1999 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

3-23-1999

Doby v. DeCrescenzo

Precedential or Non-Precedential:

Docket 98-1124

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Recommended Citation

"Doby v. DeCrescenzo" (1999). 1999 Decisions. Paper 74.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1999/74
Filed March 22, 1999 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

Nos. 98-1124 and 98-1224 

REBECCA S. DOBY; HERBERT K. DOBY, 

 Appellants in No. 98-1124 

v. 

JAMES DECRESCENZO; BUCKS COUNTY DEPARTMENT 

OF MENTAL HEALTH AND MENTAL RETARDATION; 

PHILLIP M. FENSTER, COUNTY ADMINISTRATOR, BUCKS 

COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH AND 

MENTAL RETARDATION, in his official capacity; AMY 

BRYANT, individually and in her official capacity as 

Delegate for the County Administrator of the Bucks 

County Department of Mental Health/Mental Retardation 

Lenape Valley Foundation; DEBBIE NEIDHARDT, 

individually and in her official capacity as Delegate for the 

County Administrator of the Bucks County Department of 

Mental Health and Mental Retardation; TOWNSHIP OF 

WARRINGTON; WARRINGTON TOWNSHIP POLICE 

DEPARTMENT; JOHN BONARGO, CHIEF OF POLICE, 

WARRINGTON TOWNSHIP POLICE DEPARTMENT, in his 

official capacity; JOHN DOE, POLICE OFFICER #1, Officer 

who, with police officer #2, asked Mrs. Doby to step 

outside apartment at approximately 7:00 p.m. and took 

Mrs. Doby in handcuffs and shackles to the hospital, 

individually and in his official capacity as police officer of 

Warrington Township; JOHN DOE, POLICE OFFICER #2, 

Officer who, with police officer #1, asked Mrs. Doby to 

step outside apartment at approximately 7:00 p.m. and 

took Mrs. Doby in handcuffs and shackles to the hospital, 

individually and in his official capacity as police officer of 

Warrington Township; JOHN DOE, POLICE OFFICER #3, 

Officer who came to the Dobys' apartment at 

approximately 7:00 p.m. on December 30, 1993, and 

remained at their apartment after Mrs. Doby was taken to 
the hospital, individually and in his official capacity as 

police officer of Warrington Township; LENAPE VALLEY 

FOUNDATION; JOHN C. RICHARDS, M.D.; DOYLESTOWN 

HOSPITAL; JOSEPH KNOX, SERGEANT, of the Warrington 

Township Police Department, in his official and individual 

capacity; MICHAEL NEIPP, OFFICER, of the Warrington

Township Police Department, in his official and individual 

capacity; KENNETH HAWTHORN, OFFICER, of the 

Warrington Township Police Department, in his official 

and individual capacity 

REBECCA S. DOBY; 

HERBERT K. DOBY, 

 Appellants in No. 98-1224 

v. 

JAMES DECRESCENZO; BUCKS COUNTY DEPARTMENT 

OF MENTAL HEALTH AND MENTAL RETARDATION; 

PHILLIP M. FENSTER, COUNTY ADMINISTRATOR, BUCKS 

COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH AND 

MENTAL RETARDATION, in his official capacity; AMY 

BRYANT, individually and in her official capacity as 

Delegate for the County Administrator of the Bucks 

County Department of Mental Health/Mental Retardation 

Lenape Valley Foundation; DEBBIE NEIDHARDT, 

individually and in her official capacity as Delegate for the 

County Administrator of the Bucks County Department of 

Mental Health and Mental Retardation; TOWNSHIP OF 

WARRINGTON; WARRINGTON TOWNSHIP POLICE 

DEPARTMENT; JOHN BONARGO, CHIEF OF POLICE, 

WARRINGTON TOWNSHIP POLICE DEPARTMENT, in his 

official capacity; JOHN DOE, POLICE OFFICER #1, Officer 

who, with police officer #2, asked Mrs. Doby to step 

outside apartment at approximately 7:00 p.m. and took 

Mrs. Doby in handcuffs and shackles to the hospital, 

individually and in his official capacity as police officer of 

Warrington Township; JOHN DOE, POLICE OFFICER #2, 

Officer who, with police officer #1, asked Mrs. Doby to 

step outside apartment at approximately 7:00 p.m. and 

took Mrs. Doby in handcuffs and shackles to the hospital, 

individually and in his official capacity as police officer of 

Warrington Township; JOHN DOE, POLICE OFFICER #3, 

 2 
Officer who came to the Dobys' apartment at 

approximately 7:00 p.m. on December 30, 1993, and 

remained at their apartment after Mrs. Doby was taken to 

the hospital, individually and in his official capacity as 

police officer of Warrington Township; LENAPE VALLEY 

FOUNDATION; JOHN C. RICHARDS, M.D.; DOYLESTOWN 

HOSPITAL; JOSEPH KNOX, SERGEANT, of the Warrington 

Township Police Department, in his official and individual 

capacity; MICHAEL NEIPP, OFFICER, of the Warrington

Township Police Department, in his official and individual 

capacity; KENNETH HAWTHORN, OFFICER, of the 

Warrington Township Police Department, in his official 

and individual capacity 

On Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 

(D.C. Civ. No. 94-03991) 

District Judge: Honorable John P. Fullam 

Argued February 16, 1999 

BEFORE: GREENBERG, ROTH, and LOURIE,* 

Circuit Judges 

(Opinion filed: March 22, 1999) 

 Timothy I. McCann (argued) 

 Linda A. Carpenter 

 McCann & Geschke 

 1819 John F. Kennedy Boulevard 

 Suite 330 

 Philadelphia, PA 19103 

 Attorneys for appellants 

_________________________________________________________________ 

* Honorable Alan D. Lourie, Circuit Judge of the United States Court 

of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, sitting by designation. 

 3 
 Joseph Goldberg (argued) 

 Peggy B. Greenfeld 

 Tracy A. Walsh 

 Margolis Edelstein 

 Sixth and Walnut Streets 

 The Curtis Center, 4th Floor 

 Philadelphia, PA 19106 

 Attorneys for appellee James 

 Decrescenzo 

 Sean X. Kelly (argued) 

 Marks, O'Neill, Reilly, O'Brien 

 & Courtney 

 216 Haddon Avenue 

 Suite 500 

 Westmont, NJ 08108 

 Attorneys for appellees Bucks 

 County Department of Mental 

 Health and Mental Retardation, 

 Phillip M. Fenster, County 

 Administrator, Bucks County 

 Department of Mental Health And 

 Mental Retardation, in his official 

 capacity and Debbie Neidhardt, 

 individually and in her official 

 capacity as Delegate for the 

 County Administrator of the Bucks 

 County Department of Mental 

 Health and Mental Retardation and 

 Township of Warrington 

 4 
 Barbara S. Magen (argued) 

 Donald N. Camhi 

 Amalia V. Romanowicz 

 Post & Schell 

 1800 JFK Boulevard 

 19th Floor 

 Philadelphia, PA 19103 

 Attorneys for appellees Amy 

 Bryant, individually and in her 

 official capacity as Delegate for the 

 County Administrator of the Bucks 

 County Department of Mental 

 Health/Mental Retardation Lenape 

 Valley Foundation and Lenape 

 Valley Foundation 

 L. Rostaing Tharaud (argued) 

 Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, 

 Coleman & Goggin 

 1845 Walnut Street 

 Philadelphia, PA 19103 

 Attorneys for appellees Warrington 

 Township Police Department, John 

 Bonargo, Chief of Police, 

 Warrington Township Police 

 Department, in his official capacity, 

 Joseph Knox, Sergeant, Warrington 

 Township Police Department, in his 

 official and individual capacity, 

 Michael Neipp, Officer, of the 

 Warrington Township Police 

 Department, in his official and 

 individual capacity, and Kenneth 

 Hawthorn, Officer, Warrington 

 Township Police Department, in his 

 official and individual capacity 

 5 
 Alan S. Gold (argued) 

 Monaghan & Gold 

 7837 Old York Road 

 Elkins Park, PA 19027 

 Attorneys for appellee John C. 

 Richards, M.D. 

 Marion H. Griffin (argued) 

 Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, 

 Coleman & Goggin 

 1845 Walnut Street 

 Philadelphia, PA 19103 

 Attorneys for appellee Doylestown 

 Hospital 

OPINION OF THE COURT 

GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 

I. INTRODUCTION 

Believing that his employee Rebecca Doby was suicidal, 

James DeCrescenzo filed a petition with the Bucks County 

Department of Mental Health to have her examined 

involuntarily under section 7302 of the Pennsylvania 

Mental Health Procedures Act. The appropriate county 

official granted the petition and issued a warrant 

instructing the local police to bring Doby to a nearby 

hospital for a psychiatric evaluation; this evaluation led to 

her involuntary five-day commitment. Claiming that her 

federal rights to due process and freedom from 

unreasonable searches and seizures had been violated, 

Doby and her husband, Herbert Doby, brought suit under 

42 U.S.C. S 1983 against the individuals involved in her 

commitment, including DeCrescenzo, the county, certain of 

its officials, the police officers who executed the warrant, 

and an evaluating doctor. The district court dismissed 

portions of the Dobys' case, entered judgment as a matter 

of law for the defendants before or at the trial on other 

claims, and subsequently denied the Dobys' post-trial 

 6 
motions for a new trial and for other relief. The Dobys 

appeal, arguing primarily that Bucks County relies upon an 

unconstitutional policy in processing petitions for

involuntary examinations. After evaluation of the many 

issues involved in this case we have concluded that the 

county's policy in enforcing the Mental Health Procedures 

Act is constitutional, and that there is no other reason to 

reverse the orders or judgments on appeal. Consequently, 

we will affirm. 

II. JURISDICTION 

The district court had jurisdiction over the Dobys' section 

1983 claims under 28 U.S.C. SS 1331 and 1343 and 

supplemental jurisdiction over their related state law claims 

under 28 U.S.C. S 1367. Because the Dobys appeal from 

final orders of the district court, we have jurisdiction under 

28 U.S.C. S 1291. 

III. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

A. Factual History 

The chain of events at the center of this appeal 

commenced when Doby handed a letter to DeCrescenzo on 

December 22, 1993. At the time, Doby had worked for

DeCrescenzo's court reporting agency for two years. She 

alleges that during her employment her relationship with 

DeCrescenzo had become intimate and included several 

instances of sexual contact but not sexual intercourse. 

DeCrescenzo denies that his relationship with Doby 

extended beyond friendship. 

The letter in question was lengthy, 11 pages in total, and 

personal. It referred to abuse suffered by Doby during her 

childhood and described sexual conduct in which Doby 

wished to engage with DeCrescenzo. At the letter's 

conclusion, Doby also wrote that she had accomplished 

what she was intended to do in this lifetime and was 

"leaving." Alarmed by the letter's contents, DeCrescenzo 

consulted with his wife, his marriage counselor, and his 

attorney. Dr. Linda Edelstein, his marriage counselor, 

advised him that the letter's author was in psychiatric 

 7 
distress, potentially suicidal, and needed the immediate 

assistance of mental health professionals. On her advice, 

DeCrescenzo spoke with personnel of the Philadelphia 

mental health office who suggested that they could send a 

mobile emergency crisis team to meet with Doby. Without 

consulting Doby, DeCrescenzo arranged for the crisis team 

to come to his office on December 30, 1993. 

However, on December 30, Doby left the office before the 

mobile emergency crisis team arrived. From her car phone, 

she placed a call to a co-worker, Kathy McHugh, to advise 

her that she would not attend McHugh's New Year's Eve 

party. Doby was upset and crying, indicated that she was 

driving in the rain, and would not tell McHugh where she 

was going. McHugh reported this conversation to 

DeCrescenzo who then called Doby to ask her to return to 

the office. Doby refused and indicated that she did not want 

to speak to him. 

DeCrescenzo then called the Philadelphia mental health 

office and the Warrington Township police. At the 

suggestion of the mental health office, he also contacted 

Herbert Doby and read to him several phrases from Doby's 

letter. Concerned for his wife, Herbert Doby called her on 

the car phone but their conversation convinced him that 

nothing was wrong. Doby then phoned DeCrescenzo to 

assure him that she was not in danger. 

Unsure of what to do next, DeCrescenzo again phoned

the Warrington Township Police Department. At their

suggestion, DeCrescenzo asked his wife and Kathy McHugh 

to search Doby's work area for other indications of her 

mental state. This search revealed a suicide note Doby 

authored, which begins "If you are receiving this letter it is 

because I am gone, and I seek your help for Herb and my 

girls." The search also uncovered written reminders to 

make arrangements for organ donation and the custody of 

Doby's daughter and step-daughter. The defendants claim 

that DeCrescenzo brought these writings when he later 

applied for a warrant to have Doby involuntarily examined 

on an emergency basis. 

After discovering the suicide note, DeCrescenzo went to 

the Doylestown Hospital to petition to have Doby 

 8 
involuntarily examined according to the guidelines of the 

Pennsylvania Mental Health Procedures Act ("MHPA"), Pa. 

Stat. Ann. tit. 50, S 7101 et seq. (West Supp. 1998). During 

his drive to the hospital, he received another call from 

Herbert Doby informing him that Doby was fine. 

Section 7302 of the MHPA permits the issuance of a 

warrant for an involuntary emergency examination. It 

states: 

 Upon written application by a physician or other 

 responsible party setting forth facts constituting 

 reasonable grounds to believe a person is severely 

 mentally disabled and in need of immediate treatment, 

 the county administrator may issue a warrant

 requiring a person authorized by him, or any peace 

 officer, to take such a person to the facility specified in 

 the warrant. 

Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 50, S7302(a)(1). According to the statute 

a person may be "severely mentally disabled" if he or she 

"poses a clear and present danger of harm to others or to 

[himself/herself.]" Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 50,S7301(a). In turn, 

clear and present danger is shown if "within the past 30 

days . . . the person has made threats to commit suicide 

and has committed acts which are in furtherance of the 

threat to commit suicide." Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 50 

S7301(b)(2)(ii). The statute also provides that a physician 

must examine a person brought in under a section 7302 

warrant within two hours of her arrival at the facility. Pa. 

Stat. Ann. tit. 50, S 7302(b). If the physician performing the 

involuntary examination determines that the individual is 

severely mentally disabled and in need of immediate

treatment, the individual may be involuntarily committed to 

begin treatment for a period not to exceed 120 hours. The 

period of commitment, however, may be extended in certain 

circumstances. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 50 S 7302(b). 

Upon reaching the hospital, DeCrescenzo met with Amy 

Bryant, a crisis worker for Lenape Valley Foundation 

("LVF"), which processes petitions for involuntary 

examinations for Bucks County. In his discussion with 

Bryant, DeCrescenzo presented her with an undated copy 

of the 11-page letter and stated that he had found a suicide 

 9 
note that day on Doby's desk. Bryant's recorded the

information provided by DeCrescenzo on the section 7302 

application: 

 I believe that Rebecca Doby is in need of emergency 

 psychiatric care. Today I found an extensive suicide 

 note on her desk, as well as lists of chores including 

 transferences of information to her husband about 

 access to bank accounts, insurance policy bills, a 

 shared storage shed, and her current status with my 

 company. She also has written a reminder to call about 

 organ donations. Rebecca asked me as well to lock 

 away a file for her with a note attached instructing me 

 to destroy it if anything should happen to her. She also 

 has begun letters to friends and relatives, with 

 envelopes already addressed, asking either for 

 forgiveness for pain she caused or including pleas for 

 their help with the raising of her children. The return 

 address is to a P.O. Box which only lists the names of 

 her husband and children. In the past few weeks 

 Rebecca has been drastically less efficient at work and 

 often retires to a cot to sleep during working hours. 

 She has access to guns and has a license to carry one 

 herself; she also talks a great deal about guns. I truly 

 fear for her safety. 

DeCrescenzo did not recount the events of the day 

specifically, nor did he relate the Dobys' repeated claims 

that day that Doby was not in danger. After recording 

DeCrescenzo's application, Bryant consulted by telephone 

with Debbie Neidhardt of the Bucks County Department of 

Mental Health and Mental Retardation. During this 

conversation, Bryant read the section 7302 application to 

Neidhardt and, as required by section 7102 of the MHPA, 

inquired whether involuntary emergency treatment was the 

least restrictive alternative available.1 After a 14-minute 

discussion, Neidhardt authorized the issuance of a section 

7302 warrant for Doby's examination.2 Bryant then signed 

_________________________________________________________________ 

1. Section 7102 of the MHPA provides: "Treatment on a voluntary basis 

shall be preferred to involuntary treatment; and in every case, the least 

restrictions consistent with adequate treatment shall be employed." Pa. 

Stat. Ann. tit. 50, S7102. 

2. Although the Dobys argued that neither Bryant nor Neidhardt could 

have seen the suicide note because it was not part of the hospital's file 

 10 
the warrant on Neidhardt's behalf, and DeCrescenzo 

delivered it to the Warrington Township Police Department. 

Three police officers, Joseph Knox, Michael Neipp and 

Kenneth Hawthorn, arrived at the Dobys' apartment at 

approximately 7:00 p.m. to execute the warrant. After Doby 

answered their knock, they asked her to step outside. The 

parties disagree on whether the officers then explained to 

her why they were taking her into custody. 

After Doby refused to accompany the officers and 

attempted to reenter the apartment to speak to her 

husband, the officers "grabbed" her. When she began to 

kick at the apartment door, they handcuffed her, and after 

she continued to resist forcefully, they shackled her and 

carried her to the police car. One officer, Hawthorn, stayed 

behind to speak with Herbert Doby. After he left the 

apartment, he entered the police car and drove Doby to 

Doylestown Hospital. 

At the hospital, Dr. John Richards examined Doby. 

During the examination, they discussed the 11-page letter 

and Doby's feelings towards DeCrescenzo. Doby admitted to 

Dr. Richards that she had been depressed most of her life 

but claimed that she functioned very well. She also told 

him that she had been seeing a psychiatrist who had

prescribed Prozac to treat her depression, but that she 

recently had stopped taking the medication. When Dr. 

Richards asked Doby whether she needed help, she 

admitted that she did but refused voluntary treatment. The 

examination ended when Doby asked to phone her 

husband and her psychiatrist and Dr. Richards agreed. Dr. 

Richards involuntarily committed Doby for a period not to 

exceed 120 hours. 

On the following day, another physician, who is not a 

defendant in this suit, examined Doby, concluded that she 

was mentally disabled, and thus decided not to release her. 

_________________________________________________________________ 

on Doby, the district court noted that Neidhardt's deposition testimony 

contradicted this assertion. Neidhardt testified that she remembered 

hearing specific provisions of the two-page note during her conversation 

with Bryant. 

 11 
On January 3, 1994, Doby signed voluntary commitment 

papers on the understanding that doing so would lead to 

her release on the following day. Doby was in fact released 

on January 4, 1994. 

Claiming that the involuntary commitment violated their 

rights under federal and state law, the Dobys filed this 

action in June 1994 against DeCrescenzo, the Lenape

Valley Foundation and Amy Bryant, the Bucks County 

Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation,

Philip M. Fenster, the county administrator, and Debbie 

Neidhardt, the Township of Warrington, the Warrington 

Township Police Department, Chief John Bonargo, Sergeant 

Joseph Knox, Officer Michael Neipp, and Officer Kenneth 

Hawthorn, Dr. John C. Richards, and Doylestown Hospital. 

B. Procedural History 

In their complaint, the Dobys alleged a violation of their 

civil rights under section 1983, false arrest and 

imprisonment, assault and battery, conspiracy, gross 

negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and 

loss of consortium against all the defendants and sought a 

declaratory judgment that section 7302(a)(1) is 

unconstitutional. Additionally, they pled an invasion of 

privacy claim against DeCrescenzo, the county defendants, 

the foundation defendants, and the police defendants. 

Finally, the Dobys alleged defamation and wrongful use of 

civil proceedings against DeCrescenzo. 

In an order of June 27, 1995, the district court, by Judge 

Rendell, dismissed the section 1983 claim against Dr. 

Richards and the conspiracy claims against all the 

defendants. Then, following extensive discovery, the parties 

cross-moved for summary judgment, and the district court, 

again by Judge Rendell, addressed their claims in a

memorandum opinion and order dated September 9, 1996. 

The court dismissed claims against the foundation 

defendants, the county defendants, Doylestown Hospital, 

and Dr. Richards. The court also denied the Dobys' motion 

for summary judgment, which requested a ruling that the 

municipal defendants and individual defendants sued in 

their official capacity were liable as a matter of law under 

section 1983 because the Dobys had shown a custom or 

 12 
policy of causing constitutional violations. However, it 

allowed the Dobys to proceed with some of their claims 

against DeCrescenzo and the police defendants. 

Specifically, the court refused to dismiss the defamation, 

invasion of privacy, false arrest or imprisonment, gross 

negligence, and intentional infliction of emotional distress 

claims against DeCrescenzo. The court also allowed the 

Dobys to proceed against the police defendants on their 

section 1983 claims based on excessive force and against 

the individual police officers on claims of gross negligence 

and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Dobys 

appeal from this September 9, 1996 order, insofar as it was 

unfavorable to them. 

The remaining claims were tried on liability to a jury 

starting on January 21, 1998. At the close of the Dobys' 

case, the district court, by Judge Fullam, granted the police 

defendants a judgment as a matter of law. Thus, the jury 

deliberated only on certain claims against DeCrescenzo and 

ultimately returned a verdict on special interrogatories 

finding him liable for simple negligence but finding in his 

favor on all other counts. The jury, however, did not make 

a damages award. DeCrescenzo immediately moved for a 

judgment as a matter of law, and the court granted his 

motion, ruling that the evidence did not support the simple 

negligence verdict. The Dobys timely filed post-trial motions 

requesting reconsideration of certain earlier orders, 

amendment of the verdict, and a new trial, but the district 

court denied the motions in a memorandum and order on 

March 10, 1998. The Dobys appeal from this order as well. 

IV. DISCUSSION 

A. Did the District Court Err in Granting Summary 

 Judgment to the Municipal Defendants on the Dobys' 

 Official Capacity Claims? 

Despite the Dobys' wide-ranging claims in their 

complaint, their appeal focuses on six of the district court's 

rulings. The first ruling that the Dobys contest is the grant 

of summary judgment to LVF and the county on the official 

capacity claims. The first three issues briefed by the Dobys 

 13 
revolve around this ruling.3 Thus, the initial question before 

us is whether the district court erred in concluding that 

LVF and the county were not liable to the Dobys because 

they had no established custom or policy that caused a 

constitutional deprivation. Because this first issue requires 

us to review the grant of summary judgment, our review is 

plenary and we must draw all reasonable factual inferences 

in favor of the Dobys, the non-moving party. See Sharrar v. 

Felsing, 128 F.3d 810, 817 (3d Cir. 1997). 

 1. The existence of a municipal custom or policy 

The district court correctly ruled that the Dobys could 

recover under section 1983 on their official capacity claims 

against the county defendants only if they showed that the 

defendants had maintained a policy or custom that caused 

a deprivation of constitutional rights. See, e.g., Monell v. 

Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 

2018, 2037-38 (1978). The Dobys argue that the county 

defendants did have a custom or policy and that this policy 

was unconstitutional. Specifically, they argue (i) that 

allowing any individual, rather than only mental health 

_________________________________________________________________ 

3. The Dobys repeatedly rely on Pennsylvania courts' interpretations of 

Pennsylvania's constitutional provisions in making their argument that 

Doby's constitutional rights were violated. However, we must determine 

the liability of the county defendants under section 1983 according to 

federal law. See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 142, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 

2693 (1979). Moreover, the district court dismissed all the state law 

claims against LVF and the county based on their immunity from such 

claims under section 7114(a) of the MHPA, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 50, S 7114, 

and the Dobys have not appealed this ruling. Thus, the only valid issue 

for appeal raised by the first three sections of the Dobys' brief is 

whether 

the county and LVF had a custom or policy of enforcing the MHPA in a 

manner that caused Doby to suffer a violation of her federal 

constitutional rights to due process and freedom from unreasonable 

seizures. 

The Dobys may be arguing that the MHPA itself creates substantive 

rights that cannot be withdrawn without violating federal constitutional 

guarantees. The only such right that is briefed substantially, however, is 

the right to have only physicians or other mental health professionals 

petition for section 7302 warrants. As discussed below, we do not believe 

that the MHPA creates this right because we disagree with the Dobys' 

statutory interpretation. 

 14 
professionals, to petition for an involuntary examination is 

unconstitutional; (ii) that warrants for involuntary 

examinations must be based on probable cause, which

requires reliable informants, independent investigation, 

neutral and detached decision makers, and a warrant that 

is signed and sealed. 

The district court dismissed the official capacity claims 

against LVF and the county because it concluded that the 

Dobys' allegation of a single act of constitutional violation, 

Doby's involuntary examination, could not constitute a 

custom or policy. We are of the view that this ruling 

misapplied Monell. In concluding that the Dobys had failed 

to allege a custom or policy because they claimed only a 

single violation, the district court stated that a custom or 

policy is found only when a "municipality must have

known, or reasonably should have realized, from the nature 

of its conduct or from actual past violation, that its 

practices were causing or likely to cause violations of 

constitutional rights, and permitted these practices to 

occur." In constructing this definition, the court relied on 

Bielevicz v. Dubinon, 915 F.2d 845, 851 (3d Cir. 1990). In 

Bielevicz, however, the city had no express policy on the 

pertinent issue and the plaintiff therefore was attempting to 

prove that one official's misconduct was not an isolated 

occurrence. See id. In contrast, it cannot be doubted that 

the county and LVF maintained a custom or policy 

concerning applications for involuntary examinations. 

LVF's written "Involuntary Commitment Procedure" 

expressly foresees accepting petitions from non-physicians 

and obtaining approval for the warrant from the county by 

telephone. Moreover, it instructs the crisis worker to 

"document" the behavior witnessed by the petitioner

without making any mention of investigation. The 

defendants have not disputed that this is in fact how the 

county and LVF process petitions for involuntary 

examinations. When a plaintiff is challenging the 

constitutionality of a policy or custom itself, Bielevicz does 

not require him or her to allege a sequence of constitutional 

deprivations; the claim that the policy resulted in the 

plaintiff suffering such a deprivation satisfies Monell. See 

id. at 850-51. The district court therefore erred in 

 15 
dismissing the Dobys' official capacity claims on the ground 

that they had failed to allege a custom or policy. 

The question remains, however, whether the defendants' 

method of processing petitions truly can be considered a 

county, rather than a state, policy because when a county 

is merely enforcing state law, without adopting any

particular policy of its own, it cannot be held liable under 

the Monell line of cases. See Surplus Store and Exch., Inc. v. 

City of Delphi, 928 F.2d 788, 790-92 (7th Cir. 1991); cf. 

Garner v. Memphis Police Dep't, 8 F.3d 358, 364-66 (6th 

Cir. 1993) (stating that municipality would be held liable 

under Monell where state law authorized police officers to 

use deadly force to apprehend fleeing felons but 

municipality adopted a policy explaining when such force 

could be used). We seem not to have considered specifically 

whether municipalities or counties can be liable for 

enforcing state law, but in one decision we did approve a 

suit against a county where county sheriffs had garnished 

the plaintiffs' bank accounts based on a state statute. See 

Finberg v. Sullivan, 634 F.2d 50, 53-55 (3d Cir. 1980). We 

did not decide Finberg under Monell, however, because 

there the plaintiffs were seeking only a declaratory 

judgment that the state statute was unconstitutional. See 

id. at 53. 

Without addressing the county/state policy distinction 

specifically, the Dobys clearly have framed their arguments 

to focus on the actions of the county. They do not argue 

that section 7302 as written is itself unconstitutional; 

rather they claim that LVF and the county have enforced it 

in an unconstitutional manner by permitting warrants to be 

issued by telephone based on uncorroborated information 

supplied by individuals who are not mental health 

professionals. The Dobys' suggestion that the enforcement 

procedures should be considered a municipal or county, 

rather than a state, policy has merit; because the statute 

itself does not specify how the county delegate is to receive 

information and issue warrants, LVF and the county 

presumably have some discretion in deciding how to 

implement the warrant application procedure. The Garner 

court found the existence of such discretion determinative 

in deciding that a municipality could be held liable for 

 16 
enforcing the use of deadly force by its police officers. 

Ultimately, however, we believe that we need not decide 

whether a county or state policy is at issue because we 

conclude that the enforcement policy adopted by LVF and 

the county is constitutional. 

 2. Does the county's policy violate the Fourteenth 

 Amendment's Due Process Clause and the Fourth 

 Amendment? 

The Dobys do not contend that it is unconstitutional for 

the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to permit the 

involuntary examination of those individuals who appear to 

pose an immediate danger to themselves or others. Indeed, 

they repeatedly commend the State for drafting a statute 

that balances the need to provide treatment to the seriously 

ill against the civil rights of those in need of such 

treatment. The Dobys quarrel only with the enforcement of 

the statute in two respects: (i) that LVF and the county 

accept petitions for warrants from any individual, rather 

than only from mental health professionals; (ii) that the 

county delegate who decides whether to issue the warrant 

does not interview the petitioner personally, performs no 

investigation of the petitioner's claims, and permits the 

crisis worker to sign the warrant on his or her behalf. The 

district court relied on a well-analyzed and thoughtful 

decision of the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in 

ruling that this enforcement policy is constitutional. See 

McCabe v. Life-Line Ambulance Serv. Inc., 77 F.3d 540 (1st 

Cir. 1996). 

We deal first with a statutory interpretation contention 

the Dobys raise. They devote a considerable portion of their 

brief to arguing that statutory interpretation principles 

require us to interpret the phrase "physician or other 

responsible party" in section 7302(a)(1) to mean physician 

or other mental health professional. The decisive factor 

weighing against their interpretation is that it contradicts 

the relevant state agency's construction. The application 

form for requesting a warrant for a section 7302 

examination does not limit the class of petitioners to mental 

health professionals like physicians; it states: "Part I must 

be completed by the person who believes the patient is in 

 17 
need of treatment. If this person is not a physician, police 

officer, the County Administrator or his delegate . . . ." This 

form is created by the state agency in charge of overseeing 

the implementation of the MHPA. Pennsylvania cases 

provide that courts must defer to an administrative

agency's interpretation of a statute unless that 

interpretation is clearly erroneous. See, e.g., Frey v. State 

Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 632 A.2d 930, 933 (Pa. Super. 

1993). Given the Legislature's use of the phrase "other 

responsible party" rather than a phrase like "other health 

care professional," the agency's interpretation of the statute 

is not clearly erroneous and therefore merits our deference. 

The Dobys' first constitutional argument is that 

permitting individuals other than mental health 

professionals to petition for a section 7302 warrant violates 

the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

They contend that permitting "anyone" to petition for such 

a warrant, particularly when the petitioner's statements are 

not investigated independently, will lead to arbitrary 

deprivations of liberty as the petitioner may have improper 

motives for seeking the involuntary examination. In

circumstances where anyone can petition for a warrant, 

they argue, an individual must be granted the right to 

notice and a hearing before an involuntary examination is 

conducted. 

It is important to note the narrowness of the Dobys' 

arguments: they do not doubt that Pennsylvania has a 

legitimate interest in providing for the involuntary 

examination of dangerous individuals and that the federal 

constitution does not prohibit it from legislating procedures 

to enforce this interest. A contrary argument would be 

difficult to support as the Supreme Court has held that a 

state, in conformity with the Due Process Clause, may 

confine mentally ill individuals if it shows by clear and 

convincing evidence that the individuals are ill and 

dangerous to themselves or others. See Foucha v. 

Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80, 112 S.Ct. 1780, 1786 (1992) 

(citations omitted). The Dobys argue, however, that

permitting non-physicians to apply for such warrants 

converts a constitutional process into an unconstitutional 

one. This argument does not withstand scrutiny. 

 18 
As is made clear by the title of section 7302 of the MHPA, 

the procedure was created to allow the counties to handle 

emergency situations. Courts have stated repeatedly that 

due process is a flexible notion and that what kind of 

process is due depends on the individual and state 

interests at stake. See, e.g., Zinermon v. Bush, 494 U.S. 

113, 127, 110 S.Ct. 975, 984 (1980). It may be reasonable, 

therefore, for a state to omit a provision for notice and a 

hearing in a statute created to deal with emergencies, 

particularly where the deprivation at issue, in this case 

detention for a maximum of several hours to permit an 

examination, continues for only a short period of time. See 

Memphis Light, Gas and Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 19, 

98 S.Ct. 1554, 1565 (1978) (stating that "[o]n occasion, this 

Court has recognized that where the potential length or 

severity of the deprivation does not indicate a likelihood of 

serious loss and where the procedures underlying the 

decision to act are sufficiently reliable to minimize the risk 

of erroneous determination, government may act without 

providing additional `advance procedural safeguards' "). 

Indeed, the Dobys recognize the State's need to act

quickly in emergencies but nevertheless claim that notice 

and a hearing must be provided in cases where the 

petitioner is not a physician because the information 

provided by non-physicians is unreliable. The Dobys have 

not demonstrated, however, that non-physicians as a class 

are inherently unreliable fact informants. Furthermore, the 

Dobys misapprehend the role of a petitioner by suggesting 

that a physician is more competent than a non-physician to 

decide when conduct is "dangerous." Although their 

contention may be true, under the structure of section 

7302, the petitioners themselves are not making clinical 

determinations about an individual's mental state; instead, 

it is the county delegate, a trained mental health 

professional, who has the duty to decide whether the 

information provided by the petitioner constitutes grounds 

for issuing a warrant. The Dobys offer no convincing reason 

why non-physicians cannot be trusted to relay information 

to a person competent to judge such information under the 

appropriate clinical standards. Moreover, it is likely that a 

person other than a physician or a mental health 

professional will have the material information. 

 19 
Additionally, section 7302 specifies that the county 

should make decisions based on information provided by a 

physician or "other responsible party." In the district court 

the county presented testimony that each warrant 

application is handled as it arises in order to guard against 

individuals "who appear impaired in some way." The Dobys 

have not proffered any evidence to suggest that LVF and 

the county have a practice of issuing warrants when a 

petitioner seems clearly imbalanced or otherwise impaired. 

Further, the application procedure itself has a built-in 

safeguard to prevent ill-motivated individuals from seeking 

the involuntary examination of others: the face of the 

application includes a clear statement providing that 

anyone who supplies false information to the county may 

be prosecuted criminally. In conformity with that policy, 

Bryant informed DeCrescenzo that providing false 

information on the application would constitute a 

misdemeanor. Again, the Dobys have failed to explain why 

it is unconstitutional to permit responsible individuals to 

report about the actions of others when a mental health 

professional is entrusted with judging the import of such 

reports. Thus, the Dobys' claim that permitting nonphysicians to apply for warrants transforms a procedure 

that is sound under the Due Process Clause to one that is 

unsound is unpersuasive.4 

_________________________________________________________________ 

4. The Dobys also appear to claim substantive due process violations. "A 

substantive due process violation is established if the government's 

actions were not rationally related to a legitimate government interest or 

were in fact motivated by bias, bad faith or improper motive." Sameric 

Corp. of Delaware, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 142 F.3d 582, 590 (3d 

Cir. 

1998) (citations omitted). Our conclusion below that the MHPA 

authorizes seizures that are "reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment 

establishes that the MHPA meets the rationality test imposed by 

substantive due process analysis. Furthermore, there is no basis in the 

record to conclude that the LVF or county defendants' actions were not 

rationally related to a legitimate government interest or were motivated 

by bias, bad faith, or improper motive. Indeed, the jury answered special 

interrogatories finding in favor of DeCrescenzo himself on the Dobys' 

claims of defamation, invasion of privacy, false arrest and detention, 

gross negligence/willful misconduct, and intentional infliction of 

emotional distress. In the circumstances it is quite clear that 

DeCrescenzo was pursuing a legitimate interest in this matter. 

 20 
The Dobys' second constitutional arguments, which they 

base on the Fourth Amendment, are equally unconvincing, 

and thus the district court correctly dismissed them based 

on the "special need" exception to the probable cause and 

warrant requirements. The Dobys claim that warrants for 

involuntary examinations must be based on probable 

cause, and therefore contend that the county must conform 

to the requirements imposed by criminal law before it 

authorizes the police to take custody of a mentally ill 

individual for an involuntary examination.5 

The Fourth Amendment applies to seizures in civil, as 

well as criminal, proceedings. See O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 

U.S. 709, 714-15, 107 S.Ct. 1492, 1496 (1987). The 

fundamental inquiry in such proceedings, however, remains 

whether the government's conduct is reasonable under the 

circumstances. See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 

439-40, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 2527 (1973). 

Although it was discussing a search rather than a 

seizure, the Supreme Court has held that states may act 

without obtaining a warrant and without probable cause in 

situations where "special needs, beyond the normal need 

for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause 

requirement impracticable." Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 

868, 873, 107 S.Ct. 3164, 3168 (1987) (citations omitted). 

Construing Griffin, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 

held that the temporary involuntary commitment of those 

deemed dangerous to themselves or others qualifies as a 

"special need" permitting the state to act without a warrant. 

See McCabe, 77 F.3d at 549. We agree. 

Requiring the county to seek a warrant from a magistrate 

in a situation where the county delegate has determined 

that there are reasonable grounds to believe in an 

_________________________________________________________________ 

5. The Dobys have not explained how their Fourth Amendment challenge 

implicates a municipal or county, rather than a state, policy. The MHPA 

clearly permits seizures of mentally ill individuals without requiring 

county officials to apply to a magistrate for a warrant that would be 

issued only upon probable cause. Instead, the statute creates an 

alternative warrant scheme. We continue to assume, however, for 

purposes of this opinion, that the county and LVF's actions in enforcing 

this statute could be deemed a county policy. 

 21 
individual's "clear and present" dangerousness would entail 

delays with potentially life-threatening consequences. As 

discussed above, by its terms, section 7302 applies only in 

emergencies. Such emergency cases present a situation 

where seeking a warrant is systemically impracticable. 

Moreover, as the Supreme Court suggested in Griffin, a 

magistrate's authorization is less desirable in cases where 

non-judicial expertise is involved, such as determining the 

amount of supervision necessary for a probationer. See 

Griffin, 483 U.S. at 876, 879 n.6, 107 S.Ct. at 3170, 3172 

n.6. The same reasoning applies where a county delegate 

trained in a mental health field, rather than a magistrate 

judge trained in the law, renders the decision of whether an 

individual requires an emergency involuntary examination. 

Although the Dobys suggest that such a determination is 

unreliable when made by a county delegate on the 

telephone without a face-to-face interview with the

petitioner, this argument again ignores the emergency 

nature of section 7302 warrants. Furthermore, this 

argument ignores the fact that magistrate judges often 

issue warrants based on information supplied by police 

officers who themselves are relying on absent informants. 

Although we find that the "special need" exception 

applies to the county's conduct under the MHPA, we 

nevertheless must examine whether the procedures 

followed by the county are reasonable under the 

circumstances. Fourth Amendment doctrine provides that 

"the shorter the detention, the less compelling is the 

evidence of the necessity for it that the authorities need to 

produce." Villanova v. Abrams, 972 F.2d 792, 796 (7th Cir. 

1992) (citations omitted). Because the Dobys contest the 

issuance of the section 7302 warrant, it is important to 

focus on the deprivation of liberty caused by the execution 

of the warrant itself. The MHPA requires that a physician 

examine a detained individual within two hours of his or 

her arrival at a hospital; therefore, that individual's liberty 

will be curtailed for at most several hours unless a 

physician independently concludes that the individual is 

mentally disabled and in need of involuntary treatment. See 

Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 50, S 7302(b). Given the brief detention 

authorized, the warrant procedures provide important 

 22 
safeguards to protect individuals' rights. First, the warrant 

is authorized by a neutral and detached official, the county 

delegate. See Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 50, S 7302(a)(1); see 

McCabe, 77 F.3d at 552 (interpreting Supreme Court 

precedent to require neutral and detached decision-maker 

to authorize search or seizure in special needs exceptions to 

the warrant and probable cause requirement). Second, the 

county issues a warrant only when information presented 

by a "responsible party" convinces a trained county

delegate that reasonable grounds exist to belief that an 

individual poses a clear and present danger to him/herself 

or others. Id.; Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 50,S 7301(a). 

Because the section 7302 procedures exist to respond to 

emergency cases, it is reasonable for the county delegate to 

consult with the crisis workers over the telephone and to 

issue such warrants without independent investigation. The 

statutory requirement that the individual appear 

"responsible" and the warning on the application form that 

false statements can subject a petitioner to criminal 

prosecution are sufficient safeguards in light of the 

circumstances to assure the reliability of information 

communicated to the delegate. We therefore reject the 

Dobys' Fourth Amendment challenge.6 

B. Did the District Court Err in Granting a Judgment as 

 a Matter of Law to DeCrescenzo on the Negligence 

 Issue? 

The jury returned a verdict in DeCrescenzo's favor on all 

claims, including gross negligence/willful misconduct, 

except simple negligence. The district court, however, 

granted a judgment as a matter of law on the negligence 

_________________________________________________________________ 

6. Once again, the Dobys rely on Pennsylvania law in their section 1983 

argument, suggesting that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has rejected 

the "special need" exception for state statutes authorizing a seizure. See 

Commonwealth v. Kohl, 615 A.2d 308 (Pa. 1992). Even if the court's 

ruling in Kohl could be relevant to the federal analysis under section 

1983, the Dobys misinterpret Kohl. This decision does not purport to 

renounce categorically the "special need" exception; instead it simply 

states that, under federal law, the exception does not apply in cases 

where "the governmental interest to be advanced is the normal need for 

law enforcement." Kohl, 615 A.2d at 314. 

 23 
claim primarily because it concluded that there was simply 

no evidence to support the verdict. It also found, however, 

that the Dobys had not shown proximate cause between 

the alleged negligence and Doby's injury. Subsequently on 

the Dobys' post-trial motions it ruled that DeCrescenzo was 

immune from a claim of simple negligence under section 

7114 of the MHPA. 

We will affirm the district court's ruling on this because 

we agree with Judge Fullam's conclusion that DeCrescenzo 

qualifies for immunity under section 7114. This section 

provides in relevant part that: 

 In the absence of willful misconduct or gross 

 negligence, a county administrator, a director of a 

 facility, a physician, a peace officer or any other 

 authorized person who participates in a decision that a 

 person be examined or treated under this act . . . shall 

 not be civilly or criminally liable for such decision or 

 for any of its consequences. 

Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 50, S 7114(a). Because DeCrescenzo was 

the responsible person who initiated the involuntary 

examination proceedings under section 7302, we hold that 

he qualifies as an "authorized person who participate[d] in 

a decision that a person be examined." See id. 

Judge Rendell concluded otherwise in her summary 

judgment order because she interpreted McNamara v. 

Schleifer Ambulance Serv., Inc., 556 A.2d 448 (Pa. Super. 

1989) to limit "participa[nts] in a decision" to those with 

mental health training. We recognize that McNamara 

contains language suggesting that section 7114 only

applies to mental health professionals. See McNamara, 556 

A.2d at 449-50 (stating that "the legislature contemplated 

the decision-making process under S 7114 as one which 

would take place within the context of treatment, care, 

diagnosis or rehabilitation. It is equally clear that the 

individuals who would participate in those decisions would 

be trained in the field of mental health."). But the issue in 

McNamara was whether ambulance drivers transporting a 

mental health patient qualified for immunity under the 

MHPA. See id. at 449. Thus, the implicit question 

addressed in that case was what kind of medical personnel 

 24 
would qualify for immunity. The Pennsylvania Superior 

Court reasonably concluded that only individuals with 

mental health training, and thus those that actually had 

participated in the assessment of the patient's mental state, 

qualified for immunity. 

In contrast, the issue posed by this appeal is whether the 

individual who applies for a section 7302 warrant can be 

deemed to be a participant in the decision-making process 

to involuntarily examine the patient. We believe the answer 

to this question must be "yes" because section 7114

explicitly includes peace officers within its immunity 

provision. See Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 50, S 7114. Given the 

statutory scheme, it is difficult to imagine what role peace 

officers could play in a decision to examine or treat an 

individual other than to report information of dangerous 

conduct observed by them. Because this is precisely what 

DeCrescenzo did in this case, we find that he, like a peace 

officer, qualifies for immunity under section 7114 unless he 

engaged in willful misconduct or gross negligence. The 

district court, therefore, correctly granted judgment as a 

matter of law to DeCrescenzo on the simple negligence claim.7 

C. Did the District Court Err in Entering a Judgment as 

 a Matter of Law for the Police Defendants on the 

 Claims of Excessive Force? 

In considering the judgment as a matter of law for the 

police defendants our review is plenary. See Lightning Lube, 

Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1166 (3d Cir. 1993). In 

conducting our review, we apply the same standard relied 

upon by the district court. See id. This standard requires 

us to consider the evidence in the light most favorable to 

the nonmoving party and to deny a defendant's motion for 

a judgment as a matter of law if there is evidence 

reasonably supporting recovery by the plaintiffs. 

At the close of the Dobys' case, the district court granted 

_________________________________________________________________ 

7. We also agree with the district court that the evidence could not 

support a verdict on a negligence theory in favor of the Dobys against 

DeCrescenzo. The district court also concluded that the Dobys' pleadings 

did not include a claim for simple negligence so that the verdict for that 

reason as well could not stand. We do not reach that issue. 

 25 
a judgment as a matter of law to the police defendants on 

the excessive force claims because it ruled that no rational 

jury could find in the Dobys' favor on these claims. The 

court explained: "[b]y the plaintiff's own testimony, she was 

not mistreated. Under plaintiff's own testimony, she did 

kick and scream. So that I don't think any rational jury 

could say it was unreasonable for them to subdue her and 

then to get her to the hospital." 

In analyzing claims of excessive force under the Fourth 

Amendment, we must decide whether the actions of the 

police were "objectively reasonable in light of the facts and 

circumstances confronting them, without regard to their 

underlying intent or motivation." Graham v. Connor, 490 

U.S. 386, 397, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 1872 (1989) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). See also In re City of Philadelphia 

Litig., 49 F.3d 945, 962-63 (3d Cir. 1995). Significant 

factors in evaluating the force used by the police are 

whether the person being taken into custody is resisting or 

attempting to resist by flight. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396, 

109 S.Ct. at 1871-72. 

As the police officers argue, when they came to take Doby 

into custody they had to be prepared to handle an 

individual that the county delegate had determined posed a 

clear danger to herself or others. Further, the officers were 

aware that there were guns in the Dobys' home. Given 

these circumstances, Doby's own testimony establishes that 

the officers' actions were reasonable. 

Upon arrival at the Dobys' residence, the officers knocked 

on the door and requested that Doby step outside of the 

apartment. When the officers refused to tell her why she 

was being taken into custody, Doby made clear that she 

would not accompany them willingly and "became angry." 

She then attempted to return to the apartment, thus

resisting, causing the officers to "grab" her. When she 

began to kick at the door and scream, the officers 

handcuffed her. When she continued to kick and scream, 

the officers shackled her. Once Doby arrived at the

hospital, a female officer performed a pat-down search and 

Doby was placed in a wheelchair. Her handcuffs and 

shackles were removed once she promised to cooperate. 

 26 
Doby's own testimony established that the police officers 

applied force in response to her attempts to resist, 

including kicking, screaming and flight. Moreover, they 

tailored each action taken to the type of resistance 

encountered: handcuffing to prevent flight, shackling to 

prevent kicking. We therefore conclude that the officers' 

actions were objectively reasonable as a matter of law and 

will affirm the district court's order on the excessive force 

claims.8 

D. Did the District Court Err in Denying the Dobys'

 Request for a Declaratory Judgment? 

The district court, by Judge Fullam, rejected the Dobys' 

motion for a judgment declaring the MHPA to be 

unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due 

Process Clause and the Fourth Amendment. It ruled that 

the Dobys had abandoned this claim by failing to renew it 

before the trial and that, as a result, the court had not 

provided the Attorney General of Pennsylvania with the 

notice required under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(c). We need not 

reach the issue of proper notice in order to affirm the 

district court's decision. As explained above, the statute is 

constitutional under the Due Process Clause and the

Fourth Amendment even if non-physicians are allowed to 

petition for section 7302 warrants. Thus, the district court's 

refusal to rule on the declaratory judgment motion, even if 

it had been error, was harmless. 

E. Did the District Court Abuse Its Discretion in 

 Prohibiting Dobys' Expert Susan Bierker From

 Testifying? 

We review the district court's rulings on the admissibility 

of expert testimony for abuse of discretion. See United 

_________________________________________________________________ 

8. The Dobys' claim that section 4422 of the Pennsylvania mental health 

statutes rendered the officers' actions illegal is meritless. See Pa. 

Stat. 

Ann. tit. 50, S 4422 (West 1969). Section 4422 provides that 

"[m]echanical restraints shall not be used or applied to a mentally 

disabled person, except: (1) When necessary to prevent such person from 

harming himself or others when being transported as provided in 

sections 405 or 421 . . . ." As discussed above, the restraints used by 

the 

police officers were necessary to prevent Doby from harming the officers 

or herself as a result of her resistance. 

 27 
States v. Bennett, 161 F.3d 171, 182 (3d Cir. 1998); 

Waldorf v. Shuta, 142 F.3d 601, 626-27 (3d Cir. 1998). The 

trial judge has broad discretion to admit or exclude expert 

testimony, based upon whether it is helpful to the trier of 

fact. See Bennett, 161 F.3d at 182. 

The district court, by Judge Fullam, excluded the 

testimony of Susan Bierker, a licensed clinical social worker 

who was prepared to opine that Doby had suffered posttraumatic stress disorder solely as a result of herfive-day 

involuntary commitment. The court concluded that Bierker 

was not qualified to render this opinion and that her 

opinion was based on a "seriously inaccurate" 

understanding of the facts. The Dobys claim that this was 

error. 

As the Dobys concede, Bierker's testimony was offered to 

prove the damages suffered by Doby. Because the jury 

returned a verdict in favor of DeCrescenzo on all claims 

other than simple negligence, and because the court

correctly granted a judgment as a matter of law to 

DeCrescenzo on the simple negligence claim, there were no 

damages for the jury to calculate. Thus, any error by the 

district court in excluding Bierker's testimony is harmless. 

F. Did the District Court Err in Granting Summary 

 Judgment to Dr. Richards? 

The district court, by Judge Rendell, found that, because 

Dr. Richards qualified for immunity under section 7114 of 

the MHPA, he could be liable to the Dobys only if his 

conduct amounted to gross negligence or willful 

misconduct. The court ruled, as a matter of law, that the 

Dobys had not provided evidence sufficient to "establish 

flagrant behavior which grossly deviates from the standard 

of care required." 

The claim against Dr. Richards, of course, essentially 

related to his decision to commit Doby involuntarily rather 

than to the issuance of the warrant. The Dobys do not 

contest the district court's decision that, as a treating 

physician, Dr. Richards would be liable to them only for 

gross negligence/willful misconduct. Pennsylvania law 

defines gross negligence in the context of the MHPA as 

"facts indicating more egregiously deviant conduct than 

 28 
ordinary carelessness, inadvertence, laxity or indifference. 

. . . The behavior of the defendant must be flagrant, grossly 

deviating from the ordinary standard of care." Albright v. 

Abington Memorial Hospital, 696 A.2d 1159, 1164 (Pa. 

1997) (citation omitted). Further, willful misconduct exists 

when "the danger to the plaintiff, though realized, is so 

recklessly disregarded that, even though there be no actual 

intent, there is at least a willingness to inflict injury, a 

conscious indifference to the perpetration of the wrong." 

Krivijanski v. Union R.R. Co., 515 A.2d 933, 937 (Pa. Super. 

1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

The Dobys produced two expert reports, one from Dr.

Paul S. Applebaum and the other from Dr. Eileen A. 

Bazelon, to support their contention that Dr. Richards had 

acted in a grossly negligent manner. Dr. Bazelon's report 

states: "Dr. Richards [did not act] in accordance with the 

customary or usual standard of care." She opines that by 

not questioning DeCrescenzo's motive or further 

questioning Herbert Doby and Doby's regular psychiatrist, 

Dr. Richards "deviated from the reasonable standard of 

care" and evidenced "complete disregard" for Doby's rights. 

Her report also acknowledges, however, that the content of 

Doby's writings was "frightening." 

This first report does not create a genuine factual dispute 

about Dr. Richards' gross negligence/willful misconduct. 

Dr. Bazelon merely states that Dr. Richards deviated from 

the standard of care, which might amount to ordinary 

negligence, but she does not use terms to suggest that this 

deviation was gross or flagrant. 

The second report, by Dr. Applebaum, details five 

deficiencies with Dr. Richards' examination and resulting 

diagnosis of Doby's depression, including failure to inquire 

about the most common symptoms of depression, failure to 

evaluate adequately her suicidality, failure to access 

collateral sources of data such as Doby's regular 

psychiatrist and Herbert Doby, a "grossly inadequate" 

mental status evaluation, and failure to explore less 

restrictive alternatives to involuntary commitment. The 

language of this report does suggest that Dr. Richards 

acted with gross negligence; Dr. Applebaum presents Dr. 

Richards as a highly incompetent psychiatrist, unfamiliar 

 29 
with the basic medical definition of depression or its 

common symptoms and indifferent to the information he 

did gather. However, Dr. Applebaum's failure to discuss in 

any way the contents of the 11-page letter and the suicide 

note suggests a lack of familiarity with the basic facts of the 

case. See Shaw by Strain v. Strackhouse, 920 F.2d 1135, 

1142 (3d Cir. 1990) (stating that expert opinion in the 

circumstance of that case should have been based on facts 

in the record). This apparent ignorance of Doby's writings, 

which represented crucial evidence of her mental state, 

undermines Dr. Applebaum's conclusions regarding Dr. 

Richards' actions. 

Considering the undisputed facts of this case, which 

showed that Doby had a history of depression and admitted 

to contemplating suicide, and that Dr. Richards had in his 

possession an extensive 11-page letter that even the Dobys' 

expert Dr. Bazelon concedes was "frightening," we agree 

with the district court's ruling "that the deficiencies noted 

by Drs. Applebaum and Bazelon could not amount to 

anything more than simple negligence by Dr. Richards." We 

also point out that courts should be cautious in allowing 

juries to deliberate on the liability of physicians making 

involuntary committments lest physicians decline to order 

committments when needed, thus possibly leading to 

unfortunate consequences. Cf. McArdle v. Tronetti, 961 F.2d 

1083, 1085-86 (3d Cir. 1992) (prison doctor allegedly giving 

false testimony and false diagnosis in commitment 

proceedings entitled to absolute immunity in action under 

42 U.S.C. S 1983 in furtherance of policy to protect person 

functioning as part of judicial process from harassment and 

intimidation). 

V. CONCLUSION 

We will affirm both the district court's September 9, 1996 

order granting summary judgment to the defendants on a 

portion of the Dobys' claims and its March 10, 1998 order 

denying the Dobys' motion requesting a new trial, 

reconsideration of previous orders, and amendment of the 

judgment. 

 30 
A True Copy: 

Teste: 

 Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 

 for the Third Circuit 

 31