No. 83-208 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1983 

MY RASMUSSEN and PAULINE RASMUSSEN, 

Plaintiffs and Appellants, 

LARRY C. BENNETT, CLIFFORD HARDEN, 

DANIEL P. JAIIIES, DONALD WHITING, 

and NELSON DAVES, 

Defendants and Respondents. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Ninth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Toole, 

The Honorable John M. PlcCZ-mvel, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellants: 

James C. Bartlett argued; Hash, Jellison, O'Brien 

and Bartlett, Kalispell, Montana 

For Respondents: 

P. 

Jbhn 'jg: Paul argued; Alexander & Baucus, Great Falls, 

Montana 

Submitted: November 3, 19 83 

Decided: November 23, 1983 

Filed: !\dov 2 3 I9983 

Clerk 
Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of 

the Court. 

This is an appeal from an order granting summary 

judgment in a libel and slander action filed in the District 

Court of the Ninth Judicial District, State of Montana, in 

and for the County of Toole. 

The appellant opens the introduction of his brief with 

the statement "the facts of this case are a mess." With 

that statement we are in total accord. Late in this year of 

1983, this Court is called upon to consider disputed facts 

that began in March, 1968. In addition, in a summary 

judgment decision, we are faced with a situation where the 

District Court that granted the summary judgment, did not 

have available to it the depositions of the four defendants, 

a fact unknown to either counsel until the record on appeal 

was prepared. In view of the complicated issues raised by 

this appeal, and the length of the hibernation period that 

this case lay at rest unattended by the caretakers of our 

judicial system, we find it necessary to remand the cause to 

the trial court with the four depositions for 

reconsideration. 

The four issues raised for our consideration are: 

(1) whether the defendants are liable under state law 

for libel and slander; 

(2) whether the defendants can properly claim a 

privilege or qualified privilege on religious grounds; 

(3) whether the defense of truth, based on religious 

grounds is applicable; 

(4) whether the District Court erred in granting 
summary judgment for defendants, in that there remain 

material questions of fact that ought to be litigated and 

tried on the merits; and whether the District Judge erred in 

granting summary judgment when it did not have available to 

it the four depositions for review. 

As previously noted it is this final issue we find 

controlling, necessitating a return to the trial court. 

While the District Court disputed on several facts in the 

case, it found they were not relevant because of a letter 

from the Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York 

Inc., dated August 3, 1982, which controlled the litigation. 

Had the court had before it the depositions, it is possible 

that it could have ascertained that there was sufficient 

evidence to go to a jury. 

Rule 56(c) M.R.Civ.P., provides that summary judgment 

is proper if: " * * * the pleadings, depositions, answers to 

interrogatories, and admissions on file show that there is 

no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 

party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." In 

Harlan v. Anderson (1976), 169 Mont. 447, 450, 548 P.2d 613, 

615, this Court commented on the above rule: 

"This Court has on many occasions 

commented upon the nature of the burden 

of proof imposed on the moving party 

under Rule 56. The Court has 

consistently held that the party moving 

for summary judgment has the burden of 

showing the complete absence of any 

genuine issue as to all facts which are 

deemed material in light of those 

substantive principles which entitled him 

to a judgment as a matter of law. We 

have also held the rule operates to hold 

the movant to a 'strict standard' and 

that: 

"' * * * To satisfy his burden the movant 

must make a showing that is quite clear 

what the truth is, and that excludes any 
real doubt as to the existence of any 

genuine issue of material fact. * * *' 

Kober & Kyriss v. Stewart & Billings 

Deaconess Hospital, 148 Mont. 117, 122, 

417 P.2d 476, 478." 

Where as here, the court did not have the depositions 

before it, and quite possibly did not have all the facts 

before it, summary judgment was improperly granted. 

Summary judgment is set aside and the cause is 

returned to the District Court for further consideration. 

We concur: 

s-,-Qos*4 Chief Justice 

~rd~ustice John C. Sheehy, specially concurring: 

It has been a long time coming but the Court has now 

at least partially reversed Mustang Beverage Co., Inc. v. 

Joseph Schlitz Brewing Company (1973), 162 Mont. 243, 511 

P.2d 1. n