[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 16-13922

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 3:15-cr-00064-TJC-JBT-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

 versus

HEZEKIAH WILLIAMS, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

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(May 9, 2017)

Before JULIE CARNES, JILL PRYOR and BLACK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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Hezekiah Williams appeals his 120-month total sentence, imposed above the 

Guideline range, after pleading guilty to aiding and abetting attempted bank fraud, 

in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1344(2) and 2, aiding and abetting aggravated identity 

theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1028A(a)(1) and 2, and aiding and abetting the 

possession of counterfeit securities, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 513(a) and 2. On 

appeal, Williams argues that the sentence was procedurally and substantively 

unreasonable. After review,1 we affirm.

I. DISCUSSION

The district court conducted a lengthy review of Williams’ criminal history 

in sentencing him, and we recount some of those facts here. According to his 

presentence investigation report, Williams’ first conviction occurred when he was 

seventeen years old; he is now sixty-one. The report lists a string of subsequent 

convictions, occurring regularly in the intervening forty years. Ten of those 

convictions were for forgery, passing forged checks, uttering forged instruments, 

and similar crimes. The district court noted the sheer number and frequency of 

these crimes and that Williams appeared to return to them after serving his time for 

each conviction.

 1 We review the reasonableness of a sentence under the deferential abuse-of-discretion 

standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007); United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 

1188–89 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc).

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“When reviewing for procedural reasonableness, we ensure that the district 

court: (1) properly calculated the Guidelines range; (2) treated the Guidelines as 

advisory; (3) considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors; (4) did not select a 

sentence based on clearly erroneous facts; and (5) adequately explained the chosen

sentence.” United States v. Wayerski, 624 F.3d 1342, 1353 (11th Cir. 2010). 

Williams bears the burden of showing his sentence is procedurally unreasonable,

United States v. De La Cruz Suarez, 601 F.3d 1202, 1223 (11th Cir. 2010), and he 

takes issue only with the second factor listed above, contending the district court 

failed to give the Guidelines range due consideration, resulting in the Guidelines 

carrying effectively no weight at all. It is true that even though it is not bound by 

the Guidelines, “a sentencing court may not give them so little consideration that it 

amounts to not giving any real weight to the Guidelines range in imposing the 

sentence.” United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1218 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) 

(quotation omitted). But here, the district court thoroughly explained its sentence, 

touching on each of the § 3553(a) factors, and expressing its conviction that the 

Guidelines sentence was not sufficient to achieve those purposes. Indeed, the court 

specifically and extensively explained why the Guidelines result was inappropriate 

in this case. The court was entitled to place great weight on Williams’ criminal 

history and the need for general and specific deterrence to protect the public, 

noting that Williams had been committing crimes for forty years, including 

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multiple instances of the same fraudulent activity resulting in the present guilty 

plea. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (2); see also United States v. Williams, 526 F.3d 

1312, 1322–23 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding a sentence to be reasonable where the 

sentencing court explained why it attached great weight to one § 3553(a) factor). 

There was no procedural error.

Nor was Williams’ sentence substantively unreasonable. Irey, 612 F.3d at 

1189 (“A district court abuses its discretion when it (1) fails to afford consideration 

to relevant factors that were due significant weight, (2) gives significant weight to 

an improper or irrelevant factor, or (3) commits a clear error of judgment in 

considering the proper factors.” (quotation omitted)). It is true that “[a] major 

variance does require a more significant justification than a minor one—the 

requirement is that the justification be sufficiently compelling to support the degree 

of variance.” Id. at 1198 (quotation omitted). However, the court explicitly and 

comprehensively considered all of the relevant factors, including the mitigating 

evidence Williams offered, in making its decision. That Williams’ conviction was 

for an ordinary, low-level economic crime is not dispositive; the court was entitled 

to place comparatively more weight on the fact that these violations were part of a 

much broader and continuing pattern spanning decades. Williams, 526 F.3d at 

1322–23. The resulting sentence was below the thirty-year statutory maximum 

Williams could have received, and we have upheld variances of comparable 

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magnitude. See United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 2008)

(holding that a sentence under the maximum statutory sentence available under law 

is an indicator of reasonableness); United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 

1256–57 (11th Cir. 2015) (upholding sentence more than three times as long as the 

top of the Guidelines range); United States v. Early, 686 F.3d 1219, 1221–23 (11th 

Cir. 2012) (upholding sentence 113 months above the Guidelines range). The 

district court’s thorough and forthright discussion of the § 3553(a) factors in 

sentencing Williams does not leave a “definite and firm conviction that the district 

court committed a clear error of judgment.” Irey, 612 F.3d at 1190.

II. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Williams’ sentence.

AFFIRMED.

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