PRESENT: Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, and 

Lemons, JJ., and Compton, S.J. 

STATE WATER CONTROL BOARD, 

DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL 

QUALITY, ET AL. 

v. Record No. 021507 OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 

 April 17, 2003 

FRANCES BROADDUS CRUTCHFIELD, ET AL. 

FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

 This appeal originates from a final decision of the State 

Water Control Board (the Board). We primarily consider whether 

the petitioner landowners properly perfected their appeal in the 

circuit court and whether they have standing to challenge the 

Board's decision granting a permit for the discharge of treated 

wastewater into a river adjoining their land. 

 In April 1999, the Board, under authority provided in Code 

§ 62.1-44.15(5) of the State Water Control Law, Code §§ 62.1-

44.2 through –44.34:28, granted Hanover County a Virginia 

Pollution Discharge Elimination System Permit (the permit). The 

permit allows the County to discharge up to ten million gallons 

per day of treated wastewater into the Pamunkey River (the 

river) adjacent to property owned by Frances B. Crutchfield and 

her son, Henry R. Broaddus (collectively, the petitioners). 

 The petitioners filed a petition for appeal in the Circuit 

Court of the City of Richmond against the Board and the 
Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) (collectively, the 

Board), asking that the court declare the permit invalid. In 

response, the Board filed a demurrer asserting that the 

petitioners lacked standing to pursue their appeal. The Board 

also asked the court to dismiss the appeal on the ground that 

the petitioners failed to name the County as a party to the 

appeal in a timely manner. 

 The circuit court overruled the demurrer, holding that the 

petitioners alleged standing by claiming injury to the historic 

sites located on their property. The court allowed the 

petitioners to add the County as a party to the appeal, but 

denied them leave to amend their petition regarding their 

claimed injuries. 

After hearing evidence on the question of standing, the 

circuit court dismissed the appeal with prejudice on the ground 

that the petitioners had not established standing because they 

failed to demonstrate "any actual or imminent injury." The 

court held that the petitioners' claims of injury merely 

constituted "abstract distress." 

The petitioners appealed from the circuit court's judgment 

to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the judgment in an 

unpublished opinion. Crutchfield v. State Water Control Bd., 

Record No. 1095-01-2 (April 2, 2002). The Court of Appeals 

remanded the case for a hearing on the merits of the petition, 

2
holding that the petitioners had standing to challenge the 

Board's issuance of the permit. The Court of Appeals also 

concluded that the circuit court abused its discretion in 

refusing to allow the petitioners leave to amend the allegations 

of their petition, and held that the petitioners' failure to 

name the County in the original petition did not create a 

jurisdictional defect in the proceedings. 

The Board and the County appealed from the Court of 

Appeals' judgment. We awarded an appeal based on our 

determination that the Court of Appeals' decision involves 

matters of significant precedential value. See Code § 17.1-

410(B). 

 The following facts are relevant to this appeal. The 

petitioners own an 878-acre tract of land in Hanover County 

known as "Newcastle Farm" (the farm). The farm is bordered for 

several miles by the Pamunkey River and contains the remains of 

the colonial-era town of Newcastle, which was founded in 1738 

and is listed as a Virginia Historic Landmark. The farm also 

includes part of a former plantation, known as Marlbourne, which 

is listed in the National Historic Landmark Registry. 

 The County sought the permit to facilitate its planned 

Totopotomoy Wastewater Treatment Plant. Under the County's 

plan, treated wastewater will be transported about eight miles 

from the plant to the Pamunkey River through a buried 36-inch3
diameter pipeline, which will cross the petitioners' land. To 

install the pipeline, the County acquired by condemnation from 

the petitioners a 50-foot-wide easement passing through the 

center of their farm. The County also obtained by condemnation 

an additional acre near the center of the farm's river frontage 

to construct reaeration and discharge structures necessary for 

the project. The County's plan will cause the treated 

wastewater to be discharged from an outfall pipe located on the 

river bottom about 50 yards upstream from the petitioners' boat 

ramp, irrigation pump, and "picnic-swimming area." 

 In considering the County's permit application, the Board 

held a public hearing during which the petitioners voiced their 

objections to the proposed project. The petitioners also 

submitted written comments in opposition to the project. 

 In April 1999, the Board granted the County's permit 

request. The petitioners timely filed a notice of appeal and 

petition for appeal in the circuit court. In their petition for 

appeal, they alleged that the Board's decision would result in 

the "effective termination of existing beneficial uses of the 

Pamunkey River for recreation." 

 The petitioners attached as an exhibit to their petition a 

letter they had submitted to the DEQ as part of the "public 

comment" process. In the letter, the petitioners alleged that 

the proposed discharge system would interfere with existing 

4
recreational uses of the river. The petitioners also stated in 

the letter that several people have used "the area immediately 

downstream from the proposed discharge [site] for swimming for 

many years. Those using this area are not limited to the 

property owners." Additionally, the petitioners stated that the 

farm "contains significant, documented historic resources that 

would indeed be adversely affected by construction of the 

proposed discharge pipe, reaeration structure, and outfall." 

 The circuit court granted the Board's request to depose the 

petitioners on the issue of their standing to appeal the Board's 

decision. In her deposition, Crutchfield testified that she was 

concerned that installation of the pipeline would adversely 

affect the historic value of the property and would destroy 

"relics" and other items of archeological importance. 

Crutchfield also testified that if the pipeline is installed, 

she will no longer swim, fish, or canoe in the river, and the 

enjoyment she derives from camping near the river will be 

impaired. 

 In his deposition, Broaddus testified that the presence of 

the discharge structure and pipeline would hinder his enjoyment 

of the farm's historic resources and recreational amenities. He 

further testified that the proposed discharge structure would be 

within sight of the Newcastle Town ruins located on the farm. 

Broaddus also stated that operation of the discharge facility 

5
and pipeline system will cause him to abandon or decrease the 

frequency of his recreational activities in the river. 

 The Board presented evidence of a "cultural resources 

investigation," which concluded that the County's project would 

not affect the farm's historic significance. The circuit court 

also received the results of an "archeological evaluation" 

indicating that the farm's cultural resources already had been 

impaired by farming operations, and that the portions of the 

farm affected by the proposed project did "not contain 

sufficient integrity to yield any further significant 

information about the past." After hearing this evidence, the 

circuit court dismissed the petitioners' appeal, holding that 

they failed to establish injury to the farm's historic resources 

and, thus, failed to demonstrate standing to challenge the 

Board's decision.1

 On appeal in this Court, the Board first argues that the 

Court of Appeals erred in affirming the circuit court's decision 

permitting the petitioners to add the County as a party to the 

appeal. The Board contends that Rule 2A:4 required the 

petitioners to serve the County, a necessary party to the 

 1

 In reaching this conclusion, the circuit court did not 

consider the petitioners' allegations and evidence regarding 

injury to their recreational interests based on its earlier 

holding that the original petition failed to allege injury to 

those interests. 

6
appeal, with a copy of their petition at the time it was filed, 

and that the petitioners' failure to do so created a 

jurisdictional defect in the proceedings. We disagree with the 

conclusion urged by the Board. 

 The petitioner's appeal to the circuit court was based on 

the Administrative Process Act (the Act), Code §§ 2.2-4000 

through –4033, which provides that an appeal of a decision by 

the Board must be brought "in the manner provided by the rules 

of the Supreme Court of Virginia." Code § 2.2-4026. Such 

appeals brought under the Act are governed by Part 2A of the 

Rules of this Court. See Rule 2A:1; Virginia Ret. Sys. v. 

Avery, 262 Va. 538, 540-42, 551 S.E.2d 612, 613-14 (2001). 

 Because the petitioners' notice of appeal and original 

petition for appeal were timely filed within the 30-day time 

periods specified in Rules 2A:2 and 2A:4, the circuit court had 

jurisdiction over the subject of the appeal.2 See id. at 542, 

551 S.E.2d at 614; see also Occoquan Land Dev. Corp. v. Cooper, 

239 Va. 363, 366-67, 389 S.E.2d 464, 466 (1990). The 

petitioners' failure to have a copy of the petition served on 

 2

 We do not address any other requirements of Rule 2A:2 

pertaining to the petitioners' notice of appeal because the 

County and the Board did not challenge the petitioners' 

compliance with this Rule either in the circuit court or in 

their brief filed with this Court. 

7
the County did not divest the court of this jurisdiction. See

Avery, 262 Va. at 542, 551 S.E.2d at 614. 

 The Board incorrectly asserts that the language of Rule 

2A:4(a) precluded the circuit court from permitting the County 

to be added as a party in the case after expiration of the 30-

day time period for filing the petition. This provision states: 

Within 30 days after the filing of the notice of 

appeal, the appellant shall file his petition for 

appeal with the clerk of the circuit court named in 

the first notice of appeal to be filed. Such filing 

shall include all steps . . . to cause a copy of the 

petition to be served (as in the case of a bill of 

complaint in equity) on the agency secretary and on 

every other party. 

 Although the plain language of this provision required the 

petitioners to serve a copy of their original petition on the 

County, their failure to do so did not prevent the circuit court 

from permitting them to amend their petition at a later date to 

add the County as a party. The contrary argument advanced by 

the Board would improperly transform the service of process 

provisions of Rule 2A:4 into a jurisdictional requirement 

mandating dismissal of the appeal in the circuit court. See

Avery, 262 Va. at 542, 551 S.E.2d at 614. We decline to apply 

Rule 2A:4 in this manner in the absence of language in the Rule 

compelling such a result. Thus, we conclude that the circuit 

court's decision permitting the County to be added as a party to 

the appeal was a matter subject to the court's discretionary 

8
authority. See Browning-Ferris Indus. of S. Atl., Inc. v. 

Residents Involved in Saving the Env't, Inc., 254 Va. 278, 282-

83, 492 S.E.2d 431, 433-34 (1997). 

The present record supports this discretionary 

determination. The County, as the entity granted the discharge 

permit, was a necessary party in the case. Id. at 282, 492 

S.E.2d at 433-34; see Asch v. Friends of the Cmty. of Mount 

Vernon Yacht Club, 251 Va. 89, 90-91, 465 S.E.2d 817, 818 

(1996). Thus, the circuit court could not determine the merits 

of the appeal and render a valid judgment in the case unless the 

County was added as a party. Atkisson v. Wexford Assocs., 254 

Va. 449, 455, 493 S.E.2d 524, 527 (1997); Asch, 251 Va. at 91, 

465 S.E.2d at 818; Schultz v. Schultz, 250 Va. 121, 124, 458 

S.E.2d 458, 460 (1995). Moreover, we observe that the County 

did not object to being added as a party in the petitioners' 

appeal. Accordingly, we conclude that the Court of Appeals did 

not err in affirming the circuit court's decision permitting the 

County to be added as a party in the case. 

 We next consider whether the Court of Appeals erred in 

concluding that the circuit court abused its discretion in 

denying the petitioners leave to amend the allegations of their 

original petition. The Board asserts that because Rule 2A:4 

required that the original petition state the reasons why the 

petitioners contended the Board's decision was unlawful, the 

9
circuit court did not have authority to allow amendment of the 

petition to state a "new" ground of injury, namely, injury to 

the petitioners' recreational use of the farm and the river. 

We find no merit in the Board's assertion that the original 

petition and letter exhibit failed to allege injury to the 

petitioners' recreational use of the farm and the river. In the 

letter attached to their original petition, the petitioners 

alleged that the proposed discharge of wastewater will interfere 

with existing uses of the river. In that letter, the 

petitioners discussed the recreational use, including swimming, 

of the area immediately downstream from the proposed discharge 

site, and stated that "[t]hose using this area are not limited 

to the property owners." 

A fair inference from these statements is that the 

petitioners, who are the property owners, use the river and 

their adjacent property for recreational purposes. Therefore, 

we are not presented with an issue whether Rule 2A:4 precludes a 

petitioner from amending a petition to add a different 

allegation of injury, and we limit our consideration to the 

issue whether the circuit court abused its discretion in denying 

the petitioners leave to amend their petition regarding their 

original claims of injury. 

We observe that the provisions of Rule 2A:4 do not prevent 

a circuit court from exercising its discretion either to grant 

10
or deny a request to amend a timely filed petition for appeal. 

However, like any other decision submitted to a circuit court's 

discretion, the refusal to allow such amendments must be 

supported by the record. 

 Here, the record shows that this was the petitioners' first 

request to amend the allegations of their petition, and the 

proposed amendments did not add any new claims of injury. In 

addition, the record does not indicate that the petitioners' 

request would have caused any delay in the court's consideration 

of the merits of the appeal or would have resulted in other 

prejudice to the parties in the case. Based on these factors, 

we conclude that the Court of Appeals did not err in holding 

that the circuit court abused its discretion in denying the 

petitioners' request to amend the allegations of their original 

petition. 

 The Board next argues that the Court of Appeals erred in 

concluding that the petitioners had standing to appeal the 

Board's decision, and in failing to give deference to the 

circuit court's "factual finding" that the petitioners failed to 

demonstrate an actual or imminent injury to the farm's historic 

resources. We disagree with the Board's arguments. 

The requirements for standing to challenge a final decision 

by the Board are stated in Code § 62.1-44.29, which provides in 

relevant part: 

11
Any owner aggrieved by, or any person who has 

participated, in person or by submittal of written 

comments, in the public comment process related to, a 

final decision of the Board . . . is entitled to 

judicial review thereof in accordance with the 

provisions of the Administrative Process Act . . . if 

such person meets the standard for obtaining judicial 

review of a case or controversy pursuant to Article 

III of the United States Constitution. A person shall 

be deemed to meet such standard if (i) such person has 

suffered an actual or imminent injury which is an 

invasion of a legally protected interest and which is 

concrete and particularized; (ii) such injury is 

fairly traceable to the decision of the Board and not 

the result of the independent action of some third 

party not before the court; and (iii) such injury will 

likely be redressed by a favorable decision by the 

court. 

The language of this statute reflects the holdings of the United 

States Supreme Court regarding the requirements of standing 

under the "case" or "controversy" provisions of Article III of 

the United States Constitution. Mattaponi Indian Tribe v. 

Commonwealth, 261 Va. 366, 376, 541 S.E.2d 920, 925 (2001). 

The standing provisions of Code § 62.1-44.29 require 

persons challenging a final decision by the Board to establish 

that they meet all three enumerated requirements of the statute 

before a court will consider the merits of their challenge to a 

governmental action. These components of Article III standing 

are not merely requirements of pleading, but must be supported 

by adequate evidence. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 

555, 561 (1992); see Pye v. United States, 269 F.3d 459, 467 

(4th Cir. 2001). 

12
 For purposes of Article III standing, the "injury in fact" 

that must be established in a case involving a plaintiff's 

recreational and aesthetic interests is not injury to the 

environment, but injury to the plaintiff. Friends of the Earth, 

Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181 

(2000); Piney Run Pres. Ass'n v. County Comm'rs, 268 F.3d 255, 

263 (4th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1077 (2002). This 

requirement precludes a plaintiff from alleging a generalized 

grievance to vindicate an interest shared by the entire public. 

Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 

F.3d 149, 156 (4th Cir. 2000); see Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573-74; 

Committee to Save the Rio Hondo v. Lucero, 102 F.3d 445, 449 

(10th Cir. 1996). 

A plaintiff must show that the alleged injury will affect 

him in a personal and individual manner. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 

n.1; Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d at 156. However, 

the claimed injury need not be a large one, and an "identifiable 

trifle" will be sufficient to meet the "injury in fact" 

requirement. LaFleur v. Whitman, 300 F.3d 256, 270-71 (2nd Cir. 

2002); Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d at 156; Sierra 

Club v. Cedar Point Oil Co., 73 F.3d 546, 557 (5th Cir. 1996). 

Thus, in "environmental cases," it generally is sufficient if a 

plaintiff establishes that he uses the affected area, and that 

he is a person "for whom the aesthetic and recreational values 

13
of the area will be lessened" by the defendant's actions. 

Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. at 183 (quoting 

Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 735 (1972)); accord Piney 

Run Pres. Ass'n, 268 F.3d at 263. Scientific proof of actual 

harm to an environmental resource is not required to establish 

standing in such cases. See Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 

F.3d at 159-60. 

 We also note that the location of the petitioners' farm is 

relevant to the present standing inquiry, because the farm is 

contiguous to, and touches, the Pamunkey River. So situated, 

the farm is "[r]iparian land," and the petitioners are 

"[r]iparian owners" of that land. See Code §§ 62.1-104(5) and –

104(6). Riparian owners have the right to make reasonable use 

of the water flowing past their land, and they have a right to 

enjoy the recreational and aesthetic advantages that are 

conferred on such land adjoining a watercourse. Thurston v. 

City of Portsmouth, 205 Va. 909, 911-12, 140 S.E.2d 678, 680 

(1965); Taylor v. Commonwealth, 102 Va. 759, 773, 47 S.E. 875, 

880-81 (1904); see Carr v. Kidd, 261 Va. 81, 95, 540 S.E.2d 884, 

892-93 (2001). 

 In accordance with these principles, we conclude that the 

circuit court erred in its standing determination because the 

petitioners' allegations and evidence of injury to their 

14
recreational interests and use of the river established that 

they have met all three requirements of Article III standing.3

 The petitioners have alleged and established an "actual or 

imminent injury" that is "concrete and particularized" in 

nature, rather than a mere statement of abstract concern or a 

general averment of injury. See Code § 62.1-44.29(i). This 

imminent injury includes injury to their recreational enjoyment 

of their property and the river's resources to which they have a 

recognized right as riparian landowners. As stated above, in a 

letter accompanying their original petition, the petitioners 

inferentially alleged that they use the area immediately 

downstream from the proposed discharge site for recreational 

purposes, including swimming. They also alleged that the 

proposed discharge of wastewater would interfere with existing 

recreational uses of the river. 

 The evidence showed that the County's wastewater treatment 

project would require the use of a buried three-foot-diameter 

pipeline placed through the petitioners' land. An outfall 

facility for treated sewage will be located on the one-acre site 

taken from the petitioners by condemnation, which is surrounded 

by the remaining acreage of the farm. The proposed permit will 

 3

 Because we reach this conclusion based solely on these 

allegations and evidence, we need not consider the sufficiency 

of the petitioners' additional allegations and evidence 

concerning injury to the farm's historic resources. 

15
allow the County to discharge as much as ten million gallons of 

treated wastewater daily from this outfall facility into the 

Pamunkey River only 50 yards upstream from the petitioner's boat 

ramp, irrigation pump, "swimming hole," and picnic area. 

 The petitioners both testified that they regularly use the 

river for swimming, fishing, and boating, and that they would be 

required either to decrease or discontinue these activities 

altogether if the County is allowed to operate its discharge 

facilities under the permit. The petitioners further stated 

that the outfall location would have an adverse impact on their 

recreational use of the river, and that their aesthetic 

enjoyment of the farm and river would be harmed by the daily 

discharge of treated wastewater into the river. 

 We also conclude that the petitioners' injuries are "fairly 

traceable" to the Board's decision to issue the permit to the 

County and do not result from the actions of a third party not 

before the court. See Code § 62.1-44.29(ii). Without the permit 

allowing the discharge of treated wastewater, the injuries that 

were the subject of the petitioners' testimony would not occur. 

The County would not be able to discharge the millions of gallons 

of treated wastewater into the river adjacent to the farm, and 

would have no need to construct the pipeline through the farm or 

to build the accompanying discharge structures. Thus, in the 

absence of the permit, the petitioners' use and enjoyment of the 

16
farm and the river for recreational purposes would remain 

unaffected. 

 Finally, we observe that the petitioners' injuries would be 

"redressed" by a favorable judgment of the circuit court. See

Code § 62.1-44.29(iii). The petitioners asked that the circuit 

court declare the permit "invalid, void and of no effect." As 

stated above, the petitioners' injuries would not occur in the 

absence of a permit issued by the Board because the County would 

be unable to construct the outfall facilities, install the 

pipeline, and discharge the treated wastewater into the river 

without a permit authorizing these actions. Accordingly, we 

conclude that the Court of Appeals did not err in holding that 

the petitioners have established standing to bring their appeal 

under the Act in the circuit court. 

 For these reasons, we will affirm the Court of Appeals' 

judgment, and will remand the case to the Court of Appeals with 

direction that the case be remanded to the circuit court for a 

trial on the merits of the petitioners' claims. 

Affirmed.

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