United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit 

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No. 18-3009

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Amanda Gibson

 Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

Concrete Equipment Company, Inc., A Nebraska Corporation, doing business as 

Con-E-Co 

 Defendant - Appellee

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the District of Nebraska - Omaha

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Submitted: November 12, 2019

 Filed: June 3, 2020

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Before GRUENDER, KELLY, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges. 

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GRUENDER, Circuit Judge. 

Amanda Gibson appeals the district court’s1 grant of summary judgment to 

Concrete Equipment Company (“Con-E-Co”) on her sex discrimination claim, her 

sexual harassment claim, and her retaliation claims under Title VII of the Civil 

1

The Honorable John M. Gerrard, Chief Judge, United States District Court

for the District of Nebraska. 
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Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the Nebraska Fair 

Employment Practice Act (“NFEPA”), Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-1101 et seq.2 We 

affirm. 

I.

Con-E-Co is a Nebraska corporation that manufactures portable and stationary 

concrete batch plants and mixers. Con-E-Co hired Gibson in December 2013. 

During her employment at Con-E-Co, Gibson was reprimanded for violations of the 

company’s harassment policy. Gibson used sexualized, vulgar language on multiple 

occasions, including one incident that resulted in her suspension. 

During her employment at Con-E-Co, Gibson claims she experienced several 

instances of crude, sexually charged behavior directed at her by her coworkers. 

These incidents included a male employee commenting that she would look “good 

with a rod between [her] legs,” a male employee commenting that her “girls” looked 

“fuller/perkier,” a male employee attempting to grab her breast, and various other 

incidents. 

In March 2015, Gibson witnessed an interaction between plant foreman C.J. 

Coartney and an African-American employee, Curtis Frost, in which Coartney 

reprimanded Frost for using a vending machine during Frost’s working time. Gibson 

believed that Frost was reprimanded because of his race. After witnessing the 

incident, Gibson expressed her concerns about it to Coartney and at least one other 

plant foreman, Gary Stillman. 

Shortly after speaking with Stillman and Coartney, Gibson wrote a letter 

addressed to both foremen, to which she attached a picture she had drawn containing 

2

The NFEPA is patterned after federal law, “and given that neither party 

points to any differences between them, our analyses of [Gibson’s] federal claims 

apply with equal force to [her] state claims.” Blake v. MJ Optical, Inc., 870 F.3d 

820, 825 n.7 (8th Cir. 2017).
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profane language. At the top of the letter, Gibson wrote, “ATTENTION – 

CONFIDENTIAL. Please return picture when you are finished reading this so I 

know you’ve read it.” In the letter, she stated that Coartney and Stillman should 

look at things from Frost’s and Gibson’s perspectives “because he is one of only a 

few black guys here” and Gibson was “one of only a few females here.” There was 

no explicit reference to race or sex discrimination in the letter, and the only reference 

to Frost is the line, “he is one of only a few black guys here.” Gibson gave the letter 

and picture to Coartney and told him that she wanted both Coartney and Stillman to 

see it. 

Soon after Gibson delivered the letter, she was approached by Kari 

Hockemeier, Con-E-Co’s Human Resource Manager, who told Gibson that she had 

distributed a letter and picture that were deemed offensive and that she was 

suspended pending an investigation. Ultimately, Hockemeier terminated Gibson’s 

employment. 

About a week after Gibson’s employment was terminated, she contacted 

Oshkosh Corporation Company (“Oshkosh”), the parent company of Con-E-Co, and 

made a complaint pursuant to Oshkosh’s Non-Retaliation Policy. She wrote that, in 

her opinion, Con-E-Co’s decision to terminate her employment was “[d]irect 

retaliation for [her] good-faith actions regarding wrongdoing/unethical behavior by 

a Foreman.” Gibson also attached an eight-page letter detailing every incident of 

alleged sexual harassment and discrimination she had experienced during her 

employment. Oshkosh conducted an investigation of the matter and ultimately 

determined that Gibson’s firing was justified. 

Gibson then filed claims for sex discrimination, sexual harassment, and 

retaliation under Title VII and NFEPA in the United States District Court for the 

District of Nebraska. The court granted summary judgment in favor of Con-E-Co 

on all claims. Gibson appeals. 
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II.

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Martinez v. W.W. 

Grainger, Inc., 664 F.3d 225, 229 (8th Cir. 2011). Summary judgment is appropriate 

if there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled 

to judgment as a matter of law. Meyer v. McKenzie Elec. Coop., Inc., 947 F.3d 506, 

508 (8th Cir. 2020).

A.

Gibson first argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment 

on her Title VII sex discrimination claim that she was fired from Con-E-Co on 

account of her sex. She does not allege direct evidence of discrimination, so we 

analyze her claim under the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas 

Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Fields v. Shelter Mut. Ins., 520 F.3d 859, 

863-64 & n.3 (8th Cir. 2008). Under this framework, a plaintiff must first establish 

a prima facie case of sex discrimination by showing that: (1) she is a member of a 

protected class; (2) she was meeting her employer’s legitimate job expectations; (3) 

she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) similarly situated employees 

outside the protected class were treated differently. Id. at 864. If the plaintiff

succeeds, the burden shifts to the defendant to “rebut the presumption of 

discrimination by articulating a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse 

employment action.” Fenney v. Dakota, Minn. & E. R.R. Co., 327 F.3d 707, 712 

(8th Cir. 2003). If the defendant rebuts the presumption, the burden shifts back to

the plaintiff to demonstrate that the proffered non-discriminatory reason is 

pretextual. Id. 

Gibson failed to establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination because she 

did not demonstrate that she met Con-E-Co’s legitimate job expectations or that 

Con-E-Co treated her differently than similarly situated male employees. First, ConE-Co warned Gibson about her use of sexual language when talking to her 
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coworkers, such as telling a coworker she only knew how to “nurse babies and suck 

dick” and on multiple occasions yelling that her “underwear’s up her ass.” Shortly 

before her firing, Gibson delivered a picture to her foremen that contained extremely 

offensive language. These undisputed violations of Con-E-Co’s harassment policy 

show that Gibson was not meeting her employer’s expectations, and therefore her 

firing was justified. See Patterson v. Ind. Newspapers, Inc., 589 F.3d 357, 359, 365 

(7th Cir. 2009) (affirming summary judgment because a plaintiff’s repeated 

violations of a newspaper’s overtime policy demonstrated that she was not meeting 

her employer’s legitimate job expectations). 

Second, Gibson also failed to establish that her comparator male coworkers 

were similarly situated to her because these coworkers, unlike Gibson, were not 

reported for multiple violations of the harassment policy. To establish a prima facie

case based on differential treatment, a plaintiff must show that she and the more 

leniently treated employees were “similarly situated in all relevant respects.” Jones 

v. Frank, 973 F.2d 673, 676 (8th Cir. 1992) (noting that establishing a prima facie

case of sex discrimination requires showing that proffered comparators had “similar 

work histor[ies]” to the complainant). Of the fourteen male employees that Gibson 

claims engaged in sexually harassing behavior, she describes only four as engaging 

in multiple incidents of harassment. And only one of those four employees, Andrew 

Anderson, was reported to Stillman. Gibson told Stillman that Anderson had made 

comments to her about previously working as a male stripper and had told her his 

stripper name was “Horse Cock.” Even if Anderson was not reprimanded for this 

particular incident, there is no record evidence that Anderson, unlike Gibson, was 

reported at any other time by any other employees. 

In contrast, Gibson admits that other employees reported her multiple times 

for violations of the harassment policy before she submitted the profanity-laced 

picture that resulted in her firing. For example, she was reported for saying loudly 

that her “underwear was riding up [her] ass” and for comparing women to

motorcycles, saying “[W]hat does a good bike have in common with a good woman? 

Treat her right, ride her well, she’ll go with you anywhere. Don’t, she’ll dump you 
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on your ass.” Because Gibson has not identified a male comparator whose 

inappropriate actions were similarly reported to foremen or Con-E-Co’s Human 

Resources Department multiple times, she has also failed to establish a prima facie

case based on similarly situated male comparators being treated more favorably than 

she was treated. 

Because Gibson did not demonstrate that she met her employer’s expectations 

or that Con-E-Co treated her less favorably than similarly situated comparators, the 

district court did not err in granting summary judgment on her sex discrimination 

claim.

B. 

Gibson also argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment 

to Con-E-Co regarding her sexual harassment claim based on vulgar behavior 

directed at her by her coworkers. To establish a prima facie case against her

employer for sexual harassment by its employees, Gibson must demonstrate that: 

“(1) she belongs to a protected group; (2) she was subject to unwelcome sexual 

harassment; (3) the harassment was based on sex; (4) the harassment affected a term, 

condition, or privilege of employment; and (5) the employer knew or should have 

known of the harassment and failed to take proper remedial action.” See Blomker v. 

Jewell, 831 F.3d 1051, 1056 (8th Cir. 2016). The district court granted summary 

judgment to Con-E-Co on the fourth element, finding that the harassment did not 

affect a term, condition, or privilege of Gibson’s employment. To establish this 

fourth element, Gibson must demonstrate (1) that the environment was objectively 

hostile and (2) that she “subjectively perceive[d]” the environment as “abusive.” See 

Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993); Sandoval v. Am. Bldg. Maint. 

Indus., Inc., 578 F.3d 787, 801 (8th Cir. 2009) (“The fourth element involves both 

objective and subjective components.”).
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Even if we assume that Con-E-Co’s employees’ offensive conduct was 

objectively hostile,

3 establishing the objective component, Gibson’s claim fails 

because she does not demonstrate that she subjectively perceived the alleged 

harassment as abusive. See Duncan v. Gen. Motors Corp., 300 F.3d 928, 934 (8th 

Cir. 2002) (“[T]he fourth part of a hostile environment claim includes both objective 

and subjective components: an environment that a reasonable person would find 

hostile and one that the victim actually perceived as abusive.”). In a letter to an 

OshKosh corporate employee who was investigating Gibson’s post-termination 

complaint, Gibson stated, “I loved it there: I told all the guys it was like having a 

bunch of brothers and uncles I never wanted . . . . I was rarely offended, and the few 

times I was[,] . . . I handled it . . . .” Moreover, evidence that Gibson “engaged in 

behavior similar to that which she claimed was unwelcome or offensive,” on 

multiple occasions, demonstrates that the behavior of the accused employees was 

not unwelcome. See Beard v. Flying J, Inc., 266 F.3d 792, 798 (8th Cir. 2001). 

Therefore, because Gibson does not establish a genuine dispute of material fact as 

to the subjective component of her harassment claim, the district court did not err in 

granting summary judgment to Con-E-Co on this claim. 

C. 

Finally, Gibson contends that Con-E-Co violated Title VII because it 

terminated her employment in retaliation for her complaints of race and sex 

discrimination. Because there is “no evidence, direct or circumstantial, showing a 

specific link between [Gibson] and any alleged retaliatory practices,” the same

McDonnell Douglas framework applies to this claim as to her sex discrimination 

claim. See Bakhtiari v. Lutz, 507 F.3d 1132, 1136-37 (8th Cir. 2007) (internal 

quotation marks and footnote omitted). Gibson must first establish a prima facie

case that would permit a reasonable jury to find that (1) she engaged in protected 

conduct, (2) she suffered an adverse employment action, and (3) the adverse action 

3

During oral argument, Con-E-Co’s counsel essentially conceded that the 

objective component of whether the harassment affected a term, condition, or 

privilege of Gibson’s employment was established.
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was causally linked to the protected conduct. See Stewart v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 

196, 481 F.3d 1034, 1042-43 (8th Cir. 2007). If Gibson establishes a prima facie

case, the burden shifts to Con-E-Co to “show a legitimate . . . reason for its actions.” 

See id. at 1043. If such a reason is proffered, the burden then returns to Gibson to 

“present evidence that (1) creates a question of fact as to whether [Con-E-Co]’s 

reason was pretextual and (2) creates a reasonable inference that [Con-E-Co] acted 

in retaliation.” See id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Gibson failed to establish 

a prima facie case for retaliation in response to either her race discrimination or sex 

discrimination complaints. 

First, Gibson asserts that she was fired in retaliation for her letter regarding 

Coartney’s treatment of Frost that she characterizes as a report of race 

discrimination. She must first establish that her letter to Coartney and Stillman about 

the vending machine incident constituted protected activity, meaning “opposition to 

employment practices prohibited under Title VII.” See Bakhtiari, 507 F.3d at 1137. 

An individual making a complaint must have an objectively reasonable belief that 

an actionable Title VII violation has occurred for the complaint to qualify as a 

protected activity. Brannum v. Mo. Dep’t of Corr., 518 F.3d 542, 548-49 (8th Cir. 

2008). This reasonableness assessment is made “in light of the applicable 

substantive law.” Id. 

Race discrimination under Title VII requires that an employee suffer an 

“adverse employment action” that amounts to a “material employment 

disadvantage,” such as “cuts in pay or benefits” or other actions that “affect an 

employee’s future career prospects.” Jones v. City of St. Louis, 825 F.3d 476, 480

(8th Cir. 2016). Although Gibson knew Frost had been “written up” after the 

incident involving his use of the vending machine during working time, she had no 

reason to think that he had suffered any other repercussions, and written criticism 

does not constitute a materially adverse action “when it did not result in any change” 

to the “terms or conditions” of employment. Wagner v. Campbell, 779 F.3d 761, 

767 (8th Cir. 2015). Because Gibson did not have an objectively reasonable basis 

for believing that a Title VII violation had occurred, her complaint did not constitute 
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protected activity. Brannum, 518 F.3d at 549. Therefore, the district court did not 

err in granting summary judgment to Con-E-Co on Gibson’s claim of retaliation for 

reporting race discrimination.

Second, Gibson also failed to establish a prima facie retaliation claim based 

on her reporting of sex discrimination because she did not demonstrate a causal 

connection between her sex discrimination complaints and the termination of her 

employment. See Stewart, 481 F.3d at 1043. Although Gibson claims she reported 

several instances of sex discrimination during her employment at Con-E-Co in 

addition to her letter to Coartney and Stillman a few days before she was fired, she 

does not offer causation evidence that gives rise to “an inference of retaliatory 

motive” for the adverse employment action. See Kipp v. Mo. Highway & Transp. 

Comm’n, 280 F.3d 893, 897 (8th Cir. 2002). “Generally, . . . more than a temporal 

connection between protected activity and an adverse employment action is required 

to show a genuine factual issue on retaliation exists.” Buettner v. Arch Coal Sales 

Co., 216 F.3d 707, 716 (8th Cir. 2000). Gibson offers no more than a temporal 

connection to suggest causation here, and even that connection is, at best, tenuous. 

Although Gibson’s firing followed closely after her submission of the letter 

and picture to Stillman and Coartney, the picture contained extremely offensive and 

sexualized words, and Con-E-Co’s harassment policy forbids “sexually 

suggestive . . . pictures or written words, . . . slurs or innuendos.” See Wierman v. 

Casey’s Gen. Stores, 638 F.3d 984, 1001 (8th Cir. 2011) (noting that a prima facie

retaliation case “built on temporal proximity[] is undermined where the allegedly 

retaliatory motive coincides temporally with the non-retaliatory motive”). 

Additionally, Gibson does not present evidence of any concurrent retaliatory 

measures against her for her earlier complaints or offer other evidence linking her 

eventual firing with those earlier complaints. See Stewart, 481 F.3d at 1043. 

Because Gibson has failed to offer evidence sufficient to raise a genuine dispute of 

material fact regarding a causal link between her complaints and her firing, she has

not presented a prima facie case for retaliation based on sex discrimination.
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III. 

For the foregoing reasons, the district court did not err in granting summary 

judgment to Con-E-Co. We affirm.

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