J-A27020-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Appellee

v. PATRICK CHURILLA, Appellant : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : : : : : : : No. 1218 WDA 2011

Appeal from the Order Entered July 14, 2011, In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Criminal Division, at Nos. CP-02-CR-0012399-1992 an d

CP-02-CR-0015417-1992.

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., SHOGAN and MUSMANNO, JJ. MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED DECEMBER 09, 2014 Appellant, Patrick Churilla, appeals from the orde r of the PCRA court that reinstated his direct appeal rights. After ca reful review, we quash Appellant’s direct appeal and remand for proceeding s consistent with this

memorandum. We summarize the protracted history of this case a s follows. In 1992, while incarcerated on unrelated charges, Appellant confessed to the 1990 murder, robbery, and attempted rape of a woman in t he Lawrenceville section of Pittsburgh. On one criminal information , Appellant was charged with homicide. On a second criminal information, A ppellant was charged with robbery, indecent assault, and criminal attemp t to commit rape. Because the illegal conduct charged constituted a s ingle criminal episode,J-A27020-14

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the two criminal informations were joined for trial . On November 1, 1993, a jury convicted Appellant of first-degree murder, an d he received a sentence of life imprisonment. Also, on that date, the jury convicted Appellant of all of the charges on the second criminal information. However, sentencing on the non-homicide convictions was deferred, pending the preparation of a presentence report, and scheduled for December 13, 1993. 1 However, both the Commonwealth and Appellant agree that sentencin g on the convictions

contained in the second criminal information did no t occur on December 13, 1993, or on any other date. On April 27, 1994, App ellant filed mandatory post-verdict motions, which the trial court never a ddressed. In June of 2008, Appellant began filing pro se motions, which the trial court treated as PCRA petitions, and appointed PCRA counsel. Eventually, in May of 2011, appointed counsel filed an amended PCR A petition and a second amended PCRA petition. The Commonwealth res ponded that Appellant’s judgment of sentence was not final, tha t Appellant should be formally sentenced, and that his appellate rights s hould be reinstated. On July 14, 2011, although never having sentenced Appe llant on the convictions pertaining to the second criminal information, the PCRA court entered an order reinstating Appellant’s direct appeal rights. This appeal followed. Appellant presents the following issues for our re view:

1 In addition, the record indicates that the trial c ourt may have permitted Appellant additional time to file “post-verdict” mo tions.J-A27020-14

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1. Whether this Honorable Court has jurisdiction to entertain a direct appeal when the appeal was premature because Appellant was never sentenced as to the non-homicide charges and the trial court never ruled upon the post-verdict motio ns? 2. Whether there was sufficient evidence to prove t he crime of robbery when Appellant strangled the Victim to deat h and attempted to rape her and, as an afterthought, stol e the Victim’s money? 3. Whether the trial court erred in failing to supp ress Appellant’s statements to correction officers when Appellant wa s in custody and being interrogated but was not given Miranda warnings? Appellant’s Brief at 5. Initially, we must address the jurisdiction of thi s Court to address this direct appeal. We observe that the PCRA provides p etitioners with a means of collateral review, but has no applicability unti l the judgment of sentence

becomes final. Commonwealth v. Kubis , 808 A.2d 196, 198 n.4 (Pa. Super. 2002). Moreover, in criminal cases, direct appeals must be taken from the entry of a final judgment of sentence. Commonwealth v. Tillery , 611 A.2d 1245, 1247 (Pa. Super. 1992). See also Commonwealth v.

O'Neill , 578 A.2d 1334, 1335 (Pa. Super. 1990) (explaining that in criminal cases, appeals lie from judgment of sentence rather than from the verdict of guilt); Commonwealth v. Pollick , 215 A.2d 904, 905 (Pa. 1966) (explaining the longstanding principle that “as a g eneral rule the defendant in a criminal case may appeal only from the judgmen t of sentence”).J-A27020-14

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In Commonwealth v. Gumpert , 512 A.2d 699 (Pa. Super. 1986), we explained this concept as follows: there exists a long standing rule that parties must wait until a final decision is rendered, after which they may ai r their grievances in a single orderly appeal. In the crim inal context, it is the judgment of sentence which marks the complet ion of the trial court proceedings, and accordingly (with cert ain carefully delineated exceptions), a judgment of sentence is a prerequisite to appealability.

Id . at 700 (citations omitted). Thus, when an appeal is taken prior to the entry of the judgment of sentence amounting to the final order, the appeal must be quashed. Commonwealth v. Griffin , 539 A.2d 1372 (Pa. Super. 1988). See also Commonwealth v. Oliver , 454 A.2d 1128, 1129 (Pa. Super. 1983) (quashing appeal without prejudice whe re a final judgment of sentence was not imposed).

Our review of the record reflects that on November 1, 1993, at the conclusion of a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of first degree murder, robbery, indecent assault, and criminal attempt of rape. N.T., 10/28- 11/1/1993, at 290, 293. Also on that date, the rec ord reflects that the trial court sentenced Appellant only on the murder convic tion. Id . at 296; Docket Entry Number 17. Our further review of the certified record indicates, as conceded by the Commonwealth, that th e trial court has never sentenced Appellant on the remaining non-homicide c onvictions. Therefore, because there has not been a judgment of sentence a s to all of Appellant’sJ-A27020-14

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convictions, the judgment of sentence is not final. Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction to address this direct appeal, and we are constrained to quash this appeal and remand for the imposition of a judg ment of sentence as to the remaining convictions. In addition, we are mindful that post-verdict moti ons must be decided before sentencing. Commonwealth v. Williams , 434 A.2d 179, 180 n.4 (Pa. Super. 1981). Here, our review of the record reveals that Appellant filed post-verdict motions, albeit beyond the date permitted under thenapplicable Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 1123 (addressing postverdict motions and the ten-day filing period). Sp ecifically, the certified record reflects that Appellant filed his post-verdi ct motions on April 27, 1994, which was beyond the ten-day filing period pe rmitted by the rule then applicable. However, the trial court has never dis posed of the post-verdict motions filed by Appellant. Further complicating t he matter is an indication

in the certified record that the trial court intend ed to grant Appellant additional time in which to file his post-verdict m otions. N.T., 10/28- 11/1/1993, at 297. As the Commonwealth concedes in its brief to this Court, “a fair reading of the transcript indicates that the trial judge may well have intended to allow [A]ppellant’s counsel additi onal time within which to file [post-verdict motions].” Commonwealth’s Brief at 22. Indeed, as the Commonwealth admits, “it is a fair inference that [ the trial judge] intendedJ-A27020-14

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to communicate to [A]ppellant’s counsel that [couns el] was being granted additional time to file [post-verdict motions]. Mo reover, the record contains no indication that the [trial] court ever set a spe cific deadline for the filing [of post-verdict motions].” Id . at 23. Hence, upon remand, the trial court shall dispose of Appellant’s post-verdict motions p rior to imposing judgment of sentence on the remaining convictions. Appeal quashed. Case remanded for further proceed ings consistent with this memorandum. Jurisdiction relinquished. Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary Date: 12/9/2014