If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

UNPUBLISHED

September 25, 2024

11:36 AM

v No. 367754

Wayne Circuit Court

MICHAEL JONES, LC No. 23-001478-01-AR

Defendant-Appellee.

Before: RICK, P.J., and MURRAY and MALDONADO, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff appeals by delayed leave granted the circuit court order affirming the district 

court’s decision to dismiss the charge of carrying a concealed weapon (“CCW”), MCL 750.227, 

against defendant, Michael Jones. We reverse the order suppressing the gun, vacate the order 

dismissing the case, and remand the case with an order to reinstate the charges and bind defendant 

over to the circuit court for further proceedings. 

I. BACKGROUND

This case arises from a routine police check by the Detroit Police Department of a running 

vehicle parked next to a vacant lot. Officer Deshawn Perry, along with his partner, Officer Flannel, 

were patrolling a residential street when Officer Perry observed a parked vehicle next to a vacant 

lot, still running. Making Officer Flannel aware of the vehicle, they pulled up parallel to 

defendant’s vehicle, who was in the driver’s seat. While remaining in the scout car, Officer Perry 

asked the two male passengers if everything was okay, and the passengers responded that they 

were fine, with one proceeding to say they stopped for the passenger to urinate. This admission 

prompted Officer Perry to get out of the scout car and ask defendant if defendant had a valid 

driver’s license, to which he responded that he did not. Defendant was then asked if there were 

any weapons in the car, to which he stated that he was open carrying and did not have a concealed 

pistol license (“CPL”) to carry the gun. Officer Perry asked defendant to exit the vehicle and

defendant was detained in the back of the scout car while Officer Perry searched defendant’s 

vehicle. During the search, Officer Perry recovered the gun located close to the center console on 

the right side, not properly stored and fully loaded. After the search, Officer Perry verified that 
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defendant’s driver’s license had been revoked and that defendant did not have a CPL for the 

recovered gun. Defendant was taken to jail on the charge of carrying a concealed weapon. 

Officer Perry had been with the Detroit Police Department for 3 years at the time of the 

exchange with defendant. Officer Perry testified the original stop was informal and only

transitioned to an investigatory stop when he thought defendant’s passenger had urinated outside 

in the vacant lot. In this case, the presence of reasonable suspicion is important when determining 

if there is a Fourth Amendment right violation. Defendant argues Officer Perry lacked reasonable 

suspicion because neither defendant nor the passenger admitted that the urinating in question was 

outside. Plaintiff argues that due to the context of the facts and circumstances of the case, Officer 

Perry had a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the passenger had just urinated outside. Facts 

to consider are (1) it being late at night, (2) defendant’s car was parked and running next to a vacant 

lot, (3) the passenger had admitted he just urinated, (4) no readily apparent access to private toilets, 

and (5) during the exchange, neither defendant nor the passenger specifically denied Officer 

Perry’s determination that the passenger had urinated outside. 

At the preliminary examination, the district court granted defendant’s motion to suppress 

the evidence and dismissed the case holding that the gun was recovered during an illegal seizure 

of defendant. On appeal, the circuit court affirmed the lower court’s decision holding that there 

was a violation of defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights as a reasonable person would not have 

believed that they were free to leave in this exchange. Plaintiff now appeals the decision to this 

Court. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standard of review for a motion to suppress involves two distinct components. First, 

any factual findings made by the trial court are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. 

This means that the appellate court defers to the trial court’s factual findings unless, after a review 

of the entire record, the appellate court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake 

has been made. People v Swirles (After Remand), 218 Mich App 133, 136; 553 NW2d 357 (1996). 

Second, the application of these facts to a constitutional provision, such as the Fourth Amendment, 

is a question of law. On questions of law, the appellate court owes no deference to the trial court 

and applies a de novo standard of review to the ultimate conclusion. People v White, 294 Mich 

App 622, 627; 823 NW2d 118 (2011).

In the context of a district court’s decision to bind a criminal defendant over for trial, the 

standard of review is for an abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion occurs when the district 

court’s decision falls outside the range of principled outcomes. People v Lucynski, 509 Mich 618, 

633 n 5; 983 NW2d 827 (2022); see also People v Magnant, 508 Mich 151, 161; 973 NW2d 60 

(2021).

III. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff argues that the circuit court’s holding to suppress the gun as evidence, and to

dismiss the case, was not justified as there was reasonable and articulable suspicion that 

defendant’s passenger had urinated outside. Plaintiff contends this reasonable suspicion justified 
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Officer Perry’s actions when transitioning from an informal stop to an investigatory stop, and the 

recovery of the gun was not a result of a violation of defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights. 

We hold the district court erred in suppressing the gun as evidence by incorrectly ruling 

that the evidence was obtained in violation of defendant’s rights under the Fourth Amendment. 

The district court incorrectly held that Officer Perry illegally seized defendant without reasonable 

suspicion. Accordingly, the district court abused its discretion in not binding defendant over for 

trial, and the circuit court erred when it affirmed the district court’s decision.

The United States Constitution and the Michigan Constitution guarantee the right to be free 

from unreasonable searches and seizures. US Const, Am IV; Mich Const 1963, art 1, § 11. A 

warrantless seizure is constitutional if it falls within one of the established exceptions. An 

investigatory stop is one of the exceptions. Lucynski, 509 Mich at 625, 637. A valid investigatory 

stop must be justified at its inception and reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that 

justified the interference by police with a person’s right to security. People v Champion, 452 Mich 

92, 98; 549 NW2d 849 (1996). A brief seizure to investigate does not violate the Fourth 

Amendment if the officer has a reasonably articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. 

Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1, 22, 30-31; 88 S Ct 1868; 20 LEd 2d 889 (1968). 

Officer Perry’s actions did not constitute a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. 

Defendant is considered “seized” only if, under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable 

person would not have felt free to leave the encounter. People v Shabaz, 424 Mich 42, 66; 378 

NW2d 451 (1985), citing United States v Mendenhall, 446 US 544; 100 S Ct 1870; 64 L Ed 2d 

497 (1980). Factors indicating a seizure include the presence of multiple officers, display of 

weapons, physical touching, partially blocking the defendant’s vehicle, or the use of authoritative 

language or tone. See Mendenhall, 446 US at 553-555; People v Duff, ___ Mich ___, ___; ___

NW3d ___ (2024) (Docket No. 163961); slip op at 9-12. In this case, there were only two police 

officers present, with only Officer Perry speaking with defendant. Further, there was no display 

of weapons or physical restraint, and the officer’s language was merely inquisitorial. We hold that

a reasonable person in this context would have felt free to leave when the officers initially pulled 

up and engaged with defendant and the passenger.

Here, the informal stop first began when Officers Perry and Flannel stopped alongside 

defendant’s vehicle, which was parked and running on the street. Officers Perry and Flannel did 

not even partially block defendant in when they first pulled up to his car. Rather, they parked 

parallel to speak with defendant. This initial interaction did not constitute a seizure but was merely 

to check if individuals in the parked vehicle were okay. Following the factors listed in Duff,

Officer Perry’s actions did not reflect a traffic stop as his scout car did not block in defendant’s 

vehicle and Officers Perry and Flannel did not illuminate the scout cars lights or sirens.

Defendant argues that he was illegally seized when Officer Perry pulled up alongside his 

car because a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave the encounter. In Lucynski, 509 

Mich at 626, 643, the Court held that the defendant was seized under the Fourth Amendment 

because a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave due to the police blocking the 

defendant’s only path of egress with their scout car. Further, the officer’s seizure of the defendant 

was based on beliefs that were objectively unreasonable. In contrast, the present case did not 

involve a traffic stop but rather an informal stop to check on the vehicle’s passengers. Officer 
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Perry did not block defendant’s path of egress, as he parked parallel to defendant’s car. 

Additionally, the body camera footage and Officer Perry’s testimony shows that he was merely 

talking to the individuals in the car when he discovered that defendant did not have a valid driver’s 

license, solidifying this stop was not an illegal seizure. Police officers may question any person 

to gather information and ask for identification without implicating the Fourth Amendment 

provided that the police “do not convey a message that compliance with their requests is required.” 

Florida v Bostick, 501 US 429, 435; 111 S Ct 2382; 115 L Ed 2d 389 (1991); see also Florida v 

Royer, 460 US 491, 497-498; 103 S Ct 1319; 75 L Ed 2d 229 (1983). The facts of the present case 

differ significantly from those in Lucynski, 509 Mich 618, making defendant’s reliance on that 

case misplaced. Officer Perry’s actions when he first pulled up alongside defendant’s vehicle did 

not result in an unconstitutional seizure as a reasonable person would have felt, under all these 

circumstances, free to leave or not engage with police.

The circuit court held that Officer Perry lacked reasonable suspicion of any criminal 

activity. The court reasoned that the admission to urinating was insufficient without a specific 

statement that the urination occurred outside, holding that Officer Perry lacked reasonable 

suspicion. We disagree with this reasoning as Officer Perry reasonably inferred that criminal 

activity had occurred due to the circumstances and facts of this encounter. 

Any evidence obtained from a constitutionally unreasonable search may be excluded unless 

the police have a warrant, or if a search fell under an exception to the warrant requirement. People 

v Eaton, 241 Mich App 459, 461; 617 NW2d 363 (2000). A warrantless seizure could be seen as 

constitutional if the officer had reasonable suspicion to believe that the defendant had violated the 

law. Lucynski, 509 Mich at 625. Police officers only need an “articulable and reasonable 

suspicion” of a violation of the law to request a driver to produce their license. People v Williams, 

236 Mich App 610, 612; 601 NW2d 138 (1999), citing Delaware v Prouse, 440 US 648, 663; 99 

S Ct 1391; 59 L Ed 2d 660 (1979). Whether a police officer has reasonable suspicion to make an 

investigatory stop is determined on a case-by-case basis, examining the context of the facts and 

circumstances in their totality. People v Jenkins, 472 Mich 26, 32; 691 NW2d 759 (2005), citing 

People v Oliver, 464 Mich 184, 192; 627 NW2d 297 (2001). Reasonable suspicion involves 

officers relying on the environment of their exchanges along with reasonable interpretations and 

common-sense conclusions about human conduct. Jenkins, 472 Mich at 32. 

Unlike in Lucynski, where the officer’s actions were objectively unreasonable, the 

passenger in this case made an incriminating statement that he had just urinated that led Officer 

Perry to infer that there had been a violation of law. This admission gave Officer Perry reasonable 

suspicion that criminal activity had just occurred, thereby justifying the eventual seizure of 

defendant. The totality of the facts and circumstances before Officer Perry, included: (1) it being 

late at night, (2) defendant’s car was parked and running next to a vacant lot, (3) the passenger had 

admitted he just urinated, (4) no readily apparent access to private toilets, and (5) during the 

exchange, neither defendant nor the passenger specifically denied Officer Perry’s determination 

that the passenger had urinated outside. These facts and circumstances gave Officer Perry 

reasonable suspicion that criminal behavior had taken place, and warranted further investigation. 

The encounter with defendant here did not transition to an investigatory stop until Officer 

Perry possessed reasonable suspicion that the passenger had recently urinated outside, which is a 

misdemeanor. Defendant argues that Officer Perry could not have reasonable suspicion because 
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neither occupant explicitly stated that they had urinated outside. But Officer Perry, relying upon 

his common-sense judgments of human conduct, reasonably interpreted the situation to be that the 

passenger had just urinated outside. Jenkins, 472 Mich at 32. To that point, Officer Perry’s 

statement to the passenger’s admission to urinating was to ask, “Where’d you pee at? You know 

you can’t do that man.” Additionally, during the encounter, neither defendant nor the passenger 

explicitly denied that the passenger had urinated outside. This lack of denial to the clearly

interpreted criminal activity further enhanced Officer Perry’s reasonable suspicion that criminal 

activity had just occurred. 

Therefore, under the totality of circumstances of this entire interaction, it was objectively 

reasonable for Officer Perry to suspect that the passenger had just urinated in the vacant lot. This 

reasonable suspicion warranted Officer Perry to transform the informal encounter into an 

investigatory stop and briefly detain defendant to verify defendant’s driver’s license and, after 

defendant’s admission that he possessed a gun, his CPL registration. The subsequent discovery of 

the gun was lawful based on the reasonable suspicion he developed during the initial exchange.

Therefore, there was no violation of defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights. 

The order granting the motion to suppress the gun as evidence is reversed, the order 

dismissing the case is vacated, and the matter is remanded to the circuit court for further 

proceedings.

1

 We do not retain jurisdiction.

/s/ Michelle M. Rick

/s/ Christopher M. Murray

/s/ Allie Greenleaf Maldonado

 

1 We hold that there was no Fourth Amendment violation. However, even if a violation was found, 

the seizure would have still been considered constitutional as defendant freely and voluntarily gave 

consent that was sufficiently attenuated from the alleged Fourth Amendment violation. People v 

Mead, 503 Mich 205, 216; 931 NW2d 557 (2019), and Frederick, 500 Mich 228, 242-243; 895 

NW2d 541 (2017).