J-A14010-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

MICHELLE SHULLA

v.

CLAYTON L. KNORR, JR. 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1217 MDA 2021

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 17, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County Civil Division at No(s): 

2021-05213

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., STABILE, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED: JUNE 28, 2022

Appellant, Clayton L. Knorr, Jr., appeals from the judgment of sentence 

of two months’ probation, imposed after the trial court convicted him of

indirect criminal contempt (“ICC”) for having violated a protection from abuse

(“PFA”) order issued under the Protection from Abuse Act, (“PFAA”), 23 

Pa.C.S. § 6101 et seq. Counsel seeks permission to withdraw from further 

representation pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 A.2d 738 (Pa. 1967).1 

Upon review, we find that counsel’s Anders brief satisfies the requirements 

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 Counsel initially filed an Anders brief on February 8, 2022, which was 

stricken by this Court on February 15, 2022, for failure to comply with the 

procedural and substantive requirements of Commonwealth v. Santiago, 

978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009), and for failure to file a petition to withdraw or a 

letter advising Appellant of his rights pursuant to Commonwealth v. 

Millisock, 873 A.2d 748 (Pa. Super. 2005). On February 28, 2022, counsel 

filed an application to withdraw as counsel and an amended Anders brief. 
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set forth in Santiago, supra. Accordingly, we grant counsel’s petition to 

withdraw and affirm the judgment of sentence. 

This matter was initiated by a temporary PFA order obtained by Michelle 

Shulla against Appellant on May 24, 2021. After several continuances, a 

hearing on the temporary PFA was scheduled for August 17, 2021. In the 

meantime, the Plains Township Police Department filed a complaint against 

Appellant, charging him with ICC for violation of the PFA order, pursuant to 

23 Pa.C.S. § 6114(a). Attached to its complaint was an affidavit of probable 

cause, in which the arresting officer stated:

On 6/13/2021[,] at approximately 13:52 hours[,] Michelle Shulla

received a phone call from a private number and answered the 

call. Shulla stated that the call was made by her ex[-]boyfriend 

([Appellant]) who she currently has an active NO Contact PFA 

against.... Shulla stated that she knows the call came from 

[Appellant] because she recognized his voice. Shulla then 

reported the incident to county 911 and shortly after came to the 

Plains Township Police Station and provided a written statement 

that reflects the above. The order was also confirmed to have 

been served to [Appellant] on 06/04/2021 while he was 

incarcerated at [the Luzerne County Correctional Facility 

(“LCCF”)].... 

Affidavit of Probable Cause, 6/13/21 (single page). An ICC hearing was held 

on August 17, 2021, in conjunction with the continued PFA hearing. 

Ms. Shulla, Appellant, and Appellant’s sister, Tammy Knorr, testified at 

the August 17, 2021 hearing, regarding the ICC charge. After hearing the 

testimony of the witnesses, the trial court entered an order finding Appellant 

guilty of violating the PFA order and sentenced him to a term of two months’ 
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probation. Additionally, the trial court issued a final PFA order against 

Appellant, with an expiration date of August 17, 2022. 

On September 15, 2021, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal from 

the August 17, 2021 judgment of sentence. On September 17, 2021, the trial 

court directed Appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of on 

appeal, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Appellant timely complied. The trial 

court filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion on November 23, 2021. 

Appellant now presents the following issues for our review, via counsel’s 

Anders brief: 

1. Whether the evidence was sufficient to find [Appellant] guilty 

of violating the [PFA o]rder?

2. Whether the facts presented support an arguable appellate 

issue?

Anders Brief at 3. 

“When faced with a purported Anders brief, this Court may not review 

the merits of the underlying issues without first passing on the request to 

withdraw.” Commonwealth v. Rojas, 874 A.2d 638, 639 (Pa. Super. 2005) 

(quoting Commonwealth v. Smith, 700 A.2d 1301, 1303 (Pa. Super. 

1997)). 

Court-appointed counsel who seeks to withdraw from representing 

an appellant on direct appeal on the basis that the appeal is 

frivolous must: 

(1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that, 

after making a conscientious examination of the record, 

counsel has determined that the appeal would be frivolous; 

(2) file a brief referring to anything that arguably might 

support the appeal but which does not resemble a “no-
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merit” letter or amicus curiae brief; and (3) furnish a copy 

of the brief to the [appellant] and advise the [appellant] of 

his or her right to retain new counsel or raise any additional 

points that he or she deems worthy of the court’s attention. 

Commonwealth v. Miller, 715 A.2d 1203[, 1207-08] (Pa. Super. 

1998) (citation omitted). 

Rojas, 874 A.2d at 639. Appellant’s counsel has complied with these 

requirements. Counsel petitioned for leave to withdraw, and filed a brief 

satisfying the requirements of Anders, as discussed, infra. Counsel also 

provided a copy of the brief to Appellant, and he submitted proof that he 

advised Appellant of his right to retain new counsel, proceed pro se, and/or to 

raise new points not addressed in the Anders brief. 

Our Supreme Court has held, in addition, that counsel must explain the 

reasons underlying his assessment of Appellant’s case and his conclusion that 

the claims are frivolous. Thus, counsel’s Anders brief must satisfy the 

following criteria before we may consider the merits of the underlying appeal:

[W]e hold that in the Anders brief that accompanies courtappointed counsel’s petition to withdraw, counsel must: (1) 

provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with 

citations to the record; (2) refer to anything in the record that 

counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set forth 

counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) state 

counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous. 

Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling 

case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the conclusion 

that the appeal is frivolous. 

Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361. 

Upon review of the Anders brief submitted by Appellant’s counsel, we 

find it complies with the technical requirements of Santiago. Counsel’s 

Anders brief (1) provides a summary of the procedural history and facts of 
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this case; (2) directs our attention, when applicable, to the portions of the 

record that ostensibly supports Appellant’s claim of error; (3) concludes that 

Appellant’s claim is frivolous; and (4) does so by citation to the record and 

appropriate/applicable legal authorities.2 Thus, we now examine whether 

Appellant’s claim is, indeed, frivolous. We also must “conduct a simple review 

of the record to ascertain if there appear on its face to be arguably meritorious

issues that counsel, intentionally or not, missed or misstated.” 

Commonwealth v. Dempster, 187 A.3d 266, 272 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en 

banc). 

We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence mindful of the 

following standard of review:

In determining whether the evidence was sufficient to support a 

defendant’s conviction, we must review the evidence admitted 

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2 Counsel cited the notes of testimony from the August 17, 2021 contempt 

hearing in his Anders brief; however, the transcript was not included in the 

certified record. Our law is unequivocal that it is “the appellant’s responsibility 

to order the transcript required and ascertain its presence in the record prior 

to certification for appeal.” Commonwealth v. O’Black, 897 A.2d 1234, 

1238 (Pa. Super. 2006). See also Pa.R.A.P. 1911(a). In the event that 

counsel discovers an omission after the record is certified, he may correct the 

omission by requesting transmittal of a supplemental certified record. See

Pa.R.A.P. 1926(b)(2). It is not the responsibility of the appellate court to 

obtain the necessary transcript. Commonwealth v. Preston, 904 A.2d 1, 7 

(Pa. Super. 2006). “If, however, ... notes of testimony are cited specifically by 

the parties ..., then we have reason to believe that such evidence exists[, and 

i]n this type of situation, we might well make an informal inquiry to see if 

there was an error in transmitting the certified record to this Court.” Id. at 

8. Hence, we contacted the Luzerne County Prothonotary and obtained a copy 

of the missing transcript. While we were able to overlook counsel’s failure to 

ensure that the certified record was complete in this instance, we warn counsel 

not to disregard the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure in the future. 
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during the trial along with any reasonable inferences that may be 

drawn from that evidence in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth as the verdict winner. If we find, based on that 

review, that the jury could have found every element of the crime 

beyond a reasonable doubt, we must sustain the defendant’s 

conviction. 

Commonwealth v. Daniels, 999 A.2d 590, 594 (Pa. Super. 2010). “The 

Commonwealth may sustain its burden by means of wholly circumstantial 

evidence. Further, the trier of fact is free to believe all, part, or none of the 

evidence.” Commonwealth v. Taylor, 137 A.3d 611, 614 (Pa. Super. 2016). 

Section 6114 of the PFAA provides:

Where the police, sheriff or the plaintiff have filed charges of 

indirect criminal contempt against a defendant for violation of a 

protection order issued under this chapter, a foreign protection 

order or a court-approved consent agreement, the court may hold 

the defendant in indirect criminal contempt and punish the 

defendant in accordance with the law.

23 Pa.C.S. § 6114(a). To establish indirect criminal contempt, the 

Commonwealth must prove that:

1) the order was sufficiently definite, clear, and specific to the 

contemnor as to leave no doubt of the conduct prohibited; 2) the 

contemnor had notice of the order; 3) the act constituting the 

violation must have been volitional; and 4) the contemnor must 

have acted with wrongful intent.

Taylor, 137 A.3d at 615 (citation omitted). 

Here, the PFA order issued on May 24, 2021, expressly states:

1. [Appellant] shall not abuse, harass, stalk, threaten, or attempt 

or threaten to use physical force against any of the above 

persons in any place where they might be found.

...
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3. Except for such contact with the minor child/ren as may be 

permitted under Paragraph 5 of this order, [Appellant] is 

prohibited from having ANY CONTACT with [Ms. Shulla], or any 

other person protected under this order, either directly or 

indirectly, at any location, including but not limited to any 

contact at [Ms. Shulla’s] school, business, or place of 

employment....

4. Except for such contact with the minor child/ren as may be 

permitted under Paragraph 5 of this order, [Appellant] shall not 

contact [Ms. Shulla], or any other person protected under this 

order, by telephone or by any other means, including through 

third persons. 

PFA Order, 5/24/21, at 1. 

We deem the language of the PFA order to be sufficiently clear to leave 

Appellant with no doubt as to the type of conduct prohibited. See Taylor, 

supra. Moreover, the record reflects that Appellant was aware of the PFA 

order in place at the time of his alleged violation. See N.T. Hearing, 8/17/21, 

at 8 (Appellant’s acknowledgment of a prior PFA hearing and that “there was 

to be no contact”). Thus, the first two elements needed to establish ICC have 

been met. 

As to the third and fourth elements needed to establish ICC, Appellant’s 

sufficiency claim focuses solely on the trial court’s credibility determinations

regarding the parties’ testimony. Ms. Shulla testified at the hearing that she 

received a phone call from Appellant on June 13, 2021, during which he said 

to her, “do you want this to go away[,] or do I have to make it worse?” N.T. 

Hearing at 4-5. In response, Ms. Shulla “just cried and ... hung up.” Id. at 5. 

She stated that she then called 911 and filed a police report. Id. at 6. 
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Contrarily, Appellant and Ms. Knorr insisted that Appellant did not 

initiate the phone call on June 13, 2021. Rather, they both testified that Ms. 

Shulla placed the call and attempted to trick Appellant into talking to her. Id.

at 8-9, 11. After hearing all of the testimony, the trial court found that the 

Commonwealth had met its burden of establishing the ICC charge, “based 

upon what the court deem[ed] to be credible evidence presented before it[.]” 

Id. at 13. 

The trial court was free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence 

presented. See Taylor, supra. Clearly, it found Ms. Shulla’s testimony to 

be credible. It is well-established that credibility determinations are strictly 

within the province of the finder of fact and, thus, we may not re-weigh the 

evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. 

Commonwealth v. Gibson, 720 A.2d 473, 480 (Pa. 1998). Accordingly, 

mindful of the trial court’s credibility determinations and viewing the evidence 

in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, we agree that the record 

contains sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that the 

Commonwealth met its burden of establishing ICC. 

Finally, our review of the record reveals no other potential, non-frivolous 

issues that Appellant could raise on appeal. As such, we agree with counsel 

that a direct appeal in this case is wholly frivolous. Accordingly, we grant 

counsel’s motion to withdraw.

Judgment of sentence affirmed. Petition to withdraw granted. 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 06/28/2022