### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-05-00673- CR

Da vid Hod ge s, App e lla nt

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

FROM THE DIS TRICT C OURT OF TR AV IS COUN TY, COUN TY C OURT A T LA W N O. 4 NO. 67130 2, HO NORAB LE MIK E DENTON, JUDGE PRESI DING

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N
I n a tr ia l be fo re the c ourt , D a vid Ho dg e s w a s c on vic te d of a ssa ult and se nte nc e d to 180 day s’ conf

inement. SeeTe x. Pe n. Cod e Ann. § 2 2. 01 (We st Su pp . 2 00 6) . In tw o is su e s, appellant c ontends that the evide nce is leg ally insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court violated his rig ht to confrontation whe n it allowed the complaina nt to testify to portions of her
ou t- of -c ourt state me nt given to pol ic e a ft e r t he a lle g e d a ssa

ult . B e c a us e the e vid e nc e wa s le g a lly sufficie nt and the testimony was a dmissibl e and did not viol at e appellant’s rig ht to confrontation,
we a ffirm the judg ment of convic tion.

The testimony

at trial showed that Austin Police Off icer Charles Edwa

rds re sponded to a 911 hang -up ca ll on the morning of J une 6, 2005. When he ar rived at a re sidence that appellant share d with the complainant, he w ent inside to speak with the c omplainan t while another office r2

spoke with appellant. Edwar ds observe d fre sh bruises on the complaina nt’s body and photog raphe d the m. T he ph oto g ra

ph s sh ow ingthe br

uis e s w e re a dmi tte d into e vid e nc e a t tr ia l. The c omplainant testified that she a nd the appe llant resided tog ether at t h e time of the incident and that she is afra id of appe llant. She testified that she w as u n ab l e to recall what
occur red on the day

in question and that all she could re call wa s being on the floor. She a lso reca lled speaking with the officers. She rec ounted fil ling out the assault victim statement, and she identified her ha ndwriting on the statement. The trial court e x cluded the statement from e vidence afte r an ob je c tio n b y de fe ns e c ouns e l. T he c omp la ina nt t e sti fi e d that th e de ta ils of the a ssa ult we re sti ll f

re sh in her mind when the police arr ived and she completed the statement. She identified photog raphs of the bruise s she sustained that nig ht an d testified that the photog raphs a ccur ately depicted he r injuries. She also testified that appe llant cause d the bruises. Appellant did not cross-examine the
c omp la ina

nt o r t he of fi c e r. At the c on c lus ion of the br ie f tr ia l, t he tr ia l c ourt

re se rv e d ju dg me nt t o
c on sid e r l e g a l qu e sti on s and the n f ound a pp e lla nt guil ty of a ssa ult
. I n h is fi rs t iss ue , a

pp e lla nt c on te nd s th a t he wa s d e nie d th e op po rt un ity to e ff e c tiv e ly
cross-e x amine the c omplainant beca use her lack of re collection of the alleg ed assa ult and relianc e on the assault victim statement essentially made her “unava ilable.” The State re sponds that the issue
wa s no t pr e se rv e d fo r a

pp e a l, and that the a dmi ssi on of the c omp la ina nt’ s te sti mony did no t vi olate appellant’ s confrontation rig hts. I n deter mining the c onstitut ional issue prese nted, we r eview the t ri al co u rt ’s ru l i n g de novo
. Se e W all v . S tate , 184 S.W .3d 730, 742-43 (Te x . Crim. App. 2006). The State urg es that appe llant did not preserve err or bec ause he failed to obtain a ruling on his objection to t h e u s e o f t he wr itten statement and did not object to the trial c ourt’s3

“re fusal” to r

ule. B ut the rec ord re flec ts the trial court sustained a ppellant’s objec tion to the admission of the victim statement, and def ense c ounsel repe atedly re -u rged his objec tion to the State’s use of the statement in ref reshingthe complainant’ s rec ollection. We conclude that appellant prese rved this issue for r eview.

The Six th Amendment provides, “ I n all c r im in a l p r o s e c uti o n s , th e a c c u sed shall enjoy t h e r i g h t
. . . t o b e c o n f

r o n t e d w i t h t h e w i t n e s s e s a g a i n s th i m. . . . ” U
. S
. C o n s t
. a m e n d
. V I. In Crawf ord v. W ashington , the Supreme Court he ld that the Confrontation Clause bar s the admission of “ te sti mon ia l” he ars ay un le ss the de c lara nt is un a va ila

ble and the de fe nd ant ha d a pr ior op po rt un ity to c ro ss-ex ami ne the d e c lara nt. 54 1 U .S. 36 , 6 8 ( 20 04 ). “ Te sti mon ia l” state me nts inc lud e a t a minimum “prior te stimony at a pr eliminary

hear ing, be fore a g rand jury , or at a former trial” a nd “police inter

rog ations.” Id
. Be cause the par

ties do not assert other

wise, we will assume the complainant’ s prior st atement wa s testimonial in nature. See D avis v. W ashington , 126 S. Ct . 2266, 2273-74 (2006) ; W all , 184 S.W .3d at 735 & n.11. I n Da v is , a sim ila r s tate me nt wa s h e ld t o b e “ inh e re ntl y testimonial.” Da v is , 126 S. Ct . at 2278. The Con s t i t u tion does not permit the admission of a te sti mon ia l st a te me nt o f a wi tne ss who do e s not ap pe ar at tr ia l un le ss t he wi tne ss i s unava ila

ble to testify and the de fenda

nt had a pr ior opportunity for c ross-examination. Cra wfo rd , 541 U.S. at 59
n. 6. I t is the “ tr ia l us e o f

, n o tt h e i n v e s t i g a t o r

y collection of, e

xpa rte testimonial stateme nts” that offe nds the Confrontation Clause. Da v is , 126 S. Ct . at 2279.4 When t he dec lara

nt appea rs for c ross-examination at trial, howeve r, the Con fr on tatio n Cla

us e do e s not pla c e any c on str a int s on the us e of he r p ri or te sti mon ia l st a te me nt. Cra wfo rd , 541 U.S. at 59. As the Supreme Court r easone d in Cra wfo rd :
The Clause doe s not bar admission of a stateme nt so long a s the dec lara nt is present at trial to defe nd or explain it. (The Clause also does not bar the use of te stimoni al statements for purposes other than establishi ng the t ruth of t he matter asser ted. See Tennesseev. Stree t , 471 U.S. 409, 414 (1985)).
54 1 U .S. a t 59 n. 9; see also California v. Green , 399 U.S. 149, 162 (1970).

The c omplainant’s statement doe s not appea r in the re cord e x cept to the e x tent she
rea d excerpts from it, to which def ense c ounsel objecte d. I n eac h instance, the trial court sustained the objection. B ut the complainant was present at trial and testi fied. Her rec ollections and lac k of
rec ollections, as well as he r cr edibility , wer e subjec t to cross-examination. Appell ant had the opportunity

to question the complainant about the state ment she g ave the police, the i n j uries she incurre d, and the limitations of her memory , b u t he dec lined to cross-e x amine her . The Confrontation Clause does not constra in the use of c omplainant’s prior stat ements bec ause she appea red for cross-examination at t rial. Se e Cra wfo rd , 5 41 U. S. at 59 ; se e als o Ca rte r v . S tate , 150 S.W .3d 2 3 0 , 2 4 1 n.13 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2004, no pet.) (Confr ontation Clause not violated beca use victim of fe lony assault on family member actually testified at trial). There fore , there was no violation of the Confrontation Clause. We over rule a ppellant’s first issue. I n his second is sue, appellant urg es t hat t he admissible evidenc e introduce d at trial is leg ally insufficient to support his conviction. He c ontends that the evide nce did not connec t the complainant’s injuries to any act committ ed by appellant and there was no evidenc e that he c aused5

her to f all to the g round. I n revie wing the leg al suffic iency of the e vidence , we view

all the evidenc e in the light most favor able to the verdic t to deter mine whether any rational trier of fa ct could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a rea sonable doubt. J ac k so n v . V irg ini a , 4 43 U. S. 30 7, 31 9 ( 19 79 ); Dr ic ha s v . S tate , 175 S.W .3d 795, 798 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). A per son com mits t he off ense of assault if the pe rson intentionally , knowing ly , or
rec klessly cause s bodily

injury t o an o t h er. Tex. P en. Code Ann. § 22.01. “ Bodily injury ” mea

ns phy sical pain, illness, or any impairment of phy sical condition. Id . § 1.07(a) (8) ( West. S upp. 2006). The de finition is broad an d en co m p as s es “e ven re latively minor phy sical conta cts so long a s they
c o n s ti tute mo r e th an me r e o f f e n s iv e to u c h ing .” L an e v . S tate , 7 63 S.W. 2d

78 5, 78 6 ( Te x. Cr im. App. 1989). I n her state ment, the complainant ha d written that appe llant grabbe d her by the nec k and threatened that he was g oing to ge t a g un and kill her fa mily . I n her te stimony , she cla imed not to r e me mbe r the a lle g e d ass a ult
. She re c a lle d only that sh e and he r c hil dr e n w e re ho me a lon e wi th the appe llant at the time of the incide nt and that she e nd ed u p o n t h e floor. T he State introduce d photogr aphs showingthe injuries and the complainant identified them as the injurie s she sustained. She te sti fi e d th a t a

pp e lla nt c a us e d th e br

uis e s on he r b od y . Sh e a lso tol d th e of

fi c e r t hat sh e wa s in pain. Whether the complainant’s lack of memory was due to f ear or her injuries, the trial court wa s the trier of

fac t, and we g ive g reat defe renc e to its fact d et er m i n at i o ns and its evaluations of the
cre dibilit y

of witnesses. Se e Ha nk

s v . S tate , 137 S.W .3d 668, 671 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). Vie wing the evidenc e in the lig ht most favorable to the verdic t, a rational trier

of fa ct could have found that appellant c aused the complainant’s injuries. We over rule a ppellant’s sec ond issue.6 Havingoverr

uled appe llant’s issues, we a ffirm the judg ment of convic tion.

__________________________________________ J an P. Patterson, J ustice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces Patter son and Pemberton Affir med Filed: Oc tober 18, 2006 Do No t Pu

bli sh