IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. COA22-477

Filed 02 May 2023

Guilford County, Nos. 17 CRS 88458–59

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v.

ROBERT LEE LAMB, JR.

Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 11 October 2019 by Judge Lora 

Christine Cubbage in Guilford County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals

7 March 2023.

Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Special Deputy Attorney General Robert 

T. Broughton, for the State.

Sharon L. Smith for defendant-appellant.

ZACHARY, Judge.

Defendant Robert Lee Lamb, Jr., appeals from a judgment entered upon a 

jury’s verdicts finding him guilty of felony possession of cocaine, misdemeanor 

possession of up to one-half ounce of marijuana, and misdemeanor possession of drug 

paraphernalia. After careful review, we dismiss Defendant’s appeal.

I. Background
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At approximately 4:00 a.m. on 22 October 2017, Detective1 Michael Lewis of 

the Guilford County Sheriff’s Office initiated a traffic stop of a vehicle that he 

observed driving with revoked tags. The vehicle contained two occupants: the driver 

and Defendant. Detective Lewis noticed the odor of marijuana as he approached, 

requested the assistance of additional law enforcement officers, and asked each 

occupant to exit the vehicle.

Master Corporal Todd Riddle and Deputy Diaz2 arrived on the scene shortly 

thereafter; Master Corporal Riddle stood by the vehicle’s occupants, while Deputy 

Diaz assisted Detective Lewis in searching the vehicle. Detective Lewis discovered 

marijuana in the ashtray and a book bag in the back seat. Detective Lewis asked the 

occupants to whom the book bag belonged, and Defendant replied that the bag was 

his. A search of the bag revealed a digital scale and a lockbox, from which emanated

the odor of marijuana.

Detective Lewis then asked Defendant if he had a key to open the lockbox;

Defendant replied that he did not, and that the lockbox was not his. Detective Lewis 

pried open the lockbox with a pocketknife and discovered within a small handgun; a 

white, powdery substance that he believed to be cocaine; a dollar bill on which there 

was a white, powdery residue; multiple small, blue plastic baggies; a glass jar with a 

1 Detective Lewis had the rank of deputy on the morning of 22 October 2017, but had attained 

the rank of detective by the time that he testified at trial. For consistency and ease of reading, we refer 

to him as Detective Lewis. 

2 Deputy Diaz’s first name is not disclosed in the record on appeal.
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pink, crystallized substance inside; and multiple pills. Defendant was arrested and 

charged with possession with intent to sell or distribute alprazolam, possession with 

intent to sell or distribute cocaine, and possession of drug paraphernalia. 

On 14 May 2018, a Guilford County grand jury returned indictments charging 

Defendant with two counts of possession with intent to sell or distribute a controlled 

substance (one for alprazolam and one for cocaine), misdemeanor possession of drug 

paraphernalia, and misdemeanor possession of marijuana. 

On 6 September 2019, Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained 

by warrantless searches, and on 11 September 2019, Defendant filed another motion 

to suppress evidence obtained in violation of his Miranda rights. See Miranda v. 

Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966). On 12 September 2019, Defendant’s 

motions to suppress came on for hearing. The trial court denied both of Defendant’s 

motions in open court and by order entered the next day.

On 2 October 2019, the matter came on for trial. At the outset, Defendant’s 

counsel informed the trial court that he did not anticipate that Defendant would put 

on any evidence. 

Detective Lewis testified first for the State. When Detective Lewis was 

questioned about his investigation of the book bag, Defendant objected based upon 

the grounds stated in his motions to suppress, which the trial court again overruled. 

Detective Lewis testified that when he asked “who the [book bag] belonged to[,]” 

Defendant stated that the book bag belonged to him. Defendant also objected when 
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Detective Lewis was about to testify as to Defendant’s answer to whether he had the

key to the lockbox, again based on the prior motion to suppress, which this time the 

trial court sustained. 

On cross-examination, defense counsel questioned Detective Lewis about 

Defendant’s statement regarding his ownership of the lockbox, and the State objected 

on hearsay grounds. The trial court excused the jury and Defendant conducted a voir 

dire of Detective Lewis. The State contended that Defendant’s statements that he did 

not have a key to the lockbox and that the lockbox was not his were “self-serving”

statements that did not fall within any hearsay exception, and were therefore

inadmissible because Defendant would not be “subject to cross-examination[.]” The 

trial court sustained the State’s objection. 

Before the jury returned, defense counsel asked the trial court whether

Defendant could reconsider his initial decision not to testify on his own behalf:

[DEFENDANT’S COUNSEL]: Okay. If I can’t -- if I can’t 

get this -- you know, I -- I may have to revisit that.

THE COURT: Okay. But if you -- if you go there with this 

witness --

[DEFENDANT’S COUNSEL]: Right.

THE COURT: -- you’re going to put your client up so [the 

State] can cross-examine him.

[DEFENDANT’S COUNSEL]: I understand.

THE COURT: Okay.

[DEFENDANT’S COUNSEL]: Could I -- could I briefly 
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speak to him?

THE COURT: Sure. Uh-huh. 

After some discussion, Defendant’s counsel stated that Defendant would take 

the stand in order to “confirm” his statements, and requested that the trial court 

revisit its ruling on the State’s objection:

Please the court, I am going to -- I intend -- I know what I 

said early on, but based on the -- the ruling I’m going to go 

ahead and -- and confirm that [Defendant] is going to take 

the stand to confirm what he said and also subject himself 

to cross-exam[ination] in this case.

So I am asking to ask those questions since -- since that 

issue is no longer -- [the State will] have an opportunity to 

cross-examine him on that, ask any questions [it] wants to. 

The trial court agreed to let Defendant proceed with his cross-examination of 

Detective Lewis. When the jury returned, Defendant asked Detective Lewis to 

confirm that Defendant stated that he did not have a key for the lockbox and that the 

lockbox was not his, which Detective Lewis did.

Meanwhile, the State voluntarily dismissed the charge of possession with 

intent to sell or distribute alprazolam. After the close of the State’s evidence, 

Defendant took the stand to testify on his own behalf. Defendant testified, inter alia,

that although the book bag was his, neither the digital scale nor the lockbox 

discovered inside belonged to him. Consequently, Defendant continued, he did not 

“have a key to the lockbox” because “it was not [his] box.”

After deliberating, the jury returned its verdicts finding Defendant guilty of 
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felony possession of cocaine (a lesser-included charge of possession with intent to sell 

or distribute cocaine); misdemeanor possession up to one-half ounce of marijuana;

and misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia. The trial court consolidated the 

convictions into a single judgment, sentenced Defendant to a term of 4 to 14 months 

in the custody of the North Carolina Division of Adult Correction, then suspended 

that sentence and placed Defendant on supervised probation for a period of 12 

months.

Defendant timely filed notice of appeal. 

II. Discussion

Defendant argues that the trial court erred (1) by denying his motion to 

suppress evidence obtained in violation of his Miranda rights,

3 and (2) by initially 

limiting his cross-examination of Detective Lewis. In response, the State argues, inter 

alia, that Defendant waived appellate review of these issues by subsequently eliciting 

and even testifying to the same evidence that he now argues was erroneously 

admitted. For the reasons that follow, we agree with the State.

“Where evidence is admitted over objection, and the same evidence has been 

previously admitted or is later admitted without objection, the benefit of the objection 

is lost.” State v. Terry, 337 N.C. 615, 624, 447 S.E.2d 720, 725 (1994) (citation 

omitted). Although a defendant’s privilege against compulsory self-incrimination is 

3 Defendant does not challenge the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence

obtained as a result of the warrantless searches. 
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constitutionally protected, “a defendant who testifies to the same facts that he alleges 

to be inadmissible and then fails to claim that his in-court testimony was compelled 

or impelled by the trial court’s errors has cured the errors of the trial judge and 

rendered them harmless.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see 

also N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1443(c) (2021) (“A defendant is not prejudiced by the 

granting of relief which he has sought or by error resulting from his own conduct.”).

Here, Defendant’s Miranda argument concerns his statement regarding his 

ownership of the book bag, while his cross-examination argument concerns his desire 

to elicit testimony from Detective Lewis “regarding his interrogation of [Defendant]

about the lockbox and its key.” As the State correctly observes, however, Defendant

testified that “[t]he book bag was mine” when he took the stand in his case-in-chief. 

Defendant thus “testifie[d] to the same fact[ ] that he alleges to be inadmissible” in 

his first argument on appeal. Terry, 337 N.C. at 624, 447 S.E.2d at 725. Further, our 

careful review of the transcript reveals that Defendant’s counsel also elicited 

testimony about this same statement on cross-examination of Detective Lewis.

Similarly, the State suggests that, with regard to Defendant’s crossexamination argument, “the same testimony initially excluded by the trial court was 

later admitted during both the State’s case-in-chief and Defendant’s case-in-chief[.]”

Indeed, after Defendant informed the trial court that he intended to change his trial 

strategy and testify on his own behalf, the trial court allowed the cross-examination 

that it initially limited. Consequently, Defendant was permitted to elicit testimony
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from Detective Lewis that Defendant had informed Detective Lewis that “the box 

belong[ed] to his friend and [Defendant did] not have a key for it[.]” Deputy Diaz also

testified to this same statement by Defendant, absent any subsequent objection from 

Defendant. And when Defendant later took the stand, during both his direct 

examination and upon cross-examination, he testified that he did not “have a key to 

the lockbox[.]”

In summary, all of the statements central to Defendant’s arguments on appeal 

were admitted into evidence several times, either without objection by Defendant, 

during Defendant’s cross-examination of the State’s witnesses, or during Defendant’s 

own testimony. Accordingly, both issues are susceptible to waiver as unpreserved or 

invited error.

Nevertheless, Defendant argues that the trial court’s decision to limit his crossexamination of Detective Lewis “forced [Defendant] to take the stand in his own 

defense” and prejudiced him by “open[ing] himself to cross-examination regarding his 

prior, unrelated arrest for assault . . . and whether he lied to police in conjunction 

with that arrest.” To the extent that this argument implicates our Supreme Court’s 

suggestion that a Miranda issue might not be waived if the defendant “claim[s] that 

his in-court testimony was compelled or impelled by the trial court’s errors[,]” we 

conclude that Defendant was not, in fact, “compelled or impelled” to testify by the 

trial court’s initial decision to limit cross-examination in this case. Id. (citation 

omitted).
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When the trial court sustained the State’s objection to Defendant’s crossexamination of Detective Lewis regarding the key to the lockbox, the trial court ruled 

that Defendant’s statement would be inadmissible hearsay “if [Defendant was] not 

putting up any evidence.” Defendant was then faced with a choice of trial strategy: 

continue with his initial plan not to testify and leave the hearsay ruling intact, or

change his trial strategy and testify on his own behalf in order to render his statement 

concerning the key to the lockbox admissible. The trial court did not compel 

Defendant to testify on his own behalf, however. That was a matter of trial strategy,

and “matters of trial strategy . . . are not generally second-guessed by” our appellate 

courts. State v. Prevatte, 356 N.C. 178, 236, 570 S.E.2d 440, 472 (2002), cert. denied, 

538 U.S. 986, 155 L. Ed. 2d 681 (2003).

As the State argues in its brief: “A side effect of that strategy decision, however, 

is the waiver of Defendant’s prior efforts to preserve for appellate review the trial 

court’s ruling suppressing that same statement.” Each of Defendant’s arguments on 

appeal concern the allegedly erroneous admission of statements that were ultimately 

admitted repeatedly at trial, absent Defendant’s objection and, in some instances, by 

Defendant’s own testimony. Defendant therefore “has cured the [alleged] errors of the 

trial judge and rendered them harmless.” Terry, 337 N.C. at 624, 447 S.E.2d at 725 

(citation omitted). Moreover, Defendant cannot show prejudice “by error resulting 

from his own conduct.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1443(c).

III. Conclusion
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We need not address the merits of either of Defendant’s arguments on appeal, 

as Defendant has cured any alleged errors “and rendered them harmless” such that 

he is not entitled to appellate review. Terry, 337 N.C. at 624, 447 S.E.2d at 725

(citation omitted). We therefore dismiss Defendant’s appeal.

DISMISSED.

Judges CARPENTER and WOOD concur.