Opinion issued May 2, 2013

In The

Court of Appeals 

For The 

First District of Texas 

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NO. 01-12-00477-CV

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AMERICAN RODSMITHS, INC., ROBERT SCHERER AND SANDRA 

SCHERER, Appellants

V.

GLV INTERNATIONAL, INC., Appellee

On Appeal from the 152nd District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Case No. 2012-08551

MEMORANDUM OPINION

In a Texas proceeding to domesticate a state of Washington judgment, 

appellants, American Rodsmiths, Inc. (“ARS”), Robert Scherer, and Sandra 

Scherer, challenge the jurisdiction of a Washington state district court to enter the 
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judgment in favor of appellee, GLV International, Incorporated (“GLV”), against 

ARS, Robert Scherer, and “Jane Doe Scherer.” Concluding that we lack 

jurisdiction, we dismiss the appeal. 

Background

On December 2, 2010, GLV sued ARS, Robert Scherer, and “Jane Doe 

Scherer,” “Husband and Wife and the Marital Community Comprised Thereof” in 

the Washington state district court for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and 

the enforcement of a personal guaranty on a debt. On September 23, 2011, the 

Washington district court granted GLV summary judgment against ARS, Robert 

Scherer, and “Jane Doe” Scherer, awarding damages in the amount of 

$342,497.13. ARS and Robert Scherer appealed the summary judgment on 

November 22, 2011. 

On February 9, 2012, GLV filed a petition in the Harris County district court

below to enforce the Washington judgment against ARS, Robert Scherer, and his 

wife, Sandra Scherer. On March 8, 2012, ARS, Robert Scherer, and Sandra 

Scherer filed a motion, seeking to stay enforcement of the Washington judgment.

1

They further challenged the judgment on the ground that it was entered against 

 1 See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 35.006 (Vernon 2008).
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Sandra Scherer in violation of her due process rights.

2

 On May 18, 2012, the trial 

court granted the stay indefinitely.

Dismissal

This Court notified the parties that it intended to dismiss the appeal for want 

of jurisdiction and invited briefing on the issue. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a). 

Appellants are challenging the Washington judgment that was rendered final and 

enforceable in Texas when GLV filed it in the Harris County district court in 

compliance with the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (“UEFJA”). 

See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 35.003 (Vernon 2008) (instructing 

district court clerk to treat the foreign judgment in same manner as judgment of 

that court itself); Walnut Equip. Leasing Co. v. Wu, 920 S.W.2d 285, 286 (Tex.

1996). The filing of the foreign judgment effectively comprises both a plaintiff’s 

original petition and a final judgment. Wu, 920 S.W.2d at 286. 

The enforcement of a foreign judgment may be stayed. See TEX. CIV. PRAC.

& REM. CODE ANN. § 35.006 (Vernon 2008). However, section 35.006 does not 

provide that such an order is appealable. And, here, the order granting the stay 

does not dispose of all the issues and parties, specifically, appellants’ attack on the 

jurisdiction of the Washington district court. See Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 

S.W.3d 191, 200 (Tex. 2001). 

 2 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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A foreign judgment filed in a Texas court is subject to the same procedures, 

defenses, and proceedings for reopening, vacating, staying, enforcing or satisfying 

a judgment as a judgment of the court in which it is filed. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. &

REM. CODE ANN. § 35.003; Wu, 920 S.W.2d at 286. The judgment debtor may 

then initiate the same defenses and proceedings for reopening, vacating, or staying 

a final judgment. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 35.003(c).

In support of their assertion that this Court should view their motion to stay 

the enforcement, which included a challenge to the Washington court’s 

jurisdiction, as a motion for new trial, which was in effect denied, appellants rely 

on Moncrief v. Harvey, 805 S.W.2d 20 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, no pet.). 

Appellants acknowledge that their jurisdictional challenge was not addressed by 

the trial court, but nevertheless, argue that it was overruled by operation of law 

after seventy-five days. However, in Moncrief, the court simply addressed the 

appellate timetables for attacking a foreign judgment. 805 S.W.2d at 22. The 

purpose of making a procedural comparison of a motion to contest enforcement of 

a foreign judgment to a motion for new trial is to note that a trial court has the 

same extended period of time to review a motion to contest a foreign judgment as 

it would have if a party filed a motion for new trial. Counsel Fin. Servs, L.L.C. v.

David McQuade Leibowitz, P.C., 311 S.W.3d 45, 52 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 

2010, pet. denied) (noting that “[t]o compel a judgment debtor to perfect an appeal 
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within thirty days of the filing of the foreign judgment would minimize the trial 

court’s opportunity to review the debtor’s motion to contest recognition of the 

foreign judgment.”). Thus, the court in Moncrief “merely explain[ed] that for the 

purposes of appellate timetables, a motion to stop enforcement of a judgment filed 

pursuant to the UEFJA operates procedurally as a motion for new trial.” Id. at 53. 

Here, the Harris County district court granted appellants the relief that they 

requested—a stay of the enforcement of the Washington judgment. And it did not 

dispose of all the issues and parties. Accordingly, we conclude that we do not have 

jurisdiction over the appeal.

Conclusion

We dismiss the appeal.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Justices Jennings, Bland, and Massengale.