2002 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

11-8-2002

Wilson v. PA St Pol

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 02-1531

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Recommended Citation

"Wilson v. PA St Pol" (2002). 2002 Decisions. Paper 716.

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*The Honorable Paul R. Michel, United States Circuit Judge for the Federal Circuit, sitting

by designation.

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

__________

No. 02-1531

__________

MICHAEL ANTHONY WILSON,

 Appellant

v.

PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE DEPARTMENT; PAUL J. EVANKO, In his official

capacity as Commissioner of the Pennsylvania State Police; LINDA M. BONNEY, In her

official capacity as Director of Bureau of Personnel, 

Pennsylvania State Police Department

 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Intervenor

__________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(No. 94-cv-06547)

District Judge: The Honorable Bruce W. Kauffman

__________

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

October 29, 2002

__________

Before: NYGAARD, GARTH, and MICHEL,* Circuit Judges

(Opinion Filed: November 7, 2002)

__________
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OPINION

__________

Michel, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiffs-appellants Michael Anthony Wilson, et al. appeal from the District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania's January 3, 2001 order partially granting

defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiffs' class action. Wilson et al. v. Pa. Police Dep't et

al., No. 94-CV-6547, slip op. (E.D. Pa. Jan. 3, 2001) (order partially granting motion to

dismiss). The class action was filed on behalf of state police officer candidates denied

employment on the basis of visual impairment. The trial court granted the motion with

respect to the plaintiffs' substantive due process claim, Americans with Disabilities Act

claim, and Rehabilitation Act claim. Id. The motion was denied with respect to the

plaintiffs' equal protection. Id. As to the equal protection claim, the District Court later

granted summary judgment to all defendants, the Pennsylvania State Police ("PSP"),

Commissioner Paul J. Evanko, in his official capacity as Commissioner of the PSP, and

Linda M. Bonney, in her official capacity as Director of Bureau of Personnel, PSP

(collectively, "defendants"). Wilson et al. v. Pa. Police Dep't, Evanko, and Bonney, No.

94-CV-6547, slip op. (E.D. Pa. Jan. 18, 2002)(order granting summary judgment). 

The plaintiffs timely appeal the January 3, 2001 ruling, although only as to their

Rehabilitation Act claim, and the January 18, 2002 grant of summary judgment on the equal

protection claim. We will affirm-in-part and reverse-in-part the judgment of the District

Court and remand the case to that court.
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I.

We have jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 

The plaintiffs consist of "all persons who have been or will be denied employment as state

police officers since June 14, 1992, because of visual impairment and who are able to

achieve, through corrective lenses, surgery, or otherwise, either 20/20 binocular vision or

20/20 vision in one eye." 

A.

The Rehabilitation Act claim was dismissed on the grounds that Congress had not

abrogated the states' immunity from suits under the Rehabilitation Act, and therefore the

Eleventh Amendment barred the plaintiffs' claim. Under this court's recent decision in

Koslow v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 302 F.3d 161 (3d Cir. 2002), the dismissal of

the Rehabilitation claim by the trial court in this case was an error. This court has not yet

addressed whether Congress abrogated the states' immunity from suits under the

Rehabilitation Act but Koslow held that "if a state accepts federal funds for a specific

department or agency, it voluntarily waives sovereign immunity for Rehabilitation Act

claims against the department or agency -- but only against that department or agency." Id.

at 171. The court did not reach the abrogation issue because it held waiver was clearly

intended by Congress in Section 2000d-7 of the Rehabilitation Act, as amended, as a

precondition to the acceptance of federal funds and states were, therefore, on notice that by

accepting federal funds they would waive Eleventh Amendment immunity to Rehabilitation

Act claims. Id. at 169-70. Koslow also specifically clarified that a state can avoid liability
1

 Defendants assert that Barnes v. Gorman, 122 S. Ct. 2097 (2002), should somehow

affect this court's understanding of Koslow and that the issues require further briefing. This

contention is unpersuasive since Barnes was decided before Koslow and focused on

liability for punitive damages. Not only are punitive damages not involved in this case, but

also the Koslow opinion specifically referred to Barnes as maintaining a consistent

interpretation of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Koslow, 302 F.3d at 176 n.18. 

Consequently, Barnes does not have any significance for this case.

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for § 504 claims by declining federal funds to the relevant department or agency and,

therefore, the acceptance of funds is a "free and deliberate choice by [a state] that does not

rise to the level of an 'unconstitutional condition.'" Id. at 174. Defendants' arguments to

the contrary are thus disposed of. It is also implicit in all of the defendants' arguments that

the PSP receives federal funds. Therefore, in light of the holding in Koslow, the trial

court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' Rehabilitation Act claims in this case is clearly

incorrect.1 The trial court must reach the merits of the Rehabilitation Act claim.

B.

The second claim was decided on summary judgment on the grounds that: (1) the

relevant group of similarly-situated persons for purposes of the equal protection analysis

were state trooper cadet applicants, and since plaintiffs made no argument that all state

trooper cadet applicants were not treated alike, their attempt to show irrationality in the

application of the standards fails; (2) the rational relationship test does not require that the

PSP's standards be the best possible to accomplish their purpose, plaintiffs' arguments that

those with better eyesight than the cut-off used by the PSP are equally unqualified, is

irrelevant to a rationality analysis; and (3) the rational relationship test does not require
5

specific proof to support a standard setting, plaintiffs' arguments that the customary

definitions of visual impairment and legal blindness were the only basis for the established

standards does not matter either. Wilson et al. v. Pa. Police Dep't, Evanko, and Bonney,

No. 94-CV-6547, slip op. at 5-6 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 18, 2002)(order granting summary

judgment). We see no error in the trial court's analysis. Rational basis scrutiny requires us

to be very deferential to the PSP's determination of the need for a standard for uncorrected

vision. Plaintiffs have not presented any evidence to suggest that the PSP's standard was

not rationally related to its legitimate interest in public and officer safety, only evidence

suggesting that other standards might have been satisfactory or even better. That evidence

alone cannot at law support an equal protection claim. Therefore, we must affirm the trial

court's judgment with respect to the equal protection claim.

II.

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm-in-part and reverse-in-part the judgment of

the district court and remand the case for further proceedings as necessary.
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TO THE CLERK:

Please file the foregoing opinion.

/s/ Paul R. Michel 

Circuit Judge