### RECORD IMPOUNDED

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2764- 22

NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY, Plaintiff-Respondent,

v. S.A.S. (deceased), Defendant,

and D.W., Defendant-Appellant.

___________________________ IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF Z.S.S., a minor.

___________________________

Submitted May 7, 2024

– Decided May 14, 2024 Before Judges Puglisi and Haas.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court. " Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parti es in the case and its use in other cases is limite d. R. 1:36- 3.2 A- 2764

- 22 On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey , Chancery Division, Family Part, Essex County, Docket No. FG- 07

- 0024 -22. Jennifer Nicole Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Marc D. Pereira, Designated Counsel, on t he briefs ). Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Janet Greenberg Cohen, Assistant Attorn ey General, of counsel; Meaghan Goulding, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). Jennifer Nicole Sellitti, Public Defender, Law Guardian, attorney for minor (Meredith Alexis Pollo ck, Deputy Public Defender, of counsel; David B. Valent in, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant D.W. 1 is the biological father of Z.S.S. 2 Defendant appeals from the April 24, 2023 judgment of guardianship te rminating his parental rights

to the child. Defendant contends that the Division of Child Protection and Permanency (Division) failed to prove the first, se cond, and third prongs of

N.J.S.A. 30:4C -15.1(a) by clear and convincing evidence. The Law Guardian supports the termination on appeal as it did before the trial court.

1 We refer to the adult parties and the child by init ials to protect their privacy. R. 1:38 -3(d)(12).

2 Z.S.S.'s biological mother, S.A.S. passed away in 2021.3 A- 2764

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Based on our review of the record and applicable l aw, we are satisfied that the evidence in favor of the guardianship petition overwhelmingly supports the trial court's decision to terminate defendant's par ental rights. Accordingly, we affirm substantially for the reasons set forth by t he trial court in its thorough written decision rendered on April 24, 2023. We add the following comments. As the trial date approached, defendant stopped at tending court proceedings and failed to remain in contact with hi s attorney. As a result, the Division's attorney asked if the trial could "proceed virtually" as a number of the pre-trial conferences already had under the existing C ovid-19 protocol. The court stated it had "no problem with that, as long as everybody else agrees." Defendant's attorney replied, "I consent." The Law Guardian said he "consent[ed] as well." As a result, the April 5, 2 023 trial was conducted using Zoom, which is a video-conferencing platform. In Point II of his appellate brief, and despite his attorney's explicit consent to the virtual proceeding, defendant argues for the first time that the trial was "constitutionally deficient" because "no accommodat ion was provided to [defendant] in order to enable [his] meaningful par ticipation in his trial." This argument lacks merit. See R. 2:11 -3(e)(1)(E).4 A- 2764

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Contrary to defendant's unsupported contention that there was "no evidence that [he] knew how to access Zoom, would u nderstand the significance of an email with a Zoom link, or had the technologi cal or financial capability to access a computer to make use of a Zoom link[,]" de fendant had already participated in several pre-trial conferences that were conducted using Zoom. Defendant never complained of any difficulty in acc essing the videoconferencing platform in any of those proceedings. Moreover, defendant's attorney made opening and closing statements on his behalf, challenged the Division's evidence as needed, and thoroughly cross-examined both of the

Division's witnesses. Therefore, defendant's trial comported with all due process requirement s. At the trial, the Division presented overwhelming e vidence that established, by clear and convincing evidence, all four statutory prongs outlined in N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a). In its thorough decisio n, the trial court concluded that termination of defendant's parental rights was in Z.S.S.'s best interests, and fully explained the basis for each of its determina tions. The scope of our review of a trial court's decision to terminate parental rights is limited. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Ser vs. v. F.M., 211 N.J. 420,

448 -49 (2012). "Because of the family courts' special jurisdi ction and expertise5 A- 2764

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in family matters," we accord deference to the tria l court's fact-finding and the conclusions that flow logically from those findings of fact. Cesare v. Cesare , 154 N.J. 394, 413 (l998). We are bound by those fa ctual findings so long as they are supported by sufficient credible evidence. N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 279 (2007). The trial court's opinion tracks the requirements o f N.J.S.A. 30:4C15.1(a), including the 2021 amendments to that stat ute, 3 and is supported by

substantial and credible evidence in the record. F.M ., 211 N.J. at 448-49. After appraising the record in light of the findings of f act contained in the court's decision, we find nothing that requires our interve ntion. The trial court carefully reviewed the relevant evidence and fully explained its reasons in a logical and forthright fashion. Children like Z.S.S. are entitled to a permanent, s afe, and secure home. We acknowledge "the need for permanency of placemen ts by placing limits on the time for a birth parent to correct conditions i n anticipation of reuniting with

the child." N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. C. S., 367 N.J. Super. 76, 111 (App. Div. 2004). As public policy increasingly fo cuses on a child's need for permanency, the emphasis has "shifted from protract ed efforts for reunification

3 See L. 2021, c. 154.6 A- 2764

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with a birth parent to an expeditious, permanent pl acement to promote the child's well-being." Ibid. That is because "[a] child cannot be held prisoner of the rights of others, even those of his or her parents. Children have their own rights, including the right to a permanent, safe and stable placement." Ibid. In summarizing the bases for its decision, the tria l court stated: The evidence shows that substantively, [defendant] is not committed to [Z.S.S.]. [Defendant] did not complete any of the scheduled psychological evaluations. He failed to consistently visit [Z.S. S.] or maintain contact with the Division such that he cou ld participate in psychological or bonding evaluations in order for an expert to opine on the quality of his relationship with [Z.S.S.]. [Defendant] had expres sed a desire to voluntarily surrender his parental righ ts to [Z.S.S.] however [he] did not follow through with t his stated desire or make meaningful efforts to show he wanted to parent [Z.S.S.]. Despite the length of t ime [Z.S.S.] has been in placement and the opportunitie s [defendant] has been given to become a stable paren t, he has failed to do so. There is no evidence that [defendant] has a stable home for [Z.S.S.] to live in. [Z.S.S.] has multiple special needs which, by all accounts, are being met thoroughly by [the resource parent]. Her home is the only one [Z.S.S.] has eve r known. [Defendant] has never parented [Z.S.S.] or even visited him in person. [Z.S.S.] has been removed from his parents for almo st three years. [Defendant] has visited him a handful of times since June 2021 and all visits were virtual. He has not demonstrated any progress towards stability himself since his release from incarceration nearly two7 A- 2764

- 22 years ago. To force [Z.S.S.] to wait for a specula tive chance at reunification is not in his best interest s. Freeing [Z.S.S.] for adoption will allow him the opportunity to get the permanency he so desperately needs and deserves particularly in light of the mul titude of services he will not doubt require to address hi s medical needs. We agree with the trial court that any further del ay of permanent placement would not be in the child's best interest s. Affirmed.