IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING

2019 WY 115

OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2019

November 14, 2019

PAUL A. WOODIE and KIMBERLY A. 

WOODIE a/k/a KYMBERLY A. 

WOODIE a/k/a KYM WOODIE, 

husband and wife,

Appellants

(Defendants),

v.

JANET WHITESELL,

Appellee

(Plaintiff).

PAUL A. WOODIE and KIMBERLY A. 

WOODIE a/k/a KYMBERLY A. 

WOODIE a/k/a KYM WOODIE, 

husband and wife,

Appellants

(Defendants),

v.

JANET WHITESELL,

Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 S-19-0047

 S-19-0077

Appeal from the District Court of Teton County

The Honorable Timothy C. Day, Judge
Representing Appellants:

William R. Fix and Jessica Simons of Fix Law Office, Jackson, Wyoming; Larissa 

A. McCalla, Wyarno, Wyoming. Argument by Ms. McCalla.

Representing Appellee:

John R. Goodell of Racine Olson, PLLP, Boise, Idaho.

Before DAVIS, C.J., and FOX, KAUTZ, BOOMGAARDEN, and GRAY, JJ.

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. 

Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, 

Wyoming 82002, of typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final 

publication in the permanent volume.
1

KAUTZ, Justice.

[¶1] Janet Whitesell sued Paul and Kimberly Woodie (Woodies) in the district court in 

Teton County, Wyoming, seeking to collect on a promissory note (Note). The Woodies 

executed the Note in Idaho and delivered it to Ms. Whitesell in payment for real estate 

located in Idaho. The Note was originally secured by a deed of trust in the property. At 

the time of the transaction, neither party had any connection with Wyoming. The Woodies 

filed several motions to dismiss the Wyoming lawsuit, asserting the Wyoming district court 

lacked subject matter jurisdiction and the lawsuit was barred by the statute of limitations. 

The district court denied the Woodies’ motions to dismiss and granted summary judgment 

in favor of Ms. Whitesell. The Woodies challenge both rulings on appeal. We affirm.

 

FACTS

[¶2] In May 2011, Ms. Whitesell sold her home in Idaho to the Woodies for $225,000. 

The Woodies paid $50,000 with money they borrowed from Snake River Funding (Snake 

River) and delivered a $175,000 promissory note to Ms. Whitesell for the balance. The 

Note called for the Woodies to make 47 monthly installments beginning July 1, 2011, and 

to make a balloon payment on July 1, 2015. In return, Ms. Whitesell delivered a warranty 

deed to the Woodies, which they recorded. The Woodies gave Snake River a first deed of 

trust in the subject property as security for the debt associated with the $50,000 down 

payment and gave Ms. Whitesell a second deed of trust in the same property to secure the 

$175,000 Note. 

[¶3] The Woodies made five (5) monthly payments to Ms. Whitesell. They stopped 

making payments on the Note in December 2011, asserting Ms. Whitesell failed to timely 

vacate the property. In September 2012, Ms. Whitesell recorded a Notice of Default in the 

property records in Idaho. The next month, Snake River, as senior lienholder, also recorded 

a Notice of Default and began foreclosure proceedings. Snake River foreclosed on the 

property; neither Ms. Whitesell nor the Woodies redeemed the property. 

[¶4] In July 2017, Ms. Whitesell filed this lawsuit in Teton County, seeking judgment 

against both Mr. and Mrs. Woodie on the Note. A Teton County deputy sheriff served Mr. 

Woodie with the complaint and a summons in Teton County, Wyoming. Shortly thereafter, 

without filing any challenge to the Wyoming court’s personal jurisdiction over either 

defendant, Wyoming counsel entered an appearance on behalf of both Mr. and Mrs. 

Woodie. The Woodies later filed several motions to dismiss arguing, among other things, 

Ms. Whitesell’s complaint was barred by the applicable Idaho statute of limitations and the 

district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over her complaint. The district court 

denied the motions to dismiss. 
2

[¶5] Ms. Whitesell filed a motion for summary judgment with an affidavit stating the 

Woodies defaulted on the Note and establishing the balance due. The district court found 

there were no genuine issues of material fact and granted summary judgment in her favor. 

ISSUES

[¶6] The issues presented by the Woodies are:

1. Did the district court have subject matter and personal jurisdiction?

2. Did the district court correctly apply the correct Idaho statute of limitations?

3. Did the district court fail to properly apply the Idaho Trust Deeds Act?

4. Did the district court err in awarding interest, attorney’s fees and costs to Ms. 

Whitesell?

DISCUSSION

1. Did the district court have subject matter and personal jurisdiction?

[¶7] In their issue statement, the Woodies claim the district court lacked subject matter 

jurisdiction; however, a close reading of their argument shows they challenge personal 

jurisdiction as well. Accordingly we will address both.

[¶8] Jurisdictional issues “present questions of law that this Court reviews de novo.” 

DeLoge v. Homar, 2013 WY 33, ¶ 10, 297 P.3d 117, 120 (Wyo. 2013) (citing Hall v. Park 

County, 2010 WY 124, ¶ 3, 238 P.3d 580, 581 (Wyo. 2010)). See also, Operation Save 

America v. City of Jackson, 2012 WY 51, ¶ 16, 275 P.3d 438, 447 (Wyo. 2012) 

(subject matter and personal jurisdiction are questions of law considered de novo, without 

regard to the district court’s determination) (citing Meyer v. Hatto, 2008 WY 153, ¶ 14,

198 P.3d 552, 555 (Wyo. 2008), and Northfork Citizens for Responsible Dev. v. Park Cty.

Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 2008 WY 88, ¶ 6, 189 P.3d 260, 262 (Wyo. 2008)).

a. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

[¶9] “Subject matter jurisdiction is ‘the power to hear and determine cases of the general 

class to which the proceedings in question belong.’” Lacey v. Lacey, 925 P.2d 237, 238 

(Wyo. 1996) (quoting Fuller v. State, 568 P.2d 900, 903 (Wyo. 1977)). Wyoming courts 

derive their subject matter jurisdiction from the Wyoming Constitution and statutes enacted 

by the Wyoming legislature. Best v. Best, 2015 WY 133, ¶ 11, 357 P.3d 1149, 1152 (Wyo. 

2015). Our constitution recognizes broad jurisdiction in the district courts, stating they 

have “original jurisdiction of all causes both at law and in equity ... in which jurisdiction 
3

shall not have been by law vested exclusively in some other court[.]” Wyoming 

Constitution Art. 5, § 10 (emphasis added). The Wyoming legislature limited a district 

court’s subject matter jurisdiction by vesting “exclusive original jurisdiction” in circuit 

courts for contract and other actions where the amount sought does not exceed fifty 

thousand dollars ($50,000.00). Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 5-9-128 (LexisNexis 2019). It has not, 

however, limited a district court’s jurisdiction over contract claims for contracts made or 

performed outside Wyoming. The starting point in this analysis, then, is that district courts 

have extensive subject matter jurisdiction, enabling them to consider all common law 

causes (except as limited by the legislature). In this case, Ms. Whitesell sued to enforce a 

contract, in particular a promissory note. It goes without saying that district courts in 

Wyoming have subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate promissory notes and other 

contract cases as long as the amount in controversy requirement is met. See, e.g., Thornock 

v. Pacificorp, 2016 WY 93, 379 P.3d 175 (Wyo. 2016) (contract dispute adjudicated in 

district court); Prudential Preferred Properties v. J & J Ventures, Inc., 859 P.2d 1267 

(Wyo. 1993) (dispute over promissory note adjudicated in district court). 

[¶10] The Woodies assert the Note in this case belongs to a separate class of contracts 

which a Wyoming court may not enforce, as the Note was made in Idaho and was secured 

by real estate in Idaho. The Woodies provide no authority for either of these novel 

positions. They make an unsupported assertion that Wyoming courts should not have 

subject matter jurisdiction over contracts made outside Wyoming because to do so would 

greatly burden the Wyoming courts and encourage forum shopping. Those assertions are 

suspect, have not been the law in Wyoming to this point, and the Woodies fail to support 

them. We decline to judicially create a new limitation on subject matter jurisdiction in the 

manner they propose. The fact that a promissory note was made in another state or was 

secured by collateral located in another state does not impact a Wyoming district court’s 

subject matter jurisdiction to resolve a case based on the note.

[¶11] We previously recognized that Wyoming courts have subject matter jurisdiction to 

resolve disputes involving contracts made outside the state if either party to the contract is 

subject to personal jurisdiction in Wyoming. Booth v. Magee Carpet Co., 548 P.2d 1252, 

1256 (Wyo. 1976). “[T]he general rule is that when a suit is based upon a contract, as in 

this case, the action is transitory and may be determined by any court which can obtain 

jurisdiction on the person without regard to its place of execution or performance.” Id.

[¶12] The Woodies claim our holding in Booth is limited to circumstances when 

performance of the contract somehow is connected to Wyoming. Booth states exactly the 

opposite. Our language in Booth is unambiguous, recognizing subject matter jurisdiction 

in such contract cases “without regard to its place of execution or performance.” Id. at 

1256 (emphasis added). 

[¶13] The Woodies assert the district court had no subject matter jurisdiction because the 

Note was part of an Idaho real estate transaction. Wyoming courts do not have jurisdiction 
4

to enforce contracts in a manner which affects title to real estate in another state. This 

limitation, however, does not turn on whether the contract was made outside Wyoming, 

but instead is a limitation on a Wyoming court’s authority to affect title to real estate in 

another state. “We have stated that we think the issue settled, at least since Fall v. 

Eastin, 215 U.S. 1, 30 S.Ct. 3, 54 L.Ed. 65 (1909), that the court of one state has no power 

to directly affect title to land located wholly within the borders of another. Decrees and 

judgments purporting to this effect are void, and to the extent the decree before us purports 

to so do it must fail.” Meima v. Broemmel, 2005 WY 87, ¶ 64, 117 P.3d 429, 450 (Wyo. 

2005). 

[¶14] A Wyoming court’s inability to affect title to real estate in another state is irrelevant 

to this case. The Note the Woodies gave Ms. Whitesell has no effect on title to real estate 

located in Idaho or anywhere else. Although the Note originally was secured by a second 

deed of trust in Idaho property, that deed of trust was extinguished by foreclosure and is 

not part of Ms. Whitesell’s Wyoming case against the Woodies. Any judgment resulting 

from Ms. Whitesell’s suit will have no effect on any title to real estate. 

b. Personal Jurisdiction

[¶15] Within their subject matter jurisdiction argument, the Woodies assert they had 

insufficient contacts with Wyoming to establish a Wyoming court’s personal jurisdiction 

over them. They argue that because their activity in Wyoming (operating a towing business 

in Teton County) is unrelated to the Note, the Wyoming district court could not exercise 

personal jurisdiction over them in a suit based on the Note. 

[¶16] Wyoming courts, by statute, have personal jurisdiction over any person on any basis 

that does not violate the Wyoming or United States Constitution. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 5-1-

107(a) (LexisNexis 2019). “So long as the exercise of jurisdiction does not offend the Due 

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the courts 

of this state have jurisdiction over a defendant.” Black Diamond Energy Partners 2001-A 

Ltd. v. S&T Bank, 2012 WY 84, ¶ 19, 278 P.3d 738, 743 (Wyo. 2012); Markby v. St. 

Anthony Hosp. Systems, 647 P.2d 1068, 1074 (Wyo. 1982). 

[¶17] The United States Supreme Court has recognized personal jurisdiction based on 

one’s presence in a state does not violate the United States Constitution. 

Among the most firmly established principles 

of personal jurisdiction in American tradition is that the courts 

of a State have jurisdiction over nonresidents who are 

physically present in the State. The view developed early that 

each State had the power to hale before its courts any 

individual who could be found within its borders, and that once 

having acquired jurisdiction over such a person by properly 
5

serving him with process, the State could retain jurisdiction to 

enter judgment against him, no matter how fleeting his visit.

Burnham v. Superior Court of California, Cty. of Marin, 495 U.S. 604, 610-11, 110 S. Ct. 

2105, 2110, 109 L. Ed. 2d 631 (1990).

[¶18] Such personal jurisdiction results whenever someone is in the State without regard 

to the reason for his presence. It makes no difference that the Woodies claim to only have 

been in Wyoming to run their business. 

Decisions in the courts of many States in the 19th and early 

20th centuries held that personal service upon a physically 

present defendant sufficed to confer jurisdiction, without 

regard to whether the defendant was only briefly in the State or 

whether the cause of action was related to his activities there. 

See, e.g., Vinal v. Core, 18 W.Va. 1, 20 (1881); Roberts v. 

Dunsmuir, 75 Cal. 203, 204, 16 P. 782 (1888); De Poret v. 

Gusman, 30 La.Ann., pt. 2, pp. 930, 932 (1878); Smith v. 

Gibson, 83 Ala. 284, 285, 3 So. 321 (1887); Savin v. Bond, 57 

Md. 228, 233 (1881); Hart v. Granger, 1 Conn. 154, 165 

(1814); Mussina v. Belden, 6 Abb.Pr. 165, 176 

(N.Y.Sup.Ct.1858); Darrah v. Watson, 36 Iowa 116, 120-121 

(1872); Baisley v. Baisley, 113 Mo. 544, 549-550, 21 S.W. 29, 

30 (1893); Bowman v. Flint, 37 Tex.Civ.App. 28, 29, 82 S.W. 

1049, 1050 (1904). See also Reed v. Hollister, 106 Ore. 407, 

412–414, 212 P. 367, 369-370 (1923); Hagen v. Viney, 124 

Fla. 747, 751, 169 So. 391, 392-393 (1936); Vaughn v. 

Love, 324 Pa. 276, 280, 188 A. 299, 302 (1936).

Id., 495 U.S. at 612-13, 110 S.Ct. at 2111. The Supreme Court concluded its opinion in 

Burnham by stating, “The Due Process Clause does not prohibit [state] courts from 

exercising jurisdiction ... based on the fact of in-state service of process.” Id., 495 U.S. at 

628, 110 S.Ct. at 2119. This principle applies to the Woodies. 

[¶19] The Wyoming district court had personal jurisdiction over Mr. Woodie because he 

was served within the state and, as a result, there is no question the court had personal 

jurisdiction regarding him. 

[¶20] The parties do not address Mrs. Woodie separately and the record does not indicate 

she was personally served. However, the first document the Woodies’ attorneys filed in 

the case was a voluntary appearance on behalf of both Mr. and Mrs. Woodie. This 

appearance did not contest the trial court’s personal jurisdiction over either Mr. or Mrs. 

Woodie. We have explained:
6

In order for a court to acquire jurisdiction over a defendant, 

that defendant must be properly served or must 

“voluntarily” appear. A judgment entered without the court 

having jurisdiction is null and void. A defendant may waive his 

right to challenge a court’s jurisdiction. Such a challenge 

should be made at the defendant’s soonest opportunity. Failure 

to timely broach the issue with the court may result 

in waiver of that defense. Most importantly for this case, where 

a defendant appears voluntarily, without questioning the 

court’s personal jurisdiction, that appearance is the equivalent 

of proper service of process. Matter of Adoption of MSVW, 965

P.2d 1158, 1162 (Wyo.1998); and see Ostermiller v.

Spurr, 968 P.2d 940, 943 (Wyo.1998) (consent to court’s 

jurisdiction for one purpose may result in court's jurisdiction 

for any related purpose).

Knight ex rel. Knight v. Estate of McCoy, 2015 WY 9, ¶ 27, 341 P.3d 412, 419 (Wyo. 2015) 

(quoting Operation Save Am., ¶ 54, 275 P.3d at 455-56 (quoting JAG v. State Dep’t of

Family Servs., 2002 WY 158, ¶ 13, 56 P.3d 1016, 1019 (Wyo. 2002))); see also, Walton v.

State ex rel. Wood, 2002 WY 108, ¶ 10, 50 P.3d 693, 697 (Wyo. 2002) (failure to 

question personal jurisdiction at earliest opportunity deemed a waiver). Ms. Woodie 

appeared voluntarily, without questioning the district court’s personal jurisdiction over her. 

That appearance was the equivalent of service of process and precludes her challenge to 

personal jurisdiction. In sum the district court had subject matter jurisdiction and personal 

jurisdiction over both Mr. and Mrs. Woodie.

2. Did the district court correctly apply the correct Idaho statute of 

limitations?

[¶21] The Woodies moved to dismiss Ms. Whitesell’s Wyoming lawsuit on the Note, 

claiming it was barred by Idaho’s statute of limitations for contract claims. The district 

court denied that motion, finding her suit was timely under Idaho’s statute of limitations 

for claims based on promissory notes/negotiable instruments. 

[¶22] The Woodies’ motion to dismiss based on the statute of limitations was, in effect, a 

motion for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted under W.R.C.P. 

12(b)(6) because it relied on the allegations in the complaint. Inman v. Boykin, 2014 WY 

94, ¶¶ 11-21, 330 P.2d 275, 279-81 (Wyo. 2014); Vance v. Wyomed Lab, Inc., 2016 WY 

61, 375 P.3d 746 (Wyo. 2016); Irene v. Seneca Ins. Co., Inc., 2014 WY 145, 337 P.3d 483 

(Wyo. 2014). “When reviewing W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, we accept the facts 

stated in the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” 

DeLoge, supra, at 120. “Whether an action is barred by the statute of limitations is a 
7

question of law that this Court reviews de novo.” Inman, ¶ 21, 330 P.3d at 281 (citing Hoke 

v. Motel 6 Jackson, 2006 WY 38, ¶ 6, 131 P.3d 369, 373 (Wyo.2006)). See also, Boutelle 

v. Boutelle, 2014 WY 147, ¶ 7, 337 P.3d 1148, 1151 (Wyo. 2014).

[¶23] The parties agree Idaho’s statutes of limitation apply because Ms. Whitesell’s cause 

of action on the Note arose in Idaho. Application of Idaho’s statutes of limitation is 

required by Wyoming’s “borrowing statute,” Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-117 (LexisNexis 

2019), which states: “If by the laws of the state or country where the cause of action arose 

the action is barred, it is also barred in this state.” When a Wyoming court considers 

another state’s statute of limitation under our borrowing statute, it must consider “any 

applicable tolling or other statutes as well as pertinent court cases. In effect, plaintiff’s 

cause must be viewed as if filed in the state where under the laws of that state 

a cause of action accrued.” Boutelle, ¶ 15, 337 P.3d at 1153.

[¶24] The relevant dates were stated in Ms. Whitesell’s complaint and are not in dispute. 

The promissory note required monthly installments beginning on July 1, 2011, and 

continuing on the same day of each consecutive month until June 1, 2015, when the entire 

balance was due. The Woodies made the monthly payments from July 1, 2011, through 

November 1, 2011, but made no payments thereafter. The Woodies defaulted and the cause 

of action accrued on December 1, 2011. Ms. Whitesell filed suit in Wyoming on July 21, 

2017, five years and seven months after the cause accrued.

[¶25] The Woodies argue Idaho’s basic statutes of limitation applicable to contracts 

control. Those statutes state: (1) “Civil actions can only be commenced within the periods 

prescribed in this chapter after the cause of action shall have accrued, except when, in 

special cases, a different limitation is prescribed by statute,” Idaho Code Ann. § 5-201 

(LexisNexis 2019); and (2) “Within five (5) years: An action upon any contract, obligation 

or liability founded upon an instrument in writing.” Idaho Code Ann. § 5-216 (LexisNexis 

2019). 

[¶26] The district court, however, found this case was one of those “special cases” when 

a “different limitation is prescribed by statute.” The different limitation is found in the 

Negotiable Instruments section of Idaho’s Uniform Commercial Code, which states “an 

action to enforce the obligation of a party to pay a note payable at a definite time must be 

commenced within six (6) years after the due date or dates stated in the note or, if a due 

date is accelerated, within six (6) years after the accelerated due date.” Idaho Code Ann. 

§ 28-3-118 (LexisNexis 2019). 

[¶27] Idaho Code Ann. § 28-3-102 (LexisNexis 2019) states section 3 of Idaho’s Uniform 

Commercial Code, including § 28-3-118, applies to negotiable instruments. The Woodies 

argue the Note is not a “negotiable instrument,” thus the six (6) year limitations period does 

not apply. The district court disagreed, and so do we.
8

[¶28] Idaho’s Uniform Commercial Code provides a specific definition for a 

negotiable instrument. It states: 

“[N]egotiable instrument” means an unconditional promise or 

order to pay a fixed amount of money, with or without interest 

or other charges described in the promise or order, if it:

(a) Is payable to bearer or to order at the time it is issued or 

first comes into possession of a holder;

(b) Is payable on demand or at a definite time; and

(c) Does not state any other undertaking or instruction by 

the person promising or ordering payment to do any act in 

addition to the payment of money, but the promise or order 

may contain (i) an undertaking or power to give, maintain, 

or protect collateral to secure payment, (ii) an authorization 

or power to the holder to confess judgment or realize on or 

dispose of collateral, or (iii) a waiver of the benefit of any 

law intended for the advantage or protection of an obligor.

Idaho Code Ann. § 28-3-104 (1) (LexisNexis 2019). 

[¶29] The Woodies argue the Note is not a “negotiable instrument” under the statute 

because it is not “an unconditional promise” to pay. Idaho law defines an unconditional 

promise as:

Except as provided in this section, for the purposes of section

28-3-104(1), a promise or order is unconditional unless it states 

(i) an express condition to payment, (ii) that the promise or 

order is subject to or governed by another writing, or (iii) that 

rights or obligations with respect to the promise or order are

stated in another writing. A reference to another writing does 

not of itself make the promise or order conditional.

Idaho Code Ann. § 28-3-106(1) (LexisNexis 2019). The Note explicitly states that the 

Woodies “promise to pay to the order of Janet Whitesell.” The Note does not fall into the 

exceptions stated in § 28-3-106(1)(i) or (ii). The Note does not state any condition for

payment. It contains no statement nor implication that the promise to pay is governed by 

any other instrument. The Woodies claim the Note is conditioned upon terms in the parties’ 

real estate contract and submit Ms. Whitesell did not properly vacate the property as 

anticipated by that contract. However, the Note never mentions the real estate contract and 

does not make payment conditional on when or whether Ms. Whitesell moved out. 
9

[¶30] With respect to § 28-3-106(1)(iii), the Note does not state rights or obligations with 

respect to the Woodies’ promise to pay are found in another document. The Note 

references the Deed of Trust which sets out “rights as to acceleration,” but § 28-3-106(2) 

specifically provides that reference to another document for acceleration rights does not 

make a note conditional. On its face, then, the Note meets Idaho’s statutory definition of 

a negotiable instrument and does not fall into any of the listed exceptions. 

[¶31] In a curious assertion, the Woodies claim the reference to the Deed of Trust in the 

Note made the obligation to pay conditional because Ms. Whitesell had the option to 

foreclose on the property. They provide no logical argument or authority for this position. 

We see nothing about the existence of real estate collateral which would make Ms. 

Whitesell’s obligation to pay the Note conditional. Furthermore, the Woodies ignore the 

fact that a prior lienholder had foreclosed, effectively extinguishing the Deed of Trust. 

[¶32] Finally, the Woodies argue the Warranty Deed, which they received in return for 

the Note, “disqualifies the promissory note from consideration as a negotiable instrument 

under Idaho Code sections 28-3-104(1) and 28-[3]-106(1).” This argument, consisting of 

a mere six sentences in their opening brief, is entirely devoid of logic or authority. The 

Woodies present no possible explanation for how the Warranty Deed could make the Note 

anything other than an unconditional promise to pay. Neither document referenced the 

other, nor did either express any conditions upon the Woodies’ obligation to pay. 

[¶33] The essence of the Woodies’ arguments is that their obligation to pay on the Note 

was conditioned upon Ms. Whitesell moving out of the property. The Note contains no 

such condition. The Woodies invite us to find such a condition in the real estate contract

and apply that condition to the Note. Ms. Whitesell responds the contract does not make 

the Woodies’ obligation to pay conditional upon Ms. Whitesell vacating by a certain date. 

Whether the contract included such a requirement, however, is unrelated to the issue of 

whether the Note is conditional. It simply is not.

3. Did the district court fail to properly apply the Idaho Trust Deeds Act?

[¶34] The Woodies assert the district court erred in ignoring required procedures under 

the Idaho Trust Deeds Act. Essentially, the Woodies claim the Act required Ms. Whitesell 

to foreclose on her second deed of trust before she could sue them on the Note. We decline 

to address this argument as the Woodies failed to raise this claim before the district court.

[¶35] The Woodies did not cite the Idaho Trust Deeds Act in any of their pleadings or 

motions. We find no indication the Woodies ever claimed the Idaho Trust Deeds Act 

required Ms. Whitesell to take any particular action or that they ever claimed the Act 

precluded her from suing on the Note. 
10

[¶36] Although the record reveals some terminology used in the Idaho Trust Deeds Act, 

the Woodies never connected that language to any statutory requirements. Moreover, 

while the Woodies generally claimed Ms. Whitesell had a duty to mitigate her losses, they

likewise failed to connect that general claim to any statute. Neither side cited the Idaho 

Trust Deeds Act to the district court, nor did they cite to any case requiring the Act’s 

application to this case. Because the Woodies failed to claim lack of compliance with the 

Idaho’s Trust Deeds Act, the district court did not address this issue in granting summary 

judgment. “This court has taken a dim view of a litigant trying a case on one theory and 

appealing it on another.... Parties are bound by the theories they advanced below.” Crofts 

v. State ex. rel. Dept. of Game and Fish, 2016 WY 4, ¶ 19, 367 P.3d 619, 624 (Wyo. 2016) 

(quoting Davis v. City of Cheyenne, 2004 WY 43, ¶ 26, 88 P.3d 481, 490 (Wyo. 2004)).

[¶37] Accordingly, we decline to address this issue for the first time on appeal.

4. Did the district court err in awarding interest, attorney’s fees and costs to 

Ms. Whitesell?

[¶38] The Woodies assert the district court’s Order on Attorney’s Fees, Costs and Interest 

must be reversed. Their argument is simply an assertion that if we hold in their favor with 

respect to their jurisdiction and statute of limitations arguments , the district court’s order 

on attorney’s fees, costs and interest must be reversed. They make no claim the order was 

unauthorized or that the amount of fees, costs and interest was unreasonable. The Note 

clearly authorized an award of attorney’s fees. Because we affirm the district court’s 

conclusions regarding jurisdiction and the statute of limitations, we also affirm the district 

court’s Order on Attorney’s Fees, Costs and Interest.

[¶39] Affirmed.