J. S67042/14 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

 : PENNSYLVANIA 

Appellee : 

: 

 v. : 

 : 

 : 

GEORGE EDWARD CLARITT, : 

 : 

 Appellant : No. 875 WDA 2014 

Appeal from the PCRA Order May 12, 2014 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Warren County 

Criminal Division No(s).: CP-62-CR-0000390-2011 

BEFORE: DONOHUE, MUNDY, and FITZGERALD,* JJ. 

MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.: FILED MARCH 16, 2015 

Appellant, George Edward Claritt, appeals from the order entered in 

the Warren County Court of Common Pleas denying, after an evidentiary 

hearing, his first Post Conviction Relief Act1 (“PCRA”) petition. This case 

returns to us after we remanded to have Robert Kinnear, Esq., comply with 

all the requirements of Turner/Finley2 or file an advocate’s brief. 

Appellant’s counsel has filed a petition to withdraw. We grant counsel’s 

petition and affirm the order below. 

 

*

 Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. 

1

 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. 

2 Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988); Commonwealth 

v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc). 
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We adopt the facts and procedural history set forth in the PCRA court’s 

decision. See PCRA Ct. Op., 5/13/14, at 1-3. After an evidentiary hearing 

at which Appellant and his trial counsel testified, the PCRA court denied 

Appellant’s petition on May 13, 2014. Appellant timely appealed. 

On May 28, 2014, the trial court ordered Appellant to file and serve on 

the court a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement within twenty-one days. The 

docket does not reflect compliance with Pa.R.C.P. 236.3 On June 16, 2014, 

Appellant filed a Rule 1925(b) statement but failed to serve a copy on the 

court. The PCRA court issued a Rule 1925(a) decision objecting to counsel’s 

failure to serve the Rule 1925(b) statement. 

Instantly, we ascertain whether Appellant complied with Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b)(1), which states in relevant part: “(1) Filing and service.—

Appellant shall file of record the Statement and concurrently shall serve the 

judge. Filing of record and service on the judge shall be in person or by mail 

. . . .” Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(1) (emphasis added). We must also examine 

whether the PCRA court strictly complied with Pa.R.C.P. 236 when it ordered 

a Rule 1925(b) statement. See In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 509-10 (Pa. 

Super. 2007) (holding, “strict application of the bright-line rule [of Rule 1925 

waiver] necessitates strict interpretation of the rules regarding notice of 

 

3

 We discuss this in further detail below. 
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Rule 1925(b) orders.” (citation omitted)); see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 114(B)-

(C); Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(2). 

Rule 236 states in pertinent part: 

Rule 236. Notice by Prothonotary of Entry of Order 

or Judgment 

(a) The prothonotary shall immediately give written

notice of the entry of 

* * * 

(2) any other order or judgment to each party’s 

attorney of record or, if unrepresented, to each party. 

The notice shall include a copy of the order or 

judgment. 

(b) The prothonotary shall note in the docket the giving 

of the notice and, when a judgment by confession is

entered, the mailing of the required notice and documents. 

Pa.R.C.P. 236(a)(2), (b). Rule 236 mandates that the prothonotary give 

“written notice of the entry of a court order to each party and to note on the 

docket that notice was given.” Id. at 510 (emphasis added). 

If the docket does not show that notice of the entry of 

a Rule 1925(b) order was provided to an appellant, then 

we will not conclude that the appellant’s issues have been 

waived for failure to file a Rule 1925(b) statement. That a 

party may have actually received notice is not 

determinative under circumstances where the docket does 

not reflect that notice was sent. 

In re L.M., 923 A.2d at 510 (emphases added and citations omitted). 

In this case, Appellant’s counsel inexplicably failed to serve the PCRA 

judge a copy of the Rule 1925(b) statement. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). We 

decline to find waiver, however, as the docket failed to reflect notice of the 
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entry of the order on Appellant. See In re L.M., 923 A.2d at 510. Because 

counsel’s failure to comply with well-settled law does not result in waiver of 

Appellant’s issues on appeal, we return to the procedural history. 

Previously, Appellant’s counsel filed a Turner/Finley brief with this 

Court without, inter alia, filing a petition to withdraw and complying with all 

the requirements of Turner/Finley. Appellant filed a pro se petition 

requesting, inter alia, a Grazier4 hearing. This panel struck counsel’s brief, 

forwarded to counsel Appellant’s pro se petition per Commonwealth v. 

Jette, 23 A.3d 1032, 1044 (Pa. 2011) (holding, “once the brief has been 

filed, any right to insist upon self-representation has expired”), and ordered 

counsel to, inter alia, comply with Turner/Finley. 

Appellant’s counsel filed another petition to withdraw with this Court. 

Because counsel’s Turner/Finley petition was deficient, we denied his 

petition and remanded to have counsel file a proper petition or an advocate’s 

brief within thirty days. Appellant has again filed another Turner/Finley 

brief. 

Appellant’s counsel raises the following issue: 

Is [Appellant’s] claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 

without merit? 

Appellant’s Turner/Finley Brief at 4. 

 

4 Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998). 
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Prior to addressing the issues raised in the Turner/Finley brief, we 

examine the following in evaluating counsel’s petition to withdraw: 

[I]ndependent review of the record by competent counsel 

is required before withdrawal is permitted. Such 

independent review requires proof of: 

1) A “no-merit” letter by PCRA counsel detailing the nature 

and extent of his review; 

2) The “no-merit” letter by PCRA counsel listing each issue 

the petitioner wished to have reviewed; 

3) The PCRA counsel’s “explanation”, in the “no-merit” 

letter, of why the petitioner’s issues were meritless; 

4) The PCRA court conducting its own independent review 

of the record; and 

5) The PCRA court agreeing with counsel that the petition 

was meritless. 

Commonwealth v. Widgins, 29 A.3d 816, 817-18 (Pa. Super. 2011) 

(alterations and citations omitted). Further, the Widgins Court explained: 

The Supreme Court [in Commonwealth v. Pitts, 981 

A.2d 875 (Pa. 2009),] did not expressly overrule the 

additional requirement imposed by [Commonwealth v. 

Friend, 896 A.2d 607 (Pa. Super. 2006),] decision, i.e., 

that PCRA counsel seeking to withdraw contemporaneously 

forward to the petitioner a copy of the application to 

withdraw that includes (i) a copy of both the “no-merit” 

letter, and (ii) a statement advising the PCRA petitioner 

that, in the event the trial court grants the application of 

counsel to withdraw, the petitioner has the right to 

proceed pro se, or with the assistance of privately retained 

counsel. 
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Id. at 818. Instantly, we have reviewed counsel’s petition to withdraw and 

conclude it complies with the requirements set forth by the Widgins Court. 

See id. Accordingly, we proceed. 

Appellant contends that on direct appeal, a claim should have been 

raised that trial counsel was ineffective during the jury selection process. He 

asserts that counsel refused to cooperate with him during voir dire. We hold 

Appellant is not entitled to relief. 

“On appeal from the denial of PCRA relief, our standard and scope of 

review is limited to determining whether the PCRA court’s findings are 

supported by the record and without legal error.” Commonwealth v. AbuJamal, 941 A.2d 1263, 1267 (Pa. 2008). Furthermore, where there is 

support for a PCRA court’s credibility determinations, the reviewing court is 

bound by those determinations. Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 720 A.2d 

79, 93-94 (Pa. 1998). 

With respect to claims of counsel’s ineffectiveness, we state the 

following as background: 

[C]ounsel is presumed to have provided effective 

representation unless the PCRA petitioner pleads and 

proves that: (1) the underlying claim is of arguable merit; 

(2) counsel had no reasonable basis for his or her conduct; 

and (3) Appellant was prejudiced by counsel’s action or 

omission. To demonstrate prejudice, an appellant must 

prove that a reasonable probability of acquittal existed but 

for the action or omission of trial counsel. A claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel will fail if the petitioner 

does not meet any of the three prongs. Further, a PCRA 

petitioner must exhibit a concerted effort to develop his 
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ineffectiveness claim and may not rely on boilerplate 

allegations of ineffectiveness. 

Commonwealth v. Perry, 959 A.2d 932, 936 (Pa. Super. 2008) 

(punctuation marks and citations omitted). 

In determining whether counsel’s action was reasonable, the court 

does not consider “whether there were other more logical courses of action” 

counsel could have pursued, but simply examines whether counsel’s decision 

had any reasonable basis. Commonwealth v. Washington, 927 A.2d 586, 

594 (Pa. 2007). Conversely, to merit relief, counsel’s action, given all the 

other available alternatives, must be “so unreasonable that no competent 

lawyer would have chosen it.” Commonwealth v. Miller, 431 A.2d 233, 

234 (Pa. 1981) (citation omitted). 

A failure to satisfy any prong of the test for ineffectiveness requires 

rejection of the claim. Washington, 927 A.2d at 594. “In the context of a 

PCRA proceeding, [the defendant] must establish that the ineffective 

assistance of counsel was of the type ‘which, in the circumstances of the 

particular case, so undermined the truth-determining process that no 

reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place.’” Id.

(citations omitted). The defendant must establish actual prejudice, or 

demonstrate that the alleged act of ineffectiveness falls within a narrow 

range of circumstances in which there is a presumption of prejudice. 

Commonwealth v. Reed, 971 A.2d 1216, 1224-25 (Pa. 2009). 
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After careful consideration of the record, the parties’ briefs, and the 

decision of the Honorable Maureen A. Skerda, we affirm on the basis of the 

PCRA court’s opinion. See App. A to PCRA Ct. Op., 5/13/14, at 7-8 (holding 

trial counsel’s testimony was more credible than Appellant’s testimony; trial 

counsel testified he informed Appellant of his rights and that Appellant did 

not communicate with counsel or attempt to participate in jury selection 

process). We have also conducted our own independent review of the 

record and discern no meritorious issues. See Widgins, 29 A.3d at 818. 

Consequently, having discerned no legal error, we grant counsel’s petition to 

withdraw and affirm the order below. See Abu-Jamal, 941 A.2d at 1267; 

Perry, 959 A.2d at 936. 

Petition to withdraw granted. Order affirmed. 

Judge Donohue joins the memorandum. 

Judge Mundy concurs in the result. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 3/16/2015