UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

JANE DOE, : 

 : 

Plaintiff, : Civil Action No.: 22-3474 (RC)

 : 

 v. : Re Document No.: 7 

 : 

LLOYD AUSTIN, III, : 

Secretary of Defense, : 

 : 

Defendant. : 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO PROCEED UNDER PSEUDONYM

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, a former intelligence officer for the Defense Intelligence Agency, moves to 

proceed pseudonymously in this action bringing claims largely under Title VII of the Civil 

Rights Act of 1964 against Defendant Lloyd Austin in his official capacity as Secretary of 

Defense (“Defendant”). Plaintiff alleges she suffered discrimination based on her race and 

national origin, retaliation for protected activity, and a hostile work environment, as well as a 

violation of due process when her security clearance was reconsidered without her participation. 

Plaintiff moves to proceed under pseudonym because she worked anonymously in her 

intelligence role, and because disclosure of her identity could impair future work in the defense 

industry and crucially, place her and her loved ones at risk of retaliation and violence from 

hostile foreign actors. Defendant opposes, saying that Plaintiff has not met her burden of 

showing she deserves to proceed anonymously. For the reasons stated below, the Court will 

grant the motion to proceed under pseudonym. 
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II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff served as an intern, and then as a full-time “Human Intelligence (HUMINT) 

Intelligence Officer,” in the clandestine operations division of the Defense Intelligence Agency, 

a subagency of the Department of Defense, from March 28, 2011 through October 15, 2014. 

Pl.’s Decl. ¶ 3, ECF No. 7-1; First Am. Compl. (“Am. Compl.”) ¶¶ 12, 63, ECF No. 16. This

position “involved participating in clandestine operations in hostile foreign nations, and 

operating on behalf of the United States, with a particular focus on nations adversarial to the 

U.S.” Pl.’s Decl. ¶ 4. Plaintiff worked “anonymously in this capacity, operating under a 

pseudonym to protect [her] identity and the identities of [her] family members and loved ones.” 

Id. ¶ 3. Plaintiff is Chinese American by ethnicity, and a naturalized United States citizen who 

previously held but renounced her United Kingdom citizenship. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 2, 25. 

Plaintiff alleges that the Agency targeted her based on her race and national origin, and in 

retaliation for engaging in protected activity. Id. ¶ 2. For example, Plaintiff alleges that after she 

returned to work from a pre-authorized vacation to Jamaica, where she participated in a beauty 

pageant, an Agency security official interrogated her about her trip and asked her to take a 

polygraph. Id. ¶¶ 14–18. The polygraph was followed by further meetings, including an Agency 

official’s insistence that Plaintiff write a Statement of Allegiance to the United States, even 

though Agency policy only required dual citizens to write such statements. Id. ¶¶ 19–23, 25–26. 

Plaintiff alleges the Agency also took discriminatory action against her for participating in 

gatherings with other Asian American intelligence professionals. Id. ¶¶ 31–32. After Plaintiff 

filed an informal complaint of discrimination with the Agency’s Equal Employment Office, the 

harassment and discrimination against Plaintiff persisted, with more meetings, polygraphs, and a 

counterintelligence risk assessment of Plaintiff. Id. ¶¶ 34–46. Indeed, Plaintiff alleges that many 
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of these events were in retaliation for her complaint. Id. ¶¶ 37–41. Plaintiff names one specific 

security official as a driving force in the discrimination and retaliation, id. ¶ 36, but also alleges 

involvement by numerous others and a continuously hostile work environment. Id. ¶¶ 44, 49. 

 In the end, Plaintiff was involuntarily and indefinitely suspended, had her security 

clearance revoked, and was eventually removed from federal service. Id. ¶¶ 55–65. Plaintiff 

alleges that knowingly inaccurate accusations about her conduct and foreign influence were used 

as a pretext to cover up discrimination and retaliation. Id. Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant 

continued to interfere with her employment prospects and her ability to obtain a security 

clearance. Id. ¶ 64. Although these allegations are absent from the amended complaint, 

Plaintiff’s declaration attached to her reply in support of this motion alleges that “while Plaintiff 

ceased to work for Defendant nine years ago, Plaintiff has worked in roles that involve sensitive 

national security information, including 4.5 years in the Army Reserves and 5.5 years for 

government contractors.” Pl.’s Reply Further Support Motion Proceed Under Pseudonym (“Pl.’s 

Reply”) at 2, ECF No. 15 (citing Pl.’s Reply Decl. ¶ 1, ECF No. 15-1). Like during her time 

with the Agency, she uses a pseudonym in those roles. Id. In 2023, Plaintiff received notice that 

“a request for reconsideration of the revocation of her security clearance had been denied” and 

alleges she did not receive proper procedural protections related to this reconsideration. Am. 

Compl. ¶ 65. Plaintiff now brings four counts against Defendant: disparate treatment based on 

her race and national origin (Count I); hostile work environment based on her race and national 

origin (Count II); unlawful retaliation based on her protected EEO activities (Count III); and a 

due process claim based on the revocation of her security clearance (Count IV). Id. ¶¶ 70–81. 

Plaintiff filed her original complaint in this action on November 11, 2022. See Compl., 

ECF No. 1. Plaintiff’s initial Motion to Proceed Under Pseudonym, ECF No. 2, was presented to 
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then-Chief Judge Beryl Howell, who granted the motion “subject to any further consideration by 

the United States District Judge to whom this case is randomly assigned.” Mem. & Order, Nov. 

14, 2022, at 1, ECF No. 3. In granting the motion, the court emphasized that “[a]ny general 

presumption in favor of open proceedings or public interest in disclosing plaintiff’s identity is 

significantly outweighed by the highly sensitive nature of the information implicated and the 

personal security risk that plaintiff, her loved ones and other non-parties could face if the 

information were made public.” Id. at 7. 

After the case was assigned to this Court, Plaintiff again moved to proceed under 

pseudonym. See Pl.’s Mot. Proceed Under Pseudonym, ECF No. 7. Defendant has responded 

and the motion is ripe for decision. See Def.’s Opp. Mot. Proceed Under Pseudonym, ECF No. 

13; Pl.’s Reply. 

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Plaintiffs generally must proceed by name. Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a) (“The title of the 

complaint must name all the parties.”). This rule promotes a “presumption in favor of disclosure 

[of litigants’ identities], which stems from the ‘general public interest in the openness of 

governmental processes,’ . . . and, more specifically, from the tradition of open judicial 

proceedings.” In re Sealed Case, 931 F.3d 92, 96 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (internal citations omitted) 

(quoting Wash. Legal Found. v. U.S. Sent’g Comm’n, 89 F.3d 897, 899 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). That 

“presumption of openness in judicial proceedings is a bedrock principle of our judicial system.” 

In re Sealed Case, 971 F.3d 324, 325 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (citing Courthouse News Serv. v. Planet, 

947 F.3d 581, 589 (9th Cir. 2020)). Accordingly, courts “generally require parties to a lawsuit to 

openly identify themselves to protect the public’s legitimate interest in knowing all of the facts 
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involved, including the identities of the parties.” Id. at 326 (internal quotation marks omitted) 

(quoting United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448, 1463 (per curiam) (D.C. Cir. 1995)). 

Nonetheless, in special circumstances, courts may permit a party to proceed 

anonymously. A party seeking anonymity “bears the weighty burden of both demonstrating a 

concrete need for such secrecy, and identifying the consequences that would likely befall it if 

forced to proceed in its own name.” In re Sealed Case, 971 F.3d at 326. Once that showing has 

been made, “the court must then ‘balance the litigant’s legitimate interest in anonymity against 

countervailing interests in full disclosure.’” Id. (quoting In re Sealed Case, 931 F.3d at 96). 

When weighing those concerns, five factors, initially drawn from James v. Jacobson, 6 F.3d 233, 

238 (4th Cir. 1993), serve as “guideposts from which a court ought to begin its analysis.” In re 

Sealed Case, 931 F.3d at 97. These five factors are: 

(1) whether the justification asserted by the requesting party is merely to avoid 

the annoyance and criticism that may attend any litigation or is to preserve 

privacy in a matter of [a] sensitive and highly personal nature; (2) whether 

identification poses a risk of retaliatory physical or mental harm to the 

requesting party or[,] even more critically, to innocent non-parties; (3) the ages 

of the persons whose privacy interests are sought to be protected; (4) whether 

the action is against a governmental or private party; and relatedly, (5) the risk 

of unfairness to the opposing party from allowing an action against it to proceed 

anonymously. 

Id. (citing James, 6 F.3d at 238). 

This “balancing test is necessarily flexible and fact driven” and the five factors are “nonexhaustive.” In re Sealed Case, 971 F.3d at 326. A court must not simply “engage in a wooden 

exercise of ticking the five boxes.” In re Sealed Case, 931 F.3d at 97. In exercising discretion 

“to grant the rare dispensation of anonymity . . . the court has ‘a judicial duty to inquire into the 

circumstances of particular cases to determine whether the dispensation is warranted’ . . . 

tak[ing] into account the risk of unfairness to the opposing party, as well the customary and 
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constitutionally-embedded presumption of openness in judicial proceedings.” Microsoft, 56 F.3d 

at 1463 (quoting James, 6 F.3d at 238) (other internal citations and quotation marks omitted)).

IV. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff has shown that her privacy interests, which stem from a serious risk of 

retaliation from foreign actors if her identity is revealed, are greater than any unfairness to 

Defendant and override the public interest in open judicial proceedings. The Court will therefore 

continue to allow her to proceed under pseudonym. 

The first factor weighs in favor of Plaintiff. Plaintiff’s justification for proceeding 

pseudonymously is not to “avoid the annoyance and criticism that may attend any litigation” but 

to “preserve privacy in a matter of sensitive and highly personal nature.” In re Sealed Case, 931 

F.3d at 97 (citing James, 6 F.3d at 238). The D.C. Circuit has emphasized that the first factor 

“commonly involves intimate issues such as sexual activities, reproductive rights, bodily 

autonomy, medical concerns, or the identity of abused minors.” In re Sealed Case, 971 F.3d at 

327. Plaintiff’s asserted interests do not neatly line up with these types of issues, which seem to 

focus on matters that would be potentially embarrassing, traumatic, or that otherwise impede on 

an individual’s personal life. Cf. Doe v. Bogan, 542 F. Supp. 3d 19, 23 (D.D.C. 2021) 

(emphasizing the “sexual activities, reproductive rights, bodily autonomy, medical concerns, or 

the identity of abused minors” language when analyzing the first factor) (quoting In re Sealed 

Case, 931 F.3d at 97). But even though Plaintiff’s identity as a covert U.S. intelligence officer

does not exactly match such topics, it is surely sensitive and highly personal. Given that the 

D.C. Circuit has emphasized that the appropriate inquiry is “flexible and fact driven,” In re 

Sealed Case, 971 F.3d at 326, and also that the five factors are “non-exhaustive” anyway, id, the 
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Court is comfortable finding that Plaintiff’s interests move the first factor in her favor. See 

Mem. & Order, Nov. 14, 2022 (finding that first factor favors Plaintiff).

Relatedly, the second factor strongly weighs toward allowing Plaintiff to proceed under 

pseudonym. Plaintiff requests a pseudonym not because of her discrimination claims against 

Defendant, but because of her sensitive role as a Defense Intelligence Agency intelligence 

officer: a role where she was required to operate under pseudonym. Pl. Decl. ¶ 3. If her identity 

is now revealed in this litigation, Plaintiff may draw the attention of hostile foreign actors. 

Id. ¶ 5. Accordingly, Plaintiff and her loved ones would be in immediate danger of retaliation, 

capture, ransom, abduction, or death. See id. ¶¶ 5–6. The collateral damage could go even

further. Because Plaintiff worked under a pseudonym in her Agency position, id. ¶ 3, revealing 

her identity as a secret U.S. intelligence officer may endanger any persons she associated with in

that role. This interest has previously justified the use of a pseudonym. See, e.g., Peary v. Goss, 

365 F. Supp. 2d 713, 716 n.1 (E.D. Va. 2005) (noting that the plaintiff, a former CIA officer, 

“has adopted a pseudonym for the purpose of this litigation to preserve CIA operational 

security”). Thus, releasing Plaintiff’s name would “pose[] a risk of retaliatory physical or mental 

harm to the requesting party or[,] even more critically, to innocent non-parties.” In re Sealed 

Case, 931 F.3d at 97 (quoting James, 6 F.3d at 238). 

In another issue that the parties seem to group under the second factor, Plaintiff also 

alleges that she will suffer additional harm because she continues to work in support of the U.S. 

intelligence community in roles that require a pseudonym. Pl.’s Reply Decl. ¶¶ 1–2. The Court 

agrees that this action resembles Bird v. Barr, No. 19-cv-1581, 2019 WL 2870234 (D.D.C. July 

3, 2019), where a group of plaintiffs who were employed as New Agency Trainees and 

Intelligence Analyst Trainees sought to sue the Department of Justice anonymously because the 
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nature of their work required them to remain anonymous and minimize public exposure. Id. at 

*1. The Court allowed all but one of the plaintiffs to proceed under pseudonym because their 

safety and careers could be at risk if their names were to be revealed. Id. at *5. This interest, 

too, favors allowing Plaintiff to proceed under pseudonym. 

The third and fourth factors slightly weigh against allowing Plaintiff to proceed under 

pseudonym. For the third factor, Plaintiff is an adult and does not allege that any minors would 

be at risk if her identity is revealed. See id. (considering “the ages of the persons whose privacy 

interests are sought to be protected”); see generally Am. Compl. And regarding the fourth 

factor, “there is a heightened public interest when an individual or entity files a suit against the 

government.” In re Sealed Case, 971 F.3d at 329. Still, while Plaintiff alleges that she suffered 

from pervasive discrimination during her employment with the government, this is not a case 

where “the party asking to proceed anonymously seeks to alter the operation of public law both 

as applied to it and, by virtue of the legal arguments presented, to other parties going forward.” 

Id. (observing that the public interest is “intensified” in such circumstances). Defendant notes 

that Plaintiff has identified one Defense Intelligence Agency employee by name and alleged that 

her conduct was racially discriminatory. See Am. Compl. ¶ 46. Because Plaintiff seeks to enjoy 

the protection of a pseudonym while lobbing accusations at others, and because the public 

generally has an interest in the full details of litigation against the government, the fourth factor

moderately tilts toward disclosure. See Doe v. Rogers, 12-cv-1229 (TFH), 2023 WL 1470007, 

*3 (D.D.C. Feb. 2, 2023) (“the plaintiff disparages government employees while proceeding 

pseudonymously. . . [t]his factor thus weighs in favor of disclosure.”). 

Lastly, the fifth factor favors Plaintiff because Defendant would suffer no “risk of 

unfairness” if Plaintiff’s motion were granted. See In re Sealed Case, 931 F.3d at 97 (quoting 
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James, 6 F.3d at 238). Plaintiff has provided Defendant with her identifying information in a 

sealed declaration; allowing her to proceed anonymously will not harm Defendant’s ability to 

defend this action. See Bird, 2019 WL 2870234, at *6 (finding that fifth factor favored 

proceeding under pseudonym when plaintiffs had already disclosed their identities to the 

defendant in discrimination complaints). And as Plaintiff notes, Defendant itself faces potential 

harm to its operations and employees if Plaintiff’s identity is disclosed, illustrated by how 

Defendant previously sought to keep her identity secret. See Ex. B, Pl.’s Reply, April 3–9, 2014 

email chain (discussing efforts to protect Plaintiff’s identity in EEOC case), ECF No. 15-2. 

All in all, the risk of harm to Plaintiff and others is decisive and outweighs 

“countervailing interests in full disclosure.” In re Sealed Case, 931 F.3d at 96. While the public 

interest in open proceedings is mighty, Plaintiff has shown that disclosing her identity could spur 

hostile foreign actors to target, injure, or even kill her or others. To avoid this outcome, and in 

light of Defendant’s modest opposing interests, the Court will allow Plaintiff to proceed under 

pseudonym. 

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed Under Pseudonym (ECF No. 7). 

is GRANTED. It is hereby: 

ORDERED that Plaintiff may proceed with the case using the pseudonym “Jane Doe”; 

and it is 

FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant is prohibited from publicly disclosing Plaintiff’s 

identity or any personal identifying information that could lead to the identification of Plaintiff 

by nonparties, except for the purposes of investigating the allegations contained in the Amended 
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Complaint and for preparing any responses or motions, and Defendant may not include 

Plaintiff’s name in any pleadings. 

SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 29, 2024 RUDOLPH CONTRERAS

United States District Judge