IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

IN AND FOR NEW CASTLE COUNTY

STATE OF DELAWARE )

) I.D. No. 30206697DI

v. )

)

JONATHAN M. WONNUM )

)

Defendant )

Submitted: April 4, 2014

Decided: July 3, 2014

Upon Defendant’s Second Motion for Postconviction Relief. 

DENIED.

 

ORDER

Scott D. Goodwin, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, 

Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for the State.

Jonathan M. Wonnum, Smyrna, Delaware, pro se. 

COOCH, R.J.

This 3rd day of July 2014, upon consideration of Defendant’s Second Motion 

for Postconviction Relief, it appears to the Court that:

1. Defendant Jonathan M. Wonnum (“Defendant”) filed this Second

Motion for Postconviction Relief based on his apparent belief that his

trial counsel was ineffective during his plea negotiation process and 

that he was wrongly denied counsel during his subsequent 

postconviction proceedings. He asks the Court to revisit his plea 

negotiations as well as his First Motion for Postconviction Relief 

addressing same.1

 1 Def.’s Mot. for Postconviction Relief.
2

2. Defendant’s first trial for First Degree Murder and Possession of a 

Deadly Weapon During the Commission of a Felony ended in a 

mistrial on the murder charge. The jury convicted Defendant on the 

weapon charge but deadlocked eleven to one in favor of conviction as 

to the murder.2

 

3. On August 9, 1993, the morning of Defendant’s retrial, Defendant 

pleaded guilty to First Degree Murder. As a result of the plea, the 

State set aside the verdict on the weapon charge.3

 The Court 

conducted a thorough plea colloquy and was satisfied that the guilty 

plea was “knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently offered.”4

4. Before his sentencing, Defendant submitted a pro se letter asking to 

withdraw his guilty plea. He claimed he was “forced” into taking the 

plea.5

 After considering the letter as a Motion to Withdraw his guilty 

plea and a thorough review of the record, this Court denied the 

motion.

6

 It held that “Defendant’s request to withdraw guilty plea 

amounts merely to a change of mind of Defendant and does not 

demonstrate that the plea was involuntary or that Defendant was 

otherwise mistaken about his legal rights.”7

 Defendant was sentenced

to life in prison without the possibility of parole the next day and did 

not appeal.

8

5. Defendant, pro se, filed his First Motion for Postconviction Relief in 

1996. In it, he again claimed issues with his guilty plea. He also 

claimed he was denied access to transcripts of his first trial.

9

 This 

Court denied his Motion as previously adjudicated as to the guilty 

plea and found his transcript arguments “completely conclusory.”10

The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed this Court’s denial on 

appeal.11

 2 Wonnum v. State, 1997 WL 588855, at *1 (Del. Sep. 16, 1997) (ORDER). 3 Id.

4 State v. Wonnum, No. IN92-09-0496, 0497 at 15 (Del. Super. Aug. 9, 1993) (TRANSCRIPT) (hereinafter “Plea 

Transcr.”).

5 State v. Wonnum, Docket # 22, at 2 (Del. Super. Sep. 14, 1993) (ORDER). 6 Id.

7 Id. at 6. This Court’s Order on his Motion to Withdraw discusses, at length, several passages from Defendant’s 

plea colloquy where he had the opportunity to alert the court to any coercion or misunderstanding in regards to his 

plea. Additionally, a fresh review of the transcript reveals several instances where the Court requested clarification 

from trial counsel, or further answers from Defendant to confirm the voluntariness of his plea. Plea Transcr. at 5, 9. 8 Wonnum, 1997 WL 588855, at *1. 9 Def.’s First Mot. for Postconviction Relief, Docket #30 (Aug. 26, 1996).

10 State v. Wonnum, Docket #34, (Del. Super. Feb. 26, 1997) (ORDER). 11 Wonnum, 1997 WL 588855.
3

6. Defendant has now filed a Second Motion for Postconviction Relief.12 

He again claims ineffective assistance of counsel relating to his guilty 

plea, now claiming he was “tricked” into taking it. Defendant’s 

second ground requests counsel and claims that the absence of counsel 

during his first motion establishes its own ineffective assistance 

claim.

13 Defendant’s request for counsel was DENIED in the April 

24, 2013 Order of Briefing issued by the Court.14

7. Under the Delaware Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure, a 

Motion for Postconviction Relief can be barred for time limitations, 

repetitive motions, procedural defaults, and former adjudications.15 A 

motion exceeds time limitations if it is filed more than one year after 

the conviction is finalized or they assert a newly recognized, 

retroactively applied right more than one year after it is first 

recognized.16 A motion is considered repetitive and therefore barred if 

it asserts any ground for relief “not asserted in a prior postconviction 

proceeding.”17 Repetitive motions are only considered if it is 

“warranted in the interest of justice.”18 Grounds for relief “not asserted 

in the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction” are barred as 

procedural default unless movant can show “cause for relief” and 

“prejudice from [the] violation.”19 Grounds for relief formerly 

adjudicated in the case, including “proceedings leading to the judgment 

of conviction, in an appeal, in a postconviction proceeding, or in a

federal habeas corpus hearing” are barred.20 Former adjudications are 

only reconsidered if “warranted in the interest of justice.”21

 12 Defendant first filed his Second Motion for Postconviction Relief on March 20, 2013 and an Order of Briefing 

was issued. Or. of Briefing, Docket #43 (Apr. 24, 2013). Trial counsel submitted his affidavit, to which Defendant 

replied. Def.’s Reply to Aff., Docket #48 (July 31, 2013). Defendant then filed a Motion for Default, as the State 

failed to file their Response by the August deadline. Def.’s Mot. for Default, Docket #50 (Sep. 26, 2013). This 

Court denied that motion in a letter issued October 9, 2013 citing personnel changes at the Department of Justice, 

and extended the State’s deadline to November 29, 2013. Ltr. dated Oct. 9, 2013 from the Court to Mr. Grubb and 

Mr. Wonnum, Docket #52 (Oct. 10, 2013). In that same letter, the Court further explained its denial of Defendant’s 

request for counsel based on recently amended Rule 61, stating the new procedure only applies to first 

postconviction motions filed after the effective date of May 6, 2013. Id. Defendant also filed a subsequent Motion 

for Expansion of Record that was DENIED and a Motion for Expansion of Time that was GRANTED. Or., Docket 

#57 (Dec. 24, 2013); Order, Docket #59 (Jan. 13, 2014).

13 Def.’s Mot. for Postconviction Relief. In his Reply and subsequent letters to the Court, Defendant alleges 

unconscionability, “manifest injustice, “collusion” by all parties (including the Defendant himself), and 

“intimidation” contributed to his guilty plea. Def.’s Reply at 2, 4, 10-13. 14 Or. of Briefing, Docket #43 (Apr. 24, 2013). 15 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i). 16Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1). 17 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(2). 18 Id.

19 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3). 20 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4). 21 Id.
4

8. Before addressing the merits of this Second Motion for Postconviction 

Relief, the court must first apply the procedural bars of Superior Court 

Criminal Rule 61(i).22 If a procedural bar exists, then the Court will 

not consider the merits of the postconviction claim.23 

9. Defendant’s Motion is procedurally barred in several ways. First, 

Defendant’s motion was filed more than one year after Defendant’s 

conviction was finalized thirty days after his sentencing on September 

15, 1993 and is therefore time-barred under Rule 61(i)(1).24 This 

motion was filed more than twenty years after sentencing and 

Defendant provides no evidence of a newly recognized, retroactively 

applied right. Defendant originally appeared to argue he had a 

retroactively applied right to counsel based on Martinez v. Ryan,

25

however in his Reply he seems to have abandoned that argument.26 In 

any event, Martinez “did not create a new right such as to qualify as 

means of relief from the procedural bar of Rule 61(i)(1). Further, since 

Martinez did not establish a new constitutional right, it cannot be 

applied retroactively.”27

10. In addition, Defendant’s claims as to ineffective assistance of counsel 

during his plea negotiations are procedurally barred as previously 

adjudicated. This is the third time the Court has been asked to address 

the same circumstances surrounding Defendant’s guilty plea. The 

Court has addressed, and rejected, all of Defendant’s arguments as to 

the plea in previous motions. Simply altering the language from 

“forced” to “tricked” does not change the fact that Defendant’s 

arguments have already been decided in this Court.28 Likewise, the 

cases Defendant points to of other defendants who have received, in his 

opinion, more beneficial plea agreements do not change the fact that

the Court has found that Defendant “knowingly, voluntarily and 

intelligently” accepted his plea and found no compelling reason to 

revisit that decision in the past twenty years.

29

 22 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990). 23 Id. 24 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(m)(1) (“A judgment of conviction is final for the purpose of this rule ...[i]f the defendant 

does not file a direct appeal, 30 days after the Superior Court imposes sentence”). 25 132 S.Ct. 1309 (2012). 26 Def.’s Reply at 4. Instead, Defendant argues he relies on “the Delaware Constitution and the U.S. Constitution, 

and the rationale underlying Martinez.” 27 State v. Travis, 2013 WL 1196332, at *3 (Del. Super. Mar. 25, 2013), aff'd sub nom., Anderson v. State, 69 A.3d 

370 (Del. 2013) and aff'd, 69 A.3d 372 (Del. 2013). 28 Younger, 580 A.2d 552, 556 (“Neither federal nor state courts are required to relitigate in postconviction 

proceedings those claims which have been previously resolved.”)

29 Wonnum, 1997 WL 588855, State v. Wonnum, Docket #34, (Del. Super. Feb. 26, 1997) (ORDER), State v. 

Wonnum, Docket # 22, at 2 (Del. Super. Sep. 14, 1993) (ORDER).
5

11. Even if the Court were to consider the “tricked” assertion as new, then 

it is barred as a repetitive motion under Rule 61(i)(2) and the 

requirements of Rule 61(b)(2). Defendant would have had knowledge 

of the ground when he filed his original postconviction motion and his

failure to include it bars further consideration.

12. Defendant’s second ground for postconviction relief claims ineffective 

assistance of counsel in that he had no counsel during his first 

postconviction proceeding.30 This claim, assuming arguendo that it is 

not time-barred or previously adjudicated as part of his original 

ineffective assistance claims, is barred as a procedural default. If this 

ground is indeed new, Defendant fails to show “cause for relief” and 

“prejudice from [the] violation” other than bald assertions that he was 

denied an alleged litany of state and federal constitutional rights when 

the court denied him counsel. On the contrary, the Delaware Supreme 

Court has held that there is neither a federal nor a state constitutional 

right to counsel in a postconviction proceeding. The Supreme Court 

held in Roten v. State:

Contrary to Roten's contention, Martinez does not hold that there is 

a federal constitutional right to counsel in first postconviction 

proceedings. Furthermore, Roten misreads this Court's decision in 

Holmes v. State. In Holmes, we held that the Superior Court abused 

its discretion in denying Holmes' motion for the appointment of 

counsel to assist him in his first postconviction proceeding. We 

remanded for the appointment of counsel under the Superior 

Court's new Criminal Rule 61(e), which allows for the 

appointment of counsel in first postconviction proceedings. The 

rule was adopted May 6, 2013 and is not retroactive. We did not 

hold in Holmes that a right to counsel in first postconviction 

proceedings exists as a matter of Delaware constitutional law.31

As such, Defendant’s arguments fail to overcome the bar of 

Rule 61(i)(3).

13. This Court finds the “interests of justice”32 do not require any 

of the above procedural bars to be reversed. The Delaware

Supreme Court has explained:

[T]he “interest of justice” exception provides two pathways to 

demonstrate that a claim is not procedurally barred. The exception 

 30 Def.’s Mot. for Postconviction Relief at 2. 31 2013 WL 5808236, at *1 (Del. Oct. 28, 2013) (ORDER). 32 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(2)&(4).
6

applies when (1) “the previous ruling was clearly in error or there 

has been an important change in circumstances, in particular, the 

factual basis for issues previously posed,” or (2) there is an 

“equitable concern of preventing injustice.”12 But the interest of 

justice exception is narrow and will only be applied in limited 

circumstances.33

Defendant claims that “[u]ntil an attorney has briefed and 

professionally presented all of the Defendant’s substantial claims of 

consequential violations the interest of justice has not been served.”34 

Defendant is incorrect. As discussed above, there is no absolute right 

to counsel in a postconviction proceeding. “Justice does not require 

that an issue that has been previously considered and rejected be 

revisited simply because the claim is refined or restated.”35 His 

substantial claims have been addressed by this Court and Defendant 

provides no new evidence that warrants a reversal of the procedural 

bars.

14. Defendant also asserts that he must overcome the procedural bars of

Rule 61 because he has “a colorable claim that there was a miscarriage 

of justice because of a constitutional violation that undermined the 

fundamental legality, reliability, integrity or fairness of the proceedings 

leading to the judgment of conviction.”36 “This exception to the 

procedural bars is very narrow and is only applicable in very limited 

circumstances.”37 However, “[a] claim of ineffective counsel in 

violation of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, by 

its very nature, qualifies as just such an exception.”38 This Court finds 

that Defendant has failed to show that he has “a colorable claim.” 

Instead, Defendant relies on cases that either do not create a new right

to overcome the bar39 or bare assertions about his rights under “the 

constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws under the 

Federal Constitution and due process of law under both the Federal and 

Delaware Constitutions.”40 Defendant argues again for a Martinez-like 

decision, contending that “[t]he Defendant does not purport retroapplication, however, it would be unfair to not give retrospective 

 33 Lindsey v. State, 2014 WL 2178453, at *3 (Del. May 27, 2014) (quoting Weedon v. State, 750 A.2d 521, 527-28 

(Del. 2000). 34 Def.’s Reply at 7. 35 Riley v. State, 585 A.2d 719, 721 (Del. 1990) abrogated on other grounds by Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719 

(1992).

36 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5). 37 State v. Wilmer, 2003 WL 751181 (Del. Super. Feb. 28, 2003), aff'd, 827 A.2d 30 (Del. 2003). 38 Id.

39 See discussion of Martinez, supra. See also Shockley v. State, 2013 WL 167005, at *2 (Del. Jan. 15, 2013) 

(rejecting the argument that Lafler v. Cooper and Missouri v. Frye create a “new rule of law”). 40 Def.’s Reply at 1-2.
7

consideration.”41 The Court finds these arguments unpersuasive to 

apply the “very narrow” exception of Rule 61(i)(5). However, even a 

review of Defendant’s claims on the merits shows that they must fail. 

15. To successfully articulate an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a

claimant must demonstrate first that counsel’s performance was 

deficient. To prove counsel’s deficiency, a Defendant must show that 

counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness.42 “Mere allegations of ineffectiveness will not suffice. 

A defendant must make specific allegations of actual prejudice and 

substantiate them.”43 “[A] court must indulge a strong presumption that 

counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional 

assistance.”44 Secondly, a Defendant must demonstrate that the 

deficiencies prejudiced the Defendant by depriving him or her of a fair 

trial with reliable results. A successful Sixth Amendment claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel requires a showing “that there is a 

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the 

result of the proceeding would have been different.”45 

16. Defendant is mistaken when he argues that “[t]here is nothing in the 

record to support a claim that counsel was adequate” to support his own 

claim. The burden is on him, the Defendant, to overcome the strong 

presumption that trial counsel’s representation was reasonable. 

Defendant offers no evidence to support his claim other than his 

feelings as to the inadequacy of his plea.46

17. It is clear from Defendant’s filings to the Court that he regrets 

accepting his plea. However that regret and dissatisfaction with the 

result does not negate the fact that he was thoroughly informed and 

agreed to the consequences of the plea. Defendant now claims that he 

was “tricked,” however a review of earlier papers reveals that he was 

aware of the consequences of the plea, and agreed to it on the advice of 

trial counsel that it may benefit an attempt at a pardon.47 “In the 

absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, [Defendant] 

must be bound by what he said at the time of his plea.”48 Defendant 

 41 Def.’s Reply at 8. 42 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. 43 Wright v. State, 671 A.2d 1353, 1356 (Del. 1996). 44 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 45 Id. at 694. 46 “Under what definition of the word benefit would a plea to life (death in prison) sentence in exchange for vacating 

a conviction on a weapons charge (a knife) fall? This is a classic case of Anti-Affluenza.” Def.’s Reply at 8. 47 State v. Wonnum, Docket # 22, at 2 (Del. Super. Sep. 14, 1993) (ORDER). 48 Fullman v. State, 560 A.2d 490 (Del.1989) (citing Little v. Allsbrook, 731 F.2d 238, 239-40 n.2 (4th Cir. 1984)).
8

fails to provide any support that his trial counsel acted unreasonably 

during the plea process. His arguments are the embodiment of “mere 

allegations of ineffectiveness” and therefore fail the first prong of 

Strickland.

18. Since the Defendant fails the first part of the Strickland test, this Court 

need not go further. However, in light of the circumstances the Court 

chooses to address the second prong for the sake of completeness. 

Defendant states “[t]he record supports a valid claim that the Defendant 

would have proceeded with a second trial had counsel not tricked and

lied to Defendant and his family. The Defendant had absolutely 

nothing to lose by a second trial, and everything to gain[.]”49 Defendant 

offers nothing in the record to actually back up this assertion, other than 

comments that his plea was “absurd.”50 It is quite possible that 

Defendant may have chosen to take the plea absent counsel’s advice, 

given the previous eleven to one result. Defendant offers nothing from 

the record, other than blanket statements, to refute that argument to a 

reasonable probability. Defendant’s assertions to what he believes 

would or would not happen are simply not enough to establish 

prejudice under Strickland. 

19. Defendant’s second ground for postconviction relief consists solely of 

bald assertions regarding to his lack of counsel during his first motion. 

His arguments on this ground appear to be inextricably intertwined

with his arguments to overcome the procedural bars of Rule 61, which 

are addressed above. 

Therefore, Defendant’s Second Motion for Postconviction Relief is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

______________________

Richard R. Cooch, R.J.

oc: Prothonotary

cc: Investigative Services 

 49 Def.’s Reply at 8. 50 Def.’s Reply at 2.