IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

Assigned on Briefs November 17, 2020 at Knoxville

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. TORSAUNT LAMONT SHANKLIN

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Montgomery County

No. CC2018-CR-20 William R. Goodman III, Judge 

No. M2019-01896-CCA-R3-CD

The Defendant, Torsaunt Lamont Shanklin, was charged with drug and firearm offenses 

after those items were discovered during a search of his motel room. The Defendant filed 

a motion to suppress the evidence, arguing that the officers lacked probable cause for a 

search warrant based solely on the smell of marijuana coming from the room. The trial 

court denied the suppression motion. A jury convicted the Defendant of one count each of 

possession with the intent to manufacture, sell, or deliver twenty-six grams or more of 

cocaine, simple possession of marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia, and possession 

of a firearm during the commission of or attempt to commit a dangerous felony, as well as 

three alternative counts of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. He received an 

effective thirty-five-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the denial of his 

motion to suppress. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the Defendant 

is not entitled to suppression of the evidence, which was seized pursuant to a valid search 

warrant. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. However, we remand this 

case for entry of corrected judgment forms as detailed in this opinion. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Circuit Court Affirmed;

Case Remanded

D. KELLY THOMAS, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JAMES CURWOOD

WITT, JR., and ALAN E. GLENN, JJ., joined.

Gregory D. Smith (on appeal), Clarksville, Tennessee, and Melissa A. King (at trial), 

Adams, Tennessee, for the appellant, Torsaunt Lamont Shanklin. 

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; T. Austin Watkins, Assistant 

Attorney General; John W Carney, Jr., District Attorney General; and Helen O. Young,

Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

03/22/2021
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OPINION

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On August 15, 2017, the Defendant was a guest in Room 225 of a Motel 6 in 

Clarksville. Around 6:30 a.m. that day, Clarksville Police Department (“CPD”) officers

Adam Noble and Tyler Weaver were present at the Motel 6 on an unrelated matter when 

they smelled marijuana emitting from the Defendant’s room.1 After the officers knocked 

on the door, the Defendant answered, and when he did so, the marijuana smell intensified. 

Though Officer Noble instructed the Defendant to step outside, the Defendant, instead, 

stepped back inside and attempted to the close the door. The Defendant was “redirected” 

back outside. Because the Defendant would not provide the officers with a clear answer 

of whether there were other occupants inside, Officer Weaver performed a protective 

sweep of the room. While this was occurring, the Defendant began walking backwards 

away from Officer Noble. Officer Noble demanded that the Defendant return; however, 

the Defendant “took off running.” Officer Noble was able to apprehend the Defendant in 

a nearby stairwell. 

Joshua Smith, a drug agent with the CPD, subsequently appeared on the scene, and 

he observed the motel room and spoke with Officers Noble and Weaver. Later that day, 

Officer Smith obtained a search warrant for the Defendant’s motel room. In the affidavit 

in support of the warrant, Officer Smith stated as follows: 

On August 15, 2017, at approximately 06:30 hours, Officer Adam 

Noble and Officer Tyler Weaver of the Clarksville Police Department 

conducted a walkthrough of the Motel 6 parking lot (3080 Wilma Rudolph

Boulevard). While walking near Room 225, Officers smelled the distinct 

odor of raw marijuana emitting from the doorway. They knocked on the door 

and made contact . . . . Officers smelled the odor of raw marijuana emitting 

from the interior of Room 225.

While [the Defendant] was speaking with the Officers, he attempted 

to close the door on them. The Officers removed him from the room at which 

time he attempted to flee on foot, but he was taken into custody.

While attempting to obtain consent from [the Defendant] to search the 

room, [the Defendant] stated that there was marijuana in a nightstand in the 

room, but he denied consent to search the entire room.

 

1 We take this initial recitation of the facts from Officer Noble’s arrest warrant, which charged the 

Defendant with evading arrest. 
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Officers conducted a protective sweep of the room to ensure no other 

person was hiding and/or possibly destroying evidence. During the 

protective sweep, in plain view, Officers observed cigarillos on a nightstand 

and tobacco remains in the trash.

Your Affiant arrived at Room 225 and smelled the distinct odor of 

raw marijuana emitting from the room.

Through training and experience, Officer Noble, Officer Weaver and 

your Affiant know the smell of both burnt and raw marijuana, all having 

made numerous arrests for marijuana possession. Your Affiant knows that

subjects will use cigarillos to ingest marijuana, as they will split the cigarillo 

open, remove the tobacco and refill it with marijuana.

A check of [the Defendant’s] criminal history revealed that he has 

fourteen prior arrests for Drugs-Schedule II, Drugs-Schedule VI and Simple 

Possession since 2006.

Officer Smith also detailed his experience and training in the affidavit. 

During the search, drugs and a handgun were discovered in the Defendant’s room. 

Thereafter, a Montgomery County grand jury returned a ten-count indictment against the 

Defendant, charging him with one count each of possession of twenty-six grams or more 

of cocaine with the intent to sell, manufacture, or deliver; possession of more than one-half 

ounce of marijuana with the intent to sell, manufacture, or deliver; simple possession of 

marijuana; possession of drug paraphernalia; theft of property valued at $1,000 or less; 

evading arrest; and possession of a firearm during the commission of or attempt to commit 

a dangerous felony, as well as three alternative counts of possession of a firearm by a 

convicted felon. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-14-103, -16-603, -17-417, -17-418, -17-425, 

-17-1307, -17-1324. 

Prior to trial, the Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence. In the motion, 

the Defendant claimed that he was asleep when the officers knocked on the door and noted 

that the room was not his, but registered to one Ashley Fitts. He argued that “there was no 

probable cause to search and no consent given” and that therefore, “the subsequent search 

by the officer [was] an illegal warrantless search and any evidence obtained pursuant to the 

illegal search should be suppressed.”

2

 The State filed a reply, relying on the “four corners 

 

2 The Defendant also challenged the search of his vehicle that was parked outside the motel room and the 

subsequent search of his storage unit. However, because the Defendant was not charged with any offense 

based upon evidence found therein, we will limit our discussion to the facts and arguments surrounding the 

motel room. 
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of the search warrant,” and submitting that “sufficient probable cause existed for the 

issuance of said warrant.”

On October 8, 2018, a hearing was held. The parties did not present any evidence, 

though they discussed the facts contained in Officer Noble’s affidavit in support of the 

evading arrest charge.3 Defense counsel argued that the Defendant had an expectation of 

privacy in the motel room and that the officers “had no right to be outside of [the 

Defendant’s] room.” 

After argument, the trial court issued an oral ruling denying the motion. The trial 

court first determined that there was no expectation of privacy in the area outside of the 

Defendant’s motel room. The trial court then noted that the officers detected the odor of 

marijuana and proceeded to get a search warrant. Finally, the trial court reviewed the 

information contained in the search warrant affidavit and found that the information, under 

the totality of the circumstances, supported probable cause for the issuance of a warrant to 

search the motel room. The trial court entered an order denying the motion on October 29, 

2018. The Defendant proceeded to trial. 

At trial, both Officers Noble and Weaver testified. Around 6:30 a.m. on August 15, 

2017, Officers Noble and Weaver, dressed in uniform, went to execute an arrest warrant at 

a Motel 6 in Clarksville. According to Officer Noble, he had “received some information 

from an officer in another district about a person who possibly had a warrant staying at that 

hotel.” The officers parked at a nearby gas station in order not to alert the person whom 

they were seeking of their presence, so there was no recording of the events that followed. 

It was “just becoming daylight” when the officers arrived at the motel. As the

officers crossed the parking lot of the motel looking for the arrest warrant suspect’s vehicle,

they smelled the odor of marijuana near the building. The doors of the motel rooms opened 

to the parking lot, so the officers went from door to door “smelling doors,” trying to locate 

the source of the marijuana. Officer Noble explained that they would smell “the door crack 

where [the door] would open.” After checking the rooms on the first floor in the vicinity 

of the odor, they proceeded to the second floor, where they were able to determine that the 

smell was emanating from inside Room 225 on the corner. 

They knocked on the door a couple of times over the course of about a minute before 

the Defendant opened the door; when he did so, the smell intensified. The officers 

confirmed that they did not know to whom the motel room was rented at that time, and 

they could not recall if they identified themselves as police while knocking. Officer Noble 

said that the Defendant was dressed in basketball shorts and a white tank top and that he 

 

3 There were three different arrest warrants in this case, but only Officer Noble’s affidavit in support of the 

evading arrest charge provided context for the issues presented. 
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appeared as though he might have been sleeping. The officers told the Defendant that they 

“were there because of the odor and that [the Defendant] needed to step outside and talk 

to” them. The Defendant was argumentative about the officers’ “being there just over the 

smell of weed coming from the room,” and he stepped back inside and attempted to shut 

the door. Officer Noble put his foot between the door and the door frame, and Officer 

Weaver grabbed the Defendant’s wrist and escorted him outside into the breezeway. 

Officer Noble explained, “And once [the Defendant] was there and trying to shut [the 

door], [they] felt the need to bring [the Defendant] out [them]selves to deal with it.” 

Though the Defendant was not under arrest at that time, he was not free to leave either. 

Because the Defendant was “continuously argumentative” and would not say if 

anyone else was inside the motel room, Officer Weaver performed a protective sweep of 

the room to ensure their safety while they talked to the Defendant, as well as to prevent the 

destruction of any evidence. Officer Noble stayed outside with the Defendant. Both 

officers confirmed that the Defendant did not give consent to search the motel room. 

After Officer Weaver went inside the motel room with his pistol drawn, Officer 

Noble told the Defendant to wait next to him in the breezeway and not to leave, but the 

Defendant backed away and then ran down a nearby stairwell. Officer Noble estimated 

that the top of the stairwell was approximately five yards away from the motel room. 

Officer Noble chased the Defendant down the stairs and held him on the ground. Officer 

Weaver said that about five seconds after he had entered the motel room, he heard the 

commotion, left the motel room, and helped Officer Noble secure the Defendant. The 

Defendant was placed in handcuffs. 

Because Officer Weaver was unable to complete the protective sweep prior to 

assisting Officer Noble in the stairwell, Officer Weaver returned to the motel room to 

continue with the sweep. Officer Weaver estimated that he was out of view of the motel 

room for around thirty seconds. Upon conducting the protective sweep, which took 

between ten to fifteen seconds to complete, Officer Weaver did not find anyone else inside 

the room. He opined that only the Defendant was staying in the room. 

 During the sweep, Officer Weaver saw in plain view “dryer sheets stuffed in the 

air conditioner by the front door,” the “guts” of cigarillos in the trash can, and a pack of 

cigarillos lying on the nightstand. Officer Weaver explained that although cigarillos 

usually contained tobacco, drug users often emptied the “guts” of a cigarillo and refilled it 

with marijuana to smoke. In addition, according to Officer Weaver, during their interaction 

with the Defendant, the Defendant mentioned that all this was taking place over “a blunt,” 

and the Defendant admitted that there was “some marijuana” in the drawer of the 

nightstand. 
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Officer Smith also testified. He confirmed that he arrived on the scene and that after 

being briefed by the officers, a decision was made to obtain a search warrant for the motel 

room, which he did. Officer Smith indicated that regardless of the items observed during 

the protective sweep, “the overwhelming probable cause” to search was based upon “[t]he 

smell[,] the strong smell of raw marijuana” coming from the room. Officer Smith believed 

that the smell alone was sufficient to secure a search warrant. 

Inside the motel room, the officers found twenty-one baggies of cocaine, seven 

baggies of marijuana, three digital scales, a loaded 9mm handgun, and a number of cellular 

telephones. They also found a spoon with cocaine residue inside of a condiment container. 

There were two boxes of plastic sandwich bags, one of which was unopened. There were 

also plastic sandwich bags with torn-off corners, which were often used in the process of 

packaging drugs for resale, according to Officer Smith. Officer Smith also indicated that 

the portions of the cigarillos found in the motel room appeared to have been used as a 

wrapper for smoking marijuana; partially smoked blunts were observed in the ashtray. 

Men’s clothes were found hanging in the closet and inside a television stand drawer; 

Officer Smith did not observe any women’s clothes in the motel room. The Defendant’s 

wallet, which contained his driver license and his social security card, was found in the 

nightstand, and a total of $2,100 was found inside the room. 

Paperwork with the Defendant’s name on it was located inside the room, including 

a receipt from an eyeglass store and papers for a U-Haul storage unit. The storage unit 

papers bore both the Defendant’s name, as well as the name of one Ashley Fitts; the 

Defendant later identified Ms. Fitts as his girlfriend. Officer Smith stated that they were 

able to ascertain that the motel room had been rented to Ms. Fitts for approximately two 

weeks and that the Defendant was specifically listed as a guest on the paperwork. There 

was also a “body cleanser” discovered in the motel room, which Officer Smith said was 

commonly used by an individual in an attempt to deceive a drug test. 

The officers found a composition book that appeared to serve as a business ledger 

for the Defendant’s drug-dealing operation; however, Officer Smith conceded that 

handwriting on documents found inside the motel room was not entirely consistent. 

Officers Smith explained that drug dealers often used multiple phones in their operations, 

and he opined that many of the individually-wrapped baggies that contained drugs found 

inside the Defendant’s motel room appeared to be ready for resale. 

The officers also found two boxes of latex gloves, which, according to Officer 

Smith, were commonly used by drug dealers to avoid leaving fingerprints on the plastic 

bags. In addition, there was a bottle of Inositol found in the same bag as the handgun, and 

in the mini-refrigerator, the officers located baking soda. According to Officer Smith, 

baking soda was commonly used by drug dealers to convert powder cocaine to crack 
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cocaine, and Inositol was a cutting agent commonly used by drug dealers to dilute cocaine. 

Finally, Officer Smith stated that dryer sheets were sometimes stuffed inside air vents in 

an effort to mask the odor of a controlled substance. 

The Defendant’s father, who was a painter by profession, told Officer Smith that the 

Defendant worked for him, though the Defendant’s father would not provide any details of 

that employment. Two pay stubs for the Defendant were entered into evidence, which 

reflected pay for periods ending September 25, 2016, and October 2, 2016. Also, the 

Defendant’s 2016 W-2 was entered into evidence and reflected total earnings of $4,441.50 

for the year. 

Tennessee Bureau of Investigation Crime Lab Agent Lela Jackson tested the drug 

items found in the Defendant’s motel room. The portion of the marijuana she tested 

weighed 6.68 grams and the cocaine portion weighed 26.35 grams. There was also a 

mixture of baking soda and cocaine that weighed 19.93 grams. She did not test the entirety 

of the drugs given to her. 

The Defendant did not have anything incriminating on his person or in his vehicle 

at the time of his arrest. Following the Defendant’s arrest, William Evans, a drug agent 

with the CPD, interviewed the Defendant at the police station beginning at 7:01 p.m. on 

August 15, 2017. The Defendant verbally waived his Miranda rights at the outset of the 

interview. During the interview, which was recorded and played for the jury, the Defendant 

disputed the amount of cocaine that was in the motel room, but he admitted that he both 

used and sold cocaine. He also admitted that he had smoked marijuana in the motel room 

and that the gun belonged to him. In addition, the Defendant asserted that other people in 

the area of his motel room were smoking marijuana. The Defendant also mentioned being 

employed by “Rainbow Company,” as well working with his father. Regarding Ms. Fitts, 

the Defendant said “something to the effect that she had dipped, as in, she had left the

room.” When asked if his motel room had been paid for in full, the Defendant said that he 

got arrested before he could “go pay it for the day.” He denied knowing what Inositol was 

used for in the drug-making process.

That concluded the State’s proof. The Defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal 

focusing on the suppression issues. First, the Defendant argued that “[b]ecause the officer 

did not have probable cause to arrest the [D]efendant before [the officer] invaded an area 

where the [D]efendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy, the subsequent arrest and 

seizure of all evidence [was] invalid.” The Defendant continued, 

From the affidavit, there was nothing more than cigarillo packages on 

the nightstand. Assuming that the search warrant for Room 225 is valid, the

search is where the product of an unlawful initial intrusion of Room 225 puts 
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off the fruits of all search warrants and should have been suppressed and this 

matter dismissed.

The trial court noted that the suppression issue had been previously addressed and denied 

the motion for a judgment of acquittal. 

The Defendant did not present any proof, and that concluded the proceedings during 

the first part of bifurcated guilt phase. Five counts were submitted to the jury for their 

consideration.

4

 Then, during the second part of the bifurcated guilt phase, proof regarding 

the three alternative counts of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon was received, 

and those counts were presented to the jury. Ultimately, the Defendant was convicted of 

possession with intent to manufacture, sell, or deliver twenty-six grams or more of cocaine, 

simple possession of marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia, and possession of a 

firearm during the commission of or attempt to commit a dangerous felony. He was also 

found guilty of the three alternative counts of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. 

He was acquitted of evading arrest. The trial court merged the convictions for possession 

of firearm by a convicted felon, and it imposed a total effective sentence of thirty-five years 

in prison as a career offender.

The Defendant filed a motion for new trial, again raising the suppression issue. The 

Defendant argued that he was unlawfully arrested when the officers removed him from his 

motel room and that the officers improperly obtained the search warrant using information 

gained during the subsequent protective sweep. The trial court again relied on its prior 

suppression ruling and denied the Defendant’s motion for new trial. He filed an appeal to 

this court. 

ANALYSIS

The Defendant asserts that “there was no probable cause for the initial warrantless 

search of Room 225.” He submits that his constitutional rights were violated when the 

officers knocked on his motel room door relying on “a bald claim of smelling marijuana”

after “sniffing at motel doors.” The Defendant maintains, “This is not how an orderly 

society chooses to allow police to function. In a world where police excesses are producing 

calls to defund whole police forces, rules of engagement must be both clear and followed.” 

The Defendant then proceeds to discuss what he considered an arrest when the 

officers forced him outside of his motel room, submitting that he believed he was under 

arrest at that time despite any testimony by the officers to the contrary. The Defendant 

notes that Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-7-103(a)(2) limits a police officer’s right 

 

4 The charges of theft of property and possession of more than one-half ounce of marijuana with intent to 

manufacture, sell, or deliver were never presented to the jury for their consideration.
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to execute a warrantless arrest to situations when a misdemeanor occurs or is threatened in 

the officers’ presence, as well as noting that testimony established he appeared to have 

been asleep just before he opened the door. The Defendant cites law from other states for 

the proposition that “police cannot use a bogus or pretextual misdemeanor arrest to justify 

a search.” The Defendant concludes, “Since the only basis for the detention, search, arrest 

and even knocking on the door of Room 225 was the smell of marijuana through a closed 

door, the only thing police had as probable cause was a misdemeanor occurring outside the 

officers’ presence.” Therefore, in the Defendant’s opinion, the evidence should have been 

suppressed, and his case dismissed. 

The State responds that the officers lawfully searched the Defendant’s motel room 

pursuant to a search warrant based on probable cause. According to the State, though the 

Defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his motel room, he did not have any 

reasonable expectation of privacy “in any other portion of the motel property open to the 

public.” The State maintains that the officers “were lawfully present in the motel’s parking 

lot and in the breezeway.” The State continues that the protective sweep was valid because 

the officers had a least a reasonable suspicion to detain the Defendant and investigate 

further after they smelled marijuana in the area of the Defendant’s room, a smell that 

intensified after the Defendant voluntarily opened his motel room door, and after the 

Defendant refused to say if anyone else was in the room. According to the State, the 

Defendant could be arrested for a misdemeanor because the officers had probable cause 

for an arrest after the Defendant ran away and they believed that he possessed marijuana 

based on the strong odor coming from the motel room. The State continues, “[E]ven if [the 

Defendant] should not have been arrested, he cannot avail himself of the exclusionary rule 

because only evidence, not an arrest, can be suppressed.” The State notes that no evidence 

was seized during the protective sweep and concludes that the search warrant was based 

on probable cause and that the trial court properly denied the Defendant’s suppression 

motion.

On appellate review of suppression issues, the prevailing party “is entitled to the 

strongest legitimate view of the evidence adduced at the suppression hearing as well as all 

reasonable and legitimate inferences that may be drawn from the evidence.” State v. 

Talley, 307 S.W.3d 723, 729 (Tenn. 2010) (quoting State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 23 

(Tenn. 1996)). Questions about “the assessment of witness credibility, the weight and 

value of evidence, and the resolution of evidentiary conflicts are entrusted to the trial court” 

as the trier of fact. State v. Meeks, 262 S.W.3d 710, 722 (Tenn. 2008) (citing State v.

Scarborough, 201 S.W.3d 607, 615 (Tenn. 2006)). When the trial court “makes findings 

of fact in the course of ruling upon a motion to suppress, those findings are binding on 

appeal unless the evidence in the record preponderates against them.” Id. (citing State v.

Berrios, 235 S.W.3d 99, 104 (Tenn. 2007)). Conversely, a trial court’s conclusions of law 

along with its application of the law to the facts are reviewed de novo without any 
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presumption of correctness. Id. (citing State v. Hayes, 188 S.W.3d 505, 510 (Tenn. 2006)). 

In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, an appellate court may consider 

the evidence presented both at the suppression hearing and at the subsequent trial. State v. 

Henning, 975 S.W.2d 290, 299 (Tenn. 1998).

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of 

the Tennessee Constitution protect individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures by 

law enforcement officers. We begin our review by observing that “under both the federal 

and state constitutions, a warrantless search or seizure is presumed unreasonable, and 

evidence discovered as a result thereof is subject to suppression unless the State 

demonstrates that the search or seizure was conducted pursuant to one of the narrowly 

defined exceptions to the warrant requirement.” State v. Yeargan, 958 S.W.2d 626, 629 

(Tenn. 1997). That is, a trial court necessarily indulges the presumption that a warrantless 

search or seizure is unreasonable, and the burden is on the State to demonstrate that one of 

the exceptions to the warrant requirement applied at the time of the search or seizure. Id. 

Hotel and motel guests’ right to privacy in their rooms is also protected by the Fourth 

Amendment. State v. Ross, 49 S.W.3d 833, 840 (Tenn.2001); see also Hoffa v. United 

States, 385 U.S. 293, 301 (1966).

Reasonableness is the “touchstone of the Fourth Amendment.” Florida v. Jimeno, 

500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991). Though the Defendant had an expectation of privacy inside his 

motel room, the central issue in this case is whether the Defendant had a reasonable 

expectation of privacy in the common areas of the motel, specifically the breezeway. 

Neither the Fourth Amendment nor article 1, section 7 of our constitution precludes 

governmental intrusion absent the reasonable expectation of privacy. State v. Talley, 307 

S.W.3d 723, 733-34 (Tenn. 2010) (citing Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375

(1993); State v. Munn, 56 S.W.3d 486, 494 (Tenn. 2001)). In consequence, “an 

investigation by governmental authorities which is not a search as defined by the Supreme 

Court may be conducted without probable cause, reasonable suspicion or a search warrant.” 

State v. Bell, 832 S.W.2d 583, 58-90 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991). 

In the determination of whether a search or seizure meets constitutional standards, 

the first consideration is whether the accused has a reasonable expectation of privacy. See 

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). In Katz, a twoprong test was established: “(1) whether the individual had an actual, subjective 

expectation of privacy and (2) whether society is willing to view the individual’s subjective 

expectation of privacy as reasonable and justifiable under the circumstances.” Munn, 56 

S.W.3d at 494 (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979)). A defendant has the 

initial burden of establishing a legitimate expectation of privacy, and the failure to do so is 

dispositive in favor of the State. Talley, 307 S.W.3d at 730. 
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The general rule regarding dwellings such as apartment buildings and motels is that 

an occupant has no legitimate expectation of privacy in areas subject to common use. See

Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 2.3(c), at 758-62 (5th ed. 2012). This rule applies 

to external and internal hallways, even those immediately adjacent to private areas such as 

individual apartments and motel rooms. Id. 

In Talley, the Tennessee Supreme Court upheld this court’s decision “rejecting the 

Sixth Circuit bright-line rule that a resident always has a reasonable expectation of privacy 

in a secured common area” in favor of “the totality of the circumstances test . . . for 

determining the reasonableness of an expectation of privacy.” 307 S.W.3d at 734. 

Applying this test, the court held that “the [d]efendant [resident] did not have a reasonable 

expectation of privacy in the commonly shared, interior hallway of a condominium 

complex” because no resident “could unilaterally exclude others rightfully within the 

hallway,” residents had collectively allowed non-residents to have intermittent access to 

the common areas, and there was “no evidence that the [d]efendant had taken any 

precautions to maintain his privacy in the common areas of the building.” Id. at 734-35. 

The court noted that “[a]s a general rule, unlocked or unsecured common areas of 

apartment buildings do not qualify for any reasonable expectation of privacy.” Id. 307 

S.W.3d at 732 n.4 (citations omitted). 

Under the totality of the circumstances, we see no need to depart from the general 

rule in this case. The breezeways belonged to the motel owner, not the occupants of the 

individual rooms, and no evidence indicated that the police lacked permission to be present 

on the breezeways. The Defendant had a possessory interest in the room itself, but as to 

the breezeway, his interest, like that of the other motel guests, was one of common, not 

exclusive, use and access. See United States v. Miravalles, 280 F.3d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir.

2002) (reasoning that common areas in an apartment building are available for the use of 

other tenants, visitors of other tenants, the landlord, delivery people, repair workers, and 

the like). The outside walkway of a motel, unlike a traditional curtilage, frequently must 

be traversed at all hours by strangers, including guests and hotel staff. Although the 

Defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy inside the room he rented, he had no 

expectation of privacy in the sights, sounds, and smells detectible without unconstitutional 

intrusion from outside the room. Accordingly, the presence of law enforcement officers 

on the motel breezeway was not a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

See e.g., Sanders v. Commonwealth, 772 S.E.2d 15, 23-24 (Va. Ct. App. 2015) (holding 

same). 

Moreover, we find no legal justification for a conclusion that the officers’ smelling 

the motel doors somehow converted their presence into an unlawful search. The law is 

well established that a canine sniff, standing alone, is not a search for purposes of the Fourth 

Amendment. See, e.g., Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 410 (2005); United States v.
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Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983). Key to the decisions in those cases was that each law 

enforcement officer and his trained dog were at a location in which they had a right to be 

at the time of the sniff and alert. Certainly if a canine sniff is not a search for purposes of 

the Fourth Amendment, then neither is a police officer’s. See Sanders, 772 S.E.2d at 25

(holding that no search occurred because the police officers and the drug detection dog 

were at a place in which they had a right to be at the time of each sniff). Thus, the officers’ 

smelling the door jambs under the circumstances of this case did not violate the 

Defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy. See United States v. Roby, 122 F.3d 1120, 

1124-25 (8th Cir. 1997) (approving a dog sniff in the common corridor of a hotel); United 

States v. Marlar, 828 F. Supp. 415, 419 (N.D. Miss. 1993) (approving a dog sniff of an 

exterior motel room door opening onto a public sidewalk and parking lot); Nelson v. State, 

867 So.2d 534, 535-37 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (approving a dog sniff of a hotel hallway); 

State v. Washburn, 685 S.E.2d 555, 558-60 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009) (approving a dog sniff in 

the common hallway of a storage facility). 

Seemingly, the Defendant contends that even if the officers were lawfully present 

in the breezeway, they were still prohibited from knocking on his door, detaining him, and 

conducting a protective sweep of the room based solely on the smell of marijuana; thus, 

according to the Defendant, the evidence should have been suppressed as fruit of the 

poisonous tree. However, law enforcement officers are not required to seek a search 

warrant, even if there might be sufficient information and ample time to do so, before they 

conduct a knock and talk investigation. Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 8 (2013). Courts 

have generally recognized the right of police officers to enter portions of a person’s 

property that are implicitly open to the public for purposes of seeking consent to perform 

a search. State v. Cothran, 115 S.W.3d 513, 522 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003). In explaining 

the procedure and reasoning for it, this court has quoted with approval the following:

Absent express orders from the person in possession against any possible 

trespass, there is no rule of private or public conduct which makes it illegal 

per se, or a condemned invasion of the person’s right of privacy, for anyone 

openly and peaceably, at high noon, to walk up the steps and knock on the 

front door of any man’s “castle” with the honest intent of asking questions 

of the occupant thereof-whether the questioner be a pollster, a salesman, or 

an officer of the law.

Id. at 521 (quoting United States v. Cormier, 220 F.3d 1103, 1109 (9th Cir. 2000)). The 

knock and talk procedure is generally regarded as a consensual encounter. Id. (citing Latta 

v. State, 88 S.W.3d 833, 838 (2002)). Moreover, no basis for suspecting a crime is being 

committed, neither reasonable suspicion nor probable cause, is required by officers before 

they can engage in a consensual encounter like the knock and talk. Id. Here, the officers, 
- 13 -

who were in a place that they had a right to be present, were not constitutionally prohibited 

from knocking on the Defendant’s motel room door. 

The Defendant’s argument fails to account for what happened next—the fact that 

the evidence from his motel room was seized pursuant to a search warrant. The officers 

smelled marijuana emitting from the Defendant’s room before they knocked on the door, 

and the smell only got stronger when the Defendant opened the door. The odor of an illegal 

substance alone can provide sufficient probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant. 

State v. Donte Lavon Green, No. W2018-00092-CCA-R3-CD, 2019 WL 1595684 (Tenn. 

Crim. App. Apr. 15, 2019) (finding probable cause supported the search warrant after law 

enforcement was called to the motel due to the smell of marijuana, approached the 

defendant’s door, the defendant opened the door, and an “[o]fficer immediately smelled 

the strong odor of what he believed to be raw marijuana coming from the room”), perm. 

app. denied (Tenn. Aug. 16, 2019); State v. Billy Joe Hodge, No. W2016-01009-CCA-R3-

CD, 2017 WL 4004229, at *6 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 8, 2017) (noting that “probable 

cause can be based solely on an officer’s detection of the odor of marijuana” and 

concluding that the smell of marijuana from a residence provided probable cause for the 

search); State v. Frederic A. Crosby, No. W2013-02610-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 4415924, 

at *8 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 9, 2014) (determining that the smell of marijuana emanating 

from a person provided probable cause to search); State v. Bradley Lonsinger, No. M2003-

03101-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL 49569, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 5, 2005) (“It is well 

established in Tennessee that the odor of an illegal substance, either alone or in conjunction 

with other facts and circumstances, can provide sufficient probable cause, depending on 

the situation, for either a warrantless search or the issuance of a search warrant.”).

In the interest of brevity, and because the evidence was obtained following the 

issuance of a search warrant, we decline to delve into the Defendant’s less than clear 

allegations regarding his subsequent detention and the protective sweep of the motel room, 

which occurred after the Defendant opened his motel room door to speak with the officers. 

We do so without deciding the merits of those allegations because the legality of the initial 

entry and the Defendant’s detention are not dispositive of the suppression issue. Moreover, 

even if we were to accept the Defendant’s legal challenges to his initial detention and the 

protective sweep, they would not entitle him to the relief he seeks. 

Pursuant to the independent source doctrine, evidence is still admissible if the 

government obtained that evidence via an independent legal source, like a warrant. See

State v. Carter, 160 S.W.3d 526, 532 (Tenn. 2005); see also Donte Lavon Green, 2019 WL 

1595684, at *6. No evidence was seized during the protective sweep or from the 

Defendant’s initial detention or subsequent arrest. When the Defendant was detained and 

the officers performed the protective sweep of the Defendant’s motel room, the officers 
- 14 -

already had ample information to obtain a search warrant. The Defendant does not make 

any specific challenges to the validity of this search warrant on appeal. 

In analyzing the validity of a search pursuant to a warrant, a court may redact an 

affidavit to remove any references to tainted information that was illegally obtained, and 

“any resulting search is deemed constitutional so long as the redacted affidavit has been 

properly scrutinized and still suffices to establish probable cause.” State v. Randall Keith 

Smith and Nicholas Ryan Flood, No. W2009-02678-CCA-R3-CD, 2011 WL 6885348, at 

*7 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 27, 2011). Even if we redact the search warrant and remove

from our probable cause analysis any reference to the Defendant’s flight and any 

subsequent observations by the officers during the protective sweep, the search warrant 

was still supported by probable cause. See Donte Lavon Green, 2019 WL 1595684, at *6.

Besides any allegedly tainted evidence, the affidavit recited that Officers Noble and 

Weaver were conducting a walkthrough of the Motel 6 parking lot and that while they were 

walking near Room 225, the officers “smelled the distinct odor of raw marijuana emitting 

from the doorway.” The officers then knocked on the door and made contact with the 

Defendant, and they “smelled the odor of raw marijuana emitting from the interior of Room 

225.” While speaking with the Defendant and attempting to obtain consent to search the 

room, the Defendant stated that there was marijuana in a nightstand in the room. Officer 

Smith stated that when he arrived on the scene of Room 225, he likewise “smelled the 

distinct odor of raw marijuana emitting from the room.” Accordingly, there was probable 

cause to support the search warrant even if we were to remove any references to the 

allegedly tainted evidence—a search that ultimately resulted in the recovery of the 

marijuana, cocaine, plastic bags, scales, $2,100 in cash, baking soda, Inositol, and a 

handgun. We conclude that the evidence was admissible because it was obtained pursuant 

to a valid search warrant. The trial court did not err by failing to suppress the evidence.5 

Upon our review of the appellate record, the record does not explain disposition of 

the charges of theft of property or possession of more than one-half of ounce of marijuana 

with intent to manufacture, sell, or deliver. A complete judgment form for each count of 

the indictment is required by law. See State v. Berry, 503 S.W.3d 360, 364 (Tenn. 2015) 

(Order). The trial court should, on remand, enter judgment forms reflecting the disposition 

of all counts of the indictment. We also note that an amended judgment form for Count 2 

was entered reflecting that Counts 6, 7, and 8 (the three alternative counts of possession of 

a firearm by a convicted felon) “were merged” into Count 2 (possession of a firearm during 

 

5

In a footnote, the Defendant submits that his argument “will somewhat double as a sufficiency of evidence 

argument.” Any argument by the Defendant regarding sufficiency of the evidence focuses solely on the 

suppression of the evidence. Because we have held that the trial court did not err in admitting the evidence, 

we fail to indulge the Defendant’s sufficiency argument any further. 
- 15 -

the commission of dangerous felony). However, in the initial set of forms, a judgment was 

entered for Count 8, and it reflected that Counts 6 and 7 merged with Count 8. We find 

that the initial judgment forms correctly reflected the trial court’s sentencing decision.

6

 

Those forms too shall be revised upon remand. 

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing analysis, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. 

However, this case is remanded for entry of corrected judgment forms consistent with this 

opinion. 

 

D. KELLY THOMAS, JR., JUDGE

 

6

Initially, the trial court said that Counts 6, 7, and 8 merged with Count 2. However, it then corrected itself 

and merged Counts 6 and 7 with Count 8, imposed a thirty-year sentence for Count 8, and ran the sentence 

concurrently with Count 1.