J-S40040-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

LAWRENCE MANGRUM, 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2149 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence May 4, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0009743-2015

BEFORE: OTT, DUBOW, JJ., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED JULY 25, 2017

Lawrence Mangrum appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed 

May 4, 2016, in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas.1 The trial 

court sentenced Mangrum to an aggregate term of five to 15 years’ 

imprisonment following his non-jury conviction of persons not to possess 

firearms and possession of an instrument of crime (“PIC”).2 On appeal, 

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*

Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 Mangrum was tried jointly with his two co-defendants, Hassan Robinson 

and Clarence Glenn. All three were convicted of the same offenses. They 

are now represented by the same attorney on appeal, and have filed 

identical briefs. See Commonwealth v. Robinson 2434 EDA 2016; 

Commonwealth v. Glenn, 2078 EDA 2016.

2 See 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 6105 and 907, respectively.
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Mangrum challenges the sufficiency and weight of the evidence supporting 

his convictions. For the reasons below, we affirm.

The facts underlying Mangrum’s conviction were aptly summarized by 

the trial court as follows:

Officer Kevin Lewis of the Philadelphia Police Department 

testified that at approximately 8:48 PM on August 19, 2015, he 

and his partner, Officer Sanders, were on duty and were parked 

at the intersection of 56th and Haverford Ave. in the city and 

County of Philadelphia when they heard the sound of nearby 

gunfire. Believing it to have come from the area of “55th and 

Vine, which is a block down and... one block over,” he 

immediately drove to the vicinity and observed three males, 

identified in Court as [Mangrum] and his Co-Defendants, [] 

Glenn and [] Robinson, “running across Vine from 300 Sickles 

onto 200 Sickles.” The three males were the only individuals he 

observed in the area. 

Believing “the males might possibly come out of the 

breezeway there”, Officer Lewis drove to the 5400 block of 

Summer Street to intercept them. On arriving, he observed the 

three males attempting “to get into a white Oldsmobile, which 

was running on the highway unattended.” Officer Lewis and his 

partner “were able to stop them from getting in the car and get 

them in handcuffs.” Officer Lewis estimated that it took 

“between ten and fifteen seconds” from when he first heard the 

gunshots to when he intercepted [Mangrum] and the two other 

Co-Defendants.

On August 19, 2015, Detective Vincent Parker of the 

Philadelphia Police Department was on duty, along with his 

partner, Detective Ortiz. They responded to the area of 300 

North 55 Street, the location of the incident in question, where 

Detective Parker observed his partner recover “12 9 MM FCCs 

[fired cartridge casings] ... on the west side of the street” and 

four 9MM FCCs... from the east side of the street near the 

walkway.” Detective Parker also personally recovered three 

firearms from 236 Sickles Way. This was corroborated by Officer 

Lewis, who testified that these three firearms were located in 

“the flight path” that he observed the three Co-Defendant’s “run 
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through”, only “about 20 yards” from where the white 

Oldsmobile was located with the engine running.

At his waiver trial it was stipulated by counsel that 

[Mangrum] did not “have a valid license to carry a firearm” and 

was prohibited from carrying a firearm. It was also stipulated 

that the FCCs recovered correspond to two of the three firearms 

recovered by Detective Parker, with the third firearm being 

determined to be inoperable. 

Trial Court Opinion, 10/17/2016, at 3-4 (record citations omitted). 

Mangrum and his co-defendants were subsequently charged with 

persons not to possess firearms, possession of a firearm without a license, 

possession of a firearm on a public street in Philadelphia, PIC, and 

conspiracy.3 They proceeded to a joint non-jury trial held on February 26, 

2016. At the conclusion of the testimony, the trial court found Mangrum 

guilty of persons not to possess firearms and PIC, and not guilty of the 

remaining charges. On May 4, 2016, the court sentenced Mangrum to a 

term of four to 10 years’ incarceration for the firearms offense, and a 

consecutive term of one to five years’ incarceration for PIC. Mangrum filed a 

timely post-sentence motion challenging the sufficiency and weight of the 

evidence and requesting reconsideration of his sentence. The trial court 

denied Mangrum’s motion on June 13, 2016, and this timely appeal 

followed.4

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3 18 Pa.C.S.§§ 6105, 6106, 6108, 907, and 903, respectively.

4 On July 5, 2016, the court ordered Mangrum to file a concise statement of 

errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Mangrum 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Preliminarily, we must address the trial court’s contention that 

Mangrum’s issues are waived on appeal as a result of his vague concise 

statement. See Trial Court Opinion, 10/17/2016, at 2-3. It is well-settled 

that when a trial court directs an appellant to file a Rule 1925(b) statement, 

the statement must “concisely identify each ruling or error that the appellant 

intends to challenge with sufficient detail to identify all pertinent issues for 

the judge.” Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(ii). Indeed, this Court has found waiver 

where an appellant’s concise statement is too vague to permit review. 

Commonwealth v. Tyack, 128 A.3d 254, 260 (Pa. Super. 2015). 

Particularly, when an appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, 

the [Rule] 1925(b) statement needs to specify the element or 

elements upon which the evidence was insufficient. This Court 

can then analyze the element or elements on appeal. [Where a 

Rule] 1925(b) statement [ ] does not specify the allegedly 

unproven elements[,] ... the sufficiency issue is waived [on 

appeal].

Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Williams, 959 A.2d 1252, 1257 (Pa. 

Super. 2008) (quotation omitted). The same is true for a challenge to the 

weight of the evidence. See Commonwealth v. Freeman, 128 A.3d 1231, 

1248-1249 (Pa. Super. 2015).

Nevertheless, when our appellate review is not hindered by the defects 

in the concise statement, we have declined to find waiver. See 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

complied with the court’s directive, and filed a concise statement on July 26, 

2016.
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Commonwealth v. Smith, 955 A.2d 391, 393 (Pa. Super. 2008) (finding 

issues not waived despite vague Rule 1925(b) statement when the trial court 

“filed an opinion which meaningfully addressed the [appellant’s] 

arguments.”). In the present case, Mangrum filed a post-sentence motion in 

which he challenged both the weight and sufficiency of the evidence, and, in 

particular, the fact that “the Commonwealth failed to present any direct 

evidence that [he] was in possession of a firearm.” Post-Sentence Motion, 

5/5/2016, at ¶ 7(a). Moreover, the trial court, despite finding waiver, 

addressed both claims in its opinion. See Trial Court Opinion, 10/17/2016, 

at 5-9. Consequently, because we are able to meaningfully review 

Mangrum’s issues on appeal, we decline to find his claims waived.

In his first issue, Mangrum contends the evidence was insufficient to 

support his convictions because the Commonwealth failed to prove he 

possessed a firearm on the night in question. Our review of a challenge to 

the sufficiency of the evidence is well-established: 

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the 

evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at 

trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there 

is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every 

element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In 

applying the above test, we may not weigh the evidence 

and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In 

addition, we note that the facts and circumstances 

established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every 

possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a 

defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless 

the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter 

of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the 

combined circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain 
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its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a 

reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial 

evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire 

record must be evaluated and all evidence actually 

received must be considered. Finally, the finder of fact 

while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the 

weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part 

or none of the evidence.

“This standard is equally applicable to cases where the evidence 

is circumstantial rather than direct so long as the combination of 

the evidence links the accused to the crime beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” “Although a conviction must be based on ‘more than 

mere suspicion or conjecture, the Commonwealth need not 

establish guilt to a mathematical certainty.’” 

Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 756 (Pa. Super. 2014) 

(internal citations omitted), appeal denied, 95 A.3d 275 (Pa. 2014).

In the present case, Mangrum challenges his convictions of persons 

not to possess firearms and PIC. Section 6105 of the Uniform Firearms Act,5

provides, inter alia, that a person who has been convicted of certain 

enumerated offenses, “shall not possess, use, control, sell, transfer or 

manufacture ... a firearm in this Commonwealth.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(a)(1). 

Furthermore, pursuant to Section 907 of the Crimes Code, “[a] person 

commits a misdemeanor of the first degree if he possesses any instrument 

of crime with intent to employ it criminally.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 907(a).

Here, Mangrum stipulated he was prohibited from possessing a firearm 

under Section 6105. See N.T., 2/26/2016, at 51. Moreover, it is axiomatic 

that “[a] handgun is clearly an instrument of crime as defined” in the PIC 

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5 18 Pa.C.S. § 6101 et seq.
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statute. Commonwealth v. Monroe, 422 A.2d 193, 195 (Pa. Super. 

1980). Consequently, Mangrum’s argument focuses on the court’s finding 

that he “constructively possessed one of the firearms the police found.” 

Mangrum’s Brief at 9. 

Because Mangrum did not possess a firearm on his person at that time 

of his arrest, the Commonwealth was required to establish that Mangrum 

constructively possessed one of the three firearms recovered from the 

courtyard. 

Constructive possession is a legal fiction, a pragmatic construct 

to deal with the realities of criminal law enforcement. 

Constructive possession is an inference arising from a set of 

facts that possession of the contraband was more likely than not. 

We have defined constructive possession as conscious dominion. 

We subsequently defined conscious dominion as the power to 

control the contraband and the intent to exercise that control. 

To aid application, we have held that constructive possession 

may be established by the totality of the circumstances.

Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 67 A.3d 817, 820 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation 

omitted), appeal denied, 78 A.3d 1090 (Pa. 2013). “Additionally, it is 

possible for two people to have joint constructive possession of an item of 

contraband.” Id. at 820-821.

Relying on Commonwealth v. Carter, 450 A.2d 142 (Pa. Super. 

1982), Mangrum argues the evidence was insufficient to establish he had 

“both the power to control and the intent to exercise that control over the 

firearm.” Mangrum’s Brief at 9. First, he notes the guns were recovered 

from “the courtyard of a five-building public housing project in which 

hundreds of people lived and to which hundreds more had access.” Id. at 
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10. Second, he emphasizes neither his DNA nor his fingerprints were 

discovered on any of the weapons, and he told police he was running 

because “somebody had just shot at him.” Id. Finally, Mangrum maintains: 

“Other than the fact that [he] was seen by Officer Lewis running from the 

area in which the gun was found, there was no evidence connecting him to 

the gun.” Id. Accordingly, he asserts his convictions were based upon 

“mere conjecture, speculation, and suspicion.” Id.

The trial court addressed Mangrum’s sufficiency claim as follows:

Within seconds of hearing gunfire, Officer Lewis saw [Mangrum] 

and his two Co-Defendants, fleeing the area. He, and his 

partner apprehended the three Co-Defendants as they were 

trying to enter an unattended and running vehicle. Only ten to 

fifteen seconds had passed from when the shots were first fired 

and the three Co-Defendants were taken into custody.

Subsequent inspection of the Co-Defendant’s flight path 

led to the recovery of three firearms, as well as multiple FCCs 

that came from two of the recovered firearms. Because it was 

stipulated that [Mangrum] was prohibited from possessing a 

firearm, and because possession is the only element in dispute 

as it relates to the PIC charge, the Commonwealth only needed 

to prove that [Mangrum] possessed a firearm for [Mangrum] to 

be found guilty of Possession of a Firearm by Persons Prohibited 

and PIC. In viewing the totality of the circumstances, it is clear 

that [Mangrum] illegally possessed a firearm.

In finding [Mangrum] guilty, the Court stated “[to] find the 

defendants not guilty, I really would have to torture the facts. I 

mean, it defies reason. I would have to manufacture a 

reasonable doubt, and I’m not going to do that.” The Court also 

stated: 

“It’s a circumstantial evidence case, the circumstances 

being you have a well-defined crime scene, a shooting that 

takes place we know just within moments because the 

police are right there and hear it. You have them running 

from the direction of the crime scene toward a waiting car. 
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And along the way, along their path, they find three guns 

– three guys, three guns.”

Specifically, the court found that the presence of the unattended 

white Oldsmobile in such close proximity of the crime scene was 

a key factor, stating:

“The white Oldsmobile says they’re involved, doesn’t it?

Who leaves a car running with nobody in it unless they 

expect to be back soon and be in a hurry to get away?

Even if you’re just going to, you know, be gone for a little 

bit and come back in a short time, you turn your car off. 

You take your key with you. You go wherever you’re going 

to go, do whatever you’re going to do, unless you know 

that you’re running from something and then you want to 

be able to jump into the car and take off.

I mean that car is what prevents me from accepting your 

argument. It’s not just the shooting took place 

somewhere and these guys happen to be in the 

neighborhood. They’re running for that car.

The Court finds that the circumstantial evidence presented 

in this case by the Commonwealth is sufficient to support 

[Mangrum’s] convictions for Possession of a Firearm by Persons 

Prohibited and PIC.

Trial Court Opinion, 10/17/2016, at 7-8 (record citations omitted).

Our review of the record and relevant case law reveals ample support 

for the trial court’s decision. Absent from Mangrum’s discussion is the one 

fact the trial court found to be dispositive – Mangrum and his cohorts were 

apprehended while attempting to flee in an unattended, running vehicle

just moments after the shooting. See N.T., 2/26/2016, at 15. Indeed, 

Officer Lewis testified he intercepted the three men “between ten and 15 

seconds” after he heard the initial gunshots, and saw no other individuals in 

the area. Id. at 16, 21. Further, he estimated the guns were recovered 
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“about 20 yards” from where the men were found, in the “flight path that 

[he] observed the males run through.” Id. at 17. As Officer Lewis 

continued to retrace the defendants’ steps, he recovered “over 15 shell 

casings” in the courtyard of the housing development. Id. at 18. The 

totality of these circumstances supports the trial court’s finding that 

Mangrum had the power and intent to control one of the three recovered 

firearms. See Hopkins, supra.

Moreover, the decision in Carter does not affect our analysis. In that 

case, a panel of this Court held the evidence was sufficient to establish the 

defendant constructively possessed a firearm recovered from a vehicle in 

which he was the driver. See Carter, supra, 450 A.2d at 147-148. 

Although there were four other occupants in the car, the panel concluded the 

location of the firearm (under the brake pedal), and the actions of the 

defendant immediately after the stop (bending down towards the 

floorboard), supported the trial court’s finding that the defendant had 

constructive possession of the weapon. See id. Similarly, here, Mangrum’s 

actions in fleeing from the crime scene, moments after gunshots were heard, 

to an unattended vehicle left running for a quick getaway, was sufficient to 

support the trial court’s determination that Mangrum constructively 
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possessed one of the weapons.6 Accordingly, no relief is warranted on 

Mangrum’s first issue.

Next, Mangrum challenges the weight of the evidence supporting his 

convictions. Our review of a weight claim is well-established:7

The weight of the evidence is a matter exclusively for the finder 

of fact, who is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence 

and to determine the credibility of the witnesses. A new trial is 

not warranted because of “a mere conflict in the testimony” and 

must have a stronger foundation than a reassessment of the 

credibility of witnesses. Rather, the role of the trial judge is to 

determine that notwithstanding all the facts, certain facts are so 

clearly of greater weight that to ignore them or to give them 

equal weight with all the facts is to deny justice. On appeal, our 

purview is extremely limited and is confined to whether the trial 

court abused its discretion in finding that the jury verdict did not 

shock one’s conscience. Thus, appellate review of a weight claim 

consists of a review of the trial court’s exercise of discretion, not 

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6 We note Mangrum also relies on this Court’s decision in Commonwealth 

v. Person, 39 A.3d 302 (Pa. Super. 2012), in which the panel determined 

the defendant did not have constructive possession of a gun recovered from 

the top of a kitchen cabinet for purposes of applying the now 

unconstitutional mandatory minimum sentence found at 42 Pa.C.S. § 9712.1 

(mandatory sentence for defendant who possesses firearm while selling 

narcotics). See Person, supra, 39 A.3d at 306-307. Indeed, the panel 

emphasized the defendant did not reside in the home, did not have exclusive 

access to the area where the gun was recovered, and was not seen entering 

the kitchen. See id. at 307. However, Mangrum fails to acknowledge that 

the Pennsylvania Supreme Court vacated this Court’s opinion on appeal, and 

remanded for further consideration in light of the Supreme Court’s decision 

in Commonwealth v. Hanson, 82 A.3d 1023 (Pa. 2013). See 

Commonwealth v. Person, 86 A.3d 864 (Pa. 2014). Therefore, the 

Superior Court’s original decision is of little precedential value. 

 

7 We note Mangrum properly preserved his weight of the evidence claim by 

raising the issue in a timely post-sentence motion before the trial court. 

See Pa.R.Crim.P. 607(A)(3).
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a review of the underlying question of whether the verdict is 

against the weight of the evidence. An appellate court may not 

reverse a verdict unless it is so contrary to the evidence as to 

shock one’s sense of justice.

Commonwealth v. Rosser, 135 A.3d 1077, 1090 (Pa. Super. 2016) (en 

banc), appeal denied, 2017 WL 1194930 [711 MAL 2016] (Pa. March 31, 

2017) (quotation omitted).

In support of his claim, Mangrum emphasizes “there was no evidence 

to connect him to the guns found by the police.” Mangrum’s Brief at 10. He 

maintains that while the trial court relied upon the fact he was apprehended 

as “he attempted to get into a running car[,]” the Commonwealth presented 

no evidence “that Mangrum owned the car or had arrived at the location in 

the car.” Id. at 11. Moreover, Mangrum repeats his assertion that there 

was no DNA or fingerprint evidence linking him to the recovered weapons. 

See id.

The trial court denied Mangrum’s weight claim by emphasizing that the 

police officers were “credible witnesses as their testimony was credible, 

clear, convincing, truthful, and uncontradicted.” Trial Court Opinion, 

10/17/2016, at 9. Although Mangrum’s conviction rests solely upon 

circumstantial evidence, we detect no abuse of discretion on the part of the 

trial court in concluding the weight of the evidence, considering all the 

circumstances surrounding Mangrum’s arrest, supports the guilty verdicts. 

Indeed, we agree with the trial court’s determination that the verdict does 

not “shock one’s sense of justice and make the award of a new trial 

imperative.” Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Rosetti, 863 A.2d 1185, 
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1192 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 878 A.2d 864 (Pa. 

2005). Accordingly, Mangrum is entitled to no relief.

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/25/2017