alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Christopher M. JOHNSON, Appellant.

No. WD 41858.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.

Dec. 5, 1989.

Cullen Cline, Columbia, for appellant.

Jerome S. Antel, III, Asst. Pros. Atty., Columbia, for respondent.

Before BERREY, P.J., and TURNAGE and ULRICH, JJ.

ORDER

PER CURIAM.

Defendant appeals from convictions of driving while intoxicated, § 577.010, RSMo. 1986, and failing to stop for a flashing red light, § 304.301.1, RSMo. 1986, alleging the court erred in convicting the defendant of the charges in that there was insufficient evidence to support verdicts of guilty.

Appeal dismissed as to alleged error concerning conviction for failing to stop.

Judgment affirmed as to conviction for driving while intoxicated. Rule 30.25(b).
FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

_____________________________

No. 1D2023-2092 

_____________________________

MARENDA L. BYRD,

Appellant,

v.

LEON COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD,

Appellee.

_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon County.

Angela C. Dempsey, Judge.

August 27, 2024

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

B.L. THOMAS, NORDBY, and TANENBAUM, JJ., concur.

_____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

_____________________________
2

Marenda L. Byrd, pro se, Appellant.

Ben A. Andrews and Stephanie L. Clark, Pennington, P.A.,

Tallahassee, for Appellee.
#### In the Matter of A.S., a Child.

No. 13-93-450-CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas, Corpus Christi.

March 24, 1994.

*403J.R. Schneider, Jr., Schneider & McWil-liams, P.C., George West, for appellant.

W.L. Hardwick, County Atty., George West, for appellee.

Before SEERDEN, C.J., and DORSEY and FEDERICO J. HINOJOSA, Jr., JJ.

OPINION

SEERDEN, Chief Justice.

This appeal results from an adjudication that appellant engaged in delinquent conduct. Appellant contends that he was not properly admonished as required by section 54.03 of the Texas Family Code, and that there was no evidence presented at the adjudication hearing to prove that he was within the juvenile court’s jurisdiction. We reverse.

Factual Background

Pursuant to a jury trial, the appellant, A.S., was found to have engaged in delinquent conduct by injuring a child. At disposition, the court placed appellant on one-year probation committed to the custody and control of his parents, with provisions for educational and supervisory assistance. Appellant presents two points of error for our review. The State has made no reply.

Jurisdiction

We first address appellant’s jurisdictional point. On appeal, as in his motion for directed verdict which was denied, appellant asserts that the State failed to offer any evidence that he was within the jurisdictional age of the court. The Texas Family Code, in section 51.02, defines “child” as: a person who is:

> (A) ten years of age or older and under 17 years of age; or

> (B) seventeen years of age or older and under 18 years of age who is alleged or found to have engaged in delinquent conduct or conduct indicating a need for supervision as a result of acts committed before becoming 17 years of age.

Because the juvenile court is not one of general jurisdiction, its power to act is derived exclusively from the statutory grant of authority delineated in the Family Code. *Accord In re J. T.,*526 S.W.2d 646, 647 (Tex.Civ.App.—El Paso 1975, no writ); *Miguel v. State,*500 S.W.2d 680, 681 (Tex.Civ.App.—Beaumont 1973, no writ). To invoke the juvenile court’s jurisdiction, the State was required to not merely allege, but also *prove*that the appellant was within the age limits of the juvenile court’s statutory grant of authority. *See Mingus v. Wadley,*115 Tex. 551, 285 S.W. 1084, 1089 (1926). The record before us is totally devoid of such proof. We sustain appellant’s jurisdictional point.

It is unnecessary to the disposition of this case to address appellant’s other point of error. Tex.R.App.P. 90(a).

We hold that, without evidence of age, the court lacked the jurisdiction to adjudicate that appellant engaged in delinquent conduct. The judgment of the juvenile court is REVERSED and the cause is REMANDED to that court for further action consistent with this opinion.
[Federal Register Volume 61, Number 98 (Monday, May 20, 1996)]
[Notices]
[Page 25238]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 96-12563]



-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
National Park Service


 Mojave National Preserve Advisory Commission; Notice of Meetings

    Notice is hereby given in accordance with the Federal Advisory 
Committee Act that meetings of the Mojave National Preserve Advisory 
Commission will be held June 12 , 1996; assemble at 1:00 PM at the 
National Park Service Information Center in Baker California; travel by 
private vehicle to Kelso Depot, Kelso, California; and June 13, 1966, 
at 9:30 AM, at the National Park Service Visitor Center at Hole-In-The-
Wall, Mojave National Preserve.
    The agenda: Provide administrative information concerning Advisory 
Commission process; update on Northern and Eastern Mojave Planning 
Process; discussion of issues and Advisory Commission role in planning.
    The Advisory Commission was established by PL #03-433 to provide 
for the advice on the development and implementation of the General 
Management Plan.
    Members of the Commission are:

Micheal Attaway
Irene Ausmus
Rob Blair
 Peter Burk
Dennis Casebier
Donna Davis
Nathan `Levi' Esquerra
Gerald Freeman
Willis Herron
Eldon Hughes
Claudia Luke
Clay Overson
Norbert Riedy
Marcia Turoci
Mal Wessel

    This meeting is open to the public.
Mary G. Martin,
Superintendent, Mojave National Preserve.
[FR Doc. 96-12563 Filed 5-17-96; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4310-70-P
#### Larry Hier RODRIGUEZ, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 1330-92.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, En Banc.

Nov. 25, 1992.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 13, 1993.

*745Gilbert A. Villarreal, Houston, for appellant.

John B. Holmes, Jr., Dist. Atty., and Andrea F. Lopes and J.R. Buchanan, Asst. Dist. Attys., Houston, Robert Huttash, State’s Atty., Austin, for State.

OPINION ON APPELLANT’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW

PER CURIAM.

Appellant pled guilty and was convicted of possession of cocaine in an amount less than twenty-eight grams. The trial court assessed punishment at confinement for twenty years. The conviction was affirmed. *Rodriguez v. State,*834 S.W.2d 592 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st], 1992). In his petition for discretionary review, Appellant raises seven grounds, including two which allege the Court of Appeals erred in refusing to consider Appellant’s motion to suppress and motion for disclosure of the informant, along with an attached affidavit, in evaluating whether Appellant met his burden of proof regarding a warrant-less search and seizure.

The trial court held a hearing on Appellant’s motion to suppress and motion to require disclosure of the identity of an informant. No witnesses were called at the hearing and no evidence was formally introduced. The trial court listened to the different versions of fact offered by the parties and denied the motions.

In the Court of Appeals Appellant claimed the trial court erred in overruling these motions. The Court of Appeals held Appellant did not meet his burden of proof because he did not offer anything except oral argument in support of the motions.

Appellant contends, and we agree, that Article 28.01, § 1(6), V.A.C.C.P., permits the trial court to determine the merits of the motions “on the motions themselves, or upon opposing affidavits, or upon oral testimony, subject to the discretion of the court.” Therefore, the Court of Appeals should have considered his motions and the attached affidavit in determining whether Appellant met his burden of proof on his claims.

Grounds one and two of Appellant’s petition are summarily granted and this cause is remanded to the Court of Appeals for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. The remaining grounds of Appellant’s petition are refused without prejudice to refile after the Court of Appeals’ disposition of the case.
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### C OURT OF 

### A PPEALS FOR THE



### F IRST 

### D ISTRICT OF 

### T EXAS AT 

### H OUSTON



### O RDER ON 

### M OTION

Cause Number: 01

- 16

- 00098

- CV

Trial Court Cause

Number: 79855

- CV

Style: Michael A. McCann

v Spencer Plantation Investments, LTD

Date motion filed * : July 1, 2016

Type of motion: Motion to strike appellee’s brief

Party filing motion: Appellant

Document to be filed:

Is appeal accelerated? YES NO

Ordered that motion is:

Granted

If document is to be filed, document due:

Absent extraordinary circumstances, the Court will not grant additional motions to extend time

Denied

Dismissed ( e.g. , want of jurisdiction, moot)

Other:

Judge's signature: /s/ Terry Jennings

Acting individually Acting for the Court

Panel consists of

Date: July 14, 2016
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#### CITIES OF ABILENE et al., Petitioners, v. PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION OF TEXAS et al., Respondents.

No. D-4044.

Supreme Court of Texas.

July 21, 1995.

Rehearing Overruled Oct. 27, 1995.

Barbara Day, Susan C. Gentz, Jesus Si-fuentes, Walter Washington, Austin, Luis A. Wilmot, San Antonio, for petitioners.

R.S. Davis, II, Thomas C. Pelto, Brook Bennett Brown, Austin, John Andrew Martin, Dallas, Stephen R. Butler, Rosenberg, William G. Mundy, Irving, Anthony Gillman, Austin, John F. Bell, Jr., Fort Worth, Neal R. Larsen, Steven Baron, Norma K. Seogin, Robert J. Hearon, Jr., Edward L. Eckhart, G. Michael Bauer, Selden Anne Wallace, Robin A. Melvin, W. Scott McCollough, Austin, Don R. Richards, Lubbock, Jim Boyle, Austin, for respondents.

PER CURIAM.

This is an administrative appeal from a final order of the Texas Public Utility Commission (PUC) involving Southwestern Bell Telephone Company (Bell) and others. In 1989, the PUC initiated an inquiry into the reasonableness of Bell’s existing rates pursuant to section 42 of the Public Utility Regulatory Act (PURA).1 In 1990, the PUC ordered Bell to reduce its rates to decrease its annual revenue by approximately $73 million. When the PUC determined Bell’s reasonable and necessary operating expenses, it considered, among other things, Bell’s federal income tax liability. In calculating Bell’s federal income tax liability, the PUC did not include the income tax deductions actually taken by Bell for expenses disallowed by section 41(c)(3) of PURA The Office of Public Utility Counsel, the City of McKinney and numerous other cities sought judicial review of the PUC’s order. The trial court affirmed. The court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the PUC erroneously calculated Bell’s federal in*494come tax liability in estimating its operating expenses when it did not include the income tax deductions actually taken by Bell for expenses disallowed by section 41(c)(3). 854 S.W.2d 932.

In *Public Util. Comim’n v. GTE Southwest Inc.,*901 S.W.2d 401 (Tex.1995), this court held that when calculating GTE’s federal income tax liability for the purpose of determining GTE’s reasonable and necessary operating expenses, the PUC was not required to include the income tax deductions actually taken by GTE for expenses disallowed by section 41(c)(3) of PURA. Consequently, pursuant to Rule 170 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, a majority of the court grants the applications for writ of error and, without hearing oral argument, reverses that portion of the court of appeals’ judgment concerning the calculation of Bell’s federal income tax liability which did not include the income tax deductions actually taken by Bell for expenses disallowed by section 41(e)(3). The remainder of the court of appeals’ judgment is affirmed.

1

. Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat. art. 1446c, § 42.
#### Jefferson MARSHALL, Movant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent.

No. 63760.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division One.

Oct. 26, 1993.

Deborah B. Wafer, Sp. Public Defender’s Office, St. Louis, for movant.

*675Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen., Elizabeth L. Ziegler, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.

Before CRANDALL, P.J., and REINHARD and CRIST, JJ.

*ORDER*

PER CURIAM.

Movant, Jefferson Marshall, appeals from the denial of his Rule 24.035 motion without an evidentiary hearing. The judgment of convictions sought to be vacated were for burglary in the first degree and unlawful use of a weapon for which movant was sentenced to concurrent terms of imprisonment of seven years and five years respectively.

The judgment of the motion court is based on findings of fact that are not clearly erroneous; no error of law appears. An opinion would have no precedential value.

The judgment of the motion court is affirmed. Rule 84.16(b).
FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

_____________________________

No. 1D18-0957

_____________________________

SHEDRICK LURRY,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon County.

Martin A. Fitzpatrick, Judge.

July 10, 2018

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

ROBERTS, WETHERELL, and OSTERHAUS, JJ., concur.

_____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or

9.331.

_____________________________
2

Shedrick Lurry, pro se, Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
Exhibit 32.1



Certification

Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

(Subsections (a) and (b) of Section 1350, Chapter 63
of Title 18, United States Code)



Pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and (b) of section 1350, chapter 63 of title 18, United States Code), each of the undersigned officers of Excelsior Venture Partners III, LLC (the Company), does hereby certify, to such
officers knowledge, that:



The Annual Report on Form 10-K for the fiscal
year ended October 31, 2005 (the Form 10-K) of the Company fully complies with the requirements of Section 13 (a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the information contained in the Form 10-K fairly
presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



|                       |  |  |  |  |  |                             |  |                           
|---------------------- |  |  |  |  |  | --------------------------- |  | --------------------------
|                       |  |  | 
|Date: January 27, 2006 |  |  |  |  |  | /s/    LEO P. GROHOWSKI    
|                       |  |  |  |  |  | Name:                       |  | Leo P. Grohowski          
|                       |  |  |  |  |  | Title:                      |  | Co-Chief Executive Officer
|                       |  |  | 
|Date: January 27, 2006 |  |  |  |  |  | /s/    RAGHAV V. NANDAGOPAL
|                       |  |  |  |  |  | Name:                       |  | Raghav V. Nandagopal      
|                       |  |  |  |  |  | Title:                      |  | Co-Chief Executive Officer
|                       |  |  | 
|Date: January 27, 2006 |  |  |  |  |  | /s/    ROBERT F. AUFENANGER
|                       |  |  |  |  |  | Name:                       |  | Robert F. Aufenanger      
|                       |  |  |  |  |  | Title:                      |  | Treasurer                 



The foregoing certification is being
furnished solely pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and (b) of section 1350, chapter 63 of title 18, United States Code) and is not being filed as part of a separate disclosure document.



47
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JAIRO OSWALDO ROCHE-MEJIA,

 Petitioner,

 v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,

 Respondent.

No. 10-73702

Agency No. A070-958-620

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted May 14, 2013** 

Before: LEAVY, THOMAS, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.

Jairo Oswaldo Roche-Mejia, a native and citizen of Guatemala, petitions for

review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal

from an immigration judge’s decision denying his applications for asylum, 

FILED

MAY 17 2013

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

 * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

 ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
withholding of removal, and cancellation of removal. Our jurisdiction is governed

by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We dismiss the petition for review.

We lack jurisdiction to consider Roche-Mejia’s contention that he

established past persecution and fears future persecution on account of imputed

political opinion because he did not raise it to the BIA. See Vargas v. INS, 831

F.2d 906, 907-08 (9th Cir. 1987) (“Failure to raise an issue in an appeal to the BIA

constitutes a failure to exhaust remedies with respect to that question and deprives

this court of jurisdiction to hear the matter.”). Roche-Mejia does not otherwise

challenge the BIA’s denial of asylum and withholding of removal. See Tijani v.

Holder, 628 F.3d 1071, 1080 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Issues not raised and argued in the

opening brief are deemed waived.”). 

We also lack jurisdiction to consider Roche-Mejia’s contention regarding

alleged due process violations relating to the hearing transcript because he failed to

raise it to the BIA. See Vargas, 832 F.3d at 907-08. 

Finally, with respect to Roche-Mejia’s cancellation of removal claim, we

lack jurisdiction to consider his challenge to the agency’s hardship determination. 

See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i); Figueroa v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 487, 494 (9th Cir.

2008) (this court lacks jurisdiction to review BIA’s discretionary determination

that an applicant for cancellation of removal failed to establish that his removal

2 10-73702
would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to U.S. citizen

relatives). 

PETITION FOR REVIEW DISMISSED.

3 10-73702
[Federal Register Volume 61, Number 100 (Wednesday, May 22, 1996)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Page 25604]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 96-12763]



=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

Bureau of Indian Affairs

25 CFR Part 291

RIN 1076-AD67


Establishing Departmental Procedures To Authorize Class III 
Gaming on Indian Lands When a State Raises an Eleventh Amendment 
Defense To Suit Under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act

AGENCY: Bureau of Indian Affairs, Interior.

ACTION: Correction.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: This document corrects the name of the issuing agency and the 
CFR part number for the advance notice of proposed rulemaking regarding 
Class III Indian gaming on Indian lands published on May 10, 1996.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
George Skibine, Director, Indian Gaming Management Staff, (202) 219-
4066.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Beginning on page 21394 in the issue of 
Friday, May 10, 1996, make the following corrections on page 21394:
    1. In the heading of the document, under the heading ``Department 
of the Interior,'' the issuing agency was previously listed as the 
National Indian Gaming Commission. This should be changed to read 
Bureau of Indian Affairs.
    2. In the CFR heading of the document, the CFR citation was 
previously listed as 25 CFR Part 525. This should be changed to read 25 
CFR Part 291.
    3. The agency in the AGENCY caption is corrected to read ``Bureau 
of Indian Affairs, Interior.''

    Dated: May 16, 1996.
Ada E. Deer,
Assistant Secretary--Indian Affairs.
[FR Doc. 96-12763 Filed 5-21-96; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4310-02-M
**EXHIBIT 32**

**CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICERAND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICERPURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

Theundersigned, being the Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer ofVenoco, Inc., a Delaware corporation (the “Issuer”), hereby certify thatthe report on Form 10-Q (the “Report”) of the Issuer for the quarter endedSeptember 30, 2005, which accompanies this certification, fully complies withthe requirements of Section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of1934 and that the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in allmaterial respects, the financial condition and results of operations of theIssuer.
| /s/ TIMOTHY M.  MARQUEZ                |   |
|----------------------------------------|--------|
| Timothy M. Marquez                     |
| *Chief Executive Officer and Chairman* |
| November 21, 2005                 |
| /s/ DAVID B. CHRISTOFFERSON            |   |
| David B. Christofferson                |
| *Chief Financial Officer*              |
| November 21, 2005                 |

 

----