Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D),

this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as prec edent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT : ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE : BARBARA J. SIMMONS GREGORY F. ZOELLER Oldenburg, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana IAN MCLEAN Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana


## IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF INDIANA

LARRY PARKS, ) ) Appellant

- Defendant, ) ) vs. ) No. 49A02

- 1108

- CR

- 706 ) STATE OF INDIANA, ) ) Appellee

- Plaintiff. )

APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT The Honorable John S. Alt, Master Commissioner Cause No. 49G14

- 1102

- CM

- 010223

March 6, 2012 MEMORANDUM DECISION
- NOT FOR PUBLICATION VAIDIK, Judge2 Case Summary Larry Parks appeals his conviction for Class A misdemeanor driving while suspended. He contends that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evi dence obtained from a traffic stop because the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to initiate the stop . Finding that the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop Parks , the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence. We the refore affirm the trial
court. Facts and Procedural History On February 14, 2011, Parks was driving southbound on Shadeland Avenue. Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department Officer Kimberly Evans was on routine patrol when she noticed that Parks’s rea r license plate was hanging down at a ninety

degree angle from the ordinary horizontal position and was fastened by a single bolt or

screw. She ran the license plate number through the computer in her patrol vehicle and was informed that the license plate had been reported as stolen. Officer Evans contacted IMPD dispatch , and they confirmed that the license plate had been reported as stolen. She followed Parks’s vehicle for a short time until she was joined by backup and then initiated a traffic stop of the vehicle. IMPD Officer Gregory Scott was Officer Evans’s backup during the traffic stop. He also observed that the license plate was fastened by a single bolt or screw, but he reported that it w as hanging down at a forty

- five

- degree angle from the ord inary horizontal position.3

Officer Evans informed P arks why she had stopped him and asked for his driver’s
license. Officer Evans ran his license through dispatch and learned that Parks’s driving privileges had been suspended. She then issued Parks a tr affic citation for the improperly

- displayed license plate and arrested him for driving while suspended. Since Parks had a previous judgment within the past ten years for driving while suspended, the State charged him with Class A misdemeanor driving while suspended. It was determined that the car belonged to Parks’s sister and that the license plate was valid and not in fact stolen, so he was not charged with theft. Parks filed a motion to suppress all evidence obtained from the traffic stop , arguing tha t the stop was illegal. The trial court denied the motion. Parks was found guilty of driving while suspended at a bench trial and was sentenced to two days in jail , with credit for one day, and a ninety

- day license suspension. Parks now appeals. Discuss ion and Decision Although Parks argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction of driving while suspended, the issue is more appropriate ly framed as whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the evidence obtained fro m the traffic stop

. A trial court has broad discretion in ruling on the admission or exclusion of evidence. Kimbrough v. State , 911 N.E.2d 621, 631 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). The trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence will be disturbed on revi ew only upon a showing of an abuse of discretion. Id. An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s ruling is clearly against the logic, facts, and circumstances presented. Id. We do4

not reweigh the evidence, and we consider conflicting evidence most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. Collins v. State , 822 N.E.2d 214, 218 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied

. Parks contends that the traffic stop w as unlawful because the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop him . We disagree. It is well settled that a police officer may briefly detain a person whom he believes has committed an infraction or ordinance violation. Goens v. State , 943 N.E.2d 829, 832 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011 ) (quotation omitted)

. An officer’s decision to stop a vehicl e is valid so long as his or her on

- the

- spot evaluation reasonably suggests that lawbreaking occurred. Gunn v. State , 956 N.E.2d 136, 139 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). In this case, Officer Evans noticed that Parks’s license plate was improperly displayed in vio lation of Indiana Code Section 9

- 18

- 2

- 26(b) . Section 9

- 18

- 2

- 26(b) requires that a license plate be “ securely fastened in a horizontal position

. ” The license plate was fastened by only one screw or bolt and hanging at a ninety

- degree angle from horizontal

. When Officer Scott later saw the license plate, it was fastened in the same manner, but he describe d it as hanging at a forty

- five

- degree angle from horizontal. Taking this evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s decision, the license plate was not horizontal , giving Officer Evans an objectively justifiable reason t o conduct a traffic stop. Before conducting the traffic stop, Officer Evans also ran Parks’s license plate number through the computer in her patrol vehicle and was notifi ed that the license plate had been reported as stolen. Officer Evans contacted IMPD , and they confirmed this5

report. This provided an additional objectively justifiable reason to conduct the traffic stop. After performing the lawful traffic stop, Office r Evans ran Parks’s driver’s license through dispatch , conduct that is within the scope of reasonable detention of a traffic stop. See State v. Quirk , 842 N.E.2d 334, 340 (Ind. 2006) . It was then that she learned that his driving privileges had been susp ended. This evidence was properly admitted at trial, as both the initial traffic stop and subsequent running of Parks’s driver’s license

were legal. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence that Parks operated a motor vehicle wh ile his driving privileges were suspended. We therefore affirm the trial court. Affirmed

. ROBB, C.J., and NAJAM, J., concur.