IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Scott T. Young, :

Appellant :

:

v. : No. 658 C.D. 2015

: Submitted: February 19, 2016

The Estate of Frank J. Young :

and Norma Young :

BEFORE: HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge

HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

HONORABLE DAN PELLEGRINI, Senior Judge

OPINION 

BY JUDGE SIMPSON FILED: April 12, 2016

Scott T. Young (Plaintiff), representing himself, appeals from a March 

13, 2015 order of the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County1(trial court)

denying Young’s motion for reconsideration of its March 4, 2015 order sustaining

preliminary objections to Young’s complaint seeking compensatory damages from

the estates of his late aunt and uncle (Defendants or Estates). Essentially, 

Plaintiff’s complaint alleged that certain unnamed individuals mistreated Plaintiff’s 

aunt and uncle in their last days. The individuals also interfered with Plaintiff’s 

relationship with his aunt and uncle by denying him visitation. Because we 

consider Plaintiff’s uncounseled appeal to be a timely appeal of the trial court’s 

order sustaining Defendants’ preliminary objections, we address the merits of 

Plaintiff’s appeal. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

 

1

The Honorable David J. Williamson presided.
2

I. Background

A. Generally

Plaintiff is a nephew of the late Frank J. Young and his wife, Norma 

Young. They were married for 50 years. In June 2014, Norma Young died testate; 

her will left her entire estate to her husband. In August 2014, Frank Young died 

testate. He willed the bulk of his assets to nine charitable organizations 

(Charities).2

Following the probate of Frank Young’s will, John A. Young, another 

nephew, filed an informal caveat. However, he failed to file a bond, and the caveat 

was deemed withdrawn. In September 2014, letters testamentary were issued to 

the executor named in the will, Attorney Richard E. Deetz (Executor).

B. Writ of Summons

In October 2014, Plaintiff initiated the underlying action in this case 

by filing a writ of summons naming “The Estate of Frank and Norma Young” as 

defendants. See Certified Record (C.R.), Writ of Summons, filed 10/31/15. 

Thereafter, the trial court issued a rule against Plaintiff to file a complaint within

20 days. In response, Plaintiff filed a motion seeking a stay of the filing period for 

 

2

The charitable beneficiaries of Frank Young’s Estate included the: Alzheimer’s Disease 

and Related Disorders Association, American Cancer Society, Inc., American Heart Association, 

Christ Hamilton United Lutheran Church, Shriners Hospitals for Children, Animal Welfare 

Society of Monroe, Diakon Lutheran Social Ministries (d/b/a Lutheran Home at Topton), 

Masonic Villages of the Grand Lodge of Pennsylvania, and Salvation Army. 

 
3

the complaint in order to conduct pre-complaint discovery. The trial court denied 

Plaintiff’s motion. Tr. Ct. Order, 1/15/15.

C. Complaint

On January 22, 2015, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendants 

alleging “loss of consortium and the los[s] of support, cooperation, aid, 

companionship and loving interactive relationship critical in the last days of [his 

aunt’s and uncle’s] life.” Compl., 1/22/15 at ¶1. Plaintiff’s complaint sets forth 

the following allegations. An attorney for the “Estate of Frank and Norma Young” 

issued a letter that was posted on his aunt and uncle’s residence directing him not 

to trespass or contact his aunt or uncle. Compl. at ¶1. When Plaintiff attempted to 

visit his aunt and uncle, a stranger, while behind closed doors, repeatedly met him 

and told him to leave the property in accord with instructions posted by Valerie 

Glassford (Glassford). Compl. at ¶2. Plaintiff contacted Glassford, who denied 

knowledge of such instructions. Compl. at ¶3. Thereafter, Plaintiff again 

confronted the stranger at the residence, who then claimed her directions to deny 

Plaintiff visitation came from a personal care provider named Sanki. Id.

On another occasion, Sanki refused to open the door or permit 

Plaintiff to visit his aunt and uncle. Compl. at ¶4. Plaintiff’s aunt appeared behind 

Sanki and demanded to speak with him. Id. Sanki physically blocked Plaintiff’s 

aunt and closed the draperies. Id. Plaintiff’s aunt then appeared at the kitchen 

window and shouted something to Plaintiff. Id. Plaintiff’s aunt was then removed 

from the window and not seen again. Id.
4

On yet another occasion, Plaintiff’s uncle, in the presence of women 

Plaintiff believed to be nurse’s aides, invited him into the home. Compl. at ¶5. 

Plaintiff’s aunt then joined them. Id. She appeared ragged and unkempt. Id. 

Plaintiff’s aunt then asked the other women why they opened the screen door for 

Plaintiff. Id. They replied that Plaintiff’s uncle wanted him to come inside. Id. 

Plaintiff’s aunt then stated she wished Plaintiff could come anytime. Id. However, 

Plaintiff’s aunt also told Plaintiff not to come when “the others” were around 

because they will put her on the sixth floor if she “doesn’t play along.” Id. 

Thereafter, “[a] lengthy visit followed without interruption, enjoying conversation 

of health, family, inheritance and business.” Id.

 

In paragraph 6, Plaintiff alleged (with emphasis added):

persons obtained, hired, paid and or managed by or with 

the knowledge of the attorney for, and estate 

administrator of Frank J. Young and Norma Young, did 

mentally confuse, emotionally abuse and otherwise 

impose undue influence, wrongfully interfering with 

[Plaintiff’s] rights and relationships with Frank J. Young 

and Norma Young, Plaintiff Uncle and Aunt respectively 

(now deceased) and all benefits thereof.

 

Compl. at ¶6.

Plaintiff further alleged his uncle denied any knowledge of a letter 

prohibiting Plaintiff’s trespass. Compl. at ¶7. However, Plaintiff’s uncle did 

recognize his signature on the bottom of the letter. Id.
5

In his prayer for relief, Plaintiff alleged that “[whereas] these 

wrongful acts had a debilitating affect upon [Plaintiff and his aunt and uncle] 

together and individually and upon the beneficial relationship of the parties, 

[Plaintiff] seeks compensatory award of the Estate.” Compl. at ¶2.

D. Charities’ Petition to Intervene

In response to Plaintiff’s complaint, Charities filed a petition to 

intervene. See C.R., Petition to Intervene, 1/22/15. Charities averred that the 

determination of Plaintiff’s action would affect their legally enforceable interest in 

the remainder of Frank J. Young’s Estate. Id. Further, Charities asserted 

Plaintiff’s action was improper because it constituted a will contest and should 

have been filed as either a caveat to or appeal from probate. Id.

In February 2015, after Plaintiff failed to timely file an answer or 

respond to a rule to show cause, the trial court entered an order making the rule 

absolute and granting Charities leave to intervene in the action. Tr. Ct. Order, 

2/18/15. The same day, the trial court also entered an order denying as untimely 

Plaintiff’s motion for argument on the rule to show cause.

E. Preliminary Objections

Meanwhile, on January 30, 2015, Defendants, through their personal 

representative, Attorney Janet Marsh Catina (Estate Representative), filed 

preliminary objections to Plaintiff’s complaint in the nature of a demurrer. First,

Defendants asserted Plaintiff’s complaint was legally insufficient because 

Pennsylvania law does not recognize a cause of action for “loss of support, 
6

cooperation, aid, companionship or loving interaction.” Prelim. Objs. at ¶1a. 

Second, Pennsylvania law does not recognize a cause of action for loss of 

consortium between a nephew and his aunt or uncle. Prelim. Objs. at ¶1b. Third, 

Plaintiff’s complaint lacked any allegation that either Frank J. Young or Norma 

Young committed any of the acts specified. Prelim. Objs. at ¶1c. Fourth, although 

Plaintiff’s complaint alleged undue influence, it did not name an alleged 

perpetrator. Prelim. Objs. at ¶1d. Fifth, Plaintiff’s complaint failed to aver in what 

manner Plaintiff suffered economic harm as a result of the conduct alleged. 

Prelim. Objs. at ¶1e. Therefore, Plaintiff lacked standing to bring any cause of 

action based on that conduct. Id.

Defendants further asserted Plaintiff’s complaint failed to conform to 

law or rule of court for a number of reasons. See Prelim. Objs. at ¶2(a) – (i). 

Chiefly, Defendants alleged, even assuming Plaintiff’s complaint is an attempt to 

lodge a will contest, Plaintiff’s action is improper. Prelim. Objs. at ¶2(a). Rather, 

the correct action would be the filing of a caveat or an appeal from probate. Id. 

Such actions fall within the mandatory jurisdiction of the Orphans Court Division. 

Id. To that end, Plaintiff’s complaint, which would affect the interests of the nine 

charitable beneficiaries named in Frank J. Young’s will, failed to provide notice to 

the Attorney General as required by Pa. O.C.R. 5.5. Prelim. Objs. at ¶2(i).

Defendants also alleged Plaintiff’s complaint: contained scandalous 

and impertinent matter, lacked sufficient specificity to determine what cognizable 

cause of action was alleged, and purported to sue “The Estate of Frank J. Young 

and Norma Young,” a legal entity that does not exist. Prelim. Objs. at ¶¶3, 4, 5.
7

Because this case may affect the rights of charitable beneficiaries, the 

Attorney General entered an appearance as parens patriae (public guardian), and 

joined in Defendants’ preliminary objections. The Attorney General is an 

indispensable party in every proceeding which affects a charitable trust. In re 

Voegtly’s Estate, 151 A.2d 593 (Pa. 1959); In re Milton Hershey Sch. Trust, 807 

A.2d 324 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002) (en banc).

The same day, Plaintiff filed a one-page response to Defendants’ 

preliminary objections.

F. Trial Court Orders

On March 2, 2015, the trial court held oral argument on Defendants’ 

preliminary objections. Plaintiff failed to either appear or submit a brief. Two 

days later, the trial court issued an order sustaining Defendants’ preliminary 

objections and dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint. In its order, the court stated

1. Defendants’ first preliminary objection in the nature of 

a demurrer is GRANTED. The allegations in Plaintiff’s 

Complaint are legally insufficient as Pennsylvania Law 

does not support the causes of action(s) raised therein, 

nor does the Plaintiff set forth facts sufficient to plead a 

cognizable cause of action. As such, Plaintiff’s 

Complaint is DISMISSED.

2. The other preliminary objections raised by Defendants 

are DISMISSED as moot since the Plaintiff’s Complaint 

is being dismissed, as set forth above.

 

Tr. Ct. Order, 3/4/15.
8

In response, Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration and a request 

to file an amended complaint. On March 13, 2015, the trial court issued an order 

denying Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration. Plaintiff appealed.

II. Discussion

A. Argument

Plaintiff raises the following issues in his Statement of Questions:

Was it proper for the Court to dismiss Plaintiff[’s] 

complaint without:

a. affording [Plaintiff an] opportunity to repair 

pleadings.

b. Plaintiff [an] opportunity to oppose [Charities’]

petition to intervene.

c. Notice to Plaintiff of instruction of local rules of 

procedure advising Plaintiff of a prerequisite 

briefing schedule before the preliminary objection 

hearing.

d. Certifying or guaranteeing delivery of notice of 

a hearing schedule to argue against Defendants[’]

Preliminary Objections which prejudicial [sic] pro 

se Plaintiff Young who received rural mail notice 7 

days after hearing was already held.

e. Allowing opportunity to amend [the] complaint 

and to provide pro se litigant instruction therein[.]

Appellant’s Br. at 6.

Essentially, Plaintiff argues he suffered “mental, emotional pain, 

anguish and loss of economic support, cooperation, aid and companionship thru
9

[sic] damaging interference in his relationship with his aunt and uncle.” 

Appellant’s Br. at 8 (Summary of Argument). Plaintiff asserts these injuries

“resulted from the action of the person or parties responsible for directing the 

administration” of his aunt’s and uncle’s estates. Id. However, without precomplaint discovery, Plaintiff cannot name the parties responsible. Nevertheless 

he asserts they include: “(estate administrator, legal council [sic], health care 

providers, etc.)” Id. However, Plaintiff believes he can obtain the necessary 

information regarding the “persons/parties accountable ... via application of 

discovery subpoenas ....” Id.

Plaintiff further asserts the trial court improperly denied him an 

opportunity to argue against Charities’ petition to intervene. Appellant’s Br. at 8

(Summary of Argument). In addition, Plaintiff argues he did not receive timely

notice of oral argument on the preliminary objections and certain filing 

requirements, including the need to file an answer and a brief. Id. 

Consequently, Plaintiff requests that we “find in favor of [his] timely 

answer” to Charities’ petition to intervene. Appellant’s Br. at 15. Plaintiff also 

seeks a remand with directions to the trial court to instruct him on the “repair of 

pleadings previously denied” and provide him with time to “repair pleadings 

accordingly.” Appellant’s Br. at 15. Plaintiff requests that we direct the trial court 

on remand to allow discovery deemed necessary to repair of Plaintiff’s complaint. 

Id. Plaintiff asserts this would include:

 

1. subpoena of Youngs[’] financial records of years 2012 

thru [sic] 2015
10

2. subpoena[s] of [Executor’s]/estate administrator 

records of Youngs[’] health and fiscal care without 

regard to Attorney/Client privilege 2012 thru [sic] 2015.

3. subpoena of information of health care providers and 

medical records. 

Appellant’s Br. at 15. Ultimately, Plaintiff requests that we instruct the trial court 

to permit him to file an amended complaint.

B. Analysis

1. Denial of Reconsideration 

Plaintiff’s notice of appeal states that he appealed from the trial 

court’s March 13, 2015 order denying his motion for reconsideration of the trial 

court’s earlier order granting Defendants’ preliminary objections and dismissing 

his complaint. However, an order denying reconsideration of a final order is not an 

appealable order. Edwards v. Bd. of Pardons, 970 A.2d 425 (Pa. 2008); Estate of 

Merrick, 247 A.2d 786 (Pa. 1968).

Nonetheless, Plaintiff filed his notice of appeal on March 24, 2015, 

less than 30 days after the trial court’s March 4, 2015 order sustaining Defendants’ 

preliminary objections. In addition, the trial court, in an opinion in support of its 

order, and the parties, in their appellate briefs, address the merits of the order 

sustaining preliminary objections. As such, we will review the merits of the trial 

court’s order.
11

2. Appellate Review

When reviewing a trial court’s order sustaining preliminary objections 

in the nature of a demurrer, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of 

review is plenary. Seeton v. Adams, 50 A.3d 268 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012). 

Preliminary objections may be sustained when, based on the facts pled, it is clear 

that the plaintiff will be unable to establish a right to relief. Id. All well-pled 

material facts alleged in the complaint, and the inferences fairly deducible 

therefrom, must be accepted as true. Id. However, conclusions of law, 

argumentative allegations, expressions of opinion and unwarranted inferences need 

not be accepted. Id. 

3. Failure to State a Cognizable Claim

Plaintiff’s complaint alleges a cause of action against Defendants for 

“loss of consortium and the los[s] of support, cooperation, aid, companionship and 

loving interactive relationship critical in the last days of Frank and Normas [sic] 

life.” Compl. at ¶1. More specifically, Plaintiff, as a concerned nephew, seeks a 

monetary award from his aunt’s and uncle’s estates to compensate him for the loss 

of support and companionship that resulted from mistreatment of his aunt and 

uncle by third parties.

As we noted in Battisti v. Tax Claim Bureau of Beaver County, 76 

A.3d 111, 115 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013), there are three types of civil actions governed 

by the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure: (1) an assumpsit or contract action; 

(2) a trespass or tort action; and, (3) an equity action. Pa. R.C.P. No. 1001(b). 

Because Plaintiff seeks monetary damages, his action is not one in equity. Because 
12

Plaintiff does not assert or imply a contractual relationship with his aunt or uncle 

or their respective estates, his action does not sound in contract. Rather, Plaintiff’s 

claim for loss of support and companionship must be considered a tort action for 

loss of consortium.

In Steiner by Steiner v. Bell Telephone Co. of Pennsylvania, 517 A.2d 

1348 (Pa. Super. 1986), the Superior Court declined to recognize a cause of action 

on behalf of children for loss of parental consortium based on negligently inflicted 

injuries to a parent. The Court recognized “that parental consortium included love, 

companionship, affection, society, comfort, services and solace.” Id. at 1350 

(citing Hay v. Med. Ctr. Hosp. of Vermont, 496 A.2d 939 (Vt. 1985)).

Nonetheless, Pennsylvania law does traditionally recognize a cause of 

action for a spouse’s loss of consortium. Tucker v. Phila. Daily News, 848 A.2d 

113, 127 (Pa. 2004) (citation omitted) (consortium defined as “the legal right of 

one spouse to the company, affection, and assistance of and to sexual relations with 

the other”). However, in Steiner, the Superior Court recognized that although 

some of the same labels may be applied to elements of both the spousal and 

parent/child relationships, the relationships are substantively different and are not 

comparable. Id.

Ultimately, the Steiner Court reasoned, the establishment of a 

parent/child cause of action for consortium is a policy determination for the 

legislature. Id. Thus, the Superior Court concluded, “we do not recognize a 

child’s cause of action for loss of parental consortium due to tortious interference 
13

of a third party.” Steiner, 517 A.2d at 1357 (emphasis added); see also Schroeder 

v. Ear Nose & Throat Assocs. of Lehigh Valley, Inc., 557 A.2d 21 (Pa. Super. 

1989) (parents cannot recover for loss of society and companionship of unborn 

child; claims for loss of consortium limited to spouses).

In accord with Schroeder and Steiner, no cause of action exists for a 

nephew’s loss of his aunt’s or uncle’s consortium based on their alleged 

mistreatment by third parties. Therefore, because there is no legal authority 

supporting Plaintiff’s claim in the present case for loss of his aunt’s and uncle’s 

consortium, we observe no error or abuse of discretion in the trial court’s order 

sustaining Defendants’ preliminary objections on the basis that Plaintiff’s 

complaint failed to set forth facts sufficient to plead a cognizable cause of action. 

4. Plaintiff’s Remaining Challenges

a. Pre-Complaint Discovery

Plaintiff argues the trial court erred in denying his motion for precomplaint discovery.

A trial court’s decision to grant or deny pre-trial discovery falls within 

the trial court’s discretion. McNeil v. Jordan, 894 A.2d 1290 (Pa. 2006). In 

exercising its discretion, a trial court must assess whether the plaintiff can establish 

probable cause showing his requested discovery will materially advance a legally 

sufficient pleading. Id. As discussed above, there is no legal authority supporting

a nephew’s cause of action for monetary damages for the loss of his aunt and 

uncle’s consortium, companionship, or support based on the tortious acts of third 
14

parties. Schroeder; Steiner. Therefore, Plaintiff’s request for pre-complaint 

discovery would not have aided him in establishing a cause of action for loss of 

consortium. Id. Thus, we discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial 

of his motion for pre-trial discovery. McNeil.

b. Intervention

Plaintiff also argues the trial court erred in granting Charities’ petition 

to intervene without affording him an opportunity to present argument.

A trial court enjoys broad discretion in determining whether to grant a 

petition to intervene. Twp. of Radnor v. Radnor Recreational, LLC, 859 A.2d 1 

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2004). As discussed above, the Attorney General, acting as parens 

patriae (public guardian), is an indispensable party in every proceeding that affects 

a charitable trust. Because Charities were named as the beneficiaries of the bulk of 

Frank J. Young’s Estate, they clearly had a direct and substantial interest in 

Plaintiff’s action seeking a monetary award against Defendants. Voegtly’s Estate. 

As such, we discern no abuse of discretion in the trial’s court’s order granting them 

leave to intervene. Radnor Twp.

Nevertheless, Plaintiff argues the trial court erred in finding untimely 

his response to the trial court’s rule returnable requiring that he file an answer by 

February 13, 2015. Plaintiff asserts he obtained a U.S. Postal Service form 3817 

indicating he mailed his response that day. R.R. at 5a. 
15

Plaintiff’s timeliness argument does not compel reversal. The trial 

court’s order required that Plaintiff’s answer be received by the court’s 

prothonotary by 4:30 p.m. on February 13, 2015. See Tr. Ct. Order, 1/23/15; C.R. 

at Item No. 18. Plaintiff’s response was not stamped as received by the 

prothonotary until March 3, 2015. R.R. at 4a. Moreover, regardless of the timing 

of Plaintiff’s response, Charities had a direct and substantial interest in Plaintiff’s 

action against Defendants. Such an interest permits intervention. Consequently, 

the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting Charities leave to intervene. 

Radnor Twp.

c. Oral Argument on Preliminary Objections

Plaintiff asserts he did not receive notice of the scheduled oral 

argument on the preliminary objections until seven days after the argument. 

Plaintiff therefore argues the trial court improperly dismissed his complaint 

without certifying or guaranteeing notice of argument on the preliminary 

objections.

Any interested party may request oral argument on a motion. Pa. 

R.C.P. No. 211. However, the right to argument under Rule 211 is a qualified right 

subject to judicial discretion. Gerace v. Holmes Prot. of Phila., 516 A.2d 354 (Pa. 

Super. 1986); City of Phila. v. Kenny, 369 A.2d 1343 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1977). In a 

given case, the trial court may dispense with oral argument if it so desires and 

dispose of the case on the record or on the briefs. Gerace (citing Kenny). 
16

Here, the trial court observed, Plaintiff’s presence at oral argument 

would not have corrected the deficiencies in his complaint. See Tr. Ct.’s Pa. R.A.P 

1925(a) Op., 4/28/15, at 5; C.R. at Item No. 8. The trial court noted Defendants 

served Plaintiff with a praecipe for argument, dated January 30, 2015, requesting 

that the preliminary objections be placed on the March 2015 argument list. See

C.R. at Items No. 20, 21. Therefore, the trial court reasoned Plaintiff, although 

uncounseled, had an obligation to check the trial court’s March 2015 calendar 

schedule, which is available to the public.

However, despite being served in mid-February with Defendants’ 

preliminary objections, supporting brief, and praecipe for argument, Plaintiff failed 

to appear or file a responsive brief as required by Monroe County Rules of Civil 

Procedure Nos. 1028(c)(2) (briefs required for preliminary objections) and 210 

(form and filing of briefs).

Even assuming the trial court or prothonotary should have notified 

Plaintiff that Defendants’ preliminary objections were placed on the March 2015 

argument list as requested, we do not believe Plaintiff’s presence at oral argument

would have resulted in a different outcome. As discussed above, there is simply no 

legal authority supporting Plaintiff’s claim for loss of his aunt’s and uncle’s 

consortium or support. Schroeder; Steiner. Given the totality of the 

circumstances, including Plaintiff’s failure to file written argument with the trial 

court, we discern no prejudicial error in the trial court’s order sustaining

Defendants’ preliminary objections regardless of Plaintiff’s lack of participation in 

oral argument. Gerace; Kenny.
17

5. Pro Se Status

Finally, Plaintiff consistently asserts in his brief that as a pro se or 

uncounseled litigant, he is entitled to instruction by the trial court as to how file to

a complaint that will survive preliminary objections and state a legally cognizable 

claim. The trial court, however, bears no such responsibility. Although pleadings 

filed by uncounseled or unrepresented litigants are to be construed liberally, “an 

[uncounseled] litigant is not to be given any particular advantage because of his 

lack of knowledge of the law.” Mueller v. Pa. State Police Headquarters, 532 A.2d 

900, 902 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1987). In short, an uncounseled litigant cannot expect the 

court to act as his attorney. Smathers v. Smathers, 670 A.2d 1159 (Pa. Super. 

1996). 

Regardless, there is no legal authority supporting Plaintiff’s claim for 

loss of his aunt’s and uncle’s consortium or support. Schroeder; Steiner. 

Consequently, Plaintiff’s complaint could not be amended to state a cognizable 

consortium claim. Id. 

III. Conclusion

Discerning no error or abuse of discretion in the trial court’s order 

sustaining Defendants’ preliminary objections, we affirm.

 

ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Scott T. Young, :

Appellant :

:

v. : No. 658 C.D. 2015

:

The Estate of Frank J. Young :

and Norma Young :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 12th day of April, 2016, for the reasons stated in the 

foregoing opinion, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County is 

AFFIRMED.

 

ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge