NO. 07-08 -021 0-CR IN THE CO URT OF APPEA LS FO R THE S EVEN TH D ISTRI CT O F TEXAS

AT AM AR ILLO PAN EL B MA RC H 2, 20 09

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___ TROY A. BOW LEY , Appel lan t
v. THE S TATE OF TEXAS, Appel lee

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______ FRO M T HE 13 7 DIS T RI CT COU RT OF L UB BO CKCOU NT Y; TH NO. 200 7-41 8,4 23; HON. CECIL G. PURY EAR, PRES IDING

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____ Opinion

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____ Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and HANCOCK, JJ. T royA. Bo w l ey w as c on v i cte d of fel on y D W I. H e c l ai ms on ap pe al th athis conviction shou ld be rev ersed b ecau se 1) he received inef fective assistance of

coun sel, and 2)the tr ial co urt er re d i n noti nst ru ctin g the j ur y to dis re g ard c omments from the prosec utor

aboutpl ea neg oti ati ons or g ra nti ng a mi str ial

. W e rev erse.2

Ineff ect iv e As si sta nce of C ounse l DW I i s el ev at ed to a th i rd de g ree fel on y i f th e de fen da nt ha s two pr i or DW I
conv icti ons. T EX . P EN . C OD E A NN . §49.09( b) ( Ver non Su pp. 2 008)

. Proof of the two pr ior
conv icti ons is an e lementof the o ffense w hic h mustbe p ro v en by th e S ta te du ri ng the g uil t/i nnoce nce p h a se of the tr ial

. W il l v. State, 794 S. W .2d 9 48, 9 52- 53 ( Tex . Ap p.– Ho u s t o n [ 1 Di s t

. ] 1 9 9 0 , p e t

. re f ’d ). Ho we ve r, a d e fe n d a n tm a y st ip u la t e t o t h e two

st p re d i c a t e o ffe n s e s w h i c h p re v e n t s t h e S t a t e fro m p ro v i n g t h e m d u r i n g i t s c a s e - i n - c h i e f. Her nandez v. Sta te, 109 S. W .3d 4 91, 4 94 ( Tex . C ri m. App. 2003) . W hether to sti pul ate, thoug h, has been presumed to be a matter re lat ed to tr ial st ra teg y . Tuton v . St ate, No. 02- 04- 512- CR , 200 5 Tex . Ap p. L EX I S 10270 at *12 ( Tex . Ap p.–F ort W orth D ecember 8, 2005, no pet.) (not desi g nated for publ ic ati on) ; Staf for d v . St ate, 7 5 8 S

. W

. 2 d 6 6 3 , 6 7 3 -7 4 (T e x. App.–H oust on [1 D is t.] 1988) , re v’ d on other

gr ounds, 813 S.W .2d 503 (Tex . C ri m. App. st 1991)

. This i s p arti cul ar ly so w hen t he record i s si len t as to w hy co unsel di d w hat h e di d. Id. Here, t he record fail s t o di sc los e w hy co unsel opte d not t o s ti pul ate t o the pr ior
conv icti ons. Thus, w e must presume that it w as par t of hi s t ri al strateg y . Tuton v . St ate, supra ; Sta fford

v. State , supra . Moreover, appe llant fa ils to ill ustrat e ho w the de cision af

fecte d the outco me . Th is is import ant becaus e he has the b urden t o prov e notonl y er ro r but a ls o preju dic e. Can non v . S ta te, 2 5 2 S .W .3 d 342, 348- 49 ( Tex . C ri m. App. 2008)

. Me re ly co ncl udi ng thatthe out com e w as af

fecte d, w ithou t explaining how, is not eno ugh. In tho se situa tions, w e areW e no t e t hat t he t enorof app el l ant ’ s ar gum ent r egar di ng h i s cl ai m of i neff ect i v eness i s t r oubl esom e. 1 H e st at es wi t hi n hi s br i eft hat “ [ a] ppel l at e [ c] ounsel bel i ev es t he Appe l l at e Cour t i s wel l awar e of t he r eput at i on of[ t ] r i al [ c] ounsel ” and t hat t o “ per m i t [ t ] r i al [ c] ounsel t o con t i nue t o go t o t r i al wi t houtknowi ng t he l aw i s a m i st ake. ” T hese com m ent s sm ack of som e pe r sonal ani m osi t yhel d t owar ds t r i al coun sel

. Al l owi ng ani m osi t y , i fany , t o gu i de o ne’ s wr i t i ng a nd t hough t pr ocess i s i l l
- adv i sed a nd i nappr opr i at e when dr aft i ng a n ap pe l l ate bri ef. 3 effect iv ely

as ked to pe rfor m appel lan t’ s j ob, w hic h we canno t. C onseq uentl y , t he first four is sues are ov er ru led

. 1 Ref er ence to P

leaNegoti

ati ons Next, appel lan t c ontends thatthe tr ial co urt er re d i n fa iling to ins tr uctthe jur y to dis re g ard the Sta te’ s referenc e to ple a neg oti ati ons and g ra nt a mis tr ial

. W e ag re e. T he issue arose upo n c ros s - ex am i na ti on o f ap pe l l an t. D ur i ng hi s direct examina tion, he ha d test if ied ab outhow he a dm itted to com mitt ing th e acts un derlyi ng his prev iou s c onv icti ons; bec ause he admi tted that they oc cur re d, he al leg edl y had deci ded to pl ead g uil ty

to them. H ow ev er , he deni ed commi tti ng the c ur re nt offense, a nd th at was w hy he h ad not pled guilty to i t. In ot her w ords, ap pellan t w as try ing to portray to th e jury how he t ook re spons ibi li ty

for h is wron g s w hen he act ual ly was w ro ng , and bec ause he
w as n o t ta ki ng su ch re spons ibi li ty now , he must not h av e v iol ated the l aw . In effort to dis credi t hi m, the Sta te i nter ro g ated him about thos e pr ior con vict io ns and t hen as ked
w hether the re ason he w as not p lea din g g uil ty now w as “b ecaus e we c oul dn’ t ag re e on a ple a ag re ement that y ou preferred.” T o tha t app ell ant o bje cte d. The tr ial co urt s ust ain ed appel lan t’ s o bje cti on butdeni ed his re q uest for an ins tr uct ion to dis re g ard. Ital so deni ed mis tr ial

. Gi v en th e manner

i n w hic h the q uest ion w as posed , one coul d reason abl y i nter pret itas di sc los ing thatpl ea neg oti ati ons had oc cur re d, t hat p o te nti al offers were made a ndW e tre a t t h i s a s a n e v i d e n ti a ry m a tte r b e c a u s e th a t i s h o w th e li ti g a n ts p re s e n te d itto u s . Y e t, to 2 th e e x t e n t th a t t h e q u e s tio n its e lfp r o p o u n d e d b y th e S ta te is n o t a c tu a lly e v id e n c e , o n e c o u ld r e a s o n a b ly a d d r e s s th e is s u e w ith in th e f r a m e w o r k o fp r o s e c u to r ia l m is c o n d u c t a n d a r r iv e a t th e s a m e o u tc o m e . T h is i s so because t he p ubl i c pol i cydi sc ussed i n P ry s ta s h v . S ta te , 3 S. W

. 3d 5 22 ( T ex. C r i m . App. 199 9) and S m ith v . S ta te , 898 S. W

. 2d 8 38 ( T ex. C r i m . App. 199 5) i s no l ess ap pl i cabl e. Si m pl yput , di scl osi ng t o t he j ur yt hat pl ea negot i at i ons occur r ed can be deem ed i m pr operi r r espect i v e of whet hert he d i scl osur e em anat ed fr o m th e p ro s e c u to r’s q u e s ti o n o r th e w i tn e s s ’ a n s w e r to th e q u e s ti o n .

T hi s p ot ent i al i t yi s hei ght ened her e be cause t he e xt ent of t he p l ea n egot i at i ons a nd whet hert hey 3 act ual l yoccur r ed was t r ul yconj ect ur al si nce a ppel l ant di d no t answert he q uest i on. Nor di d an y one dev el op t he m at t er . So, what we ha v e he r e i s an i nv i t at i on f r om t he St at e t o t he j ur y t o i nv oke i t s col l ect i v e i m agi nat i on a b o u t a h i g h l yp re ju d i c i a l to p i c w h i l e a s s e s s i n g a p p e l l a n t’ s g u i l t. 4 re jected, and t hat appel lan t’ s desi re s pres ented the major obs tac le to ar ri v ing at a barg ain

. So to o is it conceivable tha t me ntion of plea ne gotiation s having occurred cou ld mista kenly lea d a j uror

to conc lud e tha t app ell ant b elieved himsel f gui lty si nce an i nnoce nt pe rs on w oul d notco ntempl ate a dmitti ng g uil t. See Lar a v. St ate, No

. 1 3 -0 1 -0 9 9 -C R, 2 0 0 2 T e x. 2 App. L EX I S 5654 at 8 (Tex

. App.–C or pus Chr is ti Aug ust 1, 2002, no pet .) ( not d esi g nated for publ ic ati on) ( sta ti ng that“ [c] ommon sense tel ls us, and a j uror , t hat a person w ho tr ies to c ut a deal i s p ro babl y g uil ty ”). As the cour

t i n Lara sa id, w hen t he q uest ion i s “ ‘di d he do it’” (as it was he re), referen ce to ple a ne gotiation s “can only prejudice a de fend ant .” Id. at * 7- 8. So, at t he v er y l east , i t c oul d be sai d tha t t he prosec utor ’s co mment and it s inh erent i nsi nuati on of appel lan t’ s g uil t was improper sin ce it was ir re lev ant, see T EX . R. E V ID . 402 (stating tha t irrelev ant evidence is inad missible ), or, if min ima lly relevant, highly mislea ding and prejudicial. See T EX . R. E V ID . 403 (s tati ng that rel ev ant ev ide nce maybe 3
ex cl uded i f its probati v e v alu e i s s ubst anti all y outweig hed by the d ang er of unfair preju dic e, confusi on, a nd mi sl eadi ng the jur y , among othe r thi ng s) ; Pr ys tash v . St ate , 3 S.W .3d 5 22, 527- 28 ( Tex . C ri m. App. 1999) (reaff ir ming that ev ide nce of pl ea neg oti ati ons is subj ectto
ex cl usi on unde r Rul e 403) ; Sm it h v . St ate , 898 S.W .2d 8 38, 8 43- 44 ( Tex . C ri m. App. 1995) (holdin g tha t referen ce to ple a ne gotiation s w as subject to exclusion und er Rule 403 sinceBecause t he t r i al cour t sust ai ne d t he o bj ect i on a nd t he a ppl i cabl e st andar d of r ev i ew i s one of 4 a b u s e d d i s c re ti o n , w e m a yu s e a n yg ro u n d to ju s ti fy th e tria l c o u rt’ s d e c i s i o n . S e e P ry s ta s h v . S ta te , 3 S. W

. 3d 522, 527 ( T ex. C r i m . App. 199 9) ( hol di ng t hat anygr ound m aybe used t o j ust i fya deci si on, i r r espect i v e of whet heri t was pr opoun ded at t r i al , when t he st andar d of r ev i ew i s one ofabused di scr et i on)

. So, w e ar e f r ee o fth e S ta te ’s a tt e m p t t o r e s tr ic t o u rr e v ie w to th e a p p lic a tio n o fT e x a s R u le o fE v id e n c e 4 1 0 , w h ic h r u le i nv ol v es t he d i scl osur e of “ st at em ent s” m ade dur i ng p l ea n egot i at i ons. T hi s was pu r por t edl ywhyhe pl ed g ui l t yt o t he a ccusat i ons u nder l y i ng h i s pr i orconv i ct i ons. 5 5 any min imal rele v ance itmay hav e had in that cas e was subs tanti all y outweig hed by

the dan ger of b oth unfair prejudice and of mislead ing the jury ). 4 Next, the g ra v e r is k o f undue preju dic e and decep ti on went unabated w hen the tr ial
cour t w it hhel d i ts ins tr uct ion to d isr e gard the co mment. This i s t ro ubl ing bec ause the comment str uck

at one of the major

themes of

a p p e lla n t’ s defense. At the t ime, he endeav ored to conv inc e the jur y of hi s inn ocenc e by est abl is hin g thathe t ook re spons ibi li ty for hi s a cti ons, and he s oug ht t o do thi s b y i ll ust ra ti ng that , i n the pas t, he pl ed g uil ty w hen he was actu all y

gui lty . Gi v en the “common sens e” inferenc e tha t t hose eng ag ed i n pl ea

5 neg oti ati ons hav e probabl y co mmitt ed th e c ri me, Lara v. State , supra , the prosecu tor’s menti on of ple a n e g oti ati ons w as a q uic k, improper w ay to neg ate a ppel lan t’ s d efense. And , counse l p ossesse d suf f icient legitimate ev iden ce to reb ut th e strate gy and estab lish appel lan t’ s g uil t, as il lus trated by the re por

ter ’s record. To thi s we add another

co nsi derati on. W hil e s ust ain ing an o bje cti on al one may be
eno ugh to stop a litig ant f rom fu rther alludin g to the obje ctiona ble matte r, it does no t inform th e j urors t ha t th ey

a re proh i bi te d from c on s i de r i ng w ha t th ey hea rd. Ad di ti on al l y , i t s ee ms to be the pol icy of this Sta te t hat u nle ss i nst ru cte d oth er w is e, j urors a re free to c onsi der
w hat t hey

heard i n the co urtroom for a ll pur poses . See Ham m ock v. Sta te , 46 S.W .3d 8 89, 895 ( Tex. Crim . Ap p. 20 01) ( re cog niz ing thatunl ess a l imi ti ng i nst ru cti on i s s oug ht, the6

ev ide nce is deemed admitted for al l pur poses ). S o , itco uld be s aid that w it hhol din g the instructio n to disregard the prose cuto r’s referen ce to plea negotia tions in fact l ef t the jurors free t o c on s i de r

t he m. Ano the r ma tter of policy mu st also be broa ched

. It enco mp asses tha t w hich favors the occurrence of

plea an d sett lem entnegotiat ions. Disc lo sing to a jury thatsuch neg oti ati ons occ ur re d “mi li tates ag ain st [that] pol icy ,” acc ordin g to the Cou rtof Criminal Appeal s. Pr

ys tash v. St

ate , 3 S.W .3d at 528. Moreover, the policyis well-settled , shou ld affectour

dec isio n -mak ing proces ses , and sh oul d hav e been know n to the S tate’ s t ri al
couns el. Fi nal ly , t here ex is ts leg it imat e q uest ion as t o wh ether aff ir ming the jud g ment by hol din g the er ro r har mles s woul d i nv it e the State to repeat thi s w ro ng and others. Ag ain , despi te t he aforementi oned and long -e sta bli shed pol icy , i t nev erthel ess so jou rn ed i nto t he prohi bit ed area. S o too has i t s tr iv ed, v ia it s appel lat e br ief, to i ll ust ra te t he l eg it imacy of it s condu ct, des pit e the di cta tes by our C our t of C ri minal Appea ls i n Prystash and Sm it h. Thos e c i rc u ms t a n c e s h a rd l y s u g g e s t t h a t t h e h a r ml e s s e r ro r r u l e w i l l n o t b e u s e d as ( or has not b ecome)a means of sl ipp ing before the j ur y thi ng s t hat s houl d be ex cl uded. In short, t he Sta te interject ed highly p rejudicial informa tion int o the g uilt/inn ocen ce phase of the t ri al. The tr ial cour t hel d as much. Howev er , effort to amel iorate t he s it uati on did no t occur. T hatconstitu ted harm f ul error unde r the circumst ance s before us. Con seq uentl y , we s ust ain i ss ues fiv e and si x , rev erse the judg ment of the tr ial co urt, and
re mand the ca use. Br ian Qui nn Chief Justice Publ is h.