In the United States Court of Federal Claims

No. 21-1864C

(Filed: January 31, 2022)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

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LAUNA GOLDDEEN OGBURN, *

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Plaintiff, *

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v. *

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THE UNITED STATES, *

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Defendant. *

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OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Launa Golddeen Ogburn — proceeding pro se — seeks backpay and 

other monetary compensation from the United States, plus certain forms of equitable 

relief. See Compl. at 2–4 (ECF 1). Defendant moves to dismiss “because the statutes 

and regulations she cites are not money-mandating.” See Mot. to Dismiss at 4 (ECF 

8) (“Mot.”); see also id. at 5–6 (seeking dismissal because “Ms. Ogburn does not 

identify a substantive provision of law, regulation, or the Constitution that can fairly 

be construed as mandating compensation, and we are not aware of any provision that 

would mandate payment to Ms. Ogburn”).1 The motion is DENIED. But Ms. Ogburn 

is ORDERED to file an amended complaint as described below.

This Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction — its authority to pass judgment on 

the cases before it — is limited to specific types of claims against the federal 

government, most commonly claims for money as provided by the Tucker Act. See, 

e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1); see also Brown v. United States, 105 F.3d 621, 623 (Fed. 

Cir. 1997) (“The Court of Federal Claims is a court of limited jurisdiction.”). Because 

the Tucker Act is only “a jurisdictional statute [that] does not create any substantive 

right enforceable against the United States for money damages,” United States v. 

Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 398 (1976) (citing Eastport S.S. Corp. v. United States, 178 Ct. 

Cl. 599, 605–07 (1967)), parties asserting Tucker Act jurisdiction must “identify a 

1 Ms. Ogburn has filed an opposition, see Opp. (ECF 11), and the government has filed a reply, see

Reply (ECF 12). Today the Court received a document from Ms. Ogburn captioned “Notice re – Missing 

Certificates of Service.” The document shall be FILED by my leave. To the extent Ms. Ogburn seeks 

any relief, it is DENIED. 
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substantive right for money damages against the United States, separate from the 

Tucker Act itself.” Todd v. United States, 386 F.3d 1091, 1094 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citing

Testan, 424 U.S. at 398). That requires a “money mandating” source of law, i.e., a 

statute or regulation that “can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by 

the Federal Government for the damage sustained and is reasonably amenable to the 

reading that it mandates a right of recovery in damages.” Jan’s Helicopter Serv., Inc. 

v. F.A.A., 525 F.3d 1299, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quotes and citations omitted) (quoting 

United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 217 (1983), and United States v. White 

Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465, 473 (2003)).

The government may well be correct that some of the sources of law Ms. 

Ogburn cites are not money-mandating. Yet the Complaint also mentions the Fair 

Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., which is money-mandating. See Compl. 

at 2; Abbey v. United States, 745 F.3d 1363, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Ms. Ogburn’s 

opposition brief, moreover, mentions 5 U.S.C. § 5332, which establishes the General 

Schedule of basic pay rates for federal employees. See Opp. at 4. That statute is likely 

money-mandating as well. See McAllister v. United States, 105 Fed. Cl. 180, 183 

(2012); United States v. Connolly, 716 F.2d 882, 887 (Fed. Cir. 1983). The 

government’s assertions that “the statutes and regulations [Ms. Ogburn] cites are not 

money-mandating” and that “Ms. Ogburn does not identify a substantive provision of 

law ... that can fairly be construed as mandating compensation” are thus flatly belied 

by the record. See Mot. at 4–5. The government cannot simply wish away moneymandating statutes expressly cited in the plain text of Ms. Ogburn’s filings. 

More broadly, although “pro se litigants are not excused from meeting 

jurisdictional requirements,” Spengler v. United States, 688 F. App’x 917, 920 (Fed. 

Cir. 2017) (citing Kelley v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 812 F.2d 1378, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 

1987)), they are “entitled to a liberal construction of [their] pleadings.” See HowardPinson v. United States, 74 Fed. Cl. 551, 553 (2006) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 

519, 520–21 (1972)). Where a basis for jurisdiction is evident, this Court has even 

accepted jurisdiction over pro se complaints that fail to cite the relevant moneymandating law. See id. In this case, where Ms. Ogburn plainly seeks back pay — a 

common request in this Court — it would not be proper to dismiss merely because 

she has not identified the exact legal basis for recovery as precisely as a lawyer would.

By the same token, it would be premature to dismiss Ms. Ogburn’s requests 

for equitable relief. See Mot. at 6–7. This Court may, “as an incident of and collateral 

to” a money judgment, “issue orders directing restoration to office or position, 

placement in appropriate duty or retirement status, and correction of applicable 

records” when needed to “provide an entire remedy and to complete the relief afforded 

by the judgment.” 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(2). Defendant is correct that “the Court of 
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Federal Claims does not have jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus[.]” Alvarado 

Hosp., LLC v. Price, 868 F.3d 983, 999 (Fed. Cir. 2017). But if Ms. Ogburn were to 

prevail on a claim for money, the substance of the equitable relief she requests — such 

as correction of her employment records — may be appropriate. Compl. at 4.

The real problem with Ms. Ogburn’s Complaint — which the government only 

mentions in passing, Mot. at 5 — is that it does not explain the facts that entitle her 

to money. A complaint in this Court must contain “a short and plain statement of the 

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[.]” RCFC 8(a)(2). The allegations 

need not be “detailed,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)), but must be “sufficient ..., [when] 

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,’” id. (quoting 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). In this case, the Complaint requests several forms of 

compensation and describes Ms. Ogburn’s past efforts to obtain that compensation.

Compl. 2–4. It does not, however, provide facts “showing that [she] is entitled to” the 

compensation. RCFC 8(a)(2). For example, although Ms. Ogburn claims that she is 

entitled to back pay and a disability annuity at a certain pay grade, Compl. at 2, the 

Complaint does not disclose the reasons she was entitled to payment at the requested 

grade, nor the difference between what she was entitled to and what she received. 

When a complaint is “so vague or ambiguous that [the government] cannot 

reasonably prepare a response,” this Court may order the plaintiff to provide a “more 

definite statement.” See RCFC 12(e); see also Geospatial Tech. Assocs., LLC v. United 

States, No. 16-346C, 2020 WL 4436332, at *4 (Fed. Cl. May 21, 2020) (citing Pinson 

v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 975 F. Supp. 2d 20, 26 (D.D.C. 2013), and Gal-Or v. United 

States, 93 Fed. Cl. 200, 205 (2010)). That is the appropriate course here. Ms. Ogburn 

is ORDERED to file, no later than March 2, 2022, an amended complaint that 

includes a “short and plain statement” of facts showing why she is entitled to each 

item of compensation she seeks. The motion to dismiss is DENIED without prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/ Stephen S. Schwartz

STEPHEN S. SCHWARTZ

Judge