UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 22-4376

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

ROBERT BRADLEY LOCKHART,

 Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at 

Harrisonburg. Michael F. Urbanski, Chief District Judge. (5:19-cr-00020-MFU-JCH-1)

Submitted: July 12, 2023 Decided: July 25, 2023

Before GREGORY and HARRIS, Circuit Judges, and MOTZ, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: Dennis E. Jones, DENNIS E. JONES, PLC, Abingdon, Virginia, for 

Appellant. S. Cagle Juhan, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, 

Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

USCA4 Appeal: 22-4376 Doc: 30 Filed: 07/25/2023 Pg: 1 of 5
2

PER CURIAM:

A jury convicted Robert Bradley Lockhart of conspiracy to distribute and to possess 

with intent to distribute 100 grams or more of heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 

(b)(1)(B), 846, and possession with intent to distribute heroin resulting in serious bodily 

injury, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C). The district court sentenced 

Lockhart to 20 years’ imprisonment and he now appeals. On appeal, Lockhart’s counsel 

has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there 

are no meritorious grounds for appeal but questioning whether the district court should 

have granted Lockhart’s motion for judgment of acquittal under Fed. R. Crim. P. 29. 

Although informed of his right to do so, Lockhart has not filed a pro se supplemental brief. 

For the following reasons, we affirm Lockhart’s convictions, vacate his sentence, and 

remand for resentencing.

“We review the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal de novo.” United 

States v. Savage, 885 F.3d 212, 219 (4th Cir. 2018). In assessing the sufficiency of the 

evidence, we decide whether there is substantial evidence to support the convictions when 

viewed in the light most favorable to the government. Id. “Substantial evidence is 

evidence that a reasonable finder of fact could accept as adequate and sufficient to support 

a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. 

Rodriguez-Soriano, 931 F.3d 281, 286 (4th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up). In making this 

determination, we do not resolve conflicts in the evidence or evaluate the credibility of 

witnesses. Savage, 885 F.3d at 219. “A defendant who brings a sufficiency challenge 

USCA4 Appeal: 22-4376 Doc: 30 Filed: 07/25/2023 Pg: 2 of 5
3

bears a heavy burden, as appellate reversal on grounds of insufficient evidence is confined 

to cases where the prosecution’s failure is clear.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

In order to convict Lockhart of the drug conspiracy under § 846, the Government 

had to demonstrate: (1) an agreement between Lockhart and one or more persons to 

distribute and possess with intent to distribute heroin; (2) that Lockhart knew of the 

conspiracy; and (3) that Lockhart knowingly and voluntarily became a part of the 

conspiracy. United States v. Ath, 951 F.3d 179, 185 (4th Cir. 2020). The Government 

also had to demonstrate that Lockhart could have reasonably foreseen that the conspiracy 

would involve 100 grams or more of heroin. United States v. Brooks, 524 F.3d 549, 558 

(4th Cir. 2008). For a conviction under § 841(a) for possession with intent to distribute 

heroin resulting in serious bodily injury, the Government had to prove that Lockhart 

knowingly possessed heroin with the intent to distribute it and that serious bodily injury 

resulted from the use of that heroin. See United States v. Randall, 171 F.3d 195, 209 (4th 

Cir. 1999); see also United States v. Robinson, 55 F.4th 390, 401 (4th Cir. 2022). Serious 

bodily injury means bodily injury involving a substantial risk of death. 21 U.S.C. 

§ 802(25). 

We have thoroughly reviewed the record and conclude that the district court did not 

err in denying Lockhart’s Rule 29 motion. The Government presented several witnesses 

who testified to Lockhart’s drug distribution and activities in the conspiracy, including the 

amount of heroin involved over the course of the conspiracy. With respect to the 

substantive possession count, the Government demonstrated that Lockhart provided heroin 

to the victim, who used that heroin and suffered an overdose. The victim was revived on 

USCA4 Appeal: 22-4376 Doc: 30 Filed: 07/25/2023 Pg: 3 of 5
4

the side of the road by first responders and transported to the hospital for treatment. While 

the Government’s expert and witnesses who responded to the scene of the overdose opined 

that the victim faced a substantial risk of death from the overdose, Lockhart provided the 

testimony of an expert who disagreed regarding the severity of the overdose. Although 

this testimony was conflicting, “[c]redibility determinations are within the sole province of 

the jury and are not susceptible to judicial review.” Robinson, 55 F.4th at 404 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). The Government demonstrated sufficient evidence from which 

a reasonable jury could conclude that the victim was at a substantial risk of death, and the 

district court thus correctly denied Lockhart’s motion for a judgment of acquittal.

With respect to the sentence, however, the criminal judgment lists 13 standard 

conditions of supervised release that the district court did not orally pronounce at the 

sentencing hearing or state that it was incorporating into the judgment, and the court did 

not explain its reasons for imposing these special conditions of supervised release. A 

district court must announce all nonmandatory conditions of supervised release at the 

sentencing hearing. United States v. Rogers, 961 F.3d 291, 296-99 (4th Cir. 2020). This 

“requirement . . . gives defendants a chance to object to conditions that are not tailored to 

their individual circumstances and ensures that they will be imposed only after 

consideration of the factors set out in [18 U.S.C.] § 3583(d).” Id. at 300. In United States v. 

Singletary, we explained that “the heart of a Rogers claim is that discretionary conditions 

appearing for the first time in a written judgment . . . have not been ‘imposed’ on the 

defendant.” 984 F.3d 341, 345 (4th Cir. 2021). In situations such as Lockhart’s, where the 

district court fails to announce or otherwise incorporate the discretionary conditions of 

USCA4 Appeal: 22-4376 Doc: 30 Filed: 07/25/2023 Pg: 4 of 5
5

supervised release, the appropriate remedy is to vacate the entire sentence and remand for 

a full resentencing hearing. See id. at 346 & n.4. We therefore do not address the 

procedural and substantive reasonableness of the sentence at this time. See id.

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case and have 

found no other meritorious grounds for appeal. We thus affirm Lockhart’s convictions, but 

vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing. This court requires that counsel inform 

Lockhart, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for 

further review. If Lockhart requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such 

a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw 

from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on 

Lockhart.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

AFFIRMED IN PART,

VACATED IN PART, 

AND REMANDED

USCA4 Appeal: 22-4376 Doc: 30 Filed: 07/25/2023 Pg: 5 of 5