-1- 

STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

TAEVIN TRAVON JOHNSON, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, 

and 

MCLAREN OAKLAND, 

 Intervening Plaintiff, 

UNPUBLISHED 

August 11, 2015 

v No. 321649 

Wayne Circuit Court 

METROPOLITAN PROPERTY & CASUALTY 

INSURANCE COMPANY a/k/a METLIFE 

AUTO & HOME, 

LC No. 13-002108-NF 

 Defendant-Appellee. 

TAEVIN TRAVON JOHNSON, 

 Plaintiff, 

and 

MCLAREN OAKLAND, 

 Intervening Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v No. 321774 

Wayne Circuit Court 

METROPOLITAN PROPERTY & CASUALTY 

INSURANCE COMPANY a/k/a METLIFE 

AUTO & HOME, 

LC No. 13-002108-NF 

 Defendant-Appellee. 

Before: RONAYNE KRAUSE, P.J., and GLEICHER and STEPHENS, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 
-2- 

 Plaintiff Taevin Johnson accumulated staggering medical bills at intervening plaintiff 

McLaren Oakland following a serious motor vehicle accident. His no-fault insurer, defendant 

Metlife, denied coverage, contending that the policy had been non-renewed effective 14 days 

before the accident. Taevin filed suit and McLaren intervened. Both challenged the sufficiency 

of the non-renewal notice. The circuit court found that notice mailed to Eddie Johnson, Taevin’s 

mother and the named insured on the policy, at her last known address was all that was required. 

Because the non-renewal was valid and the policy had expired before Taevin’s accident, the 

circuit court summarily dismissed the suit. We affirm. 

I. BACKGROUND 

 Eddie maintained a no-fault automobile insurance policy through Metlife, which 

provided coverage for her and her son and their two vehicles.1

 Eddie was designated on the 

policy’s declarations page as “insured” and Taevin as “child.” The declarations page also 

described the parties’ vehicles, including a 2005 Chevrolet Impala for which Taevin was listed as 

the “principal operator.” Taevin was the registered owner of the Impala, which had been added 

to the policy in 2011. 

 On August 5, 2012, Metlife used first-class mail to send a notice of termination to Eddie 

at the address she had provided to the insurer. Metlife informed Eddie that it would not renew 

the policy at its expiration because Taevin had accumulated six points for moving violations. 

The policy expired on September 8, 2012. Eddie claimed that she did not receive this notice 

despite that she resided at the address listed on her policy until the end of August. Eddie was 

aware that her insurance premium was not deducted from her biweekly pay check on September 

9, 2012, but did not contact Metlife at that time. 

 On September 22, 2012, Taevin was involved in a serious motor vehicle accident. He fell 

into a coma and was hospitalized at McLaren Oakland for an extended period. One year later, 

Taevin still suffered the effects of nerve damage and required continuing medical treatment. 

 Eddie notified Metlife immediately after the accident, but the insurer denied coverage 

based on the non-renewal letter. Taevin then filed suit for first-party no-fault benefits and 

McLaren intervened to protect its interests. Taevin and McLaren contended that Metlife was 

required to send a separate notice of termination to Taevin and that its failure to do so voided the 

non-renewal. Metlife retorted that under the plain language of the policy, it was required to send 

notice of non-renewal only to the named insured, Eddie, at her last known address by first-class 

mail. Metlife had complied with these requirements, and thus no coverage existed at the time of 

the accident. The circuit court agreed with Metlife and summarily dismissed Taevin’s and 

McLaren’s claims. This appeal followed. 

 

1

 For convenience and clarity, we refer to Eddie and Taevin Johnson by their first names. 
-3- 

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW 

 We review de novo a circuit court’s resolution of a summary disposition motion. Zaher v 

Miotke, 300 Mich App 132, 139; 832 NW2d 266 (2013). 

 A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) “tests the factual support of a 

plaintiff’s claim.” Walsh v Taylor, 263 Mich App 618, 621; 689 NW2d 506 

(2004). “Summary disposition is appropriate under MCR 2.116(C)(10) if there is 

no genuine issue regarding any material fact and the moving party is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law.” West v Gen Motors Corp, 469 Mich 177, 183; 665 

NW2d 468 (2003). “In reviewing a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10), this Court 

considers the pleadings, admissions, affidavits, and other relevant documentary 

evidence of record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party to 

determine whether any genuine issue of material fact exists to warrant a trial.” 

Walsh, 263 Mich App at 621. “A genuine issue of material fact exists when the 

record, giving the benefit of reasonable doubt to the opposing party, leaves open 

an issue upon which reasonable minds might differ.” West, 469 Mich at 183. 

[Zaher, 300 Mich App at 139-140.] 

 The interpretation of an insurance policy is a question of law that we also review de 

novo. Hunt v Drielick, 496 Mich 366, 372; 852 NW2d 562 (2014). 

 An insurance policy is similar to any other contractual agreement, and, 

thus, the court’s role is to “determine what the agreement was and effectuate the 

intent of the parties.” Auto-Owners Ins Co v Churchman, 440 Mich 560, 566; 489 

NW2d 431 (1992). “[W]e employ a two-part analysis” to determine the parties’ 

intent. Heniser v Frankenmuth Mut Ins Co, 449 Mich 155, 172; 534 NW2d 502 

(1995). First, it must be determined whether “the policy provides coverage to the 

insured,” and, second, the court must “ascertain whether that coverage is negated 

by an exclusion.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). [Hunt, 496 Mich at 

372-373.] 

In interpreting an insurance policy, we must give “its terms their ordinary and plain meaning if 

such would be apparent to a reader of the instrument.” DeFrain v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 

491 Mich 359, 367; 817 NW2d 504 (2012) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 

III. ANALYSIS 

 The circuit court correctly dismissed Taevin’s claim for benefits and McLaren’s quest for 

compensation for services rendered. The Metlife policy provides that if the insurer decides not 

to renew a policy, it “will mail notice to you at the last known address shown on our records” 

with “at least 20 days” notice. The policy defines “you” as “the person(s) named in the 

Declarations of this policy as named insured and the spouse of such person or persons if a 

resident of the same household.” Eddie is the only person listed in the policy declarations as the 

“named insured.” Taevin is designated as “child.” Therefore, Metlife was required under the 

policy to mail notice only to Eddie. Metlife used first-class mail to send the notice 33 days 

before policy expiration, well in excess of the contractual notice period. And Eddie’s claim that 
-4- 

she did not receive the nonrenewal letter does not invalidate the termination. The policy 

specifically provides that “[p]roof of mailing of any notice shall be sufficient proof of notice.” 

Accordingly, under the plain language of the Metlife policy, the policy was validly non-renewed 

and coverage did not exist at the time of Taevin’s accident. 

 That the letter to Eddie was sufficient to place Taevin on notice is also supported by Auto 

Club Ins Ass’n v Hawkins (After Remand), 435 Mich 328; 458 NW2d 628 (1990). In interpreting 

a statute that requires notice of policy cancellation to “the insured,” the Court held: 

where notice of cancellation is properly provided to the “principal named insured” 

or (if the policy terminology is different) to the insured in whose name the policy 

was issued, that is sufficient notice to any other insured person who is a family 

member and who lives in the same household. [Id. at 337.] 

 Taevin contends that Metlife had a duty to change the policy declarations to list him as a 

named insured because he was the registered owner of the covered Impala. Taevin cites no legal 

support for such a duty. The Metlife policy itself provides no parameters for designating an 

individual as an “insured” in the policy declarations. Rather, it seems that a person becomes a 

“named insured” by requesting such designation. As neither Eddie nor Taevin made such a 

request, Taevin was not entitled to redesignation. Even if Metlife had been required to change 

Taevin’s status, the failure to provide separate notice to Taevin would not void the non-renewal. 

In Hawkins, 435 Mich at 331, the insurance company failed to notify Elbur Hawkins that it had 

cancelled the policy. Rather, it sent notice to Elbur’s wife, Shirley Hawkins. The policy 

declarations page described Shirley as the “principal named insured” and Elbur as an “other 

named insured[].” Id. Even though Elbur was a named insured, the Supreme Court held that the 

insurance company was not required to send him a separate notice; the notice to his wife who 

lived in the same household sufficed. Id. at 337. 

 Taevin and McLaren also invoke the statutory notice requirements of MCL 500.3020 and 

MCL 500.3224 to invalidate the non-renewal in this case. These statutes provide specific 

information that must be included in a notice of policy cancellation and describe the method of 

service. These provisions are inapplicable in this case, however. MCL 500.3204(2) provides: 

Refusal to renew any policy of automobile liability insurance shall not constitute a 

cancellation unless the insurer fails to mail, 20 days prior to the termination date 

of the policy, by first class mail, a notice to the insured that the policy will not be 

renewed. 
-5- 

Metlife used first-class mail to send notice to Eddie on August 5, 2012, 33 days before the policy 

would expire. The refusal to renew therefore cannot be deemed a “cancellation” and MCL 

500.3020 and MCL 500.3224 are inapplicable. 

 We affirm. 

/s/ Amy Ronayne Krause 

/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher 

/s/ Cynthia Diane Stephens