The c ities of Austin and Dallas will be r efe rre d to as “Austin,” “ Dallas,” or “Cities” de pending 1 on the c on te xt. 

### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-03-00762- CV

Am e r ic an V e te r ans , D e par tm e nt of Te xa s, and V e te r ans of F or e ign Wa r s, De par tm e nt

of T exas, Appellants// City of Dallas, Cross-Appellan t

v. City of Austin , City of Dallas, an d the Honorabl e G reg A bbott, Of fi ce of the At torney G e ne r al o f Te xa s, App e lle e s//Am e r ic an V e te r ans , D e par tm e nt of Te xa s, and Vet erans of For eign Wars, Depart m ent of Texas, Cross-Appellees

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 250TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. GN301204 , HO NORAB LE SCOTT H. JENKI NS, JUDGE PRESI DING

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N
Ameri c a n V e te r a n s , D e p a r tm e nt o f T e xa s , a n d V e te rans of

For eig n Wars, Depa

rtment of Te xas, a

pp e a l fr om the tr ia l c ourt ’s dis mis sa l of the ir de c lara tor y jud g me nt a c tio n th a t so ug ht t o invalidate smoking ordinanc es in the citi es of Austin and Dallas. Appellants sued Austin and D allas 1 and the Honor able Gr egAbbott, Attorney Gene ral of the State of Texas. T he Attorne y Gene ral wa s fi rs t di smi sse d a s a

pa rt y ba se d on his ple a to the jur isd ic tio n. Au sti n an d Da lla s als o fil e d p le a s toAustin, Tex., C ode § 12-5- 1—12-5-14 ( 2003) (Or dinance No. 030605-17); Da llas, Tex., C ode 2 § 41-1—41-12 ( 2003) (Or dinance No. 25168); Op. Te x . Att’y Gen. No. JM-737 (1987). 2 the jurisdiction that were later g rante d, cre ating a final j u d gm en t
. We affir m the trial court’ s jud g me nt.

F ac tu al a nd P r oc e dur al B ac kgr ound

Appellants ar e non-pr ofit fraterna l org anizations that provide edu c a ti o n a l, c h aritable , and cultura l prog rams to Texas veter ans. Among other activities, they operate bing o halls. They

c on te nd that sm ok ingor din a

nc e s ma y inh ibi t th e a mou

nt o f bu sin e ss i n th e se bin g o h a lls . In Apr il 2003, appellants sued Austin, Dallas, and the Attorney Gene ral. Appellants first soug ht declar atory

and inj un c tiv e re lie f on the ir c la ims c ha lle ng ing the va lid ity of anti -s mok ing or din anc e s in Aus tin and Dallas and the validity of an attorney g ener al opinion. Appellants later amende d their petition 2 to reque st only decla

ratory relief . Appellants ar g ued that the a nti-smoking ordina

nces violate d the due proc ess and e qual protec tion clauses of the Texas Constitution, as well as violating se ctions 1.08 and 48.01 of the Texas Penal Code. The Attorne y Gene ral a

nd the Cities filed p l ea s to the jurisdiction challeng ing a ppellants’ standing and the tria l court’s jurisdiction to issue the reque sted decla ration. I n three issues on appea l, appellants conte nd that the trial court err ed in gr anting the Attor ne y Ge ne ra l’ s and

the Citi e s’ ple a s to the jur isd ic tio n ( on e and tw o) and in d e nyinga

pp e lla nts ’ motion to apportion costs (three)

.3 Discussion I. Dism issal of Att

orney Ge neral I n their first issue, appe llants contend th a t t h e trial court e rre d in gr anting the Attorney Gene ral’s ple a to t he jurisdiction. The Attorne y Gene ral’s ple a asse rted that a ppellants did not have standing and that ther e wa s no live controver sy betwee n t h e parties, r ender ing the case nonjusticiable. Appellants off er se vera l bases to over

turn the trial court’s ruling : their action raised a live controve rsy ag ainst the Att orney Gene ral; t heir action called for a decla ration t hat an attorney g ener al opinion was invalid; and their a ction sounded in qu o wa rra nto .
Jus tic iab le

Cont ro v e rsy A d e c larator

y jud g me nt a c tio n mu st name a s pa rt ie s a ll pe rs on s wh o h a ve or c la im any interest that mig ht be af fec ted by the dec laration. Tex

. C i v . P rac . & Re m. Code Ann. § 37.006(a) (West 1977) (herea fter, Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code). The attorney g ener al must be serve d wi th a c op y of any pr oc e e din g c ha lle ng ingthe c on sti tut ion a lity of a statut e or

or din anc e and “ is entitled to be hea

rd.” Id . § 37 .0 06 (b ). How e ve r, it d oe s n ot a uto ma tic a lly

fo llo w that th e re is a justiciable controve rsy

betwee n the par

ties that will be resolved by the dec laration. Se e Lon e Sta rr Mu ltiThe ate rs, In c . v . S

tat e , 922 S.W .2d 295, 297 (Tex. App.—Austin 1996, no writ). Th e Attor ne y Ge ne ra l c on te nd s th a t no jus tic ia ble c on tr ov e r s y

e xists be c a

us e thi s su it attacks c riminal ordinance s. The Attorne y Gene ral do es not have the authority to enforc e the ordinanc es i n question. Se e id . at 298. I n Lon e Sta rr , the court dismiss ed for want of jurisdiction when the pla intiff sued only the State and the A ttorney Gene ral for decla

ratory and injunctive re lief over the co n s t i tutionality of the State’s c riminal obscenity statutes. The Court noted: “Tha t theThe district and c ounty attorney s who had the authority to enforc e the statute should have been 3 named a s defe ndants. Lon e Sta rr M ult i Th e ate rs, In c . v . S

tat e , 9 2 2 S. W. 2 d

2 9 5 , 2 9 8 ( T e x. App.—Austin 1996, no writ). The deleted section specific ally stated t hat the provisions of sec tion 48.01 did not preempt any 4 ordinanc e adopte d by

a g overnme nt entity

now or in the futur e dea li n g wi t h smoking. See Act of May 8, 1975, 64th L eg ., R.S., ch. 290, § 2, 1975 Tex. Gen. L aws 744, 745. 4 a tto rn e y g e ne ra l must be g ive n noti c e of a su it t o d e c lare a

statut e un c on sti tut ion a l do e s n ot s ug g e st, as L one Starr c ontends, that the attorney g ener al i s the proper party to sue in an ac tion for dec laratory relief from the e nforc ement of a criminal statute.” Id . T he Cou rt op ine d tha t the pa

rt y re sp on sib le for e nforc ing the statute must be the def endant a g ainst whom a suit for dec laratory or i njunctive relief was broug ht. Id

. a t 29 7. Th e Court he ld that be c a us e the Attor

ne y Ge ne ra l ha d n o a

uth or ity to e nf or c e the statut e a t is su e in t hat c a se , th e re wa s n o ju sti c ia ble c on tr ov e rs y

be tw e e n th e pa

rt ie s, rende ring any

opinion advisory

. Id . at 297-98. 3 I n this case, a s in L o n e Sta rr , the Attorney Gene ral doe s not have e nforc ement

a uth or ity ov e r t he se or din anc e s. A j us tic ia ble iss ue be tw e e n a

pp e lla nts and the Attor

ne y Ge ne ra l is not present. Se e id

. The Attorn ey G

eneral Opinion Appellants have also asser ted a claim for decla

ratory relief reg arding the validity of Attorney Gene ral Opinion JM -737, advising the Har ris County

attorney that a City

of Hou ston

smo kin g or din anc e wa s n ot p re e mpt e d b y se ction 4 8. 01 of

the Te xas P e na l Co de . T he a pp e lla nts argue that an a

mendment to the Penal Code de leted the se ction discussed in this opinion, t hus rende ring J M-737 invalid. 45 Opinions of the Attorney Gene ral a

re a dvisory

in nature. Holmes v . Morales , 924 S.W. 2d 92 0, 92 4 ( Te x. 19 96 ); Te x as Al c oh oli c Be v e rage Com m’n v. Am us e me nt & Mu sic Op e ra tor s of Tex., Inc

. , 9 97 S.W. 2d

65 1, 65 6 ( Te x. Ap p. —A us tin 19 99 , pe t. dis m’ d w .o .j. ); W eave r v. He ad , 984 S.W .2d 744, 746 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1999, no pet.). S u ch opinions are c onsidered persua sive and are given due consideration, but are not binding on a court. See H enry v . Kaufman County Dev

. Dist. No. 1 , 150 S.W .3d 498, 503-04 (Tex

. App.—Austin 2004, pet. di sm’d by ag r.); City of G ar la nd v. Da lla s M

or nin g Ne ws , 969 S.W .2d 548, 554 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1998), aff’d , 22 S.W .3d 307 (Tex. 2000). A court may invalidate an opinion of the Attorney Gene ral by

making

a co n t ra ry

ruling interpre ting a

statute, or by

taking a position otherwise c ontrary to the position expressed in the attorne y

g ener al opinion. Head , 984 S.W .2d at 746. JM-7 37 wa s is su e d in

re sp on se to a sp e c if

ic qu e sti on a

bo ut a smo kin g or din anc e in Ha rr is C ounty . Ac ourt

c ha lle ng e to t

hat or din anc e wo uld

be the a pp ro pr ia te ve hic le to i nv a lid a te that ordinanc e. A litiga

nt might cite the opinion as pe rsuasive a uthority . Howeve r, that opinion does not have the pr ece dential value of a court opinion—it would simply be one of many fac tors for the trial court to conside r in making its decision about the validity of such a n ordinanc e. Simi larly , appellants mus t c h a ll e n g e th e Ci ti e s ’ o r d in a n c e s . T h e Un if

orm Dec laratory Judg me nts Ac t pe rm its c ourt s to de c lare “ ri g hts , status , and oth e r le g a l r e la tio ns .” Civ . Pr a c . & Re m. Cod e § 3 7. 00 1( a ). Ho we ve r, if no jus tic ia

ble c la im exist s bet

we e n the pa

rt ie s, de c larator

y re lie f i s not appropriate. Se e Bo nh am v . B e ad le , 907 S.W. 2d 46 5, 46 7 (T e x. 19 95 ). A j us tic ia ble c on tr ov e rs y consists of something more than a theore tical dispute; suc h a controve rsy exis ts if a g enuine c onflict of tang ible interest exis ts and the dec laration sought will resolve the controve rsy . See Texas Dep’ tAppellants note that the State ma y bring a quo wa rr an t o proce eding to protect itself a nd the 5 g ener al public. See Tex. Ci v. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 66.001 (West 1997) (he rea fter Civ. Prac

. & Re m. Code). They

contend t h at t he State should have broug ht a proc eedingto challeng e the Citi e s’ or din anc e s a s b e ing in c on fl ic t w ithState law. B e c a us e the State did

no t br ingsu c h a

su it, they contend t hat they

wer e entitled to bring the ca se. Appe llants cite no authority for the proposition that they

wer e entitled to “step into the attorney g ener al’s shoes.” 6 ofPu b. Sa fe ty v . M oo re , 985 S.W .2d 149, 153 (Tex. App.—Austin 1998, no pet.). In this case, the

“ g e nu ine c on fl ic t of tang ibl e int e re sts ” is be tw e e n the a pp e lla nts and the c iti e s of

Da lla s and

Au sti n based on the ir ordinanc es, which ma y not even have bee n based on this attorne y g ene ra l opinion. The de clar ation that would resolve the rea l co n t ro versy is a dec laration concer

ning the validity

of the ordinances , not the validity of the attorney

g ener al opinion. Quo Wa rra nto

Ap pe lla nts a sse rt that th e ir c la ims a g a ins t the Attor

ne y Ge ne ra l are pr op e rl y

wi thi n the trial court’ s jurisdiction because the claims ar e “in the nature of a qu o wa rra nto .” Howeve r, a 5 suit in t he natur e of a quo war ranto may be broug ht only by the Attorney Gene ral or the county

or district attorney of a proper county , either upon his ow n motion or at the reque st of an i n d i v i d ual

re la tor . Ci v. Pr a c . & Re m. C od e § 6 6. 00 2; se e W ils on v . S tat e , 9 77 S.W. 2d

37 9, 38 0 ( Tex . Cr im. Ap p. 19 98 ); Ne wso n v . S

tat e , 922 S.W .2d 274, 277 (Tex. App.—Austin 1996, writ denied) . Fur ther,

a qu o wa rra nto proce eding must state th at “t h e i n formation is soug ht in the name of the State of Texas.” Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 66.002(b). In this case, ne ither the Attorne y Gen er al nor the

c o u n t y o r d i s t r i c ta t t o r

n e ys f o r T r a v i s an d

D a l l a s C o u n t i e s h a v e b r o u g h tt h i s a c t i o n . A c c o r d i n g l y, this case doe s not sound in qu o wa rra nto .Ap p el l an t s co n t en d t h at t h e tr i al co u rt erro n eo u s l y d et er m i n ed t h at t h ey d o n o th av e s t an d i n g. 6 Ev e n if a pp e lla nts ha d s tand ing , th e tr ia l c ourt la c ke d su bje c t ma tte r jur isd ic tio n on oth e r g ro un ds , so standing w ill not be discussed. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1 (cour t to hand down written opinion that is as brief a s prac ticable but addr esses e very issue raised a

nd nece ssary

to final dispositi on). 7 We h a ve c on sid e re d a

nd re je c te d a pp e llan ts’ argume nts c on c e rn ingthe ir a bil ity to maintain this suit ag ainst the Attorney Gene ral. We over

rule a ppellants’ first issue.

II. Cit ies of Austin and Dallas—Pleas to t he Jurisdi ction I n their sec ond issue, appellants c ontend that the trial c ourt err ed in g ranting the pleas to the ju r is d ic ti o no f

th e c it ie s o f

A u s ti nan d

D a ll a s . T h e Ci ti e s f

il e d p le a s to th e ju

r is d ic tion challeng ing a

ppellants’ standing and the trial court’s jurisdiction to issue a dec laration concer ning a pena l statute. Whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law. Texas De p’t of Parks &W

ildlif e v. M iranda , 133 S.W .3d 217, 227 (Tex. 2004). For this rea son, the appellate cour t applies a de novo standard of revie w to a trial c ourt’s ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction. Id.; W ebb County v. Sandoval , 126 S.W .3d 264, 266 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003 , n o pet.). A pla intiff bear s the burden to e stablish the trial court’s jurisdiction. Texas Ass’n of Bus. v. Texas Air Control Bd. , 8 52 S.W. 2d 44 0, 44 6 ( Te x. 19 93 ). A tri a l c ou rt is a uth or ize d to he ar e vid e nc e a s n e c e ssa ry to deter mine jurisdictional issues. M iranda , 13 3 S .W .3d at 22 3; Bland Indep. Sc h. Dist. v. Blue , 34 S.W .3d 547, 555 (Tex. 2002). 6

“Naked De claration” C

oncerning C

rim inal Law A civil court may

not issue naked de clar ations of rig hts, status, or other leg al relationships arising under a pena l statute. State v. Morales , 869 S.W .2d 941, 947 (Tex. 1994);Appellants also asser t that the anti-smoking ordinanc es are pree mpted by section 48.01 of the 7 Texas Penal Code. B eca

use we deter

mine that the trial cour

t properly dismiss ed the c ase ba sed on the plea to the jur isdiction, we nee d not rea ch this pree mption is sue. See Tex. R. App. P . 47.1. 8 Ve te ra ns of Fo re ign W

ar s v. A bb ott , N o . 0 3

- 0 2

- 0 0 0 4 7

- CV , 2 0 0 3 T e x. A p p . L E X I S 6 3 2 6 , a t * 6 ( T e x. Ap p. —A us tin

July 24 , 2 00 3, no pe t.) (m e m. o p. ); Ro bin so n v . J e ffe rso n Co un ty , 37 S.W .3d 503, 506

n. 1 ( Te x. Ap p. —T e x ark ana 20 01 , n o p e t.) ; City of L ongview v. H ead , 3 3 S. W. 3 d

4 7 , 5 2 ( T e x. Ap p. —T y le r 2 00 0, no pe t.) . B e c a us e Tex as has a b if

ur c a te d s y ste m of

c ri min a l and

c ivi l jurisdiction, the meaning and validity of a penal statute or or dinance should ordinarily be dete rmined by courts exerc ising c riminal jurisdiction. Robinson , 3 7 S. W.3 d at 50 7- 08. T he re fo re , a n e qu ity court’s pow er to interf

ere with the enfor ceme nt of a criminal statute is extremely limit ed. A court will not evaluate t he constit utionality of a criminal st atute without a re quest for injunctive r elief. See Morales , 8 69 S.W. 2d

at 94 2; Robinson , 37 S.W .3d at 5 0 6 n.1. We turn now to the nature of the ordinanc es at issue.

Appellants conte nd that they are not a ttacking a criminal law, but r ather a re g ulation. Howeve r, appe llants’ live pleading befor e the trial court states: “At is sue here is the ex tent to which t h e c i t y m ay makea crime ou t of be havio r, po sse ssi ng burn ing tob a c c o in a pr ivate bu sin e ss, tha t is

no t c ri min a l unde r t

he Te xas P e na l Co de .” (E mph a sis a dd e d. ) F ur the r, “ Ap pe lla

nts do no t se e k to enjoin any

criminal ac tion. I nstead, they seek de clar atory and mandamus relief .” B oth the Dallas

an d t h e A u s t i no rd i n an ce s cr ea t e C l as s C m i s d e m ea n o rs p u n i s h ab l e b y a f i n e, t h u s cr ea t i n g a criminal off

ense. 7 Appellants spec ifically

exci s e d th e ir r e q u e s t f o r in ju n c ti v e r e li ef in their f

irst amended orig inal petition. Appellants also repr esente d to the trial court that they wer e not see king injunctiveAp pe lla nts have no t me t th e ir

burd e n to br ingthe mse lve s w ith in the a bil ity of a c ourt of e qu ity 8 to en joi n the e nf

or c e me nt of a pe na l ord ina nc e that is un c on sti tut ion a l and wh os e e nf

or c e me nt w ill cause irrepa

rable harm to a ve sted proper ty rig ht. See, e .g. , Cor

ny n v . A k in , 50 S.W .3d 7 3 5 , 7 37 (T e x. Ap p. —E l Paso 20 01 , n o p e t.) ; Ha ng on II I, In c . v . G re

gg Cou nty , 8 9 3 S. W. 2 d

7 2 4 , 7 2 6 ( T e x. Ap p. —T e xa

r k an a 1 9 9 5 , w r i td i s m ’ d )

. T h e y h a v e m a d e n o s h o w i n g o f h ar m t o v e s t e d

p ro pe rt y ri g hts

. 9 re lie f. Ap pe lla

nts ’ fa ilure to s e e k in

jun c tiv e re lie f d e pr ive s th e c ourt of jur isd ic tio n b e c a

us e a c ivi l court doe s not have jurisdiction to make the na ked dec larations request ed b y ap p ellants. See Morales , 8 69 S.W. 2d

at 94 1; Veterans , 2 0 0 3 T e x. A p p . L E X I S 6 3 2 6 , a t *6 ; Dal la s Co un ty Di st. Attorney v. D oe , 969 S.W .2d 537, 542 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1998, no pe t.). 8

Am endm ent of Pleadings

Ap pe lla nts c on te nd

tha t th e y sh ou ld have be e n g ive n an op po rt un ity to a me nd the ir pleading s befor e dismissal. The hear ing on the plea to the jur isdiction was held September 9, 2003, some three wee ks afte r the Cities’ pleas to the jurisdiction ra ising the “ naked de clar ation” issue we re filed. Nothing in the rec ord shows that appe llants attempted to amend their ple ading s after that plea was filed. I nstead, at the hearing on the plea to the jur isdiction, appellants maintained their position that they wer e not attacking a criminal statute and that the line of case s relied upon by appellee s was simply inapposite. Appellants we re f ully notified of the pleadingdefic iency —rathe r than a sking f

or leave to amend, their a ctions demonstrated that they chose to stand on the ple ading s that

a ff ir ma tiv e ly ne g a te d ju

ri sd ic tio n. Th is f

a ilure to a me nd the ir ple a din g s in

re sp on se to t

he ple a to the jurisdiction waived their rig ht to amend pleading s befor e dismissal. See Kassen v . Hatley , 887 S.W. 2d 4, 13 -1 4 n .1 0 ( Te x. 19 94 ); O’Neal v. Texas Bd. of Chiropractic Examr’s , No. 03-03-270- CV , 2 00 4 T e x. Ap p. L EX I S, at *1 0- 11 (T e x. Ap p. —A us tin Se pte mbe r 1 0, 20 04 , n o p e t.) (m e m.Cf. Te x as A &M U

niv . S y s. v . Ko se og lu , 16 7 S.W. 3d 37 4, 38 3 (T e x. Ap p. —Wa c o 2 00 5, pe t. 9 fi l ed ) ( cr i t i ci z i n g O’Neal v. Bd. of Chiropractic Examr’s , N o . 0 3

- 0 3

- 0 0 1 2 0 , 2 0 0 4 T e x . A p p . LE X IS 8 2 5 4 , at *11 (Tex . App.—Austin Sept. 10, 2004, no pet.) (mem. op.)) . The c urre nt case does not involve mere inaction on p l aintiffs’ pa rt, but an ame ndment that remove d cer tain alleg ations, a failure to reque st leave to am end in re sponse to the plea to the jur isdiction, and an af firmative re pr e se ntatio n to the c ourt a t th e he ari ngon

ple a that injunc tiv e re lie f wa s not sou g ht. Ap pe lla nts also compl a in

th a t t h e p le a to th e ju r is d ic ti o np r o c e d

u r e w a s to o s im il ar

to a s u mm ar y ju d g me nt proce dure without the protections of that proce dure. A ppellants’ conc erns a

re a ddresse d in Texas Departme nt of Parks and W ildlif e v. M iranda , part i cu l ar l y

in J ustice B rister’s dissent c riticizi ng curr ent plea to the jur isdiction practice

. See Tex as Dep’t of Parks & W ildlif e v. M iranda , 133 S.W .3d 217, 239-45 (Te x . 2004). 10 op.). Appellants’ first amende d pleading , on which they chose to stand, a ffirmatively neg ated the 9 trial court’ s jurisdiction. According ly , we ove rrule issue two.

III . Co sts I n th e ir thi rd iss ue , a pp e lla nts c on te nd

that th e tr ia l court did no t hav e jur isd ic tio n to

awa rd costs bec ause the court dismissed the ca se for want of jurisdiction. Appellants also arg ue that there is good c ause to a p p o rt ion costs beca use evide nce on the pleas to the jurisdiction was not require d, making deposition costs incurre d unnece ssary and unre asonable

. Jurisdi ction A cour

t r etains j urisdiction to awar d costs even if the trial cour

t determines it does not have jurisdiction over the suit. Baines v. M

ensing, 12 S.W. 98 4, 98 5 (T e x. 18 89 ); Nicholson v. Mi lls , 227 S.W .2d 354, 356 (Tex. Civ. App.—1950, writ ref’ d). “Aparty cannot attempt to invoke the jurisdiction of a c ourt by suit, and say

he is exempt from the costs of the pr ocee ding on the g round that the c ourt had no jurisdiction.” Ba ine s, 12 S.W . at 985.We note that this is not a case in w hich plaintiff and def endant pr evailed in pa

rt or in which 10 it i s d if f ic u lt to a s c e rta in

w h e th e r th e r e w a s a

“ p r e v a il in g p arty
. ” Pl a in ti f f s r e c e iv e d

n o n e o f the re lie f t he y so ug ht; de fe nd ants re c e ive d a ll o f t he re lie f t he y so ug ht. 11 App ortio nment o

f C os ts Even if the tr ial court ha d jurisdiction, appellants arg ue that costs should be allocated betwee n the par

ties. “The succe ssful party to a sui t shall rec over of his adver sary all costs incurre d 10 the re in, e xce pt w he re oth e rw ise pr ov ide d. ” Te x. R. C iv. P. 1 31 . T he un de rl y ingpurp os e of the ru le i s “ t o e n s u r e t h e p r e v a i l i n g p art y i s f r e e d o f t h e b u r d e n o f c o u rt c o s t s an d t h a t th e l o s i n g p art y p a ys those costs.” Furr’s Supermarke ts, I nc. v. B ethune , 5 3 S. W.3 d 3 75 , 3 78 (T e x. 20 01 ). Ta xing c os ts

a g a ins t a su c c e ssf

ul part y or or de ri ng e a c h part

y to p ay the ir ow n c os ts g e ne ra lly

c on tr a ve ne s Ru le 131. Id . at 376. The trial court may adjudg e the preva iling party ’s costs ag ainst it only on a showing of “g ood cause .” Id. a t 37 6- 77 ; se e als o Tex. R. C iv. P. 141. Good cau s e i s s h o wn o n l y i f the preva iling par

ty has unnec essar ily

prolong ed the procee dings, unr easona bly incre ased the costs, or otherwise did something that should be pena liz ed. Fu rr’ s S up e rm ar k e ts , 53 S.W .2d at 377. Th e g ra nt o f t he ir ple a s to the jur isd ic tio n ma de the Citie s th e su c c e ssf ul p art ie s to thi s su it. Te x . R. Civ . P. 13 1; Dear v . City of Irving , 9 02 S.W. 2d 73 1, 73 9 ( Te x. Ap p. —A us tin 19 95 , w ri t de nie d) (a

“ pr e va ili ngpa

rt y ” is o ne wh o is vin dic a te d b y judg me nts re nd e re d) . In th is

case , appellants did not meet their burden of showing “g ood cause ” to deviate from the a llocation of costs as pre scribed by

Rule 131. Appellants filed suit in mid-April 2003. The trial cour t entere d its final judgment in mid-Nove mber 2003. Appe llants contend that appellees ran up costs by taking

unnece ssary

depositions without identifying the specific depositions they claim ar e unnec essar

y or
unrea sonable. Appe llants assert that depositions a re unnece ssary to support a plea to the jur isdiction beca use no fac ts a

re nece ssary to ma

ke a dete rmination about standing . Howeve r, under curr ent plea12

to t he jur isd ic tio n p ra c tic e , tr ia l c ourt s c an a nd do c on sid e r e vid e nc e in a dd iti on to t he ple a din g s: “[B]eca use a court must not act without de termining that it has subject-matter jurisdiction to do so, it should hear

evidenc e as ne cessa

ry to determine the issue befor e proc eedingwith the case .” Bland , 34 S.W .3d at 354. The court is not require d to look solely at the plea dings to de termine a plea to the jurisdiction. Id . Appellants t hemselves introduc ed the de positions i n the plea to the jur isdiction hear ing. A

ppellants have not demonstrated that the prevailing pa rties unnec essar ily

prolong ed the proce eding s, unrea sonably incre ased c osts , o r p er formed some other a ct that should have be en penalized. Se e Fu rr’

s S up e rm ar k e ts , 53 S.W .3d at 377. Appellants have not demonstrated go od cause to disturb the trial court’s a war d of costs in acc ordanc e with Rule 131. Acc ording ly , we ove rrule issue thr ee.
Conclusion We have ove rruled a

ppellants’ issues pre sented. Appellee City of Dallas filed notice of appe al for a

conditional cross-point, asking that if we did not aff irm the t rial court’s judgme nt that

we r eview the trial court’s disposi tion of t he C ity of Dallas’s motion to transfe r venue. Be cause of our disposition of the case , we ne ed not addr ess this cros s -p o i n t . We affir m the trial court’ s jud g me nt.

W. Kenneth L aw, Chief Justice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces B . A. Smith and Pury ear Affir med Filed: De cembe r 15, 2005