COURT OF APPEALS

DECISION

DATED AND FILED

August 10, 2023

Samuel A. Christensen

Clerk of Court of Appeals

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further editing. If 

published, the official version will appear in 

the bound volume of the Official Reports. 

A party may file with the Supreme Court a 

petition to review an adverse decision by the 

Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 

and RULE 809.62. 

Appeal No. 2022AP404-CR Cir. Ct. No. 1975CF1

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS

DISTRICT IV

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

 PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

 V.

RONALD S. SCHILLING,

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Dane County: 

RHONDA L. LANFORD, Judge. Affirmed. 

Before Kloppenburg, P.J., Graham, and Nashold, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent 

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3). 
No. 2022AP404-CR

2

¶1 PER CURIAM. Ronald Schilling, pro se, appeals the circuit court’s 

order denying his motion for sentence modification. He argues that new factors 

justify modification of his sentence. We conclude that he has not established the 

existence of any new factor. Accordingly, we affirm.1

Background

¶2 In 1976, Schilling was convicted of first-degree murder as party to a 

crime. He stabbed the victim multiple times in the course of an armed robbery 

committed with two co-actors. He was twenty-four years old at the time of the 

offense. 

¶3 The circuit court sentenced Schilling to life imprisonment. Under 

sentencing law then in effect, a term of life imprisonment carried the possibility of 

parole. See WIS. STAT. § 57.06(1)(a) (1975-76).2

¶4 In June 2021, Schilling filed the motion for sentence modification at 

issue here. He alleged that there were multiple new factors justifying modification 

of his sentence, including new research on adolescent brain development and 

factors relating to denial of parole. The circuit court concluded that Schilling had 

not established the existence of any new factor. 

 

1

 Schilling filed his reply brief after the deadline, but the brief was nonetheless accepted 

for filing, and we have considered the reply brief arguments.

2

 Schilling was also convicted of armed robbery as party to a crime. On that charge, the 

circuit court imposed a five-year prison sentence to run concurrent with Schilling’s life sentence 

on the murder charge. 
No. 2022AP404-CR

3

Discussion

¶5 “A new-factor analysis is a two-step process: (1) is there a ‘new 

factor,’ and, if so, (2) does the ‘new factor’ justify modification of the defendant’s 

sentence?” State v. McDermott, 2012 WI App 14, ¶9, 339 Wis. 2d 316, 810 

N.W.2d 237. The defendant has the burden to demonstrate the existence of a new 

factor by clear and convincing evidence. Id. Whether the defendant has satisfied 

that burden is a question of law we decide de novo. Id. If the defendant 

establishes the existence of a new factor, the circuit court has discretion to decide 

whether the new factor justifies modification of the defendant’s sentence. Id.

¶6 The definition of a new factor is set forth in case law. It is “‘a fact 

or set of facts highly relevant to the imposition of sentence, but not known to the 

trial judge at the time of original sentencing, either because it was not then in 

existence or because, even though it was then in existence, it was unknowingly 

overlooked by all of the parties.’” State v. Harbor, 2011 WI 28, ¶40, 333 Wis. 2d

53, 797 N.W.2d 828 (quoted source omitted). 

¶7 Schilling contends that there are five new factors: (1) new research 

on adolescent brain development; (2) changes to parole rules and policies; 

(3) improper influence by the victim’s friends and family and corrections officers

on the parole process and his security classification; (4) his rehabilitation in 

prison; and (5) the COVID-19 pandemic. 

¶8 We address each of these alleged new factors in the discussion 

sections that follow. Because we conclude that Schilling has not established the 

existence of any new factor, there is no need to remand for the circuit court to 

exercise its discretion under the second part of the two-part test for sentence 

modification. See id., ¶38 (“[I]f a court determines that the facts do not constitute 
No. 2022AP404-CR

4

a new factor as a matter of law, ‘it need go no further in its analysis.’” (quoted 

source omitted)).3 

1. Research on Adolescent Brain Development

¶9 Schilling argues that new research on adolescent brain development 

constitutes a new factor. His underlying reasoning is difficult to understand. 

Construing his briefing liberally, we conclude that he argues that this research is 

highly relevant to the imposition of his sentence both because: (1) the research 

indicates that relatively young offenders have less impulse control and should 

therefore be held less culpable for their actions, and (2) the research sheds new 

light on how his difficult childhood or other adverse circumstances in his youth 

influenced his mental health conditions. 

¶10 We reject these arguments because Schilling does not persuade us 

that the research, although new, is highly relevant to the imposition of his 

sentence. On the contrary, Schilling makes a concession that supports a 

conclusion that the research is not highly relevant in his case. 

¶11 According to Schilling, under the sentencing law in effect at the 

time, the circuit court’s only sentencing options were life imprisonment or 

probation.4 And, he acknowledges that probation was not an appropriate option 

 

3

 Schilling argues that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion by failing to 

address some of the new factors that he alleged in his motion for sentence modification. 

Applying de novo review, we address each of the alleged new factors that Schilling raises in this 

appeal. 

4

 The homicide statute under which Schilling was convicted, WIS. STAT. § 940.01(1) 

(1975-76), states: “Whoever causes the death of another human being with intent to kill that

person or another shall be sentenced to life imprisonment.” 
No. 2022AP404-CR

5

for him at the time. He thus effectively concedes that the court had no realistic 

sentencing alternative other than life imprisonment. 

¶12 Given Schilling’s concession and the nature of his crime, it is not 

plausible to suggest that the circuit court might have imposed a different sentence 

if the court had known then what we know now about adolescent brain 

development. The new research on adolescent brain development is therefore not 

highly relevant to the imposition of Schilling’s sentence and not a new factor. 

2. Changes to Parole Rules and Policies

¶13 Schilling argues that changes to parole rules and policies since the 

time of his sentencing constitute a new factor. We reject this argument as 

inconsistent with our supreme court’s decision in State v. Franklin, 148 Wis. 2d

1, 434 N.W.2d 609 (1989). 

¶14 In Franklin, the supreme court held that “for a change in parole 

policy to constitute a new factor, parole policy must have been a relevant factor in 

the original sentencing.” Id. at 15. It further held that a change in parole policy 

“is not a relevant factor unless the court expressly relies on parole eligibility.” Id. 

¶15 Here, the transcript of Schilling’s sentencing hearing shows that the 

circuit court made no reference to parole when imposing sentence. Therefore, any 

change in parole rules or policies is not a new factor for Schilling. 

3. Influence by Victim’s Friends and Family 

¶16 Schilling alleges that the victim’s friends and family, some of whom 

are involved in the correctional system, have engaged in improper efforts to 
No. 2022AP404-CR

6

influence the parole review process. He argues that these alleged improper efforts 

to influence constitute a new factor. 

¶17 We reject this argument because we conclude that, even if Schilling 

proved these allegations, they would not be highly relevant to the imposition of his 

sentence. His central contention appears to be that he has been unfairly and 

improperly denied parole for more than 45 years. However, we are not persuaded 

that the denial of parole, even if improper, can be a new factor for Schilling when 

the circuit court did not reference parole at sentencing, let alone state any 

expectation of when he might be paroled. 

¶18 Schilling additionally alleges that correctional employees have 

improperly influenced his security classification, and he argues that this is also a 

new factor. We conclude that this alleged misconduct is not a new factor because 

it bears no relationship to the basis for Schilling’s sentence and is therefore not 

highly relevant to the imposition of his sentence.5

4. Rehabilitation

¶19 Schilling appears to argue that his rehabilitation in prison is a new 

factor, although in his reply brief he concedes that rehabilitation is “not in and of 

 

5

 This is not to say that Schilling is without any means to obtain judicial review of any 

alleged irregularities relating to the parole review process or his security classification. However,

judicial review would likely be by petition for a writ of certiorari, and he would need to satisfy 

applicable procedural requirements, including any requirement relating to exhaustion of 

administrative remedies. See State ex rel. Johnson v. Cady, 50 Wis. 2d 540, 549-50, 185 

N.W.2d 306 (1971) (holding that judicial review of a parole revocation decision is by writ of 

certiorari); Richards v. Graham, 2011 WI App 100, ¶5, 336 Wis. 2d 175, 801 N.W.2d 821 

(reviewing a parole commission decision by writ of certiorari); State ex rel. Richards v. Traut, 

145 Wis. 2d 677, 678-81, 429 N.W.2d 81 (Ct. App. 1988) (reviewing the denial of an inmate’s 

internal request for a change in security classification by writ of certiorari).
No. 2022AP404-CR

7

itself” a new factor. We agree with this concession because it is well settled that 

rehabilitation is generally not a new factor. See State v. Kluck, 210 Wis. 2d 1, 7, 

563 N.W.2d 468 (1997) (“[C]ourts of this state have repeatedly held that 

rehabilitation is not a ‘new factor’ for purposes of sentence modification.”).

5. COVID-19 Pandemic

¶20 Schilling argues that the COVID-19 pandemic is a new factor. 

Although the pandemic was not in existence at the time of his sentence, Schilling 

does not explain how the pandemic or its consequences are highly relevant to the 

imposition of his sentence. We therefore conclude that the pandemic is not a new 

factor here.

Conclusion

¶21 In sum, for the reasons stated above, we affirm the circuit court’s 

order denying Schilling’s motion for sentence modification. 

By the Court.—Order affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.

RULE 809.23(1)(b)5. (2021-22).

6

 

6

 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2021-22 version unless otherwise 

noted.