1

09- 0016- cr U n i t e d St at e s v . Shan

UN ITED STA TES CO URT OF AP P EALS F OR TH E S ECO N D CI RCU IT 

## SUMMA RY ORDER
Ru li ng s b y su m m ar

y o r de r do no t h ave pr ece de nt ia l e ff ect . Ci ta ti onto a su m m ar y o r de r filed on or

after January 1, 2007, is permit ted and i s go v e rn e d by Feder al Rule of Appellate Pr ocedure 32.1 and thi s cou rt’s Local Rule 32.1.1 . When citing a sum mary or der in a d ocument file d wit h t hi s co ur t, a p ar ty m us t c ite ei the r the F ed er al App en di x o r

anel ect r on ic da ta ba se (withthe not ation “sum mary or der”) . A party citin g a summar y order must serve a copy of it on any part

y not r epresented by cou nsel. At a stated term

of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second

Circuit, h eld at the Daniel Pat rick Moynihan Un ited Stat es Courthouse, 500 Pearl St reet, in t he City of New Y ork, on the 15 day of January, two t housand ten .

th PR E SE NT: J OS É A. C AB R ANES ,

R OS EMAR Y S. P OO L ER , G ER A R D E. L

YN CH , Circuit Jud ges ,

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x U NI T ED S TATES O F A M ERI CA ,

Appellee ,
v. No . 09 -0 016 -c r K EV I N S HAN ,
De

fe ndant -A ppe lla nt
.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x FOR APP ELLANT : S EB A S T I A N O. D E S A N T IS , Sa bi lia& D eSt ant is , N ew Lo nd on , CT

. F OR AP P ELLEE : J OHN H. D URHAM , As s is tan t U ni te d S tat es At to r ney (Nora R. Danne hy, United Sta tes Attor ney, William J. Nardini, Assis tant United States Attorney, on the br ief ) U ni te d S tat es At to r ney ’s Of fi ce f or th e Di s tr ict of Connectic ut.2

App eal f r om a ju dgm ent

of th e Unit ed S tat es Di s tr

ict Cou r t f or th e Di s tr ict of Con nec ti cut

(A lvi n W. T ho mp s on , Judge

). UPON DUE CONSIDERAT ION IT IS HEREB Y ORDERED, A DJUDGED, AND DECREED th at the j ud gm ent of th e Di s tr ict Cou r t b e AF F IRME D

. Defendant Kevi n Shan wa s convicted after a jury trial of the following : (1) one count of deali ng firearms without a license, in viola tion of 18 U.S.C. § § 922(a)(1)(A) and 924 (a)(1)(D); ( 2) one cou nt of po s s es s io n o f afi r ear m b y an u nl awf ul us er of a con tr olleds ub s tan ce, i n v io lat io n o f 1 8 U.S.C . §§ 92 2(g)(3) and 924(a)(2); and (3) two counts of distribution of cocaine ba se in violation of 21 U .S. C. § 8 41(a)( 1) and(b )( 1) (C) . O n ap peal , Sh an ar gue s th at the e vid enc e pr es ent ed at tr ial was in suff ic ie nt t o su pp ortthe ju ry ’s g ui lty v er di cton the co un ts of de a li ng fir ea rms wit ho ut a li ce nse and possess ion of a firearm by an unlawful user of a controlled subs tance. Shan a lso argues that the Distr ict Court erred in failing to strike hearsay testimony by a g overnment age nt. We a ss ume the par ti es ’ f amilia r it y with the u nd erlyi ng f

act s andpr oce du r al his to ry of th e cas e. Because “the task of choosing among c ompeting, permissible inferences is for the [jury, and] no t f or th e r evi ewing co ur t, ” United Sta tes v. M cDermott , 245 F.3d 133, 13 7 (2d Cir. 2001), w e are r equ ir ed t o r evi ew the e vid enc e “i n the l igh t m os t f

avo r abl e t o the g ov er nm ent ,” United Sta tes v. Gas ki n , 36 4 F .3d438 , 45 9 (

2dCir . 20 04) and“r es ol

ve all is s ues of

cr edi bi lit y infa vo r of th e ju ry’s ver di ct .” Uni

te d St ate s v . De ss na , 28 7 F .3d170 , 17 7 (

2d Cir . 20 02) (q

uo ti ng Uni

te d St ate s v . De ss na , 260 F. 3d 150 , 15 4 (

2dCir . 20 01) ). Se e g

en er all y Ja ck so n v. V

ir gi nia , 44 3 U. S. 3 07, 318 -1 9 ( 197 9)

. At trial, the gove rnment intr oduced much e vidence that could support the jury’s verdict on the charge of unlawfully de aling i n firearms . To s ustain its bur den on proof on this charge, the gov er nm ent

hadto pr ov e as fo llo ws : ( 1) th e de fe nd ant eng agedinth e bu s in es s of deal in g in firearms , (2) that the defendant did not have a lic ense to deal in firea rms , and (3) that the defenda nt act ed w ill fully

. See, e.g. , Uni

te d St ate s v . A lla h , 130 F.3d 33, 37-45 (2d C ir. 1997). Here, the government met that burden. Firs t, the government presented uncontroverted evidenc e that the it em s Sh a n so ld to t he co nfi de nti a l i nfo rma nt w er e f ire a rms. Attri a l, the go ve rnm en t a lso in tr od uce d ev

id enc e t o s ho w that

Sh an wa s “en gage d i n the b us in es s of ” de ali ng i n f

ir ear ms , as r equ ir ed b y 18 U.S .C. § 921 (a) (2 1) (C) . Sp ecif ically, th e go ver nm ent

pr es ent ed e vid enc e that defendant sold two firearms within roughly one month and that Shan a cknowle dged on tape that he had a source of supply for other wea pons. T his is s ufficient to establish that Shan held himself out as a source of weapons, as we required in United Sta tes v. Carter , 80 1 F .2d78, 81- 82 (

2d Cir . 19 86)

. Next, Shan stipulated tha t he was not federally licensed to dea l in firearms. F inally , the government s ho wed th at S hanact ed w ill fully by p r es ent

in g ev id enc e that

he w as war

y t o l et other s witnes s hi s tr ans act io ns andth at h e s ol d we apo ns fo r abo ve m ar ket

pr ice. T akento gether , thi s evi den ce was suff ic ie nt t o su pp ortthe ju ry ’s g ui lty v er di cton the ch a rge of d ea li ng in fir ea rms.3

The government also presented ample evidence to suppor t the jury’s guilty verdict on the charge of bei ng an unlawful user of a controlled subs tance i n poss ession of a firearm. At trial, the gov er nm ent

pr es ent ed s ever al r eco r dedcon ver s ati on s inwhi ch S hanim pl iedth at h e hadus ed coc ain e. T hes e co nv er s ati on s to ok pl ace d ur in g the p er

io d i n whichdef

end ant was s ell in g f ir ear ms . Acc ordingly, the gove rnment pres ented sufficient evidenc e to support the jury’s guilty verdict on this char ge. Sh an al s o ar

gue s th at the D is tr

ict Cou r t e r r ed i n f

ail in g t o s tr ike , sua sponte , hearsay testimony presented by a federal age nt. Shan conc edes that he did not objec t to this testimony. When a defendant chooses for tactical rea sons not to lodge an obje ction, he w aive s his clai ms of error on app eal. See, e.g. , United Sta tes v. Wellington , 41 7 F .3d284 , 28 9- 90 ( 2d Cir . 20 05) ; United Sta tes v. Yu-Leung , 5 1 F. 3d 11 16 , 1 12 2 ( 2d C ir. 19 95 ) (c on cl ud in g t ha t i f a pa rty re fra in s from ob je ctin g a s a “tactic al matter, then that a ction constitutes true ‘waiv er,’ which will nega te even pl ain error r evi ew”) . H er e, S han ’s failu r e t o l od ge anob ject io n was a ta ct

ical dec is io n b ecau s e de fe ns e co un s el as kedth e agen t ab ou t the h ear s ay t es ti mo ny o n cr os s -e xam in ati oninan at te mp t t o u s e the h ear s ay statements t o Shan’s adva ntage. Furthermore, on cros s-examination, defense counsel did not dispute the hearsay testimony that Shan ha d discuss ed the sale of AK-47s with the coope rating witnes s , b ut

r ath er , t r iedto s ugg es t that

any dis cus s io ns wer e pu ff ery be caus e the g

un s nev er mat er ial ized . S ee Uni te d St ate s v . Co o nan , 938 F.2d 1553, 1 561 (2d Cir. 1991 ) (holding that defendant waiv ed his r

igh t t o ap peal

an ev id ent iar y claim bec aus e he welc om ed s uchevi den ce at tr ial ). Evenif the actions of Shan’s attorney did not constitute tr ue wa iver, the admission of this evidenc e did not con s ti tu te pl ainer r or

by the D is tr

ict Cou r t b ecau s e the s tat eme nt was po te nt

ially ad mi s s ib le as back gr ou ndevi den ce. CONCLUSI ON
For t he re a son s sta te d a bo ve , t he ju dg me nt o f th e D ist ric t C ou rt i s AF F IRME D

. FO R T HE CO URT : Ca therine O'Hag an W olfe, Cle rk By:___________________________