### In The C ou rt o f A p p ea ls Si x t h Appe l l at e Di st r i c t o f Te x as a t Te x ar ka na

______________________________ No . 0 6- 09 -0 00 43 -C R

______________________________ CURTI S W . PORTL EY, Appe llant

V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appea l from the 124th J udicial District Court

Gre g g County , Texas Trial Court No. 34995-B

B e f o r e M o r r i s s , C
. J. , C a

rt e r an d M o s e l e y , JJ. Memorandum Opinion by J ustice Carte rWe note in the judgme nt of the t ri al co u rt that the appe llant's na me was misspelled a s 1
" Cur tic ." We u se the sp e lli ngof his sig natur e and

the sp e lli ngof his name on the oth e r d oc ume nts in the case , "Curtis," in this opi nion. 2 MEMORANDUM OPI

NI ON Curtis W . Portley pled g uilty to dr iving while intox icated (DWI ). After an adjudication of 1 g uilt, the trial court sentenc ed him to ten y ear s' imprisonment, suspended impositi on of the sente nce, and plac ed him on community supervision for six y ear s. The trial court found that Portley violated his community

supervision and sente nced him to four y ear s' imprisonment in the Tex as De partment of Criminal J ustice–Institut ional Division. Portley challeng es th e t ri al court' s jurisdiction over the re vocation hea ring , argues that the
e vid e nc e wa s le g a lly and fa c tua lly ins uf fi c ie nt fo r t

he tr ia l c ourt

to f ind he vio late d h is c omm

un ity supervision by

consuming alcohol, and complains that his ple a of true to a nother condition (driving a motor vehic le without a g uardia n interlock sy stem) was involuntary . We affir m. I. The Tr ial

Co ur t H ad J ur isdi c ti on O ve r th e Re vo c at ion P r oc e e ding s "A t any time during the per iod of community supervision the judge may issue a wa

rra nt for violation of any

of the c onditions of the community supervision and c ause the defe ndant to be
arres ted ." T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . ANN . art. 42.12, § 21(b) (Vernon Supp. 2009). I t is undisput ed that both the application to re voke Portley ' s community su p ervision and the order f or ar rest we re filed bef ore the expiration of the community supervision period.I n W he at v . S tate , we pointed out that the Texas L eg islature ame nded Ar ticle 42.12 of the 2 Texas Code of C ri minal Procedure to ext end the tria l court' s continuing jurisdiction to revoke community

supervision afte r the e x piration of the ter m of community supervision. 165 S.W .3d 802, 805 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2005, pet. dism'd, untimely filed). 3 P o rt l ey 's i s s u e i s wi t h t h e ti m i n g o f th e fi l i n gs . T h e or d er o f a rr es t , s i gn edb y

t h e t ri al j u d ge Dec ember

22, 2008, states that the applicat i o n was pre sented to him on the 22nd. Yet, both the
a pp lic a tio n fo r re vo c a tio n of c omm un ity su pe rv isi on and the or de r fo r arr e st have a fi le -m ark sta mp of De cembe r 24, 2008. Portley believes this proves the arr est was authorized befor e the a pplication
was e ven filed. H e conte nds the trial court did not have jurisdiction for this reason. In support of his c on te nti on , Po rt le y

c ite s th e fo llo wi nge xce rp t f ro m Br e c he ise n v . S

tate : Two re quirements must be met for a trial c ourt to acquire jurisdiction to revoke prob at i o n . T h e State must file with the trial cour t, before the expiration of the probationar

y period, a

mo t i o n to revoke probation that alleg es the probationer violated the ter

ms of the probation judgment. The trial court mus t then, bef ore the expiration of the probationar y per i o d , issue a ca

pias based upon this motion that order s the arr est of the pr obationer. 2 4 S.W .3d 761, 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (citations omitted). I n arr iving at this conclusion, the Texas Court of Crimi nal Appea ls quoted Guillot : "in or der fo r t he c ourt to h a ve jur isd ic tio n to re vo ke pr ob a tio n b oth the mot ion

to r e vo ke and

c a pia s f or arr e st
mu st be i ss uedpri or t o t he t erm in ati on of t h e p r o b a t i o nary peri od ." Gu ill ot v . S

tate , 543 S.W .2d 650, 652 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976)
. The issue in these ca ses was w hether the State had use d diligenc e in both filing and issuing an ar rest warra nt before the probationary period e x pired, a

matter whic h is unquestioned in this case.Ge n e r a ll y , d o c u me n ts ar e f il e d w it h th e c le r k o f th e c o u rt; h o w e v e r , a

ju d g e ma

y a c cept 3 fi l i n g o f a paper by noting the filing date there on and transmitting it to the cler k' s office . T EX . R. C IV . P. 74 ; Ga rza v . S

tate , 919 S.W .2d 788, 789 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 1996, no pet.).

4 Her e, the tria l court' s signe d order of arr est specific ally states the trial cour t was pre sented wi th a n ap pli c a tio n f

or re vo c a tio n o f P or

tle y ' s c omm

un ity su pe rv isi on De c e mbe r 2 2, 20 08 , a

fa c t th is Court will not choose to ig nore. The re is no re quirement that the a pplication for r evocation be filed with the cler

k' s office befor e the tria l judge issues the war rant of arr est; it is not uncommon for suc h
a pp lic a tio ns to b e fi rs t pr e se nte d to the jud g e and the n fil e d with the arr e st o rd e r. F ur the r, in s ome instances district judg es are authorized to file pleading s in their court. We disag ree with Portley that 3 Breche isen imposed a seque ntial require ment for the f ormal filing of the application and issuance of the a rre st warr ant. Instead, it requir ed that in o rd er to revoke community supervision afte r the term of c ommunity

supervision has expired t he State must prove that be fore the expiration of the
c omm un ity su pe rv isi on pe ri od , ( 1) t he S tate fi le d a mot ion to r e vo ke and

(2 ) a c a pia s o r a rr e st
war rant wa s issued. T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . ANN . art. 42.12, § 21(e ) (Ve rnon Supp. 2009). We find the trial cour

t had jurisdiction over the r evocation procee ding. II. P ortle y's Ple a Relating to the Inte rlock Devic e Was Not Involuntary I f a person i s place d on DWIcommunity supervision, a c ourt may "r equire as a c ondition of community

supervision that the def

endant have a de vice installed, on th e mot or vehic le owned by the def endant or on the vehicle most reg ularly driven by

the d ef en d ant, that uses a de ep-lung5

breath analy sis mechanism," which disables the ope ration of the vehicle if alcohol is de tected. T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . ANN . art. 42.12, § 13(i) (Ve rnon Supp. 2009). " The c ourt shall require the defe ndant to obtain the device at the def endant' s own cost bef

o re t h e 3 0 t h day

afte r the date of
con vi cti on un les s th e cou rt fi nd s th at to so do wou ldno t b e in th e bes t i nt eres t o f j us ti ce." Id. " If the c ourt de te rm ine s th e of

fe nd e r i s una

ble to p ay fo r t he de vic e , the c ourt may imp os e a re a so na ble pay men t s chedul e." Id. An awa rd of c omm un ity su pe rv isi on is n ot a ri g ht, bu t a c on tr a c tua l pr ivi le g e e nte re d in to betwee n a cour

t and a de fenda

nt. Sp e th v . S

tate , 6 S.W .3d 530, 534 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). For t h i s re ason, the lawis well-settled that conditions of community supervision not objected to a re aff irmatively

acc epted a s terms of the c ontrac t, and a de fenda nt cannot cha lleng e a co n d i t i o n of community

supervision for the first time at a revoc ation proce eding
. Id. a t 53 5; Va le v . S tate , 486 S.W. 2d 37 0 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 72 ); In re V.A. , 140 S.W .3d 858, 860 (Tex. App.—For t Worth 2004, no pet.) (de fenda

nt could not object that condition of community supervision was unr easona ble at
re vo c a tio n h e ari ng ); Lop e z v . S tate , 46 S.W .3d 476, 480 (Tex. A pp.—For t Worth 2001, pet. ref' d) (" Under Sp e th , there fore , we a re pr ohibited from hearing on appea l a challeng e to the validi ty of a condition of community

supervision unless an objection to that c ondition wa s made at the time the
c on dit io n was imp os e d, pr e suma bly a t se nte nc ing
. . . . " ); An tho ny v . S tate , 962 S.W .2d 242, 246 (Tex. App.—For

t Worth 1998, no pet.).Por tle y c or re c tly re c ite d that " [i]n a c omm un ity su pe rv isi on re vo c a tio n he ari ng a t wh ic h it 4 is alleg ed only

that the def

endant violated the conditions of communi ty supervision by

failing to pay c omp e ns a tio n p a id t o a

pp oin te d c ouns e l, c omm

un ity su pe rv isi on fe e s, or c ourt c os ts, the state mus t prove by a pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e that the de fenda nt was able to pay

and did not pay

as ord eredby

th e ju dge." T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . ANN . art . 4 2. 12 , § 21 (c ) ( Ve rn on Sup p. 20 09 ). Th is statut e is i na

pp lic a ble in thi s re vo c a tio n he ari ng sin c e fa ilure to pa y fo r t he int e rl oc k d e vic e , n ot a mandated f

ee unde r the statute sin ce a defenda nt can c hoose not to drive, wa s not the only rea son why Portley ' s community

supervision was be ing r evoked.

6 The trial court' s order

establishing c onditions of community supervision order ed Portley not to "dr ive a motor vehicle without a g uardia n interlock de vice . . . f

or three y ear s." B eca

use he now claims he did not have the financ ial means, Portley failed to purc hase one . He a dmitted to the court t h at h e d i d

n o tab i d e b y

t h i s co n d i t i o no f c o m m u n i t y s u p erv i s i o nan d

p l edt ru e t o t h e S t at e's alleg ation of violation. He a lso te stified in the revoc ation hear ing that he re g ularly drove a motor
ve hic le wi tho ut t

he de vic e . Y e t, Por

tle y c la ime d this ple a wa s invo lun tary be c a us e his c ouns e l di d not discuss the possibil ity that lack of

funds for the device could have been a d efense duringthe
revoc ation proce eding s. We overrule this for sever al reasons. First, the c ourt did not require Portley to drive an a

utomobile, but P ortley

knew that if he owned a

n automobile or re g ularly used one, he
was re quired to install the device and pay fo r it. I n fac t, when community supervision was be ing
a sse sse d, Por

tle y state d h e un de rs too d f

e e s w ou ld b e imp os e d a

nd ve ri fi ed he woul d p ay

the m. 4 Despite that knowle dg e, Portley elec ted to drive a

n automobile without the device. Se c on d, Por

tle y ne ve r a dv ise d th e c ourt

of his inab ili ty

to p ay fo r t he de vic e in a

tim e ly fashion as c ontemplated by Article 42.12, Sec tion 13(i) (which a llows the trial court to dete rmine
a re asonable pay

ment schedule if the cour t determines the p ro b ationer c annot pay for the de vice)
.7

His rec ent claim of ina

bility to affor d the device is substantially weakened since he failed to make
su c h clai m fr om N ov e mbe r 2 00 7, wh e n h e wa s p la c e d o n c omm un ity su pe rv isi on , unti l hi s
revoc ation proce eding in Febr uary 2009. We overrule this point of er ror. III . Evi de nc e Wa s Suffic ie nt to Re vo ke P or tl e y's Co m m unit y Supe r vis ion The orde r of c ommunity

supervision al s o p ro hibited Portley from drinkingalcoholic or intox icating bever ag es. The trial court found Portley violated this condition. P ortley contends the evidenc e wa s leg ally

and fa ctually

insufficient to support the c ourt' s finding. We disag ree . A . St a nd a r d o f R e v ie w Whil e the de cision to revoke c ommunity supervision rests wit hin the di scre tion of t he trial court, it is not absolute. In re T.R.S. , 115 S.W .3d 318, 320 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, no pet.). To revoke community

supervision, the State must prove e very element of

at l ea s t one g round for
revoc ation by

a pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e. J

oh ns on v . S

tate , 9 43 S.W .2d 83, 85 (T e x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [1s t D ist .] 19 97 , n o p e t.) ; T.R.S. , 115 S.W .3d at 320. "' Preponder ance o f t he evi den ce' has been defi ned as t he great er wei ght an d d egree of cr ed i b l e t est im on y ." T.R.S. , 115 S.W .3d at 320. In other wor ds, if the g reater we ight of cr ed i b l e evidenc e in this case c reated a
re a so na ble be lie f that Por

tle y vio late d a

c on dit ion of c omm un ity su pe rv isi on , th e sta

nd ard wa s me t. Id. at 3 2 1 (c i t i n g Ma rti n v . S tate , 623 S.W .2d 391, 393 n.5 (Tex. Crim. App. [ Panel Op.] 1981)). I n a re vocation hea

ring , the trial judg e is the sole trier of the fa cts and de termines the
cre dibilit y of t he witnesses and the weig ht to be g iven to the testimony
. Id. ; Le e v . S tate , 952 S.W .2d8

89 4, 89 7 ( Te x. Ap p. —D a lla s 1 99 7, no pe t.) ; Johnson , 943 S.W .2d at 85. The judg e may acc ept or reje ct any or all of a

witness' testimony
. T.R.S. , 1 1 5 S
. W
. 3 d at 3 2 1 (c i t i n g Ma tti as v . S tate , 731 S.W .2d 936, 940 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987)). C onsidering the uni que nature of a revoc ation hear ing and the tria l court' s broad discr etion in the proce eding s, the g ener al standar ds for r eviewingfac tual sufficie ncy

do not apply
. Pi e rc e v . S tate , 11 3 S.W. 3d 43 1, 43 6 ( Te x. Ap p. —T e xar ka na 20 03 , p e t. denied) . I nstead, we revie w the trial c ourt' s decision re g ardingcommunity supervision revoc ation fo r a nab u s e o f d i s cr et i o nan d ex am i n e t h e e v i d en ce i n a l i gh tm o s tfa v o rab l e t o t h e t ri al co u rt 's order
. T.R.S. , 1 15 S.W. 3d a t 32 1; Pierce , 1 1 3 S
. W
. 3 d at 4 3 6 (c i t i n g Ga rre tt v . S tate , 619 S.W .2d 172, 174 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981)). Thus , if the g re a te r w e ig ht o f c re dib le evide nc e c re a te s a
rea sonable be lief a de fenda nt has violated a c ondition of his or her community supervision, the trial court' s order of revocation did not abuse its discre tion and must be upheld. Pierce , 113 S.W .3d at 4 3 6 (c i t i n g Sc am ar

do v . S tate , 517 S.W .2d 293, 298 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974)). I f the State' s proof is s uf fi c ie nt t o pro ve any on e of the a lle g e d c omm un ity su pe rv isi on vio latio ns , th e re vo c a tio n s ho uld be af firmed. T.R.S. , 115 S.W .3d at 321 (c i t i n g Ste v e ns v . Stat e , 9 0 0 S. W. 2 d 3 4 8 , 3 5 1 ( T e x. App.—Texarkana

1995, pet. re f' d)). B. A nal ys is At the revoc ation hear ing, Offic er Debr a Stil es testified she was dispatched to the scene of
an assa ult where Portley

was pre sent. She stated: he had the smell of alcohol[ic] beverag e coming from his br eath. He was unsteady on his feet. He wanted to lea n ag ainst the truck while w e we re ta lking, or ag ainst the9

house, whatever

we we re standingclose to. His ey es we re blood s hot. And he–he c on tin ua lly re pe a te d h ims e lf

a s if he ha d f or g ott e n th a t he ha d a lr e a dy sa id i t. Stil es conc luded Portley

was unde r the influenc e of a lcohol and wa s intox icated. Offic er Cody

Har g rove wa s also dispatched to the sc ene, a nd he testified that he smelled alcohol on Portley ' s breath and that P ortley ' s speec h was slurred. The office r re called that Portley admitted he had be en drinking . Portley denied dr inking a

ny alcohol that day
. B a se d o n th e te sti mony

of the of fi c e rs , w e c on c lud e the tr ia l c ourt did no t a bu se its dis c re tio n in

fi nd ing , b y

a pr e po nd e ra

nc e of th e evi de nc e , th a t Po rt le y vio late d h is c omm

un ity supervision by

consuming an alc oholic bever ag e. Portley ' s last point of error is overrule d. IV . C onc lusi on We affir m the trial court' s judgme nt.

J ack Ca rter J ustice Date Submitted: October 26, 2009 Date D ecide d: November 5, 2009 Do No t Pu

bli sh