Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-23-00548-CV

Jose Carlos RAMOS,

Appellant

v.

URBAN, LLC D/B/A ReBar,

Appellee

From the 224th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2022-CI-13450

Honorable H. Paul Canales, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

Sitting: Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

Beth Watkins, Justice

Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice

Delivered and Filed: August 7, 2024

AFFIRMED

Appellant Jose Carlos Ramos appeals the trial court’s April 24, 2023 order granting 

summary judgment in favor of appellee Urban, LLC. Ramos argues the trial court erred by granting 

Urban’s summary judgment motion on limitations grounds because (1) the Texas Supreme Court’s 

COVID-19 emergency orders granted the trial court discretion to toll the statute of limitations, 

(2) the trial court abused its discretion by failing to toll the statute of limitations, and (3) Urban did 

not carry its burden to conclusively negate the tolling of the statute of limitations pursuant to the 

emergency orders. We affirm.
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BACKGROUND

Ramos worked as a bouncer for Urban’s bar, ReBar. On June 12, 2020, during a shift, an 

intoxicated individual shot Ramos in the arm after Ramos had refused entry to him. Ramos filed 

suit against Urban on July 19, 2022, more than two years after the incident. Urban moved for 

summary judgment on limitations grounds, and the trial court granted the motion on April 24, 

2023. Ramos then filed this appeal.1

SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON LIMITATIONS GROUNDS

Ramos argues (1) the Supreme Court’s COVID-19 emergency orders granted trial courts

discretion to toll the statute of limitations, (2) the trial court abused its discretion by failing to 

exercise its discretion to toll the statute of limitations, and (3) the trial court erred by concluding 

Urban carried its burden by conclusively negating the tolling of the statute of limitations. 

A. Standard of Review & Law

“The standard for reviewing a summary judgment under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 

166a(c) is whether the successful movant at the trial level carried its burden of showing that there 

is no genuine issue of material fact and that judgment should be granted as a matter of law.” Gill 

v. Hill, 688 S.W.3d 863, 868 (Tex. 2024) (quoting KPMG Peat Marwick v. Harrison Cnty. Hous. 

Fin. Corp., 988 S.W.2d 746, 748 (Tex. 1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A defendant 

moving for summary judgment on the affirmative defense of limitations has the burden to 

conclusively establish that defense.” Id. (quoting KPMG Peat Marwick, 988 S.W.2d at 748) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). “Furthermore, to succeed on limitations at the summaryjudgment stage, the movant ‘must also conclusively negate application of the discovery rule and 

1 Ramos also filed suit against two additional parties, but he has since nonsuited his claims against those parties.
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any tolling doctrines pleaded as an exception to limitations.’” Id. (quoting Draughon v. Johnson, 

631 S.W.3d 81, 85 (Tex. 2021)).

“However, a summary-judgment movant does not have the burden of proof to negate every

potential challenge to a limitations defense.” Id. A “defendant has the burden regarding any issues 

raised that affect the running of limitations.” Id.; Draughon, 631 S.W.3d at 88 (“First, the 

defendant has the burden regarding any issues raised that affect which days count toward the 

running of limitations—such as accrual, the discovery rule, and tolling.”). 

“Thus, to obtain traditional summary judgment on a limitations defense, the defendant must 

conclusively prove (1) when the cause of action accrued, and (2) that the plaintiff brought its suit 

later than the applicable number of years thereafter—i.e., that ‘the statute of limitations has run.’”

Draughon, 631 S.W.3d at 89 (quoting Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 

211, 220 (Tex. 2004)). “So if the nonmovant challenges the date on which the limitations period 

began or argues that limitations did not expire before suit was filed (due to tolling or some other 

doctrine), a movant must conclusively disprove the nonmovant’s allegations to carry its summaryjudgment burden.” Gill, 688 S.W.3d at 868. “In sum, a plaintiff’s assertion that the statute of 

limitations was tolled falls within the category of issues affecting the running of limitations on 

which the moving defendant bears the burden.” Draughon, 631 S.W.3d at 92. Unless “the 

defendant has conclusively established its entitlement to traditional summary judgment,” “the 

burden does not shift to the plaintiff.” Id. at 90.2

“Undisputed evidence may be conclusive of the absence of a material fact issue, but only 

if reasonable people could not differ in their conclusions as to that evidence.” Buck v. Palmer, 381 

2 Then, “if the defendant carries that burden and conclusively establishes its defense, the plaintiff can avoid summary 

judgment by raising a genuine issue of material fact on any equitable defense that its suit should not be barred even 

though the limitations period has run—such as fraudulent concealment, estoppel, or diligent service.” Id. at 89; see 

TEX. R. CIV. P. 94 (providing affirmative defenses discussed in Draughon). 
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S.W.3d 525, 527 (Tex. 2012). If the evidence is undisputed and conclusive of the absence of a 

material fact issue, the question of whether a plaintiff is entitled to recover is a question of law, 

which we review de novo. See, e.g., Buck, 381 S.W.3d at 527; Jones v. Wright, 667 S.W.3d 444, 

449 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2023, no pet.); Lewis v. Ally Fin. Inc., No. 11-12-00290-CV, 2014 

WL 6997668, at *3 (Tex. App.—Eastland Dec. 4, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.); Kessling v. 

Friendswood Indep. Sch. Dist., 302 S.W.3d 373, 379 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. 

denied).

B. Analysis

Turning to the record, the material facts are not in dispute: Ramos’s claim accrued on June 

12, 2020, the day of the shooting, and Ramos filed his lawsuit on July 19, 2022—two years and 

thirty-seven days after the shooting.

3

When Urban moved for traditional summary judgment, it argued the statute of limitations 

had expired based on the foregoing facts and further contended the Texas Supreme Court’s 

emergency orders did not toll the statute of limitations and thereby make Ramos’s lawsuit timely. 

In support of its contention, it included as exhibits the First Emergency Order Regarding the 

COVID-19 State of Disaster and the Eighth Emergency Order Regarding the COVID-19 State of 

Disaster. See First Emergency Ord. Regarding COVID-19 State of Disaster, 596 S.W.3d 265 (Tex. 

2020); Eighth Emergency Ord. Regarding COVID-19 State of Disaster, 597 S.W.3d 844 (Tex. 

2020). Urban noted Ramos cited and relied upon the First Emergency Order as tolling the statute 

of limitations in his petition. Urban explained, however, that the First Emergency Order did not 

apply because the language in the order expired on June 1, 2020, pursuant to the Eighth Emergency 

3 Nor does any party dispute the applicable statute of limitations is “two years after the day the cause of action accrues.” 

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.003(a).
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Order. It further noted even if the statute of limitations had been tolled for thirty days, Ramos filed 

suit more than two years and thirty-seven days after the shooting. 

Ramos opposed the motion, explaining Urban ignored the “broad grant of discretion” to 

trial courts to “modify or suspend any and all deadlines and procedures, whether prescribed by 

statute, rule or order . . . [specifying a date certain]” provided by the Texas Supreme Court in the 

subsequent emergency orders issued between October 1, 2020 and October 1, 2021. See TwentySixth Emergency Ord. Regarding COVID-19 State of Disaster, 609 S.W.3d 135, 135 (Tex. 2020); 

Twenty-Ninth Emergency Ord. Regarding COVID-19 State of Disaster, 629 S.W.3d 863, 863 (Tex. 

2020); Thirty-Third Emergency Ord. Regarding COVID-19 State of Disaster, 629 S.W.3d 179, 

179–80 (Tex. 2021); Thirty-Sixth Emergency Ord. Regarding COVID-19 State of Disaster, 629 

S.W.3d 897, 897 (Tex. 2021); Thirty-Eighth Emergency Ord. Regarding COVID-19 State of 

Disaster, 629 S.W.3d 900, 900 (Tex. 2021); Fortieth Emergency Ord. Regarding COVID-19 State 

of Disaster, 629 S.W.3d 911, 912 (Tex. 2021). Ramos also argued the statute of limitations was 

tolled during that period.4

Urban filed an amended motion for summary judgment reiterating its original arguments 

and contending that at the time Ramos filed suit, none of the emergency orders he cited were in 

effect. Instead, the Fifty-First Emergency Order Regarding the COVID-19 State of Disaster was 

in effect, and the order includes no language extending deadlines in civil cases.5 Urban explained 

that as a result there was no emergency order in place to extend the statute of limitations in this 

case when Ramos filed suit. After the summary judgment hearing, the trial court granted Urban’s 

4 Ramos also “move[d] that the court order that the statute of limitations in this case be decreed suspended for the 

period of October 1, 2020 through October 21, 2021.”

5 The Fifty-First Emergency Order was included as an exhibit to the amended motion.
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motion, explaining the latest order did not include language permitting it to toll the statute of 

limitations. 

Here, because it is undisputed Ramos filed suit more than two years after the incident, we 

need only determine whether Urban conclusively established its defense that the statute of 

limitations had run by conclusively negating any tolling. See Gill, 688 S.W.3d at 868; Draughon, 

631 S.W.3d at 85. Ramos opposed Urban’s summary judgment motion by contending the TwentySixth Emergency Order, Twenty-Ninth Emergency Order, Thirty-Third Emergency Order, ThirtySixth Emergency Order, Thirty-Eighth Emergency Order, and Fortieth Emergency Order tolled 

the statute of limitations, rendering his lawsuit timely. We therefore review whether the trial court 

erred when it concluded those emergency orders did not toll the statute of limitations. See, e.g.,

Buck, 381 S.W.3d at 527; Jones, 667 S.W.3d at 449.

We construe statutes and court orders pursuant to their plain meaning. See, e.g., Kim v. 

Ramos, 632 S.W.3d 258, 269 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2021, no pet.) (“We interpret court 

orders, like the Texas Supreme Court’s Twenty-Ninth Emergency Order, according to the plain 

meaning of their terms.”); W. Harwood 334B Land Tr. v. Clement, No. 02-20-00216-CV, 2021 

WL 1229973, at *5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 1, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“These principles 

clearly apply to our construction of Government Code Section 22.0035(b)—the authority 

underlying the Seventeenth Order—and we see no reason not to apply them also to our 

construction of the order itself.”); see also Clay Expl., Inc. v. Santa Rosa Operating, LLC, 442 

S.W.3d 795, 798 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (providing “legal effect of a 

court order are questions of law that we determine de novo based on the plain language 

of . . . order” (citing F.F.P. Operating Partners, L.P. v. Duenez, 237 S.W.3d 680, 683 (Tex.

2007)). Each of those emergency orders provides, in pertinent part the orders are “issued pursuant 

to Section 22.0035(b) of the Texas Government Code.” See Twenty-Sixth Emergency Ord., 609 
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S.W.3d at 135; Twenty-Ninth Emergency Ord., 629 S.W.3d at 863; Thirty-Third Emergency Ord., 

629 S.W.3d at 179–80; Thirty-Sixth Emergency Ord., 629 S.W.3d at 897; Thirty-Eighth 

Emergency Ord., 629 S.W.3d at 900; Fortieth Emergency Ord., 629 S.W.3d at 912. Texas 

Government Code section 22.0035(b) allows the Texas Supreme Court to “modify or suspend 

procedures for the conduct of any court proceeding affected by a disaster during the pendency of 

a disaster declared by the governor.” TEX. GOV’T CODE § 22.0035(b). It further provides any such

order “may not extend for more than 90 days from the date the order was signed unless renewed 

by the chief justice of the supreme court.” Id.

Each of the emergency orders further provides: 

Subject only to constitutional limitations, all courts in Texas may in any case, civil 

or criminal—and must to avoid risk to court staff, parties, attorneys, jurors, and the 

public—without a participant’s consent:

a. except as provided in paragraph (b)6

, modify or suspend any and all 

deadlines and procedures, whether prescribed by statute, rule, or order . . . .

See Twenty-Sixth Emergency Ord. Regarding COVID-19 State of Disaster, 609 S.W.3d 135, 135

(Tex. 2020); Twenty-Ninth Emergency Ord. Regarding COVID-19 State of Disaster, 629 S.W.3d 

863, 863 (Tex. 2020); Thirty-Third Emergency Ord. Regarding COVID-19 State of Disaster, 629 

S.W.3d 179, 179–80 (Tex. 2021); Thirty-Sixth Emergency Ord. Regarding COVID-19 State of 

Disaster, 629 S.W.3d 897, 897 (Tex. 2021); Thirty-Eighth Emergency Ord. Regarding COVID-19 

State of Disaster, 629 S.W.3d 900, 900 (Tex. 2021); Fortieth Emergency Ord. Regarding COVID19 State of Disaster, 629 S.W.3d 911, 912 (Tex. 2021).7 “Case” means “[a] civil or criminal 

6 Paragraph (b) addresses proceedings under Subtitle E, Title 5 of the Family Code. 

7 The language in the Fortieth Emergency Order is identical, except it excludes the language providing courts “must 

[modify or suspend deadlines or procedures] to avoid risk to court staff, parties, attorneys, jurors, and the public.”
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proceeding, action, suit, or controversy at law or in equity.” Case, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY

(12th ed. 2024), available at Westlaw; TEX. GOV’T CODE § 311.011. 

Each of the emergency orders further provides their “effective” and “expir[ation]” dates.

See Twenty-Sixth Emergency Ord., 609 S.W.3d at 138; Twenty-Ninth Emergency Ord., 629 

S.W.3d at 866; Thirty-Third Emergency Ord., 629 S.W.3d at 182; Thirty-Sixth Emergency Ord., 

629 S.W.3d at 899; Thirty-Eighth Emergency Ord., 629 S.W.3d at 902; Fortieth Emergency Ord., 

629 S.W.3d at 913. “Effective” means “in operation at a given time.” Effective, BLACK’S LAW 

DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024), available at Westlaw. “Expire” means “to be no longer legally 

effective; to become null at a time fixed beforehand” or “to come to an end.” Expire, BLACK’S 

LAW DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024), available at Westlaw. The emergency orders were therefore in 

operation from October 1, 2020—the effective date of the Twenty-Sixth Emergency Order—

through October 1, 2021—when they came to an end pursuant to the expiration date of the Fortieth

Emergency Order. See Twenty-Sixth Emergency Ord., 609 S.W.3d at 138; Twenty-Ninth 

Emergency Ord., 629 S.W.3d at 866; Thirty-Third Emergency Ord., 629 S.W.3d at 182; ThirtySixth Emergency Ord., 629 S.W.3d at 899; Thirty-Eighth Emergency Ord., 629 S.W.3d at 902; 

Fortieth Emergency Ord., 629 S.W.3d at 913. The Fortieth Emergency Order further provided it 

was “intended to be the final renewal of” the paragraph providing the trial courts the power to 

modify or suspend any and all deadlines and procedures in proceedings, except in justice and 

municipal court proceedings. Fortieth Emergency Ord., 629 S.W.3d at 913. 

Taken together, the emergency orders provided all trial courts with discretion to modify or 

suspend any and all deadlines and procedures in any case between October 1, 2020 and October 

1, 2021. A previously noted, Ramos filed his case on July 19, 2022. At that time, the effective 

emergency order was the Fifty-First Emergency Order. See Fifty-First Emergency Ord. Regarding 

COVID-19 State of Disaster, 660 S.W.3d 98 (Tex. 2022). The Fifty-First Emergency Order, also 
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in effect at the time Ramos’s statute of limitations expired a little over a month earlier, does not 

contain language of any kind tolling any deadlines or statutes of limitation. See Fifty-First 

Emergency Ord., 660 S.W.3d at 99. Urban therefore carried its burden to conclusively establish 

its defense of statute of limitations and conclusively negated the application of any tolling. See 

Gill, 688 S.W.3d at 868; cf. Kim, 632 S.W.3d at 269–70 (“When the trial court granted Ramos’s 

third motion for extension of time to serve an expert report and later denied Dr. Kim’s motion to 

dismiss, the Texas Supreme Court’s Twenty-Ninth Emergency Order was in effect” and “under its 

plain terms” the emergency order “permitted the trial court, in its broad discretion, to extend the 

deadline for Ramos to serve his expert report on Dr. Kim.”). The burden then shifted to Ramos to 

raise a genuine issue of material fact. See Lujan v. Navistar, Inc., 555 S.W.3d 79, 84 (Tex. 2018)

(“If the movant carries this burden, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to raise a genuine issue of 

material fact precluding summary judgment.”). But Ramos did not raise any material facts

precluding summary judgment. 

Accordingly, we cannot conclude the trial court erred by granting Urban’s motion for 

summary judgment.

CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s April 24, 2023 order granting Urban’s motion for summary 

judgment.

Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice