No. 89-524 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1990 

STATE OF MONTANA, 

Plaintiff and Respondent, 

DANNY WALTER CHATRIAND, 

Defendant and Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Park, 

The Honorable Frank M. Davis, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Dan Yardley, Yardley & Yardley, Livingston, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Hon. Marc Racicot, Attorney General, Helena, Montana 

Nels Swandal, County Attorney, Livingston, Montana 

Filed: 

Submitted on Briefs: April 12, 1990 

~ecided: May 24, 1990 
Chief Justice J. A. Turnage delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

Danny Walter Chatriand appeals his conviction of felony sale 

of dangerous drugs (cocaine) and felony possession of dangerous 

drugs (marijuana). The case was tried to a jury in the District 

Court of the Sixth Judicial District, Park County. We affirm. 

The sole issue on appeal is whether the District Court erred 

in denying Chatriand's motion to suppress evidence seized from his 

house pursuant to a search warrant. 

In November 1988, Livingston police officers raided the home 

of Chatriand and Gina Richtmyer. They arrested the couple under 

an arrest warrant relating to sales of drugs to an informant at 

the home. After ~hatriand and Richtmyer were taken to jail, the 

police officers searched the home pursuant to a search warrant. 

They found bags of marijuana, scales, a hypodermic syringe, and two 

papers identified as records of drug transactions. 

At an omnibus hearing in March 1989, Chatriand's counsel moved 

to suppress the evidence seized from the home. A briefing schedule 

was set, with a hearing date "to be set after briefs received." 

After the parties filed their briefs, the court deemed the matter 

submitted instead of setting it for hearing. On May 11, 1989, it 

filed an order denying the motion to suppress. The defense moved 

to vacate the denial and to set the matter for hearing as was 

originally indicated in the omnibus order. 
The motion to vacate was heard on May 19, 1989. The court 

vacated its order denying the suppression motion, following which 

the parties and the court discussed whether another hearing was 

necessary so that the defense could present testimony in support 

of its motion to suppress. The court suggested that the defense 

dictate into the record the substance of what its witnesses would 

say. The proposed testimony, as explained by the defense, would 

be that no search warrant was left at defendant's house. The State 

stipulated to that testimony, but asked to be allowed to submit a 

legal memorandum. Defense counsel also was to submit a brief. For 

the convenience of witnesses, they agreed that if a suppression 

hearing was necessary, it would be held immediately prior to trial. 

On the day of trial, following empanelment of the jury, 

defense counsel renewed the motion to suppress. Noting that the 

matter had been briefed, the court denied the motion. Defense 

counsel objected that no hearing had been held. The court asked 

the nature of the testimony which would be presented at such a 

hearing. The defense answered that witnesses would testify that 

no search warrant was left at the house. The court again denied 

the motion. Trial then proceeded, resulting in Chatriand's conviction. 
Did the District Court err in denying Chatriand's motion to 

suppress evidence seized from his home pursuant to a search 

warrant? 

Chatriand argues that failure to display the search warrant 

or to leave a copy of it at his home violated his substantial 

rights. Although one of the officers testified that he left a 

warrant at the home, the State is willing to assume, for the sake 

of this argument as it did for the argument below, that no warrant 

was displayed to Chatriand or left at the home. 

The defense points out that another district court, in Gina 

Richtmyerls trial, held that the evidence seized pursuant to this 

search warrant should be suppressed. But, as the defense acknowledges, that ruling is not controlling here. 

Under § 46-5-103, MCA, a search and seizure is not illegal if 

irregularities in the procedure do not affect the substantial 

rights of the accused. Illinois, from whose criminal code most of 

Montana's was derived, including 5 46-5-103, MCA, has held that, 

absent a showing of prejudice, failure to leave a copy of a search 

warrant at the place searched does not invalidate the search. 

People v. McCullum (111.App.Ct. 1975), 338 N.E.2d 248, 250-51, 

aff'd, 362 N.E.2d 307, 311. As a general rule, statutes which 

require peace officers to exhibit or deliver a copy of the search 

warrant at the place to be searched are viewed as ministerial only, 

and failure to comply with such statutes does not void an otherwise 
valid search. 2 W. LaFave Search and Seizure 5 4.12 (a) (1987) . 

We adopt that rule. 

Chatriand has not made a showing of prejudice to him as a 

result of failure to display or leave a copy of the search warrant 

at his home. He has not shown that the search might not have 

occurred or might have been less intrusive had the warrant been 

shown to him or left at the house. Moreover, the defense was 

provided with a copy of the warrant well before trial and has made 

no objection to its form. 

Chatriand also argues that failure to hold an evidentiary 

hearing on the matter of suppression violated his constitutional 

rights. As noted in the facts set forth above, the parties 

stipulated to the facts which would be relevant to the grounds 

raised for suppression of the evidence--namely, that no copy of 

the search warrant was left at the home. Chatriand never raised 

any additional grounds for objecting to the search. We affirm the 

conclusion of the District Court that under these circumstances, 

no hearing was required and the evidence seized in the search was 

admissible. 

Affirmed. 
We concur: 

Justice R. C. McDonough, specially concurring: 

I concur in the result.