NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO J.H.

No. 1 CA-JV 23-0072 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JD28565

The Honorable Julie Ann Mata, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Public Advocate, Mesa

By Suzanne Sanchez

Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office

Emily M. Stokes

Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety

Maricopa County Office of the Legal Advocate, Phoenix

By Amanda L. Adams

Counsel for Appellee J.H.

FILED 11-7-2023
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO J.H.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Andrew M. Jacobs delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Michael J. Brown and Chief Judge David B. Gass joined.

J A C O B S, Judge:

¶1 The father of the child J.H. (“Father”) appeals the juvenile 

court’s order terminating his parental rights with respect to J.H. under 

A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c), the fifteen-month out-of-home care ground. We 

reject Father’s challenges to the order because reasonable evidence supports

the juvenile court’s findings that the Department of Child Safety (“DCS”) 

made diligent efforts to reunify the family, and that termination was in 

J.H.’s best interests. We thus affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. Father’s Difficulties Caring for J.H. Came to the Attention 

of DCS.

¶2 J.H. came to the attention of DCS in January 2021 through a 

hotline report. The report alleged Father left his then three-year old J.H.

with a friend, Ashley, and neglected to pick up J.H. or respond to 

communications about them for several days. The report further alleged 

Ashley was a drug user and mentally unstable and could not care for J.H.

¶3 Father maintained he could not have picked up J.H. from 

Ashley for various reasons. Father explained he could not take physical 

custody of J.H. for several days and was then living in a homeless shelter. 

Upon determining Mother’s whereabouts were unknown and that Father 

was unable to care for J.H., DCS investigators took J.H. into custody 

pursuant to a court order. 

¶4 Medical professionals soon determined J.H. showed signs of 

neglect. Nearly four years old, he still could not speak clearly, did not know 

the alphabet or how to count, and did not recognize colors. He also had 

bruised arms and legs and untreated eczema likely caused or exacerbated 

by being left in soiled diapers.
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO J.H.

Decision of the Court

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¶5 J.H. was later diagnosed with high-functioning autism. His 

caregivers reported he occasionally experienced violent outbursts because 

he had difficulty with social interactions. DCS enrolled J.H. in behavioral, 

occupational, physical, and speech therapies, through which J.H. improved 

significantly. J.H. has formed close bonds with his foster parents, his foster 

brother, and a friend at school. 

B. The Court Declares J.H. Dependent as to Father, Who Then 

Experiences Legal and Behavioral Difficulties.

¶6 On DCS’ motion, the juvenile court found J.H. dependent as 

to Father and outlined a family reunification case plan. For Father to regain 

custody, he needed stable housing, employment, and a demonstrated 

ability to meet J.H.’s basic and developmental needs. DCS referred Father 

to various services, including a psychological evaluation by Dr. Menendez, 

a Ph.D. psychologist, who assessed Father with below-average intelligence 

and limited knowledge of child development. She diagnosed him with 

borderline intellectual functioning and suggested Father was unlikely to be 

able to raise J.H. with his assessed parenting skills. She offered treatment 

recommendations to improve his parenting skills.

¶7 Roughly three weeks later, Father was arrested for attempting 

child sex trafficking through online communication with an undercover 

officer posing as a minor. He pled guilty to attempted child sex trafficking, 

a class 3 felony, in August 2021. After two months in jail, he was released 

on lifetime probation as a sex offender. Father was not allowed contact with 

any child other than J.H. and faced computer restrictions. The record did 

not indicate Father was interested in either pre-pubescent children or incest.

¶8 Upon his release from jail, DCS referred Father for substance 

abuse evaluation and drug testing. For nine months, Father consistently

tested, and all but one of his tests were negative. Nevertheless, Father 

remained inconsistent in visiting J.H., even after adjustments were made to 

accommodate his work schedule. DCS’s case manager Mr. Harrison 

provided support, facilitating necessary appointments and reminders. 

¶9 In February 2022, Father enrolled in a sex-offender treatment 

program his probation required, later undergoing a psychosexual 

evaluation. This evaluation, though incomplete, showed Father

minimizing his offense and seeking to blame the victim for his conduct.

Dr. Rodriguez had concerns about Father’s treatment success due to 

cognitive limitations, instability, and parenting deficits, demonstrating
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO J.H.

Decision of the Court

4

potential risks to J.H.’s safety. DCS also obtained Father’s sex-offender 

treatment records, revealing a high risk of sexual reoffending.

¶10 DCS also provided Father with visitation services throughout 

the case. However, it stopped providing visitation while Father was 

incarcerated from late June of 2021 to mid-August of 2021 and not allowed

to have contact with minors. After his release from jail, Father requested 

that DCS reinstate visits. DCS referred Father for supervised visits, drug 

testing and treatment, and asked him to enroll in individual counseling. 

Father failed to consistently attend or complete individual counseling. 

¶11 In the next three months, Father only visited J.H. once, failed 

to keep in touch with service providers and DCS, and missed court 

hearings. Father also completed parenting classes in August 2022, but he 

continued to deny any responsibility for J.H. coming into DCS’ care and 

maintained that it had been a misunderstanding. 

C. The Court Changes J.H.’s Case Plan to Severance and 

Adoption, Ultimately Terminating Father’s Parental Rights 

on the Fifteen-Month Out-of-Home Placement Ground.

¶12 In January 2022, the juvenile court changed J.H.’s case plan to 

severance and adoption. DCS moved the court to terminate the parentchild relationship between J.H. and his parents. 

¶13 The court suspended Father’s in-person visits and directed 

DCS to arrange virtual visits for Father. This decision stemmed from 

Father's inconsistent attendance at in-person visits and J.H.’s adverse 

reactions during those visits. J.H. began refusing to enter cars associated 

with Father’s visits and displaying aggressive behavior towards those 

attempting to place him in the car.

¶14 Over the next year, DCS provided Father with reunification 

services, including drug testing, treatment, and virtual visitation, and 

assisted Father with self-referrals for individual counseling and 

neurological evaluation. His participation in services was inconsistent and 

he cancelled his first scheduled virtual visit with J.H. in March 2022. 

Although he continued to request in-person visits at court hearings, he 

continued to miss or cancel the virtual visits with J.H. When Father did 

attend the virtual visits, J.H., who participated in virtual visits with other 

family members and providers, refused to talk to father and eventually 

started turning off the video as soon as Father appeared on the screen. 
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO J.H.

Decision of the Court

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¶15 In May 2022, the court reaffirmed its prior order that Father’s 

visits occur virtually, finding in-person visits would be counterproductive 

to Father’s ability to form a relationship with J.H. and could actually 

endanger J.H. At the November 2022 report and review hearing, the court 

suspended Father’s virtual visits and encouraged him to write letters to J.H. 

¶16 Meanwhile, in early 2022, Father moved into the house of a

girlfriend he met in October 2021. DCS assessed her as a possible safety 

monitor and determined that she would not be appropriate because she 

minimized the severity of Father’s criminal offense. 

¶17 By the time of the termination adjudication, five-year-old J.H. 

had been in care for over two years and was thriving. He had transitioned 

to a regular school for kindergarten, performed well academically with an 

individualized education plan, and formed strong bonds in his foster home, 

particularly with his foster brother and parents.

¶18 On February 24, 2023, the court held a termination

adjudication. The court found J.H. had been in an out-of-home placement 

considerably longer than 15 months. The court found that DCS had 

diligently provided reunification services, which if completed would likely 

have resulted in reunification. The court found that Father has not been 

able to remedy the circumstances that caused out-of-home placement 

because J.H. refuses all visits, and Father does not appreciate his prior 

neglect or the wrongfulness of his crime. The court found Father’s progress 

insufficient in addressing the reasons for J.H.’s foster care placement

because he would not commit to any reunification services, accepted no 

culpability for his crime, and was not parenting any of his six children. The 

superior court also found it was substantially unlikely Father would be able 

to parent J.H. in the near future.

¶19 The court also found termination to be in J.H.’s best interests. 

The court noted that J.H. is adoptable and likely to be adopted in his current 

foster placement, with whom he is “exceptionally bonded.” The court also 

weighed that J.H. refuses visits with Father, that Father was convicted of a 

crime with a child victim, and that Father’s probation prevents him from 

transporting J.H. to his therapy and thus from participating in it as well. 

Consequently, the court found terminating Father's parental rights in the 

best interests of the child, and ordered them terminated.
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO J.H.

Decision of the Court

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¶20 Father timely appealed. This court has jurisdiction under 

A.R.S. § 8-235(A) and Article 6, Section 9 of the Arizona Constitution.

 DISCUSSION

I. Reasonable Evidence Supports the Juvenile Court’s Finding that 

DCS Made a Diligent Effort to Provide Reunification Services.

¶21 Father challenges the juvenile court’s determination that DCS 

made a diligent effort to reunify him with his son, arguing DCS failed to 

accommodate his disabilities. DCS argues that while a “diligent effort” to 

provide appropriate reunification services to the parent under A.R.S. § 8-

533(B)(8) is required, it is not required to “provide every conceivable service 

or to ensure that the parent participates in [the] service[s].” Maricopa Cnty. 

Juv. Action No. JS-501904, 180 Ariz. 348, 353 (App. 1994). This court accepts 

the juvenile court’s factual findings “if reasonable evidence and inferences 

support them.” Brionna J. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 255 Ariz. 471, 478 ¶ 30

(2023) (citing Jessie D. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 251 Ariz. 574, 579-80 ¶ 10 

(2021)) (cleaned up). We defer to these findings because “the juvenile court 

is in the best position to weigh evidence and assess witness credibility.” Id.

¶22 The determination of what constitutes diligent efforts by DCS 

is case-specific. DCS must identify the factors that led to the child’s out-ofhome placement and subsequently offer services that hold a reasonable 

prospect of rectifying these conditions. Donald W. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 

247 Ariz. 9, 23 ¶ 50 (App. 2019). Moreover, when a parent is disabled, as 

Father claims he is, DCS must follow the Americans with Disabilities Act 

(ADA) and make reasonable accommodations to accommodate the parent’s 

disability. Jessica P. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 251 Ariz. 34, 38 ¶ 14 (App. 2021).

¶23 The record refutes Father’s claim that DCS did not diligently 

provide reunification services. DCS consistently referred Father to a range 

of services and evaluations, including a psychological evaluation by Dr. 

Menendez, who provided treatment recommendations to improve his 

parenting skills. DCS referred Father for substance abuse evaluation and 

drug testing upon his release from jail. 

¶24 Unfortunately, Father’s participation remained weak and 

inconsistent, as he failed to complete the psychosexual evaluation and 

individual counseling. Furthermore, Father missed numerous in-person 

and virtual meetings with J.H., which highlighted Father’s pattern of 

disengagement from the services he complained were not adequate. 
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO J.H.

Decision of the Court

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¶25 Father objects that DCS failed to accommodate his claimed 

intellectual disability. As an initial matter, reasonable evidence supports 

the conclusion that Father is not disabled, as Dr. Menendez opined that his 

IQ was “beyond the range of an intellectual disability.” While the juvenile 

court did not expressly conclude that Father was not disabled, it could 

reasonably have concluded he was not, and we will assume the court found 

facts necessary for its legal conclusions. DCS’ prior agreement to 

accommodate his claimed intellectual disability, which Father notes, did 

not require the juvenile court to find one existed.

¶26 But assuming Father was disabled, the record cannot be read 

to suggest he was not accommodated. For one thing, Father’s brief in this 

court faults DCS for not “asking Father which form of communication he 

found most effective,” but it never says what form of accommodation as to 

communication DCS failed to make. This argument does not allow us to 

rule for Father, because he cannot show an abuse of discretion from the 

omission of an unspecified form of communication. We also agree with 

J.H., whose brief notes that DCS “utilized several forms of communication 

to keep in contact with [Father], including telephone calls, in-person 

meetings, services letters, e-mails, and text messages.” DCS communicated 

reasonably with Father, whatever his communication needs and 

preferences. Importantly, DCS facilitated Father’s awareness of 

appointments properly, and DCS need not ensure Father actually

participates in the provided services. See JS-501904, 180 Ariz. at 353.

¶27 Father’s claim that he was not provided a recommended 

neurological evaluation is likewise unpersuasive. Harrison, DCS’s 

caseworker, helped Father self-refer for such an evaluation in April 2022, 

both meeting with Father and calling Mercy Care to get him a list of 

providers from which to choose. Harrison even offered to help schedule 

the evaluation for Father once he picked a provider. DCS also referred 

Father to Terros, where he received help with his seizure disorder, further 

aiding his neurological health. The juvenile court did not err by failing to 

find a lack of diligent efforts to reunify from a supposed failure to provide 

a neurological evaluation.

¶28 Finally, Father’s claim that DCS did not make diligent efforts 

to reunify because of a lack of visits with J.H. is likewise unavailing. Father 

is responsible for much of the period in which he could not visit J.H. Father 

was incarcerated for attempting to commit a sex offense with a minor for 

two months in 2021, and could not then have contact with any minors, 

including J.H. While on probation thereafter, DCS arranged one visit, but 

Father fell out of contact with DCS. 
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO J.H.

Decision of the Court

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¶29 DCS asked the court to suspend visits in January 2022 because 

J.H. would become upset when he recognized a van he associated with 

visiting Father. The juvenile court restricted visits to a virtual format in 

January 2022 given the harm to J.H. attending them. Unfortunately, J.H. 

would terminate the video visits as soon as J.H. saw Father. In May 2022, 

the juvenile court then found that danger to J.H. justified the cessation of 

visits altogether. Father properly concedes that the finding of danger 

justified cessation of visits at that time. 

¶30 Father nonetheless contends that the juvenile court’s 

November 2022 order continuing its suspension of visits made DCS’s 

efforts non-diligent because that order was not supported by a repeated 

finding of danger from visits. This argument fails for several reasons. First, 

the record was replete with facts from which the juvenile court could 

reasonably have concluded that J.H., an autistic child who physically 

endangered himself when made to visit Father, might continue to do so. 

Second, the juvenile court’s order suspending visitation was a final, 

appealable order Father failed to challenge in this court. See Maricopa Cnty. 

Juv. Action No. JD-5312, 178 Ariz. 372, 374 (App. 1994). As the juvenile court 

noted in finding diligent efforts, Father also failed to request a hearing on it 

before the juvenile court. The suspension of visits was supported by 

reasonable evidence, and Father did not take further steps in disagreement 

with it at the time. On this particular set of facts, we cannot say the juvenile 

court abused its discretion by finding DCS had made diligent efforts to 

reunify this family. 

II. Reasonable Evidence and Inferences Support the Juvenile Court’s 

Finding that Termination Is in J.H.’s Best Interests.

¶31 We accept the juvenile court’s findings as to J.H.’s best 

interests “if reasonable evidence and inferences support them.” Brionna J., 

255 Ariz. at 478 ¶ 30 (citing Jessie D., 251 Ariz. at 580 ¶ 10 (2021)). As both 

DCS and J.H. point out, Father has not disputed the juvenile court's findings 

regarding J.H. thriving in the adoptive placement, the closeness of J.H. to 

the foster parents, and the benefits of termination to J.H. Conceding that 

a relationship with Father would be detrimental to J.H., potentially 

exposing J.H. to instability and the risk of emotional, physical, or sexual 

abuse, Father concedes the premises of the juvenile court’s best interest 

finding. See Britz v. Kinsvater, 87 Ariz. 385, 388 (1960). 
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO J.H.

Decision of the Court

9

¶32 Father nonetheless challenges the juvenile court’s best interest 

finding, arguing the juvenile court erred in this finding because it did not 

consider or order permanent guardianship of J.H. by a foster parent willing 

to serve in that capacity. This analysis fails for three reasons. 

¶33 First, A.R.S. § 8-533(B) calls for a best interest analysis, and 

the juvenile court conducted one. A best interest analysis asks whether 

termination will benefit the child, or continuing the relationship will harm 

the child. Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS-500274, 167 Ariz. 1, 5 (1990). As 

just noted, Father concedes all of the premises of the best interest analysis 

the court did conduct. And as J.H. points out, that analysis is supported by 

the record. For this reason, there is no need to consider within the best 

interest analysis an alternative (here, guardianship) to a beneficial 

termination or a detrimental continuation of the parent-child relationship.

¶34 Second, Father’s reliance on Timothy B. v. Dep’t of Child Safety,

252 Ariz. 470 (2022) to advance this argument is misplaced. Timothy B.

required consideration of a permanent guardian in terminations under 

A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(4), the statutory text of which requires consideration of 

maintaining a “normal home” during a parent’s lengthy incarceration. See

id. at 474-77 ¶¶ 16-27. Here, Father is not incarcerated, and A.R.S. § 8-

533(B)(8)(c) furnishes very different grounds for termination – fifteen 

months of care out-of-home, a failure to remedy the cause of out-of-home 

placement, and an unlikelihood of proper and effective parental care and 

control in the near future. Timothy B. does not suggest a court must consider 

permanent guardianship where the grounds for termination do not require 

determining whether termination will deprive a child of a “normal home 

for a period of years.” See id. Nor would it be logical to intuit the need in 

A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(4) for such a determination where the parent is at liberty 

and determined to be substantially likely unable to parent in the near term.

¶35 Third, Father’s argument ignores the guardianship statute. 

Under it, the court may only establish a guardianship where adoption is a 

remote possibility “or termination of parental rights would not be in the 

child’s best interest.” See A.R.S. § 8-871(A)(4). Here, the juvenile court 

found, and Father has not challenged, that adoption is likely. And other 

than preferring a permanent guardianship, Father has not challenged the 

findings underpinning the juvenile court’s conclusion that termination is in 

J.H.’s best interests.
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO J.H.

Decision of the Court

10

¶36 The juvenile court’s ruling that terminating Father’s parental 

rights is in J.H.’s best interests is supported by reasonable evidence and 

inferences.

CONCLUSION

¶37 We affirm.