FILED

April 24, 1998

Cecil Crowson, Jr.

Appellate C ourt Clerk

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

 ______________________________________________

MOHAMED F. ALI, M.D., 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

Vs. Washington Law No. 15924

C.A. No. 03A01-9708-CV-00347

FREDIA MOORE, DANNY (PAT)

STORY, AMERICA’S MOST 

WANTED and FOX TELEVISION

BROADCASTING, 

Defendant-Appellee.

____________________________________________________________________________

FROM THE LAW COURT FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY

THE HONORABLE G. RICHARD JOHNSON

Mohamed F. Ali, M.D., Pro Se,

of Mountain City

Donald L. Zachary, Sue E. McClure; Bass, Berry & Sims, PLC

of Nashville, For Appellee, Fox Television Broadcasting

VACATED IN PART, AFFIRMED IN PART AND REMANDED

Opinion filed: 

W. FRANK CRAWFORD, 

PRESIDING JUDGE, W.S.

CONCUR:

ALAN E. HIGHERS, JUDGE

DAVID R. FARMER, JUDGE

This is an action for defamation and violation of constitutionalrights. Plaintiff/Appellant
1

 Ali erroneously sued Fox Broadcasting Company under the name, “Fox Television

Broadcasting.”

2

 Fredia Moore and Danny (Pat) Story were also named as defendants, but they are

not involved in this appeal.

3

 This indictment was later dismissed due to a technicality but it was subsequently

reinstated.

2

Mohamed F. Ali, M.D. sued Defendant/Appellee Fox Television Broadcasting (Fox),1

 for

defamation and for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a result of two television broadcasts.

2

 The

trial court granted summary judgment to Fox and subsequently made the order final pursuant to

Tenn.R.Civ.P. 54.02. The trial court also enjoined Ali from filing future pro se actions. Ali

appeals.

Facts and Procedural History

Prior to December of 1989, Ali was a family physician practicing in Johnson City,

Tennessee. In July of 1989, Defendant Fredia Moore, a patient of Ali, visited Ali pursuant to

an appointment. Immediately thereafter, Moore reported to the police that she had been sexually

assaulted by Ali while she was under the influence of an injection. It was alleged that Ali later

attempted to bribe Moore and her husband in exchange for their efforts to have the rape charge

dropped. Ali was indicted in December of 1989 on one count of rape and two counts of

attempted bribery.3

 Ali was arrested and released after posting a $100,000 bond through

Defendant Danny Story, a bail bondsman. The Tennessee Board of Medical Examiners

suspended Ali’s medical license on December 15, 1989. Moore brought a civil suit against Ali

for the alleged rape in January of 1990, and obtained a $4 million default judgment in June of

1991.

Around June of 1990, Ali left the United States. On August 14, 1992, Fox, a television

broadcasting network, fed to its affiliated stations an episode of the television program,

America’s Most Wanted. The episode featured the rape and bribery charges brought against Ali

and the fact that his whereabouts were unknown. The episode included interviews with Moore

and a police officer, as well as a narration and re-enactment of the alleged rape and bribery

incidents. A viewer of the episode contacted the authorities and reported that he had seen Ali

in Cairo, Egypt. A subsequent undercover investigation by Story ultimately led to the return of

Ali to the United States in October of 1992. Fox proceeded to broadcast a follow-up program
4

 America’s Most Wanted was later stricken as a defendant, since it is not a legal

entity.

5

 The trial court dismissed a motion by Ali to set aside this order. 

3

on Ali’s capture in an America’s Most Wanted episode aired on October 30, 1992.

In September of 1993, a jury convicted Ali of rape and one count of attempted bribery.

Apparently Ali was acquitted of charges of failing to appear and skipping bail. On October 27,

1993, Ali filed this action against Moore, alleging defamation and the violation of his

constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Ali filed an Amended Complaint on April

18, 1994, adding as parties defendant Story, Fox, and America’s Most Wanted.

4

Fox moved for summary judgment, arguing that Ali’s claim is barred by the statute of

limitations and that he has failed to establish the elements of a defamation claim. Fox also

asserted that Ali can not state a constitutional claim against Fox, since Fox is not a state actor.

The trial court granted summary judgment to Fox on August 22, 1996, without explaining its

reasoning, and on February 4, 1997, made the order final pursuant to Tenn.R.Civ.P. 54.02.5 The

suit against the remaining defendants was scheduled for trial. Ali, however, requested a nonsuit

on the day before trial, and the trial court dismissed the suit without prejudice on April 30, 1997.

Moore proceeded to request Rule 11 sanctions. Although Moore withdrew her request for

sanctions on the date of the hearing, the trial court sua sponte permanently enjoined Ali from

filing pro se actions in the First Judicial District and appointed a local attorney to represent Ali

for any future meritorious claims.

Issues

The first issue for review is:

1. Whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to

Defendant Fox?

A motion for summary judgment should be granted when the movant demonstrates that

there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment

as a matter of law. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04. The party moving for summary judgment bears the

burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Bain v. Wells, 936 S.W.2d

618, 622 (Tenn. 1997). On a motion for summary judgment, the court must take the strongest

legitimate view of the evidence in favor of the nonmoving party, allow all reasonable inferences
6

 The statute of limitations for slander is only six months and the discovery rule does

not apply. T.C.A. § 28-3-103 (1980); Quality Auto Parts Co. v. Bluff City Buick Co., 876

S.W.2d 818, 820-22 (Tenn. 1994).

4

in favor of that party, and discard all countervailing evidence. Id. In Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d

208 (Tenn. 1993), our Supreme Court stated:

Once it is shown by the moving party that there is no genuine issue of material

fact, the nonmoving party must then demonstrate, by affidavits or discovery

materials, that there is a genuine, material fact dispute to warrant a trial. In this

regard, Rule 56.05 provides that the nonmoving party cannot simply rely upon

his pleadings but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine

issue of material fact for trial.

Id. at 211 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).

Summary judgment is only appropriate when the facts and the legal conclusions drawn

from the facts reasonably permit only one conclusion. Carvell v. Bottoms, 900 S.W.2d 23, 26

(Tenn. 1995). Since only questions of law are involved, there is no presumption of correctness

regarding a trial court's grant of summary judgment. Bain, 936 S.W.2d at 622. Therefore, our

review of the trial court’s grant of summary judgment is de novo on the record before this Court.

Warren v. Estate of Kirk, 954 S.W.2d 722, 723 (Tenn. 1997).

W e fir st a d d r e s s A li’s lib e l cl a i m agai nst Fox. The t r i a l cour t appar ent l y aw a r ded s u m m a r y j udgm ent t o Fox

based on A l i ’ s f a i l u r e t o com p l y w ith th e sta t u t e o f lim ita tio n s a n d / o r A li’s fa ilu r e to est abl i sh a pri m a fa c i e cl a i m for

lib e l . No repor t ed case i n T ennessee has di rec t l y add res sed w het her a t e l evi s i on b roadcast should be desi gnated as l i bel

or s l ander. T here i s no cl ear consensus am ong our si s t er s t a t es concerni ng thi s i s s ue. See 50 A m . Jur . 2d Libel &

Slander § 10 (1995). T he “m ost preval ent ” vi e w , how ever, i s t hat broadcast s s hou l d be co nsi dered as l i bel ;

p a rtic u l a rly i f t hey are based on w r i t t en scr i p t s . Jef f r ey F . G hent, A nno t a tio n , Defamation by Radio or

Television, 50 A . L . R . 3d 1311, 1319 ( 1973) ; see also R e s t a t e m ent ( Second) of Tort s § 568A (1976) ( “Broadc a s t i n g

o f defam a t ory m a t t er b y m eans of r adi o or t e l evi s i on i s l i bel , w het her or not i t i s r ead f r o m a m anus c r i p t . ” ) . I n t h e

i nst ant ca se, i t w o u ld ap p e ar that t h e bro a d c a s t should be cl ass i f i ed as l i bel ; part i cul arl y si nce i t w as based on a prepared

s c rip t . I n any eve n t , a des i gnat i o n of the bro a d c a st as l ibel en h a n c es the ap p e l l a n t ’ s po sit ion in t he present case, si nce

t he l i bel st a t u t e of l i m i t a t i ons i s m o r e f avor abl e t o a pl a i n t i f f .

6

T h e epi sode s of America’s Most Wanted at i s s ue w ere ai red nat i onw i de on A ugu s t 14, 1992 an d O c t ober

30, 1992. A l i ’s o rigin al C o m p lain t , li sting o n ly M o o r e as a def endan t , w as f i l ed on O c t ober 27, 199 3 . A l i ’ s A m ended

C o m p l a i n t , addi ng Fox as a def endant , w a s f i l ed on A p r i l 18, 1994.

A n act i on f o r l i bel m ust be brough t “w i t h i n on e (1) year af t er t he cause of act i on accrued. ” T . C . A . § 28- 3 - 104
5

(a)(1 ) ( Supp. 1997) . I n Applewhite v. Memphis State Univ., 495 S. W . 2 d 190 , 195 (Tenn . 197 3), t he C ourt hel d

t hat a cause o f act i on f o r l i bel acc r ues on t he dat e t hat t he al l eged l i bel i s publ i she d i n t he count y t hat t he ac t i on i s

b r ought . T he Applewhite holdi ng w a s in th e context of a m ass pub l i cat i on o f a book. A l i argues t hat t he dis covery

r u l e shoul d appl y i n t he pr e s ent cas e . A l i m a i n t a i n s t hat si nce he w as overs eas, he did not di scover and reas onab l y cou l d

not have dis covered t he F ox b roadcast s unt i l he ret urned t o t he U n i t e d S tat es. I n fac t , A l i i nsi s t s i n his pl eadi ngs t hat

he di d not becom e “f u l l y aw a r e of t he exa c t cont ent s ” of t he al l eged l i bel unt i l ar ound t he end of June 1993.

I n Quality Auto Parts Co. v. Bluff City Buick Co., 876 S. W . 2d 818, 820- 22 ( Tenn. 1994) , th e

T ennessee Supre m e Court hel d that t h e disco v e ry ru le do es n ot ap ply to the sland er stat ute o f l i m i t ati o n s . In Leedom

v. Bell, N o . 03A 01-970 4-C V -00136 , 199 7 W L 671 918 (Tenn . A pp. O c t . 29, 1997) , t h i s C ourt fi r s t consi dered w het her

t h e di s c over y r u l e s houl d be appli e d t o an ac t i on f o r l i bel . The i s s ue i n Leedom, how ever , w a s nar r o w ed t o t he cont ext

o f lib e l th a t w as not rea d i l y accessi b l e t o t he gen era l pub l i c . Id. at *6. The C our t not ed t hat t he “de c i ded m oder n t r end

i n A m erican juri spru d e n c e ” is i n f avor of appl y i ng t he di s c over y r u l e i n “l i m i t ed s i t uat i ons where t he al l egedl y l i bel ous

s t a t e m ent occurr e d i n pri vat e or confi denti a l pub l i cat i ons w h i ch are not rea d i l y avail abl e t o t he plai n t i f f or t he gen era l

pub l i c . ” Id. at *7. A dvo cat i ng thi s m odern t rend, t he C ourt quo t ed app rovi ngly t he f o l l o w i ng st a t e m ent by t h e

M i s s i s s i ppi Supre m e Court :

W e ar e convi nced t hat t he gene r a l pol i c i e s under l y i ng t he s t a t u t e o f lim ita tio n s

w ill not be t h w art ed by adop t i on o f t he dis covery rul e i n t hat l i m i t ed cl ass of l i bel

cases w h i ch, because of the secretive or inherently undiscoverable

nature of the publication t he pl a i n t i f f di d not know , or w i t h r eas onabl e

d i l i gence coul d n o t h ave dis covered, t hat he had been d efa m ed. In s uch rar e

i nst ances, w e do not bel i eve t hat a pl a i n t i f f can be acc use d of sl eepi ng on hi s

rig h t s . 

Id. ( quot i ng Staheli v. Smith, 548 So. 2d 1299, 1303 ( M i s s . 1989) ) ( e m phas i s a dded) .

T h e i nst ant case pr e s ent s a deci dedl y di f f e r ent f act ual sc enar i o . A t t h e t i m e of t he fi r s t broadcast , on O c t ober

30, 1992, A l i w as i n E gyp t , having l eft t he cou n t ry af t er he w as r e l eased on b a i l . A s s u m i ng that t h e br oadca s t w a s not

aire d i n Egypt, A l i ’ s f a i l u r e t o di s c over t he br oadca s t w a s due t o hi s own behavi o r . Cf. Teeters v. Curry, 518

S . W . 2 d 51 2, 51 7 (T e n n. 19 7 4 ) (“[T ]he pu bli c p oli c y of o ur state i s op p o sed to req uiri n g that su it b e file d w hen

circumstances totally beyond the control of the injured party m ake i t i m poss i b l e f o r hi m t o br i ng sui t .”

(em phasi s added ) ) . M ore i m port ant l y , how ever, i t i s undi sput ed t hat at t he t i m e of t he s econd br oadca s t , A l i w as back

i n t he U n i t e d Stat es, and the broadcast w as nei t her “s ecr e t i ve” no r of an “i nher ent l y undi s c over abl e nat u r e . ” The se cond

broadcast repeat ed a l arge par t of t he fi r s t broadcast and am p l y provided A l i of not i ce t hereof . U nder th e f act s of t h i s

case, A li is n o t e n title d to rel y on t he dis covery rul e , and A l i ’ s sui t fi l ed against Fo x on A pri l 18, 1994, m ore t han si x t een

m o n ths after t h e sec o n d b roa d c ast, is barred by the o n e -ye ar stat ute o f l i m i t ati o n s . 
6

 A l i ’ s 42 U. S . C . § 1983 act i o n i s l i kew i se bar red f or t he reas ons st a t ed abo ve, beca use suc h act i on m ust be

f i l ed w i t h i n one yea r af t e r t he ca use of act i on acc r ues . T. C . A . § 28- 3 - 104 ( a ) ( 3 ) .

T h e sec o n d issue for rev iew is:

2 . W het her t he t r i a l court err ed i n grant i ng D efe ndan t Fo x a fi nal j udg m ent und e r

Tenn. R . C i v . P. 54?

S o m e t i m e af t e r t he t r i a l cour t gr ant ed s u m m a r y j udgm ent t o Fox, t he or der w a s m ade f i nal pur sua n t t o

Tenn . R . C i v . P . 54. 02. A l i contends t hat t he entr y of f i nal j udg m ent w as i m proper s i nce t he t r i a l j udg e t hat ent ere d fi nal

j udgm ent , Judge Johns on, w a s di f f e r ent t han t h e tr ial judg e tha t gran ted su m m ary judg m e n t , Jud g e S e e ley. A l i also

a l l eges t hat Judge John son should have recused h i m s e lf from t he case due to bi as and con f l i c t s of i n t ere s t s ; nam e l y A l i

ass ert s t hat Judge John son i s r e l a t ed t o and repr esent ed A l i ’ s w i fe bef ore becom i ng a judge. 

T enn. R. Civ. P. 54. 02 p rovi des i n pert i nent par t :

W hen m ore t han one clai m for rel i ef i s pr esent i n an acti on, w het her as a cl a i m ,

coun t erc l a i m , cros s - c l a i m , or t h i rd par t y cl a i m , or w hen m u l t i p l e part i es ar e

i nvol ved, t he cou r t , w het her at l a w or i n equ i t y , m ay dir ect t he en try o f fi nal

j udgm ent as t o one or m o r e but f e w e r t han al l of t h e cl a i m s or par t i e s onl y upon

a n express det erm i nat i on that t here i s no j ust r eas on f o r del a y an d u p o n a n e x p ress

d i r ect i on f o r t he ent r y of j udgm ent .

A s m ent i oned previ ousl y , t he t r i a l cour t pr oper l y gr ant ed s u m m a r y j udgm ent t o Fox. B eca use “no j ust r eas on f o r del ay”

exi s t ed, th e tria l cour t cor r ect l y m ade t h e or der a f i nal j udgm ent . Id. A l i ’s c o n ten t i o n s a re w h o l l y w i t h o u t m erit. A l i ’ s

volunt ary nonsui t di d not appl y t o Fo x , si nce fi nal j udg m ent had b een ent e r ed on beha l f of Fox bef o r e A l i t ook a nons u i t .

T h e thi rd issue fo r review is:

3 . W het her t he t r i a l court err ed i n i m posi ng sancti ons against pl a i n t i f f ?

A fte r Al i nonsui t e d h is cl aim ag ainst t h e rem aining de fen d a nts, M o o re m o v e d for R ule 1 1 sa n c t i o n s . T his

request w a s w i t hdr a w n on t he dat e of t he hea r i ng. The t r i a l cour t , never t hel e s s , ent e r ed an or der per m anent l y enj o i n i n g

A l i fr o m filin g pro se a c tio n s in th e F irs t J u d i c i a l D i s tri c t. T h e tri a l c o u rt, h o w ever, appo i n t e d a l ocal at t o r ney t o

repr esent A l i for any p o t ent i a l m eri t ori ous cl a i m s t hat m ay ari se i n t he fut ure.

N o t w i t hst andi n g t he l audab l e object i ve of t he t r i a l cour t ’ s order , w e fi nd that such an o rder vi o l a t es t he op e n

c o urts prov isi o n of the T e n n e ssee C o n sti tut ion. T e n n. C o n st. A r t . I, § 1 7, w hich stat es:

T hat al l cour t s s hal l be open; and eve r y m an, f o r an i n j u r y done hi m i n hi s l ands ,

goods, per son or r eput a t i on, sha l l have r e m edy by due cou r s e of l a w , and r i ght

and j ust i ce a d m i n i s t e r ed w i t hout sa l e , deni a l , or del ay. . . .

Id.; See Whitaker v. Whitaker, 957 S. W . 2d 834, 838- 39 ( Tenn. A pp. 1997) .

T h e or der of t he t r i a l cour t enj o i n i ng def endant f r o m f i l i ng any pr o se act i on i s va cat ed. The orde r of t h e tria l

cou r t i n all o the r res p e c ts is affirm e d . T h is ca s e is rem a n d e d to th e trial c o u rt for s u c h fu rthe r p r o c e e d ing s a s a r e
7

necessar y . C ost s on app eal are ass ess ed against t he app e l l ant .

_________________________________

W. FRANK CRAWFORD, 

PRESIDING JUDGE, W.S.

CONCUR:

____________________________________

ALAN E. HIGHERS, JUDGE

____________________________________

DAVID R. FARMER, JUDGE