2010 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

1-29-2010

USA v. Steven Jackson

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 08-4871

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NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

 

No. 08-4871

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

STEVEN JACKSON,

 Appellant

 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(D.C. Criminal. No. 07-cr-00338-001)

District Judge: Honorable Stanley R. Chesler

 

Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

on January 26, 2010

Before: RENDELL and JORDAN, Circuit Judges

 and PADOVA, Senior District Judge*

(Filed: January 29, 2010)

 

OPINION OF THE COURT

 

 

*Honorable John R. Padova, Senior District Judge for the Eastern District of

Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
 We review the District Court’s decision whether to hold an evidentiary hearing on a 1

motion to suppress under an abuse of discretion standard. Padillas v. Stork-Gamco, Inc.,

186 F.3d 412, 418 (3d Cir. 1999) (stating that whether to hold evidentiary hearing on

admissibility of contested evidence “rests in the sound discretion of the district court.”).

2

PADOVA, Senior District Judge

Steven Jackson appeals his conviction on one count of possessing controlled 

substances with intent to deliver in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) & (b)(1)(c) and 18 U.S.C.

§ 2, one count of possessing a firearm and ammunition in furtherance of a drug trafficking

offense in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(1), and one count of possessing that firearm

as a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)(A). The District Court had subject

matter jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231; we have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm the conviction.

Because we write only for the parties, we dispense with any lengthy discussion of the

facts. Jackson argues that the district court’s refusal to conduct an evidentiary hearing on his

suppression motion was improper. He argues that “once the defendant has established a 1

basis for his motion, i.e., the search or seizure was conducted without a warrant, the burden

shifts to the government to show that the search or seizure was reasonable.” United States

v. Johnson, 63 F.3d 242, 245 (3d Cir. 1995). Jackson contends that once he demonstrated

in his suppression motion that the evidence was seized without a warrant, the District Court

was required to hold an evidentiary hearing because the burden shifted to the Government

to prove the search and seizure was reasonable, without him having to make any further
 Other Courts of Appeals likewise require a defendant to raise significant factual 2

disputes in order to receive a pretrial evidentiary hearing. See United States v. Howell,

231 F.3d 615, 620 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating “An evidentiary hearing on a motion to

suppress need be held only when the moving papers allege facts with sufficient

definiteness, clarity, and specificity to enable the trial court to conclude that contested

issues of fact exist.”); United States v. Glass, 128 F.3d 1398, 1408- 1409 (10th Cir.1997)

(holding that defendant bears the burden of showing there are material facts in dispute,

and an evidentiary hearing is only required when the motion to suppress raises factual

allegations that are sufficiently definite, specific, detailed, and nonconjectural to enable

the court to conclude that contested issues of fact going to the validity of the search are in

issue); United States v. Sophie, 900 F.2d 1064, 1070-71 (7 Cir. 1990) (holding that an th

evidentiary hearing is necessary only if the party requesting the hearing raises a

significant, disputed factual issue); United States v. Panitz, 907 F.2d 1267, 1273-74 (1st

Cir. 1990) (holding that “[t]he test for granting an evidentiary hearing in a criminal case

should be substantive: did the defendant make a sufficient threshold showing that

3

evidentiary production. We do not agree.

The standard for when a hearing is required is well settled in our case law. As a

general matter, an evidentiary hearing is required in circumstances in which a defendant

advances a “colorable claim” that his or her constitutional rights have been violated. United

States v. Brink, 39 F.3d 419 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that the District Court erred in failing

to hold an evidentiary hearing where the defendant stated “a colorable claim that the

government violated his constitutional right to counsel by placing him in a cell with a known

informant who may have been acting as a government agent”). A claim is “colorable” if it

consists “of more than mere bald-faced allegations of misconduct.” United States v. Voigt,

89 F.3d 1050, 1067 (3d Cir. 1996). Thus, to warrant an evidentiary hearing, a defendant’s

motion must contain “issues of fact material to the resolution of the defendant’s

constitutional claim.” Id., 89 F.3d at 1067. 

2
material facts were in doubt or dispute?”); Wojtowicz v. United States, 550 F.2d 786, 790

(2d Cir. 1977) (holding that a defendant must present “sufficiently detailed and

controverted factual allegations” in order to receive an evidentiary hearing).

4

Jackson did not offer any version of events contrary to the version contained in the

police reports he attached to his motion. He based his request for an evidentiary hearing only

on alleged discrepancies in the reports, which he argued raised questions about the

truthfulness of the account provided, and raised the suggestion that the events leading to his

arrest may have unfolded differently. This was not a sufficient showing under Brink and

Voigt. Accordingly, there was no abuse of discretion in the District Court’s decision to deny

an evidentiary hearing.

Jackson also argues that the District Court erred when it determined that he lacked

standing to challenge the lawfulness of the search. The record cannot support any such

interpretation of the District Court’s ruling. The Court stated at the end of its ruling that the

“defendant furthermore hasindeed not proffered any evidence that he hasstanding to warrant

a suppression hearing in this case.” A 71. Plainly, the District Court found that Jackson had

failed to put forth any alternative version of the facts to warrant a hearing, not that he lacked

standing to challenge the search. Because the district court actually determined the

suppression issue on its merits, Jackson’s standing argument must be rejected.

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment of conviction.