UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA JENNIFER B. CAMPBELL, : : Plaintiff, : Civil Action No.: 12-01769 (RC) : v. : Re Document No.: 84 : DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, : : Defendant. :
MEMORANDUM OPINION
G RANTING IN P ART AND D ENYING IN P ART P LAINTIFF ’ S M OTION FOR F EES AND C OSTS
I. INTRODUCTION Plaintiff Dr. Jennifer Campbell brought suit against her former employer, the District of Columbia, in 2012. See Compl., ECF No.1. Dr. Campbell alle ged that the District acted unlawfully when, amidst allegati ons that Dr. Campbell had steer ed contracts, the District terminated her employment as C hief Operating Officer of the Dis trict’s Department of Health Care Finance. See id. ¶¶ 6–99. After a five-day jury trial held in December 2015, a jury found for Dr. Campbell on her constitutional claim, brought under 42 U.S. C. § 1983. See Verdict Form at 2, ECF No. 65. The jury awarded Dr. Campbell $250,000.00 in com pensatory damages for her physical pain, emotional distress, humiliation, embarrassment, inconvenience, and medical
expenses. See id. at 3; see also Jury Instrs. at 39–40, ECF No. 66 (instructing the jury to awa rd monetary damages for physical pain, emotional distress, humiliation, embarrassment, inconvenience, and medical expens es, but not for lost wages or other employment benefits). The Court added $304,823 in financial dam ages to which the Districthad stipulated. See Joint Pretrial Statement at 2, ECF No. 41.2 Dr. Campbell now moves for atto rney’s fees and costs under 42 U .S.C. § 1988, and she also urges the Court to adopt an enhancement multiplier. See Pl.’s Mem. P. & A. Supp. Mot. Fees & Costs at 1–2, ECF No. 84-2 [he reinafter Pl.’s Mem.]; Pl. ’s Reply Def.’s Opp’n Pl.’s Mot. Fees & Costs at 3, 10–13, ECF No. 1 01 [hereinafter Pl.’s Reply] . The District agrees that Dr. Campbell should receive a f ee award, but it argues that her requested fees and costs are too high and that an enhancement is not appropriate. See D.C.’s Opp’n Pl.’s M ot. Attorneys’ Fees at 1, ECF No. 96 [hereinafter Def.’s Opp’n]. The Court concludes t hat, for the most part, Dr. Campbell’s requested fees a re, in light of her voluntary re ductions, reasonable. But the Court declines to award fees for dupli cative time spent at trial and will make minor additional reductions to account for aberrat ions in Dr. Campbell’s attorne ys’ billing records. The Court also determines that an enhancemen t is not appropriate and that Dr. Campbell’s requested costs include inappropriate items. A ccordingly, the Court will grant in part and deny in part Dr. Campbell’s motion.

II. LEGAL STANDARD In a civil rights suit brou ght under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the dist rict court may, in its discretion, award reasonable atto rney’s fees to the prevailing party. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b); Talley v. District of Columbia , 433 F. Supp. 2d 5, 7 (D.D.C. 2006). In doing so, the Court fo llows a two-step inquiry: first, the court must determine whether the p arty seeking attorney’s fees is the prevailing party; second, the cour t must determine whether the requested fees are reasonable. See Turner v. D.C. Bd. of Elections & Ethics , 354 F.3d 890, 895 (D.C. Cir. 2004)) (“The plaintiff . . . bears the burden of establishi ng both entitlement to an award o f attorney’s fees as well as the amount properly due.”).3 A prevailing party “is one who ha s been awarded some relief by a court.” Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res. , 532 U.S. 598, 603 (2001). A litigant need not succe ed at every step of the litigation to be a prevailing party under § 1988; indeed, “a litigant ‘who is unsuccessful at a stage of litigati on that was a necessary step to her ultimate victory is entitled to attorney’s fees even for the un successful stage.’” Air Transp. Ass’n of Can. v. FAA , 156 F.3d 1329, 1335 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (quoting Cabrales v. Cty. of L.A. , 935 F.2d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 1991)). If the Court determines that a plaintiff is the prevailing part y, the court must then determine whether the fe es sought are reasonable. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b); Turner , 354 F.3d at 895. “The most useful starting poi nt for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplie d by a reasonable hourly rate.” Hensley v. Eckerhart , 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). The plain tiff bears the burden of d emonstrating that the number of hours spent on aparticular task is reasonab le. See Role Models Am., Inc. v.
Brownlee , 353 F.3d 962, 969–70 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (citing Blum v. Stenson , 465 U.S. 886, 896 n.11 (1984)). To that end, the pl aintiff’s “supporting document ation must be of sufficient detail and probative value to enable the court to determine with a hig h degree of certainty that such hours were actually and reasonably expended.” Id. at 970 (quoting In re Olson , 884 F.2d 1415, 1428 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (brackets and internal quotation marks om itted)). The district court should exclude from a fee request “hour s that were not ‘reasonably exp ended,’” including hours “that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.” Hensley , 461 U.S. at 434 (quoting S. Rep. No. 94-1101, at 6 (1976)). A plaintiff can demonstrate a r easonable hourly rate (or “lodes tar”) by submitting evidence of “the attorneys’ bil ling practices; th e attorneys’ s kill, experience, and reputation; and4 the prevailing market rates in the relevant community.” Covington v. District of Columbia , 57 F.3d 1101, 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1995). In this circuit, plaintiffs m ay also demonstrate a reasonable hourly rate by relying on evidence such as an updated version o f the Laffey Matrix created by the United States Attorney’s Office. Id. at 1109. 1 Although a district court maynot relieve plaintiffs of their obligation to demonstrat e that rates such as those in the Laffey Matrix are reasonable, see Eley v. District of Columbia , 793 F.3d 97, 105 (D.C. Cir. 2015), the Laffey Matrix can “provide a useful starting point.” Covington , 57 F.3d at 1109. In exceptional circumstances whe n “an enhanced award may be jus tified,” a court may take a third step and apply an additional multiplier. Hensley , 461 U.S. at 435. “[T]here may be circumstances in which the basi c standard of reasonable rates multiplied by reasonably expended hours results in a fee that is . . . unreasonably low.” Blum , 465 U.S. at 897. But because “there are a few such circumstances,” these “‘rare’ and ‘exceptional’” circumstances “require specific evidence that the lodestar fee would not have been adequate to attract competent counsel.” Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn , 559 U.S. 542, 554 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Blum , 465 U.S. at 897).

1 The Laffey Matrix is a fee schedule used by s ome courts to determine reaso nable hourly rates for legal work. See generally Laffey v. Nw. Airlines, Inc. 572 F. Supp. 354, 371–75 (D.D.C. 1983) (establishing the first Laffey fee matrix, in the context of a longstanding employment discrimination class action), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds , 746 F.2d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1984), overruled in part on other grounds , Save Our Cumberland Mountains, Inc. v. Hodel , 857 F.2d 1516 (D.C. Cir. 1988)). The Unite d States Attorney’s Offic e for the District of Columbia prepares the matrix for use in cases in which a “fee-shifting” statute allows prevailing plaintiffs to recover their attorney’s fees. See Eley v. District of Columbia , 793 F.3d 97, 101 (D.C. Cir. 2015); see also, e.g. , USAO Attorney’s F ees Matrix – 2015 – 2016 , Civil Div. of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for D.C., http s://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/fil e/796471/download (last visited July 29, 2016). Updated Laffey Matrix rates are available through the U.S. Attorney’s Office’ s website. See Civil Division , U.S. Attorney’s Office for D.C., https://www.justice.gov/usao -dc/ civil-division (last update d Dec. 1, 2015) (publishing links to Laffey matrices at the bottom of the webpage).5 III. ANALYSIS Dr. Campbell requests fees for t he work of eight attorneys and one paralegal. 2 In support of her request, Dr. Campbell has provided billing records that provide descriptions of the work performed, the number of hours spent on various tasks, and the applicable rates for each individual. See generally Billing Records, Pl.’s Reply E x. A, ECF No. 101-2. The Distric t does not dispute that Dr. Campbell is the prevailing party, nor does the District argue against applying the 2015–2016 Laffey Matrix to determine reasonable hourly rates for Dr. Campbell’s attorneys.

2 The individuals listed in Dr. C ampbell’s initial request are: Anabia Hasan, Katie Lampron, Alan Lescht, Sara Mc Donough, Rani Rolston, Sara Safrie t, Constance Travanty, and paralegal Sandra Valiente. See Pl.’s Mot. Fees & Costs at 1– 2, ECF No. 84 [hereinafter Pl.’s Mot.]. In Dr. Campbell’s reply fil ings, she requests fees for a n additional 100.0 hours of work performed by Ms. McDonough, Ms. Saf riet, and Ms. Valiente, as w ell as an additional attorney, August Johannsen. See Johannsen Billing Reco rds, Pl.’s Reply Ex. A at 3, ECF No. 101 -2 (documenting 3.3 hours of work performed on Dr. Campbell’s case ); McDonough Am. Billing Records, Pl.’s Reply Ex. A at 10–12, ECF No. 101-2 (documenting 45.8 hours of work performed on Dr. Campbell’s case that are not included in the e xhibits to Dr. Campbell’s initial fee motion); Safriet Am. Billi ng Records, Pl.’s Reply Ex. A at 30–32, ECF No. 101-2 (documenting 48.8 additional hours); Valiente Am. Billing Recor ds, Pl.’s Reply Ex. A at 40, ECF No. 101-2 (documenting 1.8 additional hours). These additional hours consist principally of time spent opposi ng the District’s post-trial motion, which this Court later denied, see Campbell v. District of Columbia , No. 12-1769, 2016 WL 3023977 (D.D.C. May 25, 2016), as well as time spent litigat ing this fee petition, see, e.g. , McDonough Am. Billing Records, Pl.’s Reply Ex. A at 11–12 (requ esting fees for time spent preparing the reply in support of Dr. Campbell’s fee petition). These hours are thus compensable under fee-shifting statutes. See Grano v. Barry , 783 F.2d 1104, 1113–14 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (observing, in the context of amotion for fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, that “[i]t is . . . a longstanding rule that hours reasonably devoted to litigating a ttorneys’ fees are compensable”); see, e.g. , Castle v. Bentsen , 872 F. Supp. 1062, 1068 (D.D.C. 1995) (awarding fees in a Tit le VII case for time spent opposing a mo tion for judgment notwithstand ing the verdict). The Court notes that Dr. Campbe ll first raised these additional hours in her reply brief, after the District filed its opposition. Given that the Distric t has not requested leave to file a surreply, the Court will consider Dr. Campbell’s additional hours as part of her initial fee request. See generally, e.g. , Conservation Force v. Salazar , 916 F. Supp. 2d 15, 30–31 (D.D.C. 2013) (awarding fees for work tha t was first documented in a pl aintiff’s reply brief). The Court will accordingly analyze them unde r the objections from the Dis trict’s opposition, just as the Court will do for the hours Dr. C ampbell submitted in her initi al fee request.6 See Def.’s Opp’n at 1, 3. 3 Therefore, the Court will not address these issues and will us e the
2015–2016 Laffey Matrix to determine hourly rates for Dr. Campbell’s attorneys. See USAO Attorney’s Fees Matrix – 2015 – 2016 , Civil Div. of the U.S. Atto rney’s Office for D.C., https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/ file/796471/download (last visi ted July 29, 2016). The District does argue, however, (1) that Dr . Campbell’s attorneys failed t o exercise required billing judgment in a number of ways, s o the Court should reduce their total claimed hours by thirty percent; 4 (2) that Dr. Campbell should not receive an enhanced fee award ; and (3) that Dr. Campbell’s request for costs includes improper items. See Def.’s Opp’n at 4–10. In response, Dr. Campbell opposes most of the D istrict’s contentions and ins ists that an enhanced fee award is appropriate, but she has voluntar ily reduced some of her claime d hours and costs. See Pl.’s Reply at 3, 10–13. The Court addresses eac h of the District’s objecti ons to Dr. Campbell’s requested fees and costs in turn.

3 Although Dr. Campbell submits billing records dating as far ba ck as September 25, 2012, see, e.g. , Safriet Am. Billing Records, P l.’s Reply Ex. A at 14, she arg ues that fees should “be awarded at current USAO Ma trix rates.” Pl.’s Mem. at 13; see also id. at 15 (showing that Dr. Campbell filed her fee mo tion on February 23, 2016); USAO A ttorney’s Fees Matrix— 2015–2016, Pl.’s Mot. Ex. A, ECF No. 84-3 (setting rates for Ju ne 1, 2015 through May 31, 2016). Because the District does not contest this point nor the fact that Dr. Campbell’s requested rates are sometimes higher than her attorneys’ typical billing rates, see Def.’s Opp’n at 1, the Court will deem any arguments aga inst Dr. Campbell’s requested rates conceded and will apply the 2015–2016 rates. See Lescht Decl. ¶¶ 10–11, Pl.’s Mot. Ex. B, ECF No. 84-4 (noting that Alan Lescht, one of Dr. Campbell’s attorneys, “provide[s] servi ces at a rate lower than that set forth by the U.S. Attorney’s Office Matrix to enable [his firm’ s] clients to afford legal representation”). See generally Perdue , 559 U.S. at 556 (explaining th at, “by basing the award on current rates,” a court can c ompensate for a delay in fee payment (quoting Missouri v. Jenkins ex rel. Agyei , 491 U.S. 274, 282 (1989))); Heller v. District of Columbia , 832 F. Supp. 2d 32, 60 (D.D.C. 2011) (applying Perdue ’s principles in ruling on arecent § 1988 fee motion).
4 The District does not, however, a rgue that the Court should re duce Dr. Campbell’s fee award to account for limited success. See Def.’s Opp’n at 3–10. Cf. Hensley , 461 U.S. at 434–36 (allowing such reductions in certain cases).7 A. Exercise of Billing Judgment 1. Insufficient Exclusions The District contends that Dr. C ampbell’s counsel failed to exe rcise proper billing judgment and did not “make a good fa ith effort to exclude from a fee request hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.” Def.’s Opp’n a t 4 (quoting Hensley , 461 U.S. at 434); see id. at 4–5. A lawyer requesting f ees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 must d o so “just as a lawyer in private practice ethica lly is obligated to exclude su ch hours from his fee submission.” Hensley , 461 U.S. at 434. “The fee application should therefore indi cate whether nonprodu ctive time . . . was excluded and, if time was excluded, the nature o f the work and the number of hours involved should be stated.” Nat’l Ass’n of Concerned Veterans v. Sec’y of Def. , 675 F.2d 1319, 1327–28 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Here, the District argues that Dr. Campbell excluded “only two entries” and therefore did not exercise proper billing judgm ent. Def.’s Opp’n at 5. Dr. Ca mpbell claims, however, that additional documented exclusions of entries were not required a nd that “affidavits averring that [counsel] did not bill all the tim e performed in this case” sho uld be sufficient to establish proper billing judgment. Pl.’s Reply at 2. She is correct: “Failing to specify hours which were written off is not a fatal deficiency,” a nd attorneys demonstrate billi ng judgment when “the Court can discern that the time claimed ‘ was necessary and reasonable and that any nonproductive time was excluded from the request.’” District of Columbia v. Jeppsen , 686 F. Supp. 2d 37, 39 (D.D.C. 2010) (quoting Cook v. Block , 609 F. Supp. 1036, 1041 (D.D.C. 1985))); see also Heller v. District of Columbia , 832 F. Supp. 2d 32, 55–56 (D.D.C. 2011) (holding, on the basi s of plaintiff’s counsel’s represent ations in the plaintiff’s fee mo tion, that counsel’s representations about hours excluded are sufficien t to demonstrate billing judg ment).8 To this end, Dr. Campbell has pr ovided a supplemental affidavitfrom Mr. Lescht, which provides more detail about the wo rk that his firm excluded from Dr. Campbell’s fee request. See Pl.’s Reply at 2; Lescht Suppl . Decl., Pl.’s Reply Ex. H, ECF N o. 101-9. The affidavit states that Mr. Lescht did not request fees for hours spent (1) meeting wit h Dr. Campbell during the course of the litigation, Lescht Suppl . Decl. ¶ 3; (2) corresponding w ith opposing counsel, id. ¶ 4; (3) traveling to and from and atte nding post-trial mediation, id. ¶ 5; and (4) supervising the associate attorneys who worked on this case, id. ¶ 6. In addition to Mr. Lescht’s supplemental affidavit, however, Dr. Campbell also provides amended billing records tha t include additional entries of excluded work. See Pl.’s Reply at 2–3; Billing Rec ords, Pl.’s Reply Ex. A. These amended billing records include more th an forty entries (consisting of more than fifty hours) of excluded work. 5 And Dr. Campbell notes that many o f the attorneys’ billing rec ords further support the claim that Mr. Lescht excluded w ork from Dr. Campbell’s fee req uest, because Mr. Lescht’s billing records omit time entries that correspond to time entri es in which other a ttorneys’ billing records mention Mr. Lescht. 6 Furthermore, although Dr. Cam pbell filed her complaint in 2012 , the amounts that her attorneys billed were extremely modest unt il late 2015, when it became

5 See Lampron Am. Billing Records, Pl.’s Reply Ex. A at 4, ECF No. 1 01-2 (excluding one entry consisting of 0.3 hours of work); McDonough Am. Billi ng Records, Pl.’s Reply Ex. A at 7–11 (excluding ten entries consisting of 22.9 hours of work ); Rolston Am. Billing Records, Pl.’s Reply Ex. A at 13 (exclud ing one entry consisting of 1 ho ur of work); Safriet Am. Billing Records, Pl.’s Reply Ex. A at 14–31 (excluding twenty-nine entr ies consisting of 26.75 hours of work); Valiente Am. Billing R ecords, Pl.’s Reply Ex. A at 38–40 (excluding seven entries consisting of 1.6 hours of work).
6 See Pl.’s Reply at 2–3 (citing portions of the billing records tha t refer to Mr. Lescht and mention work done by “AL” or “Alan”). Compare, e.g. , McDonough Am. Billing Records, Pl.’s Reply Ex. A at 6 (noting th at, on October 12, 2015, Ms. McDonou gh conferred with “AL” about a motion), with Lescht Billing Records, Pl.’s Reply Ex. A. at 5 (including no entries from October 2015).9 clear that her case would go to trial. 7 Based on this record, the Court concludes that Dr. Campbell’s attorneys’ amende d billing records, taken with M r. Lescht’s supplemental affidavit, satisfy Dr. Campbell’ s obligation to exclude “excess ive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary” hours. Hensley , 461 U.S. at 434. 2. Administrative Work The District further contends t hat Dr. Campbell requests fees f or administrative work and that such work is not compensab le under § 1988. Def.’s Opp’n at5; see also Clerical Tasks by Att’ys, Def.’s Opp’n Ex. A, ECF N o. 96-1 (listing entries that the District claims involve clerical work). In response, Dr. Campbell argues that work documented inseveral of the entries that the District attacks required an a ttorney’s knowledge and expertise , and thus should be compensated at attorney rates. Pl.’s Repl y at 3–4. Specifically, Dr. Campbe ll points to four entries: (1) Ms. Safriet’s 1.4 hours of tim e spent editing and copying alist of trial exhibits on September 29, 2015, id. at 3; (2) Ms. Safriet’s 0.4 hour s of time spent preparing docu ments to bring to the courthouse on December 9, 2015, id. at 3–4; (3) Ms. Safriet’s 2.9 hour s of time spent printing, organizing, marking, redacti ng, and copying exhibits on Decembe r 10, 2015, id. at 4; and (4) Ms. Travanty’s 0.8 hours of time spent assembling documents for discovery production on January 30, 2014 and February 4, 2014, id. See Safriet Am. Billing Record s, Pl.’s Reply Ex. A at 14, 24–25; Travanty Billing Records , Pl.’s Reply Ex. A at 34. D r. Campbell argues that these tasks required an attorney’s di scretion and training, and that attorneys customar ily perform them.
See Pl.’s Reply at 3–4.

7 See, e.g. , McDonough Am. Billing Records, Pl.’s Reply Ex. A at 6–12 (doc umenting over 200 hours spent on Dr. Campbe ll’s case, but a ll in October 2015 or after); Safriet Am. Billing Records, Pl.’s Reply Ex. A at 14–32 (documenting over 4 00 hours, but nearly all in September 2015 or after); Travanty Am. Billing Records, Pl.’s R eply Ex. A at 33–37 (documenting only about 150 hours spent on Dr. Campbell’s case in 2012, 2013, and 2014).10 The Supreme Court has noted that attorneys’ compensable work in cludes “factual investigation, including locati ng and interviewing witnesses; a ssistance with depositions, interrogatories, and document pr oduction; compilation of statis tical and financial data; checking legal citations; and drafting correspondence.” Missouri v. Jenkins ex rel. Agyei , 491 U.S. 274, 288 n.10 (1989). To be sure, these tas ks lie “in a gray area of tasks that might appropriately be performed either by an attorney or aparalegal”—but they are no t “purely clerical or secretarial tasks,” which are not compensable at an attorney’s rate. Id. Based on Dr. Campbell’s description of the work documented in the four time entries discussed above , all four entries fall squarely within the Supreme Court’s desc ription of compensable attorney work: they all generally involve “document production” and “compilation of . . . data.” Id. ; see Pl.’s Reply at 3–4 (explaining that Dr. Campbell’s attorneys “exerci sed discretion and applied [the ir] training” to determine appropriate documents to produce in discovery, to identify appr opriate exhibits for trial, and to redact appropriate information fro m those exhibits). The Court therefore agrees with Dr. Campbell, finds that her atto rneys appropriately performed the tasks described in the four entries, and holds that those ta sks are compensable under § 198 8. As for the other tasks that the D istrict contends are administr ative and thus not compensable, see Def.’s Opp’n at 5, Dr. Campbell disagrees and argues that thos e tasks are not “purely clerical” in nature. See Jenkins , 491 U.S. at 288 n.10 (“[P]urely cle rical or secretarial tasks should not be billed at a paralegal rate, r egardless of w ho performs them.”); Pl.’s Reply at 4–5. But Dr. Campbell concedes t hat these tasks should be bille d at the paralegal rate. See Pl.’s Reply at 4–5. Having reviewed these tasks, the Court agrees with Dr. Campbell . Paralegal work performed by an attorney is compen sable at the paralegal rate. See Harvey v. Mohammed , 951 F.11 Supp. 2d 47, 66 (D.D.C. 2013) (citing Jenkins , 491 U.S. at 288 n.10). 8 The work that the District attacks as “clearly clerical,” Def.’s Opp’n at 5, is not substa ntially less “legal” than the types of work that other courts have dete rmined compensable at the paral egal rate. For example, the District takes issue with time that Dr. Campbell’s counsel spen t printing and organizing documents. See Clerical Tasks by Attorneys, Def .’s Opp’n Ex. A. But this Cour t has held that similar tasks, such as “organ ization of files and deposition do cuments,” are compensable as paralegal work. See Harvey , 951 F. Supp. 2d at 66. Therefore, the Court will apply the paralegal rate to these tasks, as reflect ed in Dr. Campbell’s amended bil ling records. See McDonough Am. Billing Records, Pl.’s Reply E x. A, at 7, 9; Safriet Am. Billin g Records, Pl.’s Reply Ex. A at 14–16, 18, 22–24, 26–28. 9

8 The Court notes that, in some circumstances, the Court may not be required to apply the paralegal rate to tasks that aparalegal would perform and that do not require an attorney’s training and judgment. On occasion, courts in this district hav e held that such tasks are compensable at full attorney rates. See, e.g. , Cox v. District of Columbia , 754 F. Supp. 2d 66, 77 (D.D.C. 2010) (awarding fees for “clerical” work, and observing that attorney rates may be appropriate for administrative tasks performe d by solo practiti oners or small firms); see also Jenkins , 491 U.S. at 288 n.10 (noting that many types of work “lie[] i n a gray area of tasks that might appropriately be perform ed either by an attorney or a par alegal”). Because, however, Dr. Campbell concedes that many of the tasks that the District mentions “should not be billed at the attorney rate” (and thus s hould be billed at the paralegal rate), Pl.’s Reply at 4, the Court will apply the paralegal r ate as requested. See McDonough Am. Billing Records, Pl.’s Reply Ex. A at 7, 9 (applying the paralegal rate t o entries that the District mentioned); Safriet Am. Billing Records, Pl.’s Repl y Ex. A at 14–16, 18, 22–24, 26–28 (same).
9 The District claims that the li st of non-compensable administr ative tasks that it provided in its opposition contains “some examples” and is “non-exhausti ve.” Def.’s Opp’n at 5. The Court has reviewed Dr. Campbe ll’s amended billing records and b elieves that the remaining entries are appropriately billed. Dr. Campbell has voluntarily reduced the requested rate to a paralegal rate for several time entries that the District did n ot mention, including for some entries that reflect additional work t hat Dr. Campbell’s counsel performed after Dr. Campbell filed her initial fee motion. See McDonough Am. Billing Records, Pl.’s Reply Ex. A at 10; Safrie t Am. Billing Records, Pl.’s Reply Ex. A at 16, 23, 30. To the extent that the District believes that rates for any remaining entries should be reduced to paralegal rates, the Court deems those arguments waived. See Johnson v. Panetta , 953 F. Supp. 2d 244, 250 (D.D.C. 2013) (“[P]erfunctory and undeveloped arguments, and arguments that are unsupported by pe rtinent authority, are deemed waived.”).12 3. Travel Time The District also notes that Ms. McDonough billed travel time a t her full hourly rate, which the District argues is “an other example of failure to exe rcise appropriate billing judgment.” Def.’s Opp’n at 5–6; see also Doe v. Rumsfeld , 501 F. Supp. 2d 186, 193 (D.D.C. 2007) (citing Cooper v. U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. , 24 F.3d 1414, 1417 (D.C. Cir. 1994)) (“Travel . . . time is supposed to be compensated at half the attorney’s hourl y rate.”). In her reply brief, Dr. Campbell acknowledges that the r equested travel rate was inerror, but argues that her error was an oversight, not a failure t o exercise billing judgment. P l.’s Reply at 5. As evidence, Dr. Campbell notes that, in her or iginal fee request, the rate that she used for Ms. Safriet’s travel time was half of Ms. Safriet’s hourly rate. Id. ; see Safriet Billing Records, Pl.’s Mot. Ex. L at 9, 12–14, ECF No. 84-14. Because Dr. Campbell has corrected her er ror, the Court will award Dr. Campbell fees for her counsel’s travel time as requested in her amended billing records. Compare McDonough Billing Records, Pl.’s Mot. Ex. H at 2–3, ECF No. 84 -10 (using the same rate for travel and f or non-travel time), with McDonough Am. Billing Records, Pl.’s Reply Ex. A, at 7–8 (using a reduced rat e, or seeking no fees, for tr avel time). The Court is satisfied with Dr. Campbell’s assertion tha t her initial e rror was an ove rsight, and that it does not indicate lack of billing judgment more generally.

The Court does observe, however, that Dr. Campbell did not redu ce her requested rate to the paralegal rate for one time entry that she conceded “should not be billed at the attorney rate.” Pl.’s Reply at 4. Compare Safriet Am. Billing Records, Pl. ’s Reply Ex. A at 17 (seeking the attorney rate for an entry descri bed as “Met with SV re: creati ng binder for cross exam”), with Clerical Tasks by Attorneys at 1, Def’s Opp’n Ex. A (listing th e same entry as one for which the Court should not award fees). The Court accordingly will reduce the rate for that entry to the applicable paralegal rate.13 4. Demonstrative Exhibits Next, the District argues that D r. Campbell’s “charges for work on demonstrative exhibits” is not compensable. D ef.’s Opp’n at 6. The District n otes that Dr. Campbell’s attorneys “billed numerous hours c ontacting various companies about makin g trial exhibits and a time line and also billed for their own time spent on this project.” Id. ; see also Excess Work on Demonstratives, Def.’s Opp’n E x. B, ECF No. 96-2 (listing time entries describing work on demonstrative exhibits). The Dis trict contends that “[v]ery little of this material was actually used at trial,” and that “the amount of time spent . . . appear s to include time spent learning how to make and use the exhib its.” Def.’s Opp’n at 6. In her reply brief, Dr. Campbell clarifies that these “demonstr ative exhibits” were in fact PowerPoint slides that her attorn eys developed for trial use. P l.’s Reply at 5. Dr. Campbell claims that preparing these s lides involved “reviewing and synthesizing the pleadings, exhibits deposition transcripts, and other evidence; crea ting a timeline of the case; synthesizing and analyzing the facts and evidence supporting each of [Dr. Campbe ll’s] claims; developing a case strategy; and drafting a detaile d outline that set forth [Dr. C ampbell’s] legal arguments and supporting evidence.” Id. at 5–6. Given that these describe d tasks are tasks that attorn eys customarily perform to prepare f or trial, Dr. Campbell argues that “[t]he fact that [Dr. Campbell’s] attorneys memori alized their case strategy in PowerPoint format, rather than in a Word document or handwritten no tes, does not pr eclude them fr om recovering fees for necessary and reasonable hour s of trial preparation.” Id. at 6. Dr. Campbell also notes that Ms. McDonough was the only attorne y who formatted the slides, and that through her pr ior work experience, Ms. McDonou gh had gained considerable experience in developing P owerPoint presentations. Id. Dr. Campbell therefore claims that,14 contrary to the District’s argum ent, her attorneys spent minima l time “learning how to make and use” the presentation. Id. Additionally, “in a good faith e ffort to exclude any ‘unnecessa ry’ hours,” Dr. Campbell states that she has reduced the fees reque sted in relation to Ms. McDonough’s work on the exhibits by twenty percent. Id. Compare Excess Work on Demonstratives at 1, Def.’s O pp’n Ex. B (listing several entrie s that describe Ms. McDonough’s work on demonstrative exhibits), with McDonough Am. Billing Records, Pl.’s Reply Ex. A at 6 (using a reduced rate for entrie s related to demonstrative exhi bits, including for entries not mentioned in the District’s li st of questionable entries). Reasonable time spent preparing f or trial (including time spent preparing exhibits like Dr. Campbell’s slides) is compensable under § 1988. See Cefalu v. Vill. of Elk Grove , 211 F.3d 416, 429 (7th Cir. 2000) (allowing compensation for time spent preparing exhibits in the form of “computer generated, multi-media presentations”); Harvey , 951 F. Supp. 2d at 64 (allowing compensation for time spent “preparing for and conducting a moc k trial, or ‘focus group,’” as long as the hours expended were reasonable). Even if, at trial, the prevailing party does not actually use the majority of the exhibits that she prepared, ti me spent preparing them is compensable as long as the work “contributed to the ultimate re sult obtained in this litigation.”
See Air Transp. Ass’n of Can. , 156 F.3d at 1335 (awarding fees for time spent in connection with an unsuccessful motion to stay, after finding that the time spe nt on the motion contributed to the movant’s later victory). Here, D r. Campbell argues that the tim e spent preparing the PowerPoint slides served as a necessary partin her overall case strategy, and her description of the tasks15 completed during that time supports her argument. See Pl.’s Reply at 5–6. The Court accordingly finds that she should receive some fees in relation to the time spent for that purpose. 10 The Court also notes, however, t hat much of the work billed by another attorney, Ms. Safriet, on these exhibits s eems to have involved researchi ng and communicating with outside vendors about the demonstrative exhibits. See Excess Work on Demonstratives at 1–2, Def.’s Opp’n Ex. B (listing entries for time that Ms. Safriet s pent “[r]eview[ing] websites of companies to make timelines” and contacting vendors such as “Co urtroom Technology,” “Cogent Legal,” “Amicus Visual So lutions,” and “MGM Trial Servi ces”). This work does not appear to have required an atto rney’s knowledge or expertise, a nd likely could have been completed by a paralegal. Indeed, M s. Valiente, the paralegal f or Dr. Campbell’s attorneys, appears to have completed several similar tasks. See id. at 3–4 (listing Ms. Valiente’s hours spent working on the exhibits). But becau se Dr. Campbell has now volu ntarily excluded requests for fees in relation to almost all the time that Ms. Safriet spent researching and communicating with outside vendors about the demonstrative exhibits, see Safriet Am. Billing Records, Pl.’s Reply Ex. A at 17–20 (seeking no fees for f ourteen time entries that relate to demonstrat ive exhibits), the Court believes that no addi tional reduction is warranted fo r fees that Dr. Campbell requested in relation to the exhibits. 11

10 For one time entry that des cribes work that Ms. McDonough perf ormed on the demonstrative exhibits, Dr. Cam pbell has not reduced the reques ted rate by twenty percent. See McDonough Am. Billing Records, Pl.’s Reply Ex. A at 7 (seeking Ms. McDonough’s full attorney rate for an entry desc ribed in part with “created slid es for opening”). Because of Dr. Campbell’s expresse d intent to “deduct the fees request for the hours Ms. McDonough spent working on demonstrative exhibits by 20-percent,” Pl.’s Reply a t 6, the Court will reduce the rate for that entry by twenty percent.
11 The District suggests that its list of charges related to demo nstrative exhibits is also “non-exhaustive.” Def.’s Opp’n a t 6. As before, the Court will deem the District’s objections to any remaining entries waived. See supra note 9.16 5. Duplicative Work The District also claims that Dr . Campbell’s request includes “ numerous instances where multiple lawyers billed for the same tasks.” Def.’s Opp’n at 6. In particular, the D istrict points to “the attendance of three atto rneys at each day of trial.” Id. The District claims that “[t]here was nothing so complicated about this case that it required multipl e lawyers.” Id. The District also argues that “[t]wo of these lawy ers were quite junior,” and tha t the District should not have to “pay for [the] training of junior associates.” Id. Redundant and duplicative work should indeed be excluded from a fee award. See Hensley , 461 U.S. at 434. Dr. Campbell ha s argued, however, that the p resence of three attorneys at trial did not involve duplica tion of effort; she claims that each attorney contributed meaningfully to Dr. C ampbell’s success. See Pl.’s Reply at 6–7. Dr. Cam pbell further claims that “this case involved complex unique claims,” and that it was “un reasonable to expect a single attorney to handle this type of case”—particularly given that the District itself had two experienced attorneys at trial. Id. Dr. Campbell also contends that “the fact that Ms. McDonough and Ms. Safriet are ‘quite junio r’ does not excuse the Districtfrom reimbursing their fees” because “[b]oth attorneys contributed to [Dr. Campbell’s] succe ssful outcome” by questioning witnesses at trial, performing l egal research, and performing o ther necessary work. Id. at 7. For fees under § 1988, “a reduction i s warranted only if the at torneys are unreasonably doing the same work.” Johnson v. Univ. Coll. of Univ. of Ala. in Birmingham , 706 F.2d 1205, 1208 (11th Cir. 1983) (emphases omitted). But if using a team o f attorneys results in “unnecessary duplication,” “double compensation should not be g ranted.” Id. To that end, “a court should not hesitate to disc ount hours if it sees signs th at a prevailing party has overstaffed a17 case.” Poy v. Boutselis , 352 F.3d 479, 490 (1st Cir. 2003) (alte ration and internal qu otation mark omitted) (quoting Gay Officers Action League v. Puerto Rico , 247 F.3d 288, 297 (1st Cir. 2001)). Here, based on the Court’s in-tri al observation, the Court agre es with Dr. Campbell’s assertion that each of the three attorneys at tri al contributed to her trial presen tation. But that does not mean that Dr. Campbell’s trial team was staffed approp riately or that each attorney’s presence at trial was reasonabl e. Just one attorney could have performed all the tasks that Dr. Campbell’s two junior attorneys performed: because Mr. Lesc ht, the most senior of Dr. Campbell’s attorneys examine d most of the witnesses at tria l, the two junior attorneys (Ms. McDonough and Ms. Safriet) ex amined just a couple witnesse s each. Thus, even though two attorneys’ presen ce at trial would have been reasonable, ha ving a third attorney was
unnecessary. Perhaps recognizing the unnecessary duplication, Dr. Campbell h as already omitted any request for fees relating (1) to Ms. McDonough’s time spent at trial on December 7, 2015 and December 8, 2015, and (2) to both junior attorneys’ time spent in the courthouse on December 11, 2015. 12 The Court will therefore, for e ntries relating to time spent at trial, reduce Dr. Campbell’s requested fees only f or the two other days of tr ial: December 9, 2015 and December 10, 2015. For those two day s of trial, the Court will decline to award fees for the lower of Ms. McDonough and Ms. S afriet’s time entries. 13

12 See McDonough Am. Billing Records, Pl. ’s Reply Ex. A at 7–8; Safri et Am. Billing Records, Pl.’s Reply Ex. A at 25.
13 The Court will therefore declin e to award fees corresponding ( 1) to Ms. McDonough’s 3 hours attending trial on Decem ber 9, 2015 and (2) to Ms. Safr iet’s 7.45 hours attending trial on December 10, 2015. See Def.’s Opp’n Ex. C, ECF No. 96-3 (comparing Ms. McDonough’s an d Ms. Safriet’s trial time). On the topic of duplicative bil ling, the Court will also declin e to award Dr. Campbell fees in relation to four time entrie s that appear to be duplicates o f other entries. See McDonough Am. Billing Records, Pl.’s Reply Ex. A at 10 (claiming three February 23, 2016 time entries that18 6. Work on Superior Court Action Finally, the District argues th at Dr. Campbell inappropriately requests fees for work performed for her District of Col umbia Superior Court action ag ainst the private parties who allegedly made the allegations that led to her termination. Def .’s Opp’n at 6–7. The District claims that because it is “not a party to that action,” it “sho uld not have to reimburse [Dr. Campbell] for the fees incurred there.” Id. at 6. In particular, the Di strict takes issue with time that Ms. Lampron and Ms. Rol ston spent defending Dr. Campb ell’s deposition and conducting depositions for Carri e Brooks-Brown, Reuben Charles, Cedric Simon, and Wayne Turnage. See id. at 6–7; Activities Related to S uperior Court Action, Def.’s Op p’n Ex. D, ECF No. 96-4 (listing time entries that the District claims are rel ated to Dr. Campbell’s Superior Court action, not Dr. Campbe ll’s case in this Court); see also Pl.’s Reply at 7–8 (clarifying the entries in the District’s exhibit). In response, Dr. Campbell argues that because this time “was expended in pursuit of a successful resolution of the cas e,” it should be compensable. P l.’s Reply at 8 (quoting Boehner v.
McDermott , 541 F. Supp. 2d 310, 318 (D.D.C. 2008)). Dr. Campbell notes t hat “[a]lthough the depositions at issue were notice d in the Superior Court Case, [ Dr. Campbell] used that testimony

exactly replicate th e three February 2 3, 2016 time entries prec eding them); Safriet Am. Billing Records, Pl.’s Reply Ex. A a t 29–30 (claiming that Ms. Safriet twice “Met with SV re: update on ordering trial / post-trial transcripts” for 0.2 hours on Febru ary 23, 2016). Dr. Campbell had already submitted the four time entries in her initial fee moti on, so the Court presumes that her attorneys inadvertently copied a nd pasted the dup licate entries into the billing records that she submitted with her reply brief. Compare McDonough Billing Records at 6, Pl.’s Mot. Ex. H (showing three February 23, 2016 entries), and Safriet Billing Records at 19, Pl.’s Mot. Ex. L (showing one February 23, 2016 that reads “Met with SV re: upda te on ordering trial / post-trial transcripts”), with McDonough Am. Billing Records, Pl.’s Reply Ex. A at 10 (showin g six February 23, 2016 time entries); Safriet Am. Billing Records, P l.’s Reply Ex. A at 29–30 (showing two entries that desc ribe the February 23, 2016 meetin g “with SV”). Because “redundant” time entries are not compensable, Hensley , 461 U.S. at 434, the Court will not award fees for the dup licate entries.19 to succeed in this [case]”: she s tates that her counsel used th e deposition testimonies obtained “to develop case strategy,” to “draf t cross-examination questions,” “to determine which witnesses to call at trial,” and to provide a dditional evidence for the juryat trial. Id. (noting that “Ms. BrooksBrown’s deposition testimony was r ead into the record at trial” ). Dr. Campbell states that “[t]he fact of the matter is that if [ she] had not noticed depositions for Ms. Brooks-Brown, Mr. Simon, and Mr. Charles in the Superior Court [c]ase, she would have de posed them in this one.” Id. Fee awards under § 1988 are only permitted for time that was “r easonably expended on the litigation .” Webb v. Bd. of Educ. , 471 U.S. 234, 242 (1985) (emphasis i n original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Hensley , 461 U.S. at 433). The Suprem e Court has suggested, however, that work performed for separate, ancillary proceeding s may be compensable if that work was “both useful and of a type ordinarily necessary” to ac hieve the result obtained in litigation. Id. at 243; see also id. at 243 n.19 (suggesting that, to m eet this standard, the work from the separate proceeding must “substitute[]” for or serve a s the “equivalent” of work which would have been performe d in the litigation); Concerned Veterans , 675 F.2d at 1335 (“Compensable time should not be limited to hours expended with in the four corners of the litigation.”). Accordingly, courts in this district have awarde d fees for work performed for separate but related actions, if there is a “clear showing thatthe time was expended in pursuit of a successful resolution of the cas e in which fees are being cla imed.” Concerned Veterans , 675 F.2d at 1335; see, e.g. , Harvey , 951 F. Supp. 2d at 57–58 (awarding fees for work performed to establish a deceased individual’s estate, for which the plainti ff served as the legal representative, because establishing the estate w as “necessary to the pursuit o f the § 1983 action and [was] thus ‘reasonably expended on the litigation’” (quoting Hensley , 461 U.S. at 433)); Boehner , 541 F. Supp. 2d at 320 (allowing fees for work on an amicus brief, bec ause the plaintiff “expended time20 on the amicus brief in pursuit of a successful resolution in th is matter and a reasonably prudent attorney would have done the same”). Here, Dr. Campbell has shown that the depositions of Carrie Bro oks-Brown, Reuben Charles, Cedric Simon, and Wayne T urnage aided her attorneys’ t rial preparation—and, in one instance, provided evidence for trial. See Pl.’s Reply at 8. The Court concludes, therefore, that the time Dr. Campbell’s counsel allegedly spent working on Dr. Campbell’s Superior Court action “was expended in pursuit of a successful resolution of the case in which fees are being claimed.” Concerned Veterans , 675 F.2d at 1335. For that work, therefore, the Court will aw ard Dr. Campbell her requested fees. 14
7. Fee Reduction For the foregoing reasons, the Court determines that, apart fro m the fee reductions that the Court has noted in footnotes above, see supra notes 9, 10, 13, no further fee reduction is warranted. Therefore, the Court will not apply the thirty perce nt overall reduction that the District requests. Cf. Def.’s Opp’n at 7–8.
B. Whether to Award an Enhancement The Court now turns to Dr. Campbell’s claim that her “unprecede nted success merits an enhancement multiplier.” Pl.’s Mem. at 13–14. Specifically, Dr. Campbell contends that her case is the first of its kind: she asse rts that “this is the only ca se in this jurisdicti on in which a plaintiff has prevailed at a jury trial on a Fifth Amendment Procedural D ue Process claim ([alleging deprivation of a liberty inter est in pursuing a chosen field of employment] under a stigma or disability theory), broug ht under 42 U.S.C § 1983.” Id. The Supreme Court has emphasized,

14 However, Dr. Campbell cannot receive a windfall for time discu ssed in this section. Accordingly, she may not seek compensation for such time in the Superior Court proceeding, should she prevail i n that matter.21 however, that “[n]either compl exity nor novelty of the issues . . . is an appropriate factor in determining whether to increase the basic fee award.” Blum , 465 U.S. at 898–99; accord Perdue , 559 U.S. at 553. The difficulty of e stablishing the merits of aplaintiff’s claim is “ordinarily reflected in the lodestar—either in the higher number of hours expended to overcome the difficulty, or in the higher hourlyrate of the attorney skille d and experienced enough to do so.” City of Burlington v. Dague , 505 U.S. 557, 562 (1992). “Taking account of it again through lodestar enhancement am ounts to double counting.” Id. at 563. Dr. Campbell suggests nonethele ss that the novelty of her victo ry “underscores the significant risk counsel undertook in representing Dr. Campbell on contingency.” Pl.’s Mem. at 14. But the Supreme Court has spok en to this issue also and has held that “enhancement for contingency is not permitted” for calculation of a reasonable attorney’s fee. See Dague , 505 U.S. at 567 (articulating this principl e in the context of fee-shift ing provisions in environmental statutes); see also Perdue , 559 U.S. at 558 (applying Dague ’s holding to fee awards under § 1988); cf. id. at 555–56 (discussing cases in whic h enhancements may be approp riate without mentioning high-risk cases). “[A]n enhancement for contingency would likely duplicate in substantial part factors alrea dy subsumed in the lodestar” and “provide attorneys with the same incentive to bring relatively meritless claims as relatively me ritorious ones.” Dague , 505 U.S. at
562–63. 15 Thus, Dr. Campbell argues in vain that counsel made “extraordin ary sacrifices and risked permanent harm, both financially and professionally.” Pl.’s Rep ly at 11. Although her counsel’s representation may be commendabl e, such sacrifices and risks ar e inherent in much complex

15 Moreover, to the extent that D r. Campbell’s attorneys’ conting ency arrangement allows them to retain a percentage of he r recovery of damages, they re ceive compensation for the contingency through that means as well.22 civil litigation. See generally Dague , 505 U.S. at 562–63 (discussing w ith approval the “risk of loss” that contingency-fee atto rneys may face in litigation, be cause it incentivizes attorneys to bring more relatively meritorious claims). The Court finds that the Laffey rates, used as the lodestar here, adequately capture these inherent sacrifices andrisks. See Briggs v. District of
Columbia , 73 F. Supp. 3d 59, 63 (D.D.C. 2014) (“ Laffey rates represent presumptive maximum rates for complex federal litigation . . . .” (emphases omitted )). Dr. Campbell makes no other argumen ts to support her proposed e nhancement. See Pl.’s Mem. at 13–14; Pl.’s Reply at 10–11. Because Dr. Campbell has n ot overcome “the ‘strong presumption’ that the lode star figure is reasonable,” Perdue , 559 U.S

. at 554, the Court lacks any grounds on which it could “provide a reasonably specific explan ation for . . . [an] award of an enhancement,” id. at 558 (requiring a district c ourt to provide “a reasonably sp ecific explanation” to facilitate appell ate review). The Court accordi ngly declines to award Dr. Campbell a fifty percent enhancement of her fee award.
C. Costs The District also argues that D r. Campbell “included improper i tems in her requests for costs.” Def.’s Opp’n at 9–10. Speci fically, the District argues that the following items, which Dr. Campbell listed in her request for costs, are not compensab le: (1) expert witness fees; (2) demonstrative exhibits; (3) “Decision Quest,” which “appear s to be a trial consulting service”; (4) travel; and (5) office supplies. Id. ; see Pl.’s Mem. at 14 (lis ting Dr. Campbell’s requested costs). In her repl y, Dr. Campbell offers no response to the District’s criticism of her requests for costs in relation t o the demonstrative exhibits, trial consulting services, and office supplies. See Pl.’s Reply at 11–13. Because Dr. Campbell, as the prevailing party, bears the burden to establish her entitleme nt to any fees and costs—and, given her lack of response, has23 not done so in relation to these th ree categories of costs—the Court determines that Dr. Campbell does not merit a costs award for these three categories. See Turner , 354 F.3d at 895 (indicating that the prevailing party bears the burden of establishing her entitlement to any award of fees and costs under § 1988). Indeed, in Dr. Campbell’s reply brief, she has reduced her requested award of costs so that it omits the a mounts Dr. Campbell previously c laimed for those three categories. Compare Pl.’s Mem. at 15 (seeking $19,498.69 in costs), with Pl.’s Reply at 11–13 (seeking $15,043.75 in costs). Dr. Campbell argues, however, tha t she should receive an award of costs for her expert witness fees and for her attorney s’ travel expenses. Pl.’s Repl y at 12–13 (seeking $5,600 for “damage evaluation reports” and $126.32 in travel costs). But D r. Campbell cite s to no authority that suggests that expert fees are reimbursable under § 1988. See Pl.’s Reply at 12; cf. Harvey , 951 F. Supp. 2d at 73–74 (holding that “expert fees are not ava ilable” for § 1983 actions). Although the Court acknowledges th at the experts’ reports on Dr . Campbell’s damages “obviated the need for complicated and e xtensive testimony and presentati on of evidence regarding lost pay,” Pl.’s Reply at 12, no statutory authority exists “for the compensation of expert fees in § 1983 actions,” Harvey , 951 F. Supp. 2d at 74. Therefore, the Court will not award Dr. Campbell costs in relation to f ees paid to experts for dama ges evaluation reports. Other courts in this Districthave held, however, that transpor tation costs are recoverable in a § 1983 action. See, e.g. , Salazar v. District of Columbia , 991 F. Supp. 2d 39, 61–62 (D.D.C. 2014) (allowing reimbursement f or “ground transportation costs” ); Harvey , 951 F. Supp. 2d at 70 (allowing reimbursement for “certain transportation costs”); Heller , 832 F. Supp. 2d at 60–61 (allowing reimbursement for travel expenses); Sexcius v. District of Columbia , 839 F. Supp. 919, 927 & n.26 (D.D.C. 1993) (citing Jenkins , 491 U.S. at 285) (allowing reimbursement for “local24 transportation and parking costs”). See generally Jenkins , 491 U.S. at 285 (explaining that a “reasonable attorney’s fee” under § 1988 “must take account of other expenses,” aside from “work performed personally by members of the bar”). 16 Here, Dr. Campbell’s counsel has included detailed reco rds of travel costs reasonably incurred, and has furthermore reduced the amount requested. See Pl.’s Reply at 12 & n.3; see also Travel Expenses, Pl.’s Reply Ex. J, ECF No. 101-11 (listing Dr. Campbell’s claimed costs). Compare Pl.’s Mem. at 14 (seeking $200.14 in travel expenses), with Pl.’s Reply at 12 (seeking $126.32 i n travel expenses). The Co urt will therefore award Dr. C ampbell her attorneys’ modest travel costs , in the amount requested in her reply.

16 The Court is mindful that, in th is Circuit, travel expenses ar e not compensable under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C § 2412. See Mass. Fair Share v. Law Enf’t Assistance Admin. , 776 F.2d 1066, 1069–70 & 1070 n.28 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (denying reimbursement for “taxi fares” and “travel expenses” under the EAJA); Action on Smoking & Health v. Civil Aeronautics Bd. , 724 F.2d 211, 224 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (deny ing reimbursement for “taxi fares” under the EAJA). T he statutory authorization for t axation of costs under the EAJA provides a list of reimbursabl e costs that do not include trave l expenses. See 28 U.S.C §§ 1920; 2412(a)(1). Courts in this circuit thus interpret the statute a s foreclosing the reimbursement of travel expenses. See NAACP v. Donovan , 554 F. Supp. 715, 719 (D.D.C. 1982) (“Through application of the rule of ejusd em generis it appears to the Co urt that such items as meals, travel and telephone expenses were not intended to be covered by this provision.”); see also Mass. Fair Share , 776 F.2d at 1070 n.28 (citing Donovan ); Action on Smoking , 724 F.2d at 224 & n.67 (also citing Donovan ). The D.C. Circuit has also hel d, however, that costs under § 198 8 are not limited by the enumerated costs under 28 U.S.C § 1920. See Laffey , 746 F.2d at 30 (rejecting the argument “that only taxable costs [unde r § 1920] may be awarded” as “ove rly narrow”). “The authority granted in section 1988 to award a‘reasonable attorney’s fee’ included the authority to award those reasonable out-of-pocket expenses . . . which are normall y charged to a fee-paying client, in the course of providi ng legal services.” Id. (alteration omitted) (quoting Northcross v. Bd. of Educ. , 611 F.2d 624, 639 (6th Cir. 1979)). Therefore, attorneys “are entitled to these costs upon a showing that such costs are of a type passed on by the firms in volved to private clients.” Id. Because courts in this district have consistently held that tra vel costs are reimbursable, see supra , the Court concludes that Dr. C ampbell can recover these costs under § 1988.25 D. Total Fees and Costs Based on the 2015–2016 Laffey Matrix’s hourly ra tes and time entries corresponding to Dr. Campbell’s compensable work, see supra Part III.A, the Court will award Dr. Campbell $314,782.30 in attorney’s fees. 17 As the Court concludes above , no multiplier is warranted. See

supra Part III.B. As discussed above, Dr. Campbell’s request for cos ts will be reduced by $5,600, the amount she request ed for expert fees, to $9,443.75. See supra Part III.C; cf. Pl.’s Reply at 11–13 (requesting $15,043.75 in costs, of which $5,600 were for expert fees). Therefore, the Court will awar d Dr. Campbell attorney’s fees an d costs in the amount of $324,226.05.

IV. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Dr. Campbell’s Motion for Fees and C osts is GRANTED IN
PART and DENIED IN PART . An order consistent with t his Memorandum Opinion is separately and contemporaneously issued.
Dated: July 29, 2016 RUDOLPH CONTRERAS United States District Judge

17 The fees were calculated based on 2015–2016 Laffey rates as follows: $3,347.50 for Ms. Hasan (10.3 hours at $325 per hour); $937.20 for Mr. Johann sen (3.3 hours at $284 per hour); $7,832.50 for Ms. Lampron ( 24.4 hours at $325 per hour); $40,015.00 for Mr. Lescht (75.5 hours at $530 per hour); $69,2 55.90 for Ms. McDonough (17 2.6 hours at $315 per hour; 52.8 hours at $252 per hour, a rate reduced by twenty percent f or work on demonstrative exhibits; 3 hours at $157.50 pe r hour, for travel; and 7.2 hour s at $154 per hour, for administrative work); $3,782.80 f or Ms. Rolston (9.8 hours at $ 386 per hour); $134,840.80 for Ms. Safriet (398.8 hours at$325 per hour; 6 hours at $162.50 p er hour, for travel; 27.7 hours at $154 per hour, for administrat ive work); $50,310.00 for Ms. Tra vanty (154.8 hours at $325 per hour); and $4,450.60 for Ms. Valiente (28.9 hours at $154 per h our).