J-A15031-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

JOHN M. MORLEY, JR. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellant

v.

STACEY ANNE COLLAZZO

Appellee No. 2852 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Order Entered August 7, 2015

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Civil Division at No(s): No. 140902787

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., DUBOW, J., and JENKINS, J. 

MEMORANDUM BY JENKINS, J.: FILED JULY 14, 2016

John M. Morley, Jr. (“Appellant”) appeals, pro se, from the August 7, 

2015 order of the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas granting 

Appellee Stacey Anne Collazzo (“Appellee”) summary judgment. After 

careful review, we affirm.

The relevant facts and procedural posture of this matter are as follows. 

Appellant and Appellee were involved in a romantic relationship that began 

in 2009 and ended in April or May of 2013. On September 30, 2013 and 

October 1, 2013, the Chief Nursing Officer at Hahnemann University 

Hospital, where Appellee was employed as a nurse, received anonymous 

letters that enclosed naked photographs of Appellee and alleged that 

Appellee shoplifted and used opiates. As a result of these letters, Appellee 

filed a police report against Appellant and, on October 8, 2013, filed a 
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petition for a protection from abuse order (“PFA”). The PFA petition claimed 

Appellant sent the letters and naked photographs of Appellee to her 

employer, that Appellant had told people in a bar explicit details of Appellant 

and Appellee’s sex life, that Appellant once demanded sex from Appellee, 

that Appellant was verbally abusive, and that Appellant suffers from 

depression. The PFA court issued a temporary full stay away order after the 

hearing on October 8, 2013.

On September 22, 2014, Appellant filed a complaint against Appellee 

sounding in defamation, false light, and abuse of process based on 

allegations that Appellee lied in her petition for the purpose of gaining a PFA 

against Appellant. Appellee filed preliminary objections to the complaint 

averring that her statements at the PFA hearing were protected by an 

absolute privilege because they were made in the course of judicial

proceedings, that the alleged defamatory statements had not been published 

beyond the court proceedings, and that Appellant had not alleged an 

improper motive.

Appellant filed an amended complaint that, together with the 

defamation, false light, and wrongful use of civil procedure counts, included 

allegations that Appellee had published the defamatory statements to 

numerous persons. Specifically, the amended complaint alleged that on 

October 5, 2013, Appellee’s friend accused Appellant of contacting Appellee’s 

employer and sending “lascivious photographs” of Appellee to her employer. 

The amended complaint also claimed that Appellee’s friend had stated that 
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Appellant was mentally ill and should seek medical help. The amended 

complaint further averred that Appellee falsely stated Appellant’s address in 

her petition, thus preventing the Philadelphia Police Department from 

properly serving him with the PFA. Appellant claimed he learned of the PFA 

only after attempting to purchase a firearm on October 11, 2013.

Appellee filed preliminary objections to the amended complaint. After 

Appellant filed an answer, the trial court overruled Appellee’s preliminary 

objections on January 14, 2015.

On January 16, 2015, Appellee filed an answer to Appellant’s amended 

complaint. In her answer, Appellee denied Appellant’s claims and raised as 

a new matter (1) that Appellant’s claims were barred because Appellee’s 

actions were not the proximate cause of Appellant’s injury, (2) the defense 

of privilege because the statements were made in the course of judicial 

proceedings, and (3) the defense of the truth. Appellee further raised an 

abuse of process counterclaim that averred Appellant filed the instant suit as 

part of a two-year campaign of abuse instigated by Appellant upon Appellee 

after she ended their romantic relationship in 2013.

Later in January, Appellant noticed Appellee’s deposition, requesting 

that Appellee bring with her to the deposition: “any and all writings between 

you and the Pennsylvania Department of State, Nurse board; and any and 

all writings between you and your employer(s) since Wednesday, July 29, 

2009.” On January 26, 2015, Appellee filed a discovery hearing request and 

a motion for a protective order based on Appellant’s notice arguing that the 
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requested correspondence was irrelevant, not reasonably calculated to lead 

to the discovery of admissible evidence, and an attempt by Appellant to use 

the court system to harass and invade Appellee’s privacy in her personal and 

professional life.

On February 13, 2015, the trial court ordered that Appellee was not 

required to produce the requested writings at the deposition. Appellant filed 

a motion for reconsideration, which the court denied on February 18, 2015. 

On February 27, 2015, Appellant filed a motion for judgment on the 

pleadings, which the trial court dismissed on March 30, 2015.

Appellee filed a motion for summary judgment on June 12, 2015, 

which the trial court granted on August 7, 2015.1 Appellant filed a timely 

notice of appeal on September 2, 2015, and a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement 

on September 21, 2015. The trial court filed its 1925(a) Opinion on 

November 9, 2015.

Appellant raises the following four (4) claims for review:

[1.] Are writings between [Appellee] and the Pennsylvania 

Department of State Nurse Board and her employer reasonably 

calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence?

____________________________________________

1 This is a simplification of the procedural posture. Between the June 12, 

2015 filing of Appellee’s motion for summary judgment and the trial court’s 

August 5, 2015 grant thereof, Appellant filed multiple filings to which 

Appellee filed multiple responses. We have omitted the specifics of these 

filings, however, because they do not bear on the instant appeal.
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[2.] Did the trial court abuse it’s [sic] discretion when it sua 

sponte ordered [Appellee’s] counsel to not waive objections at 

the deposition of [Appellee]?

[3.] Is [Appellee], who appeared without [s]ubpoena in the 

underlying [PFA] Court, in an ex parte hearing, wherein hearsay 

was considered and no criminal proceeding against [Appellant] 

was pending, entitled to Judicial or Witness Immunity?

[4.] Are material facts in dispute?

Appellant’s Brief, p. 5.

This Court’s scope and standard of review on an appeal from the grant 

of a motion for summary judgment is well settled:

Our scope of review of a trial court’s order granting or denying 

summary judgment is plenary, and our standard of review is 

clear: the trial court’s order will be reversed only where it is 

established that the court committed an error of law or abused 

its discretion.

Summary judgment is appropriate only when the record clearly 

shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that 

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The 

reviewing court must view the record in the light most favorable 

to the nonmoving party and resolve all doubts as to the 

existence of a genuine issue of material fact against the moving 

party. Only when the facts are so clear that reasonable minds 

could not differ can a trial court properly enter summary 

judgment.

Herder Spring Hunting Club v. Keller, 93 A.3d 465, 468 

(Pa.Super.2014), reargument denied (July 11, 2014), appeal granted, 108 

A.3d 1279 (Pa.2015) (quoting Shamis v. Moon, 81 A.3d 962, 968–69 

(Pa.Super.2013)).
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Appellant’s first two claims deal with the trial court’s February 12, 

2015 discovery order.2 First, Appellant claims the trial court erred by ruling 

that Appellee need not produce at her deposition writings between herself 

and the state Board of Nurses, and herself and her employers from 2009 

through the date of the deposition. See Appellant’s Brief, p. 13-16. 

Second, Appellant claims the trial court erred by sua sponte directing 

Appellee’s counsel to not waive objections at the deposition, but instead to 

place all objections on the record. See id. at 16-18. These claims lack 

merit.3

Generally, on review of an order concerning discovery, an 

appellate court applies an abuse of discretion standard. To the 

extent that the question involves a pure issue of law, our scope 

and standard of review are plenary.

Crum v. Bridgestone/Firestone N. Am. Tire, LLC, 907 A.2d 578, 585 

(Pa.Super.2006) (internal citations and quotations omitted); see also PECO 

____________________________________________

2 The trial court filed the original order on February 12, 2015. The February 

18, 2015 order denied Appellant’s requested reconsideration of the February 

12, 2015 order.

3 The trial court and Appellee argue these discovery claims are either nonappealable as interlocutory or waived as untimely. See Appellee’s Brief, pp. 

7-9; 1925(a) Opinion, pp. 13-14. Appellant alleges the claims are an appeal 

of a collateral order (or, if interlocutory, properly brought following a final 

order in the case). See Appellant’s Brief, pp. 1-2. “Generally, discovery 

orders are deemed interlocutory and not immediately appealable because 

they do not dispose of the litigation.” Dougherty v. Heller, 97 A.3d 1257, 

1261 (Pa.Super.2014). The instant appeal was timely taken after the trial 

court issued a final order granting summary judgment. Therefore, we 

decline to find Appellant’s claims either interlocutory or waived. 
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Energy Co. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 852 A.2d 1230, 1233 

(Pa.Super.2004) (“The trial court is responsible for ‘[overseeing] discovery 

between the parties and therefore it is within that court’s discretion to 

determine the appropriate measure necessary to insure adequate and 

prompt discovering of matters allowed by the Rules of Civil Procedure.”).

Pennsylvania’s Rules of Civil Procedure permit discovery regarding 

“any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved 

in the pending action,” whether or not admissible at trial, provided that “the 

information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of 

admissible evidence.” Pa.R.C.P. 4003.1. The Rules prohibit, however, 

irrelevant discovery, or discovery sought for an improper purpose. Pa.R.C.P. 

4011; see also Keystone Dedicated Logistics, LLC v. JGB Enterprises, 

Inc., 77 A.3d 1, 12 (Pa.Super.2013) (“The matters about which [a 

discovery] inquiry is made must bear pertinently upon the matters which he 

will be required to prove affirmatively at trial.” (internal quotations and 

citation omitted; emphasis deleted)). The Rules allow parties to request 

protective orders to define and enforce the parameters of discovery in a 

given matter. Pa.R.C.P. 4012.

Here, the trial court granted Appellee’s request for a protective order 

following Appellant’s request that Appellee produce “any and all writings 

between [Appellee] and the Pennsylvania Department of State, Nurse Board” 

or “any writings between [Appellee] and [her] employer since Wednesday 

July 29, 2009.” The instant lawsuit involves allegedly defamatory 
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statements made in Appellee’s October 2013 PFA petition. Accordingly, 

Appellant’s requested discovery seeks documents well beyond the scope of 

the case, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting 

Appellee’s motion for a protective order against the production of such widesweeping and irrelevant documentation.

The trial court also sua sponte included in its discovery order a 

directive that Appellee’s counsel not waive objections at Appellee’s 

deposition, but instead place all objections on the record with specificity so 

the court would be able to rule upon them if Appellant filed any motions to 

compel Appellee to answer. See Order, February 12, 2015; see also N.T. 

2/12/2015, pp. 10-12. As this Court has explained: “The trial court is 

responsible for overseeing discovery between the parties and therefore it is 

within that court’s discretion to determine the appropriate measure 

necessary to insure adequate and prompt discovering of matters allowed by 

the Rules of Civil Procedure.” Berkeyheiser v. A-Plus Investigations, 

Inc., 936 A.2d 1117, 1125 (Pa.Super.2007) (internal quotations and citation 

omitted). Accordingly, it was within the trial court’s discretion to attempt to 

expedite the pretrial discovery process by ordering counsel to place 

objections on the record. This claim lacks merit.

Appellant next claims the trial court erred in determining Appellee’s 

alleged defamatory statements were privileged. See Appellant’s Brief, pp. 

18-23. He is incorrect.
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“Defamation is a communication which tends to harm an individual’s 

reputation so as to lower him or her in the estimation of the community or 

deter third persons from associating or dealing with him or her.” Elia v. 

Erie Ins. Exch., 634 A.2d 657, 660 (Pa.Super.1993). “[O]nly statements of 

fact can support an action for libel or slander, not merely expressions of 

opinion.” Id.

In an action for defamation, the plaintiff must prove: (1) 

the defamatory character of the communication; (2) publication 

by the defendant; (3) its application to the plaintiff; (4) 

understanding by the recipient of its defamatory meaning; (5) 

understanding by the recipient of it as intended to be applied to 

plaintiff; (6) special harm to the plaintiff; (7) abuse of a 

conditionally privileged occasion. Initially, it is the function of 

the court to determine whether the communication complained 

of is capable of a defamatory meaning. A communication is 

defamatory if it tends to harm the reputation of another as to 

lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third 

persons from associating or dealing with him. A communication 

is also defamatory if it ascribes to another conduct, character or 

a condition that would adversely affect his fitness for the proper 

conduct of his proper business, trade or profession. If the court 

determines that the challenged publication is not capable of a 

defamatory meaning, there is no basis for the matter to proceed 

to trial; however, if there is an innocent interpretation and an 

alternate defamatory interpretation, the issue must proceed to 

the jury.

Krajewski v. Gusoff, 53 A.3d 793, 802-03 (Pa.Super.2012) (quoting Maier 

v. Maretti, 671 A.2d 701, 704 (Pa.Super.1995)) (emphasis deleted). 

“It has long been the law of Pennsylvania that statements made by 

judges, attorneys, witnesses and parties in the course of or pertinent to any 

stage of judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged and, therefore, cannot 

form the basis for liability for defamation.” Richmond v. McHale, 35 A.3d 
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779, 784 (Pa.Super.2012); see also Post v. Mendel, 507 A.2d 351 

(Pa.1986). As a general rule, no civil liability attaches to statements made 

in pleadings or during discovery, trial, or argument of a case where the 

statements are pertinent, relevant, and material to any issue in the suit. 

See Post, 507 A.2d at 355; see also Bochetto v. Gibson, 860 A.2d 67, 71 

(Pa.2004). 

Here, Appellee made the statements about which Appellant complains 

in a PFA petition. The PFA petition alleged, in pertinent part, as follows:

[Appellant] has been sending damaging letters to my job, he 

sent them to all the big bosses. He did not sign them but I know 

its him because there’s things in the letter [sic] only he could 

know. He sent nakes [sic] photos of me to my job also. He 

went to a bar and was talking about our sex life in explicit detail. 

My job is jeopardize [sic] now from him sending all these letter 

[sic] and I am being scrutinized. On 10/5/13 I called the police 

and filed a report against [Appellant] #13-01-039615. 

Parties were in a relationship for 3 years. Parties [sic] 

relationship ended in May 2013. In the past on one occasion 

[Appellant] demanded [Appellee] have sexual relations with him. 

[Appellant] was very verbally abusive to [Appellee] during the 

relationship. [Appellant] told [Appellee] in the past he suffered 

from depression and was prescribed medication. [Appellant] is 

51 and [Appellee] is 44.

These statements were relevant and material to the claims of the PFA 

petition and were made in a judicial pleading.4 Accordingly, the statements 

were privileged and Appellant’s claim lacks merit.5

____________________________________________

4 Appellant acknowledged as much at the February 12, 2015 hearing on 

Appellee’s petition for a protective order in which the following exchange 

took place between the court and Appellant, acting pro se:

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Finally, Appellant argues the trial court erred in granting Appellee 

summary judgment because factual disputes remain. See Appellant’s Brief, 

pp. 23-32. This claim also lacks merit.

Initially, the trial court properly concluded that any statements made 

in the course of the PFA proceedings were privileged and thus could not 

support Appellant’s claims for defamation or false light. Further, as to 

Appellee’s alleged extrajudicial statements, after receiving Appellee’s 

preliminary objections to the original complaint in which she claimed she 

only made statements in her PFA petition, the trial court stated:

Appellant further argues that Appellee made extrajudicial 

statements to family and friends. However, although Appellant 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

THE COURT: Let me see if I understand you. She filed a 

protection from abuse order under the statutes of the 

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania?

[APPELLANT]: Correct.

THE COURT: So you filed an action against her for the 

statements made in that complaint?

[APPELLANT]: Right. . . . 

N.T. 2/12/2015, p. 6.

5 Appellant’s claims that (1) Appellee “appeared without subpoena,” (2) the 

original hearing was conducted ex parte, and (3) the trial court received and 

considered hearsay testimony at the hearing have no bearing on whether 

the statements in Appellee’s PFA petition are privileged, and we need not 

discuss them further. Additionally, to the extent Appellant argues his 

defamation claims relate to statements Appellee made to her family and 

friends, he has produced no evidence to support these claims and has 

alleged no special harm resulting from them.
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pled general allegations to this effect in his Amended Complaint, 

Appellee specifically denied them, and Appellant has not, either 

during discovery or through any other part of the proceeding, 

provided any factual basis on which to support these claims. 

The only possible statement Appellee made that Appellant can 

point to with any specificity is that, on October 4, 2013, Appellee 

spoke with Guiseppe and Salvatore Foglia, Appellant’s friends, 

and asked them for help in “getting [Appellant] off [her] back . . 

.” and told them that Appellant had sent letters to Appellee’s 

place of employment and that she feared for her life. These are 

not statements of fact but opinion, nor has Appellant plead any 

special harm resulting from this statement. Appellant cannot 

show defamation as a result. Consequently, Appellant has not 

and cannot make out a prima facie case for [d]efamation[.]

1925(a) Opinion, p. 11.

The trial court’s conclusion is correct. Therefore, the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion in granting Appellee’s motion for summary judgment as 

to Appellant’s defamation claim.

The same is true of Appellant’s false light claim. A false light claim is 

actually a cause of action for invasion of privacy, which the Restatement 

(Second) of Torts defines as:

§ 652E. Publicity Placing Person In False Light

One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that 

places the other before the public in a false light is subject to 

liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if

(a) the false light in which the other was placed would be highly 

offensive to a reasonable person, and

(b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as 

to the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which 

the other would be placed.

Restatement (Second) Torts, § 652E. “Significantly, unlike the law of 

defamation, false light invasion of privacy offers redress not merely for the 
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publication of matters that are provably false, but also for those that, 

although true, are selectively publicized in a manner creating a false 

impression.” Krajewski v. Gusoff, 53 A.3d 793, 806 (Pa.Super.2012) 

(internal citation omitted).

As the trial court correctly explained:

[T]he statements made in the course of the PFA hearing were 

protected by an absolute privilege. Further, Appellant did not 

prove that Appellee publicized any statements outside of the PFA 

hearing to any one person and, in fact, specifically stated in his 

deposition testimony that he did not have actual factual 

knowledge of the time, place, and manner of any defamatory 

statement made by Appellee to many of the people Appellant 

alleged she had publicized to. Further, nothing said to the 

Foglias rises to the level of offensiveness required, or the level of 

recklessness required, to make out a prima facie case.

1925(a) Opinion, p. 12.

Likewise, the trial court properly awarded Appellee summary judgment 

on Appellant’s abuse of process claim. The Judicial Code provides as 

follows:

§ 8351. Wrongful use of civil proceedings

(a) Elements of action.--A person who takes part in the 

procurement, initiation or continuation of civil proceedings 

against another is subject to liability to the other for wrongful 

use of civil proceedings:

(1) he acts in a grossly negligent manner or without 

probable cause and primarily for a purpose other than that 

of securing the proper discovery, joinder of parties or 

adjudication of the claim in which the proceedings are 

based; and

(2) the proceedings have terminated in favor of the person 

against whom they are brought.
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42 Pa.C.S. § 8351.

As the trial court explained:

Nowhere in Appellant’s pleadings has he pled or alleged that 

Appellee acted in a grossly negligent manner in filing the PFA 

proceeding. Indeed, both pleadings and depositions reflect the 

fact that Appellee had cause to file the action and acted 

reasonably and without malice in doing so.

1925(a) Opinion, p. 13.

For the these reasons, the trial court properly granted summary 

judgment in this matter. Accordingly, we affirm the order of the trial court.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/14/2016