*The Honorable J. Smith Henley died on October 18, 1997. This opinion

is consistent with his vote at the panel’s conference following oral

argument on April 14, 1997.

The Honorable Stephen M. Reasoner, Chief Judge, United States District 1

Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

____________

Nos. 96-2834/2841

____________

Jeffrey Taylor, *

*

Appellant/Cross-appellee, *

* Appeals from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Eastern District of Arkansas

Pulaski Bank & Trust Company, * [UNPUBLISHED]

*

Appellee/Cross-appellant. *

____________

 Submitted: April 14, 1997

 Filed: April 17, 1998

____________

Before McMILLIAN, Circuit Judge, HENLEY, Senior Circuit Judge, and *

BEAM, Circuit Judge.

____________

PER CURIAM.

Jeffrey Taylor (Taylor) appeals from final orders entered in the

District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, granting summary

1

judgment in favor of Pulaski
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Bank & Trust Company (the Bank) in his diversity action for conversion and

breach of fiduciary duty, Taylor v. Pulaski Bank & Trust Co., No. LR-C-94-

850 (E.D. Ark. June 6, 1996) (memorandum and order), and denying his motion

for attorneys’ fees and costs. Id. (June 26, 1996).

The Bank cross-appeals from final orders denying its motion to

disqualify Taylor’s counsel, id. (Sept. 30, 1995), and denying its motion

for attorneys’ fees. Id. (June 26, 1996). 

Taylor was the beneficiary of the Donald E. Taylor Life Insurance

Trust (the Trust) of which the Bank served as sole trustee since 1981. In

March 1995 Taylor filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the

grounds that the Trust terms were clear and unambiguous and, as a matter

of law, Taylor was entitled to the undistributed trust funds. Interpreting

the Trust under Arkansas law, the district court found that the language

of the Trust was clear and unambiguous and Taylor was the sole beneficiary.

Id. at 6-8 (Sept. 30, 1995). In the same order, the district court denied

the Bank’s motion to disqualify Taylor’s counsel for breach of Arkansas

Rules of Professional Conduct 1.7(a) and 3.7, on the grounds that there was

no matter pending before Taylor’s counsel that was directly adverse to the

Bank and substantial hardship would result to Taylor if his counsel were

disqualified. Id. at 4-5.

Taylor later moved for attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in

connection with the enforcement of the Trust. The district court initially

denied Taylor’s motion as premature. Id. (Dec. 6, 1995). Later, after the

district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Bank, the parties

filed a joint request for extension of time to file motions for attorneys’

fees and costs. Before the district court ruled on the joint request, the

filing deadline passed without either party filing for attorneys’ fees and

costs. The district court then denied the parties’ request and directed

each party to bear his or its own fees and costs. Id. (June 26, 1996).
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We have carefully reviewed the record and agree with the analyses of

the district court as set forth in its well-reasoned memoranda and orders.

With respect the issue of attorneys’ fees and costs, we further note that

district courts generally have broad discretion in deciding motions to

extend time for filings. See, e.g., Metropolitan Fed. Bank of Iowa, F.S.B.

v. W.R. Grace & Co., 999 F.2d 1257, 1259 (8 Cir. 1993). Accordingly, we th

affirm the judgments of the district court. See 8 Cir. R. 47B. th

A true copy.

Attest:

 CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.