UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-1399

REACHING HEARTS INTERNATIONAL, INCORPORATED,

Plaintiff − Appellee,

v.

PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY; COUNTY COUNCIL OF PRINCE GEORGE'S 

COUNTY, Sitting As The District Council,

Defendants − Appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

Maryland, at Greenbelt. Roger W. Titus, District Judge. 

(8:05−cv−01688−RWT)

Argued: March 21, 2012 Decided: April 25, 2012

Before MOTZ, SHEDD, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

ARGUED: William Walter Wilkins, NEXSEN PRUET, LLC, Greenville, 

South Carolina, for Appellants. Ward Baldwin Coe, III, 

GALLAGHER EVELIUS & JONES, LLP, Baltimore, Maryland, for 

Appellee. ON BRIEF: Tonia Y. Belton-Gofreed, OFFICE OF LAW, 

Upper Marlboro, Maryland; Kirsten E. Small, NEXSEN PRUET, LLC, 

Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellants. David W. Kinkopf, 

Brian T. Tucker, GALLAGHER EVELIUS & JONES, LLP, Baltimore, 

Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM: 

This is the second time this case has been before us. In 

the first appeal, we affirmed a jury verdict in favor of 

Reaching Hearts International (“RHI”), a Seventh Day Adventist 

congregation that sought to build a church on its land in Prince 

George’s County, Maryland.1 In this appeal, Prince George’s 

County and its County Council (collectively “the County”) raise 

a number of challenges to the district court’s award of 

attorneys’ fees and expenses to RHI. For the reasons discussed

below, we affirm the order of the district court. 

I.

After the appeal by the County had concluded and our 

mandate issued, RHI filed a motion for attorneys’ fees and 

expenses on July 30, 2010.2 The motion, supported by a 

memorandum, affidavit, and verified exhibits, sought almost 

$725,000 in fees (including fees for attorneys and other non-

 1 The jury awarded $3,714,822.36, based on the County’s 

violation of RHI’s rights under the Equal Protection Clause and 

Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”).

For a fuller description of the case and its facts, see Reaching 

Hearts Int’l, Inc. v. Prince George’s County, 368 F. App’x 370 

(4th Cir. 2010) (unpublished). 

2 Although RHI had filed a motion for attorneys’ fees and 

expenses after trial, the July 30, 2010 motion was a renewed 

motion that incorporated a request for additional fees for work 

associated with the first appeal. 
3

attorney timekeepers), based on 2,635 hours of work through the

date it was filed. RHI also sought approximately $40,000 in 

expenses. The rates used in the motion were the historical 

hourly rates customarily charged to other clients by the various 

timekeepers at the time that the services were rendered.3 The 

rates for the attorneys ranged from $200 to $470 per hour. 

The historical rates requested in the motion for fees were 

different (and generally higher) than the rates RHI had 

previously negotiated to pay its attorneys. Specifically, at the 

outset of the litigation, RHI and its attorneys had agreed that 

RHI would make payments as the litigation progressed pursuant to 

a blended, discounted fee structure, with an hourly rate of $250 

for all attorneys and $130 for all paralegals. This “reduced” 

rate was agreed upon “out of consideration of [RHI’s] ability to 

pay and its charitable mission, with the express understanding 

that [RHI’s attorneys] would seek full and proper compensation 

for fees and expenses from the County should RHI prevail.” (J.A. 

206.) At the time of RHI’s renewed fee petition, RHI had 

previously paid to its attorneys $560,975.16, although RHI’s 

payments were “often [made] in a less than timely fashion 

 3 Many of those rates increased during the course of the 

litigation, which began with the filing of the Complaint in June 

2005.
4

because of [RHI’s] limited resources.” (Br. of Appellees at 8 

(citing Affidavit of Ward B. Coe, III, at J.A. 206).)

At a hearing on the motion for fees and expenses held on 

March 14, 2011, the district court heard argument from counsel 

and then determined the lodestar amount, or the “reasonable 

hourly rate multiplied by hours reasonably expended.” United 

States ex rel. Vuyyuru v. Jadhav, 555 F.3d 337, 356 (4th Cir. 

2009). In doing so, the court expressly considered the twelve 

factors pertinent to the lodestar analysis: 

(1) the time and labor expended; (2) the 

novelty and difficulty of the questions 

raised; (3) the skill required to properly 

perform the legal services rendered; (4) the 

attorney's opportunity costs in pressing the 

instant litigation; (5) the customary fee 

for like work; (6) the attorney's 

expectations at the outset of the 

litigation; (7) the time limitations imposed 

by the client or circumstances; (8) the 

amount in controversy and the results 

obtained; (9) the experience, reputation and 

ability of the attorney; (10) the 

undesirability of the case within the legal 

community in which the suit arose; (11) the 

nature and length of the professional 

relationship between attorney and client; 

and (12) attorneys' fees awards in similar 

cases.

See Jadhav, 555 F.3d at 356-57 (citations omitted); see J.A. 

182-191.

As part of its analysis of these various factors, the 

district court recognized that this was the first RLUIPA case in 

the country where money damages had been awarded by a jury. As 
5

described by the district court, this “was a very novel case 

with extremely difficult questions raised.” (J.A. 185.) It was 

“a needle in the haystack case” that “required a lot of skill on 

the part of the plaintiff’s lawyers, not just because of the 

novelty and difficulty . . . but because of the extremely 

tenacious defense raised by Prince George’s County in defending 

this case.” (J.A. 185, 188.) As to the “most critical factor[,] 

. . . the degree of success obtained,” see Hensley v. Eckerhart, 

461 U.S. 424, 436 (1983), the district court stated that this 

case “can only be described as a home run in a very adverse 

ballpark with your adversary being the New York Yankees, this 

was not an easy case.” (J.A. 190-91.)

The district court ultimately concluded that the hours set 

forth in the fee petition were reasonably expended and that the 

rates sought were reasonable. Indeed, at different points in the 

hearing, the district court referred to the rates sought as 

“very reasonable,” “extremely reasonable,” and “very fair and 

reasonable,” and further concluded that it was “more than 

satisfied that the rates being sought are those predominantly 

charged by attorneys practicing in this court.” (J.A. 188, 193, 

199.)

The district court also considered RHI’s request for an 

enhancement for superior results, but concluded that under the 
6

Supreme Court’s decision in Perdue v. Kenny A., 130 S. Ct. 1662 

(2010), a fee enhancement would not be awarded.

RHI had also asked for additional compensation, over and 

above the historical rates charged. This additional amount was

to account for the “effect of delay in payment on the value of 

the fee,” an adjustment we have explained is required in order 

to render the fee award “fully compensatory.” Daly v. Hill, 790 

F.2d 1071, 1081 (4th Cir. 1986); see Ohio River Valley Envtl. 

Coal., Inc. v. Green Valley Coal Co., 511 F.3d 407, 419 (4th 

Cir. 2007) (hereinafter “Ohio River”) (“a fee award must account 

for the effect of delay in payment”). The district court 

concluded that use of RHI’s otherwise reasonable historical 

rates failed to fully compensate it for the lost time value of 

money. Although the district court recognized that it could 

calculate interest on each monthly fee paid by RHI and owed to 

RHI’s attorneys, the court stated that it “would almost be a 

death defying mathematical calculation.” (J.A. 194.) Thus, the 

district court instead accounted for the lost time value of 

money by applying the current hourly billing rates of the 

timekeepers (as opposed to the historical rates) to the number

of hours awarded. This resulted in a total fee award, including 

time spent at the district court fee hearing and recalculating 

the fees using current rates, of $838,722.00. (J.A. 196, 202.)
7

Finally, the district court awarded the full amount of 

expenses sought by RHI, finding them to be “very reasonable” and 

“well documented.” (J.A. 193.) The award ultimately included 

expenses in the total amount of $40,784.40.4 (J.A. 202.)

The County timely appealed and we have jurisdiction 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 

II.

We review “[t]he reasonableness of the amount of a district 

court’s fee award . . . for abuse of discretion,” and questions 

of law arising in the course of the determination de 

novo. Johannssen v. Dist. No. 1-Pac. Coast Dist., MEBA Pension 

Plan, 292 F.3d 159, 178 (4th Cir. 2002), abrogated on other 

grounds by Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105 

(2008); Robinson v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 560 F.3d 235, 243

(4th Cir. 2009) (court reviews award of attorneys’ fees and 

expenses for an abuse of discretion). While that discretion is 

“not unlimited” and “[i]t is essential that the judge provide a 

reasonably specific explanation for all aspects of a fee 

 4 The Clerk of the District Court had previously awarded 

costs in the amount of $7,348.23 based on a bill of costs RHI 

submitted shortly after trial. To avoid duplication when 

entering its award of expenses upon RHI’s renewed motion, the 

district court deducted that amount from the total amount of 

expenses awarded ($40,784.40), resulting in an order awarding 

$33,400.17. (J.A. 196, 202, 554.) 
8

determination,” Perdue, 130 S. Ct. at 1676, our review is 

nonetheless “sharply circumscribed.” Jadhav, 555 F.3d at 356 

(citation omitted). “[B]ecause a district court has close and 

intimate knowledge of the efforts expended and the value of 

services rendered, the fee award must not be overturned unless 

it is clearly wrong.” Id. (citation omitted).

On appeal, the County challenges various aspects of the 

district court’s determination of the fee award. The County’s 

arguments fall into three categories: (1) challenges to the 

hourly rates used in calculating the fee; (2) challenges to the 

number of hours deemed by the district court to be reasonable; 

and (3) challenges to specific items of expenses as improperly 

documented. We address each argument in turn. 

A.

The County’s challenge to the hourly rate used by the 

district court is two-fold. First, it contends that the hourly 

rates sought by RHI, i.e., the historical billing rates, were 

far above the prevailing market rate for civil rights litigation 

in the District of Maryland, and that there was insufficient 

support in the record for the rates utilized by the district 

court. Second, it challenges the district court’s use of current 

market rates to account for a delay in payment. 
9

As to the first part of its challenge to rates, the County 

argues that the rates charged by the attorneys and paralegals to 

private clients are not the prevailing market rate for the type 

of work involved here and that a better indicator of a 

“reasonable rate” would be either the amount RHI agreed to pay 

its attorneys (the blended hourly rate of $250 for attorneys and 

$130 for paralegals) or the rates set forth in Appendix B to the 

Local Rules for the United States District Court for the 

District of Maryland, entitled “Rules and Guidelines for 

Determining Attorneys’ Fees in Certain Cases.”5

As noted, our review is limited to a determination of 

whether the district court abused its discretion, and we find no 

abuse of discretion in its determination that the rates sought 

were reasonable. The court expressly considered, and relied 

upon, affidavits from Messrs. Rosenberg and Maloney, experienced

trial attorneys who were known to the district judge and who 

 5 The rates in Appendix B vary depending on the number of 

years since an attorney has been admitted to the bar. For 

example, the suggested range of hourly rates for a lawyer 

admitted to the bar for less than five years is $150-190. For a 

lawyer admitted for fifteen years or more, the rate would be 

$275-$400. The section of Appendix B setting forth the rates 

also makes clear that “[t]he factors established by case law 

obviously govern over [these rates]” and that “[o]ne factor that 

might support an adjustment to the applicable range is an 

increase in the cost of legal services since the adoption of the 

guidelines.” Id. at n.6. According to counsel’s representations 

to this Court, the rates were last updated in January 2008.
10

both appeared regularly in federal court in Maryland in complex 

civil litigation matters and other cases. Those affidavits

stated that the rates sought were reasonable.6 The district judge 

also relied on his own knowledge of prevailing market rates in 

the relevant market. In particular, he explained that he had 

been responsible for billing at the law firm where he practiced 

prior to his appointment to the bench in 2003 and that he knew 

the rates charged by attorneys at that local firm for all types 

 6 The County emphasized, both in its brief and at argument, 

that the affidavits were insufficient to establish that the 

rates sought were reasonable because they did not contain 

“satisfactory ‘specific evidence of the prevailing market rates 

in the relevant community’ for the type of work performed.” (Br. 

at 11-12 (quoting Plyler v. Evatt, 902 F.2d 273, 277 (4th Cir. 

1990)) (citation omitted).) In particular, it contends the 

affidavits of Messrs. Rosenberg and Maloney were insufficient 

because they did not state that the claimed rates were 

consistent with the market rate for the specific type of 

litigation involved, here, “civil rights litigation.” (Br. at 

12-14.) We disagree.

While the affidavits may not have used the precise language 

suggested in Plyler and while they could have been more 

specific, there are significant distinctions between “civil 

rights cases” in general (such as Section 1983 cases brought by 

prisoners or against the police by arrestees) and a RLUIPA case 

like this one, which was much more involved and complicated than 

a typical “civil rights” case and more akin to complex civil 

litigation. As noted, there was significant novelty to this 

litigation because so few cases under RLUIPA for money damages 

in this context had occurred at that time. Thus, we conclude the 

district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that 

the affidavits were sufficient to show that the rates were 

reasonable for the type of work performed.
11

of litigation up through that time in the relevant market.7

Additionally—and significantly—there was a lack of comparable 

rates for RLUIPA work in Maryland and even nationwide, in view 

of its novelty at the time, and the fact that no jury award of 

damages had ever been made prior to this case. (J.A. 172, 184-85 

(district court noting “this was a very novel case with 

extremely difficult questions raised” and that there is not a 

RLUIPA bar that the court could look to in order to determine 

rates).) In short, we find no error or abuse of discretion in 

the district court’s determination that the historical rates 

requested were reasonable.

The County’s second challenge to the rates used by the 

district court is that the use of March 2011 hourly rates, 

rather than historical rates, constituted an improper 

enhancement and was not warranted by any delay in payment. The 

County relies heavily on the fact that RHI paid its attorneys 

the agreed-upon reduced rate throughout the litigation, and thus 

there was no delay in payment to the attorneys as to most of the 

 7 In fact, the district court noted that the historical fees 

now requested were less than what he would have termed 

comparable rates when he left private practice seven years 

earlier. (J.A. 187 (“Mr. Coe’s rates now are less than my rate 

was [when I arrived on the bench]”); id. at 199 (“all these 

rates are very reasonable. Very reasonable. I mean, my rate was 

north of these rates seven years ago. And rates at my old law 

firm have been going up since then, not down.”).)
12

fees earned. This second challenge to the rates is a slightly 

more involved issue. 

As an initial matter, we first note that the use of the 

current rates was not an “enhancement” of the fee award of the 

type discussed in the Supreme Court’s opinion in Perdue. While 

the district judge clearly indicated he would have liked to 

apply a Perdue-type enhancement, he expressly stated that he 

was not doing so, but was simply awarding the time value of 

money, or using current rates to account for a delay in payment. 

(J.A. 197 (district judge expressing that “in [his] heart of 

hearts” he believed an enhancement was probably appropriate in 

this case, but “applying current hourly rates to the recovery of 

fees in this case is fully justified by the time value of 

money”).)8 Accordingly, we address whether using current rates to 

account for either a delay in payment or the lost time value of 

money was an abuse of discretion. 

 8 The County complains that the district court’s ruling was 

simply a way to enhance the award without calling it an 

enhancement. In part, it relies on the district court’s

alternative statement that “to the extent that [applying current 

rates is] too generous, which I doubt it is, that this does 

represent in my judgment a case of superior – I mean really 

superior attorney performance.” (J.A. 197.) The record is clear 

that the district court did not apply an enhancement, as that 

term is utilized by Perdue, since the district court expressly 

disavowed that it was doing so. See id. Since we affirm the use 

of current rates as justified by the delay in payment, we do not 

have occasion to consider whether a Perdue-type enhancement 

would be appropriate in this case.
13

Our precedent is clear that, in the typical case, an 

appropriate way to compensate for a delay in payment for 

attorneys’ fees is either to use the current hourly rates 

instead of historical ones, or to include an award of interest 

to account for the lost time value of money. As the Supreme 

Court explained in Missouri v. Jenkins:

Our cases have repeatedly stressed that 

attorney’s fees awarded under [42 U.S.C. § 

1988] are to be based on market rates for 

the services rendered. . . . Clearly, 

compensation received several years after 

the services were rendered – as it 

frequently is in complex civil rights 

litigation - is not equivalent to the same 

dollar amount received reasonably promptly 

as the legal services are performed, as 

would normally be the case with private 

billings. We agree, therefore, that an 

appropriate adjustment for delay in payment

- whether by the application of current 

rather than historic hourly rates or 

otherwise – is within the contemplation of 

the statute. . . . An adjustment for delay 

in payment is, we hold, an appropriate 

factor in the determination of what 

constitutes a reasonable attorney’s fee 

under § 1988.

491 U.S. 274, 283-84 (1989) (internal footnote and citations 

omitted). 

This Court, too, has repeatedly noted that a court may base 

a reasonable rate for lodestar purposes on current rates to 

compensate for a delay in payment. See Ohio River, 511 F.3d at 

419-20; Johannssen 292 F.3d at 181; Daly, 790 F.2d at 1081. 

In Johannssen, for example, we concluded that the district court 
14

had abused its discretion in adopting historic rates without 

considering the effect of delay of payment on the value of the 

fee. As we explained in Johannssen, “consideration of the effect 

of time on the value of the fee is mandatory as part of a 

consideration of what is reasonably compensatory.” Id. at 180. 

Thus, it is clear that in an appropriate case, the use of 

current rates is permissible, and that using either current 

rates or some appropriate rate of interest is required to 

account for such a delay. The use of current rates, to be sure, 

can be an imprecise substitute for some other form of 

mathematical precision, and interest rates may often be a more 

accurate way to calculate the lost time value of money. But as 

explained above, our precedent allows that imprecise 

methodology. 

The case at bar, however, has a wrinkle that potentially 

complicates the application of this general practice to account 

for a delay in payment. That wrinkle is that RHI made 

substantial, but not always timely, ongoing payments to its 

attorneys during the litigation. Indeed, approximately $560,000 

of the initial $765,000 in fees and expenses sought by RHI had 

already been paid to its attorneys. Thus, the question could be 
15

raised as to whether the fact that a significant partial payment 

had been made to the attorneys here affects the analysis.9

It is certainly a feasible argument that, in a case where 

such a partial payment has been made, the two portions of the 

fee award (representing the paid and unpaid amounts) could be 

subject to different analyses when adjusting to account for a 

delay in payment. One portion would be the loss to RHI itself of 

what could be characterized as the traditional concept of the 

time value of money, representing the amounts it paid to its 

attorneys throughout the litigation. Had RHI not had to make 

these payments, it could have earned interest on those funds.

The second portion is the loss suffered by the attorneys from a 

delay in payment, but is applicable only to those amounts equal 

to the historical rates (as determined by the district court to 

be reasonable) less the amounts paid by RHI using the reduced 

blended rates.

 9 The fact of partial payment certainly affects who, as 

between the plaintiff (RHI) and its attorneys, should receive 

what portion of the adjustment to current rates. As RHI’s 

counsel acknowledged at oral argument, RHI should receive all 

amounts it had previously paid to its attorneys, as well as an 

additional amount representing the portion of the adjustment 

equal to the percentage of the unadjusted total award that the 

previously-paid amount comprises. Indeed, since the bulk of the 

fees were paid by RHI, it was RHI, not the attorneys, who lost 

most of the time value of its money.
16

At argument before this Court, counsel for RHI was asked 

whether any of the three principal cases RHI relied upon to 

support the district court’s use of current rates involved a 

partial payment to attorneys. RHI’s attorney responded that they 

did not involve partial payments.10 In fact, however, at least 

one of those—Johannssen—appeared to have involved a partial 

payment, although this Court did not address the significance of 

that fact.11

In Johannssen, we reversed a district court’s fee award 

because it failed to either use current hourly rates or award 

interest in order to account for a delay in payment. It appears

that Johannssen actually involved some amount of partial payment 

to the plaintiffs’ attorneys during the litigation. In a 

footnote, this Court explained:

The district court also noted that 

Plaintiffs’ attorneys had agreed to a 

retainer agreement with them that was to 

provide them with a portion of the fees 

necessary to prosecute the case. The court 

did not explain how this was relevant to the 

issue of delay other than the somewhat 

mysterious statement that “it was not 

 10 Oral Argument Digital Recording at 31:02 (March 21, 

2012).

11 The other two cases are Daly and Ohio River. In Daly, 

there was a contingency fee agreement in the underlying suit and 

no partial payments made. 790 F.2d at 1074-75 (describing 25% 

contingency fee agreement). In Ohio River, the opinion is silent 

as to any type of payment arrangement between the client and its 

attorneys. See generally 511 F.3d 407.
17

insignificant that the clients agreed to 

support the litigation to the extent that 

they did.”

Id. at 180 n.20. 

We did not explain in Johannssen the significance of this 

fact, if any, or how it could impact the district court’s 

calculation of any adjustment for delay in payment. Nonetheless, 

despite the knowledge that there was at least an agreement by 

the clients to make some payments during the litigation—and 

possibly payments were made—we held that an adjustment was 

warranted for a delay in payment, and did not differentiate the 

calculation of that adjustment into segregated amounts 

representing funds already paid by the client and amounts

unpaid. This could suggest, although it is by no means clear, 

that no different calculation is required, even in cases where 

there is a partial payment to the lawyers during the litigation.

The parties have not pointed to any Fourth Circuit cases or outof-circuit cases addressing whether a different calculation is 

required or warranted for the two possible portions of the fee 

award where there has been a partial payment by the client. 

Resolution of this question is not required in the case at 

bar, however, because the issue was not squarely raised before 

the district court. At the fee petition hearing, in the context 

of arguing that no enhancement should be applied, attorneys for 

the County argued that there was no delay in payment because the 
18

client had paid the largest portion of the fees sought to the 

attorneys. (J.A. 178 (counsel for the County arguing “there 

wasn’t a big delay in payment . . . [as to] what was paid to Mr. 

Coe by Reaching Hearts. In other words, they were paid fees by 

their client all along.”).) Thus, the district court clearly 

knew that some payments had been made. See id.12 However, the 

issue of whether the portion of the fees representing payments 

made by the client should be treated differently than payment 

for the portion representing amounts not paid to RHI’s attorneys

was never squarely presented to the district court and it was 

not asked to rule on the fee award on that basis.

Unsurprisingly, then, the district court did not address this 

point.13

 12 In his affidavit, Ward Coe, the lead counsel for RHI, 

explained: "Both RHI – for the money it already has forwarded 

for attorneys' fees and costs – and RHI's attorneys – for the 

difference between what they have received for services rendered 

versus the actual cost of those services—have unfairly lost the 

time value of money. The representation of RHI in this matter 

also carried with it the risk that full payment for services may 

not come at all or, at best, would only come many years later or 

at a reduced amount.” (J.A. 215 at ¶ 23.) See J.A. 167 (Mr. 

Coe’s statement at the fee hearing that the use of current rates 

or an “interest calculation” would “compensate[] for both 

Reaching Hearts' outlay of fees and not getting them back for a 

long time, and also the delay in payment to attorneys where 

we're both delayed in compensation because we're working for a 

client who has to pay us to play.").

13 The district court recognized that there were separate 

delays, at least to some extent, explaining that he would use 

current rates to "take into account the time value of money in 

(Continued)
19

Similarly, the County did not argue this specific point on 

appeal. Instead, it was raised by the panel at oral argument and 

the parties merely responded to the questioning by the panel. 

Regardless of whether the County’s failure constitutes a waiver 

of the issue, we cannot say that the district court abused its 

discretion in this case in failing to treat the two amounts 

differently, where that possibility was never presented to it. 

Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the court’s use 

of current hourly rates to account for a delay in payment. 

B.

We have carefully considered the County’s remaining 

challenges to the fee award. These include allegations that the 

district court failed to carefully scrutinize the fees and 

expenses sought and consequently awarded fees that were the 

result of overstaffing, excessive hours for certain tasks, or 

hours associated with RHI’s lead counsel changing law firms 

during the litigation. As to each of these challenges, we 

conclude that the district court acted within its discretion in 

 

the sense that the fee was not received by either the law firm –

by the law firm in part for a considerable period of time and, 

of course, the fact that the plaintiff had to lay this money out 

from day one all the way to the present time, to the extent that 

it paid money." (J.A. 194.) But the court did not consider 

whether those separate items should be analyzed differently nor 

did the County make that request. 
20

reaching its determination that the number of hours and the time 

entries were adequately documented and were reasonable. 

To be sure, the approved number of hours expended here (and 

indeed, the fee award itself) was quite large. But this was a 

hard-fought case, one that was vigorously litigated by the 

County. The County raised a large number of defenses, filed 

motions to dismiss on various grounds, fought discovery, came to 

two settlement conferences without authority to settle, and 

raised numerous assignments of error in its first appeal to this 

Court. It is irrelevant whether, had we been reviewing the fee 

petition in the first instance, we might have reduced some of 

the hours on the grounds urged by the County, or found that some 

hours were potentially the result of duplicative efforts. Daly, 

790 F.2d at 1079 (“[W]e are not entitled to disturb a district 

court’s exercise of discretion even though we might have 

exercised that discretion quite differently.”) We review the 

district court’s decision as to the hours expended only for an 

abuse of discretion, and we find nothing “clearly wrong” about 

its decision as to the hours reasonably expended 

here. See Jadhav, 555 F.3d at 356. 

Similarly, as to the County’s claim that certain expenses 

(in-house photocopying and legal research) were inadequately 

documented or otherwise unreasonable, we find no abuse of 

discretion in the district court’s ruling.
21

III.

As both parties acknowledge, RHI will also be entitled to 

its reasonable attorneys’ fees and expenses for its successful 

efforts in this appeal. Plyler, 902 F.2d at 281-82. Accordingly, 

we remand this case to the district court for a determination of 

reasonable attorneys’ fees and expenses related to this 

appeal. See id. 

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, the order of the district is

affirmed, and we remand to the district court for a further fee 

determination.

AFFIRMED AND REMANDED