2024 IL App (4th) 231298-U 

NO. 4-23-1298 

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

BRANDON MASON, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

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 Appeal from the 

 Circuit Court of

 Sangamon County

 No. 23CF1067

 

 Honorable 

 Rudolph M. Braud Jr.,

 Judge Presiding.

 JUSTICE DOHERTY delivered the judgment of the court.

 Justices Zenoff and Knecht concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The circuit court did not err in granting the State’s petition to detain

defendant prior to trial.

¶ 2 Defendant Brandon Mason appeals the circuit court’s order denying him pretrial 

release pursuant to article 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/art. 

110 (West Supp. 2023)). Defendant argues that the State failed to prove that (1) the proof was 

evident or presumption great that defendant committed the charged offenses, (2) defendant was 

dangerous and thereby posed a threat; and (3) no condition or combination of conditions could be 

imposed in order to mitigate the threat he posed if granted pretrial release. For the reasons that 

follow, we affirm.

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 The State charged defendant with one count of unlawful delivery of 

FILED

February 1, 2024

Carla Bender

4th District Appellate

Court, IL

NOTICE

This Order was filed under 

Supreme Court Rule 23 and is 

not precedent except in the 

limited circumstances allowed 

under Rule 23(e)(1). 
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methamphetamine (720 ILCS 646/55(a)(1) (West 2022)). In November 2023, the State filed a 

verified petition pursuant to section 110-6.1(a)(1) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(1) (West 

2022)), seeking defendant’s pretrial detention. The petition alleged defendant “posed a real and 

present threat to the physical safety of any person, persons, or the community,” based on the charge 

that was nonprobationable, with a minimum sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment, and defendant’s 

criminal history. The State stated defendant’s criminal history included prior felony convictions 

for aggravated unlawful use of a weapon, which resulted in a seven-year sentence; obstruction of 

justice, where probation was unsuccessfully terminated; and criminal damage to property. His 

history also included misdemeanor convictions for domestic battery; battery; two counts of 

unlawful possession of a firearm; and reckless conduct. Further, the State alleged defendant had 

pending felony charges in Macon County case No. 21-CF-1595 for aggravated domestic battery 

and domestic battery. Defendant was placed on global positioning system (GPS) monitoring as a 

condition of pretrial release in that case and had the monitoring condition removed approximately 

a month before the alleged offense in this matter.

¶ 5 A detention hearing followed, where the State proffered that, pursuant to a joint 

investigation with the Sangamon County Sherriff’s Office and the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and 

Firearms (ATF), two controlled purchases of narcotics were conducted. The first purchase of 

narcotics involved 413 pills containing methamphetamine by an individual other than defendant. 

Law enforcement identified defendant as the source of the 413 pills. ATF agents conducted a 

second controlled purchase from defendant, where 2100 pills were transferred for the amount of 

$2100 and field tested positive for methamphetamine. The approximate weight of the pills from 

the second controlled buy was 1013 grams.

¶ 6 The State began discussing defendant’s pending charges in Macon County when 
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defense counsel objected, arguing the State had failed to tender information regarding that charge. 

See 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(f)(1) (West 2022) (requiring the State to tender to the defendant, among 

other things, “copies of the defendant’s criminal history available, *** if relied upon by the State 

in its petition, *** at the time of the hearing”). Following a brief sidebar, off the record, the State 

agreed to continue with its proffer without relying on the pending charges in Macon County and 

continued to explain defendant’s criminal history as described in the petition.

¶ 7 The State requested that the circuit court deny pretrial release due to defendant’s 

criminal record, the severity of the offense, and the belief that placing him on home confinement 

and GPS monitoring would not deter his commission of future offenses.

¶ 8 Defense counsel argued that the circuit court should not consider the first controlled 

purchase, as ATF agents did not purchase pills directly from defendant, and that the alleged weight 

of the pills from the second controlled purchase was an approximation insufficient to support the 

charged offense. Moreover, defendant had completed boot camp on the aggravated unlawful use 

of a weapon conviction, so the least restrictive alternative to pretrial detention would be home 

confinement or GPS monitoring.

¶ 9 The circuit court found that the State had met its burden to detain defendant pretrial. 

The court found that based on the State’s proffer and defendant’s criminal history, defendant posed 

“a complete danger to the community.” A written order was entered, finding defendant was denied 

pretrial release because of the “Nature and circumstances of the offense(s) charged,” and 

“Defendant’s prior criminal history is indicative of violent, abusive or assaultive behavior.”

¶ 10 Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal, and the Office of the State Appellate 

Defender supplemented the notice with a supporting memorandum.

¶ 11 II. ANALYSIS
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¶ 12 Defendant argues that the State failed to prove (1) the proof was evident or 

presumption great that defendant committed the charged offenses, (2) defendant was dangerous 

and thereby posed a threat; and (3) no condition or combination of conditions could be imposed in 

order to mitigate the threat he posed if granted pretrial release. 

¶ 13 The Code abolishes traditional monetary bail and provides defendants with a 

presumption in favor of pretrial release. 725 ILCS 5/110-1.5, 110-2(a) (West 2022). In order for 

the State to successfully petition to keep a defendant detained prior to trial, it has the burden of 

proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that: (1) “proof is evident or presumption great” that 

the defendant committed a detainable offense, (2) depending on the offense, the defendant “poses 

a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community, based on the 

specific articulable facts of the case,” and (3) no condition or combination thereof can mitigate the 

threat the defendant poses. Id. § 110-6.1(e)(1)-(3). We review the circuit court’s judgment for an 

abuse of discretion. People v. Inman, 2023 IL App (4th) 230864, ¶ 11. A circuit court abuses its 

discretion when “ ‘its decision is “fanciful, arbitrary, or unreasonable to the degree that no 

reasonable person would agree with it.” ’ ” People v. Pacheco, 2023 IL 127535, ¶ 54 (quoting 

People v. Kladis, 2011 IL 110920, ¶ 23, quoting People v. Ortega, 209 Ill. 2d 354, 359 (2004)).

¶ 14 Turning to defendant’s arguments that the State failed to prove the proof was evident 

or presumption great that defendant committed the charged offenses, we find that the State carried 

its burden. Defendant points to the State’s allegation that the weight of the pills from the controlled 

buy involving defendant was “roughly” 1013 grams and was not an exact weight. Roughly is a 

synonym for approximately meaning “close but not exactly.” “Approximately.” MerriamWebster.com Thesaurus, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriamwebster.com/thesaurus/approximately (last visited Jan. 24, 2024). The weight, as alleged, is not 
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close to the cutoff of 900 grams, and we find the allegation as contained in the State’s petition 

sufficient. This is not a case where an approximation of 1, 10, or even 100 grams would result in 

a defect in the charge. The circuit court’s finding as to the probability defendant committed the 

alleged offense was not arbitrary or fanciful.

¶ 15 Defendant next argues that the State failed to carry its burden in proving he was 

dangerous and thereby posed a threat. Defendant argues that he “should not have been charged 

with a Class X felony” in this matter and that the State failed to show “his criminal history was 

indicative of violent behavior.” Defendant’s first argument apparently is related to the argument 

above that the State failed to show that he committed the offense by the required evidentiary 

standard due to qualifying language regarding the weight of the methamphetamine. On this point, 

we remain unpersuaded. Addressing his second contention, we find that the State carried its burden 

in establishing defendant posed a danger to the community. In the State’s proffer, defendant was 

tied to two controlled purchases. In one, he was the source of the pills, and in the other he facilitated 

the transaction. His criminal history includes convictions for aggravated unlawful use of a weapon, 

domestic battery, battery, two counts of unlawful possession of a firearm, and reckless conduct.

¶ 16 In his memorandum, defendant argues that none of the factors listed in the Code 

concerning dangerousness relate to the public harm caused by drug abuse. Further, defendant’s 

memorandum argues, “If the State did not want [defendant] selling methamphetamine, the State 

should not have arranged for [defendant] to sell drugs to the State.” Defendant makes it clear that 

he is essentially arguing that he was “entrap[ped]” into the conduct at issue.

¶ 17 Defendant’s assertion that a defendant cannot be deemed a danger to the community 

based on a drug offense is overbroad. Section 110-6.1(g)(1)-(9) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-

6.1(g)(1)-(9) (West 2022)) provides a nonexhaustive list of factors for the circuit court to consider 
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when assessing dangerousness. This subsection explicitly states that the court “shall not be limited 

to” consideration of only these factors. Id. § 110-6.1(g). Defendant is not charged with merely 

abusing or possessing a drug, but its distribution. Defendant was charged under the 

Methamphetamine Control and Community Protection Act (720 ILCS 646/1 et seq. (West 2022)). 

The legislature promulgated this statutory scheme with the intent to “reduce the damage that the 

manufacture, distribution, and use of methamphetamine are inflicting on children, families, 

communities, businesses, the economy, and the environment in Illinois.” Id. § 5. The legislative 

intention behind the adoption of the Controlled Substance Act (720 ILCS 570/100 (West 2022))—

including its prohibitions against the trafficking of controlled substances—is to protect “the peace, 

health, and welfare of the citizens of Illinois.” People v. Johnson, 2023 IL App (5th) 230714, ¶ 26. 

These are relevant considerations when assessing what the legislature meant when it provided for 

the pretrial detention of a person who posed a “danger” to the “community.” See id., ¶¶ 25-26. 

Given defendant’s criminal history, the legislature’s determination that distributing 

methamphetamine has a deleterious impact on the community at large, and the amount of 

methamphetamine the State was able to connect to defendant, the finding that defendant posed a 

danger to the community was not fanciful, arbitrary, or unreasonable. 

¶ 18 Finally, we address defendant’s argument that the State failed to prove that there was 

no less restrictive alternative to pretrial detention. Defendant argues that GPS monitoring was a 

less restrictive alternative. We disagree. It was not an abuse of discretion for the circuit court to 

find that neither home confinement nor GPS monitoring would alleviate concerns of recidivism, 

as the record did not demonstrate how such conditions would prevent defendant from continuing 

to commit offenses of the kind with which he was charged. Accordingly, it was not an abuse of 

discretion for the court to find that the State met its burden in showing no condition or combination 
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thereof could mitigate the threat posed by defendant.

¶ 19 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 20 For the reasons stated, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment. 

¶ 21 Affirmed.