UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 22-4628

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

JAMES ANTHONY SHAW, II,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at 

Richmond. David J. Novak, District Judge. (3:21-cr-00144-DJN-1)

Submitted: June 11, 2024 Decided: September 5, 2024

Before WILKINSON and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges, and KEENAN, Senior Circuit 

Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: Geremy C. Kamens, Federal Public Defender, Patrick L. Bryant, Appellate 

Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, Laura J. Koenig, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Darius 

R. Holloway, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC 

DEFENDER, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Jessica D. Aber, United States Attorney, 

Stephen E. Anthony, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED 

STATES ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:

James Anthony Shaw, II, pled guilty, pursuant to a conditional plea agreement, to 

possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and the 

district court sentenced him to 52 months’ imprisonment, consecutive to any state sentence 

imposed. On appeal, Shaw challenges the district court’s order denying his motion for a 

hearing pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). Finding no reversible error, 

we affirm.

“We assess de novo the legal determinations underlying a district court’s 

suppression rulings, including the denial of a Franks hearing, and we review the court’s 

factual findings relating to such rulings for clear error.” United States v. White, 850 F.3d 

667, 672 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). “In doing so, we must construe 

the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party and give due weight to 

inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and law enforcement officers.” 

United States v. Lull, 824 F.3d 109, 114-15 (4th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks 

omitted).

“An accused is generally not entitled to challenge the veracity of a facially valid 

search warrant affidavit” by way of a motion to suppress. United States v. Allen, 631 F.3d 

164, 171 (4th Cir. 2011). “In its decision in Franks . . . , however, the Supreme Court 

carved out a narrow exception to this rule, whereby an accused is entitled to an evidentiary 

hearing on the veracity of statements in the affidavit.” Id. Under Franks, a defendant is 

entitled to suppression of evidence seized if, during an evidentiary hearing, “perjury or 

reckless disregard is established by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence, and, 

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with the affidavit’s false material set to one side, the affidavit’s remaining content is 

insufficient to establish probable cause.” Franks, 438 U.S. at 156. To obtain a Franks 

hearing, the “defendant must make a substantial preliminary showing that (1) law 

enforcement made a false statement; (2) the false statement was made knowingly and 

intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth; and (3) the false statement was 

necessary to the finding of probable cause.” United States v. Moody, 931 F.3d 366, 370 

(4th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted).

An allegation of falsity “cannot be conclusory”; instead, it “must rest on affidavits 

or other evidence . . . showing that the statements at issue are objectively false.” Id. 

Affidavits, which “are normally drafted by nonlawyers in the midst and haste of a criminal 

investigation,” “must be interpreted in a commonsense manner,” and “[m]ere imprecision 

does not, by itself, show falsity.” Id. at 372 (internal quotation marks omitted). Even if 

falsity is established, “[t]he second showing, requiring intentional falsity or reckless 

disregard for the truth, is just as demanding. An innocent or even negligent mistake by the 

officer will not suffice.” Id. at 371. To establish recklessness in this context, “the particular 

affiant must have been subjectively aware that the false statement . . . would create a risk 

of misleading the reviewing magistrate judge and nevertheless chose to run that risk.” 

United States v. Pulley, 987 F.3d 370, 377 (4th Cir. 2021). “And here too, the defendant 

must provide facts—not mere conclusory allegations.” Moody, 931 F.3d at 371.

“The Franks test also applies when affiants omit material facts with the intent to 

make, or in reckless disregard of whether they thereby made, the affidavit misleading.” 

United States v. Colkley, 899 F.2d 297, 300 (4th Cir. 1990) (internal quotation marks 

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omitted). “When a defendant relies on an omission, [his] heavy burden is even harder to 

meet.” United States v. Haas, 986 F.3d 467, 474 (4th Cir. 2021). This is because “the 

affirmative inclusion of false information in an affidavit is more likely to” invalidate a 

warrant than an omission, as “[a]n affiant cannot be expected to include in an affidavit 

every piece of information gathered in the course of an investigation.” Colkley, 899 F.2d 

at 300-01. In this context, “[a]n officer acts with reckless disregard when []he fails to 

inform the magistrate of facts []he subjectively knew would negate probable cause. And 

the mere fact that information was omitted from an affidavit cannot alone show 

recklessness or intentionality.” Haas, 986 F.3d at 475 (citation omitted).

Regarding the final showing, courts consider the totality of the circumstances to 

determine whether the false or omitted information was necessary to establish probable 

cause. See Lull, 824 F.3d at 118; Colkley, 899 F.2d at 301. “A district court may not hold 

a Franks hearing where, after stripping away the allegedly false statements, the truthful 

portions of the warrant application would still support probable cause.” Moody, 931 F.3d 

at 371. And “[o]mitted information that is potentially relevant but not dispositive [of the 

probable cause determination] is not enough to warrant a Franks hearing.” Colkley, 

899 F.2d at 301. This prong of the Franks inquiry serves “to prevent the admission of 

evidence obtained pursuant to warrants that were issued only because the issuing 

magistrate was misled into believing that there existed probable cause.” Moody, 931 F.3d 

at 371 (internal quotation marks omitted).

If the defendant makes “a substantial preliminary showing” of the three Franks

factors, then the district court “must hold a Franks hearing to develop the evidence on the 

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affidavit’s veracity.” Haas, 986 F.3d at 474. And if the defendant establishes these three 

factors by a preponderance of the evidence at the hearing, “the search warrant must be 

voided and the fruits of the search excluded.” Franks, 438 U.S. at 156.

Shaw argues that the district court erred in denying his motion for a Franks hearing 

based on the deputy’s misrepresentations and omissions in the search warrant affidavit. He 

contends that, while each misrepresentation and omission alone might not have been 

sufficient to defeat probable cause, the errors combined created an affidavit that 

exaggerated his connection to the premises to be searched and gave a false impression of 

the duration and scope of the investigation. Had the deputy been truthful and forthcoming, 

Shaw avers, the magistrate would not have found probable cause for the search.

Having carefully reviewed the record and the parties’ arguments on appeal, we 

conclude that the district court did not err in denying Shaw’s motion for a Franks hearing. 

We agree with the district court that the search warrant affidavit was sloppy, as it contained 

some false or imprecise statements and omitted certain details about the investigation. But 

we also agree with the district court that Shaw failed to make a substantial preliminary 

showing that the misrepresentations and omissions were made intentionally or with 

reckless disregard for the truth or that they were crucial to the magistrate’s finding of 

probable cause.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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