United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted September 20, 2018*

Decided September 24, 2018

Before

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge

AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge

No. 18‐1534

EDDIE R. HUDSON,

Petitioner‐Appellant,

v.

STANLEY KNIGHT,

Superintendent of Plainfield

Correctional Facility,

Respondent‐Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Southern District of Indiana,

Indianapolis Division.

No. 1:17‐cv‐1821‐SEB‐MJD

Sarah Evans Barker,

Judge.

O R D E R

Prisoner Eddie Hudson petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254 to restore sentencing credits that he lost after the prison said that he possessed a

weapon. He argues that prison officials violated his right to due process by not allowing

him access to a recording that he says exonerates him and by refusing to watch it

themselves. The district court denied the petition. We vacate the judgment because the

                                                 

* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and

record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not

significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 18‐1534    Page 2

prison has justified neither its decision to deny Hudson access to the recording nor its

refusal to have prison officials view it.   

Hudson was charged with possessing a dangerous weapon after officers at

Plainfield Correctional Facility found two razor blades attached to a toothbrush handle

under his mattress. His bed is in an “open dorm” area that many inmates use. Prison

officials told Hudson that he could contest the charge and present evidence at a

disciplinary hearing. Hudson maintained that the weapon was not his, and he asked to

review the video surveillance recording of his bed area to see who had placed it there.

He initially asked to review the 24 hours before the officers discovered the weapon, but

he later modified his request to 12 hours’ review. (The prison denies receiving the

modification but argues that either way it should win on appeal.) In refusing Hudson’s

request, an officer checked a box on a form stating that “allowing the offender to view

video recorded evidence” would “jeopardize the safety and/or security of the facility.”

An officer reviewed only 11 minutes of the recording—from the time the officers

entered Hudson’s bed area until they ended the search.   

Hudson lost at his disciplinary hearing. After considering the 11‐minute

recording, Hudson’s testimony (asserting his innocence), a photo of the weapon, and

staff reports, the hearing officer ruled that Hudson had possessed a dangerous weapon.

The officer revoked 125 days of earned sentence credits and demoted him to a

classification under which he will earn sentence credits at a reduced rate.   

Hudson seeks relief from this ruling. He appealed administratively, but his

appeals were denied. He then petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus under § 2254,

contending that (1) he was denied due process because the prison denied him access to

the part of surveillance recording that preceded the search, and (2) the evidence was

insufficient to conclude that he possessed a dangerous weapon. The district court

denied the petition, ruling that Hudson received due process and that “some evidence”

supported the finding of guilt.   

We briefly address and reject Hudson’s argument that the evidence in the record

was insufficient to find him guilty of possessing a weapon. Hudson observes that the

weapon was found in an “open dorm” where other inmates had access to his mattress;

thus, he argues, the discovery of the weapon under his mattress did not prove that he

had put it there. But the disciplinary board’s decision need only be supported by “some

evidence” that he possessed it. Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985); Jones

v. Cross, 637 F.3d 841, 849 (7th Cir. 2011). Our inquiry is confined to whether any reliable
No. 18‐1534    Page 3

evidence supports the hearing officer’s conclusions. See Webb v. Anderson, 224 F.3d 649,

652 (7th Cir. 2000). The video recording showing that officers found the weapon under

Hudson’s mattress satisfies this “meager threshold.” Scruggs v. Jordan, 485 F.3d 934, 941

(7th Cir. 2007). Hudson responds that other evidence in the hearing record could

support a contrary finding, but that possibility alone does not negate that “some

evidence” supports the finding of guilt.

   

Although some evidence supports guilt, Hudson still may—and does—contend

that the ruling is flawed because he did not receive due process. See Ellison v. Zatecky,

820 F.3d 271, 274 (7th Cir. 2016). Hudson has a protected liberty interest in his earned

sentence credits, so he was entitled to due process before losing them. See id.; Scruggs v.

Jordan, 485 F.3d 934, 939 (7th Cir. 2007). And due process requires that prisoners receive

access to exculpatory evidence, including video recordings, “unless its disclosure would

unduly threaten institutional concerns.” Piggie v. McBride, 277 F.3d 922, 925 (7th Cir.

2002) (Piggie I); see also Ponte v. Real, 471 U.S. 491, 498–99 (1985). Prison officials may

thus withhold video recordings under a “bona fide security justification.” Jones, 637

F.3d at 848–49. But “[w]e have never approved of a blanket policy of keeping

confidential security camera videotapes for safety reasons.” Piggie v. Cotton, 344 F.3d

674, 679 (7th Cir. 2003) (Piggie II). Likewise, a “conclusory” invocation of security is not

sufficient. Hayes v. Walker, 555 F.2d 625, 630 (7th Cir. 1977). Instead, the prison must

explain why the release of a particular video recording might jeopardize security—such

as a statement that the inmate “might learn the location and capabilities of the prison

surveillance system, thus allowing him to avoid detection in the future.” Piggie II,

344 F.3d at 679.

The prison has not said why security would be threatened if Hudson saw the

surveillance recording. Instead, an officer merely found, by checking a box on a form,

that “allowing the offender to view video recorded evidence” would “jeopardize the

safety and/or security of the facility.” But such “broad unsupported findings” about

“security” are not adequate. Hayes, 555 F.2d at 630. If the prison may incant “security”

without explaining it, an inmate’s right to present exculpatory evidence “could be

arbitrarily denied in any case and thereby rendered meaningless. This court would be

unable to exercise even limited review of such broad findings.” Id. That is why the

prison must explain its rationale for withholding evidence. See Ponte, 471 U.S. at 498–99.

It need not do so during the administrative process, see Hayes, 555 F.2d at 630, but it

must do so eventually, see Ponte, 471 U.S. at 498‐99. Yet the prison has not at any time—

during the administrative proceedings, in the district court, or in this court—explained

why letting Hudson see the recording might endanger prison security. Nor is any bona
No. 18‐1534    Page 4

fide security justification evident from the record. Therefore, the unelaborated security

rationale fails.

Even if the prison had offered a valid reason for refusing to let Hudson watch the

recording, it violated Hudson’s due process rights for another reason. The prison

officials themselves were supposed to review the recording for possibly exculpatory

video evidence, as Hudson requested, and they did not. See Piggie I, 277 F.3d at 925–26.

The prison responds that it reviewed the 11‐minute segment showing the search. But

that segment is what the prison expected to be inculpatory. Hudson believes that another

inmate planted the weapon under his mattress before the search, not that the officers

found no weapon during the search. To review potentially exculpatory evidence, the

prison should have watched a portion of the recording covering a reasonable amount of

the time before the search started. (Because the prison did not review any of the

potentially exculpatory recording, we need not decide what portion would have been

reasonable.)   

The prison replies unpersuasively that it could not review any more of the video

evidence. It argues that it is “unrealistic and impractical” to expect that in all

disciplinary cases its staff will “review long periods of irrelevant security video when

contraband is found.” We see two problems with this argument. First, a video recording

is “irrelevant” only if nothing exculpatory is on it. But “the record here does not

demonstrate with any degree of certainty that the tape lacked exculpatory value or was

otherwise irrelevant.” Piggie II, 344 F.3d at 679.1 Second, the prison’s argument that it is

too costly to review video recordings in “all disciplinary cases” is not sufficient. We

consider only the evidence of the burden involved in a particular case; we do not

speculate about the “aggregate...costs of compliance” when there is no evidence other

inmates are actually making similar requests. See Schlemm v. Wall, 784 F.3d 362, 365–66

(7th Cir. 2015). Because the prison has not argued, let alone substantiated, that the

burden of reviewing a reasonable portion of the possibly exculpatory recording is

unmanageable here, this rationale for refusing to watch the recording is inadequate.   

The district court’s decision is VACATED, and the case is REMANDED for

further proceedings.   

                                                 

1 The prison argues on appeal that it made an in‐camera submission to the

district court. But the record reflects no such submission, the prison does not state what

part of the recording it submitted, and the district court made no findings about it.