RECORD IMPOUNDED

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-4142-17T4

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

GERY F. DESTRA,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________________

Submitted May 28, 2020 – Decided June 16, 2020

Before Judges Fuentes, Haas and Enright.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Essex County, Indictment No. 15-09-1971.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Stefan Van Jura, Assistant Deputy Public 

Defender, of counsel and on the brief).

Theodore N. Stephens II, Acting Essex County 

Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Lucille M. 

Rosano, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting 

Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2

A-4142-17T4

On September 3, 2015, an Essex County grand jury returned an eightcount indictment charging defendant with two counts of first-degree aggravated 

sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(1) (counts one and two); three counts of 

second-degree sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(b) (counts three, four, and five); 

third-degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(7) (count six); and two 

counts of third-degree endangering the welfare of a child, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a) 

(counts seven and eight).

Following a multi-day trial, the jury found defendant guilty of counts one, 

four, six, seven, and eight.1 The jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict 

on counts two and five.

At sentencing, the trial judge granted the State's motion to dismiss counts 

two and five. The judge then sentenced defendant to twenty-five years in prison 

on count one, with a twenty-five-year period of parole ineligibility pursuant to 

the Jessica Lunsford Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2. The judge also sentenced defendant 

to a consecutive four-year term on count four, and concurrent terms on the 

remaining counts.2 Finally, the judge placed defendant on parole supervision 

 

1

 Prior to deliberations, the trial court granted the State's motion to dismiss 

count three of the indictment.

2

 Thus, defendant's aggregate sentence was twenty-nine years, subject to the 

parole ineligibility term discussed above.
3

A-4142-17T4

for life and ordered him to comply with the registration requirements of Megan's 

Law, N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2.

On appeal, defendant raises the following contentions:

POINT I

IMPROPER ADMISSION OF -- AND INSTRUCTION 

ON -- "TENDER YEARS" EVIDENCE DEPRIVED 

DEFENDANT OF DUE PROCESS AND A FAIR 

TRIAL, AND REQUIRES REVERSAL OF THE 

CONVICTIONS. (Not Raised Below).

A. The Failure of the Trial Court to Hold a Hearing 

on the Admissibility of Tender Years Evidence 

Through [The Victim's Mother] Requires 

Reversal of the Convictions.

B. The Inadequate and Erroneous Instruction on the 

Use of Tender Years Evidence Requires Reversal 

of the Convictions.

POINT II

THE AGGRAVATED ASSAULT CONVICTION 

SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE STATE 

PRESENTED NO EVIDENCE FROM WHICH A 

REASONABLE JURY COULD FIND SIGNIFICANT 

BODILY INJURY.

POINT III

DEFENDANT'S FIRST STATEMENT SHOULD 

HAVE BEEN SANITIZED BECAUSE REFERENCES 

TO [THE DIVISION OF YOUTH AND FAMILY 
4

A-4142-17T4

SERVICES[3]] REMOVING HIM FROM HIS HOME

AND PROHIBITING HIM TO BABYSIT HIS 

YOUNG NIECE IMPLIED A FINDING OF GUILT. 

(Not Raised Below).

POINT IV

IF THE CONVICTIONS ARE NOT REVERSED, THE 

MATTER MUST BE REMANDED FOR A 

RESENTENCING PROCEEDING IN WHICH THE 

TERM OF IMPRISONMENT ON COUNT SIX IS 

ORDERED TO RUN CONCURRENT WITH THE 

TERM OF IMPRISONMENT ON COUNT ONE.

After reviewing the record in light of the contentions advanced on appeal 

and the applicable law, we affirm defendant's conviction and sentence.

I.

When A.R. (Amy)4 was six and seven years old, she lived with her mother 

and stepfather, but would regularly visit her biological father, who resided on 

the second floor of a two-family home. Defendant, who was a nineteen-yearold high school student, lived on the first floor of that residence with his family, 

 

3

 This agency is now known as the Division of Child Protection and Permanency 

(DCPP).

4

 Pursuant to Rule 1:38-3(c)(12), we use pseudonyms to refer to the victim, the 

victim's mother, A.C. (Audrey), and the victim's friend, S. (Sally), to protect the 

victim's privacy.
5

A-4142-17T4

including his niece, Sally. Amy visited her father's house approximately four 

times per week, and she and Sally would often play together during these visits.

5

 

On April 22, 2015, Amy's mother, Audrey dropped Amy off at her father's 

home so she could run some errands. When Audrey returned to pick Amy up, 

she saw Amy say goodbye to Sally, but not to defendant. Audrey had never seen 

defendant at the house before.

Audrey testified that she thought it was "weird" that Amy did not say 

goodbye to defendant because she is a "very chipper . . . happy kid," so she asked 

Amy who defendant was. Audrey explained that Amy's body language changed 

when she questioned the child about the defendant. She testified that Amy

"started feeling cold, like started feeling funny," and Audrey became concerned 

that something happened between defendant and her child.

On the car ride home, Audrey asked Amy if anyone had touched her 

private parts. Amy responded that she knew she could tell Audrey if anything 

happened. Audrey then told Amy, "if you're lying you're going to get beaten" 

and "it's very important that you tell me these things." Audrey explained that 

she made this statement because she knew "something wasn't right."

 

5

 Sally was approximately three years older than Amy.
6

A-4142-17T4

Amy told Audrey that defendant choked her, and he also threatened to 

choke her if she did not let him touch her "butt." Amy also revealed that 

defendant makes her "suck on his private parts" and that "white stuff come[s] 

out." 

Audrey became angry and drove back to the home to confront defendant. 

Defendant denied any inappropriate behavior and told Audrey that he had a 

girlfriend and did not "need to mess with no little girl." Audrey then called the 

police, who took her and Amy to the station to make a report.

The Division of Youth and Family Services (DYFS) then came to 

Audrey's house, and when the workers left, Audrey took Amy to the hospital. A 

few days later, hospital personnel informed Audrey that Amy had chlamydia.

Detective Eric Serio of the Essex County Prosecutor's Office Special 

Victims Unit testified that he conducted a forensic interview of Amy on April 

23, 2015. The interview was video-recorded and played for the jury.

During the interview, Amy stated that defendant touches her "bottom" and 

her "boom boom"—meaning her vagina—with his "private" and takes out his 

"private" and "put[s] it in my mouth." Amy said that defendant would pull her 

pants down and touch his private on her bottom with her underwear on, and also 

put his private in her bottom. She stated that it "didn't feel good," and that he 
7

A-4142-17T4

had done this more than ten times. Amy also said that defendant put his private 

in her "boom boom" more than three times, and that defendant put his private in 

her mouth more than ten times. Amy added that when defendant put his private 

in her mouth, "white stuff would come out" and go in her mouth, and that it 

"taste[d] like pee." Amy told Detective Serio that defendant would call her into 

his room when no one was home, and if she did not obey him, he would choke 

her. Amy also reported that Sally saw defendant choking her on one occasion.

Amy said defendant told her not to tell anyone what he was doing to her. 

Audrey was the first person Amy told about the assaults. She told her mother 

because her mother said she would beat her if she did not tell the truth, "so I told 

the truth." Amy could not recall when the first or last time the inappropriate 

touching happened, but she believed she was six years old when it started. Amy

told Detective Serio that defendant was the only person who did this to her.

Amy was nine years old when she testified at trial and her testimony was 

consistent with what she reported to her mother and the police on April 22, and 

23, 2015. Amy testified she told her mother that defendant told her "to put his 

thing in my mouth." Amy stated that this occurred more than five times and that 

"white stuff" would come out of defendant's "private" and go "in [her] mouth." 
8

A-4142-17T4

Amy stated that when she would visit the home to see her father, defendant 

would call her into his bedroom, and she would kneel on the bed. Amy explained 

that defendant would "put his hand on my neck and, then pull[] it forward" so 

"he could put my mouth [on] his private." Amy also testified that on one 

occasion, defendant was watching "something nasty" on television, which 

depicted "people that put their private in their butt and in their mouth."

An emergency room physician who examined Amy on April 22, 2015, 

testified that his examination revealed no signs of trauma to Amy's vagina or 

rectum. However, he explained that children generally heal quickly, and the 

absence of tears or other injury to the tissue did not mean abuse had not occurred. 

On April 29, 2015, defendant voluntarily accompanied police to the police 

station and, after waiving his Miranda6rights, he provided a statement, which 

was video-recorded and played for the jury. Defendant stated he knew Amy

because she played with his niece, Sally. However, he denied ever touching or 

choking Amy and stated she was not allowed in his room. 

Defendant agreed to provide the police with a urine sample before leaving 

the station. Defendant later submitted to additional testing for sexually 

 

6

 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
9

A-4142-17T4

transmitted diseases at the emergency room. A nurse practitioner testified that 

defendant tested positive for chlamydia. The nurse practitioner stated that 

although there are different strains of chlamydia, he was not aware of any 

screening test that could be used to determine whether one person's case of 

chlamydia matched another person's strain of the disease.

Armed with this information, the police arrested defendant on May 6, 

2015. According to the detectives who arrested and later interviewed defendant,

he did not appear to be under the influence of any illicit substances. At the 

police station, defendant waived his Miranda rights and gave a video-recorded 

statement to the detectives, which was played at the trial.

At first, defendant denied that he touched, had sex with, or was ever alone 

in the house with Amy. However, as the interrogation continued, defendant 

admitted to numerous sex acts with Amy, but claimed that Amy initiated all the 

encounters. 

According to defendant, the first incident occurred when Amy entered 

defendant's bedroom after he had gotten out of the shower. Amy saw his penis, 

asked what it was, and touched it. Defendant told her to leave the room. 

Defendant claimed that Amy soon returned, put his penis in her mouth and 
10 A-4142-17T4

sucked on it for five seconds. Defendant said he did not ejaculate and again told 

the child to leave the room.

After that incident, defendant explained that Amy would come into his 

room and try to lie on top of him and pull his pants down. One time, Amy pulled 

defendant's pants down when he was on the couch in the living room watching 

television, and started to suck his penis. 

Defendant told the detectives that on a third occasion, Amy entered his 

bedroom while he was watching pornography and masturbating. He stated that 

the child saw the pornography on the television. Defendant left the room to 

clean himself after he climaxed and returned to find Amy on his bed. Defendant 

stated that the young child pulled his pants down and started sucking his penis. 

Defendant told the detectives he ejaculated on the child's face. Defendant later 

admitted he had called the child to come into his room as he watched 

pornography, pulled his own pants down, and encouraged the child to suck his 

penis. 

Defendant said that on yet another occasion, Amy entered his room, took 

her clothes off, and got into bed with him. He stated that Amy put her butt 

against him and rubbed it against his penis and he pulled her closer to him.
11 A-4142-17T4

Defendant initially denied having vaginal intercourse with Amy. 

However, he stated that she rubbed her vagina close to his penis and that his 

penis bent rather than entering her vagina. Defendant later admitted it was 

possible that his penis "accidentally" slipped into Amy's vagina. He then told 

the detectives that he had penetrated the child with the tip of his penis. 

Defendant claimed that the vaginal penetration occurred just that one time, after 

which he refused Amy's advances.

Defendant denied that he ever choked Amy. Instead, defendant alleged

that Amy grabbed him around the neck and choked him when he tried to remove 

her from his lap. He said he had to pinch her hand to get her to release her grip 

and forcibly remove her.

Defendant testified on his own behalf and denied he had any physical 

interactions with Amy. Defendant stated that he had not been truthful in his 

second interview with the police, because he was threatened by the detectives 

and believed they would not let him go unless he told them what they wanted to 

hear. He also claimed he was under the influence of Xanax when he gave the 

statement. On cross-examination, however, defendant admitted he told the 

detectives during both of his statements that he did not feel threatened or 

coerced, and understood he could stop the interviews at any time.
12 A-4142-17T4

II.

In Point I.A. of his brief, defendant argues that his convictions must be 

reversed because the trial judge failed to hold a hearing on the admissibility of 

the tender years evidence that the State introduced through Audrey's testimony. 

While the judge erred by not conducting a N.J.R.E. 1047 hearing concerning 

Audrey's testimony, we are satisfied that the error was harmless in light of other 

strong evidence of defendant's guilt.

We begin our analysis with the language of the tender years exception to 

the hearsay rule. N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27) states:

 A statement by a child under the age of 12 relating to 

sexual misconduct committed . . . against that child is 

admissible in a criminal . . . proceeding if (a) the 

proponent of the statement makes known to the adverse 

party an intention to offer the statement and the 

particulars of the statement at such time as to provide 

the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to 

meet it; (b) the court finds, in a hearing conducted 

pursuant to Rule 104(a), that on the basis of the time, 

content and circumstances of the statement there is a 

probability that the statement is trustworthy; and (c) 

. . . the child testifies at the proceeding . . . .

In interpreting this evidence rule, our Supreme Court has made clear that 

 

7

 "N.J.R.E. 104(a) provides the vehicle for the court to conduct a hearing to 

determine the admissibility of evidence that is subject to a condition before the 

evidence may be introduced at trial." State in Interest of A.R., 234 N.J. 82, 87 

n.2 (2018).
13 A-4142-17T4

[b]efore admitting a child's out-of-court statement 

pursuant to N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27), the trial court must 

make certain findings at a [N.J.R.E.] 104 hearing. The 

court must determine whether "on the basis of the time, 

content and circumstances of the statement there is a 

probability that the statement is trustworthy." N.J.R.E. 

803(c)(27). The statement's admissibility is also 

conditioned on either the child testifying or, if the child 

is unavailable as a witness, on the presentation of 

"admissible evidence corroborating the act of sexual 

abuse." Ibid. . . . The admissibility of a child's 

testimonial statement, therefore, will be conditioned on 

the child taking the stand. State v. P.S., 202 N.J. 232, 

249 (2010) (noting the admissibility of child victim's 

statement is conditioned on not only "judicial finding 

of trustworthiness," but also "opportunity to crossexamine the child at trial" (quoting State v. R.B., 183 

N.J. 308, 318 (2005)); see also State v. D.G., 157 N.J. 

112, 124 (1999).

[A.R., 234 N.J. at 102-03.]

Thus, the trial court must conduct a N.J.R.E. 104 hearing to evaluate the 

proposed tender years testimony and if it determines to admit the testimony in 

evidence, the court must make the required finding that "on the basis of the time, 

content and circumstances of the statement there is a probability that the 

statement is trustworthy." N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27).

The trial proceedings in this matter began on September 20, 2017, when a 

recall judge transferred this matter to the trial judge for trial. On that day, the 

prosecutor gave the trial judge a copy of her pretrial memorandum. In the
14 A-4142-17T4

memorandum, the State advised the defense that it intended to rely upon 

N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27) to introduce the testimony of Detective Serio concerning 

the forensic interview he conducted with Amy, and the testimony of Audrey in 

connection with her discovery that defendant sexually assaulted the child. The 

prosecutor asked for a N.J.R.E. 104 hearing for both witnesses.

At that point in the proceedings, the judge had begun conducting a 

Miranda hearing to address defendant's motion to suppress the two statements 

he made to the police. Therefore, no further action was taken on September 20, 

2017 on the tender years evidentiary issues.

The parties convened before the judge again on September 27, 2017. At 

that time, the witness needed for the Miranda hearing was not available and, 

instead, defense counsel had defendant take the stand to confirm his decision to 

proceed with the trial in lieu of entering a plea.

The next day, September 28, 2017, the Miranda hearing continued. 

During a late afternoon break in the proceedings, the parties and the judge began 

the N.J.R.E. 104 hearing concerning Amy's forensic interview with Detective 

Serio. They also agreed that jury selection could start on October 3, 2017 after

the two hearings were finished. Neither the parties nor the judge mentioned the 
15 A-4142-17T4

State's still-pending oral application to determine the admissibility of Audrey's 

tender years testimony.

The parties returned to court on October 3, 2017 and completed the 

Miranda hearing and the N.J.R.E. 104 hearing on the admissibility of the

forensic interview. At that point, defendant withdrew his objection to the 

admissibility of Detective Serio's tender years testimony.

8

 On October 3, 2017, 

the judge entered a written order finding "that on the basis of time, content and 

circumstances of [the forensic video interview (FVI)] statement[,] there is a 

probability that the statement is trustworthy and the FVI of [Amy] will be 

admissible contingent upon the testimony of [Amy] at trial[.]" 

The parties and the judge then proceeded with jury selection and, after the 

jury was chosen, the judge scheduled the trial to begin one week later, on 

October 10, 2017. If there was any further discussion between the parties and 

the court concerning Audrey's tender years testimony during this one-week 

hiatus, there is no record of it in the materials supplied to us on appeal. 

On October 10, 2017, the parties returned to court. As the proceedings

began, the prosecutor submitted a letter memorandum in support of the State's 

 

8 Defendant also withdrew his objection to the admissibility of his first 

statement to the police, and the judge rejected his objections to the introduction 

of his second statement.
16 A-4142-17T4

motion to admit Amy's disclosure of sexual abuse to Audrey under N.J.R.E. 

803(c)(27). Defense counsel acknowledged his receipt of the memorandum, but 

raised no objection to the motion. The prosecutor told the judge that Audrey 

had not yet arrived at the courthouse and was still "[seven] minutes away." 

While that statement may be an indication that the prosecutor anticipated that 

the required N.J.R.E. 104 hearing would be held as soon as Audrey arrived, the 

judge instead brought the jury into the courtroom to begin the trial.

Once the jury was sworn, the judge gave the jurors her preliminary 

instructions, and then directed the parties to make their opening statements. 

When the attorneys concluded their remarks, the prosecutor requested a sidebar

conference. The prosecutor told the judge that Audrey had arrived, and asked 

the judge, "so how do you want to do this?" Again, the record gives us no clear 

indication whether the prosecutor was referring to excusing the jury and 

beginning the N.J.R.E. 104 hearing, or whether she meant the commencement 

of the trial testimony. The judge instructed the prosecutor to "bring [Audrey] 

in." The prosecutor stated, "And in front of the jury we'll do the - - in front of 

the jury we'll do the - -[,]" and the judge replied, "The jury can sit." Neither the 

prosecutor nor defense counsel raised an objection to permitting Audrey to 

testify before the jury.
17 A-4142-17T4

The prosecutor then called Audrey as her first witness, and Audrey

testified in front of the jury concerning Amy's disclosures to her. The matter 

was then adjourned until the next day, and the trial continued from that point 

forward. Sometime on October 10, 2017, however, the judge issued a written 

order finding "that on the basis of time, content and circumstances of [Amy's 

statement to Audrey,] there is a probability that the statement is trustworthy and 

will be admissible as a tender years exception to the hearsay rule[,] N.J.R.E. 

803(c)(27)."

While the record contains no explanation for the judge's decision to 

proceed in this fashion, it is clear that the judge erred by admitting Audrey's 

testimony concerning Amy's disclosures without first conducting a N.J.R.E. 104 

hearing as required by N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27). We are also convinced that we must 

consider this issue even though the error was not brought to the attention of the 

trial judge. See R. 2:10-2 (stating that "[a]ny error or omission shall be 

disregarded by the appellate court unless it is of such a nature as to have been 

clearly capable of producing an unjust result.").

At the outset, we note that the judge's mistake here was not a "structural 

error" that would automatically require a reversal. "A structural error . . . is a 

'structural defect[] in the constitution of the trial mechanism, which def[ies] 
18 A-4142-17T4

analysis by harmless-error standards.'" State v. Camacho, 218 N.J. 533, 549 

(2014) (second and third alterations in the original) (quoting Arizona v. 

Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309-10 (1991)). Structural errors "are so intrinsically 

harmful as to require automatic reversal . . . without regard to their effect on the 

outcome." Ibid. (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 7 (1999)) 

(alteration in original).

Here, the judge's mistake was a "trial error" that has been "defined as an 

'error which occurred during the presentation of the case to the jury,' and 

therefore may 'be quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence 

presented in order to determine whether it was harmless beyond a reasonable 

doubt.'" Id. at 547 (quoting Fulminate, 499 U.S. at 307-08). As the Supreme 

Court recently stated:

An evidentiary error will not be found "harmless" 

if there is a reasonable doubt as to whether the error 

contributed to the verdict. State v. McLaughlin, 205 

N.J. 185, 211-12 (2011) (citing [State v.] Macon, 57 

N.J. [325,] 338 ](1971))]. The prospect that the error 

gave rise to an unjust result "must be real [and] 

sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to whether [it] 

led the jury to a verdict it otherwise might not have 

reached." State v. Lazo, 209 N.J. 9, 26 (2012) (second 

alteration in original) (quoting [State v.] R.B., 183 N.J.

[308,] 330 [2005]). As the Court noted in [State v.] 

W.B., "[c]onvictions after a fair trial, based on strong 

evidence proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, 

should not be reversed because of a technical or 
19 A-4142-17T4

evidentiary error that cannot have truly prejudiced the 

defendant or affected the end result." 205 N.J. [588,] 

614 [(2011)].

[State v. J.R., 227 N.J. 393, 417 (2017).]

The Supreme Court applied the harmless error standard in D.G. to reverse 

the defendant's conviction in a case where the trial court failed to conduct an

N.J.R.E. 104 hearing and failed to make any of the findings required by N.J.R.E. 

803(c)(27) prior to the admission of the tender years testimony of the child 

victim's aunt. 157 N.J. at 127-28. In that case, the defendant did not make a 

confession to the police, and he "denied that any sexual contact occurred" during 

his trial testimony. Id. at 122. On the other hand, the victim repeatedly recanted 

her accusations against the defendant, which forced the prosecutor to impeach 

the victim on the witness stand. Id. at 128. In addition, the victim "made 

identical allegations against her natural father." Ibid. Under these 

circumstances, the Court held that the judge's error could not be considered 

harmless in light of the victim's overall lack of credibility and, instead, required 

the reversal of the defendant's convictions. Id. at 127-28.

We reached a similar conclusion in State v. W.L., Sr., 292 N.J. Super. 100 

(App. Div. 1996), a case which the Supreme Court cited with approval in its 

D.G. opinion. D.G., 157 N.J. at 127-28. In W.L., the trial judge also failed to 
20 A-4142-17T4

conduct a hearing or make the findings required by N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27) before 

admitting the tender years testimony. 292 N.J. Super. at 117-18. There, as in 

D.G., the court found that "the vital issue of guilt was exceedingly close and any 

error that could have appreciably tipped the credibility scale would have to be 

regarded as plain error" requiring the reversal of the defendant's conviction. 

W.L., 292 N.J. Super. at 117 (internal citation and quotation omitted). As in 

D.G., the defendant in W.L. did not confess to committing the offenses prior to 

trial, and both of the child victims gave conflicting accounts of the alleged abuse 

to DYFS workers during their investigation. Id. at 104-05. In addition, we 

identified other critical errors, including the improper admission of expert 

testimony and inappropriate remarks made by the prosecutor in his opening and 

closing statements that also warranted the reversal of the verdict. Id. at 118. 

On the other hand, in State in the Interest of S.M., 284 N.J. Super. 611, 

621 (App. Div. 1995), we found that the judge's failure to hold the N.J.R.E. 104 

hearing was harmless in a non-jury setting where the defendant failed to object, 

and the trial court made findings at the conclusion of the trial that made it clear 

that the court determined the statements were trustworthy.

Applying these principles, we conclude that the judge's error in admitting 

Audrey's testimony was harmless under the totality of the idiosyncratic 
21 A-4142-17T4

circumstances presented in this case. Here, the State's proofs can fairly be 

described as overwhelming. Amy testified at the trial and her account of 

defendant's actions remained consistent both on direct and cross-examination. 

Unlike in D.G., the child never recanted any of her accusations, the prosecutor 

had no need to attempt to impeach her testimony, and Amy remained steadfast 

in her claim that defendant was the only individual who harmed her. 

The State also presented the statements Amy made during Detective 

Serio's forensic video. These statements mirrored Amy's testimony at trial, 

including her explanation of how she came to first disclose defendant's assaults 

to her mother.

Defendant confessed to the assaults and described what occurred in detail. 

Although he claimed at trial that he lied to the police because he was under the 

influence of Xanax and just wanted to go home, the police observed no signs of 

intoxication. In addition, defendant admitted on cross-examination that he told

the detectives he did not feel threatened or coerced, and understood he could 

stop the interviews at any time.

Both defendant and Amy tested positive for chlamydia. Defendant argued 

to the jury that the State should have attempted to perform additional tests to 

determine whether he and the child had the same strain of the disease. However, 
22 A-4142-17T4

the nurse practitioner who testified at trial stated he was unaware of any 

screening test that could accomplish this, and defendant presented no testimony, 

expert or otherwise, on this subject. 

Under these circumstances, we are unable to conclude that the judge's 

failure to conduct a hearing prior to the admission of Audrey's testimony 

changed the result of defendant's trial. The jury heard Amy's explanation for

her disclosure through Detective Serio's testimony and the child's own 

statements on the witness stand. The jurors also heard defendant's confession 

and his attempt to recant it at trial. As in S.M., the judge was aware that she 

needed to ensure that Amy's statements to Audrey were trustworthy as evidenced 

by the findings included in her belated October 10, 2017 order.

In short, when the evidence is viewed in its entirety, it is clear that the 

judge's error concerning the N.J.R.E. 104 hearing was not clearly capable of 

producing an unjust result. Therefore, we reject defendant's contention to the 

contrary.

While this record does not warrant the reversal of defendant's conviction, 

we would be remiss if we did not comment on some of the problems inherent in 

the approach adopted by the trial court in addressing the pretrial issues involved 

in this case. Rule 3:9-1(e) clearly requires the court to conduct pretrial hearings 
23 A-4142-17T4

"to resolve issues relating to the admissibility of statements by defendant, . . .

sound recordings, and motions to suppress shall be held prior to the [p]retrial 

[c]onference" required by Rule 3:9-1(f). (emphasis added). The purposes 

underlying the rule are clear.

First, it provides a technique for substantially 

expediting the conduct of the trial itself. The evidence 

questions covered by the rule ordinarily involve the 

taking of testimony outside the presence of the jury, and 

these voir dire hearings, if conducted during the trial, 

impair the continuity of trial as well as substantially 

imposing upon the time of the jurors. More 

significantly, these determinations, if made prior to jury 

selection, constitute interlocutory determinations 

which may be appealable by the State. This procedure 

also provides a more meaningful opportunity for a 

defendant to seek leave to appeal from the adverse 

determination. 

[Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 6

on R. 3:9-1 (2020).]

In addition to these considerations, 

adverse determinations of such questions, when they 

constitute, in effect, the sole defense, may result in a 

defendant's decision to plead guilty, and, if he or she 

wishes to appeal the ruling, entering a conditional plea 

pursuant to and in accordance with [Rule] 3:9-3(f). 

Finally, both parties are able to more effectively 

prepare their cases for trial if they know, by pretrial 

determination, which evidence will be inadmissible.

[Ibid.]
24 A-4142-17T4

As we observed over ten years ago, 

[w]ithout [these] pre-trial determination[s], a defendant 

is left in the dark about a critical part of the State's 

proofs against him. A defendant is entitled to know, in 

advance of trial, the full arsenal of evidence the State 

has amassed against him, including whether the State 

can legally present to the jury statements he may have 

made to the police. Such knowledge is not only 

indispensable to formulate a sound defense strategy at 

trial, but it is also essential in assisting a defendant in 

making the decision to accept or reject a prosecutor's 

plea-agreement offer. R. 3:9-1(b), (e).

[State v. Elkwisni, 384 N.J. Super. 351, 360 n.3 (App. 

Div. 2006), aff’d, 190 N.J. 169 (2007).]

Moreover, 

[t]he State is also prejudiced if a determination as to the 

admissibility of a defendant's statements is not made 

before trial. Without advance notice of what evidence 

will be admitted at trial, the prosecutor: (1) is unable 

to assess rationally the strengths and weaknesses of the 

State's case; and (2) risks creating grounds for a 

mistrial, by unknowingly advising the jury, in the 

course of his/her opening statement, of information the 

court may subsequently determine to be inadmissible.

[Ibid.]

Here, the judge began the proceedings on September 20, 2017 by 

immediately starting the Miranda hearing without providing any explanation 

other than that another judge had transferred the case to her for trial. After 

discovering a problem in the videotape replay system, the judge conducted the 
25 A-4142-17T4

pretrial conference. That conference should not have been held until after the 

pretrial hearings had been fully scheduled or completed. See R. 3:9-1(f) 

(requiring that the pretrial conference should not be held until "all motions have 

been decided or scheduled"). One week later, the judge prematurely conducted 

the plea cut-off, before resuming the Miranda hearing on September 28, 2017. 

The Miranda hearing and the N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27) hearing for Detective Serio 

were not completed until October 3, 3017.

As the apparent result of these uncoordinated managing efforts, the judge 

failed to schedule or conduct a N.J.R.E. 104 hearing to determine the 

admissibility of Audrey's tender years testimony. While the State had identified 

the need for a hearing on September 20, 2017, it did not submit its memorandum 

in support of the motion until after the jury had already been selected and the 

trial was about to begin on October 10, 2017. After the parties completed their 

opening statements, it appeared that the prosecutor may have believed the judge 

would next conduct the N.J.R.E. 104 hearing, but the judge instead instructed 

the prosecutor to call Audrey as a witness before the jury. Neither the prosecutor 

nor defense counsel objected and the judge never conducted the hearing required 

by N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27).
26 A-4142-17T4

While we understand that the judge was asked to step in for another judge 

to conduct a trial in this case, the matter should thereafter have been managed 

in accordance with the clear requirements of Rule 3:9-1. As we have concluded, 

the judge's error in failing to conduct the N.J.R.E. 104 was harmless beyond a 

reasonable doubt under all of the circumstances of this case. However, this 

mistake could have been entirely avoided had the judge simply followed the 

legal roadmap provided by the Rules of Court.

Accordingly, we strongly caution trial judges that the unintended, 

negative consequences that may flow from a lack of adherence to the pretrial 

procedures and calendaring requirements of Rule 3:9-1 certainly outweigh any 

minor inconveniences a brief delay in the start of a trial to ensure full compliance 

may engender. 

III.

In Point I.B. of his brief, defendant also argues for the first time that the 

judge's instruction to the jury on the tender years testimony was "inadequate and 

erroneous." We disagree.

Jury instructions "must provide a 'comprehensible explanation of the 

questions that the jury must determine, including the law of the case applicable 

to the facts that the jury may find.'" State v. Montalvo, 229 N.J. 300, 320 (2017) 
27 A-4142-17T4

(quoting State v. Singleton, 211 N.J. 157, 181-82 (2012)). If there is no 

objection when the jury instruction is given, "there is a presumption that the 

charge was not in error and was unlikely to prejudice the defendant's case." Ibid. 

(quoting Singleton, 211 N.J. at 182). Because defendant did not object to the 

judge's tender years testimony instruction, we review the judge's determination 

under a plain error standard. Ibid.

There is no Model Jury Instruction for the tender years hearsay exception. 

When there is no available model instruction, "the better practice is to mold the 

instruction in a manner that explains the law to the jury in the context of the 

material facts of the case." State v. Tierney, 356 N.J. Super. 468, 482 (App. 

Div. 2003) (quoting State v. Concepcion, 111 N.J. 373, 379 (1988)).

As noted in Section II of this opinion, N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27) provides that 

statements by children relating to sexual misconduct committed against them 

when they were under the age of twelve may be admitted at trial if there is a 

probability that the statement are trustworthy. To explain this concept to the 

jury in this case, the judge gave the jurors the following instruction:

But first we will discuss what is referred to as 

tender years. A statement by a child under the age of 

[twelve] relating to sexual misconduct with or against 

the child is admissible in a criminal proceeding [i]f, 

among other considerations, it is determined that [on]

the basis of the time, content and circumstances of the 
28 A-4142-17T4

statement[,] there's a probability that the statement is 

trustworthy. Here[,] [Audrey] testified on statements 

allegedly made to her by the victim, [Amy], on 

allegations of criminal conduct by the defendant.

Det[ective] Serio testified regarding the forensic 

video interview conducted by Det[ective] Serio with 

the seven[-]year[-]old victim, [Amy], where [Amy] 

made allegations of criminal conduct by the defendant. 

As jurors[,] you may give such weight to the testimony 

as you deem it entitled.

Contrary to defendant's contentions on appeal, the instruction did not 

improperly imply that the judge had found that either Audrey's or Detective 

Serio's testimony had been credible or trustworthy. Instead, the judge 

specifically referred to their testimony as mere "allegations" and she told the 

jurors they should "give such weight to the testimony as [they] deem it entitled."

We also note that the judge gave additional instructions to the jurors on 

the issue of witness credibility. For example, the judge instructed the jurors that 

they were "the sole and exclusive judges of the evidence, of the credibility of 

the witnesses and the weight to be attached to the testimony of each witness." 

The judge gave similar instructions during her final charge to the jury at the 

conclusion of the trial.

"[I]n reviewing any claim of error relating to a jury charge, the 'charge 

must be read as a whole in determining whether there was any error’ . . . ." 
29 A-4142-17T4

State v. Gonzalez, 444 N.J. Super. 62, 70-71 (App. Div. 2016) (quoting State v. 

Torres, 183 N.J. 554, 564 (2005)). Applying this standard, we detect no 

reversible error in the judge's instructions on the tender years instruction to the 

jury. The instruction adequately explained the law to the jurors as stated in 

N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27) and advised them, consistent with the overall charge as a 

whole, that they were the sole judges of the credibility of Audrey's and Detective 

Serio's testimony concerning the statements Amy made to them.

IV.

In Point II of his brief, defendant asserts that the judge erred by denying 

his motion for a judgment of acquittal on the third-degree aggravated assault 

charge (count six) at the conclusion of the trial. Defendant argues that the State 

failed to produce sufficient evidence to prove he caused significant injury to the 

child victim when he choked her for refusing to accede to his assaults and to 

force her to do so. Again, we disagree. 

A motion for acquittal must be granted "if the evidence is insufficient to 

warrant a conviction." R. 3:18-1.

On a motion for judgment of acquittal, the governing 

test is: whether the evidence viewed in its entirety, and 

giving the State the benefit of all of its favorable

testimony and all of the favorable inferences which can 

reasonably be drawn therefrom, is such that a jury could 
30 A-4142-17T4

properly find beyond a reasonable doubt that the 

defendant was guilty of the crime charged.

[State v. D.A., 191 N.J. 158, 163 (2007) (citing State v. 

Reyes, 50 N.J. 454, 458-59 (1967)).]

We have stated that "the trial judge is not concerned with the worth, 

nature[,] or extent (beyond a scintilla) of the evidence, but only with its 

existence, viewed most favorably to the State." State v. DeRoxtro, 327 N.J. 

Super. 212, 224 (App. Div. 2000) (quoting State v. Kluber, 130 N.J. Super. 336, 

341 (App. Div. 1974)). Our review of a trial court's denial of a motion for 

acquittal is "limited and deferential," and is governed by the same standard as 

the trial court. State v. Reddish, 181 N.J. 553, 620 (2004).

Applying these standards, we conclude that the State presented sufficient 

proofs at trial concerning the aggravated assault charge to survive defendant's 

motion for a judgment of acquittal. A person is guilty of aggravated assault 

under N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(7) "if the person . . . causes significant bodily injury 

purposely or knowingly." "'Significant bodily injury' means bodily injury which 

creates a temporary loss of the function of any bodily member or organ or 

temporary loss of any of the five senses." N.J.S.A. 2C:11-1(d).

Here, the child victim testified that defendant choked her on numerous 

occasions by putting his hand around her neck when she refused to obey his 
31 A-4142-17T4

sexual demands. Amy told Detective Serio that defendant choked her if she 

refused to come when he called her into his room. She also stated that on one 

of these occasions, Sally saw defendant choking her. At trial, Amy testified that 

defendant would put his hand on her neck and pull it forward to force her to put 

his penis into her mouth. Amy also reported these assaults to her mother.

Defendant's use of these chokeholds on the child obviously caused a 

temporary loss of a bodily function, namely, Amy's ability to breathe, and 

therefore fell within the intendment of the statutory language of N.J.S.A. 2C:12-

1(b)(7) and N.J.S.A. 2C:11-1(d). Therefore, we discern no basis for disturbing 

the judge's decision denying defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal on 

the aggravated assault charge.

V.

In Point III, defendant argues for the first time on appeal that because he 

and a detective mentioned that DYFS had initiated an investigation into his 

involvement with Amy during his first interview with the police on April 29, 

2015, and this statement was admitted into evidence, his convictions must be 

reversed. This argument lacks merit.

In his April 29 statement, defendant told the detective that a DYFS worker 

advised him he could not continue to live in the house and babysit Sally while 
32 A-4142-17T4

the investigation was pending. Defendant also said that the worker asked him 

if he had touched the child or if she "gave [him] oral sex[.]" Defendant told the 

worker "no," and further stated that he never even let Amy come in his room. 

Prior to the trial, the judge held a Miranda hearing concerning both of 

defendant's statements to the police. After the hearing was completed, defendant 

withdrew his objection to the admission of the April 29 statement.9 In addition, 

defendant did not object to the statement when it was played to the jury at the 

trial. Further, when defendant testified during the trial, his attorney referred to

the statement on direct examination in order to allow defendant to tell the jury 

that he had denied the allegations from the outset. However, defendant now 

asserts that the judge erred by failing to sua sponte redact the references to 

DYFS from the statement.

As noted above, when a party argues for the first time on appeal that an 

error occurred during trial, we analyze the argument under the plain error 

standard. R. 2:10-2. Applying that standard, we perceive no error, much less 

reversible error, in the admission of defendant's unredacted, April 29 statement. 

The references to DYFS were fleeting. The prosecutor never referred to DYFS

during her questioning of the witnesses or during her summation. Moreover, 

 

9

 The judge found that defendant's May 6, 2015 statement was admissible.
33 A-4142-17T4

defendant was able to use the statement to support the overall defense strategy 

that defendant had consistently denied all of the allegations of abuse as soon as 

they were raised. Under these circumstances, we reject defendant's contention 

on this point.

VI.

 Finally, defendant argues in Point IV that his sentence was excessive. We 

disagree.

Trial judges have broad sentencing discretion as long as the sentence is 

based on competent credible evidence and fits within the statutory framework. 

State v. Dalziel, 182 N.J. 494, 500 (2005). Judges must identify and consider 

"any relevant aggravating and mitigating factors" that "are called to the court's 

attention" and "explain how they arrived at a particular sentence." State v. Case, 

220 N.J. 49, 64-65 (2014) (quoting State v. Blackmon, 202 N.J. 283, 297 

(2010)). "Appellate review of sentencing is deferential," and we therefore avoid 

substituting our judgment for the judgment of the trial court. Id. at 65; accord

State v. O'Donnell, 117 N.J. 210, 215 (1989); State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 365 

(1984). 

We are satisfied the judge made findings of fact concerning aggravating 

and mitigating factors and the imposition of consecutive sentences that were 
34 A-4142-17T4

based on competent and reasonably credible evidence in the record, and applied 

the correct sentencing guidelines enunciated in the Code. Accordingly, we 

discern no basis to second-guess the sentence.

Affirmed.