Filed 9/20/23 In re L.V. CA2/8

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

In re L.V., Jr., a Person Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

 B319841

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

L.V.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. 21LJJP00507A)

 

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles

County. Susan Ser, Judge. Affirmed.

Joseph T. Tavano, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, 

Assistant County Counsel, and Jessica S. Mitchell, Deputy 

County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_________________________________
2

INTRODUCTION

L.V. (Father), the father of a dependent child, appeals from 

juvenile court’s restraining order, enjoining him from contacting 

a social worker assigned to the case. Father also appeals from 

the court’s dispositional order, removing the child from parental

custody and denying Father’s request to have the child placed 

with him. We conclude the evidence was sufficient to support the

restraining order because Father engaged in conduct toward the 

social worker that is prohibited under Welfare and Institutions 

Code1 section 213.5. We further conclude the evidence was 

sufficient to support the dispositional order because the juvenile 

court reasonably could find that placing the child with Father 

would be detrimental to his physical safety and well-being, and 

that removal from Father was the only reasonable means to 

protect the child from harm. We accordingly affirm. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

I. Dependency petition

Father and M.M. (Mother) are the parents of L.V., Jr.,

(L.V.), a boy born in October 2021. At the time of L.V.’s birth, 

Father and Mother were in a dating relationship, but did not 

reside together. Mother had no prior criminal or dependency 

history. Father had a number of prior convictions for offenses 

that included assault, criminal threats, and marijuana 

possession. He had been identified as the father of another child 

in an open family maintenance case, but none of the allegations 

in that case involved him.

1 Unless otherwise stated, all further statutory references 

are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
3

On October 10, 2021, the Los Angeles County Department 

of Children and Family Services (DCFS) received a referral 

alleging that Mother and L.V. had both tested positive for 

methamphetamines at the child’s birth. In an interview with

DCFS at the hospital, Mother stated she was shocked by the test 

results. According to Mother, she was not currently using any 

drugs. She last experimented with methamphetamines in 2018, 

and Father helped her to stop using the drug at that time. She 

believed the positive drug test was likely caused by eating tainted 

food from a food truck a few days before she gave birth. Mother 

planned to reside with L.V. in the maternal grandparents’ home 

upon their release from the hospital. She reported Father had 

not visited L.V. in the hospital because he was a military veteran 

who suffered from posttraumatic stress disorder. 

On October 11, 2021, DCFS attempted to meet with Father, 

but he refused to make himself available for an interview. 

He also had been uncooperative with DCFS in the other open 

dependency case. In a telephone call with DCFS, Father stated 

he wanted custody of L.V. He denied any history of drug use, and

expressed shock that Mother and the baby had tested positive for 

methamphetamines. 

Following L.V.’s discharge from the hospital, DCFS took 

the child into protective custody. On October 15, 2021, DCFS

filed a dependency petition for L.V. under section 300, 

subdivision (b)(1). The petition alleged that Mother had a history 

of substance abuse and abused methamphetamines during her 

pregnancy, which caused L.V. to have a positive toxicology screen

for the drug following his birth. The petition further alleged that 

Father knew or reasonably should have known of Mother’s 

substance abuse, and failed to protect L.V. from the risk of harm.
4

At the October 21, 2021 detention hearing, Mother 

appeared via Webex and was appointed counsel. Father did not 

appear. The juvenile court detained L.V. from both parents at 

that time. On November 5, 2021, Father appeared for 

arraignment via Webex and was appointed counsel. At least 

10 to 15 times during the hearing, Father attempted to unmute 

himself and to interrupt the court. When Father refused to 

cooperate despite the court’s repeated admonishments, the court 

ejected him from the hearing. Father’s counsel requested that 

L.V. be released to Father, or alternatively, the paternal 

grandmother. The court denied the request, and ordered DCFS 

to investigate potential relative placements with discretion to 

release L.V. to any appropriate relative pending adjudication of 

the petition. The court granted both parents monitored 

visitation.

II. Jurisdictional and dispositional report

As of the November 18, 2021 jurisdictional/dispositional 

report, L.V. was residing in a foster home. DCFS reported that 

the child was doing well in the care of his foster parents, and had 

begun monitored visits with Mother. In a November 2021 

interview with DCFS, Mother denied using drugs during her 

pregnancy. She maintained that the positive drug test following 

L.V.’s birth was caused by tainted food purchased from a food 

truck. She stated that she and Father were good parents, and

that the safest place for her child was at home with her.

DCFS made multiple attempts to interview Father for its

report, but was unable to reach him. In a lengthy e-mail sent to

the children’s social worker Angela Stantorf (CSW Stantorf) on 

November 16, 2021, Father questioned why DCFS was trying to 

contact him, and stated that he did not have a case. He also
5

accused DCFS of unlawfully detaining L.V., asserting in part: 

“ ‘None of you people at DCFS has done the job properly! It’s 

pretty sad that my child was taken from my baby’s mother at 

6 day’s [sic] old when he was in no danger! The child must be in 

imminent danger to be removed the way he was! Your 

organization placed my child in more danger then [sic] we would 

ever do! Had anyone done their job you would know that 

[Mother] is the victim of a crime and all you people have done is 

victimized her even more! She doesn’t know her rights or the law 

but guess what? I DO! . . . I’m coming for every last person on 

this case! If you knew anything about me you people would know 

that I know the law because I worked with them and the 

government for over 15yrs [sic] all I hear is that I’m this and I’m 

that, but only thin[g] I am is a pissed off father who [sic] child 

was taken illegally.’ ” 

In the e-mail, Father denied Mother had any prior drug 

use, and claimed the positive drug test was caused by either the 

meal she ate from the food truck or the medication given to her at 

the hospital. He further stated: “I demand my child back and 

I’m not going to be treated like we’re guilty of something when 

we’re not! [L.V.] should have never been taken so all of this is 

voided! I will not conform nor perform for your little dog and 

pony show! I am not a criminal, molester, or druggie! Beyond 

being judged in a court of law you will be judged by the highest 

authority of them all . . . GOD! Everyone will have their day and 

when that day comes may he have mercy on your soul’s [sic]

because to put someone through this is pure EVIL!’ ”

In a series of supplemental reports filed prior to the 

adjudication hearing, DCFS noted that L.V. remained placed 

with his foster parents. Between December 2021 and 
6

January 2022, Mother had four positive tests for 

methamphetamines, and failed to appear for a number of other 

drug tests. In a January 2022 meeting with DCFS, Mother 

admitted to using drugs, and indicated that she planned to 

participate in a drug treatment program. As of February 2022, 

Mother was attending an outpatient drug program. She had 

tested negative for drugs in three consecutive tests, but was not 

consistently attending her individual program sessions. 

She continued to have monitored visitation with L.V., and was 

attentive to the child during the visits.

Between December 2021 and March 2022, CSW Stantorf emailed Father on several occasions in an effort to set up his visits 

with L.V. and to provide referrals for services. Father did not 

respond to any of these e-mails. CSW Stantorf also tried to 

contact Father via text message. On March 2, 2022, Father 

responded to CSW Stantorf in a lengthy text message, which 

began: “I don’t have a case with you! Never have never will! 

It’s such a shame that you’re just now messaging me after almost 

5 month’s [sic] of illegally having my child! I don’t live with 

[Mother] nor was I at the hospital! Per the law and your own 

guidelines, my child should have never been taken!” He denied 

any involvement in the other dependency case in which he had 

been identified as a father. He also accused DCFS of kidnapping 

L.V. when it detained the child from Mother. 

Father then asserted: “You people fuked [sic] up bad! 

I coming [sic] for everyone’s job! This is a level of incompetence 

that can’t be measured! No offense but I don’t care who you are 

or how nice you’ve pretended to be to [Mother] or my child! 

This is criminal what’s been done! There’s a certain line that’s 

established and once you cross it there’s no ‘I made a mistake’ or 
7

‘I’m so sorry, I didn’t know’ fuk [sic] that! People will be held 

accountable even this judge! . . . You all can think I’ve been 

blowing smoke and I’m a nobody all you want! But you shall see 

1st hand how much I love my child and how fuked [sic] up this 

has been and the pain and torment you’ve caused my family! 

I know it’s not you exactly but you’re collateral damage at this 

point because you did nothing to try and really help my child be 

where he should have been all along! I’m sure [Mother] has given 

you the packet of evidence we comprised [sic] of all the infractions 

and violations of rights! You should look through it! Maybe 

you’ll learn something about me! Instead of following the rest of 

the sheep.” 

Father’s text message continued: “This is the only time I’m 

texting you! So you can take your classes and whatever else 

you’re trying to pull and stick it . . . I think you get the rest! 

I know the Law i [sic] worked in it for 10yrs [sic] of my life! I’m 

not doing shit for you people to make me look like I actually have 

a case hahahah you’re crazy! Go ahead and run to the judge with 

this message just like you did with the email! This doesn’t make 

me need a psychiatric evaluation! This means I’m fuking [sic] 

mad because my son was taken and I’m being violated and 

slandered left and right! But never given the full paperwork to 

know what’s really going on nor the opportunity to speak on [sic] 

court to show I’m not who you all are saying I am! Really does 

suck it had to come this far! But God always has a plan! And 

everything happens when it’s supposed to! God Bless and 

GOODLUCK! [sic] You’re going to need it!” 

Father also sent photos to CSW Stantorf with his text 

message. In one image, which appeared to be a self-photo taken 

in front of a mirror, Father was wearing a law enforcement badge 
8

around his neck and a gun holstered at his waist. In another 

image, Father was wearing a skeleton-type mask over his face.

III. Adjudication hearing

On March 8, 2022, the juvenile court held the adjudication 

hearing on the section 300 petition. The court sustained the 

allegations in the petition made against Mother based on her 

substance abuse, and dismissed the allegations made against 

Father. With respect to Father, the court stated that “[t]he 

father has not been entirely cooperative with the Department, 

but the court does not find that there is a preponderance of the 

evidence regarding his failure to protect.” 

Both parents requested that L.V. be immediately released 

to Father as a nonoffending parent. The court denied the 

request, finding that it would be detrimental for the child to be 

placed with Father at that time. The court continued the matter 

for a dispositional hearing, and ordered DCFS to assess releasing 

L.V. to the parents or the paternal grandmother.

IV. Request for a restraining order

On March 8, 2022, the date of the adjudication hearing, 

DCFS filed a request for a restraining order against Father on 

behalf of CSW Stantorf under section 213.5. DCFS alleged that 

Father sent CSW Stantorf e-mail and text messages along with a 

photo, which caused her to feel threatened and to fear for her 

safety. DCFS further alleged that, during a call with CSW 

Stantorf, Father said “he had become numb to killing children as 

a result of his war experience overseas and PTSD,” which also 

caused her to fear for her safety. At the adjudication hearing, the 

court granted a temporary restraining order against Father. 

The hearing on DCFS’s request for a permanent 

restraining order was held on March 29, 2022. Prior to the start 
9

of the hearing, Father refused to comply with the court’s request 

that he remove his hat while inside the courtroom. When the 

court ordered Father to either remove his hat or exit the 

courtroom, Father became angry at the court and the bailiff. 

The bailiff and a second deputy had to address Father outside the 

courtroom due to his disruptive behavior. 

CSW Stantorf testified at the hearing. According to her 

testimony, she had been working as a children’s social worker for

DCFS for about two years. Her first contact with Father was in a

November 2021 telephone call. During the call, Father said that

he had been deployed multiple times and had become numb to 

having to kill children to protect the men in his unit. He did not 

make any specific threat at that time.

When CSW Stantorf later reached out to Father to discuss

the case, he responded in the November 16, 2021 e-mail. 

Although Father did not make any direct threats of harm in the

e-mail, CSW Stantorf feared for her safety based on his

statement about God having mercy on their souls. It was her 

understanding that this statement typically was made when a 

person had died or was dying.

CSW Stantorf next had contact with Father in March 2022

when he replied to her text message. In his reply, Father did not 

threaten CSW Stantorf with physical harm. She feared for her 

safety, however, based on Father’s statement calling her 

collateral damage. As a military veteran herself, CSW Stantorf 

understood this term to refer to an innocent civilian being injured 

or killed. She also felt threatened by the accompanying photo of 

Father with a holstered gun, although she acknowledged that 

Father also wore a badge and was not holding the weapon in the 
10

photo. Father’s text message was CSW Stantorf’s last contact 

with him. 

As a DCFS social worker, CSW Stantorf had prior 

encounters with parents who were angry about their children 

being detained. This was the first time that she sought a 

restraining order against a parent. She testified that Father’s 

statements and behavior had caused her substantial emotional 

distress. 

Following this testimony, counsel for DCFS asked the court 

to grant a permanent restraining order against Father. Citing

sections 213.5 and 340.5, DCFS’s counsel argued that Father 

made a threat of physical harm against CSW Stantorf and had 

the apparent ability to carry out that threat. Father’s counsel 

opposed the request, arguing that CSW Stantorf’s testimony 

showed that Father never made a direct threat of harm. 

His counsel also argued that Father’s statements about coming 

after the people involved in the case referred to pursuing 

available legal remedies, and not acts of violence.

The court granted the request for a restraining order.

The court stated that, while Father may not have made a direct 

threat against CSW Stantorf, a reasonable person would consider 

his statements to her to be threats of physical violence. The court 

also noted that Father’s statements and behavior had caused 

CSW Stantorf to experience substantial emotional distress. 

In addition, the court found that Father’s conduct toward CSW 

Stantorf constituted harassment, which as defined in Code of 

Civil Procedure section 527.6, includes a willful course of conduct 

directed at a specific person that alarms, annoys, or harasses the 

person, and that serves no legitimate purpose.
11

In issuing the restraining order, the court also considered 

Father’s behavior at the hearing. The court stated: “Our bailiff 

made a simple request for the father to remove his hat. Father 

got very angry, at one point pointed to the court, and stated 

something to the court in an angry tone. I didn’t catch what the 

father stated, but then he started approaching the bailiff very 

closely, I believe [in] a threatening manner. This was all in 

reaction to the bailiff asking the father to follow court rules.” 

The restraining order prohibited Father from having any 

contact with CSW Stantorf, and required him to stay at least 

100 yards from her person, residence, and workplace for a period

of three years.

V. Dispositional hearing

Prior to the dispositional hearing, DCFS reported that it 

had attempted to assess the paternal grandmother and both 

parents for L.V.’s possible placement, and was recommending 

that the child not be released to them at that time. As to the

paternal grandmother, she told DCFS she wanted to know the 

rules before having the child placed with her and did not want to 

make any changes to her home. While she indicated she was 

willing to have Mother and Father reside in her home, she asked 

that DCFS communicate with her directly because “[Mother]

lies.” She also stated Father was not currently living with her 

because she “can only take so much of [him].” Although the 

paternal grandmother agreed to a home assessment, no one 

answered the door when DCFS arrived at the scheduled time. 

As to Mother, she informed DCFS that she again tested 

positive for methamphetamines in April 2022. Her counselor 

advised DCFS that Mother would be discharged from her drug 

treatment program if she had another positive or missed drug 
12

test. As to Father, DCFS reported that it had been unable to 

assess him for placement because he had not responded to any of 

the repeated attempts to reach him. DCFS stated it was

concerned that if Father refused to make himself available for an 

interview, he would not make L.V. available for monthly visits

from the agency to assess the child’s safety and well-being. 

DCFS also expressed concern about Father’s mental health given 

that he reportedly suffered from posttraumatic stress disorder, 

appeared to have unresolved anger issues, and had engaged in 

threatening and harassing conduct toward CSW Stantorf.

In addition, DCFS noted Father had not participated in any 

services, and had not visited L.V. since the child was detained. 

On April 11, 2022, the juvenile court held the dispositional 

hearing. Counsel for DCFS and counsel for L.V. joined in 

requesting the child be removed from both parents. Mother’s 

counsel asked the court to release L.V. to Mother on the condition

that she reside with the paternal grandmother, or alternatively, 

to Father. Father’s counsel requested that the court release L.V. 

to Father as a nonoffending, noncustodial parent. 

After hearing argument from counsel, the court declared 

L.V. a dependent of the court under section 300, subdivision (b). 

The court removed L.V. from both parents, finding that the child 

would be in substantial danger if returned to parental custody,

and that there were no other reasonable means of protecting L.V.

from harm. The court also denied Father’s request that L.V. be

released to him, finding that such placement would be 

detrimental to the child’s safety, protection, or well-being. 

In making its ruling, the court noted that it had made a 

prior finding of detriment at the March 8, 2022 adjudication 

hearing based on Father’s conduct toward CSW Stantorf. 
13

The court also noted that Father had to be removed from the 

courtroom at the March 29, 2022 restraining order hearing based 

on his hostile behavior toward the court and bailiff. The court 

then stated: “So the father, if he can’t comply with a simple 

request by the court and our bailiff, the court has little confidence 

that [he] will cooperate with the department and comply with 

court orders. . . . [C]ompliance with the court and the 

department is essential for a release of a child to the father, since 

the department and the court [have] to ensure that the child will 

be safe. [¶] . . . So the . . . finding that the court made on March 8, 

2022, that does remain. And the court has additional evidence to 

support that finding.” 

The court ordered monitored visitation and reunification 

services for both parents. Mother’s case plan included a full drug 

and alcohol treatment program with aftercare and weekly drug 

testing, parenting education, and individual counseling. Father’s 

case plan consisted of parenting education, individual counseling, 

and a psychiatric evaluation with follow-up treatment as 

recommended. 

Father filed a timely appeal. 

DISCUSSION

On appeal, Father challenges the sufficiency of the 

evidence supporting the restraining order issued against him. 

Father also contends the evidence was insufficient to support the 

dispositional orders removing L.V. from his custody and denying 

his request that the child be placed with him. 

I. Restraining order

At the March 29, 2022 hearing, the juvenile court granted 

DCFS’s request for a restraining order that enjoined Father from 

having any contact with CSW Stantorf for a three-year period. 
14

On appeal, Father argues the juvenile court erred in issuing the

restraining order because there was no evidence that he made

any threats of physical harm to CSW Stantorf. We conclude

Father’s argument lacks merit.

A. Governing law

Section 213.5 authorizes the issuance of a restraining order

to protect a social worker in a pending dependency proceeding. 

It provides, in relevant part, that the juvenile court may “issue 

an ex parte order enjoining a person from molesting, attacking, 

striking, stalking, threatening, sexually assaulting, battering, 

harassing, telephoning, . . . destroying the personal property, 

contacting, . . . coming within a specified distance of, or

disturbing the peace of the child’s current or former social 

worker.” (§ 213.5, subd. (a).) “Issuance of a restraining order 

under section 213.5 does not require ‘evidence that the restrained 

person has previously molested, attacked, struck, sexually 

assaulted, stalked, or battered’ ” the person to be protected. 

(In re S.G. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 654, 671.) “Nor does it require 

evidence of a reasonable apprehension of future abuse.” (In re 

C.Q. (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 355, 363.) Rather, “[t]here need only 

be evidence that the restrained person ‘disturbed the peace’ ” of 

the protected person. (In re Bruno M. (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 990, 

997.) In this context, one person “ ‘disturb[s] the peace’ ” of 

another by engaging in “ ‘ “conduct that destroys the mental or 

emotional calm of the other party.” ’ ” (Ibid.)

Section 340.5 also permits the juvenile court to issue a 

restraining order to protect a social worker from the parents of a 

dependent child. It states that the juvenile court “may, for good 

cause shown and after an ex parte hearing, issue its order 

restraining the parents of the dependent child from threatening 
15

the social worker, or any member of the social worker’s family, 

with physical harm.” (Id., subd. (a).) Under the statute, “ ‘good 

cause’ means at least one threat of physical harm to the social 

worker, or any member of the social worker’s family, made by the 

person who is to be the subject of the restraining order, with the 

apparent ability to carry out the threat.” (Id., subd. (b).) To be 

entitled to relief under section 340.5, either the child welfare 

agency or the social worker “must show a threat arising from the 

social worker’s performance of his or her assigned duties in 

providing services to a dependent child of the juvenile court.” 

(In re Matthew F. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 883, 888.)

“[A]ppellate courts apply the substantial evidence standard 

to determine whether sufficient facts supported the factual 

findings in support of a restraining order and the abuse of 

discretion standard to determine whether the court properly 

issued the order.” (In re Carlos H. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 861, 866; 

accord, In re S.G., supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 670; In re A.M.

(2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 614, 619.) When the appellant challenges 

the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the juvenile court’s 

factual findings, “ ‘we view the evidence in a light most favorable 

to the respondent, and indulge all legitimate and reasonable 

inferences to uphold the juvenile court’s determination. If there 

is substantial evidence supporting the order, the court’s issuance 

of the restraining order may not be disturbed.’ ” (In re Bruno M., 

supra, 28 Cal.App.5th at pp. 996–997.) 

B. Substantial evidence supported the restraining 

order against Father

Viewed in the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s

order, the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that

Father engaged in conduct prohibited under section 213.5. 
16

The record reflects that, during the course of the dependency

case, Father sent CSW Stantorf two lengthy, vitriolic writings

along with some concerning self-photos, which she perceived as

threatening and caused her to fear for her physical safety.

In his first writing sent via e-mail, Father told CSW

Stantorf, “ ‘I’m coming for every last person on this case!’ ” 

He also warned her, “ ‘Beyond being judged in a court of law you 

will be judged by the highest authority of them all . . . GOD! 

Everyone will have their day and when that day comes may he 

have mercy on your soul’s [sic] because to put someone through 

this is pure EVIL!’ ” CSW Stantorf testified that, even though 

Father did not make any explicit threats of violence in his e-mail, 

she feared for her safety based on his statement about God 

having mercy on her soul because “[t]hat’s usually a statement 

made when someone is dying or has died.”

In his second writing sent via text, Father wrote, “[Y]ou 

shall see 1st hand how much I love my child and how fuked [sic] 

up this has been and the pain and torment you’ve caused my 

family! I know it’s not you exactly but you’re collateral damage 

at this point because you did nothing to try and really help my 

child be where he should have been all along.” He also stated, 

“Really does suck it had to come this far! But God always has a 

plan! And everything happens when it’s supposed to! God Bless 

and GOODLUCK [sic]! You’re going to need it!” CSW Stantorf 

testified that Father’s description of her as “collateral damage” 

also caused her to fear for her safety because, as a fellow military 

veteran, she understood the term to refer to a “civilian, an

innocent party being injured or killed.” In addition, Father chose 

to attach to this text message photos of himself wearing a gun 

holstered at his waist and a skeleton-type mask over his face.
17

Given this evidence, the juvenile court reasonably could

find that Father “ ‘disturbed the peace’ ” under section 213.5 by

engaging in “ ‘ “conduct that destroy[ed] the mental or emotional

calm” ’ ” of CSW Stantorf. (In re Bruno M., supra, 28 Cal.App.5th

at p. 997.) The court also reasonably could find that Father’s

conduct was “harassing” within the meaning of section 213.5. 

While section 213.5 does not define harassment, Code of Civil

Procedure section 527.6, which authorizes civil restraining orders

prohibiting harassment, provides a definition of the term. (See

In re Brittany K. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1497, 1510 [courts may

refer to other statutes “for purposes of obtaining a ‘reasonable

and practical’ statutory construction” of terms used in section

213.5].) It defines “harassment” to include “a knowing and willful

course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously

alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and that serves no

legitimate purpose.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 527.6, subd. (b)(3).) 

The conduct “must be that which would cause a reasonable

person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and must actually

cause substantial emotional distress.” (Ibid.) CSW Stantorf

testified that Father’s conduct did in fact cause her “substantial

emotional distress.” She further testified that she had prior 

experience with parents who were angry about their children 

being detained, but this was the first time that a parent’s conduct

caused her to seek a restraining order. CSW Stantorf’s testimony 

therefore provided substantial evidence to support the issuance of 

a restraining order under section 213.5. 

Citing section 340.5, Father contends the evidence was 

insufficient to support a restraining order because CSW Stantorf 

admitted in her testimony that Father never made any direct 

threats of physical harm to her. Unlike section 340.5, however, 
18

section 213.5 does not require a showing that the person to be 

restrained made a prior threat of physical harm. Instead, 

“[i]t may be sufficient to show that the person to be restrained 

‘disturb[ed] the peace’ of the petitioner (§ 213.5, subd. (a)).” 

(In re S.G., supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 671.) Although counsel 

for DCFS relied on section 340.5 in arguing that a restraining 

order was warranted, she also noted that section “213.5 does 

allow the court to enjoin such conduct” to “protect the social 

worker in this case.” Moreover, both DCFS’s request and the

juvenile court’s order were made on Judicial Council forms that 

specifically referenced section 213.5. In any event, the juvenile 

court reasonably could have inferred that Father’s statements to 

CSW Stantorf, along with the photos he sent of himself wearing a 

holstered gun and a mask, constituted an implied threat of 

physical harm under section 340.5.

In deciding to grant the restraining order, the juvenile 

court also could have drawn a reasonable inference that Father’s 

conduct toward CSW Stantorf was likely to continue given the 

hostility and lack of impulse control that he displayed at the 

hearing on the restraining order. (See In re Bruno M., supra, 

28 Cal.App.5th at p. 998 [restraining order proper where juvenile 

court reasonably could infer from parent’s “ ‘tendency to resort to 

violence as well as from his evident lack of impulse control, that 

he might be a threat to [the protected person’s] safety’ ”].) 

As described by the court, Father refused to comply with a simple

decorum request that he remove his hat inside the courtroom. 

Instead, Father responded to the court in an “angry tone” and

approached the bailiff in a “threatening manner,” ultimately 

resulting in his removal from the hearing.
19

Father argues that his conduct was that of a parent who 

was angry about his child being detained. He also asserts that 

his statements to CSW Stantorf showed he was taking certain 

measures to contact her superiors, but was not threatening acts 

of violence. At the hearing on the restraining order, the juvenile 

court was able to review the entirety of Father’s e-mail and text 

messages to CSW Stantorf and to hear her testimony about the 

extent of her contact with Father. Based on such evidence, the 

court found that a reasonable person would consider Father’s

statements to CSW Stantorf to be threats of physical harm, and 

that his statements and conduct actually caused CSW Stantorf 

substantial emotional distress. It is not the role of the appellate 

court to reweigh the evidence or second-guess the juvenile court’s 

credibility determinations. (In re S.G., supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at 

p. 672.) Rather, “ ‘we must indulge all reasonable inferences to 

support the decision of the juvenile court and will not disturb its 

findings where there is substantial evidence to support them.’ ” 

(In re Carlos H., supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at p. 866.) Because there 

was substantial evidence supporting the restraining order, the 

juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in issuing it. 

II. Dispositional order

At the April 11, 2022 dispositional hearing, the juvenile 

court removed L.V. from the custody of both Mother and Father, 

denied Father’s request to have the child placed with him, and 

ordered the parents to participate in reunification services. 

On appeal, Father asserts the evidence was insufficient to 

support these orders because there was no evidence that L.V. 

ever suffered or was at risk of suffering serious physical harm in

Father’s custody. We conclude this claim also fails. 
20

A. Governing law

Section 361, subdivision (d), governs the removal of a child

from a noncustodial parent. It provides that “[a] dependent child

shall not be taken from the physical custody of his or her

parents . . . with whom the child did not reside at the time the

petition was initiated, unless the juvenile court finds clear and

convincing evidence that there would be a substantial danger to

the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional

well-being of the child for the parent . . . to live with the child or

otherwise exercise the parent’s . . . right to physical custody, and

there are no reasonable means by which the child’s physical and

emotional health can be protected without removing the child

from the child’s parent’s . . . physical custody.” (§ 361, subd. (d).)

In determining whether to remove a child from parental

custody, “the juvenile court may consider the parent’s past

conduct and current circumstances, and the parent’s response to

the conditions that gave rise to juvenile court intervention.”

(In re D.B. (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 320, 332.) The court “must also

consider whether there are any reasonable protective measures

and services that can be implemented to prevent the child’s

removal from the parent’s physical custody.” (Ibid.) “A removal

order is proper if it is based on proof of (1) parental inability to

provide proper care for the minor and (2) potential detriment to

the minor if he or she remains with the parent. [Citation.]

The parent need not be dangerous and the minor need not have

been harmed before removal is appropriate. The focus of the

statute is on averting harm to the child.” (In re T.W. (2013)

214 Cal.App.4th 1154, 1163; accord, In re D.B., at p. 328.)

Section 361.2 governs the placement of a child following

removal from parental custody. It states, in relevant part, that
21

“[i]f a court orders removal of a child pursuant to Section 361, the

court shall first determine whether there is a parent of the child,

with whom the child was not residing at the time that the events

or conditions arose that brought the child within the provisions of

Section 300, who desires to assume custody of the child. If that

parent requests custody, the court shall place the child with the

parent unless it finds that placement with that parent would be

detrimental to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional

well-being of the child.” (§ 361.2, subd. (a).)

Section 361.2 “evinces the legislative preference for

placement with the noncustodial parent when safe for the child.” 

(In re Patrick S. (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1254, 1262.) Thus, “[i]t

requires placement with a noncustodial, nonoffending parent who

requests custody ‘unless the placement would be detrimental to

the child.’ ” (In re C.M. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1401.) 

In making a finding of detriment, the juvenile court “weighs all

relevant factors to determine if the child will suffer net harm.” 

(In re A.C. (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 38, 43.) The burden is on the

party opposing placement with a nonoffending parent “to show by

clear and convincing evidence that the child will be harmed if the

nonoffending parent is given custody.” (In re C.M., at p. 1402.)

Although the language of section 361, subdivision (d), is not

identical to section 361.2, it is substantively similar. (Compare

§ 361, subd. (d) [placement with noncustodial parent would create

“substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or

physical or emotional well-being of the child”] with § 361.2,

subd. (a) [placement with noncustodial parent would be

“detrimental to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional

well-being of the child”].) Moreover, under both statutes, the

standard of proof is clear and convincing evidence. (In re S.F.
22

(2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 696, 720 [applying § 361, subd. (d)]; In re

C.M., supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 1401 [applying § 361.2].) 

Accordingly, in most cases in which a court finds a “substantial

danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or

emotional well-being of the child” (§ 361, subd. (d)) in a parent’s

custody, it will also find “that placement with that parent would

be detrimental to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional

well-being of the child” (§ 361.2, subd. (a)). (See In re S.F., at

p. 720, fn. 14 [any error in applying § 361.2 instead of § 361,

subd. (d), would have been harmless given the statutes’ similar

standards]; In re A.A. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 597, 610 [“[i]t is

illogical to require a court to consider placing a child with a

noncustodial parent who has already been determined to pose a

substantial danger”].)

An appellate court reviews challenges to the sufficiency of

the evidence supporting dispositional orders for substantial

evidence. (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773.) “ ‘ “In making

this determination, we draw all reasonable inferences from the

evidence to support the findings and orders of the dependency

court; we review the record in the light most favorable to the

court’s determinations; and we note that issues of fact and

credibility are the province of the trial court.” [Citation.] “We do

not reweigh the evidence or exercise independent judgment, but

merely determine if there are sufficient facts to support the

findings of the trial court.” ’ ” (Ibid.) “When reviewing a finding

that a fact has been proved by clear and convincing evidence, the

question before the appellate court is whether the record as a

whole contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact

finder could have found it highly probable that the fact was true.” 

(Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1011.)
23

“The appellant has the burden of showing there is no evidence of

a sufficiently substantial nature to support the findings or

orders.” (In re E.E. (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 195, 206.) 

B. Substantial evidence supported the juvenile 

court’s dispositional order

Based on the totality of the record in this case, the evidence 

was sufficient to support the juvenile court’s findings that placing 

L.V. with Father would pose a substantial danger to the child,

and would be detrimental to his physical safety and well-being. 

The evidence was also sufficient to support the court’s finding 

that there were no reasonable means to protect L.V. from the risk 

of harm without removing him from Father’s custody.

While the juvenile court dismissed the failure-to-protect 

allegations made against Father in the section 300 petition, the 

court reasonably could have found that, as of the dispositional 

hearing, Father did not appreciate the substantial risk of harm 

that Mother’s ongoing substance abuse posed to L.V. In her 

initial interview with DCFS, Mother admitted that she used 

methamphetamines in 2018, and that Father helped her to stop 

using the drug at that time. However, in an October 11, 2021 

telephone call with DCFS, Father expressed shock that Mother 

had tested positive for methamphetamines. Then, in his 

November 16, 2021 e-mail to CSW Stantorf, Father denied that 

Mother had any prior drug use. He also repeated Mother’s

implausible claim that her positive drug test at the time of L.V.’s 

birth had been caused by tainted food that she bought from a food 

truck. Further, on the two occasions that Father responded to 

CSW Stantorf’s multiple attempts to reach him, he questioned 

why she was attempting to contact him at all and insisted that he 

did not have a case with DCFS. Thus, despite being a
24

nonoffending parent as of the dispositional hearing, Father 

continued to display a serious lack of insight into the issues that

led to L.V. becoming a dependent of the court.

The juvenile court also reasonably could have found that 

placing L.V. with Father at the time of the dispositional hearing 

would be detrimental to the child’s safety and well-being because 

Father had no relationship with L.V. An “ ‘alleged lack of a 

relationship between [a] father and [a child] is not, by itself, 

sufficient to support a finding of detriment.’ ” (In re Adam H.

(2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 27, 33.) It is, however, a permissible factor 

that may be considered in assessing whether placement with a 

noncustodial parent would be detrimental to a child. (In re A.C., 

supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at p. 43; In re C.M., supra, 232 Cal.App.4th 

at p. 1402.) In this case, L.V. was detained by DCFS shortly after 

his discharge from the hospital, and the dispositional hearing 

was held six months later. Father did not visit L.V. in the 

hospital. Nor did Father make any effort to visit the child at any 

time over the course of the dependency proceedings. Rather, 

when CSW Stantorf repeatedly tried to contact Father to set up a 

visitation schedule, his only response was to send her the

messages and photos that would form the basis for the

restraining order against him. Given L.V.’s young age, Father’s 

complete lack of contact with the child, and Father’s denial of 

Mother’s clear substance abuse issues, there was sufficient 

evidence to support a finding that L.V. would be at risk of harm if

placed in Father’s custody. 

An order removing a child from parental custody also 

requires a showing that removal is the only reasonable means of 

protecting the child from the risk of harm. (§ 361, subds. (c)(1), 

(d).) Here, the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that 
25

there were no reasonable means of protecting L.V. absent 

removal from Father. Prior to the dispositional hearing, Father 

requested that L.V. either be released to his custody, or placed 

with him on the condition that he reside in the paternal 

grandmother’s home. The court accordingly ordered DCFS to 

assess both Father and the paternal grandmother for L.V.’s 

possible placement. Father refused, however, to make himself 

available for an in-person or telephone interview despite DCFS’s 

repeated attempts to reach him. Due to Father’s refusal to 

cooperate, DCFS also did not know where L.V. would be residing 

if the child were released to Father under in-home supervision. 

Although Father previously had identified his home address as 

the paternal grandmother’s residence, she told DCFS that Father 

was not currently living in her home because she “can only take 

so much of [him].” In addition, when DCFS attempted to conduct 

a scheduled safety assessment of the paternal grandmother’s 

home, no one answered the door. The juvenile court therefore 

reasonably could infer that placing L.V. with Father subject to 

DCFS supervision was not a sufficient alternative means of 

protecting the child from the risk of harm.

In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting 

the removal order, Father contends the juvenile court improperly 

based its detriment finding on his lack of cooperation with DCFS, 

his statements to CSW Stantorf which caused her to seek the

restraining order, and his reaction in the courtroom when he was 

ordered to remove his hat. Although the court mentioned these

specific facts in making the detriment finding, it also stated it

had “additional evidence to support that finding.” Moreover, 

the court could consider these facts in issuing the removal order 

because they supported a reasonable inference that Father would 
26

not cooperate with DCFS if L.V. were placed in his care, and 

thus, there were no reasonable means of protecting the child

short of removal. (See In re E.E., supra, 49 Cal.App.5th at p. 217 

[removal order supported by substantial evidence where, among 

other facts, parents “did not cooperate with the social worker or 

engage meaningfully in services when [social services agency]

became involved with their family,” and instead “were 

emphatically resistant to the agency’s investigation”].)

It is true, as Father asserts, that “[t]he inability of a parent 

to get along with a social worker is not evidence to support a 

removal order.” (In re Emily L. (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 1, 16.) 

This is not a case, however, where the only evidence offered in 

support of removal was the parent’s lack of cooperation with 

DCFS. Rather, as discussed, the evidence supporting the court’s 

findings in this case included Father’s denial of Mother’s drug

abuse and the risk of harm it posed to their infant child, and his

lack of any relationship with L.V. and failure to visit the child at 

any time during the dependency proceedings. On this record, 

the juvenile court’s order removing L.V. from Father’s custody 

and denying Father’s request to have the child placed with him 

was supported by substantial evidence. 

Lastly, Father argues that the portion of the dispositional 

order requiring him to participate in reunification services must 

be reversed because he was a nonoffending parent and there was 

no evidence supporting the order removing L.V. from his custody. 

As discussed, however, the evidence was sufficient to support the 

removal order. Moreover, when fashioning a dispositional order,

the juvenile court may make “all reasonable orders for the care, 

supervision, custody, conduct, maintenance, and support of the 

child.” (§ 362, subd. (a).) The court is not limited to the content 
27

of the sustained petition, and may consider the evidence as a 

whole to determine what orders would be in the child’s best 

interests. (In re Briana V. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 297, 311.) 

The court’s determination will not be reversed “ ‘absent a clear 

abuse of discretion.’ ” (In re Corrine W. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 522, 

532.) 

Here, the juvenile court reasonably could conclude that 

ordering Father to participate in parenting education, individual 

counseling, and a psychiatric evaluation would best serve L.V.’s 

interests. At the time of the dispositional hearing, Father had

never visited L.V., or had any contact with his child. Father also

displayed a lack of insight into the issues that had led to DCFS’s 

involvement with the family and filing of the section 300 petition. 

In addition, Father engaged in harassing conduct toward 

CSW Stantorf, and acted in a hostile manner toward the court 

and its bailiff when asked to follow courtroom decorum. 

Accordingly, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in 

ordering Father to participate in reunification services. 

DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s restraining order and dispositional 

order are affirmed. 

VIRAMONTES, J.

WE CONCUR:

STRATTON, P. J.

WILEY, J.