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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Shawna Perkins, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

William Stumpe, 

Defendant. 

No. CV-17-04212-PHX-DLR 

ORDER 

 Before the Court is Defendant William Stumpe’s motion to dismiss. (Doc. 12.) 

The motion is fully briefed.1

 For the reasons discussed below, Stumpe’s motion to 

dismiss is granted. 

I. Background

 In June 2016, Plaintiff Shawna Perkins and Stumpe entered into a Domestic 

Partnership Agreement (“Agreement”), which included, among other things, provisions 

governing the distribution of property in the event that the couple’s relationship ended. 

In September 2016, Perkins and Stumpe ended their domestic partnership. Also in 

September, Stumpe provided information to Perkins’ ex-husband concerning Perkins’ 

financial status for use in a family law proceeding in California. Based on these events, 

Perkins filed suit alleging: (1) breach of contract for Stumpe’s failure to comply with the 

Agreement, and (2) interference with her California spousal and child support orders. 

 1

 After reviewing the briefing, the Court finds oral argument unnecessary. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); LRCiv. 7.2(f). 
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(Doc. 11 at 7.) Stumpe moves for dismissal of both claims. The Court discusses each in 

turn. 

II. Discussion 

 A. Breach of Contract

 Perkins alleges that Stumpe breached the Agreement when he refused to provide 

her with the post-dissolution benefits outlined in it. (Id. at 7.) According to the 

Agreement, upon dissolution of their relationship Perkins was entitled to: (1) receive a 

lump sum amount of $100,000; (2) retain all assets, jewelry, clothes, furniture and 

anything else obtained during the relationship; (3) retain her Lexus, with all maintenance 

and gas paid by Stumpe for 5 years following dissolution; (4) receive one year’s salary in 

a one-time payment from Staybright Electric; and (5) the return of all personal property 

she owned at the time of the Agreement. (Id. at 10-11 ¶¶ 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6A.) Perkins 

contends that she was denied all five benefits. (Id. at 7.) 

 The Agreement, however, includes a mandatory arbitration clause, which in 

relevant part reads: “Any disputes under this Agreement shall be required to be resolved 

by binding arbitration of the parties hereto.” (Id. at 10 ¶ 10.) Stumpe asserts that 

Perkins’ breach of contract claim should be dismissed “so Perkins can proceed by 

arbitration as mandated by the [A]greement.” (Doc. 12 at 8.) 

 The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., “mandates that district 

courts shall direct the parties to proceed to arbitration on issues as to which an arbitration 

agreement has been signed.”2

 Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 218 

(1985). “The court’s role under the Act is therefore limited to determining (1) whether a 

valid agreement to arbitrate exists and, if it does, (2) whether the agreement encompasses 

the dispute at issue.” Chiron Corp. v. Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 207 F.3d 1126, 1130 

 2

 The Agreement contains a general choice of law provision requiring application of Arizona law. The Court need not decide whether the FAA or Arizona’s state law 

counterpart applies because Arizona courts have made clear that the Arizona Statute is 

interpreted the same as the FAA. See Desert Breeze Condo. Ass’n. v. Richmond Am. 

Homes of Ariz. Inc., No. 14-CV-889-PHX-DLR, 2014 WL 12672631, at *1-2 (D. Ariz. 

Aug. 15, 2014). Therefore, for purposes of this order, the Court will rely on the FAA and cases interpreting it. 
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(9th Cir. 2000) (citing 9 U.S.C. § 4). If the court decides that an arbitration agreement is 

valid and enforceable, then it should either stay or dismiss the claims subject to 

arbitration. Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1276-77 (9th Cir. 2006). 

“Where a contract contains an arbitration clause, courts apply a presumption of 

arbitrability as to particular grievances, and the party resisting arbitration bears the 

burden of establishing that the arbitration agreement is inapplicable.” Wynn Resorts, Ltd. 

v. Atlantic–Pacific Capital, Inc., 497 F. App’x 740, 742 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal citations 

omitted). Courts therefore should “construe ambiguities concerning the scope of 

arbitrability in favor of arbitration . . . .” Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 

514 U.S. 52, 66 (1995). 

 There is no dispute that the parties entered into the Agreement, that the Agreement 

contains a mandatory arbitration clause, and that Perkins’ breach of contract claim falls 

within the scope of that clause. Perkins does not argue that the arbitration clause is 

unenforceable, nor does the Court find any reason for concluding as much. Therefore, 

the Court dismisses Perkins’ breach of contract claim. See Meritage Homes Corp. v. 

Hancock, 522 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 1211 (D. Ariz. 2007). If Perkins wishes to pursue this 

claim, she must do so through an arbitration proceeding consistent with the terms of the 

Agreement.

 B. Interference Claim

 Perkins also alleges that Stumpe “interfer[ed] with and ultimately stopp[ed] [her] 

previous court ordered support in a family law case in California[.]” (Doc. 11 at 7.) 

After reviewing Perkins’ complaint, the Court understands as a general matter that 

Perkins accuses Stumpe of providing the California court presiding over her child and 

spousal support awards with information that caused the court to terminate these awards 

and order sanctions against Perkins.3

 Stumpe argues that Perkins’ claim should be 

 3

 Perkins attached a declaration submitted by Perkins’ ex-husband’s counsel 

before the California court containing information acquired from Stumpe. (Doc. 1-1 at 

26-29.) Also attached to Perkins’ complaint is a judgment from the California court 

setting aside Perkins’ child and spousal support awards because they were obtained by 

fraud, finding that Perkins owes her ex-husband $125,000 in child support arrearages and 
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dismissed for: (1) lack of personal jurisdiction, and (2) failure to state a claim for which 

relief can be granted. (Doc. 12 at 5-6, 8-11.) Because the Court finds that it lacks 

personal jurisdiction over Stumpe, it will not opine on the sufficiency of Perkins’ factual 

allegations or the plausibility of her claim. 

 Where a defendant moves to dismiss a complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction, 

the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that jurisdiction is appropriate. Sher v. 

Johnson, 911 F.2d 1357, 1361 (9th Cir. 1990). Where, as here, the motion is based on 

written materials rather than an evidentiary hearing, “the plaintiff need only make a prima 

facie showing of jurisdictional facts.” Id. In such cases, the court inquires only “into 

whether [the plaintiff’s] pleadings and affidavits make a prima facie showing of personal 

jurisdiction.” Caruth v. Int’l Psychoanalytical Ass’n, 59 F.3d 126, 128 (9th Cir. 1995). 

In determining whether the plaintiff has met this burden, uncontroverted allegations in 

the plaintiff’s complaint must be taken as true, and “conflicts between the facts contained 

in the parties’ affidavits must be resolved in [the plaintiff’s] favor for purposes of 

deciding whether a prima facie case for personal jurisdiction exists.” AT & T v. 

Compagnie Bruxelles Lambert, 94 F.3d 586, 588 (9th Cir. 1996). 

 Because no applicable federal statute governing personal jurisdiction exists, 

Arizona’s long-arm statute applies to this case. See Terracom v. Valley Nat’l Bank, 49 

F.3d 555, 559 (9th Cir. 1995). Arizona’s long-arm statute provides for personal 

jurisdiction to the extent permitted by the Due Process Clause of the United States 

Constitution. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 4.2(a); see also Uberti v. Leonardo, 892 P. 2d 1354, 1358 

(Ariz. 1995) (stating that under Rule 4.2(a), “Arizona will exert personal jurisdiction over 

a nonresident litigant to the maximum extent allowed by the federal constitution”).

 The exercise of jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant requires that the 

defendant “have certain minimum contacts . . . such that the maintenance of the suit does 

not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe Co. v. State 

 $92,087 for overpayments in spousal support, and ordering Perkins to pay her ex-husband $200,000 in sanctions for her fraud on the court. (Id. at 34-36.) 
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of Wash., Office of Unemployment Compensation and Placement, 326 U.S. 310, 316 

(1945) (internal quotations and citation omitted). Personal jurisdiction may be general or 

specific. A court may assert general jurisdiction over foreign defendants “to hear any and 

all claims against them when their affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous and 

systematic’ as to render them essentially at home in the forum State.” Goodyear Dunlop 

Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011) (citing Int’l Shoe Co., 326 

U.S. at 317). “Specific jurisdiction, on the other hand, depends on an affiliation between 

the forum and the underlying controversy, principally, activity or an occurrence that takes 

place in the forum State and is therefore subject to the State’s regulation.” Id. (internal 

quotation and citation omitted). 

 Stumpe does not have “substantial” or “continuous and systematic” contacts with 

Arizona such that an exercise of general jurisdiction would be appropriate. Perkins 

alleges that Stumpe personally owns property in Scottsdale, Arizona.4

 (Doc. 11 at 4.) 

Mere ownership of property in the forum state, unrelated to the cause of action, is 

insufficient to support general jurisdiction unless supported by other ties. See Shaffer v. 

Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 209 (1977) (“[A]lthough the presence of the defendant’s property 

in a State might suggest the existence of other ties among the defendant, the State, and 

the litigation, the presence of the property alone would not support the State’s 

jurisdiction. If those other ties did not exist, cases over which the State is now thought to 

have jurisdiction could not be brought in that forum.”). Perkins offers no other evidence 

of ties connecting Stumpe to Arizona. See Compass Fin. Partners, LLC v. Unlimited 

Holdings, Inc., No. 07-CV-1964-PHX-MHM, 2008 WL 2945585, at *3 (D. Ariz. July 28, 

2008) (noting that the plaintiff “must present evidence establishing facts that would 

demonstrate general jurisdiction”). Without more, the Court finds the Scottsdale 

property, which is unrelated to this cause of action and potentially owned by StayBright 

 4

 At other times in her papers, Perkins inconsistently alleges that StayBright Electric, not Stumpe, is the owner of the Scottsdale property. (Doc. 15 at 1.) A corporation’s ownership of property in the forum state does not confer personal jurisdiction on one of its owners. See Compass Fin. Partners, LLC v. Unlimited Holdings, Inc., No. 07-CV-1964-PHX-MHM, 2008 WL 2945585, at *4 (D. Ariz. July 28, 2008). 
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Electric rather than Stumpe, does not confer general personal jurisdiction over Stumpe. 

See Best Western Int’l, Inc. v. Coastline RE Holdings Corp., 10-CV-2290-JWS, 2011 

285846, at *2 (D. Ariz. Jan. 27, 2011). 

 In specific jurisdiction cases, the relationship between the defendant and the forum 

state “must arise out of contacts that the ‘defendant himself’ creates with the forum 

State.” Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 284 (2014) (quoting Burger King Corp. v. 

Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985)). Additionally, the requisite “minimum contacts” 

must be “with the forum State itself, not . . . with persons who reside there.” Id. A court 

will exercise specific jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant only when three 

requirements are satisfied: (1) the defendant either “purposefully directs” his activities or 

“purposefully avails” himself of the benefits afforded by the forum’s laws; (2) the claim 

“arises out of or relates to the defendant’s forum-related activities;” and (3) the exercise 

of jurisdiction comports with fair play and substantial justice. See Dole Food Co. v. 

Watts, 303 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2002). 

 Stumpe challenges the first prong of this three-part test. Purposeful direction 

exists where the defendant “(1) committed an intentional act, (2) expressly aimed at the 

forum state, (3) causing harm that the defendant knows is likely to be suffered in the 

forum state.” Axiom Foods, Inc. v. Acerchem Int’l, Inc., 874 F.3d 1064, 1069 (9th Cir. 

2017); see Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984). Here, the complaint fails to allege 

purposeful direction of relevant activities by Stumpe to Arizona. Instead, the allegations 

suggest Stumpe directed his relevant activities—contacting Perkins’ ex-husband’s 

counsel and providing relevant information for a California family law proceeding—at 

California. Therefore, Perkins’ allegations do not support the Court’s exercise of specific 

jurisdiction. 

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant William Stumpe’s Motion to dismiss (Doc. 12) 

is GRANTED. 

// 

//
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all pending motions are DENIED as moot. 

The Clerk of the Court is directed to terminate this case. 

 Dated this 17th day of September, 2018. 

Douglas L. Rayes 

United States District Judge