If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION ,” it is subject to revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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### S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

UNPUBLISHED

In re E. E

. SAYRANIAN , Minor. August 18, 2022

No. 359 674
Macomb Circuit Court Family Division

LC No. 20 19

- 000093

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Before : G ADOLA , P.J., and C AVANAGH and K. F. K ELLY , JJ.

P ER C URIAM

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Respondent appeals as of right the order of the trial court terminating her parental rights to her minor son, E E S, under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)( i ) (conditions that led to adjudication continue

to exist), (c)( ii ) (other conditions exist), (g) (failure to provide proper care or custody), (j) (likelihood child will be harmed if returned to parent), and (l) (parental rights to another child were voluntarily terminated). We affirm.

I. FACTS

In Apr il 2019, petitioner, Department of Health and Human Services, removed E E S, then seven years old, from respondent’s care. The removal of the child coincided with respondent being released from hospitalization for mental illness and with respondent being ev icted from her housing. At the conclusion of the preliminary hearing, the trial court placed E E S under the care of petitioner and authorized the filing of the petition. The petition alleged that it was contrary to
the welfare of E E S to remain in the home because of respondent’s unresolved mental illness, substance abuse, and housing instability, and that respondent had refused to participate in a voluntary safety plan for the child. Petitioner also alleged that respondent’s older c hild previously was removed from her care in 2009 due to respondent’s unresolved mental illness, housing instability, lack of proper supervision, and physical neglect, and that respondent’s parental rights

to that child were terminated in 2010. Petitioner further alleged that respondent did not have contact with another of her children who was placed with his legal father.

Respondent pleaded no contest to the allegations of the petition and the trial court adopted the parent

- agency treatment plan. The objective of the treatment plan was overcoming the barriers to reunification of respondent with E E S. The specific goals identified in the treatment plan were for respondent to abstain from substance use, obtain and maintain emotional stability, maintain a- 2

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parental bond with the child, establish an adequate legal source of income for herself and E E S, obtain and maintain suitable housing, maintain a lawful lifestyle, and to comply with services and
with the orders of the trial court.

Petitioner then prov ided numerous services to respondent and to the child, including drug testing for respondent, mental health services for respondent, counseling for the child, and supervised visitation. Over the course of several months, hearings were held regarding

respo ndent’s progress . P etitioner reported that respondent was sometimes in compliance with the services mandated by the parent

- agency treatment plan, but overall was failing to successfully address the main barriers to reunification, being her mental illness and lack of housing. After
several months

, p etitioner filed a supplemental petition seeking termination of respondent’s parental rights to E E S under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)( i ), (c)( ii ), (g), and (j) . D uring trial

, petitioner
clarified that it also was seeking termination under MCL 712A.19b(3)(l), on the basis that respondent’s parental rights to another child previously were terminated

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T estimony at trial demonstrated that respondent made some progress shortly before trial but largely had not overcome the b arriers to reunification. Foster care case workers working with respondent testified that from 2019 through early 202 1, respondent only partially complied with the parent

- agency treatment plan; respondent sometimes missed drug screens, attended therapy as directed but did not appear to make progress in therapy, and lacked adequate income and housing during that time. R espondent was psychiatrically hospitalized four times from July 27, 2019 through March 20, 2021 , for several days or weeks on each occasion

. Although respondent complied in part with mental health services, she eventually was discharged from ongoing services because the therapist believed respondent was not being honest and was denying her mental illness.

Respondent participated in superv ised visits with the child during this period, and there appeared to be a bond between respondent and E E S. But a lthough respondent successfully completed a parenting program, she was never able to move to unsupervised visits with E E S due
to her inappropriate behavior during visits . During some visits respondent talked to herself and had verbal outbursts that had a negative effect on E E S, including screaming at imaginary people whom she called “Mike” and “Larry

, ” yell ing at E E S and the foster car e worker, using inappropriate language

, and disparaging the child. The visits eventually were suspended d ue to respondent’s inappropriate behavior

.

The foster care case supervisor testified that as of the time of trial respondent had legal
income and h ad obtained housing a few weeks before the trial . The clinical social worker working with respondent testified that that her mental illness was control led at th e time of trial. Despite the recent progress, however, the foster care case supervisor opined that respondent’s ongoing instability rendered her unfit to care for the child.

The therapist working with E E S testified that E E S was diagnosed with ADHD for which he takes medication, and also w as diagnosed with PTSD

. At the time he began working with E E S, the child was confused and concerned about being separated from his parents and placed in foster care, and was hyperactive, impulsive, and distractible . The therapist testified that E E S is making some progress with self

- control, but ha s a long way t o go. E E S has learning problems and was substantially behind in school; the therapist anticipated that E E S will require extra assistance in school as well as psychiatric help for a long time.- 3

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E E S’s foster mother testified that E E S had lived in her home for two years at the time of
trial. She testified that when E E S was placed in her home in November 2019, he was frightened and insecure, but by the time of trial he had become very outgoing, appeared happy, was eating well and growing, had bonded with he r son, and had become part of the family

. She testified that

E E S only occasionally mentioned respondent, did not appear to understand that respondent had mental illness, once told her t hat he was afraid of respondent , and told her that he wanted to stay

i n the foster home . She further testified that she was interested in adopting E E S if respondent’s parental rights were terminated.

Respondent testified that at the time E E S was removed from her care she was struggling
with mental illness and had admitted herself to a hospital for mental health treatment

. She further admitted that her visits with the child were suspended after she exhibited mental illness while visiting with the child in March 2021, but later qualified this by stating that she and the foster care worker were equally to blame for her visits being suspended

. Respondent testified that after receiving different prescription medications in March 2021, her mental health improved, and she was making progress in therapy. She also testifi ed, however, that her mental health problems were not serious, that she was compliant with all aspects of the parent

- agency treatment plan at all times,
and that her lack of progress in housing and employment before March 2021 was due to the
coronavirus pa ndemic.

At the conclusion of trial, t he trial court terminated respondent’s parental rights to E E S, finding that clear and convincing evidence supported termination of respondent’s parental rights

to E E S under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)( i ), (c)( ii ), (g), (j ), and (l), and that termination of respondent’s parental rights was in the best interests of the child under MCL 712A.19b(5). Respondent now appeals

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II. DISCUSSION

A. STA TUTORY BASIS

Respondent contends that the trial court erred by finding that clear and convincing evidence supported terminating her parental rights. We disagree.

To terminate parental rights, the trial court must find that at least one basis for termination under MCL 712A.19b(3) has been proven by clear and convincing evidence

. In re Keillor , 325 Mich App 80, 85; 923 NW2d 617 (2018). Only one statutory basis for termination under MCL 712A.19b(3) need be established by clear and convincing evidence to warrant termination of parental rights. In re Martin , 316 Mich App 73, 90; 896 NW2d 452 (2016). In this case, the trial court terminated respondent’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3) (c)( i ), ( ii ), (g), (j), and (l), which provide:

(3) The court may terminate a parent’s parental rights to a child if the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, 1 or more of the following:

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(c) The parent was a respondent in a proceeding brought under this chapter, 182 or more days have elapsed since the issuance of an initial dispositional order, and the court, by clear and conv incing evidence, finds either of the following:

( i ) The conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and there is
no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable time considering the child’s age.

( ii ) Other conditions exist that cause the child to come within the court’s jurisdiction, the parent has received recommendations to rectify those conditions, the conditions have not been rectified by the parent after the parent has received notice and a hearing and has been given a reasonable opportunity to rectify the conditions, and there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable time considering the child’s age.

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(g) The parent, although, in the court’s discretion, financially able to do so, fails to provide proper care or custody for the child and there is no reasonable expectation that the parent will be able to provide proper care and custody within a reasonable time considering the child’s age.

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(j) There is a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of the child’s parent, that the child will be harmed if he or she is returned to the home of the
parent.

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(l) The parent’s rights to another child were voluntarily terminated following the initiation of proceedings under section 2(b) of this chapter or a similar law of another state and the proceeding involved abuse and included 1 or more of the following, and the parent has failed to rectify the conditions that led to the prior termination of parental rights:

( i ) Abandonment of a young child.

( ii ) Criminal sexual conduct involving penetration, attempted penetration, or assault with intent to penetrate.

( iii ) Battering, torture, or other severe physical abuse.

( iv ) Loss or serious impairment of an organ or limb.

( v ) Life

- threatening injury.

( vi ) Murder or attempted murder.- 5

- ( vii ) Voluntary manslaughter.

( viii ) Aiding and abetting, attempting to commit, conspiring to commit, or soliciting murder or voluntary ma nslaughter.

( ix ) Sexual abuse as that term is defined in section 2 of the child protection law, 1975 PA 238, MCL 722.622.

We review for clear error the trial court’s decision that at least one statutory basis to terminate parental rights was proven by cle ar and convincing evidence, as well as the trial court’s factual findings. In re Keillor , 325 Mich App at 85. The trial court’s decision to terminate parental rights is clearly erroneous if “ although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court o n the
entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. ” In re

JK , 468 Mich 202, 209

- 210; 661 NW2d 216 (2003). We will not conclude that a finding by the trial court is clearly erroneous unless it is more than po ssibly or probably incorrect, In re Ellis , 294 Mich App 30, 33; 817 NW2d 111 (2011), and we afford the trial court’s dispositional orders “considerable deference on appellate review.” In re Sanders , 495 Mich 394, 406; 852 NW2d 524 (2014).

In this case, t he record supports the trial court’s finding under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)( i ) that the conditions that led to the adjudication continued to exist and there was no reasonable likelihood
that the conditions would be rectified within a reasonable time considerin g the child’s age. Termination of parental rights under subsection (c) ( i ) is warranted when “the totality of the evidence amply supports” the finding that the parent has not achieved “any meaningful change in
the conditions” that led to the trial court as suming jurisdiction of the child. In re Williams , 286 Mich App 253, 272; 779 NW2d 286 (2009). Here, the conditions that led to adjudication were respondent’s mental illness, substance abuse, and housing instability. The child was removed from respondent ’s care in April 2019 shortly after respondent was released from hospitalization for

mental illness. The foster care case supervisor testified that respondent was again psychiatrically hospitalized four times from July 2019 through March 20, 2021 , with ea ch hospitalization lasting several days or weeks. R espondent complied in part with mental health services, but she eventually was discharged from outpatient services because the therapist believed respondent was not being honest regarding her mental illness.

Although respondent successfully completed a parenting program, she was never able to move to unsupervised visits with E E S due to her inappropriate behavior during visits, including screaming at imaginary people, yelling at E E S and the foster care worker, using inappropriate language, and disparaging the child

. Thus, d espite recent progress, the evidence indicated that respondent’s ongoing mental instability rendered her unfit to care for E E S

.

This conclusion is further supported by the evidence that respondent’s mental illness was a major factor in the termination of her parental rights to an older child in 2 010. Given that respondent did not successfully address her mental illness between 2009 and 2020, and was hospitalized for her mental health as recently as March 2021, it seems unlikely that respondent in April 2021 suddenly overcame her mental illness to the extent that she was capable of caring for a child with special needs. Moreover, respondent’s testimony that her mental il lness is a minor problem and that her failure to address the barriers to reunification before April 2021 w as caused- 6

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by the coronavirus pandemic demonstrates respondent’s inability or unwillingness to address the main barrier to reunification, which was her mental health.

T wo other barriers to reunification were respondent’s substance abuse and housing instability. The parent

- agency treatment plan called for respondent to refrain from substance use. Although respondent participated in drug screening, th e record does not indicate definitively whether respondent continued using substances. The record was clear, however, that respondent did not obtain housing until a few weeks before trial. The foster care case supervisor testified that the housing appear ed appropriate and respondent had paid the rent with funds from her newly

found employment. As the trial court found, however, although obtaining housing represented

progress for respondent

, she did not do so until late in 2021 and at the time of trial ha d not demonstrated that she could maintain stable housing. As a result, E E S, who was seven years old when removed from respondent’s care in April 2019, was in late 202 1 a nine

- year

- old child still waiting to see if his mother could maintain her newly

- foun d housing. The trial court therefore did not clearly err by finding that the conditions that led to adjudication continued to exist and there
was no reasonable likelihood that the conditions would be rectified within a reasonable time considering the chil d’s age.

The trial court also found that t ermination was warranted under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g)
because although respondent was financially able to do so, she fail ed to provide proper care or custody for the child and there was no reasonable expectation that she would be able to provide proper care and custody within a reasonable time considering the child’s age. A parent’s failure to benefit from a service plan is evidence that the parent will not be able to provide the child with proper care and custody, w arranting termination under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g). See In re White

, 303 Mich App 701, 710

- 711; 846 NW2d 61 (2014). In this case, shortly before trial respondent demonstrated that she was able to obtain a job and earn income sufficient to obtain suitable
hou sing. But although able to do so, respondent had a long history of failing to maintain income or housing

, which contributed to the termination of her parental rights to her older child in 2010

. After E E S was removed from her care in April 2019, she again failed to maintain stable income and housing until shortly before trial despite assistance provided under the parent

- agency treatment plan. The trial court correctly observed that despite her recent progress, it had taken respondent over two years to beg in to acquire basic stability , and respondent had yet to demonstrate consistent ability to parent a child with special needs

. The trial court therefore did not clearly err by finding that clear and convincing evidence supported termination under MCL 712A. 19b(3)(g).

The trial court also found that t ermination was warranted under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j)
because there was a reasonable likelihood, based on respondent’s conduct or capacity, that the
child will be harmed if returned to respondent’s home. A parent’ s failure to benefit from a service plan is evidence that the child will be harmed if returned to the parent’s home, warranting termination under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j). See In re White , 303 Mich App at 710

- 711. In this case, although respondent participated in some mental health services, she demonstrated no benefit from the services until shortly before trial. She was hospitalized due to her mental health several times while the case was pending before the trial court, and yet respondent testified that tha t she did not consider her mental health a barrier to parenting E E S. She testified at trial that her mental health was not a serious problem and that her failure to progress in the parent

- agency treatment plan was the result of the pandemic. The trial co urt therefore did not clearly err by finding that clear and- 7

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convincing evidence supported termination of respondent’s parental rights to E E S under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j).

We disagree with the trial court’s finding that termination was warranted under MCL

71 2A.19b(3)(c)( ii ), which provides for termination when other conditions exist that cause the child to come within the court’s jurisdiction, the parent has received recommendations to rectify those conditions, the conditions have not been rectified by the pa rent, and there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable time considering the child’s age. The trial court in this case did not identify what other conditions caused E E S to come within the jurisdiction of the t rial court, and the record does not demonstrate additional conditions. The trial court therefore clearly erred by finding that termination was warranted under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)( ii ).

Similarly, t he record does not support the finding that termination wa s warranted under MCL 712A.19b(3)(l). Under that sub section, termination is supported when the parent’s rights to another child were voluntarily terminated in proceedings, the termination involved abuse identified in the statute, and the parent failed to rectify the conditions that led to the prior termination. In this case, the parties do not dispute that respondent’s parental rights to an older child were terminated in 201 0 , but the record does not establish that the previous termination was based upon any type of abuse. The record therefore does not support a finding that termination was warranted under MCL 712A.19b(3)(l). However, because only one statutory basis for termination must be demonstrated to warrant termination of parental rights, reversal is not required in this case because termination was supported under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)( i ), (g), and (j). See In re Martin , 316 Mich App at 90.

B

. BEST INTERESTS

Respondent contends that the trial court clearly erred by finding that a preponderance of
the evidence demonstrated that termination was in the child’s best interests. We disagree.

Once a statutory ground for termination has been demonstrated, the trial court is required to terminate the parent’s parental rights if a preponderance of the evidence establishes that termination is in the best interests of the child. MCL 712A.19b(5); In re Medina , 317 Mich App 219, 237; 894 NW2d 653 (2016). We review for c lear error the trial court ’ s decision regarding a
child ’ s best interests. In re Atchley , ___ Mich App___, ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2022) (Docket Nos.
358502 and 358503); slip op at 5.

When determining whether termination i s in the child ’ s best interests, th e trial court should weigh all evidence available to it, id

., considering a wide variety of factors that may include the child’s bond to the parent, the parent’s parenting ability, the child’s need for permanency, stability, and finality, the advantages of a foster home over the parent’s home, the length of time the child was in care, the likelihood that the child could be returned to the parent’s home in the foreseeable future, and the parent’s compliance with the case service plan. See In re Payne/Pumphr ey/Fortson

, 311 Mich App 49, 63

- 64; 874 NW2d 205 (2015). The trial court also should consider the child’s safety and well

- being , including the risk of harm to the child if returned to the parent ’ s care. See
In re VanDalen , 293 Mich App 120, 141

- 142; 809 NW2d 412 (2011).- 8

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In this case, trial court considered the appropriate factors, observing that E E S needed permanence that respondent was unable to provide due to her mental illness and had failed to provide for over two years. The trial court also considered that the child was thriving in his placement with a foster family. These findings are suppor ted by the testimony of the foster care case supervisor regarding respondent’s delayed progress on the goals of the parent

- agency treatment plan and the testimony of the child’s therapist and the child’s foster mother regarding
the child’s needs. The tria l court therefore did not clearly err by determining that termination was
in the child’s best interests.

Affirmed.

/s/ Michael F. Gadola /s/ Mark J. Cavanagh /s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly