[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 21-10288

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

STEVEN BENJAMIN SCHWARZ, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

Versus

GEORGIA COMPOSITE MEDICAL 

BOARD, 

Defendant-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

D.C. Docket No. 1:18-cv-01142-MLB

____________________

Before WILSON, JORDAN, and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges.

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2 Opinion of the Court 21-10288

PER CURIAM:

Dr. Steven Benjamin Schwarz, proceeding pro se, appeals 

the district court’s dismissal of his claim under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The district court did not err because, first, it could not grant 

meaningful relief from restrictions on Schwarz’s medical license, 

making that issue moot, and second, Schwarz did not allege a 

prima facie case of discrimination under Title II to show an abrogation of the agency’s sovereign immunity. Accordingly, we affirm 

the district court’s dismissal of Schwarz’s claims.

I. 

In his amended complaint, Schwarz alleged the following 

facts regarding his disability and treatment by the Georgia Composite Medical Board (Board). Schwarz suffers from bipolar disorder 

and Crohn’s disease and surrendered his medical license in 2009 after being declared mentally incompetent by a probate court following an episode of bipolar depression. After treatment, Schwarz’s 

mental competency was declared restored in 2013, so he applied 

for the reinstatement of his medical license. The Board denied his 

application in 2014, citing his failure to pass the Special Purpose 

Examination (SPEX), a requirement for reinstatement. Schwarz 

retook and passed the SPEX in 2017, and subsequently submitted a 

new application for reinstatement of his medical license after nine 

years of being out of practice.

While his application was pending, Schwarz filed the present 

suit seeking reinstatement of his license and other relief. Schwarz 

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alleged that, before the suit was resolved, the Board entered into a 

Public, Non-Disciplinary Consent Agreement for Reinstatement 

(Consent Agreement) with him that restored his medical license 

with conditions in 2018. The Consent Agreement applied explicitly 

to his 2018 reinstatement and required that Schwarz adhere to a 

“Supervision Requirement.” Under this requirement, Schwarz 

agreed to practice medicine only “in the same office as and under 

the direct supervision of a Board approved psychiatrist” and to submit “quarterly reports to the Board from the supervising physician 

regarding [his] clinical practice,” which was to include the supervising psychiatrist’s opinion on Schwarz’s ability to practice medicine with reasonable skill and safety to patients.

Schwarz alleged in his complaint that the Board, a state 

agency, intentionally discriminated against him by imposing a requirement that he be supervised by another psychiatrist on his reinstated medical license. He suggested that the application form 

discriminates against individuals seeking treatment for medical disorders by asking if the applicant has suffered physical or substance 

use disorders resulting in the inability to practice medicine or has 

been subject to court-ordered treatment or hospitalization. 

Schwarz requested injunctive relief from the Supervision Requirement and compensatory damages for the loss of income caused by 

it. The Board replied that it was not legally required to notify 

Schwarz of his need to apply for renewal and that Schwarz still 

failed to state a viable ADA claim. The Board argued that Georgia 

law sets the requirements for renewal of a medical license and that 

Schwarz failed to timely renew his license within the specified 

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timeframe; therefore, his license was revoked by operation of law. 

The Board further argued that Schwarz failed to allege that the Supervision Requirement was placed on him because of his disability 

rather than because he had been out of practice for nine years.

The district court dismissed Schwarz’s claim for injunctive 

relief as moot after finding his license lapsed because of his failure 

to renew it, and it dismissed his claim for compensatory damages 

after finding the Board was entitled to sovereign immunity.1 

On appeal, Schwarz concedes that his medical license lapsed 

and does not present any argument about the district court’s decision to dismiss his claim for injunctive relief as moot. Instead, 

Schwarz requests that his medical license be reinstated because he 

was not given advance notice of its need for renewal. Schwarz argues that the district court erred in dismissing his claim for damages when it concluded that the Board’s sovereign immunity had 

not been abrogated because he alleged a prima facie violation of 

Title II of the ADA. 

II. 

We review de novo the dismissal of a complaint for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction and review related factual findings for 

clear error. Houston v. Marod Supermarkets, Inc., 733 F.3d 1323, 

1328 (11th Cir. 2013). We review questions of mootness de novo. 

1 Upon finding it lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the district court also denied as moot several motions Schwarz had filed. On appeal, Schwarz does 

not address that ruling and, thus, has abandoned any challenge to it. See 

Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam).

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21-10288 Opinion of the Court 5

Flanigan’s Enters., Inc. of Ga. v. City of Sandy Springs, 868 F.3d 

1248, 1255 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc), abrogated on other grounds 

by Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski, 141 S. Ct. 792 (2021). In analyzing 

a motion to dismiss, courts ordinarily do not look beyond the face 

of the complaint and documents attached to it. Fin. Sec. Assurance, 

Inc. v. Stephens, Inc., 500 F.3d 1276, 1284 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam).

Federal courts construe the filings of pro se litigantsliberally. 

Alba v. Montford, 517 F.3d 1249, 1252 (11th Cir. 2008). However, 

“this leniency does not give a court license to serve as de facto

counsel for a party, or to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in 

order to sustain an action.” GJR Invs., Inc. v. Cnty. of Escambia,

132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998) (internal citations omitted), 

overruled on other grounds by Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 

(2009). Issues not briefed on appeal are deemed abandoned. Timson, 518 F.3d at 874. 

“In order to invoke the jurisdiction of an Article III court, a

litigant must have suffered, or be threatened with, an actual injury 

traceable to the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable 

judicial decision.” Checker Cab Operators, Inc. v. Miami-Dade 

Cnty., 899 F.3d 908, 915 (11th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation mark 

omitted). That injury, moreover, must exist at all stages of review, 

and if it does not the case becomes moot and incapable of further 

adjudication. Id. In considering whether a case is moot, “we look 

at the events at the present time, not at the time the complaint was 

filed or when the federal order on review was issued.” Dow Jones 

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& Co. v. Kaye, 256 F.3d 1251, 1254 (11th Cir. 2001). When events 

subsequent to the commencement of a lawsuit create a situation in 

which the court can no longer give the plaintiff meaningful injunctive relief, a claim for such relief is moot and must be dismissed. 

Flanigan’s Enters., 868 F.3d at 1255.

On appeal, Schwarz failed to make any argument that he 

had the right to practice medicine after his license lapsed and failed 

to argue that the district court’s mootness finding was erroneous. 

Because he did not address it on appeal, Schwarz abandoned any 

challenge to the dismissal of his claim for injunctive relief. See Timson, 518 F.3d at 874. To the extent Schwarz argues that his license 

should be reinstated because he was not afforded due process, that 

issue is not properly before us because Schwarz did not assert a due 

process claim in his amended complaint. See Fin. Sec. Assurance, 

500 F.3d at 1284.

Even if not abandoned, the district court properly dismissed 

Schwarz’s claim for injunctive relief because it was rendered moot 

after his medical license lapsed due to his failure to renew it. Physicians may not practice medicine in Georgia without a valid license, so Schwarz was not permitted to practice medicine—regardless of whether he was subject to the Supervision Requirement—

at the time the district court dismissed his complaint. As such, even 

if the district court granted Schwarz’s request to relieve him of the 

Supervision Requirement, he would still be unable to practice medicine. Because Schwarz lacked any legally-cognizable interest in 

the outcome of his case after his license lapsed, his claim for injunctive relief became moot and the district court lacked subject matter 

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jurisdiction over it. See Checker Cab Operators, 899 F.3d at 915. 

Accordingly, we affirm as to this issue.

III. 

Absent a state’s consent, the Eleventh Amendment prohibits 

federal courts from hearing cases against a state or one of its agencies. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 

(1984). “Although, by its terms, the Eleventh Amendment does not 

bar suits against a state in federal court by its own citizens, the Supreme Court has extended its protections to apply in such cases.” 

Abusaid v. Hillsborough Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 405 F.3d 

1298, 1302 (11th Cir. 2005). Such a bar is jurisdictional in nature 

and should be settled at the outset of a case “to protect states from 

the indignity of being haled into federal court by private litigants.” 

Bouchard Transp. Co. v. Fla. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 91 F.3d 1445, 

1448 (11th Cir. 1996) (per curiam). The Eleventh Amendment is 

no bar, however, where Congress has abrogated the states’ sovereign immunity. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 

U.S. 299, 304 (1990). 

To abrogate a state’s immunity, Congress must have unequivocally expressed its intent to do so and acted pursuant to a 

valid grant of constitutional authority. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 

528 U.S. 62, 73 (2000). Congress has expressed its intent to abrogate 

state sovereign immunity for Title II ADA claims. Tennessee v. 

Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 530–31 (2004). Whether Congress effectuated 

its intent to abrogate sovereign immunity for Title II claims is subject to a further three-step test, to be analyzed on a claim-by-claim 

basis, asking:

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(1) which aspects of the State’s alleged 

conduct violated Title II; (2) to what extent such misconduct also violated the 

Fourteenth Amendment; and (3) insofar 

as such misconduct violated Title II but 

did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, whether Congress’s purported 

abrogation of sovereign immunity as to 

that class of conduct is nevertheless 

valid.

United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 159 (2006).

When considering facial challenges to subject matter jurisdiction, we must, as with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, take the complaint’s allegations as true. Carmichael v. Kellogg, Brown & Root 

Servs., Inc., 572 F.3d 1271, 1279 (11th Cir. 2009). “To survive a 

motion to dismiss, the complaint must contain sufficient factual 

matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible 

on its face.” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation mark 

omitted).

At step one of the Georgia test to determine whether a Title 

II claim for damages is constitutionally permissible under the Eleventh Amendment, we evaluate whether the plaintiff has stated a 

viable claim under Title II. Here, he has not. Title II of the ADA 

provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public 

entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 

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U.S.C. § 12132. To state a viable Title II claim, a plaintiff must allege facts plausibly showing

(1) that he is a qualified individual with 

a disability; (2) that he was either excluded from participation in or denied 

the benefits of a public entity’s services, 

programs, or activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by the public 

entity; and (3) that the exclusion, denial 

of benefit, or discrimination was by reason of the plaintiff’s disability.

Bircoll v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 480 F.3d 1072, 1083 (11th Cir. 2007). 

To recover damages, the plaintiff must also show intentional discrimination, which requires a showing of deliberate indifference.

Silberman v. Miami Dade Transit, 927 F.3d 1123, 1134 (11th Cir. 

2019). 

Here, the district court did not err in dismissing Schwarz’s 

claim for damages because Schwarz did not plausibly allege a violation of Title II of the ADA. To make that showing, Schwarz first 

had to allege facts supporting a plausible finding that the supervision requirement on his license was intentionally imposed because 

of his disability. See Bircoll, 480 F.3d at 1083. But Schwarz alleged 

in his amended complaint little more than general statements made 

by Professional Health Program Administrators regarding consent 

agreements generally and statistics purporting to show a history of 

discrimination against other physicians on the basis of race or 

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national origin—not disability. Taken as true, the allegations in 

Schwarz’s complaint support, at most, a finding of historical discrimination in other contexts and against other physicians that is 

not plausibly connected to Schwarz’s conclusory claim that the supervision requirement violated Title II. See Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 

678 (“A pleading that offers labels and conclusions . . . will not do.” 

(internal quotation marks omitted)). Schwarz thus failed to plead 

facts that allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 

supervision requirement was intentionally imposed on him because of his disability. See id.

Therefore, because Schwarz did not allege a plausible Title 

II ADA violation, Schwarz’s claim failed at the first step of the Georgia test for determining whether a Title II claim for damages is constitutionally permissible under the Eleventh Amendment. As a result, the Board is entitled to sovereign immunity, and the district 

court did not err by dismissing his claim for damages for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, we affirm.

AFFIRMED. 

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