Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 2 / Wednesday, January 3, 1996 / Notices 193

The facilities are pressurized water

reactors located at the licensee’s site in

Lake County, Illinois.

II

In 10 CFR 73.55, ‘‘Requirements for

Physical Protection of Licensed

Activities in Nuclear Power Reactors

Against Radiological Sabotage,’’

paragraph (a), in part, states that ‘‘the

licensee shall establish and maintain an

onsite physical protection system and

security organization which will have as

its objective to provide high assurance

that activities involving special nuclear

material are not inimical to the common

defense and security and do not

constitute an unreasonable risk to the

public health and safety.’’

In 10 CFR 73.55(d), ‘‘Access

Requirements,’’ paragraph (1), it

specifies that ‘‘the licensee shall control

all points of personnel and vehicle

access into a protected area.’’ Also, 10

CFR 73.55(d)(5) requires that ‘‘A

numbered picture badge identification

system shall be used for all individuals

who are authorized access to protected

areas without escort.’’ It further states

that individuals not employed by the

licensee (e.g., contractors) may be

authorized access to protected areas

without escort provided that the

individual, ‘‘receives a picture badge

upon entrance into a protected area

which must be returned upon exit from

the protected area * * *.’’

The licensee proposes to implement

an alternative unescorted access system

which would eliminate the need to

issue and retrieve picture badges at the

entrance/exit location to the protected

area and would allow all individuals,

including contractors, to keep their

picture badges in their possession when

departing Zion Station.

III

Pursuant to 10 CFR 73.5, ‘‘Specific

exemptions,’’ the Commission may,

upon application of any interested

person or upon its own initiative, grant

such exemptions from the requirements

of the regulations in this part as it

determines are authorized by law and

will not endanger life or property or the

common defense and security, and are

otherwise in the public interest.

According to 10 CFR 73.55, the

Commission may authorize a licensee to

provide alternative measures for

protection against radiological sabotage

provided the licensee demonstrates that

the alternative measures have the same

‘‘high assurance’’ objective, that the

proposed measures meet the general

performance requirements of the

regulation, and that the overall level of

system performance provides protection

against radiological sabotage equivalent

to that which would be provided by the

regulation.

Currently, unescorted access into the

protected area for both employee and

contractor personnel into Zion Station,

Units 1 and 2, is controlled through the

use of picture badges. Positive

identification of personnel which are

authorized and request access into the

protected area is established by security

personnel making a visual comparison

of the individual requesting access and

that individual’s picture badge. In

accordance with 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5),

contractor personnel are not allowed to

take their picture badges off site. In

addition, in accordance with the plant’s

physical security plan, the licensee’s

employees are also not allowed to take

their picture badges off site.

The proposed system will require that

all individuals with authorized

unescorted access have the physical

characteristics of their hand (hand

geometry) registered with their picture

badge number in a computerized access

control system. Therefore, all authorized

individuals must not only have their

picture badge to gain access to the

protected area, but must also have their

hand geometry confirmed. All

individuals, including contractors, who

have authorized unescorted access into

the protected area will be allowed to

keep their picture badges in their

possession when departing the Zion

Station.

All other access processes, including

search function capability and access

revocation, will remain the same. A

security officer responsible for access

control will continue to be positioned

within a bullet-resistant structure. It

should also be noted that the proposed

system is only for individuals with

authorized unescorted access and will

not be used for those individuals

requiring escorts.

Sandia National Laboratories

conducted testing which demonstrated

that the hand geometry equipment

possesses strong performance

characteristics. Details of the testing

performed are in the Sandia report, ‘‘A

Performance Evaluation of Biometric

Identification Devices,’’ SAND91—0276

UC—906 Unlimited Release, June 1991.

Based on the Sandia report and the

licensee’s experience using the current

photo picture identification system, the

false acceptance rate for the proposed

hand geometry system would be at least

equivalent to that of the current system.

To assure that the proposed system will

continue to meet the general

performance requirements of 10 CFR

73.55(d)(5), the licensee will implement

a process for testing the system. The site

security plans will also be revised to

allow implementation of the hand

geometry system and to allow

employees and contractors with

unescorted access to keep their picture

badges in their possession when leaving

Zion Station.

IV

For the foregoing reasons, the NRC

staff has determined that the proposed

alternative measures for protection

against radiological sabotage meet the

same high assurance objective and the

general performance requirements of 10

CFR 73.55. In addition, the staff has

determined that the overall level of the

proposed system’s performance will

provide protection against radiological

sabotage equivalent to that which is

provided by the current system in

accordance with 10 CFR 73.55.

Accordingly, the Commission has

determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR

73.5, this exemption is authorized by

law, will not endanger life or property

or common defense and security, and is

otherwise in the public interest.

Therefore, the Commission hereby

grants the following exemption:

The requirement of 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5) that

individuals who have been granted

unescorted access and are not employed by

the licensee are to return their picture badges

upon exit from the protected area is no longer

necessary. Thus, these individuals may keep

their picture badges in their possession upon

leaving Zion Nuclear Power Station.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the

Commission has determined that the

granting of this exemption will not

result in any significant adverse

environmental impact (60 FR 66566).

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 26th day

of December 26, 1995.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Gail Marcus,

Acting Director, Division of Reactor Projects—

III/IV, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

[FR Doc. 96–00042 Filed 1–2–96; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

[IA 95–061]

Gary A. Minnick; Order Prohibiting

Involvement in NRC-Licensed

Activities

I

On various dates in 1992 and 1993,

Gary A. Minnick was employed by

various contractors to perform rigging

and scaffolding work at nuclear power

plants licensed by the Nuclear

Regulatory Commission (NRC or

Commission), including Palo Verde,

Beaver Valley, and North Anna. In each

case, Mr. Minnick was granted
194 Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 2 / Wednesday, January 3, 1996 / Notices

temporary unescorted access to these

power plants on the basis of information

he submitted on security questionnaires.

10 CFR 73.56 and 73.57 require, in part,

that nuclear power plant licensees

conduct access authorization programs

for individuals seeking unescorted

access to protected and vital areas with

the objective of providing high

assurance that individuals granted

unescorted access are trustworthy and

reliable and do not constitute an

unreasonable risk to the health and

safety of the public. The unescorted

access authorization program must

include a background investigation,

including criminal history, and the

decision to grant unescorted access

authorization must be based upon the

licensee’s review and evaluation of all

pertinent information developed.

II

In order to be certified for unescorted

access at Palo Verde, Beaver Valley, and

North Anna, Mr. Minnick was required

to complete security questionnaires

which included a request that he list all

prior criminal arrests or charges and

provide the final disposition of each

such arrest or charge. Mr. Minnick

completed a security questionnaire on

September 21, 1992 to gain unescorted

access to North Anna, on January 7,

1993 and March 12, 1993 to gain

unescorted access to Beaver Valley, and

on September 30, 1993 to gain

unescorted access to Palo Verde. In each

case, Mr. Minnick was asked to list all

arrests and charges against him and the

disposition of these arrests and charges,

with the exception of juvenile offenses

and traffic citations not involving

reckless driving or alcohol.

Although Mr. Minnick listed one or

two arrests on each of the forms he

completed, he omitted from each of

these forms several arrests and charges

against him that occurred between 1971

and 1988 and that were required to be

listed on the unescorted access

authorization applications. Mr. Minnick

also omitted potentially significant and

material information associated with the

arrests that he did list. Specifically, he

consistently failed to disclose the fact

that he was sentenced to one year in

prison and served approximately 91

days after being convicted in 1988 of

driving after being declared an habitual

offender, which is a felony offense.

Although the arrests and charges that

Mr. Minnick listed varied from form to

form, he failed to provide a complete

list of his arrests and charges that were

required to be listed on all of the

involved forms.

In August 1994, the NRC’s Office of

Investigations (OI) began an

investigation to determine whether Mr.

Minnick deliberately falsified and/or

omitted criminal history background

information relevant to the granting of

unescorted access. In a report issued in

April 1995, OI concluded that Mr.

Minnick had deliberately falsified his

criminal history background

information which was used, in part, as

the basis for granting him unescorted

access to four NRC-licensed nuclear

power plants. On October 6, 1995, the

NRC conducted a predecisional

enforcement conference with Mr.

Minnick in Rockville, Maryland, to

assist in determining whether civil

enforcement action against him was

warranted.

During the enforcement conference,

Mr. Minnick admitted that he had

omitted arrest information from each of

the forms, but denied that he did so

deliberately. He stated at various times

during the conference that: (1) He may

have been rushed in completing the

forms; (2) he believed that, by listing

some arrest information, the remaining

information would be discovered by the

investigating agencies and that he

believed a records check would be

completed before he was granted

unescorted access; (3) he thought that

the forms required criminal background

information only for the previous 5

years; (4) he completed the forms

without the assistance of any records;

(5) he didn’t read all of the details in the

application; and (6) he thought that by

writing ‘‘habitual offender’’ everyone

would know that this offense entailed a

prison sentence. The NRC has

considered these statements but on

balance finds them not to be convincing

because: (1) The questionnaires were

clear in requesting information about all

arrests; (2) Mr. Minnick has stated that

he read and understood the language of

what he was reading; (3) on some of the

forms, Mr. Minnick listed arrests that

went beyond the 5-year period he stated

that he believed was required; (4) Mr.

Minnick exhibited a reasonably good

recollection of his arrest record in

listing different arrests on the various

forms that he completed, and (5) Mr.

Minnick consistently failed to reveal the

fact that he was sentenced to a year in

prison for one offense, instead

indicating that he had received other

sanctions for that offense. During the

enforcement conference, Mr. Minnick

indicated that he now clearly

understands the importance of reporting

fully and accurately all information

requested.

III

Based on the information described

above, the NRC concludes that Mr.

Minnick’s omissions were deliberate

and were in violation of 10 CFR

50.5(a)(2), which prohibits individuals

from deliberately providing information

to a licensee or a contractor that the

individual knows is inaccurate or

incomplete in some respect material to

the NRC. His omissions were material

because, as indicated above, licensees

are required to consider arrest

information in making unescorted

access determinations.

The NRC must be able to rely on

licensees, contractors and their

employees to provide information that

is complete and accurate in all material

respects. This is essential with respect

to access authorization programs at

nuclear power plants because temporary

access determinations are made on the

basis of information provided by

individuals prior to completion of

background records check and because

the purpose of such programs is to

assure the trustworthiness and

reliability of individuals granted access.

Mr. Minnick’s deliberate omissions,

which occurred on multiple occasions,

raise serious doubt as to whether he can

be relied upon to comply with NRC

requirements and to provide complete

and accurate information to NRC

licensees and their contractors, and

raise doubts about his trustworthiness

and reliability.

Consequently, I lack the requisite

reasonable assurance that licensed

activities will be conducted in

compliance with the Commission’s

requirements if Mr. Minnick were

permitted at this time to be involved in

any NRC-licensed activities. Therefore,

the public health, safety and interest

require that Mr. Minnick be prohibited

from involvement in licensed activities,

including obtaining unescorted access at

a licensed facility, for a period of one (1)

year from the date of this Order and that

for a period of one (1) year following

this prohibition period Mr. Minnick be

required to inform the NRC if he accepts

employment with any employer that

would involve work in NRC-licensed

activities.

IV

Accordingly, pursuant to Sections

103, 161b, 161i, 182 and 186 of the

Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended,

and the Commission’s regulations in 10

CFR 2.202, and 10 CFR 50.5, it is hereby

ordered, effective immediately, that:

A. For a one-year period from the date of

this Order, Mr. Gary A. Minnick is prohibited

from engaging in NRC-licensed activities,

including obtaining unescorted access at a

licensed facility. For the purpose of this

paragraph, NRC-licensed activities include

licensed activities of: (1) an NRC licensee; (2)
Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 2 / Wednesday, January 3, 1996 / Notices 195

an Agreement State licensee conducting

licensed activities in NRC jurisdiction

pursuant to 10 CFR 150.20; and (3) an

Agreement State licensee involved in

distribution of products that are subject to

NRC jurisdiction.

B. For a one-year period following the oneyear prohibition under paragraph A above,

Mr. Minnick shall, within 20 days of his

acceptance of each employment offer

involving NRC-licensed activities or his

becoming involved in NRC-licensed activities

as defined in Paragraph A above, provide

notice to the Director, Office of Enforcement,

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

Washington, D.C. 20555, if he accepts

employment with any employer that would

involve work in NRC-licensed activities. The

notice shall include the name, address, and

telephone number of the employer. In the

first notification, Mr. Minnick shall include

a statement of his commitment to compliance

with regulatory requirements and the basis

why the Commission should have confidence

that he will now comply with NRC

requirements.

The Director, Office of Enforcement,

may, in writing, relax or rescind any of

the above conditions upon

demonstration by Mr. Minnick of good

cause.

V

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.202, Mr.

Minnick must, and any other person

adversely affected by this Order may,

submit an answer to this Order within

20 days of the date of this Order. The

answer may consent to the conditions of

this Order. The answer may also request

a hearing on this Order. Where good

cause is shown, consideration will be

given to extending the time to request a

hearing. A request for extension of time

must be made in writing to the Director,

Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, Washington,

D.C. 20555 and include a statement of

good cause for the extension.

Unless the answer consents to this

Order, the answer shall, in writing and

under oath or affirmation, specifically

admit or deny each allegation or charge

made in this Order and shall set forth

the matters of fact and law on which Mr.

Minnick or other person adversely

affected relies and the reasons as to why

the Order should not have been issued.

Any answer or request for a hearing

shall be submitted to the Secretary, U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Attn:

Chief, Docketing and Service Section,

Washington, DC 20555. Copies also

shall be sent to the Director, Office of

Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555

and to the Assistant General Counsel for

Hearings and Enforcement at the same

address, to the Regional Administrator,

NRC Region IV, Suite 400, 611 Ryan

Plaza, Arlington, Texas 76011, and to

Mr. Minnick if the answer or hearing

request is by a person other than Mr.

Minnick. If a person other than Mr.

Minnick requests a hearing, that person

shall set forth with particularity the

manner in which his or her interest is

adversely affected by this Order and

shall address the criteria set forth in 10

CFR 2.714(d).

If a hearing is requested by Mr.

Minnick or a person whose interest is

adversely affected, the Commission will

issue an Order designating the time and

place of any hearing. If a hearing is held,

the issue to be considered at such

hearing shall be whether this Order

should be sustained.

In the absence of any request for

hearing, or written approval of an

extension of time in which to request a

hearing, the provisions specified in

Section IV above shall be final 20 days

from the date of this Order without

further order or proceedings. If an

extension of time for requesting a

hearing has been approved, the

provisions specified in Section IV shall

be final when the extension expires if a

hearing request has not been received.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland this 22nd day

of December 1995.

James L. Milhoan

Deputy Executive Director for Nuclear Reactor

Regulation, Regional Operations and

Research.

[FR Doc. 96–00041 Filed 1–2–96; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY

COMMITTEE ON GULF WAR

VETERANS ILLNESSES

Meeting

AGENCY: Presidential Advisory

Committee on Gulf War Veterans’

Illnesses.

ACTION: Notice of open meeting.

SUMMARY: Under the provisions of the

Federal Advisory Committee Act, this

notice is hereby given to announce an

open meeting concerning the

Presidential Advisory Committee on

Gulf War Veterans’ Illnesses.

DATE: January 31, 1996, 8:30 a.m.–5:00

p.m.

PLACE: Stouffer Renaissance Mayflower

Hotel, 1127 Connecticut Avenue, NW,

Washington, DC, 20036.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The

President established the Presidential

Advisory Committee on Gulf War

Veterans’ Illnesses by Executive Order

12961, May 26, 1995. The purpose of

this committee is to review and provide

recommendations on the full range of

government activities associated with

Gulf War veterans’ illnesses. The

committee reports to the President

through the Secretary of Defense, the

Secretary of Health and Human

Services, and the Secretary of Veterans

Affairs. The committee members have

expertise relevant to the functions of the

committee and are appointed by the

President from non-Federal sectors.

Tentative Agenda

Wednesday, January 31, 1996

8:30 a.m. Call to order opening remarks

8:35 a.m. Public comment

9:05 a.m. Discussion of interim report

10:30 a.m. Break

12:00 p.m. Lunch

1:15 p.m. Discussion of interim report

3:30 p.m. Break

3:45 p.m. Discussion of interim report

5:00 p.m. Meeting adjourned

A final agenda will be available at the

meeting.

Public Participation

The meeting is open to the public.

Members of the public who wish to

make oral statements should contact the

Advisory Committee at the address or

telephone number listed below at least

five business days prior to the meeting.

Reasonable provisions will be made to

include on the agenda presentations

from individuals who have not yet had

an opportunity to address the Advisory

Committee. The Advisory Committee

Chair is empowered to conduct the

meeting in a fashion that will facilitate

the orderly conduct of business. People

who wish to file written statements with

the Advisory Committee may do so at

any time.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Miles W. Ewing, Presidential Advisory

Committee on Gulf War Veterans’

Illnesses, 1411 K Street, N.W., suite

1000, Washington, DC

20005,Telephone: (202) 761–0066, Fax:

(202) 761–0310.

Dated: December 8, 1995.

C.A. Bock,

Federal Register Liaison Officer, Presidential

Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans’

Illnesses.

[FR Doc. 96–00031 Filed 1–2–96; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 3610–76–M