United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

No. 21-40878

United States of America, 

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

Saad Aziz; Maaz Aziz, 

Defendants—Appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:20-CR-382-104

Before Southwick, Haynes, and Higginson, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

Brothers Saad Aziz and Maaz Aziz were indicted for conspiracy to 

commit wire fraud, mail fraud, and money laundering. The Government 

requested (and was eventually granted) a pretrial detention order based on 

its contention that the brothers presented a serious flight risk. The brothers 

now challenge that order. They argue that the district court improperly 

* Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this 

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited 

circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

April 8, 2022

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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lumped their detention assessments, misclassified them as flight risks, and 

failed to consider alternatives to detention. 

For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM. 

I. Background

In 2020, the FBI launched an investigation into a series of armed 

robberies of cell phone stores in and near Dallas, Texas. As the investigation 

unfolded, the FBI uncovered a much larger conspiracy: a gray market in 

which wholesalers obtained high-end cell phones from device traffickers and 

then exported and sold the cell phones abroad. At the top of the conspiracy 

was the wholesaler RJ Telecom. Together with its related entities, RJ 

Telecom exported more than $100 million of stolen devices. SCS Supply 

Chain LLC (“SCS”)—a company owned by Saad Aziz and co-founded by 

Maaz Aziz—was one of those related entities. 

The brothers were indicted on September 9, 2021. They were charged 

with conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1349, 

conspiracy to commit money laundering under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h), and 

conspiracy to transport stolen property in interstate and foreign commerce 

(as well as the aiding and abetting of such transportation) under 18 U.S.C. 

§§ 371, 2314, and 2. On September 23, 2021, the brothers self-surrendered. 

The Government then moved to detain them. 

After a detention hearing, the magistrate judge denied the Government’s motion and ordered release. The Government filed an emergency 

motion for a stay of the magistrate judge’s order and appealed to the district court. The district court granted a stay and held a two-day hearing on 

the appeal of the release order. After concluding that the brothers were 

flight risks and that no set of conditions would reasonably assure their appearance, the district court revoked and set aside the magistrate judge’s

order. The brothers each filed timely notices of appeal.

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II. Jurisdiction & Standard of Review

Because detention orders are considered final judgments for purposes 

of 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we have jurisdiction over this appeal. 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3145(c). “Absent an error of law,” we will uphold a district court’s pretrial 

detention order “if it is supported by the proceedings below, a deferential 

standard of review that [this court] equate[s] to the abuse-of-discretion 

standard.” United States v. Rueben, 974 F.2d 580, 586 (5th Cir. 1992) 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Questions of law are, of 

course, reviewed de novo, United States v. Olis, 450 F.3d 583, 585 (5th Cir. 

2006), whereas factual findings supporting the detention order are reviewed 

for clear error, United States v. Aron, 904 F.2d 221, 223 (5th Cir. 1990).

III. Discussion

The brothers briefed their arguments separately on appeal, but each 

argues that: (1) the district court erred by not rendering an individualized 

assessment regarding each brother’s flight risk; (2) the district court abused 

its discretion in determining that the brothers were flight risks; and (3) the 

district court failed to adequately consider alternative options to detention. 

We address each in turn. 

A. Individualized Assessment

This court has previously explained that a district court may not 

“lump[] all the defendants together” and issue “a uniform blanket bail”

decision. United States v. Briggs, 476 F.2d 947, 948 (5th Cir. 1973). Rather, 

the “Bail Reform Act . . . clearly contemplates that each person has the right 

to separate consideration, to stand or fall on the merits of his own case rather 

than on the misdeeds of his co-defendants.” Id. Seizing on this language, 

Maaz Aziz argues that the district court improperly “lumped [the brothers] 

together” and failed to make an individualized detention determination. 

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But this case is not Briggs. Briggs involved eight unrelated codefendants, and the district court’s order was ambiguous as to which factors 

applied to which defendants. See id. at 948. Conversely, Saad Aziz and Maaz

Aziz are not simply co-defendants; they’re also brothers, with nearly 

identical backgrounds and relationships. They were both born in Pakistan 

and immigrated to the United States. They have both lived in Dallas for over 

a decade. They have the same mother and sister (both of whom also live in 

Dallas), and they have the same family living in Pakistan. That relationship 

is particularly relevant here because those ties to Pakistan (as the 

Government argues) or to Texas (as the brothers argue) are key to the flight 

risk determination. 

There are also differences between the brothers, of course. But the 

district court appropriately noted those differences when relevant. We see 

no error in the district court treating Saad and Maaz Aziz as the brothers they 

are: two individuals with nearly identical backgrounds and relationships. 

B. Flight Risk Classification

Pursuant to the Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3142, et seq., the 

Government may seek to detain an individual if there is “a serious risk that 

such person will flee” and fail to appear for trial. Id. § 3142(f)(2)(A). The 

district court here determined that there is “a serious risk that Maaz and Saad 

Aziz will flee,” and the brothers contend that that determination was an 

abuse of discretion. 

To begin, we note again the deferential standard of review applicable 

to this case. See Rueben, 974 F.2d at 586. We owe great deference to the 

district court, which held a two-day hearing and observed the witnesses. We 

cannot reverse the district court in its factual determinations absent a 

“definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United 

States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948). 

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We see no such error. The district court reasonably concluded that 

the brothers presented a flight risk based on several facts. On a corporate 

level, SCS has foreign ties—Saad Aziz is the director of SCS Canada, and the 

brothers traveled to Canada prior to SCS Canada’s incorporation. 

Moreover, SCS opened a branch in Dubai in 2020; Saad Aziz was listed as 

the branch manager; and Maaz Aziz traveled to Dubai around the time that 

the branch was established. The court also found that SCS was still operating 

and “bringing in significant amounts of money,” which the brothers could 

access. Additionally, the court cited the ongoing investigation into as many 

as eighty different SCS bank accounts and that there was evidence SCS 

transferred money out of the country after law enforcement executed a

search warrant on an SCS warehouse. 

On a personal level, the brothers have “several cousins” in Pakistan. 

Saad Aziz has at least one Pakistani bank account and owns real property in 

Pakistan. Moreover, records from Customs and Border Protection showed

that between 2018 and 2021, Maaz Aziz had “flown internationally at least 

thirteen times, traveling to Mexico, Qatar, Columbia, Canada, and Dubai.” 

During that same period, Saad Aziz left the United States at least six times, 

traveling to France, Dubai, Canada, and Mexico. 

The brothers make several arguments in response to this evidence. 

Primarily, they describe their connections to Pakistan as loose; their 

connections to Texas as strong; and dispute the resources that SCS has. 

These arguments support the notion that there is evidence that they were not 

flight risks, but there is evidence they were. That is exactly the situation 

where we defer to the district court rather than decide factual disputes 

ourselves. We cannot say, given the facts described above, that the district 

court abused its discretion in concluding that the brothers are a flight risk. 

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C. Alternatives to Detention

If a district court concludes that a defendant poses a serious flight risk, 

the Bail Reform Act requires the court to hold a detention hearing to 

“determine whether any condition or combination of conditions . . . will 

reasonably assure the appearance of such person as required.” Id. § 3142(f). 

The Bail Reform Act includes a non-exhaustive list of additional 

conditions—such as travel restrictions, reporting requirements, and a 

curfew—which may be imposed to assure appearance. 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3142(c)(1)(B). The statute instructs courts, when determining whether 

any set of conditions will reasonably assure a defendant’s appearance, to 

consider four factors, only three of which are relevant here1

: “(1) the nature 

and circumstances of the offense charged, including whether the offense is a 

crime of violence . . . ; (2) the weight of the evidence against the person; [and] 

(3) the history and characteristics of the person . . . .” Id. § 3142(g).

After thorough consideration of the § 3142(g) factors, the district 

court determined that no combination of release conditions would reasonably 

assure the brothers’ appearance at further proceedings. We perceive no error 

in the district court’s analysis of the § 3142(g) factors. 

Nevertheless, despite the fact that the district court expressly 

concluded that conditions of release would not be adequate, the brothers 

contend that the district court erred as a matter of law by failing to address

any specific conditions of release and why they would be inadequate. Neither 

the text of the Bail Reform Act nor our caselaw requires that a district court 

do so expressly. The only factors the statute explicitly requires the district 

1 The fourth factor applies when detention is premised on risk to the community. 

See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(4). Here, the brothers’ detention is premised on a flight risk 

concern, not risk to the community, so, as the district court appropriately determined, that 

factor does not apply. 

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court to state consideration of are those in § 3142(g). The brothers cite a case 

from another circuit to argue that the district court must expressly set out the 

specific conditions and why they do not suffice. See United States v. BerriosBerrios, 791 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1986). We need not decide whether we agree 

with Berrios-Berrios because, unlike in that case, here there is evidence of 

“apparent misrepresentations” that the brothers made about their finances 

and property owned abroad. In other words, the facts are different in this 

case than those in Berrios-Berrios. Given the particular facts of this case and 

the district court’s extensive consideration of the § 3142(g) factors, we are 

unable to conclude that the district court abused its discretion in this case.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s detention order is 

AFFIRMED.

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