1

Filed 6/21/24

CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION*

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

JOHN DOE et al.,

Plaintiffs and Respondents,

v.

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF 

MOTOR VEHICLES et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

 A164843

 (Alameda County

 Super. Ct. No. RG16805013)

The rights to privacy set out in our state constitution and various 

statutes are among our most cherished. But they are not without limit. We 

consider those limits in the context of the California Department of Motor 

Vehicles’ (DMV) disclosure of alcohol-impaired driving license suspensions 

and reverse the trial court’s decision restricting those disclosures. 

The DMV compiles driving records and provides them to prospective or 

current employers, insurance companies, and a variety of other requesters. 

License suspensions imposed by DMV, including those related to alcoholimpaired driving, are included in these records, even when no criminal

* Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1105(b) and 8.1110, this 

opinion is certified for publication with the exception of part II.C–D.
2

conviction has resulted. These suspensions remain on the driving record for 

three years after the suspension itself ends. 

We address whether DMV may also include on this publicly disclosed 

driving record the reason for such a suspension—for example, that the driver 

had an excessive blood-alcohol level—when the driver has not been convicted. 

The plaintiffs argue this practice effectively discloses information about a 

nonconviction arrest and, therefore, violates constitutional and statutory 

privacy prohibitions. We disagree: the disclosure of the reason for a DMV 

suspension issued for alcohol-impaired driving does not constitute the 

disclosure of information about a nonconviction arrest within the meaning of 

these privacy provisions.

FACTUAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND

A. The Public Driver Record

DMV discloses portions of a person’s DMV record to members of the 

public under certain circumstances. We refer to this as the “public driver 

record.”1

1. Contents

The public driver record contains the driver’s name; identifying 

information such as eye color and height; and license number, class, and 

status. It also includes sections entitled “Departmental Actions,” 

“Convictions,” “Failures to Appear,” and “Accidents.” (Capitalization altered.) 

License suspensions are shown in the “Departmental Actions” section.2 

1 DMV produces public driver records in formats referred to as “K4” or 

“DL 414,” which each contain identical information. 

2 For convenience, we use the term “suspensions” to refer to both 

suspensions and revocations. (Veh. Code, §§ 13102 [“When used in reference 

to a driver’s license, ‘suspension’ means that the person’s privilege to drive a 
3

Driving-related convictions, accidents, and suspensions are not 

disclosed on the public driver record indefinitely. Certain convictions are 

disclosed for ten or seven years from the date of occurrence; for example, a 

driving under the influence (DUI) conviction is disclosed for ten years. 

(§ 1808, subd. (b)(1)–(2); see also § 1803, subds. (a)–(b) [identifying 

convictions required to be reported to DMV].) All other convictions and all 

accident reports are disclosed for three years. (§ 1808, subd. (b)(3).) All 

suspensions are disclosed while in effect. (§ 1808, subd. (c).) Certain 

suspensions are not disclosed after the suspension terminates; all others are 

disclosed for three years after the suspension ends. (§ 1808, subd. (c).)3 

For each suspension disclosed, the public driver record includes the 

date the suspension began and, if no longer in effect, the date it ended. It 

also includes the statute authorizing the suspension, for example, “13352,” 

referring to section 13352; and the “Reason” for the suspension, for example, 

“Excessive blood alcohol level.”4 (Capitalization altered.) 

motor vehicle is temporarily withdrawn.”], 13101 [“When used in reference to 

a driver’s license, ‘revocation’ means that the person’s privilege to drive a 

motor vehicle is terminated and a new driver’s license may be obtained after 

the period of revocation.”].) All undesignated section references are to the 

Vehicle Code.

3 The suspensions not disclosed after termination are those imposed for 

failure to pay a child support order (Fam. Code, § 17520; former Welf. & Inst. 

Code, § 11350.6, repealed by Stats. 1999, ch. 478, § 14, eff. Jan. 1, 2000); by a 

juvenile hearing officer (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 256); and pursuant to former 

statutes requiring license suspensions for certain vandalism offenses and for 

minors who are habitual truants (former § 13202.6, repealed by Stats. 2019, 

ch. 505, § 13, eff. Jan. 1, 2020; former § 13202.7, repealed by Stats. 2018, 

ch. 717, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 2019). 

4 When discussing the “reason” for a suspension, we refer to both the 

statutory authority and the phrase describing the reason.
4

2. Authorized Recipients

There are three categories of authorized recipients of public driver 

records. 

First, employers of certain drivers must participate in a program 

whereby the employer receives public driver records annually and any time a 

conviction, accident, suspension, or other adverse license action is added. 

(§ 1808.1, subds. (b)–(c).) This program is referred to as the “Employer Pull 

Notice” or “EPN” program. Drivers covered by this program include tractortrailer operators, bus drivers, taxi drivers, and drivers for rideshare 

companies such as Uber and Lyft. (§ 1808.1, subd. (k); Pub. Util. Code, 

§§ 5431, subd. (c), 5444.) These employers are subject to criminal penalties 

for employing as a driver a person with a suspended license. (§ 1808.1, 

subd. (f).) 

Second, individuals or organizations with a “legitimate business need” 

for public driver records may establish an account with DMV to obtain these 

records. (§ 1810.2, subds. (a) & (c).) These account holders are referred to as 

“commercial requesters.” Examples of legitimate business needs include an 

insurance company’s need to conduct a risk analysis for a driver and an 

employer’s need to determine the driving record of a prospective employee 

whose job is not covered by the EPN program. 

Finally, “casual requesters” are all other individuals or organizations

requesting a public driver record. (§ 1810; see also Cal. Code Regs., tit. 13,

§ 350.02(c).) Persons requesting their own public driver record are casual 

requesters. All other casual requesters must identify a permissible use 

before obtaining a public driver record. Permissible uses include legitimate 

business uses and uses in connection with a civil, criminal, administrative, or 

arbitral proceeding. An example of an impermissible use, which would result 
5

in DMV rejecting the record request, is a desire to “get back at” someone who 

cut off the requester on the freeway. 

Persons are not notified when DMV sends their public driver record to 

an employer as part of the EPN program or to a commercial requester. 

Persons are notified when DMV sends their public driver record to a casual 

requestor, but are not notified in advance of the disclosure. 

B. License Suspensions 

A driver’s license can be suspended by a court or by DMV. (See 

generally §§ 13100–13559.) DMV is authorized or required to suspend a 

license in certain circumstances. Some of these circumstances relate to 

driving; for example, accruing a certain number of traffic violation “points” 

(§§ 12809, subd. (e), 12810.5, 13359); failing to submit to a required 

reexamination (§ 13801); driving without insurance (§ 16070); or being 

convicted of certain vehicle-related crimes (e.g., §§ 13350, 13351, 13351.5, 

13352). Others have no relation to driving; for example, failing to pay fines 

or fees (§ 13364), failing to comply with a court order (§ 13365.5), failing to 

satisfy a damages judgment (§ 16370), or failing to pay child support (Fam. 

Code, § 17520, subds. (a)(2), (e)(3)).

The category of DMV suspensions at issue here result from driving 

with a certain blood-alcohol concentration or refusing to submit to chemical 

testing.5 (§§ 13353, 13353.1, 13353.2.) A suspension pursuant to these 

statutes is commonly referred to as an “administrative per se” or “APS” 

suspension “because it does not impose criminal penalties, but simply 

5 The prohibited blood-alcohol concentrations are: (1) 0.08 percent or 

more; (2) if under 21 years old, 0.01 percent or more; (3) if driving a vehicle 

that requires a commercial driver’s license, 0.04 percent or more; and (4) if on 

probation for a DUI, 0.01 percent or more. (§ 13353.2, subd. (a).)
6

suspends a person’s driver’s license as an administrative matter upon a 

showing the person was arrested for driving with a certain blood-alcohol 

concentration, without additional evidence of impairment.”6 (MacDonald v. 

Gutierrez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 150, 155.) 

The APS suspension process begins after a peace officer makes a DUI

arrest7 and submits to DMV “a sworn report” (§ 13380, subd. (a)), using a 

form created by DMV for this purpose called the DS-367. The officer’s report 

includes “a statement of the officer’s grounds for belief that the person 

violated” the relevant statute, as well as the results of any chemical testing 

or documentation of the person’s refusal to submit to testing. (§ 13380, 

subd. (a).) At the time of the arrest, the officer must serve the person with 

notice of an order of suspension effective 30 days from service. (§§ 13382, 

subds. (a)–(b), 13388, subd. (b), 13389, subd. (b).) 

When DMV receives the officer’s sworn report, it conducts an 

administrative review of the suspension, which must be concluded before the 

suspension’s effective date. (§§ 13553, subd. (d), 13553.1, subd. (d), 13553.2, 

subd. (d), 13557, subds. (a) & (c).) DMV reviews the officer’s report and any 

evidence accompanying the report and determines whether, by a 

preponderance of the evidence, the record establishes that the officer had 

reasonable cause to believe the violation occurred; the person was arrested; 

and either the person was driving with a prohibited blood-alcohol level or 

refused to submit to a chemical test and was told refusal would result in a 

6 We also use “administrative per se” or “APS” to refer to suspensions 

arising from a person’s refusal to test.

7 For convenience, we use the term “arrest” to include detentions 

pursuant to section 23136, prohibiting blood-alcohol concentrations of 0.01 

percent or more in persons under 21 years old. 
7

suspension. (§ 13557, subds. (a), (b)(1) & (3).) If DMV finds any required fact 

not proven by a preponderance of the evidence, it must rescind the order of 

suspension. (§ 13557, subd. (b)(2) & (4).) If DMV finds the required facts 

proven, it sustains the suspension. (§ 13557, subd. (b)(1) & (2).) Suspensions 

range from four months to three years, depending on the underlying violation 

and any prior DUI convictions or APS suspensions. (§§ 13353, subd. (a), 

13353.1, subd. (a), 13353.3, subd. (b).)8

In addition to or instead of this administrative review, the person may 

request an administrative hearing on the same facts at issue in the 

administrative review.9 (§ 13358, subds. (a) & (c).) If the request is made 

within 10 days of receiving the order of suspension, the hearing must be held 

before the suspension’s effective date. (§ 13558, subd. (d).) “The 

administrative hearing is held before either the director of the DMV, a 

hearing board or, more usually, a department hearing officer (§ 14104.2, 

subd. (a)).” (Lake v. Reed (1997) 16 Cal.4th 448, 456 (Lake).) The driver may 

subpoena witnesses and documents, and present evidence. (§§ 13558, 

subds. (a) & (b), 14104.5, 14104.7.) If DMV sustains the suspension,10 the 

driver may seek writ review (§ 13559, subd. (a)) and have the “trial court . . . 

determine, based on its independent judgment, ‘ “whether the weight of the 

evidence supported the administrative decision.” ’ ” (Lake, at p. 456.) 

8 Suspensions may be longer for commercial driver’s licenses. (See 

§ 13353, subd. (b).)

9 If the person requests a hearing before completion of the

administrative review, the administrative review is not required. (§ 13557, 

subd. (e).)

10 A DMV witness testified in 2020 that in “most recent years,” APS 

suspensions were administratively vacated in approximately 10 percent of 

APS actions. 
8

Determinations made in the administrative proceeding have no 

collateral estoppel effect in criminal proceedings arising from the same 

incident.

11 (§§ 13353.2, subd. (e), 13357, subd. (f), 13358, subd. (g), 13559, 

subd. (b).) Criminal proceedings, however, can impact an APS suspension in 

certain circumstances. “If a person is acquitted of criminal charges relating 

to a determination of facts” regarding their blood-alcohol level and whether 

they were driving, any APS suspension in effect shall “immediately” 

terminate. (§ 13353.2, subds. (a), (e).) When DMV receives notice of an 

acquittal it sets aside and nullifies the suspension. In addition, if DUI 

charges are not filed because of a lack of evidence, or are filed and dismissed 

because of insufficient evidence, the person has “a renewed right to request 

an administrative hearing.” (§ 13353.2, subd. (e).)

The disclosure of the reason for an APS suspension on a public driver 

record, even when there is no corresponding conviction, is frequently 

disqualifying for a job involving driving. Witnesses testified to being denied 

jobs as an Uber driver and as a receptionist whose job duties included driving

herself between job sites, based on APS suspensions for which there was no 

corresponding conviction. A manager for a trucking company testified an 

APS suspension within the past five years was disqualifying, even if there 

were no corresponding conviction, and an insurance broker for transportation 

industry businesses testified an APS suspension within the last two to three 

years is generally an unacceptable risk to insurance underwriters. The 

trucking company manager and insurance broker also testified that, if they 

11 A DMV witness testified that in 2014 and 2015, approximately 80 

percent of APS suspensions had a corresponding DUI conviction, and an 

additional 10 percent had a corresponding conviction for alcohol-related 

reckless driving (§§ 23103 & 23103.5). 
9

learned a prospective employee had a prior suspension but the reason was 

not identified, they would assume the suspension was for alcohol-related 

driving. 

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 2016, a taxpayer plaintiff and several plaintiffs proceeding under 

pseudonyms (collectively, Plaintiffs) sued DMV and its director. As relevant 

here, Plaintiffs alleged DMV’s disclosure of the reason for an APS suspension 

for which there was no corresponding conviction violated the California 

Constitution’s right to privacy (Cal. Const., art. I, § 1) and Labor Code section 

432.7, subdivision (g)(2) (hereafter Lab. Code, § 432.7(g)(2)). Plaintiffs also 

alleged DMV violated the Information Practices Act of 1977 (Civ. Code, 

§§ 1798–1798.78; hereafter Information Practices Act or IPA), by its 

determination that criminal history and licensing actions are not governed by 

the IPA’s record correction provisions. 

A bifurcated bench trial was held, reserving a balancing test relevant to 

the constitutional privacy claim for phase two. The court issued written 

decisions after each phase. The court found DMV’s disclosure of the reason 

for an APS suspension for which there was no corresponding conviction 

violated the constitutional right to privacy of noncommercial drivers, but not 

of commercial drivers, and violated Labor Code section 432.7(g)(2). The court 

also found DMV violated the Information Practices Act. The court issued a

judgment enjoining DMV from the improper practices. 

DISCUSSION

I. Disclosure of the Reason for an APS Suspension 

The parties dispute whether disclosure on the public driver record of 

the reason for an APS suspension for which there is no corresponding 

conviction is prohibited by Labor Code section 432.7(g)(2) and/or the 
10

California Constitution’s right to privacy.

12 Labor Code section 432.7(g)(2) 

prohibits a person “authorized by law to receive criminal . . . record 

information maintained by a local law enforcement criminal . . . agency” from 

disclosing “any information received pertaining to an arrest or detention . . . 

that did not result in a conviction . . . to any person not authorized by law to 

receive that information.” As relevant here, the California Constitution’s 

“right of privacy applies to the official retention and dissemination of arrest 

records containing nonconviction data.” (Central Valley Chap. 7th Step 

Foundation v. Younger (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 212, 236 (Central Valley I); 

accord, Central Valley Ch. 7th Step Foundation, Inc. v. Younger (1989) 

214 Cal.App.3d 145, 162 (Central Valley II).)13 Plaintiffs assume the scope of 

the statutory and constitutional prohibitions are the same in relevant 

respects; we do so as well.

It is undisputed that a public driver record revealing an APS 

suspension does not, on its face, disclose that the licensee was arrested. 

Instead, it discloses that the suspension was for “Excessive Blood Alcohol 

Level” or “Refused Chemical Test,” and identifies the Vehicle Code section

authorizing the suspension on that ground. Plaintiffs argue that this 

12 We note that as to some portion of APS suspensions with no 

corresponding conviction, the criminal process is still pending. Evidence at 

trial was that criminal DUI proceedings can take two or more years. The 

parties have not expressly addressed whether the statutory and/or 

constitutional privacy analysis for these APS suspensions is different than for 

APS suspensions as to which criminal charges have been dismissed or have 

not been filed, and we therefore assume it is the same. 

13 While some cases discussing the constitutional provision characterize 

the prohibited disclosure as “arrest records” (Central Valley I, supra, 

95 Cal.App.3d at p. 236), others refer more broadly to “information regarding 

arrests” (Central Valley II, supra, 214 Cal.App.3d at p. 165). We assume, 

without deciding, that the broader characterization controls.
11

nonetheless constitutes a disclosure of information pertaining to or 

concerning an arrest because: the APS suspension process begins with an 

arrest; DMV obtains information about the arrest from the arresting officer; a 

necessary requirement for an APS suspension is that the person was arrested 

or detained;

14 and, as the trial court found, a public driver record recipient 

can determine that an arrest occurred by looking up the cited Vehicle Code 

section. While, as Plaintiffs’ argument shows, an arrest is an integral part of 

the process leading to an APS suspension, we do not agree that this means 

DMV is disclosing “information . . . pertaining to an arrest.”

Instead, revealing the reason for an APS suspension discloses the result 

of an independent administrative adjudication.

15 The materiality of this 

distinction is illuminated by the multiple, significant steps in between the 

arrest and the administrative adjudication. Following the arrest, the 

arresting officer completes a sworn report for DMV. This report is on DMV’s 

form, the DS-367, and is separate from any internal law enforcement arrest 

report arising from the same arrest. When received by DMV, the DS-367

commences the administrative APS suspension process. If no hearing is 

requested by the licensee, DMV conducts an internal administrative review

14 (§ 13557, subd. (b)(1)(B) & (3)(B) [before DMV can impose an APS 

suspension, it must find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that “[t]he 

person was placed under arrest or, if the alleged violation was of Section 

23136 [the zero tolerance law], that the person was lawfully detained”].) 

Neither party contends the constitutional privacy or Labor Code 432.7(g)(2) 

analyses are different for detentions, and we therefore assume there is no 

material difference. 

15 We note that the conduct considered critical by the trucking company 

manager and insurance broker who testified below was DMV’s 

administrative determination to suspend a license for driving with a 

prohibited blood-alcohol level or refusing to test, not that the person had been 

arrested on suspicion of doing so.
12

to determine whether the record establishes the requisite elements, including 

that the person was driving with a prohibited blood-alcohol level or refused to 

submit to a chemical test. (§ 13557, subds. (a), (b)(1) & (3).) If requested by 

the licensee, DMV holds an evidentiary hearing and considers witness 

testimony, documentary evidence, and argument on the same elements. 

Following the internal review or evidentiary hearing, DMV makes a final 

determination of whether the requirements for an APS suspension were 

established. If writ review of the resulting determination is sought, DMV’s 

findings are reviewed by a court. Thus, while the arrest itself and 

information about it received from the arresting officer are part of this 

administrative adjudication, the result of the adjudication is not simply 

information pertaining to or concerning the arrest. (See Cranston v. City of 

Richmond (1985) 40 Cal.3d 755, 773 (maj. opn. of Grodin, J.) [although the 

appellant was terminated after purportedly being detained, “his discharge 

was not based on any ‘record’ of detention within the meaning of Labor Code 

section 432.7[, subd. (a), prohibiting consideration of nonconviction arrest or 

detention in decision to terminate employment]. Rather, appellant’s 

discharge was based on [his employer’s] independent investigation of the 

facts surrounding the April 4 incident. The fact that this incident happened 

to involve a ‘detention’ (if such it was) by police officers does not bring [his 

employer’s] subsequent decision to terminate appellant within the 

proscription of Labor Code section 432.7.”].)

Similarly, the reason for an APS suspension also does not constitute 

“offender record information maintained by a local law enforcement criminal 

. . . agency . . . pertaining to an arrest” that the DMV has “received.” (Lab. 

Code, § 432.7(g)(2), italics added.) Assuming, without deciding, that the DS367 forms submitted to the DMV contain such information, the DMV does not 
13

disclose that information when it discloses the alcohol-related reasons for an 

APS suspension, because the suspension is the result of an independent 

administrative adjudication.

16 

These conclusions are supported by the reasons underlying the 

statutory and constitutional privacy provisions. As Plaintiffs recognize, 

privacy protections prevent employers and others from using nonconviction 

arrests because they are unreliable indicators of wrongdoing. “The intent of 

Labor Code section 432.7 ‘is to prevent the adverse impact on employment 

opportunities of information concerning arrests where culpability cannot be 

proved.’ ” (Housing Authority v. Van de Kamp (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 109, 

115.) Similarly, one of “the principal ‘mischiefs’ at which the [constitutional 

privacy] amendment is directed” is “the improper use of information properly 

obtained for a specific purpose” (Central Valley II, supra, 214 Cal.App.3d at 

p. 161), and the right to privacy therefore protects against “improper uses of 

[a nonconviction arrest] record,” including “reliance on such records as a basis 

for denying the former arrestee business or professional licensing, 

employment, or similar opportunities for personal advancement.” (Loder v. 

16 Even if DMV’s reliance on the information in the DS-367 form during 

the administrative adjudication process was material to the privacy issue, it 

is not the case that DMV so relies in every APS suspension. Additional 

evidence may be adduced at the administrative hearing to support the 

suspension (see §§ 13558, subds. (a) & (b); 14104.5; 14104.7), and there is no 

easy way for the recipient of the DMV’s disclosure to determine whether the 

DMV did, in fact, rely on the information in the DS-367 form. Moreover, 

whenever a person fails to request a hearing to challenge the suspension, 

that person has forfeited any challenge to the information in the form. As a 

result, the person has implicitly conceded that the information is accurate. 

(See Ross v. Superior Court (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 667, 681 [failure to 

respond may be construed as an implicit concession].) In that circumstance, 

the DMV is relying on that implicit concession, rather than on the DS-367.
14

Municipal Court (1976) 17 Cal.3d 859, 868; see also Central Valley II, at 

p. 163 [“it is not obvious why nonexempt agencies and licensing entities 

require information that apparently does not pertain to a criminal 

conviction”].)

The APS suspension process provides substantially more reliable

results. The lawfulness of an arrest depends solely on “whether a reasonable 

officer in the same position would objectively conclude there was probable 

cause to arrest.” (Espinoza v. Shiomoto (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 85, 103.) Even 

where probable cause is present, the facts supporting probable cause have not 

been subject to challenge before the arrest. While an arrest record exists

even when the arrest was unlawful, “for the DMV to suspend the driver’s 

license [under the APS suspension statutes], the underlying arrest must have 

been lawful.” (Gikas v. Zolin (1993) 6 Cal.4th 841, 847 (Gikas).) Moreover, 

the DMV must find more than just a lawful arrest to impose a suspension: it 

must also find the person either was driving with a prohibited blood-alcohol

level or refused to test and was told a refusal would result in a suspension. 

(§ 13557, subd. (b)(1) & (3).) For these findings, “[t]he standard of review is 

preponderance of the evidence [citation], and the department [DMV] bears 

the burden of proof.” (Lake, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 455.) Preponderance of 

the evidence is a higher standard than probable cause. (People v. Carrington

(2009) 47 Cal.4th 145, 163 [“The showing required in order to establish 

probable cause is less than a preponderance of the evidence or even a prima 

facie case.”].) 

Significantly, while an arrestee has no opportunity to challenge an 

arrest before it happens, a licensee can challenge an APS accusation before 

the suspension takes effect. “ ‘ “A driver’s license cannot be suspended 

without due process of law.” ’ ” (California DUI Lawyers Assn. v. Department 
15

of Motor Vehicles (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 517, 529 (DUI Lawyers); see also

Knudsen v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 186, 198

[“once a driver’s license is issued, the driver has a property right in the 

license, and the license cannot be revoked or suspended unless certain 

constitutional due process protections are followed”].) The licensee has the 

right to retain counsel (§ 14112; Gov. Code, § 11509), to obtain prehearing 

discovery (Gov. Code, § 11507.6), to subpoena records and witnesses 

(§ 14104.5), and to introduce and rebut evidence (§§ 13558, subd. (b), 14104.7; 

Gov. Code, § 11513, subd. (b)).

17 DMV’s determination following an 

evidentiary hearing is made by a neutral decisionmaker.18 The licensee is 

entitled to judicial review of an adverse administrative decision. (§ 13559.) 

To be sure, as Plaintiffs argue, procedures at an APS suspension 

hearing are not as rigorous as those in a criminal proceeding. (E.g., Lake, 

supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 462 [“One aspect of this accelerated procedure is a 

slight relaxation of the rules of evidence applicable to an administrative per 

se review hearing.”].) Nonetheless, the Legislature intentionally crafted the 

APS suspension statutes to minimize the possibility of error: One of the 

express legislative purposes was “[t]o guard against the potential for any 

erroneous deprivation of the driving privilege by providing an opportunity for 

17 Among the issues a person can raise at an APS suspension hearing is 

the reliability of any chemical test results, which Plaintiffs’ expert on bloodalcohol testing testified was inaccurate between 5 and 10 percent of the time. 

18 In DUI Lawyers, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th 517, the Court of Appeal held 

DMV’s then-current practice whereby “the APS hearing officers[] [held] dual 

roles of advocate and trier of fact” violated due process because “[t]he 

irreconcilable conflict between advocating for the agency on one hand, and 

being an impartial decisionmaker on the other, presents a ‘ “particular 

combination of circumstances creating an unacceptable risk of bias.” ’ ” (Id.

at pp. 530, 532.)
16

administrative review prior to the effective date of the suspension and an 

opportunity for a full hearing as quickly as possible after the suspension 

becomes effective.”19 (Stats. 1989, ch. 1460, § 1; see also Robertson v. 

Department of Motor Vehicles (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 938, 941 [“key provisions 

in . . . the administrative per se laws[] are aimed at safeguarding the driver’s 

rights of due process”].) Our Supreme Court has found the “procedural 

protections” in place for APS suspension proceedings render “the threat of an 

erroneous administrative determination minimal.” (Lake, at p. 463, italics 

added.)

Indeed, the Legislature created the APS suspension process as a 

separate administrative proceeding, largely independent of any criminal 

proceedings arising from the same arrest. “ ‘The Legislature, in enacting 

these [APS suspension] statutes, contemplated two processes—one involving 

court proceedings and criminal in nature, the other involving administrative 

proceedings and civil in nature; and that these processes are, for the most 

part, intended to operate independently of each other and to provide for 

different dispositions.’ ” (Gikas, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 847; see id. at pp. 844–

845 [criminal proceeding determination that arrest was illegal does not 

19 The procedural protections were balanced against the Legislature’s 

desire for an expedited suspension process: “The legislative history [of the 

APS suspension statutes] reveals that ‘[t]he need for the administrative per 

se statutes arose from the fact that “[t]he legal process leading to imposition 

of a suspension sometimes [took] years from the time of arrest.” [Citation.] 

“Many drivers with high chemical test results fail[ed] to have sanctions taken 

against their driving privilege because of reduction in charges as the result of 

‘plea-bargaining’ or pre-trial diversion programs.” [Citation.] In enacting the 

administrative per se law, the Legislature intended to establish “an expedited 

driver’s license suspension system” [citation] that would “reduce court delays. 

The suspension will be swift and certain and will be more effective as a 

deterrent....” ’ ” (Gikas, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 847.)
17

preclude opposite finding by DMV in APS suspension proceeding].) Notably, 

the Legislature determined APS suspensions were sufficiently reliable that 

they should only be vacated by a criminal court acquittal, and not by other 

nonconviction dispositions in a criminal proceeding. (Id. at p. 856 [“[T]he 

Legislature used precise language. It chose to prevent the DMV from 

suspending a driver’s license if the criminal courts found the person in fact 

not guilty of drunk driving, but not otherwise.”]; see also Agresti v. 

Department of Motor Vehicles (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 599, 604 [“A criminal case 

may be dismissed on any one of several grounds, some based on procedural 

defects, others based on the merits of the case. . . . Thus, a dismissal does not 

necessarily involve a consideration of the merits of the cause.”].)

Thus, the low threshold required for an arrest and the absence of any 

prearrest adversarial testing renders nonconviction arrests unreliable 

indicators of wrongdoing, and therefore in need of privacy protection to 

prevent their improper use. In contrast, an arrest does not lead to an APS 

suspension unless and until the offense is established under a higher 

standard and, upon the licensee’s request, the accusation is tested in an 

adversarial evidentiary hearing. The Legislature considered this procedure 

sufficiently reliable to decouple the administrative process from the criminal, 

allowing the administrative result to stand unless the criminal proceeding

results in an acquittal. This decoupling supports a conclusion that 

prohibiting disclosure of the reason for an APS suspension would not serve 

the purposes underlying the constitutional and statutory privacy provisions.

20

20 Additional support is provided by the evidence that at least some

employers and insurers would, if a public driver record did not disclose 

reasons for suspensions, treat all suspensions as alcohol-related. (See ante, 

pp. 8–9.) Such an outcome could benefit more dangerous drivers at the 

expense of those less dangerous. 
18

In sum, we hold that DMV’s disclosure of the reason for an APS 

suspension does not constitute disclosure of information received from law 

enforcement pertaining to or concerning an arrest, and is therefore not 

prohibited by Labor Code section 432.7(g)(2) or the constitutional right to 

privacy.

21 

II. Information Practices Act

DMV argues that the Information Practices Act’s record correction 

provisions do not apply to records of a driver’s criminal history and licensing 

actions. We disagree.

A. Additional Background

“ ‘The Information Practices Act, enacted in 1977, generally imposes 

limitations on the right of governmental agencies to disclose personal 

information about an individual. [Citations.] “The statute was designed by 

the Legislature to prevent misuse of the increasing amount of information 

about citizens which government agencies amass in the course of their 

multifarious activities, the disclosure of which could be embarrassing or 

otherwise prejudicial to individuals or organizations.” ’ ” (Bates v. Franchise

Tax Bd. (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 367, 373 (Bates).)

21 Plaintiffs have asserted no other basis for finding the disclosure 

prohibited. We need not and do not decide whether, as DMV contends, DMV 

is required to disclose the reason for suspensions under section 1808, 

subdivision (c); and we also need not decide how any such requirement would 

impact the constitutional privacy and Labor Code section 432.7(g)(2)

analyses. (See § 1808, subd. (c) [DMV “shall make available or disclose 

suspensions and revocations of the driving privilege”].) In an amicus brief, a 

rideshare company sought clarification about the trial court’s distinction 

between commercial and noncommercial drivers. Because we are reversing 

the trial court’s ruling on the privacy claims, the request for clarification is 

moot.
19

The IPA includes provisions authorizing corrections. Civil Code section 

1798.35 provides, “Each agency shall permit an individual to request in 

writing an amendment of a record and, shall within 30 days of the date of 

receipt of such request,” either “Make each correction in accordance with the 

individual’s request” or “Inform the individual of its refusal to amend the 

record in accordance with such individual’s request, the reason for the 

refusal, [and] the procedures established by the agency for the individual to 

request a review” by the agency.22 Civil Code section 1798.36 requires 

agencies to provide for such review and establishes timelines and certain 

procedures.23

22 In its entirety, Civil Code section 1798.35 provides, “Each agency 

shall permit an individual to request in writing an amendment of a record 

and, shall within 30 days of the date of receipt of such request: [¶] (a) Make 

each correction in accordance with the individual’s request of any portion of a 

record which the individual believes is not accurate, relevant, timely, or 

complete and inform the individual of the corrections made in accordance 

with their request; or [¶] (b) Inform the individual of its refusal to amend the 

record in accordance with such individual’s request, the reason for the 

refusal, the procedures established by the agency for the individual to request 

a review by the head of the agency or an official specifically designated by the 

head of the agency of the refusal to amend, and the name, title, and business 

address of the reviewing official.”

23 In its entirety, Civil Code section 1798.36 provides, “Each agency 

shall permit any individual who disagrees with the refusal of the agency to 

amend a record to request a review of such refusal by the head of the agency 

or an official specifically designated by the head of such agency, and, not later 

than 30 days from the date on which the individual requests such review, 

complete such review and make a final determination unless, for good cause 

shown, the head of the agency extends such review period by 30 days. If, 

after such review, the reviewing official refuses to amend the record in 

accordance with the request, the agency shall permit the individual to file 

with the agency a statement of reasonable length setting forth the reasons for 

the individual’s disagreement.”
20

DMV has established procedures for persons to exercise their rights 

under the IPA. But DMV does not permit persons to use its IPA correction

procedures with respect to criminal history or licensing action information.24

B. “Records”

DMV argues that because criminal history and licensing actions are not 

“personal information” within the meaning of the IPA, the IPA’s correction 

provisions do not apply to this type of information. We disagree.

Certain provisions of the IPA govern agencies’ handling of “personal 

information,” defined for purposes of the IPA as information “that identifies 

or describes an individual . . . .” (Civ. Code, § 1798.3, subd. (a).) However, 

the correction provisions at issue here (Civ. Code, §§ 1798.35, 1798.36) do not 

refer to personal information, and instead govern requests to correct “any 

portion of a record” (Civ. Code, § 1798.35, subd. (a); see also Civ. Code, 

§ 1798.18 [“Each agency shall maintain all records, to the maximum extent 

possible, with accuracy, relevance, timeliness, and completeness.”].) “The 

term ‘record’ means any file or grouping of information about an individual 

that is maintained by an agency by reference to an identifying particular 

such as the individual’s name, photograph, finger or voice print, or a number 

or symbol assigned to the individual.” (Civ. Code, § 1798.3, subd. (g).) This 

definition of record is not tethered to the definition of personal information, 

nor are the IPA’s correction provisions restricted to those portions of records 

containing personal information. “The IPA expressly makes the 

administrative procedures for access, amendment, and correction of 

information applicable to ‘records’ maintained by state agencies. The 

24 DMV asserts it has alternative methods to correct such information, 

but does not contend these methods comply with the IPA. 
21

definition of ‘records’ does not depend on the dichotomy between personal and 

nonpersonal information.” (Bates, supra, 124 Cal.App.4th at pp. 378–379.)

DMV argues that, despite the plain language of the correction 

provisions, these provisions must in fact refer to personal information 

because the IPA only confers the right to inspect with respect to personal 

information. However, the statute relied on by DMV underscores the 

Legislature’s understanding that personal information and records are not 

equivalent: it requires agencies to allow persons to “inspect all the personal 

information in any record containing personal information . . . .” (Civ. Code, 

§ 1798.34, subd. (a), italics added.) Moreover, the Legislature could 

reasonably determine that inspection rights should be limited to personal 

information, but that if a person learns of an error in a nonpersonal part of a 

record, that person should be entitled to request the error be corrected.

DMV does not dispute that information maintained by DMV about a 

person’s criminal history and licensing actions is part of that person’s 

“record” within the meaning of the IPA. We conclude the IPA’s correction 

provisions apply to this information.

25

C. The Federal Driver Privacy Protection Act

DMV contends Plaintiffs’ construction of the IPA would “conflict[]” with 

the federal Driver Privacy Protection Act (DPPA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721–2725, 

because the federal statute expressly excludes “information on vehicular 

accidents, driving violations, and driver’s status” from its definition of 

“personal information.” (18 U.S.C. § 2725, subd. (3).) As discussed above, the 

relevant provisions of the IPA refer to “records” rather than “personal 

information.” In any event, DMV does not argue the IPA is preempted by the 

25 We therefore need not decide whether criminal history and licensing 

actions also constitute “personal information,” as Plaintiffs contend.
22

DPPA, nor does it argue the Legislature intended the IPA cover the same 

information as the DPPA. Its sole argument, with no authority or further 

analysis, is that “[i]t makes no sense for the same driver record information 

to be excluded from ‘personal information’ under federal law, but not under 

state law.” “When an appellant asserts a point but fails to support it with 

reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as 

forfeited.” (Tellez v. Rich Voss Trucking, Inc. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 1052, 

1066.) We need not and do not address this contention.

D. Availability of Taxpayer Claim for Declaratory Judgment

Finally, DMV challenges the availability of a taxpayer claim and 

declaratory judgment relief. The challenge fails.

“Code of Civil Procedure section 526a permits a taxpayer to bring an 

action to restrain or prevent an illegal expenditure of public money. 

. . . [T]axpayer suits provide a general citizen remedy for controlling illegal 

governmental activity.” (Connerly v. State Personnel Bd. (2001) 

92 Cal.App.4th 16, 29 (Connerly).) “The statute authorizing declaratory 

judgments is explicitly limited to ‘cases of actual controversy.’ (Code Civ. 

Proc., § 1060.)” (Fiske v. Gillespie (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 1243, 1246 (Fiske).)

DMV argues no actual controversy exists because there is no evidence 

of incorrect criminal history or licensing action information, and no evidence 

anyone requested a record correction. To the contrary, there is an actual 

controversy: whether DMV’s position that the IPA’s correction provisions do 

not apply to criminal history and licensing actions violates the IPA. 

DMV next contends the availability of alternative procedures to correct 

criminal history or licensing actions and judicial review of DMV’s decisions in 

such procedures precludes a taxpayer claim. We agree with Plaintiffs that 

this argument reflects a misconception of Plaintiffs’ claim. Plaintiffs are 
23

challenging DMV’s policy of excluding criminal history and licensing action 

information from its IPA correction procedures. The availability of 

alternative procedures to correct an individual’s personal record does not 

preclude Plaintiffs’ taxpayer claim. Nathan H. Schur, Inc. v. City of Santa 

Monica (1956) 47 Cal.2d 11, relied on by DMV, is not to the contrary. (See id.

at p. 17 [where city “hold[s] a public hearing and mak[es] a quasi-judicial 

determination with reference to the issuance of a license to engage in a 

certain business . . . and such determination is reviewable by mandamus or 

certiorari,” taxpayer action challenging determination is not available].)

Finally, DMV argues that because a challenge to an IPA violation must 

show “an adverse effect” (Civ. Code, § 1798.45, subd. (c)), Plaintiffs must also 

show an adverse effect in their taxpayer claim. We disagree. “No showing of 

special damage to a particular taxpayer is required as a requisite for bringing 

a taxpayer suit.” (Connerly, supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at p. 29.) DMV’s 

authority is easily distinguishable. For example, in Reno v. Baird (1998) 

18 Cal.4th 640, relied on by DMV, the Supreme Court held that a claim that 

an employment discharge was in violation of public policy, where the only 

public policy relied on was a statute prohibiting discriminatory employment 

discharges, was restricted by the parameters of the statute. (Id. at pp. 663–

664.)

DISPOSITION

The portion of the judgment finding in favor of Plaintiffs on their 

claims for violation of the right to privacy under the California Constitution 

and violation of Labor Code section 432.7(g)(2), and issuing injunctions based 

on these claims, is reversed. The judgment is otherwise affirmed. The 

parties shall bear their own costs.
24

SIMONS, Acting P.J.

We concur. 

BURNS, J.

CHOU, J. 

(A164843)
25

Doe, et al.California Department of Motor Vehicles, et al. (A164843)

Trial Judge: Hon. Brad Seligman

Trial Court: Alameda County Superior Court

Attorneys: 

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Chris A. Knudsen, Senior 

Assistant Attorney General, Fiel D. Tigno, Supervising Deputy 

Attorney General, Christopher D. Beatty, Vincent Cheng, and Joshua 

C. Irwin, Deputy Attorneys General, for Defendants and Appellants.

East Bay Community Law Center, Miguel Soto, Jr.; Sidley Austin 

LLP, David R. Carpenter, Nicole M. Baade, Jaime A. Bartlett, Sara B. 

Brody, and Matthew Henry for Plaintiffs and Respondents.

Lehotsky Keller Cohn LLP, Steven P. Lehotsky and Gabriela 

Gonzalez-Araiza for Lyft, Inc. as Amicus Curiae.