EXHIBIT D 

Case 2:17-cv-04140-DWL Document 132-4 Filed 05/13/19 Page 1 of 48
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

_________________

Wells Fargo Bank NA, )

) No. CV-17-4140-PHX-DWL

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) Phoenix, Arizona

) April 8, 2019

Wyo Tech Investment ) 1:29 p.m.

Group LLC, et al., ) 

)

Defendants. )

_____________________________ )

BEFORE: THE HONORABLE DOMINIC W. LANZA, JUDGE

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

MOTION HEARING

Official Court Reporter:

Candy L. Potter, RMR, CRR

Sandra Day O'Connor U.S. Courthouse, Suite 312

401 West Washington Street, Spc 36

Phoenix, Arizona 85003-2151

(602) 322-7246

Proceedings Reported by Stenographic Court Reporter

Transcript Prepared by Computer-Aided Transcription

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A P P E A R A N C E S

For Defendants CWT Canada, Resources Recovery Corporation and 

Jean Noelting: 

Ryan Rapp & Underwood 

By: James Hendrik Taylor, Esq.

3200 North Central Avenue, Suite 2250

Phoenix, Arizona 85012 

Schlam Stone & Dolan 

By: Joshua Wurtzel, Esq. (Telephonically)

26 Broadway, Suite 1900 

New York, New York 10004 

For Defendant Wyo Tech Investment Group:

Wilenchik & Bartness 

By: Chase Reddeford Turrentine, Esq.

2810 North 3rd Street, Suite 103

Phoenix, Arizona 85004 

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(Proceedings begin at 1:29 p.m.)

THE CLERK: Civil case 17-4140, Wells Fargo Bank NA 

versus Wyo Tech Investment Group LLC and others. Time set for 

hearing regarding defendants' motion to dismiss, motion for 

judgment on the pleadings, defendants' motion to enjoin CWT 

parties from attempts to utilize New York restraining notices, 

and joint discovery dispute. 

Counsel, please announce your presence for the record. 

MR. TURRENTINE: Chase Turrentine for Wilenchik and 

Bartness. 

THE COURT: Good afternoon. 

MR. TAYLOR: Good afternoon, Your Honor, Hank Taylor, 

local counsel for the CWT parties; CWT Canada, Resources 

Recovery, and Jean Noelting. 

THE COURT: Good afternoon. 

MR. WURTZEL: Good afternoon, Your Honor, this is 

Josh Wurtzel from Schlam Stone & Dolan for the CWT parties as 

well. 

Thank you for accommodating me from New York. 

THE COURT: Yeah, no problem.

Can you repeat your last name? 

MR. WURTZEL: Sure. This Joshua Wurtzel, 

W-U-R-T-Z-E-L. 

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

So we are set today because as the parties know there 

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are an array of different things pending before the Court. 

There is a -- Wyo Tech's motion to dismiss, which is at docket 

number 95. There's Wyo Tech's emergency motion for an 

injunction, which is at docket number 98, which in their reply 

they narrow to as far as I can tell only a request for 

reconsideration of the Court's previous ruling on personal 

jurisdiction. There is also the discovery dispute concerning 

the subpoena to the Wilenchik firm and to Beus Gilbert, which 

is at docket number 101. 

I issued a somewhat lengthy order at docket number 109 

laying out some of what I think are the unresolved issues in 

the case. And since then the parties have filed supplemental 

briefs at 113 and 114. 

So there's a lot of stuff out there. I feel like I 

have a pretty good handle on how everything fits together, but 

I'm very interested in hearing the parties' perspectives on 

things. 

So my understanding, Mr. Turrentine, is that you have 

an electronic presentation; is that correct?

MR. TURRENTINE: No, just verbal. 

THE COURT: Okay. So, I guess I'll start, 

because -- I guess we could have either side go first, but 

because some of the things before me are motions that were 

filed by Wyo Tech, I'll start with Wyo Tech. 

So please proceed however you'd like. 

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MR. TURRENTINE: Thank you. 

And I apologize, I have a very loud voice, I'm going 

to try to not blow out any speakers here. 

THE COURT: No problem. Thank you. 

MR. TURRENTINE: So in your most recent minute entry 

and order, that very lengthy one you just described, you laid 

out a lot of the case law. If you want me to go over the facts 

of the case at any point, let me know. But otherwise, I'd like 

to just kind of proceed in the order that you described them; 

the motion to dismiss slash motion for judgment -- sorry, 

motion for judgment on the pleadings, the motion to enjoin CWT 

parties, and then the discovery dispute. 

THE COURT: Okay. Sure. 

MR. TURRENTINE: Great. 

So, the sole issue in the case has been, uncontested, 

that it's whether or not Danzik has an interest in the funds in 

dispute. However, a lot of the issues that have come up since 

then have been whether or not the funds were rightfully 

restrained by the CWT parties. And that's the crux of the 

issue for the motion to dismiss and the motion for judgment on 

the pleadings. 

Essentially we've argued that in -- or it's been 

stated that in instances where there are similar parties, 

similar issues, similar facts at stake, it's important for the 

issues of judicial economy and to avoid horizontal -- 

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horizontal appeals that would take judicial notice that in 

Federal Court and Bankruptcy Court in Wyoming, this issue was 

litigated. It was argued. 

And the -- and the judge in the Wyoming Bankruptcy 

Court stated that it was, quote, speculative, conclusory, and 

would not survive a motion to dismiss. 

On those grounds we would ask that you take judicial 

notice of that and preclude any further arguments in that 

matter. 

Now the CWT parties have made a few counter arguments 

to try to differentiate it. They cite the law of case 

doctrine, which essentially says that, oh, well, if you request 

the same relief over and over again, you should be excluded 

from doing that. 

That cites a case Meadowgate, and Meadowgate is 

citing -- 

(Court reporter interruption.)

MR. TURRENTINE: Sorry. That's one of the many 

critiques of my public speaking. 

In Meadowgate they cite U.S. v. Garcia, which further 

illuminates the issue and states that, first, the doctrine of 

case law is discretion. And it seems practical for why that 

would be. The only issue -- the only thing at issue 

here -- the only relief we're going to request is that the 

funds be released. It's going to be a consistent theme that 

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we'll be seeing throughout all the motions, and has been. 

Further, in addition to it being discretionary, it 

should be -- it shouldn't necessarily be followed if the 

decision is clearly erroneous, or its enforcement would work a 

manifest injustice. 

Our position is that the use of the New York law, for 

which none of the parties that have been restrained have any 

reasonable contact with, minimum or otherwise, that it is a 

manifest injustice to allow this to continue.

Which kind of leads me into the next motion, which is 

the motion to enjoin, if that's okay. 

THE COURT: Sure. 

MR. TURRENTINE: So we're requesting that CWT parties 

be restrained -- or be enjoined from using the New York 

restraining notice under C.P.L.R. 5222. 

The grounds for that are multiple fold. 

THE COURT: Let me just pause you right there. 

MR. TURRENTINE: Yeah, sure. 

THE COURT: Because you filed a motion to enjoin, and 

that was one of the categories of relief you sought in the 

motion. Then you filed a reply brief, it's at docket number 

110, in which you said, quote, Wyo Tech withdraws the portions 

of its motion that do not relate to its request that this Court 

reconsider its ruling regarding personal jurisdiction. 

MR. TURRENTINE: At 110? My apologies. Then I will 

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skip over that portion. 

If you'll allow me to minute to collect my thoughts. 

THE COURT: Yeah, no problem. 

MR. TURRENTINE: So, as far as the personal 

jurisdiction matter, setting that aside, the CWT parties did 

not comply with 5222. The statute itself states that -- 

THE COURT: What are you talking about now, are you 

talking -- when you said they didn't comply, are you talking 

about the restraining notice that was issued to Wells Fargo to 

get the Wyo Tech account, or are you talking about the seven 

recent ones that were the subject of the motion to enjoin? 

MR. TURRENTINE: They are both -- they're all 

interconnected, so the argument applies across the board. But 

I'm specifically discussing the earlier one in 2017 that kind 

of gave rise to these proceedings. 

THE COURT: Okay. 

MR. TURRENTINE: The state -- or the statute states 

that -- and I'll pull it up so I can quote it exactly. 

THE COURT: I just -- are you still -- are you talking 

about personal jurisdiction now or are you moving on to the 

third issue? 

MR. TURRENTINE: No, I'm arguing that even though 

they -- if they have personal jurisdiction, that they didn't 

comply with the law in the first place, and it should, 

therefore, be enjoined from utilizing that against the clients, 

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against my client. 

THE COURT: Okay. And so I want to be really clear on 

what issue we're talking about now. First you started with the 

motion for judgment as a matter of law because the Wyoming 

ruling is collateral estoppel. 

MR. TURRENTINE: Correct. 

THE COURT: Then we moved on to the next pending 

motion, which is the motion to enjoin, which we've now 

established you've withdrawn your request to enjoin them from 

the issuance of the most recent restraining notices. And the 

only relief that's requested in that motion is for the Court to 

reconsider its previous ruling that the Court lacked personal 

jurisdiction with respect to Wyo Tech's cross claims and 

counterclaims. 

There's an entirely separate set of issues which is, 

on the merits, what do we do with the restraining notice that 

was issued to Wells Fargo for the Wyo Tech account, and how 

does that relate to the three interrelated issues in my order. 

What issue are you arguing right now? 

MR. TURRENTINE: Well, I came prepared to argue 

several, but with Dennis Wilenchik being out of the country, I 

kind of jumped in at the last minute. So I apologize that 

there was that confusion. 

So the remaining issue is personal jurisdiction, is 

that the consensus here? 

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THE COURT: You have a motion asking me to reconsider 

my prior personal jurisdiction analysis. It's not clear to me 

what the validity or invalidity of the original restraining 

notice to Wells Fargo has anything to do with that. Because 

the only ground you've asked me in your papers to reconsider 

that ruling is based on what happened with the more recent 

round of restraining notices. 

So if your arguments right now are about the initial 

one, concerning the Wyo Tech account, it's not clear to me why 

that's related to personal jurisdiction. 

MR. TURRENTINE: Understood. Then moving on to the 

seven later ones. 

THE COURT: Okay. 

MR. TURRENTINE: The idea there that -- so, the 

accounts that were restrained in February, the accounts of 

IEC -- Inductance Energy Company -- Wilenchik and Bartness, and 

then several Danzik related parties, in that none of those 

parties have had any -- any interaction with the forum state of 

New York. That's one of the fundamental problems. 

There have been case law cited, such as the North 

Mariana -- I hadn't said that out loud yet -- the North Mariana

case that's cited in the briefing, that says, oh, well, we can 

restrain some of these funds from -- for people who are outside 

of the forum state, which is New York. 

There's several distinguishing factors in that case 

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though. Namely, that the judge recognized that the parties who 

were restrained never pointed out that any harm had been done. 

Further, the bank that was -- where the funds were 

being held was a New York bank, it was Merrill Lynch, which is 

headquartered in New York. So there is a more significant 

connection to those. 

In the case at hand we have Wells Fargo, which is the 

bank where all the funds were restrained, which is 

headquartered out of California -- San Francisco specifically. 

We have Wilenchik in Bartness, which is not out of a New York 

bank. And we have Bank of the West, which is, by its name, out 

west. 

So the -- there should be no -- they've not availed 

themselves of the forum state laws. There haven't been any 

minimum connections.

To allow -- to allow CWT parties to reach across state 

lines to such a degree that, as they argue, if the parties 

didn't wish to be subjected to the New York law, then they 

should have selected a bank that didn't have any business or 

branches in New York, I think is patently disingenuous. 

Anytime somebody opens a checking account, 

we -- nobody's considering, oh, well, how many states are they 

in? Which states are they in? And if all the business is done 

locally in the local state -- in this case it was done out of 

the Scottsdale branch here in Arizona -- they have not availed 

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themselves and, therefore, New York law should not be able to 

reach across state lines to this degree. 

And the reason that the New York law was selected here 

is because it's uniquely situated to advantage the judgment 

creditors in the action. And that's part of the C.P.L.R. 5222, 

which allows essentially the judgment creditor's attorney to 

act as a member of the court and issue a restraining notice and 

seize the funds across state lines, which is something that 

could not happen if they had utilized the correct forum, which 

they've -- they've localized the judgment, utilizing the 

Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act here in Arizona. 

Arguably it should be Wyoming. But in either case, the state 

laws of Arizona or Wyoming would not have permitted this sort 

of action. 

What would have happened is, they would have -- they 

would have requested a writ of garnishment from the judge, the 

judge would have signed off on it, sent it to the bank, the 

bank would have reviewed their account and said, we don't hold 

any accounts in the judgment debtor's name, sent back a reply, 

and then the CWT parties would have had ten days to request a 

hearing to make these sorts of arguments. 

In utilizing New York, they're essentially taking 

advantage of a unique forum shopping option that foregoes a 

lot of this. And as multiple of the cases have pointed out, 

JCS (sic) and North Mariana included, utilizing the New York 

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law in such a manner presents a real risk of due process 

violation. And that's what we've seen. 

And that's why I believe the statute states that it's 

based on what was known at the time of service. And that's why 

JCS cites that rule accordingly. 

THE COURT: So due process, you know, I raised it in 

my order, that I have some due process concerns with it. But 

on the other hand, one can view this statutory scheme as the 

New York legislature made a policy choice that we want to give 

all the tools possible to judgment creditors to make sure 

they're made whole. And so we created C.P.L.R. 5222. 

And, you know, there are -- all the restraining notice 

does is freeze the status quo, and then it gives other 

procedural rights to the person whose account has been frozen, 

for example, to go into court in New York very quickly and 

challenge it. 

The funds don't actually get turned over based on the 

restraining notice, they only get held for a short period of 

time. 

And the statute also gives remedies potentially to 

folks whose accounts are improperly frozen to get damages 

against attorneys who issue these restraining notices without a 

proper factual basis. 

Why don't all of those safeguards address the due 

process concerns that might otherwise be lurking in this 

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circumstance? 

MR. TURRENTINE: If that's the intention of the 

New York legislature aside, I think we're seeing the problem 

right here in front of us. 

The restraining notice was issued in 2017. We're now 

here a year and a half later. The accounts are deposited with 

the court, and Wyo Tech has been without its operating -- or at 

least 550 that was in, roughly, of its operating capital for 

that period of time. They've had to expend tremendous costs to 

even make the arguments that this was done unreasonably. 

And -- 

THE COURT: So let me ask a question on that. I 

understand all of that. But part of the reason that we're here 

a year and a half later in a federal court in Arizona is 

because when the restraining notice was issued, and Wyo Tech's 

counsel was complaining to Wells Fargo and complaining to the 

judgment creditors, the usual procedure is, you would 

immediately charge into New York court under the jurisdiction 

of the court that issued the restraining notice in the first 

place and have a very quick fight and a turnover proceeding 

over whether or not the funds were, in fact, properly 

restrained. 

Under New York law you have a quick entitlement to 

that hearing, and under New York law if Wyo Tech had shown that 

the funds were improperly restrained, they could have gotten 

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damages against the judgment creditors. 

They didn't do any of that. Instead, when Wells Fargo 

said, we want to interplead these funds in Arizona to get out 

of this and let the court sort it out, Wyo Tech consented to 

that and agreed to it. And that's, in part, why we're here. 

MR. TURRENTINE: Understood. 

THE COURT: And so I'm struggling to understand, given 

that prior concession by Wyo Tech that an interpleader action 

is proper, how they can now complain about the fact that 

they're stuck litigating an interpleader action. 

MR. TURRENTINE: And you make great points. 

One of the key elements that I point out there is that 

Wyo Tech never at any point considered that it would be subject 

to New York law in the first place. That was not part of 

their -- their business plan. They never availed themselves of 

the laws of New York. 

So essentially you could see the due process violation 

where, if the standard is if a bank has a branch or maybe a 

call center, or we connect all the banks through the Federal 

Reserve system, or something very distantly connected to a 

certain state, businesses are not intended -- intentionally 

prepared to deal with -- there's a reason why when they set up 

their operating agreement and things like that, they select 

what state they're going to operate out of, where they're going 

to do business, and what the jurisdiction -- what the judicial 

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jurisdiction is going to be at the outset. 

Being pulled into a New York court because they've set 

up some safeguard procedures is a great intention on behalf of 

the New York legislature, but in most manners it's very 

impractical and unduly burdensome in a lot of cases. 

Whereas, okay, the issue is brought before a local 

court where the members of Wyo Tech live, okay, they show up 

here and hope that we can sort this out quickly. 

But this isn't an issue that's been sorted out 

quickly. And I truly -- it would have been ideal to have gone 

back and tried to fight with New York, but quite frankly I 

think that's still an unreasonable expectation given the very, 

very loose connection to New York State law and the fact that 

they've never intentionally, impliedly, or made any sort of 

connection with that forum state. 

THE COURT: Okay. I want to turn to some of the 

questions that I posed in the order. 

One of them was, did the -- I guess one of the issues 

here is whether or not a judicial finding of alter ego status 

is required under New York law before a restraining notice has 

been issued. 

And I will say that even though there are some of 

these federal cases, JSC and some other Federal District Court 

cases that have cited JSC, do contain language suggesting that 

a judicial finding of alter ego status is required before 

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notice can issue. 

When you actually look at the underlying New York 

state law that they're interpreting, I am not seeing much 

support for that proposition. To the contrary, I'm seeing an 

array of different New York cases where judgment creditors were 

allowed to issue restraining notices based on the unproved 

suspicion that the account was held by an alter ego, and the 

New York court said that that was fine. 

MR. TURRENTINE: In looking at your -- at the long 

minute entry where you outlined a lot of these issues, I've 

taken a look at several of those cases, and specifically the 

cases that were outlined by the Law Review article. And I 

think there's a lot of very distinguishing factors. 

If you'll allow me a moment here. 

THE COURT: Sure. 

MR. TURRENTINE: So the three main cases, if I 

remember right, were Ivor, Thompson, and Plaza Hotel. 

In Ivor, alter ego was never actually argued. In Ivor

a restraining notice was issued under the fraudulent 

conveyance, which you can make the argument it's connected to 

alter ego theory. But it was uncontested at that point. 

We are contesting it. We've been contesting it. We 

tried to contest it before we ended up in court. I think the 

situations are manifestly different. 

And you kind of see that trend continue in some of the 

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other case law. Thompson, for example. Thompson was another 

case that was heavily cited by the Law Review article. 

It wasn't necessarily -- it wasn't an alter ego issue 

in the form of an existing company that was operating on its 

own, it was whether or not this alter ego even existed, because 

it was a defunct business that had gone out. And if I recall 

the facts correctly, the judgment debtor was using the business 

checking account and writing checks and paying expenses out of 

that. 

That's not the case here. That's not even what's been 

alleged here. What's been alleged here is that Wyo Tech is the 

alter ego, even though Wyo Tech has very clear operating -- 

operations, and the only evidence to suggest that Wyo Tech is 

in some way owned by Danzik, or has some interest in there, is 

because Wyo Tech paid money to Danzik for services rendered, is 

what it was, and paid some of his legal bills. 

But the legal bills that Wyo Tech has incurred have 

largely been as a result of things like this. It's been 

largely on behalf of itself as well. 

I don't think that the Thompson case makes that 

argument as well as the author of the Law Review article 

states. 

And then similarly with the Plaza Hotel case, in the 

Plaza Hotel case the party that was being restrained didn't 

deny that it was the alter ego. It essentially said, well, 

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you're making the wrong arguments, so deal with it. I'm being 

a little flippant, but that's how I read it. It had nothing to 

do with them vehemently denying that they were the alter ego, 

as we have done continuously throughout this litigation. They 

said, well, you can't get me, is what they were trying to get 

across. 

So I think there's a lot of problems with some of the 

case law. 

But I think the more direct case law, the JSC case, 

states it about as clearly as can be that these cases do not 

stand for the principle that a person cannot be restrained 

under a theory of alter ego. 

And I think that's the most direct case law that cites 

this, that has similar facts. 

THE COURT: I mean, the problem I have is, that's, 

like me, a federal court, stumbling through diversity and 

trying to understand state law. And so the $64,000 question 

is, let's look at state law, let's look at New York State law 

cases. 

Is there a case out there that says point-blank, I'm 

not going to bless this restraining notice because it's issued 

on an alter ego theory and you're not allowed to do that in 

New York unless you already have a judicial finding on that 

issue? And I have not found a single New York case that says 

that. 

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And so given the absence of authority on that, it 

causes me to question whether JSC was properly interpreting 

New York State law. 

MR. TURRENTINE: As far as whether or not there is a 

case that directly cites it, I believe you're correct. I have 

not found the case that explicitly makes the case that you 

cannot do this. 

But I believe that you can draw a reasonable inference 

from both the statute and the case law that has been presented, 

and even more so from common sense. And I don't mean that to 

impugn anybody. 

But if we allow this sort of theory -- and this kind 

of touches on the due process elements that you were 

discussing. If we permit this sort of action to continue in 

the way that it has been, it's going to result in a lot of 

people selectively choosing the New York forum to enjoin and 

freeze operating costs, which could have detrimental effects on 

some who aren't as able as Wyo Tech to weather the storm. You 

could imagine the political implications of seizing Super PAC 

funds or -- 

THE COURT: I'm just -- I don't think the implications 

are as grave as you're saying, because if somebody actually 

follows New York law, once their account gets restrained, they 

can immediately go into New York State Court, challenge the 

validity of the restraining notice, prevail, get their money 

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unfrozen, and get a bunch of damages against the attorney that 

froze their money in the first place, if they just followed 

New York law. 

MR. TURRENTINE: When I went through law school I 

always thought, when legislation is getting passed, what's the 

scariest outcome? And I can imagine a company much smaller 

than Wyo Tech, not in New York, a new startup, for example, 

that doesn't have the operating costs or the legal wherewithal 

to hire expensive attorneys to fly across the country to 

essentially argue in a state that they never thought they'd 

have any business in. 

You're right, the New York State legislature has set 

out protections, and probably with the best of intention. But 

if you have -- if somebody in New York knows of a competitor 

rising up out here in Arizona, or something like that, it would 

be really easy to utilize these procedures to suck a lot of 

their operating capital out, on the risk of going to another 

state where they're not familiar with the laws and hire 

expensive attorneys. 

I think that's an unreasonable -- an unreasonable 

expectation to have on somebody who never intended to 

participate in the New York forum in the first place. Which, 

again, isn't to say that the legislature didn't have the best 

of intentions, but if it is established that somebody can go to 

New York because it has this favorable law and can reach across 

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the country and affect new startups, or individuals, or people 

who don't have the funds or the ready access to high-priced 

lawyers, this could be a really detrimental violation of due 

process. 

Which is what the point of due process protections are 

supposed to be. It's there to ensure that, you know, at least 

in the federal constitution, that the long arm of the federal 

government can't hurt the little guy. That's the point. 

And with regards to that -- the statute 5222, 

essentially what it's doing, it's allowing the advocate, the 

nonneutral attorney for the judgment creditor, to act as a 

neutral magistrate and issue the restraining notice themselves 

to their own benefit. 

It would be -- I analogize it to being police officers 

being able to sign their own search warrants. While it may not 

yet, we're seeing an example of how difficult that can make the 

process. And if allowed to continue setting precedent, that's 

going to create potentially tremendous problems for those who 

are least able to make those -- make it to New York to fight 

it. 

THE COURT: All right. I think I understand your 

position. 

Are there any other things you'd like to address? 

MR. TURRENTINE: No, Your Honor. I think that about 

sums it up. And I appreciate the time and consideration. 

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THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 

MR. TURRENTINE: Thank you. 

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Wurtzel. 

MR. WURTZEL: Yes. This is Josh Wurtzel from Schlam 

Stone for the CWT parties. 

Thank you again, Your Honor, for accommodating me by 

phone. 

If it's okay with the Court, I'll pick up where my 

adversary left off regarding due process, and the first 

question that Your Honor posed in the order requesting 

supplemental briefing about whether a prior adjudication of 

alter ego liability is required before a restraining notice can 

be issued. 

Your Honor is correct that the underlying New York 

cases -- and I think we've cited four or five of them at 

least -- specifically almost factually on point 100 percent 

showing that a prior adjudication of alter ego liability is not 

required before you could issue a restraining notice. 

That makes sense, Your Honor, because if a judgment 

creditor had to litigate a -- someone's alter ego liability 

before issuing a restraining notice, the utility of the 

restraining notice as a judgment creditor's tool under New York 

law would be rendered ineffective. Because the whole point of 

being able to issue a restraining notice is to, as Your Honor 

pointed out, freeze the money and then fight over it. If you 

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have to fight over it before you can even freeze it, you know, 

the freezing of it ends up being useless because in all 

likelihood the money won't be there anymore. 

The point that I was getting from my adversary is that 

this -- that the statutory scheme under the New York C.P.L.R., 

and this is Article 52, which under New York law deals with 

judgment creditor's enforcement rights and judgment debtor's 

rights, it sounds like what Wyo Tech is asking the Court to do 

is strike down all or a significant portion of Article 52, or 

at least this one section that required -- that allows for 

restraining notices to be issue. 

And I have to say, this would be the first court ever 

that has done that. Not a single case that we've located that 

Wyo Tech has cited -- 

THE COURT: Let me. 

MR. WURTZEL: -- involves -- 

THE COURT: Let me hit the pause button on that. I 

mean, I think that their argument, fairly construed, is simply 

that you're not allowed to issue it in this circumstance when 

you're pursuing an alter ego theory yet there hasn't been a 

judicial determination of that particular theory. 

And at least three federal courts -- JSC, the Capitol 

Records court and AXGINC -- have all endorsed variance of that 

position. 

So you're asking me to come out the other way and 

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respectfully disagree with three federal district judges who 

are in New York, and presumably are more familiar with New York 

State law than folks all the way out here in Arizona. 

So I think that you're overstating their position a 

little. Their argument is more narrow as to the alter ego 

thing. And there is some federal diversity case law on their 

side. 

MR. WURTZEL: That's true, Your Honor. There is 

some -- there is some language in these cases. But as 

Your Honor pointed out before, when you look at the underlying 

cases -- I'll point the Court -- specifically this is in our 

supplemental briefing docket number 114, page 3 of 14, we cite 

Thompson against Pollack from 2009. This is a New York 

appellate division case, which is the equivalent of the 

Ninth Circuit in the New York State's court system. 

There there was a judgment creditor that used a 

restraining notice to freeze a nondebtor's bank account on the 

ground of -- the creditor believed that the judgment debtor had 

an interest in the funds. 

And in that case there was no prior adjudication of 

alter ego liability. And the nondebtor, just like Wyo Tech 

here, argued that it was the owner of the restrained account 

and the judgment debtor had no interest in the money. But 

still, despite the absence of a prior adjudication of alter ego 

liability, the court refused to vacate the restraining notice 

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and held that the case should be remitted to the trial court 

for a hearing to determine who had an interest in the funds. 

If the law was as stated in the JSC case and these 

other federal cases that you have to have a prior adjudication 

of alter ego liability, then it wouldn't matter what the 

hearing after the restraining notice was issued showed, all 

that would matter is that you didn't have that finding before. 

The same -- I'll make the same point about the case on 

page 4 of our supplemental brief, 1420 Associates, Inc. against 

Landfill & Recycling. This is also from the New York appellate 

division from 1998. Same thing, the judgment creditor used a 

restraining notice to freeze a nondebtor's bank account on the 

ground that the judgment debtor was using the account to pay 

his personal expenses. There was no prior adjudication of 

alter ego liability there. 

And then like here, the judgment -- the nondebtor 

asserted that it was the owner of the bank account, and that 

the -- it was separate and distinct from the judgment debtor, 

exactly the argument that Wyo Tech makes here. But the Court 

again refused to vacate the restraining notice and instead 

remitted to the trial court for a hearing to determine whether 

the judgment debtor had an interest. 

So respectfully, Your Honor, again, I think Your Honor 

made this point. With all due respect to those three federal 

cases, whether they can be distinguished or whether they're 

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just wrong, the underlying New York case law is pretty clear 

that there is no requirement of a prior adjudication of alter 

ego liability. 

So once -- if the Court accepts that the underlying 

New York case law doesn't require this, then what Wyo Tech is 

arguing is that without that prior adjudication there's a 

violation of due process. So either we're right on the law, 

we're wrong on what -- either we're right on what New York law 

requires or we're wrong. But if we're right, then Wyo Tech's 

only argument is that, even if that's New York law, it violates 

our due process rights. And there's not a single case that 

holds that, despite Article 52 and C.P.L.R. 5222 saying what it 

says, that that violates a nondebtor's due process rights. 

You know, the other thing is that, as Your Honor 

mentioned, you know, we're here in Arizona Federal Court a year 

and a half later because Wyo Tech chose not to go into New York 

court, and they chose not to make a motion to vacate the 

restraining notice before the New York court. 

Wyo Tech obviously could have done that. For 

strategic or other reasons they chose not to. But that's 

something that they could have done. And the fact that they 

didn't, and then they consented to the interpleader, to now 

hear them complain actually this whole scheme violated our due 

process rights is a bit disingenuous. 

And the last point regarding due process, Your Honor, 

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is -- and Wyo Tech respectfully, you know, disagreed with this 

argument, but under New York law, a restraining notice is an 

order directed to the garnishee, not to Wyo Tech, but in this 

case to Wells Fargo. And the restraining notice is the 

equivalent of a court order saying, Wells Fargo, whatever money 

you have in your possession, you have to freeze that money. 

And New York courts have interpreted this as meaning 

all you have to have for a restraining notice is jurisdiction 

over the garnishee. Meaning that if Wells Fargo is under the 

New York court's jurisdiction, the New York court can order 

Wells Fargo to freeze the money. We're not talking about a 

turnover motion. We're not talking about an attachment. And I 

believe attachment is actually separate. 

But in this particular instance, the only 

jurisdictional hook is the jurisdiction over the garnishee 

holding the funds. And there's no dispute that Wells Fargo was 

subject to jurisdiction in New York. 

The only response that Wyo Tech has is, well, we 

weren't thinking about having anything to do with New York -- 

THE COURT: Let me -- let me just ask you to slow down 

a little, because -- for the court reporter's perspective. 

MR. WURTZEL: Sure. I apologize, Your Honor. 

Wells Fargo -- Wyo Tech's argument here is that we 

never anticipated coming to New York or having anything to do 

with New York, because when we set up our Wells Fargo account 

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it was in Arizona and we were doing all our business in Arizona 

or in Wyoming, we had nothing to do with New York. 

But that's -- that's a very ignorant way of thinking 

about personal jurisdiction. And I understand that maybe 

Wyo Tech wasn't aware of this case law, and had they been aware 

maybe they would have chosen a bank that didn't have a branch 

in New York. 

But the CWT parties, my clients, shouldn't be 

prejudiced because Wyo Tech chose to avail itself of the use of 

a bank that is subject to jurisdiction in New York. And now it 

doesn't want to be bound by the consequences of literally 

putting its money in the hands of somebody who's subject to a 

New York court. 

So on the one hand, give Wells Fargo your money -- and 

I think it's fair to say that they had to have known that 

Wells Fargo had branches in New York when they made the 

deposit, even if they didn't think they would ultimately have 

to go to New York, and then choose not to come to New York when 

there was a restraining notice issued in New York at the 

New York branch to enforce a New York judgment. 

This is not an instance of forum shopping. This is 

where the judgment was, and this is why it's being enforced 

here. 

Respectfully, Your Honor, under New York law it's 

enough to have jurisdiction over the garnishee. And the 

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complaint by Wyo Tech that we shouldn't have to come to 

New York, as Your Honor pointed out, there are a lot of 

procedural safeguards, and it was Wyo Tech's choice to deposit 

its money with Wells Fargo rather than with a local blank that 

only has branchs in Arizona or Wyoming. 

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 

A question I have -- and this doesn't really go to the 

three issues I set out in my supplemental brief. So let's 

say -- let's say I rule in your favor on these issues and you 

get discovery and then we proceed throughout 2019 on discovery, 

and now it's time to file dispositive motions. What does the 

dispositive motion actually look like? When you come in and 

say you have the superior claim to the interpleaded funds, what 

law are you applying, and what theory are you going to 

articulate? 

MR. WURTZEL: So, Your Honor, if I may, the law will 

be the law of interpleader actions under federal law. So the 

court's role in this case, in this interpleader action, is to 

determine the, quote, ownership of the disputed funds. And we 

cite a lot of cases showing that on page 7 of 14 of docket -- 

THE COURT: So like -- but there's no -- as far as I'm 

aware, no federal common law of how you construe an alter ego 

claim. I guess I was presuming, but I don't know with 

certainty because we haven't got there yet, that you would be 

arguing that Wyo Tech qualifies as the alter ego of Danzik 

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under New York law, which is applicable here as a matter of 

diversity. But maybe that's incorrect. So that's what I'm 

just trying to still see in my mind how this is all going to 

play out a couple months down the line. 

MR. WURTZEL: Sure. I think -- I think there are two 

issues that we're maybe mixing and matching. 

The first issue is, what is the Court deciding? And 

what we say is that the Court is not deciding whether the 

restraining notice was valid in the first place, the Court is 

deciding ownership of the funds. And I think that's well 

established in the case law, the question is ownership. 

The next question is, well, how do you determine 

ownership? Well, there's not a federal common law on ownership 

of money. So I think Your Honor's correct, the answer would be 

that we would apply New York law on who has the superior claim 

on who is the, quote, owner of these funds. 

We might make an alter ego argument, which would be 

that Wyo Tech is the alter ego of Dennis Danzik, and thus the 

money there is functionally his. 

We might also argue that, you know, that it's 

not -- not that it's an alter ego, but that the money that's 

sitting there, even if Wyo Tech is a separate entity, that that 

particular money happens to belong to Dennis Danzik, which is 

slightly different than an alter ego argument. 

I don't know specifically whether we'll argue one or 

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both of those. But to Your Honor's question, the Court would 

have to decide who is the owner of the funds. And then I 

believe -- and we would have to -- this would have to be the 

subject of briefing at the summary judgment stage. But we 

would argue that New York law about ownership is what would 

govern here. And we would make various arguments not just 

limited to the alter ego one. 

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 

Another issue I wanted you to address. One of the 

motions that's before the Court is Wyo Tech's motion to dismiss 

slash motion for judgment on the pleadings. It's at docket 

number 95. And one of the arguments they make there is, all of 

this stuff about whether you guys can step into the shoes and 

grab Wyo Tech's funds because it's the same thing as Danzik, 

was already considered by the bankruptcy judge in Wyoming who 

ruled on the merits against you. And, therefore, that should 

have some sort of preclusive effect on this Court. 

So please address that argument. 

MR. WURTZEL: Sure, Your Honor. 

So first of all, that's not true. What happened in 

the Wyoming Bankruptcy Court -- I guess the first point 

actually is that that case has been dismissed. And we've cited 

case law showing that once the bankruptcy case is dismissed, 

everyone's put back to their prebankruptcy position. 

So, you know, the fact that the case was dismissed 

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means that that holding is actually -- that holding in and of 

itself inherently has no preclusive effect. 

But on the merits, what happened there was, we had 

brought a motion in the Wyoming Bankruptcy Court asking to 

assert fraudulent transfer claims against Wyo Tech. And the 

reason we wanted to do that is because we believed that 

Wyo Tech -- that Dennis Danzik had transferred assets, 

including intellectual property and various technology from 

RDX, which is the other judgment debtor that we have, that 

Danzik was the CEO of. That he had transferred that 

intellectual property from RDX to Wyo Tech. And there was 

certain things in Mr. Danzik's bankruptcy filing that indicated 

that he was possession of intellectual property that had 

belonged to RDX, and was now in the use -- was now being used 

by Wyo Tech. 

So we went to -- on the advice of our bankruptcy 

counsel, who told us that any fraudulent transfer claims that 

are brought during a bankruptcy belong to the bankruptcy 

estate, we went to the Wyoming Bankruptcy Court and we asked 

the Wyoming Bankruptcy Court to allow us to assert these 

claims. 

And again, the claims we were looking to assert had 

nothing to do with the money that has been interplead here. We 

didn't need the Bankruptcy Court's permission to litigate over 

the money here, because the Bankruptcy Court had already given 

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that permission in a separate order lifting the automatic stay 

to allow this case to go forward. 

So we already had Bankruptcy Court approval to 

litigate over the interplead funds. What we needed Bankruptcy 

Court approval to do was to go -- was to assert fraudulent 

transfer claims for other assets that were -- that we alleged 

or believed were fraudulently transferred from Danzik to 

Wyo Tech. 

It wouldn't have made any sense for us to go ask for 

permission to assert fraudulent transfer claims if the basis 

for those claims was going to be the -- you know, the 

interplead money which we were already litigating. We didn't 

have to assert another claim. If we win the interpleader, we 

win the money. We don't need to have another claim. We wanted 

to assert a separate claim for separate assets. 

In that motion to the Wyoming Bankruptcy Court, the 

Wyoming Bankruptcy Court considered a number of factors, 

including the fact that we hadn't asked -- formally asked 

Mr. Danzik to bring those claims, and other bankruptcy factors 

under the Bankruptcy Code for when to confer derivative 

standing on a creditor to assert a claim. And one of the 

things the Court said was that our allegations about fraudulent 

transfer were conclusory and speculative. 

And to be honest, that wasn't a bad assessment, given 

that we didn't get into the level of detail about where the -- 

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exactly what assets were fraudulently transferred. 

But what the Court did not do was rule on whether we 

could assert -- whether the CWT parties as creditors could 

assert that the interplead funds were -- you know, are funds 

that belonged to Danzik. That was never an issue before the 

Court -- before the Wyoming Bankruptcy Court on that motion. 

And the Wyoming Bankruptcy Court did not purport to adjudicate 

that issue. 

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 

Is there anything else you'd like to address? 

MR. WURTZEL: I guess the only other thing which my 

adversary mentioned at the beginning was this motion to enjoin 

the restraining notices. 

As Your Honor observed, Wyo Tech has already withdrawn 

all of that motion other than the reconsideration part of the 

motion. And I didn't really hear it from the other side, but 

I'll say it affirmatively, nothing about these later 

restraining notices changes any of the Court's personal 

jurisdiction analysis, nor do these later acts, which wouldn't 

give rise to personal jurisdiction anyway under the Court's 

initial analysis. But even if they did, these are additional 

separate acts that give rise to a completely separate claim. 

They don't increase the contact that the CWT parties or their 

counsel had with Arizona when they served the 2017 restraining 

notice. 

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And with that, unless Your Honor has additional 

questions, we have nothing further. 

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 

Mr. Turrentine, if you'd like a few more minutes, I'll 

give you a chance for rebuttal. 

MR. TURRENTINE: Thank you much. 

So when opposing counsel brought up due process at the 

very beginning, he noted that one of the benefits of the 

New York law is that it essentially freezes the funds. And 

that's correct. And what I'm hearing as the argument is, well, 

the reason why that's beneficial is because those funds are 

frozen and, therefore, can't be fraudulently conveyed later on 

down the road. 

Which, one, is assuming that a Class 6 felony, at 

least here in Arizona, is going to take place. 

And two, it's also not a problem in Wyoming or here in 

Arizona where the judgment is domesticated. In fact, that is, 

as it's been pointed out, a procedural safeguard that's 

recognized in the vast majority of forums, but certainly here 

in Arizona where the judgment was domesticated. 

If we're talking about the procedural safeguards that 

are in place, opposing counsel seems to acknowledge that what 

New York State law does is essentially give the benefit of the 

doubt to the judgment creditor, which is not something that I 

think is a reasonable assumption to make, given the 

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universality of the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments 

Act. 

And additionally, and I was trying to find it, but in 

the response to the letter by Eilender in November of 2017, I 

think it was the response to the November 2nd letter, the 

opposing counsel refers to that and says, oh, yeah, well, you 

know, it would be a potentially fraudulent transfer, and here's 

the -- we'll pursue fraudulent transfer claims. Essentially 

acknowledging the safeguards that would have been available 

here, but they chose not to avail themselves of. 

Additionally, opposing counsel cites Thompson as 

line-by-line example. And I would take contention to that. 

The party in Thompson's business entity alter ego is a 

nonexistent entity, not an entity that, like Wyo Tech, or even 

IEC, or any of these other parties, actually exists and 

actually has business operations ongoing. 

So, again, I would say that there's a difference 

there, even if the Court says that -- you know, the State Court 

of New York says, okay, that's fine to seize their assets. The 

assertion was not, okay, this is a legitimate business that's 

operating under a false flag, they're saying it didn't exist. 

And something that doesn't exist can't have harm, which is a 

crucial distinction between that and this. 

It's also interesting -- I brought up a little while 

ago that they domesticated the judgment here in Arizona, but 

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again, chose the least convenient forum. And, yeah, that's an 

argument that I think should hold more weight than is given 

credit to, subjecting somebody -- and that's kind of the 

argument behind the North Mariana case that, okay, well, the 

parties whose funds have been restrained are subject to 

New York law. 

But the two key aspects of that case are that, one, 

the parties whose funds were restrained were never -- never 

demonstrated any harm, never claimed any harm from that 

seizure. If my memory serves it was a trust account for 

children that they wouldn't have access to for years. So 

slightly different scenario. 

And, again, that was in Merrill Lynch, New York. So 

even if we're going to make the jurisdictional argument that 

somebody was subjected to the New York forum, Merrill Lynch 

makes a lot of sense, they're headquartered in New York, unlike 

the banks that have been gone after in these cases. 

I wanted to bring up the case Zolt, which was brought 

up in the stipulated -- the stipulated arguments for the 

discovery dispute. 

THE COURT: I view Zolt as a Rorschach test that both 

parties could peer into and find something that supports their 

position. 

MR. TURRENTINE: That's probably true. But as I'm 

here to advocate for my side, let me at least argue what I see 

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has taken place. 

So, again, a lot of the assertions that have been 

made -- and even there's some case law that talks about, oh, 

paying the personal expenses for Dennis Danzik, just as a 

factual matter what we've asserted is entirely different than I 

think what the simple deposits and -- yeah, simply depositing 

money into the funds, and then having those distributed after 

the fact, there's no evidence that -- that's been presented 

really at all, but there's not even an assertion that Dennis 

Danzik took some windfall moneys that he had hiding, opened it 

up in the name of Wyo Tech. 

Essentially what the claim is is that, oh, well, 

because Wyo Tech is paying some of Danzik's bills, also known 

as employing him in a contractual manner quite often, that 

demonstrates evidence. And I think that's -- that's a tenuous 

assertion at best. 

And what's more, even the dollar amounts of what's 

been asserted and paid and all this other stuff still wouldn't 

rise to the level of being able to seize the entire operating 

capital of Wyo Tech. 

For example -- and this is not, of course, to impugn 

you. But if you were the judgment debtor to me the creditor, I 

would not be able to go -- for say $7 million, I would not be 

able to go after the Department of Justice's Treasury because 

they're paying your salary and assume that the entirety of the 

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account, at least up to the amount of my judgment, therefore, 

belongs to you. 

As just a matter of -- again, as a matter of justice 

here, the assumption that the entirety of Wyo Tech's operating 

capital in that Wells Fargo account could be seized on the idea 

that they have spent some moneys, not moneys that are still 

alleged to be in the account, but have spent money on 

attorney's fees and salary for Mr. Danzik, I think is a gross 

overstep and, again, huge potential for due process abuse. 

And if you were my judgment debtor and I went after 

the Department of Justice's bank account, I think we all know 

that there's no way the Federal Government would stand in and 

accept that. And I don't think that that's a reasonable -- and 

I think that assumption is fairly reasonable. 

THE COURT: All right. In your hypothetical you don't 

have the Department of Justice then, although they grumble at 

first, consenting to an interpleading action where all the 

money would get put into Federal Court for further litigation. 

MR. TURRENTINE: Fair enough. 

Finally, the CWT parties are arguing that the matter 

in the Bankruptcy Court is significantly different. Of course, 

they're not arguing for the -- these interpleader funds. But 

that's not what the requirement for judicial notice is. It's 

similar facts, similar parties. Not the exact same thing, 

because there would be, of course, no reason to go after the 

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exact same thing in multiple jurisdictions. 

However, even in their own pleadings you see that 

funds, plural, are included in what they were seeking in the 

bankruptcy action, along with the intellectual property and 

stuff like that. Their assertions of alter ego and fraudulent 

conveyance essentially in the Bankruptcy Court were 

overinclusive. But that doesn't mean that they're 

substantially different in any way than the funds that are 

available here. They are funds that have been alleged to have 

been fraudulently transferred or in the possession of an alter 

ego for Dennis Danzik. 

So the overall issue of, oh, well, these are slightly 

different, I don't think in any way pushes back on the idea of 

taking judicial notice of another Federal Court ruling on the 

issue. Even if the case was ultimately dismissed, part of the 

overall jurisprudence was in this issue, and it was ruled upon 

on the merits. 

THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 

A final question I have. If I end up ruling against 

you and agreeing to enforce the subpoenas, will two weeks be 

enough time to comply? 

MR. TURRENTINE: As I stated earlier, Mr. Wilenchik, 

the partner, is returning on Thursday. If two-and-a-half weeks 

or pushing back to the end of the third week, I think that 

would be better, because he's been gone for the better part of 

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a month now and there's 1,000 things on the partner's desk that 

are going to have to be dealt with. 

THE COURT: Understood. 

MR. TURRENTINE: That's if you see it in your wisdom 

to do that, then three weeks would be preferable. 

THE COURT: I understand. 

MR. TURRENTINE: Thank you. 

THE COURT: All right. Well, I'll take this under 

submission -- 

Excuse me. Mr. Wurtzel, were you trying to say 

something? 

MR. WURTZEL: Yes, Your Honor. Thank you. 

And just -- if the Court does rule that we are 

entitled to take discovery, which we think is the way the Court 

should come out, there is a fact discovery cutoff of April 

29th. We had reached out to counsel for Wyo Tech to push this 

back. 

And honestly there hasn't really been any discovery in 

the case other than the initial disclosures from the MIDP. We 

had served a number of subpoenas, not a single one of which was 

complied with, and we're going to have to be chasing nonparties 

in other jurisdictions, and we might even have a motion or two 

before Your Honor. 

But in any event, we expect to ask the Court, putting 

aside -- I'm fine with the two law firms having two-and-a-half 

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or three weeks or that amount of time. But regardless, the 

April 29th deadline, we are going to ask the Court to push that 

back so that we can, you know, enforce these subpoenas, take 

party document discovery, which we were actually promised by 

Wyo Tech last week and we didn't get. 

But in any event, my point is that there is basically 

all the discovery in this case that remains to be done, and 

we're going to need more time. 

THE COURT: Well, I appreciate hearing that. I'm not 

going to prejudge how I'm going to rule on any future request 

to extend the discovery deadlines, other than, my general 

approach is, when I set deadlines, I mean to adhere to them. 

I'll only agree to move them if Rule 16's good cause standard 

has been met. 

It may be that you can show good cause here. But I 

certainly would encourage you, at a minimum, if there are 

things you haven't even yet tried to notice, document requests 

you haven't even sent out, depositions you haven't tried to 

notice, and you want an extension so that you can start 

belatedly doing that, I'm probably going to look more 

pessimistically on that type of request. 

If, conversely, there are things that you have long 

ago issued that you haven't received compliance because the 

receiving party has been under the impression that discovery 

was unavailable here, I'd probably be more willing to look 

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favorably upon that. 

I'm not going to tell you right now that I'm just 

going to rubber stamp a request to extend all the deadlines. 

I'll look very carefully at that. 

MR. WURTZEL: I understand, Your Honor. 

And just for the record, we actually did notice all 

the depositions -- all the party depositions on February 3rd. 

And we served probably half a dozen to -- probably closer to a 

dozen nonparty subpoenas also at the beginning of February. 

And, you know, we pushed off the depositions because 

we -- I'm sorry, we also served document requests and 

interrogatories on Wyo Tech on February 3rd. 

Wyo Tech had asked for an extension and then another 

extension, and it was supposed to be April 5th that they were 

going to respond. We didn't get those responses. 

Because we didn't have any party documents we agreed 

to push off the party depositions until we can get the document 

productions. 

And then the nonparties, we served those subpoenas two 

months ago. And having spoken to one of the witnesses, I was 

told that a Wyo Tech principal had told him to disregard it and 

throw it in the trash. 

So given the pendency of the current motion, in 

particular the supplemental briefing that the Court asked, we 

haven't come to Your Honor to ask for an extension or to move 

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to compel just yet, but all the discovery -- or virtually all 

the primary discovery, both party and nonparty, that we're 

going to want in this case, we served and we served months ago. 

We just haven't gotten compliance with them. 

THE COURT: I understand. 

Well, just for -- as I said earlier, I intend to issue 

a ruling on all of these pending motions very soon, if not 

today, tomorrow, you know, sometime this week. 

I just -- to avoid the suspense, I think it's very 

likely I'm going to rule that the judgment creditors are 

entitled to conduct discovery, and I'm going to rule to enforce 

these subpoenas. 

And so I'm hopeful that, assuming the order comes out 

that way, that could give clarity to the parties and even the 

nonparties on what the parameters going forward are going to 

look like on the discovery front. And hopefully the order will 

give a lot of guidance that you all can work together to figure 

things out without coming to the Court for discovery disputes. 

But if that's not the case, please follow my usual 

protocol about presenting discovery disputes in the form of a 

joint two-page summary. 

MR. WURTZEL: Thank you, Your Honor. 

THE COURT: All right. Is there anything else? 

MR. TURRENTINE: No, Your Honor. 

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you very much. I appreciate 

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the argument. I know you both put a lot of time in preparing 

for it, and we had a lot of issues to address today. So the 

argument was very helpful. 

Thank you very much. 

(Proceedings concluded at 2:32 p.m.) 

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C E R T I F I C A T E

I, CANDY L. POTTER, do hereby certify that I am duly 

appointed and qualified to act as Official Court Reporter for 

the United States District Court for the District of Arizona.

I FURTHER CERTIFY that the foregoing pages constitute 

a full, true, and accurate transcript of all of that portion of 

the proceedings contained herein, had in the above-entitled 

cause on the date specified therein, and that said transcript 

was prepared under my direction and control.

DATED at Phoenix, Arizona, this 10th day of April, 

2019.

s/Candy L. Potter________

Candy L. Potter, RMR, CRR

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