* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### DEC 13 2002 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

MARVIN F. JONES,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. JO ANNE B. BARNHART, Commissioner of Social Security Administration,

Defendant-Appellee. No. 02-6115 (D.C. No. CIV-00-1649-R) (W.D. Okla.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before BRISCOE , Circuit Judge, BRORBY , Senior Circuit Judge, and HARTZ , Circuit Judge.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materiallyassist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). T he case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.-2-

Claimant Marvin Jones appeals from an order of the district court affirming the Commissioner of the Social Security Administrat ion denying disability benefits. Because we conclude that substantial evi dence supports the Commissioner’s decision, and because that decision was reached in accord with relevant legal standards, we affirm. Mr. Jones filed his application for disability insu rance benefits in 1993, alleging inability to work due to pain in his back, legs and right shoulder, carpal tunnel syndrome in both hands, and vision and menta l problems. That application was denied initially and on reconsideration. Aftera hearing in 1994, an administrative law judge (ALJ) found Mr. Jones was not entitled to benefits. In 1995, the Appeals Council granted a remand based onMr. Jones’s submission of new evidence of his disability. Following a second administrative hearing in 1996, a new ALJ issued her decision denying disability benefits to Mr. Jones. In that decision, the ALJ found that Mr. Jones suffered from diabetes mellitus, deg enerative disc disease, and dysthymia and anxiety, secondary to a substance abu se disorder. The ALJ found that Mr. Jones’s capacity to work was limited to li ght and medium jobs that require only limited use of judgment, occasional and superf icial contact with others, and occasional stooping and crouching. The ALJ conclud ed that despite these limitations, Mr. Jones was capable of performing hi s past relevant work as an-3-

automobile assembly worker and as a cleaner. Thus, the ALJ found that Mr. Jones was not disabled at step four of the Commissioner’s five-step process for determining disability. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). The burden of proving a prima facie case of disability at steps one throughfour is borne by the claimant. See Williams v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 748, 751 (10th Cir. 1988). The district c ourt affirmed the denial of benefits, and this appeal fo llowed. We review the Commissioner’s decision to determine whether the relevant findings are supported by substantial evidence in l ight of the entire record, and to determine whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal standards. Hargis v. Sullivan , 945 F.2d 1482, 1486 (10th Cir. 1991). “Substanti al evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might acceptas adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. “Evidence is insubstantial if it is overwhelmingly contradicted by other evidence.” O’Dell v. Shalala , 44 F.3d 855, 858 (10th Cir. 1994). In the course of this review, we may “neither reweigh the evidence nor substitute our judgment for that of the [Commissioner].” Casias v. Sec’y of Health & Human
Servs. , 933 F.2d 799, 800 (10th Cir. 1991). Although he has been represented by counsel at vari ous times throughout this proceeding, Mr. Jones is appealing this matter pro se. Due to his pro se status, we have read Mr. Jones’s brief on appeal wi th tolerance, affording Mr. Jones a great deal of leniency in articulating his arguments of error.-4-

Nevertheless, Mr. Jones’s obvious dissatisfaction w ith the outcome of his administrative proceeding does not persuade us thatthe Commissioner erred in making her determination. With the benefit of coun sel, Mr. Jones raised a number of claims before the district court, which were tho roughly reviewed and found meritless. Our repetition of the legal and factual analysis of that court at this time would be unproductive and superfluous. We note only that Mr. Jones’s reliance on separate disability determinations by the Oklahoma Workers’ Compensation Court and the Veteran’s Administration as a basis for his social security claim is unhelpf ul to his appeal. Just as the former determinations did not preclude Mr. Jones fr om attempting to obtain disability benefits from the Commissioner, neither did they compel the Commissioner to automatically grant those benefits. Simply put, the workers’ compensation and veterans administration proceeding s are entirely different and separate from a claim under the Social Security Act , with different parties, different evidentiary standards, and different bodi es of law governing their
outcomes. Compare Okla. Stat. tit. 85, § 22 (schedule of disability c ompensation under Oklahoma Workers’ Compensation Act), and 38 C.F.R. § 4 (Department of Veterans Affairs schedule for rating disabilities), with 20 C.F.R. § 404, subpt. P (social security regulations for determining disabi lity and blindness). While disability determinations by other agencies should be considered, see Baca v.1 This court received the administrative record on ap peal on May 31, 2002.

We have reviewed appellee’s supplemental appendix and note that it is a duplication of the record already on file. Therefo re, appellee’s motion for leave to file a supplemental appendix is denied. -5- Dep’t of Health & Human Services , 5 F.3d 476, 480 (10th Cir. 1993), they are not binding on the Commissioner, s ee 20 C.F.R. § 404.1504. We have carefully reviewed the appellate record andwe agree with the district court that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that although limited, Mr. Jones is not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. 1 Thus, for substantially the same reasons set forth in the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation dated September 28, 2001, and th e district court’s order dated February 1, 2002, the judgment of that court is AFF IRMED.

Entered for the Court

Wade Brorby Senior Circuit Judge