In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 09-3719

NONA RAY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

CITY OF CHICAGO AND CHICAGO POLICE

OFFICER MALINOWSKI #7028,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 08 CV 7274—James B. Zagel, Judge.

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 16, 2010—DECIDED JANUARY 5, 2011

Before CUDAHY, ROVNER and EVANS, Circuit Judges.

CUDAHY, Circuit Judge. In October 2008, Malinowski,

a police officer, stopped Nona Ray for operating a motor

vehicle at night without headlights. During this stop,

Malinowski and his partner discovered a package containing controlled substances within Ray’s car. The

officers arrested Ray and took her to a nearby police

station, where she was detained for several hours

before being charged with possession of a controlled
2 No. 09-3719

substance and subsequently released. Ray later filed

suit against the City of Chicago and police officer

Malinowski, alleging that their actions violated the Constitution’s prohibition on unreasonable seizures and

deprived her of her rights to due process and equal

protection under the law.

The district court dismissed Ray’s claims for failure

to allege facts sufficient to support a finding that her

constitutional rights had been violated. We affirm.

I. Background

On October 17, 2008, Malinowski observed Ray operating an automobile at night without its headlights

turned on. Malinowski and his partner pulled Ray over,

instructing Ray and her passenger to leave the vehicle.

Shortly thereafter, Malinowski or his partner discovered

a plastic bag containing what they believed to be

cocaine inside Ray’s car. The officers placed Ray under

arrest and took her to a nearby police station, where

she was eventually charged with possession of a controlled substance. The exact length of Ray’s detention

is unclear, however the parties’ pleadings agree that

Ray was detained for several hours. The criminal

charge against Ray for possession was dropped at her

first court appearance.

Pursuant to Section 7-24-225 of the Municipal Code

of Chicago, Malinowski impounded Ray’s vehicle following her arrest. Section 7-24-225 of the Code provides

that, when arresting individuals for possession of a con-
No. 09-3719 3

trolled substance in a motor vehicle, police officers

“shall provide for the towing of the vehicle to a facility

controlled by the city” and that “the owner of record

of any motor vehicle that contains any controlled

substance . . . shall be liable to the city for an administrative penalty . . . plus any applicable towing and storage

fees.”

On November 19, 2008, Ray contested the seizure of

her vehicle at a proceeding before the City of Chicago’s

Department of Administrative Hearings (DOAH). She

argued that she had been unaware that there were drugs

in her car, that the drugs did not belong to her and,

hence, that she should not have to pay the statutory fine

or the costs associated with impounding her vehicle.

The City’s counsel argued that the ordinance imposed

strict liability on the owners of vehicles that contain

controlled substances. At the conclusion of the proceeding, the hearing officer agreed with the City’s interpretation of the ordinance and entered a finding ordering

Ray to pay $2,180 in fees and costs.

On December 12, 2008, Ray filed a complaint against

the City of Chicago and Officer Malinowski in the U.S.

District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Ray’s

complaint alleged that she was deprived of rights

secured by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. It

also included a supplemental state claim seeking administrative review of the DOAH’s finding, as well as

a challenge to the constitutionality of the ordinance.

On October 7, 2009, the district court granted defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss. The district court
4 No. 09-3719

found that Ray’s complaint failed to allege facts sufficient

to support any of her claims for relief. Ray currently

appeals from the district court’s dismissal of her claims.

II. Discussion

We apply the de novo standard when reviewing a

district court’s determination that a plaintiff has failed

to state a claim for which relief can be granted, accepting

as true all well-pleaded allegations and drawing all

reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Bielanski v.

County of Kane, 550 F.3d 632, 633 (7th Cir. 2008). However, we “need not accept as true legal conclusions, or

threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,

supported by mere conclusory statements.” Brooks v.

Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009). Complaints need

only provide a “short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” that is

“sufficient to provide the defendant with fair notice of

the claim and its basis.” Windy City Metal Fabricators &

Supply, Inc. v. CIT Tech. Fin. Servs., Inc., 536 F.3d 663,

667 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544 (2007)). While the federal pleading standard is

quite forgiving, our recent decisions have emphasized

that “the complaint must contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.” Bonte v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 624 F.3d

461, 463 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ___ U.S. ___,

129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009)).

Ray contends that the district court erred when it dismissed her complaint. Our review of the district court’s
No. 09-3719 5

decision is somewhat complicated by the vague and

inarticulate claims for relief that are set forth in Ray’s

complaint and the variety of ways that her counsel

has interpreted these claims over time. Yet, because

we find that Ray has failed to plead facts that are

sufficient to support any of the claims she could have

plausibly meant to assert, we affirm the district court’s

judgment.

A. Claims Based on Ray’s Arrest and Post-Arrest

Detention

Ray’s complaint appears to allege that the police violated her Fourth Amendment rights when they arrested

and detained her. On appeal, Ray has clarified the bases

of her claim, arguing (1) that her arrest constituted an

illegal seizure because the police officers lacked probable

cause to believe that she was guilty of possessing a controlled substance and (2) that the officers detained her

for an unreasonably long period of time after arresting her.

The district court did not err in dismissing Ray’s arrestrelated claim. Where a police officer “has probable cause

to believe that an individual has committed even a very

minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without

violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.”

Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001). This

is true even if the minor criminal offense is a traffic

offense. United States v. Childs, 277 F.3d 947, 953 (7th Cir.

2002) (en banc). So long as a police officer has probable

cause to believe that a person has committed a crime,

then it is not constitutionally relevant whether “the
6 No. 09-3719

person was arrested on . . . charges for which there was

no probable cause.” Holmes v. City of Hoffman Estates,

511 F.3d 673, 682 (7th Cir. 2007). Ray has conceded that

she committed a traffic violation in the presence of

Malinowski and his partner. Under Atwater and Childs,

this provided the police with all of the probable cause

they needed to arrest Ray without violating the Fourth

Amendment. See Atwater, 532 U.S. at 324-25.

The district court’s dismissal of Ray’s post-arrest detention claim was also proper. Ray is correct in asserting

that the law does not grant police officers carte blanche

after issuing a traffic citation to detain a motorist to

investigate other possible criminal activity. United States

v. Figueroa-Espana, 511 F.3d 696, 702-03 (7th Cir. 2007);

United States v. Finke, 85 F.3d 1275 (7th Cir. 1996).

Indeed, we have held that in such situations the police

are required to release individuals “as soon as the

officers have assured themselves that no skullduggery

is afoot.” Childs, 277 F.3d at 952. The rules are considerably different, however, when police officers

actually arrest an individual—such individuals “need not

be released as quickly as possible.” Id. at 952. A person

arrested without a warrant may be held prior to a

judicial determination of probable cause for a “brief

period” to carry out “the administrative steps incident

to arrest.” Chortek v. City of Milwaukee, 356 F.3d 740,

746 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103,

113-14 (1975)). When considering this issue in a case

presenting analogous facts, we held that detention

times ranging from three to fourteen and one-half

hours were not constitutionally unreasonable absent
No. 09-3719 7

any evidence that the delay in releasing the arrested

individuals was motivated by an improper purpose.

Chortek, 356 F.3d at 747-48. Because Ray has not

alleged that the length of her detention exceeded this

time frame or that it was the result of illicit motives, she

has failed to state a claim for which we can grant relief.

B. Claims Based on Ray’s Allegedly Malicious Prosecution

Ray’s complaint contains a claim that could be interpreted to include an allegation that Defendants violated her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by

causing her to be charged with possession of a controlled

substance. On appeal, Ray has argued that her complaint states that the police planted the drugs that provided the basis for Ray’s possession charge and, hence,

that it alleges facts sufficient to support a malicious

prosecution tort claim.

The district court decision to dismiss this claim was

correct. Federal courts are rarely the appropriate forum

for malicious prosecution claims. We have previously

stated that individuals do not have a “federal right not

to be summoned into court and prosecuted without

probable cause, under either the Fourth Amendment or

the Fourteenth Amendment’s Procedural Due Process

Clause.” Tully v. Barada, 599 F.3d 591, 594 (7th Cir. 2010).

See also Bielanski, 550 F.3d at 638-42 (“[T]he interest in

not being prosecuted groundlessly is not an interest that

the Fourth Amendment protects.”) (internal citations

omitted). While we have also held that we will allow
8 No. 09-3719

individuals to bring Section 1983 malicious prosecution

suits when the relevant state’s law does not provide

them with a way to pursue such claims, Newsome v.

McCabe, 256 F.3d 747, 750-51 (7th Cir. 2001), Illinois law

recognizes tort claims for malicious prosecution. See

Swick v. Linutard, 662 N.E.2d 1238, 1242 (Ill. 1996). Hence,

it was appropriate for the district court to refuse to

hear Ray’s claims and conclude that the appropriate

venue for her claims is Illinois state court.

On appeal, Ray has attempted to recast the malicious

prosecution claim set forth in her complaint as a Brady

claim, but even if she had originally presented the

district court with a Brady claim, it too would have

been properly dismissed. Ever since the Supreme Court’s

decision in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), we

have permitted individuals to file Section 1983 suits

alleging that they have been denied a fair trial because

the state has failed to provide them with access to

material exculpatory evidence. See Newsome, 256 F.3d at

752. Ray has failed to identify a single instance, however, where we have allowed such suits when the individual is merely charged with a crime, but never fully

prosecuted. See, e.g., Garcia v. City of Chicago, 24 F.3d 966,

971-72 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that there was no basis

for a Brady claim where the charges against an individual

were nolle prossed); Pope v. City of Chicago, No. 08-c-4715,

2009 WL 811625, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 24, 2009) (“The rule

against bringing malicious prosecution claims . . . cannot

be avoided by mischaracterizing malicious prosecution

claims based on providing false information . . . as Brady

violations for failing to disclose that the information is
No. 09-3719 9

false.”) (citing Gauger v. Hendle, 349 F.3d 354, 360 (7th

Cir. 2003)). Because Ray concedes that the charges

against her were dropped at her first post-arrest court

appearance, her claim falls outside of the exception recognized in Brady. As Ray has not identified any other exception that would save her from the general bar against

malicious prosecution claims, we are left to conclude

that the district court was correct in finding her claim to

be irreparably flawed.

C. Claims Concerning Section 7-24-225 of the Municipal

Code of Chicago

Finally, Ray’s complaint asserts a supplemental state

claim, pursuant to Illinois’ Administrative Review Act,

735 ILCS 5/301 et seq. (2010), seeking review of the

DOAH’s finding that Ray was liable under Section 7-24-225

of the Municipal Code of Chicago. Ray has argued that

her claim also includes a direct challenge to the constitutionality of the ordinance. On appeal, Ray raises only one

argument concerning the district court’s ruling. She

contends that we should reverse the district court’s

ruling because the court inappropriately considered

materials outside of the complaint—a transcript of the

DOAH hearing—when deciding whether to dismiss her

claims.

Ray’s argument suffers from several problems. First, it

is well established that district courts may take judicial

notice of certain documents—including records of administrative actions—when deciding motions to dismiss. See,

e.g., Fornalik v. Perryman, 223 F.3d 523, 529 (7th Cir. 2000);
10 No. 09-3719

Gen. Elec. Cap. Corp. v. Lease Resolution Corp., 128 F.3d

1074, 1080 (7th Cir. 1997). Hence, even if the district court

had relied on the hearing transcript when deciding

whether it should dismiss Ray’s claim, it is not apparent

that its actions would have constituted error. Second, a

review of the district court’s opinion establishes that

its decision was not based on the transcript, but on

Ray’s failure to plead “facts to support her allegation[s] that the challenged ordinance is unconstitutional . . . [and that] the finding of the Dept. of Administrative Hearings is arbitrary, unreasonable, and against

the manifest weight.” Because the district court’s decision to dismiss Ray’s claim was based on deficiencies

that it found in her complaint and her only argument on

appeal focuses exclusively on issues related to the transcript, she has failed to identify grounds for reversal.

Finally, our own independent assessment of the sufficiency of Ray’s complaint leads us to the same conclusion as the district court. The complaint simply does not

contain allegations of fact sufficient to support Ray’s

claims that DOAH’s findings were arbitrary or that the

ordinance is unconstitutional.

III. Conclusion

For all of the reasons set forth above, the ruling of the

district court is

AFFIRMED.

1-5-11