FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

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Case No. 5D23-0324

LT Case No. 2019-CA-000171

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TEKI WILLIAMS,

Appellant,

v.

JOHN WEAVER,

Appellee.

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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Nassau County.

Eric C. Roberson, Judge

Brian J. Lee, of Morgan & Morgan, Jacksonville, for Appellant.

Kansas R. Gooden, Miami, and Lara Edelstein, Boca Raton, of 

Boyd & Jenerette, P.A., for Appellee.

March 15, 2024

BOATWRIGHT, J.

Appellant, Teki Williams (“Williams”), appeals the trial 

court’s entry of final summary judgment in favor of Appellee, John 

Weaver (“Weaver”). Williams argues the trial court’s entry of final 

summary judgment was improper due to the existence of a genuine 

dispute of material facts. We agree and therefore reverse the entry 

of summary judgment and remand for further proceedings.
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I.

Williams, at all times material to this analysis, was an 

employee of Royal Green Lawn & Ornamental Services, Inc. 

("Royal Green"). Weaver hired Royal Green to spray the grass at 

his home with fertilizer and weed herbicide (“lawn services”). On 

November 3, 2017, Williams, in his capacity as an employee of 

Royal Green, arrived at Weaver’s home to perform the lawn 

services and parked in the street in front of Weaver’s house. Prior 

to the start of any lawn services, Williams began walking through 

the lawn to Weaver’s front door to drop off job-related paperwork. 

In the course of traversing Weaver’s lawn, Williams walked onto a 

deck located on the front lawn, which was at ground level. When 

Williams stepped on the deck, he slipped on a dark colored area 

covered in algae and fell. He injured his back as a result of the fall.

In his deposition, Williams testified that the grass on 

Weaver’s lawn was wet, as it was early in the morning. When he

approached the deck, he noticed that the wood looked old and dark 

in color; however, it did not appear to be wet. Williams believed 

the deck was safe to walk upon. Williams’ observation that the 

deck seemed to be a safe walking surface was based both on the 

general appearance of the deck, and that the deck had a bench and 

decorations on it, thus indicating the deck’s usability. After he 

slipped and fell, he noticed that the dark coloration was, in fact, a 

greenish algae that was all over the deck. He did not notice the 

algae prior to falling.

Weaver stated in his deposition that he annually cleaned the 

deck but that it had not been cleaned for a few months preceding 

Williams’ fall. He stated he walked by the deck every day, but he 

did not notice the deck was slippery. He stated he did not think the 

deck was slippery at the time of Williams’ fall, but he 

acknowledged that it could have been slippery. Finally, after 

viewing a picture of the deck taken at the time of the incident, 

Weaver agreed that the deck needed to be cleaned at the time of the 

fall and that the portion of the deck with the algae on it was 

unsuitable for walking.
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The picture, which is contained in the record on appeal, 

depicts a wood deck that is almost completely dark in color. The 

picture additionally shows that the deck has a bench on it and 

some decorative pumpkins and potted plants. 

Following a hearing on Weaver’s motion for summary 

judgment, the trial court ruled that there was no genuine dispute 

as to the material facts and granted summary judgment in favor 

of Weaver. In particular, the trial court found that Williams was 

an employee of an independent contractor who was injured in the 

course and scope of performing his contractual duties. Further, the 

trial court found, based on the parties’ testimony and the picture 

of the deck, that no reasonable jury could find that the green algae 

on the deck was anything but open and obvious. The court 

postulated that because the grass was wet, and the deck’s 

condition of having algae was apparent, it was “common sense” 

that one could fall on the deck. The court concluded that if 

Williams had been paying attention, the fall would not have 

happened. This appeal follows.

II.

A trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary judgment is 

subject to a de novo standard of review. Baxter v. Northrup, 128 

So. 3d 908, 910 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013) (citing Volusia Cnty. v. 

Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P., 760 So. 2d 126, 130 (Fla. 2000)). 

“To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, a movant must 

show that (1) ‘there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact’

and (2) ‘the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’”

Welch v. CHLN, Inc., 357 So. 3d 1277, 1278 (Fla. 5th DCA 2023) 

(quoting Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(a)). When determining if there is a 

genuine dispute of material fact, “[t]he court views the evidence in 

a light most favorable to the non-moving party, and a genuine 

dispute occurs when the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to 

return a verdict for that party.” Id. (citing Baum v. Becker & 

Poliakoff, P.A., 351 So. 3d 185, 189 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022)).

A primary purpose of Florida’s summary judgment rule “is 

to ‘isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims or 

defenses.’” Olsen v. First Team Ford, Ltd., 359 So. 3d 873, 877 (Fla. 

5th DCA 2023) (quoting In re: Amends. to Fla. Rule of Civ. Proc. 
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1.510, 309 So. 3d 192, 194 (Fla. 2020)). The Florida Supreme Court,

however, noted that in adopting this amendment, they reaffirmed 

“the bedrock principle that summary judgment is not a substitute 

for the trial of disputed fact issues.” Id. “As the [United States]

Supreme Court itself has emphasized, the summary judgment rule 

must be implemented ‘with due regard . . . for the rights of persons 

asserting claims and defenses that are adequately based in fact to 

have those claims and defenses tried to a jury.’” Id. (quoting 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986)). 

A.

Generally, property owners must maintain their premises in 

a reasonably safe condition for business invitees, including 

employees of independent contractors. Pertl v. Exit Info. Guide, 

Inc., 708 So. 2d 956, 957–58 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997). However, a 

property owner who employs an independent contractor to perform 

work on his property will not be held liable for injuries sustained 

by the employee of an independent contractor during the 

performance of that work. Phillips v. Republic Fin. Corp., 157 So. 

3d 320, 324 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015). 

There are two noteworthy exceptions to this rule. An owner 

can be held liable for damages sustained by an employee of an 

independent contractor where either (1) the property owner 

actively participates in or exercises direct control over the work; or 

(2) the property owner negligently creates or negligently approves 

a dangerous condition. Conklin v. Cohen, 287 So. 2d 56, 60 (Fla.

1973). This rule and its exceptions, however, apply only if the 

independent contractor or employee is injured in the course of the 

work he was hired to perform. Strickland v. Timco Aviation Servs., 

Inc., 66 So. 3d 1002, 1006 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (holding that if the 

employee is injured not in the course of the work the contractor 

was hired to perform, but rather while the employee is attempting 

to access the premises to perform that work, the independent 

contractor standard does not apply). Thus, when an employee of 

an independent contractor is injured outside the scope of the 

contracted duties, courts will analyze the duty of the property 

owner to the employee under the separate framework applied to 

business visitors or invitees. Id.
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In this case, Weaver contracted with Royal Green to spray 

his lawn with fertilizer and weed herbicide. Williams had not yet 

begun spraying the lawn at the time he was injured on Weaver’s 

premises. He was merely entering the property to perform the 

contracted work on the lawn. As such, his injuries were not 

sustained in the course of performing the work under the contract,

i.e., spraying the lawn. Thus, Weaver’s duty to Williams at the 

time of his injury should be analyzed under the separate

framework governing a landowner’s duty to business invitees.

B.

As stated previously, property owners must maintain their 

premises in a reasonably safe condition for business invitees. A 

landowner ordinarily “owes an invitee two independent duties: (1) 

to give warning of concealed perils which are known or should be 

known to the owner, but which are not known to the invitee[;] and 

(2) to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe 

condition.” Frazier v. Panera, LLC, 367 So. 3d 565, 567 (Fla. 5th

DCA 2023). 

Regarding the duty to warn of any concealed dangers, “[t]he 

obvious danger doctrine provides that an owner or possessor of 

land is not liable for injuries to an invitee caused by a dangerous 

condition on the premises when the danger is known or obvious to 

the injured party, unless the owner or possessor should anticipate 

the harm despite the fact that the dangerous condition is open and 

obvious.” Aaron v. Palatka Mall, L.L.C., 908 So. 2d 574, 576–77 

(Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (citing Ashcroft v. Calder Race Course, 

Inc., 492 So. 2d 1309 (Fla. 1986)). The “obvious danger” doctrine 

“rests upon the generally accepted notion that owners and 

possessors of real property should be legally permitted to assume 

that those entering their premises will perceive conditions that are 

open and obvious to them upon the ordinary use of their 

senses.” Id. at 577. However, the test “is not whether the object 

itself is obvious, but [rather] whether the dangerous condition of 

the object is obvious.” Conrad v. Boat House of Cape Coral, LLC, 

331 So. 3d 857, 861 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021) (quoting Pratus v. 

Marzucco’s Constr. & Coatings, Inc., 310 So. 3d 146, 149 (Fla. 2d 

DCA 2021)). To determine whether the doctrine applies in a given 

case, courts are required to consider all of the facts and 
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“circumstances surrounding the accident and the alleged 

dangerous condition.” Id. 

Although it was undisputed that the deck itself was open 

and obvious, whether the dangerous condition of the deck was 

obvious was in dispute at the time the trial court granted summary 

judgment in favor of Weaver. In particular, although the deck 

appeared dark, Williams testified that it did not look wet, and the 

slippery condition was not known to him until he stepped on the 

deck. It was not until he fell that he noticed the dark area was 

algae, which was slippery in nature. This was confirmed by 

Weaver, who had admitted that although he walked by the deck 

daily, he did not think it was slippery at the time when Williams

fell but stated that it could have been slippery. This clearly showed 

that even Weaver was uncertain about the dangerous condition of 

the deck, i.e., its slipperiness. As a result, this raises a genuine 

dispute of material fact regarding whether the dangerous 

condition of the deck was open and obvious. See Pratus, 310 So. 3d 

at 150 (finding that where an employee of a subcontractor stepped 

into an uncovered drain on a construction site and was injured,

though the drain itself was obvious, genuine issues of material fact 

existed regarding whether “the uncovered drain presented an open 

and obvious danger”); see also Smile v. Fla. POP, LLC, No. 20-

14141, 2022 WL 18956202 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 14, 2022) (finding that 

where a patron of a restaurant slipped and fell while stepping into 

a puddle of water in the parking lot, summary judgment was not 

appropriate because even though the puddle was open and 

obvious, the dangerousness of the puddle, i.e. its slippery nature, 

was not open and obvious).

Notwithstanding the foregoing analysis regarding whether

the dangerous condition of the deck was open and obvious, Weaver

had a separate and distinct duty to maintain the premises in a 

reasonably safe condition. While the fact that a danger is obvious 

discharges a landowner’s duty to warn, it does not discharge the 

landowner’s duty to maintain his property in a reasonably safe 

condition. See Marriott Int’l, Inc. v. Perez-Melendez, 855 So. 2d 624, 

631 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003). Despite a hazard being open and obvious, 

a property owner has a duty to maintain the property in a 

reasonably safe condition by repairing conditions that they foresee 

will cause harm. Middleton v. Don Asher & Assoc. Inc., 262 So. 3d 
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870, 872 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019). As a result, “[w]hen an injured party 

alleges that the owner or possessor breached the duty to keep the 

premises in a reasonably safe condition, an issue of fact is 

generally raised as to whether the condition was dangerous and 

whether the owner or possessor should have anticipated that the 

dangerous condition would cause injury despite the fact it was 

open and obvious.” Aaron, 908 So. 2d at 578.

Here, Weaver acknowledged that the deck needed to be 

maintained during the year. He also acknowledged that it needed 

to be cleaned at the time of Williams’ fall. Based on this, he also 

agreed that the portion of the deck with the algae on it should not 

have been walked upon. This raises a genuine dispute of material 

fact concerning whether Weaver had properly maintained the deck 

in a reasonably safe condition and whether he should have 

anticipated that the dangerous condition would cause injury.

III.

Because genuine issues of material fact exist regarding 

Weaver’s duties to warn and to maintain his premises, we reverse 

the order granting the motion for summary judgment and remand 

for further proceedings. 

REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings.

JAY, J., concurs.

MACIVER, J., dissents, with opinion.

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Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

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Case No. 5D23-0324

LT. Case No. 2019-CA-000171

MACIVER, J., dissenting.

I agree with the court below that no reasonable jury could 

find that a prudent person walking in rubber boots across a wet 

lawn could fail to know that crossing a wooden discolored deck may 

pose a slipping hazard. 

This observation embodies two important concepts. First, 

the concept that a property owner is not liable for the least common 

denominator of care exercised by visitors to his or her property. 

Second, that not every conceivable factual question must be 

determined by a jury—only those that pose a genuine dispute of a 

material fact. 

The majority here has found two questions appropriate for 

jury consideration. First, whether the slippery nature of the 

wooden deck was open and obvious. Next, whether Appellee, 

Weaver, exercised reasonable care in maintaining his private 

property. I disagree on both counts and would affirm the court 

below. 

The bulk of torts jurisprudence is still a matter of common 

law. The political power of the people to decide these rules has not 

been exercised by their legislative representatives. Rather, the 

courts have attempted to observe common societal behaviors and 

deduce what the otherwise informalized rule would be. Because 

common-law rules are formed from our observations of common 

behavior, they must be grounded in a common sense 

understanding of that behavior. 

The courts’ observations become precedent to be followed in 

later cases. The precedents also become the formalized rule that 

informs future parties what their rights and obligations are under 

the common law. If the decision tree on whether a legal duty exists 

has become so complex that judges have difficulty determining the 

legal duties of the homeowner, what does that say about the clarity 

of the law for the parties that are supposed to be bound by it?
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Finally, while factual questions about whether the rules 

have been violated in individual circumstances are left to the jury, 

the question of what is the common law rule always remains the 

province of the court itself.

Open and obvious nature of the hazard

The majority has found that there is a genuine dispute of 

material fact regarding whether the dangerous condition of the 

deck was open and obvious. Specifically, the majority notes that 

although the deck appeared dark, Williams testified that it did not 

look wet, and the slippery condition was not known to him until he 

stepped on the deck. However, as the court below noted it was 

Williams who, while wearing rubber boots, walked across the wet 

lawn before stepping onto the deck. Williams—by his own 

testimony—introduced an element of the dangerous condition. 

Turning back to common sense understanding of societal 

expectations and behaviors, we can again observe that a property 

owner is not expected to be liable to the least amount of care that 

can be exercised by someone on their property. The fact that the 

discolored deck could be slippery if the person walking across it got 

it wet is an obvious fact. It is just as clear and obvious to the visitor 

as it would be to a homeowner. Stated more simply, no reasonable 

jury could find that a prudent person walking in rubber boots 

across a wet lawn could fail to know that crossing a wooden 

discolored deck may pose a slipping hazard.

Duty to maintain property in a reasonably safe condition

The majority also finds a genuine dispute of material fact 

concerning whether Weaver had properly maintained the deck in 

a reasonably safe condition and whether he should have 

anticipated that the dangerous condition would cause injury. I 

disagree. 

The majority notes, “[w]hen an injured party alleges that the 

owner or possessor breached the duty to keep the premises in a 

reasonably safe condition, an issue of fact is generally raised as to 

whether the condition was dangerous and whether the owner or 

possessor should have anticipated that the dangerous condition 
10

would cause injury despite the fact it was open and obvious.” 

Aaron, 908 So. 2d at 578. Here, though, there is no allegation that 

the deck alone was dangerous. Rather, based upon the testimony 

of both parties, the deck became slippery when Williams crossed it 

wearing wet rubber boots. In other words, while Weaver may have 

had a duty to maintain his property in such a manner so as not to 

create a dangerous condition, that principle cannot logically be 

extended to require him to foresee and accommodate a lack of 

someone else’s care that exacerbates a condition of his property. 

Because I would not find that Weaver’s duty extended so far, there 

is no material question regarding the reasonableness of his level of 

maintenance the property. 

Based upon the foregoing, I must respectfully dissent.