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Dennis I. Wilenchik, #005350

WILENCHIK & BARTNESS PC

The Wilenchik & Bartness Building

2810 North Third Street

Phoenix, Arizona 85004

admin@wb-law.com

Leo R. Beus, #002687

BEUS GILBERT PLLC

701 North 44th Street

Phoenix, Arizona 85008

lbeus@beusgilbert.com

Attorneys for Wyo Tech Investment Group, LLC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,

Plaintiff,

v.

WYO TECH Investment Group, LLC; CWT 

Canada II Limited Partnership; Resources 

Recovery Corporation; and Jean Noelting,

Defendants.

WYO TECH Investment Group, LLC,

Cross-Claimant,

v.

CWT Canada II Limited Partnership, 

Resources Recovery Corporation, and Jean 

Noelting,

Cross-Claim Defendants.

WYO TECH Investment Group, LLC,

Third Party Plaintiff,

v.

Schlam Stone & Dolan, LLC, a New York 

Limited Liability Partnership; and Jeffrey M. 

Eilender,

Third Party Defendants.

Case No.: 2:17-CV-04140-JJT

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE OF 

WRONGFULLY RESTRAINED 

FUNDS

(Oral Argument Requested)

Case 2:17-cv-04140-DWL Document 92 Filed 10/23/18 Page 1 of 14
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES ........................................................................... 1

I. CWT’s Factual Claims are Irrelevant.............................................................................. 2

A.Ownership or Signing Authority of Non-Judgment Debtors is Not Evidence Sufficient to 

Support a Restraining Notice which the CWT Parties have Conceded by Failing to 

Address.................................................................................................3

B.Evidence of Payments made to Judgment Debtor from an Account is Not Evidence of the 

Judgment Debtor having any Interest in any of the Funds in the Account. ........................ 4

II. A Restraining Notice Issued under a Theory of a “Sham” Corporation is Invalid as a 

Matter of Law. ................................................................................................................... 6

III. The CWT Parties Fail to Address the Invalidity of the Restraining Notice.............. 8

IV. The Doctrine of Law of the Case Does Not Prevent this Court from Revisiting its Prior 

Ruling.................................................................................................................................. 8

V. The CWT Parties Completely Fail to Address the Undeniable Fact that if they 

Believed the Monies in the Account Belonged to Dennis Danzik this Action Would 

Violate the Bankruptcy Automatic Stay and would be Void. ...................................... 10

CONCLUSION................................................................................................................................ 11

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Wyo Tech Investment Group, LLC (“Wyo Tech”), hereby files its Reply in Support of its 

Motion for the Immediate Release of the Wrongfully Restrained Funds. This Motion is supported 

by the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities and prior filings in this case.

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

The CWT Parties’ Response misses the point entirely. Indeed, the CWT Parties entirely 

ignore Wyo Tech’s arguments regarding their violation of the bankruptcy stay in the event the 

funds were somehow determined to be Dennis Danzik or RDX’s; entirely ignore that there is no 

evidence whatsoever that Dennis Danzik or RDX deposited any money in the account in question; 

ignore the fact that a non-judgment debtor signor on an account does not magically convert all of 

the funds in the account to the non-judgment debtor’s funds (let alone the funds of a non-signor 

judgment debtor); entirely ignore that the mere payment of monies out of an account to a judgment 

debtor does not magically convert the funds in the account to that of the judgment debtors’; and 

entirely ignore the fact that the CWT Parties’ “alter ego/sham” company argument is not a basis 

for the issuance of a restraining notice as a matter of law. Significantly, the CWT Parties failure 

to contest these arguments, or indeed even reference them, constitutes a waiver and must result in 

Wyo Tech’s Motion being granted. See e.g., Martinez–Serrano v. I.N.S., 94 F.3d 1256, 1260 (9th 

Cir.1996) (failure to address issue constitutes waiver).

Rather, the CWT Parties’ Response consists almost entirely of claims that Dennis Danzik 

is allegedly a bad person who has allegedly stolen money.1

 Whether Dennis Danzik is a bad 

 1 Wyo Tech submits that the claims made by the CWT Parties in this regard are false. However, 

given that they are also irrelevant, rather than address them, Wyo Tech attaches hereto a copy of 

the Rule 5015 (effectively a Rule 60 Motion) filed in the New York Court by Dennis Danzik and 

RDX which Wyo Tech believes controverts the CWT Parties claims. [Exhibit A hereto]. Wyo 

Tech will not waste anymore of this Court’s time in relation to these claims given their complete 

irrelevance to the issues presented herein.

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person or has stolen money is entirely irrelevant and is nothing more than a thinly veiled attempt 

at prejudicing this Court in the hope that this Court ignores the actual issues, just as the CWT 

Parties have. The fact of the matter is plain, even if true, this does not, and cannot, provide the 

basis for a validly issued notice of restraint.

I. CWT’s Factual Claims are Irrelevant.

2

Despite the CWT Parties unsupported claim to the contrary, no issue of fact exists. While 

otherwise buried in a cacophony of false and irrelevant assertions, the CWT Parties’ summarize 

their supposed “evidence” as follows: (1) “Wyo Tech was formed by ... [Elizabeth] Danzik”; (2) 

“[o]ver half of the funds paid from the restrained Wyo Tech account were paid to ... Danzik 

Applied Sciences, LLC ... or to Elizabeth Danzik ... and to other known Danzik cronies”; (3) 

“Wyo Tech also paid thousands of dollars in Danzik’s legal fees out of this account”; and (4) 

“[t]he signature card on the account states that Jovahna Danzik ... is the ‘owner with control’ of 

Wyo Tech.” [Doc. 88 at 1:18 – 2:4]. The problem with this supposed “evidence” is that none of 

it matters or is even remotely relevant.3

 2 The CWT Parties claim that this is a summary judgment briefing. This, however, is simply not 

true or supported by the law. Wyo Tech does not seek judgment on any claim or defense, rather, 

it seeks the return of its funds (as the motion is properly titled). As defined by Black’s Law 

Dictionary, the term “summary judgment” means “[a] judgment granted on a claim or defense 

about which there is no genuine issue of material fact and on which the movant is entitled to 

prevail as a matter of law.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). In any event, a court 

may consider a motion for summary judgment even without an accompanying statement of facts. 

Indeed, when an otherwise styled motion is converted into a motion for summary judgment the 

Ninth Circuit does not require strict compliance with Rule 56. See e.g., Mayer v. Wedgewood 

Neighborhood Coalition, 707 F.2d 1020, 1021 (9th Cir.1983) (per curiam) (citing Portland Retail 

Druggists Association, 662 F.2d at 645). Rather, all that is required is fair notice, which clearly 

the CWT Parties have, since they are the ones arguing that somehow this motion must be 

converted into a motion for summary judgment. Moreover, the single case relied on by the CWT 

Parties for their contention was decided on the merits. In any event, although not a separate 

document, Wyo Tech included within its Motion a separate section entitled “statement of facts”. 

As such, even if considered a motion for summary judgment (which it is not), the CWT Parties 

objection puts form over substance.

3 The CWT Parties claim that they need additional time to conduct discovery to oppose this motion 

is without support or merit. Indeed, the CWT Parties have not even attempted to inform this Court 

of what additional discovery they need or what that additional discovery may show. Their 

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A. Ownership or Signing Authority of Non-Judgment Debtors is Not Evidence Sufficient 

to Support a Restraining Notice which the CWT Parties have Conceded by Failing to 

Address.

Even if true that Wyo Tech was formed by Elizabeth Danzik, Elizabeth Danzik is not a 

judgment debtor. Moreover, the undisputed evidence is that William (Bill) Hinz is the interim 

CEO and sole owner of Wyo Tech at all relevant times. Again, not a judgment debtor. Even if 

true that “[o]ver half of the funds paid from the restrained Wyo Tech account were paid to ... 

Danzik Applied Sciences, LLC ... or to Elizabeth Danzik ... and to other known Danzik cronies” 

not one of these payments was made to a judgment debtor. Similarly, whether or not Jovahna 

Danzik was a signor or an owner with control does not magically convert the account’s funds to 

hers (a non-judgment debtor), let alone the funds of a judgment debtor.

Significantly, the CWT Parties fail to challenge the legal analysis proffered by Wyo Tech 

in its Motion (Doc. 72) in relation to these points. Indeed, Wyo Tech’s Motion (Doc. 72) 

painstakingly addressed the legal effect of this supposed evidence starting on page 9 line 9 and 

continuing through page 12 line 4. As Wyo Tech explained therein, and as was uncontested by 

the CWT Parties, even evidence that a non-judgment debtor is a joint account holder, not just a 

signor for a brief period, does not provide the necessary evidence that any of the funds in the 

account were owned by any of these non-judgment debtors, let alone one of the judgment debtors. 

 

conclusory statement to the contrary is not sufficient. Moreover, the CWT Parties have the burden 

to prove that at the time they issued the restraining notice they had sufficient facts, a point they 

fail to address, and have therefore waived. [Doc. 72 at fn. 1 (“Wyo Tech anticipates that Judgment 

Creditors and their Counsel will attempt to delay a ruling on this Motion by claiming that they 

need to conduct “additional” discovery. Any such request should be denied. For one, Judgment 

Creditors and their Counsel have already conducted extensive discovery after the fact in relation 

to the sole issue in this case. Moreover, however, Judgment Creditors and their Counsels defense 

of their actions must be done based on the evidence they claim to have had in their possession at 

the time they issued the wrongful restraining notice and failed to comply with Arizona’s 

garnishment statute. Indeed, [p]ursuant to CPLR § 5222 a restraining notice is valid if, at time of 

service, the person served knows or has reason to believe that he is indebted to judgment debtor. 

As such, there is absolutely no reason to delay the returning of Wyo Tech’s funds by yet another 

ploy on the part of Judgment Creditors to interfere with Wyo Tech’s business, which has already 

been halted as a result of the wrongful acts of these actions complained of.”)].

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Noble v. Noble, 26 Ariz. App. 89, 93, 546 P.2d 358, 362 (1976) (mere fact that wife placed her 

separate funds in joint checking account with husband is not conclusive of any intent on her part 

that husband be vested with joint ownership of funds); O’Hair v. O’Hair, 109 Ariz. 236, 238, 508 

P.2d 66, 68 (1973) (form of bank account is not regarded as sufficient to establish intent of 

depositor to give another a joint interest in or ownership of deposit).

Having failed to address this, the CWT Parties have waived any argument to the contrary.

B. Evidence of Payments made to Judgment Debtor from an Account is Not Evidence of

the Judgment Debtor having any Interest in any of the Funds in the Account.

Even the one alleged payment that was made for the benefit of the judgment debtor—“Wyo 

Tech also paid thousands of dollars in Danzik’s legal fees out of this account”—is similarly

irrelevant even if true. Indeed, the CWT Parties only make claims that money was paid from the 

account for the benefit of Dennis Danzik. There is not a single allegation that Dennis Danzik or 

RDX (the only judgment debtors) ever placed any of their own monies in the account. Indeed, 

this salient issue was pointed out to the CWT Parties in Wyo Tech’s Motion:

Significantly, while Judgment Creditors claim that evidence of payments being 

made from a third-party account on behalf of a Judgment Debtor is sufficient to 

allow a restraint of all third-party funds, what Judgment Creditors and their Counsel 

conveniently omit is that in both cases, the salient issue, was that the Judgment 

Debtor had deposited assets in the account, and was dissipating those assets. Zolt, 

231 A.D.2d 479 (the Court found the restraining notice to be properly issued 

because “Deposition testimony and documentation indicated that defendant Zolt’s 

personal funds were deposited in his wife’s account”). Indeed, the case that is 

relied upon by the Court in Zolt explicitly states that the “regular” payment of 

personal expenses is insufficient on its own, but rather, there must also be evidence 

that the account “functioned as ‘recipients’ of his personal assets.” ERA Mgt. v. 

Morrison Cohen Singer & Weinstein, 199 A.D.2d 179 (1993). No evidence has been 

shown or produced that would establish that Judgment Debtors deposited any funds 

in the Wyo Tech account or that any of the Judgment Debtors drew any moneys 

from the account.

[Doc. 72 at fn. 1].

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Rather than contest this, the CWT Parties blindly cite the same cases discussed by Wyo 

Tech ostensibly for the purpose of claiming that they somehow establish that the mere payment 

of funds from an account to a judgment debtor allows garnishment of the entire account. Tellingly, 

even the CWT Parties own citations belie this contention. [Doc. 88 at 14:19 – 24 (“see also 

Bingham v. Zolt, 231 A.D.2d 479, 479 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1996) (restraining notice 

properly issued when evidence showed that ‘judgment debtor ha[d] regularly used another’s bank 

account as a ‘recipient’ of the debtor’s personal assets or as a source for payment of the debtor’s 

expenses,’ including using funds from this account to ‘pay his legal expenses’)” (emphasis added); 

id. at 14:24 – 27 (“ERA Mgt., Inc. v Morrison Cohen Singer & Weinstein, 199 A.D.2d 179, 179 

(N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1993) (bank accounts belonging to non-debtor entities were properly 

restraining when evidence showed that accounts were ‘regularly used to pay [debtor’s] personal 

expenses’ and functioned as ‘“recipients” of his personal assets’)” (emphasis added)). 

That is, these cases stand for the simple proposition that a judgment debtor cannot transfer 

his funds into an account of another to pay his own expenses and avoid collection because the 

transfer of the funds to the account does not transmute the funds into those of the account holder. 

Similarly, non-judgment debtor funds transferred into a non-judgment debtor account are not 

transmuted into judgment debtor funds. Indeed, the funds cannot become judgment debtor funds 

unless and until specific funds are paid to the judgment debtor—the very reason why the proper 

action would have been to garnish Wyo Tech, not Wells Fargo.

In any event, the CWT Parties’ contention that payment alone is sufficient is entirely 

absurd. Simply because a paycheck comes from the Federal Government does not make all funds 

of the United States the funds of that employee. Indeed, even in a more nefarious situation funds 

in an account are not, and cannot be transmuted simply by payment alone. Whether some funds 

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were paid out of an account, gifted from an account, or stolen4 therefrom does not change the 

ownership interest in the remaining funds or create a reasonable basis to seize the account. As we 

can all hopefully agree, if Party A gratuitously pays a small sum toward Party B’s legal expenses 

for whatever reasons, Party B does not thereby become an owner of all of Party A’s assets and 

funds. Again, as Wyo Tech has conceded, if the Judgment Creditors wish to garnish Wyo Tech 

relating to future payments to Judgment Debtors or debts owed to them, they would have been 

within their rights.

II. A Restraining Notice Issued under a Theory of a “Sham” Corporation is 

Invalid as a Matter of Law.

Notably absent from the CWT Parties response is any discussion of the fact that their true 

theory—that Wyo Tech is a “sham”—is not a theory on which a restraining notice can be validly 

issued. [Doc. 62 at 3:13 – 17 (“That Danzik would use an alter-ego company to evade creditors 

is nothing new.”); Doc. 88 4:5 – 6 (“That Danzik would use a sham company to hold his assets 

and keep them out of reach of creditors is nothing new”); see generally id.]. 

While Wyo Tech is not a “sham” or “alter ego”, this basis is undeniably not a proper claim 

for issuance of a restraining notice. As was stated in Wyo Tech’s Motion (Doc. 72) and as is 

uncontested in the CWT Parties’ Response (Doc. 88):

 4 As is black letter law, by analogy, a thief does not obtain title to stolen funds, let alone the 

remaining funds that were not stolen. Salt River Valley Water Users’ Ass’n v. Peoria Ginning Co., 27 Ariz. 145, 152, 231 P. 415, 417 (1924) (“A thief or finder acquires no rights whatever to the 

goods, capable of ripening into title, and he may not, by the simple expedient of warehousing the 

goods, transmute title to another. No rights can flow from him or through him, even to a bona fide 

holder for value of the receipt”). Similarly, if Judgment Creditors and their Counsel’s contention 

were correct, the crime of embezzlement could not exist, as the act of embezzling would 

necessarily thereby transmute ownership rights to the embezzler, making it impossible to satisfy 

the requirement that the embezzled funds are owned by someone other than the embezzler. State 

v. Johnson, 179 Ariz. 375, 378, 880 P.2d 132, 135 (1994) (Theft by embezzlement occurs when 

a person “converts for an unauthorized ... use ... property of another entrusted to the defendant or 

placed in the defendant’s possession for a limited, authorized ... use.”) quoting Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 

13-1802(A)(2).

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The other cases cited by the plaintiff are equally inapposite. In both Bingham v. Zolt,

231 A.D.2d 479, 647 N.Y.S.2d 220 (App.Div.1996), and ERA Mgmt., Inc. v. 

Morrison Cohen Singer & Weinstein, 199 A.D.2d 179, 605 N.Y.S.2d 91 

(App.Div.1993), the court found that restraining notices were properly issued 

against bank accounts held in the name of third parties, but where the plaintiffs had 

shown evidence that the accounts held the assets of the judgment debtor.5 These 

cases, like the others cited by the plaintiff, support the proposition that a judgment 

creditor may restrain the assets of a judgment debtor wherever those assets may be. 

They do not support the proposition that the assets of third parties may be 

restrained in anticipation of a finding that those third parties are alter egos or 

hold assets of alleged alter egos of the judgment debtor. Such a conclusion is not 

only unsupported by the text of N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5222 or any of the cases cited by 

the plaintiff, but would also pose significant due process problems.

JSC Foreign Econ. Ass’n Technostroyexport v. Int’l Dev. & Trade Servs., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 2d 

366, 392–93 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (emphasis added). Even under New York law, the restraint of third 

party funds on a theory of alter ego through the use of a § 5222 restraining notice—as is the case 

here—is not allowed and constitutes a clear and knowing violation of due process. That is, the 

restraining notice was and is clearly invalid.

Moreover, by completely failing to address this black letter law the CWT Parties have 

conceded that a restraining notice cannot issue on a theory of “sham” company, and as such, the 

restraining notice issued here—which they concede was issued on a theory of “alter ego”—was 

void and invalid. As is clear, therefore, the Court has no choice but to release the wrongfully 

restrained funds to Wyo Tech.

 5 Significantly, while Judgment Creditors claim that evidence of payments being made from a 

third-party account on behalf of a Judgment Debtor is sufficient to allow a restraint of all third- party funds, what Judgment Creditors and their Counsel conveniently omit is that in both cases, 

the salient issue, was that the Judgment Debtor had deposited assets in the account, and was 

dissipating those assets. Zolt, 231 A.D.2d 479 (the Court found the restraining notice to be 

properly issued because “Deposition testimony and documentation indicated that defendant 

Zolt’s personal funds were deposited in his wife’s account”). Indeed, the case that is relied upon 

by the Court in Zolt explicitly states that the “regular” payment of personal expenses is insufficient 

on its own, but rather, there must also be evidence that the account “functioned as ‘recipients’ of 

his personal assets.” ERA Mgt. v. Morrison Cohen Singer & Weinstein, 199 A.D.2d 179 (1993). 

No evidence has been shown or produced that would establish that Judgment Debtors deposited 

any funds in the Wyo Tech account or that any of the Judgment Debtors drew any moneys from 

the account.

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III. The CWT Parties Fail to Address the Invalidity of the Restraining Notice.

Rather than address Wyo Tech’s arguments regarding the invalidity of the restraining 

notice, the CWT Parties claim that this Court has already ruled to the contrary. However, the 

exact language the CWT Parties’ cite for this contention proves that the CWT Parties are plainly 

wrong in their assertion:

Moreover, as this Court ruled in its August 1, 2018 order, where, as here, a 

restraining notice specifies the property to be levied upon, the garnishee bank has 

“no duty to investigate the validity of the Restraining Notice.” Dkt. at 8.

[Doc. 88 at 16:14 – 18 (emphasis added)]. As the plain language of this section of the Court’s 

ruling makes absolutely clear, the Court did not rule that the Restraining Notice was valid, rather, 

it ruled that the bank had “no duty to investigate the validity of the Restraining Notice.” As such, 

the CWT Parties have failed to address this argument made by Wyo Tech, yet again waiving any 

contention to the contrary.

Similarly, the CWT Parties claim that this Court has already ruled that the CWT Parties 

were not required to comply with Arizona’s garnishment statutes. However, none of this Court’s 

rulings even touch on this issue. Instead, all this Court has ruled is that Wells Fargo was allowed 

to abide by the New York Restraining Notice and restrain funds in Arizona. This ruling, however, 

does not mean that the CWT Parties actions in issuing the Restraining Notice were legally sound. 

The CWT Parties failure to address this by instead attempting to conflate this Court’s prior ruling 

results in the waiver of any argument to the contrary.

IV. The Doctrine of Law of the Case Does Not Prevent this Court from Revisiting 

its Prior Ruling.

The doctrine of “law of the case” generally precludes a court from reconsidering an issue 

that has already been decided in the identical case, either by the same court or a superior court. 

Alexander, 106 F.3d at 876 (citing Thomas v. Bible, 983 F.2d 152, 154 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,

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508 U.S. 951, 113 S.Ct. 2443, 124 L.Ed.2d 661 (1993)). The doctrine is designed to ensure judicial 

consistency and to prevent the reconsideration, during the course of a single continuous lawsuit, 

of those decisions which are intended to put a particular matter to rest. Pit River Home and Agric. 

Coop. Ass'n v. United States, 30 F.3d 1088, 1097 (9th Cir.1994).

The law of the case doctrine is routinely characterized not as a limitation on the power of

a tribunal to revisit prior rulings, but rather as a “guide” to the court’s exercise of its discretion,

see Alexander, id. (citing Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618, 103 S.Ct. 1382, 1391, 75 

L.Ed.2d 318 (1983)). The doctrine is usually described not as a rule of substantive law, but a rule

of practice designed to protect both the court and the litigants before it from repeated reargument

of issues already decided. 18 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal 

Practice and Procedure § 4478, at 790 (1981) (quoting Messinger v. Anderson, 225 U.S. 436, 

444, 32 S.Ct. 739, 740, 56 L.Ed. 1152 (1912)); see also Ferreira v. Borja, 93 F.3d 671, 674 (9th 

Cir.1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1122, 117 S.Ct. 972, 136 L.Ed.2d 856 (1997) (insisting that law

of the case doctrine is not one of “inescapable application”). The doctrine appliesto issues decided

explicitly or by necessary implication in the court’s prior ruling. Leslie Salt Co. v. United States,

55 F.3d 1388, 1393 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 955, 116 S.Ct. 407, 133 L.Ed.2d 325 (1995).

Despite these characterizations, a court may exercise its discretion to revisit and reverse a

prior ruling only on one of five specified grounds. Those grounds are (1) a clearly erroneous prior

ruling, (2) an intervening change in controlling law, (3) substantially different evidence, (4) “other

changed circumstances,” and (5) that “manifest injustice” would result were the prior ruling

permitted to stand. Thomas v. Bible, 983 F.2d at 155 (citing United States v. Tham, 960 F.2d 1391, 

1397 (9th Cir.1991); Milgard Tempering, Inc. v. Selas Corp.,902 F.2d 703, 715 (9th Cir.1990);

United States v. Estrada–Lucas, 651 F.2d 1261, 1263–65 (9th Cir.1980)); 18 Charles Alan Wright, 

Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4478, at 790 (1981) 

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(citing United States v. McClain, 593 F.2d 658, 664–65 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 918, 100 

S.Ct. 234, 62 L.Ed.2d 173 (1979); In re United States Steel Corp., 479 F.2d 489, 494 (6th Cir.),

cert. denied, 414 U.S. 859, 94 S.Ct. 71, 38 L.Ed.2d 110 (1973); White v. Murtha, 377 F.2d 428, 

431–32 (5th Cir.1967)).

While this Court previously rejected Wyo Tech’s argument regarding the single entity rule 

in holding that “Wells Fargo had authority under New York law to comply with the Restraining 

Notice by freezing a bank account in Arizona”, as explained in Wyo Tech’s instant Motion this 

Court’s ruling misapplied New York law.

V. The CWT Parties Completely Fail to Address the Undeniable Fact that if they 

Believed the Monies in the Account Belonged to Dennis Danzik this Action 

Would Violate the Bankruptcy Automatic Stay and would be Void.

Tellingly, the CWT Parties admit that they have brought this matter in bad faith. They fail 

to mention, let alone address, the fact that if they were somehow correct that the monies in the 

account belonged to Dennis Danzik this action would be a flagrant violation of the bankruptcy 

automatic stay and would be void. See In re Christensen, 98.1 I.B.C.R. 15 (Bankr.D.Idaho 1998) 

(Enforcement of a garnishment against the debtor’s property after the filing of the bankruptcy 

petition constitutes an attempt to collect a judgment from the debtor, and amounts to a violation 

of the automatic stay); see, also, Schwartz v. United States (In re Schwartz), 954 F.2d 569, 571 

(9th Cir.1992) (Acts in violation of the automatic stay are deemed void and without legal effect).

Moreover, Judgment Creditors and their Counsel would have a duty to stop these proceedings, 

which they have not. See, e.g., In re Buchanan, 273 B.R. 749, 751 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2002) 

(discussing duty to effectuate stay even if garnishment was filed prepetition) (quoting Elder v. 

City of Thomasville, 12 B.R. 491, 494 (“‘[A]ll who have a part in the garnishment must take such 

positive action as necessary to give effect to the automatic stay.’. Inaction is unacceptable. Id.” 

(emphasis added)).

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It would be astonishing, if it were not so obvious, that the CWT Parties have—by failing 

to address it—conceded that they have brought this action in bad faith and with full knowledge 

that Dennis Danzik does not have any interest in the funds in the account because if he did this 

action would be a violation of the automatic stay and entirely void. After all, the CWT Parties 

and their firm are participating in the Wyoming Bankruptcy proceedings, and they have been 

cautioned previously by the Bankruptcy Court regarding violating the automatic stay.6

CONCLUSION

This Court must immediately release the wrongfully restrained funds to Wyo Tech, after 

which, Wyo Tech should be allowed to pursue its damages claims as asserted in this suit.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 23rd day of October, 2018.

WILENCHIK & BARTNESS, P.C.

/s/ Dennis I. Wilenchik, Esq.

Dennis I. Wilenchik, Esq.

The Wilenchik & Bartness Building

2810 North Third Street

Phoenix, Arizona 85004

admin@wb-law.com

BEUS GILBERT PLLC

Leo R. Beus, Esq.

701 North 44th Street

Phoenix, Arizona 85008

lbeus@beusgilbert.com

Attorneys for Wyo Tech Investment Group, LLC

 6 The only bankruptcy matters even mentioned by the CWT Parties are not the currently on going 

bankruptcy at issue here, U.S. Bkt. Ct. Dist. Wy. Case No. 17-20934. Indeed, as recently as 

August 14, 2018 the Bankruptcy Court recognized that the automatic stay remains in place 

(modifying the stay for the narrow and limited purpose of allowing the Internal Revenue Service 

to place a lien on real property). [U.S. Bkt. Ct. Dist. Wy. Case No. 17-20934 (Doc. 176) attached 

hereto as Exhibit B].

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ELECTRONICALLY FILED October 23, 2018.

COPY served via CM/ECF System, which sends notification

to all parties registered therein this 23rd day of October, 2018.

/s/ Hilary Myers

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