30494 Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 108 / Tuesday, June 8, 2021 / Notices 

Washington, DC 20530, 202–307–6607, 

jill.ptacek@usdoj.gov. 

[FR Doc. 2021–11916 Filed 6–7–21; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4410–11–P 

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 

Drug Enforcement Administration 

[Docket No. 17–31] 

Jennifer L. St. Croix, M.D.; Order 

Denying Motion To Stay 

I. Introduction 

On April 12, 2021, I issued a Decision 

and Order revoking, effective May 12, 

2021, Certificate of Registration No. 

FS2669868 issued to Jennifer L. St. 

Croix, M.D. (hereinafter, Petitioner) at a 

registered address in Tennessee. 

Jennifer L. St. Croix, M.D., 86 FR 19010 

(April 12, 2021) (hereinafter, April 12, 

2021 Decision/Order). On May 6, 2021, 

Petitioner’s Counsel filed by email with 

the Drug Enforcement Administration 

Office of the Administrative Law Judges 

(hereinafter, OALJ) a Motion to Stay 

Enforcement Pending Appeal 

(hereinafter, Motion to Stay) and served 

by email the Drug Enforcement 

Administration Office of Chief Counsel 

(hereinafter, DEA or Government). The 

OALJ forwarded the Motion to Stay to 

my office. On May 7, 2021, I ordered the 

Government to respond to Petitioner’s 

Motion to Stay no later than 5:00 p.m. 

on Monday, May 10, 2021. The 

Government filed a timely response 

(hereinafter, Govt Opposition), arguing 

that the Motion to Stay should be 

denied. 

Later in the day of May 7, 2021, the 

United States Department of Justice 

alerted my office that Petitioner had 

filed a pro se petition with the District 

of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals for 

review of my April 12, 2021 Decision/ 

Order. Petition for Review of Agency 

Decision, St. Croix v. United States Drug 

Enforcement Administration, 21–1116 

(dated May 5, 2021) (hereinafter, Review 

Petition). Petitioner identified her 

address on her Review Petition to be in 

Las Vegas, Nevada. Review Petition, at 

1. 

Having considered the merits of 

Petitioner’s Motion to Stay and of the 

Government’s Response in conjunction 

with the record evidence, I deny 

Petitioner’s Motion to Stay. 

II. The April 12, 2021 Decision/Order 

Petitioner requested a hearing on the 

allegations that the Order to Show 

Cause (hereinafter, OSC) made against 

her. 86 FR at 19011. She attended the 

hearing with her attorney. Id. at 19018. 

After the Government rested, 

Petitioner’s counsel made a motion for 

summary disposition. Id. at 19017–18. 

After the Chief Administrative Law 

Judge (hereinafter, ALJ) heard from both 

the Petitioner’s and the Government’s 

counsels on the motion, he ruled on the 

motion from the bench, denying it in 

part and reserving it in part. Id. 

Petitioner then advised the Chief ALJ 

that she chose not to present a case. Id. 

at 19018. Following discussion about 

that decision, Petitioner sought and 

obtained from the Chief ALJ time to 

consult with her attorney. Id. After the 

opportunity to consult, Petitioner restated her decision not to put on a case. 

Id. Accordingly, Petitioner knowingly 

declined the opportunity to offer 

documentary evidence and oral 

testimony for the record. 

In my April 12, 2021 Decision/Order, 

I found that Petitioner ‘‘had committed 

such acts as would render . . . [her] 

registration inconsistent with the public 

interest.’’ 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(4). The acts 

alleged in the OSC for which I found the 

Government had submitted substantial 

evidentiary support for the record and 

had proven were legal violations were 

(1) that Petitioner issued controlled 

substance prescriptions for no legitimate 

purpose and outside the usual course of 

professional practice, (2) that Petitioner 

failed to maintain medical records 

pertaining to her prescribing of 

controlled substances, (3) that Petitioner 

provided misleading information to 

investigating DEA agents, (4) that 

Petitioner failed to provide fullycompliant controlled substance 

prescription drug logs to DEA for 

periods during which she issued 

controlled substance prescriptions, (5) 

that Petitioner stored controlled 

substances at an unregistered location, 

and (6) that Petitioner failed to provide 

effective controls or procedures to guard 

against the theft or diversion of 

controlled substances. 86 FR at 19019– 

21, 19023–25. I did not find substantial 

evidence and/or a legal basis to support 

the OSC’s allegations (1) that Petitioner 

had continued to issue controlled 

substance prescriptions to individuals 

who are intimate or close acquaintances, 

and to an individual with whom she 

had a ‘‘romantic interaction,’’ (2) that 

Petitioner violated 21 U.S.C. 

843(a)(4)(A) by failing to comply with 

the terms of her June 2011 

Memorandum of Agreement 

(hereinafter, MOA) with DEA, (3) that 

Petitioner did not maintain records of 

the controlled substances she 

dispensed, and (4) that Petitioner did 

not conduct an initial inventory of the 

controlled substances she received. Id. 

at 19019–20, 19022–25. 

In adjudicating the OSC issued to 

Petitioner, I found that Petitioner made 

legal arguments that conflict with a core 

principle of the Controlled Substances 

Act (hereinafter, CSA)—the 

establishment of a closed regulatory 

system devised to ‘‘prevent the 

diversion of drugs from legitimate to 

illicit channels.’’ Gonzales v. Raich, 545 

U.S. 1, 13–14, 27 (2005). I found that 

Petitioner proposed a course of action 

regarding the storage of controlled 

substances that would be a danger to 

public health and safety as it would 

allow the storage of controlled 

substances anywhere, as long as no 

dispensing took place at the location. 86 

FR at 19024. I declined to accept 

Petitioner’s arguments, concluding that 

to do so would conflict with my 

authority under the CSA and would 

establish a dangerous policy. Id. 

In my adjudication of the OSC issued 

to Petitioner, I also determined that 

Petitioner urged me to accept positions 

that minimize statutory and regulatory 

inventory requirements. Id. I rejected 

those positions as well. 

III. Petitioner’s Motion To Stay 

Petitioner argues that there are 

multiple reasons why her Motion to 

Stay satisfies the applicable legal 

standard and why I should grant her 

requested relief. First, she argues that 

there is a substantial likelihood that her 

review petition will prevail because she 

has had ‘‘no further issues regarding her 

prescribing and management of 

controlled substances . . . over the past 

seven years.’’ Motion to Stay, at 3. 

Petitioner also argues that the reviewing 

Circuit Court will find in her favor 

because the penalty I assessed in my 

April 12, 2021 Decision/Order ‘‘is 

excessive, unjust, and disproportionate 

to her actions’’ based on her ‘‘review of 

other administrative actions against 

physicians.’’ Id. at 4. 

Second, Petitioner posits that she will 

suffer irreparable injury if enforcement 

of my April 12, 2021 Decision/Order is 

not stayed. ‘‘It would be difficult,’’ the 

Motion to Stay argues, ‘‘to overstate the 

impact that the loss of her [DEA 

registration] would have on . . . [her] 

ability to earn a living.’’ Id. She states 

that enforcement of my April 12, 2021 

Decision/Order ‘‘will result in the 

immediate loss of her current position 

and essentially make her unemployable 

as a physician.’’ Id. She also states that 

she ‘‘will not be able to recover her lost 

income that will result from her sudden 

unemployment’’ and that a stay of 

enforcement ‘‘would allow . . . [her] to 

continue to support herself while she 

explores other employment 

opportunities.’’ Id. at 5. 


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Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 108 / Tuesday, June 8, 2021 / Notices 30495 

1According to the Motion to Stay, Petitioner is 

‘‘actively engaged in the care and treatment of 

individuals in desperate need of medical care, and 

. . . does not pose any immediate danger to the 

community.’’ Motion to Stay, at 6. 

2Petitioner likely referenced ‘‘seven’’ years 

because the record evidence includes a three-year 

MOA between Petitioner and DEA dated June 2011. 

DEA issued her the Tennessee-based registration, 

whose revocation is effective tomorrow, because 

she agreed to the MOA’s terms. 

Third, Petitioner argues that no party 

‘‘will be harmed if the enforcement of 

the . . . [April 12, 2021 Decision/Order] 

is stayed.’’ Id. In support of this 

argument, Petitioner states that the 

enforcement proceeding never ‘‘alleged 

that any action or omission by . . . [her] 

resulted in harm to any person,’’ and 

that DEA ‘‘did not apparently see . . . 

[her] as posing any kind of imminent 

threat or danger to her . . . patients, as 

it never sought any sort of injunction or 

immediate suspension of her 

certificate.’’ Id. She also argues that ‘‘no 

parties have been harmed in the past 

and there is no likelihood that any 

parties would be harmed if a stay of 

enforcement is granted.’’ Id. at 6. 

Fourth, Petitioner states in her Motion 

to Stay that the ‘‘public interest is in 

allowing an experienced practitioner to 

keep practicing in a medical specialty 

that is urgently needed during a global 

pandemic.’’ 1 Id. at 6. Petitioner indicates 

that she would like ‘‘to at least give 

proper notice to her employer and allow 

sufficient time to try and find a suitable 

employment.’’ Id. Petitioner’s definition 

of ‘‘proper notice’’ appears to be 

connected to ‘‘at least until this action 

has been finally concluded.’’ Id. at 7. 

Petitioner also claims that, ‘‘as she is a 

woman of Asian descent, . . . [she] is 

particularly suited to provide 

compassionate and understanding 

treatment to patients who have been the 

victim of ongoing racial/ethnic 

prejudices, as she herself has 

experienced these prejudices herself.’’ 

Id. at 6. 

IV. The Government’s Opposition to the 

Motion to Stay 

As already discussed, the Government 

opposes Petitioner’s Motion to Stay. 

Supra section I. Regarding whether 

Petitioner is likely to prevail on appeal, 

the Government states that the Motion 

to Stay ‘‘assigns no legal or factual 

errors to the Acting Administrator’s 

decision.’’ Govt Opposition, at 3. It 

argues that Petitioner’s Motion to Stay 

‘‘points (without analysis or 

comparison) to a single court of appeals 

decision finding that the Agency’s 

decision to revoke a practitioner’s 

registration was ‘arbitrary.’ ’’ Id. (citing 

Morall v. Drug Enf’t Admin., 412 F.3d 

165, 181 (D.C. Cir. 2005)). According to 

the Government, ‘‘Morall offers . . . 

[Petitioner] here no relief’’ because, ‘‘as 

the D.C. Circuit has since reiterated, 

‘under the Administrative Procedure 

Act, the [Agency’s] choice of sanction is 

entitled to substantial deference.’ ’’ Govt 

Opposition, at 3 (citing Chien v. Drug 

Enf’t Admin., 533 F.3d 828, 835 (D.C. 

Cir. 2008) (quoting Morall, 412 F.3d at 

177)). The Government’s Opposition 

states that an ‘‘Agency’s sanction 

decision is ‘arbitrary’ only if it is a 

‘flagrant departure from DEA policy and 

practice . . . and if the departure is not 

only unexplained, but entirely 

unrecognized in the [Agency’s] 

decision.’ ’’ Govt Opposition, at 3–4 

(citing Chien, 533 F.3d at 836 (quoting 

Morall, 412 F.3d at 183) (emphasis 

added by the Government)). The 

Government concludes that Petitioner 

has not shown that the April 12, 2021 

Decision/Order was ‘‘arbitrary’’ and that 

she ‘‘‘ has not established a serious 

question going to the merits of [her] 

appeal, much less a substantial 

likelihood of success on the merits of 

[her] petition for review to warrant the 

issuance of a stay.’ ’’ Govt Opposition, at 

3, 5 (quoting Medicine ShoppeJonesborough, Motion to Stay Denial, 73 

FR 3997, 3998 (2008)). 

Regarding whether Petitioner’s 

Motion to Stay demonstrates irreparable 

harm, the Government argues that it 

does not, because it ‘‘offers no evidence 

in support’’ of its claims that revocation 

‘‘would ‘result in the immediate loss of 

her current position and essentially 

make her unemployable as a 

physician.’ ’’ Govt Opposition, at 5 

(citing Medicine Shoppe-Jonesborough, 

73 FR at 3998). The Government 

concludes that Petitioner’s allegations of 

harm are ‘‘entirely speculative and, as 

importantly, unsubstantiated.’’ Govt 

Opposition, at 6. 

V. The Applicable Legal Standard 

The Supreme Court has addressed the 

purpose of stays and the legal standard 

for the evaluation of motions to stay. In 

Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. Fed. 

Communications Comm’n, the Supreme 

Court ruled that ‘‘it is reasonable that an 

appellate court should be able to 

prevent irreparable injury to the parties 

or to the public resulting from the 

premature enforcement of a 

determination which may later be found 

to have been wrong . . . [and it] has 

always been held, therefore, that, as part 

of its traditional equipment for the 

administration of justice, a federal court 

can stay the enforcement of a judgment 

pending the outcome of an appeal.’’ 316 

U.S. 4, 9–10 (1942). 

In 2009, the Supreme Court provided 

the legal standard applicable to 

Petitioner’s Motion to Stay. Nken v. 

Holder, 556 U.S. 418 (2009). According 

to Nken, four factors guide a court’s 

exercise of discretion to stay 

enforcement of an order pending 

review, and the party requesting the stay 

‘‘bears the burden of showing that the 

circumstances justify an exercise of that 

discretion.’’ 556 U.S. at 433–34. The 

four factors are ‘‘(1) whether the stay 

applicant has made a strong showing 

that he is likely to succeed on the 

merits; (2) whether the applicant will be 

irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) 

whether issuance of the stay will 

substantially injure the other parties 

interested in the proceeding; and (4) 

where the public interest lies.’’ Id. at 

434. According to the Court, the ‘‘first 

two factors of the traditional standard 

are the most critical.’’ Id. If the 

applicant satisfies the first two factors, 

‘‘the traditional stay inquiry calls for 

assessing the harm to the opposing party 

and weighing the public interest.’’ Id. at 

435. When the Government is the 

opposing party, these two factors merge. 

Id. 

VI. Application of the Legal Standard to 

Petitioner’s Motion to Stay 

Having analyzed the Motion to Stay, 

the Government’s Opposition, and the 

entire record in this matter, I find that 

Petitioner has not met her burden of 

showing that the circumstances justify 

an exercise of my discretion to stay, 

pending appellate review, enforcement 

of the sanction I ordered on April 12, 

2021. Id. at 433–34. 

Regarding whether there is a 

substantial likelihood that Petitioner 

will prevail on the merits, even if 

Petitioner had substantiated her 

argument, which she did not, that she 

has had ‘‘no further issues regarding her 

prescribing and management of 

controlled substances’’ for the last seven 

years, her argument is irrelevant to my 

adjudication of the OSC and to the 

Circuit Court’s review of my Decision/ 

Order.2 The OSC at issue, dated April 

12, 2017, and the adjudication of that 

OSC concern Petitioner’s unlawful and 

allegedly unlawful acts during a 

specified period before April 12, 2017. 

As such, Petitioner’s argument that she 

has had ‘‘no further issues regarding her 

prescribing and management of 

controlled substances’’ since the date of 

the OSC is of no relevance. 

For the portion of the alleged sevenyear period that is before the date of the 

OSC, I note that neither this Agency nor 

any other federal law enforcement 

agency is required to bring all possible 

charges against any subject at one time. 

See, e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 


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30496 Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 108 / Tuesday, June 8, 2021 / Notices 

821, 831 (1985) (‘‘This Court has 

recognized on several occasions over 

many years that an agency’s decision 

not to prosecute or enforce, whether 

through civil or criminal process, is a 

decision generally committed to an 

agency’s absolute discretion.’’). Instead, 

agencies exercise their investigative and 

prosecutorial discretion based on 

matters such as enforcement priorities 

and the availability of resources. See, 

e.g., id. at 831–32. 

Further, Petitioner has had, and 

continues to have, the option of 

submitting an application for a new 

DEA registration. The Agency’s 

decisions make clear that an applicant’s 

past actions that violate the law need 

not result in her being denied a DEA 

registration indefinitely. See, e.g., 

Michele L. Martinho, M.D., 86 FR 24012 

(2021). 

Regarding her allegation that the 

sanction I assessed in my April 12, 2021 

Decision/Order is ‘‘excessive, unjust, 

and disproportionate to her actions,’’ 

Petitioner neither submitted evidence 

for the record during the hearing on the 

OSC nor now submits evidence that 

substantiates it. My April 21, 2021 

Decision/Order, however, explains how 

violations that I found Petitioner had 

committed go to the heart of the CSA 

and its implementing regulations, and 

rejects her arguments that minimize 

applicable legal requirements. See, e.g., 

86 FR at 19024. Accordingly, I do not 

find persuasive Petitioner’s arguments 

that there is a substantial likelihood that 

she will prevail on the merits upon 

appellate review, and I reject them. 

Petitioner’s irreparable injury 

arguments are predictions that she does 

not tether to existing or new record 

evidence. For example, as already 

discussed, Petitioner provides an 

address for herself in Las Vegas, Nevada 

in the pro se review petition she 

recently filed in the District of Columbia 

Circuit. Supra n.1. There is no record 

evidence, and she submitted no new 

evidence along with this or her Review 

Petition filing, that Petitioner is 

registered in Nevada or even that she is 

licensed to practice medicine in 

Nevada. Petitioner’s irreparable injury 

arguments related to any future loss by 

her of earned income, therefore, are 

without a sufficient basis in record 

evidence. Accordingly, I reject them. 

Further, Petitioner’s loss of earned 

income claims are of a generic nature 

that any practitioner whose registration 

had been revoked or suspended could 

make. Even if Petitioner had submitted 

record evidence substantiating these 

predictions, the CSA does not direct me 

to consider her loss of earned income or 

potential loss of earned income. 

Accordingly, I do not accept Petitioner’s 

irreparable injury arguments. 

Nken makes clear that the ‘‘first two 

factors of the traditional standard are 

the most critical.’’ 556 U.S. at 434. It 

also explains that, if the applicant 

satisfies the first two factors, ‘‘the 

traditional stay inquiry calls for 

assessing the harm to the opposing party 

and weighing the public interest.’’ Id. at 

435. Here, Petitioner has not satisfied 

either of the first two factors. Supreme 

Court case law makes clear that I need 

not address Petitioner’s arguments 

regarding the third and fourth stay 

factors. Id. For the sake of having a 

complete record, however, I shall do so. 

Assuming, arguendo, the accuracy of 

Petitioner’s arguments that she has 

never been accused of harming a person, 

and of her suggestion that the third 

factor addresses such harm, I find that 

the legal violations I sustained in my 

April 12, 2021 Decision/Order do not 

include harm to a person among their 

elements. Accordingly, I find 

Petitioner’s third factor arguments to be 

irrelevant, and I reject them. 

Fourth, even if the record evidence 

substantiates Petitioner’s public interest 

claims, which it does not, the Agency 

has rejected community impact 

arguments. See, e.g., Perry County Food 

& Drug, 80 FR 70084 (2015). 

Accordingly, I reject Petitioner’s public 

interest arguments. 

Having determined that Petitioner has 

not met her burden of showing that the 

circumstances justify an exercise of my 

discretion to stay enforcement of the 

sanction I ordered on April 12, 2021, 

pending appellate review, I deny her 

Motion to Stay. 

It is so ordered. 

Dated: May 11, 2021. 

D. Christopher Evans, 

Acting Administrator. 

[FR Doc. 2021–11982 Filed 6–7–21; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4410–09–P 

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 

[OMB Number 1103–0102] 

Agency Information Collection 

Activities; Proposed eCollection 

eComments Requested; Community 

Oriented Policing Services (COPS) 

Progress Report 

AGENCY: Community Oriented Policing 

Services, Department of Justice. 

ACTION: 60-Day notice. 

SUMMARY: The Office of Community 

Oriented Policing Services (COPS), 

Department of Justice (DOJ), will be 

submitting the following information 

collection request to the Office of 

Management and Budget (OMB) for 

review and approval in accordance with 

the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995. 

DATES: The purpose of this notice is to 

allow for an additional 60 days for 

public comment August 9, 2021. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: If 

you have comments especially on the 

estimated public burden or associated 

response time, suggestions, or need a 

copy of the proposed information 

collection instrument with instructions 

or additional information, please 

contact Lashon M. Hilliard, Department 

of Justice Office of Community Oriented 

Policing Services, 145 N Street NE, 

Washington, DC 20530, 202–305–5245. 

Written comments and/or suggestions 

can also be directed to the Office of 

Management and Budget, Office of 

Information and Regulatory Affairs, 

Attention Department of Justice Desk 

Officer, Washington, DC 20530 or sent 

to OIRA_submissions@omb.eop.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Written 

comments and suggestions from the 

public and affected agencies concerning 

the proposed collection of information 

are encouraged. Your comments should 

address one or more of the following 

four points: 

—Evaluate whether the proposed 

collection of information is necessary 

for the proper performance of the 

functions of the agency, including 

whether the information will have 

practical utility; 

—Evaluate the accuracy of the agency’s 

estimate of the burden of the 

proposed collection of information, 

including the validity of the 

methodology and assumptions used; 

—Enhance the quality, utility, and 

clarity of the information to be 

collected; and 

—Minimize the burden of the collection 

of information on those who are to 

respond, including through the use of 

appropriate automated, electronic, 

mechanical, or other technological 

collection techniques or other forms 

of information technology, e.g., 

permitting electronic submission of 

responses. 

Overview of This Information 

Collection 

(1) Type of Information Collection: 

Revision of a currently approved 

collection. 

(2) Title of the Form/Collection: COPS 

Progress Report. 

(3) Agency form number: 1103–0102 

U.S. Department of Justice Office of 

Community Oriented Policing Services. 

(4) Affected public who will be asked 

or required to respond, as well as a brief 


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