UNITED STAT ES COURT OF AP P EALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS

N O . 02-300
M I CH A EL T. R

UDD , A PP EL L ANT ,
V
. R. J A M ES N I C HOL S ON , S EC RE T A RY O F V ET ER A N S A FF A I RS , A PPEL L EE
.

On Ap pe a l f ro m th e B oa

rd of Ve te ra ns ' Ap pe a ls
(De cided August 18, 2006 )

Richard R. Jam es , of

Ric hmo nd , V ir g ini a , w a s o n th e br ie f f or the a pp e lla nt. Tim S

. Mc Cla in , G e ne ra l Co un se l; R. Ra nd all Cam pb e ll , As si st antGen eral Co un se l; Carolyn F. W ashington , Deputy

Assistant Gener al Counsel; and Richard May erick, all of Washington, D.C., wer e on the br ief for

the appe llee.
B e f o r e H A G E L, MOORMAN, and D AVI S, Judges

. HAGEL , Judge : Michae l T

. Rudd a ppeals through counsel a

November

15, 2001, Boa

rd of Ve ter ans' Ap pe a ls ( B oa

rd ) d e c isi on

in whic h th e B oa

rd de nie d h im ( 1) an e ff

e c tiv e date pr ior

to Dec ember

14, 1994, for a

n awa rd of service connec tion f

or irritable bowel sy

ndrome, (2) an ef

fec tive date pr ior to November

1, 1994, for a

n awa rd of service connec tion for bipolar disorder, a nd (3) a n
e ff e cti ve dat e pr ior

to D e c e mbe r 1 4, 19 94 , f or the a ssi g nme nt o f a

60 % d isa

bil ity ra tin gfo r h is service -conne cted low- back disa bility

. In a November 14, 2003, order the Court vacated the B oard decision and r emande d the matter for rea djudication pursuant to the Veter ans Claims Assistance Act
o f 2 0 0 0 , P u

b

. L

. No

. 1 0 6 -4 7 5 , § 3 , 1 1 4 S t at

. 2 0 9 6 , 2 0 9 6 -9 7

. T h e S ec re t ary ap p ea l edth e C o urt 's order to the Unit ed States Court of Appea ls for the F eder al Circuit (F eder al Circuit). On June 3, 2004, the Fe dera l Circuit vacate d the Court's decision and rema nded the matter

to the Court. The Court, in t u rn , ev entually stay ed the a

ppeal pe nding the dispositi on of the a ppeal in Dingess v. Nicholson , 19 Vet.App. 473 ( 2006), or until further order of the Court.2

On Marc h 30, 2006, in a si ng le-judg e dec ision, the Court vacate d the Novembe r 2001 B oard decision and dismissed the appe al. On Apr il 17, 2006, Mr. Rudd filed a moti on for a panel de cision. Fo r t h e re asons provided he rein, the Court will g rant the motion for a panel de cision, rec all the Marc h 3 0, 20 06 , s ing le -j ud g e de c isi on , v a c ate the B oa rd de c isi on , a

nd dis mis s th e a

pp e a l.

I. F AC TS Mr . Ru dd se rv e d o n a c tiv e duty

in t he U. S. A rmy fr om Augus t 19 70 to Augus t 19 78 . Sh or tly afte r his discharg e fr om service , he wa s awa rded se rvice connec tion f or a low-bac k condition and
was a ssigne d a 40% disability rating . On Novembe r 1, 1994, he filed a claim for se rvice connec tion for post-tra

umatic stress disorder

. In corr espondenc e dated De cembe r 14, 1994, he infor med a VA reg ional office that he wished a n incre ased rating for his service -conne cted back condition and that h e s o u g h ts e r

v i c e c o n n e c t i o nf

o r , am o n go th e r

th i n g s , " [ b ] o w e l s y

n dr o m e . " R e c o r d

( R

. ) at2 0 2

. In Marc h 1995, the reg ional office incre ased the rating for his se rvice -conne cted low- back c ondition to 6 0% and

awa rd e d h im s e rv ic e c onne c tio n f or ir ri ta ble bo we l sy

nd ro me ; th e e ff

e c tiv e date fo r b oth

awa rd s w a s D e c e mbe r 1 4, 19 94 . T he re g ion al off ice a lso de nie d s e rv ic e c onne c tio n f or po sttraumatic stre ss disorder. In an August 1997 decision, the B oard a war ded him service connec tion for b ip o la r d is o r d e r . T h e r e g io n a l o f f ic e , in a Se p te mb e r

1 9 9 7 d e c is io nim

p le me n ti n gth at B o ard decision, assig ned that awa rd an eff ective date of November 1, 1994, the date on which Mr. Rudd had cla imed service connec tion for post-traumatic stress disorder

. In J uly 1999, Mr. Rudd reque st ed ea rl i er eff ective da tes for a ll of his service- connec ted conditions. The re g ional office denied him ea rlier e ffe ctive date s for his servic e-c onnecte d conditions, including irr itable bowel sy ndrome, bipol ar disorder, and f or the a ssignment of

the 60% disability ratingfor his ser

vice- connec ted low-b ac k d i sability . He a ppeale d to the Boa

rd, which decide d the appe al in November 2001. In that decision, the B oard de nied hi m (1) an e ffe ctive date prior to Dec ember 14, 1994, for his service -conne cted irr itable bowel sy ndrome, (2) an effec tive date pr ior to November 1, 1994, for his service -conne cted bipolar disorder, and (3) an eff ective date prior to Dec ember 14, 1994, for the assig nment of a 60% disability ratingfor his ser

vice- connec ted low-ba ck dis ability

. Wit h respe ct to the irritable bowe l sy

ndrome, the B oard c oncluded that De cemb er 1 4 , 1 9 9 4 , was the pr oper3

eff ective date for that awa

rd beca use that is the date of

the claim and " [t ]here is no evidenc e of a ny
ear lier communication which could even be construed a s an informa l claim for se rvice connec tion" for irr itable bowel sy

ndrome. R. at 5. With respect to the bipol ar d i s o rd er , the B oard r eac hed an

a lmo st i de nti c a l con c lus ion and no te d that "[a ]lth ou g h the ini tia l man if e statio ns of

his ps y c hiatr ic disability may have occur

red e arlier , there is simpl y no leg al basis for a

n eff ective date ea

rlier than [November 1, 1994,] t he date of the re ceipt of the claim." R. at 6. Turningto the low-bac k disability , the B oard c oncluded that the incre ased- ratingclaim was r ece ived on Dec ember 14, 1994, that there was no e vidence of an e arlier informal cla im, and that t h er e was no evidence "of any treatment or examination or any other evidence of an a scer tainable incr ease in his service- connec ted back disa bility " in the year

prec edingthe filing of that cla im. R. at 8. On appe al, Mr. Rudd argues that the B oard f ailed to obt ai n cer

tain evidenc e, including
rec ords from the Socia l Security Administration, which might be r eleva nt in determining the prope r eff ective date for his ser

vice- connec ted bipolar disorde r. He also argues t hat VA committ ed g rave pr oc e dura l e rr or wh e n it fa ile d to ob ta in c e rt a in oth e r re c or ds

. Hi s r e ma ini ngargume nts a ll r e late to an alleg ed violation of VA's du t y t o n otify pursuant to the Ve tera

ns Claims Assi stance Act of 2000. He r equests that the Court vac ate the B oard de cision and re mand the matter s. In response , the S ecr etar

y argues t hat M r. Rudd is not entitl ed to ea rlier e ffe ctive date s for his se rvice -conne cted irritable bowe l sy ndrome a nd bipolar disorder

and for his increa sed rating f

or his se rvice -conne cted low-bac k condition. Wit h respe ct to the duty to notify , the Secr etar

y contends that, i f a ny su c h e rr or

e xists , it is n on pr e jud ic ia l. In M r. Rud d' s mo tio n f

or a pa ne l de c isi on

he argue s, amon goth e r t hin g s, that no a

uth or ity
was c ited in the Marc h 30, 2006, single -judg e dec ision for the " implicit hol ding tha t the re is no such th i n g as a f

re es t an d i n g cl ai mfo r a nea rl i er ef fe ct i v e d at e" a n d

th atth e C o urtm ad e i mp l i ci tfi n d i n gs of fa c t r egardi ng th e fi na lity of the Marc h 1 99 5 a

nd Se pte mbe r 1 99 7 r e g ion a l of fi c e de c isi on s. Motion at 4-11. He r equests that if " a pane l were to agr ee wi t h the sing le judg e that ther e is no [freestandingclaim for a

n ear lier eff

ective date], it should vacate the Boa rd decision and rema

nd the
case to the Boa

rd and reg ional office to assess in the first instance whether the pleading s constituted Not ice s o f Di sagreem entand , i f so, w het her t hey were t im ely

or m ay be ex cus ed i f un ti mel y ." Id. at 11.A l t ho ugh not rel evant here, an ad d i t i o nal excep t i o n t o t he rul e o f f i nalit y e x ists i n t he f

o rm o f B o ard 1
re c o n sid e ra tio n . See 3 8 U .S .C . § 7 1 0 3 (a ) (" T h e d e c isio n o f t h e B o a rd d e te rm inin g a m a tter u n d e r se c tio n 7 1 0 2 o f t h is tit le

. . . i s fina l un le ss th e C h a irm a n o rd e rs re c o n sid e ra tio n ." ).

In L eo n a rd , the ap p el l ant fi l ed a "c l ai m t o reop en f o r an ear l i er ef

f ect i ve d at e. " 40 5 F.3d at 13 3 7

. T hus, t he 2 F e d e ra l C irc u it o b se rv e d th a t " L e o n a rd ' s re q u e st fo r a n e a rlie r e ff e c tive d a te [w a ]s a ' c la im ' un d e r [3 8 U .S .C .] § 5 1 1 0 (a )." I d. at 133 6. B eca us e s ect i on 511 0(a) provi des t hat "t he ef f ect i ve dat e o f

an awar d bas ed on . . . a cl ai m r eopened af t er f i n al a dj u di ca t i on . . . s h al l n ot be ea r l i er t h an t h e da t e of r ec ei pt of

a ppl i ca t i on t h er ef

or e, " t h e Fe der al Ci r cu i t w en t on t o co ncl ud e t hat s uch a cl ai m co ul d no t res ul t i n t he award o f an earl i er ef f ect i ve d at e. T he i ss ue p res ent ed i n L eo n a rd was not wh et her t her e e xi s t s a f r ee s t andi ng cl ai m f

o r a n ea rli er ef

f ect i ve dat e. T hat ques t i on i s , howev er , pre s ent ed s quar el y i n t hi s ca s e. I ndeed, ha d M r . Rudd f i l ed a " clai m t o r eope n f o r an ear l i er ef

f ect i ve d at e" (or even i f

t here were a f a c t u a l b a s i s t o d e t e r m i n e t h a t a c l a i m t o r e o p e n e x i s t e d h e r e ) , o u r d e c i s i o n w o u l d h a v e m i r r o r e d t h e F e d e r a l C i r c u i t 's d eci si o n i n L eo n a rd

. 4 II. AN AL YSI S The e ffe ctive dates relating to the three conditions on appea l were assig ned by the re g ional office in de cisions dated in Ma rch 1995 and September 1997. Those decisions wer e not appe aled and ther efor e bec ame f

inal. That beingthe case , the Fe dera l Circ uit ha s made it clear that Mr. Rudd could attempt to overc ome the fina lity of those dec isions–in an at t em p t t o g ain ea rlier e ffe ctive dates–in one of

two way s, by a reque st f

or re vision of those reg ional office decisions base d on clea r and unmistakable e rror , or by a cla im to reopen ba sed upon new and materia l evidence

. See Cook 1 v. Principi , 3 18 F .3 d 1 33 4, 13 39 (F e d. Cir . 2 00 2) (e n b anc ); see also 38 U.S .C . § 51 09 A(a) ( "A decision by

the Secr etar

y . . . is subject t o revision on the g rounds of c lear and unmistakable e rror . I f evide nce e stablishes the err or, t he prior decision shall be r ever sed or r evised." ); 38 U.S.C. § 5108 (" I f n e w an d mate r ia l e v id e n c e is p r e s e n te d o r s e c ur e d w it h r e s p e c t to a c la im w h ic h h a s been disallowed, the S ecr etar

y shall reope n the claim and re view the f ormer disposition of the cla im."); Andrews v. Nicholson , 421 F.3d 1278, 1281 ( Fe d. Cir. 2005). Of the two, beca use the prope r eff ective date for a

n awa rd based on a claim to reope n can be no ear lier t han the date on which that claim w a s r e c e iv e d , 3 8 U

. S. C. § 5 1 1 0 ( a ) , o n ly a r e qu e s t f o r r e v is io n p r e mi s e d o n c lear and unmistakable er

ror c ould result in the assig nment of ear lier eff ective dates for the awa

rds of ser vice
connec tion for irritable bow el sy ndrome a nd bipolar disorder

and for the assig nment o f t he 60% disability rating for Mr. Rudd's service- connec ted l ow-ba ck condition. See Leonard v. Nicholson , 2 405 F.3d 1333, 13 3 7 (F ed

. C i r. 2005) ("[A]bsent a showing of [clear and unmistakable e rror , the

a pp e lla nt] c ann ot r e c e ive dis a

bil ity pa y me nts fo r a

tim e fr ame e arl ie r t

ha n th e a pp lic atio n d ate of

his
c la im t o r e op e n, e ve n w ith ne w e vid e nc e su pp or tin gan e arl ie r d isa

bil ity date ." ); Flas h v . B ro wn , 85

Vet.App. 332, 340 ( 1995) (" When a claim to re open is succe ssful and the benef it soug ht is awarde d upon readju dic atio n, the e ff e c tiv e date is the date of

the c la im t o r e op e n. " ); see also Bingham v

. Principi , 18 Vet.App. 470, 475 ( 2004). Mr. Rudd does n o t argue that his reque st for an e arlier eff ec t i v e d at e s hould be construe d as a motion to revise ba sed on cle ar a nd unmistakable er

ror. The only rema ining possibili ty

in this case is that the cla im can be pr ocesse d as some for m of fr eesta nding c laim for ea

rlier e ffe ctive date s even though the Marc h 1995 and September 1997
re g ion a l of

fi c e de c isi on s a ssi g nin g e ff e c tiv e date s w e re no t a

pp e a le d to the B oa

rd and be c ame fi na l. Howeve r, such a

possibi l i t y

vitiates the rule of

finality

. See Le on ar

d and Cook , both su

pra . Acc ording ly , to the extent that Mr. Rudd has improperly raised a fre estanding"c laim for an e arlier eff ective da te" in an attempt to overc ome the fina lity of the Mar ch 1 9 95 and September 1997
re g ion a l of

fi c e de c isi on s, his a

pp e a l w ill be dis mis se d. In a dd iti on , the B oa rd de c isi on on

a pp e a l w ill be vac ated be cause the B oard e rre d to the extent that it entertaine d such an imprope r " claim" without imposing the str i ctures of finality

. See Sm ith ( Ir ma ) v . B ro wn , 10 Vet.App. 330, 334 ( 1997) (vac atinga B oard de cision issued after a vete ran' s death a

nd dismiss ing appea l). Be cause we f ind that there is no proper c laim in this case , we will not addre ss Mr. Rudd's other contentions of er

ror. In h is m oti on

fo r a pa ne l de c isi on , M r. Rud d a sse rt s f or the fi rs t ti me that c e rt a in s tate me nts made by him or his repre sentative c onstitu t e v al i dNotices of D isag ree ment as to the Mar ch 1995 and September

1997 reg ional office decisions and that equitable tolling should a pply to excuse any late filingof the N o t i ce s of Disag ree ment. Howeve r, he did not ra ise those ar g uments befor e the Boa rd, and the Boa

rd did not addre ss those issues. A ccor dingly , we will not, in the first instance, decide such issues. See McPhail v. Nicholson , 1 9 V e t. Ap p . 3 0 , 3 3

- 3 4 ( 2 0 0 5 ) ( h o ld in gth at t he appellant' s as s ertions of c lear and unmistakable e rror

wer e no long er at issue and that the issue of equitable tolling of

the per iod for filinga Notice of Disagree ment based on me ntal incapa city was
n o t p r o p e r ly

b e f o r e th e Co urt) , a

ff 'd , 168 Fe d.Appx. 952 ( Fed. Cir. 2006) ( unpublished opinion). Th e Court no te s, ho we ve r, that Mr

. Rud d is no t wi tho ut re c ours e , a s he re ma ins fr e e to f ile a motion to revise base d upon clea r and unmistak ab l e error w ith respec t to the March 1995 a nd Septemb er 1 997 reg ional office decisions. Neve rtheless, it is noteworthy that his arguments on
a pp e a l a ll p e rt a in t o th e dutie s to no tif y and a ssi st a nd that suc h a

rgume nts wo uld

be of no ava il i n the clea r-a nd-unmistakable- err or conte x t. See Live say v. Princ ipi , 15 Vet.App. 165, 179 ( 2001) (e n6

banc) (holding that the notice r equire ments of 38 U.S.C. § 5103(a) do not a pply to motions based
on c le ar a nd unmis taka

ble e rr or ); see also Cook, 318 F.3d at 1344-47 (holding that "a brea ch of the duty to a ssist ca

nnot c onstitut e [clear and unmistakable err or]"). Mr. Rudd is al s o n o t p re cluded from filinga re quest for a n extension of the one-year time limit to f ile a Notice of Disagree ment for "g ood cause shown" under 38 C.F.R. § 3.109(b) (2005) . We, of course , express no opinion as to the potential succe ss of any

such pursuits.

III . C ON CL USI ON On c on sid e ratio n o f t

he fo re g oin g , th e sta

y is dis so lve d. Th e mot ion fo r a pa ne l de c isi on

is g rante d and the Ma

rch 30, 2006, sing le-judg e dec ision is recalled. T h e No v em b er 2001 Boar d decision on appe al is VACATED a nd this appeal is DI SMI SSED.