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******************************************************VENDRELLAv

. ASTRIAB FAMILYLTD. PARTNERSHIP—CONCURRENCE ZARELLA, J., with whom VERTEFEUILLE, J., joins, concurring. I agree with the majority that, for reasons of public policy, this court should adopt the rule that ‘‘the owner or keeper of a domestic1 animal has a duty to take reasonable steps to prevent injuries that are foreseeable because the animal belongs to a [species
or breed]2

. . . that is naturally inclined to cause such injuries

. . . [and that] the owner may be held liable for negligence ifhe or she fails to take such reasonable steps and an injury results.’’ (Footnotes added.) I do not agree, however, that ‘‘the [evidence presented]

. . . created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the

. . . injury [sustained by the plaintiffAnthonyJohn Vendrella] was foreseeable because horses have anaturalpropensityto bite.’’ The naturalpropensity ofhorses to nip and bite was recognized by every witness who gavetestimonyonthe subjectduringthe summaryjudgment proceedings, and, in any event, it is a matter of
common knowledge. Accordingly, because courts can take judicial notice of matters of common knowledge, the trial court should take judicial notice of the fact that horses have a natural propensity to nip and bite, and leave for the jury the more limited question of whether the defendants, Astriab Family Limited Partnership and Timothy D. Astriab, in light of this knowledge and their knowledge of Scuppy’s3 past behavior, took reasonable precautions to prevent Scuppy from causing foreseeable harm.
I begin by observing that the present case does not involve a wild animal or a domesticated animal that the owner had reason to know possessed dangerous propensities abnormal to its species. Rather, Scuppy belongs to a species that is not abnormally dangerous. Furthermore, Scuppy never demonstrated any dangerous propensities while in the defendants’ possession. Thus, in defining the question that should be submitted to the jury, this court should rely in part for guidance
on the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which speaks directlytothe liabilityofan ownerinthis circumstance. See, e.g., Allen v. Cox, 285 Conn. 603, 606, 615–17, 942 A.2d 296 (2008) (relying on Restatement [Second] of Torts to determine scope of defendants’ liability for injuries caused by their cat).
Section 518 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides: ‘‘Except for animal trespass, one who possesses or harbors a domestic animal that he does not know orhave reason to knowto be abnormally dangerous, is subject to liability for harm done by the animal if, but only if

. . . (b) he is negligent in failing to prevent the harm.’’ 3 Restatement (Second), Torts § 518, p. 30 (1977).
Comment (e) explains that § 518 ‘‘is applicable tothose domestic animals ofa class that can be confined tothepremisesoftheirkeepersorotherwisekeptunder constant control without seriously affecting their usefulness and which are not abnormally dangerous. Although the utility of these animals is sufficient to justify their being kept without risk of

. . . strict liability

. . . many of them are recognizably likely to do substantial harm while out of control and, therefore, their keepers are under a duty to exercise reasonable
care to have them under a constant and effective control.’’ Id., comment (e), p. 31.
Comment (f) further explains that ‘‘[t]he amount of
care that the keeper of a domestic animal is required to exercise in its custody is commensurate with the character ofthe animal.’’ Id., comment (f), p. 31. Comment (g) adds that ‘‘the characteristics that are normal to its class are decisive, and one who keeps the animal is required to know the characteristics.’’ Id., comment (g), p. 31. Finally, in discussing domesticated animals that may become dangerous in particular circumstances, comment (h) provides that ‘‘[o]ne who keeps a domestic animal that possesses only those dangerous propensities that are normal to its class is required to know its normal habits and tendencies. He is therefore required to realize that even ordinarily gentle animals are likely to be dangerous under particular circumstances and to exercise reasonable care to prevent foreseeable harm.’’ Id., comment (h), pp. 31–32.
In my view, the natural propensity of horses, which
are not abnormally dangerous animals, to nip and bite
as aconsequence oftheirnaturallyinquisitive orplayful disposition is so widely known that the trial court should take judicial notice of that fact and limit the questionsubmittedtothejurytowhetherthe defendant took reasonable steps to prevent Scuppy from causing foreseeable harm. ‘‘To takejudicial notice is afunction, and to apply it to the decision of causes a right, which appertains to every court ofjustice, from the lowest to the highest.

. . . The true concept ofwhat isjudicially known is that it is something which is already in the court’s possession or, at any rate, is so accessible that it is unnecessary and therefore time wasting to require evidence of it.

. . . Judicial notice, therefore, in its appropriate field, meets the objective of establishing facts to which the offer ofevidence would normally be directed.

. . . The underlying theory is that proof by evidence concerning a proposition may be dispensed with where the court isjustified, by general considerations, in declaring the truth of the proposition without requiring evidence from the party.

. . . This theory goesnofurther, however, thantomeanthattheproposition is taken as true without an offer of proof by the party who should ordinarily have offered it. Judicial notice of the proposition is in no sense conclusive,and the opponent is not prevented from disputing it by evidence ifhe believes it to be disputable.

. . . Matters whichmayproperlybejudiciallynoticedinthiswayare those which cometo the knowledge ofmengenerallyin the course of the ordinary experience of life or those matters which are generally accepted by mankind as true and are capable ofready and unquestionable demonstration.

. . . Thus, facts may be judicially noticed which are so notorious that the production ofevidence would be unnecessary, or which the judicial function supposes the judge to be familiar with, in theory at least, or which, although they are neither notorious
nor bound to be judicially known, are capable of such instant and unquestionable demonstration, if desired, that no party would think of imposing a falsity on the tribunal in the face of an intelligent adversary.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State

v. Tomanelli, 153 Conn. 365, 368–69, 216 A.2d 625 (1966).
This court has further statedthatmatters ofcommon knowledge on which judicial notice may be taken are limited to ‘‘those well substantiated facts that are obvious to the general community.’’ State v. Padua, 273 Conn. 138, 193, 869A.2d 192 (2005) ( Katz, J., dissenting and concurring). ‘‘Although the concept of common knowledge plays asignificantrole in ourjurisprudence, this courtneverexplicitlyhasdefineditsmeaning. Similarly, despite its universal importance, very few courts outside Connecticuthave endeavoredtoprovide astandard by which to determine when a matter rises to the level of common knowledge.

. . . The few jurisdictions to do so have cited the definition set forth in various editions of Black’s Law Dictionary.

. . . According to the [eighth] edition of that dictionary,
commonknowledgeisdefinedasa‘ factthatissowidely knownthat acourtmayacceptit astrue withoutproof.’

. . . Black’s Law Dictionary (8th Ed. 2004).4 In order for something to be considered a fact, it must, at the very least, generally be accepted as true and have a basis in reality. See id. (defining ‘fact’ as ‘[s]omething that actually exists; an aspect of reality’). Therefore,
common knowledge is not tantamount to a common belief that may be nothing more than a perception grounded in folklore, not reality.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; footnote added.) State v. Padua, supra, 193–94 (

Katz, J., dissenting and concurring).
Mindful of these principles, I would conclude that the natural propensity of horses to nip and bite is a matter of common knowledge. Accordingly, the trial court should take judicial notice of this fact and not submit it to the jury. Taking judicial notice of the habits and characteristics of domestic animals is not unusual. In fact, it has happenedquite ofteninotherjurisdictionsandhasbeen done inthis state, aswell. Forexample, this courtnotedin Baldwin v. Ensign, 49 Conn. 113 (1881), that ‘‘[t]he propensity of colts and of horses generally when at liberty in the highway to run and gambol, and to annoy and excite other horses, and their liability to cause damage in various ways, are so well known that they need only be mentioned.’’ Id., 117. The court subsequently added that ‘‘the natural playfulness of

. . . [colts] maybe under some circumstances as dangerous
as a positive vice.’’ Id., 118. Thereafter, in Bischoffv. Cheney, 89 Conn. 1, 92 A. 660 (1914), this court effectively took judicial notice of the fact that cats as a species are harmless when it concluded that ‘‘[t]he cat isnotofaspeciesofdomesticanimalsnaturallyinclined to mischief, such as, for example, cattle

. . . . The cat’s disposition is kindly and docile, and by nature it is one of the most tame and harmless of all domestic animals.’’ Id., 5. Similarly, the trial court should take judicial notice that horses as a species have a natural propensity to bitebecausetheoverwhelmingmajorityofpeopleknow from their own experience and from the experience of others, as reported in the media and otherwise, that horses have a natural propensity to nip and bite and may occasionally do so when they come into close contact with humans. Taking judicial notice of the fact that horses have a natural propensity to nip and bite also is consistent withthe decisions ofmanyotherjurisdictionsthathave taken judicial notice of, or described as ‘‘a matter of
commonknowledge,’’thenaturalpropensitiesofhorses to nip, bite, kick, or engage in otherplayful, inquisitive,
orinadvertentbehaviorthat, due to their sheersize and weight, may be harmful or dangerous to persons in close proximity. See, e.g., Weaver v. National Biscuit Co., 125 F.2d 463, 465 (7th Cir. 1942) (‘‘[a]ll men know that a horse which has been stabled and well-fed will, when turned out, run and plunge, and become dangerous in the midst of people; all horses are, when loose,
more or less dangerous on sidewalks and streets and all men knowthis’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]); Pool v. Clark, 207 Ark. 635, 637, 182 S.W.2d 217 (1944) (‘‘[i]t is a well-known propensity of livestock, such as horses, cattle, sheep and other domestic animals to graze upon, trample down and destroy grass and other growing crops’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]); Cooper v. Oregon Short Line Railroad Co., 45 Idaho 313, 323, 262 P. 873 (1927) (‘‘The court can takejudicial notice of the habits and propensities of animals.

. . . Itisamatterofcommonknowledgethathorses, strange to each other, frequently fight when brought into close contact. They, when unused to railroad transportation, become restive, excited and frightened in such surroundings.’’ [Citationsomitted.]); Williamsv.Hawkins, 304 So. 2d 75, 77 (La. App. 1974) (‘‘[a]llegations ofbeing ‘high strung’ or ‘skittish’ and testimony that the horse
was acting up could not possibly be interpreted as a‘dangerous propensity [of that particular horse],’ especially when considered in light of the common knowledge that agreat manyhorses attimes are skittish, high strung, and act up’’), appeal denied, 307 So. 2d 373 (La. 1975); Tamburello v. Jaeger, 176 So. 2d 707, 709 (La. App. 1965) (‘‘It is a matter of common knowledge that all horses have [the] capacity [to cause injury by kicking]; and there are certain inherent dangers in handling horses, such as being stepped on while currying, feeding, harnessing, or while preparing to mount. There is the danger of being kicked or otherwise injured by a horse subjected to sudden excitement or fear; the danger ofbeing kicked orbitten when one disturbs ahorse while eating. It is also a matter of common knowledge that some horses are by nature more gentle or more nervous or fearful than others. In other words

. . . horses have certain characteristics in common

. . . .’’), aff’d, 249 La. 25, 184 So. 2d 544 (1966); Simonds

v. Maine Telephone & Telegraph Co., 104 Me. 440, 442, 72 A. 175 (1908) (‘‘[i]t is common knowledge that all horses

. . . are liable to be frightened by any unaccustomed

. . . appearances and noises in unaccustomed situations; that they are susceptible to fright from the mosttrivialthings;thattheirvagariesareunforeseeable; and that it is practically impossible to guard against them’’); Fraumeni v. Aleppo Temple Shriners Activities, Inc., Massachusetts Superior Court, Docket No. 950204 (Mass. Super. April 23, 1997) (‘‘It is [common knowledge and] uncontroverted that horses have anatural dangerous propensity without regard to conditioning ortraining. [Theplaintiff] himselfassertedthateven with the proper care, horses have apropensity to buck and that ‘you can never depend on them.’ ’’); Rosenthal

v. Hill TopRidingAcademy, Inc., 261 Minn. 88, 92, 110 N.W.2d 854 (1961) (It was entirely proper that ‘‘[t]he trial court tookjudicial notice, ‘as a matter ofcommon knowledge, that some horses shy at traffic and some horses don’t.’

. . . A reasonable man is assumed to have such knowledge of the habits of animals as is customary in his community. For instance, he should know that certain objects are likely to frighten horses. It is also a matter ofcommon knowledge, which it may be assumed that he knows, that horses are anxious to return to their stable, particularly at the end ofthe day; that they are nervous and excitable; and that, even though gentle, many of them fear motorcycles and motor scooters, and as night approaches, even gentle horses may become restless and difficult to handle, particularly when in the hands of an inexperienced rider.’’ [Footnote omitted.]); Crosby v. Burge, 190 Miss. 739, 748, 1 So. 2d 504 (1941) (‘‘courts

. . . takejudicial notice ofthe character and habits of domestic animals

. . . [and] [i]t is common knowledge that any horse, regardless of how gentle he may be, is likely to jump
or lunge forward when his companion animal [in a plowing team] falls or hits against him from a three
or four foot embankment’’ [citation omitted; internalquotation marks omitted]); Bracken v. Bruce, 190 N.J. Super. 146, 152, 462 A.2d 201 (App. Div. 1983) (‘‘[I]t appears to us within common knowledge that most animals

. . . might be startled by

. . . sudden, unexpected noises.

. . . The excitability of horses [being ridden on a highway with cars] is, therefore, a proper subject ofjudicial notice

. . . .’’ [Citations omitted.]); Padillav. Winsor, 67 N.M. 267, 273, 354 P.2d 740 (1960) (taking judicial notice of fact that ‘‘horses no matter how gentle, with slight provocation, or without any known provocation, will sometimes shy, jump or even startto buck’’); Hommelv. Benshoff , 178 Misc. 2d 1038, 1041, 682 N.Y.S.2d546 (1998) (‘‘Itis amatterofcommon knowledge that one ofthe central dangers to allparticipants in sporting activities involving horses is the strengthandunpredictabilityoftheanimalsthemselves.

. . . Thus, for all who work closely with horses—even ifnot direct participants in the sport itself—there is an elevated risk of injury

. . . . [T]here is no dispute that
a horse is a powerful and sometimes unpredictable animal

. . . .’’ [Citations omitted.]); Settlemeyer v. Southern Railway Co., 91 S.C. 147, 150, 74 S.E. 137 (1912) (it is common knowledge that ‘‘horses [are] excited and frightened by the odor of wild animals’’); Blaha v. Stuard, 640 N.W.2d 85, 88 (S.D. 2002) (‘‘[i]t is
common knowledge that horses buck’’); Jarvis v. Koss, 139 Vt. 254, 255, 427 A.2d 364 (1981) (‘‘[t]he habits and qualities of common animals

. . . are matters of common knowledge and a proper subject for judicial notice’’). But see Leipske v. Guenther, 7 Wis. 2d 86, 91, 95 N.W.2d 774, 96 N.W.2d 821 (1959) (‘‘there is no evidence that it is anatural propensity ofhorses to bite people, and we are not prepared to takejudicial notice of such a propensity’’). Similarly, the evidence was undisputedinthepresent
case that horses have a natural propensity to nip and bite. Allofthewitnesses onbothsideswho gave deposition testimony on the behavior of horses during the summary judgment proceedings acknowledged this propensity. Bradley W. Amery, a doctor of veterinary medicine whose affidavit was filed in support of the plaintiffs’ opposition to the summaryjudgment motion, gave adetailedandlengthyexplanationastowhythisis the case. Vendrellav.AstriabFamilyLtd. Partnership, 133 Conn. App. 630, 635, 635–36n.10, 36A.3d 707 (2012). Amery explained that he was ‘‘very familiar with

. . . horses and

. . . uniquely familiar with the propensities ofhorses to bite.

. . . Biting is a natural part ofhorses’ lives and horses can bite for many reasons. Anatomicallythe horse has his eye located laterally on his head. While this provides a near 350 degree range of vision it does mean that there are two blind spots. These are directly in front of the horse’s nose for approximately 3-4 feet, and directly behind the head creating a 10 degree blind spot behind the horse. This means that the horse doesn’t see what he is grabbing and is reliantonthe sensoryinputfromhis mouth. While the nervous systemis fastitis unabletoprocess allthatinformation before the bite has occurred. Biting is also a common form of mutual grooming. Horses will usually stand facing opposite directions and use their teeth to both scratch and bite the other horse’s back, neck and withers. This behavior can be easily replicated by a human scratching a horse’s withers. Nipping is a term that is often appliedto horses attracting attention. This behavioris generallybelievedto be the result ofhand feeding treats. However, this behavior can be created by any form of positive reinforcement (like scratching their muzzle, or head, patting their neck or even verbal rewards) [and] [t]his nipping behavior can escalate if the [person’s] attention is not on the horse to a full bite.

. . . [M]ost of the bites are not the result of aggressive

. . . or nasty horses. They occur when the horse is being groomed, tacked up, being [hand-fed] treats, or in pain.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 635–36 n.10.
In other deposition testimony, Milford Animal Control Officer Richard George agreed with the statement that ‘‘a horse doesn’t have to have a tendency to bite in order to bite’’ and that he himself had been bitten by horses in the past. Captain Bernard L. Begley, Jr., of the Milford Fire Department similarly testified in support of the plaintiffs’ opposition that he had been riding horses ‘‘all of [his] life,’’ that ‘‘a horse [could] bite at any time,’’ and that ‘‘[t]hey have all been doing it

. . . since the beginning oftime, biting and kicking.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Vendrella v. AstriabFamilyLtd. Partnership, supra, 133 Conn.App. 636. Begley further stated that he always was careful whenfeedinghorses andthathe ‘‘neverput [his] fingers anywhere near the mouth of a horse.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Begley also opined that ‘‘a horse’s propensity to bite is part of its nature.’’ Id.
The defendant Astriab concurred with these assessments. In his deposition testimony, Astriab ‘‘acknowledged that a horse, by its very nature, could harm a person who attempts to pet or feed [it], stating that ‘a horse could bite you and cause great physical damage.’ He further acknowledged that he understood that even though a horse does not display a propensity to bite another person, horses by their nature could bite a person. He testified, based on his experience, that he
was ‘well aware’ that horses can bite people. ‘‘Astriab also

. . . repeatedly described Scuppy as a ‘typicalhorse.’ WhenaskedifScuppywasdifferentfrom other horses that would bite ifa finger was put in front of him, Astriab answered, ‘[n]o.’ He acknowledged his
concern that if someone made contact with Scuppy, whether to pet or feed him, he or she could get bit. When asked whether ‘a person who doesn’t know Scuppy

. . . can go up to Scuppy, put [his] hand outand the horse, being a horse, could bite that person,’ Astriab answered, ‘[y]es.’ ’’ Id., 636–37.
The fact that the plaintiffs’ witnesses and the defendant Astriab gave consistent testimony regarding the natural propensity of horses to nip and bite—not because they are abnormally dangerous animals but because oftheir inherent disposition to engage in such behavior—supports the conclusion that it is a matter of common knowledge that horses as a species have a natural propensity to bite. Accordingly, the trial court should take judicial notice of this characteristic and limit the question submitted to thejury to whether the defendants, given this knowledge and their knowledge ofScuppy’s pastbehavior, took reasonable precautions to prevent Scuppy from causing foreseeable harm.
The majority acknowledges that judicial notice has been taken of the natural propensities of animals in past cases and that the court in Bischoff ‘‘effectively took judicial notice of the fact that cats as a species
are harmless,’’ but states that, ‘‘[i]fthe question ofcats’ naturally mischievous propensities had come before this court as a matter of first impression today, we might have applied the more flexible approach that we adopt in this opinion and have left that determination to thejury on a case-by-case basis.’’ Footnote 24 ofthe majority opinion. The majority explains that, ‘‘when reasonableminds coulddifferastowhetheraparticular harm was foreseeable, the issue is one for the jury.

. . . Thus

. . . ifaplaintiffcanprove that an injury by a domestic animalwasforeseeable because the animal belonged to a class with naturally mischievous propensities, the owner or keeper of the animal has a duty to take reasonable steps to prevent foreseeable harm. In any given case, the existence ofthis duty will depend on proofthat the harm was foreseeable, which is a question of fact for the trier of facts.’’5 (Citations omitted; emphasis in original.) Footnote 6 ofthe majority opinion.
I disagree. Asking ajury to decide whether aparticularspecies ofdomesticatedanimalhasanaturalpropensity to engage in potentially harmful behavior makes
no sense. First, the natural propensities of a species are, by definition, fixed, which means that they are an essentialpart ofthe animal’s nature. Thus, to the extent reasonable minds can differ as to whether a natural propensity exists, it means that common experience andthe currentstate ofscientific knowledge areinsufficient to justify the application of a legal standard that charges the owner of an animal with such knowledge. In these cases, all guesswork should be eliminated, and the legal standard that should be applied to determine
an owner’s negligence should be based on the owner’s knowledge ofthepropensities ofthe animalinquestion. Second, and closely related, ifreasonable minds can differ as to whether such apropensity exists, an ownernever can be charged with knowledge and with the obligation to protect against the potentially harmful consequences ofthe animal’s behavior because he reasonably may believe that the propensity does not exist. Third, ifreasonable minds can differ, defendants will notbejudgedunderthe same legalstandardinidentical circumstances because juries may reach differing conclusions as to whether the propensity is natural to the species and whether the defendant should be charged with knowledge that it exists. This is not only unfair to owners charged with negligence, whose fate will depend on the ‘‘luck of the draw’’ and the subjective opinions ofthejurymembers, butwillleadto confusion regarding the future liability of animal owners under Connecticut’s negligence law and to disputes as to whetherthere was sufficient notice ofthe animal’s propensity to engage in the harmful behavior.
Owners must have notice of their potential liability for an animal’s harmful behavior so that they will be encouraged to take proper precautions. For example, if this court were to take judicial notice of the natural propensity of horses to nip and bite, owners would know not only that they must protect against harm due to the unique characteristics of a particular horse, but thattheyalsomusttakestepstoprotectagainstforeseeable harm that might arise from the general propensity of horses to nip and bite. Such steps might consist of posting warning signs, building fences, or otherwise separating their horses from persons with whom they should not come into contact. None ofthe cases cited by the majority suggests that the question of whether a domesticated animal has a naturalpropensitytoengageinharmfulbehaviorshould besubmittedtothejury.6Seefootnote22 ofthemajority opinion. Rather, most ofthe cases state that the owner or keeper ‘‘is assumed to know the animal’s general propensities’’; (emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted) Humphries v. Rice, 600 So. 2d 975, 978 (Ala. 1992); thus indicating that the only question the jurymustdecide iswhetherthe ownertookappropriate steps to prevent foreseeable harm. See, e.g., Groh v. Hasencamp, 407 So. 2d 949, 952 (Fla. App. 1981) (‘‘[t]he

ownerorkeeperofa domestic animal is bound to take notice ofthe generalpropensities ofthe class to which it belongs, and also ofanyparticularpropensities peculiar to the animal itself of which he has knowledge or is put on notice; and in so far as such propensities
are of a nature likely to cause injury he must exercise reasonable care to guard against them and to prevent injuries which are reasonably to be anticipated from them’’ [emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted]), reviewdenied, 415 So. 2d 1360 (Fla. 1982);Farrior

v. Payton, 57 Haw. 620, 630, 562 P.2d 779 (1977) (‘‘[t]he

owner or keeper of a domestic animal is bound to take notice ofthe generalpropensities ofthe class to whichit belongs

. . . and insofar as such propensities are of
anature likely to cause injury he must exercise reasonable care to guard against them and to prevent injuries which are reasonably to be anticipated from them’’ [emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted]); Ross v. Lowe, 619 N.E.2d 911, 914 (Ind. 1993) (‘‘the

owner ofa dog is bound to know the naturalpropensities ofdogs, and if these propensities are [of] the kind which reasonably might be expected to cause injury, the owner must use reasonable care to prevent such injuries from occurring’’ [emphasis added]); Huber v. Timmons, 184 Neb. 718, 722, 171 N.W.2d 794 (1969) (‘‘Even in the absence of any known viciousness in a domestic animal, its owner is obliged to exercise over it a certain degree of care depending upon the kind and character of the particular animal concerned, the circumstances in which it is placed, and the purposes for which it is employed or kept. The owner

. . . is charged with knowledge ofthe naturalpropensities of animals

. . . and, ifthese propensities are ofthe kind thatmightcause injuryhemustexercisethe care necessary to prevent such injuries as may be anticipated.’’ [Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.]); Griner v. Smith, 43 N.C. App. 400, 407, 259 S.E.2d 383 (1979) (‘‘[t]heownerofadomesticanimalischargeable with knowledge of the general propensities of certain animals andhe mustexercise due caretopreventinjury from reasonably anticipated conduct,’’ even in absence ofevidencethatanimalhad knownviciouspropensities [emphasis added]). Indeed, after the court in Huber

v. Timmons, supra, 721, observed that horses have a natural propensity to rear or bolt when frightened and that a person riding a horse for hire must take this propensityintoaccount, itconcludedthattheonlyquestion that should have been presented to the jury was ‘‘whether

. . . [the] defendants were negligent in entrusting the pony [on which the child was riding] to [the inexperienced handler’s] care.’’ Id., 722.
In the present case, I would conclude that it is a matter of common knowledge that horses as a species have anaturalpropensityto nip andbite andthat, tothe extentthe majoritybelieves that evidence is requiredto support this conclusion, it has been provided by the uncontroverted testimony ofall ofthe witnesses in this
case who testified about the general disposition and behavior of horses. Accordingly, the majority should not conclude, in light of the evidence in this case, that the natural propensity of horses to bite is a genuine issue of material fact that must be submitted to the jury. Rather, the jury should be asked to determine whether, given the fact that horses as a species have a natural propensity to bite and given the defendants’ knowledge of Scuppy’s past behavior, the defendants took appropriate measures to prevent Scuppy from causing foreseeable harm.
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur inthe judgment.

1 A ‘‘domestic animal’’ is defined in the Restatement (Second) of Torts as ‘‘an animal that is by custom devoted to the service of mankind at the time and in the place in which it is kept.’’ 3 Restatement (Second), Torts § 506 (2), p. 10.

2 The majority describes horses as a ‘‘class’’ of animals, but horses are a species within the class of ‘‘mammals

. . . .’’ Sykes v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 57 T.C. 618, 626 (1972).

3 Scuppy is the name of the horse that bit Anthony John Vandrella.

4 The ninth, and most recent, edition of Black’s Law Dictionary retains this definition of ‘‘common knowledge,’’ as well as the eighth edition’s definition of ‘‘fact.’’ Black’s Law Dictionary (9th Ed. 2009).

5 The majority essentially says the same thing in a different part of its opinion when it states that, ‘‘if a plaintiff presents evidence that it was reasonablyforeseeablethatahorsewouldbe dangerousundertheparticular facts and circumstances of the case, and reasonable minds could differ on that question, the issue is one for the trier of facts.’’ Footnote 22 of the majority opinion.

6 The majorityrespondsin afootnote that ‘‘the courtinDolezalv. Carbrey, [161 Ariz. 365, 370, 778 P.2d 1261 (App. 1989)], concluded that the questions of whether ‘an otherwise gentle horse might bolt in reaction to out-of-theordinary cues’ and whether ‘an inexperienced rider on a runaway horse could be harmed in some manner’ were questions for the jury because reasonable minds could reach different conclusions on those questions.’’ Footnote 25 of the majority opinion. The majority also claims that the natural propensity of horses to bite is not a matter of common knowledge in contemporary society because horses are not a daily presence in most people’s lives, and that different types of horses may have a more or less pronounced propensity to engage in biting behavior, thusjustifying submission of propensity questions to the jury. See id. I disagree. First, insofar as the majority relies on Dolezal, that case is unpersuasive. The question inDolezal was not whetherthe horse had a natural propensity to bolt that the owner should have foreseen but whether it was foreseeable that a show horse trained to respond to subtle cues might unexpectedly bolt when the novice rider’s ‘‘legs were flapping during her ride and

. . . shejabbed the horse with one foot and dragged her heel across the horse’s back when she attempted to dismount.’’ Dolezalv. Carbrey, supra, 161 Ariz. 370. In this context, which did not require the jury to consider the natural propensities of horses but the qualities instilled in the particular horse because ofits specialtraining, the court concludedthat ‘‘[r]easonable minds could differ whether it is foreseeable that an otherwise gentle horse might bolt in reaction to out-of-the-ordinary cues

. Taking this one step further, [the court] also believe[s] that reasonable minds could conclude that it is foreseeablethataninexperiencedrideronarunawayhorse couldbeharmed in some manner.’’ (Emphasis added.) Id. The court thus determined that resolving the question ofnegligence required an examination ofthe owner’s conduct, such as whether he should have allowed an inexperienced rider

on the horse, whether he instructed the rider properly, and whether he sufficiently supervised her ride and dismount. Id., 370–71. Second, the fact that horses are not a daily presence in people’s lives does not mean that it is not common knowledge that they have a natural propensity to nip and bite. Bulls are not a daily presence in people’s lives, but it is common knowledge that they have a natural propensity to engage inbehaviorthat causes harmto others ifthey are not sufficiently controlled. See 3 Restatement (Second), supra, § 518, comment (g), p. 31 (‘‘the keeper of a bull

. . . is required to take greater precautions to confine it to the land on which it is kept and to keep it under effective control when it is taken from the land than would be required of the keeper of a cow or gelding’’). Similarly, it is common knowledge that domesticated horses, although not naturally dangerous animals, have certain potentially harmful propensities, including bucking, biting, and kicking, because people are constantly exposed to horses byway ofbooks, television, movies, computer games, parades, and a wide variety of recreational activities. Accordingly,

one need not have direct contact with horses to have knowledge of their general propensities in our media-saturated world. Third, to the extent the propensities of an animal may not be common knowledge because the animal belongs to a subspecies with characteristics that distinguish it from other members of the species, that issue has not been raised. The issue before the court is whether the owner of a horse had a duty to take reasonable steps to prevent the horse from causingforeseeable harm because horses as a species are naturally inclined to engage inthe type ofconductthat causedAnthonyJohnVendrella’s injuries. As previously noted, Astriab described Scuppy as a ‘‘typical horse’’ who would react no differently from other horses when in close contact with people who might approach to pet or feed him. Thus, to the extent the majority considers howthe issue ofduty shouldbe resolvedwhen an animal is a member of a subspecies with characteristics that differ from other members ofthe species, orwhenaparticularanimalhas knownmischievous propensities that might result in foreseeable harm, its reasoning has no relevance to the issue in the present case.