The Honorable Wiley B. McAfee 

District Attorney 

33rd and 424th Judicial Districts 

170 l East Polk Street 

Burnet, Texas 78611 

The Honorable Rebecca Lange 

Llano County Attorney 

801 Ford Street, Room 111 

Llano, Texas 78643 

Dear Mr. McAfee and Ms. Lange: 

KEN PAXTON 

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS 

August 25, 2016 

Opinion No. KP-0111 

Re: Whether a commissioners court may 

impose a vehicle policy that regulates the 

use, deployment, recording, and tracking of 

vehicles used by the sheriff (RQ-0100-KP) 

Both of your request letters concern the authority of a commissioners court and the county 

auditor to adopt ·and administer a county vehicle policy handbook for county officers and 

employees who operate Llano County vehicles. 1 The McAfee Brief states that in January 2016, 

the Llano County Commissioners Court adopted a county driver and vehicle policy handbook 

"intended to apply to all vehicles operated in the course of Llano County business including 

vehicles that have been allocated to the Sheriff and other elected officials." McAfee Brief at 2. 

The Lange Request Letter informs us that the commissioners court repealed the January policy 

handbook and replaced it with a new policy handbook adopted in April 2016. Lange Request 

Letter at 1. Collectively, your questions concern two basic issues: (1) whether a commissioners 

court may adopt a county vehicle policy regulating the use of county vehicles that applies to county 

officers and employees, including the sheriff and employees of the sheriffs office; and (2) whether 

the county auditor may access and examine county records and adopt regulations concerning 

county employees and elected officials'. use of county vehicles. McAfee Request Letter at 1; 

McAfee Brief at 3-5; Lange Request Letter at 2. 

With respect to the first issue, the Texas Constitution grants a commissioners court "such 

powers and jurisdiction over all county business, as is conferred by this Constitution" or the 

Legislature. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 18(b). A commissioners court is a "county's principal 

governing body," and its "powers and duties . . . include aspects of legislative, executive, 

administrative, and judiCial functions." Comm 'rs Ct. of Titus Cty. v. Agan, 940 S.W.2d 77, 79 

1

See generally Letter & Brief from Honorable Wiley 8. McAfee, Dist. Att'y, 33rd and 424th Jud. Dists. to 

Tex. Att'y Gen. (Feb. 26, 2016), ("McAfee Request Letter" & "McAfee Brief," respectively); Letter from Honorable 

Rebecca Lange, Llano Cty. Att'y, to Tex. Att'y Gen. (June 14, 2016) ("Lange Request Letter") 

https ://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov I opinion/requests-for-op in i on-rqs. 
The Honorable Wiley B. McAfee 

The Honorable Rebecca Lange 

Page 2 

(KP-0111) 

(Tex. 1997). A commissioners court's responsibility for county business and to make the county's 

budget is a legislative function, and the commissioners court has broad discretion to oversee the 

county's fiscal operations and policies. Griffin v. Birkman, 266 S.W.3d 189, 194-95 (Tex. App.-

Austin 2008, pet. denied). Duties expressly assigned to the commissioners court include the 

implied authority to exercise powers necessary to accomplish those duties. City of San Antonio v. 

City of Boerne, 111 S.W.3d 22, 28 (Tex. 2003). 

At the same time, the constitution and statutes grant other independent, elected county 

officers a sphere of county authority "within which the Commissioners Court may not interfere or 

usurp." Pritchard & Abbott v. McKenna, 350 S.W.2d 333, 335 (Tex. 1961). This allocation of 

the county's authority to the commissioners court and to other county officers creates a "delicate 

system of checks and balances." Smith v. McCoy, 533 S.W.2d 457, 459 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 

1976, writ dism'd). The limitation on a commissioners court's powers with respect to other elected 

county officials derives from "the policy that elected officers ... discharge the public trust and 

carry the responsibility for the proper discharge of that trust." Abbott v. Pollock, 946 S.W.2d 513, 

517 (Tex. App.-Austin 1997, writ denied). However, an elected county official's exclusive 

sphere of authority consists only of the officer's core duties under the Texas Constitution and 

statutes. See Griffin, 266 S.W.3d at 197. 

The constitution and statutes define the sphere of authority of a county sheriff. TEX. 

CONST. art. V, § 23; see generally Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. KP-0003 (2015) (discussing sheriff's 

constitutional and statutory powers). The sheriff's foremost responsibility is to enforce the law 

within the county as conservator of the peace and keeper of the county jail. See TEX. CODE CRIM. 

PROC. art. 2.17; TEX. Loe. Gov'T CODE § 351.041. The sheriff's law enforcement authority 

implicitly includes "reasonable authority necessary to attain the end result." Fort Bend Cty. 

Wrecker Ass 'n v. Wright, 39 S.W.3d 421, 425 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.). 

The commissioners court and the sheriff both possess authority concerning the county 

vehicles allocated to the sheriff, and to some degree, their respective spheres of authority intersect. 

The commissioners court's authority with respect to county vehicles derives primarily from its 

budgetary discretion to determine the vehicles and other equipment to be allocated to county 

officers such as the sheriff. See Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. Nos. GA-0480 (2006) at 2 (observing that 

"patrol vehicles allocated to a sheriff by a commissioners court are tools to be used by the sheriff 

to perform the sheriff's law enforcement duties"); JC-0214 (2000) at 2 ("The principal power of 

the commissioners court with respect to other county officers like the sheriff is the power of the 

purse strings."). A county vehicle allocated to a county officer or employee remains county 

property, and therefore the commissioners court's authority with respect to the county vehicle 

continues after the vehicle has been allocated to the sheriff. See Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. Nos. GA-0158 

(2004) at 4 ("The sheriff's vehicles belong to the county, which acts through its commissioners 
The Honorable Wiley B. McAfee 

The Honorable Rebecca Lange 

Page 3 

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court."); GA-0308 (2005) at 2-3 (determining that, in particular circumstances, a commissioners 

court may reduce the number of vehicles allocated to the sheriff).2 

In addition to a commissioners court's general fiscal authority, various statutes provide 

specific authority to commissioners courts concerning aspects of county vehicle ownership and 

use. For example, a commissioners court possesses general authority to provide insurance for 

county-owned vehicles. TEX. C1v. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.027(a), (c) (generally authorizing 

governmental units to purchase insurance but limiting its authority to require an employee to 

purchase liability insurance as a condition of employment); see generally Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 

MW-490 (1982) (determining that counties with a population of less than 1.4 million have the 

authority but not the duty to purchase liability insurance for county motor vehicles). And the 

commissioners court has general authority to approve markings on county vehicles, consistent with 

statutory regulations. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE§§ 721.004(a), .005(b)(l)(B); Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. 

No. GA-0158 (2004) at 4 (stating that "the commissioners court exercises ultimate authority over 

the content, design, or placement of any particular decal"). 

However, a commissioners court's oversight authority does not permit it to interfere with 

or usurp the sheriffs authority to use the vehicles, personnel, and other resources that have been 

allocated to the sheriff to perform the duties of that office. See Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. GA-0480 

(2006) at 4. In particular, a commissioners court generally may not interfere with the sheriffs 

responsibility to deploy law enforcement officers and vehicles. See Weber v. City of Sachse, 591 

S.W.2d 563, 567 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, writ dism'd) (determining that the sheriffs 

"decisions as to the deployment of law enforcement officers within the county are left to his 

discretion and judgment since this matter is not specifically prescribed by law"); Tex. Att'y Gen. 

Op. No. JC-0214 (2000) at 5 (determining that a commissioners court does not possess the 

authority to "micro-manage [the sheriffs] deployment of the fleet of cars placed at his disposal"). 

Disciplining deputies also falls within the sheriffs sphere of authority, regardless of whether a 

county vehicle is involved. See TEX. Loe. Gov'T CODE § 85.003(c), (f) ("a deputy serves at the 

pleasure of the sheriff' with certain limitations). Thus, a commissioners court may not adopt a 

county vehicle policy that unreasonably interferes with or usurps the sheriffs authority to use the 

vehicles, personnel, and other resources allocated to the sheriff to perform the duties of that office. 

See Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. JC-0239 (2000) at 4 (stating that "[a] commissioners court that adopts 

2While a commissioners court assigns county vehicles to the sheriff, a sheriff may also receive a vehicle 

forfeited to the state under chapter 59 of the Code of Criminal Procedure "to maintain, repair, use, and operate [the 

vehicle] for official purposes," pursuant to an agreement between the attorney representing the state and the law 

enforcement agency. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 59.06(b). Article 59.06 assigns duties to a commissioners court 

but does not address formulation of policy concerning such a vehicle. See id. art. 59 .06(b-I) (commissioners court 

may revoke a sheriff's loan of a forfeited vehicle to another agency or district), (d) (forfeiture proceeds budget to be 

submitted to the commissioners court). Nevertheless, it is conceivable that a sheriff's use of a forfeited vehicle could 

implicate matters within the commissioners court's authority, particularly if such use impacts the fiscal operations of 

the county. 
The Honorable Wiley B. McAfee 

The Honorable Rebecca Lange 

Page 4 

(KP-0111) 

a policy to keep employees from following their supervising county official's instructions [might] 

unlawfully interfere in the official's sphere of authority"). 

Just as the commissioners court may not usurp or unreasonably interfere with the sheriffs 

core constitutional and statutory duties, however, the sheriff may not frustrate the commissioners 

court in the performance of its responsibilities. See Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. Nos. JC-0214 (2001) at 

6-7 (determining that a sheriff may not interfere with the commissioners court's budgetary 

authority by not turning in an old vehicle); JM-910 (1988) at 10 (determining that county officers 

were required to comply with requirements of a county personnel policies manual "so long as those 

requirements do not interfere with the proper operation of the other constitutional or statutory 

county ... offices"). In particular matters, a commissioners court may establish broad operational 

guidelines provided they do not unreasonably interfere with the performance of an independent 

officer's official duties. See Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. Nos. GA-1018 (2013) at 2-3 (commissioners 

court may establish reasonable office use policy); JM-1098 (1989) at 2 (determining that whether 

a commissioners court may promulgate smoking regulations in county jail depends on particular 

facts); H-1190 (1978) at 2-3 (determining that a commissioners court may provide broad 

operational guidelines applicable to a jail). 

Both request letters ask about the commissioners court's authority to adopt the specific 

policies in the original and subsequent county driver and vehicle policy handbooks. McAffee 

Request Letter at 1; McAfee Brief at 3-5; Lange Request Letter at 1. We are unable to provide 

you with an item-by-item review of either handbook. In Attorney General Opinion GA-0994, this 

office observed that in the event the sheriffs office policy and the commissioners court's county 

policy conflict, determining which policy prevails "would require an analysis of the specific 

subject of the policies to determine whether, under the facts and applicable law, the sheriff or the 

commissioners court possesses final policymaking authority." Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. GA-0994 

(2013) at 2 n.2. Such an analysis is not within the scope of an attorney general opinion because 

this office does not construe county ordinances or policies or resolve fact questions, which are 

matters for the commissioners court to determine in the first instance, subject to judicial review. 

See Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. JM-1098 (1989) at 2-3 (declining to answer whether the 

commissioners court's broad operational guidelines prevail over the sheriffs rules concerning the 

operation of the jail); see also Tex. Att'y Gen. L0-93-107 at 1 ("It is not within the purview of 

this office to construe local governmental bodies' personnel manuals[.]"). Ultimately, whether a 

particular county vehicle policy may apply to the sheriffs office depends on ( 1) whether the policy 

is within the authority of the commissioners court and, if so, (2) whether the policy usurps or 

unreasonably interferes with the performance of the sheriffs constitutional or statutory duties. See 

Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. GA-1018 (2013) at 2-3. 

Ms. Lange also asks whether a county auditor possesses the authority to access and 

examine county records and adopt and enforce regulations "to ensure" county vehicles are used 

for "legitimate public purposes" and "to protect the county against legal claims and excessive or 

improper use of county equipment." Lange Request Letter at 2. While not elected, a county 

auditor nevertheless possesses "an impressive array of independent administrative duties and 

discretionary powers." Comm 'rs Ct. of Harris Cty. v. Fullerton, 596 S.W.2d 572, 576 (Tex. Civ. 
The Honorable Wiley B. McAfee 

The Honorable Rebecca Lange 

Page 5 

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App.-Houston [l st Dist.] 1980, writ ref d n.r.e.). Like other county officials, county auditors 

have the powers the law expressly grants and the implied powers necessary to perform the powers 

expressly granted. See Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. GA-1002 (2013) at 1. The Local Government 

Code grants the auditor "general oversight of the books and records of a county, district, or state 

officer authorized or required by law to receive or collect money or other property that is intended 

for the use of the county or that belongs to the county." TEX. Loe. Gov'T CODE§ 112.006(a). The 

auditor possesses a right of "continual access" to all records of officers concerning county financial 

matters. Id. § 115.001. The county auditor's oversight duties authorize the auditor to examine an 

officer's records concerning not only county money but also county property. See Tex. Att'y Gen. 

Op. No. GA-1002(2013) at 2. The auditor must "see to the strict enforcement of the law governing 

county finances." TEX. Loe. Gov'T CODE § 112.006(b). The auditor may impose reasonable 

reporting requirements on county officers in aid of the auditor's fiscal examination and reporting 

duties. See Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. JM-1275 (1990) at 2-3. 

A county auditor's authority to impose requirements on other county officers is limited to 

that necessary to the performance of the auditor's duties, however. A county auditor may not 

access records of a county officer that do not pertain to the auditor's duty to investigate and report 

on county financial matters. See Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. JM-1186 (1990) at 4-5 (determining 

that county auditor could not require a constable to provide a monthly record of civil papers 

received and served when no fee was involved). Also, a county auditor may not exercise the right 

of access to an officer's records in a manner that divests the officer of reasonable control over the 

records. Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. GA-1002 (2013) at 2-3. Finally, a county auditor's authority to 

"see to the strict enforcement of the law" is limited to laws governing county finances. TEX. Loe. 

Gov'T CODE§ 112.006(b); see also Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. Nos. JM-1186 (1990) at 4 ("[I]t is not 

generally within the province of the auditor to ensure that county officers and employees are 

complying with the duties of their office or employment imposed on them by law where such 

efforts are not necessary to the accomplishment of the auditor's statutory duties."); M-756 (1970) 

at 5 (county auditor not entitled to examine a sheriffs records to determine whether prisoners were 

released before their sentences ended). Thus, whether a county auditor may impose a requirement 

on other county officers depends on whether the requirement (1) is reasonably necessary to the 

performance of an auditor's duties and (2) does not usurp or unreasonably interfere with the 

performance of the officer's constitutional or statutory duties.3 See Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. GA07 44 (2009) at 3 (determining that an auditor may not adopt requirements that would usurp or 

unreasonably interfere with another county officer's statutory authority). 

3 A commissioners court may assign appropriate responsibilities to a county auditor in addition to the 

auditor's statutory duties. See Agan, 940 S.W.2d at 80-81 (determining that a commissioners court could delegate 

to a county auditor "a function that the Legislature has not exclusively delegated to ... another appropriate county 

official"). However, a commissioners court may not grant a county auditor authority that usurps or unreasonably 

interferes with another independent officer's performance of constitutional or statutory duties. See id. at 82; Tex. 

Att'y Gen. Op. No. JM-1074 (1989) at 4 (determining that a commissioners court cannot confer on an agent or officer 

authority the court itself cannot exercise). 
The Honorable Wiley B. McAfee 

The Honorable Rebecca Lange 

Page 6 

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SUMMARY 

A commissioners court may enact county vehicle policies 

applicable to a vehicle used by the sheriff only to the extent that it 

does not unreasonably interfere with the sheriffs constitutional or 

statutory duties. Whether the sheriff or the commissioners court 

possesses final policymaking authority with respect to a specific 

vehicle policy will depend on specific facts and applicable law, the 

determination of which is not within the scope of an attorney general 

opm1on. 

A county auditor may access county records pertaining to the 

use of county vehicles and impose vehicle use requirements on other 

county officers only in aid of the auditor's fiscal examination and 

reporting duties and only to the extent the requirements do not 

unreasonably interfere with the officer's constitutional or statutory 

duties. 

JEFFREY C. MATEER 

First Assistant Attorney General 

BRANTLEY STARR 

Deputy First Assistant Attorney General 

VIRGINIA K. HOELSCHER 

Chair, Opinion Committee 

WILLIAM A. HILL 

Very truly yours, 

KEN PAXTON 

Attorney General of Texas 

Assistant Attorney General, Opinion Committee