IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA 

No. 69 / 06-0977 

Filed October 5, 2007 

CITY OF MADRID, IOWA, and EMC INSURANCE COMPANIES,

 Appellants, 

vs. 

ANGELA BLASNITZ,

 Appellee. 

 On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals. 

 Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Arthur E. 

Gamble, Judge. 

 Insurer seeks further review of court of appeals decision 

remanding workers’ compensation case to commissioner for 

determination of insurer’s liability for penalty benefits. DECISION OF 

COURT OF APPEALS VACATED. DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT 

AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART; CASE REMANDED. 

 Lori A. Brandau and Michael L. Mock of Bradshaw, Fowler, Proctor 

& Fairgrave, P.C., Des Moines, for appellants. 

 Jim Lawyer of Lawyer, Lawyer, Dutton & Drake, LLP, 

West Des Moines, for appellee. 
2

TERNUS, Chief Justice. 

 This appeal involves a workers’ compensation insurer’s challenge 

to an award of penalty benefits by the workers’ compensation 

commissioner. The district court ruled the commissioner had applied an 

incorrect standard in determining the employer’s liability for penalty 

benefits under Iowa Code section 86.13 (2003) and concluded the case 

should be remanded to the commissioner for reconsideration of penalty 

benefits under the appropriate test. Upon the employer’s appeal, the 

court of appeals affirmed the district court’s remand to the 

commissioner. 

 We conclude the commissioner’s award of penalty benefits was not 

supported by substantial evidence because the underlying workers’ 

compensation claim was fairly debatable as a matter of law under the 

record before the commissioner. Therefore, we vacate the court of 

appeals decision, affirm the judgment of the district court in part and 

reverse in part, and remand the case for entry of a judgment consistent 

with this opinion. 

I. Background Facts and Proceedings. 

 On August 1, 2003, the appellee, Angela Blasnitz, filed a petition 

for arbitration seeking workers’ compensation benefits for a shoulder 

injury she was ultimately found to have sustained on January 17, 2003. 

Her employer, City of Madrid, Iowa, and its workers’ compensation 

insurer, EMC Insurance Companies, denied her claim, contending she 

had not sustained a shoulder injury on the date alleged. (We will refer to 

these parties jointly as the insurer.) An arbitration decision was 

eventually entered by a deputy workers’ compensation commissioner, 

awarding disability, medical, and penalty benefits. 
3

 On intra-agency appeal, the workers’ compensation commissioner 

affirmed, adopting the deputy’s decision with some “additional analysis” 

concerning the penalty benefits issue. Before reviewing the 

commissioner’s analysis of this issue, it is helpful to summarize the 

pertinent facts found by the commissioner, as well as the relevant 

documentary evidence and testimony introduced at the hearing. 

 In January 2003 the claimant was employed as a police officer for 

the City of Madrid. On January 17, 2003, she was dispatched to a call at 

the home of Michael and Susan Palmer to investigate a domestic 

disturbance. The claimant testified at her workers’ compensation 

hearing that she slipped and fell in the Palmer home, striking her right 

shoulder and elbow. At the time of the incident, the claimant was 

wearing a remote microphone for her patrol vehicle recording system, 

and she can be heard to fall on the tape. Her fall was not visible on the 

tape, however. 

 The claimant stated in answers to interrogatories that she had 

immediate pain in her shoulder and elbow. The patrol car tape shows 

her conducting a vehicle stop after her fall, sometimes using her right 

arm above her shoulder. She does say “ouch” once while searching the 

vehicle. The claimant did not record that she sustained an injury when 

she completed her patrol activity report for her January 17, 2003 shift. 

The claimant had been injured three times while working for the city 

before the January 17, 2003 incident, and on each occasion, she had 

noted her injury in her patrol activity log on the day the injury occurred. 

 The claimant testified she had a discussion with the police chief 

the day after her fall regarding an injury to her shoulder. The chief, 

however, denied he had a conversation with the claimant on January 18 

or January 19, as he did not work on either date. 
4

 The police chief gave the claimant a three-day suspension on 

February 19, 2003, for failing to follow an office directive with respect to 

an unrelated matter. On the final day of her suspension, February 24, 

2003, the claimant sought her initial treatment for her shoulder, neck 

and arm. She reported to her chiropractor on that date that she had her 

first symptoms after a fall on her right shoulder approximately three 

weeks earlier. The claimant wrote a note to her employer the next day, 

February 25, 2003, stating that she fell “at the 10-16” and hurt her back 

and shoulder. In response to this note, the insurer authorized medical 

care with a Dr. Kirkland, who the claimant saw on March 19, 2003. The 

claimant reported to Dr. Kirkland that she slipped and fell on either 

January 17, 2003, or December 17, 2002, while responding to a call, but 

according to his records, she really could not remember. Also on 

March 19, 2003, the claimant reported to Therapeutic Associates that 

the injury occurred ninety days prior. On March 26, 2003, she told a 

physical therapist that she injured her shoulder on January 17, 2003, 

when responding to a domestic-dispute call. She gave the same history 

to a physician she consulted on May 7, 2003, who determined the 

claimant had a rotator cuff tear in her right shoulder. The claimant 

subsequently had two surgeries to repair the tear. 

 On three occasions in April 2003, the insurer made surveillance 

videos of the claimant. In one video, she can be seen bridling, leading, 

and grooming three horses for approximately ninety minutes, using both 

arms, sometimes above shoulder level. At one point, she appears to 

briefly shake her right arm and hold her right shoulder. On May 21, 

2003, the insurer took a recorded statement from Mr. Palmer, one of the 

subjects of the claimant’s January 17 domestic-disturbance call. 

Mr. Palmer told the insurer that the claimant fell straight down on 
5

January 17, 2003, and landed on her bottom. The insurer wrote to the 

claimant on May 22, 2003, denying her claim. 

 On June 2, 2003, the claimant called Mr. Palmer and asked him to 

sign a statement for her because “she was having trouble with the 

workmen’s comp.” The next day, June 3, 2003, Mr. Palmer gave a 

second statement to the insurer, stating that on January 17, 2003, “he 

had turned slightly and he turned back around and claimant had her 

feet in the air and her back was against the wall.” He explained that he 

“just wasn’t thinking right” when he gave his first statement. Eventually, 

Mr. Palmer’s deposition was taken on March 12, 2004. He testified that 

he did not see the claimant fall on January 17, 2003, but he did offer to 

help her up after her fall. He further testified she said she was fine, she 

did not act like she had been injured, and she did not rub her right arm 

or shoulder. Mr. Palmer also suggested in his deposition that the parties 

should question his wife about the incident as she was sitting on the 

couch facing the door where and when the claimant slipped. 

 The insurer then contacted Mrs. Palmer, who gave a statement on 

March 17, 2004. Mrs. Palmer stated that she saw the claimant fall and 

did not recall that the claimant struck her right shoulder or arm in the 

course of her fall. Mrs. Palmer testified consistently with her statement 

when her deposition was subsequently taken on May 11, 2004. She 

testified she saw the claimant fall, but did not see her hit anything. She 

said the claimant fell straight down on her bottom with her feet straight 

out in front of her. Mrs. Palmer said her husband asked the claimant if 

she was okay, and the claimant said she was okay and did not act 

injured. 

 In addition to the testimony of the Palmers, the police chief 

testified at the hearing that the claimant told him in mid-2002 that she 
6

had been kicked in the right arm by her horse. The police chief said he 

observed a large bruise on her arm at that time. The police chief and 

another officer also testified they believed the claimant had been 

untruthful in the past. Finally, the claimant’s surgeon stated there are 

activities involved in caring for and showing horses that could cause a 

rotator cuff tear. 

 In affirming the deputy’s decision to award penalty benefits, the 

commissioner stated: 

Not every defense or factual dispute is sufficient to constitute 

the reasonable or probable cause or excuse as contemplated 

by section 86.13. Only a very unimaginative mind would be 

unable to find a shred of evidentiary fact that could be 

pointed to as a reason to deny compensability of any claim. 

Eyewitness accounts of the same incident commonly vary. 

Memories fade. A view of the totality of the evidence is 

required to determine whether reasonable or probable cause 

or excuse existed. Substantial evidence that has a 

reasonable chance of prevailing is required . . . . 

(Emphasis added.) The commissioner then briefly reviewed the evidence, 

noting the record “contains some inconsistencies.” Notwithstanding 

these inconsistencies, he concluded, 

Claimant was employed as a peace officer, a position that 

judges and juries typically consider to be one that brings 

credibility. . . . When the totality of the facts in this case are 

considered and weighed, I find that it was not reasonable to 

consider the untimely evidence from Ms. Palmer to be of 

sufficient import and reliability to have a reasonable chance 

of outweighing all the contrary evidence that supported the 

compensability of claimant’s claim. It cannot be stated 

better than how the deputy characterized it on page 14 of his 

decision, “In light of the overwhelming weight of other 

evidence, Ms. Palmer’s statements do not make claimant’s 

claim fairly debatable.” 

(Emphasis added.) 

 The insurer sought judicial review of the commissioner’s award of 

penalty benefits, claiming (1) the commissioner had erroneously imposed 
7

a burden on the insurer to show that its position had a reasonable 

chance of prevailing, and (2) the commissioner’s award of penalty 

benefits was not supported by substantial evidence. See Iowa Code 

§ 17A.19(10)(c), (f). The claimant argued in response that the 

commissioner’s standard was merely a restatement of the fairly 

debatable test and substantial evidence in the record supported the 

commissioner’s penalty-benefits award. The district court concluded the 

commissioner had applied an incorrect legal standard and reversed the 

award of penalty benefits. The court was unwilling, however, to rule as a 

matter of law that the compensability of the claimant’s claim was fairly 

debatable. Instead, the court decided “it would be more appropriate to 

remand” the case to the commissioner for reconsideration “in light of the 

appropriate legal standard.” The court observed the commissioner may 

determine on remand that the issue was fairly debatable or may award 

penalty benefits in a different amount, and that “decision would then be 

subject to subsequent judicial review on a substantial evidence 

standard.” 

 The insurer appealed the district court’s ruling on the substantialevidence issue, and the case was transferred to the court of appeals. 

That court agreed with the district court, ruling the appropriate relief 

was to remand the case to the commissioner so he could have an 

opportunity to consider an award of penalty benefits under the correct 

test. The insurer filed an application for further review, which we 

granted. The sole issue on appeal is whether the record before the 

commissioner provides substantial evidence to support an award of 

penalty benefits.1 See id. § 17A.19(10)(f). Stated another way, we must 

 1The claimant does not contend on appeal that it would be inappropriate to 

address the substantial-evidence issue in view of the commissioner’s application of the 

incorrect legal standard, which appeared to be the concern prompting the district court 
8

decide whether the compensability of the claimant’s claim was fairly 

debatable as a matter of law. See Garcia v. Naylor Concrete Co., 650 

N.W.2d 87, 91 (Iowa 2002) (“However, in challenging an agency finding, a 

party may not succeed merely by showing that the evidence would 

support a different conclusion than the one that the agency reached. In 

order to succeed, it must be demonstrated that, as a matter of law, the 

finding that the agency made was not supported by substantial 

evidence.” (Citation omitted.)). 

II. Standard of Review. 

 “Under the Iowa Administrative Procedure Act, a reviewing court 

may reverse the decision of the workers' compensation commissioner if it 

is unsupported by substantial evidence in the record . . . .” Univ. of Iowa 

Hosps. & Clinics v. Waters, 674 N.W.2d 92, 95 (Iowa 2004) (citing Iowa 

Code § 17A.19(10) (2001)). “Substantial evidence” 

means the quantity and quality of evidence that would be 

deemed sufficient by a neutral, detached, and reasonable 

person, to establish the fact at issue when the consequences 

resulting from the establishment of that fact are understood 

to be serious and of great importance. 

Iowa Code § 17A.19(10(f)(1). “In assessing evidentiary support for the 

agency's factual determinations, we consider evidence that detracts from 

the agency's findings, as well as evidence that supports them, giving 

deference to the credibility determinations of the presiding officer.” 

Lange v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue, 710 N.W.2d 242, 247 (Iowa 2006) (citing 

Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)( f )(3)). 

 

to remand the case back to the commissioner. Therefore, we proceed directly to a 

discussion of whether there is substantial evidence in the record to support the award 

of penalty benefits. See generally Mosher v. Dep’t of Inspections & Appeals, 671 N.W.2d 

501, 514, 518 (Iowa 2003) (concluding (1) agency had incorrectly interpreted the term 

“dependent adult” as used in governing statute and (2) agency’s finding that the nursing 

home resident was a “dependent adult” was not supported by substantial evidence). 
9

III. Applicable Law.

 Penalty benefits in a workers’ compensation case are authorized by 

section 86.13, which states: 

 If a delay in commencement or termination of benefits 

occurs without reasonable or probable cause or excuse, the 

workers’ compensation commissioner shall award benefits in 

addition to those benefits payable under this chapter or 

chapter 85, 85A, or 85B, up to fifty percent of the amount of 

benefits that were unreasonably delayed or denied. 

Iowa Code § 86.13, para. 4. A claimant seeking to recover under this 

statute must establish “a delay in the commencement of benefits or a 

termination of benefits.” Keystone Nursing Care Ctr. v. Craddock, 705 

N.W.2d 299, 307 (Iowa 2005). The burden then shifts to the insurer “to 

prove[] a reasonable cause or excuse” for the delay or denial. 

Christensen v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 554 N.W.2d 254, 260 (Iowa 1996). 

“A reasonable cause or excuse exists if either (1) the delay was necessary 

for the insurer to investigate the claim or (2) the employer had a 

reasonable basis to contest the employee’s entitlement to benefits.” Id. 

 The claimant does not argue the insurer took too long to 

investigate the claim before its May 23, 2003 denial. Rather, the 

claimant contends the insurer did not have a reasonable basis to contest 

her entitlement to benefits. In the Christensen case, we held the “fairly 

debatable” standard used in the tort of bad faith denial of insurance 

claims should be used for purposes of section 86.13 penalty benefits in 

determining whether a workers’ compensation insurer had a reasonable 

basis to deny a claimant’s claim. Id. 

 This court recently stated the following principles with respect to 

the reasonable-basis element of a bad-faith tort claim: 

A reasonable basis exists for denial of policy benefits if the 

insured’s claim is fairly debatable either on a matter of fact 

or law. A claim is “fairly debatable” when it is open to 
10

dispute on any logical basis. Stated another way, if 

reasonable minds can differ on the coverage-determining 

facts or law, then the claim is fairly debatable. 

 The fact that the insurer’s position is ultimately found 

to lack merit is not sufficient by itself to establish the first 

element of a bad faith claim. The focus is on the existence of 

a debatable issue, not on which party was correct. 

 Whether a claim is fairly debatable can generally be 

decided as a matter of law by the court. That is because 

“ ‘where an objectively reasonable basis for denial of a claim 

actually exists, the insurer cannot be held liable for bad faith 

as a matter of law.’ ” As one court has explained, “[c]ourts 

and juries do not weigh the conflicting evidence that was 

before the insurer; they decide whether evidence existed to 

justify denial of the claim.” 

Bellville v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 702 N.W.2d 468, 473-74 (Iowa 

2005) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 

IV. Discussion. 

 It is apparent the commissioner erroneously weighed the evidence 

in deciding whether the claimant’s claim was fairly debatable. Moreover, 

the commissioner focused on only one item of evidence—Mrs. Palmer’s 

statement—in evaluating the reasonableness of the insurer’s denial. 

Finally, the commissioner improperly suggested the employer should 

have considered the claimant to be credible simply because she was 

employed as a peace officer. Using the proper analysis and considering 

all the facts before the commissioner that would support the insurer’s 

denial, we conclude the insurer cannot be held liable for penalty benefits 

as a matter of law. 

 Several facts and circumstances supported the insurer’s position 

that the claimant did not injure her shoulder in her January 17, 2003 

fall, including the following: (1) Mr. Palmer initially stated the claimant 

fell straight down and landed on her bottom; (2) Mr. Palmer modified his 

account of this incident only after the claimant called him, and even 

then, he continued to testify that the claimant said she was not injured 
11

immediately after her fall (in contrast to the claimant’s testimony that 

she felt immediate pain); (3) Mrs. Palmer stated the claimant fell straight 

down on her bottom; (4) the claimant’s surgeon testified that if the 

claimant fell flat on her bottom and did not hit her arm on anything, the 

fall would not have caused the injury for which he treated her; (5) the 

claimant failed to record her injury in her activity log, in contrast to three 

prior work-related injuries that she noted in her activity logs on the day 

the injuries occurred2; (6) the police chief denied he was told of the 

claimant’s injury the day after it occurred, as claimed by the claimant; (7) 

the claimant failed to seek medical treatment until five weeks after her 

fall; (8) the claimant gave inconsistent statements to treatment providers 

as to the date of her injury; (9) although at the hearing the claimant 

denied using her right arm above shoulder level to conduct a sobriety 

test in a stop three hours after her fall, her patrol car video tape shows 

the claimant using her right arm above shoulder level several times 

during the stop; (10) the claimant stated to the police chief in mid-2002 

that she had been kicked in the right arm by her horse and the police 

chief observed a large bruise on her arm; (11) the claimant’s surgeon 

testified there are activities involved in caring for and showing horses 

that could cause a rotator cuff tear; and (12) the police chief and another 

police officer believed the claimant had been untruthful at times. Only 

one conclusion can be drawn from the undisputed existence of the 

foregoing statements, testimony, and records: the insurer had a 

 2On February 20, 2002, the claimant noted in her patrol activity log that she 

twisted her left ankle on large rocks in a parking lot. On August 2, 2002, she noted in 

her log that she was assaulted by a suspect and subsequently seen at the Boone 

County Hospital. On November 30, 2002, the claimant recorded in her activity log that 

she had dropped a clipboard on the top of her left foot, causing it to turn black and 

blue. 
12

reasonable basis to contend the claimant did not sustain a rotator cuff 

tear when she fell on January 17, 2003. 

The claimant argues that many of the facts shown at the hearing 

were unknown to the insurer when it denied payment for the claimant’s 

surgery on June 20, 2003, and the facts known by the insurer on that 

date were not sufficient to render the insurer’s denial reasonable. 

Contrary to the claimant’s contention, it is uncontroverted in the record 

that, by June 20, 2003, the insurer had a statement from Mr. Palmer in 

which he stated the claimant fell straight down on her bottom, and it had 

medical records in which the claimant gave inconsistent histories of her 

injury. These facts made the claimant’s claim fairly debatable. Those 

facts arising later or coming to the attention of the insurer subsequent to 

June 20, 2003, merely provided further support for the insurer’s decision 

to persist in its denial. 

 We note the claimant, in discussing the facts pertinent to the 

validity of her claim for benefits, ignores Mr. Palmer’s initial statement, 

apparently due to the fact that he subsequently gave a second statement 

more favorable to the claimant. But the insurer is not required to accept 

the evidence most favorable to the claimant and ignore contradictory 

evidence. See Bellville, 702 N.W.2d at 479 (stating insurer is not 

required to view the facts in a light most favorable to the claimant); 

Gilbert v. USF Holland, Inc., 637 N.W.2d 194, 200 (Iowa 2001) (stating 

employer could reasonably argue later inconsistent version of incident 

was a fabrication). Here, reasonable persons could discount 

Mr. Palmer’s assertion that he “just wasn’t thinking right” when he gave 

his first statement and disbelieve his second statement, concluding 

Mr. Palmer changed his account of what happened to assist the claimant 

in recovering workers’ compensation benefits. Similarly, the insurer was 
13

not required to believe the claimant simply because she was a police 

officer, as implied by the commissioner. 

 The claimant also relies on the fact the commissioner rejected the 

insurer’s evidence when the commissioner ruled the claimant sustained 

a shoulder injury on January 17, 2003. But the fact the commissioner 

was not convinced by the evidence supporting the insurer’s denial does 

not negate the existence of a genuine dispute with respect to whether the 

claimant’s January 2003 fall was the cause of her injury. Bellville, 702 

N.W.2d at 473 (stating the fact the insurer’s position is ultimately found 

to lack merit will not by itself establish the insurer had no reasonable 

basis for its denial of benefits); Gilbert, 637 N.W.2d at 200 (same). 

 In view of the facts that created a genuine dispute with respect to 

the cause of the claimant’s rotator cuff tear, we conclude the claimant’s 

claim was fairly debatable as a matter of law. See id. at 474 (“[I]f it is 

undisputed that evidence existed creating a genuine dispute . . . , a court 

can almost always decide that the claim was fairly debatable as a matter 

of law.”). Consequently, the commissioner’s award of penalty benefits 

was not supported by substantial evidence. See Gilbert, 637 N.W.2d at 

201 (“In conclusion, we hold as a matter of law there was a reasonable 

factual dispute as to the manner in which Gilbert's injury occurred. 

Therefore, there is not substantial evidence in the record to support a 

finding that the compensability of his injury was not fairly debatable.”). 

The district court should have remanded this case to the commissioner 

for entry of an order denying penalty benefits. 

V. Disposition. 

 The record before the commissioner established that the claimant’s 

entitlement to benefits was fairly debatable as a matter of law. 

Consequently, there is not substantial evidence to support a finding that 
14

the insurer’s denial of that claim was “without reasonable or probable 

cause or excuse” so as to entitle the claimant to penalty benefits. 

Because there is not substantial evidence to support the commissioner’s 

award of such benefits, that part of the commissioner’s decision must be 

reversed. 

 We vacate the court of appeals decision because that court 

concluded the penalty-benefits issue should be remanded for a ruling by 

the commissioner. We affirm that part of the district court’s decision 

reversing the commissioner’s award of penalty benefits. We reverse that 

part of the district court judgment remanding the matter to the 

commissioner for reconsideration of the penalty-benefits claim. Finally, 

we remand this case to the district court for entry of an order reversing 

the commissioner’s award of penalty benefits and directing the 

commissioner to deny the claimant’s request for penalty benefits. 

DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED. DISTRICT 

COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART; 

CASE REMANDED.