FINAL C OPY

294 Ga. 421 S13A1862. D ORITIS v. DOR ITIS.

T HOMPSON , Chief Justice. Victor Doritis (

husband) a

ppeals from a

trial c ourt’s judgment on a petitio n for contempt filed by his form er wife, Mabe l (wife), and his counterclaim

for contempt arising out of their divorce action. For the re asons that follow, th e judgmen t of the trial court is affirm ed in part and reversed in part. Husband

and wife weredivorce d in Marc h 2012 by a final divor ce decree incorpora ting the parties’ sett lement agreement. Several months later, wife filed

a petition fo r contempt alleging husband h ad fai led to tu rn over to her certain items of jewelry contained in a bas e ment s afe wh ich sheclaim s should ha ve been divided pu

rsuant to the te rms of t

he dec ree. Husband c ounterc laim ed for contempt, arguing t

hat wif e had fa iled to c omply

with the decre e’s par enting a

nd visitationprovisio ns and had fai led to re imburse him for repair s made

to the marital home. The trial c ourt refus ed to hold e ither pa rty in c ontem

pt but found that pursuant t o the t erms of the final dec ree, the par ties ha d agree d to a1 The decre e pro vides , in pertin ent pa rt:

Marital H om e: Household Goods, Furni ture, Furnishi ngs, Artwork, and Per son al E ffe cts. The parties w ill atte mpt to equal ly divide a ll hous ehold goods, furnis hing, a nd personal effe cts in the Mari tal Home to hi s and her mutualsati sfacti on. . . . If 2 distributi on of propert y giving wif e her jewelry from the safe and ordered husband to return th ese items to wife. Acknowled ging hus band’s admissi on that he alreadyhad sold certain of the items, the cour t further ordered that “[i ]n the event [husband] is unable to return all piece s o f jewe lry, but

returns s elec tive item s, said items sha ll be a ppraise d by a m

utually agreed upon cert ified apprais er and t

he am ount

of the a ppraisal shall b e subtra cted from theamount [husband] owes ($40 ,000) to [w ife] f or reim burs eme nt of

the je welry .” The court also directed the partie s to submit for the court’s review a list of dis puted expenses, if any, fo r repairs to th e marital home. 1. Husband

contend s the portion of the trial court’s order directi ng him to return t

he jew elry t o wife c onstitute s an im proper m odifica

tion of the f

inal divorce decre e. The

final de creeprovides w ith rega rd to personal p roperty that the partie s woul d attemp t to rea ch an agr eeme nt, and i n the ev ent the y were unable to do so, a specificall y identif ie d third par ty would make the fin al distri bution. 1 After he aring testimony an d reviewing e-mails b etween the partiesan agree men t is not rea ched then th e partie s will com plete a list of all personal

prop erty contai ned in the resi dence (as e videnced in the videotape d inventory in 201 1) wit

h an es ti mat ed v al ue n ext to eac h i te m. This li st wil l be provi ded to Ms. Grossman as a fina l arbi trat or on the div ision o f pro perty. Eac h par ty will prov ide to M s. Gro ssma n their p referre d sele ction of items, then Ms. Grossman w ill pr ovide to the parties a final dist ribution of said i tems.

3 regardin g the division of the saf e’s cont ents, t

he trial court determ ined the parties had reached an agreement as to distri bution o f the jewelry and ord ered husband to imm ediate ly ret

urn these item s to wi fe or provide her with compensation

for the it em s he adm ittedly sold. Th is ruling do es not impermissibly

modify the decree inasmuch as th e trial court simply found th at the parties entered an agree ment regardin g the contents of t he safe, which they were authorized to do under the plain term s of

the final decree, and enter ed an order enforcing the de cree , whi ch it clearly wa s authorized to do. See OC GA § 23-4-31; Hamilton v. Ham ilt on , 292 Ga. 81 (1) (734 SE 2d 355) (2012); Hudson v. H

udson , 220 Ga. 730 (1 41 SE2d 4 53) (196 5). Contrar yto husband’s a

rgumen t, it doe s not ma

tter tha t the content s of the safe werenot includ ed in a videotap e of househo ld goods createdby the parties during the divorce proc eedings beca use nothin g in the decree indica tes tha t the videota pe was int ended a s an exc lusive i nventory of persona

l propert y to be4

divided. Similarly , we do not find the absence from the decree

of a specific reference to the sa fe’s contents to b e determinative. The decree was sufficiently speci fic as to t

he procedure to be followed in dividing personal property to apprise the par ties of w hat wa s require d of

them, and

the trial court’ s order merely applie s that pro cedure

to the persona l property at issue. This is not a circumstance, theref

ore, wh ere property was not cove red by t he dec ree a

nd the court went beyond an interpre tation of the d ecree in an action for contempt to determ ine ownership of the prop erty. Compare Buckley v. Buckley , 239 Ga. 433, 434 (238 SE2d 238) (19 77). 2. Husband argu es that even if the trial cour t was authorized t o enter an order pertaining to the

distribution of

the jewe lry, there wa s no credible evidence to support t

he trial court’s valuation of theitem s. At th e contempt hearing , however, wife iden tified from an inventory prepared by the par ties each piece of jewelry they had agreed belon ged to her and estimated that th ese items had an aggregate value of $40,000 . The trial court fo und this evidence, which

was not disputed by husband at th e hearin g, to be credible and val ued the2 Husband’s cla im that the tr ial c ourt depr ived him of t he opportuni ty

to pres ent evid enc e an d ar gum ent o n th e issu e of valu ation is no t sup por ted b y the re cor d. 5 jewel ryat issue

at $40,0 00. 2 Beca

use hus band alrea dy had so ld some of the items of jewelry, whic h therefore could not be independently

appraised, the tr ial court’s order directs that the val ue of the missing ite ms be determ ined by subtrac ting the appraised value of the items still in

husband’s p ossession

from the $40,000 ag gregate

value. Thus, there is evidence in the rec ord supporting the trial c ourt’s val

ue determina

tion, a nd the tri al cour

t’s order provides a reasonable method by which the value of the m issing je welry

shall be determ ined. Although under diff erent c ircum stance s other m ethods of v aluati on may have been prefera

ble, the difficulty

in obtainin g such eviden ce in this c ase

was caused by husba

nd’s spiriting awa

y of theproperty . Give n the circum stance s, we find no error in the trial court’s metho d of dete rmining the value of the items so ld by husb and in viol ation of th e decree. 3. Rely ing on a prov ision in thefinal de cree entitli ng husband t o reim bursem ent

for “repairs ” made to the marital home w hi le it w as liste d for sale, husband a sserte d in his co untercl aim f or conte mpt tha

t wifeowed him

for expenses he incurred fo r docu ment s hredding, light bulbs , houseke eping an d6

landsca ping. The trial court denie d th is ground of husba nd’s peti tion, concluding that the parties did not intend “ repairs” to inclu de the general household expense s clai med by husband. Husband a

rgues tha t the tri al cour

t’s interpretation

of the term “re

pair” c onstitute s an im

proper m odifi cat ion of the decree. Although a trial court lacks au thority to mod ify a d ivorce decree within

a contem pt proce eding, i t may

interpret or cla

rify suc h decre e in the

courseof resolving contempt issues p roperly befor e it. Killingsworth v. Killingsworth , 286 Ga. 234, 236 (686 SE2d 640) (2009). The te st for det ermining “whe ther a tri a l court's ruling constitutes a proper clarific ation or impermissible modific ation

of a divor

ce de creeis whet

her theclari fication [or inte rpreta tion] is reasonable or wheth er it is so contra ry to the apparent intent

ionof the orig inal order as to amount to a modification.” (Cita tion and punctuatio n omitted.) Cason v. Cason , 281 Ga. 296, 2 97 (1) (6 37 SE2d 7 16) (200 6). The co ntrolling principle to be applied wh en interpretin g a divorce decree which incorporat es the partie s’ settlement a

greem ent is to “find theintent of the par ties by looking to the ‘four corn ers’ of t

he agre eme ntand in the lig ht of circumstances as t hey existed at the ti me the agreement was made. [Cit.]” Ward v. W ard , 236 Ga . 860,3 This prov is ion st ates t hat “husband wil l att empt [to] make repair s to the marit al resi dence and conti nue to li st sai d resi dence for sal e. In t he event husba nd makes any repairs,

. . . husband shal l rece ive a cr edit/ payment for sai d payment s from the s ale of th e resi dence before any

net profi ts ar e divide d by t he parti es.” 7 861 (226 SE2d 52) ( 1976). The challenged provisio n provid es only that husband shall be entitled to

a credit or payment for re

pairs m ade to t

he mari tal hom e while

it was listed f

or sale. 3 It say s nothing to s uggest a n i nten t by the

partie s to reim

burse husba

nd for expenses related to his general mainten ance or u se of t he home such as those asserted in h i s counte rclai m. Ac cordingly , we c oncludethe tria l court’s interpretation

of the decree is rea sonableand not so c ontrary to the in tention o f the par ties a s to am ount to a m

odifica tion. 4. The fin al dec ree spe cifie s that th e net proceed s from t he sale of the marital home shall be divi ded equally bet ween the partie s, but it make s no provision for the time w ithin whi ch such p rocee ds must b e distribute d. Nowhere in

the decree does it indicate that the se proceeds would be held until the partie s had fulf

illed th eir other obligations under the decree. Never theles s, the trial c ourt incl

uded in it s cont empt o rd er a provisio n directing t hat the net procee ds from the

sale of the m arita l homeshall not be distri buted unti l husband8

returned the jewelry to w ife or provided her with adequate compensation f

or the items sold. We a gree w ith husban d that thi s was a n imprope

r modifi cation

of the final decree. Althou gh the t rial court ha d broad a uthority to enforc e and seekcompliance with its original decree, OCGA § 23-4-31, it could not do s o byimposing upon husband a pre-condition to his rece ipt of the net proceeds that didnot exist in the original decre e. Accordingly, we revers e that portion of t he trial court’s o rder wit

hholding husba

nd’s s hare of the net

procee ds until he returned the jewelry to wife or prov ided her wit h adequa te com pensati on for the missing items. 5. By the terms of the final d ecree, husband and wife wer e given j oint legal custody of their

minor c hi ld with wife hav ing primary phys ical custody. Due to the c hild’s ag e, she was al most 16 at the timeof the divorce, the p arties agreed husband wa s to havevisitat ion “as th e mino r child a nd [h]usba

nd mutually agree.” Husband con tends the tr ial cou rt abuse d its disc retion by failing to hold wif

e in conte mpt for h er all eged fa ilure to abide b ythe te rms of the divorce decree re lated to parenting and vis itation. He al so argue s that th e trial court erred by failing to exercise its supervisory authority over the chi ld’s decisi on to disc ontinue vi sitatio n. See Worley v. Whiddon , 261 Ga . 218 (4034 Although husband ar gues he was denied t he opportuni ty

to pres ent evi dence at t he hea rin g, in cl udi ng e vi den ce o f pa re nt al al ie nat io n, th e r eco rd doe s no t s upp or t t hi s c la im. At no point dur ing the hear ing did hus band offer t o present or proffer

test imony, expert or lay , on any

issue, and he made no request for a cont inuance t o allow him t o do so. 9 SE2 d 799) (19 91); Prater v. Wheeler , 253 Ga . 649, 650- 651 (322 SE2d 8 92) (1984). At the hea ring, wife present ed evide nce de monstra

ting that she had n ot violated the visitatio n provis ions of th e d ecre e be cause it was the chi ld who electednot t o visit with husband, and pursuant to the decree , visitation was to take place only when it was mutua lly agreeabl e to both hu sband and the chi ld. The trial court’s refusal

to hold wif

e in con tempt of the final dec ree wi th rega rd to visitation, therefore, is supported by the record, and we

fin d no ab use of discre tion in this rul ing of the tr ial court. See Horn v. She pherd , 292 Ga . 14 (4) (732 SE2d 427) (20 12) (trial court’s ruling on c ontem pt will be affirme d on appeal if there is any evid ence to suppo rt it). The fact that th e rel ati onship between husband

and the child may

have deteriorate d to the point that the child does not wish to visit with husband doe s not, by itself, dema

nd the c onclusion that wife has engage d in contemptuous conduct. 4 In addition , we findthe trial court properly e xercised its authorit y over t he10

child’s decisi on not

to attend counse ling or visi t with he r fathe r. Thetrial c ourt interviewed the child, who by the ti me of the c ontem pt hear ing was 1 7-yea

rs old, and det erm i ned, ba sed on the child’s a

ge, the child’s w ishes, the circumstances of the div orce, and the absence of any evid ence that wife was interfering with visitation, that com pelled counseling or visitation with husband wouldnot be in the ch ild’s best inte rest. T he trial court t

hus conside

red the evidenc e before

it, toge ther wi th the child’s wishes, and properly e xercised its discretion. S ee Worley , supra, 261 Ga. at 2 19. Judgme nt affir

med in part an d revers ed in pa

rt. All the Justi ces c oncur.

H UNS TEIN , Justic e, con curring. I concur fully in Divisions 1, 2, 3, and 5 of the majority opinion. As to Division 4, I als o concur but do so only beca use thetrial c ourt dec lined to f ind husband in contempt. Had the

trial c ourt

found husba

nd in contempt for s elling the jewe lry whi ch the t

rial c ourt found

the parties had agree d wouldbe awarded to wife, I would affir m the trial court’s authority to require that husband com plywith his obliga tions reg arding the

jewe lry prior

to rece iving any

procee ds from the sale of the marital re sidence. See O CGA§ 23-4-31 (“[a] superior court shall have full power to mold its decre es so as to me et the exigenc ies of e ach c ase a nd shall have full pow er to enforce its d ecree s when rendered”); Smith v. Smith , 293 Ga. 563, 565 (1 ) (748 SE2 d 456) (2013) (affirming trial court’s authority to deviate from the letter o f the divor ce decree as neces sary to “ reme d[y] th e harm c aused by

husband’s c ontem

ptuous cond

uct”).

Decid ed Janua

ry 21, 201 4. Dome stic re lations. Fulton Supe rior Court . Befo re JudgeShoob. Christine M. S tadler , for appellant. Michae l J. O’H agan, Christy C. Thomann , for appellee.