United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 02-3204

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Felicia Amajali, *

*

Petitioner, *

* Petition for Review of an Order

v. * of the Board of Immigration Appeals.

* [UNPUBLISHED]

John D. Ashcroft, Attorney General *

of the United States, *

*

Respondent. *

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Submitted: November 21, 2003

Filed: January 13, 2004

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Before WOLLMAN, BYE, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM.

Felicia Amajali (Amajali), a native of Nigeria, petitions for review of a Board

of Immigration Appeals (BIA) order summarily affirming an immigration judge’s

denial of Amajali’s applications for asylum and withholding of removal. Amajali

contends that the immigration judge erred in concluding that she had not established

persecution and a well-founded fear thereof and also argues that the BIA’s summary

decision violated her rights. We deny the petition.
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Substantial evidence supports the immigration judge’s conclusions that

Amajali’s past treatment did not rise to persecution and that Amajali does not have

a reasonable fear of persecution. Dominguez v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 678, 679 (8th Cir.

2003) (standards for granting asylum and withholding of removal); Peripanathan v.

INS, 310 F.3d 594, 597 (8th Cir. 2002) (standard of review). Amajali’s exclusion

from highschool debate and certain athletic events, her rejection from Benin

University, and being dropped from the Nigerian Junior Olympic Team were certainly

unfair. Cf. Regalado-Garcia v. INS., 305 F.3d 784, 787 (8th Cir. 2002) (defining

persecution as “the infliction or threat of death, torture, or injury to one's person or

freedom, on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social

group, or political opinion.” (citation omitted)). Nevertheless, the evidence also

established that Amajali was allowed to attend classes, was never arrested or

imprisoned for her or her father’s political activities, was allowed to travel to other

countries and compete in select athletic events while still living in Nigeria, and was

granted a passport, which was renewed by the Nigerian embassy in 1991. Moreover,

the immigration judge was entitled to find that Amajali’s inability to contact her

family since 1993 was insufficient to support a reasonable fear of persecution given

the lack of corroborating evidence regarding her family’s status. See e.g.,

Hajiani-Niroumand v. INS, 26 F.3d 832, 838 (8th Cir. 1994) (recognizing importance

of corroborating evidence and giving deference to immigration judge’s credibility

findings).

Finally, on appeal to the BIA, Amajali alleged that “denial of . . . . entry into

the university [of Benin] and the denial of being allowed to compete in the Junior

Olympics” would hamstring her ability to find coaching and sports administration

employment in Nigeria. The BIA’s summary decision did not address this argument,

and Amajali suggests that this was error. We disagree. Although an agency must

explain the basis for its decision, the BIA’s streamlined review procedures are

permissible, Dominguez, 336 F.3d at 680, and an applicant should not be able to

thwart the administrative scheme merely by reserving additional arguments for
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appeal. At any rate, Amajali’s argument fails on the merits because such speculative

and generalized economic harms are not a basis for a well-founded fear of

persecution. Nyonzele v. INS, 83 F.3d 975, 983 (8th Cir. 1996).

The petition is denied.

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