T h e H o n o ra b le A rth u r L . A la rc ó n , S e n io r C irc u it J u d g e fo r t h e U n ited S ta te s C o u rt o f A p p e a ls fo r th e N inth * C i rcui t , s i t t i ng by desi gnat i o n.

NO T REC OM M EN DE D F OR P UB LIC AT ION File Na me: 08a0659n.06 Filed: Nove mber 3, 2008 No. 07-4514 U N IT E D S T A T E S C O U R T O F A P P E A LS F O R T H E S IX T H C IR C U IT EARLW. BURKHOL DER J R., et al., Pla int if fs - A pp e lla nts , v. I NTERNATI ONAL

UNI ON, UNI TED AUTOMOB I L E, AEROSPACE AND AGRI CUL TURAL

I MPL EMENT WORKERS OF A MERI CA, L ocal No. 12; I NTERNATI ONAL

UNI ON, UNI TED AUTOMOB I L E, AEROSPACE AND AGRI CUL TURAL

I MPL EMENT WORKERS OF A MERI CA; DAI ML ERCHRYSL ER CORP ORATI ON, De fe nd ants - A

pp e lle e s. )

) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APP EAL

FROM THE U

NI TED S T ATES DI STRI CT COURT FOR THE N O R T H E R

N D IS T R IC T O F O H IO OPI NI ON

Be for e : D AU G HTREY , G ILM AN , a nd A LA RC ÓN , C ir c uitJudg e s. * Art hur L. Alarcón, Circuit Judge. Ap p e l l a nt s a r e m a c h i n e r e pa ir

me n p re se ntl y

or fo rm e rl y
e mpl oy e d b y

the Da iml e rC hr

y sle r C or po ratio n (“ Da iml e rC hr

y sle r” ) at tw o Chr

y sle r Jee p plants in Toledo, Ohio. Appellants claim that their union, A ppellees International Union United Automobile, Aer ospace and Ag ricultural Implement Workers of Ame rica (“U AW”) and I

ntern ati onal Union United Automobile, Aer ospace and Ag ricultural Implement Workers of Ame rica , L ocal 12 ( “L ocal 12 ” ), br e a c he d th e ir du ty of fa ir re pr e se ntatio n b y

fa vo ri ngc e rt a in s kil le d w or ke rs —n ame ly-2-

millw rig hts and elec tricians—over Appellants, who a

re ma chine r epair

men. This alleg ed pr e fe re nti a l tr e a tme nt c a

us e d App e lla

nts to los e tr a ini ngand

e mpl oy me nt o pp or

tun iti e s th a t le d to de c re a se s in

pa y and , u lti mate ly , jo b loss e s in gr e ate r pr op or tio n than millwri g hts and e le c tr ic ians . Appellants initially

filed suit ag ainst UAW and L ocal 12 on August 26, 2002. On November 25, 2002 , p ursuant to Rules 19(a) (1)( A) a nd (a) (1)( B) (i) of the Fe dera l Rules of Civil Procedur e, UAW and L ocal 12 f

iled a motion t o add Da imlerChry sler as a defe ndant on the base s that it was
a pa rt y ne c e ssa ry fo r f ull re lie f a

nd , if no t a dd e d, Da iml erC hry sl er’s a bil ity to p ro te c t it s inte re st would be impaire d. The district c ourt g rante d this mot ion on Dece mber 3, 2002. Appe llants added DaimlerChry sler as a

defe ndant in their subseque ntly filed Third Ame nded Complaint, but made no alleg ations ag ainst DaimlerChry sler. On May 19, 2006, UAW and L ocal 12 moved f or summary

jud gm ent on six g rounds: (1) Appellants’ c laims under sec tion 9(a) of the L abor- Manag ement Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159 (“Sec tion 9(a)” ), should be conside red hy brid claims pursuant to section 301 of the L abor- Manag ement Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (“Sec tion 301” ), and Appellants had not alleg ed and could not show a

brea ch of the collective barg aining ag ree ment; ( 2) Appellants had no evidenc e to support the alleg ation that the unions used their influenc e with Daimler Chry sler to ca use plaintiffs to b e dis pr op or

tio nate ly la id of f; (3 ) A pp e lla nts c ou ld n ot s ho w that th e y ha d a ny ri g ht t o b e c ro sstr a i n e d ; ( 4) Ap pe lla

nts c ou ld n ot s ho w that th e y we re de nie d f

a ir re pr e se ntatio n; ( 5) Ap pe lla nts c ou ld not show a bre ach of

fai r re prese ntation and any claims relating to the lines of de marc ation committee wer e bar

re d b y the statute of limitations; and (6) Appe llants could not show they wer e d en i edap p re n t i ce s h i p tra i n i n g.-3-

F oll ow ingthe ini tia l summa ry jud g me nt br ie fi ng , the dis tr ic t c ourt a sk e d th e pa

rt ie s to fi le supplemental brief

s reg arding whether Appellants exhausted internal union remedie s prior to filing the c omp la int . T he dis tr ic t c ourt g ra nte d th e UA W an d L oc a l 12 ’s mot ion fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt. For the re asons that follow, we vacate and r emand f or fur ther proc eeding s. I Appellants ar e pre sent or for mer e mploy ees of

DaimlerChry sler at two Chry sler Jeep plants in Toledo, Ohio. DaimlerChry sler employ s sever al kinds of employ ees, known as “skilled trade smen,” at the Toledo plants. This case implicates three g roups of skilled trade smen: machine r epair

men, millwrights, and e lectric ians. Appellants ar e mac hine re pairmen. Until 1997, the skill ed tra desmen at DaimlerChry sler’s Tole do plant wer e re prese nted by two unions. The UAW repr esente d, amongothers, millwrig hts and elec tricians. The Mecha nics Education Society

of Amer ica ( “MESA”) repr esente d machine tr ades e mploy ees, inc luding machine r epair

men. The MESA c ollective bar g aining ag ree ment included “lines of demar cation” that delineate d what ty

pe of w ork wa s assig ned to its member employ ees, a nd the division of work among the skilled trades. L ines of dema rcation determine what ty pe of w ork will be made available to eac h trade , and the number of worke rs from e ach tr ade ne eded to c omplete the wor k. In 1997, former

MESA members bec ame UA W members and also be came subject to a new UA W collective bar g aining ag ree ment. The ne w collec tive barg aining ag ree ment did not set forth lines of de marc ation. In 1 99 9, wh e n D a iml e rC hr y sle r b uil t a

se c on d Jee p p lant, pr ob le ms d e ve lop e d a s to wh ic h g ro up of

sk ill e d tr a de sme n ( e .g ., ma c hin e re pa ir me n, mil lw ri g hts , o r e le c tr ic ians ) s ho uld do which wor

k. In J anuar

y 2001, L ocal 12 a

nnounced the cre ation of a L ines of De marc ation-4-

Commi ttee (“ L DC”) to cr eate and dra ft lines of dema rcation that would dist ribute the wor k amongthe skilled tradesme n. Represe ntatives wer e ele cted a nd the L DC was for

med by Marc h 2001. Meanwhile, at the first plant, one J eep pr oduct line was discontinued, a nd another

product lin e re du c e d th e numbe r o f Je e ps pr od uc e d. Th is r e su lte d in

lay of fs fr om Augus t 20 01 un til Aug ust 2002. In J anuar y 2002, Appellant Thomas Rutherf ord cha lleng ed the Ma

rch 2001 f

ormation of the L DC by

filing a n internal a

ppeal at the local union level. The union determined that the appea l was untimely

beca use it was filed more than six months after the L DC had bee n cre ated. After an unsucc essful ser ies of attempts to have this int erna l union appeal, a s well as other g rieva nces, he ard, A

ppellants filed their f

irst complaint in this matter on August 26, 2002. Ap pe lla nts a lle g e d in

the ir c omp la int

that U AW a

nd L oc a l 12 us e d th e ir

inf lue nc e to favor millwrights and e lectric ians over ma chine r epair men. They

also contende d that the
c re a tio n o f t

he L DC wa s n ot a

uth or ize d b y

the un ion bylaws or

c on sti tut ion . F ur

the r, Ap pe lla

nts
a sse rt e d th a t th e wo rk

de signatio ns se t f

or th i n th e lin e s o f d e marc a tio n, c re a te d b y the L DC , resulted in mac hine re pairmen losingwork a nd employ

ment opportunities and, ultimately , being la id o ff in a g re a te r p ro po rt ion

tha n th e oth e r s kil le d tr a de sme n. Ap pe lla nts ame nd e d th e ir complaint five times, addingadditional plaintiffs and Da imlerChry sler as a defe ndant. Eac h complaint, howeve r, sets for th substantially

identical alleg ations. On May 19, 2006, UAW and L ocal 12 moved f

or summary

judgme nt. The district court g rante d this mot ion on October 26, 2007, holding that Appe llants failed to exhaust internal union reme dies and we re not e x cused from doingso. Appellants have timely appea led the district cour t’s order
. II-5-

Th is C ourt

re vie ws de novo appea ls from order s g rantingsummary judgme nt. EEOC v. Un iv . o f D e tro it , 904 F.2d 331, 334 ( 6th Cir. 1990). Summ ary judgme nt is gra

nted when the
mov ant d e mon str a te s th a t th e ple a din g s, de po sit ion s, a ff ida vit s, and oth e r e vid e nc e ava ila

ble to the c ourt e sta bli shno g e nu ine iss ue of

mate ri a l f

a c t. F e d. R. C iv. P. 5 6( c ). I f t he mov ant m e e ts its bu rd e n, the re sp on din g pa

rt y mus t de mon str a te that th e re is a g e nu ine iss ue of

mate ri a l f

a c t in dispute. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 572, 586 (1986). The respondingparty

must set forth sufficie nt evidence supporting a claimed f

actua l dispute. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, I nc. , 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). I f the re sponding pa rty fails to make
a sh ow ingon

an e le me nt f

or wh ic h h e or

sh e be ars the burd e n o f p ro of , th e mov ant i s e nti tle d to summary judgme nt as a matter

of law. Ce lote

xCor p. v . Ca tre tt , 4 7 7 U
. S. 3 1 7 , 3 3 1 ( 1 9 8 6 )
. We revie w the evide nce in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Ma tsu sh ita , 475 U.S. at 587. In this case, howe ver, the district court fa iled to addre ss a threshold statute of limitations iss ue that c ou ld r e nd e r t

he c a se un tim e ly . F or

that r e a so n, we wi ll r e mand fo r t he dis tr ic t c ourt

to
rea ch a de cision on the applica bility of the statute of

limit ations. See D andridge v. W illiams , 397 U.S. 471, 476 n.6 (1970) (“ When attention has bee n focuse d on other issues, or when the c ourt fr om whic h a

c a se c ome s h a s e xpre sse d n o v ie ws on a c on tr oll ingqu e sti on , it

may be a pp ro pr iate to r e mand

the c a se rathe r t

ha n d e a l w iththe me ri ts o f t hat qu e sti on

in t his Court .” ); Mt. Clemens v. EPA , 917 F.2d 908, 916 n.7 ( 6th Cir. 1990) (re manding to district court and de clining to a ffirm on alternative g rounds “[b]ecause the se ar g uments were not addre ssed by the district court a

nd additional fac t finding w ould be re quired to re solve the issues ra ised”). A-6-

In its decision gr anting summary judgme nt, the trial court did not addr ess the question whether Appellants filed their

complaint within the applicable statute of limitations period. See Bu rk ho lde r v . U

AW , e t al

. , No. 02cv7422, 2007 WL3165789 (N.D. O hio Oct. 26, 2007). A
c omp la int ba se d o n a

un ion ’s br e a c h o f t

he duty of fa ir re pr e se ntatio n is su

bje c t to a six- month statut e of lim itatio ns pe ri od . 2 9 U .S. C. § 16 0( b) ; De lc os te llo v . I nt'l Bh d. of T e am ste rs , 4 62 U. S. 151, 155 n.2 (1983). “ As a g ener al rule, the limit ations period beg ins to run when the potential pla int if f ‘ kn ow s o r s ho uld

have kn ow n o f t

he un ion ’s a lle g e d b re a c h o f i ts d uty of fa ir repr esentation.’” Ratkosky v. United Transp. Union , 843 F.2d 869, 873 ( 6th Cir. 1988). The statute of limitations m ay be tolled duringthe time in which an e mploy ee pur sues interna l union
reme dies. Garrish v. Int ’ l Union , 417 F.3d 590, 595 ( 6th Cir. 2005). Howeve r, “the statute of limit ations is not tol led duringthe time an employ ee pur sues interna l union remedies that a re completely

futile.” Id. Appellants’ br eac h of the duty -of- fair- repr esentation claims relate to the ma nner in whic h the unions cre ated the L DC and the subseque nt effe ct from the c reation and implementation of the lines of dema

rcation. Accor ding to the U AW and L ocal 12, the L DC elec ted re prese ntatives in J anuar y 2001 and wa s formed in Mar ch 2001. Mr. Rutherf ord interna lly

appea led the fo rm a tio n o f t

he L DC on

Janu ary 4, 20 02 , n ine months a ft e r t he L DC wa s c re a te d. Ap pe lla nts filed the orig inal complaint on August 26, 2002, one y ear and five months after the L DC was formed. It is not clear f

rom the re cord whether

any events oc curr ed betwe en the f ormation of the L DC and Mr . Ruthe rf

or d’ s in iti a l in te rn a l un ion a pp e a l, o r t

he fi lin g of

the or ig ina l c omp la int

in this action, that cre ate a

basis for r elief that is not t ime-bar red.-7-

Mo re ov e r, Ap pe lla

nts fi le d a F if th A me nd e d Co mpl a int

on Se pte mbe r 2 9, 20 05 , th a t,
a pa rt fr om t he inc lus ion

of a dd iti on a l pl a int if

fs , in c lud e s a lle g a tio ns that are su bs tanti a lly identical to the first c omplaint. These alleg ations assert c laims within t he six -month statute of lim itatio ns pe ri od . App e lla nts a lle g e that “ [d]ur ing
. . . th e la st s ix mon ths , d e fe nd ants . . . c le arl y fa vo re d o the r s kil le d tr a de s . . . ov e r t he ma c hin e re pa ir

me n who are the pla int if

fs .” B ut t he F if th Am e nd e d Co mpl a int

fa ils to s pe c if

y wh e n th e a lle g e d b re a c he s o c c ur re d o r whe n App e lla

nts lear ned of the m. For e x ample, Appe llants alleg e that “D efe ndants . . . brea ched [their] duty of fa ir re pr e se ntatio n o we d to the pla int if fs
. . . . [an d] c on tin

ue to b re a c h [th e ir ] dut

y of fa ir
re pr e se ntatio n o we d to pla int if fs and thi s c on sti tut e s a

c on tin uin g vio latio n o f [the ir ] dut y of fa ir
re pr e se ntatio n. ” Th e re are no sp e c if ic re fe re nc e s to tim e , b ut A pp e lla nts a lle g e that th e a c ts complained of

constitute a “c ontinuing violation.” Al tho ug h th e statut e of

lim itatio ns is t oll e d w hil e a pa rt y purs ue s in te rn a l un ion

re me die s, it is not tolled if the employ ee is pursuinginternal union re medies that ar e complete ly futile. Ga rri sh , 417 F.3d at 595. I n their brief in support of their summary judgme nt motion, Appellants attempted to avoid the exhaustion bar by stating that they

could not be af

forde d
c omp le te re lie f t

hr ou g h th e int e rn a l a

pp e a l pr oc e ss. We have a

duty to remand a

matter for

an evide ntiary

hear ing where the fa cts do not appea r in the re cord. See, e .g. , Ringrose v. Enge lberg Huller Co. , 692 F.2d 403, 405 ( 6th Cir. 1982) (r emandingissues of fa ct re lating to the statute of limitations t o the district court for a fa c tua l de te rm inatio n) ; Leon v. Fe d. Reserv e Bank of Chicago , 823 F.2d 928 ( 6th Cir. 1987) (s ame ). Ac c or din g ly , u

po n r e mand , th e tr ia l c ourt is i ns tr uc te d to de te rm ine wh e the r A pp e lla nts ’
c la ims surv ive d th e statut e of lim itatio ns .-8- B I f the district cour

t determines upon r emand that Appe llants filed the ac tion within t he limit ations period, it must determine whe ther Appe llants’ failure to exhaust i s excused by the UAW and L ocal 12’ s brea ch of the duty of fa ir repr esentation. See W illiams v. Molpus , 171 F.3d 36 0, 36 9 ( 6th

Cir . 1 99 9) (p ro vid ingthat “ [t]he g e ne ra l r e qu ir e me nt t hat a g ri e va nt m us t e xha us t his or he r i nte rn a l un ion

re me die s, ho we ve r, is e xcu se d if the un ion br e a c he s it s d

uty of fa ir repr esentation.”) (r elying on Hines v. Anc hor Motor Freight, Inc. , 424 U.S. 554, 571 (1976)). Th e UA W an d L oc a l 12 a sk thi s c ourt to a ff ir m th e g ra nt o f s umm ary

jud g me nt, contendingthat the holding in Mo lpu s is wro ngand c on fu se s th e re qu ir e me nt t o e xha us t contra ctual g rieva

nce pr ocedur es with internal union proc edure s. The UAW and L ocal 12 a rgue that Hines addre sses the issue re g ardingthe contra ctual g rieva nce pr ocedur e, under

a collec tive b ar g a in in g a g r e e me n t, r a th e r th anth e inte r

n a l u n io np r o c e d

ur e , un d e r

a un io nc o n s ti tuti o n . We disag ree . In both Hines and Molpus , the plaintiffs alleg ed bre ach of the collec tive barg aining
a g re e me nt and a bre ach of the duty of fa ir repr esentation. See Hines , 4 24 U. S. at 55 6; Molpus 171 F.3d at 364. I n fac t, in Hines , the Court explained that “[t] o preva il ag ainst either the
c omp any or the Un ion , [pl a int if

fs ] mus t no t on ly

sh ow that their dischar g e wa s contrar y to the
c on tr a c t but must carry the burden of de monstrating a breach of duty by the U nion .” Hines , 424 U.S. at 570-71 (e mphasis added) . Moreove r, Molpus expli citly states that one is excused fr om the exhaustion requireme nt if “the union bre ache s its duty of fa ir repr esentation.” Molpus 171 F.3d at 364. Hines and Molpus addre ss the duty of fa ir repr esentation–not whether a plaintiff pursues his or he r g rieva

nce unde r the c ollective bar g aining ag ree ment rathe r than the unionMo re ov e r, the c ourt no te s th a t th e UA W an d L oc a l 12 argue d in the tr ia l cou

rt and in t he ir 1 appellate brief that all of Appe llants’ claims are based on the collective ba rg aining ag ree ment. I f the court a cce pted this argument, which it does not, the UAW and L ocal 12 would pr esumably ag ree that Molpus applies her e. The UAW and L ocal 12 do not addr ess this in t h ei r s u p p l emental brief addre ssing the a

pplication of Molpus
. Clayton se t f

or th t he fo llo wi ngthr e e fa c tor s th a t c ou ld p ro vid e a c ou rt wi th d isc re tio n to 2 e xcu se a fa ilure to exha

us t: “f ir st, wh e the r u

nio n o ff ic ia ls a re so ho sti le to t

he e mpl oy e e that he c ou ld not hope to obtain a fa ir hea ringon his claim; second, whe ther the inter nal union appea ls procedur es would be inade quate e ither to rea ctivate the e mploy ee’ s g rieva nce or to awa

rd hi m the full relief

he seeks unde r § 301; and third, whe ther e x haustion of interna l proce dures would unr easona bly delay th e e mp l o y e e ' s o p p o rtun i ty t o o b t a i n a j u d i c i a l h e ar i n g o n th e m e r i t s o f h i s c l a i m . I f any of the se fa c tor s are fo un d to e xist, the c ourt may pr op e rl y e xcu se the e mpl oy e e ' s fa ilure to e xha us t.” 45 1 U .S. at 689. -9- constitution. Thus, t he application of Molpus is not li mited to a case involving only a g rieva nce purs ue d und e r t

he c oll e c tiv e ba

rg a ini nga g re e me nt. 1 The UA W and L ocal 12 a lso sugg est that if applied, Molpus would eliminate the exhaustion requirement in suits alleg ing br eac h of the duty of fa ir repr esentation. This arg ument fa ils to r e c og nize that Hines was de cided year s prior to the cr eation of the Clayton fac tors. See Clayton v. Int’l Union, UAW , 4 51 U. S. 6 79 , 6 89 (1 98 1)
. Th e e xce pti on to e xha us tio n s e t f

or th 2 in Molpus simply

repr esents the f

irst and sec ond fac tors set forth in Clayton
. Id. In Hines , the plaintiffs alleg ed their union bre ache d its duty of fa ir repr esentation by

“ arb itr ari ly

and in b a d f a ithde pr ivi ngpe tit ion e rs of the ir e mpl oy me nt a nd pe rm itt ingthe ir discharg e without sufficie nt proof.” Hines , 424 U.S. at 558. Fa iling to proc ess a g rieva nce or submit evidence in support of a g rieva nce c ould potentially

fall under

the first or se cond exceptions to ex haustion set forth in Clayton . There fore , the exception set forth in Hines , and applied in Molpus , mere ly falls within the framework e x presse d in Clayton pr ov idi ngthat “cour ts have discr etion to decide whether to require exhaustion of internal union proce dures.”-10-

Clayton , 4 51 U. S. at 68 9. We h old that Molpus applies to the instant matter a nd the district
c o urt , u p o nr e m an d , s h o u l d

c o n s i d e r w h e th e r Ap p e l l an t s ’ f

a i l ur e t o e x h a

u s tw a s e x c u s e d

b y a brea ch of the duty

of fa ir repr esentation. The UA W and L ocal 12 a lso ask this court to affir m the g rant of summar

y judgme nt on the alter nate g round that they

did not breac h the duty

of fa ir repr esentation in creating a nd implementing the lines of demar cation. Howe ver, be cause these a rguments were not addre ssed by the district court, a

nd additional fac t finding w ould be re quired to re solve these issues, we decline the ir reque st. See M t. Clemens v. EPA , 917 F.2d at 916 n.7 (rema nding to district cour

t and dec lining to af

firm on alter

native g rounds “[b]ecause the se ar g uments were not addre ssed by the district court a

nd additional fac t finding w ould be re quired to re solve the issues ra ised”). T o provide their a

rguments with a proper

hear ing, a

nd to gr ant Appellants a

n opportunity

to respond,
we wi ll r e mand

thi s matte r t o th e dis tr ic t c ourt fo r a he ari ngand

fi nd ing s o n th e iss ue of

fa ir
re pr e se ntatio n. I f t

he dis tr ic t c ourt

fi nd s th a t th e re is a

dis pute d is su e of

mate ri a l f

a c t on thi s iss ue , it sh ou ld p ro c e e d to a

tr ia l on the me ri ts. C The UA W and L ocal 12 a lso ask us to affirm the district c ourt’s g rant of summar y judgme nt on the alternative basis that Appellants’ c laims arise unde r Section 301 rather than Section 9(a) . We decline to do so. The r ecor d shows that Appellants’ c laims are a sserted unde r Section 9(a)
. “Section 9(a ) of the N ational L abor Relations Act, by virtue of its g rant of e x clusive repr esentation status to a union over employ ees that make up a ba rg ainingunit, creates a duty of fair r epre sentation on the re prese ntative union.” Pratt v. UAW , Local 1435 , 939 F.2d 385, 388-11-

(6th Cir. 1991). “Sec tion 9(a), in conjunc tion with 28 U.S.C . § 1337, cre ates a jurisdictional basis for a ctions for bre ach of the duty of fa ir repr esentation . . . .” Id. A union member ma

y also bringsuit ag ainst his union, or his employ er, f or bre ach of

a
c oll e c tiv e ba

rg a ini nga g re e me nt, purs ua nt t o Se c tio n 3 01 . Su c h a n a c tio n is kn ow n a s a “straig htforwa

rd sec tion 301 breac h of contra ct claim [which] is mere ly a suit for bre ach of

a labor c ontrac t, whether

that contra ct be a

collective ba

rg aining ag ree ment or a union constitution.” Mo or e v . Lo c al U nio n 5 69of I

nt'l Bh d. of E le c . W

or k e rs , 989 F.2d 1534, 1541 n.2 (9th Cir. 1993). Whe n a un ion me mbe r f

ile s a Se c tio n 9 (a ) c la im a

nd a Se c tio n 3 01 c la im i n th e same complaint, the ac tion is known as a hy brid suit. “‘A hy

brid section 301 ac tion involves two constituent claims: brea ch of a collective ba

rg aining ag ree ment by

the employ er a

nd brea ch of the duty of fa ir repr esentation by

the union.’ The two c laims are ‘ inext rica bly interdepe ndent.’ Unless a plaintiff ‘ demonstrates both violations, he ca nnot succe ed ag ainst either pa rty .’” Garrison v. Cassens Transp. Co. , 334 F.3d 528, 538 ( 6th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). UAW and L ocal 12 c ontend that Appellants’ c laims fail beca use they are hy brid claims. We d isa g re e . App e lla

nts ’ c omp la int

a lle g e s th a t th e UA W an d L oc a l 12 br e a c he d th e duty of fa ir repr esentation. There a

re no a lleg ations ag ainst DaimerChry sler, nor ha ve Appe llants alleg ed a br e a c h o f t

he c oll e c tiv e ba

rg a ini nga g re e me nt. III Th e g ra nt o f s umm ary

jud g me nt i s V AC AT ED and the matte r i s RE MA

ND ED wi th instructions that the district court deter mine whether

any of the c laims asserted in the c omplaint
we re ma de wi thi n th e statut e of lim itatio ns . I f t

he c ourt fi nd s th a t any

of Ap pe lla nts ’ c la ims-12-

survive the statute of

limit ations bar, it should then deter mine whether

the def endants bre ache d the duty of fa ir repr esentation.-13-

RO NA LD LEE G ILM AN , C ir c uitJudg e , c onc ur r ing . Iconcur with the lead opinion’s holding, but write se parately to briefly addre ss its analy sis of W illiams v. Molpus , 171 F .3 d 3 60 (6 th C ir . 1 99 9) . T he le a d o pin ion ho lds that Molpus , which provide s that “[t] he g ener al require ment that a g rieva

nt must ex haust his or her inter nal union reme dies . . . is excused if the union brea ches its duty

of fa ir repr esentation,” controls the “e x haustion” aspe ct of the c urre nt
ca s e. L ea d

Op
. at8 -1 0 (c i t i n g Molpus , 171 F.3d at 369). In so holding, the le ad opinion rea sons that the exception to exhausti on set forth in Molpus simply repr esents the f

irst and sec ond fac tors laid out in Clayton v. Int’l Union, UAW , 4 51 U. S. 6 79 , 6 89 (1 98 1) . T he se fa c tor s a re a s f oll ow s: [F]i rst, whether

union officials a

re so hostile to the employ ee that he could not hope to obtain a f

air he aringon his claim; [ and] second, whe ther the inter nal union appea ls procedur es would be ina dequate either to re activate the employ ee’ s g rieva nce or to awar d him the full relief he seeks unde r § 301 . . . . L ea d Op
. at9 , n . 2 (q u o t i n g Clayton , 451 U.S. at 689). As the author of Molpus , Imust sheepishly admit that Inow believe the exhaustionexception lang uag e in that opinion was over broad. Cf. Henslee v . Union Planters Nat. Bank & Trust Co. , 335 U.S. 595, 600 (1949) (F rankf urter, J., dissenting) ( “Wisdom t oo often ne ver comes, a nd so one oug ht not to reject it mere ly beca use it comes late.” ). Molpus ’s e xce pti on to the administrative-e x haustion require ment does not simply mirror the f

irst two Clayton fac tors as the lead opinion states; instead, its broa d languag e unconditionally waives the exhaustion require ment for a

ny plaintiff who alleg es a br eac h of duty of fa ir repr esentation in his or her
c omp la int . T his c on se qu e nc e is c on tr ary to t he g e ne ra l po lic y

of havin g la bo r d isp ute s f

ir st submitt ed to interna l union gr ievanc e proc edure s, see Holmes v . Donovan , 984 F.2d 732, 738 (6th Cir. 1993), and the U AW appropriate ly criticizes the Molpus languag e for that rea son.-14-

But be cause this panel is powerle ss to overrule a prior pane l’s published opinion, see Sa lm i v . S e c ’y of H e alt h &Hu ma n S

e rv s. , 774 F.2d 685, 689 ( 6th Cir. 1985), Mo lpu s mus t g overn our

decision on the e x haustion issue. Molpus sh ou ld, ho we ve r, be c los e ly sc rutin ize d if the issue comes be fore a future en banc panel of this court.