UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-4093

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

CHAVEZ DEPAUL FOX, a/k/a Paul Fox,

 Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle 

District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. James A. Beaty, Jr., 

Chief District Judge. (1:05-cr-00149-JAB-5)

Submitted: August 28, 2012 Decided: September 14, 2012

Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

John D. Bryson, WYATT, EARLY, HARRIS & WHEELER, LLP, High Point, 

North Carolina, for Appellant. Ripley Rand, United States 

Attorney, Sandra J. Hairston, Assistant United States Attorney, 

Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Chavez Depaul Fox pled guilty to one count of 

conspiracy to distribute cocaine base. He was sentenced to a 

term of seventy-seven months’ imprisonment to be followed by 

five years of supervised release. While on supervised release, 

Fox was arrested twice pursuant to traffic stops and found to be 

in possession of marijuana. The district court revoked Fox’s 

supervised release term and sentenced him to forty-three months’ 

incarceration. On appeal, Fox’s sole contention is that the 

district court improperly relied on hearsay evidence in finding 

that he violated the terms of his release in violation of Fed. 

R. Crim. P. 32.1(b)(2)(C) and his rights under the Confrontation

Clause.

We review a district court’s decision to revoke 

supervised release for abuse of discretion. United States v. 

Pregent, 190 F.3d 279, 282 (4th Cir. 1999). A district court’s 

ruling to admit hearsay evidence during a supervised release 

revocation hearing is likewise reviewed for abuse of 

discretion. United States v. Medford, 661 F.3d 746, 751 (4th 

Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1729 (2012).

“Supervised release revocation hearings are informal 

proceedings in which the rules of evidence, including those 

pertaining to hearsay, need not be strictly applied.” United 

States v. Doswell, 670 F.3d 526, 530 (4th Cir. 2012); see also
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Fed. R. Evid. 1101(d)(3) (excluding probation revocation 

hearings from proceedings subject to the federal rules of 

evidence). However, due process affords a releasee a limited 

right “to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses” at a 

revocation hearing “unless the hearing officer specifically 

finds good cause for not allowing confrontation.” Morrissey v. 

Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972). Prior to admitting hearsay 

evidence in a revocation hearing, “the district court must 

balance the releasee’s interest in confronting an adverse 

witness against any proffered good cause for denying such 

confrontation.” Doswell, 670 F.3d at 530. Further, the due 

process guarantee is embodied in the procedural rule that a 

releasee is “entitled to . . . question any adverse witness 

unless the court determines that the interest of justice does 

not require the witness to appear.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 

32.1(b)(2)(C).

Here Officer Hanes, who effectuated the first traffic 

stop, explained to the court that his captain told him that 

morning that he had received information that a “Paul Fox” was 

in possession of three pounds of marijuana. When the officer 

began explaining what the confidential source specifically said, 

defense counsel objected and the government changed its 

questioning to ask Officer Hanes what he did as a result of the 

information he received. 
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Upon our review, we find that the statement at issue 

was not hearsay. “Fed. R. Evid. 801(c) defines an out of court 

statement as hearsay if it is offered in evidence to prove the 

truth of the matter asserted.” United States v. Love, 767 F.2d 

1052, 1063 (4th Cir. 1985) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Out of court statements are not hearsay, however, “if [they are]

offered for the limited purpose of explaining why a government 

investigation was undertaken.” Id. In Love, we rejected the 

argument that a DEA agent’s testimony concerning information he 

received from a fellow agent was hearsay, since the testimony 

was offered “only to explain why the officers and agents made 

the preparations that they did in anticipation of the 

appellants’ arrest.” Id. 

Similarly here, Officer Hanes’ testimony concerning 

the informant’s information was not offered for the truth of the 

matter asserted, but rather to explain why he was looking for 

Fox’s vehicle on the date in question. And even if the 

statement qualified as hearsay, the two officers subsequently 

testified to their first hand accounts of finding and seizing 

marijuana from Fox’s vehicle. That testimony demonstrated the 

reliability of the informant’s information, and reliability “is 

a critical factor in the balancing test under Rule 

32.1.” Doswell, 670 F.3d at 531. “If hearsay evidence is 

reliable and the Government has offered a satisfactory 
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explanation for not producing the adverse witness, the hearsay 

evidence will likely be admissible under Rule 32.1.” Id. 

Because the information provided by the confidential informant 

was clearly reliable, the evidence of the informant’s statement, 

assuming it to be hearsay, would have been admissible in the 

revocation proceeding.

We accordingly find no abuse of discretion and affirm 

the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral argument 

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented 

in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

AFFIRMED