IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Christopher Parker, :

Petitioner :

: No. 1514 C.D. 2018

v. :

: Submitted: April 26, 2019

Pennsylvania Board of :

Probation and Parole, :

Respondent :

BEFORE: HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge

HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

BY JUDGE McCULLOUGH FILED: June 13, 2019

Christopher Parker (Petitioner) petitions for review of the October 17, 

2018 order of the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole (Board), which denied 

his request for administrative relief from the Board’s December 13, 2016 order 

recalculating his maximum sentence date. Petitioner’s counsel, David Crowley, 

Esquire (Counsel), of the Public Defender’s Office of Centre County has filed an 

Application to Withdraw Appearance (Application) on the basis that there are no 

grounds for appeal and the petition lacks merit. We grant Counsel’s Application and 

affirm the Board’s order.

On February 26, 1976, a trial court sentenced Petitioner to 2 to 20 years’ 

incarceration following his conviction of third-degree murder. At that point, 

Petitioner’s original maximum sentence date was December 19, 1995. The Board 
2

released Petitioner on parole on December 19, 1977; thereafter, Petitioner, apparently 

before the expiration of his maximum sentence, engaged in criminal conduct that 

violated the conditions of his parole and resulted in a conviction. See infra note 6. On 

July 18, 2001, nearly 24 years after the Board paroled Petitioner, the Board 

recommitted him as both a technical parole violator (TPV) and a convicted parole 

violator (CPV). Under former section 21.1(a) of the Parole Act,

1 Petitioner 

automatically forfeited credit for all the years that he spent at liberty on parole, and the 

Board extended his maximum sentence date from December 19, 1995, to April 27, 

2018. (Certified Record (C.R.) at 1, 48.)

On January 31, 2002, the Board reparoled Petitioner. Approximately 11 

years later, in 2013, the police arrested Petitioner and he was charged with various 

sexual offenses involving a minor female. On March 28, 2013, the Board issued a 

warrant to commit and detain Petitioner pending the disposition of the criminal charges. 

After Petitioner entered a plea of no contest to the crimes of corruption of a minor and 

involuntary deviate sexual intercourse (IDSI), a court of common pleas sentenced him 

on February 2, 2016, to 23 months’ incarceration at a county facility, without the 

possibility of parole, and a consecutive term of probation. (C.R. at 6, 9-10, 21, 24, 26, 

30.) 

Subsequently, Petitioner signed a document waiving his rights to counsel 

and a revocation hearing, and the Board recommitted him as a CPV to serve 60 months’ 

backtime. Petitioner then filed a request for administrative relief, which the Board 

denied on December 13, 2016. In the hearing report, the Board did not award Petitioner 

 

1 Act of August 6, 1941, P.L. 861, as amended, added by the Act of August 24, 1951, P.L. 1401, 

formerly 61 P.S. §331.21a(a). The Parole Act was repealed by the Act of August 11, 2009, P.L. 147, when the 

statute was codified into the Prisons and Parole Code (Parole Code), 61 Pa.C.S. §§101-6309. 
3

any credit for time served at liberty on parole under section 6138(a)(2.1) of the Prisons 

and Parole Code (Parole Code).

2

 Because Petitioner entered a plea to IDSI, a crime 

that required registration as a sexual offender, Petitioner was not eligible to receive 

credit and the Board lacked the statutory authority to grant it. Nonetheless, the Board 

noted in the hearing report that it considered Petitioner to be “a threat to the safety of 

the community” and “[n]ot amenable to parole supervision.” (C.R. at 35, 39, 47, 49, 

58-59, 74-75.)

On October 17, 2018, the Board issued a decision affirming its earlier 

decision to recommit Petitioner as a CPV and impose 60 months’ backtime. In this 

decision, the Board modified Petitioner’s parole eligibility date to February 27, 2020, 

and extended his maximum sentence date from April 27, 2018, to May 24, 2031. (C.R. 

at 78.) 

Petitioner then filed an administrative remedies form. The form contains 

two sections directing a petitioner to “Check the Reason(s) for Appeal and Explain” 

and “Check the Reason(s) for Relief and Explain.” (C.R. at 79) (emphasis in original). 

The form also states that “[t]he request shall set forth specifically the factual and legal 

bases for the allegations.” Id. In the first section, pertaining to the Board’s revocation 

decision, Petitioner checked the boxes for “Insufficient Evidence” and “Recommitment 

 

2

61 Pa.C.S. §6138(a)(2.1). Unlike former section 21.1(a) of the Parole Act, section 

6138(a)(2.1) of the Parole Code provides the Board with discretion to award credit for days spent at 

liberty on parole when recommitting a CPV, so long as the CPV did not commit one of the statutorily 

enumerated crimes. More specifically, the Board is deprived of discretion to grant credit when “[t]he 

crime committed during the period of parole is a crime . . . requiring registration under 42 Pa.C.S. 

Ch. 97 Subch. H (relating to registration of sexual offenders).” 61 Pa.C.S. §6138(a)(2.1)(i). In 

situations where the Board maintains its authority and discretion to award credit, “the Board must 

provide a contemporaneous statement explaining its reason for denying a CPV credit for time spent 

at liberty on parole” in order “to honor the basic notions of due process” and effectuate the intent of 

the General Assembly in enacting section 6138(a)(2.1). Pittman v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation 

and Parole, 159 A.3d 466, 475 (Pa. 2017). 
4

Challenge.” Id. In the second section, pertaining to the Board’s sentence calculations, 

Petitioner checked the boxes for “Sentence Credit Challenge” and “Reparole Eligibility 

Date.” Id. However, in the spaces provided on the form for a petitioner to explain the 

basis and nature of the claims, Petitioner did not complete it in the manner that the form 

dictates. Instead, Petitioner used the spaces to express his remorse and request 

leniency, stating, among other comments, the following: “Please, [I] know I’ve made 

a grave mistake,” “I’m sorry for all the things that occurred,” and “I’m asking for 

leniency on the [time] I’m about to do.” Id. Petitioner made similar statements in the 

pages that he attached to the form. (C.R. at 81-84.) 

On October 17, 2018, the Board issued a decision denying Petitioner’s 

request for administrative relief and reasoned as follows:

The Board regulation authorizing administrative 

appeals/petitions for administrative review states that 

appeals/petitions must “present with accuracy, brevity, 

clearness and specificity whatever is essential to a ready and 

adequate understanding of the factual and legal points 

requiring consideration.” 37 Pa. Code §73.1. Your request 

for relief does not indicate that the Board made any actual

evidentiary, procedural, or calculation errors in revoking 

your parole. The only thing you request from the Board is a 

general plea for leniency. A general plea for leniency does 

not qualify as a request for relief under the regulation. 

Therefore, your request for relief must be dismissed for 

failure to present adequate factual and legal points for 

consideration against the Board. 

(C.R. at 86.) 

On November 19, 2018, Counsel filed a petition for review with this 

Court,

3

asserting only that the Board erred because it “[f]ailed to credit [his] original 

 

3 Our scope of review is limited to determining whether constitutional rights were violated, 

whether an error of law was committed, or whether necessary findings of fact are supported by 
5

sentence with all the time to which he is entitled.” (Petition for Review, ¶6.) After 

reviewing the record in this matter, on February 21, 2019, Counsel filed the Application 

and a “no-merit” letter pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), 

contending that the appeal is meritless. 

Where, as here, counsel concludes that a petitioner’s appeal is meritless, 

counsel may be permitted to withdraw from representation if counsel (1) notifies the 

petitioner of the request to withdraw; (2) furnishes the petitioner with a copy of a nomerit letter satisfying the requirements of Turner; and (3) advises the petitioner of his 

right to retain new counsel or submit a brief on his own behalf. Miskovitch v. 

Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 77 A.3d 66, 69 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013). 

When counsel seeks to withdraw under Turner, our Supreme Court has held that 

counsel may fulfill his/her responsibilities by providing a no-merit letter that details 

the nature and extent of the attorney’s review, identifies each issue the petitioner wishes 

to raise, and explains why counsel concludes those issues are meritless. 544 A.2d at 

928. Once counsel has fully complied with the technical requirements for withdrawal, 

the Court will independently review the merits of the petitioner’s claims. Miskovitch, 

77 A.3d at 70. 

Here, the record reflects that, in his Turner no-merit letter, Counsel 

informed Petitioner of Counsel’s request to withdraw, provided Petitioner with a copy 

of the Turner letter that details Counsel’s review of the issues and the reasons why 

Counsel concluded those issues are meritless, and advised Petitioner of his right to 

retain new counsel or raise any new points he might deem worthy of consideration. 

Because Counsel has satisfied the procedural requirements for withdrawal, the Court 

 

substantial evidence. McCloud v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 834 A.2d 1210, 1212 

n.6 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003).
6

will independently review the matter to ascertain whether there are any issues that 

possess arguable merit.

In his Turner no-merit letter, Counsel addresses the following four general 

issues: “Improper credit to [Petitioner’s] original sentence,” “Improper Calculation of 

[Petitioner’s] max and re-parole dates,” “Insufficient Evidence,” and “Excessiveness 

of the Recommitment.” (Turner Letter, at page 4.) 

However, issues that are not properly raised before the Board in an 

administrative appeal are waived for purposes of appellate review by this Court. 

McCaskill v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 631 A.2d 1092, 1094-95 

(Pa. Cmwlth. 1993). The Board’s regulation at 37 Pa. Code §73.1 requires that issues 

must be “present[ed] with accuracy, brevity, clearness and specificity.” 37 Pa. Code 

§73.1(a)(3), (b)(2). The failure to do so “will be a sufficient reason for denying the 

appeal.” 37 Pa. Code §73.1(a)(3). The fact that a petitioner proceeded without counsel 

before the Board does not excuse him from raising and preserving issues. Reavis v. 

Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 909 A.2d 28, 33-34 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006). 

Here, Petitioner simply checked the boxes on the administrative remedies 

form and did not provide any statements of facts or legal basis to support his claims or 

alert the Board of the particular action(s) or decision(s) that he was challenging as 

improper. Under well-settled case law applying 37 Pa. Code §73.1, Petitioner has 

failed to preserve any issues for our review and any purported issue that could have

been raised is waived. See McCaffrey v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 

537 A.2d 78, 79 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1988) (providing that a dismissal pursuant to 37 Pa. 

Code §73.1 was appropriate because “[i]t is clear that the quoted portion of the 

regulation requires a prisoner seeking administrative relief to make his claims with at 

least some small degree of specificity . . . indicating what Board action or inaction 
7

constituted error”); see also White v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 833 

A.2d 819, 822 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003); McCaskill, 631 A.2d at 1094-95.

4, 5

 

Notwithstanding waiver, Counsel engaged in a thorough review of 

Petitioner’s parole history and the record in this matter and commendably addressed 

issues that he perceived were implicated and related to the four categories listed in the 

boxes that Petitioner checked in his administrative remedies form. Ultimately, Counsel 

determined that such issues lacked merit. Upon our independent evaluation, we agree 

with Counsel. 

Initially, as noted by Counsel, Petitioner cannot at the present time 

challenge any action taken by the Board in its July 18, 2001 parole revocation and 

recommitment order because the time for doing so has long passed. See McCaskill, 

 

4 We also cite two unreported decisions from this Court for their persuasive value in 

accordance with Commonwealth Court Internal Operating Procedure 414, 210 Pa. Code §69.414. See 

Headley v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 2553 C.D. 2015, filed 

May 2, 2018) (unreported), slip op. at 6 (“Although Headley checked the box stating ‘Sentence Credit 

Challenge’ . . . . [t]here is no reference in the Administrative Appeal or the document Headley 

attached thereto of the time he spent at the [community corrections center] or incarcerated in West 

Virginia, let alone a request for credit against his original sentence for those periods. Accordingly, 

these issues are waived for purposes of appellate review by this court.” (internal citations omitted); 

Edwards v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1625 C.D. 2014, filed 

May 26, 2016) (unreported), slip op. at 9-10 (“Here, in his administrative appeal before the Board, 

[p]etitioner checked the box marked ‘Recommitment Challenge (Time/term given by Board, 

automatic reparole, return to custody, etc.)’ . . . Notably absent from [p]etitioner’s administrative 

appeal is any claim that he is entitled to sentence credit for time spent in pre-sentence confinement 

awaiting trial and sentencing for his federal charges. Therefore, because [p]etitioner failed to raise 

the issue in his administrative appeal, the issue is waived for purposes of this Court’s review.”). 

5 Furthermore, the issues regarding the nature of the evidence supporting the Board’s 

recommitment decision, the length of backtime imposed in connection with that recommitment, and 

the calculations of Petitioner’s parole eligibility and maximum sentence dates were not raised in the 

petition for review with this Court. Thus, these issues are waived on this basis as well. See Reavis, 

909 A.2d at 32 n.2 and 34; Siers v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 725 A.2d 220, 221 

(Pa. Cmwlth. 1999).
8

631 A.2d at 1095 and n.4 (concluding that when a petitioner appealed the Board’s 1992 

decision denying him administrative relief, the petitioner could not challenge the 

decisions of the Board rendered in 1986 and 1988 because “any allegations concerning 

such determinations would have been untimely and the Board would have been 

required to dismiss the appeal as it related to those issues”). In that order, the Board 

calculated Petitioner’s new maximum sentence date as April 27, 2018, and determined 

that Petitioner owed 16 years and 3 months on his original sentence.6 The Board then 

reparoled Petitioner on January 31, 2002, and following his convictions, Petitioner

completed the 23-month sentence in a county facility and was available to serve the 

balance of his original sentence—16 years and 3 months— on November 23, 2016. 

Concerning Petitioner’s maximum sentence date, the case law states that

Petitioner is entitled to a deduction from the balance of his original sentence in the

amount of one year and nine months. This period represents the time that Petitioner

 

6 With respect to Petitioner’s first instance of parole, we note that “[i]t is well-settled law that 

the Board retains jurisdiction to recommit an individual as a parole violator after the expiration of the 

maximum term, so long as the crimes that lead to the conviction occurred while the individual is on 

parole.” Fumea v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 147 A.3d 610 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016). 

Because the Board found in its July 18, 2001 decision that Petitioner owed 16 years and 3 months on

his sentence, it may be implied that Petitioner committed a crime prior to the expiration of his 20-

year sentence. The record, however, is not entirely clear on this point and fails to indicate the precise 

date on which Petitioner was arrested, the crime he committed, and length of his incarceration, if any. 

At any rate, in this appeal from an administrative proceeding, Petitioner cannot (and Counsel 

does not) challenge the Board’s July 18, 2001 order 17 years after it was entered or contest the legality 

of his detention. To the extent that Petitioner could possibly have a valid claim that he successfully 

completed the full term of his sentence prior to his first recommitment, that claim would have to be 

asserted in a habeas corpus petition in the appropriate court of common pleas. See Brown v. 

Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, 81 A.3d 814, 815 (Pa. 2013) (stating that where a petitioner 

was “testing the legality of [his] commitment and detention,” “his petition for review sounded in 

habeas corpus,” and finding that this Court “did not possess jurisdiction over such a matter;” rather,

jurisdiction lies “in the court of record from which [the] judgment of sentence originated, specifically, 

the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas”).
9

was released on bail, May 9, 2013, but remained incarcerated solely on the Board’s 

warrant, until the time he was sentenced by the court of common pleas, February 2, 

2015. See Smith v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 171 A.3d 759, 764-

65 (Pa. 2017) (“[I]f a defendant is being held in custody solely because of a detainer 

lodged by the Board and has otherwise met the requirements for bail on the new 

criminal charges, the time which he spent in custody shall be credited against his 

original sentence.”). The net outcome is that, at the time of his latest recommitment,

Petitioner owed 14 years and 6 months on his original sentence, and when this number 

is added as an extension to November 23, 2016, Petitioner’s new maximum sentence 

date was May 24, 2031. Otherwise, regarding the Board’s imposition of 60 months’

backtime, when one year and nine months is subtracted from this amount, and the sum 

is added as an extension to November 23, 2016, Petitioner’s new parole eligibility date 

was February 27, 2020. Therefore, having checked and confirmed the Board’s 

arithmetic, we agree with Counsel that the Board did not err in calculating Petitioner’s 

new maximum sentence date and reparole date.

Moreover, Petitioner admitted the fact of his convictions in the form 

waiving his rights to a revocation hearing and counsel. (C.R. at 30.) This admission, 

alone, and especially in conjunction with a copy of the court of common pleas’ 

sentencing order, (C.R. at 40), provided the Board with substantial evidence upon 

which it could recommit Petitioner as a CPV. See Pitch v. Board of Probation and 

Parole, 514 A.2d 638, 640 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1986) (stating that “a parolee’s admissions to 

asserted parole violations constitute substantial evidence upon which to base a parole 

revocation order”); Anderson v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 497 

A.2d 947, 950 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1985) (noting that it was “permissible to admit 

unauthenticated copies of state court records to show that a probationer was convicted 
10

of subsequent criminal offenses during his probationary term”). With respect to the 

Board’s imposition of 60 months’ backtime for Petitioner’s no contest plea to IDSI and 

corruption of a minor, Counsel correctly notes that this figure falls within the 

presumptive range for such convictions. See 37 Pa. Code §75.2 (stating that the 

presumptive range for IDSI and corruption of a minor is 27 to 40 months and 18 to 24 

months, respectively); Ward v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 538 A.2d 

971, 975 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1988) (“Where there are multiple offenses the Board may treat 

each offense separately and aggregate the presumptive ranges to arrive at an applicable 

presumptive range.”). Therefore, we agree with Counsel that Petitioner cannot 

successfully challenge the Board’s assessment of backtime as excessive or otherwise

illegal. See Houser v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 675 A.2d 787, 

789 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996) (“This court will not review the Board’s exercise of discretion 

in imposing backtime for parole violations where the violations are supported by 

substantial evidence and the backtime imposed is within the published presumptive 

ranges for those violations.”).

As a final matter, this Court acknowledges Counsel’s statement that 

Petitioner “is understandably perplexed about how he will still be serving a 20-year 

sentence 55 years after its imposition,” (Brief for Petitioner at 8), and we have 

previously recognized “the harsh results that occur when a CPV has served a relatively 

long and successful period of parole but cannot obtain any street time credit.” Penjuke 

v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, __ A.3d __, __ (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 

1304 C.D. 2017, filed February 1, 2019) (en banc), slip op. at 19. Nonetheless, as a 

result of legislative mandate, Petitioner automatically forfeited decades of sentencing 

credit for time spent at liberty on parole, first by virtue of being a CPV under former 

section 21.1(a) of the Parole Act, and then by being a CPV who committed an 
11

enumerated crime that divested the Board of discretion to award sentencing credit 

under current section 6138(a)(2.1)(i) of the Parole Code. 

That said, we are constrained to concur in Counsel’s observation that

“[r]easonable minds can differ as to the efficacy of the sentencing and [P]arole [C]ode 

provisions which compel this result, but there is no legal support for a claim that it is 

unlawful.” (Brief for Petitioner at 9.) In 1979, our Supreme Court held that

a state is not precluded by the Federal Constitution from 

giving paroled convicts an added inducement to ‘go straight’

by retaining the ability to recommit them for crimes they 

commit while on parole. No constitutional question is 

involved in the [] Board’s failure to give [a parolee] credit 

for time on parole and its adjustment of the expiration date 

of his new maximum. 

Young v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 409 A.2d 843, 847 (Pa. 1979)

(internal citation omitted). The holding in Young has not been undermined and 

continues to be followed by this Court as binding precedent. See, e.g., Lee v. 

Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 926 C.D. 2017, filed

January 30, 2018) (unreported), slip op. at 4. Therefore, we agree with Counsel that 

Petitioner does not have a valid claim regarding the increases of his maximum sentence 

date for being a CPV. 

 In sum, Petitioner waived any and all legal issues with respect to the 

Board’s October 17, 2018 order; Counsel’s analysis contains substantial reasons for 

concluding that Petitioner does not have any basis in law or fact that would entitle him 

to relief; and, upon our independent review, we are unable to locate an issue that 

possesses arguable merit. Accordingly, we grant Counsel’s Application and affirm the 

determination of the Board. See Reavis, 909 A.2d at 34 (granting counsel’s application 

to withdraw where the petitioner waived all the issues in the petition for review; counsel 

conducted a sufficient review of those issues; and our independent review failed to 
12

locate a meritorious issue); Roy v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole (Pa. 

Cmwlth., No. 98 C.D. 2009, filed October 6, 2009) (unreported), slip op. at 4-7 (same). 

________________________________

PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Christopher Parker, :

Petitioner :

: No. 1514 C.D. 2018

v. :

:

Pennsylvania Board of :

Probation and Parole, :

Respondent :

ORDER

AND NOW, this 13th day of June, 2019, the Application to Withdraw 

Appearance filed by David Crowley, Esquire, is GRANTED, and the decision of the 

Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, dated October 17, 2018, is 

AFFIRMED.

________________________________

PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge