This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Reports. Please 1 see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. 2 Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated 3 errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does 4 not include the filing date. 5 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 6 ANGELA HIGGINS, 7 Petitioner-Appellee, 8 v. No. 30,162 9 JESSE HIGGINS, 10 Respondent-Appellant. 11 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SIERRA COUNTY 12 Kevin Sweazea, District Judge 13 Angela Higgins 14 Coffeyville, KS 15 Pro Se Appellee 16 Thomas Kalm 17 Albuquerque, NM 18 for Appellant 19 MEMORANDUM OPINION 20 SUTIN, Judge. 21 Respondent appeals from the district c ourt’s amended order denying his motion 22 to reconsider, objections to the reports and recommendations, and the hearing officer’s 232 recommendation, and from the district court’s judgment on property equalization and 1 attorney fees. We issued a notice of proposed summary disposition, proposing to 2 affirm. Respondent has filed a memorandum in opposition and a motion to amend the 3 docketing statement in response to our notice. We have considered the response, and 4 remain unpersuaded that Respondent has demons trated reversible error. The motion 5 to amend the docketing statement does not s eek to add new issues; rather, it provides 6 more information than did the docketing st atement regarding the same issues. The 7 information provided in the motion to amend simply responds to the proposed analysis 8 in our notice. We have considered all arguments made in the motion to amend the 9 docketing statement and deny the motion as unnecessary. 10 In his docketing statement, Respondent listed ten issues. [DS 18-22] Our 11 notice construed them to raise five discre te arguments. The response to our notice 12 reorganizes the issues into the following four arguments. First, Respondent argues 13 that his due process rights were violatedbecause he was denied an opportunity to 14 voice his objections to the district court prior to its decision to adopt the hearing 15 officer’s recommendations. [DS 18-19; MIO 4-7] Second, Respondent argues that 16 the district court abused its discretion by ruli ng that it was in the best interest of the 17 children to be relocated to Kansas withPetitioner, based on its failure to hold a 18 hearing and make independent factual determinations and on the insufficiency of the 193 evidence to support the court’s written findi ngs and conclusions. [DS 21-22; MIO 7- 1 18] Third, Respondent argues that he was im properly held in contempt for violating 2 the district court’s orders because there was insufficient evidence that he failed to 3 comply with certain provisions and because he was unable to comply with the 4 financial responsibility imposed on him. [DS 21; MIO 18-22] Lastly, Respondent 5 argues that the district court abused its discretion by ordering him to pay Petitioner’s 6 attorney fees. [DS 21-22; MIO 22-26] 7 Due Process 8 Respondent contends that his due process rights were violated because he was 9 denied an opportunity to voice his objections to the district court prior to its decision 10 to adopt the hearing officer’s recommendations . He also complains that the district 11 court did not hold a hearing or exercise independent judgment before approving the 12 hearing officer’s recommendations, in violation of Rule 1-053.2 NMRA and 13 Buffington v. McGorty , 2004-NMCA-092, ¶ 30, 136 N.M . 226, 96 P.3d 787. [DS 18- 14 19; MIO 4-7] 15 Rule 1-053.2(F) states the following: 16 Within thirty (30) days after th e conclusion of the proceedings, the 17 domestic relations hearing officer shall file and submit to the court for 18 review and approval the hearing officer’s recommendations, including 19 proposed findings and conclusions, and shall serve each of the parties 20 with a copy together with a notice th at specific objections may be filed 21 within ten (10) days after service of the recommendations. 224 The committee commentary to th e rule explains that the purpose of the objections is 1 to point out to the district court the disputed matters addressed by the 2 recommendations. See Buffington , 2004-NMCA-092, ¶ 30 (holding that, prior to the 3 2006 amendment to Rule 1-053.2, due process required that the parties be given an 4 opportunity before the district court to object to the hearing officer’s 5 recommendations). 6 Our notice stated that the record did not reveal to this Court that Respondent 7 was denied the opportunity to object to the hearing officer’s recommendations in a 8 manner that has prejudiced him and that th e docketing statement did not clarify the 9 matter. [DS 18] The record indicates that the hearing officer made recommendations 10 from the bench on August 21, 2007, and that Respondent’s counsel failed to reduce 11 the recommendations to writing as he was ordered to do and faile d to file objections 12 to those recommendations at that time. [RP 118 (¶¶ 5-7)] The record further indicates 13 that the hearing officer reviewed propos ed recommendations from both attorneys at 14 a February 26, 2008, hearing and made corrections to conform to his oral 15 recommendations. [RP 118 (¶ 9)] Respondent filed a motion to reconsider and 16 objections to the hearing officer’s recommendations on March 13, 2008. [RP 109-13] 17 At this point, the district court had not ye t filed a final decree in the proceedings. On 18 November 25, 2008, the hearing officer file d another set of recommendations for the 195 final decree, which the district court approved and adopted. [RP 433-47] On August 1 12, 2009, the district court held a heari ng on Respondent’s objections to the hearing 2 officer’s recommendations and the GAL ’s recommendations, as well as on 3 Respondent’s motions to reconsider. [RP 756] The court denied the motions. [Id.] 4 Our notice explained that Respondent did not state why this process was 5 deficient and how it prejudiced him. In response to our notice, Respondent asserts 6 that the district court did not hold a hearing and that there was no opportunity for his 7 objections to be heard. [MIO 4-5] Res pondent does not directlyaddress the process 8 we detailed in this opinion, however, or our citations to the record, and he does not 9 explain why the record reflects that the district court held a hearing. We will accept 10 representations of the parties unless th e record on appeal shows otherwise. Cf. State 11 v. Calanche , 91 N.M. 390, 392, 574 P.2d 1018, 1020 (Ct. App. 1978). As we 12 indicated in our notice, the record s hows that the distri ct court considered 13 Respondent’s objections and his motions to reconsider and held a hearing on his 14 objections. [RP 756] Without any specific argument indicating why the record is 15 incorrect, we accept the repres entations in the record. We must reject Respondent’s 16 unsupported assertion that the district court did not hold a hearing that reviewed the 17 recommendations of the hearing officer and considered the objections of the parties. 186 To the extent that Respondent complains that the hearing on his objections was 1 not held earlier or was inconsistent with proper procedure, he does not explain why 2 the procedure was deficient and how he was prejudiced by the hearing held on his 3 objections. See Farmers, Inc. v. Dal Mach. & Fabricating, Inc. , 111 N.M. 6, 8, 800 4 P.2d 1063, 1065 (1990) (stating that the appellate court presumes that the district court 5 is correct and recognizing that the burden is on the appellant to clearly demonstrate 6 that the lower court erred). “In the absence of prejudice, there is no reversible error.” 7 State v. Fernandez , 117 N.M. 673, 677, 875 P.2d 1104, 1108 (Ct. App. 1994). In 8 response to our notice, Respondent complains that Buffingtondoes not require a 9 showing of prejudice. [MIO 4-5] We agree; Buffingtonrequires a hearing to review 10 the recommendations and consider the partie s’ objections. Because the record shows 11 that a hearing was conducted, we question how, if there was error in the procedure, 12 Respondent was prejudiced. The requisite prejudice to which our notice referred 13 required a showing that had the procedure be low been different insome specific way, 14 then a specific result woul d not have occurred. See In re Estate of Heeter , 113 N.M. 15 691, 695, 831 P.2d 990, 994 (Ct. App. 1992) (“On appeal, error will not be corrected 16 if it will not change the result.”). As we stated in our notice, Respondent did not 17 specify why the procedure below deniedhim an opportunity to object, or what 18 objections he was unable to raise, whic h objections he woul d have made, what 197 evidence supports his objections, and why hebelieves he would have prevailed. See 1 Buffington , 2004-NMCA-092, ¶ 31 (“The nature of the hearing and review to be 2 conducted by the district c ourt will depend upon the natureof the objections being 3 considered.”). 4 There were several hearings held and pleadings filed in which much of the 5 subject matter of Respondent’s objections wa s discussed. We do not see how the 6 district court could have b een unaware of the conteste d areas of the recommendations 7 before concluding the proce ss. For these reasons, it doe s not appear that Respondent 8 was denied the right to object, and we di sagree with Respondent’s arguments that he 9 was denied due process. 10 Custody Ruling 11 Respondent argues that the district court abused its discretion by ruling that it 12 was in the best interest of the children to be relocated to Kansas with Petitioner, based 13 on its failure to hold a hearing and make independent factual determinations and on 14 the insufficiency of the evidence to support the court’s written findings and 15 conclusions. [DS 20-22; MIO 7-18] 16 As we have stated, the record shows thatthe district court held a hearing and 17 it is within the court’s discretion to adoptthe recommendations of the hearing officer. 18 See Buffington , 2004-NMCA-092, ¶ 31 (“After the h earing, the court may adopt the 198 hearing officer’s recommendations, modify the recommendations, reject in whole or 1 in part the recommendations, or receive further evidence or recommit the matter to the 2 hearing officer with instructions.”). There is no support for Respondent’s contention 3 that the district court’s adoption of the hearing officer’s recommendations is invalid 4 or otherwise indicates that the court did not conduct an independent review. 5 Therefore, we review the district court’s fi ndings of fact to determine whether they are 6 supported by substantial evidence. 7 When determining the custody arrangement th at is in the best interest of the 8 children, the district court should consider the following factors: 9 (1) the wishes of the child’s parent or parents as to his custody; 10 (2) the wishes of the child as to his custodian; 11 (3) the interaction and interrelations hip of the child with his parents, 12 his siblings and any other person w ho may significantly affect the child’s 13 best interest; 14 (4) the child’s adjustment to his home, school and community; and 15 (5) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved. 16 NMSA 1978, § 40-4-9(A) (1977). 17 In the current case, the district court awarded the parents joint custody, except 18 for decisions relating to the children’s edu cation, which were tobe made by Petitioner, 19 and it gave Petitioner primary physical cu stody of the children, permitting them to 209 relocate, from Truth or Consequences, New Mexico, to Kansas for every school year. 1 [RP 438-40] Respondent was awarded custody of the children every spring break, 2 summer break, Thanksgiving, Christmas in ev en-numbered years to include the entire 3 school winter holiday, and half of th e school winter holiday during odd-numbered 4 years. [RP 440 (¶ 43)] 5 There is a presumption that joint custody is in the best interest of the children. 6 NMSA 1978, § 40-4-9.1(A) (1999). In determining whether joint custody is in the 7 best interest of the children, the districtcourt was required to consider the following 8 factors in addition to those set forth in Section 40-4-9. 9 (1) whether the child has estab lished a close relationship with 10 each parent; 11 (2) whether each parent is capab le of providing adequate care 12 for the child throughout each period of responsibility, including 13 arranging for the child’s care by others as needed; 14 (3) whether each parent is w illing to accept all responsibilities 15 of parenting, including a willingness to accept care of the child at 16 specified times and to relinquish care to the other parent at specified 17 times; 18 (4) whether the child can best maintain and strengthen a 19 relationship with both parents through predictable, frequent contact and 20 whether the child’s development w ill profit from such involvement and 21 influence from both parents; 22 (5) whether each parent is able to allow the other to provide 23 care without intrusion, that is, to respect the other’s parental rights and 24 responsibilities and right to privacy; 2510 (6) the suitability of a parenti ng plan for the implementation of 1 joint custody, preferably, although not necessarily, one arrived at 2 through parental agreement; 3 (7) geographic distance between the parents’ residences; 4 5 (8) willingness or ability of the parents to communicate, 6 cooperate or agree on issues re garding the child’s needs; and 7 8 (9) whether a judicial adjudicati on has been made in a prior or 9 the present proceeding that either parent or other person seeking custody 10 has engaged in one or more acts of domestic abuse against the child, a 11 parent of the child or other household member. 12 Section 40-4-9.1(B). 13 “We will overturn the trial court’s custody decision only for abuse of discretion, 14 and we will uphold the court’s findings if supported by substantial evidence. An 15 abuse of discretion occurs when a ruling is clearly contrary to the logical conclusions 16 demanded by the facts and circ umstances of the case.” Grant v. Cumiford, 17 2005-NMCA-058, ¶ 13, 137 N.M. 485, 112 P. 3d 1142 (internal quotation marks and 18 citations omitted). 19 “In accordance with the standard of review, when considering a claim of 20 insufficiency of the evidence, the appellate court resolves all disputes of facts in favor 21 of the successful party and indulges all reasonable inferences in support of the 22 prevailing party.” Las Cruces Prof’l Fire Fighters v. City of Las Cruces , 1997- 23 NMCA-044, ¶ 12, 123 N.M. 329, 940 P.2d 177 (filed 1996). We disregard evidence 2411 and inferences that are contrary to the district court’s ruling. See Weidler v. Big J 1 Enters. , 1998-NMCA-021, ¶ 30, 124 N.M. 591, 953 P.2d 1089 (filed 1997). “The 2 question [for us] is not whether substantial evidence exists to support the opposite 3 result, but rather whether such ev idence supports the result reached.” Las Cruces 4 Prof’l Fire Fighters , 1997-NMCA-044, ¶ 12. “Substantial evidence is such relevant 5 evidence that a reasonable mind would fi nd adequate to support a conclusion.” 6 Landavazo v. Sanchez , 111 N.M. 137, 138, 802 P.2d 1283, 1284 (1990). 7 Our notice recognized that Respondent’s docketing statement provided this 8 Court with facts that are favorable only tohis position and did not provide this Court 9 with all the relevant information, including those facts that support the district court’s 10 ruling. Our notice pointed out evidence in the record that would support the district 11 court’s ruling. Respondent’s memorandum in opposition to our notice substantially 12 repeats favorable facts to his position and doe s not indicate that the facts to which our 13 notice referred were incorrect. As we stated in our notice, the record suggests that 14 evidence was presented that Respondent had made vulgar, abusive, and offensive 15 comments to and about Petitioner in front of the children. [RP unnumbered 35, 72, 16 435-36] Respondent has exhibited “problem drinking” and that he drinks and drives. 17 [RP unnumbered 35, 71, 436] Respondent has refused to support any counseling for 18 Petitioner and the children during the last year the parties were separate d. [RP 71-72, 1912 76, 436 (¶ f)] Respondent was found in contem pt of court for his failure to comply 1 with the court’s order instructing him not to consume alcohol when the children are 2 in his physical custody, and instructing hi m to cooperate with Dr. Caplan to achieve 3 a proper evaluation, and to pay for his services. [RP 86-88, 436 (¶ i)] Respondent 4 also failed to pay attorney fees as was ordered by the court. [RP 436 (¶ ii)] Dr. 5 Caplan characterized Respondent as exhibiti ng a “self-centered indifference to the 6 welfare of others” and as “attention s eeking.” [RP 437 (¶ h)] Respondent exhibited 7 controlling and manipulative behavior to ward Petitioner and wa s viewed by the GAL 8 as unsupportive and un-nurturing toward Petiti oner, in a manner that may constitute 9 “actual physical, verbal, mental and emotional abuse.” [Id. (¶¶ i, j)] 10 Petitioner has a large, exte nded family in Kansas that is loving and supportive 11 and willing and able to provide security, time, childcare, and tutoring to elevate the 12 children to the higher academic standards of the schools in Kansas. [RP 439 (¶ 31)] 13 Petitioner has no family in New Mexico , and the only person in New Mexico, 14 Respondent’s mother, lives inSilver City. [RP 439 (¶ 32)] Petitioner has a hostile 15 relationship with Respondent’s mother. [I d.] Petitioner expressed legitimate reasons 16 for relocating to Kansas; including, better housing, better schools, and family support. 17 [RP 439 (¶ 33)] The children expressed a cl ear preference to liv e with their mother 18 and move to Kansas. [RP 438 (¶ 29)] Dr . Caplan reported that the children’s bond 1913 with Petitioner was stronger and that it is important for the children to maintain a bond 1 with both parents. [RP 439 (¶¶ 35-36)] Dr. Caplan testified that, although he 2 intensely dislikes relocation cases, it was in the best interest of the children that they 3 live with their mother in Kansas. [RP 438 (¶27)] The GAL and the hearing officer 4 agreed that it was in the be st interest of the children to be in the primary physical 5 custody of Petitioner in Kansas. [RP 439 (¶¶ 34, 38, 40)] 6 Although there was plenty of evidence indicating that Respondent has been a 7 good father, as we have stated, it is not our role to reweigh the evidence and substitute 8 our judgment for that of the district court. See Las Cruces Prof’l Fire Fighters , 1997- 9 NMCA-044, ¶ 12. Viewing the evidence in th e light most favorable to the district 10 court’s ruling, we hold that a reasonable mind would find this evidence adequate to 11 support the custody arrangement. We see no abuse of discretion. 12 Contempt Ruling and Attorney Fees 13 Respondent argues that he was improperly held in contempt for violating the 14 district court’s orders because there was in sufficient evidence that he failed to comply 15 with certain provisions and because he was unable to comply with the financial 16 responsibility imposed on him. [DS 21; MIO 18-22] The arguments in Respondent’s 17 memorandum in opposition are difficult to understand because he does not clearly 18 explain why the district court ruled that hehad violated orders of the court and does 1914 not explain upon what evidence such rulings were based. He states that he should not 1 have been held in contempt because he could not pay the fees he was ordered to pay; 2 however, his analysis details the testimony about his alcohol use and other allegations 3 he believed were false. [M IO 19-22] He seems to argue that because Petitioner did 4 not substantially prevail below, he should not have been required topay attorney fees. 5 Our notice explained that Respondent did not state what evidence he presented 6 that he could not comply with the districtcourt’s orders or pay attorney fees. We 7 stated it is not our responsibility to comb the record to find support for an appellant’s 8 contentions. See Murken v. Solv-Ex Corp. , 2005-NMCA-137, ¶ 14, 138 N.M. 653, 9 124 P.3d 1192 (“[W]e decline to review . . . arguments to the extent that we would 10 have to comb the record to do so.”); In re Estate of Heeter , 113 N.M. at 694, 831 P.2d 11 at 993 (“This [C]ourt will not search the record to find evidence to support an 12 appellant’s claims.”). 13 Also, we explained that it was not clear to this Court that fees and costs were 14 awarded as a sanction, as opposed to a broader resolution based on the needs and 15 resources of the parties, which is withinthe discretion of the district court. SeeNMSA 16 1978, § 40-4-7(A) (1997) (“The court may makean order, relative to the expenses of 17 the proceeding, as will ensure either party an efficient preparation and presentation of 18 his case.”); Garcia v. Jeantette , 2004-NMCA-004, ¶ 19, 134 N.M. 776, 82 P.3d 947 1915 (filed 2003) (“Our case law recognizes that th e central purpose of an award of attorney 1 fees under Section 40-4-7(A) is to reme dy any financial disparity between the 2 divorcing parties so that each may make an efficient and effective presentation of his 3 or her claims in the underlying divorce case.”). 4 We informed Respondent that in any response he may wish to file, he should 5 explain what evidence he presented indicati ng that he was unable to comply with the 6 orders of the district court, the evidence Petitioner presented, and the grounds upon 7 which the district court rule d. Also, he should have e xplained why he believed the 8 award was a sanction; why the district c ourt’s decision was without logic or reason, 9 or clearly unable to be defe nded; why the sanction was inappropriate in light of the 10 nature of the conduct and level of culp ability found by the district court; why the 11 district court’s findings and decision were not supported by substantial evidence; and 12 whether the district court considered altern atives to the sanctions ultimately imposed. 13 See Enriquez v. Cochran , 1998-NMCA-157, ¶¶ 20-21, 126 N.M. 196, 967 P.2d 1136 14 (describing the factors an appellate court c onsiders as to whether the district court 15 abused its discretion in imposing sanctions). 16 In response to our notice, Respondent asserts again that he was unable to pay 17 the costs of experts and th e attorney fees, but does notexplain what evidence he 18 presented to support these assertions. [MIO 19-25] Instead of stating what evidence 1916 was presented at the show cause hearing, Respondent simply directs this Court to the 1 tape log of the hearing. [MIO 19] Again, we inform Respondent that it is not our 2 responsibility to comb the record to discover facts that support his position. See 3 Murken , 2005-NMCA-137, ¶ 14 (“[W]e decline to review . . . arguments to the extent 4 that we would have to comb the record to do so.”); In re Estate of Heeter , 113 N.M. 5 at 694, 831 P.2d at 993 (“This [C]ourt will not search the record to find evidence to 6 support an appellant’s claims.” ). He provides this Court only with the facts favorable 7 to his position and disregards indications in the record that he had disposable income, 8 he admitted to drinking alcohol in violation of the court’s order, and that he did not 9 pay the costs of experts or attorney fees, inviolation of the court’s orders. [MIO 19- 10 22, 23-25; RP 163-64, 168, 177-79, 192, 194] 11 As we stated in our notice, this Court has addressed the broad discretionary 12 powers of the district court to resolve the expenses of domestic relations proceedings, 13 an authority that we have characterizedas “essential to the fair and orderly 14 administration of justice in [such] matters.” Philipbar v. Philipbar , 1999-NMCA15 063, ¶ 10, 127 N.M. 341, 980 P.2d 1075. “In a dissolution of marriage proceeding the 16 district court maintains jurisdiction over th e property of the parties; it divides the 17 property between the parties, and has full di scretion to make orders relative to the 18 expenses of the proceeding.” Id. ; seeNMSA 1978, §§ 40-4-4 (1973), -7(A) (1997). 1917 “The district court may also appoint experts and provide for their reasonable 1 compensation.” Philipbar , 1999-NMCA-063, ¶ 10; seeRule 11-706(A), (B) NMRA; 2 NMSA 1978, § 40-4-8(A) (1993); see also In re Adoption of Stailey , 117 N.M. 199, 3 205, 870 P.2d 161, 167 (“The court is clothe d with broad disc retion under [Rule 4 11-706(B)] in apportioning among the parties th e costs of an expert witness appointed 5 by the court.”). We also review the impos ition of sanctions for abuse of discretion. 6 See Enriquez , 1998-NMCA-157, ¶ 20. 7 It is still not clear to this Court that fees and costs were awarded as a sanction, 8 and not as a broader resolution based on the needs and resources of the parties, and 9 it is not clear that the costs and fees award, even if impos ed as a sanction, constituted 10 error. The allegations against Respondent regarding his drinking and his assets were 11 conflicting, and Respondent did not describe the overall di vision of property and debt 12 between the parties and explain why it was ine quitable. These are disputes within the 13 broad discretion of the district court to resolve, and Respondent has not clearly 14 demonstrated error. See Las Cruces Prof’l Fire Fighters , 1997-NMCA-044, ¶ 12 15 (stating that it is not our role to “rewei gh the evidence nor substitute our judgment for 16 that of the fact finder”); see also Arnold v. Arnold, 2003-NMCA-114, ¶ 6, 134 N.M. 17 381, 77 P.3d 285 (“[T]he trial c ourt is to divide communityproperty equally and gives 18 the court broad discretion in doing so.” (internal quotation marks and citation 1918 omitted)); Buckingham v. Ryan , 1998-NMCA-012, ¶ 10, 124 N.M. 498, 953 P.2d 33 1 (filed 1997) (“[W]hen there is a conflict inthe testimony, we defer to the trier of 2 fact.”). In the absence of a showing of clear error and given the broad discretionary 3 authority of the district court to assess th e expenses of domestic relations litigation, 4 we affirm the district court’s finding of c ontempt and its award of costs and fees. See 5 Farmers, Inc. , 111 N.M. at 8, 800 P.2d at 1065 (stating that the appellate court 6 presumes that the district court is correct , and the burden is on th e appellant to clearly 7 demonstrate that the lower court erred); § 40-4-7(A); Garcia , 2004-NMCA-004, ¶ 19. 8 For the reasons discussed in this opinion and in our notice, we affirm the district 9

court. 10 IT IS SO ORDERED. 11

__________________________________ 12 JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge 13 WE CONCUR: 14

_______________________________ 15 MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judge 16

_______________________________ 17 ROBERT E. ROBLES, Judge 18