SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY 

 APPELLATE DIVISION 

 DOCKET NO. A-3124-22 

IECHESKEL ABRAMSKY, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v.

RUTH ABRAMSKY, 

 Defendant-Respondent. 

________________________

Submitted June 5, 2024 – Decided August 26, 2024 

Before Judges Vernoia and Gummer. 

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Ocean County, Docket 

No. FM-15-0222-20. 

Tonneman & Connors, LLC, attorneys for appellant 

(Cheryl E. Connors, of counsel and on the briefs). 

Lederberger Law, attorneys for respondent (Leah 

Lederberger, on the brief). 

PER CURIAM 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE 

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION 

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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In this post-judgment matrimonial matter, plaintiff Iecheskel Abramsky 

appeals from an order denying his motion for a plenary hearing regarding his 

request to modify custody and parenting time. A Family Part judge denied the 

motion in part, declining to enforce a provision in the parties' Marital Settlement 

Agreement (MSA) in which the parties agreed to a one-time waiver of the 

obligation to establish a substantial change in circumstances to modify the 

custody or parenting-time schedule of their children. Given the clear language 

of the parties' agreement and the temporary nature of their initial custody 

arrangement, we reverse that provision of the order and otherwise affirm. 

I.

 Plaintiff and defendant Ruth Abramsky were married in 2007 and had 

three children who were born in 2007, 2009, and 2014, respectively. After 

obtaining a religious divorce from a rabbinical court in 2019, the parties were 

divorced by way of an April 5, 2022 dual judgment of divorce in which the 

parties incorporated their MSA of the same date. 

In the MSA, the parties agreed to have joint legal custody of the children. 

In paragraph one of the MSA, the parties also agreed: 

Neither party shall be designated as the Parent of 

Primary Residence at this time as the parties have 

agreed to an equal timesharing parenting agreement for 

a period of six months following the execution of this 
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agreement, with the acknowledgement that as of recent 

the two oldest children are not exercising parenting 

time with the Father consistent with the schedule set 

forth herein, although they are working towards 

reunification. 

In paragraph nine of the MSA, the parties agreed to retain a Parenting 

Coordinator, who would "assist the parties as it relates to parenting time issues 

and on other child related issues, and [would] make recommendations if the 

parties are unable to resolve disputes." The parties agreed to "be bound by the 

recommendations of the Parenting Coordinator unless either party files an 

application to the [c]ourt to object to the recommendation within 14 days of the 

recommendation." 

Paragraph sixteen of the MSA was entitled "Six-Month Review" and 

provided: 

After a six-month period following the execution of this 

Agreement, the parties shall review the 

custody/parenting time schedule to determine a 

schedule that is in the best interests of the children at 

this time. The parties shall attend at least one session 

with the Parenting Coordinator to mediate an 

appropriate parenting schedule with the costs of same 

to be shared as set forth above. In the event that

mediation is unsuccessful, or one party fails to 

cooperate in attending the mediation session, either 

party shall have a right to file an application with the 

[c]ourt to modify the Custody/Parenting time schedule 

set forth herein without the necessity of demonstrating 

a substantial change in circumstances. Each party 
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further reserves the right to obtain a best interests 

forensic custody evaluation at that time at his or her 

own cost. 

In a September 6, 2022 letter, plaintiff's counsel asked the Parenting 

Coordinator to schedule "as soon as possible" the mediation session the parties 

were required to attend pursuant to paragraph sixteen of the MSA. The next 

day, defense counsel emailed the Parenting Coordinator, asking her to schedule 

the mediation sometime after the six-month period referenced in paragraph 

sixteen. In an email she sent that day, the Parenting Coordinator advised the 

parties she was "professionally prohibited from engaging with the parties both 

as a [parenting coordinator] and mediator" and told them it would be "more 

appropriate for the parties to meet with another professional" for the mediation. 

The parties subsequently attended a mediation session before a different 

mediator on November 29, 2022. 

In a December 30, 2022 letter, plaintiff's attorney advised defense counsel 

that plaintiff had retained someone to perform a best-interests evaluation, citing 

paragraph sixteen of the MSA, and asked that defendant complete and execute 

the enclosed documents provided by him. Defendant apparently declined to 

participate in that evaluation. 
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On January 26, 2023, plaintiff moved to compel defendant "to cooperate 

with a best[-]interests evaluation by plaintiff's expert, . . . in accordance with 

Paragraph 16 of the [MSA]." In the motion, plaintiff also sought the scheduling 

of a plenary hearing, after the completion of the best-interests evaluation, for 

the court "to determine the following requests": (1) "[m]odifying custody and 

parenting time such that plaintiff will be designated the parent of primary 

residence and defendant will be designated the parent[] of alternate residence"; 

and (2) "[m]odifying the parenting time schedule such that the minor children 

. . . will reside with plaintiff primarily with a parenting time schedule for 

defendant of alternating weekends and one weeknight dinner each week." He 

also asked the court to order defendant to pay his counsel fees. 

In support of the motion, plaintiff submitted his certification, in which he 

asserted paragraph sixteen of the MSA "makes clear that [the parties] agreed 

that no showing of changed circumstances was necessary to modify the custody 

and parenting time schedule," the purpose of that paragraph "was to avoid 

unnecessary motion practice," and the parties' "intent when signing the MSA 

was to attend mediation and then obtain best[-]interests evaluations if [they] 

were unable to agree." 
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Defendant opposed the motion and cross-moved to "[r]ecogniz[e] and 

enforc[e]" the parties' "share[d] legal custody and equal timesharing" of the 

children set forth in paragraph one of the MSA and to modify paragraph thirtyfive of the MSA to provide that both parties would "share in the ability to 

schedule and attend medical appointments of their children." She also asked the 

court to order plaintiff to pay her legal fees. 

On May 5, 2023, the Family Part judge heard argument and issued an order 

denying plaintiff's motion, granting defendant's cross-motion, and denying both 

fee applications. In paragraph one of the order, the judge denied the aspect of 

plaintiff's motion seeking to compel defendant's cooperation with his expert's 

best-interests evaluation. The judge found that while the MSA gave the parties

the right to obtain a custody evaluation at their own cost, nothing in the MSA 

compelled the parties to "cooperate [in] or facilitate such an evaluation." 

In paragraph two of the order, the judge denied the aspect of plaintiff's 

motion seeking a plenary hearing regarding his requests to modify custody and 

parenting time without first demonstrating a substantial change in 

circumstances. The judge found the MSA did "not have any weight in

overturning the caselaw which governs the [c]ourt in determining whether to 

entertain the parties' application." Noting the court was not a party to the MSA, 
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the judge explained on the record that "parties can negotiate their alimony, they 

can negotiate the parameters of their child support, they can negotiate many 

things," but they cannot "negotiate the standards by which a [c]ourt will act." 

He held "[a] judge must consider a request for modification in accordance with 

the procedural framework established by the New Jersey Supreme Court in 

. . . . Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 157-59 (1980)," which requires the party 

seeking modification to make a prima facie showing of a change in 

circumstances. The judge concluded "there is no justification on the present 

record to find that a change in custody at this time is in the children's best 

interests." 

Plaintiff appeals from paragraphs one and two of the order, arguing the 

judge erred in declining to be bound by the MSA provision permitting the parties 

to file a custody or parenting-time modification motion "without the necessity 

of demonstrating a substantial change in circumstances" and "erroneously 

denied plaintiff the right to his best[-]interests expert." Following the 

unambiguous language of the parties' MSA, we affirm paragraph one and reverse 

paragraph two of the order. 
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II. 

Our review of a Family Part judge's findings is limited. "[W]e 'review 

. . . [a] Family Part judge's findings in accordance with a deferential standard of 

review, recognizing the court's special jurisdiction and expertise in family 

matters.'" S.B.B. v. L.B.B., 476 N.J. Super. 575, 594 (App. Div. 2023) (quoting 

Thieme v. Aucoin-Thieme, 227 N.J. 269, 282-83 (2016)), certif. denied, 256 

N.J. 434 (2024). We review de novo questions of law, such as the interpretation 

and construction of a contract. Amzler v. Amzler, 463 N.J. Super. 187, 197

(App. Div. 2020); see also Steele v. Steele, 467 N.J. Super. 414, 440 (App. Div. 

2021). 

The settlement of family disputes is "encouraged and highly valued in our 

system." Quinn v. Quinn, 225 N.J. 34, 44 (2016). Settlement agreements in 

matrimonial matters, "being 'essentially consensual and voluntary in character[,] 

. . . [are] entitled to considerable weight with respect to their validity and 

enforceability' in equity, as long as they are fair and just." N.H. v. H.H., 418 

N.J. Super. 262, 279 (App. Div. 2011) (alterations in the original) (quoting 

Petersen v. Petersen, 85 N.J. 638, 642 (1981)). "[I]t is 'shortsighted and unwise 

for courts to reject out of hand consensual solutions to vexatious personal 

matrimonial problems that have been advanced by the parties themselves.'" 
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Quinn, 225 N.J. at 44 (quoting Petersen, 85 N.J. at 645). "Therefore, 'fair and 

definitive arrangements arrived at by mutual consent should not be 

unnecessarily or lightly disturbed.'" Id. at 44-45 (quoting Smith v. Smith, 72 

N.J. 350, 358 (1977)). 

A settlement agreement resolving a matrimonial dispute is a contract and 

"is governed by basic contract principles." Id. at 45. Guided by those principles 

a court "should discern and implement the intentions of the parties" and "should 

not rewrite a contract or grant a better deal than that for which the parties 

expressly bargained." Ibid. "Thus, when the intent of the parties is plain and 

the language is clear and unambiguous, a court must enforce the agreement as 

written, unless doing so would lead to an absurd result." Ibid. 

"[S]ettlements – the parties' choice of the least unfavorable alternatives –

occur for many reasons other than certainty of result. Settlements are made to 

obviate the pressures of litigation, to avoid the expense of counsel fees, and to 

avoid the cost and delay of appeals." N.H., 418 N.J. Super. at 280. In a clear 

attempt to "obviate the pressures of litigation" and "to avoid the expense of 

counsel fees," the parties chose a six-month review period instead of proceeding 

immediately to a trial to resolve their disputes concerning custody and parenting 

time. We know that from the unambiguous language of their MSA. 
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In paragraph one, the parties agreed "[n]either party shall be designated 

as the Parent of Primary Residence at this time as the parties have agreed to an 

equal timesharing parenting agreement for a period of six months following the 

execution of this agreement . . . ." As set forth in paragraph sixteen, they agreed 

that after the six-month period, they would "review the custody/parenting time 

schedule to determine a schedule that is in the best interests of the children at 

this time"; they would "attend at least one [mediation] session with the Parenting 

Coordinator"; and, if the mediation was unsuccessful, either party had "a right 

to file an application with the [c]ourt to modify the Custody/Parenting time 

schedule set forth herein without the necessity of demonstrating a substantial 

change in circumstances." We see nothing unfair or unjust about those agreedupon procedures nor any reason to think they would lead to an absurd result. 

Focusing on the last sentence of paragraph sixteen – "Each party further 

reserves the right to obtain a best interests forensic custody evaluation at that 

time at his or her own cost" – in isolation, defendant contends the phrase "at that 

time" is somehow ambiguous and would enable plaintiff to "wake up after two, 

three or five years after entry into the MSA, invoke this contractual right, and 

change the custodial status quo on a dime." Nonsense. Looking as we must at 

the language of paragraph sixteen and the MSA as a whole, the parties clearly 
11 A-3124-22

agreed to a one-time waiver of the change-in-circumstances obligation, 

occurring only after the initial six-month review period and an unsuccessful 

mediation. It does not provide a carte blanche waiver to be invoked at any time 

on the whim of a party. 

The Family Part judge declined to enforce paragraph sixteen, believing, 

despite its clear language, plaintiff had to establish a change in circumstances 

pursuant to the "procedural framework" outlined in Lepis, 83 N.J. at 157-59. In 

so holding, the judge failed to appreciate the temporary nature of the parties' 

initial six-month custody and parenting-time arrangement and the 

reasonableness of their mutual decision to attempt to resolve their initial custody 

and parenting-time disputes by first participating in a six-month review and 

mediation before proceeding to a best-interests evaluation and trial. For these 

reasons, we reverse paragraph two of the order, in which the judge denied the 

aspect of plaintiff's motion seeking a plenary hearing regarding his requests to 

modify custody and parenting time without first demonstrating a substantial 

change in circumstances. 

The judge also denied the aspect of plaintiff's motion seeking to compel 

defendant "to cooperate with a best[-]interests evaluation by plaintiff's expert." 

The judge found that "[w]hile the terms of the MSA reserve each parties' rights 
12 A-3124-22

to obtain a custody evaluation at their own cost, there is nothing in the terms of 

the MSA that compels the other party to cooperate or facilitate such an 

evaluation" and that plaintiff had "not presented any compelling justification for 

why such an evaluation is needed at this time . . . [and] to justify the [c]ourt's 

intervention to require [d]efendant's compliance with the [p]laintiff's custody 

evaluation at this time." Because the clear language of the MSA supports the 

first conclusion and the record supports the latter, we agree and, thus, affirm 

paragraph one of the order. 

Plaintiff cited the language of paragraph sixteen in support of his motion 

to compel defendant's cooperation. But paragraph sixteen provides only that 

each party "reserve[d] the right to obtain a best interests forensic custody 

evaluation"; it says nothing about requiring the other party's cooperation with or 

participation in that evaluation. In denying plaintiff's motion to compel, the 

judge did not, as plaintiff argues, deny plaintiff his right to obtain a best-interests 

evaluation; the judge simply and correctly refused to impose an obligation to 

cooperate that did not exist in the MSA. Accordingly, we affirm paragraph one 

of the order, in which the judge denied the aspect of plaintiff's motion seeking 

to compel defendant to cooperate with his expert's best-interests evaluation. 
13 A-3124-22

Affirmed in part; reversed in part; and remanded for proceedings 

consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.