No. 67639 

FILED 

JUL 1 2 2016 

TRACE K. LINDEMAN 

CLERIcOF SUPREME COURT 

BY 

DEPUTY CLERK 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 

MICHAEL LITTLE, A CITIZEN AND 

TAXPAYER OF NEVADA, 

Petitioner, 

vs. 

THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, 

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF 

CARSON CITY; AND THE 

HONORABLE JAMES TODD RUSSELL, 

DISTRICT JUDGE, 

Respondents, 

and 

THE STATE OF NEVADA; THE 

NEVADA GOVERNOR'S OFFICE OF 

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT; STEVEN 

HILL, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS 

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE 

NEVADA GOVERNORS OFFICE OF 

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT; AND 

THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE 

OF NEVADA, 

Real Parties in Interest. 

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS 

This is an original petition for a writ of mandamus challenging 

the district court's order granting partial summary judgment on the 

grounds that the petitioner, a Nevada taxpayer, lacks standing to 

challenge the Nevada Catalyst Fund statutes. 

Petitioner Michael Little filed suit against the State of Nevada 

claiming that its Catalyst Fund violates the Nevada Constitution and that 

he was harmed, both as a taxpayer of the State of Nevada and as a direct 

competitor with Solar City, a beneficiary of the Catalyst Fund. The 

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district court granted in part the State's motion for summary judgment on 

the grounds that Little's alleged status as a Nevada taxpayer does not 

afford him standing to assert a facial challenge to the Catalyst Fund 

statutes. After the district court granted partial summary judgment and 

the filing of this writ, the 2015 Legislature amended the Catalyst Fund 

statutes. 2015 Nev. Stat., ch. 433, § 6, at 2482-83 (amending NRS 

231.1577). The district court has yet to determine whether Little has 

standing as a competitor to challenge the Catalyst Fund as applied to his 

alleged competition with Solar City or the impact of the 2015 amendment 

to NRS 231.1577 on this litigation. 

Although the district court will hold an evidentiary hearing to 

determine the issue of competitor standing, Little petitioned this court for 

a writ of mandamus to overturn the district court's conclusion that he 

lacks standing as a taxpayer and to require the district court to recognize 

taxpayer standing. We conclude that the extraordinary remedy of 

mandamus is not warranted in this case because the district court has not 

yet ruled on Little's standing as a direct competitor and because, as an 

order granting partial summary judgment, the district court's order is 

interlocutory and "subject to revision at any time before the entry of 

judgment adjudicating all the rights and liabilities of all the parties." 

NRCP 54(b). 

Little argues that this court should entertain his writ because 

the issue of taxpayer standing is an issue of first impression. Little 

further argues that this is an issue of public importance because taxpayer 

standing is necessary to hold state governments accountable for their 

actions, particularly when those actions violate the State Constitution. 

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The State, however, argues that mandamus relief is not warranted 

because Little can appeal an adverse decision after final judgment and a 

direct appeal of a final judgment is the preferred remedy at law. We agree 

with the State. 

"A writ of mandamus is available to compel the performance of 

an act that the law requires as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or 

station or to control an arbitrary or capricious exercise of discretion." Int'l 

Game Tech., Inc. v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 124 Nev. 193, 197, 179 

P.3d 556, 558 (2008); see also NRS 34.160. The decision to entertain an 

extraordinary writ petition, such as mandamus, lies within our discretion. 

Libby v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 130 Nev., Adv. Op. 39, 325 P.3d 1276, 

1278 (2014). The petitioner has the "heavy" burden to show that such 

relief is necessary. Poulos v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 98 Nev. 453, 

455, 652 P.2d 1177, 1178 (1982). We will generally refuse to issue an 

extraordinary writ when there is an adequate remedy at law. NRS 

34.170; Oxbow Constr., LLC v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 130 Nev., Adv. 

Op. 86, 335 P.3d 1234, 1238 (2014). 

When a district court enters a partial summary judgment 

order, the party whom the order is entered against may appeal after the 

district court enters a final judgment on the remaining claims if they are 

still aggrieved. State v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court (Ad America, Inc.), 

131 Nev., Adv. Op. 41, 351 P.3d 736, 740 (2015). Writ review may be 

appropriate, however, when the question is an important issue and this 

court's review at an early stage is necessary to clarify the law and avoid 

confusion. Id. We, however, will not exercise mandamus simply to control 

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a district court's "discretionary action, unless discretion is manifestly 

abused or is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously." Merits Incentives, LLC 

v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 127 Nev. 689, 694, 262 P.3d 720, 723 

(2011). The policy behind this hesitation to entertain such writ petitions 

is to promote judicial economy and avoid "piecemeal appellate review." 

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. O'Brien, 129 Nev., Adv. Op. 71, 310 P.3d 581, 

582 (2013). As a general principle, we practice judicial restraint, avoiding 

legal and constitutional issues, if unnecessary to resolve the case at hand. 

Miller v. Burk, 124 Nev. 579, 588-89, 188 P.3d 1112, 1118-19 (2008). 

Here, Little asks this court to intervene before his bench trial 

and direct the district court to find that he can challenge the Catalyst 

Fund statutes as an aggrieved taxpayer and as a direct competitor. If this 

court does not issue the writ, Little may still proceed as a direct 

competitor. He may also, depending on what transpires in district court in 

the course of the evidentiary hearing and the briefing and argument on 

the amendment to NRS 231.1577, persuade the district court to reconsider 

or revise its partial summary judgment order. Extraordinary relief is not 

necessary to allow Little any relief, including preventing Clark County 

from funding his alleged competitor, Solar City. This court does not 

address unnecessary constitutional issues. Id. While Little seems zealous 

in challenging the statutes on their face, justiciability is about a court's 

ability to redress direct injuries, rather than answer unnecessary 

constitutional questions. In this instance, the district court may still 

redress his injury. Therefore, Little has an adequate remedy at law. 

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CkitYtAve 

Cherry C p 

J. 

J. 

Because there exists an adequate remedy at law and judicial 

restraint militates against interlocutory review in this case, we decline to 

reach the parties' arguments on the merits in this matter. Accordingly, we 

ORDER the petition DENIED.' 

C.J. 

-C2lwaket" Parraguirrrres°4 

Hardesty 

Hbons 

Saitta 

cc: Hon. James Todd Russell, District Judge 

NPRI Center for Justice and Constitutional Litigation 

Attorney General/Reno 

Attorney General/Las Vegas 

Legislative Counsel Bureau Legal Division 

Carson City Clerk 

'Because we deny the petition on the grounds that Little has an 

adequate remedy at law, we decline to reach a conclusion on the issue of 

taxpayer standing at this time. Should Little be unable to pursue his 

competitor standing case in the district court or if he loses on the merits, 

he may file a direct appeal and include taxpayer standing as an issue in 

that appeal. Nothing in this order should be construed as limiting Little's 

future appellate rights. 

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