SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-2686-16T3

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE

OF CAROL A. LEE RANKINS,

Deceased.

________________________________

Argued February 6, 2018 – Decided June 25, 2018

Before Judges Sumners and Moynihan.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Probate Part, Middlesex 

County, Docket No. 250686.

Kenneth W. Thomas argued the cause for 

appellant Ursula T. Jones (Lanza Law Firm, 

LLP, attorneys; Kenneth W. Thomas, of counsel 

and on the brief).

Dawn Marie Farinella argued the cause for

respondent Clyde Rankins (Santoro and Santoro, 

attorneys; Dawn Marie Farinella, of counsel 

and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

In this Chancery Division dispute, respondent Clyde Rankins,

the surviving spouse of Carol A. Lee Rankins, claimed full 

entitlement to the proceeds from the sale of the home they owned 

and lived in through tenancy by the entirety. Appellant Ursula 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." 

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2 A-2686-16T3

T. Jones, Carol's1 daughter from a different relationship and

executrix of Carol's estate, argued that Clyde has no rights to 

her mother's one-half share of the proceeds because Carol and 

Clyde's twenty-seven year marriage is invalid based upon her 

discovery after her mother's death that her signature as a witness 

on their marriage certificate was forged. Ursula therefore 

asserted that Carol's last will and testament controls the 

disposition of her one-half share of the sales proceeds, which 

should be placed in a constructive trust for the beneficiaries –

she and her two sisters are the sole beneficiaries – due to Clyde's 

misdeeds.

2

After the parties filed summary judgment motions, the trial 

court granted Clyde's motion and denied Ursula's motion. In its 

oral decision, the court determined that there was no basis to 

nullify his marriage with Carol under either our annulment statute, 

N.J.S.A. 2A:34-1, or due to Ursula's alleged forged signature on 

the marriage certificate, and thus he was entitled to all of the 

sale proceeds as a surviving tenant by the entirety. We reverse 

because we conclude Ursula's contention that her signature was 

 

1 We use the parties' first names because some of them share a 

surname and for ease of reference, and in doing so we mean no 

disrespect.

2 The youngest sister is a minor who was adopted by Carol and 

Clyde, but whose legal guardian is Ursula.
3 A-2686-16T3

forged creates a factual dispute as to the consummation of their 

marriage under N.J.S.A. 37:1-17, which thereby prevents summary 

judgment in favor of Clyde to the sales proceeds under tenancy by 

the entirety. There is also a factual dispute concerning Clyde's 

misdeeds, which warrants a reversal of the court's decision not 

to consider whether a constructive trust should be imposed.

When reviewing an order granting summary judgment, we apply 

"the same standard governing the trial court." Oyola v. Xing Lan 

Liu, 431 N.J. Super. 493, 497 (App. Div. 2013). A court should 

grant summary judgment when the record reveals "no genuine issue 

as to any material fact" and "the moving party is entitled to a 

judgment or order as a matter of law." R. 4:46-2(c). We accord 

no deference to the trial judge's legal conclusions. Nicholas v. 

Mynster, 213 N.J. 463, 478 (2013) (citations omitted). Summary 

judgment should be denied when determination of material disputed 

facts depends primarily on credibility evaluations. Petersen v. 

Twp. of Raritan, 418 N.J. Super. 125, 132 (App. Div. 2011). 

Although both parties moved for summary judgment, but because the 

court granted judgment in favor of Clyde, we consider the facts 

in a light most favorable to Ursula. Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. 

Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 523 (1995).

Mindful of these principles, we briefly summarize the 

relevant facts and assertions from the record. Eight months after 
4 A-2686-16T3

Carol's death in 2015, Ursula, the executrix of Carol's estate

under a last will and testament executed on April 1, 2013, filed 

a verified complaint and order to show cause to probate the estate

and vacate the letters of administration previously given to Clyde.

In pertinent part, she specifically requested to enjoin and 

restrain Clyde, who married Carol in a civil ceremony on June 10, 

1988, "from dissipating any portion of the [estate] until further 

notice of the court." Clyde responded with an answer and 

counterclaim; seeking all rights to title and interest in the 

marital home,

3 which was jointly purchased a year before their 

marriage and deeded to Carol, but she later deeded the property 

to herself and Clyde, her husband, that was recorded in the 

Middlesex County Clerk's Office on July 1, 1998.

4 Carol claims 

she assisted her mother in the purchase, which was made solely 

with her mother's funds. Clyde also claimed no knowledge of his 

wife's will nor the bequests therein.

In Ursula's answer to the counterclaim, she questioned her 

mother's marriage to Clyde because she did not witness the marriage 

 

3 Although Ursula contends Carol and Clyde were not legally 

married, for ease of reference we refer to the property as their 

marital home.

4 A mortgage on the property was recorded on June 1, 2007, with 

"Clyde S. Rankins and Carol A. Rankins, Husband and Wife" as the 

borrowers.
5 A-2686-16T3

and her signature on the marriage certificate was forged. The 

court in turn executed an order admitting the will to probate;

enjoining Clyde from dissipating any portion of the estate until 

further court order; appointing Ursula as executrix of the estate; 

vacating the letters of administration granted to Clyde; allowing

Clyde to sell the marital home with the net proceeds to be held

in the trust account of Clyde's attorney; setting out a discovery 

period; requiring parties to participate in mediation; and 

scheduling a trial date.

After mediation was unsuccessful, Ursula filed a motion to 

amend her complaint to allege unjust enrichment and seek imposition 

of a constructive trust on one-half of the proceeds of the marital 

home. Clyde filed no opposition. However, the record does not 

indicate the disposition of the motion. Ursula then filed a 

summary judgment motion to impose a constructive trust on one-half 

of the proceeds of the marital home on behalf of her and her 

sisters as beneficiates of Carol's estate. In the application, 

she certified that her sister, Catherine, signed her name on the 

marriage certification as she was not at the wedding and was 

against her mother's decision to marry Clyde. Ursula also made 

various allegations concerning Clyde's emotional control over her 

mother by forcing her to add his name to the deed of the marital 

home; his physical and sexual abuse towards her mother; his sexual 
6 A-2686-16T3

abuse of her female cousin, her adopted sister's mother; his lack 

of concern and financial support for her adopted sister, his 

adopted daughter; and his mismanagement of her mother's finances 

that led her mother to file for bankruptcy and suffer stress that 

caused health issues. Ursula further contended that these

circumstances attributed to her mother's decision not to leave 

anything to Clyde in her last will and testament. Clyde filed a 

cross-motion for summary judgment supported by his certification 

that he and Carol were legally married, and that he had no 

knowledge of Ursula's sister signing her signature on the marriage 

certificate.

The court rejected Ursula's claim that the marriage was not

valid, finding there was no basis to annul the marriage under 

N.J.S.A. 2A:34-1, which allows marriages to be nullified on a 

variety of grounds, including bigamy, incest, impotence, infancy, 

and incapacity to marry. We agree with this finding.

We, however, differ with the court's rejection of Ursula's 

contention that the marriage was not legally valid because it 

failed to satisfy the marriage certificate requirements of

N.J.S.A. 37:1-17. In pertinent part, the statute provides, "[e]ach 

certificate of marriage or civil union shall also contain the 

signature and residence of at least two witnesses who were present 

at the marriage or civil union ceremony." N.J.S.A. 37:1-17. The 
7 A-2686-16T3

court determined there was no legal basis to invalidate Carol and 

Clyde's marriage due to a lack of two bona fide witnesses on the 

marriage certificate as required by N.J.S.A. 37:1-17. Even though

the statute does not specifically declare that failure to adhere 

to its requirements invalidates a purported marriage, there is a 

legal basis to support Ursula's contention.

In N.J.S.A. 37:1-10, our legislature declared that effective 

December 1, 1939:

[N]o marriage . . . shall be valid unless the 

contracting parties shall have obtained a 

marriage license as required by [N.J.S.A.] 

37:1-2 . . ., and unless, also, the marriage, 

after license duly issued therefor, shall have 

been performed by or before any person, 

religious society, institution or 

organization authorized by [N.J.S.A.] 37:1-13 

. . . to solemnize marriages; and failure in 

any case to comply with both prerequisites 

aforesaid, which shall always be construed as 

mandatory and not merely directory, shall 

render the purported marriage absolutely void.

[(Emphasis added).]

Thus, as we recognized in Yaghoubinejad v. Haghighi, 384 N.J. 

Super. 339, 341 (App. Div. 2006), N.J.S.A. 37:1-10, among other 

things, "requires that a license to marry be procured before the 

ceremony." Significantly, in Lee v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co., 337 

N.J. Super. 509, 514-16 (App. Div. 2001), we held that because a 

couple never obtained a marriage license as required by N.J.S.A. 

37:1-10, they were not legally married and, therefore, the 
8 A-2686-16T3

plaintiff was not eligible for coverage as a "family member" under 

her spouse's automobile policy. In commenting upon the couple's 

participation in a ceremonial wedding, we noted the event "add[ed] 

nothing to the case [because] [u]nder our statutes, the wedding 

was meaningless[,] [and] [t]he marriage was void from its 

inception." Id. at 516 (citing N.J.S.A. 37:1-10).

Applying these principles to this appeal, a marriage 

certificate that contains a forged signature of one of its two 

purported witnesses does not satisfy N.J.S.A. 37:1-10, and is 

thus, invalid. In turn, the marriage license cannot be lawful and 

the marriage is not legally consummated. Hence, we are constrained 

to reverse the court's legal conclusion that Ursula's contention 

that her forged signature on Carol and Clyde's marriage certificate 

did not invalidate their marriage. Since Clyde disputes Ursula's 

forgery assertion, the court should not have granted summary 

judgment to either party. A remand for trial is therefore 

necessary to enable Ursula to prove the veracity of her allegations

and its impact on Clyde's interest in the marital home.

In addition, we find fault with the court's dismissal of 

Ursula's equitable argument that a constructive trust should be 

imposed on her mother's one-half share of the sales proceeds

because under the operation of law – tenancy by the entirety – her 

mother's joint interest in the property went to Clyde. In reaching 
9 A-2686-16T3

that decision, the court explained there was no property to place 

a constructive trust upon due to its finding that Carol and Clyde 

were in fact married, giving Clyde the sole right to the sales 

proceeds of the marital home as a tenant by the entirety. However, 

as noted, we conclude there is a legitimate question as to whether 

they were legally married. Moreover, even if the marriage was 

legally consummated, the court failed to adequately address if 

there were sufficient grounds to impose a constructive trust due 

to Clyde's alleged misdeeds.

A constructive trust on property is appropriate in order to 

"prevent unjust enrichment and force a restitution to the plaintiff 

of something that in equity and good conscience [does] not belong 

to the defendant." Flanigan v. Munson, 175 N.J. 597, 608 (2003) 

(alteration in original) (citation omitted). A two-prong test, 

however, must be satisfied to impose a constructive trust. Ibid. 

A court must first find one of the parties has committed a 

"wrongful act." Ibid. (citation omitted). Second, the "wrongful 

act must result in a transfer or diversion of property that 

unjustly enriches the recipient." Ibid.

After stating that the sales proceeds go to Clyde under 

tenancy by the entirety, the court simply states: "The other 

arguments that are set forth do not form a basis under the law to

impose a constructive trust." Because the court did not 
10 A-2686-16T3

specifically address how it considered Ursula's allegations of 

Clyde's misdeeds, it is unclear whether the court made credibility 

determinations and found them unconvincing, or if the court 

accepted them as true, they did not warrant an imposition of a 

constructive trust. And of course, if the court took the former 

route by deciding a factual dispute, it should not have done so. 

See Petersen, 418 N.J. Super. at 132. On remand, the court must 

clearly set forth it findings of law and facts to determine whether 

imposition of a constructive trust is warranted. See R. 1:7-4; 

Elrom v. Elrom, 439 N.J. Super. 424, 443 (App. Div. 2015).

Finally, the record indicates that the respective summary 

judgment motions were filed and decided before any discovery 

commenced. Thus, on remand, we leave it to the court's discretion 

to determine if discovery should be permitted.

Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.