UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

MAURICE TROTTER, a/k/a Mo, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

No. 13-3147 

(D.C. Nos. 2:04-CR-20140-CM-1 & 

2:11-CV-02493-CM) 

(D. Kan.)

 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

 

Before HARTZ, BALDOCK, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges. 

 

 Maurice Trotter appeals from the district court’s decision denying a motion to 

suppress items seized from a storage locker and from the district court’s amended 

judgment, which resentenced him to 120 months’ imprisonment and a ten-year term 

of supervised release. We vacate Mr. Trotter’s sentence and remand for 

resentencing. We affirm the denial of the motion to suppress. 

 

 

*

 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this 

appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding 

precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral 

estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

August 21, 2014

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
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I. 

 Mr. Trotter was convicted of distribution and possession with intent to 

distribute significant quantities of cocaine powder and crack cocaine as well as 

conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute those substances. He was sentenced in 

2005 to 168 months’ imprisonment to be followed by ten years of supervised release. 

 We affirmed the judgment on direct appeal, but the Supreme Court granted 

Mr. Trotter’s petition for certiorari, vacated our decision, and remanded for further 

consideration in light of its recent opinion in Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 

85 (2007). This court in turn remanded to the district court to clarify the basis for its 

sentencing decision. 

 The district court issued an order clarifying its decision. When Mr. Trotter’s 

attorney did not file an appeal, he filed a pro se notice of appeal, which this court 

dismissed as untimely. 

 Mr. Trotter then sought collateral review through a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion, 

arguing that his attorney was ineffective for failing to file a timely appeal from the 

district court’s clarification order. The district court agreed. As a remedy, the 

district court entered an amended judgment on May 29, 2013, imposing a sentence of 

120 months1

, with a ten-year term of supervised release. The district court explained 

that this remedy would allow Mr. Trotter to appeal his sentence, as well as other 

 

1

 Mr. Trotter had previously filed two motions for sentence reductions under 

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) and been granted relief in 2011 and then in 2012. 
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issues he had identified. Mr. Trotter timely filed a notice of appeal from the 

amended judgment. 

II. 

 Mr. Trotter first argues that the district court erred in sentencing him to ten 

years of supervised release because the court sentenced him under the 2005 version 

of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii). He contends that he should have been sentenced 

under the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (FSA), which applies to all sentences imposed 

after its effective date of August 3, 2010. See Dorsey v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 

2321 (2012). We agree, as does the government. Under the FSA, his term of 

supervised release should be eight years, instead of ten years. We therefore vacate 

Mr. Trotter’s sentence and remand for resentencing. 

 Mr. Trotter next argues that the district court erred in denying the motion to 

suppress evidence seized from a storage unit. We conclude that he has waived this 

issue. First, there is some question whether Mr. Trotter properly raised the 

suppression issue in district court. The motion to suppress was filed by his brother 

and codefendant, Mardell Trotter. Although Mr. Trotter filed a motion to join in 

some of Mardell’s other pretrial motions, he did not ask to join in the motion to 

suppress. At the hearing on the motion to suppress, however, Mr. Trotter’s attorney 

did state that she had “joined in [the motion] basically for the result purposes.” R., 

Vol. 2 at 353. Perhaps this could constitute an adequate request to join in the motion 

to suppress, but even assuming that to be the case, Mr. Trotter’s attorney went on to 
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concede that her client did not have standing to challenge the search of the locker. 

See id. (“Even though I’ve joined in basically for the result purposes, my client 

actually doesn’t have standing in this matter. It’s [Mardell Trotter’s counsel’s] 

issue.” (emphasis added)). By conceding in the district court that he did not have 

standing to move to suppress the evidence seized from the storage locker, Mr. Trotter 

has waived any argument on appeal that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated 

by the search. We will therefore not disturb the district court’s denial of the motion 

to suppress. 

III. 

 We vacate Mr. Trotter’s sentence and remand for resentencing. We affirm the 

denial of the motion to suppress. 

 Entered for the Court 

 Harris L Hartz 

 Circuit Judge