If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

KEVIN S. REFFITT,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

UNPUBLISHED

November 19, 2019

v No. 343815

Grand Traverse Circuit Court

AMY SWOGGER and RYDER & SWOGGER 

PC,

LC No. 2017-032231-NM

Defendants-Appellees.

Before: O’BRIEN, P.J., and GADOLA and REDFORD, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

In this legal malpractice action, plaintiff Kevin S. Reffitt appeals by delayed leave 

granted an order granting defendants Amy Swogger and Ryder & Swogger, PC’s summary 

disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) (statute of limitations) and striking his breach of fiduciary 

duty claim as duplicative of his legal malpractice claim. We reverse and remand for additional 

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff’s claim arises from a divorce action between plaintiff and Dawn Bachi-Reffitt, 

commenced in February 2012 in which defendants represented him beginning on June 8, 2012.

During the pendency of the divorce, plaintiff’s brother died on March 14, 2013. Plaintiff, the 

beneficiary of a $1.5 million term life insurance policy on his brother’s life issued by Pruco 

Insurance, met with defendant Swogger on April 17, 2013, and she advised him that the 

insurance proceeds were not marital property and did not need to be disclosed to Bachi-Reffitt. 

Swogger prepared a consent judgment of divorce, which the court entered on April 19, 2013. 

Swogger, on her own initiative, included in ¶ 25 of the consent judgment a clause that provided 

for the forfeiture to the non-offending party any property concealed by a party during the 

divorce.

On May 16, 2013, plaintiff and his father met with Swogger who advised plaintiff’s 

father that the life insurance proceeds were not a marital asset and that plaintiff would have no 

financial obligation to Bachi-Reffitt when he received the funds. On May 21, 2013, Swogger 
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prepared two letters. The first, to Ralph Munch of the Huntington Bank Trust Department,

advised that the insurance proceeds were separate property and not subject to the divorce. The 

second to plaintiff, advised him of the letter to Munch and its contents. On July 18, 2013, after 

disclaiming one-third of the proceeds to his brother’s children, Pruco Insurance sent plaintiff a 

check for $1,005,289.99. Relying on Swogger’s advice, plaintiff did not disclose receipt of the 

insurance proceeds to Bachi-Reffitt.

On January 8, 2015, Bachi-Reffitt moved to enforce the consent judgment alleging that 

plaintiff violated ¶ 25 by failing to disclose the insurance policy. That prompted plaintiff to file a 

complaint against defendants on April 17, 2015, alleging that Swogger committed legal 

malpractice “by preparing a judgment of divorce for entry which provided that any assets 

concealed in the divorce proceeding were forfeited to the opposing party,” and alleging a 

vicarious liability claim against Ryder & Swogger (the 2015 Complaint).

On June 9, 2015, in acknowledgment of the divorce litigation that could “directly impact 

the parties,” plaintiff and defendants entered into a tolling agreement that provided for plaintiff’s 

voluntary dismissal of his legal malpractice action without prejudice. The parties agreed that 

plaintiff filed his complaint before the applicable statute of limitations expired and that the 

limitations period tolled since its filing on April 16, 2015. They agreed to an initial 180-day 

tolling period that could be extended upon mutual written agreement.

Among other provisions, the tolling agreement contained the following:

7. Swogger waives and agrees not to assert the statute of limitations 

as an affirmative defense to a legal malpractice action filed by [plaintiff] within 

thirty (30) days after the termination of the tolling period established under this 

Agreement or any extension of this Agreement evidenced by a mutual written 

agreement if the legal malpractice action filed relates to the same legal 

representation of [plaintiff] by Swogger which is the subject of the present 

pending litigation.

8. The Parties agree that all of their respective causes of action, 

claims, remedies, and defenses that are in existence now are not waived or 

diminished in any way by this Agreement. This Agreement does not and shall not 

renew revive or reinstate any claim or cause of action that was otherwise barred as 

of [June 9 2015,] the Effective Date of this Agreement. This Agreement is not 

intended and shall not be construed to constitute a waiver of any statute of 

limitations defense(s) that any party may have with respect to claims other than

legal malpractice, as currently alleged in [the pending 2015 case].

The parties extended the tolling agreement several times. On January 5, 2016, the court 

in the divorce action granted Bachi-Reffitt’s motion for summary disposition and awarded her 
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$1.5 million, representing the entire value of the proceeds from the policy. Plaintiff 

unsuccessfully sought leave to appeal that ruling to this Court.1

On June 29, 2017, following our Supreme Court’s denial of plaintiff’s application for 

leave to appeal the $1.5 million judgment in Bachi-Reffitt’s favor, plaintiff’s attorney notified 

defendants’ attorney that he elected to cancel the tolling agreement. On August 8, 2017, plaintiff 

filed this legal malpractice action against defendants. The general allegations in the 2017 

Complaint were more detailed and included facts not alleged in the 2015 Complaint. Plaintiff 

alleged that Swogger committed malpractice and negligence by unilaterally inserting the 

forfeiture provision in the consent judgment of divorce, by failing to advise plaintiff to disclose 

the death benefit to Bachi-Reffitt, by advising plaintiff that he had no financial obligation to her 

upon receipt of the insurance proceeds, and by advising plaintiff and Munch that the insurance 

proceeds were not subject to the divorce property division. Plaintiff also alleged that Swogger 

breached fiduciary duties owed to him.

In lieu of filing an answer, defendants moved for summary disposition on the grounds 

that plaintiff’s claims were barred by the statute of limitations and that his breach of fiduciary 

duty claim duplicated the malpractice claim.2 Defendants asserted that the tolling agreement 

tolled only the legal malpractice claim specifically alleged in the 2015 Complaint. They argued 

that the limitations period on the legal malpractice claim expired days before plaintiff filed the 

2017 Complaint. They contended that Swogger’s representation of plaintiff in the divorce action 

concluded on April 19, 2013, the date the court entered the consent judgment of divorce, and 

although plaintiff timely filed the 2015 Complaint, upon the cancellation of the tolling agreement 

plaintiff had only three days left in which to revive his legal malpractice claim. Defendants 

contended that plaintiff failed to timely file the 2017 Complaint.

Plaintiff countered that the limitations period did not commence until May 21, 2013, 

when Swogger last represented him by sending the letter to Munch advising him that the 

insurance proceeds were an inheritance that did not need to be disclosed. Plaintiff further argued 

that the statute of limitations tolled for all of plaintiff’s legal malpractice claims, not just the one 

contained in the 2015 Complaint. Plaintiff contended that his breach of fiduciary duty claim did

not duplicate his legal malpractice claim because caselaw held that the state of mind necessary 

for conduct to constitute a breach of fiduciary duty required more culpability than that necessary 

for the negligence required for malpractice. Finally, plaintiff argued alternatively that, if 

defendant was not plaintiff’s attorney after entry of the consent judgment, the trial court should 

allow him to amend his complaint to add a claim of negligent misrepresentation because 

defendants gave advice to him between April 17, 2013 and May 21, 2013.

 1 See Reffitt v Bachi-Reffitt, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered October 24, 2016 

(Docket No. 333149) (denying leave to appeal “for lack of merit in the grounds presented.”), lv 

den Reffitt v Bachi-Reffitt, 500 Mich 1021 (2017), recon den 501 Mich 866 (2017).

2 Defendants asserted that the new breach of fiduciary duty claim’s statute of limitations had not 

been tolled by the tolling agreement, and therefore, became time-barred in 2016.
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The trial court held that the tolling agreement only tolled the statute of limitations for the 

single count of legal malpractice stated in the 2015 Complaint and the statute of limitations

barred that claim because plaintiff failed to file his complaint by August 2, 2017. The trial court 

also ruled that plaintiff’s breach of fiduciary duty claim merely duplicated his legal malpractice 

claim. Accordingly, the trial court granted defendants summary disposition under MCR 

2.116(C)(7).

Plaintiff moved for reconsideration alleging that his election to cancel the tolling 

agreement became effective on July 30, 2017, after which he had 30 days to file his complaint 

and, therefore, he timely filed his complaint on August 8, 2017. Plaintiff explained that 

defendants provided him legal representation on May 16 and May 21, 2013, and he took issue 

with the trial court’s ruling that the legal representation ended as of the entry of the divorce 

judgment. Plaintiff also alleged that the trial court misinterpreted the tolling agreement to 

preclude application of the statute of limitations waiver from applying to any legal malpractice 

claims except the one contained in the 2015 Complaint. He asserted that his counsel who drafted 

the tolling agreement intended to toll all claims related to defendants’ representation. Finally, 

plaintiff also argued that the trial court failed to consider his request for leave to amend to add a 

count of negligent misrepresentation. The trial court denied reconsideration because plaintiff

raised the same issues already ruled on “either expressly or by reasonable implication” and failed 

to show a palpable error or that a different disposition of the motion must result from the

correction of an error.

II. JURISDICTION

Preliminarily, we address defendants’ argument regarding the scope of this Court’s 

subject-matter jurisdiction in this case. Plaintiff filed an appeal as of right on January 3, 2018, 

but this Court determined that it was untimely because plaintiff filed his December 6, 2017 

motion for reconsideration 22 days after the November 14, 2017 final order. Reffitt v Swogger, 

unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered January 17, 2018 (Docket No. 341796). 

Plaintiff did not seek reconsideration of that order or seek leave to appeal this Court’s decision to 

our Supreme Court. Plaintiff filed a delayed application for leave to appeal on May 14, 2018, 

which this Court granted. Reffitt v Swogger, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered 

October 30, 2018 (Docket No. 343815). Defendants are correct that we are bound by this 

Court’s previous order in Docket No. 341796, that plaintiff untimely filed his motion for 

reconsideration. However, defendants erroneously reason that because plaintiff failed to appeal 

this Court’s order in Docket No. 341796, plaintiff is precluded from seeking appellate review of 

any arguments “contained in his untimely Motion for Reconsideration.” We disagree because 

defendants misunderstand the precedential value of the January 17, 2018 order.

While this Court is bound by its determination that plaintiff untimely filed his motion for 

reconsideration, this Court based its determination that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over 

plaintiff’s previous appeal solely on the technical application of MCR 7.202(6)(a) and MCR 

7.203(A)(1). Defendants’ argument ignores this Court’s jurisdiction over applications for leave 

to appeal under MCR 7.203(B). MCR 7.205(G) sets forth the requirements for a late appeal 

“[w]hen an appeal of right was not timely filed or was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.” MCR 

7.205(G)(1). The January 17, 2018 order expressly recognized that right: “At this time, 

appellant may seek to appeal either the November 14, 2017 order or the December 14, 2017 
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order by filing a delayed application for leave to appeal under MCR 7.205(G).” Reffitt v 

Swogger, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered January 17, 2018 (Docket No. 

341796). Plaintiff having appropriately filed his delayed application for leave, and this Court 

having granted it, this Court has subject-matter jurisdiction to consider all of the issues raised by 

plaintiff on appeal.

Defendants also assert that, because plaintiff did not raise until his motion for 

reconsideration the issue of whether defendants waived the right to raise a statute of limitations 

defense as long as plaintiff filed a new malpractice complaint within 30 days of the termination 

of the tolling agreement, he failed to preserve the issue. Assuming, without deciding, that the 

issue is unpreserved, this Court “may overlook preservation requirements if the failure to 

consider the issue would result in manifest injustice, if consideration is necessary for a proper 

determination of the case, or if the issue involves a question of law and the facts necessary for its

resolution have been presented.” Smith v Foerster-Bolser Constr, Inc, 269 Mich App 424, 427; 

711 NW2d 421 (2006) (citation omitted). Given that the interpretation of a contract is a question 

of law that is reviewed de novo, Kloian v Domino’s Pizza, LLC, 273 Mich App 449, 452; 733 

NW2d 766 (2006), and the proper interpretation of the tolling agreement forms the entire basis of 

this appeal, we will consider all of plaintiff’s issues.

III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

We review de novo a trial court’s decision to grant summary disposition. Barnard Mfg 

Co, Inc v Gates Performance Engineering, Inc, 285 Mich App 362, 369; 775 NW2d 618 (2009). 

We review de novo whether a cause of action is barred by a statute of limitations. Collins v 

Comerica Bank, 468 Mich 628, 631; 664 NW2d 713 (2003). Our “review is limited to review of 

the evidence properly presented to the trial court.” Barnard Mfg, 285 Mich at 380 (citations 

omitted). We also review de novo the proper interpretation of a contract and whether a 

contract’s terms are ambiguous. Able Demolition, Inc v City of Pontiac, 275 Mich App 577, 581; 

739 NW2d 696 (2007).

We review for an abuse of discretion a trial court’s decision on a motion for 

reconsideration. Woods v SLB Prop Mgt, LLC, 277 Mich App 622, 629; 750 NW2d 228 (2008).

“An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court chooses an outcome falling outside the range 

of principled outcomes.” Ehler v Misra, 499 Mich 11, 21; 878 NW2d 790 (2016) (citation 

omitted). A trial court “abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law.” Gentris v State 

Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 297 Mich App 354, 364; 824 NW2d 609 (2012) (citation omitted). 

Finally, appellate courts “review interpretation of court rules de novo and under the same 

principles that govern the construction of statutes.” Dawley v Hall, 501 Mich 166, 169; 905 

NW2d 863 (2018) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

IV. ANALYSIS

A. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

Plaintiff first argues that the trial court erred by granting defendants summary disposition 

because, under the tolling agreement, defendants waived their right to assert a statute of 

limitations defense against plaintiff’s legal malpractice complaint. We agree.
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Summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) is appropriate if a claim is barred by the 

applicable statute of limitations. When presented with a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(7), the 

trial court must accept as true all well-pleaded allegations and construe them in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party, and it must consider all of the documentary evidence 

submitted by the parties. Wade v Dep’t of Corrections, 439 Mich 158, 162-163; 483 NW2d 26 

(1992); MCR 2.116(G)(5). Whether plaintiff timely filed his complaint under the terms of the 

tolling agreement is a question of contract interpretation. Courts interpret a contract by 

determining the intent of the parties. Able Demolition, 275 Mich App at 582. An unambiguous 

contract must be enforced according to its terms. Id. at 581. “ ‘Thus, an unambiguous 

contractual provision is reflective of the parties’ intent as a matter of law.’ ” Id., quoting Quality 

Prod & Concepts Co v Nagel Precision, Inc, 469 Mich 362, 375; 666 NW2d 251 (2003).

In this case, the trial court ruled that plaintiff’s legal malpractice claim accrued on entry 

of the consent judgment of divorce on April 19, 2013. The trial court reasoned that, because 

plaintiff filed the 2015 Complaint on April 16, 2015, he timely filed the action three days before 

the lapse of the applicable two-year statute of limitations for legal malpractice actions. The trial 

court noted that plaintiff cancelled the tolling agreement on June 29, 2017, and concluded that,

under the tolling agreement’s terms, this started a 30-day period that ended on July 30, 2017. 

Based on its determination of the claim accrual date, the trial court concluded that plaintiff had 

three days remaining from the original two-year limitations period, and therefore, plaintiff had to 

file his complaint within three days after July 30, 2017, after the cancellation of the tolling 

agreement. The trial court ruled that plaintiff’s August 8, 2017 filing occurred several days after 

the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations.

As part of the trial court’s calculation of the expiration date for the statute of limitations

period, the trial court stated that Swogger’s provision of legal advice to plaintiff on May 16 and 

21, 2013, after entry of the consent judgment of divorce on April 19, 2013, essentially did not 

constitute legal representation of plaintiff because she simply repeated legal advice she gave on 

April 17, 2013. The trial court ruled that Swogger’s provision of legal advice during May 2013, 

reverted back to the date of entry of the consent judgment of divorce for claim accrual purposes,

because she simply repeated earlier advice.

The trial court opined that Swogger’s representation of plaintiff in his divorce 

proceedings ended on the date of entry of the judgment of divorce, and “anything after that is 

separate and relates back in a way” and concluded that rendering advice after entry of the 

judgment of divorce did not constitute providing legal advice to plaintiff. The trial court,

therefore, treated Swogger’s representation as terminated and her further work for plaintiff as 

though it had no effect on the accrual date of his malpractice claim or the commencement of the 

two-year statute of limitations period. Based on that reasoning, the trial court justified its ruling 

that the limitations period for a legal malpractice action began to run on the date of entry of the

consent judgment. The trial court’s reasoning and decision in this regard cannot be sustained.

The trial court erroneously disregarded the facts that, on May 21, 2013, Swogger sent a 

letter to plaintiff, advising him that she had been contacted by Munch of Huntington Bank 

regarding the potential inheritance plaintiff might receive from his brother’s estate. Swogger 

told plaintiff that Munch requested that she draft a letter explaining that the inheritance was not a 

marital asset. Swogger complied with the request, drafted the letter on plaintiff’s behalf, and 
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sent the letter to plaintiff for his review and comments. In her letter to Munch, Swogger advised 

him that any inheritance plaintiff might receive from his brother’s estate would be separate 

property not subject to the divorce. She invited Munch to contact her with any questions. 

Swogger at no time advised either plaintiff or Munch that her representation of plaintiff had 

concluded. On the contrary, Swogger’s conduct established that she continued her legal 

representation of plaintiff after the entry of the consent judgment of divorce.

Moreover, the record does not reflect that Swogger terminated her representation of 

plaintiff upon entry of the consent judgment of divorce on April 19, 2013. There is no indication

that Swogger took any affirmative steps to do so or that the divorce court terminated Swogger’s 

representation at that time. The trial court’s conclusion that Swogger’s representation terminated 

automatically upon entry of the consent judgment of divorce on April 19, 2013, without proof of 

such termination, constituted an error. The action taken by Swogger on plaintiff’s behalf after 

the entry of the consent judgment of divorce on April 19, 2013, and the provision of legal advice 

to him during May 2013 was part of a continued course of the attorney-client relationship and the 

provision of legal representation of plaintiff through May 21, 2013. Accordingly, plaintiff’s 

legal malpractice claim accrued on May 21, 2013, and the applicable limitations period 

commenced on that date, not on April 19, 2013. Consequently, the original limitations period, if 

not tolled, would have elapsed on May 21, 2015.

Plaintiff, timely commenced his first legal malpractice action on April 16, 2015, 35 days 

before the expiration of the applicable limitations period. The determination whether plaintiff 

timely filed this legal malpractice action in this case turns on the interpretation and application of 

the provisions of the tolling agreement. 

The record reflects that the parties entered the tolling agreement during the pendency of 

the first legal malpractice action and plaintiff voluntarily dismissed that action without prejudice.

The record reflects that the parties extended the tolling period by mutual agreement. Plaintiff 

gave notice of his intent to cancel the tolling agreement on June 29, 2017. The tolling agreement 

provided in relevant part:

6. The Parties agree that either party may cancel this Agreement at 

any time provided that written notice via email or facsimile is given to the other 

party (or its legal representative) thirty (30) days prior to the cancellation. 

Written notice shall be effective and the 30 day period shall start on the day after

such notice is sent via email or facsimile to the legal representatives of the parties 

to the Agreement. 

Under ¶ 6 of the tolling agreement, the 30-day period before cancellation commenced the 

day after plaintiff sent defendants notice. The period, therefore, commenced on June 30, 2017, 

and expired 30 days later on July 29, 2017. The following day, upon the tolling agreement’s 

effective cancellation, plaintiff could file his legal malpractice action against defendants. Under 

the tolling agreement’s terms, the statute of limitations period for plaintiff’s legal malpractice 

claims began running again on July 30, 2017. Because plaintiff had 35 days in which to file his 

complaint, he had until September 2, 2017, to do so. The record reflects that plaintiff filed this 

action on August 8, 2017, well within the time remaining before the expiration of the applicable 

limitations period. Plaintiff, therefore, timely filed this action long before the expiration of the 
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limitations period. Accordingly, the trial court miscalculated the limitations period and erred by 

ruling that plaintiff failed to timely file the instant action.

Plaintiff also argues that ¶ 7 gave him 30 days after the tolling agreement cancellation to 

file his complaint and that, so long as he filed his complaint within those 30 days, the terms of 

the tolling agreement barred defendants from asserting a statutes of limitations affirmative

defense. We agree.

Paragraph 7 of the tolling agreement provided:

7. Swogger waives and agrees not to assert the statute of limitations 

as an affirmative defense to a legal malpractice action filed by Reffitt within thirty 

(30) days after the termination of the tolling period established under this 

Agreement or any extension of this Agreement evidenced by a mutual written 

agreement if the legal malpractice action filed relates to the same legal 

representation of Reffitt by Swogger which is the subject of the present pending 

litigation.

We find no ambiguity in this provision. The plain language of ¶ 7 provides that the 

parties agreed that plaintiff could file a legal malpractice action related to Swogger’s legal 

representation related to his divorce within 30 days of the termination of the tolling agreement. 

Under the terms of ¶ 7, Swogger plainly waived her right to assert a statute of limitations defense 

against such claims. Because plaintiff filed this action on August 8, 2017, within 30 days after 

the termination of the tolling period, his action complied with the terms specified in ¶ 7 and 

Swogger could not defend on the ground of the expiration of the statute of limitations. 

Therefore, the trial court’s decision suffered from an alternative flaw because even if he had only 

a limited number of days left in which to file his complaint, the plain language of the tolling 

agreement provided him a 30-day grace period.

Defendants assert that this interpretation is erroneous and that the tolling agreement had 

only a single 30-day period specified in the tolling agreement and that both ¶ ¶ 6 and 7 referred

to the same period. We disagree. The plain language of the agreement does not comport with 

such a reading. ¶ 6 specified the manner and timing of cancellation of the tolling period upon 

written notice and provided for a distinct 30-day period from notice to the date of termination. 

Paragraph 7 specified two additional provisions, Swogger’s waiver of the statute of limitations 

defense and her agreement that plaintiff had a 30-day grace period after cancellation of the 

tolling period during which plaintiff could file the instant action. Further, the propriety of 

reading the two paragraphs in this manner is apparent when read in the context of other 

provisions set forth in the tolling agreement. For example, this interpretation is consistent with 

the provisions of ¶ 3 under which the parties agreed that plaintiff “has not and will not file, or 

cause to be filed, any further legal proceedings” against defendants arising from Swogger’s 

representation “for the duration of the Tolling Period.” Paragraph 3 precluded plaintiff from 

filing a complaint until the tolling period terminated, which had to occur pursuant to ¶ 6; and ¶ 7 

provided him 30 days after that date within which he could file his complaint without fear of 

being subject to a statute of limitations defense.
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Applying the plain language of the tolling agreement to the facts of this case establishes 

that the cancellation of the tolling agreement and termination of the tolling period established by 

the tolling agreement, occurred on July 30, 2017. The 30-day period specified in ¶ 6 commenced 

on the date of plaintiff’s notice; and upon cancellation of the tolling period, the 30-day period 

specified in ¶ 7 commenced. Because plaintiff filed his complaint on August 8, 2017, within that 

30-day waiver period under ¶ 7, defendants were precluded from asserting a statute of limitations 

defense to the complaint. Accordingly, the trial court erred when it granted summary disposition 

to defendants under MCR 2.116(C)(7). Further, because interpretation of a contract is a question 

of law, DaimlerChrysler Corp v G-Tech Prof Staffing, Inc, 260 Mich App 183, 184-185; 678 

NW2d 647 (2003), and a trial court necessarily abuses its discretion when it makes an error of 

law, Gentris, 297 Mich App at 364, the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to 

reconsider its grant of summary disposition to defendants on statute of limitations grounds.

B. SCOPE OF COMPLAINT

Plaintiff also argues that the trial court erred by ruling that the tolling agreement only 

applied to the specific single legal malpractice claim stated in the 2015 Complaint and precluded

him in the instant action from asserting any other claims arising out of Swogger’s legal 

representation. We agree.

Defendant argued to the trial court that the tolling agreement tolled the applicable statute 

of limitations only as to the single legal malpractice allegation plaintiff asserted in the 2015 

Complaint, but as for any other claims of legal malpractice, the limitations period continued to 

run resulting in the expiration of the limitations period for all other claims. The trial court held 

that the allegations plaintiff made in this case, of other conduct by Swogger that breached the 

applicable standard of care, that he did not allege in the 2015 Complaint, exceeded the scope of 

the tolling agreement, and therefore, were barred by the expiration of the statute of limitations. 

The trial court concluded that the tolling agreement only applied to the single claim of alleged 

malpractice stated in the 2015 Complaint. The trial court opined that the added claims in 

plaintiff’s 2017 Complaint were barred by the statute of limitations because they were not tolled 

by the agreement, and even if Swogger’s May 2013 advice started a separate accrual period, that 

period expired in May 2015.

“The primary goal in interpreting contracts is to determine and enforce the parties’

intent.” Old Kent Bank v Sobczak, 243 Mich App 57, 63; 620 NW2d 663 (2000). “To do so, 

this Court reads the agreement as a whole and attempts to apply the plain language of the 

contract itself.” Id. The language of the contract is to be given its ordinary, plain meaning;

technical, constrained constructions should be avoided. Bianchi v Automobile Club of Mich, 437 

Mich 65, 71 n 1; 467 NW2d 17 (1991). The construction of the terms of a contract is generally a 

question of law for the court; however, where a contract’s meaning is ambiguous, the question of 

interpretation should be submitted to the fact-finder. D’Avanzo v Wise & Marsac, PC, 223 Mich

App 314, 319; 565 NW2d 915 (1997), lv den 456 Mich 864 (1997). A contract is ambiguous 

when its words can reasonably be understood in different ways. Id. Inartfully worded or 

clumsily arranged contract terms do not render a contract ambiguous if it fairly admits of one 

interpretation. Mich Twp Participating Plan v Pavolich, 232 Mich App 378, 382; 591 NW2d 

325 (1998).
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Trial courts, however, may not substitute their own judgment for the intent of the parties 

and remake the contract into something the parties never intended because that would undermine 

the parties’ freedom to contract. Grosse Pointe Park v Mich Muni Liability & Prop Pool, 473 

Mich 188, 199-200; 702 NW2d 106 (2005). Parties are free to contract as they see fit, and trial 

courts must enforce contracts unless they are in violation of law or public policy. Wilkie v AutoOwners Ins Co, 469 Mich 41, 51; 664 NW2d 776 (2003).

Contracts must “be construed as a whole, giving effect to all provisions.” Turner v 

Bituminous Cas Co, 397 Mich 406; 244 NW2d 873 (1976). Courts must avoid interpretations 

that would render any part of a contract surplusage or nugatory, and must also, if possible, seek 

an interpretation that harmonizes potentially conflicting terms. Wells Fargo Bank, NA v 

Cherryland Mall Ltd Partnership, 295 Mich App 99, 111; 812 NW2d 799 (2011), remanded on 

other ground, 493 Mich 859 (2012). Further, where a contract contains specific and general 

terms, the specific terms control over the general terms. Royal Prop Group, LLC v Prime Ins 

Syndicate, Inc, 267 Mich App 708, 719; 706 NW2d 426 (2005).

The resolution of this issue and appeal involves the construction and interpretation of the 

terms of the tolling agreement. This issue requires analysis of the tolling agreement, ¶ ¶ 3, 5, 7, 

and 8, which provided:

3. REFFITT expressly agrees that he has not and will not file, or 

cause to be filed, any further legal proceeding, against SWOGGER asserting any 

claim or cause of action arising out of or related to the facts and circumstances of 

SWOGGER’s legal representation of REFFITT for the duration of the Tolling 

Period.

* * *

5. The Parties agree that the statute of limitations applicable to 

REFFITT’s potential claims against SWOGGER relating to SWOGGER’s legal 

representation of REFFITT in his divorce proceedings shall be tolled for ONE 

HUNDRED EIGHTY (180) days from the Effective Date of this Agreement, as 

defined in Paragraph 8.

* * *

7. Swogger waives and agrees not to assert the statute of limitations 

as an affirmative defense to a legal malpractice action filed by Reffitt within thirty 

(30) days after the termination of the tolling period established under this 

Agreement or any extension of this Agreement evidenced by a mutual written 

agreement if the legal malpractice action filed relates to the same legal 

representation of Reffitt by Swogger which is the subject of the present pending 

litigation.

8. The Parties agree that all of their respective causes of action, 

claims, remedies, and defenses that are in existence now are not waived or 

diminished in any way by this Agreement. This Agreement does not and shall not 

renew, revive or reinstate any claim or cause of action that was otherwise barred 
-11-

as of the Effective Date of this Agreement. This Agreement is not intended and 

shall not be construed to constitute a waiver of any statute of limitations 

defense(s) that any party may have with respect to claims other than legal 

malpractice, as currently alleged in filed Case # 15-30919-NM, pending in the 

Circuit Court for Grand Traverse.

The plain language of ¶ 3 prohibited plaintiff during the tolling period from “asserting 

any claim or cause of action arising out of or related to the facts and circumstances of 

SWOGGER’s legal representation[.]” Paragraph 3 did not limit the scope or number of claims 

arising out of Swogger’s legal representation of plaintiff. Under ¶ 5, the parties tolled the statute 

of limitations that applied to plaintiff’s “potential claims against SWOGGER relating to 

SWOGGER’s legal representation” of plaintiff. Significantly, one cannot reasonably read ¶ 5 

without acknowledging that it recognized the possibility of additional potential claims. The 

language of ¶ 5 did not limit the scope or number of claims arising out of Swogger’s legal 

representation of plaintiff. Neither ¶ 3 nor ¶ 5 expressly prohibited plaintiff from raising other 

allegations of malpractice or restricted him from identifying conduct by Swogger during her 

representation that allegedly fell below the applicable standard of care.

Paragraph 7 provided that Swogger waived the statute of limitations defense to “a legal 

malpractice action filed by” plaintiff “if the legal malpractice action filed relates to the same 

legal representation of Reffitt by Swogger which is the subject of the present pending litigation.” 

The plain language of this paragraph permitted plaintiff to bring another legal malpractice action 

so long as it related to Swogger’s legal representation of plaintiff. The terms “which is the 

subject of the present pending litigation” describe the generic nature of the pending legal

malpractice action but do not specifically limit any post-tolling period legal malpractice action to 

the single claim asserted in the 2015 Complaint.

Notably, the plain language of ¶ 8 preserved the parties’ respective claims and defenses 

and provided that no claims or defenses were waived or diminished by the tolling agreement. 

Further, ¶ 8 preserved statute of limitations defenses for any claims plaintiff might assert other 

than legal malpractice claims. The phrase, “as currently alleged in filed Case # 15-30919-NM, 

pending in the Circuit Court for Grand Traverse[,]” appears to be descriptive but not restrictive. 

The proper interpretation of ¶ 8, therefore, does not permit reading into ¶ 8 a blanket prohibition 

against plaintiff’s raising allegations of other legal malpractice committed by Swogger during 

her representation of plaintiff.

Moreover, when read in harmony, ¶ ¶ 3, 5, 7, and 8’s permissive language cannot be 

interpreted to have prohibited plaintiff from raising in a new lawsuit any and all claims available 

to him respecting Swogger’s legal representation of him. As explained above, her representation 

did not terminate as of the entry of the consent judgment of divorce, and to the extent that her 

representation of him and conduct during that representation through May 21, 2013, allegedly 

constituted legal malpractice, the tolling agreement did not expressly or impliedly prohibit him 

from stating all such claims he may have had when filing the instant action. Further, to the 

extent that his allegations sounded in legal malpractice or claims arising from Swogger’s legal 

representation, the tolling agreement preserved plaintiff’s right to do so and prohibited Swogger 

from asserting a statute of limitations defense against them. Examination of plaintiff’s complaint 

in this action reveals that his claims all arose from and related to Swogger’s legal representation 
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of plaintiff. Further, because plaintiff filed his 2017 Complaint within 30 days of the 

cancellation of the tolling period, he timely filed his claims and they were not subject to the 

statute of limitations defense pursuant to the terms of the tolling agreement. Accordingly, the 

trial court erred by misinterpreting the tolling agreement to bar the claims raised by plaintiff in 

the instant action.

However, because ¶ 8 limited defendants’ waiver in ¶ 7 to legal malpractice claims, 

defendants did not waive their right to assert a statute of limitations defense to plaintiff’s breach 

of fiduciary duty claim which plaintiff’s 2017 Complaint indicates arose from Swogger’s legal 

representation of plaintiff, the same facts and circumstances that gave rise to the legal 

malpractice complaint. Paragraph 8 clarified that the parties did not intend for the tolling 

agreement to constitute a waiver of all statute of limitations defenses and particularly preserved 

defendants’ right to assert the statute of limitations defense to claims other than legal 

malpractice.

As this Court explained in Prentis Family Foundation, Inc v Barbara Ann Karmanos 

Cancer Institute, 266 Mich App 39, 47; 698 NW2d 900 (2005), a breach of fiduciary duty claim 

differs from a legal malpractice claim by requiring proof of conduct committed with “a more 

culpable state of mind than the negligence required for malpractice.” A claim of breach of 

fiduciary duty accrues when the beneficiary of the fiduciary relationship knew or should have 

known of the breach. Id. A breach of fiduciary duty claim must be brought within three years. 

Id. Paragraph 5 of the tolling agreement expressly tolled the statutes of limitations for all of 

plaintiff’s potential claims against Swogger relating to her representation of plaintiff in his 

divorce. Accordingly, as of June 9, 2015, the tolling agreement tolled all limitations periods for 

claims with unexpired limitations periods. Plaintiff’s allegations respecting breaches of fiduciary 

duties parallel his claims of legal malpractice and allegedly arose during Swogger’s 

representation of him. Accordingly, the accrual period for his breach of fiduciary duty claim 

commenced at the latest when she last performed work on plaintiff’s behalf on May 21, 2013. 

The statute of limitations for such claim, therefore, would ordinarily have expired on May 21, 

2016, but because of the operation of the tolling agreement, as of June 9, 2015, the limitations

period was tolled for the tolling period and recommenced following plaintiff’s termination of the 

tolling agreement. Because plaintiff filed his 2017 Complaint on August 8, 2017, the three-year 

limitations period for his breach of fiduciary duty claim had not expired.

C. BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY

Plaintiff next argues that the trial court erred by striking his breach of fiduciary duty 

claim as duplicative of his legal malpractice claims. We agree.

In opposing defendants’ request to strike the breach of fiduciary duty claim, plaintiff 

cited and quoted from authoritative caselaw from this Court that expressly held that they 

constituted distinct legal claims. See, Prentis Family Foundation, Inc v Barbara Ann Karmanos 

Cancer Institute, 266 Mich App 39, 46-47; 698 NW2d 900 (2005). Defendants argued to the 

trial court that plaintiff’s breach of fiduciary duty claim merely duplicated plaintiff’s legal 

malpractice claims. The trial court incorrectly agreed and dismissed the alternative count solely 

on that ground. Prentis, however, establishes that the two claims are not synonymous or 

duplicative and that plaintiff’s breach of fiduciary duty claim required proof of at least one 
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element distinct and separate from legal malpractice. Therefore, the trial court erred by 

dismissing plaintiff’s breach of fiduciary duty claim. Further, defendants’ assertion that the 

claim duplicated his malpractice claim and, therefore, could be dismissed as barred by the twoyear statute of limitations for legal malpractice actions also fails as a matter of law. Because 

plaintiff showed that a breach of fiduciary duty claim is not automatically duplicative of a legal 

malpractice claim, and the claim was not barred by the statute of limitations, the trial court erred 

by striking the count as duplicative, and could not have alternatively dismissed it under MCR 

2.116(C)(7).

D. NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION

Lastly, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred when it failed to consider his argument 

that he should be permitted leave to amend his complaint to add a count for negligent 

misrepresentation. Defendants argue that this Court should not decide this issue because it was 

never decided by the trial court. Defendants also note that plaintiff never actually filed a motion 

for leave to amend. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by 

failing to consider plaintiff’s alternative request to amend his pleading. Weymers v Khera, 454 

Mich 639, 654; 563 NW2d 647 (1997).

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not 

retain jurisdiction.

/s/ Colleen A. O’Brien 

/s/ Michael F. Gadola 

/s/ James Robert Redford