Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05

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### MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

A TTORNEY FOR A PPELLANT Valerie K. Boots Marion County Public Defender Agency Indianapolis, Indiana A TTORNEY S FOR A PPELLEE Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Attorney General of Indiana Justin F. Roebel Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana



### IN THE 

# COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

John Edward Williams , Appellant

- Defendant,

v. 

### State of Indiana , Appellee

- Plaintiff M arch 22, 2017 Court of Appeals Ca se No. 49A05

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- 1919 Appeal from the Marion Superior Court The Honorable David M. Hooper, Magistrate Trial C ourt Cause No. 49G12

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Mathias , Judge .Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05

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- 1919 | M a r c h 2 2 , 2 0 1 7 Page 2 of 5 [1] John Edward Williams (“Williams”) was convicted in Marion Superior Court of Class B misdemeanor criminal recklessness. Williams appeals his conviction and argues that the State failed to prove that his acts were reckless.

[2] We affirm. 

### Facts and Procedural History

[3] On or about June 26, 2015, Williams reported that his girlfriend’s 1985 tan

colored Pontiac Parisienne had been stolen. On June 28, 2015, Williams observed what he believed to be the stolen vehicle travelin g southbound on Interstate 65. He began to follow the vehicle, which was driv en by Trent Wilson (“Wilson”). Wilson’s girlfriend was in the passenger seat , and his two young nephews were in the back seat

.
[4] Wilson exited the interstate onto Raymond Street and proceeded west toward Shelby Street. He observed that Williams’ s vehicle was still following him closely. Wilson stopped that the intersection of Raymond and Shelby Street s and planned to turn north onto Shelby Street. Wilson stopped at the intersection to allow a fire truck to pass. His vehicle was then hit from behind by Williams’ s vehicle.

[5] Wilson began to pull over to check for damage to his car when Williams struck hi s vehicle again. Williams used his vehicle to push Wilson’s vehicle down the street approximately ten yards and up onto the curb. Damage to Wilson’s vehicle included a bent front driver’s side tire rim, a crack in the hood , and broken tail lights.Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05

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- 1919 | M a r c h 2 2 , 2 0 1 7 Page 3 of 5 [6] Indianap olis Metropolitan Police Department Officer Jennifer Asher (“Officer Asher”) was on duty near th e 2100 block of Shelby Street. Williams waved Officer Asher down and reported that Wilson’s vehicle was the vehicle that Williams had reported stolen two days p rior. Williams gave Officer Asher the stolen vehicle’s title and told her that he rear

- ended the vehicle to get it to stop. Tr. p p
. 14, 22. The officer checked the VIN numbers of Wilson’s vehicle and the vehicle described on Williams’ title , but the number s did not match.

[7] Officer Asher told William s that he was mistaken and Wilson’s vehicle was not the one that had been reported stolen. Williams asked if he could apologize to the driver and explained that Wilson’s car looked just like the stolen vehicle.

[8] Th e next day, Williams was charged with Class B misdemeanor criminal recklessness. Williams was found guilty as charged at a benc h trial held on July 28, 2016. He was sentenced to time served and ordered to complete forty hours of community service. Williams now appeals.


### Standard of Review

[9] Williams argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that he committed Class B misdemeanor criminal recklessness. When we review a claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence we neither reweigh the evidence nor assess the credibility of the witnesses. Instead, we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences drawn th erefrom that support the [judgment] . And we will affirm the conviction if there is probative eviden ce from which [the fact

- finder] could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05

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- 1919 | M a r c h 2 2 , 2 0 1 7 Page 4 of 5 Suggs v. State , 51 N.E.3d 1190, 1193 (Ind. 2016) (citing Treadway v. State , 924 N.E.2d 621, 639 (Ind. 2010)).


### Discussion and Decision

[10] To convict Williams of Class B misdemeanor criminal reck less ness , the State was required to prove that Williams recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally performed an act that created a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person. See Ind. Code § 35

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- 2. The State specifically alleged tha t Williams ’ reckless, knowing, or intentional act of striking Wilson’s vehicle created a substantial ri sk of bodily injury to Wilson. Appellant’s App. p. 16.

[11] Relying on his own testimony at trial, Williams argues that the State failed to
p rove that he acte d recklessly. He claims that he accidentally struck Wilson’s vehicle and specifically that “the impact occurred as he was looking over his right shoulder for the police officer he had seen at the intersection.” Appellant’s Br. at 8 (citing tr. pp. 38

- 39).

[12] “ A person engages in condu ct ‘recklessly’ if he engages in the conduct in plain, conscious, and unjustifiable disregard of harm that might result and the disregard involves a substantial deviation from acceptable standards of conduct. ” Ind. Code § 35

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- 2. Rear

- ending another vehicle is generally negligent conduct that our courts will not consider a criminally reckless act. Cf. Clancy v. State , 829 N.E.2d 203, 207 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (observing that “proof that an automobile accident ‘ arose out of the in advertence, lack of attention, forgetfulness or thoughtfulness of the driver of a vehicle, or from an error ofCourt of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05

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- 1919 | M a r c h 2 2 , 2 0 1 7 Page 5 of 5 judgment on his part,’ is not sufficient evidence of recklessness ”), trans. denied (citation omitted).

[13] However, in this case, the State presented evidence that Williams deliberately struck Wilson’s vehicle so that the vehicle would come to a stop. When he struck Wilson’s vehicle a second time, he pushed the vehicle almost ten yards and up over the curb

. Williams the n told Wilson that Wilson’s vehicl e was his and had been stolen. Tr. p. 29. Damages to Wilson’s vehicle included a bent front driver’s side tire rim, a crack in the hood of the car, and broken taillights.

[14] Williams challenges the credibility of th e State ’s evidence and requests that we credit his testimony that his acts were merely negligent. I t is more than well

settled that our court will not reweigh the evidence or credibility of the witnesses. See Suggs , 51 N.E.3d at 1193. For these reasons, we conclu de that the State presented sufficient evidence that Williams acted recklessly. We therefore affirm his conviction for Class B misdemeanor criminal recklessness.

[15] Affirmed.

B aker, J., and Pyle, J., concur.