Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before publication in the PACIFIC REPORTER. 

Readers are requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate Courts, 

303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878, email 

corrections@akcourts.us. 

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA 

OLIVIA LEE-MAGANA, 

Appellant, 

v. 

JACOB CARPENTER, 

Appellee. 

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) Supreme Court No. S-15854 

Superior Court Nos. 3AN-14-02776/ 

3AN-14-02990 CI 

O P I N I O N 

No. 7113 - July 1, 2016 

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Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third 

Judicial District, Anchorage, Michael D. Corey, Judge. 

Appearances: Olivia Lee-Magana, pro se, Anchorage, 

Appellant. No appearance by Appellee Jacob Carpenter. 

Before: Stowers, Chief Justice, Fabe, Winfree, Maassen, and 

Bolger, Justices. 

MAASSEN, Justice. 

I. INTRODUCTION 

This appeal involves two petitions for long-term domestic violence 

protective orders. A woman prevailed both on a petition she brought against her exboyfriend and on a petition he brought against her. She moved for attorney’s fees in both 

cases, but the trial court denied her motions at first and again on reconsideration. The 

woman appeals, asserting that the trial court abused its discretion by not awarding her 

full attorney’s fees on both petitions — on hers because she was the prevailing petitioner 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

in a domestic violence case for whom fees are allowed by statute, and on her 

ex-boyfriend’s because she was the prevailing party and his petition was vexatious. 

We affirm the superior court’s denial of attorney’s fees for the woman’s 

successful defense against her ex-boyfriend’s petition. As for the court’s denial of 

attorney’s fees to the woman as the prevailing petitioner, we conclude there was no 

adequate reason for denying fees and therefore reverse and remand for an award of fees 

in an appropriate amount. 

II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 

A. Background 

Olivia Lee-Magana and Jacob Carpenter met as teenagers sometime in the 

1990s.1 They were in a two-year romantic relationship beginning in 2012 and had a 

child together. But their relationship was often tumultuous. In late 2014 Carpenter 

attempted to evict Lee-Magana from his home, and there followed a dispute over child 

custody and allegations of domestic violence by each party against the other. 

B. Lee-Magana’s Petition For A Domestic Violence Protective Order 

Lee-Magana filed a petition for a protective order against Carpenter on 

September 16, 2014. At the close of an ex parte hearing, the magistrate judge granted 

her a twenty-day protective order. The subsequent hearing on a long-term protective 

order was heard by the superior court judge assigned to the parties’ custody dispute. At 

the hearing, Carpenter stipulated to an act of domestic violence because of a finding 

recently made by another judge, in a different case, involving a different petitioner, and 

the judge entered a long-term protective order predicated on that stipulation. Much of 

the rest of the hearing involved working out such details as no-contact provisions and the 

retrieval of personal property. 

Lee-Magana was represented by counsel in the superior court but is acting 

pro se on appeal. Carpenter did not file a brief on appeal or otherwise appear. 

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After the hearing Lee-Magana filed a motion for an award of $1,000 in 

reasonable actual attorney’s fees, “pursuant to [AS] 18.66.100(c)(14), based upon her 

status as the prevailing litigant in this case.” She filed the motion late and moved that 

it be accepted late; the superior court denied the fees motion without explanation. A few 

weeks later Lee-Maganamovedfor reconsideration,asking thecourt toexplain its ruling. 

C. Carpenter’s Petition For A Domestic Violence Protective Order 

A few weeks after Lee-Magana filed her petition for a long-term domestic 

violence protective order against Carpenter, he filed a petition for both short-term and 

long-term orders against her. Carpenter, unlike Lee-Magana, was denied a short-term 

order. The hearing on Carpenter’s request for a long-term order took place in late 

October, again before the judge in the custody case, two weeks after the judge had 

granted Lee-Magana a long-term order. On Carpenter’s petition against Lee-Magana, 

the superior court found “that [the case] was close,” but it declined to issue a long-term 

order on the ground that Carpenter had failed to prove he was the victim of domestic 

violence. 

Lee-Magana moved for attorney’s fees on this petition too, again seeking 

$1,000. Carpenter opposed the motion and, as in the other case, the superior court 

denied the motion without explanation. Lee-Magana moved for reconsideration and 

Carpenter again filed an opposition. 

D. The Superior Court’s Orders On Reconsideration 

On reconsideration, the superior court issued orders in both domestic 

violencematters explainingwhy it had denied Lee-Magana’s motions for attorney’s fees. 

The court explained that it did not award fees for Lee-Magana’s successful defense 

against Carpenter’s petition because it did not want to “cast a chilling effect on the 

pursuit of relief in the face of perceived entitlement to protection from alleged domestic 

violence.” It further stated that it was “unwilling to characterize Mr. Carpenter’s efforts 

[in pursuing his petition against Lee-Magana] as ‘vexatious.’ ” 

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As for Lee-Magana’spetitionagainstCarpenter —on which shesucceeded 

in obtaining a long-term protective order — the superior court noted that “Carpenter 

stipulated to the entry of [the] Long-Term Domestic Violence Order” and that “[a] 

significant portion of that hearing (which was also set on in the custody matter . . .) was 

spent with property and interim support issues which were to be included in[] the LTDV 

Order.” The court ruled that “[t]o the extent that proceeding dealt with [domestic 

violence] issues, attorney fees are denied, with prejudice.” However, “[t]o the extent the 

proceedings addressed custody and support issues, the request for attorney fees is 

dismissed, without prejudice. Attendant attorney fees issues may be raised in connection 

with any application for attorney fees in [the custody case].” 

Lee-Magana filed this appeal. It addresses only the denial of her requests 

for attorney’s fees in the two domestic violence cases. 

III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW 

We review attorney’s fee awards for abuse of discretion.2 An award or 

denial of attorney’s fees is an abuse of discretion if it is “arbitrary, capricious, manifestly 

unreasonable, or improperly motivated.”3 Interpretation of statutes, including those 

authorizing awards of attorney’s fees in particular types of cases, is subject to de novo 

review.4 

2 Greene v. Tinker, 332 P.3d 21, 41 (Alaska 2014); Koller v. Reft, 71 P.3d 

800, 808 (Alaska 2003). 

3 Rhodes v. Erion, 189 P.3d 1051, 1053 (Alaska 2008) (quoting Kellis v. 

Crites, 20 P.3d 1112, 1113 (Alaska 2001)); see also Gold Dust Mines, Inc. v. Little 

Squaw Gold Mining Co., 299 P.3d 148, 157 (Alaska 2012) (“We will not reverse an 

[attorney’s fee] award unless it is ‘manifestly unreasonable.’ ” (quoting Welcome v. 

Jennings, 780 P.2d 1039, 1043 (Alaska 1989)). 

4 See In re Vernon H., 332 P.3d 565, 572 (Alaska 2014) (construing statutory 

authority for awards of attorney’s fees in guardianship proceedings). 

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IV.	 DISCUSSION 

The superior court’s denials of attorney’s fees in the two cases — one in 

which Lee-Magana was the prevailing respondent and one in which she was the 

prevailing petitioner — are subject to different analyses. We reach different conclusions 

in the two cases. 

A.	 The Superior Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Denying 

Attorney’s Fees To Lee-Magana For Her Successful Defense Against 

Carpenter’s Petition. 

Lee-Magana contends on appeal that in seeking fees for the domestic 

violence proceeding brought by Carpenter, “she simply relied upon [Alaska] Civil Rule 

82 and her status as the prevailing party.”5 But in fact her initial motion relied solely on 

the statute governing the allowable provisions of a domestic violence protective order, 

AS 18.66.100(c)(14); she did not cite Rule 82 until she moved for reconsideration, at 

which point the court was not obliged to consider a new basis for her fees request.6 In 

any event, we have recently reiterated “as a general proposition that ‘[i]f a specific 

statutory scheme for attorney’s fees exists, Civil Rule 82 does not apply,’ ” because Rule 

82(a) specifically excludes from its reach those cases in which fees are “otherwise 

provided by law.”7 

Alaska Statute 18.66.100(c)(14) provides that “[a] protective order under 

this section may . . . require the respondent to pay costs and fees incurred by the 

5 Rule 82(a) provides: “Except as otherwise provided by law or agreed to 

by the parties, the prevailing party in a civil case shall be awarded attorney’s fees 

calculated under this rule.” 

6 See Donahue v. Ledgends, Inc., 331 P.3d 342, 356 (Alaska 2014) (holding 

that the superior court was not “obliged to consider the [Alaska Civil] Rule 68 argument 

when it was raised for the first time in motions for reconsideration”). 

7 In re Vernon H., 332 P.3d at 576 (alteration in the original) (quoting Enders 

v. Parker, 66 P.3d 11, 17 (Alaska 2003)). 

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petitioner in bringing the action under this chapter.” The statute thus authorizes awards 

of costs and fees to “the petitioner,” not to a respondent, regardless of whether the 

respondent successfully defended against the petition.8 The superior court’s explanation 

for denying Lee-Magana’s request for fees in Carpenter’s case — that awarding fees 

against an unsuccessful petitioner could “cast a chilling effect on the pursuit of relief” 

from domestic violence — is consistent with the apparent purpose of this statutory 

dichotomy. 

Lee-Magana also argues that she was entitled to attorney’s fees because 

Carpenter’s petition was vexatious. Although as with Rule 82 she did not raise a 

vexatiousness argument in her original motion, the superior court addressed the issue in 

its order on reconsideration, finding expressly that Carpenter’s efforts were not 

vexatious. This is consistent with the judge’s earlier remarks at the close of the hearing 

on Carpenter’s petition, when the judge said “there were many interactions between [the 

parties] that come very close to constituting domestic violence [in] the way Alaska has 

defined it” and that the case “was close in [his] mind.” We need not determine whether 

vexatiousness may provide a separate basis for an award of fees against an unsuccessful 

petitioner in a domestic violence case, as we defer to the superior court’s better 

perspective on the parties’ motivations and its finding in this case that Carpenter did not 

act vexatiously.9 

8 See State, Office of Pub. Advocacy v. Estate of Jean R., __ P.3d __, Op. No. 

7098, 2016 WL 1612829 (Alaska Apr. 22, 2016) (observing that “[i]n domestic violence 

proceedings, . . . the court may require the respondent to pay the petitioner’s attorney’s 

fees if a protective order is granted; yet there is no parallel provision allowing the 

respondent in a domestic violence proceeding to collect attorney’s fees from the 

petitioner if the petitioner does not prevail”). 

9 See Greene v. Tinker, 332 P.3d 21, 42 (Alaska 2014) (observing that in 

(continued...) 

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B.	 The Superior Court On Remand Should Award Attorney’s Fees To 

Lee-Magana For Her Successful Petition. 

Lee-Magana also argues that she was entitled to full attorney’s fees as the 

prevailing petitioner on the domestic violence petition she brought against Carpenter. 

Though she again makes arguments based on Rule 82 and Carpenter’s alleged 

vexatiousness, we limit our discussion to her claim under the statute.10 

Alaska Statute 18.66.100(c) provides that “[a] protective order under this 

section may” include various provisions, including one requiring the respondent to pay 

the petitioner’s costs and fees.11 Lee-Magana concedes that the statute’s plain language 

“does not expressly ‘require’ the trial court to award [her] her full costs and attorney’s 

fees,” but she argues that full reimbursement is the only way to effectuate the statute’s 

purposes. She contends that she was a victim of domestic violence and that she will be 

further victimized if she is required to pay for protection from future violence. She 

argues that in the absence of full reimbursement of attorney’s fees, petitioners like her 

may feel compelled to proceed pro se, and their lack of legal experience may deprive the 

court of the evidence it needs to make a correct decision. 

9

(...continued) 

determining whether claims were brought in bad faith for purposes of a departure from 

the Rule 82 schedule for attorney’s fees awards, “the superior court was in the best 

position to evaluate [the plaintiff’s] motivations”). 

10 As explained above, Rule 82 is displaced by the statutory fees provision, 

and an argument based on Carpenter’s alleged vexatiousness is precluded by our 

deference to the superior court’s finding that he was not vexatious. We also note that 

when seeking fees related to her successful petition, Lee-Magana expressly disclaimed 

any reliance on Rule 82, noting in her motion for reconsideration “that she is not seeking 

Civil Rule 82 fees in this case but has, instead[,] requested the reimbursement of her fees 

pursuant to [AS] 18.66.100(c)(14).” 

11 AS 18.66.100(c)(14) (emphasis added). 

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We recognize the strong policy arguments for encouraging legal 

representation in domestic violence proceedings, as represented petitioners are more 

likely to succeed in obtaining a protective order and are less likely to suffer further 

abuse.12 Notwithstanding the discretionary nature of the award, it would seem to be the 

exceptional case in which the superior court declines to award attorney’s fees to the 

prevailing petitioner. In Scully v. Scully we addressed a statutory amendment providing 

that a court “may” modify a child support judgment to provide “for the care, nurture, and 

education of unmarried 18-year-old children of the marriage while they are actively 

pursuing a high school diploma or an equivalent level of technical or vocational training 

and living as dependents with a parent.”13 Citing the number of children to which the 

change likely applied, and notwithstanding the statute’s grant of trial-court discretion, 

we concluded that “it should be the exceptional case in which a court declines to extend 

child support payments beyond the child’s eighteenth birthday where [the] statutory 

12 See JENNIFER S. ROSENBERG & DENISE A. GRAB, INST. FOR POLICY 

INTEGRITY AT N.Y.U.SCH.OF LAW, SUPPORTING SURVIVORS: THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS 

OF PROVIDING CIVIL LEGAL ASSISTANCE TO SURVIVORS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 9 

(2015), http://www.policyintegrity.org/documents/SupportingSurvivors.pdf (reporting 

that “access to legal services is a determining factor in whether a woman chooses to 

exercise her right to petition for a protective order — and whether her petition is 

sucessful”); Jane C. Murphy, Engaging with the State: The Growing Reliance on 

Lawyers and Judges to Protect Battered Women, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y&L. 

499, 511-12 (2003) (reporting that 83% of women seeking domestic violence protective 

orders who had an attorney succeeded in getting the order, while only 32% of women 

without an attorney succeeded); Amy Farmer & Jill Tiefenthaler, Explaining the Recent 

Decline in Domestic Violence, 21 CONTEMP. ECON. POL’Y 158, 167 (2003) (concluding 

that “[m]ost services provided to help battered women do not impact the likelihood of 

abuse, but the provision of legal services significantly lowers the incidence of domestic 

violence”). 

13 987 P.2d 743, 745 (Alaska 1999) (quoting AS 25.24.170(a)). 

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requirements have been met.”14 Here, too, we conclude that it should be the exceptional 

case in which a court fails to grant what the statute allows. 

In the superior court’s order on reconsideration, it explained that it denied 

“with prejudice” Lee-Magana’s request for fees related to her successful petition “to the 

extent [the] proceeding dealt with [domestic violence] issues,” but that “[t]o the extent 

the proceedings addressed custody and support issues, the request for attorney fees [was] 

dismissed, without prejudice.” The order contemplated that Lee-Magana would seek 

fees related to the custody and support issues “in connection with any application for 

attorney fees in [the ongoing custody case].” But our review of the hearing on LeeMagana’s petition for a long-term order reveals that, despite Carpenter’s stipulation to 

the underlying act of domestic violence, almost all of the hearing was devoted to ironing 

out the details of the protective order; very little of it involved issues of custody or 

support. In the brief discussion of custody, the parties agreed to leave things as they 

were, and the only discussion of child support put off the issue for later, after the parties 

had submitted their income forms. Because so little of the hearing involved custody, it 

appears that the attorney’s fees incurred in the domestic violence proceeding that LeeMagana may recover in the related custody case may be minimal. 

To the extent the superior court’s denial of attorney’s fees relied on the fact 

that Carpenter stipulated to the entry of the long-term order, the denial is also 

unwarranted. Carpenter’s stipulation did not make the proceeding or the resulting order 

unnecessary; at best it helped minimize the amount of attorney’s fees for which 

Carpenter could be held responsible. 

14 Id. at 747. 

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In short, neither justification given for the superior court’s denial of 

attorney’s fees “[t]o the extent [the] proceeding dealt with DV issues” — neither the 

possibility that Lee-Magana could recover some fees in the custody case nor the fact that 

the proceedings commenced with Carpenter’s stipulation to an act of domestic violence 

— demonstrates this to be the “exceptional case” in which a denial of fees is justified. 

We therefore reverse and remand for entry of an award of reasonable attorney’s fees. 

V. CONCLUSION 

We AFFIRM the superior court’s order denying attorney’s fees in the 

domestic violence proceeding brought by Carpenter against Lee-Magana, case number 

3AN-14-02990 CI. We REVERSE the denial of attorney’s fees in the domestic violence 

proceeding brought by Lee-Magana against Carpenter, case number 3AN-14-02776 CI. 

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