SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3710-19

THE RIDGE AT BACK BROOK,

LLC, a New Jersey limited liability 

company,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

THE EAST AMWELL TOWNSHIP 

PLANNING BOARD, a/k/a THE 

EAST AMWELL TOWNSHIP 

LAND USE BOARD, THE 

TOWNSHIP OF EAST AMWELL, 

THE TOWNSHIP COMMITTEE 

OF THE TOWNSHIP OF EAST

AMWELL, and RICK WOLFE, in 

his capacity as Mayor and Member 

of the Township Committee of the 

Township of East Amwell and as a 

Member of the Planning Board of 

the Township of East Amwell,

Defendants-Appellants.

_____________________________

Submitted February 24, 2021 – Decided July 20, 2021

Before Judges Sumners and Mitterhoff.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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A-3710-19

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Hunterdon County, Docket No. L-0204-19.

Ventura, Miesowitz, Keough & Warner, PC, attorneys 

for appellants (Jolanta Maziarz, on the briefs).

Wilentz, Goldman & Spitzer, PA, attorneys for 

respondent (Brian J. Molloy and Steven J. Tripp, of 

counsel and on the brief; Pierre Chwang, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendants East Amwell Township, the East Amwell Township Planning 

Board, the Township Committee of East Amwell Township, and East Amwell 

Township Mayor Rick Wolfe (collectively defendants) appeal from an April 29, 

2020 Law Division order granting plaintiff The Ridge at Back Brook, LLC's 

motion for summary judgment, enjoining Mayor Wolfe from participating in any 

future legislative or quasi-judicial proceedings involving plaintiff, and 

invalidating an April 10, 2019 amendment to the Master Plan of the Township 

of East Amwell. After considering the record and in light of the applicable law, 

we affirm.

The facts material to this appeal are undisputed. 

The Parties

Plaintiff has owned and operated about 300 acres of property (the 

Property) located in East Amwell Township, New Jersey. In 2002, The Ridge 
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A-3710-19

at Back Brook Golf Club (The Ridge) opened on the Property and has since been 

run by its principal, Joel D. Moore (Moore). 

Defendant East Amwell Township Planning Board (the Board), also 

known as the East Amwell Township Land Use Board, is the duly constituted 

Planning Board of the Township of East Amwell. The Board exercises the 

powers of a planning board as well as those of a zoning board of adjustment 

pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-25(c). 

Defendant Township of East Amwell (the Township) is a municipal 

corporation of the State of New Jersey. Defendant Township Committee of the 

Township of East Amwell (the Committee) is the Township's duly constituted 

governing body, exercising the powers of a township committee. Defendant 

Rick Wolfe (Wolfe) is the Mayor of the Township and is a voting member of 

both the Committee and the Board. 

Political History of East Amwell

Since the 1980's, candidates supported by the East Amwell Democratic 

Association (EADA) held a majority on the Committee. In 2016, Wolfe brought 

allegations against the EADA-controlled Committee, accusing the members of 

misappropriating approximately $1,200,000 from the Township's farmland 

preservation trust. The New Jersey Department of Community Affairs 
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investigated and determined that expenditures were improperly charged to the 

fund, but did not require that the money be reinstated. 

In the Township's 2016 elections, Wolfe and another East Amwell resident 

ran as Republicans and won. In 2017, two more of the EADA-supported 

Committee members were replaced by Republican candidates. Following the 

2018 elections, EADA lost its final seat on the five-member Committee. Wolfe 

was appointed Deputy Mayor in January 2018. In January 2019, he became 

Mayor and was re-appointed in January 2020. 

Construction of The Ridge

The Property is located in the Amwell Valley Agricultural District 

(AVAD), which imposes building restrictions intended to maintain the 

community's rural atmosphere. In 1999, upon application by Moore, the Board 

adopted Ordinance No. 99-20, which amended Section 92-91 of the Township's

Code, to make the operation of a golf course or club a permitted use in the 

AVAD, subject to certain criteria. The ordinance specifically stated that the 

required criteria "shall not be construed as conditions of a conditional use." 

Site plan approvals and amendments were granted by the Board beginning 

in October 2000, culminating in the final site plan approval with amendments in 

June 2002. Construction of the golf course began in early 2001. The Ridge 
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A-3710-19

opened for limited use in July 2002 and was fully opened when construction was 

completed in 2003. A clubhouse was subsequently built and opened in July 

2004. 

On June 9, 2016, following public hearings and testimony given by 

experts from both The Ridge and the Township, the Committee adopted 

Ordinance No. 16-04 (the 2016 Amendments) which amended the golf course 

provisions included in Section 92-91(B)(9). The amendments permitted several 

ancillary uses of the Property, including a swimming pool, tennis courts, and 

lodging for overnight accommodations. While the 2016 Amendments were in 

effect, plaintiff did not request approval for any ancillary uses. 

The Helistop and Tax Appeals

In 2006, plaintiff filed an application with the Board for approval to 

construct and operate a helistop on the Property, which was denied in March 

2006.1In 2008, plaintiff filed a second application for a helistop, this time at a 

different location on the property and with a limitation of thirty-two round-trip 

flights per year. Plaintiff's second application was denied in October 2008. 

1

 A helistop is "[a] minimally developed helicopter facility for boarding and 

discharging passengers or cargo. The [heliport/helistop] relationship is 

comparable to a [bus terminal/bus stop] relationship with respect to the extent 

of services provided or expected." FED. AVIATION ADMIN., AC NO. 150/5390-

2B, HELIPORT DESIGN (2004).
6

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In 2015, this court determined that the New Jersey Department of 

Transportation (NJDOT) has "the ultimate authority as to the placement of 

aeronautical facilities" and therefore may approve helistops, regardless of local 

zoning prohibitions. Twp. of Fairfield v. State, Dep't of Transp., 440 N.J. Super. 

310, 318-20 (App. Div. 2015) (quoting Garden State Farms, Inc. v. Bay, 77 N.J. 

439, 454 (1978)). In October 2018, plaintiff filed an application with the 

NJDOT seeking approval to construct and operate a helistop that would have a 

maximum of eight take-offs and eight landings per month, from April through 

December each year. On April 16, 2019, the NJDOT approved plaintiff's 

helistop application. 

On November 29, 2018, while plaintiff's application to the NJDOT was 

pending, the Committee held a special public meeting to address the application. 

Numerous residents and a local environmental group attended to oppose the 

helistop. During the meeting, Wolfe requested to speak as "a member of the 

public" and made several disparaging statements about plaintiff including:2

[WOLFE]: The Ridge [is] not behaving neighborly. 

And they have [not] behaved neighborly and this really 

starting to bother me as a resident of this [town]. My 

wife and I are the single largest individual taxpayer in 

2

 Plaintiff appealed its property tax assessments each year from 2013 through 

2019. The November 29, 2018 special public meeting was held while settlement 

negotiations were ongoing. 
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East Amwell. Could . . . I challenge the assessment on 

my property, yes. Can I get it reduced if I challenged 

it? Probably. Do I intend to challenge it? No. I am a 

resident of this town. This is a great [t]own. I have an 

obligation to make a contribution to this town, a 

financial contribution so the town can continue to 

function.

The Ridge is challenging its property tax 

assessment. . . . [and] to come, take us into court and 

argue that it's only worth [six] million dollars, to me is

outrageous[,] it's not neighborly. It's not doing 

anything to benefit this town.

Now . . . I am a tax lawyer actually so I'm not a 

big fan of people [overpaying] taxes. But you do have 

an obligation to your community and he is not fulfilling 

that obligation. He is slapping us in the face. He is 

throwing us a giant middle finger. And he is now doing 

it again on this helistop[,] he is throwing us a giant 

middle finger. . . .

. . . If he moves forward with this helistop, he has 

fundraisers [at] that club that I have been to for 

politicians running for office[,] I will not attend a 

[fundraiser] at that club[,] and I will let everyone that I 

know[,] know when fundraisers are being had at that 

club by politicians and not only will I not attend, I will 

not vote for any politician that has a fundraiser at that 

club. I will not make a donation to [any] organization 

that patronizes that club. I will stick signs on my farm 

and in fact if anybody wants the same signs, I will pay 

to have them made and hand them out to people as many 

people who want them.

MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC: Helistop, hella no[!]

[WOLFE]: Right. I like that. Perfect.
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A-3710-19

. . . I'm not kidding. I am . . . tired of getting the 

middle finger.

. . . .

. . . People do for each other in East Amwell. We 

don’t throw each other the middle finger. That's not the 

way we live here. I'm tired of it. So I have a different 

perspective on this. I have an economic perspective. 

He want[s] to make our life a living hell[?] I'm going 

to do what I can to make his life a living hell.

On January 3, 2019, plaintiff and the Township executed a stipulation of 

settlement which disposed of all complaints and cross-claims related to 

plaintiff's tax assessment appeal. The settlement, which was proposed by the 

Township, reduced plaintiff's tax assessment by approximately fifty percent, 

from roughly $10,600,000 to $5,347,200. 

2019 Master Plan and Zoning Amendments

On April 10, 2019, the Board conducted a public hearing on a proposal, 

which Wolfe helped draft to suggest to the Committee certain amendments to

Township's Master Plan. The suggested revisions applied only to golf courses

and clubs located in the AVAD. Because The Ridge is the only golf course 

located in the Township, plaintiff was the only member of the community the 

proposed amendments would directly affect. The proposal recommended:
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A-3710-19

1. Golf courses should be reclassified as a conditional 

use in the AVAD, not a permitted use. . . . 

2. The permitted use should be defined as a golf course 

with customary accessory buildings, structures and 

uses, including a clubhouse. Other accessory uses not 

specifically related to the sport of golfing should be 

expressly prohibited, including but not limited to 

swimming pools, tennis courts, guesthouses[,] and 

helistops . . . . 

3. Golf tournaments that will attract a significant 

number of spectators should be expressly prohibited

. . . . 

4. Best Management Practices shall be employed to 

prevent and/or minimize adverse impacts of the golf 

course on groundwater and surface water resources, and 

any deviation from the approved Integrated Turf 

Management Plan, Integrated Pesticide and Pest 

Management Plan, Water Use Budget and Water 

Recycling Plan and the Aquifer Test Plan should only 

be approved by the East Amwell Township Committee 

following a mandatory review by, with 

recommendations from, the local Board of Health

. . . . 

5. Any golf course that is a Certified Audubon 

Cooperative Sanctuary may be presumed to be 

operating in a manner consistent with the 

environmental goals and objectives of the Township as 

long as the course's certification is current and valid

. . . .
10 A-3710-19

Moore appeared at the hearing with counsel. Before the Board began its 

presentation, Moore's counsel objected to Wolfe's participation in the vote based 

on his conduct, and requested that he recuse himself. Wolfe refused. At the 

conclusion of the hearing, the Board adopted the proposal by a vote of seven to 

one. 

Wolfe subsequently drafted and posted to the Township's website a report 

summarizing the history of applications plaintiff has made to the Board since 

1998. The report quoted the Board's meeting minutes and letters from plaintiff's 

attorney to the Board. Wolfe criticized several statements plaintiff made in 

1999, prior to The Ridge's construction, regarding plaintiff's vision of what the 

club would be. Wolfe noted that plaintiff had initially indicated he wanted to 

build a "pure" golf course that did not include the traditional amenities offered 

by country clubs such as a swimming pool, tennis courts, and overnight lodging, 

and certainly not a helistop. 

The report also averred that plaintiff's tax contribution was no longer what 

was anticipated by previous Board members when deciding to adopt the 

ordinances that allowed The Ridge to be constructed. Wolfe suggested the 2016 

Amendments be repealed because the favorable treatment that the Board
11 A-3710-19

previously bestowed upon plaintiff had not resulted in a significant benefit to 

the Township. 

On May 9, 2019, about three weeks after plaintiff's helistop application 

was approved by the NJDOT, the Committee introduced Ordinance No. 19-10

(the 2019 Amendments), which essentially adopted the Board's suggested 

revisions to the Township's Master Plan. The ordinance amended Chapter 92 of 

the Township's Code by:

a. Changing the definition of golf course/club in 

Section 92-4 of the Code of East Amwell to delete 

"structures for overnight accommodation for use by 

members and their guests," and "swimming and tennis 

facilities as is customary for use by members and their 

guests and customary accessory buildings and 

structures for the maintenance and operation of the 

facility."

b. Eliminating "golf course/club" as a permitted use 

in the AVAD by deleting Section 92-91(B)(9) of the 

Code of East Amwell in its entirety.

c. Reclassifying "golf course/club" as a conditional 

use by creating a new Section 92-91(B)(7), and setting 

forth eight conditional use standards.

d. Eliminating accessory uses, including swimming 

pools, tennis courts, and guest houses, thereby 

repealing the 2016 Amendment that specifically 

permitted such uses.
12 A-3710-19

On June 13, 2019, a public hearing and a regular Committee meeting were

conducted to consider the 2019 Amendments for final adoption. Moore

appeared with counsel, who again objected to Wolfe's participation in 

consideration of the ordinance and requested his recusal. The request was 

denied, and Wolfe participated in the meeting and the vote. In fact, Wolfe was 

the only member of the Committee to comment on Ordinance No. 19-10. 

Before Wolfe gave his speech, six members of the public requested to be 

heard by the Committee; four opposed the ordinance and two supported it. Each 

person that spoke out against the ordinance expressed concern that Wolfe's 

personal feelings about plaintiff had impaired his objectivity of judgment:

MR. MILLER: I don't know exactly what issue the 

[T]ownship or a certain person has with this individual.

But this document here that I received by 

registered mail caused me to go do some digging. And 

I have read the full [twenty-eight] pages of the lawsuit. 

And I have read this [ordinance]. This is a vile, evil, 

disgraceful, vindictive amendment that you folks are 

going to sit up there, and in your conscience[,] go along 

with trying to tell some golf business, any new business 

that might be coming into town, how they need to 

operate.

. . . .

I don't see how they create any burden on the 

[T]ownship and they preserve green space[s]. This is 

the result of one person saying, ["]I am going to make 
13 A-3710-19

another person's life a living hell.["] And each one of 

you people sitting there is going to support that. I 

would ask you to look deeply in your conscience and 

say[, "]is this really good for the [T]ownship?["] This 

silly, inane crap that is in here to be [vindictive] against 

one person?

. . . .

. . . [W]e all stood and said the Pledge of 

Allegiance. And the last phrase kind of really struck 

me in my heart, that said justice for all. And I feel that 

apparently some people in front of me here don't 

subscribe to that feeling, and I feel ashamed for that.

MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC: You're putting things in 

there that are ridiculous. And I'm hoping, okay, they 

err on the side of caution here and get a little back bone. 

And if . . . it's better for the town, for the greater good 

to recuse yourself, show that you're going to support the 

people of East Amwell . . . .

MR. WEITZER: So as I sit here today and hear both 

sides, I feel like it's national politics, and it's no longer 

about law or anything else. It's just a personal vendetta. 

One side hates the other. And you know, I ask, ["]when 

did . . . the politics stop being about working for the 

town and people[?"] It's just like a personal vendetta.

And I understand you may not like Mr. Moore, 

and trust me, I get it. But I just feel the two sides are 

going after each other. And you know you are trying to 

hurt Mr. Moore and the Ridge. You . . . are not hurting 

Mr. Moore. Mr. Moore is not paying for these attorneys 

sitting here, the members are. Plain and simple. And 

the money that you're going to have to spend, the 

[T]ownship is going to have to spend, isn't coming out 

of, much out of y'alls [sic] pockets. It's on the 
14 A-3710-19

taxpayers['] money. And I [just] think . . . cooler heads 

need to prevail.

MR. DOHERTY: I see nothing compelling leading us 

to get that we need this proposed ordinance passed. 

And as a property owner, I find it troubling that 

anything that would restrict or roll back property rights 

that . . . already exist for anyone, in any real estate 

entity. I find a real problem with that. So without a 

compelling reason for this[,] I feel as much as this 

affects the golf course, it affects each one of us, so 

thank you.

Wolfe then spoke at length about plaintiff's tax appeals, helistop 

applications, and the circumstances surrounding the Committee's adoption of the 

1999 and 2016 amendments that allowed The Ridge to be constructed and 

granted additional ancillary uses. Wolfe accused plaintiff of not being a "good 

neighbor" because he challenged the Ridge's property tax assessment, and for 

filing a helistop application with the NJDOT, thereby circumventing the Board's 

approval. 

With regard to the approval process leading to the 1999 and 2016 

amendments to the Code of East Amwell, Wolfe insinuated that plaintiff bribed

Township officials:

Did money in some fashion change hands? I can't 

say for sure but [the documents] certainly raised the 

specter of buying approval in 2001.

. . . .
15 A-3710-19

Finally, the entire process from the beginning in 

1998 through 2017, has at the very least a very dark 

cloud hanging over it: closed door meetings, 

apparently many in number, back room deals, 

undisclosed personal interests, improper purposes for 

enacting ordinance, perhaps influenced by donations.

During the speech, Wolfe specifically named Fred Gardner and Don Riley 

as former members of the Board that engaged in shady dealings with plaintiff in 

2016. Wolfe also accused plaintiff of perjury, referencing plaintiff's tax appeals, 

and improperly soliciting political favors from former Board members. At the 

conclusion of the hearing, the Committee unanimously voted to adopt Ordinance

No. 19-10. 

Gardner, who served in various municipal legislative positions of East 

Amwell from 1986 to 2017, and Riley, a former member and Chairman of the 

Board who served from 2001-2018, were subsequently deposed.

3

 Both flatly 

rejected Wolfe's corruption allegations and testified that there was no factual 

basis for any of the claims. Gardner testified that Wolfe made no attempt to 

discuss the allegedly improper approvals with him prior to making the June 13, 

2019 allegations. Reilly testified that in early 2018, Wolfe called him and asked 

3

 Gardner did not serve in any municipal positions from 1989 to 1992 or 2003 

to 2005. 
16 A-3710-19

why the Board had approved the 2016 Amendments. Reilly told Wolfe that he 

voted to approve the 2016 Amendments because the ancillary uses plaintiff had 

requested were customary amenities for a golf club. Notwithstanding that brief 

conversation, Reilly testified that Wolfe had not discussed the factual basis for 

the approvals, or alleged corruption, with him prior to making the June 13, 2019 

allegations. 

On July 22, 2019, plaintiff filed an amended complaint in lieu of 

prerogative writs seeking to invalidate the 2019 Amendments, to enjoin Wolfe 

from participating in any local government action in matters involving plaintiff, 

and attorney's fees. On February 24, 2020, plaintiff moved for summary 

judgment and, on March 20, 2020, defendants cross-moved for summary 

judgment. On April 29, 2020, the motion judge granted plaintiff's motion and 

denied defendants' cross-motion, issuing a twenty-three page statement of 

reasons.

On appeal, defendants raise the following issues for our consideration.

POINT I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY MISAPPLYING 

THE NEW JERSEY LOCAL GOVERNMENT 

ETHICS LAW, N.J.S.A. 40A:9-22.2, THE 

MUNICIPAL LAND USE LAW, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-23, 

AND THE COMMON LAW TO WOLFE'S 

STATEMENTS AND IN FINDING THAT WOLFE 
17 A-3710-19

HAD AN IMPERMISSIBLE CONFLICT OF 

INTEREST WITH REGARD TO PLAINTIFF.

POINT II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY MISAPPLYING 

THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD AND 

NOT CONSTRUING THE FACTS IN THE LIGHT 

MOST FAVORABLE TO THE PARTY OPPOSING 

THE MOTION.

POINT III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY IMPROPERLY 

RESOLVING OR TAKING A POSITION ON ISSUES 

RELATED TO WOLFE'S STATE OF MIND IN 

DETERMINING TO GRANT PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

POINT IV

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY PROHIBITING 

WOLFE FROM PARTICIPATING IN ANY 

PROCEEDING OR TAKING ANY ACTION ON ANY 

MATTER INVOLVING PLAINITFF OR 

PLAINTIFF'S PROPERTY BASED UPON WOLFE'S 

ALLEGED IMPERMISSIBLE CONFLICT OF 

INTEREST WITH RESPECT TO THE 2019 

ENACTMENTS.

We review a grant of summary judgment using the same standard that 

governs the motion judge's decision. RSI Bank v. Providence Mut. Fire Ins. 

Co., 234 N.J. 459, 472 (2018) (citing Bhagat v. Bhagat, 217 N.J. 22, 38 (2014)). 

Under that standard, summary judgment will be granted when "the competent 
18 A-3710-19

evidential materials submitted by the parties," viewed in the light most favorable 

to the non-moving party, show that there are no "genuine issues of material fact" 

and that "the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law." 

Grande v. Saint Clare's Health Sys., 230 N.J. 1, 24 (2017) (quoting Bhagat, 217 

N.J. at 38); accord R. 4:46-2(c). "An issue of material fact is 'genuine only if, 

considering the burden of persuasion at trial, the evidence submitted by the 

parties on the motion, together with all legitimate inferences therefrom favoring 

the non-moving party, would require submission of the issue to the trier of fact.'" 

Grande, 230 N.J. at 24 (quoting Bhagat, 217 N.J. at 38). Nevertheless, we 

review de novo the law governing conflicts of interest, including the statutory 

and common law. Piscitelli v. City of Garfield Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 237 

N.J. 333, 350 (2019) (citing Dunbar Homes, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment

of Twp. of Franklin, 233 N.J. 546, 559 (2018)).

The parties agree upon the statutory and interpretive caselaw that governs

the issues presented in this appeal, but argue proper application of the law leads 

to opposite results. Defendants argue the trial court erroneously found Wolfe's 

critical and negative statements toward plaintiff demonstrated a perceived bias 

that was sufficient to require his recusal from matters involving The Ridge. A 

perceived bias, defendants contend, is not the standard. If local officials were 
19 A-3710-19

not allowed to make public criticisms of important local issues they would be 

encouraged not to share their views with constituents. They argue that a 

disqualifying conflict of interest arises only when that interest is not shared in 

common with other members of the public. To require public servants to act 

dispassionately or to require officials to conceal their opinions—which would 

be the result under the trial court's standard—would serve to preclude local 

government officials from carrying out their duties truthfully and to the best of 

their ability. 

"The overall objective 'of conflict of interest laws is to ensure that public 

officials provide disinterested service to their communities' and to 'promote 

confidence in the integrity of governmental operations.'" Id. at 349 (quoting 

Thompson v. City of Atlantic City, 190 N.J. 359, 364 (2007)). Resolving 

whether a conflict of interest prevented Wolfe from participating in matters 

affecting the Ridge is governed by the Local Government Ethics Law (LGEL), 

N.J.S.A. 40A:9-22.1 to -22.25, the Municipal Land Use Law (MLUL), N.J.S.A. 

40:55D-1 to -163, and the common law. Piscitelli, 237 N.J. at 349-50.

"The [LGEL] applies to all municipal office holders, including mayors 

. . . [and] members of planning boards and zoning boards of adjustment." Id. at 
20 A-3710-19

350; see also N.J.S.A. 40A:9-22.3(g). In adopting the LGEL, the Legislature 

recognized:

a. Public office and employment are a public trust;

b. The vitality and stability of representative 

democracy depend upon the public's confidence in the 

integrity of its elected and appointed representatives;

c. Whenever the public perceives a conflict between 

the private interests and the public duties of a 

government officer or employee, that confidence is 

imperiled;

d. Governments have the duty both to provide their 

citizens with standards by which they may determine 

whether public duties are being faithfully performed, 

and to apprise their officers and employees of the 

behavior which is expected of them while conducting 

their public duties . . . .

[N.J.S.A. 40A:9-22.2(a) to (d).]

Thus, the LGEL aims to "make ethical standards in state and local 

government 'clear, consistent, uniform in their application, and enforceable on 

a statewide basis.'" Grabowsky v. Twp. of Montclair, 221 N.J. 536, 552 (2015) 

(quoting Wyzykowski v. Rizas, 132 N.J. 509, 531 (1993)).

In that regard, N.J.S.A. 40A:9-22.5(d) provides that:

[n]o local government officer or employee shall act in 

his [or her] official capacity in any matter where he [or 

she], a member of his [or her] immediate family, or a 

business organization in which he [or she] has an 
21 A-3710-19

interest, has a direct or indirect financial or personal 

involvement that might reasonably be expected to 

impair his [or her] objectivity or independence of 

judgment . . . .

Next, the MLUL applies specifically to members of municipal zoning 

boards, and it provides that no member of a zoning board "shall be permitted to 

act on any matter in which he [or she] has, either directly or indirectly, any 

personal or financial interest." N.J.S.A. 40:55D-69; Piscitelli, 237 N.J. at 352; 

Grabowsky, 221 N.J. at 552.

Similar to the statutory requirements of the LGEL and the MLUL, in 

Wyzykowski, the Court enunciated the four situations under the common law 

where a public official is disqualified on conflict-of-interest grounds. 132 N.J. 

at 525-26. Specifically, an official is disqualified when he or she has:

(1) "[d]irect pecuniary interests," when an official votes 

on a matter benefitting the official's own property or 

affording a direct financial gain; (2) "[i]ndirect 

pecuniary interests," when an official votes on a matter 

that financially benefits one closely tied to the official, 

such as an employer, or family member; (3) "[d]irect 

personal interest," when an official votes on a matter 

that benefits a blood relative or close friend in a nonfinancial way, but in a matter of great importance, . . . 

and (4) "[i]ndirect [p]ersonal [i]nterest," when an 

official votes on a matter in which an individual's 

judgment may be affected [such as] membership in 

some organization and a desire to help that organization 

further its policies.
22 A-3710-19

[Ibid.]

The overarching principle of the conflict-of-interest provisions under the 

LGEL, the MLUL, and the common law is that "[a] citizen's right to 'a fair and

impartial tribunal' requires a public official to disqualify himself or herself 

whenever 'the official has a conflicting interest that may interfere with the 

impartial performance of his [or her] duties as a member of the public body.'" 

Piscitelli, 237 N.J. at 352-53 (quoting Grabowsky, 221 N.J. at 551). In resolving 

whether an official has a disqualifying interest, "[t]he question is not 'whether a 

public official has acted dishonestly or has sought to further a personal or 

financial interest; the decisive factor is "whether there is a potential for 

conflict."'" Id. at 353 (quoting Grabowsky, 221 N.J. at 554). To answer that 

question, a court must determine "whether the circumstances could reasonably 

be interpreted to show that [conflicting interests] had the likely capacity to tempt 

the official to depart from his [or her] sworn public duty." Ibid. (first alteration 

in original) (quoting Wyzykowski, 132 N.J. at 523).

Courts should, however, apply the conflict-of-interest rules cautiously, as 

"[l]ocal governments would be seriously handicapped if every possible interest, 

no matter how remote and speculative, would serve as a disqualification of an 

official." Grabowsky, 221 N.J. at 554 (alteration in original) (quoting 
23 A-3710-19

Wyzykowski, 132 N.J. at 523). Indeed, public officials "cannot and should not 

be expected to be without any personal interest in the decisions and policies of 

government." N.J.S.A. 40A:9-22.4; see also Grabowsky, 221 N.J. at 554 ("It is 

essential that municipal offices be filled by individuals who are thoroughly 

familiar with local communities and concerns."). Accordingly, "the nature of 

an official's interest must be carefully evaluated based on the circumstances of 

the specific case." Grabowsky, 221 N.J. at 554 (citing Van Itallie v. Borough 

of Franklin Lakes, 28 N.J. 258, 268 (1958)).

Applying these principles to the facts of this case, we conclude that the 

trial court correctly applied the LGEL, MLUL, and common law to find Wolfe's 

recusal was required from participation in both the drafting and voting

procedures related to the 2019 Amendments. The public statements that Wolfe 

directed at plaintiff regarding the helistop application and tax appeals, as well

as the unsubstantiated corruption allegations, followed by the drafting and 

passage of the 2019 Amendments, viewed objectively, present circumstances 

that could reasonably be interpreted to show that Wolfe's personal bias had the 

likely capacity to tempt him to depart from his sworn public duty. Piscatelli, 

237 N.J. at 352-53.
24 A-3710-19

A public official's personal interest may be a disqualifying conflict. 

Grabowsky, 221 N.J. at 555-557 (citing Barrett v. Union Twp. Comm., 230 N.J. 

Super. 195 (App. Div. 1989); and McNamara v. Borough of Saddle River, 60 

N.J. Super. 367 (Law Div. 1960)). In Barrett, this court affirmed a trial court's 

decision to invalidate an ordinance and disqualify a township official from 

voting on an amendment that would allow a continuing care facility to be 

constructed in the community. 230 N.J. Super. at 196-98. The township official 

played critical roles in adopting the amendment while serving on both the 

township committee and planning board. Id. at 198-99. His mother, however,

lived in a nursing home that was owned by the proprietors of the proposed 

continuing care facility. Id. at 199. Because the official's mother was a 

Medicaid patient, he was not financially responsible for her care and, therefore 

had no pecuniary interest in the amendment. Id. at 200. 

This court determined that a pecuniary interest is not required to find a 

disqualifying conflict, if a public official is personally interested in the matter:

The statutory disqualification is markedly broadly 

couched, extending to personal as well as financial 

interest, "directly or indirectly." There is thus 

evidenced an intent that the bar is not confined to 

instances of possible material gain but that it extends to 

any situation in which the personal interest of a board 

member in the "matter" before it, direct or indirect, may 
25 A-3710-19

have the capacity to exert an influence on his action in 

the matter.

[Id. at 202 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Zell v. Borough 

of Roseland, 42 N.J. Super. 78, 81 (App. Div. 1956)).]

Where a township committee member's present, tangible interest threatens

to influence his or her decision on the subject of a vote before the committee,

that member should not be involved in the matter, and their participation 

requires invalidation of the ordinance. Grabowsky, 221 N.J. at 556 (citing 

Barret, 230 N.J. Super. at 200); see also McNamara, 60 N.J. Super. at 376, 378 

(finding a disqualifying interest based on a committee member's "well developed 

and intense private concern" which "could have impaired his capacity to act in 

the interest of the citizens at large."). 

Barrett and McNamara support the proposition that publicly perceived 

emotional and psychological considerations can be the basis of a disqualifying 

personal interest. The critical issue in this case is whether Wolfe's personal 

interest—his animosity for plaintiff—could reasonably be perceived by the 

public as having the capacity to impair his ability to perform his sworn public 

duty—the faithful and impartial review of the 2019 Amendments. Wolfe 

demonstrated the extent of his bias in his public statements and conduct leading 

up to and after the June 13, 2019 public hearing.
26 A-3710-19

During the November 29, 2018 public hearing regarding plaintiff's thenpending helistop application to the NJDOT, Wolfe requested to speak "as a 

member of the public" and accused plaintiff of "being a bad neighbor" for filing 

tax appeals; told the audience plaintiff was giving members of the Township a 

"giant middle finger"; proclaimed he would never patronize The Ridge or donate 

or vote for any politician or organization that did; and vowed to do what he could 

to make plaintiff's life a living hell.

Subsequently, Wolfe helped to draft the proposal for the 2019 

Amendments which essentially eliminated all of the ancillary uses approved just 

three years earlier and reclassified golf courses from a permitted to a conditional 

use. Because The Ridge is the only golf course in East Amwell, plaintiff was 

the only resident of the Township that would be affected. Prior to the June 13, 

2019 public hearing, Wolfe also authored and posted to the Township's website 

a report in which he made unsubstantiated allegations that The Ridge's original 

site plan approvals, as well as the 2016 Amendments, were the product of 

corrupt dealings between plaintiff and former Board and Committee members. 

At the June 13, 2019 public hearing, Wolfe, who was the only member of the 

Committee that addressed the residents, gave a speech that encompassed fifty 

pages of transcript, during which he repeated his criticisms of plaintiff's tax 
27 A-3710-19

appeals and helistop applications, and accused plaintiff of making false 

statements under oath and bribing Township officials. Any one of these 

statements or actions, viewed on its own, would not be a sufficient basis for a 

resident to reasonably perceive a disabling conflict of interest. Viewed together, 

however, Wolfe's conduct and statements give the appearance of a deeply held 

personal bias. 

The public perception of Wolfe's bias was demonstrated at the June 13, 

2019 public hearing. There, residents of East Amwell made several statements 

communicating their concern for Wolfe's improper motive behind the 2019 

Amendments:

MR. MILLER: I don't know exactly what issue the 

[T]ownship or a certain person has with this individual. 

. . . This is a vile, evil, disgraceful, vindictive 

amendment . . . . 

. . . .

. . . This is the result of one person saying ["]I am 

going to make another person's life a living hell.["] . . . 

[I]s this really good for the [T]ownship? This silly, 

[insane] crap that is in here to be [vindictive] against 

one person? 

MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC: You're putting things in 

there that are ridiculous. And I'm hoping, okay, they 

err on the side of caution here and get a little back bone. 

And if . . . it's better for the town, for the greater good 
28 A-3710-19

to recuse yourself, show that you're going to support the 

people of East Amwell . . . .

MR. WEITZER: So as I sit here today and hear both 

sides, I feel like it's national politics, and it's no longer 

about law or anything else. It's just a personal vendetta. 

One side hates the other. And you know, I ask, when 

. . . did the politics stop being about working for the 

town and people. It's just like a personal vendetta.

And I understand you may not like Mr. Moore, 

and trust me, I get it. But I just feel the two sides are 

going after each other. And you know you are trying to 

hurt Mr. Moore and the Ridge. 

The statements made by residents at the public hearing demonstrate that not only 

did the circumstances of Wolfe's participation have the capacity to displace the 

public's confidence in his integrity to perform his sworn public duty, they 

actually did.

Defendants correctly point out that in order for a public official to be 

disqualified by a personal interest from voting on a zoning amendment, the 

interest must be distinct from those shared by members of the general public. 

Grabowsky, 221 N.J. at 555. "Our courts have rarely recognized a conflict of 

interest arising from a public employee's alleged direct personal interest or 

personal involvement in a matter when there is no prospect of financial 

advantage to the public official or his or her family or friends." Ibid. However,

there is no evidence to suggest that the personal interest in this case—Wolfe's 
29 A-3710-19

disdain for plaintiff—was shared by residents of East Amwell. We have no 

doubt that opposition to plaintiff's helistop application and tax appeals shared 

broad public support. Nor do we doubt that some residents of East Amwell were 

in favor of the 2019 Amendments. The record suggests, however, that the degree 

of Wolfe's apparent contempt for plaintiff was unprecedented in the community.

Wolfe was not the only member of the Committee to speak out against 

plaintiff's helistop application and tax appeals at the November 29, 2018 public 

hearing. The now-former-but-then-current Mayor Timothy Mathews also 

addressed the audience. He made statements that were critical of plaintiff, but 

did so in a manner that did not give the appearance of a deeply held and intense 

bias:

[MAYOR MATHEWS]: I know people who do play 

there. And Joel Moore should be very proud of his golf 

course. It's a first class course. He has done a great 

job. But in my opinion, however, The Ridge and Joel

. . . [are] not acting like a good neighbor. 

. . . So to some degree, we have created I think

someone said you know you – he keeps coming to the 

well and we keep giving. And I don’t think that is very 

neighborly.

 

. . . We get no benefit [from] the golf course. 

There's no East Amwell day. There's no bring [your]

friends day. There's no give the fire house a free round 

of golf day. As far as I know. There's no benefit to the 

hotel there. We all have homes. We're not going to 
30 A-3710-19

stay there. There's no benefit to the swimming pool, 

we're not members right. There's no benefit to the 

hydrated tennis courts. However[,] it's detrimental that 

someone testified that . . . is going to use up a quarter 

million more gallons of water, if it's done. That's 

coming out of the same well that we are all drinking out 

of. We are just a bunch of straws going into the same 

aquifer.

So instead of thanking the community for these 

zoning concessions we are here in litigation as [Wolfe]

said today, the trial starts tomorrow we are in court 

tomorrow. [East Amwell Township v. The Ridge], 

because The Ridge feels their taxes are too high. Now 

they want them to . . . be cut in half and expect the 

residents of East Amwell to pick up the tab. They 

expect us to subsidize that golf course. That is what it

would be because if their taxes go down, ours go up 

because the budget is the budget and you [have] got to 

come up with the same amount of dollars. . . . 

. . . So I ask the Ridge and specifically Joel, Joel 

if you are watching, I ask[, "]how do these impactful 

add ons to the original agreement[,] both spirit and legal 

agreement with this township, benefit the residents of 

East Amwell?["]

I would like to hear how they benefit us. And as 

I stated earlier[,] neighbors share each [other's] success. 

So how does East Amwell share in Joel's success with 

his golf course. You are not being a good neighbor, 

Joel. And I would be happy to chat with you [offline]

about it. Thank you.

A comparison of Wolfe's and Mathews' statements reveals a stark contrast 

in decorum and vitriol. The former Mayor's statements represent the opinion of 
31 A-3710-19

an elected official, on an interest shared in common with members of the public.4 

Conversely, Wolfe's statements give the appearance of an elected official with 

a deeply held personal bias against a member of his community that likely had

the capacity to influence the performance of his sworn public duties. That 

distinction is supported by the comments residents made at the June 13, 2019 

hearing, in which Wolfe was singled out for carrying out a personal vendetta. 

In stark contrast, none of the former Mayor's statements were specifically 

referenced that night. 

"Requiring recusals when appropriate does not discourage public-spirited 

citizens from serving on boards. Dedicated public servants—given the proper 

guidance—will not want to sit in judgment if they are encumbered by a potential 

conflict." Piscitelli, 237 N.J. at 353. In that regard, finding Wolfe's personal 

bias precluded him from participating in matters affecting The Ridge does not 

impede or handicap the operation of East Amwell's local government, it 

facilitates it.

With respect to defendants' argument that plaintiff's motion was 

prematurely decided because there were outstanding disputes of material fact, 

4

 Plaintiff's amended complaint in lieu of prerogative writs did not request that 

the court enjoin Mathews from participating in matters affecting The Ridge. 
32 A-3710-19

they conceded that the recusal issue was ripe for decision at oral argument, and 

by filing their cross-motion for summary judgment. Liberty Surplus Ins. Corp. 

v. Nowell Amoroso, 189 N.J. 436, 450 (2007) ("When both parties to an action 

'move[] for summary judgment, one may fairly assume that the evidence was all 

there and the matter was ripe for adjudication.'" (alteration in original) (quoting 

Morton Int'l, Inc. v. General Accident Ins. Co of Am., 266 N.J. Super 300, 323 

(App. Div. 1991))). Accordingly, we find no error in the judge's decision to 

grant plaintiff's motion. 

Because we conclude Wolfe was disqualified from voting on the 2019 

Amendments, we also conclude that his participation requires their invalidation. 

See Griepenburg v. Twp. of Ocean, 220 N.J. 239, 253 (2015). 

To the extent not addressed, defendants' remaining arguments lack 

sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.