J-A26012-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

CHANEL GLOVER 

Appellant

v.

NICOLE JUNIOR

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1369 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Order Entered May 4, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Domestic Relations 

at No(s): D22048480

BEFORE: BOWES, J., KING, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

DISSENTING MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 24, 2023

I believe that Ms. Junior established a contract-based right to parentage, 

as evidenced by the couple’s collective intent and shared cost in conceiving a 

child with her wife, Ms. Glover, via assisted reproductive technology. 

Alternatively, I believe Ms. Junior established her parentage as a matter of 

equity. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 

The learned majority succinctly summarized the relevant facts and 

procedural history. Accordingly, I do not reiterate them herein. Similarly, the 

majority explained that while parentage is typically established biologically or 

through formal adoption, our High Court has recognized that in cases involving 

assistive reproductive technology, “contracts regarding the parental status of 

the biological contributors must be honored in order to prohibit restricting a 

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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person’s reproductive options.” Majority Memorandum at 7 (quoting C.G. v. 

J.H., 193 A.3d 891, 903-04 (Pa. 2018) (cleaned up). As acknowledged by 

the High Court, “[t]here is nothing to suggest in our case law that two partners 

in a same-sex couple could not similarly identify themselves each as intended 

parents, notwithstanding the fact that only one party would be biologically 

related to the child.” Id. at 904, n.11. 

While my esteemed colleagues delineate the relative contractual 

obligations outlined between the parties in the Fairfax Cryobank Agreement

that identified Junior as the “co-intended Parent” and the couple’s in vitro

fertilization (“IVF”) agreement with RMA Fertility, that Junior executed as the 

“Partner,” it did not address the contract between Mss. Junior and Glover

concerning parentage—as cogently outlined in the trial court’s comprehensive 

discussion of the party’s mutual intent to establish Ms. Junior’s parentage. 

See Trial Court Opinion, 8/1/22 at 9-10 (“Based upon the undisputed evidence 

presented, the [c]ourt determined that it conclusively established that the 

parties, a married couple, formed a binding agreement for Junior, as a nonbiologically[-]related intended parent, to assume the status of legal parent to 

the [c]hild [conceived] through the use of assistive reproductive 

technology.”). 

As this Court recognized in Reformed Church of the Ascension v. 

Hooven & Sons, Inc., 764 A.2d 1106, 1109 (Pa.Super. 2000), “[t]he policy 

behind contract law is to protect the parties’ expectation interests by putting 

the aggrieved party in as good a position as he would have been had the 
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contract been performed.” (citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 344(a) 

(1979) (approved in Trosky v. Civil Service Commission, 652 A.2d 813, 

817 (Pa. 1995)). Whether oral or written, a contract requires three essential

elements: (1) mutual assent; (2) consideration; and (3) sufficiently definite

terms. Helpin v. Trustees of Univ. of Pennsylvania, 969 A.2d 601, 

610 (Pa.Super. 2009). 

Furthermore,

[a]n agreement is expressed with sufficient clarity if the parties 

intended to make a contract and there is a reasonably certain 

basis upon which a court can provide an appropriate remedy. 

Accordingly, not every term of a contract must always be stated 

in complete detail. If the parties have agreed on the essential 

terms, the contract is enforcible even though recorded only in an 

informal memorandum that requires future approval or 

negotiation of incidental terms. In the event that an essential 

term is not clearly expressed in their writing but the parties’ intent 

concerning that term is otherwise apparent, the court may infer 

the parties’ intent from other evidence and impose a term 

consistent with it.

Id. (cleaned up) (quotations and citations omitted). 

Instantly, as highlighted by the trial court, the certified record is replete 

with evidence of the parties’ mutual assent to conceive a child of their 

marriage using assisted reproductive technology, bestow upon Ms. Junior legal 

parent status, and to raise the child together as co-parents. See Trial Court 

Opinion, 8/1/22, at 9-10. Moreover, unlike the facts that the Supreme Court 

confronted in C.G. supra, where “[t]here was no dispute that [the former 

same-sex partner] was not party to a contract or identified as an intendedparent[,]” Ms. Junior satisfied both these components. In my mind, the only 
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question is whether the oral agreement was supported by consideration or 

some other form of validation. For the reasons that follow, I would find that 

it was. 

As our Supreme Court explained in Pennsylvania Envtl. Def. Found. 

v. Commonwealth, 255 A.3d 289, 305 (Pa. 2021), “Consideration is defined

as a benefit to the party promising, or a loss or detriment to the party to 

whom the promise is made.” (citations omitted). 

During the evidentiary hearing on Ms. Junior’s petition, Ms. Junior 

testified that she paid for one-half of all the expenses, including fees 

associated with the preliminary medical tests, in vitro fertilization, and hiring 

a doula to assist Ms. Glover during the birth. N.T., 5/3/22, at 17, 44. When

asked about the extent of the equally shared costs, Ms. Junior declared, 

“Everything: the IVF, the doula, the second parent adoption, everything. 

Everything.” Id. at 44. 

Ms. Junior also described her shared emotional role, noting how, for 

three months, she was required to administer daily fertility injections into 

Ms. Glover’s abdomen in anticipation of having her eggs removed for 

fertilization. Id. at 18-19. After the pregnancy was confirmed, Ms. Junior 

administered daily dosages of progesterone to help prevent miscarriages. Id. 

at 19. Additionally, she regularly accompanied Ms. Glover to the obstetrician. 

Id. at 20. In sum, she described their collective preparations as follows:

But every week, we would have to go to RMA for more 

bloodwork just to make sure the progesterone levels were correct, 
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that everything was coming along [as planned], and also doing 

sonograms.

And then, finally, we had completed [the assisted 

reproductive technology]. Like I said, I gave the injections for 

over three months, but now we were able to go to directly to 

Thomas Jefferson, who we decided together would be our OB. 

That’s where we would give birth.

. . . .

So, for a year, this was a constant -- for the entire year of 2021, 

us bringing our child into the world was a constant in our lives.

Although he – we weren’t pregnant before July, he was still 

part of our family because we were doing everything we could 

every week to make sure that we had him. And then once we 

conceived, we were doing everything we could every day for the 

. . . remainder of the year to make sure that he stayed with us 

through these injections, through going to the hospital, making 

sure he was okay, monitoring his heart, hearing his heartbeat, so

forth and so on. 

I’m sorry I was long-winded, but really, it was a very long 

process, and I was there for every step of it.

Id. at 21-20.

Ms. Glover not only agreed to the shared financial and emotional 

burdens, she continued to assent to the arrangement even after doubting 

whether she was still committed to co-parenting with Ms. Junior. Id. at 59. 

Ms. Glover addressed this apparent dichotomy during the evidentiary hearing 

in explaining why, despite her apprehensions about continuing her romantic 

relationship with Ms. Junior, she nevertheless executed the fertility contracts 

identifying Ms. Junior as a co-parent rather than proceeding alone or forgoing

the IVF program entirely: “I could’ve moved forward without having to do the 
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[IVF] program. . . . “Financially—it was the best decision.” Id. at 65. Hence, 

the certified record bears out that, in exchange for the consideration of the 

shared emotional burden and equally divided financial cost of the assistive 

reproductive procedure and birth, Ms. Glover agreed that her spouse, 

Ms. Junior, would possess parental rights to the child conceived through their 

combined efforts.

In my view, the foregoing exchange of promises is not so vague or 

ambiguous to preclude a legal contract because one of the parties did not 

expect legal consequences to flow from their agreement. Indeed, in rejecting 

Ms. Glover’s protestation that she, in fact, did not intend to bestow any legal 

rights upon Ms. Junior, the trial court was incredulous. It proclaimed, “[t]o 

the extent that Glover alleges she[, an attorney,] was unable to legally 

consent to a contract or understand the terms of the contracts that she signed, 

these allegations are either unproven, not credible [or] waived as she has not

raised the same on appeal.” Trial Court Opinion, 8/1/22, at 10. 

The certified record sustains the trial court’s credibility assessment. 

Indeed, approximately five months after Ms. Glover initiated the IVF program 

with Ms. Junior’s financial contributions and emotional support, Ms. Glover 

ratified the couple’s arrangement by executing a December 2021 affidavit, 

which noted the then-anticipated adoption and further endorsed Ms. Glover’s 

desire for Ms. Junior to “become a legal parent, with rights equal to

[Ms. Glover’s] rights as a biological parent.” Glover Affidavit, 12/2/21, at 1 ¶ 
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4. The affidavit continued, “I want Nicole Shawan Junior to become a legal 

parent to this child because I believe it is in the best interest of the child.” Id. 

at ¶10. In light of Ms. Glover’s recurring statements of assent, I share the 

trial court’s skepticism that Ms. Glover did not comprehend the extent of the 

agreement. 

Thus, as outlined supra, I believe Ms. Junior has an enforceable right to 

parentage under principles of contract. The certified record demonstrates the 

parties’ mutual assent, actions in furtherance of the agreement, and 

consideration. Accordingly, I respectfully disagree with the majority’s 

determination that no enforceable contract conferred parental rights on 

Ms. Junior. 

Furthermore, even if Ms. Junior did not have a contractual right to 

parentage, I believe that she warranted relief under the court’s equitable 

power. Phrased differently, I would find that Ms. Glover’s actions and 

representations regarding the child’s anticipated parentage were grounds 

under the doctrine of equitable estoppel to preclude her from challenging 

Ms. Junior’s parentage. My reasoning follows.

Equitable estoppel binds a party to the implications created by their 

words, deeds or representations. In L.S.K. v. H.A.N., 813 A.2d 872, 877 

(Pa.Super. 2002), we explained,

Equitable estoppel applies to prevent a party from assuming a 

position or asserting a right to another’s disadvantage inconsistent 

with a position previously taken. Equitable estoppel, reduced to 

its essence, is a doctrine of fundamental fairness designed to 
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preclude a party from depriving another of a reasonable 

expectation when the party inducing the expectation albeit 

gratuitously knew or should have known that the other would rely 

upon that conduct to his detriment. 

Id. (cleaned up).

With this principle in mind, I detail the following evidence regarding 

estoppel. Herein, Ms. Glover represented over a thirteen-month period that 

she intended to share parentage of the couple’s child conceived through 

assisted reproductive technology. As previously discussed, Ms. Glover

contracted with Fairfax Cryobank and RMA Fertility and she assented to 

identifying Ms. Junior as the “co-intended Parent” and “Partner,” respectively. 

Even after doubting her romantic commitment to Ms. Junior, Ms. Glover

continued to pursue the pregnancy with Ms. Junior’s financial assistance and 

shared emotional burden. 

Ms. Glover further led her spouse to believe that they would share 

parentage. Ms. Junior participated in the decision to conceive their son with 

the shared intent to raise him together. Likewise, she consistently held herself 

out as an intended parent, and with Ms. Glover’s express consent and 

endorsement, Ms. Junior performed the role of an expectant parent, including 

participating in the selection of the sperm donor and naming their child after 

conception. During the evidentiary hearing, Ms. Junior testified that, in her 

role as the “co-intended Parent” under Fairfax Cryobank contract, the couple 

collectively selected a sperm donor from Fairfax Cryobank based specifically 

on the donor’s physical appearance, interests, and genetic pedigree. Id. at 
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25. She explained, “We were looking for sperm donors who . . . resembled 

me as much as possible, because we . . . were us[ing] [Ms. Glover’s] egg, and 

we wanted our child to look as much like both of us as possible.” Id. Thus, in 

identifying a photograph of the sperm donor, Ms. Junior observed, “he’s darkskinned, like I am. He has almond shaped eyes like I do. He has a huge . . . 

wide smile like I do. He has high cheekbones like I do. In addition to that 

when we looked more deeply into the details, he’s a Sagittarius like I am.” 

Id. at 26. In addition, both the donor and Ms. Junior traced their indigenous 

history to Benin, Africa. Id. Overall, she stated, “primarily, it was because . 

. . we shared so much in common—the donor and I—and [Ms. Glover] and I 

both kept remarking on how [it was] kismet. . . [.]” Id. 

From my perspective, Ms. Glover’s actions and representations 

throughout the technologically-assisted pregnancy demonstrated her assent 

to Ms. Junior’s parentage. Ms. Junior relied upon these actions and 

representations to her detriment and would be severely prejudiced if Ms. 

Glover were permitted to deny parentage at this juncture. Thus, in addition 

to affirming the trial court’s analysis of the parties’ respective contractual 

rights, I would find the alternative grounds to affirm the trial court’s order as 

a matter of equity.

1

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1

It is axiomatic that this Court can affirm the trial court order for any reason 

supported by the certified record. D.M. v. V.B., 87 A.3d 323, 330 n.1 

(Pa.Super. 2014).
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Finally, while I believe that we should affirm the trial court order for the 

above-stated reasons, I also note that this case presents a perfect opportunity 

for the High Court to delineate the proper application of “intent-based 

parentage” as the High Court outlined the principle in C.G., supra. The C.G.

Court was asked to confront whether an unmarried former same-sex partner 

had standing as a “parent” pursuant to § 5324(1) of the Child Custody Act. 

In rejecting the former partner’s standing claim, the Court held that 

Pennsylvania jurisprudence limits recognition of legal parentage to biology, 

adoption, judicial presumptions associated with intact marriages, and 

“contract—where a child is born with the assistance of a donor who 

relinquishes parental rights and/or a non-biologically related person assumes 

legal parentage[.]” Id. at 904. As the former partner had no biological 

connection to the child, had not officially adopted the child, and did not have 

contract rights that have been recognized as affording legal parentage by way 

of contract, the High Court concluded that she was not a parent. 

Significantly, however, the Court continued:

[N]othing in today’s decision is intended to absolutely foreclose 

the possibility of attaining recognition as a legal parent through 

other means. However, under the facts before this Court, this 

case does not present an opportunity for such recognition, as the 

trial court found as fact that the parties did not mutually 

intend to conceive and raise a child, and the parties did not 

jointly participate in the process.

Id. at 904 n.11 (emphasis added).
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In their respective concurring opinions, Justices Dougherty and Wecht 

outlined their perspectives of intent-based parentage, but nonetheless agreed 

that the factual record did not warrant its application in that case. In this 

vein, Justice Dougherty reasoned that it was not necessary “to endorse any 

particular new test” because the Court was bound by the factual findings that 

there was no mutual intent to conceive and raise a child, or evidence of shared 

participation in the reproductive process. As stated by the esteemed Justice

Dougherty, those findings “preclude a holding that C.G. has standing as a 

parent under any of the proffered definitions of intent-based parentage.” Id. 

at 913. 

Justice Wecht argued that “[r]eliance solely upon biology, adoption and 

contracts is insufficient” in some situations and articulated his comprehensive 

perspective that, “in cases involving assisted reproductive technologies 

(“ART”), courts must probe the intent of the parties.” Id. at 913-14 (footnote 

omitted). However, he too was constrained to concur with the Majority’s 

decision based upon the trial court’s findings of fact. The learned justice 

explained, 

While I would embrace an intent-based test for parentage 

for persons pursuing parentage through ART, I nonetheless concur 

with the Majority's determination that C.G. was not a parent under 

the facts of this case as found by the trial court. As the Majority 

notes, the trial court found that J.H. was credible when she 

testified that C.G. never intended to be a parent to Child 

and that C.G. did not act as a parent. Further, the trial court 

credited testimony that C.G. and J.H. reached no mutual 

decision to become parents. Given that there was no 

documentary evidence of C.G.'s intent to parent, and given that 
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the trial court found, consistent with the record, that C.G.'s actions 

were not those of a parent, I join the Majority's conclusion that 

C.G. did not have standing as a parent pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. 

§ 5324.

Id. at 917 (emphases added, footnotes omitted). Overall, Justice Wecht 

concluded, “I think that today's case is a missed opportunity for this Court to 

address the role of intent in analyzing parental standing in ART cases.” Id. at 

918.

Thus, although I would affirm the trial court order establishing 

Ms. Junior’s parentage, insofar as my position failed to garner the support of 

a majority of my colleagues on this panel, I highlight the opportunity for the 

Supreme Court to consider the issue of intent-based parentage within the 

factual framework that was missing in C.G. Stated plainly, the case at bar 

presents the necessary facts to serve as the paradigm for the High Court to 

affirm the viability of intent-based parentage in cases involving assisted 

reproductive technology where the couple not only evidenced their mutual 

intent to conceive and raise the child, but they also participated jointly in the 

process.