alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, Movant, v. Barney Houston CRAWFORD, Respondent.

No. 88-SC-989-CL.

Supreme Court of Kentucky.

May 24, 1990.

*780Frederic J. Cowan, Atty. Gen., Frankfort, C. Lloyd Vest, II, Thomas B. Wine, Stephen D. Berry, Sp. Asst. Attys. Gen., for mov-ant.

J. David Niehaus, Deputy Appellate Defender of the Jefferson District Public Defender, Louisville, Michael T. Rudicil, Jefferson District Public Defender’s Office (Daniel T. Goyette, Jefferson District Public Defender, of counsel), for respondent.

GANT, Justice.

The respondent, Barney Houston Crawford, was indicted for robbery in the first degree and persistent felony offender in the second degree. During the penalty phase of the trial, after Crawford had been found guilty, he moved to suppress the evidence of the prior conviction, and a hearing was held on the motion.

The Commonwealth introduced three exhibits — viz., the judgment in the prior conviction and two AOC forms, captioned “Waiver of Further Proceedings with Petition to Enter Plea of Guilty,” and “Certificate of Counsel.” The “Waiver” had been filled in by the defendant and signed by him. It contained, in printed form, all the rights guaranteed under *Boykin v. Alabama,*395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969), together with various other rights and statements. The “Certificate of Counsel” was signed by counsel, stating among other things that counsel had fully explained the indictment herein and that the waiver of rights entered by Crawford had been entered freely and voluntarily.

In addition to these exhibits, the Commonwealth presented to the court the video tape of the proceedings at the guilty plea of the prior conviction. This video tape clearly showed that the trial judge presented these signed forms to Crawford and asked if the waiver contained his signature, to which he answered that it did. The court then inquired if movant understood the waiver form, and Crawford again answered in the affirmative.

The question certified to us in this case is whether this procedure as above described is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of *Boykin, supra,*in waiving his federally guaranteed constitutional rights. We hold that this record is adequate to show that the petitioner intelligently and knowingly pleaded guilty. As this court stated in *Kotas v. Commonwealth,*Ky., 565 S.W.2d 445, 447 (1978) “... The validity of a guilty plea is determined not by reference to some magic incantation recited at the time it was taken but from the totality of the circumstances surrounding it.”

No cases are cited requiring a judge to read from the bench a defendant’s rights to a defendant who has already waived those rights by written waiver, has acknowledged his signature thereto, and has further acknowledged that he understood those rights.

The law is so certified.

All concur.
IB 

Union Calendar No. 555 

118TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 5870 

[Report No. 118–659] 

To amend title 38, United States Code, to make certain improvements to 

the processing of claims for benefits under the laws administered by 

the Secretary of Veterans Affairs and the transparency of actions of 

Board of Veterans’ Appeals, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

OCTOBER 2, 2023 

Mr. SELF (for himself and Mr. MCGARVEY) introduced the following bill; 

which was referred to the Committee on Veterans’ Affairs 

SEPTEMBER 10, 2024 

Reported with an amendment, committed to the Committee of the Whole 

House on the State of the Union, and ordered to be printed 

[Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the part printed in italic] 

[For text of introduced bill, see copy of bill as introduced on October 2, 2023] 


ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 5870 RH

A BILL 

To amend title 38, United States Code, to make certain 

improvements to the processing of claims for benefits 

under the laws administered by the Secretary of Veterans 

Affairs and the transparency of actions of Board of 

Veterans’ Appeals, and for other purposes. 


ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS
3 

•HR 5870 RH

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Veteran Appeals Trans5 parency Act of 2024’’. 

6 SEC. 2. BOARD OF VETERANS’ APPEALS PUBLICATION OF 

7 DATES OF DOCKET ACTIVITY. 

8 Section 7107 of title 38, United States Code, is amend9 ed by adding at the end the following new subsection: 

10 ‘‘(f) PUBLICATION OF EXPECTED ACTIONS.—(1) On a 

11 weekly basis, for each docket, the Board shall publish, on 

12 a website of the Department, notice of the docket dates of 

13 the cases assigned to a Board member for a decision for 

14 that week. 

15 ‘‘(2) Each notice published under paragraph (1) shall 

16 include a statement that an assignment described in such 

17 paragraph does not require the Board to issue a decision 

18 regarding the case during such week. 

19 ‘‘(3) Paragraph (1) shall not apply to a case— 

20 ‘‘(A) that has been advanced under subsection 

21 (b); or 

22 ‘‘(B) remanded by the United States Court of 

23 Appeals for Veterans Claims.’’. 


ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS
Union Calendar No. 555 

118TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 5870 

[Report No. 118–659] 

A BILL 

To amend title 38, United States Code, to make 

peals, and for other purposes. parency of actions of Board of Veterans’ ApSecretary of Veterans Affairs and the transfor benefits under the laws administered by the certain improvements to the processing of claims 

SEPTEMBER 10, 2024 

Reported with an amendment, committed to the Comand ordered to be printed mittee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, 


ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS
#### STATE ex rel. James W. KUEHL, Appellant, v. CITY OF JENNINGS and Board of Trustees of the Police and Firemen’s Retirement Fund of the City of Jennings, Missouri, Respondents.

No. 66131.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division One.

Oct. 11, 1994.

Brent J. Jaimes, Clayton, for appellant.

Lloyd E. Eaker, Clayton, for respondent.

Before REINHARD, P.J., and GARY M. GAERTNER and CRAHAN, JJ.

*ORDER*

PER CURIAM.

James W. Kuehl (“Claimant”) appeals from the circuit court’s denial of his claim for disability retirement benefits. Claimant contends on appeal that the circuit court erred in finding he was not permanently and totally disabled as required by the applicable ordinance of the City of Jennings, Missouri. We affirm.

We have reviewed the briefs of the parties, along with the legal file, and find the circuit court’s judgment is supported by substantial evidence and is not against the weight of the evidence. No error of law appears. An opinion reciting the detailed facts and restating the principles of law would have no prec-edential value. However, the parties have been furnished with a memorandum opinion for their information only setting forth the facts and reasons for this order.

The judgment is affirmed in accordance with Rule 84.16(b).
IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-15-00413-CR

EX PARTE JAMES RAY BROSSETT

From the 54th District Court

McLennan County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2015-1932-C2A

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION

This case presents the problem when an appellate court determines the amount of 

bail set by the trial court is excessive and then proceeds to set bail. If the trial court had 

set bail in this case at $1,000,000, I would not hold that was an abuse of discretion. The 

trial court set bail at $5,000,000. I agree with the Court that $5,000,000 is excessive. The 

State conceded that $5,000,000 was effectively the denial of bail but that the State had not 

sought the total denial of bail as it otherwise might have been able to do. See TEX. CODE 

CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts 17.152 and 17.153 (West 2005).

But having determined bail was excessive, the Court then proceeds to set bail in 

an amount it determines is appropriate. We do not review this amount. This Court 
Ex parte Brossett Page 2

determines the amount. As for me, I do not understand why we, as an appellate court, 

should in the first instance set the amount of bail we think is appropriate. All we have is 

a cold record before us. I would much prefer a remand to allow the trial court to set the 

amount and conditions of bail it deems appropriate and leave this Court to review the 

trial court’s order. See Ex parte Hicks, 262 S.W.3d 387 (Tex. App.—Waco 2008, no pet.) 

(Gray, C.J, dissenting note); Ex parte Mayfield, No. 10-07-00304-CR, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 

9758 (App.—Waco 2007, no pet.) (Gray, C.J., dissenting note); Ex parte Davis, 147 S.W.3d 

546, 554 n. 1 (Tex. App.—Waco 2004, no pet.) (Gray, C.J., dissenting).

Furthermore, I find it interesting that we set one aspect of bail, the amount, but 

remand to the trial court for a determination of the conditions of bail. These conditions 

of bail could impact the appropriateness of the amount of bail. 

Moreover, if I am compelled by Court of Criminal Appeals precedent to set bail in 

the first instance rather than review the amount determined by a trial court, in this 

proceeding I would set bail at no more than $750,000. That amount appears adequate to 

assure Brossett’s presence at trial; particularly if it is accompanied with other conditions 

of bail such as his surrender of all, and a prohibition from obtaining additional, firearms, 

knives, and other weapons, surrender of Brossett’s passport, if any, a prohibition from 

any contact with the surviving victims, all being the children of the deceased victim, and 

an order to wear a GPS tracking device to assure that Brossett does not go within 1,250 

yards of them.
Ex parte Brossett Page 3

Thus, I must concur in part and dissent in part to the Court’s judgment.

TOM GRAY

Chief Justice

Concurring and dissenting opinion delivered and filed April 28, 2016 

Publish
[Federal Register Volume 61, Number 92 (Friday, May 10, 1996)]
[Notices]
[Page 21453]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 96-11696]



-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
[Docket No. RP96-227-000]


Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company; Notice of Proposed Changes in 
FERC Gas Tariff

May 6, 1996.
    Take notice that on May 1, 1996, Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company 
(Tennessee) tendered for filing as part of its FERC Gas Tariff, Fifth 
Revised Volume No. 1, the following tariff sheet, with a proposed 
effective date of June 1, 1996:

First Revised Sheet No. 654

    Tennessee states that the filing is intended to revise the pro 
forma Blanket Authorization Agreement in Tennessee's tariff to add a 
space for inserting the Blanket Agent's billing address.
    Tennessee states that a copy of the filing has been served upon 
each of Tennessee's jurisdictional customers and all affected state 
commissions.
    Any person desiring to be heard or to protest this filing should 
file a motion to intervene or protest with the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, N.E., Washington, D.C. 20426 
in accordance with 385.214 and 385.211 of the Commission's Rules and 
Regulations. All such motions or protests must be filed as provided in 
section 154.210 of the Commission's Regulations. Protests will be 
considered by the Commission in determining the appropriate action to 
be taken, but will not serve to make protestants parties to the 
proceeding. Any person wishing to become a party must file a motion to 
intervene. Copies of this filing are on file with the Commission and 
are available for public inspection in the Public Reference room.
Linwood A. Watson, Jr.,
Acting Secretary.
[FR Doc. 96-11696 Filed 5-9-96; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-M
EXHIBIT 23

CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements on
Form SB-2 (File No. 333-112159) and Form S-8 (File No. 333-121594, 333-43718 and
333-70376) of CorVu Corporation and subsidiaries of our report dated September
9, 2005, which appears on page 15 of this annual report on Form 10-KSB for the
year ended June 30, 2005.

                                              /s/ VIRCHOW, KRAUSE & COMPANY, LLP

Minneapolis, Minnesota
September 28, 2005

                                       45
EXHIBIT 31.1
 CERTIFICATION BY CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
  1)
    
    I have reviewed this Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of BPI Energy Holdings, Inc.;2)
    
    Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact
or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period
covered by this report;3)
    
    Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in
this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of
operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this
report;4)
    
    The registrants other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and
maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and
15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:
 (a)
    
    Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls
and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information
relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by
others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being
prepared;(b)
    
    Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and procedures and
presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls
and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such
evaluation; and(c)
    
    Disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal control over financial
reporting that occurred during the registrants most recent fiscal quarter that has
materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrants
internal control over financial reporting; and
 5)
    
    The registrants other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent
evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrants auditors and the
audit committee of the registrants board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent
functions):
 (a)
    
    All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of
internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect
the registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information;
and(b)
    
    Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who
have a significant role in the registrants internal control over financial reporting.
  /s/ James G. AzleinBy: James G. AzleinTitle:
    President and Chief Executive Officer 39
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Lawrence Steinhoff, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Valle Vista Property Owners Association 

Incorporated, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. CV-17-08219-PCT-GMS

ORDER 

 The Court has been advised that this case has settled (Doc. 17). 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that this matter will, without further Order of 

this Court, be dismissed with prejudice within 30 days of the date of this Order unless a 

stipulation to dismiss is filed prior to the dismissal date. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED vacating any pending hearings. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying all pending motions as moot. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk of Court to terminate this 

matter on January 8, 2018 without further leave of Court. 

 Dated this 8th day of December, 2017. 

Honorable G. Murray Snow

United States District Judge

Case 3:17-cv-08219-GMS Document 18 Filed 12/08/17 Page 1 of 1
Exhibit 32.1

Certification of Principal Executive Officer pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.

In connection with the Quarterly Report of pSivida Limited (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended December 31, 2007, as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Paul Ashton, Managing Director of the Company, certify that to the best of my knowledge:



| | 1. | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | -- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2. | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | -- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                |  |                  
|--------------- |  | -----------------
|Date:           |  | February 11, 2008
|               
|/s/ Paul Ashton
|Name:           |  | Paul Ashton      
|Title:          |  | Managing Director
FILED

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

JUNE 19, 2012

JOHN LEY

CLERK

 [DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 11-15759 

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D. C. Docket No. 1:11-cv-00743-WSD 

PHYLLIS ALLEN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

BAC HOME LOANS SERVICING, LP,

MCCALLA RAYMER, LLC, 

Defendants-Appellees.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia 

________________________

(June 19, 2012)

Before TJOFLAT, JORDAN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

This is a civil action stemming from the allegedly wrongful foreclosure of
residential property. The suit began in state court, and defendants removed the

case to the District Court because it contained a claim under the Real Estate

Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”), 12 U.S.C. § § 2601 et seq., and gave the

court subject matter jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Defendants moved the

district court to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim for relief. 

Plaintiff failed to respond to defendants’ motions to dismiss, as required by the

District Court’s Local Rule 7.1. Then, following its independent review of the

complaint’s allegations, the District Court found no merit in any of plaintiff’s

claims and, in an order entered on March 31, 2011, granted defendants’ motions. 

Record, Vol. 1 at Tab 12.

Ten days later, plaintiff moved the court pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 60(b)(4) and (6) to set aside the court’s judgment for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction and for leave to file a motion to remand. The District Court

denied the motion in an order entered on November 7, 2011, id. at Tab 12, and on

December 5, 2011, plaintiff filed a notice of appeal, appealing the District Court’s

November 7, 2011 order denying her Rule 60(b)(4)(and (6) motion. Id. at Tab 21.

We find no error in the District Court’s November 7, 2011 order. It is

therefore 

AFFIRMED.

2
Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia Clerk's Office, Atlanta, June 10, 2019. I certify that the above is a true extract from the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia. Witness my signature and the seal of said court hereto affixed the day and year last above written. , Clerk. 

# Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia
ATLANTA, June 10, 2019 The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order A19A2143. IN RE ESTATE OF TOMMY L. JONES.
Upon consideration of the APPELLANT'S motion FOR PERMISSION TO WITHDRAW THE APPEAL in the above styled case, it is ordered that the motion is hereby GRANTED.
Order issued October I , 2012

In The

(!1n11r1 nf nah

FiftI! Iitrict uf ixa at aI1a

No. 05-1O-00286-CV

CARDIAC PERFUSION SERVICES, INC. AND

MICHAEL JOUBRAN, Appel1ants/CrossAppeI1ees

V.

RANI)ALL hUGHES, Appellee/Cross-Appellant

ORDER

The Motion for Rehearing filed by appellant is hereby DENIED.

ELWTH LANG-MIF
*

 After an examination of the briefs and the record, we have concluded that

oral argument is unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the

record. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted November 29, 2005*

Decided November 29, 2005

Before

Hon. WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

Hon. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge

Hon. ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge

No. 04-4111

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

FRANCIS S. MATRIOUS,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Western District of Wisconsin

No. 04-CR-104-S-01

John C. Shabaz, 

Judge.

O R D E R

Francis Matrious pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon, 18

U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and was sentenced to 200 months’ imprisonment as an armed

career criminal, id. § 924(e). Despite stipulating in his plea agreement that the

sentencing guidelines applied in their entirety and consenting to judicial

factfinding by a preponderance of the evidence, Matrious now argues that he should

be resentenced on the ground that the district court believed it was bound by the

UNPUBLISHED ORDER

Not to be cited per Circuit Rule 53
No. 04-4111 Page 2

sentencing guidelines. See United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005); United

States v. Schlifer, 403 F.3d 849, 854 (7th Cir. 2005).

Matrious’s argument is frivolous for several reasons. First, he did not make

a Booker-type objection in the district court even though he was sentenced after the

release of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), and United States v. Booker,

375 F.3d 508 (7th Cir. 2004), judgment aff’d and remanded, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005). 

At best, then, Matrious would be entitled to a limited remand under the plain-error

analysis set forth in United States v. Paladino, 401 F.3d 471 (7th Cir. 2005), not a

full resentencing. But even a limited remand is unnecessary because we already

know that Matrious was not prejudiced by the mandatory application of the

guidelines. As the judgment of conviction reflects, the district court would have

imposed an identical sentence were it not bound by the guidelines.

More importantly, Matrious did not just forfeit his Booker argument but

instead waived altogether the right to challenge the use of the guidelines. He

agreed in his plea contract that the guidelines were “applicable in their entirety.” 

Part of the guidelines as they stood when he was sentenced in November 2004 was

the statute requiring their mandatory application. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1). And

having been duly warned that the district court read Blakely to preclude it from

making “determinations increasing the sentence . . . by a preponderance of the

evidence,” Matrious also consented to judicial factfinding by a preponderance of the

evidence. Matrious is bound by the concessions he made in his plea agreement and

has waived any right to benefit from subsequent changes in the law. See United

State v. Berheide, 421 F.3d 538, 542 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Bownes, 405

F.3d 634, 636 (7th Cir. 2005). 

AFFIRMED.