UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ BYRON TYROME TODD, Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. USA, in corporate capacity; U.S. PERSON(S), named herein as John Does in corporate capacity; THE WORLD BANK, capacity as USA Alter Ego, Defendants - Appellees. No. 15-1249 (D.C. No. 1:15- CV-00344-LTB) (D. Colo.)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________ Before TYMKOVICH , Chief Judge, HARTZ and MORITZ , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ Byron Tyrome Todd, a Colorado state prisone r, appeals pro se from the district court’s order dismissing his second amended complaint w ithout prejudice for failure to comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Todd also requests leave to proceed in forma

* After examining Todd’s brief and th e appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argumen t would not material ly assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctr ines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cite d, however, for its persuasive value. See Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 ; 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### October 27, 2015
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 pauperis (IFP) on appeal. We grant Todd’s mo tion to proceed IFP, but we affirm the district court’s dismissa l of Todd’s complaint. 1
We review a district court’ s dismissal of a complaint under Rule 8(a) for abuse of discretion. United States ex rel. Lemmon v. Envirocare of Utah, Inc. , 614 F.3d 1163, 1167 (10t h Cir. 2010). Rule 8(a) requires that a complaint cont ain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and . . . a demand for the relief sought.” Todd’s pro se status doesn’t relieve him of the dut y to comply with the rules of civil procedure. See United States v. Ceballos–Martinez , 387 F.3d 1140, 1145 (10th Cir. 2004). And while we construe a pro se litig ant’s pleadings liberally, holding such pleadings to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers, we don’t assume an advocacy ro le for the pro se litigant. Hall v. Bellmon , 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10t h Cir. 1991). After reviewing the appeal record, we c onclude the district court didn’t abuse its discretion in dismissing Todd’s second amended compla int. In thr ee separate orders, the magistrate judge informed Todd of deficien cies in his pleadings and explained to him how to cure those defici encies. Yet Todd entir ely failed to do so, ultimately filing a second am ended complaint which the di strict court described as

1 We ordinarily lack jurisdiction to revi ew the dismissal of a complaint without prejudice. But we have juri sdiction here because the di strict court dismissed the entire action, not ju st the complaint. See B. Willis, C.P.A., In c. v. BNSF Ry. Corp. , 531 F.3d 1282, 1296 n. 15 (10t h Cir. 2008) (holding that th e dismissal of a complaint ordinarily is a non-final, nona ppealable order since amendmen t generally is available, while dismissal of the entire ac tion ordinarily is final).3 follows: “[T]he second amended complaint r ecites an array of statutory and commonlaw causes of action with little, if any, connection to the factual allegations. The allegations themselves are fanciful and de lusional. Indeed, the factual allegations themselves are so confusing and disjoint ed so as to rende r the legal claims incomprehensible.” District C ourt Order, ECF No. 16, at 3. We fully agree with the district c ourt’s summary of the second amended complaint and with the court’s conclusion that even a liberal construction doesn’t bring the amended complaint within the amb it of Rule 8(a)(2). We thus affirm the district court’s dism issal of Todd’s second amended complaint. However, we grant Todd’s motion to proceed IFP and remind hi m of his obligation to continue making payments until the filing fee is paid in full. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b).

Entered for the Court
Nancy L. Moritz Circuit Judge