The slip opinion is the first version of an opinion released by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals. Once an opinion is selected for publication by the Court, it is assigned a vendor

- neutral citation by the Clerk of the Court for compliance with Rule 23

- 112 NMRA, authenticated and formally published. The sli p opinion may contain deviations from the formal authenticated opinion.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1
Opinion Number: _________________ 2
Filing Date: April 16, 2024 3

No. A

- 1

- CA

- 41120 4

BRAD BOLEN a/k/a BRADLEY 5 CARROL BOLEN , 6

P laintiff

- Appellee, 7

v. 8

NEW MEXICO RACING COMMISSION ; 9 and FABIAN LOPEZ , R ecords C ustodian for 10 New Mexico Racing Commission , 11

Defendant s

- Appellant s

. 12

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO C OUNTY 13 Joshua A. Allison , District Court Judge 14
Western Agriculture, Resource and 15 Business Advocates, LLP 16 A. Blair Dunn 17 Jared R. Vander Dussen 18 Albuquerque, NM 19
for Appellee 20
Jackson Loman Stanford Downey 21 & Stevens

- Block, P.C. 22 Eric Loman 23 Albuquerque, NM 24
for Appellants 25OPINION 1

BOGARDUS, Judge. 2

{1} This case requires us to interpret, for the first time, whether judicial immunity 3

is a defense available to a “public body” under the New Mexico Civil Rights Act 4
(CRA) , NMSA 1978, §§ 41

- 4A

- 1 to

- 13 (2021). Defendant, the New Mexico Racing 5
Commission (NMRC) 1 filed a motion for summary judgment in the district court
, 6
which argued, in relevant part, that NMRC has absolute quasi

- judicial immunity 7
from suit for its decision to initiate and prosecute an administrative disciplinary 8
proceeding against Plaintiff Brad Bolen . The district court denied NMRC’s motion 9
for summary judgment, concluding that because judicial immunity applies only to 10

individuals, NMRC is not immune from suit under the CRA. On appeal, NMRC 11
argues that the district court erred in denying its motion because judicial immunity 12
is expressly preserved under Section 41

- 4A

- 10 of the CRA and, under the facts of 13
this case, it is entitled to quasi

- judicial immunity. 2 We agree with NMRC that the 14

1 NMRC is an administrative agency created by the Horse Racing Act to regulate the sport and industry of horse racing. See NMSA 1978, §§ 60

- 1A

- 1 to

- 30 (2007
, as amended through 2023 )

. Pursuant to the Horse Racing Act, persons engaged in horse racing may only do so if licensed by NMRC. See 16.47.1.8(A) NMAC (stating “[a] person as defined by 15.2.1.7 NMAC shall not participate in pari

- mutuel racing under the jurisdiction of the commission or be employed by an association who is a gaming operator, without a valid license issued by the commission”).
2 Although NMRC raised several issues in its application for interlocutory appeal, and we granted the application as to all issues, NMRC only briefed the single issue that was raised in its separate petition for writ of error to this Court

— namely,2 district court erred and therefore reverse and remand with instructions to grant 1
summary judgment in favor of NMRC. 2

BACKGROUND 3

{ 2 } This case arises from a dispute between Bolen , licensed by NMRC as a horse 4

trainer, and a c hief s teward over the reinstatement of the license of an assistant 5

trainer that Bolen wished to employ

. After learning that his assistant trainer’s license 6
would not be reinstated after a lengthy period of suspension, Bolen contacted the 7

c hief s teward to advocate for the reinstatement of the license. It is undisputed that 8

Bolen was critical of the c hief s teward’s performance during their dispute. Based on 9
Bolen’s behavior, NMRC initiated an administrative disciplinary proceeding against 10
him for violating 16.47.1.8(L)(1)(i) NMAC. 3 11

{ 3 } The board of stewards held a hearing on the matter and ruled that Bolen had 12
violated 16.47.1.8(L)(1)(i) NMAC and issued a $500 fine, which was immediately 13
waived and would be completely abated should Plaintiff have no violations for a 14

whether the district court erred in denying NMRC’s motion for summary judgment based on its conclusion that NMRC is not immune from suit because quasi

- judicial immunity is a defense only available to individuals, not public bodies. Because we conclude that NMRC is entitled to quasi

- judicial immunity in this case, supplemental briefing on the two other claims raised by NMRC in its application, which are also tied to the CRA, is unnecessary as Plaintiff ’s CRA claims against NMRC are barred.
3 The New Mexico Administrative Code 16.47.1.8(L)(1)(i) authorizes NMRC to take disciplinary measures where a licensee’s “conduct or reputation may adversely reflect on the honesty and integrity of horse racing or interfere with the orderly conduct of a race meeting.”3 period of one year. Bolen appealed to the board of s tewards
, seeking a review before 1
an independent hearing officer. C ontemporaneously , Bolen filed the underlying 2
complaint in district court to establish NMRC’s liability and recov er damages and 3
equitable relief under Section 41

- 4A

- 3 of the CRA alleging, in relevant part, 4 that 4

NMRC retaliated against him by initiating “a vindictive prosecution” against him, 5
violating his rights under Article II, Sections 17 and 18 of the New Mexico 6

Constitution. T he administrative hearing was scheduled to take place but, before the 7
hearing, Bolen withdrew his appeal choosing only to pursue litigation. 8

{ 4 } NMRC subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment

. Bolen also filed 9

a motion for partial summary judgment on his claims against NMRC. A hearing on 10
the two motions took place. Following the hearing, t he district court granted Bolen’s 11
motion for summary judgment, in part, and denied N MRC ’s motion. The district 12
court concluded that NMRC is not entitled to quasi

- judicial immunity based on the 13
distinction between the types of claims for relief allowed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
, 14
versus those allowed under the CRA. Specifically, the district court reasoned that 15

because “ [ t ] he immunities available under [§] 1983 are based in public policy that 16

4 In his complaint, Plaintiff also sought injunctive relief and alleged that NMRC violated the New Mexico Inspection of Public Records Act (IPRA), NMSA 1978, § 14

- 2

- 1 ( 2019, amended 2023 ) , on the basis that NMRC failed to respond to his IPRA request within fifteen days. See NMSA 1978, § 14

- 2

- 11(C) (1993)

.4 protects an individual defendant from personal liability for damages” and this public 1
policy is not at issue under the CRA

— NMRC is not immune from suit. 2

{5} Following the district court’s denial of its motion, NMRC promptly filed both 3
an application for interlocutory appeal and petition for writ of error to this Court. 4
We granted both and consolidated the appeals. 5

DISCUSSION 6

{6} We begin by determining whether judicial immunity, as well as its 7

extension

— quasi

- judicial immunity, is a defense available to public bodies sued 8

under the CRA. 5 Because we conclude

— based on our plain language interpretation 9
of the relevant statutory section

— that it is, we then determine whether NMRC is 10
entitled to quasi

- judicial immunity for the claims brought against it by Bolen. We 11

hold that NMRC is entitled to quasi

- judicial immunity under the facts of this case . 12

I. Standard of Review 13

{7} We review the district court’s den ial of summary judgment de novo, s ee 14
Headley v. Morgan M gmt. Corp
., 2005

- NMCA

- 045, ¶ 5, 137 N.M. 339, 110 P.3d 15

1076, viewing the facts in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party and drawing 16

5 As we discuss in depth below, quasi

- judicial immunity is the extension of judicial immunity “to various persons whose adjudicatory functions or other involvement with the judicial process have been thought to warrant protection from harassment, intimidation, or other interference with their ability to engage in impartial decision

- making.” Hunnicutt v. Sewell
, 2009

- NMCA

- 121, ¶ 9, 147 N.M. 272, 219 P.3d 529 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)

.5 all reasonable inferences in support of a trial on the merits. Upton v. Clovis Mun. 1

Sch. Dist

. , 2006

- NMSC

- 040, ¶ 7, 140 N.M. 205, 141 P.3d 1259. “Summary 2
judgment is proper if there are no genuine issues of material fact and the movant is 3

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Roth v. Thompson
, 1992

- NMSC

- 011, ¶ 17, 4

113 N.M. 331, 825 P.2d 1241. 5

II. Quasi

- Judicial Immunity is a Defense Available to Public Bodies U nder 6 Section 41

- 4A

- 10 of the CRA 7

{8} NMRC a sserts that the district court erred in concluding that a public body 8

cannot raise quasi

- judicial immunity as a defense under the CRA

— arguing that 9

Section 41

- 4A

- 10 explicitly preserves this defense. Bolen does not dispute NMRC’s 10

argument that quasi

- judicial immunity can apply to a public body under the CRA. 11

We agree with NMRC that the district court erred. 12

{9} We review Section 41

- 4A

- 10 de novo. See Hovet v. Allstate Ins. Co
., 2004

- 13

NMSC

- 010, ¶ 10, 135 N.M. 397, 89 P.3d 69 (“Statutory interpretation is a question 14

of law, which we review de novo.”). “When construing statutes our charge is to 15
determine and give effect to the Legislature’s intent.” Wild Horse Observers Ass’n 16

v. N.M. Livestock Bd

. , 2022

- NMCA

- 061, ¶ 8, 519 P.3d 74 (internal quotation marks 17
and citation omitted). “New Mexico courts have long honored this statutory 18
command through application of the plain meaning rule, recognizing that when a 19
statute contains language which is clear and unambiguous, we must give effect to 20
that language and refrain from further statutory interpretation.” Quynh Truong v. 216 Allstate Ins. Co

. , 2010

- NMSC

- 009, ¶ 37 , 147 N.M. 583, 227 P.3d 73 (text only) 1
(citation omitted). “Statutes must also be construed so that no part of the statute is 2
rendered surplusage or superfluous, and we will not read into a statute language 3

which is not there.” Am. Fed ’n of State , Cnty. & Mun. Emps. v. City of Albuquerque
, 4

2013

- NMCA

- 063, ¶ 5, 304 P.3d 443 ( omission , internal quotation marks
, and 5

citation s omitted). Moreover, “[w]e consider all parts of the statute together, reading 6

the statute in its entirety and construing each part in connection with every other part 7
to produce a harmonious whole.” Dep’t of Game & Fish v. Rawlings , 2019

- NMCA

8

018, ¶ 6, 436 P.3d 741 (alterations, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). 9

{10} Pursuant to the CRA, a person can bring an action “to establish liability and 10
recover actual damages and equitable or injunctive relief in any New Mexico district 11
court” for the deprivation of their rights under the New Mexico Constitution “due to 12
acts or omissions of a public body or person acting on behalf of, under color of or 13

within the course and scope of the authority of a public body.” Section 41

- 4A

- 3(B). 14
Moreover, under the CRA, a claim may only be brought against a public body, not 15

an individual. Section 41

- 4A

- 3(C) . The CRA defines “public body” as “a state or 16
local government, an advisory board, a commission, an agency or an entity created 17
by the constitution of New Mexico or any branch of government that receives public 18
funding.” Section 41

- 4A

- 2. The parties do not dispute that NMRC qualifies as a 197 “public body” within the meaning of Section 41

- 4A

- 2

— NMRC is a state agency 1
created by the Horse Racing Act to regulate the sport and industry of racing. 2

{11} The statutory section at issue in this case is Section 41

- 4A

- 10, which states, 3

T he prohibition on the use of the defense of qualified immunity 4 pursuant to Section 41

- 4A

- 10

. . . of the New Mexico [CRA] and the 5 waiver of sovereign immunity pursuant to Section 41

- 4A

- 9

. . . of that 6 act shall not abrogate judicial immunity, legislative immunity or any 7 other constitutional, statutory or common law immunity. 8

NMRC contends that because Section 41

- 4A

- 10 expressly states that judicial 9
immunity is not abrogated by the prohibition on the defense of qualified immunity 10
and the waiver of sovereign immunity within Sections 41

- 4A

- 4 and

- 9 of the CRA

— 11

it is a defense available under the CRA. Moreover, according to NMRC, this 12
language read together with Section 41

- 4A

- 3(C)
, which limits claims under the CRA 13
to those “brought exclusively against a public body ,” signifies that a public body 14
sued pursuant to the CRA may raise judicial immunity as a defense . Interpreting the 15
statute otherwise, according to NMRC, would render Section 41

- 4A

- 10 16
“meaningless and unnecessary.” 17

{12} R eading Sections 41

- 4A

- 10,

- 2 , and

- 3(C) together

— we hold that a public 18
body that is sued under the CRA may raise judicial immunity, as well as quasi

19
judicial immunity, as a defense

. See State v. Farish , 2021

- NMSC

- 030, ¶ 11, 499 20
P.3d 622 (stating that the Court reads statutes as a whole and that “[ t ] he Legislature 21
is presumed not to have used any surplus words in a statute; each word must be given 228 meaning” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) ). T he plain language of 1

Section 41

- 4A

- 10, read alone, functions as an affirmation of judicial immunity. To 2
interpret Section 41

- 4A

- 10 as abrogating judicial immunity for a public body sued 3
under the CRA, as the district court did, would be to disregard the plain l anguage of 4

the statute. Because the plain language of Section 41

- 4A

- 10 is unambiguous , as 5
NMRC suggests, no further interpretation is necessary and it was an error for the 6

district court to look to the immunities under § 1983 to elucidate the intent of the 7
Legislature

. See Elite Well Serv., LLC v. N.M. Tax’n & Revenue Dep’t , 2023

- 8

NMCA

- 041, ¶ 19, 531 P.3d 635 (stating when interpreting a statute, “ [i]t is only 9
where the literal meaning of a statute would be absurd, unreasonable, or otherwise 10
inappropriate in application that we go beyond the mere text of the statute” (internal 11
quotation marks and citation omitted) )

. Therefore, w e conclude that the district court 12
erred in its determination that quasi

- judicial immunity is not a defense available to 13
a public body sued pursuant to the CRA. Accordingly, NM R C, as a public body, 14
may raise quasi

- judicial immunity as a defense to the claims brought against it by 15

Bolen. 16

III. NMRC I s E ntitled to Quasi

- Judicial Immunity 17

{13} Having determined that quasi

- judicial immunity is a defense available to 18
public bodies sued under the CRA, we now determine whether NMRC is entitled to 19
quasi

- judicial immunity for the claims brought against it by Bolen. We “review 209 questions of immunity de novo.” Hunnicutt v. Sewell
, 2009 -NMCA- 121, ¶ 8, 147 1
N.M. 272, 219 P.3d 529. NMRC argues that it is entitled to quasi

- judicial immunity 2
because the actions taken by it in initiating and prosecuting the administrative 3
proceeding against Bolen were quasi

- judicial since “Bolen was provided a full 4
hearing before the [b]oard of [s]tewards, was represented by counsel, and was days 5
away from an additional hearing before an administrative law judge when he 6
withdrew his appeal.” Bolen responds by arguing that NMRC is not entitled to quasi

7
judicial immunity here because it initiated the administrative proceeding 8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19 “maliciously,” “as retaliation for protected speech and petitioning activity and

therefore cannot justify the remainder of their actions.” We agree with NMRC.

{14} “J udicial i mmunity was developed to preserve t he a uto nomy and int egrity of

the judiciary so t

h at person s who are i n tegral to the j udicial process are a ble t o
perform t heir functions withou t the i ntimidating effect of po tentia l lawsuits.” Id. ¶ 9
(al teration, internal qu otation marks
, and citation omitted). Quasi-j ud icial immunity

is the extension of

ju dicial immun ity “ to v ariou s persons w hose adjudicatory

functio ns or oth er involveme nt wi th the ju dicial proces s hav e be e n though t to
warrant protectio n from har assment, i ntimidation, or o ther in terference wi t

h their
ability t o e n gage i n i mpartial de cision -makin g. ” Id. (internal qu otation m arks a nd

citation om itted ); see al

so Lo wrey v

. Castillo
, 2024 -NMCA- 034
, ¶ 9,

___ P .3d

_ __ (A-1-CA-400 83, Jan. 29, 2024). “These perso ns are absolutel y immun e from 2010 liability for their actions taken in performance of their roles as integral parts of the 1
judicial process.” Hunnicutt , 2009

- NMCA

- 121, ¶ 9 (internal quotations marks and 2
citation omitted). Although much of the language in our case law discusses judicial 3
immunity in the context of individuals, rather than an agency or other type of public 4
body, there is no indication that judicial immunity is a defense limited only to 5

individuals. See id. ¶ 1 (concluding that the Administrative Office of the Courts and 6
the Twelfth Judicial District Court, as defendants, were entitled to judicial 7
immunity). 8

{15} New Mexico co urts have recognized quasi

- judicial immunity for person s 9

in volved in administrative proceedings. See City of Albuquerque v. Chavez , 1997

- 10

NMCA

- 054, ¶ 17, 123 N.M. 428, 941 P.2d 509 (recognizing the Tenth Circuit’s 11
holding that administrative hearing officers are entitled to absolute immunity where 12
their “duties and the procedures employed are functionally comparable to those of a 13
court of law” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) ) ; see also Collins ex 14

rel. Collins v. Tabet , 1991

- NMSC

- 013, ¶ 18, 111 N.M. 391, 806 P.2d 40 15
(acknowledging the U.S. Supreme Court’s extension of “absolute immunity to 16
various persons whose adjudicatory functions or other involvement with the judicial 17
process have been thought to warrant protection from harassment, intimidation, or 18
other interference with their ability to engage in impartial decision

- making”)
, 19
abrogated on other grounds by State v. Mares
, 2024

- NMSC

- 002 , ¶ ¶ 2, 32, 543 P.3d 2011 1198

. However, we have yet to develop a framework for determining when an 1
administrative agency or official is entitled to quasi

- judicial immunity. 2

{16} In Kimbrell v. Kimbrell
, 2014

- NMSC

- 027, ¶ 12, 331 P.3d 915 , our Supreme 3
Court adopted the framework from a federal case, Ward v. San Diego Cnty. Dep ’ t of 4

So c. Serv s., 691 F. Supp. 238, 240 (S.D. Cal. 1988), in determining whether a 5
guardian ad litem was entitled to quasi

- judicial immunity as an “arm of the court.” 6

See Kimbrell
, 2014

- NMSC

- 027, ¶¶ 12

- 13 (internal quotation marks and citation 7
omitted); see also Lowrey , ___ - NMCA

- ___, ¶ 8 (applying this framework for 8
determining whether a parole officer was entitled to quasi

- judicial immunity as an 9
“arm of the court”). However, the facts of this case are distinct from those in 10

Kimbre l l and Lowrey , because NMRC is not alleged to be an “arm of the court.” 11
Because there is a gap in our case law concerning when an administrative official or 12
agency is absolutely immune from suit on the basis of quasi

- judicial immunity, we 13
look to federal law for guidance. S ee Akins v. United Steel Workers of Am

. , 2010

- 14

NMSC

- 031, ¶ 15, 148 N.M. 442, 237 P.3d 744 (“In developing a body of state 15
common law, we may look to federal law for guidance where it is persuasive and 16
consistent with our state law and policies.”). 17

{17} In Butz v. Economou , the United States Supreme Court held that federal 18
administrative officials are absolutely immune from suit where they were 19
performing quasi

- judicial functions. See 438 U.S. 478, 514 (1978) (holding “that 2012 persons

. . . performing adjudicatory functions within a federal agency are entitled 1
to absolute immunity from damages liability for their judicial acts [ and t]hose who 2
complain of error in such proceedings must seek agency or judicial review”). The 3

United States Supreme Court held that absolute immunity applies “to administrative 4
officials performing functions analogous to those of judges and prosecutors if the 5
following formula is satisfied: (a) the officials’ functions must be similar to those 6
involved in the judicial process, (b) the officials’ action must be likely to result in 7
damages lawsuits by disappointed parties, and (c) there must exist sufficient 8
safeguards in the regulatory framework to control unconstitutional conduct.” 9

H orwit z v. State Bd. of Med

. Exam ’rs of State of Col o. , 822 F.2d 1508, 1513 (10th 10
Cir. 1987) (summarizing the holding in Butz ). 11

{18} The Tenth Circuit has recognized the holding in Butz to apply to “cases 12
involving state administrative/executive officials serving in adjudicative, judicial, or 13
prosecutorial capacities.” I d

. at 1515. In Horwitz , the United States Court of Appeals 14

for the Tenth Circuit concluded that board members of the Colorado State Board of 15
Medical Examiners “who performed statutory functions both adjudicatory and 16
prosecutorial in nature” were entitled to absolute immunity from suit for claims 17
brought against them under § 1983. Id

. at 1509, 1515. The Tenth Circuit noted that 18
the board members served in a prosecutorial role “in that they, among other things, 19
initiate complaints, start hearings, make investigations, take evidence
, and issue 2013 subpoenas.” Id

. at 1515. Moreover, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the board 1
members served in an “adjudicative role, as judges.” Id

. Reiterating the holding in 2

Butz , the Tenth Circuit reasoned that “such officials who perform adjudicatory 3

function s within [an] agency, who must decide to initiate or pursue a proceeding 4
subject to agency adjudication, and agency personnel who present evidence in such 5
proceedings, are entitled to absolute immunity.” Id

. at 1513. 6

{19} In Gerhardt v. Mares , the United States District Court for the District of New 7

Mexico addressed a case factually analogous to the case at bar. See 179 F. Supp. 3d 8
1006 (D.N.M. 2016). In that case, the plaintiff, a licensee of NMRC, was found to 9

be in violation of a rule and as a result his horse was scratched from a race. See id

. 10

at 1013 . The licensee filed an appeal with NMRC, a hearing officer was appointed, 11
and a hearing was held on the matter. Id

. at 1014. The licensee brought suit against 12
NMRC, its director, a steward, and several racing commissioners

— alleging, among 13
other things, a violation of his constitutional rights. Id

. at 1014

- 15. The defendants, 14
including the racing commissioners, “ argue [ d ] that they [ were ] entitled to absolute 15
immunity
, because they [ were ] performing quasi

- judicial functions. ” Id

. at 1019. 16

The United States District of New Mexico court agreed, in respect to the defendant 17
racing commissioners, holding that they had absolute quasi

- judicial immunity from 18

the licensee’s claims. Id

. at 1058. This holding was based on the District of New 19

Mexico court’s conclusion that “[t]he [r]acing [c]ommissioners’ functions [were] 2014 similar to those of judges in a judicial process[, t]heir decisions are highly likely to 1
cause litigation[, and f]inally the regulatory scheme contains sufficient safeguards to 2
prevent unconstitutional conduct.” 6 Id

. 3

{20} We are persuaded by the framework relied on by the United States Supreme 4

Court
, Tenth Circuit court , and District of New Mexico court . Applying such 5
framework to the facts of this case, we conclude that NMRC is entitled to quasi

6
judicial immunity. 7

A. NMRC’s Action s Were Functionally Comparable to Those Involved in a 8 Judicial Process 9

{21} First, NMRC’s actions in administering the administrative proceeding against 10
Bolen are functionally comparable to those involved in a judicial process. NMRC 11
prompts us to employ the “functional approach” used in Hunnicut t to determine 12
whether its actions were judicial functions. See 2009

- NMCA

- 121, ¶ 9 (applying a 13
“functional test to determine whether the acts alleged . . . were judicial functions”). 14

As far as we understand, Bolen agrees

— as do we

— that the functional approach 15
applies here

. Nevertheless, Bolen argues that because the administrative proceedings 16
against him were commenced maliciously, the remainder of its actions were 17
improper. “We therefore apply the functional analysis to determine whether” NMRC 18

6 The District of New Mexico court concluded that the racing steward, who discovered the licensee’s rule violation in the first place, was “ not entitled to quasi

judicial immunity ” because he was acting in a “ministerial and mechanical [role] compared to the [r] acing [c] ommissioner’s role in the disputed events.” Id. at 1060.15 acted in a quasi

- judicial nature. See Lowrey , ___ - NMCA

- ___, ¶ 9 (applying the 1
functional approach to determine whether the defendant “acted as an arm of the 2
court”). 3

{22} In applying the functional analysis, we examine the administrative official or 4
agencies’ role in the process giving rise to the underlying allegations in order to 5
determine whether it is quasi

- judicial in nature. See id

. ¶ 10. Similar to the sequence 6

of events in Gerha r dt , here, an administrative disciplinary proceeding was initiated 7
against Bolen and a hearing was held. After the hearing, Bolen was found to have 8
violated 16.47.1.8(L)(1)( i ) NMAC. Bolen appealed the initial ruling pursuant to his 9
rights and sought a hearing before an independent hearing officer. See Gerhardt
, 179 10
F. Supp. 3d at 1058 (stating that “the [r]acing [c]ommissioners appointed a hearing 11
officer to recommend a disposition of a particular dispute, the hearing officer 12
conducted a hearing based on evidence, and the hearing officer provided a 13
recommendation” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). NMRC stated 14

that if “Bolen [had] not chosen to withdraw his appeal, the hearing officer would 15
have heard the matter and provided findings of fact s , conclusions of law, and a 16

recommendation to the members of

. . . NMRC.” See 15.2.1.9( B )(15) (c) NMAC 17
(setting out the process by which a hearing officer, after conducting a hearing, 18
prepares a report containing findings of fact and conclusions of law for consideration 19
by the commission). Moreover, if Bolen had been aggrieved by NMRC’s final order, 2016 “he could have sought review by a [d]istrict [c]ourt pursuant to Rule 1

- 075 NMRA.” 1
Bolen’s ability to appeal NMRC’s decision to this Court “indicates that [NMRC] is 2
acting in a judicial function.” See Gerha r dt
, 179 F. Supp. 3d at 1059. 3

{23} Turning to Bolen’s argument that NMRC is not entitled to quasi

- judicial 4
immunity because its action s in initiating the administrative proceeding were 5
improper
, we disagree. Again, Bolen does not dispute that NMRC was acting in a 6
quasi

- judicial capacity, rather he attempts to distinguish NMRC’s actions from the 7

defendants’ actions in Butz

— arguing that the defendants’ actions in Butz “were 8
proper on their face but may have been taken for impermissible reasons.” Whereas 9
here, Bolen argues, “the initial actions taken by [NMRC ] ’s agents were improper as 10
taken as retaliation for protected speech and petitioning activity and therefore cannot 11
justify the remainder of their actions.” 12

{24} We are not convinced that Butz can be distinguished from this case as Bolen 13

argues

— Bolen attacks NMRC’s motive in initiating the proceeding. In Butz , the 14

United States Supreme Court clarified that “a malicious intent will not subject a 15
public officer to liability for performing his authorized duties as to which he would 16
otherwise not be subject to damages liability,” 438 U.S. at 493; however an official 17

will not be excused from liability “if he failed to observe obvious statutory or 18
constitutional limitations on his powers or if his conduct was a manifestly erroneous 19
application of the statute.” Id. at 494. Beyond merely asserting that NMRC acted 2017 improperly in initiating the proceeding, Bolen has failed to provide either an 1
argument or legal authority demonstrating how NMRC’s actions in initiating and 2
prosecuting an administrative disciplinary proceeding fall outside the bounds of 3
NMRC’s authority. See Chan v. Montoya , 2011

- NMCA

- 072, ¶ 9, 150 N.M. 44, 256 4
P.3d 987 (“It is not our practice to rely on assertions of counsel unaccompanied by 5
support in the record. The mere assertions and arguments of counsel are not 6
evidence.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 7

{25} I t is clear that “[w]hen evaluating whether judicial immunity applies, we do 8
not examine the allegations of improper or illegal conduct

. . . [ r]ather, we focus on 9
the role that the individual [or public body] claiming immunity played and evaluate 10
whether that role was integral to the judicial process.” Hunnicutt , 2009

- NMCA

- 121, 11

¶ 13; see also Lowrey
,

___ - NMCA

- ___, ¶ 15 (acknowledging that “[e]ven when 12
quasi

- judicial immunity applies, however, an individual may not be entitled to its 13
protection if the alleged misconduct was clearly and completely outside the scope of 14

the individual ’ s function as an arm of the court ” (internal quotation marks and 15
citation omitted)). Here, NMRC initiated and prosecuted an administrative 16
disciplinary proceeding against Bolen

— which included initiating the complaint, 17
holding a hearing, taking evidence, and making an initial finding. Insofar as NMRC 18
served in these “adjudicative, judicial, or prosecutorial” functions, see Horwitz , 822 19
F.2d at 1515, we conclude that NMRC’s actions were functionally comparable to 2018 those involved in the judicial process. We therefore weigh the first prong in favor of 1
NMRC because NMRC’s actions were in accordance with its quasi

- judicial 2

functions. See 16.47.1.8(L)(1) NMAC (authorizing NMRC to take disciplinary 3
measures); see also 15.2.1.9 NMAC (setting out the rules of procedure for stewards’ 4
hearings and commission proceedings). 5

B. NMRC’s Actions in Administering Such an Administrative Proceeding 6 A re Highly Likely to Lead to Litigation 7

{26} Next, we turn to whether NMRC’s actions in initiating and conducting such 8
administrative proceedings are “likely to result in damages lawsuits by disappointed 9
parties.” Gerha r dt , 179 F. Supp. 3d at 1029. As the court recognized in Gerha r dt
, 10

“ [ t ] he relatively large number of lawsuits in the District of New Mexico related to 11

[NMRC ] ’s actions” exemplifies that its actions are highly likely to lead to litigation. 12

See id

. at 1059. If NMRC is concerned about liability from its action in enforcing 13
the rules, its ability to “act independently” and hold fair administrative hearings 14
could very well be impaired. See Lowrey , ___ - NMCA

- ___, ¶ 12 (stating that “[i ]f a 15
probation officer is concerned about liability . . . the probation officer’s ability to act 16
independently and the court’s ability to perform its duties could be impaired”). 17
Therefore, the second prong also favors quasi

- judicial immunity in this case. 1819 C. There Are Sufficient Procedural Safeguards to Protect Against 1 Unconstitutional Conduct 2

{27} Lastly, addressing the third prong, we conclude that there are sufficient 3
procedural safeguards here to control unconstitutional conduct. See generally 4

15.2.1.9 (A) NMAC (5/24/2022) (setting out the rules of procedure for stewards’ 5
hearings and commission proceedings). Again, Bolen does not argue that there is a 6
lack of such procedural safeguards, rather he takes issue with NMRC’s motive in 7
initiating the administrative proceeding in the first place. We therefore weigh the 8
final prong in favor of NMRC. 9

CONCLUSION 10

{28} Based on the foregoing, w e conclude that NMRC is entitled to quasi

- judicial 11
immunity under the facts of this case
, and therefore reverse and remand with 12
instructions to enter summary judgment in favor of NMRC on Bolen’s claims arising 13

under the CRA

. 14

{29} IT IS SO ORDERED. 15

________________________ ______ 16 KRISTINA BOGARDUS, Judge 1720 WE CONCUR: 1

____ _____ _

____________ ___ __________ 2 SHAMMARA H. HENDERSON , Judge 3

___________________________________ 4 KATHERINE A. WRAY , Judge 5