1

Filed 7/6/21 In re R.R. CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not 

certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for 

publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re R.R. et al., Persons Coming Under 

the Juvenile Court Law.

SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY 

CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

L.M.,

 Appellant.

E076120

(Super.Ct.Nos. J275424, J275425 

 & J275426)

OPINION

APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Annemarie G. 

Pace, Judge. Affirmed. 

Lelah S. Fisher, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Appellant.

Michelle D. Blakemore, County Counsel, and David Guardado, Deputy County 

Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
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I. INTRODUCTION

L.F. (Mother) is the maternal aunt and adoptive mother to five children: S.M., 

L.M.,

1 H.R., R.R., and R.E.2

 The three youngest children, H.R., R.R., and R.E., were 

adopted in July 2017. In March 2018, San Bernardino County Children and Family 

Services (CFS) filed petitions on behalf of all five children pursuant to Welfare and 

Institutions Code3section 300 et seq., following allegations that Mother’s husband had 

sexually abused L.M. and H.R.

During the course of the dependency proceedings, S.M. and L.M. both reached the 

age of majority,

4 and the remaining children were placed with paternal relatives willing to 

adopt in October 2019. Following the termination of reunification services and visitation 

with Mother, the juvenile court set the matter for a hearing pursuant to section 366.26 to 

consider selection of a permanent plan of adoption for H.R., R.R., and R.E. In response, 

L.M. filed a petition pursuant to section 388 requesting that his sibling relationship be 

recognized and be considered as a basis for selecting a permanent plan other than 

adoption for H.R., R.R., and R.E. 

1

 L.M.’s birth name is E.M., but he now identifies as transgender and prefers to be 

called by his chosen name, L.M.

2

 At some point in the proceedings, the juvenile court and parties began using the 

name Ri.R. to refer to R.E. However, for clarity and continuity, we will use R.E. to refer 

to this child throughout the opinion.

3

 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

4

 S.M. was born in 2001, and L.M. was born in 2002.
3

Following a contested hearing on November 5, 2020, the juvenile court denied 

L.M.’s request and terminated Mother’s parental rights. L.M. appeals from this order, 

arguing the juvenile court erred in failing to apply the sibling relationship exception to

the termination of parental rights provided in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(v). 

We find no error, and we affirm the order.

II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. Facts

Mother is the maternal aunt and adoptive mother to five children: S.M., L.M., 

H.R., R.R., and R.E.5 In March 2018, H.R. and L.M. reported they had been sexually 

abused by Mother’s husband. The children were detained, and CFS filed petitions on 

behalf of all the children pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (b), (d), and (j), as a result 

of the alleged sexual abuse.

On May 17, 2018, a jurisdictional hearing was held; Mother pled no contest to the 

allegations of the section 300 petitions, and the juvenile court sustained the allegations of 

the petitions.

On July 19, 2018, a dispositional hearing was held; and the juvenile court formally 

ordered the children removed from Mother’s custody, granted Mother reunification 

services, and approved weekly supervised visitation between Mother and the children.

5

 Mother adopted S.M. and L.M. in 2005 and adopted H.R., R.R., and R.E. in 

2017.
4

On June 18, 2019, a 12-month review hearing was held, and the juvenile court 

terminated reunification services to Mother. Following a special hearing on August 7, 

the juvenile court authorized CFS to suspend visitation among Mother and the children.

On October 11, 2019, the three youngest children, H.R., R.R., and R.E., were 

placed with paternal relatives, Mr. M. and Ms. S. L.M. was placed separately with a 

maternal relative.

On May 26, 2020, CFS recommended a hearing pursuant to section 366.26 be set 

to select and implement a permanent plan of adoption for H.R., R.R., and R.E. It was 

reported that H.R., R.R., and R.E. had adjusted well to living in the home of Mr. M. and 

Ms. S.; they wished to be adopted by Mr. M. and Ms. S.; and they no longer desired to 

have contact with L.M. or their maternal relatives in order to avoid drama. As a result, 

the juvenile court set the matter for a hearing to consider the selection and 

implementation of a permanent plan of adoption pursuant to section 366.26.

B. Section 366.26 Report

On September 18, 2020, CFS submitted a report in advance of the section 366.26 

hearing. CFS recommended parental rights be terminated and a permanent plan of 

adoption implemented for H.R., R.R., and R.E. CFS reported that all three children were 

healthy, meeting their developmental milestones, and doing well in school. H.R.’s and 

R.R.’s emotional well-being had improved to the point that they had graduated from 

services and were no longer in need of therapy.

CFS reported that the children had adjusted to their placement in the home of 

paternal relatives, Mr. M. and Ms. S.; the paternal relatives were willing to adopt the 
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children; and there was a clear attachment between the children and the paternal relatives. 

CFS reported that Mr. M. and Ms. S. had known the children their entire lives and had 

been involved with helping to provide for the children, even prior to the placement in 

their home.

CFS evaluated the prospective home of Mr. M. and Ms. S. favorably. They lived 

in a three-bedroom home that appeared to comfortably accommodate the children. Both 

Mr. M. and Ms. S. had stable employment, reported no counseling or psychological 

issues, and had no criminal or “CMS history.” However, Mr. M. and Ms. S. did report 

that they were not currently comfortable with continued contact with the children’s 

biological mother, but they indicated they would be open to contact in the future if such 

contact became appropriate. 

Following the submission of this report, the matter was set for a contested 

evidentiary hearing upon Mother’s request.

C. L.M.’s Section 388 Petition

Prior to the date set for the contested section 366.26 hearing, L.M. filed a petition 

pursuant to section 388. L.M. requested the court recognize his sibling relationship with 

H.R., R.R., and R.E. and objected to selection of a permanent plan of adoption for the 

children. L.M. argued he was raised in various homes with the children, shared 

significant and common experiences with them, and assumed the role of a caregiver and 

parent at times. He asked the juvenile court to select a plan of legal guardianship and to 

order unsupervised visitation between him and the children. L.M. stated that Mr. M. was 
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not supportive and did not sufficiently encourage visitation between L.M. and the 

children.

In a written response, CFS recommended that L.M.’s request be denied, parental 

rights be terminated, and a permanent plan of adoption selected for the children. In 

response to L.M.’s petition, a social worker contacted both Mr. M. and Ms. S. Both 

expressed the belief that it should be up to the children whether to have continued contact 

with L.M. and both indicated that the children expressed their desire to not have contact 

with L.M. at this time. Mr. M. stated that if the children were to express a desire to 

communicate with L.M. in the future, he would assist in initiating that contact.

The social worker further reported that she spoke with H.R. and R.R., separately,

by phone. H.R. expressed frustration with L.M., stated she did not want contact with 

L.M., and further stated she did not care whether her sibling relationship with L.M. 

remained intact. R.R. expressed that he preferred to be adopted by Mr. M. and Ms. S. 

and did not want anything to do with his maternal side of the family. The juvenile court 

ordered that L.M.’s petition be heard at the same time as that set for the contested section 

366.26 hearing.

D. Section 366.26 Hearing and Termination of Mother’s Parental Rights

On November 5, 2020, the juvenile court held a contested hearing regarding the 

selection of a permanent plan under section 366.26, as well as on the issue of the sibling 

bond exception raised in L.M.’s section 388 petition. The juvenile court accepted CFS’s 

section 366.26 report, as well as the written response to L.M.’s petition, into evidence.
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Mother testified that she formally adopted H.R., R.R., and R.E. in July 2017, but 

has known each of the children since birth, and the children have lived with her most of 

their lives with the exception of the last two and a half years. Mother stated she had a 

loving relationship with each of the children, in which she talked with them about their 

concerns, soothed them, and enjoyed recreational time with them. She stated that each of 

the children would verbally and physically express affection for her. On crossexamination, Mother admitted she had not seen the children for the past year, and all that 

she had described had not occurred in that time period.

L.M. testified that he is the sibling of H.R., R.R., and R.E. He lived with H.R. 

“off and on” when she was little, but he lived continuously with the children once they 

were placed into Mother’s care. He testified that he and H.R. “did everything together” 

and were “attached at the hip” as children. He also recounted that he and H.R. 

experienced sexual abuse together and would speak intimately with each other about their 

experiences. 

With respect to R.R., L.M. testified that they shared a room together after they 

were removed from Mother’s home and expressed the belief that R.R. looked to him for 

guidance. L.M. helped R.R. with homework, and the two ate together and did chores 

together. With respect to R.E., L.M. described her “like my live baby doll that I loved to 

have,” and recounted how he would help watch her and “be like, the second parent for 

her.”

L.M. believed that all three children were still bonded to him. However, since the 

children were placed with Mr. M. and Ms. S., L.M. had only had a few visits with them. 
8

Despite this, L.M. believed the children still needed him as a confidant and support 

person in their lives. 

On cross-examination, L.M. testified that he believed the children were closely 

bonded with Mother, they loved Mother, they did not “know what’s real and what’s not 

real,” and their caretaker following initial removal from Mother would manipulate the 

children into expressing a dislike for Mother. 

L.M. admitted the last time he lived with his siblings was in November 2019, and 

he had only had two or three visits with the children in 2020. L.M. further admitted that 

he had no knowledge of whether the children wished to be adopted. He did not have any 

personal information that Mr. M. or Ms. S. was manipulating the children in the manner 

he claimed prior caretakers had. 

Following argument, the juvenile court expressed its understanding that it was 

legally obligated to select adoption as the permanent plan unless it found that an 

exception applied. The juvenile court found no current bond between the children and 

Mother that would justify an exception based upon their relationship. With respect to 

L.M.’s assertion of a sibling bond, the juvenile court agreed that L.M. was part of the 

sibling set at the time of removal, he lived with the children for a large portion of the time 

they were removed, they shared common experiences, and he had been a big part of the 

children’s lives during the time they were removed. However, the juvenile court 

indicated the circumstances had since changed, noting the children were now expressing 

that they did not currently want to have a relationship with L.M. and, as such, the need 

for permanency outweighed the need to maintain any sibling bond. 
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The juvenile court terminated mother’s parental rights and set the matter for a 

further permanency planning review hearing. L.M. appeals from this order.

III. DISCUSSION

On appeal, L.M. contends the juvenile court’s order terminating mother’s parental 

rights must be reversed because the juvenile court failed to properly apply the sibling 

bond exception under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(v). Specifically, L.M. 

argues: (1) the juvenile court’s finding that the children would not suffer detriment from 

a substantial interference with their sibling relationship was not supported by substantial 

evidence, and (2) the juvenile court’s determination that the benefits of adoption 

outweigh any detriment posed by interference with the sibling relationship was an abuse 

of discretion. We find no error in the record before us, and we affirm the order.6 

A. General Legal Principles and Standard of Review

Under section 388, “[a]ny person . . . may petition the court to assert a relationship 

as a sibling related by blood, adoption, or affinity through a common legal or biological 

parent to a child who is, or is the subject of a petition for adjudication as, a dependent of 

the juvenile court, and may request . . . consideration when determining or implementing 

6

 The question of whether a sibling granted permission to appear at a section 

366.26 hearing pursuant to section 388, subdivision (b), has standing to appeal from the 

order terminating parental rights appears unsettled. (Compare In re J.T. (2011) 

195 Cal.App.4th 707 [sibling does not have standing to appeal from order terminating 

parental rights] with In re D.M. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 283 [sibling has standing to 

appeal for purpose of seeking limited review of juvenile court’s determination on 

application of sibling-bond exception].) Nevertheless, neither party raised the issue on 

appeal, and resolution of the issue appears unnecessary to affirm the juvenile court’s 

order in this case. (See In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 52, fn. 2 [declining to 

decide issue of sibling standing where unnecessary to affirm trial court’s order].)
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a case plan or permanent plan for the dependent child.” (§ 388, subd. (b)(1).) Here, L.M. 

brought a section 388 petition in order to assert a sibling relationship and request 

consideration of the sibling bond exception at the time of the contested section 366.26 

hearing. 

“The express purpose of a section 366.26 hearing is ‘to provide stable, permanent 

homes’ for dependent children. [Citation.] If the court has decided to end parent-child 

reunification services, the legislative preference is for adoption. [Citations.] When the 

court finds by clear and convincing evidence the child is likely to be adopted, the statute 

mandates judicial termination of parental rights unless . . . one of six enumerated 

exceptions applies.” (In re Elizabeth M. (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 768, 780-781.) 

One such exception is the sibling bond exception, which provides that the court is 

not required to terminate parental rights where it “finds a compelling reason for 

determining that termination would be detrimental to the child . . . [because] [t]here 

would be substantial interference with a child’s sibling relationship.” (§ 366.26, 

subd. (c)(1)(B)(v).) “ ‘If the court determines terminating parental rights would 

substantially interfere with the sibling relationship, the court is then directed to weigh the 

child’s best interest in continuing that sibling relationship against the benefit the child 

would receive by the permanency of adoption.’ ” (In re Elizabeth M., supra, 

19 Cal.App.5th at p. 781.) 

The burden is on the party opposing adoption to show that termination of parental 

rights would substantially interfere with the sibling relationship such that the detriment to 

the child outweighs the benefits the dependent child might otherwise gain in a permanent 
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home through adoption. (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 61; In re Daniel H. (2002) 

99 Cal.App.4th 804, 813.)

“In reviewing challenges to a trial court’s decision as to the applicability of these 

exceptions, we will employ the substantial evidence or abuse of discretion standards of 

review depending on the nature of the challenge. [Citation.] We will apply the 

substantial evidence standard of review to evaluate the evidentiary showing with respect 

to factual issues, such as whether the child has a close and strong bond with a sibling . . . . 

However, a challenge to the trial court’s determination of questions such as whether, 

given the existence of a sibling relationship, there is a compelling reason for determining 

that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child ‘ “is a 

quintessentially discretionary determination.” ’ [Citation] We review such decisions for 

abuse of discretion.” (In re J.S. (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1071, 1080.)

B. Substantial Evidence Supports Any Implied Finding That Termination of Parental 

Rights Would Not Substantially Interfere with the Sibling Relationship

On appeal, L.M. does not challenge the juvenile court’s determination that the 

children were adoptable, but contends the juvenile court erred in concluding that a 

permanent plan of adoption would not substantially interfere with the sibling relationship 
12

between L.M. and the children. Specifically, L.M. contends this implied7finding is not 

supported by substantial evidence. We disagree.

“The purpose of the sibling exception is to preserve long-standing sibling 

relationships that serve as ‘anchors for dependent children whose lives are in turmoil.’ 

[Citation.] ‘To show a substantial interference with a sibling relationship the . . . sibling 

granted standing . . . must show the existence of a significant sibling relationship, the 

severance of which would be detrimental to the child. Many siblings have a relationship 

with each other, but would not suffer detriment if that relationship ended. If the 

relationship is not sufficiently significant to cause detriment on termination, there is no 

substantial interference with that relationship.’ [Citation.] The court should consider ‘the 

nature and extent of the relationship, including whether the child and sibling were raised 

in the same house, shared significant common experiences or have existing close and 

strong bonds.’ ” (In re Elizabeth M., supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at p. 781.) 

In this case, while L.M. resided in the same home for a significant period of time 

and, as a result, shared some significant common experiences with the children, the 

evidence also suggested the children did not have an existing close or strong bond with 

7

 We observe that there does not appear to be an express factual finding on this 

issue. Both parties to this appeal assume the juvenile court made such a finding, but they 

have not cited to the record to identify such a finding. The minutes of the hearing and the 

juvenile court’s oral statements on the record do not appear to include any specific factual 

finding. Nevertheless, we recognize that “[t]he Legislature demands an express finding 

on the matter of detriment only when the trial court determines detriment exists and relies 

upon it to refuse to enter an otherwise proper termination order.” (In re A.A. (2008) 

167 Cal.App.4th 1292, 1321; § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(D).) “Where the statute does not 

mandate explicit findings, and where substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s 

order, findings may be implied.” (In re Aurora P. (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1142, 1166.)
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L.M. By the time of the section 366.26 hearing, H.R., R.R., and R.E. had been living 

separately from L.M. for more than a year. During that year, visitation and 

communication between the children and L.M. occurred only a handful of times. Further, 

Mr. M. and Ms. S. reported that the children expressed no desire to have contact with 

L.M., and the social worker reported that both H.R. and R.R. specifically expressed that 

they did not wish to continue a relationship with L.M. Particularly given H.R. and R.R.’s 

expressed desire to be adopted, even at the expense of maintaining a relationship with 

L.M., the juvenile court could reasonably conclude that the children’s current bond with 

L.M. was not particularly strong or that the nature of any relationship did not suggest 

L.M. served as an anchor in the lives of H.R., R.R., or R.E.

Thus, there was substantial evidence upon which the juvenile court could rely to 

find that the nature of the sibling relationship between the children and L.M. was not 

sufficiently significant to cause detriment to the children if parental rights were 

terminated. Absent detriment, the sibling bond exception to termination of parental rights 

does not apply, and where the juvenile court’s finding on this issue is supported by 

substantial evidence, L.M. has not shown grounds for reversal on appeal.

C. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Concluding the Need for 

Permanency Outweighed Any Potential Detriment 

L.M. also argues the juvenile court abused its discretion in concluding that any 

detriment to his sibling relationship with H.R., R.R., and R.E. was outweighed by the 

benefits these children would receive from adoption. As we have already explained, 

substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that the children would not 
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suffer detriment as a result of interference with any sibling relationship. Nevertheless, 

even assuming detriment did exist in this case, it was not an abuse of discretion for the 

juvenile court to conclude any such detriment was outweighed by the benefits the 

children would gain from adoption.

“[E]ven if adoption would interfere with a strong sibling relationship, the court 

must nevertheless weigh the benefit to the child of continuing the sibling relationship 

against the benefit the child would receive by gaining a permanent home through 

adoption.” (In re Celine R., supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 61; see In re J.S., supra, 

10 Cal.App.5th at p. 1080.)

Here, by the time of the section 366.26 hearing, H.R., R.R., and R.E. had been 

deprived of a permanent home for years. The children had been removed from their 

biological mother and adopted by Mother in 2017, removed less than a year later from 

Mother in March 2018, and moved multiple times in the following year until finally 

being placed with paternal relatives willing to adopt in October 2019. It was reported 

that following placement with Mr. M. and Ms. S., the children’s lives had stabilized. 

Indeed, both H.R.’s and R.R.’s emotional well-being had improved to the point where 

they were no longer considered in need of therapy, and they both expressed a desire to be 

adopted by Mr. M. and Ms. S. Based upon this record, it was not unreasonable for the 

juvenile court to conclude that the benefits these children would gain from adoption 

outweighed any potential detriment posed by interference with their sibling relationship 

with L.M.
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On appeal, L.M. does not contest the reasonableness of such a conclusion, but he 

suggests that it was unreasonable for the juvenile court to reach this conclusion without 

hearing directly from the children, pointing out that “the children have presented untrue 

representations of their positions in the past,” and that the children may have been under 

the mistaken belief that adoption was the only way to ensure they would not be returned 

to one of their prior placements. However, “ ‘ “[t]he appropriate test for abuse of 

discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason [and] [w]hen two or 

more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no 

authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court.” ’ ” (In re Stephanie M.

(1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319.) Where the juvenile court’s exercise of discretion is 

based upon evaluating the credibility of witnesses and evidence, this court does not 

reweigh the evidence or substitute its judgment for that of the juvenile court. (Id. at 

p. 319; In re L.Y.L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 947.) 

Thus, L.M.’s arguments attacking the credibility of the evidence before the 

juvenile court is not a basis for this court to reverse the juvenile court’s order. It was for 

the juvenile court to weigh the credibility of the witnesses and reports regarding the 

children’s expressed desires and to determine what weight such evidence should be 

given. If the juvenile court’s decision is otherwise reasonable following its credibility 

determinations, no abuse of discretion has been shown.
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IV. DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed. The request for judicial notice filed June 25, 2021, is 

denied, as the matters identified in the request are not relevant to the dispositive points on 

appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

FIELDS

Acting P. J.

We concur:

RAPHAEL

J.

MENETREZ

J.