[Cite as In re B. P., 2011-Ohio-1863.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

 )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF LORAIN ) 

IN RE: B. P. C.A. No. 10CA009934 

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT 

ENTERED IN THE 

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

COUNTY OF LORAIN, OHIO 

CASE No. 09JC26865 

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY

Dated: April 18, 2011 

 

CARR, Presiding Judge. 

{¶1} Melissa L. appeals from a judgment of the Lorain County Court of Common 

Pleas, Juvenile Division, that terminated her parental rights to her minor child, B.P., and placed 

him in the permanent custody of the Lorain County Children Services Board (“LCCS”). This 

Court affirms. 

I. 

{¶2} B.P. was born on February 20, 2009, and is the child of Melissa L. (“Mother”) 

and Charles P. (“Father”). Both parents participated in the proceedings below, but only Mother 

appealed from the judgment of the trial court. 

{¶3} When B.P. was born, Mother was already engaged in another custody case 

involving four older children, ranging in age from three to eleven years. LCCS had been 

involved with the family since 2007, based upon concerns for Mother’s mental health, unsafe 

and unsanitary conditions of the home, and the children’s poor school attendance. In August 
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2008, those four children were adjudicated abused, neglected, and dependent, and they were 

placed in the temporary custody of the agency. B.P. was born six months later. LCCS initially 

attempted to allow B.P. to remain in Mother’s home, as Mother was making some progress on 

the case plan objectives put in place through the first proceeding. Soon, however, the agency 

again developed concerns regarding the home environment and Mother’s ability to meet the 

basic needs of B.P. Accordingly, LCCS filed a complaint regarding B.P. on July 23, 2009. That 

complaint articulated concerns for the safety of B.P. based upon the large number of adults living 

in Mother’s home, the unsanitary condition of the home, a limited supply of food, and a pending 

eviction due to unpaid rent. In October 2009, the trial court adjudicated B.P. to be a dependent 

child and placed him in the temporary custody of the agency. Three months later, the first case 

resulted in a judgment involuntarily terminating Mother’s parental rights to the four older 

children. This Court later affirmed that judgment. See In re M.M, J.H., M.H., L.L., 9th Dist. 

Nos. 10CA009744, 10CA009745, 10CA009746, 10CA009747, 2010-Ohio-2278. 

{¶4} On June 30, 2010, LCCS filed a motion for the permanent custody of B.P. 

Following a hearing on the motion, the trial court granted permanent custody of B.P. to the 

agency. Mother now appeals and assigns one error for review. 

II. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

“THE JUDGMENT GRANTING PERMANENT CUSTODY OF B.P. TO 

LORAIN COUNTY CHILDREN SERVICES IS AGAINST THE MANIFEST 

WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.” 

{¶5} Mother argues that the trial court erroneously determined that the weight of the 

evidence supported a finding that B.P. could not be placed with either parent within a reasonable 

time or should not be placed with a parent. 
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{¶6} Before a juvenile court may terminate parental rights and award permanent 

custody of a child to a proper moving agency it must find clear and convincing evidence of both 

prongs of the permanent custody test: (1) that the child is abandoned, orphaned, has been in the 

temporary custody of the agency for at least 12 months of a consecutive 22-month period, or that 

the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed 

with either parent, based on an analysis under R.C. 2151.414(E); and (2) that the grant of 

permanent custody to the agency is in the best interest of the child, based on an analysis under 

R.C. 2151.414(D). See R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) and 2151.414(B)(2); see, also, In re William S.

(1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 95, 98-99. Clear and convincing evidence is that which will “produce in 

the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.” 

In re Adoption of Holcomb (1985), 18 Ohio St.3d 361, 368, quoting Cross v. Ledford (1954), 161 

Ohio St. 469, paragraph three of the syllabus. 

{¶7} Following a hearing, the trial court found that B.P. could not be placed with either 

of the child’s parents within a reasonable time and should not be placed with the child’s parents. 

The trial court also found that it was in the best interest of the child to be placed in the permanent 

custody of LCCS. On appeal, Mother does not challenge the finding regarding the best interest 

of B.P., but rather challenges the finding that the child could not or should not be placed with a 

parent as being unsupported by the weight of the evidence. For the reasons that follow, we find 

her argument to be without merit. 

{¶8} In considering whether a child could not be placed with either parent within a 

reasonable time or should not be placed with a parent, the trial court is to consider all relevant 

evidence. R.C. 2151.414(E). Furthermore, R.C. 2151.414(E) contains several factors, the 

presence of any one of which requires the court, upon a finding of clear and convincing evidence 
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that the factor exists, to enter a finding that the child cannot be placed with a parent within a 

reasonable time or should not be placed with a parent. Id. 

{¶9} While the trial court did not explicitly cite to any of the factors in R.C. 

2151.414(E), the detailed findings in its journal entry make it apparent that the trial court relied 

on several of the factors in R.C. 2151.414(E), including R.C. 2151.414(E)(1), failure to remedy 

conditions; R.C. 2151.414(E)(2), chronic mental or emotional illness; and R.C. 2151.414(E)(11), 

parental rights involuntarily terminated with respect to a sibling. In her appeal, Mother has not 

challenged the findings in regard to a particular factor, nor has she argued that the failure to cite 

a particular factor is reversible error. Instead, she has challenged only the broader determination 

that B.P. cannot or should not be placed with a parent. In addressing Mother’s argument, we 

reiterate here that “the better practice would be for the trial court to indicate the specific factor or 

factors in R.C. 2151.414(E) upon which it is relying in reaching its determination, so that proper 

review is ensured.” In re S.C., 9th Dist. No. 04CA008469, 2004-Ohio-4570, at ¶30. 

{¶10} Mother’s reunification case plan indicated that she should participate in a 

parenting assessment and an education program with an in-home parenting mentor, obtain 

appropriate housing and gainful employment in order to meet the basic needs of her child, and 

participate in a mental health assessment and follow any recommendations. Mother was also 

offered weekly visitation with her child. 

{¶11} According to the caseworker, when B.P. was removed from the home, he had no 

affect and displayed no emotion. He did not laugh or cry. He was fine physically, but he 

appeared to have been emotionally neglected. At eight months of age, he was not able to sit up, 

hold his head up for more than a split second, or roll over. The caseworker believed that Mother 

was not able to provide for his emotional needs and that Mother’s lack of active interaction with 
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the child contributed to his poor development. By way of contrast, within five days of being 

placed with foster parents and having received intense interaction in that home, B.P. was rolling 

over, sitting up on his own, and trying to hold his head up. It took the child several months to 

show emotions such as crying or even indicating that he was hungry. The caseworker explained 

that, one year later, B.P. has made a great deal of progress. She did not believe that this change 

was merely the result of age, but rather resulted from the constant good interaction and emotional 

support B.P. was receiving from the foster parents. 

{¶12} The trial court found that Mother had not made significant progress on her case 

plan and had not demonstrated an ability to meet the child’s basic needs or safely parent her 

child. In order to address parenting skills, Mother had been referred to an in-home parenting 

mentor, who found it necessary to focus first on Mother’s ability to meet her own basic needs. 

The mentor terminated his services after only a couple of months because Mother was not 

following through with his advice. The caseworker testified similarly that Mother failed to 

implement her suggestions on parenting, including increasing her interaction with B.P. 

{¶13} In addition, the trial court found that Mother’s housing and employment were not 

stable. Mother was evicted from a trailer early in the proceedings, placed B.P. in Blessing House 

while she stayed in motel rooms for about a month, and then stayed in another residence for 

approximately eight months. She and the maternal grandmother stayed together in the motel 

rooms and in their last residence. At the time of the permanent custody hearing, Mother and the 

maternal grandmother had not paid any rent for five or six months and they were aware that their 

residence was in foreclosure. Significantly, Mother had saved no money, had no plans for 

another place to live, and had nowhere to go. Mother had no regular employment, but had 

worked periodic jobs for temporary agencies. She and the maternal grandmother purportedly 
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shared expenses. The maternal grandmother testified that Mother contributed money when she 

was able. The caseworker testified that Mother was behind on all her bills and that Mother had 

often provided her with false information about employment and housing. 

{¶14} The trial court expressed particular concern that Mother had not resolved the 

mental health issues that had existed since the first case. According to Mother’s counselor, 

Mother had not completed her mental health treatment. Mother began attending counseling 

sessions in September 2008, as part of the first case. Initially, her attendance was fairly 

consistent, but it gradually deteriorated. Mother stopped attending counseling altogether in 

October 2009, just about the time of B.P.’s adjudication and disposition. The counseling agency 

closed Mother’s case two months later. Mother testified that she had been prescribed medication 

for her depression, but was told to stop taking it when she became pregnant. Mother reengaged 

in counseling in May 2010, after a bout of depression that reached its worst point on Mother’s 

Day. During the next five months, Mother attended six counseling sessions and missed three. 

{¶15} Mother’s counselor stated that Mother had not fully addressed past abuse and 

traumatic experiences and that omission affected her ability to avoid the unhealthy choices she 

had been making. The caseworker stated that Mother failed to accept responsibility for her bad 

decisions and had a problem telling the truth, which resulted in unsafe situations. The 

caseworker explained, for example, that if Mother had been honest about being behind in her 

trailer payments, she could have helped her devise a plan to avoid eviction. The caseworker also 

stated that Mother has not accepted responsibility for the removal of her child, but instead 

claimed that “her ex-husband tried to steal her child and sell him in Peru.” Finally, the 

caseworker stated that Mother exercised poor judgment when she took B.P. to visit a registered 

sex offender. The sex offender was an uncle who lived near Mother’s home. He testified at the 
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permanent custody hearing that Mother would bring B.P. to his house every other week during 

her scheduled visitations. 

{¶16} When Mother reengaged in counseling in May 2010, she was advised to have a 

psychiatric assessment and to participate in Dialectical Behavior Therapy (“DBT”), a group 

therapy program that met weekly for a year and addressed emotion regulation, co-dependency 

issues, and healthy coping skills. Mother attended one session before the permanent custody 

hearing. In its appeal, LCCS criticizes Mother for only attending one session, but, at the same 

time, concedes that Mother began the sessions at the first available opportunity after the program 

was recommended to her. Both the counselor and caseworker were hopeful that the DBT group 

would permit Mother to internalize certain concepts and successfully apply them to her life, but 

neither witness could guarantee that Mother would be able to do so. The caseworker also opined 

that a year “in Limbo” was too long for B.P. to wait on something that may not be successful. 

The trial court concluded that B.P. could not wait a year before achieving permanency. 

{¶17} As to Father, the trial court found that he had failed to maintain sobriety. There 

was evidence before the trial court that he had relapsed at least twice in the last year. In addition, 

Father refused to do additional drug tests that were requested by the caseworker. Father also 

failed to demonstrate a commitment to his child given that he missed 13 visits in the last two 

months and had been inconsistent in attending visits during the three months before that. At one 

time, LCCS had hoped to place B.P. with Father and his long-time girlfriend, Pat, who seemed to 

provide good care to B.P. during visits. There was conflicting testimony, however, as to whether 

Pat was willing to accept a permanent role in the care of B.P. In addition, Pat testified that 

Father would leave home for several days at a time, although she did not believe he would 

continue to do so if B.P. were permanently placed with them. Father was unemployed and had 
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no income of his own. He relied largely on Pat’s employment for financial support. Father had 

applied for social security disability, but his eligibility was not resolved at the time of the 

hearing. Father was on probation for non-support of two other children. Ultimately, the trial 

court was not convinced that their home would be a stable placement for B.P. 

{¶18} Regarding the second prong of the permanent custody test, the trial court found 

that it was in the best interest of B.P. to be placed in the permanent custody of the agency. See 

R.C. 2151.414(D)(1). The caseworker testified on the subject of the parents’ relationships with 

the child. She stated that B.P. “absolutely” had a bond with Mother and a less strong bond with 

Father. There was also evidence before the trial court, however, that Mother did not actively 

interact with her child during visits. The maternal grandmother often interacted more with the 

child than Mother did. The trial court found that Mother’s interaction with B.P. was “average at 

best” and had been minimal in recent months. Father’s attendance at visitation had declined 

sharply in recent months. 

{¶19} Mother and Father each testified at the hearing. They each claimed to love B.P. 

and to be able to provide a good home for him. Several friends and relatives testified in support 

of the parents’ efforts to regain custody and regarding the parents’ relationships with B.P. In 

general, those witnesses stated that they believed each parent loved B.P. and that B.P. seemed 

happy in the parent’s care. These witnesses essentially stated that they had no concerns about 

either parent’s ability to care for B.P.; that Mother had mood swings, but they did not interfere 

with her ability to meet the child’s needs; and that Father had a history of alcohol problems, but 

that those problems were under control. 

{¶20} B.P.’s custodial history is that he had resided with Mother for the first five months 

of his life and then resided in a foster home for a year. The caseworker explained that B.P. had a 
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very strong attachment to his foster parents, as well as to an older half-brother, who resided in 

the same home. B.P.’s foster parents had a monthly visitation plan with the foster parents of 

B.P.’s three other siblings in order that all the children could maintain those relationships. B.P.’s 

foster parents would like to adopt him if permanent custody is awarded to the agency. 

{¶21} Because of B.P.’s young age, the guardian ad litem expressed the wishes of the 

child. She believed that permanent custody was in B.P.’s best interest. She had worked with 

Mother for a year in the first case before continuing to work with her in the present case. She 

testified that although Mother was excited to see B.P. at visits, there was very little interaction 

between them. She particularly noted that she had seen no change in Mother’s parenting ability 

from the time of her initial observations until the time of the hearing. The guardian ad litem 

expressed concern with Mother’s lack of follow-through in such things as finding housing, 

obtaining regular employment, and implementing suggestions regarding the care of B.P. She 

noted that Father interacted well with B.P. when he attended visits, but that he was very 

inconsistent in his attendance. She also expressed concern with Father’s dependence on Pat for 

income and support. 

{¶22} There was evidence before the trial court that supported its conclusion that B.P. 

needed permanency and that neither of his parents could provide it. The caseworker testified that 

Mother had made only minimal progress on her case plan. Although Mother had improved the 

physical condition of her living arrangements at one point, she was about to lose her housing 

again and had no plans for another place to live. Moreover, the caseworker testified that Mother 

had previously lost custody of four children, and she had made no significant changes in her 

ability to provide safe, lasting care for this child. She also believed that alcohol dependence 

made Father unable to provide a home for B.P. According to the caseworker, the testimony that 
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Father leaves home for days at a time and missed many visits with his son is reflective of the bad 

choices he makes. She concluded that neither parent is in a position to provide safe care of the 

child and that B.P. does not deserve to wait any longer for permanency. She believed that 

permanent custody was in the best interest of the child. Neither parent offered suitable relative 

placements. 

{¶23} In addition to a general claim that the agency did not establish that B.P. could not 

or should not be placed with a parent, Mother argues that despite the agency’s stated goal of 

reunification, LCCS had actually been seeking to obtain permanent custody of B.P. since 

December 2009. In support of her argument, Mother refers to a statement in the December 2009 

Semiannual Administrative Review indicating that the agency intended to file for permanent 

custody “within the next few weeks.” The full paragraph is as follows: 

“During this review period, LCCS was granted permanent custody of [B.P.’s] four 

older siblings. The issues that originally caused LCCS to become involved with 

this family two years ago have [not] been resolved. [Mother] has no stable 

housing, no employment, and no way to meet her own basic needs independently 

of other people. [Father] also has no way to support himself seperate (sic) from 

his girlfriend, and that relationship is fairly unstable. [B.P.] would be at high risk 

of continued neglect if [he] was to be reunified with either of his parents at this 

time. LCCS does intend on filing for PC of [B.P.] within the next few weeks.” 

(Emphasis added.) 

LCCS could have filed for permanent custody of B.P. in December 2009, but it could also wait 

until June 30, 2010, as it did. In her brief, Mother has not provided any argument as to prejudice 

accruing to her by the delay in filing the motion, nor has she specifically pointed to a lack of 

effort by the agency after December 2009. It is not for this Court to develop arguments for the 

parties or speculate as to any existing prejudicial impact. 

{¶24} A review of the record demonstrates, to the contrary, that LCCS continued its 

reunification efforts after the review in December 2009. In fact, shortly after that review, the 
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agency was actively involved in attempting to arrange for a placement of B.P. with Father and 

Pat. Even the foster mother testified that she understood a placement with Father was 

“inevitable” at that point. Several Friday-to-Sunday visits had taken place in Father’s home, and 

the agency proceeded along those lines from February 2010 until May 2010, when that option 

was no longer considered viable. During the same time period, LCCS also continued 

reunification efforts with Mother. For example, when Mother had transportation problems in 

February 2010, the agency started transporting the child to Mother’s home for visits. This 

arrangement involved weekly four-hour visits and lasted from February 2010 until September 

2010, when a medical doctor suggested that visits be moved back to the visitation center because 

residual cigarette smoke in Mother’s home aggravated B.P.’s asthma. In addition, the record 

demonstrates that Mother was newly referred for a psychiatric evaluation in May 2010, and that 

she also reengaged in counseling at that time. The caseworker even attended counseling sessions 

with Mother in the summer of 2010 in an effort to accelerate some positive results. In the 

absence of any concrete argument with references to facts of record, we find no merit in 

Mother’s unsupported allegation that the agency had been seeking to obtain permanent custody 

of B.P. since December 2009. 

{¶25} Mother also complains that “LCCS was unwilling to concede that if [Mother] 

internalized the concepts presented in the dialectical therapy group, she would be in a position to 

be reunified with B.P.” The facts in evidence do not compel such a conclusion by the 

caseworker or the counselor, and any such claim would have been entirely hypothetical. 

{¶26} Upon consideration, this Court concludes that there was ample evidence before 

the trial court from which it could determine that B.P. could not be placed with either parent 

within a reasonable time or should not be placed in the care of either parent. Consequently, the 
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trial court did not err in terminating Mother’s parental rights and placing B.P. in the permanent 

custody of LCCS. Mother’s sole assignment of error is overruled. 

III. 

{¶27} Mother’s assignment of error is overruled. The judgment of the Lorain County 

Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, is affirmed. 

 Judgment affirmed. 

 There were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

 We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common 

Pleas, County of Lorain, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of 

this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27. 

 Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of 

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the 

period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(E). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is 

instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the 

mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30. 

 Costs taxed to Appellant. 

 

 DONNA J. CARR 

 FOR THE COURT 

WHITMORE, J. 

DICKINSON, J. 

CONCUR
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APPEARANCES:

HOLLACE B. WEIZEL, Attorney at Law, for Appellant. 

DENNIS P. WILL, Prossecuting Attorney, and AMY L. PRICE, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, 

for Appellee.