21522 Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 92 / Friday, May 10, 1996 / Notices

around the bulk storage tank for

facilities not protected by SPCC plans.

Present regulations require that

transfer pipelines be hydrostatically

tested at 1.5 times the maximum

allowable working pressure (MAWP) on

an annual basis. In August of 1994, the

Coast Guard also established guidelines

for conducting pneumatic pressure

testing as an alternative method. In

addition, the Coast Guard has become

aware of other, non-destructive testing

methods, including acoustic and

ultrasonic methods through several

alternative requests submitted by

industry and discussions with the Office

of Pipeline Safety.

The Coast Guard is evaluating these

other testing options to assess their

suitability as alternative pipeline testing

methods for facility operators while

maintaining an equivalent level of

safety. To accomplish this, Coast Guard

is seeking comments on the following

issues pertaining to the use of

alternative methods for ensuring

pipeline safety: (1) Whether using

methods other than pressure testing

would provide the same or greater level

of confidence for ensuring that a

pipeline meets safety standards; (2)

Whether companies would apply to use

other programs, to include using

methods such as ultrasonic and acoustic

testing, as alternatives to pressure

testing; and, (3) Whether use of

alternative testing methods would be

physically practical and less costly than

current requirements. In addition to

these, the Coast Guard encourages the

submission of comments regarding any

other aspects of its pipeline inspection

policy.

Dated: May 6, 1996.

J.C. Card,

Rear Admiral, U.S. Coast Guard, Chief,

Marine Safety And Environmental Protection.

[FR Doc. 96–11775 Filed 5–9–96; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–14–M

Federal Aviation Administration

[Docket No. 28567]

A Call for the Development of

Prototype(s) for a Global Analysis and

Information Network (GAIN)

AGENCY: Federal Aviation

Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Notice; request for comments.

SUMMARY: David Hinson, Administrator

of the Federal Aviation Administration

(FAA), stresses that Zero Accidents is

the only acceptable safety goal for the

aviation industry and the FAA. This

notice offers some ideas for the elements

needed to establish an early warning

capability for existing and emerging

safety concerns that would move the

aviation industry towards Zero

Accidents, and challenges the aviation

industry to participate in developing

that capability. Because of an emerging

combination of improved cooperation

between airline management, labor, and

various governments, advancements in

information technologies, and the

political environment in several

countries, the international aviation

industry has an unprecedented

opportunity, by sharing and analyzing

aviation safety information, to reach

Zero Accidents.

This notice (a) solicits comments on

the Global Analysis and Information

Network (GAIN) concept and

implementation strategy for collecting

and analyzing aviation safety data, and

(b) invites participation in the

development of proof-of-concept

prototypes. All interested parties,

whether or not in the aviation

community, are invited to comment on

the ideas presented, offer alternative

solutions, indicate interest in helping to

develop a GAIN prototype or the overall

system itself, and comment about how

government aviation safety agencies can

best help the industry reach Zero

Accidents.

DATES: Comments in response to this

call for action must be received by June

14, 1996.

ADDRESSES: It is requested that all

comments be submitted via the Internet

by sending an e-mail message with your

comments (plain text preferred, no

graphics please) to: concept lpaper@

asyweb01.nasdac.faa.gov.

Please include your name and

organization. Comments must also be

mailed in hard-copy (two copies) via

regular mail to: Federal Aviation

Administration, 800 Independence

Ave., SW., Office of Chief Counsel,

Attention: Rules Docket (AGC–200),

Docket No. 28567, Washington, DC

20591.

All comments must be marked:

‘‘Docket No. 28567.’’ Commenters

wishing the FAA to acknowledge

receipt of their comments must include

a pre-addressed, stamped postcard on

which the following statement is made:

‘‘Comments to Docket No. 28567.’’ The

postcard will be date stamped and

mailed to the commenter.

Comments submitted about this

Notice may be examined at the FAA at

the above address in room 915G on

weekdays, except on Federal holidays,

between 8:30 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. In

addition, commenters will be able to

review all other comments by Internet.

Your submission should not contain any

proprietary or other information that

you do not want to be made available

to the public.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr.

Chuck Fluet, Manager, Safety Analysis

Division, Office of Aviation Safety,

ASY–200, Federal Aviation

Administration, 400 7th Street, SW.,

Washington, DC 20590, telephone 202–

267–GAIN (202–267–4246).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The

aviation industry has made remarkable

progress in reducing aviation accident

rates. With today’s volume of flights, the

industry would have suffered more than

10,000 fatalities last year worldwide if

the accident rate had not improved so

dramatically since 1960. Because of this

major decline in the accident rate, the

industry now suffers an average of less

than 800 fatalities worldwide per year.

However, the rate has remained

stubbornly consistent for about the last

10 years; and at today’s accident rate,

forecast growth in air transportation

demand will lead to more than 4,500

fatalities worldwide per year by 2025—

clearly an unacceptable result.

Sound methods for certifying the

safety of new aviation products and

procedures, as well as surveillance

activities that help to ensure safe

operation and maintenance of these

products and procedures, have

contributed significantly to the current

safety levels of the aviation industry.

Within the framework of these

regulatory methods, technological

advances in engine performance and

reliability, airframes and materials, air

traffic control, cockpit automation, and

simulator training have contributed to

the safety of the aviation system.

Compliance inspections, accident and

incident investigations, special studies,

and program evaluations are the

fundamental methods of continuing

surveillance in the operating

environment, and safety has improved

significantly over the years in part

because of the lessons learned by using

these methods to understand the

mistakes and oversights of the past.

Yet all too often, the industry has not

been able to use data about accidents,

incidents and other system anomalies to

become aware of existing or emerging

safety problems in time to take

preventive measures. Just as traditional

product design and manufacturing

methods eventually gave way to new,

improved principles and methods, a

new safety information paradigm, with

much greater sensitivity to anomalies in

daily aviation system operations, could

help the industry reach Zero Accidents.

Just as aviation product improvements
Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 92 / Friday, May 10, 1996 / Notices 21523

of the past have been fostered by

technological advances, improvements

in aviation safety monitoring and

alerting will become possible as a result

of major advances in information

management technology.

An Outline of a New Safety Monitoring

Paradigm

The industry must develop a

significantly improved operational early

warning capability that is sensitive

enough to detect and alert the aviation

community to existing and emerging

problems. A major aspect of this

capability is the sharing of safety

information, both within categories in

the industry, e.g., carriers must share

with other carriers and manufacturers

with other manufacturers; and across

categories, e.g., labor, management,

carriers, manufacturers, air traffic

controllers, airport operators, and others

must share with each other. Creating

useful information, however, generally

requires the collection of large amounts

of data, and it also involves the careful

analysis of that data. Rarely would there

be any need or desire to share any raw

data, but the sharing of the analysis of

the data—the information—could be

mutually beneficial. Gathering and

analyzing large amounts of qualitative

and quantitative aviation safety data to

better understand routine system

operations is the foundation of the

Global Analysis and Information

Network (GAIN) concept.

The GAIN system would be more

sensitive to conditions that signal

increased safety risks because it would

contain information about normal

aviation system operations. The

statistical baseline for normal aviation

operations, constructed with digital

flight and ATC radar data, among other

major and currently untapped sources,

would be the plumb line from which

deviations are measured. The

importance of obtaining information

about a far greater percentage of aircraft

operations has been illustrated

repeatedly by all-too-typical accident

investigation findings of earlier flights

that experienced problems similar to the

accident aircraft. A truly effective early

warning capability would involve

significant improvements in information

feedback and analysis for aviation

operations. At a minimum, the GAIN

concept would add the following new

elements to the existing monitoring

systems to improve sensitivity:

—New data sources that would improve

risk assessment and provide a

baseline for normal flight operations,

thus improving the chances of early

anomaly detection.

—New and innovative data management

and analytical techniques and

methodologies that quickly reveal

obscure and/or infrequent data

patterns and associations.

—New methods to disseminate the

findings quickly and globally to all

who could use them to improve

aviation safety.

Analytical Strategies and Automated

Tools

The proposed analysis process would

be based upon new sources of

information and new information

technology capabilities. First,

information from voluntary reporting

programs (such as the confidential

Aviation Safety Reporting System

(ASRS), or the Air Safety Reports (ASR)

used by certain airlines) and mandatory

incident reporting systems (such as the

Pilot Deviation or Runway Incursion

data bases) would be subjected to a

range of analysis tools. These include

advanced data pattern searches—which

can be performed autonomously on the

data by ‘‘intelligent agent’’ automation

tools to discover patterns or

associations, finding the ‘‘needle in the

haystack.’’ ‘‘Intelligent agent’’ software

would aid analysts in discovering

thematic associations in text data bases,

and data visualization tools would show

the analyst associations in data base

elements. Application of such data

mining analysis tools would provide a

more focused understanding of

operational safety concerns much

sooner than current analysis techniques.

The data management and analysis take

place in a ‘‘data warehouse’’ where

operational data are extracted from

existing systems and, through a series of

steps that standardize and improve the

quality of the data, the data are

transformed into a data base designed

for targeted analysis. Within a ‘‘data

warehouse’’ environment, safety

analysts can employ various data

mining strategies.

Once existing or emerging safety

concerns are identified, hypotheses that

are developed to explain them can be

tested using empirical digital flight data,

ATC radar data, or other appropriate

data sources. A focus on remedial

measures would at times result from an

analysis of digital flight data or ATC

automated data, both vast sources of

empirical data.

As a result of new information

technologies, we have the capability, for

the first time, to monitor and analyze

the parameters of safe and normal flight.

Until very recently, it has been very

difficult to obtain accurate and reliable

information on normal flight operations.

Now, thanks to new computer

technologies, we can use flight data

recorder and radar information to

generate large amounts of very accurate

and detailed information about flight

performance. For example, the Boeing

777 records information on 700 flight

parameters 8 times a second. Several

countries, mostly in Europe, have

programs in which a carrier or civil

aviation agency routinely monitors and

analyzes operational data captured on

flight data recorders.

Statistical analysis of digital data or

ATC automated data from normal flights

would yield a baseline of routine

operations that can be used to detect

variations from norms. In addition,

baseline statistics would help safety

analysts quantify operating risks within,

as well as beyond, the envelope of

normal operations. By collecting and

analyzing information primarily about

what went wrong, we are missing the

opportunity to learn what was done

right to avoid an accident or incident in

earlier situations. The likelihood of

detecting problems and developing

remedies is significantly greater from

studying large numbers of normal daily

operations than from relying primarily

upon a far smaller number of periodic

inspections or accident and incident

investigations.

Analysis of digital flight data can

provide several types of information,

including aircraft path analysis,

derivation of environmental conditions,

aircraft configuration time histories,

aerodynamic coefficients (analysis of

coefficients can reveal degradation in

aerodynamic performance), engine

performance, aircraft attitude,

automated flight control modes and

status, warning parameters, takeoff and

landing distances, and flight loads.

Digital flight data can be used to detect

single anomalies—alerting operators

when criteria values for selected

parameters have been exceeded or when

particular events occur. Such data also

can be used to develop descriptive

statistics across fleets, to detect

deviations from statistical norms in the

aviation system, or to measure the

effects of design, procedure, or

equipment changes.

ATC automated data could be used to

analyze airplane motion and relative

position, important factors in analyzing

issues such as wake vortex and

environmental effects. An analysis of air

traffic control automated data for

normal operations could provide insight

into methods for improving ATC system

operations or potential problem areas.

Flight data anomalies from accidents

could be compared to similar anomalies

of flights that did not crash to learn

what was done differently to avoid an
21524 Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 92 / Friday, May 10, 1996 / Notices

accident. These findings might suggest

guidelines on pilot training or aircraft

design. The same autonomous

‘‘intelligent agent’’ analysis techniques

used to find patterns in data from

incident reporting also can be applied to

digital flight data and ATC radar data—

or information derived from this data

such as paths, flight loads, or

aerodynamic coefficients—to determine

if any otherwise unobserved

associations exist within the data.

Human Factors Analysis

This analytical process and the new

sources of data under consideration

could significantly improve our ability

to describe what is happening in the

aviation system, and a comparable

human factors analysis capability must

also be developed. Without a reliable

human factors analysis tool that

addresses the underlying causes or

factors associated with emerging safety

concerns, remedial measures may only

be temporary ‘‘band aids.’’ An effective

human performance analysis capability

developed for use on digital flight data

or ATC automated data—augmented by

feedback from voluntary disclosure

systems—is an essential part of an early

warning system.

A Proposed Architecture for Sharing

As noted above, for a number of

reasons, not the least of which is the

very large quantity of data, there will

probably be little or no sharing of raw

data, but only of information from the

analysis of data. Moreover, because of

improved networking technologies and

capabilities, information would not

necessarily all be sent to a massive

computer at one location, but would

probably be available to different users

to different extents by networking—

sometimes known as a ‘‘virtual

database.’’ For example, this networking

capability makes it possible for each

carrier, manufacturer, or union to have

separate GAIN-type systems, or they

could do it collectively with one or

more others or through trade

associations, or any combination of

them, and the information sharing could

occur over the network to the extent

desired or permitted by the owner of

each system.

The information that results from

GAIN analyses would ideally be

available immediately to all recipients

who could use it to improve aviation

safety. The dissemination of vital

information can be accomplished with

existing infrastructure—using the

Internet, for example, if adequate

safeguards can be provided to protect

the security and confidentiality

concerns of the information providers

regarding identified or identifiable data.

The GAIN network would have to

accommodate different requirements in

a user-friendly way, and be able to

notify automatically all appropriate

recipients about potential problems

without requiring them to know to

query the system.

Examples of Proactive Use of Aviation

Safety Data

There are several examples in various

countries that demonstrate how

effectively proactive safety measures

can be implemented as a result of

industry/labor/government partnership

sharing of such information. When one

air carrier’s data indicated that pilots

were frequently disregarding their

Ground Proximity Warning System

(GPWS), the carrier discovered that the

frequent disregard was due to a high

false alarm rate, and further analysis of

the data provided the basis for

developing a software remedy. As a

result, that GPWS system was improved

(to the benefit of all carriers that used

it), the false alarm rate dropped, and

pilots ignored the warning much less.

Similarly, a carrier that was

experiencing frequent altitude capture

excursions and deviations in one of its

aircraft types found from the data that

the problem was a combination of

inadequate pilot training and poor

altitude capture logic. Analysis of the

data provided the basis for improving

both the training and the logic. Again,

the logic fix benefited all users of that

autopilot around the world, not just the

carrier that discovered the problem.

Other examples include

improvements to training programs and/

or operations manuals as a result of high

pitch angle takeoffs, more rapid that

desirable takeoff rotation rates,

inadvertent flap/slat retraction out of

the proper speed range, and

unstabilized approaches; design fixes

for equipment that did not perform as

designed or anticipated (e.g., an aircraft

that was developing cracks from hard

landings at less than the 2 g cutoff

beyond which inspection was

mandated); and improvements in airport

signs and markings to help pilots more

accurately follow their taxi clearances.

Also important, of course, is that

without the data, it is very difficult for

carriers, manufacturers, or governments

to evaluate whether new programs and

other fixes are having the desired result.

Concept Implementation Issues

Collection and Analysis of Aviation

Safety Data

In developing an analytical process

for an early warning capability that

would monitor the system and alert the

aviation community to existing and

emerging safety concerns, please

consider what data requirements,

analysis methods, and information

dissemination methods you would

propose. In relation to the analytical

process, please consider and comment

on issues such as the following:

— What aviation safety data and

information are needed to support

your analysis plan and what, of those

needs, is not now being collected?

—Should large quantities of data be

collected on a wide range of safety

issues, or less data on fewer targeted

safety issues?

—To what extent is standardization of

the data collection or of analysis

techniques necessary? How should

the necessary standardization be

accomplished?

—How could existing data, such as

information from voluntary reporting

and correction, ASRS, AQP, FOQA,

and other such programs, be analyzed

better to provide meaningful and

useful information?

—What could industry and government

do to improve existing means for data

collection?

—Are incentives needed to stimulate

the submission of information that is

not derived from accidents or

incidents, as opposed to merely

removing the disincentives, in order

to encourage reporting?

—To what extent can international

information sharing occur with a

‘‘virtual database’’ instead of a

physically centralized data base?

—What techniques and capabilities are

you aware of in the aviation industry

or in other industries to analyze data

effectively and generate statistically

significant results, with predictive

value, from large quantities of data

describing normal operations?

—What analytical techniques and

capabilities are you aware of in the

aviation industry or in other

industries to respond effectively to

the myriad of human factors issues

that arise in operational monitoring

analysis?

Dissemination of Aviation Safety

Information

—To what extent are security measures

needed, and what security measures

are available, to protect information

confidentiality while still assuring

that it reaches all in the industry who

could use it to improve aviation

safety?

—What alerting methods are available to

ensure that information is

automatically distributed to all

recipients who could use it to
Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 92 / Friday, May 10, 1996 / Notices 21525

improve aviation safety without their

having to know to ask?

General

—Will an analysis and dissemination

system such as GAIN help the

aviation industry reach Zero

Accidents?

—Are there better ways to help the

industry reach Zero Accidents?

—What concerns, if any, do you have

about the existence of an analysis and

dissemination system such as GAIN?

—What should the relationship be

between government regulators and

GAIN for it to be most effective ?

—Although commercial aviation is the

initial target for this effort, how can

other sectors of the aviation industry,

including the military, help with this

initial effort?

—How can the program be expanded to

include input from, and the

development of remedies in relation

to information provided by,

manufacturing personnel, mechanics,

flight attendants, dispatchers, ramp

personnel, and other aviation industry

professionals whose input could help

with the proactive effort?

Considerations for Developing

Prototypes

General

Ultimately GAIN could develop into a

comprehensive international network of

systems for analysis and sharing of

aviation safety information. However,

that development would have to occur

incrementally, starting with one or more

prototypes of various pieces of the

network. Among the areas that should

be evaluated from prototype

development are: international data

standardization, data collection

protocols, analytical methods, data

sharing, alerting mechanisms, and the

potential value of emerging

technologies. By prototyping key

elements of GAIN, it will be possible to

obtain operational proof of the most

significant new capabilities being

incorporated in this early warning

system. With a minimal initial

commitment of resources, risks and

costs would be reduced, while allowing

the overall operational feasibility of the

concept to be assessed. It would help

define obstacles and issues associated

with the development of GAIN, and

provide valuable information for future

implementation planning. Because more

types of data, more types of analyses,

and more users should not generally be

added unless experience demonstrates

that such additions would be useful,

prototypes would help to provide the

experience to determine the desirability

of such additions.

Ownership

For several reasons, the elements of

the GAIN network should probably not

be owned or operated by the FAA or the

aviation regulatory agency of any other

country. Instead, they should probably

be owned by those members of the

international aviation industry that

benefit economically from its successful

performance, analogous to existing

collectively-owned, non-profit joint

ventures in the aviation industry that

provide services for the owners’ mutual

benefit. There are several reasons for

pursuing this type of ownership. First,

GAIN would probably enjoy better

acceptance by the industry if it is not

viewed as a government effort to gather

information for enforcement purposes or

to protect its own manufacturers and

carriers in an international marketplace.

Second, private ownership, as compared

with governmental ownership, would

facilitate protecting sensitive

information from public disclosure.

Third, the funding of GAIN should not

depend upon the fiscal situation in any

one country.

Last, but not least, GAIN’s existence

would be most assured, and it would

perform most effectively and efficiently,

if it were owned jointly by those who

have a direct economic interest in its

success—namely, the insurers,

manufacturers, carriers, pilots,

mechanics, controllers, and airport

operators that make up the industry.

Either GAIN will improve aviation

safety and substantially reduce costs for

the entire industry—because prevention

costs less than accidents—in which

event industry will want to own and

operate it; or it will not accomplish

these goals, in which event a better way

must be developed to reach Zero

Accidents.

In determining how GAIN might be

owned and structured, we invite your

comment about:

—What types of prototypes could best

demonstrate the concept at the lowest

cost, given existing data collection

and analysis techniques and

capabilities?

—What entities could help develop

prototype projects, how much would

they cost, and what sources of

funding are available?

—What role can you play in the

prototyping effort and subsequent

efforts to develop an operational

GAIN?

The Role of the FAA

The FAA is already engaged in several

activities to demonstrate, in relatively

small scale, the utility of safety data

collection and analysis, but the GAIN

network and its prototypes would

probably not be FAA systems. The

FAA’s Office of System Safety could

help facilitate the creation of GAIN by

informing potential participants about

the concept, and by bringing potential

participants together, but the FAA will

not own or operate GAIN, and will

probably not fund its development.

Instead, the FAA would be one of many

users of the analytical results and

supporting data from GAIN.

Given the numerous proactive

accident prevention activities that are

already underway in various countries,

it is likely that the aviation industry

would eventually develop an

international cooperative data sharing

system, such as the GAIN network, on

its own. The problem has been that it is

difficult for any one profession,

manufacturer, or airline to develop a

program that systematically facilitates

international sharing of information to

the benefit of the entire international

aviation community. Thus, in addition

to facilitating this development by

demonstrating its intent to cooperate

more with industry to reach Zero

Accidents, the FAA can play a major

role in accelerating the progress of

private industry by bringing together the

entities that can help to develop GAIN

prototypes—preferably by building as

much as possible upon the systems that

are already in place rather than starting

anew—and by helping to assure that the

prototypes are sufficiently standardized

and consistent to work together in the

more comprehensive GAIN network as

it ultimately develops.

Conclusion: A Call To Action

Please let us know of your ideas

regarding the development of a GAIN

network, particularly regarding how you

can become involved, either in a GAIN

prototype or in the more comprehensive

permanent effort. This is not an

invitation for bids or a request for

proposals, but we are soliciting

indications of interest, as well as input

regarding the viability of this or any

other concept to help the industry reach

Zero Accidents.

You are encouraged to review the

comments (Commenters will be able to

review all other comments by Internet)

and be creative about how you,

individually or together with other

commenters, can begin the development

of GAIN prototypes. If warranted by the

nature and extent of the comments, the

FAA will host a conference to bring

interested parties together to discuss

refinements of the GAIN concept and

the development of prototypes.
21526 Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 92 / Friday, May 10, 1996 / Notices

Issued in Washington, D.C., on May 7,

1996.

Christopher A. Hart,

Assistant Administrator for System Safety,

Federal Aviation Administration.

[FR Doc. 96–11725 Filed 5–9–96; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P

Notice of Intent To Rule on Application

to Use the Revenue From a Passenger

Facility Charge (PFC) at Detroit

Metropolitan Wayne County Airport

and Willow Run Airport, Detroit,

Michigan

AGENCY: Federal Aviation

Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Notice of Intent to Rule on

Application.

SUMMARY: The FAA proposes to rule and

invites public comment on the

application to use the revenue from a

PFC at Detroit Metropolitan Wayne

County Airport and Willow Run Airport

under the provisions of the Aviation

Safety and Capacity Expansion Act of

1990 (Title IX of the Omnibus Budget

Reconciliation Act of 1990) (Public Law

101–508) and Part 158 of the Federal

Aviation Regulations (14 CFR Part 158).

DATES: Comments must be received on

or before June 10, 1996.

ADDRESSES: Comments on this

application may be mailed or delivered

in triplicate to the FAA at the following

address:

Federal Aviation Administration,

Detroit Airports District Office, Willow

Run Airport, East, 8820 Beck Road

Belleville, Michigan 48111.

In addition, one copy of any

comments submitted to the FAA must

be mailed or delivered to Robert C.

Braun, Director of Airports of the Detroit

Metropolitan Wayne County Airport at

the following address: Detroit

Metropolitan Wayne County Airport,

Mezzanine, L.C. Smith Terminal,

Detroit, MI 48242.

Air carriers and foreign air carriers

may submit copies of written comments

previously provided to the Detroit

Metropolitan Wayne County Airport

under section 158.23 of Part 158.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr.

Leonard Mizerowski, Program Manager,

Federal Aviation Administration,

Detroit Airports District Office, Willow

Run Airport, East, 8820 Beck Road,

Belleville, Michigan 48111 (313–487–

7277). The application may be reviewed

in person at this same location.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The FAA

proposes to rule and invites public

comment on the application to use the

revenue from a PFC at Detroit

Metropolitan Wayne County Airport

and Willow Run Airport under the

provisions of the Aviation Safety and

Capacity Expansion Act of 1990 (Title

IX of the Omnibus Budget

Reconciliation Act of 1990) (Public Law

101–508) and Part 158 of the Federal

Aviation Regulations (14 CFR Part 158).

On April 15, 1996, the FAA

determined that the application to use

the revenue from a PFC submitted by

Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County

Airport substantially complete within

the requirements of section 158.25 of

Part 158. The FAA will approve or

disapprove the application, in whole or

in part, no later than August 8, 1996.

The following is a brief overview of

the application.

PFC Application No.: 96–02–C–00–

DTW.

Level of the PFC: $3.00.

Actual charge effective date: January

1, 1993.

Estimated charge expiration date:

June 21, 2009.

Total approved net PFC revenue:

$640,707,000.00.

Brief description of proposed

project(s):

Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County

Airport

Land Acquisition and Preliminary

Design for Fourth Parallel Runway.

Willow Run Airport

Perimeter Property Fencing and

Removal of Airport Hazards Class or

classes of air carriers which the public

agency has requested not be required to

collect PFCs: FAR Part 158.23 air taxi/

commercial operators (ATCOs) filing

from 1800–31 and enplaning fewer than

500 passengers per year at the airport.

Any person may inspect the

application in person at the FAA office

listed above under FOR FURTHER

INFORMATION CONTACT.

In addition, any person may, upon

request, inspect the application, notice

and other documents germane to the

application in person at the Detroit

Metropolitan Wayne County Airport.

Issued in Des Plaines, Illinois, on May 3,

1996.

Benito DeLeon,

Manager, Planning/Programming Branch,

Airports Division, Great Lakes Region.

[FR Doc. 96–11730 Filed 5–9–96; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–13–M

Notice of Intent To Rule on Application

to Use the Revenue From a Passenger

Facility Charge (PFC) at Ford Airport,

Iron Mountain, Michigan

AGENCY: Federal Aviation

Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Notice of Intent to Rule on

Application.

SUMMARY: The FAA proposes to rule and

invites public comment on the

application to use the revenue from a

PFC at Ford Airport under the

provisions of the Aviation Safety and

Capacity Expansion Act of 1990 (Title

IX of the Omnibus Budget

Reconciliation Act of 1990) (Public Law

101–508) and Part 158 of the Federal

Aviation Regulations (14 CFR Part 158).

DATES: Comments must be received on

or before June 10, 1996.

ADDRESSES: Comments on this

application may be mailed or delivered

in triplicate to the FAA at the following

address:

Federal Aviation Administration,

Detroit Airports District Office, Willow

Run Airport, East, 8820 Beck Road,

Belleville, Michigan 48111.

In addition, one copy of any

comments submitted to the FAA must

be mailed or delivered to Mr. William

H. Marchetti, Airport Manager, of the

Dickinson County Board of

Commissioners, at the following

address: County Courthouse 701

Stevenson Avenue, P.O. Box 609, Iron

Mountain, MI 49802.

Air carriers and foreign air carriers

may submit copies of written comments

previously provided to the Dickinson

County Board of Commissioners, under

Section 158.23 of Part 158.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Mr. Jon Gilbert, Program Manager,

Federal Aviation Administration,

Detroit Airports District Office, Willow

Run Airport, East, 8820 Beck Road,

Belleville, Michigan 48111 (313–487–

7281). The application may be reviewed

in person at this same location.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The FAA

proposes to rule and invites public

comment on the application to use the

revenue from a PFC at Ford Airport

under the provisions of the Aviation

Safety and Capacity Expansion Act of

1990 (Title IX of the Omnibus Budget

Reconciliation Act of 1990) (Public Law

101–508) and Part 158 of the Federal

Aviation Regulations (14 CFR Part 158).

On April 23, 1996, the FAA

determined that the application to use

the revenue from a PFC submitted by

the Dickinson County Board of

Commissioners was substantially

complete within the requirements of

Section 158.25 of Part 158. The FAA

will approve or disapprove the

application, in whole or in part, no later

than July 9, 1996.

The following is a brief overview of

the application.

PFC Application No.: 96–02–U–00–

IMT.