## *The Honorable J. Smith Henley died on October 18, 1997. This opinion

is cons istent with his vote at the panel’s conference following ora l argument on April 14, 1997. The Honorable Stephen M. Reasoner, Chief Judge, United States District 1 

## Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas.



# United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

____________ Nos. 96-2834/2841

____________ Jeffrey Taylor, * * Appellant/Cross-appellee, * * Appeals from the United States v. * District Court for the * Eastern District of Arkansas Pulaski Bank & Trust Company, * [UNPUBLISHED] * Appellee/Cross-appellant. *

____________ Submitted: April 14, 1997 Filed: April 17, 1998

____________ Before McMILLIAN, Circuit Judge, HENLEY, Senior Circuit Judge, and * BEAM, Circuit Judge.

____________ PER CURIAM. Jeffrey Taylor (Taylor) appeals from final orders entered in th e District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, granting summar y 1 judgment in favor of Pulaski

### -2-

Bank & Trust Company (the Bank) in his diversity action for conversion and breach of fiduciary duty, Taylor v. Pulaski Bank & Trust Co. , No. LR-C-94- 850 (E.D. Ark. June 6, 1996) (memorandum and order), and denying his motio n for attorneys’ fees and costs. Id. (June 26, 1996).

The Bank cross-appeals from final orders denying its motion t o disqualify Taylor’s c ounsel, id. (Sept. 30, 1995), and denying its motion for attorneys’ fees. Id. (June 26, 1996). Taylo r was the beneficiary of the Donald E. Taylor Life Insuranc e Trust (the Trust) of which the Bank served as so le trustee since 1981. In Marc h 1995 Taylor filed a motion for partial summary judgment on th e grounds that the Trust terms were clear and unambiguous and, as a matter of law, Taylor was entitled to the undistributed trust funds. Interpretin g the Trust under Arkansas law, the district court found that the language of the Trust was clear and unambiguous and Taylor was the sole beneficiary

. Id. at 6-8 (Sept. 30, 1995). In the same order, the district court denied the Bank’s motion to disqualify Taylor’s counsel for breach of Arkansa s Rules of Professional Conduct 1.7(a) and 3.7, on the grounds that there wa s no matter pending before Taylor’s counsel that w as directly adverse to the Bank and substantial hardship would result to Taylor if his counsel were disqualified. Id. at 4-5. Taylor later moved for attorneys’ fees and costs incurred i n connection with the enforcement of the Trust. The district court initiall y denied Taylor’s motion as premature. Id. (Dec. 6, 1995). Later, after th e district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Bank, the parties filed a joint request for extension of time to f ile motions for attorneys’ fees and costs. Before the district court ruled on the joint request, the filing deadline passed without either party fili ng for attorneys’ fees and costs. The district court then denied the parties’ request and directed each party to bear his or its own fees and costs. Id. (June 26, 1996).

### -3- We have carefully reviewed the recor d and agree with the analyses of the district court as set forth in its well-reas oned memoranda and orders. With respect the issu e of attorneys’ fees and costs, we further note that distri ct courts generally have broad discretion in deciding motions t o extend time for filings. See, e.g. , Metropolitan Fed. Bank of Iowa, F.S.B. v. W.R. Grace & Co. , 999 F .2d 1257, 1259 (8 Cir. 1993). Accordingly, we th affirm the judgments of the district court. See 8 Cir. R. 47B. th
A true copy.

Attest:
CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.