J-S90021-16 & J-S90022-16 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

TERRANCE HILL

Appellant No. 3297 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Dated May 29, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0002472-2014

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

TERRANCE HILL

Appellant No. 3298 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Dated May 29, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0002454-2014

BEFORE: OTT, J., SOLANO, J., and JENKINS, J. 

MEMORANDUM BY SOLANO, J.: FILED DECEMBER 30, 2016

Appellant Terrance Hill appeals from the judgments of sentence 

imposed by the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia following his 

convictions at Docket Nos. CP–51–CR–0002454-2014 and CP–51–CR–

0002472–2014. Appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of his 

sentences. We affirm.
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At Docket No. CP-51-CR-0002454-2014, Appellant was charged with 

robbery (18 Pa.C.S. § 3701(a)(1)(ii)), conspiracy to commit robbery (18 

Pa.C.S. § 903(c)), and related offenses. These charges related to a 

January 18, 2014 gunpoint robbery of a restaurant at 3000 Island Avenue in 

Philadelphia. N.T., 4/17/14, at 4.

At Docket No. CP-51-CR-0002472-2014, Appellant was again charged 

with robbery, conspiracy to commit robbery, and related offenses. These 

charges related to a January 23, 2014 gunpoint robbery of a restaurant at 

4201 Market Street in Philadelphia. N.T., 4/17/14, at 5.

The trial court dealt at the same time with the charges in each case. 

On April 17, 2014, Appellant entered an open guilty plea to one count of 

robbery and one count of conspiracy to commit robbery in each case. The 

trial court held a sentencing hearing in the two cases on May 29, 2015.1 At 

that hearing, Appellant’s counsel emphasized that Appellant had “a 

tremendous amount of family support.” N.T., 5/29/15, at 4. Appellant 

apologized, said he accepted full responsibility, and assured the court, “if 

you let me go today, I promise you you’ll never see me in here again.” Id.

at 5. The Commonwealth noted that, although Appellant had a prior record 

score of zero, he had previously been adjudicated delinquent and failed to 

follow the conditions of his probation. Id. at 6. Six months after his release 

____________________________________________

1 The sentencing hearing was continued several times while the trial court 

awaited the necessary reports.
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from the juvenile facility, he stole his aunt’s car and committed the two 

gunpoint robberies at issue here. Id. at 7. While in jail, he was criminally 

charged with making a weapon (a shank). Id. 

At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced 

Appellant to 5 to 10 years’ imprisonment, followed by 10 years’ probation for 

each count of robbery and each count of conspiracy to commit robbery. All 

sentences were concurrent.2 The court explained the reasons for its sentence 

as follows:

Taking into consideration [that Appellant] pled guilty, taking into 

consideration that no one was injured during the course of these 

robberies, taking into consideration that guns were used to rob 

the victims, taking into consideration [that Appellant] produced a 

weapon while in custody, taking into consideration that 

[Appellant] is a danger or threat to society, and I fashion a 

sentence to punish [Appellant,] to protect society[,] and in an 

____________________________________________

2

 At the same sentencing hearing, Appellant also was sentenced for offences 

charged at two other docket numbers that are not now before this Court. 

No. CP-51-CR-000417-2014 dealt with Appellant’s theft of his aunt’s car, for 

which he received a concurrent sentence of three and one-half to seven 

years’ incarceration for theft by unlawful taking and fleeing or attempting to 

elude police officers. No. MC-51-CR-0041515-2014 dealt with the shank 

incident, for which Appellant received a consecutive sentence of five years’ 

probation for possessing a weapon for escape in a correctional institution. 

Thus, the aggregate sentence imposed on May 29, 2015 was 5 to 10 years’ 

incarceration, followed by 15 years’ probation. The appeals now before this 

Court address only the robbery and conspiracy to commit robbery 

convictions, for which the aggregate sentence was 5 to 10 years’ 

incarceration, followed by 10 years’ probation. Appellant separately appealed 

the judgment of sentence at No. CP-51-CR-000417-2014, but we dismissed 

that appeal because Appellant failed to file a brief. See No. 3256 EDA 2015 

(Pa. Super.).
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attempt to rehabilitate him — based on his past, I think a state 

sentence is mandated. I’ll impose a state sentence.

N.T., 5/29/15, at 9-10.

On June 2, 2015, Appellant filed a Motion to Reconsider Sentence in 

which he argued that, given his age and family support, the trial court 

abused its discretion when it sentenced him above the aggravated range in 

the sentencing guidelines. See Motion to Reconsider Sentence, 6/2/15, at ¶ 

4.3 On October 6, 2015, Appellant’s motion was denied by operation of law 

pursuant to Criminal Rule 720(B)(3).

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal in each case and filed separate 

briefs that are similar, but not identical. The Commonwealth filed one brief in 

response. Because of the similarity of the issues, we address both appeals 

together in this memorandum.

In his brief relating to his conviction at No. CP-51-CR-0002472-2014 

(docketed in this Court at No. 3297 EDA 2015), Appellant raises the 

following issue:

Whether the court’s sentence of five to ten (5-10) years’ 

incarceration followed by fifteen (15) years[’] probation violated 

____________________________________________

3

 Appellant filed the same motion in each case. The guidelines suggested a 

standard range minimum sentence of 40 to 54 months, and an aggravated 

minimum sentence of up to 66 months, for each robbery. N.T., 5/29/15, at 

3. Thus, the five to ten-year prison portion of Appellant’s sentence was 

consistent with the aggravated minimum suggested by the guidelines, and 

the ten-year probationary period caused the sentence to exceed the 

guidelines.
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Pa.R.Crim.P. § 702 and [42] Pa.C.S. § 9742(b), constituting an 

abuse of discretion?

Appellant’s Brief, No. 3297 EDA 2015, filed 4/11/16 (“Appellant’s 3297 

Brief”), at 5. In his brief relating to his conviction at No. CP-51-CR-0002454-

2014 (docketed in this Court at No. 3298 EDA 2015),4 Appellant states his 

issue as follows:

Whether the court’s sentence of five to ten (5-10) years’ 

incarceration followed by fifteen (15) years[’] probation violated 

[42] Pa.C.S. § 9721(b), constituting an abuse of discretion?

Appellant’s Brief, No. 3298 EDA 2015, filed 9/16/16 (“Appellant’s 3298 

Brief”), at 5.

In each appeal, Appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of his 

sentence, an issue which is not appealable as of right. See Commonwealth 

v. Colon, 102 A.3d 1033, 1042 (Pa. Super. 2014), appeal denied, 109 

A.3d 678 (Pa. 2015). Before we exercise jurisdiction to reach the merits of 

Appellant’s issues, we must determine: (1) whether his appeals are timely; 

(2) whether Appellant preserved his issues; (3) whether Appellant’s briefs 

include a concise statement of the reasons relied upon for allowance of an 

appeal with respect to the discretionary aspects of his sentences; and (4) 

____________________________________________

4 Because Appellant did not file a timely brief at No. 3298 EDA 2015, we 

dismissed that appeal on May 26, 2016. Upon Appellant’s application for 

relief, we reinstated the appeal on June 20, 2016. When Appellant again 

failed to file a timely brief, we again dismissed the appeal. Appellant then 

filed a second application for relief, which this Court granted, reinstating the 

appeal on September 15, 2016. Appellant filed his brief on September 16, 

2016.
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whether the concise statements raise substantial questions regarding the 

sentences’ impropriety under the Sentencing Code. Id. at 1042-43. Only if 

the appeals satisfy each of these four requirements may we proceed to 

decide the substantive merits of Appellant’s claims. Id. at 1043.

Here, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal in each case, included 

concise statements of the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal in his 

briefs, and raised substantial questions. See Commonwealth v. Dodge, 77 

A.3d 1263, 1272 n.8 (Pa. Super. 2013) (“arguments that the sentencing 

court failed to consider the factors proffered in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721 . . . 

present a substantial question”), appeal denied, 91 A.3d 161 (Pa. 2014); 

Commonwealth v. Goggins, 748 A.2d 721, 727-28 (Pa. Super.) (en banc) 

(claim that court imposed sentence without presentence report or other 

equivalent source of information presents substantial question), appeal 

denied, 759 A.2d 920 (Pa. 2000).5

____________________________________________

5

 In his Statement of Questions Involved in his brief filed in 3297 EDA 2015, 

Appellant claims that the trial court violated Pa.R.Crim.P. 702 by failing to 

order a presentence investigation report or conduct a comparable 

presentence inquiry. This claim is not mentioned in his concise statement in 

that brief. However, the Commonwealth does not object on this basis. 

Therefore, Appellant’s failure to include the claim in his concise statement 

does not preclude this Court from reviewing it. See Commonwealth v. 

Campion, 672 A.2d 1328, 1334 (Pa. Super.) (where Commonwealth does 

not object to lack of a statement and where this Court’s ability to review the 

merits of a claim is not precluded by the lack of a statement, we may 

consider the merits), appeal denied, 681 A.2d 1340 (Pa. 1996).
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The Commonwealth argues, however, that Appellant failed to satisfy 

the second Colon requirement — preservation of his claims — because the 

claim raised in his motion to reconsider his sentence differed from the claims 

raised in the instant appeals. We agree. In his motion to reconsider his 

sentence, Appellant argued, “Considering Petitioner[’]s age and family 

support, Your Honor abused your discretion when you sentenced Petitioner 

above the aggravated range of his sentence.” Motion to Reconsider Sentence 

at ¶ 4. As this Court has explained, a claim “that the court failed to consider 

facts of record, though necessarily encompassing the factors of § 9721” of 

the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa. C.S. § 9721, is different from a claim “that the 

sentencing court failed to consider the factors proffered in 42 Pa.C.S. § 

9721.” Dodge, 77 A.3d at 1272 n.8. Although a claim that the trial court 

failed to consider the factors specified by the Legislature in Section 9721 

raises a substantial question justifying allowance of an appeal, a claim that 

the court merely failed to consider facts of record does not. See id. Here, 

Appellant preserved only a claim that the trial court failed to consider facts 

of record; he did not preserve a claim that the court failed to comply with 

Section 9721. He therefore failed to preserve an issue on which we may 

exercise jurisdiction.

Nonetheless, even if Appellant had properly preserved his claim, he 

would not be entitled to relief. Sentencing is vested in the sound discretion 

of the sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal 
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absent a manifest abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Zirkle, 107 A.3d 

127, 132 (Pa. Super. 2014), appeal denied, 117 A.3d 297 (Pa. 2015). An 

abuse of discretion is not merely an error in judgment. “Rather, the 

appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the sentencing 

court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its judgment for reasons of 

partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or arrived at a manifestly unreasonable 

decision.” Id. There is no showing of an abuse of discretion here.

At the outset, we note that although Appellant frames the issue in 

each of his briefs as a challenge to his “sentence of five to ten (5-10) years’ 

incarceration followed by fifteen (15) years[’] probation,” see Appellant’s 

3297 Brief at 5; Appellant’s 3298 Brief at 5, the only judgments of sentence 

at issue in these appeals are those relating to Appellant’s convictions of 

robbery and conspiracy to commit robbery under the two docket numbers 

from which these appeals are taken. Appellant’s aggregate sentence for 

those crimes was five to ten years’ incarceration, followed by 10 years’ 

probation. Appellant’s references in his briefs to an aggregate term of 5-10 

years’ incarceration, followed by 15 years’ probation relates to the total 

period of incarceration and probation for which he was sentenced under the 

two docket numbers at issue here and two additional docket numbers under 

which he was sentenced for other offenses on the same day (the sentences 

for stealing his aunt’s car and for making the shank). See note 2, supra. 

Appellant’s sentences under those other two docket numbers are not now 
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before us. We note, however, that our holding affirming Appellant’s 

sentences would be the same even if Appellant’s aggregate sentence for all 

crimes were at issue here. 

A sentencing court must impose a sentence that is “consistent with the 

protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact 

on the life of the victim and on the community, and the rehabilitative needs 

of the defendant.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b); Commonwealth v. Walls, 926 

A.2d 957, 962 (Pa. 2007). This Court has explained:

In imposing sentence, the trial court is required to consider the 

particular circumstances of the offense and the character of the 

defendant. The trial court should refer to the defendant’s prior 

criminal record, age, personal characteristics, and potential for 

rehabilitation. However, where the sentencing judge had the 

benefit of a presentence investigation report, it will be presumed 

that he or she was aware of the relevant information regarding 

the defendant’s character and weighed those considerations 

along with mitigating statutory factors.

Commonwealth v. Boyer, 856 A.2d 149, 154 (Pa. Super. 2004), aff'd, 

891 A.2d 1265 (Pa. 2006); see Commonwealth v. Devers, 546 A.2d 12, 

18 (Pa. 1988) (“Where pre-sentence reports exist, we shall continue to 

presume that the sentencing judge was aware of relevant information 

regarding the defendant’s character and weighed those considerations along 

with mitigating statutory factors”). This Court will not disturb the sentencing 

court’s discretion where the sentencing court has been informed by a presentence report and has demonstrated “any degree of awareness of the 

sentencing considerations.” Devers, 546 A.2d at 18.
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In his brief in No. 3297 EDA 2015, Appellant claims that the 

sentencing court abused its discretion by failing to order a pre-sentence 

investigation or conduct a comparable inquiry, as required by Pa.R.Crim.P. 

702. Appellant’s 3297 Brief at 12. The record reveals, however, that the trial 

court ordered and received a presentence investigation report before it 

sentenced Appellant. This claim therefore is meritless.

In both briefs, Appellant claims that the sentencing court abused its 

discretion by failing to consider all of the factors set forth in the Sentencing 

Code at 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b). Appellant’s 3297 Brief at 12; Appellant’s 3298 

Brief at 12. In his brief at No. 3298 EDA 2015, Appellant implicitly 

acknowledges that there was a presentence investigation report, but 

contends that the sentencing court did not adequately address that report. 

Appellant’s 3298 Brief at 14.6

We disagree. The trial court had the benefit of a presentence 

investigation report and demonstrated an awareness of the Section 9721(b) 

____________________________________________

6 Appellant argues that in his case, as in Commonwealth v. Jones, 565 

A.2d 732, 733 (Pa. 1989), the sentencing court erred by focusing nearly 

exclusively on the need to punish him and the harm he caused to his 

victims. Appellant’s 3297 Brief at 8; Appellant’s 3298 Brief at 7-8. In Jones, 

this Court, in an unpublished memorandum, held that the sentencing court 

had abused its discretion in imposing an excessive (50 to 100 year) 

sentence. See Jones, 565 A.2d at 733. However, the only issue addressed 

in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s opinion in Jones was its own 

jurisdiction to review this Court’s unpublished decision. Id. The Court 

concluded that it lacked such jurisdiction. Id. at 735. We therefore find 

Appellant’s reliance on Jones is misplaced.
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factors in its remarks during sentencing. See N.T., 5/29/15, at 9-10 (citing

protection of the public, gravity of the offense, and Appellant’s need for 

rehabilitation). Under these circumstances, we presume the sentencing court 

“was aware of relevant information regarding the defendant’s character and 

weighed those considerations along with mitigating statutory factors.” 

Devers, 546 A.2d at 18. We therefore conclude that there was no abuse of 

discretion.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judge Ott joins the memorandum. 

Judge Jenkins concurs in the result. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/30/2016