19622 Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 86 / Thursday, May 2, 1996 / Notices

standing as a party in interest in another

proceeding in the FM broadcast service

); WIBF Broadcasting, 17 FCC 2d 876,

877 (1969) (same).

8. In their Application for Review,

Petitioners rely on the holding in United

Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994,

1005 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (‘‘UCC’’). for the

proposition that they have standing as

representatives of the public interest. As

Pacific Telesis points out, in UCC there

were specific allegations by the party

filing the petition to deny that the

broadcast station in question was

ignoring the needs of a major segment

of the listening audience. In this case,

Petitioners make no allegations and no

party has submitted any evidence that

the A and B block licensees will fail to

provide adequate service to any segment

of the population. Petitioners’ major

complaint appears to be that they would

have preferred entities other than the

successful bidders to have received the

A and B block licenses. This is not

sufficient to support a petition to deny.

Petitioners fail to demonstrate how they

will be harmed, either as consumers or

potential bidders, by the granting of

licenses to the A and B block winners.

Accordingly, we conclude, as did the

Bureau, that Petitioners have not alleged

sufficient facts in this case to

demonstrate that it has standing to

challenge the A and B block licenses.

We agree with the Bureau that a

potential PCS bidder could allege facts

sufficient to establish standing to

challenge another PCS application by

showing that grant of that application

would cause them demonstrable injury.

See A & B Block Order at 5.

9. Petitioners repeat the argument

previously made to the Bureau that the

Commission failed to adopt specific

provisions in the A and B block auction,

which Petitioners contend is a violation

of Section 309(j) of the Act. Pacific

Telesis points out in opposition that

Petitioners fail to address the Bureau’s

holding that this argument constitutes

an untimely petition for reconsideration

of the Commission’s broadband PCS

auction rules rather than a valid basis

for a petition to deny. We agree. The

Bureau properly concluded that the

purpose of the petition to deny process

is to assess challenges to applicants’

qualifications to be Commission

licensees. Petitioners’ statutory

argument does not address licensee

qualifications, however, but challenges

the structure of the A and B block

auction itself. We agree with the Bureau

that Petitioners’ argument was not a

valid petition to deny, but was instead

a belated attempt to revisit the

Commission’s auction rules for

licensing of the A and B blocks. In the

Fifth Report and Order in Docket No.

93–253, 59 FR 37566 (July 22, 1994), the

Commission decided against making

special provisions for designated

entities on the A and B blocks. We

determined that this approach fully

complied with Section 309(j) and

affirmed this conclusion on

reconsideration more than ten months

before Petitioners filed their petition.

Petitioners’ attempt to challenge the

rules again through the petition to deny

process is therefore untimely and

procedurally improper.

10. Petitioners also reiterate their

allegation that the dominant carriers

have divided the PCS licenses in an

unlawful territorial allocation. We agree

with the Bureau that Petitioners have

failed to provide evidence supporting

this allegation or otherwise to

demonstrate that a grant of the A and B

block applications would be

inconsistent with the public interest.

Under Section 309(d)(1) of the

Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 309

(d)(1), parties filing a petition to deny

must make specific allegations of fact

sufficient to show that a grant of the

application would be prima facie

inconsistent with the public interest,

convenience, and necessity. Except

where official notice may be taken, such

allegations must be supported by

affidavits of persons with personal

knowledge of the facts alleged. Section

309(d)(2) states that if the pleadings and

affidavits fail to raise substantial and

material questions of fact and the

Commission concludes that grant of the

application would be in the public

interest, the Commission shall deny the

petition. 47 U.S.C. § 309(d)(2).

11. In support of their claim of

territorial allocation both before the

Bureau and now before the Commission,

Petitioners allege only that three

companies—AT&T Wireless PCS, PCS

Primeco, and WirelessCo—won 61% of

the A and B block licenses. Petitioners

suggest that this constitutes

‘‘circumstantial evidence’’ that is not

only enough to support a petition to

deny, but ‘‘a jury verdict finding a

conspiracy which violates antitrust

laws.’’ A petition to deny must ‘‘contain

specific allegations of fact sufficient to

show * * * that a grant of the

application would be prima facie

inconsistent with [the public interest].’’

Where the Commission finds that such

a showing has not been made, it may

refuse the petition to deny on the basis

of ‘‘a concise statement of the reasons

for denying the petition, which

statement shall dispose of all substantial

issues raised by the petition.’’ In this

instance, we find that petitioners’

allegation of territorial allocation does

not constitute a showing that the grant

to the A and B block winners was prima

facie inconsistent with the public

interest. We agree with the Bureau that

Petitioners have failed to raise a

substantial or material question of fact

based on these allegations. First,

Petitioners offer no grounds for denying

the applications of the fifteen auction

winners other than AT&T, PCS Primeco,

and WirelessCo. Second, with respect to

these latter three applicants, Petitioners

fail to provide any factual evidence of

collusion. Contrary to Petitioners’

contention that the Bureau improperly

required a ‘‘smoking gun,’’ we agree

with the Bureau’s conclusion that

Petitioners must provide a modicum of

a factual showing that collusion

occurred—particularly in an auction

that lasted over three months and

resulted in aggregate winning bids of

nearly $8 billion by 18 different parties.

Petitioners introduce no evidence

showing that AT&T, PCS Primeco,

WirelessCo, or any other A or B block

winner has violated any of the

Commission’s rules, including the

collusion rules or the rules regarding

aggregation of PCS spectrum. We also

agree with Western that the bidding

patterns were determined to a large

degree by the desire of individual

applicants to acquire national wireless

footprints and/or to acquire markets

complementing their existing

telecommunications holdings. We

therefore find Petitioners’ allegation of

collusion to be without merit.

V. Conclusion

12. For the reasons discussed above,

we are dismissing Petitioners’

Application for Review for failure to

comply with Section 1.115(b)(2) of our

rules. Although our action renders

further discussion unnecessary, we

agree with the Bureau’s disposition of

the issues Petitioners raised in their

original Petition to Deny.

V. Ordering Clause

13. Accordingly, it is ordered

pursuant to Section 4(i) of the

Communications Act of 1934, as

amended, 47 U.S.C. § 154(i), and

Section 1.115(b)(2) of the Commission’s

Rules, 47 CFR § 1.115(b)(2), that the

Application for Review filed by

Petitioners on July 21, 1995, is denied.

Federal Communications Commission.

William F. Caton,

Acting Secretary.

[FR Doc. 96–10615 Filed 5–01–96; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6712–01–P
Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 86 / Thursday, May 2, 1996 / Notices 19623

[PP Docket No. 93–253; ET Docket No. 92–

100; FCC 96–139]

Deferral of Licensing of MTA

Commercial Broadband PCS

AGENCY: Federal Communications

Commission.

ACTION: Determination on application

for review.

SUMMARY: The Commission released this

Memorandum Opinion and Order

(MO&O) to address an Application for

Review filed by the National

Association of Black Owned

Broadcasters, Percy E. Sutton, and the

National Association for the

Advancement of Colored People. This

MO&O denies the application. The

MO&O is necessary to answer the issues

addressed in the application. The

intended affect of this action is to

resolve the issues set forth in the

application.

EFFECTIVE DATE: July 1, 1996.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: John

Greenspan, (202) 418–0620, Wireless

Telecommunications Bureau,

Commercial Wireless Division.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is the

text of the MO&O, adopted March 28,

1996, released April 1, 1996. This order

is available for inspection and copying

during normal business hours at the

Commercial Wireless Division Legal

Branch, Room 7130, 2025 M Street,

N.W., Washington, D.C., and also may

be purchased from the Commission’s

copy contractor, International

Transcription Service, at (202) 857–

3800, 2100 M Street, N.W., Suite 140,

Washington, D.C. 20037.

Memorandum Opinion and Order

I. Introduction

1. The Commission has before it an

Application for Review filed on July 21,

1995 by the National Association of

Black Owned Broadcasters, Percy E.

Sutton, and the National Association for

the Advancement of Colored People

(collectively ‘‘Petitioners’’). Petitioners

seek review of a June 23, 1995 Order by

the Chief, Wireless Telecommunications

Bureau (‘‘the Bureau’’) denying two

previous requests, one filed by

Petitioners, to delay the licensing of all

MTA license winners in the

Commission’s PCS A and B block

auction until the future C block auction

winners were ready to be licensed.

II. Background

2. On April 12, 1995, the Wireless

Telecommunications Bureau issued an

Order denying the ‘‘Emergency Motion

to Defer MTA PCS Licensing’’ filed by

Communications One., Inc.

(‘‘CommOne’’), which sought to delay

issuance of the 99 A and B block

licenses in the 2 GHz Personal

Communications Service (‘‘broadband

PCS’’). Two pleadings sought review of

the CommOne Order and a stay of some

or all grants of A and B block licenses

until the conclusion of the broadband

PCS C block auction. First, on May 12,

1995, CommOne, joined by GO

Communications Corporation (‘‘GO’’),

filed a petition for reconsideration of the

CommOne Order and requested a stay of

licensing of the three largest A and B

block auction winners: AT&T Wireless

PCS, Inc. (‘‘AT&T Wireless’’), PCS

Primeco, L.P. (‘‘PCS Primeco’’), and

WirelessCo, L.P. (‘‘WirelessCo’’).

Second, on May 12, 1995, Petitioners

filed an application for review of the

CommOne Order and a stay of all A and

B block licensing. The Bureau denied

both requests for relief. Petitioners have

also filed an Application for Review of

the A and B Block Order. We are

dismissing the Application for Review

of the A and B Block Order in a separate

Order adopted today. Although both

parties sought Commission review, the

Bureau determined that because

CommOne/GO presented arguments not

previously considered by the Bureau,

Commission review would be

inappropriate. In addition, the Bureau

felt that it should reevaluate the

arguments of all parties in light of the

decision by the United States Supreme

Court in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.

Pen ̃ a, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).

3. In the Stay Denial Order, the

Bureau rejected Petitioners’ claim that

the decision to hold the C Block auction

after the A and B block auction,

combined with the absence of specific

provisions for women and minorities in

the A and B block auction, violated 47

U.S.C. § 309(j). The Bureau deemed

Petitioners’ stay request an untimely

attempt to seek reconsideration of the

Commission’s rules adopted in PP

Docket No. 93–253 with respect to the

structure and sequencing of the PCS

auctions. The Bureau noted that these

rules were adopted in the Fifth Report

and Order, 59 FR 37566 (July 22, 1994),

and reviewed on reconsideration in the

Fourth Memorandum Opinion and

Order, 59 FR 53364 (October 24, 1994),

in that docket, and that the deadline for

reconsideration had long since passed.

Finally, in addressing the stay request,

the Bureau held that Petitioners and

CommOne/Go failed to satisfy the

Holiday Tours test for determining

whether a stay is appropriate. The test

includes four elements: (1) likelihood of

success on the merits; (2) the probability

of irreparable harm in the absence of

relief; (3) the probability of harm to

third parties if a stay is granted; and (4)

whether a stay would serve or disserve

the public interest. Washington

Metropolitan Transit Commission v.

Holiday Tours, Inc., 559 F.2d 841 (D.C.

Cir. 1977)).

4. First, the Bureau determined that

the parties were unlikely to prevail on

the merits. It rejected the contention

that licensing of the A and B Block

winners should be delayed until the C

Block winners were ready to be

licensed. The Bureau concluded that the

statute did not require the Commission

‘‘to promote diversity at the cost of

delaying much needed service that

could otherwise be provided to the

public.’’ The Bureau also rejected an

economic analysis submitted by

CommOne/GO purporting to show

excessive concentration of PCS licenses.

The Bureau determined that the study

was flawed because, inter alia, it

improperly assumed that the relevant

product market was PCS, thus excluding

the potential competitive impact of

cellular and other wireless services from

the model. The Bureau also found that

the analysis ignored the fact that

licensing of the A and B blocks would

substantially increase competition while

staying the license grants would

perpetuate a more highly concentrated

market. Second, the Bureau disagreed

with Petitioners’ claim of irreparable

harm resulting from a headstart given to

the A and B block winners. It noted that

the Commission’s decision to license

the A and B blocks before the C block

was not contingent upon any particular

timetable or date for the C block

auction. It also noted that the C block

bidders could adjust their bids to

account for any impact on the value of

the C block licenses as a result of prior

licensing of the A and B blocks. Third,

the Bureau concluded that a stay would

significantly harm the A and B block

winners. The Bureau noted that at the

time of the Stay Denial Order, the A and

B block winners had already paid $1.4

billion to the United States Treasury as

a downpayment (they paid the balance

of approximately $5.6 billion on June

30, 1995) and did not earn interest on

their deposits. The Bureau further found

that the winners had already invested

significant funds in start-up costs.

Finally, the Bureau concluded that the

public interest would best be served by

not delaying a new service to the public.

It found that ‘‘rapidly providing new

competitive sources of wireless services

outweighs any possible competitive

harm that might result from the A and

B block winners being licensed ahead of

auction winners in other PCS blocks.’’
19624 Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 86 / Thursday, May 2, 1996 / Notices

Accordingly, it refused to stay the

licensing of the A and B block winners.

5. Petitioners filed the instant

Application for Review on July 21,

1995. On August 24, 1995, Petitioners

filed an Erratum to their application. On

August 3, 1995, Petitioners filed an

Emergency Motion for Stay with the

United States Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia Circuit asking the

court to stay issuance of the A and B

block licenses (which had, in fact, been

issued six weeks earlier) until the

Commission was ready to license the

winners in the C block auction as well.

The Court denied the stay request on

August 10, 1995.

III. Contentions of the Parties

6. In their Application for Review,

Petitioners repeat the same arguments

rejected by the Bureau in the Stay

Denial Order. They claim that the

Commission failed to comply with its

statutory mandate under 47 U.S.C.

§ 309(j) to provide adequate

opportunities for minorities. The failure

to provide specific incentives for

minorities in the A and B blocks,

according to Petitioners, has resulted in

an unlawful territorial allocation.

Petitioners also assert that they have

met all of the requirements for obtaining

a stay. They allege irreparable harm in

the absence of a stay, including loss of

access to capital, loss of base station cell

sites, loss of access to distributors and

retailers, and loss of market share. They

also allege that the A and B block

auction winners would not be harmed

by issuance of a stay. Initially,

Petitioners based this argument on the

erroneous assumption that the A and B

block winners had not received their

licenses, and therefore would not be

required to pay the 80% balance of their

bids while a stay was in effect. In their

Erratum Petitioners acknowledge that

the Commission granted licenses to the

A and B block winners on June 23, 1995

and that all of the auction winners

timely paid their balances on June 30,

1995. Nevertheless, Petitioners continue

to assert that this does not constitute

irreparable harm to the A and B block

winners. Petitioners also allege that all

of the A and B block winners were on

notice that the legality of their licenses

was subject to challenge. Petitioners

further assert that they are likely to

prevail on the merits of their claim that

the Commission violated its statutory

mandate to disseminate licenses to and

promote economic opportunity for

minorities. Finally, Petitioners assert

that a stay would serve the public

interest by furthering the statutory

obligation of the FCC to promote

participation in PCS by minorities and

other designated entities.

7. In a Supplement filed on August 4,

1995, Petitioners note that on July 27,

1995, the United States Court of

Appeals for the District of Columbia

Circuit stayed the C block auction.

Omnipoint Corporation v. FCC, No. 95–

1374 (D.C. Cir., July 27, 1995).

Omnipoint Corporation objected to the

Commission’s extension of the 50.1%

equity option to all applicants rather

than to just women and minority

applicants. This meant that the

applicant’s control group must hold at

least 50.1% of the applicant’s equity,

and a single investor could hold the

remaining 49.9% equity. Omnipoint

argued that despite the facial neutrality

of the rule, it violated the equal

protection guarantee because business

not owned by women or minorities did

not have adequate time to take

advantage of the rule change prior to the

filing deadline for C block bidders.

Petitioners cite a statement by Chairman

Hundt that this delay could push back

the start of the C block auction for at

least six months. Petitioners allege that

‘‘[T]he longer the time period between

the date of the A and B block licenses

are issued and the date the C block

licenses are issued, the greater and more

profound this irreparable injury will

become.’’ The court dissolved the stay

on September 28, 1995, and the C block

auction began on December 18, 1995.

Omnipoint Corp. v. FCC, No. 95–1374

(D.C. Cir., September 28, 1995).

8. All of the parties filing oppositions

allege that Petitioners have not satisfied

the four prong test for a stay as set forth

in Holiday Tours. Western PCS

Corporation (‘‘Western’’) asserts that

Petitioners would not succeed on the

merits because they ‘‘misread the

Congressional directives of 309(j).’’ PCS

PRIMECO, L.P. (‘‘Primeco’’) disputes

Petitioners’ claim of excessive harm. It

contends that the granting of a stay of

the A and B block licensing would not

remove the uncertainty concerning the

timing of the C block auction nor would

it remedy the problem of losing base

station cell sites if indeed such a

problem did exist. Primeco argues that

it is unclear how the A and B block

licensees could preclude the eventual C

block licensees from entering into

distribution, resale, or other agreements

and that Petitioners’ claim of loss of

market share was ‘‘purely speculative

and unsupported by the facts.’’

WirelessCo, L.P. and PhillieCo, L.P.

(‘‘WirelessCo’’) dispute Petitioners’

claim that a stay would not harm other

parties. WirelessCo submits that it

already paid over $2.1 billion and

PhillieCo paid $85 million to the United

States Treasury. WirelessCo indicates

that it has taken significant steps toward

providing PCS service, including

entering into negotiations with

equipment manufacturers for subscriber

equipment, network equipment,

switching equipment and cell sites. It

also submits that it has hired employees

in more than 20 cities and is presently

negotiating facility leases in multiple

locations. Finally, WirelessCo argues

that a stay would harm the public

interest by delaying the realization by

potential customers of the benefits of a

new and innovative technology that

would provide needed competition to

incumbent cellular providers. Western

raises the additional argument that

Petitioners failed to comply with

Section 1.115(b)(2) of the Commission’s

rules, 47 CFR § 1.115(b)(2), pertaining to

the requirements for filing applications

for review by not stating the grounds

upon which review should be granted

and then citing the appropriate section.

IV. Discussion

9. We agree with Western that

Petitioners’ Application for Review is

procedurally defective and must be

dismissed. Section 1.115(b)(2) of the

Commission’s rules, 47 CFR

§ 1.115(b)(2), requires applications for

review to:

specify with particularity, from among the

following, the factors which warrant

Commission consideration of the questions

presented:

(1) The action taken pursuant to delegated

authority is in conflict with statute,

regulation, case precedent, or established

Commission policy.

(ii) The action involves a question of law

or policy which has not previously been

resolved by the Commission.

(iii) The action involves application of

precedent or policy which should be

overturned or revised.

(iv) An erroneous finding as to important

or material question of fact.

(v) Prejudicial or procedural error.

As we indicate in the companion order

we are adopting today, Petitioners’

pleading is defective because it fails to

‘‘specify with particularity’’ any of the

above subsections as grounds for

granting its Application for Review. See

Chapman S. Root Revocable Trust, 59

FR 44340 (August 29, 1994), where we

held that procedurally defective

applications for review will be

dismissed. Petitioners’ statement of

general disagreement with the Bureau’s

Stay Denial Order will not suffice.

Accordingly, we will dismiss

petitioners’ Application for Review.

Although we are dismissing Petitioners’

pleading, we also conclude on the

merits that the Bureau correctly

determined that Petitioners failed to
Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 86 / Thursday, May 2, 1996 / Notices 19625

meet the strict standards for obtaining a

stay as requested here.

A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

10. Petitioners’ assertion that they

will ultimately prevail on the merits is

based upon their erroneous contention

that the Commission has failed to

comply with its statutory mandate. That

mandate includes, according to

Petitioners, the obligation to

disseminate licenses to a wide variety of

applicants, including businesses owned

by minorities. Petitioners state that only

way under Section 309(j)(3)(B) of the

Act to implement this goal in a

meaningful way is to delay licensing the

A and B block auction winners until the

Commission is ready to license the

eventual C block auction winners.

Otherwise, according to Petitioners, the

value of the C block licenses will

decrease as a result of the headstart

granted to the A and B block licensees.

Nothing in the statute or legislative

history requires such a result. In

directing the Commission to establish

bidding rules for PCS, Congress

enumerated three other objectives in

Section 309(j)(3) besides the one

Petitioners cite: (1) development and

rapid deployment of services with a

minimum of administrative and judicial

delay; (2) recovery for the public of a

portion of the value of the spectrum;

and (3) promoting efficient and

intensive use of the spectrum. In its

auction rules, the Commission has

properly balanced these objectives with

the Section 309(j)(3)(B) goal of diversity

of ownership by establishing PCS

frequency blocks of varying sizes and

service areas, reserving certain of these

blocks for entrepreneurs, and creating

special provisions for designated

entities to bid for licenses in those

blocks. We do not believe the statute

further requires the Commission to

promote diversity at the cost of delaying

much needed service that could

otherwise be provided to the public. A

stay would serve the individualized

interest of Petitioners rather than the

broader public interest. The

Commission is not at liberty to

subordinate the public interest to the

interest of ‘‘equalizing competition.’’

SBC Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 56

F.3d 1484, 1491 (D.C. Cir. 1995) quoting

Hawaiian Telephone v. FCC , 498 F.2d

771, 776 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The Bureau

correctly rejected Petitioners’ argument

that minorities will be unable to enter

the PCS market because of illegal and

unfair ‘‘territorial allocations’’ in

violation of the antitrust laws by the A

and B block bidders. In our companion

order, we find that the Bureau correctly

concluded that these allegations were

too vague to meet the requirements of a

petition to deny. We conclude here that

Petitioners have not shown any

likelihood of success on the merits.

B. Irreparable Harm

11. We agree with the Bureau that

Petitioners’ allegations of irreparable

harm are speculative, and that

Petitioners have overstated the

‘‘headstart’’ advantage of the A and B

block winners over prospective C block

winners. First, the A and B block

winners themselves will have to

compete with well-entrenched cellular

companies, who enjoy a ten-year

headstart over all broadband PCS in

terms of business arrangements, market

share, and investment in infrastructure.

Furthermore, Petitioners’ alleged

injuries from loss of cell sites, loss of

access to distributors, and difficulty in

obtaining market share do not constitute

‘‘irreparable’’ harm of the type that

would warrant grant of a stay. Nothing

prevents Petitioners and other

prospective C block bidders from

entering into agreements that are

contingent upon their winning the

auction. As the Bureau noted, to the

extent that late entry in fact

disadvantages C block winners, that

disadvantage will translate into lower

prices at auction as bids are adjusted

downward to compensate for any such

detriment. Finally, C block entrants may

actually benefit from late entry because

they will be able to evaluate the

business strategies and performances of

the A and B block winners.

C. Harm to Others

12. The third prong of the Holiday

Tours test is the potential harm a stay

would cause to others. Petitioners

acknowledge that the A and B block

winners have paid over $7 billion to the

United States Treasury for their PCS

licenses. Since winning the licenses, A

and B block winners have also invested

significant funds to cover start-up and

development costs which they cannot

begin to recoup until they are able to

use their licenses to provide service. In

light of these considerations, we believe

that a stay would cause significant harm

to other parties.

D. Public Interest

13. Finally, we conclude that a stay of

A and B block licensing would not be

in the public interest. The Bureau

correctly found that besides imposing a

financial burden on the A and B block

winners themselves, a stay would delay

the introduction of new competition

and new services to the public.

Conversely, granting the licenses will

further the Congressional directive to

promote the development and rapid

deployment of PCS for the benefit of the

public with a minimum of

administrative or judicial delay. 47

U.S.C. § 309(j)(3)(A) We continue to

believe that the public interest in

rapidly providing new competitive

sources of wireless services outweighs

any possible competitive harm that

might result from the A and B block

licensees being licensed ahead of

auction winners in other PCS blocks.

V. Conclusion

14. For the reasons discussed above,

we are dismissing Petitioners’

Application for Review for failure to

comply with Section 1.115(b)(2) of our

rules. Although our action renders

further discussion unnecessary, we

agree with the Bureau’s disposition of

the issues Petitioners raised in their

original stay request.

VI. Order Clauses

15. Accordingly, it is ordered that,

pursuant to Section 4 (i) of the

Communications Act of 1934, as

amended, 47 U.S.C. § 154(i) and 47 CFR

§ 1.115(c)(2), the Application for Review

filed by Petitioners on July 21, 1995, is

denied

16. It is further ordered that pursuant

to Section 4 (i) of the Communications

Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C.

§ 154(i) the Motion for Leave to File

Supplement to Application for Review

filed by Petitioners on August 4, 1995,

is granted.

Federal Communications Commission.

William F. Caton,

Acting Secretary.

[FR Doc. 96–10614 Filed 5–01–96; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6712–01–P

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION

Sunshine Act Meetings

DATE AND TIME: Tuesday, May 7, 1996 at

10:00 a.m.

PLACE: 999 E Street, N.W., Washington,

D.C.

STATUS: This meeting Will Be Closed to

the Public.

ITEMS TO BE DISCUSSED:

Compliance matters pursuant to 2 U.S.C.

§ 437g.

Audits conducted pursuant to 2 U.S.C.

§ 437g, § 438(b), and Title 26, U.S.C.

Matters concerning participation in civil

actions or proceedings or arbitration

Internal personnel rules and procedures or

matters affecting a particular employee

DATE AND TIME: Thursday, May 9, 1996

at 10:00 a.m.