NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff

- Appellee,

v.

SHANE SCOTT OLNEY,

Defendant

- Appellant. No. 16

- 30122

D.C. No.

2:13

- cr

- 02094

- TOR

- 19

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington Thomas O. Rice, Chief Judge, Presiding

Submitted July 11, 2017 ** Seattle, Washington

Before: TASHIMA and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges, and WALTER, *** District Judge.

Shane Olney appeals his conviction for sponsoring or exhibiting an animal

in an unlawful animal fighting venture

, 7 U.S.C. § 2156 (a)(1) ; 18 U.S.C. § 2 . He

* This disposition is not appropriate for publicati on and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable Donald E. Walter, United States D istrict Judge for the Western District of Louisiana, sitting by designation. 

# FILED

JUL 13 2017

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLER K

U.S. COURT OF APPEAL S2

contends that the district court lacked jurisdiction and that the criminal statute , as

applied to him, violates his free exercise rights under the First Amendment. We

review both contentions de novo. See United States v. Begay , 42 F.3d 486, 497

(9th Cir. 1994) ; United States v. Ward , 989 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1992). We

have juris diction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

1. We reject Olney’s challenge to the district court’s jurisdiction. “[F]ederal

court jurisdiction extends to intra

- Indian violations of federal criminal laws of

general, nationwide applicability.” United States v. Mitchell , 502 F.3d 931, 946

(9th Cir. 2007); see Fed. Power Comm’n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation , 362 U.S. 99,

116 (1960) (“[I]t is now well settled

. . . that a general statute in terms applying to

all persons includes Indians and their property interests.”). The statute at issue

here, 7 U.S.C. § 2156(a)(1), fall s within that category. Whether or not the State of

Washington retroceded its jurisdiction to prosecute state crimes occurring on

Yakama land has no bearing on this federal pros ecution of a federal crime. 1

2. We also reject Olney’s free exercise challenge to the statute. Olney was

not punished for exercising “ his dominion and control of his roosters ” in

accordance with his expressed religious beliefs. The district court found no

evidence that he “ personally exhibited or sponsored any particular rooster he

1 Olney’s request that we take judicial notice of two documents related to retrocession by Washington is therefore DENIED

.3

owned in the animal fighting venture .” Olney was convicted for “ host[ing] the

entire animal fighting venture ” in which others participated and exercised

dominion and control over their roosters.

To the extent 7 U.S.C. § 2156 , “ a neutral law of general application,” has

“the incidental effect of burdening a particular religious practice” by Olney, it

survives First Amendment scrutiny because it has a rational basis. Stormans, Inc.

v. Wiesman , 794 F.3d 1064, 1075 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied , 136 S. Ct. 2433

(2016). “[T]he prohibition of animal cruelty

. . . has a long history in American

law, starting with the early settlement of the Colonies.” United States v. Stevens

,

559 U.S. 460, 469 (2010) ; see also id. at 477 (observing that cockfighting has

“ long [been] considered immoral in much of America ”). But “ c ockfighting [is]

prohibited only in part out of compassion for the suffering animals; the main

reason [it was] abolished was because it was felt that [it] debased and brutalized

the citizenry who flocked to witness such [a] spectacle[].” Paris Adult Theatre I v.

Slaton , 413 U.S. 49, 68 n.15 (1973)

. “Congress has declared cockfighting a

scourge that warrants prose cution, and we have no quarrel with that.” Ortega

Lopez v. Lynch , 834 F.3d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 2016).

AFFIRMED.