Respondents moved the district court to dismiss. The district court denied 

appellant's motion for summary judgment, and granted respondents' 

motions to dismiss, concluding, among other things, that respondent 

Verise Campbell, Deputy Director of the Nevada Foreclosure Mediation 

Program, was immune from civil liability and that appellant's claims 

against respondent MTC Financial Inc., were barred by claim preclusion 

in light of the earlier unsuccessful quiet title action involving the previous 

owner. This court reviews the district court's dismissal of a complaint de 

novo, accepting appellant's factual allegations as true and drawing all 

factual conclusions in favor of appellants. Buzz Stew, LLC v. City of N. 

Las Vegas, 124 Nev. 224, 227-28, 181 P.3d 670, 672 (2008). 

Appellant first argues that the underlying case should have 

been stayed pending resolution of her Chapter 7 bankruptcy and that the 

order that ultimately resulted in the dismissal of her action was void ab 

initio because it was entered after she notified the court of the pending 

Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. The automatic bankruptcy stay applies to 

judicial action against a debtor, not to actions by a debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 

362(a)(1) (2008); White v. City of Santee (In re White), 186 B.R. 700, 703-04 

(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995); Edwards v. Ghandour, 123 Nev. 105, 111, 159 P.3d 

1086, 1090 (2007), abrogated on other grounds by Five Star Capital Corp. 

v. Ruby, 124 Nev. 1048, 1053-54, 194 P.3d 709, 712-13 (2008). Here, 

appellant initiated the action against respondents and the bankruptcy 

stay provision does not apply. 

Appellant next argues that a default judgment quieting title in 

the previous owner of the property was effective at the time when 

appellant acquired the property, rendering her claim to the property 
superior to all others. The default judgment in that case was set aside 

under NRCP 60(b)(1), however, and we affirmed the subsequent award of 

summary judgment against the previous owner of the property and in 

favor of the holder of the promissory note and the holder of the deed of 

trust. See Thomas v. BAG Home Loans Servicing, LP, Docket No. 56587 

(Order of Affirmance, December 20, 2011). "When a judgment has been 

set aside pursuant to Rule 60(b), the case stands as if that judgment had 

never occurred in the first place." Ditto v. McCurdy, 510 F.3d 1070, 1077 

(9th Cir. 2007). Thus, in this case, we cannot discern any impediment 

generated by the set-aside default judgment to a notice of default being 

recorded against the property, and appellant makes no other cogent 

argument regarding why her interest in the property is not subject to the 

deed of trust at issue. Similarly, after the Foreclosure Mediation Program 

(FMP) issued the foreclosure certificate, a notice of sale could be recorded. 

Therefore, having considered the parties' arguments and the appendices, 

we conclude that the district court properly granted MTC Financial Inc.'s 

motion to dismiss. 

Concerning respondent Verise Campbell, appellant cancelled 

her request for mediation believing that she had superior title to the 

property by virtue of the vacated default judgment. Because appellant 

cancelled mediation, the FMP issued a foreclosure certificate. NRS 

107.086(3), (6); see FMR 8(4). The FMP does not have an independent 

duty to undertake an analysis of the merits of appellant's claims regarding 

the vacated default judgment. Issuing the foreclosure certificate was 

required by NRS 107.086(3) and FMR 8(4) once appellant cancelled 

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mediation. Therefore, we conclude that the district court properly granted 

Verise Campbell's motion to dismiss. 

Accordingly, we 

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED. 1 

cc: Hon. Patrick Flanagan, District Judge 

Terry J. Thomas 

Robison Belaustegui Sharp & Low 

Richard J. Reynolds 

Fennemore Craig Jones Vargas/Las Vegas 

Washoe District Court Clerk 

'Appellant argues for the first time on appeal that she was denied 

the opportunity to file a peremptory challenge against Judge Flanagan. 

Because appellant did not raise this concern at any point in the district 

court, it is not proper for consideration on appeal. Old Aztec Mine, Inc. v. 

Brown, 97 Nev. 49, 52, 623 P.2d 981, 983 (1981) ("A point not urged in the 

trial court, unless it goes to the jurisdiction of that court, is deemed to 

have been waived and will not be considered on appeal."). We decline to 

address appellant's other arguments on appeal because she failed to 

provide any cogent argument or relevant citations to authority in her 

appellate briefs. Edwards v. Emperor's Garden Rest., 122 Nev. 317, 330 

n.38, 130 P.3d 1280, 1288 n.38 (2006). 

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