* After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral argument is

unnecessary.  Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record.  See FED. R. APP. P.

34(a)(2)(C).

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted July 28, 2010*

Decided July 28, 2010

Before

WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge

No. 09‐2913

SUCIC ZLATAN,

Petitioner,

v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney General

of the United States,

Respondent.

Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals.

No. A072 133 489

O R D E R

An immigration judge terminated Sucic Zlatan’s status as an asylee and ordered him

removed from the United States.  He appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals

(“BIA”), which affirmed the immigration judge’s decision.  Zlatan then filed a motion to

reconsider with the BIA, which denied the motion as untimely.  He seeks review of that

decision, but we must dismiss his petition for lack of jurisdiction.

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 09‐2913 Page 2

Zlatan, a native of the former Yugoslavia and citizen of Serbia, came to the United

States as a visitor in 1993 and was granted asylum in 1994 based on his fear of political

persecution in Yugoslavia.  In 2008 he was convicted in Illinois state court of stalking, 720

ILCS 5/12‐7.3(a)(1), cyberstalking, 720 ILCS 5/12‐7.5(a), and harassment through electronic

communications, 720 ILCS 135/1‐2.  (An appellate court vacated the latter conviction but

affirmed the other two.  People v. Sucic, No. 1‐08‐0371, 2010 WL 2010511 (Ill. App. Ct. May

19, 2010).)  Six months after his conviction, Zlatan was placed into removal proceedings, at

which point he requested permanent‐resident status, sought to maintain his asylee status,

and sought withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture.

After hearings, the immigration judge found Zlatan inadmissible because his

stalking and cyberstalking offenses were crimes of moral turpitude, see 8 U.S.C.

§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), and, alternatively, found him removable because those offenses were

aggravated felonies, see 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).  The judge terminated Zlatan’s asylum

status; denied his application for permanent‐resident status and his requests for

withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture; and ordered

him removed to Serbia.  Zlatan appealed to the BIA, which on April 13, 2009, adopted and

affirmed the decision of the immigration judge.

On May 18, 2009, Zlatan—detained in a county jail at the time—filed a motion to

reconsider with the BIA.  (That same day, he filed a petition for review of the BIA’s decision

in this court.  Because he did not file it within 30 days of the BIA’s order, see 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(b)(1), we dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction.  Zlatan v. Holder, No. 09‐2302

(7th Cir. June 4, 2009).)  The BIA denied Zlatan’s motion to reconsider as untimely,

explaining that the motion needed to be filed 30 days after the BIA’s April 13 decision—i.e.,

by May 13—and that it received the motion on May 18.  See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2).  (The BIA

does not observe a “mailbox” rule and does not consider a motion filed until the BIA has

received it; a detention facility’s receipt of the motion for mailing does not suffice.  See

Board of Immigration Appeals Practice Manual, Ch. 3, § 3.1(a)(i), available at

http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/qapracmanual/pracmanual/chap3.pdf.)  The BIA noted that

Zlatan mailed his motion from the jail no earlier than May 11, and, citing In re Liadov, 23 I. &

N. Dec. 990, 993 (BIA 2006), reasoned that the failure of the motion to arrive by May 13 was

“not a ‘rare’ or ‘extraordinary’ circumstance that would warrant consideration of an

untimely motion.”  See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).

Zlatan seeks review of the denial of his motion to reconsider, but much of his

petition focuses on the removal order.  We lack jurisdiction to consider that subject,

however, because the time period to obtain judicial review of the removal order has lapsed.

Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 405‐06 (1995); Ajose v. Gonzales, 408 F.3d 393, 394‐94 (7th Cir.

2005).  Even a timely motion to reconsider does not toll the time to seek review of the
No. 09‐2913 Page 3

removal order, see Stone, 514 U.S. at 405‐06; Asere v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 378, 380‐81 (7th Cir.

2006), much less an untimely motion.

Zlatan asserts that his motion to reconsider was timely, but we lack jurisdiction to

examine the BIA’s denial of that motion because he has been found removable for

committing crimes of moral turpitude and aggravated felonies.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C).

That statute bars us from reviewing Zlatan’s removal order, see id., and its bar extends to

subsequent motions to reconsider, see Martinez‐Maldonado v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 679, 683 (7th

Cir. 2006); Dave v. Ashcroft, 363 F.3d 649, 652 (7th Cir. 2004).  Finally, the BIA’s denial of the

motion to reconsider does not fall within § 1252(a)(2)(D)’s exception—for constitutional or

legal claims—to the jurisdiction‐stripping provisions of § 1252(a)(2); the denial was

discretionary and does not present a question of law.  See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a); Khan v. Filip,

554 F.3d 681, 687 (7th Cir. 2009); Zamora‐Mallari v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 679, 694 (7th Cir. 2008).

Accordingly, we must DISMISS the petition for want of jurisdiction.