IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

November 16, 2012 Session

STATE OF TENNESSEE EX REL., DONNA THORN v. CLAY GENTRY

Appeal from the Juvenile Court for Dickson County

No. 04-09-092CS A. Andrew Jackson, Judge

No. M2012-01264-COA-R3-JV - Filed December 7, 2012

This is a proceeding to establish the arrearage for child support owed by the father to the

mother of their minor child. The genesis of this matter was in 1993, when Mother filed a

petition to establish paternity and set support. The Department of Human Services, Child

Support Servicesintervened on behalf of Mother, paternity was established and child support

was set. Over the next two decades Father was habitually delinquent in paying child support

and Mother obtained judgements from time to time for arrearages. The most recent petition

to establish the arrearage was assigned to a Child Support Magistrate in Dickson County.

Following a hearing in March 2012, the magistrate ruled that Father’s child support arrearage

principal was $17,894.26, and that the interest on the principal, some of which had been

accruing since the entry of a 1994 judgment, totaled $54,726.64. Judgment in favor of

Mother was awarded by the magistrate in the gross amount of $72,620.90. Although Mother

had independent counsel representing her before the magistrate, the Department appealed the

magistrate’s order, purportedly on behalf of Mother but over Mother’s objection and despite

the fact none of the proceeds were owed to the Department. The juvenile court reduced the

total award to $26,937.36. Mother filed this appeal. We have determined that Mother was not

aggrieved by the magistrate’s decision; thus, the Department could not appeal, on behalf of

Mother, a wholly favorable decision. Because the case was never properly before the juvenile

court, we vacate the judgment of the juvenile court and remand with instructions to reinstate

the $72,620.90 judgment awarded by the magistrate.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Juvenile Court

Vacated and Remanded

FRANK G. CLEMENT,JR.,J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ANDY D. BENNETT

and RICHARD H. DINKINS, JJ., joined.
Brad W. Hornsby and Heather G. Parker, Murfreesboro, Tennessee, for the appellant, Donna

Thorn.

Robert E. Cooper, Jr. Attorney General and Reporter, William E. Young, Solicitor General,

and Warren Jasper, Senior Counsel, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, State of

Tennessee, Department of Human Resources.

OPINION

This appeal arises from a November 1, 2011 Petition to Establish Arrears Judgment

and Interest (“the Petition”) filed by the State of Tennessee ex rel. Donna Thornton

(“Mother”) against Clay Gentry in the Dickson County Juvenile Court.

The underlying case originated in the Davidson County Juvenile Court in October

1993, when Mother filed a petition to establish paternity for her minor child, Stormy N. The

Department of Human Services, Child Support Services intervened in that action, and in

October 1993, the Davidson County Juvenile Court issued an order finding that Clay Gentry

was the biological father and setting child support at $65 per week. In June 1994, Mother was

awarded an arrearage judgment in the amount of $14,791.92, and Mr. Gentry (“Father”) was

ordered to pay an extra $25 per week toward the arrearage. Approximately three weeks later,

the Davidson County Juvenile Court entered a second order, finding Father in contempt for

failing to meet his child support obligations and finding that Father’s arrearage at that time

equaled $15,561.

In March 2009, the Davidson County Juvenile Court entered an order finding that

Father had an arrearage balance of $37,601.85, and ordered Father to begin paying $545 per

month to liquidate the arrearage. The Davidson County court also transferred the case to the

Dickson County.

The next pleading filed was the 2011 Petition at issue in this appeal, which the

Department filed on behalf of Mother to establish yet another arrearage judgment against

Father. The matter was assigned to a Child Support Magistrate in Dickson County. Although

Father was duly served, he did not participate in any of the Dickson County proceedings, in

person or through counsel. To Mother’s surprise, however, the Department took a position

adverse to Mother at the hearing before the magistrate. When that occurred, Mother

requested a continuance so that she could retain private counsel to prosecute the Petition

against Father. The magistrate granted her a continuance and Mother promptly retained

counsel. She has been represented in this matter by her own counsel ever since.

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The hearing before the magistrate took place March 13, 2012, following which the

magistrate found that Father’s child support arrearage was $17,894.26 for principal, and that

the interest arrearage, which had been accruing since the entry of the 1994 judgment, was an

additional $54,726.64. Thus, the magistrate awarded a total judgment of $72,620.90 against

Father in favor of Mother.

In spite of the fact Mother was completely satisfied with the magistrate’s award of

$72,620.90, the Department, purportedly acting on behalf of Mother, filed a Request for

Hearing to Appeal the Findings and Recommendations of the Child Support Magistrate. The

Request sought to reduce the award to Mother by more than $45,000. The juvenile court

granted the Department’s request, and set a hearing date of April 30, 2012.

In the interim, Mother, through her counsel, filed a Motion to Dismiss the

Department’s Appeal, arguing that the Department was not a proper party to the action

because, inter alia, 1) Mother was no longer receiving state assistance, 2) Mother did not

owe any of her child support income to the state, and 3) the state “is not entitled to any

interest on child support arrears.” In response, the Department acknowledged that it had no

right to recover any of the judgment awarded to Mother, stating it had previously recovered

all funds to which the Department was entitled; nevertheless, the Department asserted that

it had standing to appeal the magistrate’s decision.

Following a hearing, the juvenile court reduced the award to Mother by $45,683.54,

for a total judgment of $26,937.36, of which $16,692.87 represented unpaid principal and

$10,244.49 represented interest. Mother filed a timely appeal from the ruling of the juvenile

court judge. The Department opposes Mother in this appeal.

ANALYSIS

Although several issues are presented for our review, we have determined this appeal

hinges upon the legal principle that “only an ‘aggrieved’ party has a right to prosecute an

appeal.” Koontz v. Epperson Elec. Co., 643 S.W.2d 333, 335 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982) (citing

Huggins v. Nichols, 440 S.W.2d 618 (Tenn. 1968)). In Koontz, this court defined an

“aggrieved party” as “one having an interest recognized by law which is injuriously affected

by the judgment, or whose property rights or personal interest are directly affected by its

operation.” Koontz, 643 S.W.2d at 335 (internal citations omitted) (citing In re Bernheim’s

Estate, 266 P. 378 (Mont. 1928)).

In its Response to Mother’s Motion to Dismiss, the Department admitted that Mother

does not owe any of her child support award to the Department. The Department further

admitted in paragraph 10, that “the State is not entitled to any interest on child support

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arrears.” Therefore, the Department has no property right or interest in the amount of the

arrearage, principal or interest, that Father owes Mother.

Tennessee Code Annotated § 71-3-124 grants the Department the authority to “file

any legal actions to establish paternity or to establish, modify or enforce child or spousal

support in any judicial or administrative proceeding on behalf of the department and the state

for persons who have assigned rights of support to the department pursuant to this section.”

Tenn. Code Ann. § 71-3-124 (2012). However, this court, in State ex rel. Strickland v.

Copley, made clear that the statute does not grant the Department unlimited authority in these

cases, but rather the Department’s authority is limited to the narrow confines of the statute.

State ex rel. Strickland v. Copley, No. W2007-01839-COA-R3-CV, 2008 WL 3875425, at

*4-6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 21, 2008).

Years earlier in these proceedings, when Mother was receiving public assistance,

Mother assigned her child support rights to the State; however, that does not bestow upon the

Department the perpetual right to control all future actions between Mother and Father as

they pertain to their child. Although the Department claimed it was acting on behalf of

Mother when it appealed the ruling of the Magistrate, nothing could be further from the truth.

The only party to benefit from the Department’s appeal of the Magistrate’s award of a

$72,620.90 judgment was Father; in fact that appeal benefitted Father by $45,683.54and

financially injured Mother by the same amount. As noted above, the decision had no impact

on the Department.

Father never participated in the Dickson County proceedings and the Department,

which was purportedly representing Mother, had no right to act on behalf of Father in this

matter. In fact, doing so would be a conflict of interest. Accordingly, the Department could

only act on behalf of Mother in the proceedings before the magistrate, and Mother was not

aggrieved by the magistrate’s order; therefore the Department, acting on behalf of Mother,

could not appeal the magistrate’s ruling to the juvenile court judge. Accordingly, the case

was never properly before the juvenile court judge.

For the reasons stated above, the juvenile court erred in allowing the Department to

prosecute an appeal from the magistrate’s order and the ruling resulting from that appeal

must be vacated.

IN CONCLUSION

We vacate the judgment of the juvenile court and remand with instructions to reinstate

the order issued by the magistrate, wherein Mother was granted a judgment for $17,894.26

in child support arrears plus interest to date of $54,441.43, for a total amount of $72,335.69.

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Further, Mother is entitled to post-judgment interest at the rate of 12% interest per annum on

the magistrate’s order. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(f)(1).

This matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Costs

of appeal are assessed against the Tennessee Department of Human Services, Child Support

Division.

___________________________________

FRANK G. CLEMENT, JR., JUDGE

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