No. 96-407 INTHESUPREMECOURTOFTHESTATEOFMONTANA 1997

MONTANANSFORPROPERTYRIGHTS, INC., anon-profit corporation; HENRYBROERS; CHARLESTUSTIN; DARRELLOLSON;DAVID LIETZ; BARBLIETZ; JIM DOWLING; RAYMOND "RAY" SERRA, SR.; CAROLDUVAL; RUSS CROWDER;RONRABIDUE,

Plaintiffs andAppellants,

__ 

# “. BOARDOFCOUNTYCOMMISSIONERS OF FLATHEAD COUNTY, MONTANA,

Defendant andRespondent.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District,

In andfor the County of Flathead, TheHonorable Katherine R.Curtis, Judge presiding.

COUNSELOFRECORD:

For Appellants: Gerald J. Neeley, Attorney at Law, Billings, Montana For Respondent: Jonathan B. Smith andDennis J. Hester, Deputy Flathead County Attorneys, Kalispell, Montana

Filed: Submitted onBriefs: October 31, 1996 Decided: January 28, 1997

Clerk .jJustice Karla M. Gray delivered the Opinion of the Court.

Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3cc), Montana Supreme Court 1995 Internal Operating Rules, the following decision shall not be cited asprecedent andshall bepublished byits filing asapublic document with the Clerk of the Supreme Court andbyareport of its result to State Reporter Publishing Company and West Publishing Company. Montanans For Property Rights, Inc., anonprofit corporation, Henry Broers, Charles Tustin, Darrell Olson, David Lietz, Barb Lietz, Jim Dowling, Raymond "Ray" Serra, Sr., Carol Duval, Russ Crowder, and Ron Rabidue (collectively, MPRI) appeal from the judgment entered bythe Eleventh Judicial District Court, Flathead County, on its orders granting the motions for summary judgment filed by the Board of County Commissioners of Flathead County, Montana (Commissioners), and denying MPRI's cross-motion for partial summary judgment. Weaffirm. The issue on appeal is whether the District Court erred in granting the Commissioners' motions for summary judgment. Inorder to resolve that issue, weaddress the following subissues:

a. Did the District Court err in concluding that planning board documents which are readily available to the public need not be onfile at the Flathead County Clerk andRecorder's office? b. Did the District Court err in concluding that freeholder protests were properly counted pursuant to 576-2-205(6), MCA?

C. Did the District Court err in concluding that 52-6- 109, MCA, prohibited the Flathead County Clerk and Recorder from providing MPRIwith alist of freeholder names andaddresses? 2d. Did the District Court err in concluding that the

Commissioners were entitled to judgment as amatter of law onMPRI's claim that the 

### Hungry Horse News and the 

### Bigfork Eagle are not newspapers of general circulation?

e. Did the District Court err in concluding that the zoning regulations were validly adopted under Title 76, Chapter 2, Part 2, MCA?

FACTSANDPROCEDURALBACKGROUND In 1973, the Commissioners established the Flathead County Planning Board (Planning Board) to advise them regarding land use issues in Flathead County. Five years later, the Planning Board proposed the first Flathead County Comprehensive Plan, which divided Flathead County into neighborhood planning units and provided general guidance for resolving land use issues. In September of 1986, the Planning Board gave notice that it would hold ahearing to receive public comments regarding arevised comprehensive plan, the so-called Flathead County Comprehensive Plan Update. The notice specified that copies of the revised comprehensive plan were available for public review atthe Flathead Regional Development Office (FRDO) The Planning Board held the public hearing andsubsequently recommended that the Commissioners adopt the revised comprehensive plan. OnFebruary 5, 1987, the Commissioners passed aresolution of intention to adopt the revised comprehensive plan; they caused notice to bepublished that the resolution had been passed. The Commissioners subsequently adopted the revised comprehensive plan and, thereafter, referred to it asthe Flathead County Master Plan (FCMP).

3TheFCMPencourages communities in Flathead County to develop

"neighborhood" plans if they experience unique problems, face special issues, or desire to more adequately plan for growth in the future. Based on that recommendation, some residents of Canyon Area communities in Flathead County formed acommittee, the Canyon Citizen Initiated Zoning Group (CCIZG), to guide the planning process for those communities. The Canyon Area is along, narrow band of land in Flathead County located generally west andsouth of Glacier National Park. CCIZG hired a consultant to assist in developing a neighborhood plan and land use regulations for their communities and, together, they drafted proposed land use regulations and a neighborhood plan (Canyon Plan) for the three land use regions in the Canyon Area--the Lower Canyon Region (Lower District), the Middle Canyon Region (Middle District), andthe Upper Canyon Region (Upper District). Thereafter, the consultant held fifteen public meetings to receive comments on the Canyon Plan and land use regulations. CCIZGthen presented the Canyon Plan to the Planning Board for review and the Commissioners subsequently passed a resolution adding the Canyon Plan to the FCMP. CCIZG andits consultant then drafted zoning regulations for the Canyon Area communities based onthe Canyon Plan. They held nine public meetings to discuss the proposed zoning regulations, which were referred to as the Canyon Area Land Use Regulatory System (CALURS)

. Following the public meetings, CCIZG presented

4the CALURSto the Planning Board for its review andrecommendation

that the Commissioners adopt the CALURS. The agenda for the Planning Board's September 14, 1994, meeting included adiscussion of the proposed CALURSandanotice regarding this meeting was published on August 25, 1994. The notice stated that copies of documents pertaining to agenda items, such as the CALURS, were available for public inspection at the FRDO. The Planning Board received public comments onthe proposed CALURSat its September meeting andpassed amotion to discuss the CALURSfurther at its next meeting, scheduled for October 12, 1994. At the October meeting, the Planning Board passed a motion recommending that the Commissioners adopt the CALURS. TheCommissioners caused twonotices to bepublished that they would hold a hearing on November 15, 1994, to receive public comments regarding adoption of the CALURS. Following the hearing, the Commissioners passed aresolution of intention to adopt the CALURS and caused notice of passage of the resolution to be published. The notice stated that copies of the proposed CALURS

were available for public inspection at the office of the Flathead County Clerk andRecorder (Clerk), the FRDO,andthe Commissioners' office. It also stated that persons owning real property (freeholders) within the Upper, Middle and Lower Districts of the Canyon Area could file written protests to the CALURSfor aperiod of thirty days beginning November 24, 1994 (the protest period). Both proponents andopponents of the CALURSrequested alist of freeholders from the Clerk in order to contact them regarding

5the CALURS. TheClerk refused to provide either group with alist

of freeholders, but did allow review of the freeholder list at her office. Oneof the opponents of the CALURSwasGlacier Wilderness Ranch (GWR),atime-share condominium association. Thechairman of GWR's board of directors filed atimely protest, purportedly on behalf of each of the approximately six hundred owners of GWRtimeshare units. TheClerk informed himthat eachtime-share owner was afreeholder entitled to individually protest the CALURSandthat hecould not protest onbehalf of all GWRowners. After the close of the protest period, the Clerk reported the protest results to the Commissioners. Less than forty percent of freeholders in the entire CanyonArea protested the adoption of the CALURS. Whenthe protests were counted by districts, less than forty percent of freeholders in the Upper and Middle Districts, but more than forty percent of freeholders in the Lower District, of the Canyon Area protested the adoption of the CALURS. Based on those percentages, the Commissioners adopted the CALURSfor the Upper andMiddle Districts of the Canyon Area. MPRI filed acomplaint for injunctive anddeclaratory relief

on September 30, 1994, seeking to invalidate the Commissioners' adoption of, and amendments to, the FCMP and certain zoning regulations adopted thereunder. In answering the complaint, the Commissioners asserted that MPRI lacked standing to bring the lawsuit andwasnot entitled to injunctive or declaratory relief; they also pled the affirmative defenses of lathes andthe statute of limitations.

6The Commissioners moved for summary judgment contending that

lathes precluded MPRIfrom challenging certain of their actions, no genuine issue of material fact existed and they were entitled to judgment asamatter of law onthe nine counts contained in MPRI's complaint. MPRIopposed the Commissioners' summary judgment motion andfiled across-motion for partial summary judgment. Thereafter, the District Court permitted MPRIto file anamended complaint and the Commissioners filed their answer. In March of 1995, the District Court heard oral argument on the parties' summary judgment motions. OnAugust 16, 1995, the District Court granted the Commissioners' motion for summary judgment on issues in the original complaint not amended by the amended complaint and denied MPRI's cross-motion for partial summary judgment. On August 30, 1995, the Commissioners moved for summary judgment onthe remaining issues in the amended complaint. MPRI opposed the motion. After oral argument, a stipulation by the parties that no issues of fact remained and supplementary memoranda, the District Court granted the Commissioners' motion for summary judgment and, thereafter, entered judgment in their favor. MPRIappeals. Additional facts are provided below as necessary for our resolution of the issues before us. STANDARDOFREVIEW Summary judgment is proper whennogenuine issues of material fact exist andthe moving party is entitled to judgment asamatterof law. Rule 56(c), M.R.Civ.P. Wereview adistrict court's grant

of summary judgment de nova, applying the same Rule 56(c), M.R.Civ.P., criteria used bythat court. Jarrett v. Valley Park, Inc. (Mont. 1996), 922P.2d 485, 487, 53St.Rep. 671, 672 (citation omitted). Ordinarily, such a review requires that we first determine whether the moving party met its burden of establishing both the absence of genuine issues of material fact andentitlement to judgment asamatter of law. Jarrett, 922P.2d at 487. In this case, MPRI does not contend that genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment on the Commissioners' first motion andthe parties stipulated to the absence of genuine issues of material fact regarding the Commissioners' second summary judgment motion. We must determine, therefore, whether the District Court erred in concluding that the Commissioners were entitled to summary judgment as amatter of law. Wereview a district court's conclusions of law to determine whether they are correct. & Estate of Brooks (Mont. 1996), 927P.2d 1024, 1026, 53St.Rep. 1263, 1264. DISCUSSION The overall issue on appeal is whether the District Court erred in granting the Commissioners' motions for summary judgment. In resolving that issue, weaddress each subissue raised by MPRI separately below.

a. Did the District Court err in concluding that planning board documents which are readily available to the public need not beonfile at the Clerk's office?

8MPRI argues that, because the CALURS proposal and the

published notice of the September 14, 1994, public hearing regarding it were not on file at the Clerk's office before the Commissioners took action onthem, the zoning regulations adopted thereunder are not valid. The Commissioners contend that 57-5 2131, MCA,does not require that the specified documents bekept at the Clerk's office and, moreover, that they were readily available to the public at the FRDO. At the outset, wenote MPRI's two-sentence "argument" onthis issue, each sentence merely quoting statutory language without analysis or application to the facts of this case. Wecaution counsel that while such a presentation may constitute minimal compliance with the Rule 23(a) (4), M.R.App.P., requirement regarding citation to authorities in support of aparty's legal contentions, it does not suffice to establish the correctness of those contentions. The general operations and conduct of local governments are governed bystatute in Montana. Title 7, Chapter 5, Part 21, MCA, sets out the requirements for conducting county government business. Section 7-5-2129, MCA, requires that boards of county commissioners maintain aminute book, aroad book, afranchise book and awarrant book. All records kept in these four county books must be available for public inspection, free of charge, at the Clerk's office. Section 7-5-2131, MCA. It is clear, under the facts of this case, that of these four books, MPRI's argument could relate only to the minute book, which is arecord of all decisions

9andorders madebythe board of county commissioners at regular and

special meetings. Section 7-5-2129(l), MCA. Wemust determine, then, whether the CALURSor the related notice are "decisions and orders" madebythe Commissioners. The CALURS was drafted by CCIZG and its consultant and presented to the Planning Board, aboard organized to advise the Commissioners onzoning and other land use planning matters, for review. CCIZG andthe Planning Board work with the Commissioners in anadvisory capacity only. They are not part of the board of county commissioners and their decisions are not "orders and decisions" made by the Commissioners as contemplated by § 7-5- 2129(l), MCA. Asaresult, weconclude that §7-s-2131, MCA,does not require that the CALURSproposal bekept at the Clerk's office andopen for public inspection there. Nor does § 7-5-2129, MCA, require that the Commissioners maintain a copy of all published notices relating to their decisions or prospective decisions in the minute book. Such notices are not "orders and decisions" of the board of county commissioners pursuant to §7-5-2129(l), MCA;they are indications tothe public of such decisions andprospective decisions which are separately required bylaw. MPRIadvances noargument that actual decisions or orders of the Commissioners relating to the CALURS

were not properly reflected in the minute book required by §7-S2129(1),MCA,andmaintained in the Clerk's office pursuant to 57- 5-2131, MCA. Thus, weconclude that MPRI has not established a failure to comply with §7-s-2131, MCA.

10MPRI also contends that 55 76-2-205(l) (d) and (5)(c), MCA,

require that the CALURSproposal andthe related notice beonfile for public inspection at the Clerk's office. It did not raise this theory in the District Court, however, andit is well-settled that

wewill not address onappeal issues not presented to the trial court. & Tisher v. Norwest Capital Mgt. &Trust (1993), 260 Mont. 143, 156, 859P.2d 984, 992 (citing Duensing v. Travelers Co. (1993) I 257 Mont. 376, 386, 849 P.2d 203, 209). Therefore, we decline to address this contention. Wehold that the District Court did not err in concluding that planning board documents which are readily available to the public need not beonfile at the Clerk's office. b. Did the District Court err in concluding that freeholder protests were properly counted pursuant to 576-2-205(6), MCA? MPRI contends that the District Court erred in upholding the Clerk's method of counting the GWRcondominium owners as six hundred freeholders entitled to protest, but counting the GWR protest asonly one protest. MPRI maintains that this procedure skewed the results so that less than the statutorily-mandated percentage of freeholders protested, resulting in the adoption of the CALURSfor the Upper andMiddle Districts of the Canyon Area. Rule 23(a) (41, M.R.App.P., requires that anappellate argument contain "the contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, andthe reasons therefor, with citations to the authorities, statutes and pages of the record relied on." MPRI cites to no statute, case, treatise, or other legal authority

11whatsoever in support of its contentions onthis issue. Therefore,

wedecline to address it.

c. Did the District Court err in concluding that 52-6- 109, MCA,prohibited the Clerk from providing MPRIwith alist of freeholder names and addresses? MPRI contends that the Commissioners and their agent, the Clerk, arbitrarily refused to provide it with alist of freeholder

names and addresses. The Commissioners maintain that 52-6-109, MCA,expressly prohibits the Clerk from providing amailing list to anyone during the 576-2-205(5), MCA,protest period. Section 2-6-109(l), MCA,generally provides that: (a) anagency may not distribute or sell for use as amailing list anylist of persons without first securing the permission of those onthe list; and (b) alist of persons prepared by the agency may not be used as a mailing list except by the agency or another agency without first securing the permission of those onthe list. Section Z-6-109(2), MCA,defines "agency" and it is undisputed in this case that the provisions of §2-6-109(l), MCA, apply to the Clerk asanofficer of Flathead County. It also is undisputed that the list of freeholder names and addresses maintained bythe Clerk is a"list" which, pursuant to §2-6-109 (11, MCA,cannot bedistributed, sold orused asamailing list without the permission of all freeholders onthe list. MPRI contends, however, that the nature of its intended use of the list

wasnot discussed whenthe list wasrequested. The record, however, reflects the following testimony bythe GWRmanager during the summary judgment proceedings:

12Tl Q: Had YOU earlier asked her on the telephone

conversation whether or not you could have a list of landowners for purposes of anyprotest? A: Yes, I did. Iasked her specifically, Isays, 1'11 trade you. If youwant mylist, I'll trade you for the list that you have of the upper canyon. It interests me to notify these people that they can protest. ais testimony indicates that MPRI discussed its intended use of the list to "notify" freeholders regarding their protest rights at the time the list was requested. The GWRmanager also testified that he requested the freeholder list so that he could send a "protest form out to every landowner, every freeholder onthe list in the upper canyon area and [he] would not have used it for any other purpose but to notify them of County action against their property." This testimony establishes that the clear intent wasto

use the list as a mailing list to send out forms protesting adoption of the CALURS. Onthe basis of this record, weconclude that §Z-6-109(1) (a), MCA,prohibited the Clerk from providing the list of freeholders to MPRI without securing the statutorilyrequired permission and that MPRI intended to use the list as a mailing list in violation of §2-6-109(l) (b), MCA. MPRIalso contends that the Clerk's refusal to provide it with

a list of freeholder names and addresses violated the protest provisions contained in 576-2-205(6), MCA. Section 76-2-205(6), MCA, provides that "if 40%of the freeholders within the district whose names appear onthe last-completed assessment roll

. have protested the establishment of the district or adoption of the regulations, the board of county commissioners maynot adopt the resolution

. .'I The statute merely sets out the percentage of 13protests required to prevent the Commissioners from adopting a

resolution establishing adistrict or zoning regulations. It does not relate in any way to aproponent or opponent's ability or inability to obtain a list of freeholders on the most recent assessment roll; nor does the Clerk's refusal to provide the list prevent or impair freeholders from filing written protests under §76-Z-205(5) (d), MCA. Weconclude that the Clerk's refusal to provide MPRIwith alist of freeholder names andaddresses did not violate the protest provisions contained in §76-2-205, MCA Finally, MPRI contends that, to the extent 52-6-109, MCA, prohibited the Clerk from providing the list of Canyon Area freeholders, the statute violated its constitutional rights. In particular, MPRI cites to the following sections of Article II of the Montana Constitution: §4, which provides that "[nlo person shall bedenied the equal protection of the laws"; §6, granting Montana citizens the right to petition for redress or to peaceably protest governmental action; s8, granting the public the right to expect governmental agencies to afford areasonable opportunity for citizen participation in the operation of such agencies; and 5 9, providing the public with the right to examine documents. MPRI presents noanalysis of its contentions in this regard within the customary constitutional framework. It merely cites to the sections of the Montana Constitution without providing any rationale or authority under which the statute--or the Clerk's reliance on the statute--violated the referenced constitutional provisions. I'[Wlhen considering the constitutionality of a statute, the constitutionality is presumed andanyone attacking the

14validity of a statute has a heavy burden of proving the

invalidity." Associated Students v. City of Missoula (1993), 261 Mont. 231, 235, 862 P.2.d 380, 382 (citations omitted). MPRI's bare citations to the Montana Constitution donot meet the heavy burden required to prove that §2-6-109, MCA, is constitutionally infirm.Wehold that the District Court did not err in concluding that 52-6-109, MCA, prohibited the Clerk from providing MPRI with a list of freeholder names andaddresses. d. Did the District Court err in concluding that the Commissioners were entitled to judgment as amatter of law onMPRI's claim that the Hungry Horse News and the Bigfork Eagle are not newspapers of general circulation? MPRIargues that certain notices regarding proposed amendments to Flathead County zoning regulations are invalid because they were published in the Bigfork Eagle andthe Hungry Horse News, andthat those newspapers are not "newspapers of general circulation" asa matter of law. The Commissioners contend to the contrary. There is no factual dispute regarding the business operations of these two newspapers. Section 76-2-205, MCA,requires that notices regarding public hearings onproposed zoning regulations andpassage of resolutions of intention to adopt such zoning regulations must be published

once aweek for two weeks in anewspaper of general circulation within the county. While the legislature did not define the term "newspaper of general circulation," this Court has addressed the statutory term onseveral occasions.

15Instate v. Board of County Com'rs (1938), 106Mont. 251, 76

P.2d 648, we set out the criteria for determining whether a newspaper is one of general circulation. "First, that anewspaper of general circulation is not determined bythe number of its subscribers, but bythe diversity of its subscribers. Second, that, even though anewspaper is of particular interest to aparticular class of persons, yet, if it contains news of ageneral character and interest to the community, although the news may be limited in amount, it qualifies as a newspaper of 'general circulation.'" [Citations omitted.1 Board of Countv Com'rs, 76P.2d at 652 (quoting Burak v. Ditson (Iowa 1930), 229N.W. 227, 228). Thefollowing year, weheld that the Bridger Times qualified asanewspaper of general circulation under the Board of County Com'rs criteria because it had been in existence andpublished for twenty-five years; it hadfour pages of general news and advertising printed in its ownplant; and it was distributed throughout the county. Shelley v. Normile (1939), 109 Mont. 117, 124, 94P.2d 206, 210. It is undisputed in this case that the Bigfork Eagle is published once each week at its plant in Bigfork and has been published since 1976. It contains news and advertising of a general character and interest to the communities in the area. Copies of the Bigfork Eagle are delivered to subscribers in Kalispell, Whitefish, Somers, Lakeside, Kila, Hungry Horse, Columbia Falls and Bigfork. Copies are also available at retail outlets in Kalispell, Whitefish, Columbia Falls andBigfork. It also is undisputed that the Hungry Horse Newsis published

once each week at its plant in Columbia Falls and has been 16published in Flathead County since 1946. It contains news and

advertising of ageneral character andinterest to the communities in the area. Copies of the 

### Hungry Horse Newsare delivered to subscribers in Kalispell, Bigfork, Columbia Falls, Coram, Essex, Hungry Horse, Kila, Lake McDonald, Lakeside, Marion, Martin City, Olney, Polebridge, Somers, West Glacier andWhitefish. Copies are also available at retail outlets in Kalispell, Bigfork, Columbia Falls, Coram, Hungry Horse, Lake McDonald, Polebridge, West Glacier andWhitefish. The

### Bigfork Eagle andthe 

### Hungry Horse Newshave subscribers in numerous communities throughout Flathead County and are available at manyFlathead County retail outlets. They carry news of general character and interest to the communities in Flathead County. Thus, they meet the "diversity of subscribers" and "general interest news" criteria set forth In Board of Countv Com'rs, 76 P.2d at 652. Moreover, like the 

### Bridger Times in Shellev, both the 

### Bigfork Eagle and the 

### Hungry Horse Newsare printed in their own plants, have been published in--and distributed throughout--the county for twenty years or more, and contain general newsandadvertising. SeeShellev, 94P.2d at210. In support of its contention that the 

### Bigfork Eagle and the 

### Hungry Horse Newsare not newspapers of general circulation, MPRI advances definitions of "newspapers of general circulation" and principles relating thereto from other jurisdictions. It does not establish that the underlying statutes in those jurisdictions are 17identical, or even similar, to §76-2-205, MCA. Nor does it offer

any explanation or rationale regarding howor whythe holdings in those cases are more appropriate or correct conclusions pursuant to §76-Z-205, MCA, than our holdings in Board of County Com'rs and Shelley. Indeed, MPRIdoes not address this Court's cases onthe issue, except to assert that they are "woefully out of date." We hold that the District Court did not err in concluding that the Commissioners were entitled to judgment as amatter of law on MPRI's claim that the Hungry Horse Newsandthe Bigfork Eagle are not newspapers of general circulation.

e. Did the District Court err in concluding that the zoning regulations were validly adopted under Title 76, Chapter 2, Part 2, MCA? MPRI andthe Commissioners agree that zoning properly can be accomplished under either Part 1or Part 2of Title 76, Chapter 2, MCA. MPRIcontends that Flathead County zoning regulations enacted after 1987 are invalid under either approach. According to MPRI, post-1987 zoning regulations are invalid under Part 1because sixty percent of the freeholders affected did not consent to the prerequisite creation of aplanning and zoning district or the appointment of afive-member zoning commission pursuant to §76-Z101, MCA. Alternatively, MPRI contends that the FCMPis not a comprehensive plan as defined in Part 2 and, therefore, zoning regulations could not have been properly adopted thereunder. The Commissioners maintain that all zoning regulations adopted by Flathead County since 1987have beenvalidly enacted under Part 2, andthat the FCMPis "comprehensive" asdefined in §76-l-601, MCA.
18Weaddress first whether the post-1987 zoning regulations were

validly adopted under Title 76, Chapter 2, Part 2, MCA. Aboard of county commissioners mayadopt zoning regulations for all or parts of its jurisdictional area in accordance with Title 76, Chapter 2, Part 2, MCA, "[flor the purpose of promoting the health, safety, morals, and general welfare of the people in cities andtowns and counties whose governing bodies have adopted

acomprehensive development plan for jurisdictional areas pursuant to chapter 1

. . .'I Section 76-2-201, MCA. Part 6of Chapter 1 discusses master plans and §76-l-601, MCA, specifically sets out five categories of information that may be included in amaster plan: (1) surveys and studies of the area; (2) maps, plats, charts, and descriptive material about the area; (3) reports and recommendations regarding plans for development of the area; (4) long-range development programs for public works projects in the area; and (5) recommendations for the development of trailer courts andmobile homesites. Category 2--maps, plats, charts, and descriptive material--is then broken down into seventeen subcategories that maybe addressed in amaster plan, including land use, streets and highways, public and private utilities, transportation, parks andrecreation, education, andconservation. TheFCMPis alengthy document addressing the people, economy, agriculture, land use, transportation, public facilities and services, parks, recreation andopen space, unit community plans, and implementation of the FCMPfor the affected areas of Flathead County. It includes and discusses most of the subjects which,

19

### under § 76-l-601, MCA, may be included in a comprehensive

development plan. Weconclude that the FCMPis acomprehensive development plan, asdefined in §76-l-601, MCA,andthat zoning regulations maybevalidly adopted thereunder pursuant to Part 2. TheCommissioners presented evidence that all of its ownand the Planning Board's post-1987 zoning actions havebeeninitiated under Part 2. Sevenzoning petitions wereentered into evidence at thefirst summaryjudgment oral argument, all ofwhich specifically requested zoning under Part 2. Resolutions entered into evidence by the Commissioners specifically state that they were adopted pursuant to §76-Z-205, MCA;Part 2. Weconclude, therefore, that the Commissioners' post-1987 zoning regulations were validly enacted under Part 2. Asaresult, weneednot address MPRI's alternative contention that the zoning regulations were not properly adopted under Title 76, Chapter 2,Part 1,MCA. Wehaveconcluded that MPRIhasestablished noerror in the District Court's conclusions of law. Therefore, wehold that the District Court did not err ingranting the Commissioners' motions for summaryjudgment. Affirmed.

20

### WeConcur: