: “ ‘[T]he lack of precedent for a 

position,’ our supreme court says, ‘differs from “cause” for failing to raise an issue, and a 

defendant must raise the issue, even when the law is against him, in order to preserve it for 

review.’ ” Id. (quoting People v. Guerrero, 2012 IL 112020, ¶ 20).

¶ 30 The court explained that, “[y]ears before [the] defendant’s initial postconviction 

proceeding in 2008, Illinois courts recognized as-applied claims under the proportionate-penalties 

clause.” Id. ¶ 46. Additionally, for “decades” Illinois caselaw “held that the proportionate-penalties 

clause required the sentencing court to take into account the defendant’s ‘youth’ and ‘mentality.’ ” 

Id. ¶ 47 (collecting cases). In other words, “Illinois courts also have long been aware that less than 

mature age can extend into young adulthood—and they have insisted that sentences take into 

account that reality of human development.” Id. 

¶ 31 The court therefore concluded that “in 2008 [the] defendant had the essential legal tools to 

raise his present proposed claim under the proportionate-penalties clause.” Id. ¶ 49. Although 

developments in the relevant caselaw “would have made it easier for [the] defendant to raise his 

claim,” “[t]he emergence of some helpful support for a claim that already was raisable is not 

cause.” Id. ¶¶ 49, 51. Having resolved the appeal based on res judicata and the failure to establish 

cause, the court did not analyze the prejudice element of the cause and prejudice test. See id. ¶ 57.

¶ 32 Similarly, here, defendant has not established cause for failure to raise a proportionate 

penalties claim in his initial postconviction petition. See People v. Kuehner, 2022 IL App (4th) 

200325, ¶¶ 100-107 (adopting Haines’s reasoning). As explained in Haines, although subsequent 

caselaw might have supported defendant’s claim, he could have raised this claim in his initial 

postconviction petition. 
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¶ 33 Ultimately, Dorsey’s holding that “Miller’s announcement of a new substantive rule under 

the eighth amendment does not provide cause for a defendant to raise a claim under the 

proportionate penalties clause” is dispositive of this appeal. Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010, ¶ 74. 

Because defendant has failed to establish cause (Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d at 464), the circuit court 

properly denied him leave to file the instant fifth successive pro se postconviction petition.

¶ 34 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.

¶ 35 Affirmed.