This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A15-0323

In re the Marriage of:

Todd Emil Nelson, petitioner,

Appellant,

vs.

Leslie Ann Nelson,

Respondent.

Filed December 21, 2015

Affirmed in part as modified, reversed in part, and remanded

Chutich, Judge

Douglas County District Court

File No. 21-FA-14-16

Carol Grant, Kurzman Grant Law Office, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Kevin D. Conneely, Keith Moheban, Stinson Leonard Street LLP, Minneapolis, 

Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Chutich, Judge; and Hooten, 

Judge. 

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

CHUTICH, Judge

Appellant Todd Nelson appeals from a marriage dissolution judgment awarding 

respondent Leslie Nelson a property settlement and limiting his parenting time to one 

weekend a month and alternating holidays. He argues that the district court erred by 
2

(1) severely restricting his parenting time without considering a relevant statutory 

presumption or finding endangerment and (2) incorrectly valuing Leslie Nelson’s share 

of various property. Because we conclude that the district court abused its discretion in 

failing to consider the relevant statutory presumption regarding parenting time, we 

reverse and remand for reconsideration consistent with the presumption. Because we 

conclude that the district court properly valued and divided most of the disputed property, 

we affirm in part as modified below.

FACTS

Todd Nelson and Leslie Nelson were married on March 1, 2007, and have three 

children together. The parties were previously married in June 1998, and divorced in 

September 2001. During this marriage, the family lived together in a mobile home on 

land owned by Todd.1The parties separated in December 2000, and Todd filed for 

divorce. Leslie did not appear for the divorce trial, and the district court entered a default 

judgment awarding Todd sole physical custody of their first child. At the time of the 

divorce, Leslie was using methamphetamine and living with her boyfriend in the Twin 

Cities. 

By late 2001 or 2002, Leslie stopped using methamphetamine, moved back to 

Douglas County, and began visiting Todd and their daughter. Soon after, Leslie became 

pregnant with the parties’ second child; by July 2002, Leslie moved in with Todd and the 

 

1 We typically do not refer to parties by their first names. Because the parties share a last 

name, we do so here to avoid confusion.
3

parties resumed their relationship. The parties cohabitated continually until they were 

married again in March 2007.

During their cohabitation, the parties had two children and built a home together; 

much of the work on the home was completed while the couple was unmarried. The 

parties disagree regarding the financial and labor contributions that Leslie made to the 

family home, but the district court found that her contributions were equivalent to 

approximately 20 percent of the fair market value of the home. 

The couple also owned a homeowner’s insurance policy from North Star 

Insurance that they purchased together in 2003. The policy was held in both parties’ 

names and the premiums were paid out of their joint checking account. In July 2009, a 

shed that Todd built before their first marriage was destroyed in a fire. The parties filed a 

claim of loss and ultimately received proceeds of $82,678.55. The district court found 

that “[a]pproximately $35,000 of the proceeds were not used for the purchase of 

replacement property or the cost of rebuilding the shed.” After using $15,000 to rebuild 

the shed, Todd transferred the entire balance to his own savings account and testified that 

he spent the remaining proceeds on attorney fees and living expenses. 

The parties separated again on September 6, 2013. On September 11, 2013, Leslie 

obtained an order for protection against Todd, which remained in effect until September 

11, 2015. Douglas County Social Services conducted a child protective services 

investigation based on the allegations underlying the order for protection and concluded 

that the children did not need protective services.
4

Since the parties’ separation, Leslie has had primary custody of the children

through a voluntary agreement between the parties, and she and the children have been 

living together at the family home. Todd had liberal parenting time according to an 

informal and voluntary agreement with Leslie, but his time became more limited before 

the marriage dissolution proceeding began. The parties gave sharply conflicting 

testimony regarding their respective parenting and care of their children. The district 

court generally believed Leslie’s testimony and disbelieved Todd’s testimony when it 

conflicted with Leslie’s. 

After a two-day hearing, the district court issued its judgment awarding Leslie: 

(1) sole legal and physical custody of the children; (2) half of the unused North Star 

insurance proceeds, or $17,500; (3) a $7,500 marital interest in the shed; and (4) $35,000 

as reimbursement for the value of her contributions to the construction of the home. The 

district court also awarded Todd parenting time “on the third full weekend of each month 

from Friday at 5:30 until Sunday at 5:30 p.m.” as well as alternating holidays. Todd 

appeals. 

D E C I S I O N

I. Parenting Time

Todd does not contest the district court’s award of sole physical and legal custody 

of the parties’ children to Leslie, but he does argue that the district court erred in limiting

his parenting time to two days a month and alternating holidays. He contends that the 

district court failed to apply a rebuttable statutory presumption of 25 percent parenting 

time, see Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 1(g) (2014), and failed to justify limiting his 
5

parenting time with a finding of endangerment. Todd also generally challenges the 

district court’s findings of fact and credibility determinations. Although we conclude that 

the district court’s findings of fact are not clearly erroneous and the district court did not 

err in failing to make an endangerment finding, we agree that the district court abused its 

discretion when it did not explicitly consider the rebuttable statutory presumption 

governing parenting time.

After determining the physical custody of a child, “the court shall, upon the 

request of either parent, grant such parenting time on behalf of the child and a parent as 

will enable the child and the parent to maintain a child to parent relationship that will be 

in the best interests of the child.” Id., subd. 1(a) (2014). The issue of parenting time is 

“governed by the best interests of the child.” In re Welfare of B.K.P., 662 N.W.2d 913, 

916 (Minn. App. 2003); see also Courey v. Courey, 524 N.W.2d 469, 472 (Minn. App. 

1994). 

District courts have broad discretion in deciding parenting-time questions. Olson 

v. Olson, 534 N.W.2d 547, 550 (Minn. 1995). A district court abuses that discretion 

when it improperly applies the law or makes findings of fact that are not supported by the 

evidence. Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705, 710 (Minn. 1985). Findings of fact are 

reviewed for clear error, id., and appellate courts defer to the district court's credibility 

determinations. Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn. 1988).

A. Rebuttable Presumption of 25 Percent Parenting Time

“In the absence of other evidence, there is a rebuttable presumption that a parent is 

entitled to receive a minimum of 25 percent of the parenting time for the child.” Minn.
6

Stat. § 518.175, subd. 1(g). The district court did not explicitly consider this presumption 

in its findings of fact or conclusions of law. Todd relies on this court’s precedent in 

Hagen v. Schirmers, 783 N.W.2d 212 (Minn. App. 2010), to argue that omitting 

consideration of the 25 percent presumption is an abuse of discretion. In Hagen, this 

court held that a district court must “demonstrate an awareness and application of the 

25% presumption when the issue is appropriately raised and the court awards less than 

25% parenting time.” Id. at 217 (citation omitted). 

Hagen stated:

Minnesota Statute Section 518.175, subdivision 1(e), is a 

legislatively imposed benchmark for parenting time. As such, 

the provision would be stripped of its purpose if appellate 

courts could, after the fact, calculate parenting time in a light 

most favorable to the decision and supply findings as a basis 

to conclude that the presumption, if considered, would have 

been overcome. 

Id. at 218. This court further noted that when district courts have a broad degree of 

discretion, it is particularly important that the district court “identify both its decision 

(e.g., spousal maintenance, child support, parenting time) as well as the underlying 

reason(s) for that decision (i.e., findings showing why the amount of maintenance, child 

support or parenting time is appropriate in the particular case).” Id. at 217-18 (citing 

Stich v. Stich, 435 N.W.2d 52, 53 (Minn. 1989) (stating, in spousal-maintenance context, 

that “[e]ffective appellate review of the exercise of [the district court’s] discretion is 

possible only when the [district] court has issued sufficiently detailed findings of fact to 

demonstrate its consideration [of all relevant factors]”); Wallin v. Wallin, 290 Minn. 261, 

267, 187 N.W.2d 627, 631 (1971) (stating that, given the district court’s broad discretion 
7

in family cases, it is especially important that the basis for its decision be set forth with a 

high degree of particularity)). The court in Hagen, therefore, remanded for consideration 

of the rebuttable statutory presumption. Id. at 219-20.

A footnote in Hagen reiterated the importance of raising the presumption to the 

district court because appellate courts “do not consider matters not argued to and 

considered by the district court.” Id. at 219 n.4 (citing Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 

582 (Minn. 1988)). Leslie argues that a remand here would be inappropriate because she 

suggested the parenting-time schedule adopted by the district court at trial and Todd did 

not raise the statutory presumption in response. 

Leslie’s assertion is incorrect. Todd did alert the district court to the statutory 

presumption in his written closing: “At a minimum, Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 1(g),

establishes a rebuttable presumption that each parent is entitled to at least 25% of the 

parenting time.” We conclude that raising the issue in a written closing argument

sufficiently alerts the district court of the need to address the rebuttable presumption. 

Accordingly, remand of the issue of parenting time is necessary.

B. Endangerment Finding

Todd further contends that the district court effectively restricted his parenting 

time by awarding him less parenting time than he was getting under the parties’ voluntary 

agreement. Assuming that court-awarded parenting time in an amount less than the 

amount he had under the parties’ voluntary agreement is a restriction under Minnesota 

Statutes section 518.175, subdivision 5, he asserts that the district court erred in failing to 

justify this assumed restriction with a finding of endangerment. See Minn. Stat.
8

§ 518.175, subd. 5(b)(1)(2014) (“Except as provided in section 631.52, the court may not 

restrict parenting time unless it finds that . . . parenting time is likely to endanger the 

child’s physical or emotional health or impair the child’s emotional development . . .”). 

Because Todd may attempt to raise this contention upon remand, we address it 

now. See generally Lee v. Lee, 775 N.W.2d 631, 642 (Minn. 2009) (making “further 

comment” on certain issues “[i]n light of our decision”). If the assumption underlying 

Todd’s argument is that an award of parenting time of less than the presumed minimum 

of 25 percent is a restriction of parenting time under Minnesota Statutes section 518.175, 

subdivision 5, that assumption is incorrect. See Hagen, 783 N.W.2d at 218 (noting, in the 

context of a parenting-time modification, that “[a]lthough a ‘restriction’ [of parenting 

time] requires a finding of endangerment or noncompliance with court orders, parentingtime allocations that merely fall below the 25% presumption can be justified by reasons 

related to the child’s best interests and considerations of what is feasible given the

circumstances of the parties”) (citation and footnote omitted). 

Further, Todd’s argument is unavailing because Minnesota Statutes section 

518.175, subdivision 5, only applies to modifications of parenting time. The current 

appeal involves an initial grant of parenting time, rather than a modification, so the 

statute relied upon by Todd does not apply. And Todd does not contend that the initial 

grant of parenting time was a restriction under Minnesota Statutes section 518.175, 

subdivision 1(b) (2014). 

Accordingly, we conclude that he has shown neither error nor abuse of discretion 

by the district court and decline to address the issue of whether the initial grant was a 
9

restriction. See State Dep’t. of Labor & Indus. v. Wintz Parcel Drivers, Inc., 558 N.W.2d 

480, 480 (Minn. 1997) (declining to address issue absent adequate briefing); State v. 

Modern Recycling, Inc., 558 N.W.2d 770, 772 (Minn. App. 1997) (stating assignment of 

error in brief based on mere assertion is waived “unless prejudicial error is obvious on 

mere inspection”). 

C. Other Arguments

Todd raises other general challenges to the district court’s findings of fact 

supporting its determination of parenting time. He argues that the district court did not 

“consider the age of the children and the children’s relationship with their dad prior to the 

commencement of the proceeding” and that “[t]here was no expert opinion supporting the 

deviation from the normal of 10%-45% parenting time between father and children.” He

argues that Leslie’s testimony was uncorroborated and unreliable and generally asserts

that the district court erred in crediting her testimony over his. He also contends that the 

district court improperly blamed him for the order for protection.

Because we remand for explicit consideration of the 25 percent parenting time 

presumption, we need not address these contentions in detail. To the extent that Todd is 

challenging the district court’s credibility determinations, however, these claims are 

unavailing. See Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d at 210 (noting that “[d]eference must be given to 

the opportunity of the trial court to assess the credibility of the witnesses”). 

II. Property Division

Todd next challenges the district court’s property settlement awarding Leslie a 

total of $60,000 plus interest. He argues that the district court abused its discretion by 
10

awarding Leslie: (1) $17,500 in unused insurance proceeds; (2) $7,500, or half the cost of 

the replacement shed the parties built on Todd’s property; and (3) $35,000, or 20 percent 

of the value of the homestead. After carefully considering the parties’ arguments, we 

conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Leslie half the cost

of the shed and 20 percent of the value of the homestead. But because the district court 

erred in concluding that spending marital assets for ordinary living expenses is a transfer, 

encumbrance, concealment, or disposition of marital property in violation of Minnesota 

Statutes section 518.58, subdivision 1a (2014), we modify the award of the unused 

insurance proceeds.

Appellate courts “independently review the issue of whether property is marital or 

nonmarital, giving deference to the district court’s findings of fact.” Baker v. Baker, 753 

N.W.2d 644, 649 (Minn. 2008). This court will only overturn a finding of fact if it is 

“clearly erroneous on the record as a whole.” Lund v. Lund, 615 N.W.2d 860, 861 

(Minn. App. 2000).

A. Excess Insurance Proceeds - $17,500

Todd contends that the district court erred in awarding Leslie $17,500 of the 

“unused North Star insurance proceeds.” 

Minnesota Statutes section 518.58, subdivision 1a, provides the following:

During the pendency of a marriage dissolution, . . . or in 

contemplation of commencing a marriage dissolution, . . . 

each party owes a fiduciary duty to the other for any profit or 

loss derived by the party, without the consent of the other, 

from a transaction or from any use by the party of the marital 

assets. If the court finds that a party to a marriage, without 

consent of the other party, has in contemplation of 
11

commencing, or during the pendency of, the current 

dissolution . . . transferred, encumbered, concealed, or 

disposed of marital assets except in the usual course of 

business or for the necessities of life, the court shall 

compensate the other party by placing both parties in the 

same position that they would have been in had the transfer, 

encumbrance, concealment, or disposal not occurred.

Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1a (emphasis added). The party claiming a violation of this 

provision has the burden of proof. Id. 

In Baker v. Baker, the Minnesota Supreme Court stated that attorney fees are not 

expenses “in the usual course of business or for the necessities of life.” 753 N.W.2d at 

653–54 (quoting Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1a). The Baker court also quoted 

approvingly from this court’s decision in Thomas v. Thomas, 407 N.W.2d 124 (Minn. 

App. 1987), concluding that “[a]ny amount taken from marital property to pay one 

party’s attorney’s fees should be accounted for on remand and the other party 

compensated in the distribution.” Id. at 653 (quoting Thomas, 407 N.W.2d at 128). 

Here, the district court ruled that the North Star insurance proceeds, including the 

unused portion, were a marital asset, and that determination is not challenged on appeal. 

The district court further found that, in 2009, Todd “transferred $35,000 of the unused 

proceeds into his individual savings account” and ultimately spent the entire value of this

marital asset after the parties separated.

The district court specifically found that Todd paid $30,000 in attorney fees from 

those funds. It concluded that Leslie was entitled to one half of the value of the unused 

proceeds and ordered Todd to reimburse her for $17,500. As in Baker, the district court 

ordered that “[e]ach party shall be responsible for their own attorney’s fees and costs 
12

associated with this action.” See id. at 649. Under Baker, the district court would abuse 

its discretion if it ordered the parties to pay their own attorney fees and allowed Todd to 

pay his attorney fees from a marital asset. See id. at 654. 

The district court also stated at trial that buying groceries is an improper use of 

marital assets unless it is done jointly. The district court found that Todd spent the rest of 

the unused insurance proceeds on living expenses; it therefore awarded Leslie half of the 

total amount. This component of the award is contrary to Minnesota Statutes section 

518.58, subdivision 1a, which states that a party is allowed to spend marital assets “in the 

usual course of business or for the necessities of life” without the consent of the other 

party. Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1a. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court 

erred in finding that Todd violated Minnesota Statutes section 518.58, subdivision 1a, by 

spending the remaining $5,000 of the unused insurance proceeds on living expenses. 

The district court did not clearly err in finding that Todd violated Minnesota 

Statutes section 518.58, subdivision 1a, by spending $30,000 of marital assets on attorney 

fees and in awarding Leslie half that amount. But because the district court clearly erred 

by finding that Todd improperly expended the remaining $5,000 of unused proceeds by 

spending it on ordinary living expenses, we modify the property award from $17,500 to 

$15,000. 

B. 50 Percent of Value of New Shed - $7,500

Todd next argues that the district court erred by ruling that the new shed was 

marital property and awarding Leslie half its value. He contends that because he built the 

original shed, it was nonmarital property. Accordingly, he claims that the new shed is 
13

also nonmarital property, even though it was built during the marriage and funded by 

proceeds from a homeowner’s insurance policy, the proceeds of which the district court 

ruled to be marital property. He contends that were it not for the original, nonmarital 

shed, there would not be any insurance proceeds. He further asserts that the additional 

insurance premium to cover the shed was “probably miniscule” and that the district 

court’s analysis fails to acknowledge that he built the shed. 

Marital property presumptively includes any property that either or both parties 

acquire during the marriage, unless covered by an enumerated exception. See Minn. Stat. 

§ 518.003, subd. 3b, 3b(a)–(e) (2014). “To overcome the presumption that property is 

marital, a party must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the property is 

nonmarital.” Antone v. Antone, 645 N.W.2d 96, 101 (Minn. 2002).

When nonmarital and marital funds are commingled, the party asserting that the 

assets are nonmarital must sufficiently trace the nonmarital assets to prove the nonmarital 

character. Crosby v. Crosby, 587 N.W.2d 292, 296–97 (Minn. App. 1998), review denied

(Minn. Feb. 18, 1999). Property can have “both marital and nonmarital aspects.” 

Schmitz v. Schmitz, 309 N.W.2d 748, 750 (Minn. 1981). But “[w]hen nonmarital and 

marital property are commingled, the nonmarital investment may lose that character 

unless it can be readily traced.” Wiegers v. Wiegers, 467 N.W.2d 342, 344 (Minn. App. 

1991). In addition, improvements made to premarital property, if made during the 

marriage, should be considered marital. Wilson v. Wilson, 348 N.W.2d 357, 359 (Minn. 

App. 1984). 
14

Here, Todd had the burden to demonstrate that the shed is nonmarital property. 

The shed was rebuilt during the parties’ marriage, using proceeds from an insurance 

policy that the district court characterized as marital property. Todd cites no caselaw to 

support his assertion that, because the original insured property was his nonmarital 

property, the property rebuilt with what the district court ruled to be the martial proceeds 

of the insurance policy should also be nonmarital. On this record, we affirm the district 

court’s determination that Todd did not carry his burden to prove by a preponderance of 

the evidence that the new shed is nonmarital property.

Todd further argues that the district court erred in finding that the replacement cost 

of $15,000 equals the fair market value of the shed. He asserts that it “is axiomatic that 

replacement cost is not fair market value,” and notes the lack of testimony about the 

value or characteristics of the shed. He suggests, without citing any legal authority, that 

the appropriate standard would be the amount “an arm’s length buyer [would] pay for the 

used shed which would have to be moved[].” We disagree.

The district court “has discretion in valuation and division of marital property 

upon the dissolution of the marriage. Its decision should not be overturned in the absence 

of a clear abuse of discretion or an erroneous application of the prevailing law.” Ebnet v. 

Ebnet, 347 N.W.2d 840, 842 (Minn. App. 1984). “Exactitude is not required of the trial 

court in the valuation of assets in a dissolution proceeding; it is only necessary that the 

value arrived at lies within a reasonable range of figures.” Johnson v. Johnson, 277 

N.W.2d 208, 211 (Minn. 1979). 
15

In addition, district courts may value property based solely on oral testimony. 

Doering v. Doering, 385 N.W.2d 387, 390–91 (Minn. App. 1986) (holding that the 

district court’s decision to base its valuation on one party’s estimate was not clearly 

erroneous). In Ebnet, this court ruled that one party’s testimony regarding the value of 

the home was sufficient for the purposes of property division. 347 N.W.2d at 840. This 

court has also stated that:

On appeal, a party cannot complain about a district court’s 

failure to rule in her favor when one of the reasons it did not 

do so is because that party failed to provide the district court 

with the evidence that would allow the district court to fully 

address the question.

Eisenschenk v. Eisenschenk, 668 N.W.2d 235, 243 (Minn. App. 2003), review denied

(Minn. Nov. 25, 2003). 

Leslie argues that the district court was within its discretion when it valued the 

shed at $15,000 based on its evaluation of the witness testimony. She notes that Todd’s 

testimony established the evidence for the valuation: he testified that the shed contributes 

“probably $15,000” to the fair market value of the homestead. We conclude that, under

Ebnet and Doering, the district court was within its discretion when it valued the shed at 

$15,000 based solely on Todd’s testimony. 

C. 20 Percent of Value of the Homestead - $35,000

Finally, Todd challenges the district court’s property award of 20 percent of the 

value of the homestead to Leslie. We initially note that the home was built between the 

parties’ marriages and therefore is not marital property. See Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd. 

3b (defining marital property). Here, Todd contends that the district court erred by 
16

speculating about the value of the homestead and Leslie’s contributions without the aid of 

expert testimony. We reject these contentions. 

1. Jurisdictional Bar

Todd first asserts that the district court erred in addressing Leslie’s claim to 

reimbursement for her contributions to the homestead because the parties were not 

married at the time most of the house was built, and thus Minnesota’s anti-palimony 

statutes strip the court of jurisdiction. See Minn. Stat. §§ 513.075- .076 (2014). We find 

this assertion to be without merit. 

Minnesota Statutes sections 513.075-.076 create a jurisdictional bar that prevents 

courts from hearing claims “based on the fact that the individuals lived together in 

contemplation of sexual relations and out of wedlock within or without this state,” Minn. 

Stat. § 513.076, unless the individuals signed a written contract and sought enforcement 

after the relationship was over. Minn. Stat. § 513.075.

The Minnesota Supreme Court has held, however, that the jurisdictional bar 

imposed by sections 513.075 and 513.076 applies only when the “sole consideration for a 

contract between cohabiting parties is their contemplation of sexual relations out of 

wedlock.” In re Estate of Eriksen, 337 N.W.2d 671, 674 (Minn. 1983). The supreme 

court also clarified that “the statutory bar does not apply where one party is merely 

seeking to preserve and protect [his or] her own property and is not seek[ing] to assert 

any rights in the property of a cohabitant.” In re Estate of Palmen, 588 N.W.2d 493, 495 

(Minn. 1999) (quotations omitted). 
17

The Palmen court noted that Minnesota Statutes sections 513.075 and 513.076

prevent cohabiting couples from claiming the legal rights of married couples, but they 

“do not operate to automatically divest unmarried couples living together of all legal 

remedies.” Id. at 496. This court found that “unless the sexual relationship constitutes 

the sole consideration for the property agreement, cohabiting parties may maintain 

actions against each other regarding their own earnings or property, based on equitable 

theories such as constructive trust or unjust enrichment.” Obert v. Dahl, 574 N.W.2d 

747, 749 (Minn. App. 1998), aff’d, 587 N.W.2d 844 (Minn. 1999).

In the context of property divisions between cohabiting partners, Minnesota courts 

have imposed constructive trusts as a remedy for unjust enrichment where there has been 

an agreement between the parties regarding that property. See, e.g., Eriksen, 337 N.W.2d 

at 674 (imposing a constructive trust where underlying agreement was to join in the 

purchase of a home and parties had reasons not to put agreement in writing); Obert, 574 

N.W.2d at 747 (finding summary judgment inappropriate when there was a question of 

material fact involving whether the parties had a property agreement that was not based 

solely on living together in contemplation of sexual relations); see also Hollom v. Carey, 

343 N.W.2d 701 (Minn. App. 1984) (declining to impose a constructive trust where there 

was no clear understanding by the parties that the property would be jointly owned and 

no extenuating circumstances justifying lack of written agreement); Tourville v. 

Kowarsch, 365 N.W.2d 298 (Minn. App. 1985) (noting “the trial court accepted 

respondent’s testimony that the parties did not have an agreement that appellant had an 

interest in the property”).
18

The district court found that Leslie “made substantial contributions of both money 

and labor to the home’s construction[,] and the value of her contributions 

is. . . approximately 20% of the portion of the homestead’s total fair market value that is 

attributable to the home and curtilage.” The district court thus awarded Leslie $35,000 as 

reimbursement for the value of her contributions to the home’s construction. The district 

court concluded that the award was not barred by Minnesota Statutes sections 513.075-

.076 because “it reimburses [her] for the value of her individual contributions to the 

home’s construction, and, therefore, does not grant [her] a portion of [Todd]’s interest in 

the property.” 

The district court did not make any explicit findings regarding an underlying 

property agreement supporting the property award. But a district court’s findings of fact 

can be implicit. See Prahl v. Prahl, 627 N.W.2d 698, 703 (Minn. App. 2001) (stating 

that “[w]e may treat statutory factors as addressed when they are implicit in the 

findings. . .”); Eckman v. Eckman, 410 N.W.2d 385, 389 (Minn. App. 1987) (stating that 

the district court’s failure to make a specific finding was not reversible error when it was 

implicit in other findings). Because a finding of an express or implied agreement is 

required in an award under Palmen and Eriksen, and the district court made such an 

award, we will infer an implicit finding that the requisite agreement existed here and 

review that implicit finding.

Implicit findings of fact are reviewed for clear error. See Vettleson v. Special Sch. 

Dist. No. 1, 361 N.W.2d 425, 428 (Minn. App. 1985). On this record, we conclude that 

an implicit finding of an implied agreement is not clearly erroneous. Leslie testified that 
19

she spent “hundreds of hours working on the home” and also contributed financially to its 

construction. The district court found her testimony credible and implicitly found that 

she would not have made these contributions unless the parties had an implied agreement 

that she would have an interest in the home in return. 

Further, at least some of the district court’s property award was attributable to 

financial and labor contributions that Leslie made during the marriage. Even though 

most of the house was completed during the period between the parties’ two marriages, 

there is evidence that she continued to work on the house and make payments for 

materials while the parties were married. Because improvements made to nonmarital 

property during a marriage are presumed to be marital property, Wilson, 348 N.W.2d at 

359, the district court also implicitly and properly found that these improvements are 

marital property and included their value in Leslie’s property award. 

Given these implicit and not clearly erroneous findings, we conclude that the 

district court was within its discretion when it awarded Leslie 20 percent of the value of 

the homestead. 

2. Valuation

Finally, Todd argues that the district court erred in speculating about the value of 

the homestead and Leslie’s contributions without the aid of expert testimony. As 

discussed earlier, the district court has broad discretion in determining property values 

when dividing property. Ebnet, 347 N.W.2d at 842. The district court is not required to 

be exact, Johnson, 277 N.W.2d at 211, and may value and divide property based solely 

on oral testimony. Doering, 385 N.W.2d at 390–91; see also Bury v. Bury, 416 N.W.2d 
20

133, 136 (Minn. App. 1987) (stating that parties are presumptively competent to testify to 

the value of their assets). 

The district court found that the total fair market value of the property is $217,000

and that $183,000 is attributable to the home and its curtilage. The district court found 

that the construction of the home was a collaborative effort and that Leslie spent 

“hundreds of hours working on the home.” The district court also found that Todd 

“purchased and paid for the bulk of the materials, supplies, and labor in 2002 using his 

non-marital cash savings,” but that some of the construction expenses were paid using the 

parties’ joint checking account. 

The district court did not abuse its discretion when it valued the homestead. Nor 

did the district court abuse its discretion in finding that the value of Leslie’s contributions 

was approximately 20 percent of the home’s fair market value, or $35,000. The district 

court did not clearly state how it calculated these numbers, but the 2014 property tax 

assessment valued the homestead at $217,100. Todd’s written closing statement 

suggested $217,500. In the face of conflicting testimony, the district court credited 

Leslie’s estimation of her contributions. Because the district court has broad discretion, 

and because this court defers to the district court’s credibility determinations, we 

conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in valuing the homestead and 

Leslie’s contributions as it did. 

In sum, because we find that the district court properly valued the shed and 

Leslie’s financial and labor contributions to construction of the family home, we affirm 

the awards of $7,500 for one-half the value of the shed and $35,000 for 20 percent of the 
21

value of the homestead, respectively, to Leslie. Although we conclude that the district 

court properly found that Todd expended $30,000 in marital assets in violation of 

Minnesota Statutes section 518.58, subdivision 1a, by spending them on attorney fees, we 

conclude that it clearly erred when it found that he improperly expended the $5,000 of 

unused insurance proceeds that he spent on living expenses. Accordingly, we modify 

Leslie’s award from the unused insurance proceeds from $17,500 to $15,000. 

Finally, because the district court was alerted to the statutory parenting time 

presumption and did not address it, we remand for the district court to (1) determine 

parenting time giving consideration to the rebuttable presumption that a parent receives

25 percent parenting time; (2) determine parenting-time percentages; (3) make findings 

supporting its determinations; and (4) state the basis for departing from the statutory 

presumption, if applicable. As in Hagen, we “reiterate that the statute gives district 

courts flexibility in weighing the evidence and the presumption.” Hagen, 783 N.W.2d at 

219. Upon remand, the district court may in its discretion reopen the record to make 

findings consistent with the statutory presumption. 

Affirmed in part as modified, reversed in part, and remanded.