NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CHARLES T. CROCKETT, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

VENALONZO, S.S.U., CO II, 

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 18-16614 

D.C. No. 2:16-cv-00959-JJT-JZB 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

John Joseph Tuchi, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted May 21, 2019**

Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, FRIEDLAND and BENNETT, Circuit Judges.

Arizona state prisoner Charles T. Crockett appeals pro se from the district 

court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that a

contraband investigation violated his constitutional rights. We have jurisdiction 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Ballen v. City of Redmond, 466 F.3d 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

MAY 30 2019

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 18-16614 

736, 741 (9th Cir. 2006). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Crockett’s First 

Amendment retaliation claim because Crockett failed to raise a genuine dispute of 

material fact as to whether defendant’s action did not reasonably advance a 

legitimate correctional goal. See Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th 

Cir. 2005) (elements of a retaliation claim in the prison context).

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Crockett’s Fourth 

Amendment claim arising out of a strip search because Crockett failed to raise a 

genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the search was unreasonable in its 

scope, manner, location, or justification. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 

(1979) (factors to be considered when evaluating whether search was unreasonable 

under Fourth Amendment).

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Crockett’s Fourth 

Amendment claim related to Crockett’s fecal sample on the basis of qualified 

immunity because defendant’s conduct did not violate clearly established rights. 

See Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 778-79 (2014) (defendants sued under 

§ 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity unless they violated a right that was 

clearly established; “a defendant cannot be said to have violated a clearly 

established right unless the right’s contours were sufficiently definite that any 

reasonable official in the defendant’s shoes would have understood that he was 
3 18-16614 

violating it”).

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Crockett’s Eighth 

Amendment cruel and unusual punishment claim because Crockett failed to raise a 

genuine dispute of material fact as to whether any alleged deprivation was 

objectively sufficiently serious. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) 

(the complained of act or omission must result in the denial of “the minimal 

civilized measure of life’s necessities” (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted)).

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Crockett’s 

Fourteenth Amendment due process claim because Crockett failed to raise a 

genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the complained of conduct 

implicated a liberty interest. See Chappell v. Mandeville, 706 F.3d 1053, 1062-63

(9th Cir. 2013) (temporary contraband watch does not trigger due process 

protections).

Crockett’s motion for appointment of counsel (Docket Entry No. 11) is 

denied.

AFFIRMED.