FILED

September 29, 1999

Cecil Crowson, Jr.

Appellate Court Clerk

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

BILLY LATTIMER )

)

Petitioner/Appellant, ) Appeal No.

) 01A01-9804-CH-00200

vs. )

) Davidson Chancery

TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT ) No. 98-489-II

OF CORRECTION, ET AL., )

)

Defendants/Appellees. )

)

APPEAL FROM THE CHANCERY COURT

FOR DAVIDSON COUNTY

THE HONORABLE CHANCELLOR McCOY PRESIDING

BILLY LATTIMER, #91238

Turney Center Industrial Prison 

Route 1,

Only, Tennessee 37140-9709

ACTING PRO SE FOR PETITIONER/APPELLANT

JOHN KNOX WALKUP

Attorney General and Reporter

MICHAEL E. MOORE

Solicitor General

ELENA J. XOINIS

Assistant Attorney General

Civil Rights and Claims Division

425 5th Avenue North

Nashville, Tennessee 37243-0488

ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENTS/APPELLEES

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED

PATRICIA J. COTTRELL, JUDGE

CONCUR:

CANTRELL, P.J., M.S.

KOCH, J.
2

OPINION

This is an appeal from the dismissal of a Petition for Declaratory Judgment

by the Chancery Court of Davidson County. The petitione r, Billy Lattimer

(“Petitioner”), is serving a sentence in the custody of the Tennessee Department

of Correction. He argues that the trial court improperly dismissed his lawsuit for

lack of jurisdiction. We agree.

During his incarceration at Northeast Correctional Center, Petitioner

accrued a large collection of photographs (over 1,000 photos), which he kept in

two bound volumes. He alleged that many of the photos were Polaroid pictures

of his family taken during their visits to him as part of a prison photo project and

others were purchased from a vendor affiliated with the Department. In any

event, Petitioner acquired or possessed the photographs with the knowledge and

permission of the Department. 

In 1995 or 1996, the Department’s policy regarding photographs changed,

and inmates were no longer permitted to acquire Polaroids. Petitioner alleges that

the policy provided that those pictures already in the possession of an inmate

would not be confiscated so long as the inmate was not the subject of certain

disciplinary actions or was not permanently transferred to another institution. The

policy permitted inmates who were transferred to mail their collections elsewhere,

but if this was not accomplished within thirty days, the collections were to be

destroyed.

In February of 1997, Petitioner was temporarily transferred from Northe ast

Correctional Center for a court date. Upon his return, Petitioner discovered that

his photos were confiscated. He filed a grievance with the Department. The

Petitioner alleges that while this grievance was still pending, he learned that his
3

photos had been destroyed.

Mr Lattimer filed the above mentioned pro se petition in the Chancery

Court of Davidson County. He styled it a “Uniform Administrative Procedures

Act Petition Pursuant to Tenn. Code. Ann. § 4-5-101, et seq. for Declaratory

Judgment.” Petitioner sought, in addition to the declaratory judgment, $3,660 in

actual damages, and $15,000 in punitive damages, as well as a mandatory

injunction that all seizures of prisoner Polaroid photographs cease.

The defendants did not respond to the petition and filed no pleadings in the

chancery court before the trial court issued a sua sponte order dismissing the

claim. Finding that this was an action primarily for damages to property, the trial

court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to hear Mr. La ttimer’s lawsuit because

it involved unliquidated damages.

I.

The petition filed herein seeks relief, inter alia, under the Uniform

Administrative Procedures Act, specifically a declaratory judgment pursuant to

Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-101, et seq. The defendants argue that the petition should

be dismissed for failure to state a claim under that statute. 

Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-224 allows a party to seek a declaratory judgment

to challenge the “ legal va lidity or applicability of a statute, rule or order of an

agency to specified circumstances.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-224(a) (Supp. 1998).

A prerequisite to such an action, however, is tha t the party first seek a declaratory

order from the agency. Id.; Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-224(b).

In the petition filed herein, there is no allegation that petitioner first sought

a declaratory order from the Department. The record includes no such request.

Therefore, the chancery court lacked jurisdiction to hear Petitioner’s declaratory
1

 Although defendants did not raise this issue below, we are not precluded from

considering it on appeal. Because it is an issue of jurisdiction, it may be raised at any time.

“Subject matter jurisdiction may never be waived and the lack thereof may be challenged at

any stage of the proceedings.” Wunderlich v. Fortas, 776 S.W.2d 953 (Tenn. App. 1989).

2

 We note that Petitioner seeks injunctive and declaratory relief, in addition to

monetary damages, for alleged deprivation of his constitutional rights. Regardless of the

caption of Petitioner’s pleading, its substance must be examined. See Norton v. Everhart,

895 S.W.2d 317, 319 (Tenn. 1995); see also Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct.

594, 596, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972).

4

judgment action brought under the U.A.P.A. See Watson v. Tennessee Dep’t of

Correction, 970 S.W.2d 494, 497 (Tenn. App. 1998); Pearson v. Garrett Fin.

Serv., Inc., 849 S.W.2d 776, 780 (Tenn. App. 1992) (where a court has reached

the correct result, it will not be reversed even if the result was predicated on an

erroneous reason). Thus, to the extent the dismissal of the case was also a

dismissal of the Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-224 claim, we affirm.1

II.

The Chancery Court premised the dismissal of this case on Tenn. Code

Ann. § 16-11-102 (1980). That statute states:

(a) The chancery court has concurrent jurisdiction, with the circuit

court, of all civil causes of action, triable in the circuit court, except

for unliquidated damages for injuries to person or character, and

except for unliquidated damages for injuries to property not

resulting from a breach of oral or written contract; and no demurrer

for want of jurisdiction of the cause of action shall be sustained in

the chancery court, except in the cases excepted. 

 (b) Any suit in the nature of the cases excepted above brought in

the chanc ery court, where objection has not been taken by a plea to

the jurisdiction, may be transferred to the circuit court of the county,

or heard and determined by the chancery court upon the principles

of a court of law. 

Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-11-102.

The Chancery Court herein determined that Petitioner’s lawsuit was

“primarily an action for damages for loss of property”,2

 and that such damages

were unliquidated and did not arise from a breach of contract. The court then
5

determined that it had no jurisdiction over such cases, relying on Tenn. Code

Ann. § 16-11-102. Howeve r, the court’s holding fails to recognize the effect of

subsection (b) of the statute. That subsection clearly provides that in the absence

of an objection, chancery court has jurisdiction over such cases. Where, as here,

no objection to jurisdiction is interposed, the chancery court may either hear the

case or transfe r it to circuit court.

The Supreme Court of Tennessee has interpreted Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-

11-102 to require transfer, rather than dismissal, even in situations where the

chancery court has no subject matter jurisdiction. In Flowe rs v. Dy er County, 830

S.W.2d 51 (Tenn. 1992), the Court held that Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-11-102(b)

mandated transfer from the chancery court to the circuit court, rather than

dismissal, of a case brought under the Governmental Tort Liability Act, which

provided that circuit courts have exclusive jurisdiction over any action brought

pursuant to the Act. 

The Court recently addressed a similar situation in Woods v. MTC

Management, 967 S.W.2d 800 (Tenn. 1998). Woods filed his complaint, which

alleged numerous violations of the Uniform Residential Landlord Tenant Act

(“URLTA”), Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-26-501, et seq., in chancery court. URLTA

specifies that general sessions courts and circuit courts have original jurisdiction

over cases brought under it. Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-28-105(a) (1993). The

chancery court dismissed the suit and denied Woods’ motion to transfer the case

to circuit court. Relying on Tenn. Code Ann. §16-11-102 (b), the Court affirmed

the chanc ery court’s finding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction, but

determined that the denial of the motion to transfer was reversible error. In so

doing, the Court made clear that “§ 16-11-102 required the chanc ery court to
6

transfer the lawsuit . . . to circuit court for further proceedings.” Woods, 967

S.W.2d at 802. Thus, even if the defendants herein had objected to the court’s

jurisdiction, dismissal of Mr. Lattimer’s claim would have been improper. See

Pauley v. Madison County, No. 02A01-9607-CH-00161, 1997 WL 110019 at *2-

3 (Tenn. App. 1997) (no Tenn. R. App. P.11 application filed).

Unlike the cases cited above, no objection to jurisdiction wa s filed in this

case. This leaves the chancery court with one more option than the courts in

those cases. The case “may be transferred to the circuit court of the county, or

heard and determined by the chancery court upon the principles of a court of

law.” Tenn. Code Ann § 16-11-102.

IV.

On appeal, Petitioner suggests that the chancery court has proper

jurisdiction because his claim is based on an implied contract with the state. In

view of our holding, this argument is now moot. 

V.

Accordingly, the dismissal by the trial court on the basis of lack of

jurisdiction is affirmed as to the claim brought under the Uniform Administrative

Procedures Act, but is reversed as to any other claims, and this case is remanded

for further proc eedings. Costs of this appeal are taxed to Appe llees. 

_________________________________

PATRICIA J. COTTRELL, JUDGE

CONCUR:

___________________________________

BEN H. CANTRELL, P. J., M.S. 

___________________________________

WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JUDGE