[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 19-13632

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D.C. Docket No. 1:99-cr-00125-KMM-12

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

ARTHUR PLESS, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

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(May 25, 2021)

Before JILL PRYOR, NEWSOM and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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Arthur Pless, a federal prisoner, appeals the district court’s denial of his 

motion for a sentence reduction under § 404(b) of the First Step Act. After careful 

consideration, we affirm.

I.

In 1999, a federal grand jury charged Pless with conspiring to possess with 

intent to distribute more than five kilograms of powder cocaine and more than 50 

grams of crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846 (Count 2); 

distributing more than 50 grams of crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 

§ 841(a)(1) (Count 15); and conspiring to use and carry a firearm during and in 

relation to a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(o) (Count 16). 

Pless proceeded to trial, and the jury returned a general verdict convicting him on 

these three counts. The district court sentenced Pless to concurrent terms of life 

imprisonment on Counts 2 and 15, and 240 months’ imprisonment on Count 16. 

On direct appeal, we affirmed Pless’s convictions and sentences. See United States 

v. Baker, 432 F.3d 1189 (2005).

In 2010, Congress passed the Fair Sentencing Act to address disparities in 

sentences between offenses involving crack cocaine and those involving powder 

cocaine. See Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (2010); see also Kimbrough v. 

United States, 552 U.S. 85, 97–100 (2007) (providing background on disparity). 

The Fair Sentencing Act increased the quantity of crack cocaine necessary to 

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trigger the highest statutory penalties from 50 grams to 280 grams and the 

intermediate statutory penalties from five grams to 28 grams. See Fair Sentencing 

Act § 2; 21 U.S.C § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii), (B)(iii). The Fair Sentencing Act’s reduced 

penalties applied only to defendants who were sentenced on or after its effective 

date. Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260, 264 (2012).

Congress subsequently passed the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-

391 § 404, 132 Stat. 5194, 5222 (2018). Among other things, the First Step Act 

gives district courts the discretion “to apply retroactively the reduced statutory 

penalties for crack-cocaine offenses in the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 to movants 

sentenced before those penalties became effective.” United States v. Jones, 

962 F.3d 1290, 1293 (11th Cir. 2020). 

After the First Step Act went into effect, Pless, proceeding pro se, moved for 

a sentence reduction under the Act. The government opposed Pless’s motion. It 

argued both that he was ineligible for a sentence reduction under the First Step Act 

and that, even if he were eligible, the court should decline to exercise its discretion 

to reduce his sentences. Pless did not file a reply. 

The district court denied the motion. First, the court concluded that Pless 

was not eligible for a sentence reduction under the First Step Act. Second, the 

court ruled in the alternative that “even if the First Step Act did support a reduction 

in [Pless’s] sentence, the Court would nonetheless decline to exercise its 

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discretion.” Doc. 1387 at 3 (emphasis in original).

1

 The district court explained 

that it had weighed the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors,

2 mentioning specifically “the 

seriousness of the present offenses, the reprehensible nature of [Pless’s] conduct,

including the murders of six individuals in furtherance of the drug conspiracy at 

issue, the need to promote the rule of law and provide adequate deterrence, and to 

protect the public from further crimes.” Id. Pless, now represented by counsel, 

appeals.

II.

We review for an abuse of discretion a district court’s denial of an eligible 

movant’s request for a reduced sentence under the First Step Act. Jones, 962 F.3d 

at 1296. “A district court abuses its discretion if it applies an incorrect legal 

standard, applies the law in an unreasonable or incorrect manner, follows improper 

procedures in making a determination, or makes findings of fact that are clearly 

1 “Doc.” numbers refer to the district court’s docket entries.

2 Section § 3553(a) states that a court should “impose a sentence sufficient, but not 

greater than necessary” to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, 

provide just punishment for the offense, afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct, protect 

the public from further crimes of the defendant, and provide the defendant with needed 

educational or vocational training. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). In imposing a sentence, a court also 

should consider: the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of 

the defendant, the kinds of sentences available, the sentencing range established under the 

Sentencing Guidelines, any pertinent policy statement issued by the Sentencing Commission, the 

need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities, and the need to provide restitution to victims. 

Id. § 3553(a)(1), (3)–(7). 

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erroneous.” Diveroli v. United States, 803 F.3d 1258, 1262 (11th Cir. 2015) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). 

III.

District courts generally lack the authority to modify a term of imprisonment 

once it has been imposed. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). But the First Step Act permits 

district courts to reduce some previously-imposed terms of imprisonment for 

offenses involving crack cocaine. See First Step Act § 404. When a movant has a 

“covered offense,” a district court has discretion to grant a sentence reduction and 

shall impose a reduced sentence “as if sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act 

of 2010 . . . were in effect at the time the covered offense was committed.” Id.

§ 404(b). 

In Jones, we addressed when the First Step Act authorizes a district court to 

reduce a movant’s sentence. To be eligible for a sentence reduction, a movant 

must have a “covered offense,” meaning he has to have been sentenced for a crackcocaine offense that triggered the higher penalties in § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) or (B)(iii). 

Jones, 962 F.3d at 1298. But even when a movant has a covered offense, a district 

court is not necessarily authorized to reduce his sentence because the First Step Act 

specifies that the district court must impose a reduced sentence “as if” the Fair 

Sentencing Act had been in effect at the time the covered offense was committed. 

Id. at 1303 (internal quotation marks omitted). When a movant’s sentence is 

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already equal to what his mandatory-minimum sentence would have been under 

the Fair Sentencing Act, he is ineligible for a sentence reduction because his 

“sentence would have necessarily remained the same had the Fair Sentencing Act 

been in effect.” Id.

That a district court is authorized to reduce a movant’s sentence does not 

mean it must do so. Id. at 1304. A district court has “wide latitude to determine 

whether and how to exercise [its] discretion in the [First Step Act] context.” Id. A 

district court’s explanation for its decision whether to exercise its discretion need 

not be “lengthy,” but the court “must adequately explain its sentencing decision to 

allow for meaningful appellate review.” United States v. Stevens, No. 19-12858,

__ F.3d __, 2021 WL 1997011, at *7 (11th Cir. May 19, 2021). The decision must 

demonstrate that the district court “considered the parties’ arguments” and had “a 

reasoned basis for exercising its own legal decisionmaking authority.” Id.

(alteration adopted) (internal quotation marks omitted). When the “explanation is

inadequate in a particular case, we will send the case back to the district court for a 

more complete explanation.” Id. (alterations adopted) (internal quotation marks 

omitted).

In this case, the district court denied Pless’s motion on two alternative 

grounds: first, that he was ineligible for relief, and second, that “even if the First 

Step Act did support a reduction in [Pless’s] sentence, the Court would nonetheless 

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decline to exercise its discretion.” Doc. 1387 at 3 (emphasis in original). 

Assuming Pless is correct that the district court erred in finding him ineligible for a 

sentence reduction, we nonetheless cannot say the court abused its discretion in 

denying his motion. 

Pless argues that the district court abused its discretion in ruling on the 

alternative ground because it failed to address—in sufficient detail to allow for 

meaningful appellate review—why it was denying a sentence reduction. He says

that the district court’s explanation was insufficient because we cannot tell whether 

the court considered all the § 3553(a) factors. But in deciding whether to exercise 

its discretion to reduce a sentence under the First Step Act, “a district court may, 

but is not required to, consider the § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Potts, No. 

19-12061, __ F.3d __, 2021 WL 1996881, at *3 (11th Cir. May 19, 2021).

The relevant question for our purposes is whether the reasoning in the

district court’s decision was sufficient to allow meaningful appellate review. See 

id. Here, we can discern from the district court’s decision that the court considered 

the parties’ arguments and had a reasoned basis for declining to reduce Pless’s 

sentences. Although the district court’s discussion of why it decided not to reduce 

the sentences was relatively brief, the order reflects that the court considered the 

parties’ arguments and rested its decision on the seriousness of the offense; the 

nature and circumstances of the offense, which included the murders of six 

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individuals; the need to promote the rule of law; the need to provide adequate 

deterrence; and the need to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant. 

This explanation was sufficient to permit meaningful appellate review. See id.; see 

also United States v. Eggersdorf, 126 F.3d 1318, 1322–23 (11th Cir. 1997) 

(concluding that district court provided sufficient explanation for denying a 

sentencing reduction based on a change to the Sentencing Guidelines when the 

court stated that it had considered the government’s brief in opposition, which set 

out and addressed the § 3553(a) factors).3

 

Pless urges us to vacate the district court’s order for another reason as 

well—that the court’s decision not to exercise its discretion may have been 

influenced by its mistake of law regarding his eligibility for a sentence reduction. 

But the district court’s order shows that the court accepted for purposes of its 

alternative ruling that it had the authority to grant Pless’s motion. We are thus 

“fully able to discern the district court’s two alternative bases” for denying a 

sentence reduction and may affirm on the latter basis. Potts, 2021 WL 1996881, at 

*4. 

3 Pless argues that the “[district] court did not allow” him to raise any arguments about 

the § 3553(a) factors or to address his “history and characteristics.” Appellant’s Br. at 33. But 

we see no indication in the record that the district court prohibited Pless from addressing the 

§ 3553(a) factors or any other considerations. This is not a case where the district court denied a

motion for a sentence reduction without giving the defendant any opportunity to be heard on the 

motion. See United States v. Russell, 994 F.3d 1230, 1240 n.9 (11th Cir. 2021) (majority op.); 

id. at 1242–43 (Branch., J, concurring).

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Even assuming the district court erred in concluding that Pless was ineligible 

for a sentence reduction under the First Step Act, we cannot say that the court 

abused its discretion when it declined to reduce his sentences.

4

AFFIRMED.

4 Also pending before us is Pless’s Motion to Supplement the Appendix, which seeks to 

add the transcript from his sentencing hearing to the appendix he filed with this Court. The

transcript is already part of the record on appeal, however. We deny the motion as moot.

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