Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion *

should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited

circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-41150

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

RICHARD KEITH TAYLOR, 

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Texas 

USDC No. 4:08-CR-16-ALL

Before REAVLEY, JOLLY, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Richard Keith Taylor pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a

firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and was sentenced to 235 months

of imprisonment. Taylor challenges the district court’s denial of a reduction in

his base offense level pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1. He argues that the district

court should not have withheld the two-level adjustment for acceptance of

responsibility on the grounds that he waited until the morning of trial to enter

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

August 4, 2009

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 08-41150

2

his guilty plea. Further, he argues that he truthfully admitted the conduct

comprising the offense early in the proceedings and that he did not enter a guilty

plea earlier because he lacked an “understanding of the process,” lacked

“communication with counsel representing him through the time of his plea,”

and lacked a “clear understanding of the ‘armed career’ provisions and how they

created a minimum fifteen (15) year sentence for his offense.” 

An appellate court’s review of a sentence must start with the issue

whether the district court committed any “significant procedural error, such as

failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range.” Gall v.

United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007). We review the district court’s

interpretation or application of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo, and its

factual findings for clear error. United States v. Armstrong, 550 F.3d 382, 404

(5th Cir. 2008), petition for cert. filed (Mar. 16, 2009) (No. 08-9339). 

Whether a defendant clearly demonstrates an acceptance of responsibility

is a question of fact. United States v. Perez, 915 F.2d 947, 950 (5th Cir. 1990).

A finding that a defendant has not accepted responsibility is examined under a

standard of review even more deferential than a pure clearly erroneous

standard. United States v. Angeles-Mendoza, 407 F.3d 742, 753 (5th Cir. 2005);

see also § 3E1.1, comment. (n.5). This court “will affirm a sentencing court’s

decision not to award a reduction under [§ 3E1.1] unless it is without

foundation.” United States v. Solis, 299 F.3d 420, 458 (5th Cir. 2002) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). 

This court has routinely upheld the denial of a reduction for acceptance of

responsibility when a defendant waits until the eve of trial to enter a guilty plea.

See United States v. Diaz, 39 F.3d 568, 570 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v.

Wilder, 15 F.3d 1292, 1299 (5th Cir. 1994). The record indicates that Taylor

rejected two plea offers by the Government during the course of the proceedings

and instead waited until the morning of trial to enter a guilty plea. Further, the

district court determined that Taylor’s attitude at the sentencing hearing did not
No. 08-41150

3

reflect responsibility or contrition for his actions. The district court’s denial of

the downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility was not without

foundation. See Solis, 299 F.3d at 458. Taylor has not shown that the district

court clearly erred in denying a reduction for acceptance of responsibility. See

Armstrong, 550 F.3d at 404.

AFFIRMED.