### TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03

- 21

- 00286

- CV

Austin Independent School District , Appellant

v.
Rodney Anderson , Appellee

FROM THE 53RD DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY NO. D

- 1

- GN

- 19

- 004070 , THE HONORABLE AMY CLARK MEACHUM , JU DGE PRESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Following term ination of his employ ment , R od ney Anderson filed suit against his

former employer
, Austin Independent School District (AISD )
, under the Tex as Whistleblower

Act, see Tex. Gov ’ t Co de § § 55 4. 00 2

- .010, and the Texas Commis s i on on Human Rights Act

(TCHRA)
, see Tex. Lab. Code § § 21.051

- .061

. AISD filed a plea to the jurisdiction
, supported
by evidence, which the trial court denied. In this interlocutor y appeal
, AISD asser ts that the trial

c ou rt e rr ed in denying its ple a be cause it is p rotected from suit by g overnmental immun ity and

because Ander son failed to assert a c laim f or which immunity is waived

. See Tex. Civ. Prac. &

Rem. Code § 51.014(a)(8) . Because we conclude that the allegations i n Ande r son ’ s pleadings

and the ju risdictio nal evidence are insufficient to support a waiver of immunity under either the

Whist leblow er Act or the TCHRA, we reverse the trial court ’ s order and render judgment

dismiss ing the suit for lack of jurisdiction

.2 B AC K GROU ND

Anderson was hired as a polic e of ficer b y AISD in its Poli ce Department in 199 5

and was promoted to sergeant in 200 4 and to l i eutenant in 2010

. From 2012 until his termination

in 2019, And ers on ’ s direct superv isor w as Interim Chief, later Ass i st ant C hief
, Chris En voy

.

On March 4
, 20 1 8
, An d erso n s e nt a n an onymo us letter to the AISD Bo ard of

Tr ustees in which he complained about the “ current leadership within the District and [the]

Department ” and
, specifically, their hand ling of a terroristic th reat received at Akin s H i g h

School in Feb ruar y 2 018

. In his letter , Anderson claimed that internal policies and procedures
were not followed during the incident response and that “ the ch aos that e nsued ” w as “ a direct

result of a lack of tr ain ing for l i n e offic er s, lack of p rope r resour ces , an d t he l a ck o f experience

of the first line supervision level

. ”

A nderson also comp laine d in his anonymous l ette r to the Board about poor

mo rale in the Police Department due to conduc t b y one of his col le ague s , Ser gea nt Da vid

Herrera

. Acco rding to Anders on ’ s l etter , the D epart ment failed to a dequately discipli ne H errer a

af t er learning that he had “ slapped and used extreme la nguage ” toward a student

. Anderson

further stated that Herrera had been accus ed o f se xually ha ra ss i ng a nother of fi cer an d that due t o

“ the treatment from Chief En v oy , Lie u tena nt B arrera, and the staff in human resources , ” the
officer resigned. Anderso n did not, however, provide a ny details a s to the harassing conduct that

Herrera had been accu s ed of co mmitting

. On A pr il 1 6, 201 8
, An d ers on sent a fo rmal grie van c e

to the Board ’ s ou tside legal counsel, in w hich he rec ited his compl a i nts a bou t the ha ndling of the

terroristic threat and lack of leade rship but omitt ed his comp la ints abou t S erg eant He rre ra.

According to t he all e gatio n s in hi s live pleadi ng s befor e the tria l court
, Anderson

also reported issues concerning Sergeant Herrera directly t o Assistant Chief Envoy. Specifically,3

i n June 2017, Anderson orally informed Envoy that Herrera h ad b e en seen sleeping wh ile on
duty

. I n a dd ition
, in January 2019, he orally informed Envoy that Herrera may have improp e rly

worked overtime duty while on leave un der the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA)

. Envoy
responded to Anderson ’ s or al report about im p rop er ov ertime by r e quest i ng th a t he se nd a

follow

- up e

- mail summarizing what he knew about the situation.

In compl i ance with Assistant Chief En voy ’ s request, o n J an uary 4, 2019,

Anderson sen t a n e

- mail to Envoy
, stating that “ he was m ade aware that [ Se r gea nt He rre ra ] was
possib ly w or k in g o ff

- du ty assig nment s at the Long Cente r and the Junior L eague ” while on

FMLA lea v e and th at he was “ br in ging this to [ En voy ’ s] a ttention for furthe r review and or

investi gati on. ” In response to the e

- mail
, En voy inform e d A nde rs on that he shoul d sub m i t a

form al co mplaint to initiat e an i n t ernal af f airs investigati on. O n January 7, 2 0 19, Anderson

submit ted a s wo rn compla int allegi ng that Herr era “ was possibly working off

- duty assign ment s

. . . while off on FMLA
, ” althoug h he was “ not sure o f t h e dates o r t imes of t he possi ble policy

viola t io ns. ” Fo llowing an investigation
, the Department d etermined that Anderson ’ s allegations

were unsubstanti ated and dismissed his complaint.

On January 18, 2019, Ser ge ant Herrera filed a gr ievan ce aga inst Anders on ,

c o m plain ing th a t Anderso n had harassed hi m by imp roperly shar ing hi s d i s cip linary history a nd

th reaten ing his work s tatus. T h e matter was assigned to an investigator , attorn ey Rach ael

Mar e sh

. D uring the cou rse of t he inv esti g a ti on, H e rr era repo r t ed t o Mare s h th at Ande r son ha d

ret aliated against him for filing the grievance by rem ovin g him from an overtime assignment at a

baseball tournament scheduled for March 1 , 2 019

. Maresh i ncorporate d H err era ’ s r e tal iat ion

c ompla int into h er ongo ing investi g a tion of hi s harassment complaint.4 Through her investigation
, Maresh learned that a lthough Anderson was not
Sergeant Herrera ’ s supervisor , he was in charge of schedul ing overtime assignme nts for the

Police Departmen t

. When questione d by Mare sh, An der so n deni ed tha t he removed Herrera ’ s
overtime assignmen t because Herrera had filed a grie vance against him

. Anderson exp lained that
, in error, he had “ double booked ” Herrer a and another officer
, Officer Thompson
, for th e same

shift and t h at he re moved Her r e r a ’ s a s s ign m e nt to corr ec t the error. Conversely, Thompson told

M ar esh that he had signed up for the morning s hift and Sergeant Herrer a had signed up for the

afternoon shift
, but that Anderson later told Th ompson to wo rk the ful l day in ste ad

.

O n April 5, 2 0 19, Mare sh r eported h er findings f rom her investigation on
Sergeant Herrera ’ s grievance against Anderson in a written execut i ve summary

. According

to the summary, Mar e sh determined that “ there was insufficient evide n ce to find by a

p re p ond era n c e of th e evi d en ce that p r ohib ite d hara ssme nt [by An derson against Herrera ] had

occurred. ” She also conclud e d , however, that “ ba sed o n th e information and doc u mentatio n
provided by the interviewees, the preponderance of the e vi dence supports a f in d in g th at

L ieutenant A nd e rs on r eta l i at ed against S er geant Herre r a for fi lin g his DIA (Local ) c omplaint by
removing hi m from an overtime d uty

. ” Ma r esh reported
, “ L t. Ander son ’ s explanation of the
duty assignment correction and deleting an extra duty on t op of a f ul l

- duty was n o t c orroborat e d

b y a ny othe r in terviewee s invol ved with th is allegation
, ” and “ no one recalled there bein g a full
day shift o n the sch edule originally for the .

. . baseball tournament. ”

AISD human resource s of ficials then met w it h Ander so n, in fo rmed him o f t h e

result s o f Mar e sh ’ s i nves tigation
, and placed him on administrative leave. AIS D Chi ef of

Polic e, A shley Gon zalez
, then recommended that the district terminate An derson ’ s empl oym ent ,5

which t he Superintend ent approve d. An d e r s on was te rmina te d from h is e mp loy ment ef fec tive
April 10, 201 9

.

On July 15, 2019, Ander son filed suit against AISD, all eg ing that AIS D violated

the TCH R A be cause it “ discriminated and retaliated again st [him] be cause of his r ace

. . . and

because of hi s oppos i tion to unlawful e m ployment pr act ic es

. ” And erso n also clai ms tha t in

violation of the Whist leblo wer A ct, AI SD “ discriminated and retaliated against [him]

. . .
because h e made good f

aith reports of violations of law co mmitted by AISD an d i ts em pl o y e es to

ap pro pri ate law en fo rc emen t autho rities

. ”

In re sponse to the suit, A ISD file d a plea to t he jurisd ictio n on the ground t hat it

is protected from suit by go vernmental immunity and that And erson had failed to es tablish

a valid waiver of immunity un d e r e it her the Whist l eblower Act or the T CHRA

. I n su pport of it s
plea, AISD attac hed Ander son ’ s deposition test im ony and ex h ibits, along with sworn

declarations from Assis ta nt C hief En voy a n d Chief G on zale z

. In the ir de clarations, Envoy

and G onzalez g e n e r ally d escrib ed a series of incidents tha t, in their view, demonstrat ed

“ performance de ficien cies ” and le d t o the decision t o recommend termination of Anderson ’ s
employme nt

. Ac cording to G onzal ez ’ s declarat ion , the “ fin al straw ” occurred when he rec e iv ed

M a resh ’ s executive summary , concluding th at Anderson had retaliated against Herrera for filing
a gri ev ance.

Anderson f iled a response to the plea to the jurisdiction
, reciting por ti o ns o f his
petiti on , ass e rt ing th at h e had “ prop e rly invoked the juri s d ic t i on of the court
, ” and attach ing

his o wn sworn de claration

. F ollowing a hearing, the trial cou rt denied AISD ’ s plea , and t his
appeal followed.6 S T ANDAR D OF R EVIE W
A plea t o t he jurisdic tion is procedural mechanism “ through which a party may

cha llen g e a t rial court ’ s authority to decide the su b ject matter ” of a claim. Texas Dep ’ t of

S t ate Health Servs. v. Balquinta , 429 S.W.3d 726, 737 (Tex. App.

— Austin 2014, pet

. dism ’ d)

.
Because whether a court has subject

- matter jurisdicti on is a question of law
, w e r e view de novo

a trial court ’ s ruling on a ple a to the jurisd iction. Tex as D e p ’ t of P arks & Wi ldlife v. Miran da
,
133 S. W .3 d 2 17, 22 5 ( Tex

. 2004)

.

A plea to th e jurisdict ion may challen ge w hether the plain t iff has alleg ed fa ct s

t ha t affirmativ ely d e m o ns t r a te a co ur t ’s juris d iction to hear the ca se, the exis tenc e of t hose

v ery jurisdic tional f

acts , or bo t h

. Texas Dep ’t of Transp . v. Lara , 625 S. W.3 d 4 6, 52 (Te x

.
2 021)

. Wh en the jurisdic tional pl e a challeng e s t h e pleadin gs , we det er min e whether t h e

p la i nt i f f ’ s plea d ings all ege facts affirmati vely demons trating sub j ec t

- matter juris dict ion

.
Miranda
, 133 S. W.3d at 226

. In making this asses sment, we con strue the pl ai ntiff ’ s p leadings
liberally, takin g all assertions as true, and look to the plai nt if f ’ s in t en t

. Texas Dep ’ t of Cri m

.

Justice v. Rangel , 595 S.W.3d 198, 205 (Tex. 202 0)

. If the pleadings affirm ative ly negat e the
existence of jurisdiction, the plea ma y be grante d without affording the plaintiff an opportunity

to replead. Miranda , 133 S .W.3d at 226

.

W h e n t h e plea challenges the existence o f jurisdictional facts
, we must move
beyond the pleadings and c ons id er evid e nc e wh e n necessa ry t o reso lv e t he jurisdictional is su es.

Alam o Heig hts Indep. Sch. Dist. v. C lark , 5 44 S. W. 3d 7 55
, 770 (Tex . 20 1 8) ; Bl an d In d e p. S c h.

D is t . v Blu e , 34 S.W .3d 547, 554

- 55 (Tex . 2000)

. Whe n those challe nged jurisdic tional fa c ts

also impli ca t e the me rits of the plaint iff ’ s c laim
, as in this ca se, the p l a intiff ’ s b ur den mirro r s th at

of a tradit io nal summar y judgme nt. L ar a , 62 5 S. W. 3d a t 46 ( q uoting Mission Con sol . In d e p.7

S ch. Dist

. v. G a rcia , 372 S. W.3d 6 29, 6 34 (Tex. 2012) ). Consequently, w e revie w the re levan t

evide nce in the li ght m ost favorable to the pl a intiff to de termine wh ethe r a g en uine is sue o f

mater ial fact ex ist s. To wn of Shady Shor es v . Swan son , 590 S. W. 3 d 54 4, 55 0 (T ex . 20 1 9) (citing

Miran da , 133 S. W .3 d at 226 )

. If the evi d enc e cr eate s a fact que stion regar ding th e jurisdi ctional

is sue, th e n t he trial c ou rt c an not g rant th e plea t o th e jurisdiction
, and th e f ac t is su e wi ll be

r esolved by t h e f

act f inder. Mi r

anda
, 133 S.W.3d a t 227

- 28

. B u t if the relevant evi denc e is
undispute d or does not rais e a fact ques tion on jurisdiction
, we rule on t he pl ea as a ma tte r of

law. See i d. at 2 28

.

Sovereig n i m m unit y g enera l l y ba rs suits a g ainst the St ate o r its agenc i es, absent a

cl e ar an d unambiguous waiver of immunity by the le g isla ture. Na z a r i v. Sta t e , 5 6 1 S. W.3 d 4 95
, 500 (T ex. 2018)

. Under t he doctrine of govern mental immun ity, p o liti ca l subdiv isions of t he

s tat e, in c l ud in g school d istricts, sh are t h e state ’ s i m mu n ity when pe r formin g g overnmental

fun ctions as the s tate ’ s agent

. Rosenb erg D ev. Corp

. v. I mp er ial Per

f o rming A rts, I

n c

. ,
571 S.W. 3d 738, 747 (Tex. 201 9)

. Therefore, l ike sover e i gn imm unity, gov ernme n ta l i mm u n it y
implicates a cour t ’ s subject

- matter j ur isdiction and may be a sserted th r ough a plea to the
jurisdiction or other p roc edural v ehi cl e , such a s a m ot io n f or su m mary j udgment

. Alam o
Heig hts , 5 44 S.W. 3d at 770

. W hen a gove rn mental d efe ndant ch al len ges j u r is di ct ion on the

basi s o f imm unit y , t he plain tiff ’ s burden of aff ir matively demonstrating ju risdictio n i nclud es
establishing a waiver o f immunit y

. Swan son , 590 S. W. 3 d at 550

.

Both th e Whist leblower Act and the TCHRA , the statutes upon w hi c h An der son ’ s

c la im s are bas ed, operate as wa ivers of gover nmental imm unity to the extent the governmental
entity is l iable under the statute

. See Tex. Gov ’ t C ode § 554 .0035 (waiver of imm un ity un d er

Whist leblower A ct) ; University of Hous

. v. Bar th , 403 S.W.3d 851, 85 4 (Te x. 2 013) (noting that8

“ elemen ts of a claim under t he Whist leb lower Act are juri sdictional and may not be waived ” );

Garcia , 372 S.W.3d at 629 (explain ing that TC HRA waives i m munity when p laint iff “ actually

states a clai m for conduct th at would viola te t he [ TC HRA] ” ). I n its jurisdicti onal plea, AISD
challenged both the sufficiency of Anderson ’ s pleadings and the existence of jurisdictional facts
,
wit h supporting evidence

. Thus, o ur ultimate inquiry is whether the pleaded and unnegated facts

pre sente d b y And e r son , taken as true a nd lib erally const rued with an eye to the p leader ’ s intent
,
aff irmatively demonstrate a cl aim within the sco pe of the Whist leblower Act or the TCHRA.

See Bra nt ley v. Texas Youth Comm ’ n , 365 S.W.3 d 89 , 94 (Tex. App.

— Austin 20 11, n o p et .)

.

DISCU SSION

O n appeal, AI SD asserts that the trial co urt erre d in denying its plea because
,
in its view, the undisp u ted fac tual alleg ation s in And erson ’ s pl e ad ings and the juris dictional

evidenc e affirmatively nega te the existence of a val i d wa i v e r of g o vernmental imm u n ity under

b oth the Whist le blower Act and the TCHRA

. In reviewing the trial court ’ s jurisdictional ruling,

w e will first examin e whether Anderson met his burde n to de mon stra te a v al i d wai ver of

immun i ty under the Whist l eblow er Act an d th en examine whether he met his burden as to his

discrimination and retaliation claim s under the TCHRA.

The W h istl e blower Act
Backgrou nd Law

When a t ri al cou rt ’ s j uri sdic ti on is p r emised on a v i o la tio n of the W hi stl eblower

Act, the plaintiff m e ets hi s bu rd e n of af f irmativ e ly demo nstr ating juri s dict i on by a ll eging facts

o r , w h e n necessary , producing evidence of facts sufficien t to show that ( 1) he was a p ublic

e m ploy ee ; ( 2) h e m ade a goo d

- fa ith rep or t o f a violat ion o f law by his empl oying gove r n men t al9

en t it y o r ano t her p ub lic empl oyee ; ( 3 ) t he r e por t was made to a n a ppr op ri at e la w

- enfo rcement
authority, an d ( 4 ) he was subject to an adverse p e r sonnel act io n , suc h as s us p ensi on o r

termination , becaus e of the r eport

. Te xas Dep ’ t of Crim

. Justi ce v . McE ly e a , 23 9 S. W

. 3d 842
, 849 (Te x. App.

— Austin 2 007 , pet. denied) ; see T ex

. Go v ’ t Code § 554.002(a)

.

In its plea to the jurisdict ion
, a nd no w on appeal, AI SD d oe s not dis pute t h at

Anderson was a publ ic em plo yee , tha t he reported c ondu ct by his employ er or an o th er p u b lic

emp lo yee , and that he suffered an adverse personnel act ion

. I nstead
, AIS D a r gue s th at And erson

failed to me et his burden to d emon strate a wai v er of immunity as to the second and third

ele ments of a Whistleblower Act cl aim b e caus e hi s p le ad ing s and t he jurisdic tional evidenc e

affi r matively n e gate the p oss i bi lity th at an y report made by Anderson qua lifies as “ a goo d faith

report o f a violation o f l aw ” to “ an ap propriate law [

- ] enf orcemen t auth or ity
, ” as t hose te rms are

use d in the Act

.

S ec tio n 5 54.0 02 of the W hi st leblower Act defines “ appr opriate law [

- ]enforcem ent
authority ” :

[ A ] report is made to an appropriate l aw [

- ] en fo r c e m e nt au th or i ty if the aut hority is part of a sta te or l ocal go ve r n ment al entity or t he fede r al go vernment that th e
e mpl oy e e in go od faith believes is au tho r ized to : (1) reg u late under o r en fo rce the la w alleged to be violat ed in the repo rt ; or (2) i nv est iga t e o r pro se cute a viol atio n of c r iminal law

.

Tex. Gov ’ t Code § 5 54 .002 ( b)

. As a result
, an em ploy ee seeking p ro tection u n der the

Whist leblower Act must prove tha t “ t he r eport was made to an approp riate law

- enforc ement

auth orit y , o r tha t the employee had a good

- faith belief that it was

. ” Texas Dep ’ t of H uman Servs

.

v. Okoli , 4 40 S.W.3d 611 , 6 14 (Te x

. 2014)

. T he is sue of w h e t her a n e mp loy ee has ma de a report

in “ good f

aith ” to an ap propriate law

- enfor ce me nt au th o rity has bot h su bjective and objective10

e lements

. Univ ers ity of T ex . S w. Me d. C tr. v. Gen til ello , 398 S. W.3d 6 80, 68 3 ( Tex. 2013)

. To

estab li sh “ good

- fai t h ” as it r e late s to an app r opriat e l aw

- enforce ment authority
, the employee

must sh ow that (1) he belie ve d that t he reporte d

- to aut horit y wa s a uthori zed ( a ) to r egu l a t e under

or enfo rce the law alleg e d t o be viol ated in t he r epor t , or ( b ) t o in vestigate or p ro s ecut e a

viol a ti on o f c rim in a l l a w ; and ( 2) his belief was r easonable in light of his training and experience.

S ee Okol i , 44 0 S. W.3d at 614

.

“ A n autho rity ’ s power to d iscipline its ow n or in vesti ga te internally does n ot

sup p o rt a go o d

- fait h belie f t h a t i t is an ap p ropriat e law

- enfo rce m ent authori ty

. ” M cMillen v.

Tex as H ealth & H

um an Servs. Comm ’ n , 485 S.W.3d 427 , 429 (Te x. 2016 ) ( per curiam ) (ci ti ng

Gentilel lo , 398 S.W .3d at 686 ) ; see Texas Comm ’ n on Envt ’ l Quality v. Re sende z , 45 0 S

. W .3 d 520,

523 ( Te x. 2 014) ( p er c uriam) ( “ Inte rna l

- c ompliance aut hority, howeve r , cann ot s upport a good

faith belie f that [reported

- to authority] had the power t o enf orc e t he G ove rnmen t Code ’ s frau d

r eporting provisions or t o pu rsu e crimi na l charges

. ” ) Inst ea d, th e r ep o r te d

- t o autho r ity must

p o s sess “ ou twa r d

- looking po wers , ” M cMill en , 485 S.W.3d at 429 , and “ reports up the ch a in of

command ” are genera lly in sufficient
, Okoli , 440 S.W.3d at 614

. In other w ords
, to co ns ti tute a n

ap pro priate law

- enfo rcement aut hority un d er t he Act, th e r eported

- t o a uth or ity mu st h ave the

powe r to en fo rce, in vest ig a te, or pr osec ute v iolations of law aga in st th ird parties out side of th e

entit y itself, or it must have the pow er to promulgate r egul ations g o ver n ing the con duc t o f th i rd
parties

. G en t il e l lo
, 3 9 8 S. W.3d a t 686

.

In ad dition, b ec ause Sectio n 55 4.002(b) describe s “ a n a ppropri at e law [

- ]

enforcement au thori ty ” in te rms of having ce rta in au th ority i n relation to “ the law allege d to be

violated in th e r ep ort ” or “ a violati on of cr iminal l a w , ” the pa r t icular law th at th e e mploy ee

report e d was v iolate d i s c ritical to the determi natio n of whether the report w as made to a n11

appr o p riate l aw

- enforcement author ity. T exas De p ’ t of Transp . v. Needham , 82 S. W.3d 314
, 320

(Te x

. 2002 ) ; Res e nde z , 450 S

. W .3 d at 5 23 (concl udin g t hat r epo rt of c r imina l viol a tions t o

sta te sen ator ’ s of

fice wa s insu ffi cient to support clai m under Act b ec ause s e na tor ’ s inve stigatory

powers were no t prosecutorial ). With these pr inciples in mi nd, we consider t h e repo rt s m ade b y

An ders on a s all eged i n h is pl ead i ngs

.

R epo rts ma d

e to t he AISD Board of Truste es

L i berally co nst r uing the all egations in Anderson ’ s pleadings and viewing those
allegat ion s in the light most favorable to him, t he repo r ts th at are th e b asi s of And ers on ’ s

W h ist l ebl o w er Act claim w ere ma d e t o t h e A IS D Board of Trus t ees ( in his March 2018 letter )

an d , separately, t o A ss is tant C hief E nv oy

. T he r eported “ v iolati on s o f law ” made to the Board
, as alleged by Anderson and reflected in his March 2018 letter a re tha t ( 1 ) Ser g eant Her re ra

“ sla p p [e d] a ha n dc uffed s t udent an d us [ed ] ex tr e me lang uage ” to ward a student in de tentio n , “ in

vio lation of the Penal Co de , § 22.04 and A IS D Policy No. 1.02.B.2 and 1 .02.B.28 ” ; ( 2 ) Herr era

sex ual ly haras sed a su b ord inate , in v io lation of the Texa s L a bor Code , Chap ter 21 ; and

(3) Assistant Chief Env oy, o the r pol ic e o fficer s, and the AISD s up e rintendent viola t e d v ariou s

AISD pol ici es in their “ mis handlin g of a February 22, 2018 t e rroris t i c thre a t

. ”

W e con clu de t hat the fa ctual al legations i n A nderson ’ s pleadi ngs a nd the r e leva n t
jurisdictional evi dence fai l to rai se a fact i s s ue regarding whet her any of these repo rts , q ual if y as

r ep orts mad e t o an “ appr opria te law [

- ] e nforc eme nt au thority ” unde r the Wh is tle b low er A ct

.
See Tex. Go v ’ t Code § 55 4 .002(b)

. A nd e r son does not alleg e , nor is ther e an y evide nce

su gg esting
, that the Board has any authority t o “ investi gate or prosecu te ” criminal offenses

. See

id

. ( governmental authority is “ appropriate l aw [

- ] en fo r c e m ent au th or i ty if

. . . th e empl oy ee in12

goo d fa ith b elieves [the authority] is au tho r ized to

. . . i nv est iga te o r pro se cute a viol atio n of

c r iminal law ” ). I n addition, ne it her the alle gati on s nor the eviden ce show that t he B oa rd has any

autho rity to “ reg ulate under or e n fo rce ” any of t he al l e g edly viol ate d l aws ( i

. e. , th e Penal Code
, the Labor Code, or AIS D pol icies ) ou t si de of AI S D
, ag a in s t th ird pa rti es

. See i d. ( governmental
authority is “ appropriate l aw [

- ] en fo r c e m ent au th or i ty if

. . . th e empl oy ee in good fai th beli eves
[th e authority] i s a u t ho r ized to

. . . . reg u late under o r en fo rce the la w alleged to be violat ed in the

repo rt ” ). A t be st, the B o ar d i s res ponsible f or internal c o mp lianc e with its own poli cies and with

the laws cited b y A nderson

. S e e Re sende z , 45 0 S

. W.3 d at 523 (inte r na l

- c om pliance authority is

in sufficient to establish status as appropriate law

- enfo rcement au thority). Moreover
, give n his

ex perti s e a nd tra ini ng , A nde rson could not have reasonably b e lieved th a t the Board o f Tr us t e es

poss essed the a ut hority to regula t e un der o r en fo rc e any of th e c ited

- to laws ag ainst third p art ies,

outside of the school district. S ee Oko l i
, 44 0 S.W.3d at 614

. Ther e f ore, t o th e e xten t A nd ers on

rel ies on his March 2018 letter to the B oard to suppo r t h is Wh is tl e blo we r claim
, we co nclude

that th e Board is no t a n “ a pp rop riat e law

- enf o rcement aut hority, ” within the mea ning o f the Act.

Rep o rts m ade to Assistant Chief Envo y

T urning t o the r eports that Anderson al lege s he made t o Assistant Chi ef Envo y,

t he r eported “ v io la ti on s o f law ” are t hat Serg eant Herre r a ( 1 ) wa s “ slee pi ng on the job
, in

violation of [the Texas] Penal Code, C ha pter 31 ” ; and ( 2 ) worked ov er t ime d ut y wh il e o n l ea ve

unde r the F a m ily and M edic al Leave Act ( F M LA)
, ” in violat io n of AI SD Policy No. 3.09.A. 2. ”

As to his repo r t that Herrera was impro p erl y wor king while on FMLA l eave , Anderson does not allege a nd the evidence does not suggest that the AISD Police Departme nt

has an y “ outward

- l oo king powers ” to regulat e or enforce the F MLA o r A ISD Polic y regar din g13

use of FML A lea v e. See M cMill en , 485 S.W .3d at 429

. In addition, Anderson does not allege

tha t working while on FMLA is a vi olati on of criminal law
, and we are not awa re of any crim inal

law prohibiti ng such work

. Finally, give n hi s ex perti s e a nd tr aini ng , A nde rson cou l d not have
reasonably b e lieved th a t the Department poss essed the aut hority to regula t e un der o r en fo rc e

either the FMLA or AIS D Policy outside of the district. S ee Oko l i
, 44 0 S.W.3d at 614

. Consequently, the factual allegations in And erson ’ s pleadings , t a ken as true, and the
jurisdictional evidence , viewed in the ligh t most favorable to And e rson , fail to show that he

belie ve d in good faith that Assistant Chief En voy or the Department wa s a uthori zed (1) to

r egu l a t e under or enforce , outside of the district
, the F MLA or A ISD Pol icy, or (2 ) to in vestigate

or p ro s ecut e a viol a ti on the FMLA or A I SD Policy as a violation of c rim in al l a w

. S ee id.

Ther e f ore, t o th e exten t A nd ers on rel ie s on his FMLA

- leave report to s uppo rt h is Wh is tle blo wer

claim , we co nclude tha t Assistant Chief E nvoy is not a n “ a pp rop riat e law

- enf o rcement

aut hority, ” within the mea ning o f the Act.

To the extent Anderson re lies on his report to Assistant Chief Envoy t hat Herrera

violated Chapter 31 of t he Penal Code
, however, we re c ognize that t he P oli c e D epar tme nt wit hin

AI SD i s au thori zed to conduc t crimina l i n ve st iga t i ons within i ts ju r isd ict ion . As previously

discussed, “ ap propri ate l aw

- en fo r c e me nt au th or i ty ” incl udes a gover nmental auth ority “ tha t

t h e employee in good faith b el iev es is aut h o r ized to

. . . i nvest iga te or p ro secut e a viol ation of

c rimin al law. ” Tex. Gov ’ t Code § 554 .002 ( b)

. Consequently, r e ports to the Departm ent o f

violati on s of crim ina l law

— including vi o la tions com mitted by the D e pa r tment ’ s o wn
employ ees

— may q ualify as re p or ts of “ violations o f la w ” to an “ a ppr o pri ate l aw [

- ] enfo rc eme nt

aut h ority. ” G entilello
, 398 S.W.3d a t 6 86 (no t ing t hat “ [ a] pol i ce departme nt employee could

retain the pro tect ion s of t h e Whi s tl eb lower Act if sh e r ep o rted that her partner [wa s eng aging14

i n c riminal narcotic s ac ti vit y ] to h er sup er vis o r i n n a r cotics or i nt ernal af fairs d iv ision ” ) ; see

also Oko l i , 44 0 S.W. 3d at 616 ( e x pla ining th at internal r eport of vio lat ion of c riminal l aw to

p olic e could be prot e ct ed under Act ). There fore, w hether Ander s on has demonstr ated a valid

Whist l e bl ower Act claim a s it relates to his re port th at Herrera was sleeping on the job
, turns on

whether such conduct c ons titutes “ a vio l at i on of crimi n al l aw , ” as tha t phra se is us ed i n the Ac t

.
See T ex. Gov ’ t Co d e § 5 5 4

. 0 0 2 ( b )

.

L ibe rall y c o ns t rued, Anders on all eges that H e rr era ’ s sl e ep in g while on d uty

con stitutes th eft un der Ch apter 31 of Pe na l Code b ec ause , pre sumably, h e receiv ed payment for

work or services n ot a ctua ll y perfor med

. L ike th e defin ition of “ a ppr o priate l a w [

- ] en forcem ent

aut horit y, ” t he “ viola tio n o f law ” element in co rporates a g oo d

- f aith s t a nda rd

. T hat i s, a p l ai ntiff

is protec t ed by t he W hist l eblow er Act wh en , in “ good fai th, ” he report s a viola ti on of la w.

Ci ty o f E lsa v. G onzale z , 325 S.W

. 3d 622, 626 ( T ex. 2 010) (per cur iam). C onseq uentl y, to
prevail on hi s Whist leblower Act claim And erson must show that he bel ieve d th at H errer a ’ s

sl ee pin g wh i le on duty cons ti t uted a viol a tion of law and his be lief must ha ve bee n reasona ble

based on his tr a ining an d e x perien c e. See i d.

Chap ter 3 1 of t he Penal C ode does not ex pres sly cr i minaliz e s leep ing d uring

work or even while on polic e du ty

. In stea d, S e ction 31.02 provi des th a t “ [a] p ers on commits a n

offense if he un l awful ly appropr i ates property wi t h intent to d e p rive t he owner of p rop e rt y

. ”

Tex. Penal Cod e § 31.02

. N ot hing in the fa cts as al leged in Anderson ’ s pl eadings or the

e vid enc e pre sen ted su gge st s th at H e rrera , by s l eeping, in t e n ded to d ep ri ve AISD of its p rope rt y

.
See Gr iffin v. State , 614 S.W.2d 15 5, 159 ( Tex. Cr im . App. 1 98 1) ( “ I ntent t o depriv e must be

deter mined from the words an d acts of the accus ed. ” ) ; see al s o Te x . Pena l Code § 31. 01

( “ [F ] ail ur e to per form th e promise i n i ss ue with ou t other ev i den ce of i n t ent or kn owle dge i s15

not suff icient pro of that the act or did no t i ntend to pe r f orm

. ” )

. Moreover, i n his deposition

t esti mon y, Anderson was a sk ed whether h e belie ved that he was reporti ng a violati o n o f law

w h e n he report e d Herrer a ’ s s lee p i ng t o E n vo y

. In re sponse , And ers on st a ted th at he di d no t

know if i t was a v i ola t ion o f la w b ut that h e knew it was ag ainst Department pol icy. An derson

was th e n a s ked whe t her base d o n his exper i e nce a nd t ra in ing, h e would ref e r a re port of an

e mp lo yee slee pi ng on th e job to the distr ict attorney fo r pr osec ut io n

. Anderso n replied tha t he

w ould not , and h e agreed that i t would have been f riv olous to do so.

T he undispu te d evid e nc e pr esented by A IS D i n supp or t of its plea a f firmativel y

demonst rat es t hat A nde rson di d n ot su bjectiv e ly b e l ie ve that Herr era ’ s sl ee pi n g cons titu ted the ft

und er the Pen a l Code and t hat, objectiv e ly, it would have bee n un re ason able for Anderso n t o

belie ve that Herrera ’ s s leeping wh ile on du ty c onstit u ted theft. Cons equently, Ander son ’ s re por t

that Herrer a was s lee ping while o n duty
, e v en if true, is not a good

- faith re por t of a vio l ation

o f c ri mi nal law

.

In s ummary, t he undisputed allegatio ns in Anders on ’ s ple a din g s a nd the per ti nent
juris dictio n al evidence, viewed in the ligh t m ost favor ab le to A nde rson, af firmatively

de mon strate t hat n one of the re ports tha t are the b asis of A nd e r so n ’ s Whis t leblower cl aim q ua lif y

as “ a good fait h report of a violation o f law ” to “ an app ropr iat e law [

- ] enf o rce ment auth ority
, ”

within the mea ning of t he Whis tl eb lo wer Ac t. B eca use Anderso n fail ed to me et h i s burden to

d em onstrate a v alid w aiver of im mu n i t y un der the Act , the trial c ourt erred in denyin g AISD ’ s
ple a to the jurisdiction as to this cl aim

.16

Texa s C ommi ssion on Human Rights A ct

B ackg rou nd L aw

The T CHRA pr ovi d es t hat a n e mp l oye r co mmits an u nl a w ful e mploymen t

p ract ic e if bec ause of “ race, color, se x, national origin , reli gion, age, or disability ” the empl oy e r

“ fai ls o r r efu ses to hir e an i n d ivid ual, di scha rges an indi vidual , dis crim i nate s in an y other m an n er

a gain s t a n indiv id u a l in conn e cti o n w ith compensation or t he te r m, c onditions
, or pri vi leges of

emp l oym ent. ” T ex. Lab. Code § 21.0 51(1 )

. In addition
, t he Act pr o hibits a n employ er fr o m

reta liating aga inst an empl oyee for en gagi ng in c ertai n protect ed act ivitie s , in cludi ng “ oppo s [ ing ]

a d i sc r iminatory pract ice. ” Id. § 21 .055

. T he Te xas L eg isl a tur e ena cted th e TCH RA, in pa rt,

to “ execu t [ e]

. . . the po l ic ie s of T i tle V II of the Civ il R ig hts Act o f 1964 a nd its su bsequent

am endm ents. ” Id

. § 21.0 01( 1 )

. Co nseque n t l y , w he n a n al yzi ng a c la i m br ought under the T CHR A,

w e may look to f

e der al law int e rpreting analog ous T i t l e V II prov isions as a uthority. In re Unit ed

Ser v s. Au to

. As s ’ n , 307 S

. W .3 d 2 9 9, 308 (Tex

. 2 010) (orig. proceed ing)

.

T o est abl ish a c la im of unlawful di sc rimi n ati o n or reta l iation un der the TCH R A
, a
plaintiff m a y rel y o n eith e r d i rect or cir cumstant ial evid e nce. Ala mo Heig hts
, 544 S. W. 3d

a t 7 81

- 82 ; Texas Al c oholi c Bev. Comm ’ n v . Moralez, No. 0 3

- 19

- 00588

- CV, 20 21 Tex. App

.

LE X I S 603 6, a t * 20 ( Tex. App.

— Au stin Ju ly 29, 2 0 21, n o pet.) (mem. op. )

. Ge ne ra lly, d ire ct

evide nce is eviden ce of “ w ha t the defendant did and said
, ” Garcia , 372 S.W3d at 63 4
, tha t,

with out infere nce or presum ptio n , esta blishes discriminatory intent
, Je spers en v. Swee twater

Ra nch A pts. , 390 S. W.3d 64 4, 653

- 54 (Tex. App.

— D allas 20 12 , no pet.)

. Once a p laintiff

pr ese nts direct ev idence, the burde n shifts to the employer to show that th e sa me adver s e
employment decisi o n woul d have been made rega rdless of a ny di scrimi nato r y animus. Ci ty of17

Austin Poli ce D ep ’ t v. Brown , 96 S.W.3d 588
, 597 (Tex. App.

— Austin 2002
, pet. dism ’ d ) (citing

Pric e Waterhouse v. H

opkins , 490 U.S. 228, 2 44

- 45 (1989) )

.
Be ca use “ moti ves are often more c o v ert than ov ert , ” mak ing dir ect evide nce of

an i m us hard to come by, a pla intiff ma y in s tead establish discrimi na tion or retaliation with

c ircums ta ntial evidence

. Ga rcia , 372 S.W. 3 d at 634

. When a plainti ff relies on ci rc u m st a ntia l

ev idence, we evaluate t h e pl aint iff ’ s c laim b y appl ying the burden

- s hi f ting fra m ework

e sta blishe d b y the Un i t e d State s Sup reme C o urt i n M c Donne ll Dougla s Co rp. v

. G ree n , 4 11 U

. S.

792 (19 73 )

. S ee Alamo Heig hts , 544 S.W.3d at 78 2 (explaining tha t b ur den

- s hif ti ng steps
apply to r e t a liat ion cl a ims)

. U nder thi s f ram ew ork, a r eb ut t able presumptio n o f dis criminati on o r

retaliatio n arises w he n an empl oye e establishes a p rima facie cas e

. Alamo Hei ghts , 544 S.W.3d

at 78 1

. An employer c an defe a t th is pres u m p tio n , however, by pr ov id ing e v i d enc e o f a
leg itim a te , nondisc rimin ato ry re as on for the emp loy ment acti on

. Id. Fin a lly, “o n ce rebutte d, th e

presum ption disap pe ars , and an e mp loy ee lacking di rect evidence can not prove a statutory

viol ati o n wi thou t evide nc e th a t th e employe r ’ s sta t e d reason is fals e and a pr etex t for

d isc ri min ation

. ” Id. Al thoug h t he burden s of prod u c t ion sh ift under the fra me wo rk , th e burden
of p er su as ion alw ay s r emains with t he employee. Id.

Circumst ant ial Evid

en ce of Rac e Di

s crimi na tion

AIS D a r gues that t h e tr ial co ur t erred in den yi ng its pl ea as to An ders on ’ s claim

o f r acial di scr imina tio n b e ca use , it contends, he f ail ed to adequately plea d fa c ts est ab lis hing a

p r ima facie case and because the undisputed juri sdictional ev idence a ff irm at ively negates the

e xisten ce o f a prima facie case

.18 T he pr e ci se ele men ts of a prima f a c ie case “ vary de p en d i n g o n the

circumst ance s. ” Exxon Mobil Corp. v R i ncones , 520 S .W .3d 5 72, 584 (Tex. 20 17 )

. To establish

a prima facie case of raci al dis crim ina tion ba sed o n dispara t e tr eatment , the plainti f f must show

that he (1) i s a memb er of a pr otected c l a s s , (2) wa s qualified fo r the posi tio n at issue, (3) was

su b ject t o a n adverse emp lo y ment action, and (4) wa s treated l ess fa vora bl y than si mi la rly

situ at e d m embe r s outside the p rotecte d c la s s. 1 Bedgoo d v

. Tex as Educ. A g ency , N o. 03

- 14

-

00030

- CV
, 2015 Tex

. A pp. L E X I S 1546, at * 4 ( Te x. App.

— Au stin Feb. 19, 2015, pe t . den ied)
(mem. op.) (citing Reev es v. S a nderson Plumbing P rods., Inc

. , 530 U.S. 1 33 , 14 2 ( 2 000 ) ; Ysleta

Inde p. S ch. D ist. v. Mo na rrez , 177 S. W.3 d 915, 9 17 ( T ex

. 2005 ) )

. Here, AISD do e s not di spu te

that A nd e rs on wa s quali f ied for hi s position
, that he is a me mber of protect ed class , or that he
was subject to an adverse emp loyment action when he was terminated

. In stead
, AISD co ntends

that Ande r so n has fai led t o af fi r ma tiv ely sho w th a t he was t reat ed l e ss f av o rab l y than si milarly

s itu ate d me mber s out s id e of his prot ect ed cla ss , the fourt h element of a prima facie

discriminat ion case.

“ Employ ees are si mi larly situated if the i r c ircu mstance s a re co mparable in al l

material r espec ts, i nc luding si m ila r stan da rd s, supe rv i s ors, and con du ct

. ” Ysl eta Indep. Sch.

D i st

. , 177 S. W. 3d at 91 7

. I n ot her words, “ [t] he s itu atio ns and condu ct of the employees i n

que sti on must be ‘ nearly ident ica l

. ’ ” Ri ncones , 5 20 S .W.3d a t 58 4 (q uoting Au tozone, In c

. v.

R eyes , 27 2 S.W. 3d 5 88
, 594 ( T e x. 2008) ). “ E mp l oye es with diffe rent re s po n sibil iti es ,

superv i sors , ca pab ilities , wor k ru l e viol at ions , or d isciplinary r ecord s a re no t c on side re d to be

1 A term inated empl oyee can also est ablish a prima f ac ie c a se of di scri mi natio n b y sho w ing th at he w as replac e d by so m eon e o u t s ide of his p rote c ted c lass

. See T exas T ech Un iv

. Health S cis. C t r.

- El Paso v

. F lore s , 612 S.W .3d 299, 305 (Tex. 20 2 0 )

. Ander son , who i s African

- American
, has not alleg ed or plead ed any fact s showing t hat h e w a s replac ed by

someon e w ho is not Afr ican

- American

.19

‘ near ly identical

. ’ ” Id. (q uoting R eye s , 27 2 S. W.3d at 594 ). “ [ O] rd inarily, i t w i ll no t b e t he

case t hat a pl ai nt i ff is similarly si tu ated to an o ther emp lo yee w h en the plai nti ff i s s ubord inat e

t o th at employee

. ” Id. ( q uoti ng Bu rks v

. W i sc on sin De

p ’ t o f Transp. , 464 F. 3d 744, 75 1

( 7th Cir. 20 06) ).

In his p leadi ngs, A nde rson s tates that h e i s “ bl ack

- A f ri can Ameri ca n , ” a nd that h e

was subject t o a n “ a dver se employmen t action ” when he wa s su spended and then , a few days

l ater, t e rmi n ate d f

rom his em ploym ent. 2 And ers on also g enerall y alleges t hat h e was “ sub jec ted

t o ra ci ally based disp arate tr eat m ent , ” t hat the re w a s “ fa vor i tism for sim ilar l y si t uated H is pan i c
employees . . . a nd simil ar l y s itua ted Caucas ia n o r white emp l oy ees , ” and th at “ the actio n s of

the deci sion ma kers i n his t erm inat ion were mot ivated by consider at ions of his r ac e

. ” H o w eve r ,
An de r s on does not id ent ify any employees who , in his vi ew, w ere “ si mil ar ly situate d ” ; p rovi de
any d etails as to whe ther such s imil arly sit uat ed emplo yees ha d simila r standa r ds, supervi sors ,
and condu ct ; o r d escribe ho w the se un i dentified emplo y ee s w e re t r eat ed m ore favo r ab ly by

AISD

. In short, the f

ac t ual all e gat ions in Ander son ’ s p leadings
, li berall y co nstrue d and ta ke n as

2 I n h is p etit ion , an d in his r e sponse to A IS D ’ s plea to t h e juri s dict ion
, An d er s o n
r ecites a lis t of additi on al a ctions tha t he contends wer e discr im inatory and re taliator y , incl u ding (1) bei ng in st ru c t ed by Assistant Chief Envoy “ t o wri t e an e mail ou tlining h i s r e p o r ts r eg ar d i ng Sergeant Herr era ’ s v iolations ” ; (2) being “ tran sferr ed f ro m th e N o rth Co mma nd to th e Sout h C om mand, i ncr easing the commute fr om his ho me

. . . by a pproximat ely 1.5 ho urs per d ay ” ; a n d (3 ) meeting “ w i th As sis tant C h ief E nvoy to discus s h is a l l e ged ‘ p er f o rm ance defi c iencies

. ’ ” F or purpos es of discr i mi nation, th e TC HR A onl y a ddre ss es “ ult i m ate hirin g decis i ons, ” s uch as hiring, gra n ting l ea ve , d ischargi n g, promo ting, o r compensat in g. S ee Be dgood v. Tex as Ed uc. Agency
, No. 03

- 14

- 00030

- C V, 2015 T ex

. App. L EXI S 1546, at *16 (T ex. App.

— Austin Feb. 19, 20 15 , p et . denied ) (m em. op. ) ; Pt ome y v. Tex as Tec h Un iv.
, 277 S.W. 3d 487, 492 (Te x. App.

— Amarillo 20 09, pet. d en i ed)

. It d o es not add ress “ e very deci si on m a d e b y employer s tha t argua bly mig ht h ave s ome ta nge n tial effect o n emp lo yment deci si ons , ” such as d isciplinary fi lings
, r epri mands, po or perfor m ance r eviews , hostili ty from fellow emp loye es, verbal t hreats,

or criticism of the employ ee ’ s work

. Anderson v . Hou st on Cmt y. Col l

. Sys. , 458 S. W

. 3 d 63 3, 644 (T ex

. App.

— Houston [ 1st D i s t.] 2015, no pet

. )

. U nder thi s standard, the add iti o nal ac tio n s recited b y And e rson in his plea dings do n ot qu alify as “ adverse em pl oym ent acti ons ” fo r the purpose of e stablishing his d iscri minat ion claim.20

true , fail t o sh ow th at Ande rson was treate d less fa v orabl y than s imi larly si t uate d me mbers

out s ide of th e pr otected cla s s.

I n add i tion, we conclude tha t t he jurisdictional evidence , view ed in the light most

favor able to Anderson, is insufficient to create a fact is sue as to whether he was subjected to
dispar ate treatm ent because of h is race. I n hi s dep os i tion testimo ny, which A ISD s ub mit te d

in sup port o f i ts plea, Ande rs on was questioned a bout which e mploye es , if any, h e believed

received m ore fa vorable tre atment f rom the AISD Polic e Department

. In response , Anders on

identi fied Assi s tant Ch ie f E nv o y and Serg eant H err era

. As to En v oy, A n de rson testifi ed that

En v o y r eceived prefere nt ial treatment i n 20 12
, when he was pr omoted to C aptain over Anderso n.

Ac co r ding to Anderson
, he w as ranked higher than Envoy at th e time of t he promot ion ; h ow ever,

as ide from his rank
, Anderso n pr ovided n o o t her facts s uggestin g that E nvo y w a s less qu alif ied

than Anders on for that posit ion

. Moreover, Anders on d oes not allege in h is pleadings that he

suf fered an adverse employment action wh en he was not pr omote d in 201 2 n or did he raise this

in his compla i nt w ith th e Texas Workf orce Com mis sion ( TW C)

. In li ght of the amo unt of time

si nce th at promotion decisi on , we ca nno t co nclud e that t his evidenc e is su ffic ien t to cr eate a f act

issue as to whether Anderso n was subject ed to dispa rat e treatme nt by AISD

. S e e T e x. L abo r

Code § 21 .202 (com pla int with TW C must be filed not l ater than 1 8 0th day after date alleged

unla wful emplo y ment p ractic e occurred ); Prai rie Vi ew A&M v . Chatha , 381 S.W.3d 500
, 513

(Tex. 2012) ( conc luding t hat 180

- day dea dline is ju r isdictiona l p re requ isite to suit )

.

As to Se rgeant Herrera, Anderson state d in his depo sit ion that Herre ra receiv ed
preferential t r eat ment beca use althou gh H err era ha d violate d Department policies on severa l

occa s ions
, “ there wa s n ever any a ct ion taken. ” A nderson a c k n o wl edged , h ow e ver , that he an d

He rrer a had different ran ks wi thin the Departm ent

— H errera bei ng of a lower ra nk
, Sergean t

—21

and th at Herrera ha d di ff

e r ent s up ervisor s and job sta ndard s th an he did

. See Reyes , 272 S. W. 3d

at 594 ( “ E mploye es with differe nt r e s pons ibilities
, supervisors, ca pabi lities, work rule violations
,
or d i s ciplinary record s are not considered to be ‘ nearly i dentical. ’ ” ). In a d dit ion
, Anderson does

not all ege , and the e vidence does not show
, th at t he Department has ev er in v es tigated a ny claim

tha t Herrera r etalia ted aga ins t a subordina t e

— th e mis con duct t hat Chi e f Gonza le z asser ts w as the

“ f inal straw ” leading to h i s decision t o rec o mme n d A nderson ’ s termi na t ion. See Ysleta I ndep.

Sch. Dist

. , 177 S.W.3d at 9 1 7

- 18 ( explaini ng th at to prove disc ri min a tion based on dispara te

di scipline, employee must usually show th at mi sconduct for which he was d ischarge d was nearly

i dentical to conduc t en gag ed in by empl oyee th at was r etained )

. Co n s equen tly, the j urisdict io nal

evide nce fai l s to sho w that H e rrer a is “ nearly identical ” to An der son fo r the purpose o f

de mon str a ting di scrimination based on di sparate treatment

. Se e Ri nco ne s , 520 S .W.3d at 584

.

We concl u de that An derson ’ s r acial

- d iscrimination cl aim
, as alleg ed, is

insufficient to de mon strat e a va lid wa iver of immunity under t he TCHRA. Moreover, the
undisputed j u ris dictional evidence submitted by AISD affirmatively neg ates the ex istenc e of a

si milarly si tuated employe e who recei ve d more favorab le trea tment th an Anderson. As a result
,
Anders on f

ailed to satisfy his burden to e sta blish a p rima facie ca se of raci al discr iminatio n

bas ed on disparate treatment , the only t he ory of dis c rimina ti on t hat he has alleged.

Di r ect Eviden ce of Racial Discrimi natio n

A lth oug h AISD ch aracterizes A nderson ’ s r a cia l

- d isc r i min ation claim as rel yin g

s olely on circumstantial evide nce, w e a lso con si der whether t here is direct evidence to su pport

hi s discrimin at ion c la i m

. Direct evidence of discrimin a t ion is evi dence that, if b eli eve d, proves

the fact o f d iscrimi nat o ry in t ent wi thout in fere n ce o r p r es umption. Jespers en , 390 S.W.3d22

at 653

- 54

. On th e oth er hand, i f an inference is required f or ev idence to be p ro bat iv e a s to

the employer ’ s discr imi nator y animu s in makin g an employm e n t decision
, the e viden ce is

cir cu m stan t ia l

. Id.

G e ner al l y , s tat eme nts that court s h ave found cons t itute direct ev iden ce of

discr imination are insults o r slur s a gainst a protect e d grou p

. K IPP , Inc. v. Whitehea d
,
446 S

. W.3 d 99
, 10 7 (Tex. A pp.

— H ouston [ 1st Dist. ] 2014, pet. de nied) ; s ee B rown v . Eas t Mis s.

Elec

. Power As s ’ n , 989 F.2 d 858, 861 ( 5th Cir. 19 93) (not ing that “ rou tine us e of racial slurs

constitutes di rect evidence that raci a l a nimus was a motivating fa c tor i n an emplo yment

decis ion ” )

. Howev er, s ta tements and remar ks

— includin g i nsul ts and s lurs

— may se rve a s d ire ct

evidence of dis crimination on ly if they are (1) related t o the employee ’ s p rotected class
, ( 2) proximate in time t o the employment decision at is s ue , (3 ) made b y an ind ividu al with

au t hority over the empl oyment dec i s ion, an d (4 ) relate d t o the employ men t d ecision at issue.

Reyes , 272 S. W.3d at 593 ; see Jack son v. C al

- W. Packaging Corp
., 602 F .3d 37 4 , 380 ( 5 th C ir

.
2 01 0) ; Anderson v. Houston Cm t y

. Coll

. Sys.
, 458 S.W.3d 633, 644 ( Tex. App

. — H ou ston

[ 1st D ist .] 2015
, no p et. )

. Com me nts that d o not satisfy t h e s e four requirement s are consider ed

“ stray remarks ” and ins uff icient to establish disc rimin at ion

. Reyes
, 27 2 S

. W.3d at 592

. In his ple a dings, Anderson does not allege that Env oy or Go nz ale z made any

st atement s or took any ac tions t hat
, without infe r enc e or presum ption
, would demonstr ate tha t

the decision to ter minate Anderson was motiv ated by his r ac e. H ow ever , i n s u pport of his

respons e to AISD ’ s plea
, Anderson attach ed hi s own sw o rn d ecl arat ion

. 3 In rele vant p a rt,

Ander so n stat es in his declarat i on :

3 At th e h eari ng on its p l ea, and in i ts reply to Ander son ’ s res ponse, AISD o bjected t o these p o rtions of And erson ’ s affi da vit as inadmissible hearsay. Nothi ng in the record, ho wever,23

[ A] t le ast three African Am eri c an students reporte d to me that A sst. Chief Envoy referre d to them as “ n ** * * * ” while they were in his car e , custody, a nd c ontrol. Also, S ergea nt Corbe t repo rted Assis tan t C hief En vo y u sing the w ord “ n***** ” in his pr e se nce

.

Ther e can be no dispute that the s e statements , if p roven , are offe nsive racial slurs and t hat E nvoy

was And erson ’ s supervisor and inv o lved with th e de c ision to termina te h i s employ m ent , ev en if

Gonzale z a c tually ma d e the d ecision to recommend termin ati on

. See Russell v. McK inn ey Hos p.

Vent ure , 235 F.3d 219 ( 5th C ir. 2000) ( “ We t h ere fore look to who a ctuall y ma de the d ecisi o n

or caused t he decision to be made, n ot simpl y to who o ffi cially m ade the decision

. ” ) ; R ey es ,
272 S. W.3d at 593 (explaining tha t “ di scrimi natory animus by a per so n other than the decisio n

maker may be impute d to a n employe r if evidence i ndic ates th at the per son i n question po ss essed

l everage or e x ert ed in fluence over the de cision

- mak er ” ). Th eref o r e , whe ther the stat ements
qualify as direct evid ence of discriminato ry inten t turns on whether the y were made a t a time

p roximat e to Anderson ’ s sus pension and termina tion in April 20 19 and wh ether they ar e r elate d

to the decisi o n to suspend and then te rmi n at e An derson ’ s em ploy ment

.

As ide from Ander son ’ s declaration , t h er e is no evidence , including A nderson ’ s

own deposition test imony, that Env oy m ade any r a cial slurs or other racis t stateme nts

. In

additio n , in his dec l aration
, Anderson does no t include a n y fa ct ual details a bout when th e

a llege d statement s were made or t hat otherwise sugg est that the statement s we re made s hortly

before And erson ’ s s uspensi on and t ermination . I n othe r words, ther e is no evid ence showing

that the s lur s were made “ proximate i n tim e t o the employment decis io n a t issu e

. ” See Reyes
,

shows that A ISD obtained a ruli ng on its objectio n. See Te x. R. App

. P. 3 3. 1 ; S t one v. Mid land M u ltifamily E quity REIT

, 334 S .W.3d 371, 374 (Tex. A pp.

— Dalla s 2011, no pet.) ( notin g that

“ [a]n o bjecti on that an affida vit contains hearsa y i s an objec tion to the form of th e affidavit ” and that “ [t] he failu r e t o obta in a ruli ng from th e t ri al court on a n objection to the f orm o f an affidavit waives the o b

j ection ” ).24

272 S. W.3d at 593 ; Anderson , 458 S.W.3d at 645 ( concludi n g that eviden ce that sup ervis or

use d ra cial slu r was not di rec t evidence of discrimination b ecaus e em ploy ee di d not “ identify an

ad verse emplo y ment action that occurred pro xi mat ely in time to [su p ervi so r ’ s] us e of racial s lur ”
or present evi dence “ that th e comment rela ted to an adv ers e e mployme nt de cis io n ” )

. Similar ly
,
there is n o evidence s ugge sting that th e sta te men ts were related to A nderson ’ s su spen sion and

termination. See Reyes , 272 S. W.3d at 593 ; see a lso Texas T e ch Univ. Health Scis. Ctr

. - El Paso

v. Flores , 612 S.W. 3 d 299, 313 (Tex. 202 0 ) (exp laining that ge neral ly comments about protected

statu s con stitu te direct e vi dence of discrim ina t ory in tent o n ly if they “ are tied to th e a dverse
employment action at issu e both in terms o f when a nd by who m they were made ” ) ( quoti n g

Goudeau v. Nat i ona l Oilwe ll Varco, L.P. , 793 F.3 d 4 70, 475 ( 5t h Cir. 2015) ) )

. W e c annot

co n clude tha t Ander son ’ s de c la r ation, showin g that Env oy u se d r a cial sl ur s at some un known

time in some un known conte xt , is su fficient to cons titute direct evidence o f d is criminatory in tent

.
V iewing Anderson ’ s decla rat ion in the light mos t favo rable to him, a reasonab l e fact finder c ou l d

not conclu de with out in f erence or pre sum ption that t he decision to suspe nd and then terminate

Anderson ’ s employment was motived by r ace

. See Jespers en , 390 S .W.3d at 653

- 54

.

I n s umm ary, Ande r son has failed to al l ege facts or pres en t evide n ce that, i f

believed , cons ti tute s direct evid enc e of ra cia l di scr iminatio n or , alternat ively, to establ ish a prima

fac ia case of racial d iscrimi nat i o n

. As a result, A nd erson f ailed to affirmative ly demonst rate a

valid waiver of immun ity u nde r the TCHRA a s to his r ac i al

- discriminatio n claim
, and the tri al

co ur t e rred in denying AI SD ’ s plea to t he jurisdic tion on this claim.25

Circum s tantial Evid

ence of Re t

a lia ti o n

AISD a r gues that the t rial c ourt err ed in d e ny ing its plea t o the jurisdi ction as to

A n de r son ’ s cl a im of ret aliatio n unde r the T CHRA fo r two i nde penden t reasons. AIS D argu es

th at (1) And e rson failed to estab lish a prim a faci e ca se of ret ali a tion , and (2) in the alternative
,
that it established a le gi timate non dis c rimin atory re ason for Ande r son ’ s te r mi n ation , and he

fa iled to raise a fact issue on whether that reason was a pretex t.

To e stabl is h a prima fac ie case of reta l iat ion und er Section 21. 055 , the Act ’ s

anti retaliation pro vision , an employe e must show (1) h e eng aged in an activity pr o tect e d b y

t h e TCHR A, ( 2 ) he e x per ie nced a mater ial a dv ers e em plo yme nt a cti on, an d (3) a c aus a l link

exis ts between t he protected activi ty and the adv ers e action. See Te x. Lab. C ode § 21. 00 5 ;
Alamo Heig hts
, 54 4 S.W. 3d at 78 1 (apply ing Mc D onne l l Dougla s fra mework t o r e t ali atio n claim

u n d er TC H RA an d ex p laining t hat al l aspe c t s of f ramewo rk ar e juri sdictio nal ). As to th e f irs t

element, a n e mployee engages i n a p rotected ac tivity when h e , “ unde r thi s chapter, ” “ opp os e s a

di s cri mi nato ry pra cti c e, ” “ make s or fi les a ch a r g e , ” “ files a com plain t, ” or “ test ifi es , as sis t s, or

par t i c ipa t es in any man ner in a n investi gation, pro cee di n g, or heari n g. ” Tex . Lab. Code § 2 1. 055

.

Bec au se s exual harassment is a f orm of sex discr im ination und e r T i tl e V I I an d the TC H RA , i t

is a “ disc r im i nat ory practi ce ” und er Sect ion 21.055
, a n d oppo sit ion t o se xual ha r assm en t is a
protected activity

. S an A nton i o Water Sys. v. N i cholas
, 461 S. W. 3d 131, 1 37 (Tex. 20 1 5)

. Here,

l iber ally const ru ing An derson ’ s pl eadings
, the on l y potential ly pro tected a c ti v ity alleged by

Ande rs on was his reporting to th e B oard o f T rustees in h is Mar ch 2018 lette r that H err e ra had

been accus e d of sexu ally haras sing a subordin at e

. 4

4 To t h e exte nt And erson suggests that AISD retaliat ed a gainst him fo r fi li ng a g rievanc e complain ing about th e Dep artmen t ’ s h andling of the ter ror i stic t h r eat at Akins Hi gh S c hool , we26 In addition
, as the s ec ond element, th e only p ote ntial retal iato r y action ta ken by

AI SD , a s a l leged by Anderson
, occ urred wh en he was tra nsfe rred t o a di fferent wor k l oca tion,
suspend ed for t hree da ys, and , shortly thereafter, t e rmi nated from his emplo yment. 5 H owever ,
in hi s complaint to t he TWC
, An der s on stated only that he had be en “ termina t ed ” “ i n retali ation

for his op posi t ion to unlawful employme n t actions

. ” As a result, we construe Ande rson ’ s

retaliation claim as a claim for retalia tory disc harge

. See Coun ty of T ravi s v. Manio n , No. 0 3

- 11

-

005 33

- C V, 2 012 Tex. A p p. LEX IS 4004, at * 6 (Tex

. A p p

. — Austin May 17, 2012, no pet. ) ( m em.

o p.) ( ex plain ing tha t actio n under TCHRA req uires “ exh aust ion of a dm inistrative remed ies ”

a nd that court will no t construe complaint filed with T WC “ to inc l ude f acts tha t w ere ini tially

o mit ted ” ( quoting H

ar ris v. Da v id McDavid Hon da
, 213 F.App ’x 258, 2 6 1 ( 5t h Ci r . 2006) ( per

curiam ) (not for publicat ion)) ) ; s ee also T ex. Lab o r Code § 21 .202 (complaint with T W C must

be filed not later than 1 8 0th day after date a ll eged unl a wf ul emplo y ment p ractic e occurred )

.
A ISD c o n t ends that A nd e rson failed to estab lis h a pri m a faci e ca s e of ret aliation

a s to the thi rd elemen t because
, it asserts, he failed to d emonstrate that there is a caus a l link

d isagr e e t hat this com plaint co n stitutes ac tivity protecte d b y the TCHRA

. T h e undis puted factual al legations and the jurisdictional evide nc e es tablish that th e grievance was not b a sed on disc rimin ation pr otected b y the TCH R A and th a t , cons e q ue n t l y, t he com plain t was not “ under t his ch a pter. ” Se e Texas Dep ’ t of Tran sp. v. L ara , 62 5 S.W.3 d 46, 59 (Tex . 2 021) ( “ [ T ]o invoke the prote ctio ns of Se ct io n 21.055 , the c onduct r elied on by t h e employee ‘ must , at a minimum
, al ert the em ployer to the e m p lo ye e ’ s r easona ble b e lief that unlawfu l discr iminat ion is at issue. ” (qu otin g Alam o Heig hts Indep. Sch. Dist. v. C lark , 5 44 S. W. 3d 7 55
, 7 86 (Tex . 20 1 8) ) )

.

5 As pr eviously mentioned
, i n h is pe t i tion
, A nde rs on list s other action s ta k e n by AISD tha t he con te nd s wer e reta liato r y. See s up ra f n.2. The TCHRA , however, doe s not p rotect

e m plo yees fr om all retali atory employme nt actio n s , only actions th at are m ate r ially ad verse. Alamo Heights
, 5 44 S. W

. 3d a t 7 88

. Mat eria lly adverse “ m eans i t wel l might have diss u a de d a
r ea so n able w o rker f

rom ma k ing o r su p porting a charge of d iscr im ination. ” Id

. (quo ti ng B u rling t on N. & S anta Fe Ry. v . Whi te , 548 U.S. 53, 67

- 68 (2 006) ). Wh ile the other actions

a lleged b y An de rson m ay be u npleasan t and anno y i n g, t hey fa il to rise t o t h e le vel o f mate r ial advers it y. Se e id.27

b etween hi s co mplaint of al l e ged sexual h arassment i n M a rch 2018 and h is termi nat i on in

A pril 2 019. Second, and in the a l ternat iv e , AI SD arg ues that e v en if A nd erso n met h is burden

to e stabli sh a prima facie ca se o f reta liation under the first ste p of th e McDonnell D ou glas

burden

- s h i ftin g fram ew ork
, he failed t o establish a va lid waiv e r o f immunity for h is retal iat io n

claim becaus e ( 1) A IS D me t i ts bur d en under the se c ond s tep to produ ce a legitima te,

nondisc riminat ory reason for terminating Ander s o n ; (2) the burden s hi fted to A n der s o n unde r th e

third step to raise a fact issue that A I S D ’ s st a te d re ason is a pr e t ext and t hat he wou ld not have

b een terminated but for hi s rep o rting ; and (3) Anders on failed to meet this burden.

All th ree bur den

- shi f

tin g step s of the M

cD onnell Dougl a s framework ar e
jurisdictional

. A lamo Height s , 544 S.W

. 3 d a t 783

- 84

. Consequently, b ot h of AISD ’ s

arg umen ts

— one ch allenging whether Anderso n met his bur den under the first step
, and the ot her
challenging whether Anderson m et his burden und er t he third step

— a re potential ly dispositiv e

of its j urisdict ional ch a l l e n ge , and w e will begin ou r a naly sis b y consi dering AISD ’ s second

ar gument . That i s , app lying M cD onn el l Dougla s , w e will ass ume wit hout de cidin g that

A nde rson me t h i s initial bur den to e st abli sh a pr i m a f aci e c ase of retali at ion

— including the

p ri ma

- fac i e

- c ase element of a “ c ausal lin k be t ween ” his c omplain t of s exua l hara ssmen t and hi s

term in ation

. In light of this ass umpti on, we will then exami ne whether AISD met i t s burden

und er t h e s e cond step o f t h e Mc D onne ll Do uglas fram ework to produce ev idence o f a leg i timate,

nondi s crimina tor y reason for its action s and, if so, wh ether Anderso n met hi s burde n of raising a

fact i ssue as to w hether the stated reason is pretext a nd that he would no t have been ter m i nated

bu t fo r reporting sexual harassment

. See Ber m u d e z v. Tex as Mut. Ins. Co.
, No . 03

- 17

- 00687

- CV
,
2018 Tex. A pp. LEXIS 7016, at * 6

- 7 (Tex. App.

— Austin Aug. 30, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.)

( affirming trial court ’ s dismissal of retaliation cl aim on summar y judgment be c ause, assumi n g28

wit hout deciding that pl a i n t iff esta blished prima fac ie case , plaintiff failed to rai se f act issue that

defendant ’ s asserted reason was pre tex t )

.

Did AISD show a l egi timate , nondisc riminatory r eason for termin ating Anderso n?

In support of it s plea t o the jurisdiction
, AISD s ub m it t ed sworn declarations fr om

A ss istant Chi ef E n vo y and C h ie f A shley Gonzalez

. I n their decl aration s , Envoy and Gonzalez

deta il e d the event s pr ece ding Chief Gonzalez ’ s re commendatio n t o termin ate A nd e rson for wha t
they d escrib e as “

job performan c e defi ci e nc i es

. ”
According to Ass is t an t Ch ie f En v oy ’ s de clarat i on , on Mar c h 27, 2019, he s ent a

me mo to Ch ie f Gonzalez co n cerning Ande rs o n ’ s job pe rf ormance un rel a ted to the grievance

fil ed b y Herre ra

. I n t he memo, a co py o f which w as s ubmitted by AIS D with its pl e a , En voy

summariz e s his co nc erns w i th A nderson and t h en describe s fo ur incidents
, o ccurr ing over t he
previous t welve month s , t hat ill ustr at e “ [Anderson ’ s ] inabilit y to lead and mana ge inci dent s. ”
For example
, En vo y des c rib e s an in cident that oc c urr e d o n M a rch 14, 201 8
, whe re a parent wi th

a h i story o f viol ence ha d thr eate n ed to sho ot staff at a n AISD midd le school

. A fter the inci de nt

w as repo rt ed to th e AIS D Polic e Departm ent , Assi stant Chief E nv o y received a ca ll fr om

act ing Patr ol Sup ervisor
, Cor pora l A l ex P hil lips . In th e c all, Ph il l ips a s ked Env oy to revi e w th e

conten ts of a not ificati on e

- mail about the threat t hat Phillips ha d dr af t ed

. P hi ll i ps ex pla i ned to
Envoy that althou gh Anderson h ad been informed o f the th rea t , he wa s not availabl e to rev i ew

the contents of the dr aft notification e

- mail

. Aft e r a few hou r s p assed with out rec eivi ng a n

u pdate a bout the inc ident
, En vo y d e cided t o c all An derson

. Envoy aske d Ander son what
precautio ns h ad be en put in p la ce “ to en su re the safety of stude nts, ” an d A n derson stated
, “ he

h ad no updat es on t he i nci d e nt. ”29 Envoy al s o describe s in his memo a sim ilar inc ident that occurred on March 24,

2019. In his mem o , En voy states:

[T ]he depar t m ent receive d i nformation re garding an e l ement ary studen t making

so cial m e di a thr eats. A fter rec eiving an email n otific ation from S gt. T y Neal, I contacte d L t. Rod ney Anderson and i nqui red w hy I was not informed o f the in ciden t. Wh en spea ki ng with And er s on, he prov i de d inaccura te i nformat ion

r e gardi ng the sp ecific f

ac ts invol v in g the in vesti gatio n , l eadin g me to pr o vide i naccur ate inform a tion to district a dm inist ratio n. ”

According to Envoy, “ I t b ecam e appa re nt t o m e that Ander son w as not over seeing this in ci dent,

an d i t w a s necessa ry for me to pr omp t him to take appro pr ia te s t ep s in t hi s i ncident

. ” Env o y

further s tates in his m emo to Gonzalez that o n M arch 26, he met with And e rs on and “ pr esented

to [ h im] t he ar eas of con cerns a nd eve nts me n tioned i n th i s me mo ” and t h at dur ing the meetin g

“ [Anderson ] ac kn o wl edg e d his lack o f invo l v e ment an d gave little i n for mation. ”

In h is dec l arati o n, Chief G onz alez st ates t hat a fter receivi ng th e Mar ch 27 memo

from A ssista nt Chie f Envo y , he sch e dul ed a disc ipl ina r y hear i ng with Ander son to di scuss

t h e per forma nc e i ssu es i dent ified in th e memo a n d “ to p rovide [And ers o n] an oppor tunity

to expla i n his side of the s tory

. ” T he h eari ng was condu cted o n Mar ch 2 9
, 2019, whi le

the gr ieva nce inv es tiga tio n agai nst Anders o n w as stil l pending

. A cco r ding to Gon z a le z ’ s

decl ar ati o n , “ [d ]uri ng t he he ari ng, [ A nderson] failed to p rov i de any valid reason for hi s job

p erformance de fici e nc ie s

. ” On April 1, 2 019
, Chi ef Gonzalez n otified Anderso n in w riting th at

h e w a s sus pend ed for th r ee day s without pay.

As to t he g r ie v ance inve s ti gat io n and Maresh ’ s fi n dings
, d elive r e d on April 5,

2 019
, Gonzalez states in h i s decl a rati on :30

The fina l s traw , a lth ough certain ly not the sole basis for m y r ecom menda tion of te rmin ati o n , wa s when I r ece i ved the investigatio n s u mmary p ursu a n t to Austin IS D Bo a r d P oli cy DIA (Lo ca l), wh i c h co nc l uded that [And e rson] retaliated

a ga inst S g t. He r

rera after Sg t. H e rr era fi led a gr ievance agains t him

. . . . Board Po licy DI A ( Local) pro hi bits re t a l iat ion agains t a n employ ee w ho makes a c l aim alleg in g to have expe ri e nce d di scri minati on or harass m e n t , an d I, as the Au s t in ISD Polic y Depa rt ment ’ s C hief of P olice, d o n ot to lerate re t a liation in the

wo rkpla ce. . . . There fore, g iven [Anderso n ’ s] d ocu m e nted job perfo rma n ce defi ciencies, cou ple d with the f i n di ng that he r e tal i a te d ag ainst Sgt. H erre ra b e cause he filed a gri e vance against [him ], I pla c ed [A n derson] on ad mini s tr ative leav e without pa y and recom mended that Aust in I SD terminate [ An de rson ’ s ]

e mplo yment on A pri l 5, 201 9, which Dr. Med i na approved e ff ective A pr il 10, 2 01 9.

. . . I n no e vent d i d [Ande r son ’ s] r ace or complai nts play an y role

w h atso e v er in my deci sion to recom mend his term ina tion o f emp loyment or anoth er empl oyment relate d deci sio n

.

In short, the evidenc e submitted b y A I SD in suppo r t o f its plea sh ows t hat

An derson was s uspen d e d a n d t hen terminated b ecause , in severa l instanc e s, he had demonstra ted

p oo r job perf

ormance in carrying out his duties a nd becaus e a n eutral inv estiga tor det ermined

that he ret ali ated a gains t a fellow officer

. W e c onclude tha t e ven i f And erso n esta bl i shed a

p rima fa cie case of r et aliation, A ISD met its bur d en under the second step o f the M c Donnell
Douglas framework to show that Anderson was suspended and the n ter mi nated fo r legi ti mate ,

no nd i s crimi n ato r y reason s

.

Did Anderso n create a fact issue as to whet he r AISD ’ s stated reas on is a pretex t?

B eca use AISD s uccessful ly r e butted a n y p res u mp tion that it re taliated ag ains t

Anderson
, the burden s h ift ed to And erson t o show that the expla n ations o ff ered by AISD w ere

not its true r easo n b u t w ere a pr e t ex t f o r re ta l i ation. That is
, e ven assuming A nderson met h i s

burden to establ ish a p rima f aci e case of retal iat ion, to defeat AISD ’ s plea
, he was req uire d to
present evid ence s h owing th at he w oul d not h ave b een t erminat e d “ but for ” h i s infor m ing the

Board o f t h at H err e ra has been accuse d of sexual har as s ment

. See Al am o Hei ghts
, 544 S. W.3d31

at 782 ; D emocrat ic Sc h s. R esearch Inc. v . Rock , 608 S.W .3d 290, 3 11 ( Tex. App.

— H ouston

[ 1 st D ist. ] 202 0, no p et.)

. The b u t

- for cau sa t i on standard i s signi fi c antly more di f f i c ult to p r ove

th a n prima fa cie causati on. A lam o He igh ts , 544 S .W.3d at 7 82

.

In ev aluati n g but

- for cau s at i on evidence
, we examine all the ci rcum stances , including th e te mpor a l pr ox imi ty between t he p rote cted ac t i v ity and the a d verse ac ti on,

knowle dg e o f t he p r ot e cted ac tivi ty, e xpression of a negati v e att itude t oward the em ployee ’ s

pr ot ecte d activity , fa i lu r e to adhere to relevant est abli shed c ompa ny policies, d iscr im inat ory

treat me nt in comparis on to si mila rly s i t ua t ed employe es, and e vidence that t he e m p loye r ’ s

s t ated reas on is false. Id. ; M orale z , 2021 Tex. App. L EXIS 60 36 , at *22. “ Tempo ral proxim ity

is relevant to causation when it is ‘ very close

. ’ ” Al amo Heights , 544 S.W.3d at 790

. Here, t he

undis puted a l leg a ti ons and th e evide nce show th a t And er s on w as s uspended and the n terminate d

appro ximately one year after his March 2 018 le tter t o the Board of Tr ust ees

. Th ere are no
allegations or evidence sugg esti ng that Assist ant Chief Envoy
, Chie f Gon zalez, or an y one el se

invol ved in An de r son ’ s ter m i nat io n was aw a re of h i s anonym o us lett er to the Board or that t hey

were othe rwis e a war e t hat An derson had reporte d t o the Board that Sergeant Herre ra ha d been

acc u sed of s exual harassment. Mo reo v er , e ven i f Envo y and Gonzalez were m ade awa re o f his

lett er to t h e Bo ard
, A nderso n has no t a lle ge d any f acts or pres ented evi dence sugg esting tha t

E nvoy , Gonzalez
, or other s in the Department expressed a ne gative attitude toward hi s informi ng

the Bo ard o f the alleg ed sexu al ha r assment ; th at the Depar t m ent failed t o a dh e re t o a n y
Department pol i c y w hen i t suspended an d t hen termi n ated him; or tha t h e w as tr eated diff erent ly

t han s im ilarly situated employee s who had not rep orted sexu al harassmen t

. I n shor t , we

concl ude tha t the undisputed all egation s a n d th e jurisd ic ti on a l ev ide n c e fail to r ais e a f act
question on t he j u ris dictional issue of whether An der son w ould not have b een termi na ted by the32

AISD P olice Depa rtment “ but for ” h is info rming the Bo ard of Trus t ee s t hat o ne h is co

- wo r kers,
Serge ant Herrera, h ad b een accu s e d of s exu a l ha rassment

.

As s uming w it hout deci d i ng tha t Anderso n met his initial bu rde n under the

M cDonnel l Do uglas f

ra me work to establish a pri ma facie case o f retaliat ion
, he failed t o meet his

su bseq u ent burden t o pl ead facts o r p re se nt evidenc e show i ng that AI S D ’ s stated reason s f or
suspendi ng and th en te r minati ng his e mpl o ym ent w ere pr e texual. Therefore, Ander son failed to
affirmatively demonst rate a valid waiv er of immuni ty under TC H RA as to h is re taliation cl a im
,
and the tr i al co urt erred in deny i ng AI SD ’ s p lea to the jurisdi c t ion on this claim.

CON C LUSION

B ecause A nd erson faile d to affir matively demonstrate a claim for which
immunity is waived
, we r ev ers e the trial court ’ s ord er den ying AISD ’ s plea to th e jurisdiction

and render judgment dis mis s i n g An der s on ’ s claims for lack of jurisdi ction

.

_____________ ______________________ _______ Cha r i L. K el l y , Ju st ice

Be for e Ch ief Ju stice By r n e, Ju st i ce s Tri a n a and Kelly

R everse and Dismissed

Fi led: August 2 5 , 2022