NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

VALERIE FRANCIS VALDIVIA, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 16-0867

No. 1 CA-CR 19-0168 PRPC

(Consolidated)

Appeal and Petition for Review from the 

Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2015-155321-001

The Honorable Colleen L. French, Judge Pro Tempore (Retired)

VACATED AND REMANDED; DENYING PCR AS MOOT

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Michelle L. Hogan

Counsel for Appellee

Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, Phoenix

By Adena J. Astrowsky

Counsel for Appellee on the Petition for Review

Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix

By Lawrence S. Matthew

Counsel for Appellant

FILED 4-22-2021
2

Debus & Kazan LTD., Phoenix

By Larry L. Debus, Gregory M. Zamora

Counsel for Appellant on the Petition for Review

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Michael J. Brown delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Chief Judge Peter B. Swann and Judge Kent E. Cattani joined.

B R O W N, Judge:

¶1 Valerie Francis Valdivia appeals her conviction and sentence

for forgery, claiming prosecutorial misconduct occurred at trial. She also 

challenges the denial of her petition for post-conviction relief. Because 

Valdivia has established fundamental, prejudicial error, we vacate her 

conviction and sentence.

BACKGROUND

¶2 Valdivia entered a bank located inside a grocery store, asking 

that her check be cashed. Because Valdivia did not have an account with 

the bank, the manager asked to speak with her and took her identification. 

Valdivia told the manager that the payor, C.S., gave her the check for work 

she completed. Valdivia claimed to be in a hurry and appeared nervous.

The manager noticed the signature on the check did not match the signature 

associated with the account and contacted C.S. to verify the transaction. 

When C.S. denied issuing the check, the manager went to a separate part of 

the bank and contacted police.

¶3 When police arrived, Valdivia was walking quickly toward 

an exit without the check or identification. Valdivia claimed she did not 

know the check was forged, telling police that an acquaintance named 

“Booty” asked her to cash it. Officers ran the nickname “Booty” through a 

database, pulled up a photo of a woman named Lauren Budoff, and 

Valdivia identified her as “Booty.” Though Valdivia would later testify she 

planned to meet Budoff at a specified location and give her the cash, she 

failed to tell officers about the meet-up location, and instead told them she 

did not have Budoff’s contact information. C.S. confirmed his checkbook 

had been stolen, he did not know either Valdivia or Budoff, and he did not 

issue the check.
STATE v. VALDIVIA

Decision of the Court

3

¶4 Valdivia was indicted for committing forgery, a class 4 felony. 

In the State’s initial notice of disclosure, Budoff was listed as a potential 

witness, along with her address. She was not called as a witness at trial,

however, where the State presented the testimony of the bank manager,

C.S., and two police officers. On cross-examination of Officer Ferrante, 

defense counsel asked the officer whether the name “Lauren Budoff [has 

any] significance to you.” The State objected based on “self-serving 

hearsay[.]” Defense counsel argued the question did not involve hearsay; 

instead, he wanted to inquire whether Officer Ferrante conducted an 

investigation of Budoff. The State replied: “The only reason you have that 

name -- that name is in the police report . . . . It is not currently evidence in 

this trial.” Following additional discussion, the court sustained the 

objection.

¶5 Valdivia testified that she ran into an acquaintance (Budoff)

at an internet café. Budoff told Valdivia she started a new job but could not 

cash her paycheck because she lacked a valid ID. Budoff offered Valdivia 

$100 to cash the check. While presenting the check to the bank and being 

questioned by the manager, Valdivia said she did not know C.S. or how 

Budoff received the check, but she believed Budoff had recently started 

working for C.S. Valdivia further testified that when asked by police where 

the check came from, she explained she got it from “Lauren Budoff,” who

“goes by Booty.” Valdivia testified that she confirmed the photo shown to 

her on the police laptop was Budoff.

¶6 During initial closing argument, the prosecutor stated that 

any claim Valdivia received the check from Budoff lacked credibility, but 

made no other references to Budoff. Defense counsel responded in part by 

asking the jury to consider why police did not investigate Budoff, asserting 

Valdivia told police officers at the outset where she obtained the check, but 

they did not “care to corroborate” her story. Defense counsel also 

emphasized that Valdivia did not write the check and it was the State’s 

burden to investigate whether Budoff was involved. According to defense 

counsel, his client did a favor and “got burned by Lauren Budoff.”

¶7 In rebuttal closing, the prosecutor repeatedly attacked 

Valdivia’s credibility and asserted there was no Budoff (or “Booty”):

The devil is in the details. When you delve a little deeper into 

[Valdivia’s] story, when I asked further questions about this 

Booty, it fell apart.

. . .
STATE v. VALDIVIA

Decision of the Court

4

[Valdivia] has no witnesses. There’s no evidence to 

corroborate anything that she says.

. . . 

All she knows is a nickname, Booty, so the police try to pull 

up who this person is. [The police] are following up on what 

she’s telling them, and of course the first photo that they pull 

up, yeah, that’s her, with nothing else to corroborate.

. . . 

Where is this Booty? Where was she on December 4? . . . These 

are red flags about the credibility of this story, the red flags 

that this story doesn’t make sense.

There’s no Booty, and even if there’s hypothetically someone 

who was also involved, your jury instructions say the absent 

participant, if someone else was also culpable, that doesn’t 

necessarily take away from her guilt, her culpability, her 

actions and her choices that day.

. . . 

If you are arrested for a crime, you don’t lead the police 

directly to the person who is responsible? Because there’s no

Booty. This person doesn’t exist.

. . . 

The defendant . . . tried to shift the burden. She tried to pass 

the buck. She was pointing fingers saying this is not my fault, 

this is somebody else’s fault, but when you ask questions, 

look at the details of this case, the details of her testimony 

yesterday, what she said, what was inconsistent, what she 

hadn’t told the police, the evidence shows that this story 

doesn’t make sense . . . . She knew the check was a forged 

check.

. . . 

It is not reasonable to make excuses and to say that the 

defendant was duped. The defendant’s story makes no sense. 

. . . There’s no way the defendant did not know that that check 

was fraudulent. All the credible evidence in this case shows 
STATE v. VALDIVIA

Decision of the Court

5

that she had to have known. It is simply not reasonable to say 

that she had no idea. It is not reasonable to blame and point 

the finger elsewhere, to blame Booty. There’s no Booty. 

(Emphasis added.) The jury found Valdivia guilty and the superior court 

sentenced her to a repetitive presumptive ten-year prison sentence.

Valdivia appealed, and while the appeal was stayed, she sought postconviction relief. After an evidentiary hearing on Valdivia’s ineffective 

assistance of counsel claim, the court denied relief. This court granted 

Valdivia’s request to consolidate her appeal and petition for review.

DISCUSSION

¶8 Valdivia argues the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by 

falsely stating to the jury that Lauren Budoff (Booty) never existed. She 

contends the statements were made in the face of the State’s knowledge that 

Budoff did exist. Valdivia emphasizes that the issue of whether Budoff 

existed was critical to her defense; she did not deny attempting to cash the 

check but claimed she did not have intent to defraud. See A.R.S. § 13-2002 

(“A person commits forgery if, with intent to defraud, the person . . . offers 

or presents . . . a forged instrument or one that contains false information.”).

¶9 To prevail on her claim of prosecutorial misconduct, Valdivia

must prove the misconduct “so infected the trial with unfairness as to make 

the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” State v. Hughes, 193 Ariz. 

72, 79, ¶ 26 (1998) (citation omitted). Because Valdivia did not raise this

issue in the superior court, we review only for fundamental error. State v. 

Escalante, 245 Ariz. 135, 140, ¶ 12 (2018); see State v. Murray, ___ Ariz. ___, 

No. CR-19-0368-PR, CR-20-0008-PR, 2021 WL 1035034, at *2, ¶ 11 (Ariz. 

Mar. 18, 2021) (clarifying that fundamental error is the proper standard for 

alleged prosecutorial misconduct that was not objected to at trial). Valdivia

bears the burden of establishing (1) trial error exists, (2) the error was 

fundamental, and (3) the error was prejudicial. Escalante, 245 Ariz. at 142, 

¶ 21.

A. Trial Error

¶10 The first step in our review is determining whether trial error 

exists. Murray, CR-19-0368-PR, at *4, ¶ 18. Prosecutors have wide latitude 

in closing argument and may urge the jury to draw reasonable inferences 

from the evidence, State v. Moody, 208 Ariz. 424, 464, ¶ 180 (2004), but such 

inferences must be reasonably supported by the evidence, State v. Acuna 

Valenzuela, 245 Ariz. 197, 222, ¶ 109 (2018). 
STATE v. VALDIVIA

Decision of the Court

6

¶11 The prosecutor in this case plainly erred by falsely asserting

to the jury that Budoff did not exist. The State had disclosed Budoff as a 

potential witness and also filed a pretrial motion in limine seeking to 

preclude Valdivia from introducing at trial any of her exculpatory 

statements in which she had referenced Budoff. Additionally, when 

Valdivia’s counsel attempted to ask Officer Ferrante about Lauren Budoff, 

the prosecutor objected on the basis that references to Budoff were “selfserving hearsay.” The court sustained the objection, presumably because 

Valdivia had not yet testified, and absent her testimony, her previous 

statements referencing Budoff were properly viewed as hearsay. But 

Valdivia subsequently testified at trial, and her references to Budoff were 

not inadmissible hearsay. Nevertheless, the prosecutor made no effort to 

correct her earlier representation that any reference to Budoff was selfserving hearsay, and instead repeatedly asserted that Budoff did not exist.

¶12 Though the prosecutor was free to vigorously contend that 

Budoff was not involved in this case, the prosecutor could not specifically 

assert something she knew to be false and urge the jury to draw conclusions

not reasonably supported by the evidence. See Hughes, 193 Ariz. at 86, ¶ 61

(stating “the State has an obligation to be honest with the facts”); see also 

United States v. Reyes, 557 F.3d 1069, 1078 (9th Cir. 2009) (“We do not lightly 

tolerate a prosecutor asserting as a fact to the jury something known to be 

untrue . . . .”). Thus, the prosecutor’s affirmative misrepresentations 

exceeded the bounds of permissible rebuttal argument.

¶13 The State contends the prosecutor’s statements were a fair 

interpretation of the evidence, and the prosecutor was really saying that 

Budoff, as Valdivia described her, did not exist. However, the prosecutor 

went well beyond asserting Valdivia was not credible or Budoff was not 

involved by stating, “there’s no Booty. This person doesn’t exist.” No 

reasonable juror could interpret the prosecutor’s comments as anything 

other than no such person existed. Valdivia has met her first burden.

B. Fundamental Error

¶14 We next consider the totality of the circumstances to decide

“whether the error is fundamental.” Murray, CR-19-0368-PR, at *4, ¶ 20 

(citation omitted). An error is fundamental if it “goes to the foundation of 

the case,” including an error that “directly impacts a key factual dispute.” 

Id. at ¶¶ 20–21(citation omitted).

¶15 Valdivia did not dispute she attempted to cash the check or 

claim that the check was properly signed. Instead, she argued she was not 
STATE v. VALDIVIA

Decision of the Court

7

guilty because she did not have intent to defraud, having been misled by 

Budoff. In arguing Budoff did not exist, the prosecutor’s misstatements 

impacted the major question to be resolved by the jury. The State had 

successfully excluded other evidence corroborating Budoff’s existence, so 

whether the jury would believe Valdivia’s defense came down to credibility 

determinations. Thus, the prosecutor’s argument that Budoff did not exist 

significantly increased the chance the jury would not believe Valdivia’s

defense and would find her guilty, going to the foundation of her case. Cf.

Escalante, 245 Ariz. at 143, ¶¶ 26–27 (holding that erroneous admission of 

drug-courier profile evidence was fundamental error going to the 

foundation of the case in part because it enhanced the likelihood that the 

jury would find against the defendant on a key factual dispute). 

C. Prejudice

¶16 Finally, Valdivia must show the error was prejudicial. Id. at 

142, ¶ 21. Establishing prejudice “varies depending on the nature of the 

error and the unique case facts.” Id. at 144, ¶ 29. We “examine the entire 

record, including the parties’ theories and arguments as well as the trial 

evidence.” Id. at 144, ¶ 31. The key inquiry is whether “without the error, 

a reasonable jury could have plausibly and intelligently returned a different 

verdict.” Id.; see also Murray, CR-19-0368-PR, at *6, ¶ 30. 

¶17 The primary question before the jury was whether Valdivia

intended to defraud the bank when she gave them a forged check, or 

whether she unknowingly handed over the check after being duped by 

Budoff. Thus, the fact of Budoff’s existence was important evidence 

weighing on both Valdivia’s defense and her credibility. The prosecutor’s 

repeated theme during rebuttal closing that Booty did not exist was more 

than an isolated misstep. See State v. Loos, No. 1 CA-CR 18-0105, 2021 WL 

1110909, at *5, ¶ 28 (Ariz. Ct. App. Mar. 23, 2021); see also State v. Dansdill, 

246 Ariz. 593, 608, ¶ 60 (App. 2019) (noting that repetition of the improper 

argument likely meant the jury gave it more weight and suggested the 

prosecutor believed it was not trivial). Instead, comments made in rebuttal 

closing—that Budoff does not exist—were among the last statements the 

jurors heard before they began deliberations.

¶18 We therefore reject the State’s contention that any prejudice 

to Valdivia was cured by the court’s jury instructions addressing (1) 

judging credibility of witnesses, and (2) the principle that lawyers’ 

arguments are not evidence. Although we presume jurors follow the 

instructions given to them, that presumption does not apply when a 

defendant has been deprived of a fair trial based on a prosecutor’s false 
STATE v. VALDIVIA

Decision of the Court

8

statements that are likely to mislead the jury about a key factual dispute in 

the case. Cf. Murray, CR-19-0368-PR, at *8, ¶¶ 38–39. And the error was 

compounded by the fact that the prosecutor made the false statements in 

rebuttal closing. See id. at *8, ¶ 37 (noting the prosecutor’s misstatement of 

the law was made in rebuttal argument, “when the words were most 

impactful”).

¶19 Absent the prosecutor’s improper comments, the jury could 

have plausibly returned a different verdict. Valdivia has therefore met her 

burden of establishing fundamental, prejudicial error based on 

prosecutorial misconduct that deprived her of a fair trial. Murray, CR-19-

0368-PR, at *3, ¶ 13 (noting defendant’s burden to establish prosecutorial 

misconduct, including deprivation of the right to a fair trial). Given this 

conclusion, we do not address Valdivia’s other assertions of error or her 

request for review of the denial of her petition for post-conviction relief. 

CONCLUSION

¶20 We vacate Valdivia’s conviction and sentence, remand for a 

new trial, and deny her petition for review from the denial of postconviction relief as moot.