See T EX . P EN . C ODE §30.02. Applicant was char g ed with the varia nts of burg lary

that 1 require proof of

intent to commit t heft or the commission or attempted commission of theft. See id. , 

## IN THE COU RT O F CR IM IN AL AP PE ALS

OF TE XAS

N O . A P - 75, 838

EX PA R TE C R A I G R O N A LD C A M PB EL L , A ppl i c ant

ON AP P LI CAT I ON F OR A W RI T OF HABE AS CORP US CAUS E N O. 2 3 , 6 3 9 - A I N T HE 3 0 0 J UDI CI AL DI S TR I CT COURT TH FROM BRAZ OR I A CO UNTY K ELL ER , P. J. , de l i ve r e d t he opi ni on o f t he C our t i n w hi c h W OMACK , K EASLE R , H ERVEY , and C OCHR AN , J J ., jo in e d . P RI CE , J. , f i l ed a di s s enti n g o p i ni on i n w hi ch M E YE RS , J OHNS ON and H OL C OM B , J J ., jo in e d . C OCHR AN , J ., f i l ed a concurri ng opi ni on i n w hi c h W OMACK , J. , j oi ne d. We f iled and set this c ase to de termine whether and under what circ umstances a rele asee who has neve r bee n convicted o f a “r eporta ble offe nse” ma

y be re quired to comply

with sex offe nder conditions of ear ly rele ase. We hold that the parole panel wa s authorized by statute to impose sex of fe nd e r co nd iti on s in ge ne ra l, an d a c hil d s a fe ty

zon e c on dit ion

in p art ic ula

r, up on thi s a pp lic a nt,

and we ho ld t

hat th e se c on dit ion s w e re no t im po se d in vio la tio n o f d

ue pr oc e ss. I. BACKG ROUND I n 1992, applicant pleaded guilty to burg lary of a building as an ha

bitual offende r and wa s 1 2CAMP BEL L - 2

§30.02(a) (1), ( 3). See id. , §12.42(d). 2 See id. , §21.08. 3 See id. , §22.01. 4 Ap pli c ant’ s h a

be a s a pp lic a tio n, the tr ia l c ourt ’s fi nd ing s, and thi s Co ur t’ s “fi le and

se t” 5 order all ref er to a pplicant having b ee n re l ea sed on mandatory supervision. Examination of the officia l r ecor ds reve als, howeve r, that applicant wa s relea sed on par ole, not mandatory supervision. sentenc ed to thirty -five y ear s in prison. I n addition to prior felony convictions, applicant also had tw o p ri or mis de me ano r c on vic tio ns : one fo r ind e c e nt e xpos ur e and on e fo r a ssa

ult

. Ac c or din g to 3 4 a police r eport in the indece nt e x posure case , applicant had exposed himself to four y oung children who wer e play

ing on the ir front law n. Applicant unzipped his pants, pulled his penis out, said,

“ [H]e y g ir l, l oo k, ” and

mov e d hi s pen is around w ithhis ha nd . Apo lic e re po rt

in t he a ssa ult c a se indicated that a

pplicant had f

orce d his way

into a six ty -y ear -old woman’s home, tried to spread he r leg s apar t, and moved toward her genitals. The re port indicated that the district attorney ’s offic e had orig inally advised the a

rre sting off

icer to file an attempted sexual assault charg e. On J uly 5, 2 0 06, applicant wa s relea sed on par ole, with special c ondition “L ” – re quiring 5 the maxim um level of supervision. On J uly 10, 2006, the parole division of the Texas Depar tment of Criminal J ustice notified applica nt that it was consideringreque sting that a parole panel of the Boa rd of Par dons and Parole impose spe cial condition “X” – sex offender conditions. The J uly 10 th notice informe d applicant that he had a rig ht to submit information on his own beha lf to g ive re asons why the sex offende r conditions should not be i m p o s ed

. T he notice g ave a deadline of

Aug ust 7, 2006. Applicant did not submit a response.CAMP BEL L - 3

On Aug ust 11, 2006, the parole pa nel held a he aringon the matter. A pplicant was not g iven the opportunity

to attend this hearing . The pa role pa nel voted t o i mpose specia l condition “O” (other) , order ing a

pplicant to submit t o a sex offende r eva luation. On Aug ust 24, 2006, applicant submitt ed to a se x offe nder inter view with Aar on P. Pi erc e, P h

. D. During the interview , Pierce asked a pplicant to explain his arr ests for the two of fense s outlined in the notice. Wit h respe ct to the

as s ault case , applicant r eplied that he w as drunk a nd intended to bre ak into a house. When a sked whether he attempted to e ng ag e in sexual activity with the woman in the house, a pplicant stated, “ I do n’ t th ink

so ; I wa s d ru nk .” With re sp e c t to the ind e c e nt e xpos ur e c a se , a pp lic ant s a id h e wa s ju st “takinga leak in a

n are a wher e there wer e kids.” Ba sed upon those answe rs and other infor mation obtai n e d in th e in te r v ie w , Pi e r c e r e c o mm e n d e d th a t a p p li c an t b e r e qu ir e d

to c o mp le te “ a

s e x ual offe nse spec ific treatment prog ram.” On October 6, 2006, the parole panel imposed specia l c ondition X. I ncluded within spec ial condition X was a

child safe ty

zone condition. On October 11, 2006, applicant r ece ived notice of the additional conditions from his parole office r. The pa role off icer ’s repor

t indicated that applica

nt was unde r home c onfinement; wa s permitted to leave his r esidenc e only for work, churc h, medical

emer g encie s, and sex offende r treatment; and was prohibited from going within a ce rtain distance , specifie d by

the B oard of

Pardons and Par ole, of pre mises where children c ommonly g ather

. On No ve mbe r 2 7, 20 06 , a

pp lic ant a dmi tte d to a pa

ro le of fi c e r that he ha d b e e n g oin g to h is fathe r’ s h ou se e ve ry

da y of the we e k b e tw e e n 5 :30 and 6: 30 p. m. an d th at he wa s awa re that hi sCAMP BEL L - 4

The house w as within 500 fee t of what wa s either a “He ad Start” sc hool (ac cordingto the 6 revoc ation alleg ations) or a day car e ce nter (a

pplicant’s testimony). Applica nt had pre viously

been moved from that r esidenc e to his sponsor residenc e. fathe r’s house was in a child safe ty zone. Applicant st ated that he went to his fathe r’s house to eat 6 and showe r bec ause his sponsor house did not have hot water . Subsequently , applicant’ s parole w as

re vo ke d f or fa ilure to f

oll owthe ins tr

uc tio ns of his pa ro le of fi c e r a nd fo r f a ilure to a vo id c hil d s a fe ty

zon e s. I n an application for a writ of habeas corpus, applicant contended that, afte r beingparole d out on mandatory

supervision, the parole panel “tac ked on” sex offender reg istration and treatment prog rams in violation of his constituti onal rig hts. He c laimed that he “ was ne ver c onvicted of a ny sex related off

ense s t o i nitiate said conditions.” He f urther c laimed that the “c hild safety zone” condition should never have be en applied to him and that he should be rele ased ba ck to mandator y supervision without sex offe nder c onditions. After desig nating issues and receiving an affidavit and various docume nts, the district court

ma de the fo llo wi ngfi nd ing s o f f a c t: (1) [Appli cant] has never been convicted or adjudicate d g uilty of a “re portable” offe nse as de fined by

Article 62.001( 5), Code of Criminal Proce dure; (2) The re w as a se x ual component to applica nt’s prior off

ense of indece nt expos ure; howeve r, it was applica

nt’s first conviction for indece nt e x posure; there fore , it is not a re portable c onviction under Ar ticle 62.001(5), Code of Criminal Procedur e; (3) Applica

nt did not violate conditi ons of m andator y supervision that resulted in the revoc ation of hi s mandatory supervision, beca use t hose conditi ons relating to sexual of fe nd e rs did

no t a pp ly to a pp lic ant. Ba sed on its findings of

fac t, the district court made the following conclusions of law :CAMP BEL L - 5

395 F.3d 216 ( 5 Cir. 2004). 7 t h Id. at 219. 8 Id. 9 Id. 10 (1) Applicant did not violate conditions of mandatory supervision that resulted in the revoc ation of his mandatory supervision, bec ause those c onditions relating to se x ual of fe nd e rs did

no t a pp ly to a pp lic ant; (2 ) A pp lic ant i s e nt i t l e d

t o m a n d a t o r y r e l e a s e w i tho ut s e x-of

fe nd e r r e la te d c on dit ion s. II. AN AL YSI S Citi ng various statutes and r elying upon Coleman v. Dre tke , applicant c ontends that sex 7 offe nder c onditions m ay

be imposed only

upon offe nders who ha

ve a “ repor

table off ense” under Chapter 62. Alternatively , relying upon Coleman , applicant c ontends that sex offender conditions

wer e imposed upon him in violation of due proce ss beca use (1) he h ad n o t been c onvicted of a “re portable of

fense ” that would justify

imposit ion of sex offender conditions without a hear ing, a nd (2) he was not g iven adva nce notice that he wa s being considere d for se x offe nder c onditions and an opportunity

to r espond. B eca

use Coleman comprises a cruc ial part of a

pplicant’s ar g uments, we dis c us s it be fo re tur

nin g to a pp lic ant’ s c on te nti on s.

A. Colem an Coleman was r elea sed on par ole on a burg lary conviction. Whil e on parole , he wa s indicted 8 fo r a g g ra vate d s e xua l a ssa

ult of a c hil d an d inde c e nc y wi th a ch ild by c on ta c t. He ple a de d guil ty

9 to, and was c onvicted of, only assault, and his pa role on the burg lary conviction was r evoked. He 10 was later released to mandatory supervision on the burglar y offe nse, on the c ondition that he resideCAMP BEL L - 6

Id. 11 Id. 12 Id. 13 Id. at 221. 14 Id. 15 Id. 16 in a halfwa

y house until employ ed. Over a month afte r that, without aff ording advanc e notice or 11 a hea ring , a par ole pane l imposed two additional conditions of relea se: that he re g ister as a sex offe nder a

nd that he attend se x offe nder the rapy . Coleman failed to p ar t i cipate in sex offe nder 12 thera py , and as a

result, his mandatory

supervision rele ase w as re voked. 13 Col e man a

rgue d th a t im

po sin g se x off

e nd e r r e g ist

ratio n a nd the ra py a s c o n d i t ion s o f h is e a rl y

re le a se , w ith ou t a ff

or din g the op po rt

un ity to c on te st h is s e x off e nd e r s ta tus , v iol a te d d

ue pr oc e ss. 14 The F ifth Circuit ex plained that a pr ocedu ra l d u e proc ess inquiry with respec t to sex offe nder conditions consisted of two eleme nts: (1) whethe r the c omplaining pa rty had a liberty interest in not having sex offender

conditions imposed on his early rele ase, a nd (2) if so, whe ther the State pr ovided constitutionally

sufficie nt proce dures be fore imposing the conditions. The c ourt furthe r explained 15 that a liberty

interest may

arise f rom two source s: the Due Proce ss Clause itself or state law. The 16 Fifth Circuit c oncluded that the Due Process Clause itself g uara ntees a prisoner some pr ocess be fore the State ca

n impose conditions “that are qual i t atively differ ent from the punishment char acte ristically

suffe red by

a per son convicted of

the cr i m e, an d whi ch have stigmatizingCAMP BEL L - 7

Id. (interna l quotation marks omitted). 17 Id. at 222 (interna l quotation marks omitted). 18 445 U.S. 480 (1980). 19 Coleman , 395 F.3d at 222. 20 Id. (c i t i n g Vitek

). 21 Id. at 223. 22 Id. 23 conseque nces.” The c ourt cha rac terized restrict i o n s t h at attend e arly rele ase a s “an e stablished 17 variation on imprisonment of convicted criminals” and found that a c ondition of early rele ase “ may pr e se nt s uc h a

dr a ma tic de pa

rt ur e fr om t

he ba sic con di ti on s o f a

pa ro le e ’s se nte nc e that th e state must provide some proce dural prote ctions prior to its impos ition.” 18 I n a dd re ssi ngwh e the r t

he se x off

e nd e r c on dit ion s im

po se d on Col e man w e re a dr a ma tic depar ture fr om the norm, the F ifth Circuit discussed the Supreme Court c ase of Vitek v . Jones , 19 wh ic h h e ld t

hat due pr oc e ss re qu ir e s pro c e dura l pr ote c tio ns be fo re an inma te may be inv olu nta ri ly committed to a mental i nstitut ion. Ba sed upon the combination of stig ma and c ompelled behavior- 20 modification treatment, the S upreme Court held that involuntary commitment to a mental instit ution imp lic a te d a

c on sti tut ion a lly

pr ote c te d li be rt

y int e re st. Th e F if

th C ir c uit fo un d th e fa c ts o f i ts c a se 21 to b e ma te ri a lly

ind ist inguis ha

ble fr om Vitek : s ex o ffender c lassification and c ounseling wer e sti g ma tizin g , a

nd the se x off

e nd e r c ouns e lin g inv olv e d in tr us ive , b e havio r- mod if

y ingte c hn iqu e s. 22 Co ns equ e ntl y , th e se x off e nd e r c on dit ion s im

po se d u po n Co le man w e re “ qu a lit a tiv e ly dif fe re nt” from the usua l conditions that attend an inmate’s release

. The Fifth Circuit also cited ca ses from 23CAMP BEL L - 8

Id. at 222, 222 n. 26. 24 Id. at 225. 25 Id. 26 See T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . art. 62.001(5) , and more specific ally (5)( F)

. 27 the Ninth and Eleve nth Circuits in s upport of the c onclusion that “prisoner s who have not been convicted of a sex offe nse have a li berty interest created by the Due Process Cl ause in free dom from sex offender

classification and conditions.” 24 Be cause the sex off

ender conditions imposed on Coleman implicated a liber ty interest, the State could have leg itimately imposed those conditions o n l y i f i t had deter mined, afte r af

fording Coleman appropr iate proc edura l protections, that Coleman constituted “a threat to society by rea son of his lack of

sexual control.” “Abse nt a conviction of a sex offense,” the Fif

th Circuit concluded, 25 the State must affor d “an a ppropriate hear ing” at which suc h a dete rmination can be made. 26 B. A ut hor iz at ion to Im pos e th e Co ndit ion atAl l I t is undisputed that applicant doe s not have a “re portable c onviction” under the sex offende r

re g istratio n s ta tut e , w hic h d oe s n ot l ist a ssa ult or burg lary wi th int e nt to c omm it the ft , and lis ts o nly

a s e c o n d c o n v ic ti o nf

o r in d e c e n t e xp o s u r e . A p p li c a n t c o n te n d s th a t G o v e r

n me n t C o d e s e c ti o ns 27 5 0 8

. 1 8 6 , 508.187, and 508.225 spec ifically addre ss when sex offende r conditions in ge nera l, and

c hil d s a fe ty zon e c on dit ion s in par tic ula r, may be imp os e d. B e c a

us e no ne of

tho se statut e s a

pp ly to the of fe ns e of ind e c e nt e xpos ur e , h e re a so ns tha t th e pa ro le pa ne l la c ks the a

uth or ity to i mpo se tho se conditions in his case. We disag ree . Se c tio ns 50 8. 18 6 and 50 8. 18 7 a dd re ss sit uatio ns in wh ic h a pa

ro le pa ne l mu st i mpo se c e rt a inCAMP BEL L - 9

See T EX . G OV ’ T C ODE §508.186 (“Aparole panel shall require as a condition of parole or 28 mandatory supervision that a rele asee require d to r eg ister as a sex off ender under Chapter 62, Code of Cr imi na l Pr oc e dure ” fu lf ill c e rt a in c on dit ion s) ; id. , §5 08 .1 87 (b )( “ A p aro le pa ne l sh a ll e sta

bli sh a child saf

ety zone” under

cer tain circ umstances with ce rtain conditions). T EX . G OV ’ T C ODE §508.225(a)

. 29 See id. , §508.225, pa ssi m . 30 Id. , §508.226. 31 Id. , §508.221. 32 T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . art. 42.12, §11(a ). 33 c o n d i t i o n s , b u tt h o s e s e c t i o n s d o n o t c o n s t r a i n t h e s c o p e o f a p ar o l e p an e l ’ s d i s c r e t i o n ar y a u t h o r i t y. 28 S ec t i o n5 0 8

. 2 2 5 au t h o ri z es t h e i mp o s i t i o n o f a ch i l d s af et y z o n e c o n d i t i o nfo r a ni n m at e s er v i n g a sent e n c e f

o r an o f f e n s e f a ll in g u n d e r s e c ti o n 3 g o f th e Co d e o f Cr im in a l Pr o c e d u re if suc h a

co n d i tion is warra

nted by the nature of the off

ense. Section 508.225 does not, howeve r, 29 specific ally prec lude the use of a child safe ty zone in other circ umstances. I n contra st, Chapte r 508 30 does conta in one instance in w hich the leg islature specific ally prec luded something from beingused

a s a c o n d i t i o no f

r e l e a s e : ani n m a t e m ay n o tb e r e qu i r e d t o u n d e r g o ano r c h i e c t o m y. 31 Mo re imp or

tantl y , s e c tio n 5 08 .2 21 c on fe rs br oa d, g e ne ra l a uth or ity on a parol e pa

ne l to impose conditions of parole or mandatory

supervision: “A pa

role pa nel may impose as a c ondition of par ole or mandatory

supervision any condition that a court may impose on a def endant plac ed on

c omm un ity su pe rv isi on un de r a rt ic le 42 .1 2, Cod e of

Cr imi na l Pr oc e dure . . . .” I n tu rn , a rt ic le 32 42 .1 2, se c tio n 1 1, pr ov ide s, “ Th e jud g e may imp ose any reas on a

ble c on dit ion

that is de sig ne d to protec t or restore the community , protec t or restore the victim, or punish, r ehabilitate, or ref orm the defe ndant.” 33CAMP BEL L - 10

See the text of T EX . P EN . C ODE §21.08 (“intent to ar ouse or g ratify the sexual desire of 34 any person” ) and the title of Penal Code, Chapter 20 ( “Sexual Offense s”). T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . art. 42.12, §9A( a)( 2)(B ). 35 Id. , §11(i). 36 Id. , §13B( a)( 1)(B ), (b)( 2)(“ (a) I f a judge g rants community supervision t o a d ef endant 37 descr ibed by

Subsection (b) a

nd the judg e dete rmines that a child . . . was the vic tim of the offe nse, the judg e shall establish a c hild safety zone applicable to the defendant . . . . (b) This sec tion applies to a def endant plac ed on community supervision for a

n offe nse . . . (2) under S ection 21.08

. . . Penal Code.”). I nd e c e nt e xpos ur e is a

se x off e ns e and

a pe rs on wh o c omm its ind e c e nt e xpos ure is 34 specific ally

identified as a

“sex offende r” by

article 42.12, section 9A, so sex offender conditions 35 would seem “rea sonable” under article 42.12, se ction 11. Moreove r, in addition to its gene ral g rant of authority , article 42.12, section 11 explicitl y permits a judg e who g rants community supervision to a se x off e nd e r i de nti fi e d b y

se c tio n 9A to r e qu ir e the pr ob a tio ne r t o “ su bmi t to tr e a tme nt, specia liz ed super

vision, or r ehabilitation acc ording to offense -spec ific standar ds of pra ctice a dopted by the Counc il o n Se x Of

fe nd e r T re a tme nt. ” F ina lly , und e r a rt ic le 42 .12, se c tio n 1 3B , a c hil d 36

sa f e ty zo n e c o n d it io nis a

r e qu ir e me n t o f

p r o b a ti o nf

o r anin d e c e n t e xp o s u r e o f f e n s e c o mmitted ag ainst a child. Given the g ener al authority g rante d to a par ole pane l to impos e any condition of 37 probation per

mitted by article 42.12, it would be odd to prohibit the imposi tion of a child safe ty zone

a s a c on dit ion

of pa ro le fo r a fi rs t- tim e ind e c e nt e xpos ur e of fe ns e wh e n i t woul d b e re qu ir e d a s a condition of probation under article 42.12. Th e dis se nt c on te nd s th a t §5 08 .2 25 , b y a uth or izin g the dis c re tio nary impos iti on of c hil d safe ty zones for 3g offe nders, impliedly prohibits the discretionar y imposit ion of a child safe ty zone

c o n d i t i o nf

o r n o n - 3 g o f

f e n s e s u n d e r

t h e ma xim ex

p r essi o unius est exc lusio alt erius – expressingCAMP BEL L - 11

See dis se nt a

t 5. Al tho ug h th e dis se nt d iscu sse s § 50 8. 19 7 a nd art ic le 42 .1 2, §1 3B , it 38 acknow ledg es that those provisions outl i n e the circumstance s under whic h the child safe ty zone condition is mandatory , rathe r than discr etionary , and it does not appe ar to be conten d i n g that the mandato r y p r o v is io n s c an b y th e ms e lv e s g iv e r is e to an im p li e d p r o h ib it io n o n a p ar o le panel’ s discretionar

y authority

. W ill iam s v . S

tat e , 965 S.W .2d 506, 507 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). 39 Id. 40 Id. 41 Da lla s v . S

tat e , 9 83 S.W .2d 276, 278 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998)(“if statute spe cifies one 42 exception to a g ener al rule or assumes t o specify the effec ts of a ce rtain provision, other e x ceptions or ef fec ts are e x cluded” ). one thing implies the ex clusion of w h at wa s not ex presse d. For sever al re asons, we f

ind the 38 dissent’s argument to be unper suasive. F ir st, the max im ex pres sed by the dis se nt i s n ot a

n in fl e xible ru le bu t is me re ly an a id i n construction. Thoug h it “has had w idesprea d leg al application,” “it is not a rule of law and the re 39 is nothing par

ticularly leg al about it.” The maxim i s “a pr oduct of log ic and c ommon sense, 40 expressing the lear

ning of common experience that when people say one thing they

do not mean something e lse.” I n consideringthe application of a rule of log ic and c ommon sense to parole law, 41 courts should also consider the broa d discretion the L eg islature obviously intended to conf

er upon the par ole authorities to fa shion appropriate conditions of par ole. Se c on d, the ma xim op e rate s only wh e n a com pr e he ns ive tr e a tme nt of the su bje c t matt e r i s intended or w hen addr essing an ex ception to a gene ral rule. An ex press gra nt of authority

does not 42 by itself g ive rise to an inf

ere nce that matters outside the express g rant a re pr ohibited. I n Dallas , we held that the express g rant of a uthority to impose conditions of bail on appea l in felony case s did notCAMP BEL L - 12

Id. a t 27 8- 80 ; see also T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . a rt . 4 4. 04 (a )( a

uth or izin g mis de me ano r b a il 43 but containing no lang uag e spec ifically authorizing c onditions of bail), (c) (providing in felony case s that th e c ourt

“ may imp os e reao na

ble c on dit ion s o n b a il p e nd ingthe fi na lity of [the de fe nd a nt’ s] conviction”)

.

Dallas , 983 S.W .2d at 279-80. 44 T h e r e i s a d i f

f e r e n t a s p e c t o f C h a

p t e r 5 0 8 t h a t d o e s s a t i s f

y Da llas by

presc ribing an 45 exception to a g ener al rule: the ma ndatory provis i o n s . T he g ener al rule is that the imposition of c on dit ion s b y

a pa ro le pa ne l is dis c re tio na ry . Two statutes within Chapte r 508 outline conditions that are mandatory

under c erta in circumstanc es, cr eatingexceptions to the ge nera l r ule of discr etion. B y sp e c if y ingthe c ir c ums tanc e s und e r w hic h c o n d i t i o n s a

r e m a n d a t o r y , t h e L e g i s la tur e ha s im

pli e dly result in an implied prohibition ag ainst imposing con d i t i o ns of bail on appe al in misdemeanor

case s. Whil e the e ntire statute addr essing bail pending appea l could be ac curately ch ara cter ized 43 as compre hensiv e, the pr ovision from which the c ourt of appe als claimed the implied prohibiti on flowed – addre ssing bail in f elony case s – was not. We explained that the courts ha d inhere nt power to i mpo se c on di ti on s o f b a il i n b oth fe lony and mis de me ano r c a se s, and we he ld t

hat th e e xpre ss provision for conditions of bail in fe lony case s did not dist urb the c ourts’ long -held inher ent

a uth or ity wi th r e g ard

to m isd e me ano rs . 44 Section 508.221 confe rs g ener al authority on parole panels to impose conditions of parole. Chapter 508 may

in its t otality

constitute a compre hensive scheme with reg ard to the imposition of conditions of parole

. But, a ccor ding to the dissent, the implied prohibition ag ainst the discre tionary imp os iti on

of c hil d s a fe ty

zon e s f low s f ro m th e e xplic it g ra

nt o f d isc re ti on ary

a uth or ity fo un d in §508. 2 2 5

. T h at s ection does not purpor t to comprehe nsively

regulate par ole conditions and is not framed as a

n exception to a g ener al rule. U nder Dallas , th e n, the e xpre ss g ra nt o f a uth or ity to i mpo se child safe ty

zones for one c lass of off ender s u n der §508.225 doe s not override a par ole pane l’s g e ne ra l a uth or ity to i mpo se a

c hil d s a fe ty

zon e c on dit ion

on oth e r c la sse s o f o ff

e nd e rs . 45CAMP BEL L - 13

indicated that no othe r circumstances involve mandatory conditions. The pre sent ca se, howe ver, involves when a

discretionar

y condition may

be imposed. 74 Tex. Crim . 552, 169 S.W . 411 (1914). 46 Fondren , 74 Tex. Crim . at 560, 169 S.W. at 415. 47 Fondren , 74 Tex. Crim . at 560, 169 S.W. at 415. 48 Fondren , 74 Tex. Crim . at 560, 169 S.W. at 415. 49 Fondren , 74 Tex. Crim . at 560, 169 S.W. at 415-16. 50 Id. 51 Third, an e x press e x clusion in the statutory schem e will neg ate the e x istence of implied exclusions. I n Fo nd

re n v . S tat e , the defendant was prosec uted for the (now non-e x istent) crime of abortion. He wa s prosec uted as an accomplice under the g ener al accomplice statute that ex isted

46 at the time, ar

tic l e 7 9

. Ar t icle 85 spec ified that there may be ac complices to all off enses e x cept 47 manslaug hter a

nd neg lige nt homicide. A s ep ar ate statute spe cific to a bortion, article 1072, 48 provided for

a theor y of ac complice liability

with respec t t o ab o rt i o n offe nses. Despite the 49

a bo rt ion -s pe c if

ic pr ov isi on

in a rt ic le 10 72 , this Court he ld that the g e ne ra l pa rt ie s st a tut e a

pp lie d to the offe nse of abortion. Significa ntly , this Court st ated: “I f the rule , e x pr essi o uniu s est

e x c lus io 50 alterius , applies at a ll to thi s statute, it unquestionably is in favor of the construc tion we g ive to the

sever al ar ticles, instead of the reve rse, f or as the s t at u t e expressly excepts manslaug hter a nd neg lige nt homicide from the a pplication of ar

ticle 79, if t h e L egis lature ha d intended to except abortion it unquestionably would have sa id so and included that in ar ticle 85.” 51 As we have ob se rv e d, Cha pte r 5 08 do e s con tai n a

n e xpre ss e xclu sio n: o rc hie c tom y is prohibited as a c ondition of parole or mandatory supervision. This exclusi on sug g ests there are noCAMP BEL L - 14

Dissent at 7 n.14. 52 T EX C ODE C R IM . P R OC . art. 42.12, §9A( a)( 2)(B ). 53 Id. , §9A(b), ( c). 54 I ndeed, a s the dissent notes, the L eg islature has e lsewher e, in the conte x t of mandatory 55 c on dit ion s, e xpre ssl y

lim ite d a c on dit ion -o f- pr ob atio n p ro vis ion ’s re a c h to a pe rs on wh o is ac tu al l y p l ac edo np ro b at i o nfo r t h e s ex o ff en s e. Di s s en tat 8 (c i t i n g T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . a rt

. 42.12, §13B( b)). other e x clusions. I f the L eg islatu re h ad intended to pr ohibit child safety zones ex cept whe re expressly provided, it could have expressly done so. Four th, the parole scheme does conta in an express provision authorizing spec ial conditions fo r s e x off

e nd e rs , in c lud ingso me on e in a pp e lla nt’ s p os iti on , th a t w ou ld l og ic a lly inc lu de a c hil d safe ty zone: ar t icle 42.12, §11(i). A s expl ained a bove, §508.221 per

mits t he imposition of any condition authorized by

article 42.12, and ar

ticle 42.12, §11(i) pe rmits a judge who g rants probation to a §9A sex of

fende r to r equire that the offe nder “ submit t o treatment, specialized supervision, or reha bilitation accordi n g t o o ff ense- specific standards of prac tice adopte d by

the Council on Sex Of fe nd e r Tr e a tme nt. ” I n a fo otn ote , th e dis se nt s ay s th a t it is n ot at a ll c le ar t

hat §1 1( i) a

pp lie s to applicant, but the dissent g ives no explanation for its conclusion. “Sex offe nder” is defined by §9A 52 as “a person who has been convicted or has ente red a plea of g uilty or nolo contende re” for a listed of fe ns e , in c lud ingind e c e nt e xpos ur e , of wh ic h a pp lic ant h a s b e e n c on vic te d. B e c a us e th is 53 definition is to be u s ed i n conjunction with prese ntence investigation reports, it seems clea r that 54 “has be en convic ted” includes prior convictions, and not just the conviction in the ca se in which the defe ndant is place d on probation. 55 The dissent fu rt h er contends that, e ven if a pplicant qualified unde r §11(i), “ there is noCAMP BEL L - 15

Dissent at 7 n.14 (e mphasis added)

. 56 Dissent at 7 n.14. 57 Council on Sex Offe nder Tr eatment, Rules and Regulations Relating to Council on Sex 58 Offender Treatment , 22 T EX . A D M IN . C ODE §810.68(1), p. 45 ( 2006). Se e als o , §810.64(d)( 20), p. 29 (2006) ( reg ardingpossibili ty of super vised visits wit h children, c lient who has history of de via nt s e xua l in te re st i n c hil dr e n s ho uld be re str ic te d f

ro m ha vin g a c c e ss t o c hil dr e n unle ss cer tain conditions are pr esent). Acts 2003, 78 L eg ., ch. 353, §§1, 2. 59 th Acts 1999, 76 L eg ., ch. 56, §§1, 2. 60 th indication that he wa s ever evaluated under

that section at the tria l court leve l.” But a pplicant was 56 evaluated pursuant to an or der by the par ole pane l, so the dissent’s o b jection see ms be that a trial

c ou rt did not order the e valuation. Article 42.12 ref ers to the t rial court beca

use i t is the probation statut e ; a t th a t po int in the c ri min a l pr oc e ss, the of fe nd e r is in the tr ia l c ourt

. Ev e n if e va luatio n is a pre requisite to application of Governme nt Code §508.221, surely the poi nt is not who orders the evaluation, but si mply

that the offe nder be evaluated, as he was in this case

. Finally , it is not self-e vident to the dissent that imposition of a child saf ety zone constitutes “tre atment, spec ialized supervision, or reha bilitation.” I t is evident to us that i t does. Unde r

57 “I ssues to Be Addre ssed in Treatment,” the Rules and Regulation s Relating to Council on S ex Offe nder Treatment spe cify “Eff ective arousa l or

impulse control shall include methods to control spontaneous devia

nt fantasies a

nd to minim ize contact with objects or pe rsons within the deviant fanta sies.” 58 I t is worth noting, as well, that article 42.12, §§9A and 11(i) wer e enac ted in 2003, afte r the 59

e na c tme nt o f § 50 8. 22 5 ( and its art ic le 42 .1 2 c ounte rp art ) i n 1 99 9. As the la te r e na c tme nt, §1 1( i) 60CAMP BEL L - 16

Ex parte Ge iken , 28 S.W .3d 553, 560 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). 61 would overr ide any

implied prohibiti on found in §508.225. Ap pli c ant c on te nd s th a t Coleman shows that s ex offe nder conditions are not “re asonable ”

un de r t he se statut e s. B ut Coleman was a construction of the Due Process Cl ause of the United States Co n s ti tuti o n , n o t o f

th e T e xa s s tatute , and Coleman ’s holding w as about what proce ss must be aff orded to the r elea see be fore sex offender conditions may

be imp o s ed , not about whether sex offe nder c onditions m ay

be imposed at a ll. I n fac t, Coleman contemplated that the imposit ion of sex offe nder c onditions would be leg itimate i f t h e re l ease e had pr eviously been c onvicted of a

sex of fe ns e or if pa rt ic ula ri zed jus tif ic a tio n f or the c on di ti on s were de ve lop e d at an “ a pp ro pr ia te hear ing” aff

orded to the rele asee . The re maining que stion (and the one that was at issue in Coleman ) is whether the p ar o l e p anel deprived a pplicant of due proce ss by failing to affor d notice and a n opportunity

to respond. C. No ti c e and O ppor tu nit y t o R e spo nd As s u m i n g Coleman articulates the corr ect rule of law with r espec t to the due proc ess rig ht to some manner of

hear ing, w e conc lude that this due proce ss rig ht was not violated in applicant’s

c a se be c a us e he wa s in fa c t pr ov ide d wi th no tic e and an op po rt un ity to r e sp on d. Ev e n w he n a

lib e rt y interest exists i n the ea

rly rele ase context, due proce ss doe s not require a live hea ring at which the convicted pe rson may

be pre sent. Rather, due proce ss require s simply that the convicted person

61 be g iven timely

notice in adva

nce of the par ole pane l’s cons i deration of the matter a nd that he be g iven an oppor

tunity to submit any

information that he feels may be relevant to the pa role pa nel’s decision.CAMP BEL L - 17

See id. , pa ssi m . 62 Ap pli c ant w a s g ive n n oti c e that he wo uld be c on sid e re d f or se x off e nd e r c on dit ion s; h e did not avail himself of the oppor tunity to respond. And during the subsequent sex offender evaluation, applicant wa s allowed to off er explanations with respe ct to his prior offe nses. Applicant c omplains that he wa s not give n the opportunity to respond to P ierc e’s sex offe nder e valuation re port. But e ven in the mand a tor

y su pe rv isi on c on te xt, w he re we have a c kn ow le dg e d th a t a lib e rt y int e re st i n e a rl y rele ase ex ists, we have not held that an inmate is entitled to noti ce of and an oppor

tunity to respond to a ll the ba d e vid e nc e the pa ro le pa ne l ma y have re c e ive d c on c e rn inghim

. 62 We deny relief

. Deliver ed: Octobe r 15, 2008 Pub lis h