THIRD DIVISION

								May 9, 2001

								(NUNC PRO TUNC March 30, 2001)

No. 1--99--1713

STATE FARM INSURANCE CO., a/s/o		)	Appeal from the

STELLA DORSEY,						)	Circuit Court of

								)	Cook County.

			Plaintiff-Appellee,		)	

								)

				v.				)

								)

JUAN JACQUEZ,						)	Honorable								

								)	James V. Murphy,				

			Defendant-Appellant.	)	Judge Presiding.

	JUSTICE BURKE delivered the opinion of the court:

	Following mandatory arbitration in this negligence action, the

circuit court entered judgment on the arbitration award in favor of

plaintiff State Farm Insurance Co. and against defendant Juan

Jacquez.  On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred

in barring his rejection of the award and that plaintiff waived any

objection to his rejection of the award.  Defendant also contends

that the court erred in entering judgment for damages in excess of

the amount sought in plaintiff's complaint and by allowing

plaintiff to amend its complaint after the arbitration hearing. 

Although plaintiff did not file an appellee's brief, we will

consider this appeal pursuant to the principles set forth in First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp., 63 Ill. 2d 128, 131-33, 345 N.E.2d 493 (1976).

	In March 1998, plaintiff filed a negligence action against defendant alleging that his driving caused an automobile accident

with Stella Dorsey, who was insured by plaintiff under a policy

that provided coverage for "property damages ***, medical payments

and uninsured motorists coverage."  In the complaint, plaintiff

alleged that the collision caused damages to Dorsey's car in the

amount of $8,353.21.  The complaint also alleged that plaintiff had

paid "the sum of $8,799.50 in uninsured motorist benefits and

medical bills" to Dorsey and on her behalf.  In both the caption of

the complaint and the prayer for relief, plaintiff sought judgment

for damages in the amount of $9,152.71, plus costs.  

	In August 1998, the trial court assigned the case to mandatory

arbitration.  An arbitration hearing was held in October 1998.  The

arbitration panel found in favor of plaintiff and awarded it

$17,161.46 in damages.  The award noted that defendant failed to

appear at the hearing "pursuant to Plaintiff's Rule 237 Notice, and

there was no prejudice to Plaintiff."  A court date for judgment on

the award was set for December 1998. 

	Defendant filed a timely notice of rejection of the award, and

in December 1998 the court set a jury trial for March 1999.  On the

date set for trial, plaintiff filed a motion to bar defendant's

rejection of the award based solely on defendant's failure to

appear at the arbitration hearing.  In its motion, plaintiff

alleged that defendant had been served with a Rule 237 notice to

appear and that he failed to file a motion to excuse his appearance

or continue the hearing.  In response, defendant alleged that he was "present through counsel" at the hearing and his attorney

participated in good faith and in a meaningful manner.  The trial

court granted plaintiff's motion and entered judgment on the award.

	Defendant filed a postjudgment motion seeking vacation or

remittitur of the award.  He argued that the award was almost

double the amount sought in the complaint and exceeded the total

contained in plaintiff's Rule 90(c) packet.  Defendant further

argued that the award was unreasonable because his request for

additional discovery had been denied and plaintiff had never

amended its complaint.  In denying defendant's motion and upholding

the arbitration award, the court entered an order finding that the

complaint was "sufficient as to the amount sought in the paragraphs

& body of the complaint," and granting plaintiff's oral motion to

amend the complaint to match the proofs.  The order further stated

that defendant had notice of the amount of damages sought and, "by

answering *** and exchanging discovery and pre-arbitration

matters[,]" could not claim that he lacked notice. 

	On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred in

debarring his rejection of the arbitration award.  He contends that

such a drastic sanction was unwarranted because plaintiff suffered

no prejudice as a result of his absence from the hearing.  In

conjunction with this argument, defendant contends that the court

could have imposed alternative sanctions that would have been less

harsh, such as barring his testimony at trial or assessing fees and

costs.

	Where a party to mandatory arbitration proceedings appeals

from sanctions imposed, the standard of review is an abuse of

discretion.  State Farm Insurance Co. v. Kazakova, 299 Ill. App. 3d 1028, 1031, 702 N.E.2d 254 (1998).  An abuse of discretion occurs

when the trial court rules arbitrarily.  Johnson v. Saenz, 311 Ill. App. 3d 693, 697, 725 N.E.2d 774 (2000).

	Supreme Court Rule 90 provides that a party may be debarred

from rejecting an arbitration award for failing to comply with a

notice pursuant to Rule 237(b).  166 Ill. 2d R. 90(g); 166 Ill. 2d

R. 237(b).  This sanction may be imposed when the party fails to be

present either in person or by counsel at the arbitration hearing,

and where the arbitration panel finds that the party failed to

participate in good faith and in a meaningful manner.  145 Ill. 2d

R. 91; see West Bend Mutual Insurance Co. v. Herrera, 292 Ill. App. 3d 669, 674, 682 N.E.2d 645 (1997).  A party who appears at the

arbitration hearing through counsel, but not in person, may still

be debarred from rejecting the award for failure to appear pursuant

to a Rule 237 notice.  Gore v. Martino, 312 Ill. App. 3d 701, 703, 728 N.E.2d 495 (2000); Hinkle v. Womack, 303 Ill. App. 3d 105, 111, 707 N.E.2d 705 (1999).

	In reviewing the imposition of the sanction of debarment,

courts have considered the circumstances of the case and the

purpose of the supreme court rules on the arbitration process,

which is to prevent abuse and uphold the integrity of the process. 

See Johnson, 311 Ill. App. 3d at 697.  Courts have also considered whether there was a "deliberate and pronounced disregard" for the

rules or the court.  Gore, 312 Ill. App. 3d at 704.  This court has held that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing the

sanction of debarment where a party's failure to appear in person

at the arbitration hearing was reasonable and not intended to make

a mockery of the arbitration proceedings.  Johnson, 311 Ill. App. 3d at 698-99 (reversing debarment where the defendant, who did not

appear pursuant to a Rule 237 notice, did not have a fluent command

of English and claimed to have been misdirected to the courthouse);

see also Gore, 312 Ill. App. 3d at 704-05 (reversing debarment where the plaintiffs appeared in person but arrived late at the

hearing).  Further, courts have reversed orders of debarment where

parties have appeared at the arbitration hearing, but were found to

have failed to participate in the hearing in good faith.  State Farm, 299 Ill. App. 3d at 1030-34 (reversing debarment where the arbitration panel had found that the defendant, who appeared but

did not speak English, failed to participate in good faith); West Bend, 292 Ill. App. 3d at 672-77 (reversing debarment where the trial court had found bad faith participation of a non-English-

speaking defendant who failed to testify or provide an

interpreter).

	In the instant case, we note initially that defendant did not

provide this court with transcripts of either the arbitration

hearing or the trial court hearing on his postjudgment motion. See Foutch v. O'Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 391-92, 459 N.E.2d 958 (1984).  However, the record is sufficient to address defendant's contention

of error.

	The record shows that neither the arbitration panel, nor the

trial court, found defendant's failure to appear in person at the

arbitration hearing constituted a failure to participate in good

faith or a meaningful manner.  However, such a finding is not a

prerequisite to debarring rejection of the arbitration award. Hill v. Joseph Behr & Sons, Inc., 293 Ill. App. 3d 814, 817, 688 N.E.2d 1226 (1997).  Therefore, the mere absence of a bad faith finding is

not dispositive here.

	However, the record here further shows that the arbitration

panel made a specific finding in its award that "there was no

prejudice to Plaintiff[,]" despite defendant's absence from the

hearing.  On this basis, the instant case is distinguishable from Hinkle.  In Hinkle, the defendant's counsel appeared at the arbitration hearing, but the defendant did not.  The Hinkle court, in affirming the trial court's sanction of debarment, found that

"the fact that [the] defendant was not found to have participated

in the arbitration hearing in bad faith [did] not detract from

[the] defendant's failure to participate [through her counsel] as

an adverse party," i.e., "to test plaintiff's case at all."  Hinkle, 303 Ill. App. 3d at 112.  The Hinkle court also rejected the defendant's argument, as defendant argues here, that the

plaintiffs were not prejudiced by the defendant's failure to

appear.  Hinkle, 303 Ill. App. 3d at 114.  Unlike Hinkle, however, defendant's argument here is supported by more than the mere

absence of a bad faith finding by the arbitration panel; it is

supported by the panel's explicit finding that plaintiff was not

prejudiced by defendant's absence.

	Further, nothing in the record indicates that the trial court

considered any basis for the sanction other than defendant's

failure to appear pursuant to Rule 237.  Although the trial court

is not generally required to state the basis of its ruling, since

there was a specific finding of the absence of prejudice to

plaintiff, the court's order imposing debarment disregarded the

absence of prejudice finding of the arbitration panel and,

therefore, was arbitrary.  Because the trial court acted

arbitrarily, we find that it abused its discretion in debarring

defendant from rejecting the award.  Accordingly, we reverse the

trial court's order imposing debarment.  Based upon our holding, we

need not address defendant's remaining arguments.

	For the reasons stated, we reverse the judgment of the circuit

court and remand this cause for further proceedings.

	Reversed and remanded.

	HALL, P.J., and CERDA, J., concur.