RENDERED: JANUARY 7, 2022; 10:00 A.M.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky

Court of Appeals

NO. 2021-CA-0062-MR

ZAYER ANTONIO ADAMS APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM CHRISTIAN CIRCUIT COURT

v. HONORABLE ANDREW C. SELF, JUDGE

ACTION NO. 16-CR-00379

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE

AND

NO. 2021-CA-0064-MR

ZAYER ANTONIO ADAMS APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM CHRISTIAN CIRCUIT COURT

v. HONORABLE ANDREW C. SELF, JUDGE

ACTION NO. 16-CR-00235

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
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OPINION

AFFIRMING

**   **  **

BEFORE: ACREE, JONES, AND K. THOMPSON, JUDGES.

JONES, JUDGE: Zayer Adams appeals from the Christian Circuit Court’s order 

denying his motion to vacate his sentence pursuant to RCr1 11.42. After a 

thorough review of the record, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

A thorough recitation of the facts of this case may be found in the 

Kentucky Supreme Court’s unpublished opinion on Adams’s direct appeal. Adams 

v. Commonwealth, No. 2016-SC-000627-MR, 2017 WL 6379489 (Ky. Dec. 14, 

2017). Briefly stated, Adams was charged for severely beating his ex-wife, 

Stephanie Shakoor, while holding her captive in her apartment on the morning of 

February 4, 2016, and attempting to flee from the police after they arrived at the 

apartment in response to a neighbor’s call. Id. at *1. Shakoor suffered numerous 

injuries, including swelling, bruising, corneal abrasion, and fractures to the 

maxillary bones and the bones adjacent to the sinus cavity; these latter injuries 

resulted from Adams repeatedly kicking Shakoor in the face. Adams was 

thereafter convicted at jury trial for second-degree assault, first-degree fleeing or 

evading police, first-degree unlawful imprisonment, and being a first-degree 

1 Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
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persistent felony offender. Id. The jury recommended a sentence of fifteen years 

for the assault conviction, to be served consecutively with a seven-year sentence 

for unlawful imprisonment; however, the trial court imposed a concurrent sentence 

of twenty years in order to comply with KRS2 532.110(1)(c). Id. The Kentucky 

Supreme Court affirmed Adams’s judgment and sentence on direct appeal. Id. at 

*5.

Adams subsequently filed a pro se motion to vacate his conviction 

under RCr 11.42, arguing he suffered ineffective assistance of counsel during his 

trial. Adams specifically contended, inter alia, that trial counsel failed to 

investigate his mental health issues in order to present mitigating evidence to the 

jury during the penalty phase. (Record (R.) at 77.) The trial court appointed postconviction counsel to assist Adams and held an evidentiary hearing on July 7, 

2020. 

During the evidentiary hearing, Adams’s trial counsel testified about 

his prior knowledge of Adams’s mental health and about counsel’s preparation for 

trial. He testified he was aware Adams had some mental health issues, and he had 

investigated the matter by reviewing a recent district court case in which the 

district court had found Adams competent following a psychological evaluation. 

Trial counsel stated he wanted Adams to get an evaluation from the Kentucky 

2 Kentucky Revised Statutes.
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Correctional Psychiatric Center (KCPC), but Adams did not wish to pursue the 

competency issue further. Additionally, trial counsel testified about how difficult

it was for him to investigate and prepare for the penalty phase of the trial because 

Adams did not wish to discuss mitigation in general or to reveal information about 

his childhood. Even so, trial counsel testified that he tried to contact Adams’s 

mother in preparation for trial. The last known address trial counsel was able to 

find for Adams’s mother was a homeless shelter, but he was unable to locate her 

there. 

Next, Adams’s trial counsel testified about his preparation for trial 

and the speed at which Adams’s case progressed. Trial counsel admitted that the 

case moved very fast and that he would have preferred to have more time to 

prepare for trial. He explained that Adams was insistent on moving things along 

quickly and that Adams opposed trial counsel’s plans to ask the court for a 

continuance. 

Adams also testified at the RCr 11.42 evidentiary hearing. He 

asserted his mother had “a mental defect” and that he suffered from a similar 

condition. He described his upbringing, his mental health medications, how he 

was not able to read or write, and how his mother was not at his trial. Adams also 

admitted he asked for a fast and speedy trial because he needed medical treatment 

for an injury to his hand, though his testimony was unclear regarding how these
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two items were connected. In addition to his testimony, Adams submitted a

collective exhibit to the court containing documents dating from the early 1980s 

from Pennyroyal Center, in which Adams was diagnosed as low-functioning and 

suffering from attention deficit disorder.

3

 The trial court ultimately denied 

Adams’s RCr 11.42 motion. This appeal followed.

II. ANALYSIS

A successful petition for relief under RCr 11.42 based on ineffective 

assistance of counsel must survive the twin prongs of “performance” and 

“prejudice” provided in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 

80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), accord Gall v. Commonwealth, 702 S.W.2d 37 (Ky. 

1985). The “performance” prong of Strickland requires as follows: 

Appellant must show that counsel’s performance was 

deficient. This is done by showing that counsel made 

errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 

“counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth 

Amendment, or that counsel’s representation fell below 

an objective standard of reasonableness.

 

Parrish v. Commonwealth, 272 S.W.3d 161, 168 (Ky. 2008) (internal quotation 

marks and citations omitted). The “prejudice” prong requires a showing that 

“counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial 

3 The Pennyroyal Center provides mental health and related services to individuals in western 

Kentucky. 
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whose result is reliable.” Commonwealth v. McGorman, 489 S.W.3d 731, 736 

(Ky. 2016) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064). 

Both Strickland prongs must be met before relief pursuant to RCr 

11.42 may be granted. “Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said 

that the conviction . . . resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that 

renders the result unreliable.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064. 

This is a very difficult standard to meet. “Surmounting Strickland’s high bar is 

never an easy task.” Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 371, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 

1485, 176 L. Ed. 2d 284 (2010). We review counsel’s performance under 

Strickland de novo. McGorman, 489 S.W.3d at 736.

For his sole issue on appeal, Adams contends his trial counsel was 

ineffective in his failure to investigate and prepare for the penalty phase of 

Adams’s trial, particularly in his failure to present evidence to mitigate Adams’s 

punishment. Adams argues a competent attorney would have gathered documents 

similar to the ones in the collective exhibit and presented them to the jury, and the 

failure of trial counsel to do so was deficient performance. Furthermore, Adams 

contends he suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s performance, pointing to the 

fact that his jury recommended a consecutive sentence which exceeded the limits 

imposed by statute.
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In its order denying the RCr 11.42 motion, the trial court determined 

that, “[o]ther than possibly introducing records from the Pennyroyal Center from 

the 1980’s – which may or may not have been admissible – it is unclear what else 

Adams believes his trial counsel should have done.” (R. at 148.) The trial court 

also found that trial counsel’s “investigation and preparation were sufficient and 

reasonable” in light of Adams’s unwillingness to assist with preparations for the 

penalty phase. Id. We agree. 

“In any case presenting an ineffectiveness claim, the performance 

inquiry must be whether counsel’s assistance was reasonable considering all the 

circumstances.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S. Ct. at 2065. However, 

[t]he reasonableness of counsel’s actions may be 

determined or substantially influenced by the defendant’s 

own statements or actions. Counsel’s actions are usually 

based, quite properly, on informed strategic choices made 

by the defendant and on information supplied by the 

defendant. In particular, what investigation decisions are 

reasonable depends critically on such information.

Id. at 691, 104 S. Ct. at 2066. Adams’s trial counsel testified how Adams did not 

wish to engage with him on questions regarding his childhood or on mitigation 

generally. Trial counsel attempted to locate Adams’s mother as a mitigation

witness, but she could not be found at her last known address. Finally, Adams 

opposed any kind of continuance, further hindering what actions counsel could 

undertake on his behalf. Trial counsel nonetheless attempted to provide mitigation 
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information to the jury through Adams’s testimony in the penalty phase. The 

record supports the trial court’s determination that Adams’s trial counsel provided 

reasonable investigation and preparation under the circumstances. 

“[C]ounsel is constitutionally ineffective only if performance below 

professional standards caused the defendant to lose what he otherwise would 

probably have won.” Brown v. Commonwealth, 253 S.W.3d 490, 499 (Ky. 2008) 

(citations omitted). We cannot say trial counsel provided deficient performance 

under the first prong of Strickland.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Christian Circuit Court’s

order denying relief under RCr 11.42.

ALL CONCUR.

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:

David L. Stewart

LaGrange, Kentucky

BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Daniel Cameron

Attorney General of Kentucky

Stephanie L. McKeehan

Assistant Attorney General

Frankfort, Kentucky