### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE A ugus t 5, 200 4 S es sio n C U ST OM LA N D D EV EL OP M EN T, IN C
. v. TO WN OF C OO P ER TO WN

and C OOP ERT OWN BOA RD OF Z ONIN G A PP EAL S An Appeal f

romthe Chancer y Court for Robert son Coun ty No. 17206 Ross H. Hicks, Ju dge

No. M2003- 02107-COA-R 3-CV - F iled Dece m ber 22, 2004

This is a z oning case . The a ppellant landowne r owns a tr act of land that it sought to re sume using as a sanitary landfill. The appellee s are the newly -incorpor ated town in which the landf ill is located a ndthetow n’ s zon ing bo ard . In 1 99 6, thela nd ow ne r andthec ou nty in w hic h th e tow n andla nd fi ll arelocated r esolved a

dispute in which the landfill was dee med a leg ally permitted nonconf

orming use under the county

zoning ordinanc e. I n 2002, the landowner soug ht a building permit from the town planning commission. The town planning commission refused to gr an t t h e p ermit until the la n d o w n e r

o b t a i n e da

d e t e r m i n a t i o n f

r o mt h e t o w n z o n i n g b o ar dt h a tt h e l a n d f i l l w a s a l e g a l ly permitted non-c onforming use under the town’s new ly -ena cted zoning or dinance s. The town zoning board de termined that the landfill was not a leg ally perm i t t ed n o nconforming use under the town zoning ordinanc es bec ause the landowner had discontinued its nonconforming use of the landfill for longe r than one y ear
. Consequently , no permit was issued. The landowner unsucce ssfully

appea led the ruling to the town zoning appe als board. The landowner then appealed the dec ision of the zoning ap p e a ls b o ar dto th e trial c o u rt. T h e trial c o u rt a f f irme d th e ru li n g o f th e zo n in g ap p e a ls b o ar d

. We aff irm, finding that the use of the pr operty as a landfill had been di scontinued for more than one y ear and t hus the landfill did not fall within the nonconforming use exception to the town’s zoning ordinanc e. Rule 3 Appeal; Jud gm ent of the Chancery Court is af fi rm ed
H OL L Y M. K I RBY , J. , d e li v e r e dth e o p in io n o f th e Co u rt, inw h ic h W. F RAN K C RAW FORD , P.J ., W.S. and A L AN E. H I G H ERS , J ., joined.
Jame s L . M ur

ph y a nd Au sti n L . McM ull e n, Na sh vil le , for the a pp e llant C us tom

L a ndDe ve lop me nt, I nc.
Geor g e A. Dean, Nashville, for appellee s Town of Coopertown and Coopertown B oard of Z oning Ap pe a ls.A l eg all y pe rm i t t i ng no nc o nfo rm i ng use is pro t ec t ed und er T .C .A

. § 1 3

- 7

- 2 0 8 , w hich p ro vid es: 1
( b)( 1) I n t he eve nt t hat a z oni ng ch ang e occu r s i n a ny l and a r ea whe r e s uch l and a r ea

w a s n o t p re v io u sly c o v e re d b y a n y z o n ing re stric tio n s o f an y go v e rn m e n ta l ag e n c y o f t h is sta te o r its p o lit ic a l sub d ivisio n s, o r w h e re su c h lan d is co v e re d b y z o n ing re stric tio n s o f a go vernm ent al agency o f t hi s st at e o r i t s p o l i t i cal s ub d i vi si o ns, and s uch zo ni ng res t ri ct i o ns d iff e r fro m z o n ing re stric tio n s im p o se d a fter the z o n ing c h a n g e , t h e n a n y ind u stria l,
co m m erci al or b usi ness est ab l i shment i n op erat i o n, pe rmit t ed t o op erat e und er zoning
re g u la tio n s o r e x c e p tio n s the re to p rio r to the z o n ing c h a n g e sh a ll b e a llo w e d to c o n tinu e in oper at i on a n d be pe r mi t t ed; pr ov i ded, t h at n o c h an g e i n t h e u s e of t h e l an d i s u n der t ak en by
suc h ind ustry o r b usiness.
(2) W hen t he use perm i t t ed t o co nt i nue t o exp and , or t o be rebui l t pursuant t o any s u bs ec t i on of

t h i s s ec t i on i s a n of

f

- pr emi s es s i g n , s u ch u s e s h al l n ot pr ec l u de an y n ew or addi t i onal conf

ormi ng us e or s t r uct ur e on t he propert y on wh i ch t he s i gn s t r uct ur e i s l ocat ed
or on any adj ace nt proper t y un der t he s ame owner s hi p; provi ded, howev er , t hat an y s uch ne w o r add i t i o nal us e o r s t ruct ure do es not res ul t i n any vi o l at i o ns o f t he ap p l i cab l e zo ni ng r es t r i ct i ons ot her t han t hos e n onconformi t i es as s oci at ed wi t h t he off

- premi s es s i gn as al l owed und er t hi s subd i vi si o n (b)(2).

(c) Indust ri al , co m m erci al or o t her busi ness est ab l i shments i n op erat i o n and p e rm itt e d to o p e ra te un d e r z o n ing re g u la tio n s o r e x c e p tio n s the re to in e ff e c t i m m e d ia te ly prec edi ng a c han ge i n z oni ng s hal l be al l owed t o expan d op er at i ons an d cons t r uct addi t i onal f aci l i t i es whi ch i nvo l ve an act ual co nt i nuance and exp ansi o n of t he act i vi t i es of t he i nd ust ry o r busi ness whi ch were p erm i t t ed and be i ng co nd uct ed pri o r t o t he change i n zo ni ng; p ro v id e d , t h a t t h e re is a r e a so n a b le a m o u n t o f sp a c e fo r su c h e x p a n sio n o n the p ro p e rty o w n e d b y su c h ind u stry o r b u sin e ss situ a te d w ithin the a re a w h ic h is affe c te d b y the c h a n g e in
zo ni ng, s o as t o avo i d nui sances t o ad joini ng l and o wners. N o buil d i ng pe rmit or l i ke p erm i ss i o n fo r const ruct i o n or l and scaping shal l be de ni ed t o an i nd ust ry or b usi ness s eeki ng t o expan d and cont i nu e a ct i vi t i es conduc t ed by t hat i ndus t r y or bus i nes s wh i ch wer e per mi t t ed pri or t o t he cha ng e i n z oni ng ; provi ded, t hat t her e i s a r eas onabl e a mo un t of s pace f or s uch -2- OP IN ION Plaintiff/Appellant Custom L and De velopment, I nc. (“Custom”) owns a trac t of land locate d in R ob e rt so n Cou nty

kn ow n a s th e Hi g hland s L a nd fi ll ( “ Hi g hland s” ). Cus tom a c qu ir e d th e pr op e rty in 1985 and later

lease d it to Br o wni ng -F erris I ndustries, I nc. (“ BF I ”) to de velop and ope rate a landfill. BF I

acc epted wa ste at the landf ill on S ept em b er 6 , 1988. On that same day , Robertson Cou nty fi le d suit to e njo in the op e ratio n, c la imi ng that th e la nd fi ll v iol a te d th e Rob e rt so n Co un ty zon ing or din a nc e s. A leg al b at tle relating to validity of the c ounty

zoning ordinanc e ensue d, resulting in an app e a l to thi s Co urt. O n a pp e a l, this Cou rt

re ma nd e d Cu sto m’ s c la im t o the R ob ert so n Co un ty Circuit Court. Robertson C ount y, Te nnessee v. Brownin g-Ferris Indu st. of Tennessee, Inc. , 799 S.W .2d 662 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990). D uring this ti me, B FI terminated the Hig hlands lease . Custom the n re a c qu ir e d the app lic able pe rm its a ndpr oc e e de d w ithde ve lop me nt o f the pr op e rty a s a la nd fi ll. After remand of the c ase, R o b er tson Countyand Custom entere d into a settlement ag ree ment that dissolved the injunction a g ainst Hig hlands. The a g ree ment stipulated that the Hig hlands landfill was a leg al l y p er mitted nonconforming use of the prope rty under the Robertson County zoning 1expan s i on on t he propert y owned by s uch i ndus t r y or bus i nes s s i t uat ed wi t hi n t he ar ea whi ch i s aff ec t ed b y t he ch an ge i n z o ning, so as to a vo i d nuisan ce s t he adjo i ning land o w ne rs.

T

. C

. A

. § 1 3

- 7

- 2 0 8 (b) and (c) (20 0 4 ). -3- ordinanc es and that the nonconforming use had not been discontinued throug h the date of the orde r, s i n ce t h e i n

j u n ct i o n h ad p re v en t ed t h e o p er at i o n o f th e l an d fi l l

. Un d ert h i s ex ce p t i o n , ev en t h o u gh the landfi ll did not conform to the County zoning ordinanc es, Custom would nonetheless be permitted by

the County

to operate the landf

ill. The settl em en t ag ree ment betwee n Custom and Robertson County

was a pproved by

the Robertson County

Circuit Court on August 22, 1996.
Af te r d iss olu tio n o f the inj un c tio n, Cus tom so ug ht o ut a

ne w w a stec oll e c tio n c omp a ny to op e rate the lan dfi ll

. The rewe resu bs ta nti a l ob sta c le s. Du e to the sp e c ia lize d n a tur e of thewa ste dis po sa l in du stry , c lie nts wi th the me a ns a ndabil ity to ope rate a

pr of ita blela nd fi ll w e reno t r e a dil y available

. I n addition, during the leng thy period of time in which the injunction had been in f orce , environmenta l guide lines g overning landfills beca m e m o re string ent. The Te nnessee Depa rtment of Environment and Conservation re qu i re d Hi g hlands to comply with the new g uidelines befor e re su min g op e ratio n o f the la nd fi ll. Co mp li a nc e wi th the se ne w g uid e lin e s r e qu ir e d Cu sto m to m o d i fy the desig n of the landf ill and add impermea

ble liners to pre vent adve rse e ffe cts on the su rr ou nd ing e nv ir on me nt.
On Dec ember

1, 1996, ap p ro x i m ately three and a half months after dissolution of the injunction ag ainst Hig hlands, the owne rs of the pr operty s u rr o unding the landfill incorporated the Def endant/Appe llee town of Coopertown. The Hig hlands property is located within the boundaries of Coopertown. Shortly

there afte r, Coopertown a dopted a zoning or dinance that became ef fec tive on J anuary

30, 1997. The Coopertown zoning ordinan ce required Hig hlands to obtain site approva l for the modified desig n. Coopertown authoriz ed the Robertson County Planning Com mission (“Planning Com mis sio n” ) t o p e rf

orm a sit e re vie w on its b e ha lf . T he Cou nty Pla nn ing Com mis sio n g rante d s ite approva l to Highlands on Septe mber 4, 1997. During this time, Custom had been looking for a client to operate the landf ill. I n early

1998, Cus tom e nte re d in to a

te ntativ e agr e e me nt w ithRe pu bli c I nd us trie s, I nc . to op e rate thela nd fi ll. Fr om March thr oug h May 1998, landfill-re lated construc tion beg an at Hig hlands. It included an a c c e ss r oa d, a

sil tatio n p on d, a ndthefi rs t w a stec e ll. I n Jun e 19 98 , h ow e ve r, Re pu bli c I nd us trie s, I nc . w ith dr e w from th e Hi g hland s p ro je c t. C us tom

wa s f or c e d to re su me these arc h f or a wa ste se rv ic e s c omp a ny

c apa bleof op e ratin g thela nd fi ll. Finally , Custom l ocate d anoth er co m p an y to operate the landf

ill. On August 31, 2001, Custom entered into an a g ree ment with Wa s t e I ndustries, I nc. (“ Waste I ndustries”) to ope rate the la nd fi ll. I n o rd e r t o u til ize ne w t e c hn olo g y a ndfu rthe r p ro te c t th e loc a l e nv ir on men t, Was te I ndustries asked Custom to make additional modifications to t he site.-4-

I n May 2002, Coopertown cr eate d the Coopertown Municipa l Planning Comm i s sion (“Coopertown Planning Commission”). On J uly 23, 2002, Custom s ubmitted to the Coopertown Planning Commission a site approval plan and a re quest for a building permit to build a trailer of fice and sca les. I n its m eeting held on September 17, 2002, the Coopertown Planning Commi ssion decide d to postpone its review of Custom’s site plan until Cust om r ec ei v ed a fi nal zoning determination from the Coopertown B u il d in g Co mmis s io n e r ( “ B u il d in g Co mmissioner” ) on whe ther Hig hlands was a

leg ally permitted nonconforming use of the prope rty under the Coopertown Z oning ordinanc e. As with the ex ce p t i o n t o t h e C o u n t y z o n i n g o rd i n an ce , t h e “ l ega l l y p er m i tted non-conf

orming use” de termination was an exception to the Coopertown zoning ordinanc es. On Septembe r 23, 2002, the B uilding Commissi oner de termined that Hig hlands was not a le g ally permitted nonconf orming use of the pr o p ertybeca

use Custom had discontinued operation of the landfill for ove r one y ear
. Under section 6.021(I ) of the Coopertown Z oning Ordinanc es, when a nonconforming use of land is discontinued for a pe riod of one y ear , the leg ally permi t t ed n onconforming use is terminated. Se c tio n 6 .0 21 (I ) o f the Coo pe rt ow n Z on ing Or din a nc e re a ds :
I . Discontinuance When a nonconf

orming use of land or

the ac tive operation of substantiallyall the nonconforming uses in any building or othe r structureor trac t of land is discontinued fo r a pe ri odon on e (1 ) y e ar, the n th e la ndor bu ild ing or

oth e r s truc tur e sh a ll the re a ft e r b e us e d o nly fo r c on fo rm ing us e
. I nte nt to re su me a c tiv e op e ratio ns sh a ll not affe ct the for eg oing pr ovision. Thus, if Custom’s use o f t he prope rty did not meet the re quirements for a leg ally permitted nonconforming use , this meant that Custom could onl y use t he property for a conforming use . Since the Coopertown zoning or dinance s did not permit operation of a landfill in that location, Custom wo uldbe pr e c lud e d f

ro m us ing its pr op e rty

fo r i ts i nte nd e d p ur

po se s, a la nd fi ll. Custom appe aled the decision of the Building Commi ssioner to t h e D efendant/Appellee Coopertown B oard of

Z oning A ppeals. The Coopertown B oard of Z oning A ppeals af

fi rmed the ru lin g of theB uil din g Com mis sio ne r andma de thefo llo wi ng fi nd ing s: (i) whe n the Z oning O rdinanc e wa s adopted on J anuary 30, 1997, the Property

was zoned ag ricultural and a landfill was not permitted as either permitted or c onditional us e ; (ii) a lth ou g h a cou rt or de r en te re d on Aug us t 22, 199 6 pro vid e d that th e la nd fi ll had bee n deeme d leg ally non-conf

o rm ing unde r Robertson County ’s zoning reg ulations and that the use ha d not been d i s conti nued bec ause of the injunction issued in the case , the court did not rule that the us e was in operation at the time of th e o r d e r o r a t th e ti me o f th e is s u a n c e o f th e in ju n c ti o n ; ( ii i) a lth o u g h the owner s have submitt ed permit applications and rec eived site plan approva l, the landfill has n ev er b ee n o p er at i o n al s i n ce t h e a d o p t i o n o f t h e Zo n i n g Or d i n an ce ; (i v ) e v en t h o u gh s o me c o n s tr

u c ti o n a c ti v itie s w e r e c o n d u c te d e ith e r b e f o r e A p r il o f 1 9 9 8 , or at theU n d e r th e c o m m o n law w rit o f ce rtio ra ri: 2

T h e wr i t of

ce r t i or ar i m ay be gr an t ed wh en ev er au t h or i ze d by l aw , an d al s o i n c as es w h er e an i n fer i or trib u n a l, b o a rd , o r o ff

ic e r e x e rc ising j u d ic ia l fu n c tio n s h a s e x c e e d e d th e j u risd ic tio n c o n fer re d , o r is
a c ting il le g a lly, w h e n , i n the ju d g m e n t o f the c o u rt, the re is n o o the r p la in, sp e e d y o r a d e q u a te re m e d y.
T

. C

. A

. § 27

- 8

- 1 0 1 (Sup p
. 19 9 7 ). -5- late st, thr ou g h th e e ndof

June 19 98 , th e la nd fi ll w a s n e ve r i n o pe ratio n de sp ite tho se activities; (v) those construction activities wer e not substantial and thus insufficient to vest a rig ht to continue the use of the Property as a landfill; (vi) those construction a c tiv iti e s e nd e d inAp ri l, 1 99 8 o r at th e late st i n Jun e of 19 98 , and thu s a ny

us e established as the result of those a ctivities has been disc ontinued for ove r one y ear ; (vii) the construc tion acti v i t i es we re not c ompleted and the landfill never ope ned; (viii) no evidenc e wa s prese nted that waste materia ls have e ver be en deposited at the sit e ; ( ix) n o e vid e nc e wa s p re se nte d th a t a ny la nd fill a c tiv iti e s a s o pp os e d to construction ac tiviti es we re c onducted on the Prope rty ; (x ) no ev i d en ce w as prese nted that any

landfill activities wer e conduct ed on the Prope rty since the adoption of the Z oning O rdinanc e; (xi) no evidence was pre sented of any meaning ful activities conducte d on the Property since 1998; ( x ii) while the owner has maintained the nec essary

permits, any

landfill use has be en discontinued for well over one y ear ; and (xiii ) since the landfill use has been discontinued for we ll over one y ear , Section 6. 02 1( I ) o f the Z on ing Or din a nc e pr oh ibi ts the re -e sta bli sh me nt o f the la nd fi ll u se o n t h e P r o p e rt y.
Th e Coo pe rt ow n B oa

rdof Z on ing Ap pe a ls, the n, c on c lud e d th a t Cu sto m’ s n ume ro us a c tiv iti e s in prepa ration to operate the landf ill did notconstitute the “a ctive oper ation” of a landfil l on the property , and that “ac tive operation” of the landfill had been discontinued for over a y ear . There fore , un de r S e c tio n 6 .0 21 (I ) o f the Coo pe rt ow n zo nin g or din a nc e s, Cus tom wo uldno t bepe rm itt e d to operate a landf

ill on its property

. Custom then fil ed a Petiti on for Writ of Certiora ri to the Robertson Cou nty Chanc e ry Cou rt (“ Chanc e ry Cou rt ” ) to ap pe a l the de c isi on of the B oa rd of Z on ing Ap pe a ls. 2
The Chanc ery

Court held a he ar i n g o n C u stom’s petition, based on the re cord of the Coopertown B oard of Z oning appea ls. It admitted no additional evidenc e but heard ar g uments of counsel. On July7, 2003, afte r considerin g t he re cord and the parties’ ar g uments, the Chance ry Court issued a complete and cog ent Memorandum Opinion.
At theou tse t of the Me mor a nd um Op ini on , the Chanc e ry Cou rt ou tli ne d th e pe rtine nt f a c ts. It acknowle dg ed the narrow scope of its re view of the Boa rd’s de cision, limi ted to a dete rmination of whe ther the Boa

rd exceede d its jurisdi ction or ac ted illeg ally , arbitra rily or fr audulently . It noted that its task was not to substi tute its judgment for that of t he Board, but rathe r t o uphold the Boa rd’s de c isi on if

the rewa s a ny

ratio na l ba sis fo r i t. Cog nizant o f this stand ardof re vie w, theChanc e r

y Cou rt state d th a t “ c e ntr a l is su e in this c a se is the de te rm inatio n o f w he the r o r n ot the Coo pe rt ow n B oa rd of Z on ing Ap pe a ls, a c tin g on be ha lfS inc e tha t d a te , t h e T e n n e sse e C o d e ha s b e e n a m e n d e d to inc lud e a 3 0 m o n th d isc o n tinu a tio n c la u se
. 3 T

. C

. A

. § 1 3

- 7

- 2 0 8 (g) (20 0 4 ). -6- of the C i t y o f Coopertown, e x cee ded its jurisdiction or has ac ted illeg ally , arbitra rily , or fraudulently .” The C h an ce ry C ourt listed three que stions as determinative of the issue. The questions were :
1. What wa s th e e f

f e c t o f th e A u g u s t 2 2 , 1 9 9 6 , Ro b e rts o n Co u n ty Ci r c u it Court Or de r o f C omp ro mis e a ndSe ttl e me nt? 2. I s the provision of Coop ertown’ s Z oning O rdinanc e providing for loss of a nonconforming use if that use is discontinued for a period of oney ear

valid? and 3. As su min g va lid ity

of the or din a nc e , is Cu sto m’ s p e ri odof no n- us e inv olu nta

ry so a s to e sto p e nf

or c e me nt o f the or din a nc e a g a ins t it ?
On the issue of the eff

ect of the Aug ust 19 9 6 s et t l em en t ag ree ment betwee n Custom and Robertson County , the Chance ry Court reje cted Coopertown’s arg ument that it was not bound by the settlemen t agr ee m en t. The Chance ry Court found that Coopertown wa s bound by the settlement a g re e me nt, a ndsp e c if

ic a lly wa s b ou ndby

thede te rm inatio n inthea g re e me nt that H ig hland s w a s a nonconforming use under Te nnessee Code Annotated § 13- 7-208.
I n its Memorandum Opinion, the Chance ry Court stated that Tenne s s ee s tatutes do not specific ally

authorize or pre clude discontinuation provisions in municipal zoni ng ordinanc es. The 3 Chance ry Court noted, howeve r, that such pr ovisions were r ecog nized in dicta in R i ves v . City of Cla rk sv ill e , 618 S.W .2d 502 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981), in whic h this Court st ated:
It sh ou ld also be re me mbe re d that re tr os pe c tiv e zon ing is o nly on e of se ve ral po ssi ble methods of attempti ng to eliminate non-conforming uses. There ar e other methods which include c ondemnation t hroug h the power of eminent domain invoking the law of nuisance , for

bid din g a re su mp tio n of use afte r a sp e c ifi e d p e rio d o f no n- us e , and prohibiting or limiting e x tensions or repairs to property

. Riv e s v . City of

Cla rk sv ill e , 618 S.W .2d at 510 (emphasis added). T he Chanc ery Court interprete d this dicta as sug g esting that a discontinuation clause was an appropriate method of c ontrolling nonconforming use s of land, and found from this that the Coopertown Boa rd of Z oning A ppeals ha d a rational basis for its enfor ceme nt of the zoning ordinance.
F inally , the Chanc e ry Cou rt c on sid e re d Cus tom ’s arg ume nt that a ny dis c on tin uatio n of its us e of thepr op e rty

a s a la nd fi ll w a s in vo lun tary , s te mmi ng fr om the orig inal inj un c tio n, a nd that th is would estop Coopertown fr om enforc ing the discontinuation ordinance. T h e P et i tion for Writ of Certiorari chronicle d Custom’s numerous actions reg arding development of Hig hlands, such as the sear ch for new clients, actions to comply with new envir onmental re g ulations, and prepa ration of the land. The Chanc ery

Court concluded, h o w e v e r , th at althoug h some construc tion activities took place as late a s 1998, Hig hlands had ne ver be en o p er at i o nal as a landfill since Coopertown a dopted the zoning ordinanc e. Custom presented no e vidence of any activity whatsoeve r on t he si te from J une-7-

of 19 98 thr ou g h A ug us t 31 , 2 00 1, thedate of thea g re e me nt w ith Was te I nd us trie s. It did n ot a pp ly fo r a bu ild ing pe rm it u nti l July 23 , 2 00 2. Th e Chanc e ry Cou rt fo un d th a t th is p e ri odof

ina c tiv ity provided a

rational ba sis for Coopertown’ s decision.
There fore , the Chance ry

Court concluded that Custom failed to be ar the burden of proving that t h e Bo ar d of Z oning A ppeals e x cee ded its jurisdiction or acted illeg ally , arbitra rily , or fraudulently

. Further, it f

ound substantial and materia l e vidence to support the Boa rd’s de cision, and a ff irme d th e re fu sa l to iss ue Cus tom a bu ild ing pe rm it. Fro m th is d e c isi on , Cu sto m no w a pp e a ls. On appeal, C ustom arg ues that the Chanc ery Court erre d in affirming the B oard’ s decision beca use Coopertown ha d no authority to act in a manne r inconsistent with t h e s t an d ard for abandonme nt of a prope rty rig ht. Custom arg ues as we ll that Coopertown cannot ba se its decision o n C u s t o m ’ s n o n u s e o f

t h e p r o p e rt y a s a

l a n d f i l l , b e c au s e a n y s u c h n o n u s e w a s i n v o l u n t ary. F i n a l l y, Cus tom ma int a ins that it

ha d a ve ste d rig ht t o d e ve lop thela nd fi ll.
The standa

rd of r eview g overning the common law writ of certiorari is well-e stablished. “The common law writ of certiorari provides the proce dural vehicle for revie wing the decisions by local zoning boa

rds. This writ aff

ords quite limited judicial review.” Laffe rty v. City of Winchester , 4 6 S

. W

. 3 d7 5 2 , 7 5 8

– 7 5 9 (T e n n
. C t

. A p p
. 2 0 0 0 ) ( ci t i n g 421 Corp. v. Metropolitan Gov’ t of Na shv ill e , 2 00 0 WL

48 81 37 ). “ I n r e c og nitionof the po lic y that fa vo rs pe rm itt ing thec ommun ity de c isi on -m ake rs c los e st to the e ve nts to make the de c isi on , the c ou rt s r e fr a in f ro m su bs tituti ng the ir judgme nts for the broa d discretionary power of the loca l gove rnment body .” Id . at 758.
This s t andar d of re view re flec ts the Court’s defe renc e to the dec ision of the zoning boar d. “I f thereis a rational or justifiable basis for the e nactment and it does not violate any state statute or positive constituti onal g uaranty , the wisdom of the zoning r eg ulation is a m at t er ex clusively for leg islative determination.” Fal lin v . Knox Co u nty Boa rd of Commissio ne rs , 656 S.W .2d 338, 342–343 (Tenn.1983). A re viewing court may overturn the decision of an administrative ag ency such as a zoning boar d only

when the a gen cy h as ac ted unlawf ully , arbitra

rily , fraudulently , or without material evide nce. La ff e rty , 46 S.W .3d at 759. The i n t ri n s i c cor rec tness of a zoning board’ s decision is not subject t o re v i ew u n d er the writ of c ertiora ri. Arnol d v. Te nnessee Bd. of Paroles , 956 S.W .2d 478, 480 (Tenn. 1997) . Both the Chanc ery Court and this Court are bound by the same standa

rd of r eview. Se e La

ff e rty , 46 S.W .3d at 758-759. On appeal, C ustom acknowledg es that the Ge neral Assembly in T.C.A. § 13-7-208 g rante d mun ic ipalit ies the p ow e r t o r e g ulate la ndus e wi thi n th e ir bo un da ri e s; h ow e ve r, it n ote s th a t a mu n ic ip a li ty ’ s e xe r c is e o f th is r e g u lato ry

p o w e r mu s t n o t c o n f

li c t w ith state l aw. 421 Corp. v. Me tro po lit an Gov e rnment of Na shv ill e and Da v ids on Co unty , 36 S.W .3d 469, 476 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). Custom asserts that a nonc onforming use such a s Hig hlands is allowed to continue ope rations under § 13- 7-208 and that the discontinuation p ro v i s i on in the Coopertown zoning or dinance c on tr a ve ne s th is s tatut e . Cu sto m a lso arg ue s th a t th e Chanc e ry Cou rt e rr e d inre lying on dic ta

in Rives as not ed above and ignore d the dec ision of this C ourt in National A uto/Tru ck Stops, Inc. v.A g r an df at h er c l au s e i s de f i n ed as “ [ a] s t at u t or y or r eg u l at or y c l au s e t h at e x empt s a c l as s of pe r s on s or 4 t r ans act i ons becau s e of ci r cums t anc es ex i s t i ng before t he new r ul e or r egu l at i on t ake s ef fect

. ” Black’ s Law D i cti o n a ry 7 0 6 (7 th e d . 1 9 9 9 ). A go o d e x p la n a tio n o f t h e re a so n s fo r su c h a “g ra n d fath e r c la u se ” is i n c lud e d in this C o urt ’ s o p i ni o n i n L aff er t y v . W i nches t er :
R a re ly, if e v e r, h a v e lo c a l go v e rn m e n ts e n a c te d z o n ing o rd ina n c e s o n a c o m p le te ly cle a n sla te

. P rop ert y i s usual l y al read y i n us e when i t i s f i rs t zo ned , and s o i t i s i nevi t ab l e t hat i d eal zo ni ng t heor y wi l l cl as h w i t h t he exi s t i ng us e of par t i cul ar pi ece s of

proper t y
. I n or der t o avoi d t he l ega l p ro b le m s tha t wo u ld a tten d a lo c a l go v e rn m e n t’s effo rts to fo rc e a p riv a te p ro p e rty o w n e r to di s con t i n u e an ot h er wi s e per mi s s i bl e u s e of pr oper t y , T en n
. Code An n
. § 13- 7- 208( b) ( 1999) requir es l o cal gove rnme nt s t o pe rmit cert ai n t y p es of pre- exi st i ng nonc o nfo rming uses t o co nt i nue e v e n if the y a re inc o n siste n t with the z o n ing c la ssifica tio n o f t h e su rr o u n d ing p ro p e rty.
L a ff e rty , 46 S.W

. 3 d 75 2 , 75 8 (T enn. C t

. A p p
. 20 0 0 ). -8- Wil lia mson Co unty , M2000-02456-COA- R3-CV, 2001 Tenn. App. L exis 300 at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2001).
I n National A uto/Tru ck Stops , t h e p l ai n t i ff o wn ed an au t o /tru cks t o p wi t h a l ar ge s i gn ou tsi de that a dv e rtise d th e bu sin e ss. A l a te r a do pte d zo nin g or din a nc e re nd e re d th e sig ns le g a lly nonconforming. Id

. at *2. The z oning ordinance also included an amortization clause that re quired the re moval of all nonconforming signs by a spec ified date

. Id . The plaintiff did not re move the signs and later a

pplied for a permit to repla ce the exis ting signs because the y had dete riorate d. The defe ndant county

denied the pe rmit, and the truck stop filed suit. Id . The trial c ourt upheld the c ou nty ’s re fu sa l to g rant the pe rm it, ho ldi ng that T. C.A . § 13 -7 -2 08 pr ote c te d b us ine sse s, no t si g ns
. Id . at *1. The truck stop a ppeale d. This Court reve rsed, f inding that the sig ns werenece ssary to the c on tin ue d c on du c t of the truc k sto p’ s bu sin e ss, te rm ing it a n “ a c c e sso ry us e ” of th e bu si ne ss establishment. It found t hat t his “ac cessory use” w as also subjec t to the protections of sec tion 13-7- 208, including the lang uag e of se ction 13-7-208( d), which pr ovides that “[n] o building permit . . . sh a ll be de nie d to an ind us try or bu sin e ss s e e kin g to d e str oy a ndre c on str

uc t f a c ili tie s n e c e ssa

ry to the continued conduct of the ac tiviti es of that industry or business.” Id

. at *4. J ust a s the principa l bu sin e ss f a c ili tie s c ou ld b e de str oy e d andre c on str uc te d, theapp e llate c ou rt

he ld that th e “ fa c ili tie s” for the “ acc essory

use,” i.e. the sig n, could be de stroy ed and r econstruc ted as we ll. Id.
Cu stom’s arg ument, howeve r, misses the point. I t is undisput ed that Section 13-7- 208, essentially

a “g randf ather clause ,” envisions t

h at a nonconforming business may need to discontinue 4 operations for a pe riod of time, spec ifically authorizing such nonc onforming b u s i n ess t o “destroy [i ts] prese nt fac iliti es and r econstruc t n ew faciliti es. . . .” T.C.A. § 13- 7-208(d) . Once the nonconforming use has bee n discontinued, howeve r, the issue be co me s , h o w lo ng the prope rty owner has to resume the nonconforming use in order to retain its protec ted status under Sec tion 13-7-208. At the time Custom requested the subjec t permit, th er e wa s no discontinuance pr ovision in t he statut e
. I n lig ht of thi s, Cus tom ’s po sit ion , a pp are ntl y , is that th e pe ri odof dis c on tin uanc e c a n la st ind e fi nit e ly , so lon g a s thepr op e rty ow ne r i s try ing re a lly

ha rdto r e su me op e ratio n. Th is i s c le arl y untenable.It a d o p ts a thirty-m o n th lim it o n c e ssa tio n o f o p e ra tio n , m o re ge n e ro u s tha n C o o p e rto w n ’s o rd ina n c e
. 5 H owe v er , e v en i f

t h e n ew s t at u t or y di s con t i n u an ce pr ov i s i on w er e appl i ca bl e, w h i ch i t i s n ot , Cus t om wou l d n ot prev ai l

. Co op er t own’ s zoni ng ordi nan ce became ef fect i ve on Jan uar y 30, 199 7, an d C us t om appl i ed for t he s ubj ect per mi t on J u l y 23, 2002. -9- Her e, C oopertown enac ted i ts own di scontinuanceordinanc e, stating that a nonconf orming use that is discontinued for longe r than one y ear will not be prote cted by the “g randf

ather clause .” Coopertown Z oning O rdinanc e Section 6.021(I ). C u s t o m arg ued to the Chanc ery Court that Coopertown’s discontinu an ce o rd i n an ce d i re ct l y co n fl i ct ed wi th T

. C

. A. § 13-7-208 a nd was therefore unauthorized. The Chanc ery Court rejec ted this arg ument, finding that, “the placing of an objec tive time limi t on non-conforming use s which ar e not operational is imminently rea sonable and does not conflict with the state statutory scheme

. ” W e ag ree . As noted by the Chance ry

Court, such a discontinuance ordinanc e wa s specific ally mentioned by this Court i n Riv e s v . Ci ty of Cla rk sv ill e , 618 S.W .2d 502, 510 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981). Moreove r, the Chanc ery Court’s holding is conf

irmed byth e L e g is latu r e ’ s late r a me n d me n t o f

Se c ti o n 1 3

- 7

- 2 0 8 to in c lu d e a s tate w id e d is c o n ti n u a nce provision. See T.C.A. § 13-7-208( g ) (2004)

. 5
Cus tom fu rthe r a sse rt s th a t th e dis c on tin uatio n ord inanc e sh ou ld n ot b e app lic ablebe c aus e its dis c on tin uatio n o f the pr op e rty ’s us e a s a la nd fi ll wa s “ inv olu nta ry .” It maint a ins that th e ph ra se

“ in o pe ratio n” in S e c tio n 1 3- 7- 20 8 s ho uld be c on str ue d to inc lud e a no nc on fo rm ing bu sin e ss that is n o ti n o p e r a t i o n o n t h e d a t e o f t h e z o n i n g c h a n g e , i f

t h e l a c k o f a c t i v e o p e r a t i o n i s i n v o l u n t ar y. Custom advocates a

standard unde r which the o wn er of a nonconf

orming business cannot be deprive d of his rig ht to eng ag e in the nonconf orming use of his property unless he demonstrates an int e nt to aban don th e no nc on fo rm ing us e , c iti ng thec omm on la w p ri nc ipl e that a n in te re st i n property is not considered a

bandoned unle ss there is proof of intent to abandon and an overt act evidenc ing the intent to abandon. Sta te e x re l. Phi lli

ps v . Smith , 241 S.W .2d 844 (Tenn. Ct. App. 19 50 ); Phy v . Ha tf

ie ld , 1 26 S.W. 10 5 ( Te nn . 1 90 9) ; Boy d v . Hu nt , 52 S.W . 131 (Tenn. 1899)

. I n s up port

of its arg ume nt, Cus tom

c ite s Boles v. City of Chatt anooga , 892 S.W .2d 416 (T e nn . Ct

. Ap p. 19 94 ), inv olv ing a City of Chattano og a

dis c on tin uanc e or din a nc e wi th a tim e lim it of 100 day s. I n Boles , t he plaintiff ope rate d an adult bookstore f or seve ral y ear s befor e a loc al zoning ordinanc e re ndere d the use nonc onforming

. Id

. at 418. The bookstore continued to operate, howeve r, as a pre- exis ting nonconforming use under the “g randf ather ” provision of the or dinance

. Id . Ten y ear s after

the zoning ordinance be came eff ective, the local attorney

g ener al filed c riminal char g es against the books tore, c laiming that the bookstorewas a public nuisance

. Id . The c riminal court issued a

temporary

injunction ag ainst the bookstore, re quiring the i m m ed i ate closure of the business. Id . The injunction was late r made permanent. Id . at 418-419. The owner s of the bookstore then a

pp ea l ed t h e permanent injunction on constitutional gr ounds, asserting that it was overbr oad. Id . at 419.
Whil e the appeal was pending , the owner of the bookstore lease d the pre mises to a tenant for the oper ation of an a dult bookstore. Id . at 420. The ne w book s t o re wa s ref used a pe rmit on the g rounds that the nonconf orming use wa s no longe r protec ted bec ause the p ro perty owner s had-10-

discontinued that use for more than 100 c onsecutive day s, thereby i n v o k i n g the discontinuation clause of the zoning or dinance

. Id.
The bookstore owner

assert ed t h at t he discontinuation clause in the ordinanc e wa s not applicable beca

use t he discontinuation of the bookstore was involuntary

. Id . I n discussing the intent aspec t of discontinued nonconf orming use, the Boles court stated:
We b e lie ve that th e te rm

“ dis c on tin ue d” or

wo rd s o f s imi lar i mp ort, a s u til ize d in zoning ordinanc es with specif ic time limit ations, should be construed to include an element of

intent, combined with some ac t

– o r failure to act – indicative of aband on me nt.

. . . To ho ld that a no n- c on fo rm ing us e c a n be c ut of f a uto matic a lly by time limi ts on discontinuance, r eg ardle ss of the re ason for that dis co n t i n u ance , strikes u s as intrinsically unfair. . . . A ccor dingly , we hold that the term

“ dis c on tin ue d ” a s f

ou ndin [Ch a ttano og a ’s dis c on tin uanc e or din a nc e ] doe s n ot a pp ly if the discontinuanceof the non-c onforming use is purely involuntary

in nature.
Id. at 422. Thus, the court in Boles he ld that th e c e ssatio n o f o pe ratio n o f the a du lt b oo ks tor e c ou ld not be consider ed a “discontinuanc e” of the nonconforming use beca use it was “pure ly

involuntary in n a tur e ,” that is, the pr op e rty ow ne r w a s le g a lly

pr e ve nte d f

ro m us ing thepr op e rty

fo r that pu rp os e by the injunction. Wit hin 100 day s after the injunction was lifted, the nonc onforming use re sumed Id. at 420. The Boles opinion included lang uag e sug g esting that the word “ discontinued” should be rea d to require an intent and an act ( or failure to ac t) indicating abandonme nt. Id. at 422. Custom, of course, e mphasizes the dicta in Boles opining that intent to abandon should be re a d in to the te rm “ dis c on tin ue d. ” Th e ho ldi ng , h ow e ve r, wa s si mpl y that a dis c on tin uanc e that is “pure ly involuntary

in nature,” as where the nonconforming use is prohibited by an injunction during thesp e c if ie d ti me pe ri od , c a nn ot b e c on sid e re d a “ dis c on tin uanc e ” un de r the or din a nc e . T his is clea rly distinguishable from the instant case , in which the injunction was lifted in Aug ust 1996, the or din a nc e be c a me e ff

e c tiv e in Janu ary 19 97 , an d Cust om did no t app ly fo r the su bje c t permit un til J uly 2002.
The fac ts in the instant case a re morecompar able to To le s v . City of Dy e rsb urg , 39 S.W .3d 138 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000) ( perm. to app.) , relied upon by the Chance ry Court be low. I n Toles , the plaintiff (“ Toles”) owned a tavern located in the c ity

of Dy ersbur g
. Id. at 139. The tavern had be en operated by

a tenant who allowed the busine ss licens e an d l i q u o r l icense to expi re. Id. Af te r this te nant le ft , Tol e s beg a n making imp ro ve me nts to the pr op e rty a ndso ug ht o ut a

ne w t e nant t o o pe rate the tavern. Repairs we re r equire d by the cityfire de partment be fore the permit could be issued, and nu me ro us re -i ns pe c tio ns were con du c te d b e fo rethepr op e rty wa s d e e me d inc omp lianc e wi th applicable codes. Id

. During the five-month period in which Toles repaired the pr operty and soug ht out a new te nant, the prope rty was re -z o n ed as residential, causing the tavern to become a nonconforming use. Id . at 139 -1 40

. To le s fin a lly fo un d a new te nant andapp lie d f or a be e r p e rm it. Id. The c ity

zoning commission denied Toles the pe rmit, determining that the prope rty could not-11-

be “g randf

ather ed” a s a nonconf

orming prior use be causethe business was not in operation whe n the property was re -zoned. Id. at 140. The pr operty owner appealed. On appeal, t he property owner cited Boles , arg uing that his repair work and application for permits showed suff

icient inten t t o continue oper ation of the tave rn to allow the prope rty to be “g randf ather ed” unde r the ne w zoning ordinance. Id. The a ppellate c ourt distinguished Bo les , noting that the nonconforming use was not preve nted by an injunction. Rather, it found, there wa s “no extrinsic forcewhich pre vented the c lub from continuing its operations.” Id . at 141. It noted that finding someone to oper ate the ta vern “ appar ently took time,” and the f act that numer ous repairs wer e required to conform to applicable codes was not the fault of the city

. Id. Itf o u n db o t h d e l a ys to be within the control of the pr operty owner
. Id.
Th e To le s court re ad Boles as indicating that “intent” is only rele vant “whe re some f

orce outside the control of the property o wn er p re v en t s the continued use of the land in a pa

rticular manner .” Id. Since no forc e outs ide t he control of t he property owner preve nted him from oper ating the tavern, the in t en t o f t he prope rty owner was “ not important.” Id. There fore , the Toles Court fo un d th a t si nc e no bu sin e ss e xiste d at th e ti me of thezon ing c hang e , th e rewa s n o b us ine ss t o “g randf ather ” in under the new zoning or dinance

. Id. As a result, the Court upheld the denia l of the beer permit. Id.
Custom l ikens its sit uation to Boles , arg uing that its l eng thy period of non- use stemme d from the orig inal injunction; itcause d Custo m t o l o s e its orig inal operator of the landf ill and cause d Custom t o hav e t o comply with more string ent environme ntal reg ulations. W e must conclude , though, that the facts in this case ar e more like Toles than Boles . Ind e e d, Cus tom ’s a c tio ns c a n f a ir ly be cha rac terized as “pr epar ation” for use of the property , which has been found not to constitut e a pre- exis ting nonc onforming use. Se e Dic ks on County v . J e nne tte , 2000 WL

1121550 at *7 (Te nn. Ct. App. Aug . 9, 2000) (“ ‘[m] er e p re p ar ation for use of prope rty . . . is not enoug h to show a devotion of the property to that use ’ in order to show a pre- exis ting nonc onforming use.”) (quoting City of Pha rr v . P

e na , 853 S.W .2d 56, 64 (Tex. App.1993)).
The e vidence in the rec ord shows clea rly that development of

a landf ill is a complex and time-consuming underta

king. E ven so, the “ g randfat her” provision of T.C.A. §13-7-208 w as des i gn ed to protect ong oing busine ss operations, not t o extend the time allowed to develop a no nc on fo rm ing bu sin e ss. Th e s tatut e c on ta ins no e xce pti on fo r a c omp le x bus ine ss s uc h a s a la nd fi ll. Consequently , we must conc lude that the Chanc ery Cou rt d i d n o t err in holding that the “g randf ather ” provision of T.C.A. § 13-7-208 does not pr otect the use of the H ighlands property as a la nd fi ll. Finally , Custom asserts that it obtained a vested right to deve lop Highlan d s b as ed on the $4 00 ,0 00 sp e nt o n c on str uc tion of Hi ghland s in19 98 . Cu sto m c ite s State ex rel. SCA Chem ical Waste Service s , Inc

, v . Ko nigsb e rg , 636 S.W .2d 430 (Tenn. 1982) , and Howe Realty Co. v. City of Na shv ill e , 141 S.W .2d 904 (Tenn. 1940) , in support of its arg ument that rig h t s u n der an exis ting ordinanc e may

vest if substantial construction or substantial liabilities are incu rr ed related to the-12-

construction. In both Konisberg andHow e , howeve r, the plainti ff’ s estoppel arg ument was re jected beca use no construc tion had beg un under the exis ting or dinance

. The more rec ent caseof Rut herford v. Murray , 2004 WL 1870066 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug . 20, 2004) provides moreg uidance on this iss ue. In Ruthe rf or d , the plai n t i ff z oning boa rd sued the defe ndant (“Murray ”) for operating an auto r epair shop in violation of the zoni ng ordinanc e. Id. at *1

. Th e tr i a l c o u rtd e t e r m i n e dt h a tt h e au t o r e p a i r s h o p w a s a

v a l i dn o n c o n f

o r m i n g u s e b e c au se Murray had completed a subst antial porti on of the c onstruction of the shop be fore the new zoning ordinanc e took ef

fec t, and was there fore protec ted under the “g randf ather ” clause of T.C.A. § 13- 7- 208. Id. at *6, *8. Substantial construction, then, re sulted in a vested right whe n the construc tion occur red immediate ly

prior to the zoning c hang e.
I n this c ase, howeve r, the $400,000 in construction costs we re inc urre d by Custom l ong afte r the Coopertown or dinance became ef fec tive and some months aft er the one-y ear discontinuation c laus e dis a llo we d th e no nc on fo rm ing us e . Atim e lin e of un dis pu te d f

a c ts is hel pf

ul t o th is ana ly sis :
A ug us t 22, 1996 – Orde r of Compromise and Settlement e ntere d betwee n the R o b e rt s o n C o u n t y C o m m i s s i o n a n dC u s t o md e s i g n a t e dH i g h l a n d s a s a l e g a l l ypermitted nonconf

orming use.
Dec em ber 1, 1996 – L ocal pr operty owner s incorporate the town of Coopertown, w h i c h i n c l u d e s t h e H i g h l a n d s p r o p e rt y. January 30, 1997

– Coopertown zoning or dinance become s eff ective. T he Coopertow n ordinanc e provide d that the Robertson County Planning Commission would perf

orm site plan approva l on behalf of Coopertown. (Coopertow n Zoning ordinanc e p. 122) August 21, 1997 – Custom obtained busi ness l icense for Highlands from Robertson C o u n t y. Septem ber 4, 1997 – Robertson CountyPlanning Commission approved Custom’s site plan.
Marc h – June, 1998 – App ro xima te ly $4 00 ,0 00 sp e nt o n c on str uc tio n o f H ig hland s. Augu s t 3 1 , 2001 – Custom s igns a g ree ment with Waste I ndustries to operate the la nd fi ll. Was te I nd us trie s r e qu e ste d mo dif ic a tio ns to the la nd fi ll.
Marc h 5, 2002 – Tenne ssee De partment of E colog y and Conser vation approve d modifications reque sted by Waste I ndustries.-13-

July 23, 2002

– C u s t o m s u b m i t t e d b u i l d i n g p e r m i t f o r tr a i l e r o f

f i c e a n d sc a le s to Coopertown Planning Commi ssion. Septem ber 17, 2002 – Coo pe rt ow n Pla nn ing Com mis sio n de te rm ine d th a t it wo uld not review the modified site pl an until Custom obtained a f inal zoning determination. Septem ber 23, 2002 – Coopertow n Building Commi ssioner dete rmined that the landfill wa s not a leg ally permitted nonconf

orming use on the g rounds that the property had not bee n used as a

landfill for ove r one y ear
. October 8, 2002 – Coopertown B oard of Z oning A ppeals c onducted a public hearing on the issue and uphe ld the decision of the Coope rtown B uilding Commissi oner The fa cts shown above areundisputed by the parties. The Coopertown zoning ordinance a nd the discontinuation provision went into effe ct on J anuary 30, 1997. Custom was awa re that there had been no a ctual oper ation of t he landfill since 1997. De spite this, C ustom chose to beg in construction s o me ti meinM a y

o f 1 9 9 8

. U n li k e Ru therf

or d , the Coopertown zoning or dinance s remaine d the same both bef

ore and afte r Custom incurred the construction costs. As such, w e must conclude that Ruthe rf or d is not applicable.
Custo m arg ues that it incurre d the construc tion costs based on the re prese ntations of the Rob e rt so n Co un ty

Plann ing Com mis sio n, a c tin g a s a g e nts fo r C oo pe rt ow n. Ho we ve r, thebu sin e ss license w as g rante d by

Rob er t s o n C o u nty

in Aug ust 1997 and the site plan wa s approve d by the planni n g co m m ission in S eptember 1997, both prior to the ef fec tive date of

the one- y ear discontinuation ordinance . We mus t conclude that the mere g ranting of site plan appr oval and issuance of

a business license by

the County

does not g rant a vested property rig ht to Highlands. F or all of these r easons, wefind that the Chan ce ry C ourt did not err in affirming the ruling of the Coo pe rt ow n B oa

rdof Z on ing Ap pe a ls.
Th e re fo re , th e de c isi on of thetria l c ou rt

is a ff irme d. Cos ts o f thi s app e a l a rea sse sse d a g a ins t A p p e l l a n tC u s t o mL a n dD e v e l o p m e n t , In c
. , f o r w h i c h e x e c u t i o n m a y i s s u e , i f n e c e s s ary.

_________________________________________ HOLL Y M. KIRBY, JUDGE