J-S37037-16 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellee 

v. 

JAMES GLENN TARTAL 

 Appellant No. 1791 WDA 2015 

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence October 21, 2015 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Jefferson County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-33-CR-0000024-2009, 

CP-33-CR-0000025-2009 

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., SHOGAN, J., and LAZARUS, J. 

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED MAY 16, 2016 

 James Glenn Tartal appeals from his probation revocation sentences 

(docket numbers CR-24-2009 & CR-25-2009) entered in the Court of 

Common Pleas of Jefferson County. After careful review, we affirm. 

 On June 17, 2009, Tartal pled guilty to one count of burglary1 (CR-24-

2009) and was sentenced to two years of intermediate punishment (IP), 

followed by five years of probation. On the same date, Tartal pled guilty to 

one count of delivery of a controlled substance (heroin)2 (CR-25-2009) and 

was sentenced to five years of probation to run concurrently with the 

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1

 18 Pa.C.S. § 3502(a). 

2

 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30). 
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sentence imposed at CR-24-2009. On August 15, 2012, the court heard 

evidence that Tartal had committed technical violations of his sentences at 

CR-24-2009 and CR-25-2009. The court ordered that Tartal remain in the 

Jefferson County jail until August 20, 2012, when he would be released to 

report to the Jefferson County Adult Probation Office to finish his probation. 

 On October 9, 2015, Tartal was convicted of manufacturing 

methamphetamine (docket number CR-298-2015). As a result of his new 

conviction, the court revoked Tartal’s probation at CR-25-2009 and 

resentenced him to 71⁄2-15 years’ imprisonment, with credit for time served. 

The court also revoked Tartal’s sentence at CR-24-2009 and resentenced 

him to 21⁄2-5 years in prison. The sentence at CR-25-2009 was ordered to 

run consecutively to the sentence imposed at CR-298-2015. The sentence 

at CR-24-2009 was ordered to run consecutively to the sentence at CR-25-

2009.3 On November 2, 2015, Tartal filed a motion for reconsideration of 

sentence which was denied. This timely appeal follows. 

 On appeal, Tartal presents the following issue for our consideration: 

Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it revoked [Tartal’s] 

probation and resentenced him to serve a sentence of incarceration in a 

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3

 Thus, the aggregate of Tartal’s probation revocation sentences is 10-20 

years of incarceration, which runs consecutively to the sentence at CR-298-

2015. 
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State Correctional Institution aggregating to a minimum of ten (10) years to 

a maximum of twenty (20) years for [Tartal’s] violation of probation/parole. 

 When reviewing the outcome of a revocation proceeding, this Court is 

limited to determining the validity of the proceeding and the legality of the 

judgment of sentence imposed. Commonwealth v. Heilman, 876 A.2d 

1021, 1026 (Pa. Super. 2005). Notwithstanding the stated scope of review 

suggesting that only the legality of a sentence is reviewable, an appellant 

may also challenge the discretionary aspects of a sentence imposed 

following revocation. Commonwealth v. Sierra, 752 A.2d 910, 912 n.6 

(Pa. Super. 2000). See also Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 83 A.3d 1030, 

1034 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc) (scope of review following revocation 

proceedings includes discretionary sentencing claims). 

Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not entitle an 

appellant to an appeal as of right. Sierra, supra. An appellant is not 

entitled to review of the discretionary aspects of sentencing unless he or she 

satisfies a four-part test: 

(1) whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see

Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly 

preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify 

sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. [720]; whether appellant’s brief has 

a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a 

substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not 

appropriate under the Sentencing Code. 

Commonwealth v. Caldwell, 117 A.3d 763, 768 (Pa. Super. 2015) (en 

banc) (quoting Commonwealth v. Allen, 24 A.3d 1058, 1064 (Pa. Super. 

2011)). 
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 Instantly, Tartal filed a timely notice of appeal, and he preserved his 

challenge to the discretionary aspects of his sentence by raising the issue in 

a motion for reconsideration of his sentence. Tartal’s brief includes a 

statement of the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal regarding the 

discretionary aspects of his sentence pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f). 

Accordingly, we must determine whether Tartal presents a substantial 

question that the sentence from which he appeals is not appropriate under 

the Sentencing Code. 

The determination of what constitutes a substantial question must be 

evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Commonwealth v. Anderson, 830 

A.2d 1013 (Pa. Super. 2003). A substantial question exists “only when the 

appellant advances a colorable argument that the sentencing judge’s actions 

were either: (1) inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing 

Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie the 

sentencing process.” Sierra, supra at 912–13. 

 In his Rule 2119(f) statement, Tartal asserts that his probation 

revocation sentences are “manifestly unreasonable in that they constitute 

too severe of a punishment under the circumstances of the case and the 

probation/parole violations, and the Court’s reasons for the sentences do not 

justify the severity.” Appellant’s Brief, at 7. This claim presents a 

substantial question invoking our appellate review. Commonwealth v. 

Philipp, 709 A.2d 920 (Pa. Super. 1998). 
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“In general, the imposition of sentence following the revocation of 

probation is vested within the sound discretion of the trial court, which, 

absent an abuse of that discretion, will not be disturbed on appeal.” 

Commonwealth v. Hoover, 909 A.2d 321, 322 (Pa. Super. 2006). A 

sentence should not be disturbed where it is evident the court was aware of 

the appropriate sentencing considerations and weighed them in a meaningful 

fashion. Commonwealth v. Fish, 752 A.2d 921, 923 (Pa. Super. 2000). 

We note that where the sentencing court has reviewed a presentence 

investigation report, the court is considered to have appropriately weighed 

the requisite sentencing factors. Commonwealth v. Naranjo, 53 A.3d 66, 

72 (Pa. Super. 2012). 

“[U]pon sentencing following a revocation of probation, the trial court 

is limited only by the maximum sentence that it could have imposed 

originally at the time of the probationary sentence.” Commonwealth v. 

Coolbaugh, 770 A.2d 788, 792 (Pa. Super. 2001). A court can sentence a 

defendant to total confinement after revoking probation if the defendant was 

convicted of another crime, the defendant’s conduct indicates it is likely that 

he will commit another crime if he is not imprisoned, or such a sentence is 

essential to vindicate the court’s authority. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9771(c). 
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The record reveals that the revocation court reviewed the relevant 

presentence investigation report (PSI) prior to revoking Tartal’s probation.4 

Moreover, the court provided ample support for its revocation sentence, 

stating the following: 

The defendant, having already completed the State Intermediate 

Punishment [P]rogram, was still on probation for Burglary and 

Delivery of a Controlled Substance when he pled guilty to 

Manufacture of a Controlled Substance for manufacturing 

methamphetamine. Clearly, then, several months in jail, more 

than a year of substance abuse treatment, and the threat of reincarceration were ineffective deterrents for this particular 

defendant, whose new crime was for the same kind of conduct – 

participation in the drug trade – that had given the [c]ourt 

jurisdiction over him in 2009. The defendant proved, therefore, 

that he was not amenable to probation; that a lesser prison term 

coupled with extensive substance abuse treatment was not the 

answer to rehabilitating him and protecting the community; and 

that he would, as he had already, likely commit additional crimes 

if not physically precluded from doing so. The [c]ourt thus 

deemed a sentence of total confinement to be the most feasible 

alternative, not because it was biased against the defendant or 

bore him any ill-will, but because he had demonstrated that he 

would not control his criminal inclinations otherwise. 

Trial Court Opinion, 12/17/15, at 15. 

 The record supports the court’s probation revocation sentences. After 

reviewing the PSI, the court concluded that Tartal’s repeated criminal 

transgressions, which occurred in multiple counties while he was on 

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4

 In fact, the Honorable John H. Foradora, who imposed Tartal’s probation 

revocation sentences in the instant case, was very familiar with Tartal’s 

criminal history since he was the judge who sentenced Tartal in 2009 for 

burglary. 
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probation, indicate that it is likely he will commit another crime if he is not 

imprisoned. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9771(c); Naranjo, supra; N.T. Gagnon 

II5 Hearing, 10/21/15, at 3. The fact that the court chose to run the 

sentences consecutively, which is within its discretion to do, is likewise 

justified where the court believed that the sentences were based on the 

minimum confinement consistent with the gravity of the offenses, the need 

for public protection, and Tartal’s need for rehabilitation. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 9721(b); see also Commonwealth v. Johnson, 961 A.2d 877, 880 (Pa. 

Super. 2008) (stating that imposition of consecutive as opposed to 

concurrent sentences is solely within sound discretion of trial court). 

 Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

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5 Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973). Although the transcript 

indicates that this was a Gagnon I hearing, it was actually a Gagnon II

hearing where the court considered whether the circumstances warranted 

revocation of probation and whether Tartal had, in fact, acted in violation of 

one or more conditions of his probation. At that hearing, the court noted 

that it had already taken judicial notice of Tartal’s plea and sentence at CR298-2015, the offense triggering the revocation of his probation. See 

Gagnon Order, 2/18/15. 
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Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 5/16/2016