IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 

ROBERT HOHN, § 

§ No. 696, 2013 

Defendant Below, § 

Appellant, § Court Below–Superior Court 

 § of the State of Delaware in 

 v. § and for New Castle County 

§ 

STATE OF DELAWARE, § 

§ 

Plaintiff Below, § Cr. ID No. 1211021787 

Appellee. § 

Submitted: May 29, 2014 

Decided: August 14, 2014 

Before STRINE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and RIDGELY, Justices. 

O R D E R 

This 14th day of August 2014, upon consideration of the appellant’s 

brief filed under Supreme Court Rule 26(c) (“Rule 26(c)”), his attorney’s 

motion to withdraw, and the State’s response, it appears to the Court that: 

(1) On November 28, 2012, the appellant, Robert Hohn, and his 

fiancée were arrested in connection with the abuse of Hohn’s child. A grand 

jury indicted Hohn on charges of Child Abuse in the First Degree, Assault in 

the Second Degree, Conspiracy in the Second Degree, Felony Endangering 

the Welfare of a Child, Unlawful Imprisonment in the Second Degree, and 

eight counts of Misdemeanor Endangering the Welfare of a Child. 
2

(2) On September 16, 2013, Hohn pled guilty to Assault in the 

Second Degree and Misdemeanor Endangering the Welfare of a Child. 

Following a presentence investigation, the Superior Court sentenced Hohn to 

a total of nine years at Level V, suspended after six years and one month for 

two years at Level IV suspended after six months for two years and eleven 

months at Level III probation. This is Hohn’s direct appeal. 

(3) On appeal, Hohn’s appellate counsel (“Counsel”)1 has filed a 

brief and a motion to withdraw under Supreme Court Rule 26(c) (“Rule 

26(c)”). Counsel asserts that, based upon a complete and careful 

examination of the record, there are no arguably appealable issues. Hohn 

responded to Counsel’s presentation with a written submission that raises 

two points challenging the sentence imposed by the Superior Court. The 

State has responded to the position taken by Counsel as well as the issues 

raised by Hohn and has moved to affirm the Superior Court’s judgment. 

(4) When reviewing a motion to withdraw and an accompanying 

brief under Rule 26(c), the Court must be satisfied that the appellant’s 

counsel has made a conscientious examination of the record and the law for 

 

1

 Hohn was represented by a different counsel at trial. 
3

arguable claims.2 The Court must also conduct its own review of the record 

and determine whether the appeal is so totally devoid of at least arguably 

appealable issues that it can be decided without an adversary presentation.3

(5) In the first of two points, Hohn contends that the length of his 

sentence exceeds the statutory maximum by six months. Hohn is mistaken. 

By statute, when the Superior Court imposes a sentence of incarceration that 

totals one year or more, the court must include a period of at least six 

months at Levels IV, III or II “to facilitate the transition of the individual 

back into society.”4

 The six-month transition period “may, at the discretion 

of the court, be in addition to the maximum sentence of imprisonment 

established by the statute.”5

(6) In his second point on appeal, Hohn contends that the judge’s 

“repeated references” to an unrelated criminal case that was prosecuted 

during the judge’s tenure as Attorney General, indicated that the judge was 

biased and had a closed mind when imposing sentence. A sentencing judge 

exhibits a “closed mind” when the sentence imposed “is based on a 

 

2

Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 486 

U.S. 429, 442 (1988); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). 

3

Id.

4

 11 Del. C. § 4204(l). 

5

Id.
4

preconceived bias without consideration of the nature of the offense or the 

character of the defendant.”6

 When deciding on a fair and appropriate 

sentence in a given case, a judge must have an “open mind at least to the 

extent of receiving all information bearing on the question of mitigation.”7

(7) At Hohn’s sentencing, the judge made two brief references to 

the 1998 prosecution and conviction of Carol Albanese for the murder by 

abuse or neglect of Bryan Martin, her boyfriend’s child.8

 The judge’s first 

remark, stating that “in the Br[y]an Martin case, there were other children in 

the case who were well cared for,” was made in response to a victim impact 

statement made by Hohn’s teenage daughter, suggesting that Hohn should 

receive a lesser sentence because he had not abused her and other children in 

the household.9 The judge’s second remark, noting that Hohn’s hitting the 

victim with a belt had caused “serious injury” because of the victim’s 

“diminished health and physical condition, much like in the Br[y]an Martin 

case,” was made in response to defense counsel’s argument that a lesser 

 

6

Jenkins v. State, 8 A.3d 1147, 1155 (Del. 2010) (quoting Weston v. State, 832 A.2d 742, 

746 (Del. 2003)). 

7

Id. (quoting Osburn v. State, 224 A.2d 52, 53 (Del. 1966)). 

8

 See Albanese v. State, 1999 WL 87154 (Del. Jan. 4, 1999) (affirming conviction and 

sentence).

9

See Hr’g Tr. at 31, 8-10 (Dec. 6, 2013). 
5

sentence was justified because Hohn had “been in jail for over a year now 

for [merely] hitting [the victim] with a belt.”10

(8) It appears to the Court that the judge’s references to the 

Albanese case were intended for a proper sentencing purpose, that is, to 

explain by analogy to a prominent case involving similar issues why the 

judge did not accept Hohn’s arguments for a lesser sentence. Neither 

reference reflects bias or a closed mind on the part of the judge, as Hohn 

would have us conclude. 

(9) The first reference involved the judge’s rational determination 

that the fact that an offender had not abused all the children under his care 

did not warrant a lesser sentence for abusing the child he did victimize. The 

second reference involved the judge’s rational determination that someone 

who commits child abuse should not get more lenient treatment when the 

victim was especially vulnerable and the assault would not have had as 

serious an effect on a typical child. 

(10) The mere fact that the judge had been Attorney General when 

the Albanese case was prosecuted and drew on her knowledge of the 

resolution of that case in addressing these specific arguments presented by 

Hohn’s counsel is not sufficient to demonstrate that she was biased or 

 

10 Id. at 33, 20. 
6

sentenced Hohn with a closed mind. Moreover, because the transcript of 

Hohn’s sentencing reflects that the judge listened to victim impact 

statements, the representations of all counsel, and Hohn’s own expressions 

of remorse before imposing sentence, the record does not otherwise support 

a claim that the sentencing judge was biased and/or had a closed mind.11

(11) Upon careful review of the record, the Court has concluded that 

Hohn’s appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any arguably 

appealable issue. We are satisfied that Counsel made a conscientious effort 

to examine the record and the law and properly determined that Hohn could 

not raise a meritorious issue on appeal. 

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to 

affirm is GRANTED. The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 

The motion to withdraw is moot. 

 BY THE COURT: 

 /s/ Henry duPont Ridgely

 Justice 

 

11 See Dabney v. State, 12 A.3d 1101, 1103 (Del. 2009) (concluding that the judge did not 

sentence with a closed mind where the judge listened to the defendant’s claims of 

remorse, considered both attorneys’ arguments, and asked whether the victim wanted to 

make a statement).