Opinion filed December 18, 2020

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals ___________

No. 11-19-00020-CR

___________

EDWARD DARRALL ANDERSON A/K/A EDWARD 

DARRELL ANDERSON, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 266th District Court

Erath County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. CR14941

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

The jury convicted Appellant, Edward Darrall Anderson a/k/a Edward Darrell 

Anderson, of the state jail felony offense of manufacture or delivery of less than one 

gram of a controlled substance, namely methamphetamine. See TEX. HEALTH &

SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.112(a), (b) (West 2017). The jury found both 

enhancement allegations to be true and assessed Appellant’s punishment at 

confinement for fifteen years and a $5,000 fine. Appellant presents two issues on 
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appeal: one in which he challenges the constitutionality of various court costs that 

were assessed against Appellant and one in which he complains that the degree of 

the offense as reflected on the trial court’s written judgment is incorrect. Because 

we agree with the contention made by Appellant in his second issue, we modify and 

affirm. 

In his first issue, Appellant asserts that the following costs assessed against 

him are facially unconstitutional and violate the separation-of-powers provision of 

the Texas constitution: (1) a $50 warrant/capias fee, (2) a $5 witness fee for a 

subpoena, (3) a $10 fee for taking and approving a bond, and (4) a $5 fee for 

summoning a jury. The complained-of fees are authorized by the Texas Code of 

Criminal Procedure as reimbursement fees for the services performed in the case by 

a peace officer. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 102.011(a)(2), (3), (5), (7) 

(West Supp. 2020). 

Appellant argues that, although the complained-of fees are “collected” for a 

legitimate criminal justice purpose, they are not necessarily “allocated” or 

“expended” for a legitimate criminal justice purpose because they are deposited into 

a general fund from which they can be spent without limitation. Appellant asserts 

that the complained-of fees thereby violate the separation-of-powers provision of the 

Texas constitution. See TEX. CONST. art. II, § 1. 

The Court of Criminal Appeals addressed this very issue in Allen v. State, 

No. PD-1042-18, 2019 WL 6139077 (Tex. Crim. App. Nov. 20, 2019).1 There, the 

court addressed a facial challenge to the constitutionality of Article 102.011(a)(3) 

and (b) based on separation of powers. 2019 WL 6139077, at *1. The argument 

made by Appellant in this appeal mirrors the argument made and rejected by the 

1

We note that the Court of Criminal Appeals issued its opinion in Allen on November 20, 2019, 

that the opinion was marked as “Publish” by the court, and that mandate issued on December 16, 2019. See

http://www.search.txcourts.gov/Case.aspx?cn=PD-1042-18&coa=coscca. 
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Court of Criminal Appeals in Allen. The Court of Criminal Appeals thoroughly 

analyzed the argument and determined: 

Because the statute imposes a fee to reimburse the government for 

expenses directly incurred in connection with a defendant’s 

prosecution, the fee falls within the core category of reimbursementbased court costs that this Court has long recognized as constitutionally 

permissible, regardless of how the fees are spent once collected. The 

statute’s failure to direct the funds to be expended for a legitimate 

criminal justice purpose in the future does not render the courts tax 

gatherers in violation of separation of powers.

Id. at *3. We adhere to the holding in Allen and conclude that the fees about which 

Appellant complains are reimbursement-based fees that pose no separation-ofpowers problem regardless of how the funds are actually spent once received. See 

id. at *7. Therefore, we hold that subsections (a)(2), (a)(3), (a)(5), and (a)(7) of 

Article 102.011 are not facially unconstitutional. We overrule Appellant’s first 

issue. 

In his second issue, Appellant contends that the trial court’s judgment 

incorrectly reflects the degree of the offense to be a second-degree felony instead of 

a state jail felony. The State agrees that the trial court’s written judgment is incorrect 

in this regard. We also agree. 

The offense for which Appellant was convicted—the delivery of less than one 

gram of methamphetamine—is a state jail felony. See HEALTH & SAFETY

§ 481.112(b). The trial court’s written judgment, which reflects that Appellant was 

convicted of a “2ND DEGREE FELONY,” is therefore erroneous. An appellate 

court has the power to modify the trial court’s judgment to make the judgment speak 

the truth when it has the necessary information before it to do so. See TEX.R. APP. P.

43.2(b); Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d 26, 27–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). Because 

we have the necessary information to make the judgment speak the truth, we sustain 
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Appellant’s second issue, and we modify the judgment of the trial court to reflect 

the degree of the offense to be a “STATE JAIL FELONY.”

As modified, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

JIM R. WRIGHT

SENIOR CHIEF JUSTICE

December 18, 2020

Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J., 

Trotter, J., and Wright, S.C.J.2

Willson, J., not participating. 

2

Jim R. Wright, Senior Chief Justice (Retired), Court of Appeals, 11th District of Texas at Eastland, 

sitting by assignment.