Filed 4/8/15 Wawock v. Super. Ct. CA2/5 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

RICHARD WAWOCK,

Petitioner,

v.

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY,
Respondent;

CSI ELECTRICAL CONTRACTORS, INC.,
Real Party in Interest. No. B261315
(Super. Ct. No. BC492586)
(Elihu M. Berle, Judge)

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING: Petition for Writ of Mandate: Writ Granted. Hayes Pawlenko, Matthew B. Haye s, Kye D. Pawlenko for Petitioner. Snell & Wilmer, Steve T. Graham, Todd E. Lundell, Ann Dwyer for Real PartyIn-Interest.2 Plaintiff Richard Wawock petitions for a writ of mandate. He seeks an order directing the responde nt court to deny the petition to confirm arbitration brought by defendant CSI Electrical Contractors, Inc. (“CSI”). We grant the petition.

STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURE Wawock, an electrician and a member of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, filed a class action co mplaint against defendant CSI Electrical Contractors (“CSI”), alleging that CSI failed to pay wages to its electricians for time spent attending mandated training courses on topics such as safety, first aid, and harassment prevention. He stated causes of action for violations of the Labor Code and controlling Wage Orders, and sought an inju nction and attorneys fees under the Unfair Competition Law (Business and Professions Co de section 17200 et seq.) as well as penalties under the Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA) (Labor Co de, § 2698 et seq.). CSI petitioned to compel ar bitration pursuant to a co llective bargaining agreement (“CBA”). After hearing, the trial court dete rmined that the CBA committed the threshold question of arbitrability to the Labor Mana gement Committee. Wawock petitioned for
writ review and this court issued an alterna tive writ. On Septembe r 17, 2013, a majority of this court denied the petition, holding that the parties had manifested a clear intent to commit the threshold question of arbitrability to the Labor Management Committee. ( Wawock v. Superior Court (Sept. 17, 2013, B2482 69) [nonpub. opin.].) This court did not decide the ques tion of arbitrability. In the meantime, Wawock submitted hi s claims to the Labor Management Committee, which found them arbitrable. The Labor Mana gement Committee issued a final arbitration award finding in favor of CS I on all claims. Wawock then filed an action
in the federal district court to vacate the arbitration award on the ground that the Labor Management Committee manifestly disregar ded federal law in finding his statutory claims arbitrable. Wawock’s federal compla int invoked federal question jurisdiction. A3 week later, CSI filed a petition in the superior court seeking to confirm the arbitration
award. In federal court, CSI moved to dismis s the lawsuit on collateral estoppel and abstention grounds, arguing that the Court of Appeal had “explicitly and finally decided”
that Wawock’s claims were arbitrable. Th e federal district court denied the motion, determining that this court had not reached the question of arbitrability, but instead had concluded only th at the question of arbitrability was to be decided by the Labor Management Committee. The federal district court also declined to abstain. The federal district court granted Wawo ck’s request to vacate the arbitration award, concluding that the Labor Manageme nt Committee manifestly disregarded the law
when it found Wawock’s claims arbitrable. Specifically, the federal district court determined that the CBA did not make explic it reference to the statutory claims brought by Wawock. (See Wright v. Universal Maritime Service Corp . (1998) 525 U.S. 70, 80 [CBA’s waiver of a judicial forum for an indi vidual’s statutory rights must be “clear and unmistakable” and may not be inferred fro m a general contractual provision]; 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett (2009) 556 U.S. 247, 2 64 [an individual’s right to a judicial forum with respect to statutory claims may be waived where the CBA “expressly cover[s] both statutory and contractual . . . claims”].) CS I appealed the order vacating the arbitration
award to the Ninth Circuit Court of A ppeals, which has not yet acted. The superior court held a hearing on CSI’s petition to confirm the arbitration award. Wawock argued that the petition should be denied b ecause the superior court is required to give full faith and credit to the federal district court’s order vacating the
arbitration award. Rather th an ruling on the petition, the supe rior court stayed the matter until at least July 15, 20 15, when the parties are to provid e an update on the status of the appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal s. Wawock filed this petition for writ of
mandate. We issued an alternative writ of mandate. The superior court did not comply
with the alternative writ of mandate.4 DISCUSSION

A. Res Judicata and Full Faith and Credit “Full faith and credit must be given to a final order or judgment of a federal court.” ( Levy v. Cohen (1977) 19 Cal. 3d 165, 172; Martin v. Martin (1970) 2 Cal.3d 752, 761; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 1908, su bd. (a)(2).) “California gives full faith and credit to a final order or judgment of a federa l court [citation] by ‘follow[ing] the rule that the preclusive effect of a prior judgment of a federal court is determined by federal law, at least where the prior judgment was on the basis of federal question jurisdiction.’” ( Nathanson v. Hecker (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1158, 1163; see also Levy v. Cohen
, supra , 19 Cal.3d at p. 173 [under the full faith and credit doctrine, a federal judgment has the
same effect in California courts that it would have in federal courts, and in federal court, res judicata prevents readjudication of all matt ers that were, or could have been, litigated in a prior proceeding betw een the same parties].) 1 Res judicata and full faith and credit both have the same preclusive effect. The federal rule “is that a judgment or or der, once rendered, is final for purposes of res judicata until reversed on appeal or modi fied or set aside in the court of rendition.” ( Nathanson v. Hecker, supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at p. 1163 [quoting Levy v. Cohen
, supra , 19 Cal.3d at p. 172]; see also Calhoun v. Franchise Tax Bd . (1978) 20 Cal.3d 881, 887 [in both federal and state court, a federal j udgment is final for purposes of res judicata until it is reversed on appeal or otherwise set aside]; People v. Rath Packing Co . (1978) 85 Cal.App.3d 308, 323 [district court judgme nt or order is final for purposes of res

1 Article IV, section 1 of the United States Constitution re quires that “Full faith and credit shall be given in each st ate to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other state.” This clause has come to mean that the “scope and effect of a federal judgment are identical to those of a judgment of a court of the state in which the federal judgment is rendered.” ( Butcher v. Truck Ins. Exchange (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1442, 1451, fn. 5.)5 judicata].) In contrast, Californi a orders and judgments are not final so long as an appeal is pending. ( Nathanson v. Hecker
, supra , 99 Cal.App.4th at p. 1163 fn.1.) As the federal district court’s jurisdic tion was based on federal question in this case, the order vacating the arbitration award is final notwithstanding the pending appeal
in the Ninth Circuit Court of A ppeals. As a final order, it is entitled to res judicata effect and full faith and credit. (See, e.g., Calhoun v. Franchise Tax Bd.
, supra , 20 Cal.3d at p. 887 [giving res judicata effect to a filed district court judgment, notwithstanding a pending Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals appeal ].) Because the federal district court has vacated the arbitration award, there is no arb itration award to confir m, and principles of res judicata require that the petition to confirm arbitration be denied. Nonetheless, CSI argues that the trial c ourt had discretion to refuse to deny the petition to confirm arbitration and instead st ay the litigation pending resolution of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals appeal. It ch aracterizes the federal district court’s order as a decision holding Wawock’s claims non-arbitrable, and cites state and federal authority holding that a trial court may stay the underlying action pending appellate
resolution of an issue of arbitrability. (See, e.g., Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino (2005) 35 Cal.4th 180, 189-90 [“an appeal from the deni al of a motion to compel arbitration automatically st ays all further trial court proceedings on the merits”]; Britton v. Co-op Banking Group (9th Cir. 1990) 9 16 F.2d 1405, 1412 [district court has discretion to stay underlying proceedings pending an appeal from the denial of a motion to compel arbitration].) The federal district court order on appeal in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals is not an order denying a motion to compel arb itration. Moreover, the issue presented in that appeal is not whether the trial court has discretion to stay the proceedings on Wawock’s wage claims. Rather, we are pres ented with a federal district court order vacating an arbitration award, and the issue is whether the trial court may, in its discretion, refuse to deny a petition to conf irm a vacated arbitration award, when the order vacating that award is fi nal and therefore entitled to res judicata effect and full faith
and credit.6 The trial court has inherent authority to manage and control its own proceedings, “including the inherent authority to stay an action when appropriate . . . [to] overcome problems of simultaneous litigation.” ( Jordache Enterprises, In c. v. Brobeck, Phleger &
Harrison (1998) 18 Cal.4th 739, 758.) The tria l court, however, also has “an inherent obligation to decide cases properly brought before [it].” ( Talley v. Valuation Counselors Group, Inc . (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 132, 150.) The federal district court’s order is final and there is no related, pending litigation that would affect the outcome. In these circumstances, to stay an action and postpone decision on the petition to confirm an arbitration award, rather than apply res judi cata, would deny full faith and credit to a final
decision of a federal court. 2

B. Law of the Case CSI also argues that the law of the case required the trial court to confirm the arbitration award, in spite of the district court’s order vacating it. We disagree. Under the law of the case doctrine, when an appellate court “states in its opinion a principle or rule of law necessary to the deci sion, that principle or rule becomes the law of the case and must be adhered to throughou t its subsequent progress, both in the lower court and upon subsequent appeal.” ( Kowis v. Howard (1992) 3 Cal.4th 888, 892-893.) In our earlier opinion, we held th at the threshold issue of arb itrability “is a matter that has been committed to the [Labor Management] Committee for decision ” by the parties’ CBA. ( Wawock v. Superior Court (Sept. 17, 2013, B248269) [n onpub. opin.], p. 7.) We expressly declined to reach the merits of th e arbitrability question, “lest the court invade the province of the arbitrator.” ( Id ., p. 7.) Because we did not determine the merits of the arbitrability question, CSI e rrs in arguing that law of the case requires the trial court
to hold Wawock’s claims arbitrable. We made no such determination.

2 Stuart v. Lilves (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 1215, 1220 , cited by CSI, is not relevant because in that case, the court was faced with two prior inconsistent judgments: the first from California and the second from Colorado. The court held that the Full Faith and Credit Clause did not require the Californi a courts to ignore a California judgment.78 DISPOSITION

The petition for writ of mandate is grante d. Petitioner shall recover his costs.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

MOSK, Acting P. J.

We concur:

KRIEGLER, J.

GOODMAN, J. 

 Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.