# In the United States Court of Federal Claims

No. 21

- 1864 C (Filed: January 31

, 202 2 ) NOT FOR PUBLICATION

*************************************** LAUNA GOLDDEEN OGBURN, *

* Plaintif f

, *

*

v. *

* THE UNITED STATES, *

* Defendant. *

*

***************************************

OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Launa Golddeen Ogburn

— proceeding pro se

— seeks backpay and
other monetary compensation from the United States

, plus certain forms of equitable
relief. See Compl. at 2

– 4 (ECF 1). Defendant mo ves to dismiss “ because the statutes and regulations she cites are not money

- mandating

. ” See Mot. to Dismiss at 4 (ECF 8) (“Mot.”) ; see als o id. at 5

– 6 (seeking dismissal because “ Ms. Ogburn does not identify a substantive provision of law, regulation, or the Constitution that can fairly be construed as mandating compensation, and we are not aware of any provision that would mandate payment t o Ms. Ogburn ”). 1 The motion is DENIED . But Ms. Ogburn
is ORDERED to file an amended complaint as described below.
This Court’s subject

- matter jurisdiction

— its authority to pass judgment on
the cases before it

— is limited to specific types of claims aga inst the federal government, most commonly claims for money as provided by the Tucker Act. See

, e.g. , 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) ; see also Brown v. United States , 105 F.3d 621, 623 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“The Court of Federal Claims is a court of limited jurisdiction.”). Because the Tucker Act is only “a jurisdictional statute [that] does not create any substantive right enforceable against the United States for money damages,” United States v.
Testan

, 42 4 U.S. 392, 398 (1976) (citing Eastport S.S. Corp. v. United States , 178 Ct. Cl. 599, 605

– 07 (1967)), parties asserting Tucker Act jurisdiction must “identify a

1 Ms. Ogburn has filed an opposition, see Opp. (ECF 11), and the government has filed a reply, see Reply (ECF 12). Today the Court received a document from Ms. Ogburn captioned “Notice re

– Missing Certificates of Service.” The document shall be FILED by my leave. To the extent Ms. Ogburn seeks any relief, it is DENIED

.- 2

-

substantive right for money damages against the United States, separate from the
Tucker Act its elf.” Todd v. United States , 386 F.3d 1091, 1094 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citing
Testan , 424 U.S. at 398) . That requires a “money mandating” source of law, i.e. , a statute or regulation that “can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by
the Federal Gove rnment for the damage sustained and is reasonably amenable to the reading that it mandates a right of recovery in damages.” Jan’s Helicopter Serv., Inc.
v. F.A.A ., 525 F.3d 1299, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quotes and citations omitted) (quoting
United States v . Mitchell , 463 U.S. 206, 217 (1983), and United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe , 537 U.S. 465, 473 (2003)).
The government may well be correct that some of the sources of law Ms. Ogburn cites are not money

- mandating. Yet the Complaint also mentions the Fair
Labor Standards Act , 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. , which is money

- mandating. See Compl. at 2; Abbey v. United States , 745 F.3d 1363, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2014)

. Ms. Ogburn’s opposition brief

, moreover, mentions 5 U.S.C. § 5332, which establishes the General Schedule of basic pay rates for federal employees

. See Opp. at 4. That statute is likely

money

- mandating as well. See McAllister v. United States , 105 Fed. Cl. 180, 183 (2012) ; United States v. Connol ly , 716 F.2d 882, 887 (Fed. Cir. 1983)

. The government’s assertions that “ the statutes and regulations [Ms. Ogburn] cites are not

money

- mandating ” and that “ Ms. Ogburn does not identify a substantive provision of
law

... that can fairly be construed as manda ting compensation ” are thus flatly belied by the record. See Mot. at 4

– 5. The government cannot simply wish away money

mandating statute s expressly cited in the plain text of Ms. Ogburn’s filings

. More broadly , although “ pro se litigants are not excused from meeting jurisdictional requirements

, ” Spengler v. United States , 688 F. App’x 917, 920 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Kelley v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Labor , 812 F.2d 1378, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1987)) , they are “e ntitled to a liberal construction of [their] pleadings. ” See Howard

Pinson v. United States , 74 Fed. Cl. 551, 553 (2006) ( citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520

– 21 (1972) ). Where a basis for jurisdiction is evident, t his Court has even accepted jurisdi ction over pro se complaints that fail to cite the relevant money

mandating law. See id . In this case, where Ms. Ogburn plainly seeks back pay

— a common request in this Court

— it would not be proper to dismiss merely because
she has not ident i f

ied the ex act legal basis for recovery as precisely as a lawyer would

. By the same token, it would be premature to dismiss Ms. Ogburn’s requests for equitable relief. See Mot. at 6

– 7. T his Court may, “ as an incident of and collateral

to ” a money judgment, “ issue ord ers directing restoration to office or position, placement in appropriate duty or retirement status, and correction of applicable
records ” when needed to “ provide an entire remedy and to complete the relief afforded by the judgment .” 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(2)

. Defendant is correct that “ the Court of- 3

-

Federal Claims does not have jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus [.]” Alvarado Hosp., LLC v. Price , 868 F.3d 983, 999 (Fed. Cir. 2017 )

. But i f Ms. Ogburn were to prevail on a claim for money, the substance of the equitable relief she requests

— such

as correction of her employment records

— may be appropriate. Compl. at 4.
The real problem with Ms. Ogburn’s Complaint

— which the government only mentions in passing, Mot. at 5

— is that it does not explain the facts that entitle her to money

. A complaint in this Court must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[.]” RCFC 8(a)(2). The allegations
need not be “det ailed,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)), but must be “sufficient ..., [when] accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,’” id. (quoting Twombly , 550 U .S. at 570). In this case, the Complaint requests several forms of compensation and describes Ms. Ogburn’s past efforts to obtain that compensation. Compl. 2

– 4. It does not, however, provide facts “showing that [she] is entitled to” the compensation. RCFC 8(a)(2). For example, although Ms. Ogburn claims that she is entitled to back pay and a disability annuity at a certain pay grade, Compl. at 2, the Complaint does not disclose the reasons she was entitled to pay ment at the requested grade , nor the differen ce between what she was entitled to and what she received

. When a complaint is “ so vague or ambiguous that [the government] cannot reasonably prepare a response ,” this Court may order the plaintiff to provide a “more
definite statement

. ” See RCFC 12(e); see also Geospatial Tech. Assocs., LLC v. United
States , No. 16

- 346C, 2020 WL 4436332, at *4 (Fed. Cl. May 21, 2020) (citing Pinson v. U.S. Dep ’

t of Justice , 975 F. Supp. 2d 20, 26 (D.D.C. 2013) , and Gal

- Or v. United
States , 93 Fed. Cl. 200, 2 05 (2010) )

. That is the appropriate course here. Ms. Ogburn
is ORDERED to file, no later than March 2 , 2022 , an amended complaint that
includes a “short and plain statement” of facts showing why she is entitled to each
item of compensation she seeks. The m otion to dismiss is DENIED without prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED

. s/ Stephen S. Schwartz STEPHEN S. SCHWARTZ Judge