[Cite as State v. Eddy, 2022-Ohio-3965.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

ALLEN COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,

CASE NO. 1-22-17

 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,

 v.

CALEB EDDY, O P I N I O N

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

Appeal from Lima Municipal Court

Trial Court No. 21CRB01452

Judgment Affirmed

Date of Decision: November 7, 2022

APPEARANCES:

Thomas J. Lucente Jr. for Appellant

Joseph C. Snyder for Appellee
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WILLAMOWSKI, J. 

{¶1} Defendant-appellant Caleb Eddy (“Eddy”) appeals the judgment of the 

Lima Municipal Court, alleging that his conviction is against the manifest weight of 

the evidence and that the trial court erred in stating the law on self-defense at his 

bench trial. For the reasons set forth below, the judgment of the trial court is 

affirmed. 

Facts and Procedural History

{¶2} Eddy and S.P. were in a relationship and resided together. Tr. 5. After 

S.P. and Eddy had an argument on July 8, 2021, S.P. removed the house key from 

Eddy’s key chain without his knowledge. Tr. 6. S.P. later explained that she took 

this house key because Eddy had packed his belongings and because she believed 

that he was about to move out of the house. Tr. 22, 24. She further testified that 

she wanted him to leave but that he remained at the house that night. Tr. 22. 

{¶3} On July 9, 2021, S.P. and Eddy had another argument. Tr. 5-6. At some 

point, Eddy removed himself from the argument and went outside. Tr. 17. He then 

came back into the house, having decided to leave the premises. Tr. 18. As he 

prepared to leave, Eddy realized that the house key was missing. Tr. 18. He then 

went into the bedroom to locate the house key and began rummaging through S.P.’s 

purse. Tr. 18. S.P. then went into the bedroom after Eddy. Tr. 18. 

{¶4} When S.P. entered into the bedroom, Eddy was facing away from her. 

Tr. 8. S.P. testified that she came alongside Eddy and attempted to stop him from 
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getting her house key from her purse. Tr. 7-8. She stated that Eddy pushed her 

away but that she then returned to his side and reached again for her house key. Tr. 

7-8. S.P. stated that Eddy then pushed her away again and stated that this second 

push was more forceful than the first. Tr. 8. In response, S.P. pushed Eddy back. 

Tr. 9. Eddy and S.P. then began struggling with each other. Tr. 9. 

{¶5} Eddy then managed to pin S.P. down with her back on the bed and her 

feet on the floor. Tr. 9. S.P. testified that she went into “defense mode” and started 

trying to scratch his face. Tr. 9. She recounted, at this point, grabbing Eddy’s 

testicles as “hard as * * * [she] could” because she believed “that [this] would get 

him off of [her] * * *.” Tr. 10. She testified that, in response, Eddy lifted her up 

off of the bed “and slam[ed her] * * * to the floor.” Tr. 10. 

{¶6} S.P. testified that Eddy then “g[o]t on top of [her] * * * and pin[ned her] 

* * * down.” Tr. 11. She then stated the following:

He put his knee into my right shoulder and held my left arm down 

to the ground with his left hand. And drew his hand back like he 

was going to punch me. And at that point, I quit fighting cuz I 

couldn’t move.

* * *

I completely gave up and just told him to get off of me. I just kept 

yelling for him to get off of me. Until he finally, after maybe, I 

don’t know, maybe forty seconds or so, he finally got off of me. 

Tr. 11, 12. S.P. stated that she got up; grabbed her phone; went into a spare 

bedroom; called 9-1-1; and reported the altercation to the dispatcher. Tr. 12-13. 
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{¶7} S.P. then called her friend, Joelene Sibeneck (“Sibeneck”), and 

recounted the events of that evening. Tr. 14, 25. On Sibeneck’s recommendation, 

S.P. locked herself in the bathroom while Sibeneck and her husband drove to S.P.’s 

house. Tr. 14, 26. Sibeneck then took S.P. from her house to a local Urgent Care 

for a medical examination. Tr. 14. A police officer met S.P. at the Urgent Care and 

took a statement from her about this incident. Tr. 29. 

{¶8} On July 30, 2021, complaints were filed that alleged that Eddy had 

committed the offense of domestic violence in violation of R.C. 2919.25(A), a 

misdemeanor of the first degree, and the offense of assault in violation of R.C. 

2903.13(A), a misdemeanor of the first degree. Doc. 1-2. On January 28, 2022, 

both S.P. and Sibeneck testified at a bench trial on these charges. Doc. 16. Tr. 5, 

25. The Defense then made Crim.R. 29 motions to challenge both charges. Tr. 31. 

On January 31, 2022, the trial court issued judgment entries that found Eddy not 

guilty of domestic violence under R.C. 2919.25(A) and guilty of assault in violation 

of R.C. 2903.13(A). Doc. 16-17. 

{¶9} Eddy then filed his notice of appeal on February 24, 2022. Doc. 18. On 

appeal, he raises the following two assignments of error:

First Assignment of Error

The trial court erred when it stated the law of self-defense 

required defendant to retreat.
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Second Assignment of Error

Appellant’s conviction were against the manifest weight of the 

evidence and contrary to law.

For the sake of analytical clarity, we will consider Eddy’s second assignment of 

error before his first assignment of error. 

Second Assignment of Error

{¶10} Eddy argues that the trial court erred in concluding that the State 

carried the burden of establishing that Eddy did not act in self-defense. He asserts 

that his conviction is, therefore, against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Legal Standard

{¶11} In a manifest weight analysis, “an appellate court determines whether 

the state has appropriately carried its burden of persuasion.” State v. Blanton, 121 

Ohio App.3d 162, 169, 699 N.E.2d 136 (3d Dist. 1997). “Unlike our review of the 

sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court’s function when reviewing the weight 

of the evidence is to determine whether the greater amount of credible evidence 

supports the verdict.” State v. Richey, 2021-Ohio-1461, 170 N.E.3d 933, ¶ 29 (3d 

Dist.), quoting State v. Plott, 2017-Ohio-38, 80 N.E.3d 1108, ¶ 73 (3d Dist.). 

{¶12} Accordingly, “the appellate court sits as a ‘thirteenth juror’ * * *.” 

State v. Davis, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-16-30, 2017-Ohio-2916, ¶ 17, quoting State 

v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 1997-Ohio-52, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). 

Appellate courts
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must review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all of the 

reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses, and 

determine whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the 

factfinder ‘clearly lost its way and created such a manifest 

miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a 

new trial ordered.’ State v. Brentlinger, 2017-Ohio-2588, 90 

N.E.3d 200, ¶ 36 (3d Dist.), quoting Thompkins at 387.

State v. Schatzinger, 3d Dist. Wyandot No. 16-20-04, 2021-Ohio-167, ¶ 52.

{¶13} “A reviewing court must, however, allow the trier of fact appropriate 

discretion on matters relating to the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the 

witnesses.” State v. Sullivan, 2017-Ohio-8937, 102 N.E.3d 86, ¶ 38 (3d Dist.), 

quoting State v. Coleman, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-13-53, 2014-Ohio-5320, ¶ 7. “Only 

in exceptional cases, where the evidence ‘weighs heavily against the conviction,’ 

should an appellate court overturn the trial court’s judgment.” State v. Little, 2016-

Ohio-8398, 78 N.E.3d 323, ¶ 27 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. Hunter, 131 Ohio St.3d 

67, 2011-Ohio-6524, 960 N.E.2d 955, ¶ 119. 

{¶14} Assault in violation of R.C. 2903.13(A) occurs where a person 

“knowingly cause[s] or attempt[s] to cause physical harm to another * * *.” R.C. 

2903.13(A). However, under Ohio law, “[a] person is allowed to act in selfdefense.” R.C. 2901.05(B)(1). “Self-defense is an affirmative defense.” State v. 

Jacinto, 2020-Ohio-3722, 155 N.E.3d 1056, ¶ 43 (8th Dist.). “The elements of selfdefense differ depending on whether the defendant used deadly or non-deadly force 

to defend himself.” State v. Chavez, 3d Dist. Seneca Nos. 13-19-05, 13-19-06, and 
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13-19-07, 2020-Ohio-426, ¶ 39, quoting State v. Bagley, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-13-

31, 2014-Ohio-1787, ¶ 15. 

{¶15} Self-defense through the use of non-deadly force is present where: 

(1) the accused was not at fault in creating the situation giving rise 

to the affray, (2) the accused (even if mistaken) had a bona fide 

belief that he was in imminent danger of any bodily harm; and (3) 

the only means to protect himself from such danger was the use 

of force not likely to cause death or great bodily harm.

Chavez at ¶ 40, citing State v. Vu, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 09AP-606, 2010-Ohio4019, ¶ 10; Ohio Jury Instructions, CR Section 421.19 (Rev. Oct. 11, 2008). See

State v. Barker, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 29227, 2022-Ohio-3756, ¶ 24; State v. 

Elam, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2021-08-106, 2022-Ohio-1895, ¶ 13. 

{¶16} As to the first element of self-defense, “Ohio courts have long 

recognized that a person cannot provoke [an] assault or voluntarily enter an 

encounter and then claim a right of self-defense.” State v. Woodson, 6th Dist. Lucas 

No. L-21-1068, 2022-Ohio-2528, ¶ 82, quoting State v. Nichols, 4th Dist. Scioto 

No. 01CA2775, 2002 WL 126973, *3 (Jan. 22, 2002). This means

the defendant must not be at fault in creating the situation that 

gave rise to the affray. Nichols at *9-10. This concept is broader 

than simply not being the immediate aggressor. Id. at *10. A 

person may not provoke an assault or voluntarily enter an 

encounter and then claim a right of self-defense. Id.; State v. 

Lewis, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2019-07-128, 156 N.E.3d 281, 

2020-Ohio-3762, ¶ 27.

State v. Elam, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2021-08-106, 2022-Ohio-1895, ¶ 14. The 

defendant must not have “engaged in such wrongful conduct toward his assailant 
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that the assailant was provoked to attack the defendant.” State v. Gillespie, 172 

Ohio App.3d 304, 2007-Ohio-3439, 874 N.E.2d 870, ¶ 17 (2d Dist.). 

{¶17} R.C. 2901.05 places the burden on the State “to disprove at least one 

of the elements of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Cervantes, 3d 

Dist. Henry No. 7-21-06, 2022-Ohio-2536, ¶ 59, quoting State v. Carney, 10th Dist. 

Franklin No. 19AP-402, 2020-Ohio-2691, ¶ 31. 

‘[U]nder the current version of R.C. 2901.05(B), the state is not 

required to prove the defendant did not act in self-defense until 

the defendant introduces evidence that tends to support they 

acted in self-defense.’ State v. Walker, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-20-

1047, 180 N.E.3d 60, 2021-Ohio-3860, ¶ 61. ‘In other words, the 

defendant maintains the burden of production on their selfdefense claim before the state inherits the burden of persuasion.’ 

Id., citing State v. Petway, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2019-L-124, 156 

N.E.3d 467, 2020-Ohio-3848, ¶ 55.

Cervantes at ¶ 60. “The elements of self-defense are cumulative, and a defendant’s 

claim of self-defense fails if any one of the elements is not present.” State v. Ridley, 

1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-210458, 2022-Ohio-2561, ¶ 15. 

Legal Analysis

{¶18} Neither party disputes that the standard for self-defense through nondeadly force is applicable in this case. On appeal, Eddy argues that the State 

“provided no evidence” that disproves an element of self-defense through the use of 

non-deadly force. Appellant’s Brief, 9. In response, the State argues that it 

disproved the first element of this affirmative defense. This first element requires 
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that the defendant “not [be] at fault in creating the situation [that] g[ave] rise to the 

affray * * *.” Chavez, supra, at ¶ 39, 40. 

{¶19} At trial, the State called S.P. as a witness. Tr. 5. She testified that, 

immediately preceding the altercation, Eddy had gone into the bedroom and was 

trying to get her house key from a key ring that was in her purse. Tr. 6. S.P. stated 

that she “walked to the side of him [Eddy] to try to reach around to grab * * * [her] 

keys.” Tr. 8. She testified that Eddy then pushed her away. Tr. 8. S.P. testified 

that she returned to Eddy’s side and that he then shoved her away. Tr. 8. She stated

that Eddy applied more force the second time that he pushed her. Tr. 8. S.P. said

that she then pushed Eddy back and that the “fight escalated” with the two of them 

“throwing punches at each other.” Tr. 9. 

{¶20} S.P.’s testimony indicates that Eddy initiated the physical altercation

as he was the first one to use force in this case. Tr. 6, 8. Her testimony also indicates 

that Eddy increased the amount of force that he used on her when he shoved her a 

second time. Tr. 8. This testimony could persuade a reasonable finder of fact that 

Eddy “was at least partially at fault for creating the situation giving rise to the affray 

* * *.” Woodson, supra, at ¶ 82. See Chavez, supra, at ¶ 40. See also State v. 

Clemmons, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 23237, 2010-Ohio-3109, ¶ 43; State v. 

Garrison, 9th Dist. Summit No. 12676, 12746, 1987 WL 8477, *1; State v. McElroy, 
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11th Dist. Trumbull Nos. 2002-T-0115 and 2002-T-0116, 2003-Ohio-6762, ¶ 31.1

Since the State only needs to carry the burden of persuasion on one element of selfdefense, we need not consider the other elements of self-defense in this analysis. 

{¶21} Accordingly, we find Eddy’s argument—that the State “provided no 

evidence” to disprove an element of self-defense through non-deadly force—to be 

without merit. Appellant’s Brief, 9. Having examined the record, we conclude that 

the evidence presented in this case does not weigh heavily against the trial court’s 

determination that the State disproved at least one element of self-defense. Thus, 

Eddy has failed to establish that his conviction is against the manifest weight of the 

evidence. His second assignment of error is overruled. 

First Assignment of Error

{¶22} Eddy argues that the trial court incorrectly applied the legal standard 

for self-defense through deadly force instead of the legal standard for self-defense 

through non-deadly force. 

Legal Standard

{¶23} R.C. 2901.01(A)(2) defines “Deadly Force” as “any force that carries 

a substantial risk that it will proximately result in the death of any person.” R.C. 

2901.01(A)(2). See State v. Kucharski, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 20815, 2005-

1 We are aware that Garrison and McElroy address the application of self-defense through deadly force. 

Garrison, supra, at *1; McElroy, supra, at ¶ 29, 31. However, the first element for self-defense through 

deadly force and the first element for self-defense through non-deadly force are the same. Chavez, supra, at 

¶ 39, 40. Both require that “the accused was not at fault in creating the situation giving rise to the affray * * 

*.” Id. Thus, the examination of fault in these cases shapes our understanding of how fault should be 

analyzed where an argument for self-defense is raised. 
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Ohio-6541, ¶ 21 (“[T]he use of nondeadly force, by definition, presents no risk of 

loss of life * * *.”). Self-defense through the use of deadly force is applicable as an 

affirmative defense where:

(1) the accused was not at fault in creating the situation giving rise 

to the affray; (2) the accused had a bona fide belief that he or she 

was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and that 

the only means of escape from such danger was in the use of force; 

and (3) the accused must not have violated any duty to retreat or 

to avoid the danger.

Chavez at ¶ 39, quoting State v. Thacker, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-03-37, 2004-Ohio1047, ¶ 14. In contrast, self-defense through the use of non-deadly force is 

applicable as an affirmative defense where: 

(1) the accused was not at fault in creating the situation giving rise 

to the affray, (2) the accused (even if mistaken) had a bona fide 

belief that he was in imminent danger of any bodily harm; and (3) 

the only means to protect himself from such danger was the use 

of force not likely to cause death or great bodily harm.

Chavez at ¶ 40. See also State v. Jordan, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-210603, 2022-

Ohio-2566, ¶ 56. Thus, “there is no duty to retreat in cases involving non-deadly 

force.” (Emphasis sic.) Id., citing State v. Brown, 2017-Ohio-7424, 96 N.E.3d 

1128, ¶ 24 (2d Dist.). 

Legal Analysis

{¶24} In this case, after the bench trial had concluded, the trial court analyzed 

S.P.’s testimony. The trial court noted that “he [Eddy] did not have to pick her 

[S.P.] up and slam her on the floor; that, “[w]hen he [Eddy] was on top of her, he 
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could’ve let her up and walked away”; that “there were times when the defendant 

was in control of the situation and did not walk away”; and that Eddy “knew that * 

* * at any point in time, he could walk away.” Tr. 47-48. Eddy argues that these 

statements indicate that the trial court believed that he had a duty to retreat in this 

case and that the trial court, therefore, incorrectly applied the legal standard for selfdefense through deadly force in this case. 

{¶25} However, these identified statements, in fact, represent the application 

of the legal standard for self-defense through non-deadly force to the circumstances 

of this case. The contents of the Ohio Jury Instructions (“OJI”) show the connection

of these statements to the first element of self-defense through non-deadly force. 

Ohio Jury Instructions, CR Section 421.19 (Rev. Dec. 4, 2021). The OJI for selfdefense through non-deadly force reads, in relevant part, as follow: 

6. AT FAULT. The defendant did not act in (self-defense) (defense 

of his/her residence) if the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt 

that the defendant was at fault in creating the (situation) 

(incident) (argument) that resulted in the injury. The defendant 

was at fault if the defendant was the initial aggressor and

(A) (insert name of victim[s]) did not escalate the (situation) 

(incident) (argument) by being the first to use or attempt to use 

(non-deadly force) (deadly force);

(B) provoked (insert name of victim[s]) into using force;

(C) did not withdraw from the (situation) (incident) (argument);

* * * 
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(Emphasis added.) Id. In support of Section 6(C) of this instruction, OJI cites to 

the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Melchior, which states the following: 

Even though the accused may in the first instance have 

intentionally brought on the difficulty and provoked the occasion, 

yet his right of self-defense will revive and his actions will be held 

justifiable upon the ground of self-defense in all cases where he 

has withdrawn from the affray or difficulty in good faith as far as 

he possibly can, and clearly and fairly announced his desire for 

peace.

State v. Melchior, 56 Ohio St.2d 15, 21, 381 N.E.2d 195, 200 (1978), quoting 1 

Wharton’s Criminal Law and Procedure 504-505, Section 232. See State v. 

Galluzzo, 2d Dist. Champaign No. 99CA25, 2001 WL 303212, *3 (Mar. 30, 2001); 

State v. Ferrell, 2020-Ohio-6879, 165 N.E.3d 743, ¶ 28 (10th Dist.).2 In the case 

presently before us, the trial court appears to have been examining this aspect of the 

first element for self-defense through non-deadly force. 

{¶26} Further, in several of the statements identified above, the trial court 

was also considering the extent to which the force used by Eddy was applied in selfdefense. Under R.C. 2901.05(B)(2), “the prosecution must prove beyond a 

reasonable doubt that the accused person did not use the force in self-defense.” R.C. 

2901.05(B)(2). See Dublin v. Starr, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 21AP-173, 2022-Ohio2298, ¶ 38. The State can carry the burden of disproving the third element of selfdefense through non-deadly force and by establishing that “the defendant used more 

2 Melchior and Ferrell are cases that address self-defense through deadly force. Melchior, supra, at 21; 

Ferrell, supra, at ¶ 25. However, as in the Ohio Jury Instructions in CR 421.19, Galluzzo applies the 

reasoning of Melchior in the context of self-defense through non-deadly force. Galluzzo, supra, at *1-3. 
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force than was reasonably necessary to defend against the imminent danger of 

bodily harm.” Jacinto, supra, at ¶ 46. State v. Jordan, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C210603, 2022-Ohio-2566, ¶ 55; State v. Myers, 5th Dist. Ashland No. 21-COA-025, 

2022-Ohio-3337, ¶ 28; Ohio Jury Instructions CR Section 421.19 (Rev. Dec. 4, 

2021). Thus, the considerations about the amount of force employed by Eddy are 

not irrelevant to the third element of a self-defense through non-deadly force 

analysis and are not an indication that the incorrect legal standard was applied in 

this case.

{¶27} Finally, under the first assignment of error, we concluded that the State 

disproved the element that requires a defendant “not [to have] be[en] at fault in 

creating the situation giving rise to the affray.” Chavez, supra, at ¶ 39, 40. Because 

the first element of self-defense through deadly force and the first element of selfdefense through non-deadly force are identical, the application of either of these two 

legal standards would yield the exact same result under the facts of this particular 

case. Id. Accordingly, we find this argument to be unpersuasive and ultimately 

inconsequential. 

{¶28} In conclusion, the trial court nowhere indicated that it believed that the 

legal standard for self-defense through deadly force was applicable or that Eddy had 

a duty to retreat in this case. The statements identified by Eddy, in fact, represent 

the application of the legal standard for self-defense through non-deadly force to the 

circumstances of this case. Having examined the record in its entirety, we find no 
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indication that the trial court applied the incorrect legal standard for self-defense in 

this case. Eddy’s first assignment of error is overruled. 

Conclusion

{¶29} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant in the particulars 

assigned and argued, the judgment of the Lima Municipal Court is affirmed. 

Judgment Affirmed

ZIMMERMAN, P.J. and MILLER, J., concur.

/hls