UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-1394

PROJECTS MANAGEMENT COMPANY,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

DYNCORP INTERNATIONAL LLC,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Alexandria. T.S. Ellis, III, Senior 

District Judge. (1:13-cv-00331-TSE-IDD)

Submitted: September 30, 2014 Decided: October 2, 2014

Before AGEE and DIAZ, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior Circuit 

Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Thomas B. Kenworthy, MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP, Philadelphia, 

Pennsylvania, for Appellant. John F. O’Connor, David M. Crane, 

STEPTOE & JOHNSON LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Projects Management Co. (“PMC”) brought this breach of 

contract action against DynCorp International LLC (“DynCorp”) 

after DynCorp mistakenly made payments to the personal bank 

account of PMC’s Managing Director, Hussein Fawaz, rather than 

to PMC. The evidence indicated that Fawaz used at least some of 

the money that DynCorp deposited in his account to benefit PMC. 

However, the only evidence regarding the amount of the benefit 

that PMC received from these payments was a conclusory affidavit 

submitted by PMC in response to DynCorp’s motion for summary 

judgment. The district court granted summary judgment to 

DynCorp, holding that PMC had failed to prove damages because it 

had not offered triable evidence of the amount of benefit it 

received from DynCorp’s deficient performance. PMC filed a 

motion for reconsideration, which the district court denied. 

PMC appeals these rulings. We affirm.

We review a district court’s order granting summary 

judgment de novo. D.L. ex rel. K.L. v. Balt. Bd. of Sch. 

Comm’rs, 706 F.3d 256, 258 (4th Cir. 2013). Summary judgment is 

appropriate only where “there is no genuine [dispute] as to any

material fact and . . . the movant is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law.” Seremeth v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs Frederick 

Cnty., 673 F.3d 333, 336 (4th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). In determining whether a genuine dispute
3

exists, we “view[] the facts and the reasonable inferences 

therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” 

Bonds v. Leavitt, 629 F.3d 369, 380 (4th Cir. 2011). The 

ultimate inquiry is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient 

disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so 

one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986). 

“Conclusory or speculative allegations do not suffice, nor does 

a mere scintilla of evidence in support of [the nonmoving 

party’s] case.” Thompson v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 312 F.3d 

645, 649 (4th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The contract’s choice-of-law provision provides that 

Virginia law applies to this case.1

 Under Virginia law, “[t]he 

elements of a breach of contract action are (1) a legally 

enforceable obligation of a defendant to a plaintiff; (2) the 

defendant’s violation or breach of that obligation; and (3) 

injury or damage to the plaintiff caused by the breach of 

obligation.” Filak v. George, 594 S.E.2d 610, 614 (Va. 2004). 

“The plaintiff bears the burden to establish the element of 

damages with reasonable certainty.” Sunrise Continuing Care, 

 1 The district court held that federal common law also 

applies to this case and applied both Virginia law and federal 

common law, finding them to be in agreement. PMC contests this 

holding on appeal. Because the district court’s conclusion was 

correct under Virginia law, we do not reach the question of 

whether the district court erred by also applying federal law.
4

LLC v. Wright, 671 S.E.2d 132, 135 (Va. 2009). “The fundamental 

principle upon which the rule of damages is based is 

compensation.” Kirk Reid Co. v. Fine, 139 S.E.2d 829, 837 (Va. 

1965) (internal quotation marks omitted). “It is not the policy 

of [Virginia] law to award damages which would put a plaintiff 

in a better position than if the defendant had carried out his 

contract.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Accordingly, if the defendant’s deficient performance has 

benefited the plaintiff in some way, the plaintiff must prove 

the difference between the benefit it received from the 

deficient performance and the benefit it would have received had 

the defendant performed properly. Sunrise Continuing Care, 671 

S.E.2d at 135-37; see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts 

§ 347 & cmt. b (1981) (stating this rule).2

Here, DynCorp performed deficiently by making its 

payments to the personal account of a PMC officer rather than to 

PMC’s account, and it is undisputed that PMC received at least 

some benefit from this deficient performance. The only evidence 

that PMC produced regarding the amount of this benefit was a 

 2 Contrary to PMC’s arguments, the holding in Burton’s 

Executor v. Manson, 129 S.E. 356 (Va. 1925), does not alter this 

rule. Burton’s Executor concerned the affirmative defense of 

payment. Id. at 358. Here, there is no dispute regarding 

payment: it is undisputed that DynCorp did not pay PMC but 

instead made its payments to Fawaz’s personal bank account. 

Instead, the issue in this case is the amount of benefit that 

PMC received from DynCorp’s deficient performance.
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conclusory affidavit. We hold that the district court concluded 

correctly that PMC failed to prove its damages to a reasonable 

certainty.

Accordingly, we affirm its decisions to grant summary 

judgment to DynCorp and to deny reconsideration.3 We dispense 

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before this court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

 3 PMC argues that this result double-counts the benefits it 

received from Fawaz’s account because the district court also 

dismissed a previous case involving another contract in which

DynCorp mistakenly made payments to Fawaz’s account. See

Projects Mgmt. Co. v. DynCorp Int’l LLC, 734 F.3d 366 (4th Cir. 

2013). However, that case was dismissed as a sanction for PMC’s 

discovery abuses and not on the basis of any benefit PMC 

received from DynCorp’s payments to Fawaz’s account. Id. at 

377. Moreover, the present case was dismissed due to PMC’s 

failure to prove the amount of its damages and not due to a 

finding that the benefits it received from Fawaz’s account 

rendered its damages zero. Accordingly, no double-counting 

occurred.