1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

ABDULLAHI MOHAMED FARAH, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF 

SOMALILAND, et al., 

Defendants. 

Case No. 1:23-cv-1205 (ACR) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

 Plaintiff Abdullahi Mohamed Farah, proceeding pro se, seeks damages for his father’s 

death, which allegedly occurred at the hands of forces loyal to the Republic of Somaliland, a 

self-declared breakaway state in East Africa whose legal status the parties vigorously dispute. 

Plaintiff has sued Somaliland officials and entities under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1350, and the Torture Victims Protection Act (TVPA), 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note. Defendants 

have moved to dismiss on various grounds. Dkt. 34-1 (Mot.). 

 For the following reasons, the Court grants Defendants’ Motion and dismisses Plaintiff’s 

Second Amended Complaint without prejudice. In so doing, the Court expresses no view about 

Somaliland’s legal status. Nor does the Court necessarily close the book on this case: it will 

allow Plaintiff one last opportunity to file a viable pleading. 

I. BACKGROUND 

A. Factual Background 

 The Court begins by describing the central facts, saving some details for the relevant 

portions of its analysis. Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court draws these facts from 
2 

his operative pleading and his filings in opposition to Defendants’ Motion. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Am. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. FDIC, 642 F.3d 1137, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 2011); 

Brown v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp. Inc., 789 F.3d 146, 150, 152 (D.C. Cir. 2015). The Court also 

relies on material of which it can take judicial notice, such as information on official U.S. 

government websites. See Spence v. U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., 109 F.4th 531, 539 n.2 (D.C. 

Cir. 2024); Arab v. Blinken, 600 F. Supp. 3d 59, 63 n.1 (D.D.C. 2022). 

 The Republic of Somaliland is a “self-proclaimed sovereign state” in East Africa 

composed of territory also claimed by the Federal Republic of Somalia. United States v. Ali, 718 

F.3d 929, 933 (D.C. Cir. 2013); see U.S. Dep’t of State, 2023 Country Reports on Human Rights 

Practices: Somalia, https://www.state.gov/reports/2023-country-reports-on-human-rightspractices/somalia [https://perma.cc/7GJ3-EZXS]. Plaintiff alleges that, “[s]ince December 27, 

2022, Somaliland Ministry of Defense troops and militias under the command of the 

Government of the Republic of Somaliland have continuously attacked . . . and indiscriminately 

shelled the civilian population of [the city of Las Anod] due to [that] population’s desire to 

remain part of Somalia.” Dkt. 31-1 (Compl.) at 14.1

 Plaintiff further alleges that, on or around 

December 30, 2022, the Government of the Republic of Somaliland, the Ministry of Defense of 

Somaliland, Somaliland President Muse Bihi Abdi, and Minister of Defense Abdiqani 

Mohamoud Aateye “ordered” Somaliland troops “into Las Anod . . . to target, attack, torture, 

murder, and subjugate the inhabitants . . . deemed to be supporters of Las Anod’s unification 

with . . . Somalia.” Id. at 14-15. “Somalis with United States citizenship or legal residency were 

deemed by . . . Defendants to be instigators and were specifically targeted.” Id. at 15. The 

soldiers “stopped [Plaintiff’s father] on the streets . . . [and] tortured and summarily executed 

1

 Citations to docket entries use the continuous ECF page numbering. 
3 

[him] . . . for his expressed support for Las Anod[’s] unification with Somalia.” Id. at 14. 

Plaintiff also asserts that the Somaliland-based Defendants used the U.S.-based Somaliland 

Mission in the United States, Somaliland Support Organization (a nonprofit operated by the 

Somaliland Government, Mot. at 7), and their agents “as a command and communication 

center,” “conspir[ing]” to identify U.S. residents and citizens “suspected to be critics of . . . 

Defendants[’] actions . . . for harassment, arrest, torture or/and murder upon arrival in areas . . . 

controlled by . . . Defendants.” Compl. at 15. 

B. Procedural Background 

 Plaintiff filed this case in May 2023, naming the Government of the Republic of 

Somaliland, the Ministry of Defense, the President, and the Minister as Defendants. Dkt. 1. 

Plaintiff has since twice amended his pleading to add Defendants and allegations. Dkts. 13, 31-

1. The operative Second Amended Complaint (to which the Court refers as the “Complaint,” for 

simplicity’s sake) adds five U.S.-based Defendants: the Mission, the Somaliland Support 

Organization, and three individuals whom Plaintiff identifies as agents of those entities, Rashid 

Nur Absiye, Bashir Goth, and Yassin Meri.2

 Compl. at 3-4. Invoking both the ATS and the 

TVPA, Plaintiff seeks $1.3 billion in damages. Id. at 12-13. 

 Defendants moved to dismiss in November 2023. Mot. In response, Plaintiff has filed an 

Opposition, Dkt. 35 (Opp.); a Supplemental Opposition, Dkt. 39; and a post-argument “Notice of 

Clarification and Correction,” Dkt. 44. Defendants have replied to each. Dkts. 36, 40, 45. The 

Court heard argument on the Motion in June 2024. 

2

 The parties use inconsistent spellings for Mr. Meri’s name. Compare, e.g., Compl. at 15 

(“Merri”), with Mot. at 7 (“Meri”). The Court uses the more frequent spelling. 
4 

II. LEGAL STANDARDS 

 Defendants’ Motion seeks dismissal under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), 

12(b)(2), and 12(b)(6) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, lack of personal jurisdiction, and 

failure to state a claim, respectively. 

 When a defendant moves to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintiff bears the burden of 

establishing jurisdiction. E.g., Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). Where, as 

here, “the defendant challenges only the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff’s jurisdictional 

allegations,” Phoenix Consulting, Inc. v. Republic of Angola, 216 F.3d 36, 40 (D.C. Cir. 2000), 

the Court “assume[s] the truth of all material factual allegations in the complaint and construe[s] 

the complaint liberally, granting [the] plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that can be derived 

from the facts alleged,” Am. Nat’l Ins. Co., 642 F.3d at 1139 (cleaned up). 

 A plaintiff confronted with a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2) must “make a prima 

facie showing of the pertinent jurisdictional facts.” Livnat v. Palestinian Auth., 851 F.3d 45, 56-

57 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (cleaned up). “Conclusory statements or a bare allegation of conspiracy or 

agency do not satisfy this burden.” Id. at 57 (cleaned up). “When deciding personal jurisdiction 

without an evidentiary hearing—as here—[a] court must resolve factual disputes in favor of the 

plaintiff, but it need not accept inferences drawn by plaintiffs if such inferences are unsupported 

by the facts.” Id. (cleaned up). 

 To avoid dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual 

matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 

678 (cleaned up). To meet that standard, a plaintiff’s allegations must support a “reasonable 

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The plausibility standard 

is not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a 
5 

defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (cleaned up). “Where a complaint pleads facts that are 

merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and 

plausibility of entitlement to relief.” Id. (cleaned up). “[T]he Court need not accept inferences 

drawn by [a] plaintiff if those inferences are not supported by the facts set out in the complaint, 

nor must the [C]ourt accept legal conclusions cast as factual allegations.” FTC v. Endo Pharms. 

Inc., 82 F.4th 1196, 1203 (D.C. Cir. 2023) (cleaned up). 

 Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court must treat him with “solicitude” in 

applying these standards. Kim v. United States, 840 F. Supp. 2d 180, 191 (D.D.C. 2012), aff’d, 

707 F.3d 335 (D.C. Cir. 2013). In particular, the Court must hold his filings “to less stringent 

standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers” and “consider [his] complaint in light of all 

filings, including filings responsive to a motion to dismiss.” Brown, 789 F.3d at 150, 152 

(cleaned up). But “even a pro se plaintiff must comply with the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure,” Hedrick v. FBI, 216 F. Supp. 3d 84, 93 (D.D.C. 2016), and must “plead factual 

matter that permits [the Court] to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct,” Brown, 

789 F.3d at 150 (cleaned up). 

III. ANALYSIS 

 Defendants raise a host of arguments for dismissal. After discussing why the Court 

need—and, it concludes, should—not address Defendants’ arguments based on foreign sovereign 

or official immunity, the Court explains that it lacks personal jurisdiction over several 

Defendants. The Court then covers why the remaining ATS and TVPA claims also cannot move 

forward. 
6 

A. The Court Need Not Address Defendants’ Immunity Arguments. 

 As a threshold matter, Defendants argue that the Court lacks jurisdiction over most of 

Plaintiff’s claims because the Somaliland Government, the Ministry, and the Mission “are 

entitled to [foreign sovereign] immunity under the FSIA” and the individual Defendants “are 

immune to Plaintiff’s ATS claim[s] . . . as foreign government officials.” Mot. at 15, 18. 

Plaintiff responds that neither form of immunity applies because “Defendants are a secessionist 

regime . . . not recognized as an independent foreign state by the United States and the United 

Nations . . . and do not meet the definition of a foreign state [under the FSIA].” Opp. at 1. The 

Court need not resolve this dispute over Somaliland’s sovereignty for two independent reasons. 

 First, although the claimed immunities go to the Court’s jurisdiction, neither involves any 

constitutional issues, and the Court has discretion to “address[] the merits where doing so 

ma[kes] it possible to avoid a doubtful issue of statutory jurisdiction.” Chalabi v. Hashemite 

Kingdom of Jordan, 543 F.3d 725, 728 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (cleaned up). Foreign sovereign 

immunity is a statutory issue governed by the FSIA; Chalabi itself declined to resolve a claim of 

immunity under the FSIA because the plaintiff’s claims failed on other, nonjurisdictional 

grounds. See id. at 728-29; see also Process & Indus. Devs. Ltd. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 

962 F.3d 576, 584-86 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (recognizing that, while a district court may not require a 

foreign sovereign to brief a merits issue before the court resolves a colorable claim of immunity, 

the court may decide the case on other grounds that the sovereign chooses to brief). And while 

foreign official immunity is a common law, rather than statutory, doctrine, see, e.g., Samantar v. 

Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 319-25 (2010), the same principle logically applies. Chalabi emphasized 

the distinction between constitutional and nonconstitutional jurisdictional issues, see 543 F.3d at 

728-29, and common law immunity, like statutory immunity, falls into the latter category. 
7 

Moreover, it would be odd indeed if the Court could decline to address a form of immunity 

expressly codified by Congress but not one created by judges. Cf. Samantar, 560 U.S. at 323 

(discussing Congress’s “intent to leave [foreign] official immunity outside the scope of the 

[FSIA]”). The Court thus has discretion to bypass Defendants’ immunity claims if their other 

arguments—even their merits arguments—render the immunity questions moot. 

 Second, even setting aside that discretion, resolving this case based on Defendants’ other 

arguments does not require the Court to reach any merits issues. “[A] federal court has leeway to 

choose among threshold grounds for denying audience to a case on the merits.” Chalabi, 543 

F.3d at 728 (cleaned up). As explained below, most of Plaintiff’s claims founder on alternative 

jurisdictional grounds. The sole claim for which the Court must reach the merits—Plaintiff’s 

TVPA claim against Mr. Goth—is one for which Defendants have not asserted an immunity 

defense. Mot. at 18 & n.13. So even if the Court could not reach the merits without addressing 

the immunity defenses, it would not need to do so to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims. 

 Given these alternative grounds for deciding this case, the Court finds it wiser not to 

wade into the debate over Somaliland’s status. Cf. Blumenthal v. Trump, 949 F.3d 14, 19 (D.C. 

Cir. 2020) (“[I]f it is not necessary to decide more, it is necessary not to decide more.” (cleaned 

up)). The legal issues underlying the immunity arguments not only are “difficult” and 

“doubtful,” Chalabi, 543 F.3d at 728-29 (cleaned up), but also implicate the “host of 

sensitive . . . foreign-relations concerns” present in FSIA cases, Exxon Mobil Corp. v. 

Corporacion CIMEX, S.A., No. 21-7127, 2024 WL 3573507, at *6 (D.C. Cir. July 30, 2024). 

Indeed, those concerns are if anything more pronounced here than in the usual case; Defendants 

ask the Court to weigh in not merely on Somaliland’s liability in a particular suit but on its very 

existence. Recognizing that “[t]he better part of valor is discretion,” William Shakespeare, 
8 

Henry IV, Part 1 act V, sc. 4, l. 118-19 (Claire McEachern ed., 2000), the Court bypasses the 

immunity issues and focuses instead on Defendants’ alternative arguments. 

B. The Court Does Not Have Personal Jurisdiction over the Somaliland Support 

Organization or Any Individual Defendant Other than Mr. Goth. 

 The Somaliland Support Organization and the individual Defendants (other than Mr. 

Goth) argue that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over them.3

 Mot. at 20-23. The Court 

agrees. 

 Some necessary background: In most cases, the personal jurisdiction inquiry examines 

whether a court sitting in a particular state can exercise jurisdiction over the defendant. See, e.g., 

Thompson Hine, LLP v. Taieb, 734 F.3d 1187, 1189 (D.C. Cir. 2013). To make that 

determination, a court “must first examine whether jurisdiction is applicable under the state’s 

long-arm statute and then determine whether a finding of jurisdiction satisfies the constitutional 

requirements of due process” based on the defendant’s contacts with that state. Id. (cleaned up); 

see Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1). A different inquiry applies, however, if a claim “arises under federal 

law” and “the defendant is not subject to jurisdiction in any state’s courts of general jurisdiction” 

(either because of restrictive state long-arm statutes or because the defendant lacks sufficient 

contacts with any one state). Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2); see Lewis v. Mutond, 62 F.4th 587, 591 

(D.C. Cir. 2023). In such a case, a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant if 

doing so is “consistent with” due process requirements based on the defendant’s contacts with 

the United States as a whole. Mutond, 62 F.4th at 591 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2)(B)). “[A] 

3

 Defendants initially argued that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Mr. Goth as well, Mot. 

at 21-22, but withdrew that contention at oral argument, Tr. at 60:13-20. Defendants also assert 

that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over the entities purportedly protected by foreign 

sovereign immunity under the FSIA because, under that statute, the Court has personal jurisdiction 

only if it has subject matter jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a)-(b); Mot. at 21 n.15. For the 

reasons discussed above, the Court can—and will—bypass this argument. See supra Section III.A. 
9 

court may use [the nationwide inquiry] to confer jurisdiction” if “a defendant does not concede 

to jurisdiction in another state.” Mwani v. Bin Laden, 417 F.3d 1, 11 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (cleaned 

up). 

 “[A]part from the scope of the forum”—a specific state or the nation as a whole—the due 

process analysis in either case is the same.4 Mutond, 62 F.4th at 591-92 (cleaned up). Due 

process “protects an individual’s liberty interest in not being subject to the binding judgments of 

a forum with which he has established no meaningful contacts, ties, or relations, and requires that 

individuals have fair warning that a particular activity may subject them to the [forum’s] 

jurisdiction.” Mwani, 417 F.3d at 11 (cleaned up). The Court must therefore assess whether the 

“defendant has sufficient contacts with the [forum] to justify the exercise of personal 

jurisdiction.” Id.

 In general, “two types” of contacts can support personal jurisdiction.5 Mutond, 62 F.4th 

at 591. First, contacts that “are so continuous and systematic as to render [a defendant] 

essentially at home in the forum” give rise to “general jurisdiction” over “any and all claims” 

against that defendant. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 

(2011) (cleaned up). “For an individual, the paradigm forum for the exercise of general 

jurisdiction is the individual’s domicile; for a corporation, . . . the place of incorporation and 

principal place of business are paradigm bases for general jurisdiction.” Daimler AG v. Bauman, 

4

 Technically, the due process requirement in the state-specific framework comes from the 

Fourteenth Amendment, while the Fifth Amendment controls the nationwide inquiry. Mutond, 

62 F.4th at 591. This distinction does not change the analysis. See id. at 591-92. 

5

 Aside from these two usual categories, a party can consent to personal jurisdiction, see Mallory v. 

Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 600 U.S. 122, 125-27 (2023), and a court may exercise personal jurisdiction 

over an individual “personally served with process while temporarily in [a s]tate,” Burnham v. 

Superior Ct. of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 607, 628 (1990) (plurality opinion). Plaintiff does not 

argue—and nothing in his Complaint or briefing suggests—that either option applies here. 
10 

571 U.S. 117, 137 (2014) (cleaned up). Second, more limited contacts may provide a basis for 

“specific jurisdiction.” Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919. “Pleading specific personal jurisdiction . . . 

requires demonstrating a close nexus between the [forum], the . . . defendant’s conduct, and the 

plaintiff’s claim.” Bernhardt v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 47 F.4th 856, 864 (D.C. Cir. 2022). 

“The defendant’s contacts must be purposefully directed at the forum,” Mutond, 62 F.4th at 591 

(cleaned up), and “the alleged injuries [must] arise out of or relate to those [contacts],” 

Bernhardt, 47 F.4th at 864 (cleaned up). 

 The Court sorts the personal-jurisdiction-contesting Defendants into two groups: (1) the 

Somaliland Support Organization and the U.S.-based individuals (other than Mr. Goth) and 

(2) the President and the Minister. It concludes that Plaintiff has not established personal 

jurisdiction over either group. 

1. The Court does not have personal jurisdiction over the Somaliland 

Support Organization or the U.S.-based individuals (other than Mr. 

Goth). 

 The Court first assesses whether it has personal jurisdiction over the Somaliland Support 

Organization and the U.S.-based individuals (other than Mr. Goth). To do so, it must first 

determine whether to use the state-specific or nationwide personal jurisdiction analysis. That 

determination turns on whether a “defendant is . . . subject to jurisdiction in any state’s courts of 

general jurisdiction”; if so, the Court must use the state-specific inquiry. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2); 

see Mutond, 62 F.4th at 591. 

 The record thus far shows that these Defendants would be subject to general personal 

jurisdiction in Virginia, making the state-specific analysis appropriate. Plaintiff alleges—and 

provides exhibits documenting—that the Somaliland Support Organization is a Virginia 

corporation with its principal place of business in Virginia. Compl. at 10; Dkt. 35-3 at 8-14. The 
11 

Organization would therefore be subject to general personal jurisdiction in Virginia.6

 See, e.g., 

Daimler AG, 571 U.S. at 137 (describing “the place of incorporation and principal place of 

business [as the] paradigm bases for general jurisdiction” over a corporation (cleaned up)). The 

same is true of the individuals, for whom Plaintiff gives Virginia addresses. See, e.g., id. (“For 

an individual, the paradigm forum for the exercise of general jurisdiction is the individual’s 

domicile . . . .” (cleaned up)). 

 The upshot is that the state-specific analysis applies, and Plaintiff must establish the 

Court’s personal jurisdiction over these Defendants based on their ties to the District of 

Columbia in particular, rather than to the nation as a whole. Plaintiff does not describe any such 

ties in any detail. Instead, he summarily asserts that the Organization and the U.S.-based 

individuals “regularly and actively conduct business activities in the District,” Opp. at 3, 

apparently attempting to invoke a provision of the D.C. long-arm statute that authorizes 

jurisdiction over claims “arising from the [defendant’s] . . . transacting any business in the 

District,” D.C. Code § 13-423(a). Plaintiff’s allegation is too broad and “conclusory” to satisfy 

Plaintiff’s burden to “make a prima facie showing of the pertinent jurisdictional facts.” Livnat, 

851 F.3d at 56-57. In any event, even taking the allegation as true, due process does not permit 

the Court to exercise either general or specific personal jurisdiction over these Defendants. 

 First, “regularly and actively conduct[ing] business activities,” Opp. at 3, in a forum is 

insufficient, without more, to confer general personal jurisdiction. Indeed, the Supreme Court 

6

 Ordinarily, the exercise of personal jurisdiction must be authorized not only by the Constitution 

but also by a state’s long-arm statute. See, e.g., Thompson Hine, 734 F.3d at 1189. But the 

Virginia long-arm statute addresses only specific personal jurisdiction, see Va. Code § 8.01-

328.1, and the Virginia Supreme Court has held that, as a result, the statute is irrelevant in cases 

involving general personal jurisdiction, see Witt v. Reynolds Metals Co., 397 S.E.2d 873, 875-76 

(Va. 1990) (finding general personal jurisdiction even where long-arm statute did not cover facts). 
12 

squarely rejected an argument that a similar formulation—“engag[ing] in a substantial, 

continuous, and systematic course of business”—supported general personal jurisdiction in 

Daimler AG. 571 U.S. at 137-39. The Court emphasized that “the inquiry . . . is not whether a 

[defendant’s] in-forum contacts can be said to be in some sense ‘continuous and systematic,’ it is 

whether that [defendant’s] affiliations with the [forum] are so continuous and systematic as to 

render it essentially at home in the forum.” Id. at 138-39 (cleaned up). Without more detailed 

allegations, the Court cannot say that these Defendants are “essentially at home” in the District. 

 Second, Plaintiff’s bare allegation of “regular[] and active[] . . . business activities” does 

not show a “close nexus”—or any nexus at all—between his claims and these Defendants’ 

activities in the District. Bernhardt, 47 F.4th at 864. Since Plaintiff has not established “that 

[his] alleged injuries arise out of or relate to [these Defendants’] activities” in the District, id.

(cleaned up), specific jurisdiction is unavailable. The Court therefore lacks personal jurisdiction 

over these Defendants. 

2. The Court does not have personal jurisdiction over the President or 

the Minister. 

 The other two individual Defendants—the President and the Minister—require a different 

analysis, though it leads ultimately to the same result. Because these individuals reside in 

Somaliland, Compl. at 2, and “do[] not concede to jurisdiction in another state,” the Court 

examines their contacts with the United States as a whole to assess its jurisdiction, Mwani, 417 

F.3d at 11 (cleaned up). 

 Plaintiff alleges that the President and the Minister “ordered” “soldiers and militia . . . 

into Las Anod . . . to target, attach, torture, murder, and subjugate the inhabitants . . . deemed to 

be supporters of Las Anod’s unification with the Federal Republic of Somalia.” Compl. at 15. 

He then seeks to tie these actions to the United States in two ways. First, he notes his father’s 
13 

U.S. citizenship. Id. Second, he alleges that “Somalis with United States citizenship . . . were 

deemed by . . . Defendants to be instigators and were specifically targeted,” and asserts that “the 

[U.S.-based] Somaliland Mission, the Somaliland Support Organization, and [their] known 

associates act[ed] as a command-and-control center for . . . Defendants and[,] among other 

things, provid[ed] the names of Somali-Americans and residents, including . . . Plaintiff’s father, 

deemed to be critics of . . . Defendants[] . . . [for Defendants] to . . . track[], harass[], arrest[], and 

murder when they arrive[d] in a territory controlled by . . . Defendants.” Dkt. 44 at 1-2; accord

Compl. at 15. Plaintiff contends that these connections suffice to confer jurisdiction; the Court 

disagrees. 

 The first connection—Plaintiff’s father’s U.S. citizenship—does not do the trick. 

“[T]orture alone of an American abroad, unless directed at the United States, is insufficient to 

satisfy the . . . minimum contacts requirement.” Mutond, 62 F.4th at 593 (cleaned up). 

 The second connection does not fill the gap. Conclusory allegations of parties’ targeting 

U.S. citizens for mistreatment do not, without supporting detail, establish personal jurisdiction. 

See id. at 593-94. In Mutond, the plaintiff—an American formerly employed as a security 

advisor to a Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) politician—brought TVPA claims against 

two DRC officials who, he alleged, had “acted in concert to detain and torture” him “because [he 

was an] American[],” and had similarly targeted other Americans because of their nationality. 

Id. at 589-90, 594. The officials sought “to extract a false confession that [the plaintiff] was one 

of many American mercenaries working with the then-DRC President’s political opponent to 

undermine the government.” Id. at 590. The D.C. Circuit concluded that these allegations did 

not show sufficient contacts by the DRC officials with the United States to support personal 

jurisdiction. See id. at 593-94. The court emphasized that the allegations were conclusory and 
14 

“merely stat[ed the plaintiff’s] theory of specific jurisdiction” without describing any supporting 

facts “in detail.” Id. at 594 (cleaned up). Further, to the extent that the allegations did permit 

inferences about the defendants’ motivations, they showed that “the fact that [the plaintiff was] 

an American was incidental to the . . . [o]fficials’ chief concern”: “the DRC’s politics,” and, in 

particular, the officials’ desire to portray an electoral rival as employing foreign mercenaries. Id.

 Plaintiff’s contention that the President and the Minister targeted U.S. citizens exhibits 

the same defects. Plaintiff avers that the President and the Minister “deemed” “Somalis with 

United States citizenship . . . to be instigators,” Compl. at 15, but provides no supporting details. 

Nor does he offer any specific allegations to describe the President and the Minister’s purported 

coordination with the U.S.-based Defendants to identify and target Somali Americans. As a 

result, like the allegations in Mutond, Plaintiff’s conclusory assertions “merely stat[e] his theory 

of specific jurisdiction” without the necessary factual support. 62 F.4th at 594 (cleaned up). 

And, again as in Mutond, insofar as Plaintiff’s allegations support any conclusions about 

Defendants’ aims, they suggest that his father’s nationality “was incidental to [Defendants’] 

chief concern”: regional politics. Id. Plaintiff himself asserts that Defendants were worried 

about local “instigators” and that soldiers targeted his father because of “his [father’s] expressed 

support for Las Anod unification with Somalia.” Compl. at 14-15. So Plaintiff’s purported U.S. 

connections do not authorize the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the President or the 

Minister. 

 Plaintiff points to several exhibits that, in his view, lend credibility to his targeting 

theory, but none allow the Court to “reasonably infer . . . purposeful availment of the United 

States” by the President or the Minister. Mutond, 62 F.4th at 595 (cleaned up). Plaintiff first 

cites a series of 2023 Twitter posts from an account purportedly affiliated with the Mission. Dkt. 
15 

35-5. The tweets praise the Somaliland Government’s handling of the conflict in Las Anod, 

describe the poster’s communications with field commanders, reference the capture of a U.S.-

citizen combatant by Somaliland forces, and assert that U.S.-based actors are “flaming the 

situation.” See id. Defendants dispute whether the account has any formal affiliation with the 

Mission, Dkt. 36 at 15-16, but, in any event, the tweets do not make Plaintiff’s targeting theory 

plausible: references on Twitter to the role of U.S. citizens or residents in the conflict in 

Somaliland do not demonstrate the existence of a large-scale surveillance operation. 

 The other exhibits Plaintiff proffers fare no better. He provides a 2012 news article, 

allegedly from the Mission’s website, that asserts that two U.S.-citizen “warlords” had led 

militias in Somaliland against Somaliland Government forces, resulting in “more than 40” 

deaths. Dkt. 35-7 at 2. The Mission’s posting an article about newsworthy events involving 

individuals with U.S. ties does not support a reasonable inference that the U.S.-based Defendants 

were covertly targeting Somali Americans en masse even in 2012—let alone at the time of 

Plaintiff’s father’s death roughly a decade later. Nor does the other article Plaintiff cites, which 

describes accusations by a “Somaliland lawmaker” that the President’s son “targeted” a BritishSomali journalist for detention and torture on her arrival in Somaliland in 2023. Dkt. 35-8 at 2-3. 

Given that the article does not mention the United States, U.S. citizens, or any of the U.S.-based 

Defendants and involves allegations about actions by the President’s son (not the President 

himself) against a single individual in Somaliland, it does not push Plaintiff’s targeting theory 

“across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680 (cleaned up); cf. Mutond, 

62 F.4th at 594-95 (explaining why news articles did not support plaintiff’s personal jurisdiction 

theory). The Court cannot exercise personal jurisdiction over the President or the Minister. 
16 

3. The Court will dismiss, rather than transfer, Plaintiff’s claims against 

those Defendants over whom the Court lacks personal jurisdiction. 

 Although Plaintiff does not raise the possibility, the Court recognizes that it must transfer 

Plaintiff’s claims against any Defendants over whom it lacks personal jurisdiction “to any 

other . . . court . . . in which the action . . . could have been brought” if doing so “is in the interest 

of justice.” 28 U.S.C. § 1631. For several reasons, the Court concludes that transfer is not 

warranted here. 

 First, several of Plaintiff’s claims fall outside the jurisdiction of any federal court, leaving 

the Court with nowhere to transfer them. No federal court would have personal jurisdiction over 

the President and the Minister. See supra Section III.B.2. And, as explained below, Plaintiff’s 

allegations in support of his ATS claims do not overcome the presumption against 

extraterritoriality, and thus those claims fall outside any federal court’s subject matter 

jurisdiction.7

 See infra Section III.C. 

 Second, the “serious substantive defects” with Plaintiff’s TVPA claims against the U.S.-

based Defendants other than Mr. Goth mean that transfer would not be “in the interest of 

justice.” Naartex Consulting Corp. v. Watt, 722 F.2d 779, 785 (D.C. Cir. 1983). In particular, 

the TVPA claims against these Defendants “would likely face dismissal . . . for failure to state a 

claim” for the same reasons discussed below in connection with Mr. Goth. Roman-Salgado v. 

Holder, 730 F. Supp. 2d 126, 131 (D.D.C. 2010); see infra Section III.D. And the TVPA claim 

against the Somaliland Support Organization would independently fail because the TVPA 

7

 Even if the presumption against extraterritoriality were a merits issue, rather than a 

jurisdictional one, transfer would not be “in the interest of justice” because the case “would 

likely face dismissal . . . for failure to state a claim.” Roman-Salgado v. Holder, 730 F. Supp. 2d 

126, 131 (D.D.C. 2010); accord Naartex Consulting Corp. v. Watt, 722 F.2d 779, 785 (D.C. Cir. 

1983) (“[T]he district court was not obliged to transfer this action . . . because [the plaintiff’s] 

claims suffer from serious substantive defects.”). 
17 

“authorizes liability solely against natural persons.” Mohamed v. Palestinian Auth., 566 U.S. 

449, 456, 461 (2012); see infra Section III.D. Dismissal, rather than transfer, is therefore 

appropriate.8

C. Plaintiff’s ATS Claims Do Not Overcome the Presumption Against 

Extraterritoriality. 

 The Court turns next to Plaintiff’s ATS claims against the remaining Defendants. The 

ATS grants district courts “original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, 

committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1350. 

“Although this jurisdictional statute does not create a cause of action, . . . courts may exercise 

common-law authority under this statute to create private rights of action in very limited 

circumstances.” Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe, 593 U.S. 628, 631 (2021). But “[t]he Supreme Court 

has established that the ‘presumption against extraterritoriality’ governs the ATS’s reach.” 

Kaplan v. Cent. Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 896 F.3d 501, 514 (D.C. Cir. 2018) 

(quoting Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 124 (2013)). “ATS claims 

involving extraterritorial activity can displace the presumption only if the claims touch and 

concern the territory of the United States with sufficient force.” Id. (cleaned up); see Nestlé, 593 

U.S. at 634 (examining factual allegations in complaint to determine whether claims cleared this 

hurdle). The Supreme Court has “treated extraterritoriality in the ATS context as a jurisdictional 

matter.” Kaplan, 896 F.3d at 516; accord Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., 770 F.3d 170, 179 (3d Cir. 

2014) (treating presumption against exterritoriality as jurisdictional in ATS context); Al Shimari 

v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516, 528 (4th Cir. 2014) (same). 

8

 Plaintiff has neither requested jurisdictional discovery nor provided any “good faith” reason to 

believe that such discovery would fill in the gaps in his jurisdictional allegations without 

devolving into a “fishing expedition.” Mutond, 62 F.4th at 596. The Court thus has no basis to 

order discovery before ruling on Defendants’ Motion. 
18 

 Plaintiff does not argue that his father’s U.S. citizenship creates a sufficient domestic 

connection to overcome the presumption, and with good reason. The extraterritoriality analysis 

focuses on the location of the conduct at issue, see, e.g., Nestlé, 593 U.S. at 634, and a plaintiff 

must accordingly establish that her claims “touch and concern the territory of the United States,” 

Kaplan, 896 F.3d at 514 (cleaned up). Consistent with that requirement, the D.C. Circuit has 

held, albeit in the context of another statute, that the U.S. citizenship of a party affected by 

extraterritorial conduct does not “make [that] conduct domestic.” Garvey v. Admin. Rev. Bd., 56 

F.4th 110, 128 (D.C. Cir. 2022). Plaintiff must point to conduct that took place in the United 

States. 

 To meet that burden, Plaintiff returns to his contention that the U.S.-based Defendants 

“act[ed] as a command-and-control center for . . . Defendants and[,] among other things, 

provid[ed] the names of Somali-Americans and residents, including . . . Plaintiff’s father, 

deemed to be critics of . . . Defendants[] . . . [for Defendants] to . . . track[], harass[], arrest[], and 

murder when they arrive[d] in a territory controlled by . . . Defendants.” Dkt. 44 at 1-2; accord

Compl. at 15 (alleging that Defendants “conspire[d],” with U.S.-based Defendants “aid[ing] and 

abet[ting]” Defendants overseas). Plaintiff does not meaningfully elaborate on this claim (for 

instance, by specifying when, where, or how Defendants communicated), and the Court has 

already explained why Plaintiff’s exhibits do not plausibly support this targeting theory. See 

supra Section III.B.2. The result is a “naked assertion[] devoid of further factual enhancement” 

that the Court need not accept as true even at the motion-to-dismiss stage. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 

(cleaned up); accord, e.g., Air Excursions LLC v. Yellen, 66 F.4th 272, 279 (D.C. Cir. 2023); see 

also Endo Pharms., 82 F.4th at 1203 (explaining that “the Court need not accept inferences 
19 

drawn by [P]laintiff if those inferences are not supported by the facts set out in the complaint” 

(cleaned up)). 

 Indeed, Plaintiff’s assertion is essentially a marriage of the allegations that the Supreme 

Court and the D.C. Circuit declined to accept as true in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 

544 (2007), and Kareem v. Haspel, 986 F.3d 859 (D.C. Cir. 2021), respectively. In Twombly—

an antitrust case—the plaintiffs bore the burden of proving, among other things, that the 

defendants had entered into “an agreement” in restraint of trade. 550 U.S. at 553 (cleaned up). 

Accordingly, the Court refused to credit the plaintiffs’ allegation that the defendants “ha[d] 

entered into a . . . conspiracy to prevent competitive entry . . . and ha[d] agreed not to compete 

with one another,” reasoning that this assertion was simply a “legal conclusion[].” 550 U.S. at 

564-65. The Court then held that the complaint’s well-pleaded factual allegations did not 

“plausibl[y] suggest[]” a conspiracy. Id. at 566. In Kareem, the D.C. Circuit did not assume the 

truth of the plaintiff’s “alleg[ation, made] upon information and belief[,] that the U.S. 

government had designated [the plaintiff] as a terrorist target approved for lethal force,” and 

concluded that the complaint’s concrete factual allegations did not support a reasonable inference 

of the purported terrorist designation. 986 F.3d at 866; see id. at 865-69. 

 Here, taking a page from the Twombly plaintiffs’ book, Plaintiff—who must, as a legal 

matter, demonstrate some connection between his father’s death and U.S. territory—alleges a 

“conspir[acy]” involving the U.S.-based Defendants. Compl. at 15. Much as in Kareem, 

meanwhile, he asserts generally that government actors targeted an individual—here, his father. 

And like the plaintiffs in both cases, he does not provide any specifics in support of his 

conclusory allegation. The Court therefore declines to assume the truth of Plaintiff’s conclusory 

conspiracy allegation. And without that allegation, there is nothing in his filings to overcome the 
20 

presumption against extraterritoriality, dooming the ATS claims, which the Court must dismiss 

for lack of jurisdiction.9

D. Plaintiff’s TVPA Claims Also Fail. 

 That leaves Plaintiff’s TVPA claims against the Government, the Ministry, the Mission, 

and Mr. Goth. Those claims also fail. 

 First, the claims against the Government, the Ministry, and the Mission are untenable 

because, as the Supreme Court unanimously held in Mohamed v. Palestinian Authority, 566 U.S. 

449 (2012), the TVPA “authorizes liability solely against natural persons” and does not authorize 

suits against “organizations, sovereign or not.” Id. at 456, 461; see 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note § 2(a) 

(authorizing suit against “[a]n individual”). Defendants raised this point in their Motion, Mot. at 

29-30, and Plaintiff did not respond either in his filings or at oral argument. See Dkts. 35, 39, 44; 

Tr. at 43:11-45:2. Given how clearly Supreme Court precedent forecloses liability—and 

Plaintiff’s lack of any argument in response to that precedent—Plaintiff’s TVPA claims against 

these Defendants are so “obviously without merit” that the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear them. 

Shapiro v. McManus, 577 U.S. 39, 46 (2015) (cleaned up); see also Steel Co. v. Citizens for a 

9

 If Plaintiff means to argue that Mr. Goth and the Mission committed a distinct tort by aiding 

and abetting the alleged overseas torts through their actions on American soil, that claim would, 

if nothing else, fail on the merits because Plaintiff has provided no concrete factual allegations to 

support his conclusory assertions of a conspiracy to target Somali Americans. The Court 

therefore need not decide whether courts may “create an aiding-and-abetting cause of action 

under the ATS.” Nestlé, 593 U.S. at 633 (cleaned up) (declining to decide this question); cf.

Chalabi, 543 F.3d at 728 (authorizing courts to “address[] the merits where doing so ma[kes] it 

possible to avoid a doubtful issue of statutory jurisdiction” (cleaned up)). And, given the 

sparseness of Plaintiff’s allegations, the Court also need not reach Defendants’ argument that 

“[e]ven if Plaintiff[] . . . pleaded specific facts” supporting his command-and-control theory, his 

claims “still [would] not touch and concern the United States with sufficient force to overcome 

the ATS’s extraterritoriality bar.” Mot. at 28 (cleaned up). 
21 

Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998) (explaining that a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction 

where a plaintiff lacks even an “arguable . . . cause of action”). 

 Second, Plaintiff’s Complaint does not state a plausible claim as to Mr. Goth. Plaintiff 

makes no specific allegations about Mr. Goth’s conduct—only a broad assertion that he, along 

with the other U.S.-based Defendants, helped track and target Somali Americans like Plaintiff’s 

father. For the reasons described above, the Court need not treat that conclusory allegation as 

true, and nothing else in Plaintiff’s filings provides any basis—let alone a reasonable one—to 

“infer[] that [Mr. Goth] is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The Court 

therefore dismisses this claim under Rule 12(b)(6). 

E. The Court Will Allow Plaintiff to Move for Leave to File a Third Amended 

Complaint. 

 For all the foregoing reasons, this case cannot move forward based on the current 

Complaint. Defendants argue that this should be the end of things: in their view, Plaintiff has 

had ample opportunity to present his claims, and he “should not be permitted to impose further 

on [Defendants] and the court system.” Dkt. 45 at 6 (cleaned up). There is some force to that 

view; Plaintiff has already amended his pleading twice and has submitted a string of filings in 

response to Defendants’ Motion, all of which the Court has considered. 

 But, mindful of its obligation to treat pro se litigants with “solicitude,” Kim, 840 F. Supp. 

2d at 191, and of Plaintiff’s contention that he could, if necessary, provide additional facts in 

support of his claims, Dkt. 44 at 3, the Court will give Plaintiff one final opportunity to move for 

leave to file a third amended complaint. 

 To minimize the burden on Defendants, if Plaintiff files such a motion, the Court will 

evaluate whether the proposed pleading survives the arguments advanced in Defendants’ briefing 

thus far, whether addressed in this Memorandum Opinion and Order or not. If the Court concludes 
22 

that the current briefing already warrants dismissal, the Court will deny the motion and dismiss 

this case. If the Court requires further analysis from the parties, it will set a status conference. 

IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 

 The Court offers Plaintiff its sincere condolences for the loss of his father. But his 

current allegations are too speculative or disconnected from this forum for this case to move 

forward. The Court therefore 

GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Dkt. 34. The Court 

DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint, Dkt. 31-1, without prejudice.10 

And the Court 

ORDERS that Plaintiff may, on or before September 30, 2024, move for leave to file a 

third amended complaint that cures the deficiencies identified in this Memorandum Opinion and 

Order. If Plaintiff files such a motion, the Court will assess whether further analysis from the 

parties is necessary and, if so, set a status conference. If Plaintiff does not so move, the Court 

will enter a final appealable Order dismissing this case without prejudice. 

 SO ORDERED. 

Date: August 29, 2024 _________________________ 

ANA C. REYES 

 United States District Judge 

10 This dismissal operates without prejudice both because the Court will allow Plaintiff to move 

for leave to file a third amended complaint and because the dismissal is on a combination of 

jurisdictional grounds, see Havens v. Mabus, 759 F.3d 91, 98 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (explaining that 

jurisdictional dismissal should operate without prejudice), and for pleading deficiencies that 

Plaintiff could cure by alleging additional facts consistent with those set forth in the Complaint, 

see Rollins v. Wackenhut Servs., Inc., 703 F.3d 122, 131 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (“[D]ismissal with 

prejudice is warranted only when a trial court determines that the allegation of other facts 

consistent with the challenged pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency.” (cleaned up)). 

The Court notes that dismissal without prejudice would also have been required had it dismissed 

the case based on Defendants’ immunity arguments. See Havens, 759 F.3d at 98.