United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit 

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No. 19-2846

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United States of America

 Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Jeremy Aungie

 Defendant - Appellant

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the District of South Dakota - Sioux Falls

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Submitted: October 22, 2020

Filed: July 12, 2021

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Before COLLOTON, GRASZ, and STRAS, Circuit Judges. 

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GRASZ, Circuit Judge. 

A jury convicted Jeremy Aungie of two counts of aggravated sexual abuse of 

a child under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153, 2241(c), and 2246(2)(A). The district court1

sentenced Aungie to concurrent terms of 420-months imprisonment and five years 

1

The Honorable Lawrence L. Piersol, United States District Judge for the 

District of South Dakota.
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of supervised release for each count. Aungie raises five issues on appeal, arguing

the district court erred by (1) denying his motion for judgment of acquittal for 

insufficient evidence, (2) denying his motions to exclude evidence of prior drug and 

alcohol use, (3) excluding expert testimony and his request for a Daubert hearing,

2

(4) excluding text messages, and (5) excluding evidence of the victim’s alleged 

motive to lie. We affirm.

I. Background

Aungie and his two children, a boy (J.A.) and a girl (A.A.), lived in a threebedroom home on the Yankton Sioux Indian Reservation with nine other family 

members, including Aungie’s parents, his sister, his brother, and his brother’s five 

young children. Aungie and his children shared one bedroom. A.A. and J.A.’s 

mother left the home when the children were two and three years old. They were 

allowed visitation with their mother one day each week but, generally, saw her less 

frequently. A.A. felt she had a close, trusting relationship with her mother, brother, 

and several friends. 

In spring 2018, when A.A. was thirteen years old, her grades deteriorated, she 

began cutting herself, and she was suspended from school for fighting. A.A.’s 

grandmother, who was also her guardian, punished A.A. by smashing her phone. 

After her suspension, A.A. decided to leave home. A.A. packed items in her school 

backpack and went to her mother, who was staying at a hotel near the school. Within 

days, A.A. disclosed to her mother that her father had sexually abused her for years. 

At trial, A.A. described incidents when Aungie struck and sexually assaulted 

her, generally while he was intoxicated. The sexual assaults began when she was 

eight or nine. Aungie woke A.A. from sleeping by touching her underneath her 

underwear, pulling her hair and telling her to lay down when she resisted. As time 

2

The Honorable Karen E. Schreier, United States District Judge for the 

District of South Dakota, denied Aungie’s motions to exclude expert testimony and 

to hold a Daubert hearing before the case was reassigned to Judge Piersol.
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went on, Aungie would lock the bedroom door, tell A.A. what to do, and hit her 

when she did not comply with his commands or resisted sexual assaults. A.A. said 

she would sometimes escape by saying she had to use the bathroom or by staying

with her grandmother. A.A. testified she was too scared to tell anyone because she 

feared her family would be mad at her, and Aungie would go to jail or kill her and 

himself, as he had threatened. She explicitly denied accusing her father of 

committing these acts only because she was angry about discipline or because she 

wanted to live with her mother.

II. Discussion

A. Judgment of Acquittal

Aungie argues the district court erred by denying his motion for judgment of 

acquittal because his convictions for sexually assaulting his daughter were not 

supported by corroborating evidence. “We review de novo the denial of a motion 

for judgment of acquittal.” United States v. Golding, 972 F.3d 1002, 1005 (8th Cir. 

2020) (quoting United States v. Cook, 603 F.3d 434, 437 (8th Cir. 2010)). “We 

apply the same standard of review to the district court’s ruling on a motion for 

judgment of acquittal as we do to a sufficiency of the evidence challenge.” Id. 

(quoting same). Accordingly, “[t]his court views the entire record in the light most 

favorable to the government, resolves all evidentiary conflicts accordingly, and 

accepts all reasonable inferences supporting the jury’s verdict.” United States v. 

Benton, 890 F.3d 697, 708 (8th Cir. 2018) (quoting United States v. Boesen, 491 

F.3d 852, 856 (8th Cir. 2007)). We will affirm the conviction if after “taking all 

facts in the light most favorable to the verdict, a reasonable juror could have found 

the defendant guilty of the charged conduct beyond a reasonable doubt.” United 

States v. Frommelt, 971 F.3d 823, 827 (8th Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. Sainz 

Navarrete, 955 F.3d 713, 718 (8th Cir. 2020)). 

Aungie contends A.A.’s testimony was vague and without support. 

“However, ‘[i]t is for the jury, not a reviewing court, to evaluate the credibility of 
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witnesses and to weigh their testimony.’” United States v. Never Misses A Shot, 781 

F.3d 1017, 1025 (8th Cir. 2015) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. 

Mallen, 843 F.2d 1096, 1099 (8th Cir. 1988)). The jury serves as “the final arbiter 

of the witnesses’ credibility, and we will not disturb that assessment.” Id. at 1026

(quoting United States v. Listman, 636 F.3d 425, 430 (8th Cir. 2011)). Moreover, 

“[i]t is well established that the uncorroborated testimony of a single witness may 

be sufficient to sustain a conviction.” United States v. L.B.G., 131 F.3d 1276, 1278

(8th Cir. 1997) (quoting United States v. Dodge, 538 F.2d 770, 783 (8th Cir. 1976)); 

see United States v. DeCoteau, 630 F.3d 1091, 1097 (8th Cir. 2011) (“[A] victim’s 

testimony alone can be sufficient to prove aggravated sexual abuse.”). 

Here, although A.A.’s testimony was, at times, imprecise, she provided 

enough detail about the who, what, when, where, and how to support the sexual 

assault convictions. Specifically, A.A. testified Aungie touched her “middle part,” 

clarifying it is “the place I pee out of,” and “stuck his middle part,” which is “the 

place he pees out of” inside her “butt” and “between [her] legs” inside her middle 

part. A.A. testified that her father first touched her “middle part” when she was eight 

or nine years old, and that he sexually assaulted her when she was thirteen years old. 

A.A. was also able to describe potential effects from the sexual abuse such as her 

fear of getting pregnant. Finally, she provided her reasoning for disclosing the 

sexual and physical abuse when she did. Taking A.A.’s testimony in the light most 

favorable to the verdict, resolving evidentiary conflicts in favor of the government, 

and accepting all reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence to support the 

jury’s verdict, there is sufficient evidence to support Aungie’s conviction. 

B. Evidentiary Rulings

 “We review evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion.” United States v. 

Keys, 918 F.3d 982, 985 (8th Cir. 2019). “We reverse only ‘if the district court’s 

evidentiary rulings constitute a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion.’” Id.

(quoting Never Misses A Shot, 781 F.3d at 1027). “[O]nly when an improper 

evidentiary ruling affected the defendant’s substantial rights or had more than a 
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slight influence on the verdict” will we reverse. United States v. Johnson, 860 F.3d 

1133, 1139 (8th Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. Picardi, 739 F.3d 1118, 1124 

(8th Cir. 2014)). “We will not reverse a harmless error.” Id.

1. Aungie’s Prior Bad Acts

Aungie argues the district court erred by allowing testimony about his drug 

and alcohol use, as well as violent conduct. The government contends testimony 

about Aungie’s intoxication and violence against A.A. and other family members 

was relevant to A.A.’s fear of reporting the abuse. We review a trial court’s 

admission of Rule 404(b) evidence for abuse of discretion “and will reverse only 

when such evidence clearly had no bearing on the issues in the case and was 

introduced solely to prove the defendant’s propensity to commit criminal acts.” 

United States v. Benitez, 531 F.3d 711, 716 (8th Cir. 2008). 

Rule 404(b)(1) provides “[e]vidence of any other crime, wrong, or act is not 

admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular 

occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.” But “evidence may be 

admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, 

preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” 

Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2). Rule 404(b) is a rule “of inclusion, such that evidence 

offered for permissible purposes is presumed admissible absent a contrary 

determination.” United States v. LaFontaine, 847 F.3d 974, 981 (8th Cir. 2017)

(quoting United States v. Contreras, 816 F.3d 502, 511 (8th Cir. 2016)). To 

determine whether the evidence was properly admitted, this court uses a four-part 

test evaluating whether “(1) it is relevant to a material issue; (2) it is similar in kind 

and not overly remote in time to the crime charged; (3) it is supported by sufficient 

evidence; and (4) its potential prejudice does not substantially outweigh its probative 

value.” Id. (quoting Contreras, 816 F.3d at 511). 

 

Before trial, the district court excluded some evidence of Aungie’s violent or 

drug-related conduct unknown to A.A.; however, the district court indicated it would 
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allow such evidence to the extent A.A. testified Aungie was drunk or high during

commission of the sexual assaults, how she knew he was drunk or high, or the 

conduct was connected to A.A. being afraid of him. At trial, A.A. testified about

specific instances when Aungie sexually abused her or physically assaulted her and 

others in the family while he was intoxicated. A.A. also expressed fear of reporting 

abuse due to Aungie’s threat of additional violence against her. A.A. testified to 

instances of violence, including instances when Aungie covered her with blankets, 

struck her face, pulled her hair, and knuckle-punched her in the back during sexual 

assaults. 

Physical abuse of the victim and close family members may be relevant by 

“provid[ing] a context for the sexual abuse and a cogent explanation for . . . failure 

to report the sexual abuse” earlier. United States v. Plumman, 409 F.3d 919, 928–

29 (8th Cir. 2005) (noting the challenged evidence demonstrated a “culture of 

coercion” in the home). Much of A.A.’s testimony about Aungie’s intoxication and 

violence directly related to the assaults he perpetrated against her, either during the 

assaults or close in time. A.A. personally observed the conduct and described its 

effect on her. The single time A.A. mentioned drug use, which was not connected 

to the assaults, the district court promptly told the jury to “disregard it.” Aungie fails 

to show undue prejudice or how any potential prejudice substantially outweighed 

the probative value of the evidence. 

2. Expert Testimony and Daubert Hearing

Aungie argues the district court erred by denying him a Daubert hearing and 

by allowing expert testimony from a forensic interviewer and pediatrician. Aungie

contests the expert testimony, detailing the lack of physical findings in most cases 

of sexual assault and the reasons why children might not immediately disclose abuse. 

Aungie also argues he was surprised at trial by the expert testimony of previously 

undisclosed medical literature and studies, which would have been disclosed during 

a Daubert hearing, and this unfairly prejudiced his defense. 

 
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“We will not reverse a district court’s ruling on the admissibility of expert 

testimony absent a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion.” In re Wholesale 

Grocery Prods. Antitrust Litig., 946 F.3d 995, 1000 (8th Cir. 2019) (internal 

quotation marks omitted) (quoting Barrett v. Rhodia, Inc., 606 F.3d 975, 980 (8th 

Cir. 2010)). Rule 702 governs the admissibility of expert witness testimony by 

allowing someone “who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skills, experience, 

training, or education [to] testify in the form of an opinion[.]” “A district court has 

great latitude in determining whether expert testimony meets the reliability requisites 

of Rule 702.” Wholesale Grocery, 946 F.3d at 1000 (quoting Craftsmen Limousine, 

Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 363 F.3d 761, 776 (8th Cir. 2004)). 

Aungie argues a trial court is obligated to hold a hearing after any Daubert 

challenge to expert testimony. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579 

(1993). However, the trial court is not always required to hold a Daubert hearing 

before qualifying an expert witness, and “when the district court is satisfied that the 

testimony is ‘reasonably based on [the expert’s] education, training, and experience, 

the court does not abuse its discretion by admitting the testimony without a 

preliminary hearing.’” Johnson, 860 F.3d at 1139 (alteration in original) (quoting 

United States v. Kenyon, 481 F.3d 1054, 1061 (8th Cir. 2007)); accord United States 

v. Evans, 272 F.3d 1069, 1094 (8th Cir. 2001) (“There is no requirement that the 

District Court always hold a Daubert hearing prior to qualifying an expert 

witness[.]”). 

Aungie does not dispute the experts’ qualifications or the reliability of the 

testimony about A.A.’s examination and forensic interviews under Rule 702. 

Rather, Aungie asserts he was prejudiced at trial because the studies relied upon by 

the experts were not made available to him. Specifically, he argues expert testimony 

about the lack of physical findings in abuse cases and delayed disclosures as 

described by the experts based on previously undisclosed studies placed him at an 

unfair disadvantage. 
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We have previously upheld the admission of expert testimony regarding the 

general characteristics exhibited by sexually abused children. See United States v. 

Kirkie, 261 F.3d 761, 765–66 (8th Cir. 2001). Further, we have allowed “expert 

testimony about the ‘emotional and psychological traits of abuse victims that often 

account for behavior such as delay in reporting the abuse or failure to “escape” the 

abusive situation.’” Johnson, 860 F.3d at 1140 (quoting United States v. Johns, 15 

F.3d 740, 743 (8th Cir. 1994)); accord United States v. Whitted, 11 F.3d 782, 785 

(8th Cir. 1993) (“[A] qualified expert can inform the jury of characteristics in 

sexually abused children and describe the characteristics the alleged victim 

exhibits.”).

 Here, the district court determined no hearing was necessary and the experts 

were qualified based on their knowledge, skill, experience, training, and education. 

The district court concluded the experts’ expected testimony would be based on their

respective experience and training and the testimony was consistent with admissible 

testimony in other child victim cases. Additionally, the experts were forbidden to 

improperly bolster A.A.’s testimony or offer any diagnosis. We do not find the 

district court abused its discretion in declining to hold a Daubert hearing and in 

allowing the two witnesses to testify as expert witnesses. 

Subsequently at trial, the experts testified based on their qualifications and 

mentioned relevant medical literature. Additionally, on cross-examination, one 

expert mentioned several previously undisclosed studies supporting the testimony 

when asked about “particular research that may be out there[.]” Aungie’s counsel 

elicited some of the information, then did not object or seek a continuance for the 

purpose of reviewing or responding. Under these circumstances, we conclude that 

there was no abuse of discretion in admitting the evidence at trial. 

 

3. Text Messages

Aungie argues the district court improperly excluded mobile telephone text 

messages as hearsay when the messages should have been admitted through the
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present sense impression hearsay exception or, in fairness, for completeness. This 

court reviews evidentiary rulings about hearsay statements for a clear abuse of 

discretion. United States v. Sheridan, 859 F.3d 579, 583 (8th Cir. 2017). 

Hearsay is a statement made “not . . . while testifying at the current trial or 

hearing” and is offered “to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Fed. R. Evid.

801(c). Hearsay is, of course, generally not admissible. Fed. R. Evid. 802. But Rule 

803 allows hearsay evidence in certain circumstances, including if such statement is 

a “present sense impression”—that is—“[a] statement describing or explaining an 

event or condition, made while or immediately after the declarant perceived it.” Fed. 

R. Evid. 803(1). 

Aungie argues his text messages with A.A. show a loving relationship 

between the two of them and reflect the love (i.e., the condition) they share 

immediately upon sending and receiving the messages. Alternatively, Aungie 

argues the trial court should have admitted the text messages in fairness, under the 

rule of completeness, because the government presented text messages showing a 

negative relationship (e.g., A.A. breaking family rules and Aungie responding with 

directives and “foul language”). 

In accordance with the rule of completeness, “[i]f a party introduces all or part 

of a writing or recorded statement, an adverse party may require the introduction, at 

that time, of any other part—or any other writing or recorded statement—that in 

fairness ought to be considered at the same time.” Fed. R. Evid. 106. “[T]he district 

court has broad discretion . . . to choose among reasonable evidentiary alternatives 

to satisfy the rule of completeness[.]” United States v. Mohamed, 727 F.3d 832, 837 

(8th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Webber, 255 F.3d 523, 526 (8th Cir. 2001)). 

Nevertheless, “[t]he party urging admission” has the burden to “specify the portion 

of the testimony that is relevant to the issue at trial and that qualifies or explains 

portions already admitted.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. 

King, 351 F.3d 859, 866 (8th Cir. 2003)). “[T]he rule . . . ‘operates to ensure fairness 

where a misunderstanding or distortion created by the other party can only be averted 
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by the introduction of the full text of the out-of-court statement.’” United States v. 

Ramos-Caraballo, 375 F.3d 797, 803 (8th Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v. Awon, 

135 F.3d 96, 101 (1st Cir. 1998)). This is a rule of timing rather than an exception 

trumping other exclusionary rules. Id.

We conclude the excluded text messages were hearsay and did not constitute 

present sense impressions. Further, the excluded texts were unnecessary to complete 

the context of the included communications because they were not parts of the same 

conversation. The rule of completeness serves as a fairness mechanism to ensure 

the jury is not misled by only admitting part of a writing or recorded statement. The 

government presented, without objection, a selection of text messages indicating

A.A. was not following family rules, and Aungie used foul language in his response. 

Aungie attempted to introduce specific text messages separate from the text 

conversations admitted. Aungie’s proposed text messages did not provide context 

to the admitted texts but were unrelated and selected only to show he and A.A. also 

exchanged normal and loving messages, specifically messages where he told A.A. 

he loved her. Further, the rule of completeness does not apply because Aungie fails

to specify how the admitted text messages distorted or misled the jury without the 

addition of the missing texts. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its 

discretion by excluding the text messages themselves. 

Even if the trial court’s decision to exclude this evidence was an abuse of 

discretion, it was harmless. The information Aungie sought to elicit, if not the exact 

wording of the messages, was admitted into evidence. These excluded messages’ 

content was conveyed to the jury during A.A.’s cross-examination when she testified

that she would text her dad she loved him and through another witness who testified 

that most of the texts between Aungie and A.A. were normal and loving. 

4. Motive to Lie

Aungie argues the district court erred by preventing him from presenting 

evidence suggesting A.A. had reasons to lie about the sexual abuse. The evidence 
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he sought to admit included details of A.A.’s misbehavior (reasons for fighting and 

alcohol use) and her desire to live with her mother. “Evidence is relevant if: (a) it 

has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the 

evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” Fed. R. 

Evid. 401. However, a trial “court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative 

value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair 

prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or 

needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 403.

The district court ruled the specific reasons for A.A. fighting at school and 

evidence of her alcohol use were irrelevant. Nevertheless, A.A. did testify about 

how she had gotten into trouble for fighting, was suspended from school, and had

always wanted to live with her mother. Because evidence of A.A.’s behavior leading 

up to her decision to disclose the sexual abuse reached the jury, any error from 

excluding specific details of A.A.’s misbehavior was harmless. We conclude the 

district court’s rulings did not affect Aungie’s substantial rights or have more than a 

slight influence on the verdict.

III. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the district court. 

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