### FILED U.S. COURT OF APPEALS ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 08/30/99 THOMAS K. KAHN CLERK

* Honorable Richard Mills, Senior U.S. Di strict Judge for the Central District of Illinois, sitting by designation. PUBLISH

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________ No. 97-8299

________________________ D.C. Docket No. 1:96-CV-00102-WLH SYLVIA CRAWFORD, Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus
BRUCE BABBITT, Secretary of the Department of the Interior, Defendant-Appellee.

__________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia

_________________________ (August 30, 1999) ON REMAND FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Before CARNES, Circuit Judge, KRAVITCH, Senior Circuit Judge, and MILLS * , Senior District Judge. CARNES, Circuit Judge:2 The Supreme Court has vacated our prio r opinion in this case, Crawford v. Babbitt , 148 F.3d 1318 (11 thCir. 1998), and remanded the case to us for further consideration in light of its decision in West v. Gibson , 527 U.S. –, 119 S. Ct. 1906 (1999). See Babbitt v. Crawford , 527 U.S. –, 119 S. Ct. 2363 (1999). In compliance with the Supreme Court's dir ective, we substitute this opinion for our prior one in this case. In 1993, Sylvia Crawford, a former employee at the Fish and Wildlife Service, a Division of the Department of the Interior (the "Agency"), was sexually harassed by her supervisors and then reta liated against when she complained about it. After Crawford filed an administrativ e complaint, the Agen cy issued a final decision finding it had discriminated agai nst her and awarding injunctive relief. Crawford subsequently brought suit in fede ral district court seeking compensatory damages. The court entered summary judgment against her on her claim for compensatory damages. Because we concl ude that Crawford failed to exhaust her administrative remedies prior to filing this action, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND Crawford worked for the Agency during the latter part of 1993. On November 8, 1993 and December 28, 1993, she filed Equal Employment Opportunity ("EEO") discrimination claims with the Agency's Office for Equal3 Opportunity alleging that her supervis ors had sexually harassed her and then retaliated against her when she complain ed. An investigator for the Agency's Office of Human Resources investigated the claims. Among other things, Crawford informed the investigator that one incident of harassment “upset” her and that the stress of the harassment led to a bleeding ulcer and other physical problems for which she had seen a doctor. The inve stigator issued a Report of Investigation in February 1995. By letter dated Fe bruary 23, 1995, the Agency's Office of Human Resources sent Crawford the report and informed her that she could request a final decision on her claims from the Agen cy, with or without an administrative hearing before an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") administrative judge. On March 29, 1995, Crawford requested an administrative hearing. On May 30, 1995, Judge Davi, the EEOC administrative judge, informed Crawford and the Agency that he had scheduled a pre-hearing conference on July 17, 1995 and a hearing on July 25, 1995. At the pre-hearing conference, the parties discussed their settlement negotiations. The Agency stated that it would not consider monetary settlement for compen satory damages because Crawford had not provided it with objective evidence of her alleged injuries or evidence demonstrating a causal connection between the harassment and Crawford's alleged4 injuries. The Agency also requested Crawford to provide any medical records or other evidence she intended to rely on at the July 25, 1995 hearing to substantiate her alleged injuries and causation. Crawfo rd did not provide the Agency with the medical records or any other evidence, but she did indicate that two doctors would testify at the hearing to substantiate her entitlement to compensatory damages. On July 25, 1995, Crawford requested a continuance of the hearing. Judge Davi denied the request and renewed settle ment discussions between the parties. The Agency stated it would not pay Craw ford compensatory damages unless she produced the evidence substantiating her in juries and causation as it had requested. After learning that the two doctors Cr awford mentioned at the pre-hearing conference would not be testifying at the h earing, Judge Davi informed her that the hearing would proceed; but he also warn ed her that without the substantiating medical evidence, no compensatory damage s would be awarded. Crawford then elected to waive the hearing and requesteda final decision from the Agency on her claims. Although fully aware that the Ag ency had requested additional evidence to substantiate her alleged injuries and causation, Crawford did not submit that evidence in the nearly thr ee months prior to the issu ance of the Agency’s final decision.5 The Agency issued its final decision on October 20, 1995. In the decision, the Agency found it had subjected Crawfordto sexual harassment and retaliation in violation of Title VII, and it awarded her in junctive relief, costs, and attorney fees. Although the decision noted Crawford’s contention that she had “developed physical problems from the stress of [her] supervisor's sexual harassment," it did not award Crawford compensatory dama ges for those alleged injuries. The decision informed Crawford that if she wa s dissatisfied, she had the choice of filing an appeal with the EEOC or filing a civil action in United States District Court. She chose the latter option. On January 12, 1996, Crawford filed this lawsuit against Bruce Babbitt in his official capacity as Secretary of the Interior. (For simplicity, we will refer to Babbitt as the Agency). Crawford's co mplaint referred to the Agency's final decision and alleged that as a result of the Agency's discrimination, she had suffered hospitalization and physical, me ntal, and emotional distress. The complaint requested that the court (1) ente r a declaratory judgment stating that the Agency had discriminated against her in vi olation of Title VII, and (2) "enter a judgment against the [Agency] for compen satory damages associated with the undue stress suffered by Plaintiff as a result of the unlawful employment practices of Defendant."6 After the parties consented to havi ng the case tried before a magistrate judge, Crawford moved for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability. She argued that the Agency's final decision c onclusively established its liability under Title VII, and she requested that the issu e of compensatory damages for her alleged injuries proceed to a jury trial. Th e Agency responded that since compensatory damages were not awarded as part of its final decision, Crawford could seek either (1) enforcement of the Agency's final d ecision but forego a claim for compensatory damages, or (2) a de novo review of the entire dispute, including liability and damages. On March 11, 1997, the magistrate j udge granted Crawford's motion for partial summary judgment as to liability and ordered the injunctive relief set out in the Agency's decision. In addition, although the Agency had not filed a summary judgment motion, the magistrate judge entered judgment for it on Crawford's claim for compensatory damages. After Crawford's motion for reconsideration of that order was denied, she appealed, cont ending that the magistrate judge erred in dismissing her claim for compensatory damages. The Agency did not cross-appeal the entry of judgment in Crawford's favor on the issue of the Agency's liability for violating Title VII.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW7 We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo , using the same legal standard employed by the district court. See , e.g. , Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta , 2 F.3d 1112, 1117 (11th Cir.1993). "Summary judgment is appropriate if the record shows no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. When deciding whether summary judgment is appropriate, all evidence and reasonable factual inferences drawn therefrom are reviewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party." Witter v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. , 138 F.3d 1366, 1369 (11th Cir.1998) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
III. ANALYSIS The crux of Crawford's claim is that she is entitled to compensatory damages for injuries she suffered as a result of the Agency's sexual harassment and retaliatory conduct in violation of Title VII. In granting judgment to the Agency on Crawford's claim for compensatory damages, the magistrate judge relied upon two grounds, either of which, if valid, will support the judgment. First, the judge found that Crawford was barred from raisi ng her claim for compensatory damages in district court because she had failed to adequately pursue it administratively, which means she had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies, although the judge did not use exhaustion language.8 Second, the judge ruled that Crawfo rd's reliance on the Agency's final decision in her motion for partial summary judgment precluded her from litigating de novo the compensatory damages issue. The magistrate judge observed that, in essence, Crawford was seeking to enforce the favorable parts of the Agency's final decision (the finding of discrimination and the award of equitable relief) while at the same time litigating de novo the unfavorable parts (the failure to award her compensatory damages). The judge reas oned that since Crawford had elected to rely on the Agency's final decision, she was bound to its terms. Therefore, the judge concluded, because the Agency's final decision did not award Crawford compensatory damages, she could not rec over those damages in the district court. In our prior opinion in this case, Crawford v. Babbitt , 148 F.3d 1318 (11 th Cir. 1998), we pointed out that the magistrate judge's reasons for dismissing Crawford's compensatory damages claim rested on the premise that an employing agency can award an empl oyee compensatory damage s in the administrative process as part of "full relief." Believi ng that compensatory damages could not be awarded in the administrative process, we concluded that neither of the grounds upon which the magistrate judge relied justif ied dismissal of Crawford's claim for compensatory damages.9 Subsequently, however, the Supreme Court held in West v. Gibson , 527 U.S. –, 119 S. Ct. 1906, 1910 (1999), that compensatory damages can be awarded in the administrative process. In light of the Supreme Court’s holding in West , our basis for rejecting the magistrate judge’s reasons for dismissing Crawford’s claim for compensatory damages is no longer valid. Accordingly, we must reconsider whether either of the magistrate judge’s reasons for dismissing Crawford’s compensatory damage s claim is correct. As mentioned earlier, the first ground relied upon by the magistrate judge in dismissing Crawford’s claim for compensatory damages was that she had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. A federal employee must pursue and exhaust her administrative remedies as a jurisdic tional prerequisite to filing a Title VII action. See Brown v. General Servs. Admin. , 425 U.S. 820, 832-33, 96 S. Ct. 1961, 1967-68 (1976). “[T]he purpose of exhaustion is to give the agency the information it needs to investigate and resolve the dispute between the employee and the employer. Good faith effort by th e employee to cooperate with the agency and EEOC and to provide all relevant, ava ilable information is all that exhaustion requires.” Wade v. Secretary of the Army , 796 F.2d 1369, 1377 (11th Cir. 1986). Where an agency or the EEOC requests in formation relevant to resolving the employee’s complaint and the employee fails to provide that information, the10 employee has failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. See Johnson v. Bergland , 614 F.2d 415, 418 (5th Cir. 1980) (conc luding plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies where his “responses to the agency request for information were insufficient to enable th e agency to determine what complaint of discrimination was made and wh en it had occurred”). See also Briley v. Carlin , 172 F.3d 567, 571 (8th Cir. 1999) (“[i]n order to exhaust administrative remedies, the claimant is required to demonstrate good faith participation in the administrative process, which includes making specific charges and providing information necessary to the investigation.”). Because Crawford failed to respond to th e Agency’s request for information relevant to her claim for compensatorydamages, she failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. At the pr e-hearing conference before the EEOC administrative judge on July 17, 1995, th e Agency specifically requested that Crawford provide it with additional evid ence substantiating her alleged injuries and the causal connection between those in juries and the harassment. She did not comply with that request. Although Crawford did promise that her doctors would testify at the hearing scheduled for July 25, 1995, when the date of that hearing arrived, she produced neither the testimony of those doctors nor any other evidence. Instead, after the Agency again informed her th at, in order to resolve her1 We note that Crawford’s counsel info rmed the magistrate judge that he believed that the administrative record would remain open to submit additional evidence concerning Crawford’s alleged injuries after the Agency issued its final decision. It is true that once the Agency issued its final decision, Crawford had the option of appealing that decision to the EEOC, see 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405, and she could have attempted to introduce additi onal evidence in the administrative record concerning her alleged injuries. However, Crawford chose to immediately file this action in federal court after the Agency ’s final decision, thereby passing up her final opportunity to submit the additional evidence into the administrative record that the Agency had requested.
11 claim for compensatory damages, it needed the additional evidence it had requested, Crawford elected to waive th e hearing before the administrative judge and requested a final decision from the Agency. Despite the fact that she knew the Agency had requested additional eviden ce to substantiate her alleged injuries and the causal connection between those injuries and the harassment, Crawford did not submit the requested evidence to the Agen cy in the nearly three months prior to the issuance of its final decision on October 20, 1995. 1
The administrative record indicates that the only information the Agency had concerning the injuries for which Cr awford sought compensatory damages was her statement to an investigator that the harassment had upset her and that the stress of the harassment had led to physical problems for which she sought medical attention. Given the nature and paucity of that information, it was reasonable for the Agency to seek additional information from Crawford to substantiate her12 alleged injuries and the causal connec tion between those injuries and the harassment. Because Crawford indicatedshe had seen a doctor, her medical records, the testimony of her doctor, or both would have been particularly valuable to the Agency in resolving the issue of her entitlement to compensatory damages. Had Crawford complied with the Agen cy’s request for additional evidence, especially the medical information, subs tantiating her alleged injuries and the causal connection between those injuries and the harassment, the Agency could have ruled on the merits of her compensato ry damages claim. The need for a court case might have been avoided. By failing to provide the Agency with the relevant information it requested to resolve her claim, Crawford did not participate in good faith in the administrative proceedings and therefore did not exhaust her administrative remedies with regard to he r claim for compensatory damages. See Wade , 796 F.2d at 1377 (“[g]ood faith effort by the employee to cooperate with the agency and EEOC and to provide all rele vant, available information is all that exhaustion requires.”); Briley , 172 F.3d at 574 (employee’s failure to comply with employing agency’s request for additiona l information concerning her entitlement to compensatory damages “amounts to a breach of her duty to cooperate in good faith in the administrative procedure, whic h is a failure to exhaust administrative2 In light of our conclusion that Crawfo rd failed to exhaust her administrative remedies, we have no occasion to address the magistrate judge’s alternative reason for dismissing Crawford’s claim for compen satory damages, i.e., that she could not enforce the favorable parts of the Agency's final decision (the finding of discrimination and the award of equitabl e relief) while at the same time litigating de novo the unfavorable parts (the failure to award her compensatory damages).
13 remedies.”). The magistrate judge’s dismissal of Crawford’s claim for compensatory damages is affirmed. 2

IV. CONCLUSION
AFFIRMED.