United States Court of Appeals 

for the Fifth Circuit ____________ 

No. 22-30490 

____________ 

Katelynn McLin, 

Plaintiff—Appellant, 

versus

Twenty-First Judicial District; Robert H. Morrison, 

III, 

Defendants—Appellees. 

______________________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Middle District of Louisiana 

USDC No. 3:21-CV-411 

______________________________ 

Before Higginbotham, Graves, and Douglas, Circuit Judges.

Patrick E. Higginbotham, Circuit Judge:

In this employment dispute, the district court dismissed with 

prejudice a suit brought by Katelynn McLin against the Louisiana 

Twenty-First Judicial District and its former Chief Judge Robert Morrison, 

concluding that: (1) the Twenty-First Judicial District lacked the capacity to 

be sued; (2) McLin failed to plausibly allege that she was treated differently 

from anyone else; and, (3) Chief Judge Morrison was entitled to qualified 

immunity. McLin now appeals. We AFFIRM. 

United States Court of Appeals 

Fifth Circuit 

FILED 

August 16, 2023 

Lyle W. Cayce 

Clerk 

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I. 

A. 

McLin is a White female previously employed by Louisiana’s TwentyFirst Judicial District.1 On November 13, 2020, McLin attended a clerical 

staff luncheon convened by the Twenty-First Judicial District. During the 

luncheon, the Judicial Administrator Sara Brumfield publicly praised McLin 

for her work performance. McLin sat next to T.D. at the luncheon, a Black 

colleague whom she had never met. At the end of the lunch, McLin stated 

that it was “time to go back to LP and deal with the LPians.” McLin alleges 

that “LPians” refers to citizens of Livingston Parish, and that she did not use 

that term “objectively or intend[ing] to be offensive, racially charged, or 

antagonistic in any possible sense.” The Parties do not suggest the use of 

“LPians” has any racial connotation. Accepting Plaintiff’s pleading as true, 

it either lacks a racial element or none was intended. Yet the comment 

prompted T.D. to search for McLin’s social media. 

While searching through McLin’s Facebook posts, T.D. noticed an 

article McLin reposted regarding a motorist on I-244 who drove his vehicle 

and horse trailer through a blockade of protestors rallying in the wake of 

George Floyd’s murder. In the post, McLin, who herself keeps and trains 

horses and drives a truck with a horse trailer, posted “All I’m going to say is 

_____________________ 

1

 Her employment was “at will” and “may be terminated by either the Court or 

the employee at any time, for any reason not prohibited by law.” McLin began her career 

with the Twenty-First Judicial District as a collection’s department collector. At the time 

of her termination, she had been promoted to a Hearing Officer’s Secretary. 

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3 

that Silver Duramax enjoys pulling that black horse trailer at 80mph 

ⷌⷍⷎ⷏ⷐⷑ#IWillrunYouOver.”2

 

T.D. complained about the Facebook post and the use of the term 

“LPians” to her supervisor, Judge Blair Edwards. Judge Edwards then 

brought the complaint to Chief Judge Morrison, who terminated McLin’s 

employment. Chief Judge Morrison asked Brumfield to process the 

termination of employment, and Brumfield, in turn, told McLin that she 

“hate[d] having to do this” but that she “had no other choice” as her “hands 

are tied.” McLin then confronted Chief Judge Morrison who confirmed that 

his decision to terminate her was based on the Facebook post and comment 

to T.D., observing that “[i]n today’s world that we live in, I have no other 

choice but to terminate you. You need to watch what you say and do.” 

B. 

In April 2021, McLin filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal 

Employment Opportunity Commission alleging that the Twenty-First 

Judicial District unlawfully terminated her based on her race in violation of 

Title VII, and the EEOC issued a right to sue letter. This suit in the Middle 

District of Louisiana followed, with: (1) a disparate treatment claim based on 

race in violation of Title VII against the Twenty-First Judicial District, (2) 

_____________________ 

2

 We note that the Twenty-First Judicial District did not have any rules or policies 

restricting employees from engaging in political speech via social media, and the only 

Twenty-First Judicial District policy concerning political speech prohibited employees 

from publicly endorsing political candidates for office. McLin alleges that her post was such 

a political opinion. 

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§ 1981 and § 1983 claims of disparate treatment based on race against Chief 

Judge Morrison, (3) a claim of unlawful termination for “political activity” 

in violation of Louisiana state law against the Twenty-First Judicial District, 

and (4) a § 1983 claim of unlawful termination in retaliation for engaging in 

protected speech in violation of the First Amendment to the U.S. 

Constitution against Chief Judge Morrison. 

The district court dismissed all claims under Rules 12(b)(1) and 

12(b)(6), holding that the Twenty-First Judicial District lacked the capacity 

to be sued, that Chief Judge Morrison was entitled to qualified immunity, and 

the Complaint failed to state a claim. McLin timely appealed. 

II. 

We review the district court’s grant of a 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss de 

novo.3

 Rule 12(b)(1) motions challenge the subject matter jurisdiction of the 

district court,4

 with the burden of proof on the party asserting jurisdiction.5

When a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is filed with other Rule 12 motions, the court 

first considers its jurisdiction.6

We review the grant of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) de 

novo, “accepting all well-pleaded facts as true and viewing those facts in the 

_____________________ 

3 Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001). 

4 Id.

5 Id.

6 Id. 

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light most favorable to the plaintiffs.”7 A complaint survives a Rule 12(b)(6) 

motion only if it “pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 

alleged.”8 

Finally, we review denials of motions to amend for abuse of 

discretion,9 but “where the district court’s denial of leave to amend was 

based solely on futility, this court applies a de novo standard of review 

‘identical, in practice, to the standard used for reviewing a dismissal under 

Rule 12(b)(6).’”10 It is not an abuse of discretion to deny the motion to amend 

if it would not survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.11 

III. 

 McLin first argues that whether she sued a judicial district instead of 

a district court is only a matter of semantics.12 We disagree. Regardless of 

_____________________ 

7 Dorsey v. Portfolio Equities, Inc., 540 F.3d 333, 338 (5th Cir. 2008) (quotation 

omitted). 

8 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 

9 Stem v. Gomez, 813 F.3d 205, 209 (5th Cir. 2016). 

10 Thomas v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 832 F.3d 586, 590 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting City 

of Clinton v. Pilgrim’s Pride Corp., 632 F.3d 148, 152 (5th Cir. 2010)). 

11 Stem, 813 F.3d at 216. 

12 On the other hand, the Twenty-First Judicial District argues that makes all the 

difference, as “the judicial districts are just geographical areas. The district courts, on the 

other hand, are subject to the control, oversight, and funding of numerous other public 

entities.” McLin contends that this is “an argument without much relevance because, first, 

these are really the same entity, and, second, if this Court were to find the Judicial District 

Court was capable of being sued based on the merits arguments below, but not the Judicial 

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whether McLin sued the Twenty-First Judicial District or the Twenty-First 

Judicial District Court, the suit fails because both entities lack juridical 

personality under Louisiana law. 

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(b), Louisiana state law governs 

the capacity of a state district court to be sued.13 By its metric, capacity 

belongs to a juridical person. The term is defined as “an entity to which the 

law attributes personality, such as a corporation or a partnership.”14 The 

Louisiana Supreme Court set forth a framework for determining an entity’s 

juridical status in Roberts v. Sewerage and Water Bd. of New Orleans.

15 The 

Roberts court held that: 

The important determination with respect to the juridical 

status or legal capacity of an entity is not its creator, nor its size, 

shape, or label. Rather the determination that must be made in 

each particular case is whether the entity can appropriately be 

regarded as an additional and separate government unit for the 

particular purpose at issue. In the absence of positive law to the 

contrary, a local government unit may be deemed to be a 

juridical person separate and distinct from other government 

entities, when the organic law grants it the legal capacity to 

function independently and not just as the agency or division 

of another governmental entity.16

_____________________ 

District, plaintiff repeats her request originally made to the district court for leave to amend 

her complaint to make that change.” 

13 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b) (“Capacity to sue or be sued is determined . . . by the 

law of the state where the court is located[.]”). 

14 La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 24. 

15 634 So.2d 341 (La. 1994). 

16 Id. at 346–47. 

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Where there is no constitutional or statutory authority for an entity to sue or 

be sued, it lacks capacity under Roberts.

17 The Louisiana Constitution 

organizes Louisiana’s government into three separate branches, legislative, 

executive, and judicial.18 Louisiana’s district courts are created by the 

Louisiana Constitution as component parts of a unified state system. Under 

that system, the Twenty-First Judicial District is not a separate entity. It is a 

part of the greater body of the Judicial Branch of Louisiana’s state 

government.19

The legislature did not classify judicial districts as political 

subdivisions for all purposes, as it limited the classification to a particular 

revenue statute.20 McLin’s comparing the Twenty-First Judicial District to 

“Fire Protection Districts” or “Hospital Service Districts” is unavailing as 

the legislature granted the latter two districts the right “to sue and be 

sued.”21 In creating specific types of districts capable of suit and not others, it 

implicitly chose not to make judicial districts separate entities.22 Having 

“district” in their name does not alone give them juridical status. The district 

_____________________ 

17 Id.

18 See La. Const. art. II. 

19 See Roberts, 634 So.2d at 346–47. 

20 See La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 49:308. 

21 See La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40:1500(A); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 46:1060. 

22 Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 163 (1973) (“If [Louisiana] had meant to . . . 

[effectuate the desired scheme] . . . ‘it knew how to use express language to that effect.’ ” 

(quoting Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 97 (1970))); see also NLRB v. Canning, 573 U.S. 

513, 600 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“If the [legislature] had thought [to enact a given 

scheme], they would have known how to do so.”). 

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court did not err in holding the Twenty-First Judicial District lacks the 

capacity to be sued.23 

IV. 

Turning to the claims against Chief Judge Morrison, McLin argues 

that the district court erred in dismissing her § 1981 and Title VII claims. We 

affirm the district court, but upon a different ground.24

Our “analysis of discrimination claims under § 1981 is identical to the 

analysis of Title VII claims.”25 McLin alleges disparate treatment, which 

“addresses employment actions that treat an employee worse than others 

based on the employee’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”26

McLin rests her claims on being a White female. 

The district court dismissed the claims, explaining that “Plaintiff does 

not allege any direct evidence of [Chief] Judge Morrison’s discriminatory 

motive . . . and therefore must prove her case through circumstantial 

_____________________ 

23 Since we conclude the Twenty-First Judicial District lacks the capacity to be 

sued and is instead properly considered a part of the Judicial Branch of Louisiana state 

government, allowing McLin to amend her complaint to bring her claims against Louisiana 

would be futile. The Eleventh Amendment bars McLin’s state-law claim for political 

discrimination arising under La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23:961. See Richardson v. S. Univ., 118 

F.3d 450, 453 (5th Cir. 1997). And while Congress abrogated the states’ Eleventh 

Amendment immunity for Title VII purposes, see Ussery v. State of La. on Behalf of La. Dep’t 

of Health & Hosps., 150 F.3d 431, 434 (5th Cir. 1998), as explained below, McLin fails to 

state a claim of racial discrimination under Title VII. See Section IV. 

24 See Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 622 (5th Cir. 2013) (noting 

that this Court “may affirm [a Rule 12(b)(6) motion] on any basis supported by the record” 

(citation omitted)). 

25 Body by Cook, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins., 869 F.3d 381, 386 (5th Cir. 2017). 

26 Pacheco v. Mineta, 448 F.3d 783, 787 (5th Cir. 2006). 

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evidence, according to the burden-shifting framework established by . . . 

McDonnell Douglas.”27 

We disagree. A complaint need not allege “each prong of the prima 

facie test for disparate treatment” in order to overcome a Rule 12(b)(6) 

motion; rather, to support a disparate treatment claim under Title VII, a 

complaint must plausibly set out facts that the “defendant took the adverse 

employment action against a plaintiff because of her protected status.”28 As 

we have previously summarized: 

[T]here are two ultimate elements a plaintiff must plead to 

support a disparate treatment claim under Title VII: (1) an 

adverse employment action, (2) taken against a plaintiff because

of her protected status. . . . We reiterate, however, that a court 

errs by requiring a plaintiff to plead something more than the 

“ultimate elements” of a claim. A court thus inappropriately 

heightens the pleading standard by subjecting a plaintiff’s 

allegations to a rigorous factual or evidentiary analysis under 

the McDonnell Douglas framework in response to a motion to 

dismiss.29

_____________________ 

27 McLin v. Twenty-First Jud. Dist., 614 F. Supp. 3d 278, 287 (M.D. La. 2022) 

(internal citation omitted and revised).

28 Raj v. La. State Univ., 714 F.3d 322, 331 (5th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation 

omitted). 

29 Cicalese v. Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch, 924 F.3d 762, 767 (5th Cir. 2019) (internal 

quotations and citations omitted). 

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While the able district judge analyzed the claims under the McDonnell 

Douglas standard,30 a plaintiff need only plead an adverse employment action, 

taken against her because of her protected status.31 McLin fails to do this. 

McLin seeks to meet the racial causation element with the comments 

made by Brumfield that her “hands are tied” as well as the Chief Judge’s 

tone and comment stating “[i]n today’s world that we live in, I have no other 

choice but to terminate you. You need to watch what you say and do.” These 

speculative allegations do not carry the day. McLin issued the public 

statement “#IWillrunYouOver” in reference to driving her truck over 

peaceful protestors. Taking all the factual allegations as true, a more 

reasonable and obvious interpretation than the one put forth by McLin is that 

her termination had to do with her public threat to run over people. While 

the district court erred in requiring McLin to make allegations that satisfy the 

McDonnell Douglas standard, McLin still failed to plead one ultimate element 

a plaintiff is required to plead: that the termination was taken against her 

_____________________ 

30 For example, the district court held that “Plaintiff satisfies the first three 

elements of her claim: she belonged to a protected class ([W]hite), excelled at her position, 

and was nonetheless fired. Still, as noted in Defendants’ dismissal papers, Plaintiff falters 

at the fourth element because she has not plausibly alleged any differential treatment, which 

requires allegations establishing that a ‘similarly situated’ comparator was not fired despite 

committing nearly the same misconduct.” McLin, 614 F. Supp. 3d at 288 (internal citation 

omitted). Being terminated is a sufficient adverse employment action. 

31 Cicalese, 924 F.3d at 767. 

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because of her protected status.32 We conclude that McLin has not asserted 

plausible facts meeting the elements of this claim.33 

V. 

Finally, McLin argues the district court erred in granting Chief Judge 

Morrison qualified immunity on her First Amendment retaliation claim. We 

disagree. 

“Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil liability 

in their individual capacity so long as their conduct does not violate clearly 

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person 

would have known.”34 “It protects all but the plainly incompetent or those 

who knowingly violate the law.”35 “Qualified immunity shields federal and 

state officials from money damages unless a plaintiff pleads facts showing (1) 

that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the 

right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged conduct.”36

“Ultimately, ‘the central concern is whether the official has fair warning that 

_____________________ 

32 Id.

33 Ferrer v. Chevron Corp., 484 F.3d 776, 780–81 (5th Cir. 2007) (“We may affirm 

a district court’s dismissal based on rule 12(b)(6) on any basis supported by the record.” 

(internal citation omitted)). 

34 Cunningham v. Castloo, 983 F.3d 185, 190 (5th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation 

omitted). 

35 Id. (internal quotation omitted). 

36 Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 

U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). 

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his conduct violates a constitutional right.’”37 We may decide which prong 

of the qualified immunity analysis to address first.38 Our inquiry starts and 

ends with the clearly established prong, whether Chief Judge Morrison 

violated a clearly established constitutional right. 

To establish a First Amendment retaliation claim, the public 

employee must establish that: “(1) she suffered an adverse employment 

action; (2) her speech involved a matter of public concern; (3) her interest in 

commenting on matters of public concern outweighs the employer’s interest 

in promoting efficiency; and (4) her speech motivated the employer’s 

adverse action.”39 Only the third prong is at issue.40 

It is canon that “public employees do not surrender all their First 

Amendment rights by reason of their employment.”41 Rather, some speech, 

even if it “concerns information related to or learned through public 

employment,” deserves protection because “‘[g]overnment employees are 

_____________________ 

37 Clarkston v. White, 943 F.3d 988, 993 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Delaughter v. 

Woodall, 909 F.3d 130, 140 (5th Cir. 2018)). 

38 Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 242 (2009) (“[T]he judges of the district 

courts and the courts of appeals are in the best position to determine the order of 

decisionmaking that will best facilitate the fair and efficient disposition of each case.”). 

39 Modica v. Taylor, 465 F.3d 174, 179–80 (5th Cir. 2006) (internal citation omitted). 

40 See Graziosi v. City of Greenville Miss., 775 F.3d 731, 740 (5th Cir. 2015) 

(observing that “whether the relevant government entity had an adequate justification for 

treating the employee differently from any other member of the general public” due to its 

role as employer is a question of law (quoting Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 

(2006))). 

41 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 417. 

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often in the best position to know what ails the agencies for which they 

work.’”42 Yet, “[g]overnment employers, like private employers, need a 

significant degree of control over their employees’ words and actions; 

without it, there would be little chance for the efficient provision of public 

services.”43 

In determining whether a public employee’s speech is protected by 

the First Amendment, we “strike a balance between ‘the interests of 

[employees] . . . commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest 

of [the government], as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public 

services it performs through its employees.’”44 In particular, we evaluate 

whether the speech has caused disruption, impeded performance, or 

“affected working relationships necessary to the department’s proper 

functioning.”45 “When close working relationships are essential to fulfilling 

public responsibilities, a wide degree of deference to the employer’s 

judgment is appropriate.”46

_____________________ 

42 Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228, 236 (2014) (quoting Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 

661, 674 (1994) (plurality opinion)) (alteration in original). 

43 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418. 

44 Graziosi, 775 F.3d at 740 (quoting Pickering v. Bd. of Ed. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 

205, Will Cnty., Ill., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)). 

45 Brawner v. City of Richardson, Texas, 855 F.2d 187, 192 (5th Cir. 1988) (internal 

citation omitted). 

46 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 151–52 (1983). When performing this balancing 

test, courts consider “whether the statement impairs discipline by superiors or harmony 

among co-workers [or] has a detrimental impact on close working relationships for which 

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McLin fails to demonstrate that her interests outweigh those of the 

Twenty-First Judicial District.47 The Supreme Court has explained that “[a] 

government entity has broader discretion to restrict speech when it acts in its 

role as employer, but the restrictions it imposes must be directed at speech 

that has some potential to affect the entity’s operations.”48 Here, Chief Judge 

Morrison’s interest in an efficient, harmonious work environment in its 

office outweighs McLin’s interests in her speech.49 Not only would a public 

Facebook post about running over Black Lives Matter protestors pose a 

threat to amicable workplace relationships, it strikes a blow against the 

Twenty-First Judicial District by undermining its efforts to stay true to the 

fact and image of a court whose “paramount purpose [is] providing a fair and 

impartial open forum in which the public may resolve its disputes.”50 Adding 

Chief Judge Morrison’s substantial interest in maintaining workplace trust 

and efficiency and responding to threats to office morale, the balance weighs 

against McLin. In other words, McLin did not show that Chief Judge 

_____________________ 

personal loyalty and confidence are necessary[.]” Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388 

(1987). 

47 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. “[T]he judicial branch depends upon the confidence 

of the people it serves. Without that necessary confidence, the judiciary cannot serve its 

paramount purpose of providing a fair and impartial open forum in which the public may 

resolve its disputes.” In re Benge, 24 So. 3d 822, 845 (La. 2009). This duty falls upon Chief 

Judge Morrison. 

48 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418. 

49 A “chief judge . . . shall exercise, for a term designated by the court, the 

administrative functions prescribed by rule of court.” La. Const. art. V, § 17. 

50 In re Benge, 24 So. 3d at 845. By McLin’s own concession, her post was public 

and caused issues at work when T.D. saw it. 

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Morrison violated a clearly established constitutional right. For at the very 

least, the law is sufficiently uncertain so as to support Chief Judge Morrison’s 

defense of qualified immunity.51 This public servant cannot be held 

personally liable in money damages for the difficult choice he was called upon 

to make and that is the issue before this court. The district court did not err 

in granting Chief Judge Morrison’s qualified immunity defense against 

McLin’s First Amendment retaliation claim. 

* * * * 

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM. 

_____________________ 

51 See McClendon v. City of Columbia, 305 F.3d 314, 332 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc) 

(holding that qualified immunity must be granted “if a reasonable official would be left 

uncertain of the law’s application to the facts confronting him”); Presley v. City of Benbrook, 

4 F.3d 405, 409 (5th Cir. 1993) (“[T]he essence of qualified immunity [is] that an officer 

may make mistakes that infringe constitutional rights and yet not be held liable where, given 

. . . uncertain circumstances, it cannot be said that []he knew []he was violating a person’s 

rights.”). 

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