[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advanc e sheets, it may be cited as State v. Turner , Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-6773.]

NOTICE This slip opinion is subject to f ormal revision before it is pu blished in an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are reques ted to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohi o, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published.

S LIP O PINION N O
. 2020-O HIO -6773
T HE S TATE OF O HIO , A PPELLEE , v . T URNER , A PPELLANT
. [Until this opinion appears in t he Ohio Official Reports advanc e sheets, it may be cited as State v. Turner , Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-6773.] Traffic law

— Marked-lanes violation

— Statutory scheme me rely discourages or prohibits a vehicle from crossing the fog line, not touching it

— Judgment
reversed. (No. 2019-1674—Submitted August 18, 2020—Decided December 22, 2 020.)
C ERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Cl ermont County, No. CA2018-11-082,
2019-Ohio-3950.

__________________ K

ENNEDY , J. {¶ 1} This case was accepted as a certified conflict between judgment s of the Twelfth District and First, Third, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, an d Eleventh District Courts of Appeals. The Twelfth D istrict certified the issue in conflict as follows:S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

2 Does an officer have reasonable and articulable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop of a motor vehicle for a marked lanes vi olation under R.C. 4511.33(A)(1) when the officer observes the tires of a vehicle driving on, but not across a marked lane line?

157 Ohio St.3d 1544, 2020-Ohio-94, 137 N.E.3d 1225. {¶ 2} We conclude upon review of the certified question that when an officer believes a traffic law has been violated, the focus of the inquiry is whether the officer had “probable cause to believe that a traffic viola tion has occurred.”
Whren v. United States , 517 U.S. 806, 810, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996);
see also Dayton v. Erickson , 76 Ohio St.3d 3, 665 N.E.2d 1091 (1996), syllabus.
We therefore consider the certif ied question within that contex t and answer it in the negative. {¶ 3} We hold, based on the plain language of R.C. 4511.33(A)(1), the definitions set forth in R.C. 4511.01, and the statutory scheme as a whole, that the single solid white longitudinal line on the right-hand edge of a roadway—the fog line—merely “discourages or prohibits” a driver from “crossing” it; it does not prohibit “driving on” or “touching” it. Manual of Uniform Traf fic Control Devices (“MUTCD”) Section 3A.06(B) (Jan. 13, 2012). {¶ 4} Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the Twelfth District Cour t of Appeals and remand this matter to that court to address the iss ue raised there by appellee, the state of Ohio: whether the State Highway Patrol t rooper reasonably believed that appellant, Ryan Turner, violated the law when he drove on the fog line, rendering the troope r’s stop of Turner lawful. I. Facts and Procedural Background {¶ 5} A State Highway Patrol trooper st opped Turner as Turner was dri ving on Old State Route 74, a two-lane , two-way road in Clermont Cou nty, for failing
to drive within the marked la nes in violation of R.C. 4511.33. As a result of theJanuary Term, 2020

3 stop, Turner was charged with committing a marked-lanes violati on under R.C. 4511.33 and operating a vehicle wh ile under the influence of al cohol in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a) and (d). {¶ 6} Turner filed a motion to suppress the evidence of driving under the
influence of alcohol that ha d been obtained during the traffic stop, arguing that the trooper did not have probable cause or a reasonable and articul able suspicion to initiate the stop. The trooper tes tified that he had observed t he two right-side tires of Turner’s vehicle touch the fog line on the right side of the roadway once and that
that touch can be seen on the dash-cam video. {¶ 7} Old State Route 74 is visible in the relevant portion of the da sh-cam video. The yellow center lines of the road are visible. The la ne in which Turner was traveling is marked by a single solid yellow longitudinal l ine; next to that line is a single broken yellow longitudinal line. On both sides of O ld State Route 74, a single solid white longitudinal line is present, which the troo per referred to in his testimony as the fog line. {¶ 8} After a hearing, the trial court granted the motion to suppress , concluding that a reasonable, pr udent police officer would not have believed that a
marked-lanes violation had occurr ed. The trial court stated th at although it could not see the one-time touch of the fog line by Turner’s tires in the dash-cam video, it would take the trooper at his word that Turner’s tires had t ouched the line. It concluded that touching the lin e does not establish probable ca use that a violation of R.C. 4511.33(A)(1) has occurred. {¶ 9} The Twelfth District reversed the judgment of the trial court i n a split decision. 2019-Ohio-3950, 145 N.E.3d 985. Construing the plai n language of R.C. 4511.33(A)(1), the majority determined that a driver “is not fu lly inside or ‘entirely within’ a single lane of traffic” when driving on a marked lane line, thereby rejecting the holdings of those courts of appeals that had dete rmined that merely touching the lane line did not violate R.C. 4511.33(A)(1). Id. at ¶ 19. HavingS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

4 determined that Turner violate d R.C. 4511.33(A)(1), the court o verruled the
decision of the trial court and held that the trooper had “reas onable and articulable suspicion” to stop the vehicl e for a traffic violation. Id. at ¶ 22. Disposing of the appeal on this basis, the majority declined to address the stat e’s alternative argument that the stop was lawful because the officer had made a reasonable
mistake of law. Id. {¶ 10} The dissenting judge construed R.C. 4511.33(A)(1) by relying on the
definition of “traffic contro l devises” in R.C. 4511.01(QQ) and the requirement in R.C. 4511.09 that the Ohio Depar tment of Transportation (“ODOT” ) adopt a manual for a uniform system of traffic-control devices. Id. at ¶ 25-26 (M. Powell, J., dissenting). Because the MUTCD only “ ‘discourages or proh ibits crossing’ ” of the solid white line, and not touching or driving upon the l ine, the dissent
concluded that a marked-lane s violation under R.C. 4511.33(A)(1 ) occurs only
when a driver crosses the solid white line. Id. at ¶ 28, quoting MUTCD, Section 3A.06B, at 390.
II. Conflict Cases {¶ 11} The Twelfth District certified its judgment as being in conflic t with judgments from the First, Third, Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh Dis trict Courts of Appeals, which held that the touching or driving on the fog lin e does not constitute a violation of R.C. 4511.33(A)(1). See State v. Williams , 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-960958, 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 3467, *4-5 (Aug. 1, 1997) (offic er did not have probable cause to believe that a marked-lanes violation occurre d when vehicle tires were directly on but not over the fog line); State v. Smith , 2017-Ohio-5845, 94 N.E.3d 1058, ¶ 25 (3d Dist.) (officer lacked reasonable, articu lable suspicion to stop vehicle for driving on top of, but not crossing, the white line); State v. Marcum , 2013-Ohio-2652, 993 N.E.2d 1289, ¶ 17 (5th Dist.) (driving on t he white fog line
was not a marked-la nes violation); State v. Parker , 6th Dist. Ottawa No. OT-12- 034, 2013-Ohio-3470, ¶ 7, 10 (motorist does not commit a marked -lanes violationJanuary Term, 2020

5 by traveling on the fog line); State v. Baker , 6th Dist. Wood No. WD-13-074, 2014- Ohio-2564, ¶ 9 (officer lacked rea sonable, articulable suspici on to stop vehicle for touching the white fog line); and State v. Kneier , 11th Dist. Portage No. 2015-P0006, 2015-Ohio-3419, ¶ 5, 17 (driving over the top of the fog line did not provide officer with probable cause for marked-lanes violation). {¶ 12} However, we find that the other cases certified as being in con flict
with this one are in fact not. See State v. Franklin , 5th Dist. Licking No. 11-CA128, 2012-Ohio-3089.¶ 21 (trooper lacked reasonable suspicion t o stop motorist when vehicle’s tires touched the far right line of the double s olid centerline); State
v. Richardson , 5th Dist. Delaware No. 00-CA-A-01-003, 2000 WL 1055917 (July 14, 2000) (trooper lacked reasonable suspicion to stop motorist when his vehicle’s tires drove on top of centerline four times); State v. Konneh , 6th Dist. Wood No. WD17-007, 2018-Ohio-1239, ¶ 26 (trooper had reasonable suspicio n to stop motorist when his vehicle’s tires completely crossed the lines separating the middle lane from the right lane); and State v. Grigoryan , 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 93030, 2010-Ohio-2883, ¶ 25 (police officer lacked reasonable suspicio n to stop motorist
whose vehicle’s tires drove on th e left yellow edge line). The se cases did not concern a vehicle’s driving on or touching the fog line, and ou r holding today does
not address them. III. The Parties’ Arguments {¶ 13} Turner argues that a majority of Ohio’s appellate courts have h eld
that a marked-lanes violation does not occur unless the driver crosses the marked lane line. Therefore, touching a marked lane line does not pro vide either a reasonable, articulable suspicion or probable cause to permit a traffic stop. The state points to the language “entirely within” in R.C. 4511.33( A)(1) and asserts that a vehicle’s tires cannot touch any lane line and be entirely wi thin a single lane of traffic. To hold otherwise, it argues, would allow drivers in e ach lane of travel to enter into the same space.S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

6 IV. Analysis A. Standard of review {¶ 14} Appellate review of a ruling on a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Burnside , 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio5372, 797 N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8. An appe llate court must accept the t rial court’s findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence. See State v. Fanning , 1 Ohio St.3d 19, 20, 437 N.E.2d 583 (1982). But the appellate court must decide the legal questions de novo. Burnside at ¶ 8. {¶ 15} The trial court accepted as true the trooper’s assertion that T urner’s tires touched the white fog lin e. The parties do not dispute t his factual finding. Therefore, our focus is the lega l question of whether touching the solid white longitudinal line—the fog lin e—violates R.C. 4511.33(A)(1). B. R.C. 4511.33(A)(1) is unambiguous: the single solid white longitudinal line at issue here marks only the edge of the roadway and the statute merely “discourages or prohibits crossing” it {¶ 16} This court has not previously pa ssed upon the question presente d
here. In State v. Mays , 119 Ohio St.3d 406, 2008-Ohio-4539, 894 N.E.2d 1204, ¶ 16, we considered only whether a vehicle’s drifting back and forth across the edge of the roadway line was a violation of R.C. 4511.33(A)(1), givi ng an officer a
“reasonable and articulable s uspicion” to stop the driver. {¶ 17} To resolve the issue before the court, we turn, once again, to statutory construction. In cons truing a statute, we do not ask “what did the general assembly intend to enact, but wha t is the meaning of that which it did enact.” Slingluff v. Weaver , 66 Ohio St. 621, 64 N.E. 574 (1902), paragraph two of the syllabus. “When the language of a statute is plain and unambig uous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no need for this court to apply the rules of statutory interpretation.” Symmes Twp. Bd. of Trustees v. Smyth , 87 Ohio St.3d 549, 553, 721 N.E.2d 1057 (2000).January Term, 2020

7 {¶ 18} To determine the plain meaning of a statute, a court relies on the definitions provided by the leg islative body, because a “defini tion by the average man or even by the ordinary dictionary with its studied enumera tion of subtle shades of meaning is not a substitute for the definition set be fore us by the
lawmakers with instructions to apply it to the exclusion of all others.” Fox v. Std. Oil Co. of New Jersey , 294 U.S. 87, 96, 55 S.Ct. 333, 79 L.Ed. 780 (1935). When a term is not defined in the statute, we use the term’s plain a nd ordinary meaning.
Brecksville v. Cook , 75 Ohio St.3d 53, 56, 661 N.E.2d 706 (1996). And “[i]n ascertaining the plain meaning of the statute, the court must l ook to the particular statutory language at issue, as well as the language and design of the statute as a
whole.” Kmart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc. , 486 U.S. 281, 291, 108 S.C. 1811, 100 L.Ed.2d 313 (1988). {¶ 19} R.C. 4511.33(A)(1) is part of an extensive statutory scheme regulating the operation of motor vehicles on Ohio roads. The meaning of the roadway marking at issue here, a nd the vehicular movement permi tted by that roadway marking, becomes unmistakable when R.C. 4511.33(A)(1) i s considered in the context of the definitions in R.C. 4511.01 and its place within the statutory and regulatory scheme. {¶ 20} R.C. 4511.09 gives ODOT authority to “adopt a manual for a uniform system of traffic control devices,” which ODOT did, the MUTCD. R.C. 4511.10 gives ODOT authority to “place and maintain traffic con trol devices, conforming to its manual and specifications, upon all state hig hways as are necessary to indicate and to carry out sections 4511.01 to 4511.78 and 4511.99.” (Emphasis added.) “Traffic cont rol devices” are defined as “a f lagger, sign, signal, marking , or other device used to regularly warn, or guide traffic .” (Emphasis added.) R.C. 4511.01(QQ). Therefore , because the legislature h as given ODOT authority to regulate marked lanes of traffic under R.C. 4511.0 9, we turn to the MUTCD for guidance.S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

8 {¶ 21} Markings on roadways serve an important function by “providing guidance and information” to the motoring public. MUTCD, Secti on 3A.01.01. “Major marking types include pavement and curb markings.” Id . at Section
3A.02.02. And “ [e]ach standard marking shall be used only to convey the meaning prescribed for that marking in the OMUTCD.” (Boldface sic and emphasis added.) Id . at Section 3A.02.01. {¶ 22} Markings are required to be yello w, white, red, blue, or purple in color and must conform to standard highway colors. Id . at Section 3A.05.01. White markings used for longitudinal lines delineate either “ A. The separation of traffic flows in the same direction, or B. The right-hand edge of the roadway

. ” (Boldface sic and emphasis added.) Id . at Section 3A.05.02. Yellow markings used for longitudinal lines delineate either “ A. The separation of traffic traveling in opposite directions, B. The left-hand edge of the roadways of d ivided highways * * *, or C. The separation of two-way left turn lanes * * * .” (Boldface sic.) Id

. at Section 3A.05.03. {¶ 23} The MUTCD sets forth the gener al function of longitudinal lines :

“ A. A double line indicates maximum or special restrictions, B . A solid line discourages or prohibits crossing (d epending on the specific application), C. A broken line indicates a permissive condition, and D. A dotted l ine provides guidance or warning of a downst ream change in lane function. ” (Boldface sic and emphasis added.) Id . at Section 3A.06.01. A normal single line is four to six inches wide, and a broken line is a normal line with segments s eparated by gaps.
Id . at Section 3A.06.02(A) and (D). {¶ 24} A yellow center line delineates a “ separation of traffic lanes that have opposite directions of travel on the roadway .” (Boldface sic.) Id . at Section 3B.01.01. A yellow center line might mark a two-lane, two-way roadway in three

ways. Id . at Section 3B.01.04. Relevant to this case, one of those opt ions is to provideJanuary Term, 2020

9 [o]ne-direction no-passing zone ma rkings consisting of a double yellow line, one of which is a normal broken yellow line and the other is a normal solid yellow line where crossing the center line marking s for passing with care is permitted for the traffic traveling adjace nt to the broken line, but is prohibited f or traffic traveling adjacent t o the solid
line.

(Boldface sic.) Id . at Section 3B.01.04(B). {¶ 25} R.C. 4511.33, entitled “Rules for driving in marked lanes,” pro vides in division (A)(1) that “[w]henever any roadway has been divide d into two or more clearly marked lanes for tra ffic, * * * [a] vehicle * * * shall be driven, as nearly as is practicable, entirely within a single lane or line of traffi c and shall not be moved
from such lane or line until the driver has first ascertained t hat such movement can be made with safety.” The sta tute has two separate components. R.C. 4511.33(A) establishes that clear marking s on a roadway determine whether two or more lanes are present. And R.C. 4511.33(A)(1) then requires a vehicle to stay as nearly as possible within that lane unless the driver can determine that he can move from that lane safely. The road markings, as set forth in the MUTCD, def ine the bounds of the “clearly marked lanes” fo r the purposes of R.C. 4511.33(A)( 1). {¶ 26} The lane of Old State Route 74 in which Turne r was traveling wh en the trooper stopped him is marked by a single solid yellow long itudinal line; next to that line is a single broken yellow longitudinal line. On bo th sides of Old State Route 74, a single solid white longitudinal line—the fog line—i s present. {¶ 27} As applied to these facts, the “clearly marked lanes for traffi c” were set by the yellow center lines. The single solid yellow longit udinal line on Turner’s side of the road and the single broken yellow longitudinal line on the other side of the road established a two-lane, two-way roadway. A single sol id whiteS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

10 longitudinal line may establish a lane for traffic flowing in t he same direction, but based on the dash-cam footage and the testimony of the trooper, no single solid white longitudinal line was markin g another lane flowing in the same direction. {¶ 28} Under the MUTCD, the only other use of a single solid white longitudinal line is to establish the right-hand edge of the ro adway. The trooper plainly understood the markings on the pavement and that the si ngle solid white longitudinal line on the right-hand side of the roadway marked the edge of the roadway because the trooper referred to the marking as the fog line. {¶ 29} As established in the MUTCD, a standard marking can “ be used only to convey the meaning prescribed for that marking ” in the MUTCD. (Boldface sic.) Id . at Section 3A.02.01. Therefore, because the single solid whi te longitudinal line as used on this two-lane, two-way roadway ser ved only to mark the right-hand edge of the roadway and because that marking mer ely discourages or prohibits crossing it, not driving on it or touching it, Turner’s touching of the fog line was not a violation of R.C. 4511.33(A)(1). {¶ 30} It is the placement of traffic-control devices—the markings—tha t carry out the requirements of “sections 4511.01 to 4511.78 and 4511.99 of the
Revised Code.” R.C. 4511.10. Roadw ay markings, therefore, ser ve to provide “guidance and information” to the motoring public as to what ac tions are permitted or prohibited on the roadway under sections R.C. 4511.01 to 451 1.78 and 4511.99
of the Revised Code. M UTCD at Section 3A.01.01. {¶ 31} Ohioans are expected to know the meaning of roadway markings
contained in the MUTCD because t he enforcement of certain Ohio traffic laws is tied to the meanings of the markings contained therein. Most s ignificantly, R.C. 4511.12(A) prohibits the driver of a vehicle from “ disobey[ing] the instructions of any traffic control device placed in accordance with this chapter, unless at the time otherwise directed by a police officer.” (Emphasis added.) As defined in R.C. 4511.01(QQ), traffic-control devices include markings. R.C. Ch apter 4511 doesJanuary Term, 2020

11 not list the markings that drivers are expected to obey. Inste ad, the MUTCD
describes the duties a nd permissive actions that the markings c onvey. {¶ 32} Other statutes rely on the MUTCD to flesh out their meanings. R.C. 4511.17(A)(1) forbids “[k]nowingly” defacing, damaging, or impr operly tampering
with “ any traffic control device, ” and R.C. 4511.17(A)(2) prohibits “driv[ing] upon or over any freshly applied pave ment marking material on the su rface of a roadway while the marking [material] is in an undried condition and is marked by flags, markers, signs, or other devices intended to protect it.” (Emp hasis added.) These statutes require knowledge of wha t constitutes a traffic-contro l device. {¶ 33} Certain permissive provisions of R.C. 4511.25—which requires vehicles to be driven on the righ t-hand side of the roadway in most circumstances— rely on the meaning of traffic-control devices to inform driver s when they can travel on other than the right-hand side of the roadway. R.C. 4511.25 (A)(5) requires travel on the right-hand side of the roadway unless “otherwise directed by a * * *
traffic control device.” The sta tute does not describe those t raffic-control devices— that is left to the MUTCD. R.C. 4511.25(C) allows a vehicle to be driven left of the center line of a roadway having four or more lanes of traff ic and providing for two-way movement of traffic “whe n authorized by official traffi c-control devices designating certain lanes to the left of the center of the road way for use by traffic not otherwise permitted to use the lanes.” R.C. 4511.25(A)(1) allows a vehicle to be driven on other than the right-hand side of the roadway when passing another vehicle proceeding in the same direction, but such a movement i s limited by any traffic-control device prohibiting passing in that section of t he roadway. See R.C.
4511.12. {¶ 34} R.C. 4511.27 governs the overtakin g and passing of vehicles proceeding in the same directi on. That provision does not defi ne or designate which roadways drivers may overtake or pass on. Overtaking and passing indicators are established by t he traffic-control devices—the r oadway markings.S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

12 See MUTCD at Sections 3B.01, Yellow Center Line Pavement Markings and Warrants; 3B.02, No-Passing Zone P avements Marking and Warrants ; and 3B.04, White Lane Pavement Markings and Warrants. {¶ 35} Many roadway markings have special purposes, and disobeying them gives rise to different violations of Ohio’s traffic laws, depending on what they signify. The single soli d white longitudinal line on the right-hand side of Old State Route 74 discourages or pr ohibits the crossing of that li ne but does not prohibit the mere touching of it. Because Turner did not cross the single solid white longitudinal line—the fog line—and driving on it or touching it is not prohibited under R.C. 4511.33(A)(1), no violation occurred. {¶ 36} This interpretation of R.C. 4511.33(A)(1) is consistent with th e greater weight of authority in jurisdictions across the nation that touching the single solid white longitudinal line on the right-hand side of the roa dway does not
constitute a violati on of R.C. 4511.33(A)(1). See Gee , “U Can’t Touch This” Fog Line: The Improper Use of A Fog Line Violation as a Pretext for Initiating an Unlawful Fourth Amendment Search and Seizure, 36 N.Ill.U.L.Rev. 1, 14 (2015) (the majority of jurisdictions hold that nominally encroaching upon traffic-control
lines does not constitute a m arked-lanes violation). See People v. Mueller , 2018 IL App (2d) 170863, 127 N.E.3d 861, ¶ 28 (officer did not have rea sonable suspicion that defendant had violated the statute for improper lane usage when vehicle’s tires touched the fog line and yellow center line three times at nigh t on curved road); United States v. Warfield , 727 Fed.Appx. 182, 186 (6th Cir.2018) (officer lacked probable cause to stop defendant’s vehicle, as merely touching a lane line is not a violation of Ohio’s marked-lanes statute); State v. Neal, 159 Idaho 439, 447, 362 P.3d 514 (2015) (twice driving onto but not across fog line doe s not violate laneuse statute); United States v. Wendfeldt , 58 F.Supp.3d 1124, 1130 (D.Nev.2014) (a vehicle’s driving onto the fog line several times did not provi de officer with reasonable suspicion to justify traffic stop for improper lane usage); United StatesJanuary Term, 2020

13 v. Colin , 314 F.3d 439, 444 (9th Cir.2002) (based on the “ ‘totality of the circumstances,’ ” a vehicle’s touching fog line and the solid y ellow line did not provide officer with reasonable su spicion to stop defendant’s v ehicle, quoting United States v. Arvizu , 534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002);
Rowe v. State , 363 Md. 424, 441, 769 A.2d 879 (2001) (vehicle’s crossing and then touching the white line bordering the shoulder did not violate marked-lanes statute); State v. Cerny , 28 S.W.3d 796, 801 (Tex.App.2000) (marked-lanes statute not
violated when vehicle touched the white shoulder line and wove somewhat within its own lane of traffic); Crooks v. State , 710 So.2d 1041, 1043 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1998) (vehicle’s crossing fog line three times did not constitute
violation of marked-lanes statut e when there was no evidence th at driver failed to ascertain that he could do so safely); and State v. Lafferty , 291 Mont. 157, 1998 MT 247, 967 P.2d 363, ¶ 14, overruled in part on other grounds, State v. Flynn , 359 Mont. 376, 2011 MT 48, 251 P.3d 143, ¶ 12 (crossing fog lin e twice and driving
on it once did not violate marked- lanes statute, which applies only to changes between marked lanes).
V. Conclusion {¶ 37} We hold, based on the plain language of R.C. 4511.33(A)(1), the definitions set forth in R.C. 4511.01, and the statutory scheme as a whole, that the single solid white longitudinal line on the right-hand edge a r oadway—the fog line—marks the edge of the roadw ay and that such a marking mere ly “discourages or prohibits” a driver from “crossing” it, not “driving on” or “touching” it. MUTCD Section 3A.06(B). {¶ 38} We accordingly answer the certif ied-conflict question, as modif ied, in the negative, reverse the judgment of the Twelfth District C ourt of Appeals, and remand this matter to that court to address the argument raised by the state of Ohio: whether the trooper’s reasonabl e mistake of law v alidated the s top. Judgment reversedS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

14 and cause remanded.
F RENCH , D E W INE , D ONNELLY , and S TEWART , JJ., concur.
F ISCHER , J., dissents, with an opinion joined by O’C ONNOR , C.J.

_________________ F ISCHER , J., dissenting. {¶ 39} Because I would conclude that the plain language of R.C. 4511.33(A) obviates the need to consult the Ohio Manual of Unif orm Traffic Control Devices (“MUTCD”) and dictates that in order for a vehi cle to remain “within a single lane or line of traffic” on a roadway that is “clearly marked,” the driver cannot drive on those lane lines, I respectfully must di ssent. I would hold
that an officer has a reasonabl e and articulable suspicion to c onduct a traffic stop
of a vehicle for a marked-la nes violation under R.C. 4511.33(A) (1) when the officer
observes the tires of a vehicl e driving on but not across a mar ked lane line. I. Legal Analysis {¶ 40} In a Billboard Hot 100 single recorded and released by his band in 1980, Cleveland’s Michael Stanley sang, “Thank God for the man who put the white lines on the highway.” See John Soeder, Three decades after “Heartland,” Michael Stanley is alive and well in “Shadowland,” (Jan. 12, 2019), https://www.cleveland.com/popmus ic/2009/12/three_decades_after_ heartland.ht ml (accessed Oct. 1, 2020) [https://perma.cc/A5CG-8TV7]; Michae l Stanley, The
80’s , http://www.michaelstanley.com/THE_80S.html (accessed Oct. 1, 2020) [https://perma.cc/R6FG-M7W3]; Billboard, The Hot 100 Chart: Week of April 11,
1981 , https://www.billboard.com/cha rts/hot-100/1981-04-11 (accessed Oct. 1, 2020) [https://perma.cc/G77P-9H5Z]. This case is not about the Ohioans who paint the white lines on the state’s roadways, but rather the motoris ts who drive on those white lines. Specifically, the issue before the court in this certified conflict is
whether an officer has a reasona ble and articulable suspicion t o conduct a trafficJanuary Term, 2020

15 stop for a R.C. 4511.33(A)(1) marked-lanes violation when the o fficer observes the tires of a vehicle driving on but not across a marked lane line

. A. Reasonable suspicion versus probable cause {¶ 41} I begin my analysis by noting a procedural quirk in this case. In his motion to suppress, appellant, Ryan Turner, argued that the Sta te Highway Patrol Trooper did not have probable cause or a reasonable and articul able suspicion to initiate the traffic stop. In granting Turner’s motion to supp ress, the trial court concluded that “a reasonably prudent officer who is familiar wi th [R.C.] 4511.33(A)(1) would not believe tha t he had probable cause to s top the defendant’s vehicle under these circumstances.” On appeal, the state raise d a single assignment of error: “The trial court erred in granting appellee’s motion to suppress, as the trooper had reasonable, articulab le suspicion to believe appell ee had committed a
marked lanes violation under Section 4511.33(A)(1).” 2019-Ohio -3950, 145 N.E.3d 985, ¶ 8. The Twelfth Dis trict Court of Appeals did not address whether probable cause existed, but rather resolved the appeal by rever sing based upon its
conclusion that there was “reas onable and articulable suspicion for the traffic stop.”
Id. at ¶ 22. I acknowledge that probable cause and reasonable and articulable suspicion are distinct concepts. See State v. Mays , 119 Ohio St.3d 406, 2008-Ohio4539, 894 N.E.2d 1204, ¶ 23. Given the procedural posture of t his case, the
substance of the Twelfth Distr ict’s decision, and the limited s cope of the certifiedconflict question that we accepte d for review, my analysis is t herefore confined to
whether reasonable and artic ulable suspicion existed. B. Legal background {¶ 42} “[T]he permissibility of a particular law enforcement practice is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Am endment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests.” Delaware v. Prouse , 440 U.S. 648, 654, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979). “To j ustify a particular intrusion, the officer must dem onstrate ‘specific and articulab le facts which, takenS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

16 together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that
intrusion.’ ” State v. Batchili , 113 Ohio St.3d 403, 2007-Ohio-2204, 865 N.E.2d 1282, ¶ 11, quoting Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). “[I]f an officer’s decision to stop a motorist for a c riminal violation, including a traffic violation, is prompted by reasonable and ar ticulable suspicion considering all the circumstances, then the stop is constitutio nally valid.” Mays at ¶ 8. {¶ 43} R.C. 4511.33(A), which makes it a tr affic violation to drive ou tside a lane, provides:

Whenever any roadway has been divided into two or more clearly marked lanes for traffic, or wherever within municipal corporations traffic is lawfully moving in two or more substant ially
continuous lines in the same dir ection, the following rules app ly: (1) A vehicle or trackless trolley shall be driven, as nearly a s is practicable, entirely within a single lane or line of traffi c and shall
not be moved from such lane or line until the driver has first ascertained that such movement can be made with safety.

{¶ 44} This court most recently analyzed R.C. 4511.33(A) in Mays . In that case, the court was presented w ith a conflict question raising the issue whether the Constitution permits a police officer to stop a motorist whom h e or she witnesses cross a right white edge line without further evidence of errat ic driving. 119 Ohio St.3d 406, 2008-Ohio-4539, 894 N.E.2d 1204, at ¶ 1. This court held that an officer may do so. Id. {¶ 45} In Mays , the only evidence of erratic driving witnessed by the officer was the defendant’s crossing of the right fog line twice by app roximately one tire
width. Id. at ¶ 2. This court rejected May s’s argument that absolute obs ervance ofJanuary Term, 2020

17 lane markings is not require d by R.C. 4511.33(A) and that drivi ng across the white edge line twice does not constitute a violation of the statute. Id. at ¶ 15-16. This court stated, “When an officer obs erves a vehicle driving back- and-forth across an edge line, the officer has a reasonable and articulable suspici on that the driver has
violated R.C. 4511.33.” Id. at ¶ 16. {¶ 46} Thus, Mays stands for the proposition that an officer has a reasonable and articulable suspicion to conduc t a traffic stop of a motor vehicle for a markedlanes violation under R.C. 4511.33(A)(1) when the officer obser ves the tires cross a marked lane line. Mays , however, did not address th e question before the court
here: Does a reasonable and ar ticulable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop exist
when the officer observes th e tires of a vehicle drive on a marked lane line? C. Reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop exists when an officer observes
a vehicle’s tires touch a lane line {¶ 47} When we construe a statute, legislative intent is our primary c oncern. State v. Marcum , 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, 59 N.E.3d 1231, ¶ 8. To determine legislative intent, we first look to the plain langua ge of the statute, and if that language is unambiguous and definite, we apply it as writt en. Summerville v.
Forest Park , 128 Ohio St.3d 221, 2010-Ohio-6280, 943 N.E.2d 522, ¶ 18, cit ing
Hubbell v. Xenia , 115 Ohio St.3d 77, 2007-Ohio-4839, 873 N.E.2d 878, ¶ 11. {¶ 48} “To discern legislative intent, we read words and phrases in co ntext and construe them in accordance with rules of grammar and commo n usage.” Mahoning Edn. Assn. of Dev. Disabilities v. State Emp. Relations Bd. , 137 Ohio St.3d 257, 2013-Ohio-4654, 998 N.E.2d 1124, ¶ 15. “ ‘[S]ignifi cance and effect should, if possible, be accorded to every word, phrase, sentenc e and part of an
act.’ ” Weaver v. Edwin Shaw Hosp. , 104 Ohio St.3d 390, 2004-Ohio-6549, 819 N.E.2d 1079, ¶ 13, quoting Wachendorf v. Shaver , 149 Ohio St. 231, 78 N.E.2d 370 (1948), paragraph five of the syllabus.S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

18 {¶ 49} The Revised Code does not define “lane.” Nor, for purposes of R.C. 4511.33(A)(1), does it distinguish among various types of lane lines (e.g., a solid yellow line, a solid white line, a dashed white line). Thus, t he Revised Code does not specify what it means for a driver to fail to drive “entire ly within a single lane or line of traffic.” Despite t he lack of statutory definitions , I conclude that this case can be resolved by looking solely to the plain language of the statute. {¶ 50} R.C. 4511.33(A)(1) provides that when a roadway has been “divid ed into two or more clearly marked lanes for traffic” or when traf fic within a municipal corporation “lawfully mov[es] in two or more substantially cont inuous lines in the same direction,” a vehicle on th e roadway “shall be driven, as nearly as is practicable, entirely within a s ingle lane or line of traffic.” {¶ 51} The statute presupposes a few thi ngs. First, there is a single roadway. Second, there are “clear ly marked” lanes (or lines of traffic) on that single roadway. Third, the vehicle mu st be driven, as nearly as pract icable, within one of those lanes (or lines of traffic). {¶ 52} According to the clear language of the statute, then, each lane is a distinct, discrete unit. There can be no overlapping of lanes, because those lanes must be “clearly marked.” The interpretation set forth by Turn er (and the majority of the appellate districts) ignores this fact, because any othe r interpretation illogically treats a lane line as a space that simultaneously e xists in multiple lanes, rendering the lanes not “clearly marked.” Instead, a part of t he roadway can belong to multiple lanes, making unclear where one lane ends and anoth er starts and who might have the right-of-way. {¶ 53} To avoid this flawed interpretation, we must treat “entirely wi thin a single lane or line of traffic” as meaning that a driver who dr ives on the lines that
establish the lane boundaries driv es outside the lane or line o f traffic. Thus, to honor the language of R.C. 4511.33(A) , I would adopt the Twelft h District’s reading of the statute and that advocated by the state and conc lude that in order toJanuary Term, 2020

19 drive “entirely within a single lane or line of traffic,” a dri ver must stay inside the inner edges of the lane lines. In other words, a driver may no t drive on the lane
lines. {¶ 54} I note again that while lines marking the boundaries between la nes and the lines marking the edge of a roadway serve different fun ctions, the relevant statute, R.C. 4511.33(A)(1), unambiguously makes no distinction among the various types of roadway markings. Because the statute makes n o such distinction, the statute applies uniformly to each type of lane line. Thus, for example, a driver
drives outside the lane or line of traffic when the vehicle’s t ires touch the right fog line or the center line separating two directions of traffic. Treating the various types of lane lines uniformly not only mirrors the statute, which doe s not make any distinctions, but also provides a uniform, common-sense rule: i n order to stay “entirely within a single lane or line of traffic,” R.C. 4511.3 3(A)(1), a vehicle’s tires cannot touch a lane line, reg ardless of the type of lane line. {¶ 55} I further note that I would not find the “as nearly as is pract icable” language of R.C. 4511.33(A)(1) to compel any different result. As this court explained in Mays , “[t]he phrase ‘as nearly as is practicable’ does not give the driver the option to remain within the lane markings; rather, the phra se requires the driver
to remain within the lane markin gs unless the driver cannot rea sonably avoid straying.” 119 Ohio St.3d 406, 2008-Ohio-4539, 894 N.E.2d 1204 , at ¶ 18, quoting R.C. 4511.33(A)(1). Rather than being a factor in the analysis whether an officer had reasonable suspicion, the “as nearly as is practicable” lan guage provides a driver with a legal defense to a c harge of driving outside the lane:

R.C. 4511.33 does provide for c ertain circumstances in which a driver can cross a lane line without violating the stat ute. However, the question of whether appellant might have a possibl e defense to a charge of viola ting R.C. 4511.33 is irrelevant in ourS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

20 analysis of whether an officer has a reasonable and articulable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop. An officer is not requir ed to determine whether someone who has been observed committing a crime might have a legal d efense to the charge.

Id. at ¶ 17. Thus, I conclude that the “as nearly as is practicab le” language of R.C. 4511.33(A)(1) does not factor into our analysis in this case. D. The MUTCD is not relevant to the analysis of this case {¶ 56} Because I reach this conclusion based on the plain language of the statute, I, under our precedents, must avoid consulting any adm inistrative rules or regulations, such as the MUTCD. If a statute’s meaning is plai n, we do not consider an administrative agency’s interpretation or implementation of that statute. See
State ex rel. Morris v. Indus. Comm. , 134 Ohio St. 380, 381-382, 17 N.E.2d 741 (1938); In re Application of Black Fork Wind Energy, L.L.C. , 156 Ohio St.3d 181, 2018-Ohio-5206, 124 N.E.3d 787, ¶ 21. Indeed, as the Supreme C ourt of the United States has succinctly put it, “When the words of a statute are unambiguous, then, this first canon is also the last: ‘judicial inquiry is complet e.’ ” Connecticut Natl.
Bank v. Germain , 503 U.S. 249, 254, 112 S.Ct. 1146, 117 L.Ed.2d 391 (1992), quoting Rubin v. United States , 449 U.S. 424, 430, 101 S.Ct. 698, 66 L.Ed.2d 633 (1981). {¶ 57} It is significant that this “first canon” requires us to end th e judicial inquiry when the words of the statute are unambiguous. This ca non does not provide that the judicial inquiry ends when the words of the st atute, considered in light of administrative rules or regulations adopted by an exec utive administrative agency, are unambiguous. As this court has explained, it is im proper for an administrative agency to alter the meaning of a statute if that statute is unambiguous. See In re VHA Diagnostic Servs., Inc. , 65 Ohio St.3d 210, 214, 602 N.E.2d 647 (1992) (explaining, in c onstruing a particular statu te, that “[t]he wordsJanuary Term, 2020

21 ‘after receiving’ are clear and unambiguous. It is improper fo r the administrative agency to change the words ‘after receiving’ to, in effect, ‘af ter determining it has received’ ”). It follows that when a statue is unambiguous, ou r inquiry should end,
and we should not look to sources outside that statute to deter mine what the statute

means. {¶ 58} I acknowledge that R.C. 4511.09 grants ODOT authority to issue the MUTCD and that R.C. 4511.10 grants ODOT authority to place and maintain traffic-control devices in conformity with the MUTCD as necessa ry to carry out the requirements of R.C. 4511.33. But t he MUTCD cannot as a matter of law alter unambiguous language of the Revis ed Code, and the General Assem bly has not enacted the portions of the MUTCD cited in the majority opinion and incorporated those provisions int o the Revised Code. {¶ 59} If the language of R.C. 4511.33(A)(1) had been found ambiguous either in the analysis of the majority opinion or in my own ana lysis, then it would have been appropriate to consult the MUTCD to resolve that ambi guity. Based on my analysis, however, (and as noted in the majority opinion) th e statutory language is plain and unambiguous. Having concluded that the statute’s meaning is plain, I
conclude that it is unnecessary for this court to consult any s ources beyond R.C. 4511.33(A)(1) to resolve this appeal.
II. Conclusion {¶ 60} Based on the plain language of R.C. 4511.33(A)(1), I respectful ly dissent from the majority decision and would hold that an offic er has reasonable and articulable suspicion to conduc t a traffic stop of a motor vehicle for a markedlanes violation under R.C. 4511.33(A)(1) when the officer obser ves the tires of a vehicle driving on but not across a marked lane line. I would accordingly answer the certified-conflict question in the affirmative and affirm t he judgment of the Twelfth District Court of Appeals.
O’C ONNOR , C.J., concurs in the foregoing opinion.S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

22 _________________ D. Vincent Faris, Clermont County Prosecuting Attorney, and Ni ck Horton, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. Faris & Faris, L.L.C., and Zac hary F. Farris, for appellant. Paul W. Flowers Co., L.P.A., and Louis E. Grube, urging revers al for
amicus curiae Ohio Associati on of Criminal Defense Lawyers. Dave Yost, Attorney General, Benjamin M. Flowers, Solicitor Ge neral, and Stephen P. Carney, Deputy Solicitor General, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio Attorney General Dave Yost.

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