25510 Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 99 / Tuesday, May 21, 1996 / Notices

(1) Suspend the operating license of

Maine Yankee pending resolution of the

Petition; (2) examine and test by plug

sampling—or other ASME approved

method—all large piping welds that

may have been susceptible to microfissures at the time of construction; (3)

reanalyze Maine Yankee containment as

one located in an area where seismic

risk is not ‘‘low’’; (4) reduce the licensed

operating capacity of Maine Yankee to

a level consistent with a flawed

containment and/or flawed reactor

coolant piping welds; (5) provide an

informal public hearing in the area of

the plant regarding the Petition; and (6)

place Petitioner on service and mailing

lists relevant to its interests in safety at

Maine Yankee and all public forums

opened by the NRC.

As the basis for these requests, the

Petition states that: (1) The containment

is inadequate for power operation in

excess of the original license, and may

be inadequate for the original power

operation limits because of

insupportable original design

acceptance criteria, yet the NRC staff

recommended to the Commission that it

grant a license amendment permitting

this design. It is further stated that the

Maine Yankee containment was

designed and constructed without

diagonal reinforcement rods, based on

low seismic risk. Additionally, after a

1979 earthquake of 4.2 magnitude and

an epicenter less than 10 miles from the

plant site, the NRC ordered the

shutdown of Maine Yankee until piping

and piping supports could be

seismically qualified. There is no public

record, however, that the NRC

reevaluated this marginally acceptable

containment design, including prior to

granting license amendments to operate

at increased power; and (2) the Maine

Yankee emergency core cooling system

(ECCS), reactor coolant piping, and

other large piping have not been

adequately analyzed for materials

degradation to ensure integrity at power

operation in excess of the originally

licensed power level, or under accident

conditions. The Atomic Energy

Commission’s concern with ‘‘microfissures’’ in reactor coolant system

welds led to appointment of a task force,

and prompted studies and reports in

1971 (prior to heightened awareness of

embrittlement phenomena) that

concluded that the microfissures would

not propagate or grow under foreseeable

conditions. The Petitioner asserts that

large pipe welds next to the reactor

vessel have endured 23 years of

corrosion, stress, vibration, and

radiation and may fail, initiating a lossof-coolant accident, or may be subject to

thermal shock failure initiated by use of

the ECCS.

The Petition has been referred to the

Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor

Regulation (NRR) pursuant to 10 CFR

2.206. As provided by Section 2.206,

appropriate action will be taken on the

Petition within a reasonable time. By

letter dated May 13, 1996, the Director

denied the Petitioner’s request for

suspension of Maine Yankee’s operating

license, pending resolution of the

Petition.

A copy of the Petition is available for

inspection at the Commission’s Public

Document Room at 2120 L Street NW.,

Washington, D.C. 20555–0001 and the

local public document room in the

Wiscasset Public Library, High Street,

P.O. Box 367, Wiscasset, ME 04578.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland this 13th day

of May 1996.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

William T. Russell,

Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor

Regulation.

[FR Doc. 96–12693 Filed 5–20–96; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

Regulatory Guide; Issuance,

Availability

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission

has issued a revision to a guide in its

Regulatory Guide Series. This series has

been developed to describe and make

available to the public such information

as methods acceptable to the NRC staff

for implementing specific parts of the

Commission’s regulations, techniques

used by the staff in evaluating specific

problems or postulated accidents, and

data needed by the staff in its review of

applications for permits and licenses.

Revision 2 of Regulatory Guide 1.82,

‘‘Water Sources for Long-Term

Recirculation Cooling Following a Lossof-Coolant Accident,’’ has been revised

to provide current guidance on methods

acceptable to the NRC staff for meeting

the Commission’s requirements with

respect to the sumps and suppression

pools that perform the functions of

water sources for emergency core

cooling, containment heat removal, and

containment atmosphere cleanup. This

guide also updates the guidance on

evaluating blockage by debris in the

sumps and suppression pools of boiling

water nuclear power reactors.

Comments and suggestions in

connection with items for inclusion in

guides currently being developed or

improvements in all published guides

are encouraged at any time. Written

comments may be submitted to the

Rules Review and Directives Branch,

Division of Freedom of Information and

Publications Services, Office of

Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, Washington, DC 20555.

Regulatory guides are available for

inspection at the Commission’s Public

Document Room, 2120 L Street NW.,

Washington, DC. Single copies of

regulatory guides may be obtained free

of charge by writing the Office of

Administration, Attention: Distribution

and Services Section, U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, Washington,

DC 20555–0001, or by fax at (301) 415–

2260. Issued guides may also be

purchased from the National Technical

Information Service on a standing order

basis. Details on this service may be

obtained by writing NTIS, 5285 Port

Royal Road, Springfield, VA 22161.

Regulatory guides are not copyrighted,

and Commission approval is not

required to reproduce them.

(5 U.S.C. 552(a))

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 6th day

of May 1996.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Themis P. Speis,

Deputy Director, Office of Nuclear Regulatory

Research.

[FR Doc. 96–12696 Filed 5–20–96; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE

COMMISSION

[File No. 1–8627]

Issuer Delisting; Notice of Application

To Withdraw From Listing and

Registration; (Santa Fe Pacific Gold

Corporation, Common Stock, $0.01 Par

Value)

May 15, 1996.

Santa Fe Pacific Gold Corporation

(‘‘Company’’ or ‘‘SFPG’’) has filed an

application with the Securities and

Exchange Commission (‘‘Commission’’),

pursuant to Section 12(d) of the

Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (‘‘Act’’)

and Rule 12d2–2(d) promulgated

thereunder, to withdraw the above

specified security (‘‘Security’’) from

listing and registration on the Chicago

Stock Exchange, Inc. (‘‘CHX’’).

The reasons alleged in the application

for withdrawing the Security from

listing and registration include the

following:

According to the Company, the

Security of SFPG is currently traded on

the NYSE and the CHX. The Company

incurs annual fees for each of the

exchanges. Currently SFPG is paying an

annual fee of $2,500 to the CHX.

From time to time SFPG has issued

additional shares of Security for use in

connection with its employee benefit