alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Leslie Rowell, Respondent, v Utica Mutual Insurance Company, Respondent, and Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation, Appellant.

Order unanimously modified on the law and as modified affirmed with costs to plaintiff, in accordance with the following memorandum: Zolene Garner gave her brother, Leslie Rowell, permission to drive her car. While Rowell was inside a delicatessen, a man attempted to steal the car. Rowell ran out of the store to recover the car and was injured when he became caught in an open door of the car and was dragged. The car was insured by Utica Mutual. The policy contained a standard uninsured motorist endorsement under which Utica Mutual agreed to pay all sums which the insured shall be legally entitled to recover as damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured automobile due to injury sustained by the insured.

Rowell commenced the instant action against Utica Mutual and Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation (MVAIC) seeking a declaration of the respective rights and obligations of the parties. Utica Mutual moved to dismiss on the grounds that Rowell was not an "insured” and that the car was not an "uninsured automobile” as defined in the policy endorsement. MVAIC cross-moved for summary judgment and a declaration that Utica Mutual was responsible for coverage because Rowell was an insured and, therefore, not qualified to sue MVAIC *(see,*Insurance Law § 5202 [b]).

Supreme Court properly granted Utica Mutual’s motion and denied MVAIC’s motion. Rowell was not an insured under the policy because at the time of the accident the car was not being used with permission. The car was not an "uninsured automobile” because the policy exempted from its definition a *1044car owned by the named insured which is the case here because Rowell had his sister’s permission to use the car. The language of the uninsured motorist endorsement is clear and precise and this court may not vary the policy language to accomplish notions of abstract justice or moral obligation *(see, Breed v Insurance Co.,*46 NY2d 351, 355). Accordingly, judgment is granted declaring that plaintiff is entitled to make a claim only against MVAIC. (Appeal from order of Supreme Court, Erie County, McGowan, J.—summary judgment.) Present—Dillon, P. J., Doerr, Green, Lawton and Lowery, JJ.
**Exhibit 23.1**

**Consent of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm**

We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in theRegistration Statements on Form S-8 (Nos. 333-61814, 333-117412, 333-125960) and the Registration Statement on Form S-3 (No. 111495) of Sohu.com Inc. of our report dated February 28, 2008 relating to the consolidated financial statements, financialstatement schedule, and the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting, which appears in Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2007. 

PricewaterhouseCoopers Zhong Tian CPAs Limited Company 

Beijing, the People’s Republic of China 

February 28, 2008
**Exhibit 32.1**

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO**

**18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**

**AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Deerfield Triarc Capital Corp. (the “Company”) for the period ended September 30, 2006 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), each of the undersigned officers of the Company certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

 (1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 (2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

|                                                                                               |   |                    |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|-------------------------|
| /s/ JONATHAN W. TRUTTER                                                                            |   | Date: November 14, 2006 |
| Jonathan W. TrutterChief Executive Officer(Principal Executive Officer)                            |   |                    |
|                                                                                               |   |                    |
| /s/ RICHARD G. SMITH                                                                               |   | Date: November 14, 2006 |
| Richard G. Smith

Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer

(Principal Financial Officer) |   |                    |

A  signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other  document authenticating, acknowledging or otherwise adopting that signature  that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement  required by Section 906, has been provided to Deerfield Triarc Capital Corp.  and will be retained by Deerfield Triarc Capital Corp. and furnished to the  Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

The foregoing certification is being furnished solely pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and (b) of section 1350, chapter 63 of title 18, United States Code) and is not being filed as part of the Form 10-Q or as a separate disclosure document.

 

 

----
[Federal Register Volume 61, Number 93 (Monday, May 13, 1996)]
[Notices]
[Pages 22028-22029]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 96-11817]



-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Office of the Secretary


Defense Science Board Task Force on Deep Attack Weapons Mix Study 
(DAWMS); Notice of Advisory Committee Meetings

SUMMARY: The Defense Science Board Task Force on Deep Attack Weapons 
Mix Study (DAWMS) will meet in closed session on June 5, 1996 at the 
Pentagon, Arlington, Virginia.
    The mission of the Defense Science Board is to advise the Secretary 
of Defense through the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and 
Technology on scientific and technical matters as they affect the 
perceived needs of the Department of Defense. At this meeting the Task 
Force will develop an independent assessment of the analytic tools and 
models employed in the DoD internal DAWNS effort. Specifically, the 
Task Force will (1) assess the analysis developed in part one of the 
study, (2) evaluate the soundness of the analytic approach proposed for 
part two, and (3) review the alternatives--developed in part two to 
ensure that they are balanced and representative.
    In accordance with Section 10(d) of the Federal Advisory Committee 
Act,

[[Page 22029]]

P.L. No. 92-463, as amended (5 U.S.C. App. II, (1988)), it has been 
determined that this DSB Task Force meeting concerns matters listed in 
5 U.S.C. Sec. 552b(c) (1) (1988), and that accordingly this meeting 
will be closed to the public.

    Dated: May 7, 1996.
L.M. Bynum,
Alternative OSD Federal Register Liaison Officer, Department of 
Defense.
[FR Doc. 96-11817 Filed 5-10-96; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 5000-04-M
[Federal Register Volume 61, Number 92 (Friday, May 10, 1996)]
[Notices]
[Page 21506]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 96-11795]



=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

NATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM


National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee

AGENCY: National Communications System (NCS).

ACTION: Notice of meeting.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory 
Committee will hold a meeting to exchange facts and information on the 
threats to the nation's information infrastructure to include a brief 
from the National Security Agency. This special meeting will be held 
Thursday, May 23, 1996, from 9:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. at 4301 North 
Fairfax Drive, Room 272, Arlington, VA 22203. The agenda is as follows:

--Call to Order/Welcoming Remarks
--Threat Briefing
--Discussion
--Closing Remarks/Adjournment

    Due to the classification of the information to be discussed, this 
meeting will be closed to the public in the interest of national 
security.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Telephone (703) 607-6221 or write the 
Manager, National Communications System, 701 South Court House Rd., 
Arlington, VA 22204-2198.
Dennis Bodson,
Chief, Technology and Standards.
[FR Doc. 96-11795 Filed 5-9-96; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 5000-03-M
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

WESTERN DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

MICHAEL J. STEPHANIC, JR.,

Petitioner

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 385 WAL 2016

Petition for Allowance of Appeal from 

the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 7th day of March, 2017, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is 

DENIED.
### UNPUBLISHED



# UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT



#  U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA ,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. No. 00-4225



# 
J ERRY B. G IVENS ,

Defendant-Appellant. 

# 
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond. Robert E. Payne, District Judge.

(CR-99-95) Submitted: December 21, 2000 Decided: January 9, 2001 Before NIEMEYER, LUTTIG, and KING, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

COUNSEL Jeffrey L. Everhart, RICE & EVERHART, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Helen F. Fahey, United States Attorney, John S. Davis, Assistant United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).OPINION
PER CURIAM:Jerry B. Givens appeals his criminal conviction for money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a) (1994). We affirm. Givens raises two issues on appeal. First he contends that there was insufficient evidence to support his money laundering conviction. To sustain a conviction, the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the government, must be sufficient for a rational trier offact to have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Glasser v. United States , 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942). In making this assessment, the government is entitled to all reasonable inferences from the facts established to those sought to be established. United States v. Tresvant , 677 F.2d 1018, 1021 (4th Cir. 1982). Our review of the record in light of this standard leads us to conclude that Givens’ conviction was supported by substantial evidence. Givens next contends that the district court erred in denying his motion for a new trial based upon his assertion that the Government committed a Brady violation. A defendant must prove three elements to establish a due process violation under Brady v. Maryland , 373 U.S. 83 (1963): (1) the prosecution withheld or suppressed evidence; (2) the evidence is favorable; and (3) the evidence is material to the defense. Moore v. Illinois , 408 U.S. 786, 794-95 (1972). Evidence is material when there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. United States v. Bagley , 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985). Our review of the record leads us to concludethat Givens has not met this standard and that the district court therefore did not err in denying his motion for a new trial on this basis. Accordingly, we affirm Givens’ conviction. We dispense with oralargument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED 2 U NITED S TATES v. G IVENS
[Federal Register Volume 61, Number 91 (Thursday, May 9, 1996)]
[Notices]
[Page 21169]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 96-11577]



-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
[Docket No. ER96-1139-000]


KinEr-G Power Marketing Inc.; Notice of Issuance of Order

May 3, 1996.
    On February 22, 1996, as amended March 29, 1996, KinEr-G Power 
Marketing Inc. (KPMI) submitted for filing a rate schedule under which 
KPMI will engage in wholesale electric power and energy transactions as 
a marketer. KPMI also requested waiver of various Commission 
regulations. In particular, KPMI requested that the Commission grant 
blanket approval under 18 CFR Part 34 of all future issuances of 
securities and assumptions of liability by KPMI.
    On April 30, 1996, pursaunt to delegated authority, the Director, 
Division of Applications, Office of Electric Power Regulation, granted 
requests for blanket approval under Part 34, subject to the following:
    Within thirty days of the date of the order, any person desiring to 
be heard or to protest the blanket approval of issuances of securities 
or assumptions of liability by KPMI should file a motion to intervene 
or protest with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First 
Street NE., Washington, D.C. 20426, in accordance with Rules 211 and 
214 of the Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure (18 CFR 385.211 
and 385.214).
    Absent a request for hearing within this period, KPMI is authorized 
to issue securities and assume obligations or liabilities as a 
guarantor, indorser, surety, or otherwise in respect of any security of 
another person; provided that such issuance or assumption is for some 
lawful object within the corporate purposes of the applicant, and 
compatible with the public interest, and is reasonably necessary or 
appropriate for such purposes.
    The Commission reserves the right to require a further showing that 
neither public nor private interests will be adversely affected by 
continued approval of KPMI's issuances of securities or assumptions of 
liability.
    Notice is hereby given that the deadline for filing motions to 
intervene or protests, as set forth above, is May 30, 1996.
    Copies of the full text of the order are available from the 
Commission's Public Reference Branch, 888 First Street NE., Washington, 
D.C. 20426.
Linwood A. Watson, Jr.,
Acting Secretary.
[FR Doc. 96-11577 Filed 5-8-96; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-M
*The Honorable Ann D. Montgomery, United States District Judge for the

District of Minnesota, sitting by designation.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 00-2806

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, * Appeal from the United States 

* District Court for the Eastern

v. * District of Arkansas.

*

Rufus Raglin Stelivan, * [UNPUBLISHED]

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: March 13, 2001

Filed: March 22, 2001 

___________

Before RICHARD S. ARNOLD and FAGG, Circuit Judges, and MONTGOMERY,*

District Judge.

___________

PER CURIAM.

When Arkansas state police officers arrested Rufus Raglin Stelivan in 1995, the

officers seized $2700 in cash. Stelivan was notified personally and by publication of

state court forfeiture proceedings, but he failed to contest the matter, and the cash was

forfeited to the state in 1996. No federal forfeiture proceedings were ever initiated.

After the state court forfeiture, Stelivan brought this federal action seeking the money's
**The Honorable Susan Webber Wright, Chief Judge, United States District

Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas.

-2-

return. The district court** found $960 of the forfeited cash belonged to Stelivan, but

concluded the state forfeiture complied with state law and the Due Process Clause, and

thus the district court lacked jurisdiction over the restitution action. Stelivan appeals.

"[O]nly one court may have jurisdiction over the res in an in rem proceeding."

Madewell v. Downs, 68 F.3d 1030, 1041 n.13 (8th Cir. 1995). Thus, the first court,

whether state or federal, to acquire jurisdiction over forfeited money maintains

jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. See id. Here, the state court acquired

primary jurisdiction in the state court forfeiture proceedings, so the federal district court

lacked jurisdiction to return it. See id. Stelivan asserts the district court issued an

improper advisory opinion about the $960 and the adequacy of state notice. We

disagree. The district court's findings and conclusions merely showed the state had

obtained primary jurisdiction over the money. We affirm the district court's dismissal

for lack of jurisdiction.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
Case 2:17-mj-07556-BSB Document 1 Filed 11/07/17 Page 1 of 5
Case 2:17-mj-07556-BSB Document 1 Filed 11/07/17 Page 2 of 5
Case 2:17-mj-07556-BSB Document 1 Filed 11/07/17 Page 3 of 5
Case 2:17-mj-07556-BSB Document 1 Filed 11/07/17 Page 4 of 5
Case 2:17-mj-07556-BSB Document 1 Filed 11/07/17 Page 5 of 5
NO. 07-02-0049-CR

	IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

	FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

	AT AMARILLO

	PANEL C

	MARCH 8, 2002

	______________________________

	RAYNALDO MEDELLIN, APPELLANT

	V.

	THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE

	_________________________________

	FROM THE 181ST DISTRICT COURT OF POTTER COUNTY;

	NO. 44,285-B; HONORABLE JOHN BOARD, JUDGE

	_______________________________

Before QUINN and REAVIS and JOHNSON, JJ.

	Appellant Raynaldo Medellin appeals from his conviction for delivery of a controlled substance.  We dismiss for want of jurisdiction. 

	Appellant has filed a “Notice of Appeal and Request for Court’s Permission to Appeal” from his judgment of conviction dated December 10, 2001, in Cause No. 44,285-B in the 181st District Court of Potter County for delivery of a controlled substance.  Neither a clerk’s record nor a reporter’s record has been filed in connection with the appeal.  

	In his notice of appeal, appellant asserts that his conviction was pursuant to a plea bargain and that the punishment assessed by the trial court was in accordance with the plea bargain.  Appellant does not allege that (1) his appeal is based on a jurisdictional defect, (2) the substance of the appeal was raised by written motion ruled on before trial or (3) the trial court granted permission to appeal.  See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(b)(3).  He asserts only that he is “requesting that the [trial] court grant permission to Defendant to pursue his appeal.” 	

	A threshold question in any case is whether the court has jurisdiction over the pending controversy.  See State v. Roberts, 940 S.W.2d 655, 657 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996).  Courts will address the question of jurisdiction sua sponte; for, unless a court has jurisdiction over a matter, its actions in the matter are without validity.  Id. at 657 n.2.  

	Appellate jurisdiction is invoked by giving timely and proper notice of appeal.  See  State v. Riewe, 13 S.W.3d 408, 410 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000).  To perfect appeal from a judgment which was rendered on the defendant’s plea of guilty or nolo contendere under Code of Criminal Procedure article 1.15, and in which the punishment assessed did not exceed the punishment recommended by the prosecutor and agreed to by the defendant, the notice of appeal must (a) specify that the appeal is for a jurisdictional defect; (b) specify that the substance of the appeal was raised by written motion and ruled on before trial; or (c) state that the trial court granted permission to appeal.  See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(b)(3);1 White v. State, 61 S.W.3d 424, 428 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001).  Dismissal of an issue or the entire matter is appropriate unless the form of the notice of appeal is proper to perfect appeal as to the issue or matter.  Id.  

	Appellant’s Notice of Appeal does not contain any of the three allegations necessary to invoke our appellate jurisdiction over an appeal from his conviction.  See TRAP 25.2(b)(3); White, 61 S.W.3d at 428.   Accordingly, our jurisdiction has not been invoked and we dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.  

								Per Curiam

Do not publish.
H. Res. 370 

In the House of Representatives, U. S., 

May 12, 2009. 

Whereas there are approximately 54,000,000 children and 

7,000,000 adults who spend their days in the Nation’s 

120,000 public and private schools; 

Whereas over half of schools in the United States have problems linked to indoor air quality; 

Whereas children are more vulnerable to environmental hazards as they breathe in more air per pound of body 

weight due to their developing systems; 

Whereas children spend an average of 30 to 50 hours per 

week in school; 

Whereas poor indoor environmental quality is associated with 

a wide range of problems that include poor concentration, 

respiratory illnesses, learning difficulties, and cancer; 

Whereas an average of 1 out of every 13 school-age children 

has asthma, the leading cause of school absenteeism, accounting for approximately 14,700,000 missed school 

days each year; 

Whereas the Nation’s schools spend approximately 

$8,000,000,000 a year on energy costs, causing officials 

to make very difficult decisions on cutting back much 

needed academic programs in efforts to maintain heat 

and electricity; 
2 

•HRES 370 EH 

Whereas healthy and high performance schools designed to 

reduce energy and maintenance costs, provide cleaner air, 

improve lighting, and reduce exposures to toxic substances provide a healthier and safer learning environment for children and improved academic achievement 

and well-being; 

Whereas new building construction, especially new school 

buildings, should be designed to optimize energy efficiency, lower energy costs, and reduce carbon dioxide 

emissions; 

Whereas Congress has demonstrated its interest in this compelling issue by including the Healthy High-Performance 

Schools Program in the No Child Left Behind Act and 

the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007; 

Whereas our schools have the great responsibility of guiding 

the future of our children and our Nation; and 

Whereas April 27, 2009, would be an appropriate date to 

designate as ‘‘National Healthy Schools Day’’: Now, 

therefore, be it 

Resolved, That the House of Representatives supports 

the goals and ideals of National Healthy Schools Day. 

Attest: 

Clerk.
#### Chandra Veda KELLISON, Petitioner/Respondent, v. DIRECTOR OF REVENUE, Respondent/Appellant.

No. 70256.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division One.

Dec. 10, 1996.

Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Attorney General, Ronald D. Pridgin, Special Assistant At-tomey General, Missouri Department of Revenue, Jefferson City, for Respondent/Appellant.

R. Andrew Beeny, Clayton, for Petitioner/Respondent.

Before DOWD, P.J., and REINHARD and GARY M. GAERTNER, JJ.

*ORDER*

PER CURIAM.

Director of Revenue appeals from the circuit court’s judgment setting aside the suspension of petitioner’s driving privileges for violation of the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law, § 303.025, RSMo 1986. We affirm. The judgment of the trial court is supported by substantial evidence and is not against the weight of the evidence; no error of law appears. An extended opinion would have no precedential value. The parties have been furnished with a memorandum for their information only, setting forth the reasons for this order affirming the judgment pursuant to Rule 84.16(b).