## In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth

___________________________ No. 02

- 18

- 00109

- CV

___________________________

On Appeal from the 67th District Court Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 067

- 294048

- 17

Before Gabriel, Kerr, and Pi ttman, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Gabriel 

### C RESTOR 

### G LOBAL 

### I NVESTMENTS 

### D ELAWARE 

### LLC , Appellant

V


### . W ILMINGTON 

### T RUST 

### , N ATIONAL 

### A SSOCIATION 

### , AS 

### T RUSTEE FOR THE 

### R EGISTERED 

### H OLDERS OF 

### C OLONY 

### A MERICAN 

### F INANCE 

### 2015

- 1 M ORTGAGE



### - B ACKED 

### N OTES 

### ; C HRISTOPHER 

### C HAUVIN 

### , I NDIVIDUALLY 

### ; C OLONY 

### A MERICAN 

### F INANCE 

### L ENDER 

### , LLC; AND 

### C OLONY 

### A MERICAN 

### F INANCE 

### 2015

- 1, L TD 

### , A 

### C AYMAN 

### I SLANDS 

### C OMPANY 

### , Appellees2 MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellant Crestor Global Investments Delaware LLC (Crestor) attempts to appeal the trial court’s interlocutory order denying its motion to vacate a previous order appointing a receiver. See Tex . Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(2) (West Supp. 2018 ). Appellees filed a motion to dismiss contending this appeal is

moot. We agree. Accordingly, we grant a ppellees ’ motion to dismiss and dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction.
A p pellee Colony American Finance Lender , LLC (Colony) loaned Crestor nearly $2.5 million to use in connection with twenty

- six rental homes located in Dallas
and Tarrant counties. In exchange for the funds , Crestor agreed to repay the loan
with interest and secured that agreement by executing two deeds of trust covering the
twenty

- six rental homes

. Alleging that Crestor had defaulted on its loan payments and was presumed to be insolvent , appellees filed on August 22, 2017, a n application for the appointment of a temporary receiver , asserting that Crestor’s defaults had placed the twenty

- six rental homes in imminent danger of being lost or damaged. On September 14, 2017, the trial court signed an agreed order appointing a receiver for the twenty

- six rental ho mes. On February 26, 2018, Crestor filed a motion to vacate the trial court’s September 14th agreed order appointing a receiver , alleging that in the proposed
order appellees presented to the court , which the trial court ultimately signed, appellees had , without authorization, included an electronic signature of Crestor’s3

president to indicate Crestor agreed to the order

. After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found there was “ ample evidence ” that Crestor had agreed to the receivership and consequently denied the motion to vacate the September 14th receivership order

. Crestor then brought this interlocutory appeal from that denial.
See id. (authorizing interlocutory appe al from an order that “overrules a motion to
vacate an order that appoints a receiver”). In its brief, Crestor has raised fiv e issues, each of which asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by denying its motion to vacate the September 14th receivership order. And the relief it seeks from this court is that we reverse the trial
court’s order denying the motion to vacate and render an order vacating the September 14th receivership order. In their motion to dismiss, appel lees assert that this appeal is moot because the trial court has discharged the receiver a nd all receivership property has been sold or otherwise removed from the receivership

. Crestor has not filed a response to appellees’ motion to dismiss. Appellees attached as an exhibit to their motion to dismiss a certified copy of
an order the trial c ourt signed on July 12, 2018. That order states that the trial court found that “[a]s a result of the transfer of the [p] roperty, the receivership is no longer

neces sary for the protection of the [p] roperty, and Receiver should be excused from
the further performance of his duties.” “A case becomes moot if, since the time of filing, there has ceased to exist a justiciable controversy between the parties

— that is, if the issues presented are no4

longer ‘live,’ or if the parties lack a legally cognizable in terest in the outcome.” Heckman v. Williamson Cty. , 369 S.W.3d 137, 162 (Tex. 2012). In simple terms, a case is
moot when the court’ s action on the m erits cannot affect the parties’ rights or
interests. Id. If a case is or becomes moot, the court must vacate any order or judgment previously issued and dismiss the c ase for want of jurisdiction. Id. When a trial court appoints a receiver to sell real property, and the real property is sold after the appellant has perfected its appeal, the appeal of the appointment of
the receiver becomes moot. See Mitchell v. Turbine Res. Unlimited, Inc. , 523 S.W.3d 189,
19 6 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, pet. denied) ; Pirate’s Lake, Ltd. v. Vestin Realty Mortgage I, Inc. , No. 14

- 08

- 00085

- CV, 2008 WL 3833618, at *2 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 12, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.). Here, t he property subject to the receivership has been transferred, and the trial court has discharged the
receiver. It follows that the trial court’s order discharging the receiver extinguished the controversy between the parties as to the only issue presented in this appeal: the propriety of the trial court’s order denying Crestor’s motion to vacate the receivership
order. Accordingly, we conclude this appeal has become moot. See Heckman , 369 S.W.3d at 162. We therefore grant appellees’ motion to dismiss and dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(f) ; Heckman , 369 S.W.3d at
162

.5 /s/ Lee Gabriel
Lee Gabriel Justice
Delivered: October 4, 2018