[Cite as In re Adoption of J.M.M. , 2021-Ohio-775.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT HENRY COUNTY

IN RE: THE ADOPTION OF: CASE NO. 7-20-06 J.M.M., O P I N I O N [THOMAS B. - APPELLANT]

IN RE: THE ADOPTION OF: CASE NO. 7-20-07 J.N.M., O P I N I O N [THOMAS B. - APPELLANT]

Appeals from Henry County Common Pleas Court Probate Division Trial Court Nos. 20195004 and 20195005 Judgments Affirmed Date of Decision: March 15, 2021

APPEARANCES:



### Todd B. Guelde for Appellant 

### Jennifer N. Brown for AppelleeCase Nos. 7-20-06, 7-20-07

-2- ZIMMERMAN, J. {¶1} Petitioner-appellant, Thomas J. Brissey (“Thomas”), appeals the decision of the Henry County Court of Common Pleas, Probate Division, concl uding that the consent of respondent-appellee, Daniel Lester Mohr (“Daniel”), to Thoma s’s petitions to adopt J.M.M. and J.N.M. (collectively “the twins”) is necessary. Fo r the reasons that follow, we

affirm. {¶2} J.M.M. and J.N.M. were born in 2009 to Daniel and Sandra Kay Co mstock nka Skyelynn Sandra Kay Brissey (“Skyelynn”). 1 (July 8, 2020 Tr. at 6); (Case No. 20195004, Doc. Nos. 1, 2, 4); (Case No. 20195005, Doc. No. 1, 2, 4). Dan iel was listed as the father

on both J.M.M.’s and J.N.M.’s birth certificates. 2 (Case No. 20195004, Doc. No. 3); (Case No. 20195005, Doc. No. 3). Although Daniel and Skyelynn had b een married previously, they were not married at the time their twins were born. 3 (Case No. 20195004, Doc. No. 16); (Case No. 20195005, Doc. No. 15). {¶3} Skyelynn and Thomas were married in 2018. (Case No. 20195004, Doc. Nos. 1, 16); (Case No. 20195005, Doc. Nos. 1, 15). On November 14, 2019, Thomas filed

1 Skyelynn is aka Sandra Kay Russell, Skyelynn Sandra-Kay Russe ll, Sandra Kay Brissey, and Skylar Sandra Kay Brissey; Daniel referenced Skyelynn as “Sandy” in his text mess ages and throughout his testimony. (July 8, 2020 Tr. at 4, 13-14); (Case No. 20195004, Doc. Nos. 1, 2, 16); (Case No . 20195005, Doc. Nos. 1, 2, 15). 2 The twins have a whole-blood sibling (Danny age 26) born to Da niel and Skyelynn. (July 8, 2020 Tr. at 37-38, 48); (Case No. 20195004, Doc. No. 16); (Case No. 20195005, Doc. No. 15). 3 Notably, Skyelynn was married to Richard Comstock Jr. (“Richar d”), her third former spouse, when the twins were born. (July 8, 2020 Tr. at 48-49); (Case No. 20195004, Doc. No . 16); (Case No. 20195005, Doc. No. 15). Because the trial court’s record does no t contain a divorce decree or i nformation related to whether the establishment of paternity was rebutted by Daniel under R.C. 3111.03, we cannot glean from the record whether Richard should have been served in the instant action (as the presumptive-natural f ather), and whether his consent to adopt may be have been necessitated under R.C. 3107.07.Case Nos. 7-20-06, 7-20-07

-3- petitions to adopt J.M.M. and J.N.M. in the trial court. (Case No. 20195004, Doc. No. 1); (Case No. 20195005, Doc. No. 1). In his petitions, Thomas asse rts that Daniel’s consent to the adoptions is not necessary because he “* * * has failed without justifiable cause to provide more than de minimis contact with the minor for a perio d of at least one year immediately preceding the filing of the adoption petition or th e placement of the minor in the home of the petitioner.” (Case No. 20195004, Doc. No. 1); (Case No. 20195005, Doc. No. 1). Skyelynn consented to Thomas’s adoption of the childre n on November 14, 2019. (Case No. 20195004, Doc. No. 1); (Case No. 20195005, Doc . No. 1). The one-year “look back” period as to Daniel’s contact with the children at issue in these adoptions is November 15, 2018 to November 14, 2019. {¶4} On January 29, 2020, Daniel filed pro se letters objecting to the adoptions on

the basis that he had been denied access to the children for a 12-month period. 4 (Case No. 20195004, Doc. No. 15); (Case No. 20195005, Doc. No. 14). Late r, Daniel (when represented by counsel) filed objections to the petitions and a denial of consent abandonment denying the allegations in Thomas’s petitions. (Ca se No. 20195004, Doc. Nos. 20, 23); (Case No. 20195005, Doc. Nos. 18, 21). The trial court rescheduled the matter for a “consent not required” hearing on July 8, 2020 to give Daniel’s counsel time

4 Daniel was incarcerated at the Corrections Center of Northwest Ohio when the adoption petitions were filed. (Case No. 20195004, Doc. Nos. 15, 16, 21, 28); (Case No. 20195005, Do c. No. 14, 15, 19, 26).Case Nos. 7-20-06, 7-20-07

-4- to prepare. 5 (Case No. 20195004, Doc. Nos. 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27); (Case No. 20195005, Doc. No. 22, 23, 24, 25). {¶5} After conducting the “consent not required” hearing, the trial court issued an order requiring the parties to provide proposed findings of fac t and applicable case law, which the parties timely filed. (July 8, 2020 Tr. at 62-63); ( Case No. 20195004, Doc. Nos. 30, 31, 32, 33); (Case No. 20195005, Doc. Nos. 28, 29, 30, 31). Thereafter, trial court filed its entry on August 14, 2020 finding that justifiable cause exi sts for Daniel’s failure to provide more than de minimis contact with the twins and ordered that Daniel’s consent was required for the adoptions to proceed. (Case No. 20195004, Doc . No. 34); (Case No. 20195005, Doc. No. 32). {¶6} Thomas filed his notice of appeal in each case on September 11, 2020, and we have consolidated these cases for purposes of our review. (Cas e No. 20195004, Doc. No. 35); (Case No. 7-20-06, JE Sept. 28, 2020); (Case No. 20195005, Doc. No. 33); (Case No. 7-20-07, JE Sept. 28, 2020). He raises one assignment of error in each appeal. Assignment of Error The Probate Court’s Decision That Appellee’s Consent To Adoptio n Is Required Because Appellee Had Justifiable Cause For The Failure To Provide More Than De Minimis Contact With The Minor Children Is Against The Manifest Weight Of The Evidence.

5 Daniel was not permitted to appear in person as a result of th e Covid-19 pandemic; nevertheless, he appeared via video conference from the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction Correctional R eception Center in Orient, Ohio. (July 8, 2020 Tr. at 2, 48); (Case No. 20195004, Doc. No . 28); (Case No. 20195005, Doc. No. 26).Case Nos. 7-20-06, 7-20-07

-5- {¶7} In his sole assignment of error, Thomas argues The trial court erred by determining that Daniel’s consent to the adoptions is required. Specifically, Thomas argues that the trial court erred by concluding that Daniel had justifiable cause for failing to provide more than de minimis contact with his twins for one year immediately preceding the filing of the adoption petitions, and that such determinati on is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Standard of Review {¶8} “‘Ordinarily, the written consent of a minor child’s natural pa rents is required prior to adoption, but R.C. 3107.07 provides exceptions to this requirement.’” In re Adoption of H.R. , 3d Dist. Logan No. 8-14-15, 2014-Ohio-5390, ¶ 23, quoting In re Adoption of K.C. , 3d Dist. Logan No. 8-14-03, 2014-Ohio-3985, ¶ 20. Specifical ly, R.C.

3107.07 states: {¶9} Consent to adoption is not required of any of the following: (A) A parent of a minor, when it is alleged in the adoption petitio n and the court, after proper service of notice and hearing, finds by cle ar and convincing evidence that the parent has failed without justifia ble cause to provide more than de minimis contact with the minor or to provi de for the maintenance and support of the minor as required by law or judi cial decree for a period of at least one year immediately preceding either the filing of the adoption petition or the placement of the minor in the home of the petitioner. R.C. 3107.07(A). “‘R.C. 3107.07(A) is written in the disjuncti ve.’” In re Adoption of H.R. at ¶ 23, quoting In re Adoption of K.C. at ¶ 21. “‘Therefore, a failure without justifiable cause to provide either more than de minimis contact with the minor or maintenance andCase Nos. 7-20-06, 7-20-07

-6- support for the one-year time period is sufficient to obviate t he need for a parent’s consent.’” (Emphasis sic.) Id. , quoting In re Adoption of K.C. at ¶ 21, citing In re Adoption of A.H. , 9th Dist. Lorain No. 12CA010312, 2013-Ohio-1600, ¶ 9. {¶10} “Because cases such as this one may involve the termination of fundamental parental rights, the party petitioning for adoption has the bur den of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that the parent failed to provide more tha n de minimis contact with the minor or failed to provide for the maintenance and support of the minor during the requisite one-year period and that there was no justifiable cau se for the failure.” Id. at ¶ 24, citing In re Adoption of K.C. at ¶ 24, citing In re R.L.H. , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25734, 2013-Ohio-3462, ¶ 9. “‘“Once the petitioner has establi shed this failure, the burden of going forward shifts to the parent to show some facially jus tifiable cause for the failure. * * * The burden of proof, however, remains with the petitioner .”’” Id. , quoting In re

R.L.H. at ¶ 9, quoting In re A.N.B. , 12th Dist. Preble No. CA2012-04-006, 2012-Ohio3880, ¶ 10. ‘Clear and convincing evidence is that measure or degree of pro of which is more than a mere “preponderance of the evidence,” but not to th e extent of such certainty as is required “beyond a reasonable doubt” in cr iminal cases, and which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.’

Id. , quoting Cross v. Ledford , 161 Ohio St. 469 (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus, and citing In re Adoption of K.C. at ¶ 24. AnalysisCase Nos. 7-20-06, 7-20-07

-7- {¶11} “‘The Supreme Court of Ohio has articulated a two-step analysis for probate courts to employ when applying R.C. 3107.07(A).’” Id. at ¶ 25, quoting In re Adoption of

K.C. at ¶ 23, citing In re Adoption of M.B. , 131 Ohio St.3d 186, 2012-Ohio-236, ¶ 23. “The first step involves deciding a factual question—in this case, w hether the parent failed to provide more than de minimis contact with the minor or failed t o provide for the maintenance and support of the minor for a period of at least o ne year immediately preceding the filing of the adoption petition.” Id. , citing In re Adoption of K.C. at ¶ 23, citing In re R.L.H. at ¶ 12, citing In re Adoption of M.B. at ¶ 23. See also In re Adoption of S.J.M.H. , 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-130683, 2014-Ohio-3565, ¶ 29. “‘“A trial court has discretion to make these determinations, and in connection with the first step of the analysis, an appellate court applies an abuse-of-discretion sta ndard when reviewing a probate court decision * * *.”’” Id. , quoting In re Adoption of K.C. at ¶ 23, quoting In re Adoption of M.B. at ¶ 25. See also In re Adoption of S.J.M.H. at ¶ 29. “In the second step of the analysis, if a probate court finds the parent failed to provide more than de minimis contact or failed to provide for the maintenance and support of the minor, the court then determines ‘whether justifiable cause for the failure has been proved by clear and convincing evidence.’” Id. , quoting In re Adoption of M.B. at ¶ 23. See also In re Adoption of K.C. at ¶ 23. “‘A probate court’s decision on whether justifiable cause exists will not be disturbed on appeal unless the determination is against the man ifest weight of theCase Nos. 7-20-06, 7-20-07

-8- evidence.’” Id. , quoting In re Adoption of K.C. at ¶ 23, citing In re Adoption of M.B. at ¶

24 and In re Adoption of Masa , 23 Ohio St.3d 163 (1986), paragraph two of the syllabus. ‘In determining whether a judgment is against the manifest weig ht of the evidence, we must review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider witness credibility and determi ne whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact “clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice” that there must be a reversal of the judgment and an order for a new trial.’ In re Adoption of N.T.R. , 10th Dist. Franklin No. 16AP-589, 2017-Ohio-265, ¶ 11, citing In re Adoption of E.E.R.K. , 2d Dist. Miami No. 2013 CA 35, 2014-Ohio-1276, ¶ 18, quoting Stegall v. Crossman , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 20306, 2004-Ohio-4691, ¶ 29. {¶12} We begin by addressing the first step of the analysis and apply ing the appropriate standard of review—abuse of discretion. Our review of the record reveals that there was conflicting evidence regarding whether Daniel had con tact with the twins during the “look back” period. (July 8, 2020 Tr. at 24-25, 36-38, 40- 41, 44, 52, 54, 61-62). Indeed, the trial court determined, “[w]hile the issue of wheth er the Christmas present was delivered in 2016 or 2018 marked, ‘from Dad’ is disputed, the C ourt would not find Skyelynn[’s ] testimony on rebuttal ‘clear and convincing’ as t o when the present was delivered.” ( Id. at 61-62); (Case No. 20195004, Doc. No. 34); (Case No. 2019500 5, Doc. No. 32). According to the trial court: [w]hether the Christmas gift was delivered in December of 2016 or 2018, there would still remain the need to view the second prong, whe ther de minimis contact was justifiable by the interference of the othe r parent. The Court would go back to the June 29, 2018 meeting between Skyely nn [] and Daniel [] where she asked him to consent to adopt and he refuse d. SheCase Nos. 7-20-06, 7-20-07

-9- subsequently blocked him on Facebook and started to limit the [ twins] contact with Louise Mohr [their paternal grandmother]. Additio nally, it was only on rebuttal that Skyelynn [] testified that she now rememb ered that the gifts marked ‘from Dad’ were delivered in 2016 and not 2018. (Case No. 20195004, Doc. No. 34); (Case No. 20195005, Doc. No. 32). Thus, in our review of the record, we conclude that the trial court implicitly found that Thomas did not meet his burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence as to the first step of the analysis. Nevertheless, even if we were to assume without deci ding that Daniel failed to provide more than de minimis contact with the twins for the one -year period in question, Thomas’s argument fails because the trial court found that the second step of the analysis (i.e., whether justifiable cause existed as to lack of contact) determinative under the facts presented. {¶13} “‘“Ohio courts have held that justification of a parent’s failu re to

communicate with his or her child is shown when there has been ‘significant interference’ with a parent’s communication with a child or ‘significant disc ouragement’ of such

communication.”’” In re J.P.E. , 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2016-T-0113, 2017-Ohio-1108, ¶ 17, quoting In re M.E.M. , 11th Lake No. 2010-L-020, 2010-Ohio-4430, ¶ 29, quoting In re Kr.E., K.E., & A.E. , 9th Dist. Lorain No. 06CA008891, 2006-Ohio-4815, ¶ 21, citing In re Adoption of Holcomb , 18 Ohio St.3d 361 (1985), paragraph three of the syllabus. “ In determining whether a natural parent’s failure to have more tha n de minimis contact was justified, the central question is whether there was a signific ant interference with visitation and communication and not whether it was possible for the natur al parent to have doneCase Nos. 7-20-06, 7-20-07

-10- more to overcome the interference with visitation and communica tion.” Id. at ¶ 26, citing

In re S.B.D. , 2d Dist. Miami No. 2006-CA-25, 2006-Ohio-5133, ¶ 37. Here, u nder the second step of the analysis, the trial court determined that ju stifiable cause exists for

Daniel’s failure to have de minimis contact with the twins. Th us, we must decide whether such determination is against the manifest weight of the eviden ce under Thomas’s argument. {¶14} Thomas called Skyelynn as his first witness in his case-in-chie f. (July 8, 2020 Tr. at 4). Skyelynn testified she and Daniel lived together as a couple until their break-up in March 2013. ( Id. at 11-12). According to Skyelynn, this was the last time Dani el saw the twins. ( Id. ). Skyelynn testified that she met Daniel for lunch in June 20 18 to discuss Daniel’s request for contact with the twins. ( Id. at 11). They also discussed whether Daniel would consent to an adoption of the twins by Thomas. ( Id. ). Daniel refused. ( Id. ) However, Daniel and Skyelynn agreed to meet (with the twins pre sent) the following Tuesday (on July 3, 2018) at a neutral park per Daniel’s reques t for contact. ( Id. at 11-12, 17-18). Skyelynn testified that Daniel never followed up with her as to the location and time of this meeting, and thus the meeting never occurred. ( Id. at 17-18). Moreover, Skyelynn testified that the twins never received any letters, c ards, birthday or Christmas presents, or telephone calls from Daniel between November 2018 and November 2019. ( Id. at 19).Case Nos. 7-20-06, 7-20-07

-11- {¶15} On cross-examination, Skyelynn testified that she could not rec all if she “blocked” Daniel on Facebook between 2018 and 2019. ( Id. at 20-21). She also testified as to being familiar with the adoption process (as to consent) since she had requested Daniel, on multiple occasions, to give his consent to the adopt ion of their oldest child (Danny) to Skyelynn’s previous husband. ( Id. at 21-22). Moreover, Skyelynn testified that she stopped permitting Daniel’s mother, Ella Louise Mohr ( “Louise”) to visit with the

twins in late 2018 because she believed Louise would allow Dani el contact with them. ( Id. at 22-24). Skyelynn also stated that she did recall Louise dro pping off presents to the twins in December 2018. ( Id. at 24-25). {¶16} Next, Thomas testified in support of his adoption petitions. ( Id. at 25). Thomas testified that he and Skyelynn got married in March 2018 . ( Id. at 27). Thomas testified that he has never met Daniel, although he was aware t hat Daniel had texted Skyelynn in June 2018. ( Id. at 27-28). Further, Thomas was informed by Skyelynn that Daniel would not consent to the adoption, and that the two neve r had their follow-up meeting as discussed. ( Id. at 29). Moreover, Thomas testified that he did not recall whe ther Daniel ever sent cards or letters to the twins. ( Id. at 30). {¶17} On cross-examination, Thomas testified that both he and Skyelyn n were upset that Daniel refused to give consent Thomas’s adoption petitions . ( Id. ). Further, while Thomas was aware the twins received presents in December 2018, he wasn’t sure from whom the presents were sent. ( Id. at 31).Case Nos. 7-20-06, 7-20-07

-12- {¶18} Thomas rested his case, and Daniel called his mother, Louise (t he twins’ paternal grandmother) as his first witness. ( Id. at 32). Louise testified that she had known Skyelynn since 1992. ( Id. at 33). She testified that she had a good relationship with t hem and routinely visited with the twins prior to November 2018. ( Id. at 34). According to Louise, she tried to visit the twins in late 2018 through Novem ber 2019, but she was denied access to the twins because Skyelynn told her she was afraid th at she (Louise) would let Daniel have contact with them. ( Id. at 35). Nevertheless, Louise continued to try to maintain contact with the twins by bringing them gifts for the 2018 and 2019 holidays (i.e., Halloween, Christmas, and Valentine’s Day). ( Id. at 36). Although Louise wanted to deliver the gifts personally, Skyelynn would tell her that the twins were unavailable, and Louise was directed to leave the gifts on Skyelynn’s porch. ( Id. at 36-38). In December 2018, Louise, dropped off a bag containing Christmas presents f or the twins from Louise, Daniel, Danny, and other family members. ( Id. at 37-38). {¶19} On cross-examination, Louise testified that Daniel had personal ly wrapped his Christmas 2018 gifts (i.e., board games) for the twins at L ouise’s home prior to Louise’s delivery. ( Id. at 40-41). {¶20} Next, Daniel called his wife, Lisa Mohr (“Lisa”) as his second witness. ( Id. at 42-43). Lisa testified that she and Daniel had been married for two years, since 2018. ( Id. at 42-43, 45-46). Lisa testified that Daniel’s only form of c ommunication with Skyelynn was through Facebook, but he had been “blocked” by Sky elynn in 2018. ( Id. ).Case Nos. 7-20-06, 7-20-07

-13- Nonetheless, Lisa stated that Daniel continued to try to contac t the twins through mail by sending the twins a Christmas card with money. ( Id. at 44). {¶21} Finally, Daniel testified on his own behalf. ( Id. at 47). According to his testimony, he had been in a two-year drug-rehabilitation progra m preceding the filing of the adoption petitions. ( Id. at 49). He testified that after his release from rehab, he contacted Skyelynn to re-establish a relationship with the twin s. ( Id. at 50). Daniel testified that he and Skyelynn met for lunch and discussed his future con tact with the twins. ( Id. ). Daniel further testified that Skyelynn asked him to consent to adoption (which he refused). ( Id. at 50-51, 57). He also testified that they agreed to a meetin g at Kingsbury Park at noon on July 3, 2018. ( Id. ). However, Daniel stated that Skyelynn “blocked” him on Faceb ook and failed to show up at the park. {¶22} Further, Daniel testified he was concerned that if he called Sk yelynn or showed up at her residence she would alert law enforcement and have him arrested. ( Id. at 51-54). Daniel testified that he did send the twins Christmas gifts in December 2018. ( Id. at 54). {¶23} After Daniel rested his case, Thomas recalled Skyelynn to testi fy on rebuttal. ( Id. at 61). According to Skyelynn, the Christmas presents for the twins were actually received for Christmas 2016 and the Christmas cards appeared to be written in Louise’s handwriting. ( Id. at 61-62).Case Nos. 7-20-06, 7-20-07

-14- {¶24} With no further evidence being introduced, the trial court dete rmined that “Daniel could perhaps have been more assertive in attempting to have contact with J.M.M. and J.N.M., but it is clear Skyelynn [] would have resisted any attempts.” (Emphasis added.) (Case No. 20195004, Doc. No. 43); (Case No. 20195005, Doc. No. 32). {¶25} Thomas argues that because the June 29, 2018 meeting occurred o utside of the one-year “look back” period the trial court should not have considered that meeting in making its determinations as to justifiable cause. However, a probate court is not restricted to focusing solely on the one-year statutory period in making s uch a determination. See In the Matter of C.D.G. , 2d Dist. Montgomery Nos. 28664 and 28665, 2020-Ohio-2959, ¶ 1 5. Nonetheless, we conclude that justifiable cause may be demonstr ated by events either before or during the one-year prior to the filing of the petiti on or a combination of both. {¶26} Next, Thomas challenges the trial court’s determination that Sk yelynn’s conduct did not rise to level of significant interference so as to constitute justifiable cause. See In re Adoption of Holcomb , 18 Ohio St.3d 361 (1985), paragraph three of the syllabus (“Significant interference by a custodial parent with communica tion between the noncustodial parent and the child, or significant discouragement o f such communication, is required to establish justifiable cause for * * * failure to co mmunicate”). Importantly, the Supreme Court of Ohio has refused to adopt a “precise and infle xible meaning” for “justifiable cause,” but instead has stated that “the better-re asoned approach would be to leave to the probate court as finder of fact the question of wh ether or not justifiable causeCase Nos. 7-20-06, 7-20-07

-15- exists.” Id. at 367 (1985), citing In re Adoption of McDermitt , 63 Ohio St.2d 301 (1980). In this regard, the Supreme Court stressed that “[t]he probate court is in the best position to observe the demeanor of the parties, to assess their credibility, and to determine the

accuracy of their testimony.” (Emphasis added.) Id. {¶27} It is clear in our review of the record that the trial court de termined the issue of justifiable cause based on the credibility of the witnesses. Unquestionably, Skyelynn’s explanation of Daniel’s lack of contact with the twins is ultim ately a credibility determination, which is left to the sound discretion of the tri al court. “‘A trial court is “free to believe all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness w ho appears before it.”’” In re Adoption of K.C. , 2014-Ohio-3985, at ¶ 26, quoting In re Adoption of M.C. , 4th Dist. Jackson No. 11CA5, 2011-Ohio-6527, ¶ 19, quoting Rogers v. Hill , 124 Ohio App.3d 468, 470 (4th Dist.1998). See also In re J.P.E. , 2017-Ohio-1108, at ¶ 39. As such, we conclude that the evidence supporting that Skyelynn significantly interf ered with Daniel’s communication and visitation with the children is weightier tha n the evidence that she did

not. {¶28} Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court’s determination t hat justifiable cause exits for Daniel’s failure to provide more than de minimi s contact with the twins is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Specifically, we cannot say that the trial court lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of j ustice.Case Nos. 7-20-06, 7-20-07

-16- {¶29} For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the trial court did not err in concluding that Daniel’s consent to Thomas’s adoption of J.M.M. and J.N.M. is required under R.C. 3107.07(A). {¶30} Thomas’s assignment of error is overruled. {¶31} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in th e particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgments of the trial court

. Judgments Affirmed WILLAMOWSKI, P.J. and MILLER, J., concur. /jlr