IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. 232PA13

FILED 12 JUNE 2014

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v.

BRUCE TYLER MURCHISON

On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. ' 7A-31 of a unanimous, 

unpublished decision of the Court of Appeals, ___ N.C. App. ___, 741 S.E.2d 927

(2013), reversing judgments entered on 8 August 2012 by Judge James M. Webb in 

Superior Court, Moore County. Heard in the Supreme Court on 18 February 2014.

Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Kimberly N. Callahan, Assistant Attorney 

General, for the State-appellant.

William B. Gibson for defendant-appellee.

MARTIN, Justice.

While on probation, defendant was indicted for first-degree burglary, firstdegree kidnapping, and assault with a deadly weapon. At the resulting hearing, the 

trial court revoked his probation. The Court of Appeals held, and defendant argues, 

that the trial court abused its discretion by basing the revocation upon hearsay 

evidence. The trial court was permitted under statute to consider hearsay evidence 

in the revocation hearing. Because we conclude that the trial court reasonably 
STATE V. MURCHISON

Opinion of the Court

-2-

exercised its discretion in revoking defendant’s probation and activating his 

previously earned sentence, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.

On 26 October 2011, defendant pled guilty to two counts of assault with a 

deadly weapon with intent to kill (offense date 30 September 2010), assault with a 

deadly weapon (offense date 13 May 2011), and possession with intent to sell or 

deliver marijuana (offense date 22 September 2010). Defendant was on probation 

when he committed these offenses. He received sentences of twenty-four to thirtyeight months of imprisonment for each count of assault with a deadly weapon with 

intent to kill and six to eight months of imprisonment for the remaining convictions. 

The trial court suspended these sentences and placed defendant on supervised 

probation for sixty months. 

On 2 February and 13 February 2012, defendant’s probation officer, Leslie 

Tyree, filed reports alleging defendant had violated numerous conditions of his 

probation by, among other things, committing assault with a deadly weapon on 1 

February 2012, missing curfews, and failing to attend counseling for his drug and 

anger problems. Finding defendant in violation of the conditions of his probation, 

the trial court modified his probation, imposing an active term of ninety days of

imprisonment.

Defendant was released from the ninety-day term of imprisonment on 21 

May 2012 to continue his term of probation. On 21 June 2012, Officer Tyree filed
STATE V. MURCHISON

Opinion of the Court

-3-

violation reports alleging defendant had been charged on 17 June 2012 with firstdegree burglary, first-degree kidnapping, and assault with a deadly weapon. The 

matter was heard in Superior Court, Moore County, on 8 August 2012. Officer 

Tyree testified over objection that defendant’s mother had called her and reported 

that defendant had “broke[n] into her house and held her and his girlfriend in a 

closet, and he had knives.” Officer Tyree further testified that she believed 

defendant would kill somebody if allowed to remain on probation. The State also 

introduced a computer printout from the Administrative Office of the Courts 

indicating that defendant had been indicted for first-degree burglary in Lee County 

and that the case was set for the week of 6 August 2012. The trial court found that 

defendant unlawfully, willfully, and without legal justification had violated 

conditions of his probation by committing one or more subsequent offenses, as 

alleged in the violation reports. Accordingly, the trial court revoked defendant’s 

probation and activated his suspended sentences. 

Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in revoking his 

probation because the State failed to produce any evidence other than hearsay in 

support of the revocation. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, holding 

that “the evidence presented at the revocation hearing was not competent so ‘as to 

reasonably satisfy the judge in the exercise of his sound discretion that the 

defendant ha[d] willfully violated a valid condition of probation.’ ” State v. 

Murchison, ___ N.C. App. ___, 741 S.E.2d 927, 2013 WL 1899615, at *4 (2013) 
STATE V. MURCHISON

Opinion of the Court

-4-

(unpublished) (alteration in original) (citation omitted). We allowed the State’s 

petition for discretionary review. 

“Probation or suspension of sentence comes as an act of grace to one convicted 

of, or pleading guilty to, a crime.” State v. Duncan, 270 N.C. 241, 245, 154 S.E.2d 

53, 57 (1967) (citing Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 492, 55 S. Ct. 818, 819 (1935)). 

When a defendant’s probation is revoked, “the sentence [the defendant] may be 

required to serve is the punishment for the crime of which he had previously been 

found guilty.” State v. Hewett, 270 N.C. 348, 352, 154 S.E.2d 476, 479 (1967).

The Supreme Court of the United States has observed that revocation of 

probation “ ‘deprives an individual . . . only of the conditional liberty’ ” dependent on 

the conditions of probation. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 781, 93 S. Ct. 1756, 

1759 (1973) (citation omitted), superseded by statute, Parole Commission and 

Reorganization Act, Pub. L. No. 94-233, 90 Stat. 228 (1976). A probation revocation 

proceeding is not a formal criminal prosecution, and probationers thus have “more 

limited due process right[s].” Id. at 789, 93 S. Ct. at 1763. Consistent with this 

reasoning, we have stated that “[a] proceeding to revoke probation is not a criminal 

prosecution” and is “often regarded as informal or summary.” Hewett, 270 N.C. at 

353, 154 S.E.2d at 479. Thus, “the alleged violation of a valid condition of probation 

need not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Duncan, 270 N.C. at 245, 154 

S.E.2d at 57 (citations omitted). Instead, “[a]ll that is required in a hearing of this 
STATE V. MURCHISON

Opinion of the Court

-5-

character is that the evidence be such as to reasonably satisfy the judge in the 

exercise of his sound discretion that the defendant has willfully violated a valid 

condition of probation.” Hewett, 270 N.C. at 353, 154 S.E.2d at 480. Accordingly, 

the decision of the trial court is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See State v. 

Maness, 363 N.C. 261, 279, 677 S.E.2d 796, 808 (“[Abuse of discretion] occurs when 

a ruling is manifestly unsupported by reason or is so arbitrary that it could not have 

been the result of a reasoned decision.” (citations and internal quotation marks 

omitted)). The State argues that because the formal rules of evidence do not apply 

in probation revocation proceedings, the Court of Appeals erred in finding abuse of 

discretion. We agree. 

Both the Criminal Procedure Act and the Evidence Code address the issue 

before this Court. The Criminal Procedure Act states that “[f]ormal rules of 

evidence do not apply” in probation revocation hearings. N.C.G.S. § 15A-1345(e) 

(2013). Similarly, our Rules of Evidence, other than those concerning privileges, do 

not apply in proceedings for “sentencing, or granting or revoking probation.” Id.

§ 8C-1, Rule 1101(b)(3) (2013); see also id. Rule 101 (2013). 

Our precedent applying Rule of Evidence 1101(b)(3) to sentencing 

proceedings is instructive. In State v. Carroll the defendant argued that the trial 

court erred by allowing a jury to consider and find an aggravating factor that was 

based solely on inadmissible hearsay. 356 N.C. 526, 545, 573 S.E.2d 899, 912
STATE V. MURCHISON

Opinion of the Court

-6-

(2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 949, 123 S. Ct. 2624 (2003). The trial court admitted, 

among other things, testimony that a judgment from Florida showed the defendant 

had a prior violent felony conviction and that the fingerprints in the Florida file 

matched the copy of the defendant’s fingerprints in a Cumberland County file. Id.

at 545-46, 573 S.E.2d at 912. Noting that the Rules of Evidence do not apply in 

capital sentencing proceedings, we concluded that the hearsay evidence was 

“reliable evidence relevant to the State’s duty to prove its aggravating 

circumstances” and was properly admitted. Id. at 547, 573 S.E.2d at 913.

Similarly, in State v. Thomas the defendant argued the trial court erred in 

his sentencing proceeding by admitting the testimony of a detective who reported 

the statements of a robbery victim to prove an aggravating factor. 350 N.C. 315, 

358-59, 514 S.E.2d 486, 512-13, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1006, 120 S. Ct. 503 (1999). 

Citing Rule of Evidence 1101(b)(3), we wrote, “We have repeatedly stated that the 

Rules of Evidence do not apply in capital sentencing proceedings. Therefore, a trial 

court has great discretion to admit any evidence relevant to sentencing.” Id. at 359, 

514 S.E.2d at 513 (citations omitted).

As in Carroll and Thomas, the trial court in this case had “great discretion to 

admit any evidence relevant to” the revocation of defendant’s probation. Id. The 

trial court exercised this discretion when it admitted Officer Tyree’s testimony 

reporting the statements of defendant’s mother that defendant had broken into her 
STATE V. MURCHISON

Opinion of the Court

-7-

home and threatened defendant’s girlfriend and her with a knife. The trial court 

also exercised its discretion when it admitted the computer printout from the 

Administrative Office of the Courts showing that defendant had been indicted for 

first-degree burglary in Lee County, with the case calendared for that very week.

This hearsay evidence was relevant for determining whether defendant had 

violated a condition of his probation by committing a criminal offense. See N.C.G.S. 

§ 15A-1343(b)(1) (2013). Because the proceeding was a probation revocation 

hearing, the trial court was not bound by the formal rules of evidence and acted 

within its discretion when it admitted the hearsay evidence. Id. §§ 8C-1, Rule 

1101(b)(3), 15A-1345(e). Given the statements of defendant’s mother, the document 

indicating defendant had been indicted for first-degree burglary, defendant’s 

demonstrated propensity for violence, and Officer Tyree’s concern that defendant 

would kill somebody if allowed to remain on probation, we cannot say that the trial 

court abused its discretion in revoking defendant’s probation and activating his 

suspended sentence. See Hewett, 270 N.C. at 353, 154 S.E.2d at 480.

Our General Assembly has declared that the primary purposes of criminal 

sentencing are to punish the offender fairly, to protect the public, to rehabilitate the 

offender, and to deter criminal behavior. N.C.G.S. § 15A-1340.12 (2013). The 

discretion afforded to trial courts in probation hearings is a significant means to 

ensure that these purposes are achieved. The evidence before the trial court 
STATE V. MURCHISON

Opinion of the Court

-8-

allowed the reasonable conclusion that defendant had continued a course of 

criminal action and posed a danger to the public. The trial court was therefore 

justified in activating his suspended sentence. We reverse the decision of the Court 

of Appeals.

REVERSED.