Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before 

any court except for the purpose of 

establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

ROBERTA L. RENBARGER CHERRIE L.B. WELLS

Renbarger Law Firm Fort Wayne, Indiana

Fort Wayne, Indiana

ROBERT J. HENKE

DCS Central Administration

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

IN THE MATTER OF THE TERMINATION )

OF THE PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP )

OF: I.M.A. and L.R.A. (Minor Children), and )

M.M.H. (Mother), )

Appellant-Respondent, )

)

vs. ) No. 02A04-1212-JT-634

)

THE INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF )

CHILD SERVICES, )

Appellee-Petitioner. )

APPEAL FROM THE ALLEN SUPERIOR COURT

The Honorable Charles F. Pratt, Judge

The Honorable Lori K. Morgan, Magistrate

Cause No. 02D08-1202-JT-43

Cause No. 02D08-1202-JT-44

July 19, 2013

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

BAILEY, Judge
2

Case Summary

M.M.H. (“Mother”) appeals the termination court’s order terminating her parental 

rights as to I.M.A. and L.R.A. (“Children”).

We affirm.

Issue

Mother raises two issues for our review, one of which we find dispositive and restate 

as: whether there was insufficient evidence to support the conclusion that continuing the 

parent-child relationship posed a threat to Children’s well-being. 

Facts and Procedural History

I.M.A. was born to Mother in 2007; L.R.A. was born to Mother in 2009.1 Each child 

was born premature and suffered upper respiratory difficulties during childhood. Mother 

suffered from Crohn’s Disease and had been previously diagnosed with bipolar disorder and 

post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”). I.M.A. was receiving treatment for hyperactivity. 

During the first six months of L.R.A.’s life, Mother brought the child to hospital emergency 

rooms for treatment approximately fifty times. After a visit to the hospital in March 2010, an 

emergency room physician contacted the Department of Child Services (“DCS”) to report 

concerns about Mother’s neglect of Children.

DCS contacted Mother, who agreed that I.M.A. and L.R.A. were Children in Need of 

Services (“CHINS”). Upon investigation of Mother’s and the Children’s circumstances, 

DCS also learned that Mother’s relationship with Father involved domestic violence. As part 

 

1 The parental rights of Q.A. a/k/a P.M. (“Father”) were also terminated; Father does not appeal.
3

of a safety plan to avoid removal of the Children from her home, Mother sought and obtained 

protective orders against Father as to herself and Children. DCS began to provide parenting 

and other home-based services for Mother. The court ordered Mother to obtain 

psychological health services for herself and designated a specific physician as a primary 

point of contact for the Children’s medical care.

During the initial phases of the case, Mother and the Children resided with Mother’s 

mother (“Grandmother”). Mother’s relationship with Grandmother was volatile at times, and 

in July 2010 Mother moved with the Children to a trailer park that was relatively near 

Father’s place of residence. After less than one month, however, Mother moved herself and 

the Children out of the mobile home and back into Grandmother’s home.

Soon after this, on August 10, 2010, Mother was preparing a sleep aid for I.M.A. and 

left the medication out while she used the restroom. I.M.A. consumed an overdose amount 

of the prescription medication; consequently, DCS removed the Children from the home and 

placed them into foster care. After Children’s removal from the home, Mother began to 

obtain psychological counseling services and to engage in supervised visitation with the 

Children.

After approximately one year, in August 2011, DCS returned the Children to Mother’s 

home, which she still shared with Grandmother, for a trial home visit, with the expectation 

that the Children would be reunified with Mother. On November 17, 2011, a hearing was 

held, during which DCS requested a three-month extension of the trial home visit to enable 

Mother’s continued access to services, including assistance locating independent housing for 
4

herself and Children.

On November 18, 2011, Mother was arrested after driving a car used to transport an 

individual who committed a bank robbery. L.R.A. was in the car with Mother at the time. 

Mother was arrested and was in jail from November 18, 2011 until February 7, 2012, when 

she was released to a four-year term of home detention after pleading guilty to a charge of 

Aiding an Armed Robbery, as a Class C felony.

On November 22, 2011, shortly after Mother’s arrest, a detention hearing was held, 

and the Children were again placed into foster care. The Children remained in foster care 

after Mother was released from prison and into home detention.

On February 21, 2012, a permanency hearing was held, at which DCS requested that 

Mother’s parental rights be terminated.

On March 28, 2012, after requesting that a community corrections officer take her for 

psychiatric treatment, Mother was rearrested for violating the terms of her home detention 

sentence. Mother’s home detention was subsequently revoked, and she was incarcerated in 

the Indiana Department of Correction.

In a hearing conducted on July 31, August 1, August 2, and August 16 2012, the 

termination court heard evidence relating to DCS’s petition to termination Mother’s parental 

rights. On November 14, 2012, the termination court entered findings and conclusions, in 

which it granted DCS’s petition to termination Mother’s parental rights.

This appeal ensued.
5

Discussion and Decision

Mother appeals the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights. Our standard of 

review is highly deferential in cases concerning the termination of parental rights. In re K.S., 

750 N.E.2d 832, 836 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). This Court will not set aside the trial court’s 

judgment terminating a parent-child relationship unless it is clearly erroneous. In re A.A.C., 

682 N.E.2d 542, 544 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence 

to support a judgment of involuntary termination of a parent-child relationship, we neither 

reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses. Id. We consider only the 

evidence that supports the judgment and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. Id.

Parental rights are of a constitutional dimension, but the law provides for the 

termination of those rights when the parents are unable or unwilling to meet their parental 

responsibilities. Bester v. Lake Cnty. Office of Family & Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 

(Ind. 2005). The purpose of terminating parental rights is not to punish the parents, but to 

protect their children. In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d 204, 208 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied. 

Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4(b)(2) sets out the elements that the DCS must allege 

and prove by clear and convincing evidence in order to terminate a parent-child relationship:

(A) That one (1) of the following is true:

(i) The child has been removed from the parent for at least six (6) 

months under a dispositional decree.

(ii) A court has entered a finding under IC 31-34-21-5.6 that 

reasonable efforts for family preservation or reunification are 

not required, including a description of the court’s finding, the 

date of the finding, and the manner in which the finding was 

made.

(iii) The child has been removed from the parent and has been under 
6

the supervision of a county office of family and children for at 

least fifteen (15) months of the most recent twenty-two (22) 

months, beginning with the date the child is removed from the 

home as a result of the child being alleged to be a child in need 

of services or a delinquent child;

(B) That one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted 

in the child’s removal or the reasons for placement outside the 

home of the parents will not be remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the 

parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the 

child.

(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been adjudicated a 

child in need of services;

(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and

(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child.

If the court finds that the allegations in a petition described in Section 4 of this chapter 

are true, the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8(a). A 

trial court must judge a parent’s fitness to care for his or her child at the time of the 

termination hearing, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions. In re J.T., 

742 N.E.2d 509, 512 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. The trial court also must “evaluate 

the parent’s habitual patterns of conduct to determine the probability of future neglect or 

deprivation of the child.” Id. Courts have properly considered evidence of a parent’s prior 

criminal history, drug and alcohol abuse, history of neglect, failure to provide support, and 

lack of adequate housing and employment. A.F. v. Marion Cnty. Office of Family & 

Children, 762 N.E.2d 1244, 1251 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied.

In her appeal of the trial court’s decision terminating her parental rights, Mother 
7

argues that DCS did not provide sufficient evidence to satisfy the requirements of 

subsections 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B)(i) and (ii). See supra. This statute “is written in the 

disjunctive” so that only one of the requirements of subsection (B)—here, either that there is 

a reasonable probability the conditions necessitating a child’s removal will not be remedied 

or that continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the child’s well-being—

need be proved by clear and convincing evidence. In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d at 209.

The evidence presented to the termination court included testimony concerning 

Mother’s mental health status and her decision-making skills. Before the CHINS 

proceedings began, Mother had already been diagnosed with Crohn’s disease, bi-polar 

disorder, and PTSD. As a result of the rendering of services during the CHINS proceeding, 

Mother was also diagnosed with borderline personality disorder. Mother’s therapist, Cynthia 

Probst (“Probst”), testified that borderline personality disorder caused Mother to make 

decisions that coincided with her own perceived interests to the detriment of the Children’s 

needs. Probst also testified that Mother’s decision-making was frequently impulsive, 

including the decision to leave I.M.A.’s sleeping medication accessible to him in August 

2010, and that Mother compartmentalized her problems and refused to accept accountability 

for the effects upon the Children of her own decisions. Probst and other service providers 

further testified that Mother’s arrest after aiding a bank robbery with L.R.A. in the car, 

together with Mother’s subsequent failure to comply with the terms of her home detention or 

to participate regularly in DCS-provided services during that period, demonstrated that 

Mother’s impulsiveness had not come under control. Thus, all the service providers opined 
8

that maintaining the parent-child relationship between Mother and the Children would 

continue to expose the Children to the risks of Mother’s impulsiveness.

In addition, numerous service providers, the Children’s Guardian Ad Litem, and the 

Court-Appointed Special Advocate testified that Mother would present partial versions of 

facts to various service providers in order to get an answer she wanted on issues relating to 

her care of the Children or other matters. The Children’s Guardian Ad Litem characterized 

this conduct “relentless” and driven by Mother’s personality disorder. (Aug. 1, 2012 Tr. at 

110.) Mother’s triangulation among service providers extended to questions concerning the 

Children’s medical care, and a safety plan was put into place that required Mother to contact 

a support system before taking the Children for medical care during the trial home visit from 

August to November 2011. Several service providers testified that Mother’s decisionmaking abilities, even with successful completion of services, were likely insufficient to 

avoid harm to the Children without DCS-provided services in place for an extended period of 

time, and all of the providers testified that the safety plan’s decision-making support system 

could not function in the long-term without DCS supervision. 

In summary, all the service providers involved in the case testified that Mother’s 

progress throughout the case was like a “roller coaster[,]” moving from one crisis to the next 

without permanent improvement. (Aug. 1, 2012 Tr. at 89.) Mother’s decision-making 

abilities, which had placed the Children in jeopardy on prior occasions, had not improved 

after nearly two years of DCS-provided services, and service providers testified that 

continued services were unlikely to create subsequent improvement. Based upon this 
9

evidence, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence that continuation of the parent-child 

relationship posed a threat to the Children’s well-being under subsection 31-35-2-

4(b)(2)(B)(ii). Thus, we need not consider Mother’s argument under subsection 31-35-2-

4(b)(2)(B)(i), and affirm the trial court’s order terminating Mother’s parental rights.

Affirmed.

NAJAM, J., and BARNES, J., concur.