alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
[Federal Register Volume 61, Number 16 (Wednesday, January 24, 1996)]
[Sunshine Act Meetings]
[Page 2002]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 96-1149]








Nuclear Regulatory Commission

DATE: Weeks of January 22, 29, February 5, and 12, 1996.
PLACE: Commissioners' Conference Room, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, 
Maryland.

STATUS: Public.

MATTERS TO BE CONSIDERED:

Week of January 22

    There are no meetings scheduled for the Week of January 22.

Week of January 29--Tentative

Tuesday, January 30

10:00 a.m.
    Briefing by DOE on Status of High Level Waste Program (Public 
        Meeting)

Wednesday, January 31

10:00 a.m.
    Periodic Briefing on Operating Reactors and Fuel Facilities 
        (Public Meeting)
    (Contact: Victor McCree, 301-415-1711)
2:00 p.m.
    Discussion of Full Power Operating License for Watts Bar (Public 
        Meeting)
    (Contact: Fred Hebdon, 301-415-2024)

Week of February 5--Tentative

Wednesday, February 7

10:00 a.m.
    Briefing on System Reliability Studies (Public Meeting)
    (Contact: Patrick Baranowsky, 301-415-7493)

Week of February 12--Tentative

    There are no meetings scheduled for the Week of February 12.

    Note: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is operating under a 
delegation of authority to Chairman Shirley Ann Jackson, because 
with three vacancies on the Commision, it is temporarily without a 
quorum. As a legal matter, therefore, the Sunshine Act does not 
apply; but in the interests of openness and public accountability, 
the Commission will conduct business as though the Sunshine Act were 
applicable.

    The schedule for Commission meetings is subject to change on short 
notice. To verify the status of meetings call (recording)--(301) 415-
1292.

CONTACT PERSON FOR MORE INFORMATION: Bill Hill (301) 415-1661.

    This notice is distributed by mail to several hundred 
subscribers; if you no longer wish to receive it, or would like to 
be added to it, please contact the Office of the Secretary, Attn: 
Operations Branch, Washington, DC 20555 (301-415-1963).
    In addition, distribution of this meeting notice over the 
internet system is available. If you are interested in receiving 
this Commission meeting schedule electronically, please send an 
electronic message to <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#f0919c92b09e8293de979f86"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="6908050b29071b0a470e061f">[email protected]</span></a> or <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#27404c536749554409404851"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="c0a7abb480aeb2a3eea7afb6">[email protected]</span></a>.

    Dated: January 19, 1996.
William M. Hill, Jr.,

SECY Tracking Officer, Office of the Secretary.

[FR Doc. 96-1149 Filed 1-20-96; 2:55 pm]

BILLING CODE 7590-01-M

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</html>
[Federal Register Volume 61, Number 90 (Wednesday, May 8, 1996)]
[Notices]
[Pages 20835-20836]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 96-11503]



-----------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 20836]]


DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
[TA-W-32,079; TA-W-32,079A; TA-W-32,079B]


Notice of Termination of Investigation; Nesor Alloy Corporation, 
West Caldwell, New Jersey; Nesor Alloy Corporation, Montville, New 
Jersey; Nesor Alloy Corporation, Fairfield, New Jersey

    Pursuant to Section 221 of the Trade Act of 1974, an investigation 
was initiated on March 12, 1996 in response to a worker petition which 
was filed on behalf of workers at Nesor Alloy Corporation, West 
Caldwell, Montville and Fairfield, New Jersey locations.
    The petitioner has requested that the petition be withdrawn. 
Consequently, further investigation in this case would serve no 
purpose; and the investigation has been terminated.

    Signed at Washington, D.C. this 27th day of April, 1996.
Russell T. Kile,
Acting Program Manager, Policy and Reemployment Services, Office of 
Trade Adjustment Assistance.
[FR Doc. 96-11503 Filed 5-7-96; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4510-30-M
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-4277

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

RONALD ELZEY, a/k/a Duff,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

Maryland, at Baltimore. William D. Quarles, Jr., District 

Judge. (1:09-cr-00288-WDQ-11)

Submitted: August 19, 2011 Decided: August 29, 2011

Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Marc G. Hall, HALL & CHO, P.C., Rockville, Maryland, for 

Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Jonathan 

Biran, Appellate Chief, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Ronald Elzey appeals his conviction and 262-month 

sentence for one count of conspiracy to participate in a 

racketeering enterprise in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) 

(2006). His sole contention on appeal is that his 2003 Maryland 

conviction for resisting arrest should not have been considered 

a predicate offense for a career offender sentencing enhancement 

pursuant to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.1 (2009). 

Elzey’s argument is foreclosed by our recent decision in United 

States v. Jenkins, 631 F.3d 680 (4th Cir. 2011). A three-judge 

panel of this court may not overrule the precedent set by a 

prior panel. United States v. Rivers, 595 F.3d 558, 564 

(4th Cir. 2010). 

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
#### In the Matter of Ayana E. and Others, Children Alleged to be Neglected. Beverley E., Appellant; Commissioner of Social Services, Respondent.

Appeal from the order of disposition of the Family Court of the State of New York, Bronx County (Harold Lynch, J.), entered on or about September 16, 1987, and vacated upon consent of the parties, unanimously dismissed; and order of said court entered on or about October 28, 1988, discharging the children to their father under certain conditions imposed upon a finding of neglect in an order entered on March 3, 1987, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Appellant mother contends that there was insufficient evidence for a finding of neglect inasmuch as the children were well cared for and her problems resulted from poverty and homelessness. Pursuant to Family Court Act § 1012 (f) (i), a child who is "impaired or is in imminent danger of becoming impaired” as a result of "the failure of [a] parent * * * to exercise a minimum degree of care” must be found to have been neglected. The evidence presented at the fact-finding hearing by the caseworker and psychiatrist revealed that, prior to her eviction, the appellant and her children remained in a darkened apartment with the blinds closed and lights off, that appellant exhibited improper behavior by excessive and compulsive feeding, bathing and changing of the children, and that her disorganization and inability to keep her appointment with the welfare agency resulted in her eviction. She also exhibited confusion and poor judgment in being unable or unwilling to follow through with plans to secure housing. Further, her episodes of mental illness resulting in hospitalization and her refusal to cooperate with treatment or take medication were sufficient to find neglect *(see, Matter of Eugene G.,*76 AD2d 781, *mot to dismiss appeal granted*51 NY2d 878). Thus, sufficient evidence was presented to substantiate a finding of neglect *(see, Matter of Danielle M.,*151 AD2d 240, 243).

Because the original dispositional order was vacated, the appeal with respect to said order is purely academic and must be dismissed as moot *(Matter of Hearst Corp. v Clyne,*50 NY2d 707, 713-714; *Matter of Jodi P.,*133 AD2d 158). Concur— Murphy, P. J., Ross, Rosenberger, Asch and Rubin, JJ.
Exhibit 32.1
                                  ------------



                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



         In connection  with the Annual  Report of Dental  Patient Care America,
Inc. (the  "Company") on Form 10-KSB/A for the period ended December 31, 2004 as
filed with the  Securities  and  Exchange  Commission  on the date  hereof  (the
"Report"),  I, Michael Silva,  Chief Executive Officer of the Company,  certify,
pursuant  to 18  U.S.C.  ss.  1350,  as  adopted  pursuant  to  ss.  906  of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

         (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2) The  information  contained in the Report fairly  presents,  in all
material  respects,  the  financial  condition  and result of  operations of the
Company.



/s/ Michael Silva
------------------
Chief Executive Officer
June 27, 2005
Motion Granted; Order filed October 10, 2013.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

____________

NO. 14-13-00256-CR

____________

MILTON WHITING, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 174th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 1365102

ORDER

Appellant is represented by appointed counsel, Andrew G. McGee.

Appellant’s brief was originally due July 1, 2013. Counsel has been granted four 

extensions of time to file the brief until September 20, 2013. On October 8, 2013, 

counsel filed a further motion for extension of time. The court grants a final 

extension and issues the following order:
2

We order appellant’s counsel, Andrew G. McGee, to file appellant’s brief 

in this appeal on or before November 4, 2013. No further extensions will be 

entertained absent exceptional circumstances. If counsel does not timely file 

appellant’s brief as ordered, the Court may issue an order directing the trial court to 

conduct a hearing to determine the reason for the failure to file the brief and the 

consideration of sanctions, appointment of new counsel, or other appropriate relief.

PER CURIAM
**Exhibit 32.1**

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACTOF 2002**

In connection with the Annual Report of Mothers Work, Inc. (the “Company”)on Form 10-K for the year ended September 30, 2006 as filedwith the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”),I, Dan W. Matthias, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuantto 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 ofthe Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1)   The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)   The information contained in the Reportfairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and resultsof operations of the Company.

| /s/ DAN  W. MATTHIAS |     |
|---------------------------|----------|
| Dan W. Matthias           |     |
| *Chief Executive Officer* | * * |
| December 13, 2006    |     |

 

----
EXHIBIT 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of Beacon Power Corporation (the "Company") on Form 10-K for the year ending
December 31, 2009 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, F. William Capp, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. section 1350, as adopted pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:



/s/ F. WILLIAM CAPP F. William Capp Chief Executive OfficerMarch 15, 2010


---



QuickLinks
## Supreme Court ofthe United States Office ofthe Clerk 

### Washington, DC 20543-0001 Scott S. Harris Clerk ofthe Court 

### December 2, 2015 (202)479.3011
Clerk 

### Court ofCriminal Appeals ofTexas P.O. Box 12308 Capitol Station Austin, TX 78711
Re: Roberto Gonzalez De La Cruz v. Texas No. 15-7207 (Your No. WR-76,781-01)
Dear Clerk: 

### The petition for a writ ofcertiorari in the above entitled case was filed on November 24, 2015 and placed on the docket December 2, 2015 as No. 15-7207.
Sincerely, Scott S. Harris, Clerk by 

### iBJalock Melissa Case Analyst


# Abe,Acos»,C\etk
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Anthony Corbett, Appellant.

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Herman Cahn, J., at suppression hearing; Edward McLaughlin, J., at jury trial and sentence), rendered October 28, 1987, convicting defendant of grand larceny in the fourth degree and sentencing him to an indeterminate term of imprisonment of from 1 Vi to 3 years, unanimously affirmed.

We have had occasion to address these proceedings in the course of affirming the judgment of conviction of a codefendant *(People v Ford,*161 AD2d 262). Although this defendant himself neither made any demand for, nor took any property, the evidence was quite sufficient to establish that he intentionally rendered assistance to the codefendant Ford and a third individual, never apprehended, with intent to deprive the complainant of his property. *(See, People v Jackson,*44 NY2d 935.) There was testimony that defendant stood two feet from the complainant, as part of a triangular formation surrounding the complainant, while the codefendant Ford demanded the victim’s property; that he fled with and remained in the company of said codefendant from the time of the incident to their arrest 20 minutes later; that unlike his garb at the time of the incident, defendant, immediately prior to and upon his arrest, wore his distinctly patterned jacket inside out; and that he stated that the complainant “deserved to be robbed”. The hearing court’s conclusion that the complainant’s and another eyewitness’s independent source warranted the admis*416sion of their in-court identifications of defendant, despite their exposure to a photograph of him prior to trial, finds firm support in the record. *(See, Neil v Biggers,*409 US 188; *People v Ramos,*42 NY2d 834.) We have examined defendant’s other contentions and find them to be without merit. Concur—Kupferman, J. P., Sullivan, Carro, Ellerin and Smith, JJ.
#### James C. McDANIEL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. APPRAISAL INSTITUTE, a Corporation Organized Under the Laws of the State of Illinois, fka American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers of the National Association of Realtors; Dan W. Mahoney, Husband; Susan Mahoney; Wife; Sanders Solot, Husband; Ruth-Jean Solot, Wife, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 94-17158.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Sept. 16, 1997.

ORDER

The concurring opinion, filed June 30, 1997 [117 F.3d 421], is amended as follows:

Delete the first full sentence on Slip Opinion page 7592 [117 F.3d at 424], starting with “The Institute ...” and replace it with: “The Institute only accepts between two and seven percent of its candidates, and MAI appraisers get over 90% of the commercial business in Southern Arizona.”

With the above amendment, the appellant’s petition for rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc is DENIED. The appellee’s petition for rehearing is also DENIED.
##### 



Exhibit 31.2 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 302(a)
OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 I, Bruce Newsome, certify that:  1.
    
    I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K of Imperial Parking
Corporation;2.
    
    Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any untrue
statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to
make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such
statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by
this quarterly report;3.
    
    Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this quarterly report, fairly present in all
material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash
flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this
quarterly report;4.
    
    The registrants other certifying officers and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as
defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-14 and 15d-14) for the registrant and
have:  a)
    
    designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused
such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our
supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the
registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known
to us by others within those entities, particularly during the
period in which this quarterly report is being prepared;b)
    
    evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure
controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions
about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures,
as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such
evaluation; andc)
    
    disclosed in this report any change in the registrants
internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the
registrants most recent fiscal quarter (the registrants fourth
fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially
affected, or is reasonably likely to affect, the registrants
internal control over financial reporting; and  5.
    
    The registrants other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on
our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting,
to the registrants auditors and the audit committee of registrants board
of directors (or persons performing the equivalent function):  a)
    
    all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the
design or operation of internal control over financial reporting
which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrants
ability to record, process, summarize and report financial
information; andb)
    
    any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management
or other employees who have a significant role in the registrants
internal control over financial reporting. Date: March 24, 2004
    /s/ Bruce NewsomeBruce NewsomeChief Financial Officer
EX-10.1 FIRST AMENDMENT/2004 EQUITY INCENTIVE PLAN



 






Exhibit 10.1




FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE

PROASSURANCE CORPORATION

2004 EQUITY INCENTIVE PLAN




     THIS FIRST AMENDMENT to the ProAssurance Corporation (the “Corporation”) 2004 Equity Incentive
Plan (the “Plan”) is effective September 13, 2006 (the “Effective Date”).



     The Plan currently defines Fair Market Value as the average of the daily closing prices for a
share of the Corporation’s common stock on the New York Stock Exchange on the five trading days
prior to the applicable date. Although the use of an average of closing share prices is an
acceptable method for valuing stock compensation under current guidelines of the Securities and
Exchange Commission (“SEC”), the Compensation Committee recommended that the Board of Directors
amend the Plan to make the definition of Fair Market Value consistent with the reporting
requirements under the SEC’s new rules on disclosure of executive compensation and, based on advice
of legal counsel, determined that the Plan may be so amended by the Board of Directors without
stockholder approval as permitted under Section 12(l) of the Plan. The Board of Directors approved
the amendment of the Plan as so recommended on September 13, 2006, and directed Corporation to
execute an amendment to the Plan.



     NOW, THEREFORE, by order of the Board of Directors of the Corporation, the Plan is hereby
amended to modify the definition of “Fair Market Value” by substituting the following as the
definition of “Fair Market Value” in Section 2 of the Plan:




“Fair Market Value” on any date shall mean (i) if the Shares are
actively traded on any national securities exchange or reported on
NASDAQ/NMS on a basis which reports closing prices, the closing
sales price of the Shares on the day the value is to be determined
or, if such exchange was not open for trading on such date, the next
preceding day on which it was open; (ii) if the Shares are not
traded on any national securities exchange, the average of the
closing high bid and low asked prices of the Shares on the
over-the-counter market on the day such value is to be determined,
or in the absence of closing bids on such day, the closing bid on
the next preceding day on which there were bids; or (iii) if the
Shares also are not traded on the over-the-counter market, the Fair
Market Value as determined in good faith by the Committee based on
such relevant facts as may be available to the Committee, which may
include opinions of independent experts, the price at which recent
sales have been made, the book value of the Shares, and the
Company’s current and future earnings.



     This Amendment is effective September 13, 2006. The Plan shall remain in effect and continue
in accordance with its terms as amended by this First Amendment.



 









 





     IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has executed this First Amendment as of the Effective
Date.



	 	 	 	 	 
	 	PROASSURANCE CORPORATION

 	 
	 	By:  	Victor T. Adamo
 	 
	 	 	Its: President 	 
	 	 	 	 
	 




2
#### Leslie SPRINGER and the Jackson Estate, Petitioner, v. Louis SPRUIELL, Respondent. Leslie SPRINGER and the Jackson Estate, Petitioner, v. FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF PLAINVIEW, Texas and Cowles Liipfert, Trustee for the Francis Adair Jones Trust, Respondents.

Nos. D-3803, D-3804.

Supreme Court of Texas.

Nov. 24, 1993.

Donald M. Hunt and Gary M. Bellair, Lubbock, Joseph Stephen Stokes, Plainview, for petitioners.

Bill LaFont, Lanny Voss and Lowell Kregg Hukill, Plainview, Cecil Kuhne and Layton Z. Woodul, Sr., Lubbock, for respondents.

*593PER CURIAM.

The court of appeals consolidated these two appeals and dismissed them for want of jurisdiction as appeals of interlocutory orders. In its originally unpublished opinion the court of appeals concluded that summary judgments reciting that plaintiffs “have and recover nothing” do not dispose of all claims asserted by plaintiffs because summary judgment procedure does not presume all issues and claims are reached. 866 S.W.2d 626. Since that court’s disposition, however, we have issued our opinion in *Mafrige v. Ross,*866 S.W.2d 590 (Tex.1993), which holds that such express language purporting to dispose of all claims makes the summary judgment final and appealable. Without hearing argument, a majority of the court grants the applications for writ of error, reverses the judgments of the court of appeals dismissing the appeals, and remands the causes, as consolidated, to the court of appeals for further proceedings consistent with this opinion and *Mafrige.*Tex.R.App.P. 170.