This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations fr om the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 LYLE A. DETHLEFSEN and 2 VERA A. DETHLEFSEN , 3 Plaintiffs-Appellants, 4

v. Nos. 33,540 & 33,660 5 (Consolidated) 6 WILLIAM H. WEDDLE, ARDEEN J. WEDDLE 7 Individually and as TRUSTEES OF THE WEDDLE 8 FAMILY REVOCABLE TRUST, ROBERT COCHRAN 9 SUSAN COCHRAN, DAN WARREN, VON EVA WARREN, 10 and THE NEW MEXICO LAND CONSERVANCY, 11 Defendants-Appellees. 12 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SIERRA COUNTY 13 Kevin R. Sweazea, District Judge 14 Jones & Smith Law Firm LLC 15 J. Brian Smith 16 Albuquerque, NM 17 for Appellants 18 William H. Weddle 19 Ardeen J. Weddle 20 Robert Cochran 21 Susan Cochran 22 Dan Warren 23 Von Eva Warren 242 Winston , NM 1 Pro Se Appellees 2 Domenici Law Firm , P.C. 3 Peter V. Domenici, J.R. 4 Albuquerque, NM 5 for Appellees The Weddle Family Revokable Trust 6 A. Blair Dunn 7 Alonzo Maestas 8 Albuquerque, NM 9 for Appellees New Mexico Land Conservancy and Amicus Curiae 10

MEMORANDUM OPINION 11 VIGIL, Chief Judge. 12 {1} This case comes before us for the second time. In the prior appeal, Dethlefsen 13 v. Weddle , 2012-NMCA-077, ¶ 36, 284 P.3d 452, we affirmed the district court’s 14 judgment “that an express, fifty-foot wi de easement and road of some undetermined 15 dimension burdens both the Dethlefsen and Warren Properties.” However, we 16 concluded that “the recorded property doc uments are ambiguous with respect to the 17 width of the road, the location of the ro ad within—or separatefrom—the fifty-foot 18 wide easement, the use, the nature, and purpose of the road, and the permissibility of 19 a lockable gate.” Id . We therefore remanded “for ad mission and consideration of all 20 relevant extrinsic evidence to determine the proper scope and us e of the easement as 21 intended by the common grantor, including a determination of the history and use of 223 a locked gate at Forest Service Road 157.” Id . For the reasons that follow, we affirm 1 the district court. 2 DISCUSSION 3 {2} Following a bench trial of two-and-a half days of testimony, the admission of 4 close to fifty exhibits, and a visit to the pr operty, the district court determined: (1) the 5 easement is fifty feet in wi dth across the Dethlefsen and Warren lands; (2) the fifty6 foot width of the easement is measured as twenty-five feet to either side from the 7 centerline of Monument Creek that runs through the Dethlefsens’ property; (3) that 8 “[w]ithin said easements, th e size of the traveled and maintained roadway is the 9 amount reasonably necessary for the uses thatare intended, which is generally twenty 10 feet, more or less, which may be slightly more around corners”; (4) that the Cochrans’ 11 easement includes ingress and egress and th e movement of livestock; (5) that the 12 Weddles’ easement is limited to ingress and eg ress, but not to a specific vehicle type; 13 and (6) that a locked gate constitutes anunreasonable restriction on the easement and 14 that the Dethlefsens cannot require that the gate remain locked at all times. 15 {3} The Dethlefsens appeal on three grounds: (1) that substantial evidence does not 16 support the finding that the size of the traveledand maintained roadway is twenty feet, 17 more or less, and that ingress and egress is not limited to a specific type of vehicle 18 type and may include vehicles that are wi der than the present existing gate; (2) that 19 the district court erred in finding that a locked gate constitutes an unreasonable 204 restriction on the easement and that the gatemust remain unlocked; and (3) that the 1 district court erred in awarding the We ddles’ costs as “prevailing parties.” 2 {4} We address each argument in turn. Because this is a memorandum opinion, and 3 because the parties are familiar with the facts and procedur al history of the case, it is 4 unnecessary for us to set them forth, except as required for our analysis. 5 1. Substantial Evidence of Roadway Width and Vehicle Size 6 {5} The Dethlefsens contend that “the road should be no more than fourteen feet in 7 width as limited by the access gate and the hi storic width and uses of the road and 8 what is reasonable and necessary for the uses of the road under the circumstances.” 9 The Dethlefsens contend that the judgment of the district court to the contrary is not 10 supported by substantial evidence and is contrary to law. We disagree. 11 {6} In the prior appeal we determined th at the recorded property documents are 12 ambiguous with respect to the width and location of the road and the use, nature, and 13 purpose of the road. Hence, the district c ourt was faced with determining the meaning 14 of the easements as questions of fact. See Mark V, Inc. v. Mellekas , 1993-NMSC-001, 15 ¶ 13, 114 N.M. 778, 845 P.2d 1232 (“Once the agreement is found to be ambiguous, 16 the meaning to be assigned the unclear terms is a question of fact.”); see also 17 28A C.J.S. Easements § 189 (2015) (“The extent of the right of an easement is a 18 question of fact[.]”). 195 {7} “Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence that a r easonable mind would 1 find adequate to s upport a conclusion.” State ex rel. King v. B & B Inv. Grp., Inc. , 2 2014-NMSC-024, ¶ 12, 329 P.3d 658 (internal quotation mark s and citation omitted). 3 “The question is not whether substantial evidence exists to support the opposite result, 4 but rather whether such eviden ce supports the result reached.” N.M. Taxation & 5 Revenue Dep’t v. Casias Trucking , 2014-NMCA-099, ¶ 20, 336 P.3d 436 (internal 6 quotation marks and citation omitted). “We will not reweigh the evidence nor 7 substitute our judgment for that of the fact finder.” Id. (alteration, internal quotation 8 marks, and citation omitted). “In determini ng whether or not there is substantial 9 evidence to support the trial court’s findi ngs, we look only at the evidence favorable 10 to the appellees.” Robertson v. Carmel Builders Real Estate , 2004-NMCA-056, ¶ 28, 11 135 N.M. 641, 92 P.3d 653. 12 {8} The intent of the parties determines the existence and scope of an easement. 13 Mayer v. Smith , 2015-NMCA-060, ¶ 11, 350 P.3d 1191, cert. denied sub nom. Mayer 14 v. Jones , 2015-NMCERT-004, 348 P.3d 694. If the re servation or grant is ambiguous, 15 “the parties’ intention must be determined from the language of the instrument as well 16 as from the surrounding circumstances.” Sanders v. Lutz , 1989-NMSC-076, ¶ 8, 109 17 N.M. 193, 784 P.2d 12. “[T]he sc ope of an easement, or right-of-way, is narrow and 18 is measured by the nature and purpose of the easement.” Walker v. United States , 19 2007-NMSC-038, ¶ 49, 142 N.M. 45, 162 P. 3d 882 (internal quotation marks and 206 citation omitted). “The easement holder’s right to use the property is limited to the 1 particular purpose for which the easement was created.” City of Rio Rancho v. Amrep 2 Sw. Inc. , 2011-NMSC-037, ¶ 33, 150 N.M. 428, 260 P.3d 414. An easement holder 3 “is entitled to make only the uses reasona bly necessary for the specified purpose.” Id. 4 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see 28A C.J.S. Easements § 215 5 (2015) (“[A]n easement holder is only entitled to do what is ‘reasonably necessary’ 6 to fairly enjoy the rights that were expressly granted[.]”). 7 {9} The Dethlefsens do not dispute the ex istence of the fifty-foot easement or its 8 location; the Dethlefsens only dispute the width of the roadway within the easement. 9 According to the Dethlefsens, the road historically has been a two-track road—a 10 single lane—where the width is eight to fourteen feet, unsurf aced. The Dethlefsens 11 contend that the roadway should be no greater than the historic width of fourteen feet, 12 which is reasonable and necessary for the uses under these circumstances. The 13 evidence supports the district court’s findings to the contrary. 14 {10} The fifty-foot width of the easement is measured as twenty-five feet to either 15 side from the centerline of Monument Cr eek that runs through the Dethlefsen 16 property. Thus, the district court reasone d that the location and size of the road 17 depends on the conditions of the ground and the environment. The road is intertwined 18 with the creek bottom at specifi c sections and closely locatednear the creek in others. 19 Kristine Hawkins (Hawkins), the previous owner of the Cochran property for fourteen 207 years and the first person to purchase pr operty from original grantor Kenneth Eng 1 (Eng), testified that she would drive out of the creek for a sturdi er surface when water 2 was running through the creek. The water fro m the creek would change directions 3 from one year to the next and Hawkins would need to move around depending on the 4 flow of the water. Hawkins sometimes could not even drive on the road on certain 5 occasions due to the water, declaring her access as impassable. Dan Warren, current 6 owner of the Warren property, testified th at such floods are notunusual in the area. 7 Prior to the bench trial, another flood occurred. 8 {11} There is also evidence thatother pathways have beendeveloped on the original 9 road, causing the road easement not to bea two-track road. William Weddle , current 10 owner of the Weddle property, testified thatcertain areas within the creek had “well 11 worn” paths when Weddle first observed th e area. Hawkins gave further support by 12 testifying that the roadway has dual pathways in which the two paths are the existing 13 roadway. Eng testified in his deposition that he would not describe the road easement 14 as a two-track road. The Dethlefsens evenadmitted that the current road has two 15 pathways beginning at the gate at the tim e the district court judge conducted the 16 second site visit. Additional testimony from Weddle demonstrates that the road that 17 “come[s] off” Warren’s property in 1996 was approximately twenty-feet wide. A 18 previous path on the road eas ement was sixteen-feet wide. 198 {12} Another natural element al so impedes the property ow ner’s ability to access the 1 road easement. Hawkins testified that she encountered overhanging trees with large 2 branches on the road. Hawkins would need to cut the branches to avoid scraping her 3 trailers. Other branches of such size would fall on the road easement, and Hawkins 4 would need to remove them. Weddle testif ied that cottonwood branches and an oak 5 tree had fallen on the road. Dethlefsen tes tified that he had re moved branches from 6 trees to give access to large equipment. 7 {13} The district court further noted that this road easement is not simply a two-track 8 road due to its maintenance. Hawkins tes tified that she brought in a D-3 bulldozer to 9 maintain the road. Robert Cochran, current owner of the Cochran property, testified 10 that Weddle used his tractor to straighten the road after a flood destroyed the gate 11 between the Dethlefsen and Warren property, causing significant debris to scatter 12 across the area. Prior to the flood, Weddle laid a considerable amount of gravel on the 13 easement. Weddle had also leveled the ro adway in 2010 because he had had guests 14 arriving on his property. 15 {14} Finally, the district court concluded that Eng intended to allow property owners 16 to transport large vehicles—beyond the width of the gate—across the easement. The 17 district court reasoned that the survey pl at, done during a transaction between Eng and 18 the Dethlefsens and identifying a fifty-footwide easement, was Eng’s expression of 19 his specific intent, which the Dethlefsen s accepted. Eng provides support in his 209 deposition that the property owners could us e the necessary amount of road in the 1 easement to “move what they wanted to m ove across . . . in their normal business”; 2 whether it was fifty, twenty, or five feet on the easement. 3 {15} Additional evidence shows the property ow ners’ need to travel in vehicles 4 greater in width than the fourteen-foot widegate. Hawkins testified that large storage 5 tanks would need to be transported through the easement for ranching purposes, which 6 would not fit through the fourteen-foot gate. Weddle testified that he currently plans 7 to continue to live on his property and build a larger house. Weddle had wanted to 8 transport a pre-fabricated building, located at Elephant Butte, that was fifteen feet in 9 width across his property on a sixteen-foot wide vehicle. Because Warren objected to 10 Weddle’s approach in transporting the building to his property, Weddle dissembled 11 the building and moved the pieces on a flatbed trailer. Weddle had to make four trips 12 with this trailer to transport all of the pieces onto his property. Dethlefsen himself 13 admits that a D-9 bulldozer he used to build a private roadway from Monument Creek 14 to his home, did not enter through the gate. 15 {16} The record demonstrates that the exis tence of natural elem ents create obstacles 16 to ingress and egress, thereby generating different pathways for the road; that the 17 roadway is maintained with mechanical vehicles, including bulldozers and tractors; 18 and that Eng’s intent was to allow property owners who have the need, to drive 19 vehicles greater than the width of the gate. We therefore conclude that there is 2010 substantial evidence to support the districtcourt’s findings that it is reasonably 1 necessary that the road be twenty-feet wide, more or less, for the specific purposes of 2 ingress and egress and to allo w vehicle types to enter thatare wider than the existing 3 gate. 4 2. Substantial Evidence That Gate is To Be Unlocked 5 {17} The Dethlefsens next argue that the district court erred when it found that the 6 locked gate at Forest Service Road 157 was an unreasonable restriction on the 7 easement. We review whether substantial evidence supports the district court finding 8 that the locked gate is an unreas onable restriction on the easement. See Huff v. 9 McClannahan , 1976-NMCA-121 , ¶ ¶ 6-7, 89 N.M. 762, 557 P.2d 1111 (stating that 10 “[w]hether the gates unreasonabl y interfered with [the] plain tiffs’ right of passage was 11 a question of fact”). 12 {18} The owner of a servient estate “may make any reasonable use desired of the 13 land in which the easement exists.” Dyer v. Compere , 1937-NMSC-088, ¶ 13, 41 14 N.M. 716, 73 P.2d 1356. “[T]he se rvient [estate, however], may not use [the] property 15 in a way that obstructs the normal use of the easement.” 28A C. J.S. Easements § 234 16 (2015). A locked gate is permitted as long as “it is necessary for the efficient use of 17 the servient estate and it does not impos e an unreasonable [restriction] upon the use 18 of the easement.” 28A C.J.S. Easements § 240 (2015); see Huff , 1976-NMCA-121, 19 ¶ 5 (“[T]he servient owner may maintain a gate across the way if necessary for the use 2011 of the servient estate and if the gate does not unreasonabl y interfere with the right of 1 passage.” (internal quotation marks and c itation omitted)). We conclude that the 2 evidence supports the district court’s finding and affirm on this point as well. 3 {19} Cochran described his difficulties of i ngress and egress caused by the the locked 4 gate at Forest Service Road 157. The lockedgate was a problem at night, in the winter 5 season, and during the evenings. Cochran saidForest Service Road 157 is a mile from 6 his property. He has family, friends, and business associates who come and visit him 7 on his property, and he tries to make arrangements to meet his guests if he knows they 8 are coming. Otherwise, Cochran’s guests have to travel down the road and ask 9 Cochran to open the gate. At times, Cochran himself, as well as his guests, have had 10 to walk from the gate to Cochran’s property at night without a flashlight. Visitors have 11 sometimes left because the gate was locked. 12 {20} Warren also testified about difficulties hehad due to the lock ed gate at Forest 13 Service Road 157. According to Warren, the security on the gate and the fences 14 connected to that gate “isolate” about one acre of Warren’s land, which makes it 15 difficult for Warren to access his own property. Warren testified that he feels his right 16 to access his property has been constraine d due to the gate, believing that his 17 neighbors use his property as a “security bu ffer” for their more distant properties. 18 After the district court asked what outcomehe would desire fro m the court, Warren 19 testified that he had a preference that th ere should not be a locked gate. 2012 {21} The evidence also establis hes that the property owne rs, who have the right of 1 ingress and egress on the road way, risk not having emerge ncy vehicles travel across 2 the easement due to the lock ed gate at Forest Service Road 157. According to a 3 written statement by Nathan Pasos, Fire Ch ief of the Winton-Chloride Volunteer Fire 4 Department, fire-trucks weigh at least 16.5 tons and therefore he “would not consider 5 going off a dirt road to bypass a locked gate even . . . under optimum conditions.” 6 Weddle testified that he had a conversation with Fire Chief Paso s and discussed fire 7 protection for Monument Creek due to the number of fires in the area. Based on 8 Weddle’s conversation with Fi re Chief Pasos and this statement, Weddle concluded 9 that the locked gate prohibits emerge ncy vehicles from entering onto the road 10 easement. Hawkins has had property burn in a fire, and she was worried about fires 11 in this area because fire vehicles cannot pass through the locked gate. 12 {22} We conclude that the foregoing eviden ce supports the district court’s finding 13 that the locked gate at Forest Service Road 157 is an unreasonable restriction on the 14 easement. Cases and other authorities cited to us by the Dethlefsens do not persuade 15 us otherwise, as they did not require any specific determinations involving locked 16 gates on an easement. The district court here correctly applied the law to the question 17 of fact: whether the locked gate is an unreasonable restriction on the easement. 18 3. Weddle as the Prevailing Party 1913 {23} The Dethlefsens argue that the district court erred when it found that Weddle 1 was the prevailing party pursuant to Rule 1-054(D)(1) NMRA. We review the district 2 court’s finding under an abus e of discretion standard. See Mayeux v. Winder , 2006- 3 NMCA-028, ¶ 41, 139 N.M. 235, 131 P.3d 85 (“The issue we must determine is 4 whether the trial court abused its discreti on in concluding [the d]efendant was the 5 prevailing party.”) “An abuse of discretion o ccurs when a ruling is clearly contrary to 6 the logical conclusions demanded by the facts and circumstances of the case.” Benz 7 v. Town Ctr. Land, LLC , 2013-NMCA-111, ¶ 11, 314 P.3d 688 (internal quotation 8 marks and citation omitted). “When reas ons both supporting and detracting from a 9 decision exist, there is no abuse of discretion.” In re Camino Real Envtl. Ctr. Inc. , 10 2010-NMCA-057, ¶ 23, 148 N.M. 776, 242 P.3d 343. 11 {24} Rule 1-054(D)(1) states “[e]xcept whenexpress provision therefor[e] is made 12 either in a statute or in thes e rules, costs, other than atto rney fees, shall be allowed to 13 the prevailing party unless the court othe rwise directs[.]” “A prevailing party is 14 defined as the party who wins the lawsuit—th at is, a plaintiff who recovers a judgment 15 or a defendant who avoids an adverse judgment.” Mayeux , 2006-NMCA-028, ¶ 41 16 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A prevailing party can also be defined 17 as “the party to a suit who successfully prosecutes the action or successfully defends 18 against it, prevailing on the main issue, ev en though not n ecessarily to the extent of 19 his original contention.” Id. (alteration, internal quotati on marks and citation omitted). 2014 {25} The issues that were tried and then re manded for resolution were: the width and 1 location of the road; the use, nature, and purpose of the road; and the permissibility 2 of the locked gate. See Dethlefsen , 2012-NMCA-077, ¶ 36. While Weddle was not one 3 hundred percent successful on all of these issues, on the whole, Weddle prevailed on 4 the overriding issues relating to the width of the road, whether to allow a locked gate, 5 and use of the road for ingress and egre ss for any legal uses on the Weddle property. 6 Under these circumstances, we cannot concl ude that the district court committed an 7 abuse of discretion in finding that Weddle is the prevailing party for purposes of 8 awarding costs. 9 CONCLUSION 10 {26} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s findings. 11 {27} IT IS SO ORDERED. 12

______________________________ 13 MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Chief Judge 14

WE CONCUR: 15

___________________________________ 16 RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Judge 17

___________________________________ 18 J. MILES HANISEE, Judge 19