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22-661-cr

United States v. McGrain

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Second Circuit 

August Term 2023

Submitted: November 29, 2023

Decided: June 21, 2024

No. 22-661-cr

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Appellee, 

v.

JOSEPH MCGRAIN,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of New York 

No. 20-cr-6113, Wolford, Chief Judge. 
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Before: LYNCH, PARK, and MENASHI, Circuit Judges.

Joseph McGrain was sentenced to 264 months’ imprisonment 

for sexually abusing his then-girlfriend’s fourteen-year-old daughter

(“MV”) and obstructing the investigation into that abuse. At 

sentencing, the district court (Wolford, C.J.) applied a two-offenselevel enhancement under section 2G2.1(b)(5) of the Sentencing 

Guidelines because MV was in McGrain’s “custody, care, or 

supervisory control” when McGrain abused her. It also denied 

McGrain an offense-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility 

because (1) McGrain merited an enhancement for obstruction of 

justice and (2) he continued to deny both that he had a sexual 

relationship with MV and that he convinced her to send him sexually 

explicit images. Finally, in weighing the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) 

sentencing factors, the district court determined that McGrain was

dangerous because he refused to admit the full extent of his conduct. 

McGrain argues on appeal that each of these decisions was reversible 

error, that his sentence should be vacated, and that his case should be 

assigned to a different judge on remand. 

 We AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. 

Martin J. Vogelbaum, Office of the Federal Public 

Defender, Buffalo, NY, for Defendant-Appellant. 

Katherine A. Gregory, Assistant United States Attorney 

for Trini E. Ross, United States Attorney for the Western 

District of New York, Buffalo, NY, for Appellee. 
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PARK,Circuit Judge: 

Joseph McGrain was sentenced to 264 months’ imprisonment 

for sexually abusing his then-girlfriend’s fourteen-year-old daughter

(“MV”) and obstructing the investigation into that abuse. At 

sentencing, the district court (Wolford, C.J.) applied a two-offenselevel enhancement under section 2G2.1(b)(5) of the Sentencing 

Guidelines because MV was in McGrain’s “custody, care, or 

supervisory control” when McGrain abused her. It also denied 

McGrain an offense-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility 

because (1) McGrain merited an enhancement for obstruction of 

justice and (2) he continued to deny both that he had a sexual 

relationship with MV and that he convinced her to send him sexually 

explicit images. Finally, in weighing the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) 

sentencing factors, the district court determined that McGrain was

dangerous because he refused to admit the full extent of his conduct. 

McGrain argues on appeal that each of these decisions was reversible 

error, that his sentence should be vacated, and that his case should be 

assigned to a different judge on remand. 

We affirm the judgment of the district court. 
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I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background1

In the late spring or early summer of 2018, McGrain’s girlfriend 

and her fourteen-year-old daughter, MV, moved into his house to live 

with him full time. At one point, they shared a roughly 1,200-squarefoot, two-level home with at least two of McGrain’s daughters, the 

daughter of McGrain’s cousin, and occasionally the daughters’ 

boyfriends, one of whom was MV’s brother. 

MV’s mother and McGrain shared some parenting 

responsibilities. MV’s mother was her primary parent and caregiver, 

and she “usually” had the final say in parenting decisions. After some 

initial disagreements over how to raise MV, she and McGrain agreed 

to parent only their respective children. But McGrain still set the 

“rules of the house,” often drove MV to school, and was usually the 

only person home with MV after school.

MV and McGrain grew close, and she confided in him about 

her difficulties changing schools after moving. She considered 

McGrain the “father [she] never had” and thought of one of his 

daughters as “a little sister.” When MV had trouble sleeping one 

night, her mother trusted McGrain to lie down with her for comfort, 

as McGrain did for his biological daughter when she had nightmares 

and couldn’t sleep. 

1 As discussed below, MV testified at a presentencing evidentiary 

hearing. The district court found her testimony credible and McGrain does 

not challenge that finding. This section is drawn from her testimony. 
5

McGrain took advantage of that trust to abuse MV sexually for 

nearly a year and a half. The two had sexual intercourse roughly 400 

times. McGrain regularly asked MV to send him sexually explicit 

images, including images of herself engaged in sexual acts. MV 

complied. And throughout, McGrain provided her with drugs, 

including LSD, fentanyl, MDMA, cocaine, and marijuana. 

On March 27, 2020, MV’s brother and others discovered 

sexually explicit messages with McGrain on MV’s phone. They 

confronted MV. One of McGrain’s daughters urged MV to delete all 

her communications with McGrain, which MV tried to do. She

deleted messages and photographs shared via SnapChat, Instagram, 

and text, but forgot to erase her Facebook messages. MV’s brother 

wanted to recover the messages and so reached out to their biological 

father and his girlfriend, who paid for the cellphone. The girlfriend 

then contacted law enforcement, and police came to the house that 

evening. McGrain was not arrested that night; the record is not clear

as to why. 

MV left McGrain’s house the night the police came, but 

McGrain continued to contact her. When MV told McGrain that law 

enforcement had their Facebook messages, he told her that “death is 

my way out” and that if MV “really want[ed] it to end, then tell them 

you set it all up and lied.” MV protested that she couldn’t do that 

because the police already had the messages and everyone in her 

family knew what happened. To this McGrain responded, “well, I 

know what I need to do.” Alarmed, MV asked McGrain to promise 

that he wouldn’t kill himself, but McGrain didn’t respond. MV then
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told her biological father and his girlfriend about the conversation. 

They contacted the police a second time. Sometime the next day, 

McGrain deleted the contents of his cell phone. And a few days later, 

McGrain was arrested pursuant to a criminal complaint charging him 

with enticement of a minor, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b).

B. Procedural History

1. McGrain’s Indictment and Guilty Plea

In August 2020, a grand jury in the Western District of New 

York returned an indictment charging McGrain with (1) enticement 

of a minor, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b); (2) attempted 

obstruction of justice for pressuring MV to tell law enforcement that

she had lied, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(1); and (3) obstruction 

of justice for deleting the contents of his phone, in violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 1519. 

McGrain attempted to plead guilty without a plea agreement 

in April 2021. The district court refused to accept that plea because 

McGrain refused to admit that he had sex with MV or intended to do 

so when he was sending her the text messages on which the 

enticement charge was based. Instead, McGrain claimed that he had 

expressed his desire to have sex with MV only after she turned 18. 

Without an admission that McGrain had or intended to have sex with 

MV, his plea to the enticement charge would have lacked a factual 

basis, so the district court could not accept it. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 

11(b)(3). 
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Later that month, the district court accepted a new guilty plea. 

Although McGrain continued to maintain that he did not have sex 

with MV, he admitted to encouraging her to send him sexually 

explicit photographs of herself. He denied, however, that he ever 

received any. The district court determined that enticing a minor 

victim to send sexually explicit images would violate 18 U.S.C. 

§ 2422(b) and so would be a sufficient factual basis for the plea. It also 

determined that whether McGrain and MV had had sex would be “a 

sentencing issue” “[b]ecause [it] will impact the Guideline 

calculations, but it doesn’t impact whether or not there is a factual 

basis to plead to the charge.” McGrain’s counsel agreed. The district 

court also accepted McGrain’s guilty plea to the obstruction charges. 

2. The Evidentiary Hearing 

The district court scheduled an evidentiary hearing before 

sentencing to resolve factual disputes arising from McGrain’s 

presentence investigation report (“PSR”). The PSR applied the crossreference at section 2G1.3(c)(1) of the Sentencing Guidelines for child 

pornography to McGrain’s section 2422(b) violation. McGrain’s plea 

allocution triggered that cross-reference when he admitted that he 

had encouraged MV to send him sexually explicit images of herself. 

Applying the cross-reference, McGrain’s base offense level was 

32. The PSR added: (1) two levels because MV was under the age of 

sixteen (section 2G2.1(b)(1)(B)); (2) two levels because MV was in 

McGrain’s “custody, care, or supervisory control” (section 

2G2.1(b)(5)); (3) two levels because the offense involved the use of a 

computer (section 2G2.1(b)(6)(B)); (4) two levels for obstruction of 
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justice (section 3C1.1); and (5) five levels because McGrain had 

engaged in a pattern of prohibited sexual conduct (section 

4B1.5(b)(1)). Finally, the PSR subtracted two levels for acceptance of 

responsibility (section 3E1.1(a)), for a total offense level of 43. 

McGrain objected to the PSR, primarily contesting that he ever 

had a physical sexual relationship with MV or that she was ever in his 

custody, care, or supervisory control. He also filed a letter expressing 

his remorse, saying that he was “again claiming responsibility for 

[his] actions.” But he did not admit to his sexual abuse of MV or to 

receiving sexually explicit images from her. After the district court 

determined that it would need to hold an evidentiary hearing to 

address McGrain’s objections to the PSR, he tried to withdraw nearly 

all of them. He continued to object, however, to the application of the 

section 2G1.3 cross-reference. 

The district court determined that an evidentiary hearing 

remained necessary because McGrain refused to admit that he had 

sexually abused MV and the resolution of that factual dispute would 

impact the Guidelines enhancements that would apply in calculating

his total offense level. The hearing took place over two days in 

December 2021. MV testified at length about McGrain’s sexual abuse 

as well as his demands that she send him sexually explicit images. 

3. The District Court’s Conclusions and Sentencing

On February 1, 2022, the district court issued a decision finding 

MV’s testimony “entirely credible and believable,” including the 

portions establishing that McGrain had sex with MV “repeatedly and 

consistently from the time she was 14 years old until on or about 
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March 27, 2020.” United States v. McGrain, 583 F. Supp. 3d 392, 398 

(W.D.N.Y. 2022). It found that McGrain’s “version of events” was 

“not credible” and that McGrain’s claim at the plea proceeding that 

he had not had sex with MV was perjurious. Id. at 399. The district 

court found that McGrain had sex with MV, id.; that he caused her to 

produce child pornography, id. at 399-400; and that MV was in his 

custody, care, or supervisory control, id. at 401-02. 

The district court sentenced McGrain to 264 months’ 

imprisonment, despite the fact that the Guidelines recommended a 

life sentence. It calculated an offense level of 45 before reducing to 

the maximum offense level of 43. The district court generally 

followed the PSR’s calculation, including by applying the child 

pornography cross-reference under section 2G1.3(c)(1), but it applied 

no reduction for acceptance of responsibility. The district court based 

its sentence on the offense conduct, the impact on MV, McGrain’s 

efforts to cover up the conduct, and McGrain’s failure to admit the 

full extent of what he had done, which demonstrated that he 

continued to be “dangerous”: “[Y]ou haven’t [admitted the truth] up 

to this point. And so you’re not remorseful, and, to me, that 

demonstrates how dangerous you are because of the fact that you 

have refused, after all of this, after an evidentiary hearing, after 

having the minor victim come in and testify, bringing your daughters 

in here to testify, you still, to this day, refuse to admit the truth.” 

This timely appeal followed. 
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II. DISCUSSION

McGrain makes three arguments on appeal. First, he 

challenges the application of the “custody, care, or supervisory 

control” enhancement under section 2G2.1(b)(5). Second, he claims 

the district court erred by denying him credit for acceptance of 

responsibility under section 3E1.1(a). And third, he asserts that the 

district court’s factual finding that he is dangerous—and therefore 

merits a greater sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)—was not 

supported by the record. We reject each of these arguments and 

affirm the judgment of the district court. 

A. “Custody, Care, or Supervisory Control” Enhancement

We review a district court’s interpretation and application of 

the Guidelines de novo, and its findings of fact relevant to the 

Guidelines’ application for clear error. See United States v. Cramer, 777 

F.3d 597, 601 (2d Cir. 2015). McGrain argues that the “custody, care, 

or supervisory control” enhancement should not apply because it 

requires a defendant to have a “pre-existing parent-like position of 

authority.” Appellant’s Br. at 37 (quoting United States v. Brooks, 610 

F.3d 1186, 1201 (9th Cir. 2010)). We disagree. Parent-like authority is 

sufficient to merit the enhancement, but it is not necessary. Although 

we have not previously addressed in a published opinion the types of 
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relationships to which the enhancement applies,2 the plain language 

of section 2G2.1(b)(5) encompasses McGrain’s relationship with MV. 

We begin with the text. Section 2G2.1(b)(5) of the Guidelines 

requires a two-level enhancement “[i]f the defendant was a parent, 

relative, or legal guardian of the minor involved in the offense, or if 

the minor was otherwise in the custody, care, or supervisory control 

of the defendant.” U.S.S.G. § 2G2.1(b)(5). Under the first part of this 

Guideline, the enhancement applies to “a parent, relative, or legal 

guardian of the minor” by virtue of their relationship alone. The 

second part then includes other defendants without such a 

2 In a summary order, we have considered the relationships covered 

by section 2A3.1(b)(3)(A), which applies in criminal sexual abuse cases and, 

like section 2G2.1(b)(5), provides for a two-level enhancement if the victim 

was “in the custody, care, or supervisory control of the defendant.” 

U.S.S.G. § 2A3.1(b)(3)(A). The relevant application note for section 

2A3.1(b)(3)(A) is also virtually identical to the note for section 2G2.1(b)(5). 

In United States v. Jass, 331 F. App’x 850 (2d Cir. 2009), we concluded that 

the defendant’s “long-term status as the live-in girlfriend of the child’s 

father permitted the district court to find that her status was sufficiently 

akin to that of a stepmother to support a finding of some degree of custody 

and supervisory control over the child even if the father exercised primary 

custody and control.” Id. at 857. We also noted that “the district court’s 

factual finding regarding [the defendant’s] custody and supervisory control 

over the child victim[]” is reviewed “for clear error.” Id.; see also United 

States v. Perez-Colon, 62 F.4th 805, 812 (3d Cir. 2023) (“[W]e review 

application of the § 2G2.1(b)(5) enhancement for clear error.”); United States 

v. Alfaro, 555 F.3d 496, 499 (5th Cir. 2009) (stating, in reviewing a district 

court’s application of the enhancement under § 2G2.1(b)(5), that “[w]e 

review for clear error this application of the Sentencing Guidelines in 

question to the facts”). 
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relationship but who nonetheless had “custody, care, or supervisory 

control” of the minor. The word “otherwise” indicates that parents, 

relatives, and legal guardians are examples of those who exercise 

custody, care, or supervisory control but that such authority is not 

restricted to parents, relatives, and legal guardians. 

The question whether a minor is in the “custody, care, or 

supervisory control” of a defendant “requires a case-by-case analysis 

of the defendant’s relationship to the victim and the setting in which 

the crime was committed.” United States v. Perez-Colon, 62 F.4th 805, 

812 (3d Cir. 2023). As the application note explains, “[i]n determining 

whether to apply this adjustment, the court should look to the actual 

relationship that existed between the defendant and the minor and 

not simply to the legal status of the defendant-minor relationship.” 

U.S.S.G. § 2G2.1 cmt. n.5(A). 

And although a relationship qualifying for the enhancement 

may often be “parent-like,” the text of the Guideline is not so limited. 

“[C]ustody, care, or supervisory control” may encompass a range of 

other relationships in which a minor is “entrusted to the defendant, 

whether temporarily or permanently.” Perez-Colon, 62 F.4th at 813 n.9 

(quoting U.S.S.G. § 2G2.1 cmt. n.5(A)); see also id. at 813 (“Care and 

supervisory control require some degree of authority over or 

responsibility for the victim—something more than mere presence. 

But that standard does not require parent-like authority.” (cleaned 

up)). “The authority exercised by a relative can vary widely 

depending on the relative and is often less than ‘parent-like.’” Id. at 

813. 
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Application note 5(A) to section 2G2.1 reinforces this 

understanding. It explains that “[s]ubsection (b)(5) is intended to 

have broad application and includes offenses involving a minor 

entrusted to the defendant, whether temporarily or permanently. For 

example, teachers, day care providers, baby-sitters, or other 

temporary caretakers are among those who would be subject to this 

enhancement.” U.S.S.G. § 2G2.1 cmt. n.5(A). This note supports the 

ordinary reading of the text, which contemplates that a defendant 

may have the requisite degree of authority over the minor without 

qualifying as a parent, relative, or legal guardian. We thus reject 

McGrain’s proposed requirement of parent-like authority as 

inconsistent with the text of section 2G2.1. 

Applying the Guideline to this case, McGrain’s relationship 

with MV easily merits the enhancement. Even though MV’s mother 

was her primary parent, the district court correctly determined that 

McGrain shared some parental responsibilities with her. In 

particular, McGrain lived with MV for over a year and a half. He set 

the rules of the household for MV. He was frequently alone with MV 

both while driving her to school and at home after school. MV 

thought of McGrain as the “father [she] never had.” Both MV and her 

mother trusted McGrain to comfort her, including by lying down 

with MV at night. It is this relationship of trust and care that McGrain 

abused by victimizing MV. 

The Eighth Circuit confronted a virtually identical fact pattern 

and applied the two-level enhancement under section 2A3.1(b)(3)(A)

in United States v. Balfany, 965 F.2d 575 (8th Cir. 1992). In that case, 
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the defendant and the victim’s mother “lived together as husband and 

wife,” and “[a]lthough they often disciplined their own children, . . . 

they shared many household responsibilities, including caring for the 

children at times.” Id. at 585. In addition, on “at least one occasion” 

when sexual abuse occurred, the victim “was clearly in [the 

defendant’s] sole custody and care.” Id. We likewise conclude that 

the two-level enhancement under section 2G2.1(b)(5) applies here 

because McGrain, among other things, lived with MV’s mother, 

shared household responsibilities and parenting authority, and was 

frequently trusted to care for MV alone. 

In response, McGrain points to two decisions of other Circuits

finding the “custody, care, or supervisory control” enhancement to be 

inapplicable. But neither resembles this case. In United States v. Blue, 

255 F.3d 609 (8th Cir. 2001), the Eighth Circuit concluded that the 

victim’s mother had never transferred care of the child to the 

defendant, who assaulted the child when they were temporarily in 

the bathroom together while the mother was home. Id. at 614-15. 

Here, McGrain lived with MV when the abuse occurred and was 

trusted to supervise her alone at least some of the time, including 

when the abuse began. See id. (distinguishing cases in which 

defendants babysat or supervised the victims while their parents 

were absent). And in United States v. Blackbird, 949 F.3d 530 (10th Cir. 

2020), the government “had not presented one iota of evidence that 

the defendant actually controlled any aspect of the [victim’s] life.” Id. 

at 532 (cleaned up). But here, McGrain set household rules and had 

some say in parenting decisions for MV. 
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We thus affirm the district court’s application of the 

enhancement. 

B. Acceptance of Responsibility Reduction 

Section 3E1.1(a) of the Sentencing Guidelines allows a district 

court to grant a two-level reduction in a defendant’s offense level “[i]f 

the defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for 

his offense.” U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a). McGrain challenges the district 

court’s denial of this reduction. 

“Whether the defendant has accepted responsibility is a factual 

question, and a district court’s determination in this regard should 

not be disturbed unless it is without foundation.” United States v. 

Taylor, 475 F.3d 65, 68 (2d Cir. 2007) (cleaned up). The reduction for 

acceptance of responsibility “is unavailable, absent ‘extraordinary 

circumstances,’ to a defendant properly found to merit an 

obstruction-of-justice enhancement.” United States v. McLeod, 251 

F.3d 78, 82-83 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting United States v. Champion, 234 

F.3d 106, 110 (2d Cir. 2000)). 

McGrain does not contest that he merited an enhancement for 

obstruction of justice. Instead, he argues that this is an 

“extraordinary” case for several reasons, including because (1) 

“much” of his obstructive conduct occurred before his arrest; (2) he 

pleaded guilty; (3) his failure to admit to a sexual relationship with 

MV led to his admission that he attempted to get her to send him 

sexual images, increasing his Guidelines range; and (4) his acceptance 

of responsibility increased over time. We reject these arguments and 
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affirm the district court’s conclusion that this case did not present 

“extraordinary circumstances.” 

First, it is not extraordinary that McGrain’s obstruction 

occurred before his purported acceptance of responsibility. Engaging 

in conduct that indicates acceptance of responsibility after having 

obstructed justice does not necessarily entitle a defendant to a 

reduction under section 3E1.1(a). See Champion, 234 F.3d at 108, 111

(affirming denial of acceptance-of-responsibility reduction when the 

defendant “made false statements at the time of his arrest, submitted 

a perjurious affidavit, and had two witnesses testify falsely on his 

behalf” even though he later “confessed his guilt and provided 

information to the police”). In any event, to whatever extent a sincere 

and complete acceptance of responsibility after earlier obstructive 

conduct could merit application of the sentence reduction in an 

appropriate case, the district court here found that McGrain never 

took responsibility or expressed remorse for his sexual abuse of MV.

Second, the fact that McGrain pleaded guilty and admitted to 

certain facts concerning his relationship with MV does not entitle him 

to a reduction for acceptance of responsibility. We have held that 

“[a]lthough a guilty plea, combined with truthful statements about 

the defendant’s offense and other relevant conduct, is significant 

evidence of acceptance of responsibility, it can be outweighed by 

conduct that is inconsistent with acceptance of responsibility.” United 

States v. Strange, 65 F.4th 86, 91 (2d Cir. 2023) (internal quotation 

marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Ortiz, 218 F.3d 107, 108 (2d 

Cir. 2000)). The application notes similarly provide that “[a] 
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defendant who enters a guilty plea is not entitled to an adjustment 

under this section as a matter of right.” U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 cmt. n.3. 

Third, McGrain’s argument that his admission to soliciting 

sexual images from MV increased his Guidelines range is incorrect. 

Without applying the section 2G1.3(c)(1) cross-reference and keeping 

everything else the same, McGrain’s offense level under the PSR 

would have been 43. Although the district court calculated an offense 

level of 45 using the cross-reference, 43 is the maximum offense level. 

So McGrain’s Guidelines range would have been life regardless of the 

cross-reference.3 

Finally, McGrain’s claim that he should receive credit for an 

incomplete, though increasing, acceptance of responsibility is without

support and without merit. We see no basis to disturb the district 

court’s determination that McGrain showed a “lack of remorse.” 

The district court’s factual determination that McGrain had not 

accepted responsibility for his actions was well justified and not 

without foundation. We thus affirm the district court’s denial of a 

reduction for acceptance of responsibility. 

3 The district court calculated a base offense level of 28 under section 

2G1.3(a)(3) of the Guidelines without the cross-reference. It added five twolevel increases under sections 2G1.3(b)(1)(B), 2G1.3(b)(2)(B), 2G1.3(b)(3)(B), 

2G1.3(b)(4)(A), and 3C1.1. That brought McGrain’s offense level to 38, 

which he does not challenge. But the five-level increase under section 

4B1.5(b)(1), which the district court applied with the cross-reference, also 

would have applied without it. That makes McGrain’s offense level 43 

regardless of the cross-reference. 
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C. Dangerousness Finding

We review the district court’s finding that McGrain was 

dangerous for plain error because he did not object to it. See United 

States v. McCrimon, 788 F.3d 75, 78 (2d Cir. 2015). 

To show plain error, “an appellant must demonstrate that 

(1) there is an error; (2) the error is clear or obvious, rather than 

subject to reasonable dispute; (3) the error affected the appellant’s 

substantial rights, which in the ordinary case means it affected the 

outcome of the district court proceedings; and (4) the error seriously 

affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial 

proceedings.” Id. (cleaned up).

The district court determined that McGrain was dangerous 

based on the fact that he “h[ad] not been honest about what [he] did.” 

McGrain argues that this had no evidentiary basis. He further claims 

that the district court failed to explain why his denial of certain 

relevant conduct made him dangerous and thus that it did not 

“adequately explain the chosen sentence to allow for meaningful 

appellate review and to promote the perception of fair sentencing.” 

Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007). 

First, the district court’s factual determination that McGrain 

was dangerous was supported and explained sufficiently by its 

assessment—after two guilty-plea proceedings, a two-day 

evidentiary hearing, and a sentencing hearing—that McGrain had not 

been honest about or accepted responsibility for his actions. See, e.g.,

United States v. Broxmeyer, 699 F.3d 265, 295 (2d Cir. 2012) (“[L]ack of 

remorse for, or even appreciation of, the seriousness of the totality of 
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[a defendant’s] conduct [is] a circumstance that further expanded the 

range of substantively reasonable sentences to allow the district court 

to afford adequate specific deterrence and protection of the public.”). 

Second, the district court adequately explained the reasons for 

its sentence. It carefully reviewed the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing 

factors and explained how they applied to McGrain. See United States 

v. Genao, 869 F.3d 136, 142 (2d Cir. 2017) (“There is no requirement 

that a judge imposing a sentence provide lengthy or elaborate 

explanations of the often multiple aggravating and mitigating factors 

about the offense and the offender, or the precise weight assigned by 

the court to the various, sometimes competing policy considerations 

relevant to sentencing.”). The district court addressed McGrain’s 

upbringing and employment history, his struggles with depression, 

the seriousness of his offense and the rest of the section 3553(a) 

factors. And it concluded that McGrain’s refusal to be honest about 

what he had done indicated that he remained “dangerous.” 

The district court did not err in finding that McGrain was 

dangerous or in increasing his sentence accordingly. We thus affirm 

the district court’s judgment in its entirety and need not address 

McGrain’s request to be resentenced by a different judge. 

III. CONCLUSION

McGrain lived with, and sexually abused, MV for nearly a year

and a half before he was caught. He took advantage of his position of 

trust to commit his crime. When discovered, he destroyed evidence 

and attempted to manipulate MV in an effort to avoid prosecution for 

his actions. At no point did he accept responsibility or even fully 
20

admit what he had done. We find no error in the district court’s 

imposition of a 264-month sentence. 

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.