United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued December 6, 2019 Decided August 11, 2020 

No. 19-7020 

CHANTAL ATTIAS, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL 

OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, ET AL., 

APPELLANTS

v. 

CAREFIRST, INC., DOING BUSINESS AS GROUP 

HOSPITALIZATION AND MEDICAL SERVICES, INC., DOING 

BUSINESS AS CAREFIRST OF MARYLAND, INC., DOING BUSINESS 

AS CAREFIRST BLUECROSS BLUESHIELD, DOING BUSINESS AS 

CAREFIRST BLUECHOICE, INC., ET AL., 

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 1:15-cv-00882) 

Matthew Wayne Stonestreet argued the cause for 

appellants. With him on the briefs were Jonathan B. Nace, 

Christopher T. Nace, and Troy N. Giatras. 

Marc Rotenberg and Alan Butler were on the brief for 

amicus curiae Electronic Privacy Information Center in 

support of appellants. 
2 

Matthew O. Gatewood argued the cause for appellees. 

With him on the briefs was Robert D. Owen. 

Before: SRINIVASAN, Chief Judge, and GRIFFITH and 

KATSAS, Circuit Judges. 

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge KATSAS. 

KATSAS, Circuit Judge: After hackers allegedly stole 

sensitive customer information from a health insurer’s data 

system, seven customers brought a litany of tort, contract, and 

statutory claims against the company. The district court 

dismissed all claims of five plaintiffs and most claims of two 

plaintiffs. We must decide whether the court permissibly 

certified the dismissed claims under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 54(b), so as to make the dismissal order final and 

immediately appealable. 

I 

The plaintiffs’ complaint alleges the following. CareFirst, 

Inc. and its subsidiaries provide health insurance to customers 

in the District of Columbia, Maryland, and Virginia. In June 

2014, hackers penetrated CareFirst’s servers and stole or 

accessed customers’ names, birthdates, e-mail addresses, 

subscriber numbers, and possibly social security and credit 

card numbers. Seven customers from the District, Maryland, 

and Virginia sued CareFirst on behalf of all similarly situated 

insureds. The customers collectively raised eleven state-law 

claims: five tort claims (negligence, negligence per se, fraud, 

constructive fraud, and breach of a duty of confidentiality); two 

contract claims (breach and unjust enrichment); and four 

statutory claims (D.C., Maryland, and Virginia consumer 

protection laws and the D.C. data breach notification statute). 

All told, the seven plaintiffs raised fifty-four claims stemming 

from the data breach. 
3 

CareFirst moved to dismiss for lack of standing and failure 

to state a claim. The district court dismissed the case on 

standing grounds, Attias v. CareFirst, Inc., 199 F. Supp. 3d 193 

(D.D.C. 2016), but we reversed, 865 F.3d 620 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 

On remand, CareFirst renewed its motion to dismiss for 

failure to state a claim. The district court granted the motion in 

substantial part; it dismissed every claim made by five of the 

seven plaintiffs and all but two claims made by the two other 

plaintiffs, Curt and Connie Tringler of Maryland. Attias v. 

CareFirst, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2019). First, the 

court held that state law required actual damages for nine of the 

eleven claims (all but the unjust enrichment and D.C. consumer 

protection claims). Id. at 9–11. Because only the Tringlers 

alleged actual damages, the court dismissed the relevant nine 

claims of the other five plaintiffs. Id. at 17. The court also 

dismissed the unjust enrichment claims for failure to plead a 

necessary element. Id. at 25. Finally, it dismissed the tort 

claims and the D.C. consumer protection claims as duplicative 

of the breach-of-contract claims. Id. at 17–26. In sum, the 

court dismissed every claim except the Tringlers’ claims for 

breach of contract and for violation of the Maryland consumer 

protection statute. Id. at 27. 

The district court directed the parties “to advise the court 

of whether it should issue an order under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 54(b) as opposed to certifying questions for 

interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).” J.A. 14. 

With no explanation, the parties agreed that Rule 54(b) was the 

better route for generating an appealable order. The plaintiffs 

also moved to stay the Tringlers’ surviving claims during any 

appeal. They explained that this Court’s “ultimate ruling will 

substantially impact the progress of those claims.” Resp. to 

Feb. 14, 2019 Min. Order & Mot. for Stay of Remaining 

Claims, ECF No. 59, at 1. 
4 

In a brief order, the district court entered final judgment on 

all the dismissed claims under Rule 54(b). Tracking the Rule’s 

language, the court expressly found “‘no just reason for delay’ 

of entry of final judgment.” J.A. 158. But the court provided 

no reasoning for its conclusion, and it stayed the case pending 

resolution of this appeal. 

In this Court, neither party questioned the validity of the 

Rule 54(b) certification, but we ordered the parties to address 

the issue at oral argument and in supplemental briefs. 

II 

Under Article III of the Constitution, the “judicial Power 

of the United States” is limited to resolving specified categories 

of “Cases” or “Controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III, §§ 1 & 2. 

Moreover, as an “inferior” court created by statute, id. § 1, this 

Court “can have no jurisdiction but such as the statute confers,” 

Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. 441, 449 (1850). Before passing on the 

merits of any dispute, we must therefore determine whether we 

have both Article III and statutory jurisdiction. Steel Co. v. 

Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94–96 (1998). And 

we must raise those issues ourselves, even if no party has done 

so. Id. at 94. 

For review of district-court decisions, our statutory 

jurisdiction comes primarily from 28 U.S.C. § 1291. That 

section gives the courts of appeals “jurisdiction of appeals from 

all final decisions of the district courts of the United States,” 

except those directly appealable to the Supreme Court. A 

“final decision” under section 1291 ordinarily must resolve 

every claim of every party in a case. Ritzen Grp., Inc. v. 

Jackson Masonry, LLC, 140 S. Ct. 582, 586 (2020); Sears, 

Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 431–32 (1956). 
5 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) builds on that 

baseline principle. The adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure increased the opportunity for litigants to join 

multiple claims and parties in one lawsuit. See Sears, 351 U.S. 

at 432. To complement that change, Rule 54(b) offered the 

chance for earlier appellate review of some claims in a multiclaim or multi-party action. See id. at 433–34. The Rule “does 

not relax the finality required of each decision” by 

section 1291. Id. at 435. But it “provide[s] a practical means 

of permitting an appeal to be taken from one or more final 

decisions on individual claims, in multiple claims actions, 

without waiting for final decisions to be rendered on all the 

claims in the case.” Id.; accord Cold Metal Process Co. v. 

United Eng’g & Foundry Co., 351 U.S. 445, 453 (1956). 

Rule 54(b) provides: 

When an action presents more than one claim 

for relief—whether as a claim, counterclaim, 

crossclaim, or third-party claim—or when 

multiple parties are involved, the court may 

direct entry of a final judgment as to one or 

more, but fewer than all, claims or parties only 

if the court expressly determines that there is no 

just reason for delay. Otherwise, any order or 

other decision, however designated, that 

adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the 

rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties 

does not end the action as to any of the claims 

or parties and may be revised at any time before 

the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the 

claims and all the parties’ rights and liabilities. 

The Rule establishes three requirements for an otherwise 

interlocutory order to be certified as a final judgment: (1) the 
6 

order must resolve a distinct “claim for relief”; (2) the order 

must be “final” with respect to that claim; and (3) the district 

court must permissibly determine that there is “no just reason 

for delay” in entering judgment. See Bldg. Indus. Ass’n of 

Superior Cal. v. Babbitt, 161 F.3d 740, 743 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 

The first two elements—whether the district court finally 

resolved one or more distinct claims for relief—plainly 

implicate our jurisdiction. An interlocutory order that does not 

resolve a distinct “claim for relief” is not a “decision” in the 

sense required by section 1291. See Swint v. Chambers Cnty. 

Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35, 41–42 (1995). And if a disposition is 

not “final” under Rule 54(b), then it likewise cannot qualify as 

a “final decision” under section 1291. See Sears, 351 U.S. at 

437. Thus, if a district court certifies a matter that does not 

involve the “final” disposition of an entire “claim,” we must 

raise the problem ourselves and must dismiss “for want of a 

final judgment.” Tolson v. United States, 732 F.2d 998, 1001–

03 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 

The third element—whether the district court permissibly 

found that there is “no just reason for delay” of an appeal—has 

two components. First, the court must expressly determine that 

there is no just reason for delay. This is a “bright-line 

requirement” for establishing appellate jurisdiction on a Rule 

54(b) certification. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n, 161 F.3d at 743. 

Second, we must decide whether the district court’s 

determination was an abuse of discretion. See Curtiss-Wright 

Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1, 10 (1980). To do that, we 

assess whether the district court reasonably considered the 

“judicial administrative interests as well as the equities 

involved,” including the relationship between the certified and 

uncertified claims and the potential for multiple appeals on the 

same issues. Id. at 8; see Bldg. Indus. Ass’n, 161 F.3d at 744–

45. If the district court failed to explain why it found “no just 
7 

reason for delay,” we must “do the best we can” to discern its 

reasoning. See Bldg. Indus. Ass’n, 161 F.3d at 745. And we 

must dismiss the appeal if we conclude that the district court 

unreasonably weighed the relevant equities, Brooks v. Dist. 

Hosp. Partners, 606 F.3d 800, 806 (D.C. Cir. 2006), or if we 

cannot discern whether it reasonably did so, Bldg. Indus. Ass’n, 

161 F.3d at 745. 

The permissibility of a Rule 54(b) certification depends in 

significant part on the relationship between the certified claims 

finally resolved by the district court and the uncertified claims 

that remain pending before it. In Tolson, we addressed when 

different claims are distinct enough to justify the entry of final 

judgment on only some of them. We established this “rule of 

thumb” on that question: “When alleged claims are so closely 

related that they would fall afoul of the rule against splitting 

claims if brought separately, they do not qualify as ‘separate’ 

claims within the meaning of Rule 54(b).” 732 F.2d at 1001 

(cleaned up). We then applied that principle to dismiss an 

appeal from an order resolving one of three transactionally 

related negligence claims. See id. at 1002–03. 

III 

Under this framework, we lack appellate jurisdiction over 

the certified claims of the Tringlers and of the other plaintiffs. 

Start with the Tringlers’ claims. The Tringlers raise 

contract, tort, and statutory claims arising out of the same 

event—the June 2014 cyberattack on CareFirst. Their pending 

breach of contract and Maryland consumer protection claims 

arise from the same transaction and occurrence as their 

dismissed tort and unjust enrichment claims. Under basic 

principles of claim preclusion, the Tringlers could not have 

litigated to judgment one action involving the claims still 

pending before the district court and another involving the 
8 

claims already dismissed. See, e.g., Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 

U.S. 880, 892 (2008); Smith v. Jenkins, 562 A.2d 610, 613 

(D.C. 1989); Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24 (Am. 

Law Inst., 1982). So under Tolson, they likewise cannot sever 

the latter claims for an immediate appeal under Rule 54(b). See

732 F.2d at 1002. 

That leaves us with the other plaintiffs’ claims. Tolson

does not resolve whether the district court could have certified 

their claims despite the pendency of certain claims by the 

Tringlers. For purposes of claim preclusion, different plaintiffs 

may litigate parallel claims in different lawsuits. See, e.g.,

Smith, 562 A.2d at 613; 18 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal 

Practice & Procedure § 4406 (3d ed. 2017). Nonetheless, any 

such certification would raise concerns, for the claims of any 

one plaintiff in this case overlap substantially with the claims 

of every other plaintiff. The claims of each plaintiff arise from 

the same computer hacking and data breach. They involve the 

same form contracts used by CareFirst. They involve the same 

alleged misrepresentations made by the company on the 

internet and in its promises to comply with federal privacy law. 

And, given the parties’ decision to litigate the common-law 

claims under D.C. law, they involve almost entirely the same 

governing law. All of this explains why the plaintiffs seek class 

certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), 

which requires “common” questions to predominate over 

“individual” ones. It also explains why the plaintiffs moved to 

stay the claims pending in the district court on the ground that 

our disposition of the appeal would “substantially impact the 

progress of those claims.” ECF No. 59, at 1. This suggests that 

a Rule 54(b) certification would generate “piecemeal appeals” 

in a case that “should be reviewed only as [a] single unit[].” 

Curtiss-Wright Corp., 446 U.S. at 10. 
9 

In any event, we need not decide whether the district court 

could have certified the non-Tringler claims alone, because we 

lack jurisdiction over them for a separate reason: It is unclear 

whether the district court would have certified these claims for 

immediate appeal had it properly declined to certify the claims 

of the Tringlers. The district certified a very different subset of 

claims—all claims minus the two pending Tringler claims—

and it failed to explain its reasons for doing so. We are thus 

left much as we were in Building Industry Association: We 

confront certified claims that appear highly “intertwined” with 

claims still pending below (and with other dismissed claims 

that cannot be certified). 161 F.3d at 745. And we have no 

“assistance” in the form of an explanation from the district 

court. See id. As a result, we cannot determine whether the 

district court would have certified only the non-Tringler 

claims, much less whether it could have come up with a 

permissible justification for doing so. As in Building Industry 

Association, we must therefore dismiss the appeal for lack of 

jurisdiction. 

So ordered.