MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions Decision: 2018 ME 106 Docket: Cum

- 17

- 174 Argued : November	15,	2017 Decided: July	26,	2018 Panel: SAUFLEY,	C.J.,	and MEAD, GORMAN , JABAR , HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.

STATE	OF	MAINE

v. DMITRI L. CANNADY

HJELM ,	J. [¶1]		In	2004,	the	Secretary	of	State	mailed	a	notice	to	Dmitri	L.	Cannady’s last	known	address,	with	information	that	his	right	to	operate	a	motor	vehicle was	 about	 to	 be revoked.	 	 The	 letter	 was	 returned by	 postal	 officials to	 the Secretary	 of	 State’s	 office with	 a	 notice	 on	 the	 envelope that Cannady	 had moved	and	left	no	forwarding	address.		More	than	eleven	years	later,	Cannady was	 stopped	 for	 a	 traffic	 violation	 and	 subsequently	 charged	with	 operating after	 habitual	 offender	 revocation	 (Class	 D), 29

- A	 M.R.S. § 2557

- A(2)(A) (2017) ,	 and	 faili ng	 to	 give	 his correct	 name	 (Class	 E), 17

- A	M.R.S.	 §	 15

- A(2)2 (2017) ; 29

- A	M.R.S.	 §	 105(4)	 (2017)

. 1 After	 holding	 a	 jury

- waived	 trial,	 the court	(Cumberland County , L.	Walker,	J. )	convicted	him	of	both	charges. [¶ 2 ] This	appeal	by	Cannady	calls	for	us	t o answer	the	narr ow	question of wh ether	the	statutory	r equirement of	notice is satisfied	where	the Secretary of State	elects	to mail the	notification to	the	licensee’s most	recent address	on
f

ile	 with	 the	 Secretary	 of	 State pursuant	 to 29

- A	 M.R.S.	 § 2557

- A(1)(A)(4) (2017) and that notification is returned	by	postal	authorities as undeliverable

. We	conclude	that, in	tho se	particular	circumstances,	the statutory	notification process	 necessary	 for	 a	 conviction	 for	 operating	 after	 habitual	 offender revocation	has	not	been	satisfied.		We therefore	vacate	the	conviction	for that charge but	affirm	the	conv iction	for	failing	to	give his correct	name

. 2
I.		BACKGROUND [¶ 3 ] T he	following	facts	found	by	the	court	are supported	by	the	record, which	we v iew in the	l ight	most	favorable	to	the judgment

. See State v.	Jeskey , 2016	ME	134,	¶ ¶ 30, 33, 146	A.3d	127

. A	Portland	p olice officer working	the

1 The	 State	 later	 dismissed	 the	 original	 charge	 of	 failing	 to	 give his correct	 name	 (Class	 E), 17

- A M.R.S.	 §	15

- A(2)	(2017) , and	 filed	a	substitute	charge	alleging	a	different	 formulation	of the same	offense, 29

- A	M.R.S.	§	105(4)	(2017)

.
2 Cannady	 also argues	 that	 the	 court	 erred	 by	 denying	 his	 motion	 to	 suppress	 based	 on	 its determination	t hat	the	traffic	stop	was	lawful and	that	the	evidence	was	insufficient	to	support	the conviction	for	failing	to	give his correct	name.		Because	these	challenges	are	n ot	persuasive,	we	do not	address	them	further	and	affirm	the	conviction	for	the	latter	charge.3 evening	shift	on December	4,	2015,	pulled	into a	convenience	store parking	lot
on	Forest	Avenue. The	officer o bserved a	person ,	later	identified	as Cannady , drive	a	vehicle	out	of	the	parking	lot without	wearing	his	seatbelt

. After	making a	 traffic	 stop	 for	 the	 seatbelt	 violation , 29

- A	 M.R.S.	 §	 2081(3

- A)	 (2017) , t he officer asked	 Cannady	 for	 his	 name	 and	 identification	 documents.	 	 Cannady provided	a false name and had	difficulty	providing an address,	phone	number, and	social	security	number. Because	t he	officer was	unable	to	verify	Cannady ’s identity with the	name Cannady h ad given ,	 the	officer	detained Cannady and transported him to	the	jail	for	fingerprinting

. A	cruiser	video recording shows that	w hile	en	route	to	the	jail , Cannady	admitted to	the	officer that	he	was	not the	 person	 whose	 name	 he	 had provided

. After	 Cannady	 identified himself correctly , the	 officer	learned	 from	 the	 dispatcher	 that	 Cannady’s	license	 had been	revoked	and	that	there	was	an	outstanding	warrant	for	failing	to	appear on	an	earlier	revocation	charge. [ ¶ 4 ] T he	State	charged	Cannady w ith operating	after	habitual	offender revocation	and	failing	to	give his correct	name. Cannady	entered	pleas	of	not guilty. At a jury

- waived	trial held	in	December of 2016 , only	the officer testified

. The court	 admitted	 in	 evidence a certification from	 the	 Secretary	 of	 State’s office stating that	Cannady’s	license had	been	revoked as	of the	alleged	offense4 date and	that	notice	of	that	revocation	had	been	sent	to	Cannady	in	conformity with 29

- A	 M.R.S. § 2482(1) (A) (2017) ; a	 notice	 of	 revocation dated July	 21, 2004, addressed	 to	 Cannady	 and	 stating	 that	 his driver’s license or	 right	 to operate will	be	revoked	for	an	indefinite	period	effective	August	5,	2004 ; 3 and an	envelope bearing	a	postmark	of July	26 ,	2004, which had	been returned	to the Secretary	of State on	August	11,	2004, with	the	notation, “MOVED	LEFT	NO
ADDRESS	UNABLE	TO	FORWARD RETURN	TO	SENDER .” [¶ 5 ] At	 the	close	of	 the	State’s	case, Cannady	moved	 for a judgment of acquittal on	the charge	of op erating	after habitual	offender re vocation on	the ground s that	 he	 did	 not	 have	 actual	 knowledge	 that	 his	 license	 had	 been revoked	and that the Secretary	of State had failed	to	take appropriate steps	to provide	that	notice to	him after	the written notice of	revocation was	returned

as undeliverable

. In	a	written	order,	 t he	court denied	Cannady’s	motion	and

3 T he	 a ppendix	 filed	 by	 Cannady	 contains	 a	 copy	 of	 his	 full	 driving	 record.	 	 That	 document, however,	 was	 not offered	 in	 evidence at	 trial	 and	 is	 not	 contained	 i n	 the	 record. T he	 Rules	 of Appellate	Procedure provide that	the	“appendix shall	not include	any	documents	that	are	not a part of	the	trial	court	file	or	the	record	on	appeal,	other	than	a	supplement	of	legal	authorities	authorized in	 subdivision	 (1)	 hereo f.” M.R.	 App.	 P.	 8(c)(2)	 (Tower	 2016) (emphasis	 added) ; see	 also M.R. App. P. 8(g)(1)	(restyled	Rules). T he	 notice	 of	 revocation	 sent	 to	 Cannady that	 was	 admitted	 at	 trial ,	 however, contains	 some limited information	about	his mot or	 vehicle	driving	 record ,	which	shows that	his	driver’s	license expired	in	2003	and that	he	was	convicted	in 1999,	2002,	and	2004	for	operating	after	suspension , thereby	 bringing	 him within the	 statutory	 definition	 of “ habitual	 offender. ” S ee 29

- A M .R.S. § 2551

- A(1)(A)(4)	(2017)

.5 found him guilty	of both	charges

. At the sentencing	hearing,	the	court	imposed the	mandatory	minimum thirty

- day jail	 term and $500	 fine on	 the	charge	 of operating	 after habitual	 offender revocation and a	 concurrent	 seven
- day jail
sentence on	 the charge of failure	 to	 give his correct	 name. Cannady	 filed	 a timely	 notice	 of	 appeal. See 15 M.R.S.	 § 2115	 ( 201 7 ) ;	 M.R.	 App.	 P.	 2(a)(3) , (b)(2)(A) ( Tower 2016)

. 4
II. DISCUSSION [¶ 6 ] Cannady asserts on	appeal that pursuant	 to	Maine’s	 statute s	and principles	 of	 due	 process

— particularly	 given increase s in the severity	 of sentences	 to	 be	 imposed	 for	 the	 crime of	 operating	 after habitual	 offender
revocation 5

— t he Secretary	of State	is	required	to	do	more when it is	on	notice that	its	c hosen	method	of	communication	wa s	unsuccessful and that the	State

4 The	restyled	Maine	Rules	of	Appellate	Procedure	do	not	apply	because	this	appeal	was	 filed prior	to	September	1,	2017. See M.R.	App.	P.	1	(restyled	Rules).

5 The current statute that	 defines operating	 after	 habitual	 offender	 revocation establishes mandatory	minimum	penalties of at least a thirty

- day	jail	term and a	$500	fine, but ,	if	aggravati ng factors	are	present,	require s at	least a	two
- year	term	of	imprisonment and a	$1,000	fine at	the	most severe	range . 29

- A	M.R.S. § 2557

- A(2)(A), (D)	(2017).		These	sentencing	provisions	became	effective in	200 6

. P.L.	2005,	ch.	606,	§	A

- 11	(effective	Aug.	23,	2006) (T he statute	was also amended	in	2009 but	not	in	a	way	that affects the	substance	of	the	penalties. See P.L.	200 9,	ch.	54,	§	5	(effect ive	April 2 2 , 2009) )

. In	contrast,	the	prior	iterations	of the statute established	only	the various classification s of the	crime and did	not	prescribe	any	mandatory	minimum	penalties

. Compare P.L.	2005, ch.	606, § A

- 11, with P.L.	2003, ch.	452,	§§	Q

- 90, Q

- 91, and P.L.	1995,	ch.	65,	§	C

- 14.6 is required	 to	 prove	 that	 the	 licensee	 has received	 or	 otherwise	 has actual knowledge	of the revocation

. [¶ 7 ] We review constitutional challenges de	 novo , s ee State	 v.	 Jones , 2012 ME	126,	¶	35,	55	A.3d	432 ,	and,	on	a	challenge to	the	sufficiency	of	the evidence	to	support	a	criminal	conviction ,	we	look	to “ whet her the trier	of	fact could	have	 found	 every	element	 of the	 offense	charged	beyond	 a	 reasonable doubt , ” State	v.	Tayman ,	2008	ME	177,	¶	4,	960	A.2d	1151

. “The	interpretation of	a	statute	is	a	legal	issue	we	review	de	novo.” State	v.	Jones ,	2012	ME	88,	¶	6, 46	A.3d	 1125

. Criminal	 statutes	 are “‘ strictly const rued

.	 .	 . to	avoid absurd,
ill ogical,	or	inconsistent	results

. ’ ” I d. (quoting State	v.	Nastvogel ,	2002	ME	97, ¶ 6,	798	A.2d	1114 )

. O ur	purpose	in	interpreting	a	statute	is	“to	effectuate	the intent	of	the	Legislature,	which	is	ordinarily	gleaned	from	th e	plain	language	of the	 statute

. ” State	v.	Kendall ,	2016	ME	 147,	¶	 14, 148	A.3d	1230 (quotation marks	 omitted)

. “ We examine [ the ] statutory	language	in	 the	context	 of	 the entire	 statutory	 scheme .” Id. Only	 if	 the	 statute	 is	 ambiguous	 do	 we	 look beyond	the	plain	language to the legislative	history. State	v. Legassie ,	2017	ME 202,	¶	13,	171	A.3d	589

. “ A	statute	is	ambiguous	if	it	is	reasonably	susceptible to	 different	 interpretations .” Carrier	 v.	 Sec’ y	 of	 State ,	 2012	 ME	 142,	 ¶	 12,
60 A.3d	1241 (quotation	marks	omitted).7 [¶ 8 ] For	a	person	to	be	convicted	of	the	crime	of	opera ting	after habitual offender revocation ,	the	State	must	prove beyond	a	reasonable	doubt that the accused operated	a	motor	vehicle	on	a	public	way	when	that person’s	license	to operate	had been	revoked. 29

- A	M.R.S.	§	2557

- A(1)(A)	(2017)

. Additionally, and	central	to	the	issue	in	this	case,	the	State	must	prove	that	the	accused (1)	 [h] as	 received	 written notice	 of	 the	 revocation	 from	 the Secretary	of	State; (2)	 [h] as	 been	 orally	 informed	 of	 the	 revocation	 by	 a	 law enforcement	officer; (3) [h] as	actual	knowledge	of	the	revocation;	or (4) [i] s	 a	 person to	 whom	 written	 notice	 was	 sent in	 accordance with section	2482	or	former	Title	29,	section	2241,	subsection 4

. 29

- A	M.R.S.	§	2557

- A(1)(A) (emphasis	added)

. [¶ 9 ] As	 section	 2557

- A (1)(A) is	 structured,	 the	 first	 three of	 these alternatives comprise various	ways	of	providing	the	licensee	with actual notice , whereas the	fourth	constitutes an attempt to	provide	notice

. At	oral	argument,

t he	 State made	 explicit that	 it	 is not asserting that Cannady	 had	 actual knowledge	that	the	Secretary	of	State	had	revoked	his	license , even	though	he had been	convicted	 three	 times	 for	operating	after	suspension, see	supra n.3,

an d	 provided	 incorrect	 identification information	 to	 the	 officer	 in	 this	 case.8 Therefore,	a t	issue here is only the last	of	the	alternative	elements prescribed
in section 2557

- A(1) (A) (4) ,	which	incorporates	the	terms	of 29

- A	M.R.S.	§ 2482 (2017)

. [¶1 0 ] Section	 2482 provides the	 following	 methods	 by	 which	 the Secretary	 of State	 can satisfy	 the	 notice	 requirement set	 out	 in	 section 2557

- A(1)(A)(4) : 1. Notification	by	Secretary	of	State. Upon	determining	that a	person	is	subject	to	license	suspension	or	revocation,	the Secretary	 of	 State	 shall	 immediately	 notify	 the	 person,	 in writing,	of	the	license	suspension	or	revocation. The	notice:
A. Must	be	sent to	the	last	name	and	address	provided	under section	1407	or,	if	the	person	has	not	applied	for	a	license, on	record	with	the	Secretary	of	State ; [ 6 ]
B. Must	be	sent	to	the	address	provided	in	the	report	of	the law	 enforcement	 officer	 if	 that	 address	 differs	 f rom	 the address	of	record;	or
C. May	be	served	in	hand.

.	.	. . 3. Receipt	date. The	notice	is	deemed	received	3	days	after mailing, unless	returned	by	postal	authorities

.

6 A	 licensee	 has	 thirty	 days	 by	 which	 to	 notify	 the	 Secretary	 of	 State	 of	 an	 address	 change. 29

- A M.R.S.	§	1407	(2017)

.9 29

- A	M.R.S.	 §	2482 (emphasis	added). Cannady	argues	 that	 the reference	 to “receipt” in	 section	2482(3) means	 that	pro of	 of	mailing	in	and	 of	itself , and
wit hout	proof	of	actual	receipt, is	not	enough	to	satisfy	the	requirements	of	this
statute. [¶1 1 ] As	we	discuss	below,	w e	have	held in	several	cases that	section 2482	 does	 not	 require the	 State	 to	 prove	 that the	licensee	 actually	 received notice	 of	 a	 license	 suspension	 or	 revocation.	 	 We	 have articulated that conclusion,	 however,	 in	 cases	 where	 the mailed	 notice	 was	 not	 returned	 by postal	authorities	as	undeliverable.		By	contrast,	in this	case	we	are	called	up on for	the	first	time	to	address	the	question	of whether compliance	with section 2482(1) (A) , which ordinarily	 requires only	 that	 the notice be	 mailed	 to the licensee’s	 last	 kno wn	 address,	 is	 sufficient when	 that	 notice	 is returned by postal	authorities and ,	pursuant	 to	 section	2482(3), the	licensee	is therefore not	deemed	to	have	received	that	notice in	that	situation

. [¶1 2 ] To	 address	 this	 issue,	 we	 review	 the	 evolution	 of Maine law applicable	to the	notice	requirement ,	and	we then	apply	the	principles	we	glean from	that	review	to	the	facts	of	this	case

.10 A. Maine Law	Governing	Notice	of	License	Suspension	and	R evocation [¶1 3 ] In State	 v.	 Kovtuschenko ,	 521	 A.2d	 718	 (Me.	 1987) , we first addressed the	question	of whether a mailed notice	of a license suspension or revocation satisfies due	 process .	 	 T he	 defendant asserted	 that ,	 as	 a constitutional	matter, he	could	not	be	convicted	of	operating	with	a	suspended license	 unless	 the	 State	 proved	 that	 he	 had	 actual	 knowledge	 of	 the
suspe nsion. 7 Id. at	 718

- 19. At	 trial , the	 court	 admitted	 evidence	 that the defendant had	 not	 received	 the	 notice for	 the sole purpose	 of rebut ting the State’s	 evidence	 that	 the	 notice	 had	 been	 mailed

. Id. at	 719. T he court

7 The	operating	after	suspension	statute	applicable	in State	v.	Kovtuschenko ,	521	A.2d	718 ,	718 (Me. 1987) ,	provided	in	relevant	part, 1. Offense;	 penalty. No	 person	 may	 operate	 a	 motor	 vehicle	 on	 any	 public highway	of	this	State	at	a	time	when	his license	.	.	.	ha s	been	suspended	or	revoked

. . . when	that	person:

.	.	.	. D. Is	a	person	to	whom written	notice	was	sent	by	ordinary	mail	at	the	last known	address	shown	by	the	records	maintained	by	the	Secretary	of	State. 29	M.R.S.A.	§	2184(1)(D)	(Supp.	1983 ). That	statute did	not	contain or	make reference to receipt	of the	notice,	as 29

- A	M.R.S.	§ 2482(3)	(2017) now	does. See supra ¶	10.11 ultimately found that ,	 despite evidence of	 non

- receipt , the State	 proved “ the essential	element	of mailing

. ” Id. [¶1 4 ] Affirming the	conviction	on	appeal , w e	explained	the	reason	why the	State	was	required	to	prove only that	the	notice	had	been	mailed and	not actually	received : I t	 has	 long	 been	 the	 law	 in	 this	 jurisdiction	 that	 proof	 of mailing	 raises	 a presumption	 of	 receipt .	 	 U ndoubtedly	 the Legislature	had this	history in	mind	along	with	the administrative convenience	 of	 this	 system,	 and	 above	 all	 with	 its	 concern	 that presumpt ively	 dangerous	 operators	 must	 be removed	 from Maine’s	highways

.	.	.	. Id

. (emphasis	 added) (citations	 omitted) ; see	 also Field	 &	 Murray, Maine Evidence § 301.2	 at	 64 (6th	 ed.	 2007) (“[A]	 [l]etter	 deposited	 in	 the	 mail properly	 addressed	 and	 stamped	is	 presumed	 to	 have	 been	 received.”). We concluded	that	the	State	was	not	required	to	prove	that Kovtuschenko actually received the notice bec a use “mail	 addressed	 to	 a	 licensee	 at	 the	 ad dress	 he himself	supplied	is reasonably calculated	to	reach	him	and	apprise	him	of	the Secretary’s	 action. Thus,	it	accords this	Defendant all	 the	process	 that	is	his due.

.	 .	 . [T]he counterpart	 provision	 of	 the	 federal	 constitution	 imposes	 no more	 rigorous	 requirement	 of	 due	 process.” Kovtuschenko ,	 521	 A.2d	 at	 719 (citations	 omitted) ( citing Mennonite	 Bd

. of	 Missions	 v.	 Adams ,	 462	 U.S.	 791,12 799

- 800	(1983 ) ; Mullane	v.	Cent

. Hanover	Bank & Trust	Co. ,	339	U.S.	306,	314

- 15 (19 50 ) )

. [¶1 5 ] Importantly	 for	 the	 present	 case,	 the	 core	 of the analysis in Kovtuschenko is	the	connection we	drew between	mailing	and	receipt :	p roof	of mailing	is	material , not	for	its	own	sake , but because mailing to	the	licensee’s last	known	address creates some	expectation	that	the	addressee received the mailed	notice , although	the	State	need	not	go	so	far	as	to	prove	actual	receipt

. Id

. [¶1 6 ] Our next opinion	that	offered	a	meaningful	discussion	of	the	notice requirement	was State	 v.	 La marre ,	 553	 A.2d	 1260	 (Me.	 1989)

. In	 two	 trials involving	charges	of	operating	after	suspension,	Lamarre	presented	evidence that	 he	 did	 not	 receive	 the mailed suspension notice because	 he	 actually received	his	mail	at	a	post	office	box rather	than	at	the	street	address he had provided to the	Secretary	of	State

. Id. at	1261

- 62. As	in Kovtuschenko ,	the	trial
court	in Lamarre admitted	 evidence	 of	 non

- receipt only to refute the	 State’s evidence	that	the	notice	had	been	mailed. Id. at	1262.		On	appeal following	his
convictions , Lamarre asserted that	 the	 operating	 after	 suspension	 or
revocation statute ,	29	M.R.S.A.	§	2184	(Supp.	1987) , which	was	materially	the13 same	 as	 the statute at	 issue in Kov t u schenko , 8 created an	 unconstitutional presumption that	the licensee received the	notice	of	suspension	based	on	proof that	 the Secretary	 of State	 mailed th at notice	 to	 the licensee’s last	 known address

. Lamarre ,	 553	 A.2d	 at	 1262. We rejected	 Lama rre’s	 constitutional challenge,	stating that	“section	2184	creates	no	presumption	of	receipt,	nor	is
the State	 required	 to	 prove	 receipt , ”	 because	 notice	 mailed	 to	 the	 address provided	by	 the	licensee	is “‘ reasonably	calculated ’ ” to	 reach him	 or	her

. I d. (quoting Kovtuschenko ,	521 A.2d	at 719 )

. [¶1 7 ] In	 1989,	 after	 we	 issued	 our	 opinion	 in Lamarre

— where	 we disclaimed	 any	 statutory	 presumption	 of	 receipt	 based	 on	 mailing

— t he Legislature	 explicitly	 cre ated a	 receipt	 provision in	 the	 statute	 applicable	 to provisional	licenses by adding the	 following	language:	“The notice	is	deemed received	5 days	after	mailing, unless	returned	by	postal	authorities .” P.L.	1989, ch.	 866,	 §	 B

- 20	 (effective	 April	 19,	 1990) (codified	 at	 29

- A M.R.S .A. § 2241

- G(2)(F)(2)	(Supp.	19 90 ) ) (emphasis	added) ; see	also Blier	v.	Inhabitants of	Town	of	Fort Kent ,	273	A.2d	732,	734	(Me.	1971) (“It	is	to	be	presumed	the Legislature	 enacted	 [the	 statute]	 with	 a	 full	 knowledge	 of	 the	 existing

8 Compare P.L.	1987,	ch.	791,	§	25 , with P.L.	1981,	ch.	679,	§	43.14 conditions	 of	 the	 comm on	 law	 and	 of	 statu tes	 with	 respect	 to	 the subject

- matter.” (quotation	marks	omitted)). [¶1 8 ] W hen	 the	 motor	 vehicle code was recodified	 in	 1993, that statutory reference	to	receipt was added to	statutes	governing operating	after suspension	 or	 revocation ,	including	 the	 statute	at	issue	in	 this	case

. See P.L. 1993,	ch.	683,	§§	A

- 1,	2 (effective	Jan.	1,	1995) (repealed	and	replaced	Title	29 of	 the	 Maine	 Revised	 Statutes	 Annotated).	 	 This	 language	 remains	 in	 effect today,	except	that	the	statute	now	provides	a more	immediate date	of	receipt, so	 that	 “notice	 is	 deemed	 received 3 days	 after	 mailing,	 unless	 returne d	 by
pos tal	authorities.” 29

- A	M.R.S.	§ 2482(3). [¶1 9 ] This	 was	 followed	 five	 years	 later	 by	 our	 decision in State	 v. Tayman ,	2008	ME	177,	¶¶	1,	4,	960	A.2d	1151 ,	where t he	defendant	appealed his	 conviction	 of	 operating	 after	 suspension	 by	 arguing in	 pa rt that	 the Secretary	of State’s suspension notice,	sent	by	regular	mail,	was	insufficient.		At trial,	“the	State	presented	prima	facie	evidence”	of that mailing , 9 and “Tayman offered	 nothing	 at	 t rial	 to	 rebut	 the	 State’s	 proof ” or “ allege[d] any	 specific infirmity	with	 the	mailing	 procedure

. ” I d. ¶	 9. Affirming	 the	 conviction,	we

9 This	evidence	included a	certificate	issued	by	the	Secretary	of	Stat e,	which	stated	that	the	notice was	sent	in	accordance	with	statutory requirements

. State	v.	Tayman ,	2008	ME	177, ¶	3,	960 A.2d 1151

.15 observed	that	the	State	presented	evidence	that	the notice	process	used	by	the Secretary	of	State met	the	statutory	requirements , id. ¶	8,	which	would	mean that	the notice ha d been	mailed to Tayman’s	last	known address , id. ¶	6

. We stated	 again “ that proof	 of	 mailing	 of	 notice,	 rather	 than	 of	 actual	 receipt, satisfied	both	statutory	and	due	process	requirements,”	and	that	“the	State	is not	 required	 to	 prove	 receipt.” Id. ¶	 7 (citing Lamarre ,	 553	 A.2d	 at	 1262 ; Kovtuschenko ,	 521	 A.2d	 at	 719 ). We	 therefore	 concluded	 that the	 State’s “unrebutted”	evidence	of	mailing	allowed	the	court	to	rationally	find	that	the State	had	proved	notice	beyond	a	reasonable	doubt. Id. ¶	9. [¶ 20 ] This	review	of	Maine	law	governing	the	sufficiency	of	notice	of	a license	suspension	or	revocation frames the	issue	presented	in	 this	case:	are the	requirements of section s	2557

- A(1)(A)(4)	and 2482 (1)(A) met	when	 the State	elects	to	prove	notice	of	a	lic ense	revocation with evidence	of	mailing but that	notice i s	returned	by	postal	officials	to	the	Secretary	of	State’s	office? [¶ 2 1] It	is	evident	 from	section	2482	and	applicable	case	law that	 the requirement	 of	 notice	 of	 a	 li cense	 suspension	 or	 revocation is	 not	 always satisfied	with	bare	proof	 that	 the	notice	wa s	mailed.		Rather,	our	case	law is rooted in Kovtuschenko , 521	 A.2d	 at	 719, where	 we	 explained	 that	 mailing, particularly	 to	 an	 address	 provided	 by	 the	 licensee,	 creat es	 a	 reasonable16 expectation	that	the	licensee will	receive	that	notice.		This principle	is solidified in	the explicit codification	of the receipt provision contained	in section	2482(3), where	the	Legislature articulated that	“notice	is	deemed	rece ived 3 days	after mailing ” unless that	notice	is “ returned	by	postal	authorities.” Were	the	statute applied	 so	 that	 the	 act	 of	 mailing	 by	 itself is sufficient	 when	 the	 notice	 is returned	by	postal	officials , section	2482(3) would	be rendered meaningless in
cont ravention	of the	principle	of	construction	that	statutory	language	may	not “be	 treated as	surplusage	if	a	reasonable	construction	applying	meaning	and force	is	otherwise	possible.” State	v.	Lowden ,	2014	ME	29,	¶	14,	87	A.3d	694 (quotation	marks	omitted) ; see	also State v.	Day ,	2000	ME	192,	¶	5,	760	A.2d
1039 (“A	criminal	statute	must	be	strictly	construed.”). [¶ 22 ] Furthermore,	the	connection between proof	of mailing and	some expectation	of	receipt is	supported	by	the	notice	requirements	enumer ated	by section	2557

- A(1)(A).		As	noted	above, see	supra ¶ ¶ 8

- 9 , t he	first	three	methods by	which	the	State	can prove the	element	of	notice	are with evidence that the licensee received some	form	of	actual notice	of	the	administrative	action	taken against	his	or	her	license. See 29

- A	M.R.S.	§	2557

- A (1)(A)(1)

- (3). In	contrast, although the	fourth	method nominally requires	only	proof	of	the	mailing	itself,
id. §	2557

- A(1)(A)(4), that mailed	notice is	deemed to	be received unless postal17 authorities	return	the	notice as	undeliver ed to	the	Secretary	of	State’s	office , id. §	2482(3)

. It	would	be	incongruous	to	construe	section	2482(1) (A) in	a	way that	allows	the	act	of	mailing	to	be	just	as	sufficient	as	the	pat hways	to	actual
noti ce	also	provided	in	the	statute when	that mailed notice	is	returned	to	the Secretary	 of	 State’s	 office. See Nastvogel ,	 2002	 ME	 97,	 ¶	 6,	 798	 A.2d	 1114 (stating	that	“statutory	language	must	be	construed	to	avoid	absurd,	illogical, or	inconsistent	results”	(quotation	marks	omitted)). If	there	is	any	ambiguity resulting	 fro m	 the	 interplay	 between	 section 2482(1)(A)	 and	 2482(3),	 that ambiguity	 is	 resolved through	 the	 Legislature’s	 express	 enactment	 of	 a provision	 that incorporates	 the	 prospect of	 recei pt	 into	 the	 mailing requirement after	we	had	specifically	stated	in Kovtuschenko ,	521	A.2d	at	719, that	that	was	the	Legislature’s	evident	intention.		That	e xpectation of	receipt is a	strong	one:	the	licensee	is	“deemed”	to	have	received	the	notice	three	days after	it	is	mailed. 29

- A	M.R.S.	§	2482(3). But	it	is	subject	to	a	narrow	and	clearly defined	 exception: that “ deemed ” receipt	 does	 not	 happen	 when	 post al authorities	return	the	notice	to	the	Secretary	of	State. Id. [¶ 23 ] Therefore ,	in	both	case	law	and	statute, the	principle	of	receipt	is brought	directly	into	the requirement	of notice because mailing	is	tethered	to the result of	that	mailing

— namely,	the	prospect	that	the	notice	will	be	received.18 Accordingly, we	hold that when postal	 officials	 return a mailed notice to	 the Secretary	of	State, the specific	type	of	notice defined in	section	2482,	which	is brought	 into	 the	 crimin al	 statute, see 29

- A	 M.R.S. §	 2557

- A(1)(A)(4), is not satisfied

. 10
B

. Application	of	the	Notice	Statute [¶ 24 ] We	now	consider	how	 these	legal	principles	apply	 to	 the	State’s evidence	presented	against	Cannady. [¶ 25 ] We	begin	by	acknowledging	 that	 the	unavailability	 of	 “deemed”
notice that	 occurs	 when	 the	 notice	 is	 returned	 by	 the	 post	 office	 does	 not preclude	proof	of	notice	by	other	means. A s	noted	above, however, see	supra ¶ 9 , at	 oral	 argument the	 State explicitly disclaimed	 any	 contention	 that Cannady’s	 conviction	 of	 operating	 after	 habitual	 offender	 revocation	 can	 be affirmed	based	on	a ny	other theory	of notice

. Rather,	the	State	relies entirely
on	its	assertion that	the	Secretary	of	State	satisfied	the requirements	of	section s

10 We	note	that , as	a	matter	of	due	process,	when	the	Secretary	of	St ate	suspends	or	revokes	that person ’s	license, the licensee’s noncompliance	with	 the	 statutory	 obligation	 to	 update	 his	 or her address	 with	 the	 Secretary	 of	 State	 does	 not result	 in	 the	 forfeiture	 of that	 person’s	 “right	 to constitutionally	sufficient	notice.” Jones	v.	 Flowers ,	547	U.S.	220,	232	 (2006) ; see	 also	Giberson	v. Quinn ,	445 A.2d	1007,	1008	(Me.	1982)	(“That	a Stat e	must	observe	the	strictures	of	due	process whenever	it	moves	 to	 deprive	 a	 person	 of	 his	 [or	 her]	motor	 vehicle	 operator’s	license	is	a	well established	rule	of	law.”). Therefore,	a lthough	Maine	licensee s	are	required	to	notify	the	Secretary of	State	of any	change	of	address, s ee 29

- A	M.R.S.	§ 1407 ,	the	failu re	to	do	so	does	not	result	in	the loss	of the c onstitutional	due	process	right to notice.19 2482(1)(A) and	 2557

- A(1)(A)(4) by	 merely	 having	 mailed	 the	 notice	 to Cannady’s	last	known	addres s ,	even	though	the	notice	was	returned	by	postal authorities

. [¶ 26 ] T he	 terms	 of	 the	 statute	 foreclose	 that	 result ,	 because	 the undi sputed	 facts	 in	 this	 case	 establish	 that	 postal	 authorities	 returned the
notice of	revocation to	 the	Secretary	of	State’s	office	with	information	 that	it was	undeliverable. Therefore, in	the	face	of	the	State’s unequivocal disavowal of	 reliance	 on	 any	 oth er	 type	 of	 notice , the evidence was	insufficient for the

court to	 find that	 the	State	proved	notice	as	 required	by	 statute ,	which	is	an essential	element	of	the	crime	of operating	after	habitual	offender	revocation,

see 29

- A	M.R.S.	 §	 2557

- A(1)(A)(4),	 (2) (A),	 and	 Cannady’s	 conviction	 for that crime	must	be	vacated. [¶ 27 ] To	be	clear,	 our	conclusion	here	does	not disturb	 settled law	in Maine	 that when	 the	 State’s	 case	 is	 built	 on	 the	 provisions	 of	 section s 2482(1)(A) and	2557

- A(1)(A)( 4) and	the	Secretary of	State’s	mailing	has	not been	 returned	 by	 postal	 authorities , the	 State	 is	 not	 required	 to prove affirmatively	 that	 the	 licensee actually	 received	 notice of	 suspension	 or20 revocation

. 11 In	most	cases,	evidence	of	mailing,	if	accepted	by	the	fact

- finder, will	 be	 sufficient	 to	 satisfy	 the	 notice	 requi rement	 pursuant	 to	 section 2557

- A (1)(A)

. See Tayman ,	2008	ME	177,	¶¶	7,	 9,	960	A.2d	1151; Lamarre , 553 A.2d	at	1262; Kovtuschenko ,	521	A.2d	at	719. Rather,	o ur	holding	today is narrowly	drawn	and	limited	by	t he undisputed	fact that,	although	the	Secretary of	State	mailed	notice	to	Cannady’s	last	known	address ,	the	notice was	returned by	 postal	 officials as	 undeliverable and the Secretary	 of State did	 not subsequently take	 additional	 steps to	 provide	 notice	 in any	 of	 the	 ways described	 in	 sections 2482 (1) or 2557

- A(1)(A). Given	 the	 record	 and	 the limited	argument	of	the	State ,	pursuant	to	section	2482(3)	and the fo undational common	law	principle	that creates	an	expectation	of	receipt	based	on	evidence of	mailing, the	State did	not	present	evidence	on	which	the	court	was	entitled to	find	that	the	Secretary	of	State	satisfied	the	s tatutory	requirement	of	notice. See	 Tayman , 2008	 ME	 177,	 ¶	 4,	 960	 A.2d	 11 51	 ( describing	 the	 appellate standard	for	reviewing	the	sufficiency	of	the	evidence )

.

11 Unlike the	defendants	in Lamarre and Kovtuschenko , who	relied	on	evidence	of	non

- receipt merely	to	rebut	the	State’s	evidence	of	mailing, see State	v. Lamarre ,	553	A.2d 1260, 1262 (Me.	1989) ; Kovtuschenko ,	521	A.2d	at	719 , Cannady	does	not	rely	on	an	argument	that	the	notice	was	not	mailed.21 III.		CONCLUSION [¶ 28 ] In	 summary , we	 conclude	 that the	 eviden ce	 is	 insufficient	 to support	 the	 court’s	 determination that	 the	 Secretary	 of	 State	 satisfied	 the statutory element	governing	notice	of Cannady’s	license revocation

. Fo r	that

reason , we	 vacate	 the	 conviction	 for	 the	 charge	 of	 operating	 after	 habitual offender	revocation

. 12 The	entry	is: The	 j udgment of conviction for operating	 after habitual	offender	revocation is	vacated,	and	the case is remanded	 for	 entry	 of	 judgment	 of acquittal	 on	 that	 charge

. T he	 judgment of conviction	for	failing	to	give his correct	name is affirmed.

Tina	Heather	Nadeau,	 Esq. (orally) ,	 The	 Law	 Office	 of	 Tina	Heather	 Nadeau, PLLC,	Portland,	for	appellant	Dmitri	L.	Cannady Stephanie	 Anderson,	 District	 Attorney , and	 Jennifer	 F.	 Ackerman,	 Asst.	 Dist. Atty. (orally) ,	Prosecutorial	District	Two,	Portland,	for	appellee	State	of	Maine

Cumberland	County	Unified	Criminal	Docket	docket	number	CR

- 2015

- 7186 F OR C LERK R EFERENCE O NLY

12 Because	we vacate	the	conviction	on	statutory	grounds,	we	do	not	reach	Cannady’s	assertion that	the	steps	taken	by	the	Secretary	of	State	to	notify	him	of	the	license	revocation were	insufficient to	satisfy	his	right	to due	process. See State	v.	Bassford ,	440	A.2d 105 9,	1061	(Me .	1982) (stating	that as	 a	 “ fundamen tal	 rule	 of	 appellate	 procedure	 .	 .	 . a	 court	 should	 avoid	 expressing	 opinions	 on constitutional law whenever	 a	nonconstitutional	 resolution	 of	 the	issues	 renders	a	 constitutional ruling unnecessary ” (quota tion	marks	omitted))

.