IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Qaadir Abdul-Aleem, :

Petitioner :

:

v. :

:

Pennsylvania Board of :

Probation and Parole, : No. 1173 C.D. 2019

Respondent : Submitted: January 31, 2020

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge

HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY 

JUDGE COVEY FILED: April 22, 2020

Qaadir Abdul-Aleem (Abdul-Aleem) petitions this Court for review of 

the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole’s (Board) June 27, 2019 order 

denying his request for administrative relief. Abdul-Aleem presents three issues for 

this Court’s review: (1) whether the Board improperly extended Abdul-Aleem’s 

judicially imposed sentence by recommitting him to serve the balance of his original 

sentence; (2) whether the Board failed to properly credit him for the time he served 

on his parole detainer for his county sentence and for his time spent at liberty on 

parole; and (3) whether the Board abused its discretion by improperly applying the 

presumptive range for backtime to be served. After review, we affirm.

On October 17, 2012, Abdul-Aleem pled guilty to charges of Drug 

Manufacture/Sale/Delivery or Possession with Intent to Deliver and was sentenced to 

21⁄2 to 5 years of incarceration (Original Sentence). See Certified Record (C.R.) at 1.
2

On April 15, 2015, Abdul-Aleem was released on parole from his Original Sentence. 

See C.R. at 4-8. At that time, his maximum release date was September 10, 2017. 

See C.R. at 6. On January 9, 2017, the Board issued a Warrant to Commit and Detain 

Abdul-Aleem after he was arrested and charged with criminal offenses. See C.R. at 

9. On February 23, 2017, the charges were dismissed. See C.R. at 22.

On May 10, 2017, Abdul-Aleem was again arrested by police on new 

criminal charges, and on May 11, 2017, the Board issued a Warrant to Commit and 

Detain him. See C.R. at 25, 27. Abdul-Aleem waived his right to a detention 

hearing, and, while in the Philadelphia County Prison, Abdul-Aleem received a Board 

decision recorded July 27, 2017 detaining him pending disposition of the criminal 

charges. See C.R. at 37. On June 21, 2018, Abdul-Aleem pled guilty to charges of 

Manufacture, Delivery or Possession with Intent to Manufacture or Deliver a 

Controlled Substance and was sentenced to 6 to 18 months of incarceration from 

which he was immediately paroled. See C.R. at 47. In addition, he was sentenced to 

two years of probation. See id. On July 5, 2018, the Board issued another Warrant to 

Commit and Detain Abdul-Aleem, and he was transferred to State Correctional 

Institution (SCI) at Graterford. See C.R. at 38. On August 14, 2018, Abdul-Aleem 

waived his rights to counsel and a hearing, and admitted that his new conviction 

violated his parole. See C.R. at 39. By decision recorded on October 29, 2018 

(mailed November 6, 2018) (November 6, 2018 Decision), the Board formally 

recommitted Abdul-Aleem as a convicted parole violator (CPV) to serve his 

unexpired term of 2 years, 3 months and 11 days, and recalculated his Original 

Sentence maximum release date to October 15, 2020. See C.R. at 78.

On November 30, 2018, Abdul-Aleem filed a Petition for Administrative 

Review (Petition) which the Board denied on June 27, 2019. See C.R. at 83-84, 95-
3

96. In its response to Abdul-Aleem’s Petition, the Board explained:

[T]he Board recalculated your max[imum sentence release]

date to October 15, 2020 based on your recommitment as a 

[CPV] . . . .

. . . the Board properly recalculated your maximum 

sentence. You were paroled from a[n] [SCI] on April 15, 

2015 with a max[imum sentence release] date of September 

10, 2017 leaving you with 879 days remaining on your 

sentence the day you were released. You were arrested

May 11, 2017 by local authorities in Philadelphia County 

and a [B]oard detainer was lodged the same day; there is no 

indication you posted bail prior to your original max[imum 

sentence release] date of September 10, 2017. On June 21, 

2018, you were sentenced in a Philadelphia County Court of 

Common Pleas to a new term of incarceration to be served 

in the county. Based on these facts, you are not entitled to 

any pre-sentence credit because you were never solely 

incarcerated on the [B]oard detainer from the date of your 

arrest to your sentencing date. You are, however, entitled 

to confinement credit for 46 days from January 9, 2017 to 

February 24, 2017. Subtracting 46 from 879 days leaves 

you with 833 days remaining on your sentence.

The Prisons and Parole Code [(Parole Code)] provides that 

[CPVs] who are released from a[n] [SCI] and receive a new 

sentence to be served in a county prison must serve the new 

sentence first. The record shows that you were paroled 

from your Philadelphia County sentence the day of 

sentencing, June 21, 2018, and a [B]oard detainer was 

subsequently re-lodged July 5, 2018. Thus, you did not 

become available to begin service of your original sentence 

until July 5, 2018. Adding 833 days you owe as a [CPV] to 

that availability date establishes a recalculated max[imum 

sentence release] date of October 15, 2020.

C.R. at 95-96 (citations omitted). Abdul-Aleem appealed to this Court.1

 

1

“Our scope of review of the Board’s decision denying administrative relief is limited to 

determining whether necessary findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, an error of 

law was committed, or constitutional rights have been violated.” Johnson v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & 

Parole, 206 A.3d 88, 91 n.3 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019) (quoting Fisher v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 62 

A.3d 1073, 1075 n.1 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013)).
4

Abdul-Aleem first contends that the Board exceeded its authority by 

modifying a judicially imposed sentence. Specifically, Abdul-Aleem asserts that “the 

[Board] does not have proper jurisdiction to impose the additional backtime and thus 

alter his judicially[ ]imposed original maximum release date.” Abdul-Aleem Br. at 

11 (emphasis added). He further argues that “[t]he judicial termination date of 

September 10, 2017 creates an additional liberty interest for Abdul-Aleem, and any 

extension of prison time beyond the judicially[ ]imposed termination date requires 

minimum due process in a venue of competent jurisdiction to ensure that said 

liberties are not abrogated.” Id. at 14. Thus, Abdul-Aleem appears to assert that 

when recalculating his maximum release date, the maximum sentence date rather 

than the maximum sentence length controls.

Initially, Section 6138(a)(1) of the Parole Code provides: 

A parolee under the jurisdiction of the [B]oard released 

from a correctional facility who, during the period of parole 

or while delinquent on parole, commits a crime punishable 

by imprisonment, for which the parolee is convicted or 

found guilty by a judge or jury or to which the parolee 

pleads guilty or nolo contendere at any time thereafter in a 

court of record, may at the discretion of the [B]oard be 

recommitted as a parole violator.

61 Pa.C.S. § 6138(a)(1). Section 6138(a)(2) of the Parole Code requires that if the 

Board orders a parolee to be recommitted, that parolee must serve the remainder of 

the term which he would have been compelled to serve had the parole not been 

granted and shall not receive credit for the time at liberty on parole unless the Board, 

in its discretion, awards such credit. 61 Pa.C.S. § 6138(a)(2); see also 61 Pa.C.S. § 

6138(a)(2.1). 

This Court acknowledges that “the Board is not permitted to impose 

backtime which exceeds the entire remaining balance of [a] parolee’s unexpired term.

The Board can only require that a parolee serve the remaining balance of his 
5

unexpired term since the Board does not have the power to alter a judicially[ 

]imposed sentence.” Yates v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 48 A.3d 496, 502 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2012) (quoting Savage v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 761 A.2d 643, 645 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2000) (citation omitted)). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has specifically 

held that the Board’s authority to extend maximum term expiration dates under such 

circumstances does not usurp the courts’ sentencing functions, or violate a parolee’s 

due process rights. See Gaito v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 412 A.2d 568 (Pa. 1980). 

Accordingly, here, when the Board imposed backtime, it did not modify a judicially

imposed sentence, but instead, required Abdul-Aleem to serve the remainder of the 

original judicially imposed sentence. Thus, Abdul-Aleem’s argument fails.

Abdul-Aleem next argues that the Board failed to properly allocate 

credit for time he served on his parole detainer for his county sentence and for his 

time spent at liberty on parole. Specifically, Abdul-Aleem contends:

Abdul-Aleem was in fact paroled on June 21, 2018 for his 

new conviction of Possession with Intent to Deliver . . . and

then was available to serve the balance of his [O]riginal 

[S]entence. The Board must comply with . . . Martin [v. Pa. 

Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 840 A.2d 299, 309 (Pa. 2003)] . . . 

wherein the Commonwealth Court [sic] indicated that 

[p]etitioner is entitled to time credit for all the time 

incarcerated that is not attributable to the new sentence.

Abdul-Aleem, therefore asserts that the excess credit 

extending from June 21, 2018 forward should be applied to 

his [O]riginal [S]entence.

Abdul-Aleem Br. at 15. The Board responds:

Abdul-Aleem’s reliance on [Martin] is misplaced because 

the Martin exception to Gaito only applies where an 

individual is acquitted of the new charges or no new 

sentence is imposed, and in cases where the time spent in 

pre-sentence custody exceeds the length of the new 

sentence. 
6

Because Abdul-Aleem was sentenced to county prison 

for his new crime he was required to serve the new 

sentence before his [O]riginal [S]entence. Further, the 

new sentence must be served consecutively to the [O]riginal 

[S]entence. Thus, Abdul-Aleem could not resume serving 

his [O]riginal [S]entence until he was released from his new 

county sentence, either on parole, or at the expiration of his 

maximum date.

Board Br. at 7-8 (emphasis added; citations and footnotes omitted).

“Pursuant to Gaito, ‘this Court consistently held that once a parolee is 

sentenced on a new criminal offense, the period of time between arrest and 

sentencing, when bail is not satisfied [on the new criminal charge], must be applied 

toward the new sentence, and not to the original sentence.’” Stroud v. Pa. Bd. of 

Prob. & Parole, 196 A.3d 667, 674 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018) (quoting Armbruster v. Pa. 

Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 919 A.2d 348, 352 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007)). “The sole exception 

to Gaito’s general rule, set forth in Martin, allows pre-sentence credit to be applied to 

the original sentence ‘when [an] offender is incarcerated both on Board detainer and 

for new charges and receives new sentence of imprisonment that is shorter than [the] 

term of [the] pre-sentence incarceration[.]’” Stroud, 196 A.3d at 676 n.16 (quoting 

Smith v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 171 A.3d 759, 761 n.6 (Pa. 2017)).

Section 6138(a)(5) of the Parole Code provides:

If a new sentence is imposed on the parolee, the service of 

the balance of the term originally imposed by a 

Pennsylvania court shall precede the commencement of the 

new term imposed in the following cases:

(i) If a person is paroled from a[n] [SCI] and the new 

sentence imposed on the person is to be served in the 

[SCI].

(ii) If a person is paroled from a county prison and the 

new sentence imposed upon him is to be served in the 

same county prison.
7

(iii) In all other cases, the service of the new term for 

the latter crime shall precede commencement of the 

balance of the term originally imposed.

61 Pa.C.S. § 6138(a)(5) (emphasis added). Given that Abdul-Aleem was sentenced 

to a county prison for his new conviction, Section 6138(a)(5) of the Parole Code 

required him to serve the new sentence before his Original Sentence. As the Board 

explained in its June 27, 2019 Order:

[Abdul-Aleem was] paroled from [his] Philadelphia County 

sentence the day of sentencing, June 21, 2018, and a 

[B]oard detainer was subsequently re-lodged July 5, 2018. 

Thus, [he] did not become available to begin service of [his]

Original Sentence until July 5, 2018. Adding 833 days [he]

owe[d] as a [CPV] to that availability date establishe[d] a 

recalculated max[imum sentence release] date of October 

15, 2020.

C.R. at 96. This Court agrees and concludes that the Board properly allocated AbdulAleem’s time served in accordance with Section 6138(a)(5) of the Parole Code.

Further, Abdul-Aleem contends that the Board erred and abused its 

discretion by denying him credit for street time and failing to state sufficient reasons 

for doing so.

“[T]he Board must articulate the basis for its decision to grant or deny a 

CPV credit for time served at liberty on parole.” Pittman v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & 

Parole, 159 A.3d 466, 474 (Pa. 2017). 

The [Pennsylvania] Supreme Court noted [in Pittman] that 

‘the reason the Board gives does not have to be extensive 

and a single sentence explanation is likely sufficient in most 

instances.’ Id. at 475 n.12. The [Board] must issue a 

contemporaneous statement of reasons as to why it denied a 

[CPV] credit for time spent at liberty on parole; where the 

Board fails to do so, this Court will remand for the Board to 

set forth its reasons. 
8

Smoak v. Talaber, 193 A.3d 1160, 1164 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018) (emphasis added). Here, 

the Board explained in its November 6, 2018 Decision its reason for denying AbdulAleem credit for time spent at liberty on parole, as “NEW CONVICTION

SAME/SIMILAR TO ORIGINAL OFFENSE.” C.R. at 65; see also C.R. at 50. The 

Board’s explanation adequately supports its denial and is sufficient to explain the 

Board’s action. See Barnes v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 203 A.3d 382, 390-91 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2019) (concluding that the Board’s explanation that the “new conviction 

was ‘same/similar to the original offense’” provided “sufficient explanation for the 

Board’s decision to deny . . . credit”). Accordingly, the Board properly denied 

Abdul-Aleem credit for time at liberty on parole and stated sufficient reasons for 

doing so. 

Finally, Abdul-Aleem asserts that the Board abused its discretion by 

improperly applying the presumptive range for backtime. Abdul-Aleem pled guilty 

to a felony charge of “Manufacture, Delivery, or Possession with Intent to 

Manufacture or Deliver” involving heroin, in violation of Section 13 of the

Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act (Controlled Substances Act).

2

 

See C.R. at 47. Under section 4(1)(ii) of The Controlled Substances Act, 35 P.S. §

780-104(1)(ii), heroin is classified as a Schedule I drug. Section 13(f) of the 

Controlled Substances Act provides:

Any person who violates clause . . . (30) of subsection (a) 

with respect to:

(1) A controlled substance or counterfeit substance 

classified in Schedule I or II which is a narcotic drug, is 

guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof shall be 

sentenced to imprisonment not exceeding [15] years, or 

to pay a fine not exceeding two hundred fifty thousand 

dollars ($250,000), or both or such larger amount as is 

 

2 Act of April 14, 1972, P.L. 233, as amended, 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30).
9

sufficient to exhaust the assets utilized in and the profits 

obtained from the illegal activity.

35 P.S. § 780-113(f) (emphasis added). Thus, Abdul-Aleem’s crime was punishable 

by a maximum 15-year imprisonment penalty. 

Section 75.1 of the Board’s Regulations entitled “Application of 

presumptive ranges to [CPVs]” states:

(a) Presumptive ranges of parole backtime to be served will 

be utilized if a parolee is convicted of a new criminal 

offense while on parole and the Board orders recommitment 

as a convicted parole violator after the appropriate 

revocation hearing. 

(b) The presumptive ranges of parole backtime are 

intended to structure the discretion of the Board while 

allowing for individual circumstances in terms of mitigation 

and aggravation to be considered in the final decision. 

(c) The Board may deviate from the presumptive range or 

determine that recommitment should not occur, provided 

written justification is given. 

(d) The presumptive ranges are intended to directly relate 

to the severity of the crime for which the parolee has been 

convicted. 

(e) The severity ranking of crimes listed in § 75.2 (relating 

to presumptive ranges for convicted parole violations) is not 

intended to be exhaustive, and the most closely related 

crime category in terms of severity and the presumptive 

range will be followed if the specific crime which resulted 

in conviction is not contained within the listing.

37 Pa. Code § 75.1. Section 75.2 of the Board’s Regulations provides that the 

presumptive range for felony drug violations with a maximum 15-year imprisonment 

penalty is 24 to 36 months. 37 Pa. Code § 75.2. Our Supreme Court has explained 

that “[a]s long as the period of recommitment is within the presumptive range for the 

violation, the Commonwealth Court will not entertain challenges to the propriety of 

the term of recommitment.” Smith v. Commonwealth, 574 A.2d 558, 560 (Pa. 1990). 
10

Here, Abdul-Aleem’s 27-month and 11-day recommitment term falls within the 24-

to 36-month presumptive range, and accordingly, this Court “will not entertain [the] 

challenge[] to the propriety of the [recommitment term].” Id.

For all of the above reasons, the Board’s order is affirmed.

___________________________

ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Qaadir Abdul-Aleem, :

Petitioner :

:

v. :

:

Pennsylvania Board of :

Probation and Parole, : No. 1173 C.D. 2019

Respondent :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 22nd day of April, 2020, the Pennsylvania Board of 

Probation and Parole’s June 27, 2019 order is affirmed.

___________________________

ANNE E. COVEY, Judge