The Honorable Patrick A. Conmy, United States District Judge for the District 1 of North Dakota, sitting by designation. United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

_____________ No. 97-1806

_____________ Alton W. Bruns, An Individual; * * Plaintiff - Appellant, * * Werner Enterprises, Inc., a Nebraska * Corporation, * * Appeal from the United States Plaintiff, * District Court for the * District of Nebraska. v. * * Amana, an Iowa Corporation, also * known as Speed Queen Company; * International Paper Company, a * New York Corporation, * * Defendants - Appellees. *

_____________ Submitted: November 21, 1997 Filed: December 18, 1997

_____________ Before BOWMAN and MURPHY, Circuit Judges, and CONMY, District Judge. 1

_____________ BOWMAN, Circuit Judge.The Honorable Richard G. Kopf, United States District Judge for the District 2 of Nebraska. The Honorable Warren K. Ur bom, United States District Judge for the District 3 of Nebraska. International Paper now remains the only defendant. 4 -2- Alton Bruns appeals the order of the District Court denying his request fo r a jury 2 tria l. Bruns also appeals the judgment of the District Court in favor of defendan t 3 International Paper on his product liability claim.
Bruns or iginally filed tort claims against Amana and International Paper. 4 Amana removed the action to federal court. Ten months after the last answer was filed in federal court, Bruns filed a motion requesting a jury trial. The magistrate judge to whom the case was assigned for pre-trial matters denied the mot ion as untimely. Bruns appealed the ruling to the D istrict Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) (1994). The court affirmed the magistrate judge's denial. The case proceeded to a bench trial, wherein the court found in f avor of the defendants on Bruns's tort claims. This appeal followed.
I.
Bru ns argues that the District Court erred in sustaining the magistrate's orde r denying a jury trial. Bruns claims he was not required to demand a jury trial unde r Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 81(c). We disagree. Rule 81(c) provides in part that:
If state law applicable in the court from which the case is removed does not require the parties to make express demands in order to claim trial by-3-

jury, they need not make demands after removal unless the court directs that they do so within a specified time if they desire to claim trial by jury. Fed. R. C iv. P. 81(c) (emphasis added). It is not disputed that under Nebraska la w Bruns would have been entitled to a jury trial in state court without the need to make anexpress demand. See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1104 (1995) ("Issues of fact . . . shall betried by a jury unless a jury trial is waived . . . ."). Thus, unless the court directed that Bruns expressly demand a jury trial within a specified time, under Rule 81(c) he is automatical ly entitled to a trial by jury in federal court without the need to make an express demand. The District Court's Local Rule 81.2 provides that, in actions re moved from state court, a party must fi le a demand for a jury trial within ten days after service of notice of removal or ten days after serv ice of the answer, whichever is later. Under this rule, Bruns filed his demand 299 days late. "Failure to make demand as directed herei n constitutes waiver of trial by jury." Local Rule 81.2. The issue in thi s case is whether the court "directed" Bruns to make an express demand for a jury trial in order to invoke the right. SeeFed. R. Civ. P. 81(c). We hold that Local Rule 81.2 was a directive by the Dist rict Court, which required Bruns to file anexpress demand for a jury trial. Local Rule 81.2 specifically provides that parties must make an express demand for a trial by jury. The effect of the local rule is that the court in each case directs parties de siring a trial by jury to make an express demand to invoke the right when their c ase is removed to federal court. It is frivolous to contend that the dis trict court must separately direct, in every case, that the parties follow the loc al rule; yet that is the result if we accept Bruns's argument. Furthermore, contrary to Bruns's assertion, at least one other circuit has decided this issue. See O'Malley v. United Stat es Fidelity & Guar. Co. , 776 F.2d 494, 501 (5th Cir. 1985) ("[T]he Rul e 81(c) dir ective can be found in the [Mississippi] Local Rules [requiring a writte n request for jury trial in removal cases] . . . .").-4-

Bruns's failure to timely demand a jury trial in accordance with the local rul e con stituteda waiver of the right. The District Court was correct in affirming th e magistrate's order.
II.
Bruns next argues that the District Court's judgment in favor of Internationa l Paper was inconsistent with its own findings and contrary to the evidence presented at trial. After careful review of the record, we conclude that an extensive discussion is not war ranted. We are satisfied the District Court's findings that the product was not unreasonably dangerous and that any defect in the product was not the proximate cause of Bruns's injury are not clearly erroneous. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.
III. For the reasons stated, the appealed order and judgment of the District Court are affirmed. A true copy.
Attest: CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.