No. 2-09-1136 Filed: 11-1-10

IN THE AP PE LLATE COU RT OF ILLIN OIS SECOND DI STRICT

MICHA EL A. RAJTEROWSKI , ROBERT ) Appeal from the Circuit Court SK ELTO N, LY NN S KELT ON, MICH ELLE ) of De Ka lb Co un ty. ELI ASON, JEFFREY ELI

ASON, PAUL ) BRIAN HUDON, a

nd ANDREA LEE ) HUDON, ) ) Plaintiff s-Appell ants, ) ) v. ) No. 08--CH--271 ) THE CITY OF SYCAMORE and ) SYCAMORE COMMUNITY UNI T SCHOOL ) DISTRI CT No. 427, ) Honorab le ) Kurt P. Klein, Defend ants-App ellees. ) Judge , Pres idin g.

JUSTICE JORGENSEN d

elivere d the opini on of the c ourt: Inan amended five-count complaint, plai ntif fs, Michael A. Rajterowski, Robert and Ly nn Skelton, Michelle and Jeffrey Eliason, and Paul B rian and Andrea Lee Hudon, sue d defend

ants, the City of Sy camore (City ) and Sy camore Community

Unit School District No. 427 (School District), arguing that the City's rea

l estate transfer tax, from which buy ers of homestead real estate who had resided inthe City for

at least one ye ar were exempt, violated the federal and state c onstitutions and that, in e ntering into an intergovernmental agreement under which the City forwarded transfer tax

revenues to the School District, the City and the School District exceeded their c onstitutional and statutory authority. Defend

ants move d to dismissplaintiff s' compl aint, ass erting

that it fa iled to sta teNo. 2--09--1136

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a cause of ac tion. 735 ILCS 5/2--615 (West 2008). The trial court granted defendants' motion as to all cou nts and dis missed pla

intiffs' complain t with pre judice. Pl aintiffs

appeal. We affir

m. I. BACKGROUND OnMarch 21, 2006, a referendum was pa ssed, authorizing the City, a home ru le municipa

li ty, to impose a municipal transfer tax on real property transferred

within its boundaries (Transfer Tax). OnApril 17, 2006, the City adopted Ordinanc e No. 2005.93 (Ordina nce ), which established the Transfer Tax. The Ordinance became effe ctive on June 1, 2006, and imposed on the transfe r of title to real estate located in the City a tax at a rate of $5 for each $1,000 of value or fraction thereof. The Ordinance was intended by the City to create a

new source of funds that it would give to the Schoo l District , a public s chool dist rict, to supplement the School District's operating revenue. The mechani sm by

which the

City provides the funds to the School District is an intergovernmental agreement

(Intergove

rnmental Agreement) executed pur s uant to the Illinois Inter governmental CooperationAct

(5 IL CS 220/1 et seq. (West 2008)). The agreement provided that c ertain start-up and ongoing operating expenses the City incurred that were related to the Tra nsf er Tax would be withheld from the revenues genera ted by the tax. There would also be a cooperatively established method to accou nt for the monies re ceived f

rom the Tr

ansfer Tax and dist

r ibuted to the School District. The Ordinance contains an exemption, which is at issue in this appeal, for buy ers of homestead real estate within the City who have been residents of the City for at least one y

ear: "1. The following deeds shall be exempt from the tax levied by this Article: * * *No. 2--09--1136

1 Rajterowski paid $1,915; the Skeltons paid $2,395; the Eliasons paid $2,425; and the Hudons paid $2,020. -3-

(n) A deed or trust document where the gr antee or buyer

is purchasing homestead real estate within the [C]ity and has mai ntained r esi dent status (whether as a tenant or as an owner-occupier

of real property) w

ithin the corporate limits of the City *** for a period of at least one year immediate ly prior to the date of application for exemption from the transfer tax to be imposed." Sycamore Municipa l Code §3--20--6 (2006). Rajterowski formerly lived one -quarter mile outside the City

's limits a nd purch ased a home inthe City in July 2006. Rober t and Ly nn Skelton formerly lived in Edwar dsville and purchased a home in the City in October 2006. Michelle a nd J effrey

Eliason formerly r

esided in Texas and purchased

a home in the City in June 2006. Paul and Andrea Hudon for merly resided in F lorida and purchased

a home in the

City in Augus t 2006. Be cause plaintiff s had not be en resid

ents of th e City for one yea r immediately prior to purc hasing homestead property in the City, they

did not qualify for the T rans fer T ax exemptio n. Pla intif fs pa id the Tran sfer Tax. 1 OnJuly 10, 2008, plaintiffs sued the City and the School District. In a five-count complain t, plaintiffs alleged that

the Transfer Tax violates the United States and I llinois Constitutions and that, in entering into the Intergovernmental Agreement, the City and the Schoo l District

exceede d their

au th or it y. S pecif

ically, plaintiffs alleg ed that: (1) the Ordinance violates the privilege s and immunities clause of article I V, section 2, of the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., art. IV, §2) (count I); (2) the Ordinanc e violat es the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution (U.S. Const, amend. XIV) (c ount II); (3) the Ordinance viola tes the un iformity clause o f the I llinois Constitution (Ill . Const. 197 0, art. IX, §2) (count I II); (4) in enacting the Ordinance and ente ring int oNo. 2--09--1136

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the Intergov ernmen tal Agr eeme nt, the City exceeded its authority under the Illinois Constitution (count IV) ; and (5)in enter

ing intothe Intergove

rnmental Agreement, the School District exceeded its authority under the I

llinois Constitution (count V). OnSept ember 2, 2008, defenda nts moved to d ismiss plaintiffs' complaint (735 IL CS 5/2--615 (West 2008)), allegi

ng that i t failed t o state a ny c ause of action. On November 25, 2008, the court held a hear ing on the motion. On January 13, 2009, the court g ranted the motion, finding that plaintiff s' complaint failed to state a cause of action as to all counts. The cour t granted plaintiffs leave to file an a mended c omplaint. OnFebruary

10, 2009, plaintiffs filed

an amended 26-page, 5-c ountcomplaint. Thereafter,

on March 12, 2009, defendants moved to strike and dismiss the amended complaint. On April 17, 2009, defen dants moved for sanctions (155 Ill. 2d R. 137), arg uing that plaintiffs' amend e d complaint contained

no substantive changes from the initial complaint and, therefore , was an improper attempt to

relitigate claims already

decided by the

trial court. A hearing on the motion to dismiss was held on

August 20 , 2009. On

October 15, 2009, t

he trial c ourt gr

anted de fendant s' motion and dismissed plaint iffs' compl aint with prejudice. Also, the court denied defendants' motion for sanctions, find

ing that sanction s were " not appro priate in this matte

r." Plai ntiffs ap peal. II . STANDARD OF REVIEW A motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2--615 of the Code of Civil Proced ure (735 I LCS 5/2--615 (West 2008)) challenges only the complaint's legal sufficiency

. Napleton v. Village of Hinsdale , 229 I ll. 2d 296, 3 05 (2008) ; DeWoskin v. Loew's Chicag o Cinema, Inc. , 306 Ill. App. 3d 504, 513 (1999) (legal sufficiency of complaint alleging constitutional violations may be raised by section2--615 motion). The motion does not raise affirmative factual defenses. DeWoskin , 306 I ll.No. 2--09--1136

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App. 3d at 5 14. Inruling on a section 2--615 motion to dismiss, a court should inquire whether the allegations of the complaint, when accepted as true and considered in the light most favorable to the pla intiff, are sufficient to state a cause of ac tion upon which relief may be granted. Turner v . Memorial Medical Center , 233 I ll. 2d 494, 4 99 (2009) . "Evide ntiary materia l outside of

the complaint may not be considered ." DeWoskin , 306 Ill. App. 3d a t 514. Since Illinois is a fact-pleading

jurisdict ion, "a p laintiff

must alleg e facts

sufficie nt to bring hi s or her c laim within the scope of the cause of

action asser ted." Turner , 233 Ill. 2d at 499. A plaintiff need not prove his or her caseat the ple ading st

age; however, he or she

must alleg e specif

ic facts supporting each element of the cause of action, and "the court will not admit conclusions of law and conclusory allegations

n ot supported by

specific facts ." Visvardi s v. Eric P. Ferleg er, P.C. , 375 Ill. App. 3d 719, 724 (2007). A complaint sho uld not be dismissed under section 2--615 unless no set of facts can be proved that would entitle the plaintiff to recover. Napleton , 229 Ill. 2d at 305. We review de novo the trial court 's dismissal of a complaint under section 2--615

. Kelley v. Carbone , 361 I ll. App. 3d 477, 480 (2005). III. AN ALYS IS Home rule munic ipalities , such as t he City , have the

right to levy taxes. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, §6(a). They

may exercise their ta

xation powers, unless restrict ed by the constitution or appropr iate legislation. Mulligan v. Dunne , 61 Ill . 2d 544, 55 0 (1975). A transf er tax in an

d of itself does not "offend any consti tutional provisio ns." Stahl v. Village of Hoffman Estates , 296 Ill. App. 3d 550, 554 (1998); see also 65 ILCS 5/8--3--19 (West 2006) (authorizing home rule municipalities to impose, up on prior a

pproval by r

efere ndum, real estate transfer taxes). I ndeed, the centralissueNo. 2--09--1136

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in this case

is whether plaintiffs' complaint stated a cause of a ction that the exemption viola te s certain constituti onal or st

atutory provision s. A. Count I--Privileges and I mmunities Clause of Article IV of the Fe deral Constitution The privileg es and immu nities cla use provi des that: " The Citizen s of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States." U.S. Const., art. IV, §2, cl. 1. It " was desig

ned 'to place th e citizens

o f each S tate upon the same footing with citizens of other States, so far as t he adv antages resul ting fr om cit izen ship in th ose St ates ar e conce rned. ' " United Building & Construct ion Trades Council v. Mayor & Council of the City of Camden , 465 U.S. 208, 215-16, 79 L. Ed. 2d 249, 257, 104 S . Ct. 1020, 1026 ( 1984) , quot ing Paul v. Vir ginia , 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180, 19 L. Ed. 357, 360 (1868); see also Broeckl v. Chicago Park District , 131 Ill. 2d 79, 88 (1989) ("clause prohibits one State from discriminating a gainst citizens of another State" and "do es not app ly w here a c ity or municipa

l ordinance discr

iminates a

gainst intrasta

te residen ts" (emphas is added). Although the clause is written in terms of state citizenshi p guar antees, it also applies to residency

or ci ti ze ns hi p r es tr ic ti on s e st ab li sh ed by municipalities

. United Building & Construct

ion Trade s Council , 465 U.S. at 215, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 256, 104 S. Ct. at 1026. Further, merely because an ordinance disadvantag es some in-state res id ents does not immunize the ordinance fromconstitutional review. United Building & Construction Trades C ouncil , 465 U.S. at 215, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 256, 104 S. Ct. at 1026. Incount I of their amended complaint, t he Eliasons and the Hudons (the plaintiffs who moved to the City from out of state) soug ht declaratory , injunctive, and other relief. They alleg ed that they were

wr ongly deni ed the privileges and immunities guarantee d under the federal constitution because, as to application of theexemption, there was no rational basis or substantialNo. 2--09--1136

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reason for the differential treatment between City residents and nonresidents. The Eliasons and the Hudons noted that, in passing the Ordinance, the City sought to increase funding for the School District. They alleg ed that lack of adequate school funding, to the extent it exists, is not caused by resident citizens of foreign states moving into the City and purc hasing r eal esta te; thus, there is no substantial reason or rationalbasis for the discrimination between resident citizens of a foreig n state and resident citizens of the Ci ty. They furthe r alleged that buy

ers who are residents of foreig n states

can never qu alify or be eli gib le for

the Transfer Tax exemption. For the following reasons, we

con clu de t hat th e tr ial cou rt d id not err in di sm is si ng c oun t I. To assess whether

plaintiff s pleade d a cause

of action based upon a violation of the privileges and immunities clause, we briefly review the requirements for showing suc h a violation. When a law establishes a citizenship or residency classifi cation, a

court ap plies a tw o-part te st

in assessing whether the law violates the privileges and immunities clause. First, the court determines whe ther the benefit or activity c onstitutes one of the "p rivileges and immunities" protected by the clause. United Build ing & Construct

ion Trade s Council , 465 U.S. at 218, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 258, 104 S. Ct. at 1027. Second, t

h e court de termines

if there is a substa

ntial stat e intere st in the dif

ferenc e in treatment of nonresidents. United

Building & Constru

ction Tra des Counc il , 465 U.S. at 2 22, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 261, 104 S. Ct. at 1029. As to the first part of

th e test, the

Supreme C ourt has n

oted that states mus t treat r

esidents and nonresid ents "without unnecessary distinctions" when the nonresident seeks to "enga ge in an essential activity

or exerc ise a bas ic right." Baldwin v. Fish & G ame Co mm'n , 436 U.S. 371, 387, 56 L. Ed. 2d 354, 367, 98 S. Ct. 1852, 1862 (1978). However, if the nonre sident engages in conduct that is not "fu

ndame ntal" bec ause it do es not "b ea[r] upon the vitali ty o f the Nat

ion as a si

ngleNo. 2--09--1136

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entity," the privileges and immunities clause affords no protection. Baldwin , 436 U.S. at 3 83, 56 L. Ed. 2d at 365, 98 S. Ct. at 1860. The determination: "whether a righ t is suf

ficiently fundame

ntal to be protected by the [privileges and immunities] clause should not be confuse d with a de

terminat ion of whe

ther an a ctiv i ty constitutes a fundamental right so as to require strict judicial scrutiny under the due proc ess and equal pr otection clauses when the activity is regulated by

the government. For example, the regulation of conditions of employ ment is notconsidered a

limitation of a fundamental right for due process and equal protection analysis, but the ability

to engage in private sector activity or employ

ment is a fundament al right pr otected by the pr ivileges and immunities clause." (Emphases added.) 2 R. Rotunda & J. Nowak, Constitutional Law §12.7(d)(ii), at 335-36 (4th ed. 2007). Along with priva

te-sec tor employ

ment, ac cess to th e courts and the di sposition o f private ly held propert y have been held to be fundame ntal rig hts for pr ivilege s and immun

ities cla use anal ysi s (see Baldwin , 436 U.S. a

t 383, 56 L . Ed. 2d at

365, 98 S. Ct. at 1860), as has th e right to procure medical service s ( Doe v . Bolton , 410 U.S. 179, 200, 35 L. Ed. 2d 201, 217, 93 S. Ct. 739, 751 (1973)). However, recreational ac tivities, such as recreational hunting or fishing, are not considered privileges or immunities. Baldwin , 436 U.S. at 388, 56 L. Ed. 2d at 368, 98 S. Ct. at 1863; Toomer

v. Witsell , 334 U.S. 385, 403, 92 L. Ed. 1460, 1475, 68 S. Ct. 1156, 1165 (1948 ). Likew ise, s uffrage and qualification for elective office may be tied to anindividua

l's iden tification with a spe cific sta te and are, therefore, not protected by the privileges and immunities clause. See Baldwin , 436 U.S. at 383, 56 L. Ed. 2d at 365, 98 S. Ct. at 1860.No. 2--09--1136

2 A second aspect o f the rig

ht to trave l is a newl

y arrived citizen's right to the same privileg es and immunities enjoyed by

other citizens of the same state. This right is identified in the privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment. Saenz , 526 U.S . at 502 -03 , 14 3 L. Ed. 2d at 703-04, 119 S. Ct. at 1526. A third aspect of the right to travel, which has no specific textual source inthe constitution, protects the right of a citizen of one state to enter and leave another state. Saenz , 526 U.S. at 500-01 , 143 L . Ed. 2d at 702, 119 S. C t. at 1525. The rig ht to trave l is not explic itly mentioned

in the federal constitution, and Saenz is the only Supreme Courtcase to enunciate three aspects of the right to travel. Further, the rig ht to travel has, in variou s cases, been held to be grounde d upo n the privileges and immunities clause of article I V, the privileges and immunities clause of the fo urteent h amendme

nt, or the co mmerce c lause, or it has bee n gene rally considered as

a basic right under the federal c onstitution. Shapiro v. Thompson , 394 U.S. 618, 630 n.8, 22 L. Ed. 2d 600, 612 n. 8, 89 S. Ct. 1322, 132 9 n.8 (1969) (citing cases), overruled on other grounds by Edelman v. Jordan , 415 U.S. 651, 39 L. Ed. 2d 662, 94 S. Ct. 1347 (1974). -9- Onappeal, plaintiffs argue that their complaint sufficiently plea ded that the rights to travel and purchas e proper

ty a re funda mental ri ghts pro tected b y th e privile ges and immuniti es claus e. Pr el im in ar il y, we note that there is some support for the p roposition th at the rights to travel and purchas e property a

re considered privileges and immunities. See Saenz v. Roe , 526 U.S. 489, 500- 01, 143 L. Ed. 2d 689, 702, 119 S. Ct. 1518, 1525 (1999) (discussing the three aspects of the right to travel and noting that the privileges and immunities clause of article I V protects citizens of one state who travel to another state, intend ing to return home at the end of their journey ); 2 Ward v. Maryland , 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418, 430, 20 L. Ed. 449, 452 (1871) (the clause " plainl y an d unmistaka

bly secures and protects theright of a citizen o f one Stat

e to pass i nto any other Sta te ofNo. 2--09--1136

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the Union for the purpose of engaging in lawful commerce, trade, or business, without molestation; to ac quire persona

l proper ty; to take a

nd hold re al estate ; to maintain actions in the courts of the State; and to be exempt from any hig her taxes or excises than are imposed by the State uponits own citizens" (emphasis added)); see also Borden v. Selden , 259 Iowa 808, 819, 146 N.W.2d 306, 314 (1966) (statute denying

nonresident Iowa landowne rs a land tax credit that was granted to resident

owners held unconstitutional as violating the privileges and immunities clause) ; Opinio n of the Judges , 81 S.D. 629, 632, 140 N.W.2d 34, 35 (1966) (advisor y op inion holding that property ta x relief act that g ranted t o South Dak

ota resid ents a real estate tax refund not

allowed t o nonresi dents was unconstitutional as violating privileges and immunities clause). Assuming that the foregoing rightsare fun damen tal fo r purp oses o f the p rivil ege s and im munities clause, we conclude that plaintiffs' complaint has failed to sufficiently plead a violation of the clause. Incount I, plaintiffs allege d that, along with l aws pas sed by states, the privileg es and immunities clause applies to a n ordinan ce th at di sc ri mi na te s o n t he ba si s o f m un ic ip al re si de nc y. Nowhere in count I of

t he complaint did plaintiffs specifically mention the rights to travel and purchas e property. Neverthe less, we infer these rights from the alleg ations referencing "discrimination

[in application of the Transfer Tax exemption] between resid ent ci tize ns of a forei gn st at e a nd re si de nt ci ti ze ns of " t he Ci ty. Having determined that p laintiffs, via their references to the diffe rential treatment of resident s and nonr esidents , adequately

pleaded that the rights to travel and purchase property a

re privileges and immunities, we conc lude that their co mplaint fa

iled to ple ad suffi cient fa

cts as tothe second

part of our inquiry. This analy

sis, i.e. , whether there is a substantial state inte rest in the differe nce in treatment of nonre sidents, c onsists of t wo aspects: ( 1) th ere must be a substantial reason for theNo. 2--09--1136

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discrimination beyond the fa ct that they are

citizens of other

states; that is, there must be something to indicate that noncitizens constitute a "peculiar source of evil" at which the statute o r ordina nce is directed; and (2) the court must find a substantia l or rea sonable r

elationsh ip between

the evil and the discrimination practiced against noncitizens. Hicklin v. Orbeck , 43 7 U. S. 518 , 52 5-2 7, 5 7 L. Ed. 2d 397, 404- 05, 98 S. Ct. 2 482, 2487- 88 (1978) ; Peopleex rel. Bernardi v. Leary Construction Co. , 102 Ill. 2d 295, 299 (1984). Plaintiffs argue that the "evil" a t which the Ordinance i s d irected is inadequate school fundi ng. Inde ed, in the ir

amended complaint, plaintiffs alleged that the Ordinanc e was inten ded "to create a new source of funds that [the City] will give to the School District to supplement the School Dist rict's operating revenues," a nd plaintiffs attached thereto a copy of the Intergovernmental Agree ment. The ques tion, pla

intiffs a sse rt, is whe th er n onr esi den ts are th e so urc e of th e ev il . In their complaint, they alleg ed

that there "is no substantial reason, nor rational basis for discriminating between citizens of

a forei gn state

and cit izens of [the City

], when es tablishing

a transf er tax to increa se school funding." The complaint continued, "Lack of adequa te school funding, if indeed there is a la ck of fu ndin g, is n ot cau sed by resi dent c itiz ens of a forei gnstate moving into [the Ci ty] and purchasing real estate, thus, there is no ' substantial reason' nor 'rational basis' for the discrimination between resident citizens of a foreign state a nd resident citizens of" the City. The foregoing

a llegat ions are clearly conclusory . To surviv e a sect ion 2--61 5 motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must alleg e specif

ic facts supporting each element of the cause of action, and we will "not adm

it conclu sions of la

w and con

clusory allega ti o ns not supported by specific f acts." Visvardi s , 37 5 I ll. App. 3d at 724. The foregoing alleg ations mirror the "elements" of the second aspect of our analy sis, i.e. , substant ial reas on and sub stantial r elationsh ip, but do not constitut

eNo. 2--09--1136

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specific factual allegations. Nowhere in count I of their amended complaint did plaintiffs provide any factua l alleg ations sup

porting th eir conc lusion that residents of a foreign state, such as the Eliasons and the Hudons, who move to the City and purc h ase real estate d

o not caus e inadeq

uate school funding . In their appe llate bri ef, plai ntiffs sta te that the

City "is discrimina ting ag ainst nonresid ents who may

only be a smal l part of t

he cause /so urce o f increased costs in the School District." (Emphasis added.) They continue , the "f

acts could show that the majority of the incr eased School District costs result from an increase of the school population coming mainly fr

om children bornto established residents, from costs of salary increases to existing

teache rs, or from increased administration or energy

costs that are unrelated to an overwhelming mass (if t here isone) of new studentscoming f

rom pare nts who mov ed" to th e City from outside it. (Emphasis added.) We agree with plaintiffs that the f

acts could show

any of the foregoin

g sourc es of the

underfu nding, b ut this does not absolv e them of

their obligat ion to plead spe cific fa

cts to stat e a clai m for rel ief. Be cause count I of the amended c omplaint contained, as to the elements of a privileges and immunities c lause claim, mer ely c onc lu sor y all ega ti ons uns upp ort ed b y spe cif ic f act s, w e co ncl ude th at, as t o co unt I, the trial court did not err in granti ng def endants' motion to dis miss. B. Count II --Equal Protection Clause of the Federal Constitution Incount II of their a mende d comp laint , plai ntiff s alle ge d that the Or dinance violates the equal protection

clause o f the fou

rteenth amendme

nt, which pr

ovides tha t the state s may

not " 'd eny to any p erson within [their] jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,' " but does allow r easonabl e classifications among such persons. Western & Southern L ife Insuran ce Co. v. State Board of Equalization of California , 451 U.S. 648, 656-57, 68 L. Ed. 2d 514, 523, 101 S. Ct. 207 0, 2077 (1981), quoting U.S. Const., amend. XIV, §1. They asser ted that the Ordinance, by

treating plaintiffsNo. 2--09--1136

3 Plaintiffs also alleged (gener ally and not as to any

specific plaintiff in this case) that par ts of the City do not lie within the School District; rather, they lie in a neighboring district. Plaintiffs alleged that purchasers moving into portions of the City that are not within the School Dis trict must pay the tax eve

n though their ch ildren wi ll attend s chool in a nother sc hool distri ct. -13- dispara tely fromCity residents purchasing homestead property , denies them equal protection of the laws. In this count, unlike in count I , plaintiffs specifically a lleged that the right to

own prope

rty is a fundamental right and that the exemption ( i.e. , the d iscri minat ion), based upon a buyer's residence prior to p

urchasi ng rea l estate i n the City, has neit

her a ra tional ba sis nor is na

rrowly tailored to the reason the City adopted the Transfer Tax ( i.e. , to address school underfunding). Plaintiffs noted tha

t the City

's and the School District's boundaries are not coterminous. The Ordinance, they

allege d, violate s the equa l protec tion clau se by making unc onstitutional distinctions among severa

l classif ications o f buy

ers: (1)residen

t and nonr

esident b uye rs of re al esta

te; ( 2) homestead

and nonhomestead

residen t buyers of r

eal esta te; (3) pe rsons li ving within the School District butou ts id e t he Ci ty w ho bu y ho me st ea d p ro pe rt y wi th in th e C it y; and (4) p ersons liv ing in (or moving to ) the City

who buy homestead or

nonhomestead real estate within the City but outside t he S chool District. Plaintiffs asserted that there is no real and substantial differe nce among the classes of purchasers. As to Ratjerowski, plaintiffs alleged that he was wrongly denied equa l protection because, prior to purchasing real estate in the City , he already lived in the School District. In plaintiffs' view, after Ratjerow ski moved i

nto the City

, he did no t cause

any additiona l burden t o the Schoo l District

. 3No. 2--09--1136

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As to the Skel

tons, Elia sons, and

Hudons (who livedoutside the City and the School District), plaintiff

s alleg ed that th ere is no

rationa l basis for the dispa rate tre atment of

residen ts and nonresid ents. These plaintiffs paid the Transfer Tax that a City r esident of more than one yea r does not have t o pay and, ther efore, were de

nied the e qual prot

ection of the laws. Ad di ti on al ly, plaintiffs alleged that the exemption is unco nsti tutional as it applies to resident , n onhomestead

purchasers, including corporations, partne rships, or individuals purchas in g commercial pro per ty. In plaintiffs' view, a resident corporation or individual purchasing a building for office space places no additional financia l bur d en on the School District and is, therefore, no different from a re sident hom estead b uye r when one conside

rs the City

's on ly r eason for the Ordinance. The first step in as sessing

an equa l protec tion claim

is to determine if the enactment at issue disadvantages a suspect class or infringes upon a fundame ntal right. Fundamental rights include the expression of ideas , partic ipation in t he politic al proce ss, a nd intimate persona l privacy in

terests. Peopleex rel. Tucker v. Kotsos , 68 Ill. 2d 88, 97 (1977). Where the en actment creates a suspect classification

or infringes upon a fundamental right, then, under what is called strict-scrutiny review, the enactment must promote a compelling or overriding sta t e inter est. Illinois Housing Development Authority v. Van Met er , 82 I ll. 2d 116, 1 19-20 (19 80). Fur ther, the enactme nt must be narrowly tailored thereto, i.e. , the leg islature mu st use the least restrictive means consistent with the attainment of its goal. Schultz v. Lakewood Electric Corp. , 362 Ill. App. 3d 716, 720 (2005). Inter m ediate scrutiny applies to an ordinance that is based on a gender or illegitimacy classification or that causes certain incidental burdens to speech. In re Detention of Samuelson , 189 Ill. 2d 548, 561-62 (2000); Desnick v. Department of Professional Regulation , 171 Ill. 2d 510, 521 (1 996). I n all otherNo. 2--09--1136

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circumst ances, courts wi l l rev ie w a n o rd in an ce un de r h ig hl y de fe re nt ia l r at io na l- ba si s s cr ut in y. Samuelson , 189 Ill. 2d at 562. Under the rational-ba sis test, t he enactment must bear a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest. Van Meter , 82 Ill. 2d at 120. Onappeal, plaintiffs argue tha t t he y stated an equal protection claim. They assert that the rights to travel and

own prope

rty are fun damenta l rights requirin g stric t-scruti

ny a naly sis. I n their

c o mplaint, plaintiffs alleged that the equal protection clause pr events a municipality from discriminating on the basis of residency , without a proper basis for that discrimination. They also specific ally

alleged that the right to own

property is a f

undamental right. Alternatively , they arg ue th at, if the foregoing are not fundamental rights, the Ordinance does not survive ra tiona l-basi s review. Turning first to property, we reject plaintiffs' assertion that the right to private housing, in and of it self, i s a fundamental right. See, e.g. , Van Meter , 82 Ill. 2d at 121 (the Supreme Court "has clearly ruled tha t a right to private

housing is not a fu

ndamenta l right" and, thus, applies rationalbasis review "to government actions that might burden a person's ability to find adequate housing"), citi ng Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas , 416 U.S. 1, 7-9, 39 L. Ed. 2d 797, 803 -04, 94 S. Ct

. 1536, 1540-41 (1974) (

upholding

a villag e zoning ordinanc e that limit e d, w ith certain exceptions, the occupancy

of one-f amily dwelling s to tradit

ional fa milies or to groups of not more than two unrelated persons after

determining that no fundamental right guarantee d by the fede ral constitution

was involved a

nd, thus, applying r

ational-basis scrutiny), a

nd Lindsey

v. Normet , 405 U.S. 56, 74, 31 L. Ed. 2d 36, 51 , 92 S. Ct. 862, 874 (1972) ("We are unable to perceive in [the fede ral constitution] any constitutional gua rantee of access to dwellings of a part icul ar quality, or a

ny recognition

of the rig ht of a te nant to oc cupy

the rea l proper ty o f his landlord beyond the ter m of hisNo. 2--09--1136

-16-

lease without the payment of re nt or otherwise contrary

to the terms of the relevant agree ment"); see also 4 R. Rotunda & J. Nowak, Constitutional Law §18.44, at 411 (4th ed. 2008) ("the Court has not subjected gover nmental a

ctions whi ch might

burden p ersons'

abilities to find ad

equate private housing to any standard of review above the rationality test of the due process

and equal protection guara ntees. Of course, if

these laws involve the use of suspect classifications or burden funda mental rights they w

ill be subjected to the strict scrutiny standa rd of review"). As to the right to travel, count II of plainti ffs' c omplaint di d not explic itly mention the

right. Rather, they alle ged tha t basi ng appl icabi lity of t he ex empti on on a buyer's re si de nc y prior to purchasingreal estate in the City wa s unconstitutional becau se it impermissibly distinguished between, inter alia , nonresident (including out-of-state) and resident buye rs. We conclude that the assertion that the discrimination against out-of-state re si dents implicates the right to travel can be

reasona bly inferre d from the

complain t's alle gations

. Having determined

that plain tiffs ade quately

pleaded that the O rdinanc e affe cts the rig ht to travel, we next address the proper level of scrutiny . Plaintiffs urge that, as tothe right to travel, strict scrutiny applies, and defendants respond that rati onal-ba sis revie

w is appro

priate. Case law is not directly on point. For example, laws that establish durational residency requirements for certain gove rnmental benefit s are subject to strict-scrutiny review. See, e.g. , Shapiro v. Thompson , 394 U.S. 618, 634, 22 L. Ed. 2d 600, 615, 89 S. Ct. 1322, 1331 (1969) (applying strict-scrutiny review a nd holding

invalid

as a restriction on the fundamental right to travel a one-y ear residency

requirement for subsistence welfare benefits), overruled on other grounds by Edelman v. Jordan , 415 U.S. 651, 39 L. Ed. 2d 662, 94 S. Ct. 1347 (1974); see also M emorial H ospital v. Maricop a County, 41 5 U. S. 250 , 25 9, 3 9 L.No. 2--09--1136

-17-

Ed. 2d 306, 315, 94 S. Ct. 1076, 1082-83 (1974) (Court, applying strict-scrutiny revie w, struck down Arizonastatute that required one-yea r residency

in a county as a c ondition of receiving nonemergency

hospitalization ormedical care at county 's expense; "medic al care

is as much

'a bas ic necessi ty of lif e' t o an indig ent as we lfare a ssistance . And, g overnme ntal privi leges or benef

its necessary to basicsustenance have often been viewed a s being of greater c onstitutional significance thanless essentia

l forms of gover nmental e ntitlemen ts"); Dunn v. B lumstein , 405 U.S. 330, 338, 31 L. Ed. 2d 274, 281-82, 92 S. Ct. 995, 1001 (1972) (applying strict-scrutiny

analysis to invalidate, as violative of

rights to travel and vote, Tennessee durational r esidency law

that required a

voter to be

a resident of the state for one y

ear and of the county for

three months before the voter could vote). In At to rn ey G eneral

v. So to-Lopez , 476 U.S. 8 98, 911, 90 L. Ed . 2d 899, 91 1, 106 S. Ct. 2317, 2325 (1986), the Court, in a plur ality opinion, invalidated a New Y ork statute and constitutional provision t hat provided a preference in civil servic e employment to vetera ns who lived inthe state when they

entered military se

rvice, but denied a similar preference to resident veterans who lived outside the state when they entered military se

rvice. Justice Brennan

delivered the opinion of the Court and noted

that strict-scrutiny re

view should apply. Soto-Lopez , 476 U.S. at 906, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 907, 106 S. Ct. at 2322. Inother factual scenarios, the Supreme Court has dec lined to define the appropriate standard, altho ugh it ha s nevert

heless str uck down t

he enactments as u

nconstitu tional und

er rational-bas is review. In Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor , 47 2 U. S. 612 , 86 L. Ed. 2d 487, 105 S. Ct. 2862 (1985), for example, the Supreme Court considered whether a Ne w Mexico statute that gra nt ed a $2,000 propert

y ta x exemption to V

ietnam ve terans w ho reside d in

the state before May 8, 1976, but notto those who

resided in the stat

e on or af ter that d ate, viol ated the

equal pr otection clause of theNo. 2--09--1136

-18-

fourtee nth amendment. The Court did no t addres s t he prope r standa rd of re view to be

applied i n right-to-travelcases, n

oting tha t if the sta tutory scheme d

oes not pa ss even the rationality te st, the Court 's inquiry ends. Hooper , 472 U.S. at 618, 86 L. Ed. 2d at 493, 105 S. Ct. at 2866. The Court held that the discrimination the statute made between veterans who established residency before the statutory date and those who arrived thereafter bore n o rati onal r elati onshi p to o ne of t he sta te's objectives--encouraging

veterans to move to New Mexico--b ecause

the state set the e ligibility

date long after the triggering

event, the date, had occurred. Hooper , 472 U.S. at 619, 86 L. Ed. 2d at 494, 105 S. Ct. at

2866-67. Next, the Court addressed the statute's second purpose--to rewa rd veterans who served before May

8, 1976. The Court noted that resident veterans may be offered prefere

ntial treatment vis-a-vis nonveterans without offending the equal protection clause, but the statute at issue

was problematic because it conf erred a benefit only

on established

resident veterans--those who resided in the state before the statutory date. Hooper , 472 U.S. at 620-21, 86 L. Ed. 2d at 494-95, 105 S. Ct. at 2867-68. "The State may not favor established residents over new residents base d on the view that

the State may take ca re of ' its own,' if such is d

efined by pr

ior resid ence. N ewcome

rs, by establish

ing bona fide re sidence

in the St ate, become the State's 'own' and may not be discriminated

agains t solely

on the bas is of their arrival in the State after May 8, 1976." Hooper , 472 U.S. at 623, 86 L. Ed. 2d at 496, 105 S. Ct. at 2868. Accordingly , the Court held that the equal protection

clause did not permit the State to establish a preference f or established resident veterans

over newcomers in the retroactive apportionment of an economic benefit. Hooper , 472 U.S. at 623, 86 L. Ed. 2d at 4 97, 105 S. Ct. at 2869; se e also Zobel v. Williams , 457 U.S. 55, 60-64, 72 L. Ed. 2d 6 72, 677-80, 102 S. Ct. 2309, 2313-15 (1982) (refusing to adopt a standard of re view an d inval idati ng, as not with standing even ra tional-ba sis scruti

ny, Alaska' s statutor

y sc heme to distributeNo. 2--09--1136

-19-

to its adult c itizens inc ome derived from its petrole

um reven ues in var yin g amoun ts based u pon their length of resid ency in the stat

e; rig ht to travel implicated because statute distinguished between residents based upon when they arrived in the state). Inanother right-to-travel case, the Court did not discuss the level of scr utiny , alth ough,

ar gu ab ly, in upholding a law, it applied rational-basis review. See Sosna v. Iowa , 419 U.S. 393, 406- 09, 42 L . Ed. 2d 532, 544-46, 95 S. Ct. 553, 561-62 (1975) (upholding one-y ear reside nc y requirement

for maint aining d ivorce a ction on th e basis th at the sta te had a strong, traditional intere st insetting the terms of

and procedures for marriag e and divorce; right to migrate not violated as appel lant's access

to desire d state pr

ocedure was only tempora rily delay ed and be cause st

at e may reasonably

desire to insulate divorce decrees from c ollateral attack). We conclude that rational-basis review is appropriate in this case . The So to -Lo pez Court held that the rig ht to civil service employ

ment, although not a necessity of life or the right to vote, "is unquestionably

substantial. The award of bonus points can mean the difference between winning

or losing civil service employ ment, with its attendant job security, dece nt pay, and g ood benefits." Soto-Lopez , 476 U.S. at 908, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 909, 106 S. Ct. at 2324. Also, the Court noted that the appellees had been permane ntly deprive d of the ve

terans' credits they

sought. Soto-Lopez , 476 U.S. at 909, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 909, 106 S. Ct. at 2324. "Such a permanent

deprivation of a significant benefit , based only on the fa ct of nonresidence at

a past p oint i

n time , cle arly

oper atesto penaliz e appellees for exercis ing their right s to migrate. " Soto-Lopez , 476 U.S. at 909, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 909, 106 S. Ct. at 2324. We conclude that private housing (or a pr op er ty tax exemption) does not constitute a significant

benefit or privile ge like

civil ser vice emp loy

ment ( Soto-Lopez ), subsiste nce welfa

reNo. 2--09--1136

-20-

benefit s ( Shapiro ), noneme rgenc y ho spit ali zation or medical care ( Memorial Hospital ), or voting rights( Dunn ). See al so , e.g. , Syl vester v. Commissioner of Revenue , 445 Mass. 304, 311, 837 N.E.2d 662, 667-68 (2 0 05) (rational-basis review appropriate in asse ssing whether five-y ear residency require ment for p artial r

eal esta te tax exempt

ion for di sabled ve

terans violated r

ight to travel protected by e qual protection clause; "residency requirement in the vetera ns' exemption does notprevent

new arrivals from purchasing prope rty in Massachusetts or

from esta blishing a domicile here. It recog

nizes that the plaintiff, as a taxpayer, has no right to a particular rate of taxation, and it is underpinned *** by the we ll-settled law" prot ec ting sta tes from u

ndue fed eral inte rfere nce in the tax field) ; cf. Ball v. Village of Streamwood , 281 Ill. Ap p. 3d 679, 683-85 (1996) (apply ing rationa l-basisreview to determin e whether a real estate transf er tax imposed on sellers but exempting those who purchased residences within the village violated

the right to intrasta

te travel protected by the equal protect ion clause; court concluded that no vital government benefit or pr ivilege was involved). Thus, we now a ssess whether pla intiffs sta ted a cla im that the

Ordinance, unde

r rationa l-basis review, infringes on the rights to housing and travel in violation of equal protection. Plaintiffs arg ue that they stated a claim that the Ordinance bears no rational relationship to a leg itimate governmental interest because there is n o rationa l basis for cre ating a class of persons, such as Ratjerowski, who live in the School District and pay taxes to fund the schools bu

t live outsi de the corporate limits of the City , and tre ating th em diffe rently from peo ple who live in both the Sc ho ol Di st ri ct an d t he Ci ty. Also, they

contend t hat ther e is no rational basis for

charg ing new

residen ts a trans fer tax when these

same persons w

ill be pay ing prop erty

taxes, just l ike other

City residen ts, to support

t he School District. Fi na ll y, t he y urge that it was not appropriate to dismiss this case under section 2--615,No. 2--09--1136

-21-

because there is case law

invalidating state laws under rational-basis review. See Hooper , 472 U.S. at 623, 86 L. Ed. 2d at 497, 105 S. Ct. at 2869; Zobel , 457 U.S. at 60-64, 72 L. Ed. 2d at 677-80, 102 S. Ct. at 2313-15. Defend ants respond t

hat the Or

dinance , on its fa

ce, demonstrates , as does t h e Intergove rnmental Agree

ment, tha t its purpose i s to incre ase scho ol funding to help of fset the c osts associated

with new students moving into the City. Exempted from the tax are established residen ts who will not add new burdens to the schools when they purc hase new homes in the City . Residen ts under this classification, according to defendants, do not cre ate an additional burden to the distri ct;

co nv er se ly, nonresident homestead purchasers do add to the econ omic burd

en by potentia lly increasing

the number of children entitled to attend the public schools. Requiring this class to pay the Transfe

r Tax rationally

and legitimately

advances the City' s purpose for passing the Ordinance. Defend ants urge that plainti ffs' a llegat ions suppor

t the rati onal purp ose and le gitimate goal for the Transfer Tax--supplemental sch ool funding. Defendants also assert that it is bey ond dispute that providing adequate public s chools is a legitimate governmental g oal. Finally, they argue that the Ordinance does not violate equal protectio n merely bec ause the City and the School District boundar ie s are not c ote rminous. D efenda nts conte nd that the

fit need not be per

fect; it need only avoid being arbitrary . For example, the fact that Rajterowskiwas not exempt from the Transfer Tax does notinvalida

te the Or dinance because it does not negate the Ordinance' s legitimate purpose or

ma ke it di sc ri mi na to ry. We conclude that plaintiffs failed to state a claim that the Ordinance is not rationally related to a legit imate g overnme

ntal inter est. "The rational basis te st is parti cularly deferential in the context of classification made by

tax laws, and if a set of facts can be reasona bly conceive d

that wouldNo. 2--09--1136

-22-

sustain the classification, the tax m ust be uphel d." Ball , 281 I ll. App. 3d at 683. Pla

intiffs' allegations that the Transfer Tax's purpose--to addre ss school und erfundi ng--ta rgets only certain class es of resi dents do not show that the law is arbitrary . The allegations, rather, refle ct that the Ordinance makes a reasonable distinction between those adding newburdens t

o the schools (who

are subject to the Transfer Tax) and those who do not add to the underfunding (who are exempt from paying the tax). That the "fit" is not perfect, due to the l ack of coterminous boundaries, does not

cause the law to

failfor being arbitrary

, under rational-basis review. City of New Orleans v. Dukes , 427 U.S. 297, 303, 49 L. Ed. 2d 511, 517, 96 S. Ct. 2513, 2517 (1976) ("States are a ccorded wide latitude in the regula

tion of the ir local e conomies under the ir

police powers, and rational distinctions may be made with substantial ly less than mathem atical exactitude. Legislature s may implement

their program step by

step"). Hooper and Zobel , wherein the Court struck down the enactments at issue as not withstanding even rat ional-b asis review, do not compel a different conclusion. Although Hooper involved a pro pert y t ax exempt ion, the r

esidency r

equirem ent in tha

t case wa s a fixed-d

ate require ment: the New Mexico statute provided a property tax exemption for Vietnam veterans who had established residency

in the state before May

8, 1976. Ho oper , 472 U.S. at 618, 86 L. Ed. 2d at 493, 105 S. Ct. at 2862. The Co urt no ted, q uoti ng Zobel , that "the Constitution will not tole rate

a state benefit

progra m that 'c reates fixed, per

manent di stinctions ...betwe en...cla sses of c oncede dly bona fide residents, based on how long they have been in the S tate.' " Hooper , 472 U.S. at 623, 86 L. Ed. 2d at 496 , 105 S . Ct. at 286 9, quo ting Zobel , 45 7 U. S. at 5 9, 7 2 L. Ed. 2d at 677, 102 S. Ct. at 2312. H ere, the

exemption is

not a fixed-date e

nactmen t.No. 2--09--1136

-23-

Insum, we conclude tha t the tria l court did

not err in

dismissing

count I I of p laintiff

s' amended complain t. C. Count III --Uniformity Clause of the Illinois Constitution The uniformity clause of the Illinois Constitution provides that, "[i]n any law classify ing the subjects or objects of non-property taxes or fees, the classes shall be reasonable and the subjects and objectswithin ea

ch class s hal l be taxed uniformly. Exemptions, deductions, credits, refunds and other allowances shall be reasonable." Ill. Const. 1970, art. IX , §2. Incount III of their amended c omplaint, plaintiffs al leged that the Ordinance' s exemption violates the uniformity clause. The y noted that the

object of the Ordinance is to tax purchasers who

move into the City who bring newstudents in

to the Scho ol District from outs ide the Cit y, b ecause they are the cause of the inade quate school fundi ng. Plain tiffs al leged that the Ordinance cre ated several classes of taxpayer s: resident buyers

who purchase nonhomestead property ; resident buyers purchasinghomestead

property; and nonr

esident buyers pur

chasing homestead property . As to the first class, plaintiffs alleged that there is no real a nd substantial di fference bet ween resident homestead

purchas ers and resident nonhomest e ad purchasers and that the classification does not bea r

some reasona

ble rela tionship to t

he object of the Or

dinance , especi ally

when "the only

reason" the City adopted t

he Ordinance wa s to addre ss the Scho ol Dist rict's add itional financial burden that stems from new students moving into the distri ct. I n plain tiffs' view, the resident nonhomestead purchasers are not a

dding to t

he School

District' s burden, ye

t they are not e

ntitled to t

he same exemption a s reside

nt homeste ad purchasers. As to the sec ond and th

ird class ifications, plaint

iffs alle ged tha t distinguishing between resident and nonresident homestead buy ers does not bear

some reasonable relationship to the objectNo. 2--09--1136

-24-

of the Ordi nance whe n the reason for the Ordinance is to address the School District' s additional financial burden that stems from new stude nts moving

into the district. Th ey

allege d that the

re is

no exemption for nonresident buyers w ho do not have children or whose children do not attend public school in the School District(such as Rajterowksi); the Ordinance does not exempt buy ers who move to the City but already lived in the School District (but outside the City) and thus were already paying property taxes and fe es and are not bringing new stude nts into the School District; and the Ordinance does not tax buyers who move into the School District but outside the City and who are bringing new childre n into the School District. Finally, they alleged that

the Ordinance does notexempt nonresident

or resident nonhomestead buy ers moving into areas of the City that are not within the

School Dis trict. Plaintiffs further

asserte d that, if t

he School

D istrict is underf

unded, th e cause s could

be declining propert

y ta x revenue , increa ses in

the number of children of City residents who qualify f

or the exemptions, increases in s alary, c hang es in the a mount of sta

te and fe deral a

id, incre ases in insurance costs, and other expenses. The complaint cited to a study, the "2007 Syca

more Housing Impact Analysis" pre

par ed by S trategic Manageme nt Alliance in June 2007 (Study), which is not contained inthe record on appeal. Plaintiffs alleged tha t the Study did not

quantify the number of

newstudents coming into the School District who were previously non-City residents. They alleged that the City "has not and

can not actually

demonstrate and determine the number of children moving into Sycamore

from outside of Sycamore ." Plaintiffs noted that the Study stated that 22.3% of new home buyers wer

e from the

City ; that 49% of new detached homes built since June 2004 had no children living in

them at the

point of initial oc cupancy ; and that 91% of townhouses and condominiums built during that time had no children living in them at initial occupancy

. Further,No. 2--09--1136

-25-

plaintiffs quoted from the Study with respec t to sales of

existing homes to non-City buy ers: " 'The average of 2.60 people per existing housing unit re-occupied in 2006 is slightly lowe r than th e Special Census findings from 2005 which showe d 2.68 peopl e live d in S ycamore's owner-occupied homes o n avera ge. Thi s diff erence d oes no t prov e that there a re les s chil dren, but i t does sugge s t there are less peopl e overall.' " Plaintiffs also quoted the fo llow ing fro m the S tudy: " 'Th e find ings sugge st that, of those who re sponded to the mail survey who were

transfe r taxpay ers [ i.e. , nonresid ent purchasers], 18% said that they were

notsending their children to Sy camore schools.'

" Plaintiffs alleged

that th e foregoing statements do not support the asser tion that a large number of new students are coming into the City from outside and causing an eco nomic burden on the School District. Thus, the differenc e among th e classifications, in their view, is not real and substantial and the exemption s as drawn a re unre asonable

because there is n o reasonable re lationship between those taxed and those exempted. Fi na ll y, they assert that there

is no rea sonable r

elationsh ip to the object of the le gislation when the tax applies

to purcha sers who

end up re siding in

those portions of the City that do not lie within the School District. For t he f ollowing reasons, we

con clu de t hat th e tr ial cou rt d id not err in di sm is si ng c oun t III. "To surv ive sc

rutin y u nder the u nifor mity clau se, a nonpr oper ty tax or fee classifi cation mu st: (1) be based on

a real and substantial difference between the people taxed and those not taxed; and (2) bear some reasona

ble relation ship to the object of the legislation or to public policy." (Emphases added.) Valstad v. Cipriano , 357 I ll. App. 3d 905, 914 ( 2005). " A plaintif f is notrequire d to come forward with any and all conc eivable explanations for the tax and the

n prove e ach one

unreasonable ***." Geja's Café v. Metropolitan Pier & Exposition Authority

, 153 I ll. 2d 239, 248 (1992). Rather, upon a good-faith uniformity challenge, the taxing body bears the "burden of prod ucing aNo. 2--09--1136

-26-

justification for

the classificat ion." Valstad , 357 Ill. App. 3d at 914; see also Geja's Café , 153 I ll. 2d at 248. Next, "pl aintiff b ears the burden of persuading the court that the justification is not supported by facts or is insuf

ficient as a m atter of law." Valstad , 357 I ll. App. 3d at 914. Where the plaintiff fails to me et his or h er burde n, judgme nt is proper as a matter of law. Geja's Café , 153 I ll. 2d at 249; see also Valstad , 357 Ill. App. 3d at 914. This court's inquiry unde

r a uniformity clause

challenge is relatively

narrow: "[T]he court

is not required

to have proof of perfect rationality as to each and every

taxpayer. The uniformity clause wa s not designed as a straitjacket for the General Assembly . Rather, the uniformit

y c lause wa s designed to enf orce min imum standa

rds of re aso nablenes s and fairness as b etween groups of taxpayers." Geja's Café , 153 Ill. 2d at 252. The uniformity clause " was not made to duplicate the limitation on the taxin g power containe d in the equal protect ion clause. " Searle Pharmaceuticals, I nc. v. Department of Revenue , 117 Ill. 2d 454, 467 (1987). Rather, the clause "imposes more stringent limitations than the equal prote ction clause on the authority of a le gislative body to classify the subj ects and obj ects of tax ation." DeWoskin , 306 Ill. App. 3d at 518. Nevertheless, a court's analy sis is of limited scope because legislative enactme nts carry the presumption of validity and bec ause broad latitude is granted to legislative classifications for taxing purposes. Allegro Services, L td. v. Metro politan P ier & Exposition Authority , 172 Ill. 2d 243, 250 (1996). As to the first p art of our inquiry, i.e. , whether the exemption is based upon a real and substantial difference between the people taxed and the people not taxed, this element is essenti ally conceded in defen dants' f avor on a ppeal. I n their a mended c omplaint, p la intiffs alle ged, in a conclusory

fashion, that ther

e is no real an

d substant

i al differen ce between resident homesteadNo. 2--09--1136

-27-

purchasers and resi dent nonhomestea d purcha sers. They also alleg ed, again in a conclusory fashion, that there is no real and substantial difference betwe en r esident andnonresident homestead purchas ers. On appeal, plaintiffs concede that there is a fac tual distinction between resident and nonresident buyers of homestead real estate. As to the sec ond part o f our inqu iry , whethe

r the tax cl assific ation bea rs some rea sonable relation ship to the object of the enactment or to public policy , plaintiff s argue that the need for funding for the School District is not reasonably related to the classification of resident buyers of homestead

real es tate versus nonresident buyers of ho mestead

real es tate. The

y no te t hat nonresid ents moving into the City who hav e no children do not add any economic strain to the School Dist rict. Accord ing to plaint iffs, City residen ts who are

also Schoo l District

residen ts do

cause financi al strain

on the School Distric

t. Nonre sidents mov

ing into t he City and the School District "may" cause financial strain, "but not any more of a strain than the residents who are already burdeningthe School District." Plaintiffs assert that the stated purpose of the Ordinance , to fund the School District, cann o t be met when it taxes those who may perha ps cause financial strain on the School District in the future, while failing to tax the one group k nown to already c ause financial strain on the School District. Further, plaintiffs argue that the City cannot determine the number of children moving into the City from outside the City

. As they did in their

complain t, plaintif fs note that the City's Study

did notquantify the new stude nts entering the School District from outside the Ci ty. Plaintiffs argue that the Study shows that nonresidents are not causing a school funding crisis. Thus, the differential classification between reside nts and nonresidents is not reasonably

related to the school funding issue. Plaintiffs contend that, once a nonresident becomes a resident, he or she begins paying

property taxes to fund his or her use of the schools. An additional tax based upon theNo. 2--09--1136

-28-

nonre siden t's failure

to pay past prop erty

taxes for a

benefit he or she was not r

eceiving prior to purc hasing property within the City is not reasonable. Plaintiffs argue that this is espe cially tru e given that the only

group c ertain

to use those bene fits i s the one g

roupexemp t fro m pay

ing t he ta x. Additio na ll y, plaintiffs take issue with the fact that the Ordinance does not exem pt purchaser s of nonhomestead

real property , including residents who purchase nonhomestead real property. The

y note that t

he exemption d

oes not ap

ply to any buyers of c ommercia

l proper ty, even thou

gh these buyers do not put a

ny more str

ain on the School District than resident buye rs of homestead real estate, the only gr

oup excluded from paying the Transfer Tax. Finally , plai ntiffs argue that a uniformit y clause analysis nece ssarily require s analysis of the fa cts and circumstances surrounding the Ordinance's enactment and purpo se and a d etermination of the least restrictive means of achievi ng the le gislativ e goal a

nd, thus, preclude s dismissal on the ple adings. Defend ants respond that the face of plaintiffs' ame nded complaint provides a reason for the Ordinance that is

clearly r elated to the classification of resident purchas ers of ho mestead propert y

as exemp t fro m pay

ing t he Tr ansf er Ta x. They point to plaintiffs' a llegation that "[t]he object of the legislation

is to tax buyers who move into Sy camore who bring new students into theSchool District fromoutside of

Syc amore be cause th

e Defe ndant' s [ sic ] assert that is what is causing what Defend ant[s] be lieve to b e inadequate school funding." De fendants further note that plaintiffs alleged that the " only

reason" the City

adopted t he Ordinance " is to address the additional financial burde n to th e School District that stems from new students moving into the School District." Defend ants argue that a reasonable ba sis for the classifi cat ion exempting resident homestead purchaser s, w ho "by de finition" will not be bringing new students into the School District, was actually pleaded in the ame

nded comp laint.No. 2--09--1136

-29-

As to nonhomestead

property, de fendants argue that such purcha sers include those who will

use the prope

rty as renta l proper ty, which co

uld reas onably

be expect

ed to add f

amilies th at would add to the School District's financial burden. Nonhomestead proper ty also includes commerc ial property, whic

h, defendants assert, adds to a community's g

rowth, which necessarily

increases the burden upon the School Di strict. Thus, def endants r eason, w hen nonho mestead

propert y is purchased, the Transfer Tax imposed up on the pu rchase at the ve ry least be ars some

reasona ble relation to the purchase. Next, as to the Study, def endants arguethat: (1) plaintiffs' allegation that the City cann ot demonstra te the number of children moving into the City from outside it has no factual basis in the complaint; (2) quantification of the children entering the City

is not essentia

l to the inquiry because

it is clear that homestead purchasers who a lready live in the City

will not be burdeningthe Schoo l District with additional students by virtue of their purc hase of new homesteads within the City, while nonresident homestead purchasers "have

the clear potential to do so"; and (3) the burden

is not on defendants to prove any particular set

of fact s; so long

as there is a set of fa cts that can reasona

bly be conceived that would sustain the classifica tion, as there is here, the classification must be upheld. We address

first pla intiffs' argument that a uniformity clause c hallenge necessarily

involves

a factua l analy sis and, th erefor

e, prec ludes dismissal on the pleadings. We disagree. I t has been noted that, in the context of

a uniformity clause c

hallenge, a section 2--615 motion "is generally *** inappropriate" because such claims involve a burden-shifting arrang ement and summary judg

ment "is more suited to the t ask." DeWos kin , 306 Ill. App. 3d at 523. However, " [w]hen the

reasona blenessof a tax class ifica tion is det ermin able as a matt er of l aw, a un iform ity chall enge may be decided in the context of a section 2--615 mot ion." DeWoskin , 306 Ill. App. 3d at 523 (movieNo. 2--09--1136

-30-

theater patron challenged county amusem ent tax; cour t held tha t as a matt

er of la w, there was a

reasona ble basis for exe mpti ng from county amuseme nt tax patrons of organizations benefitting community

and not pa

trons of c ommercia

l o rganizat ions; exclusion of raffles and intertrack wagering facilities from the definition of amuseme nt was re asonable

because participatory a

ctivities and the operation of amusement devices are funda mentally di ffer ent from passive entertainment, and their exclusion was notarbitrary or unreasonable as a matter of law; howeve r, whether the sizeof

anentertainment facility

or the frequency

with which an entity off

ered amusement activities justified

anexemption pr esented

factua l question s, as did th e assess ment of a n exemption

for amus ements sponsored by military

and veterans organizations). As to the Ord

inance' s differ

ential tr eatment o f reside

nts and non

residen ts, we conclude as a matter of law that t he exemption from the

Transfe r Tax for r esidents (but not f or nonre sidents) bears

a reasonable relationship to the school underfunding issue. I t is certainly rea sonable to impose upon

newresid ents t he one -tim e burd en, vi a the T ransfe r Tax , of co ntrib utin g t o the maintenance of a School District. New residents are a reasonable class to target f or the imposition of such a burden,

as they gener

ally will add to the school population and costs. Plaintiffs' attempt to characterize the Ordinance as imposing a tax burden on new residents for past school underfunding issues (for which they necessa rily are not r esponsibl e) is una

vailing because it is not cle ar on this

record that th is i s the Ordinance's purpose. We cannot discer n from this record that the Ordin ance's purpose (sole or otherwise) is to addr

ess an existing underfunding issue. It is equally plausible/reasonable to read the Ordinance as a forward-looking enactment that

seeks to have new

users of the schoo ls ( i.e. , primari ly

newCity residents) bear

the cost at the commencement of th ei r C it y re si de nc y fo r t he im pa ct th ey,

a s a group, will have o n the S chool Dist rict's finan ces. W e will not s econd -guess the Ci ty'sNo. 2--09--1136

-31-

determination

that property taxes alone a re inadequate t o add

ress the added financial burden that new students/r esidents impose on t

he schoo ls. Plaintiff s' re li an ce on th e S tu dy i s misplace d, as the excerpts recited in the amended complaint do not prov

ide a suf ficient f actual b asis for plain

tiffs' allegation that new residents are not causingschool underfunding. I ndeed, the excerpts themselves undercut plaintiffs' allegations: (1) the "difference [ i.e. , the slight decrease from 2005 to 2006 in the avera ge num ber of peopl e in existing homes purchase d by non- City buy ers] does not prove that there areless children , but it does sugge st that ther e are le ss people

overall " (emphasis added); (2) "22.3% of new home buyers we

re from Sycamore ," which implies that the overwhelmingmajority (almost 80 %) were

nonresid ents; (3) "49% of new detached homes built since June of 2004 had no children at all living in them at the pointof initial occupancy," which implies that 51%, or a majority, did have ch ildren liv ing in them; and (4) "of those who responded

to the mail

survey who were

transfe r taxpay ers [ i.e. , nonresident purchase rs], 18% said that they wer e not sending their children to Sy camore schools," which implies th at th e o ve rw he lm in g m aj or it y were doing so. As to the Ordinance's treatment of homestead and nonho mestead

purchas ers, we conclude

as a matter of law that the exemption from the Transfer Tax for homestead purchasers (but not for nonhomestead

purchasers) bears a reasona ble relationship to the issue of school funding. The uniformit y clause does not require that the class taxed be the so le or prima ry bene fici ary

of the tax. Arang old Corp. v. Zehnder , 329 Ill. App. 3d 781, 798 (2002). "Rather, c ourts have held that uniformit y is satisfied even when

those taxed benefit only indirectly [citation], or when others not taxedbenefit as well." Arang old , 329 Ill. App. 3d at 798. As de fendant s note, commercia l proper ty encompasses rental property , and ren ters cou ld reasonably

be expect ed to add t o the S chool Dist rict'sNo. 2--09--1136

4 The question was certified under Supreme Court Rule 308 (134 I ll. 2d R. 308). -32- studentpopulation. Further, nonresi dential c ommercia l proper ty c an reas onably

be expect ed to add to a community's g

rowth through additional employ ment opportunities. These opportunities certain ly attract to the City families whose c hildren would generally

be expected

to attend the public schools. For similar re asons, pla

intiffs' allegations that certain other classificationsshould have been exempted from the tax fail. They complain that ther e is no exemption for nonresident purchasers who have no children or whose children do no t attend public schools. Plaintiffs also protest that there is no exemption for purchasers who formerly lived in the School Districtand moved to the City and for purchasers who move to areas of the City that are not w ithin the Sc

hool Distr

ict. Plaint iffs' allegations fail to sufficiently state a uniformity clause cl ai m because, as we noted above with respec t to nonhomestead purchasers, there exists an interrelationship w herein those classifications of taxpayers indirectly

benefit as a result of the Transfer Ta x. Ball v. Village of Streamwood , 281 Ill. App. 3d 679 (1996), is instructive. In Ball , taxpayers challenged

the const

itutionali ty o f an exemp tion to a vil lage' s real e st ate tran sf er tax that was imposed, unlike in this case, upon sellers of real property . The exemption rel ieved sellers who purchased

new res idences within

the village from pay

ment of the transfer tax . In asses sing a certified question 4 asking whether the exemption violate d the taxpayers' rights to uniformity, the court first concluded that there was a difference between those ta xed (those relocating outside the village) and those not taxed (those remaining in the village). Ball , 281 Ill. App. 3d at 685. Next, the court addressed whether t

he cl assification bore a reasonable relationship to the object of the enactme nt. Referring to its earlier holding (in asse ssing, under rational-basis review, whe ther theNo. 2--09--1136

5 The Ball court relied on Nordlinger v. Hahn , 50 5 U. S. 1, 1 20 L. Ed. 2d 1, 112 S. Ct. 2326 (1992), wherein the Supreme Court addres sed an equal protection challeng e (without a right-to-travel componen

t) to a California law

requiring property

reassessment upon a change in owner ship. The law exempted from reassessment property transfers by

persons over a ge 55 and transfers betwee n parents and their children. The Ball court not ed that th e Court upheld

the exemptions, concluding that a " '[s]tate has a legitimate interest in local neig hborhood preservation, continuity , and stability.' " Ball , 281 Ill . App. 3d at 6 84, qu otin g Nordlinger , 505 U.S. at 12, 120 L. Ed. 2d at 13, 112 S. Ct. at 2333. -33- exemption vi ol at ed th e t ax pa ye r s' rights to intrasta te travel) that the village articulated " a rational b asis for structu ring its tax in this m anner" ( Ball , 281 I ll. App. 3d at 685), s

pecific all y, t

hat th e exemption encouraged community continuity and values, t

he court concluded that the tax and the exemption did notviolate the uniformity clause of the Illinois Constitution. Ball , 281 Ill. App. 3d at 685; 5 see also Stahl v. Village of Hoffman Estates , 296 Ill. App. 3d 550, 558-59 (1998) (finding B al l controlling and affirming section 2--615 dismissal of ac tion challenging constitutionality of transfer tax exemption for sellers who lived on the property for one ye ar

if they purcha sed another residence in the village within a certain period; the taxpay ers who challenged

the exemption moved out of the village after transferr ing their property

). Argua bly , school underfunding presents a more pressing issue than the preservation of community

continuity or values, as wa s the issue in Ball

. In any event, the community-value s-and continuity rationa le prese nt in Bal l is also a consideration here due to, as we noted above , the interrelationshi p betwe en vari ous co mmun ity groups and th e qual ity/fun ding o f the co mmun ity's public schools.No. 2--09--1136

-34-

Ins um, w e conclu

de that th e trial c ourt did no t err in di smissing c ount I II of plainti ffs' amended complain t. D. Count I

V--the C ity' s Constitutional Autho rity Incount I

V, plainti ffs alle ged tha t, in enact ing the Ordinance and entering into the Intergove rnmental Agree

ment, the City , a home r

ule unit, e xceeded i ts constitutional ( i .e. , home rule) authority in two respects: it (1) circ umven ted the School Code (105 IL CS 5/1--1 et seq. (West 2008)); and

(2) exceeded its jurisdiction. For the following reasons, we conclude that the trial cour t did not err in dismissing count IV. Pr el im in ar il y, we note tha t the Illinois Constitution provides that "[h]ome rule units may exercise and perf orm concurr

ently with the Sta

te any power or funct ion of a home rule u

nit to the extent th at th e G en er al As se mb ly b y la w d oe s n ot sp ec if ic al ly l imit the c oncurrent exercise or specific ally

declar e the Stat e's exer cise to be exclusive ." (Emphases add ed.) Ill. Const. 19 70, art. VII , §6(I). Home rule units' powers are liberally construed. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI I, §6(m). As previous ly

noted, a t ransfe r tax in and of itself does not "offend any constitutional provisio ns." Stahl , 296 Ill. App. 3d at 554; see also 65 I LCS 5/8--3--19 (West 200 6) (auth orizing home rule municipalities to impose, upon prior approval by re ferendum, real estate transfer taxes). The cons titution pe

rmits inter

gover nmental c ooperat

ion. I t provide s: "Units of local government and school districts may contract or other wise asso ciate among themselves *** to obtain or share services and to exercise, combine, or tr ansfer any power or function, in any manner not pr ohibited by law or by

ordinance . *** Participating units of government may

use their credit, revenues, and other re sources to pay costs and toNo. 2--09--1136

6 The term "public agency " includes units of local government and

school dis tricts. 5 I

LCS 220/2 (West 2008). -35- service debt related to intergovernmental activities." (Emphasi s added. ) Ill . Const. 197 0, art. VII , §10(a). Si mi la rl y, the I

ntergovernmen

tal Cooper

ation Act address es in

tergov ernmental cooperation: "Any power or powers, privileges, functions, or authority exercised or w

hich may be exercised by a public ag ency 6 of this State may be exercised, combined , transferred, and enjoyed jointly with any other pub lic age

ncy of this Stat

e and join tly w ith any public agency of any other state

or of the United States to the extent that laws of such other state or of the United States do n

ot prohibi t joint exer

cise or enjoyment and except where specifically

and expressly prohibited by

law ." (Emphasis added.) 5 ILCS 220/3 (West 2008). The I ntergovernmen

tal Cooper

ation Act also per mits intergovernme

ntal cont racts: "Any one or more public agenc ies may contract with any

one or mor

e other p ublic agencies to perform any gover nmental se

rvice, a ctivity or under taking or to combine, transfer, or exercise any

powers, function s, privile ges, or authority which an y of the public agencies enterin

g into the contract is authorized by law to perf orm, provided that such contract shall be approved by

the governing bodies of

each party

to the contract and except where specifically a

nd expressly prohibited by law . Such co ntract shall set forth fully the purposes , powers, rights, o bje ctives and responsibilities of the contracting parties." (Emphasis added.) 5 ILCS 220/5 (West 2008). As to the first aspect of count IV , plaintiffs alleged that the Ordinance cr eated a new

source of funds to su

pplement th e S chool District's operating revenue s and, as such, circumvented theNo. 2--09--1136

7 As an example, plaintiffs specifically referred in their complaint to the Local Government Distributive Fund est

abli shedin the State Revenue Sharing Act (30 I LCS 115/0.1 et seq. (West 2008)), whichrequire s the Tre asurer to alloca te to a special fund certain income tax revenues and pay t herefrom cer

tain amounts to municipalities and counties. 30 IL CS 115/1 (West 2008). Municipalities and counties must use such funds "solely for the general welfare

of the people of the State o f Illinois, i ncluding financial assistance to school districts, any part of which lie within the municipa lity or county, throug

h unrestricted block grants for school purposes c arried out within the municipality or county

making the grant" (30 I

LCS 115/3 (West 2008)). -36- School Code's (105 ILCS 5/1--1 et seq. (West 2008 )) proc edures f or raisin g tax rev enues for schools

. Plaintiffs alleged that, in the School Code, the legislature establish ed a mec hanism fo r funding

public education. Plaintiffs alleged that increases in school funding must be the subject of proper school board resolution and that

the schoo l board mu st

submit to the School District's voters for referendum

a proposition to increase the ann ual tax rate f

or educa tional pur poses. 10 5 IL CS 5/17--3 (West 2008). They furthe

r alleged that the Ordinance that a dopted the Transfer

Tax (that is to

be used to fund the School Dis trict) wa s nota refe rendum su

bmitted toall School

District voters an

d was not treated as a tax levy for

educational purposes, as required by the School Code. Conc eding that some statutes specifically a

uthorize municipalities to give certain portions of their tax r

evenue s to public school districts , 7 plaint iffs alle ged that there is no statutory authority, including the School Code, permitting a municipality to give Tr ansfer Tax revenues to any public sc hool di st ri ct . A cc or di ng ly, they alleged that the City , w it hout legal authority , circumvented the School Code by raising tax revenues for schools without following the procedure s set forth in the statute.No. 2--09--1136

-37-

"[T]he legislature has enacted a compr ehensive scheme for the creation, mana gem ent and operation of Illinois schools. *** Thus th e legislature, pursuant to the constitutional mandate, exercises plenary power over the Illin ois school system." Board of Education of School District No. 150 v. City

of Peoria , 76 Ill. 2d 469, 476 (1979); see also I ll. Const. 1970, art. X, §1 ("The State has the primary

responsibility for financing the system of public educa tion" (emphasis added)). Section 17--3 of the School Code, upon which plaintiffs rely, a ddresses additional tax levies and provides, in r

elevant part: "The school board

in any district h aving a

population of less than 500,00 0 inhabita nts

ma y, by proper r

esolution , cause a proposition to increase, f or a limi ted peri od of not le ss than3 nor more than 10 yea

rs or for an unlimited period, the annual tax rate for educational purposes to be submitted to the v oters of such district at a regular scheduled e lection." (Emphases added.) 105 ILCS 5/17--3 (West 2008). Defend ants respond that

the City may

share with the School District the revenue generate d by the Transfer Tax. They note that, as a home rule entity , the City can exercise a ny power pertainingto its gov ernment and aff airs (I ll. Const. 1970, art. VII , §6(a)). Further, defenda nts assert that both the constitution and statutes permit intergovernmental cooperation. As to the School Code, defenda nts argue that it does not prohibit a school district from receiving funds from

sources other thanits own property tax levy and, in any eve

nt, the City , n o t the School District, passed the Ordinance at issue. The City, acc ording to defendants, is not sub ject to the S chool Code's provision s. The statute

establishes a mechanism by which a school district may submit a re ferendum to its voters to increase the district' s annual t ax levy ; in enac ting the

Ordinance, the C ity

did not and could not increase the School District's annual tax levy or circ

umvent the Schoo l Code. De fendant sNo. 2--09--1136

-38-

argue that Schoo l District funding pertain s to the City's g overnment and affairs because it promotes the gener al prospe rity and welfare of the community and that the expenditure of tax money nee d not benefit all taxpayers e qually to be constitutional. We agree with defe

ndants tha

t plaintif fs' re liance o

n section 17--3 of the Schoo l Code is misplaced

because that provision addresses the obligations of school boards, not

munic ipali

ties. We also agree with defendants that, in their complaint, plaintiffs pointed to no provision inthe School Code that spec ifically

restr icts a m unicipal ity' s powers to forwa rd monies

to school d

istricts. Further, the constitu

tion provi des that the State ha s primary responsi bility for fina ncing p ublic education. Il l. Const. 1970, art. X, §1. However, it does not confer on the State exclusive responsi bility for school funding. Because a home rule unit may

exercise concurr ently with the Sta

te any power of a home rule unit, in the abs ence o f any specific legisla tive limita

tion on home

rule units' powers, or the Sta

te 's exclus i ve exercise of power, over schools, we ca nnot conclude that plaintiffs stated a claim that the City exceede d its authority by circumventing the School Code. We find City

of Peoria in st ruc ti ve. Inthat case, a home rule municipality enac ted ordinances imposing taxes upon t

he witnes sing of or partic ipation in a museme nts and upon the privilege of purchasing f

ood or alcoholic beverages ser ved at restaurants or taverns. The taxes were paid by

consumer s, but the or

dinance s also impos ed on esta blishment o

perato rs an d owners the duties of collecting the taxes and

keeping records of tax receipts and imposed on them the obligat ion to file tax returns reflecting such receipts. The sc hool district and park district challenged the ordinance s

as unenfor

ceable agains t them. As t

o the scho ol distric t, the supr eme court held that the ordinances imposed duties upon the board of education that were not authorized, such as the keeping of record s, examination of books, and collection of the taxes. City of Peoria , 76 I ll. 2d at

476-77. These dutiesNo. 2--09--1136

8 As to the p ark

district, the court held that the ordinances did not constitute unauthorized regula tion, bec ause muni cipalitie s had explic it statutor y a uthority to establish

and maint

ain park s. City of Peoria , 76 Ill. 2d at 477. -39- were over and above those imposed upon the entity by the legislature. City

of Peoria , 76 Ill. 2d at 476-77. Further, the court held that the o rdinanc es confe

rred on t he schoo l district p owers tha t it did not hav e by statute, such a s the power to collect taxes on behalf of the city and to hold the m a s t rustee. City

of Peoria , 76 Ill. 2d at 477. Thus, the ordinances constituted t he un auth orize d regulation

of the school district, contrary to the constituti on (I ll. Const. 19 70, art. X , §1 ("T he State shallprovide f

or an ef ficient syst

em of hig h quality public educational institutions and services")). City of Peoria , 76 Ill. 2d at 477. 8 City of Peoria is di st in gu is ha bl e b ec au se , i n t ha t c as e, th e m un ic ip al it y' s ordinan ces burdened the school dis trict b y r equiring it to, among

other thin

gs, coll ect the mu

nicipal ta x and mainta

in record s. Here, the Transfe r Tax mere ly c onfers b enefits t o the Scho ol District by

forwar ding to it funds to enable the district to carr y ou t its opera tions. Th is di st in ct io n i s c ri ti ca l b ec au se th e C it y, via the Ordinance and

by entering

into the Intergover

nmental Agreement, has neither infringed on the State 's powe

r nor bur dened the School Dis trict. Plaintiffs next argue that the City ha s no obligation to solve a school revenue shortage and, thus, any transfe r of fund s to the dist

rict con stitutes a

donation or gift. In plaintiffs' view, the City cannot donate money

to the School Districtbecause this does not pertain to the City' s government and affairs. See Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI I, §6(a) (" a home rule unit may e xercise any powe

r and perform any functi on per taini ng to i ts gov ernmen t and a ffairs inclu ding, but notlimited to, the power *** to tax").No. 2--09--1136

-40-

Plaintiffs rely on

anAttorney Gene

ral opinion that addressed a proposed agre ement to share sales tax re ve nu e b et we en th e C it y of Be ll ev il le , a ho me ru le un it , a nd St . C la ir Co un ty. 1978 I ll. Att'y Gen. Op. 165. The proposed agree ment provided that, whenever the city received sales tax

revenue from businesses located in territory that had been newly

annexed by

the city , the city would share a portion

of the ta x with the coun ty, which was no long er receiving tax revenues from the businesse s. The coun

ty was not obligated to provide the city with any considera

tion for the proposed agree ment. The Attor

ney Genera l opined th at the cit

y di d not have autho rity to enter into the proposed agreement

and that the agreement was, there fore, invalid. 1978 Ill. Att'y Gen. Op. 165. Alth ough constitutional and statutory provisions add ressing intergovernmental coope ration authorized

cities to contract with counties, they did not aut horize c ities to donate city funds to counties , which wa s, in

essence, what the city wa s proposing to do. 1978 Ill. Att'y Gen. Op. 165. According

to the Attorney Gene

ral, a home r

ule municipality's power

s are limited to strictly local affairs and do not encompass those involving other municipa lities, the county, or the State. 1978 Ill. Att'y Ge

n. O p. 165. Thus, the

city was unde

r no leg al oblig ation to a ssist the c ounty in remedying

the financial problems that were caused when businesses located in ter ritory annexed by the city were

no longer subject

to the coun ty 's se rvic e occ upat ion ta x. 1978 Ill. Att'y

Gen. Op. 165. Plaintiff s' reliance on the foregoing Attorney General opinion is misplaced. In our view the critical distinction betwee n the Tra nsfer Ta x and the City

of Bell evill e's proposed

arrang ement wit

h St. Clair Count y i s the n atur e of t he be nefi t rec eive d by

the p arty colle cting

the ta x. In this case, the City benefit s from for

warding Transfe r Tax reve nues to the School District because better-financed schools benefit the community (whic h includes the portions of the School District that are within the Ci ty) as a whol e. I

n the sche

me propos ed by

the City of Belle ville , as the A

tto rney Ge

neralNo. 2--09--1136

-41-

specific ally

noted, the county wa s not obligated under the agree m ent to pa y any

consideration therefor. Indeed, f

or shari ng sale s tax reve

nue with the county

, Bellev ille rec eived no b enefit in return. Its transfer of tax revenue was purely gratuitous, which is not the case here (as we ca n discern from the complaint's allegations). For the same reason t hat we re ject plai ntiff' s relianc e on th e Attorney Genera l Bellev ille opinion, we also reject

the second aspect of plaint iffs' c laim in

count IV. Therein, plaintiffs a lleged that Transfe r Tax reve nues will b e used to f

und the School Distr

ict, which includes areas outside the City's corporate boundaries and juris diction (b ecause the entities' boundaries are not coterminous). They alleged that the City

has no authority to pass or enf orce an ordinance that has an extraterr itorial effect by d isbursing tax monies to

the Schoo l District . In o

ur view, plaintiff

s failed t o state a claim that the City exceede d its autho rity . Again , better -financ ed schoo ls benef

it the commun it y a s a whole. See, e.g. , Board of Librar y D irectors v. City

of La ke Fore st , 17 Ill. 2d 277, 285 (1959) (upholding statute r

equiring township to

pay to cities the proc eeds of township library tax collected on property ly

ing within cities; fact that libraries maintained by the cities were located outside the boundaries of township did not invalidate the levy; "the true test is the enhancement of the general welfare of th e township levying the tax"). The allegation that there are portions of the School District that are not within the City's bounda ries does not form the basis of a claim for relief. Insummary , we conc lu de that th e trial c ourt did no t err in di smissing p laintiff s' clai m in

co un t IV th at th e C it y ex ce ed ed it s c on st it ut io na l a ut ho ri ty. E. Count V- -the Scho ol District's AuthorityNo. 2--09--1136

-42-

Fi na ll y, in count V, plaintiffs asserted that the School District exceed ed its constitutional authority by entering

into an intergovernmental agre ement for the City to collect taxes and give them to the Scho ol District and for the Schoo l District

to acce pt the tax re

venues. Sp ec if ic al ly, plaintiffs alleged that, since the Transfer Tax will be used to fund the School District, which includes areas outside the City' s boundaries and jurisdiction, the Ordinance has an extraterritorial effec t. An inter gover nmental agree ment, pla

intiffs a lleged , cannot b e used in t his

manner. T hey also alleged that the School Code and other statutes provide a c omplete and s pecifi c method for fina ncing p ublic schools. For

example, the School D istrict, under the School Code, can levy on ly ad valorem

( i.e. , according to value) taxes on real property (105 IL CS 5/17--2 (West 2008) ("The school board of any district having a population of less than 500,000 inhabitants may levy a tax annually

, at not to e

xceed the maximum rate s and for

the spec ified pur

poses, up on all the

taxable propert y of the dis trict at th e value, as equalized or assessed by the Department of Revenue as follows")). Plaintiffs alleged tha t the Schoo l Code doe s not give the Schoo l District

the authority to impose the Transfer Tax either directly

or indirectly throug

h the City and doesnot give the School Di st ri ct th e a ut ho ri ty t o r ec ei ve Tr an sf er Ta x r ev en ue s f

ro m t he Ci ty. Thus, in summ ary , plaintif fs alleg ed that th e In

tergov ernment

al Agr eement is invali d becaus e it has an extraterritorial effect and because the School District

does not have sta tutory authority to impose (direc tly

or in di re ct ly) a transfer tax or to receive transfer tax revenues. On appeal, plaintiffs address only the statutory

authority and not the

extrater ritorial aspect o f their c laim. We limi tour analy sis accord

ingly and, for the follow

ing rea sons, con

clude tha t the tria l court did not err in dismissing count V.No. 2--09--1136

-43-

We begi n by rev iewing the powers granted to non-home-rule entities such as the School District and the authority they

may exercise via inter

governmental ag

reem ents. The constitution provides that school districts "shall have only powers grante d by law." I ll. Const. 1970, art. VII , §8. This provision preserves the concep t of "Dil lon's Rul e." Und er "Dil lon's Rul e," non -home-r ule units possess only those powers that ar e specifically

conveye d by the constitution or by statute or that

are

necessa rily implicit from the express authority. Commonwea lth Edison Co . v. City

of Warre nville , 288 Ill. App. 3d 373, 380 ( 1 997); Fischer v. Brombolich , 207 Ill. App. 3d 1053, 1059 (1991). Becau se a non-home-rule entity derives its powers only from "a n express grant from the legislature, the statutes granting this power are strictly construed, and

any doubt conce

rning an asserted power is resolved against the [ non-home-ru le entity]." Fischer , 207 Ill. App. 3d at 1059. As plaintiffs note, the Attorney G eneral has, in various opinion letters, consiste

ntly opined that non-h ome-r ule en titi es may not , by enteri ng int o int ergo vermental agreements, circumvent statutory requirements or limitations. See, e.g. , 2005 Ill. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 05--010 ("the Intergove rnmental Coope r ation section of the Constitution and its statutory counterpart, the Intergove rnmental Cooperation Act, are not grants of authority to und ertake jointly functions that the coopera

ting ent itie s can not undertake individually" ); 2000 Ill. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 00--015 (constitutional a nd statutory interg overnmental cooperation provisions "are not *** independe nt grant[s ] of authority and c annot authorize an entity to do that which is not otherwise authorized or permitted by law" ); 1998 Ill. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 98--014 (same). Certain opinion letter fact

ual scenarios are instructive. I n one letter, the Attorney General opined that a public group self-insurance fund, whose members consisted of units of local government

and state ag encies, could (a s to certa in of its me

mbers) expand its coverage to provideNo. 2--09--1136

-44-

group hea lth insuran ce bene fits for it s memb ers' em ployees an d thei r depen dents . 1998 Ill. Att 'y G en. Op. No. 98 --014. Sp ecifica lly, counties

and home r

ule units could

jointly sel f-insure

th e benefit s, but non-home-rule municipalities did nothave that authority be cause they did not have the independent authority to self-insure a nd the Intergove

rnmental Cooperation Act did not independently g

rant them authority to do so. 1998 I ll. Att'y Gen. O

p. No. 98--014. Inanother opinion, the Attorney Genera l addres sed the a

uthority of a town ship (whic

h is a non-home -ruleunit) to contract w ith a private corporation to provide for the collection and disposal of waste and recy

clables from residences within the township's unincorpora ted areas, as well as

commerc ia l waste generated by the township. The questions posed were whether refe rendum approval was a prerequisite to the exercise of such authority and whether, in the absen ce o f referendum

approval, the township could implement the plan through an int ergovernm ental agreement

betwee n it and th e coun ty. The Attorney General opined that (pursuant to the relevant statute) refer

endum app

roval wa s a

prerequisite to the township's contemplated contract and tha t the referendum

requirement could not be cir cumvented through the use of an interg overnmental agreement

with the county. 2000 I

ll. Att'y Gen. O

p. No. 00--015. "An intergovernmenta l agreement by which the county would fac ilitate waste collection in a sing le townshi

p, without r

elation to waste management

insurrounding areas, is not consiste nt with the

appare nt legis lative int

ent of" a statute permitting county-wide wa ste management plans. 2000 I ll. A tt'y Gen. Op. No. 00--015. Further, another statute that permitted

counties to contrac t with var ious gov ernment

al entitie s for was te disposal d

id not specific ally

mention townships. 2000 Ill. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 00--015. Fi na ll y, in another letter, the Attorney General opined that an ent ity formed under an intergovernmental

coopera tion agreement betwee n home rule and non-home-rule municipalities wasNo. 2--09--1136

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bound by s tatutory

limitations

gover ning its non-home -rulemembers. 2005 Ill. Att 'y Gen. Op. No. 05--010. Specifically, home r ule membe rs wer e exempt from competitive bidding statutes when seekingcontractors to develop the proposed South Suburban Airport in Peotone. 2005 I ll. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 05--010. Non-home-rule municipalities had more limited powers and were subject to the State's procurement requirements. 2005 I ll. Att'y Gen. O

p. No. 05--010. We find the foregoing op inions well reasoned and persuasive. See Vine Street Clinic v. HealthLink, Inc. , 222 Ill. 2d 276, 283 (2006) (Attorney Genera l's well-reasoned opinions "interpreting

or construing an

Illinois statute a

re pers uasive a uthority and are entitled t o conside rable weight in resolving a question of first impre ssio n, alt hough they do not have the f orce and effect of law"). We reject defendants' assertion that the for egoing Attorney

Gen eral opinion letters are inapposit e because the statutes at issue "expressly prohibited" the non-home-rule entities from performing

certain acts. To t

he contr ary , the prov

isions at is sue in the opinions did notexpressly prohibit certain acts. See 2005 Ill. Att 'y Gen. Op. No. 05--010 (stating that section 11--103--10 of the Municipa

l Code (65 IL CS 5/11--1 03--10 ( West 2004)) allows mun

icipalitie s to jointly

exercise their statutory powers to operate airports , but does not , expressl y or impliedly

, remove the li mitatio ns imposed on them by other laws); 2000 I ll. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 00--015 (opining that article 210 of the Township Code (60 IL CS 1/210--5 et seq. (West 1998)) expressly

authorize d township s, with referendum

approval, to contract for

waste disposal and that referendum requireme ntcould not be circumvented

through use of int ergov ernment

al agr eement w itha county); 1998 I

ll. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 98--014 (

noting that section 10--4- -2 of the Illinois Municip al Code (6 5 IL CS 5/10--4 --2 (West 1996)) does not grant non-home-rule municipalities the option to self-insure, but not

noting that it expressly prohibited the option).No. 2--09--1136

9 Te ch ni ca ll y, although they did allege that the School District is a public school district that exceeded its constitutional authority, plaintiffs did not specifically a

llege that the School District i s

a non-home-rule entity. E lsewhere in their complaint, they alleged that

the City is a home rule unit. We do not find plaintiffs' failure to specifically allege tha t the Schoo l District is a non-home-rule entity fatal to t heir cla im. -46- Thus, as we ha

ve noted: (1) non- home-ru le units such as the Schoo l District may exercise only those powers granted to them by the constitution or by statute, togethe r with such implied powers as are essential, not merely convenient, to carry

out their express powers; and (2) the power to cooperate intergovernment al ly c annot authorize an agreement that contrave nes statutory prohibitions or

limitations

that appl y to the part icipating entities. In c ount V, pla

intiffs sufficien

tly alleged the foregoing. They

alleged that

the Schoo l District , as a pub lic schoo l district, did not have t he authority to enter into an intergovernmental agreement to enac t a Transfer Tax or receiv e Transfe r Tax reve

nues whe re the School Code d

oes not au

thorize suc

h acts. 9 Next, we assess th e School D istrict' s statutor y a uthority to enact the Transfer Tax or receive Transfer Tax revenues. School boards or districts do not have an inherent power to levy taxes. In

re Application of the Du Pa ge Co un ty C ollector , 294 Ill. App. 3d 868, 870 (1998). Rather, that power is granted

by the legislature and is strictly construed. Du Page County Collector , 294 Ill. App. 3d at 870. Plaintiffs argue that

they adequa

tely pleaded tha

t, although the City may

have the authority to enact a Transfer Tax, the School District does not have independent authority to enact ( directly

or indirectly) such a

tax to generate additional revenues. Plaintiffs asse rt that, like the townsh

ip in the opinion letter addressing waste collection, the Sch ool Dist rict cannot circumvent the SchoolNo. 2--09--1136

-47-

Code or other statutes by e ntering into an intergov ernmental agreement to receive Tr ansfer Tax

revenues when it does not have independent authority to do so. Plaintiffs argue that the School Code authorizes the School District to impose prop erty tax levies, but not transfer ta xes. Thus, an intergovernmental

agreement cannot give

the School District authority to rece ive tax revenues generated by

the City's Tra

nsfer Tax. D efenda nts respond that the City and not the School District enacted the Transfer Ta x pursuant to its statutory and constitutional authority and assert that plaintiffs have not provided any legal au th or it y expressly prohibiting the distribution of Transfer Tax proceeds to the School Dis trict. They urge that plainti ffs, the

refore , have fa

iled to state a claim that the School District exceeded its authority or that the Interg overnmental Agreement is invalid. Defendants further note that section 10--20 of the School Code grants schooldistricts wide powers as to school matters and shows that school districts are notrestricted to powers expressly enumerated in the School Code. Section 10-- 20 of the Sc

hool Code provides: "The schoo l board ha s the powe rs enume rated in the Secti ons of this

Article following th is Section. T his enume

ration of powers is

not exclusiv e, but the board may exercise all other powers not inconsistent with this Ac t that may be re quisite or proper for the maintenance, operation, and development of any school or school s under the jurisdiction of the board. T

his grant of powers does not release a school board from any

duty imposed upon it by this Act or an y other law." (Emphasi s added. ) 105 I LCS 5/1 0--20 (We st

2008). Subsequent

statutes address school boards' powers to, inter alia , "provide for the revenue nec essary to maintain schools in their districts" (105 IL CS 5/10--20.3 (West 2008)), visit and inspe ct school s (105 IL CS 5/10--2 0.6 (West 2 008)), a ppoint tea

chers a nd fix their

salaries (105 ILCS 5/10--20.7No. 2--09--1136

-48-

(West 2008)), and develop and implement policies of hiring minority teachers (105 ILCS 5/10-- 20.7 a (West 2008)). Plaintiffs respond that section10

-- 20 gr an ts sc ho ol di st ri ct s o nl y incidental powers and grants them only

so long as those powers do not conflict with any other state law. We conclu

de that pl aintiffs

failed to state a c laim

that the Intergove

rnmental Agreement

is invalid because the Schoo l District

exceede d its autho rity

in imposing

(direc tly orindirectly) a Transfer Tax and agreeing

to rece ive Tran sfer Ta

x revenue s. We disag

ree with plaintiff s that this

caseis similar to the Attor ney Gener al opinion letter addressing waste collection. There , the Attor ney General opined that a township could not circumvent a statutory limitation ( i.e. , referendu

m approva l) through the use of an inter

gover nmental a greement. Her

e, in thei r amende d complai

nt, plaintiffs alleged that the enactment of a transfer tax and the receipt of revenues thereunder were not consistent with, spec ifically

, the Scho ol Code pr

ovision tha

t sp ec ifically

permits sc

hool boar ds to impose ad valorem

taxes on real property

(105 IL CS 5/17--2 (West 200 8)). Plaintiffs' complaint alleged that school districts can levy on ly prop erty taxes and not transfe r taxes and, thus, in the absence of specific authority to enact the Transfer Tax, the I ntergovernmental Agre ement is void. Inour view, plaintiffs overlook the fact that the City and not the School District enacted the Transfer Tax and tha t none of

the School Code provisions upon which they rely prohibits a school district fromreceiving tra

nsfer ta x revenue s. Accor

dingly , we conc lude that

the trial court did not e rr i n dismissing count V. IV. CONCL USION For the foregoing reasons, the judg ment of the circuit court of De Kalb County is affirmed. Affirmed. HUTCHINSON and BU

RKE, JJ., concur.