Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 71A05-1712-CR-2963 | February 4, 2019 Page 1 of 32

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Amy D. Griner

Griner & Company

Mishawaka, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Ian McLean

Supervising Deputy Attorney

General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Jabreeh Cash Davis-Martin,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

February 4, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

71A05-1712-CR-2963

Appeal from the St. Joseph 

Superior Court

The Honorable Elizabeth C. 

Hurley, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

71D08-1603-MR-002

Vaidik, Chief Judge.

Case Summary

[1] Jabreeh Cash Davis-Martin was convicted of murder for the brutal beating 

death of Jodie Henderson in South Bend in January 2016. He now appeals his 
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conviction on a variety of grounds as well as his maximum sentence of sixtyfive years. Specifically, Davis-Martin contends that (1) the State withheld his 

cell-phone records in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), (2) the 

State violated his due-process rights by not correcting a detective’s false 

testimony, (3) the trial court erred in not supplementing the pattern jury 

instruction on impeachment by prior inconsistent statements, (4) the trial court 

admitted evidence that he told his mother he did not want to talk to the police 

in violation of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, (5) the 

evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, and (6) the trial court erred in 

not identifying three mitigators. We affirm. 

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Around 6:30 p.m. on January 15, 2016, Jodie and his aunt, Donna Forrest, 

went to Felisha Sconiers’s house on Sorin Street in South Bend. Felisha’s 

mother and son, Davis-Martin, also lived in the house, with Davis-Martin 

staying in the basement. Shortly after arriving at the Sorin Street house, Jodie 

suggested buying alcohol. Jodie, Donna, and Felisha went to the liquor store 

and bought some vodka. Upon returning to the house, they sat around the 

kitchen table and drank. Throughout the evening, other people were coming 

and going, including Davis-Martin and his friend, Ricky Jackson. While Jodie, 

Donna, and Felisha were at the kitchen table, Jodie, an openly gay man, told 

Felisha that he “want[ed]” her son, Davis-Martin. Tr. Vol. II p. 32; Ex. 278

(video). Felisha told Jodie not to talk about her son, adding “you can talk to 
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me about my husband, though, you can have that motherfu**er.” Ex. 278. 

Jodie responded that he didn’t want her husband, he was “gonna git [her] son.” 

Id. Felisha told Jodie to stand up, because she was going to “kick [him] in [the] 

a** right now.” Id. Jodie then asked Felisha what made her think that DavisMartin “ain’t in love with me too?” Id. Felisha responded, “I know he ain’t.” 

Id. When Jodie called Davis-Martin his “husband,” Felisha, upset, warned him 

not to talk about her son “like that.” Id.

[3] As the evening wore on, Jodie passed out. It was later determined that his 

blood-alcohol content had been in the range of 0.25. Tr. Vol. III p. 31. Donna 

was unable to rouse Jodie, so around 11:45 p.m. Davis-Martin, who was getting 

ready to go out, moved Jodie to the living-room couch. Donna put Jodie’s two 

cell phones and car keys in his coat pocket and then put his coat on top of him 

as a blanket. After confirming with Felisha that Jodie could sleep on the couch, 

Donna went home. As she left, she saw Davis-Martin standing at a car talking 

to someone.

[4] Meanwhile, Felisha went to sleep on the couch near Jodie. At some point, 

Felisha heard Jodie get up and say he was leaving. 

[5] Sometime around 2:00 to 3:00 a.m., Ricky returned to the Sorin Street house

because he had left his coat there. According to Ricky, the outside of the house 

“didn’t look right” because there was “like blood and stuff.” Tr. Vol. II p. 207. 

Ricky also saw “a dude sitting up across the street” on the curb. Id. at 208. 

After he got his coat and was leaving, Ricky noticed that the man across the 
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street (he did not know who it was, but he could tell it was not Davis-Martin)

was mumbling that he wanted to go home. Id. at 212. Ricky did not help the 

man, however, because he had just been released from prison two weeks earlier

and did not want to get in trouble. 

[6] Shortly before 7 a.m., police officers from the South Bend Police Department 

were dispatched to the 1200 block of East Sorin Street on a report of an 

unresponsive male in the street. Upon arrival, the officers found Jodie lying 

face down in the street across from the Sorin Street house. Jodie, who had 

significant head trauma, did not have a coat on, and he was missing his left 

shoe. Paramedics arrived and pronounced him dead. 

[7] There was a good deal of evidence for the officers to collect at the scene. At the 

Sorin Street house, the officers observed blood in the snow in the front yard, on 

the cement walkway leading to the house, and on the front porch. More blood 

was found near Jodie’s body across the street from the house. The officers 

observed that a paver had been removed from the top of a retaining wall and 

was on the ground near Jodie’s body. In addition, the porch railing by the front 

door of the house had been broken away from the house and was leaning out 

toward the yard. One of the spindles was broken, with half of it missing. In the 

front yard, the officers found the missing half of the spindle with blood on it as 

well as part of a broken chair, a piece of black material, and a piece of circular 

foam with blood on it.
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[8] The snow also contained clues about Jodie’s death. The officers found several 

footprints in the snow that had been made by two different shoes. The tread 

pattern of one was consistent with Nike Air Force 1 shoes. The officers also 

found an impression in the snow that resembled a folding chair with a circular 

seat. Finally, the officers found drag marks in the snow leading away from the 

Sorin Street house toward Jodie’s body across the street. 

[9] Inside the Sorin Street house, the officers found Jodie’s missing left shoe

underneath a recliner in the living room. The officers also found a pile of trash 

at the bottom of the basement stairs. Inside the pile of trash was a pair of Nike 

Air Force 1 shoes. Later forensic testing revealed that Davis-Martin’s DNA 

was on the shoes. A comparison of the impressions from the Nike Air Force 1 

shoes and the footprints in the snow showed that they were a match. Tr. Vol. 

III p. 62. The officers also found a folding chair in the basement that looked 

like the impression in the snow. The officers brought the intact chair outside, 

and it matched the impression. The broken chair part and piece of black 

material found in the yard also matched the chair found in the basement.

[10] Later that day, South Bend Police Department Detective Brian Cook 

interviewed Felisha. During the interview, Detective Cook told Felisha that he 

wanted to interview her son. Felisha then called Davis-Martin from the 

interview room and told him that the police wanted him to come to the station 

“because they found Jodie dead across the street, and they want[ed] to talk to 

everybody who was [at the Sorin Street house] last night.” Tr. Vol. II p. 66. 

Davis-Martin replied, “I ain’t going down there to talk to nobody.” Id. In a 
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second call happening “immediately after,” Davis-Martin told his mother that 

he did not have time to talk to the police because he was at work. Id.; Tr. Vol. 

IV pp. 16-17. It was later learned that Davis-Martin did not go to work that 

day. 

[11] An autopsy performed on January 17 found multiple abrasions on Jodie’s 

hands, arms, legs, torso, back, and head. There were also lacerations to his 

head, which indicated that the skin had been split open by forceful impacts. 

There was a fracture to the outer layer of his skull and to a rib. According to 

the forensic pathologist, the manner of death was homicide, and the cause of 

death was multiple injuries, “including blunt and chop injuries.” Tr. Vol. III p. 

23. Jodie’s alcohol consumption and exposure to the cold contributed to his 

death. Id. at 22. 

[12] The investigation of Jodie’s death continued throughout February and March. 

On February 18, Davis-Martin was arrested on an unrelated charge and 

incarcerated in the St. Joseph County Jail. Around this same time, Detective 

Cook interviewed Davis-Martin. Tr. Vol. II pp. 218-20; Tr. Vol. IV p. 13. On 

February 21, Davis-Martin placed a phone call from jail, which was recorded. 

During the call, Davis-Martin stated that he had not yet finished cleaning his 

room in the basement and needed the recipient of the call to throw away the 

trash at the bottom of the stairs (which is where the Nike Air Force 1 shoes had 

been found). 
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[13] In March, a man named Brandon Trotter contacted police and said that he had 

been at his sister’s apartment in the early-morning hours of January 16 and had 

seen Davis-Martin there. According to Brandon, Davis-Martin was “geeked”

and “[h]igh on cocaine, weed, [and] alcohol.” Tr. Vol. III pp. 158, 161. DavisMartin told the people gathered there that he had hit somebody “over the head” 

and the blood “squirted out like a movie.” Id. at 158. Brandon noticed blood

on Davis-Martin’s shirt and in the webs between his fingers. 

[14] Also in March, police spoke with Cameron Wilson and Laura Luna, who were 

also at that same apartment in the early-morning hours of January 16. During 

their interviews with Cameron and Laura, police learned that between 2:00 and 

3:00 a.m. on January 16, Laura drove Cameron to the apartment. Laura stayed 

in the car while Cameron went inside. When Cameron walked in, DavisMartin, whom he knew from high school, was there. Davis-Martin asked 

Cameron for a ride to Sorin Street. Cameron agreed, and Davis-Martin 

accompanied him to the waiting car. Laura then drove to Sorin Street. On the 

way, Davis-Martin said “he got into it [earlier that night] with somebody 

because they made a pass on him” and “tried to suck his di**.” Id. at 171. 

Davis-Martin referred to the person as a “fa**ot.” Id. at 195. Davis-Martin 

said he stabbed the person “a couple times,” threw him out of the house, and 

thought he had killed him. Id. at 195. Neither Cameron nor Laura believed 

Davis-Martin at the time. 

[15] When they were almost to Sorin Street, however, Davis-Martin called his 

mother and told her to get rid of a coat, boil some water and bleach and melt 
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the snow with blood in it, and clean the blood on the porch. Cameron said 

Davis-Martin did not use Cameron’s phone to make the call and that he 

assumed Davis-Martin used Laura’s phone. Laura, however, said she did not 

know what phone Davis-Martin used. In any event, when they pulled up

across from the Sorin Street house, the car’s headlights illuminated Jodie lying 

in the street in a curled-up position. He was barely moving. Upon seeing this, 

Davis-Martin exclaimed, “fu**ing fa**ot is still alive.” Id. at 200. DavisMartin got out of the car and started kicking and punching Jodie. Jodie, who 

did not fight back, grunted. Davis-Martin then retrieved a paver from a nearby 

retaining wall and was about to hit Jodie with it when Cameron got out of the 

car and stopped him. As Cameron and Laura pulled away from the house, 

Jodie’s body was no longer curled up but rather face down—the same position 

he was in when police arrived shortly before 7 a.m. Numb and afraid, neither 

Cameron nor Laura called police.

[16] The State charged Davis-Martin with murder on March 22; he was still in the 

St. Joseph County Jail on the unrelated charge when he was served with the 

arrest warrant. Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 137.

[17] While incarcerated, Davis-Martin spoke to several inmates about his case. For 

example, Andrew Fry was housed with Davis-Martin for approximately six 

weeks beginning in June 2016. Davis-Martin and Andrew became friends, 

discussing the frequent jailhouse topics of “Women and sex, our cases and 

drugs, what we’re in [jail] for,” and “what is going on in the cell block.” Tr. 

Vol. II pp. 223-24. During one of these conversations, Davis-Martin looked 
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“down” and “depressed.” Id. at 224. To cheer him up, Andrew told him about 

one of his and his wife’s “swinger encounters.” Id. At the end of the story, 

Davis-Martin asked Andrew if he was attracted to any of the men that he and 

his wife had encounters with. Andrew responded yes, because he was bisexual. 

Davis-Martin responded that he was bisexual, too. Davis-Martin then asked 

Andrew if he had told anyone about being bisexual, and Andrew answered that 

his wife knows “and whoever I decide to let know.” Id. at 225. Davis-Martin, 

however, said he did not want anyone to know and “that’s why he was in jail.” 

Id. at 226. Davis-Martin then explained that he and Jodie had a relationship 

and that everything was going well until Jodie wanted to tell people about their 

relationship. Davis-Martin said one night, Jodie went to the Sorin Street house 

looking for him and ended up telling his mother about their relationship. 

Davis-Martin’s mother then called him inquiring about his relationship with 

Jodie. Davis-Martin was “furious” about this. Id. at 228. When Davis-Martin 

saw Jodie later, they argued, and Davis-Martin hit him with a gun. DavisMartin planned to hit Jodie “only a few times,” but “he couldn’t stop himself” 

and beat him up “until he couldn’t move no more.” Id. at 229. Davis-Martin 

told Andrew that although the police did not have a lot of physical evidence 

implicating him, he was worried about “some shoes.” Id. at 231. 

[18] Davis-Martin also spoke with inmates Marcus Green and Anthony Lyons. 

Davis-Martin and Marcus were cellmates for a short time. According to

Marcus, one day in September 2016 Davis-Martin told him that he was in jail 

for murder and that “all he did was beat the guy’s ass and he froze to death.” 
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Tr. Vol. III p. 149. Davis-Martin explained that the guy had told people they 

were having a relationship, which made him “look like a f**.” Id. at 150. In 

November 2016, Davis-Martin approached Anthony in the jail and said he 

heard that Anthony had beat a murder charge before and wanted to know his 

chances of doing the same. Anthony responded that he did not beat a murder 

charge; rather, he got convicted of a lesser charge. Davis-Martin then asked 

Anthony if he knew about his charge. When Anthony said no, Davis-Martin 

told him that he was in jail for “killing the f**.” Id. at 137. Anthony responded

that their cases were not the same. Davis-Martin told Anthony that he still 

might be able to beat his murder charge because no one saw him kill Jodie. 

[19] A jury trial was held in June 2017. At trial, Detective Cook testified on direct 

examination that when he eventually interviewed Davis-Martin in February 

2016, Davis-Martin told him that he did not have a cell phone and had not had 

one for “quite some time.” Tr. Vol. IV p. 17. Detective Cook, however, 

testified that this statement was not true, as he “received [Davis-Martin’s] 

cellphone number during [his] investigation and actually did a search warrant, 

received his cellphone records . . . .” Id. Detective Cook explained that DavisMartin’s cell-phone records were “hit and miss” because with “[t]oday’s 

technology you can actually make an internet call from your phone which is 

hard to track a number.” Id. Detective Cook explained that despite DavisMartin’s claim that he did not have a cell phone, he could tell from DavisMartin’s cell-phone records that he, in fact, had a cell phone around the time of 

Jodie’s murder. On cross-examination, defense counsel asked Detective Cook 
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if he had Davis-Martin’s cell-phone records with him, and Detective Cook

responded that he only had his “notes” and “work product” with him. Id. at 

20. Defense counsel then asked Detective Martin if there were any calls 

between Davis-Martin’s cell phone and Felisha’s cell phone between 10 p.m. on 

January 15 and the following day when Felisha called Davis-Martin from the 

police station, and Detective Cook said no. Id. at 22. Defense counsel also

asked Detective Cook if there were any calls between Laura’s cell phone and

Felisha’s cell phone around that same time, and Detective Cook said no. Id. at 

23, 36, 37-38. Detective Cook reiterated that internet calls cannot be tracked, 

which is one of law enforcement’s “biggest enemies” right now. Id. at 36; see 

also id. at 38 (explaining that the internet “makes phone calls disappear”).

[20] Defense counsel also cross-examined Detective Cook about whether Marcus 

and Anthony had given him information in the past:

Q Has Marcus Green provided you information on any other 

cases; either a defendant who is already charged or a case 

that you are investigating and he provides information that 

would assist in that?

A Not that I recall.

* * * * *

Q What about Anthony Lyons?

A Possibility. He has been around a while.
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Q Did you investigate a case against Brian Lac[e]y?

A Bryant Lac[e]y, yes, ma’am.

Q Bryant Lac[e]y?

A Yes.

Q And did [Anthony] Lyons give you information on that 

case?

A Not that I recall.

Tr. Vol. IV p. 31. Defense counsel then moved on to a different topic. 

[21] In addition, Cameron testified on direct examination that while they were 

driving to Sorin Street, Davis-Martin said he beat somebody up because they 

made a pass at him and “tried to suck his di**.” Tr. Vol. III p. 171. The 

following colloquy then occurred: 

Q Now, previously you talked to the police about this, right? 

A Yeah. 

Q And you told them some additional details about a couple 

of those things? 

A I told you before I don’t remember. It’s been so long, and 

I was drunk that night too. 
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Q Did you tell the police that [Davis-Martin] told you that he 

killed a fa**ot that night? 

A No. 

Q Did you tell the police that [Davis-Martin] had told you 

that he stabbed the guy in the head multiple times? 

A No. 

Q Did you tell the police that he had thrown the guy out of 

his house and beat his a**? 

A No. 

Q Are you saying he didn’t say those things? 

A I don’t recall. 

Q You don’t remember saying those things? 

A I don’t remember. I told you I was drunk. 

Q And if you told police about this conversation just a couple 

months after it happened, would your memory have been 

better when you talked to the police then or would your 

memory be better now? 

A Pretty sure it would be better than it is now.

Q So you could have said those things, you just aren’t sure 

that you said them as we sit here today? 
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A Right.

Id. at 172-73. Cameron went on to testify that as they pulled up across from the 

Sorin Street house, they saw Jodie, who looked beat up, lying in the street. 

Davis-Martin then got out of the car and hit, kicked, and punched Jodie while 

calling him a “fa*.” Id. at 177. Cameron testified that Davis-Martin got a 

paver and was about to hit Jodie with it when he got out of the car and stopped 

Davis-Martin from doing so. 

[22] At the close of the evidence, the trial court gave the jury the following pattern 

jury instruction on impeachment by prior inconsistent statements:

The credibility of a witness may be attacked by introducing 

evidence that on some former occasion the witness made a 

statement inconsistent with his testimony in this case. Evidence 

of this kind may be considered by you in deciding the value of 

the testimony of the witness.

2 Ind. Pattern Jury Instruction—Criminal § 12.1300 (4th ed.); Appellant’s App. 

Vol. II p. 121. Davis-Martin asked the trial court to add the following sentence 

to the end of the pattern instruction, “However, prior inconsistent statements of 

a testifying witness that were offered for impeachment may not be considered as 

substantive evidence.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 67. The trial court declined 

to add the sentence, finding that its instruction was “the pattern and it says 

most everything you said.” Tr. Vol. IV p. 95. 

[23] The jury found Davis-Martin guilty. At sentencing, the trial court found no 

mitigators and the following aggravators: (1) Davis-Martin’s criminal history
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(Class A misdemeanor intimidation and Class C felony carrying a handgun 

without a license); (2) the fact that he was on probation for the handgun 

conviction when he committed the offense; and (3) the nature and 

circumstances of the offense. The trial court explained that the third aggravator 

was the “biggest”:

I think the most aggravating part of this case or biggest 

aggravating factor that I consider would be the fact – I guess we 

can call it the nature and circumstances of the offense. We can 

call it the fact that the harm inflicted was greater than what was 

necessary for the commission of the offense itself, but I guess 

when I look at it, Mr. Davis-Martin, it was the absolute depravity 

with which this crime was committed.[1] I struggle to think of 

another case that I have seen . . . that exhibited this level of 

depravity, and that’s really the only word I can think to use that 

in my mind encompasses what happened to [Jodie]. 

I look at the fact that this was a person that you knew, that you 

were purportedly friends with, family were friends, someone that 

you hung out with . . . fairly regularly. Whether or not the two 

of you were in a relationship, whether you weren’t—there is 

evidence to suggest either or both.

You knew [Jodie]. You knew who he was. You knew that he 

was a veteran. You knew that he was a gay man. You knew if 

 

1 Davis-Martin argues that the trial court erred in identifying the third aggravator. He claims that this 

aggravator is labeled “the harm inflicted was greater than what was necessary to commit the offense,” which 

is improper as a matter of law because death (the harm inflicted) is an element of murder. Appellant’s Br. p. 

35. The trial court, however, gave two labels for this aggravator. Regardless of the label, the court made 

clear that this aggravator was the depraved nature and circumstances of the offense. Tr. Vol. IV p. 174. As 

the court put it, at any point Davis-Martin could have called for help, but he did not do so; instead, he went

back to the Sorin Street house, not to help Jodie, but “to insure that [he] was dead.” Id. at 176. The trial 

court did not err in identifying the third aggravator. 
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from nothing else from the evidence presented that night that . . . 

he had expressed interest in you and having more than a 

friendship with you. So you knew all of those things about him. 

But up to that point as far as I could tell those things didn’t 

impact your friendship in any way. They didn’t diminish the 

friendship. It didn’t make him a lesser person in your mind.

But something that night, Mr. Davis-Martin. Again I keep going 

back to the fact that it’s this level of depravity that I just haven’t 

seen in many cases before now. 

And . . . what it reveals to me is your character. And I can 

consider your character in fashioning a sentence as well. And 

what you put [Jodie] through that night was so far greater than 

what would have been necessary to satisfy the elements of 

murder. . . . The length of time over which this killing occurred, 

the fact that at some point during the attack that you perpetrated 

you could have called for help, you could have realized what you 

were doing, realized the situation [Jodie] was in, gotten him help, 

kept him alive. And you didn’t. And what you did do was go 

back to insure that he was dead. And that to me just speaks to 

your character, Mr. Davis-Martin.

And I can’t fathom – we talk about the worst of the worst 

offenders being deserving of the maximum sentence, I can’t 

fathom a wors[e] offense and I can’t fathom a wors[e] offender 

and a wors[e] character based upon the nature and circumstances 

of this situation.

Id. at 174-76. Accordingly, the court sentenced Davis-Martin to the maximum 

term of sixty-five years.

[24] After sentencing, the State turned over Davis-Martin’s cell-phone records to the 

defense. Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 170. Davis-Martin then filed a motion to 
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correct error, arguing that the State (1) withheld his cell-phone records in 

violation of Brady and (2) knowingly used false evidence from Detective Cook 

regarding whether Marcus and Anthony had given him information in the past

without correcting it. To support his motion, Davis-Martin submitted several 

exhibits, including the following: (1) his cell-phone records and (2) police 

reports that the State had provided him in discovery showing that Marcus and 

Anthony had given Detective Cook information in the Bryant Lacey murder

case. The State filed a response along with affidavits. According to Detective 

Cook’s affidavit, after trial he found Davis-Martin’s cell-phone records

in a folder on my computer’s hard drive labeled, “Felisha 

Sconiers Records.” In checking the CMHU hard drive, the 

master evidence log, and the master casebook, it does not appear 

that I turned in the Defendant’s records to our evidence 

technician. The evidence technician is the party that sends out 

copies of our materials to the prosecutor.

Appellant’s App. Vol III. p. 126. Detective Cook’s affidavit also provided:

[A]t that moment on the witness stand, I did not recall that 

[Marcus] and [Anthony] gave information on the Lacey case. 

My testimony was honest. I would not, and did not[,]

misrepresent information or lie.

Id. The trial court denied Davis-Martin’s motion to correct error. 

[25] Davis-Martin now appeals. 
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Discussion and Decision

I. Motion to Correct Error

[26] Davis-Martin first contends that the trial court should have granted his motion 

to correct error. Generally, rulings on motions to correct error are reviewed for 

an abuse of discretion. Becker v. State, 992 N.E.2d 697, 700 (Ind. 2013). 

A. Late disclosure of Davis-Martin’s cell-phone records

[27] Davis-Martin argues that the State violated Brady “by failing to disclose DavisMartin’s cellular phone records which were material.” Appellant’s Br. p. 18. 

Brady and its progeny apply to the State’s failure to disclose favorable evidence 

that is material to the accused’s guilt or punishment. Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 

469 (2009); Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. There are three components to a Brady

violation: (1) the evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either 

because it is exculpatory or impeaching; (2) the evidence must have been 

suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and (3) prejudice 

(materiality inquiry). Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999). Evidence 

is material when there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been 

disclosed, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Cone, 556 

U.S. at 470. Notably, Brady only applies to the discovery, after trial, of 

information that was known to the prosecution but unknown to the 

defense. Hubbell v. State, 754 N.E.2d 884, 893 (Ind. 2001); Lowrimore v. State, 

728 N.E.2d 860, 867 (Ind. 2000), reh’g denied; Bates v. State, 77 N.E.3d 1223, 
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1226 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017); see also 6 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal 

Procedure § 24.3(b) (4th ed. 2015). 

[28] We recently addressed the State’s late disclosure of evidence in Bates. In that 

case, the defendant was charged with burglary for breaking into a house and 

taking a diaper bag. While combing the victim’s neighborhood for the diaper 

bag, the police found a wallet. The police contacted the wallet’s owner, who 

said that he had lost his wallet over two years earlier. The police determined 

that the wallet was unrelated to the burglary case and did not tell the defendant 

about its discovery. At trial, one of the searching officers briefly testified that 

another officer had found a wallet during the search. Defense counsel crossexamined the officer about the wallet but did not ask for a continuance to 

pursue the matter. After the State’s case-in-chief, the defendant argued that the 

State’s failure to disclose the existence of the wallet before trial violated Brady. 

The trial court found no Brady violation, and the jury eventually found him 

guilty of burglary. 

[29] The defendant renewed his Brady challenge on appeal. We explained that for 

most exculpatory evidence, the prosecution is able to satisfy its constitutional 

obligation by disclosing the evidence at trial. Bates, 77 N.E.3d at 1226 (citing 6 

LaFave, § 24.3(b)). In such cases, the burden rests with the defendant to 

establish that “the lateness of the disclosure so prejudiced defendant’s 

preparation or presentation of his defense that he was prevented from receiving 

his constitutionally guaranteed fair trial.” Id. (quoting 6 LaFave, § 24.3(b)). 

We noted that if the defendant does not request a continuance when the 
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disclosure is first made at trial, that failure may be viewed as negating any claim 

of actual prejudice. Id. (citing 6 LaFave, § 24.3(b)); see also Braswell v. State, 550 

N.E.2d 1280, 1283 (Ind. 1990) (explaining that a continuance could have been 

a proper remedy when the evidence was disclosed during—and not before—

trial; however, the defendant did not request a continuance). We ultimately 

concluded that the defendant’s Brady challenge failed for two reasons: (1) he 

gave us “no reason to believe that the owner could have offered evidence that 

was favorable to him, either because it was exculpatory or impeaching” and (2) 

he “did not ask the trial court for a continuance to pursue the matter.” Bates, 77 

N.E.3d at 1226. 

[30] This case is similar to Bates. At trial, Detective Cook testified that he had

obtained Davis-Martin’s cell-phone records.2 On cross-examination, defense 

counsel asked Detective Cook if he had Davis-Martin’s cell-phone records with 

him, and Detective Cook said no. Defense counsel then asked Detective Cook 

about those records, including whether they showed a phone call from DavisMartin to his mother around 2:00 to 3:00 a.m. on January 16 (which is when 

Cameron and Laura testified that Davis-Martin called his mother from the car). 

Detective Cook said the records did not disclose such a call but that did not 

 

2

It appears that defense counsel knew the State was attempting to get Davis-Martin’s cell-phone records

before trial. In February 2017, about four months before trial, defense counsel sent the following email to the 

prosecutor:

I have a subpoena for [Davis-Martin’s] phone records but no disc that indicates that’s what is on 

it nor have I found it on another disc.

Appellant’s App. Vol. III p. 59.
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mean such a call did not occur. He explained that if someone makes a call 

from their cell phone using the internet, such as by using Facebook Messenger, 

that call will not show up on cell-phone records. Defense counsel also asked 

Detective Cook about Laura’s cell-phone records. Again, Detective Cook said 

they did not disclose a call to Felisha around 2:00 to 3:00 a.m. on January 16. 

He added the same caveat about calls not showing up if they are made using the 

internet. Davis-Martin did not object or ask for a continuance to further 

explore issues relating to his cell-phone records. 

[31] We find that Davis-Martin’s Brady challenge fails for two reasons. First, DavisMartin’s failure to request a continuance negates any claim of actual prejudice. 

A request for a continuance would have allowed the trial court and the parties 

to discuss this issue in real time—and not in a motion to correct error after trial. 

Second, Davis-Martin has failed to prove that the State’s late disclosure so 

prejudiced his preparation or presentation of his defense that he was prevented 

from receiving his constitutionally guaranteed fair trial. Davis-Martin claims

that his cell-phone records—which do not show a call from his cell phone to his 

mother’s cell phone around 2 to 3 a.m. on January 16—would have 

“dispel[led]” Cameron’s and Laura’s testimony that he called his mother from 

the car and asked her to destroy evidence. Appellant’s Br. p. 18. But defense 

counsel was able to make this point during her cross-examination of Detective 

Cook. And defense counsel argued the point during closing argument. See Tr. 

Vol. IV p. 126 (arguing that after 10 p.m. on January 15, there were no calls 

between Davis-Martin and his mother until she called him on January 16 from
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the police station). Notably, Davis-Martin does not cite any additional 

information from his cell-phone records that he would have used. In any event, 

Detective Cook testified that even if the cell-phone records did not contain such 

a call, a call still could have been made using the internet. Accordingly, the 

trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Davis-Martin’s motion to 

correct error on this ground.

3

 

B. Failure to correct false evidence

[32] Davis-Martin next argues that his “due process rights under the Fourteenth 

Amendment of the U.S. Constitution were violated when the State’s witness, 

Detective Cook, testified falsely and the State failed to correct it.” Appellant’s 

Br. p. 19. Davis-Martin points out that contrary to Detective Cook’s responses 

of “Not that I recall,” Marcus and Anthony had, in fact, provided him with 

information in the Bryant Lacey murder case. 

[33] It is well established that “a conviction obtained through use of false evidence, 

known to be such by representatives of the State, [falls] under the Fourteenth 

Amendment. The same result obtains when the State, although not soliciting 

false evidence, allows it to go uncorrected when it appears.” Napue v. Illinois, 

 

3 Davis-Martin also argues that he could have used his cell-phone records “to impeach [Detective] Cook’s 

assertion that Davis-Martin got rid of his phone to conceal evidence of his involvement in [Jodie’s] death.” 

Appellant’s Br. p. 18. Davis-Martin, however, does not cite the record to support that Detective Cook made 

such an assertion. 
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360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959) (citations omitted); see also Smith v. State, 34 N.E.3d 

1211, 1219 (Ind. 2015). As our Supreme Court has said,

In determining whether to vacate a conviction because of the 

State’s solicitation of false evidence or knowing use of it without 

correction, . . . the proper question is: did the State impermissibly 

use false testimony to obtain a conviction in violation of a 

defendant’s due process rights? The main thrust of the case law 

in this area focuses on whether the jury’s ability to assess all of 

the facts and the credibility of the witnesses supplying those facts 

has been impeded to the unfair disadvantage of the defendant. 

Active or passive behavior by the State that hinders the jury’s 

ability to effectively act as the fact-finder is impermissible and 

may violate a defendant’s due process rights.

Smith, 34 N.E.3d at 1220.

[34] Davis-Martin claims that he “should have been given the opportunity” to argue

to the jury that Marcus and Anthony were serial snitches. Appellant’s Br. p. 22. 

But Davis-Martin had an opportunity to do just that. As the State points out, 

during discovery it provided Davis-Martin with Detective Cook’s police reports 

in Bryant Lacey’s murder case showing that Marcus and Anthony had, in fact,

given Detective Cook information. Appellant’s App. Vol. III pp. 34-40, 117; 

Appellee’s Br. p. 35. If Davis-Martin was not satisfied with Detective Cook’s 

“Not that I recall” responses, then he should have asked him about the police 

reports. Davis-Martin did not do so. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse 

its discretion in denying Davis-Martin’s motion to correct error on this ground 

either. 
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II. Pattern Jury Instruction

[35] Davis-Martin next contends that the trial court erred in not supplementing

Pattern Jury Instruction—Criminal 12.1300 with the following sentence, 

“However, prior inconsistent statements of a testifying witness that were offered 

for impeachment may not be considered as substantive evidence.” DavisMartin claims that this sentence was needed because of the State’s direct

examination of Cameron regarding whether he gave additional details to the 

police. 

[36] The purpose of jury instructions is to inform the jury of the law applicable to the 

facts without misleading the jury and to enable it to comprehend the case 

clearly and arrive at a just, fair, and correct verdict. O’Connell v. State, 970 

N.E.2d 168, 172 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). Instructing the jury lies within the sole 

discretion of the trial court. McBride v. State, 785 N.E.2d 312, 316 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2003), trans. denied. Before a defendant is entitled to reversal, he must 

affirmatively show that the instruction error prejudiced his substantial rights. 

Hernandez v. State, 45 N.E.3d 373, 376 (Ind. 2015).

[37] We emphasize that the instruction the trial court gave is a pattern jury 

instruction. The instruction advised the jury that a witness’s credibility may be 

attacked with a prior inconsistent statement and that the prior inconsistent 

statement may be considered by the jury in deciding the value of the witness’s 

trial testimony. The pattern jury instruction fully informed the jury of the law. 

But even if we agreed with Davis-Martin that the trial court should have 
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supplemented the pattern jury instruction, he has not shown that the instruction 

error prejudiced his substantial rights. Although the State may impeach its own 

witness, it may not put a witness on the stand for the sole purpose of 

introducing otherwise inadmissible evidence cloaked as impeachment. Herron 

v. State, 10 N.E.3d 552, 556 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). On direct examination, the 

State asked Cameron three questions regarding whether he gave additional 

details to the police: (1) whether he told police that Davis-Martin told him that 

he “killed a fa**ot that night”; (2) whether he told police that Davis-Martin told 

him that he stabbed Jodie in the head multiple times; and (3) whether he told 

police that Davis-Martin had thrown Jodie “out of his house and beat his a**.” 

Tr. Vol. III p. 172. Cameron said he did not remember making those 

statements, but he could have. This, however, was not the State’s sole—or even 

primary—purpose for calling Cameron as a witness. Cameron also testified

that Davis-Martin attacked Jodie because he made a move on him, that he saw 

Davis-Martin hit, kick, and punch Jodie while calling him a “fa*,” and that he 

stopped Davis-Martin from hitting Jodie with a paver. Cf. Herron, 10 N.E.3d at 

556 (concluding that the State’s only purpose in calling a witness to the stand 

was for impeachment, as the impeachment spanned thirty of thirty-five pages of 

the witness’s testimony, with the remaining pages containing no substantive 

testimony). Accordingly, Davis-Martin has failed to establish reversible error 

on this issue.
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III. Privilege Against Self-Incrimination

[38] At trial, the State presented evidence that Felisha, at the request of Detective 

Cook, called Davis-Martin from the police station on January 16 and told him 

that the police wanted him (as well as everyone else at the Sorin Street house 

that night) to come to the station to discuss Jodie’s death, but Davis-Martin told 

his mother that he was not going to the police station because he was at work. 

Davis-Martin did not object to this testimony. Davis-Martin now argues that 

the trial court should not have allowed the State to present this evidence 

because it violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 

Davis-Martin acknowledges that because he did not object below, he must 

establish fundamental error. The doctrine of fundamental error is an extremely 

narrow exception to the waiver rule that requires the defendant to show that the 

alleged error was so prejudicial to the defendant’s rights as to make a fair trial 

impossible. Gavin v. State, 41 N.E.3d 1038, 1042 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). The 

defendant must show that, under the circumstances, the trial judge erred in not 

raising the issue sua sponte because the alleged error (a) constituted a clearly 

blatant violation of basic and elementary principles of due process and (b) 

presented an undeniable and substantial potential for harm. Id.

[39] The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, made applicable to the states 

through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that no person shall be 

compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. U.S. Const. 

amend. V; Cameron v. State, 22 N.E.3d 588, 592 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). “[A] 

witness who desires the protection of the privilege must claim it at the time he 
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relies on it.” Salinas v. Texas, 570 U.S. 178, 183 (2013) (plurality opinion)

(quotation and ellipsis omitted); Nichols v. State, 55 N.E.3d 854, 860 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2016), trans. denied. “[N]o ritualistic formula is necessary in order to 

invoke the privilege” against self-incrimination. Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 

155, 164 (1955). Rather, the witness must only put the interrogating official 

“on notice [that he] intends to rely on the privilege.” Salinas, 570 U.S. at 183; 

see also Quinn, 349 U.S. at 164 (holding that the witness’s invocation must be 

“sufficiently definite to apprise [the interrogating official] of his intention” to 

invoke the privilege). The express invocation requirement gives courts tasked 

with evaluating a Fifth Amendment claim a contemporaneous record 

establishing the witness’s reasons for refusing to answer. Salinas, 570 U.S. at 

183-84. 

[40] Here, we find that Davis-Martin did not invoke the privilege against selfincrimination when he told his mother on the phone that he was not going to 

the police station to talk to the police. See id. at 185-91 (a plurality opinion 

holding that a witness does not invoke the privilege against self-incrimination 

by simply standing mute and that the prosecution’s use of the defendant’s 

noncustodial silence did not violate the Fifth Amendment because the 

defendant failed to state that he was not answering the officer’s question on 

Fifth Amendment grounds); Nichols, 55 N.E.3d at 860 (holding that evidence 

that the defendant did not accept a police officer’s invitation to attend an 

interview did not violate the defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege against 

self-incrimination because the defendant did not invoke the privilege); Owens v. 
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State, 937 N.E.2d 880, 891-92 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (concluding that even under 

cases holding that a defendant’s pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence is protected by 

the Fifth Amendment, evidence that the defendant did not respond to a police 

officer’s efforts to make contact with him did not support a finding that he 

invoked his right to remain silent), reh’g denied, trans. denied; see also Mira v. 

State, 3 N.E.3d 985, 986-89 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (in a case where a detective 

wrote a letter to the defendant that he was a suspect in a larceny and needed to 

contact him, the defendant called the detective and told him that he would 

check his schedule and call back, but the defendant never called back, we held 

that the failure on the defendant's part to follow up with the detective 

comported with Owens and “d[id] not support a finding that he invoked his right 

to remain silent” under Article 1, Section 14 of the Indiana Constitution). 

[41] There could have been many reasons why Davis-Martin did not want to talk to 

the police that day. See, e.g., Salinas, 570 U.S. at 189 (“To be sure, someone 

might decline to answer a police officer’s question in reliance on his 

constitutional privilege. But he also might do so because he is trying to think of 

a good lie, because he is embarrassed, or because he is protecting someone 

else.”); Owens, 937 N.E.2d at 891 (“Owens’s mere lack of response does not 

support a finding that he invoked the right to remain silent. Perhaps Owens did 

not respond because the wind blew [the police officer’s business] cards away, or 

perhaps Owens was very ill or too busy, or perhaps he just did not like the 

police.”). In fact, Davis-Martin told his mother on the phone that he could not 

go to the police station because he was working. Notably, Davis-Martin later 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 71A05-1712-CR-2963 | February 4, 2019 Page 29 of 32

spoke to Detective Cook. Accordingly, we conclude that the State did not 

violate Davis-Martin’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. It 

follows that no error, let alone fundamental error, occurred in the admission of 

this evidence.

IV. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[42] Davis-Martin contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction 

for murder. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a 

conviction, appellate courts must consider only the probative evidence and 

reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. Sallee v. State, 51 N.E.3d 130, 133 

(Ind. 2016). It is the fact-finder’s role, not that of appellate courts, to assess 

witness credibility and weigh the evidence to determine whether it 

is sufficient to support a conviction. Id. It is not necessary that the evidence 

“overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.” Id. (quotation omitted). 

The evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn from it to 

support the verdict. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 147 (Ind. 2007).

[43] Davis-Martin’s sufficiency challenge is a narrow one. That is, he argues that 

“there was insufficient evidence of a credible nature from which a reasonable 

jury could have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Appellant’s Br. 

p. 29. Davis-Martin points out that the State’s witnesses included felons, 

jailhouse snitches, and reluctant witnesses. He also points to contradictions in

some of the witnesses’ testimony. However, all of these things were pointed out 

to the jury during trial, and the jury found him guilty of murder. The jury, and 
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jury alone, assesses the credibility of witnesses and resolves conflicts in the 

evidence. Moreover, in making his sufficiency challenge, Davis-Martin does 

not acknowledge the other evidence admitted in this case—including physical 

evidence. Accordingly, Davis-Martin’s sufficiency challenge fails. 

IV. Sentencing

[44] Last, Davis-Martin contends that the trial court erred in sentencing him to the 

maximum term of sixty-five years. Our trial courts enjoy broad discretion in 

sentencing, and we will reverse only for an abuse of that discretion. McCoy v. 

State, 96 N.E.3d 95, 99 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). One way a trial court abuses its 

discretion is entering a sentencing statement that “omits reasons that are clearly 

supported by the record and advanced for consideration.” Anglemyer v. State, 

868 N.E.2d 482, 491 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007).

[45] Davis-Martin first argues that the trial court should have considered his age—

he was twenty-three at the time of Jodie’s murder—as a mitigator. See Tr. Vol. 

IV p. 169 (defense counsel asking the trial court to impose the advisory sentence 

of fifty-five years “given Mr. Davis-Martin’s age, balanced against what stated I 

about his [criminal] record.”). Youth, however, is not automatically a 

significant mitigating circumstance. Smith v. State, 872 N.E.2d 169, 178 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. If a trial court does not find youth to be a 

mitigator, it is under no obligation to explain its reasoning. Id. At the time of 

the Jodie’s murder, Davis-Martin had two convictions and was on probation for 

a handgun conviction. He also had a juvenile record, including a period of 
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probation. In light of this evidence, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

not identifying Davis-Martin’s age as a mitigator. 

[46] Davis-Martin next argues that the trial court should have considered as a 

mitigator that he “had a young baby that he cared for prior to his incarceration”

and that long-term incarceration would create an undue hardship to his child. 

Appellant’s Br. p. 34. Davis-Martin, however, did not advance this mitigator 

below, and on appeal he does not cite any evidence in the record that he cared 

for his child before Jodie’s murder. In fact, the PSI suggests that Davis-Martin

had little involvement with his child. See Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 142 (“The 

defendant reported the child lives with [her mother] and the defendant reported 

he is unsure of his relationship with the child. . . . The defendant reported he 

has not been ordered to pay child support . . . .”). Accordingly, the trial court 

did not abuse its discretion in not finding undue hardship to his child as a 

mitigator. 

[47] Last, Davis-Martin argues that the trial court should have considered as a 

mitigator that this act “was out of character for [him],” as there was evidence

that he and Jodie had “a good and playful relationship” before this night. 

Appellant’s Br. p. 34. However, any positive character evidence is 

overshadowed by Davis-Martin’s actions in beating Jodie and leaving him in 

the cold, only to return to beat him some more. The trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in not finding Davis-Martin’s character as a mitigator. We therefore 

affirm Davis-Martin’s sixty-five-year sentence. 
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[48] Affirmed.

Riley, J., and Kirsch, J., concur.