C O U R T O F A P P E A LS EI GHTH D I STRI CT OF TEXAS ELPASO, TEXAS

I N THE I NTEREST OF E.V ., A MI NOR CHI L D

. § § § § § § No. 08-07-00014- CV

Appea l from the 383rd District Court of El Paso County , Texas (TC#2000CM4849)

O P I N I O N Ap pe lla nt, Adol fo Vi eweg , Sr ., a pp e a ls a tr ia l c ourt

de c isi on mod if yingthe amou

nt o f h is child support obligations t o E

. V. We reve rse the judg ment of the trial c ourt and re nder judg ment fo r A pp e lla nt. I. BACKG ROUND On J uly 26, 2000, Appellee , the Attorney Gene ral of T exas (“Attorne y Gene ral” ), f

i l ed a Petition To Establish the P are nt-Child Relationship, alleg ing that Viewe g was the fathe r of E.V. The

rec ord re flec ts that, on October 12, 2000, the trial cour t entere d an orde r establishing Viewe g ’s fathe rhood and or deringhim to pay chil d s u p p o rt to the mother of E.V ., Maria I sela Pac heco (“Pac heco” ), in the amount of $128 pe r month, beg inning on Nove mber 1, 2000. On Au g us t 9, 20 06 , the Of

fi c e of the Attor

ne y Ge ne ra l f ile d it s su it t o mo dif

y the 20 00 c hil d

su pp or t or de r. I n h is p le a din g , th e Attor ne y Ge ne ra l a lle g e d that “ [t]he c ir c ums tanc e s of the c hil d or a pe rson af

fec ted by t h e orde r to be modified have mater ially and substantially

chang ed since rendition of the or der, or

it has been thre e y ear s since the or der was rende red or last modified andA n am o unt eq ual t o $6 0 4

. 5 8 pe r mo nt h. 1 the monthly

amount of the child support awa rd under the order differ s by either 20 pe rce nt or $100 from the a

mount that would be awa rded in a ccor dance with the child support g uidelines.” The matter

was re fer red to an associate judge

. Following a trial, the associate judg e found that Viewe g had a monthly income of $1,950 a

nd that there was only

one child bef

ore the court. The associate judge enter ed an order that modified Viewe g ’s monthly child support obligation to $390 and re quired Vie wegto provide hea lth insurance f or E.V. Viewe g appea led to the trial cour t on the basis that his income h ad n o t incre ased since the 2000 orde r and that he had other child support ob lig a tio ns fo r whic h h e wa s e nti tle d c re dit

. On Dec ember

14, 2006, the trial court c onducted a hear ing on the appea l. Viewegtestified that he op e rate d a

bu sin e ss f

ixingtir e s and

we ldi ng . V ie we g te sti fi e d th at he was c ur re ntl y

su pp or tin g fo ur c hil dr e n, inc lud ing E. V. , an d that he wa s und e r a co ur t ord e r to pay $2 50 pe r m on th in c hil d s up po rt fo r tw o c hil dr e n fr om a pr e vio us marr ia g e . V ie we g a lso te sti fi e d th a t he ha d a fo ur th child for which he provided the m other “$50 sometimes, a week.” Viewe g did not, however , offe r into evidence any

court doc uments conce rning these a lleg ed oblig ations. Although he introduced copies of va

rious money

order s in the amount of $250, the copies do not indicate the identity of the pa y e e or the re a so n f

or the pa y me nts

. As for his inc ome, Viewe g first testified that he ma de betwe en $900 and $1,200 pe r month, bu t he su bs e qu e ntl y

state d th a t he ma de be tw e e n $1, 00 0 an d $1, 40 0 p e r m on th. He int ro du c e d h is 2005 fede ral income tax return and t estified that, af ter de ductions, he had a

n income of $7,255 f

or that y ear . The Sche dule C statement for V ieweg ’s business listed gr oss rec eipts or sales of $18,950. 1 Viewe g deducte d $5,139 for the c ost of g oods sold, leaving a g ross profit of $13,811. F rom this, he deducte d a total of $1,215 for car and truc k ex p enses, $2,116 f or depr eciation and section 179expense deduc tion, $2,314 for utiliti es, and $711 for other e x penses. Vie wegexplained that the

de du c tio n o f $ 5, 13 9 w a s f or we ldi ngg a se s. He de nie d s e lli ng any of the we ldi ngg a se s. As fo r h is individual feder al tax return, Viewe g listed $7,255 as hi s business income. He claimed that he would “bar ely

. . . make the same” in 2006. Although he previously owned some othe r re al estate , he te sti fi e d th a t ha d to “ g ive up ” the pr op e rt ie s, be c a us e he c ou ld no t make the pa y me nts fo r t

he m. Vi e we g de nie d th a t he re c e ive d a ny mon e y fo r t he pr op e rt ie s. On cr oss-examination, Viewegwas a sked about the tax deduc tion in the amount of $1,215 for c ar a nd truck e x penses. Vie wegresponde d that he lived in the same plac e that he w orked a nd did no t ne e d “ cars or th e tr uck .” Vi e we g late r t e sti fi e d th a t he ow ne d thre e ve hic le s. He a lso acknow ledg ed havingsold certa in automobiles, despite havingtestified on di rec t examination t hat he had no sour ces of

income other

than the income he rec ei v ed fr o m h is business. Vieweg ’s testimony also indicated that, beca use he lived on t h e prope rty on which he ha d his business, he de du c te d th e fu ll amou

nt o f t he c os t of uti lit ie s a nd oth e r i te ms a s b us ine ss e xpe ns e s. Duringthe hea

ring , the trial cour

t inquired as to the l ocation of the business and noted that he was familiar with it. The trial judge noted that the business was a “hug e we lding shop” and that he had se en it. At the close of the hearing , the t rial j udg e announced that he would deny the appe al and explained, “I

just don’t find the i ncome tax rec ords credible. Iknow the business he is re fer ring to. I t’ s r ig ht t

he re on Al ame da Str e e t and

it’ s a hu g e , a ware ho us e and he ob vio us ly

c omm ing le s a ll his ex penses into the business and Idon’t believe his testimony that sometimes he makes no mone y .” The trial c ourt subsequently enter ed an or der a dopting the a ssociate judg e’s or der. I n this appeal, Vie wegargues that the trial c ourt err ed in finding that there was a materia l and

su bs tanti a l cha

ng e in his c ir c ums tanc e s to war ra nt mod if ic a tio n of the c hil d s up po rt or de r, be c a

us e there was no e vidence that there had been a chang e in V ieweg ’s financ ial resour ces betwee n the 2000N e ithe r th e A tto rn e y G e n e ra l no r P a c h e c o fi le d a re sp o n se b rie f i n this m a tter , an d ne ithe r V ie w e g (w h o is 2 now pr o s e) , t he A t t orn ey G ene r al , nor P ach eco a p p ea red a t the ora l ar gu ment , wh i ch V i eweg ’ s f ormer coun s el ha d r equ es t ed. o rd er an d t h e D ec em b er

1 4 , 2 0 0 6 h ea ri n g. 2

II. DI SCU SSIO N A. Standard of

Review When the trial court is the trier of fa ct, a leg al s u fficiency challeng e to the trial c ourt’s finding s of fa ct is review able u nder the same standa rd that is applied in re viewingevidenc e supporting a

jury ’s answe r. Catali na v. Blasdel , 881 S.W. 2d 29 5, 29 7 ( Te x. 19 94 ); In re Ex punction of J.A. , 186 S.W .3d 592, 595 (Tex. App.--El Paso 2006, no pet.)

. A “no-evidenc e” or leg al i nsufficie ncy point is a question of law, which cha lleng es the leg al sufficie ncy

of the e vidence to support a par tic u l ar fac t finding. Serrano v. Union Planters Bank , N.A. , 162 S.W .3d 576, 579 (Tex. A pp.--El Paso 2004, pet. denied) . When, as here , the par ty without the burde n of proof

suffe rs an unf

avora ble finding , the challeng e on appea l is one of “ no evidenc e to support the finding .” Id. A leg al suffic iency or “no- evidenc e” cha l l eng e will be sustained on appea l, if the rec ord shows: (1) the c omplete abse nce of a vital fa ct; (2) the c ourt is barre d by rules of law or evidenc e fr om givingweig ht to the only evidenc e off

ere d to prove a

vital fac t; (3) t he evidenc e off

ere d to prove a

vital fac t is no m o re t h an a s cint illa; or (4) the e vidence establishes conclusively the oppos ite of the vital fa ct. Car ra sc o v . S te war t , 224 S.W .3d 363, 367 (Tex. App.--El P as o 2 0 0 6 , n o p et

. ) ( ci t i n g City of Keller v. W ilson , 168 S.W .3d 802, 810 (Tex. 2005)). I n re vie wi ng a le g a l su ff

ic ie nc y c ha lle ng e , we vie w the e vid e nc e in t he light m os t f

a vo ra ble to the judgme nt, cre diting fa vorable evidenc e if a rea sonable juror (or judge , sitti ng as a f act f inder) could, and disre g arding contra ry evidenc e if a

rea sonable fa ct finder

could not. City of Keller , 168 S

. W

. 3 d at 8 0 7

. W e a re t o co n s i d er t h e ev i d en ce i nt h e l i gh tm o s tfa v o rab l e t o t h e v er d i ct an d i n d u l geever

y rea sonable infe renc e that would support it. Id. a t 822. Ho we ve r, if the e vid e nc e a llo ws of on ly one infe renc e, the trie r of f act may not disreg ard it. Id. When a no-e vidence point of err or re sts on the compete ncy

of the e viden ce , we m ay not disreg ard c ontrary

evidenc e showingit to be incompetent. Id. at 812. Mos t of the a

ppeala ble issues in family

law, including the issue of c hild support, are evaluated ag ainst an abuse of di s cr et i o n s tandar d. Du ra n v . G ar c ia , 2 2 4 S. W. 3 d 3 0 9 , 3 1 3 ( T e x. Ap p . -- E l P as o 2 0 0 5 , n o p e t

. ) ( c i t i n g Tat e v . Ta te , 55 S.W .3d 1, 5-6 (Te x . App.--E l Paso 2000, no pet.)). A n order

reg ardingchild sup p o rt wi l l n o t be disturbed on a ppeal, unless the c omplainant demonstrates a clea

r abuse of discre tion. Lindsey v. Lindsey , 965 S.W .2d 589, 591 (Tex. App.--El Pa so 19 98 , n o p e t.) . T he te st f or a bu se of dis c re tio n is not whe the r the fa c ts pr e se nt a n a pp ro pr iate

case for the trial court’s actions in the opinion of a revie wing court, but whether the trial court a cted without refe renc e to any

g uiding r ules and princ iples. Id. I n other words, the appropr iat e i nquiry i s whether

the ruling was a

rbitrar y and unre asonable

. Id. ; Hodson v. Keiser , 8 1 S. W. 3 d 3 6 3 , 3 67 (T e x. Ap p. -- El Pa so 20 02 , n o p e t.) . T he me re fa c t th a t a tr ia l jud g e may de c ide a matte r w ith in h is discretionar

y authority in a manner

differ ent from how an a

ppellate judg e in a similar cir cumstance would have ruled does not demonstrate that a n abuse of discretion has oc curr ed. So uth weste rn Be ll Tel. Co. v. Johnson , 3 89 S.W. 2d 64 5, 64 8 ( Te x. 19 65 ); J o n es v . S tra y ho rn , 159 Tex. 421, 321 S.W .2d 290, 295 (1959). An a buse of discr etion does not occ ur s o l o n g as some evide nce of a substantive and probative char acte r exists t o s upport the trial cour t’s decision. Lide v. Lide , 116 S.W. 3d 14 7, 15 2 ( Te x. Ap p. -- El Pa so 20 03 , n o p e t.) ; Sotelo v. Gonzales , 1 7 0 S. W. 3 d 7 8 3 , 7 8 8 ( T e x. App.--E l Paso 2005, no pet.).

“ I n th e c hil d s up po rt

c on te xt, an ap pe lla

nt m ay c ha lle ng e the su ff

ic ie nc y of the e vid e nc e to support a findingof net re source s, a findingof the prove n needs of the child, a f

inding of voluntaryun e mpl oy

me nt o r u

nd erem pl oy

men t, o r a

fi nd ingof

a mate ri a l and

su bs tanti a l c ha

ng e in circ umstances.” Knight v. Knight , 131 S.W .3d 535, 539 (Tex. App.--El Paso 2004, no pet.) (citing Hodson v. Keiser , 81 S.W .3d 363, 367 (Tex. App.--El Paso 2 0 0 2, no pet.)). T o such a c halleng e, we employ a two-prong ed analy sis: (1) Did the trial court have sufficie nt information upon which t o e x e r c i s e i t s d i s c r e t i o n ; an d ( 2 ) i f s o , d i d t h e t r i a l c o u rte r

r i ni t s a p p l i c a t i o n o f

d i s c r e t i o n ? Lindsey , 965 S.W .2d at 592. A trad i t i o n al suffic iency revie w is applied to the first question. Id. I f we de te rm ine that su ff

ic ie nt e vid e nc e e xists , w e the n d e c ide wh e the r t he tr ia l c ourt

ma de a re a so na ble decision. Id. I n other words, we must decide whe ther the tria l court’s de cision was neither arbitra ry

nor unre asonable

. Id. B. Th e Modification Order Se c tio n 1 56 .4 01 of

the Te xas F a mil y

Cod e pr ov ide s, in p e rt ine nt p art : (a) Ex cept a s provided by Subsection . . . (b), the c ourt may modify an orde r that provides for

the support of a

child . . . under Sec tion 154.182, if: (1) the circumstances of the child or a person af fec ted by the order have materially

and substantially

chang ed since . . .: (A) the date of

the orde r’s re ndition; or

. . . (2 ) it ha s be e n thr e e y e ars sin c e the or de r w a s r e nd e re d o r l a st modified and the monthly amoun t o f the child support awa rd under the orde r di ff

er s by either 20 pe rce nt or $100 from the a mount that wo uld be awa rd e d in a c c or da nc e wi th t he c hil d s up po rt

g uid e lin e s. T EX . F AM . C ODE ANN . § 156.401(a) . When a dec ision of an associate judg e is appe aled to the ref err ing court, as in this case , the matter is tried de novo by the re fer ring court. SeeT EX . F AM . C ODE A NN . § 20 1. 01 5; se e als o H arre ll v . H

arre ll , 9 8 6 S. W. 2 d 6 2 9 , 6 3 1 ( T e x. Ap p . - - E l Pa s o 1 9 98, no pet.). The party

seekingmodification has the bur den to show the re quisite chang e in circ umstancesAl t houg h t he r ecor d i ndi cat es , and none of t he part i es di s put es , t hat , on O ct ob er 12 , 20 00 , t he cour t order ed 3 V i ew eg t o pa y mon t h l y c h i l d s u ppor t i n t h e amou n t of $128, t h e or der i t s el f

i s n ot c on t ai n ed i n t h e r ec or d. since the e ntry

of the prior

order

. See H

odson , 8 1 S. W.3 d at 36 8; Li n d s ey , 965 S.W .2d at 593. Acc ording ly , the Attorney Gene ral a

nd Pachec o had the burden to prove at least one of the g rounds for modification provided in section 156.401(a ). The only person to testify

at t he trial was Viewe g . Although the Assistant Attorney Gene ral may have suc cessf

ully impeache d portions of Vieweg ’s t estimony , she di d not elicit any evidenc e that Viewe g ’s income was $1,950 per month. The Attorney Gene ral and Pachec o did not p resent any witnesses or e vidence at the trial. They did not provide any

evidenc e as to Vie weg ’s financ ial circ ums t ance s at the time of the initial order and none is c ontained in the re cord. Nor did they 3 prese nt any

evidenc e as to Vie weg ’s financ ial circ umstances at time of the trial. They prese nted no

e vid e nc e c on c e rn inga mate ri a l and su bs tanti a l c ha

ng e in the c ir c ums tanc e s of E. V. or anyon e e lse aff ecte d by the child support order. Alt houg h the trial judg e doubted the c redibility of View eg ’s tax returns a nd was fa miliar with the location and phy s i ca l s ize of Viewe g ’s business, this does not constitute evidenc e that View eg ’s income wa s $1,950 per month. Ther e wa s no evidenc e of a

su bs tanti ve and

pr ob a t i v e c h a r a c te r t o s up po rt

the tr ia l c ourt ’s fi nd ingthat V ie we g ’s monthl y inc ome

wa s $ 1, 95 0. Ac c or din g ly , w e ho ld t hat the tr ia l c ourt did no t have su ff ic ie nt inf or matio n to e xer c ise its discretion in this case, and it a bused its discr etion by

incre asing Viewe g ’s child support obligation to $390 per month. III . C ON CL USI ON We sustain Vieweg ’s i ssue, reverse the j udg ment of t he trial court, and rende r judg ment for Ap pe lla nt.KENNET H R. CARR, J ustice

May 1, 2008 B e f o r e C h e w , C

. J. , M c C l u r e , a n d C ar r , JJ.