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NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CHRISTINA STEPHENS, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner 

of Social Security, 

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 22-35998 

D.C. No.1:20-cv-02137-IM 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Oregon

Karin J. Immergut, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted October 18, 2023**

Portland, Oregon

Before: KOH and SUNG, Circuit Judges, and EZRA,*** District Judge.

Christina Stephens appeals the district court’s decision affirming the 

Administrative Law Judge’s (ALJ) denial of her application for Social Security 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable David A. Ezra, United States District Judge for the 

District of Hawaii, sitting by designation.

FILED

OCT 20 2023

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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Disability Insurance (SSDI) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI). On appeal, 

Stephens contends that the ALJ improperly discounted (1) Stephens’s subjective 

symptom testimony, (2) Dr. Eckerd’s medical opinion, and (3) lay witness 

testimony from Stephens’s mother and boyfriend. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

1. The ALJ provided clear and convincing reasons to discount Stephens’s

subjective symptom testimony. See Smith v. Kijakazi, 14 F.4th 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 

2021) (holding that when there is no evidence of malingering, an ALJ may “reject 

the claimant’s testimony about the severity of her symptoms only by offering 

specific, clear and convincing reasons for doing so” (citation omitted)). 

With regard to Stephens’s mental health related limitations, Stephens testified 

that her anxiety was so severe that she was unable to leave her house without the 

assistance of her family and the thought of leaving her house gave her panic 

attacks. She also argues that she has “significant deficits in her ability to 

concentrate, remain in the workplace for a full day, and handle social interactions 

with supervisors, coworkers, and the public.” The ALJ reasonably discounted 

Stephens’s testimony because many of Stephens’s mental health related symptoms 

were controlled by medication. See Wellington v. Berryhill, 878 F.3d 867, 876 (9th 

Cir. 2017) (holding that “evidence of medical treatment successfully relieving 

symptoms can undermine a claim of disability”). Furthermore, the ALJ reasonably 
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discounted Stephens’s testimony because, during the period of disability, Stephens 

engaged in multiple social activities, including going to a party at a cousin’s house, 

going out with family and friends, going fishing, dating, attending college full 

time, and driving to California to visit her father, that undermined the alleged 

severity of her symptoms. See Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1040 (9th Cir. 

2007) (explaining that an ALJ may consider “whether the claimant engages in 

daily activities inconsistent with the alleged symptoms”).

With regard to Stephens’s physical limitations, Stephens claimed that she was 

unable to “stand or sit” for more than 15 minutes at a time. The ALJ reasonably 

discounted Stephens’s testimony because Stephens’s neuropathy, back problems, 

and complaints of pain were largely controlled by medication. See Wellington, 878 

F.3d at 876. The ALJ found that Stephens’s symptoms also improved after her 

bariatric surgery and that Stephens generally presented to her examinations with 

“no acute distress,” “a normal gait and station, and normal strength and muscle 

tone.” Further, although Stephens alleged her neuropathy was “debilitating,” 

medical testing showed only “mild to moderate neuropathy.” Finally, the ALJ 

reasonably concluded that the alleged severity of Stephens’s physical symptoms 

was inconsistent with the “objective evidence and [Stephens’s] level of activity”

during the period of disability, which included feeding her pets, preparing simple 

meals, driving a car, performing household repairs, mowing, and shopping. See 
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Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1016 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that because 

“disability claimants should not be penalized for attempting to lead normal lives in 

the face of their limitations ... only if [claimants’] level of activity were 

inconsistent with [their] limitations would [daily] activities have any bearing on 

[their] credibility” (citation omitted)).

2. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s discounting of Stephens’s medical 

evidence. See Woods v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 792 (9th Cir. 2022) (explaining that 

under the new regulations, the ALJ “must articulate how persuasive [he] finds all 

of the medical opinions from each doctor . . . and explain how [he] considered the 

supportability and consistency factors in reaching these findings” (cleaned up) 

(quoting 20 C.F.R.§ 404.1520c(b))). Here, the ALJ discounted Dr. Eckerd’s 

opinion for two reasons: (1) the limitations were supported only by Stephens’s 

subjective complaints, which, as discussed above, the ALJ properly rejected as 

inconsistent with the record and Stephens’s daily activities, see Tommasetti v. 

Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2008) (“An ALJ may reject a treating 

physician's opinion if it is based ‘to a large extent’ on a claimant’s self-reports that 

have been properly discounted as incredible.” (citation omitted)), and (2) the 

severity of limitations was inconsistent with objective medical evidence.

Dr. Eckerd’s opinion that full-time employment would be Stephens’s “breaking 

point” and would result in Stephens “descending into intense, paralyzing anxiety 
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and panic attacks” was not reflected in Dr. Eckerd’s treatment notes, which 

regularly described Stephens as “cooperative and pleasant,” “appropriate[ly] 

dress[ed] and groom[ed]” and “engaged.” Additionally, the ALJ did not take these 

statements out of context. The ALJ reasonably explained that Dr. Eckerd’s severe 

limitations regarding Stephens’s social functioning were unsupported by the level 

of Stephens’s daily activities and the psychiatric signs observed by her medical 

providers. That Stephens would have us place less weight on the observed 

psychiatric signs is insufficient to find that the ALJ’s decision is not supported by 

substantial evidence. See Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 489, 499 (9th Cir. 2022) 

(“The standard isn’t whether our court is convinced, but instead whether the ALJ’s 

rationale is clear enough that it has the power to convince.”).

The ALJ also did not err in crediting Dr. Peterson’s opinion while discounting 

Dr. Eckerd’s opinion. Although the medical opinions of both physicians were 

similar in some respects, Dr. Peterson, unlike Dr. Eckerd, did not state that 

Stephens was unable to maintain full-time employment. Rather, Dr. Peterson 

opined that Stephens “suffers from multiple conditions that impact her ability to 

work full-time,” and the symptoms caused by these conditions were “more likely 

to occur with stress, and prolonged interaction with people and a work 

environment.” The ALJ accepted Dr. Peterson’s opinion and accounted for these 

conditions in setting Stephens’s residual functional capacity.
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3. The ALJ considered but did not articulate how he evaluated Stephens’s 

mother’s and boyfriend’s lay witness testimony. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(d), 

416.920c(d) (providing that an ALJ is “not required to articulate how [he] 

considered evidence from nonmedical sources”). Stephens argues that the ALJ’s 

failure to provide reasons for discounting these lay witnesses was error. We have 

not yet addressed whether under the new regulations an ALJ is still required to 

provide germane reasons for discounting lay witnesses. However, we need not 

decide this issue because any error in not addressing these lay witnesses’ testimony

was harmless. See Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[A]n 

error is harmless so long as there remains substantial evidence supporting the 

ALJ’s decision and the error ‘does not negate the validity of the ALJ’s ultimate 

conclusion.’” (citation omitted)).

Both Stephens’s mother and her boyfriend provided statements that were 

similar to Stephens’s subjective complaints, which the ALJ reasonably rejected as 

discussed above. Therefore, the ALJ’s rejection of the lay witnesses’ statements 

was also reasonable. See Valentine v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 694 

(9th Cir. 2009)(holding that when “the ALJ provided clear and convincing reasons 

for rejecting [the claimant’s] own subjective complaints,” “it follows that the ALJ 

also gave germane reasons for rejecting [lay witness] testimony” that “was similar 

to such complaints”). 
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4. Because substantial evidence supportsthe limitations set forth by the ALJ in 

setting Stephens’s residual functional capacity, the hypotheticals posed to the 

vocational expert were proper and the ALJ did not err in relying upon them. See 

Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1166 (9th Cir. 2014) (“An ALJ may rely on a 

vocational expert’s testimony that is based on a hypothetical that contains all of the 

limitations that the ALJ found credible and supported by substantial evidence in 

the record.” (cleaned up)).

AFFIRMED.