Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 118 / Wednesday, June 23, 2021 / Rules and Regulations 32775 

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David Cantrell, 

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[FR Doc. 2021–13191 Filed 6–17–21; 4:15 pm] 

BILLING CODE 4000–01–P 

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS 

COMMISSION 

47 CFR Parts 1 and 27 

[AU Docket No. 21–62; DA 21–655; FR ID 

32766] 

Auction of Flexible-Use Service 

Licenses in the 3.45–3.55 GHz Band for 

Next-Generation Wireless Services; 

Notice and Filing Requirements, 

Minimum Opening Bids, Upfront 

Payments, and Other Procedures for 

Auction 110; Bidding in Auction 110 

Scheduled To Begin October 5, 2021 

AGENCY: Federal Communications 

Commission. 

ACTION: Final action; requirements and 

procedures. 

SUMMARY: This document establishes the 

procedures to be used for Auction 110, 

the Auction of new flexible-use licenses 

in the 3.45–3.55 GHz band (the 3.45 

GHz Service). 

DATES: Applications to participate in 

Auction 110 must be submitted before 6 

p.m. Eastern Time (ET) on July 21, 2021. 

Upfront payments for Auction 110 must 

be received by 6 p.m. ET on September 

9, 2021. Bidding in Auction 110 is 

scheduled to start on October 5, 2021. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

General Auction 110 Information: 

FCC Auctions Hotline at 888–225–5322, 

option two; or 717–338–2868. 

Auction 110 Legal Information: Mary 

Lovejoy or Andrew McArdell at 202– 

418–0660. 

3.45 GHz Service Information: Joyce 

Jones at 202–418–1327. 

3.45 GHz Service Technical 

Information: Ira Keltz, (202) 418–0616. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a 

summary of the Auction 110 Procedures 

Public Notice, released on June 9, 2021. 

The complete text of the Auction 110 

Procedures Public Notice, including 

attachments and any related document, 

are available on the Commission’s 

website at www.fcc.gov/auction/110 or 

by using the search function for AU 

Docket No. 21–62, DA 21–655, on the 

Commission’s Electronic Comment 

Filing System (ECFS) web page at 

www.fcc.gov/ecfs. Alternative formats 

are available to persons with disabilities 

by sending an email to FCC504@fcc.gov 

or by calling the Consumer & 

Governmental Affairs Bureau at (202) 

418–0530 (voice), (202) 418–0432 

(TTY). 

I. General Information 

A. Introduction 

1. By the Auction 110 Procedures 

Public Notice, the Office of Economics 

and Analytics (OEA), jointly with the 

Wireless Telecommunications Bureau 

(WTB), establishes the procedures to be 

used for Auction 110, the auction of 

new flexible-use licenses in the 3.45– 

3.55 GHz band (the 3.45 GHz Service). 

Auction 110 is the Commission’s third 

scheduled auction of mid-band 

spectrum, which is intended to further 

the deployment of fifth-generation (5G) 

wireless, the Internet of Things (IoT), 

and other advanced spectrum-based 

services across the country. The Auction 

110 Procedures Public Notice continues 

to implement section 905 of the 

Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021, 

which required the Commission to start 

an auction to grant new initial licenses 

subject to flexible use in the 3450–3550 

MHz (3.45 GHz) band by December 31, 

2021. 

2. The bidding for new licenses in 

Auction 110 is scheduled to commence 

on October 5, 2021. The Auction 110 

Procedures Public Notice provides 

details regarding the procedures, terms, 

conditions, dates, and deadlines 

governing participation in Auction 110 

bidding, as well as an overview of the 

post-auction application and payment 

processes. 

B. Background and Relevant Authority 

3. In the 3.45 GHz Second Report and 

Order, 86 FR 17920, April 7, 2021, the 

Commission made available 100 

megahertz of spectrum in the 3.45–3.55 

GHz band for licensed use within the 

contiguous United States. In that Order, 

the Commission allocated the 3.45–3.55 

GHz band for new non-federal fixed and 

mobile (except aeronautical mobile) 

operations in the contiguous United 

States. Among other things, the 

Commission authorized both fixed and 

mobile operations in the 3.45–3.55 GHz 

band using geographic area licensing, 

established licensing and operating 

rules for the new 3.45 GHz Service, and 

decided to use its competitive bidding 

rules to assign 3.45 GHz Service 

licenses. 

4. On March 18, 2021, in accordance 

with section 309(j)(3) of the 

Communications Act of 1934, as 

amended (Communications Act), the 

Commission released a public notice 

seeking comment on certain competitive 

bidding procedures and various other 

procedures to be used in Auction 110. 

The Commission received comments 

from eight parties in response to the 

Auction 110 Comment Public Notice, 86 

FR 18000, April 07, 2021, and eight 

reply comments. In the Auction 110 

Procedures Public Notice, OEA and 

WTB resolve all open issues raised in 

the Auction 110 Comment Public Notice 

and address the comments received. 

5. Other Commission rules and 

decisions provide the underlying 

authority for the procedures OEA and 

WTB adopt today for Auction 110. 

Among other things, prospective 

applicants should familiarize 

themselves with the Commission’s 

general competitive bidding rules, 

including recent amendments and 

clarifications thereto, as well as 

Commission decisions regarding 

competitive bidding procedures, 

application requirements, and 

obligations of Commission licensees. 

Prospective applicants also should 

familiarize themselves with the 

Commission’s rules regarding the 3.45 

GHz Service, as well as the licensing 

and operating rules that are applicable 

to all part 27 services. In addition, 

applicants must be thoroughly familiar 

with the procedures, terms, and 

conditions contained in the Auction 110 

Procedures Public Notice and any future 

public notices that may be released in 

this proceeding. 

6. The terms contained in the 

Commission’s rules, relevant orders, 

and public notices are not negotiable. 

The Commission may amend or 

supplement the information contained 

in its public notices at any time and will 

issue public notices to convey any new 

or supplemental generally applicable 

information to applicants. Pursuant to 

the Commission’s rules, OEA and WTB 

also retain the authority to implement 

further procedures during the course of 

this auction. It is the responsibility of all 

applicants to remain current with all 

Commission rules and with all public 

notices pertaining to Auction 110. 

C. Description of Licenses To Be Offered 

in Auction 110 

7. Auction 110 will offer 4,060 new 

flexible-use licenses for spectrum in the 

3.45–3.55 GHz band throughout the 

contiguous United States. The 100 

megahertz of spectrum in this band will 

be licensed on an unpaired basis and 

divided into ten 10-megahertz blocks in 


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partial economic area (PEA)-based 

geographic areas located in the 

contiguous 48 states and the District of 

Columbia (PEAs 1–41, 43–211, 213–263, 

265–297, 299–359, and 361–411). These 

10-megahertz blocks are designated as A 

through J. 

8. All 3.45 GHz Service licenses will 

be issued for 15-year, renewable license 

terms, and certain licenses are subject to 

cooperative sharing requirements, as 

described in the 3.45 GHz Second 

Report and Order and below, as well as 

any other conditions that may be 

established in related proceedings. 

Interested parties will be able to find 

additional information about the 

cooperative sharing requirements, 

including information about the 

encumbrances in specific PEAs, on the 

National Telecommunications and 

Information Administration’s (NTIA) 

3450–3550 MHz web page at https://

www.ntia.doc.gov/category/3450-3550- 

mhz. Interested parties can also find 

additional guidance and information on 

federal/non-federal coordination 

procedures in the public notice issued 

jointly by NTIA and the Commission. 

OEA and WTB understand that the 

Department of Defense (DoD) will hold 

one or more workshops to provide 

further information on transition and 

coordination plans, as well as guidance 

on anticipated received power levels 

from the DoD’s high-powered 

operations, methods and means for 

sharing proprietary and classified 

information (e.g., through ‘‘Trusted 

Agents’’), and descriptions of potential 

national emergency scenarios. 

9. Licensees may hold up to four 10- 

megahertz blocks (out of a total of ten) 

in the 3.45–3.55 GHz band within any 

PEA at any given time for the first four 

years after the close of the auction. A 

licensee in the 3.45–3.55 GHz band may 

provide any services permitted under 

terrestrial fixed or mobile, except 

aeronautical mobile, allocations (as set 

forth in the non-Federal Government 

column of the Table of Frequency 

Allocations in section 2.106 of the 

Commission’s rules, as modified by the 

3.45 GHz Second Report and Order), so 

long as it complies with the relevant 

licensing, operating, and technical rules. 

D. Auction Specifics 

1. Auction Title and Start Date 

10. The auction of licenses in the 

3.45–3.55 GHz band will be referred to 

as ‘‘Auction 110.’’ Bidding in Auction 

110 will begin on Tuesday, October 5, 

2021. Pre-bidding dates and deadlines 

are listed below. The initial schedule for 

bidding rounds in Auction 110 will be 

announced by public notice at least one 

week before bidding begins. 

11. Unless otherwise announced, 

bidding on all licenses will be 

conducted on each business day until 

bidding has stopped on all licenses. 

2. Auction Dates and Deadlines 

12. The following dates and deadlines 

apply to Auction 110: 

Auction Application Tutorial Available 

(via internet): No later than June 22, 

2021 

Short-Form Application (FCC Form 175) 

Filing Window Opens July 8, 2021, 12 

p.m. Eastern Time (ET) 

Short-Form Application: (FCC Form 

175) 

Filing Window Deadline: July 21, 2021, 

6 p.m. ET 

Upfront Payments (via wire transfer): 

September 2, 2021, 6 p.m. ET 

Bidding Tutorial Available (via 

internet): No later than September 16, 

2021 

Mock Auction: September 30, 2021 

Bidding Begins in Auction 110: October 

5, 2021 

3. Requirements for Participation 

13. Those wishing to participate in 

Auction 110 must: 

• Submit a short-form application 

(FCC Form 175) electronically prior to 6 

p.m. ET on July 21, 2021, following the 

electronic filing procedures set forth in 

the FCC Form 175 Instructions. OEA 

will prepare and make publicly 

available detailed instructions for 

submitting an FCC Form 175 for 

Auction 110 (FCC Form 175 

Instructions) in the Education section of 

the Auction 110 website at www.fcc.gov/ 

auction/110. 

• Submit a sufficient upfront 

payment and an FCC Remittance Advice 

Form (FCC Form 159) by 6 p.m. ET on 

September 2, 2021, following the 

procedures and instructions set forth in 

the FCC Form 159 Instructions. 

• Comply with all provisions 

outlined in the Auction 110 Procedures 

Public Notice and applicable 

Commission rules. 

II. Applying To Participate in Auction 

110 

A. General Information Regarding 

Short-Form Applications 

14. An application to participate in 

Auction 110, referred to as a short-form 

application or FCC Form 175, provides 

information that the Commission uses to 

determine whether the applicant has the 

legal, technical, and financial 

qualifications to participate in a 

Commission auction for spectrum 

licenses. The short-form application is 

the first part of the Commission’s twophased auction application process. In 

the first phase, a party seeking to 

participate in Auction 110 must file a 

short-form application in which it 

certifies, under penalty of perjury, that 

it is qualified to participate. Eligibility 

to participate in Auction 110 is based on 

an applicant’s short-form application 

and certifications and on the applicant’s 

submission of a sufficient upfront 

payment for the auction. After bidding 

closes, in the second phase of the 

process, each winning bidder must file 

a more comprehensive post-auction, 

long-form application (FCC Form 601) 

for the licenses it wins in the auction, 

and it must have a complete and 

accurate ownership disclosure 

information report (FCC Form 602) on 

file with the Commission. OEA and 

WTB remind applicants that being 

deemed qualified to bid in Auction 110 

does not constitute a determination that 

a party is qualified to hold a 

Commission license or is eligible for a 

designated entity bidding credit. 

15. A party seeking to participate in 

Auction 110 must file an FCC Form 175 

electronically via the Auction 

Application System prior to 6 p.m. ET 

on July 21, 2021, following the 

procedures prescribed in the FCC Form 

175 Instructions. If an applicant claims 

eligibility for a bidding credit, then the 

information provided in its FCC Form 

175 as of the filing date will be used to 

determine whether the applicant may 

request the claimed bidding credit. 

Below OEA and WTB describe more 

fully the information disclosures and 

certifications required in the short-form 

application. An applicant that files an 

FCC Form 175 for Auction 110 will be 

subject to the Commission’s rule 

prohibiting certain communications. An 

applicant is subject to the prohibition 

beginning at the deadline for filing 

short-form applications—6 p.m. ET on 

July 21, 2021. The prohibition will end 

for applicants on the post-auction down 

payment deadline for Auction 110. 

16. An applicant bears full 

responsibility for submitting an 

accurate, complete, and timely shortform application. Pursuant to the 

Commission’s competitive bidding 

rules, each applicant must make a series 

of certifications under penalty of perjury 

on its FCC Form 175 related to the 

information provided in its application 

and its participation in the auction, and 

it must confirm that it is legally, 

technically, financially, and otherwise 

qualified to hold a license. Additionally, 

each participant in Auction 110 must 

certify that it has read the Auction 110 

Procedures Public Notice and has 

familiarized itself both with the auction 


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procedures and with the requirements 

for obtaining a license and operating 

facilities in the 3.45–3.55 GHz band). If 

an Auction 110 applicant fails to make 

the required certifications in its FCC 

Form 175 by the filing deadline, then its 

application will be deemed 

unacceptable for filing and cannot be 

corrected after the filing deadline. 

17. An applicant should note that 

submitting an FCC Form 175 (and any 

amendments thereto) constitutes a 

representation by the certifying official 

that he or she is an authorized 

representative of the applicant with 

authority to bind the applicant, that he 

or she has read the form’s instructions 

and certifications, and that the contents 

of the application, its certifications, and 

any attachments are true and correct. 

Submitting a false certification to the 

Commission may result in penalties, 

including monetary forfeitures, license 

forfeitures, ineligibility to participate in 

future auctions, and/or criminal 

prosecution. 

18. Applicants are cautioned that, 

because the required information 

submitted in FCC Form 175 bears on 

each applicant’s qualifications, requests 

for confidential treatment will not be 

routinely granted. The Commission 

generally has held that it may publicly 

release confidential business 

information where the party has put that 

information at issue in a Commission 

proceeding or where the Commission 

has identified a compelling public 

interest in disclosing the information. In 

this regard, the Commission specifically 

has held that information submitted in 

support of receiving bidding credits in 

auction proceedings should be made 

available to the public. 

19. An applicant must designate 

between one and three individuals as 

authorized bidders in its FCC Form 175. 

The Commission’s rules prohibit an 

individual from serving as an 

authorized bidder for more than one 

auction applicant. 

20. No individual or entity may file 

more than one short-form application or 

have a controlling interest in more than 

one short-form application. If a party 

submits multiple short-form 

applications for an auction, then only 

one application may form the basis for 

that party to become qualified to bid in 

that auction. 

21. Similarly, and consistent with the 

Commission’s general prohibition on 

joint bidding agreements, a party 

generally is permitted to participate in 

a Commission auction only through a 

single bidding entity. Accordingly, the 

filing of applications in Auction 110 by 

multiple entities controlled by the same 

individual or set of individuals 

generally will not be permitted. This 

restriction applies across all 

applications, without regard to the 

geographic areas selected. The 

Commission adopted a limited 

exception to the general prohibition on 

the filing of multiple applications by 

commonly controlled entities for 

qualified rural wireless partnerships 

and individual members of such 

partnerships. 47 CFR 1.2105(a)(3). 

Under this limited exception, each 

qualifying rural wireless partnership 

and its individual members will be 

permitted to participate separately in an 

auction. As noted by the Commission in 

adopting the prohibition on applications 

by commonly controlled entities, this 

rule, in conjunction with the 

prohibition against joint bidding 

agreements, protects the 

competitiveness of the Commission’s 

auctions. 

22. After the initial short-form 

application filing deadline, Commission 

staff will review all timely submitted 

applications for Auction 110 to 

determine whether each application 

complies with the application 

requirements and whether the applicant 

has provided all required information 

concerning its qualifications for 

bidding. After this review is completed, 

a public notice will be released 

announcing the status of applications 

and identifying the applications that are 

complete and those that are incomplete 

because of minor defects that may be 

corrected. That public notice also will 

establish an application resubmission 

filing window, during which an 

applicant may make permissible minor 

modifications to its application to 

address identified deficiencies. The 

public notice will include the deadline 

for resubmitting modified applications. 

To become a qualified bidder, an 

applicant must have a complete 

application (i.e., have timely filed an 

application that is deemed complete 

after the deadline for correcting any 

identified deficiencies), and must make 

a timely and sufficient upfront payment. 

Qualified bidders will be identified by 

public notice at least 10 days prior to 

the mock auction. 

23. The Auction 110 Procedures 

Public Notice outlines below additional 

details regarding certain information 

required to be submitted in the FCC 

Form 175. An applicant should consult 

the Commission’s rules to ensure that, 

in addition to the materials described 

below, all required information is 

included in its short-form application. 

To the extent the information in the 

Auction 110 Procedures Public Notice 

does not address a potential applicant’s 

specific operating structure, or if the 

applicant needs additional information 

or guidance concerning the described 

disclosure requirements, the applicant 

should review the educational materials 

for Auction 110 (see the Education 

section of the Auction 110 website at 

www.fcc.gov/auction/110) and/or use 

the contact information provided in the 

Auction 110 Procedures Public Notice to 

consult with Commission staff to better 

understand the information it must 

submit in its short-form application. 

B. License Area Selection 

24. An applicant must select all of the 

license areas on which it may want to 

bid from the list of available PEAs on its 

FCC Form 175. An applicant must 

carefully review and verify its PEA 

selections before the FCC Form 175 

filing deadline because those selections 

cannot be changed after the auction 

application filing deadline. An 

applicant is not required to place bids 

on any or all of the license areas 

selected, but the FCC Auction Bidding 

System (bidding system) will not accept 

bids for blocks located in PEAs that the 

applicant did not select in its FCC Form 

175. The auction application system, 

however, will provide an applicant the 

option to select all 406 available PEAs 

at one time using an ‘‘all PEAs’’ feature. 

C. Disclosure of Agreements and 

Bidding Arrangements 

25. An applicant must provide in its 

FCC Form 175 a brief description of, 

and identify each party to, any 

partnerships, joint ventures, consortia or 

agreements, arrangements, or 

understandings of any kind relating to 

the licenses being auctioned, including 

any agreements that address or 

communicate directly or indirectly bids 

(including specific prices), bidding 

strategies (including the specific 

licenses on which to bid or not to bid), 

or the post-auction market structure, to 

which the applicant, or any party that 

controls or is controlled by the 

applicant, is a party. In connection with 

the agreement disclosure requirement, 

the applicant must certify under penalty 

of perjury in its FCC Form 175 that it 

has described, and identified each party 

to, any such agreements, arrangements, 

or understandings to which it (or any 

party that controls it or that controls) is 

a party. As discussed below, an 

applicant may continue negotiating, 

discussing, or communicating with 

respect to a new agreement after the 

FCC Form 175 filing deadline, provided 

that the communications involved do 

not relate both to the licenses being 

auctioned and to bids or bidding 

strategies or post-auction market 

structure. If, after the FCC Form 175 


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filing deadline, an auction applicant 

enters into any agreement relating to the 

licenses being auctioned, then it is 

subject to these same disclosure 

obligations. Each applicant must 

maintain the accuracy and completeness 

of the information in its pending 

auction application. 

26. For purposes of making the 

required agreement disclosures on the 

FCC Form 175, if parties agree in 

principle on all material terms prior to 

the application filing deadline, then 

each party to the agreement that is 

submitting an auction application must 

provide a brief description of, and 

identify the other party or parties to, the 

agreement on its respective FCC Form 

175, even if the agreement has not been 

reduced to writing. Parties that have not 

agreed in principle by the FCC Form 

175 filing deadline should not describe, 

or include the names of parties to, the 

discussions on their applications. 

27. The Commission’s rules generally 

prohibit joint bidding and other 

arrangements involving auction 

applicants (including any party that 

controls or is controlled by such 

applicants). For purposes of the 

prohibition, a joint bidding arrangement 

includes any arrangement relating to the 

licenses being auctioned that addresses 

or communicates, directly or indirectly, 

bidding at the auction, bidding 

strategies, including arrangements 

regarding price or the specific licenses 

on which to bid, and any such 

arrangement relating to the post-auction 

market structure. 

28. This prohibition applies to joint 

bidding arrangements involving two or 

more nationwide providers, as well as 

joint bidding arrangements involving a 

nationwide provider and one or more 

non-nationwide providers, where at 

least one party to the arrangement is an 

applicant for the auction. In the 

Updating Part 1 Report and Order, 80 

FR 56763, Sep. 18, 2015, the 

Commission stated that entities that 

qualify as nationwide providers 

generally would be identified in 

procedures public notices released 

before each auction. To that end, and 

consistent with the Commission’s 

decisions in recent spectrum auctions, 

the Commission considers AT&T, TMobile, and Verizon to be ‘‘nationwide 

providers’’ for the purpose of 

implementing the competitive bidding 

rules in Auction 110. 

29. Under certain circumstances, a 

non-nationwide provider may enter into 

an agreement to form a consortium or a 

joint venture (as applicable) that results 

in a single party applying to participate 

in an auction. Specifically, a designated 

entity (DE) can participate in one 

consortium or joint venture in an 

auction, and non-nationwide providers 

that are not designated entities may 

participate in an auction through only 

one joint venture. While two or more 

non-nationwide providers may 

participate in an auction through a joint 

venture, a nationwide and a nonnationwide provider may not do so. A 

non-nationwide provider may enter into 

only one agreement to form a 

consortium or joint venture (as 

applicable), and such consortium or 

joint venture shall be the exclusive 

bidding vehicle for its members in the 

auction. The general prohibition on 

joint bidding arrangements excludes 

certain agreements, including those that 

are solely operational in nature, as 

defined in section 1.2105(a)(2)(ix)(A)– 

(C) of the Commission’s rules. 

30. To implement the prohibition on 

joint bidding arrangements, the 

Commission’s rules require each 

applicant to certify in its short-form 

application that it has disclosed any 

arrangements or understandings of any 

kind relating to the licenses being 

auctioned to which it (or any party that 

controls or is controlled by it) is a party. 

The applicant must also certify that it 

(or any party that controls or is 

controlled by it) has not entered and 

will not enter into any arrangement or 

understanding of any kind relating 

directly or indirectly to bidding at 

auction with, among others, any other 

applicant or a nationwide provider. 

31. Although the Commission’s rules 

do not prohibit auction applicants from 

communicating about matters that are 

within the scope of an excepted 

agreement that has been disclosed in an 

FCC Form 175, the Commission reminds 

applicants that certain discussions or 

exchanges could nonetheless touch 

upon impermissible subject matters, and 

that compliance with the Commission’s 

rules will not insulate a party from 

enforcement of the antitrust laws. 

32. Applicants should bear in mind 

that a winning bidder will be required 

to disclose in its FCC Form 601 postauction application the specific terms, 

conditions, and parties involved in any 

agreement relating to the licenses being 

auctioned into which it had entered 

prior to the time bidding was 

completed. This applies to any bidding 

consortium, joint venture, partnership, 

or other agreement, arrangement, or 

understanding of any kind entered into 

relating to the competitive bidding 

process, including any agreements 

relating to the licenses being auctioned 

that address or communicate directly or 

indirectly bids (including specific 

prices), bidding strategies (including the 

specific licenses on which to bid or not 

to bid), or the post-auction market 

structure, to which the applicant, or any 

party that controls or is controlled by 

the applicant, is a party. 

D. Ownership Disclosure Requirements 

33. Each applicant must comply with 

the applicable part 1 ownership 

disclosure requirements and provide 

information required by sections 1.2105 

and 1.2112, and, where applicable, 

section 1.2110, of the Commission’s 

rules. Specifically, in completing FCC 

Form 175, an applicant must fully 

disclose information regarding the real 

party- or parties-in-interest in the 

applicant or application and the 

ownership structure of the applicant, 

including both direct and indirect 

ownership interests of 10% or more, as 

prescribed in sections 1.2105 and 

1.2112 and, where applicable, section 

1.2110 of the Commission’s rules. Each 

applicant is responsible for ensuring 

that information submitted in its shortform application is complete and 

accurate. 

34. In certain circumstances, an 

applicant may have previously filed an 

FCC Form 602 ownership disclosure 

information report or filed an auction 

application for a previous auction in 

which ownership information was 

disclosed. The most current ownership 

information contained in any FCC Form 

602 or previous auction application on 

file with the Commission that used the 

same FCC Registration Number (FRN) 

the applicant is using to submit its FCC 

Form 175 will automatically be prefilled into certain ownership sections on 

the applicant’s FCC Form 175, if such 

information is in an electronic format 

compatible with FCC Form 175. 

Applicants are encouraged to submit an 

FCC Form 602 ownership report or 

update any ownership information on 

file with the Commission in an FCC 

Form 602 ownership report prior to 

starting a short-form application for 

Auction 110 to ensure that their most 

recent ownership information is prefilled into their short-form application. 

Each applicant must carefully review 

any ownership information 

automatically entered into its FCC Form 

175, including any ownership 

attachments, to confirm that all 

information supplied on FCC Form 175 

is complete and accurate as of the 

application filing deadline. Any 

information that needs to be corrected 

or updated must be changed directly in 

FCC Form 175. 

E. Foreign Ownership Disclosure 

Requirements 

35. Section 310 of the 

Communications Act requires the 


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Commission to review foreign 

investment in radio station licenses and 

imposes specific restrictions on who 

may hold certain types of radio licenses. 

Section 310 applies to applications for 

initial radio licenses, applications for 

assignments and transfers of control of 

radio licenses, and spectrum leasing 

arrangements under the Commission’s 

secondary market rules. In completing 

FCC Form 175, an applicant is required 

to disclose information concerning 

foreign ownership of the applicant. If an 

applicant has foreign ownership 

interests in excess of the applicable 

limit or benchmark set forth in section 

310(b), then it may seek to participate in 

Auction 110 as long as it has filed a 

petition for declaratory ruling with the 

Commission prior to the FCC Form 175 

filing deadline. An applicant must 

certify in its FCC Form 175 that, as of 

the deadline for filing its application to 

participate in the auction, the applicant 

either is in compliance with the foreign 

ownership provisions of section 310 or 

has filed a petition for declaratory ruling 

requesting Commission approval to 

exceed the applicable foreign ownership 

limit or benchmark in section 310(b) 

that is pending before, or has been 

granted by, the Commission. Additional 

information concerning foreign 

ownership disclosure requirements is 

provided in the FCC Form 175 

Instructions. 

F. Information Procedures During the 

Auction Process 

36. Consistent with past practice in 

many prior spectrum license auctions, 

OEA and WTB adopt the Commission’s 

proposal to limit information available 

in Auction 110 in order to prevent the 

identification of bidders placing 

particular bids until after the bidding 

has closed. More specifically, OEA will 

not make public until after bidding has 

closed: (1) The PEAs that an applicant 

selects for bidding in its short-form 

application, (2) the amount of any 

upfront payment made by or on behalf 

of an applicant for Auction 110, (3) any 

applicant’s bidding eligibility, and (4) 

any other bidding-related information 

that might reveal the identity of the 

bidder placing a bid. 

37. The limited information 

procedures used in past auctions have 

helped safeguard against potential 

anticompetitive behavior such as 

retaliatory bidding and collusion. No 

commenters objected to this proposal, 

and OEA and WTB find nothing in the 

record to suggest departure from the 

Commission’s now-established practice 

of implementing these procedures in 

wireless spectrum auctions. OEA and 

WTB find that the competitive benefits 

associated with limiting information 

disclosure support adoption of such 

procedures and outweigh the potential 

benefits of full disclosure. 

38. Once the bidding begins in 

Auction 110, under the limited 

information procedures (sometimes also 

referred to as anonymous bidding), 

information to be made public after each 

round of bidding will include, for 

licenses in each geographic area, the 

supply, the aggregate demand, the price 

at the end of the last completed round, 

and the price for the next round. The 

identities of bidders placing specific 

bids and the net bid amounts (reflecting 

bidding credits) will not be disclosed 

until after the close of bidding. 

39. Throughout the auction, bidders 

will have access to additional 

information related to their own bidding 

and bidding eligibility through the 

Commission’s bidding system. For 

example, bidders will be able to view 

their own level of eligibility, both before 

and during the auction. 

40. After the close of bidding, bidders’ 

PEA selections, upfront payment 

amounts, bidding eligibility, bids, and 

other bidding-related actions will be 

made publicly available. 

41. OEA and WTB warn applicants 

that direct or indirect communication to 

other applicants or the public disclosure 

of non-public information (e.g., 

reductions in eligibility, identities of 

bidders) could violate the Commission’s 

rule prohibiting certain 

communications. Therefore, to the 

extent an applicant believes that such a 

disclosure is required by law or 

regulation, including regulations issued 

by the U.S. Securities and Exchange 

Commission (SEC), OEA and WTB 

strongly urge that the applicant consult 

with the Commission staff in the 

Auctions Division before making such 

disclosure. 

G. Prohibited Communications and 

Compliance With Antitrust Laws 

42. The rules prohibiting certain 

communications set forth in section 

1.2105(c) apply to each applicant that 

files a short-form application (FCC Form 

175) in Auction 110. Section 

1.2105(c)(1) of the Commission’s rules 

provides that, subject to specified 

exceptions, ‘‘[a]fter the short-form 

application filing deadline, all 

applicants are prohibited from 

cooperating or collaborating with 

respect to, communicating with or 

disclosing, to each other or any 

nationwide provider [of 

communications services] that is not an 

applicant, or, if the applicant is a 

nationwide provider, any nonnationwide provider that is not an 

applicant, in any manner the substance 

of their own, or each other’s, or any 

other applicants’ bids or bidding 

strategies (including post-auction 

market structure), or discussing or 

negotiating settlement agreements, until 

after the down payment deadline. . . .’’ 

1. Entities Subject to Section 1.2105(c) 

43. An ‘‘applicant’’ for purposes of 

this rule includes all ‘‘controlling 

interests’’ in the entity submitting the 

FCC Form 175 auction application, as 

well as all holders of interests 

amounting to 10% or more of the entity 

(including institutional investors and 

asset management companies), and all 

officers and directors of that entity. 

Under section 1.2105(c), a party that 

submits an application becomes an 

‘‘applicant’’ under the rule at the 

application deadline, and that status 

does not change based on later 

developments. Thus, an auction 

applicant that does not correct 

deficiencies in its application, fails to 

submit a timely and sufficient upfront 

payment, or does not otherwise become 

qualified, remains an ‘‘applicant’’ for 

purposes of the rule and remains subject 

to the prohibition on certain 

communications until the Auction 110 

down payment deadline. 

44. As the Commission proposed in 

the Auction 110 Comment Public 

Notice, OEA and WTB consider AT&T, 

T-Mobile, and Verizon to be 

‘‘nationwide providers’’ for the 

purposes of the prohibited 

communications rule for Auction 110. 

2. Prohibition Applies Until Down 

Payment Deadline 

45. The prohibition in section 

1.2105(c) on certain communications 

begins at an auction’s short-form 

application filing deadline and ends at 

the auction’s down payment deadline 

after the auction closes, which will be 

announced in a future public notice. 

3. Scope of Prohibition on Certain 

Communications; Prohibition on Joint 

Bidding Agreements 

46. Section 1.2105(c) of the 

Commission’s rules prohibits certain 

communications between applicants for 

an auction, regardless of whether the 

applicants seek permits or licenses in 

the same geographic area or market. The 

rule also applies to communications by 

applicants with non-applicant 

nationwide providers of 

communications services and by 

nationwide applicants with nonapplicant non-nationwide providers. 

The rule further prohibits ‘‘joint bidding 

arrangements,’’ including arrangements 

relating to the permits or licenses being 


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auctioned that address or communicate, 

directly or indirectly, bidding at the 

auction, bidding strategies, including 

arrangements regarding price or the 

specific permits or licenses on which to 

bid, and any such arrangements relating 

to the post-auction market structure. 

The rule allows for limited exceptions 

for communications within the scope of 

any arrangement consistent with the 

exclusion from the Commission’s rule 

prohibiting joint bidding, provided such 

arrangement is disclosed on the 

applicant’s auction application. 

Applicants may communicate pursuant 

to any pre-existing agreements, 

arrangements, or understandings 

relating to the licenses being auctioned 

that are solely operational or that 

provide for the transfer or assignment of 

licenses, provided that such agreements, 

arrangements, or understandings are 

disclosed on their applications and do 

not both relate to the licenses at auction 

and address or communicate bids 

(including amounts), bidding strategies, 

or the particular permits or licenses on 

which to bid or the post-auction market 

structure. 

47. In addition to express statements 

of bids and bidding strategies, the 

prohibition against communicating in 

any manner includes public disclosures 

as well as private communications and 

indirect or implicit communications. 

Consequently, an applicant must take 

care to determine whether its auctionrelated communications may reach 

another applicant. OEA and WTB 

remind applicants that they must 

determine whether their 

communications with other parties are 

permissible under the rule once the 

prohibition begins at the deadline for 

submitting applications, even before the 

public notice identifying applicants is 

released. 

48. Parties subject to section 1.2105(c) 

should take special care in 

circumstances where their officers, 

directors, and employees may receive 

information directly or indirectly 

relating to any applicant’s bids or 

bidding strategies. Such information 

may be deemed to have been received 

by the applicant under certain 

circumstances. For example, 

Commission staff have found that, 

where an individual serves as an officer 

and director for two or more applicants, 

the bids and bidding strategies of one 

applicant are presumed to be conveyed 

to the other applicant through the 

shared officer, which creates an 

apparent violation of the rule. 

49. Subject to the limited exceptions 

for communications within the scope of 

any arrangement consistent with the 

exclusion from the Commission’s rule 

prohibiting joint bidding, section 

1.2105(c)(1) prohibits applicants from 

communicating with specified other 

parties only with respect to ‘‘their own, 

or each other’s, or any other applicant’s 

bids or bidding strategies . . . .’’ The 

Prohibited Communications Guidance 

Public Notice, 80 FR 63215, Oct. 19, 

2015, released in advance of the 

broadcast incentive auction (Auction 

1000) reviewed the scope of the 

prohibition generally, as well as in that 

specific auction’s forward auction of 

spectrum licenses and reverse auction to 

relinquish broadcast licenses. As the 

Commission explained therein, a 

communication conveying ‘‘bids or 

bidding strategies (including postauction market structure)’’ must also 

relate to the ‘‘licenses being auctioned’’ 

in order to be covered by the 

prohibition. Thus, the prohibition is 

limited in scope and does not apply to 

all communications between or among 

the specified parties. The Commission 

consistently has made clear that 

application of the rule prohibiting 

communications has never required 

total suspension of essential ongoing 

business. Entities subject to the 

prohibition may negotiate agreements 

during the prohibition period, provided 

that the communications involved do 

not relate to both: (1) The licenses being 

auctioned and (2) bids or bidding 

strategies or post-auction market 

structure. 

50. Accordingly, business discussions 

and negotiations that are unrelated to 

bidding in Auction 110 and that do not 

convey information about the bids or 

bidding strategies, including the postauction market structure, of an 

applicant are not prohibited by the rule. 

Moreover, not all auction-related 

information is covered by the 

prohibition. For example, 

communicating merely whether a party 

has or has not applied to participate in 

Auction 110 will not violate the rule. In 

contrast, communicating, among other 

things, how a party will participate, 

including specific geographic areas 

selected, specific bid amounts, and/or 

whether or not the party is placing bids, 

would convey bids or bidding strategies 

and would be prohibited. 

51. While section 1.2105(c) does not 

prohibit business discussions and 

negotiations among auction applicants 

that are unrelated to the auction, each 

applicant must remain vigilant not to 

communicate, directly or indirectly, 

information that affects, or could affect, 

bids or bidding strategies. Certain 

discussions might touch upon subject 

matters that could convey price or 

geographic information related to 

bidding strategies. Such subject areas 

include, but are not limited to, 

management, sales, local marketing 

agreements, and other transactional 

agreements. 

52. OEA and WTB caution applicants 

that bids or bidding strategies may be 

communicated outside of situations that 

involve one party subject to the 

prohibition communicating privately 

and directly with another such party. 

For example, the Commission has 

warned that prohibited communications 

concerning bids and bidding strategies 

may include communications regarding 

capital calls or requests for additional 

funds in support of bids or bidding 

strategies to the extent such 

communications convey information 

concerning the bids and bidding 

strategies directly or indirectly. 

Moreover, the Commission found a 

violation of the rule against prohibited 

communications when an applicant 

used the Commission’s bidding system 

to disclose its bidding strategy in a 

manner that explicitly invited other 

auction participants to cooperate and 

collaborate in specific markets, and it 

has placed auction participants on 

notice that the use of its bidding system 

to disclose market information to 

competitors will not be tolerated and 

will subject bidders to sanctions. 

53. Likewise, when completing a 

short-form application, each applicant 

should avoid any statements or 

disclosures that may violate section 

1.2105(c), particularly in light of the 

limited information procedures in effect 

for Auction 110. Specifically, an 

applicant should avoid including any 

information in its short-form application 

that might convey information regarding 

its PEA selections, such as referring to 

certain markets in describing 

agreements, including any information 

in application attachments that will be 

publicly available that may otherwise 

disclose the applicant’s PEA selections, 

or using applicant names that refer to 

licenses being offered. 

54. Applicants also should be mindful 

that communicating non-public 

application or bidding information 

publicly or privately to another 

applicant may violate section 1.2105(c) 

even though that information 

subsequently may be made public 

during later periods of the application 

or bidding processes. 

4. Communicating With Third Parties 

55. Section 1.2105(c) does not 

prohibit an applicant from 

communicating bids or bidding 

strategies to a third party, such as a 

consultant or consulting firm, counsel, 

or lender. The applicant should take 

appropriate steps, however, to ensure 


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that any third party it employs for 

advice pertaining to its bids or bidding 

strategies does not become a conduit for 

prohibited communications to other 

specified parties, as that would violate 

the rule. For example, an applicant 

might require a third party, such as a 

lender, to sign a non-disclosure 

agreement before the applicant 

communicates any information 

regarding bids or bidding strategy to the 

third party. Within third-party firms, 

separate individual employees, such as 

attorneys or auction consultants, may 

advise individual applicants on bids or 

bidding strategies, as long as such firms 

implement firewalls and other 

compliance procedures that prevent 

such individuals from communicating 

the bids or bidding strategies of one 

applicant to other individuals 

representing separate applicants. 

Although firewalls and/or other 

procedures should be used, their 

existence is not an absolute defense to 

liability if a violation of the rule has 

occurred. 

56. As the Commission has noted in 

other spectrum auctions, in the case of 

an individual, the objective 

precautionary measure of a firewall is 

not available. As a result, an individual 

that is privy to bids or bidding 

information of more than one applicant 

presents a greater risk of becoming a 

conduit for a prohibited 

communication. OEA and WTB will 

take the same approach to interpreting 

the prohibited communications rule in 

Auction 110. OEA and WTB emphasize 

that whether a prohibited 

communication has taken place in a 

given case will depend on all the facts 

pertaining to the case, including who 

possessed what information, what 

information was conveyed to whom, 

and the course of bidding in the auction. 

57. OEA and WTB remind potential 

applicants that they may discuss the 

short-form application or bids for 

specific licenses or license areas with 

the counsel, consultant, or expert of 

their choice before the short-form 

application deadline. Furthermore, the 

same third-party individual could 

continue to give advice after the shortform deadline regarding the application, 

provided that no information pertaining 

to bids or bidding strategies, including 

PEAs selected on the short-form 

application, is conveyed to that 

individual. 

58. Applicants also should use 

caution in their dealings with other 

parties, such as members of the press, 

financial analysts, or others who might 

become conduits for the communication 

of prohibited bidding information. For 

example, even though communicating 

that it has applied to participate in the 

auction will not violate the rule, an 

applicant’s statement to the press that it 

intends to stop bidding in an auction 

could give rise to a finding of a section 

1.2105 violation. Similarly, an 

applicant’s public statement of intent 

not to place bids during bidding in 

Auction 110 could also violate the rule. 

5. Section 1.2105(c) Certifications 

59. By electronically submitting its 

FCC Form 175 auction application, each 

applicant for Auction 110 certifies its 

compliance with section 1.2105(c) of the 

rules. The mere filing of a certifying 

statement as part of an application, 

however, will not outweigh specific 

evidence that a prohibited 

communication has occurred, nor will it 

preclude the initiation of an 

investigation when warranted. Any 

applicant found to have violated these 

communication prohibitions may be 

subject to sanctions. 

6. Duty To Report Prohibited 

Communications 

60. Section 1.2105(c)(4) requires that 

any applicant that makes or receives a 

communication that appears to violate 

section 1.2105(c) must report such 

communication in writing to the 

Commission immediately, and in no 

case later than five business days after 

the communication occurs. Each 

applicant’s obligation to report any such 

communication continues beyond the 

five-day period after the communication 

is made, even if the report is not made 

within the five-day period. 

7. Procedures for Reporting Prohibited 

Communications 

61. A party reporting any information 

or communication pursuant to sections 

1.65, 1.2105(a)(2), or 1.2105(c)(4) must 

take care to ensure that any report of a 

prohibited communication does not 

itself give rise to a violation of section 

1.2105(c). For example, a party’s report 

of a prohibited communication could 

violate the rule by communicating 

prohibited information to other parties 

specified under the rule through the use 

of Commission filing procedures that 

allow such materials to be made 

available for public inspection. 

62. Parties must file only a single 

report concerning a prohibited 

communication and must file that report 

with the Commission personnel 

expressly charged with administering 

the Commission’s auctions. This process 

differs from filing procedures used in 

connection with other Commission 

rules and processes, which may call for 

submission of filings to the 

Commission’s Office of the Secretary or 

ECFS. Filing through the Office of 

Secretary or ECFS could allow the 

report to become publicly available and 

might result in the communication of 

prohibited information to other auction 

applicants. This rule is designed to 

minimize the risk of inadvertent 

dissemination of information in such 

reports. Any reports required by section 

1.2105(c) must be filed consistent with 

the instructions set forth in the Auction 

110 Procedures Public Notice. For 

Auction 110, such reports must be filed 

with the Chief of the Auctions Division, 

Office of Economics and Analytics, by 

the most expeditious means available. 

Any such report should be submitted by 

email to the Auctions Division Chief 

and sent to auction110@fcc.gov. If you 

choose instead to submit a report in 

hard copy, contact Auctions Division 

staff at auction110@fcc.gov or (202) 

418–0660 for guidance. 

63. Given the potential competitive 

sensitivity of public disclosure of 

information in such a report, a party 

seeking to report such a prohibited 

communication should consider 

submitting its report with a request that 

the report or portions of the submission 

be withheld from public inspection by 

following the procedures specified in 

section 0.459 of the Commission’s rules. 

OEA and WTB encourage such parties 

to coordinate with the Auctions 

Division staff about the procedures for 

submitting such reports. 

8. Winning Bidders Must Disclose 

Terms of Agreements 

64. Each applicant that is a winning 

bidder will be required to provide as 

part of its long-form application any 

agreement or arrangement it has entered 

into and a summary of the specific 

terms, conditions, and parties involved 

in any agreement it has entered into. 

This applies to any bidding consortia, 

joint venture, partnership, or agreement, 

understanding, or other arrangement 

entered into relating to the competitive 

bidding process, including any 

agreement relating to the post-auction 

market structure. Failure to comply with 

the Commission’s rules can result in 

enforcement action. 

9. Additional Information Concerning 

Prohibition on Certain Communications 

in Commission Auctions 

65. A summary listing of documents 

issued by the Commission, OEA, and 

WTB addressing the application of 

section 1.2105(c) is available on the 

Commission’s auction web page at 

www.fcc.gov/summary-listingdocuments-addressing-application-ruleprohibiting-certain-communications. 


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10. Antitrust Laws 

66. Regardless of compliance with the 

Commission’s rules, applicants remain 

subject to the antitrust laws, which are 

designed to prevent anticompetitive 

behavior in the marketplace. 

Compliance with the disclosure 

requirements of section 1.2105(c)(4) will 

not insulate a party from enforcement of 

the antitrust laws. For instance, a 

violation of the antitrust laws could 

arise out of actions taking place well 

before any party submits a short-form 

application. The Commission has cited 

a number of examples of potentially 

anticompetitive actions that would be 

prohibited under antitrust laws: For 

example, actual or potential competitors 

may not agree to divide territories in 

order to minimize competition, 

regardless of whether they split a market 

in which they both do business, or 

whether they merely reserve one market 

for one and another market for the other. 

67. To the extent that Commission 

staff become aware of specific 

allegations that suggest that violations of 

the federal antitrust laws may have 

occurred, they may refer such 

allegations to the United States 

Department of Justice for investigation. 

If an applicant is found to have violated 

the antitrust laws or the Commission’s 

rules in connection with its 

participation in the competitive bidding 

process, then it may be subject to a 

forfeiture and may be prohibited from 

participating further in Auction 110 and 

in future auctions, among other 

sanctions. 

H. Provisions for Small Businesses and 

Rural Service Providers 

68. A bidding credit represents an 

amount by which a bidder’s overall 

payment across all the licenses won will 

be discounted, subject to the caps 

discussed below. As set forth in section 

1.2110 of the Commission’s rules, and 

as described below, these rule revisions 

include, but are not limited to: (1) 

Adopting a two-pronged standard for 

evaluating eligibility for small business 

benefits, (2) establishing a new 

attribution rule for certain disclosable 

interest holders of applicants claiming 

designated entity benefits, (3) updating 

the gross revenue amounts defining 

eligibility for small business benefits, (4) 

creating a separate bidding credit for 

eligible rural service providers, and (5) 

establishing caps on the total amount of 

designated entity benefits any eligible 

winning bidder may receive. 

69. In Auction 110, designated entity 

bidding credits will be available to 

applicants demonstrating eligibility for 

a small business or a rural service 

provider bidding credit and 

subsequently winning license(s). These 

bidding credits will not be cumulative— 

an applicant is permitted to claim either 

a small business bidding credit or a 

rural service provider bidding credit, 

but not both. Each applicant must also 

certify that it is eligible for the claimed 

bidding credit in its FCC Form 175. In 

addition to the information provided 

below, each applicant should review 

carefully the Commission’s decisions 

regarding the designated entity 

provisions as well as the part 1 rules. 

70. In particular, the Commission 

reminds applicants applying for 

designated entity bidding credits that 

they should take due account of the 

requirements of the Commission’s rules 

and implementing orders regarding de 

jure and de facto control of such 

applicants. These rules include a 

prohibition, which applies to all 

applicants (whether they seek bidding 

credits or not), against changes in 

ownership of the applicant that would 

constitute an assignment or transfer of 

control. This may, in some 

circumstances, include changes in 

officers or directors. Applicants should 

not expect to receive any opportunities 

to revise their ownership structure after 

the filing of their short- and long-form 

applications, including making 

revisions to their agreements or other 

arrangements with interest holders, 

lenders, or others in order to address 

potential concerns relating to 

compliance with the designated entity 

bidding credit requirements. This policy 

will help to ensure compliance with the 

Commission’s rules applicable to the 

award of bidding credits prior to the 

conduct of the auction, which will 

involve competing bids from those that 

do and do not seek bidding credits, and 

thus preserves the integrity of the 

auction process. OEA and WTB also 

believe that this will meet the 

Commission’s objectives in awarding 

licenses through the competitive 

bidding process. 

1. Small Business Bidding Credit 

71. For Auction 110, bidding credits 

will be available to eligible small 

businesses and consortia thereof, subject 

to the caps discussed below. Under the 

service rules applicable to the 3.45 GHz 

Service licenses to be offered in Auction 

110, the level of bidding credit available 

is determined as follows: 

• A bidder that qualifies as a ‘‘small 

business’’—i.e., one with attributed 

average annual gross revenues that do 

not exceed $55 million for the preceding 

five years—is eligible to receive a 15% 

discount on its overall payment. 

• A bidder that qualifies as a ‘‘very 

small business’’—i.e., one with 

attributed average annual gross revenues 

that do not exceed $20 million for the 

preceding five years—is eligible to 

receive a 25% discount on its overall 

payment. 

72. In adopting this two-tiered 

approach in the 3.45 GHz Second 

Report and Order, the Commission 

observed that this approach would 

provide consistency and predictability 

for small businesses. 

73. Small business bidding credits are 

not cumulative; an eligible applicant 

may receive either the 15% or the 25% 

bidding credit on its overall payment, 

but not both. The Commission’s unjust 

enrichment provisions also apply to a 

winning bidder that uses a bidding 

credit and subsequently seeks to assign 

or transfer control of its license within 

a certain period to an entity not 

qualifying for at least the same level of 

small business bidding credit. 

74. Each applicant claiming a small 

business bidding credit must disclose 

the gross revenues for the preceding five 

years for each of the following: (1) The 

applicant, (2) its affiliates, (3) its 

controlling interests, and (4) the 

affiliates of its controlling interests. The 

applicant must also submit an 

attachment that lists all parties with 

which the applicant has entered into 

any spectrum use agreements or 

arrangements for any licenses that may 

be won by the applicant in Auction 110. 

In addition, to the extent that an 

applicant has an agreement with any 

disclosable interest holder for the use of 

more than 25% of the spectrum capacity 

of any license that may be won in 

Auction 110, the applicant must 

disclose the identity and the attributable 

gross revenues of any such disclosable 

interest holder. This attribution rule 

will be applied on a license-by-license 

basis. As a result, an applicant may be 

eligible for a bidding credit on some, but 

not all, of the licenses for which it is 

bidding in Auction 110. If an applicant 

is applying as a consortium of small 

businesses, then the disclosures 

described in this paragraph must be 

provided for each consortium member. 

2. Rural Service Provider Bidding Credit 

75. An eligible applicant may request 

a 15% discount on its overall payment 

using a rural service provider bidding 

credit, subject to the cap discussed 

below. To be eligible for a rural service 

provider bidding credit, an applicant 

must: (1) Be a service provider that is in 

the business of providing commercial 

communications services and, together 

with its controlling interests, affiliates, 

and the affiliates of its controlling 


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interests, has fewer than 250,000 

combined wireless, wireline, 

broadband, and cable subscribers; and 

(2) serve predominantly rural areas. 

Rural areas are defined as counties with 

a population density of 100 or fewer 

persons per square mile. An applicant 

seeking a rural service provider bidding 

credit must provide the number of 

subscribers served as of the short-form 

application deadline. An applicant may 

count any subscriber as a single 

subscriber even if that subscriber 

receives more than one service. 

76. Each applicant seeking a rural 

service provider bidding credit must 

disclose the number of its subscribers, 

along with the number of subscribers of 

its affiliates, controlling interests, and 

the affiliates of its controlling interests. 

The applicant must also submit an 

attachment that lists all parties with 

which the applicant has entered into 

any spectrum use agreements or 

arrangements for any licenses that may 

be won by the applicant in Auction 110. 

In addition, to the extent that an 

applicant has an agreement with any 

disclosable interest holder for the use of 

more than 25% of the spectrum capacity 

of any license that may be won in 

Auction 110, the identity and the 

attributable subscribers of any such 

disclosable interest holder must be 

disclosed. Like applicants seeking 

eligibility for small business bidding 

credits, eligible rural service providers 

may also form a consortium. If an 

applicant is applying as a consortium of 

rural service providers, then the 

disclosures described in this paragraph, 

including the certification, must be 

provided for each consortium member. 

3. Caps on Bidding Credits 

77. Eligible applicants claiming either 

a small business or rural service 

provider bidding credit will be subject 

to specified caps on the total amount of 

bidding credit discounts that they may 

receive. OEA and WTB adopt the 

bidding credit caps for Auction 110 at 

the amounts proposed by the 

Commission in the Auction 110 

Comment Public Notice. Specifically, 

OEA and WTB adopt a $25 million cap 

on the total amount of bidding credit 

discounts that may be awarded to an 

eligible small business, and a $10 

million cap on the total amount of 

bidding credit discounts that may be 

awarded to an eligible rural service 

provider. Additionally, to create parity 

among eligible small businesses and 

rural service providers competing 

against each other in smaller markets, 

no winning designated entity bidder 

may receive more than $10 million in 

bidding credit discounts in total for 

licenses won in PEAs with populations 

of 500,000 or less. 

4. Attributable Interests 

a. Controlling Interests and Affiliates 

78. Pursuant to section 1.2110 of the 

Commission’s rules, an applicant’s 

eligibility for designated entity benefits 

is determined by attributing the gross 

revenues (for those seeking small 

business benefits) or subscribers (for 

those seeking rural service provider 

benefits) of the applicant, its affiliates, 

its controlling interests, and the 

affiliates of its controlling interests. 

Controlling interests of an applicant 

include individuals and entities with 

either de facto or de jure control of the 

applicant. Typically, ownership of 

greater than 50% of an entity’s voting 

stock evidences de jure control. De facto 

control is determined on a case-by-case 

basis based on the totality of the 

circumstances. The following are some 

common indicia of de facto control: 

• The entity constitutes or appoints 

more than 50% of the board of directors 

or management committee; 

• the entity has authority to appoint, 

promote, demote, and fire senior 

executives that control the day-to-day 

activities of the licensee; and 

• the entity plays an integral role in 

management decisions. 

79. Additionally, for attribution 

purposes, officers and directors of an 

applicant seeking a bidding credit are 

considered to have a controlling interest 

in the applicant. Applicants should 

refer to section 1.2110(c)(2) of the 

Commission’s rules and the FCC Form 

175 Instructions to understand how 

certain interests are calculated in 

determining control for purposes of 

attributing gross revenues. 

80. Affiliates of an applicant or 

controlling interest include an 

individual or entity that: (1) Directly or 

indirectly controls or has the power to 

control the applicant, (2) is directly or 

indirectly controlled by the applicant, 

(3) is directly or indirectly controlled by 

a third party that also controls or has the 

power to control the applicant, or (4) 

has an identity of interest with the 

applicant. The Commission’s definition 

of an affiliate of the applicant 

encompasses both controlling interests 

of the applicant and affiliates of 

controlling interests of the applicant. 

For more information on the application 

requirements regarding controlling 

interests and affiliates, applicants 

should refer to sections 1.2110(c)(2) and 

(c)(5) respectively, as well as the FCC 

Form 175 Instructions. 

81. An applicant seeking a small 

business bidding credit must 

demonstrate its eligibility for the 

bidding credit by: (1) Meeting the 

applicable small business size standard, 

based on the controlling interest and 

affiliation rules discussed in the 

Auction 110 Procedures Public Notice; 

and (2) retaining control, on a licenseby-license basis, over the spectrum 

associated with the licenses for which it 

seeks small business benefits. For 

purposes of the first prong of the 

standard, applicants should note that 

control and affiliation may arise 

through, among other things, ownership 

interests, voting interests, management 

and other operating agreements, or the 

terms of any other types of agreements— 

including spectrum lease agreements— 

that independently or together create a 

controlling, or potentially controlling, 

interest in the applicant’s or licensee’s 

business as a whole. In addition, once 

an applicant demonstrates eligibility as 

a small business under the first prong, 

it must also be eligible for benefits on 

a license-by-license basis under the 

second prong. As part of making the 

FCC Form 175 certification that it is 

qualified as a designated entity under 

section 1.2110, an applicant is certifying 

that it does not have any spectrum use 

or other agreements that would confer 

either de jure or de facto control of any 

license it seeks to acquire with bidding 

credits. 

82. Applicants should note that, 

under this standard for evaluating 

eligibility for small business bidding 

credits, if an applicant executes a 

spectrum use agreement that does not 

comply with the Commission’s relevant 

standard of de facto control, then it will 

be subject to unjust enrichment 

obligations for the benefits associated 

with that particular license, as well as 

the penalties associated with any 

violation of section 310(d) of the 

Communications Act and related 

regulations, which require Commission 

approval of transfers of control. If that 

spectrum use agreement (either alone or 

in combination with the designated 

entity controlling interest and 

attribution rules described above) goes 

so far as to confer control of the 

applicant’s overall business, then the 

gross revenues of the additional interest 

holders will be attributed to the 

applicant, which could render the 

applicant ineligible for all current and 

future small business benefits on all 

licenses. 

b. Limitation on Spectrum Use 

83. Under section 1.2110(c)(2)(ii)(J) of 

the Commission’s rules, the gross 

revenues (or the subscribers, in the case 

of a rural service provider) of an 

applicant’s disclosable interest holder 


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are attributable to the applicant, on a 

license-by-license basis, if the 

disclosable interest holder has an 

agreement with the applicant to use, in 

any manner, more than 25% of the 

spectrum capacity of any license won by 

the applicant and acquired with a 

bidding credit during the five-year 

unjust enrichment period for the 

applicable license. For purposes of this 

requirement, a disclosable interest 

holder of an applicant seeking 

designated entity benefits is defined as 

any individual or entity holding a 10% 

or greater interest of any kind in the 

applicant, including but not limited to, 

a 10% or greater interest in any class of 

stock, warrants, options, or debt 

securities in the applicant or licensee. 

Any applicant seeking a bidding credit 

for licenses won in Auction 110 will be 

subject to this attribution rule and must 

make the requisite disclosures. 

84. Certain disclosable interest 

holders may be excluded from this 

attribution rule. Specifically, an 

applicant claiming the rural service 

provider bidding credit may have 

spectrum license use agreements with a 

disclosable interest holder, without 

having to attribute the disclosable 

interest holder’s subscribers, so long as 

the disclosable interest holder is 

independently eligible for a rural 

service provider credit and the use 

agreement is otherwise permissible 

under the Commission’s existing rules. 

If applicable, the applicant must attach 

to its FCC Form 175 any additional 

information as may be required to 

indicate any license (or license area) 

that may be subject to this attribution 

rule or to demonstrate its eligibility for 

the exception from this attribution rule. 

Consistent with the Commission’s 

limited information procedures, the 

Commission intends to withhold from 

public disclosure all information 

contained in any such attachments until 

after the close of Auction 110. 

c. Exceptions From Attribution Rules for 

Small Businesses and Rural Service 

Providers 

85. Applicants claiming designated 

entity benefits may be eligible for 

certain exceptions from the 

Commission’s attribution rules. For 

example, in calculating an applicant’s 

gross revenues under the controlling 

interest standard, the Commission will 

not attribute to the applicant the 

personal net worth, including personal 

income, of its officers and directors. 

However, to the extent that the officers 

and directors of the applicant are 

controlling interest holders of other 

entities, the gross revenues of those 

entities will be attributed to the 

applicant. Moreover, if an officer or 

director operates a separate business, 

then the gross revenues derived from 

that business would be attributed to the 

applicant. 

86. The Commission has also 

exempted from attribution to the 

applicant the gross revenues of the 

affiliates of a rural telephone 

cooperative’s officers and directors, if 

certain conditions specified in section 

1.2110(b)(4)(iii) of the Commission’s 

rules are met. An applicant claiming 

this exemption must provide, in an 

attachment, an affirmative statement 

that the applicant, affiliate and/or 

controlling interest is an eligible rural 

telephone cooperative within the 

meaning of section 1.2110(b)(4)(iii), and 

the applicant must supply any 

additional information as may be 

required to demonstrate eligibility for 

the exemption from the attribution rule. 

87. An applicant claiming a rural 

service provider bidding credit may be 

eligible for an exception from the 

Commission’s attribution rules as an 

existing rural partnership. To qualify for 

this exception, an applicant must be a 

rural partnership providing service as of 

July 16, 2015, and each member of the 

rural partnership must individually 

have fewer than 250,000 combined 

wireless, wireline, broadband, and cable 

subscribers. Because each member of 

the rural partnership must individually 

qualify for the bidding credit, by 

definition, a partnership that includes a 

nationwide provider as a member will 

not be eligible for the benefit. 

88. Finally, a consortium of small 

businesses or rural service providers 

may seek an exception from the 

Commission’s attribution rules. Under 

the Commission’s rules, a consortium of 

small businesses or rural service 

providers is a conglomerate organization 

composed of two or more entities, each 

of which individually satisfies the 

definition of small business or rural 

service provider. A consortium must 

provide additional information for each 

member demonstrating each member’s 

eligibility for the claimed bidding credit 

in order to show that the applicant 

satisfies the eligibility criteria for the 

bidding credit. The gross revenue or 

subscriber information of each 

consortium member will not be 

aggregated for purposes of determining 

the consortium’s eligibility for the 

claimed bidding credit. This 

information must be provided, however, 

to ensure that each consortium member 

qualifies for the bidding credit sought 

by the consortium. 

I. Provisions Regarding Former and 

Current Defaulters 

89. Pursuant to the rules governing 

competitive bidding, each applicant 

must make certifications regarding 

whether it is a current or former 

defaulter or delinquent. A current 

defaulter or delinquent is not eligible to 

participate in Auction 110, but a former 

defaulter or delinquent may participate 

so long as it is otherwise qualified and 

makes an upfront payment that is 50% 

more than would otherwise be 

necessary. Accordingly, each applicant 

must certify under penalty of perjury on 

its FCC Form 175 that it, its affiliates, its 

controlling interests, and the affiliates of 

its controlling interests are not in 

default on any payment for a 

Commission construction permit or 

license (including down payments) and 

that it is not delinquent on any non-tax 

debt owed to any Federal agency. 

Additionally, an applicant must certify 

under penalty of perjury whether it 

(along with its controlling interests) has 

ever been in default on any payment for 

a Commission construction permit or 

license (including down payments) or 

has ever been delinquent on any non-tax 

debt owed to any Federal agency, 

subject to the exclusions described 

below. For purposes of making these 

certifications, the term ‘‘controlling 

interest’’ is defined in section 

1.2105(a)(4)(i) of the Commission rules. 

90. Under the Commission’s rule 

regarding applications by former 

defaulters, an applicant is considered a 

‘‘former defaulter’’ or a ‘‘former 

delinquent’’ when, as of the FCC Form 

175 deadline, the applicant or any of its 

controlling interests has defaulted on 

any Commission construction permit or 

license or has been delinquent on any 

non-tax debt owed to any Federal 

agency, but has since remedied all such 

defaults and cured all of the outstanding 

non-tax delinquencies. For purposes of 

the certification under section 

1.2105(a)(2)(xii), the applicant may 

exclude from consideration any cured 

default on a Commission construction 

permit or license or cured delinquency 

on a non-tax debt owed to a Federal 

agency for which any of the following 

criteria are met: (1) The notice of the 

final payment deadline or delinquency 

was received more than seven years 

before the FCC Form 175 filing 

deadline, (2) the default or delinquency 

amounted to less than $100,000, (3) the 

default or delinquency was paid within 

two quarters (i.e., six months) after 

receiving the notice of the final payment 

deadline or delinquency, or (4) the 

default or delinquency was the subject 

of a legal or arbitration proceeding and 


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was cured upon resolution of the 

proceeding. With respect to the first 

exclusion, notice to a debtor may 

include notice of a final payment 

deadline or notice of delinquency and 

may be express or implied depending 

on the origin of any Federal non-tax 

debt giving rise to a default or 

delinquency. Additionally, for the third 

exclusion, the date of receipt of the 

notice of a final default deadline or 

delinquency by the intended party or 

debtor will be used for purposes of 

verifying receipt of notice. 

91. In addition to the Auction 110 

Procedures Public Notice, applicants are 

encouraged to review previous guidance 

on default and delinquency disclosure 

requirements in the context of the 

auction short-form application process. 

Parties are also encouraged to consult 

with Auctions Division staff if they have 

any questions about default and 

delinquency disclosure requirements. 

92. The Commission considers 

outstanding debts owed to the United 

States Government, in any amount, to be 

a serious matter. The Commission has 

previously adopted rules, including a 

provision referred to as the ‘‘red light 

rule,’’ that implement its obligations 

under the Debt Collection Improvement 

Act of 1996, which governs the 

collection of debts owed to the United 

States. Under the red light rule, 

applications and other requests for 

benefits filed by parties that have 

outstanding debts owed to the 

Commission will not be processed. 

When adopting that rule, the 

Commission explicitly declared, 

however, that its competitive bidding 

rules are not affected by the red-light 

rule. As a consequence, the 

Commission’s adoption of the red light 

rule does not alter the applicability of 

any of its competitive bidding rules, 

including the provisions and 

certifications of sections 1.2105 and 

1.2106, with regard to current and 

former defaults or delinquencies. 

93. OEA and WTB remind each 

applicant, however, that any indication 

in the Commission’s Red Light Display 

System, which provides information 

regarding debts currently owed to the 

Commission, may not be determinative 

of an auction applicant’s ability to 

comply with the default and 

delinquency disclosure requirements of 

section 1.2105. Thus, while the red light 

rule ultimately may prevent the 

processing of long-form applications by 

auction winners, an auction applicant’s 

lack of current ‘‘red light’’ status is not 

necessarily determinative of its 

eligibility to participate in an auction 

(or whether it may be subject to an 

increased upfront payment obligation). 

Moreover, a prospective applicant in 

Auction 110 should note that any longform applications filed after the close of 

bidding will be reviewed for compliance 

with the Commission’s red light rule, 

and such review may result in the 

dismissal of a winning bidder’s longform application. OEA and WTB 

encourage each applicant to carefully 

review all records and other available 

Federal agency databases and 

information sources to determine 

whether the applicant, or any of its 

affiliates, or any of its controlling 

interests, or any of the affiliates of its 

controlling interests, owes or was ever 

delinquent in the payment of non-tax 

debt owed to any Federal agency. 

J. Optional Applicant Status 

Identification 

94. Applicants owned by members of 

minority groups and/or women, as 

defined in section 1.2110(c)(3), and 

rural telephone companies, as defined 

in section 1.2110(c)(4), may identify 

themselves regarding this status in 

filling out their FCC Form 175 

applications. This applicant status 

information is collected for statistical 

purposes only and assists the 

Commission in monitoring the 

participation of various groups in its 

auctions. 

K. Modifications to FCC Form 175 

1. Only Minor Modifications Allowed 

95. After the initial FCC Form 175 

filing deadline, an Auction 110 

applicant will be permitted to make 

only minor changes to its application 

consistent with the Commission’s rules. 

Examples of minor changes include the 

deletion or addition of authorized 

bidders (to a maximum of three) and the 

revision of addresses and telephone 

numbers of the applicant, its 

responsible party, and its contact 

person. Major modification to an FCC 

Form 175 (e.g., change of PEA selection, 

certain changes in ownership that 

would constitute an assignment or 

transfer of control of the applicant, 

change in the required certifications, 

change in applicant’s legal classification 

that results in a change in control, or 

change in claimed eligibility for a higher 

percentage of bidding credit) will not be 

permitted after the initial FCC Form 175 

filing deadline. If an amendment 

reporting changes is a ‘‘major 

amendment,’’ as described in section 

1.2105(b)(2), the major amendment will 

not be accepted and may result in the 

dismissal of the application. 

2. Duty To Maintain Accuracy and 

Completeness of FCC Form 175 

96. Pursuant to section 1.65 of the 

Commission’s rules, each applicant has 

a continuing obligation to maintain the 

accuracy and completeness of 

information furnished in a pending 

application, including a pending 

application to participate in Auction 

110. Consistent with the requirements 

for spectrum auctions, an applicant for 

Auction 110 must furnish additional or 

corrected information to the 

Commission within five business days 

after a significant occurrence, or amend 

its FCC Form 175 no more than five 

business days after the applicant 

becomes aware of the need for the 

amendment. An applicant is obligated 

to amend its pending application even 

if a reported change may result in the 

dismissal of the application because it is 

subsequently determined to be a major 

modification. 

3. Modifying an FCC Form 175 

97. As noted above, a party seeking to 

participate in Auction 110 must file an 

FCC Form 175 electronically via the 

FCC’s Auction Application System. 

During the initial filing window, an 

applicant will be able to make any 

necessary modifications to its FCC Form 

175 in the Auction Application System. 

An applicant that has certified and 

submitted its FCC Form 175 before the 

close of the initial filing window may 

continue to make modifications as often 

as necessary until the close of that 

window; however, the applicant must 

re-certify and re-submit its FCC Form 

175 before the close of the initial filing 

window to confirm and effect its latest 

application changes. After each 

submission, a confirmation page will be 

displayed stating the submission time 

and submission date. 

98. An applicant will also be allowed 

to modify its FCC Form 175 in the 

Auction Application System, except for 

certain fields, during the resubmission 

filing window and after the release of 

the public notice announcing the 

qualified bidders for an auction. During 

these times, if an applicant needs to 

make permissible minor changes to its 

FCC Form 175 or must make changes in 

order to maintain the accuracy and 

completeness of its application pursuant 

to sections 1.65 and 1.2105(b)(4), then it 

must make the change(s) in the Auction 

Application System and re-certify and 

re-submit its application to confirm and 

effect the change(s). 

99. An applicant’s ability to modify 

its FCC Form 175 in the Auction 

Application System will be limited 

between the closing of the initial filing 


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window and the opening of the 

application resubmission filing window, 

and between the closing of the 

resubmission filing window and the 

release of the public notice announcing 

the qualified bidders for an auction. 

During these periods, an applicant will 

be able to view its submitted 

application, but will be permitted to 

modify only the applicant’s address, 

responsible party address, and contact 

information (e.g., name, address, 

telephone number, etc.) in the Auction 

Application System. An applicant will 

not be able to modify any other pages 

of the FCC Form 175 in the Auction 

Application System during these 

periods. If, during these periods, an 

applicant needs to make other 

permissible minor changes to its FCC 

Form 175, or changes to maintain the 

accuracy and completeness of its 

application pursuant to sections 1.65 

and 1.2105(b)(4), then the applicant 

must submit a letter briefly 

summarizing the changes to its FCC 

Form 175 via email to auction110@

fcc.gov. The email summarizing the 

changes must include a subject line 

referring to Auction 110 and the name 

of the applicant, for example, ‘‘Re: 

Changes to Auction 110 Auction 

Application of XYZ Corp.’’ Any 

attachments to the email must be 

formatted as Adobe® Acrobat® (PDF) or 

Microsoft® Word documents. An 

applicant that submits its changes in 

this manner must subsequently modify, 

certify, and submit its FCC Form 175 

application(s) electronically in the 

Auction Application System once it is 

again open and available to applicants. 

100. Applicants should also note that 

even at times when the Auction 

Application System is open and 

available to applicants, the system will 

not allow an applicant to make certain 

other permissible changes itself (e.g., 

correcting a misstatement of the 

applicant’s legal classification, name, or 

certifying official). If an applicant needs 

to make a permissible minor change of 

this nature, then it must submit a 

written request by email to the Auctions 

Division Chief, via auction110@fcc.gov 

requesting that the Commission 

manually make the change on the 

applicant’s behalf. Once Commission 

staff has informed the applicant that the 

change has been made in the Auction 

Application System, the applicant must 

then re-certify and re-submit its FCC 

Form 175 in the Auction Application 

System to confirm and effect the 

change(s). 

101. As with filing the FCC Form 175, 

any amendment(s) to the application 

and related statements of fact must be 

certified by an authorized representative 

of the applicant with authority to bind 

the applicant. Applicants should note 

that submission of any such amendment 

or related statement of fact constitutes a 

representation by the person certifying 

that he or she is an authorized 

representative with such authority and 

that the contents of the amendment or 

statement of fact are true and correct. 

102. Applicants must not submit 

application-specific material through 

the Commission’s Electronic Comment 

Filing System. Further, as discussed 

above, parties submitting information 

related to their applications should use 

caution to ensure that their submissions 

do not contain confidential information 

or communicate information that would 

violate section 1.2105(c) or the limited 

information procedures adopted for 

Auction 110. An applicant seeking to 

submit, outside of the Auction 

Application System, information that 

might reflect non-public information, 

such as an applicant’s PEA selection(s), 

upfront payment amount, or bidding 

eligibility, should consider including in 

its email a request that the filing or 

portions of the filing be withheld from 

public inspection until the end of the 

prohibition on certain communications 

pursuant to section 1.2105(c). 

103. Questions about FCC Form 175 

amendments should be directed to the 

Auctions Division at (202) 418–0660. 

III. Preparing for Bidding in Auction 

110 

A. Due Diligence 

104. OEA and WTB remind each 

potential bidder that it is solely 

responsible for investigating and 

evaluating all technical and marketplace 

factors that may have a bearing on the 

value of the licenses that it is seeking in 

Auction 110 and that it is required to 

certify, under penalty of perjury, that it 

has read the Auction 110 Procedures 

Public Notice and has familiarized itself 

with the auction procedures and the 

service rules for the 3.45–3.55 GHz 

band. The Commission makes no 

representations or warranties about the 

use of this spectrum or these licenses for 

particular services. Each applicant 

should be aware that a Commission 

auction represents an opportunity to 

become a Commission licensee, subject 

to certain conditions and regulations. 

This includes the established authority 

of the Commission to alter the terms of 

existing licenses by rulemaking, which 

is equally applicable to licenses 

awarded by auction. A Commission 

auction does not constitute an 

endorsement by the Commission of any 

particular service, technology, or 

product, nor does a Commission license 

constitute a guarantee of business 

success. 

105. An applicant should perform its 

due diligence research and analysis 

before proceeding, as it would with any 

new business venture. In particular, 

OEA and WTB encourage each potential 

bidder to perform technical analyses 

and/or refresh its previous analyses to 

assure itself that, should it become a 

winning bidder for any Auction 110 

license, it will be able to build and 

operate facilities that will fully comply 

with all applicable technical and legal 

requirements. OEA and WTB urge each 

applicant to inspect any prospective 

sites for communications facilities 

located in, or near, the geographic area 

for which it plans to bid, confirm the 

availability of such sites, and to 

familiarize itself with the Commission’s 

rules regarding the National 

Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the 

National Historic Preservation Act 

(NHPA), and other environmental 

statutes. 

106. OEA and WTB also encourage 

each applicant in Auction 110 to 

continue to conduct its own research 

throughout the auction in order to 

determine the existence of pending or 

future administrative or judicial 

proceedings that might affect its 

decision on continued participation in 

the auction. Lockheed Martin 

Corporation has filed a request for 

waiver of certain Commission rules that 

is currently pending before the 

Commission. Additionally, three 

Petitions for Reconsideration of the 3.45 

GHz Second Report and Order are 

currently pending before the 

Commission. If the Commission acts on 

any of these pending matters prior to the 

auction, we will provide updated 

information for potential bidders as 

necessary. Each applicant is responsible 

for assessing the likelihood of the 

various possible outcomes and for 

considering the potential impact on 

licenses available in an auction. The 

due diligence considerations mentioned 

in the Auction 110 Procedures Public 

Notice do not constitute an exhaustive 

list of steps that should be undertaken 

prior to participating in Auction 110. As 

always, the burden is on the potential 

bidder to determine how much research 

to undertake, depending upon the 

specific facts and circumstances related 

to its interests. For example, applicants 

should pay particular attention to the 

framework adopted in the 3.45 GHz 

Second Report and Order that requires 

new flexible-use licensees to reimburse 

secondary, non-federal radiolocation 

operators for the relocation costs 

associated with their transitions into the 

2.9–3.0 GHz band and cooperative 


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sharing requirements for certain 

licenses. 

107. Applicants in Auction 110 

should carefully consider the impact of 

the aggregation limit in the 3.45 GHz 

Service, discussed further in Section 

III.B.4, below. In particular, applicants 

should consider whether any of their 

own attributable interest holders have 

permissible overlapping interests in 

another applicant that could further 

limit the number of licenses that each 

applicant may hold in a given PEA. For 

example, a single individual or entity 

may be permitted to hold a noncontrolling interest of 10% or more in 

multiple applicants, but the combined 

holdings of those applicants in any PEA 

may not exceed the four-license 

aggregation limit. 

108. Applicants are solely responsible 

for identifying associated risks and for 

investigating and evaluating the degree 

to which such matters may affect their 

ability to bid on, otherwise acquire, or 

make use of the licenses available in 

Auction 110. Each potential bidder is 

responsible for undertaking research to 

ensure that any licenses won in the 

auction will be suitable for its business 

plans and needs. Each potential bidder 

must undertake its own assessment of 

the relevance and importance of 

information gathered as part of its due 

diligence efforts. 

109. The Commission makes no 

representations or guarantees regarding 

the accuracy or completeness of 

information in its databases or any 

third-party databases, including, for 

example, court docketing systems. To 

the extent the Commission’s databases 

may not include all information deemed 

necessary or desirable by an applicant, 

it must obtain or verify such 

information from independent sources 

or assume the risk of any 

incompleteness or inaccuracy in said 

databases. Furthermore, the 

Commission makes no representations 

or guarantees regarding the accuracy or 

completeness of information that has 

been provided by incumbent licensees 

and incorporated into its databases. 

B. Licensing Considerations 

1. Transition of Incumbent Operations 

110. Potential applicants in Auction 

110 should consider carefully the 

process for transitioning incumbent 

Federal and non-Federal radiolocation 

and amateur operations out of the 3.45– 

3.55 GHz band and to the cooperative 

sharing requirements within the band 

when developing business plans, 

assessing market conditions, and 

evaluating the availability of equipment 

for 3.45 GHz Service operations. Each 

applicant should follow closely releases 

from the Commission concerning these 

issues and consider carefully the 

technical and economic implications for 

commercial use of the 3.45–3.55 GHz 

band. 

a. Cooperative Sharing in the 3.45–3.55 

GHz Band 

111. The 3.45–3.55 GHz band will 

operate using a cooperative sharing 

framework under which existing federal 

users are prohibited from causing 

harmful interference to non-federal 

operations, except in limited 

circumstances and in locations where 

current incumbent federal systems will 

remain indefinitely in the band. Under 

the following circumstances, nonfederal systems are not entitled to 

protection against harmful interference 

from federal operations (and limited 

restrictions may be placed on nonfederal operations); (1) in ‘‘Cooperative 

Planning Areas’’ identified by the DoD 

in which it anticipates that federal 

operations will continue after the 

assignment of flexible use licenses in 

the band; and (2) in ‘‘Periodic Use 

Areas’’ that overlap with certain 

Cooperative Planning Areas, in which 

the DoD will need episodic access to all 

or a portion of the band in specific, 

limited geographic areas. Cooperative 

Planning Areas and Periodic Use Areas 

are coordination areas, rather than 

exclusion areas, meaning that 

commercial operations within their 

boundaries are not precluded. Under 

this framework, incumbent federal 

operations and new flexible use 

operations must coordinate with each 

other to facilitate shared use of the band 

in these specified areas and during 

specified time periods as described in 

the 3.45 GHz Second Report and Order. 

b. AIA’s Petition for Reconsideration 

and Lockheed Martin Corporation’s 

Waiver Request 

112. We note that one of the pending 

petitions for reconsideration, filed by 

the Aerospace Industries Association, 

seeks adoption of a coordination 

framework for certain existing federal 

contractor facilities and that Lockheed 

Martin Corporation has filed a request 

for waiver of certain Commission rules 

across the lower 75 megahertz of the 

3.45–3.55 GHz Band related to its 

Experimental Radio Service licenses 

and operations between midnight and 

8:00 a.m. ET. Potential bidders should 

be aware that if relief substantially 

similar to that sought by Lockheed were 

granted, it would affect coordination 

requirements and spectrum use in 

blocks A through H in PEAs 41, 44, and 

227 for the duration of time of any such 

grant. 

c. Relocation of Secondary Non-Federal 

Radiolocation Operations 

113. In addition to the federal users 

operating in the 3.45–3.55 GHz band, 

the 3.3–3.55 GHz band is currently used 

by secondary non-federal radiolocation 

licensees that will be relocated to the 

2.9–3.0 GHz band no later than 180 days 

after the flexible-use licenses won in 

Auction 110 are granted. In order to 

facilitate the expeditious clearing of the 

3.3–3.55 GHz band, in the 3.45 GHz 

Second Report and Order, the 

Commission adopted a requirement that 

licensees in the new 3.45 GHz Service 

reimburse the current 3.3–3.55 licensees 

for their reasonable costs related to the 

relocation of their operations to the 2.9– 

3.0 GHz band. Auction 110 winning 

bidders will be required to pay these 

reimbursement costs in addition to their 

winning bid amounts. For additional 

information about cost-sharing and 

reimbursement procedures related to the 

licenses offered in Auction 110, 

potential bidders should review 

carefully the 3.45 GHz Second Report 

and Order. 

d. Commercial Spectrum Enhancement 

Act/Spectrum Act Requirements and 

Aggregate Reserve Price 

114. The spectrum in the 3.45–3.55 

GHz band is covered by a Congressional 

mandate that requires auction proceeds 

to be used to fund the estimated 

relocation or sharing costs of incumbent 

federal entities. In 2004, the Commercial 

Spectrum Enhancement Act (CSEA) 

established a Spectrum Relocation Fund 

(SRF) to reimburse eligible federal 

agencies operating on certain 

frequencies that have been reallocated 

from federal to non-federal use for the 

cost of relocating their operations. The 

CSEA, as amended by the Spectrum Act, 

requires that the total cash proceeds 

from any auction of eligible frequencies 

must equal at least 110% of the 

estimated relocation or sharing costs 

provided to the Commission by NTIA, 

and it prohibits the Commission from 

concluding any auction of eligible 

frequencies that falls short of this 

amount. The Commission’s rules 

therefore require that the establishment 

of a reserve price in order to meet the 

CSEA’s requirement that Auction 110’s 

total cash proceeds amount to at least 

110% of the NTIA’s estimate of the 

relevant relocation or sharing costs. 

115. NTIA provides the Commission 

with an estimate of eligible federal 

entities’ relocation or sharing costs and 

the timelines for such relocation or 

sharing pursuant to the requirements of 


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the CSEA. On January 14, 2021, NTIA 

provided to the Commission an estimate 

of $13,432,140,300 for the relocation or 

sharing costs of the incumbent Federal 

entities currently operating in the 3.45– 

3.55 GHz band. Accordingly, for 

Auction 110, OEA and WTB establish a 

single aggregate reserve price to ensure 

that total cash proceeds from the 

auction equal at least $14,775,354,330, 

or 110% of NTIA’s estimate. 

116. OEA and WTB adopt procedures 

that have been used in past Commission 

auctions to determine whether the 

reserve price is met in Auction 110. 

Although total cash proceeds from 

Auction 110 will not be known 

precisely before the conclusion of the 

auction, these procedures will provide a 

careful, conservative estimate of 

whether total cash proceeds meet the 

reserve price after each bidding round 

in the clock phase. 

117. As in many services, the 

Commission has established for this 

auction bidding credits for small 

business and rural service providers. 

Winning bidders claiming such credits 

may pay less than the amount of their 

winning bids for any licenses won. In 

the CSEA/Part 1 Declaratory Ruling, the 

Commission determined that ‘‘total cash 

proceeds’’ for purposes of meeting the 

CSEA’s requirement means winning 

bids net of any applicable bidding credit 

discounts at the end of bidding. Thus, 

whether the CSEA’s total cash proceeds 

requirement has been met depends on 

whether winning bids, net of any 

applicable bidding credit discounts, 

equal, in aggregate, at least 110% of 

estimated relocation costs. 

118. As in prior Commission auctions, 

OEA will assess whether the reserve 

price is met—whether the auction will 

generate sufficient total cash proceeds— 

based on bids in the clock phase of the 

auction and not the assignment phase. 

Total cash proceeds from assignment 

phase payments are expected to be 

small relative to those from the clock 

phase and therefore less likely to 

contribute significantly to meeting the 

reserve price. Given that assignment 

phase payments will be determined 

using a second-price rule, an individual 

bidder will have little ability to boost 

net winning bids in the assignment 

phase in order to meet the reserve price. 

OEA and WTB do not wish to require 

bidders or Commission staff to invest 

the additional time in the assignment 

phase if ultimately no licenses will be 

assigned. 

119. Whether winning bidders in the 

clock phase claim any bidding credits 

that may reduce total cash proceeds to 

less than gross winning bids only can be 

determined with certainty at the close of 

the clock phase of bidding. However, 

OEA will estimate whether the reserve 

is met during the clock phase by 

assuming conservatively that for a 

category in a PEA with excess demand, 

blocks will be won by the bidders with 

the highest bidding credit percentages, 

to the extent that such bidders still 

demand blocks in that category in that 

PEA. In order to make bidders aware of 

whether the reserve is likely to be met 

while they are still bidding in the clock 

phase, OEA and will indicate on the 

Public Reporting System (PRS) whether 

estimated total cash proceeds based on 

the bids in the most recently completed 

round would satisfy the reserve. If the 

reserve has not yet been met, OEA will 

make available only to bidders 

information on the shortfall between the 

reserve and the estimated total cash 

proceeds, rounded up to the nearest 

million. 

These procedures are designed to 

avoid a potential situation where the 

reserve price is assumed to be met, but, 

when bidding credits are considered, 

final net winning bids later prove 

insufficient. For a category in a PEA 

without excess demand, the 

requirement will be evaluated based on 

a true calculation of net revenue after 

bid processing, rather than on the 

estimate, since information on how to 

apply bidding credits precisely will be 

available in that case. 

120. These procedures are designed to 

avoid a potential situation where the 

reserve price is assumed to be met, but, 

when bidding credits are considered, 

final net winning bids later prove 

insufficient. For a category in a PEA 

without excess demand, the 

requirement will be evaluated based on 

a true calculation of net revenue after 

bid processing, rather than on the 

estimate, since information on how to 

apply bidding credits precisely will be 

available in that case. 

2. International Coordination 

121. Potential bidders seeking 

licenses for geographic areas adjacent to 

the Canadian and Mexican borders 

should be aware that the use of the 3.45 

GHz Service frequencies they acquire in 

Auction 110 are subject to current and 

future agreements with the governments 

of Canada and Mexico. 

122. The Commission routinely works 

with the United States Department of 

State and Canadian and Mexican 

government officials to ensure the 

efficient use of the spectrum as well as 

interference-free operations in the 

border areas near Canada and Mexico. 

Until such time as any adjusted 

agreements, as needed, between the 

United States, Mexico, and/or Canada 

can be agreed to, operations in the 3.45– 

3.55 GHz band must not cause harmful 

interference across the border, 

consistent with the terms of the 

agreements currently in force. 

3. Environmental Review Requirements 

123. Licensees must comply with the 

Commission’s rules for environmental 

review under the NEPA, the NHPA, and 

other environmental statutes. Licensees 

and other applicants that propose to 

build certain types of communications 

facilities for licensed service must 

follow Commission procedures 

implementing obligations under NEPA 

and NHPA prior to constructing the 

facilities. Under NEPA, a licensee or 

applicant must assess if certain 

environmentally sensitive conditions 

specified in the Commission’s rules are 

relevant to the proposed facilities, and 

prepare an environmental assessment 

when applicable. If an environmental 

assessment is required, then facilities 

may not be constructed until 

environmental processing is completed. 

Under NHPA, a licensee or applicant 

must follow the procedures in section 

1.1320 of the Commission’s rules, the 

Nationwide Programmatic Agreement 

for Collocation of Wireless Antennas 

and the Nationwide Programmatic 

Agreement Regarding the Section 106 

National Historic Preservation Act 

Review Process. Compliance with 

section 106 of the NHPA requires tribal 

consultation, and if construction of the 

communications facilities would have 

adverse effects on historic or tribally 

significant properties, an environmental 

assessment must be prepared. 

4. Spectrum Aggregation Limit 

124. In the 3.45 GHz Second Report 

and Order, the Commission adopted a 

spectrum aggregation limit for flexibleuse licenses in the 3.45 GHz Service that 

allows any entity to hold a maximum of 

40 megahertz (i.e., four blocks out of 

ten) in any PEA at any point in time for 

four years post-auction. For purposes of 

spectrum attribution to a particular 

entity, all controlling interests and noncontrolling interests of 10% or more, 

including institutional investors and 

asset management companies, are 

attributable. In addition, interests of less 

than 10% are attributable if the interest 

confers de facto control, including but 

not limited to partnership and other 

ownership interests and any stock 

interest in a licensee. 

125. Consistent with this limit on the 

number of blocks that a single entity can 

hold in any single PEA, the bidding 

system will limit to four the number of 

blocks that a bidder can demand in any 

given PEA at any point in the auction. 


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Therefore, in each bidding round, a 

bidder will have the opportunity to bid 

for a total of up to four blocks of 

spectrum per PEA. This spectrum 

aggregation limit will apply across both 

categories in PEAs that contain Cat1 and 

Cat2 blocks. As a result, no single entity 

will be permitted to bid on, for example, 

two Cat1 blocks and three Cat2 blocks 

within a single PEA. An aggregation 

limit of four blocks furthers the 

Commission’s interest in promoting 

greater diversity in participation in the 

3.45 GHz Service by ensuring that, if 

licenses for all blocks in a PEA are 

awarded, there will be at least three 

winning bidders in the PEA. 

126. The bidding system will not, 

however, prevent an entity from bidding 

on more licenses than it may otherwise 

be permitted to hold under the relevant 

attribution rules. Applicants should 

therefore encouraged to conduct the 

necessary due diligence prior to the 

short-form application deadline to 

determine whether any of its 

attributable interest holders have 

attributable interests in other potential 

auction participants, which may limit 

each applicant’s ability to hold up to 

four licenses in a single PEA. Bidders 

are reminded, however, that section 

1.2105(c) of the competitive bidding 

rules, 47 CFR 1.2105(c), prohibits 

certain communications between 

auction participants beginning at the 

short-form application deadline and 

continuing until the deadline for 

winning bidders to make down 

payments. 

C. Bidder Education 

127. Before the opening of the shortform filing window for Auction 110, 

detailed educational information will be 

provided in various formats to would-be 

participants on the Auction 110 web 

page. Specifically, OEA will provide 

various materials on the pre-bidding 

processes in advance of the opening of 

the short-form application window, 

beginning with the release of step-bystep instructions for completing the FCC 

Form 175, which OEA will make 

available in the Education section of the 

Auction 110 website at www.fcc.gov/ 

auction/110. In addition, OEA will 

provide an online application 

procedures tutorial for the auction, 

covering information on pre-bidding 

preparation, completing short-form 

applications, and the application review 

process. 

128. In advance of the start of the 

mock auction, OEA will provide 

educational materials on the bidding 

procedures for Auction 110, beginning 

with the release of a user guide for the 

bidding system and bidding system file 

formats, followed by an online bidding 

procedures tutorial. OEA and WTB 

recognize the importance of these 

materials to applicants’ and bidders’ 

comprehension of the bidding 

procedures adopted herein. 

Accordingly, the educational materials 

shall be released as soon as reasonably 

possible to provide potential applicants 

and bidders with time to understand 

them and ask questions before bidding 

begins. 

129. OEA and WTB believe that 

parties interested in participating in 

Auction 110 will find the interactive, 

online tutorials an efficient and effective 

way to further their understanding of 

the application and bidding processes. 

The online tutorials will allow viewers 

to navigate the presentation outline, 

review written notes, and listen to audio 

of the notes. Additional features of this 

web-based tool include links to auctionspecific Commission releases, email 

links for contacting Commission staff, 

and screen shots of the online 

application and bidding systems. The 

online tutorials will be accessible in the 

Education section of the Auction 110 

website at www.fcc.gov/auction/110. 

Once posted, the tutorials will remain 

continuously accessible. 

D. Short-Form Applications: Due Before 

6 p.m. ET on July 21, 2021 

130. In order to be eligible to bid in 

Auction 110, an applicant must first 

follow the procedures to submit a shortform application (FCC Form 175) 

electronically via the Auction 

Application System, following the 

instructions set forth in the FCC Form 

175 Instructions. The short-form 

application will become available with 

the opening of the initial filing window 

and must be submitted prior to 6 p.m. 

ET on July 21, 2021. Late applications 

will not be accepted. No application fee 

is required for short-form applications. 

131. Applications may be filed at any 

time beginning at noon ET on July 8, 

2021, until the filing window closes at 

6 p.m. ET on July 21, 2021. Applicants 

are strongly encouraged to file early and 

are responsible for allowing adequate 

time for filing their applications. There 

are no limits or restrictions on the 

number of times an application can be 

updated or amended until the initial 

filing deadline on July 21, 2021. 

132. An applicant must always click 

on the CERTIFY & SUBMIT button on 

the ‘‘Certify & Submit’’ screen to 

successfully submit its FCC Form 175 

and any modifications; otherwise the 

application or changes to the 

application will not be received or 

reviewed by Commission staff. 

Additional information about accessing, 

completing, and viewing the FCC Form 

175 is provided in the FCC Form 175 

Instructions. Applicants requiring 

technical assistance should contact FCC 

Auctions Technical Support at (877) 

480–3201, option nine; (202) 414–1250; 

or (202) 414–1255 (text telephone 

(TTY)); hours of service are Monday 

through Friday, from 8 a.m. to 6 p.m. 

ET. In order to provide better service to 

the public, all calls to Technical 

Support are recorded. 

E. Application Processing and Minor 

Modifications 

1. Public Notice of Applicants’ Initial 

Application Status and Opportunity for 

Minor Modifications 

133. After the deadline for filing 

auction applications, the Commission 

will process all timely submitted 

applications to determine whether each 

applicant has complied with the 

application requirements and provided 

all information concerning its 

qualifications for bidding. OEA will 

issue a public notice with applicants’ 

initial application status, identifying: (1) 

Those that are complete; and (2) those 

that are incomplete or deficient because 

of defects that may be corrected. The 

public notice will include the deadline 

for resubmitting corrected applications 

and an electronic copy of the public 

notice will be sent by email to the 

contact address listed in the FCC Form 

175 for each applicant. In addition, each 

applicant with an incomplete 

application will be sent information on 

the nature of the deficiencies in its 

application, along with the name and 

contact information of a Commission 

staff member who can answer questions 

specific to the application. 

134. After the initial application filing 

deadline on July 21, 2021, applicants 

can make only minor modifications to 

their applications. Major modifications 

(e.g., change of PEA selection, certain 

changes in ownership that would 

constitute an assignment or transfer of 

control of the applicant, change in the 

required certifications, change in 

applicant’s legal classification that 

results in a change in control, or change 

in claimed eligibility for a higher 

percentage of bidding credit) will not be 

permitted. After the deadline for 

resubmitting corrected applications, an 

applicant will have no further 

opportunity to cure any deficiencies in 

its application or provide any additional 

information that may affect Commission 

staff’s ultimate determination of 

whether and to what extent the 

applicant is qualified to participate in 

Auction 110. 


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135. Commission staff will 

communicate only with an applicant’s 

contact person or certifying official, as 

designated on the applicant’s FCC Form 

175, unless the applicant’s certifying 

official or contact person notifies 

Commission staff in writing that another 

representative is authorized to speak on 

the applicant’s behalf. Authorizations 

may be sent by email to auction110@

fcc.gov. 

2. Public Notice of Applicants’ Final 

Application Status After Upfront 

Payment Deadline 

136. After Commission staff reviews 

resubmitted applications and upfront 

payments, OEA will release a public 

notice identifying applicants that have 

become qualified bidders for the 

auction. A Qualified Bidders Public 

Notice will be issued before bidding in 

the auction begins. Qualified bidders are 

those applicants with submitted FCC 

Form 175 applications that are deemed 

timely filed and complete and that have 

made a sufficient upfront payment. 

F. Upfront Payments 

137. In order to be eligible to bid in 

Auction 110, a sufficient upfront 

payment and a complete and accurate 

FCC Remittance Advice Form (FCC 

Form 159, Revised 2/03) must be 

submitted before 6 p.m. ET on 

September 2, 2021. After completing its 

short-form application, an applicant 

will have access to an electronic prefilled version of the FCC Form 159. An 

accurate and complete FCC Form 159 

must accompany each payment. Proper 

completion of this form is critical to 

ensuring correct crediting of upfront 

payments. Payers using the pre-filled 

FCC Form 159 are responsible for 

ensuring that all the information on the 

form, including payment amounts, is 

accurate. Instructions for completing 

FCC Form 159 for Auction 110 are 

provided below. 

1. Making Upfront Payments by Wire 

Transfer for Auction 110 

138. Upfront payments for Auction 

110 must be wired to, and will be 

deposited in, the U.S. Treasury. 

139. Wire transfer payments for 

Auction 110 must be received before 6 

p.m. ET on September 22, 2021. An 

applicant must initiate the wire transfer 

through its bank, authorizing the bank 

to wire funds from the applicants 

account to the proper account in the 

U.S. Treasury. No other payment 

method is acceptable. The Commission 

will not accept checks, credit cards, or 

automated clearing house (ACH) 

payments. To avoid untimely payments, 

applicants should discuss arrangements 

(including bank closing schedules and 

other specific bank wire transfer 

requirements, such as an in-person 

written request before a specified time 

of day) with their bankers several days 

before they plan to make the wire 

transfer, and must allow sufficient time 

for the transfer to be initiated and 

completed before the deadline. The 

following information will be needed: 

ABA Routing Number: 021030004. 

Receiving Bank: TREAS NYC, 33 

Liberty Street, New York, NY 10045. 

Beneficiary: FCC, 45 L Street NE, 3rd 

Floor, Washington, DC 20554. 

Account Number: 827000001001. 

Originating Bank Information (OBI 

Field): (Skip one space between each 

information item). 

‘‘AUCTIONPAY’’ 

Applicant FCC Registration Number 

(FRN): (Use the same FRN as used on 

the applicant’s FCC Form 159, block 

21). 

Payment Type Code: (Same as FCC 

Form 159, block 24A: ‘‘U110’’). 

Note: The beneficiary account number 

(BNF Account Number) is specific to the 

upfront payments for Auction 110. Do not 

use a BNF Account Number from a previous 

auction. 

140. At least one hour before placing 

the order for the wire transfer (but on 

the same business day), applicants must 

print and fax a completed FCC Form 

159 (Revised 2/03) to the FCC at (202) 

418–2843. Alternatively, the completed 

form can be scanned and sent as an 

attachment to an email to 

RROGWireFaxes@fcc.gov. On the fax 

cover sheet or in the email subject 

header, write ‘‘Wire Transfer—Auction 

Payment for Auction 110’’. To meet the 

upfront payment deadline, an 

applicant’s payment must be credited to 

the Commission’s account for Auction 

110 before the deadline. 

141. Each applicant is responsible for 

ensuring timely submission of its 

upfront payment and for timely filing of 

an accurate and complete FCC Form 

159. An applicant should coordinate 

with its financial institution well ahead 

of the due date regarding its wire 

transfer and allow sufficient time for the 

transfer to be initiated and completed 

prior to the deadline. Among other 

things, OEA and WTB caution each 

applicant to plan ahead regarding any 

potential delays in its or its financial 

institution’s ability to complete wire 

transfers due to the COVID–19 

pandemic. The Commission repeatedly 

has cautioned auction participants 

about the importance of planning ahead 

to prepare for unforeseen last-minute 

difficulties in making payments by wire 

transfer. Each applicant also is 

responsible for obtaining confirmation 

from its financial institution that its 

wire transfer to the U.S. Treasury was 

successful and from Commission staff 

that its upfront payment was timely 

received and that it was deposited into 

the proper account. As a regulatory 

requirement, the U.S. Treasury screens 

all payments from all financial 

institutions before deposits are made 

available to specified accounts. If wires 

are suspended, the U.S. Treasury may 

direct questions regarding any transfer 

to the financial institution initiating the 

wire. Each applicant must take care to 

assure that any questions directed to its 

financial institution(s) are addressed 

promptly. To receive confirmation from 

Commission staff, contact Scott 

Radcliffe of the Office of Managing 

Director’s Revenue & Receivables 

Operations Group/Auctions at (202) 

418–7518 or Theresa Meeks at (202) 

418–2945. 

142. Please note the following 

information regarding upfront 

payments: 

• All payments must be made in U.S. 

dollars. 

• All payments must be made by wire 

transfer. 

• Upfront payments for Auction 110 

go to an account number different from 

the accounts used in previous FCC 

auctions. 

143. Failure to deliver a sufficient 

upfront payment as instructed by the 

upfront payment deadline will result in 

dismissal of the short-form application 

and disqualification from participation 

in the auction. 

2. Completing and Submitting FCC 

Form 159 

144. The following information 

supplements the standard instructions 

for FCC Form 159 (Revised 2/03) and is 

provided to help ensure correct 

completion of FCC Form 159 for upfront 

payments for Auction 110. Applicants 

need to complete FCC Form 159 

carefully, because: 

• Mistakes may affect bidding 

eligibility; and 

• Lack of consistency between 

information provided in FCC Form 159 

(Revised 2/03), FCC Form 175, longform application (FCC Form 601), and 

correspondence about an application 

may cause processing delays. 

145. Therefore, appropriate crossreferences between the FCC Form 159 

Remittance Advice and the short-form 

application (FCC Form 175) are 

described below. 


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Block number Required information 

1 ........................ LOCKBOX #—Leave Blank. 

2 ........................ Payer Name—Enter the name of the person or company making the payment. If the applicant itself is the payer, this entry 

would be the same name as in FCC Form 175. 

3 ........................ Total Amount Paid—Enter the amount of the upfront payment associated with the FCC Form 159 (Revised 2/03). 

4–8 .................... Street Address, City, State, ZIP Code—Enter the street mailing address (not Post Office box number) where mail should be 

sent to the payer. If the applicant is the payer, these entries would be the same as FCC Form 175 from the Applicant Information section. 

9 ........................ Daytime Telephone Number—Enter the telephone number of a person knowledgeable about this upfront payment. 

10 ...................... Country Code—For addresses outside the United States, enter the appropriate postal country code (available from the Mailing Requirements Department of the U.S. Postal Service). 

11 ...................... Payer FRN—Enter the payer’s 10-digit FCC Registration Number (FRN) registered in the Commission Registration System 

(CORES). 

21 ...................... Applicant FRN (Complete only if applicant is different than payer)—Enter the applicant’s 10-digit FRN registered in CORES. 

24A ................... Payment Type Code—Enter ‘‘U110’’. 

25A ................... Quantity—Enter the number ‘‘1’’. 

26A ................... Fee Due—Amount of Upfront Payment. 

27A ................... Total Fee—Will be the same amount as 26A. 

28A ................... FCC Code 1—Enter the number ‘‘110’’ (indicating Auction 110). 

Notes: 

• Do not use Remittance Advice 

(Continuation Sheet), FCC Form 159–C, for 

upfront payments. 

• If applicant is different from the payer, 

complete blocks 13 through 21 for the 

applicant, using the same information shown 

on FCC Form 175. Otherwise leave them 

blank. 

• No signature is required on FCC Form 

159 for auction payments. 

• Since credit card payments will not be 

accepted for upfront payments for an auction, 

leave Section E blank. 

3. Upfront Payments and Bidding 

Eligibility 

146. The Commission has delegated 

authority to OEA and WTB to determine 

appropriate upfront payments for each 

license being auctioned, taking into 

account such factors as the efficiency of 

the auction process and the potential 

value of similar licenses. An upfront 

payment is a refundable deposit made 

by each applicant seeking to participate 

in bidding to establish its eligibility to 

bid on licenses. Upfront payments that 

are related to the inventory of licenses 

being auctioned protect against 

frivolous or insincere bidding and 

provide the Commission with a source 

of funds from which to collect payments 

owed at the close of bidding. 

147. Applicants that are former 

defaulters must pay upfront payments 

50% greater than non-former defaulters. 

For purposes of classification as a 

former defaulter or a former delinquent, 

defaults and delinquencies of the 

applicant itself and its controlling 

interests are included. For this purpose, 

the term ‘‘controlling interest’’ is 

defined in 47 CFR 1.2105(a)(4)(i). 

148. An applicant must make an 

upfront payment sufficient to obtain 

bidding eligibility on the generic blocks 

on which it will bid. OEA and WTB 

adopt the Commission’s proposal to set 

upfront payments based on MHz-pops, 

and that the amount of the upfront 

payment submitted by an applicant will 

determine its initial bidding eligibility, 

the maximum number of bidding units 

on which a bidder may place bids in 

any single round. In order to bid for a 

block, qualified bidders must have a 

current eligibility level that meets or 

exceeds the number of bidding units 

assigned to that generic block in a PEA. 

At a minimum, therefore, an applicant’s 

total upfront payment must be enough 

to establish eligibility to bid on at least 

one block in one of the PEAs selected 

on its FCC Form 175 for Auction 110, 

or else the applicant will not become 

qualified to participate in the auction. 

The total upfront payment does not 

affect the total dollar amount the bidder 

may bid. 

149. In the Auction 110 Comment 

Public Notice, the Commission 

proposed to require applicants to submit 

upfront payments based on $0.03 per 

MHz-pop for PEAs 1–50 and $0.01 per 

MHz-pop for all other PEAs, subject to 

a minimum of $500. In response to 

concerns raised by commenters that 

calculating upfront payments and 

bidding units with a significant 

structural break between the top 50 

markets and markets just outside of the 

top 50 has the potential to create 

distortions in bidding behavior, OEA 

and WTB will forgo the discrete break 

in calculation amounts for large and 

small markets for upfront payment and 

bidding unit amounts. 

150. Accordingly, OEA and WTB 

adopt upfront payments for a generic 

block in a PEA based on $0.01 per MHzpop for all PEAs. The results of these 

calculations will be rounded using the 

Commission’s standard rounding 

procedures for auctions: Results above 

$10,000 are rounded to the nearest 

$1,000; results below $10,000 but above 

$1,000 are rounded to the nearest $100; 

and results below $1,000 are rounded to 

the nearest $10. The upfront payment 

amount per block in each PEA is set 

forth in the ‘‘Attachment A’’ file on the 

Auction 110 website at www.fcc.gov/ 

auction/110. 

151. OEA and WTB also adopt the 

Commission’s proposal to assign each 

generic block in a PEA a specific 

number of bidding units, equal to one 

bidding unit per $100 of the upfront 

payment. The number of bidding units 

per block in each PEA is set forth in the 

‘‘Attachment A’’ file that lists the 

upfront payment amounts. The number 

of bidding units for one block in a given 

PEA is fixed, since it is based on the 

MHz-pops in the block, and it does not 

change during the auction as prices 

change. Thus, in calculating its upfront 

payment amount, an applicant must 

determine the maximum number of 

bidding units on which it may wish to 

bid in any single round and submit an 

upfront payment amount for the auction 

covering that number of bidding units. 

In some cases, a qualified bidder’s 

maximum eligibility may be less than 

the amount of its upfront payment 

because the qualified bidder has either 

previously been in default on a 

Commission construction permit or 

license or delinquent on non-tax debt 

owed to a Federal agency, or has 

submitted an upfront payment that 

exceeds the total amount of bidding 

units associated with the license areas it 

selected on its FCC Form 175. In order 

to make this calculation, an applicant 

should add together the bidding units 

for the number of blocks in PEAs on 

which it seeks to be active in any given 

round. Applicants should check their 

calculations carefully, as there is no 

provision for increasing a bidder’s 

eligibility after the upfront payment 

deadline. 


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TABLE 1—UPFRONT PAYMENTS, BIDDING ELIGIBILITY, AND BIDDING FLEXIBILITY EXAMPLE

PEA Bidding units Upfront 

payment 

PEA058—Bloomington, IN ...................................................................................................................................... 1,070 $107,000 

PEA064—South Bend, IN ....................................................................................................................................... 950 95,000 

If a bidder wishes to bid on one block in both of the above PEAs in a round, it must have selected both PEAs on its FCC Form 175 and purchased at least 2,020 bidding units (1,070 + 950) of bidding eligibility. If a bidder only wishes to bid on a block in one of these PEAs, but not 

both, purchasing 1,070 bidding units would meet the eligibility requirement for a block in either PEA. The bidder would be able to bid on a block 

in either PEA, but not both at the same time. If the bidder purchased only 950 bidding units, the bidder would have enough eligibility to bid for a 

block in PEA064 but not for one in PEA058. 

152. If an applicant is a former 

defaulter, it must calculate its upfront 

payment for the maximum amount of 

generic blocks in each PEA on which it 

plans to bid by multiplying the number 

of bidding units on which it wishes to 

be active by 1.5. In order to calculate the 

number of bidding units to assign to 

former defaulters, the Commission will 

calculate the number of bidding units a 

non-former defaulter would get for the 

upfront payment received, divide that 

number by 1.5, and round the result up 

to the nearest bidding unit. If a former 

defaulter fails to submit a sufficient 

upfront payment to establish eligibility 

to bid on at least one generic block in 

a PEA, the applicant will not be eligible 

to participate in Auction 110. The 

applicant, however, will retain its status 

as an applicant in Auction 110 and will 

remain subject to 47 CFR 1.2105(c). 

G. Auction Registration 

153. All qualified bidders for Auction 

110 are automatically registered for the 

auction. Registration materials will be 

distributed prior to the auction by 

overnight delivery. The mailing will be 

sent only to the contact person at the 

contact address listed in the FCC Form 

175 and will include the SecurID®

tokens that will be required to place 

bids. 

154. Qualified bidders that do not 

receive this registration mailing will not 

be able to submit bids. Therefore, any 

qualified bidder for Auction 110 that 

has not received this mailing by noon 

on September 8, 2021, should call the 

Auctions Hotline at (717) 338–2868. 

Receipt of this registration mailing is 

critical to participating in the auction, 

and each applicant is responsible for 

ensuring it has received all the 

registration materials. 

155. In the event that a SecurID ®

token is lost or damaged, only a person 

who has been designated as an 

authorized bidder, the contact person, 

or the certifying official on the 

applicant’s short-form application may 

request a replacement. To request a 

replacement, call the Auction Bidder 

Line at the telephone number provided 

in the registration materials or the 

Auction Hotline at (717) 338–2868. 

H. Remote Electronic Bidding via the 

FCC Auction Bidding System 

156. Bidders will be able to 

participate in Auction 110 over the 

internet using the FCC Auction Bidding 

System (bidding system). During the 

assignment phase only, bidders will 

have the option of placing bids by 

telephone through a dedicated auction 

bidder line. Please note that telephonic 

bid assistants are required to use a script 

when entering bids placed by telephone. 

Telephonic bidders are therefore 

reminded to allow sufficient time to bid 

by placing their calls well in advance of 

the close of a round. The length of a call 

to place a telephonic bid may vary; 

please allow a minimum of 10 minutes. 

The toll-free telephone number for the 

auction bidder line will be provided to 

qualified bidders prior to the start of 

bidding in the auction. 

157. Only qualified bidders are 

permitted to bid. Each authorized 

bidder must have his or her own 

SecurID ® token, which the Commission 

will provide at no charge. Each 

applicant will be issued three SecurID ®

tokens. A bidder cannot bid without his 

or her SecurID ® token. In order to 

access the bidding function of the 

bidding system, bidders must be logged 

in during the bidding round using the 

passcode generated by the SecurID ®

token and a personal identification 

number (PIN) created by the bidder. 

Bidders are strongly encouraged to print 

a bid summary for each round after they 

have completed all their activity for that 

round. For security purposes, the 

SecurID ® tokens and a telephone 

number for bidding questions are only 

mailed to the contact person at the 

contact address listed on the FCC Form 

175. Each SecurID ® token is tailored to 

a specific auction. SecurID ® tokens 

issued for other auctions or obtained 

from a source other than the FCC will 

not work for Auction 110. Please note 

that the SecurID ® tokens can be 

recycled, and the Commission requests 

that bidders return the tokens to the 

FCC. Pre-addressed envelopes will be 

provided to return the tokens once the 

auction has ended. 

158. The Commission makes no 

warranties whatsoever, and shall not be 

deemed to have made any warranties, 

with respect to the bidding system, 

including any implied warranties of 

merchantability or fitness for a 

particular purpose. In no event shall the 

Commission, or any of its officers, 

employees, or agents, be liable for any 

damages whatsoever (including, but not 

limited to, loss of business profits, 

business interruption, loss of use, 

revenue, or business information, or any 

other direct, indirect, or consequential 

damages) arising out of or relating to the 

existence, furnishing, functioning, or 

use of the bidding system. Moreover, no 

obligation or liability will arise out of 

the Commission’s technical, 

programming, or other advice or service 

provided in connection with the 

bidding system. 

159. To the extent an issue arises with 

the bidding system itself, the 

Commission will take all appropriate 

measures to resolve such issues quickly 

and equitably. Should an issue arise that 

is outside the bidding system or 

attributable to a bidder, including, but 

not limited to, a bidder’s hardware, 

software, or internet access problem that 

prevents the bidder from submitting a 

bid prior to the end of a round, the 

Commission shall have no obligation to 

resolve or remediate such an issue on 

behalf of the bidder. Similarly, if an 

issue arises due to bidder error using the 

bidding system, the Commission shall 

have no obligation to resolve or 

remediate such an issue on behalf of the 

bidder. Accordingly, after the close of a 

bidding round, the results of bid 

processing will not be altered absent 

evidence of any failure in the bidding 

system. 

I. Mock Auction 

160. All qualified bidders will be 

eligible to participate in a mock auction 

for the clock phase. Only those bidders 

that are qualified to participate in 

Auction 110 will be eligible to 

participate in the mock auction. The 

mock auction, which will begin on 


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September 30, 2021, will enable 

qualified bidders to become familiar 

with the bidding system and to practice 

submitting bids prior to the auction. 

OEA and WTB recommend that all 

qualified bidders, including all their 

authorized bidders, participate to assure 

that they can log in to the bidding 

system and gain experience with the 

bidding procedures. Participating in the 

mock auction may reduce the likelihood 

of a bidder making a mistake during the 

auction. Details regarding the mock 

auction will be announced in the 

Qualified Bidders Public Notice for 

Auction 110. 

161. After the clock phase of the 

auction concludes, a separate mock 

auction for the assignment phase will be 

held for those qualified bidders that 

won generic blocks in the clock phase. 

J. Auction Delay, Suspension, or 

Cancellation 

162. At any time before or during the 

bidding process, OEA, in conjunction 

with WTB, may delay, suspend, or 

cancel bidding in Auction 110 in the 

event of a natural disaster, technical 

obstacle, network interruption, 

administrative or weather necessity, 

evidence of an auction security breach 

or unlawful bidding activity, or for any 

other reason that affects the fair and 

efficient conduct of competitive 

bidding. This approach has proven 

effective in resolving exigent 

circumstances in previous auctions and 

OEA and WTB find no reason to depart 

from it here. OEA will notify 

participants of any such delay, 

suspension, or cancellation by public 

notice and/or through the bidding 

system’s announcement function. If the 

bidding is delayed or suspended, then 

OEA may, in its sole discretion, elect to 

resume the auction starting from the 

beginning of the current round or from 

some previous round, or cancel the 

auction in its entirety. OEA and WTB 

emphasize that they will exercise this 

authority at their discretion. 

K. Fraud Alert 

163. As is the case with many 

business investment opportunities, 

some unscrupulous entrepreneurs may 

attempt to use Auction 110 to deceive 

and defraud unsuspecting investors. 

Common warning signals of fraud 

include the following: 

• The first contact is a ‘‘cold call’’ 

from a telemarketer or is made in 

response to an inquiry prompted by a 

radio or television infomercial. 

• The offering materials used to 

invest in the venture appear to be 

targeted at IRA funds, for example, by 

including all documents and papers 

needed for the transfer of funds 

maintained in IRA accounts. 

• The amount of investment is less 

than $25,000. 

• The sales representative makes 

verbal representations that: (a) The 

Internal Revenue Service, Federal Trade 

Commission (FTC), Securities and 

Exchange Commission (SEC), FCC, or 

other government agency has approved 

the investment; (b) the investment is not 

subject to state or federal securities 

laws; or (c) the investment will yield 

unrealistically high short-term profits. 

In addition, the offering materials often 

include copies of actual FCC releases, or 

quotes from FCC personnel, giving the 

appearance of FCC knowledge or 

approval of the solicitation. 

164. Information about deceptive 

telemarketing investment schemes is 

available from the FCC, as well as the 

FTC and SEC. Additional sources of 

information for potential bidders and 

investors may be obtained from the 

following sources: 

• The FCC’s Consumer Call Center at 

(888) 225–5322 or by visiting 

www.fcc.gov/general/frauds-scams-andalerts-guides. 

• the FTC at (877) FTC–HELP ((877) 

382–4357) or by visiting 

www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0238- 

investment-risks. 

• the SEC at (202) 942–7040 or by 

visiting www.sec.gov/investor. 

165. Complaints about specific 

deceptive telemarketing investment 

schemes should be directed to the FTC, 

the SEC, or the National Fraud 

Information Center at (202) 835–0618. 

IV. Bidding Procedures 

166. OEA and WTB will conduct 

Auction 110 using an ascending clock 

auction design with two phases. The 

first phase of the auction—the clock 

phase—will consist of successive clock 

bidding rounds in which bidders 

indicate their demands for a number of 

generic license blocks in specific 

categories and PEAs. In the second 

phase—the assignment phase—winning 

clock phase bidders will have the 

opportunity to bid for their preferred 

combinations of frequency-specific 

license assignments, consistent with 

their clock phase winnings, in a series 

of sealed-bid rounds conducted by PEA 

or, in some cases, PEA group. 

167. In conjunction with WTB, OEA 

will release shortly updated technical 

guides that provide the mathematical 

details of the adopted auction design 

and algorithms for the clock and 

assignment phases of Auction 110. The 

information in the updated technical 

guides, which are available in the 

Education section of the Auction 110 

website (www.fcc.gov/auction/110), 

supplements the decisions in the 

Auction 110 Procedures Public Notice. 

The Auction 110 Clock Phase Technical 

Guide details the adopted procedures 

for the clock phase of Auction 110. The 

Auction 110 Assignment Phase 

Technical Guide details the adopted 

procedures for the assignment phase. 

A. Clock Phase 

1. Clock Auction Design 

168. Under the bidding procedures 

that OEA and WTB adopt, during the 

clock phase of Auction 110, bidders will 

indicate their demands for generic 

license blocks in a bidding category in 

specific geographic areas—in this case, 

PEAs. There may be one or two bidding 

categories in a given PEA. The clock 

auction format will proceed in a series 

of rounds, with bidding being 

conducted simultaneously for all 

spectrum blocks in all PEAs available in 

the auction. During each bidding round, 

the bidding system will announce a perblock clock price for each category in 

each PEA. Qualified bidders will 

submit, for each category and PEA for 

which they wish to bid, the number of 

blocks they seek at the clock price 

associated with the current round. 

Bidding rounds will be open for 

predetermined periods of time. Bidders 

will be subject to activity and eligibility 

rules that govern the pace at which they 

participate in the auction. 

169. As proposed, for each product— 

a category in a PEA—the clock price for 

a generic license block will increase 

from round to round if bidders indicate 

total demand for blocks in that product 

that exceeds the number of blocks 

available. The bidding rounds will 

continue until, for all products, the total 

number of blocks that bidders demand 

does not exceed the supply of available 

blocks. 

170. If the aggregate reserve price to 

satisfy the CSEA requirement has been 

met at the time that the clock phase 

bidding stops, those bidders indicating 

demand for a product at the final clock 

phase price will be deemed winning 

bidders, and the auction will proceed to 

the assignment phase. If the reserve 

price has not been met at the time 

bidding stops in the clock phase, the 

auction will end, and no licenses will be 

assigned. 

171. Following the clock phase, if the 

reserve price has been met, the 

assignment phase will offer clock phase 

winners the opportunity to bid an 

additional amount for licenses with 

specific frequencies. All winning 

bidders, regardless of whether they bid 

in the assignment phase, will be 


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assigned licenses for contiguous blocks 

within a category in a PEA. In addition, 

if in a PEA there are one or more 

bidders with clock phase winnings in 

both categories, one of the bidders will 

be assigned frequency blocks that are 

contiguous across the two categories. 

2. Generic License Blocks in Two 

Bidding Categories 

172. As established in the 3.45 GHz 

Second Report and Order, the 3.45–3.55 

GHz band will be licensed in uniform 

10-megahertz sub-blocks in each of the 

406 PEAs in the contiguous United 

States. In most PEAs, new licensees 

generally will have unrestricted use of 

all ten frequency blocks. In other areas, 

specifically in PEAs that wholly or in 

part cover Cooperative Planning Areas 

or Periodic Use Areas, licensees must 

coordinate with incumbent federal 

operations in the band, as established in 

the 3.45 GHz Second Report and Order. 

In some of the PEAs where coordination 

is required, all ten blocks will be subject 

to the same restrictions. In others, the 

restrictions may vary depending upon 

the frequency block—specifically, in 

some PEAs subject to coordination with 

federal incumbents, the A through D 

blocks may be subject to different 

restrictions than the E through J blocks. 

As set forth in the 3.45 GHz Second 

Report and Order, the lower 40 

megahertz of the band—between 3450– 

3490 MHz corresponding to the A 

through D blocks—are affected 

differently than the upper 60 megahertz 

in certain PEAs in the band. In the event 

Lockheed is granted relief substantially 

similar to that sought in its waiver 

request, the A through H blocks will be 

subject to different conditions than the 

I and J blocks in the three affected PEAs. 

See Lockheed Waiver Request. 

173. Categories. The Commission 

adopts the proposal to establish 

categories for bidding such that all the 

blocks within a category in a PEA are 

similar in terms of any requirements or 

restrictions. For the reasons proposed by 

the Commission, OEA and WTB adopt 

bidding categories as follows: In the 

PEAs where all ten blocks are the 

same—i.e., all ten generally are 

unrestricted or all ten are subject to the 

same restrictions—the ten generic 

blocks will be considered Category 1, or 

‘‘Cat1,’’ blocks. In the PEAs subject to 

coordination with federal incumbents 

where the restrictions differ according 

to the frequency, the four blocks A 

through D will be considered Category 

1, or ‘‘Cat1,’’ while the six blocks E 

through J will be considered Category 2, 

or ‘‘Cat2,’’ for bidding. In PEAs with two 

categories, we designate certain blocks 

as Cat1 and other blocks as Cat2 simply 

to denote that for these licenses the 

coordination requirements in a PEA 

differ between the two categories. For 

all licenses, we caution potential 

bidders to investigate carefully the 

restrictions that may apply to a given 

PEA. In particular, we note that DoD has 

created a workbook that specifically 

describes the coordination requirements 

for each Cooperative Planning Area and 

Periodic Use Area. In 334 PEAs, there 

will be ten generic blocks of a single 

Cat1 product, and in 72 PEAs, there will 

be two products. OEA and WTB also 

note that in the three PEAs that 

encompass the areas subject to 

Lockheed’s pending waiver request, the 

eight blocks A through H would be 

considered Cat1 while the two blocks I 

and J would be considered Cat2 for 

bidding should relief substantially 

similar to that sought by Lockheed be 

granted. 

174. This approach to determining 

bidding categories differs somewhat 

from the approach the Commission has 

taken in prior clock auctions, in that the 

coordination requirements on blocks in 

a given category in a given PEA may 

differ from the requirements on the 

same category of blocks in a different 

PEA. For example, the Cat1 blocks in 

one PEA may be unrestricted while the 

Cat1 blocks in another PEA may require 

some degree of coordination. Similarly, 

the restrictions on Cat2 blocks will 

likely vary from PEA to PEA. In 

previous auctions, blocks in a given 

bidding category generally have been 

subject to the same use requirements in 

all PEAs, but because the restrictions in 

this auction differ so widely from PEA 

to PEA, that approach is not feasible. 

Importantly, however, for Auction 110, 

within any given PEA, the blocks within 

a category can be considered generic, 

and bidding in the clock phase will 

determine a single price that will apply 

to each generic block in a category in a 

PEA. 

175. This approach for bidding on 

generic blocks in two categories is based 

on the close similarity of the blocks 

within each bidding category within a 

PEA. To the extent a bidder has a 

preference for licenses for specific 

frequencies, the bidder may bid for its 

preferred blocks in the assignment 

phase. However, a bidder for a generic 

block in a category will not be assured 

that it will be assigned, or not be 

assigned, any particular frequency 

block. 

176. Limit on number of blocks per 

bidder. In the 3.45 GHz Second Report 

and Order, the Commission adopted a 

spectrum aggregation limit for flexibleuse licenses in the 3.45 GHz band of a 

maximum of 40 megahertz (i.e., four 

blocks out of ten) in any PEA at any 

point in time for four years post-auction. 

Consistent with this limit on the 

number of blocks that a single entity can 

hold in any single PEA, the bidding 

system will limit to four the number of 

blocks that a bidder can demand in any 

given PEA at any point in the auction. 

Therefore, in each bidding round, a 

bidder will have the opportunity to bid 

for a total of up to four blocks of 

spectrum per PEA. This spectrum 

aggregation limit will apply across both 

categories in PEAs that contain Cat1 and 

Cat2 blocks. As a result, no single entity 

will be permitted to bid on, for example, 

two Cat1 blocks and three Cat2 blocks 

within a single PEA. More specifically, 

the bidding system will not permit bids 

to be submitted that, if fully applied, 

would result in the bidder demanding 

more than four blocks in the PEA. 

Further, the system will not fully apply 

submitted bids if doing so would result 

in the bidder demanding more than four 

blocks in the PEA. For example, a 

requested increase in one category may 

not be applied if a requested reduction 

in the other category cannot be applied 

because of insufficient aggregate 

demand. 

177. An aggregation limit of four 

blocks will further the Commission’s 

interest in promoting greater diversity in 

participation in the 3.45 GHz band by 

ensuring that, if licenses for all blocks 

in a PEA are awarded, there will be at 

least three winning bidders in the PEA. 

3. Bidding Rounds 

178. As proposed, Auction 110 will 

consist of sequential bidding rounds, 

each followed by the release of round 

results. OEA and WTB will conduct 

bidding simultaneously for all spectrum 

blocks in both bidding categories for all 

PEAs available in the auction. In the 

first bidding round of Auction 110, a 

bidder will indicate, for each product, 

the number of generic license blocks it 

demands at the minimum opening bid 

price. 

179. The initial bidding schedule will 

be announced in a public notice to be 

released at least one week before the 

start of bidding. OEA will retain the 

discretion to adjust the bidding 

schedule in order to foster an auction 

pace that reasonably balances speed 

with the bidders’ need to study round 

results and adjust their bidding 

strategies. Such adjustments may 

include changes in the amount of time 

for bidding rounds, the amount of time 

between rounds, or the number of 

rounds per day, and will depend upon 

bidding activity and other factors. 

180. Auction 110 will be conducted 

over the internet. A bidder will be able 


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to submit its bids using the bidding 

system’s upload function, which allows 

bid files in a comma-separated values 

(CSV) text format to be uploaded. The 

bidding system will not allow bids to be 

submitted unless the bidder selected the 

PEAs on its FCC Form 175, the bidder 

has sufficient bidding eligibility, and 

the bids, if applied, are consistent with 

the aggregation limit of 40 megahertz in 

a PEA. 

181. During each round of the 

bidding, a bidder will also be able to 

remove bids placed in the current 

bidding round. If a bidder modifies its 

bids for blocks in a PEA in a round, the 

system will take the last bid submission 

as that bidder’s bid for the round. No 

bids may be withdrawn after the close 

of a round. Unlike an auction conducted 

using the Commission’s simultaneous 

multiple-round auction format, there are 

no provisionally winning bids in a clock 

auction. As a result, the concept of bid 

withdrawals as used in simultaneous 

multiple-round auctions does not apply 

to a clock auction. 

4. Stopping Rule 

182. OEA and WTB adopt a 

simultaneous stopping rule for Auction 

110, under which all blocks in all PEAs 

will remain available for bidding until 

the bidding stops in every PEA. 

Specifically, bidding will close for all 

blocks after the first round in which 

there is no excess demand in any 

product. Excess demand is calculated as 

the difference between the number of 

blocks of aggregate demand and supply. 

Under this approach, it is not possible 

to determine in advance how long 

Auction 110 will last. 

5. Availability of Bidding Information 

183. OEA and WTB adopt the 

proposal to make public after each clock 

phase bidding round, for each category 

in each PEA: The supply, the aggregate 

demand, the posted price of the last 

completed round, and the clock price 

for the next round. The posted price of 

the previous round is, generally, the 

start-of-round price if supply exceeds 

demand; the clock price of the previous 

round if demand exceeds supply; or the 

price at which a reduction caused 

demand to equal supply. The identities 

of bidders demanding blocks in a 

specific category or PEA will not be 

disclosed until after Auction 110 

concludes (i.e., after the close of 

bidding). 

184. OEA will also make public after 

each clock phase bidding round 

whether the reserve price has been met, 

that is, whether the estimated total cash 

proceeds based on the bids in the most 

recently completed round would satisfy 

the CSEA requirement. If the reserve has 

not yet been met, each bidder will be 

informed about the shortfall between 

the reserve and the estimated total cash 

proceeds, rounded up to the nearest 

million. This shortfall information will 

not be publicly available during the 

auction. 

185. Each bidder will have access to 

additional information related to its 

own bidding and bid eligibility. 

Specifically, after the bids of a round 

have been processed, the bidding 

system will inform each bidder of the 

number of blocks it holds after the 

round (its processed demand) for every 

product and its eligibility for the next 

round. 

186. Limiting the availability of 

bidding information during the auction 

balances the Commission’s interest in 

providing bidders with sufficient 

information about the status of their 

own bids and the general level of 

bidding in all areas and license 

categories to allow them to bid 

confidently and effectively, while 

restricting the availability of 

information that may facilitate 

identification of bidders placing 

particular bids, which could potentially 

lead to undesirable strategic bidding. 

6. Activity Requirement, Contingent 

Bidding Limit, and Missing Bids 

187. Activity requirement. To ensure 

that the auction closes within a 

reasonable period of time, an activity 

rule requires bidders to bid actively 

throughout the auction, rather than wait 

until late in the auction before 

participating. For this clock auction, a 

bidder’s activity in a round for purposes 

of the activity rule will be the sum of 

the bidding units associated with the 

bidder’s demands as applied by the 

auction system during bid processing. 

Bidders are required to be active on a 

specific percentage (the activity 

requirement percentage) of their current 

bidding eligibility during each round of 

the auction. Failure to maintain the 

requisite activity level will result in a 

reduction in the bidder’s eligibility, 

possibly curtailing or eliminating the 

bidder’s ability to place bids in 

subsequent rounds of the auction. 

188. OEA and WTB adopt the 

proposal to require that bidders 

maintain a fixed, high level of activity 

in each round of Auction 110 in order 

to maintain bidding eligibility. 

Specifically, bidders must be active on 

between 90% and 100% of their bidding 

eligibility in all clock rounds, with the 

specific percentage within this range to 

be set for each round. Thus, the activity 

rule will be satisfied when a bidder has 

bidding activity on blocks with bidding 

units that total 90% to 100% of its 

current eligibility in the round. OEA 

will set the activity requirement 

percentage initially at 95%. If the 

activity rule is met, then the bidder’s 

eligibility will not change for the next 

round. If the activity rule is not met in 

a round, the bidder’s eligibility will be 

reduced. Bidding activity will be based 

on the bids that are applied by the FCC 

auction bidding system. That is, if a 

bidder requests a reduction in the 

quantity of blocks it demands in a 

product, but the bidding system cannot 

apply the request because demand 

would fall below the available supply, 

then the bidder’s activity will reflect its 

unreduced demand. Under the 

ascending clock auction format, the FCC 

auction bidding system will not allow a 

bidder to reduce the quantity of blocks 

it demands in an individual product if 

the reduction would result in aggregate 

demand falling below (or further below) 

the available supply of blocks in the 

product. 

189. OEA will retain the discretion to 

change the activity requirement 

percentage during the auction. The 

bidding system would announce any 

such change in advance of the round in 

which it would take effect, giving 

bidders adequate notice to adjust their 

bidding strategies. 

190. Contingent bidding limit. 

Because a bidder’s eligibility for the 

next round is calculated based on the 

bidder’s demands as applied by the 

auction system during bid processing, a 

bidder’s eligibility may be reduced even 

if the bidder submitted bids with 

activity that exceeds the required 

activity for the round. This may occur, 

for example, if the bidder bids to reduce 

its demand in PEA X by two blocks 

(with 10 bidding units each) and bids to 

increase its demand by one block (with 

20 bidding units) in PEA Y. If the 

bidder’s demand can only be reduced by 

one block in PEA X (because there is 

only one block of excess demand), the 

increase in PEA Y cannot be applied, 

and absent other bidding activity the 

bidder’s eligibility would be reduced. 

To help a bidder avoid potentially 

having its eligibility reduced as a result 

of submitted bids that could not be 

applied during bid processing, as 

proposed, OEA and WTB adopt 

procedures to allow a bidder to submit 

bids with associated bidding activity 

greater than its current bidding 

eligibility. For example, depending 

upon the bidder’s overall bidding 

eligibility and the contingent bidding 

percentage, a bidder could submit an 

‘‘additional’’ bid or bids that would be 

considered (in price point order with its 

other bids) and applied as available 


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eligibility permits during the bid 

processing. However, OEA and WTB 

emphasize that even under these 

additional procedures, the bidder’s 

activity as applied by the auction 

system during bid processing will not 

exceed the bidder’s current bidding 

eligibility. That is, if a bidder submits 

bids with associated bidding units 

exceeding 100% of its current bidding 

eligibility, its processed activity cannot 

exceed its eligibility. 

191. Under these procedures, after 

Round 1 a bidder may submit bids with 

bidding units totaling up to a contingent 

bidding limit equal to the bidder’s 

current bidding eligibility for the round 

times a percentage (the contingent 

bidding percentage) equal to or greater 

than 100%. The Commission has 

previously referred to the contingent 

bidding limit as the activity upper limit, 

and similarly, to the contingent bidding 

percentage as the activity limit 

percentage. OEA and WTB modify those 

terms to remind bidders that bids 

submitted using the contingent bidding 

limit will be applied only under certain 

circumstances. For Round 1, the 

contingent bidding limit would be 

100% of the bidder’s initial bidding 

eligibility. OEA and WTB adopt an 

initial contingent bidding percentage of 

120% to apply beginning in Round 2. 

This limit will be subject to change in 

subsequent rounds within a range of 

100% to 140%. In any bidding round, 

the auction bidding system will advise 

the bidder of its current bidding 

eligibility, its required bidding activity, 

and its contingent bidding limit. The 

Auction 110 Clock Phase Technical 

Guide provides examples of use of the 

contingent bidding limit, and bidders 

are encouraged to review them. 

192. As with the activity requirement 

percentage, OEA will retain the 

discretion to change the contingent 

bidding percentage during the auction 

and will announce any such changes in 

advance of the round in which they 

would take effect. 

193. Missing bids. Under the clock 

auction format, bidders are required to 

indicate their demands in every round, 

even if their demands at the new 

round’s prices are unchanged from the 

previous round. Missing bids—bids that 

are not reconfirmed—are treated by the 

auction bidding system as requests to 

reduce to a quantity of zero blocks for 

the product. If these requests are 

applied, or applied partially, then a 

bidder’s bidding activity, and its 

bidding eligibility for the next round, 

may be reduced. in which they would 

take effect. 

194. For Auction 110, OEA and WTB 

will not provide for activity rule waivers 

to preserve a bidder’s eligibility. OEA 

and WTB note that the procedures to 

permit a bidder to submit bids with 

bidding activity greater than its 

eligibility, within the precise limits set 

forth above, will address some of the 

circumstances under which a bidder 

risks losing bidding eligibility and 

otherwise could wish to use a bidding 

activity waiver, while minimizing any 

potential adverse impacts on bidder 

incentives to bid sincerely and on the 

price setting mechanism of the clock 

auction. This approach not to allow 

waivers is consistent with the ascending 

clock auction procedures used in other 

FCC clock auctions. The clock auction 

relies on precisely identifying the point 

at which demand decreases to equal 

supply to determine winning bidders 

and final prices. Allowing waivers 

would create uncertainty with respect to 

the exact level of bidder demand and 

would interfere with the basic clock 

price-setting and winner determination 

mechanism. Moreover, uncertainty 

about the level of demand would affect 

the way bidders’ requests to reduce 

demand are processed by the bidding 

system, as addressed below. 

7. Acceptable Bids 

a. Minimum Opening Bids 

195. As is typical for each auction, the 

Commission sought comment on the use 

of a minimum opening bid amount and/ 

or reserve price, as mandated by section 

309(j) of the Communications Act. OEA 

and WTB will establish minimum 

opening bid amounts for Auction 110. 

The bidding system will not accept bids 

lower than the minimum opening bids 

for each product. Based on the 

Commission’s experience in past 

auctions, setting minimum opening bid 

amounts judiciously is an effective tool 

for accelerating the competitive bidding 

process. 

196. For Auction 110, the 

Commission proposed to calculate 

minimum opening bid amounts based 

on bandwidth and license area 

population using a tiered approach 

under which the calculation would vary 

by market population. The Commission 

proposed minimum opening bid 

amounts for a block in a PEA based on 

$0.06 per MHz-pop for PEAs 1–50 and 

$0.02 per MHz-pop for all other PEAs, 

subject to a minimum of $1000. 

197. Based on comments in the 

record, however, OEA and WTB adopt 

revised, lower minimum opening bid 

amounts for Auction 110. Specifically, 

OEA and WTB adopt minimum opening 

bid amounts for a block in a PEA based 

on $0.03 per MHz-pop for PEAs 1–50, 

$0.006 per MHz-pop for PEAs 51–100, 

and $0.003 per MHz-pop for all other 

PEAs, subject to a minimum of $1000. 

These minimum opening bid amounts 

are set forth in the ‘‘Attachment A’’ file 

on the Auction 110 website at 

www.fcc.gov/auction/110. 

b. Clock Price Increments 

198. OEA and WTB adopt the 

proposed procedures regarding clock 

price increments for Auction 110. 

Accordingly, after bidding in the first 

round and before each subsequent 

round, the bidding system will 

announce the start-of-round price (also 

referred to as the posted price of the 

previous round) and the clock price for 

the upcoming round—that is, the lowest 

price and the highest price at which 

bidders can specify the number of 

blocks they demand during the round. 

As long as aggregate demand for blocks 

in the product exceeds the supply of 

blocks, the start-of-round price will be 

equal to the clock price from the prior 

round. If demand equaled supply at a 

price in a previous round, then the startof-round price for the next round will be 

equal to the price at which demand 

equaled supply. If demand was less than 

supply in the previous round, then the 

start-of-round price for the next round 

will not increase. 

199. OEA will set the clock price for 

blocks in a specific product for a round 

by adding a percentage increment to the 

start-of-round price. For example, if the 

start-of-round price for a block of a 

given product is $10,000, and the 

percentage increment is 20%, then the 

clock price for the round will be 

$12,000. The result of the clock price 

calculation will be rounded as follows: 

results above $10,000 will be rounded 

up to the nearest $1,000, and results 

below $10,000 will be rounded up to the 

nearest $100. OEA will set the initial 

increment percentage at 10%, and may 

adjust the increment within a range of 

5% to 20% inclusive, as rounds 

continue. The total dollar amount of the 

increment (the difference between the 

clock price and the start-of-round price) 

will be capped at a certain amount. OEA 

will set this cap on the increment 

initially at $50 million and may adjust 

the cap as rounds continue. The 

proposed 5% to 20% increment range 

and cap will allow OEA to set a 

percentage that manages the auction 

pace and takes into account bidders’ 

needs to evaluate their bidding 

strategies while moving the auction 

along quickly. 

c. Intra-Round Bids 

200. As proposed, OEA and WTB will 

permit a bidder to make intra-round 

bids by indicating a point between the 


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start-of-round price and the clock price 

at which its demand for blocks changes. 

In placing an intra-round bid, a bidder 

will indicate a specific price and a 

(different) quantity of blocks it demands 

if, after bids for the round are processed, 

the price for blocks should increase 

beyond that intra-round amount. 

201. An intra-round bid gives the 

bidder the flexibility to indicate that it 

wants to change its demand at a price 

lower than the clock price. However, 

intra-round bids will be optional; a 

bidder may choose to express its 

demands only at the clock prices. 

Permitting intra-round bids allows the 

auction system to use relatively large 

increments, thereby speeding the 

auction, without running the risk that a 

jump in the clock price will overshoot 

the market clearing price—the point at 

which demand for blocks equals the 

available supply. 

8. Bids To Change Demand, Bid Types, 

and Bid Processing 

202. Under the ascending clock 

auction format the Commission 

proposed for Auction 110, and which 

OEA and WTB adopt, a bidder will 

indicate in each round the number of 

blocks in each product that it demands 

at a given price, subject to the in-band 

limit of four discussed above. 

203. A bidder that is willing to 

maintain the same demand for a product 

(relative to its demands from the 

previous round as processed by the 

bidding system) at the new clock price 

would bid for that quantity at the clock 

price, indicating that it is willing to pay 

up to that price, if need be, for the 

specified quantity. Bids to maintain 

demand will always be applied by the 

auction bidding system. A bidder that 

wishes to change the quantity it 

demands would bid at the clock price or 

at an intra-round price, depending upon 

the point at which its demands change. 

204. For example, if a bidder has 

processed demand for two blocks 

entering a round in which the start-ofround price is $2,000 and the clock 

price is $2,500, but it is only willing to 

buy one block if the price should 

increase above $2,100, the bidder can 

submit an intra-round bid indicating a 

bid quantity of one at a price of $2,100. 

Or, if the bidder is not willing to pay 

more than the start-of-round price of 

$2,000 for any blocks, it can submit an 

intra-round bid requesting a quantity of 

zero at the start-of-round price of 

$2,000. 

205. To facilitate bidding for multiple 

blocks in a PEA, bidders will be 

permitted to make two types of bids: 

Simple bids and switch bids. A 

‘‘simple’’ bid indicates a desired 

quantity of blocks in a product at a price 

(either the clock price or an intra-round 

price). A ‘‘switch’’ bid allows the bidder 

to request to move its demand for a 

quantity of blocks from Cat1 to Cat2, or 

vice versa, within the same PEA at a 

price for the ‘‘from’’ category (either the 

clock price or an intra-round price). 

‘‘Switch’’ bids are allowed only in PEAs 

with two categories. 

206. OEA and WTB will not 

incorporate any form of package bidding 

procedures into the clock phase of 

Auction 110. Package bidding would 

add complexity to the bidding process, 

and OEA and WTB do not see 

significant benefit from such 

procedures, given the clock auction and 

assignment phase format OEA and WTB 

adopt. A bidder may bid on multiple 

blocks in a PEA (up to the limit of four) 

and in multiple PEAs. As set forth 

below, the assignment phase will assign 

contiguous blocks to winners of 

multiple blocks in a category in a PEA 

and give bidders an opportunity to 

express their preferences for specific 

frequency blocks, thereby facilitating 

aggregations of licenses. Also as set 

forth below, if there are one or more 

bidders that win blocks in both 

categories, the assignment phase 

bidding system will assign blocks that 

are contiguous across the categories to 

one such bidder. 

207. OEA and WTB adopt bid 

processing procedures that the auction 

bidding system will use, after each 

bidding round, to process bids to change 

demand to determine the processed 

demand of each bidder for each product 

and a posted price for each product that 

will serve as the start-of-round price for 

the next round. 

a. No Excess Supply Rule for Bids To 

Reduce Demand 

208. Under the ascending clock 

auction format, the FCC auction bidding 

system will not allow a bidder to reduce 

the quantity of blocks it demands in a 

product if the reduction would result in 

aggregate demand falling below (or 

further below) the available supply of 

blocks in the product. Therefore, if a 

bidder submits a simple bid to reduce 

the number of blocks for which it has 

processed demand as of the previous 

round, the bidding system will treat the 

bid as a request to reduce demand that 

will be applied only if the ‘‘no excess 

supply’’ rule would be satisfied. 

Similarly, if a bidder submits a switch 

bid to move its demand for a quantity 

of blocks from Cat1 to Cat2 within the 

same PEA, the FCC auction bidding 

system will treat the bid as a request 

that will be applied only if the ‘‘no 

excess supply’’ rule would be satisfied 

for Cat1 in the PEA. 

b. Eligibility Rule and Aggregation Limit 

for Bids To Increase Demand 

209. The bidding system will not 

allow a bidder to increase the quantity 

of blocks it demands in a product if the 

total number of bidding units associated 

with the bidder’s demand exceeds the 

bidder’s bidding eligibility for the 

round. Therefore, if a bidder submits a 

simple bid to increase the number of 

blocks for which it has processed 

demand as of the previous round, the 

bidding system will treat the bid as a 

request to increase demand that will be 

applied only if it would not cause the 

bidder’s activity to exceed its eligibility. 

The eligibility rule for bids to increase 

demand does not apply to switch bids 

because the bidder’s processed activity 

does not change when a switch bid is 

applied. 

210. In addition, in light of the inband aggregation limit of 40 megahertz 

in a PEA established by the 3.45 GHz 

Second Report and Order, the bidding 

system will not permit a bidder to 

increase the number of blocks it 

demands in a PEA if its total demand in 

the PEA would exceed four blocks. 

c. Partial Application of Bids 

211. Under the bid processing 

procedures OEA and WTB adopt, as in 

all previous FCC spectrum auctions 

using the clock auction format, a bid 

(simple bid or switch bid) that involves 

a reduction from the bidder’s previous 

demands can be applied partially—that 

is, reduced by fewer blocks than 

requested in the bid—if excess demand 

is insufficient to support the entire 

reduction. Accordingly, the bidding 

system will apply a bidder’s request to 

reduce demand as much as possible 

consistent with the no excess supply 

rule. A switch bid may be applied 

partially, but the increase in demand in 

the ‘‘to’’ category will always match in 

quantity the reduction in the ‘‘from’’ 

category. A simple bid to increase a 

bidder’s demand may be applied 

partially if the total number of bidding 

units associated with the bidder’s 

demand exceeds the bidder’s bidding 

eligibility for the round, or if fully 

applying the bid would violate the 

aggregation limit. Therefore, the bidding 

system will accommodate a bidder’s 

request to increase demand as much as 

possible consistent with the aggregation 

limit and as long as the bidder’s activity 

does not exceed its eligibility. 

d. Processed Demand 

212. As proposed, OEA and WTB 

adopt procedures to determine the order 


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in which the bidding system will 

process bids after a round ends. Bids to 

maintain demand are considered first 

and always applied. The bidding system 

will then process bids to change 

demand in order of price point, where 

the price point represents the 

percentage of the bidding interval for 

the round. For example, if the start-ofround price is $5,000 and the clock 

price is $6,000, a price of $5,100 will 

correspond to the 10% price point, 

since it is 10% of the bidding interval 

between $5,000 and $6,000. The bidding 

system will first consider intra-round 

bids in ascending order of price point 

and then bids at the clock price. The 

system will consider bids at the lowest 

price point across all PEAs, then look at 

bids at the next price point in all areas, 

and so on. If there are multiple bids at 

a single price point, the system will 

process those bids in order of a bidspecific pseudo-random number. As it 

considers each submitted bid during bid 

processing, the bidding system will 

determine the extent to which there is 

excess demand in each PEA at that 

point in the processing in order to 

determine whether a bidder’s request to 

reduce demand can be applied. 

Likewise, the auction bidding system 

will evaluate the activity associated 

with the bidder’s most recently 

determined demands at that point in the 

processing to determine whether a 

request to increase demand can be 

applied. 

213. Because in any given round some 

bidders may request to increase 

demands for licenses while others may 

request reductions, the price point at 

which a bid is considered by the 

bidding system can affect whether it is 

applied. Bids not applied because of 

insufficient aggregate demand or 

insufficient eligibility will be held in a 

queue and considered, again in order, if 

there should be excess demand or 

sufficient eligibility later in the 

processing after other bids are 

processed. 

214. Therefore, once a round closes, 

the bidding system will process bids to 

change demand by first considering the 

bid submitted at the lowest price point 

and determining the maximum extent to 

which that bid can be applied given 

bidders’ demands as determined at that 

point in the bid processing. If the bid 

can be applied (either in full or 

partially), the number of blocks the 

bidder holds at that point in the 

processing will be adjusted, and 

aggregate demand will be recalculated 

accordingly. If the bid cannot be applied 

in full, the unfulfilled bid, or portion 

thereof, will be held in a queue to be 

considered later during bid processing 

for that round. The bidding system will 

then consider the bid submitted at the 

next highest price point, applying it in 

full, in part, or not at all, given the most 

recently determined demands of 

bidders. Any unfulfilled requests will 

again be held in the queue, and 

aggregate demand will again be 

recalculated. Every time a bid or part of 

a bid is applied, the unfulfilled bids 

held in the queue will be reconsidered, 

in the order of the original price points 

of the bids (and by pseudo-random 

number, in the case of tied price points). 

The auction bidding system will not 

carry over unfulfilled bid requests to the 

next round, however. The bidding 

system will advise bidders of the status 

of their bids when round results are 

released. 

e. Price Determination 

215. OEA and WTB further adopt bid 

processing procedures that will 

determine, based on aggregate demand, 

the posted price for each product for the 

round, which will serve as the start-ofround price for the next round. The 

uniform price for all of the blocks in a 

product will increase from round to 

round as long as there is excess demand 

for blocks in the product but will not 

increase if aggregate demand does not 

exceed the available supply of blocks. 

216. Under these procedures, if at the 

end of a round the aggregate demand for 

blocks in the product exceeds the 

supply of blocks, the posted price will 

equal the clock price for the round. If a 

reduction in demand was applied 

during the round and caused demand in 

the product to equal supply, the posted 

price will be the price at which the 

reduction was applied. If aggregate 

demand is less than or equal to supply 

and no bid to reduce demand was 

applied for the product, then the posted 

price will equal the start-of-round price 

for the round. The range of acceptable 

bid amounts for the next round will be 

set by adding the percentage increment 

to the posted price. 

217. When a bid to reduce demand 

can be applied only partially, the 

uniform price for the product will stop 

increasing at that point, since the partial 

application of the bid will result in 

demand falling to equal supply. Hence, 

a bidder that makes a bid to reduce 

demand that cannot be fully applied 

will not face a price for the remaining 

demand that is higher than its bid price. 

218. After the bids of the round have 

been processed, if the stopping rule has 

not been met, the FCC auction bidding 

system will announce clock prices to 

indicate a range of acceptable bids for 

the next round. Each bidder will be 

informed of its processed demand and 

the extent of excess demand for blocks 

in each product. 

9. Winning Bids in the Clock Phase 

219. Under the clock auction format 

for Auction 110, if the reserve price to 

meet the CSEA requirement is met in 

the clock phase, bidders with processed 

demand for a product at the time the 

stopping rule is met will become the 

winning bidders of licenses 

corresponding to that number of blocks 

and will be assigned specific 

frequencies in the assignment phase. 

The final clock phase price for a generic 

block in a product will be the posted 

price for the final round. This and other 

Auction 110 bid processing details are 

addressed in the Auction 110 Clock 

Phase Technical Guide. 

B. Assignment Phase 

220. Following the conclusion of the 

clock phase, if the reserve price to 

satisfy the CSEA requirement has been 

met, the assignment phase will follow. 

As proposed, in the assignment phase, 

in a series of bidding rounds, each clock 

phase winning bidder will have the 

opportunity to indicate its preferences 

for specific frequency licenses 

corresponding to the generic blocks it 

won in each category in the clock phase. 

As proposed, a bidder will be assigned 

contiguous frequencies for blocks it 

wins within each category and PEA 

regardless of whether it chooses to bid 

in the assignment phase. As set forth 

below, OEA and WTB adopt an 

additional assignment procedure to 

address commenter concerns that the 

procedures, as proposed, did not take 

contiguity across categories into 

account. 

1. Sequencing and Grouping of PEAs 

221. As proposed, OEA will sequence 

assignment rounds to make it easier for 

bidders to incorporate frequency 

assignments from previously assigned 

areas into their bid preferences for other 

areas, recognizing that bidders winning 

multiple blocks of licenses generally 

will prefer contiguous blocks across 

adjacent PEAs. To that end, OEA will 

conduct rounds for the largest markets 

first to enable bidders to establish a 

‘‘footprint’’ from which to work. 

222. Specifically, OEA will conduct a 

separate assignment round for each of 

the top 20 PEAs and to conduct these 

assignment rounds sequentially, 

beginning with the largest PEA. Once 

the top 20 PEAs have been assigned, 

OEA will conduct, for each Regional 

Economic Area Grouping (REAG), a 

series of assignment rounds for the 

remaining PEAs within that region. 


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223. Further, the bidding system will 

group into a single market for 

assignment any non-top 20 PEAs within 

a REAG in which the same winning 

bidders will be assigned the same 

number of blocks in each category, and 

all are subject to the small markets 

bidding cap or all are not subject to the 

cap. Grouping in this way may also help 

maximize contiguity across PEAs. 

224. OEA will sequence the 

assignment rounds within a REAG in 

descending order of population for a 

PEA group or individual PEA. The 

bidding for the different REAGs will be 

conducted in parallel in order to reduce 

the total amount of time required to 

complete the assignment phase. 

2. Acceptable Bids and Bid Processing 

225. Under the bidding procedures 

OEA and WTB adopt, in each 

assignment round a bidder will be asked 

to assign a price to one or more possible 

frequency assignments for which it 

wishes to express a preference, 

consistent with its winnings for generic 

blocks in the clock phase. The price will 

represent a maximum payment that the 

bidder is willing to pay, in addition to 

the price established in the clock phase 

for the generic blocks, for the frequencyspecific license or licenses in its bid. In 

PEAs where there are two categories and 

a bidder won generic blocks in both 

categories, a bidder will submit its 

preferences for blocks won in Cat1 and 

Cat2 separately, rather than submitting 

bids for preferences that include blocks 

in both categories. That is, if a bidder 

won one block in Cat1 and two blocks 

in Cat2, it will not be able to submit a 

single bid amount for an assignment 

that includes both categories. Instead, it 

will submit its bid or bids for 

assignments in Cat1 separately from its 

bid or bids for assignments in Cat2. 

226. In response to numerous 

comments requesting that the 

Commission implement procedures that 

would prioritize contiguous 

assignments across categories, OEA and 

WTB modify the procedures proposed 

in the Auction 110 Comment Public 

Notice to ensure that, in PEAs with both 

Cat1 and Cat2 blocks, if one or more 

bidders win blocks in both categories in 

the clock phase, one of those bidders 

will be assigned licenses that are 

contiguous across the categories. 

Specifically, in each assignment round, 

prior to implementing the proposed 

optimization procedures separately for 

each category in the PEA or PEA group, 

the bidding system will first determine 

if there are one or more bidders with 

winnings in both categories. If there are, 

the bidding system will assign blocks 

that are contiguous across the categories 

to one such bidder. To do so, the 

bidding system will consider the sum of 

each such bidder’s bid for its Cat1 

option that includes the highestfrequency block (D) and its bid for the 

Cat2 option that includes the lowestfrequency block (E). The bidder with the 

highest bid total will be assigned 

licenses that are contiguous across the 

categories (i.e., that include blocks D 

and E and any other blocks contiguous 

to D and/or E that the bidder won. The 

bidder’s assignment payment will be the 

price of the bidder with the secondhighest total bid for options that include 

blocks that are contiguous across 

categories. 

227. Once the bidding system has 

determined whether there is at least one 

bidder with cross-category winnings 

and if so, has assigned licenses to one 

of those bidders, the system will, as 

proposed, use an optimization approach 

to determine the winning frequency 

assignment for the remaining blocks in 

each category in each PEA or PEA 

group. The auction system will select 

the assignment that maximizes the sum 

of bid amounts among all assignments 

that satisfy the contiguity requirements 

within categories. Furthermore, if 

multiple blocks in a category in a PEA 

remain unsold, the unsold licenses will 

be contiguous. 

228. The additional price a bidder 

will pay for a specific frequency 

assignment (above the clock phase 

price) in a given category will be 

calculated consistent with a generalized 

‘‘second price’’ approach—that is, the 

winner will pay a price that would be 

just sufficient to result in the bidder 

receiving that same winning frequency 

assignment while ensuring that no 

group of bidders is willing to pay more 

for an alternative assignment where 

each bidder is assigned contiguous 

spectrum within that category. This 

price will be less than or equal to the 

price the bidder indicated it was willing 

to pay for the assignment. OEA will 

determine prices in this way because it 

facilitates bidding strategy for the 

bidders, encouraging them to bid their 

full value for the assignment, knowing 

that if the assignment is selected, they 

will pay no more than would be 

necessary to ensure that the outcome is 

competitive. 

3. Information Available to Bidders 

During the Assignment Phase 

229. After the clock phase concludes 

but before bidding begins in the 

assignment phase, the bidding system 

will provide to each assignment phase 

bidder a menu of bidding options 

consisting of possible configurations of 

frequency-specific licenses on which it 

can bid. These bidding options will be 

consistent with the bidder’s clock-phase 

winnings but will not take into account 

the winnings of other bidders. The 

bidding system will also announce the 

order in which assignment rounds will 

take place and indicate which PEAs will 

be grouped together for bidding. The 

bidding system will provide clock phase 

winning bidders with this information 

as soon as possible and will announce 

a schedule of assignment phase rounds 

that will commence no sooner than five 

business days later. 

230. After each assignment round, the 

bidding system will inform each bidder 

of its own assignment and assignment 

payment for each assignment category 

for each PEA or PEA group assigned in 

the round. The bidding system will also 

provide each bidder with its current 

total payment, which is calculated as 

the sum of the bidder’s total clock 

payment across all PEAs and the 

bidder’s assignment payments for the 

PEAs for which an assignment round 

has already completed. During the 

assignment rounds this information will 

provide the bidder a running estimate of 

the dollar amount it will owe at the end 

of the auction. A bidder that is claiming 

a bidding credit will also be informed 

about its current bidding credit discount 

and whether the discount has been 

capped. 

C. Final Auction Payment Calculations 

231. When all assignment rounds 

have been completed, a bidder’s final 

auction payment takes into account the 

sum of final clock phase prices across 

all licenses that it won, the sum of all 

of the bidder’s assignment payments, 

and any claimed bidding credits. 

Specifically, if a bidder is not claiming 

a bidding credit, its final payment is 

determined by summing the final clock 

phase prices across all licenses that it 

won and its assignment payments across 

all PEAs or PEA groups. 

232. If a bidder claims a bidding 

credit, a bidding credit discount is 

calculated by applying the bidder’s 

bidding credit percentage to the sum of 

the bidder’s clock payments and 

assignment payments, capping the 

bidding credit discount if it exceeds the 

applicable caps for small businesses, 

rural service providers, and small 

markets. The resulting bidding credit 

discount is subtracted from the sum of 

the bidder’s clock payments and 

assignment payments to determine the 

final payment for a bidder with a 

bidding credit. 


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D. Calculating Individual ‘‘Per-License’’ 

Prices 

233. While final auction payments for 

winning bidders will be calculated with 

bidding credit caps and assignment 

payments applied on an aggregate basis, 

rather than to individual licenses, the 

bidding system will also calculate a 

‘‘per-license’’ price for each license. 

Such individual prices may be needed 

if a licensee later incurs license-specific 

obligations, such as unjust enrichment 

payments. 

234. After the assignment phase, the 

auction bidding system will determine a 

net and gross post-auction price for each 

license that a bidder won by 

apportioning assignment payments and 

bidding credit discounts (only 

applicable for the net price) across all 

the bidder’s licenses. To calculate the 

gross per-license price, the auction 

bidding system will apportion the 

assignment payment to licenses in 

proportion to the final clock phase price 

of the blocks that the bidder is assigned 

in that assignment category and PEA (or 

PEA group). Mathematical details of 

these procedures, including how the 

system apportions the assignment 

payment for an assignment that is 

contiguous across the two categories, are 

given in the Auction 110 Assignment 

Phase Technical Guide. To calculate the 

net price, the auction bidding system 

will first apportion any applicable 

bidding credit discounts to each PEA or 

PEA group in proportion to the gross 

payment for that market. Then, for each 

PEA or PEA group, the auction bidding 

system will apportion the assignment 

payment and the discount to licenses in 

proportion to the final clock phase price 

of the blocks that the bidder is assigned 

in that assignment category for that PEA 

(or PEA group). 

E. Auction Results 

235. The bidding system will 

determine winning bidders as described 

in Section IV.A.9 (Winning Bids in the 

Clock Phase), above. After release of the 

public notice announcing auction 

results, the public will be able to view 

and download bidding and results data 

through the FCC Public Reporting 

System (PRS). 

F. Auction Announcements 

236. Commission staff will use 

auction announcements to report 

necessary information, such as schedule 

changes, to bidders. All auction 

announcements will be available by 

clicking a link in the bidding system. 

V. Post-Auction Procedures 

237. The public notice announcing 

the close of the bidding and auction 

results will be released shortly after 

bidding has ended in Auction 110. This 

public notice will also establish the 

deadlines for submitting down 

payments, final payments, and the longform applications (FCC Form 601) for 

the auction. 

A. Down Payments 

238. The Commission’s rules provide 

that, unless otherwise specified by 

public notice, within ten business days 

after the release of the auction closing 

public notice for Auction 110, each 

winning bidder must submit sufficient 

funds (in addition to its upfront 

payment) to bring its total amount of 

money on deposit with the Commission 

to 20% of the net amount of its winning 

bids (less any bidding credits, if 

applicable). Because it is not possible to 

know when bidding in Auction 110 will 

end, and thus whether post-auction 

payments will be due in late 2021 or 

early 2022, some commenters request 

that OEA and WTB announce before the 

bidding begins that down payments will 

be due in early 2022. Commission staff 

have previously recognized that 

uncertainties regarding the year in 

which down payments will be due 

could affect potential applicants from a 

capital planning perspective, and that 

this could in turn affect auction 

participation. Acknowledging that such 

uncertainties may be presented under 

the current schedule for Auction 110, 

OEA and WTB exercise their discretion 

under the Commission’s rules to set the 

down payment deadline for Auction 110 

to be the later of January 7, 2022, or ten 

business days after release of the 

auction closing public notice. 

B. Final Payments 

239. Each winning bidder will be 

required to submit the balance of the net 

amount for each of its winning bids 

within 10 business days after the 

deadline for submitting down payments. 

C. Long-Form Application (FCC Form 

601) 

240. The Commission’s rules provide 

that, within 10 business days after 

release of the auction closing public 

notice, winning bidders must 

electronically submit a properly 

completed post-auction application 

(FCC Form 601), including the 

necessary filing fee of $3,175, for the 

license(s) they won through the auction. 

The filing fee will be required only if 

the recently amended section 1.1102 of 

the Commission’s rules is in effect by 

the post-auction application deadline. 

241. A winning bidder claiming 

eligibility for a small business bidding 

credit or a rural service provider 

bidding credit must demonstrate its 

eligibility for the bidding credit sought 

in its FCC Form 601 post-auction 

application. Further instructions on 

these and other filing requirements will 

be provided to winning bidders in the 

auction closing public notice for 

Auction 110. 

242. Winning bidders organized as 

bidding consortia must comply with the 

FCC Form 601 post-auction application 

procedures set forth in section 1.2107(g) 

of the Commission’s rules. Specifically, 

license(s) won by a consortium must be 

applied for as follows: (a) An individual 

member of the consortium or a new 

legal entity comprising two or more 

individual consortium members must 

file for licenses covered by the winning 

bids; (b) each member or group of 

members of a winning consortium 

seeking separate licenses will be 

required to file a separate FCC Form 601 

for its/their respective license(s) in their 

legal business name; (c) in the case of 

a license to be partitioned or 

disaggregated, the member or group 

filing the applicable FCC Form 601 shall 

include the parties’ partitioning or 

disaggregation agreement with the FCC 

Form 601; and (d) if a DE credit is 

sought (either small business or rural 

service provider), the applicant must 

meet the applicable eligibility 

requirements in the Commission’s rules 

for the credit. 

D. Ownership Disclosure Information 

Report (FCC Form 602) 

243. Within 10 business days after 

release of the auction closing public 

notice for Auction 110, each winning 

bidder must also comply with the 

ownership reporting requirements in 

sections 1.913, 1.919, and 1.2112 of the 

Commission’s rules by submitting an 

ownership disclosure information report 

for wireless telecommunications 

services (FCC Form 602) with its FCC 

Form 601 post-auction application. 

244. If a winning bidder already has 

a complete and accurate FCC Form 602 

on file in the FCC’s Universal Licensing 

System (ULS), then it is not necessary 

to file a new report, but the winning 

bidder must certify in its FCC Form 601 

application that the information on file 

with the Commission is complete and 

accurate. If the winning bidder does not 

have an FCC Form 602 on file, or if the 

form on file is not complete and 

accurate, then the winning bidder must 

submit a new one. 

245. When a winning bidder submits 

an FCC Form 175, ULS automatically 

creates an ownership record. This 

record is not an FCC Form 602, but it 

may be used to pre-fill the FCC Form 

602 with the ownership information 


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submitted on the winning bidder’s FCC 

Form 175 application. A winning bidder 

must review the pre-filled information 

and confirm that it is complete and 

accurate as of the filing date of the FCC 

Form 601 post-auction application 

before certifying and submitting the FCC 

Form 602. Further instructions will be 

provided to winning bidders in the 

auction closing public notice. 

E. Tribal Lands Bidding Credit 

246. A winning bidder that intends to 

use its license(s) to deploy facilities and 

provide services to federally recognized 

tribal lands that have a wireline 

penetration rate equal to or below 85% 

is eligible to receive a tribal lands 

bidding credit as set forth in sections 

1.2107(e) and 1.2110(f)(3) of the 

Commission’s rules. A tribal lands 

bidding credit is in addition to, and 

separate from, any other bidding credit 

for which a winning bidder may qualify. 

247. Unlike other bidding credits that 

are requested prior to the auction, a 

winning bidder applies for the tribal 

lands bidding credit after the auction 

when it files its FCC Form 601 postauction application. When initially 

filing the post-auction application, the 

winning bidder will be required to 

inform the Commission whether it 

intends to seek a tribal lands bidding 

credit, for each license won in the 

auction, by checking the designated 

box(es). After stating its intent to seek a 

tribal lands bidding credit, the winning 

bidder will have 180 days from the close 

of the post-auction application filing 

window to amend its application to 

select the specific tribal lands to be 

served and provide the required tribal 

government certifications. Licensees 

receiving a tribal lands bidding credit 

are subject to performance criteria as set 

forth in section 1.2110(f)(3)(vii). For 

additional information on the tribal 

lands bidding credit, including how the 

amount of the credit is calculated, 

applicants should review the 

Commission’s rulemaking proceeding 

regarding tribal lands bidding credits 

and related public notices. 

F. Default and Disqualification 

248. Any winning bidder that defaults 

or is disqualified after the close of an 

auction (i.e., fails to remit the required 

down payment by the specified 

deadline, fails to submit a timely longform application, fails to make a full 

and timely final payment, or is 

otherwise disqualified) is liable for 

default payments as described in section 

1.2104(g)(2). A default payment consists 

of a deficiency payment, equal to the 

difference between the amount of the 

bidder’s winning bid and the amount of 

the winning bid the next time a license 

covering the same spectrum is won in 

an auction, plus an additional payment 

equal to a percentage of the defaulter’s 

bid or of the subsequent winning bid, 

whichever is less. 

249. The percentage of the applicable 

bid to be assessed as an additional 

payment for defaults in a particular 

auction is established in advance of the 

auction. OEA and WTB adopt the 

Commission’s proposal to set the 

additional default payment for Auction 

110 at 15% of the applicable bid for 

winning bids. The bidding system will 

calculate individual per-license prices 

that are separate from final auction 

payments, which are calculated on an 

aggregate basis. 

250. Finally, in the event of a default, 

the Commission has the discretion to reauction the license or offer it to the next 

highest bidder (in descending order) at 

its final bid amount. In addition, if a 

default or disqualification involves 

gross misconduct, misrepresentation, or 

bad faith by an applicant, then the 

Commission may declare the applicant 

and its principals ineligible to bid in 

future auctions and may take any other 

action that it deems necessary, 

including institution of proceedings to 

revoke any existing authorizations held 

by the applicant. 

G. Refund of Remaining Upfront 

Payment Balance 

251. All refunds of upfront payment 

balances will be returned to the payer of 

record as identified on the FCC Form 

159 unless the payer submits written 

authorization instructing otherwise. 

Bidders are encouraged to use the 

Refund Information icon found on the 

Auction Application Manager page or 

the Refund Form link available on the 

Auction Application Submit 

Confirmation page in the FCC Auction 

Application System to access the form. 

After the required information is 

completed on the blank form, the form 

should be printed, signed, and 

submitted to the Commission by mail, 

fax, or email as instructed below. 

252. If you have elected not to access 

the Refund Form through the Auction 

Application Manager page, the 

Commission is requesting that all 

information listed below be supplied in 

writing. 

Name, address, contact and phone 

number of Bank, ABA Number (capable 

to accept ACH payments), Account 

Number to Credit, Name of Account 

Holder, FCC Registration Number 

(FRN). 

The refund request must be submitted 

by fax to the Revenue & Receivables 

Operations Group/Auctions at (202) 

418–2843, by email to 

RROGWIREFAXES@fcc.gov. 

Note: Refund processing generally takes up 

to two weeks to complete. Bidders with 

questions about refunds should contact Scott 

Radcliffe at (202) 418–7518 or Theresa Meeks 

at (202) 418–2945. 

VI. Procedural Matters 

253. Supplemental Final Regulatory 

Flexibility Analysis. As required by the 

Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, as 

amended (RFA), 5 U.S.C. 603, a 

Supplemental Initial Regulatory 

Flexibility Analysis (Supplemental 

IRFA) was incorporated in the Auction 

110 Comment Public Notice released in 

March 2021. The Commission sought 

public comment on the proposals in the 

Auction 110 Comment Public Notice, 

including comments on the 

Supplemental IRFA. The Rural Wireless 

Association, Inc. (RWA) filed comments 

specifically addressing the 

Supplemental IRFA, and OEA and WTB 

address those comments in the 

Supplemental FRFA in the Auction 110 

Procedures Public Notice. The Auction 

110 Procedures Public Notice 

establishes the procedures to be used for 

Auction 110 and supplements the Initial 

and Final Regulatory Flexibility 

Analyses completed by the Commission 

in the 3.1–3.55 GHz Report and Order 

(R&O) and Further Notice of Proposed 

Rulemaking (FNPRM), 85 FR 64062, 

October 2, 2020, and 85 FR 66888, 

October 21, 2020, 3.45 GHz Second 

Report and Order, 86 FR 17920, April 7, 

2021, 3.45 GHz Second Report and 

Order, and other Commission orders 

pursuant to which Auction 110 will be 

conducted. This present Supplemental 

Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis 

(Supplemental FRFA) conforms to the 

RFA. 

254. Need for, and Objectives of, the 

Rules. The Auction 110 Procedures 

Public Notice implements auction 

procedures for those entities that seek to 

bid to acquire licenses in Auction 110. 

Auction 110 will be the Commission’s 

third auction of mid-band spectrum in 

furtherance of the deployment of fifthgeneration (5G) wireless, the Internet of 

Things (IoT), and other advanced 

spectrum-based services. The Auction 

110 Procedures Public Notice adopts 

procedural rules and terms and 

conditions governing Auction 110, and 

the post-auction application and 

payment processes, as well as sets the 

minimum opening bid amounts for 

flexible-use licenses in the 3.45–3.55 

GHz band (3.45 GHz Service) that will 

be offered in Auction 110. 

255. To promote the efficient and fair 

administration of the competitive 


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bidding process for all Auction 110 

participants, OEA and WTB adopt the 

following procedures proposed in the 

Auction 110 Comment Public Notice: 

• Establishment of bidding credit 

caps for eligible small businesses, very 

small businesses, and rural service 

providers in Auction 110; 

• designation of AT&T, T-Mobile, and 

Verizon Wireless as nationwide 

providers for purposes of the 

prohibition of certain communications; 

• use of anonymous bidding/limited 

information procedures which will not 

make public until after bidding has 

closed: (1) The PEAs that an applicant 

selects for bidding in its short-form 

application (FCC Form 175), (2) the 

amount of any upfront payment made 

by or on behalf of an applicant for 

Auction 110, (3) an applicant’s bidding 

eligibility, and (4) any other biddingrelated information that might reveal the 

identity of the bidder placing a bid; 

• establishment of an additional 

default payment of 15% under section 

1.2104(g)(2) of the rules in the event that 

a winning bidder defaults or is 

disqualified after the auction; 

• a specific upfront payment amount 

for products available in Auction 110; 

• establishment of a bidder’s initial 

bidding eligibility in bidding units 

based on that bidder’s upfront payment 

through assignment of a specific number 

of bidding units for each generic block; 

• establishment of a single aggregate 

reserve price for the auction to ensure 

that total cash proceeds from the 

auction equal at least $14,775,354,330; 

• use of a simultaneous stopping rule 

for Auction 110, under which all blocks 

in both categories in all PEAs would 

remain available for bidding until the 

bidding stops in every PEA; 

• use of a clock auction format for 

Auction 110 under which each qualified 

bidder will indicate in successive clock 

bidding rounds its demands for 

categories of generic blocks in specific 

geographic areas. Categories are 

determined based on the framework set 

forth in the 3.45 GHz Second Report 

and Order, in which the lower 

frequency bands are affected differently 

than the upper frequency bands in 

certain PEAs in the band; 

• permission for bidders to make two 

types of bids: Simple bids and switch 

bids. A ‘‘simple’’ bid indicates a desired 

quantity of blocks in a product at a price 

(either the clock price or an intra-round 

price). A ‘‘switch’’ bid allows the bidder 

to request to move its demand for a 

quantity of blocks from Cat1 to Cat2, or 

vice versa, within the same PEA at a 

price for the ‘‘from’’ category (either the 

clock price or an intra-round price); 

• use of an activity rule that would 

require bidders to be active on between 

90% and 100% of their bidding 

eligibility in all regular clock rounds; 

• use of an activity rule that does not 

include a waiver of the rule to preserve 

a bidder’s eligibility; 

• a specific minimum opening bid 

amount for products available in 

Auction 110; 

• establishment of acceptable bid 

amounts, including clock price 

increments and intra-round bids, along 

with a proposed methodology for 

calculating such amounts; 

• establishment of a methodology for 

processing bids and requests to reduce 

and increase demand subject to the no 

excess supply rule for bids to reduce 

demand and the eligibility rule for bids 

to increase demand; and 

• establishment of an assignment 

phase that will determine which 

frequency-specific licenses will be won 

by the winning bidders of generic blocks 

during the clock phase. 

256. The procedures for the conduct 

of Auction 110 constitute the more 

specific implementation of the 

competitive bidding rules contemplated 

by parts 1 and 27 of the Commission’s 

rules and the underlying rulemaking 

orders, including the 3.45 GHz Second 

Report and Order, and relevant 

competitive bidding orders, and are 

fully consistent therewith. 

257. Summary of Significant Issues 

Raised by Public Comments in Response 

to the Supplemental IRFA. RWA filed 

comments that address issues discussed 

in the Supplemental IRFA. RWA argues 

that the Commission’s analysis in the 

Auction 110 Comment Public Notice’s 

Supplemental IRFA underestimates the 

costs that small and rural entities incur 

when participating in an FCC auction. 

RWA states that, contrary to the 

Commission’s expectations, small and 

rural providers regularly consult 

attorneys, engineers, and consultants to 

participate in Commission auctions, 

incurring costs of up to $100,000 on 

average per auction. However, RWA 

provides no support for this cost figure. 

Nor does RWA clarify what portion of 

this figure represents costs associated 

with applying to participate in the 

auction and/or whether the figure may 

be an aggregate amount for all of its 

trade association members. RWA also 

claims that the educational materials 

provided by the Commission are 

insufficient, as some materials are not 

provided until after the short-form 

application deadline. 

258. Response to Comments by the 

Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small 

Business Administration. Pursuant to 

the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, 

which amended the RFA, the 

Commission is required to respond to 

any comments filed by the Chief 

Counsel for Advocacy of the SBA and to 

provide a detailed statement of any 

changes made to the proposed 

procedures as a result of those 

comments. The Chief Counsel did not 

file any comments in response to the 

procedures that were proposed in the 

Auction 110 Comment Public Notice. 

259. Description and Estimate of the 

Number of Small Entities to Which the 

Rules Will Apply. The RFA directs 

agencies to provide a description of, 

and, where feasible, an estimate of the 

number of small entities that may be 

affected by the rules and policies 

adopted herein. The RFA generally 

defines the term ‘‘small entity’’ as 

having the same meaning as the terms 

‘‘small business,’’ ‘‘small organization,’’ 

and ‘‘small governmental jurisdiction.’’ 

In addition, the term ‘‘small business’’ 

has the same meaning as the term 

‘‘small business concern’’ under the 

Small Business Act. 5 U.S.C. 601(3). 

Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 601(3), the 

statutory definition of a small business 

applies unless an agency, after 

consultation with the Office of 

Advocacy of the Small Business 

Administration and after opportunity 

for public comment, establishes one or 

more definitions of such term which are 

appropriate to the activities of the 

agency and publishes such definition(s) 

in the Federal Register. A ‘‘small 

business concern’’ is one which: (1) Is 

independently owned and operated, (2) 

is not dominant in its field of operation, 

and (3) satisfies any additional criteria 

established by the SBA. 

260. As noted above, Regulatory 

Flexibility Analyses were incorporated 

into the 3.1–3.55 GHz R&O and FNPRM 

and the 3.45 GHz Second Report and 

Order. These orders provide the 

underlying authority for the procedures 

proposed in the Auction 110 Comment 

Public Notice and are adopted herein for 

Auction 110. In those regulatory 

flexibility analyses, the Commission 

described in detail the small entities 

that might be significantly affected. In 

the Auction 110 Procedures Public 

Notice, in the Supplemental FRFA, OEA 

and WTB incorporate by reference the 

descriptions and estimates of the 

number of small entities from the 

previous Regulatory Flexibility 

Analyses in the 3.1–3.55 GHz R&O and 

FNPRM and the 3.45 GHz Second 

Report and Order. 

261. Description of Projected 

Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other 

Compliance Requirements for Small 

Entities. The Commission designed the 

auction application process to minimize 


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reporting and compliance requirements 

for small businesses and other 

applicants. In the first part of the 

Commission’s two-phased auction 

application process, parties desiring to 

participate in an auction file 

streamlined, short-form applications in 

which they certify under penalty of 

perjury as to their qualifications. 

Eligibility to participate in bidding is 

based on an applicant’s short-form 

application and certifications, as well as 

its upfront payment. In the second 

phase of the process, winning bidders 

file a more comprehensive long-form 

application. Thus, an applicant that fails 

to become a winning bidder does not 

need to file a long-form application or 

provide the additional showings and 

more detailed demonstrations required 

of a winning bidder. 

262. OEA and WTB do not expect that 

the processes and procedures adopted 

in the Auction 110 Procedures Public 

Notice will require small entities to hire 

attorneys, engineers, consultants, or 

other professionals to participate in 

Auction 110 and comply with the 

procedures adopted in the Auction 110 

Procedures Public Notice because of the 

information, resources, and guidance 

the Commission makes available to 

potential and actual participants. OEA 

and WTB cannot quantify the cost of 

compliance with the procedures, 

however, they do not believe that the 

cost of compliance will unduly burden 

small entities that choose to participate 

in the auction. OEA and WTB note that 

the processes and procedures are 

consistent with existing Commission 

policies and procedures used in prior 

auctions. Thus, some small entities may 

already be familiar with such 

procedures and have the processes and 

procedures in place to facilitate 

compliance resulting in minimal 

incremental costs to comply. For those 

small entities that may be new to the 

Commission’s auction process, the 

various resources that will be made 

available, including, but not limited to, 

the mock auction, remote electronic 

bidding, and access to hotlines for both 

technical and auction assistance, should 

help facilitate participation without the 

need to hire professionals. For example, 

OEA intends to release an online 

tutorial that will help applicants 

understand the procedures for filing the 

auction short-form applications (FCC 

Form 175). OEA also intends to offer 

other educational opportunities for 

applicants in Auction 110 to familiarize 

themselves with the FCC Auction 

Application System and the bidding 

system. By providing these resources as 

well as the resources discussed below, 

OEA and WTB expect small entities that 

use the available resources to 

experience lower participation and 

compliance costs. 

263. RWA does not provide evidence 

that suggests that outside consultants 

are needed to comply with the auction 

procedures adopted here. Instead, RWA 

claims that small entity bidders cannot 

make complex decisions on the future 

impacts of auction bidding, 

participation, and winning bidder 

compliance requirements without 

outside counsel. In doing so, RWA 

appears to conflate compliance with 

auction procedures with the 

development of bidding strategies and 

compliance with the relevant service 

rules. As discussed below, the 

Commission makes every effort to 

educate auction participants at every 

stage of the auction process in order to 

reduce the need for outside consultants. 

264. Moreover, neither the short-form 

application nor the bidding system for 

Auction 110 require applicants to 

provide detailed technical or financial 

information that would require the 

advice of outside experts, nor do they 

require technical or legal expertise to 

access or use. That some entities may 

elect to hire outside consultants as a 

matter of convenience and/or to develop 

bidding strategies is not relevant to the 

question of whether they are necessary 

for small entities to comply with 

auction procedures. 

265. Steps Taken to Minimize the 

Significant Economic Impact on Small 

Entities, and Significant Alternatives 

Considered. The RFA requires an 

agency to describe any significant, 

specifically small business, alternatives 

that it has considered in reaching its 

approach, which may include the 

following four alternatives (among 

others): (1) The establishment of 

differing compliance or reporting 

requirements or timetables that take into 

account the resources available to small 

entities; (2) the clarification, 

consolidation, or simplification of 

compliance and reporting requirements 

under the rule for such small entities; 

(3) the use of performance rather than 

design standards; and (4) an exemption 

from coverage of the rule, or any part 

thereof, for such small entities. 

266. The Commission has taken steps 

to minimize any economic impact of its 

auction procedures on small entities 

through, among other things, the many 

free resources the Commission provides 

to potential auction participants. As 

mentioned above, consistent with the 

past practices in prior auctions, small 

entities that are potential participants 

will have access to detailed educational 

information and Commission personnel 

to help guide their participation in 

Auction 110, which should alleviate any 

need to hire professionals. For example, 

small entities and other would-be 

participants will be provided with 

various materials on the pre-bidding 

process in advance of the short-form 

application filing window, which 

includes step-by-step instructions on 

how to complete FCC Form 175. In 

addition, small entities will have access 

to the web-based, interactive online 

tutorials produced by Commission staff 

to familiarize themselves with auction 

procedures, filing requirements, bidding 

procedures, and other matters related to 

an auction. 

267. The Commission has also taken 

steps to ensure that the application 

system is simple to use and that FCC 

Form 175 itself is easy to complete. For 

example, the application will pre-fill 

ownership information that an applicant 

has previously provided in FCC Form 

175 for prior auctions or in an FCC 

Form 602. 

268. After the initial application stage, 

auction participants whose applications 

have been deemed incomplete have the 

opportunity to correct their errors. An 

applicant whose application is deemed 

incomplete will receive a letter from the 

Commission identifying the specific 

errors in their application and providing 

contact information for a specific FCC 

staff member who has been assigned to 

provide additional information about 

the nature of the errors and the 

information needed to correct them. 

Additionally, after the application 

process is complete and the 

Commission has identified the 

applicants who will be qualified to bid 

in Auction 110, all qualified bidders for 

Auction 110 will automatically be 

registered for the auction, and 

registration materials will be distributed 

prior to the auction by overnight 

delivery. Applicants are not required to 

take any further steps until bidding 

commences. 

269. Prior to the start of bidding, 

eligible bidders will be given an 

opportunity to become familiar with 

auction procedures and the bidding 

system by participating in a mock 

auction. Eligible bidders will have 

access to a user guide for the bidding 

system, bidding file formats, and an 

online bidding procedures tutorial in 

advance of the mock auction. Further, 

OEA and WTB will conduct Auction 

110 electronically over the internet 

using a web-based auction system that 

eliminates the need for small entities 

and other bidders to be physically 

present in a specific location. These 

mechanisms are made available to 

facilitate participation in Auction 110 


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by all eligible bidders and may result in 

significant cost savings for small entities 

that use them. Moreover, the adoption 

of bidding procedures in advance of the 

auction, consistent with statutory 

directive, is designed to ensure that the 

auction will be administered 

predictably and fairly for all 

participants, including small 

businesses. 

270. Small entities and other auction 

participants may seek clarification of, or 

guidance on, complying with 

competitive bidding rules and 

procedures, reporting requirements, and 

using the bidding system at any stage of 

the auction process. Additionally, an 

FCC Auctions Hotline will provide 

small entities one-on-one access to 

Commission staff for information about 

the auction process and procedures. 

Further, the FCC Auctions Technical 

Support Hotline is another resource that 

provides technical assistance to 

applicants, including small entities, on 

issues such as access to or navigation 

within the electronic FCC Form 175 and 

use of the bidding system. 

271. The Commission also makes 

various databases and other sources of 

information, including the Auctions 

program websites and copies of 

Commission decisions, available to the 

public without charge, providing a lowcost mechanism for small entities to 

conduct research prior to and 

throughout the auction. Prior to the start 

of bidding, and at the close of Auction 

110, OEA will post public notices on the 

Auctions website that articulate the 

procedures and deadlines for the 

auction. The Commission makes this 

information easily accessible and 

without charge to benefit all Auction 

110 applicants, including small entities, 

thereby lowering their administrative 

costs to comply with the Commission’s 

competitive bidding rules. 

272. Another step taken to minimize 

the economic impact for small entities 

participating in Auction 110 is the 

Commission’s adoption of bidding 

credits for small businesses and rural 

service providers. In accordance with 

the service rules applicable to the 3.45 

GHz Service licenses to be offered in 

Auction 110, bidding credit discounts 

will be available to eligible small 

businesses and small business consortia 

on the following basis: (1) A bidder with 

attributed average annual gross revenues 

that do not exceed $55 million for the 

preceding five years is eligible to receive 

a 15% discount on its overall payment 

or (2) a bidder with attributed average 

annual gross revenues that do not 

exceed $20 million for the preceding 

five years is eligible to receive a 25% 

discount on its overall payment. Eligible 

applicants can receive only one of the 

available small business bidding 

credits—not both. 

273. An eligible rural service provider 

may request a 15% discount on its 

overall payment using a rural service 

provider bidding credit. To be eligible 

for a rural service provider bidding 

credit, an applicant must: (1) Be a 

service provider that is in the business 

of providing commercial 

communications services and, together 

with its controlling interests, affiliates, 

and the affiliates of its controlling 

interests, has fewer than 250,000 

combined wireless, wireline, 

broadband, and cable subscribers; and 

(2) serve predominantly rural areas. 

Rural areas are defined as counties with 

a population density of 100 or fewer 

persons per square mile. Eligible 

applicants can request either a small 

business bidding credit or a rural 

service provider bidding credit, but not 

both. 

274. The total amount of bidding 

credit discounts that may be awarded to 

an eligible small business is capped at 

$25 million and there is a $10 million 

cap on the total amount of bidding 

credit discounts that may be awarded to 

an eligible rural service provider. In 

addition, to create parity among eligible 

small businesses and rural service 

providers competing against each other 

in smaller markets, OEA and WTB 

adopt a $10 million cap on the overall 

amount of bidding credits that any 

winning designated entity may apply to 

winning licenses in PEAs with a 

population of 500,000 or less. Based on 

the technical characteristics of the 3.45– 

3.55 GHz band and OEA and WTB’s 

analysis of past auction data, OEA and 

WTB anticipate that the caps adopted in 

the Auction 110 Procedures Public 

Notice will allow the majority of small 

businesses to take full advantage of the 

bidding credit program, thereby 

lowering the relative costs of 

participation for small businesses. 

275. These procedures for the conduct 

of Auction 110 constitute the more 

specific implementation of the 

competitive bidding rules contemplated 

by parts 1 and 27 of the Commission’s 

rules and the underlying rulemaking 

orders, including the 3.45 GHz Second 

Report and Order and relevant 

competitive bidding orders, and are 

fully consistent therewith. 

276. Report to Congress. The 

Commission will send a copy of the 

Auction 110 Procedures Public Notice, 

including the Supplemental FRFA, in a 

report to Congress pursuant to the 

Congressional Review Act. In addition, 

the Commission will send a copy of the 

Auction 110 Procedures Public Notice, 

including the Supplemental FRFA, to 

the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the 

SBA. 

Federal Communications Commission. 

William Huber, 

Associate Chief, Auctions Division, Office of 

Economics and Analytics. 

[FR Doc. 2021–12617 Filed 6–22–21; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 6712–01–P 

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 

National Oceanic and Atmospheric 

Administration 

50 CFR Part 660 

[Docket No. 210616–0131] 

RIN 0648–BK25 

Magnuson-Stevens Act Provisions; 

Fisheries Off West Coast States; 

Pacific Coast Groundfish Fishery; 2021 

Harvest Specifications for Pacific 

Whiting, and 2021 Pacific Whiting 

Tribal Allocation 

AGENCY: National Marine Fisheries 

Service (NMFS), National Oceanic and 

Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), 

Commerce. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: NMFS issues this final rule to 

establish the 2021 harvest specifications 

and management measures for Pacific 

whiting caught in the U.S. Exclusive 

Economic Zone off the coasts of 

Washington, Oregon, and California 

consistent with the Magnuson-Stevens 

Fishery Conservation and Management 

Act, the Pacific Whiting Act of 2006, 

and other applicable laws. This rule also 

establishes the 2021 adjusted U.S. Total 

Allowable Catch (TAC), tribal and nontribal allocations, and research and 

bycatch set-asides. These measures are 

intended to help prevent overfishing, 

achieve optimum yield, ensure that 

management measures are based on the 

best scientific information available and 

ensure the long-term sustainability of 

Pacific whiting. 

DATES: Effective June 23, 2021. 

ADDRESSES: This final rule is accessible 

via the internet at the Office of the 

Federal Register website at https://

www.federalregister.gov. Background 

information and documents are 

available at the NMFS website at 

https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov and at 

the Pacific Fishery Management 

Council’s website at http://

www.pcouncil.org/. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Stacey Miller, phone: 503–231–6290, 

and email: Stacey.Miller@noaa.gov. 


jbell on DSKJLSW7X2PROD with RULES