United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit 

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No. 23-2433

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United States of America

 Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Geovany Gonzalez-Gonzalez

 Defendant - Appellant

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Iowa - Western

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Submitted: January 8, 2024

Filed: July 11, 2024

[Unpublished]

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Before SMITH, Chief Judge,1 GRUENDER and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM.

1

Judge Smith completed his term as chief judge of the circuit on March 10, 

2024. See 28 U.S.C. § 45(a)(3)(A). 
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Geovany Gonzalez-Gonzalez violated the terms of his supervised release. The 

district court2 revoked his supervised release and sentenced him to 30 months’ 

imprisonment and two years of supervised release. He challenges the substantive 

reasonableness of his sentence. We affirm.

I. Background

In 2013, Gonzalez pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to 

distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine after being convicted of a felony 

drug offense. The district court sentenced him to 192 months’ imprisonment and 10

years of supervised release but later reduced the term of imprisonment to 97 months. 

Gonzalez was released in March 2019 and began serving his supervised release. 

From June 2019 to September 2022, Gonzalez failed to report for drug testing

three times. In March 2023, he tested positive for marijuana and admitted to using a

cannabis-derived oil or tea. On April 7, the district court added 20 hours of 

community service to his supervised-release conditions, to be completed within 45 

days. Gonzalez was required to report his completion to the probation office.

Beginning April 17, Gonzalez failed to report for drug testing on three 

consecutive days. Afterward, he told his probation officer that his stomach hurt so 

badly he could not get out of bed. The officer told Gonzalez to go to the hospital, 

and Gonzalez did. On April 25, he tested negative for drugs. 

 In May 2023, Gonzalez assaulted his wife and his father-in-law. He grabbed 

his wife around the neck and scratched and bruised her arm. He also chased and 

threw an object at his father-in-law and either shoved his father-in-law into a wall or 

shoved furniture against his father-in-law. When police came, Gonzalez barricaded 

himself inside his home, threatened to cut out his veins, and poured a fire accelerant 

2

The Honorable Leonard T. Strand, then Chief Judge, now United States 

District Judge for the Northern District of Iowa.
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on a pile of his wife’s clothes. Eventually, he was arrested and charged with statelaw misdemeanors. 

 

The probation office filed a petition to revoke Gonzalez’s supervision, 

alleging the above violations. The petition noted that Gonzalez had not yet 

completed his community service but did not allege a violation based on that 

incompletion. Gonzalez did not contest any of the violations. 

The district court held a revocation hearing on May 31, 2023. It ruled that the 

most serious offense, Gonzalez’s assault against his wife, was a grade A violation. 

The court also determined that the Sentencing Guidelines range was 27 to 33 

months’ imprisonment. Gonzalez did not contest these rulings. 

Gonzalez accepted responsibility for his conduct in a statement to the court.

He also submitted an email from a third party confirming that he had completed 21 

hours of community service. In defense of Gonzalez, his counsel pointed out that 

Gonzalez owned a lead mitigation business, had done well on supervised release 

until the assaults, and suffered from stomach pain that contributed to his controlled 

substance and testing violations. The government informed the court that Gonzalez’s 

wife had decided not to press charges against him. She had filed a waiver of 

prosecution, though under state law the prosecutor still had discretion to prosecute

Gonzalez. 

The district court considered Gonzalez’s criminal history. Specifically, the 

court observed that Gonzalez had been convicted of possessing cocaine with intent 

to distribute at age 18. The court also recalled that, in 2013, after having failed to 

appear for a change-of-plea hearing, he had barricaded himself in a home in a “fourto five-hour standoff with law enforcement.” R. Doc. 131, at 22. The court said that 

the two standoffs “were incredibly dangerous and repeated situations” that gave the 

court “a lot of concern about how Mr. Gonzalez reacts when things are going 

poorly.” Id. at 23. And the court further noted Gonzalez’s acts of domestic abuse and 

stated, “[A]ll of this is quite aggravating.” Id. 
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The court also considered Gonzalez’s mitigation evidence. It commented that 

there was no medical evidence showing the nature of Gonzalez’s illness. The court

acknowledged that Gonzalez was working and trying to perform lead remediation, 

but it also noted that the exhibits submitted did not show the extent of that work. 

In determining the sentence, the court said that it would have sentenced 

Gonzalez to the top of the Guidelines range but for his acceptance of responsibility. 

The court then sentenced him to 30 months’ imprisonment, the midpoint of the 

Guidelines range, and two years of supervised release. Gonzalez appeals. 

II. Discussion

We review for an abuse of discretion the substantive reasonableness of a 

sentence imposed after a revocation of supervised release. United States v. Dixon, 

52 F.4th 731, 733 (8th Cir. 2022). “An abuse of discretion occurs when a court: (1) 

fails to consider a relevant factor that should have received significant weight; (2) 

gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor; or (3) considers only the 

appropriate factors but in weighing them commits a clear error of judgment.” Id. 

Prior to revoking a term of supervised release, a district court must consider several

factors, including “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and 

characteristics of the defendant,” as well as “the need for the sentence imposed . . . 

to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct . . . [and] protect the public from 

further crimes of the defendant.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)–(2)(C); see also id.

§ 3583(e)(3). A district court has “wide latitude in weighing relevant factors.” 

United States v. Wilkins, 909 F.3d 915, 917 (8th Cir. 2018) (quoting United States 

v. Farmer, 647 F.3d 1175, 1180 (8th Cir. 2011)).

A. Consideration of the Prior Standoff

Gonzalez first argues that the district court “gave significant weight to an 

improper sentencing factor” when it considered his prior standoff with police. 

Appellant’s Br. at 17. He notes that the prior standoff was remote in time and was 

not alleged to be a violation of his supervised-release conditions. Furthermore, the 
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court raised the prior conduct sua sponte and had already considered this conduct at 

Gonzalez’s original sentencing. Gonzalez argues that the court’s emphasis on the 

prior standoff suggests “that the [c]ourt did not consider” his domestic violence “to 

be commensurate with a typical grade A violation.” Id. at 20. 

The district court did not abuse its discretion in considering Gonzalez’s prior 

standoff with law enforcement. The court was required to consider Gonzalez’s 

“history and characteristics” before revoking his supervised release. 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a)(1); see also id. § 3583(e)(3). A court may consider that a defendant has 

put himself in situations “fraught with danger,” United States v. Beran, 751 F.3d 

872, 875 (8th Cir. 2014), or repeatedly engaged in wrongdoing of the same character, 

see United States v. Kreitinger, 576 F.3d 500, 504 (8th Cir. 2009); United States v. 

Larison, 432 F.3d 921, 922, 924 (8th Cir. 2006). The district court noted the 

dangerousness of Gonzalez’s conduct, suggesting that the court had in mind “the 

need for the sentence imposed . . . to protect the public from further crimes of the 

defendant.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C); see also id. § 3583(e).

Additionally, in the context of an initial sentencing, “[i]t is well-settled that 

factors taken into account in calculating the advisory [G]uidelines range can form 

the basis of an upward variance . . . and that a sentencing court may vary upward 

based on criminal history already accounted for by the Guidelines.” United States v. 

Manuel, 73 F.4th 989, 993 (8th Cir. 2023). At a revocation hearing, a court possesses

the same discretion to consider the defendant’s past misconduct; indeed, the court is 

required to consider the defendant’s “history and characteristics.” 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a)(1). 

As for Gonzalez’s claim that his prior standoff was remote in time, we have 

previously permitted a sentencing court to consider 25 years of criminal history. 

United States v. Abrica-Sanchez, 808 F.3d 330, 335 (8th Cir. 2015). Gonzalez’s 

conduct was considerably more recent than the conduct considered in AbricaSanchez. 
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Furthermore, the district court had discretion to consider Gonzalez’s prior 

standoff even though the government did not raise the issue. We have noted that 

when the same judge presides over an initial sentencing and a later revocation, “the 

district court [i]s aware of [the defendant’s] history and characteristics.” United 

States v. Franklin, 397 F.3d 604, 607 (8th Cir. 2005). The court is not required to 

turn a blind eye to a defendant’s known history and focus only on the facts argued 

by the parties. 

Thus, Gonzalez’s prior standoff was relevant history that the district court 

appropriately considered.

B. Mitigating Factors

Gonzalez next argues that the district court failed to appropriately weigh the 

mitigating factors. When “the district court heard argument from counsel about 

specific § 3553(a) factors, we may presume that the court considered those factors.” 

United States v. Keating, 579 F.3d 891, 893 (8th Cir. 2009). Here, the court did not 

overreach its “wide latitude in weighing [the] relevant factors.” Wilkins, 909 F.3d at 

917 (quoting Farmer, 647 F.3d at 1180). 

First, Gonzalez argues that the court should have placed more weight on his 

four years of compliance while on supervised release. He contends that he is not a 

recidivist violator. But Gonzalez first violated his supervised-release conditions 

when he failed to report for drug testing on June 25, 2019, merely three months after 

his release, and he failed to report on two more occasions prior to the spring of 2023.

There was no four-year stretch of compliance. Regardless, Gonzalez’s counsel 

argued in mitigation that Gonzalez had complied with supervision for about four 

years, so we presume that the district court considered the absence of any major 

violations during that four-year period. See Keating, 579 F.3d at 893. 

Second, Gonzalez argues that the court should have given more weight to his 

medical condition and his community service. He asserts that his positive marijuana 

test resulted from his use of an over-the-counter cannabis product to treat his 
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stomach pain. After this positive test, the court modified his supervised release 

conditions to include 20 hours of community service, which he contends that he 

completed. 

The district court considered Gonzalez’s reported stomach pain but apparently 

did not think it was a health condition warranting a reduction in sentence. Gonzalez 

did not testify about the pain he had experienced, and the court specifically noted 

the absence of any medical records showing Gonzalez’s health problems. The court 

was not required to accept as proof of a medical condition Gonzalez’s report to the 

probation officer that he was experiencing pain. See United States v. Marrow Bone, 

378 F.3d 806, 809 (8th Cir. 2004) (“[A] revocation court is not bound to credit the 

defendant’s explanations and the existence of mitigating factors need not result in 

the sentence requested by the defendant.”); United States v. Hensley, 36 F.3d 39, 41 

(8th Cir. 1994) (“[The defendant] was given an opportunity to offer mitigating 

circumstances for his violations and to argue that those circumstances weighed 

against revocation. Although the [d]istrict [c]ourt listened to and explored [the 

defendant’s] explanations, the court was not bound to credit those 

explanations . . . .”). 

Additionally, although Gonzalez submitted evidence to the court showing 

completion of his community service, he did so on May 31, nine days after the 

expiration of the 45-day period for completion. And there was no indication from 

the email whether the hours had been completed before the deadline. But regardless, 

Gonzalez’s counsel brought up the community service in argument, and we may

presume that the court considered it. See Keating, 579 F.3d at 893. The court may 

have reasonably determined that Gonzalez’s completion of required community 

service was not particularly strong mitigation evidence but instead merely overcame 

the revocation petition’s indication that he had failed to complete the community 

service. 

Third, Gonzalez argues that the court should have afforded more weight to the 

facts that he missed the three drug tests in April because of stomach pain and that he
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eventually tested negative for drugs. But as noted above, the court was not required 

to accept his report of pain as conclusive. And although a negative drug test does 

lend credence to his explanation for missing the tests, it is not particularly strong 

mitigation evidence given his later, more serious violations. 

Finally, Gonzalez argues that his wife’s waiver of prosecution should have 

been considered in mitigation and that his grade A violation was closer to a grade C 

violation. But the court said that it would consider the waiver, and we have no reason 

to doubt that it did. Furthermore, the waiver does not diminish Gonzalez’s

culpability for his conduct. Gonzalez admitted to assaulting his wife and conceded 

that this was a grade A violation. The district court was not required to downgrade 

this violation based on the mercy of Gonzalez’s wife. 

We hold that the court adequately considered the mitigating factors presented

at sentencing.

III. Conclusion

The district court did not abuse its discretion in considering Gonzalez’s prior 

standoff with police, and the court appropriately considered the mitigating factors 

presented. Therefore, we affirm. 

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