DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

ANTHONY MCINTYRE,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

No. 4D15-1230

[June 15, 2016]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, 

Broward County; David A. Haimes, Judge; L.T. Case No. 14-1483 CF10A.

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Jeffrey L. Anderson, 

Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Luke R. 

Napodano, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

CIKLIN, C.J.

Anthony McIntyre appeals his conviction for the lesser included 

offense of attempted second-degree murder with a firearm. He raises 

three issues on appeal, none of which we find have merit. However, we

write to address McIntyre’s contention that his alibi witness was 

improperly excluded.

After the state charged McIntyre with attempted first-degree murder, 

the state filed its demand for notice of alibi, pursuant to Florida Rule of 

Criminal Procedure 3.200.

The case proceeded to trial upon McIntyre’s speedy trial demand. 

After the victim testified, defense counsel inquired whether the state 

would object to allowing McIntyre’s cousin, “Mr. Caesar,” to testify that 

McIntyre was not at the crime scene but rather at his Broward County

apartment at the time of the offense. Defense counsel explained: “I 

know it’s a late thing to do, but he has been talking to me about that on 

the phone this morning and the phone late yesterday. Sorry I didn’t 

bring it up sooner. He wants me to make a proffer about that.” 
2

The trial court observed that the parties were “halfway through the 

trial,” and chided, “You can’t all of a sudden raise an alibi defense for the 

first time in the middle of trial when the state has already given opening 

statement and the defense has already given their opening statement.”

On appeal, McIntyre argues the court erred in excluding his witness 

without first conducting an inquiry and exploring alternatives to 

exclusion. “A trial court’s exclusion of alibi witnesses under rule 3.200 is 

subject to review for abuse of discretion.” Martin v. State, 41 So. 3d 

1100, 1101 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010).

Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.200 provides the following in 

pertinent part:

On the written demand of the prosecuting attorney, 

specifying as particularly as is known to the prosecuting 

attorney the place, date, and time of the commission of the 

crime charged, a defendant in a criminal case who intends to 

offer evidence of an alibi in defense shall, not less than 10 

days before trial or such other time as the court may direct, 

file and serve on the prosecuting attorney a notice in writing 

of an intention to claim an alibi, which notice shall contain 

specific information as to the place at which the defendant 

claims to have been at the time of the alleged offense and, as 

particularly as is known to the defendant or the defendant’s 

attorney, the names and addresses of the witnesses by 

whom the defendant proposes to establish the alibi. . . . Both 

the defendant and the prosecuting attorney shall be under a 

continuing duty to promptly disclose the names and 

addresses of additional witnesses who come to the attention 

of either party subsequent to filing their respective witness 

lists as provided in this rule. If a defendant fails to file and 

serve a copy of the notice as herein required, the court may 

exclude evidence offered by the defendant for the purpose of 

providing an alibi, except the defendant’s own testimony. . . . 

For good cause shown the court may waive the requirements 

of this rule.

Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.200. This rule is distinct from Florida Rule of Criminal 

Procedure 3.220, which governs discovery. The Florida Supreme Court 

has elaborated on the difference in the manner in which alleged

violations of these two rules are treated:
3

Although the two rules share the same rationale, to eliminate 

surprise at trial, the notice of alibi rule is not a discovery 

rule. Rule 3.200 also diminishes the opportunity of 

presenting manufactured false alibis. Under the ten-day 

notice requirement, the state is at least advised of the 

existence of the alibi and has the option of investigating it. If 

the state goes to trial without this notice, it does not have 

the opportunity to depose the alibi witness, determine the 

witness’s credibility, determine whether there is a witness to 

rebut the alibi witness’s testimony, or otherwise check its 

validity. Thus, a defense violation of rule 3.200 inherently 

prejudices the prosecution.

Rule 3.220, like the notice of alibi rule, was designed to 

ensure that both the state and the defense have knowledge 

of relevant information regarding the case and are properly 

prepared for trial. However, unlike the notice of alibi rule, a 

violation of rule 3.220 will not always result in prejudice. 

For that reason, rule 3.220(n) provides a choice among 

sanctions the court may impose for violation of the rule. 

After conducting a Richardson inquiry,1 the court can 

determine how severe the sanction should be based on the 

degree of prejudicial impact caused by the discovery 

violation. The notice of alibi rule does not provide a list of 

sanctions comparable to that in rule 3.220 because a 

violation of the notice of alibi rule will always result in 

prejudice. In contrast to rule 3.220, the notice of alibi rule 

limits the court to excluding the alibi evidence or waiving the 

requirement for good cause if the defendant fails to provide 

the state with the requisite notice. Because a violation of the 

notice of alibi rule is not completely analogous to a failure to 

furnish discovery information under rule 3.220, the 

decisional law applying to rule 3.220 is not equally 

applicable to the notice of alibi rule. 

. . . . 

A Richardson inquiry “is designed to ferret out procedural

prejudice occasioned by a party’s discovery violation.” A 

good cause hearing, on the other hand, is designed to 

determine whether good cause existed to waive the 

requirements of the notice of alibi rule. While a trial court’s 

1 Richardson v. State, 246 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 1971).
4

failure to conduct a Richardson inquiry has been treated as 

per se reversible error, we hold that a trial court’s failure to 

conduct a good cause hearing regarding compliance with the 

notice of alibi rule should be reviewed to determine whether 

the defendant was harmed by such failure. 

Small v. State, 630 So. 2d 1087, 1088-89 (Fla. 1994) (emphasis in 

original) (footnote added) (internal citations omitted). 

Citing to Small, this court found no error where a trial court struck 

defense alibi witnesses disclosed on the first day of trial after the trial 

court found the appellant had not shown good cause to waive the 

requirements of Rule 3.200. Ramsaran v. State, 664 So. 2d 1106, 1106-

07 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995).2 

Here, the state demanded a notice of alibi, and McIntyre did not 

comply with the requirements of rule 3.200. 

McIntyre did not offer the trial court any reason for his failure to 

comply with rule 3.200. Thus, the court had no basis upon which to 

waive McIntyre’s compliance with the notice of alibi rule. There is no 

indication in the trial transcript that McIntyre was prevented from 

offering grounds for his noncompliance. We find that McIntyre was not 

harmed by the court’s failure to conduct a good cause hearing where it is 

apparent that he had no good cause to offer. 

Affirmed.

TAYLOR and MAY, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

2 This is not a case where the state did not demand a notice of alibi. In such a 

case, and where the defendant participates in discovery, the failure to disclose 

an alibi witness triggers the need for a Richardson hearing. Martin, 41 So. 3d at 

1102.