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### STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

AMY LYNNE FUNK,

Plaintiff-Appellant, UNPUBLISHED April 2, 2015

v No. 319467
Calhoun Circuit Court Family Division MATTHEW JAMES FUNK, LC No. 13-000164-DM

Defendant-Appellee.

Before: W ILDER , P.J., and S ERVITTO and S TEPHENS , JJ.

P ER C URIAM

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Plaintiff appeals as of right from the parties’ judgment of di vorce, entered in the Family Division of Calhoun Circuit Court. The judgment of divorce pre served her right to appeal the prior venue decision of the Ingham Circuit Court. We affirm th e trial court’s grant of attorney fees and dismiss as moot plain tiff’s argument that venue was pr oper in Ingham County.

In October 2012, plaintiff filed a complaint for divorce in In gham County. In accordance with MCL 552.9, she asserted that she had been a continuous res ident of Michigan for at least 180 days and a resident of Ingham County for at least 10 days p rior to filing her complaint. Defendant’s attorney entered a special appearance in Ingham Cir cuit Court, arguing that venue did not lie in Ingham County. The trial court agreed with defe ndant and ordered plaintiff’s case transferred to Calhoun County. The trial court also awarded de fendant attorney fees pursuant to MCR 2.223(B)(1).

Plaintiff’s challenge to the venue decision of the Ingham Circ uit Court is moot. “As a general rule, an appellate court will not decide moot issues.” B P 7 v Bureau of State Lottery

, 231 Mich App 356, 359; 586 NW2d 117 (1998). “An issue is deeme d moot when an event occurs that renders it impossible for a reviewing court to gran t relief.” Id . However, this Court may nevertheless reach the moot question if “the issue is one o f public significance that is likely to recur, yet evade j udicial review.” Ryan v Ryan , 260 Mich App 315, 330; 677 NW2d 899 (2004). Here, there is no meaningful relief this Court can pro vide because the parties have already received their divorce. Further, the issue of proper v enue for a divorce action— something that typically affects only the parties to the divorc e and their minor c hildren—is not of significant public interest. Nor do the issues appear likely t o recur in the future and evade judicial review because the part ies’ consent judgment of divorc e has already been finalized.-2- Plaintiff’s argument that the trial court abused its discretio n in awarding attorney fees pursuant to MCR 2.223(B)(1) also involves the issue of venue. “The award of attorney fees in a
divorce action is within the trial court’s discretion.” Maake v Maake , 200 Mich App 184, 189; 503 NW2d 664 (1993). An abuse of discretion occurs when the tr ial court’s decision is “outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes.” In re Temple Marital Trust , 278 Mich App 122, 128; 748 NW2d 265 (2008).

MCR 2.223(B)(1) provides tha t if venue was improper:

The court shall order the change at the plaintiff’s cost, whic h shall include the statutory filing fee applicable to the court to which the a ction is transferred, and which may include reasonable compensation for the defendant ’s expense, including reasonable attorne y fees, in attendi ng in the wrong c ourt.

The use of the word “may” clearly indicates that the award of r easonable attorney fees is discretionary with t he trial court.

Plaintiff asserts the trial court abused this discretion becau se venue was proper in Ingham County and because her action was not frivolous. In Stamadianos v Stamadianos , 425 Mich 1, 14; 385 NW2d 604 (1986), the Supreme Court reversed this Court’ s determination that MCL 552.9 was a venue provision rather than a jurisdictional statut e. The Court expressly held “the ten-day county residency requirement of MCL 552.9 is a jurisdic tional and not a venue provision.” Id . at 13. Accordingly, plaintiff’s argument that MCL 552.9 prov ides for both the proper jurisdiction and proper ve nue of a divorce action is who lly without merit.

Further, plaintiff’s assertion that the general venue provisio n in MCL 600.1621 should not apply to divorce cases because it does not expressly mentio n divorce is without merit. MCL 600.1621 provides in pertinent part as follows:

Except for actions provided for in sections 1605 [real actions , replevin], 1611 [action on probate bond], 1615 [action against governmenta l units], and 1629 [tort and product liability ac tions], venue is determined as follows:

(a) The county in which a defendant resides , has a place of business, or conducts business, or in which the registered office of a defen dant corporation is located, is a proper county in whi ch to commence and try an act ion.

(b) If none of the defendants meet 1 or more of the criteria i n subdivision (a), the county in which a plain tiff resides or has a place of business, or in which the registered office of a plain tiff corporation is located, is a proper county in which to commence and try and action.

(c) An action against a fiduciary appointed by court order sha ll be commenced in the county in which the fiduciary was appointed. [Emphasis added.]

Based on the plain language of the statute, it is clear that ex cept for circumstances not applicable in this case, venue is governed by MCL 600.1621. Thus, althoug h there is not a specific-3- provision addressing divorce by name, MCL 600.1621’s catchall p rovision still applies to divorce cases. As such, venue in plaintiff’s case was proper i n Calhoun County because that was the county where defendant resides.

Accordingly, plaintiff’s position was frivolous because it was devoid of arguable legal merit. MCL 600.2591(3)(a)( iii ) (a party’s defense in a civil action is frivolous if it is “d evoid of arguable legal merit”). 1 The award of attorney fees was proper.

We affirm the trial court’s d ecision awarding defendant attorn ey fees, and dismiss as moot plaintiff’s venue challenge.

/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ Deborah A. Servitto /s/ Cynthia Diane Stephens

1 Plaintiff argues that there was arguable legal merit to her po sition because it is common practice to file a complaint for divorce in the county where th e plaintiff resides instead of the county where the defendant resides. However, the fact that man y attorneys and judges allegedly misapply MCL 552.9 does not somehow transform plaintiff’s argum ent into an issue with arguable legal merit.