alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 10.32

March 15, 2002

|    |  |                                                  
|--- |  | -------------------------------------------------
|Re: |  | Long-Term Stay-On Performance Incentive Payment..

Dear Steve:

This
letter (the "Agreement") sets forth the revised terms and conditions pursuant to which Station Casinos, Inc. (the
"Company") has decided to award you a Long-Term Stay-On Performance Incentive Payment (the "LTSO
Payment"). This Agreement supercedes and replaces that letter agreement dated June 19, 2001 (the "Former Agreement")
between the Company and you regarding the LTSO Payment, and the Former Agreement shall no longer be of any force or effect.

---

| |  | STATION CASINOS, INC.,a Nevada corporation
| |  | ------------------------------------------
| |  |                                           
| |  | By:                                       
| |  |                                           

By signing below, you hereby acknowledge and agree to all of the foregoing terms and conditions of this Agreement.

|Agreed to and Accepted By: |  | 
|-------------------------- |  | 
|                           |  | 
|Stephen L. Cavallaro       |  | 

2

---

QuickLinks
EXHIBIT 32


                          SECTION 1350 CERTIFICATIONS

                  CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION
                1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE
                           SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


     In connection with the annual  report of ICrystal,  Inc. (the "Company")
on Form  10-KSB/A  for the  period  ended  December 31,  2003 as filed  with the
Securities and Exchange  Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"),  I, Larry
J. Hrabi, CEO, Chairman and CFO of the Company,  certify,  pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
section 1350, as adopted  pursuant to Section 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of
2002, that based on my knowledge:

     1. The Report fully  complies  with the  requirements  of Section  13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.


Date: May 13, 2004


/s/ LARRY J. HRABI
______________________________________
Larry J. Hrabi
CEO,
Chairman and CFO





A SIGNED  ORIGINAL OF THIS WRITTEN  STATEMENT  REQUIRED BY SECTION 906, OR OTHER
DOCUMENT AUTHENTICATING, ACKNOWLEDGING, OR OTHERWISE ADOPTING THE SIGNATURE THAT
APPEARS IN TYPED FORM WITHIN THE  ELECTRONIC  VERSION OF THIS WRITTEN  STATEMENT
REQUIRED  BY  SECTION  906,  HAS BEEN  PROVIDED  TO  ICRYSTAL, INC. AND WILL BE
RETAINED  BY  ICRYSTAL, INC.  AND  FURNISHED  TO THE  SECURITIES  AND  EXCHANGE
COMMISSION OR ITS STAFF UPON REQUEST.
[Federal Register Volume 61, Number 91 (Thursday, May 9, 1996)]
[Notices]
[Page 21166]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 96-11571]



-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
[Docket No. ER96-1195-000]


ANP Energy Direct Company; Notice of Issuance of Order

May 3, 1996.
    On February 27, 1996, ANP Energy Direct Company (ANP) submitted for 
filing a rate schedule under which ANP will engage in wholesale 
electric power and energy transactions as a marketer. ANP also 
requested waiver of various Commission regulations. In particular, ANP 
requested that the Commission grant blanket approval under 18 CFR Part 
34 of all future issuances of securities and assumptions of liability 
by ANP.
    On May 1, 1996, pursuant to delegated authority, the Director, 
Division of Applications, Office of Electric Power Regulation, granted 
requests for blanket approval under Part 34, subject to the following:
    Within thirty days of the date of the order, any person desiring to 
be heard or to protest the blanket approval of issuances of securities 
or assumptions of liability by ANP should file a motion to intervene or 
protest with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First 
Street, NE, Washington, D.C. 20426, in accordance with Rules 211 and 
214 of the Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure (18 CFR 385.211 
and 385.214).
    Absent a request for hearing within this period, ANP is authorized 
to issue securities and assume obligations or liabilities as a 
guarantor, endorser, surety, or otherwise in respect of any security of 
another person; provided that such issuance or assumption is for some 
lawful object within the corporate purposes of the applicant, and 
compatible with the public interest, and is reasonably necessary or 
appropriate for such purposes.
    The Commission reserves the right to require a further showing that 
neither public nor private interests will be adversely affected by 
continued approval of ANP's issuances of securities or assumptions of 
liability.
    Notice is hereby given that the deadline for filing motions to 
intervene or protests, as set forth above, is May 31, 1996.
    Copies of the full text of the order are available from the 
Commission's Public Reference Branch, 888 First Street, NE, Washington, 
D.C. 20426.
Linwood A. Watson, Jr.,
Acting Secretary.
[FR Doc. 96-11571 Filed 5-8-96; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-M
#### STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Clarence TAYLOR, Defendant/Appellant. Clarence TAYLOR, Movant/Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent.

Nos. 61184, 62342.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division One.

May 18, 1993.

Elizabeth Haines, St. Louis, for appellant.

Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen., Michael J. Runzi, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.

Before AHRENS, P.J., and REINHARD and CRIST, JJ.

*434ORDER

PER CURIAM.

In this jury-tried case, defendant appeals from his conviction of second-degree burglary in violation of § 569.170 RSMo 1986. Defendant also appeals from the denial, without an evidentiary hearing, of his Rule 29.15 motion for postconviction relief. Defendant was sentenced as a prior and persistent offender to six years’ imprisonment.

No jurisprudential purpose would be served by a written opinion. However, the parties have been furnished with a memorandum opinion for their information only, setting forth the facts and reasons for this order.

The judgments of the trial court and motion court are affirmed in accordance with Rules 30.25(b) and 84.16(b).
#### In the Matter of Keith S. Ligreci, as Sergeant of the Town of Clay Police Department, Petitioner, v Owen P. Honors, Sr., as Commissioner of Public Safety of the Town of Clay, et al., Respondents.

Determination unanimously annulled on the law without costs, petition granted and matter remitted to respondent Town Supervisor for further proceedings, in accordance with the following memorandum: Petitioner, a Town of Clay police officer, appeals from the determination of Patrick D. DiDomenico, Town of Clay Supervisor, which demoted him from the rank of sergeant to patrolman. Petitioner contends that, because the Town Supervisor did not have a copy of the hearing transcript prior to rendering his determination, the Town Supervisor failed to review the record independently (Civil Service Law §75 [2]; McKinney’s Uncons Laws of NY § 891 [L 1940, ch 834]) and his determination must be annulled. Petitioner’s contention has merit *(see, Matter of Wallace v Murphy,*21 NY2d 433; *Matter of Vano v McGuire,*70 AD2d 540). Unless the failure to provide the transcript can be cured, the determination must be annulled *(see, Matter of Fraccola v City of Utica,*135 AD2d 1112, *Iv denied,*72 NY2d 807, *cert denied*489 US 1053).

There is no dispute that the Town Supervisor did not have the transcript at the time he made his determination on July 31, 1989. The evidence indicates that the earliest it could have been received was August 28, 1989, 28 days after the determination was made. In an affidavit, the Town Supervisor avers that he had reviewed the statement of charges, petitioner’s answer, hearing exhibits, and the Hearing Officer's findings and recommendations prior to making his determination and that "a reading of the entire record including the trial testimony only adds further credence to the merits of the action taken”. That affidavit was dated December 12, 1989, however, and was submitted in answer to the petition herein. The *1011circumstances thus are unlike those in *Matter of Fraccola (supra),*and we are unable to conclude that the Town Supervisor had sufficient evidence to make an informed and independent judgment at the time he made his determination *(see, Matter of Wallace v Murphy,*21 NY2d 433, *supra; Matter of Taub v Pirnie,*3 NY2d 188). The matter must therefore be submitted for consideration of the entire record.

In view of the foregoing, we need not decide petitioner’s remaining contentions. (Article 78 proceeding transferred by order of Supreme Court, Onondaga County, Reagan, J.) Present—Doerr, J. P., Denman, Balio, Lawton and Lowery, JJ.
United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit 

___________________________

No. 20-1268

___________________________ 

United States of America

 Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Christian Nero Copeland

 Defendant - Appellant

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the District of Nebraska - Omaha

____________ 

Submitted: November 16, 2020

 Filed: December 31, 2020 

[Unpublished]

____________ 

Before BENTON, ERICKSON, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges. 

____________

PER CURIAM.

Christian Nero Copeland pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute 

crack cocaine, discharging a firearm during a drug trafficking crime, and forfeiture 

of currency and a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), (d); 21 U.S.C. 
-2-

§§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1), 853; and 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c). The district court1 sentenced 

him to 60 months in prison and five years of supervised release. After serving his 

sentence, he violated the conditions of his supervised release. The court revoked his 

release, sentencing him to 18 months in prison and five years of supervised release. 

He appeals. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court affirms. 

Copeland claims the district court failed to properly weigh the sentencing 

factors and imposed an unreasonable sentence. This court reviews “a district court’s 

revocation sentence using the same standards applied to initial sentencing 

decisions.” United States v. Parker, 669 Fed. Appx. 323, 324 (8th Cir. 2016). “A 

sentence within the Guidelines range is accorded a presumption of substantive 

reasonableness on appeal.” United States v. Perkins, 526 F.3d 1107, 1110 (8th Cir. 

2008).

Copeland believes the district court abused its discretion “when it failed to 

consider the excess time that Copeland had already served for his original offense 

and placed punishment over the rehabilitative goals that underly supervised release.” 

This argument is without merit. Imposing a within-guidelines sentence, the district 

court considered each of the § 3553(a) factors, especially the fact that Copeland 

“pose[d] a danger to society.” See United States v. Franklin, 397 F.3d 604, 607 (8th 

Cir. 2005) (“[E]vidence that the district court was aware of the relevant § 3553(a) 

factors required to be considered can be inferred from the record.”). The district 

court has “wide latitude to weigh the section 3553(a) factors in each case and assign 

some factors greater weight than others in determining an appropriate sentence.” 

United States v. Campbell, 976 F.3d 775, 778 (8th Cir. 2020). “The mere fact that a 

1

The Honorable Laurie Smith Camp, United States District Judge for the 

District of Nebraska, now deceased.
-3-

court could have weighed the sentencing factors differently does not amount to an 

abuse of discretion.” Id.

* * * * * * *

 

The judgment is affirmed.

______________________________
#### Lester COBB, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent.

No. 69312.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division One.

Sept. 24, 1996.

Raymund J. Capelvotich, Asst. Public Defender, St. Louis, for appellant.

Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen., Jill C. LaHue, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.

Before DOWD, P.J., and REINHARD and GARY M. GAERTNER, JJ.

*ORDER*

PER CURIAM.

Appellant, Lester Cobb, appeals from the judgment of Jefferson County Circuit Court denying his Rule 24.035 motion without an evidentiary hearing. We affirm.

We have reviewed the briefs of the parties and the legal file and find the judgment is not clearly erroneous. As an extended opinion would serve no jurisprudential purpose, we affirm pursuant to Rule 84.16(b). A memorandum, solely for the use of the parties here involved, has been provided explaining the reasons for our decision.
EXHIBIT 23.1

               CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT

         We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration
Statement on Form S-8, SEC File No. 333-135197, of Spare Backup, Inc. and the
related prospectuses of our audit report dated March 30, 2007 with respect to
the consolidated balance sheet at December 31, 2006 and the consolidated
statements of operations, shareholders' equity and cash flows of Spare Backup,
Inc. and its subsidiaries for the year ended December 31, 2006 appearing in the
Form 10-KSB for the year ended December 31, 2006.


/s/ Sherb & Co., LLP
Certified Public Accountants
March 30, 2007
Exhibit 32
 CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
  
    
    The Annual Report of the Company on Form 10-K for the period ended
June 30, 2009, fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
Section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
    
    The information contained in such report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operation of the Company.
  /s/ John J. HaleyJohn J. HaleyPresident and Chief Executive Officer/s/ Roger F. MillayRoger F. MillayVice President and Chief Financial Officer
EXHIBIT 32.2

                                MMC ENERGY, INC.
    CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of MMC Energy, Inc. (the "Company") on
Form 10-QSB for the period ended June 30, 2006 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Denis Gagnon, Chief
Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,
as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been
provided to MMC Energy, Inc. and will be retained by MMC Energy, Inc. and
furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

August 14, 2006


                                        /S/ DENIS GAGNON
                                        -------------------------------
                                        DENIS GAGNON
                                        CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
Exhibit
        32.1
 
 CERTIFICATION
        PURSUANT TO
 18
        U.S.C.
        ss.1350,
 AS
        ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
 SECTION
        906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
 
 In
        connection with the Annual Report of Q Comm International, Inc. (the"Company")
        on Form 10-KSB/A for the period ended December 31, 2004 as filed with the
        Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") on the date hereof (the "Report"),
        I,
        Michael D. Keough, Chief Executive Officer of the Company,certify, pursuant
        to
        18 U.S.C. ss.1350, as adopted pursuant to ss.906 of theSarbanes-Oxley Act
        of
        2002, that:
 
 (1)
              The
                  Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
                  15(d) of
                  the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
                  and
 
 (2)
              The
                  information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
                  respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
                  the
                  Company.
 
 A
        signed
        original of this written statement has been provided to the Company and will
        be
        retained by the Company and furnished to the SEC or its staff upon
        request.
 
 
 /s/
        Michael D. Keough
 
 Michael
        D. Keough
 Chief
        Executive Officer
 
 August
        10, 2005
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICER
PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

The undersigned, Hak Jin Kim, the Chief Executive Officer and Principal Financial Officer of Power Air Corporation (the "Company"), hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to his knowledge, the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the three months ended December 31, 2009, fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and that the information contained in the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q fairly presents in all material respects the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

Date: February 16, 2010

By: /s/ Hak Jin KimHak Jin Kim
President, Secretary, Chief Executive Officer, Chief Financial Officer and a director



A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signatures that appear in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906, has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

__________
EXHIBIT 32.1


                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the Annual Report of Beacon Power Corporation (the "Company")
on Form  10-K  for the  period  ending  December  31,  2003 as  filed  with  the
Securities  and Exchange  Commission  on the date hereof (the  "Report"),  I, F.
William Capp, Chief Executive  Officer of the Company,  certify,  pursuant to 18
U.S.C.  section 1350, as adopted  pursuant to section 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The  information  contained in the Report fairly  presents,  in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



                                /s/ F. William Capp
                                F. William Capp
                                Chief Executive Officer

                                March 30, 2004
COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-16-00406-CR

BILLY JOE ARMSTRONG, JR. 

A/K/A BILLY JOE ARMSTRONG 

A/K/A BILLY ARMSTRONG A/K/A 

BRADLEY NELSON

APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE

----------

FROM THE 355TH DISTRICT COURT OF HOOD COUNTY

TRIAL COURT NO. CR13583

----------

MEMORANDUM OPINION1

----------

Appellant Billy Joe Armstrong, Jr. appeals his conviction for theft in an 

amount less than $1,500. See Act of May 9, 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., ch. 120, § 1

 

1See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
2

2011 Tex. Gen. Laws 609 (amended 2015) (current version at Tex. Penal Code 

§ 31.03 (e)(3)).

Armstrong’s court-appointed appellate counsel filed a motion to withdraw 

as counsel and a brief in support of that motion. See Anders v. California, 386

U.S. 738, 744–45, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 1400 (1967). Counsel’s brief and motion meet 

the requirements of Anders v. California by presenting a professional evaluation 

of the record demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds for relief. Id. 

Armstrong had the opportunity to file a pro se brief and has done so; the State 

has not filed a brief.

Once an appellant’s court-appointed attorney files a motion to withdraw on 

the ground that the appeal is frivolous and fulfills the requirements of Anders, this 

court is obligated to undertake an independent examination of the record. See

Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Mays v. State, 

904 S.W.2d 920, 922–23 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1995, no pet.). Only then may 

we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 82–

83, 109 S. Ct. 346, 351 (1988).

We have carefully reviewed the record, counsel’s brief, and appellant’s 

response. We agree with counsel that this appeal is wholly frivolous and without 

merit; we find nothing in the record that might arguably support the appeal. See

Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); see also
3

Meza v. State, 206 S.W.3d 684, 685 n.6 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Accordingly, we 

grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

/s/ Bonnie Sudderth

BONNIE SUDDERTH

CHIEF JUSTICE

PANEL: SUDDERTH, C.J.; WALKER and MEIER, JJ. 

DO NOT PUBLISH

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

DELIVERED: March 1, 2018