17-1771 

Ramos-De Lopez v. Whitaker 

BIA 

Christensen, IJ 

A206 896 837/838 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER

FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF 

APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER 

IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN 

ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY 

ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 

for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall 

United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 

New York, on the 8th day of January, two thousand nineteen. 

PRESENT: 

ROBERT A. KATZMANN,

 Chief Judge,

JON O. NEWMAN, 

GUIDO CALABRESI,

Circuit Judges. 

_____________________________________ 

ROSA IRMA RAMOS-DE LOPEZ, CARLOS 

STANLEY LOPEZ-RAMOS, 

 Petitioners, 

v. 17-1771 

 NAC 

MATTHEW G. WHITAKER, ACTING 

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

 Respondent. 

_____________________________________ 

FOR PETITIONERS: H. Raymond Fasano, New York, NY. 

FOR RESPONDENT: Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant 

Attorney General; Russell J.E. 

Verby, Senior Litigation Counsel; 

John D. Williams, Trial Attorney, 

Office of Immigration Litigation, 

United States Department of 

Justice, Washington, DC. 
2

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 

Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review 

is DENIED. 

 Petitioner Rosa Irma Ramos-De Lopez and her son, Carlos 

Stanley Lopez-Ramos, natives and citizens of El Salvador, 

seek review of a May 8, 2017, decision of the BIA affirming 

a December 7, 2016, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) 

denying their applications for asylum, withholding of 

removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture 

(“CAT”). In re Rosa Irma Ramos-De Lopez and Carlos Stanley 

Lopez-Ramos, Nos. A 206 896 837/838 (B.I.A. May 8, 2017), 

aff’g No. A 206 896 837/838 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Dec. 7, 

2016). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the 

underlying facts and procedural history in this case. 

 Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed 

the IJ’s decision as modified by the BIA, and address only 

the adverse credibility determination. See Xue Hong Yang v. 

U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir. 2005). The 

applicable standards of review are well established. See

8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 

162, 165-66 (2d Cir. 2008). “Considering the totality of the 
3

circumstances, and all relevant factors, a trier of fact may 

base a credibility determination on . . . the consistency 

between the applicant’s . . . written and oral statements . 

. . , the internal consistency of each such statement, [and] 

the consistency of such statements with other evidence of 

record . . . .” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); see also Xiu 

Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 163-64. The multiple inconsistencies 

in Ramos-De Lopez’s statements provide substantial evidence 

for the adverse credibility determination. 

 The agency reasonably relied on the record of Ramos-De 

Lopez’s credible fear interview. Although “adverse 

credibility determinations based on ‘discrepancies’ with a 

credible fear interview should be examined with care,” the 

interview record here bears sufficient indicia of 

reliability. See Ming Zhang v. Holder, 585 F.3d 715, 725 (2d 

Cir. 2009). The interview was conducted with an interpreter, 

Ramos-De Lopez expressly declined to have her attorney 

present, the interview was memorialized in a question and 

answer format, the questions posed were designed to elicit 

details of Ramos-De Lopez’s asylum claim, and her responses 

indicated that she understood the questions. Id. (listing 

“hallmarks of reliability”). 
4

 Given the reliability of the interview record, 

substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination 

that Ramos-De Lopez was not credible as to her claim that 

members of El Salvador’s Mara gang targeted her and her son 

on January 4, 2014, because she proselytized Catholicism in 

gang territory. Ramos-De Lopez’s statements at the 

interview were inconsistent with her testimony regarding 

the gang’s motive for targeting her and her son and she 

added additional instances of persecution to her 

application and testimony. See 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). At her credible fear interview, she 

said that the gang members targeted her on January 4 

because she would not allow them to take her son away to 

work for them carrying drugs. At that interview, she was 

asked whether there was any other reason she feared going 

back to El Salvador, and answered no. Ramos-De Lopez did 

not compellingly explain these discrepancies. See Majidi 

v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A petitioner 

must do more than offer a plausible explanation for . . . 

inconsistent statements to secure relief; [s]he must 

demonstrate that a reasonable fact-finder would be 

compelled to credit h[er] testimony.” (internal quotations 
5

omitted)). Although she now argues that the IJ failed to 

consider a psychological report diagnosing her with posttraumatic stress disorder, she failed to exhaust this issue 

because she did not raise it before the BIA. See Lin Zhong 

v. Dep’t of Justice, 480 F.3d 104, 117-25 (2d Cir. 2007) 

(describing issue exhaustion as mandatory). 

 The agency also reasonably relied on Ramos-De Lopez’s 

inconsistent testimony concerning when the gang members gave 

her brother an extortion letter. See 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). In her written statement and 

testimony, Ramos-De Lopez asserted that she stopped staying 

at her brother’s home when she saw people watching the house, 

and she specified that after her departure, the gang members 

delivered an extortion letter to her brother. In contrast, 

her brother wrote that his receipt of the note was the event 

that prompted Ramos-De Lopez to return to her own home. 

 Given the inconsistencies between Ramos-De Lopez’s 

statements and between her statements and documentary 

evidence about the incidents central to her and her son’s 

claim, the agency’s adverse credibility determination is 

supported by substantial evidence. See 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). That determination was dispositive of 
6

asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief because all 

three claims were based on the same factual predicate. See 

Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156-57 (2d Cir. 2006). 

 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 

DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal 

that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, 

and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition 

is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument 

in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of 

Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 

34.1(b). 

FOR THE COURT: 

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk