ILLINOIS OFFICIAL REPORTS

Appellate Court

In re Vanessa K., 2011 IL App (3d) 100545

Appellate Court

Caption

In re VANESSA K., Alleged to be Subject to Involuntary Medication

(Vanessa K., Respondent-Appellant).

 District & No. Third District

Docket No. 3-10-0545

Filed

Rehearing denied

August 17, 2011

September 26, 2011

Held

(Note: This syllabus

constitutes no part of

the opinion of the court

but has been prepared

by the Reporter of

Decisions for the

convenience of the

reader.)

The order for the involuntary administration of psychotropic medications

to respondent was upheld on appeal over her contention that the State

failed to comply with the statutory requirements that she be given written

information about the risks and benefits of the proposed treatments.

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Rock Island County, No. 10-MH-13;

the Hon. Raymond J. Conklin, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed. 
Counsel on

Appeal

Ann Krasuski, of Guardianship & Advocacy Commission, of Hines,

Cynthia Z. Tracy, of Guardian & Advocacy Commission, of Peoria, and

Veronique Baker, of Guardianship & Advocacy Commission, of

Chicago, for appellant.

Jeff Terronez, State’s Attorney, of Rock Island (Terry A. Mertel and

Richard T. Leonard, both of State’s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor’s

Office, of counsel), for the People.

Panel JUSTICE O’BRIEN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Presiding Justice Carter and Justice Wright concurred in the judgment

and opinion.

OPINION

¶ 1 The trial court granted the State’s petition to involuntarily administer psychotropic

medication to respondent Vanessa K. She appealed. We affirm.

¶ 2 FACTS

¶ 3 Respondent Vanessa K., who was 35 years old at the time the petition was filed, suffers

from schizophrenia. She voluntarily resided in a facility for persons with mental illness

before admitting herself, also voluntarily, to the Robert Young Mental Health Center for

inpatient treatment. During her hospitalization at Robert Young, she would intermittently

take her medication and other times would refuse to take it. Her treating doctor, Ernest

Galbreath, filed a petition for involuntary treatment with psychotropic medication, seeking

authority to administer the antipsychotic medication, Risperdal Consta, as a first choice, and

offering 20 other medications as treatment alternatives, including Prolixin Decanoate, also

an antipsychotic.

¶ 4 At a hearing on the petition to involuntarily medicate, Galbreath testified in support of

the petition. Early in Galbreath’s testimony, Vanessa’s attorney interrupted and stated for

the record that Vanessa, “during the [d]octor’s testimony has been writing very rapidly on

a number of pieces of paper and humming and making other noises and chewing her lips and

talking to herself and not appearing to be engaged with the proceedings–.” Vanessa then left

the proceedings, stating:

“I am leaving. Go ahead, discuss it without me, I will leave this for Supreme Court

Judge and half the world is watching, there is my written appeal, the Judge has the paper,

thank you and I do want to leave because you all –.” 

The record includes the “written appeal” Vanessa gave the trial court before leaving the

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proceeding, which consists of illegible and illogical writing.

¶ 5 Galbreath resumed his testimony and stated that he was a psychiatrist and medical

director at Robert Young. He had been Vanessa’s treating psychiatrist for over three years

and diagnosed her with schizophrenia paranoia, a serious mental illness. The disorder causes

a patient to experience auditory and visual hallucinations, and to be psychotic, paranoid, and

fearful of what might be done to her. Vanessa had been brought to Robert Young after she

attacked a staff member at her residential facility when she was not given a soda. Her

treatment at Robert Young included counseling and group sessions, as well as individual

sessions with Galbreath. Her treatment plan also included medication.

¶ 6 Galbreath saw Vanessa daily during her inpatient treatment. Due to her mental illness,

Vanessa was exhibiting a deterioration in her ability to function. He described that Vanessa

spent entire days pacing up and down the hallway where she would previously sit and

participate in a therapy session. Her deteriorating behavior also included laughing out loud,

talking to herself, not taking her medication, and becoming angry and belligerent toward her

caretakers. She was also exhibiting or threatening disruptive behavior. Galbreath stated that

Vanessa’s behavior was continuing, and “getting worse each day.” Because of her illness,

the least restrictive treatment alternatives, to allow Vanessa to medicate herself or to

voluntarily take her medication, had not been effective in the past and would not be viable

options.

¶ 7 Galbreath discussed his treatment plan of prescribing Prolixin Decanoate, the

antipsychotic medication with a generic name of fluphenazine decanoate. The drug is

administered in an injectable dose of 2.5 and 50 milligrams every two weeks. No testing or

procedures were required to monitor the medication, although he would observe Vanessa’s

progress on the drug. Galbreath pointed to the ability for Vanessa to go two weeks between

doses as a reason he prescribed the drug. He also pointed to Vanessa’s refusal to take

medication on her own, noting that when medicating herself, Vanessa “refuses at random,

[is] very paranoid, that’s part of her illness.” He had administered Prolixin Decanoate to

Vanessa previously and found it to be an effective treatment for her. Her prior use of the

drug resulted in continued auditory and visual hallucinations, but curbed her physical

aggression. When taking the drug previously, Vanessa remained free of hospitalization for

her illness for over a year. He rejected less restrictive treatment or medication because of

Vanessa’s unpredictability and unreliability about maintaining her medication. He stated that

Vanessa “will not address the psychotic activity.” In his opinion, she lacked the capacity to

make a reasoned decision regarding the administration of medication. He believed the drug

was necessary as a safety measure to manage Vanessa so she would not attack people, which

first occurred after she stopped taking her medication. He also observed that, when not on

her medication, Vanessa was “not really rational to take care of herself.”

¶ 8 Galbreath acknowledged that when he submitted the petition, his first preference for

medication was Risperdal Consta, a newer antipsychotic drug than Prolixin Decanoate,

which had not been available in an injectable form when Vanessa previously took the drug.

He explained that he substituted the medication because at the time he filed the petition, he

did not know that Vanessa had taken previously taken Prolixin. He testified regarding the

side effects of Risperdal Consta and compared them to the side effects of Prolixin

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Decanoate. Galbreath stated that he had advised Vanessa orally about the risks, benefits, and

side effects of medication, including Risperdal Consta and Prolixin Decanoate, on a daily

basis during her hospitalization at Robert Young, although she would often become

disruptive and leave during the explanation. On her arrival at Robert Young, Vanessa was

provided a standard form, written explanation concerning the side effects of different

medications generally given to his patients. Galbreath acknowledged that he never gave

Vanessa written information specifically concerning Prolixin Decanoate.

¶ 9 The trial court questioned Galbreath, ensuring that the doctor wanted the trial court to

grant him authority to give Vanessa Prolixin Decanoate, 2.5 to 50 milligrams intravenously,

every two weeks, rather than Risperdal Consta, as stated in the petition. As a result of

discussion with Vanessa’s attorney, the trial court narrowed the petition to substitute Prolixin

Decanoate as the primary medication, over Vanessa’s objection. The State also objected,

noting that the statutory written notice requirements were to be strictly construed and that

Vanessa was not given written information about Prolixin Decanoate. According to the State,

because Vanessa was provided written information regarding Risperdal Consta, it should

remain the primary medication per the petition in order to comply with the statutory

requirements. The trial court admonished the parties to decide whether to amend the petition

and adjourned for 10 minutes. When the hearing reconvened, Galbreath testified that he gave

Vanessa an oral explanation and written information on Prolixin Decanoate. The written

information states that the drug treats schizophrenia and includes the following headings:

“When This Medicine Should Not Be Used,” “How to Use This Medicine,” Drugs and Foods

to Avoid,” “Warnings While Using This Medicine,” and “Possible Side Effects.” A copy of

the written information provided Vanessa was admitted into evidence.

¶ 10 Following the close of testimony, the trial court granted the petition in its entirety. It

made the following findings. Vanessa had a serious mental illness, suffered from a

deterioration of her ability to function, and had engaged in threatening behavior. The

benefits of involuntarily administration of Prolixin Decanoate outweighed its harm. Vanessa

was informed orally and in writing about the drug’s side effects. Vanessa lacked the capacity

to make a reasoned decision about taking medication. Less restrictive alternatives were

explored and determined to be inappropriate. The trial court noted Vanessa’s in-court

behavior as support that a least restrictive environment would not work. No testing was

required for the safe administration of the drug. Afer making its findings, the trial court gave

a copy of Vanessa’s appeal rights to her attorney and told him to give it to her, which

counsel agreed to do.

¶ 11 ANALYSIS

¶ 12 Vanessa raises three issues: whether the State failed to comply with section 2-102 of the

Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code (Code) (405 ILCS 5/2-102(a-5) (West

2010)); whether the order allowing the involuntary administration of medication was

supported by clear and convincing evidence (405 ILCS 5/2-107.1(a-5) (West 2010)); and

whether the issues raised on appeal are moot.

¶ 13 We begin with the mootness issue, as it affects the viability of the appeal. Vanessa argues

that this court should recognize her appeal under the recognized exceptions to the mootness

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doctrine. She contends all three of the exceptions apply. Whether an exception to the

mootness doctrine applies is a question of law, which we review de novo. In re Alfred H.H.,

233 Ill. 2d 345, 350 (2009).

¶ 14 Courts will generally not decide moot questions, render advisory opinions, or consider

issues where the results will not be affected regardless of how the court decides the issues.

Alfred H.H., 233 Ill. 2d at 351. There are three exceptions to the mootness doctrine. In re

Daryll C., 401 Ill. App. 3d 748, 752 (2010). The public interest exception applies where (1)

the question is one of a public nature; (2) there is a need for an authoritative determination

for future guidance of public officers; and (3) there is a likelihood that the question would

recur. In re Robin C., 395 Ill. App. 3d 958, 963 (2009). The “capable of repetition yet

evading review” exception requires the complaining party to show that (1) the challenged

action is too short in its duration to be fully litigated prior to its cessation and (2) there is a

reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would be subjected to the same

action again. In re Barbara H., 183 Ill. 2d 482, 491 (1998). The collateral consequences

exception applies where a party has suffered or is threatened with an actual injury traceable

to the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial determination. Daryll C.,

401 Ill. App. 3d at 752.

¶ 15 Because the July 14, 2010, order authorizing the administration of psychotropic

medication was limited by statute to 90 days, it had expired by the time of this appeal,

making the issues raised here moot. 405 ILCS 5/2-107.1(a-5) (West 2010). However, we

find that the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine applies and permits this court

to reach the merits of Vanessa’s first issue. Vanessa seeks an interpretation of the written

notification requirements of section 2-102 of the Code, a matter of public concern. A

determination of that issue by this court will guide other public officers seeking and deciding

petitions to involuntarily medicate a respondent. There is a substantial likelihood that this

issue will arise again because petitions are limited to 90-day periods for involuntary

administration.

¶ 16 The public interest exception does not apply to Vanessa’s second issue, where she raises

a sufficiency of the evidence argument, because the facts of this case are particular to it and

not matters of public concern. We determine that the second exception to the mootness

doctrine, capable of repetition yet evading review, applies to the second appeal issue. The

90-day statutory limit for the involuntary administration establishes that an action

challenging the grant of a petition cannot be fully litigated before it expires. As supported

by the testimony below, Vanessa’s history of noncompliance with maintaining her

medication, and her inability to reason rationally because of her illness, it is reasonable to

expect that she would be subject to another petition for involuntary administration of

psychotropic medication in the future. Because these exceptions apply, we need not address

the collateral consequences exception.

¶ 17 Having concluded that exceptions to the mootness doctrine apply, we address the

substantive issues. We first consider whether the State failed to comply with section 2-102

of the Code. 405 ILCS 5/2-102(a-5) (West 2010). Vanessa contends that the State failed to

establish that it provided the required written information to her about the medications that

were options for her treatment. She also complains that the State failed to comply with the

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three-day notice requirement as set forth in section 2-107.1(a-5)(1) of the Code. 405 ILCS

5/2-107.1(a-5)(1) (West 2010).

¶ 18 The primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the

legislature’s intent. In re Mary Ann P., 202 Ill. 2d 393, 405 (2002). The best indicator of the

intent of the legislature is the statute’s language, which should be given its plain and

ordinary meaning. Mary Ann P., 202 Ill. 2d at 405. We review issues of statutory

construction de novo. In re Michelle J., 209 Ill. 2d 428, 434 (2004).

¶ 19 Section 2-102(a-5) states:

“If the services include the administration of *** psychotropic medication, the physician

or the physician’s designee shall advise the recipient, in writing, of the side effects, risks,

and benefits of the treatment, as well as alternatives to the proposed treatment, to the

extent such advice is consistent with the recipient’s ability to understand the information

communicated. The physician shall determine and state in writing whether the recipient

has the capacity to make a reasoned decision about the treatment. *** If the recipient

lacks the capacity to make a reasoned decision about the treatment, the treatment may

be administered only (i) pursuant to the provisions of Section 2-107 or 2-107.1 [405

ILCS 5/2-107 or 405 ILCS 5/2-107.1] ***.” 405 ILCS 5/2-102(a-5) (West 2010).

¶ 20 Section 2-102(a-5) requires written notification of the proposed treatment’s side effects,

risks, benefits, and alternative treatments. In re Dorothy J.N., 373 Ill. App. 3d 332, 336

(2007). A person cannot make an informed decision regarding the administration of

medication unless the risks and benefits are explained to him or her. In re Cathy M., 326 Ill.

App. 3d 335, 341 (2001). Even when a respondent is verbally advised about the benefits and

risks of a medication, and refuses to take it, he or she is entitled to written information. In

re Richard C., 329 Ill. App. 3d 1090, 1095 (2002). The State must present clear and

convincing evidence that it complied with the notification requirements in section 2-102(a5). In re Louis S., 361 Ill. App. 3d 774, 779-80 (2005).

¶ 21 Vanessa argues that trial court’s order must be reversed because she was not provided

written information about all the medication approved for administration by the court, noting

the lengthy list of alternative medications attached to the order. She relies on In re John R.,

339 Ill. App. 3d 778 (2003), and In re Laura H., 404 Ill. App. 3d 286 (2010), which

interpreted the statute as necessitating that written information be provided on all the

alternative medications. Both cases are distinguished on the facts. In John R., two of the

respondents did not receive any written information on the medications to be involuntarily

administered and the third respondent only received information on one of the drugs

authorized in the trial court’s order. John R., 339 Ill. App. 3d at 784. In Laura H., the

respondent was given a stack of drug handouts that failed to notify her about the risks,

benefits, and alternatives to the proposed treatment. Laura H., 404 Ill. App. 3d at 290. 

¶ 22 The involuntary administration of psychotropic medication implicates a respondent’s

liberty interests, which include a right to refuse medication. In In re C.E., 161 Ill. 2d 200,

214 (1994), the court recognized a mentally ill person’s constitutionally protected liberty

interest to refuse the administration of psychotropic medication. The court discussed two

guiding fundamental concerns about an involuntary treatment recipient’s due process rights,

including the “substantially invasive nature of psychotropic substances and their significant

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side effects” and “recognition that psychotropic substances may be misused by medical

personnel” for patient control rather than treatment. C.E., 161 Ill. 2d at 214-15. Because it

implicates a respondent’s liberty interests, the statute must be strictly construed. In re Alaka

W., 379 Ill. App. 3d 251, 275 (2008).

¶ 23 Here, the petition originally requested the administration of Risperdal Consta. Galbreath

gave Vanessa written information on that drug and attempted to verbally explain its risks,

benefits and side effects. He also verbally informed her of the risks, benefits, and side effects

of Prolixin Decanoate. Although he spoke to Vanessa on a daily basis regarding medication,

she would not participate in the discussion. In his opinion, Vanessa was “not really rational

to take care of herself,” and due to her illness, had a limited ability to understand the

information regarding the medication. After the petition was filed, Galbreath determined that

Prolixin Decanoate, an older form of schizophrenia medication, had worked well for Vanessa

in the past and would be a better medication for her. The order entered by the trial court was

limited to the administration of Prolixin Decanoate. The trial court expressly asked

Galbreath what medication he wanted to administer to Vanessa. Galbreath explained why

Prolixin Decanoate was a better choice for Vanessa, based on her prior experience using the

medication. No other medications were discussed and the order specified only Prolixin

Decanoate. In re Gail F., 365 Ill. App. 3d 439, 447 (2006) (finding trial court can approve

fewer medications than listed in the petition pursuant to treating doctor’s request). Galbreath

did not specify any alternative medications as he did not consider them to be viable options

for Vanessa. Accordingly, there was no need to provide information on all the medications

listed as alternatives in the attachment to the trial court’s order. At the hearing, Galbreath

admitted that written information on Prolixin Decanoate was not provided to Vanessa. The

hearing recessed for Galbreath to give Vanessa written information on the drug. When the

hearing reconvened, Galbreath testified that he provided Vanessa a document describing

Prolixin Decanoate and its use, benefits, risks and side effects as required by the statute.

¶ 24 Vanessa also argues that the statute requires the written information be provided to a

respondent three days prior to the hearing on a petition for involuntary administration. She

points to section 2-107.1(a-5)(1), which requires that a respondent be delivered a copy of the

petition three days before the hearing and contends that section 2-102 must be read in

conjunction with that requirement. 405 ILCS 5/2-107.1(a-5)(1), 2-102(a-5) (West 2010). We

find nothing in the Code requiring a three-day notice for the dissemination of written

materials. While section 2-102 references section 2-107.1, it does not incorporate that

section’s three-day notice requirement. We agree with Vanessa that a respondent may not

be able to make an informed decision without written information on the proposed treatment,

and that the better practice is to provide the information prior to the hearing. However, we

will not read into the statute conditions not expressed by the legislature. Michelle J., 209 Ill.

2d at 437. We find that Vanessa was timely provided the necessary written information on

Prolixin Decanoate as required in section 2-102 of the Code. In addition, the statutory

requirements pertain to the extent the respondent is able to understand. Here, Galbreath’s

testimony and Vanessa’s conduct at the hearing demonstrate her limited ability to

understand.

¶ 25 Our final issue is whether the order allowing the involuntary administration of

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medication was supported by clear and convincing evidence. Vanessa claims that the State

failed to establish that she lacked capacity, that the benefits of medications outweighed their

harm, and that the testing and procedures included in the order were necessary.

¶ 26 Section 2-107.1 allows a party to petition the court for an order authorizing the

involuntary administration of psychotropic medication. 405 ILCS 5/2-107.1(a-5)(1) (West

2010). The petition and notice of the hearing on it must be delivered to the respondent, his

or her attorney and guardian no later than three days before the hearing date. 405 ILCS 5/2-

107.1(a-5)(1) (West 2010). The petition may also ask the court to authorize any testing and

procedures necessary for the safe and effective administration of the medication and must

set forth the specific testing and procedures. 405 ILCS 5/2-107.1(a-5)(1) (West 2010).

Sections 2-107.1(a-5)(4)(A) through (a-5)(4)(G) state:

“(4) Psychotropic medication *** may be administered to the recipient if and only

if it has been determined by clear and convincing evidence that all of the following

factors are present. In determining whether a person meets the criteria specified in the

following paragraphs (A) through (G), the court may consider evidence of the person’s

history of serious violence, repeated past pattern of specific behavior, actions related to

the person’s illness, or past outcomes of various treatment options.

(A) That the recipient has a serious mental illness ***.

(B) That because of said mental illness ***, the recipient currently exhibits any

one of the following: (i) deterioration of his or her ability to function, as compared

to the recipient’s ability to function prior to the current onset of symptoms of the

mental illness *** for which treatment is presently sought, (ii) suffering, or (iii)

threatening behavior.

(C) That the illness *** has existed for a period marked by the continuing

presence of the symptoms set forth in item (B) of this subdivision (4) or the repeated

episodic occurrence of these symptoms.

(D) That the benefits of the treatment outweigh the harm.

(E) That the recipient lacks the capacity to make a reasoned decision about the

treatment.

(F) That other less restrictive services have been explored and found

inappropriate.

(G) If the petition seeks authorization for testing and other procedures, that such

testing and procedures are essential for the safe and effective administration of the

treatment.” 405 ILCS 5/2-107.1(a-5)(4)(A) through (a-5)(4)(G) (West 2010).

¶ 27 The State must present expert testimony regarding the above factors to sustain its burden.

In re Joseph M., 398 Ill. App. 3d 1086, 1090 (2010). Expert medical testimony is considered

clear and convincing when the expert identifies direct observation of the respondent on

several occasions as the basis for his or her diagnosis. In re Schaap, 274 Ill. App. 3d 497,

502 (1995) (citing In re Tuman, 268 Ill. App. 3d 106, 111 (1994)). An expert may also rely

on unsubstantiated evidence ordinarily considered as hearsay in order to explain the basis

of her opinion, if the evidence is the type reasonably relied on by experts in the field.

Schaap, 274 Ill. App. 3d at 502.

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¶ 28 An order authorizing administration of medication is limited to no more than 90 days.

405 ILCS 5/2-107.1(a-5)(5) (West 2010). The order must designate the persons authorized

to administer the treatment and specify the medications and anticipated range of dosages,

and “may include a list of any alternative medications and range of dosages deemed

necessary.” 405 ILCS 5/2-107.1(a-5)(6) (West 2010). This court will not reverse a trial

court’s order permitting the involuntary administration of psychotropic medication unless

it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Joseph M., 398 Ill. App. 3d at 1089. An

order is against the manifest weight of the evidence only when an opposite conclusion is

apparent or when the findings appear to be unreasonable, arbitrary and not based on the

evidence. Joseph M., 398 Ill. App. 3d at 1089.

¶ 29 Vanessa contends that the State did not prove she lacked capacity, that the treatment’s

benefits outweighed its harm, and that testing and procedures were necessary. She does not

dispute that the State established she has a serious mental illness; that because of her illness

she exhibits a deterioration of her ability to function as compared to her ability before the

current onset of symptoms, suffering, and threatening behavior; and that her illness has

existed for a period showing continued symptoms. 405 ILCS 5/2-107.1(a-5)(4)(A), (a5)(4)(B), (a-5)(4)(C) (West 2010).

¶ 30 To determine whether “the recipient lacks the capacity to make a reasoned decision about

the treatment” (405 ILCS 5/2-107.1(a-5)(4)(E) (West 2010)), a trial court considers the

following factors:

“(1) The person’s knowledge that he has a choice to make;

(2) The person’s ability to understand the available options, their advantages and

disadvantages;

(3) Whether the commitment is voluntary or involuntary;

(4) Whether the person has previously received the type of medication or treatment

at issue;

(5) If the person has received similar treatment in the past, whether he can describe

what happened as a result and how the effects were beneficial or harmful; and

(6) The absence of any interfering pathologic perceptions or beliefs or interfering

emotional states which might prevent an understanding of legitimate risks and benefits.”

In re Israel, 278 Ill. App. 3d 24, 37 (1996).

¶ 31 The record establishes the first factor, knowledge that she has a choice, weighs against

involuntary administration. Galbreath testified that Vanessa would take her medication when

she wanted to take it and would refuse it other times. Her refusal to take her medication

prompted the filing of the petition to involuntarily medicate. Although Vanessa’s reasoning

in making a choice regarding her medication is suspect due to her mental illness, it appears

that she was aware that she had a choice regarding medication. The second factor, ability to

understand the available options, favors involuntary administration. Galbreath testified that

he verbally informed Vanessa about the medication options on a daily basis but as a result

of her illness, she would become disruptive and leave the room. He also characterized

Vanessa as “not really rational to take care of herself” when she was not properly medicated,

as demonstrated by her courtroom behavior.

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¶ 32 The third factor, that the commitment is voluntary, favors Vanessa. However, this factor

is tempered by Galbreath’s testimony that Vanessa was “getting worse every day” due to her

refusal to consistently take her medication. The fourth factor, Vanessa’s previous use of

Prolixin Decanoate, favors involuntary administration. Galbreath explained that Vanessa has

reacted favorably to the drug in the past, that it curbed her aggression and that it allowed her

to avoid hospitalization for over a year. The fifth factor, Vanessa’s testimony regarding prior

use of the medication, also favors involuntary administration. As reflected in the record,

Vanessa was disruptive during the hearing and left without testifying. She presented the trial

court with a purported “written appeal” that consisted of illogical writings. The final factor,

the absence of any interfering pathologic perceptions, beliefs, or emotional states preventing

an understanding of risks and benefits, also favors involuntary administration. Galbreath

explained that because of her illness, Vanessa refused to consistently take her medication

and to address her psychotic activity. Based on our application of the Israel factors to the

instant facts, we find that the State established that Vanessa lacked the ability to make a

reasoned decision regarding her medication.

¶ 33 We next consider whether the State established that the benefits of administering Prolixin

Decanoate outweighed its harm. Galbreath compared the side effects of Risperdal Consta to

those of Prolixin Decanoate. He noted that Vanessa previously used Prolixin Decanoate with

successful results and apparently without adverse reaction. Without the medication, Vanessa

was not rational to care for herself as evidenced by her worsening condition. He also

believed that the involuntary administration of psychotropic medication was necessary for

safety concerns, as supported by Vanessa’s aggressive and threatening behavior toward her

caretakers. Another benefit Galbreath mentioned was Vanessa’s ability to stay out of the

hospital for a year when previously using Prolixin Decanoate. Finally, contrary to Vanessa’s

claim, Galbreath testified, and the trial court reiterated, that no testing or procedures were

needed to monitor Vanessa’s use of Prolixin Decanoate. Galbreath said that he would

monitor Vanessa with observation and that no other action was necessary. We find that the

State proved by clear and convincing evidence the statutory factors necessary to sustain its

petition. The trial court’s grant of the petition to involuntarily administer psychotropic

medication was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 34 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Rock Island County is

affirmed.

¶ 35 Affirmed.

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