IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Frederick W. Chapman, :

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 1405 C.D. 2016 : Submitted: March 31, 2017 Unemployment Compensation : Board of Review, :

Respondent :

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge

HONORABLE JULIA K. HEARTHWAY, Judge HONORABLE DAN PELLEGRINI, Senior Judge

OPINION BY SENIOR JUDGE PELLEGRINI FILED: June 13, 2017

Frederick W. Chapman (Claimant) petitions this Court for review of
the Unemployment Compensation Board of Re view’s (Board) dismissal of his
appeal due to it being untimely filed under Section 502 of the Unemployment
Compensation Law (Law). 1 We affirm.

I.

Pursuant to a consulting agreement, Claimant performed work for
Khan Academy, Inc. as a mathematics copy e ditor

. When he was informed that his

services were no longer needed, he filed an application for unemployment

1 Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex. Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended , 43 P.S. § 822.2

compensation benefits . Claimant’s application was denied by the Service Center

and h e appealed.

On April 7, 2016, for reasons that are not nec essary to set forth, the

Referee affirmed the Service Center’s denial of benefits. The Referee ’s decision

also contained a notice that Claimant had 15 days to appeal the decision to the

Board 2 and the various ways an appeal could be taken

– i .e. , in perso n, mail, fax,

internet or email

. The information regarding electronic transmission warned :

A party filing an appeal via the Internet or electronic mail is responsible for using the proper format and for delay, disruption or interruption of electronic sig nals and readability of the document and accepts the risk that the appeal may not be properly or timely filed.

(Record (R.) Item No. 10, Referee’s Decision/Order dated 4/7/16.) 3

2 Section 502 of the Law states that a referee’s decision is a final decision of the Board “unless an appeal is filed therefrom, within fifteen days after the date of such decision. . . . .” 43 P.S. § 822. Furthermore, 34 Pa. Code § 101.82(a) provides:

A party seeking to appeal a Department determination shall file an

ap peal . . . on or before the 15 th day after the date on which notification of the decision of the Department was delivered personally to the appellant or mailed to him at his last known post office address.

3 This language mirrors the Department of Labor a nd Industry’s regulation, which provides:

A party filing an appeal by electronic transmission is responsible

for using the proper format and for delay, disruption, interruption of electronic signals and readability of the document and accepts the risk tha t the appeal may not be properly or timely filed. (Footnote continued on next page...)3 To file within the required 15 days, Claimant had until April 22, 2016

,

to appeal the Refe ree’s decision to the Board. His petition for appeal was

transmitted via e mail on April 22, 2016

, purportedly at 11:59 :46 p.m. , but was not received by the Board’s server until April 23, 2016

, at 12:00 a.m. The Department

of Labor and Indu stry ’s (Department) r egulation s et forth at 34 Pa. Code §

101.82 (b)(4) provides that for appeals submitted by electronic transmission:

The date of filing is the receipt date recorded by the Department appeal office or the Board’s electronic transmission s ystem
, if the electronic record is in a form capable of being processed by that system.

Id. (emphasis added). Because Claimant’s appeal was not received by the Board’s
electronic transmission system within 15 days, the Board dismissed his appeal as

unti mely

. 4 Claimant requested a hearing on the timeliness issue and the Board
granted his request.

At the hearing, Claimant presented evidence that he appeal ed via

email and that his Gmail timestamp indicated that the date of mailing was 11:59 :46

(continued...)

34 Pa. Code § 101.82(b)(4).

4 In McClean v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review , 908 A.2d 956, 959 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006), we noted that the 15

- day time limit was mandatory and “if an appeal is not timel y filed within the specified time period, the determination becomes final, and the Board does not have the requisite jurisdiction to consider the matter.”4

p.m. on Ap ril 22, 2016. When asked why he waited until the last possible moment
to file his appeal, he answered:

I went through a number of steps; tried to prepare my appeal conscientiously. But that’s not the only thing on my plate. I have to

— not only do I need to fulfill the requirements for eligibility for benefits by applying for at least two jobs a week and having at least one job search a week, I am doing more than the minimum in order to find work sooner . . . . So , it’s simply that my resources have been stretched very thin between the intricacies of the appeal process and the demands of looking for work in a difficult job market.

(R. Item No. 18, Transcript of Testimony

— Board’s Remand Hearing held 6/3/16

. )

The Board again dismissed Claimant’s appeal be cause under the regulation

, the

date that an email appeal is received by the Board ’s electronic transmission system

is the date it is file d which makes a filing on April 23, 2016, at 12:00 a.m.
untimely

. This petition for review followed. 5

II.

A.

Claima nt contends that because Section 502 of the Law does not
define when an appeal is “filed,” 34 Pa. Code § 101.82(b)(4) stating that an appeal

is filed when received b y the Board i s invalid because “ the prevailing criterion is

5 Our review of the Board ’ s decision is limited to determining whether an error of law was committed , whether constitutional rights were violated, or whether necessary findings of fact were supported by substantial evidence. Frazier v. Unemployment Compensation Board of
Review , 833 A.2d 1181, 1183 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003).5

the date sent rather than the d ate received

. For example, the Court and the Board

both use this criterion for fi lings submitted by postal mail. ” 6 ( Claimant’s Brief at
9) (emphasis in original). Claimant then argues that his Google Gmail timestamp

, which shows that his appeal was sent at 11:59:46 p.m. on April 22, 2016, should

have been sufficient to estab lish that his appeal was filed o n time because an appeal sent by mail is deemed filed when sent as evidence d by the U.S. postmark.

While Claimant is correct that Section 502 of the Law does not state

w hether an appeal is “ filed ” when it is sent or received, Section 203 of the Law
gives the Board the power to adopt regulations relating to rules of procedure
providing, in relevant part, that:

It shall be the duty of the board to hear appeals arising from claims for compensation, adopt, amend or rescind such rules of procedure

. . . as it deems necessary and consistent with this act. Such rules of procedure shall be effective in such a manner as the board shall prescribe and shall not be inconsistent with this act.

6 34 Pa. Code § 101.82(b)(1) pr ovides that the filing date for a written appeal will be determined as follows:

(i) The date of the official United States Postal Service postmark on the envelope containing the appeal. . . .

(ii) If there is no official United States Postal Service post mark . . . the date of a postage meter mark on the envelope containing the appeal.

(iii) If the filing date cannot be determined by any of the methods in subparagraph (i) or (ii), the filing date will be the date recorded by the Department, the workforce investment office or the Board when it receives the appeal.6

43 P.S. § 763(d). Pursuant to this power , the Board adopted regulations that
provide that the date a n appeal is filed is determined by what method a c laimant

decides to utilize to take the appeal. O ther than filing by mail, this regulation
provides that the filing date is determined to be when the item is received

. Regarding electronic filing, 34 Pa. Code § 101.82(b)(4) provides that “ [t]he date of
filing is the receipt date recorded by the Department appeal office or the B oard’s
electronic transmission system

. . . ” 7

Because “[t]he Board is bound to follow its own regulations in
determining the perfection date of an appeal,” Edwards v. Unemployment
Compensation Board of Review , 639 A.2d 1279, 1281 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994) (citi ng Costello v. State Employee’s Retirement Board , 596 A.2d 260 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1991),
and the appeal here was untimely, the Board properly found that it was without
jurisdiction to hear Claimant’s appeal.

B.

Without saying so, what Claimant appear s to be c ontending is that 34
Pa. Code § 101.82(b)(4) is invalid because there is no rational basis for not accepting a Google Gmail timestamp as evidence that he sent his appeal at
11:59:46 p.m. on April 22, 2016

, while accepting a U.S. postmark for mailed
appeals

.

7 This Court has held that validly promulgated regulations “have the same force as statutory provisions,” and that regulatory time limits “should be given the same effect as mandatory time provis ions appearing in [a] statute, as both serve the useful function of providing for finality in the administrative process.” Mayer v. Unemployment Compensation Board of
Review , 366 A.2d 605, 607 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1976).7 T aking an appeal by mail gave claimants and employers across the

Commonwealth who did not live near a Board office th e same access to take an
appeal

– a post office. Moreover, unlike private or electronically placed
timestamps, U.S. postmarks a re accep ted under the r egulations because they a re easy to determine, deemed reliable and are n ot subject to manipulation. See UGI
Utilities, Inc. v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review , 776 A.2d 344 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2001); see also George v. Unemployment Compe nsation Board of

Review , 767 A.2d 1124, 1128 n.8 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001), overruled on other grounds
by Diehl v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (ESAB Group, Inc.) , 57
A.3d 1209 (Pa. 2012).

The rule that a mailed appeal is filed when it is “sent” ha s no application to that portion of the regulation involving an electronic filing, which

fixes the date of the appeal to when it is “received” by the Board ’s electronic

transmissio n system

. When this electronic filing method is used, all filers are on

equ al footing in having access to the electronic filing system

. And like filing in
person, an electronic filing is only perfected when the appeal is received at one of

the Board’s offices

– n ot when an appellant beg an his journey to the Board’s

office , when he signed through security, or when he came up to the counter and
placed his name on the list to be served . Simply, the filing date is when the Board
actually receives the appeal

. 8 This is also the same rule as applied by the courts of

this Commonwealth in determining when appeals are timely filed. 9

8 Even if we could ignore that the regula tion provides that an electronic appeal is filed when it is received, and even if we conflate filing by mail with filing electronically, we cannot look backwards to say that Claimant’s appeal had to be timely filed because it was received exactly at 12:00 a.m. on April 23, 2016, and, because transmission does not occur (Footnote continued on next page...)8

(continued...)

instantaneously, the appeal had to be timely sent on April 22, 2016, the last day for timely filing his appeal. In Hanna v. Zoning Board of Adjustment of Pittsburgh , 437 A.2d 115 (Pa. Cmwlth

. 1981), the issue was whether events subsequent to the mailing of a zoning board decision could serve to calculate the beginning of an appeal period when there was no date of mailing on that decision. We rejected that argument, holding that the time for appeal did not begin to run unless there was a date of mailing on the Board’s decision. We did so because it provided certainty to the appellant regarding when an appeal had to be taken. Id. at 118; see also Schmidt v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania , 433 A .2d 456 (Pa. 1981). The argument we rejected in Hanna is no different than one that says that if a claimant delivered the letter to the post office at 11:59:46 p.m. but it was not postmarked until 12:00 a.m. the following day, it should be considered time ly filed.

9 I f accepted

, Claimant’s contention that there is no rational basis to treat electronic filings differently than mail filings will also have an impact on how appeals are taken under the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure and a Pennsylvan ia Supreme Court order regarding electronic filing. This is because

, like the Board’s regulations, except for mailing in certain proscribed circumstances, the day and time notice is received is the date an appeal is taken.

Pa.R.A.P. 905(a)(3) deals with appeals from common pleas court orders to an appellate court. It requires that the appeal be filed with the prothonotary or clerk of that common pleas court and the date of the appeal is “[u]pon receipt of the notice of appeal the [common pleas] clerk sha ll immediately stamp it with the date of receipt, and that date shall constitute the date when the appeal was taken . . .”

Pa.R.A.P. 1514(a) deals with the filing of an appeal to this Court from an agency such as the Board. Here, the requirements for mai ling are more stringent than those contained in the Board’s regulation because a postmark does not fix the date of mailing unless accompanied by United States Postal Service Form 3817, Certificate of Mailing.

The requirement f

or electronically appealing a n agency adjudication is not set forth in the Rules of Appellate Procedure, but instead by an order of our Supreme Court dated January 6, 2014. See In re: Electronic Filing System in the Appellate Courts (Pa., No. 418, filed January 6, 2014). It provide s that when a party appeals an agency adjudication electronically

, the manner states in I (B) “The electronic filing must be completed by 11:59:59 p.m. EST/EDT to be considered filed that da y.” (Emphasis added.) Under our Supreme Court’s order then

, it is not when the appeal is transmitted, not when the appealing party gains access to the court’s electronic system, not when the appealing party begins to file the appeal, but only when it is “completed.” Only then will the appeal be considered “received.”9 Because in a dopting 34 Pa. Code § 101.82(b )(4) t he Board was acting

within its scope as a delegated rulemaking authority and had a rational basis for
making the receipt by the Board’s electronic transmission system the operative
filing date for when the appeal was deemed filed, t he Board properly found that
regulation was not inconsistent with Section 502 of the Law.

C

. Claimant also argues that the Board erred by failing to consider the
possibility that its own time of receipt of the email appeal as recorded in its
computer system could have been inaccurate. Aside from the fact that this
argument is purely speculative, it ignores that 34 Pa. Code § 101.82(b)(4)
specifically provides that the date an appeal is received is the date it is logged

, and

that Claimant assumed the risk that his elec tronically submitted appeal would not

be properly time

- stamped. In Roman

- Hutchinson v. Unemployment Compensation
Board of Review , 972 A .2d 1286 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009)

, the c laimant similarly
contended that something in the email system went awry which led to the
Department’s failure to receive her timely

- sent email appeal

. A s here, the claimant
submitted proof that her appeal wa s sent within the time limit. Nonetheless

, we

found that 34 Pa. Code. § 101.82(b)(4) contemplates a malfunction in an email
delivery system and places the risk of an untimely filing on the claimant by
providing that the party filing an appeal “accepts the risk that the appeal may not
be properly or ti mely filed.” 10

10 Claimant has not sought a nunc pro tunc appeal and does not specifically allege that there was any sort of administrative breakdown which caused the delay. While he speculates about the possibility that the Board’s date of receipt was inaccurate, even if he made out that claim, the failure of an email transmission does not constitute an administrative breakdown. See (Footnote continued on next page...)10 Claimant should have taken the time to prepare the appeal with more

than 14 seconds to be received by the Board’s electronic transmission system.
Presciently, an Explanatory Comment for Pa.R.C.P. No. 205.4, relating to the
electronic filing and service of legal papers, also provides that having the filing
party assume the risk that an electronically filed document might not be properly

filed is :

[B]ased upon the concern that the immediacy of the

electronic transfer of legal papers may foster increased dependency upon last

- minute preparation and filing, leaving insufficient time in which to remedy either a deficiency in the legal paper being filed or the inability to effectuate the filing.

Explanatory Comment

— 1999, Pa.R.C.P. No. 205.4(e)(1).

Accordingly, f

o r the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Board’s order
dismissing Claimant’s appeal as untimely.

________________________________ DAN PELLEGRINI, Senior Judge

(continued...)

Zellman v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1588 C.D. 2007, filed January 31, 2008).IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Frederick W. Chapman, :

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 1405 C.D. 2016

: Unemployment Compensation : Board of Review, :

Respondent :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 13 th day of June , 2017, the order of the
Unemployment Compensa tion Board of Review in the above

- caption ed case is

affirmed.

________________________________ DAN PELLEGRINI, Senior JudgeIN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Frederick W. Chapman

, : Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 14 05 C.D. 2016

: Submitt ed : March 3 1 , 2017 Unemployment Compensation : Board of Review, : Respondent :

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge

HONORABLE JULIA K. HEARTHWAY, Judge HONORABLE DAN PELLEGRINI, Senior Judge

D ISSENTING OPINION BY JUDGE COHN JUBELIRER FILED: June 13, 2017

At the stroke of midnight , at the instan t the Unemployment Compensation
Board of Review’s (Board) server ’s clock moved from April 22, 2016 to April 23,

2016, Frederick W. Chapman ’s (Claimant) appeal challeng ing the d ecision of an Unemployment Compensation Referee, arrived at that server

. The Referee’s

d ecision had been sent by mail to Claimant on April 7, 2016

, and therefore his
appeal had to be filed by April 22, 2016. T he Board acknowledged in its Decision

that Claimant sent his appeal at 11:59 p.m. on April 22, 2016 . However

, because

the appeal was received at 12:00 a.m., April 23, 2016, the Board found Claimant’s
appeal was untimely. (Board Decision at 2.) The majority affirms, but, u nder

these unique circumstances, I respectfully disagree

. T he date an appeal is sent can be used for de termining the timeliness of an

appea l filed by mail

. In fact, t he preferred order in determining the filing date of a
mailed appeal is the mailing date identified on the official U.S. Postal ServiceRCJ

- 2

postmark or postage meter mark on the envelope containing the appeal, or a U .S.

Postal Service Form 3817 or certified mail receipt

. 34 Pa. Code § 101.82(b) (1)

. Only i f the date mailed cannot be ascertained from one of these methods is the
appeal considered filed when received. See also 34 Pa. Code § 101.82(b)(2) (using
the date an appeal is delivered to a common carrier if that date is “established by a
document or other record prepared by the common carrier in the normal course of
business”).

Had Claimant fou nd a post office open at that hour, and had his appeal been

post marked at 11:59 p.m., it would have been timely. However, b ecause Claimant

emailed his appeal

, there is no postmark. Claimant did bring to the hearing his
“Google time [ ] stamp ” showing that the email was sent at 11:59:46 p.m. on April

22, 2016

. 1 ( Claimant’s Petition for Appeal from Referee’s Decision with

Attachments, R. Item 11, Board Exs. B9

- B10; Email to Board Requesting a
Hearing on Timeliness, R. Item 13

, Board Ex s . B4

- B5 .) And, importantly, there is
a time stamp from the Board’s own server indicating receipt of the appeal at 12:00
a.m.; the appeal thus had to have been sent prior to 12:00 a.m. However, the
Board’s regulations treat emailed appeals differently from mailed ap peals by
providing that the emailed appeals are filed when received , never when they are

sent

. The majority justifies this difference with two explanations . It first posits
that allowing the taking of an appeal by mail equalize s appellate access between

those who were located near a Board office and those who are not because both

could now go to a post office to file an appeal

. Chapman v. Unemployment Comp.

1 The Board stated in its decision that Claimant presented evidence that he sent the email at 11:59 p.m. on April 22, 2016. (Board Decision at 2.)RCJ

- 3

Bd. of Review (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1405 C.D. 2016, filed June 13, 2017 ) , slip op. at

7. The person w ho went to the Board office would perfect the appeal when it was
submitted to the filing office; the person who went to the post office could perfect
the appeal when it was submitted to the mail delivery system. However, the
majority does not convincingly explain why those who submit their appeal via

computer likewise should not perfect their appeal when it is submitted to the
electronic mail delivery system.
The majority also justifies the difference because

, unlike a U.S. Postal

Service postmark , which is easy to determine and deemed reliable , a n electronically

- placed time stamp is subject to manipulation. Id. (citing UGI
Utilities, Inc. v. Unemployment Comp

. Bd

. of Review , 776 A.2d 344, 347 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2001) ; George v. Unemployment Comp

. Bd

. of Review , 767 A.2d 1124,
1128 n.8 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001), overruled on other grounds by Diehl v.
Unemployment Comp

. Bd

. of Review (ESAB Grp

. , Inc.) , 57 A.3d 1209 (Pa.
2012) )

. Wh ether or not electronically

- placed time stamp s may be subject to
manipulat ion an d, therefore, not reli able

, is irrelevant to this case because there is
no need to rely on the Google time stamp. Claimant’s appeal was received at
12:00 a.m. on April 23, 2016, and the transmission does not occur instantaneously.

Claimant therefore nece ssarily had to have sent the appeal before 12:00 a.m., and

thus it had to have been sent before midnight on April 22 , 2016, the last day for
timely filing his appeal

. Any perceived unreliability of time stamps from private fax or email systems
is not applicable here because the focus is not on the Google time stamp, but on the

Board’s time stamp

. T here can be no question in this unusual situation that

Claimant in fact pressed the send button on his keyboard and in fact sent the appealRCJ

- 4

to the Bo ard on the 15 th day , as required by Section 502 of the Unemployment
Compensation Law (Law)

. 2 The Board did not discredit Claimant’s evidence that
he sent the email at 11:59 p.m. on April 22, 2016, or find that this evidence was
unreliable. Instead, it co ncluded that, notwithstanding this evidence, it “ha[d] no
discretion to use the sent time as the appeal date” because of its regulation. (Board
Decision at 2.) Notwithstanding this, the practical and realistic approach I would

use here is consistent with this Court’s precedent. See

, e.g. , Wright v.
Unemployment Comp

. Bd

. of Review , 41 A.3d 58, 67 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011)
( revers ing a Board decision that found a faxed appeal untimely because the

claimant had presented uncontroverted evidence that he timely transmitted his
appeal, although the appeal was not found in the Board’s records , and the Board
had capriciously disregarded this uncontroverted evidence )

. The majority cites Hanna v. Zoning Board of Adjustment of Pittsburgh , 437
A.2d 115 (Pa. Cmwlth. 19 81), as supporting its position. Hanna , however,
emphasizes the importance of the public’s right to appeal a n adverse government agency’s determination

. There, a local agency did not identify the specific
“mailing date” on its decision, although the deci sion itself was dated and that date
was listed on an accompanying letter

. Id. at 116. The appellant did not file his
appeal timely , and so the appeal was quashed

. Id. This Court reversed, holding
that there is an implicit duty on a n agency to advise th e parties of the mail ing date

to ensure that an aggrieved party know s , with certainty, the time remaining in
which to file an appeal or petition for review. Id. at 117 (citing Schmidt v.

Commonwealth , 433 A.2d 456, 458 (Pa. 1981) )

. I do not interpret a decision that

2 Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex. Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended , 43 P.S. § 822.RCJ

- 5

imposes an affirmative duty on government agencies to provide the public with the
date a decision is placed in the mail so that any appeal rights can be timely
exercised, as requiring us to extinguish such rights.

A lthough I appreciate the majority’s concern that this approach would
impact appeals filed under the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure
(Appellate Rules) , I believe this approach is more consistent with those Rules than
the majority’s . In Miller v. Unemployment Comp ensatio n B oar d of Review , 476
A.2d 364 (Pa. 1984) , our Supreme Court reversed an order of this Court quashing a petition for review because it had not been timely filed

. The Court stated that it
“ha[s] long refused to give overly technical, restrictive readings to procedural
rules, particularly when remedial statutes such as the [Law] are involved” and that
“[d]ismissals are particularly disfavored.” Id. at 366

- 67. Acknowledging that the
petition did not comply with Appellate Rules, the Supreme Court “neverthel ess reverse[d] on the peculiar facts of th[e] case.” Id. at 365. It held that

adherence to . . . [jurisdictional] rules [regarding the timely filing of appeals that ] prescribe[] the only evidence of timely mailing which will be acceptable should not re sult in dismissal if timeliness can be determined by reference to the internal records of the court , and petitioner’s counsel can bring the relevant facts and records which show timeliness to the court’s attention

, without the necessity of an evidentiary hearing.

Id. (emphasis added). Accordingly, the Court concluded that

where the record shows clearly and without dispute that a petition for review was timely mailed prior to the 30

- day jurisdictional deadline,

w here counsel for the appellant apprises the court of the record in that respect and timeless can be determined from an examination of the records of the court, a fair and just interpretation of our rules makes a dismissal improper.RCJ

- 6

Id. at 367. The conclusion that, based on the Board’s own internal records and the
“peculiar facts” here, Claimant’s appeal had to have been “timely [e]mailed prior
to the [15]

- day jurisdictional deadline,” id. at 365, 367, is consistent with the
principles espoused in Miller and would not impact

, negatively or otherwise, the
filing of appeals under the Appellate Rules. 3

Because Claimant had to have submitted his appeal, as required by Section
502 of the Law, on the 15 th day for it to have been time stamped as receiv ed
precisely at 12:00 a.m. on the 16 th day, I would hold that Claimant’s appeal was
timely and, therefore, would remand for the Board to consider Claimant’s appeal.
To do otherwise unnecessarily elevates form over substance and disregards the
importance o f allowing the public to utilize all means provided , within the full time
period allowed , to file an appeal

. This is particularly true where the appeal period,
15 days measured from the date the decision is placed in the mail , is so brief and is
rarely ever, due to the realities of the postal system, the full time period allowed by

the Law. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.

_____________________________________ RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge

3 Although Miller has not been extended to the Board’s unemployment compensation regulations, see Gannett Satellite Information Network, Inc. v . Unemployment Compensation Board of Review , 661 A.2d 502, 504

- 05 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995) (holding that Miller does not apply to appeals filed pursuant to administrative agency regulations), I believe that a similar practical and realistic approach has been rec ognized in unemployment compensation appeals under the Board’s regulations. See, e.g. , Wright , 41 A.3d at 67.