Opinion filed Jan uary30 , 2 009



### In The 

# Eleven th Court of Appeals

____________ 

### No. 1 1- 07 -0 02 64 -CV

____ ____ __ MEL VIN J. S COT T A ND JOYC E M. SC OTT, Ap pellants V. CA ROL SP ALD ING A ND EA RN EST S PA LDIN G, Ap pellees

On App eal from the 259th Distric t Court

Jones County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 20,544

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N
We ar e c a ll e d u

p o n to a d dr e s s s e v e n is s u e s o n a p p e a l in th is c o n tr a c t f

o r d e e d la w s u it

. We

reve rse a nd rema nd that portion of t he judgment awarding attorney ’s fees. Otherw ise, we modify the a mou nt o f d a ma g e s and

a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he tr ia l c ourt

. Melvin J . Scott and J oy ce M. Scott owne d a building in Ha mlin. They

enter ed into a contr act to s e ll the pr op e rt

y to Caro l Spal din g and Ea rn e st Spa ldi ng fo r $10 ,0 00 . T he purc ha se pr ic e wa s to b e p ai d at t h e ra t e of $ 2 5 0 p er m o n t h

. T h e S co t t s agr ee d t o d el i v er a wa rr an t y d ee d t o t h e S p al d i n gs when the $10,000 pur chase price had bee n paid. B e fo re the sa le of

the pr op e rt

y to t he Spa ldi ng s, Jone s Co un ty ha d b e e n r e nti nga

sp a c e in the building f

or $300 a month. Afte r the sale of the prope rty to the Spaldings, the Scotts continued2

to rec eive the rent chec ks from the county but would give the che cks to the Spalding s eac h month. The Spalding s wo u l d t h en wr ite the Scotts a che ck for the $250 pay

ment called f

or under the contra ct. I t is larg ely

undisputed that the Spaldings pa id the Scotts fifty -one pa y ments of $250 ea ch plu s an a dd iti on a l $2 00 in t wo oth e r c he c ks , f

or a tot a l of $1 2, 95 0 o n th e $1 0, 00 0 c on tr a c t. At so me po int

in t ime be fo re the c on tr a c t pr ice had been p a id, the Spa ldi ng s h a d n ot p a id

so me of the a d va lor e m ta xes du e on the pr op e rt y
. Th e Sc ott s d e c ide d to wi thh old the Jone s Co un ty

re nt f or six mo nth s and

us e that $1 ,8 00 to p ay

tho se de lin qu e nt t a xes. The S palding s operated a business in the bui lding that they purcha sed from the S cotts. The bus in e s s e v e n tu a ll y c lo s e d

. A c c o r d in g to M r s
. Sp a ld in g , n o t lo n g b e f o r e th e b u s in e s s c lo s e d, she tol d M rs . Sc ott

that sh e wa

nte d to se ttl e up and

“ g e t th e pa

pe rs on [the bu ild ing ].” Mr s. Sc ott sa id that she would talk to Mr. Scott and g et bac k to her. Subsequently , and while the Spalding s still had persona l property in the bui lding, Mr. Scott went to the S palding ’s hom e. Mrs. Spalding testified that she told Mr. Scott that she wanted to se ttle up and aske d him, “[H] ow m uch more do we have to pay , or how much ha

ve we paid y ou? ” Mr. Scott s aid that he did not know but that he would g et back to he r. Mrs. Spalding ’s testimony was that, at t hat time, Mr. Scott told her that he ha d “no intentions of giving[t hem] a deed to this place .” Mr. S cott said that he made no such statement “ that [he knew] of.” On a la te r o c c a sio n, Mr . Sc ott we nt b a c k to the Spa ldi ng ’s ho me . M r. Sc ott te sti fi e d th a t it

wa s at t h i s t i m e t h at M rs
. S p al d i n g s u rr en d er edt h e k ey s t o t h e p ro p er t y t o h i m
. M rs
. S p al d i n g, howeve r, testified that she did not surrender the key s to him but that she g ave Mr . Scott a new ke y to the back door

of the building beca

use the old lock had bee n repla ced a fter it had be en dama g ed. Mr . Sc ott a lr e a dy ha d k e y s to the re st o f t he bu ild ingbe c a

us e he and

Mrs. S cott

sti ll h a d s ome proper ty stored ther e. Th e Spa ldi ng s w ro te the ir la st c heck to th e Sc ott s in F e br ua ry 20 03 . L a te r, Mr . Sc ott discovere d that the Spaldings ha d not paid sever al y ear s of ad va lorem taxes on the proper ty , and he paid them. I n their briefs, the parties seem to a g ree that the amount of the taxes paid was $2,562.33. The S palding s submitt ed exhibits showing that they had wr itten chec ks to the Scotts in t he total amount of $12,950. Additionally , as we have note d, th e S co t t s redirected $1,800 due to the Spaldings a

nd paid it over to taxing authorities

. E v en though the Spalding s had paid $14,750,3

$4 ,7 50 mor e tha

n wa s du e on the c on tr a c t, t he Sc ott s d id n ot d e liv e r a de e d to the m but, r a the r, so ld t h e p r o p e rt y t o a

t h i r d p art y. Af te r t he Sc otts res ol d th e pr op e rt y , th e Spa ldi ng s su e d th e m c la imi ngthat th e Sc ott s committed various dece ptive trade prac tices, common-law fra ud, fra ud in a re al estate transac tion,

and br e a c h o f c on tr a c t. Af te r a be nc h tr ia l, t

he tr ia l c ourt awa

rd e d the Spa ldi ng s a c tua l dama g e s of $1 4, 25 0. B e c a us e the trial cour

t found that the Scotts’ ac tions were c ommi t t ed k n o wi n g ly , it also awar ded the Spa ldi ng s a dd iti on a l da

ma g e s o f $ 8, 00 0. F ina lly , th e c ourt awa rd e d th e Spa ldi ngs $ 8, 00 0 in

a tto rn e y ’s fe e s. Seven issues ar e broug ht to us by the Scotts. They

are the following : (1) there is either no evidenc e or insuff

icient evidenc e to support the trial c ou rt ’s fi ndings r eg ardingdece ptive trade prac tices; (2) the finding that the Spaldings did not aba ndon the prope rty

is ag ainst the g reat weig ht

and pr e po nd e ra

nc e of the e vid e nc e ; (3 ) the Spa ldi ng s a re no t e nti tle d to a dd iti on a l da ma g e s b e c a

us e the re cord doe s not show that the Scotts acted knowing ly ; (4) the e vidence does no t support the fi nd ingthat the Sc ott s’ a c tio ns we re the pr od uc ing c a us e of the Spa ldi ng s’ dama g e s; ( 5) the re is a varia nce be tween the conclusions of law and the judgme nt; (6) the trial court should have considere d evidenc e of of

fsets and c redits in favor

of the Scotts; and (7) the trial court should n o t h ave taken jud ic ia l no tic e of

the a mou nt o f atto rn e y ’s fe e s a

wa rd e d to the Spa ldi ng s. Be cause finding s of fa ct in a benc h trial have the same f orce and dig nity

as a jury verdic t, we

re vie w the m fo r le g a l and fa c tua l su ff ic ie nc y of the e vid e nc e un de r t

he same sta

nd ard s w e a

pp ly in revie wing a jury ’s finding s. Ca t a l i n a v. Blasdel , 881 S.W .2d 295, 297 (Tex. 1994). When

re vie wi ngthe le g a l su ff

ic ie nc y of the e vid e nc e , we c on sid e r t he e vid e nc e in t

he lig ht m os t f

a vo ra ble to th e challeng ed finding and indulg e eve ry rea sonable infe renc e that would support it. City of Keller v. W

ilson , 168 S.W .3d 802, 823 (Tex. 2005). We m u s t cr ed i t favor able e vidence if a

re a so na ble fa c tf ind e r c ou ld a

nd dis re g ard c on tr ary e vid e nc e un le ss a re a so na ble fa c tf ind e r c ou ld n ot. Id. at 8 2 7

. We must determine whethe r the e vidence at trial would ena ble re asonable and f a ir

- mi n d e d p e o p le to f

in d th e f a c ts a t issue. Id. Th e fa c tf ind e r i s th e on ly

jud g e of wi tne ss
cre dibilit y

and the we ight to g ive to testimony

. Id. at 819. When review ing a

challeng e to the factual suff iciency of the e vidence , we e x amine the e ntire

rec ord, consider ing both the e vidence in favor of and contr ary

to the challeng ed finding

. Cain v.4

Ba in , 709 S.W .2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986). After considering

and we ighingall the evidenc e, we set aside the f

act f inding only

if it is so contrary

to the overw helming w eigh t of the e vidence as to be clea rly wrongand unjust. Pool v. Ford Motor Co. , 715 S.W .2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986). As in a leg al sufficie ncy

revie w, the trier

of fa ct is the sole judge of the cre dibilit y of the witnesses a nd the weig ht to be g i v en t o their testimony

. GTE Mobilnet of S. Tex. Ltd. P’ship v. Pascoue t , 61 S.W .3d 599, 615-16 (Te x . App.—Houston [14th Dis t.] 2001, p et. denied). We may not substit ute our own judgme n t fo r that of the tr ier of f act, e ven if we would rea ch a dif fer ent answe r on the e vidence

. Ma r. Ov e rse as Cor

p. v . E lli s , 971 S.W .2d 402, 407 (Tex. 1998) . The amount of evidenc e nec essar y to aff irm a judgment i s far less than t hat necessar y to reve rse a

judgme nt. Pascouet , 61 S.W .3d at 616. The Scotts’ complaints ar e dire cted spe cifica lly at Finding s of Fa ct Nos. 7 throug h 13, 17, and 20 throug h 22. I nit s F in d in g o f

F a c t N o
. 7 , th e tr ia l c o urt f o u n d th a t t h e Sc o tt s h a d

r e p r e s e n te d

to the Spaldings that they

would provide a

war ranty dee d afte r the princ ipal was pa id and that the repr esentation was not true. In Finding of F act No. 8, the trial court found that the contra ct had use s or bene fits that it did not have. And, in F inding of Fa ct No. 9, the tria l court found that the c ontrac t confe rre d rig hts and obligations that it did not have. Th e c on tr a c t be tw e e n the pa rt ie s pr ov ide d that, wh e n the su m of $1 0, 00 0 ha d be e n p a id t o the Sc ott s, the y

wo uld iss ue a de e d to th e Spa ldi ng s. Th e re fo re , th e tr ia l c ourt did no t e rr wh e n it fo un d in its se ve nth

fi nd ing of fa c t tha t the Sc ott s had re pr e se nte d to the Spa ldi ng s tha t the y wo uld furnish a w arr anty

deed to them when t h e p u rc h as e pric e wa s paid. The tria l court had te stimony befor e it that the Scotts never of fer ed to deliver a

deed to the Spalding s, even thoug h more than the contra ctual purc hase pr ice had been pa id. The trial cour t also had testimony

befor e it from both of the Spaldings that Mr. Scott said that he neve r intended to g ive them a wa rra nty deed. Mr . Scott’s te sti mony wa s th at he did

no t sa y that, “ that [he kn e w] o f. ” F ur the rm or e , the Sc ott s sold

the pr op e rt

y to s ome on e e lse e ve n th ou g h th e Spa ldi ng s h a d p a id m or e tha n th e e nti re purc ha se pr ic e
. As the on ly tr ie r o f f a c t, t he tr ia l c ourt

wa s f re e to b e lie ve or

dis be lie ve the wi tne sse s. Th e e vid e nc e is b oth leg ally and fa ctually

sufficie nt to support the s eventh finding of fac t that the S cotts repr esente d they would deliver a

war ranty deed to the Spalding s when the pur chase price was pa id and that the repr esentation was untrue. B eca use we have f

ound leg al and f

actua l support in the evidenc e for the5

tr ia l c ourt ’s se ve nth

fi nd ing , w e ne e d n ot a dd re ss F ind ing s o f F a c t No s. 8 and 9. Th e Sc ott s’ fi rs t issue on appea l is overruled. We m us t no w d e c ide wh e the r t

he mis re pr e se ntatio ns that th e tr ia l c ourt fo un d in its se ve nth finding wer e a producing cause of i njury to the Spaldings, a s the trial cour t found in its tenth finding of fact

. I n th e Sc ott s’ br ie f, the y g ive thi s d e fi nit ion

of pr od uc ingc a us e : “ Pr od

uc ingc a us e is a substantial fac tor that broug ht about the injury and without whi ch t h e injury would not have

o cc u rr ed

. ” C i t i n g Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. J efferson Assocs., Ltd. , 8 9 6 S. W. 2 d 1 5 6 , 1 6 1 ( T e x. 1995). Under

this iss ue, the Scotts seem to ar g ue that, since the pay ments that the Spaldings made to the Scotts were pa id out of the J ones County rent chec ks, the Spaldings wer e not a ctually out any money . Be cause the J ones County rent money

was the Spalding s’ money , the ar g ument is based upon a fa lse premise. See Grave s v. Diehl , 958 S.W .2d 468, 472 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 1997, no writ). I f the Spalding s had bee n told before they enter ed the c o n trac t for dee d that they

we re no t g oin g to g e t a

de e d, the re c an b e lit tle do ub t that the y wo uld have de c lin e d to e nte r t

his transac tion and pay

the purc hase pr ice, a

nd the injury would not ha ve occ urre d. The four

th issue on appea l is overruled. I n issue two, the Scotts claim t hat t he trial court’s finding that the S palding s did not abandon the prope rty

was ag ainst the gre at weight and preponde ranc e of the evidence. They inform us of the standard of revie w but c ite us to no authority on the issue of abandonme nt. The complaint is waived. T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 38.1(h). Eve n if the point were not waived, the tr ial court hear d the contra dicting tes t i m o n y re g ardingthe key s to the proper ty and other

testimony

reg ardingabandonme nt. As the trier of fac t, the trial court wa s the judg e of the cre dibilit y of the witnesse s and the we ight to be g iven to their testimony . The Scotts had the burden of proof on the i ssue of a bandonment. Aba

ndonment is an aff irmative def

ense. T EX
. R. C IV
. P. 9 4; Sa n J ac into S an d Co . v . S

w. B e ll Te l. C

o ., 426 S.W .2d 338, 344 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [ 14th Dist.] 1968, writ ref ’d n.r.e.). The tr ial court fa iled to find

a ba nd on me nt. Th e Sc ott s’ c omp la in t in thi s is su e is f ra me d a s a fa c tua l su ff

ic ie nc y c omp la int

. Whe n a pa rt y a tta c ks the fa c tua l su ffi c ie nc y of an is su e up on

wh ic h it ha d th e burd e n o f p ro of

, it must demonstrate that the a dverse finding is ag ainst the g reat weig ht and pre pondera nce of the evidenc e. Marrs & Smith P’ship v. D.K. Boyd Oil & Gas Co. , 22 3 S. W.3 d 1 ,1 4 ( Te x. Ap p. —E l Pa so 2005, pet. denied) . The e vidence that we have outlined above shows that the Scotts have not met this burden. The se cond issue on appe al is overr uled.W e hav e n o t b ee n tol d w hy the am ount of

the tw o c hec k s tota ling$200 of a dditi onal pay

m ent s ar e not i ncl uded in t he 1 judg m ent

. 6 I n issue three , the S co tts arg ue that the Spalding s were not entitled to additional damag es under T EX
. B US
. & C OM
. C ODE ANN
. § 17.50(b)( 1) (Ve rnon Supp. 2008)

. Specifica lly , the ar g ument is that the record does not support a finding t hat t he S cotts acte d knowing ly

. As in the second issue, except to state the law g en er all y , the ar g ument here is not supported by citations to authority , and

we fi nd no re c or d r e fe re nc e s r e g ard ingthe evi dence . T he iss ue is w a ive d. Rul e 38 .1 (h ). Ev e n if the issue is not waived, the Scotts c annot preva il. Ag ain, the trial court had bef ore it testimony

that Mr

. Sc ott tol d the Spa ldi ng s on a t le a st on e oc c a sio n that he ne ve r int e nd e d to fu rn ish a de e d. Th is testimony , which the tria l court as the t rier of fac t was entitled to believe , toge ther with the undisputed fac ts that no deed wa s ever tender ed even though the proper ty was paid for a

nd that the proper ty was sold t o another afte r t he S palding s had paid for it, supports the t rial cour t’s finding that the Scotts acted know ingly . We overrule issue three

. I n th e ir fi ft h is su e on

a pp e a l, t he Sc ott s a sse rt

that th e re is a

c on fl ic t be tw e e n th e nin th conclusion of law

and the judg ment. I n the judg ment, the trial court a war ded the Spalding s $8,000 in additional damag es. In a subseque nt conclusion of law, the t ri al co urt conc luded that the additional damag es should be $6,000. When conc lusions of law are in conflict with an e arlier filed judgme nt, the conclusions ar e contr olling over the judg ment. Di c k

e rso n v . D e

Ba rb ie ris , 964 S.W .2d 68 0, 6 8 4 ( T e x. A p p
. — H o u s t o n [1 4 t h D i s t

. ] 1 9 9 8 , n o p e t

. )

. T h e S c o t t s ’ f i f t h i s s u e o na pp e a l is sustained, and the tr ial court’s judg ment is modified to reflec t the additional d am ag es aw ard of $6,000. I n their six th issue on appea l, the Scotts a sk us to hold that the trial cour t erre d when it fa iled to c on sid e r o ff

se ts a nd c re dit s in re nd e ri ngits jud g me nt. Th e argume nt i s th a t th e Spa ldi ng s p a id only $8,387.67 on the purc hase pr ice. They rea ch thi s conclusion by using, as the starting point of the ir argume nt, the $1 2, 75 0 r e pr e se nte d by the fi ft y -o ne c he c ks of

$2 50 e a c h a s th e tot a l amou nt p a id by the S p al d i n gs o n t he purc hase pr ice. Although the y do not count the $1,800 re nt money from 1 J ones County

that they diverted a

way from the Spaldings as being paid toward the purc hase pr ice, the Scotts arg ue that the tria l court shoul d have of fset that amount. As the Scotts have constructe d their ar g ument, an $1,800 off set would reduc e the total amount paid by th e S p al d i n gs on the purcha se price to $10,950. N ext, the Scotts c laim that the $2,562.33 they paid for taxes should beW e note that, al thoug h the Sc otts s oug ht a n of f se t and cr edi t, the y m ade no count er cl ai m f or the ta x es the y

ha d v olunta

ril y 2 p a i da ft e r th e S p a l d i n g s h a dp a i dfo r th e p r o p e r t y. 7 offse t and, there by , reduc e the amount paid by the Spaldings to $8,387.67, a n amount less than the $10,000 purcha se price

. There fore , the Scotts c onclude that the purcha se price was ne ver pa id and that they wer e never obligated to de liver a war ranty deed to the Spaldings beca use the purc hase pr ice

was ne ver pa id. First, the $1,800 be longe d to the Spaldings, a nd an off set would not be prope r. Even if we

wer e to a g ree that the voluntary pay ment of taxes should be offset, whic h we do not, the f ifty -one chec ks less the $2,562.33 paid taxes e quals $10,187.67, an amount in e x cess of the purc hase pr ice. Fur thermore , althoug h the Scotts have c ited us to one ca se re g ardingthe standard of re view applicable to this i ssue, they have pr esente d us no authority to show us why

the trial cour

t’s failure to offset the a

mount of the taxes, paid voluntarily by the S cotts afte r t he S palding s had per formed under the contra ct, was err or. W e conside r the issue to be w aived. See Rul e 38 .1 (h ). Th e Sc ott s’ 2 six th issue on appea l is overruled. I n the seve nth issue on appea l, the S cotts urg e thi s court to hold that the t rial court erre d when it award ed at t o rney ’s fe es to the Spalding s. The Spalding s prese nted no evidenc e on the issue of attorney ’s fe es. Instead, they claim t hat t he trial court could take judicial notice that the attorne y ’s fee s sought wer e usual, customary , nece ssary and rea sonable unde r T EX
. C IV
. P R AC
. & R EM
. C ODE ANN . §§ 38.003-.004 (Ve rnon 2008). T EX
. C IV
. P R AC
. & R EM
. C ODE ANN
. § 38.001 (Ve rnon 2008) p ro v i d es t h at re as o n ab l e at t o rn ey ’s fe es m ay b e re co v er ed i f th e cl ai m i s f o rt h e f o l l o wi n g: (1 ) r e nd e r e d

s e r vic e s; ( 2) pe rf

or me d la bo r; (3 ) f ur nis he d mate ri a l; ( 4) fr e ig ht o r e xpre ss o ve rc ha rg e s; (5) lost or dama g ed fr eig ht or express; (6) killed or injured stoc k; (7) a sw orn ac count; or (8) an ora l or written c ontrac t. Section 38.003 cre ates a rebuttable presumption that the usual and c ustomary attorney ’s fe es for a claim of the ty

pe desc ribed in Section 38.001 ar e re asonable . Section 38.004 allows the cour t to take judicial notice of the usual and customary attorney ’s fe es. At lea st two courts have held that these provisions ar e not limited to thos e cla ims set ou t i n S ec t i o n 3 8.001. See, e .g., Main Place Custom Homes, Inc . v. Honak er , 192 S.W .3d 604, 622 (Tex. A pp.—For t Worth 2006, pet. denied) ; Le fto n v. Gr iff

ith , 13 6 S.W. 3d 27 1 (T e x. Ap p. —Sa n An ton io 2 00 4, no pe t.) ; Copeland v. Alsobrook , 3 S. W.3 d 5 98 (T e x. Ap p. —Sa n A nto nio 19 99 , p e t. d e nie d) . H ow e ve r, we a g re e wi th t ho se c ourt s8

that hold th a t, u n le s s th e c la im is o n e s e t f

o rth in Se c ti o n3 8

. 0 0 1 , th e c o u rt m ay n o t t a k e ju dicial notice that the usua l and customary fee s are rea sonable but, rathe r, t he party must offe r l eg ally and fac tually sufficie nt evidence on the issue. See, e .g. , Cha re ttev . F itz ge ra ld , 213 S.W .3d 505, 514-15 (T e x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [14th Di st. ] 20 06 , no p e t.) ; Ha sty In c
. v
. In woo d Bu c k ho rn J oin t V e ntu re , 908 S.W. 2d 49 4, 50 2 ( Te x. Ap p. —D a lla s 1 99 5, wr it d e nie d) ; Leggett v. Brinson , 817 S.W .2d 154, 159 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1991, no writ). Be cause the trial court’s judgme nt is ba sed upon violations of the DT PA, thi s c a se is n ot a c la im that is de sc ri be d in Se c tio n 3 8. 00 1. Th e tr ial cou rt abu se d it s discretion whe n it awar ded attorne y ’s fe es base d only on judicial notice under Sections 38.003 and 38.004. The Scotts’ seve nth issue on appea l is sust ained. No rm a lly , w he n w e fi nd that th e re is n o e vid e nc e to s up po rt a fi nd ing , th e re me dy

is t o
re ve rs e and

re nd e r o n th e po int

. Ho we ve r, the awa rd of a tto rn e y ’s fe e s und e r t

he DT PA p re se nts a
u n iq u e s it u a ti o n
. T h is is s o b e c a

u s e an aw ar d o f a tt o r

n e y ’ s f e e s is ma n d ated. T EX
. B US
. & C OM
. C ODE ANN
. § 17 .5 0( d) (V e rn on Sup p. 20 08 ). Th e tr ia l c ourt sh all awa rd reasonable and nec essar y attorney ’s fe es. Id. There fore , here , the proper action is to rema nd the issue of attorney ’s fee s to the trial court f

or a de termination of the r easona ble and ne cessa

ry attorney ’s fe es to be a

war ded. See Le gg e tt , 8 17 S.W. 2d

a t15 9. Th e se ve nth iss ue on a pp e a l is su sta ine d, and

the c a us e is r e mand e d to the trial cour

t for a de termination of attorne y ’s fe es in ac corda nce w ith this opinion. The judg ment of the trial c ourt is reve rsed with re spect to its awar d of attorney ’s fe es and

rema nded to the trial c ourt for a proper assessment of those f

ees. We modify

the award of a dditional damag es by

reduc ing the awa

rd to $6,000. Otherw ise, the judg ment of the trial c ourt is affir med.

J I M R. W RI GHT CH I EF JUSTI CE

J anuar y 30, 2009 Panel consists of: Wright, C.J ., M c C a l l , J. , an d

S t r an g e , J.