PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

 

Nos. 10-1678 & 10-1825

 

MARINA KARPENKO,

 Appellee/Cross-Appellant

v.

PAUL LEENDERTZ,

 Appellant/Cross-Appellee

 

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. No. 5-09-cv-03207)

District Judge: Honorable Thomas M. Golden

 

Argued July 12, 2010

Before: FUENTES, ALDISERT, and ROTH, Circuit Judges.

(Opinion filed: August 24, 2010)

Stephen J. Cullen, Esquire (Argued)

Kelly A. Powers, Esquire

Joshua J. Gayfield, Esquire

Miles & Stockbridge, P. C. 

10 Light Street

Baltimore, MD 21202

Counsel for Appellee/Cross-Appellant
2

Linda Shay Gardner, Esquire (Argued)

Gardner Law Offices

740 Main Street

Bethlehem, PA 18018

Counsel for Appellant/Cross Appellee

 

 O P I N I O N 

 

ROTH, Circuit Judge:

Paul Leendertz, father of the minor child at issue in this

proceeding, appeals the District Court’s grant of a petition filed

by the mother, Marina Karpenko, for the child’s return under the

Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child

Abduction. For the following reasons, we will affirm the grant

of Karpenko’s petition and order the minor child’s immediate

return to her mother in the Netherlands.

I. Background

This action follows a long, bitter dispute between

Leendertz and Karpenko over custody of their minor child, E.L.,

born in Pennsylvania in 2001. Leendertz and Karpenko were

married at the time of E.L.’s birth, but separated in 2002 and

officially divorced in 2007. In September 2002, the

Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas issued an order

incorporating a Custody Stipulation executed by the parties

which provided that (1) Karpenko would obtain primary

physical custody and live with E.L. in the Ukraine, Karpenko’s

native country; and (2) Leendertz would have regular visitation

rights to be arranged in the Ukraine, the Netherlands, or the

United States. Leendertz has family in the Netherlands and, as

a commercial pilot, is able to visit the Netherlands. 
3

Karpenko initially moved with E.L. to the Ukraine, but

at Leendertz’s request, she relocated to Ede, Netherlands. E.L.

arrived in the Netherlands at age two and began attending Dutch

public school at age four. E.L. has numerous Dutch friends and

socializes with Karpenko’s relatives in the Netherlands. E.L.

learned Dutch as her primary language and became immersed in

Dutch culture. 

Although Karpenko’s relocation from the Ukraine to the

Netherlands was ostensibly to accommodate Leendertz,

Karpenko refused to allow full visitation in accordance with the

court-ordered Custody Stipulation. In 2007, following further

deterioration of relations, Karpenko moved to a new location in

Ede, Netherlands, and refused to provide Leendertz with her

address or phone number. In 2008, both parties filed petitions

for sole physical and legal custody: she in the Dutch District

Court of Arnhem, he in the Pennsylvania Court of Common

Pleas. The Dutch court stayed Karpenko’s petition pending a

decision by the Pennsylvania court. 

By Order of May 20, 2009, the Pennsylvania Court of

Common Pleas granted sole custody of E.L. to Leendertz. That

order purports to (1) transfer sole legal and primary physical

custody to Leendertz; (2) grant Leendertz “sole authority to

apply for and obtain a United States passport for the minor child

without Mother’s consent or authorization and without any

further notice to Mother;” (3) grant Leendertz authority to

“obtain custody of the child at any place that she may be found,

whether in the United States or any other country” without any

further proceedings; (4) grant Leendertz and his sister authority

“to pick up the child at her school or any location;” (5) award

Karpenko visitation rights “as she and the Father may agree;”

and (6) adjudge Karpenko in civil contempt for willfully

violating prior court orders. Karpenko appealed and the

Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed.
4

In the Netherlands, a foreign order is not enforceable

until domesticated by a Dutch court. Dutch Civil Code, Title 9,

Article 985, et seq. However, rather than reducing the May 20,

2009, Order to a domestic judgment under Dutch law,

Leendertz arranged to seize E.L. in the Netherlands and return

with her to Pennsylvania without notice to Karpenko or the

Dutch court presiding over the custody proceeding there. On

May 27, 2009, Leendertz located E.L. on the sidewalk outside

her school in the Netherlands. With the help of an unidentified

third party, Leendertz placed E.L. in a car and drove her to

Germany, where they flew to Dubai and ultimately the United

States. Dutch authorities issued an Amber Alert within minutes

of E.L.’s removal. By Order of May 29, 2009, a Dutch court

ruled that (1) at the time of E.L.’s removal, Karpenko and

Leendertz had joint custody under Dutch law; (2) Leendertz

acted unlawfully by removing the child without Karpenko’s

permission; and (3) Leendertz shall immediately return E.L. to

Karpenko. Leendertz refused to comply with the Dutch Order

and currently resides with his new wife and E.L. in

Northampton, Pennsylvania.

On July 20, 2009, Karpenko filed the instant petition for

return of E.L. under the Convention on the Civil Aspects of

International Child Abduction, done at The Hague on October

25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670 at 1, 22514 U.N.T.S. at 98,

reprinted in 51 Fed. Reg. 10, 494 (1986) (Hague Convention),

as codified by the International Child Abduction Remedies Act,

42 U.S.C. 11601, et seq. (ICARA). Karpenko claims she is

entitled to the immediate return of her daughter because

Leendertz wrongfully removed her from the Netherlands to the

United States.

The District Court for the Eastern District of

Pennsylvania granted Karpenko’s petition for E.L.’s return on

March 3, 2010. To avoid potentially relocating E.L. multiple

times during the pendency of this proceeding, however, the
The District Court properly rejected Leendertz’s 1

arguments for abstention under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37

(1971), and Colorado River Water Conservation District v.

United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976), because these matters,

raised in this federal court action, were never raised in the

Pennsylvania state court custody proceeding. See Yang v. Tsui,

416 F.3d 199, 202 (3d Cir. 2005). By its own terms, a

proceeding under the Hague Convention is distinct from

determinations of custody, Hague Convention, art. 19 (“A

decision under this Convention concerning the return of the

child shall not be taken to be a determination on the merits of

any custody issue.”), so the pendency of custody proceedings in

state court supplies no reason for a federal court to abstain from

adjudicating a Hague Convention petition.

5

District Court stayed enforcement of its Order pending appeal.

Leendertz appeals the District Court’s grant of Karpenko’s

Hague Convention petition. Karpenko cross-appeals the District

Court’s entry of the stay.

II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review

The District Court properly exercised jurisdiction under

42 U.S.C. § 11603(a), which confers United States district

courts with original jurisdiction over actions arising under the

Convention. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 1

We review the District Court’s factual findings for clear

error. Factual findings will be upheld so long as the District

Court’s “account of the evidence is plausible in light of the

record, even if . . . we would have weighed the evidence

differently.” Yang v. Tsui, 499 F.3d 259, 270 (3d Cir. 2007).

Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. Id.
Article 3 of the Convention provides: 2

The removal or the retention of a child is to be considered

wrongful where --

a. it is in breach of rights of custody attributed to

a person, an institution or any other body, either

jointly or alone, under the law of the State in

which the child was habitually resident

immediately before the removal or retention; and

b. at the time of removal or retention those rights

were actually exercised, either jointly or alone, or

would have been so exercised but for the removal

or retention.

6

III. Discussion

The Hague Convention, Article 1, sets forth its two

primary objectives: “(a) to secure the prompt return of children

wrongfully removed to or retained in any Contracting State; and

(b) to ensure that rights of custody and of access under the law

of one Contracting State are effectively respected in the other

Contracting States.” The Hague Convention does not provide

a forum to resolve international custody disputes, but rather it

provides a legal process “to restore the status quo prior to any

wrongful removal or retention, and to deter parents from

engaging in international forum shopping in custody cases.”

Yang, 499 F.3d at 270. The United States and the Netherlands

are State signatories to the Convention.

Under the Hague Convention, the petitioner bears the

initial burden of proving by preponderance of the evidence that

the child was habitually resident in a State signatory to the

Convention and was wrongfully removed to a different State as

defined by Article 3. Karkkainen v. Kovalchuk, 445 F.3d 280, 2

287 (3d Cir. 2006). “[A] child’s habitual residence is the place
The affirmative defenses require the respondent to prove 3

(1)that a grave risk that the child’s return would expose him or

her to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the

child in an intolerable situation by clear and convincing

evidence; (2) that the child’s return would not be permitted by

the fundamental principles of the requested State relating to the

protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms by clear

and convincing evidence; (3) that the child is now settled in his

or her new environment by preponderance of the evidence; (4)

that the person from whom the child was removed was not

exercising custody rights at the time of removal or retention, or

had consented to or subsequently acquiesced in the removal or

retention by preponderance of the evidence; or (5) that the child

objects to being returned and has attained an age and degree of

maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of its views by

preponderance of the evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 11603(e)(2).

7

where he or she has been physically present for an amount of

time sufficient for acclimatization and which has a degree of

settled purpose from the child’s perspective.” Id. at 291-92. In

Yang, we divided the analysis of the petitioner’s burden into

four parts:

A court must determine (1) when the removal or

retention took place; (2) the child’s habitual

residence immediately prior to such removal or

retention; (3) whether the removal or retention

breached the petitioner’s custody rights under the

law of the child’s habitual residence; and (4)

whether the petitioner was exercising his or her

custody rights at the time of removal or retention.

499 F.3d at 270-71. Once the petitioner meets its initial burden,

the respondent may oppose the child’s return by proving one of

five affirmative defenses. 

3
The District Court explained its holding on habitual 4

residence as follows: 

The child moved with the Mother to the Netherlands when she

was only two years old. The child has lived in the Netherlands

with the Mother for the past six years. At the time she was

removed, the child was attending school in the Netherlands

where she has numerous friends. Her primary language is Dutch

and she was fully involved in all aspects of daily and cultural

life in the Netherlands. There can be no doubt that the

Netherlands, not the United States, is the place where she has

been physically present from the age of two until she was

removed at the age of eight and which held a degree of settled

purpose from the child’s perspective.

8

The District Court held an evidentiary hearing, after

which it issued the following factual findings and legal

conclusions: E.L. was removed on May 27, 2009, from her

habitual residence in the Netherlands. Karpenko had custody 4

at the time of removal because, under Dutch law, divorced

parents retain joint custody until a Dutch court rules otherwise;

there was no severance of joint custody by a Dutch court as of

May 27, 2009, a point conceded by Leendertz’s expert on Dutch

law. Karpenko was exercising her custody rights at the time of

removal because she was actively involved in E.L.’s daily life.

By removing E.L., Leendertz breached Karpenko’s custody

rights under Dutch law because he resorted to an extreme form

of self-help, “a snatch and run,” rather than registering the

Pennsylvania court’s May 20, 2009, Order in the Netherlands as

required by Dutch law. Leendertz failed to carry his burden of

establishing his affirmative defense, i.e., that granting the

petition would pose a grave risk of physical, sexual, or

psychological abuse upon E.L.’s return.

Leendertz argues that the District Court’s factual findings

are clearly erroneous. We disagree. Leendertz’s claims of error

do not leave us with a firm conviction that any of the factual
9

findings are mistaken. For example, Leendertz argues that the

District Court failed to consider the parties’ settled parental

intent regarding the child’s location in its analysis of habitual

residence. As “critical” evidence of settled parental intent that

E.L. would reside in the United States, Leendertz relies on a

February 28, 2002, custody agreement which purports to

stipulate E.L.’s habitual residence to be the United States. Even

assuming it were possible for parents to contractually stipulate

a child’s habitual residence, Leendertz’s reliance on the

February 28, 2002, agreement is misplaced. That stipulation

was vacated when the Pennsylvania court adopted the parties’

subsequently executed Custody Stipulation on September 19,

2002. The September 19, 2002, Custody Stipulation states that

E.L. would reside in the Ukraine.

In another claim of purported error, Leendertz argues the

District Court disregarded evidence that his conduct complied

with Dutch and American law “[a]t all times,” and therefore he

did not breach Karpenko’s custody rights by removing E.L. from

the Netherlands. Leendertz contends he was legally entitled to

rely on the Pennsylvania court’s May 20, 2009, Order when he

seized E.L. outside her school in the Netherlands. However,

that Order purports to exercise power authorizing conduct by

Leendertz on foreign soil – in particular, a “snatch and grab,” as

accurately characterized by the District Court. A Pennsylvania

state court lacks jurisdiction to authorize such conduct;

therefore, the Pennsylvania court’s May 20, 2009, Order was a

nullity in the Netherlands until domesticated by a Dutch court.

On May 29, 2009, a Dutch court ruled that Leendertz acted

unlawfully by removing the child without Karpenko’s

permission. These facts support the District Court’s finding that

Leendertz breached Karpenko’s custody rights.

We conclude that the District Court’s findings of fact

were not clearly erroneous. We agree with the District Court’s

ultimate assessment: “Under no authority was the Father 
Our sister court has exercised inherent equitable power 5

to deny relief in the analogous but distinct context of fugitive

disentitlement, which “limits access to courts in the United

States by a fugitive who has fled a criminal conviction in a court

in the United States,” Prevot v. Prevot, 59 F.3d 556, 562 (6th

Cir. 1995) (Hague Convention petition dismissed because

petitioner was a fugitive in the United States), but fugitive

disentitlement does not apply to Karpenko’s conduct here.

10

authorized to snatch the child from her school in the manner he

did.” 

At oral argument, a member of this panel posed a novel

question which was not raised or briefed by the parties or

considered by the District Court: Should this Court exercise its

equitable power to deny relief under the Hague Convention

because Karpenko filed this petition with unclean hands? The

doctrine of unclean hands, named for the equitable maxim that

“he who comes into equity must come with clean hands,” “is a

self-imposed ordinance that closes the doors of a court of equity

to one tainted with inequitableness or bad faith relative to the

matter in which he seeks relief, however improper may have

been the behavior of the defendant.” Precision Instrument Mfg.

Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 814 (1945). The

doctrine may be raised sua sponte, Highmark, Inc. v. UPMC

Health Plan, 276 F.3d 160, 174 (3d Cir. 2001); the question then

is whether its application is appropriate here.

Karpenko’s conduct in the Netherlands was decidedly not

commendable; it was wrong for her to interfere with Leendertz’s

visitation rights and to refuse to disclose the child’s new address

after relocating. But we are not aware of any authority that

would support dismissal of a Hague Convention petition on

grounds of unclean hands. The language of the Hague 5

Convention, and of ICARA which implements it, demonstrates

that their purpose is to protect the well-being of children. The

Convention’s preamble emphasizes that “the interests of
11

children are of paramount importance in matters relating to their

custody” and expresses a desire to protect children from the

harms caused by wrongful removal. Hague Convention,

preamble. The conduct of the parents, other than the claim of

abduction or retention, is not mentioned in the Hague

Convention except to the extent that that conduct may be

relevant to one of the affirmative defenses. Moreover, article 19

of the Convention provides that a decision to return a child

under the Convention is not a determination on the merits of

custody. Custody is to be decided by a court of the child’s

“habitual residence.” The purpose of the Convention is to

safeguard the child by discouraging kidnapping in connection

with custody disputes.

We conclude that application of the unclean hands

doctrine would undermine the Hague Convention’s goal of

protecting the well-being of the child, of restoring the status quo

before the child’s abduction, and of ensuring “that rights of

custody and of access under the law of one Contracting State are

effectively respected in the other Contracting States.” Hague

Convention, art. 1(b). 

Furthermore, wrongful removal of a child is most likely

to occur when strained relations between parents are at their

worst. As part of the irresponsible behavior that may

accompany such strained relations, one or both parents may

interfere with the other’s custody rights. The Hague Convention

discourages parents from resorting to the most extreme form of

interference, child abduction, by providing a judicial remedy for

removal. If relief for abduction were unavailable to parents with

allegedly unclean hands, the well-being of the abducted child,

which is a main purpose of the Hague Convention, would be

ignored. There would be no remedy to prevent a cycle of

abduction and re-abduction, an outcome which would inflict

needless harm on vulnerable children. 
12

As we have mentioned, a petitioner’s prior conduct may

be relevant to determining whether relief should be granted, but

such conduct does not destroy eligibility to file a claim under the

Hague Convention. Once a petition is filed, the court will

consider the petitioner’s prior conduct in the context of the

respondent’s affirmative defenses, such as an assertion that

returning the child would pose a grave risk of harm. The

affirmative defenses allow consideration of those aspects of the

petitioner’s conduct which directly relate to the child’s wellbeing. Here, Leendertz did raise the affirmative defense of

physical or psychological harm to the child. The District Court

found for Karpenko on this issue. In addition, any irresponsible

conduct by either party will be a consideration by the proper

court in future custody proceedings. 

Moreover, when considered against the facts of this case,

we can see how inappropriate the doctrine of unclean hands

would be because Leendertz engaged in precisely the type of

conduct that the Hague Convention was designed to deter. 

Leendertz brazenly violated Dutch law when he snatched his

daughter from school and ran with her from Germany to Dubai

to the United States. Dutch authorities responded by issuing an

Amber Alert, much the way American authorities would respond

if such illegal conduct were to be committed in the United

States. 

If Leendertz had simply followed the procedures under

Dutch law to domesticate the Pennsylvania court’s May 20,

2009, Order, the Dutch court would have had the opportunity to

consider this claim of custody. In 2008, when the parties filed

separate custody petitions in the United States and the

Netherlands, the Dutch court stayed Karpenko’s custody

proceeding pending a ruling by the Pennsylvania court rather

than granting Karpenko custody in Leendertz’s absence. The

Dutch court’s handling of the case demonstrates its willingness

to consider Leendertz’s interests and the Pennsylvania court’s
13

decision. By resorting to self-help, Leendertz foreclosed an

opportunity to perfect a claim to custody. We conclude that the

doctrine of unclean hands does not bar Karpenko’s pursuit of

statutory remedies under the Hague Convention to restore the

status quo before E.L’s abduction.

IV. Conclusion

For the above stated reasons, we will affirm the District

Court’s Order, granting Karpenko’s petition under the Hague

Convention, lift the stay of enforcement of that Order so that

E.L. may be returned to the Netherlands immediately, and

dismiss Karpenko’s cross-appeal of the stay as moot.
Marina Karpenko v. Paul Leendertz

Nos. 10-1678 & 10-1825

ALDISERT, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

My colleagues conclude that the Hague Convention and

the International Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA), 42

U.S.C. §§ 11601-11610, divest this Court of its elemental power

to deny relief to a litigant with “unclean hands” relative to the

equitable remedy sought. I disagree, as I cannot accept that the

Convention sub silentio undermines our power – and indeed, our

obligation – to deny equitable relief to a petitioner who has

engaged in unconscionable conduct directly bearing on the

dispute between the parties. Accordingly, I would raise the

unclean-hands doctrine sua sponte to dismiss Karpenko’s

petition based on her unscrupulous actions in willfully violating

the custody orders of Pennsylvania courts, abusing

Pennsylvania’s legal processes, absconding with the parties’

daughter, E.L., and denying E.L. all access to Leendertz, her

father, since 2006. Because this unconscionable misconduct

relates directly to Karpenko’s claim for return of a child under

the Hague Convention, it operates as a complete bar to her

relief. Respectfully, I dissent.

I.

Both the Hague Convention and its available remedy –

the return of a child – are equitable in nature. See Hazbun Escaf
See also, e.g., Bell v. Aerodex, Inc., 473 F.2d 869, 872 1

(5th Cir. 1973) (“[T]he remedy sought . . . dictate[s] whether the

case will be considered an action at law or a proceeding in

equity.”).

2

v. Rodriquez, 200 F. Supp. 2d 603, 611 n.21 (E.D. Va. 2002).1

As with other equitable remedies, therefore, Hague relief is

subject to the equitable doctrine that “he who comes into equity

must come with clean hands.” Precision Instr. Mfg. Co. v. Aut.

Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 814 (1945) (quotation marks

omitted). The doctrine of unclean hands is “a self-imposed

ordinance that closes the doors of a court of equity to one tainted

with inequitableness or bad faith relative to the matter in which

he seeks relief, however improper may have been the behavior

of the defendant.” Id. Courts close their doors “only for such

violations of conscience as in some measure affect the equitable

relations between the parties [relative to the relief sought].”

Highmark, Inc. v. UPMC Health Plan, 276 F.3d 160, 174 (3d

Cir. 2001) (quotation omitted). As we have often emphasized,

the nexus “between the misconduct and the claim must be

close.” E.g., In re New Valley Corp., 181 F.3d 517, 525 (3d Cir.

1999).

Although the doctrine of unclean hands is frequently

interposed as an equitable defense, we may raise the doctrine

sua sponte, see Highmark, 276 F.3d at 174, to ensure that our

equitable powers are “never . . . exerted in behalf of one who

has acted fraudulently or who by deceit or any unfair means has
3

gained an advantage,” Keystone Driller Co. v. Gen. Excavator

Co., 290 U.S. 240, 245 (1933). As we have explained

previously,

the equitable doctrine of unclean hands is not a

matter of defense to the defendant. Rather, in

applying it[,] courts are concerned primarily with

their own integrity, and with avoiding becoming

the abettor of iniquity.

Ne. Women’s Ctr., Inc. v. McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342, 1354 (3d

Cir. 1989) (citations and quotations omitted). Consequently, it

is our prerogative, and even our obligation, to shut this Federal

Court’s doors “in limine” to a remedy-seeker who has

committed “some unconscionable act [with an] immediate and

necessary relation to the equity that he seeks.” Keystone, 290

U.S. at 245.

 Contrary to the majority’s conclusion, the doctrine of

unclean hands is fully applicable to litigation under the Hague

Convention. Although the majority is correct that the uncleanhands doctrine is not among the Convention’s enumerated

exceptions, I presume that “Congress is knowledgeable about

existing law pertinent to the legislation it enacts,” Goodyear

Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174, 185 (1988), including the

doctrines of equitable tolling and fugitive disentitlement, as well

as the unclean-hands doctrine, applicable to suitors seeking

equitable relief. Consequently, I do not share the majority’s
See also Prevot v. Prevot, 59 F.3d 556, 566 (6th Cir.

2

1995) (leaving open the question whether “unclean hands” may

be asserted as a “defense” or exception in a case under the

Hague Convention). 

4

difficulty in locating “any authority that would support dismissal

of a Hague Convention petition on grounds of unclean hands.”

Maj. Op. at 11. The long arm of equity is present here. Indeed,

the equitable nature of the Convention’s remedy renders the

unclean-hands doctrine fully applicable in Convention cases.

Nothing in ICARA or the Convention specifies otherwise. That

is all the “authority” I require.2

The majority is mistaken in assuming that Hague

litigation is immune from traditional equitable doctrines. In

Journe v. Journe, 911 F. Supp. 43 (D.P.R. 1995), a district court

invoked its “equitable powers” and the doctrine of waiver to

dismiss Dr. Journe’s petition for the return of his children under

the Hague Convention. Id. at 47-48. After his wife removed his

children from France to Puerto Rico, Dr. Journe voluntarily

dismissed his divorce and custody proceedings in French court.

Id. at 48. In view of those facts, the court held that Dr. Journe

“waived” his Hague remedy by “eschew[ing] [his] opportunity

to resolve the custody dispute in his native France.” Id. In the

court’s view, Dr. Journes’s conduct evinced “an intent to

relinquish his rights to have the custody issues decided by the

courts of France.” Id. Significantly, the court’s waiver analysis

afforded no special solicitude for Hague Convention claims. See
5

id.

Courts have similarly invoked their equitable powers to

deny Hague relief under the fugitive disentitlement doctrine. In

Prevot v. Prevot, 59 F.3d 556 (6th Cir. 1995), the Court of

Appeals for the Sixth Circuit applied the doctrine to reverse the

district court’s grant of the Hague petition of Mr. Prevot, a

fugitive from the United States. Id. at 566-567. In the court’s

view, “nothing in the [Hague] Convention or [ICARA] . . .

purports to strip an American court of the powers inherent to it

as a court,” including the powers to “react to abuses of

American criminal process, to defiance of judicially-imposed

obligations owed to victims of crime, and to flights from

financial responsibilities to our government.” Id. at 566. Other

courts have followed suit. See Pesin v. Rodriguez, 244 F.3d

1250, 1253 (11th Cir. 2001) (applying the doctrine to dismiss

the fugitive mother’s appeal from the district court’s order

granting the father’s Hague petition, reasoning that “[w]e cannot

permit [her] to reap the benefits of a judicial system the orders

of which she has continued to flaunt”); Sasson v. Shenhar, 667

S.E.2d 555, 564 (Va. 2008) (affirming the appellate court’s

dismissal of the father’s Hague appeal on fugitive disentitlement

grounds). Additionally, those courts that have declined to apply

the disentitlement doctrine have done so based on specific

factual circumstances, and have not determined the doctrine to

be categorically inapplicable to claims of wrongful removal
See March v. Levine, 249 F.3d 462, 470 (6th Cir. 2001) 3

(observing that “[g]iven the fundamental rights at issue, . . .

disentitlement will generally be too harsh a sanction in a case

involving an ICARA petition,” and declining to disentitle the

petitioner based on civil contempt orders unrelated to the

parties’ Hague dispute); Walsh v. Walsh, 221 F.3d 204, 216 (1st

Cir. 2000) (holding that dismissal under the fugitive

disentitlement doctrine would be “too harsh[,] particularly in the

absence of any showing that the fugitive status has impaired the

rights of the other parent”).

6

under the Hague Convention. In my view, these cases 3

demonstrate that Hague litigation is subject to the full range of

nonstatutory equitable doctrines applicable in other

controversies. As indicated, because the return-of-child remedy

is essentially equitable, a Hague petition is subject to equity’s

doctrine of unclean hands.

The majority finds the unclean-hands doctrine

inapplicable in Hague litigation because it “would undermine

the Hague Convention’s goal of protecting the well-being of the

child, of restoring the status quo before the child’s abduction,

and of ensuring ‘that rights of custody and of access under the

law of one Contracting State are effectively respected in the

other Contracting States.’” Maj. Op. at 11-12 (quoting Hague

Convention, art. 1(b)). But that argument proves too much.

When we apply equitable doctrines to deny a remedy to which

a claimant is otherwise entitled, we necessarily subordinate the
7

substantive law to our Court’s obligation to defend our

jurisprudential reputation and integrity. Cases under the Hague

Convention have been no exception. Thus, when courts have

applied the fugitive disentitlement doctrine to Hague matters,

they have subordinated Hague policies to deter “abuses of

American criminal process,” Prevot, 59 F.3d at 566, “promot[e]

the efficient operation of the courts, discourag[e] flights from

justice, and avoid[] prejudice to the other side caused by the

appellant’s fugitive status,” Pesin, 244 F.3d at 1253. Likewise,

at least one court has subordinated Hague policies to the policies

underlying the doctrine of waiver. See Journe, 911 F. Supp. at

48. Unless the majority is prepared to exempt Hague litigation

from the doctrines of both waiver and fugitive disentitlement, it

lacks a principled basis for refusing to apply the unclean-hands

doctrine on the ground that it “undermine[s]” Hague objectives.

See Maj. Op. at 11.

The majority states that “fugitive disentitlement does not

apply to Karpenko’s conduct here,” Maj. Op. at 11 n.5, but

offers no justification for distinguishing between the equitable

doctrines of fugitive disentitlement and unclean hands. I readily

concede that the unclean-hands doctrine is inapplicable to some

categories of lawsuits, as when litigants represent the public

interest, e.g., Perma Life Mufflers v. Int’l Parts Corp., 392 U.S.

134, 138-139 (1968) (pari delicto defense unavailable in private

antitrust cases because they “serve[] important public

purposes”), or act as private attorneys general, e.g., ASPCA v.

Ringling Bros. & Barnum & Bailey Circus, 244 F.R.D. 49, 53
Through the ages, great writers and dramatists have 4

sounded the call for the intervention of relief now reflected by

modern day equity precepts. “Rigorous law is often rigorous

injustice,” wrote the Roman playwright Terence (185-159 B.C.)

in Heautontimorumenos act. iv, sc. 5, l. 48. Years later Cicero

(106-45 B.C.) wrote that “‘extreme law, extreme injustice’ is

now become a stale proverb in discourse.” I. De Officiis, ch.10.

This aphorism echoed in Jean Racine’s 1664 observation that

“extreme justice is often injustice.” Frères Ennemies, act iv. sc.

3. Then came Voltaire in 1718: “Mais l’extrême justice est une

extrême injure.” Oedipus, act iii, sc. 3. 

8

(D.D.C. 2007) (unclean-hands defense unavailable in litigation

under the Endangered Species Act because private litigants

further “the overriding public policy in favor of protecting the

animals”). But the rationale foreclosing the unclean-hands

doctrine in those cases – that unclean hands should not bar a

litigant from achieving a broad public benefit – is absent in

individual cases under the Hague Convention. Nor can the

majority’s position be justified by reference to the magnitude of

the rights implicated in Hague litigation. See Walsh v. Walsh,

221 F.3d 204, 216 (1st Cir. 2000) (“To bar a parent who has lost

a child from even arguing that the child was wrongfully

removed to another country is too harsh.”). In my view, that

magnitude heightens our profound obligation to ensure that this

Court does not become an instrumentality of iniquity in relation

to those rights.4
9

The majority is also concerned that application of the

unclean-hands doctrine would be commonplace in Hague

Convention matters, because wrongful removal “is most likely

to occur when strained relations between parents are at their

worst” and after “one or both parents may [have] interfere[d]

with the other’s custody rights.” Maj. Op. at 12. They fear that

the unclean-hands doctrine will eviscerate the Hague

Convention’s “remedy [for] prevent[ing] a cycle of abduction

and re-abduction, an outcome which would inflict needless harm

on vulnerable children.” Maj. Op. at 12. But that argument

assumes that we would apply the doctrine woodenly, without

sensitivity to the acrimonious factual circumstances frequently

attending Hague petition cases. Here, I heed the Supreme

Court’s admonition, in the fugitive disentitlement context, that

courts must exercise “restraint,” denying relief only as a

“reasonable response to the problems and needs that provoke it.”

Degen, 517 U.S. at 823-824. Applying that teaching, I would not

deny Hague relief as a matter of course whenever one parent has

done something to “interfere with the other’s custody rights,”

Maj. Op. at 12, as I agree that this may be relatively

commonplace in heated custody battles. I accept that the

unclean-hands doctrine must be applied with restraint, but I

insist that it must be applied. Unless the Supreme Court instructs

otherwise, I refuse to interpret the Hague Convention to afford

unconditional relief to a litigant whose exceptional, inequitable,

and reprehensible misconduct is a direct, but-for cause of the

unlawful removal of which she complains.
10

The majority contends finally that, even if the Hague

Convention is subject to the doctrine of unclean hands, it

inappropriate in this case because “Leendertz engaged in

precisely the type of conduct that the Hague Convention was

designed to deter.” Maj. Op. at 13. As a factual matter, I

disagree. The majority acknowledges, but downplays, the fact

that Leendertz removed his daughter to the United States in

reliance on an order from a Pennsylvania court that purported to

authorize him to “obtain custody of the child at any place that

she may be found, [including “at her school,”] whether in the

United States or any other country.” App. 445-447.

Significantly, it additionally specified that “[n]o further

proceedings or any further orders shall be required for Father to

obtain custody of the child.” App. 445-447. Although the

Pennsylvania court may have lacked the authority to enter an

order with such a huge sweep, that order doubtless made this

case of unlawful removal an exceptional one. Here, Leendertz

did not eschew legitimate legal processes for self-help; he did

not remove his child to the United States because he was

unwilling or unable to obtain judicial relief. Indeed, given

Leendertz’s multi-year effort to gain access to his daughter

through the court system, I doubt he would have removed the

child to the United States but-for the Pennsylvania court’s order

purporting to authorize his actions. I am aware of no other case

in which a Hague respondent effected an unlawful removal that

was purportedly authorized by an American court. Under these

circumstances, I conclude that Leendertz’s conduct was

qualitatively different from that which “Hague Convention was
11

designed to deter,” Maj. Op. at 12, and I find the Convention’s

deterrence rationale completely inapplicable in this case.

In sum, I would hold that the doctrine of unclean hands

is fully applicable in Hague Convention cases, as “[p]ublic

policy . . . makes it obligatory for courts to deny a plaintiff relief

once his ‘unclean hands’ are established.” Gaudiosi, 269 F.2d at

882. Although I recognize that we must measure

“unconscionable conduct” with sensitivity to the factual

peculiarities of Hague cases, I would not except Hague litigation

from this longstanding principle. I now turn to the application of

these precepts to the uncontroverted facts of this case. 

II.

The equitable doctrine of unclean hands applies when a

party seeking relief has committed an “unconscionable” act that

is “immediately related to the equity the party seeks in respect

to the litigation.” Highmark, 276 F.3d at 174. Additionally, the

nexus “‘between the misconduct and the claim must be close.’”

Id. (quoting New Valley, 181 F.3d at 525). I would hold that

Karpenko’s conduct in this case was both unconscionable and

directly related to her petition for the equitable remedy of return

of a child under the Hague Convention. Accordingly, I would

reverse the District Court and remand for the entry of an order

dismissing her petition.

In September 2002, Leendertz and Karpenko entered a
12

stipulation in which they agreed that Karpenko would have

primary physical custody of the child in the Ukraine, subject to

Leendertz’s right to visit the child four times per year, for a total

of thirteen weeks. Karpenko v. Leendertz, No. 09-03207, 2010

WL 831269, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 4, 2010) (District Court’s

Return Order & Opinion); see App. 265-267 (stipulation). The

stipulation was entered as an Order of the Court by a judge of

the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas. Karpenko, 2010 WL

831269, at *1. As agreed, Karpenko thereafter moved with the

child to the Ukraine. Id. In May 2003, she relocated to the

Netherlands, apparently at Leendertz’s request. Id.

Since 2006, Karpenko has unconscionably denied

Leendertz all access to the child, in complete violation of the

parties’ 2002 agreement and the laws of both the United States

and Holland. See id. at *2. Additionally, when Karpenko moved

with the child to a new address in the Netherlands in 2007, she

did not provide Leendertz with her new address or telephone

number. Id. In numerous telephone messages, Karpenko has

threatened Leendertz that he will never see E.L again and has

warned him that, if he tries to see her, Karpenko will change the

child’s name and get her a new passport. Id. Other evidence

indicated that Karpenko maligned Leendertz and denied the

child access even to Leendertz’s relatives in the Netherlands.

See App. 455. In my view this conduct is malicious and

unconscionable; it goes far beyond a simple “interfere[nce] with

[Leendertz’s] custody rights.” Maj. Op. at 12. 
13

Karpenko also behaved unconscionably in disregarding

the custody orders of Pennsylvania courts and manipulating

those courts to her advantage. Not insignificantly, Karpenko

first obtained the right to leave the United States with E.L. via

the September 2002 order of the Pennsylvania Court of

Common Pleas. See Karpenko, 2010 WL 831269, at *1-2. To

obtain that right, Karpenko pledged that Leendertz would have

rights of visitation and access and promised not to challenge the

custody agreement. Id.; App. 266-267. That pledge proved

entirely specious, however, as Karpenko went on to disregard

each of her court-ordered obligations once she departed the

United States. Karpenko first disregarded the court’s order with

respect to Leendertz’s visitation rights; by 2006, she was

determined to deny him any and all access to the child. See

Karpenko, 2010 WL 831269, at *2. Then, in February 2008, she

petitioned a Dutch court for sole custody of E.L., this time

disregarding the Pennsylvania court’s order insofar as it bound

her not to challenge the parties’ September 2002 agreement. See

id. On May 23, 2008, Leendertz filed petitions in Pennsylvania

court for Modification of a Custody Order and for Civil

Contempt. Id. Karpenko sought a continuance of those

proceedings, and in exchange for that continuance, Karpenko

promised the court that she would permit Leendertz to visit with

the child pending the full hearing. See App. 336, 405. Pursuant

to that promise, the court entered an order granting Leendertz

partial physical custody in the Netherlands during the week of

October 26 to November 30, 2008. App. 429. But Karpenko’s

promise was yet another subterfuge; predictably, she defied the
14

court and refused to permit Leendertz to visit with his daughter.

App. 452. In view of those circumstances, a Pennsylvania court

entered a contempt order against Karpenko on May 20, 2009.

Karpenko, 2010 WL 831269, at *2; App. 448-456. That court

additionally awarded Leendertz full custody over E.L. and

authorized him to “obtain custody . . . at any place that she may

be found.” Karpenko, 2010 WL 831269, at *2; App. 446.

When the District Court granted Karpenko’s Petition for

Return of Child, she very nearly succeeded in making the

federal courtsystem an “abettor” of her inequitable conduct. See

Ne. Women’s Ctr., 868 F.2d at 1354. As the District Court

granted Karpenko’s Hague petition, it observed, but apparently

minimized, Karpenko’s complete lack of credibility throughout

the proceedings. Karpenko, 2010 WL 831269, at *3.

Nevertheless, the District Court’s subsequent Stay Order

memorialized its distrust of the litigant who had achieved

success on the merits of her Hague claim. In that order, the

District Court assumed Karpenko would defy almost any court

order adverse to her, emphasizing its “concern[] that the Mother

[would] not comply with an Order from the Third Circuit

ordering the child’s return to the United States.” Karpenko v.

Leendertz, 2010 WL 996465, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 15, 2010)

(District Court’s Stay Order). To circumvent an adverse order,

the Court predicted that “[t]he Mother may . . . flee with the

child to an unknown location in Europe and change the child’s

name, as she has threatened to do in the past.” Id. In my view,

Karpenko’s inequitable conduct toward Leendertz thus
15

continued as she invoked the District Court’s power against him,

while making it clear that she did not consider herself to be

bound by its orders. Unlike my colleagues, I would not permit

her to employ the power of the federal courts in this abusive

manner. Additionally, in view of Karpenko’s evident disdain for

American courts, I believe it is only fitting to deny her “the

benefits of a judicial system the orders of which she has

continued to flaunt,” Pesin, 244 F.3d at 1253, just as we do in

fugitive disentitlement cases.

Karpenko’s petition under the Hague Convention is but

her latest effort to make American courts the instrumentalities

of her inequitable conduct. In my view, we are duty-bound to

deny Karpenko all equitable relief in view of her unconscionable

and fraudulent conduct – her manipulation of the American legal

process, her defiance of court orders, and her unrelenting

iniquity toward Leendertz. It is plain that Karpenko seeks equity

in this Court after she “gained an advantage” by “act[ing]

fraudulently, [by] deceit, [and by] unfair means.” Keystone, 290

U.S. at 244-245. I would hold that Karpenko’s unclean hands

bar us from hearing her case, much less granting her requested

relief. Accordingly, I would remand these proceedings to the

District Court for entry of an order dismissing Karpenko’s

petition. For the reasons heretofore stated, I respectfully dissent.