FILED

April 22, 1998

Cecil Crowson, Jr.

Appellate C ourt Clerk

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

FEBRUARY 1998 SESSION

STATE OF TENNESSEE, )

) C.C.A. NO. 02C01-9704-CR-00153

Appellee, )

) SHELBY COUNTY

VS. )

) HON. JOHN P. COLTON, JR.

CHARLES E. TAYLOR, ) JUDGE

)

Appellant. ) (Habitual Motor Vehicle Offender)

FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:

A C WHARTON, JR. JOHN KNOX WALKUP

Public Defender Attorney General & Reporter

WALKER GWINN ELIZABETH T. RYAN

Asst. Public Defender Asst. Attorney General

201 Poplar, Suite 201 425 Fifth Ave., North

Memphis, TN 38103 Cordell Hull Bldg., Second Fl.

Nashville, TN 37243-0493

JOHN W. PIEROTTI

District Attorney General

ALANDA HORNE

Asst. District Attorney General

201 Poplar, Suite 301

Memphis, TN 38103

OPINION FILED:____________________

AFFIRMED

JOHN H. PEAY,

Judge
1

In its b rief, th e Sta te arg ues that th e def endant fa iled to time ly file his Notic e of Appeal. Th is

conten tion is in error. An order w as ente red on D ecem ber 2, 19 96, denying the defe ndant’s m otion to

dism iss th e Sta te’s petition . How ever, the o rder actually dec laring the defen dant a habitual mo tor ve hicle

offender was not entered until December 10, 1996. It is from this latter date that the time for filing a

Notice o f Appea l begins. T he defe ndant filed his notice o n Janu ary 9, 1997 . This is within the thirty

days as tim e is com puted un der T.R .A.P. Ru le 21(a). 

2

O P I N I O N

The defendant was declared a habitual motor vehicle offender on

December 10, 1996. He now appeals and argues that such a declaration violated the

double jeopardy provisions of the state and federal constitutions. He does not contest

the underlying facts which led him to be declared such an offender.1

The Habitual Motor Vehicle Offenders Act seeks to deny the privilege of

operating a motor vehicle to those who have demonstrated “their indifference to the

safety and welfare of others and their disrespect for the laws of the state.” T.C.A. 

§ 55-10-602(2). The defendant was convicted of four driving offenses between January

1991 and June 1995, thus he falls within the statutory definition of a habitual offender.

T.C.A. § 55-10-603(2).

The defendant now argues that his being declared a habitual offender is

violative of the due process clause. He argues that he was convicted of four offenses

and was punished accordingly. He further contends he “has already suffered mandatory

temporary revocation of his drivers license” and is now being punished a second time for

the same conduct. 

The Supreme Court of Tennessee has addressed this very issue and has

determined that the revocation of driving privileges under the Habitual Motor Vehicle

Offenders Act does not subject one to double jeopardy. State v. Conley, 639 S.W.2d
3

435, 437 (Tenn. 1982). The defendant, however, invites this Court to reconsider the

Conley case using the analysis of a more recent United States Supreme Court case,

United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989). This Court has previously performed such

an analysis and has concluded that even under the most recent federal cases, a

defendant’s declaration as a habitual motor vehicle offender and subsequent revocation

of his license is not violative of his right against double jeopardy as provided by both the

federal and state constitutions. State v. Jeffery L. Becton, No. 02C01-9611-CR-00431,

Shelby County (Tenn. Crim. App. filed Dec. 3, 1997, at Jackson)(no perm. app. filed);

State v. Milton Spears, Jr., No. 02C01-9606-CR-00197, Shelby County (Tenn. Crim. App.

filed July 10, 1997)(no perm. app. filed); State v. Randy A. McClure and Teddy G.

Ownby, No. 03C01-9605-CC-00198, Sevier County (Tenn. Crim. App. filed Jan. 29, 1997,

at Knoxville)(no perm. app. filed). The judgment of the court below is affirmed.

______________________________

JOHN H. PEAY, Judge

CONCUR:

______________________________

JOSEPH B. JONES, Judge

______________________________ 

THOMAS T. WOODALL, Judge