United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit 

Chicago, Illinois 60604 

Submitted June 14, 2018 

Decided June 14, 2018 

Before 

DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge 

JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge 

DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge 

No. 17-1457 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

STEPHEN T. ANGERMAN, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

 Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Northern District of Illinois, 

Western Division. 

No. 15 CR 50002-1 

Frederick J. Kapala, 

Judge. 

O R D E R 

Stephen Angerman pleaded guilty to bank fraud, money laundering, and 

testifying falsely in a bankruptcy proceeding, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 1344, 1956(a)(1)(B)(i), 

152(2), and was sentenced to 26 months’ imprisonment and ordered to pay $582,513.35 

in restitution to the banks he defrauded. Angerman filed a notice of appeal, but his 

appointed lawyer asserts that the appeal is frivolous and moves to withdraw under 

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Angerman did not respond to counsel’s motion. 

Because counsel’s analysis appears to be thorough, we limit our review to the subjects 

she discusses. See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014); United States 

v. Wagner, 103 F.3d 551, 553 (7th Cir. 1996). 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION 

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 
No. 17-1457 Page 2 

In her Anders submission, counsel informs us that Angerman does not wish to 

withdraw his guilty plea, and thus she appropriately refrains from discussing the 

adequacy of the plea colloquy or the voluntariness of the plea. United States v. Konczak, 

683 F.3d 348, 349 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Knox, 287 F.3d 667, 670–71 (7th Cir. 

2002). 

Angerman has informed counsel that he wants to challenge only the order of 

$393,611.47 in restitution to one of the four banks, Alliant Credit Union, for an unpaid 

mortgage. Counsel explains that Angerman could challenge that calculation in three 

ways. First, Angerman could argue, as he did in the district court, that he should have 

received credit for two payments he allegedly made to the bank. But counsel correctly 

rejects that argument because Angerman acknowledged that the payments do not 

appear on the loan statement, and there is no evidence that his payments went toward 

the principal due on the mortgage. 

Second, counsel considers whether Angerman could contest the district court’s 

calculation of the mortgage property’s value. The district judge deducted the 

foreclosure sale price from the amount owed on the mortgage, but Angerman could 

argue that the judge should have deducted the property’s fair market value instead. The 

argument, however, would be frivolous because the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act 

of 1996 requires offenders to pay the value of the property less “the value (as of the date 

the property is returned) of any part of the property that is returned,” 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3663A(b)(1)(B)(ii), and it is undisputed that the property’s value is measured “by the 

amount of money the victim received in selling the collateral.” Robers v. United States, 

134 S. Ct. 1854, 1856 (2014) (emphasis added). 

Finally, counsel evaluates whether Angerman could argue that the restitution 

order should have excluded the $212,500 in expenses that Alliant paid to a third party 

to vacate a tax deed on the property. The district judge included the payment in the 

restitution award because it was the “actual cost” incurred by Alliant to obtain clear 

title. Counsel properly concludes that any challenge to the restitution amount would be 

frivolous because damages to the property are losses recoverable under the MVRA, 

see United States v. Scott, 405 F.3d 615, 619–20 (7th Cir. 2005), and costs incurred to 

mitigate damage to the property’s value—such as paying real estate taxes before a 

foreclosure sale or paying maintenance and utilities expenses to preserve the 

collateral—fall within that category. See United States v. Robers, 698 F.3d 937, 955 

(7th Cir. 2012), aff’d, 134 S. Ct. 1854 (2014). 
No. 17-1457 Page 3 

Accordingly, we GRANT the motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.