Filed 11/20/20 P. v. Oats CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). T his opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

SINCLAIR E OATS,

Defend ant and Appellant. D076792

(Super. Ct. No. SCD282660)

APPEAL fro m a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Polly H. Shamoon, Judge. Affirmed in part; reversed in part; remanded with
directions

. Kenneth J. Vandevelde, under appoin tment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric Swenson and Allison V. Acosta , Deputy Attorneys General, f or Plaintiff and Respondent.2

Sinclair e Oats was charged with attending an arranged illicit meeting with a minor (Pen. Code, 1 § 288.4, subd. (b); count 1), contacting a minor with intent to commit a sexual offense (§ 288.3, subd. (a); count 2), and
sendi ng harmful matter to a minor with the intent to seduce the minor (§ 288.2, subd. (a); count 3). Oats pled guilty to count 3 in exchange for dismissal of counts 1 and 2. The court suspended imposition of sentence and granted Oats formal probation for fo ur years. Oats appeals, challenging certain probation conditions. He asserts that
the no contact with female minors provision contained in probation
conditions 10(k), 10(i), and a n additional condition under probation
condition 14 is unconstitutional a nd unauthorized to the extent it prohibit s him from having contact with his children. Oats argues that probation
condition 7(a), which requires him to take psychotropic medications if prescribed or ordered by a physician is vague and overbroad. He furthe r maintains that probation condition 10(p), prohibiting possession of pornographic material, is vague and overbroad. Oa t s also claims probation
conditions 6(r) and 7(b), which require him to participate in any assessment program chosen by his probation of ficer as well as any treatment, counseling, or other conduct suggested by the assessments, are an unconstitutional delegation of judicial power. Additionally, he contends that probation
condition 6 ( k ) , requiring him to notify the probation officer of any contact s with law enforcement, is vague. Finally, Oa t s insists that the order granting formal probation should be corrected to reflect the fact that probation
conditions 15, 16, and 17 were stayed pending a successful completion of probation.

1 Statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.3

We agree w ith Oats that probation condition 7(a) is both vague and
overbroad . Also, as the government concedes, probation condition 10(p) is vague and needs further clarification by the superior court. Because we are remanding this matter to address these two prob ation conditions, we additionally will instruct the superior court to make sure the order granting formal probation accurately states what conditions were stayed pending successfully completion of probation. However, as to the remainder of Oats ’s claims, we find them forfeited or without merit.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Oats , a 34

- year
- old man with a wife and nine children under the age
of 15, had a profile on an application called MeetMe. 2 In March 2019, he exchanged numerous messages with a de tective who was posing as a 13

- year
old girl named “Ash.” Although “Ash’s ” profile stated that she was 18 years old, she told Oats that she was 13 years old, and Oats responded, “Ok, Wow, I’m super Lowkey [sic] with you,” and, “Can’t let anyone know about you.” In other messages, Oats asked “Ash” when she would “be ready to get some king dick in [her] life,” told her she could perform oral sex on him, and sent her a photo of his erect penis. On March 13, Oats arranged to meet with “Ash” to have sex in h is car, after he picked up his children from school and dropped them off at home. While he was on his way to the arranged meeting, Oats sent “Ash” a message telling her to remove her panties so he could “start right away to eat [her] sweet pussy and then have sex.” When Oats exited his car at the meeting point, the police arrested him and discovered a box of condoms in his possession

.

2 Because Oats pled guilty, we take the background facts from the probation report.4

Oats admitted sending the picture of his penis as well as using several online dating apps. When the police searched Oa ts ’s phone, they found a message in which Oats appeared to solicit a sex act and other messages with an unknown person involving payment for images. Officers also found photos on his phone depicting females “ who appeared to be under age or considered

‘ age difficult. ’ ” Oats was charged with attending an arranged illicit meeting with a minor (§ 288.4, subd. (b); count 1), contacting a minor with intent to commit a sexual offense (§ 288.3, subd. (a); count 2), and sending harmful matter to a
minor with the intent to seduce the minor (§ 288.2, subd. (a); count 3). Oats pled guilty to count 3 in exchange for dismissal of counts 1 and 2. At this sentencing hearing, the superior court began by asking whether this case had been refer r ed to Child Protective Se rvices (CPS) . The court explained, “[T]his [case] deals with a very serious offense of an arranged meeting to have sex with a 13

- year
- old girl. [Oats] has three other daughters in the house, all minors around that age, at least one of them[,] with anothe r baby on the way. And CPS looks like [it] has done nothing to look into that. And I’m not sure if his wife is protecting those children

. . . . So that’s a concern to the Court.” The court then imposed “an absolute no contact with any minor female
und er the age of 18” order as a condition of probation. The court explained that the condition meant “no contact with any minor females under the age
of 18 until further court order, which means he can’t go live at home with his5

daughters under the age of 18 until after this Court gives him permission, which will be after he attends a significant amount of sex offender therapy.” 3
Oat s ’s counsel objected to imposition of the no contact condition (probation condition 14) , claiming that it was overbroad and th at there was no evidence that Oats had behaved inappropriately with his own children. Defense counsel pointed out that the “detectives . . . had plenty of opportunity to interview [Oats’s] family. And [probation condition 14] is basically going to force [Oats] into a potentially homeless situation

. . . . ” In response, the superior court “clarif[ied] for the record

. . . the facts that ha[d] been presented to” the court. To this end, the court explained:

“The defendant met with the victim on social med ia. Although it was an undercover agent, to him it was a 13

- year
- old girl named Ash. He contacted her, and they had correspondence on numerous occasions. She told him that she was 13 years old. He said he wants to be low key about that and not tell any body.
“His next conversation, including conversations about sex, specifically asking, ‘When are you going to be ready for some king dick in your life,’ specifically referring to sexual acts. “He went on to specifically correspond with this seemingly 13

- year
- old girl about how she can perform oral sex on him, how they can have sex in a regular way, and how they would meet to have sex. And in fact, he says to her, ‘I have to pick up my kids from school and drop them

3 The court stated that probation condition “14 will also include no contact with any mino r females under the age of 18 until further court order

. . . . ” The court’s statement in this regard is reflected in

“ Attachment 1 ” to the order granting formal probation, which provides, “No Contact with any female minors under the age of 18.” For conv enience and consistency with the briefs submitted by the parties, we will refer to this blanket no contact with female minors as probation condition 14.6

off at home. And once I take them hom e and stop at the store to get some condoms, then we can meet in the parking lot to have sex in my car.’ ”
After the court asked for clarification from the prosecutor, it continued to explain :
“And after he dropped his kids off and after he went and

bou ght a brand

- new box of condoms, it was then that he parked his vehicle in the lot where he was to meet the victim, where he was then contacted by the undercover agent. “In investigating this case further, it was clear that there were pictures that he was sending of his genitalia to this seemingly 13

- year
- old girl about having sex with her.
“Given that fact pattern and the fact that he has young girls at home

— in fact, he claims he has nine children and his wife is pregnant and he specifically says ‘I hop e she has a girl,’ this Court is very concerned about the welfare of those children. But specifically because he was contacting this 13

- year
- old girl and dropped his kids off at home with the specific intent of dropping them off before he went to meet her to have sex is a concern for their safety. And it ’ s the nexus to the Court’s order in this case.
“So I will let your record stand as it will. The Court is willing to consider modifying that order as soon as he has been in some sort of treatment or the rapy for his conduct and potential modify that behavior. But until he goes to treatment, sex offender therapy, there will be an absolute no contact order with him being with minors, at least females under the age of 18.”7 DISCUSSION
I THE CHALLENGED PROBAT ION CONDITIONS

A. Oats’s Contentions Oats challenges a number of the condition s of probation that the court imposed, on various and multiple grounds. For example, he challenges conditions 10(k), 4 10(i), 5 and 14 on the grounds they are constitutionally

o verbroad and violate People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481 ( Lent ). He also contends the additional no contact condition under probation condition 14 is vague. Oats maintains probation conditions 7(a) 6 and 10(p) 7 are vague and overbroad. He challenges prob ation 6(k) 8 as vague. Oats additionally

4 Under probation condition 10(k), Oats may not “knowingly associate with minors, nor be in places w here [he] know[s], or [his] P.O. or other law enforcement officer informs [him] that minors congregate, unless with an adult approved by P.O.”
5 Per probation condition 10(i), Oats is prohibited from “knowingly contact[ing] females under 18 [ years of ] age except per family court orders regarding visitation and/or custody of children”
6 Probation condition 7(a) requires Oats to “[t]ake psychotropic medications if prescribed/ordered by doctor.”
7 Probation condition 10(p) does not allow Oats to “knowingly possess any pornographic material, including computer files and disks, or knowingly be in places where [he] know[s], or a P.O. or other law enforcement officer informs [him], that pornographic materials are the main item for sale.”
8 Probation condition 6 (k) requires Oats to “[p]rovide true name, address, and date of birth if contacted by law enforcement” and to “[r]eport contact or arrest in writing to the P.O. within 7 days,” including “the date of contact/arrest, charges, if any, and the name of the law enforcement agency.”8

contends probation conditions 6(r) 9 and 7(b) 10 constitute unconstitutional delegation of judicial power. Finally, Oats claims the probation order needs to accurately reflect that probation conditions 15, 16, and 17 were stayed pending successful completion of probation. B. Applicable Law The only condition to which O ats raised an objection with the superior

court was probation condition 14. He claimed that the condition was
overbroad and that there was no evidenc e that he behaved inappropriately with his own children. He did not explicitly make a Lent reasonableness objection. Nor did he claim probation condition 14 was vague. He accepted without objection all of the other conditions of probation. Challenges to probation conditions ordinarily must be raised in the trial court; if they are not, appellate review of those conditions will be deemed forfeited. ( People v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 234

- 235 ( Welch ) [extending the forfeiture rule to a claim that pr obation conditions are unreasonable, when the probationer fails to object on that ground in the trial court].) However, a defendant who did not object to a probation condition at sentencing may raise a challenge to that condition on appeal if the defendan t’s appellate claim “amount[s] to a ‘facial challenge , ’ ” i.e., a challenge that the “phrasing or language

. . . is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad,” and the determination whether the condition is constitutionally defective “does not require scrutin y of individual facts and circumstances but instead requires the review of abstract and generalized legal concepts

— a

9 Probation condition 6(r) requires Oats to “[p]articipate and comply with any assessment program if directed by the P.O.”
10 Probation condition 7(b) requires Oats to “[p]articipate in treatment, therapy, counseling, or other course of conduct as suggested by validated assessment tests.”9

task that is well suited to the role of an appellate court.” ( In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 885 ( Sheena K .).) Because Oats did not object in the trial court to any of the probation conditions except for condition 14 , he has forfeited any as

- applied constitutional objections on appeal to the remaining conditions . We therefore address Oats’s constitutional challenges to most of the conditions only to the extent that they “ ‘present “pure questions of law that can be resolved without reference to the particular sentencing record developed in the trial court.” ’ ” ( Sheena K

., supra , 40 Cal.4th at p. 889.) Further, as we discuss in part I.F, post , we decline to consider Oats’s constitutional challenge to probation conditions 6 ( r ) and 7 ( b ) on the ground that they constitute impermissible delegations of judicial authority to a probation officer. Because Oats accepted these conditions without objection, he failed to provide the trial court with an opportunity to address his concerns. Although it could be argued that such challenges constitute facial constitutional challenges, and that we therefore could exercise our discretion
to consi der these claims (see Sheena K ., supra , 40 Cal.4th at p. 889), we
decline to do so under the circumstances. C. Conditions 10(k), 10(i), and 14 Probation condition 10(k) requires that Oats “not knowingly associate with minors, nor be in places where you know, or your P.O. or other law enforcement informs you, that minors congregate, unless with an adult approved by the P.O.” Probation condition 10(i) prohibits Oats from “knowingly contact[ing]
females under 18 [ years of ] age except per family court orde rs regarding visitation and/or custody of children

. ”10

Probation condition 14 prohibits Oats from having “[c]ontact with any female minors under the age of 18.” Here, Oats claims that these three conditions are overbroad and violate
Lent , supra , 15 Cal.3 d 481 . However, Oats only objected to probation
condition 14. As such, he has forfeited his challenge to conditions 10(k)
and 10(i) unless he is making a facial challenge to either condition. (See
Welch , supra , 5 Cal.4th at pp. 234

- 235; Sheena K

. , supra , 40 Cal.4th at

p. 885.) Oats does not advance a facial challenge against probation
conditions 10(k) and 10(i). Further, we do not see how he could articulate such a challenge. The language in both of those conditions is not overbroad on its face. Bot h conditions require knowledge and provide a mechanism for
association (either by identifying an approved adult or allowing Oats to seek permission through a family court order ) . Moreover, Oats ’s attack on conditions 10(k) and 10(i) is clearly an as

- appli ed challenge because he argues that those conditions prohibit him from seeing his minor, female
children. However, those conditions apply to all female minors , not just his daughters. Therefore, we are satisfied that the constitutional challenge to proba tion conditions 10(i) and 10(k) ha s been forfeited as well as his challenge to those conditions under Lent . We thus turn to Oats’s challenge of probation condition 14. Here, Oats claims probation condition 14 infringes upon numerous constitutional right s, including the right to family privacy (see Stanley v. Ill

. (1972) 405 U.S. 645, 651), the right to raise one’s children (see Brekke v. Wills (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 14 0 0, 1404), the right to marital privacy (see People v.
Frazier (1967) 256 C a l.App.2d 63 0, 631), and the right to privacy in one’s home (see Tom v. City and County of San Francisco (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th11

674, 678

- 679). In addition, referring to rights beyond the home and family unit, Oats claims probation condition 14 violates his freedom of association (see People v. Leon (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 943, 951; People v. Bauer (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 937, 944 ( Bauer )) and right to travel (see Shapiro v. Thompson (1969) 394 U.S. 618, 630 ). Yet, merely referring to constituti on al rights and claiming t hey have been violated does not end our inquiry. “If a probation condition serves to rehabilitate and protect public safety, the condition may ‘impinge upon a constitutional right otherwise enjoyed by the probationer, who is “not entitled to the same degr ee of constitutional protection as other citizens.” ’ ” ( People v. O’Neil (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1351, 1355.) A constitutionally overbroad condition is one that restricts a defendant’s fundamental constitutional rights to a greater degree than necessary to achieve the condition’s purpose. ( People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 384 ( Olguin ) .) The overbreadth doctrine requires that probation conditions that may impinge on constitutional rights be tailored carefully and be reasonably related to the compe lling state interest in reformation and rehabilitation. ( In re Victor L. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 902, 910.) “ ‘The essential question in an overbreadth challenge is the closeness of the fit between the legitimate purpose of the restriction and the burden it imposes on the defendant’s constitutional rights

— bearing in mind, of course, that perfection in such matters is impossible, and that practical necessity will justify some infringement.’ [Citation.]” ( People v. Pirali (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1341, 1346 ( Pirali ) .)
The rights that Oats claims probation condition 14 violates are not absolute. For example, t he restriction of the right of association is part of the nature of the criminal process. ( People v. Robinson (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 816, 818.) Probat ioners do not enjoy the absolute liberty to which other12

citizens are entitled. ( Griffin v. Wis

. (1987) 483 U.S. 868, 874; see People v.
Mills (1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 171, 181 [any person who commits sexual offense has waived any right to privacy].) In addit ion, California has a compelling interest in ensuring the safety of children, and this compelling interest may justify restrictions on a defendant’s constitutional rights. ( Mills, at p. 176; People v. Delvalle (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 869, 879.)
In the in stant action , the state’s compelling interest in protecting children and rehabilitating Oats justified restrictions on Oats’s constitutional rights. That the restrictions operated to prohibit Oats’s contact with his daughters does not categorically make t hem unconstitutional. (See People v. Jungers (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 698, 705 [upholding prohibition on defendant’s ability to contact his wife in a domestic violence case, even though the restriction curtailed the defendant’s rights of association and

mar ital privacy ] ; In re Peeler (1968) 266 Cal.App.2d 483, 492

- 493 [court upheld probation condition prohibiting association with reputed drug users, including defendant’s husband, effectively requiring her to live apart from him]; People v. Celestine (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1370, 1375 [probation condition prohibiting defendant from associating with other drug users, including defendant’s girlfriend, was proper]; People v. Wardlow (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 360, 367 ( Wardlow ) [court properly imposed probation condition of no contact with other child molesters, including defendant’s brothers].) The probation condition at issue here also was carefully tailored and reasonably related to Oats’s reformation. The evidence before the superior court proved that Oats ha s a se xual interest in female minors. As the court explained, Oats pursued a sexual encounter with someone who m he believed
to be a 13

- year
- old girl. Additionally, o n Oats’s phone, the police found photos depicting females who appeared to be minors or “age dif ficult

. ”13

Apparently, Oats had retrieved the subject photos from those individuals’ social media and dating application profiles. Because of Oats’s clearly demonstrated sexual interest in female minors, the superior court carefully tailored probation cond itions , like condition 14, to help reform that behavior by prohibiting Oats from having any contact with female minors. In doing so, the superior court recognized that this pro bation condition would impact Oats’s ability to contact his minor daughters, a nd it made clear that it would consider modifying that condition as soon as it had reason to
believe that Oats did not pose a threat to his daughters’ safety. Until then, the court was concerned by the fact that there appeared to have been no CPS investig ation and that it was unclear whether Oats’s wife was in a position to protect their children. In light of these significant concerns

— as well as the nature of Oats ’s offense and his willingness to pursue a 13

- year
- old for sex

— the probation condition did n ot impinge on Oats’s constitutional rights any more than necessary to protect female minors, including Oats’s own children

. In addition, the condition is clearly aimed at rehabilitat ing Oats

. ( See Olguin , supra , 45 Cal.4th at p. 384.) Oats argues that probation condition 14 i s overbroad because there was no evidence that he engaged in inappropriate conduct with his own daughters. Although Oats is correct that there was no evidence that he engaged in sexually inappropriate conduct with his daughters, th e lack of that evidence is cold comfort on the record before us. As the superior court noted, Oats told someone , who m he believed to be a 13

- year
- old girl, that he needed to pick up his children and drop them off at home before he met the 13 year old for sex

. The court further noted that Oats commented that he hoped his pregnant wife would give birth to a girl. And at least one of Oats’s daughters is near in age to the girl with whom he was seeking to have a14

sexual encounter. The lengths of which Oats l abored to meet a supposed 13

- year
- old girl for sex as well as the cavalier manner in which he approached the safety of his own family underscores the superior court’s concern that Oats was too dangerous to be left alone with any female minors, even his own daughters.
Further , despite the superior court’s well

- founded concern for Oats’s minor daughters, the court remained wil l ing to modify probation condition 14 if it was warranted. To this end, the court left open the possibility that Oats would be permi tted to resume contact with his daughters after he received sex offender counseling

. Additionally, we observe that probation condition 14 does not prohibit any contact with his male children. Focusing on his right to raise his children, Oats asks this c ourt to follow United States v. Wolf Child ( 9th Cir. 2012) 699 F.3d 1082 ( Wolf Child ) and determine that probation condition 14 is overbroad. Oats’s reliance on Wolf Child is misplaced. 11 There , the 22

- year
- old defendant tried to have sex with the heavily

- intoxicated 16

- year
- old victim at a party. ( Wolf Child , at p. 1088.) As a condition of the defendant’s probation, the district court prohibited him from being in the company of children under the age of 18, and the defendant challenged that condition as overbroad because it prohibited contact with his own daughters. ( Id . at p. 1091.) The Ninth Circuit agreed. In reaching its conclusion, the Ninth Circuit expressed consternation that the district court gave little consideration or weight to the
burden that the probation condition would place on the defendant’s association and privacy rights. ( Id. at pp. 1093

- 1095.) The Ninth Circuit

11 We recognize that decisions of the federal district courts are not binding on this court. ( People v. Seaton (200 1 ) 26 Cal.4th 598, 653.) That said, we may still rely on them as persuasive author ity. ( People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1292.)15

noted that t he district court had not made any effort to examine that relationship and determine whether the defendant’s conduct posed a risk to
his children. ( Ibid .) The court also explained that the nature of the defendant’s offens e ( trying to have sex with someone who was only six years younger than him at a party ) did not support the subject probation condition. ( Id

. at pp. 1097

- 1098.) Further, the court was clearly troubled by the fact that the defendant would be deprived “of his fundamental right to reside with and be in the company of his daughters during the 10 years of his supervised release that follows his sev en year prison sentence.” ( Id . at p. 1098.) Here, Oats attempted to have sex with someone who he believed to be only 13 years old, 21 years his junior , and closer in age to his own daughters. Rather than a single alcohol

- induced act of sexual aggressio n, Oats developed a rapport with a minor using an electronic application, where he presumably believed he could maintain secrecy and privacy. The trial court thus was reasonably concerned by Oats ’s sophisticated pursuit of sexual relationships
with minors

. Moreover, unlike the district court in Wolf Child , the trial court here did give considerable weight to the impact that the probation conditions
would have on Oats ’s relationship with his daughters . The court also explained why it was concerned, and it clarified the circumstances under which it would consider modifying the conditions in the future. Additionally, the time that Oats could be prohibited from contact with his daughters is
much shorter than the 10

- year prohibition in Wolf Child . And Oats c ould further decrease the time of his prohibition by engaging in therapy and seeking visitation approval in the family court. Also , we are not p e rsuaded by Oats ’s reliance on Bauer , supra , 211 Cal.App.3d 937. In that case, the defendant was convicted of false imprisonment and assault, and a condition of his probation required the16

probation officer’s approval of the defendant’s choice of residence. ( Id . at

p. 940.) At 26 years old, the defendant still lived at home with his parents, and the only connect ion between his living arrangements and the offenses or his rehabilitation was the tenuous suggestion that the defendant was immature because his parents were overly protective. ( Id . at p. 944.) Against
this back d rop , the appellate court determined that the condition was unconstitutionally overbroad. ( Ibid .) Here, by contrast, the evidence showed
that Oats had pursued a sexual encounter with a 13

- year
- old girl and that he was also living with three girls under the age of 15. Because of those facts,
the condition of probation that prohibits Oats from having contact with any females under the age of 18 (until further order of the court) directly operates to protect children and rehabilitate Oats

. Likewise, we do not believe that People v. Beach (1983) 1 47 Cal.App.3d
612 ( Beach ) compels a different result in the instant action. There, an elderly widow who was concerned about her neighborhood’s decline and her own safety shot a man who had parked in her driveway and whom she perceived
to be a threat. ( Id

. at pp. 618

- 619.) As a condition of probation, the court
exiled the woman from her home and neighborhood, where she had lived for 24 years, out of concern for her own safety and repeat incidents. ( Id. at

pp. 619

- 620.) The appellate court held that the condition was unconstitutionally overbroad because in the 24 years in which the defendant had lived in the neighborhood, she had not been involved in any other acts of violence, and it was likely she would feel even less secure in a new and unfamiliar envi ronment. ( Id . at pp. 621

- 622.) The court also noted that other probation conditions were more narrowly tailored to address the same concerns, such as prohibiting the defendant’s possession of dangerous17

weapons and requiring her to participate in communit y service activities. ( Id . at p. 623.) Here, the same concerns that plagued the appellate court in Beach are not present. Unlike the defendant in Beach , Oats has not argued that he will feel less secure if prohibited from cohabitating with his minor d aughters

. Additionally, the record before us is clear that Oats poses a danger to female minors. The superior court provided a very detailed explanation why it was imposing probation condition 14, and, in doing so, specifically referenced the safety of O ats’s female children. Oats points to no other, more narrowly tailored probation condition, that can achieve the same result. To the contrary, he argues that any condition that prohibits him from living with his female children is overbroad. Further , as the court explained, we are mindful
that the record is unclear whether Oats ’s wife i s in a position to supervise
interactions between Oats and his daughters and protect the daughters as
necessary. Thus, we agree with the People, there does not appear to be any other adequate , more narrowly tailored way to ensure the protection of Oats’s children. And, in a nod to Oats’s constitutional rights, the superior court explicitly stated that it would entertain alternatives if presented with
additional evidence. On the record before us, we cannot say that probation condition 14 is constitutionally overbroad. Oats also challenges probation condition 14 on the grounds that it is
unauthorized under Lent , supra , 15 Cal.3d 481. We observe that it is not
clear that Oats made any such objection below. In response to the superior court indicating that condition 14 “will also include no contact with any minor females under the age of 18 until further court order, which means [Oats] can’t go live at home with his daught ers under the age of 18 until after18

this Court gives him permission . . .”[,] Oats’s counsel made the following objection: “Your honor, I object to that condition. It’s overbroad.

There’s no evidence in this particular case that my client’s children are in any way affected at all. The detectives have had plenty of opportunity to interview my client’s family. And it’s basically going to force my client into a potentially homeless situation, and then we end up seeing, you know, people living on the stree ts and being stuck in a situation where they’re not able to get off the streets, get a place to live, find a job.” Perhaps, Oats’s counsel’s reference to a lack of evidence that Oats’s children are not “affected at all” implicitly raise d a nexus challeng e, thus implicating Lent , supra , 15 Cal.3d 481. The People do not argue that Oats forfeited his Lent challenge. As such, we will address Oats’s claim on the
merits. When an offender accepts a probationary sentence, thereby avoiding incarceration, state law authorizes the sentencing court to impose conditions on such release as are “fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done, that amends may be made to society for the breach of the law, for any injury done to any person resulting from such br each and .

. . for the reformation and rehabilitation of the probationer.” ( § 1203.1, subd. (j).) Accordingly, “[i]n granting probation, courts have broad discretion to impose conditions to foster rehabilitation and to protect public safety .

. . .” ( Pe ople v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1120 ( Carbajal ) .) The broad discretion granted to trial courts to impose probation conditions “is not without limits,” however; “a condition of probation must serve a purpose specified in the statute,” and
conditio ns regulating noncriminal conduct must be “ ‘reasonably related to the crime of which the defendant was convicted or to future criminality.’ ” ( Id. at p. 1121.) Therefore, a condition of probation is generally “invalid [only19

if] it ‘(1) has no relationsh ip to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality.’ ” ( Lent , supra , 15 Cal.3d at p. 486.) “This test is c onjunctive

— all three prongs must be satisfied before a reviewing court will invalidate a probation term.” ( Olguin , supra , 45 Cal.4th at p. 379.) We review the reasonableness of a probation condition imposed by the trial court for an abuse of discretion. ( Ibid .) Oats argues that probation condition 14 is unreasonable under Lent because: (1) his relationship with his own children is unrelated to his offense of sending illicit material to a minor to seduce her; (2) having a relationship with one’s own ch ildren is not criminal; and (3) “the record does not indicate more than a hypothetical relationship between the probation condition and future criminality.” We reject these conditions. As a threshold matter, we note that Oats ignores the blanket prohibi tion in probation condition 14 that he may not have any contact with any female minor. Rather, Oats presents condition 14 as a restriction on his ability to interact with his daughters only. In this sense, Oats characterizes
this condition as if it speci fically prohibits him from contacting his own
children. It does not. Probation condition 1 4 limits his contact with all female minor children, a category that includes his minor daughters . The condition is not specifically aimed at Oats’s daughters . No r does it only apply
to them. Because probation condition 14 applies to all female minors, we
evaluate its reasonableness under Lent in that context. Oats was convicted of sending sexual photos to a 13

- year
- old with the intent to seduce her.
Prohibitin g Oats from contacting female minors is directly related to that20

offense. Moreover, the subject condition does not criminalize Oats for having a relationship with his own children . He must avoid contact with all female
minors. However, the court specifi cally stated it could reconsider his contact with his own female children if he engages in certain therapy and/or receive s an order from the family law court. Finally, probation condition 14 is reasonably related to future criminality because it helps to prevent Oats from establishing a similar relationship with any female minor in the future. (See
Lent , supra , 15 Cal.3d at p. 486.) In short, on the record before us, we certainly cannot say the superior court abused its discretion imposing probation cond ition 14. That condition is not arbitrary or capricious or does not otherwise exceed the bounds of reason
under the circumstances presented . (See Olguin , supra , 45 Cal.4th at p. 384; Carbajal , supra , 10 Cal.4th at p. 1121 .) Finally, Oats maintains that probation condition 14 is unconstitutionally vague. He asserts that the condition needs a scienter requirement. The People, relying on People v. Hall (2017) 2 Cal.5th 4 94 ( Hall ), argue that the scienter requirement is to be presumed. We agree with
the People. Probation conditions are subject to the “void

- for

- vagueness doctrine.” ( Hall , supra , 2 Cal.5th at p. 500

. ) “This doctrine, which derives from the due process concept of fair warning, bars the government from enforcing a provision that ‘forbids o r requires the doing of an act in terms so vague’ that people of ‘common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.’ [Citations.] To withstand a constitutional challenge on the ground of vagueness, a probation co ndition must be sufficiently definite to inform the probationer what conduct is required or prohibited, and to enable the court to determine whether the probationer has21

violated the condition. [Citations.] In determining whether the condition is sufficie ntly definite,

. . . a court is not limited to the condition ’ s text. [Citation.] We must also consider other sources of applicable law [citation], including judicial construction of similar provisions. [Citations.] Thus, a probation condition should not be invalidated as unconstitutionally vague

‘ “ ‘if any reasonable and practical construction can be given to its language.’ ” ’ ” ( Id . at p. 500

- 501.) Applying these principles, the California Supreme Court concluded in
Hall , supra , 2 Cal.5th 494 that probation conditions prohibiting the possession of firearms and illegal drugs were not void for vagueness despite their lack of an express scienter requirement. ( Id . at pp. 501

- 504.) Looking beyond “the condition ’ s text” to “other sources of applicable l aw” ( id . at

p. 500), the court construed the conditions in light of case law that (1) “articulates . . . a general presumption that a violation of a probation condition must be willful,” (2) “specifically provides that probation conditions barring possessi on of contraband should be construed to require knowledge of its presence and its restricted nature” ( id . at p. 501 .), and (3) “construe[s] criminal statutes against the backdrop of the common law presumption that scienter is required and impl[ies] the req uisite mental state, even where the statute is silent” ( i bid ). Because these sources were sufficient to inform a reasonable probationer that the conditions included a scienter requirement, the court concluded “no change to the substance of either conditio n would be wrought by adding the word ‘knowingly.’ ” ( Id . at p. 503.) When the Supreme Court decided Hall , it dismissed review of In re A.S. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 758, 12 which presented the issue of whether no

12 Review granted and opinion superseded July 31, 2014, review dismissed March 22, 2017, No. S220280.22

contact probation conditions must be modifi ed to explicitly include a scienter requirement. We infer from this dismissal that the Supreme Court intended
that courts construe no

- contact probation conditions in the same manner as conditions prohibiting the possession of contraband. Applying this ap proach,
we conclude probation condition 14 is not void for vagueness. That condition implicitly contains a scienter requirement. Thus, probation condition 14 prohibits Oats from knowingly having “[c]ontact with any female minors under the age of 18.” 13
D. Condition s 7(a) and 10(p) Oats claims that probation conditions 7(a) and 10(p) are unconstitutionally overbroad and vague. The People concede that
condition 10(p) is vague, but argue that neither condition is overbroad. Further, the People contend t hat condition 7(a) is not vague, and, additionally, Oats ’s challenge to that condition is not ripe. We agree with Oats as to these two conditions. Accordingly, we conclude that probation condition 7(a) is both overbroad and vague, and probation condition 10(p) is

vague. Probation condition 7(a) requires Oats to “[t]ake psychotropic medications if prescribed/ordered by doctor.” Because Oats did not object to this condition below, we must limit our review to his facial challenge that the condition is vag ue and overbroad. (See Sheena K ., supra , 40 Cal.4th at

p. 889.) Probation condition 7(a) is unconstitutionally vague because it does not define the term “psychotropic,” leaving Oats to guess what prescribed drug might fall under the psychotropic categor y. The People argue we should read

13 We note that the implicit scienter requirement in probation condition 14 is consistent with the explicit scienter requirements in the other no contact probation conditions, 10(k) and 10(i).23

a scienter requirement into this condition

. (See Hall , supra , 2 Cal.5th at

p. 503.) Yet, even if we were to read probation condition 7(a) as requiring Oats to know that a prescribed drug is a psychotropic, we struggle to contemplate how he could do so. The People point out that the doctor is likely to inform Oats if a psychotropic medication is prescribed; however, this assumption does not change the fact that the condition does not require an explanation from a doctor or alter the lack of any definition of psychotropic in the condition itself. Additionally, we agree with Oats that probation condition 7(a) is overbroad. The People claim this condition is “tailored carefully and reasonably related to the compelling st ate interest in reformation and rehabilitation.” To this end, they insist the condition “only requires that [Oats] take psychotropic medication that a physician determines to be medically necessary for [Oat’s] treatment.” Yet, the People’s assertion begs the question: treatment of what? The People imply that the condition is aimed at a doctor prescribing a drug to Oats as part of his treatment arising out of his underlying offense of pursuing a sexual encounter with a 13

- year
old. But a simple reading of the plain text of probation condition 7(a) undermines the People’s argument. There are no restrictions limiting this condition to treatment of Oats as it relates to his offense. Instead, the condition requires Oats to take psychotropic medications for any purpose, if ordered or prescribed by a physician, regardless of whether they are for a24

mental disorder related to Oats’s offense or to his reform and rehabilitation. Such a condition is a textbook example of overbreadth

. 14 Probation condition 10(p) fares no better than condition 7(a). Probation condition 10(p) does not allow Oats to “knowingly possess any pornographic material, including computer files and disks, or knowingly be in places where [he] know[s], or a P.O. or other law enforcement office r informs [him], that pornographic materials are the main item for sale.” Oats argues this condition is overbroad and vague. The People disagree that the condition is overbroad, but concede that it is vague. Consequently, they offer additional language they contend addresses the vagueness. As we explain below, we determine that the People’s suggested language does not remedy the vagueness problem before us. The People acknowledge that the identification of pornography is inherently imprecise and subje ctive . (See People v. Turner (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1432, 1436 ( Turner ); Pirali , supra , 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 1353. ) Thus, they propose a revision to probation condition 10(p) that is similar to modifications that have satisfied other appellate courts : Oats “shall not possess or view pornographic or sexually explicit material, having been informed by the probation officer that specified publications, websites, or other materials are pornographic or sexually explicit

. ” (See Turner , at

p. 1436 ; Pirali , at p. 1353 .) In this sense, the People urge us to follow Turner
and Pirali but do not explain why we should do so.

14 Because we find probation condition 7(a) overbroad on these grounds, we do not reach Oats’s argument that the condition also violates his right to privacy . Additionally, we summarily reject the People’s argument that Oats’s challenge to probation condition 7(a) is not ripe. The fact that Oats could challenge the condition after a doctor prescribes him psychotropic medicine that he does not wish to take do es not cure the condition’s constitutional ills.25

The defendant in Pirali , who had been convicted of possessing child pornography, was barred by the conditions of his probation from possessi ng or purchasing “ ‘ any pornographic or sexually explicit material as defined by the probation officer. ’ ” ( Pirali , supra , 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 1344.) He challenged this condition on the grounds that it was vague and lacked specificity, and that without an express knowledge requirement he would not know what the condition forbade. ( Id. at p. 1352.) The appellate court agreed, explaining, “a probation condition ‘ “must be sufficiently precise for the probationer to know what is required of him, and for the court to determine whether the condition has been violated.” ’ [Citation.] Here, [the court found] the probation condition does not sufficiently provide defendant with advance knowledge of what is required of him. The fact that the probation officer may deem material sexually explicit or pornographic after defendant already possesses the material would produce a situation where defendant could violate his probation without adequate notice.” ( Ibid .) The court therefore modified the condition to stat e: “ ‘You’re ordered not to purchase or possess any pornographic or sexually explicit material, having been informed by the probation officer that such items are pornographic or sexually explicit.’ ” ( Id . at p. 1353.) The appellate court in Pirali reli ed on Turner , supra , 15 5 Cal.App.4th 1432. In that case, the defendant exposed himself indecently to a three

- year
old girl. ( Id . at p. 1434.) One of his conditions of probation was that he

“ ‘[n]ot possess any sexually stimulating/oriented material deem ed inappropriate by the probation officer and/or patronize any places where such material or entertainment is available.’ ” ( Ibid .) The appellate court concluded this condition was unconstitutionally vague: “The phrase ‘sexually stimulating/oriented mat erial deemed inappropriate by the probation officer’26

is an inherently imprecise and subjective standard.” ( Id . at p. 1436.) The court modified the condition to read, “ ‘Not possess any sexually stimulating/oriented material having been informed by the pr obation officer that such material is inappropriate and/or patronize any places where such material or entertainment in the style of said material are known to be available.’ ” ( Ibid .) The court also concluded that, as modified, the condition

was not ove rbroad because “[p]reventing the possession of sexually oriented materials by persons such as defendant promotes public safety and his rehabilitation.” ( Id . at p. 1437.)
In both Pirali and Turner , the respective courts were concerned with
advance notice to the probationer. In other words, how would the probationers know what material they were prohibited from possess ing ? The two appellate courts provided similar answers: T he probation officer would determine what was p rohibited and inform the probatio ners as such. Thus,
in Pirali , it was the probation officer who was to define pornography or sexually explicit material (see Pirali , supra , 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 1353), and,
in Turner , the probation officer would define sexually stimulat ing /oriented

mater ial (see Turner , supra , 1 5 5 Cal.App.4th. at p. 1436.) Therefore, neither case directly addressed what Oats argues here

— the term “pornography” is unconstitutionally vague.
Unlike Pirali or Turner , a more recent appellate case addressed that very question

. In re D.H. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 722 ( D.H. ) , in which the appellate court determined that the term “ ‘ pornography, ’ ” contained in a probation condition for a minor, was vague. ( Id. at p. 743.) Th e appellate
court in that case also observed that “ Piral i and Turner provide little guidance

. . . because both decisions were concerned with the lack of notice created by leaving the prohibited category’s definition to the probation27

officer.” ( Id . at p. 728.) In the instant action, Oats asks us to follow D.H

. Surprisingly, the People do not discuss D.H. whatsoever in their respondent’s brief.
In D.H. , a 16

- year
- old minor who admitted to indecent exposure on a public bus was placed on probation. ( D.H ., supra , 4 Cal.App.5th at p. 724.) As a condition of pro bation, the minor was prohibited from accessing pornography. ( Id . at p. 725.) The minor appealed, arguing the no

pornography condition was unconstitutionally vague. ( Id. at p p. 727

- 728.) The appellate court agreed with the minor that the term “ ‘ pornog raphy ’ ” was inherently vague and directed the trial court on remand “to define more precisely the material the court intends to prohibit.” ( Id . at p. 729.) 15 Although not faced with an overbreadth challenge, the court suggested the juvenile court careful ly consider on remand “what purpose this condition is intended to serve, as it is far from clear to us how restricting D.H.’s access to

any materials that might be considered pornographic will help him avoid the behavior he exhibited in committing his offe nse or aid more generally in his rehabilitation.” ( I

bi d

. ) We agree with the reasoning of D.H. Probation condition 10(p) , as currently written , is unconstitutionally vague and must be stricken. (See People v. Dominguez (1967) 256 Cal.App.2d 623, 624, 6 29 [striking invalid condition of probation after defendant found to have violated it].) We are not satisfied that the People’s proposed modification of the condition, based on the language of Pirali

— that Oats “not possess or view any pornographic or

15 The court concluded the constitutional infirmity could not be remedied by requiring the probation officer to notify the minor in advance what materials would be considered pornographic because the term

“ ‘ pornography ’ ” was itself subjective and capable of multiple interpretations. ( D.H. , supra , 4 Cal.App.5th at pp. 728

- 729.)28

sexu ally explicit material, having been informed by the probation officer that specified publications, websites, or other materials are pornographic or sexually explicit ”

— solves this problem. ( See Pirali , supra , 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 1353.) There is a logist ical difficulty with this approach: How could Oats get the probation officer’s opinion on whether any particular material is pornographic without first viewing it and showing it to the officer? Even if this obstacle could be overcome, the more fundamenta l problem of the inherent vagueness of the term “pornography” remains.
Our conclusion here should not be read as a determination that a probation condition cannot prohibit a defendant’s access to pornography or that pornography is incapable of a definiti on that passes constitutional muster. To the contrary, there are several avenues down which the superior court may travel to craft a constitutional condition . For example, the court could refer to “obscene material, ” as defined by title 15, section 3006, subdivision (c)(15) of the California Code of Regulations. Under that provision, “[o]bscene material” is defined as “material taken as a whole, which to the average person, applying contemporary statewide standards, appeals to the prurient interest; and is material which taken as a whole, depicts sexual conduct; and which, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3006,
subd. (c)(15)(A) [adopting standard set forth in Miller v. Calif ornia (1973) 413 U.S. 15, 24]; see Jenkins v. Georgia (1974) 418 U.S. 153 [“nudity alone does
not render material obscene under Miller ’s standards”].) “Obscene material” may encompass visual depictions of anal or vaginal contact and nudity/sexual
conduct involving a minor, but it excludes text

- only material. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3006, subds. (c)(15)(C) , (D).) Or perhaps, the superior court

can use the phrase “ sexually explicit ” instead of pornography and then utilize29

the definition of “sexually ex plicit conduct ” under federal law , which defines such conduct as (1) sexual intercourse, including genital

- genital, oral

- genital,
anal

- genital, or oral

- anal; (2) bestiality; (3) masturbation; (4) sadistic or masochistic abuse; or (5) lascivious exhibition of the genitals, breast or pubic area. (18 U.S.C. § 2256.) Although we have proposed some potential language that could make probation condition 10(b) less vague and we possess the authority to modify an unconstitutional probation condition on appeal (s ee Sheena K ., supra , 40 Cal.4th at p. 892), here, we believe the more prudent approach would be to remand the matter to the superior court and allow it to fashion a constitutional probation condition. On remand, we encourage the superior
court to consider the scope of this probation condition and what purpose this condition is intended to serve. (See D.H ., supra , 4 Cal.App.5th at p. 729.) Although Oats was convicted of a sex crime, his crime was aimed at seducing
a 13

- year
- old minor. Further, material f ound on his phone implicate d that Oats is interested in sexual interactions with underage females. As such, the superior court can fashion a probation condition to more directly relate to Oats’s offense and predilections while aiding in his rehabilitation

. 16 E. Condition 6(k) Oats contends that condition 6 (k) , which states that he shall “ [p]rovide true name, address, and date of birth if contacted by law enforcement ” and

16 Oats also challenges probation condition 10(p) on the grounds it is overbroad. In doing so, he argues that his First Amendmen t right to free speech includes the right to view sexually oriented materials. (See United States v. Playboy En tm’t Group (2000) 529 U.S. 803, 810.) We do not address the overbreadth challenge here because we determined the subject condition is vague and provide the superior court the opportunity to revise the condition. In doing so , we anticipate the superior court will ensure the revised condition in narrowly tailored

.30

“ [r]eport contact or arrest in writing to the [probation officer] within 7 days, ”
in cluding “ the date of contact/arrest, charges, if any, and the name of the law enforcement agency, ” is unconstitutionally vague.

“ [T]he underpinning of a vagueness challenge is the due process concept of ‘ fair warning. ’ [Citation.] The rule of fair warn ing consists of ‘ the due process concepts of preventing arbitrary law enforcement and providing adequate notice to potential offenders ’ [citation], protections that are

‘ embodied in the due process clauses of the federal and California Constitutions. (U.S . Const., Amends. V, XIV; Cal. Const., art. I, § 7). ’ ” ( Sheena K. , supra , 40 Cal.4th at p. 890.) “ A probation condition ‘ must be sufficiently precise for the probationer to know what is required of him, and for the court to determine whether the conditi on has been violated, ’ if it is to withstand a challenge on the ground of vagueness. ” ( Ibid .) Probation conditions are given “ ‘ “ the meaning that would appear to a reasonable, objective reader. ” ’ ” ( In re I.V. (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 249, 261.) The mer e fact that there “ ‘ “ ‘ may be difficulty in determining whether some marginal or hypothetical act is covered by [a condition ’ s] language ’ ” ’ ” does not render
the condition “ impermissibly vague. ” ( Id. at p. 261.) Oats relies on People v. Relkin (2016 ) 6 Cal.App.5th 1188 ( Relkin ), to support h is argument that the portion of this condition requiring that he report any “ contact ” with law enforcement is unconstitutionally vague. The
court in Relkin considered a probation condition that required the defen dant

“ to ‘ report to the probation officer, no later than the next working day, any arrests or any contacts with or incidents involving any peace officer. ’ ” ( Id. at

p. 1196.) The court concluded that “ the portion of the condition requiring that defendant report ‘ any contacts with

. . . any peace officer ’ ” was vague because it “ does indeed leave one to guess what sorts of events and31

interactions qualify as reportable. ” ( Id . at p. 1197.) According to the court, it
was not certain that the condition would not be triggered “ when defendant

says ‘ hello ’ to a police officer or attends an event at which police officers are present, but would be triggered if defendant were interviewed as a witness to a crime or if his ‘ lifestyle were such that he is present when criminal activity

occurs. ’ ” ( Ibid .) “ The language does not delineate between such occurrences and thus casts an excessively broad net over what would otherwise be activity not worthy of reporting. ” ( Ibid .)
In contrast to the condition at issue in Re lkin , condition 6 (k) ’ s requirement that Oats “ [p]rovide [h is ] true name, address, and date of birth if contacted by law enforcement ” would appear to a reasonable, objective reader to refer to contacts initiated by a law enforcement officer in which the off icer requests that information from Oats. This would not include mere greetings by law enforcement officers or conversations with officers at events Oats may attend. Further, the requirement that Oats report the “ contact or arrest ” and
that he include th e “ name of the law enforcement agency ” indicates that the interaction must be of a type and nature that either the law enforcement officer would have supplied this information to Oats, or Oats would have been made aware of this information because the natu re of the “ contact ” was sufficiently substantive. This, too, indicates that a reasonable reading of the condition sufficiently delineates between a casual, random interaction between Oats and a law enforcement officer, including the exchanging of pleasant ries, and a situation in which Oats is a witness to a crime or is specifically stopped and questioned by a law enforcement officer. We therefore reject Oats’s vagueness challenge to condition 6 (k)

.32 F. Conditions 6(r) and 7(b) Oats relies on People v. C ervantes (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 353 ( Cervantes ) to argue that conditions 6 ( r ) and 7 ( b ) “are void because they delegate to the probation officer the judicial power to determine the kinds of tests, counseling, treatment, and conduct to which Mr. Oats must

par ticipate

. ” Additionally, Oats contends these conditions represent “[a]n unlawful delegation of judicial power to the probation officer

. . . [that] violates the doctrine of separation of powers

. . . . ” Again, condition 6 ( r ) requires that Oats “[p]artic ipate and comply with any assessment program if directed by the P.O.” Condition 7 ( b ) requires that Oats “[p]articipate in treatment, therapy, counseling, or other courses of conduct as suggested by validated assessment tests.” Oats argues that probation condition 6 ( r ) “ unlawfully delegates to the probation officer the court’s authority to determine the types of assessment tests in which Mr. Oats must participate .” Oats objects that condition 7 ( b )

“ unlawfully delegates to the probation officer the court’ s authority to determine the types of treatment, counseling, and other conduct in which Mr. Oats must participate. ” Further, Oats contends these two probation conditions would allow the probation officer to engage in such mischief as requiring him to take an eye exam and then purchase and w ear glasses or take the Scholastic Aptitude Test and enroll in an algebra course. Oats warns that under conditions 6(r) and 7(b), the probation officer is granted “unfettered discretion to select any assessment test wha tsoever” and “require Mr. Oats to take the test, and then to direct Mr. Oats to take any remedial measures suggested by the test.” As such, Oats insists these conditions allow the probation officer to usurp the judicial function of determining the terms

a nd conditions of probation.33

We reiterate that Oats did not object to either of these two conditions on the ground that they improperly delegate judicial authority at the time the trial court imposed them. Challenges to probation conditions are typically forfeited if not raised when they are imposed ( Welch , supra , 5 Cal.4th

at pp. 234

- 235), with a narrow exception that a court may exercise its discretion to consider such challenges if they are constitutional challenges presenting pure questions of law ( Sh eena K ., supra , 40 Cal.4th at p. 885)

. However, merely couching a n objection as a constitutional challenge is not sufficient to avoid forfeiture. Not “ ‘all constitutional defects in conditions of probation may be raised for the first time on appeal, sin ce there may be circumstances that do not present “ pure questions of law that can be resolved without reference to the particular sentencing record developed in the trial

court. ” [Citation.] In those circumstances, “[ t ] raditional objection and waiver pri nciples encourage development of the record and a proper exercise of
discretion in the trial court. ” [Citation.] ’ [Citation.] .

. . [T]he probationer should object to a perceived facial constitutional flaw at the time a probation condition initially is imposed in order to permit the trial court to consider, and if appropriate in the exercise of its informed judgment, to effect a correction.’ ” ( Ibid .)
To the extent Oats had any concerns about the court delegating to the probation officer the authority to direct him to comply with any of these conditions, Oats could have, and should have, objected and asked the trial court to address those concerns at the time the conditions were imposed.34

Instead, he accepted these conditions to avoid imprisonment. 17 I n accepting the terms of probation without raising any objection that would have allowed the trial court to address these concerns, Oats prevented the trial court from being able to more narrowly draw the conditions. Indeed, the court could have had legit imate reasons for leaving some of the conditions open

- ended in Oats’s case, and could have stated those reasons on the record if Oats had raised an objection at the time the conditions were imposed. Specifically, the
court could have related its discretio nary choices to Oats’s needs as a probationer. The purpose of the forfeiture rule is to avoid precisely the situation that we have here, where an objection would have permitted the trial court to address these concerns and/or make a better record to suppo rt the court’s decisions; the forfeiture rule exists to encourage parties to bring errors to the attention of the trial court so they may be immediately
corrected. ( Sheena K

., supra , 40 Cal.4th at p. 881.) We conclude that Oats

17 Probation is not an inherent right; it is an act of leniency ( Wardlow , supra , 22 7 Cal.App.3d at p. 365), the purpose of which is to serve as a “period of genuine rehabilitation” ( Griffin v. Wis

. , supra , 483 U.S. at p. 875). Probationers may consent to limit their constitutional rights in preference to incarceration; on the flip side, if a condition appears too onerous, a defendant may choose to serve the prison sentence instead. ( Olguin , supra , 45 Cal.4th at p. 379.)35

has forfeited his contenti ons, and we see no reason to exercise our inherent discretion to consider them despite the forfeiture. 18

G. Probation Conditions 15, 16, and 17 Oats ’s final argument is that the written order granting formal probation does not accurately reflect that the superior court declared during the sentencing hearing that probation conditions 15, 16, and 17 were to be stayed. The People agree that the order should be corrected to reflect that condition 17 is to be stayed, but note that the order already provides th at conditions 15 and 16 will be stayed. Below, the superior court ordered that probation conditions 15, 16,
and 17 be stayed pending Oats’s successful completion of probation. The

18 We also question the validity of Oats’s contentions on the merits. Oats relies primarily on Cervantes in support of his contentions that a number of conditions improperly delegate to the probation officer the court’s authority to set the conditions of probation. However, Cervantes involved the delegation of the calculation of restitution; but the calculation of restit ution is specifically reserved for the court, pursuant to statute. ( Cervantes , supra , 154 Cal.App.3d at p. 356.) Cervantes does not stand for the proposition that a court may never delegate to the probation officer some decision

- making authority with reg ard to the precise implementation of probation conditions. Leaving certain day

- to

- day decision

- making to a probation officer often makes sense and is necessary, in fact, because the “trial court is poorly equipped to micromanage” the selection of programs or tools that assist a probationer in his or her rehabilitation. ( People v. Penoli (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 298, 308.) Further, it seems apparent that under the terms of the challenged conditions, the court effectively authorized the conditions but permitte d the probation officer to determine whether to implement them, depending on Oats’s performance on probation, thereby placing Oats in a better position than he would have been if the court had simply imposed the conditions without allowing the probation of ficer to determine that such conditions were not in fact necessary for the effective supervision of Oats. Essentially, the court has determined that Oats may be subjected to these conditions, and that they should be imposed. However, Oats may avoid havin g the conditions applied to him if he successfully performs on probation without them.36

court’s written order granting Oats formal probation states that probatio n conditions 15 and 16 are stayed pending successful completion of probation,
but is silent as to condition 17. A court’s oral judgment controls when there is an inconsistency between that and the written documents, such as minutes and abstracts of judgme nt, purporting to summarize the court’s order, and appellate courts may correct such clerical errors. ( People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185.) Accordingly, on remand, we order the superior court to ensure the order granting formal probation accur ately state s that probation condition 17 is stayed pending Oats’s successful completion of probation. DISPOSITION We remand this matter to the superior court to modify probation conditions 7(a) and 10(p). In addition, the superior court is to ensure tha t the amended order granting probation accurately reflects th at probation condition 17 is stayed pending Oats’s successful completion of probation. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

HUFFMAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

McCONNELL, P. J.

BENKE, J.