UNITED STAT ES COURT OF AP P EALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS

No. 00-1267
D ANA L. M Y ERS , A PP EL L ANT ,

V
. ANTHONY J. P RI NCI PI , S EC RE T A RY O F V ET ER A N S A FF A I RS , A PPEL L EE
.

On Ap pe a l f ro m th e B oa

rd of Ve te ra ns ' Ap pe a ls
(Argued F ebrua

ry 8, 2002 Dec ided Aug ust 13, 2002 )

Jame s C. McKay , o f Wa sh ing ton , D .C. , f or the a pp e lla nt.
Da v id J . Lo we ns te in , wi th w ho m Tim S. Mc Cla in , G e ne ra l Co un se l; Ro n G arv in , Assistant Ge ne ra l Co un se l; Darryl A. Joe , Acting Deputy Assistant Gener al Counsel; and Kat hy A. Ba nfi e ld , all of Washington, D.C., we re on the brief, f or the a ppellee.
Be fore KRAMER, Chief Judge , and I VERS and STEI NB ERG, Judges

. STEINB ERG, Judge : T h e a p p e ll a n t, th r o u g h c o u n s e l, s e e k s r e v ie w o f a Ju n e 1 5 , 2 0 0 0, decision of the Boa

rd of Ve tera

ns' Appea ls (Boa

rd or B VA) that denied an e ffe ctive date ear lier than Janu ary 28 , 1 99 4, fo r a

n a wa rd of De pa

rtme nt of Ve te ra

ns Af fa ir s (V A) se rv ic e c on ne c tio n f or his ba c k c on dit ion . Re cord (R .) at 4. Th e B oa rd re a c he d th is c on c lus ion

by re a so nin g that an Apr il 1958 VA re g ional office (RO) decision wa s a " final dec ision" that the a ppellant did not appea l and there fore could not provide the basis for an ear lier ef fec tive date ( EED). R. at 3, 8- 9. The a ppellant and the Sec reta

ry have both f

iled briefs, a

nd the appe llant has filed a r eply brief. T he Court hear d oral a rg ument from the pa

rties on Febr uary

8, 2002, and ther eaf

ter orde red br iefing on five issues raised dur ing or al ar g ument. Mye rs v. Principi , 1 5 Ve t

. App. 428 (2002) (per c uriam orde r) [hereinaf ter Mye rs II

]. The Sec reta

ry has filed a r esponse, a

nd the appe llant has filed a r eply there to. This appea l is ti mely , and the Court has jurisdiction pursua nt to 38 U.S.C. §§ 7252(a) and 7266( a).2

For the re asons that follow, the Court will rever se the B oard de cision and re mand the matter for the assig nment of an e ffe ctive date and a r ating or ratings, a s appropr iate.

I. Re le va ntBac kgr ound The veter an serve d honorably in the U.S. Ma rine Corps from January

1956 to Dece mber 20, 1957. R. at 37. I n M arch and Nove mber 1957, he was a dmitted to a U.S. naval hospital for tr e a tme nt o f b a c k pa in. R. at 23 -3 5. Duri ng his tr e a tme nt in Nov e mbe r 195 7, he wa s d ia g no se d w ith a cong enital back defor

mity , "spondy

loly sis, L 4, L 5, without spondy lolist hesis". R. at 27-28. A Nava l Boa

rd of Me dical Survey

deeme d him "[u] nfit for duty " a nd rec ommended that he be dis c ha rg e d f ro m se rv ic e be c a

us e of thi s c on dit ion

. R. a t 28

. Ac c or din g to se rv ic e me dic a l r e c or ds , in 1 95 5, pr ior

to h is e ntr

y int o th e se rv ic e , h e " fe ll 3 0 f e e t fr om a br idg e a nd land e d on his b a c k" ; th is i n c i d e n tc a

u s e d h i s i n j u r y , w h i c h w a s " a g g r a v a t e d b y p r o l o n g e d s t a n d i n g o r w a l k i n g "

. R

. a t2 7

. In

a 19 95 VA F or

m 1-9 Sub sta

nti ve Ap pe a l to the B VA , th e ve te ra n a sse rt e d th a t th is a c c ount o f h is inj ur y wa s in c or

re c t and that, i ns te a d, he ha d " sli pp e d do wn a n e mba nk me nt by a br idg e a t th a t ti me [i n 1955], wit h no injuries". R. at 150. I n Fe bruar

y 1958, two months after his discha rg e, the ve tera

n made his first cla im for servic e
c o n n e c ti o nf

o r h is b a c k c o n d it io n ( R. a t 3 9

- 4 2 ) ; t h e V A RO d e n ie d

th a t c la im

in A p r il 1 9 5 8 ( R. at 44) and sent notice of that decision to the veter an on May 2, 1958 (R. at 49). The RO advised the veter an that he ha d one y ear to appea l if he wished to do so and that, if he " so inform[ed] " that office , he wou ld "be fur nis he d [a ] VA F or m 1- 9 f or that pu rp os e " . R. a t 49 . O n Apr il 2 0, 19 59 , th e RO

re c e ive d a

le tte r f ro m th e ve te ra

n, statin g , in

pe rt ine nt p a rt : T h i s l et t er

i s i n re gar d s t o m y

cl ai m wh i ch wa s fi l edi n S an Di ego la st y e a r. The c la im w a s turn e d b a c k b e c a us e it w a s sa id t

hat my condition [ was] not incurr[ed in] nor was ag g r[a]vated by my milit ary se rv ic e . I wo uld lik e to h a ve a c op y of that lett e r so that I may re fi le my claim as s o o n as possible. The letter that was g iven to me has g otten lost somewhere so Iwill need anothe r copy
. Also, please se nd me ins tr uc tio ns of ho w to g o a bo ut re op e nin g my c la im. My condition has become worse since m y rele ase f rom the ser

vice. I fee l that I should be able to ge t something to justify it because Iwas ne ver bothe r e d w it h my b a c k u n ti l a f te r Ih a d a lr e a dy s e r v e d f o u rtee n months of my

enlistment period.3 Please send me all materia ls as soon as possible so that Imay g et this claim reopene d as soon as c an be a rra ng ed.
R. at 56. On J une 2, 1959, an R O verified its rece ipt of his letter and infor med him: "Such evide nce as y ou may

wish to submit to reope n y our cla im must show that it [ sic] was incurre d during service ." R. at 62. I n J une 1960, the RO "c onfirmed and continued" the prior denial of servic e c o n n ec tion (R. at 79) a

nd informed the veter an that "[t]he e vidence does not w arr ant any chang e in the pre vious deter mination" (R. at 78) . I n October 1986 and April 1988, the R O aga in denied his claims to reope n beca use it found that the evide nce pr esente d was not newand mater ial. R. at 89, 106. Th e ve te ra

n f ile d in F e br ua ry 19 94 sti ll an oth e r cl a im to re op e n ( R. at 10 9) , w hic h th e RO denied ( R. at 128-30), a

nd the veter an subseque ntly appea led to the Board (R. at 137-38). I n J anuar y 1997, the B oard r eopene d his c laim a nd rema nded the matter to the RO. R. at 181- 89. I n J une 1997, the RO awa

rd e d s e rv ic e c on ne c tio n for " c hr on ic lum bo sa c ra l st

ra in a g g ra vatin g pr e -e xistin g L 5- S1 spondy lolist hesis", r ated at 40% fro m J an u ar y 28, 1994 (with a 100% r ating for the pe riod from Fe bruar y 14, 1996, throug h Marc h 31, 1996, for tre atment that nec essitated conva lesce nce)

. R. at 21 9- 22 . In June 19 97 , the ve te ra n re qu e ste d a n EE D by su bmi tti ng a

state me nt- in- su

pp or t- of -c la im fo rm , in wh ic h h e state d: " My

fi rs t a pp e a l w a s f

il ed in 19 58

. . . . Ple a se e xpla in w hy Iwa s o nly compensated from 1994 to prese nt." R. at 242. The RO denie d an EED ( R. at 273), as did the B oard (R. at 283-89), a

nd the veter an appe aled to this Court. I n October 1999, the Court va cate d the J anuar y 1998 BV A decision beca use the Boa

rd fa iled to p ro v i d e an ad equate statement of r easons or bases f or its decision and re manded the matter for

rea djudication. My e rs v . W est , No. 98-864, 1999 WL1023785 at *4-6 (O ct. 22, 1999) [here inafter My e rs I ]; R. at 291-98. The Court noted the Boa rd' s failure to a

naly ze thor oug hly the finality

of the April 1958 RO decision or to re fer to authority s u p p o rt ing its conc lusion. Id . at *5. The Court

c on c lud e d th a t sh ou ld t

he 19 59 le tte r c on sti tut e a n a pp lic a tio n f

or re vie w on

a pp e a l, " the n it

wo uld appea r that the RO' s No v em b er 1 9 9 4 [S tatement of the Case (SOC)] may have be en a pa

rt of the

a dju dic a tio n o f a

n o ri g ina l, r a the r t

ha n a re op e ned , c la im, and

the B oa rd ' s e ff e c tiv e -d a te deter mination must consider the application of 38 U.S.C. § 5110(b)(1)"

. My e rs I , 1999 WL 1023785 at *6.4

On re mand, in the B VA decision here on appea l, the Boa rd dete rmined that it could awa rd an EED only

if it found that, in response to the 1958 RO decision, the vete ran ha d "f iled an appe al . . . [rather than] submitt ed instead a n application to r eopen his c laim". R. at 7. The B oard r easone d that " the le tte r f

ro m th e ve te ra

n co nta ins a ll the inf

or ma tio n re qu ir e d th e n b y

re g ulatio n to c on sti tut e an application for appeal[] and would be considered as such by the current Board if the veter an had not expressed specif

ically and without qua lification an intent f or some other course of ac tion". R. at 8. I n e xami nin g the ve te ra n' s int e nt, the B oa

rd e va luate d the le tte r that he wr ote to t he RO in A

pr il 19 59 , a nd c on c lud e d: He did not use the w ord ["]appea l[ "] or state words to the eff ect that he wished to c halleng e that dete rmination. The R O had inst ructe d him that if h e wi s h ed to appeal, he should inform " this office," and they would furnish [to] h i m [a] VA F orm 1-9 for that purpose. He did no t in di cat e in h is s ta te me nt o f Jun e 19 59 that he wi sh e d to a pp e a l.
R. at 7- 8. F ur

the rm or e , th e B oa

rd fo un d: [W ]hen his claim in 1959, construed a s a cla im to reopen, wa s denied and he w as g iven the opportunity to appea l , h e d id not do so. Fr ankly , the B oard f

eels that if the ve tera

n had intended to a

ppeal the 19 58 de c isi on

in h is c or re sp on de nc e re c e ive d in May 19 59 , h e wo uld have c erta inly

appea led the 1960 dec ision d en y ing his c laim or at least have clar ified his intent reg ardinghis earlier claim.
R. at 8.

II. Contentions on Appeal I n his principal brief

, the appe llant argues, inter a lia, that the Bo ar d d ec ision should be

reve rsed be cause his April 1959 letter "constituted a valid application for revie w on appe al" pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 4005 (1958). Br ief (B r.) at 9-11. T h e appellant a sserts that the B oard e rre d by focusing on his decision not to appeal the June 1960 decision and that instead the B oard should have focuse d on the obvious intent stated in the 1959 letter. B r. at 11. The appell an t al s o ar gu es t hat beca use an SOC was never issued as to the 1958 RO decision, under Tab laz on v . B ro wn , 8 Vet.App. 359, 361 (1995), the 1958 RO de cision is not final and there fore the Court should rever se the B oard5

decision and a ssign a

n eff ective date of Fe bruar

y 8, 1958 (B r. at 14-16, 19), the date of his orig inal claim (R. at 39-42)

. Th e Se c re tary

c ounte rs that, u

nd e r c ur re nt 3 8 U .S. C. § 51 10 (a ), Janu a ry 28 , 1 99 4, the date on which the appellant filed his claim to reopen, is the c orre ct ef fec tive date. B r. at 8. In support of his argument that reve rsal is improper be cause the veter an fa iled to file a timely application for revie w on appea l ( Br

. at 9), the Secre tary urg es that the Court ha s an "oblig ation to reviewboth the actua l wording of a communication and the context in which the communication was written in order to determine w hether

the statement qua lified as a [Notice of Disag ree ment (NOD )] in 1959" ( Br . at 15-16). The Secre tary further argues that the Court a lso should look to t h e "c i rcumstances surrounding the letter" , including, inter alia, (1) the failure of the appellant to file an appea l after the RO " inf or me d h im o f t

he e vid e nc e ne e de d to su bs ta nti a te his cla im" (R . at 62 ); (2 ) h is f a ilure to

a pp e a l th e 19 60 (R . at 78 ), 19 86 (R . at 89 ), and 19 88 (R . at 10 6- 07 ) R O d e c isi on s; a nd (3 ) h is admis s io n , th r o u g h h is r e p r e s e n tati v e , th a t t h e 1 9 5 8 RO d e c is io n " b e c a me f in a l w h e n th e v e te r an failed to pe rfe ct an a

ppeal within the one[-]y ear time period as pr escr ibed by law" (R. at 279). B r. at 16-17. F oll ow ingor a l argume nt, the Court or de re d s up ple me nta

ry br ie fi ngby

the Se c retary

a s to whether , under 1958 a

nd curr ent law a

nd regulation, (1) the c orre spondence lawfully co u l d have been a claim t o reope n, (2) the a ppellant had the r ight to submit additional evidence at the time of the c or re sp on de nc e , a

nd (3 ) t he ob lig a tio n is a

pp lic a ble " to c on str

ue lib e ra lly

tow a rd s a

c la ima nt" law , regulation, and pleading s; the Court also ordere d briefingreg arding(4) leg islative history relating to sec tion 4005(e), a nd (5) the me aning of the RO' s May 1958 ref ere nce to the use of VA For m 1-9. Mye rs II

, 15 Vet.App. at 428-29. In r e s p o n s e t o t h e C o u rto r d e r , t h e S e c r e t a r y a s s e rt s t h a tt h e v e t e r a n c o u l d h a v e l a w f

u l l y, within the one-y ear

period a fter the date of the RO' s decision, re quested that his claim be r eopene d

or prese nted additional evidenc e on the orig inal claim. Response (Resp.) at 1-2. Wit h reg ard to the rule of liber al construc tion, the Secre tary argues that althoug h that rule was in e ffe ct in 1958 when the veter an' s claim was a djudicated befo re the RO, it is not i mplicated her e bec ause his 1959

corr espondenc e " expli citly " ref er re d to "r eopen[ing ]" and " ref il[ ing]" his claim, rather than "a ppeal[ing]" i t

. R es p
. at 2-3. The Secre tary also submitted legislative history that he conte nds6

supports his readingof 38 U.S.C. § 4005(e) ( 19 5 8 ) t hat " should" in sec tion 4005(e) r etained the

m ea n i n g o f "must" as it wa s orig inally written in Vete rans Regulation No. 2 from Mar ch 1933. R es p
. at 4-7, Exhibit (Exh.) A. Wi th reg ard to the r efe renc e to VA F orm 1-9, the Sec reta ry notes that he was un a

ble to " un c ov e r t

he statut or

y or re g ulator y g e ne sis " of

the pr oc e dure bu t argue s, instead, that a "V A manual[] extant at the time" of the 1959 letter re fer red to the F orm. Resp. at 7, Ex h. D ; V A M a n u a l 8

- 5 , A d ju d ic a ti o n Pr o c e d

u r e , 1 9 5 6 Ch a n g e s , p a r a
. 1 3 7 [h e r e in a f te r " M anual 8-5" or " the Manua l"]. I n the appe llant's r eply , h e argues, inter a lia, (1) that ther e wa s no indication in his 1959

corr espondenc e t h at h e wi shed to prese nt evidence in support of his claim and thus he wa s not attempting to r eopen his c laim (Reply at 1-2); ( 2) that the c hang e o f t h e wo rd "must" in VA Re g ulatio n N o. 2 to " sh ou ld" in s e c tio n 4 00 5( e ) s imp ly re fl e c ts " that th e re qu ir e me nt b e c a me discretionar

y and not mandator

y " ( Reply at 3); and (3) that VA fa iled to examine the vetera n' s 1959 le tt e r , w h ic h e xp r e s s e d " d is s a ti s f a c ti o n f o ll o w in g r a ti n g
. . . a c ti o n " , in o r d e r to d etermine, as require d by Manual 8-5, whether there was "proc edura l, regulatory , or fa ctual er ror in adjudication

or oth e r c ir c ums tanc e s wa

rr a nti ng fu

rt he r de ve lop me nt o r c or

re c tiv e a c tio n" , a

nd that V A f a ile d to send him a F orm 1-9, as the n require d by Manual 8-5 ( Reply

at 3-4).

III . A nal ys is A. 1959 Letter as an Appl ication for Review on Appeal I n the dec ision now on appea l , t he B oard f ound on rema

nd that the appe llant's 1959 le tter "c ontain[ed] all the i nformation required then by [st atute and] regulation to constitut e an a pplication for a ppeal" . R. at 8. Be cause that deter mination is favorable to the appellant, ther e may be a se rious question whether , under Nolen v. Gobe r , the Court could a l t er t h at co nclusion. Nolen , 222 F.3d 13 56 , 1 3 6 0 ( F e d

. C i r
. 2 0 0 0 ) ( h o l d i n g t h a t o n c e S e c r e t a r y h a d d e t e r

m i n e d t h a t c l a i m w a s w e ll groun ded , t hat det erm in ati on hadser ved it s "gatekeep in g/t ri gg eri ng fun cti on " and "l os [ t] it s fo rce", and, ther efor e, it was improper for Court to reconsider matter). N either this Court nor the U.S. Court of Appe al s fo r t h e Feder al Circuit has held whe ther this Court can disturb a f avora ble B oard dete r mi n a ti o n
. H o w e v e r , th is is n o t th e a p p r o p r ia te c a s e to r e a c h th a t qu e s ti o n , b e c a u s e , f or the

rea sons set forth below, w e ag ree with the Boa rd' s conclusion that the 1959 letter met the c riteria f or7

an a pp lic a tio n f

or re vie w on a

pp e a l. We a lso no te that it may be qu e sti on a ble fo r the Se c re tary

to argue, in appa

rent c ontradiction of the B oard' s determination, that the letter does not s at i sfy

the statutory require ments for a

n application for

revie w on appe al. See 38 U.S.C. § 7252(a) (providing that Secre tary

may not seek re view of a

n y Bo ar d d ec i sion). Ag ain, in light of our independe nt revie w, we ne ed not furthe r addr ess this question in the inst ant ca se. Following the RO' s May

1958 denial of the veteran' s orig inal claim for se rvice connec tion, he expressed in his April 1959 letter (quoted, i n pertinent part, in part I , above) the desire to "r efile" his c laim that " was turned back beca use it was said that [his] condition [ was] not incurr[ed] nor was

a g g r[a ]va te d b y

[his ] mil ita

ry se rv ic e " a nd a sk e d for " ins tr uc tio ns of ho w t o g o a

bo ut r e op e nin g [his ] claim" . R. at 56. At that time, 38 U.S.C. § 4005 contained the require ments for an application for revie w on appe al, including that the application be filed within one y ear afte r the date of mailing of notice of the RO decision being appeale d. 38 U.S.C. § 4005(a) (1958). F urthermor e, the statute the n pr ov ide d in

pe rt ine nt p a rt :

(d ) I n eac h application for revie w on appe al the name and service of the ve tera

n on acc ount of whose se rvice the claim is based must be stated, tog ether

with the num ber of the claim and the date of the a cti on fr om w hic h th e a pp e a l is take n. Th e a

pp lic a tio n mu st clea rly identify the bene fit sought. (e ) E a c h a

pp lic a tio n f

or re vi ew on a

pp e a l sh ou ld c on ta in sp e c if ic a ssi g nme nts of

the a lle g e d mi sta

ke of fa c t or

e rr or of law i n the adjudication of the claim. Any application which is insufficient may be dismissed.
38 U. S.C. § 4 00 5( d) , ( e ) ( 19 58 ); see 38 C.F.R. § 19.2 (1956) (providing no additional guide lines for application for

revie w on appe al). I n the B VA dec ision on appea l, the Board reasone d that the 1959 letter was not an application for r eview on a

ppeal be cause the veteran did not use the pr oper la ng uag e in that letter, did not send to th e RO a

s u b s e qu e n t s tate me n t o f

th a t i n te n t, a n d

d id n o t a p p e a l t h e 1 9 6 0 RO d e c is io n , w hich "[f]rankly , the B oard fe e ls " he would have done had he intended to a ppeal the 1958 decision. R. at 7-8 (empha sis a dded). The Boa rd summarized its decision as f ollows: "Ac cording ly , the B oard c ites the sp e c if ic lang ua g e us e d b y the ve te ra n [in] his Ma

y 19 59 c or re sp on de nc e a nd

his de c isi on

no t to

a pp e a l th e 19 60 de c isi on

a s conclusive ev idence

of his intent not to a

ppeal the 1958 decision." R. at8

8 (empha sis added). The Boa rd' s rea soning r eg ar d i n g t he vete ran' s decisions not to appea l later deter minations, as we ll as the Secre tary ' s simil ar a rg ument, is inherently

flawe d: Neither the Boa

rd nor the Court ca

n look ahea d in time to determine wh at happened in the past. The issue of law befor e the RO a

nd the B oard, a

nd now bef

ore the Court, is not what t h e v et er an intended, subjectively , by his 1959 letter as divined fromhis s ubs e que nt a c tio ns b e twe e n tha t ti me and the pr ese nt , but rather

whether the content of

that letter objec tively

s at i s fi ed the criteria f

or an application for

revie w on appe al under then-e x isting l aw, 38 U.S.C. § 4005 (1958). F urthermor e, the Boa rd' s deter mination that the veter an' s decision not to appea l a later decision was "c onclusive evidenc e" of the ve tera

n' s intent not to appeal a prior decision has no support in the law or in log ic. 1. Com pliance with Section 4005(d) As t o t h e co n tent require ments of the statute, a s require d by section 4005(d) , the veter an inc lud e d in

the 19 59 le tte r h is n a me (" Da na L e Roy My e rs " ), se rv ic e (" my

mil ita ry se rv ic e " ), c la im number (" C 20 696 280"), a nd date of the prior a ction (" last y ear ") . R. at 56; 38 U .S.C. § 4005(d) (1 95 8) . T his su

bs e c tio n of the statut e a lso re qu ir e d th a t th e a pp lic a tio n " c le a rl y

ide nti fy the be ne fi t soug ht"; the ve tera

n descr ibed his claim that " was turne d back beca use it was said that my

condition [wa s] not inc ur

r[e d] nor wa s ag g r[a ]va te d by my mil ita ry se rv ic e " , the re by imp lic itl y re fe rr ingto h is

c la im a s on e fo r s e rv ic e c on ne c tio n. R. at 56 . M or e ov e r, he state d th a t he fe lt h e " sh ou ld b e a ble to g e t so me thi ngto j us tif

y [his dis a b i l i t y]" , t h e re by , in his ow n w or ds , re que

sti ng service connec tion. Ib id .; 38 U.S.C. § 4005(d) (1958). As to the BV A finding that t h e ap p el l ant had not indicate d specific ally to the RO that he wanted to a

ppeal ( R. at 7- 8), the Secre tary provides a copy of an excerpt fr om Manual 8-5, whic h,

un de r t he he a din g " I nf

or ma l App e a ls" , w a s ame nd e d b y VAin 1 95 6 to pr ov ide , in pe rt ine nt p a rt : Whil e appe als should not be invited, it is important that the statutory rig ht of appe als be in nowise r estri ct ed

. Whenever a c la ima nt expresse

s dis s atisfaction following rating or other adjudicative a ction, it should be determined whether there has bee n proce dural, re g ulat o ry , or fa ctual er ror in adjudication or other circ umstances wa

rra nting f urther de velopm en t or cor rec tive action. Un le ss i t is de te rm ine d th a t th e re is e nti tle me nt t o sub st ant ially a ll benef its sought, the vete ran should be f urnished wi t h VA Form 1-9

. . . , toge the r w iththe ne c e ssa ry ins tr uc tio ns re la tiv e to i ts9 completion, without effor t to dissuade him from the pre sentation of a for mal appea l. Manual 8-5 ( emphasis adde d). The Court notes that the precursor to 38 U.S.C. § 4005 (1958) wa s 38 U.S.C. § 3305 (1957) and that, prior to 1957, this provision exis ted in e x ecutive order s codified as VA Regulation No. 2 from Mar ch 1933 and N o. 2(A) f rom J uly 1933; these four provisions are ide n ti c a l in s u

b s ta n c e , a s is r e le v a n t to th e in s ta n t a p p e a l ( V A Re g u lati o n N o
. 2 ma n d a te d that applications for

revie w on appe al be f

iled within six months, but t he other three provisions contained one-y ear filing de adlines). The ref ore, when VA, in Ma

nual 8-5, wrote in 1956 a re g ulation under t h e hea ding of

"I nformal Appe als" that require d only that the veter an " e

x p r es s [ ] d i s s a t i s f a c tio n" with an R O decision, VA was interpre ting the then-extant VA Reg ulation No. 2 and the subseque nt statut e s c od if

ie d in se c tio ns 33 05 in 1 95 7 a

nd 40 05 in 1 95 8. B e c a

us e the re we re no a me ndme nts to the Manual in 1958 (Resp. at 7 n.1), the Court finds that VA' s interpre tation is controlling, see Chevron U.S.A., I

nc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. , 467 U.S. 837, 843-45 (1984) ( establishing that wher e statute doe s not directly addre ss prec ise question at iss u e, Court should follow ag ency
r e g u l a t i o na s l o n g a s " b a s e d o n a p e r m i s s i b l e c o n s t r

u c t i o n o f t h e s t a tu t e " a n d

n o t" a r b i t r a r y,
c a pr ic iou s, or manif

e stl y c on tr a ry to t

he statut e " ); cf. Brown v. Gardner , 513 U.S. 115, 122 ( 1994) (holding that long- standing ag ency interpre tations that have not be en subjec t to judicial review a re not due defe renc e simply beca use of their longe vity), and that the veter an expre s s ed , i n h i s own words, that he w as dissatisfied with the RO dec ision when he stated that his c laim " was turne d back" and t h at h e "should be able to g et something to justi fy [hi s disability ]". R. at 56; Manual 8-5. Th e re fo re , th e Court

a g re e s w iththe B oa

rd ' s impli c it de te rm inatio n tha t the a pp e lla nt c omp lie d w ith 38 U.S.C. § 4005(d) (1958). 2. Com pliance with Section 4005(e) Th e pa rt ie s d isa g re e ov e r w he the r s ub se c tio n 40 05 (e ) is mand a tor y or pe rm iss ive , b e c a

us e it details that the application for revie w " sho uld

contain spec ific assig nments of the alleg ed mistake of fa ct or e rror

of law" . 38 U.S.C. § 4005(e) (1958) . The Sec reta ry argues t hat the provision states a mandatory

condition (Br

. at 11-12), wher eas the appellant counters that "should" , toge ther with t he

c la us e , " [a]n y

a pp lic a tio n w hic h is ins uf

fi c ie nt m ay

be dismissed", allows for discr etion on the par t of the VAa dju dic a tor

(R e ply B r. a t 3)

. Al tho ug h th e pr ov isi on ' s p la in m e a nin g str on g ly su g g e sts10

that a discre tionary authority is g rante d, the C ourt need not rea ch that issue, beca use, as the Boa

rd de te rm ine d, we ho ld t

hat th e a pp e lla nt' s 195 9 co rr e sp on de nc e satis fi e d a ny po te nti a l r e qu ir e me nts under se ction 4005(e) , which dire ct ed t h at the veter an should make " specific assig nments of the

a lle g e d mi sta

ke of fa c t or err or of law

in the adjudication of the claim" . 38 U.S.C. § 4005(e) (1958) (empha sis added). Spea king a bout his back condition, the vete ran a sserted in his 1959

corr espondenc e: " Ifee l that Ishould be able to ge t something to justify it because Iwas ne ver bothere d with my

back until af

ter I had alr eady

served fo u rt een months of my enlistment period." R. at 56 . The ve te ra

n' s sta te me nt is suf

fi c ie nt to co ns tit

ute a n "a lle g e d mista

ke of fa c t," i.e ., that hi s back injury

was a g g ravated by

service . Fur

thermore , this stateme n t might also be sufficie nt to be considere d an " alleg ed . . . er ror of law" , i.e., that the Boa rd err ed in not awa

rding service connec tion, but beca use we find an " alleg ed mistake of f act" , the Court need not r eac h that question. 3. Board's C

onstru ction of the St

atus of th e 1959 Le tter For purposes of our analy sis of the Boa rd' s deter mination that the 1959 letter constituted a

c la im t o r e op e n, we a ssume , a rgue nd o, that th e Se c re tary is c or re c t in his a sse rt ion

that th e a pp e lla nt, within the one-y ear

period a fter the RO decision, could have filed a cla im to reopen. Resp. at 1-2. The Court will also assume, ar g uendo, that althoug h the letter w as not ac companied by new evidenc e, it met the applica b l e s tatutory

and re g ulatory

require ments of a c laim to reopen,

see 38 U.S.C. § 4004 (1959); 38 C.F.R. § 19.5 (1956). Be cause , as determined i n parts I I I .A.1. and I I I .A .2 ., a bo ve , a nd a s th e B oa

rd de te rm ine d, the 19 59 le tte r s a tis fi e d a ll re qu ir e me nts a nd c ri te ri a for a n application for revie w on appea l, we must deter mine whether the Board erre d in its J une 2000 de c isi on w h e n i t f

a i l e d t o s o c o n s t r

u e t h e 1 9 5 9 l e t t e r a n d i n s t e a d c o n c l u d e d t h a t t h e 1 9 58 RO decision had be come f

inal. R. at 8-9. Wit h r e g a r d to the Secr etar

y ' s duty to construe liber ally

law, re g ulation, and pape rs submitted by the a pp e lla nt at th e tim e of

the RO a nd

B VAde c isi on s, the Se c re tary c on c e de s: Th e the or ie s o f " lib e ra l c on str uc tio n" and

" int e rp re tiv e do ub t" wo u l d h av e c o mp el l e d t h e
. . . R O t o co n s t ru e [ t h e] [ a] p p el l an t 's wr itt e n s ub mis sio ns in the lig ht mos t f a vo ra ble to t he ve te ra n w ith in the confines of law. The pro-c laimant aims of the adjudicative sy stem would have compelled the RO to take ac tion most benef icial to [t h e ] [a ]p p e ll a n t, g iv e n th e c ir c u ms ta n c e s p r e s e n te d

. H o w e v er,11 these theor ies ca

nnot be used to circ umvent or s u perc ede the clea r statutory require ments imposed by Congr ess. Re sp . at 3; se e als o 38 C.F.R. § 3.63 (1956) (noting the "de fined and consistently applied poli cy of the Veterans' Administration to administer t he law unde r a br oad and liber al interpre tation consistent with the fac ts shown in eac h case ")

. Be cause of our holding that the 1959 letter me t the criter ia for an application for re view on appe al, we r ejec t the Secre tary ' s argum en t t hat the rule of libera l

c on stru cti on is no t im

pli c a te d in

thi s c a se and

we a lso ho ld t

hat th e B VAe rr e d b y

fa ili ngbo th t o apply that ru l e an d to find, theref ore, that the 1959 letter c onstitut ed an a pplication for r eview on

a pp e a l, t he de te rm inatio n th a t w a s mo re fa vo ra ble to t he ve te ra n. We n e xt co ns ide r t

he e ff e c t of thi s h o l d i n g. B. E ff e c t of Find ing tha t 19 59Le tte r Co nsti

tute s a n App lic ation f

or Re v ie w on A

pp e al "[W] here VA has f

ail ed to proc edura lly

comply with statutorily

mandated r equire ments, a cla im do es no t beco me fi nal for pu rpo ses of app eal to th e C ou rt ." Tablazon , su pra . I n Tablazon , the Court c on c lud e d: " [B ]ec a us e the RO did

no t f ur nis h th e a pp e lla nt w ith a n SO C, h e wa s una

ble to fi le a for mal app eal to th e BVA, andth e . . . [ RO ] deci si on nev er be cam e fi nal ." Ibid. I n the instant case, the veter an submitted an application for re view on appea l, but the RO never took f urther action in response to that doc ument, which had place d his c laim in appellate status. He was not sent a VA Form 1-9, as required by the VA proce dures then enumer ated in Manual 8-5, nor di d he re ceive a fur ther B VA dec ision reg ardinghis claim. See R. at 1- 31 3. Th eref or e , a s th e Cou

rt he ld i n Fende rso n v . W

est , t h i s c l a i m i s , " a s a

m a t t e r o f l a w , [a n ] o r i g i n a l c l a i m [] t h a t[w a s ] p l a c e d in appellate status by

[an] NOD[] [ (her e, an a

pplication for r eview on a

ppeal) ] ex pressing disag ree ment wi th [ an] in it ial rat in g award[ ] andnev er ul ti mat ely res ol v e d u nt il th e Board deci si on on app eal ". Fende rson , 1 2 V e t.A

pp . 1 19 , 1 25 (1 99 9) ; see also Holland v. Gobe r , 10 Vet.App. 433, 436 ( 1997) (per curiam order) (vac ating BV A dec ision and remandingmatter whe re V A fa iled to iss u e S OC

a ft e r c la ima

nt su bmi tte d ti me ly

NO D) ; cf. W

oods v. Gobe r , 14 Vet.App. 214, 221 ( 2000) (r emanding EED-c laim issue when RO fa iled to notify appellant of its decision and appe llant's c laim theref ore
rema ined open) . I n other wor ds, beca use that 1958 claim was sti ll open in J anuar y 1997 when the B oa rd , is su ingits fi rs t de c isi on on thi s matte r, re op e ne d h is c la im a nd re mand e d it

to t he RO a nd

in J une 1997 whe n the RO awa rded se rvice connec tion for his back co n d i t i o n (R. at 219-22), the12

veter an' s orig inal service -conne ction claim is part of the c u r r e n t c la im stream. See F

enderson , su

pr a . The RO's 1960, 1986, and 1988 denials of reope ning for lac k of newand mater ial evidenc e we re not rele vant to the continued a ppellate status of the veter an' s 1958 claim bec ause the RO was oblig ed by the April 1959 application for revie w on appea l to issue an SOC (not a new RO decision) in orde r to p e rm it the ve te ra

n to pe rf e c t hi s a pp e a l to the B oa

rd by fi lin g a F or m V A 1 -9 (o r c omp a ra

ble document), a

nd it never did so. Where a veter an applies f

or bene fits within one y ear afte r the date of discha

rg e, the e ffe ctive date of an awa

rd of " dis a

bil ity c omp e ns a tio n" is the da y fo llo wi ng the date of

dis c ha rg e . 3 8 U .S. C. § 5110(b)( 1). I n the instant case , the veter an wa s discharg ed fr om service on Dec ember 20, 1957 (R . at 37 ), a nd , a s th e B oa rd fo un d (R

. a t 4) , his a

pp lic a tio n fo r be ne fi ts wa s re c e ive d by the RO in Februar y 1958 (R. at 42), we ll within t he one- y ear deadline. See 3 8 U

. S. C. § 5 1 1 0 ( b ) ( 1 ) . Under section 5110(b) (1), there is no basis in the rec ord on appea l ( ROA) for a n eff ective da te of the a war d of ser vice c onnection for

the appe llant's ba ck condition other tha n the day afte r the date of discha

rg e,
se e Pe rry ( Ea rl) v . W est , 12 Vet.App. 365, 369 (1999) (specify ing pr oper e ffe ctive date and re versing B VAde c isi on

a nd re mand ingma tte r f

or a ssi g nme nt of that ef

fe c tiv e date ); ho we ve r, be c a us e it i s possible that not all of the materia l that may bear on this question w as i n cl u ded in the ROA, the Cou rt wi ll v a c a t e t h e B o a r d d e c i s i o n an d

r e m a n d t h e m a t t e r

t o t h e B o a r d

t o a s s i g n an a

p p r o p r i a te eff ective da te. Unless the B oard c oncludes on re mand, base d on materia l not in the ROA, that an eff ective date of the da y a ft e r t he date of dis c ha rg e is n ot warrant e d, the B oa rd mus t c on sid e r t

wo ma tte rs : First, the B oard must consider whether an awa rd of stag ed rating s is a

ppropriate under Fende rson , su pr a (holding that Boa

rd may awa rd stag ed ratings in adjudicating "a ssignment of an ini tial rating fo r a dis a bil ity fo llo wi nga n in iti a l awa

rd of se rv ic e c on ne c tio n f

or that di sa bil ity " ); cf

. Francisco

v . B ro wn , 7 Vet.App. 55, 58 ( 1994) (f inding no B oard e rror

wher e B o ar d fo cused on most re cent medical e vidence in claim for increa sed di sability rating not part of adjudication of init ial service

connec tion awar d). Second, the Boa r d s h o u ld c o n s id e r wh e ther sec tion 5110 requires the assig nment of a rating of at least 10%, ef fec tive from the da

y afte r the date of discha

rg e. Com pa re 38 U. S.C. § 5110(b)( 1) with 38 U.S.C

. § 5 1 1 0 (b)( 2). Specific ally , the Court notes that section 5110(b) (2) require s that the " eff

ective da te of a n awa rd of incr ease d compensation" be the " earliest date as of13

which it is ascer

tain ab l e t hat an incr ease in disabilit y had occ urre d", w here as sec tion 5110(b)(1) require s that the " eff

ective date of a

n awa rd of dis ab ili

ty compens ation " be the day afte r the date of d i s ch ar ge, i f t h e v et er an m ee t s t h e o n e- y ea r f i l i n g d ea d l i n e. T h e d i ff

er en ce i n t h e s t at u t o ry

l an gu age might sug g est that althoug h the ef fec tive date f

or an increase in compens ation de pe nd s o n th e date of the incr ease in disa b ility , in determining the ef fec tive date f

or an initial awa

rd of dis ab ili

ty compens ation wher e appli c a ti o n th e r e f o r is ma d e w it

h in th e y ear afte r dischar g e, such compens ation shall be paid a s of the day afte r the date of discha rge , and, ther efor e, as of that date, a ctual compens ation must be paid; in other words, as of the da y afte r the date of discha

rg e, the c laimant must rece ive at lea st a 10% disability rating , which is the minimum rating under w hich a c laimant

rec eives " disability

compensation". 38 U.S.C. § 5110(b)(1) , (b)( 2).

IV. Conclusion Up on c on sid e ratio n o f t

he fo re g oin g a na ly sis , the RO A, a nd the su bmi ssi on s of the pa

rt ie s, the Court reve rses the June 15, 2000, BV A dec ision and remands the matter for the assig nment of (1) a n e f f e c ti v e d a te f

o r th e in it ia l a w a r d o f s e r v ic e c o n n e c ti o n a n d ( 2 ) a r a ti n g o r rating s, as appropr iate. On r emand, the Boa rd is to provide expeditious adjudication and issuance of a dec ision supported by

an ade quate state ment of re asons or ba ses, see 38 U.S.C. §§ 1131, 5110(b)( 1), 7104(a ), (d )( 1) ; 38 U. S.C. § 4 00 5( d) , ( e ) ( 19 58 ); 38 C.F .R. § 1 9. 2 ( 19 56 ); Fende rson , su pra , and Fletche r v. Derwinski , 1 Ve t.A

pp . 3 94 , 3 97 (19 91 ) (n oti ngthat " [t]he Court e xpe c ts t

hat th e B VAwi ll

ree x am i ne the e vidence of re cord, se ek any other e vidence the B oard f eels is nec essar

y , and issue a timely , well-supporte d decision in this case ") , all consistent with this opini on and in ac corda nce with section 302 of the Veter ans' Be nefits I mprovements Act of 1994, Pub. L . No. 103-446, § 302, 108 Stat. 4645, 4658 (found at 3 8 U.S.C. § 5101 note) (re quiring Secre tary to provide for

" e xp e d it io u s tr e a tm e n t" f

o r c la im s r e ma

n d e d b y B V A o r th e Co u rt) [h e r e in a f te r V B I A § 3 0 2 ]; see Vargas-Gonzalez v. Principi , 15 Ve t.A pp . 222 , 225 -3 0 (20 01 ) (h old ing that VB I A § 302 a pp lie s to all elements of c laim remande d by Court or Boa

rd), and with a ll a

pplicable law and r eg ulation. See Al lda yv . B ro wn , 7 Ve t.A

pp . 5 17 , 5 33 -3 4 ( 19 95 ). On re mand , th e a

pp e lla nt w ill be fr e e to s ub mit additional evidenc e and arg ument on the re manded c laim in accor dance with Kut sc he ro us k yv . W est , 12 Ve t.A pp . 3 69 , 3 72 -7 3 ( 19 99 ) ( pe r c ur iam or de r) (c on c lud ingthat an a pp e llant is e nti tle d, un til14

90 day s after

Boa rd m ai l s postremand notice to appellant, to submit additional evidence and

argume nt o r t o r e qu e st h e a ri ngon a pp e a l a t w hic h a

pp e lla nt m a y su bmi t ne w e vi den ce) , a

nd a ll applicable law and r eg ulation. The Court notes that a r emand by this Court or by

the B oard c onfer s on an appe llant the rig ht to VA compliance with the ter ms of the re mand orde r and imposes on the Secre tary a conc omitant duty

to ensure c ompli an ce with those terms. Se e Ste ga ll v . W

est , 11 Vet.App. 268, 271 (1998). A final decision by the B oard f

ollowing the r emand he rein orde red will constitut e a ne w dec ision that, if adverse , may be appe aled to thi s Court only upon the filing of

a new Notice of Appea l with the Court not later than 120 day s after the date on which notice of the Boa rd' s new fina l decision is mailed to the appellan t

. Se e Ma rsh v . W est , 11 Vet.App. 468, 472 (1998). REVERSED AND REMANDED

.