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NIEVEEN v. TAX 106

Cite as 311 Neb. 574

Sandra K. Nieveen, appellant, v. TAX 106, 

a Nebraska general partnership, 

et al., appellees.

___ N.W.2d ___

Filed May 13, 2022. No. S-21-364.

1. Constitutional Law: Statutes. The constitutionality of statutes and 

statutory interpretation present questions of law.

2. Motions to Dismiss: Pleadings: Appeal and Error. A district court’s 

grant of a motion to dismiss on the pleadings is reviewed de novo by 

an appellate court, accepting the factual allegations in the complaint as 

true and drawing all reasonable inferences of law and fact in favor of the 

nonmoving party.

3. Actions: Motions to Dismiss: Pleadings: Appeal and Error. An appellate court reviewing a dismissal on the pleadings is not obliged to accept 

as true legal conclusions couched as factual allegations or threadbare 

recitals of the elements of a cause of action supported by mere conclusory statements.

4. Equity: Quiet Title. A quiet title action sounds in equity.

5. Equity: Appeal and Error. On appeal from an equity action, an appellate court tries factual questions de novo on the record and, as to questions of both fact and law, is obligated to reach a conclusion independent 

of the conclusion reached by the trial court, provided that where credible 

evidence is in conflict in a material issue of fact, the appellate court 

considers and may give weight to the fact that the trial judge heard 

and observed the witnesses and accepted one version of the facts rather 

than another.

Appeal from the District Court for Lancaster County: Kevin 

R. McManaman, Judge. Affirmed.

Mark T. Bestul, Jennifer Gaughan, and Caitlin Cedfeldt, of 

Legal Aid of Nebraska, for appellant.

Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library

www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/

06/10/2022 08:06 AM CDT
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NIEVEEN v. TAX 106

Cite as 311 Neb. 574

Christian R. Blunk, of Harris & Associates, P.C., L.L.O., for 

appellees TAX 106 and Vintage Management, LLC.

Patrick F. Condon, Lancaster County Attorney, and Eric 

Synowicki for appellees Lancaster County and Rachel Garver.

Douglas J. Peterson, Attorney General, and James A. 

Campbell, Solicitor General, for appellee Attorney General.

Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Funke, Papik, 

and Freudenberg, JJ., and O’Gorman, District Judge.

Papik, J.

After Sandra K. Nieveen failed to pay her real property 

taxes, the Lancaster County treasurer sold a tax certificate 

for the property to a private party. Over 3 years later, when 

Nieveen had still not paid the relevant property taxes, the tax 

certificate holder applied for and obtained a tax deed to the 

property. Nieveen later filed a lawsuit in which she argued 

that she should be declared the owner of the property for various reasons. The district court denied Nieveen relief, finding 

that she did not qualify for an extended redemption period 

under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-1827 (Reissue 2018) and that the 

tax certificate sale process did not violate her constitutional 

rights under the U.S. and Nebraska Constitutions. Nieveen now 

appeals, but we find no error on the part of the district court 

and, thus, affirm.

BACKGROUND

Tax Certificate Sale and Deed Transfer.

Nebraska utilizes tax certificate sales as one method of 

recouping delinquent property taxes. See, Neb. Rev. Stat. 

§ 77-1801 et seq. (Reissue 2018); Continental Resources v. 

Fair, ante p. 184, 971 N.W.2d 313 (2022) (discussing statutes 

governing tax certificate sale process). Nieveen did not pay 

her 2013 property taxes. As a result, the Lancaster County 

treasurer, pursuant to Nebraska’s tax certificate sale statutes, 
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sold a tax certificate for Nieveen’s property to TAX 106 on 

March 2, 2015.

Three years after purchasing the tax certificate, TAX 106 

began to take the procedural steps required by statute to 

request a tax deed from the Lancaster County treasurer for 

Nieveen’s property. See § 77-1837. On March 2, 2018, TAX 

106 sent a notice by certified mail to Nieveen of its intention 

to apply for a tax deed to the property in 3 months’ time if she 

did not redeem the property by paying the taxes, interest, and 

fees. See § 77-1831.

TAX 106 assigned its interest in the tax certificate to Vintage 

Management, LLC (Vintage). In June 2018, after Nieveen 

failed to redeem the property within the time period set forth in 

TAX 106’s notice, Vintage applied for and received a tax deed 

to Nieveen’s property from the Lancaster County treasurer.

Nieveen’s Quiet Title Action.

Nearly a year after the issuance of the tax deed to Vintage, 

Nieveen filed this lawsuit in which she sought to quiet title to 

the property in her name. The defendants included Lancaster 

County and the Lancaster County treasurer (collectively 

Lancaster County), as well as Vintage. Nieveen alleged that 

TAX 106 obtained the tax certificate by paying $2,390.48 for 

delinquent property taxes in 2013 and 2014 and that it paid an 

additional $1,405.90 in property taxes for 2015. Nieveen also 

alleged that at the time Lancaster County issued the tax deed, 

her property was assessed at $61,900, and that there was no 

deed of trust securing a mortgage on the property.

Nieveen alleged that the issuance of the tax deed had violated her rights under the U.S. and Nebraska Constitutions. 

Relevant to this appeal, Nieveen alleged that the issuance of 

the tax deed had violated her rights under the Due Process 

Clauses of the U.S. and Nebraska Constitutions, the Takings 

Clauses of the U.S. and Nebraska Constitutions, and the 

Excessive Fines Clauses of the U.S. and Nebraska Constitutions. 

She also alleged that she had a statutory right to a 5-year 
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redemption period under § 77-1827 because she had a mental 

disorder at the time of the tax certificate sale.

Lancaster County and Vintage filed motions to dismiss 

in which they contended that Nieveen’s complaint failed to 

state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The district 

court granted the motions to dismiss as to Nieveen’s constitutional claims.

After the dismissal of Nieveen’s constitutional claims, her 

sole remaining claim was that title should be quieted in her 

name because she was entitled to an extended redemption 

period under § 77-1827. The district court granted summary 

judgment to Lancaster County on this claim, because Lancaster 

County did not claim an interest in the property at issue. The 

district court overruled Vintage’s motion for summary judgment on that claim, finding that there remained genuine questions of material fact to be determined at trial.

Trial Evidence.

At trial, Nieveen offered evidence in support of her claim 

that she had a “mental disorder” for purposes of § 77-1827 at 

the time of the tax certificate sale. Nieveen testified that she 

had been diagnosed with “major depressive disorder, recurrent, 

severe,” and generalized anxiety disorder.

Nieveen testified that she had dealt with depression and 

anxiety for 30 years, but that her condition had improved in 

2018 after she started taking a new medication. She asserted 

that she would have been suffering from symptoms of depression and anxiety in 2015 because it “was no different than any 

other year” prior to beginning her new course of medication 

in 2018.

Nieveen testified that she experienced “good days” and 

“bad days” with respect to her depression and anxiety. Before 

she found an effective medication, she had more bad days 

than good days. On a bad day, Nieveen testified that she 

would stay at her house and sleep or watch television. During 

bad days, she would not pay bills or pick up her mail. She 
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testified that her mail would “build up” to such an extent 

that postal workers would “bundle it up and throw it on [her] 

back porch or . . . take it back to the post office” and warn 

her that if she did not start “picking up” her mail, they would 

no longer deliver to her house. Nieveen claimed to still have 

some mail from 2015 that she had not yet gone through.

Nieveen testified that there was no reason aside from her 

mental health that would have prevented her from responding to the sale of the tax certificate for her property in March 

2015. She also testified, however, that sometimes she failed to 

pay bills because she did not have the money to pay and that 

when she did not have the money, she would ignore the bills. 

When asked by her counsel why she failed to pay certain bills, 

Nieveen initially responded that she “[j]ust didn’t want to deal 

with the situation.” When her counsel followed up to ask if she 

failed to pay because of symptoms of her depression and anxiety, Nieveen responded that it was “because [of] depression, 

anxiety, I didn’t want to deal with life in general. So, looking at 

my bills was depressing, and making me anxious. I just didn’t 

want to deal with it, and I didn’t deal with it.”

Nieveen acknowledged that several years prior to trial, she 

had received a notice from the city that she needed to make 

certain repairs to her house and remove a couch from its front 

porch. She admitted that she promptly responded to those 

notices and, with the help of her brother-in-law, did what 

the city required. She also acknowledged that in 2008, she 

received a notice that she had failed to pay her property taxes, 

but that her daughter paid the taxes and, as a result, the situation did not escalate as it did with respect to the tax certificate 

sale at issue in this case.

Nieveen admitted that she understood she had to pay her 

bills and that there were consequences if she failed to do 

so. She also admitted that between 2010 and 2016, neither 

a guardian, conservator, nor a power of attorney managed 

her affairs.
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Nieveen’s daughter also testified at trial. Her daughter testified that she had no reason to doubt Nieveen’s diagnoses and 

that she had observed Nieveen to be “[v]ery withdrawn” and 

to sleep a lot. Nieveen’s daughter corroborated Nieveen’s testimony that she failed to pay taxes and other bills when due. 

When asked why Nieveen did not pay her bills, Nieveen’s 

daughter responded, “I’d say [it is a] combination of money 

and just like — I don’t — denial of just life, in general of the 

way life works . . . .”

Nieveen also offered and the district court received deposition testimony of Sabrina Hellbusch. Hellbusch is a licensed 

advanced practice registered nurse in Nebraska and is board 

certified in mental health. Nieveen has been a patient of 

Hellbusch since November 2018. Hellbusch confirmed that she 

had diagnosed Nieveen with “major depressive disorder, recurrent, severe,” and generalized anxiety disorder. Hellbusch testified that Nieveen’s mental disorder was “severe enough that it 

could cause a person to neglect an important activity and could 

cause a person to miss important deadlines.” She also testified 

that, in her opinion, Nieveen’s symptoms were sufficiently 

severe that they explained why her responsibilities have not 

always been met. Hellbusch admitted that she was only able to 

give opinions concerning Nieveen’s condition from 2018 forward and thus could not give an opinion concerning Nieveen’s 

condition in 2015.

In addition to evidence concerning Nieveen’s mental health, 

Nieveen offered evidence regarding an attempt to redeem the 

property in May 2019. Nieveen and her daughter testified that 

her daughter supplied Nieveen with a blank check and that 

Nieveen went to the Lancaster County treasurer’s office to 

tender payment for the unpaid taxes. They testified that the 

treasurer’s office refused to accept the payment.

Vintage did not present any live testimony at trial. It 

did offer and the district court received an affidavit of Dr. 

Bruce Gutnik. Dr. Gutnik has practiced medicine in psychiatry 

and neurology for more than 46 years. Gutnik stated in his 
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affidavit that he had reviewed Nieveen’s medical records and 

prescription records and concluded there was “no evidence” 

that at the time of the tax certificate sale “Nieveen was unable 

to manage her own affairs or understand her then current condition.” He also stated that “[t]here was no evidence that she 

could not understand her legal rights or protect her rights.”

District Court Order.

Following trial, the district court issued a written order finding that Nieveen was not entitled to the extended redemption 

period under § 77-1827 and dismissing the case. After summarizing the evidence, the district court explained that the 

relevant question was whether Nieveen suffered a mental disorder at the time of the tax certificate sale in March 2015. The 

district court concluded that this court set forth the definition 

of “mental disorder” when we said the following:

[A] person with a mental disorder . . . is one who suffers 

from a condition of mental derangement which actually 

prevents the sufferer from understanding his or her legal 

rights or from instituting legal action[,] and . . . a mental 

disorder . . . is an incapacity which disqualifies one from 

acting for the protection of one’s rights.

Wisner v. Vandelay Investments, 300 Neb. 825, 861, 916 N.W.2d 

698, 726 (2018), quoting Maycock v. Hoody, 281 Neb. 767, 

799 N.W.2d 322 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The district court determined that Nieveen had failed to 

carry her burden to establish a mental disorder. The district 

court stated that although it was clear that Nieveen suffered 

from depression and anxiety, “without something more,” it 

could not find that her condition was such that she was entitled 

to the extended redemption period set forth in § 77-1827.

Nieveen appealed and filed a notice pursuant to Neb. Ct. 

R. App. P. § 2-109(E) (rev. 2014) that her appeal challenged 

the constitutionality of Nebraska statutes. We moved the case 

to our docket. The Attorney General filed a brief on appeal 

defending the constitutionality of the challenged statutes.
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ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Nieveen assigns, renumbered and restated, that the district 

court erred by (1) finding she did not suffer from a mental 

disorder under § 77-1827 at the time of the tax certificate 

sale, (2) dismissing her claim that the issuance of the tax deed 

violated her rights under the Due Process Clauses of the U.S. 

and Nebraska Constitutions, (3) dismissing her claim that the 

issuance of the tax deed violated her rights under the Takings 

Clauses of the U.S. and Nebraska Constitutions, and (4) dismissing her claim that the issuance of the tax deed violated 

her rights under the Excessive Fines Clauses of the U.S. and 

Nebraska Constitutions.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[1] The constitutionality of statutes and statutory interpretation present questions of law. HBI, L.L.C. v. Barnette, 305 Neb. 

457, 941 N.W.2d 158 (2020).

[2,3] A district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss on the 

pleadings is reviewed de novo by an appellate court, accepting 

the factual allegations in the complaint as true and drawing 

all reasonable inferences of law and fact in favor of the non

moving party. SID No. 67 of Sarpy Cty. v. State, 309 Neb. 600, 

961 N.W.2d 796 (2021). However, an appellate court reviewing 

a dismissal on the pleadings is not obliged to accept as true 

legal conclusions couched as factual allegations or threadbare 

recitals of the elements of a cause of action supported by mere 

conclusory statements. Id.

[4,5] A quiet title action sounds in equity. Wisner v. Vandelay 

Investments, 300 Neb. 825, 916 N.W.2d 698 (2018). On appeal 

from an equity action, an appellate court tries factual questions de novo on the record and, as to questions of both 

fact and law, is obligated to reach a conclusion independent of the conclusion reached by the trial court, provided 

that where credible evidence is in conflict in a material 

issue of fact, the appellate court considers and may give 

weight to the fact that the trial judge heard and observed the 
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witnesses and accepted one version of the facts rather than 

another. Id.

ANALYSIS

Extended Redemption Period.

Nieveen first argues that the district court erred by finding 

that she was not entitled to the 5-year extended redemption 

period under § 77-1827. Nieveen contends that if she was 

entitled to the extended redemption period, title to the property should be quieted in her name, because she attempted to 

redeem the property in May 2019 by paying the unpaid taxes. 

We will thus consider whether the district court erred in its 

determination that Nieveen was not entitled to the extended 

redemption period.

Section 77-1827 provides that “[t]he real property of persons 

with . . . a mental disorder so sold, or any interest they may 

have in real property sold for taxes, may be redeemed at any 

time within five years after such sale.” We have held that an 

owner of property is entitled to the 5-year redemption period 

set forth in § 77-1827 if the owner has a mental disorder at 

the time of the sale of the tax certificate. See Wisner, supra. 

Accordingly, the relevant question in this case is whether 

Nieveen had a mental disorder for purposes of § 77-1827 in 

March 2015.

Nieveen’s appellate briefs appeared to accept that the governing definition of mental disorder under § 77-1827 was the 

definition applied by the district court and set forth in Wisner. 

That definition, quoted in the background section above, 

requires a party seeking the extended redemption period to 

establish that he or she has a mental health condition, but 

it also requires that he or she establish that the condition 

prevented the person from understanding his or her legal 

rights or taking action to protect those rights. See Wisner, 

supra. At oral argument, Nieveen seemed to at least implicitly back away from the Wisner formulation, arguing that 

Nieveen’s diagnoses alone should entitle her to the extended 
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redemption period. To the extent Nieveen has invited us to 

retreat from the definition of mental disorder adopted in Wisner, 

we decline.

Our adherence to the definition of mental disorder set forth 

in Wisner is informed by the history of § 77-1827 and our 

interpretation of similar language in a similar statute. The language of § 77-1827 has not always used the term “mental disorder.” See § 77-1827 (Reissue 1981). Legislation enacted in 

1986 removed the term “insane” and replaced it with “mental 

disorder.” See 1986 Neb. Laws, L.B. 1177, § 34. In the context of another statute providing for a tolling of the statute of 

limitations if a person was “insane,” Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-213 

(Reissue 1985), we said that “the word insane means such 

condition of mental derangement which actually prevents the 

sufferer from understanding his or her legal rights or instituting legal action” and that insanity, for purposes of that statute, 

“results in an incapacity which disqualifies one from acting for the protection of one’s rights.” Sacchi v. Blodig, 215 

Neb. 817, 821, 822, 341 N.W.2d 326, 330 (1983) (emphasis 

omitted). The same legislation that changed the terminology 

of § 77-1827 removed that statute’s reference to the word 

“insane” and replaced it with “mental disorder.” 1986 Neb. 

Laws, L.B. 1177, § 5. After that amendment, the Nebraska 

Court of Appeals held that despite this change, the statute 

should have the same meaning. See Vergara v. Lopez-Vasquez, 

1 Neb. App. 1141, 510 N.W.2d 550 (1993). The Court of 

Appeals relied on language from this court directing that “[a] 

mere change of phraseology” will not change the operation 

of a statute “unless the intent to make such change is clear 

and unmistakable.” Id. at 1146-47, 510 N.W.2d at 553, quoting Shames v. State, 192 Neb. 614, 223 N.W.2d 481 (1974) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). In Maycock v. Hoody, 281 

Neb. 767, 799 N.W.2d 322 (2011), we affirmed the Court of 

Appeals’ interpretation of § 25-213.

All of this history brings us to Wisner v. Vandelay, 300 

Neb. 825, 916 N.W.2d 698 (2018), where we held that the 
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same definition that was once used for “insane” and was later 

extended to “mental disorder” for purposes of § 25-213 should 

also be used for “mental disorder” for purposes of § 77-1827. 

Given the similarities between the two statutes and between 

the respective amendments to the statutes in 1986, we are not 

convinced that holding was erroneous. Furthermore, in the time 

since our decision in Wisner, despite making other changes to 

the tax certificate sale process, see 2019 Neb. Laws, L.B. 463, 

§§ 1 through 8 and 10 (amending §§ 77-1802, 77-1831 through 

77-1835, 77-1837, and 77-187.01 (Cum. Supp. 2020); repealing § 77-1824.01 (Cum. Supp. 2020)), the Legislature has not 

amended § 77-1827. As we often say, where a statute has been 

judicially construed and that construction has not evoked an 

amendment, it will be presumed that the Legislature has acquiesced in the court’s determination of the Legislature’s intent. 

Heckman v. Marchio, 296 Neb. 458, 894 N.W.2d 296 (2017). 

Accordingly, we will analyze Nieveen’s claim that she had a 

mental disorder for purposes of § 77-1827 under the definition 

adopted in Wisner.

Under the Wisner definition, Nieveen was required to prove 

that she had a condition of mental derangement which prevented her either from understanding her legal rights or from 

taking action to protect her legal rights. We do not believe 

Nieveen proved that her condition was such that she was incapable of understanding her legal rights. Nieveen acknowledged 

in testimony that she knew she had to pay her bills and that 

there were consequences if she did not.

We likewise are not persuaded that Nieveen proved that 

her mental condition in March 2015 prevented her from taking action to protect her legal rights. Although Nieveen testified that her mental health was the only thing that would 

have prevented her from responding to the sale of the tax 

certificate in March 2015, there was also evidence of other 

possible reasons. Nieveen testified that sometimes she failed 

to pay bills because she lacked money. Nieveen’s daughter 

also testified that Nieveen failed to pay bills because of a 
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combination of lacking money and a “denial . . . of the way 

life works.” Other evidence also suggested that despite her 

depression and anxiety, Nieveen was capable of protecting her 

legal rights. Such capacity is indicated by her testimony that 

several years prior to trial, she promptly responded to a notice 

from the city about the condition of her house and, with the 

help of her brother-in-law, took corrective action. Furthermore, 

Nieveen admitted that her affairs were not managed by a 

guardian, conservator, or power of attorney.

We also note that Nieveen acknowledged that even prior to 

starting a more effective medication in 2018, she had “good 

days” and “bad days” with respect to her depression and 

anxiety. All of Nieveen’s testimony focused on her claimed 

inability to tend to responsibilities during “bad days.” Nieveen 

provided no testimony, however, that would have established 

what she was experiencing in March 2015 when the tax certificate was sold. Hellbusch, Nieveen’s expert witness, could 

not give an opinion as to Nieveen’s condition in March 2015. 

On the other hand, Gutnick, Vintage’s expert witness, stated in 

his affidavit that based on his review of her medical records, 

he saw no evidence that she was unable to protect her rights at 

that time.

After reviewing this evidence de novo, we find that the 

district court did not err in determining that Nieveen did not 

have a mental disorder for purposes of § 77-1827 and thus 

was not entitled to the extended redemption period provided 

for in that statute. While we have no reason to question that 

Nieveen suffered from depression and anxiety in 2015, we 

do not believe she proved that those conditions prevented her 

from understanding her legal rights or taking action to protect 

them. Our decision should not be understood as a conclusion 

that depression and anxiety could never constitute a mental 

disorder under § 77-1827.

Procedural Due Process.

Nieveen next argues that the district court erred by dismissing her claim that the issuance of the tax deed violated 
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her rights to procedural due process guaranteed by the 14th 

Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and article I, § 3, of the 

Nebraska Constitution.

The 14th Amendment’s Due Process Clause provides that 

States shall not “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 

without due process of law.” The language in the Nebraska 

Constitution is similar. It says, “No person shall be deprived of 

life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .” Neb. 

Const. art. I, § 3. We have interpreted our state constitutional 

provision “coextensive[ly]” with that of the 14th Amendment. 

Keller v. City of Fremont, 280 Neb. 788, 791, 790 N.W.2d 711, 

713 (2010).

Nieveen alleged in her operative complaint that her rights 

to procedural due process were violated in two ways. First, 

she asserted that she was provided inadequate notice because, 

pursuant to § 77-1831, she received notice of her right to 

redeem only 3 months prior to Vintage’s filing an application 

for the tax deed. Second, she asserted that she was denied her 

right to procedural due process because there was no process 

in place to claim a right to the extended redemption period 

under § 77-1827.

We can quickly conclude that the district court did not err by 

dismissing Nieveen’s claim she was entitled to more advance 

notice of Vintage’s intent to apply for a tax deed to her property. We very recently rejected essentially the same argument 

in Continental Resources v. Fair, ante p. 184, 971 N.W.2d 313 

(2022). In that case, we held that due process did not require 

the delinquent taxpayer to receive notice at the time of the tax 

certificate sale and that it was sufficient the delinquent taxpayer received actual notice that a tax certificate had been sold, 

that he had 3 months to redeem the property, and that if the 

property owner failed to do so, the tax certificate holder would 

apply for a tax deed. Id. Under the reasoning of Continental 

Resources, Nieveen cannot show that she was constitutionally 

entitled to earlier notice.
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As for Nieveen’s claim that she was denied procedural 

due process because there was no process in place to claim 

a right to the extended redemption period under § 77-1827, 

it too encounters an immediate hurdle. As the district court 

observed in dismissing this claim, Nieveen brought this lawsuit to invalidate the tax deed on the basis of the extended 

redemption period and thus it cannot be said that there was 

no process by which Nieveen could claim a right to the 

extended redemption period. No doubt aware of this difficulty, 

Nieveen argues on appeal that due process required that she 

be provided with a hearing in which she could claim a right 

to the extended redemption period prior to the issuance of the 

tax deed.

We are not persuaded that the district court erred by dismissing this aspect of Nieveen’s procedural due process claim. 

First, it is not clear that Nieveen was constitutionally entitled 

to an opportunity for a hearing prior to the issuance of the 

tax deed. Procedural due process is flexible and calls for such 

protections as the particular situation demands. Manning v. 

Dakota Cty. Sch. Dist., 279 Neb. 740, 782 N.W.2d 1 (2010). 

And although sometimes government entities must provide an 

opportunity for a hearing before a party is deprived of an interest protected by the Due Process Clause, that is not always the 

case. See id.

Nieveen has not offered any reasons why it was imperative 

that an opportunity for a predeprivation hearing be provided 

here, and it would seem that at least some of the relevant 

factors tilt in the opposite direction. In order to determine 

whether an opportunity for predeprivation process is required, 

courts consider the “competing interests at stake, along with 

the promptness and adequacy of later proceedings.” United 

States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43, 

53, 114 S. Ct. 492, 126 L. Ed. 2d 490 (1993). The competing interests can be analyzed through the three-part inquiry 

set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S. Ct. 

893, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1976), which requires a balancing of 
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the private interest affected by official action, the risk of an 

erroneous deprivation through the procedures used, and the 

government’s interest. See James Daniel Good Real Property, 

supra. Here, although Nieveen obviously has a great interest in her property, her operative complaint acknowledged 

that even after the issuance of the tax deed, she continued 

to reside there. Further, Nieveen can hardly argue that the 

process she ultimately received—a full-blown trial before a 

district court judge with the power to invalidate the tax deed 

issued to Vintage and quiet title in her name—was somehow inadequate.

In the end, we find it unnecessary to determine whether 

Nieveen was constitutionally entitled to the opportunity for a 

hearing on the applicability of § 77-1827’s extended redemption period prior to the issuance of the tax deed. We reach 

this conclusion because Nieveen had such an opportunity. 

Nieveen’s operative complaint alleges that she received notice 

that the tax certificate holder was applying for a tax deed on 

March 2, 2018, but Lancaster County did not issue a deed to 

Vintage until June 22. Nieveen could have filed a lawsuit prior 

to June 22 seeking to enjoin Lancaster County from issuing the 

tax deed on the grounds that she was entitled to § 77-1827’s 

extended redemption period.

In other words, Nieveen was not denied a hearing prior to 

the issuance of the tax deed; she failed to avail herself of the 

opportunity for such a hearing. As we have previously held, 

the requirements of due process are satisfied if a person has 

reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard appropriate to the nature of the proceeding and the character of the 

rights which might be affected by it; if a person has access 

to the courts for protection of his or her rights, it cannot be 

said that such person was deprived of property without due 

process of law. Holste v. Burlington Northern RR. Co., 256 

Neb. 713, 592 N.W.2d 894 (1999). Whether there should be 

an additional administrative process—permitting a delinquent 

property owner, before the issuance of a tax deed, to claim 
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the extended right to redeem under § 77-1827—is a matter 

properly addressed to the Legislature.

We find that the district court did not err in dismissing 

Nieveen’s procedural due process claims.

Takings.

Nieveen also challenges the district court’s dismissal of her 

claim that the issuance of the tax deed violated the Takings 

Clauses of the U.S. and Nebraska Constitutions. In support 

of these claims, Nieveen alleged in her operative complaint 

that by issuing the tax deed to Vintage, Lancaster County 

effectuated a taking of her property for a private purpose. 

Alternatively, Nieveen alleged in her operative complaint that 

even if the issuance of the tax deed was for a public purpose, 

she was entitled to just compensation because her equity in 

the real property exceeded her tax debt. Again, however, we 

recently rejected identical arguments in Continental Resources 

v. Fair, ante p. 184, 971 N.W.2d 313 (2022). In light of that 

decision, Nieveen cannot show the district court erred by dismissing her claims under the Takings Clauses.

Excessive Fines.

Finally, Nieveen argues that the district court erred by dismissing her claims based on the Excessive Fines Clauses of the 

U.S. and Nebraska Constitutions. Nieveen alleged that because 

the issuance of the tax deed resulted in her losing equity in 

her property well above her tax debt, it is an excessive fine. In 

Continental Resources, supra, we rejected an identical argument that the issuance of a tax deed violated the Excessive 

Fines Clause of the U.S. Constitution. And although no claim 

was made under the Excessive Fines Clause of the Nebraska 

Constitution in Continental Resources, Nieveen has not made 

an argument that we should ascribe a different meaning to 

that provision than its essentially identical federal counterpart. 

Accordingly, we find that the district court did not err in dismissing Nieveen’s claim under the Excessive Fines Clauses.
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CONCLUSION

We find that the district court did not err when it determined 

that Nieveen was not entitled to the extended redemption 

period under § 77-1827 or when it dismissed Nieveen’s constitutional claims. Accordingly, we affirm.

Affirmed.

Stacy, J., not participating.