This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER

contains regulatory documents having general

applicability and legal effect, most of which

are keyed to and codified in the Code of

Federal Regulations, which is published under

50 titles pursuant to 44 U.S.C. 1510.

The Code of Federal Regulations is sold by

the Superintendent of Documents. Prices of

new books are listed in the first FEDERAL

REGISTER issue of each week.

Rules and Regulations Federal Register

2095

Vol. 61, No. 17

Thursday, January 25, 1996

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 95–NM–55–AD; Amendment

39–9494; AD 96–02–06]

Airworthiness Directives; Boeing

Models 727, 737, and 747 Series

Airplanes; McDonnell Douglas Model

DC–8 and DC–9 Series Airplanes,

Model MD–88 Airplanes, and Models

MD–11 and MD–90–30 Series

Airplanes; Lockheed Models L–1011–

385 Series Airplanes; Fokker Models

F28 Mark 1000, 2000, 3000, 4000, and

0100 Series Airplanes; and British

Aerospace Model Avro 146–RJ Series

Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation

Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: This amendment supersedes

two existing airworthiness directives

(AD), applicable to certain transport

category airplanes equipped with

certain Honeywell Standard Windshear

Detection Systems (WSS). Those AD’s

currently require a revision to the FAAapproved Airplane Flight Manual

(AFM) to alert the flightcrew of the

potential for significant delays in the

WSS detecting windshear when the

flaps of the airplane are in transition.

Those AD’s were prompted by a report

of an accident during which an airplane

encountered severe windshear during a

missed approach. This amendment

requires that the currently-installed line

replaceable unit (LRU) be replaced with

a modified LRU having new software

that eliminates delays in the WSS

detecting windshear when the flaps of

the airplane are in transition. The

actions specified by this AD are

intended to prevent significant delays in

the WSS detecting hazardous

windshear, which could lead to the loss

of flight path control.

EFFECTIVE DATE: February 26, 1996.

ADDRESSES: Information concerning this

AD may be obtained from or examined

at the Federal Aviation Administration

(FAA), Transport Airplane Directorate,

Rules Docket, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW.,

Renton, Washington; or at the FAA, Los

Angeles Aircraft Certification Office,

Transport Airplane Directorate, 3960

Paramount Boulevard, Lakewood,

California.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: J.

Kirk Baker, Aerospace Engineer,

Systems and Equipment Branch, ANM–

130L, FAA, Los Angeles Aircraft

Certification Office, 3960 Paramount

Boulevard, Lakewood, California 90712;

telephone (310) 627–5345; fax (310)

627–5210.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: A

proposal to amend part 39 of the Federal

Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39)

by superseding AD 95–04–01,

amendment 39–9153 (60 FR 9619,

February 21, 1995), and AD 95–09–05,

amendment 39–9208 (60 FR 20887,

April 28, 1995) that was corrected on

May 12, 1995 (60 FR 26824, May 19,

1995); was published in the Federal

Register on June 13, 1995 (60 FR 31122).

The proposed action is applicable to

certain transport category airplanes

equipped with certain Honeywell

Standard Windshear Detection Systems

(WSS). The action proposed to require

replacement of the currently-installed

line replaceable unit (LRU) with a

modified LRU having new software that

eliminates delays in the WSS detecting

windshear when the flaps of the

airplane are in transition.

Interested persons have been afforded

an opportunity to participate in the

making of this amendment. Due

consideration has been given to the

comments received.

One commenter supports the

proposed rule.

One commenter requests that the

proposal be withdrawn since

unmodified WSS’s provide the

necessary level of safety required for

windshear detection. Furthermore, the

commenter states that existing AD’s 95–

04–01 and 95–09–05, which require that

specific operational procedures be

followed, ensure that the flightcrews are

properly trained on the peculiarities of

the Honeywell WSS.

The FAA does not concur. The FAA

finds that the unsafe condition will be

positively addressed by installing new

software in the LRU that will eliminate

delays in the WSS detecting windshear

when the flaps of the airplane are in

transition. Additionally, the FAA has

determined that long term continued

operational safety will be better assured

by design changes to remove the source

of the problem, rather than by

performing special operating

procedures. Performing long-term

special operating procedures may not be

providing the degree of safety assurance

necessary for affected airplanes in the

fleet. This, coupled with a better

understanding of the human factors

associated with numerous continual

special procedures, has led the FAA to

consider placing less emphasis on

special procedures and more emphasis

on design improvements. This

requirement for modification of the

software is in consonance with these

considerations.

One commenter requests a revision to

part 121 or part 135 of the Federal

Aviation Regulations (FAR) (14 CFR 121

or 135), since the proposal does not

address the root problem. The

commenter states that the proposal

addresses ‘‘reactive’’ WSS’s but, since

‘‘predictive’’ systems are now available,

they should be required equipment on

all aircraft. The commenter contends

that the ultimate solution to the problem

would be to require airborne predictive

windshear detection equipment, in

conjunction with ground-based

detection equipment, on all airplanes

operating in accordance with FAR part

121 or 135.

The FAA does not concur. According

to section 39.1 (‘‘Airworthiness

directives’’) of the FAR (14 CFR 39.1),

the issuance of an AD is based on the

finding that an unsafe condition exists

or is likely to develop in a product of

a particular type design. This AD is

based on such a finding; it is the result

of an investigation into the cause of an

accident involving a transport category

airplane equipped with Honeywell

Standard Windshear Detection System.

That investigation revealed that a design

feature in the windshear computer

delayed detection of windshear when

the airplane’s flaps were in transition.

From this investigation, the FAA

determined that an unsafe condition

exists with regard to the flightcrew
2096 Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 17 / Thursday, January 25, 1996 / Rules and Regulations

being unaware of the potential for

significant delays in the WSS detecting

windshear when the flaps of the

airplane are in transition. The issuance

of this AD is to correct that unsafe

condition. While the commenter’s

request to require installation of specific

equipment for operation of air carriers

or air taxis in accordance with part 121

or part 135 has merit, it is clearly

beyond the scope of this AD action.

One commenter requests a change in

the applicability from the proposed

manufacturers of the airplanes to

Honeywell, the manufacturer of the

faulty WSS’s. The FAA does not concur

in this case. While it is assumed that an

operator will know the models of

airplanes it operates, there is a potential

that the operator will not know or be

immediately aware of specific items that

are installed on its airplanes. The FAA

reasons that, by calling out all of the

manufacturers of the airplane models on

which the subject item is likely to be

installed, it will prevent ‘‘unknowing

non-compliance’’ with the AD on the

part of the operator.

One commenter requests a revision to

the proposal to include a requirement to

install placards in all airplanes to warn

flightcrews of the potential for

significant delays in the WSS detecting

windshear. This commenter states that,

since the WSS’s on all airplanes within

an operator’s fleet will not be modified

simultaneously, the flightcrew may not

know whether the airplane has a

modified or unmodified WSS. This

commenter contends that these

proposed placards would minimize the

possibility for confusion as to the

operating characteristics of the specific

WSS on the airplane.

The FAA does not concur. The FAA

finds that safety of the fleet of affected

airplanes will be ensured by the

requirements of AD 95–04–01 and AD

95–09–04 [and retained in paragraph (a)

of the final rule], which require a

limitation to the FAA-approved

Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) to alert

the flightcrew of the potential for

significant delays in the WSS detecting

windshear when the flaps of the

airplane are in transition. Typically,

placards that are used in the cockpit are

brief and provide pilots with

information that highlights significant

changes (i.e., labeling specific

equipment inoperative). Longer, more

detailed changes to systems, such as

that required by paragraph (a) of the

final rule, are normally detailed in the

AFM. Therefore, the FAA finds that the

requiring the installation of a placard in

the cockpit to warn pilots of the

potential for significant delays in the

WSS detecting windshear would not

significantly enhance safety.

Conversely, the FAA has received

comments to other rulemaking actions

from operators indicating that an

overabundance of placards in the

cockpit tends to clutter the cockpit,

which would make it easy for the

flightcrew to overlook important

operational changes that require the

pilot to take necessary action.

One commenter requests a revision to

paragraph (a) of the proposal, which

restates the requirements of AD 95–04–

01 and AD 95–09–05. Proposed

paragraph (a) requires a revision to the

FAA-approved AFM to alert the

flightcrew of the potential for significant

delays in the WSS detecting windshear

when the flaps of the airplane are in

transition. The commenter requests the

inclusion of references to the roll rate

desensitizing feature, which the

commenter states would increase

flightcrew confidence in the system to

detect windshear in all configurations.

The FAA does not concur. During

certification testing, the FAA evaluated

the effects of bank angles and roll rates,

and determined that roll rates high

enough to cause desensitization will

produce the 15-degree bank angle that is

noted in the AFM limitation required by

paragraph (a) of the final rule. The FAA

has reviewed all currently available data

and finds that changes to paragraph (a)

of the final rule to incorporate roll rate

compensations are not warranted.

However, paragraph (b) of the final rule

has been changed to recommend

revising the AFM limitation [required

by paragraph (a) of the final rule]

following installation of a modified

LRU. The newly revised AFM limitation

alerts pilots that sustained banks greater

than 15 degrees will desensitize the

WSS and that the potential exists for

delays in the WSS detecting windshear.

Several commenters object to the

proposed requirement of paragraph (b)

to replace the currently installed LRU

with a modified LRU having new

software that eliminates delays in the

WSS detecting windshear when the

flaps of the airplane are in transition.

Several commenters state that the

proposed replacement is unnecessary

since such replacement would not

enhance safety of the affected airplanes.

One of these commenters notes that the

proposed replacement requirement

would result in changes in aircraft

configuration that may increase

nuisance alerts, since the sensitivity

reduction factor would be totally

eliminated during flap transition.

The FAA does not concur. The

criteria for reactive windshear systems

state that a warning shall be issued once

the windshear is encountered. The

criteria also consider the airplane’s

available performance and the system’s

propensity for nuisance alerts due to

turbulence. The FAA evaluates

compliance with these criteria based

upon the system’s ability to issue timely

warnings in all reasonably expected

conditions. The FAA finds that

encountering windshear during flap

transition is a reasonably expected

condition, vis-a ́-vis the accident during

which an airplane encountered severe

windshear during a missed approach.

Further, the FAA has determined that

conducting missed approaches, prior to

encountering windshear, is a reasonably

probable scenario. In such a scenario,

the pilot would rely on prior knowledge

attained in FAA-required training to

recognize and recover from a windshear

encounter, such as that provided in

‘‘Windshear Training Aid,’’ Revision 1,

dated February 1990. Therefore, the

pilot would likely determine that

windshear has been encountered before

the detection system actually detects the

phenomena since the WSS is intended

to be strictly an adjunct system, not a

sole or primary system. The windshear

training that pilots receive instructs the

pilot not to retract the airplane’s flaps in

this scenario. However, if the pilot does

not believe that windshear has been

encountered, the pilot may execute a

normal go-around and retract the flaps,

due to what the pilot perceives to be an

unstable approach. Therefore, the FAA

considers any delay in windshear

detection to be unacceptable while the

airplane’s flaps are in transition.

Consequently, the FAA finds that any

improvement in warning time for the

pilot will enhance safety for the affected

airplanes.

Further, the FAA does not concur that

installation of a modified LRU, and

consequently, removal of the windshear

warning delay during flap transition,

would result in an increase in nuisance

alerts. The FAA has reviewed all

available data and cannot substantiate

the commenter’s assertion that

elimination of the sensitivity reduction

factor during flap transition would

result in an increase in nuisance alerts.

The FAA finds that the flaps are usually

extended at altitudes higher than the

altitude at which the system is armed.

Furthermore, the FAA considers

conducting a go-around with strong

turbulence (excluding actual windshear

conditions) to be a highly unlikely

combination of events. Additionally, the

FAA will evaluate the modified

Honeywell windshear computer to

determine compliance with the

nuisance alert criteria, discussed above.

Several commenters request an

extension to the proposed compliance
Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 17 / Thursday, January 25, 1996 / Rules and Regulations 2097

time of 24 months for the replacement

of the LRU. These commenters suggest

that a compliance time of 36 months

would be more appropriate to

accommodate the time necessary to

amend the supplemental type certificate

(STC) and revise the parts manufacture

approval. One of these commenters

states that, since airplanes are

prohibited from flying with a mixture of

modified and unmodified units, this

extension is necessary to ensure that

Honeywell will be able to provide an

adequate number of modified units to

the affected fleet.

The FAA concurs. The FAA has

verified with the manufacturer that the

lead time for developing the required

LRU will exceed the proposed

compliance time of 24 months. Further,

the FAA has determined that extending

the compliance time to the suggested 36

months will accommodate the time

necessary for the manufacturer to

develop, test, and certify these units.

The FAA finds that this 12-month

extension will not adversely affect

safety significantly. Therefore,

paragraph (b) of the final rule has been

revised accordingly.

One commenter requests that the

proposed 24-month compliance time for

replacement of the LRU be shortened to

12 months. This commenter suggests

that the proposed compliance time may

be too long, in light of the catastrophic

consequences of the identified unsafe

condition.

The FAA does not concur that a

shorter compliance time is appropriate.

The proposed 24-month compliance

time was based on the time originally

estimated as necessary for operators to

obtain modified LRU’s, plus the time

necessary for operators to install that

modified LRU on the affected fleet.

However, in light of the information

received concerning availability of these

required parts, as discussed above, the

FAA has determined that a more

appropriate time for accomplishing the

replacement of the LRU is 36 months.

The FAA considers that the AFM

limitation currently required by AD 95–

04–01 and AD 95–09–05 [and retained

in paragraph (a) of the final rule] will

ensure safety in the interim until the

LRU’s can be replaced.

One commenter requests a revision to

paragraph (b) of the proposal to specify

that the modified LRU have software

that would eliminate the horizontal

portion of the flap rate compensation

feature only. The commenter contends

that removal of the vertical portion of

the flap rate compensation feature will

increase nuisance alerts and will

minimally improve the time it takes for

the WSS to detect hazardous windshear

when the flaps of the airplane are in

transition.

The FAA does not concur. Since

paragraph (b) of the final rule requires

that the FAA approve all replacement

LRU’s, the FAA approval will include,

among other factors, a review of the

system’s susceptibility to nuisance

warnings caused by both horizontal and

vertical compensations.

Two commenters request an extension

to the proposed compliance time of 12

months required by paragraph (c),

which prohibits installation of

unmodified LRU’s. One of these

commenters states that a 12-month

extension would allow Honeywell, the

manufacturer of these WSS’s, sufficient

time to develop and manufacture an

adequate number of modified units. The

other commenter suggests that an

extension of 6 months would allow

operators ample time to remove and

return the units to Honeywell to be

reprogrammed.

The FAA concurs that a 6-month

extension to the compliance time is

appropriate. The FAA has confirmed

that the manufacturer will require 18

months to manufacture an adequate

number of units. The FAA has

determined that such an extension to

the compliance time will not

compromise the safety of the affected

airplanes, and that the currently

required operating limitations will

provide an acceptable level of safety in

the interim. Therefore, paragraph (c) of

the final rule has been revised to

prohibit, installation of unmodified

LRU’s as of 18 months after the effective

date of the AD.

One commenter supports the

proposed rule, but recommends that the

proposed 12-month compliance time of

paragraph (c), which prohibits

installation of unmodified LRU’s, be

shortened to 6 months. This commenter

states that, in light of the accident that

prompted this AD action, 12 months

may be too long to permit unmodified

LRU’s to be installed on the affected

airplanes.

The FAA does not concur. Based

upon the information received

concerning the new schedule for the

availability of required parts, discussed

above, the FAA finds it necessary to

extend this compliance time to 18

months.

After careful review of the available

data, including the comments noted

above, the FAA has determined that air

safety and the public interest require the

adoption of the rule with the changes

previously described. The FAA has

determined that these changes will

neither increase the economic burden

on any operator nor increase the scope

of the AD.

There are approximately 2,320

airplanes of the affected design in the

worldwide fleet. The FAA estimates that

1,618 airplanes of U.S. registry will be

affected by this AD.

The actions that are currently

required by AD’s 95–04–01 and 95–09–

05 take approximately 1 work hour per

airplane to accomplish, at an average

labor rate of $60 per work hour. Based

on these figures, the cost impact on U.S.

operators of the actions currently

required is estimated to be $97,080, or

$60 per airplane.

The new actions that are required by

this new AD will take approximately 10

work hours per airplane to accomplish,

at an average labor rate of $60 per work

hour. Required parts will be provided

by Honeywell at not cost to operators.

Based on these figures, the cost impact

on U.S. operators of the new

requirements of this AD is estimated to

be $970,800, or $600 per airplane.

The cost impact figures discussed

above are based on assumptions that no

operator has yet accomplished any of

the requirements of this AD action, and

that no operator would accomplish

those actions in the future if this AD

were not adopted.

The regulations adopted herein will

not have substantial direct effects on the

States, on the relationship between the

national government and the States, or

on the distribution of power and

responsibilities among the various

levels of government. Therefore, in

accordance with Executive Order 12612,

it is determined that this final rule does

not have sufficient federalism

implications to warrant the preparation

of a Federalism Assessment.

For the reasons discussed above, I

certify that this action (1) is not a

‘‘significant regulatory action’’ under

Executive Order 12866; (2) is not a

‘‘significant rule’’ under DOT

Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44

FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and (3)

will not have a significant economic

impact, positive or negative, on a

substantial number of small entities

under the criteria of the Regulatory

Flexibility Act. A final evaluation has

been prepared for this action and it is

contained in the Rules Docket. A copy

of it may be obtained from the Rules

Docket at the location provided under

the caption ‘‘ADDRESSES.’’

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation

safety, Safety.
2098 Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 17 / Thursday, January 25, 1996 / Rules and Regulations

Adoption of the Amendment

Accordingly, pursuant to the

authority delegated to me by the

Administrator, the Federal Aviation

Administration amends part 39 of the

Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR

part 39) as follows:

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS

DIRECTIVES

1. The authority citation for part 39

continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 USC 106(g),40113, 44701.

§ 39.13 [Amended]

2. Section 39.13 is amended by

removing amendments 39–9153 (60 FR

9619, February 21, 1995) and 39–9208

(60 FR 20887, April 28, 1995), and by

adding a new airworthiness directive

(AD), amendment 39–9494, to read as

follows:

96–02–06 Boeing; McDonnell Douglas;

Lockheed; Fokker; and British

Aerospace Regional Aircraft Limited,

AVRO International Aerospace Division

(Formerly British Aerospace, plc; British

Aerospace Commercial Aircraft,

Limited): Amendment 39–9494. Docket

95–NM–55–AD. Supersedes AD 95–04–

01, Amendment 39–9153; and AD 95–

09–05, Amendment 39–9208.

Applicability: The following models and

series of airplanes, certificated in any

category, equipped with Honeywell Standard

Windshear Detection Systems (WSS):

Manufacturer and model of airplane Type of computer Part Nos.

Boeing 727–100 and –200 .............................................. Standard Windshear (Honeywell STC) ............................ 4061048–902, –903, and

–904, 4068054–901,

4068060–901.

Boeing 737–100 and –200 .............................................. Standard Windshear (Honeywell STC) ............................ 4061048–903, –904, and

–905, 4068058–903.

Boeing 737–200 ............................................................... Performance Management (Honeywell STC) .................. 4050730–904 through

–911, 4051819–906.

Boeing 737–300 ............................................................... Standard Windshear (Honeywell STC) ............................ 4068060–901.

Boeing 747–100 and –200 .............................................. Standard Windshear (Honeywell STC) ............................ 4061048–904.

McDonnell Douglas DC–8–50, –60, and –70 .................. Standard Windshear (Honeywell STC) ............................ 4068046–903.

McDonnell Douglas DC–9–10, –21, –31, –41, and –51 . Standard Windshear (Honeywell STC) ............................ 4068046–901, –902,

4068048–901, –902.

McDonnell Douglas DC–9–80 and MD–88 ..................... Windshear (OEM TC) ...................................................... 4059845–902.

McDonnell Douglas MD–90–30 ....................................... Windshear (OEM TC) ...................................................... 4059845–910.

McDonnell Douglas MD–11 ............................................. Flight Control (OEM TC) .................................................. 4059001–901 through –905

(with windshear option

selected).

Lockheed L–1011–385–1, –385–1–14, –385–1–15, and

–385–3.

Standard Windshear (OEM TC) ...................................... 4068044–901.

Fokker F28 Mark 1000, 2000, 3000, and 4000 ............... Standard Windshear (Honeywell STC) ............................ 4068052–901.

Fokker F28 Mark 0100 .................................................... Flight Management (OEM TC) ........................................ 4052502–951 (with

windshear option selected).

British Aerospace Avro 146–RJ70A, –RJ85A, and

–RJ100A.

Flight Control (OEM TC) .................................................. 4068300–902.

Note 1: This AD applies to each airplane

identified in the preceding applicability

provision, regardless of whether it has been

modified, altered, or repaired in the area

subject to the requirements of this AD. For

airplanes that have been modified, altered, or

repaired so that the performance of the

requirements of this AD is affected, the

owner/operator must use the authority

provided in paragraph (d) of this AD to

request approval from the FAA. This

approval may address either no action, if the

current configuration eliminates the unsafe

condition; or different actions necessary to

address the unsafe condition described in

this AD. Such a request should include an

assessment of the effect of the changed

configuration on the unsafe condition

addressed by this AD. In no case does the

presence of any modification, alteration, or

repair remove any airplane from the

applicability of this AD.

Compliance: Required as indicated, unless

accomplished previously.

To prevent significant delays in the

Honeywell Standard Windshear Detection

Systems (WSS) detecting hazardous

windshear, which could lead to the loss of

flight path control, accomplish the following:

(a) Revise the Limitations Section of the

FAA-approved Airplane Flight Manual

(AFM) to include the following statement, at

the time specified in either paragraph (a)(1)

or (a)(2) of this AD, as applicable. This may

be accomplished by inserting a copy of this

AD in the AFM.

‘‘During sustained banks of greater than 15

degrees or during flap configuration changes,

the Honeywell Windshear Detection and

Recovery Guidance System (WSS) is

desensitized and alerts resulting from

encountering windshear conditions will be

delayed.’’

(1) For all Boeing, McDonnell Douglas,

Lockheed, and Fokker airplanes specified in

the applicability statement of this AD: Within

14 days after March 8, 1995 (the effective

date of AD 95–04–01, amendment 39–9153).

(2) For British Aerospace Model Avro

airplanes specified in the applicability

statement of this AD: Within 14 days after

May 15, 1995 (the effective date of AD 95–

09–05, amendment 39–9208).

(b) Within 36 months after the effective

date of this AD, replace the currentlyinstalled line replaceable unit (LRU) with a

modified LRU having new software that

eliminates delays in the WSS detecting

windshear when the flaps of the airplane are

in transition, in accordance with a method

approved by the Manager, Los Angeles

Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA,

Transport Airplane Directorate.

Accomplishment of this replacement

constitutes terminating action for the

requirements of paragraph (a) of this AD;

after the replacement has been accomplished,

the AFM limitation required by paragraph (a)

of this AD may be revised to read as follows:

‘‘During sustained banks of greater than 15

degrees, the Honeywell Windshear Detection

and Recovery Guidance System (WSS) is

desensitized and alerts resulting from

encountering windshear conditions will be

delayed.’’

(c) As of 18 months after the effective date

of this AD, no person shall install on any

airplane an LRU that has not been modified

in accordance with paragraph (b) of this AD.

An unmodified LRU may be installed up to

18 months after the effective date of this AD,

provided that, during that time, the AFM
Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 17 / Thursday, January 25, 1996 / Rules and Regulations 2099

limitation required by paragraph (a) of this

AD remains in effect.

(d) An alternative method of compliance or

adjustment of the compliance time that

provides an acceptable level of safety may be

used if approved by the Manager, Los

Angeles ACO. Operators shall submit their

requests through an appropriate FAA

Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may

add comments and then send it to the

Manager, Los Angeles ACO.

Note 2: Information concerning the

existence of approved alternative methods of

compliance with this AD, if any, may be

obtained from the Los Angeles ACO.

(e) Special flight permits may be issued in

accordance with sections 21.197 and 21.199

of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR

21.197 and 21.199) to operate the airplane to

a location where the requirements of this AD

can be accomplished.

(f) This amendment becomes effective on

February 26, 1996.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on January

18, 1996.

Darrell M. Pederson,

Acting Manager, Transport Airplane

Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. 96–1102 Filed 1–24–96; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–13–U

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

Bureau of Export Administration

15 CFR Parts 770, 771, 772, 773, 774,

775, 776, 785, 786, 787 and 799

[Docket No. 960103001–6001–01]

RIN 0694–AB36

Revisions to the Export Administration

Regulations: Reform of Computer

Export Controls; Establishment of

General License G–CTP

AGENCY: Bureau of Export

Administration, Commerce.

ACTION: Interim rule.

SUMMARY: The Bureau of Export

Administration (BXA) is amending the

Export Administration Regulations

(EAR), to implement the President’s

October 6, 1995, announcement on

major reform of computer export

controls.

The President announced a

liberalization of export controls on all

computers to countries in North

America, most of Western Europe, and

parts of Asia. For certain other

countries, including many in Latin

America and Central and Eastern

Europe, this rule also liberalizes export

controls on computers. For the former

Soviet Union, China and certain other

countries, U.S. export controls will

focus on computers intended for

military and proliferation end-uses or

users, and ease controls on exports of

computers to civilian customers.

Finally, there will be no change in

current policy for computer shipments

to terrorist countries, with the exception

of the addition of Sudan to ECCNs

4A94F, 4D94F, 4E94F, and Computer

Tier 4 (a grouping of terrorist countries,

for the purpose of computer controls).

This decision will streamline

validated license requirements for U.S.

computer manufacturers of computers

that are, or will be in the next two years,

widely available in the international

market place.

DATES: Effective Date: This rule is

effective January 22, 1996.

Comment Date: Comments must be

received by February 26, 1996.

ADDRESSES: Written comments (six

copies) should be sent to Sharron Cook,

Office of Exporter Services, Bureau of

Export Administration, Department of

Commerce, P.O. Box 273, Washington,

DC 20044.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For

general information contact Sharron

Cook, Regulatory Policy Division,

Bureau of Export Administration,

Telephone: (202) 482–2440.

For technical information contact

Joseph Young, Strategic Trade Division,

Bureau of Export Administration,

Telephone: (202) 482–4197.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

When controls were last revised in

1993, the Administration recognized

that computer technology would

continue to change rapidly—and that it

would need to review control levels

within 18 to 24 months. Accordingly,

for the past several months, the

Administration has conducted a review

of computer export controls that took

into account (1) the rapid advance of

computing technology since 1993, (2)

our security and nonproliferation

interests, and (3) the need for a policy

that would remain effective over the

next 18 to 24 months.

This review found that enormous

advances in the power and capabilities

of computing systems coming into

widespread commercial use have

occurred and will continue to occur

over the next two years. The commercial

computer market is being transformed

by the emergence of workstations

containing multiple high-speed

microprocessors, the ready availability

of high-speed communications links,

and the continuing rapid progress in

software to permit difficult problems to

run in parallel and on networks.

Based on these developments, the

Administration has determined that

computers capable of up to 7,000

million theoretical operations per

second (MTOPS) will become widely

available in open international markets

within the next two years. The

Administration has also determined that

computers with performance

capabilities at and above 10,000 MTOPS

have a significant number of strategic

applications.

The new computer export controls

found in this rule are to implement the

following goals, as stated by the

President:

To permit the government to calibrate

control levels and licensing conditions

depending upon the national security or

proliferation risk posed by exports to a

specific destination;

To enhance U.S. national security and

preserve the U.S. computer industrial base by

ensuring controls on computer exports are

effective and do not unnecessarily impede

legitimate computer exports; and

To permit the government to track global

sales, thereby illuminating how high

performance computing may be used to

pursue critical military applications.

In this interim rule, the term

‘‘supercomputer’’ and the separate

supercomputer section in § 776.11 have

been removed. The majority of the new

computer controls can now be found in

§ 776.10 that generally pertains to

computers. Because the term

supercomputer was removed from the

EAR, all such references have been

removed.

Within General License GCG,

§ 771.14, the supercomputer restriction

is removed, with the exception that, ‘‘no

computers with a CTP greater than

10,000 MTOPS may be exported to

Argentina, Hong Kong, South Korea,

Singapore, and Taiwan without a

validated license.’’ This is consistent

with the President’s announcement of

October 6, 1995, which provides a

ceiling for the CTP level for which

general licenses can be used for these

countries, except Taiwan and Hong

Kong. Hong Kong and Taiwan have a

CTP limitation for computers of 10,000

MTOPS and are in Computer Tier 2,

established by this rule.

In this rule, the supercomputer

restriction is also removed from General

Licenses G–TEMP and SAFEGUARDS.

All computers are now eligible for

temporary export under the provisions

of General License G–TEMP. Also, all

computers are now eligible for export to

the International Atomic Energy Agency

(IAEA) under the provisions of General

License SAFEGUARDS.

A new General License G–CTP is

established by this rule under § 771.28.

This general license authorizes the

export of computers and specially