*Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_____________________

No. 96-30280

_____________________

BRIJ M. JANMEJA,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY AGRICULTURAL &

MECHANICAL COLLEGE BOARD OF SUPERVISORS;

ALLEN A. COPPING, Individually and in his

capacity as President of the LA State 

University System; LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY

AT EUNICE; MICHAEL SMITH, Individually and in

his capacity as Chancellor of LA State

University at Eunice; DONALD O. ROGERS,

Individually and in his capacity as Vice-Chancellor

of Academic Affairs of LA State University at

Eunice; THERESA DEBECHE, Individually and in her

capacity as Head of the Division of Nursing and

Allied Health of LA State University at Eunice;

EDWARD CALLOWAY, Individually and in his capacity

as Director of the Respiratory Care Program of

Louisiana State University at Eunice,

Defendants-Appellees.

_________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Western District of Louisiana, Lafayette

(95-CV-263)

_________________________________________________________________

April 14, 1997

Before JOLLY, JONES, and WIENER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*
2

This appeal presents the question whether a state employee

demoted from his administrative position after refusing to sign a

letter in the course of an evaluation proceeding has raised viable

claims under either the First or the Fourteenth Amendment. After

reviewing the record, studying the briefs, and considering the

arguments presented to this court, we have concluded that the

district court did not err in dismissing the claims.

I

Brij M. Janmeja is a tenured associate professor at Louisiana

State University at Eunice (“LSU-E”), a two-year community college

under the supervision and management of the Louisiana State

University Board of Supervisors. Until September 1994, Janmeja

concurrently held the administrative position of Director of the

Respiratory Care Program at LSU-E. 

The Respiratory Care Program undergoes an accreditation review

process, conducted by the Joint Review Committee for Respiratory

Therapy Education, every five years. A portion of this process is

a self-study, which Janmeja was responsible for overseeing. In

response to inquiries from the Joint Review Committee for

Respiratory Therapy Education, Janmeja drafted a letter attributing

the high attrition rate at the LSU-E program to the inadequate

academic preparation of entering students. 
1DeBeche suggested that the causes of the high attrition rate

also included the faculty’s educational methodologies and the

program’s design and location, among other factors.

3

Janmeja’s supervisor, Theresa deBeche, did not approve of the

letter, suggesting that the attrition issue was more complex than

suggested by Janmeja’s letter.1 Janmeja refused deBeche’s request

to redraft the letter, and deBeche subsequently redrafted the

letter to include a more comprehensive analysis of the attrition

issue. Janmeja refused to sign the re-drafted letter unless his

supervisors allowed him to add a disclaimer to the document. His

supervisors declined, and deBeche signed the letter and submitted

it to the Joint Review Committee for Respiratory Therapy Education.

After the incident, Janmeja’s supervisors left a note

requesting that he meet with them immediately. Upon arriving at

the meeting, Janmeja was told that he had been reassigned to the

position of Director of Clinical Education effective immediately.

This reassignment, amounting to an administrative demotion, did not

affect Janmeja’s tenured position or salary as an associate

professor.

Janmeja filed this action against the Louisiana Board of

Supervisors, various LSU-E officials, deBeche, and the faculty

member who replaced him as Director of the Respiratory Care

Program. He alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985,

claiming that he was demoted for exercising his right to free
4

speech and that he had been denied his right to procedural due

process, and sought reinstatement to the position of Director of

the Respiratory Care Program, money damages and attorneys’ fees.

The defendants filed for summary judgment claiming Eleventh

Amendment immunity and qualified immunity. The district court

dismissed all of Janmeja’s claims, except his claims for

prospective injunctive relief against the individual defendants in

their official capacities to redress alleged violations of

Janmeja’s rights to free speech and procedural due process. 

Janmeja’s First and Fourteenth Amendment claims proceeded to

a bench trial. At the conclusion of Janmeja’s evidence, his First

Amendment claim was dismissed on the basis that the speech was not

a matter of public concern and, even if it were, Janmeja’s interest

in commenting on the matter was not greater than the defendants’

interest in promoting the efficiency of the public service they

performed. At the conclusion of all evidence, Janmeja’s due

process claim was dismissed because he failed to pursue the

internal grievance procedure provided by LSU-E.

Janmeja appeals only from the district court’s rulings on his

First and Fourteenth Amendment claims.

II

A
5

A public employee may not be discharged for exercising his

right to free speech under the First Amendment. Thompson v. City

of Starkville, 901 F.2d 456, 460 (5th Cir. 1990). In order to

prevail on a claim of this nature, the plaintiff must first

establish that the speech involved a matter of public concern. Id.

We review de novo the trial court’s decision that Janmeja’s speech

was not a matter of public concern. Terrell v. University of Texas

Sys. Police, 792 F.2d 1360, 1362 n.2 (5th Cir. 1986).

This court has set forth the following standard for

determining when speech relates to a matter of public concern:

Because almost anything that occurs within a public

agency could be of concern to the public, we do not focus

on the inherent interest or importance of the matters

discussed by the employee. Rather, our task is to decide

whether the speech at issue in a particular case was made

primarily in the plaintiff’s role as a citizen or

primarily in his role as an employee. In making this

determination, the mere fact that the topic of the

employee’s speech was one in which the public might or

would have had a great interest is of little moment.

Id. at 1362; see also Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983)

(“[W]hen a public employee speaks not as a citizen upon matters of

public concern, but instead as an employee upon matters only of

personal interest, absent the most unusual circumstances, a federal

court is not the appropriate forum in which to review the wisdom of

a personnel decision taken by a public agency allegedly in reaction

to the employee’s behavior.”). 
6

Janmeja’s draft of the proposed self-study letter was clearly

prepared in the course of his duties as an employee. The letter

did not address a matter of public concern, and the district court

did not err in dismissing his First Amendment claim.

B

In order to establish a claim for denial of procedural due

process, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he had a property

interest or right in the position from which he was removed.

Browning v. City of Odessa, 990 F.2d 842, 844 (5th Cir. 1993). The

existence of a property interest in employment is determined by

state law. See Moulton v. City of Beaumont, 991 F.2d 227, 230 (5th

Cir. 1993).

Louisiana adheres to the doctrine of “employment at will.”

Gilbert v. Tulane Univ., 909 F.2d 124, 126 (5th Cir. 1990). Under

this doctrine, employment is not a property right unless there is

a specific contract provision granting such a right. Moulton, 991

F.2d at 230. 

Louisiana State University regulations provide that tenure

attaches only to academic positions, not administrative

assignments; therefore, because Janmeja’s demotion affected only

his administrative position, a non-tenured position, he had no

property interest in the position of Director of the Respiratory
2The district court ruled that Janmeja had a property interest

in his administrative position, specifically an “individual right

to market himself,” and dismissed the claim because Janmeja failed

to exhaust LSU-E’s internal grievance procedure. We find it

unnecessary to address the exhaustion issue, because, as noted

above, we find that Janmeja had no property interest in his purely

administrative assignment. See Terrell, 792 F.2d at 1362 n.3

(“When the judgment of the district court is correct, it may be

affirmed on appeal for reasons other than those given or relied on

below.”).

7

Care Program and failed to state a procedural due process claim

under the Fourteenth Amendment.2

III

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court

is

A F F I R M E D.