IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-11-00447-CV

IN RE J.C.L., A JUVENILE

Original Proceeding

MEMORANDUM OPINION

In this mandamus proceeding, we are asked to determine whether the 

respondent, Judge Robert Stem of the 82nd Judicial District Court, abused his discretion 

in failing to consider and hold a hearing on relator J.C.L.’s applications for a writ of 

habeas corpus. For the reasons stated herein, we conditionally grant relator’s petition 

for writ of mandamus.

I. BACKGROUND

This is not the first time this matter has been before this Court. See generally In re 

J.C.L., No. 10-11-00407-CV, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 8756 (Tex. App.—Waco Oct. 28, 2011, 

orig. proceeding) (mem. op.). As such, the majority of the operative facts in this case 

have been outlined in our opinion in relator’s previously-filed mandamus. See id. at **1-
In re J.C.L., a Juvenile Page 2

3. In his previously-filed mandamus, relator complained about the trial court’s decision 

to detain him because of: (1) his involvement in a one-car accident that resulted in the 

death of another minor, C.N.J.; (2) the allegation of delinquent conduct—criminallynegligent homicide; and (3) the conclusion that he is a danger to himself and the 

community. See id. at **1-2; see also TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 51.03(a)(1), 54.01 (West 2008 

& Supp. 2011); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.05 (West 2011). We denied relator’s 

mandamus on the basis that he had an adequate remedy other than mandamus relief to 

challenge his detention—in particular, a direct appeal pertaining to an application for a 

writ of habeas corpus that was pending in the trial court. See In re J.C.L., 2011 Tex. App. 

LEXIS 8756, at **4-7.

In this mandamus, relator notes that he filed his original habeas corpus 

application on October 25, 2011. The trial court notified him that a hearing would not 

be held on the application until the Robertson County District Attorney’s Office 

responded. Nevertheless, relator sent letters to the trial court requesting a hearing on 

the application. While his application was pending in the trial court, relator was 

released from his ten-day detention on November 1, 2011; however, upon relator’s 

release from detention, the trial court imposed several conditions upon relator, 

including a curfew, prohibiting relator from operating a motor vehicle under any 

circumstance, requiring relator to wear an electronic GPS monitoring device, and 

prohibiting relator from going anywhere other than home and school.1

 

1 It is noteworthy that the trial court did not conduct a hearing regarding the imposition of the 

conditions of release; therefore, neither relator nor the Robertson County District Attorney’s Office were 

afforded the opportunity to present evidence regarding the propriety of the conditions of release.
In re J.C.L., a Juvenile Page 3

In a letter dated October 25, 2011 but file-stamped November 4, 2011, the trial 

court informed the parties that relator’s habeas corpus application was dismissed as 

moot because relator had been released from detention. Shortly thereafter, relator sent 

the trial court another letter requesting a hearing on his habeas corpus application. 

Relator specifically noted that: “The Court of Appeals has indicated that the legal 

vehicle to address my client’s issues is the Writ of Habeas Corpus. I cannot invoke the 

Appellate Court’s jurisdiction without an order. Thus, if the Court would prefer to 

deny my application without a hearing, I would be satisfied with that course of action.” 

On November 7, 2011, relator filed an amended habeas corpus application, 

challenging, once again, the legality of his detention and the conditions of release 

imposed by the trial court. In his amended application, relator also referenced our 

opinion in his previously-filed mandamus and included it in the appendix. Apparently, 

no action has been taken with respect to relator’s amended application.

On December 2, 2011, relator filed this mandamus complaining that the trial 

court erred in concluding that his habeas corpus application was moot and that the trial 

court abused its discretion by failing to conduct a hearing on his habeas corpus 

application. We requested a response from the real party in interest, the Robertson 

County District Attorney’s Office; a response was filed on December 21, 2011. On 

January 23, 2012, this matter was orally argued.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that will issue only to correct a clear 

abuse of discretion when there is “no adequate remedy by appeal.” In re Prudential Ins. 
In re J.C.L., a Juvenile Page 4

Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135-36 (Tex. 2004) (citations omitted). “A trial court has no 

‘discretion’ in determining what the law is or applying the law to the facts.” Walker v. 

Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex. 1992). “Thus, a clear failure by the trial court to 

analyze or apply the law correctly will constitute an abuse of discretion.” Id. (citations 

omitted). And, generally speaking, an adequate legal remedy exists if the relator is able 

to raise the issue on appeal. See id. However, in some extraordinary cases, an appellate 

remedy may be inadequate when the benefits to mandamus review outweigh the 

detriments. See In re McAllen Med. Ctr., Inc., 275 S.W.3d 458, 462, 468-69 (Tex. 2008) 

(orig. proceeding); In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d at 136. Moreover, a relator 

has the burden of providing this Court with a sufficient record to establish his right to 

mandamus relief. See Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 837; see also TEX. R. APP. P. 52.3, 52.7.

III. STANDING AND MOOTNESS

In his first issue, relator contends that the trial court erred in concluding that his 

original application for writ of habeas corpus is moot. We agree.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law2

 

2 As we noted in relator’s previous mandamus, the Texas Supreme Court and the Texas 

Legislature have recognized that, in general, juvenile proceedings such as these are civil, not criminal, in 

nature. See In re Hall, 286 S.W.3d 925, 927 (Tex. 2009) (“Although quasi-criminal in nature, proceedings in 

juvenile court are considered civil cases . . . .”); In re R.J.H., 79 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex. 2002) (noting that the 

Texas Family Code governs juvenile delinquency proceedings in Texas and requires that the proceedings 

be conducted under the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, except as to discovery, and the Texas Rules of 

Evidence applicable to criminal proceedings); In re M.R., 858 S.W.2d 365, 366 (Tex. 1993); Carrillo v. State, 

480 S.W.2d 612, 615 (Tex. 1972); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.17 (West Supp. 2011); see also In re J.C.L., No. 

10-11-00407-CV, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 8756, at *4 (Tex. App.—Waco Oct. 28, 2011, orig. proceeding) 

(mem. op.).
In re J.C.L., a Juvenile Page 5

Whether a court has subject-matter jurisdiction is a legal question that we review 

de novo. See Trulock v. City of Duncanville, 277 S.W.3d 920, 923 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, 

no pet.). The mootness doctrine implicates subject-matter jurisdiction. See id.

“Standing is a constitutional prerequisite to maintaining suit in either federal or 

state court.” Williams v. Lara, 52 S.W.3d 171, 178 (Tex. 2001) (citing Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. 

Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 444 (Tex. 1993)). For a plaintiff to have standing, a 

controversy must exist between the parties at every stage of the legal proceedings, 

including the appeal. See United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 39, 71 S. Ct. 104, 

106-07, 95 L. Ed. 36 (1950); see also Williams, 52 S.W.3d at 184 (Tex. 2001). If a 

controversy ceases to exist or, in other words, “the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ 

or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome,” then the case becomes 

moot. Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 481, 102 S. Ct. 1181, 1183, 71 L. Ed. 2d 353 (1982); 

see O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495-96, 94 S. Ct. 669, 683-84, 38 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1974) 

(“Past exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy 

regarding injunctive relief . . . if unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse 

effects.”); see also Williams, 52 S.W.3d at 184. And if a case becomes moot, the parties 

lose standing to maintain their claims. Williams, 52 S.W.3d at 184 (citing City of Los 

Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105-06, 103 S. Ct. 1660, 1666-67, 75 L. Ed. 2d 675 (1983); 

Murphy, 455 U.S. at 481, 102 S. Ct. at 1183).

B. Discussion

In his original habeas corpus application filed on October 25, 2011, relator argued 

that: “The State presented no evidence that the child was a flight risk, no evidence that 
In re J.C.L., a Juvenile Page 6

the child was driving a vehicle and therefor, a danger to anyone, and no evidence that 

the child was not being adequately supervised by his parents.” Relator also asserted 

that:

The juvenile system is designed to rehabilitate rather than incarcerate[;] 

protect, rather than punish. The Court in detaining the child in this case 

did the opposite. The Court decided to punish by incarceration and in so 

doing, did not protect the child. . . . [T]he juvenile system also seeks to 

avoid the taint of criminality and to prevent recidivism and promote 

rehabilitation. The best method of avoiding the attachment of criminal 

taint is by keeping the child completely out of the system. By detaining 

the child, in the instant case, the Court threw the child completely into the 

system.

Before he could get a hearing on his original habeas corpus application, relator was 

released from the juvenile detention center. However, after releasing relator from 

detention but without a hearing, the trial court imposed several conditions of release, 

which include a curfew, a prohibition from operating a motor vehicle, and requirements 

to wear a GPS-monitoring device and only go to school and his home. The trial court 

then issued a letter ruling dismissing relator’s original habeas corpus application as 

moot.

The crux of relator’s habeas corpus applications is that he has been and is 

currently being subjected to an unlawful restraint on his liberty. We agree that relator’s 

liberty has been and continues to be restrained.3 In addition to being originally 

detained in the juvenile detention center, relator is currently subject to additional 

restraints on his liberty via the conditions imposed on his release. See Ex parte Williams, 

 

3 Despite our conclusion that relator’s original habeas corpus application is not moot, we decline 

to comment on the merits of the application—namely, whether the restraints on relator’s liberty were and 

are unlawful.
In re J.C.L., a Juvenile Page 7

690 S.W.2d 243, 244 (Tex. 1985) (“‘It is not required that the applicant for a writ of 

habeas corpus be actually confined in a jail. Any character of restraint which precludes 

absolute and perfect freedom of action will justify the issuance of the writ.’”) (quoting 

Ex parte Calhoun, 127 Tex. 54, 91 S.W.2d 1047, 1048 (1936)); see also Hensley v. Mun. Court, 

411 U.S. 345, 349, 93 S. Ct. 1571, 1573-74, 36 L. Ed. 2d 294 (1973) (holding that one may 

be in custody for habeas corpus purposes despite the fact that such person has been 

released from jail on bail or personal bond). As such, we find that a controversy—a 

continued restraint on relator’s liberty—existed at the time of his release and remains in 

existence today. See Ex parte Williams, 690 S.W.2d at 244 (concluding that Williams’s

liberty was restrained even though he was out on bond because incarceration “is not a 

speculative possibility where the unfolding of events may render the controversy moot; 

his bond could be revoked at any time”)4; see also In re Richards, 202 S.W.3d 779, 789 

(Tex. App.—Beaumont 2006, pet. denied) (noting that courts have reviewed various 

restrictions or restraints on liberty that do not amount to confinement through habeas 

proceedings) (citing Ex parte Alakayi, 102 S.W.3d 426, 432 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th 

Dist.] 2003, pet. ref’d) (reviewing restrictions imposed in a community-supervision 

order limiting contact with minors and creating a child safety zone); In re Pierre, 50 

S.W.3d 554, 558-59 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2001, orig. proceeding) (examining restrictions 

imposed for failing to pay child support, and requiring father to submit to testing for 

drugs and alcohol); In re Ragland, 973 S.W.2d 769, 771 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1998, orig. 

 

4 If relator were to violate any of the conditions of release imposed, he would be subject to further 

detention. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 53.02(b), 54.01(e) (West 2008).
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proceeding) (reviewing a restriction requiring a person to perform a certain amount of 

community service each week); Ex parte Duncan, 796 S.W.2d 562, 564 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, orig. proceeding) (examining restrictions requiring a person in 

violation of a child-support order to report monthly to a probation officer and limiting 

his right to travel)). We therefore disagree with the trial court’s determination that 

relator’s original habeas corpus application is moot.5

IV. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT’S FAILURE TO CONSIDER AND RULE ON RELATOR’S 

HABEAS CORPUS APPLICATION WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION

In his second issue, relator argues that the trial court abused its discretion in 

refusing to hold a hearing on his habeas corpus application because the act of holding a 

hearing is ministerial.

A. The Trial Court’s Duty to Consider and Rule on a Motion

As noted earlier, mandamus will issue only to correct a clear abuse of discretion 

when there is no adequate remedy by appeal. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 

at 135-36. A court may abuse its discretion by failing to execute a ministerial task for 

which no discretion attaches, such as refusing to conduct a hearing or rule on a 

properly-pending motion. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Marshall, 829 S.W.2d 157, 158 (Tex. 1992) 

(per curiam); In re Blakeney, 254 S.W.3d 659, 661 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2008, orig. 

 

5 We point out that the purpose of a habeas corpus proceeding is not to determine the ultimate 

guilt or innocence of the applicant, but only to ascertain whether the applicant’s liberty has been 

unlawfully restrained. See Ex parte Gordon, 584 S.W.2d 686, 688 (Tex. 1979); In re Alexander, 243 S.W.3d 

822, 827 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2007, orig. proceeding); see also In re Sanner, No. 01-09-00001-CV, 2010 

Tex. App. LEXIS 4031, at *9 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] May 20, 2010, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.).
In re J.C.L., a Juvenile Page 9

proceeding); see also In re Williams, No. 07-11-00429-CV, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 8808, at 

**1-2 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Nov. 3, 2011, orig. proceeding) (per curiam).

The parties do not dispute that relator’s habeas corpus applications were 

properly filed and before the trial court. In addition, the record reflects that relator has 

requested that the trial court hold a hearing and ultimately rule on his habeas corpus 

applications. “While it is a basic premise that an appellate court lacks the power to 

compel a trial judge to do a particular act involving or requiring discretion on his part, 

this Court is empowered to order a trial judge to exercise his discretion in some 

manner.” O’Donniley v. Golden, 860 S.W.2d 267, 269 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1993, orig. 

proceeding); see In re Chavez, 62 S.W.3d 225, 228 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2001, orig. 

proceeding) (“[A]dmittedly, the need to consider and rule upon a motion is not a 

discretionary act.”); see also In re Minnfee, No. 07-09-0005-CV, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 332, 

at *2 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Jan. 16, 2009, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (“[W]e cannot tell 

a trial judge how to rule on motions pending before them before the trial judge himself 

rules on them.”). We therefore conclude that the trial court has a ministerial duty to 

consider and rule on relator’s habeas corpus applications, especially in light of our 

conclusion that the trial court’s dismissal of relator’s habeas corpus application as moot 

was improper.

B. Reasonable Time for Trial Court to Perform its Ministerial Duty

Despite our conclusion that it has a ministerial duty to consider and rule upon 

relator’s properly-pending habeas corpus applications, the trial court has a reasonable 

time within which to perform its ministerial duty. See In re Blakeney, 254 S.W.3d at 661; 
In re J.C.L., a Juvenile Page 10

see also Safety-Kleen Corp. v. Garcia, 945 S.W.2d 268, 269 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997, 

orig. proceeding). A trial court’s refusal to rule on a pending motion within a 

reasonable amount of time constitutes a clear abuse of discretion. See In re Shredder Co., 

L.L.C., 225 S.W.3d 676, 679 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2006, orig. proceeding). Whether a 

reasonable time for the trial court to act has lapsed is dependent upon the circumstances 

of each case. In re Blakeney, 254 S.W.3d at 662. “Determining what time period is 

reasonable is not subject to exact formulation . . . . Moreover, no bright line separates a 

reasonable time period from an unreasonable one.” Id. (citing In re Keeter, 134 S.W.3d 

250, 253 (Tex. App.—Waco 2003, orig. proceeding); In re Chavez, 62 S.W.3d at 228). In 

analyzing whether a reasonable period has lapsed, Texas courts have noted the 

following:

“[A reasonable time to rule] is dependent upon a myriad of criteria, 

not the least of which is the trial court’s actual knowledge of the motion, 

its overt refusal to act on same, the state of the court’s docket, and the 

existence of other judicial and administrative matters which must be 

addressed first. Ex parte Bates, 65 S.W.3d 133[, 135] (Tex. App.—Amarillo 

2001, orig. proceeding). So too must the trial court’s inherent power to 

control its own docket be factored into the mix. See Ho v. Univ. of Tex. at 

Arlington, 984 S.W.2d 672, 694-95 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1998, pet. denied) 

(holding that a court has the inherent authority to control its own 

docket).”

In re Blakeney, 254 S.W.3d at 663 (quoting In re Chavez, 62 S.W.3d at 228-29). 

Furthermore, because the trial court’s power to control its own docket is discretionary, a 

reviewing appellate court may not arbitrarily interfere with it. Ex parte Bates, 65 S.W.3d 

at 135.
In re J.C.L., a Juvenile Page 11

Here, relator was detained on October 24, 2011. He filed his original habeas 

corpus application the next day—October 25, 2011. The trial court responded to 

relator’s habeas corpus application by informing him that it would schedule a hearing 

or issue a ruling on the pleadings once the State filed a response to his application. 

However, despite relator’s requests that the trial court conduct a hearing on his 

application, the trial court issued its letter ruling dismissing relator’s application as 

moot after he was released from the juvenile detention center. Moreover, the record 

indicates that the trial court has not issued a ruling on relator’s amended habeas corpus 

application. And to date, no hearing has been held on either of relator’s habeas corpus 

applications. Further, more than three months have elapsed since relator was first 

detained and the trial court was informed of his complaints regarding the alleged 

unlawful restraints on his liberty.

Given the circumstances of this case, especially considering relator is a juvenile, 

the trial court did not conduct a hearing regarding the imposition of the conditions of 

release, and relator’s liberty interest continues to be restrained to this day, we conclude 

that, only for the purposes of this case, a reasonable time period has elapsed for the trial 

court to consider and rule upon relator’s habeas corpus applications. See In re Blakeney, 

254 S.W.3d at 663; In re Keeter, 134 S.W.3d at 253; In re Chavez, 62 S.W.3d at 228; see also 

In re B.W., 313 S.W.3d 818, 820 (Tex. 2010) (“One of the purposes of placing such 

jurisdiction in civil courts under the Family Code is to ‘provide for the care, the 

protection, and the wholesome moral, mental, and physical development of children 

coming within its provisions.’”) (quoting TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.01 (West 2008) 
In re J.C.L., a Juvenile Page 12

(providing also that the juvenile justice code is intended to treat, train, and rehabilitate 

children and remove, where appropriate, the taint of criminality from children 

committing certain unlawful acts)). Accordingly, under these circumstances, we find 

that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to consider and rule on relator’s 

habeas corpus applications within a reasonable time. See In re Blakeney, 254 S.W.3d at 

662-63; see also In re Shredder Co., L.L.C., 225 S.W.3d at 679. Thus, we conclude that 

relator has proved his entitlement to mandamus relief.6 See In re Blakeney, 254 S.W.3d at 

662-63; see also In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d at 135-36; Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 

840.

V. CONCLUSION

Because we have concluded that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to 

consider and rule on relator’s habeas corpus applications within a reasonable time, we 

conditionally grant relator’s petition for writ of mandamus. The writ will issue only if 

the trial court fails to consider and rule on relator’s applications within twenty-one days 

of this opinion.

 

6 At oral argument, the State argued, among other things, that relator did not prove entitlement 

to mandamus relief because he could present his habeas corpus application to another district court. See 

In re Piper, 105 S.W.3d 107, 109 (Tex. App.—Waco 2003, orig. proceeding); In re Davis, 990 S.W.2d 455, 457 

(Tex. App.—Waco 1999, orig. proceeding). However, Texas courts have held that a “technically available 

legal remedy will not defeat a petitioner’s entitlement to mandamus relief when the remedy is ‘so 

uncertain, tedious, burdensome, slow, inconvenient, inappropriate or ineffective as to be deemed 

inadequate.’” In re Davis, 990 S.W.2d at 457 (citing State ex rel. Holmes v. Court of Appeals, 885 S.W.2d 389, 

394 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (quoting Smith v. Flack, 728 S.W.2d 784, 792 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987)); Kozacki v. 

Knize, 883 S.W.2d 760, 762 (Tex. App.—Waco 1994, orig. proceeding)); see Ex parte Hargett, 819 S.W.2d 866, 

868 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (noting that, under proper circumstances, an applicant may pursue a writ of 

mandamus when the trial court refuses to consider a habeas application) (citing Von Kolb v. Koehler, 609 

S.W.2d 654, 655-56 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1980, orig. proceeding)). We find that, under the circumstances in 

this case, requiring relator to present his habeas corpus applications to another district court would be too 

burdensome, slow, inconvenient, and ineffective as to be deemed inadequate; therefore, relator may 

pursue a writ of mandamus in this Court. See In re Davis, 990 S.W.2d at 457; see also Kozacki, 883 S.W.2d at 

762. 
In re J.C.L., a Juvenile Page 13

 

AL SCOGGINS

Justice

Before Chief Justice Gray,

Justice Davis, and

Justice Scoggins

Conditionally granted

Opinion delivered and filed February 15, 2012

[OT06]