alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### The STATE of Texas, Appellant, v. Ray HERNANDEZ, Appellee.

No. 12-89-00023-CR.

Court of Appeals of Texas, Tyler.

June 5, 1989.

Mark W. Patterson, Huntsville, Don Gordon, Dist. Atty., Crockett, for appellant.

Willia R. Pemberton, Pemberton & Garner, Crockett, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

The State has filed a motion for leave to late file the certified transcript in this appeal from the trial court’s order granting Appellee’s motion for new trial. That motion was the result of this Court’s notice to the State that the Transcript, received on March 16, 1989, was not timely. Having reconsidered Tex.R.App.P. 54(b), specifically that portion providing, “If a motion for new trial is timely filed, the transcript and statement of facts shall be filed within one-hundred-twenty days after the day sentence is imposed or suspended in open court or the order appealed from had been signed,” we have concluded that because there was a timely motion for new trial filed in this case, albeit not one assailing the order appealed,1 the record was not due to be filed until 120 days after the order was signed granting the motion for new trial. Recognizing that the rule was in place before the State was authorized to appeal from any postjudgment orders and that the literal application of the rule here does not logically mesh with the purpose of allowing an extended time for filing the record when a motion for new trial has *599been filed,2 we reach this conclusion be-causé the literal language of the rule mandates this interpretation.

1

. *Cf. American Home Assurance Co. v. Faglie,*747 S.W.2d 5, 6 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1988, writ denied); *Kitchens v. Kitchens,*737 S.W.2d 101, 102 (Tex.App.—Waco 1987, no writ), interpreting the rule extending the time allowed for perfecting a civil appeal when there has been a motion for new trial.

2

. To allow the trial court time to act upon the motion for new trial, Tex.R.App.P. 31(e)(1), without the necessity of filing the record in an appeal that may become moot if the motion for new trial is granted.
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|                                                                                   |   | Three      MonthsEndedDecember 31, 2007 |       |   | Three      MonthsEndedDecember 31, 2006 |   |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|----------------------------------------------|------------|--------|-----------------------------------------|--------|
| Net      Income                                                                        |   | $                                            | 1,173      |   |                                    | $      | 1,688 |   |
| Weighted      average common shares outstanding for computation of basic      EPS |   |                                         | 12,953,525 |   |                                    |   | 12,939,383 |   |
| Dilutive      common-equivalent shares                                                 |   |                                         | 53,944     |   |                                    |   | — |   |
| Weighted      average common shares for computation of diluted EPS                |   |                                         | 13,007,469 |   |                                    |   | 12,939,383 |   |
| Earnings      per common share:                                                        |   |                                         |       |   |                                    |   |   |   |
|                                                                                   |   |                                         |       |   |                                    |   |   |   |
| Basic                                                                                  |   | $                                            | 0.09       |   |                                    | $      | 0.13 |   |
|                                                                                   |   |                                         |       |   |                                    |   |   |   |
| Diluted                                                                                |   | $                                            | 0.09       |   |                                    | $      | 0.13 |   |
#### STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Eric WALLACE, Appellant. Eric WALLACE, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent.

Nos. 64365, 67315.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division One.

Oct. 10, 1995.

Judith C. LaRose, Office of the State Public Defender, Columbia, for appellant.

Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen., Fernando Bermudez, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.

Before REINHARD, P.J., and KAROHL and WHITE, JJ.

*ORDER*

PER CURIAM.

Defendant appeals the judgment entered on his convictions by jury of delivery of a controlled substance and possession of a controlled substance. Defendant was sentenced to consecutive terms of imprisonment of seven years for the delivery of a controlled substance conviction and five years for the possession of a controlled substance conviction. Defendant also appeals the denial of his Rule 29.15 motion after an evidentiary hearing. Defendant failed to raise a point of error regarding this issue and his appeal of the motion court’s judgment is deemed abandoned. No jurisprudential purpose would be served by a written opinion. The judgments are affirmed in accordance with Rules 30.25(b) and 84.16(b).
#### Myron Siskin, as Assignee of Realty Pace Setters, Inc., Plaintiff, v 221 Sullivan Street Realty Corp. et al., Defendants. (Action No. 1.) Benjamin Eisner, Plaintiff, v E. & R. Mavin Construction, Ltd., et al., Respondents. Vistatech Enterprises, Ltd., Nonparty Appellant. (Action No. 2.)

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Harold Baer, Jr., J.), entered on or about December 6, 1989, denying the motion by nonparty Vistatech Enterprises, Ltd. to quash a subpoena duces tecum served on Vistatech’s bank, unanimously affirmed, with costs.

Certain of the defendants (the Teitz defendants) in the underlying action alleged that the plaintiff Benjamin Eisner converted the proceeds of 21 checks given to him to purchase real property and make mortgage payments. Two of those checks, each in the amount of $1,050, were deposited into the bank account of the nonparty Vistatech in January and June of 1987. The Teitz defendants obtained a judicial subpoena duces tecum directed to Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. (MHT) seeking, as here pertinent, copies of Vistatech’s banking records for the period January 1986 through October 1989.

Vistatech moved to quash the subpoena essentially on the basis that it was overly broad and oppressive. The Teitz defendants urged that Vistatech, an importer/exporter of electronic equipment, had not satisfactorily explained how it came into possession of two checks payable to "Domare Estates, Inc.” and earmarked for mortgage payments. The Supreme Court limited the subpoena to require MHT to produce Vistatech’s records for 1986, 1987 and the first quarter of 1988, and denied Vistatech’s motion to quash.

*357The Teitz defendants urge, for the first time on appeal, that Vistatech had no standing to challenge a subpoena directed to its bank, citing as authority *People v Doe*(96 AD2d 1018). We need not here determine whether the "standing” principle set forth in *People v Doe*should be limited to subpoenas issued by the government or a Grand Jury in criminal or quasi-criminal proceedings. *(See, Young v United States Dept. of Justice,*882 F2d 633, 642, n 11, which suggests that the mere fact that bank customers have no Fourth Amendment interest in their bank records does not mean they have no privacy interest in a civil context.) Assuming that Vistatech had standing to challenge the subpoena, we find that the subpoena, as modified by the court, was not overly broad in the circumstances presented. Concur—Kupferman, J. P., Sullivan, Carro, Ellerin and Smith, JJ.
**Exhibit      32.1**

| (1) | The                report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)                of                the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;                and |
|-----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| (2) | The                information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material                respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the                Company. |
|-----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|                                 |                               |                                              |
|--------------------------------------|------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------|
|                            |                          |                                         |
| Dated:                  May 30, 2007 | By:                      | /s/ Patrick                A. Galliher  |
|                                 | Patrick A. Galliher President |
|                                 |                               |

----
**Exhibit 32**

 

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THESARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

 

The undersigned, theChief Executive Officer and the Chief Financial Officer of IndependenceBancshares, Inc. (the “Company”), each certify that, to his or herknowledge on the date of this certification:

 

1.               The quarterly report of the Company for the periodended June 30, 2009 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commissionon this date (the “Report”) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

2.               The information contained in the Report fairlypresents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result ofoperations of the Company.

 

 
| Date:  | August 10, 2009 | By:                                                    | /s/ Lawrence R. Miller |
|--------|----------------------|--------------------------------------------------------|------------------------|
|   |                 | Lawrence R. Miller                                     |
|   |                 | Chief Executive Officer  (Principal Executive Officer) |
|   |                 |                                                   |
| Date:  | August 10, 2009 | By:                                                    | /s/ Katie N. Tuttle    |
|   |                 | Katie N. Tuttle                                        |
|   |                 | Chief Financial Officer  (Principal Financial Officer) |

 

----
**EXHIBIT 31.2**

**CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICERPURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

I,David B. Christofferson, certify that:

1.                 I have reviewedthis report on Form 10-Q of Venoco, Inc. (“Registrant”);

2.                 Based on myknowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material factor omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, inlight of the circumstances under which such statements were made, notmisleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3.                 Based on myknowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information includedin this report, fairly present in all material respects the financialcondition, results of operations and cash flows of the Registrant as of, andfor, the periods presented in this report;

4.                 The Registrant’sother certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintainingdisclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and15d-15(e)) for the Registrant and have:

a)               designed suchdisclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls andprocedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that materialinformation relating to the Registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries,is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during theperiod in which this report is being prepared;

b)              evaluated theeffectiveness of the Registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures andpresented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of thedisclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by thisreport based on such evaluation; and

c)               disclosed in thisreport any change in the Registrant’s internal control over financial reportingthat occurred during the Registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (theRegistrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that hasmaterially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, theRegistrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and

5.                 The Registrant’sother certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recentevaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the Registrant’sauditors and the audit committee of Registrant’s board of directors (or personsperforming the equivalent functions):

a)               all significantdeficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internalcontrol over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adverselyaffect the Registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and reportfinancial information; and

b)              anyfraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees whohave a significant role in the Registrant’s internal control over financialreporting.
| /s/ DAVID B.  CHRISTOFFERSON  |   |
|------------------------------------|--------|
| David B. Christofferson            |
| *Chief Financial Officer*          |
| November 21, 2005             |

 

----
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

No. DA 23-0500 

STATE OF MONTANA, 

Plaintiff and Appellee, 

v. 

WILLIE VELTKAMP, 

Defendant and Appellant. 

GRANT 

Pursuant to authority granted under Mont. R. App. P. 26(1), the 

Appellant is given an extension of time until December 22, 2023, to 

prepare, file, and serve the Appellant's opening brief. 

11/16/2023

Case Number: DA 23-0500
Exhibit 31.1
 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 302  OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
  1.
    
    I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Deerfield Capital Corp.;
 2.
    
    Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material
fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the
period covered by this report;
 3.
    
    Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included
in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of
operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this
report;
 4.
    
    The registrants other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and
maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e)
and 15d-15(e)) and internal control over financial reporting (as defined in Exchange Act
Rules 13a-15(f) and 15d-15(f)) for the registrant and have:
     5.
    
    The registrants other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent
evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrants auditors and
the audit committee of the registrants board of directors (or persons performing the
equivalent functions):
   Date: August 11, 2008
    /s/ JONATHAN W. TRUTTERJonathan W. TrutterChief Executive Officer
(Principal Executive Officer)
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v June Harris, Appellant.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Cohen, J.), rendered August 17, 1987, convicting her of criminal possession of stolen property in the first degree and unauthorized use of a vehicle in the third degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant contends that the complainant’s trial testimony is incredible and uncorroborated, and, therefore, the jury’s verdict is against the weight of the evidence and her guilt has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. We disagree.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution *(see, People v Contes,*60 NY2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (CPL 470.15 [5]). Although the complainant and the defendant gave drastically different accounts of how the defendant came to be driving the complainant’s car, the jury’s determination to credit the version proffered by the complainant finds support in the record *(see,*
      *549
      *People v Garafolo,*44 AD2d 86, 88), and we decline to disturb it.

The prosecutor’s conduct, although at times improper, was not so egregious as to have deprived the defendant of a fair trial *(see, People v Galloway,*54 NY2d 396). Thompson, J. P., Brown, Lawrence and Eiber, JJ., concur.
#### Ralph K. MILLER, Petitioner, v. William MAC GANN, Jim M. Perdue, and MGP Farm & Ranch, a Texas Partnership, Respondents.

No. D-2178.

Supreme Court of Texas.

Sept. 30, 1992.

Ralph K. Miller, New Braunfels, for petitioner.

Stanley B. Binion, Kevin Dubose, Merry Miller, Houston, for respondent.

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING

PER CURIAM.

The motions for rehearings are overruled. The court’s opinion of July 2,-1992, is withdrawn, and the following is substituted therefor.

This land ownership dispute involves the doctrine of judicial estoppel. Ralph Miller sued William Mac Gann and Jim Perdue for breach of fiduciary duty relating to their mutual ownership of a land tract in Brazo-ria County. Gann and Perdue deny the land was owned by the parties’ partnership. Gann and Perdue further assert that Miller is judicially estopped from claiming partnership ownership because they allege Miller had claimed individual ownership in a property settlement agreement within his 1978 divorce decree.

After the trial court dismissed Miller’s suit, the court of appeals reversed and remanded, stating that Miller’s prior statements in the settlement agreement did not judicially estop him from today claiming partnership ownership because he “did not appear before the court to give *testimony*about the property characterization” in the divorce proceeding. 822 S.W.2d 283, 288-89. This assertion by the court of appeals is inconsistent with the settled law of this state. The applicability of judicial estoppel is not limited to oral testimony, but applies with equal force to any sworn statement— whether oral or written — made in the course of a judicial proceeding. *See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Wells,*557 S.W.2d 144, 147 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio 1977, writ ref’d n.r.e.); *Van Deusen v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co.,*514 S.W.2d 951, 956 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1974, no writ). In denying the applications for writ of error, we should not be construed as approving the court of appeals’ interpretation of this doctrine.
Letter Agreement


 Exhibit 10.1 
 

 
 October 26, 2006 
 Multicell Technologies, Inc. 
 701 George Washington Highway 
 Lincoln 
 RI 02865 
 USA 
 Dear Sirs 
 Worldwide Exclusive License Agreement dated December 31st 2005 made between Multicell Technologies.
Inc. (“Multicell”) and Amarin Neuroscience Limited (“Amarin”) (the “Agreement”) 
 We refer to the Agreement, as
amended by letter agreement dated June 27, 2006 (“First Amendment Letter”) and to recent discussions between Multicell and Amarin relating to the payment of the sum of $400,000 (the “Sum”) remaining payable by
Multicell to Amarin pursuant to Section 3.2(a) of the Agreement, as amended by the First Amendment Letter. 
 As per your proposal and our further
discussions, it is agreed that the milestone and payment terms for the Sum (as set out in the Agreement, as amended by the First Amendment Letter) shall be further revised to payment by instalment (“Instalment(s)”) as follows: 

 

	 	•	 	$100,000 due on November 3, 2006; 

  

	 	•	 	$300,000 due on December 15, 2006 

 Notwithstanding the above, the
Sum or any outstanding Instalment, shall in any event be due and payable in full by December 15, 2006. 
 In the event that Multicell should raise
finance in excess of $3,000,000 in a financing (other than bridging finance or equity line credit) prior to December 15, 2006, all outstanding amounts of the Sum shall be immediately payable. 
 In the event that Multicell defaults in paying any of the Sum and/or the Instalments and notwithstanding Section 9.2(a) of the Agreement, Amarin shall, at its
option, thereafter be at liberty to terminate the Agreement on the giving of seven (7) days prior written notice to Multicell at any time. 
 For the
avoidance of doubt Multicell shall have no cure period in respect of the non payment of the above Sum and/or the Instalments by the due date(s) set forth above. 
 Amarin Neuroscience Ltd · 1st Floor · Magdalen Centre North · The Oxford Science Park · Oxford · OX4 4GA · UK 
 Tel: +44 (0)1865 784210 · Fax: +44 (0) 1865 784213 · Email: admin@amarin-neuro.com · www.amarincorp.com 
 Registered In Scotland
No. 179838 
 Registered Office: 4th Floor · Saltire Court · 20 Castle Terrace ·
Edinburgh · EH1 2EN · Scotland · UK 






 

 
 In the event that this letter agreement is not counter signed by Multicell and returned to Amarin on or before
October 27, 2006, then this letter agreement shall be null and void. 
 Save as set out above, the parties’
respective rights and obligations under the Agreement shall remain unaffected. 
  

	
	 Yours faithfully

	
	 /s/ Alan Cooke

	 Duly authorised, for and on behalf of
 Amarin Neuroscience Limited


  

	
	 Amendment terms agreed

	
	/s/ Stephen Chang
	 Duly authorised, for and on behalf of
 Multicell Technologies, Inc.


 Date Oct 26, 2006 
 Amarin Neuroscience Ltd · 1st Floor · Magdalen Centre North · The Oxford Science Park · Oxford · OX4 4GA · UK 
 Tel: +44 (0)1865 784210 · Fax: +44 (0)1865 784213 · Email: admin@amarin-neuro.com · www.amarincorp.com 
 Registered In Scotland
No. 179838 
 Registered Office: 4th Floor · Saltire Court · 20 Castle Terrace ·
Edinburgh · EH1 2EN · Scotland · UK 
  

 - 2 -
**EXHIBIT 32**

**CERTIFICATION OFCHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICERAND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICERPURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

Theundersigned, being the Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer ofVenoco, Inc., a Delaware corporation (the “Issuer”), hereby certifythat the report on Form 10-Q (the “Report”) of the Issuer for thequarter ended June 30, 2007, which accompanies this certification, fullycomplies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the SecuritiesExchange Act of 1934 and that the information contained in the Report fairlypresents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results ofoperations of the Issuer.
| /s/ Timothy M. Marquez                 |   |
|----------------------------------------|--------|
| Timothy M. Marquez                     |   |
| *Chief Executive Officer and Chairman* |   |
| August 13, 2007                   |   |
| /s/ Timothy A. Ficker                  |   |
| Timothy A. Ficker                      |   |
| *Chief Financial Officer*              |   |
| August 13, 2007                   |   |

 

----