PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-1294

UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION,

Petitioner,

v.

VIRGINIA RICHARDS, widow of Arlie Richards; DIRECTOR, 

OFFICE OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION PROGRAMS, UNITED STATES 

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,

Respondents.

−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−

BLACK LUNG LEGAL CLINIC,

Amicus Supporting Respondent.

No. 12-1978

PEABODY COAL COMPANY,

Petitioner,

v.

DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION PROGRAMS, UNITED 

STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR; MARY ELLEN MORGAN, Widow of Don 

Morgan,

Respondents.

−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−

BLACK LUNG LEGAL CLINIC,
2

Amicus Supporting Respondent.

On Petitions for Review of an Order of the Benefits Review 

Board. (11-0414-BLA, 11-0414-BLA-A, 10-5248-BLA, 11−0634-BLA)

Argued: March 21, 2013 Decided: July 5, 2013

Before NIEMEYER, DAVIS, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Petitions for review denied by published opinion. Judge Diaz 

wrote the opinion, in which Judge Niemeyer and Judge 

Davis joined.

ARGUED: Kathy Lynn Snyder, JACKSON KELLY, PLLC, Morgantown, West 

Virginia; Mark Elliott Solomons, GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP, 

Washington, D.C., for Petitioners. Ryan Christopher Gilligan, 

WOLFE, WILLIAMS, RUTHERFORD & REYNOLDS, Norton, Virginia; Barry 

H. Joyner, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, Washington, D.C., 

for Respondents. ON BRIEF: Amy Jo Holley, JACKSON KELLY, PLLC, 

Morgantown, West Virginia, for Petitioner Union Carbide 

Corporation. Laura Metcoff Klaus, GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP, 

Washington, D.C., for Petitioner Peabody Coal Company. M. 

Patricia Smith, Solicitor of Labor, Rae Ellen James, Associate 

Solicitor, Gary K. Stearman, Counsel for Appellate Litigation, 

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, Washington, D.C., for Federal 

Respondent. Joseph E. Wolfe, WOLFE, WILLIAMS, RUTHERFORD & 

REYNOLDS, Norton, Virginia, for Respondents Virginia Richards 

and Mary Ellen Morgan. Timothy C. MacDonnell, Carney N. 

Simpson, Student Caseworker, Gordon Jenkins, Student Caseworker, 

Black Lung Legal Clinic, WASHINGTON AND LEE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF 

LAW, Lexington, Virginia, for Amicus Supporting Respondents.
3

DIAZ, Circuit Judge:

These consolidated cases involve claims for survivors’ 

benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act (“BLBA”), 30 U.S.C. 

§ 901 et seq., filed by Respondents Virginia E. Richards and 

Mary Ellen Morgan. In both cases, Department of Labor (“DOL”) 

Administrative Law Judges (“ALJs”) awarded the survivors’ 

claims, and the DOL Benefits Review Board (the “Board”) 

affirmed. Union Carbide Corporation and Peabody Coal Company, 

the coal mine operators responsible for payment of Respondents’ 

benefits, petitioned for this court’s review. Petitioners

submit that principles of res judicata foreclose Respondents--

each of whom previously and unsuccessfully sought BLBA 

survivors’ benefits--from relying on a recent amendment to the 

BLBA to pursue benefits again through a so-called “subsequent 

claim.” We disagree. Because the amendment created a new cause 

of action that was unavailable to Respondents when they brought 

their initial claims, res judicata does not bar their subsequent 

claims. Accordingly, we affirm the Board’s awards.

I.

In addition to lifetime disability benefits for coal 

miners, the BLBA provides survivors’ benefits to certain of 

their dependents. The statute has been substantially amended 

over the years. Initially, a deceased miner’s qualifying 
4

dependents could obtain survivors’ benefits either by showing 

that the deceased miner’s death was caused by pneumoconiosis,1 or 

by showing that the miner was totally disabled by pneumoconiosis 

at the time of his death. Survivors who proved their 

entitlement under the latter method were automatically entitled 

to benefits even if pneumoconiosis played no role in the 

deceased miners’ deaths. See 30 U.S.C. § 922(a)(2) (1970). 

This automatic “derivative benefits” scheme was reinforced in 

the 1978 amendments to the BLBA, which enacted 30 U.S.C.

§ 932(l), providing: “In no case shall the eligible survivors of 

a miner who was determined to be eligible to receive benefits

under this title at the time of his or her death be required to 

file a new claim for benefits, or refile or otherwise revalidate 

the claim of such miner.” Pub. L. No. 95-239, § 7(h), 92 Stat. 

95, 100 (1978).

In 1981, Congress scaled back benefits under the BLBA, 

eliminating Section 932(l)’s provision of automatic derivative 

survivors’ benefits. Consequently, a survivor filing a claim on 

or after January 1, 1982, could establish entitlement only by 

proving that the miner’s death was due at least in part to 

 1 The BLBA’s implementing regulations define 

“pneumoconiosis” as “a chronic dust disease of the lung and its 

sequelae, including respiratory and pulmonary impairments, 

arising out of coal mine employment.” 20 C.F.R. § 718.201(a). 
5

pneumoconiosis. See Shuff v. Cedar Coal Co., 967 F.2d 977, 979 

(4th Cir. 1992).

In 2010, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 

(“ACA”) reinstated Section 932(l)’s automatic survivors’ 

benefits for claims filed after January 1, 2005, that were

pending on or after the ACA’s March 23, 2010, enactment date. 

Pub. L. No. 111–148, sec. 1556, § 932 (“Section 1556”), 124 

Stat. 119, 260 (2010); W. Va. CWP Fund v. Stacy, 671 F.3d 378, 

381-82 (4th Cir. 2011). Accordingly, survivors whose claims 

meet those temporal thresholds need no longer show that the 

miner’s death was caused by pneumoconiosis; the claimant need

only show that the miner was determined to be eligible to 

receive BLBA benefits at the time of his death. Section 1556 is 

silent as to whether survivors whose previous claims were denied 

may now receive benefits by filing “subsequent” claims under 

amended Section 932(l).

DOL’s implementing regulations set forth the protocol for 

treatment of these “subsequent” claims--defined as claims filed 

“more than one year after the effective date of a final order 

denying a claim previously filed by the claimant under this 

part.”2

 20 C.F.R. § 725.309(d). The regulations provide:

 2 These regulations, which became effective on January 19, 

2001, implement the pre-ACA version of Section 932(l), and thus 

still provide that survivors filing after 1981 may only recover

(Continued)
6

A subsequent claim shall be processed and adjudicated 

in accordance with the provisions [that govern 

original claims], except that the claim shall be 

denied unless the claimant demonstrates that one of 

the applicable conditions of entitlement . . . has 

changed since the date upon which the order denying 

the prior claim became final. 

***

(3) If the applicable condition(s) of entitlement 

relate to the miner’s physical condition, the 

subsequent claim may be approved only if new evidence 

submitted in connection with the subsequent claim 

establishes at least one applicable condition of 

entitlement. A subsequent claim filed by a surviving 

spouse, child, parent, brother, or sister shall be 

denied unless the applicable conditions of entitlement 

in such claim include at least one condition unrelated 

to the miner’s physical condition at the time of his 

death.

20 C.F.R. § 725.309(d).

Addressing the effect of res judicata on BLBA claims, a 

1997 DOL comment to the proposed Section 725.309(d) observed 

that “the principles of claim preclusion are applicable to 

claims under the Act.” 62 Fed. Reg. 3352 (proposed Jan. 22, 

1997) (citing Pittston Coal Grp. v. Sebben, 488 U.S. 105, 122-23 

 

upon showing that a miner’s death was due to pneumoconiosis. 20 

C.F.R. § 725.212, 725.218, 725.222. DOL has issued a notice of 

proposed rulemaking, in which it proposes to revise its 

regulations to reflect the ACA amendments. 77 Fed. Reg. 19468, 

19478 (proposed Mar. 30, 2012) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pts. 

718, 725). Notably, and consistent with its litigation position 

here, DOL proposes to revise Section 725.309(d) to provide for 

automatic entitlement on survivors’ subsequent claims, 

notwithstanding previous denials. Id. at 19468. 
7

(1988)). In the context of subsequent claims, however, DOL 

clarified that “claim preclusion bars only an attempt to 

relitigate a cause of action that was previously resolved; it 

has no effect on the litigation of a cause of action which did 

not exist at the time of the initial adjudication.” Id. (citing 

Lawlor v. Nat’l Screen Serv. Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 328 (1955)).

II.

A.

Arlie C. Richards worked as a coal miner for over thirty 

years and was awarded BLBA benefits in 1987. Union Carbide paid 

his BLBA benefits until his death in January 1994. Virginia 

Richards, Arlie’s widow, filed her first claim for survivors’ 

benefits in February 1994. After protracted proceedings, an ALJ

ultimately denied her claim on May 6, 2006, because she failed 

to prove that her husband’s death was due in part to 

pneumoconiosis. Mrs. Richards did not appeal that denial, but 

filed a second, subsequent claim for survivors’ benefits in May 

2009. In October 2009, months before the ACA’s enactment, a DOL 

district director denied that claim because it failed to 

demonstrate a change in any condition of entitlement, as is 

required of subsequent claims under Section 725.309(d)(3). Mrs. 

Richards requested a hearing before an ALJ. 
8

While that request was pending, Congress enacted the ACA, 

restoring automatic derivative survivors’ benefits under Section 

932(l). Upon a motion from the Director of the Office of 

Workers’ Compensation Programs (“Director,” the Federal 

Respondent in these cases), the ALJ acknowledged the change in 

law and issued a summary decision awarding benefits to Mrs. 

Richards, since her husband had been receiving benefits at the 

time of his death.

Union Carbide appealed to the Board, arguing--as it does in 

its instant petition--that Mrs. Richards’s subsequent claim was 

barred by 20 C.F.R. § 725.309(d)(3) and principles of res 

judicata. In January 2012, the Board issued a split en banc

decision affirming the ALJ’s award of benefits. Richards v. 

Union Carbide Corp., 25 Black Lung Rep. (Juris) 1-31 (Ben. Rev. 

Bd. 2012) (en banc). The Board made four principal 

determinations. First, it held that the plain text of Section 

932(l), as amended by Section 1556, authorizes its application 

to subsequent claims. Second, it held that Mrs. Richards had 

demonstrated a change in a condition of entitlement unrelated to 

her husband’s physical condition, thus satisfying 

Section 725.309(d)(3). Third, the Board concluded that res 

judicata did not bar Mrs. Richards’s subsequent claim because a 

determination of entitlement under Section 932(l) did not 

require relitigation of the prior finding that Mr. Richards’s
9

death was unrelated to pneumoconiosis. Finally, the Board 

modified the benefit accrual date, clarifying that benefits for 

successful subsequent claims are payable from the month 

following the prior denial. Union Carbide timely petitioned for 

this court’s review.

B.

Don Morgan worked as a coal miner for nineteen years and 

filed a claim for lifetime disability benefits in 1987. An ALJ 

approved his claim in 1991, and after more than a decade of 

proceedings, we affirmed Mr. Morgan’s award of benefits in June 

2004. Peabody Coal Co. v. Morgan, 98 F. App’x 966 (4th Cir. 

2004). Mr. Morgan died months before that decision, in January 

2004. 

In May 2004, Mary Ellen Morgan, Don’s widow, filed a claim 

for survivors’ benefits. The district director initially 

approved her claim, but an ALJ denied benefits after determining

that Mrs. Morgan had failed to prove that her husband’s death 

was due to pneumoconiosis. Mrs. Morgan appealed, but the Board 

affirmed the denial in October 2008. Mrs. Morgan took no 

further action on her 2004 claim, and the Board’s decision 

became final.

After Congress amended the BLBA via ACA Section 1556, Mrs. 

Morgan filed a second, subsequent claim. As he did in Richards, 

the Director moved for a summary decision awarding benefits. 
10

Acknowledging the change in law, the ALJ granted the motion. 

Peabody, Mr. Morgan’s former employer, appealed to the Board, 

arguing that Mrs. Morgan’s subsequent claim was barred by 20 

C.F.R. § 725.309(d) and principles of res judicata.3 

The Board affirmed the award, relying on its decision in 

Richards. Morgan v. Peabody Coal Co., BRB No. 11-0634, 2012 WL 

2860525 (Ben. Rev. Bd. June 15, 2012) (unpublished). Peabody 

timely petitioned for this court’s review. 

III.

The central issue before us is whether, in light of the ACA 

amendments to Section 932(l) of the BLBA, a final decision 

denying benefits on a prior claim bars a survivor from receiving 

benefits through a subsequent claim. We consider this question 

of law de novo. Stacy, 671 F.3d at 388. 

A.

 3 Peabody also contended that Section 1556 created an 

impermissible irrebuttable presumption that a miner’s death was 

due to pneumoconiosis. Peabody briefly raises this argument, 

which the Board rejected, on appeal. We too reject it because 

the amendment does not raise the presumption Peabody alleges. 

As the Third Circuit recently explained, a miner’s death is not 

presumed to be due to pneumoconiosis under amended Section 

932(l); indeed, the cause of the miner’s death is irrelevant in 

the context of automatic survivors’ entitlements. See B & G 

Constr. Co. v. Dir., OWCP, 662 F.3d 233, 254 (3d Cir. 2011).
11

Petitioners argue that Mrs. Morgan and Mrs. Richards are 

ineligible for automatic derivative survivors’ benefits under 

amended Section 932(l). Because, unlike past amendments to the 

BLBA, Section 1556 does not expressly authorize departure from 

the traditional principles of res judicata, Petitioners believe

that Respondents’ previously denied claims should preclude them 

from bringing subsequent claims under amended Section 932(l). 

According to Petitioners, Section 1556 did not create a new 

cause of action, but rather merely created a new theory or 

method by which survivors may demonstrate entitlement. This 

change in law, Petitioners insist, does not negate the 

preclusive effect of Respondents’ previously denied claims, 

particularly because the record evidence remains unchanged since 

the denial of the Respondents’ initial claims. 

Relatedly, Petitioners say that the Board erred in 

determining that Respondents’ subsequent claims were not barred 

by 20 C.F.R. § 725.309(d)(3), which requires that a subsequent 

claim be denied unless the survivor can show a change in the 

conditions of entitlement unrelated to the decedent’s physical 

condition.

Petitioners also contend that the Board’s decision in these 

cases renders meaningless Congress’s requirement that the claims 

be filed “after January 1, 2005” and pending on or after the 

ACA’s March 23, 2010 enactment date. See Section 1556(c). By 
12

allowing previously denied claimants to file subsequent claims 

under amended Section 932(l), Petitioners say the Board has 

created an end-run around Section 1556(c)’s filing limitations, 

which Congress imposed to mitigate the financial burden of 

Section 1556 on coal mine operators.

Defending the Board’s holding, Respondents say that the 

plain language of Section 1556 and amended Section 932(l) 

permits awards on survivors’ subsequent claims, since Section 

1556 states, without qualification, that the amendment 

“appl[ies] with respect to claims filed” within Section 

1556(c)’s time limitations. Fed. Resp’t’s Br. at 21 (quoting 

Section 1556(c)) (emphasis added by Federal Respondent). 

Respondents rely on our recent decision in Stacy, where we 

affirmed the applicability of amended Section 932(l) to a 

survivor’s original claim. 671 F.3d at 388-89. In holding that 

amended Section 932(l) applies not only to miners’ claims but 

also to those of survivors, we observed that “the plain language 

of that section requires that amended § 932(l) apply to all

claims [that satisfy Section 1556(c)’s time limitations].” Id.

at 388. Accordingly, since survivors may file subsequent

“claims” under the BLBA, Respondents insist that their instant 

claims are encompassed by Section 1556. 

Countering Petitioners’ res judicata arguments, Respondents 

contend that Section 1556 did not merely change the process by 
13

which survivors could prove their entitlement, but instead 

created a new, previously unavailable cause of action. Although 

Respondents acknowledge that they presented no new evidence 

since the denial of their initial claims, they maintain that 

their subsequent claims rely on facts different from the initial 

claims, thus rendering res judicata inappropriate. To wit, 

whereas Respondents’ initial claims turned on whether 

pneumoconiosis caused the miners’ deaths, Respondents point out 

that that fact is irrelevant to their subsequent claims under 

amended Section 932(l), which concern only whether the miners 

were eligible to receive benefits at the time of their deaths.

Finally, Respondents argue that their reading does not 

defeat the burden-mitigating time limitations in Section 

1556(c), which they believe are still effectuated by the 

judicially implied requirement that claimants take some 

affirmative action to initiate the administrative application of 

Section 932(l) after January 1, 2005. Fed. Resp’t’s Br. at 24 

(citing Stacy, 671 F.3d at 388-89). Thus, rather than being 

required to pay all previously denied survivors’ claims where 

the miner died while receiving benefits, coal operators must pay

only those where a surviving spouse has taken pains to submit a 

subsequent claim.

B.
14

Looking first to the text of Section 1556, we reject 

Petitioners’ contention that the amendment does not apply to 

survivors’ subsequent claims. As we explained in Stacy, “the 

plain language of [Section 1556] requires that amended § 932(l) 

apply to all claims [that satisfy Section 1556(c)’s time 

limitations].” 671 F.3d at 388. “Because Congress used the 

term ‘claims’ without any qualifying language,” id., and because 

survivors whose claims were previously denied may file 

subsequent “claims” under the BLBA, see 20 C.F.R. § 725.309(d),

the statutory text supports Respondents’ position that amended 

Section 932(l) applies to all claims that comply with Section 

1556(c)’s time limitations, including subsequent claims. 

Petitioners are correct that, in contrast to previous BLBA 

amendments, Section 1556 does not explicitly indicate an intent 

to override the res judicata effect of previously denied claims. 

Compare Section 1556, with Pub. L. No. 95-239, § 11, 92 Stat. 

95, 101 (Mar. 1, 1978) (directing the Secretary of Health, 

Education, and Welfare, upon a claimant’s request, to review and 

apply amendments to previously denied claims), and Pub, L. No. 

92-303, § 6, 86 Stat. 150, 156 (May 19, 1972) (same, only 

without the need for a claimant’s request). But application of 

Section 1556 to subsequent claims does not require us to run

roughshod over res judicata. Rather, res judicata is not 

implicated by Respondents’ subsequent claims since entitlement 
15

under Section 932(l), as revived by Section 1556, does not 

require relitigation of the prior findings that the miners’ 

deaths were not due to pneumoconiosis. 

In this case, Respondents easily satisfy 20 C.F.R. 

§ 725.309(d)(3)’s requirement of showing a change in the 

conditions of entitlement unrelated to the decedent’s physical 

condition. By restoring the derivative entitlement provisions 

of Section 932(l), Congress has effectively created a “change”

establishing a new condition of entitlement unrelated to whether 

the miner died due to pneumoconiosis.

And just as Congress created a new condition of entitlement 

for purposes of Section 725.309(d), so too it created a new 

cause of action for purposes of res judicata. 

By “precluding parties from contesting matters that they 

have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate,” the doctrine 

of res judicata minimizes “the expense and vexation attending 

multiple lawsuits, conserve[s] judicial resources, and foster[s]

reliance on judicial action by minimizing the possibility of 

inconsistent decisions.” Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892 

(2008) (internal quotations omitted). “However, res judicata 

does not bar claims that did not exist at the time of the prior 

litigation.” Meekins v. United Transp. Union, 946 F.2d 1054, 

1057 (4th Cir. 1991). A party invoking res judicata must 

establish three elements: (1) a previous final judgment on the 
16

merits, (2) an identity of the cause of action in both the 

earlier and the later suit, and (3) an identity of parties or 

their privies in the two suits. Id.

Identity of the cause of action--the only prong presently

in dispute--exists if two claims “arise out of the same 

transaction or series of transactions or the same core of 

operative facts.” Pueschel v. United States, 369 F.3d 345, 355 

(4th Cir. 2004). While typically it is a new factual 

development that gives rise to a fresh cause of action, see, 

e.g., Lawlor, 349 U.S. at 328, changes in law can also have that

effect. For instance, “on rare occasions, when a new statute 

provides an independent basis for relief which did not exist at 

the time of the prior action, a second action on the new statute 

may be justified.”4

 18 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal 

Practice, ¶ 131.22[3] (3d ed. 2013); see also Clodfelter v. 

Republic of Sudan, No. 11-2118, 2013 WL 3069775, at *9 (4th Cir. 

June 20, 2013); Maldonado v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 664 F.3d 1369, 

1379 (11th Cir. 2011).

Like Respondents, we recognize that the record evidence has 

not changed since the denial of the original claims and that the 

 4 By contrast to a statutory change, a change in precedent 

generally provides no relief from res judicata, since it merely 

reflects an error in the prior decision. See Federated Dep’t 

Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 398 (1981).
17

only relevant change is one of law. Nevertheless, we conclude 

that the instant subsequent claims arise from operative facts 

that are separate and distinct from those underlying

Respondents’ initial claims, and therefore constitute new causes 

of action. Whereas Respondents’ initial claims turned on 

whether the deceased miners died due to pneumoconiosis, these 

subsequent claims concern only whether the miners were 

determined to be eligible to receive black lung benefits at the 

time of their deaths--an entirely unrelated factual issue. 

Meanwhile, the statutory change in law provides a 

previously unavailable basis for relief that justifies the 

instant claims, since res judicata does not bar claims that the 

parties have not had a “full and fair opportunity to litigate.” 

Sturgell, 553 U.S. at 892. On this point, Petitioners cite the 

Supreme Court’s decision in Sebben, 488 U.S. 105. Sebben

involved the 1977 amendments to the BLBA, which imposed higher 

evidentiary standards on miners attempting to receive benefits, 

but which also required DOL to reopen and readjudicate certain 

pending and denied claims using the previously applicable, less 

restrictive standards. 488 U.S. at 110-11. DOL reopened these 

claims as required, but the claimants alleged that the agency

failed to readjudicate them under the previously applicable, 

more lenient standards, as mandated by the amendment. Id.
18

Two classes of claimants brought suit in Sebben: the first 

had timely appealed the administrative denials of their reopened 

claims, while the second had not appealed and were seeking to 

reopen their finally determined claims for a third time. Id. at

112-13. Thus, to succeed, the second class needed to establish 

“not only a duty to apply less restrictive criteria than those 

[applied by DOL], but also a duty to reopen the final 

determinations.” Id. at 122. Ultimately, although the Court 

agreed that DOL had improperly applied the more restrictive 

standards during their initial readjudications, it held that res 

judicata nevertheless barred the second class of claimants from 

reopening their finally (though wrongly) determined claims. Id.

Sebben does establish that res judicata can serve as a bar 

to BLBA claims, but it is inapposite here, where Respondents 

have not had any prior opportunity to litigate the cause of 

action giving rise to their subsequent claims. Unlike 

Respondents, who bring their derivative entitlement claims for 

the first time under amended Section 932(l), the second class of 

Sebben claimants had already received (albeit under the wrong 

evidentiary standard) the reopening and readjudication to which 

they were entitled under the 1977 amendments. Thus, the Supreme 

Court’s refusal to grant the Sebben claimants a third bite at 

the apple merely reflects the well-settled principle that res 

judicata precludes relitigation of a final judgment on the 
19

merits even if that judgment was wrong. See Moitie, 452 U.S. at 

398. And in contrast to Sebben, where relitigation would have 

risked upsetting previously adjudicated claims and creating 

inconsistent judgments, litigation of Respondents’ subsequent 

claims seeking benefits under amended Section 932(l)’s newly 

revived cause of action runs no such risk, since these claims

were never previously adjudicated. 

C.

Petitioners attempt to divine congressional intent to 

exclude subsequent claims from the amendment’s ambit by parsing 

a single post-enactment statement of the late Senator Robert C. 

Byrd, sponsor of Section 1556, who commented: “It is clear that 

[Section 1556] will apply to all claims that will be filed 

henceforth, including many claims filed by miners whose prior 

claims were denied, or by widows who never filed for benefits 

following the death of a husband.” 156 Cong. Rec. S2083 (daily 

ed. March 25, 2010). As the Supreme Court has observed, 

“[p]ost-enactment legislative history (a contradiction in terms) 

is not a legitimate tool of statutory interpretation.” 

Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 131 S. Ct. 1068, 1081 (2011). In any 

case, although Senator Byrd’s statement may imply that the 

amendment excludes those widows who did file prior claims for 

benefits, it does not explicitly state as much. Meanwhile, his 

observation that the amendment applies to “all claims that will 
20

be filed henceforth” can be read to encompass subsequent claims, 

and his description of the scope of the statute as “including” 

certain types of claims connotes that his selected examples were 

intended to be illustrative of the amendment’s reach, not 

exhaustive. In short, any inference drawn from Senator Byrd’s 

ambiguous post-enactment statement cannot overcome the plain 

text of the amendment, which indicates its application to “all 

claims,” without qualification.

Finally, we address the concern that allowing Respondents’ 

subsequent claims to proceed would remove the burden-mitigating 

time limitations Congress placed in Section 1556(c). As we 

observed in rejecting a due process challenge to Section 1556 in 

Stacy, the retroactive time limitations in Section 1556 

represent Congress’s “measured approach” to reinstating the 

automatic survivorship entitlements of Section 932(l). 671 F.3d 

at 384. Recognizing the potential financial burden the 

amendment might place on operators, “Congress mitigated the 

retroactive impact of Section 1556 by limiting its application 

to ‘claims filed . . . after January 1, 2005, that are pending 

on or after’ March 23, 2010--the date the [ACA] was enacted. 

Consequently, operators must only pay automatic survivors’

benefits for claims filed in or after 2005.” Id. (quoting 

Section 1556(c)) (citation omitted).
21

These limitations are not rendered meaningless by our 

holding here, since claimants seeking automatic entitlements 

must still take steps to assert their derivative rights. 

Claimants whose initial claims were denied before the ACA’s 

January 2005 cutoff must affirmatively file a subsequent claim 

with the agency; meanwhile, the second limitation--requiring 

that the claims be pending on or after the ACA’s March 2010 

enactment--prevents DOL from having to sua sponte reopen claims 

filed after 2005 but denied before the amendment’s enactment.

The Director attests to the practical effect of this 

regime, noting that only approximately 130 of the 1,040 eligible 

survivors have so far filed claims under the amended entitlement 

provisions. Fed. Resp’t’s Br. at 27 n.14. Thus, by requiring 

that DOL award the automatic entitlement only on claims 

(subsequent or otherwise) that have been filed since January 1, 

2005, and are pending on or after March 23, 2010, the 

limitations continue to meaningfully mitigate the coal mine 

operators’ financial burden.5

 5 As Respondents point out, the amendment’s financial burden 

is further allayed by the Board’s determination that automatic 

survivors’ benefits on a subsequent claim are payable only from 

the month following the prior denial, rather than from the month 

of the miner’s death. This decision represents an attempt to 

reconcile 20 C.F.R. § 725.503(c), which instructs that benefits 

are payable to an entitled survivor “beginning with the month of 

the miner’s death,” with 20 C.F.R. § 725.309(d)(5), which 

clarifies that “[i]n any case in which a subsequent claim is 

(Continued)
22

IV.

Under the plain language of Section 1556 and principles of 

res judicata, Mrs. Richards and Mrs. Morgan are entitled to 

survivors’ benefits. In compliance with Section 1556(c)’s time 

limitations, Respondents filed their instant subsequent claims 

after January 1, 2005, and their claims were pending on and 

after March 23, 2010. Their deceased husbands were both 

determined to be eligible to receive BLBA benefits at the time 

of their deaths, and Petitioners do not deny that Mrs. Richards 

and Mrs. Morgan meet the dependency and relationship criteria 

for eligible survivors. Meanwhile, res judicata does not bar 

their claims, since Section 1556 created a new cause of action 

not available to them at the time they brought their initial 

claims. Respondents are therefore entitled to automatic 

derivative benefits under 30 U.S.C. § 932(l), and we accordingly 

deny Union Carbide’s and Peabody’s petitions for review.

PETITIONS FOR REVIEW DENIED.

 

awarded, no benefits may be paid for any period prior to the 

date upon which the order denying the prior claim became final.” 

Reading those provisions together, the Board reasonably chose an 

accrual date that would provide successful subsequent claimants 

with meaningful benefits yet which, at the same time, would 

mitigate the burden to the operator and respect the validity of 

the earlier denial.