IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI NO. 2014-IA-00197-SCT WILLIAM GREENWOOD d/b/a ANTIQUE WOOD COMPANY

OF MISSISSIPPI

v. MESA UNDERWRITERS SPECIALTY INSURANCE COMPANY , CENTRAL INSURERS OF GRENADA, INC. AND DIXIE SPECIALTY INSURANCE, INC.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 01/24/2014 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. JEFF W EILL, SR. TRIAL COURT ATTORNEYS: CHUCK McRAE CLARK MONROE, II ERIC PRICE KATHRYN BREARD PLATT KATRINA LYNN DANNHEIM RICHARD E. KING THOMAS LYNN CARPENTER COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF HINDS COUNTY ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: SETH CLAYTON LITTLE CHUCK McRAE ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES: THOMAS LYNN CARPENTER, JR. CARR ALLISON KATHRYN BREARD PLATT NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - INSURANCE DISPOSITION: REVERSED AND REMANDED - 12/10/2015 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED:
EN BANC. KITCHENS, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:¶1. Af

ter a lawsuit was f

iled against W illiam Greenwood, do i n g b u s i n e s s a s A ntique
W o od Com

pany of Mississippi, Greenwood’s insurers, l ocated i n Rankin C ounty and Grenada County , denied indem ni t y c o v e r age. Greenwood s ued the insurers in the Circuit
Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County , a l leging breach of contract, conspiracy , and b a d f

aith. Following a grant of a m otion f or change of venue to the d ef endants, Greenwood f

iled the i nstant pet i t i o n f o r interlocutory appeal, which this C ourt granted. Greenwood asserte d t hat venue was proper in W arren C o unty

. W e a gree and reverse the judgm ent of the Circuit Court of the First J udicial D istrict of Hinds County and rem and the case f or transf er to the Circuit Court of

W arren County

. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶2. W i lliam Greenwood owned Antique W o od C om pany o f M i ssissippi (Greenwood),

w h ich was in the b usiness o f b uy ing salvage rights to old buildings f o r the p u r p o s e o f stripping and s elling the buildings’ lum ber, b ricks, and other m aterials. G reenwood obtained salvage rights to a V i c k s b u rg postbellum b uilding 1 b uilt i n 1868 and sought a policy of insurance to cover “debris rem oval.” Central Insurers of Grenada, Inc. (Grenada), and Dixie Specialty Insurance, Inc. (Dixie), obtained policies on behalf o f Greenwood through Mesa Underwriters Specialty I nsurance Com p a n y ( M esa), f

o rm erly known as Montpelier US
Insurance Com

pany (Montpelier).

1 T h e co m

p lain t s tates th at th e b u ild in g is l o cated at 7 0 7 th ro u g h 7 1 3 C l u ster S treet in V ick sb u rg , M ississip p i. T h e C ity o f V ick sb u rg is situ ated w h o lly in Warren C o u n ty

. M ississip p i O fficia l & S ta tistica l R eg ister 3 6 3 (2 0 1 2 -2 0 1 6 )

. 2¶3. Greenwood’s dism antling o f t h e b u i l d i n g r e s ulted in a lawsuit f iled by adjoining building owners, who claim e d that dam age had resulted “to an adjacent b uilding and wall.”
One of the a djoining business o wners had “requested t he d em olition b e stopp e d as it was dam aging and w ould continue to dam age the adjacent property

. ” Ultim ately , the owners said, “the additional dem olition caused substantial dam age to the adjacent building.” A coverage investigation by Montpelier resulted in a denial of coverage: Our inv e s t i gation revealed s everal i ssues concerning coverage. The investigation revealed t hat y ou owned the building at the tim e y ou took out the policy and d id not choose to insure t h e property at that tim e. The signed application states that y our business is 1 00% d e b r i s rem oval. You t old the inspector that spoke to [ y ou] concerning y our business that y ou only pick up legal l andf

ill debris. The policy was w ritten f o r debris rem oval only not the taking down of b uildings. Furtherm ore, the b uilding was o wned by y ou and the resultant dam age w ould arise out of t he ownership, use[ ,] and m aintenance of the prem ises y ou own, of which w e do n ot insure and were never put on notice [ ]. For these r easons and the provisions in the policy we are unable to provide[ ] indem nity or def

ense f or the above m entioned claim

. Aggrieved by the denial of coverage f or indem nity o r d ef

ense, Greenwood sued Mesa (then Montpelier), Grenada, and Dixie, in t he Circuit Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County , alleging breach of contract, conspiracy , and bad f aith. ¶4. Mesa and Dixie f

iled a m otion to transf

e r v e n u e o n O c t ober 31, 2013, a rguing that Rankin County w as the p roper county f or venu e p u rposes under Mississippi Code Section
1 1

- 1 1-3(1)(a)(i) (Rev. 2004), 2 b e cause the in-state d ef endants, Dixie and Grenada, were

2 M ississip p i C o d e S e ctio n 1 1

- 1 1 -3 (1 )(a)(i) states:
C i v il actio n s o f w h i ch th e circu it co u r t h a s o rig in al j u risd ictio n sh all b e co m m en ced in t h e c o u n ty w h ere th e d ef en d an t resid es, o r, if a co rp o ratio n , in th e c o u n t y o f its p r in cip al p lace o f b u sin ess, o r in th e co u n t y w h ere a su b stan tial alleg ed act o r o m issio n o c cu rred o r w h ere a s u b stan tial ev en t th at 3located in Rankin and Grenada C ounties, respectively

. 3 G reenwood responded to the m otion

to transf er venue by a rguing that venue w as proper in W arren C ounty because the events giving rise to the claim

which resulted in the denial of coverage took place there. ¶5. The trial c ourt rul e d t h a t Wa r r e n C o u nty was not a proper venue because “the substantial act was t he denial of the claim , which occurred i n Rankin County , n ot the alleged building dem olition in W arren County

. ” T he trial court also ruled that Greenwood’s venue options against Dixie and Grenada were Rankin County or G r e n a d a C o u n t y . G reenwood f

iled

an interlocutory appeal on February 13, 2014, which was g ranted by a panel of this Court on April 16, 2014. ¶6. T h e sole interlocutory issue bef ore this Court is whether t he t rial court e rred i n i t s determ ination that venue was not proper in W arren County and was proper only in Rankin or Grenada Counties.
STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶7. “W e rev i e w ‘ a t r i a l court’s grant or denial of a m o tion f or c h ange o f venue f

or an abuse of discretion, but questions of law, such as interpretation o f the general venue statute,

are reviewed d e novo.’” Wood v. Safeway I ns. C o. , 114 So. 3d 714, 716 (Miss. 2013) (q u o ting Laurel Ford Lincoln-Mercury, I nc. v. Blakeney , 8 1 So. 3d 1123, 1125 (Miss. 2012)).

cau sed th e in

j u ry o ccu rred

. 3 “ D ix ie i s a M ississi p p i co rp o ratio n w h o se ad d ress in 4 0 0 L ib erty P ark , D riv e, F lo w o o d , M ississip p i, w h ich is l o cated in R an k in C o u n ty , M ississip p i.” “D ef en d an t C en tral In su r ers o f G ren ad a, I n c.[ ,] i s a M ississip p i co rp o ratio n w h o se ad d ress is 6 3 9 West M o n r o e S treet, G ren ad a, M ississip p i, w h ich is lo cated in G r en ad a C o u n ty , M ississip p i.” 4DISCUSSION

¶8. T h e M i s s i ssippi venue statute provides f our perm i ssible venue o ptions f or “[ c]ivi l actions of wh i c h t h e circuit court has original jurisdiction”: (1) “the county where the def endant resides,” or ( 2) “ if a corporation, [ ] the county of its principal place of business,”

or ( 3) “the county w here a substantial alleged a ct or o m ission occu r r e d ” or ( 4) the county “where a s ubstantial event that caused the injury o ccurred.” M iss. Code Ann. § 11-11-3(1)(a)(i) ( Rev. 2004). Gr e e n w o o d m aintains on i nterlocutory appeal that W arren County is a proper venue under the statute because “a substantial alleged act or o mi s s i o n ” or a “substantial event that caused the injury occurred” there. I d. ¶9. “‘Of right, the plaintif f selects am ong the perm issible v enues, a nd h is choice m ust be sustained unless in the end there is no credible evidence s upporting the f actual b asis f

or the claim of v enue.’” Hedgepeth v. Johnson , 975 S o. 2d 235, 238 (Miss. 2008) (quoting Flight Line, Inc. v. Tanksley , 608 S o. 2d 1149, 1155 (Miss. 1992)). Greenwood is correct that the dism antling of

the building, which resulted in the lawsuit f or which the insurers ref

used to provide coverage, occurred in W arren County

. Because W arren County is neither a “county where the def

endant reside s ” n o r “the county o f its principal place of business,” we m ust

con s i d e r w hether W arren County is a “county where a substantial a l leged act o r om ission occurred or where a substantial event that caused the injury occurred.” Miss. Code Ann. § 11-11-3(1)(a)(i) (Rev. 2004) (em phasis added). ¶10. Mesa, Grenada, and Dixi e a r g u e that the statutory language “in t he c ounty where a substantial a l l eged act or om i ssion occurred or where a substantial event that caused the

5injury occurred , ” m eans, in the context of nonrenewal of i nsurance policies, “the relevant

actions of the insurance com pany . . . . a ssociated with the com pany ’s decision not to renew the policy .” Holm es v. McMillan , 21 So. 3d 614, 619 (Miss. 2009) ( citing Med. Assurance Co. of Miss. v. Myers , 956 So. 2d 213, 218-19 (Miss. 2007)). ¶11. In Holm e s , t h e p l a i n t i f f h a d been in an autom obile accident “in the roundabout
in t ersection of I nternational Drive and Old Brandon Road, a t t he entrance to the JacksonEvers International Airport.” H olm es , 21 So. 3d a t 6 1 5

. The plaintif f sued State Farm in Hinds C ounty f

or breach o f contract, aggrieved b y State Farm ’s ref usal to pay him a satisf a ctory am ount in uninsured m otorist benef its. Id. at 616. State Farm sought a transf er of venue. Id. The accident scene, although phy sically located in Rankin County , was under the jurisdiction o f the City o f Jackson. Id. The trial court denied the change o f venue and this
Court reversed, f

inding “no d ispute that the location w here the accident occurred, giving rise

to this suit, is phy sically i n Rankin County .” I d. at 616, 6 18. B e c a u s e the accident had occurred in Rankin County and because “[ n ]othing in t h e r e c o r d

. . . suggests that the

r e j ection o f the settlem ent dem and was connected t o Hinds County ,” this Court h e l d t h a t venue was not proper in Hinds County , but was proper in Rankin County

. Id. at 619-20. ¶12. In a sim ilar case, the Hedgepeths of Oc e a n S p r i n g s w e re d enied coverage by State
Farm Fire and Casualty Insurance Com pany f ollowing Hurricane K atrina. Hedgepeth , 975
So. 2d at 236. T he Reverend Hedgepeth had obtained a renter’s i n s u r a n c e p o l icy f or the
parsonage of the church he pastored; b ut, because t he policy did n ot include a separate f lood insurance policy , the insurance claim s o n personal property lost to storm surge w ere denied.

6Id. The Hedgepeths had requested f lood insurance, but their i nsurance agent, who lived in Madison County and kept an of f ice in Hinds County , had i nf orm ed t hem t hat such was not available t o renters. Id. The Hedgepeths f iled suit in Jackson County , the trial court granted
State F arm ’ s m otion t o transf er venue to M adison County , and t his Court granted an interlocutory

appeal to the Hedgepeths. Id. at 237. ¶13. This Court c o n s i d e r e d “whether either ‘a s ubstantial alleged act or om i ssion’ or ‘a substantial event that caused injury ’ o ccurred in Jackson County .” Id. at 239. Noting that the Hedgepeths’ insurance agent h ad “urged them to com m it insurance f raud,” t his C o urt f

ound that the a gent “was in Jackson C ounty at the Hedgepeths’ hom e when she allegedly told Mrs. Hedgepeth t o list som e of the property which had been d estroy ed o n the f irst f loor as having b een located on the s econd f loor,” proposed conduct which the Hedgepeths averred ha d “caused them m ental anguish and em otional distress.” Id. at 240. F urtherm ore, representatives of State F arm inf orm ed t he Hedgepeths at their h om e in Jackson County that their claim s would be denied f or lack of f lood coverage. I

d. ¶14. This Court sustained t he H edgepeths’ c h o i c e o f venue and r em anded the case to Jackson Count y . I

d . I n s upport o f that decision, this Court cited Myers , 4 in which we had held t h a t b e c ause “[ n]o ‘substantial event that caused injury ’ to Dr. My e r s occurred in Holm e s C ounty ,” My ers h a d to “show that a substantial a lleged act or om ission occurred there.” Hedgepeth , 975 So. 2d at 239 (citing Myers , 956 So. 2d a t 2 19). In d istinguishing

4 In Myers , this Court held that Madison County , where the insurer’s decision not to renew the policy occurred, was the proper venue because it was the insurer’s “decision not to renew the insurance policy that is the alleged cause of [ plaintif f ’s] injuries.” Myers , 956 So. 2d at 219, 220. 7Myers , w e held that “[ t ]he He d g e p e t h s ’ c laim s are based, at least in part, on a ctual losses

suf f e red due to H urricane Katrina, as their com plaint a lleges the loss of thousands of dollars
in personal property as a result of the def endant’s f

ai l u r e t o provide f

lood insurance.” Hedgepeth , 975 So. 2d at 240 (em phasis a dded). The Court ultim ately f ound t hat, “[ b]ecause ‘substantial alleged acts,’ as w ell as a ‘substantia l e v e n t t hat c aused injury ’ occurred in Jackson County , Jackson County is a proper venue f

or this case.” I

d. ¶15. As this Court recognized in Myers , H edgepeth , and Holm es , the statutory language allows f or venue either in “ the county where a s ubstantial alleged act or om ission occurred”

or in the county “ where a substantial event that c aused the injury occurred.” Miss. Code Ann. § 11-11-3(1)(a)(i). It is true, as Mesa, Grenada, and Dixie argue, that venue would be proper in the present case in Rankin County , where Dixie is located, or in Grenada C ounty , where Central Insurers of Gren ada, Inc., is located. B ut it i s not true that our law prevents the plaintif f f rom selecting W arren County , the county “where a substantial event t hat caused the injury o ccurred.” In Hedgepeth , this Cour t f ound that the “ substantial event that caused injury ” w as Hurricane K atrina. Hedgepeth , 975 So. 2d at 240. I n Holm es , this Co u r t h eld that the “substantial event that caused inj u r y ” w a s t he autom obile accident which had occurred in Rankin County

. Holm es , 21 So. 3d at 620. ¶16. Here, the b uilding in which Greenwood owns an interest i n salvage rights is situated
in W arren County

. Greenwood’s dism a nt l i n g o f t h e b u i l d i n g a l l egedly dam aged the adjoining landowners’ b uildings in W arren Cou n t y , w hich resulted in a l awsuit by the adjoining landowners against Greenwood. It was that dam a ge and the resultant l awsuit which, because

8the i nsurance c om pany ref u sed to d ef

end Greenwood, r esulted in allegations of “ a c t u a l l osses suf f e red.” H e dgepeth , 975 So. 2d at 240. Greenwood’s com plaint alleges that “[ a]f

t er proceeding with t he dism antling of the b uilding, the adjoining building o wners f iled a claim

a n d a lawsuit.” W hen insurers denied the c laim , “[ a]s a result of D e f endants[ ’] actions, [ Greenwood] becam e em

broiled in the claim and ultim a t ely the lawsuit without the benef it” of indem nity c overage. The plai n t i f f f urther alleged l oss of “valuable m aterials,” which allegedly had been ruined “due t o t h e e x p osure to the elem e n ts.” W e hold that the dism antling of the Vicksburg buildi n g and the r esultant lawsuit c onstitutes “a s u bstantial

eve n t t h a t c a used injury ” pursuant to Section 11-11-3(1)(a)(i). W e hold that venue was proper i n W a r ren County , and that the trial court abused its discretion in lim iting Greenwood’ s venue options to Rankin or Grenada Counties.
CONCLUSION ¶17. Venue is proper in Rankin or Grenada Counties. Venue a lso is p r o p e r i n Wa rren C o u n t y because “a substantial event that caused injury , ” Greenwood’s dism antling of a building which allegedly dam aged buildings of adjoining landowners, o c c urred in W arren County . Greenwood has established adequately that W arren County is a proper venue, and the plaintif

f ’s choice of perm i ssible venue options controls. W e t h e r e f ore reverse the judgm ent of the Circuit Court of the First J udicial District of Hinds County a nd rem and the case f or transf er to the Circuit Court of

W arren County

. ¶18. REVERSED AND REMANDED. WALLER, C.J., DICKINSON, P.J., LAMAR, PI E R C E , K ING AND COLEMAN, JJ., CONCUR. RANDOLPH, P.J., NOT PARTICIPATING.

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