IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Selinda Lane, :

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 299 C.D. 2019

: Submitted: August 23, 2019

Pennsylvania Board of :

Probation and Parole, :

Respondent :

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge

HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge

HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BY JUDGE BROBSON FILED: January 23, 2020

Petitioner Selinda Lane (Lane), also known as Selinda Short, petitions 

for review of a final determination of the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and 

Parole (Board), dated September 20, 2018.1 The Board denied Lane’s request for 

administrative relief, thereby rejecting her claim that the Board erred by failing to 

 

1 Lane filed with this Court a seemingly untimely petition for review in which she avers

facts in support of an appeal nunc pro tunc. The basis for the requested relief includes the Board’s 

mailing of the final determination to an incorrect address and staffing issues at the Lycoming 

County Public Defender’s Office. As directed by this Court’s order dated April 3, 2019, the parties 

address the timeliness of Lane’s petition for review in their briefs on the merits. The Board, in so 

doing, states that it “has no reason to believe or suspect that the professed reasons by [Lane’s] 

counsel are anything but true,” and that it “does not believe that the granting of [nunc pro tunc

relief] would be unreasonable or an abuse of the Court’s discretionary powers in this respect.” 

(Respondent’s Brief at 9-10.) The Court agrees with the assessment of the parties and, therefore, 

will consider the merits of the appeal now before us. 
2

grant her credit for all time served at liberty on parole. For the reasons set forth 

below, we affirm.

On June 2, 2010, Lane pled guilty to receiving stolen property, forgery, 

identity theft, retail theft, and reckless endangerment. (Certified Record (C.R.) 

at 1-2.) The Court of Common Pleas of the 39th Judicial District (Franklin County 

Branch) sentenced Lane to a minimum term of incarceration of 4 months, 15 days 

and a maximum term of incarceration of 2 years for the offenses of receiving stolen 

property, forgery, identity theft, and one count of retail theft. (Id.) With respect to 

the remaining three counts of retail theft and the offense of reckless endangerment, 

the Court of Common Pleas of the 39th Judicial District (Franklin County Branch)

sentenced Lane to a minimum term of incarceration of 1 month and a maximum term 

of incarceration of 2 years. (Id.) The Board granted Lane parole on March 3, 2011. 

(Id. at 5.) Lane was released from confinement on August 1, 2011. (Id. at 8.) At 

the time of her parole, Lane had a maximum sentence date of January 4, 2020. (Id.) 

In addition to the standard conditions of her parole, the Board required Lane to report 

to the Atkins House in York, Pennsylvania, and complete a rehabilitation program 

immediately following her release from confinement. (Id. at 12.) Lane tested 

positive for drug use several times throughout her time on parole, including the 

following test dates: August 1, 2011, August 27, 2015, August 31, 2015, 

September 14, 2015, and September 21, 2015. (Id. at 39.) 

Police arrested Lane on February 16, 2017, after finding 9 bags of 

cocaine and 10 bags of heroin at her home during a warranted police search. (Id.

at 17.) That same day, the Cumberland County District Attorney charged Lane with 

three counts of Manufacture, Delivery, or Possession With Intent to Manufacture or

Deliver, Section 13(a)(30) of The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device & Cosmetic 
3

Act, Act of April 14, 1972, P.L. 233, as amended, 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30), and 

with Conspiracy to Manufacture, Delivery, or Possession With Intent to 

Manufacture or Deliver, 18 Pa. C.S. § 903. (Id. at 43.) The Board issued a warrant 

to commit and detain Lane on February 17, 2017. (Id. at 18.) The Court of Common 

Pleas of Cumberland County set Lane’s monetary bail on February 17, 2017, and 

readjusted Lane’s bail on February 27, 2017; Lane posted bail on February 27, 2017. 

(Id. at 40, 42.) By Board decision dated March 22, 2017, the Board ordered Lane to 

be detained throughout the duration of the disposition of her new criminal charges. 

(Id. at 22.) 

On June 27, 2017, Lane pled nolo contendere to Conspiracy to 

Manufacture, Delivery, or Possession With Intent to Manufacture or Deliver, 18 Pa.

C.S. § 903. (Id. at 47-48.) The Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County 

sentenced Lane to a minimum incarceration term of 1 year, 6 months, and a 

maximum incarceration term of 3 years. (Id. at 48.) Lane, therefore, was detained 

solely by the Board’s warrant from the date that she posted bail on 

February 27, 2017, until her sentencing date of June 27, 2017. (Id. at 40, 42.) The 

Board issued a notice of charges and hearing to inform Lane of her upcoming 

revocation hearing before the Board on July 11, 2017. (Id. at 35.) Lane waived her 

right to a revocation hearing on July 13, 2017. (Id. at 26.) Within the Board’s 

hearing report, dated August 11, 2017, the Board indicated that it should deny Lane 

credit for all time spent at liberty on parole because she was “selling heroin.” (Id.

at 29.) By Board decision recorded on August 30, 2017, and mailed on 

September 15, 2017, the Board recommitted Lane as a convicted parole violator

(CPV) to serve an incarceration term of 15 months’ backtime, thus, denying her

credit for all time spent at liberty on parole because of her “poor supervision history.” 
4

(Id. at 54.) After crediting Lane time for the 120 days she spent detained solely by 

the Board’s warrant from February 27, 2017, until June 27, 2017, the Board 

recalculated Lane’s parole violation maximum date to be September 26, 2025. (Id.

at 40, 54.) 

Lane, through her attorney, sought administrative relief with the Board 

by filing an administrative remedies form on October 2, 2017, arguing that 

the 15 months’ imposed backtime is excessive and that the Board abused its 

discretion in its recalculation of Lane’s maximum sentence date by denying her 

credit for all time spent at liberty on parole.

2

 (Id. at 56-62.) The Board received 

correspondence from Lane on May 22, 2018, inquiring about the status of her 

administrative remedies request, as neither she nor her attorney had received any 

documentation regarding her request for administrative relief. (Id. at 68.) 

On September 20, 2018, the Board denied Lane’s requested relief, 

reasoning:

[Lane] was released on parole on August 1, 2011, 

with a maximum sentence date of January 4, 2020. At that 

point, 3078 days remained on her sentence. The Board has 

the authority to establish a parole violation maximum date 

in cases of [CPVs]. Because she was recommitted as a 

[CPV], she is required to serve the remainder of her 

original term and is not entitled to credit for any periods of 

time at liberty on parole. The record in this matter does 

not show that the Board abused its discretion when it did 

not award credit for time at liberty on parole. [Lane] is 

entitled to 120 days of credit on her parole violation 

maximum date for the time she was detained solely by the 

Board from February 27, 2017[,] to June [2]7, 2017. 

 

2 As she was not sure if her attorney was submitting an administrative remedies form, Lane 

filed a separate administrative remedies form on October 1, 2017, challenging the Board’s decision 

to deny her credit for all time spent at liberty on parole, noting that this was her first parole 

revocation as a CPV and she had been on, what she described as, the lowest level of parole with 

very little supervision needed. (C.R. at 56-59.)
5

[Lane] was sentenced to state incarceration on June 27, 

2017. Because [s]he was sentenced to state incarceration, 

she is required to serve her original sentence prior to the 

new sentence. However, that provision does not take 

effect until a parolee is recommitted as a [CPV]. Thus, she 

did not become available to commence service of her 

original sentence until the Board voted to recommit her as 

a parole violator on August 21, 2017. Adding 2958 days 

(3078-120) to August 21, 2017[,] [results in a] 

September 25, 2025 parole violation maximum sentence 

date. Finally, the record in this matter reflects that the 

recommitment period imposed in this case is not subject 

to challenge because it falls within the presumptive range 

for the new convictions.

(Id. at 73-74 (citations omitted).)

Lane now petitions this Court for review,3arguing that the Board 

abused its discretion by failing to grant her credit for all of the time spent at liberty 

on parole. When determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, the 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that “[a]n abuse of discretion is not merely an 

error of judgment, but occurs only where the law is overridden or misapplied, or the 

judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, 

bias or ill will.” Zappala v. Brandolini Prop. Mgmt., Inc., 909 A.2d 1272, 1284 

(Pa. 2006); see also Moss v. SCI-Mahanoy Superintendent Pa. Bd. of Prob. & 

Parole, 194 A.3d 1130, 1133 n.5 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018), appeal denied, 215 A.3d 562

(Pa. 2019). 

 

3 This Court’s standard of review is limited to determining whether constitutional rights 

were violated, whether an error of law was committed, or whether necessary findings of fact are 

supported by substantial evidence. 2 Pa. C.S. § 704.
6

Section 6138(a)(2.1) of the Prisons and Parole Code, 61 Pa. C.S. 

§ 6138(a)(2.1), sets forth guidelines for the Board’s discretionary power in granting 

and denying credit for parole and provides: 

The Board may, in its discretion, award credit to a parolee

recommitted under paragraph (2)[4]for the time spent at 

liberty on parole, unless any of the following apply: 

(i) The crime committed during the period of 

parole . . . is a crime of violence . . . or a crime 

requiring registration [as a sexual offender].

(ii) The parolee was recommitted under 

[S]ection 6143 [of the Prisons and Parole Code, 61 Pa. 

C.S. § 6143,] (relating to early parole of inmates 

subject to Federal removal order).

(Emphasis added.)5

 

4 Section 6138(a)(2) of Prisons and Parole Code, 61 Pa. C.S. § 6138(a)(2), provides, in 

part: 

If the parolee’s recommitment is so ordered, the parolee shall be reentered to serve 

the remainder of the term which the parolee would have been compelled to serve 

had the parole not been granted and, except as provided under paragraph (2.1), 

shall be given no credit for the time at liberty on parole. 

(Emphasis added.)

 

5 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that, pursuant to Section 6138(a)(2.1) of the 

Prisons and Parole Code, in order to properly exercise its own authority, “the Board must provide 

a contemporaneous statement explaining its reason for denying a CPV credit for time spent at 

liberty on parole.” Pittman v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 159 A.3d 466, 475 (Pa. 2017). The 

Supreme Court specified that a “single[-]sentence explanation” given by the Board explaining its 

decision “is likely sufficient in most instances” to meet the Pittman standard. Id. at 475 n.12. 

Moreover, this Court has found that the statement “poor supervision history” is sufficient to meet 

the Pittman standard. See Cuthbert v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole (Pa. Cmwlth., 

No. 1116 C.D. 2018, filed July 12, 2019), slip op. at 9-10; see also Sullivan v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & 

Parole (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 883 C.D. 2018, filed April 18, 2019), slip op. at 17. We note, however, 

that this Court has also found the Board’s reasoning of a CPV’s “poor supervision history” 

inadequate to satisfy the Pittman standard when this reason is “facially inconsistent” with the 

CPV’s clean parole record. See Baldwin v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole (Pa. Cmwlth., 

No. 907 C.D. 2018, filed April 2, 2019), slip op. at 6 (holding that Board’s stated reason—i.e.,
7

Lane argues that the Board abused its discretion in denying her credit 

for all the time she spent at liberty on parole, because the Board’s stated reason for 

its denial of her credit—i.e., “poor supervision history”—“has little or no support in 

the record.” (Petitioner’s Br. at 13.) Lane does not dispute that she had tested 

positive for drug use—first on the day she was released from confinement in 

August 2011 and then 4 times during a 25-day period in 2015. Rather, Lane appears 

to contend that the successful aspects of her parole supervision—i.e., a 4-year period

between her first and second positive urinalysis and another period of 17 months 

from her last positive urinalysis to her arrest on the new criminal charges—somehow 

negate her earlier violations of the conditions of parole. She appears to dicker over 

the Board’s characterization of her parole supervision history as “poor.” Lane cites 

no authority, and we find none, to illustrate that testing positive for illegal drug use 

several times while on parole combined with an arrest for possession and selling 

illegal drugs does not either constitute “poor supervision history” or provide a basis 

for the denial of credit. Furthermore, while Lane may have a difference of opinion 

as to whether she should be considered as having a “poor supervision history,” the 

Board’s characterization of it as such does not rise to the level of an abuse of 

discretion. An abuse of discretion requires more than just a difference of opinion, 

and Lane has not established that the Board, in denying credit to Lane, overrode or 

misapplied the law or exercised judgment that was “manifestly unreasonable, or the 

result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will.” Zappala, 909 A.2d at 1284. We must 

 

“poor supervision history”—did not satisfy Pittman standard because it was “facially inconsistent 

with Baldwin’s spotless record of compliance with parole supervision for almost nine years,” 

during which time he had “no infractions of any kind.”). Here, Lane does not argue that the Board 

failed to set forth its rationale for denial of credit in a contemporaneous statement; rather, Lane 

argues that the Board’s rationale is insufficient. 
8

conclude, therefore, that the Board did not abuse its discretion when it denied Lane 

credit for her time spent at liberty on parole.

Accordingly, we affirm the order of the Board.

P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Selinda Lane, :

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 299 C.D. 2019

:

Pennsylvania Board of :

Probation and Parole, :

Respondent :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 23rd day of January, 2020, we AFFIRM the final 

determination of the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole.

P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge