NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

LAURA L., Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, J.L., Appellees.

No. 1 CA-JV 17-0339

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JD30388

The Honorable Nicholas B. Hoskins, Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

John L. Popilek, P.C., Scottsdale

By John L. Popilek

Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By JoAnn Falgout

Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety

FILED 12-26-2017
LAURA L. v. DCS, J.L.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge James P. Beene delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Randall M. Howe and Judge Kent E. Cattani joined.

B E E N E, Judge:

¶1 Laura L. (“Mother”) appeals the termination of her parental 

rights to her child, J.L. (born in 2011). For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 In April 2015, the Department of Child Safety (“DCS”) took 

J.L. and her two siblings into custody and filed a dependency petition

alleging abuse or failure to protect from abuse, neglect, and unwillingness 

or inability to provide proper and effective parental care. Mother’s two 

other children, C.L. and E.L., are not parties to this appeal.

¶3 During the pendency of the case, DCS provided Mother with 

several services, including substance-abuse assessment and treatment, 

parent-aide services, psychological evaluation, and individual counseling. 

DCS informed Mother of the requirements of these services at various court 

hearings and through multiple service letters. Mother participated in but 

failed to complete several substance-abuse treatment programs. She also

was closed out of her referral for individual counseling and parent aide 

visits with her children due to inconsistent participation.

¶4 In August 2016, DCS moved to terminate Mother’s parental 

rights to J.L. based on Mother’s substance abuse and nine months out-ofhome placement. Ariz. Rev. Stat. (“A.R.S.”) § 8–533(B)(3) and –533(B)(8)(a). 

At the termination hearing, Mother testified that she primarily speaks 

Spanish and that none of the case managers assigned to her case spoke 

Spanish. She testified that communicating with them was difficult and that 

DCS failed to provide her an interpreter when she contacted them.

¶5 A DCS case manager testified, however, that Mother usually 

had a family member with her who was able to translate for her, and, if 

Mother did not have someone with her to interpret, DCS provided 

someone. The case manager further testified that Mother always had a 

translator for the supervised visits and that services were discussed with 

Mother at court hearings where a Spanish interpreter was present. Both the 
LAURA L. v. DCS, J.L.

Decision of the Court

3

case manager and a DCS supervisor testified that Mother failed to maintain 

contact with DCS despite different case managers attempting to contact her.

¶6 The superior court found the DCS case worker’s testimony 

concerning reunification services to be credible and supported by the 

evidence. The court also found that the translation services DCS provided 

both in and out of court were appropriate. Throughout the dependency, 

the court consistently found that DCS had made reasonable efforts to 

provide Mother with appropriate reunification services.

¶7 In July 2017, the court terminated Mother’s parental rights to 

J.L. on both grounds alleged in the petition and found that severance would 

be in J.L.’s best interests. Mother timely appealed. We have jurisdiction 

pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 8–235(A) and 12–120.21(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶8 The fundamental right to parent one’s child is not absolute. 

Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 284, ¶ 24 (2005). The superior court may 

terminate parental rights if it finds, “by clear and convincing evidence, at 

least one of the statutory grounds set out in section 8–533,” and by a 

preponderance of the evidence that termination is in the best interests of the 

child. Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 248–49, ¶ 12 (2000); 

Kent K., 210 Ariz. at 284, ¶ 22.

¶9 We review an order terminating parental rights for an abuse 

of discretion and will not reverse unless “there is no reasonable evidence to 

support” the order. Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 207 Ariz. 43, 47, 

¶ 8 (App. 2004). Because the superior court “is in the best position to weigh 

the evidence, observe the parties, judge the credibility of witnesses, and 

make appropriate findings,” we will accept its findings of fact unless no 

reasonable evidence supports them. Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 203 

Ariz. 278, 280, ¶ 4 (App. 2002).

¶10 To meet its burden under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(a), DCS was 

required to prove: (1) the child has been in an out-of-home placement for at 

least nine months; (2) DCS has “made a diligent effort to provide

appropriate reunification services;” and (3) “the parent has substantially 

neglected or willfully refused to remedy the circumstances that cause the 

child to be in an out-of-home placement, including refusal to participate in 

reunification services[.]” Mother argues only that DCS did not make a 

diligent effort to provide appropriate reunification services as required 

under § 8-533(B)(8)(a). DCS fulfills this requirement by providing the 

parent “with the time and opportunity to participate in programs designed 
LAURA L. v. DCS, J.L.

Decision of the Court

4

to improve the parent’s ability to care for the child.” Mary Ellen C. v. Ariz. 

Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 193 Ariz. 185, 192, ¶ 37 (App. 1999). But DCS is not 

required to provide the parent with every conceivable service or to ensure 

that she participates in every service offered. In re Maricopa Cty. Juvenile

Action No. JS-501904, 180 Ariz. 348, 353 (App. 1994).

¶11 Mother argues that she did not receive a fair opportunity to 

fully engage in reunification services from DCS because the language 

barrier between her and the DCS managers resulted in poor communication 

regarding the services.

¶12 DCS provided substantial evidence that showed that Mother 

was provided with appropriate reunification services for two years before 

the termination hearing. These services included drug and alcohol 

screenings, psychological evaluation, supervised visits with her children, 

and individual counseling. Mother was informed of these services through 

letters and during court hearings, but failed to consistently participate in 

these services.

¶13 As to the language barrier, the superior court found the case 

manager’s testimony credible that, in interacting with DCS, Mother either 

brought someone with her to serve as an interpreter or the case manager 

provided her with an interpreter. The court also determined that, despite 

having multiple case managers that did not speak Spanish, DCS “was 

credible in trying to reach out to [Mother],” and the translation services 

DCS provided both in and out of court were appropriate. Because 

reasonable evidence supports the court’s finding, we will not disturb it. See 

Jesus M., 203 Ariz. at 280, ¶ 4.

¶14 Sufficient evidence supports the superior court’s finding that 

DCS provided Mother with appropriate reunification services. 1

 

1 Mother does not challenge the superior court’s finding that 

termination of her parental rights is in J.L.’s best interests; thus, we do not 

address it. See Crystal E. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 241 Ariz. 576, 577-78, ¶ 5 

(App. 2017).
LAURA L. v. DCS, J.L.

Decision of the Court

5

CONCLUSION

¶15 Accordingly, we affirm the superior court’s termination of 

Mother’s parental rights to J.L. pursuant to A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(a).2

 

2 Because we find that the superior court did not err in terminating 

Mother’s rights under Arizona Revised Statutes section 8–533(B)(8)(a), we 

need not address the court’s termination of Mother’s rights under § 8-

533(B)(3). See Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 251, ¶ 27 

(2000) (if appellate court affirms one statutory basis, it need not address 

other statutory bases for termination).