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CHATTERJEE V. CHATTERJE

Cite as 313 Neb. 710

Apurba Chatterjee, third-party plaintiff, 

appellee and cross-appellee, v. Indraja 

Chatterjee, appellee and cross-appellant, 

and Indraneel Chatterjee, third-party 

defendant, appellant.

___ N.W.2d ___

Filed March 10, 2023. No. S-22-194.

1. Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. A jurisdictional question which does 

not involve a factual dispute is determined by an appellate court as a 

matter of law.

2. Statutes: Appeal and Error. The meaning and interpretation of statutes 

are questions of law for which an appellate court has an obligation to 

reach an independent conclusion irrespective of the decision made by 

the court below.

3. Standing: Jurisdiction. A party must have standing before a court can 

exercise jurisdiction, and either a party or the court can raise a question 

of standing at any time during the proceeding.

4. Standing: Jurisdiction: Parties. Standing refers to whether a party had, 

at the commencement of the litigation, a personal stake in the outcome 

of the litigation that would warrant a court’s exercise of its subject matter jurisdiction and remedial powers on that party’s behalf.

5. Standing: Parties. To have standing, the plaintiff must have some 

legal or equitable right, title, or interest in the subject matter of 

the controversy.

6. ____: ____. A plaintiff does not generally have standing to bring a case 

on behalf of a third party.

7. ____: ____. The focus of the standing inquiry is not whether the claim 

the plaintiff advances has merit; it is on whether the plaintiff is the 

proper party to assert the claim.

8. Parent and Child: Paternity: Presumptions: Evidence. The presumption set forth in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-377 (Cum. Supp. 2022) may be 

rebutted by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence.

Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library

www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/

03/10/2023 09:06 AM CST
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Appeal from the District Court for Douglas County: Marlon 

A. Polk, Judge. Vacated and dismissed.

Jeffrey A. Wagner, of Wagner, Meehan & Watson, L.L.P., for 

appellant.

Scott Hahn and David Pontier, of Koenig | Dunne, P.C., 

L.L.O., for appellee Apurba Chatterjee.

Francis E. Younes, of High & Younes, L.L.C., for appellee 

Indraja Chatterjee.

Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke, 

Papik, and Freudenberg, JJ.

Heavican, C.J.

INTRODUCTION

Indraneel Chatterjee appeals and Indraja Chatterjee crossappeals from the district court’s order establishing paternity of 

the minor children in Apurba Chatterjee. We vacate the order 

and dismiss.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Apurba filed a complaint on March 18, 2020, citing Neb. 

Rev. Stat. § 43-1401 et seq. (Reissue 2016 & Cum. Supp. 

2018), seeking to establish paternity, custody, and support. 

He alleged that Indraja was pregnant with twins and that 

based on the approximate date of conception, he believed he 

might be the biological father of the children. He also sought 

genetic testing in that complaint. Apurba, despite sharing a 

last name with husband and wife Indraneel and Indraja, is not 

related to them. Subsequently, Apurba moved to add Indraneel 

as a third-party defendant and sought to file an amended 

complaint.

Apurba’s motion for genetic testing of the twins was 

granted, as was his motion to add Indraneel as a party and his 
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motion to file an amended complaint. That complaint prayed, 

as had the original complaint, that if testing showed that 

Apurba was the biological father, Indraneel be disestablished 

as the twins’ father and an order establishing Apurba’s paternity be entered, as well as an order setting forth custody, parenting time, and support.

The twins were born in June 2020. At the time of the births, 

Indraneel and Indraja were married. Genetic testing was performed, and on June 11, results were returned indicating that 

there was a 99.9-percent statistical probability that Apurba was 

the biological father of the minor children. Based on information provided by Indraneel and Indraja at the hospital where 

the children were born, birth certificates for the minor children 

were issued on July 6, 2020, naming Indraneel as the children’s father.

On March 21, 2022, a decree of paternity, custody, and support was entered by the district court. That decree found that 

Indraja was the children’s biological mother and that Apurba 

was the children’s biological father. The court ordered joint 

legal and physical custody of the children, set forth a parenting 

plan and vacation schedule, and made several orders surrounding support and expenses, including ordering Apurba to pay 

$833 per month in child support.

Indraneel appeals from this determination, and Indraja crossappeals. We moved this case to our docket through our power 

to regulate the docket of this court and the Nebraska Court 

of Appeals.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Indraneel assigns that the district court erred in failing to 

grant his motion to dismiss. On cross-appeal, Indraja assigns 

that the district court erred in (1) denying Indraneel’s motion to 

dismiss, (2) denying Indraja’s motion to dismiss, (3) granting 

Apurba’s partial motion for summary judgment, and (4) exercising jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action.
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STANDARD OF REVIEW

[1] A jurisdictional question which does not involve a factual dispute is determined by an appellate court as a matter 

of law. 1

[2] The meaning and interpretation of statutes are questions 

of law for which an appellate court has an obligation to reach 

an independent conclusion irrespective of the decision made by 

the court below. 2

ANALYSIS

This appeal raises the question of whether Nebraska’s paternity statutes allow for an alleged father to establish paternity 

over a child born to a married couple. In addition to the argument by both Indraneel and Indraja that the district court erred 

in establishing paternity in Apurba, Indraja contends that the 

district court lacked jurisdiction over Apurba’s request.

We understand Indraja’s contention as challenging Apurba’s 

standing to seek the establishment of paternity. We agree and 

conclude that as a stranger to the marriage of Indraneel and 

Indraja, Apurba lacked standing to challenge the legitimacy 

of children born to the marriage. We accordingly dismiss this 

appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Civil proceedings to establish the paternity of a child are 

governed by §§ 43-1411 and 43-1411.01. Section 43-1411 

sets out the circumstances under which a paternity action may 

be instituted and identifies who may institute such an action. 

Section 43-1411 provides in relevant part:

A civil proceeding to establish the paternity of a 

child may be instituted, in the court of the district 

where the child is domiciled or found or, for cases 

under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, where 

1 State on behalf of Marcelo K. & Rycki K. v. Ricky K., 300 Neb. 179, 912 

N.W.2d 747 (2018).

2 State on behalf of Miah S. v. Ian K., 306 Neb. 372, 945 N.W.2d 178 

(2020).
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the alleged father is domiciled, by (1) the mother or the 

alleged father of such child, either during pregnancy 

or within four years after the child’s birth, unless (a) a 

valid consent or relinquishment has been made pursuant 

to sections 43-104.08 to 43-104.25 or section 43-105 for 

purposes of adoption or (b) a county court or separate 

juvenile court has jurisdiction over the custody of the 

child or jurisdiction over an adoption matter with respect 

to such child pursuant to sections 43-101 to 43-116 or 

(2) the guardian or next friend of such child or the state, 

either during pregnancy or within eighteen years after the 

child’s birth.

Conversely, civil proceedings to disestablish paternity are 

governed by § 43-1412.01, which provides in relevant part:

An individual may file a complaint for relief and the 

court may set aside a final judgment, court order, administrative order, obligation to pay child support, or any 

other legal determination of paternity if a scientifically 

reliable genetic test performed in accordance with sections 43-1401 to 43-1418 establishes the exclusion of the 

individual named as a father in the legal determination.

Apurba argues, simply stated, that he is the alleged father 

to the children whose paternity is at issue in this case and 

that thus, he can, under § 43-1411, maintain an action to 

establish his paternity. He argues that he need not disestablish 

Indraneel’s paternity because it was never legally established. 

Apurba further contends that the results of the DNA test show 

he is the biological father of Indraja’s children by a likelihood 

of over 99 percent and that thus, a rebuttable presumption 

exists under § 43-1415 that he is their father.

[3-7] A party must have standing before a court can exercise jurisdiction, and either a party or the court can raise 

a question of standing at any time during the proceeding. 3

3 Alpha Wealth Advisors v. Cook, ante p. 237, 983 N.W.2d 526 (2023).
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Standing refers to whether a party had, at the commencement 

of the litigation, a personal stake in the outcome of the litigation that would warrant a court’s exercise of its subject matter 

jurisdiction and remedial powers on that party’s behalf. 4 To 

have standing, the plaintiff must have some legal or equitable 

right, title, or interest in the subject matter of the contro

versy. 5 A plaintiff does not generally have standing to bring 

a case on behalf of a third party. 6 The focus of the standing 

inquiry is not whether the claim the plaintiff advances has 

merit; it is on whether the plaintiff is the proper party to 

assert the claim. 7

We agree with Apurba that Indraneel’s paternity was never 

“legally” established and thus is not capable of being disestablished by § 43-1412.01. 8 But we disagree that Apurba otherwise has standing to challenge Indraneel’s status as the father 

of Indraja’s children.

Apurba relies on § 43-1411 and argues that on the basis 

of statements made by Indraja and the results of the DNA 

test ordered by the court, he is the alleged father of Indraja’s 

children. But even assuming the truth of these allegations, the 

children do not meet the definition of a child for purposes of 

§ 43-1411. Put simply, Apurba focuses on whether he is an 

alleged father without also considering that his standing is limited by the term “child.”

And that term, for purposes of §§ 43-1401 to 43-1418, 

means “a child under the age of eighteen years born out of 

4 Id.

5 Id.

6 Id.

7 Id.

8 Cf. Erin W. v. Charissa W., 297 Neb. 143, 897 N.W.2d 858 (2017), 

disapproved on other grounds, State on behalf of Kaaden S. v. Jeffrey T., 

303 Neb. 933, 932 N.W.2d 692 (2019).
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wedlock.” 9 A “[c]hild born out of wedlock” shall mean “a 

child whose parents were not married to each other at the time 

of its birth, except that a child shall not be considered as born 

out of wedlock if its parents were married at the time of its 

conception but divorced at the time of its birth.” 10

[8] Because of the operation of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-377 

(Cum. Supp. 2022), these children are not considered to be 

born out of wedlock. Section 42-377 sets forth the legal presumption of the legitimacy of children, providing:

Children born to the parties, or to either spouse, in a 

marriage relationship which may be dissolved or annulled 

pursuant to sections 42-347 to 42-381 shall be legitimate 

unless otherwise decreed by the court, and in every case 

the legitimacy of all children conceived before the commencement of the suit shall be presumed until the contrary is shown.

We have held that the presumption set forth in § 42-377 may 

be rebutted by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence. 11

Under the operation of § 42-377, Indraja’s children are 

presumed to be legitimate and do not meet the definition of 

children born out of wedlock. This decision is consistent with 

prior case law.

In State on behalf of Miah S. v. Ian K.,

 12 we interpreted 

§§ 43-1401(1) and 43-1411 as dictating that a child born during a marriage was not “born out of wedlock” as defined by 

§ 43-1401(2). There, the State sought to invoke § 43-1411 

to establish the biological paternity of an outsider to a marriage to which a child had been born. This court explained 

that the definitions of “[c]hild” 13 and “[c]hild born out of 

9 § 43-1401(1).

10 § 43-1401(2).

11 See Alisha C. v. Jeremy C., 283 Neb. 340, 808 N.W.2d 875 (2012).

12 State on behalf of Miah S. v. Ian K., supra note 2.

13 § 43-1401(1).
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wedlock” 14 were, by the opening clause of § 43-1401, 15

expressly applied to § 43-1411. Although the holding was limited to a § 43-1411 action brought by the State, the reasoning 

applies equally here.

And where a statute has been judicially construed and that 

construction has not evoked an amendment, it will be presumed that the Legislature has acquiesced in the court’s determination of the Legislature’s intent. 16 This principle applies 

here to stand for the continued validity of our interpretations of 

§§ 43-1401 and 43-1411, neither of which has been amended 

in any way that might contradict our decision in State on 

behalf of Miah S.

Moreover, we are unpersuaded by Apurba’s reliance on 

Gomez v. State ex rel. Larez,

 17 where we were asked to determine whether a married woman could seek to establish paternity in someone other than her husband. In that case, a married woman gave birth to a child she alleged was fathered by 

Ralph Gomez, who was not her husband. The married woman 

sought, through action of the State, to have the paternity established in Gomez. Gomez objected to the court’s jurisdiction, 

arguing that a married woman could not bring an action for 

paternity. Gomez seemed to acknowledge that the language 

of the definition itself did not support his position, but he 

nevertheless contended that the Legislature did not intend for 

married women to assert and prove that their child was born 

out of wedlock.

We disagreed. We set forth the history of the statute setting 

forth the establishment of paternity, noting that upon enactment “‘any woman’” could maintain a suit for paternity; by 

14 § 43-1401(2).

15 § 43-1401 (“[f]or purposes of sections 43-1401 to 43-1418”).

16 Bogue v. Gillis, 311 Neb. 445, 973 N.W.2d 338 (2022).

17 Gomez v. State ex rel. Larez, 157 Neb. 738, 61 N.W.2d 345 (1953).
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1875, the Legislature had revised the statutory language to 

provide a cause of action for “‘any unmarried woman,’” and in 

1941, the Legislature passed another statutory revision indicating that “‘any woman’” could make such a complaint. 18 It was 

apparent from this history that a married woman could assert 

a claim for paternity on the basis of a child fathered by a man 

who was not her husband and that this child was to be considered as one born out of wedlock.

While Gomez stands for the proposition that a married 

woman could attempt to establish paternity in someone other 

than her husband, it does not opine as to whether a stranger to 

a marriage could do so. We conclude that one cannot. Given 

the statutory presumption in favor of the legitimacy of children 

born during the parties’ marriage, and the lack of statutory 

protection provided to parties outside of that relationship, we 

determine that Nebraska’s existing statutes prioritize the marital relationship.

We agree with the dissent’s observation that situations like 

this one present difficult policy decisions. But it is the function 

of the Legislature, through the enactment of statutes, to declare 

what is the law and public policy of this state. 19 In another 

context, we have said that we highlight competing policy 

arguments “not to choose one side or the other, but to observe 

that once the Legislature has enacted a statute, the resolution 

of those arguments is not our job.” 20 Here, the parties essentially dispute whether biology or marital status is paramount. 

Ultimately, that policy question belongs to the Legislature and 

not with this court. As such, we hold that Apurba lacks standing to seek a finding of paternity and that his petition must 

be dismissed.

18 Id., 157 Neb. at 743, 744, 61 N.W.2d at 348.

19 Bogue v. Gillis, supra note 16.

20 Id. at 461, 973 N.W.2d at 348.
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CONCLUSION

The decision of the district court establishing paternity in 

Apurba is vacated, and his petition seeking the establishment 

of paternity is dismissed.

Vacated and dismissed.

Funke, J., dissenting.

I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion of the court. 

I agree with the majority’s finding that Indraneel Chatterjee’s 

paternity of the minor children has not been established, but I 

disagree with the majority’s finding that Apurba Chatterjee has 

no standing to bring his paternity action, which he filed prior 

to the birth of the minor children. Instead, I would find that 

because he is an “alleged father” under the relevant statute and 

because the minor children are “children born out of wedlock,” 

Apurba has standing to bring this action.

Nebraska law, via Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-377 (Cum. Supp. 

2022), creates a presumption that a married mother’s husband 

is the father of her child if the child is born during the marriage. The presumption “merely creates a default assumption 

absent sufficient evidence to the contrary” 1 and may be rebutted by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence. 2 With the 

advent of genetic testing, this marital presumption of paternity 

can now be overcome by scientifically reliable evidence that 

the husband is not the biological father of the child. 3 Genetic 

testing can also establish paternity of children born out of 

wedlock. 4 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-1411 (Reissue 2016) provides, 

as relevant, that a civil proceeding to establish the paternity 

of a child may be brought by an “alleged father.” At issue 

is whether the presumption in § 42-377 operates to eclipse 

1 Alisha C. v. Jeremy C., 283 Neb. 340, 356, 808 N.W.2d 875, 887 (2012).

2 Alisha C., supra note 1.

3 Id.

4 Id.
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the standing granted to an “alleged father” by § 43-1411. 

Unlike the majority, I believe that it does not.

We need not, for purposes of our standing analysis, determine whether Apurba has established paternity by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence. As we have previously 

explained, because standing focuses “‘on the party, not the 

claim itself,’” when considering standing, “the legal and factual validity of the claim presented must be assumed.” 5 And 

assuming that Apurba’s claim has merit and that he would be 

entitled to establish paternity, he is the proper party to assert 

that claim and request such relief. 6

In Heiden v. Norris,

 7 asserted grandparents filed a complaint 

to establish grandparent visitation with minor children after 

the children’s mother died and visitation was granted. The 

children’s father appealed, arguing that the district court erred 

in finding that the asserted grandparents had standing to bring 

the action. 8 In particular, the children’s father argued that the 

asserted grandparents, who had raised the children’s mother, 

lacked standing to bring the action under Nebraska’s grandparent visitation statutes because they were not the “biological 

or adoptive parent[s] of [the children’s] biological or adoptive 

parent” as required by those statutes. 9 In rejecting this argument, we explained:

[The children’s father] conflates standing with the merits of the [asserted grandparents’] claim. Under the doctrine of standing, a court may decline to determine the 

merits of a legal claim because the party advancing it is 

not properly situated to be entitled to its judicial determination. But as we have said previously, the focus of 

5 See Heiden v. Norris, 300 Neb. 171, 174, 912 N.W.2d 758, 761 (2018).

6 Cf. Heiden, supra note 5.

7 Id.

8 Id.

9 Id.
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the standing inquiry is “on the party, not the claim itself.” 

For that very reason, in considering standing, the legal and 

factual validity of the claim presented must be assumed. 

Here, if the [asserted grandparents’] assertions that they 

are grandparents within the meaning of [the applicable 

statute] and entitled to visitation under the statute are 

assumed to be valid, it becomes plain that the [asserted 

grandparents] are the proper parties to bring such a claim 

and thus have standing. 10

After concluding that the asserted grandparents did have standing, we addressed the merits of their claim and concluded that 

they were not “grandparents” under the statute and were not 

entitled to grandparent visitation. 11 We vacated the order of 

visitation, remanding the cause with directions to dismiss. 12

Heiden should inform our standing analysis in the present case. In his amended complaint, Apurba alleged that he 

engaged in sexual intercourse with Indraja Chatterjee; that, 

as a result, Indraja became pregnant with twins; that he is 

the twins’ biological father; and that Indraja told him that he 

is the twins’ biological father. Apurba requested, inter alia, 

genetic testing of the minor children to establish his paternity, 

the results of which did in fact favor his paternity.

Under § 43-1411, an “alleged father” may bring a civil 

action to “establish the paternity of a child.” For purposes of 

§ 43-1411, a “[c]hild” is a “child under the age of eighteen 

years born out of wedlock.” 13 A “[c]hild born out of wedlock” 

is defined as a child whose “parents were not married to each 

other” at the time of the child’s birth. 14 When an individual 

brings a paternity action as an “alleged father of [a] child 

10 Id. at 174-75, 912 N.W.2d at 761.

11 Id. at 175, 912 N.W.2d at 761.

12 See Heiden, supra note 5.

13 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-1401 (Reissue 2016).

14 Id.
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[born out of wedlock]” per § 43-1411, he is alleging that he 

is a parent; he is alleging that under § 43-1401, he is one of 

the “parents [who] were not married to each other” at the time 

of the child’s birth. Here, if Apurba’s assertions that he is the 

children’s biological parent and that he is entitled to establish his paternity are assumed to be valid, it becomes plain 

that Apurba is the proper party to bring his claim and thus 

has standing.

Accordingly, the applicable analysis should be as follows: 

Section 42-377 provides a “default” presumption of paternity 

that can be rebutted by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence. 15 Section 43-1411 provides who can rebut the presumption in establishing paternity, as well as where and how to do 

so. Section 43-1411 expressly grants standing to an “alleged 

father of such child.” In this case, the fact of consequence is 

whether, under the plain language of the statute, Apurba qualifies as an alleged father, i.e., a parent not married to Indraja. 

Statutory language must be given its plain and ordinary meaning, and an appellate court will not resort to interpretation 

to ascertain the meaning of statutory words which are plain, 

direct, and unambiguous. 16 Apurba plainly qualifies as an 

alleged father. As this is apparent from the text of § 43-1411 

and from his amended complaint, it should be the end of our 

standing analysis.

But the majority forgoes a plain language analysis in its construction of a fixed loop: The majority concludes that our statutory presumption of legitimacy as applied to children born in a 

marriage is rebuttable and, yet, operates to preclude interested 

parties from rebutting it. In doing so, the majority inappropriately shifts the focus of our standing analysis from Apurba to 

the claim itself.

15 Alisha C., supra note 1, 283 Neb. at 356, 808 N.W.2d at 887.

16 Timothy L. Ashford, PC LLO v. Roses, ante p. 302, 984 N.W.2d 596 

(2023).
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The majority contends that even if Apurba is an alleged 

father, he lacks standing because the children do not meet the 

definition of children born out of wedlock. The majority suggests that our holding in State on behalf of Miah S. v. Ian K. 17

definitively determined that a child born during a marriage is 

not a child born out of wedlock. The majority then applies the 

doctrine of legislative acquiescence to indicate that the issue 

has been fully resolved.

Though the language cited by the majority is found in State 

on behalf of Miah S., perhaps our opinion was not as precise 

as it could have been. In that case, we considered whether 

the State had the statutory authority to establish paternity in a 

putative father when the child was born during the marriage of 

the mother and another man. We concluded that the child was 

not a child on whose behalf the State was authorized to initiate a civil proceeding to establish paternity under § 43-1411. 

We made no determination as to whether a putative father had 

standing to seek the establishment of paternity.

My concern with State on behalf of Miah S. is that we did 

not address in it the earlier case of Gomez v. State ex rel. 

Larez 18 in which we held that the mother of a child born out 

of wedlock, within the meaning of our paternity statutes, may 

be a married woman at the time of conception and birth of 

the child. As such, the Gomez holding seems to indicate that 

a child born during a marriage can be considered a child born 

out of wedlock, which State on behalf of Miah S. fails to 

address or reconcile. The majority opinion attempts to distinguish Gomez by noting that the movant in that case was the 

biological mother instead of the biological father. However, 

nothing within our paternity statutes articulates different standing rules for biological mothers and biological fathers. If 

17 State on behalf of Miah S. v. Ian K., 306 Neb. 372, 945 N.W.2d 178 

(2020).

18 Gomez v. State ex rel. Larez, 157 Neb. 738, 61 N.W.2d 345 (1953).
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the Legislature had wished to make such a distinction, it could 

have easily done so in § 43-1411.

Because of our contradictory holdings in State on behalf of 

Miah S. and Gomez, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to 

determine which of our conflicting interpretations of the phrase 

“child born out of wedlock” the Legislature has acquiesced in. 

The doctrine of legislative acquiescence generally holds that 

“‘when an appellate court judicially construes a statute and 

that construction fails to evoke an amendment, it is presumed 

that the Legislature has acquiesced in the court’s determination 

of the Legislature’s intent.’” 19 Here, however, we have judicially construed the statutory text in two different ways, and 

the most that can be said is that the Legislature has expressed 

no opinion. As such, I respectfully disagree with the majority 

opinion’s contention that the definition of a “child born out of 

wedlock” is well-settled law.

When considering the definition of a “child born out of 

wedlock,” I note that § 43-1401(2) defines the same as “a 

child whose parents were not married to each other at the time 

of its birth.” Here, the results of the genetic testing clearly 

show that Apurba is the biological father of the minor children. Further, the record is clear that Apurba was not married 

to Indraja at the time of the conception or birth of the minor 

children. Lastly, as the majority points out, there has been no 

establishment of paternity in Indraneel. As such, under the 

plain reading of the statute, I suggest that the minor children 

meet the definition of children born out of wedlock because 

their parents were not married at the time of their conception 

or birth. So whether one focuses on the terms “alleged father” 

or “child,” either way Apurba has standing to bring this action 

to establish paternity.

I recognize that a factual situation like the one here presents 

difficult policy considerations. However, the sole question 

19 State v. Casterline, 290 Neb. 985, 988, 863 N.W.2d 148, 151 (2015).
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before this court is whether the statutes discussed above give 

Apurba standing to attempt to establish paternity. Because I 

believe these statutes are best read to provide him with such 

standing, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion 

finding otherwise.

Miller-Lerman and Papik, JJ., join in this dissent.