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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket 40554

STATE OF IDAHO,

 Plaintiff-Respondent-Cross Appellant,

v.

CHARLYNDA LYNN GOGGIN, 

 Defendant-Appellant-Cross Respondent.

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Boise, June 2014 Term

2014 Opinion No. 90

Filed: August 22, 2014

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of 

Idaho, Ada County. Hon. Richard D. Greenwood, District Judge.

The decisions of the district court are affirmed in part and reversed in part.

Silvey Law Office, Star, for appellant. Greg S. Silvey argued. 

Honorable Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. 

Kenneth K. Jorgensen argued. 

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J. JONES, Justice

This appeal arises from the conviction of Charlynda Goggin for conspiracy to 

manufacture, deliver or possess with intent to deliver a controlled substance; conspiracy to deliver 

or possess with intent to deliver drug paraphernalia; delivery of a controlled substance; and 

delivery of drug paraphernalia. After the jury returned a guilty verdict, Goggin filed a motion to 

acquit and a motion for a new trial. The district court denied the motion to acquit but granted the 

motion for a new trial on the conspiracy charges, holding that the jury should have been instructed 

that mistake of law is a defense to conspiracy. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

I.

BACKGROUND

In September 2011, in response to a tip regarding suspicious activity, the Boise Police 

Department began investigating a warehouse in Boise leased by a man named Morgan Alley. The 

police conducted surveillance of the warehouse, observing who came and went, and seized trash 

discarded outside the warehouse on multiple occasions. Upon obtaining a warrant, Detective 

Joseph Andreoli searched the warehouse and found synthetic cannabinoids and the materials 
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necessary to manufacture products containing synthetic cannabinoids.1 Andreoli testified that the 

warehouse contained “all of the items necessary” to manufacture synthetic marijuana, “including 

chemical; plant material; acetone, which is used as a solvent; and tobacco flavoring.” The 

warehouse also contained “the packaging materials, such as the small plastic containers, lids, and 

sticker labels” necessary to package a finished synthetic marijuana product. In fact, the warehouse 

was set up in an assembly line fashion and contained synthetic marijuana in various stages of 

completion. The warehouse also contained finished synthetic marijuana products in small plastic 

containers labeled with stickers reading “Twizted Potpourri.” 

During the course of the investigation, the police expanded their surveillance to include the 

Red Eye Hut (the Red Eye), a Boise store owned by the limited liability company for which 

Morgan Alley was the registered agent. Detective Andreoli stated that the Red Eye “appeared to be 

a head shop”2 due to the nature “of the items for sale inside.” The shop contained various types of 

pipes, concealment containers, grinders, digital scales, drug testing kits, and “body-cleansing 

solutions to defeat drug tests.” At one point, Detectives Kevin Holtry and Jason Harmon entered 

the Red Eye in an undercover capacity and purchased three containers of Twizted Potpourri and a 

metal pipe from Goggin. Testing showed that one of these containers contained plant material 

treated with JWH-019 and the other two containers contained plant material treated with AM2201. Both JWH-019 and AM-2201 are synthetic cannabinoids. Thereafter, the police executed 

search warrants on the warehouse and the Red Eye, seizing approximately 30,000 containers of 

Twizted Potpourri from the warehouse and over 9,000 containers of Potpourri and 340 pipes from 

the Red Eye. 

Goggin was arrested and ultimately admitted to selling Twizted Potpourri and a pipe to 

Harmon and to working at the warehouse. She was charged with conspiracy to manufacture, 

deliver or possess with intent to deliver a controlled substance in violation of Idaho Code sections

37-2732(a), 18-1701, and 37-2732(f); conspiracy to deliver or possess with intent to deliver drug 

paraphernalia in violation of Idaho Code sections 37-2734B and 18-1701; delivery of a controlled 

substance in violation of Idaho Code section 37-2732(a); and delivery of drug paraphernalia in 

violation of Idaho Code section 37-2734B. Her case was consolidated with co-defendants Morgan 

 1 Throughout the record, the terms “synthetic cannabinoid,” “synthetic marijuana,” “spice,” and “potpourri” are used 

interchangeably. Technically, synthetic cannabinoids are the actual chemicals that resemble the chemicals found in 

marijuana. Synthetic marijuana is the name of the product consisting of plant material treated with synthetic 

cannabinoid. Spice and potpourri are street names for synthetic marijuana. 

2 According to Andreoli, a head shop is a store that “caters to drug users . . . .” 
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Alley, Tashina Alley, Cadee Peterson, Matthew Taylor, Hieu Phan, and Tonya Williams. Prior to 

trial, Goggin joined in a motion to dismiss filed by Morgan Alley, in which he argued that AM2201 was not a Schedule I controlled substance. The district court denied this motion, holding that

even though AM-2201 was not specifically named in Schedule I, the Legislature intended for it to 

be included within Schedule I’s scope.3 Subsequently, Alley entered a conditional guilty plea, but 

preserved his right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss. State v. Alley, 155 

Idaho 972, 975, 318 P.3d 962, 965 (Ct. App. 2014). After hearing Alley’s appeal, the Court of 

Appeals reversed the district court’s decision, holding that whether AM-2201 falls under Schedule 

I “is a factual question that cannot be resolved in a pretrial motion to dismiss.” Id. at 980–81, 318 

P.3d at 970–71.

Four of the defendants—Goggin, Peterson, Taylor, and Tashina Alley—proceeded to jury 

trial. The jury convicted Goggin on all counts. Goggin then filed a motion pursuant to I.C.R. 29 for 

judgment of acquittal on all charges and a separate motion for new trial. The district court issued a 

memorandum decision denying the motion for acquittal and denying a new trial on the delivery 

counts, but granting a new trial on the two conspiracy counts because it did not instruct the jury 

that a mistake of law is a defense to conspiracy.

Goggin timely appeals the order denying her motion to acquit and denying her motion for a

new trial on the delivery charges. The State cross-appeals from the order granting a new trial on the 

conspiracy charges. 

II.

ISSUES ON APPEAL

I. Did the district court err when it denied Goggin’s motion to acquit for insufficient 

evidence?

II. Did the district court err when it denied Goggin’s motion for a new trial on the 

delivery charges? 

III. Did the district court err when it granted Goggin’s motion for a new trial on the 

conspiracy charges?

III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court reviews a trial court’s ruling on a motion for acquittal for substantial evidence. 

State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 460, 272 P.3d 417, 432 (2012). The Court reviews a trial court’s 

 3 Goggin has not appealed the district court’s decision to deny the motion to dismiss. 
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ruling on a motion for new trial for an abuse of discretion. State v. Cantu, 129 Idaho 673, 674, 

931 P.2d 1191, 1192 (1997). The Court exercises free review over questions of law. Rhoades v. 

State, 149 Idaho 130, 132, 233 P.3d 61, 63 (2010).

IV. 

ANALYSIS

On appeal, Goggin contends that the district court erred in denying her motion for acquittal.

She argues in the alternative that the district court erred in denying her motion for a new trial on 

the delivery counts. The State cross-appeals, arguing that the district court erred in granting a new 

trial on the conspiracy counts. These issues will be addressed in turn. 

A. Motion to Acquit

Goggin contends that the district court erred in denying her motion to acquit because there 

was insufficient evidence to support her convictions. Under I.C.R. 29, the district court may set 

aside a jury verdict and enter judgment of acquittal “if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a 

conviction.”

The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees 

the right to due process, and the U.S. Supreme Court has held that as a part of that 

due process, “no person shall be made to suffer the onus of a criminal conviction 

except upon sufficient proof—defined as evidence necessary to convince a trier of 

fact beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of every element of the offense.”

Adamcik, 152 Idaho at 460, 272 P.3d at 432 (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 316, 

(1979)). Nonetheless, “[a]ppellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence is limited in scope.”

State v. Herrera-Brito, 131 Idaho 383, 385, 957 P.2d 1099, 1101 (Ct. App. 1998). 

The relevant inquiry is not whether this Court would find the defendant to be guilty 

beyond a reasonable doubt, but whether ‘after viewing the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the 

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Adamcik, 152 Idaho at 460, 272 P.3d at 432 (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319) (emphasis in 

original).

Thus, “the only inquiry for this Court is whether there is substantial evidence upon which a 

reasonable jury could have found that the State met its burden of proving the essential elements” of 

the charged crimes “beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. “Evidence is substantial if a reasonable trier 

of fact would accept it and rely upon it in determining whether a disputed point of fact has been 

prove[n].” State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 712, 215 P.3d 414, 432 (2009). In conducting its

analysis, “the Court is required to consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the State,” 
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but will not substitute its “judgment for that of the jury on issues of witness credibility, weight of 

the evidence, or reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence.” Adamcik, 152 Idaho at 460, 

272 P.3d at 432.

Here, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, there is substantial 

evidence in the record to support Goggin’s convictions. The statute under which Goggin was 

convicted for delivery of a controlled substance provides that “[e]xcept as authorized . . . , it is 

unlawful for any person to . . . deliver . . . a controlled substance.” I.C. § 37-2732(a). The statute 

under which Goggin was convicted for delivery of drug paraphernalia provides that “[i]t is 

unlawful for any person to deliver . . . drug paraphernalia, knowing, or under circumstances 

where one reasonably should know, that it will be used to . . . ingest . . . a controlled substance.” 

I.C. § 37-2734B. 

Goggin’s conspiracy convictions were based on two statutes: Idaho Code section 18-1701 

and Idaho Code section 37-2732 (f). Idaho Code section 18-1701 provides:

If two (2) or more persons combine or conspire to commit any crime or offense 

prescribed by the laws of the state of Idaho, and one (1) or more of such persons 

does any act to effect the object of the combination or conspiracy, each shall be 

punishable upon conviction in the same manner and to the same extent as is 

provided under the laws of the state of Idaho for the punishment of the crime or 

offenses that each combined to commit.

Idaho Code section 37-2732(f) provides: “If two (2) or more persons conspire to commit any 

offense defined in this act, said persons shall be punishable by a fine or imprisonment, or both, 

which may not exceed the maximum punishment prescribed for the offense, the commission of 

which was the object of the conspiracy.” Thus, Goggin’s conspiracy convictions require that she 

combine or conspire with another person to deliver a controlled substance and to deliver 

paraphernalia.

A “controlled substance” is a drug or substance “in schedules I through V” of Idaho’s 

Uniform Controlled Substances Act. I.C. § 37-2701(e). Schedule I lists substances that the State 

Board of Pharmacy has determined have a “high potential for abuse” and have “no accepted 

medical use in treatment in the United States” or lack “accepted safety for use in treatment under 

medical supervision.” I.C. § 37-2704. At the time Goggin was arrested and charged, Schedule I 

listed:

Tetrahydrocannabinols or synthetic equivalents of the substances contained in the 

plant, or in the resinous extractives of Cannabis, sp. and/or synthetic substances, 
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derivatives, and their isomers with similar chemical structure such as the 

following:

* * *

ii. The following synthetic drugs: 

a. Any compound structurally derived from 3-(1-

naphthoyl)indole or 1H-indol-3-yl-(1-naphthyl)methane by 

substitution at the nitrogen atom of the indole ring by alkyl . . . 

I.C. § 37-2705(d)(30) (2011), amended by I.C. § 37-2705(d)(31) (2013). 

The district court instructed the jury that AM-2201, JWH-019, and JWH-210 were 

controlled substances. Goggin has not appealed that instruction. In an augmentation to her brief 

on appeal, however, Goggin argues that under State v. Alley, she could have “pursue[d] a mistake 

of fact defense if the jury found that AM-2201 did not have a similar chemical structure to one of 

the example substances listed” under Schedule I.4 Yet, Goggin has not asked this Court whether 

the district court properly determined that AM-2201 is a controlled substance. 

Goggin argues that she must be acquitted of all her convictions because she did not know 

the product she was selling contained a synthetic cannabinoid. That is, she did not know that the 

Twizted Potpourri contained synthetic cannabinoids. In the alternative, she maintains that even if 

she did know that the Twizted Potpourri contained synthetic cannabinoids, she did not know the 

synthetic cannabinoids in the Twizted Potpourri were Schedule I substances―she believed the 

synthetic cannabinoids were legal. For example, she argues that 

the State presented evidence from Morgan Alley that he told Charlynda that the 

materials she was handling were legal, going as far as to show her a lab report as 

scientific proof. So not only was there no evidence that she knew the plant 

material contained a controlled substance, the evidence was to the contrary. 

This issue centers on whether the State was required to prove Goggin knew that the synthetic 

cannabinoids in the Twizted Potpourri were illegal and whether the State presented sufficient 

evidence to prove Goggin knew that the Twizted Potpourri contained synthetic cannabinoids. 

In ruling on Goggin’s motion for acquittal on the delivery and paraphernalia charges, the 

 4 In Alley, the Court of Appeals concluded that it was a question of fact as to whether the substance in Twizted 

Potpourri, AM-2201, was an illegal synthetic cannabinoid since its specific chemical formulation was not listed in 

the non-exclusive list of example synthetic equivalents following the “such as” language in I.C. § 37-2705(d)(30). 

155 Idaho at 980−81, 318 P.3d at 970−71. However, the plain language used by the Legislature banned all forms of 

synthetic marijuana and the subsequent list of specific chemical formulations merely provided examples of the 

illegal substances. The fact that AM-2201 had a slight variation from the substances specifically listed as exemplars 

does not change the fact that the Legislature intended to ban all types and forms of synthetic marijuana, regardless of 

their chemical formulations. 
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district court noted:

The testimony did not specify there were no synthetic cannabinoids shown by the 

lab report, only that the material “did not contain anything illegal.” Whether or 

not the substance detected by the laboratory was illegal is, of course, a legal 

decision and one for this Court to decide.

The court observed that, while there was no evidence to show Goggin knew the material in the 

Twizted Potpourri “was a controlled substance other than a synthetic cannabinoid,” there was 

“substantial evidence from which a jury could conclude that Goggin knew the material was a 

synthetic cannabinoid.” 

The district court correctly determined that the State was not required to prove Goggin 

knew the synthetic cannabinoids in the Twizted Potpourri were illegal. The delivery of

paraphernalia statute requires that the defendant deliver paraphernalia knowing that it will be 

used to “ingest . . . a controlled substance.” I.C. § 37-2734B. Thus, if Goggin knew the pipe she 

sold with the Twizted Potpourri was intended to ingest synthetic cannabinoids, she had the 

mental state necessary for conviction for delivery of paraphernalia. Although the delivery of 

controlled substances statute—I.C. § 37-2732(a)—does not expressly require a mental element, 

Idaho Code section 18-114 provides that “[i]n every crime or public offense there must exist a 

union, or joint operation, of act and intent, or criminal negligence.” I.C. § 18-114. The Court has 

explained “that the intent required by I.C. § 18-114 is not the intent to commit a crime, but is 

merely the intent to knowingly perform” the prohibited act. State v. Fox, 124 Idaho 924, 926, 

866 P.2d 181, 183 (1993). Therefore, because Idaho Code section 37-2732(a) does not expressly 

require any mental element and Idaho Code section 18-114 only requires general intent, delivery 

under section 37-2732(a) only requires the knowledge that one is delivering the substance. See 

Fox, 124 Idaho at 926, 866 P.2d at 183 (concluding that because Idaho Code section 37-2732(c), 

which makes possession of a controlled substance illegal, “does not expressly require any mental 

element and I.C. § 18-114 only requires a general intent, we conclude that the offense only 

requires a general intent, that is, the knowledge that one is in possession of the substance”). 

This knowledge element requires that the defendant know the identity of the substance.

State v. Blake, 133 Idaho 237, 242, 985 P.2d 117, 122 (1999); State v. Armstrong, 142 Idaho 62, 

64, 122 P.3d 321, 323 (Ct. App. 2005) (“[T]he defendant’s ignorance of the presence of the 

substance, or mistaken belief that it was an innocuous material, if believed by the jury, would be 

exculpatory.”). “For example, one who truly believed that the powdery substance in a package 
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was a harmless item, such as sugar, could not be convicted of possession.” Armstrong, 142 Idaho 

at 65, 122 P.3d at 324 (citing Blake, 133 Idaho at 242, 985 P.2d at 122). This knowledge “may 

be proved by direct evidence or may be inferred from the circumstances.” Id.

Importantly, knowledge of a particular substance’s identity is not synonymous with 

knowledge of a particular substance’s illegality. Blake, 133 Idaho at 240, 985 P.2d at 120 (“[T]he 

individual need not know the substance possessed is a controlled substance.”). In Fox, the 

defendant was charged with possession of a controlled substance—ephedrine—under Idaho 

Code section 37-2732(c). 124 Idaho at 925, 866 P.2d at 182. Although in some states ephedrine 

was a legal over-the-counter drug, in Idaho it was listed as a Schedule II substance in the 

Uniform Controlled Substances Act. Id. Nonetheless, the defendant argued that he did not know 

ephedrine was illegal and, therefore, a good faith mistake of law excused his possession of the 

ephedrine. Id. at 926, 866 P.2d at 183. This argument failed because “[i]gnorance of the law is 

not a defense.” Id. The Court explained:

[t]his is simply a case where [the defendant] possessed a substance, knowing full 

well what the substance was, but claiming now that he did not know it was listed 

in the statutes as a controlled substance. There is nothing in that argument which 

would rise to the level of a viable defense.

Id. Indeed, the defendant did “not claim that he did not know that he possessed ephedrine[,]” just 

that he did not know ephedrine was illegal. Id. As a result, any evidence tending to establish his 

“lack of knowledge that ephedrine was illegal” was “irrelevant” because mistake of law is not a 

defense. Id. Thus, for a possession of a controlled substance conviction, a defendant must have 

knowledge of possession, not knowledge that the substance possessed is controlled under the 

law. By extension, then, for a delivery of a controlled substance conviction, a defendant must 

have knowledge of delivery, not knowledge that the substance to be delivered is controlled. 

As a result, Goggin’s arguments as to her ignorance of the illegality of the synthetic 

cannabinoids in the Twizted Potpourri are irrelevant. Regardless of whether Alley informed 

Goggin that the substances in the Twizted Potpourri were legal, and regardless of whether 

Goggin believed him, if Goggin knew the Twizted Potpourri contained synthetic cannabinoids, 

she had the mental state necessary for conviction for delivery. The record contains substantial 

evidence upon which a reasonable jury could have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the State 

met its burden of proving that Goggin knowingly delivered synthetic cannabinoids and knowingly

delivered a pipe for ingesting synthetic cannabinoids.
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Andreoli testified that when he entered Alley’s warehouse, it was set up for manufacturing 

synthetic marijuana and contained completed synthetic marijuana products packaged and ready for 

sale. These containers were labeled with stickers reading: “Not for human consumption,” “Must be 

18 plus to purchase,” and “Complies with federal and state laws.” Later, Andreoli observed similar 

containers of Twizted Potpourri for sale in the Red Eye, priced at $15 per gram. As a comparison, 

Andreoli testified that he had found “traditional potpourri” in “traditional stores such as Walmart 

and Target.” This traditional potpourri was packaged in boxes or plastic bags, sold in large 

quantities, and was “quite cheap.” In fact, Andreoli “purchased a large quantity of [traditional]

potpourri for $5.” This traditional potpourri is used for its aroma and is added to water. 

As to the Red Eye, Andreoli explained that he believed it to be a head shop. Andreoli 

explained that head shops are “typically disguised as a smoke shop or a tobacco shop, but they 

are, in fact, head shops that cater to drug users.” He stated that head shops attempt to disguise the 

true nature of their products “in their name themselves, and the signage and the verbiage that 

they use within the store. . . . [Y]ou won’t see a store called a head shop in its actual business 

name. It will be called a smoke shop or a tobacco shop.” Essentially, “the name itself and the 

signing on the outside of the store would make one who didn’t know better believe that the shop 

was for tobacco use or for tobacco users or just a normal smoke shop.” 

The significance of the name Alley’s store—“The Red Eye Smoke Shop”—and the logo 

associated with the store—a “bloodshot red eye” with attached wings—were discussed at trial. 

Andreoli testified that 

[r]ed eyes are quite often associated with persons under the influence of 

marijuana. The bloodshot red eyes are a – especially for law enforcement – a 

common sign of somebody being under the influence of a controlled substance, 

specifically marijuana.

It’s also well-known among the drug culture that marijuana causes red, bloodshot 

eyes. In the picture, you can see the red, bloodshot eye, which, again, is very 

much so associated with marijuana use.

The wings on the eye itself stand out to me in being that wings are meant to make 

someone fly or make something fly. And the high associated with marijuana is 

often referred to as flying or getting high, which obviously wings would enable a 

person to do.

So this is very symbolic of marijuana and drug culture to me.

Beyond the name of the store, Andreoli also discussed the Red Eye’s inventory. Along 

with items like chips, candy, and drinks, the Red Eye contained 
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numerous glass pipes. . . . [,] metal pipes and smaller pipes, which are considered 

one-hitters, just to smoke a small amount of marijuana or synthetic cannabinoids. 

There were also concealment containers inside. There was large water pipes, 

which . . . we call bongs. Smaller water pipes, which are considered bubblers.

There were grinders, digital scales, drug testing kits, pipe cleansing solution, 

along with body-system cleansing solutions to defeat drug tests. . . . [T]here were 

actual pipes that had the number 420 on them. 

There were – there was a blanket or a tapestry of – bearing the image of Bob 

Marley hanging from one of the walls inside the store. 

Furthermore, tobacco was only “1 to 2 percent” of the Red Eye’s entire inventory. Andreoli 

stated that the contents of the Red Eye brought him “to the conclusion that the Red Eye Hut was 

a head shop.” He explained that in a head shop, one would find expect to find 

pipes, the water pipes, the bongs, grinders, concealment containers, the pipe 

cleansing solution. Oftentimes you’ll find roach clips for sale, digital scales that 

are used to weigh an illegal substance. Again, you’ll see a lot of reference to the 

420. You’ll also see reference to an individual named Bob Marley, who is 

associated with the marijuana subculture.

Andreoli explained that Bob Marley “was a reggae singer, and actually a – quite a good one. But 

he was just as well known for his marijuana use . . . . The majority of the pictures that you will 

find of Bob Marley have him smoking from a marijuana cigarette.” Bob Marley “actually sang 

many songs about smoking marijuana. He was iconic in – and still is – in the marijuana 

subculture.” Andreoli also stated that inside a shop that “caters to drug users,” he finds

“numerous items” relating to drug testing, “including drug-testing kits, and solutions or 

shampoos used or designed to defeat a urinalysis drug test.”

Andreoli also testified that the items found in the Red Eye were consistent with 

paraphernalia found in many drug investigations. He explained he “typically” sees

glass pipes; water pipes, which are referred to as bubblers; large water pipes, 

which are also referred to as bongs. There are grinders, which are used to grind 

the marijuana bud down into a finer substance to be smoked through a marijuana 

joint. . . .

Concealment containers, which are made to look like household items such as a 

Pringles container – the long, tubular Pringles container—that has a false bottom 

on it to be able to hide things inside; specifically drugs.

Andreoli explained that in his “over ten years as a law enforcement officer,” he has “never seen a 

glass pipe or a glass water pipe or a glass bong be used to smoke tobacco.” Instead, Andreoli saw 

them used “[m]ainly to smoke marijuana and, more recently, to smoke marijuana as well as 
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synthetic cannabinoids.” 

Andreoli testified that in an actual smoke shop, one would expect to find 

[a] large humidor where good, fancy, or nice cigars are kept. Smoking devices, 

but much different than what you see in a head shop. Typically, the pipes located 

at an actual tobacco shop are dealing in corncob pipe or a wooden pipe. You 

never see a glass pipe at a true tobacco store. 

He also stated that in actual smoke shops, “there is much more tobacco than there is actual 

smoking devices.” 

On September 26th, Detectives Kevin Holtry and Jason Harmon entered the Red Eye in 

an undercover capacity and were assisted by Goggin. She talked with the detectives about the 

Red Eye’s products and would pull out any product in which they were interested. Harmon 

eventually paid Goggin for three containers of Twizted Potpourri and a metal pipe. Goggin told 

the detectives that the pipe Harmon purchased “was popular among her friends and that they 

were going to be mad at her or something for selling it.” Later, in an interview with Andreoli, 

Goggin first stated 

that she didn’t necessarily . . . work at the Red Eye Hut, but she volunteered her 

time to help Morgan out. She advised that the Red Eye Hut opened on – I believe 

it was September 22. And she stated that she worked at the store on that day and 

worked – has worked every day since the store opened on the 22nd.

She explained her duties as opening the store each morning. And she remained in 

full control of the store until she was later relieved in the day by the store owner, 

Morgan Alley.

“Initially,” when Andreoli “asked her what types of items she sold, she identified that 

she sold cigarettes, she sold snacks, she sold soda.” Andreoli explained that Goggin “basically 

listed all the items in the store that are legal and admitted to selling those.” After Andreoli 

“confronted” Goggin “with the fact that she had sold synthetic cannabinoids in the form of 

Twizted Potpourri as well as drug paraphernalia to an undercover detective,” she “admitted that 

she has sold the Twizted Potpourri and she has also sold the paraphernalia inside the store.” 

Goggin went on to explain that she has sold “the Twizted Potpourri and the paraphernalia” at 

other times, although Andreoli clarified that Goggin probably described the items he referred to 

as “paraphernalia,” “pipes,” or “the glassware.”

Goggin also initially “denied knowledge as to where the Potpourri came from.” After 

Andreoli “confronted” her “with the fact that she had been seen during surveillance at the 

warehouse” she “became truthful” and admitted involvement with the warehouse. She told 
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Andreoli “that her main job at the warehouse was to affix the stickers on the lids of the 

containers . . . . , but there were also occasions where she weighed and filled the containers or 

fastened the lids on the containers as well.” 

When Andreoli asked Goggin “if she personally has used” Twizted Potpourri, “she 

smiled . . . and said, ‘It’s not for human consumption.’” Andreoli explained: “I asked Ms. 

Goggin to be truthful with me and asked her what the intended use of the Twizted Potpourri was, 

and she said, quote, ‘I’m not going to say it,’ end quote. She then went on to say further that she 

would just agree that she and I both knew what it was intended for.”

Thus, there is sufficient evidence in the record to support a finding that Goggin knew the 

Twizted Potpourri contained synthetic cannabinoids and knew the pipe would be used to ingest 

that substance. The warehouse in which Goggin admitted she worked housed an operation that 

applied synthetic cannabinoids to plant material to manufacture Twizted Potpourri. Goggin 

admitted that she herself assisted in packaging the Twizted Potpourri and the store in which 

Goggin worked, the Red Eye, served as a retail outlet for the Potpourri. Although Goggin contends 

that she knew neither that the Twizted Potpourri contained synthetic cannabinoids nor that the 

Twizted Potpourri was intended to be smoked, it was reasonable for the jury to have found 

otherwise. The State presented considerable evidence that the Red Eye catered to drug users and 

sold items intended to be used in conjunction with marijuana and synthetic marijuana. When 

Goggin herself sold the Potpourri to the undercover detectives, she sold it with a pipe, a device 

commonly used to smoke marijuana. She told the detectives that her own friends were interested in 

the pipe she sold to them. Furthermore, the evidence suggested that the Twizted Potpourri was not, 

in fact, consistent with traditional potpourri, but contained synthetic marijuana. Finally, Goggin’s 

references to the legality of the Twizted Potpourri and her lies about her relationship with the 

warehouse and the Red Eye suggest that she knew the Potpourri contained synthetic cannabinoids. 

Goggin presented evidence and made arguments attempting to show that she was 

ignorant of the synthetic cannabinoids in the Twizted Potpourri and the district court gave the 

jury an instruction as to mistake of fact. The jury did not accept this argument, and there is

substantial evidence in the record to support its decision. Therefore, we affirm the district court’s 

decision to deny her motion to acquit.

B. Motion for New Trial

Goggin contends that the district court erred when it refused to grant her motion for a new 
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trial on the delivery charges. The State argues that the district court erred when it granted Goggin’s 

motion for a new trial on the conspiracy charges. A court may grant a new trial if it has 

“misdirected the jury on a matter of law . . . .” I.C. § 19–2406(5). Under I.C.R. 34, “[t]he court . .

. may grant a new trial to the defendant if required in the interest of justice.” “A trial court has 

wide discretion to grant or refuse to grant a new trial, and, on appeal, this Court will not disturb 

that exercise of discretion, absent a showing of manifest abuse.” State v. Cantu, 129 Idaho 673, 

674, 931 P.2d 1191, 1192 (1997). When determining whether the district court abused its 

discretion, this Court conducts a three-tiered inquiry:

(1) whether the lower court rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) 

whether the court acted within the outer boundaries of such discretion and 

consistently with any legal standards applicable to specific choices; and (3) 

whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of reason.

Id. Here, the issue centers on whether the district court acted consistently with the legal standards 

applicable to jury instructions. 

Where “the new trial motion turned upon the propriety of a jury instruction, . . . this 

Court exercises free review.” State v. Armstrong, 142 Idaho at 62, 64, 122 P.3d 321, 323 (Ct. 

App. 2005). “If the instructions taken as a whole, and not individually, fairly and adequately 

present the issues, state the applicable law, and do not mislead the jury or prejudice a party, then 

there is no reversible error.” Id. 

1. Order Denying New Trial on the Delivery Charges

As to the delivery convictions, Goggin argues that “reversal and new trial . . . is required 

because the jury instructions were misleading.” She argues that “the mistake of law instruction 

removed . . . the knowledge element from the crimes of delivery.” At trial, the district court 

instructed the jury that “[w]hen the evidence shows that a person voluntarily did that which the 

law declares to be a crime, it is no defense that the person did not know that the act was unlawful 

or that the person believed it to be lawful.” As previously discussed, under Idaho Code section

37-2732(a), the State was required to prove that Goggin knew the Twizted Potpourri contained 

synthetic cannabinoids. Under Idaho Code section 37-2734B, the State was required to prove 

that Goggin knew the pipe would be used to ingest a controlled substance. And, of course, 

mistake of law is not a defense to knowledge of a substance’s identity. State v. Fox, 124 Idaho 

924, 926, 866 P.2d 181, 183 (1993). Thus, whether Goggin knew that synthetic cannabinoids 

were illegal is irrelevant. Therefore, the mistake of law instruction did not remove the knowledge 
14

element from the delivery counts.

Furthermore, a review of all the instructions reveals that the jury was not misled and was 

required to find that Goggin had knowledge that the Twizted Potpourri contained synthetic 

cannabinoids and that the pipe would be used to ingest the same. Under Instruction 36, the jury 

could not reach a guilty verdict for delivery of a controlled substance unless it found that Goggin

“either knew” she had delivered “a Schedule I synthetic cannabinoid or believed it was a 

controlled substance.” Similarly, under Instruction 40, the jury could not reach a guilty verdict 

for delivery of paraphernalia unless it found that Goggin delivered the metal pipe “knowing, or 

under circumstances where the defendant reasonably should know, that it would be used to 

ingest a controlled substance.”

As a result of these instructions, the jury could convict Goggin of delivery of a controlled 

substance only if it found that she either knew or believed that the Twizted Potpourri contained a 

synthetic cannabinoid. Similarly, the jury could convict Goggin of delivery of paraphernalia only 

if it found that she either knew or believed that the pipe she sold was to be used to ingest a 

controlled substance. Thus, we affirm the district court’s decision to deny Goggin’s motion for a 

new trial as to the delivery charges because the instructions did not mislead the jury into 

believing it had to convict Goggin even if she was unaware that the Twizted Potpourri contained 

synthetic cannabinoids or that the pipe was to be used to ingest a controlled substance. 

2. Order Granting a New Trial on the Conspiracy Charges

As to the conspiracy charges, the State argues that the district court erred when it granted 

Goggin’s motion for a new trial. The district court granted this motion because, in its view, 

“[t]he jury should have been instructed that a good faith belief that the object crime was not 

illegal is a defense to conspiracy.” At trial, the district court instructed the jury that for Goggin to 

be guilty of conspiracy to manufacture, deliver or possess with intent to deliver a controlled 

substance, she must have agreed “to commit the crimes of manufacturing, and/or delivering, 

and/or possessing with the intent to deliver, a controlled substance, to-wit: Schedule I synthetic 

cannabinoids;” and she must have “intended that at least one of the crimes would be 

committed . . . .” Similarly, the district court instructed the jury that for Goggin to be guilty of 

conspiracy to deliver or possess with the intent to deliver drug paraphernalia, she must have 

agreed “to commit the crimes of delivery of drug paraphernalia and or/possession with the intent 

to deliver drug paraphernalia, to wit: glass and metal pipes; bongs; scales; and/or a variety of 
15

containers;” and she must have “intended that at least one of the crimes would be 

committed . . . .” The State contends that the district court’s instructions to the jury were correct 

because “nowhere in the conspiracy statutes or in the case law interpreting them is there any 

requirement that the state also prove the defendant intended to violate the law or knew of the 

illegality of the agreed-upon act.” Goggin contends that the conspiracy statutes “do not merely 

provide that a defendant agree to commit an act which happens to be illegal, rather, the statutes 

require that the defendant enter into an agreement to commit an act which he or she knows is 

illegal.”5 

In support of her position, Goggin rests heavily on the notion that, historically, 

conspiracy was a specific intent crime. It appears this Court has not directly addressed whether 

Idaho’s codified conspiracy statutes require specific intent, although the Court of Appeals has 

assumed they do. State v. Rolon, 146 Idaho 684, 691, 201 P.3d 657, 664 (Ct. App. 2008) (“While 

an Idaho court has not explicitly held as much, it is generally accepted that conspiracy is a 

specific intent crime that requires the intent to agree or conspire and the intent to commit the 

offense which is the object of the conspiracy. See 15A C.J.S. Conspiracy § 112 (June 2008).”).

Regardless, the common law status of conspiracy is not particularly relevant to the issues 

presented here. Instead, to determine the mental state required for conviction, this Court looks to 

the text of the relevant statutes. 

This Court has previously ruled that whether a criminal intent is a necessary 

element of a statutory offense is a matter of construction, to be determined from 

the language of the statute in view of its manifest purpose and design, and where 

such intent is not made an ingredient of the offense, the intention with which the 

act is done, or the lack of any criminal intent in the premises, is immaterial.

Fox, 124 Idaho at 925–26, 866 P.2d at 182–83 (quotations omitted).

The statutes under which Goggin was convicted of conspiracy—Idaho Code section 18-

1701 and Idaho Code section 37-2732(f)—do not provide for a specific mental state. Idaho Code 

section 18-1701 provides:

If two (2) or more persons combine or conspire to commit any crime or offense 

prescribed by the laws of the state of Idaho, and one (1) or more of such persons 

does any act to effect the object of the combination or conspiracy, each shall be 

punishable upon conviction in the same manner and to the same extent as is 

 5 Goggin attempts to argue that the State waived this issue because it failed to argue to the district court that mistake 

of law is not a defense to conspiracy. This is simply incorrect—the State did attempt to persuade the district court 

that it was not required to prove intent to violate the law. 
16

provided under the laws of the state of Idaho for the punishment of the crime or 

offenses that each combined to commit.

Idaho Code section 37-2732(f) provides: “If two (2) or more persons conspire to commit any 

offense defined in this act, said persons shall be punishable by a fine or imprisonment, or both, 

which may not exceed the maximum punishment prescribed for the offense, the commission of 

which was the object of the conspiracy.” We have stated: “It is axiomatic that a conspiracy is 

established upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt that there is an agreement between two or 

more individuals to accomplish an illegal objective, coupled with one or more overt acts in the 

furtherance of the illegal purpose accompanied by the requisite intent to commit the underlying 

substantive offense.” State v. Garcia, 102 Idaho 378, 384, 630 P.2d 665, 671 (1981).

Goggin does not dispute that she entered into an agreement with Morgan Alley to deliver 

the Twizted Potpourri or the pipe. Instead, she argues that because she did not know that the 

Potpourri contained an illegal substance, she could not have conspired to deliver the Potpourri or 

paraphernalia. Yet, this goes beyond what is required by the language of the statutes. The statutes 

require that two or more people agree to commit an illegal act. A person commits an illegal act 

by engaging in the activities prohibited by statute. Therefore, a person will have committed

conspiracy when she agrees with another person to engage in activities prohibited by statute. 

For example, a person is guilty of conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance under

Idaho Code section 37-2732(f) when she and another person agree to deliver a controlled 

substance. The statute does not require the State to prove that the defendant knew it was illegal to 

deliver a controlled substance. Under this analysis, then, to be convicted of conspiracy, a 

defendant must have simply intended to engage in the acts necessary to commit the underlying 

substantive offense. Thus, whether the defendant knows the acts are illegal is irrelevant. This is 

consistent with the general rule that, in Idaho, 

[i]gnorance of the law is not a defense. See e.g., Hale v. Morgan, 22 Cal.3d 388, 

149 Cal.Rptr. 375, 380, 584 P.2d 512, 517 (1978) (“[I]n the absence of specific 

language to the contrary, ignorance of a law is not a defense to a charge of its 

violation.”); State v. Einhorn, 213 Kan. 271, 515 P.2d 1036, 1039 (1973) (“The 

general rule is that ignorance of the law does not disprove criminal intent.”) 

Fox, 124 Idaho at 926, 866 P.2d at 183.

Other courts have interpreted similar conspiracy statutes to mean that the defendant must, 

with the mental state required by the underlying offense, only agree to engage in the conduct

prohibited by the underlying offense, not that the defendant must know the acts are illegal. In 
17

U.S. v. Feola, the defendant was convicted of conspiracy under 18 U.S.C § 371, which defines 

conspiracy as occurring when “two or more persons conspire . . . to commit any offense against 

the United States, . . . and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the 

conspiracy.” 420 U.S. 671 (1975). In considering this issue, the Supreme Court found “no textual 

support for the proposition that to be guilty of a conspiracy a defendant in effect must have 

known that his conduct violated federal law.” Id. at 687. Indeed, the conspiracy statute 

makes it unlawful simply to “conspire . . . to commit any offense against the 

United States.” A natural reading of these words would be that since one can 

violate a criminal statute simply by engaging in the forbidden conduct, a 

conspiracy to commit that offense is nothing more than an agreement to engage in 

the prohibited acts. 

Id. The Court also noted that in the past, it had “declined to require a greater degree of intent for 

conspiratorial responsibility than for responsibility for the underlying substantive offense.” Id. at 

688 (citing United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601 (1971)). Similarly, in U.S. v. Haldeman, a case 

the district court relied on when it decided to grant a new trial, the Circuit Court of Appeals for 

the District of Columbia stated: “a defendant does not have to be aware that he was violating a 

particular law, such as 18 U.S.C. § 371, so long as he had the conscious intent to do that which 

the law in fact forbids.” United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 117 (D.C. Cir. 1976).

In this case, because neither Idaho Code section 18-1701 nor Idaho Code section 37-

2732(f) contain specific language providing for a mistake of law defense, Goggin’s argument 

fails. We reverse the district court’s decision to grant her a new trial on the conspiracy charges. 

V.

CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, we affirm the district court’s decision to deny Goggin’s motion to 

acquit and to deny Goggin’s motion for a new trial on the delivery charges. We reverse the district 

court’s decision to grant Goggin a new trial on the conspiracy charges. 

Chief Justice BURDICK, and Justices EISMANN, W. JONES, and HORTON CONCUR.