Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1608-CR-1919 | March 22, 2017 Page 1 of 5

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Valerie K. Boots

Marion County Public Defender Agency

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Justin F. Roebel

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

John Edward Williams,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

March 22, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

49A05-1608-CR-1919

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court

The Honorable David M. Hooper, 

Magistrate

Trial Court Cause No.

49G12-1506-CM-22606

Mathias, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1608-CR-1919 | March 22, 2017 Page 2 of 5

[1] John Edward Williams (“Williams”) was convicted in Marion Superior Court 

of Class B misdemeanor criminal recklessness. Williams appeals his conviction 

and argues that the State failed to prove that his acts were reckless.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On or about June 26, 2015, Williams reported that his girlfriend’s 1985 tancolored Pontiac Parisienne had been stolen. On June 28, 2015, Williams 

observed what he believed to be the stolen vehicle traveling southbound on 

Interstate 65. He began to follow the vehicle, which was driven by Trent Wilson 

(“Wilson”). Wilson’s girlfriend was in the passenger seat, and his two young

nephews were in the back seat.

[4] Wilson exited the interstate onto Raymond Street and proceeded west toward 

Shelby Street. He observed that Williams’s vehicle was still following him 

closely. Wilson stopped that the intersection of Raymond and Shelby Streets 

and planned to turn north onto Shelby Street. Wilson stopped at the 

intersection to allow a fire truck to pass. His vehicle was then hit from behind 

by Williams’s vehicle. 

[5] Wilson began to pull over to check for damage to his car when Williams struck 

his vehicle again. Williams used his vehicle to push Wilson’s vehicle down the 

street approximately ten yards and up onto the curb. Damage to Wilson’s 

vehicle included a bent front driver’s side tire rim, a crack in the hood, and 

broken tail lights.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1608-CR-1919 | March 22, 2017 Page 3 of 5

[6] Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department Officer Jennifer Asher (“Officer 

Asher”) was on duty near the 2100 block of Shelby Street. Williams waved 

Officer Asher down and reported that Wilson’s vehicle was the vehicle that 

Williams had reported stolen two days prior. Williams gave Officer Asher the 

stolen vehicle’s title and told her that he rear-ended the vehicle to get it to stop. 

Tr. pp. 14, 22. The officer checked the VIN numbers of Wilson’s vehicle and 

the vehicle described on Williams’ title, but the numbers did not match.

[7] Officer Asher told Williams that he was mistaken and Wilson’s vehicle was not 

the one that had been reported stolen. Williams asked if he could apologize to 

the driver and explained that Wilson’s car looked just like the stolen vehicle.

[8] The next day, Williams was charged with Class B misdemeanor criminal 

recklessness. Williams was found guilty as charged at a bench trial held on July 

28, 2016. He was sentenced to time served and ordered to complete forty hours 

of community service. Williams now appeals.

Standard of Review

[9] Williams argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that 

he committed Class B misdemeanor criminal recklessness.

When we review a claim challenging the sufficiency of the 

evidence we neither reweigh the evidence nor assess the 

credibility of the witnesses. Instead, we consider only the 

evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom that support 

the [judgment]. And we will affirm the conviction if there is 

probative evidence from which [the fact-finder] could have found 

the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1608-CR-1919 | March 22, 2017 Page 4 of 5

Suggs v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1190, 1193 (Ind. 2016) (citing Treadway v. State, 924 

N.E.2d 621, 639 (Ind. 2010)).

Discussion and Decision

[10] To convict Williams of Class B misdemeanor criminal recklessness, the State 

was required to prove that Williams recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally 

performed an act that created a substantial risk of bodily injury to another 

person. See Ind. Code § 35-42-2-2. The State specifically alleged that Williams’

reckless, knowing, or intentional act of striking Wilson’s vehicle created a 

substantial risk of bodily injury to Wilson. Appellant’s App. p. 16.

[11] Relying on his own testimony at trial, Williams argues that the State failed to

prove that he acted recklessly. He claims that he accidentally struck Wilson’s 

vehicle and specifically that “the impact occurred as he was looking over his 

right shoulder for the police officer he had seen at the intersection.” Appellant’s 

Br. at 8 (citing tr. pp. 38-39).

[12] “A person engages in conduct ‘recklessly’ if he engages in the conduct in plain, 

conscious, and unjustifiable disregard of harm that might result and the 

disregard involves a substantial deviation from acceptable standards of 

conduct.” Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2. Rear-ending another vehicle is generally

negligent conduct that our courts will not consider a criminally reckless act. Cf. 

Clancy v. State, 829 N.E.2d 203, 207 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (observing that “proof 

that an automobile accident ‘arose out of the inadvertence, lack of attention, 

forgetfulness or thoughtfulness of the driver of a vehicle, or from an error of 
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judgment on his part,’ is not sufficient evidence of recklessness”), trans. denied

(citation omitted).

[13] However, in this case, the State presented evidence that Williams deliberately 

struck Wilson’s vehicle so that the vehicle would come to a stop. When he 

struck Wilson’s vehicle a second time, he pushed the vehicle almost ten yards 

and up over the curb. Williams then told Wilson that Wilson’s vehicle was his 

and had been stolen. Tr. p. 29. Damages to Wilson’s vehicle included a bent 

front driver’s side tire rim, a crack in the hood of the car, and broken taillights.

[14] Williams challenges the credibility of the State’s evidence and requests that we 

credit his testimony that his acts were merely negligent. It is more than wellsettled that our court will not reweigh the evidence or credibility of the 

witnesses. See Suggs, 51 N.E.3d at 1193. For these reasons, we conclude that the 

State presented sufficient evidence that Williams acted recklessly. We therefore 

affirm his conviction for Class B misdemeanor criminal recklessness.

[15] Affirmed.

Baker, J., and Pyle, J., concur.