1 14-2162 Mejia v. New York City Health & Hospitals Corp. 

## UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 

# SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT = S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT , A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATA BASE (WITH THE NOTATION A SUMMARY ORDER @ ). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated term of the United States Cour t of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthou se, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 9 th day of December, two thousand fifteen.
PRESENT: ROBERT A. KATZMANN, Chief Judge , RALPH K. WINTER, JOHN M. WALKER, JR., Circuit Judges.

_____________________________________ ANGELA MEJIA, Plaintiff-Appellant , v. No. 14-2162
NEW YORK CITY HEALTH AND HOSPITALS CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee , DIVISION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, Defendant

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_____________________________________2 FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Angela Mejia, pro se, New York, NY. FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE N.Y.C. HEALTH & HOSPITALS CORP.: Richard Dearing, Diana Lawless, Assistant Corporation Counsels, for Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel of the City of New York, New York, NY. Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Pauley, J .). UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED

. Angela Mejia, proceeding pro se , appeals the district court’s dismissal, on collateral estoppel grounds, of her action alle ging that her former employer, the New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation (“HHC”), terminated her b ecause of her disability in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12112 et seq. On February 9, 2012, Mejia filed a complaint with the New York State Division of Human Rights (“DHR”) alleging that HHC had fired her because she was disabled in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law. Mejia alleged that she had worked as a clerical associate at HHC for nearly tw enty-one years before she injured herself while commuting to work in May 2011. According to the investig ation conducted by the DHR, HHC granted Mejia medical leave after Mejia sustained her injury. With supporting letters from her doctor, she later sought and received three ex tensions of that leave. HHC refused, however, to grant her a fourth extension—which Mejia claims was al so supported by letters from her doctor—and, instead, terminated her employment. HHC did not provide notice of its decision to Mejia, who3 learned she lost her job only after she inquired in to the status of her request. On August 3, 2012, the DHR issued a decision finding that “its investigation did not reveal sufficient evidence to establish a nexus between [Me jia’s] disability and [HHC’s] deci sion to terminate” Mejia. Record on Appeal doc. 23-2 at 2. The DHR r easoned that Mejia was a provisional employee not entitled to leave extensions and that her te rmination was therefore justified as a “business necessity.” On October 3, 2012, Mejia filed an Article 78 petition in the New York Supreme Court for New York County, seeking reversal of th e DHR’s decision. The Supreme Court denied Mejia’s petition, reasoning that she had a full and fair opportunity to pr esent her claim to the DHR and that the DHR’s decision wa s not arbitrary and capricious. Mejia then filed this action in federal cour t, alleging that HHC ha d violated her rights under the ADA. The district court, on HHC’s motion, determined that Mejia was collaterally estopped from asserting such a cl aim and dismissed the complaint. This appeal followed. “We review the district court’s dismissal of [an] action on colla teral estoppel grounds de

novo .” Johnston v. Arbitrium (C ayman Islands) Handels AG , 198 F.3d 342, 346 (2d Cir. 1999). “[A] federal court must give to a state-court judgment the same preclusive effect as would be given that judgment under the law of the St ate in which the judgment was rendered.” Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. , 465 U.S. 75, 81 (1984). “Under New York law, the doctrine of issue preclusion only ap plies if (1) the issue in questi on was actually and necessarily decided in a prior proceeding, and (2) the party against whom the doctrine is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the i ssue in the first proceeding.” Colon v. Coughlin , 58 F.3d 865, 869 (2d Cir. 1995) (footnote omitted).4 Although we share the district court’s symp athy for Mejia, we also agree with its conclusion that Mejia is collate rally estopped from litigating her claim under the ADA. First, to prevail on her ADA claim, Mejia w ould have to establish that HHC terminated Mejia because of her disability. See Parker v. Columbia Pictures Indus. , 204 F.3d 326, 337 (2d Cir. 2000). This same issue, however, was presented to the Suprem e Court in Mejia’s Article 78 petition when she challenged the merits of the DHR’s decision, a nd the Supreme Court ruled against Mejia when it found that the DHR’s decision was neither arb itrary nor capricious. The Supreme Court’s decision that an agency’s determination of an is sue was not arbitrary and capricious is sufficient to constitute an “actual[] and necessa r[y] deci[sion]” of that issue. Cf. Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp. , 456 U.S. 461, 484 (1982); Maira v. Stamm , 488 N.Y.S.2d 914, 915 (4th Dep’t 1985). Second, the Supreme Court also found that Mejia had a full and fair opportunity to litigate in front of the DHR the issue of whether HHC terminated her position because of her disability, and nothing in the record suggests that she lacked a fu ll and fair opportunity to litigate her Article 78 petition. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk