UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 18-4763

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

ANTOINE DESHAWN MILLER,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, 

at Charleston. David A. Faber, Senior District Judge. (2:04-cr-00096-2)

Submitted: March 26, 2019 Decided: April 8, 2019

Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Brian J. Kornbrath, Acting Federal Publilc Defender, Jonathan D. Byrne, Assistant 

Federal Public Defender, Lex A. Coleman, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE 

OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant. 

Michael B. Stuart, United States Attorney, Emily J. Wasserman, Assistant United States

Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charleston, West Virginia, 

for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Antoine Deshawn Miller appeals from the 60-month sentence imposed upon 

revocation of his supervised release, arguing that the sentence was plainly unreasonable. 

Finding no error, we affirm. 

Miller pled guilty in 2005 to conspiracy to obstruct interstate commerce by 

robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (2012) (“Hobbs Act robbery conspiracy”) 

(Count 1), and use of a firearm during a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 924(c)(1)(A) (2012) (Count 2). Miller was sentenced to a total term of 172 months’ 

imprisonment, consisting of a 52-month sentence for Hobbs Act robbery conspiracy and 

a consecutive sentence of 120 months’ imprisonment for the § 924(c) conviction. He did 

not appeal.

Miller began serving his five-year term of supervised release on July 5, 2017. In 

February 2018, a petition to revoke Miller’s supervised release was filed, based on three 

violations of the terms of his supervision: (1) commission of a crime (burglary, robbery, 

illegal possession of a firearm); (2) possession of a firearm; and (3) failure to make 

monthly restitution payments. At his revocation hearing, Miller did not contest the 

violations. 

Based on a criminal history category of II and his most serious violation (a Grade 

A offense), Miller’s policy statement range was 15 to 21 months’ imprisonment on Count 

1 and 27 to 33 months’ imprisonment on Count 2. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 

Manual (USSG) § 7B1.4(a), p.s. (2016). The statutory maximum sentences were 24 
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months as to Count 1 and 60 months as to Count 2. The court imposed a 60-month 

sentence, with no additional supervised release. Miller appeals. 

A sentence imposed after revocation of supervised release should be affirmed if it 

is within the applicable statutory maximum and is not plainly unreasonable. United 

States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 437, 439-40 (4th Cir. 2006). In determining whether a 

sentence is “plainly unreasonable,” this court first assesses whether the sentence is 

procedurally and substantively reasonable. Id. at 438. Only if a sentence is found 

procedurally or substantively unreasonable will this court “then decide whether the 

sentence is plainly unreasonable.” Id. at 439. “A revocation sentence is procedurally 

reasonable if the district court adequately explains the chosen sentence after considering

the Sentencing Guidelines’ nonbinding Chapter Seven policy statements and the 

applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) [(2012)] factors.” United States v. Slappy, 872 F.3d 202, 

207 (4th Cir. 2017) (footnotes and internal quotation marks omitted). “A court need not 

be as detailed or specific when imposing a revocation sentence as it must be when 

imposing a post-conviction sentence, but it still must provide a statement of reasons for 

the sentence imposed.” United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). The court’s explanation must be sufficient to permit 

the court to “effectively review the reasonableness of the sentence” and to “provide [it] 

an assurance that the sentencing court considered the § 3553(a) factors with regard to the 

particular defendant before [it] and also considered any potentially meritorious arguments 

raised by the parties with regard to sentencing.” United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 

657 (4th Cir. 2007). A revocation sentence is substantively reasonable if the district court 
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sufficiently provides a justification for that sentence. Slappy, 872 F.3d at 207 (citing 

Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440). 

Here, the district court properly calculated Miller’s policy statement ranges. The 

transcript of the revocation hearing reveals that the district court also properly considered 

the Chapter 7 policy statements as well as the relevant factors under § 3553(a) before 

imposing the statutory maximum 60-month sentence. The court took into account the 

nature and circumstances of Miller’s violations, noting the “egregious nature of the 

offense violation.” Accordingly, we find that the sentence imposed was not plainly 

unreasonable and affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral argument 

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately addressed in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED