Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before 

any court except for the purpose of 

establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

BARBARA J. SIMMONS GREGORY F. ZOELLER

Oldenburg, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana

IAN MCLEAN

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

LARRY PARKS, )

)

Appellant-Defendant, )

)

vs. ) No. 49A02-1108-CR-706

)

STATE OF INDIANA, )

)

Appellee-Plaintiff. )

APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT 

The Honorable John S. Alt, Master Commissioner

Cause No. 49G14-1102-CM-010223

March 6, 2012

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

VAIDIK, Judge
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Case Summary

Larry Parks appeals his conviction for Class A misdemeanor driving while 

suspended. He contends that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence 

obtained from a traffic stop because the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to 

initiate the stop. Finding that the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop Parks, the trial 

court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence. We therefore affirm the trial 

court.

Facts and Procedural History

On February 14, 2011, Parks was driving southbound on Shadeland Avenue. 

Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department Officer Kimberly Evans was on routine 

patrol when she noticed that Parks’s rear license plate was hanging down at a ninetydegree angle from the ordinary horizontal position and was fastened by a single bolt or 

screw. She ran the license plate number through the computer in her patrol vehicle and 

was informed that the license plate had been reported as stolen. Officer Evans contacted 

IMPD dispatch, and they confirmed that the license plate had been reported as stolen. 

She followed Parks’s vehicle for a short time until she was joined by backup and then 

initiated a traffic stop of the vehicle.

IMPD Officer Gregory Scott was Officer Evans’s backup during the traffic stop. 

He also observed that the license plate was fastened by a single bolt or screw, but he 

reported that it was hanging down at a forty-five-degree angle from the ordinary 

horizontal position.
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Officer Evans informed Parks why she had stopped him and asked for his driver’s 

license. Officer Evans ran his license through dispatch and learned that Parks’s driving 

privileges had been suspended. She then issued Parks a traffic citation for the 

improperly-displayed license plate and arrested him for driving while suspended. Since 

Parks had a previous judgment within the past ten years for driving while suspended, the 

State charged him with Class A misdemeanor driving while suspended. It was 

determined that the car belonged to Parks’s sister and that the license plate was valid and 

not in fact stolen, so he was not charged with theft.

Parks filed a motion to suppress all evidence obtained from the traffic stop, 

arguing that the stop was illegal. The trial court denied the motion. Parks was found 

guilty of driving while suspended at a bench trial and was sentenced to two days in jail, 

with credit for one day, and a ninety-day license suspension.

Parks now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

Although Parks argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his 

conviction of driving while suspended, the issue is more appropriately framed as whether 

the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the evidence obtained from the traffic 

stop. A trial court has broad discretion in ruling on the admission or exclusion of 

evidence. Kimbrough v. State, 911 N.E.2d 621, 631 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). The trial 

court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence will be disturbed on review only upon a 

showing of an abuse of discretion. Id. An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial 

court’s ruling is clearly against the logic, facts, and circumstances presented. Id. We do 
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not reweigh the evidence, and we consider conflicting evidence most favorable to the trial 

court’s ruling. Collins v. State, 822 N.E.2d 214, 218 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. 

Parks contends that the traffic stop was unlawful because the officer did not have 

reasonable suspicion to stop him. We disagree. It is well settled that a police officer may 

briefly detain a person whom he believes has committed an infraction or ordinance 

violation. Goens v. State, 943 N.E.2d 829, 832 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (quotation omitted). 

An officer’s decision to stop a vehicle is valid so long as his or her on-the-spot evaluation 

reasonably suggests that lawbreaking occurred. Gunn v. State, 956 N.E.2d 136, 139 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2011).

In this case, Officer Evans noticed that Parks’s license plate was improperly 

displayed in violation of Indiana Code Section 9-18-2-26(b). Section 9-18-2-26(b)

requires that a license plate be “securely fastened in a horizontal position.” The license 

plate was fastened by only one screw or bolt and hanging at a ninety-degree angle from 

horizontal. When Officer Scott later saw the license plate, it was fastened in the same 

manner, but he described it as hanging at a forty-five-degree angle from horizontal. 

Taking this evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s decision, the license

plate was not horizontal, giving Officer Evans an objectively justifiable reason to conduct 

a traffic stop.

Before conducting the traffic stop, Officer Evans also ran Parks’s license plate 

number through the computer in her patrol vehicle and was notified that the license plate 

had been reported as stolen. Officer Evans contacted IMPD, and they confirmed this 
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report. This provided an additional objectively justifiable reason to conduct the traffic 

stop.

After performing the lawful traffic stop, Officer Evans ran Parks’s driver’s license 

through dispatch, conduct that is within the scope of reasonable detention of a traffic 

stop. See State v. Quirk, 842 N.E.2d 334, 340 (Ind. 2006). It was then that she learned 

that his driving privileges had been suspended. This evidence was properly admitted at 

trial, as both the initial traffic stop and subsequent running of Parks’s driver’s license 

were legal. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence that Parks 

operated a motor vehicle while his driving privileges were suspended. We therefore 

affirm the trial court.

Affirmed.

ROBB, C.J., and NAJAM, J., concur.