United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

Nos. 20-1107, 20-1338

DAHUA TECHNOLOGY USA INC.,

Plaintiff, Appellee/Cross-Appellant,

v.

FENG ZHANG,

Defendant, Appellant/Cross-Appellee.

APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Rya W. Zobel, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Lynch, Lipez, and Barron,

Circuit Judges.

Daniel E. Rosenfeld, with whom Jennifer C. Brown and DLA Piper 

LLP were on brief, for appellee/cross-appellant.

Benjamin Flam, with whom Philip J. Gordon and Gordon Law Group 

LLP were on brief, for appellant/cross-appellee. 

February 17, 2021
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LYNCH, Circuit Judge. This case involves a contract 

dispute under Massachusetts law between Dahua Technology USA Inc. 

("Dahua") and Feng Zhang, a former employee of Dahua. Zhang says 

that Dahua breached its release agreement with him by paying him 

$680,000 in total instead of $680,000 a month. Dahua says that 

the agreement contains a mistake and that Zhang has breached his 

duty of good faith and fair dealing by trying to take advantage of 

this mistake. The district court granted summary judgment in favor 

of Dahua but did not award it attorneys' fees. Zhang appeals from 

the grant of summary judgment. Dahua cross-appeals from the denial 

of attorneys' fees. We vacate the grant of summary judgment

because there are material facts in dispute and remand. 

I. Facts

Dahua is an Irvine, California based company with an 

office in Massachusetts. It manufactures and sells video 

surveillance equipment and is the United States subsidiary of 

Zhejiang Dahua Technology Co., Ltd., a Chinese company. 

On November 5, 2015, Dahua offered Zhang the position of 

Chief Strategy Officer, Vice President, and President of North 

American and Enterprise Sales. Dahua's offer to Zhang said that 

he would be paid $510,000 a year, receive 100,000 shares of Dahua 

stock on his start date, January 1, 2016, and serve for a term of 

three years. It said that if Dahua terminated Zhang for cause

(other than illegal conduct or company misconduct), Zhang would be 
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entitled to payment of his salary through his three-year term. 

The offer contained no non-compete clause, confidentiality 

provision, non-disparagement clause, or release of claims. Zhang 

accepted this offer. 

In August 2017, Dahua decided to terminate Zhang. Liquan 

Fu, the founder and chairman of Dahua, said that Zhang was fired 

because Dahua's North American business declined under Zhang's 

leadership and because Zhang had damaged relationships with

Dahua's other divisions. The decision was made by a team of senior 

leaders at Dahua, including Fu and Dahua's then-president and chief 

executive officer, Li Ke. Dahua's general counsel asked Haiyan 

Yue, a member of Dahua's internal legal department, to draft a 

separation agreement for Zhang. On August 23, 2017, Yue asked 

Cathryn Le Regulski, Dahua's Virginia-based outside counsel, for 

assistance drafting the agreement. They began working on a draft. 

Dahua also drafted a strategy document in preparation 

for its negotiation with Zhang. One bullet point said that the 

"baseline" of his severance package should include "[s]alary, 

bonus and other benefits from the date of termination to the end 

of [Zhang's] term" and "[a]dditional compensation to entice 

[Zhang] to release all claims against Dahua." Another said that 

Zhang "might act as a whistleblower and blow the whistle on 

vulnerabilities of [Dahua's] products or operations, which may 

cause damage." It listed specific areas where it was concerned 
- 4 -

Zhang could act as a whistleblower: Dahua's market strategy, 

Dahua's "[g]rey area of sales strategy," and Dahua's "compliance 

with laws [or] regulations." 

In August 2017, Fu travelled from China to Boston for 

the sole purpose of informing Zhang of his termination and 

negotiating the specific terms of his separation agreement. When 

Fu arrived in Boston, Zhang picked him up at the airport and drove 

him to his hotel. Zhang said that, during the car ride, Fu told 

him that Dahua was considering replacing him. They agreed to talk 

more the next day. Because Fu does not speak English, Zhang and 

Fu spoke in Mandarin Chinese. 

The next morning, Zhang met Fu at his hotel. Zhang said 

that he and Fu discussed Zhang's future role at the company. They 

agreed that Zhang would leave his current role but stay on as a 

corporate advisor for two years. They agreed that Zhang would be 

paid $240,000 a year in this new role. According to Zhang, he was 

employed as an advisor to the company because Dahua needed his 

experience, expertise, and knowledge. According to Fu, Dahua did 

not have much work for Zhang to do and viewed the consulting 

agreement as compensation for Zhang's termination. 

Zhang also said that Fu told him he would "take care of" 

Zhang's existing contract and company stock, "treat [him] well," 

and that Zhang would need to sign a new agreement. They did not 

discuss specific dollar amounts regarding Zhang's compensation for 
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the time remaining on his employment agreement or the 100,000 

shares of company stock he owned. Zhang said Fu then made a long 

phone call and, when he returned, told Zhang that they were "all 

set."

Zhang and Fu then went to Dahua's office in Waltham, 

Massachusetts. Yue and Le Regulski incorporated the consulting 

agreement Zhang and Fu had discussed into Zhang's separation 

package. They produced multiple iterations of two documents: a 

separation agreement and a consulting agreement. At least five 

different versions of the separation agreement exist in the record, 

and it is unclear which version Yue and Fu ultimately presented to 

Zhang. 

The terms of the separation agreement changed 

meaningfully from version to version. One version said Dahua would 

"pay [Zhang] an amount equal to the value of the appreciation of 

100,000 shares of common stock of [Dahua] from January 1, 2017 to 

August 28, 2017." Another version instead said that Zhang "agreed 

to relinquish any and all rights that [he has] or may have with 

regard to the stocks of [Dahua]." At one point, Yue asked Le 

Regulski if she could include a sentence in the agreement saying 

that Zhang "will be awarded 100,000 shares of [Dahua] common 

stock." Zhang says that 100,000 shares of Dahua stock, which is 

publicly traded, were worth $942,803 in August 2017. There are 

also emails from Yue to Le Regulski asking her to include 
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additional terms that do not appear in any of the separation 

agreements in the record. 

Zhang said that in the separation agreement he was given, 

Dahua offered to pay him $680,000 total for the remaining sixteen 

months on his employment contract. He also said it contained a 

sixteen-month non-compete clause, a confidentiality clause, a nondisparagement clause, a release of claims against Dahua, and a 

paragraph saying that if Zhang breached the agreement, Dahua could 

claw back all payments it made under the agreement. The versions 

of the separation agreement in the record contain most of these 

terms. Zhang also said that in the consulting agreement he 

rejected, Dahua offered to employ Zhang as an at-will consultant 

for two years and pay him $240,000 a year. 

Zhang refused to sign these agreements. He said he 

rejected the consulting agreement because Fu had promised him a 

two-year agreement and he did not want his employment to be at 

will. He said that he rejected the separation agreement because 

he was already entitled to $680,000 with no additional restrictions 

under his original employment agreement with Dahua.1 Zhang said 

he never told anyone at Dahua how much money he wanted in exchange 

for accepting the restrictions in the separation agreement. 

1 In Zhang's original contract, Dahua agreed to pay him 

$510,000 a year (or $42,500 a month) for three years. Sixteen 

months remained on his contract, and sixteen months at $42,500 a 

month is $680,000. 
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However, he said after he rejected the offer he told Lynette Lv, 

who worked in human resources at Dahua, that without the 

confidentiality agreement he would write a business case study 

based on his time at Dahua and sell it for millions of dollars. 

After Zhang rejected the package, Yue and Le Regulski 

discussed changes to Dahua's offer over the phone. In an email 

memorializing their conversation, Yue said that Zhang and Fu had 

agreed "on the spot" that Zhang would remain an employee of the 

company with the title of senior corporate advisor for two years.

Because of this change, Le Regulski said that Zhang would have to 

sign a release agreement rather than a separation agreement and 

sent a draft release agreement to Yue. 

Unlike the draft separation agreement, the draft release 

agreement Le Regulski sent included a blank space for Yue to fill 

in. It read: "[T]he Company agrees to make monthly severance 

payments to you in the amount of $ _____ for sixteen (16) months." 

Yue typed "680,000" into this blank space. She said that the 

wording in the draft release agreement was different than the 

wording in the draft separation agreement and that she typed 

"680,000" by mistake. In all versions of the draft separation 

agreement, the severance clause read: "the Company agrees to make 

severance payments to you in the form of continuation of your base 

salary in effect on the Separation Date for sixteen (16) months." 
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The release agreement included other notable terms. It 

included a non-compete clause, a non-disparagement clause, a 

confidentiality clause, and a release of claims against Dahua. 

Zhang also agreed to surrender all of his rights to Dahua stock, 

and the agreement gave him the option of accelerating his severance 

payments by collecting them in a lump sum. 

Unlike Zhang's consulting agreement, which chose 

Massachusetts law, the release agreement chose Virginia law. When 

asked why Virginia law was chosen, Le Regulski said she did not 

recall. During the drafting process, Qiang Li, a partner at Le 

Regulski's law firm, sent Yue and Le Regulski an email asking them 

if there was "[a]ny reason we are using Virginia law." Neither 

Yue nor Le Regulski responded. Yue later said that, after 

receiving Li's email, she realized that she had forgotten to change 

the choice-of-law provision in the template Le Regulski had sent 

her. 

Yue and Fu presented the release agreement to Zhang. 

They did not explain any of the changes to him. Zhang said that 

before signing the agreement he read all of its terms. He did not 

discuss the new terms with anyone, including Fu or Yue. Fu signed 

the agreement on behalf of Dahua in front of Zhang. Zhang signed 

the release after Fu. Fu said he did not read the document before 

he signed it and did not have it translated from English to 

Chinese. 
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Dahua paid Zhang $62,500 a month for the next four 

months. According to Dahua, the $62,500 reflected $20,000 a month 

from Zhang's senior consultant role and $42,500 a month (i.e., 

$680,000 divided by sixteen months) from the release agreement. 

During this period, Zhang did not tell anyone at Dahua that he was 

receiving only $62,500 a month instead of the $700,000 a month he

believed he was supposed to be receiving under the written terms 

of his severance package. He said he did not complain to Dahua 

because Dahua had a history of paying him late. For example, he 

said that in 2016, Dahua paid him only $200,000 of the $510,000 it 

owed him and that it did not pay him the remaining $310,000 until 

2017. 

In November 2017, at Fu's request, Zhang travelled to 

Beijing. There, Fu paid Zhang 1.6 million yuan (approximately 

$240,000) in cash. Zhang said that he understood this payment to 

cover the appreciation on the value of the 100,000 shares of Dahua 

stock he had received under his 2015 employment agreement.2 He 

did not consider it to be full compensation for the stock Dahua 

had given him in 2015. 

2 The documents Zhang signed did not obligate Dahua to 

make this payment. An earlier, unsigned draft of the separation 

agreement said that Zhang would be compensated for the appreciation 

of his stock. The agreement the parties ultimately signed said 

that Zhang "agree[d] to relinquish any or all rights . . . with 

regard to the stocks of [Dahua]." Nevertheless, both Zhang and 

Dahua say that there was an agreement that Zhang would receive a 

cash payment related to his stock.
- 10 -

In January 2018, Dahua notified Zhang that it was ending 

its consulting arrangement with him. It sent him a draft 

separation agreement saying that Dahua would pay him a lump sum of 

$910,000.3 Zhang refused to sign the agreement and, under the 

acceleration clause in the August 2017 release agreement,

requested that Dahua pay him the amount they had agreed to. He 

said that Dahua owed him over $11 million. 

II. Procedural History

Dahua filed a complaint against Zhang on May 31, 2018. 

It sought a declaratory judgment that the August 2017 agreement 

was unenforceable and asked the court to reform it because the 

parties had made a mutual mistake. It also sought damages against 

Zhang for breaching the contract's implied covenant of good faith 

and fair dealing. Zhang counterclaimed, alleging that Dahua 

breached the August 2017 contract. 

Zhang filed a motion for summary judgment on May 9, 2019, 

and Dahua filed its own motion for summary judgment on June 10, 

2019. The district court granted Dahua's motion and denied 

Zhang's. Applying Massachusetts law, it held that there was "no 

genuine dispute that a unilateral, if not mutual, mistake permeated 

the 2017 severance agreement" and that Zhang breached the 

3 This amount represented the money Dahua says it still 

owed Zhang under the August 2017 agreement (i.e., $510,000 for the 

year remaining on the release agreement plus $400,000 for the year 

and eight months remaining on his consulting agreement). 
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agreement's implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Dahua 

Tech. USA, Inc. v. Zhang, 433 F. Supp. 3d 41, 47 (D. Mass. 2020). 

It reformed the release agreement to "provide for a $680,000 total 

severance payment, in sixteen monthly installments of $42,500." 

Id. In a later order, it denied Dahua's request for damages in 

the form of attorneys' fees. 

Zhang appeals from the district court's order granting 

Dahua's motion for summary judgment and denying his own, and Dahua 

cross-appeals the district court's denial of attorneys' fees.

III. Analysis

Zhang argues that the district court erred when it 

applied Massachusetts law instead of Virginia law to the release 

agreement. He also argues that the district court did not view 

the evidence in the light most favorable to him and that genuine 

disputes of fact precluded summary judgment in Dahua's favor. 

We review a district court's choice-of-law determination 

and grant of summary judgment de novo. Robidoux v. Muholland, 642 

F.3d 20, 22 (1st Cir. 2011). When, as here, there is "an appeal 

from cross-motions for summary judgment, the standard does not 

change; we view each motion separately and draw all reasonable 

inferences in favor of the respective non-moving party." Roman 

Cath. Bishop of Springfield v. City of Springfield, 724 F.3d 78, 

89 (1st Cir. 2013) (citing OneBeacon Am. Ins. Co. v. Com. Union 

Assurance Co. of Can., 684 F.3d 237, 241 (1st Cir. 2012)).
- 12 -

A. Choice of Law

Zhang first argues that, because the release agreement 

says that Virginia law governs the agreement, the district court 

should have applied Virginia law. He says that Virginia law is 

more favorable to him in two ways: (1) it would require Dahua to 

allege fraud as an element of its unilateral mistake defense; and 

(2) it does not recognize an independent claim for breach of the 

agreement's implied duty of good faith and fair dealing. 

Because this is a diversity case, we apply 

Massachusetts's choice-of-law rules. See Levin v. Dalva Bros., 

Inc., 459 F.3d 68, 73 (1st Cir. 2006). When "the parties have 

expressed a specific intent as to the governing law, Massachusetts 

courts will uphold the parties' choice as long as the result is 

not contrary to public policy." Oxford Glob. Res., LLC v.

Hernandez, 106 N.E.3d 556, 564 (Mass. 2018) (quoting Hodas v. 

Morin, 814 N.E.2d 320, 324-25 (Mass. 2004)). To determine if a 

choice-of-law provision is against public policy, Massachusetts 

follows the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. See id. It 

will not uphold the parties' choice if: "(a) the chosen state has 

no substantial relationship to the parties or the transaction and 

there is no other reasonable basis for the parties' choice, or (b) 

application of the law of the chosen state would be contrary to a 

fundamental policy." Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws 

§ 187(2) (Am. Law Inst. 1971). 
- 13 -

The district court held that the choice-of-law provision 

was ineffective because Virginia has no substantial relationship 

to the parties or the transaction. See Dahua, 433 F. Supp. 3d at 

45. Zhang says the district court erred in its analysis of 

§ 187(2)(a) because the agreement has a substantial relationship

to Virginia and because the court did not consider whether there 

was another reasonable basis for the agreement's choice of Virginia 

law. If the court did not err in its conclusion under § 187(2)(a), 

he does not argue that under normal Massachusetts choice-of-law 

rules there was any error in applying Massachusetts law.

First, Zhang says that Dahua had a reasonable basis for 

choosing Virginia law because that term was included in the 

contract drafted by Dahua. The fact that the release agreement 

recited Virginia law is no more than a prerequisite to applying 

§ 187. See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 187 cmt. a 

(Am. Law Inst. 1971) ("The rule of this Section is applicable only 

in situations where it is established to the satisfaction of the 

forum that the parties have chosen the state of the applicable 

law."). The fact that the agreement recites Virginia law is not 

itself a reasonable basis as that term is used under § 187(2)(a). 

Reading the Restatement as Zhang does would make § 187(2)(a) 

impossible to satisfy because every recitation in an agreement of 

choice of law would automatically be reasonable.
- 14 -

The other arguments that there was a substantial 

relationship to Virginia or reasoned basis for using Virginia law 

are not supported by the record. Zhang says that Le Regulski gave 

reasons for Dahua's choice of Virginia law in her deposition. But 

she only explained that the choice of law "depends on what the 

circumstances are." She never gave a reason for why the release 

agreement referenced Virginia law. She said she does not recall 

whether the term was discussed or why it was included. Next, Zhang 

says that Li's email asking why the release agreement chose 

Virginia law shows that the provision was "discussed and 

considered" and that the fact that Le Regulski is based in Virginia 

creates a substantial relationship with Virginia. But again, there 

is no evidence that there was any discussion or consideration of 

Virginia law. The email -- which neither Le Regulski nor Yue 

responded to -- instead indicates that Dahua's own lawyers did not 

know why Virginia law was included and did not choose it because 

Le Regulski was based in Virginia. Indeed, Yue said that, after 

receiving Li's email, she learned for the first time that the 

release agreement referred to Virginia law. She said the only 

reason the agreement referred to Virginia law was because she 

forgot to change the template Le Regulski had sent her. Finally, 

Zhang says that the fact that the consulting agreement chose 

Massachusetts law and the release agreement chose Virginia law 

shows that Dahua had a reason for choosing Virginia law in the 
- 15 -

release agreement. But he does not say what that reason was, and 

this fact is consistent with the only indication in the record of

why Dahua chose Virginia law -- Yue's statement that she forgot to 

change the provision in the release agreement. 

Zhang said that he himself had no basis to choose 

Virginia law. He does not have any evidence or argument that he 

wanted Virginia law to apply. He said that when he was presented 

with the release agreement, the fact that it said that "Virginia 

law applies, for [him], . . . doesn't matter." 

Where the record evidence shows no substantial 

relationship to Virginia and no other reasonable basis for the 

agreement's reference to Virginia law, § 187(2)(a) directs that 

the agreement's language about Virginia law not be effectuated.

In these circumstances, the diversity court must conduct 

the choice-of-law analysis of the forum state. Massachusetts takes

a functional approach to choice of law. Cosme v. Whitin Mach. 

Works, Inc., 632 N.E.2d 832, 834 (Mass. 1994). No party argues 

that if the contract's choice-of-law provision is not enforced, 

the law of some state other than Massachusetts should apply. For 

the reasons stated by the district court, see Dahua, 433 F. Supp. 

at 45, Massachusetts law governs.

B. Dahua Did Not Waive Its Unilateral Mistake Defense

Next, Zhang argues that Dahua waived its unilateral 

mistake defense. Dahua responds that it was Zhang who waived any 
- 16 -

such argument that Dahua had waived by not raising it before the 

district court. We agree with Dahua.

"Courts are entitled to expect represented parties to 

incorporate all relevant arguments in the papers that directly 

address a pending motion." Mancini v. City of Providence ex rel.

Lombardi, 909 F.3d 32, 46 (1st Cir. 2018) (quoting McCoy v. Mass. 

Inst. of Tech., 950 F.2d 13, 22 n.7 (1st Cir. 1991)).

Zhang failed to raise his waiver argument in his 

opposition to Dahua's motion for summary judgment or in his own 

motion for summary judgment. Instead, he directly responded to 

Dahua's unilateral mistake defense in these motions. The only 

time Zhang argued that the unilateral mistake defense had been

waived was at the very end of the district court's hearing on the 

parties' motions for summary judgment. He devoted only five 

sentences to the argument and cited no legal authority. In these 

circumstances, Zhang's argument was not enough to preserve the 

issue. 

C. Disputed Issues of Material Fact Preclude Entry of Summary 

Judgment in Favor of Dahua or Zhang

Both Dahua and Zhang moved for summary judgment before 

the district court. Zhang appeals both the district court's grant 

of Dahua's motion and its denial of his motion. When reviewing 

cross-motions for summary judgment, "we must decide 'whether 

either of the parties deserves judgment as a matter of law on facts 
- 17 -

that are not disputed.'" Fidelity Co-op. Bank v. Nova Cas. Co., 

726 F.3d 31, 36 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Barnes v. Fleet Nat'l 

Bank, N.A., 370 F.3d 164, 170 (1st Cir. 2004)). We review each 

motion independently, see Matusevich v. Middlesex Mut. Assurance

Co., 782 F.3d 56, 59 (1st Cir. 2015), and view the record "in the 

light most favorable to the nonmoving party" when doing so, Donahue

v. Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n, 980 F.3d 204, 207 (1st Cir. 2020).

The contract defenses of mutual mistake and unilateral 

mistake are common to both parties' motions. Under Massachusetts 

law, to successfully reform a contract based on a mistake defense, 

"a party must present full, clear, and decisive proof of mistake." 

Polaroid Corp. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 610 N.E.2d 912, 917 (Mass. 

1993); see also Nissan Autos. of Marlborough, Inc. v. Glick, 816 

N.E.2d 161, 165 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004); LaFleur v. C.C. Pierce Co., 

496 N.E.2d 827, 833 n.10 (Mass. 1986) (quoting Kidder v. Greenman, 

187 N.E. 42, 48 (Mass. 1933)). 

To assert a mutual mistake defense, a party must show 

that (1) the contract contained a mistake when it was made; (2) 

the mistake is shared by both parties; (3) the mistake relates to 

an essential element of the bargain; and (4) the party raising the 

defense did not bear the risk of mistake. See LaFleur, 496 N.E.2d 

at 830-31; Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 152 (Am. Law Inst.

1981). 
- 18 -

In contrast, asserting a unilateral mistake defense 

requires a party to show that (1) the contract contained a mistake 

when it was made; (2) one party made the mistake; (3) the mistake 

relates to an essential element of the bargain; (4) the party 

raising the defense did not bear the risk of mistake; and either 

(5)(a) the effect of the mistake makes the contract unconscionable 

or (5)(b) the party not raising the defense had reason to know of 

the mistake or caused the mistake. See Nissan, 816 N.E.2d at 166; 

Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 153 (Am. Law Inst. 1981). 

1. The District Court Erred in Granting Summary Judgment to 

Dahua

First, we address Zhang's appeal of the district court's 

grant of summary judgment to Dahua. Because Zhang is the nonmovant, we view the facts in the light most favorable to him. See

Donahue, 980 F.3d at 207. We hold that, on this record, there are 

at least three triable issues of fact: whether Dahua made a mistake

(informing whether any mistake defense is viable), whether Zhang 

made a mistake (informing whether a mutual mistake defense is 

viable), and, if only Dahua was mistaken, whether Zhang knew or 

should have known of Dahua's mistake (informing whether a 

unilateral mistake defense is viable). Because of these issues of 

fact, a reasonable jury could conclude that Dahua's unilateral and

mutual mistake defenses both fail and could return a verdict in 

favor of Zhang. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 
- 19 -

242, 248 (1986) (holding that summary judgment is not appropriate 

if "the dispute about a material fact is 'genuine,' that is, if 

the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict 

for the nonmoving party").

First, the circumstances of Dahua's negotiation with 

Zhang could support a verdict in Zhang's favor. Zhang was a highlevel executive at Dahua and Dahua took its negotiation with him 

seriously. The stakes were high enough that Dahua sent its

chairman and founder, Fu, from China to the United States to

negotiate with Zhang in person. The sole purpose of this trip was 

to negotiate with Zhang. Indeed, Fu explained that "from the time 

when I arrived [in] Boston to the time when I . . . left Boston, 

almost any time, day and night, was spent communicating with Mr. 

Zhang." 

As part of its preparation for this negotiation, Dahua 

created a document outlining Zhang's negotiating strengths. It 

understood that it would need to provide "additional compensation" 

on top of what it owed Zhang under his 2015 contract to get him to 

sign an agreement releasing his claims against Dahua and containing 

confidentiality and non-compete clauses. Specifically, Dahua was 

concerned that Zhang might reveal information that could damage it

or that Zhang might serve as a whistleblower on Dahua's sales 

practices or failure to comply with laws and regulations. Based 

on Zhang's position at Dahua, a reasonable jury could conclude 
- 20 -

that securing Zhang's compliance with the release agreement's 

restrictive clauses was valuable enough to Dahua that it made no 

mistake by offering Zhang $680,000 a month. And even if a jury 

determined that Dahua did make a mistake, it could reasonably

conclude that Zhang, believing that the confidentiality and noncompete clauses were important to Dahua, did not make a mistake 

and neither knew nor should have known that Dahua had made one. 

Next, the record is not clear about the terms of the 

first severance agreement Zhang rejected. The parties agree that 

Zhang was only ever shown two severance packages -- the one he 

rejected and the one he signed. But the record contains many 

versions. Zhang was shown multiple iterations of the separation 

agreement during his deposition but could not definitively say 

which version Dahua presented to him on August 28, 2017. These 

agreements contained different terms governing what compensation, 

if any, Zhang would receive for his stock. At the time of the 

negotiation, Zhang had shares of Dahua that he claims were worth 

approximately $942,803. Under one version, Zhang would surrender 

all his rights to this stock. Under another, he would receive 

compensation only for his stock's appreciation. As reflected in 

an email between Yue and Le Regulski, Dahua may even have

considered granting Zhang an additional 100,000 shares of stock. 

These drafts provide some evidence that Dahua considered terms

that varied the value of Zhang's severance package by millions of 
- 21 -

dollars. They also raise questions about whether the terms of the 

agreement Zhang rejected were better or worse than the terms Dahua 

says he later agreed to. The exact terms of the agreement are 

relevant to whether Dahua or Zhang were mistaken when they entered 

the contract. If only Dahua made a mistake, they are also relevant 

to whether Dahua can successfully assert a unilateral mistake 

defense because, depending on the terms Zhang rejected, a 

reasonable jury could conclude that Zhang did not know and should 

not have known that Dahua made a mistake in its second offer.

Zhang's account of the negotiation provides additional 

evidence that could support a jury verdict in his favor. He said 

that he rejected Dahua's original offer because it treated him 

worse than his 2015 employment agreement. After rejecting the 

offer, he told a human resources representative that he could make 

"millions" by writing about his experience at Dahua, an opportunity 

he says he gave up by agreeing to the confidentiality and nondisparagement terms in the release agreement. Zhang also said 

that Fu told him that Dahua would "treat [him] well." Whether

both parties made a mistake, whether only Dahua made a mistake, 

and, if so, whether Zhang knew or should have known about it turns 

in part on Zhang, Fu, and Yue's differing accounts of the 

negotiation. A trier of fact can assess these accounts "based on 

credibility and other factors that the district court could not 
- 22 -

weigh on summary judgment," Melo v. City of Somerville, 953 F.3d 

165, 171 (1st Cir. 2020), and could find in Zhang's favor. 

Finally, in the agreement Zhang signed, he gave up all 

the stock he was entitled to under his original employment 

agreement. Under Dahua's account of the negotiation, Zhang made 

a bad deal. Dahua says Zhang -- shortly after rejecting a deal he 

said treated him unfairly -- agreed to give up stock assertedly 

worth $942,803 in exchange for a two-year consulting contract 

(worth $580,000), a release of all his claims against Dahua, and 

additional non-compete, confidentiality, and other conditions that 

he would not otherwise be bound by. A reasonable jury could 

instead conclude that there was no mistake because Dahua increased 

its offer to Zhang and, unlike in the prior drafts where it 

adjusted Zhang's compensation via stock, chose to do so by altering 

his severance pay. A reasonable jury could also conclude that

Zhang was not mistaken about the contract he agreed to, defeating 

Dahua's mutual mistake defense, and that he did not know and should 

not have known about any mistake Dahua made, defeating Dahua's 

unilateral mistake defense.

Because of the triable issues of fact on this record 

that bear on the viability of Dahua's contract defenses, the 

district court erred when it granted summary judgment in Dahua's

favor. 
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2. The District Court Did Not Err by Denying Zhang's Motion for 

Summary Judgment

Turning to Zhang's appeal of the district court's denial 

of his motion for summary judgment, we now view the facts in the 

light most favorable to Dahua, the non-movant. We hold that a

reasonable jury could find that, for the reasons already given, 

Dahua made a mistake and that it could also find either that Zhang 

did not know that the agreement he signed said that Dahua would 

pay him $680,000 a month (allowing Dahua to succeed on its mutual 

mistake defense) or that, if he did notice this term, he knew or 

should have known that Dahua had made a mistake (allowing Dahua to

succeed on its unilateral mistake defense). Therefore, the 

district court's denial of Zhang's motion for summary judgment was 

proper.

Zhang's expectations for Dahua's second severance offer

and his behavior after receiving it could allow a reasonable jury

to find in Dahua's favor. First, as we have explained, it is 

unclear from the record how much the initial severance package 

Dahua presented to Zhang was worth. Some of the severance packages 

in the record were worth significantly more than others. Taking 

the facts in the light most favorable to Dahua, a reasonable jury 

could conclude that, if Zhang noticed that Dahua increased its 

offer to him, the increase was so large that Zhang either knew or 

should have known that Dahua had made a mistake. Such a factual 
- 24 -

finding would allow Dahua to prevail on its unilateral mistake 

defense.

A reasonable jury could also conclude that Zhang never 

even noticed the $680,000 a month term, allowing Dahua to succeed 

on its mutual mistake defense. After Dahua presented Zhang with 

its original severance offer, the only specific change Zhang 

requested was that his consulting arrangement be for a term of two 

years rather than at will. He never told anyone at Dahua that he 

wanted $680,000 a month to accept the release agreement's terms

and no one at Dahua ever told Zhang that Dahua was increasing the 

value of his severance pay. Indeed, Zhang says that after seeing 

the large increase in his severance pay in Dahua's second offer, 

he never confirmed that Dahua had intended this increase and never 

discussed any of the agreement's updated terms with Fu or Yue. 

Finally, the issues of who was mistaken and, if only 

Dahua was, whether Zhang knew or should have known that Dahua was 

making a mistake also turn on Zhang, Fu, and Yue's differing 

accounts of the severance negotiation. A jury could assess the 

credibility of the witnesses to resolve these issues and reasonably 

determine that one of Dahua's mistake defenses succeeds. See id.

On this record, because disputed facts, if resolved in 

Dahua's favor, could allow either Dahua's mutual or unilateral 

mistake defense to succeed, denial of summary judgment in Zhang's 

favor was proper. 
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D. Dahua's Cross-Appeal

Dahua argues that, after the district court granted its 

summary judgment motion and held that Zhang breached the release 

agreement, it should have awarded Dahua attorneys' fees as damages 

for the breach. Because we vacate the district court's grant of 

summary judgment, we dismiss Dahua's cross-appeal as moot. See

DeCambre v. Brookline Hous. Auth., 826 F.3d 1, 20 (1st Cir. 2016) 

(citing Bos. Duck Tours, LP v. Super Duck Tours, LLC, 531 F.3d 1, 

31 n.31 (1st Cir. 2008)). 

IV. Conclusion

The district court's grant of summary judgment in 

Dahua's favor is vacated, its denial of summary judgment in favor 

of Zhang is affirmed, and Dahua's cross-appeal is dismissed. We 

remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. No 

costs are awarded.