Present: All the Justices 

VIRGINIA SOCIETY FOR HUMAN LIFE, 

 INCORPORATED, ET AL. 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 972659 JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 

 June 5, 1998 

DONALD S. CALDWELL, ATTORNEY FOR 

 THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA FOR 

 THE CITY OF ROANOKE, ETC., ET AL. 

UPON A QUESTION OF LAW CERTIFIED BY THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

 Pursuant to our Rule 5:42, the United States Court of 

Appeals for the Fourth Circuit certified a question of Virginia 

law to this Court which we accepted by order entered January 16, 

1998. The question involves the construction of various 

provisions of the Campaign Finance Disclosure Act (the Act), 

Code §§ 24.2-900 to -930, and Code § 24.2-1014, a penalty 

provision applicable to certain activities governed by the Act. 

 The Act, in pertinent part, requires certain individuals or 

organizations that give money and services of any amount, and 

any other thing of value over $100, “for the purpose of 

influencing the outcome of an election,” Code § 24.2-901, to 

file a statement of organization, Code § 24.2-908, and to report 

their expenditures toward that purpose to the State Board of 

Elections, Code § 24.2-910. In addition, any writing made “for 

the purpose of influencing the outcome of an election for public 

office” is required to include an identification of the author 
under Code § 24.2-1014. This statute further provides civil and 

criminal penalties for the failure to identify the author of 

such writings. 

 The following facts are set forth in the order of 

certification from the Court of Appeals. The Virginia Society 

for Human Life, Incorporated (VSHL) is a nonprofit organization 

that conducts issue advocacy by periodically preparing and 

distributing “voter guides” that do not expressly advocate the 

election or defeat of any candidate but, rather, state the views 

of candidates on public issues.1 In an initial 1995 complaint 

asserting that these statutes, as enacted prior to 1996, have 

been used in the past to impose unconstitutional prior 

restraints on issue advocacy, VSHL sought, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983, to bar their future enforcement through declaratory and 

injunctive relief from the United States District Court for the 

Western District of Virginia.2 VSHL contended that these 

statutes placed an impermissible burden on its First Amendment 

 

1

For purposes of this opinion, we adopt the assumption of 

the Fourth Circuit that VSHL “conducts only issue advocacy.” 

2

Andrea Sexton, a Virginia resident and a member of VSHL, 

was also a plaintiff in the suit. The suit was filed against 

Donald S. Caldwell, Attorney for the Commonwealth of Virginia 

for the City of Roanoke, in his official capacity as a 

representative of the class of Attorneys for the Commonwealth of 

Virginia, and Pamela M. Clark, Dr. George M. Hampton, Sr., and 

M. Bruce Meadows, in their official capacities as officers of 

the State Board of Elections. 

2
rights. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 78-80 (1976)(per 

curiam); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, 514 U.S. 334, 

357 (1995). 

 While the complaint was pending in the district court, the 

Virginia General Assembly enacted amendments to the specific 

statutes in question during its 1996 session. Following the 

filing of an amended complaint challenging these statutes as 

amended, the district court ruled that the current statutes 

could be narrowly construed so as to avoid any constitutional 

infirmity by limiting their application to individuals or 

organizations advocating the election or defeat of a clearly 

identified candidate. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 80. Based upon 

this construction of the statutes, the district court ruled that 

because VSHL engaged only in issue advocacy, it lacked standing 

to challenge the enforcement of the statutes and dismissed the 

suit on that ground. 

 VSHL appealed the ruling of the district court to the Court 

of Appeals which, seeking an authoritative construction of the 

statutes in question, certified the following question of law to 

this Court: 

Whether Va. Code Ann. §§ 24.2-901, -908, -910 & -1014 

apply to issue advocacy groups, or whether the use of 

the phrase “for the purpose of influencing the outcome 

of an election” and related phrases limits the 

application of those statutes to groups that expressly 

advocate the election or defeat of a particular 

candidate. 

3
 In light of certain concerns expressed in the order of 

certification and in order to conform to our policy of 

responding to certified questions in the affirmative or the 

negative, we will exercise our discretion under Rule 5:42(d) to 

restate the question as follows: 

Whether the use of the phrase “for the purpose of 

influencing the outcome of an election” in Code 

§§ 24.2-901, -908, -910, and –1014 may be narrowly 

construed to limit the application of those statutes 

to groups that expressly advocate the election or 

defeat of a clearly identified candidate. 

 Within the statement supporting the determinative nature of 

the certified question, Rule 5:42(b)(6), the Court of Appeals 

has expressed grave doubts as to the method used by the district 

court in arriving at the narrowing construction of these 

statutes. The district court found that the phrase “for the 

purpose of influencing the outcome of an election” as used in 

these statutes “is a term of art whose well-established meaning 

excludes issue advocacy” based upon the rationale of Buckley. 

 Citing Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 330 (1988), the Court 

of Appeals notes that federal courts may not “‘adopt a narrowing 

construction of a state statute unless such a construction is 

reasonable and readily apparent.’” Continuing, the Court of 

Appeals expressed doubts that a narrowing construction of these 

statutes is readily apparent and that the structure and history 

of the Act suggest that it applies to issue advocacy groups such 

4
as VSHL. The Court of Appeals correctly notes, however, that 

under the broader rules of statutory construction available in 

this Court we “may impose a narrowing construction upon these 

statutes if [we determine] that such a construction would be 

correct.” For the reasons that follow, we conclude that such is 

the case here. 

 The rules of statutory construction pertinent to our 

analysis here are firmly settled. Principal among these rules 

is that we determine, and adhere to, the intent of the 

legislature reflected in or by the statute being construed. As 

an initial and primary proposition, that intent is to be 

determined by the words in the statute. See Marsh v. City of 

Richmond, 234 Va. 4, 11, 360 S.E.2d 163, 167 (1987). Where the 

words used in the statute are not sufficiently explicit, we may 

determine the intent of the legislature “from the occasion and 

necessity of the statute being passed [or amended]; from a 

comparison of its several parts and of other acts in pari

materia; and sometimes from extraneous circumstances which may 

throw light on the subject.” Richmond v. Sutherland, 114 Va. 

688, 691, 77 S.E. 470, 471 (1913). 

 Additionally, when, as here, the constitutionality of a 

statute is challenged, our determination of legislative intent 

is guided by the recognition that “[a]ll actions of the General 

Assembly are presumed to be constitutional.” Hess v. Snyder 

5
Hunt Corp., 240 Va. 49, 52, 392 S.E.2d 817, 820 (1990). Thus, 

“a statute will be construed in such a manner as to avoid a 

constitutional question wherever this is possible." Eaton v. 

Davis, 176 Va. 330, 339, 10 S.E.2d 893, 897 (1940); see also

Jacobs v. Meade, 227 Va. 284, 287, 315 S.E.2d 383, 385 (1984). 

In this context, we will narrowly construe a statute where such 

a construction is reasonable and avoids a constitutional 

infirmity.3 Pedersen v. City of Richmond, 219 Va. 1061, 1065, 

254 S.E.2d 95, 98 (1979). 

 The parties do not dispute, and it is readily apparent, 

that absent a narrowing construction of the phrase “for the 

purpose of influencing the outcome of an election” as used by 

the General Assembly in the statutes in question, these statutes 

would apply to individuals and groups that engage solely in 

issue advocacy, and, thus, would be unconstitutionally 

 

3

VSHL asserts that without an ambiguity in the language of 

the statutes in question we may not resort to extrinsic aids of 

construction. See Wall v. Fairfax County School Board, 252 Va. 

156, 159, 475 S.E.2d 803, 805 (1996). This assertion is without 

merit in the present case. While an ambiguity of language may 

serve as the basis for rejecting an unconstitutional 

interpretation of a statute in favor of one that survives 

constitutional scrutiny, see, e.g., Miller v. Commonwealth, 172 

Va. 639, 648, 2 S.E.2d 343, 347 (1939), a finding of ambiguity 

is not a prerequisite for applying a narrowing construction to 

preserve a statute’s constitutionality. To the contrary, we may 

construe the plain language of a statute to have limited 

application if such a construction will tailor the statute to a 

constitutional fit. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 520 

(1972). 

6
overbroad. However, a narrowing construction is reasonable 

because it is consistent with the manner in which the United 

States Supreme Court construed very similar federal election 

statutes in Buckley. Moreover, a narrowing construction avoids 

a constitutional infirmity and is consistent with the 

legislative intent that we are able to determine from the words 

used by the General Assembly under the circumstances existing at 

the time these statutes were enacted or amended. 

 Each of the statutes in question has either been enacted or 

amended subsequent to the decision in Buckley. Without 

question, the General Assembly is presumed to have knowledge of 

decisions of the United States Supreme Court on constitutional 

issues that bind actions of the states when enacting statutes 

that potentially invoke such issues. Accordingly, here the 

General Assembly is presumed to have had knowledge that the 

Buckley decision narrowly construed the phrase “for the purpose 

of influencing” as used in federal election laws to apply only 

to expenditures used to advocate the election or defeat of a 

clearly identified candidate and, thus, to exclude groups that 

engage solely in issue advocacy. Similarly, that presumption of 

knowledge extends to the more recent McIntyre decision that a 

state statute cannot constitutionally prohibit anonymous issue 

advocacy by groups that engage solely in issue advocacy. 

7
 Additionally, the General Assembly, when amending a 

statute, is presumed to have knowledge of the Attorney General’s 

interpretation of that statute in its existing form. See Lee 

Gardens Arlington Limited Partnership v. Arlington County Board, 

250 Va. 534, 540, 463 S.E.2d 646, 649 (1995). In 1995, the 

Attorney General, in response to an inquiry concerning the 

constitutionality of Code § 24.2-1014 in light of the McIntyre

decision, issued a formal opinion, consistent with prior 

opinions on related issues, expressly construing the phrase “for 

the purpose of influencing” as having the same definition as 

that adopted in Buckley. See 1995 Op. Va. Att’y Gen. 170. 

 In light of the General Assembly’s knowledge of the 

opinions in Buckley and McIntyre and the Attorney General’s 

opinion adopting a narrowing construction of the broad sweep of 

the phrase “for the purpose of influencing” at the time the 

General Assembly enacted or amended the statutes in question, we 

conclude that the General Assembly intended to limit that phrase 

and related phrases so as to have no application to individuals 

or groups that engage solely in issue advocacy and that do not 

expressly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly 

identified candidate. 

 We now consider the effect of this narrowing construction 

on each of the statutes in question. In doing so we will 

8
address only those provisions of the Act pertinent to the 

present case. 

 Code § 24.2-901(A) provides definitions for various terms 

used throughout the Act that control the meaning of specific 

sections. “Contribution” is defined as “money . . . given . . . 

for the purpose of influencing the outcome of an election” and 

“Expenditure” is defined as “money . . . paid . . . for the 

purpose of influencing the outcome of an election.” 

“Independent expenditure” is defined as “an expenditure made by 

any person or political committee which is not made to . . . a 

candidate” or generally on behalf of a candidate. “Political 

committee” is defined as a “person or group of persons which 

receives contributions or makes expenditures for the purpose of 

influencing the outcome of any election.” 

 We first apply these definitions to Code § 24.2-908, which 

requires a “political committee which anticipates receiving 

contributions or making expenditures in excess of $200 in a 

calendar year” to file a statement of organization with the 

State Board of Elections. As narrowly construed, a group that 

engages solely in issue advocacy and does not receive 

“contributions” or make “expenditures” to expressly advocate the 

election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate is not a 

“political committee” as defined in Code § 24.2-901(A), and, 

consequently, is not included in the mandate of Code § 24.2-908. 

9
The same rationale applies to the provisions of Code § 24.2-

910(B) that require any group that “is not a political committee 

and who makes independent expenditures” to report these 

expenditures to the State Board of Elections. An “independent 

expenditure” contemplated by this section and as defined in Code 

§ 24.2-901(A) excludes expenditures made solely for issue 

advocacy.4 Similarly, Code § 24.2-1014, when narrowly construed 

in this manner, requires identification of authorship only on 

writings “made for the purpose of influencing the outcome of an 

election for public office” and excludes writings that are 

limited to issue advocacy. 

 Finally, we consider the terms of Code § 24.2-901(B) that 

have evoked express concerns by the Court of Appeals in its 

order of certification and are asserted by VSHL to prohibit the 

narrowing construction we adopt in this case. For the purpose 

of applying the filing requirements of Code § 24.2-908 and the 

reporting requirements of Code § 24.2-910, Code § 24.2-901(B) 

expressly excludes from the definition of a “political 

committee” “an organization holding tax-exempt status under 

§ 501(c)(3) of the United States Internal Revenue Code which, in 

providing information to voters, does not advocate or endorse 

 

4

Because we construe Code § 24.2-910(B) to exclude 

expenditures made solely for issue advocacy, we find no 

inconsistency in the language of subsections (B)(1) and (B)(2). 

10
the election or defeat of a particular candidate, group of 

candidates, or the candidates of a particular political party.” 

 Citing the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, 

that is, the expression of one thing is the exclusion of 

another, the Court of Appeals questions whether this express 

statement would not result in the definition of a “political 

committee” necessarily including organizations, such as VSHL, 

which do not have § 501(c)(3) status, but which nonetheless 

provide information to voters that “does not advocate or endorse 

the election or defeat of a particular candidate, group of 

candidates, or the candidates of a particular political party.”5 

Assuming that this is a correct application of this maxim of 

construction, it does not preclude the application of a 

narrowing construction to the definition of a “political 

committee” as contemplated by the General Assembly. Thus, we 

conclude that even if organizations lacking § 501(c)(3) status, 

such as VSHL, are subsumed within that definition, under the 

narrowing construction such groups would be subject to its 

application elsewhere in the Act only if their activities were 

to exceed the bounds of issue advocacy. 

 

5

VSHL does enjoy tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(4) of the 

United States Internal Revenue Code. 

11
 Accordingly, we hold that the phrase “for the purpose of 

influencing the outcome of an election,” as used in Code 

§§ 24.2-901, -910, and –1014, as well as its implication for 

terms used in Code § 24.2-908, may be narrowly construed to 

limit the application of those statutes to groups that expressly 

advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified 

candidate. 

Certified question answered in the affirmative. 

12