(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2008 1 

Syllabus 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

KNOWLES, WARDEN v. MIRZAYANCE 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 

THE NINTH CIRCUIT 

No. 07–1315. Argued January 13, 2009—Decided March 24, 2009 

Respondent Mirzayance entered pleas of not guilty and not guilty by

reason of insanity (NGI) at his state-court murder trial. During the

guilt phase, he sought to avoid a conviction for first-degree murder 

and instead obtain a second-degree murder verdict by presenting 

medical testimony that he was insane at the time of the crime and

was, therefore, incapable of the necessary premeditation or deliberation. The jury nevertheless convicted him of first-degree murder. After the trial’s NGI phase was scheduled, Mirzayance accepted his 

counsel’s recommendation to abandon the insanity plea. Counsel believed that a defense verdict was unlikely because the jury had just 

rejected medical testimony similar to that which would be presented 

to establish the NGI defense. Moreover, although counsel had 

planned to supplement the medical evidence with testimony by Mirzayance’s parents as to their son’s mental illness, the parents refused 

to testify at the last moment. Following his conviction, Mirzayance

alleged in state postconviction proceedings that his attorney’s recommendation to withdraw the NGI plea constituted ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668. The 

trial court denied relief, and the California Court of Appeal affirmed. 

Mirzayance then applied for federal habeas relief, which the District Court denied. The Ninth Circuit reversed, ordering an evidentiary hearing on counsel’s recommendation to withdraw the NGI 

plea. During the hearing, the Magistrate Judge made extensive factfindings, including, inter alia, that the NGI phase medical evidence 

essentially would have duplicated the evidence the jury rejected in

the guilt phase; that counsel doubted the likelihood of prevailing on 

the NGI claim because the jury’s finding of first-degree murder as a 

practical matter would cripple Mirzayance’s chances of convincing 
2 KNOWLES v. MIRZAYANCE 

Syllabus 

the jury that he nevertheless was incapable of understanding the nature and quality of his act and of distinguishing right from wrong;

that Mirzayance’s parents were not simply reluctant, but had effectively refused, to testify; that counsel had made a carefully reasoned 

decision not to proceed with the NGI plea after weighing his options

and discussing the matter with experienced co-counsel; but that

counsel’s performance was nevertheless deficient because Mirzayance

had “nothing to lose” by going forward with the NGI phase of the

trial. The Magistrate Judge also found prejudice and recommended 

habeas relief. The District Court accepted the recommendation and 

granted the writ. The Court of Appeals affirmed, ruling, among other

things, that counsel’s performance had been deficient because Mirzayance’s parents had not refused, but had merely expressed reluctance to testify, and because competent counsel would have attempted to persuade them to testify, which Mirzayance’s counsel 

admittedly did not. The court essentially concluded that competent

counsel would have pursued the insanity defense because counsel 

had nothing to lose by putting on the only defense available. In addition, the court found prejudice because, in the court’s view, there was 

a reasonable probability the jury would have found Mirzayance insane had counsel pursued the NGI phase. The Ninth Circuit concluded that federal habeas relief was authorized under 28 U. S. C. 

§2254(d)(1) because the California Court of Appeal had “unreasonabl[y] appli[ed] clearly established Federal law.” 

Held: Whether the state-court decision is reviewed under §2254(d)(1)’s 

standard or de novo, Mirzayance has failed to establish that his counsel’s performance was ineffective. Pp. 8–16. 

(a) The State Court of Appeal’s denial of Mirzayance’s ineffectiveassistance claim did not violate clearly established federal law. The 

Ninth Circuit reached a contrary result based largely on its application of an improper review standard—it blamed counsel for abandoning the NGI claim because there was “nothing to lose” by pursuing it. 

But it is not “an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law” for a state court to decline to apply a specific legal rule that

has not been squarely established by this Court. See, e.g., Wright v. 

Van Patten, 552 U. S. ___, ___. Absent anything akin to the “nothing 

to lose” standard in this Court’s precedent, habeas relief could have

been granted under §2254(d)(1) only if the state-court decision in this

case had unreasonably applied Strickland’s more general standard

for ineffective-assistance claims, whereby a defendant must show 

both deficient performance by counsel and prejudice, 466 U. S., at 

687. The question “is not whether a federal court believes the state

court’s determination” under Strickland “was incorrect but whether 

[it] was unreasonable—a substantially higher threshold.” Schriro v. 
Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 3 

Syllabus 

Landrigan, 550 U. S. 465, 473. And, because Strickland’s is a general standard, a state court has even more latitude to reasonably determine that a defendant has not satisfied that standard. Under the 

doubly deferential judicial review that applies to a Strickland claim 

evaluated under the §2254(d)(1) standard, Mirzayance’s ineffectiveassistance claim fails. It was not unreasonable for the state court to 

conclude that counsel’s performance was not deficient when he counseled Mirzayance to abandon a claim that stood almost no chance of 

success. Pp. 8–11. 

(b) Even if Mirzayance’s ineffective-assistance claim were eligible 

for de novo review, it would still fail because he has not shown ineffective assistance at all. Mirzayance can establish neither the deficient performance nor the prejudice required by Strickland. As to 

performance, he has not shown “that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” 466 U. S., at 687–688. 

Rather, counsel merely recommended the withdrawal of what he reasonably believed was a claim doomed because similar medical testimony had already been rejected and the parents’ testimony, which he 

believed to be his strongest evidence, would not be available. The 

Ninth Circuit’s position that competent counsel might have persuaded the reluctant parents to testify is in tension with the Magistrate Judge’s contrary findings and applies a more demanding standard than Strickland prescribes. The failure to show ineffective 

assistance is also confirmed by the Magistrate Judge’s finding that

counsel’s decision was essentially an informed one “made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options,” and

was therefore “virtually unchallengeable.” Id., at 690. The Ninth 

Circuit’s insistence that counsel was required to assert the only defense available, even one almost certain to lose, is not supported by

any “prevailing professional norms” of which the Court is aware. See 

id., at 688. Nor has Mirzayance demonstrated that he suffered 

prejudice, which requires a showing of “a reasonable probability that,

but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 

would have been different.” See id., at 694. In fact, it was highly improbable that the jury, having just rejected testimony about Mirzayance’s mental condition in the guilt phase, would have reached a

different result based on similar evidence at the NGI phase. Pp. 11– 

16. 

Reversed and remanded. 

THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, 

C. J., and STEVENS, KENNEDY, BREYER, and ALITO, JJ., joined, and in 

which SCALIA, SOUTER, and GINSBURG, JJ., joined as to all but Part II. 
_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 1 

Opinion of the Court 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 07–1315 

MICHAEL A. KNOWLES, WARDEN, PETITIONER 

v. ALEXANDRE MIRZAYANCE 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[March 24, 2009] 

JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.* 

A federal court may grant a habeas corpus application

arising from a state-court adjudication on the merits if the 

state court’s decision “was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal 

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States.” 28 U. S. C. §2254(d)(1). In this case, respondent

Alexandre Mirzayance claimed ineffective assistance of 

counsel because his attorney recommended withdrawing 

his insanity defense. The California courts rejected this 

claim on state postconviction review. We must decide 

whether this decision was contrary to or an unreasonable

application of clearly established federal law. We hold 

that it was not. Whether reviewed under the standard of 

review set forth in §2254(d)(1) or de novo, Mirzayance

failed to establish that his counsel’s performance was 

ineffective, see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 

(1984). 

—————— 

* JUSTICE SCALIA, JUSTICE SOUTER, and JUSTICE GINSBURG join all but

Part II of this opinion. 
2 KNOWLES v. MIRZAYANCE 

Opinion of the Court 

I 

Mirzayance confessed that he stabbed his 19-year-old 

cousin nine times with a hunting knife and then shot her 

four times. At trial, he entered pleas of not guilty and not 

guilty by reason of insanity (NGI). Under California law, 

when both of these pleas are entered, the court must hold

a bifurcated trial, with guilt determined during the first 

phase and the viability of the defendant’s NGI plea during 

the second. Cal. Penal Code Ann. §1026(a) (West 1985).

During the guilt phase of Mirzayance’s trial, he sought to

avoid a conviction for first-degree murder by obtaining a

verdict on the lesser included offense of second-degree 

murder. To that end, he presented medical testimony that

he was insane at the time of the crime and was, therefore, 

incapable of the premeditation or deliberation necessary 

for a first-degree murder conviction. The jury nevertheless convicted Mirzayance of first-degree murder. 

The trial judge set the NGI phase to begin the day after

the conviction was entered but, on the advice of counsel, 

Mirzayance abandoned his NGI plea before it commenced. 

He would have borne the burden of proving his insanity 

during the NGI phase to the same jury that had just convicted him of first-degree murder. Counsel had planned to 

meet that burden by presenting medical testimony similar 

to that presented in the guilt phase, including evidence 

that Mirzayance was insane and incapable of premeditating or deliberating. Because the jury rejected similar 

evidence at the guilt phase (where the State bore the

burden of proof), counsel believed a defense verdict at the

NGI phase (where the burden was on the defendant) was 

unlikely. He planned, though, to have Mirzayance’s parents testify and thus provide an emotional account of 

Mirzayance’s struggles with mental illness to supplement 

the medical evidence of insanity. But on the morning that 

the NGI phase was set to begin, Mirzayance’s parents

refused to testify. After consulting with co-counsel, coun-
Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 3 

Opinion of the Court 

sel advised Mirzayance that he should withdraw the NGI

plea. Mirzayance accepted the advice. 

After he was sentenced, Mirzayance challenged his

conviction in state postconviction proceedings. Among 

other allegations, he claimed that counsel’s recommendation to withdraw the NGI plea constituted ineffective

assistance of counsel under Strickland. The California 

trial court denied the petition and the California Court of 

Appeal affirmed without offering any reason for its rejection of this particular ineffective assistance claim. People 

v. Mirzayance, Nos. B116856, B124764 (Mar. 31, 1999),

App. to Pet. for Cert. 165–167, 200–201 (hereinafter App.).

Mirzayance then filed an application for federal habeas

relief under 28 U. S. C. §2254, which the District Court 

denied without an evidentiary hearing. The Court of 

Appeals reversed the District Court and ordered an evidentiary hearing on counsel’s recommendation to withdraw the NGI plea. Mirzayance v. Hickman, 66 Fed. 

Appx. 676, 679–681 (CA9 2003). During that evidentiary 

hearing, a Magistrate Judge made factual findings that 

the District Court later adopted. Post-Remand Report and

Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge in 

No. CV 00–01388 DT (RZ) (CD Cal.), App. 38, 68; Mirzayance v. Knowles, No. CV 00–1388 DT (RZ) (CD Cal., 

Nov. 15, 2004), id., at 35–36. 

According to the Magistrate Judge, counsel’s strategy

for the two-part trial was to seek a second-degree murder

verdict in the first stage and to seek an NGI verdict in the 

second stage. This strategy faltered when the jury instead 

convicted Mirzayance of first-degree murder. In the circumstances of this case, the medical evidence that Mirzayance planned to adduce at the NGI phase essentially 

would have duplicated evidence that the jury had necessarily rejected in the guilt phase. First-degree murder in

California includes any killing that is “willful, deliberate,

and premeditated.” Cal. Penal Code Ann. §189 (West 
4 KNOWLES v. MIRZAYANCE 

Opinion of the Court 

1999). To prove NGI, a defendant must show that he was 

incapable of knowing or understanding the nature of his 

act or of distinguishing right from wrong at the time of the 

offense. See People v. Lawley, 27 Cal. 4th 102, 170, 38 

P. 3d 461, 508 (2002). Highlighting this potential contradiction, the trial judge instructed the jury during the guilt

phase that “[t]he word ‘deliberate,’” as required for a firstdegree murder conviction, “means formed or arrived at or

determined upon as a result of careful thought and weighing of considerations for and against the proposed course 

of action.” App. 48–49.

When the jury found Mirzayance guilty of first-degree

murder, counsel doubted the likelihood of prevailing on 

the NGI claim. According to the Magistrate Judge: 

“The defense suspected that a jury’s finding, beyond a 

reasonable doubt, that [Mirzayance] had ‘deliberated’ 

and ‘premeditated’ his killing of [the victim] as a practical matter would cripple [Mirzayance’s] chances of 

convincing the jury later, during the sanity phase, 

that [Mirzayance] nevertheless ‘was incapable of

knowing or understanding the nature and quality of

his . . . act and of distinguishing right from wrong at

the time of the commission of the offense,’ Cal. Penal 

Code §25(b), . . . . 

. . . . . 

“Any remaining chance of securing an NGI verdict . . .

now depended (in [counsel’s] view) on presenting some

‘emotional [im]pact’ testimony by [Mirzayance’s] parents, which [counsel] had viewed as key even if 

the defense had secured a second-degree murder verdict at the guilt phase.” Id., at 50–51 (emphasis in

original; capitalization omitted). 

But, as the Magistrate Judge found, on the morning

that the NGI phase was set to begin, Mirzayance’s parents 

effectively refused to testify: 
Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 5 

Opinion of the Court 

“[T]he parents at least expressed clear reluctance to 

testify, which, in context, conveyed the same sense as 

a refusal.” Id., at 72 (emphasis in original). 

Although the parties disputed this point, the parents’ later

actions supported the Magistrate Judge’s finding that the

parents’ reluctance to testify amounted to refusal: 

“Corroborating the Court’s finding that [Mirzayance’s] parents indicated a strong disinclination to 

testify at the NGI phase are the facts that (1) they did

not testify later at his sentencing hearing, and (2) the

reason for their choosing not to do so . . . is that . . . [it] 

would have been ‘too emotional’ for them. . . . If weeks 

after the guilty verdict and the withdrawal of their 

son’s NGI plea, [Mirzayance’s] parents’ emotions still

prevented them from testifying at the sentencing 

hearing, then surely those emotional obstacles to their 

testifying in the NGI phase would have been at least 

as potent, and probably more so.” Id., at 73 (emphasis

in original). 

The Magistrate Judge found that counsel made a carefully reasoned decision not to go forward with the NGI

plea: 

“[Counsel] carefully weighed his options before making his decision final; he did not make it rashly. . . . 

[Counsel’s] strategy at the NGI phase . . . depended 

entirely on the heartfelt participation of [Mirzayance’s] parents as witnesses. . . . Moreover, [counsel] knew that, although he had experts lined up to

testify, their testimony had significant weaknesses. . . . [Counsel’s] NGI-phase strategy became

impossible to attempt once [Mirzayance’s] parents . . . 

expressed . . . their reluctance to [testify] . . . . All 

[counsel] was left with were four experts, all of whom 

reached a conclusion—that [Mirzayance] did not pre-
6 KNOWLES v. MIRZAYANCE 

Opinion of the Court 

meditate and deliberate his crime—that the same jury 

about to hear the NGI evidence already had rejected 

under a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of proof. 

The experts were subject to other impeachment as 

well. . . . [Counsel] discussed the situation with his

experienced co-counsel . . . who concurred in [counsel’s] proposal that he recommend to [Mirzayance] the

withdrawal of the NGI plea.” Id., at 69–71. 

Based on these factual findings, the Magistrate Judge

stated that, in his view, counsel’s performance was not 

deficient. 

Despite this determination, the Magistrate Judge concluded that the court was bound by the Court of Appeals’ 

remand order to determine only whether “‘there were 

tactical reasons for abandoning the insanity defense.’” Id., 

at 98 (quoting Hickman, 66 Fed. Appx., at 680). Even 

though the Magistrate Judge thought that counsel was 

reasonable in recommending that a very weak claim be 

dropped, the Magistrate Judge understood the remand

order to mean that counsel’s performance was deficient if 

withdrawing the NGI plea would achieve no tactical advantage. The Magistrate Judge found that “[Mirzayance]

had nothing to lose” by going forward with the NGI phase 

of the trial, App. 100, and thus held, under the remand

order, that counsel’s performance was deficient, ibid. As 

to prejudice, the Magistrate Judge concluded the court

was similarly bound by the remand order because the

Court of Appeals described the NGI defense as remaining 

“‘viable and strong.’” Id., at 98 (quoting Hickman, supra, 

at 681). Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge found prejudice and recommended granting the writ of habeas corpus.

The District Court accepted this recommendation and 

granted the writ. 

The Court of Appeals affirmed. Mirzayance v. Knowles, 

175 Fed. Appx. 142, 143 (CA9 2006). It first stated that 
Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 7 

Opinion of the Court 

the lower court had misunderstood its remand order, 

which it described as requiring an examination of “counsel’s reason for abandoning the insanity defense,” rather 

than as mandating that the District Court must find 

deficient performance if it found counsel had “nothing to 

lose” by pursuing the insanity defense. Ibid.; App. 98–99.

Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals affirmed the finding of 

deficient performance. According to the court, Mirzayance’s “parents did not refuse, but merely expressed 

reluctance to testify.” Knowles, 175 Fed. Appx., at 144.

And because they may have been willing, “[c]ompetent 

counsel would have attempted to persuade them to testify, 

which counsel here admits he did not.” Ibid.1 The Court 

of Appeals also “disagree[d] that counsel’s decision was

carefully weighed and not made rashly.” Ibid. 

Furthermore, even though it had suggested that the

District Court unnecessarily evaluated counsel’s strategy 

under a “nothing to lose” standard, the Court of Appeals

affirmed the District Court in large part because Mirzayance’s “counsel did not make a true tactical choice”

based on its view that counsel had nothing to gain by

dropping the NGI defense. Ibid. The court held that 

“[r]easonably effective assistance would put on the only 

defense available, especially in a case such as this where

there was significant potential for success.” Id., at 145 

(internal quotation marks omitted). The Court of Appeals

also found prejudice because, in its view, “[i]f counsel had 

—————— 

1At best, the Court of Appeals’ characterization of counsel’s efforts to 

persuade the parents to testify is misleading. According to the Magistrate Judge, counsel testified that he did attempt to persuade the 

parents to testify but that their response “ ‘was kind of flat, and I had 

no influence over them.’ ” App. 54 (quoting testimony from evidentiary 

hearing). In his efforts to convince the parents to testify, counsel told 

them that Mirzayance “had no chance of securing an NGI verdict 

without the ‘emotional quality from nonprofessional witnesses’ that Mr. 

and Mrs. Mirzayance’s testimony could provide; and ‘that they were 

abandoning their son.’ ” Id., at 53–54 (same). 
8 KNOWLES v. MIRZAYANCE 

Opinion of the Court 

pursued the insanity phase of the trial, there is a reasonable probability . . . that the jury would have found Mirzayance insane.” Ibid. 

We granted the petition for writ of certiorari, vacated

the Court of Appeals’ opinion, and remanded for further

consideration in light of Carey v. Musladin, 549 U. S. 70 

(2006), which held that a state court had not “‘unreasonabl[y] appli[ed] clearly established Federal law’” when it

declined to apply our precedent concerning statesponsored courtroom practices to a case involving spectator conduct at trial, id., at 76–77. Knowles v. Mirzayance, 

549 U. S. 1199 (2007). On remand, the Court of Appeals

concluded that its decision was unaffected by Musladin 

and again affirmed the District Court’s grant of habeas 

corpus. App. 4. The Court of Appeals reiterated the same

analysis on which it had relied prior to this Court’s remand, again finding that the California court had unreasonably applied clearly established federal law because 

defense counsel’s failure to pursue the insanity defense 

constituted deficient performance as it “secured . . . [n]o 

actual tactical advantage.” Id., at 8. We granted certiorari, 554 U. S. ___ (2008). 

II 

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 

Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 28 U. S. C. §2254(d)(1), a federal 

court may not grant a state prisoner’s habeas application

unless the relevant state-court decision “was contrary to, 

or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court 

of the United States.”2 Here, the relevant state-court 

—————— 

2Before the Court of Appeals, Mirzayance contended that the standard of review set forth in §2254(d)(1) should not apply to his case. See 

Brief for Appellee in No. 04–57102 (CA9), pp. 28–29, 33. Before this 

Court, however, Mirzayance contends that the Court of Appeals correctly applied §2254(d) to his claim. See Brief for Respondent 27, 32. 
Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 9 

Opinion of the Court 

decision is the California Court of Appeal’s decision denying state habeas relief.

We conclude that the state court’s decision to deny

Mirzayance’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim did 

not violate clearly established federal law. The Court of 

Appeals reached a contrary result based, in large measure,

on its application of an improper standard of review—it 

blamed counsel for abandoning the NGI claim because 

there was nothing to lose by pursuing it.3 But this Court 

has held on numerous occasions that it is not “‘an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law’” for

a state court to decline to apply a specific legal rule that 

—————— 

Mirzayance did question whether the California Court of Appeal’s 

denial of his claim should receive as much deference as the “prototypical” state-court adjudication “involv[ing] both a reasoned, written 

opinion and an adequate development of the factual record in support 

of the claims.” Id., at 33. Mirzayance thus contends that “the usual

§2254(d) deferential approach must be modified and adapted” in 

evaluating his claim. Id., at 34. Nonetheless, because Mirzayance has 

not argued that §2254(d) is entirely inapplicable to his claim or that the

state court failed to reach an adjudication on the merits, we initially

evaluate his claim through the deferential lens of §2254(d). See United 

States v. International Business Machines Corp., 517 U. S. 843, 855, 

n. 3 (1996) (finding that party abandoned issue by failing to address it

in the party’s brief on the merits); Posters ‘N’ Things, Ltd. v. United 

States, 511 U. S. 513, 527 (1994) (same). 

In addition, we do not decide whether the Court of Appeals was 

correct in finding that an evidentiary hearing on Mirzayance’s claim 

was required. See Mirzayance v. Hickman, 66 Fed. Appx. 676, 679–681 

(CA9 2003). Mirzayance’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim fails 

even under the facts presented at the evidentiary hearing. 3Although the Court of Appeals implicitly disavowed the “nothing to 

lose” standard applied by the District Court and Magistrate Judge, see 

App. 5; Mirzayance v. Knowles, 175 Fed. Appx. 142, 143 (CA9 2006), it 

nevertheless concluded that “[n]o actual tactical advantage was to be

gained” by counsel’s withdrawal of the insanity defense, App. 8; 

Knowles, supra, at 144. Finding that counsel is deficient by abandoning a defense where there is nothing to gain from that abandonment is

equivalent to finding that counsel is deficient by declining to pursue a 

strategy where there is nothing to lose from pursuit of that strategy. 
10 KNOWLES v. MIRZAYANCE 

Opinion of the Court 

has not been squarely established by this Court. See 

Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U. S. ___, ___ (2008) (slip op., at 

5–6 (per curiam); Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U. S. 465, 478 

(2007); Musladin, supra, at 76–77. This Court has never 

established anything akin to the Court of Appeals’ “nothing to lose” standard for evaluating Strickland claims. 

Indeed, Mirzayance himself acknowledges that a “nothing

to lose” rule is “unrecognized by this Court.” Brief for 

Respondent 28. And the Court of Appeals did not cite any 

Supreme Court decision establishing a “nothing to lose” 

standard in any of its three opinions in this case. See App.

3–12; Knowles, 175 Fed. Appx. 142; Hickman, 66 Fed. 

Appx. 676.

With no Supreme Court precedent establishing a “nothing to lose” standard for ineffective-assistance-of-counsel 

claims, habeas relief cannot be granted pursuant to

§2254(d)(1) based on such a standard. Instead, such relief 

may be granted only if the state-court decision unreasonably applied the more general standard for ineffectiveassistance-of-counsel claims established by Strickland, in 

which this Court held that a defendant must show both 

deficient performance and prejudice in order to prove that 

he has received ineffective assistance of counsel, 466 U. S., 

at 687. Indeed, this Court has repeatedly applied that 

standard to evaluate ineffective-assistance-of-counsel 

claims where there is no other Supreme Court precedent 

directly on point. See, e.g., Van Patten, supra, at ___ (slip

op., at 5) (evaluating claim under Strickland where no 

Supreme Court precedent established that any other 

standard applied to the “novel factual context” before the 

Court); Schriro, supra, at 478 (evaluating claim under 

general Strickland standard where no Supreme Court 

precedent addressed the particular “situation in which a

client interferes with counsel’s efforts to present mitigating evidence to a sentencing court”). 

The question “is not whether a federal court believes the 
Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 11 

Opinion of the Court 

state court’s determination” under the Strickland standard “was incorrect but whether that determination was 

unreasonable—a substantially higher threshold.” Schriro, 

supra, at 473. And, because the Strickland standard is a 

general standard, a state court has even more latitude to

reasonably determine that a defendant has not satisfied 

that standard. See Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U. S. 

652, 664 (2004) (“[E]valuating whether a rule application was unreasonable requires considering the rule’s

specificity. The more general the rule, the more leeway courts have in reaching outcomes in case-by-case

determinations”).

Under the doubly deferential judicial review that applies to a Strickland claim evaluated under the 

§2254(d)(1) standard, see Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U. S. 

1, 5–6 (2003) (per curiam), Mirzayance’s ineffectiveassistance claim fails. It was not unreasonable for the 

state court to conclude that his defense counsel’s performance was not deficient when he counseled Mirzayance to 

abandon a claim that stood almost no chance of success. 

As explained more fully below, this Court has never required defense counsel to pursue every claim or defense, 

regardless of its merit, viability, or realistic chance for 

success. See also infra, at 14–15. 

III 

Even if Mirzayance’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel 

claim were eligible for de novo review, it would still fail. 

Strickland requires a defendant to establish deficient

performance and prejudice. 466 U. S., at 687. Mirzayance

can establish neither. 

Mirzayance has not shown “that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” 

Id., at 687–688. “The proper measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing 

professional norms.” Id., at 688. “Judicial scrutiny of 
12 KNOWLES v. MIRZAYANCE 

Opinion of the Court 

counsel’s performance must be highly deferential,” and “a

court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s 

conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Id., at 689. “[S]trategic choices made

after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to

plausible options are virtually unchallengeable.” Id., at 

690. 

Here, Mirzayance has not shown that his counsel violated these standards. Rather, his counsel merely recommended the withdrawal of what he reasonably believed 

was a claim doomed to fail. The jury had already rejected

medical testimony about Mirzayance’s mental state in the 

guilt phase, during which the State carried its burden of 

proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The Magistrate 

Judge explained this point: 

“All [counsel] was left with were four experts, all of

whom reached a conclusion—that [Mirzayance] did 

not premeditate and deliberate his crime—that the

same jury about to hear the NGI evidence already had

rejected under a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard 

of proof. The experts were subject to other impeachment as well.” App. 71. 

In fact, the Magistrate Judge found that counsel “convincingly detailed ways in which [the experts] could have been

impeached, for overlooking or minimizing facts which 

showcased [Mirzayance’s] clearly goal-directed behavior.” 

Id., at 70. 

In the NGI phase, the burden would have switched to

Mirzayance to prove insanity by a preponderance of the 

evidence. Mirzayance’s counsel reasonably believed that 

there was almost no chance that the same jury would have

reached a different result when considering similar evidence, especially with Mirzayance bearing the burden of 

proof. Furthermore, counsel knew he would have had to 

present this defense without the benefit of the parents’ 
Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 13 

Opinion of the Court 

testimony, which he believed to be his strongest evidence. 

See ibid. (“[Counsel’s] strategy at the NGI phase had been

to appeal to the jury in one or both of two ways that depended entirely on the heartfelt participation of [Mirzayance’s] parents as witnesses”). Counsel reasonably

concluded that this defense was almost certain to lose. 

The Court of Appeals took the position that the situation 

was not quite so dire because the parents “merely expressed reluctance to testify.” Id., at 7; Knowles, 175 Fed. 

Appx., at 144. It explained that “[c]ompetent counsel 

would have attempted to persuade them to testify.” App. 

7; Knowles, supra, at 144. But that holding is in tension 

with the Magistrate Judge’s findings and applies a more 

demanding standard than Strickland prescribes. The 

Magistrate Judge noted that the parents “conveyed the 

same sense as a refusal.” App. 72. Indeed, the Magistrate

Judge found that the parents “did not testify later at

[Mirzayance’s] sentencing hearing” because it “would have 

been ‘too emotional’ for them.” Id., at 73 (quoting testimony from evidentiary hearing). Competence does not 

require an attorney to browbeat a reluctant witness into 

testifying, especially when the facts suggest that no

amount of persuasion would have succeeded. Counsel’s 

acceptance of the parents’ “convey[ance] [of] . . . a refusal,” 

id., at 72, does not rise to the high bar for deficient performance set by Strickland. 

Mirzayance’s failure to show ineffective assistance of 

counsel is confirmed by the Magistrate Judge’s finding

that “[counsel] carefully weighed his options before making his decision final; he did not make it rashly.” App. 69. 

The Magistrate Judge explained all of the factors that

counsel considered—many of which are discussed above—

and noted that counsel “discussed the situation with his 

experienced co-counsel” before making it. Id., at 71. In 

making this finding, the Magistrate Judge identified 

counsel’s decision as essentially an informed decision 
14 KNOWLES v. MIRZAYANCE 

Opinion of the Court 

“made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options.” Strickland, 466 U. S., at 690. 

As we stated in Strickland, such a decision is “virtually 

unchallengeable.” Ibid. 

Without even referring to the Magistrate Judge’s finding, the Court of Appeals “disagree[d] that counsel’s decision was carefully weighed and not made rashly.” App. 7; 

Knowles, supra, at 144. In its view, “counsel acted on his 

subjective feelings of hopelessness without even considering the potential benefit to be gained in persisting with 

the plea.” App. 8; Knowles, supra, at 144–145. But courts 

of appeals may not set aside a district court’s factual 

findings unless those findings are clearly erroneous. Fed. 

Rule Civ. Proc. 52(a); Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U. S. 

564, 573–574 (1985). Here, the Court of Appeals failed

even to mention the clearly-erroneous standard, let alone 

apply it, before effectively overturning the lower court’s

factual findings related to counsel’s behavior. 

In light of the Magistrate Judge’s factual findings, the 

state court’s rejection of Mirzayance’s ineffectiveassistance-of-counsel claim was consistent with Strickland. The Court of Appeals insisted, however, that 

“‘[r]easonably effective assistance’ required here that

counsel assert the only defense available . . . .” App. 8; see

also Knowles, supra, at 145. But we are aware of no “prevailing professional norms” that prevent counsel from 

recommending that a plea be withdrawn when it is almost 

certain to lose. See Strickland, supra, at 688. And in this 

case, counsel did not give up “the only defense available.” 

Counsel put on a defense to first-degree murder during the 

guilt phase. Counsel also defended his client at the sentencing phase.4 The law does not require counsel to raise 

—————— 

4Mirzayance has no complaints about the sentencing phase since he 

received the lowest possible sentence for his first-degree murder conviction. California authorizes three possible sentences for murder: death, 
Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 15 

Opinion of the Court 

every available nonfrivolous defense. See Jones v. Barnes, 

463 U. S. 745, 751 (1983); cf. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U. S. 

510, 533 (2003) (explaining, in case involving similar issue

of counsel’s responsibility to present mitigating evidence

at sentencing, that “Strickland does not require counsel to

investigate every conceivable line of mitigating evidence 

no matter how unlikely the effort would be to assist the 

defendant . . . [or even to] present mitigating evidence at 

sentencing in every case”). Counsel also is not required to

have a tactical reason—above and beyond a reasonable 

appraisal of a claim’s dismal prospects for success—for

recommending that a weak claim be dropped altogether.

Mirzayance has thus failed to demonstrate that his counsel’s performance was deficient.

In addition, Mirzayance has not demonstrated that he

suffered prejudice from his counsel’s performance. See 

Strickland, 466 U. S., at 691 (“An error by counsel, even if 

professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting

aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error 

had no effect on the judgment”). To establish prejudice,

“[t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable 

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, 

the result of the proceeding would have been different. A 

reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id., at 694. To prevail

on his ineffective-assistance claim, Mirzayance must show, 

therefore, that there is a “reasonable probability” that he

would have prevailed on his insanity defense had he pursued it. This Mirzayance cannot do. It was highly improbable that a jury, which had just rejected testimony 

about Mirzayance’s mental condition when the State bore 

the burden of proof, would have reached a different result 

—————— 

life imprisonment without parole, and imprisonment for 25 years to life.

Cal. Penal Code Ann. §190(a) (West 1999). Mirzayance was sentenced

to 25 years to life plus 4 years for a weapons enhancement. 
16 KNOWLES v. MIRZAYANCE 

Opinion of the Court 

when Mirzayance presented similar evidence at the NGI

phase. See supra, at 12–13. 

IV 

Mirzayance has not shown that the state court’s conclusion that there was no ineffective assistance of counsel 

“was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application

of, clearly established Federal law” under §2254. In fact, 

he has not shown ineffective assistance at all. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is

remanded with instructions to deny the petition. 

It is so ordered.