Filed 9/12/24 P. v. Zamora CA6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

EZEKIAL ZAMORA,

Defendant and Appellant.

 H050959

 (Santa Clara County

 Super. Ct. Nos. C1650184, C1760640,

 C1764491)

In the trial court Ezekial Zamora moved for resentencing under Penal Code 

section 1172.75 on the ground that his sentence included an enhancement for a prior 

prison sentence—or “prison prior”—that is no longer valid. (Subsequent undesignated 

statutory references are to the Penal Code.) The trial court denied the motion on the 

ground that punishment for the prison prior was struck. Following this district’s recent 

opinion in People v. Espino (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 188 (Espino), we conclude that the 

trial court erred. Section 1172.75 requires resentencing where a now-invalid prison prior 

was imposed, whether punishment for the prior was executed, stayed, or struck. 

Accordingly, we reverse and remand with directions to conduct resentencing. 

I. BACKGROUND

Because the facts concerning Zamora’s offenses are not relevant to the issues on 

this appeal, we omit those facts and only discuss the procedural background. 
2

Zamora was charged in three separate Santa Clara County proceedings. First, in 

docket No. C1650184, he was charged with a single count of inflicting corporal injury on 

the mother of his child. Second, in docket No. C1760640, Zamora was charged with two 

counts of vehicle theft with a prior conviction and one count of driving with a suspended 

license. Even more important for purposes of this appeal, the complaint in the second 

proceeding also alleged a prison prior (for vehicle theft) under section 667.5, 

subdivision (b). Third, in docket No. C1764491, Zamora was charged with fourteen 

counts: nine counts of second degree robbery, one count of attempted second degree 

robbery, one count of grand theft, one count of attempted grand theft, one count of 

battery, and one count of child endangerment. In connection with four of the robbery 

counts, the complaint alleged that Zamora used a dangerous weapon (a knife).

On February 22, 2018, Zamora pleaded no contest to all counts and admitted all 

allegations in the second and third proceedings—including the prison prior allegation in 

the second proceeding—and the trial court provided an indicated sentence that Zamora 

would receive an aggregate sentence of eight years in state prison. Four days later, 

Zamora pleaded no contest to the one count in the first proceeding. 

In May 2018, the trial court sentenced Zamora in the three proceedings, imposing 

an aggregate sentence of eight years in state prison. The court used the first robbery 

count in the third proceeding as the principal term and on that count imposed an upperterm sentence of five years. The trial court also imposed consecutive one-year terms on 

three other robbery counts from that proceeding. For the remaining counts, including the 

vehicle theft counts in the second proceeding, the court imposed concurrent sentences 

ranging from two to five years. Finally, the trial court imposed enhancements for 

Zamora’s prison prior and for the use of a deadly weapon but struck punishment for the

enhancements. 

In March 2023, Zamora moved for resentencing, arguing based on intervening 

changes in the law that he was entitled to resentencing under section 1172.75 because his 
3

sentence included a now-invalid prison prior. Neither the prosecutor in the trial court nor 

the Attorney General on appeal has denied that the California Department of Corrections 

identified Zamora as an individual serving a sentence containing a now-invalid prison 

prior. Nevertheless, the prosecutor opposed Zamora’s motion, and the trial court denied 

resentencing. The trial court reasoned that section 1172.75 authorizes resentencing only 

where a now-invalid prison prior was both imposed and executed. Although the section 

declares invalid most prison priors “imposed” before January 1, 2020 (§ 1172.75, 

subd. (a)), the trial court noted that the term “imposed” may be used as a shorthand for

sentences that are both imposed and executed, and it concluded that section 1172.75 

should be interpreted to use the term “imposed” in this manner based on other provisions 

in the section, and the Legislature’s stated intent. 

Zamora subsequently filed a timely notice of appeal. 

II. DISCUSSION

Zamora argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for resentencing 

because a prison prior is “imposed” under section 1172.75 if it was included in a 

judgment, whether punishment for the prior was executed, stayed, or struck. The 

Attorney General responds that a prison prior was “imposed” under section 1172.75 only 

if the prior was both imposed and executed. Reviewing this question of statutory 

interpretation de novo (People v. Renteria (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 1276, 1281-1282 

(Renteria)), we agree with Zamora. 

When first enacted, section 667.5, subdivision (b) required that a one-year 

enhancement be imposed for each prior prison term served (and was later amended to 

include jail terms served under section 1170, subdivision (h)), unless the defendant 

remained free of custody for at least five years. (Stats. 1976, ch. 1139, § 268; see 

Renteria, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 1282; People v Jennings (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 

664, 681.) In 2019, the Legislature amended section 667.5, subdivision (b) to allow 

enhancements for prior prison terms only for sexually violent offenses. (Stats. 2019, 
4

ch. 590, § 1.) Two years later, Senate Bill No. 483 (2021-2022 Sess.) (Sen. Bill 483) 

made this change retroactive by enacting what is now section 1172.75. (Stats. 2021, 

ch. 728, § 3; see also Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 12 [moving provision to § 1172.75, 

subd. (a)].) Section 1172.75 states that “[a]ny sentence enhancement that was imposed 

prior to January 1, 2020, pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 667.5, except for any 

enhancement imposed for a prior conviction for a sexually violent offense . . . [,] is 

legally invalid.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (a).)

Section 1172.75 requires the Secretary of the Department of Corrections and 

Rehabilitation and county correctional administrators to identify any individual in their 

custody “currently serving a term for a judgment that includes an enhancement described 

in subdivision (a)” (§ 1172.75, subd. (b)) and the sentencing court to verify that “the 

current judgment includes a sentencing enhancement described in subdivision (a)”

(§ 1172.75, subd. (c)). If the sentencing court verifies that the judgment against an 

individual includes a now-invalid prison prior, the individual’s sentence is recalled, and 

the individual is resentenced. (Ibid.) In resentencing, the court is required to apply any 

changes in the law reducing sentences or providing judicial discretion (§ 1172.75, 

subd. (d)(2)), and resentencing must result in a “lesser sentence,” unless such a sentence 

would endanger public safety (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(1)).

People v. Espino, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th 188, a decision from this district, 

concluded, albeit over a dissent, that section 1172.75 requires resentencing where, as 

here, prison priors were imposed but punishment was struck. We follow the Espino

decision’s reasoning, which, for the sake of convenience, is recounted below largely 

verbatim. 

There is a split over whether section 1172.75 requires resentencing where a prison 

prior was imposed but stayed. The majority of decisions addressing this situation have 

concluded that resentencing is required. A decision from this district first held that 

resentencing is required where a prison prior was imposed but punishment was stayed. 
5

(See Renteria, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1282-1283.) Subsequent decisions from the 

Third, Fourth and Fifth Districts agreed. (People v. Mayberry (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 

665, 673-676 (Mayberry) [Fifth District]; People v. Saldana (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 1270, 

1272-1273, review granted Mar. 12, 2024, S283547 (Saldana) [Third District]; People v. 

Christianson (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 300, 314, review granted Feb. 21, 2024, S283189 

(Christianson) [Fourth District].) One decision from the Fourth District disagreed.

(People v. Rhodius (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 38, 40-41, 45, 48-49, review granted Feb. 21, 

2024, S283169) (Rhodius).) The Supreme Court has granted review of three of these 

decisions. (Rhodius, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th 38; Christianson, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th 300; 

Saldana, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th 1270.)

Following the weight of authority, we interpret section 1172.75 to apply when a 

prison prior was imposed but stayed. We also conclude that section 1172.75 applies 

where a prison prior was imposed but punishment was struck. Section 1172.75 requires 

courts to resentence any individual whose “current judgment includes an enhancement 

described in subdivision (a)” (§ 1172.75, subd. (c)), which declares invalid “[a]ny 

sentence enhancement that was imposed” for a prior prison term not involving a sexually 

violent offense (§ 1172.75, subd. (a)). In the context of an obligation or penalty, the 

ordinary and usual meaning of the word “impose” is “to make, frame, or apply (as a 

charge, tax, obligation, rule, penalty) as compulsory, obligatory or enforc[ea]ble.” 

(Webster’s 3d New Internat. Dict. (1993) p. 1136, col. 1; see also American Heritage 

Dict. (5th ed. 2011) p. 883, col. 2 [defining “impose” to mean “establish or apply as 

compulsory” or “bring about by authority or force”].) As a consequence, 

section 1172.75, subdivision (a) is naturally understood to declare invalid any 

enhancement for a prior prison term (not involving a sexually violent offense) that was 

made or applied and included in the judgment against the defendant, without regard to 

whether punishment for the prison prior was executed, stayed, or struck. Under this 

interpretation, Zamora’s prison prior was imposed upon him and rendered invalid under 
6

section 1172.75 because, even though punishment was struck, the prison prior was 

included in the judgment against him. 

The Supreme Court has recognized that the term “impose” may be interpreted 

more narrowly. In particular, the Court observed, “impose” may be “employed as 

shorthand” to refer to enhancements that were imposed and then executed. (People v. 

Gonzalez (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1118, 1125.) The Attorney General contends that 

section 1172.75 uses “impose” in this narrow sense. In support of this position, the 

Attorney General points to the section’s requirement that resentencing ordinarily “result 

in a lesser sentence than the one originally imposed.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(1).) The 

sentence for an enhancement, the Attorney General argues, cannot be reduced if the 

punishment was stayed or struck and therefore section 1172.75 should be interpreted to 

declare invalid only prison priors that were imposed and executed. Most decisions to 

consider this argument have rejected it. (Mayberry, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at pp. 673-

676; Saldana, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 1278, rev.gr.; Christianson, supra, 97 

Cal.App.5th at p. 312, rev.gr.) We do so as well.

As these decisions recognize, even when punishment for an enhancement is

stayed, the enhancement carries “the potential for an increased sentence in certain 

circumstances, and removal of the stayed enhancement does provide some relief to the 

defendant by eliminating that potential.” (Christianson, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 312, 

rev.gr.) In particular, when a prison prior or other enhancement is imposed but stayed, 

the trial court retains the ability under certain circumstances to lift the stay and execute 

the stayed term. (Ibid.; see also Mayberry, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 674 [“Imposedbut-stayed prison prior term enhancements carry the possibility of execution.”]; Saldana, 

supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 1278, rev.gr. [“The presence of a stayed term or enhancement 

is not without significance; it is part of the sentence and remains available if its execution 

becomes necessary and proper for any legally sanctioned reason.”].) In addition, if a 

defendant is resentenced, a stay might not be reimposed. (See People v. Cortez (2016) 3 
7

Cal.App.5th 308, 316 [in resentencing after a sentence is recalled, “[a] court may also 

impose a previously stayed sentence”].) Thus, even when a prison prior was stayed, 

elimination of the prison prior reduces the potential sentence facing the defendant and 

therefore results in a “lesser” sentence than the one originally imposed. (Mayberry, 

supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at pp. 674-675; Christianson, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 312; 

Saldana, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 1278.)

If the Legislature had intended to limit section 1172.75 to prison priors that were 

imposed and executed, it could have done so clearly and unequivocally. (Christianson, 

supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 313, rev.gr.) Section 1172.75 expressly differentiates 

between inmates “currently serving a sentence based on the enhancement” for a prison 

prior (§ 1172.75, subd. (c)(1)) and inmates with a judgment that merely “includes an 

enhancement” for a prison prior (§ 1172.75, subd. (b) [requiring correctional officials to 

identify individuals serving terms for judgments including enhancements]; § 1172.75, 

subd. (c) [requiring courts to verify that identified judgments include prison priors]). In 

particular, section 1172.75 requires correctional officials to prioritize inmates currently 

serving time based on a prison prior and to identify them to sentencing courts several 

months before identifying those merely serving a term for a judgment including a prison 

prior. (§ 1172.75, subd. (c)(1), (c)(2).) If the Legislature had intended the term “impose” 

to apply only to those inmates upon whom a prison prior was imposed and executed, it 

similarly could have limited resentencing under section 1172.75 to those inmates serving 

(whether currently or not) a sentence based on a prison prior. The Legislature did not do 

so. Instead, it declared invalid “any enhancement imposed” for a prison prior not 

involving a sexually violent offense without requiring execution of the enhancement 

(§ 1172.75, subd. (a)) and provided for resentencing of any individual with “a current 

judgment that includes a [now-invalid] sentencing enhancement” (§ 1172.75, subd. (c), 

italics added), without requiring that the individual be serving a term based on such an 

enhancement. This omission “suggests that the Legislature intended to use the term 
8

‘impose’ in the broader sense” and to include prison priors that were imposed but stayed. 

(Christianson, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 313.) 

This same reasoning applies to prison priors that were imposed but punishment 

was struck. The Legislature’s use of the term “impose” in section 1172.75 without any 

qualification or indication that it is limited to prison priors imposed and executed 

suggests that the Legislature used the term in its ordinary (and unlimited) sense. As 

shown above, the ordinary meaning of the word “impose” encompasses all prison priors

that were made and therefore included in a judgment, whether punishment was executed, 

stayed, or struck. In addition, as Zamora points out, even when an enhancement was 

imposed but punishment struck, “[t]he fact of the enhancement . . . remain[s]” and may 

adversely impact the defendant in other ways such as restricting the ability to accrue 

conduct credits or subjecting the defendant to additional punishment for future 

convictions. (In re Pacheco (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1439, 1444; see also People v. 

Fuentes (2016) 1 Cal.5th 218, 225-226 [“even if the punishment is struck, an 

enhancement finding could impact defendant in a future case”].) While it is unclear what 

adverse impact a prison prior may have when punishment is struck, we cannot be sure 

that a prison prior has no potential detrimental impact in that situation. We therefore 

conclude that, where a prison prior was imposed but punishment was struck, a sentence 

entirely omitting the prior is a “lesser” sentence under section 1172.75. 

The Attorney General also argues that, where a prison prior was imposed but 

punishment struck, resentencing would not further the purposes of section 1172.75. The 

Attorney General contends that the section has two purposes: reducing the impact of 

increased sentences due to enhancements on minority communities and freeing up 

funding for community-based services. However, in at least some cases where 

punishment was struck resentencing would serve these purposes: In resentencing under 

section 1172.75, courts are required not only to strike punishments for now-invalid prison 

priors, but also to “apply any other changes in law that reduce sentences” (§ 1172.75, 
9

subd. (d)(2)), which may reduce sentences even where no punishment for a now-invalid 

prison prior was imposed, thereby furthering the purposes identified by the Attorney 

General. Even more important, it is doubtful that the Legislature had only two purposes 

in enacting what is now section 1172.75. As our Supreme Court has recognized, 

“[l]egislation is frequently ‘ “the product of multiple and somewhat inconsistent purposes 

that led to certain compromises.” ’ [Citations.]” (People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 

834, 854.) Among other things, the Legislature may choose to pursue a primary

objective or set of objectives by adopting rules that are simple and easy to administer but 

somewhat overinclusive—such as applying section 1172.75 to all now-invalid prison 

priors that were imposed, without regard to whether punishment was executed, stayed, or 

struck. None of the evidence of legislative intent to which the Attorney General points 

excludes that possibility. We therefore decline to infer an implicit execution requirement 

into the word “impose” and instead follow the ordinary meaning of the term in 

interpreting section 1172.75 to apply to all now-invalid prison priors that were imposed 

and included in the judgment against a defendant. 

Zamora argues that his resentencing should cover his full sentence even though the 

sentences for the charges in the proceeding in which the prison prior was imposed (the 

second one involving vehicle theft) have been completed. The Attorney General agrees, 

and so do we. Although Zamora was charged in three separate proceedings, the trial 

court imposed a single aggregate sentence. The Penal Code expressly authorizes 

sentencing for multiple felonies in different proceedings. (§ 1170.1, subd. (a) 

[authorizing sentencing for two or more felonies “whether in the same proceeding court 

or in different proceedings or courts”].) As the Supreme Court has recognized, in such a 

sentencing, “enhancements for prior convictions do not attach to particular counts.” 

(People v. Tassell (1984) 36 Cal.3d 77, 90, overruled on other grounds in People v. 

Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380.) Instead, enhancements attach to the sentence as a whole 

and “are added just once as the final step in computing the total sentence.” (Ibid., fn. 
10

omitted) Consequently, even though Zamora has served the sentences imposed for the 

convictions in the proceeding where the prison prior was alleged, Zamora is entitled to a 

resentencing covering all matters addressed in his original sentence. 

III. DISPOSITION

The order denying Zamora’s petition for resentencing is reversed. The matter is 

remanded to the trial court, which is directed to recall Zamora’s sentence and resentence 

him consistent with this opinion, Penal Code section 1172.75, and current law.
____________________________

BROMBERG, J.

I CONCUR:

____________________________________

BAMATTRE-MANOUKIAN, ACTING P. J.

People v. Zamora

H050959
Lie, J., Dissenting: 

For the reasons I stated in People v. Espino (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 188, 202–206 (dis. opn. of 

Lie, J.), I respectfully dissent. 

_____________________________________

LIE, J.

People v. Zamora

H050959