No. 96-407 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1997 

MONTANANS FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS, INC., 

a non-profit corporation; HENRY BROERS; 

CHARLES TUSTIN; DARRELL OLSON; DAVID 

LIETZ; BARB LIETZ; JIM DOWLING; RAYMOND 

"RAY" SERRA, SR.; CAROL DUVAL; RUSS 

CROWDER; RON RABIDUE, 

Plaintiffs and Appellants, 

__ “. 

BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF 

FLATHEAD COUNTY, MONTANA, 

Defendant and Respondent. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Flathead, 

The Honorable Katherine R. Curtis, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellants: 

Gerald J. Neeley, Attorney at Law, Billings, 

Montana 

For Respondent: 

Jonathan B. Smith and Dennis J. Hester, Deputy 

Flathead County Attorneys, Kalispell, Montana 

Filed: 

Submitted on Briefs: October 31, 1996 

Decided: January 28, 1997 

Clerk .j 
Justice Karla M. Gray delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3 cc), Montana Supreme Court 

1995 Internal Operating Rules, the following decision shall not be 

cited as precedent and shall be published by its filing as a public 

document with the Clerk of the Supreme Court and by a report of its 

result to State Reporter Publishing Company and West Publishing 

Company. 

Montanans For Property Rights, Inc., a nonprofit corporation, 

Henry Broers, Charles Tustin, Darrell Olson, David Lietz, Barb 

Lietz, Jim Dowling, Raymond "Ray" Serra, Sr., Carol Duval, Russ 

Crowder, and Ron Rabidue (collectively, MPRI) appeal from the 

judgment entered by the Eleventh Judicial District Court, Flathead 

County, on its orders granting the motions for summary judgment 

filed by the Board of County Commissioners of Flathead County, 

Montana (Commissioners), and denying MPRI's cross-motion for 

partial summary judgment. We affirm. 

The issue on appeal is whether the District Court erred in 

granting the Commissioners' motions for summary judgment. In order 

to resolve that issue, we address the following subissues: 

a. Did the District Court err in concluding that 

planning board documents which are readily available to 

the public need not be on file at the Flathead County 

Clerk and Recorder's office? 

b. Did the District Court err in concluding that 

freeholder protests were properly counted pursuant to 

5 76-2-205(6), MCA? 

C. Did the District Court err in concluding that 5 2-6- 

109, MCA, prohibited the Flathead County Clerk and 

Recorder from providing MPRI with a list of freeholder 

names and addresses? 

2 
d. Did the District Court err in concluding that the 

Commissioners were entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law on MPRI's claim that the Hungry Horse News and the 

Bigfork Eagle are not newspapers of general circulation? 

e. Did the District Court err in concluding that the 

zoning regulations were validly adopted under Title 76, 

Chapter 2, Part 2, MCA? 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

In 1973, the Commissioners established the Flathead County 

Planning Board (Planning Board) to advise them regarding land use 

issues in Flathead County. Five years later, the Planning Board 

proposed the first Flathead County Comprehensive Plan, which 

divided Flathead County into neighborhood planning units and 

provided general guidance for resolving land use issues. 

In September of 1986, the Planning Board gave notice that it 

would hold a hearing to receive public comments regarding a revised 

comprehensive plan, the so-called Flathead County Comprehensive 

Plan Update. The notice specified that copies of the revised 

comprehensive plan were available for public review at the Flathead 

Regional Development Office (FRDO) The Planning Board held the 

public hearing and subsequently recommended that the Commissioners 

adopt the revised comprehensive plan. 

On February 5, 1987, the Commissioners passed a resolution of 

intention to adopt the revised comprehensive plan; they caused 

notice to be published that the resolution had been passed. The 

Commissioners subsequently adopted the revised comprehensive plan 

and, thereafter, referred to it as the Flathead County Master Plan 

(FCMP). 

3 
The FCMP encourages communities in Flathead County to develop 

"neighborhood" plans if they experience unique problems, face 

special issues, or desire to more adequately plan for growth in the 

future. Based on that recommendation, some residents of Canyon 

Area communities in Flathead County formed a committee, the Canyon 

Citizen Initiated Zoning Group (CCIZG), to guide the planning 

process for those communities. The Canyon Area is a long, narrow 

band of land in Flathead County located generally west and south of 

Glacier National Park. 

CCIZG hired a consultant to assist in developing a 

neighborhood plan and land use regulations for their communities 

and, together, they drafted proposed land use regulations and a 

neighborhood plan (Canyon Plan) for the three land use regions in 

the Canyon Area--the Lower Canyon Region (Lower District), the 

Middle Canyon Region (Middle District), and the Upper Canyon Region 

(Upper District). Thereafter, the consultant held fifteen public 

meetings to receive comments on the Canyon Plan and land use 

regulations. CCIZG then presented the Canyon Plan to the Planning 

Board for review and the Commissioners subsequently passed a 

resolution adding the Canyon Plan to the FCMP. 

CCIZG and its consultant then drafted zoning regulations for 

the Canyon Area communities based on the Canyon Plan. They held 

nine public meetings to discuss the proposed zoning regulations, 

which were referred to as the Canyon Area Land Use Regulatory 

System (CALURS) . Following the public meetings, CCIZG presented 

4 
the CALURS to the Planning Board for its review and recommendation 

that the Commissioners adopt the CALURS. 

The agenda for the Planning Board's September 14, 1994, 

meeting included a discussion of the proposed CALURS and a notice 

regarding this meeting was published on August 25, 1994. The 

notice stated that copies of documents pertaining to agenda items, 

such as the CALURS, were available for public inspection at the 

FRDO. The Planning Board received public comments on the proposed 

CALURS at its September meeting and passed a motion to discuss the 

CALURS further at its next meeting, scheduled for October 12, 1994. 

At the October meeting, the Planning Board passed a motion 

recommending that the Commissioners adopt the CALURS. 

The Commissioners caused two notices to be published that they 

would hold a hearing on November 15, 1994, to receive public 

comments regarding adoption of the CALURS. Following the hearing, 

the Commissioners passed a resolution of intention to adopt the 

CALURS and caused notice of passage of the resolution to be 

published. The notice stated that copies of the proposed CALURS 

were available for public inspection at the office of the Flathead 

County Clerk and Recorder (Clerk), the FRDO, and the Commissioners' 

office. It also stated that persons owning real property 

(freeholders) within the Upper, Middle and Lower Districts of the 

Canyon Area could file written protests to the CALURS for a period 

of thirty days beginning November 24, 1994 (the protest period). 

Both proponents and opponents of the CALURS requested a list 

of freeholders from the Clerk in order to contact them regarding 

5 
the CALURS. The Clerk refused to provide either group with a list 

of freeholders, but did allow review of the freeholder list at her 

office. One of the opponents of the CALURS was Glacier Wilderness 

Ranch (GWR), a time-share condominium association. The chairman of 

GWR's board of directors filed a timely protest, purportedly on 

behalf of each of the approximately six hundred owners of GWR timeshare units. The Clerk informed him that each time-share owner was 

a freeholder entitled to individually protest the CALURS and that 

he could not protest on behalf of all GWR owners. 

After the close of the protest period, the Clerk reported the 

protest results to the Commissioners. Less than forty percent of 

freeholders in the entire Canyon Area protested the adoption of the 

CALURS. When the protests were counted by districts, less than 

forty percent of freeholders in the Upper and Middle Districts, 

but more than forty percent of freeholders in the Lower District, 

of the Canyon Area protested the adoption of the CALURS. Based on 

those percentages, the Commissioners adopted the CALURS for the 

Upper and Middle Districts of the Canyon Area. 

MPRI filed a complaint for injunctive and declaratory relief 

on September 30, 1994, seeking to invalidate the Commissioners' 

adoption of, and amendments to, the FCMP and certain zoning 

regulations adopted thereunder. In answering the complaint, the 

Commissioners asserted that MPRI lacked standing to bring the 

lawsuit and was not entitled to injunctive or declaratory relief; 

they also pled the affirmative defenses of lathes and the statute 

of limitations. 

6 
The Commissioners moved for summary judgment contending that 

lathes precluded MPRI from challenging certain of their actions, no 

genuine issue of material fact existed and they were entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law on the nine counts contained in MPRI's 

complaint. MPRI opposed the Commissioners' summary judgment motion 

and filed a cross-motion for partial summary judgment. Thereafter, 

the District Court permitted MPRI to file an amended complaint and 

the Commissioners filed their answer. 

In March of 1995, the District Court heard oral argument on 

the parties' summary judgment motions. On August 16, 1995, the 

District Court granted the Commissioners' motion for summary 

judgment on issues in the original complaint not amended by the 

amended complaint and denied MPRI's cross-motion for partial 

summary judgment. 

On August 30, 1995, the Commissioners moved for summary 

judgment on the remaining issues in the amended complaint. MPRI 

opposed the motion. After oral argument, a stipulation by the 

parties that no issues of fact remained and supplementary 

memoranda, the District Court granted the Commissioners' motion for 

summary judgment and, thereafter, entered judgment in their favor. 

MPRI appeals. 

Additional facts are provided below as necessary for our 

resolution of the issues before us. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

Summary judgment is proper when no genuine issues of material 

fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law. Rule 56(c), M.R.Civ.P. We review a district court's grant 

of summary judgment de nova, applying the same Rule 56(c), 

M.R.Civ.P., criteria used by that court. Jarrett v. Valley Park, 

Inc. (Mont. 1996), 922 P.2d 485, 487, 53 St.Rep. 671, 672 (citation 

omitted). Ordinarily, such a review requires that we first 

determine whether the moving party met its burden of establishing 

both the absence of genuine issues of material fact and entitlement 

to judgment as a matter of law. Jarrett, 922 P.2d at 487. 

In this case, MPRI does not contend that genuine issues of 

material fact precluded summary judgment on the Commissioners' 

first motion and the parties stipulated to the absence of genuine 

issues of material fact regarding the Commissioners' second summary 

judgment motion. We must determine, therefore, whether the 

District Court erred in concluding that the Commissioners were 

entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. We review a 

district court's conclusions of law to determine whether they are 

correct. & Estate of Brooks (Mont. 1996), 927 P.2d 1024, 1026, 

53 St.Rep. 1263, 1264. 

DISCUSSION 

The overall issue on appeal is whether the District Court 

erred in granting the Commissioners' motions for summary judgment. 

In resolving that issue, we address each subissue raised by MPRI 

separately below. 

a. Did the District Court err in concluding that 

planning board documents which are readily available to 

the public need not be on file at the Clerk's office? 

8 
MPRI argues that, because the CALURS proposal and the 

published notice of the September 14, 1994, public hearing 

regarding it were not on file at the Clerk's office before the 

Commissioners took action on them, the zoning regulations adopted 

thereunder are not valid. The Commissioners contend that 5 7-5 

2131, MCA, does not require that the specified documents be kept at 

the Clerk's office and, moreover, that they were readily available 

to the public at the FRDO. 

At the outset, we note MPRI's two-sentence "argument" on this 

issue, each sentence merely quoting statutory language without 

analysis or application to the facts of this case. We caution 

counsel that while such a presentation may constitute minimal 

compliance with the Rule 23(a) (4), M.R.App.P., requirement 

regarding citation to authorities in support of a party's legal 

contentions, it does not suffice to establish the correctness of 

those contentions. 

The general operations and conduct of local governments are 

governed by statute in Montana. Title 7, Chapter 5, Part 21, MCA, 

sets out the requirements for conducting county government 

business. Section 7-5-2129, MCA, requires that boards of county 

commissioners maintain a minute book, a road book, a franchise book 

and a warrant book. All records kept in these four county books 

must be available for public inspection, free of charge, at the 

Clerk's office. Section 7-5-2131, MCA. It is clear, under the 

facts of this case, that of these four books, MPRI's argument could 

relate only to the minute book, which is a record of all decisions 

9 
and orders made by the board of county commissioners at regular and 

special meetings. Section 7-5-2129(l), MCA. We must determine, 

then, whether the CALURS or the related notice are "decisions and 

orders" made by the Commissioners. 

The CALURS was drafted by CCIZG and its consultant and 

presented to the Planning Board, a board organized to advise the 

Commissioners on zoning and other land use planning matters, for 

review. CCIZG and the Planning Board work with the Commissioners 

in an advisory capacity only. They are not part of the board of 

county commissioners and their decisions are not "orders and 

decisions" made by the Commissioners as contemplated by § 7-5- 

2129(l), MCA. As a result, we conclude that § 7-s-2131, MCA, does 

not require that the CALURS proposal be kept at the Clerk's office 

and open for public inspection there. 

Nor does § 7-5-2129, MCA, require that the Commissioners 

maintain a copy of all published notices relating to their 

decisions or prospective decisions in the minute book. Such 

notices are not "orders and decisions" of the board of county 

commissioners pursuant to § 7-5-2129(l), MCA; they are indications 

to the public of such decisions and prospective decisions which are 

separately required by law. MPRI advances no argument that actual 

decisions or orders of the Commissioners relating to the CALURS 

were not properly reflected in the minute book required by § 7-S2129 (1) , MCA, and maintained in the Clerk's office pursuant to 5 7- 

5-2131, MCA. Thus, we conclude that MPRI has not established a 

failure to comply with § 7-s-2131, MCA. 

10 
MPRI also contends that 55 76-2-205(l) (d) and (5) (c), MCA, 

require that the CALURS proposal and the related notice be on file 

for public inspection at the Clerk's office. It did not raise this 

theory in the District Court, however, and it is well-settled that 

we will not address on appeal issues not presented to the trial 

court. & Tisher v. Norwest Capital Mgt. & Trust (1993), 260 

Mont. 143, 156, 859 P.2d 984, 992 (citing Duensing v. Travelers Co. 

(1993) I 257 Mont. 376, 386, 849 P.2d 203, 209). Therefore, we 

decline to address this contention. 

We hold that the District Court did not err in concluding that 

planning board documents which are readily available to the public 

need not be on file at the Clerk's office. 

b. Did the District Court err in concluding that 

freeholder protests were properly counted pursuant to 

5 76-2-205(6), MCA? 

MPRI contends that the District Court erred in upholding the 

Clerk's method of counting the GWR condominium owners as six 

hundred freeholders entitled to protest, but counting the GWR 

protest as only one protest. MPRI maintains that this procedure 

skewed the results so that less than the statutorily-mandated 

percentage of freeholders protested, resulting in the adoption of 

the CALURS for the Upper and Middle Districts of the Canyon Area. 

Rule 23(a) (41, M.R.App.P., requires that an appellate argument 

contain "the contentions of the appellant with respect to the 

issues presented, and the reasons therefor, with citations to the 

authorities, statutes and pages of the record relied on." MPRI 

cites to no statute, case, treatise, or other legal authority 

11 
whatsoever in support of its contentions on this issue. Therefore, 

we decline to address it. 

c. Did the District Court err in concluding that 5 2-6- 

109, MCA, prohibited the Clerk from providing MPRI with 

a list of freeholder names and addresses? 

MPRI contends that the Commissioners and their agent, the 

Clerk, arbitrarily refused to provide it with a list of freeholder 

names and addresses. The Commissioners maintain that 5 2-6-109, 

MCA, expressly prohibits the Clerk from providing a mailing list to 

anyone during the 5 76-2-205(5), MCA, protest period. 

Section 2-6-109(l), MCA, generally provides that: 

(a) an agency may not distribute or sell for use as 

a mailing list any list of persons without first securing 

the permission of those on the list; and 

(b) a list of persons prepared by the agency may 

not be used as a mailing list except by the agency or 

another agency without first securing the permission of 

those on the list. 

Section Z-6-109(2), MCA, defines "agency" and it is undisputed in 

this case that the provisions of § 2-6-109(l), MCA, apply to the 

Clerk as an officer of Flathead County. 

It also is undisputed that the list of freeholder names and 

addresses maintained by the Clerk is a "list" which, pursuant to 

§ 2-6-109 (11, MCA, cannot be distributed, sold or used as a mailing 

list without the permission of all freeholders on the list. MPRI 

contends, however, that the nature of its intended use of the list 

was not discussed when the list was requested. 

The record, however, reflects the following testimony by the 

GWR manager during the summary judgment proceedings: 

12 
Tl 

Q: Had YOU earlier asked her on the telephone 

conversation whether or not you could have a list of 

landowners for purposes of any protest? 

A: Yes, I did. I asked her specifically, I says, 1'11 

trade you. If you want my list, I'll trade you for the 

list that you have of the upper canyon. It interests me 

to notify these people that they can protest. 

ais testimony indicates that MPRI discussed its intended use of 

the list to "notify" freeholders regarding their protest rights at 

the time the list was requested. The GWR manager also testified 

that he requested the freeholder list so that he could send a 

"protest form out to every landowner, every freeholder on the list 

in the upper canyon area and [he] would not have used it for any 

other purpose but to notify them of County action against their 

property." This testimony establishes that the clear intent was to 

use the list as a mailing list to send out forms protesting 

adoption of the CALURS. On the basis of this record, we conclude 

that § Z-6-109(1) (a), MCA, prohibited the Clerk from providing the 

list of freeholders to MPRI without securing the statutorilyrequired permission and that MPRI intended to use the list as a 

mailing list in violation of § 2-6-109(l) (b), MCA. 

MPRI also contends that the Clerk's refusal to provide it with 

a list of freeholder names and addresses violated the protest 

provisions contained in 5 76-2-205(6), MCA. Section 76-2-205(6), 

MCA, provides that "if 40% of the freeholders within the district 

whose names appear on the last-completed assessment roll . 

have protested the establishment of the district or adoption of the 

regulations, the board of county commissioners may not adopt the 

resolution . .'I The statute merely sets out the percentage of 

13 
protests required to prevent the Commissioners from adopting a 

resolution establishing a district or zoning regulations. It does 

not relate in any way to a proponent or opponent's ability or 

inability to obtain a list of freeholders on the most recent 

assessment roll; nor does the Clerk's refusal to provide the list 

prevent or impair freeholders from filing written protests under 

§ 76-Z-205(5) (d), MCA. We conclude that the Clerk's refusal to 

provide MPRI with a list of freeholder names and addresses did not 

violate the protest provisions contained in § 76-2-205, MCA 

Finally, MPRI contends that, to the extent 5 2-6-109, MCA, 

prohibited the Clerk from providing the list of Canyon Area 

freeholders, the statute violated its constitutional rights. In 

particular, MPRI cites to the following sections of Article II of 

the Montana Constitution: 

§ 4, which provides that "[nlo person shall be denied the 

equal protection of the laws"; 

§ 6, granting Montana citizens the right to petition for 

redress or to peaceably protest governmental action; 

s 8, granting the public the right to expect governmental 

agencies to afford a reasonable opportunity for citizen 

participation in the operation of such agencies; and 

5 9, providing the public with the right to examine 

documents. 

MPRI presents no analysis of its contentions in this regard 

within the customary constitutional framework. It merely cites to 

the sections of the Montana Constitution without providing any 

rationale or authority under which the statute--or the Clerk's 

reliance on the statute--violated the referenced constitutional 

provisions. I' [Wlhen considering the constitutionality of a 

statute, the constitutionality is presumed and anyone attacking the 

14 
validity of a statute has a heavy burden of proving the 

invalidity." Associated Students v. City of Missoula (1993), 261 

Mont. 231, 235, 862 P.2.d 380, 382 (citations omitted). MPRI's 

bare citations to the Montana Constitution do not meet the heavy 

burden required to prove that § 2-6-109, MCA, is constitutionally 

infirm. 

We hold that the District Court did not err in concluding that 

5 2-6-109, MCA, prohibited the Clerk from providing MPRI with a 

list of freeholder names and addresses. 

d. Did the District Court err in concluding that the 

Commissioners were entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law on MPRI's claim that the Hungry Horse News and the 

Bigfork Eagle are not newspapers of general circulation? 

MPRI argues that certain notices regarding proposed amendments 

to Flathead County zoning regulations are invalid because they were 

published in the Bigfork Eagle and the Hungry Horse News, and that 

those newspapers are not "newspapers of general circulation" as a 

matter of law. The Commissioners contend to the contrary. There 

is no factual dispute regarding the business operations of these 

two newspapers. 

Section 76-2-205, MCA, requires that notices regarding public 

hearings on proposed zoning regulations and passage of resolutions 

of intention to adopt such zoning regulations must be published 

once a week for two weeks in a newspaper of general circulation 

within the county. While the legislature did not define the term 

"newspaper of general circulation," this Court has addressed the 

statutory term on several occasions. 

15 
In state v. Board of County Com'rs (1938), 106 Mont. 251, 76 

P.2d 648, we set out the criteria for determining whether a 

newspaper is one of general circulation. 

"First, that a newspaper of general circulation is not 

determined by the number of its subscribers, but by the 

diversity of its subscribers. Second, that, even though 

a newspaper is of particular interest to a particular 

class of persons, yet, if it contains news of a general 

character and interest to the community, although the 

news may be limited in amount, it qualifies as a 

newspaper of 'general circulation.'" [Citations omitted.1 

Board of Countv Com'rs, 76 P.2d at 652 (quoting Burak v. Ditson 

(Iowa 1930), 229 N.W. 227, 228). The following year, we held that 

the Bridger Times qualified as a newspaper of general circulation 

under the Board of County Com'rs criteria because it had been in 

existence and published for twenty-five years; it had four pages of 

general news and advertising printed in its own plant; and it was 

distributed throughout the county. Shelley v. Normile (1939), 109 

Mont. 117, 124, 94 P.2d 206, 210. 

It is undisputed in this case that the Bigfork Eagle is 

published once each week at its plant in Bigfork and has been 

published since 1976. It contains news and advertising of a 

general character and interest to the communities in the area. 

Copies of the Bigfork Eagle are delivered to subscribers in 

Kalispell, Whitefish, Somers, Lakeside, Kila, Hungry Horse, 

Columbia Falls and Bigfork. Copies are also available at retail 

outlets in Kalispell, Whitefish, Columbia Falls and Bigfork. 

It also is undisputed that the Hungry Horse News is published 

once each week at its plant in Columbia Falls and has been 

16 
published in Flathead County since 1946. It contains news and 

advertising of a general character and interest to the communities 

in the area. Copies of the Hungry Horse News are delivered to 

subscribers in Kalispell, Bigfork, Columbia Falls, Coram, Essex, 

Hungry Horse, Kila, Lake McDonald, Lakeside, Marion, Martin City, 

Olney, Polebridge, Somers, West Glacier and Whitefish. Copies are 

also available at retail outlets in Kalispell, Bigfork, Columbia 

Falls, Coram, Hungry Horse, Lake McDonald, Polebridge, West Glacier 

and Whitefish. 

The Bigfork Eagle and the Hungry Horse News have subscribers 

in numerous communities throughout Flathead County and are 

available at many Flathead County retail outlets. They carry news 

of general character and interest to the communities in Flathead 

County. Thus, they meet the "diversity of subscribers" and 

"general interest news" criteria set forth In Board of Countv 

Com'rs, 76 P.2d at 652. Moreover, like the Bridger Times in 

Shellev, both the Bigfork Eagle and the Hungry Horse News are 

printed in their own plants, have been published in--and 

distributed throughout--the county for twenty years or more, and 

contain general news and advertising. See Shellev, 94 P.2d at 210. 

In support of its contention that the Bigfork Eagle and the 

Hungry Horse News are not newspapers of general circulation, MPRI 

advances definitions of "newspapers of general circulation" and 

principles relating thereto from other jurisdictions. It does not 

establish that the underlying statutes in those jurisdictions are 

17 
identical, or even similar, to § 76-2-205, MCA. Nor does it offer 

any explanation or rationale regarding how or why the holdings in 

those cases are more appropriate or correct conclusions pursuant to 

§ 76-Z-205, MCA, than our holdings in Board of County Com'rs and 

Shelley. Indeed, MPRI does not address this Court's cases on the 

issue, except to assert that they are "woefully out of date." We 

hold that the District Court did not err in concluding that the 

Commissioners were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on 

MPRI's claim that the Hungry Horse News and the Bigfork Eagle are 

not newspapers of general circulation. 

e. Did the District Court err in concluding that the 

zoning regulations were validly adopted under Title 76, 

Chapter 2, Part 2, MCA? 

MPRI and the Commissioners agree that zoning properly can be 

accomplished under either Part 1 or Part 2 of Title 76, Chapter 2, 

MCA. MPRI contends that Flathead County zoning regulations enacted 

after 1987 are invalid under either approach. According to MPRI, 

post-1987 zoning regulations are invalid under Part 1 because sixty 

percent of the freeholders affected did not consent to the 

prerequisite creation of a planning and zoning district or the 

appointment of a five-member zoning commission pursuant to § 76-Z101, MCA. Alternatively, MPRI contends that the FCMP is not a 

comprehensive plan as defined in Part 2 and, therefore, zoning 

regulations could not have been properly adopted thereunder. The 

Commissioners maintain that all zoning regulations adopted by 

Flathead County since 1987 have been validly enacted under Part 2, 

and that the FCMP is "comprehensive" as defined in § 76-l-601, MCA. 

18 
We address first whether the post-1987 zoning regulations were 

validly adopted under Title 76, Chapter 2, Part 2, MCA. 

A board of county commissioners may adopt zoning regulations 

for all or parts of its jurisdictional area in accordance with 

Title 76, Chapter 2, Part 2, MCA, "[flor the purpose of promoting 

the health, safety, morals, and general welfare of the people in 

cities and towns and counties whose governing bodies have adopted 

a comprehensive development plan for jurisdictional areas pursuant 

to chapter 1 . . .'I Section 76-2-201, MCA. Part 6 of Chapter 1 

discusses master plans and § 76-l-601, MCA, specifically sets out 

five categories of information that may be included in a master 

plan: (1) surveys and studies of the area; (2) maps, plats, 

charts, and descriptive material about the area; (3) reports and 

recommendations regarding plans for development of the area; 

(4) long-range development programs for public works projects in 

the area; and (5) recommendations for the development of trailer 

courts and mobile home sites. Category 2--maps, plats, charts, and 

descriptive material--is then broken down into seventeen 

subcategories that may be addressed in a master plan, including 

land use, streets and highways, public and private utilities, 

transportation, parks and recreation, education, and conservation. 

The FCMP is a lengthy document addressing the people, economy, 

agriculture, land use, transportation, public facilities and 

services, parks, recreation and open space, unit community plans, 

and implementation of the FCMP for the affected areas of Flathead 

County. It includes and discusses most of the subjects which, 

19 
under § 76-l-601, MCA, may be included in a comprehensive 

development plan. We conclude that the FCMP is a comprehensive 

development plan, as defined in § 76-l-601, MCA, and that zoning 

regulations may be validly adopted thereunder pursuant to Part 2. 

The Commissioners presented evidence that all of its own and 

the Planning Board's post-1987 zoning actions have been initiated 

under Part 2. Seven zoning petitions were entered into evidence at 

the first summary judgment oral argument, all of which specifically 

requested zoning under Part 2. Resolutions entered into evidence 

by the Commissioners specifically state that they were adopted 

pursuant to § 76-Z-205, MCA; Part 2. We conclude, therefore, that 

the Commissioners' post-1987 zoning regulations were validly 

enacted under Part 2. As a result, we need not address MPRI's 

alternative contention that the zoning regulations were not 

properly adopted under Title 76, Chapter 2, Part 1, MCA. 

We have concluded that MPRI has established no error in the 

District Court's conclusions of law. Therefore, we hold that the 

District Court did not err in granting the Commissioners' motions 

for summary judgment. 

Affirmed. 

20 
We Concur: