### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON Ja nua ry 6, 200 4 S es sio n
GAR Y JOHN SON v. S TAT E OF TEN NES SEE

Appeal f rom the Circ uit Court for Tip ton County No. 4062 Joe H. Walker, Judge

No. W2003-00220-C CA-R 3-P C - F iled May 3, 2004

The petitioner pled g uilty to one count of burg lary and one c ount of theft of pr operty betwee n $1,000 and $1 0 , 0 0 0 o n A u g u s t 2 1 , 2 0 0 1

. H e w a s s e n te n c e d to tw e lv e y e ar s f o r e a c h o f

f e n se to run
concur rently to be serve d at six ty

perc ent as a

car eer offe nder. The petitioner fi l ed a p et i t i o n for post-conviction re lief on April 16, 2002. The trial court de nied t he petition on J anuar y 13, 2003. The pe titioner appea ls this denial alleg ing that he was aff orded ineffe ctive assistance of counse l and his plea wa s not know ingly , intelligently and voluntarily enter ed. We affir m the decision of the tr ial

c ourt

.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Tr ialCo ur t i s A ffirm e d.

J ER R Y L. S MI TH , J ., delivere d the opinion of the cour t, in which D AVI D G. H AYES , and T H O M A S T. W O O D A LL , J J ., joined.

J . Ba rney Wit hering ton, I V, Covington, Te nnessee , for the a ppellant, Gar

y J ohnson

Pa ul G . Summe rs , A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l & Re po r

t e r ; J. R o s s D ye r, As sis tant A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; E liza

be th Rice, District Attorney

Gene ral; and K im L inville, Assist ant District Att o rn ey Gene ral, for

the appellee , State of Tenne ssee.

OP IN ION

Fa ctual B ackg round

On Novembe r 6, 2000, the Tipton County Gra nd J ury indicted t he petitioner w ith burg lary and thef t of proper

ty betwee n $1,000 and $10,000. The petitioner’s indictment was for some stolen minibikes that were f

o u n d i n an ab andoned pick-up truck ow ned by a Mr. L eon Wells. At the-2-

preliminary

hear ing, M r. W el l s stated that the petitioner bor rowe d his pick-up truck the night the minibikes were stolen. Tr ial counsel believed that Mr. Wells was a believa ble witness and told the petitioner that if Mr. Wells testified at trial, the petitioner would likely be convicted. Trial counse l believed this to be e specia lly true in lig ht of the petitioner’ s ext ensive c riminal rec ord.
At some point betwee n the pre liminary hear ing a

nd the trial date, the State offe red the petitioner a ple a bar g ain. Howe ver, the petitioner maintained that Mr. Wells would not be pre sent to te sti fy a t the tr ia l and , th e re fo re , r e je c te d th e ple a

of fe r. Th e ple a

of fe r w a s o n th e ta

ble up un til the day befor e trial. Tr ial counsel repe at edly tried to g et the petitioner to a cce pt the plea. The petitioner ref

used. On Aug ust 21, 2001, the day of trial, Mr. Wells arr ived to testify at trial. Afte r
c on su lti ngwi th t

ri a l c ou ns e l, the pe tit ion e r ple d g uil ty to bot h co un ts as c ha

rg e d in the ind ic tme nt. At a se pa rate se nte nc ing

he ari ngon

Janu ary 18 , 2 00 1, the tr ia l c ourt

sen tenc e d th e pe tit ion e r t o tw e lve y e ars a s a

c are e r o ff

e nd e r f or e a c h o ff e ns e to b e se rv e d conc ur

re ntl y a t si xty pe rc e nt a s a
car eer offe nder.
On April 16, 2002, the petitioner filed a petition f or post-conviction re lief. Afte r a he aring held J anuar

y 10, 2003, the trial cour

t entere d an orde r deny

ing the petition on J anuar y 13, 2003.
The pe titioner appea ls the trial court’s or der de ny ing his petition for post-c onviction relief. He a rgu es that his petition shoul d have be en g rante d beca use: (1) he was a ffor ded inef fec tive

a s s i s t an c e o f

c o u n s e l a tt h e t r i a l l e v e l an d ( 2 ) h e d i d

n o te n t e r i n t o h i s g u i l t y p l e a kn o w i n g l y, i n t e l l i g e n t l y a n d

v o l u n t ar i l y.

Stand ard of Review
The post-c onviction court’s finding s of fa ct ar e conc lusive on ap p eal unless the e vidence preponde rate s otherwise. See State v. Bur ns, 6 S.W .3d 453, 461 (Tenn. 1999). During our re view of the issues ra ised, we w ill afford those f indings of f

act the w eig ht of a jury verdic t, a nd this court is b o u n d b y th e p o s t- c o n v ic ti o nc o u rt’ s f in d in g s u n le s s th e e v id e n c e in th e r e c o r d

p r e pondera tes ag ainst those finding s. See He nley v. State, 960 S.W .2d 572, 578 (Tenn. 1997) ; Alley v. State, 958 S.W .2d 138, 147 (Tenn. Crim .App. 1997). This Court may not r ewe igh or re- evaluate the evide nce,
no r s ub sti tut e its inf

e re nc e s f or tho se dr awn

by the po st- c on vic tio n c ourt . Se e State v. Ho ne y c utt , 54 S.W .3d 7 6 2 , 7 66 (Tenn. 2001) . Howeve r, the post-c onviction court’s c onclusions of law a re revie wed unde r a pur ely

de novo standard with no presumption of corr ectne ss. See Fields v. State, 40 S.W .3d 450, 458 (Tenn. 2001)

.

Ef fectiveness of Assistance of Coun sel

W h en a petitioner se eks post-convic tion relief on the ba sis of ineffe ctive assistanc e of counsel, the pe titioner bear s the burden of showing that (a) the servic es rendere d by trial counsel

wer e d e f ic ie n t an d ( b ) th a t th e d e f ic ie n t p e r f

o r ma n c e w a s p r e

ju d ic ia l. Se e Po w e r s v . State, 942 S.W. 2 d 5 5 1 , 5 5 8 ( T e n n

. Cr im

. A p p

. 1 9 9 6 )

. I n o r d e r to d e mo n s tr a te d e f ic ie n t p e r f

o r ma n c e, the-3-

petitioner must show that the servic es re ndere d or the a dvice g iven was be low “the r ang e of competenc e dema

nded of attorney s in c riminal case s.” Bax ter v. Rose, 523 S.W .2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 19 75 ). I n o rd e r t o d e mon strat e pre jud ic e , th e pe tit ion e r m

us t sh owthat th e re is a

re a so na ble probability

that, but for counse l’s defic ient perf ormanc e, the r esult of the procee d i n g wo u ld have been dif fer ent. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2068, 80 L . Ed. 2d 674 (1984). “B eca

use a petitioner must establish both prong s of the test to preva il on a claim of ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel, failure to prove e ither def icient per formanc e or resulting prejudice provides a suf

ficient ba sis to deny

relief on the claim.” H enley , 960 S.W .2d at 580.

As no te d a

bo ve , th is C ourt

wi ll a ff or d th e po st- c on vic tio n c ourt ’s fa c tua l f ind ing s a presum p t i on of cor

rec tness, rende ring them conclusive on a ppeal unless the r ecor d preponde rate s ag ainst the court’ s findings. See id. at 578. However, our supreme c ourt has “de termined that issues of def icient per formanc e by

counsel a nd possible prejudice to the defe nse are mix ed questions of law and fa ct .

. . ; t h u s , [appellate] review of [t hese issues] is de novo” with no pre sumption of

corr ectne ss. Burns, 6 S.W.3d at 461.

F ur the rm or e , o n c la ims of

ine ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l, the pe tit ion e r is n ot e nti tle d to the be ne fi t of

hin ds ig ht. Se e Ad

kin s, 91 1 S. W.2 d at 34 7. Th is C ourt may no t se con d-gues s a
re a so na b l y
- b a s e d t r i a l s t r a t e g y , a n d

w e c an n o tg r an tr e l i e f

b a s e d o na s o u n d , b u tu n s u c c e s s f

u l, tactica l de cision made dur ing the course of the proc eeding s. See id. Howe ver, suc h defe renc e to the tactica l decisions of counsel applies only if counsel makes those dec isions after a dequate prepa ration for the c ase. See Cooper v. State, 847 S.W.2d 521, 528 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992).
The petiti oner a

rg ues that trial counse l was ineff ective f or allowing him to plead to the indictme n t a s c h ar g e d

an d th e na g r e e to a

s e n te n c e o f

th e maxim

u m p e n a lt y

. H e ar g u e s th a t t

r ia l counsel did not inform h i m of the possible pena lty and that he w ould not have pled guilty had he known he c ould be consider ed a c are er of fende r and be sentenc ed to twelve y ear s to be served at six ty perc ent.

T h e p et i t i o n er

p re s en t edt wo wi t n es s es , i nad d i t i o nt o h i m s el f, at the p o s t -c o n v i ct i o nh ea ri n g. The pe titioner testified that trial counse l told him that the best t hing to do wa s plead guilty and that he would proba

bly g et house a

rre st or probation or he would be take n into custody immediately

and g iven fiftee n y ear s. The petitioner stated that trial counse l never told him t here was a

possibili ty

that he wo uld be se nte nc e d as a ca

re e r of fe nd e r. Th e pe tit ion e r t e sti fi e d th a t he g a ve se ve ra l na me s to tr ia l c o u n s e l a s a li b i w it

n e s s e s , B e tt

y D a v is ( a ls o kn o w n a s B e tt y Pr a tt ) w h o e mp loy ed him, her husband Charle s Pratt, J osephine Ada ms, and Sherry

J ohnson.

J osephine Ada

ms testified at the post-convic tion hearing . She stated t h at s h e wa s the petitioner’s g irlfriend. Howeve r, she did not ac tually know the petitioner at the time he committed the offe nse. She stated in her testimony

that she could n o t h av e b ee n an alibi wit ness for him for these off enses. L i s a W i l s on also testified at the post-c onviction hear ing. She is the pe titioner’s sister. She testified that she be lieved trial c ounsel was a sleep at the sentenc ing he aring . Howeve r,-4-

she also stated she did not know a ny thing a bout the fac ts of the ca se other tha n what she ha d been told.

Trial counse l also testified at the post-c onviction hear ing. H e testified that he urged the petitioner to take the plea barg ain offere d to him by the State betwe en the pr eliminary hear ing a nd the trial date . The pe titioner repe atedly ref used. When Mr. Wells arrived to te stify at the trial, the petitioner cha

ng ed his mind and then wa nted to plea. Unf

ortunately , at t hat t ime, there was no long er
a deal to be ha d, and he ple d g uilty with no assuranc e of w hat his sentence would be. Tria l counsel te sti fi e d that he tol d the pe tit ion e r that the State c on sid e re d him a c are e r of fe nd e r and

wa nte d h im to be sentenc ed as such, but that he would make sure that he was indee d a ca ree r off ender befor e the sentenc ing he aring . Trial counse l advised the pe titioner to plead guilty beca use he did not believe that he had a chanc e of being acquitted at trial beca use of the believability of the witnesse s and the pe tit ion e r’ s e xten siv e re c or d. Tr ia l c ouns e l te sti fi e d that he did no t te ll the pe tit ion e r h e wa s e lig ibl e for house arr est or probation

. He al s o d id not reca ll the petitioner mentioning a ny other potential alibi witnesses other than Ms. Da vis a nd Mr. Pratt, who both refuse d to testify at trial bec ause the y h a d n o t h i n g t o s ay.

Withre g a rd to t ri a l c ouns e l, t

he tr ia l c ourt

ma de the fo llo wi ngfi nd ing s:

The Court ac cre dits the testimony of [trial counsel]. The petitioner wa s not
a ssu re d th a t he wo uld

se rv e his se nte nc e un de r h ou se arr e st o r c ommun ity

c or re c tio ns

. Th e Court fi nd s tha t [ tr ia l couns e l] pr ov ide d ad e qu a te a ssi sta nc e ; he me t w ith petitioner and discusse d t h e ca se, he he ard the proof at the preliminary hear ing, he spoke t o witnesses. The Court acc redits [trial counsel]’s testim ony about the lac k of alibi witnesses being p rese nted. The de fenda nt presente d two witnesses at the he ari ng , n e ith e r o f w hic h p re se nte d a n a lib i de fe ns e fo r t

he de fe nd ant. Petitioner failed to show a ny pre- trial motions of any

conseque nce that [ trial

c ouns e l] f a ile d to fi le , o r t

hat su c h f a ilure wa s p re

jud ic ia l.

We have r eviewe d trial counsel’ s testimony at the post-convic tion hearing . W e have f ound no evidenc e that pre ponderates ag ainst what the trial c ourt included in its findings of fac t.

We cannot conc lude from the evidenc e prese nted that trial counsel’ s service s were below the competenc e dema

nded of attorney s in criminal case s. Trial counsel tried to persuade the petitioner to take the plea

barg ain the State off

ere d him. The petitioner refused, so trial counsel had no choice but t o p ro ce ed to trial. The petitioner r epeatedly assure d trial counsel that the ow ner of the truck

u s e d t o s t e a l t h e m i n i b i k e s w o u l d n o t b e a t t h e t r i a l t o t e s t i f y. W h e nt h i s w i t n e s s ar

r i v e d t o t e s t i f y, despite hi s slashed ti res, the petitioner chose to plead guilty

. The plea offe r was no longe r ava ilable. The pe titioner entere d a plea and was subject to a sentenc e imposed by the trial court. Trial counse l could not control the decision of the trial cour t. Trial counse l’s repr esentation of the petitioner wa s
no t de fi c ie nt.-5- Voluntariness of

Guilty P lea

Whe n evaluating the know ing a nd voluntary

nature of a guilty

plea, the U nited States Supreme Court has he ld that “[t] he standa rd wa s and re mains whether the plea r epre sents a voluntary

and int e lli g e nt c ho ic e a mon g the a lte rn a tiv e c ourses o f a c tio n o pe n to the de fe nd ant. ” No rt h Caro lin a v. Al fo rd , 4 00 U. S.2 5, 91 S. Ct . 1 60 , 164 (1 97 0)

. Th e c ourt re vie wi ng the vo lun tari ne ss of a guilty plea must look to the totality of t he circumstance s. See S tate v. Turner, 191 S.W.2d 346, 35 3 ( Te nn . Cr im. Ap p. 19 95 ); se e a lso Cha mbe rl a in v . St a te, 81 5 S. W.2 d 5 34 , 5 42 (T e nn . Cr im. Ap p. 19 90 ). Spe c if

ic a lly , a re vie wi ngc ourt

mus t c on sid e r “ the re la tiv e int e lli g e nc e of the de fe nd a nt; the deg ree of his f

amiliarity with criminal proce eding s; whether he was re prese nted by competent counsel and had the opportunity to confe r with counsel a bout the options available to him; the ext ent of a dv ic e fr om c ouns e l and the c ourt c on c e rn in g t he c ha

rg e s a g a ins t hi m; a

nd the re a so ns fo r h is decision to plead gu i l t y , including a desire to avoid a g reater pe nalty that might re sult from a jury trial. Bla nkenship v. State, 858 S.W .2d 897, 904 (Tenn. 1993)

.
Th e pe tit ion e r a

rgue s th a t he did

no t e nte r h is p le a

kn ow ing ly , in te lli g e ntl y

and vo lun tari ly be c a us e he wa s un awa

re that he wo uld be c ha

rg e d a s a c are e r o ff

e nd e r, wa s a ssu

re d th a t he wo uld

re c e ive c omm

un ity c or re c tio ns or

pr ob a tio n, and

his g uil ty ple a fo rm did no t in dic a te the po ssi ble leng th of sentenc e, off

ender classification, rang e of se ntence , or per centa g e of se ntence

.
I n the finding s of fa ct, the post-convic tion court found that th e p et i t i oner did indee d understand the signific ance of his plea and that he was fully awa re of the conse quence s of his plea. The post-c onviction court also stated that the petitioner under stood the possible sentence . We have found no evide nce that preponde rate s otherwise.
At the plea a g ree ment s u

b mi ssion hearing , the following exchang e occ urre d betwee n the trial court a nd the petitioner:
[C OURT:] Iunderstand the plea a rra ng ement to b e t hat y ou’re enter ing

a p l e a o f g u i l t y t o t h e i n d i c t m e n ta s c h ar g e d

. T h e s e ar e D f e l o n i e s , an d t h e y c ar

r y a rang e of punishment of not less than two y ea rs to serve 30 pe rce nt, up to not more than 12 y ear s to se rve 60 perc ent. The State has filed notice indicating that they seek t o h av e y o us en t en ce d

as an en h an ce d o ff

en d er ; t h at i s , ei t h er a R an ge t wo o r R an ge three offe nder.

Your attorney

has indicate d that he fe els that some of these convictions should be consider ed as one conviction; that is, some of the c onvictions on the notice that’s bee n filed in this matter should be consi d er ed as one conviction due to the event dates being the same.-6- Th os e are de c isi on s th a t w ill have to b e ma de a t a sen te nc ing he ari ng ; th a t is , the ra ng e of punis hme nt, the pe rc e nt o f sent e nc e to b e se rv e d b e fo re re le a se
c la ssi fi c a tio n, and

wh e the r o r n ot you ’re qua lif ie d f or pr ob a tio n o r a lte rn a te sentenc ing. A nd even though that’s asked for, those are all decisions that would have to b e ma de a t a

se nte nc e he ari nga t a

la te r d a te . D o y ou

un de rs tand

tha t?
[THE PETI TI ONER]: Yes, sir.

Clearly , the trial cour

t set out the possibil ity

of an e x tensive sentenc e at the guilty plea he aringand the petitioner indicated he unde rstood that.

As stated above , we must also look at t he tot ality of the c ircumstance s surrounding the plea. As far as the re lative intellige nce of the petit ioner, the petitioner completed the tenth g rade and lef t school to work with his father

. At the time of his guilty plea, he was e mploy ed as a car penter , which is g e n e r a ll y

c o n s id e r e d

to b e a s k il le d o c c u p a ti o n

. T h e p e ti ti o n e r

w a s v e r y f a mi li ar w it h c r iminal proce eding s as evidenc ed by his prior rec ord. T h e p et itioner had ten pr ior convictions for e ither bu rglar y or the ft of pr op e rt y . H e a lso ha d o the r c on vic tio ns fo r e va din g arr e st a nd va ri ou s tr a ff

ic offe nses. The petitioner had pled g uilty on at least one other occa sion to two of the above- mentioned theft of pr operty

convictions. The pe titioner was re prese nted by competent c ounsel. His trial

c ouns e l ha d b e e n p ra c tic ingfo r e ig hte e n y e ars and e sti ma te d c ri min al lawto b e 90 pe rc e nt o f h is prac tice. The petitioner had time to confe r wit h trial counsel prior to pleading g uilty . The trial c ourt adequately

informed the pe titioner of the sente ncing s ituation surrounding the g uilty plea. The petitioner chose to plead guilty beca use of the une x pecte d appea ranc e of M r. W el l s

. All parties appea red to be lieve that if Mr. Wells testified t hat t he petiti oner’ s conviction was virtua lly assure d.

Ba sed on the totality of the circ umstances, we conclude that the petitioner e ntere d a knowing and voluntary

plea.

Conclusion

For the rea sons sta

ted above, we aff

irm the dec ision of the trial court to deny post-conviction relief to the petitioner.

___________________________________ J ERRY L . SMI TH, JUDGE