United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit 

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No. 20-2001

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Matt Raeburn

 Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

James Gibson, Individually; and in his Official Capacity as a Police Officer for the 

City Of Vilonia

 Defendant - Appellee

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Central

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Submitted: May 13, 2021

Filed: August 31, 2021

[Unpublished]

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Before SMITH, Chief Judge, SHEPHERD and GRASZ, Circuit Judges. 

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PER CURIAM. 

Following his arrest at a high school baseball game, Matt Raeburn sued the 

City of Vilonia and Vilonia Police Officer James Gibson under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for 

violations of his First and Fourth Amendment rights and under Arkansas state law. 
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The district court1 granted summary judgment in favor of the City and Officer 

Gibson on the § 1983 claims. The district court declined to exercise supplemental 

jurisdiction over the state law claims and dismissed them without prejudice. 

Raeburn appeals the grant of summary judgment on the § 1983 claims. Having 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.

I. 

On April 9, 2018, Matt Raeburn was attending his son’s baseball game at 

Vilonia High School—the team for which his son played—in Vilonia, Arkansas, 

when he got into a verbal altercation with a parent of the visiting school, Searcy High 

School, and Butch Schucker, Searcy’s Athletic Director. Administrators from both 

schools were concerned about the situation, particularly Raeburn’s behavior, and 

Vilonia High School Vice Principal James “Rick” Kelley called the police. Vilonia 

Police Officer James Gibson responded. When he arrived, Officer Gibson spoke to 

Kelley and Schucker. They told Officer Gibson that Raeburn was the one who 

started the incident and pointed Raeburn out. Officer Gibson asked Kelley what he

wanted done. Kelley told Officer Gibson to pull Raeburn to the side and ask him to 

calm down, and if Raeburn could calm down and stay quiet, he could remain at the 

game, but if he could not, he would have to leave.

Officer Gibson’s dash cam captured his interaction with Raeburn, and the 

video footage was part of the summary judgment record. Officer Gibson approached

Raeburn and asked him to step to the front of Officer Gibson’s patrol car. Raeburn 

was argumentative but eventually complied. Officer Gibson then attempted to 

engage with Raeburn about why Officer Gibson was called there, but his attempts 

were met with interruptions and argument from Raeburn. Officer Gibson then asked 

for Raeburn’s identification. Raeburn complied slowly while continuing to argue 

with and interrupt Officer Gibson. Officer Gibson had a warrant check run and then 

1

The Honorable D.P. Marshall Jr., Chief Judge, United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Arkansas.
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instructed Raeburn to “leave.” Raeburn failed to comply and began to question 

Officer Gibson. Officer Gibson repeatedly instructed Raeburn to “leave” and 

Raeburn failed to do so. The third time he told Raeburn to leave, Officer Gibson 

said, “You’re going to leave or you’re going to jail for criminal trespass.” Raeburn 

still did not leave. Officer Gibson then produced his handcuffs and instructed 

Raeburn once more to “leave.” After that final command, Raeburn said he was 

leaving. Officer Gibson replied “it’s too late” and reached for Raeburn’s left arm. 

Raeburn jerked his left arm away and moved away from Officer Gibson. Officer 

Gibson then pushed Raeburn onto the hood of his patrol car, using his hands and 

body to secure Raeburn on the hood. Raeburn struggled, avoiding Officer Gibson’s 

attempts to handcuff him, but eventually he ceased resisting. Officer Gibson finally 

handcuffed Raeburn’s hands behind his back and told him he was under arrest. 

Officer Gibson cited Raeburn for disorderly conduct, resisting arrest, and trespass, 

and he transported Raeburn to the Faulkner County Detention Center. After Raeburn 

complained to the Vilonia Chief of Police, prosecutors dropped all charges against 

Raeburn, and Officer Gibson was disciplined for violating department policies 

regarding arrests and was assigned additional training. 

Raeburn sued Officer Gibson in his individual and official capacities, alleging 

violations of Raeburn’s constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and violations 

of state law. Raeburn alleged that Officer Gibson made an unlawful arrest and used 

excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment; arrested Raeburn in 

retaliation for Raeburn exercising his First Amendment rights; and committed 

various state law violations. Raeburn also alleged that the City failed to adequately 

train Officer Gibson.

2

2

Under § 1983, “[a] suit against a government officer in his official capacity

is functionally equivalent to a suit against the employing governmental entity.” 

Veatch v. Bartels Lutheran Home, 627 F.3d 1254, 1257 (8th Cir. 2010). Here, “the 

employing governmental entity” is the City of Vilonia. The district court treated the 

failure to train claim as a claim against the City, and it treated the other § 1983 claims 

as claims against Officer Gibson in his individual capacity only. Raeburn has not 

challenged this treatment of his claims in the district court or in this Court. To the 

extent that Raeburn’s complaint could be read to allege an official capacity claim for 
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The district court granted in part and denied in part Officer Gibson and the 

City’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed all claims. The district court 

granted the motion insofar as it dismissed the § 1983 claims with prejudice. The 

district court found that Officer Gibson was entitled to qualified immunity on the 

unlawful arrest claim because Raeburn’s arrest was supported by arguable probable 

cause, and that Officer Gibson was entitled to qualified immunity on the excessive 

force claim because the amount of force he applied to Raeburn was reasonable.

Additionally, the district court found that Raeburn’s retaliatory arrest claim failed 

because Officer Gibson had arguable probable cause to arrest him, and that 

Raeburn’s failure to train claim against the City failed because there was no 

underlying constitutional violation. The district court denied the motion as to the 

state law claims, declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1367(c) and thus dismissing them without prejudice. Raeburn appeals only the 

grant of summary judgment on the § 1983 claims.

3

II. 

“We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing 

the evidence in the light most favorable to [Raeburn] as the nonmoving party and 

drawing all reasonable inferences in [his] favor.” Roebuck v. USAble Life, 992 F.3d 

732, 735 (8th Cir. 2021). “Courts conduct a two-part inquiry to determine whether 

qualified immunity protects a government official from liability: (1) whether the 

facts taken in a light most favorable to [the plaintiff] make out a violation of a 

unlawful arrest, excessive force, or First Amendment retaliation, Raeburn’s failure 

to raise these arguments below means we will not consider them for the first time on 

appeal. See Peter Kiewit Sons’, Inc. v. Wall St. Equity Grp., Inc., 809 F.3d 1018, 

1022 (8th Cir. 2016). 

3

Raeburn does not mention the state law claims in his Issues Presented, and 

his brief contains a single passing reference to the Arkansas Civil Rights Act. 

Because Raeburn has failed to meaningfully argue the state law claims on appeal, 

any arguments regarding the state law claims are waived. See Ahlberg v. Chrysler 

Corp., 481 F.3d 630, 638 (8th Cir. 2007). 
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constitutional . . . right; and (2) whether that right was clearly established” at the 

time of the official’s alleged misconduct. Hoyland v. McMenomy, 869 F.3d 644, 

652 (8th Cir. 2017) (second alteration in original) (citation omitted). “The court may 

consider these steps in any order, but ‘[u]nless the answer to both of these questions 

is yes, the [official] [is] entitled to qualified immunity.’” Ehlers v. City of Rapid

City, 846 F.3d 1002, 1008 (8th Cir. 2017) (first alteration in original) (citations 

omitted). “When properly applied, [qualified immunity] protects ‘all but the plainly

incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 

U.S. 731, 743 (2011) (citation omitted).

A.

Raeburn first argues that the district court erred in granting summary 

judgment based on qualified immunity in favor of Officer Gibson on Raeburn’s 

unlawful arrest claim. He also asserts that the dismissal of his charges has preclusive 

effect in this litigation and operates to bar relitigation of the issue of probable cause

because it establishes that Officer Gibson’s arrest of Raeburn was not supported by 

probable cause. “A warrantless arrest is consistent with the Fourth Amendment if it 

is supported by probable cause, and an officer is entitled to qualified immunity if 

there is at least ‘arguable probable cause,’” Ehlers, 846 F.3d at 1008-09 (citation 

omitted), “that is, whether the officer should have known that the arrest violated 

plaintiff’s clearly established right,” Habiger v. City of Fargo, 80 F.3d 289, 295 (8th 

Cir. 1996) (White, J.). “Arguable probable cause exists even where an officer 

mistakenly arrests a suspect believing it is based in probable cause if the mistake is 

‘objectively reasonable.’” Ehlers, 846 F.3d at 1009 (citation omitted). “A court 

properly applies collateral estoppel[, or issue preclusion,] to bar a party from 

relitigating an issue actually and necessarily decided in a prior proceeding based on 

the same or a different cause of action.” Devan v. City of Des Moines, 767 F.2d 

423, 424 (8th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (citation omitted) (discussing preclusion in a 

federal civil rights action).

 
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The district court concluded that Officer Gibson was entitled to qualified 

immunity on the unlawful arrest claim because he had arguable probable cause to 

arrest Raeburn for obstructing governmental operations in violation of Ark. Code 

Ann. § 5-54-102. We conclude that the district court correctly granted summary 

judgment to Officer Gibson on the unlawful arrest claim, albeit for a different 

reason. We find that Officer Gibson was entitled to qualified immunity because he 

had arguable probable cause to arrest Raeburn for criminal trespass in violation of 

Ark. Code Ann. § 5-39-203. See Christiansen v. W. Branch Cmty. Sch. Dist., 674 

F.3d 927, 934 (8th Cir. 2012) (appellate court may affirm “on any ground supported 

by the record” (citation omitted)).

Section 5-39-203 provides: “A person commits criminal trespass if 

he . . . purposely enters or remains unlawfully in or upon . . . [t]he premises owned 

or leased by another person.” Ark. Code Ann. § 5-39-203. Here, Officer Gibson 

was informed by school officials that Raeburn had instigated a verbal altercation on 

school property in the presence of high school students. Additionally, school

officials requested Officer Gibson’s assistance and specifically requested that 

Raeburn be told to leave if he could not calm down. It was objectively reasonable 

for Officer Gibson to believe that school officials had vested him with the authority 

to decide whether Raeburn failed to calm down and should leave school property. 

The video demonstrates that a reasonable officer could have perceived Raeburn’s 

behavior to be uncooperative and not calm, again in the presence of high school 

students. And Officer Gibson instructed Raeburn to leave school property numerous 

times, but Raeburn repeatedly resisted these commands. Based on these 

circumstances, it was not objectively unreasonable for Officer Gibson to believe that 

Raeburn was “remain[ing] unlawfully” on school property when Raeburn refused to 

obey Officer Gibson’s commands to leave. See id. Officer Gibson was not “plainly 

incompetent,” nor did he “knowingly violate the law,” when he arrested Raeburn for 

criminal trespass. See Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 743 (citation omitted). And because 

the question of whether there was probable cause (or arguable probable cause) to 

arrest focuses on the circumstances existing at the time of the arrest, Raeburn has 

not demonstrated that the later dismissal of his charges was an adjudication that no 
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arguable probable cause existed to arrest him, and thus the dismissal has no

preclusive effect here. See Devan, 767 F.2d at 424; cf. Ehlers, 846 F.3d at 1009 

(probable cause exists when circumstances “at the time of the arrest ‘are sufficient 

to lead a reasonable person to believe that the defendant has committed or is 

committing an offense’” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)). On this record, it was 

not clearly established that the arrest violated Raeburn’s constitutional rights 

because Officer Gibson had arguable probable cause to arrest Raeburn for criminal 

trespass. See Habiger, 80 F.3d at 295. Accordingly, the district court did not err in

granting summary judgment to Officer Gibson based on qualified immunity on 

Raeburn’s unlawful arrest claim.

B. 

Raeburn next argues that the district court erred in granting summary 

judgment in favor of Officer Gibson on the excessive force claim. We disagree. The 

video shows that Raeburn was noncompliant and jerked away when Officer Gibson 

attempted to arrest him, which justified Officer Gibson’s use of minimal force to 

effectuate the arrest. See Ehlers, 846 F.3d at 1011 (officer did not use excessive 

force when he executed a takedown on suspect who ignored two commands to put 

his hands behind his back; suspect “at least appeared to be resisting” and thus officer 

“was entitled to use the force necessary to effect the arrest”). Raeburn contends that 

he was not actively resisting arrest, but we do not accept his version of the facts 

because it is “blatantly contradicted by the record.” See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 

372, 380 (2007). Officer Gibson’s use of his hands, body, and patrol car in order to 

secure Raeburn was not excessive. After Raeburn ceased resisting, Officer Gibson 

removed his left hand and used only his body to hold Raeburn down to handcuff 

him. Officer Gibson’s use of force was objectively reasonable under the 

circumstances. See Carpenter v. Gage, 686 F.3d 644, 649-50 (8th Cir. 2012)

(deputies entitled to qualified immunity on excessive force claim where they 

“reasonably could have interpreted [arrestee’s] actions as resistance and [they] 

responded with an amount of force that was reasonable to effect the arrest”); Ehlers, 

846 F.3d at 1011. Thus, we conclude that no constitutional violation occurred with 
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respect to the force applied by Officer Gibson and that the district court did not err 

in granting summary judgment on the excessive force claim.

C. 

The district court also correctly dismissed the two remaining federal claims. 

Raeburn’s First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim against Officer Gibson fails as 

a matter of law because Officer Gibson had arguable probable cause to arrest him. 

See Peterson v. Kopp, 754 F.3d 594, 602 (8th Cir. 2014) (explaining that lack of 

probable cause or arguable probable cause is an element of a retaliatory arrest 

claim).

4

 And Raeburn’s failure to train claim against the City fails as a matter of 

4

Raeburn argues that the existence of arguable probable cause does not bar his 

retaliatory arrest claim because officers generally exercise their discretion not to 

arrest in these circumstances, citing Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1727 (2019) 

(“Although probable cause should generally defeat a retaliatory arrest claim, a 

narrow qualification is warranted for circumstances where officers have probable 

cause to make arrests, but typically exercise their discretion not to do so.”). As proof 

that officers generally exercise their discretion not to arrest in these circumstances, 

Raeburn points to the Vilonia Chief of Police’s statements during Officer Gibson’s 

internal investigation that (1) he did not think there was sufficient probable cause to 

arrest Raeburn for disorderly conduct, and (2) he would not have charged Raeburn 

with obstruction. But although the Supreme Court has held that the “no-probablecause requirement should not apply when a plaintiff presents objective evidence that 

he was arrested when otherwise similarly situated individuals not engaged in the 

same sort of protected speech had not been,” id., Raeburn presented no such 

objective evidence. Even if he did, Nieves was decided in May 2019, more than a 

year after the events giving rise to Raeburn’s claims, and Nieves did not decide 

whether the exception was clearly established when the plaintiff was arrested in 

2014, cf. Rochell v. City of Springdale Police Dep’t, 768 F. App’x 588, 591 (8th 

Cir. 2019) (Colloton, J., concurring) (agreeing that district court did not err in 

denying qualified immunity in light of a 2018 case’s “definition of what was clearly 

established law in [September] 2014,” when September 2014 was “more than a year 

before the incident in this case”). Thus, Nieves did not clearly establish at the time 

of Officer Gibson’s alleged misconduct (April 2018) that there is an exception to the 

general rule that arguable probable cause defeats a retaliatory arrest claim. See

Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 663 (2012) (holding that officers were entitled to 
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law because Officer Gibson is not liable. See Sinclair v. City of Des Moines, 268 

F.3d 594, 596 (8th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (“Because the police officers are absolved 

of liability, the City cannot be held liable for their actions.”). Accordingly, the 

district court did not err in granting summary judgment on the § 1983 claims.

III. 

We affirm the district court’s judgment.

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qualified immunity on retaliatory arrest claim because “at the time of [plaintiff’s] 

arrest, it was not clearly established that an arrest supported by probable cause could 

violate the First Amendment”).