Filed 9/7/18; Modified and certified for publication 10/1/18 (order attached)

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SAN DIEGO UNIFIED PORT DISTRICT,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

 v.

CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMMISSION,

Defendant and Appellant,

SUNROAD MARINA PARTNERS, LP,

 Real Party in Interest and Respondent.

 D072954

 (Super. Ct. No. 

 37-2015-00034288-CU-WM-CTL) 

APPEAL from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, 

Ronald L. Styn, Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Daniel A. Olivas, Assistant Attorney General, 

Jamee Jordan Patterson and Hayley Elizabeth Peterson, Deputy Attorneys General, for 

Plaintiff and Respondent. 

Pacific Legal Foundation and Damien M. Schiff as Amici Curiae on behalf of

Plaintiff and Respondent. 
2

Thomas A. Russell and Rebecca S. Harrington; Jenkins & Hogin and Christi Hogin,

Gregg W. Kettles for Defendant and Appellant. 

Nossaman and Steven Harold Kaufmann for Real Party in Interest. 

Plaintiff and respondent San Diego Unified Port District (District) unsuccessfully 

asked defendant and appellant California Coastal Commission (Commission) to certify 

an amendment of District's port master plan (at times, the amendment) to authorize 

specified hotel development in the East Harbor Island subarea, including construction of 

a 175-room hotel by real party in interest Sunroad Marina Partners, LP (Sunroad). 

District filed a petition for peremptory writ of mandate challenging Commission's denial 

of certification, and the trial court in January 2017 issued the writ, finding Commission 

violated provisions of the California Coastal Act of 1976 (at times the Act; Pub. Res. 

Code,1 § 30000 et seq.) and "impermissibly set policy" by setting a maximum rental rate 

or fixing an amount certain for room rental rates. Commission did not appeal that ruling, 

but reheard District's application and again denied certification, finding the master plan 

amendment lacked sufficient specificity to adequately protect lower cost visitor and 

public recreational opportunities, including overnight accommodations. On objections by 

District and Sunroad, the trial court in August 2017 ruled that Commission had 

essentially conditioned its certification on the provision of lower cost overnight 

accommodations, which "infring[ed] on the wide discretion afforded to the District to 

determine the contents of land use plans and how to implement those plans." The court 

 

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Public Resources Code.
3

ruled that Commission had acted in excess of its jurisdiction and did not proceed in the 

manner required by law.

Commission appeals from the August 2017 postjudgment order. It contends it 

complied with the writ, but afterwards in the face of Port's and Sunroad's objections the 

trial court expanded the writ's scope, thereby exceeding its jurisdiction. Commission 

asks this court to find it complied with the writ as issued, reverse the order sustaining 

District and Sunroad's objection, and direct the trial court to discharge the writ. 

Commission further contends it properly denied District's proposed amendment on 

remand, arguing: (1) substantial evidence supports its finding the proposed amendment 

does not conform to the Act's policies; (2) Commission, not District, has the ultimate 

authority to decide whether a proposed amendment is consistent with the Act; and (3) 

Commission did not set hotel rates in violation of the Act. 

In this context, we narrowly review the correctness of the trial court's 

postjudgment ruling that Commission exceeded its jurisdiction or acted contrary to law in 

denying certification of District's proposed master plan amendment. Doing so, we hold 

the court erred by relying in part on provisions of the Act governing a local government's 

authority and imposing limits on Commission's jurisdiction with respect to local coastal 

programs, which do not pertain to port master plans or master plan amendments. We 

further conclude the lower court engaged in an impermissibly broad interpretation of a 

provision of the Act barring Commission from modifying a master plan amendment as a 

condition of certification. (§ 30714.) We reverse the order and direct the trial court to 

discharge the writ of mandate and enter judgment in Commission's favor. 
4

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 2015, District submitted to Commission Port Master Plan Amendment No. 

PMP-6-PSD-14-003-2 (the amendment) for certain development on the East Harbor 

Island subarea. The amendment proposed to revise District's existing master plan, which 

had allowed for a single 500-room hotel, to permit development of a 175-room hotel by 

Sunroad as well as up to two additional hotels with a total of 325 rooms, for a combined 

total of 500 rooms. About a year earlier, District submitted this proposed amendment but 

withdrew it after Commission staff recommended Commission deny certification due to 

"inconsistency with the public access and recreation policies of the Coastal Act that 

protect and encourage lower-cost visitor and public recreational opportunities." 

Specifically, Commission staff had observed the proposal did not include any specific 

requirement for the provision of lower cost accommodations; it did not "include policy 

language that either reserves a portion of this subarea for lower cost hotel units or 

identifies an alternative location where such lower cost accommodations will be 

developed to which . . . in-lieu fees may apply."2 Commission staff concluded the 

proposal did not meet the requirements of section 30213 of the Act, providing in part that 

lower cost visitor and recreational facilities "shall be protected, encouraged, and, where 

feasible, provided."

 

2 An "in-lieu fee" generally refers to any fee paid toward mitigating impacts 

associated with a particular development. (See, e.g., § 30607.8, subd. (c) [defining an inlieu fee for purposes of that section as "any fee paid as a condition for issuance of a 

coastal development permit to mitigate impacts associated with the development of lower

cost coastal visitor-serving projects"].)
5

After District resubmitted the amendment in 2015, Commission staff again 

recommended denial of certification due to inadequacies with the recreation and lower

cost overnight accommodation policies. Commission staff had offered language to 

include in the amendment that would reserve a portion of the subarea's land, as well as a 

minimum of 25 percent of the 500 hotel rooms, for lower cost overnight 

accommodations, but District decided there was inadequate direction from its board to 

incorporate it into the submittal. Instead, District added a paragraph into its final 

submittal to address the development of the remaining 325 rooms: "If the District issues 

a Request for Proposals (RFP) to develop the one or two hotels (up to 325 rooms) on the 

southwesternmost area of Subarea 23 before the District has completed a lower cost 

visitor accommodations study, the RFP shall specify that no less than 25 [percent] of the 

hotel rooms will be midscale or economy, as defined by Smith Travel Research. The 

developer of the midscale or economy hotel rooms shall be required to include amenities 

that lower the cost of stay. Examples of amenities that could lower the cost of stay may 

include the provision of kitchenettes, refrigerators and/or microwaves in guest rooms, it 

could also include provision of complimentary services such as Wi-Fi, continental 

breakfast and/or parking. If a hotel is developed at a midscale or economy product, it 

need not pay the in-lieu fee identified earlier in this precise plan."

Commission staff determined the language was inadequate: "[I]t is unlikely that 

these [midscale or economy] rooms would be what the Commission considers lower cost 

overnight accommodations. Based on the Commission's past practice, a lower cost 

overnight accommodation in the San Diego region would be one whose rate is below 
6

approximately $106. Based on Commission staff's research of other midscale and 

economy hotel chains in the vicinity, it is very unlikely that the market rate of new hotel 

rooms on the waterfront developed as an economy product—let alone a midscale 

product—would fall into this category. In addition, the deletion of in-lieu fees should not 

be considered or permitted without detailed criteria and evidence regarding a project's 

design to ensure a reduction or deletion in the fee is warranted. In this case, the proposed 

language is too general to determine whether the midscale/economy hotel rooms and 

amenities would result in accommodations that are truly lower cost, and would allow 

build-out of the remainder of the room allocation for the subarea. Full-buildout should 

not occur until it has been determined that this subarea is not required to accommodate a 

lower-cost hotel and/or a very low cost option, such as a hostel, through use of in-lieu fee 

payments and to fulfill the results of [District's] study described below."

According to Commission staff, though District's proposed amendment 

acknowledged that the hotel developers must contribute a " 'fair share' " of on-site or offsite lower cost visitor accommodations or pay an in-lieu fee based on a study District was 

to prepare, that study had not been completed, and the "policy language does not 

establish or identify the number of lower cost units needed to meet public demand, or the 

potential location and timeframe for development of lower cost accommodations 

elsewhere within the Port." Commission adopted its staff's findings in its final report. It 

denied certification of the amendment. 

District petitioned for a writ of mandate (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1085, 1094.5; Pub. 

Res. Code, § 30801) setting out four causes of action, and Sunroad joined in District's 
7

supporting arguments. District asked the court to have Commission rescind its decision 

and remand District's application to Commission to either hold a new hearing or deem the 

amendment certified by operation of law. It asked the court to exercise continuing 

jurisdiction over the matter to ensure Commission complied with the writ and the court's 

judicial declaration. 

In January 2017, the trial court granted the writ as to the second cause of action 

seeking to compel Commission to vacate its denial based on violations of the Act, finding 

Commission acted " 'without, or in excess of [its] jurisdiction.' " In part, the court stated 

it was "not persuaded by the Commission's argument that the Commission did not modify 

the [amendment] or require the District to accept any language as a condition of 

certification. By designating $106 as the rate for a 'lower cost overnight accommodation'

the Commission set a maximum rental rate and thereby 'fixed an amount certain' for room 

rental rates necessary for the District to obtain certification of the [amendment] in 

violation of [sections 30213 and 30714]." The court further ruled Commission 

"impermissibly set policy" and that, "while [section] 30213 protects, encourages and 

prefers 'lower cost visitor and recreational facilities' the Commission lacks the authority 

to determine the precise method by which the District should implement [section] 

30213's broad policy objective."3 

 

3 For this part of its ruling, the trial court quoted from Yost v. Thomas (1984) 36 

Cal.3d 561. Its order states: "Section 30500, subdivision (a) . . . provides that: 'Each 

local government lying, in whole or in part within the coastal zone shall prepare a local 

coastal program for that portion of the coastal zone within its jurisdiction.' Section 

30500, subdivision (c) makes it clear that: 'The precise content of each local coastal 
8

District submitted a proposed judgment granting the peremptory writ and a 

proposed writ. Commission then objected to the proposed writ on several grounds, 

including that in preparing the proposed writ, District had relied on section 30512.2, 

which did not apply to port district master plans; District had included unnecessary 

language; and District had included a provision going beyond the Court's tentative ruling 

and statement of decision. The court sustained several of Commission's objections and 

modified the proposed peremptory writ accordingly. 

In March 2017, the court entered judgment granting the peremptory writ of 

mandate. It issued a writ ordering Commission to vacate its August 2015 action to deny 

certification of the amendment and to "[n]otice and conduct a new public hearing in 

accordance with applicable regulations and the California Coastal Act during the May 

 

program shall be determined by the local government, consistent with Section 30501, in 

full consultation with the commission . . . .' 'The commission shall certify a land use 

plan, or any amendments thereto, if such commission finds that a land use plan meets the 

requirements of, and is in conformity with, the policies of Chapter 3. . . .' (§ 30512, subd. 

(c).) 'The commission's review of a land use plan shall be limited to its administrative 

determination that the land use plan . . . does, or does not, conform with the [policies of 

the act] . . . the commission is not authorized by any provision of this division to diminish 

or abridge the authority of a local government to adopt and establish, by ordinance, the 

precise content of its land use plan' (§ 30512.2, subd. (a)). 'The commission may only 

reject zoning ordinances, zoning district maps or other implementing actions on the 

grounds that they do not conform with, or are inadequate to carry out, the provisions of 

the certified land use plan.' (§ 30513.) The wording of these and other sections does not 

suggest preemption of local planning by the state, rather they point to local discretion and 

autonomy in planning subject to review for conformity to statewide standards. As was 

noted in City of Chula Vista v. Superior Court (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 472, 488 . . . , 'the 

Commission in approving or disapproving an LCP does not create or originate any land 

use rules and regulations. It can approve or disapprove but it cannot itself draft any part 

of the coastal plan.' " The court concluded: "As applied to this case, while [section] 

30213 protects, encourages and prefers 'lower cost visitor and recreational facilities' the 

Commission lacks the authority to determine the precise method by which the District 

should implement [section] 30213's broad policy objective." 
9

2017 . . . Commission meeting scheduled to be held in San Diego and, following the 

hearing, take action on the [amendment] application, without consideration of a 

requirement to provide overnight accommodations at a rate of $106 [per] night, or any 

other specific rate, as a means of establishing 'lower cost overnight accommodations.' " 

The writ further provided: "Nothing in this writ shall limit or control the discretion 

legally vested in you." The court retained jurisdiction over the matter "until such time as 

the court has determined that the . . . Commission has complied with this writ by taking 

the mandated actions in accordance with the Coastal Act."

On remand, Commission staff sought to reach agreement with District staff 

regarding lower cost overnight accommodation provisions but District elected not to 

modify its amendment. Additionally, staff reported that District had discontinued its 

study on lower cost overnight accommodations, instead passing guidelines that 

Commission staff stated lacked specific procedures for protecting, encouraging or 

providing for lower cost overnight visitor accommodations within District and delayed 

consideration of how such accommodations could be provided. Staff explained: "As 

proposed, the [amendment] language acknowledges the hotel developer(s) must 

contribute a 'fair-share' of on-site or off-site lower cost visitor accommodations or pay in 

in-lieu fee based on a study conducted by the District; however, . . . the study is no longer 

being pursued by the Port, so it is unclear how these requirements would be implemented. 

In addition, the language proposed in the [amendment] would be similar to that included 

in other [amendments] approved by the Commission for other specific hotel project; 

however, reliance on this language has not resulted in the actual provision of additional 
10

lower cost overnight accommodations within the Port. For example, of the existing 8,035 

overnight accommodations within the Port, only 3 [percent] are lower cost (237 RV sites 

at Chula Vista RV Resort). There is an increasing need for lower cost overnight 

accommodations within the Port in the form of a specific program that will result in units 

as opposed to deferred collection of in-lieu fees."4 Further, staff found it unlikely any 

new hotel developed as an economy or mid-scale product would be lower cost given the 

"prime location" of the subject subarea: "In order for overnight accommodations on East 

 

4 Staff found District had misstated the number of rooms that would be developed 

as "midscale or economy" rooms; that only 82 of 325 rooms would be designated for 

such development, and District's actual proposal was that any hotel developed as 

midscale or economy would not need to pay in-lieu fees. Staff additionally found the 

Smith Travel Research definition used by District was unclear; it had not specified which 

standard its proposed language was based on and what it meant: "The ambiguity of the 

proposed language is confusing and the [proposed master plan] should include more 

specifically defined terms. The [amendment] also requires the provision of 'amenities' to 

lower the cost of stay, but it does not specify the extent of amenities that would be 

required. Thus, these mid-scale rooms could include a microwave and free wifi as 

amenities, and still comply with the proposed [amendment]. While [District] may have 

intended for its submittal to adequately provide lower cost accommodations at the Port, 

as drafted, it could be construed as laid out above, resulting in the construction of only 

higher cost rooms. Thus, the proposed [amendment] fails to protect or provide lower cost 

overnight accommodations." Staff stated: "The Commission acknowledges that midprice hotels may serve as a part of the overall effort to address the need for more 

affordable accommodations within the Port because they are typically less costly or are 

more reasonably priced for larger groups and families; however, the focus for any future

resumption of the study should be the protection and provision of new lower cost

accommodations that all economic segments of the population can afford to use,

including hostels, tent camping, cabins/yurts, and low cost hotels/motels (e.g., budget

hotels with the lowest average room rates). Thus, any future study should provide a goal

specifically related to providing lower cost accommodations that is distinguishable from

the goal for moderate cost overnight accommodations and include analysis of how this

goal is consistent with the Public Trust Doctrine and the Coastal Act."
11

Harbor Island to be lower cost, and maintained as such, they would need to be a type of 

development that is designed in such a manner to be intrinsically lower cost." 

Staff stated that while the Act emphasized the need to protect and provide public 

access and lower cost visitor and recreational facilities, the proposed amendment "does 

not include any specific requirement for the provision of lower cost accommodations onsite or in the subarea and does not meet the requirements of [s]ection 30213." Nor did it 

contain an in-lieu fee for the remaining 325 rooms if developed as mid-scale or economy 

to mitigate the loss of public trust lands that could otherwise be used for lower cost 

accommodations. Staff stated "that the proposed Port Master Plan amendment, as 

submitted, does not conform to the provisions of Section 30711 of the Coastal Act. The 

proposed changes in land use do not contain sufficient detail in the [port master plan] 

submittal for the Commission to make a determination of the proposed amendment's 

consistency with Sections 30210, 30211, and 30213 of the Coastal Act." Staff again 

recommended certification be denied in part on grounds the amendment "does not 

conform with or carry out the policies of Chapter 3 and Chapter 8 of the Coastal Act."

Commission held a new public hearing, which took place in May 2017. At the 

hearing, a District representative agreed to include in the amendment a provision that the 

hotel developer pay an in-lieu mitigation fee of $41,020 per room for 25 percent of all 

500 hotel rooms and the Port would include in its future master plan update a plan to 

address "lower cost facilities including overnight accommodations." Accounting for that 

agreement, the commissioners nevertheless unanimously voted to deny certification. 

Observing that the current level of low-cost visitor accommodations within District was 
12

only about 3 percent, the commissioners urged that Commission, as the trustee of public 

trust lands, not accept money in exchange for overnight housing, but instead ensure that 

the plan "delineate[ ] numbers of what rooms can be low cost" and "actually provide 

overnight accommodations that are affordable for people." 

In June 2017, Commission filed a return to the peremptory petition for writ of 

mandate, stating that it had denied certification of the amendment. It "found that the 

[amendment] does not conform with or carry out the Chapter 3 and Chapter 8 policies of 

the Coastal Act." The return further states: "As directed by the Court, the Commission 

did not consider a requirement to provide overnight accommodations at a rate of $106 

[per] night or any other specific rate." Commission asserted it had fully complied with 

the writ issued by the court, and requested that it be discharged. 

District objected and moved to set aside Commission's return and again remand 

the matter to Commission to comply with the writ. It argued Commission had exceeded 

its jurisdiction and violated the Act, as reflected by commentary of some of the 

commissioners during the May 2017 hearing, by making a "specific policy of lower cost 

overnight accommodations . . . dispositive in voting on [the amendment]." More 

specifically, District objected that Commission "demand[ed] a specific policy 

(a land set aside for low-cost overnight accommodations over public recreational 

facilities) and . . . articulat[ed] how that policy must be carried out (must designate 25 

[percent] of new hotel rooms to be provided at lower cost—hostel, yurts, cabins and 

camping) . . . ." It characterized Commission's jurisdictional role in reviewing master 

plan amendments as "limited" by section 30714, which states that Commission may not 
13

modify a plan as submitted as a condition of certification, and section 30512.2, which 

prohibited Commission from diminishing or abridging a local government's authority to 

"adopt and establish, by ordinance, the precise content of its land use plan." District also 

objected that Commission interpreted the writ as merely prohibiting it from mentioning 

dollar figures as a technicality; that by its actions Commission engaged in "specific 

policy making" and it attempted to indirectly set room rates. Sunroad joined in the 

objections and motion. 

In August 2017, the trial court sustained the objections of District and Sunroad and 

granted the motion to set aside Commission's action. The court found Commission had 

satisfied the writ's directive not to consider a requirement to provide overnight 

accommodations at a $106 rate or any other specific rate as a means of establishing lower

cost overnight accommodations. However, it ruled that Commission nevertheless acted 

in excess of its jurisdiction and did not proceed in the manner required by law when it 

again denied certification. In part, the court found Commission was "in essence, 

requiring that the [amendment] include a provision for 'lower-cost overnight visitor 

servicing accommodations' as a condition of certification" and in that way Commission 

"infringe[d] on the wide discretion afforded to the District to determine the contents of 

land use plans and how to implement these plans." The court issued another peremptory 

writ of mandate, commanding Commission to vacate its May 2017 action denying 

certification, to conduct a new public hearing in accordance with applicable regulations 

and the Act, and to take action on the amendment application "in compliance with the 
14

Coastal Act and consistent with the court's prior rulings in this case." The writ again 

provides: "Nothing in this writ shall limit or control the discretion legally vested in you."

Commission filed this appeal from the trial court's August 2017 order after 

judgment.5 

DISCUSSION

Commission presents two issues: First, it contends the lower court exceeded its 

jurisdiction when it found Commission had failed to comply with the writ. According to 

Commission, in reaching this ruling, the court enforced portions of the writ it had 

previously struck as beyond the scope of its decision in response to Commission's 

objections, and thus the court "improperly expanded the scope of the judgment and writ." 

 

5 While this appeal was pending, this court granted an application of the San Diego 

Port Tenants Association and Pacific Legal Foundation to file an amicus curiae brief on 

behalf of District. Amici contend that in denying certification, Commission imposed a 

condition lacking an essential nexus to the impacts of the proposed hotel development, 

and thus its action amounts to an unconstitutional exaction under Nollan v. California 

Coastal Commission (1987) 483 U.S. 825 and Dolan v. City of Tigard (1994) 512 U.S. 

374. We have considered the amicus brief, as well as Commission's answer to that brief, 

in determining the issues presented on appeal. Because Commission did not 

conditionally approve certification or otherwise impose a permit condition on private 

land (City of Perris v. Stamper (2016) 1 Cal.5th 576, 591), the arguments lack merit. 

(See also California Building Industry Assn. v. City of San Jose (2015) 61Cal.4th 435, 

461 [municipality's inclusionary housing ordinance was not an exaction as it did not 

require the developer to dedicate any portion of its property to the public or pay any 

money to the public].) They are not ripe in any event. (Sierra Club v. California Coastal 

Commission (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 602, 618 [takings decisions must await as-applied 

challenges and are usually not ripe until the permit stage; regulatory takings claims 

generally require final administrative action as to specific land]; see Gherini v. California 

Coastal Commission (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 699, 713 [mere adoption of a general plan 

does not constitute a taking; enactment of a zoning regulation or land use plan not 

sufficiently definite or final to support such a claim].) 
15

Commission relies on Craven v. Crout (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 779, holding a court loses 

power to change a previously-entered judgment. Commission maintains that if we find it 

complied with the writ "as issued," we should reverse the order and direct the trial court 

to discharge the writ. 

Second, Commission contends it properly denied certification of the amendment 

on remand. It maintains substantial evidence supports its decision that the amendment 

does not conform to the Act's Chapter 3 policies, including section 30213, and 

specifically its finding that the amendment lacked sufficient specificity to adequately 

protect, encourage or provide lower cost visitor and public recreational facilities, 

including lower cost overnight accommodations, and was inconsistent with the public 

access and recreation policies of the Act. Commission maintains it is its role, not 

District's, to exercise discretion to determine whether an amendment meets the Act's 

standards, based on cases such as City of Chula Vista v. Superior Court (1982) 133 

Cal.App.3d 472 (City of Chula Vista) and City of Malibu v. California Coastal 

Commission (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 989, which hold Commission may use its 

independent judgment and expertise to implement the Act's policies. 

Because Commission's latter points have merit, we do not reach its contentions 

regarding the trial court's asserted overreach in jurisdiction. (See Burke v. California 

Coastal Commission (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1098, 1109.)

I. Standard of Review

The parties dispute in some respects the pertinent standard of review. 

Commission argues the question at hand is not whether the trial court erred but whether 
16

substantial evidence supports its decision on remand to deny certification. Citing Ross v. 

California Coastal Commission (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 900, it argues this court 

undertakes the same role as that of the trial court: to examine the entire record, and 

presume Commission's decision is supported by substantial evidence unless District or 

Sunroad show there is no support for its findings. Commission maintains we may reverse 

only if a reasonable person would not have reached the conclusions made by it based on 

the evidence before it. Further, Commission maintains this court must defer, and give 

great weight, to its interpretation of the controlling statutes and regulations. 

District and Sunroad point out that because Commission did not appeal from the 

court's January 2017 decision to grant the writ, it has waived its right to appeal from that 

judgment or the writ's directives. (Los Angeles Internat. Charter High School v. Los 

Angeles Unified School District (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1348, 1354.) They are correct 

that the validity of the first March 2017 writ is not before us. (Brown v. California 

Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 1107, 1114; City of 

Carmel-by-the-Sea v. Board of Supervisors of Monterey County (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 

964, 970-971.) But following Commission's return and the hearing on respondents'

objections, the trial court issued the same directive in a new writ: to take action on 

District's master plan amendment application "in compliance with the Coastal Act . . . ."6 

The court's order following the hearing into the adequacy of Commission's return on the 

 

6 It also directed Commission to act "consistent with the court's prior rulings in this 

case." But the court found Commission had complied with its directive not to consider 

specific rental rates.
17

writ is appealable as an order enforcing the judgment. (Los Angeles Internat. Charter 

High School v. Los Angeles Unified School District, at pp. 1354-1355.)

Thus, in these proceedings we review the trial court's order under section 1097 of 

the Code of Civil Procedure, which permits the court to "make any orders necessary and 

proper for the complete enforcement of the writ." (Code Civ. Proc., § 1097.) The 

question on appeal is whether the trial court erred by concluding Commission had failed 

to comply with the writ in denying certification of District's amendment. (See Brown v. 

California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 1114; 

Robles v. Employment Development Department (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 530, 546; Los 

Angeles Internat. Charter High School v. Los Angeles Unified School District, supra, 209 

Cal.App.4th 1355; City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. Board of Supervisors of Monterey 

County, supra, 137 Cal.App.3d 964, 971-971.) Our focus is still on Commission's 

response to the writ and the trial court's assessment of that response. (Robles, at p. 546; 

City of Carmel, at p. 972.) The analysis necessarily entails an inquiry into whether 

Commission's decision has evidentiary support (Los Angeles Internat. Charter High 

School, at p. 1355 [involving an appeal from an order discharging a writ; appellate court 

"will uphold the [District's facilities] decision unless it is devoid of evidentiary support"]) 

and, as District appears to acknowledge, also an inquiry into whether the trial court 

correctly concluded that Commission had again exceeded its jurisdiction or otherwise did 

not proceed in a manner required by law. We reject District's contention that 

Commission waived its right to raise issues concerning its statutory jurisdiction under the 

Act by failing to appeal from the March 2017 judgment. 
18

" 'When the determination of an agency's jurisdiction involves a question of 

statutory interpretation, "the issue of whether the agency proceeded in excess of its 

jurisdiction is a question of law." ' " (Citizens v. A Better Eureka v. California Coastal 

Commission (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1577, 1583.) " '[C]ourts do not defer to an agency's 

determination when deciding whether the agency's action lies within the scope of 

authority delegated to it by the Legislature.' " (Ibid., quoting Burke v. California Coastal 

Commission, supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 1106; Security National Guaranty, Inc. v. 

California Coastal Commission (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 402, 414.) Throughout this 

analysis, we consider issues of statutory interpretation de novo. (Brown v. California 

Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 1114; Robles v. 

Employment Development Department, supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at p. 546; City of Dana 

Point v. California Coastal Commission (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 170, 187.)

II. The Coastal Act and Port Master Plans

The Coastal Act is a " 'comprehensive scheme to govern land use planning for the 

entire coastal zone of California.' " (Pacific Palisades Bowl Mobile Estates, LLC v. City 

of Los Angeles (2012) 55 Cal.4th 783, 793; Yost v. Thomas (1984) 36 Cal.3d 561, 565.) 

It is "beyond dispute that California has a legitimate interest in protecting and 

maintaining its beaches as recreational resources." (Ocean Harbor House Homeowners 

Association v. California Coastal Commission (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 215, 231.) 

Accordingly, a core principle of the Act is to maximize public access to and along the 

coast as well as recreational opportunities in the coastal zone. (§ 30001.5, subd. (c); Yost, 

at pp. 565-566; City of Dana Point v. California Coastal Commission, supra, 217 
19

Cal.App.4th at p. 185; Ocean Harbor House, at p. 231; LT-WR, L.L.C. v. California 

Coastal Commission (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 427, 806.) The Legislature further "sought 

to '[a]ssure orderly, balanced utilization and conservation of coastal zone resources taking 

into account the social and economic needs of the people of the state.' " (Carstens v. 

California Coastal Commission (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 277, 290, quoting § 30001.5, 

subd. (b).) Underlying the Act's goals are the Legislature's findings that " ' "the 

California coastal zone is a distinct and valuable natural resource of vital and enduring 

interest to all the people"; that "the permanent protection of the state's natural and scenic 

resources is a paramount concern"; that "it is necessary to protect the ecological balance 

of the coastal zone"; and that "existing developed uses, and future developments that are 

carefully planned and developed consistent with the policies of this division, are essential 

to the economic and social well-being of the people of this state . . . ." ' " (Pacific 

Palisades Bowl Mobile Estates, at p. 793.) The Commission is to resolve conflicts in the 

Act's policies "in a manner which on balance is the most protective of significant coastal 

resources." (§ 30007.5; Carstens, at p. 290.) 

The Act "shall be liberally construed to accomplish its purposes and objectives."

(§ 30009; Sierra Club v. California Coastal Commission (2005) 35 Cal.4th 839, 849 

(Sierra Club); Pacific Palisades Bowl Mobile Estates, LLC v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 

55 Cal.4th at pp. 793-794; Burke v. California Coastal Commission, supra, 168 

Cal.App.4th at p. 1108) and "any exception to the statute's main purpose must be strictly 

construed." (Burke, at p. 1108.) Commission, "unless specifically otherwise provided, 

shall have the primary responsibility for the implementation" of the Act's provisions and 
20

"is designated as the state coastal zone planning and management agency for any and all 

purposes . . . ." (§ 30330; see Marine Forests Soc. v. California Coastal Commission 

(2005) 36 Cal.4th 1, 20.) Thus, "[t]he Commission has the ultimate authority to ensure 

that coastal development conforms to the policies embodied in the state's Coastal Act." 

(City of Dana Point v. California Coastal Commission, supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 186.) And, a " 'fundamental purpose of the Coastal Act is to ensure that state policies 

prevail over the concerns of local government.' " (Pacific Palisades Bowl Mobile 

Estates, at p. 794; City of Dana Point, at p. 186.) 

Chapter 3 of the Act sets out coastal resources planning and management policies, 

which "shall constitute the standards by which the . . . permissibility of proposed 

developments subject to the provisions of this division are determined." (§ 30200; see 

Sierra Club, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 849.) One such policy is that "maximum access . . . 

and recreational opportunities shall be provided for all the people consistent with . . . the 

need to protect public rights, rights of private property owners, and natural resource areas 

from overuse." (§ 30210.) "Development shall not interfere with the public's right of 

access to the sea where acquired through use or legislative authorization . . . ." (§ 30211.) 

Chapter 3 also includes section 30213, at issue here, which provides: "Lower cost 

visitor and recreational facilities shall be protected, encouraged, and, where feasible, 

provided. Developments providing public recreational opportunities are preferred." That 

section further states: "The commission shall not (1) require that overnight room rentals 

be fixed at an amount certain for any privately owned and operated hotel, motel or other 

similar visitor-serving facility located on either public or private lands; or (2) establish or 
21

approve any method for the identification of low or moderate income persons for the 

purpose of determining eligibility for overnight room rentals in any such facilities." 

(§ 30213.)7 "The use of private lands suitable for visitor-serving commercial recreational 

facilities designed to enhance public opportunities for coastal recreation shall have 

priority over private residential, general industrial, or general commercial development, 

but not over agriculture or coastal-dependent industry." (§ 30222.) 

 

7 Sunroad has moved in this court for judicial notice of a 2016 minute order in an 

unrelated case, San Diego Navy Broadway Complex Coalition v. San Diego Unified Port 

District (Sunroad) (Super. Ct. S.D. County, 2016, No. 37-2014-00009407-CU-TT-CTL), 

in which another San Diego Superior Court judge rejected a challenge to District's 

decision to certify an environmental impact report (EIR) for the same master plan 

amendment. Sunroad argues this decision is relevant to the procedural history of 

District's master plan amendment at issue, the length of time the amendment has been 

pending unresolved and efforts of respondents to complete the CEQA and administrative 

process. Sunroad states its counsel made reference to this decision in discussing the 

legislative history of section 30213 of the Act at the July 2014 hearing before 

Commission on the amendment, but that the findings were not included in the 

administrative record. Sunroad's arguments concerning the 2016 minute order related to 

the EIR do not convince us that the San Diego Navy Broadway Complex Coalition order

is relevant to whether the trial judge in this case correctly decided Commission either 

exceeded its jurisdiction or acted in a manner contrary to law in connection with its 2017 

decision to again deny certification of the amendment. Sunroad also asks this court to 

judicially notice 1981 revised findings of Commission in approving a 300-unit hotel in 

Marina Del Ray. But Sunroad does not establish that these Commission findings are in 

fact included within the legislative history of section 30214, that is, that they were 

matters available to and presumably reviewed by the Legislature when adoption of those 

statutes was under consideration. (See Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. 

(1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 45, fn. 9.) Even if it did, it has not argued the statute's words are 

ambiguous or unclear such that extrinsic aids to interpretation are necessary. (Burden v. 

Snowden (1992) 2 Cal.4th 556, 562; Huff v. Securitas Security Services USA, Inc. (2018) 

23 Cal.App.5th 745, 507-508 [court is precluded from considering legislative history 

where statutory language is unambiguous]; Breslin v. City and County of San Francisco 

(2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1064, 1979.) We deny Sunroad's request. 
22

The Act's public access policies "shall be implemented in a manner that takes into 

account the need to regulate the time, place, and manner of public access depending on 

the facts and circumstances in each case . . . ." (§ 30214. subd. (a), italics added.) This 

implementation provision, section 30214, contains an express declaration of legislative 

intent: "It is the intent of the Legislature that the public access policies of this article be 

carried out in a reasonable manner that considers the equities and that balances the rights 

of the individual property owner with the public's constitutional right of access pursuant 

to Section 4 of Article X of the California Constitution. Nothing in this section or any 

amendment thereto shall be construed as a limitation on the rights guaranteed to the 

public under [the aforementioned constitutional provision]." (§ 30214, subd. (b).)8 It 

further specifies mandatory considerations for Commission's implementation authority: 

"In carrying out the public access policies of this article, the commission and any other 

responsible public agency shall consider and encourage the utilization of innovative 

access management techniques . . . . " (§ 30214, subd. (c).)

Chapter 8 of the Act governs California ports and port district master plans. 

(§§ 30700, 30711.) Section 30708 provides: "All port-related developments shall be 

located, designed, and constructed so as to: . . . Provide for other beneficial uses 

 

8 Article X, section 4 of the California Constitution provides: "No individual, 

partnership, or corporation, claiming or possessing the frontage or tidal lands of a harbor, 

bay, inlet, estuary, or other navigable water in this State, shall be permitted to exclude the 

right of way to such water whenever it is required for any public purpose, nor to destroy 

or obstruct the free navigation of such water; and the Legislature shall enact such laws as 

will give the most liberal construction to this provision, so that access to the navigable 

waters of this State shall be always attainable for the people thereof."
23

consistent with the public trust, including, but not limited to, recreation . . . , to the extent 

feasible." (§ 30708, subd. (d).) Each port governing body must prepare and adopt a port 

master plan with public participation and submit it for certification by Commission. 

(§§ 30711, 30712, 30714.) The port master plan must describe development projects 

subject to section 30715 "in sufficient detail to be able to determine their consistency 

with the policies of Chapter 3 . . . ." (§ 30711, subd. (a)(4).) The plan also "shall contain 

information in sufficient detail to allow the commission to determine its adequacy and 

conformity with the applicable policies of this division." (§ 30711, subd. (b).) Port 

master plan amendments are submitted and processed for certification in the same 

manner as the original master plan. (§ 30716, subd. (a).)9 

When a port governing body submits a plan amendment for certification, 

Commission within 90 days "shall certify the plan or portion of a plan and reject any 

portion of a plan which is not certified" and it "may not modify the plan as submitted as a 

condition of certification." (§ 30714.) If Commission rejects a plan, it must base the 

rejection on written findings of fact and conclusions of law. (Ibid.) If it takes no action 

within 90 days, the plan is deemed certified. (Ibid.) "The commission shall certify the 

plan, or portion of a plan, if the commission finds both of the following: [¶] (a) The 

 

9 "The commission shall approve a port master plan only if the commission finds 

that sufficient information has been submitted to allow the commission to determine the 

adequacy and conformity of the proposed plan(s) with the applicable policies of the 

California Coastal Act of 1976, pursuant to the requirements of Public Resources Code, 

Section 30711 and of Section 13625 of these regulations, and that the master plan fulfills 

the requirements of . . . Section 30714(a) and (b)." (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 13632, 

subd. (d).)
24

master plan, or certified portions thereof, conforms with and carries out the policies of 

this chapter. [¶] (b) Where a master plan, or certified portions thereof, provide for any of 

the developments listed as appealable in Section 30715, the development or 

developments are in conformity with all of the policies of Chapter 3 . . . ." (Ibid.) Once 

Commission certifies a master plan, the Act delegates authority over coastal development 

permits for new development to the appropriate port governing body, except that 

approvals of certain development may be appealed to Commission. (§ 30715, subd. (a).)

The Act grants appellate jurisdiction to Commission over port district approvals of 

hotel and motel development in connection with a port district master plan or master plan 

amendments. (§ 30715.) The port district governing bodies "shall inform and advise the 

commission in the planning and design of appealable developments authorized" under 

Chapter 8, and notify Commission as to how a proposed hotel or motel development is 

"consistent with the applicable port master plan and this division." (§ 30717.) 

Thereafter, a port district's approval of such a development becomes effective unless an 

appeal is filed with Commission within a short time period. (Ibid.) 

III. The Court Erred by Relying on Standards Relating to Local Coastal Programs and 

the Discretion Accorded Local Governments in Establishing, Creating and Implementing 

Land Use Plans

We first address a main premise of the trial court's conclusion that Commission 

exceeded its jurisdiction and failed to proceed in a manner required by law. District and 

Sunroad have adopted much of the court's underlying reasoning on appeal. Citing Yost v. 

Thomas, supra, 36 Cal.3d 561, City of Malibu v. California Coastal Commission (2012) 
25

206 Cal.App.4th 549 and Schneider v. California Coastal Commission (2006) 140 

Cal.App.4th 1339, the trial court found Commission had imposed conditions on District 

for certification, and thereby "infringe[d] on the wide discretion afforded to the District to 

determine the contents of land use plans and how to implement these plans." 

None of the cited cases, however, involve a port district's authority; all deal with a 

local coastal program (LCP), which the Act requires every "local government" within the 

coastal zone to prepare. (§ 30500; Yost v. Thomas, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 567 [city of 

Santa Barbara]; City of Malibu v. California Coastal Commission, supra, 206 

Cal.App.4th at pp. 552, 554 [Malibu]; Schneider v. California Coastal Commission, 

supra, 140 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1342, 1346 [county of San Luis Obispo].) A "local 

government," is specifically defined by the Act as a "chartered or general law city, 

charter or general law county, or any city and county." (§ 30109.) The California 

Supreme Court in Yost v. Thomas did not address the scope of Commission's authority in 

the port master plan context; it held the Act did not preclude a referendum on a city 

council's approval of a hotel conference center development (a general plan amendment, 

specific plan, rezoning, parking modifications and a development plan sought by the 

respondent, a private corporation) within the coastal zone. (Yost v. Thomas, at pp. 564, 

565, 567, 569.) The city was acting under the land use plan portion of its LCP that had 

been approved by Commission. (Id. at p. 564.) Though the high court held the city 

council's actions were legislative (id. at p. 570), the respondent argued the acts became 

administrative because the land was in a coastal zone subject to the Act's requirement that 

local governments develop land use plans, and thus the city council became an agency of 
26

the state in enacting all land use policies. (Id. at p. 571.) The high court rejected that 

argument, basing its ruling on the Act's provisions governing LCP's (§§ 30500, subds. 

(a), (c), 30512, subd. (c), 30512.2, subd. (a), 3051310) granting discretion to local 

governments: "Under the act, local governments . . . have discretion to zone one piece of 

land to fit any of the acceptable uses under the policies of the act, but they also have the 

discretion to be more restrictive than the act. The Coastal Act sets minimum standards 

and policies with which local governments within the coastal zone must comply; it does 

not mandate the action to be taken by a local government in implementing local land use 

controls. The Commission performs a judicial function when it reviews a local 

government's LCP—it determines whether the LCP meets the minimum standards of the 

act [citation], but once an LCP has been approved by the Commission, a local 

government has discretion to choose what action to take to implement its LCP: it can 

decide to be more restrictive with respect to any parcel of land, provided such restrictions 

do not conflict with the act. [¶] The act, therefore, leaves wide discretion to a local 

government not only to determine the contents of its land use plans, but to choose how to 

implement these plans. Under such circumstances a city is acting legislatively and its 

actions are subject to the normal referendum procedure." (Yost, at pp. 572-573, fn. 

omitted.) "Yost [v. Thomas] stands for nothing more than that a city's actions in 

implementing the LCP retain their legislative nature for the purposes of referendum. 

That does not mean that, once the LCP is certified, it becomes a matter of local law. The 

 

10 See footnote 3, ante.
27

city's actions in implementing the LCP, as well as any coastal development permit issued 

by the city, are still subject to Commission review." (Charles A. Pratt Construction Co., 

Inc. v. California Coastal Commission (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1076.)

In City of Malibu v. California Coastal Commission, the appellate court held 

Commission had acted in excess of its jurisdiction by approving amendments to a city's 

certified LCP that had been proposed by a state conservancy authority over the city's 

objection. (City of Malibu v. California Coastal Commission, supra, 206 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 552.) Commission sought to authorize its action under section 30515, providing that 

Commission could override a city's refusal to amend its LCP but only where the 

amendment was sought for "the development of a public works project or energy facility 

that would meet the public needs of an area greater than that encompassed in the local 

coastal program that were not anticipated when the LCP was certified." (City of 

Malibu, at p. 564.) The appellate court observed the conservancy's amendment sought to 

override the city's local land use plans and policies, and substitute new ones so that it 

could avoid having to ask Commission for coastal development permits. (Id. at pp. 559-

560.) It held Commission's action contradicted the express legislative limitation in 

section 30512.2, subdivision (a) preventing it from " 'diminish[ing] or abridge[ing] the 

authority of a local government' as to 'the precise content of its land use plan.' " (Id. at 

p. 564.) 

In Schneider v. California Coastal Commission, the appellate court addressed 

Commission's decision to impose special conditions on a coastal development permit, in 

part based on a finding the proposed development would be visible from the ocean. 
28

(Schneider v. California Coastal Commission, supra, 140 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1342.) The 

court pointed out that after Commission certifies an LCP, development review authority 

is delegated to the local government (id. at p. 1344, citing in part § 30519, subd. (a)), and 

that on review of a development permit Commission's jurisdiction is limited to deciding 

whether the locally approved development does not conform to the standards of a 

certified LCP or the Act's access policies. (Id. at pp. 1344-1345.) It held Commission in 

construing the relevant provision of the Act (§ 30251) had added words (id. at p. 1345), 

and its adoption of an unwritten policy for the County of San Luis Obispo to protect 

scenic views from offshore, ocean-based vantage points was unsupported by either the 

language of the Act or the county's LCP. (Id. at p. 1348.) Citing Yost v. Thomas, supra, 

36 Cal.3d at p. 572 and City of Chula Vista, supra, 133 Cal.App.3d at p. 488, the court 

stated: "When Coastal Commission certified the LCP in 1988, it lacked authority ' "to 

create or originate any land use rules and regulations" ' or draft any part of the coastal 

plan. [Citations.] In reviewing the proposed development to determine whether it was 

consistent with the certified LCP, Coastal Commission was not empowered to adopt a 

new offshore visual resource policy for San Luis Obispo County. [Citation.] 

'Administrative action that is not authorized by, or is inconsistent with, acts of the 

Legislature is void.' " (Schneider v. California Coastal Commission, 140 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 1348.)

The broad land-use implementation and policy-making jurisdiction discussed in 

these cases is that granted to a specified city or county; the Act requires only a local 

government entity within the coastal zone to prepare an LCP, with an accompanying land 
29

use plan and implementing ordinances. (Landgate, Inc. v. California Coastal 

Commission (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1006, 1010-1011.) Though District is an independent 

governmental entity existing under state law (Rider v. City of San Diego (1998) 18 

Cal.4th 1035, 1039-1040), neither District nor Sunroad cite authority for the proposition 

that it falls within the specifically defined category of a local government such that the 

limitations on Commission's authority with respect to LCP's apply. The provisions 

governing LCP's and the express limits imposed on Commission's jurisdiction with 

regard to development under an LCP—prohibiting Commission from determining the 

"precise content" of a land use plan (§§ 30500, subd. (c); 30512.2, subd. (a)), creating 

land use regulations, or drafting coastal plans (City of Chula Vista, supra, 133 

Cal.App.3d 472, 488)—have no application to District, or District's master plan, which is 

governed by a different statutory scheme within the Act. We decline to rewrite the law 

so as to extend those statutory restrictions on Commission's jurisdiction over LCP's to 

port district master plans governed by Chapter 8 of the Act.

On appeal, District cites the LCP-related authorities (Yost v. Thomas, supra, 36 

Cal.3d 561; City of Malibu v. California Coastal Commission, supra, 206 Cal.App.4th 

549) to argue that Commission lacks authority under the Act to require lower cost 

overnight accommodations in connection with its proposed master plan amendment. 

District seeks to extend these authorities to it as a "legislative body" so as to show it has 

wide discretion to formulate "land use plans like the port master plan" and to " 'determine 

how to implement' certified plans. At the same time, District appears to concede that the 

provisions governing LCP's do not apply to it; it maintains it brought the LCP-related 
30

limitations on Commission's authority to the trial court's attention only "to reinforce the 

non-legislative role of this executive branch agency." District contends, however, that 

the provisions of the Act related to port master plans and master plan amendments 

impose greater constraints on Commission's discretion and authority than do the Act's 

provisions for LCP's; it argues Commission is making merely "semantic" distinctions 

between the LCP limitations on Commission's role and port master plan limitations. 

According to District, section 30714 of the Act "expressly prohibits [Commission] 

engaging in developing policy suggestions to port master plans" and from requiring 

District to provide low cost overnight accommodations. As we explain more fully below, 

we disagree with District's characterization or interpretation of the master plan provisions 

of the Act and the extent of the limits on Commission's jurisdiction or authority in 

implementing the Act and its policies.

Sunroad, for its part, argues Commission in reconsidering District's proposed 

amendment "did exactly the same thing" that the trial court in January 2017 found 

improper. That is, Sunroad argues, Commission assertedly "sought to regulate rental 

rates anyway through the backdoor, in violation of [s]ection 30213 and the court's ruling, 

when it found . . . that the [amendment] failed to provide 'intrinsically lower cost'

accommodations such as 'hostels, tent camping, cabins/yurts, and low cost hotels/motels 

(e.g. budget hotels with the lowest average room rates.[)]' " Sunroad argues Commission 

merely used a euphemism for describing accommodations expected to charge less than 

$106 per night, and was an act by Commission that " 'impermissibly set policy . . . .' " 
31

The trial court in assessing Commission's compliance with the writ, however, 

determined that Commission had not impermissibly set room rates, but had complied 

with the writ's directive not to do so. Narrowly interpreting the statutory exceptions to 

Commission's broad authority as we must (Pacific Palisades Bowl Mobile Estates, LLC 

v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 796; Citizens For A Better Eureka v. 

California Coastal Commission, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at p. 1586), we agree with the 

court's reasoning. Nothing in Commission's findings required District to set or fix 

overnight room rental rates "at an amount certain." (§ 30213, italics added.) That 

Commission identified various types of lower cost accommodations—hostels, tent 

camping, cabin or yurts, and budget hotels or motels—or used parameters in determining 

what constitutes a lower cost product, does not violate the prohibition in section 30213 

against setting specific monetary rates. A conclusion otherwise would read the words "at 

an amount certain" out of the statute and render them meaningless, an untenable 

construction. (Varshock v. Department of Forestry & Fire Protection (2011) 194 

Cal.App.4th 635, 643, fn. 4 ["Under established rules of statutory construction, we may 

not 'omit what has been inserted' [citation] or 'render[] a part of a statute meaningless or 

inoperative' "]; Trackman v. Kenney (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 175, 184.) There is no basis 

to disturb that aspect of the court's ruling.11 

 

11 No party has claimed that Commission sought to "establish or approve any method 

for the identification of low or moderate income persons for the purpose of determining 

eligibility for overnight room rentals in any [hotel, motel, or other similar visitor-serving 

facility]" in violation of section 30213. 
32

As for Sunroad's complaint that Commission erred by setting policy, that argument 

echoes the trial court's erroneous reasoning and those arguments made in the 

aforementioned cases pertaining to LCP's, in which appellate courts would not permit 

Commission to usurp the land-use and policy-making functions of cities and counties. 

(E.g., City of Malibu v. California Coastal Commission, supra, 206 Cal.App.4th at p. 564 

["The Conservancy's overlay district . . . substitutes the land use policies and 

development standards of the Conservancy and the . . . Commission for those of the city, 

in contradiction of the legislative mandate preventing the . . . Commission from 

'diminish[ing] or abridg[ing] the authority of a local government' as to 'the precise 

content of its land use plan.' (§ 30512.2, subd. (a).)"].) 

IV. Commission Did Not Exceed its Jurisdiction in Denying Certification

The narrow question at hand is whether the trial court correctly found Commission 

had exceeded its jurisdiction or otherwise acted contrary to law in denying certification 

on the grounds stated. As indicated, though we review the correctness of the court's 

reasoning, we address de novo the question of whether Commission's decision was within 

its authority or jurisdiction under the Act. 

In answering this question, we give an "expansive interpretation" (Pacific 

Palisades Bowl Mobile Estates, LLC v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 796) 

to the Act's public access provisions, and strictly or narrowly construe exceptions to the 

Act's main purposes. (Accord, ibid.; Citizens For A Better Eureka v. California Coastal 

Commission, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at p. 1586.) 
33

A. The Act's Master Plan Provisions Do Not Prohibit Commission from Determining the 

Scope and Extent of Coastal Policy When Reviewing a Port Master Plan Amendment's 

Consistency with Those Policies

This court has previously recognized Commission's broad mandate under the Act 

relating to planned development and other uses within the coastal zone. (City of Chula 

Vista, supra, 133 Cal.App.3d at p. 481 ["Clearly, the statutory mandate is a large 

order"].) In City of Chula Vista, we explained in the context of Commission's review of a 

city's LCP that Commission "insure[s] continued state coastal planning and management"

(id. at p. 480) and achieves the Legislature's goals by providing "statewide supervision 

over coastal zone development, to avoid local pressures having an undue impact upon the 

planning for this unique and irreplaceable resource . . . ." (Id. at p. 481.) In view of the 

broad legislative goals of the Act (§ 30001.5), Commission's role is to "promulgate[] 

statewide rules and statewide policies," not merely to act as a "rubber stamp agency" with 

respect to local planning. (Id. at p. 489.) It does this as the statewide entity primarily 

responsible for implementing the Act and promoting its policies, ensuring they are 

furthered and carried out. (Ibid.) This court pointed out Commission exercises its 

independent judgment on the issue of a local entity's compliance with coastal policy. 

(Ibid.; see Gherini v. California Coastal Commission, supra, 204 Cal.App.3d at pp. 709-

710.)12 Commission's broad supervisory role in implementing statewide coastal policy 

 

12 In City of Chula Vista, we addressed a city's argument that Commission had no 

legislative power with respect to its review of an LCP for conformity with statewide 

standards, and therefore could decide only whether the city's action was arbitrary and 
34

is particularly important when dealing with a port master plan, the purpose of which is to 

guide future uses and development within the port district. A master plan is precisely the 

sort of tool that requires Commission's input and expertise for enforcing and furthering 

coastal policies, including those dealing with public access and lower cost visitor 

facilities. 

 

capricious. (City of Chula Vista, supra, 133 Cal.App.3d at p. 488.) We declined to find 

the scope of Commission's power dictated by the fact local entities were charged with the 

primary land planning function: "The fact City is the first agency to work on the plan is 

not determinative of the scope of Commission's powers. . . . Local government is to be 

included, but statewide standards are to be formulated; local government plans, but a 

statewide commission reviews. Surely the Legislature did not go to all this trouble to 

create a statewide rubber stamp agency which does no more than review local legislation 

for arbitrary and capricious enactments. Rather, it is assumed statewide interests are not 

always well represented at the local level, and therefore, an agency is needed which 

promulgates statewide rules and statewide policies." (Id. at p. 489.) We rejected the 

city's argument that Commission may not exercise its independent judgment in reviewing 

an LCP. (Id. at p. 489.) We explained that the fact a city is the first agency to work on 

an LCP "does not preclude the Commission also having coordinate powers at a later stage 

in the procedure" and "is not determinative of the scope of Commission's powers." (Id. at 

pp. 488, 489.) We explained in that context that "the entire scheme of the Act provides 

for the initial planning to be done locally and the final approval to be done by a statewide 

agency with an eye to statewide policies and limitations. The function of the statewide 

agency would be trivial and its existence unjustifiable if its function were purely to 

review City's action for rationality, for conceivable conformity to the state standards 

rather than actual compliance. Clearly, the Commission must exercise its independent 

judgment to decide if such conformity has been achieved because that decision cannot 

be completely delegated to the local entity where it is likely to be subject to local 

economic and political pressures which cannot so readily influence the Commission." 

(Id. at p. 489, italics added.) If Commission is empowered to exercise its independent 

judgment in the context of an LCP with the attendant limitations on its power to dictate 

precise land use policies, then certainly Commission may exercise its independent 

judgment with respect to a port master plan, where its powers with regard to development 

policy are not so limited. District argues that City of Chula Vista merely holds that 

Commission is relegated to a quasi-judicial function in reviewing consistency with the 

Act, but this is an overly narrow characterization of its holding. 
35

District sees Commission's jurisdiction differently. It characterizes Commission 

as having a limited statutory role in certifying master plans. District argues the Coastal 

Act is structured so that "precise policy" originates with a legislative body; that District is 

charged with creating the policies to implement the Act whereas Commission is an 

executive branch agency charged only with verifying consistency with the plan and the 

Act. According to District, section 30714 of the Act "expressly prohibits [Commission 

from] engaging in developing policy suggestions to port master plans." District 

challenges Commission's power to articulate how District should carry out the Act's 

public access policies, arguing Commission lacks authority to "originate policy," require 

or dictate specific policies and policy choices, or engage in "policymaking." District 

argues "[t]he California Legislature put the Port District—not Commission—in charge of 

figuring out how to achieve the Port Act's [sic] mission and advance the policies of the 

Coastal Act." The latter contention is asserted without citation to authority, and on that 

ground alone we do not consider it. (In re Michael A. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 661, 668; 

Taylor v. Roseville Toyota, Inc. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 994, 1001, fn. 2; Kim v. 

Sumitomo Bank (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 974, 979.)

District's other contentions are a variation of the same erroneous reasoning of the 

trial court premised on express statutory limits on Commission's authority with respect to 

a local government's LCP. And District's arguments are not supported by section 30714, 

which, unlike the LCP provisions of the Act, says nothing about Commission's ability to 

dictate or suggest the type of visitor facilities and alternatives that would comply with 

coastal policy. Under the trial court's reasoning, when Commission determined that 
36

coastal policy required District to actually provide lower cost overnight accommodations 

in its master plan amendment and identified the sorts of development meeting that 

standard, Commission modified the plan as a condition of certification in violation of 

section 30714. But such a conclusion is based on an impermissibly broad reading of the 

limit placed on Commission in section 30714, providing it "may not modify the [master] 

plan as submitted as a condition of certification." Strictly construing that limitation as we 

must, section 30714 prohibits Commission only from conditionally approving a master 

plan, that is, granting certification subject to a specified modification. To conclude 

otherwise would prevent Commission from denying certification of a master plan with 

specific factual and legal findings as to its deficiencies or suggestions for compliance, as 

any such decision would be construed as an unacceptable conditional approval or 

modification of the plan in violation of section 30714. Commission did not conditionally 

approve certification, but denied it on grounds the proposed amendment did not further 

the Act's public access policies or contain sufficient specificity or detail to permit it to 

find it complied with those policies, including the Act's mandate that "lower cost visitor . 

. . facilities shall be . . . provided." (§ 30213, italics added.) Commission's suggestions 

as to how District could meet that mandate did not tell District to amend its plan in any 

particular way. In denying certification, Commission expressly acknowledged that it was 

not permitted to make such modifications, but was required to approve or deny the plan

amendment as submitted.

Neither the port master plan provisions nor the public access provisions of the Act 

contain a broad legislative mandate in favor of District's authority over the "precise 
37

details" of port master plans; though District's governing body prepares the master plan 

and Commission may not modify it as submitted as a condition of certification (§ 30714), 

it ultimately remains Commission's primary role and responsibility as the statewide 

supervisory agency to implement the Act and ensure a port master plan furthers the Act's 

policies. (Accord, City of Chula Vista, supra, 133 Cal.App.3d at p. 481; Charles A. Pratt 

Construction Co., Inc. v. California Coastal Commission, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at 

pp. 1075-1076.) Commission must certify District's plan or plan amendment with those 

objectives. (§ 30714.) In doing so, Commission is empowered to not only determine 

whether a master plan amendment conforms with the Act's policies, but that it carries out 

those policies. (Ibid.) It exercises its independent judgment as to whether District's 

proposed amendment reflects "actual compliance" with state standards and policies. 

(Charles A. Pratt, at pp. 1075-1076; City of Chula Vista, supra, 133 Cal.App.3d at 

p. 490.) Commission has a statutory mandate to "consider and encourage the utilization 

of innovative access management techniques" (§ 30214, subd. (c); see Surfrider 

Foundation v. California Coastal Commission (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 151, 158, fn. 2), 

and account for "the need to regulate the . . . manner of public access" on a case-by-case 

basis (§ 30214, subd. (a)). It is permitted to "tak[e] into account the social and economic 

needs of the people of the state" (§ 30001.5, subd. (b)) and "ensure that state policies 

prevail" over local concerns. (See Pacific Palisades Bowl Mobile Estates, LLC v. City of 

Los Angeles, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 794; City of Dana Point v. California Coastal 

Commission, supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 186.)
38

Commission exercised this permissible function in deciding whether the proposed 

port master plan amendment complied with and carried out section 30213 without 

actually providing lower cost overnight accommodations such as hostels, cabins, 

campgrounds or budget motels. With respect to "lower cost visitor and recreational 

facilities," section 30213 is unambiguously mandatory: Such facilities "shall be . . . 

provided" where feasible. The statute separately references both "visitor . . . facilities"

and "recreational facilities," indicating that a visitor facility is something different from a 

recreational resource such as a park, promenade, walking path, dock or golf course. As 

the "state coastal zone planning and management agency for . . . all purposes" charged 

with primary responsibility for implementing the Act (§ 30330) it is within Commission's 

power to interpret section 30213's reference to visitor facilities as mandating the 

provision of overnight accommodations. To the extent Commission interpreted section 

30213 in this way—a determination that does not involve the scope of its authority—we 

give great weight to its administrative construction. (Coronado Yacht Club v. California 

Coastal Commission (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 860, 868; see Ross v. California Coastal 

Commission, supra, 199 Cal.App.4th at p. 922; In re Acknowledgement Cases (2015) 239 

Cal.App.4th 1498, 1505 [a court must defer to the agency's interpretation of a statute 

unless that interpretation contradicts the statute's clear language and purpose]; Hines v. 

California Coastal Commission (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 830, 849 [it is well established 

that great weight must be given to the administrative construction of those charged with 

the enforcement and interpretation of a statute].) But this court must ultimately pass on 

the statute's construction (In re Lucas (2012) 53 Cal.4th 839, 849), and doing so we 
39

conclude this interpretation is not "clearly erroneous" (ibid.) because it is consistent with 

the statute's plain language, which refers to "any privately owned and operated hotel, 

motel or other similar visitor-serving facility . . . ." (§ 30213, italics added.) The statute 

itself refers to visitor facilities as places for overnight lodging. And such an 

interpretation is consistent with statewide coastal policy—reflected in amendments 

effective in 2018—that lower cost overnight accommodations "including hotels, motels, 

hostels, cabins, and camping opportunities, are essential elements of coastal . . . access"

because "[a] lack of affordable accommodations remains a barrier to coastal access." 

(§ 31411, added by Stats. 2017, ch. 838, § 3, eff. Jan. 1, 2018.) We therefore reject 

District's assertions that section 30213, and the Act more generally, do not refer to or 

mandate overnight accommodations.13 

Nothing prevents Commission from delineating the statewide policies in its 

findings, explaining a master plan's deficiencies in detail, or suggesting what sorts of 

visitor facilities meet the Act's goals and section 30213's mandate. Rather, it is within 

Commission's broad authority to apply its expertise and devise solutions to promote the 

policy of providing "lower cost visitor . . . facilities," including by specifying overnight 

accommodations that are the "type of development . . . designed in such a manner to be

intrinsically lower cost," in District's master plan. Likewise, the Act does not prevent 

 

13 District did not argue below that it was economically infeasible to provide such 

overnight facilities. It maintained visitor facilities included not just overnight 

accommodations, but encompassed "public parks, public areas and promenades, streets 

and sidewalks, bike paths, parking areas, boat moorings and public boat launches and 

ramps." Such uses, however, fall in the separate category of "recreational facilities" in 

section 30213.
40

Commission from deciding that collection of in-lieu mitigation fees no longer furthers or 

carries out the legislative mandate that lower cost visitor facilities be provided. District 

points out that the trigger for collecting such fees has not occurred for some of the past 

hotel projects and it collected fees for another hotel that can be transferred if not used. 

But Commission is entitled to conclude that the built-in delays with in-lieu mitigation 

fees render them ineffectual in actually providing lower cost visitor facilities in 

connection with the present plan amendment. The fact Commission previously certified 

District's master plan without provision of such lower cost accommodations or subject to 

in-lieu mitigation fees does not prevent Commission from now concluding that District's 

proposed amendment does not further the Act's mandate for lower cost overnight 

accommodations. 

Additionally, Commission's denial was based on a finding that District's proposed 

amendment was insufficiently specific to permit it to conclude that it met the Act's public 

access policies, a conclusion well within its review authority under the master plan 

provisions of the Act. (§ 30711, subds. (a)(4), (b) [requiring master plans contain 

"information in sufficient detail" to permit a determination of consistency with public 

access and port master plan policies].) Neither District nor Sunroad meaningfully 

challenge the conclusion that the amendment lacked specific requirements for the 

provision of lower cost accommodations either on the site or in the subarea generally. 

District merely argues that Commission's rejections of economy and midscale 

accommodations with kitchenettes, refrigerators or microwaves indirectly sets 
41

room rates, a claim the trial court properly rejected. Though District also challenges the 

sufficiency of the evidence supporting Commission's findings, it makes these assertions 

without explanation or citation to the administrative record, then argues Commission's 

findings "amount to little more than staff speculation and guesswork . . . ." The trial 

court in initially reviewing Commission's decision was required to presume it was 

supported by substantial evidence unless District or Sunroad showed otherwise. (Ross v 

California Coastal Commission, supra, 199 Cal.App.4th at p. 921; Bay Area Citizens v. 

Association of Bay Area Governments (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 966, 998.) It did not rule 

Commission's findings lacked substantial evidence. Indeed, neither District nor Sunroad 

objected to Commission's postremand action on that ground. 

District argues that courts consistently hold Commission "exceeds its jurisdiction 

when it strays into policymaking." The broad contention is unsupported by the cited 

cases, which address Commission's statutory authority under the Act to undertake 

particular actions, such as require a permit, designate environmentally sensitive habitats, 

or deny a coastal development permit on particular grounds. (See City of Dana Point v. 

California Coastal Commission, supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at pp. 189-190 [Commission 

lacked appellate jurisdiction under section 30625 to consider appeals of a nuisance 

abatement ordinance because enactment of the ordinance was not an "appealable action"

permitting administrative appeal to Commission]; Burke v. California Coastal 

Commission, supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1100-1101, 1106, 1108 [Commission lacked 

jurisdiction to require a permit for a fence, because it fell within a statutory exemption for 

boundary disputes or settlements under section 30416, subdivision (c)]; Douda v. 
42

California Coastal Commission (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1181, 1186, 1191, 1199-1200 

[holding Commission possessed authority to designate an environmentally sensitive 

habitat area before an LCP has been certified, pointing out the Act "does not parse what 

policies should be specifically enforced or how they should be enforced" in that context, 

and Commission also had authority under section 30251 to deny a coastal development 

permit because it would impair scenic and visual resources four and a half miles inland, 

because the statute "contains no restrictions"]; Security National Guaranty, Inc. v. 

California Coastal Commission, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at pp. 418, 422-423 [resolving 

whether the Act granted Commission the power to declare a site an environmentally 

sensitive habitat area during an administrative appeal from the grant of a coastal 

development permit; the statutory scheme for LCP's did not grant Commission the 

authority to make changes to the content of an LCP (§ 30603), and Commission imposed 

additional standards not contained in the LCP as well as sought to amend it contrary to 

section 30514, providing LCP's may be amended "by the appropriate local 

government"].) 

B. Commission Did Not Violate Any Other Express Statutory Limits on Its Authority in 

Denying Certification. 

District points to several other provisions of the Act that it suggests limit 

Commission's jurisdiction in certifying a master plan and confer more power to District. 

But none of these provisions restrict Commission's authority to prescribe the types of 

overnight facilities that would further the mandate that lower cost visitor facilities be 
43

provided in District's master plan, or suggest methods to ensure developers actually put 

such facilities in place. 

District points to section 30714's short, 90-day, time period within which 

Commission must act to certify a master plan amendment, as well as its language 

deeming an amendment approved if Commission fails to take action within that time. 

But these types of provisions are merely designed to avoid unnecessary bureaucratic 

delay (see, e.g., Encinitas Country Day School, Inc. v. California Coastal Commission 

(2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 575, 583-584); they do not speak to the scope of Commission's 

jurisdiction in assessing whether a proposed amendment complies with and furthers the 

Act's public access policies and deciding what types of facilities best carry out those 

policies. 

District also refers to asserted limits on Commission's "permit authority" in section 

30715. The section prevents Commission from exercising its "permit authority . . . 

provided in Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 30600)" over "new development"

following its certification of a master plan, and delegates approvals to District at such 

time. (§ 30715, subd. (a).) The specifically referenced permit authority is for coastal 

development permits, which are not at issue in this proceeding. This provision in no way 

limits the scope of Commission's jurisdiction in certifying or denying certification of a 

port master plan or master plan amendment. 

V. Commission's Denial of Certification Is Not Otherwise Contrary to Law

Sunroad maintains Commission failed to adopt written findings as required by 

section 30714, which states a Commission's rejection of any portion of a plan shall be 
44

based on written findings of fact and conclusions of law. It suggests Commission did not 

explain its reasons for rejecting the proposed master plan amendment as modified during 

the post-remand May 2017 hearing to include District's agreement to pay additional inlieu mitigation fees. According to Sunroad, this creates an "fundamental obstacle" to 

Commission's argument that substantial evidence supports its findings. 

Neither District nor Sunroad made this procedural challenge to the trial court in 

objecting to Commission's June 2017 return. We decline to consider such challenges for 

the first time on appeal where an objection could have been, but was not presented to the 

trial court by some appropriate method. (See In re Marriage of Hinman (1997) 55 

Cal.App.4th 988, 1002.) In sum, the trial court had no basis to conclude that 

Commission's denial of certification is otherwise contrary to law. 
45

DISPOSITION

The order is reversed and the matter remanded with directions to the trial court to 

discharge the writ of mandate, and enter judgment in favor of the California Coastal 

Commission. Commission shall recover its costs on appeal.

O'ROURKE, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

IRION, J.

DATO, J.
Filed 10/1/18

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SAN DIEGO UNIFIED PORT DISTRICT,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

 v.

CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMMISSION,

Defendant and Appellant,

SUNROAD MARINA PARTNERS, LP,

 Real Party in Interest and Respondent.

 D072954

 (Super. Ct. No. 

 37-2015-00034288-CU-WM-CTL) 

ORDER MODIFYING OPINION

[CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]

ORDER DENYING REHEARING

ORDER CERTIFYING OPINION 

FOR PUBLICATION

THE COURT: 

It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on September 7, 2018, be modified as 

follows: 

On page 1, in the first paragraph of the counsel listing, line 3, the words "Plaintiff 

and Respondent" are replaced with the words "Defendant and Appellant," so that the 

paragraph now reads: 

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Daniel A. Olivas, Assistant Attorney 

General, Jamee Jordan Patterson and Hayley Elizabeth Peterson, Deputy 

Attorneys General, for Defendant and Appellant. 
2

On page 2, in the third paragraph of the counsel listing, line 2, the words 

"Defendant and Appellant" are replaced with the words "Plaintiff and Respondent," so 

that the paragraph now reads: 

Thomas A. Russell and Rebecca S. Harrington; Jenkins & Hogin and Christi 

Hogin, Gregg W. Kettles for Plaintiff and Respondent.

On page 3, in the last line of the second full paragraph, the words "and enter 

judgment in Commission's favor" are omitted so that the sentence now reads:

We reverse the order and direct the trial court to discharge the writ of 

mandate. 

On page 35, in the sentence starting on line 10 of the first paragraph, "[sic]" is 

omitted so that the sentence now reads:

District argues "[t]he California Legislature put the Port District—not 

Commission—in charge of figuring out how to achieve the Port Act's mission and 

advance the policies of the Coastal Act." 

On page 45, in the first sentence of the disposition, the words "and enter judgment 

in favor of the California Coastal Commission" are omitted so that the sentence now 

reads: 

The order is reversed and the matter remanded with directions to the trial 

court to discharge the writ of mandate.

The petition for rehearing is denied. 

The opinion in this case filed September 7, 2018, was not certified for publication.

It appearing the opinion meets the standards for publication specified in California Rules 

of Court, rule 8.1105(c), the request pursuant to rule 8.1120(a) for publication is

GRANTED.
3

IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the opinion meets the standards for publication

specified in California Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(c); and ORDERED that the words 

"Not to Be Published in the Official Reports" appearing on page 1 of said opinion be 

deleted and the opinion herein be published in the Official Reports.

This modification changes the judgment.

O'ROURKE, Acting P. J.

Copies to: All parties