09-4955-c r

USA v. Doug las
U N IT E D S T A T E S C O U R T O F A P P E A LS F O R T H E S E C O N D C IR C U IT SUM M AR

Y O RD ER RU LIN G S BYSUM M AR Y O RDER

DO NO T HA VE P RE CE DE NT IA L EF F EC T. CI TA TION TO A SUM M AR Y O RD ER

F ILED ON OR

AF TER JA NU AR

Y 1 , 2 00 7, IS P ERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY F EDERAL RULE OF AP P ELL ATE PR OCEDURE 32 .1 AN D THI S CO UR T’ S LOC AL RU LE 3 2. 1. 1. WHE N C ITI NG A SU M M AR

Y O RD ER IN A D OC UM EN T F ILED WI TH TH IS C OU RT , A PARTY M UST CI TE EI THER THE F ED ER AL AP P EN DI X O R AN ELEC TR ON IC DA TA BA SE ( WI TH TH E N OTA TIO N “SU M M AR

Y O RD ER ”) . AP AR TY CITIN GA SU M M AR Y O RD ER

M UST SER

VE A CO P Y O F IT O N A NYP AR TYNO T REP RE SEN TED BYCO UN SEL. At a stated te rm of the United States Court of A ppeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patric k Moy

nihan Courthouse, 500 Pear l Street, in the City of Ne w York, on the 23 day rd of Nove mber, two thousand ten.
Pr e se nt: RO GE R J. MI NE R, ROBERT A. K

ATZ MANN, P E T E R W
. H A LL, Circuit Judges ,

________________________________________________ UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA,

Appellee , v. No. 09-4955-c r THOMAS DOUG L AS I V,

Defendant-

Appellant
.

________________________________________________ Counsel for Appe llee: T I MOTHY C. D OH E R TY , J R ., Assistant United States Attorney (Gre g ory L . Waples, Assistant United States Attorney , on the brief

), for Tristram J. C offin, UnitedIn a compa nion per curiam opinion, we addr ess and r ejec t Doug las’s conte ntion that he 1 c ann ot b e c onvic te d o f c ri min a l e nti c e me nt p ur su ant t o 1 8 U .S. C. § 24 22 (b ) b e c a us e his communications wer e dire cted at an adult, not at a minor. 2 States Attorney

for the D istrict of Ver

mont, Burling ton, Vt
. Couns e l f or De fe nd ant- Ap pe lla

nt: R OB I N C. S MI TH , L aw Of fice of Robin C. S mith, Esq., P.C., Brookly

n, N.Y. Appea l from the United States District Court for the District of Ve rmont (Sessions, C.J. ). ON CO NSI DE RA TIO N W HEREOF , i ti s h e r e b y OR DE RE D , AD JU DG ED , and DE CREED that th e jud g me nt o f t he dis tr ic t c ourt

be and he re by is AF F IRM ED
. Def endant- Appellant Thomas Doug las I V appe als from a judgme nt of conviction, ente red
on No ve mbe r 2 4, 20 09 in t

he Un ite d St a te s D ist

ri c t Co ur t f or the Di str ic t of

Ve rm on t ( Se ssi on s, C.J. ), followinga jury

trial, of one c ount of attempting to entice a minor to eng ag e in illeg al
se xua l a c tiv ity

and on e c ount o f k

no wi ng ly tr ans po rt ingan im a g e of c hil d p or no g ra phy in int e rs tate c omm e rc e . O n a pp e a l, D ou g la s r a ise s a

numbe r o f c ha lle ng e s to his c on vic tio n. F ir st, he ar g ues that his counsel be low was inef fec tive beca

use he f ailed to strike two jurors; sec ond, he argues that the district cour t abused its discretion in admitting c erta in evidence of his past similar
a c ts; and thi rd , h e argue s th a t he did no t take the “ su

bs tanti a l st e p” ne c e ssa

ry to c omm it attempted entice ment. We assume the par ties’ familiarity

with the fac ts and proce dural history 1 of the c ase. Doug las first ar g ues that his counsel at trial was inef fec tive under Strickland v. W ashington , 4 66 U. S. 6 68 (1 98 4) , f or fa ili ngto s tr ike tw o ju

ro rs wh o e xpre sse d a

re luc tanc e to view imag es of c hild pornog raphy . “When fa ced w ith a claim for ine ffe ctive assistanc e of3

c ouns e l on

dir e c t a pp e a l, w e may : ( 1) de c lin e to h e ar t he c la im, pe rm itt ingthe a pp e lla nt t o r a ise the issue as pa

rt of a subse quent petition for wr it of habea s corpus pursua nt to 28 U.S.C . § 2255; (2) r emand the c laim to the district court for ne cessa ry fac tfinding; or ( 3) dec ide the cla im on the
rec ord bef

ore us.” Un ite d S

tates v . M orris , 3 50 F .3 d 3 2, 39 (2 d Ci r. 20 03 ). “ As the Sup re me Court [ has] reminded us, ‘in most case s a motion broug ht under § 2255 is pre fer able to dire ct
a pp e a l f or de c idi ngc la ims of

ine ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e ’ b e c a us e the dis tr ic t c ou

rt is ‘ be st s uit e d to developingthe fa cts nec essar y to determiningthe ade quacy of re prese ntation during an entire trial.’” Un ite d S

tates v . G as k

in , 3 6 4 F. 3 d

4 3 8 , 4 6 7 -6 8 (2 d

C i r. 2 0 0 4 ) ( qu o t i n g Massaro v. United States , 5 38 U. S. 5 00 , 5 04 -0 5 ( 20 03 )) . T he same is tru e he re . A c c or din g ly , in the se c ir c ums tanc e s, we de c lin e to h e ar D ou g la s’ s in e ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l c la im. Doug las next arg ues that the district cour t abused its discretion whe n it admitted the te sti mony of B re nd a F or re ste r, his e x-g ir lf

ri e nd , r e g ard ingc hat f

ile s th a t sh e fo un d o n h is computer. H e re asons that the evide nce w as not admissible under F eder al Rule of Evidenc e 404(b). He argues also that the g overnme nt provided inade quate notice of the e vidence and that he would not have raised a n entra pment defe nse if he ha d been f ully advised of the content of F or re ste r’ s te sti mony . B oth

argume nts fa il. “In revie wing whether

a district cour

t properly admitted evidenc e under Rule 404(b), we consider whether : ‘(1) the prior ac ts evidence was off ere d for a proper purpose; (2) the evidenc e wa s r e le va

nt t o a dis pute d is su e ; ( 3) the pr ob a tiv e va lue of the pr ior a c t e vid e nc e su

bs tanti a lly
outw e ig he d th e da

ng e r o f i ts unf

a ir pr e jud ic e ; and

(4 ) t he c ourt a dmi nis te re d a

n a pp ro pr iate limit ing instruc tion.’” United States v. Brand , 467 F.3d 179, 196 ( 2d Cir. 2006) (quoting United Sta te s v . G arc ia , 291 F.3d 127, 136 ( 2d Cir. 2002)).4

Al l f our p ro ng s o f t

he Rul e 40 4( b) inq

uir y are satis fi e d h e re . A s a

n in iti a l matte r, int e nt i s a prope r purpose . F ED . R. E V ID . 404(b). As D oug las’s counse l indicated duringclosing
argume nt, Do ug la s’ s inte nt w a s in dis pute a t tr ia l. F or

re ste r’ s te sti mony

wa s r e le va

nt t o Doug las’s intent bec ause it tende d to show that Doug las’s conve rsations with “L iz” were not
mere talk but were direc ted at havingsexual contact with a minor, as he had done in the pa st. See F ED . R. E V ID . 401 (def ining r eleva

nt evidence as “e vidence havingany tendenc y to make the exis tence of any

fac t that is of conseque nce to the de termination of the a ction more proba ble or less probable than it would be without the evidenc e”) . As we state d in Brand , “[t] he g overnme nt is r e qu ir e d to e sta

bli shon ly a ‘s imi lari ty

or so me c onne c tio n’ to e sta bli shthat a

pr ior a c t is
re l ev an tt o [ i n t en t ]
. ” 4 6 7 F. 3 d at1 9 7 (q u o t i n g Ga rc ia , 291 F.3d at 137). We are satisfied that the probative value of

For rester ’s testimony , which re lated Doug las’s statement in an I nterne t chat that he had “moleste d” his niece and other children, substantially

outweig hed the da

ng er of
an y un f a ir p r e ju d ic e . F in a ll y , th e d is tr ic t c o urt g av e ana p p r o p r iate li mi ti n g in s tr

u c ti o n . We there fore conclude that the evidenc e wa s proper ly admitted under Rule 404( b). Moreove r, F orre ster’s testimony was a dmissibl e also a s propensity evidenc e in view of Doug las’s entra

pment defe nse. Althoug h Doug las does not appe ar to dispute its admissibil ity , he rejoins that he did not have sufficie nt notice of the nature of F orre ster’s testimony and cla ims that he would not have asser

ted an e ntrapment de fense if he ha d known the full extent of what she
wo uld say . H is a

rgume nt i s w ith out me ri t. The g overnme nt proffe red that Forr ester w ould testify that she had se en a c hat transc ript in which Doug las stated that he ha d molested his niece. A t trial, she testified that in the transcr ipt, “Mr. Doug las was talkingto another pe rson, another male, and the y

wer e talking5

about—that he ha d molested his niece.” Gov. App’x 357. W hen aske d for f urther de tails, she responde d, “[Doug las] had told thi s person that he had molested his niece from—he moleste d children f rom the ag es of e ight to 15.” Id. at 358. She said nothing further about these othe r children. In these c ircumstance s, we re ject any contention that the g overnme nt’s proff er w as ina de qu a te or

ma de in b a d f

a ith . F or re ste r t e sti fi e d th a t D ou g la s c la ime d to have mol e ste d h is nie c e , a s th e g ov e rnme nt h a d in dic a te d in its pr of fe r. She me nti on e d o the r c hil dr e n o nly in
connec tion with Douglas’ s statements in the chat transcr ipt. I n any event, e ven assumingthat D o u g l a s w o u l d

h av e r e tr a c t e d

h i s e n tr a p m e n td e f

e n s e t o p r e v e n tth e a dm i s s i o no f th i s t e s t i m o n y, it would have bee n admissible independently to show his intent under Rule 404(b). Finally , “[i] n order

to establish that a def

endant is guilty

of an attempt to commit a cr ime, the g ov e rnme nt m

us t pr ov e that th e de fe nd ant h a d th e int e nt t o c omm it the c ri me and e ng a g e d in conduct amounting to a ‘ substantial step’ towar ds the commission of the crime.” Brand , 467 F .3 d at 20 2 ( int e rn a l qu ota tio n ma rk s o mitte d) . D ou g la s a

rgue s th a t th e g ov e rnme nt f a ile d to prove be y ond a re asonable doubt that he took such a “ substantial step.” He asser ts that the
e vid e nc e re ve a ls o nly

that he ta lke d a

nd fa nta size d a bo ut “ tr a ini ng ” L iz’ s d a

ug hte r, wh ic h is insufficient a s a matter of law. To cha lleng e succ essfully the suffic iency

of the e vidence underly

ing his c onviction, a defe ndant must carr

y a “he avy burden.” Brand , 467 F.3d at 201 (internal quotation mar ks omitted). Not only must the evidence be viewe d in the light most favor able to the g overnme nt and all per

missibl e infe renc es dra

wn in its favor, but if the e vidence , thus construed, suff

ices to convinc e any

rational trier

of fa ct of the de fenda

nt’s g uilt bey ond a re asonable doubt, then the def endant’ s conviction must stand.6

Un ite d S tates v . D aeW

ha n Ki m , 435 F.3d 182, 184 ( 2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (alter ation omitted) (quoting United States v. Martinez , 54 F.3d 1040, 1042 ( 2d Cir. 1995)). We have e mphasized that “[a] conviction under § 2422(b) r equire s a findingonly of an attempt to entice or

an intent to entice, a

nd not an intent to perfor

m the sexual act following the persua sion.” Brand , 4 67 F .3 d at 20 2. Th e inq uir y the re fo re is whe the r D ou g la s atte mpt e d to g ain the conse nt or willingne ss of a minor to eng ag e in cr iminal sex ual ac tivity , not whether he at t em p t edt o h av e s ex wi tha m i n o r. As we h o l d i nth e a cc o mp an yi n g per curiam opinion, a defe ndant may

do so by communicatingwith an adult guardia n of a minor. Her e, Doug las proposed that L iz bring her daug hter to Alaba

ma so that he c ould “train” h e r . T h e r e a f

t e r , h e t o l d

Li z th a th e e x p e c t e d

t o r e c e i v e $ 5 0 0 o nth e s i x t e e n tho f M ay an d s a i d , “ If y ou want to come, I ’ll help y ou then.” Gov. A pp’x 276. Douglas r epeatedly ref err ed to the $500 and sug g ested that he could use the mone y to help L iz t rave l. He advise d her, “ I f you have enoug h for g as her e, come on. Ican g et y ou back if y ou want to g o back.” Gov. App’x 286. He calc ulated L iz’s gas e x penses, g ave he r some assistanc e in finding a job in his area , and promised to provide fur

ther a ssistance onc e she a rrived. F urther, D oug las g ave L iz hi s phone number a nd
assure d her that she would have a plac e to live when she arr ived. On the ba sis of these fa cts, we
are persua ded that Doug las “e ng ag ed in conduc t amounting to a ‘ substantial step’ towar ds the commission of the crime” and that his conduc t was “of such a nature that a

rea sonable obser

ver, vie wi ngit i n c on te xt co uld c on c lud e be y on d a

re a so na ble do ub t th a t it

wa s und e rt ake n in
acc ordanc e with a de sign to violate the statute.” Brand , 467 F.3d at 202 (internal quotation marks omitted).7

We have c onsidered D oug las’s re maining a rguments and find them to be without merit. Fo r t h e r ea s o n s s t at edh er ei nan d i nth e a cc o mp an yi n g per curiam opinion, the judgment of the dis tr ic t c ourt

is AF F IRM ED
. FOR THE COURT: CA TH ERI

NE O’ HA GA

N WO L F E, CL ERK