1 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 47522
STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff

- Respondent,

v. MARK HENRY LANKFORD,

Defendant

- Appellant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Moscow, April 2023 Term
Opinion filed: July 12, 2023
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk

Appeal from the District Court of the Second Judicial District of the State of Idaho, Idaho County. Jay P. Gaskill, District Judge.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed

. Eric Don Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for Appellant. Garth McCarty argued.
Raúl R. Labrador, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, for Respondent. L. LaMont Anderson argued.

_______________________________________________ MOELLER, Justice. This is Mark Henry Lankford ’s third appeal from his convict ion s for the first

- degree
murder s of Robert and Cheryl Bravence near Grangeville, Idaho , in 1983

. Errors in L ankford’s
first two trials in 1984 and 2008 resulted in those conv i ctions being vacated. Lankford was r e tried
in 2019 and was again convicted of first

- degree murder. Lankford now appeals his third
conviction , assigning error on the following grounds: (1) that the district court abused its discretion when it allowed the State to question Lankford’s brother about statements Lankford made on a
late

- disclosed prison phone recording ; (2) that the evidence was insufficient to support his
conviction when the “ law of the case doctrine ” is applied to his case ; and (3) that the district court erred in denying Lankford’s motion to dismiss for a speedy trial violation. For the reasons stated below, we affirm Lankford’s conviction s

. I. F ACTUAL AND P ROCEDURAL B ACKGROUND2 In October 1983, Mark Henry Lankford (hereinafter “Lankford” or “Mark Lankford”) and his brother, Bryan Stuart Lankford , were arrested for the murders of Robert and Cheryl Bravence , which occurred at a campground in the woods near Grangeville, Idaho . As we detailed in Mark Lankford I , “The Lankfords were . . . tried separately for the murders of Robert and Cheryl Bravence. Bryan Lankford agreed to be a witness for the State at his brother’s trial because he
believed the State had of fered him an indeterminate life sentence instead of the death penalty in exchange for his testimony.” State v. Mark Henry Lankford , 116 Idaho 860, 864, 781 P.2d 197, 201 (1989) ( Mark Lankford I ). At Mark Lankford’s first trial, Bryan Lankford 1 testif ied t o Mark Lankford’s involvement in the murders. We summarized Bryan Lankford’s testimony in Mark Lankford I as follows: Bryan testified as follows: After reaching the Idaho County forest where they hid out, Mark and Bryan decided to steal an automobile from a campsite in the area. They reasoned that, because the monthly payments on Mark ’ s car [a 1982 Chevrolet Camaro] were delinquent, the police would be searching for it and so they needed to abandon it to avoid capture. They left the car in the woods covered with brush and set off to steal another car. They walked down a mountain road which eventually led to a campsite occupied by Robert Bravence and his wife Cheryl. Bryan entered the campsite first, with a shotgun draped over his arms, and engaged the Braven ces in conversation. Shortly thereafter Mrs. Bravence left the campsite to go down to a nearby stream for some water. After Mrs. Bravence left, Mark Lankford ran out from behind some bushes where he had been hiding, and into the campsite and ordered Robert Bravence to kneel on the ground in front of him. Mark Lankford then hit Robert Bravence in the back of the head with a brown wooden night stick. When Cheryl Bravence returned to the campsite she rushed to the side of her husband who was lying on the groun d. Mark Lankford ordered her to kneel down on the ground next to the body of her husband and struck her in the back of the neck with the same nightstick. The Lankfords placed the Bravences’ bodies into the Bravence van and drove back to their former campsi te where Mark hid the bodies near his Camaro. The Lankfords then drove the Bravence van to Oregon and later to California where they abandoned it in Los Angeles. During their travels they purchased food and accommodations with the Bravences’ credit card.

1 Bryan Lankford was convicted and originally sentenced to death in his first trial , before the United States Supreme Court later vacated his death sentence , Bryan Lankford v. Idaho , 500 U.S. 110 (1991) (5

- 4 decision) . Bryan Lankford’s case was remanded to this Court , Id. at 128 , where we remanded to the district court for resentencing. State v. Bryan Lankford , 127 Idaho 608, 612, 903 P.2d 1305, 1309 (1995). Br yan Lankford was then re sentenced to two consecutive fixed life terms. State v. Bryan Stuart Lankford , 127 Idaho 608, 903 P.2d 1305 (1995) . Bryan Lankford appealed to this Court, which vacated the second sentence and remanded “ for resentencing in which the prosecution [was] obligated to make its initial recommendation for an indeterminate life sentence and is not allowed to present evidence in aggravation .” Bryan Stuart Lankford , 127 Idaho at 619, 903 P.2d at 1316

.3 M ark Lankford I , 116 Idaho at 864, 781 P.2d at 201. At the conclusion of his separate trial, the jury found Mark Lankford guilty of two counts of first

- degree murder for the killings of Robert and Cheryl Bravence. He was later sentenced to death. Mark Lankf ord initially appealed to this Court in 1989, where we affirmed his judgment of conviction and his sentence of death. Mark Lankford I , 116 Idaho at 878, 781 P.2d at 215. In April 1992, “Lankford filed another petition for post

- conviction relief under I.C. § 19

– 2719, seeking a new trial or resentencing.” Mark Lankford v. State , 127 Idaho 100, 897 P.2d 991 (1995) ( hereinafter “ Mark Lankford II ” ). This Court denied his appeal after determining that “Lankford . . . failed to assert any claim not barred by I.C. § 19

– 2719.” Mark Lankford II , 127 Idaho at 102, 897 P.2d at 993. Lankford’s post

- conviction proceedings continued through the federal courts. “Mark [Lankford] pursued his state appeals, p ost

- conviction relief, and state habeas relief, then (after several false starts) he filed a federal habeas petition.” Mark Lankford v. Arave , 468 F.3d 578, 582 (9th Cir. 2006). In his federal habeas petition, the United States District Court for the Distr ict of
Idaho determined an erroneous jury instruction had been given and found that his trial counsel had been ineffective, but “the court ultimately denied the petition, finding there was no prejudice.” Id

. at 583

. However, on appeal to the Ninth Circuit , it reversed the district court, concluding there was prejudice : Bryan’s testimony about the murder weapon, the number of blows, and the force of those blows was vague, contradictory, and when considered in light of the Bravences’ fragmented skulls not pe rsuasive. It is this precise scenario an accomplice who must implicate the defendant in order to hide his own culpability that Idaho’s corroboration requirement addresses. We agree with the district court that FitzMaurice’s requested jury instructions were simply wrong under Idaho law. The corrupted instruction was not corrected by other instructions. Although the question is close, we disagree with the district court as to the prejudicial effect of the error. There was ample evidence that either one or bot h of the Lankfords killed the Bravences, but there was no evidence that Mark attacked and killed the Bravences other than Bryan’s testimony , and there was strong evidence raised at the habeas proceedings suggesting that Bryan’s testimony is inconsistent wi th the forensic evidence. Counsel’s request that the jury be instructed that it could convict on the basis of Bryan’s testimony alone was plainly prejudicial. Id

. at 591 (emphasis added). Accordingly, the judgment of the federal district court was reversed , and the case was remanded “with instructions to grant the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, with4 appropriate instructions to retry Mark Lankford within a reasonable time or release him.” Id

. at 592

. “A new trial was held in 2008, and on February 13, 2008, a jury again found Lankford guilty of both murders. Lankford then filed a motion for a new trial. In July 2008, Lankford was sentenced to two consecutive fixed life sentences, which he timely appealed.” State v. Mark Henry Lankford , 162 Idaho 477, 48 4, 399 P.3d 804, 811 (2017) (3

- 2 decision) ( hereinafter “ Mark Lankford III ” ). 2 That appeal was suspended until the motion for a new trial was resolved in district

court

. Id. In October 2009, the district court denied the motion for a new trial. Later that same month, Lankford filed a second motion for a new trial , which w as denied in December 2013

. Id. Lankford then appealed the denial of both motions to this Court. Id. This Court released its original decision in July 2016, but subsequently granted the State’s petition for rehearing. Id. On rehearing, this Court concluded “that there is a ‘reasonable likelihood’ that [a witness’s] false testimony about his motive for testify ing ‘ could have affected the judgment of the jury.’ ”
162 Idaho at 507, 399 P.3d at 834 (emphasis added). This Court further concluded that “[t]he prosecutor’s failure to disclose the full details of the agreement ‘undermines our confidence in the

outcome of the trial,’ such that we cannot be sure the defendant ‘received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.’ ” Id

. (citing Kyles v. Whitley , 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995)). Ultimately, this Court held “that Lankford’s rig ht to a fair trial was violated and that he [was] entitled to a new trial.” Id. Accordingly, Lankford’s 2008 conviction was vacated, and the case was again remanded to the district court. In 2019, Lankford was again retried and convicted of the murders of Robert and Cheryl
Bravence. This was Lankford ’s third convict ion for the Bravences’ murders . He was once again sentenced to two consecutive fixed life sentences without the possibility of parole. Lankford timely appealed. On appeal, Lankford argues: ( 1 ) that the district court abused its discretion when it allowed the State to question Lankford’s brother about statements Lankford made on a late

disclosed prison phone recording; ( 2 ) that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction when the law of the case doctrine is applied to his case ; and (3) that the district court erred in

2 In its briefing, t he State denominates State v. Lankford , 162 Idaho 477, 484, 399 P.3d 804, 811 (2017) , as “ Lankford III .” However, given the numerous appeals of both Mark and Bryan Lankford , “ Mark Lankford III ” is used to refer to Mark Lankford’s 2017 appeal to eliminate a ny confusion between the brothers’ appeals

.5 denying Lankford’s motion to dismiss for a speedy trial vio lation. For the reasons stated below,
we affirm Lankford’s conviction s

. II. S TANDARD OF R EVIEW “Whether evidence is relevant is a question of law and is subject to de novo
review.” State v. Ochoa , 169 Idaho 903, 912, 505 P.3d 689, 698 (2022) . However, this Cou rt reviews a trial court’s decision whether to admit or exclude evidence under the abuse of discretion
standard. State v. Korn , 148 Idaho 413, 416, 224 P.3d 480, 483 (2009) (citing Dachlet v. State , 136 Idaho 752, 755, 40 P.3d 110, 113 (2002) ); State v. Og den , 171 Idaho 258 , 266, 519 P.3d 1198, 1206 (2022) ( “The question of whether evidence is relevant is reviewed de novo, while the decision
to admit relevant evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” ) (quoting State v. Hall , 163 Idaho 744, 781, 419 P.3d 1042, 1079 (2018) ).
Under that abuse of discretion standard, this Court reviews four elements to determine “[w]hether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason.” State v. Villa

- Guzman , 166 Idaho 382, 384, 458 P.3d 960, 962 (2020) (quoting Lunneborg v. My Fun Life , 163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018)). In regard to a motion for acquittal, as this Court noted in State v. Adamcik , “[t] he Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees the right to due process, and the U.S.
Su preme Court has held that as a part of that due process, ‘ no person shall be made to suffer the onus of a criminal conviction except upon sufficient proof

- defined as evidence necessary to convince a trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of every element of the
offense. ’ ” 152 Idaho 445, 460, 272 P.3d 417, 432 (2012) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 316 (1979) ). Importantly, “[t] he relevant inquiry is not whether this Court would find the defendant to be guilty beyond a reasonabl e doubt, but whether ‘ after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. ’ ” Id. (citing Jackson
, 443 U.S. at 319 ) (emphasis i n original). Thus, in review of a motion for acquittal, “the only inquiry for this Court is whether there is substantial evidence upon which a reasonable jury could have found that the State met its burden of proving the essential elements of first

- degree murder beyond a reasonable
doubt.” Id. (citing State v. Joslin , 145 Idaho 75, 80, 175 P.3d 764, 769 (2007)); State v. Goggin ,6 157 Idaho 1, 4, 333 P.3d 112, 115 (2014) (“The Court reviews a trial court’s ruling on a motion for acquittal for substantial evid ence.”). Regarding Lankford’s constitutional challenge, “[c]onstitutional issues and the construction and application of legislative acts are pure questions of law over which this Court
exercises free review.” Hall v. State , 155 Idaho 610, 615, 315 P.3d 798, 803 (2013) (quoting State v. Statton, 136 Idaho 135, 136, 30 P.3d 290, 291 (2001) ).
III. A NALYSIS Lankford asserts three discrete points of error. First, he argues that the district court abused
its discretion under Idaho Rule of Evidence Rule 4 03 when it ruled on an objection related to a prison telephone conversation between his two brothers, Lee John Lankford and Bryan Lankford. Second, he argues that under the “ law of the case doctrine, ” this Court’s decision in Mark Lankford
III
, coupled wit h the lack of testimony from Lane Thomas , a key witness in Mark Lankford II , establishes that the evidence is insufficient to support Lankford’s conviction. Third, Lankford argues that the district court erred in denying Lankford’s motion to dismiss for a speedy trial
violation. We will address each point in turn.
A. The district c our t did not err in its decision regarding the late

- disclosed telephone calls

. Initially, i t is important to note that this case concerns a late disclosure of evidence , rather
than a nondisclosure

. While a nondisclosure concerns evidence the defense has no t been shown, a late disclosure is just that, late. It is evidence disclosed later than required by the trial court or the relevant rules. While both late disclosure and nondisclosure run afoul of the disclosure requirement and can be subject to discovery sanctions, nondisclosure also implicates a defendant’s constitutional right to exculpatory information. See Brady v. Maryland , 373 U.S. 83 (1963); Napue
v. Illinois , 360 U.S. 264 (1959). While Lankford ’s brief mentions a “nondisclosure” argument raised by the defense below , his argument s , authorit ies cited, and section headings all reference a “late disclosure.” 3 Accordingly, based on the record, and in the absence of argument to the contrary, we will evaluate Lankford’s argument as based solely on the late

- disclosed evidence.
As to the inquiry concerning the general admissibility of late

- disclosed evidence, t his Court has said that “[w]here the question is one of late disclosure rather than failure to disclose, the inqu iry

3 In the two instances where Lankford uses the term “nondisclosure” in his argument, the surrounding language and context reference late disclosure.7 on appeal is whether the lateness of the disclosure so prejudiced the defendant’s preparation or presentation of his defense that he was prevented from receiving his constitutionally guaranteed
fair trial.” State v. Byington , 132 Idaho 589, 592, 977 P. 2d 203, 206 (1999) (citing State v. Olsen, 103 Idaho 278, 283, 647 P.2d 734, 739 (1982)). Thus, “[t]o prove prejudice, a defendant must show there is a reasonable probability that, but for the late disclosure of evidence, the result of the proceedings woul d have been different.” State v. Tapia , 127 Idaho 249, 255, 899 P.2d 959, 965 (1995) (citing State v. Spradlin, 119 Idaho 1030, 1034, 812 P.2d 744, 748 (Ct.App.1991)). Here, the evidence was disclosed by the State after the trial had commenced, during the
State’s case

- in

- chief

. Therefore, t he essential inquiry is whether the lateness of the disclosure so prejudiced Lankford’s preparation or presentation of his defense that he was prevented from receiving his constitutionally guaranteed fair trial. For Lankford to prove prejudice, he must show
there is a reasonable probability that but for the late disclosure his trial result would have been
different. The evidence in question consisted of recordings from three telephone calls made from prison by Bryan Lankford

— two with a male ( Lee John Lankford ( Mark and Bryan’s b rother ) ) and
one call with a female. While the recordings themselves are not i n the record, the discussions surrounding the recordings below suggest that the recordings illustrate a motive for Bryan to lie

. The district court determined that there was no c oordinated communication to fabricate testimony
shown on the recordings

. However, t he district court recognize d that there were “a lot of integrated statements,”

— i.e., admissible statements intertwined with inadmissible statements

— that made the phone call s problematic . The court was primarily concerned with references on the call s to Lankford being incarcerated. Thus, the district court ruled that admitting the recordings would be unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403 despite their relevance.
After the dist rict court disallowed the admission of the recordings, the State sought clarification of the district court’s ruling. The prosecutor first informed the district court of his intention: “Judge, in light of the Court’s ruling, the State does intend to re

- cal l Bryan Lankford regardless and, specifically, without admitting the tapes, talk to him about the statements he made.” The district court agreed. Later, just before Bryan Lankford was to testify, counsel for Lankford argued that the recordings were inadmis sible and raised concern about how far the State might inquire. The prosecutor explained his understanding of the district court’s ruling: “my understanding of the Court’s ruling is that, [the] ruling excluded, the extrinsic evidence, the tapes8 of his statements, I fully intend on asking him about the statements, as is my right.” The district court agreed. Later, when Bryan Lankford took the witness stand, the district court reminded Bryan
Lank ford about the district court’s order “regarding not talking about convictions or sentencings or being in prison[.]” The State then b riefly questioned Bryan about his prior inconsistent

statements on the recordings indicating that he intended to lie to get Lankford acquitted and , perhaps , get himself out of prison. Bryan then had the opportunity to explain or deny the

statements , which he took

— explaining some statements and denying others. For example, t he prosecutor asked Bryan: “you believe that the only way you can get out of prison, is if you assist in acquitting your brother, Mark Lankford, correct?” Bryan responded: “That’s stupidity.” The prosecutor then asked Bryan: “You believe that, if [Mark Lankford] is acquitted, you will have to be let out of pr ison, correct?” Bryan denied such a belief. The prosecutor similarly inquired, “[i]f Mark is acquitted, he’ll be able to help you get out of prison, correct?” After an overruled objection, Bryan stated, “I don’t know how. You got any ideas?” Additionally, the prosecutor asked if Bryan
had made a statement that he was going to “blow them [the State] out of the water at [ Lankford’s ]
trial , correct?” Bryan answered, “I have no idea.” The State’s direct examination of Bryan ended
as follows: Q : [Prosecutor] You also said, I’m going to do everything I can to make sure he’s acquitted, correct?
A : [Bryan Lankford] Sounds like something I would say. He should be acquitted. He’s innocent. Q : So in your own words, you’re willing to do anything at thi s point to help your brother get acquitted?
A : No, not anything. Q : And that would include taking sole responsible [sic] for two murders, correct?
A : No. I did it. End of story. It must be stressed that the recordings the prosecutor all ud ed to were not admitted into evidence. Instead, t he district court a llow ed the State to generally inquire into the prior inconsisten t

statements for impeachment purposes

. But when questioned about his prior statement s , Bryan denied some and acknowledged another with the explanation that , although he knew his brother to
be innocent , he would not do “anything” to get him acquitted

. When viewed in the full context of the trial, t his cannot be said to be unfairly prejudicial

— if prejudicial at all

— and w e conclude that9 the district court did not abuse its discretion. The district court recognized that the tapes concerned integrated statements that referenced Lankford’s incarceration. Accordingly, the district court did not allow the tapes to be admitted. Instead, the di strict court only allowed a general inquiry into the prior inconsistent statements. T he colloquy between the State and Bryan Lankford did not
reference Lankford’s incarceration

— the prejudicial effect cited by the district court when it
excluded the recordi ngs . Thus, the district court denied the admission of the recordings under 403 but permitted inquiry into some statements without referencing incarceration

. Importantly, the State made no further attempt to offer the recordings for impeachment. Although not referenced by the district court in the colloquy with counsel prior to Bryan
Lankford’s redirect examination , the use of a recorded conversation for impeachment purposes is permitted under Rule 613 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence. This rule pro vides : ( a) Showing or Disclosing the Statement During Examination. When examining a witness about the witness ’ s prior statement, a party need not show it or disclose its contents to the witness. But the party must, on request, show it or disclose its co ntents to an adverse party ’ s attorney. (b) Extrinsic Evidence of a Prior Inconsistent Statement. Extrinsic evidence of a witness ’ s prior inconsistent statement is admissible only if the witness is given an opportunity to explain or deny the statement and an adverse party is given an opportunity to examine the witness about it, or if justice so requires.
I.R.E. 613. Just because the court barred the extrinsic evidence from being directly admitted pursuant to Rule 403 does not mean that the evidence was als o prohibited for the separate purpose of impeachment. U nder Rule 613, a witness may be questioned about prior inconsistent statements
with out requiring the prior statement to be introduced as extrinsic evidence. Further , the State is permitted to impeach i ts own witness under Rule 607. Since the inquiry of Bryan Lankford at issue was proper, there remains the question of the
late disclosure. T he primary focus is on whether the lateness of the disclosure itself prejudiced the preparation o r presentation of the defense to such a degree that the “ result of the proceedings would
have been different

. ” Tapia , 127 Idaho at 255, 899 P.2d at 965

. Here, the late disclosure came during the State’s case in chief, as potential evidence to impeach the te stimony of its own witness

. And, as mentioned above, t he Idaho Rules of Evidence permit the State to impeach its own
witness es. I.R.E. 607

. While the evidence was not beneficial to Lankford, i t cannot be said that the lateness of the disclosure prejudiced Lankford’s preparation or presentation. In fact, Lankford’s position, both below and on appeal, was that this evidence was merely cumulative

.10 Again, it is important to note that this late

- disclosed evidence was never actually admitted. It was only generally referenced by the prosecution and never entered into the record

. When Bryan denied making certain statements, no effort was made under Rule 613 (b) to impeach his testimony
with extrinsic evidence of the telephone calls. Inas much as the recordings were not introduced, this diminishes any inference that the lateness of the disclosure prejudice d Lankford. In fact, g iven Bryan ’s responses , Lankford has failed to show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for
the late d isclosure of this evidence, the result of the proceedings would have been different. Accordingly, the district court’s decision related to the late

- disclosed evidence is affirmed

. Lankford also argues that the district court erred in denying his Rule 403 objection. Lankford specifically faults the district court for failing to exercise reason in disallowing the actual recording but permitting the subject matter of the recorded conversation to be inquired into by the State on direct examination. We disagree

. Idaho Rule of Evidence 403 provides that “[t]he court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” We review the district court’s I.R.E. 403 decision for an abuse
of discretion. State v. Ogden , 171 Idaho 258, 519 P.3d 1198, 1213 (2022) (citing State v. Garcia , 166 Idaho 661, 671, 462 P.3d 112 5, 1135 (2020)), cert. denied , 143 S. Ct. 1010 (2023). Here, the district court excluded the recordings from being played for the jury. The district court recognize d that there were references on the call to Lankford being incarcerated , which it found problematic . Thus, the district court concluded that admitting the recordings into evidence would be unfairly prejudicial despite their relevance. Consistent with this concer n of unfair prejudice , just before Bryan Lankford testified on redirect, the district court caution ed Bryan
Lankford that he could mention “nothing about Mark Lankford being in prison or convicted, or anything like that . . . .” Taken together, w e conclud e that the district court reached its decision s through the
exercise of reason and did not otherwise abuse its discretion

. It recognized that the recordings concerned integrated statements that referenced Lankford’s incarceration and, a ccordingly, did not
allow the recordings to be admitted. Instead, the district court only allowed a general inquiry into the prior inconsistent statements. Importantly, the colloquy between the State and Bryan Lankford
did not reference Lankford’s incarceration

— a chief prejud icial concern cited by the district court11 when it excluded the tapes. Thus, the district court denied the direct admission of the recordings under 403 but permitted inquiry into some statements not referencing incarceration for impeachment purposes

. This is permissible under Idaho Rule of Evidence 613. Denying the direct
admission of evidence does not necessarily preclude its use for impeachment purposes when making an inquiry into a prior inconsistent statement under Idaho Rule of Evidence 613.
In S tate v. Floyd , the Idaho Court of A ppeals observed that “Rule 403 does not offer protection against evidence that is merely prejudicial in the sense of being detrimental to the party’s case. The rule protects against evidence that is unfairly prejudicial, that is, if it tends to suggest decision on an improper basis.” 125 Idaho 651, 654, 873 P.2d 905, 908 (Ct. App. 1994) (citing Wade v. Haynes, 663 F.2d 778, 783 (8th Cir.1981))

. Frankly, i t is uncertain whether the colloquy between the prosecutor and Bryan Lankford concerning his past statements was actually
detrimental to Mark Lankford’s chance at acquittal . But even if it were , it did not provide a foundation for the jury to make its decision on an improper basis. Accordingly, the district court
did not er r in allowing the State to question Bryan Lankford regarding his prior inconsistent

statement s

. B. The law of the case doctrine does not apply because this Court’s comments regarding the evidence from the 2008 trial expressed neither a principle n or a rule of law. Lankford challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction and argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion for acquittal pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 29. Lankford’s theory is layered and re sts on a contorted application of the law of the case doctrine and the corroboration requirement of Idaho Code section 19

- 2117. Essentially, Lankford argues that since the State offered basically the “same evidence that was before this Court in the prior a ppeal [,] and no other witnesses testified that Mark had the intent to commit the robbery[,]” this Court’s determination in Mark Lankford III that Lane Thomas’ testimony was
“essential” renders Lankford’s conviction uncorroborated under Idaho Code section 1 9

- 2117. Thus, in Lankford’s view, the district c ourt was bound by the same legal conclusions about the importance of certain evidence made in this Court’s prior opinion vacating a different trial , even though it was deciding issues in a different trial with a different evidentiary record

. This is a
mis application of the law of the case doctrine.
As we have said, “[t]he law of the case doctrine is well settled in Idaho and is utilized to

‘ maintain consistency and avoid reconsideration o f matters once decided during the course of a12 single, continuing lawsuit. . . . ’ ” Eich v. Wilbur J. Eich & Henrietta C. Eich Revocable , 169 Idaho 467, 497 P.3d 541, 547 (2021) (citing Berrett v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 161 , 165 Idaho 913, 922, 454 P.3d 555, 564 (2019)). “The law of the case doctrine provides ‘upon an appeal, the Supreme Court, in deciding a case presented[,] states in its opinion a principle or rule of law necessary to the decision , such pronouncement becomes the law of the case, and mu st be adhered to throughout its subsequent progress, both in the trial court and upon subsequent appeal

. . . . ’ ” State v. Dunlap , 155 Idaho 345, 375, 313 P.3d 1, 31 (2013) (emphasis added) (citing Stuart v. State, 136 Idaho 490, 495, 36 P.3d 1278, 1283 ( 2001)). Importantly, it is not the ultimate legal
conclusions that become the law of the case ; rather , it is the principles or rules of law necessary to
reach that conclusion that become the law of the case.
I n Mark Lankford III
, th is Court found that Lane Thomas’ trial testimony was of critical importance to Lankford’s 2008 conviction. H owever, that conclusion was based on the overall
evidence introduced at that trial. A statement that such evidence , which concerned impeachment evidence relating to the scope of benefits given to Thomas by the State for testifying against
Lankford , was important testimony in that trial because its suppression by the State ran afoul of Brady 4 or Napue

. 5 In Lankford’s 2008 trial, Thomas ’s testimony was necessary to satisf y the corroboration requirement of Idaho Code section 19

- 2117 . Without his testimony at that trial , we concluded there was “a ‘reasonable likelihood’ that Thomas’ false testimony about his motive for testifying ‘ could have affected the j udgment of the jury.’ ” Mark Lankford III , 162 Idaho at 507, 399 P.3d at 834 (emphasis in original). However, this does not mean that Lankford cannot be convicted without the testimony of Lane Thomas. In the trial we are now reviewing, there was different , if not wholly new evidence presented to the jury

. As one notable example, Dr. Bruce Anderson, a forensic anthropologist, testified during
the third trial that , based on a review of Cheryl Bravence’s x

- rays, she had possible defensive
wounds on her hands. Moreover, x

- rays showed that both victims had facial fractures consistent with a “narrow” weapon. Anderson opined that “a club, say like a night stick type club, [could]
have cause d a fracture like that.” This evidence was important because it not only co ntradicts Bryan’s testimony in this trial that he used a rock in killing both victims, but it also corroborates
hi s testimony from an earlier trial where he testified that Mark had killed both victims with a

4 Brady v. Maryland , 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 5 Napue v. Illinois , 360 U.S. 264 (1959).13 nightstick. There was testimony in this trial th at Mark Lankford carried a nightstick

— including
from Mark himself

— and a nightstick was found among the items in the 1982 Camaro (registered in Mark Lankford’s name) that the brothers concealed near the victim’s bodies

. Importantly, Dr.
Anderson did not testify in either of Mark Lankford’s previous trials.
As discussed above, the law of the case doctrine is applied when this Court “states in its opinion a principle or rule of law necessary to the decision. . . .” Dunlap , 155 Idaho at 375, 313
P.3d at 31. While our view of Lane Thomas’ testimony , as it concerned Mark Lankford’s second trial, was necessary to this Court’s analysis in our earlier opinion, that does not make it a principle
or rule of law binding in the next trial. This is especially true where the evidence and trial strategies
were not identical

. Thus, we hold that the law of the case doctrine does not apply to the statement
in Mark Lankford III indicating the importance of Lane Thomas’ testimony to that trial because it

was neither a principle n or rule of law.
C. Lankford’s speedy trial rights were not violated. In Idaho, a defendant’s right to a speedy trial is guaranteed by the federal and state
constitutions and Idaho Code section 19

- 3501. On appeal, counsel for Lankford acknowledges that when moving to dismiss below, counsel conceded that the statutory protections of Idaho Code
section 19

- 3501 did not apply under this Court’s precedent in State v. Avelar , 129 Idaho 700 , 931
P.2d 1218 (1997), which held that the statutory speedy trial protections do not apply to defendants following a successful appeal

. Regarding the constitutional protections, Lankford does not specify whether his asserted error on appeal is grounded in the Idaho Constitution or the United States
Constitut ion . Instead, Lankford simply argues a constitutional speedy trial violation using the four

factor analysis from Barker v. Wingo , 407 U.S. 514 (1972)

. As an initial matter, the State notes a procedural defect with Lan k ford’s appeal. The State
asserts that since Lankford has offered no authority regarding the discrete question of whether the constitutional right to a speedy trial reattaches after a successful appeal, he has waived the issue. The Idaho Appellate Rules provide that an appellant’s argument “sh all contain the contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues presented on appeal, the reasons therefor, with citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of the transcript and record relied upon.” I.A.R. 35(a)(6). Further,
this Court has ind icated that it “will not search the record on appeal for error.” Bach v. Bagley , 148 Idaho 784, 790, 229 P.3d 1146, 1152 (2010) (citing Suits v. Idaho Bd. of Prof’l Discipline, 138 Idaho 397, 400, 64 P.3d 323, 326 (2003)). In Bach v. Bagley , this Court hel d that “[a] general14 attack on the findings and conclusions of the district court, without specific reference to evidentiary or legal errors , is insufficient to preserve an issue .” 148 Idaho 784, 790, 229 P.3d 1146, 1152 (2010) (citing Michael v. Zehm, 74 I daho 442, 445, 263 P.2d 990, 993 (1953)).
We conclude that Lankford’s presentation of the speedy trial violation issue was not a “general attack.” Lankford presents his constitutional challenge with citation to relevant Supreme Court authority and preced ents of this Court. Further, Lankford’s challenge is supported by a clear argument. Lankford did not fail “to assert his assignments of error with particularity and to support his position with sufficient authority . . . .” Id

. (citing Randall v. Ganz, 96 Idaho 785, 788, 537 P.2d 65, 68 (1975)). Thus, his assignments of error are not “too indefinite to be heard by the Court.”
Id. ( citing Randall , 96 Idaho at 788, 537 P.2d at 68). Further, Lankford’s speedy trial assignment
of error contains content ions and supportive reason ing with respect to the speedy trial violation issue on appeal , including citations to authority and the portions of the record he relies upon. Accordingly, we conclude Lankford’s speedy trial constitutional challenge is procedura lly proper
under I.A.R. Rule 35 and not “too indefinite” for this Court’s review under our precedents. Regarding the merits of Lankford’s speedy trial claim , both the state and federal speedy trial constitutional rights are analyzed under Barker v. Wingo
, 407 U.S. 514 (1972)

. However, t his
Court has held that w hile the text is similar, “the right to a speedy trial under the Idaho Constitution is not identical to the right guaranteed by the United States Constitution.” State v. Hobson , 99 Idaho 200, 201, 579 P.2d 697, 698 (1978). The key difference is when the speedy trial clock begins. “Under the Sixth Amendment, the period of delay is measured from the date there is ‘a formal indictment or information or else the actual restraints imposed by arrest and hold ing to answer a criminal charge.’ ” State v. Young , 136 Idaho 113, 117, 29 P.3d 949, 953 (2001) (quoting United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320 (1971)); see Marion , 404 U.S. at 321 (“[W]e decline to extend [the] reach of the amendment to the period pri or to arrest.”). However, “[u]nder the Idaho Constitution, the period of delay is measured from the date formal charges are filed or the defendant is arrested, whichever occurs first.” Young , 136 Idaho at 117, 29 P.3d at 953 (citing State v. Stuart, 110 Id aho 163, 715 P.2d 833 (1986)); see also State v. Davis , 141 Idaho 828, 837, 118 P.3d 160, 169 (Ct. App. 2005) (“[W]e apply the stricter [speedy trial] standard found in our state constitution.”) (emphasis added). From there, both state and federal constitu tional claims turn to the balancing test under Barker

.15 “[T]he ‘balancing test’ laid down in Barker v. Wingo , 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972) , is consistent with decisions of this Court stating that whether one has been deprived of his right to a speedy trial must be decided by reference to considerations in addition to the mere passage of time.” State v. Lindsay , 96 Idaho 474, 475, 531 P.2d 23 6, 237 (1975) (citing
Hadlock v. State , 93 Idaho 915, 478 P.2d 295 (1973) and Ellenwood v. Cramer , 75 Idaho 338, 272 P.2d 702 (1954)) (adopting the balancing test from Barker in determining whether a speedy trial
violation occurred under the Idaho Constitu tion). Thus, the United States Constitution and the Idaho Constitution are both interpreted under Barker

. In applying Barker , this Court balances four primary factors identified by the Supreme Court of the United States: “(1) the length of the delay; (2) t he reason for the delay; (3) whether the defendant asserted the right to a speedy trial; and (4) the prejudice to the defendant.” Clark , 135 Idaho at 258, 16 P.3d at 934 (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 530). Although Lankford argues that his constitutional spe edy trial rights were violated under
Barker , he does not argue how the stricter time calculation of the Idaho standard strengthens his argument or otherwise impacts the result. Thus, it appears the federal constitutional right is all that is challenged by Lankford.
1. The length of the delay While there are four factors in the Barker speedy trial analysis, the first serves as a threshold consideration in determining whether further inquiry is required . As the Supreme Court
noted in Barker : “The length of the delay is to some extent a triggering mechanism. Until there is some delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance.” 407 U.S. at 530. The Court held that a co nstitutionally permissible delay depends on the complexity of the crime : “ t he delay that can be tolerated for an ordinary street crime is considerably less than for a serious, complex conspiracy charge.” Id. at 531. Thus, the primary inquiry is whether the delay is “presumptively prejudicial” and warrant s further inquiry of the other Barker factors. If the delay is presumptively prejudicial, then the other factors determine if the delay is constitutionally permissible

— i.e. , whether the delay is permissible for the type of crime charge d given the reasons for the delay, the assertion of the right, and any prejudice
to the defendant.
Our opinion in Mark Lankford III was filed on July 3, 2017. After t he remittitur was filed , the opinion became final on July 27, 2017. Lankford’s retrial commenced on September 3, 2019.16 Thus, the length of delay here is 768 days , more than 2 5 months from the final opinion vacating
Lankford’s 2008 conviction until the commencement of Lankford’s third trial

. We have previously det ermined that a seven

- and

- a

- half

- month interval between a mistrial declaration and a second trial was presumptively prejudicial : “ A delay of this length [seven

- and

one

- half

- m onths] is sufficient to trigger our inquiry into whether a defendant has been denied a speedy trial.” State v. Talmage , 104 Idaho 249, 252, 658 P.2d 920, 923 (1983) (citing State v.
Holtslander , 102 Idaho 306, 308

– 09, 629 P.2d 702, 704

– 05 (1981)); see also State v. Lindsay , 96 Idaho 474, 476, 531 P.2d 236, 238 (1975) (“[T]he interve ning period was thus some fourteen months, long enough to ‘trigger’ our inquiry.”); State v. Campbell , 104 Idaho 705, 708, 662 P.2d 1149, 1152 (Ct. App. 1983) (concluding that a twelve

- month period was presumptively prejudicial). Here, the delay between th e remittitur and the commencement of a new trial was over two

years. Lankford’s third murder trial was undoubtedly a complex one

— it centered on decades

- old discovery and evidence , and it required the testimony of numerous fact witnesses and expert
witnesse s

. Some of these witnesses had died or were incarcerated since his earlier trials , requiring attorneys for both sides to adjust the strategies used in the prior trials

. Yet, considering the precedent of this Court, we hold that the over two

- year delay for retrial was presumptively prejudicial ; therefore, we conclude that the delay triggers further inquiry under the remaining
Barker factors.
2. The reasons for the delay Lankford characterizes the length of delay as excessive by noting he has “been in constant custody for nearly 35 years and ha[s] yet to receive a fair trial.” However, as discussed above, this
Court reviews the right to a speedy trial in the context of a retrial as the time between the final decision vacating judgment (the remittitur) and the new trial

— and not the length of time from the
initial arrest. 6

6 The Ninth Circuit rejected the approach that the whole period of arrest, when there is a trial, appeal, and subsequent retrial, is reviewed in the same speedy trial manner. See United States v. Robles , 563 F.2d 1308, 1309 ( 9th Cir. 1977) (“[The defendant] first argues on this appeal that the three

- year delay from the date of the offense to his retrial (after his successful appeal) denies him his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. This argument is without merit. Robles was afforded a speedy trial in August 1974, five months after the indictment was filed, which resulted in his conviction. That conviction was vacated by this C ourt for reasons not related to this appeal. What happened was that the defendant was afforded a speedy trial; his conviction was vacated on appeal; and he was retried and again convicted. These facts17 When discussing the reason for this delay between trials in his b rief on appeal, Mark acknowledges in his briefing that his own actio ns played a role in the delay: [Lankford] acknowledged that he filed a motion to recuse the prosecutor due to his misconduct in the 2008 trial on September 14, 2017, and that the prosecutor was informed of his intention to the [sic] file the motion prior to its filing. The district court granted that motion [on] November 21, 2017, but Mark asserted that the prosecutor did not take any action to find alternative counsel until December 8, 2017. Further, Mark pointed out that he asserted his speedy trial righ ts in his motion to recuse the prosecutor. (Internal citations omitted). While Lankford concedes that his motion to recuse the prosecutor may have caused some del a y , he also argues “that motion should not count against him. [He] is, of course, entitled to a fair trial as well as a speedy trial, and these motions were essential to guaranteeing him a fair trial.”
T he record demonstrates that during the two

- year period between remittitur and retrial , the attorneys for both sides were not idle. Rather, there were a significant number of unusual procedural events during this span. As mentioned above, remittitur was filed on July 27, 2017 , and Lankford was appointed new counsel on August 1

. The State moved to quash the order appointing
the Idaho At torney General as special prosecutor and reappoint MacGregor. This was granted without objection from Lankford. Yet, a few weeks later, after the initial trial date was set for January 8, 2018 , Lankford moved to recuse the newly re

- appointed prosecutor , Ma cGregor , on September 14, 2017 . After a hearing, the district court took this motion under advisement on October 23, 2017. Subsequently, Lankford filed a second motion to recuse MacGregor on November 6, 2017 , followed by a motion to change venue on Novembe r 9, 2017. Th e latter motion included an objection from Lankford to again continuing the trial , asserting that he had not waived his speedy trial rights. The Idaho County prosecutor petitioned the district court for the appointment of a special

pro secutor on December 12, 2017. On December 20, 2017, the district court order ed that a special prosecutor be appointed pursuant to Idaho Code section 31

- 2603

. The Idaho County prosecutor
then moved to continue the jury trial , citing difficulty finding a special prosecutor to prosecute the
case on behalf of the State. O n January 12, 2018, the Idaho County prosecutor filed an amended

do not amount to a denial of his Sixth Amendment rights. ” (citing Harrison v. United States , 392 U.S. 219, 221, n. 4 (1968); Barker v. Wingo , 407 U.S. 5 14 (1972); and United States v. Simmons , 536 F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 1976) )

.18 petition for a special prosecutor , seeking the appointment of the Canyon County prosecutor and the Payette County prosecutor as special prosecutors. The district court eventually appointed three prosecutors from the Canyon County prosecutor’s office as special prosecutors and o n February
1 , 2018, it reschedule d the trial for August 20, 2018. On February 21, 2018, Lankford moved to dismiss for a speedy trial violation. The n , as he
does now , Lankford pointed to the “nearly 35 year s ” that Lankford has been in prison as the delay. The same day, Lankford also filed a motion to dismiss based on the law of the case doctrine. On March 16, 2018, Lankford then moved to disqualify the presiding district judge for cause based on
what Lankford claimed w as “demonstrated bias and prejudice that has prevented [Lankford] from having a fair trial.” On April 3, 2018, the district court issue d an order addressing most of the outstanding
motions , including motions regarding certain evidence and the co ndition of jail facilities

. O n May 16, 2018, the district court also denied Lankford’s motion to disallow the transcripts of previous
trial testimony from deceased witnesses. Thereafter, in June 2018, Lankford sought permission to
seek an interlocutory app eal to this Court on that denial . Permission to seek an interlocutory appeal was granted by the district court on June 25, 2018. After granting permission to seek permission from the Supreme Court, the district court vacated the trial date and reset the tr ial for November
2018

. This Court ultimately denied the request for an interlocutory appeal on August 20, 2018

. Ironically, had this Court granted Lankford’s motion, his trial would have certainly been delayed even longer. In September 2018, Lankford ’s att orneys sought leave to withdraw . In their motion,
counsel detailed that they were seeking to withdraw because Lankford had requested “in writing and in person that [ they ] withdraw immediately from his case.” The hearing on th at motion took place on October 5, 2018. Within a week , the district court granted the motion to withdraw and
allowed for a substitution of counsel

. The district court initially denied a request from the State for

a continuance of the November 2018 trial date after an objecti on at the hearing from Lankford. The State sought the continuance because the relatives of the victims were unavailable. Thereafter,
the State again moved to continue the trial , citing, among other reasons, the need for defense counsel to prepare for trial

. On October 29, 2018, the district court appointed new counsel for
Lankford . Lankford’s new attorneys did not object to the State’s second request for a continuance ,19 nor did they object to the new trial date, which was reset for September 3, 2019 . There were no
further continuances and the trial commenced as schedule d.
As illustrated above , there were extensive and disruptive procedural events taking place
between the remittitur and the eventual retrial

— many of which resulted from Lankford’s own actions . Lankford argues that he should not be penalized for moving to recuse a prosecutor early
in the case . Indeed, he should not a nd will not. However, t he recusal of a prosecutor is a major event, and a reasonable time should be allowed for a new prose cutor to prepare for trial , especially
when it concerns a 35

- year

- old, double homicide case. Finding prosecutor s who are willing and
able to take on a complex case such as this on short notice is no simple task. In addition , Lankford
later attempt ed to dis qualify the presiding judge , only later to withdraw the request and seek permissive appeal on some of the very issues he now raises in this appeal . Finally, Lankford asked
the district court

— only two months before the November 2018 trial date

— to dismiss his appointed
trial counsel and appoint new defense counsel

. Motions of this nature will almost inevitably lead to considerable delay s in going to trial. In sum, most of the delays here were precipitated by Lankford ’s own actions

. In the case
of t he last and longest continuance, the delay was reasonably necessary to allow new prosecutor s and new defense counsel time to prepare for tria l

. While we recognize th at Lankford was free to file his motions and seek the relief to which he believed he was entitled, he was not free from the natural consequences of his actions when they affect ed the trial court’s ability to provide him both
a fair and speedy trial. Therefore, w e conclude that Lankford ’s collect ive actions below ma d e the delay reasonable under the circumstances of this case. Accordingly , the district court did not err in
its determination that the two

- year delay in proceeding to trial was reasonable under both the Idaho
and U nited States constitu tions

. 3. Whether the defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial Lankford asserted his speedy trial right at least once. On February 21, 2018, Lankford moved the district court to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial. This was shortly after a new prosecuto r had been appointed. In that motion, Lankford reminded the district court that he had not waived his speedy trial right. I mportantly, however, Lankford did not re assert his right to a speedy trial
later when the State moved to disqualify the Idaho Attorney General’s Office as prosecutor and reappoint MacGregor. Likewise, there is no objection in the record from Lankford after the district court granted a continuance following the appointment of his new at torneys

— the longest20 continuance and the one that was necessarily granted to allow Lankford’s new defense attorneys time to adequately prepare for trial. Therefore, we conclude that although Lankford did a ssert his right after the first continuance, he fail ed to do so later. Again, the later continuances were also
unavoidable , due to the need for both the State and the new defense counsel to prepare for trial,
and caused by his motion to recuse the prosecutor and his request for new counsel . A fter his early assertion of his right to a speedy trial, Lankford failed to re assert this right when the most considerable delays in the trial

— often precipitated by h i s own actions

— occurred.
4. The prejudice to the defendant Concerning the prejudice prong of Barker , Lankford again relies on the overall length of the delay from the initial arrest

— some 35 years

— to argue that “the evidence and testimony to be presented has been known to the State since [Lankford’s] first trial. Considering that 35 years had passed at t he time Mark [Lankford] was preparing for his third trial, it is clear that the relevant testimony and evidence had already been gathered and that a new investigation would be
unfruitful.” However , as discussed above, there were extensive procedural events taking place
between the remittitur and retrial. As noted above, much of the delay occurred at Lankford ’s request and should have been the reasonably expected result of the motions granted in his favor. The longest of the delays resulted from granting Lan kford’s motion for new counsel , so that
defense counsel could prepare for trial. Clearly, it would have been far more prejudicial for the district court to require Lankford to proceed to trial with unprepared attorneys. Considering all the factors from Bar ker v. Wingo , we conclude that while further inquiry is triggered by the length of the delay , the procedural history of this case do es not give rise to a speedy trial violation. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s decision denying the motion to dismiss for a speedy trial violation.
IV. C ONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the district court

. Chief Justice BEVAN, Justice BRODY , and Justices Pro Tem BURDICK and MEYER
CONCUR.