1

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

____________________

NO. 09-17-00259-CR

____________________

MICHAEL ALLEN MARTZ, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

_______________________________________________________ ______________

On Appeal from the 435th District Court 

Montgomery County, Texas

Trial Cause No. 16-09-11327-CR

________________________________________________________ _____________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

In four appellate issues, Michael Allen Martz contends his conviction for 

felony driving while intoxicated should be reversed.1 Martz argues that (1) he 

 

1 Martz’s indictment, filed in December 2016, alleges that he had been 

convicted on six prior occasions for driving while intoxicated. See Tex. Penal Code 

Ann. § 49.04(a) (West Supp. 2018) (defining the elements of the offense of driving 

while intoxicated), § 49.09(b) (West Supp. 2018) (providing that a driving while 

intoxicated offense is a third-degree felony if the person has two prior convictions 

related to the operation of a motor vehicle while intoxicated). 
2

received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to take steps to 

remove two of the jurors from the jury that heard his case, (2) the trial court 

committed reversible error when it denied his motion for new trial, (3) the trial court 

erred when it denied his motion for directed verdict, and (4) the jury’s verdict should 

be reversed because it is not supported by enough evidence to prove he was guilty.

For the reasons explained below, we affirm.

Background

One evening in September 2016, Olivia Corona called 911 after she saw a 

man driving his truck in her lane of traffic on a road that runs behind a grocery store 

in Porter, Texas. She followed the man into the parking lot of the nearby store, where 

she obtained a partial license number from the temporary tag that was on the man’s 

truck. While in the parking lot, Corona observed the man for over five minutes while

he drove his truck erratically inside the parking lot. Corona saw the man make five 

or six attempts to park. He then parked the truck and entered the store. Corona, who 

had called the 911 dispatcher and had the dispatcher on the phone, described the man 

and how he was driving, where the man parked his truck, and told her what numbers 

she got from the truck’s tag. Corona did not, however, remain at the scene to identify 

the man to the officers who came to the store. 
3

Department of Public Safety Troopers Benjamin Polansky and Bruno Miauro 

responded to the call that Corona placed to 911. When they got there, they found the 

truck where Corona told the 911 dispatcher it would be. Based on the description of 

the driver, which the troopers had from the dispatcher, they found Martz inside the 

store. During Martz’s trial, the troopers testified that Martz appeared to be 

intoxicated, smelled of alcohol, had bloodshot eyes, and slurred his speech when 

they spoke to him. Polansky took Martz outside the store, where he gave Martz the 

horizontal-gaze nystagmus and finger-count tests.

2 The jury viewed Trooper 

Polansky’s dashcam video of Martz performing the field sobriety tests. According 

to Trooper Polansky, based on Martz’s appearance, the results of the field sobriety 

tests, and the information Corona provided 911 about Martz’s driving, he arrested 

Martz and charged him with driving while intoxicated (DWI). 

Trooper Polansky put Martz in his patrol car and read Martz his statutory 

rights, including the DIC-24 Mandated Statutory Warning.

3 According to the 

 2 The standardized field sobriety test consists of (1) the horizontal-gaze 

nystagmus test, (2) the walk-and-turn test, and (3) the one-leg-stand test. Trooper 

Polansky did not administer the walk-and-turn or the one-leg-stand tests because he 

did not want to evaluate the accuracy of any clues related to intoxication that might 

be confounded by pre-existing injuries Martz claimed that he had suffered. 

3 This testimony undoubtedly refers to the DIC-24 Mandated Statutory 

Warning, a warning that law enforcement officials are required to give to suspects 

who are arrested for DWI. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 724.015 (West Supp. 
4

trooper, Martz verbally consented to the trooper’s request to obtain a specimen of 

his blood. After the troopers took Martz to a nearby hospital, a registered nurse took 

two blood specimens from Martz. 

The blood specimens the trooper obtained from Martz were tested by the 

Department of Public Safety’s Crime Lab in Houston. A forensic scientist employed 

with the Crime Lab, Katherine Brown, testified in Martz’s trial. She explained that 

she analyzed Martz’s blood specimens and determined they contained .028 grams of 

ethanol per 100 milliliters of blood. Brown then forwarded Martz’s specimens to the 

Crime Lab in Austin so they could be further analyzed for the presence of drugs. 

Eduardo Padilla, a forensic scientist with the Crime Lab in Austin, also 

testified in the trial. He explained that he analyzed the blood specimens to determine 

whether they showed that Martz had used marijuana. According to Padilla, the tests 

he conducted showed that Martz had both active and inactive ingredients of

marijuana in his blood. He explained the active ingredients in marijuana can interfere 

with a person’s ability to concentrate, to perceive situations, result in the person 

feeling dizzy, cause a person to slur his speech, and interfere with a person’s ability 

to drive a car. Dan Rios, another forensic scientist with the lab in Austin, testified 

 

2018). The warning advises the suspect about the consequences of refusing to 

consent to the trooper’s request for a breath or blood specimen. Id.
5

that he analyzed the blood specimens to evaluate them for the presence of the 

benzodiazepine class of drugs. Rios testified that he found Martz’s blood specimens 

contained alprazolam, carisoprodol, meprobamate, a metabolite of carisoprodol, and 

hydrocodone. 

Michael Dean, a patrol sergeant with the Conroe Police Department and 

certified drug recognition expert, testified in the trial and addressed whether the 

levels of the drugs in Martz’s system could impair a person’s normal use of his

mental or physical faculties. In general, Dean described the types of symptoms the 

drugs in Martz’s system could cause. He stated the drugs in Martz’s system were 

capable of impairing a person’s normal use of his mental and physical faculties.

After the State rested, Martz moved for a directed verdict. He argued the State 

failed to present enough evidence to tie him to the truck Corona saw before calling

911. The trial court denied the motion. Next, Martz called Dr. Jimmie Valentine, a 

retired professor of pediatrics and pharmacology. Dr. Valentine testified that the 

concentrations of the six substances detected in Martz’s blood specimens were not 

high enough to show that Martz no longer had the normal use of his mental or 

physical faculties when the police arrested him at the store. 

On the morning of the last day of Martz’s trial, a deputy informed the court 

and the parties about an incident that occurred after court had adjourned the day 
6

before. During a hearing outside the presence of the jury, the deputy testified that, 

while he escorted Martz in shackles outside the courthouse, he saw a juror exiting 

the courthouse. During the hearing, the deputy testified that he did not know whether 

the juror leaving the courthouse noticed them or whether the juror recognized Martz, 

who was in street clothes at the time he was being transported to the jail. At the 

request of the State and Martz, the trial court took no action regarding the incident. 

The jury then found Martz guilty of felony DWI. Subsequently, the trial court 

assessed a life sentence. Martz then filed a motion for new trial. In the motion, Martz

asserted he did not get a fair trial because one of the jurors might have seen him 

wearing shackles. The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the motion,

but then allowed the motion to be overruled by operation of law.4

Analysis

Sufficiency of the Evidence

We begin our analysis with issues three and four since if sustained they would 

require the trial court’s judgment to be reversed and a judgment rendered in Martz’s

favor. In issues three and four, Martz argues that the evidence is insufficient to 

support the jury’s verdict. A complaint that a trial court committed error by denying 

 

4 See Tex. R. App. P. 21.8(c) (a motion for new trial which is not ruled on in 

a timely fashion is deemed to have been denied if the trial court does not issue its 

ruling within 75 days after imposing or suspending the defendant’s sentence). 
7

a motion for directed verdict is viewed on appeal as a challenge to the sufficiency of 

the evidence.

5 For that reason, we address issues three and four together.6

Martz presents two basic arguments to support these issues. First, he argues 

the trial court should have granted his motion for directed verdict because the 

evidence before the jury failed to prove that he was the man seen driving the truck 

in the parking lot. Second, Martz argues that given the levels of the drugs the Crime

Lab detected in his blood, the evidence failed to prove that he was intoxicated. 

When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we determine 

whether, “‘after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, 

any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond 

a reasonable doubt.’”7 Each fact need not point directly and independently to guilt 

if the cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support 

the conviction.8 Circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence to

 

5 Williams v. State, 937 S.W.2d 479, 482 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).

6 Martz presents no challenge to the paragraphs in the indictment used to 

enhance his sentence.

 

7 Nisbett v. State, 552 S.W.3d 244, 262 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (quoting 

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)).

8 See Nisbett, 552 S.W.3d at 262 (citing Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2007)).
8

establish an actor is guilty, and circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to 

establish a person’s guilt.9 The jury is the sole judge of the credibility of the 

witnesses and the weight to be afforded to the testimony that it considered in the 

trial.10 As a reviewing court, our role “is simply to ensure that the evidence presented 

supports the jury’s verdict and that the State has presented a legally sufficient case 

of the offense charged.”11 

To establish that a person committed the offense of DWI, the State must prove 

that the person was intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place.12

The Penal Code defines “[i]ntoxicated” as “(A) not having the normal use of mental 

or physical faculties by reason of the introduction of alcohol, a controlled substance, 

a drug, a dangerous drug, a combination of two or more of those substances, or any 

other substance into the body; or (B) having an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or 

more.”13

 

9 Jenkins v. State, 493 S.W.3d 583, 599 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016).

10 Queeman v. State, 520 S.W.3d 616, 622 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017).

11 Id.

12 Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 49.04(a).

13 Id. § 49.01(2) (West 2011).
9

Martz argues that there was not enough evidence before the jury to allow it to 

reasonably conclude that he was the person driving the truck Corona saw being 

driven erratically in late-September 2016. We disagree. The evidence before the jury 

in the trial includes a video of Martz sitting in Trooper Polansky’s patrol car. In the 

video, Martz stated: “I’m not trying to give nobody a hard time, I just wanted to go 

to the grocery store and get a few things and go home....[I] had a hard time getting 

parked there and I came around the wrong way and had to turn around and I was 

trying to back in there and that’s why somebody called on me.” Martz informed the 

Trooper that he owned the truck that police found parked in the store’s parking lot,

and he asked the trooper to take some of his personal items, such as his cellphone, 

from the truck. Trooper Polansky testified that he retrieved the items Martz asked 

him to remove from the parked truck. We conclude that Martz’s statements

acknowledging he had been driving the truck, the testimony from other witnesses

showing that Martz was the owner of the truck, and testimony linking Martz’s truck 

to the one Corona saw being driven in the parking lot authorized the jury to find that 

Martz was driving the truck that Corona testified she saw being driven erratically in 

the parking lot at the store.

14 We overrule issue three.

 

14 See Gribble v. State, 808 S.W.2d 65, 70 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (providing 

that the identity of a perpetrator “may be established by an extrajudicial confession 

alone”); McCann v. State, 433 S.W.3d 642, 647-48 (Tex. App—Houston [1st Dist.] 
10

Second, we address Martz’s argument claiming the jury did not have enough 

evidence about the effects of the intoxicants in his blood to allow the jury to find 

him guilty. In Martz’s case, the State did not rely on a per se theory of intoxication; 

instead, the State argued the evidence established that Martz had lost the normal use 

of his mental or physical faculties based on the combination of the alcohol and drugs

in his system when they arrested him for DWI.

15

Under Texas law, juries are authorized to infer that a person has lost the loss 

of the normal use of his mental or physical faculties based on circumstantial 

evidence. In Martz’s case, the evidence shows he was seen driving erratically, had 

slurred speech, mumbled, had bloodshot eyes, swayed while standing, exhibited 

clues of intoxication after undergoing a field sobriety test, smelled of alcohol, and 

 

2014, no pet.) (upholding a DWI conviction because among other corroborating 

circumstances, the defendant stated that the vehicle was registered to him, described 

“how the accident occurred,” was found near the scene of the accident, and smelled 

of alcohol); Hines v. State, 383 S.W.3d 615, 623 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2012, 

pet. ref’d) (considering 911 caller’s description that matched the defendant as 

evidence of the defendant’s identity as the driver). 

15 Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 49.01(2); see Kirsch v. State, 306 S.W.3d 738, 743 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (holding that the State may prove intoxication in either of 

two ways: (1) the “impairment” theory—the loss of normal use of mental or physical 

faculties or (2) the “per se” theory—an alcohol concentration in the blood, breath, 

or urine of 0.08 or more).
11

admitted to recently consuming one or more intoxicating substances.

16 Furthermore, 

an experienced trooper testified that he thought Martz was intoxicated. The evidence 

is sufficient to establish that Martz was intoxicated.

17

During the trial, Trooper Polansky testified that Martz exhibited six out of six 

clues of intoxication when he gave Martz a horizontal-gaze nystagmus test. 

According to Trooper Polansky, Martz was also unable to follow the directions the 

trooper gave him during a finger-count test. Trooper Polansky expressed the opinion 

that based on all the circumstances he gathered in his investigation he thought that 

Martz was intoxicated. Other evidence, presented through forensic scientists,

showed that Martz had alcohol, marijuana, and four medications in his blood when 

he was arrested for DWI. That testimony established that the substances in Martz’s 

blood were intoxicants capable of impairing the normal use a person would 

otherwise have over their physical and mental faculties. 

 

16 See Kirsch, 306 S.W.3d at 745; Cotton v. State, 686 S.W.2d 140, 142 n.3 

(Tex. Crim. App. 1985).

17 See Annis v. State, 578 S.W.2d 406, 407 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (providing 

that an officer’s testimony that a person was intoxicated provided sufficient evidence 

to establish the element of intoxication); Brister v. State, 414 S.W.3d 336, 341 (Tex. 

App.—Beaumont 2013) (“When based upon facts an experienced officer observes 

and then describes to the jury, an officer’s opinion concerning a person’s 

intoxication provides sufficient evidence of intoxication.”), aff’d, 449 S.W.3d 490 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2014). 
12

Martz argues the evidence is insufficient to establish intoxication because the 

level of each of the medications in his system was within the therapeutic range for 

each of those drugs. He further notes the alcohol level in his blood was below the 

legal limit. Martz relies heavily on the testimony of his expert, Dr. Valentine, who 

explained that the types of medications in Martz’s system were not at levels

sufficient to impair a person’s ability to drive. The jury was not required to reach a 

verdict consistent with Dr. Valentine’s testimony, as the State relied on an 

impairment theory of intoxication in Martz’s trial.18 The jury could reasonably reject

Dr. Valentine’s testimony based on the physical signs of impairment that the 

testimony shows Martz exhibited when the police arrested him at the store.

19

Refusing to give Dr. Valentine much weight is logical since he never addressed the 

synergistic effects of the multiple medications that were detected in Martz’s blood.

Furthermore, Dr. Valentine agreed that marijuana has no therapeutic range. We

conclude the evidence authorized the jury to convict Martz of DWI. We overrule 

Martz’s fourth issue.

 

18 See Nesbitt, 552 S.W.3d at 262.

19 See Fitts v. State, 982 S.W.2d 175, 186 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 

1998, pet. ref’d) (providing that the jury must determine the appropriate weight to 

accord expert testimony, and that the jury may reject such testimony “if it fails to 

comport with the jurors’ concepts of sound logic”).
13

Motion for New Trial

In issue two, Martz argues the trial court abused its discretion by denying his 

motion for new trial. In the motion, Martz argued that he was entitled to a new trial 

because one of the jurors possibly saw him in shackles as he left the courthouse

before the jury decided his case. Before reaching the merits of the arguments Martz 

raises in issue two, we must decide whether he preserved the error for our review.20

The record before us in Martz’s case shows that Martz failed to ask for a 

mistrial or to lodge a timely and specific objection when he was in the trial court 

regarding the juror who might have seen him in shackles. The Court of Criminal 

Appeals has recognized that a defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial by an 

impartial jury is “subject to waiver (or even forfeiture) by the defendant in the 

interest of overall trial strategy.”21

The record also shows that, during the trial, Martz and his trial attorney were 

aware that a juror possibly saw Martz leaving the courthouse in shackles. In a hearing 

to address the incident, Martz’s attorney told the court that he and his client wanted 

 

20 See Gipson v. State, 383 S.W.3d 152, 159 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (“An 

appellate court ‘may not reverse a judgment of conviction without first addressing 

any issue of error preservation.’”) (quoting Meadoux v. State, 325 S.W.3d 189, 193 

n.5 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010)).

21 See State v. Morales, 253 S.W.3d 686, 697 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). 
14

to complete Martz’s trial without anyone mentioning anything to the jury about the 

incident. Under the circumstances, the record shows that Martz was aware of the 

problem, that he did not object to going forward, and that he wanted the existing jury 

to reach a verdict in his case. On this record, we conclude that Martz affirmatively 

waived any complaint he had about the juror remaining on the jury.

22 We overrule 

Martz’s second issue.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

In his first issue, Martz argues he received ineffective assistance of counsel. 

According to Martz, his attorney was ineffective for two reasons. First, when 

selecting the jury, Martz’s trial attorney failed to strike a member of the array who 

ended up being on the jury. Martz claims his attorney should have exercised a strike 

on the prospective juror because she indicated during voir dire that she had a family 

member who was killed by a drunk driver. Second, Martz argues his attorney was 

ineffective because he failed to ask the trial court to take remedial measures to 

 22 See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 512-13 (1976) (explaining that while 

the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the State from compelling the defendant to be 

tried while wearing identifiable prison clothes, “the failure to make an objection to 

the court as to being tried in such clothes, for whatever reason, is sufficient to negate

the presence of compulsion necessary to establish a constitutional violation”); 

Mitchell v. State, 989 S.W.2d 747, 749 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (explaining that 

“Estelle suggests it may sometimes be sound defense strategy for a defendant to 

stand trial in jail clothes which is why Estelle decided a defendant must object to 

being tried in jail clothes before he may later complain about it”). 
15

address the problem created when one of the jurors possibly saw Martz outside the 

courthouse in shackles.

To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must 

show that the performance of his attorney fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness, and that, but for counsel’s alleged error, the outcome of the 

proceedings would probably have been different.23 When making an ineffective 

assistance of counsel claim, the defendant bears the burden of developing the facts 

necessary to meet the burden to show the defendant received ineffective assistance 

under the standards identified in Strickland.

24 Generally, to prove a claim of 

ineffective assistance, the defendant must overcome the “strong presumption that 

counsel’s conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable professional 

assistance.”25

If the defendant failed to raise his claim of ineffective assistance in the trial 

court, the record on direct appeal will rarely be sufficient to allow the defendant’s to 

 23 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984).

24 See Jackson v. State, 877 S.W.2d 768, 771 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (citing 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689).

25 Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690).
16

appeal to show whether the trial attorney’s alleged errors violated the standards in 

Strickland.

26 Ordinarily, the defendant’s trial attorney should “‘be afforded an 

opportunity to explain his actions before being denounced as ineffective.’”27 When 

the trial attorney’s explanation is not in the record before the appellate court, and 

unless the record demonstrates the conduct at issue was “‘so outrageous that no 

competent attorney would have engaged in it[,]’” the appellate court should not find 

the attorney provided the defendant with ineffective assistance.

28

Martz’s trial attorney was not called or questioned in the trial court about why 

he made the decisions that Martz criticizes in his appeal. Moreover, the record that 

is before us suggests the attorney’s decisions were based on trial strategy. Martz and 

his attorney liked the jury they had and did not want to have anyone inquire about 

whether Martz was seen in shackles. 

Martz’s criticism about his attorney’s failure to exercise his strikes in the 

manner Martz now claims they should have been exercised is also conduct that 

Martz’s trial attorney should have been given the chance to explain in the court 

 

26 Menefield v. State, 363 S.W.3d 591, 592-93 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (citing

Goodspeed v. State, 187 S.W.3d 390, 392 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).

27 Id.

28 Id. 
17

below. In jury selection, the prospective juror, who ended up being seated as one of 

the jurors, indicated that her son’s father-in-law was killed by a drunk driver in 2010. 

When Martz’s attorney asked whether that would make it difficult for her to be fair 

and objective, she responded: “No.”

We conclude Martz failed to meet his burden of proof to show that he received 

constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel. For that reason, we overrule his 

first issue. 

Conclusion

Having overruled each of Martz’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

AFFIRMED. 

_________________________

 HOLLIS HORTON

 Justice

Submitted on September 12, 2018

Opinion Delivered June 12, 2019

Do Not Publish

Before Kreger, Horton and Johnson, JJ.