1 Local Rule 47.5.1 provides: "The publication of opinions that

have no precedential value and merely decide particular cases on

the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes needless

expense on the public and burdens on the legal profession."

Pursuant to that rule, the court has determined that this opinion

should not be published.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_____________________

No. 95-20009

Summary Calendar

_____________________

ROBERT D. DAWSON,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

VERSUS

KLEIN INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT and DONALD COLLINS,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

(CA-H-93-3137)

_____________________________________________________

July 31, 1995

Before JONES, BARKSDALE, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:1

Robert Dawson appeals from the adverse summary judgment on his

state and federal constitutional claims against the Klein

Independent School District. We AFFIRM. 

I.

Dawson was terminated from his position as tax assessorcollector for the District on April 21, 1992. The termination

followed a hearing, at Dawson's request, by the District's Board of
2 The District suggests that the summary judgment was not a

final, appealable order because its counterclaim for attorneys'

fees, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, is still pending. "[A]

decision on the merits is final for purposes of appeal irrespective

of the determination of attorneys' fees." Bogney v. Jones, 904

F.2d 272, 273 n.1 (5th Cir. 1990).

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Trustees. Thereupon, Dawson filed this action against the District

and its superintendent, Donald Collins, claiming, among other

things, that he was terminated without procedural due process. The

district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment,

holding, inter alia, that, as a matter of law, Dawson was afforded

both notice and an opportunity to respond, and that Collins was

entitled to qualified immunity. 

II.

First, Dawson challenges the summary judgment against his

procedural due process claim.2 Our review is de novo. Calpetco

1981 v. Marshall Exploration, Inc., 989 F.2d 1408, 1412 (5th Cir.

1993).

As the district court noted, the required process before

termination of a government employee consists of two elements:

notice and an opportunity to respond. Cleveland Bd. of Education

v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 545-46 (1985). Dawson received both.

As early as June 4, 1991, more than ten months before his

termination, Dawson received notice of numerous complaints

regarding his professional demeanor (offensive remarks, loss of

temper) and work activity (playing cards and performing outside

work while on duty). On February 25, 1992, he was notified of

additional complaints, and was reassigned as a "business officer",
3 Dawson also challenges the district court's conclusion that

Collins is entitled to qualified immunity. As a government

official, Collins is entitled to qualified immunity unless his

conduct violated Dawson's clearly established rights, e.g.,

Jefferson v. Ysleta Indep. Sch. Dist., 817 F.2d 303, 305 (5th Cir.

1987). Because of our due process holding, we need not address

this issue.

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pending an investigation. On March 4, he received written notice

from Collins that he was recommending Dawson's dismissal to the

Board of Trustees. And, on March 12, the Board of Trustees

informed Dawson of their acceptance of Collins' recommendation, and

of Dawson's right to a hearing. Dawson requested a hearing; and,

pursuant to his attorney's request, the hearing was moved from

April 7 to April 21, 1992. Dawson was aware of his right to call

and cross-examine witnesses, and exercised those rights at the

hearing. 

Dawson claims that, prior to his hearing, he was not notified

of the specific reasons for his dismissal. We disagree. He was

notified, well over a month before his hearing, that his pending

termination arose from: (1) failure to meet the District's

standards of professional conduct, (2) failure to comply with

administrative regulations, (3) failure to comply with official

directives, and (3) conducting private for-profit business during

work time. Additionally, he received full disclosure of the

evidence to be presented against him at his hearing, and was given

additional time to prepare his defense. Given the four charges,

together with the specific evidence against him, Dawson's notice

was more than sufficient for him to present his defense. E.g.

Woodbury v. McKinnon, 447 F.2d 839, 844 (5th Cir. 1971).3
The district court's summary judgment also dismissed the other

related federal and state constitutional claims in Dawson's

complaint. Dawson has not addressed them on appeal; therefore,

they are abandoned. 

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III.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is 

AFFIRMED.