alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 23

CONSENT OF KPMG LLP AS

INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM

FOR NORTH BAY BANCORP



<PAGE>


CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM

The Board of Directors
North Bay Bancorp:


We consent to the  incorporation  by  reference in the  registration  statements
(No's. 333-93537,  333-43972 and 333-90006) on Form S-8 of North Bay Bancorp and
subsidiaries   of  our  report  dated  March  22,  2005,  with  respect  to  the
consolidated balance sheets of North Bay Bancorp and subsidiaries as of December
31, 2004 and 2003 and the related consolidated income statements,  statements of
changes in shareholders'  equity and  comprehensive  income,  and cash flows for
each of the years in the three year period  ended  December  31,  2004,  and all
related financial statement schedules,  which report appears in the December 31,
2004, annual report on Form 10-K of North Bay Bancorp and subsidiaries.



/s/ KPMG LLP

San Francisco, California
March 29, 2005
[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 78 (Monday, April 24, 1995)]
[Notices]
[Pages 20155-20156]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-9987]



=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS


Persian Gulf Expert Scientific Committee; Meeting

    The Department of Veterans Affairs, (VA), in accordance with Pub. 
L. 92-463, gives notice that meetings of the VA Persian Gulf Expert 
Scientific Committee will be held on: Monday, June 26, 1995, at 9:00 
a.m.-5:00 p.m., Tuesday June 27, 1995, at 8:30 a.m.-12:01 p.m. The 
location of the meeting will be 801 I Street, NW., Washington, DC, room 
1105.
    The Committee's objectives are to advise the Under Secretary for 
Health about medical findings affecting Persian Gulf era veterans.
    At this meeting the Committee will review all aspects of patient 
care and medical diagnoses and will provide professional consultation 
as needed. The Committee may advise on other areas involving research 
and development, veterans benefits and/or training aspects for patients 
and staff.
    All portions of the meeting will be open to the public except from 
4:00 p.m. until 5:00 p.m. on June 26, 1995, and 11:00 a.m. until 12:01 
p.m. on June 27, 1995. During these executive sessions discussions and 
recommendations will deal with medical records of specific patients and 
individually identifiable patient medical histories. The disclosure of 
this information would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of 
personal privacy. Closure of these portions of the meetings is in 
accordance with subsection 10(d) of Public Law 92-463, as amended by 
Public Law 94-409, and as cited in 5 U.S.C. 552b(c)(6).
    Additional information concerning these meetings may be obtained 
from the Chairperson, Office of Public Health & Environmental Hazards, 
810 Vermont Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20420.

    Dated: April 14, 1995.

    [[Page 20156]] By Direction of the Secretary.
Heyward Bannister,
Committee Management Officer.
[FR Doc. 95-9987 Filed 4-21-95; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8320-01-M
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 03-41147 Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus RAUL LUCIO-FLORES, Defendant-Appellant.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. L-00-CR-112-1

-------------------- Before BARKSDALE, DeMOSS, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Raul Lucio-Flores (Lucio) has moved to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Lucio was notified but filed no response. Our independent review of the brief and the record discloses no nonfrivolous issue for appeal. The motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the appeal is
DISMISSED. See 5 TH C IR . R. 42.2. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

## F I L E D June 23, 2004 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk
Order entered January 24, 2014

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-13-00872-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF L.M.C AND E.H.C., CHILDREN

On Appeal from the 219th Judicial District Court

Collin County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 219-54113-2010

ORDER

By postcard dated September 30, 2013 we notified Court Reporter Indu Bailey that the 

reporter’s record in this case was overdue. We directed Ms. Bailey to file the reporter’s record 

within thirty days. In response, Ms. Bailey notified the Court that no designation or payment 

arrangements had been made to produce the record. The Court then directed appellant to provide 

verification that he had paid for or made arrangements to pay for the record, or that he had been 

found entitled to proceed without payment of costs. By letter dated October 25, 2013, appellant 

notified the Court that he had “requested the reporter’s record and has made payment and further 

payment arrangements with the reporter.” Therefore, we ORDER Indu Bailey to file the 

reporter’s record within THIRTY DAYS of the date of this order. 

/s/ ELIZABETH LANG-MIERS 

JUSTICE
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr., Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Stephen J. Markman

Mary Beth Kelly

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano, Justices

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

 October 4, 2013

t1001

Order 

Clerk

October 4, 2013

147214 & (122)

JOHNA BENEFIELD,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

Cross-Appellant,

v SC: 147214

COA: 300307

Oakland CC: 2008-092119-CZ

THE CINCINNATI INSURANCE COMPANY,

THE VILLAGE AT STONEGATE POINTE

CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, and NORTH

MANAGEMENT, INC.,

Defendants-Appellants,

Cross-Appellees. 

_________________________________________

JOHNA BENEFIELD,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v Oakland CC: 2008-097062-CZ

BYRON CRAFT and RICHARD R. KOLAR,

Defendants-Appellees.

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the March 19, 2013 

judgment of the Court of Appeals and the application for leave to appeal as crossappellant are considered and, pursuant to MCR 7.302(H)(1), in lieu of granting leave to 

appeal, we REVERSE that portion of the Court of Appeals judgment that reversed the 

trial court’s exclusion of emotional distress damages for the plaintiff’s breach of contract 

and negligence claims. Emotional distress damages are generally not recoverable for 

breach of a commercial contract, and the plaintiff did not establish that such damages 

were within the contemplation of the parties at the time the contract was made. Kewin v 

Massachusetts Mutual Ins Co, 409 Mich 401, 419 (1980). Emotional distress damages 

are also generally not recoverable for the negligent destruction of property. Price v High 

Pointe Oil Co, Inc, 493 Mich 238, 264 (2013). In all other respects, leave to appeal is 

DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the remaining questions presented should be 

reviewed by this Court.
EXHIBIT 32



<PAGE>

     In connection with the quarterly report of New Taohuayuan Culture Tourism
Co., Ltd., (the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended September 30, 2009
as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
"Report") Cai Danmei, the Principal Executive and Financial Officer of the
Company, certifies pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of her
knowledge:

     (1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
          15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
          material respects, the financial condition and results of operation of
          the company.


November 10, 2009                      By:  /s/ Cai Danmei
                                           -----------------------------------
                                           Cai Danmei, Principal Executive and
                                           Principal Financial Officer
### IN THE UNI TED STAT ES COURT OFAPPEALS FOR THE FIF TH CIRCU IT

No. 10-31012 Summary Calendar

STEVON ARCHIE, Plaintiff-Appellant

v. JAMES LEBLANC; PAT B O O K , W ar d e n , C at ah o u l a C o rr e c ti o n al C e nt e r ; J O H N DOE; JOAN DOE, Defendants-Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana USDC No. 1:08-CV-1381

Before GARZA, SOUTHWICK, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Stevon Archie, Louisiana prisoner # 439157, appeals f o llowing the d i s missal of his civil action against James LeBlanc, the Secretary of the Louisiana Department of Corrections. Archie originally sued LeBlanc and Pat Book, Warden, Catahoula Corrections Center, in state court. Book removed the 1 U n i te d S ta te s C o u rt o f A p p ea l s

F i ft h C i rc u i t 

### F I L E D Octob er 27 , 20 11 Lyle W . Cayce Clerk

Pur sua nt to 5 T H C IR

. R. 47.5 , the cour t has det erm ined that this op inion sho uld not * be publ ish ed and is not pr ece dent excep t unde r the lim ite d cir cum st ance s se t for th in 5 T H C IR

. R. 47.5 .4.

Archi e als o sue d “Jane Do e and John Do e,” but he doe s not app eal the dis tri ct cour t’s 1 dis mi ss al of the clai ms agai nstt hem

. Case: 10-31012 Document: 00511646896 Page: 1 Date Filed: 10/27/2011No. 10-31012

action with the consent of LeBlanc. The district court then dismissed Book based upon discovery violati o n s ; we dismissed Archie’s appeal of that order as frivolous. Archie v. LeBlanc , Case No. 09-30651 (5th Cir. Feb. 22, 2 010). T h e c a se remanded pending in the district court against LeBlanc who moved to di s miss claiming qualified immunity, failure to allege a claim upon which relief could be granted, and failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The district court granted the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The district court also denied the original motion to remand (styled as an “opposition to petition for removal” but treated as a motion to remand) Archie had filed at the outset of the case, reasoning that LeBlanc had consented to f e deral jurisdiction by filing a consent to the removal. On appeal, Archie challenges only the decision that the district court had jurisdiction over LeBlanc. He does not address the conclusion that he failed to state a claim, so we conclude that issue is abandoned. Yohey v. Collins , 985 F.2d 222, 225-26 (5th Cir. 1993). We review the denial of a motion to remand to state court de novo. City of Clarksdale v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. , 428 F.3d 206, 210 (5th Cir. 2005). Archie has not addressed the basis for the district court’s conclusion that it had jurisdiction or otherwise demonstrated error in the denial o f h i s motion to remand. See Meyers v. T exa s , 410 F.3d 236 (5th Cir. 2005)(holding that voluntary invocation of the federal court’s jurisdiction through the removal process waives Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal courts)

. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

2 Case: 10-31012 Document: 00511646896 Page: 2 Date Filed: 10/27/2011
EXHIBIT 32.1

CERTIFICATION

PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

(CHAPTER 63, TITLE 18 U.S.C. §1350(a) AND (b))

Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
(Chapter 63, Title 18 U.S.C. §1350(a) and (b)), the undersigned hereby individually certifies in his capacity as an officer of USI Holdings Corporation (the Company) that the Annual Report of the Company on Form 10-K for the period
ended December 31, 2005 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that the information contained in such report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and
results of operations of the Company at the end of and for the periods covered by such Report.



|                      |  |                                        
|--------------------- |  | ---------------------------------------
|Dated: March 10, 2006 |  | /s/ DAVID L. ESLICK                    
|                      |  | David L. Eslick Chief Executive Officer

This certification shall not be deemed to be filed for the purpose of Section 18
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and will not be incorporated by reference into any registration statement filed under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, unless specifically identified therein as being incorporated therein by
reference.

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document authenticating, acknowledging, or
otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906, has been provided to USI Holdings Corporation and will be retained by USI Holdings Corporation and
furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
#### Jimmy E. CURTIS, Sr., Petitioner, v. C. Blake STEPHENS and Virgil L. Morgan, Respondents.

No. D-3999.

Supreme Court of Texas.

Nov. 17, 1993.

*493Joe D. Gregory, Izak D. Gregory, Grapevine, for petitioner.

Cecil R. Miskin, Arlington, for respondent.

PER CURIAM.

C. Blake Stephens and Virgil Morgan were the directors, officers and shareholders of Arlington Datsun, Inc., a business against whom Jimmy Curtis brought a contract action in 1983. Stephens and Morgan did not notify Curtis of their voluntary dissolution of Arlington Datsun in September 1984, as required by statute,1 and continued to defend the dissolved business under the corporate name. Curtis claims that he was unaware of Arlington Datsun’s dissolution until after he obtained a final judgment against it in 1988. When the judgment was not satisfied, he filed an action to trace Arlington Datsun’s assets against Stephens and Morgan in their capacity as directors and shareholders.

Stephens and Morgan obtained a summary judgment on the grounds that Article 7.12 of the Texas Business Corporation Act barred this suit.2 The court of appeals held that the limitations period did not begin to run until Curtis discovered or should have discovered that Arlington Datsun intended to dissolve. 858 S.W.2d 822, 825.3 The appellate court reversed and remanded to the trial court for a determination of the factual dispute concerning this matter.

In denying this application for writ of error, we neither approve nor disapprove of the decision of court of appeals to apply the discovery rule in such situations as an alternative to strict enforcement of Article 6.04 of the Texas Business Corporation Act.

1

. Tex.Bus.Corp.Act Ann. art. 6.04 (Vernon 1993). The more recent version of this statute does not differ in any relevant way from that in effect at the time of the dissolution.

2

. The suit was brought more than three years after corporate dissolution.

3

. The court held that a fact issue regarding the discovery rule was created by evidence that Curtis may have been aware of a bulk sale of the assets of Arlington Datsun and that the Secretary of State’s office has dissolution documents on file.
exv10w24



 





EXHIBIT 10.24




Monsanto Company Recoupment Policy

(adopted by the Board of Directors on Oct. 24, 2006)



In the event the Company is required to prepare an accounting restatement due to the material
noncompliance of the Company with any financial reporting requirement under the securities laws, as
a result of misconduct (as determined by the members of the Board of Directors who are considered
“independent” for purposes of the listing standards of the New York Stock Exchange) each of the
Company’s “Specified Executive Officers” shall reimburse the Company for any incentive award made
to such executive officer on the basis of having met or exceeded specific targets for performance
periods occurring in whole or in part during the 12-month period following the first public
issuance or filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission (whichever first occurs) of the
financial document embodying such financial reporting requirement for periods beginning after
August 31, 2006. For purposes of this policy, (i) the term “incentive awards” means awards under
the Company’s Annual Incentive Plans and Long-Term Incentive Plans, the amount of which is
determined in whole or in part upon specific performance targets relating to the financial results
of the Company; and (ii) the term “Specified Executive Officers” means the Company’s President and
Chief Executive Officer; Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer; Executive Vice
President and Chief Technology Officer; Executive Vice President, North America Commercial;
Executive Vice President, International Commercial; Executive Vice President, Manufacturing; Senior
Vice President, Secretary and General Counsel; and Vice President and Controller. From and after
September 1, 2006, the award statement or terms and conditions of any incentive award by the
Company to a Specified Executive Officer shall include a provision incorporating the requirements
of this policy.
##### 



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADDED BY
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
  1.
    
    The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a)
or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and2.
    
    The information contained in this Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the consolidated financial condition and
results of the Company as of and for the period covered by this
Report.
 By:
    
    /s/ William J. McGurkWilliam J. McGurkPresident and Chief Executive OfficerAugust 15, 2005
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EASTERN DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

CHRISTOPHER RUSSELL,

Petitioner

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 259 EAL 2019

Petition for Allowance of Appeal from 

the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 22nd day of October, 2019, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal

is DENIED.
<PAGE>
                                                                    EXHIBIT 32.2

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



              In connection with the Quarterly Report of K&F Industries
  Holdings, Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-Q/A for the period ended June 30,
  2005 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof
  (the "Report"), I, Dirkson R. Charles, Chief Financial Officer of the Company,
  certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section
  906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

              (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section
  13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

              (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
  all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
  the Company.

        /s/ DIRKSON R. CHARLES
        -------------------------------
        Dirkson R. Charles
        Executive Vice President and
        Chief Financial Officer
        November 7, 2005
1 C OURT OF A PPEALS FOR THE
F IRST D ISTRICT OF T EXAS AT H OUSTON

O RDER ON M OTION FOR R EHEARING

Appellate case name: G onzalo S osa v. J ulio G arcia

Appellate case number: 01

- 1 3

- 0 1 0 3 3

- CV

Trial court case number: 10 36 389

Trial court: County Civil Court No. 1 of Harris County

On May 8, 2014, we dismissed this appeal for want of prosecution after appellant did not respond to the Court’s notice that this appeal was subject to dismissal for failure to timely file a brief. On May 20, 2014, appellant, Gonzalo Sosa, filed this motion for rehearing, along with his appellate brief and second motion to extend time to file brief, requesting that we accept the filing of his attached brief. Appella nt’s counsel explains that he failed to timely file his brief by March 27, 2014, because his office had a complete crash of his computerized system that required an overhaul of his system and his office was relocated within the building, resulting in a los s of calendaring and a substantial part of his research. Appellee, Julio Garza, opposes both motions because appellant is essentially seeking reinstatement of his appeal that was dismissed, not a rehearing. We construe the appellant’s motion as one to re instate the appeal, grant it, and withdraw this Court’s May 8, 2014 Memorandum Opinion and Judgment.

If an appellant fails to timely file a brief, we may dismiss the appeal for want of prosecution unless the appellant reasonably explains the failure and th e appellee is not significantly injured by the appellant’s failure to timely file a brief. T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 38.8(a)(1). However, the Texas Supreme Court has “ instructed the courts of appeals to construe the Rules of Appellate Procedure reasonably, yet liberally, so that the right to appeal is not lost by imposing requirements not absolutely necessary to effect the purpose

of a rule.” Verburgt v. Dorner , 959 S. W.2d 615, 616

- 17 (Tex. 1997). Thus, appellant’s counsel’s explanation is reasonable because it was neither deliberate nor intentional noncompliance. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 38.8(a)(1) ; Hone v. Hanafin , 104 S.W.3d 884, 887 (Tex. 2003) (per curiam). Furthermo re, the appellee is not significantly injured because2 appellant timely filed his motion for rehearing while attaching his brief. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 38.8(a)(1), 49.1.

Accordingly, we grant the appellant’s motion for rehearing construed as a motion

to rein state the appeal, reinstate the appeal, withdraw this Court’s May 8, 2014 Memorandum Opinion and Judgment, and direct the Clerk of this Court to accept appellant’s brief for filing. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 49.3. Appellee’s brief, if any, must be

filed within 30 days from the date of this order

. See id .; T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 2, 38.6(b). We dismiss all other pending motions as moot.

It is so ORDERED.

Judge’s signature: / s/ Evelyn V. Keyes
 Acting for the Court

Panel consists of: Justices Keyes, Bland, and Brown

Date: A ugust 19, 2014