### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT KNOXVI LLE A pr il 25, 200 6 S es sio n
STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. DO NN IE JOE HEN SLEY
Appeal f romthe Cr im inal Cou rt for G ree ne County No. 04CR208 Jam es E. Beckner, Judge

No. E2005-01444-CC A-R3- CD - F iled Augu st 7, 2006

The de fendant, Donnie J oe He nsley , appea ls from his Gree ne County Criminal Court juryconviction of first deg ree murder. H e cla ims on appeal th at t h e t ri al court erre d (1) in failing to dismiss t he indictment because the juvenile c ourt had transfe rre d his c ase to c riminal court without appointing
a g uardia n ad litem, ( 2) in ref using to re mand to juvenile court because a pr osecution witness had lied in the juvenile court transfe r hearing, and (3) in re fusing to ext end the plea cut-off date until the de fe nd a nt atta ine d h is 1 8thbirthd a y . T he de fe nd a nt also c laim s th at th e ev ide nc e is l e g a lly ins uf fi c ie nt t o s up po rt

the c on vic tio n o f premed it ated f ir st d e g re e mur de r. We f indno re ve rs ibl e err or and a ffirm the judg ment of the c riminal court.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 ; J udgm e nt of t he Cr im ina l C our t i s A ffirm e d.

J A M ES C UR WO OD W I TT , J R ., J ., deli vere d the opinion of the court, in which J ER R Y L. S MI TH and T H O M A S T. W O O D A LL , J J ., joined.

Wil liam L ouis Ricker and Kim C. Mi ller, Gre eneville, Te nnessee , fo r t h e Appellant, Donnie J oe H e n l s e y.

Paul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l & Re po rt e r; John H. B le ds oe , A ssi stant A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; C. B e rk e le y B e ll, Jr., Di stric t Atto rn e y Ge ne ra l; an d Cec il Mill s, As sis ta nt Dis tr ic t A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l, for the A ppellee, State of Tenne ssee.
OP IN ION

T h e e v i d e n c e a t tr i a l d e s c r i b e d t h e g r i s l y m u r d e r o f t h e v i c t i m , 1 8

- y e ar

- o l d B i l l i e Jo Hensley , on May

2, 2004. Hug h Al ex ander Wil liams, ag e 18, testified that he had bee n char g ed
a lon g wi th the de fe nd a nt f or the ho mic ide ; he ha d p le a de d g uil ty to s e c on d d e g re e mur de r i n e xch a ng e fo r h is t

ru thf ul t e sti mon y

in the de fe nd a nt’ s tria l. M r. Willi a ms t e sti fi e d that, abo ut a
m o n t h b e f

o r e t h e m u r d e r , h e , t h e d e f e n d a n t , a n d t w o o t h e r

a s s o c i a t e s , M i c h a e l S e l l e r s a n d L a t o n ya Crockett, discussed killing the defendant’s mother, his mother’s boy friend, and the victim, who was the defe ndant’s sister. The defe ndant believed that by killing the other

members of

his household,-2-

he c ou ld o btain m ari

juana a nd$1 5, 00 0 inc a sh that he be lie ved his mothe r’ s b oy frie nd , w ho so ld marijuana , kept in the locked ba sement of the r esidenc e.

Mr. Will iams testified that, on May 2, 2004, the defendant called him and said “today is the day ” to kill the defe ndant’s family

. The ti ming wa s prompted when the defe ndant’s mother and her boy friend took a trip to Kentucky , thus allowing him to kill his sister without interfer ence

. Mr. Will iams testified that the def endant ha d ag ree d to pay

Sellers and Croc kett $1,000 eac h from the proce eds of the crimes if they would serve as look-outs. Mr. Wil liams te stified , “I in s er t ed my self.” H e aske d the defendant for $3,000 from the proce eds. The defe ndant ag ree d and stated that he wa s g oing to kill his sist er w ith a knife.

Mr. Will iams testified that he, Sellers, Crockett, and the defe ndant rode around in a
car , inge sted some Valium pills and marijuana, and boug ht some “rubbe r” glove s and a te lephone
c ard . M r. W il li ams a ndthe de fe nd a nt e nte re d th e re sid e nc e wh e rethede fe nd a nt andthevic tim lived. The de fendant told Mr. W illiams t o call the victim out of her bedroom, and whe n she eme rg ed into the hall, the defe ndant attac ked her from behind with a sword. The de fendant initi ally stabbed the victim thro u gh t h e n ec kand then use d a hunting knife to stab the victim seve ral times. The de fe nd a nt t oldMr

. Willi a ms to he lp him , a nd Mr

. Willi a ms u se d h is p oc ke t kn if e to s ta b th e vic tim

. He e stimated that the victim was stabbed 50 to 60 times.

Throug h a means devised by Mr. W illiams to use t he telephone car d to call his aunt and to have her c all Sellers’ c ellular tele phone, Mr. Seller s was ale rted to come to the defe ndant’s house. Mr. Sellers and Ms. Crockett arrived within ten m inutes of W illiams’ initial call. The y oung me n b ro ke int o th e ba se me nt b ut f ou ndne ith e r m on e y

no r m ari juana . Wh e n M r. Se lle rs be c a me distressed and c ried, he and Ms. Crocke tt drove aw ay , leaving Mr. Will iams and t he def endant without transportatio n

. T h e p ai r tried to cle an the murde r we apons in the bathroom a nd left the ho us e by fo ot. As the y

c ro sse d a bridg e a t ne arb y Lic k Cr e e k, the y thr e w the kn ive s, Mr . Wil lia ms’ ja c ke t, andthe g lov e s in to the c re e k. Th e y wa lke d to the ho me of

a n a c qu a int a nc e , G a il Re y no lds , wh o d ro ve the pa ir

to M r. Willi a ms’ ho us e . T he re, Mr . Wil liams u se d g a so lin e to b urn th e ir clothing.

Mr . Wil lia ms t e sti fi e d th at th e de fe nd a nt b e g a n to ta lk o f s uic ide . Withina fe w h ou rs , the police came to the Wil liams’ residenc e and arr ested both y oung men. Mr. Wil liams took t he office rs to the cr eek and showed them whe re the implements of the crime had bee n thrown.

The investig at i n g p o lice off icer s found the victim’s body ly ing in the living room floor. The y

found the odor of

bleac h and a bloody

towel in the bathroom an d l at ex gl o v es i n the bathtub. The ba sement door ha d been “ busted open,” and in the base ment, they found drug para pherna lia, including pla stic bag s , s ca l es , and hemostats. Inside a stove in the ba sement, they fo un d ma ri juana a ndro lls of

qu art e rs

. The off icer who transported the def endant to the jail i ntroduce d into evidence a compac t disk on which he had rec orded part of his e n route c onversation with the defendant. At one-3-

point, the defe ndant said, “[M] ental health’s told me that if I didn’t learn to control my emotions that I would wind up in jail. . . . And it looks like that’s happe ned.”

Other pr osec u t i o n witnesses established that the murder w eapons w ere rec overe d from Lick Cree k, about one- fourth of a mile from the homi ci d e s ce n e. F orensic e x amination
reve aled no f

inge rprints on the recover ed it ems but established that the burned re fuse f ound at Mr. Willi a ms’ ho us e ha d be e n clo thi ng

. DN A te sti ng re ve a le d th a t bl oo d s ta ins fo un d o n M r. Willi a ms’ hand conta ined his blood as well as blood from the vic tim and the defe ndant. A y ellow bra cele t worn by the defendant bore a sample of the vi ctim’s blood. Ms. Rey nolds testified that she furnishe d the def endant a nd Mr. Will iams a ride to the latter’s house on the afte rnoon of May 2, 2004. Medica l
ev id e n c e s h o w e d th a t th e v ic ti m s u s tain e d 1 5 1 s ta b w o u n d s , 3 7 o f w h ic h p e n e tr a te d her torso. Se ve ra l pu nc tur e d he r lun g s, he art , a ndliv e r. She su staine d a he a d p un c tur e that e nte re d h e r b rain
a nda sta b th a t tr a ve le d c omp le te ly thr ou g h he r ne c k. Se ve ra l of the wo un ds we rec on sis te nt w ith wounds that could be inflicte d with the hunting knife that had bee n found in the cr eek.

The def e n d a n t o f

f e r e d n o e v id e n c e

. T h e ju r y f o u n d th e d e f

e n d a n t g u il ty

of pr e me dit a te d f

ir st d e g re e mur de r, a nd the tria l c ou rt imp os e d a

lif e se nte nc e wi tho ut the po ssi bil ity of par ole. Following the court’s overr uling of the motion for new trial, the def endant pe rfe cted a timely appea l.

I. Pr oc e du re in J

uv e nil e Cou rt

The de fendant, who was a juvenile at the time of the homicide, is ag g rieve d that the juvenile court transfe rre d his c as e t o criminal court without appointing a g uardia n ad litem. He
ac k n o wl ed ges t h att h e j u v en i l e c o u rt d i d ap p o i n tan at t o rn eyt o re p re s en th i matt h e t ra n s fe r h ea ri n g, bu t he po sit s th a t hi s mo the r, his on ly liv ing pa re nt, wa s n ot onl y the vic tim ’s mothe r b ut w a s a lso targ eted to be killed. F or these r easons, the de fendant arg ues, his mother could not have discharg ed the role of

a par ent t o him during the juvenile court proce ss, nece ssitating the a ppointment of a g uardia n ad litem, as re quired by rule and as a function of due process of law. The state counters that the def endant ne ver r aised a n issue of conf lict of interests of h is mother, who appa rently attended th e tr a n s f e r h e ar in g , a n d th e ju v e n il e c o u r t n e v e r h a d th e o p p o r tu n ity to e v a lu a te the nee d for a g ua rd ia n a d li te m. Th e sta

te a lso c la ims that th e re qu ir e me nt o f a g ua rd ia n a d li te m do e s n ot a

pp ly to juvenile court tra nsfer h ea ri n gs ; rathe r, the a ppointment of counsel is the spec ified mea ns of protec ting a

juvenile’s intere sts in a t ra n s fe r h ea ri n g . At any rate , the state c laims the denial of a g uardia n ad litem in the juvenile court transfe r hea ring does not deprive the criminal court of jurisdiction of the transfe rre d case

.

Pr ior to t ri a l, the c ri min a l c ou rt

he ardarg ume nts on th e defe nd a nt’ s mo tio n to dismiss

. I n denying the motion, the trial judgesaid, “[I ]t would be re dundant to have a g uardia n ad litem. A gua

rdian ad litem c annot func tion in any way to do anything more than or e ven as muc h as appointed c ounsel.” The court noted that the defe ndant enjoy ed the be nefit of “very able” counsel in juvenile court.-4- Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 37-1-134 g overns the transfe r of the pr osecution of a juv e nil e to c ri min a l c ou rt a ndpr ov ide s in pe rt ine nt p art : (a) After a petition has bee n filed alle gi ng delinquency based on
c on du c t th a t is de sig nate d a c ri me or pu bli c of fe ns e unde r the la ws , including loc al ordinanc es, of this state, the c ourt, befor e hea ring the petition on the meri t s , may transfe r the c hild to the sheriff of the
c ou nty to b e he ld a c c or din g to l a w andto b e de a lt w itha s a n a du lt i n the criminal court of compe tent jurisdiction. The dispositi on of the child shall be as if the child wer e an a dult if:
(1 ) T he c hil d w a s si xtee n (16 ) y e ars or mor e of a g e a t th e tim e of the a lleg ed conduc t, or the child wa s less than six teen ( 16) y ear s of ag e if such child was charg ed with the offense of f irst deg ree murder, second deg ree murder, r ape, a g g ravated ra pe, ra pe of a child, aggr av a t ed ro b b er y , es p ec i al l y aggr av at ed ro b b er y , k i d n ap p i n g, ag gra vated kidnapping or espe cially ag g ravated kidnapping or an attempt to comm i t an y

such off enses. The district attorney g ener al may not seek, nor may any child transfe rre d under the provisions of this section rec eive, a

sentenc e of de ath for the offe nse for which the child was tra nsfer

red;
(2 ) Ahe ari ng on wh e the r the tr a ns fe r s ho uldbe ma de is h e ld in conformity

with §§ 37-1-124, 37-1- 126 and 37-1- 127;
(3) Re asonable notice in writing of the time, plac e and pu rp o s e o f

t h e h e ar i n g i s g i v e n t o t h e c h i l d a n d t h e c h i l d ’ s p are nts , gu ar d i an o r o t h ercu s t o d i an at l ea s t t h re e (3 ) da y s p ri o r t o t h e h ea ri n g; and
(4 ) Th e c ou rt

fi nd s th a t th e rearere a so na ble g ro un ds to be lie ve that:
(A) T he child committed the delinquent a ct as a lleg ed;
(B ) The c hild is not committable to an institut ion for the developmenta lly

disabled or menta lly

ill; and
(C) The inter ests o f the community require that the child be put under leg al re straint or discipline.

. . . .-5- (e) No chi ld , e ither bef

ore or afte r re aching eig hteen ( 18) y ear s o f a g e , s h a ll b e p r o s e c u te d f o r a n o f f e n s e p r e v io u s ly

c o mm itted unless the ca se has be en tra nsfer red a s provided in subsection (a ).

Te nn . Co de An n. § 3 7- 1- 13 4( a ), (e ) ( 20 05 ); se e als o Te nn . R. Juv. P. 2 4( b) (2 )( ii) (d ir e c tin g that, i n juvenile court transfe r hea ring , the “c hild shall be repr esente d by an attorne y ”).

Te nn e sse e Rul e of

Juve nil e Pr oc e du re37 pr ov ide s: (a) Appointment, Gener ally . I n any juvenile proc eeding , on app lic a tio n o f a

pa rty or on its ow n moti on , the c ou rt ma y app oin t a gu ar d i an ad l i t em fo r ach i l d wh o i s a p ar t y t o t h e p ro ce ed i n g. (b) Requirement W here Parent Absent or a Conflict of I ntere st. The court shall appoint a guar dian ad litem for a child who does not have a parent or g uardia n appea ring on the child’s beha lf or the pa rent’s or g uardia n’s intere sts appear to conflict with those of the c hild.

Tenn. R. J uv. P. 37(a), ( b). Reg arding the conduc t of hearings, Te nnessee Code Annotated se ction 37 -1 -1 26 pr ov ide s in pe rt ine nt p art :

I n delinquency

hearin gs or in hea

ring s in which the child is alleg ed upon three (3) or

more c ourt proce edings to be unruly and not
amena ble to tr eatment or

reha bilitation as specified in § 37-1- 132(b), a party is entitled to repre sentation by l egal c ounsel at all stag es of
a ny pr oc e e din g s un der this p art

. . . . I n a ll d e lin qu e nc y he ari ng s, counsel must be provide d for a child not repre sented by

such child’s pare nt, gua

rdian, g uardia n ad litem or custodian.

Te nn . Co de An n. § 3 7- 1- 12 6( a ) ( 20 05 ). A guardi an a d li te m is a “ re sp on sib le a du lt w ho is appointed by

the court to protect the right s and int ere sts of a child during the pende ncy of a pr oc e e din g inv olv ing the c hil d a nd to a dv oc a te fo r the be st int e re sts of the c hil d. ” Te nn . R. Juv. P. 2(7).

The defe ndant raised the issue of a faulty transfe r hea

ring via a mo tio n to dis mi ss filed pretria l in the conviction court. Gene rally , a motion to dismiss a criminal prosecution equates to a claim that the trial c ourt lacks jurisdiction to procee d. Our supre me court has addre ssed the issue of the c on vic tio n c ou rt ’s jurisd ic tio n to try a nd c on vic t a de fe nd a nt wh os e c a se orig inate d injuv e nil e court. In Sa wy e rs v . S tate , 814 S.W .2d 725 (Tenn. 1991), our supreme court reviewe d a petition for post-conviction re lief in which Sawy ers challeng ed his first deg reemurder c onviction on the g round that he wa s a

juv e nil e a t th e tim e of t he ho mic ide a ndha d n ot b e e n a ff or de d a tr a ns fe r h e ari ng in juvenile court. Id. at 726. Sawy ers r ece ived no juvenile court transfe r hearing beca use, at the time, no one, including Sawy ers himself, kne w his actua l date of birth. Id. When S aw y er s d i s coveredR ec o gn i zing t ha t t he d efen d an t m ay rejo i n that, ev en i f t he t rial co urt p ro p erly d en i ed t he m o t i o n t o d i sm i ss, 1

t he co urt s ho ul d have nevert hel ess ord ered a rem and to juveni l e co urt t o avai l t he d efend ant of a guardian ad l i t em duri ng
a n ew t r ans fer he ar i ng

. W e bel i eve , howev er , t hat s uch an act i on woul d hav e been ef fect i vel y a di s mi s s al f

r om cr i mi nal

co urt b ec au se it wo uld h av e surre nd ere d the ca se to juv en i l e c o urt, wh i ch wo uld ha ve ha d t he p o w er to retain an d d i sp o se
o f t h e c a se

. W e h a v e a lr e a d y o p ine d tha t t h e c rim ina l co u rt w a s n o t o b lige d to d ism iss the c a se b e c a u se it w a s fully

v e ste d w ith su b je c t m a tter ju risd ic tio n

. -6- e ig ht y e ars a ft e r h is t

ri a l th a t he wa s a c tua lly

a juv e nil e a t the tim e of

the ho mic ide , h e fi le d th e po stconviction petition. Id.

The supre me court rejec ted any notion that the lack of a

transfe r hea

ring deprive d the conviction court of jurisdiction. Id. a t 72 9 ( “ [T]he abs e nc e of a tr a ns fe r o rd e r c a nn ot b e sa id t o aff ect the c ourt’s subject matter jurisdiction, w hich, in a re al sense, is c oncurr ent with that of the juvenile court as to cer t ai n o ff en ses committed by

children f

alling w ithin a specified a g e span.” ). Th e hig h c ou rt

no te d t hat “[ t] he on ly

re qu ir e me nt .

. . is that su c h p ro c e e din g s a g a ins t a juv e nil e must originate in juvenile court.” Id. I n h i s b ri ef, the defe ndant essentially rec og nizes that the criminal court had jurisdiction to try and convic t him. W e hold that the criminal court in the prese nt
c a se ha d s ub

je c t- ma tte r j urisd ic tio n to try a ndc on vi ct the de fe nd a nt, wh os e pr os e c uti on be g a n in juvenile court. As such, we f ind no error

in the trial court’s denial of the mo tio n to dis mi ss
. 1
Although the Sa wy e rs c o u r t stated that eve n the total deprivation of a juvenile tra nsfer hearing did not implicate a lack of the conviction court’s jurisdiction, it recog nized that “[t ]he right involved, althoug h cre ated by statute, is sufficiently fundame ntal to be considere d a matter of due proce ss, in the context of juvenile justi ce.” Id. As su c h, the iss ue ma y be c og niza

ble in a po stconviction re lief proc eeding . The c ourt dec lined to apply the post-conviction ac t’s waiver provision to deny the claim “w here the er

ror is ra ised at the fir st opportunityand ther e is no sug g estion of bad faith on the pe titioner’s part.” Id. As a matter of post-conviction proce dure, the court rule d “that the ca se must be re turned to t he trial c ourt for a de novo hea

ring to determine w hether or not Sawy ers wo uldha ve be e n tr a ns fe rr e d f ro m juve nil e to crimi na l cou rt , ba se d on the fa c ts e xistin g a t th e tim e of his indi ct m en t an d trial.” Id. The “ non-jurisdictional” fe ature of Sa wy e rs bring s us to the implicit crux of the de fendant’s complaint – that the criminal court simply err oneously

determined that th e abs e nc e of

a g ua rd ia n adlit e m in juv e nil e c ou rt didno t jus tif

iy a re ma ndto that c ou rt . With no jurisdictional issue at stake, we conclude that the criminal court was t h e p ro p er tribunal for i n i t i al l y d et er m i n i n g t h e e ff

ec t , i f a n y , o f th e ab s en ce o f a guard i an ad l i t em i n t h e t ra n s fe r h ea ri n g. On c e we dis til l th e c laim t o th is i ssu e , w e se e that th e de fe ndant ’s op po rtun ity a ndme tho d to establish a statutory

or a due proce ss claim came in the motion procee ding launched in the c riminal court. I n other words, we do not believe that the de fendant may compel the c riminal court to re mand the ca se by

mere ly raising the issue without establishing in that court sufficient c ause f or re mand.

We look first at the defe ndant’s cl ai m to relief ba sed upon an a sserted violation of Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 37-1-126(a ) and/or Tennesse e R ule of Juvenile Procedure37(b). We c on c lud e that, e ve n if the se ma nd a te s f

or app ointi ng g ua

rd ia ns a d li te m app ly

in a juv e nil e transfe r hea

ring wher e leg al counsel is a ppointed pursuant to Tennesse e Code Annotated sec tion 37- 1-126(a ), the de fendant failed to establish an e ntitlement to relief in t h e cr i m i n al court. The-7-

provisions for appointi ng g uardia ns ad li tem in such a context must be viewed as direc tory only and not mandatory

. See ge nerally State v. J ones , 729 S.W .2d 683, 685 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1986) (a dv e rt ing to “ g e ne ra l ru le in Te nn e sse e that statut ory pr ov isi on s w hic h r e la te to the mod e or tim e of doing an ac t to which the statute applies a re not to be ma ndatory , but dir ectory only ”). In other leg al contexts, the failure of a court or a state functionary to obse rve a direc tory provision occa sions no relief to the ag g rieve d party unless the party establishes pre

judice, see, e .g., State v. Allen, 976 S.W .2d 661, 667 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997) ; Sta te v . M ar tin , 634 S.W .2d 639, 643 (Tenn. Crim. App. 19 82 ); State v. Mc Cray, 61 4 S. W.2 d 9 0, 94 (T e nn

. Cr im. Ap p. 19 81 ) ( “ Th e app e llant h a s f a ile d to demonstrate how she wa s prejudice d by this failure [of the state to list names of its witnesse s on the indictment] , even thoug h the appe llant c ontends that she wa s surprised at trial when these witnesses testified.”) , or bad f

ait h o r u ndue advantag e, Allen , 9 76 S.W. 2da t 67 7; State v. Kendrick s, 947 S.W .2d 875, 883 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). Ty pically , the determination of prejudice , bad faith, or undue advantag e is entrusted to the sound discr etion of the trial j u d ge. Kendricks, 947 S.W .2d at 883.

I n the pre sent ca se, the de fenda n t fa i l ed to establish that he was e ntitled to the appointment of a g uardia n ad litem or that the c riminal court judg e abuse d his discretion in fa iling to remand the case

. To be sure, Tenne ssee Rule of J uvenile Procedur e 37(b) g ener ally require s the appointment of a g uardia n ad litem whe n the pare nt of the child ac cused of

a delinquent a ct appe ars to ha ve a conflict of interests; howeve r, even if the re quirement a pplies to a transfe r hea

ring and eve n if we a ssume that the re lationship of the defe ndant’s sole living pare nt to the victim appe ars to be
a c on fl ic t of

int e re sts , th e de fe nd a nt d id n ot sho w that the app oin tme nt of a g ua rd ia n adlit e m w ou ld have a dvance d his interests in any way . He established no basis for a finding that a g uardia n ad litem would or could ha ve bene fitted him in some way that his able counsel could not. He ide ntified no issue – such as diminis hed mental capa city , emotional impairment, or crisis of confidenc e – which might have indicated the ne ed for an advoc ate in addition to his leg al counse l. The trial court
c on c lud e d th a t th e de fe nd a nt’ s le g a l c ou ns e l in the tr a ns fe r he ari ng fu lf ill e d a ll o f the re qu ir e me nts of an a dvocate for the de fendant, including a ny require ments that a gu ardia n ad litem might have addre ssed. The rec ord does not indicate other wise. We have revie wed the statutory premises for

a juvenile’s tra nsfer

to adult court: the child’s ag e, the a pplication of a qua lify ing pr oscriptive statute,
c e rt a in p ro c e du ra l f

orma lit ie s, a

det erm in a tio n o f r e a so na ble g ro un ds fo r f

ind ing that th e c hil d committed the offe nse, the child is not committable to a ins tituti on for de velopmental disability or mental i llness, and whether communit y interests re quire the c hild’s placeme nt in lega l restra int or discipline. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-134( a). Aleg al advoc ate is ty pically , if not uniquely , suited to expl ore, and to advanc e the child’s interests in r espec t of , these issues. Even if we assume that the issue of de velopmental disability or mental illness may

sug g est the aptness of a

more pe rsonal advocate, the def

endant in the pr esent c ase r aised ne ither issue.
Next, we ex amine the defe ndant’s claim that he was deprive d of due pr ocess of law. We of course rec og nize that the conce pts of due proce ss of law found in the Fourteenth Amendme nt to the fede ral c onstitut ion and the “la w of the la nd” clause of the s tate constitution require that the state in a c riminal case must comport with constitut ional due proc ess notions of fundame ntal fairne ss. See U.S. Const. amend I V; Tenn. Const. Art 1, § 8; Mu 'Mi n v . V irg ini a , 500 U.S. 415, 426,In re G a u lt , 387 U

. S. 1, 87 S. Ct

. 142 8 ( 19 67 ) , es t abl i s hed t hat chi l dren , as wel l as adul t s , en j oy cons t i t ut i onal 2
p ro te c tio n s, e sp e c ia lly w h e n th e ir inte re st in p h ysic a l fre e d o m is t h re a te n e d b y the sta te

. S e e a lso S c h a ll v . M a rtin , 467 U .S . 2 5 3 , 1 0 4 S . C t. 2 4 0 3 (1 9 8 4 ); In re W in sh ip , 3 9 7 U .S . 3 5 8 , 9 0 S . C t. 1 0 6 8 (1 9 7 0 ). T h e c h ild ’s inte re st in lib e rty, howev er , i s l i mi t ed becau s e “ j uv eni l es , un l i ke adul t s , ar e a l way s i n s om e f orm of cu s t od y

. ” D o e v . N o rris , 751 S. W

. 2d 8 3 4 , 8 3 9 (T e n n . 1 9 8 8 ).
-8- 11 1 S. Ct. 18 99 , 1 90 5 ( 19 91 ); Sp ad afi na v . S tate , 77 S.W .3d 198, 207 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2 0 00); State v. Chapman, 97 7 S. W.2 d 1 22 , 1 26 (T e nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 97 ); see also, e.g., State v . McKnight , 51 S.W .3d 559, 567 (Tenn. 2001) (g ener al due pr ocess incor p orate s “fundamental principles of lib e rty a ndjus tic e ” ); State v. Frasier , 914 S.W .2d 467, 470 (Tenn. 1996) (stating that g ener al due proce ss is a requirement of fundame ntal fairne ss). That said, the r ecor d in the prese nt case evince s 2 no sh o wi n g that fundame ntal fairne ss was off ended w hen the juvenile c ourt conduc ted a transfer hearing w ithout appointing a g uardia n ad litem. We have a bove mentioned the f

actor s that belie any operative issue to be addr essed by a g uardia n ad litem, and our obser vations apply with equal for ce he re . F un da me nta l f

a ir ne ss is no t of

fe nd e d wh e n, a s he re , the a c c us e d juv e nil e re c e ive s th e be ne fi t of able leg al counse l during the transf er pr ocedur e.

We rec og n i z e t h at , in Sa wy e rs , our supre me court in a post-conviction appe al
re m an d ed t h e c as e t o t h e t r i a l c o u rt fo r ad et er m i n at i o n wh et h ert h e j u v en i l e c o u rt , fo l l o wi n g a transfe r hearing , would have transfe rre d Sawy ers’ case to the trial court. Se e Sa wy e rs , 814 S.W .2d at 729. T h e supre me court took this action to oblige the trial court to determine whe ther the due proce ss violation was harmless; the supre me court itself ruled th at t he denia l of a transfer hearing
was a violation of due pr ocess principles. Id. Unlike in the pre sent ca se, however, Sawy ers wa s tot a lly de nie d th e statut ory

ri g ht n ot t o be tr a ns fe rr e d fo r tr ia l a s a n a du lt w ith ou t a he ari ng . B e c aus e no transfe r hea

ring was a ffor ded Sawy ers, the supr eme c ourt l ac k ed any basis for c oncluding that
one wa s unnece ssary . I n the pre sent ca se, not only did the hearing oc cur, but the de fendant’s interests were advocate d by counsel. Thus, the criminal court wa s positioned to evaluate whe ther notions of fundamenta l fairne ss wer e offended in that hearing. T his determination, we note , is not one of ha rmlessness of a constitutional e rror ; r ather , it a djudicates whether a constitutional viol ation
occur red in the f

irst instance.

II

. P e rju ry in the Transfer Hearing

Th e de fe nd a nt u ns uc c e ssf ull y mo ve d th e tria l c ou rt to r e ma ndhis c a se to j uv e nil e court for a new transfe r hearing beca use, he asserted, Michae l Sellers g ave pe rjured te stimonyin the tr a ns fe r h e ari ng

. Es se nti a lly , the de fe nd a nt cl a ims that, i n th e tr a ns fe r h e ari ng , Se lle rs didno t f ull y ad m i th i s i n v o l v em en t i n t h e pl an n i n g an d ex ec u t i o n o f t h e v i ct i m ’s m u rd er

. He cl ai m s t h atal t h o u gh Sellers testified truthfullyat the hea ring that he ente red the victim’s residenc e shortly afte r she wa s mur de re d, he faile d to me nti on his prior inv olv e me nt i n th e plann ing of thec rime, inc lud ing his motivation bylucre . Although Seller s testified in the transfe r hea ring that he panicked af

ter see ing t h e v i ct i m ’s b o d y , h e f

ai l ed t o d i s cl o s e t h ath e p an i ck ed o n l y af t erh e f ai l ed t o fi n d m o n eyo r d ru gs in the baseme nt. The defe ndant also claims that Sellers failed to disc lose in the transfe r hea ring that he had le ft the juveniles to take the blame for the homicide and ha d cal l ed t h e p olice to divert attention from himself.-9- We need only

addre ss two a spects of the issue. First, we are unconvince d that Sellers prese nted fa lse sworn testimony in the transfe r hearing. T his conclusion has two compone nts. The first component is that the def endant e ssentially

complains t h at S ellers wa s less than forthc oming in the transfe r hea

ring , not that h e made false statements. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 16-702(a ) (2003) ( setting f

ort h al t er n at ive modes of c ommitt ing pe rjury , all of which r equire making a s t a t e m e n t )

. T h e s e c o n d c o m p o n e n ti s t h a tt h e r e c o r d f a i l s t o e s t ab l i s h t h a tS e l l e r s t e s t i f i e d f a l s e l y, even if one infe rs that Sellers testified at v ar i an ce with other statements attributed to him. I n that vein, the cla im of perjury

is often made out by the m ere jux taposition of two sworn, but contra dicting testimonies of the same witness. I n t h e p re sent ca se, the re cord c ontains no sworn testimony of Sellers to compar e with his transfe r hea ring testimony

. I n his brief, the de fendant cites mere ly to the statements of c ounsel, made during pr etrial a rg uments, to ill ustrate that Seller s’ hea ring testimony
was not f orthcoming

. “[S] tatements of counsel are not evidence .” State v. Elec troplati ng, Inc., 990 S.W .2d 211, 224 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998) . We are awa re that Sellers’ pret ri al statement wa s prese nted as a n exhibi t to the pretrial he aring , but we notice that the pretria l statement was undated and unsworn. In the abse nce of contra dictory

sworn testimonies, o ne may question whether

the de fe nd a nt o the rw ise e s t a

b l i s h e d any sw orn f a lsi ty on Se lle rs ’ p art

in the tr a ns fe r h e ari ng , d e sp ite that, at trial, Hug h Wil liams testified to Sellers’ dee per involveme nt in the crime.

Second, we perc eive no leg al conse quence , even if Sellers i s deeme d to have te stified falsely in the t ransf

er hearing

. I n his brief, the defe ndant complains t hat Sellers’ f lawed te stimony impugns the “re asonable cause ” portion of the juvenile c ourt’s re g imen of finding s. Howeve r, on the issue of reasonable c ause, the juvenile court transfe r hea ring “is the exact counte rpart of the Gene ral Sessions preliminary hearing to the e x tent of the issue of pr obable c ause.” State v. W omack , 59 1 S. W.2 d 4 37 , 4 43 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . 1 97 9) . We kn ow that, g e ne ra lly , a de fe c t in p ro ba ble c aus e proce eding s such as the pr ocure ment of an a rre st warr ant has “ no conseque nce in the l aw unless the defe ndant is prejudice d by it.” Sta te v . Ca mp be ll , 641 S.W .2d 890, 893 (Tenn. 1982). Ther e is no pr e jud ic e wh e n th e state “ se c ur e s a n in dic tme nt o r pr esen tm ent , [w iththe re su lt that] a ny de fe c ts
emanating f

rom the orig inal arr est war rant a re c ured.” Da nn

y Ra y Meeks v . S tate , No. 01C01-9709-CC-00387, slip op. at 3-4 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, Oc t. 23, 1998). Simi larly , a claimed de fec t of conflict of i ntere sts in the testimony in a pre liminary

hearing is c ured by

the g rand jury ’s determination of probable c ause and rende ring of an indictment. State v. P r i n ce Ja me el R. Tar iq , N o

. 0 3 C 0 1

- 9 6 0 2

- C R

- 0 0 0 8 6 , s l i p o p

. a t 7 ( T e n n

. C r i m

. A p p

. , K n o x v i l l e , F e b

. 1 8 , 1 9 9 7 )

. In the pre sent ca se, the juvenile court’s transfer order was followe d by

the g rand jury ’s determination of proba ble cause and r eturn of an indictment f or first deg ree murder. A ny testimonial or rea sonablecause defe ct in the transf

er he aring was c ured.

II I. De nia l of

Ex te ns ion of P le a Cu t- off Da te

The de fendant is ag g rieve d that the trial court denied his reque st to extend the pe riod for plea -bar g aining past his 18 birthday

. The trial court’s plea cut-of f date was April 11, 2005. The th defe ndant attained his 18 birthday on May 10, 2005, the day

his jury trial b ega n

. He c laims that th beca use his trial counsel wa s profe ssionally bound to respec t his wishes as to a plea or a waiver of jury trial, he should have been a vailed the o pportunity to attain adulthood befor e forfeiting the-10-

opportunity

to expl oi t a p lea opportunity , espec ially in light of his mother’s r elationship to the victim, her daug hter.

The de fendant did not, however, c ite any authority for this claim. Th i s m aybe becau s e t h e p au cit y

of law that exi sts on the point indi cate s that, pursuant to his juvenile court transfe r adjudication, he was to “be dealt with as a n adult as t o all pending and subseque nt criminal char g es.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-134( c) ( 2005). Given that his rite of passag e wa s marked by the transfe r orde r, we cannot se e, nor doe s th e d ef en d an t articulate, how his ability to appre ciate, or op po rtun ity

to g a in, a fa vo ra

ble ple a ba rg a in w ou ld h a ve be e n e nh a nc e d w itha n a dd iti on a l 30 day s. At a ny rate , the failu re to c ite to apt a uth ority is a waive r o f the c la im o n a

pp e a l. R . T e nn . Ct . Crim. App. 10(b).
IV. Sufficiencyof the Evidenc e

I n his challeng e to the s ufficie ncy of the c onvicting e vidence , the def endant a dvance s his infere nces f

rom the evidenc e that he was essentially the pawn of

Sellers and Croc kett and that t h e i n cu l p at i n g ev i d en ce s u p p l i ed b y W i l l i am s wa s t ai n t ed b y

h i s o wn s el f- i n t er e s t s i n s e cu ri n g a fa vo ra ble g uil ty ple a in e xch a ng e fo r t e sti fying a g a ins t th e de fe nd a nt.

When an ac cused c halleng es the suff iciency of the e vidence , t h e appellate court
co n s id e r s th e e v id e n c e in th e li g h t mo s t f a v o r a b le to th e p r o s e c u ti o n to d e te r mi n e whether any ratio na l trie r o f f

a c t c ou ld h a ve fo un d th e e sse nti a l e le me nts of thec ri me be y on d a

re a so na ble do ub t, Ten n. R. A pp . P. 13 (e ); J ac k so n v . V irg ini a , 4 4 3 U

. S. 3 0 7 , 3 2 4 , 9 9 S. Ct

. 2 7 8 1 , 2 7 9 1

- 9 2 ( 1 979), reg ardle ss whether

the conviction is based upon dir ect e videnc e, circ umstantial evidence , or a combination of direc t and circ umstantial evidence , Sta te v . W inte rs , 137 S.W .3d 641, 654-55 (Te nn. Crim. App. 2003), pe rm
. app
. denied (T e nn . 200 4)

. Es pe c ia lly ini mic a l to the de fe nd a nt’ s cla im i s the w e l l

- r o o t e d a xi o mt h a tt h e a p p e l l a t e c o u r t

n e i t h e r r e

- w e i g h s t h e e v i d e n c e n o r s u b s t i t u t e s its infere nces for those dr awn by the trier of

fac t. Id. at 655. Also, the cr edibilityof the witnesse s, the weig ht and value of

the evidenc e, and all other fa ctual issues raised by the evidenc e ar e re solved by the trier of

fac t. State v. Cabbage , 571 S.W .2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978). The a ppellate c ourt aff

ords the State of Te nn e sse e the str on g e st l e g iti ma te vie w o f the e vid e nc e c on ta ine d inthe re c or d a s w e ll as all re asonable and leg itimate infere nces w hich may be dra wn from the e vidence

. Id.

Th e defe nd ant wa s c ha

rg e d w itha ndc on vic te d o f f ir st d e g re e mur de r, sp e c if ic a lly the “pr emeditated and intentional killing of another .” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202( a)( 1) (2003) (prosc ribing preme ditated first deg ree murder) . Premeditation “is an act done a fter the exercise of ref lection and judgme nt” and “mea ns that the intent to kill must have bee n formed prior to the ac t itself.” Id. § 39-13-202( d). Althoug h “[i] t is not nece ssary that the purpose to kill pre- exis t in the mind of the ac cused for any definite period of time,” pre meditation occur s only when the “ acc used was suff iciently fre e fr om excitement and passion.” Id.

The e vidence in the light most favor able to the state established that prior to May 2, 20 04 , th e de fe nd a nt c on te mpl a te d th e mur de r o f n ot o nly his sis te r, bu t a lso his mothe r a ndhe r m a le-11-

companion. Althoug h the other conspirator s contributed ideas a nd narc otics to the enterprise, the defe ndant chose the day

for k i l l i n g h i s sister and prompted the other c onspirators into action. He devised the me thod of killing the victim and o rche strated Hug h Wil liams’ movements during the attack. Mr . Wil liams’ testimony , as an a ccomplice , was c orrobor ated b y p h y s i cal e vidence , an independe nt witness, and the def endant’ s pretria l statement. We have no pause in pronounc ing the evidenc e suff

icient to support the conviction of pr emeditated f irst deg ree murder.

V. Conclusion

None of the def endant’ s appellate claims merits relief , and the judg ment of the trial court is af firmed.

___________________________________ J AMES CURW OOD WI TT, J R., J UDGE