NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION 

File Name: 17a0353n.06 

No. 16-5487 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 

KAREN LAWRENCE, Personal Representative 

for the Estate of Charles Hoffman, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

MADISON COUNTY et al., 

Defendants,

and 

DOUG THOMAS, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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ON APPEAL FROM THE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

COURT FOR THE EASTERN 

DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY 

 OPINION 

Before: BOGGS, SILER, and MOORE, Circuit Judges. 

 KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. Defendant-Appellant Madison County 

Jailer Doug Thomas appeals the district court’s judgment denying qualified official immunity as 

to Plaintiff-Appellee Karen Lawrence’s state-law negligence claim. Lawrence, as personal 

representative for the estate of her son Charles Hoffman, brought this lawsuit after Hoffman 

committed suicide while incarcerated in the Madison County Detention Center (MCDC). 

Lawrence sued Madison County and employees of the MCDC in their official and individual 

capacities for constitutional and state-law violations. This appeal concerns only Jailer Thomas’s 

claim of qualified official immunity from Lawrence’s individual-capacity state-law negligence 
No. 16-5487, Lawrence v. Madison County et al. 

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claim against Thomas. Lawrence alleged that Thomas was negligent because he failed to 

enforce a mandatory policy requiring jail employees to check on inmates in isolated housing 

every twenty minutes. The district court held that Thomas did not have qualified official 

immunity because Thomas’s duty to enforce the mandatory twenty-minute check-in policy was 

ministerial, not discretionary. For the reasons discussed below, we AFFIRM the judgment of 

the district court. 

I. BACKGROUND 

A. Factual Background 

Charles Hoffman was committed to the custody of the MCDC on October 14, 2012. 

R. 156-6 (Hoffman Med. Questions Form 10/14/2012) (Page ID #1311); R. 156-1 (Mem. in 

Support of Summ. J. at 2) (Page ID #1258). Hoffman was on parole in Michigan until he cut off 

his ankle monitor and fled to Kentucky, where he was apprehended and taken to the MCDC. 

R. 156-2 (Lawrence Dep. at 46–48) (Page ID #1289–91); R. 156-1 (Mem. in Support of Summ. 

J. at 2) (Page ID #1258). 

 On November 7, 2012, Hoffman was put into isolated housing (also called “the hole”). 

R. 154-13 (Incident Report 11/07/2012 at 1) (Page ID #871). There is a factual dispute as to why 

Hoffman was put in isolated housing—it is not entirely clear whether Hoffman threatened to kill 

himself, threatened to hurt himself without going so far as to threaten to kill himself, threatened 

to hurt others, or some combination. See Opinion & Order at 2–4 (summarizing various parties’ 

and witnesses’ statements about why Hoffman was moved to isolated housing). Although 

potentially relevant to other aspects of Lawrence’s lawsuit, the details of why Hoffman was put 
No. 16-5487, Lawrence v. Madison County et al. 

3 

in isolated housing are not relevant to the sole issue in this appeal, which is whether Jailer 

Thomas is entitled to qualified official immunity on Lawrence’s state-law negligence claim. 

Hoffman committed suicide on November 10, 2012. R. 179-3 (Med. Exam’r Report at 1) 

(Page ID #4045). Hoffman hanged himself using a bedsheet and a plastic bag. Id. (Page ID 

#4045); R. 156-20 (Moody Dep. at 20–21) (Page ID #1392–93). Hoffman threaded the plastic 

bag through a small hole in the air vent and tied the other end of the bag to the bedsheet, which 

he had made into a noose. R. 156-20 (Moody Dep. at 20–21) (Page ID #1392–93). Officer 

Christine Greene went to Hoffman’s cell at 8:42 p.m. and found him hanging from the ceiling. 

R. 179-3 (Med. Exam’r Report at 1) (Page ID #4045); R. 180 (Keeton Dep. at 21) (Page ID 

#4086). Officers unsuccessfully attempted CPR. Id. The coroner pronounced Hoffman dead 

shortly after Greene found him. R. 179-3 (Med. Exam’r Report at 1) (Page ID #4045). 

The MCDC policy in effect on the day of Hoffman’s suicide required officers to check 

every twenty minutes on inmates housed in the hole. R. 180 (Keeton Dep. at 110) (Page ID 

#4175). The evidence indicates that on the evening Hoffman committed suicide, no one checked 

on him for over three hours. Greene checked on Hoffman at 5:11 p.m. and found him dead at 

8:42 p.m., but no one checked on him between 5:11 p.m. and 8:42 p.m. Id. at 22 (Page ID 

#4087). Greene initially disputed that she did not check on Hoffman between 5:11 p.m. and 8:42 

p.m. During an investigation into Hoffman’s death, Greene told detective Michael Keeton that 

she had checked on Hoffman between 5:30 p.m. and 6:00 p.m. and at approximately 7:30 p.m. 

Id. at 21 (Page ID #4086). Greene said that, at 7:30 p.m., Hoffman waved at her and told her he 

was fine. Id. (Page ID #4086). Greene also filled out a log indicating that she had checked on 
No. 16-5487, Lawrence v. Madison County et al. 

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Hoffman several times. Id. at 24 (Page ID #4089). However, the MCDC’s surveillance video 

contradicts the logs and Greene’s statements to Keeton, and shows that in fact Greene did not 

check on Hoffman between 5:11 p.m. and 8:42 p.m. Id. at 22 (Page ID #4087). Keeton 

concluded that Greene was lying when she said she checked on Hoffman between 5:11 p.m. and 

8:42 p.m. and concluded that she had altered the logs. Id. at 22–23 (Page ID #4087–88). 

Keeton asked Thomas about the altered logs. Thomas acknowledged that he knew his 

staff falsified the logs and that he previously had to talk to his staff about not altering the logs. 

R. 180 (Keeton Dep. at 37) (Page ID #4102). Keeton found that there was “a history [and] 

practice” of MCDC staff failing to check on inmates housed in the hole. Id.

B. Procedural History 

Lawrence filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 

Kentucky on November 8, 2013. She brought constitutional and state-law claims against several 

defendants, including Thomas, Greene, and other officers who were on duty at the jail on the 

night Hoffman committed suicide. R. 1 (Compl. at 1, 7–15) (Page ID #1, 7–15). The sole claim 

at issue in this appeal is an individual-capacity state-law negligence claim against Thomas. 

Appellant Br. at 3; Appellee Br. at 3. The district court denied Thomas’s motion for summary 

judgment with respect to the individual-capacity state-law negligence claim against him. 

Opinion & Order at 41. The district court held that Thomas did not have qualified official 

immunity. It determined that the twenty-minute check-in policy “unambiguously imposed a duty 

to perform a concrete act at a fixed interval, with no built-in discretion to deviate from that duty. 

Substantial evidence also supports . . . that Thomas failed to take reasonable steps to enforce the 
No. 16-5487, Lawrence v. Madison County et al. 

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requirement. The check-in requirement thus imposed a ministerial duty.” Id. (footnote omitted). 

It determined that Thomas was “not entitled to qualified immunity for allegedly breaching that 

duty.” Id. Thomas timely appealed. 

II. DISCUSSION 

We have jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal of the denial of qualified official 

immunity. Hedgepath v. Pelphrey, 520 F. App’x 385, 388–89 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Berryman 

v. Rieger, 150 F.3d 561, 563 (6th Cir. 1998)); cf. Marson v. Thomason, 438 S.W.3d 292, 296 

(Ky. 2014). The defendant is entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified official 

immunity only if the undisputed facts (or, if there are disputed facts, the evidence viewed in the 

light most favorable to the plaintiff) establish that the requirements for qualified official 

immunity are satisfied. Hedgepath, 520 F. App’x at 388–89; cf. Rowan Cty. v. Sloas, 201 

S.W.3d 469, 474 (Ky. 2006). We review the district court’s judgment de novo. See Finn v. 

Warren Cty., 768 F.3d 441, 448 (6th Cir. 2014). 

Reviewing de novo, we reach the same conclusion as the district court. Enforcing the 

mandatory twenty-minute check-in policy is a ministerial function, and Thomas is not entitled to 

qualified official immunity for his failure to discharge this ministerial function. 

“Qualified official immunity applies to the negligent performance by a public officer or 

employee of (1) discretionary acts or functions, i.e., those involving the exercise of discretion 

and judgment, or personal deliberation, decision, and judgment; (2) in good faith; and (3) within 

the scope of the employee’s authority.” Yanero v. Davis, 65 S.W.3d 510, 522 (Ky. 2001) 

(citation omitted). Qualified official immunity does not apply to “the negligent performance of a 
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ministerial act, i.e., one that requires only obedience to the orders of others, or when the officer’s 

duty is absolute, certain, and imperative, involving merely execution of a specific act arising 

from fixed and designated facts.” Id. (citation omitted); see also Sloas, 201 S.W.3d at 477–79 

(providing examples of discretionary and ministerial duties). “Whether the employee’s act is 

discretionary, and not ministerial, is the qualifier that must be determined before qualified 

immunity is granted to the governmental employee.” Marson, 438 S.W.3d at 296. 

According to the Kentucky Supreme Court, “a ministerial act is ‘one . . . when the 

officer’s duty is absolute, certain, and imperative, involving merely execution of a specific act 

arising from fixed and designated facts.’” Id. at 297 (quoting Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 522). “[A] 

governmental agent can rightfully be expected to adequately perform the governmental function 

required by the type of job he does. To the extent his job requires certain and specific acts, the 

governmental function is thwarted when he fails to do or negligently performs the required acts.” 

Id. at 296. As such, “failing to properly carry out the government’s commands when the acts are 

known and certain can be” a tort. Id. By contrast, “when performance of the job allows for the 

governmental employee to make a judgment call, or set a policy, the fact that there is uncertainty 

as to what acts will best fulfill the governmental purpose has resulted in immunity being 

extended to those acts where the governmental employee must exercise discretion.” Id.

The key question is whether performing the act is mandatory, not whether the employee 

has some discretion about how to perform it: “[A]n act is not necessarily outside the ministerial 

realm ‘just because the officer performing it has some discretion with respect to the means or 

method to be employed.’” Id. at 297 (quoting Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 522). Even if an employee 
No. 16-5487, Lawrence v. Madison County et al. 

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has some discretion about how to do the act, if the employee “has no choice but to do the act, it 

is ministerial.” Id.

In a case similar to this one, we ruled that under “‘well-settled’ Kentucky law . . . 

although a supervisor’s decision ‘on the content of policies and training is a discretionary 

function, the training of employees to adhere to their duties once that content is decided is a 

ministerial function.’” Finn, 768 F.3d at 449 (quoting Hedgepath, 520 F. App’x at 391). To the 

extent that “the contents of the policy were decided” and supervisors “simply failed to train the 

jailers on how to comply with those policies,” an allegation of failing to train officers to follow a 

policy “implicate[d] a ministerial duty.” Id. (quoting Hedgepath, 520 F. App’x at 391–92). Like 

training, “the supervision of employees is a ministerial act when it merely involved enforcing 

known policies.” Id. (quoting Hedgepath, 520 F. App’x at 391). 

Marson and Finn control the outcome of this case. As in Finn, the content of the policy 

at issue was decided. The policy made it mandatory for jail employees to check every twenty 

minutes on inmates housed in the hole. Because the policy made checking in every twenty 

minutes mandatory, the jail employees had no choice but to check on inmates every twenty 

minutes, and Thomas had no choice but to train the jail employees to comply with the policy and 

supervise them to ensure they were complying with the policy. Thomas “simply failed to train 

the jailers on how to comply with [the] polic[y].” Finn, 768 F.3d at 449 (quoting Hedgepath, 

520 F. App’x at 391–92). Training and supervising the jail employees to follow the mandatory 

twenty-minute check-in policy “involv[ed] merely execution of a specific act”—namely, 

ensuring that jail employees followed the mandatory twenty-minute check-in policy—“arising 
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from fixed and designated facts”—namely, the existence of the mandatory twenty-minute checkin policy. Marson, 438 S.W.3d at 297 (quoting Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 522). Marson makes clear 

that just because Thomas had “some discretion with respect to the means or method to be 

employed” does not mean that training and supervising jail employees to follow the mandatory 

twenty-minute check-in policy was “outside the ministerial realm.” Marson, 438 S.W.3d at 297 

(quoting Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 522). Because he “ha[d] no choice but to do the act” of training 

jail employees to follow the twenty-minute check-in policy, the act “is ministerial.” Id. 

Therefore, training jail employees to follow the jail’s mandatory twenty-minute check-in 

policy is a ministerial function, not a discretionary function. Thomas is not entitled to qualified 

official immunity because he failed to perform a ministerial function. 

Qualified official immunity also does not apply to acts performed in bad faith, which 

“can be predicated on a violation of a constitutional, statutory, or other clearly established right 

which a person in the public employee’s position presumptively would have known was afforded 

to a person in the plaintiff’s position, i.e., objective unreasonableness” or “willfully or 

maliciously intend[ing] to harm the plaintiff or act[ing] with a corrupt motive.” Yanero, 65 

S.W.3d at 523 (citation omitted). Nor does qualified official immunity apply to acts performed 

outside “the scope of the employee’s authority.” Id. at 522. All three criteria (a discretionary 

act, performed in good faith, that is within the scope of the employee’s authority) must be 

satisfied for qualified official immunity to apply. Id. Because the first criterion is not met, we 

do not address the latter two criteria. 
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III. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.