-1- 

STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

RICHARD T. BILDSTEIN and CONNIE M. 

YUSKA, 

 Plaintiffs-Appellees/CrossAppellants, 

UNPUBLISHED 

January 21, 2016 

v No. 323094 

Van Buren Circuit Court 

EARL F. HASLER, DIANNE HASLER, 

WILLIAM F. BENNER, ARTHUR BENNER, 

ELIZABETH BENNER, RYAN FLAGEL, APRIL 

MONTEY, TINA REIDY, LORETTA REIDY, 

JOHN MCNAUGHTON, DANIEL HUGHES, 

JAMES V. MEERSMAN, JR., MATTHEW 

THUNELL, MINDY THUNELL, WILLIAM 

O’MEARA, TRUSTEE, ARTHUR O’MEARA, 

JASON MCCROREY, MARJORIE BLAYLOCK, 

WAYNE BLAYLOCK, BOBBY BLAYLOCK, 

and MICHELLE BLAYLOCK, 

LC No. 11-060787-CH 

 Defendants-Appellants/CrossAppellees, 

and 

DANIEL VIDA, CATHERINE KUTCKA, 

AUDREY J. SPERLING TRUST, JAMES R. 

WRIGHT, WILLIAM MORACA, TERESA 

MORACA, RONALD PAVLIK, ROSARIO 

PICONE, JR., ROSARIO PICONE, SR., DANIEL 

VIDA, SUSAN VIDA, JAMES WITTLING, 

RONALD PAVLIK, KATHERINE PAVLIK, 

THOMAS WICHLINSKI, PATRICA 

WICHLINSKI, JEFFERY SCHMAL, AUDREY 

HUGHES, GRACE HENDRICKSON, DANIEL 

GREENE, FRANK CICCHETTI, GADO 

ONGWELA, EDWIN LAMMEL, GIL SNYDER, 

NANCY SNYDER, RUSSELL CROSS, JR., 

MARCUS TENNANT, KRISTINE TENNANT, 

SHARON ROURKE, BARBARA BALDWIN, 

RANDALL MCMANIGAL, RONALD 
-2- 

MCMANIGAL, MICHAEL CONRAD JR., 

TRUSTEE, NICHOLAS MAROZSAN, 

DELORES MAROZSAN, THOMAS FOSTER, 

JANET FOSTER, IRENE MESTACH, DEREK 

NESTICH, JODI MANEKE, EAA PROPERTIES, 

L.L.C., STEVE LAVELLE, LYNN LAVELLE, 

TERRENCE SALS, THOMAS GANGAS, 

GEORGE GANGAS, STEPHEN KERESZTESI, 

MICHAEL BURRAFATO, ALISON 

BURRAFATO, BIRNEY VANDERBOEGH, 

JACQUELINE JONKER, MARILYN HERALD, 

SISTER LAKES, L.L.C., THOMAS HUGHES, 

HELEN HUGHES, HARRY KOWALSKI, 

ANGELA KOWALSKI, KAREN 

KAZMIERZAK, ROGER SOUCY, ELIZABETH 

SOUCY, and JAMES HOGAN, 

 Defendants. 

Before: BECKERING, P.J., and GLEICHER and M. J. KELLY, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 The parties own lots in the Woodland Beach No. 1 subdivision bordering Crooked Lake 

in Van Buren County. Plaintiffs are a married couple who own a lakefront lot that abuts 

“Woodland Court,” a strip of land that culminates at the lake. Disgruntled by the “partying” of 

certain backlot owners around a dock extending from Woodland Court, plaintiffs filed suit 

seeking a declaration of everyone’s interests and an injunction to prevent undesirable activities. 

Upon competing motions for summary disposition, the circuit court ruled that plaintiffs had 

littoral rights in their lot,1

 but that a dedication in the plat map gave all backlot owners the right 

to enjoy Woodland Court and the platted beach along the lakefront. The backlot owners’ rights 

included the right to erect a nonexclusive dock for the temporary mooring of boats and to use the 

beach at Woodland Court for normal beach activity. 

 Both sides have appealed. The backlot owners contend that the circuit court improperly 

resolved the matter without the addition of all necessary parties, i.e., the complete roster of the 

subdivision property owners. They also challenge the court’s decision to reach certain issues at 

all, as well as the propriety of the restrictions on their use of Woodland Court. Plaintiffs, on the 

 

1

 Technically, land abutting a river includes riparian rights, while land abutting a lake includes 

littoral rights. See 2000 Baum Family Trust v Babel, 488 Mich 136, 138 n 1; 793 NW2d 633 

(2010). The parties and the circuit court referred to plaintiffs’ interests as riparian. We employ 

the correct description of these rights in this opinion. 
-3- 

other hand, argue that the restrictions are not broad enough. We affirm the circuit court’s 

decision to proceed with the matter despite the absence of several lot owners. We also affirm the 

court’s rulings in regard to the parties’ rights to Woodland Court. The parties correctly assert 

that the circuit court should not have defined the parameters of the beach easement along the 

lakefront properties, however, and we vacate that part of the judgment. 

I. BACKGROUND 

 In 1941, the four original owners of a block of land recorded a plat map for the Woodland 

Beach subdivision on Crooked Lake. The plat dedicated “the streets and beaches as shown on 

said plat . . . to the use of persons owning property in said plat, except the street designated as 

‘county road,’ which [was] dedicated to the use of the public.” The 20-foot-wide Woodland 

Court, which is perpendicular to and ends at Crooked Lake, borders plaintiffs’ lot. On the plat, 

when Woodland Court reaches Crooked Lake, it turns and becomes a “beach (private)” (the 

Beach). The Beach sits between a row of six lots, including plaintiffs’, and Crooked Lake. 

 Plaintiffs initially filed suit only against Earl and Dianne Hasler, challenging their 

activities on Woodland Court. The Haslers constructed a long F-shaped dock into Crooked Lake 

extending from Woodland Court. They moored a boat at the dock for extended periods. And the 

Haslers, along with a bevy of guests, spent the summer lounging and picnicking on the dock, 

engaging in water activities, and generally “partying” according to plaintiffs. In their March 25, 

2011 “complaint to determine interest in land,” plaintiffs described Woodland Court and the 

Beach and indicated that these were dedicated to the use of all lot owners. Plaintiffs asserted, 

however, that the Haslers’ “activities in front of Plaintiffs’ lot and on Woodland Court exceed 

the scope of their dedicated rights,” and that this overreaching had impaired the use and 

enjoyment of plaintiffs’ littoral rights. Plaintiffs sought a declaration that the dedication did not 

include the right to erect a pier or to moor watercraft at the end of Woodland Court and that as 

littoral owners, plaintiffs possessed the rights accompanying that interest. Plaintiffs also sought 

an injunction preventing the Haslers from exceeding the scope of the dedication in the future. 

 The Haslers retorted that all lot owners within the subdivision were necessary parties to 

the action because plaintiffs sought to define the rights of all. After some negotiation, plaintiffs 

agreed to amend their complaint and began the Herculean effort of serving every lot owner. 

Ultimately, service could not be accomplished as to approximately 20 lot owners and the court 

dismissed plaintiffs’ claims against those parties. Many other defendants declined to respond 

and default judgments were entered against them. Only the small group of defendants-appellants 

remained. The Haslers again sought to dismiss the suit based on the dismissal of certain 

defendants for lack of service, but the court denied the request. As plaintiffs were seeking to 

enjoin certain individuals from engaging in uses beyond the scope of the dedication, rather than 

to amend the plat or exert title over the dedicated areas, the court determined that those parties 

who were actually necessary were then before the court. 

 Plaintiffs and remaining defendants subsequently filed competing motions for summary 

disposition, each believing the law was on their side in defining the scope of their interests. In a 

confusing and sometimes contradictory order, the circuit court denied the motions on March 5, 

2014. Following the transfer of the matter to a different judge, plaintiffs sought reconsideration 

and the court decided to rehear the matter. The circuit court partially granted each side’s motion 
-4- 

on July 17, 2014. The circuit court held that all subdivision owners had the following rights to 

Woodland Court and the beach at its terminus: (1) to install one nonexclusive dock; (2) to 

temporarily moor boats to the dock, but not overnight; (3) to use Woodland Court as it extends 

into Crooked Lake for fishing, swimming, boating, and other incidental purposes; and (4) to use 

the beach on Woodland Court for regular beach activities. The court also held that plaintiffs’ lot 

was littoral and that the lot owners had an easement to use the Beach in front of plaintiffs’ lot for 

ingress and egress to Crooked Lake. 

II. NECESSARY PARTIES 

 Defendants continue to argue that the circuit court should have dismissed the action in its 

entirety because plaintiffs failed to effectuate service on each lot owner within the subdivision. 

We review a circuit court’s decision regarding joinder for an abuse of discretion. Mason Co v 

Dep’t of Community Health, 293 Mich App 462, 489; 820 NW2d 192 (2011). 

 MCR 2.205(A) provides that “persons having such interests in the subject matter of an 

action that their presence in the action is essential to permit the court to render complete relief 

must be made parties and aligned as plaintiffs or defendants[.]” When such persons have not 

been made parties and are subject to the jurisdiction of the court, the court shall order a summons 

for their appearance. MCR 2.205(B). The purpose of MCR 2.205(A) is “to prevent the splitting 

of causes of action and to ensure that all parties having a real interest in the litigation are 

present.” Mason Co, 293 Mich App at 489. 

 In their amended complaint, plaintiffs alleged that “[s]ome or all defendants” had 

“constructed piers that extend into Crooked Lake from Woodland Court and from the beach area 

on or near” their lot. They also alleged that “[s]ome or all defendants” had moored boats to the 

piers and “engaged in sunbathing, partying, swimming, picnicking, and other beach activities at 

the end of Woodland Court and on or near” their lot. According to plaintiffs, these activities 

exceeded the scope of the dedication for Woodland Court. In their amended complaint, plaintiffs 

asked the court to declare the rights of defendants regarding Woodland Court, including that 

defendants did not have a right to erect a pier and moor watercraft at the end of Woodland Court, 

and to grant injunctive relief, including requiring defendants to remove the dock and forbidding 

defendants from placing additional docks into Crooked Lake and from mooring boats. 

Essentially, plaintiffs wanted a judgment that prohibited defendants from engaging in activities 

that they believed were beyond the scope of the dedication. There is no claim that any of the 

dismissed defendants engaged in any of the alleged prohibited activities. The individuals who 

had purportedly engaged in the subject activities had been served with process, submitted to the 

circuit court’s jurisdiction, and would be subject to any judgment of the court. See MCR 

3.114(H). Therefore, the circuit court could render complete relief to plaintiffs, and acted within 

its discretion in denying defendants’ motion to dismiss. 

III. LITTORAL RIGHTS AND BEACH DEDICATION 

 Defendants assert that the circuit court should not have resolved whether plaintiffs 

possessed littoral rights or determined the scope of the dedication of the Beach as those issues 

had no bearing on the use of Woodland Court, the only real issue in the case according to 

defendants. Plaintiffs concede in their responsive brief to defendants’ appeal that the circuit 
-5- 

court should not have defined the scope of the Beach easement. Indeed, beyond the cursory 

allegations regarding the Beach in plaintiffs’ complaint, plaintiffs made no argument in this 

regard. Absent an “actual controversy” over the use of the Beach, MCR 2.605(A)(1), we vacate 

that portion of the circuit court order.2

 However, we discern no reversible error in the circuit court’s decision to elucidate 

plaintiffs’ property interest. In order to define the parties’ interests in Woodland Court, the 

circuit court was first required to identify the parties’ interests in their own lots and the 

subdivision. Moreover, plaintiffs are littoral owners. Plaintiffs own a lot separated from the 

lake only by a strip of land dedicated to all lot owners as a beach. Michigan courts have 

repeatedly held that such dedications and easements do not cut off the waterfront owner’s littoral 

rights. See Thies v Howland, 424 Mich 282, 293; 380 NW2d 463 (1986). See also 2000 Baum 

Family Trust, 488 Mich at 167-168. Accordingly, we discern no error meriting relief. 

IV. SCOPE OF WOODLAND COURT DEDICATION 

 Neither party was satisfied with the circuit court’s description of defendants’ rights to use 

and enjoy Woodland Court. Defendants argue that the circuit court improperly limited the length 

of time they may moor boats to the nonexclusive dock. Plaintiffs complain that defendants 

should have no right to install, maintain, or use any dock. 

 Plaintiffs sought summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(9) and (10), and defendants 

under MCR 2.116(I)(2). As a motion based on MCR 2.116(C)(9) (failure to present a viable 

defense) is dependent on the pleadings alone, Glass v Goeckel, 473 Mich 667, 677; 703 NW2d 

58 (2005), and the court considered the evidence presented by the parties, we consider the 

motion as granted under MCR 2.116(C)(10). 

 We review a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition de 

novo. . . . 

 A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual support of a plaintiff’s 

claim. Summary disposition is appropriate under MCR 2.116(C)(10) if there is no 

genuine issue regarding any material fact and the moving party is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law. In reviewing a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10), 

this Court considers the pleadings, admissions, affidavits, and other relevant 

documentary evidence of record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 

party to determine whether any genuine issue of material fact exists to warrant a 

trial. A genuine issue of material fact exists when the record, giving benefit of 

reasonable doubt to the opposing party, leaves open an issue upon which 

reasonable minds might differ. [Zaher v Miotke, 300 Mich App 132, 139-140; 

832 NW2d 266 (2013) (quotation marks and citations omitted).] 

 

2

 As the circuit court should not have reached this issue, we need not consider defendants’ 

alternate challenges to the substance of the order. 
-6- 

 The Woodland Beach subdivision was platted before the Land Division Act, MCL 

560.101 et seq., took effect in 1968. Martin v Beldean, 469 Mich 541, 547; 677 NW2d 312 

(2004). “[D]edications of land for private use in plats before [the Land Division Act] took effect 

convey at least an irrevocable easement in the dedicated land.” Little v Hirschman, 469 Mich 

553, 564; 677 NW2d 319 (2004). “[A] purchaser of platted lands receives not only the interest 

described in the deed, but also whatever rights are reserved to the lot owners in the plat.” Id. at 

561. When interpreting a plat, this Court seeks to effectuate the intent of the plattor. Tomecek v 

Bavas, 482 Mich 484, 490-491; 759 NW2d 178 (2008) (opinion by KELLY, J); id. at 499 

(CAVANAGH, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). When the language of a legal 

instrument is plain and unambiguous, it is to be enforced as written and no further inquiry is 

permitted. Little v Kin, 468 Mich 699, 700; 664 NW2d 749 (2003); Dyball v Lennox, 260 Mich 

App 698, 704; 680 NW2d 522 (2004). Only if the language is unambiguous may extrinsic 

evidence be considered to determine the plattor’s intent. Little, 468 Mich at 700; Dyball, 260 

Mich at 704. 

 Here, the plat simply states: “[T]he streets and beaches as shown on [the] plat are hereby 

dedicated to the use of persons owning property in said plat.” The plat does not define “use.” 

The scope of the “use” can be determined, however, by looking to the legal understanding of that 

term in relation to roadways terminating at the waterfront. 

 First, caselaw supports the circuit court’s conclusion that defendants could install a 

nonexclusive dock into Crooked Lake from Woodland Court. It was long settled before the 

current plat was created that when a road that ends at the water is dedicated to public use, a 

public agency may construct a dock for public use. See Backus v Detroit, 49 Mich 110, 120; 13 

NW 380 (1882). As described in Thies, 424 Mich at 296, the right to construct a dock is not 

dependent on the public owning the roadway in fee. “Rather, it is based upon the presumption 

that the plattor intended to give access to the water and permit the building of structures to aid in 

that access.” Id. The only limit is that “[a]ny dock which is constructed at the end of a common 

way must be made available for the use of those to whom the way is dedicated.” Id. In Thies, 

the Supreme Court noted that the result should be no different when the roadway (and therefore 

the dock) are dedicated to the use of subdivision lot owners. Id. Accordingly, neither party’s 

challenge to this portion of the court’s order has merit. 

 Second, defendants complain that their right to moor boats should not be limited to 

temporary use. One stick in the bundle of littoral and riparian rights is the right “to permanently 

anchor boats off the shore.” 2000 Baum Family Trust, 488 Mich at 166. See also Thies, 424 

Mich at 288; Hall v Wantz, 336 Mich 112, 117; 57 NW2d 462 (1953). However, “[a]n incident 

of the public’s right of navigation is the right to anchor boats temporarily.” Thies, 424 Mich at 

288 (emphasis added). See also Delaney v Pond, 350 Mich 685, 688; 86 NW2d 816 (1957). 

Defendants are not littoral owners, they are backlot owners with a right to access the water 

through land dedicated for that purpose on the plat map. Absent littoral rights, defendants have 

no ground to assert a right to moor boats on the lake for any extended period of time. It was 

within the circuit court’s purview to determine what constituted “temporary mooring” and we 

discern no error in the overnight restriction defined by that court. 

 Third, we also discern no error in the circuit court’s determination that defendants could 

use the dock for fishing, swimming, and boating, and that portion of the beach on Woodland 
-7- 

Court for regular beach activities. In Thies, 424 Mich at 288, the Supreme Court noted, 

“Nonriparian owners and members of the public who gain access to a navigable waterbody have 

a right to use the surface of the water in a reasonable manner for such activities as boating, 

fishing and swimming.” We see no reason the same should not be true where a dedicated 

roadway ends at the water. Compare Delaney, 350 Mich 686-687 (noting that where the backlot 

owners enjoyed a 10-foot easement along a riverfront pier which was specifically limited as an 

access point, the backlot owners could not use the pier for fishing and swimming without 

committing a trespass). Here, there was no such specific limitation on the use of Woodland 

Court or the water’s edge. Accordingly, within the confines of Woodland Court and the dock 

extending from its terminus, the circuit court correctly determined that defendants could engage 

in normal beach and dock activities.3

 We affirm in part and vacate in part. We do not retain jurisdiction. 

/s/ Jane M. Beckering 

/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher 

/s/ Michael J. Kelly 

 

3

 Given these conclusions, we need not address defendants’ alternate argument that they had 

obtained a prescriptive easement to maintain a dock.