1 6 -2 58 5 (L)

UnitedStates v . Meh ta 1 

## I nthe 2 

# U ni t e d S t at e s Cour tofA p pe al s 3 

## For the Secon d Circu it 4 5 6 August Term 2017 7 8 9 No. 16-2585(L) 10 No. 16-2598(C ON) 11 No. 16-2606(C ON) 12 13 Uni ted States of Ameri ca, 14 Appellee, 15 16 v. 17 18 Gaurav Mehta, 19 Defendant-Appellant, 20 21 Mary Opoka, 22 Defendant-Appellant, 23 24 Isha Mehta, 25 Defendant-Appellant. 26 27 28 Appeal from the Uni ted States Di stri c tC ourt 29 f or the Northern Di stri ct of New York 30 Thomas J. McAvoy, Di stri ct Judge. 31 (Argued: May 21, 2018; Deci ded: March 21, 2019) 32 331 Before: Parker, Li vi ngston, and C hi n, Circuit Judges.

2

________ 3 4 Appeal from judgments of convi cti on i n the Uni ted States Di stri ct C ourt 5 for the Northern Di stri ct of New York (McAvoy, J . ) . The defendants were 6 convi cted of marri age fraud and i mmi grati on fraud i n vi ol ati on of 8 U . S . C . § 7 1325(c) and 18 U.S.C . § § 2, 1546 ( a ) . D u r i n g the course of the tri al, the judge met 8 wi th certai n jurors ex p arte to di scuss th e jurors’ concerns about two defendants’ 9 out-of-court behavi or. H e a l so i nstructed the jurors that they coul d consi der the 10 defendants’ sel f-i nte r e s t i n the outcome o f the case when anal yzi ng thei r tri al 11 testi mony. These errors c ompel us to VACATE the judgments of the Di stri ct 12 C ourt and RE MAND .

________ 13 14 15 D A V I D B. G O O D H A N D , Uni t e d States Department of Justi ce, 16 C ri m i nal Di vi si o n, A ppel l ate Secti on, W ashi ngton, DC , and 17 S T E V E N D. C L Y M E R, Assi stant Uni ted States Attorney, for Grant 18 C . Jaqui th, Uni ted States Attorney f or the Northern Di stri ct of 19 New York, Albany, NY, for the United States of America . 20 21 H A R R Y S A N D I C K, Patterson Bel knap W ebb & Tyl er L LP, New 22 York, NY, for Gaurav Mehta . 23 24 E R I C K. S C H I L L I N G E R, L aw Offi ce of Eri c K. Schi l l ing e r , E a s t 25 Greenbush, NY, for Mary Opoka. 26 27 R O B E R T A. C U L P , Law Offi c e of R obert A. Cul p, Garri son, NY, for Isha Mehta. 28 29

________ 30 31 32 33 34

21 BARRINGTON D. PARKER, Circuit Judge :

2 Defendant Mary Opoka was convi cted of marr i age fraud, and d efendants 3 Gaurav M ehta and Isha Mehta were each convi cted o f b o th marri age fraud and 4 i mmi grati on fraud. See 8 U.S. C . § 1 325(c); 18 U.S.C . §§ 2, 1546(a). Duri ng the 5 course of the tri al i n the Uni ted States Di str i ct C ourt f or the Northern Di stri ct of 6 New Y ork (McAvoy, J. ), the judge met ex p arte w i th fi ve jurors a nd di scussed the 7 jurors’ concerns about two defendants’ out-of-court behavi or. In addi ti on, the 8 judge l a ter i nstructed the jurors tha t, when anal y zi ng the defendants’ testi mony, 9 they c oul d consi der how the defendants’ sel f-i nter e s t i n the outcome of the case 10 coul d create a m oti ve t o t e s ti f y fal sel y. The c i rcumstances of the meeti ng wi th 11 the jurors and the jury charge rel ati ng to a testi fyi ng defendant’s moti vati on to l i e 12 are di rectl y contrary to the l aw of thi s Ci rcui t. Because these errors u n d e rmi ne 13 the presumpti on of i nnocence a nd our c o nfi dence i n the fai r n e ss of the 14 proceedi ngs, we vacate the judgments and remand.

31 B A C K G R O U N D

2 Gaurav Mehta (“Gaurav”), Isha Mehta (“Isha”), and thei r son were i ssued 3 touri st vi sa s i n 2009 to enter the Uni ted States from Indi a for si x months. Whi l e 4 i n the Uni ted States, Gaurav marri ed Mary Op o k a ( “ Opoka”) and Isha marri ed 5 B r a ndon Johnson (“Johnson”), both of whom w ere U.S. ci ti zens. Gaurav and 6 Isha then appl i ed to adjust thei r statuses to l a wfulpermanent resi dents. 7 Fol l owi ng a m i nor car acci dent, Isha was questi oned by pol i ce o ffi c e r s , a n d 8 her responses rai sed suspi ci ons about her m arri a g e to Johnson. Thi s i nci dent 9 tri ggered an i nvesti g ati on by i mmi grati on agents i n t o I sha’s marri a ge to Johnson 10 and Gaurav’s m arri age to Opoka. The investi gati on yi e l d e d evi dence that 11 suggested that Gaurav a n d Isha’s m arri ages were fraudul ent. G aurav, Isha, and 12 Opoka w ere e v e n tu al l y arrested and i ndi cted. G aurav and I sha were charged 13 wi th marri age fraud and i mmi grati on fraud, and Opoka was c h arged wi th 14 marri age fraud. See8 U.S.C . § 1325(c); 18 U.S.C . §§ 2, 1546(a). 15 T r i a l commenced on October 27, 2015. On the thi rd day, a fter the j ury had 16 been excused and counsel was wai ti ng to meet the judge i n chambers, the c o u r t 17 cl erk i nformed the judge that several jurors wi shed to speak w i th hi m. Wi thout

41 noti f

yi ng counsel of the request, the j u dge entere d th e j u ry room to speak wi th 2 the jurors. On the record, he stated: 3 We are here in the jury room and there a re several j u r o r s h e r e —fi ve 4 to be exact—and they had asked some ques t i o ns of my cl erk, and I 5 thought i t woul d be best i f I l i stened to th e i r questi ons and i t doesn’t 6 have to d o wi th the meri ts of the c a s e , i t’s somethi ng el se, as I 7 u n d e r stand, and I wi l l l i sten to what you have to say and see w h a t I 8 can do for you. 9 10 Joi nt Appendi x ( “ J .A.”) at 769. One juror, speaki ng for the other jurors, tol d the 11 judge that she was c oncerned by two of the defendants’ behavi o r o ut s i d e the 12 courthouse: 13 I’ve been c oming i nto the bui l di ng and g oi ng out, [Gaurav and 14 Opoka] have been ki nd o f l i ngeri ng and stari ng, l i k e, wal ki ng 15 noti ceabl y sl o w and I feel l i ke I see them, see me, i f I was comi ng in, 16 even i f I' v e been behi nd them, l i ke, from the s e c o nd fl oor parki ng 17 ramp to the entrance. It’s pretty obvi ous route and they h ave—feel 18 l i ke they were l ol l ygaggi ng . . . . 19 20 Id. As th e j ur o rs were expressi ng thei r concerns, the judge stated: “That’s 21 di sturbi ng. I thi nk what I woul d do, i f you don ’ t mind, woul d be a ssi gn a court 22 securi ty offi cer to accompany you to your cars. W oul d that hel p?” Id. at 769–70. 23 The jurors responded i n the affi rmati v e. Id. at 770. The judge went on to say: 24 I don’t know why they are doi ng th a t. I m e an, I’ve been doi ng thi s 25 for year s a n d y e ars a nd once i n a whi l e y ou get somebody that acts 26 i nappropri a te l i ke that but I thi nk we shoul d have a cour t s e curi ty 51 offi cer there and I wi l l tal k wi th staff a nd have s o m e b o d y r eady for

2 you tomorrow. 3 4 Id . 5 After the remai ni ng j urors departed, the judge i nformed counsel that the ex 6 parte meeti ng had o ccurred. Id. at 771– 7 2 . T he judge di d not have the transcri pt 7 read to counsel , but provi ded a summary as fol l ows: 8 [ O n e of the jurors] sai d that she was c o ncerned because a s s h e 9 w a l k e d t o a nd from her car, [Gaurav and Opoka] . . . woul d sort of 10 fo l l o w th e m and stare at them and i t made them v ery, very nervous 11 and that—so they wanted to k n o w w h at I coul d do about i t. I sai d, 12 wel l, I’l l tr y t o a ssi gn a court securi ty offi cer to you to accompany 13 you to y o u r v e h i cl es. . . . Anyway, they di dn' t al l seem to be upset 14 but a cou p l e o f th e m seemed pretty nervous and the other three just 15 ki nd of w ere there fo r , l i ke, fi l l ers. I l i stened to thei r concerns 16 anyway. 17 18 Id . at 772. The judge then i nstructed counsel to t el l thei r cl i ents “to stay th e h e l l 19 away from the [jury].” Id. 20 After the judge’s expl anati on of the ex parte meeti ng, the defe n d a n ts 21 moved for judgments o f acqui ttal . The moti ons were deni ed. At that poi nt, 22 Isha’s counsel al so asked for a mi stri al b e c a u s e h e was concerned that the jury’s 23 fear of Gaurav a nd O p o ka mi ght affect the jury’s percepti on of Isha. 1 Id. at 781.

1 Counself or Isha stated: Bef ore we go to the c harge c onferenc e, J u dge, b ased upon what you rel ayed to us, 61 The judge deni ed the moti on, expl a i ni ng that “nothi ng” he heard i n th e meeti ng

2 suggested “that [the jurors] made up thei r m i nd[ s ] about gui l t or i nnocence.” Id. 3 at 781. 4 In the course o f th a t c o nversati on, counsel f or Gaurav addressed the judge: 5 “We don’t know what the testi mony—Judge hasn’t tol d us everythi ng they sai d,” 6 id. a t 782, and the judge responded: “ I tol d you every th i n g th a t I thought . . . 7 ha[d] to do wi th the i ssue of what I had t o d o to make [the jurors] feel 8 comfortabl e,” id. at 782–83. Opoka’s co unsel al so expressed hi s c oncerns about 9 the accuracy of the jury’s account: 10 It does concern me onl y because [Gaurav], w a l ki ng out of the 11 courthouse l ast ni ght wi th my cl i ent and w i th Ms. Mehta and the 12 three of us [defense counsel ] wal ked out, [counsel for I s ha] was 13 wal ki ng out 20 yards i n front of us but I’m not sure i f they are 14 referenci ng m e l eavi ng the courthouse at ni ght when thi s woul d 15 h ave transpi red. Thi s was wi th both my cl i ent and [Gaurav ] a n d 16 [counsel for Gaurav] was i n cl ose proxi mi ty when they were l eavi ng. 17

I’ m goi ng to ask as to a m i stri al as to M rs. J ohnson. The jurors are c onc erned ab out

c onduc t b etween M rs. M ehta and M r. M ehta and I’ m c onc erned i t woul d spi l l ov er to her, and there’ s no reason i t shoul d b ec ause she di dn’ t do anyth in g w r o ng. I don’ t know i f [ G aurav and Opoka] di d b ut [ Isha] di d n ot and we hav e at l east three, m ayb e f our jurors c onc erned ab out that, and I woul d ask f or a m i stri al . J .A. 781. 71 Id. at 783. The judge, attempting to assuage coun s e l ’ s c oncerns, expl ai ned hi s

2 reason for assi gni ng securi ty: 3 I don’t know. The jurors per c e i v e s o methi ng that wasn’t real l y 4 happeni ng, maybe they are just fi rst-ti me j urors a nd they are al l a 5 l i ttl e nervous about the process and readi ng somethi ng int o w h at 6 was real l y i nnocent behavi or. I’m not sayi ng i t’s ag a i nst your 7 defendants. I’m just sayi ng I want to make the j ury feel comfortabl e. 8 Many occasi o ns I have had jurors accompani ed by [securi ty o ffi cers] 9 goi ng between thi s c ourthouse and the parki ng ramp a n d al so the 10 Bi nghamton courthouse. It’s not unusual for i t to happen. 11 12 Id. The jud g e d i d n ot, however, report that he had used words l i ke “ di sturbi ng” 13 and “i nappropri ate” i n h i s me e t i n g wi th the fi ve jurors, nor di d he state that he 14 had t o l d the jurors that, i n hi s “years and y ears” of presi di ng at t ri al s, thi s 15 si tuati o n was unusual . Id . a t 7 6 9–70. After thi s di scussi o n, the judge di d not go 16 on to i nqui re a s to w h e ther the apprehensi ons expressed by the jurors wi th 17 whom he met were shared by other jurors who were n o t p r e s e nt at the 18 conference. Moreover, no inqui ry wa s m a d e of any of the j urors as to whether 19 they coul d remai n i mparti a l . 20 After the cl ose of evi dence, when chargi ng the jury, the judge stated: “Y o u 21 may consi d er the fact that a defendant’s i nterest i n the outcome o f th e case 22 creates a moti ve for fal se testi mony, but i t by no means f o l l ows that a defendant

81 i s not c apabl e of t el l i ng the truth.” Id. at 1093. Defense counsel fai l ed to obj e c t to

2 the i nstructi o n at the ti me i t w a s gi ven. Addi ti o nal l y, on the el ements of 3 § 1 3 2 5 ( c), the judge charged the jury that marri age fraud occurred i f the 4 defendant “woul d not have ente red the marri age u nl ess the purpose was to 5 avoi d the i mmi grati on l aws rel ati ng to al i ens remai ni ng i n the Uni ted States.” Id. 6 at 1100. He further charged that i f the marri ages i n qu e s t i on “were entered for 7 l egi ti mate reasons, then there i s no evasi on of the i mmi grati o n l aw.” Id. Isha had 8 objected to thi s charge, aski ng the j u dge to i nstruct the jury that marri age f raud 9 occurs o nl y when a person enters i nto a marri age “ w i t h out i ntending to live 10 together as husband an d w i f e, f or the purpose of evadi ng the i mmi grati on l aws of 11 the Uni ted States.” Id . at 35, 788 (emphasi s added). The judge deni ed Isha’s 12 request. Fol l owi ng i ts d el iberati ons, the jury convi cted the three defendants on 13 al lcounts, and the judge sentenced each to three years’ probati on. 14 T h e d e f e n d a nts rai se a number of i ssues on appeal . Al though we do not 15 questi on the judge’s consci enti ousness and good fai th, we nonethel ess concl ude 16 that hi s ex parte meeti n g wi th the jurors and hi s i nstructi on about assessi ng the 17 credibi l i ty of a t esti fyi ng defendant were suffi c i entl y sharp departures from the

91 l aw of thi s C i rcui t as to undermi ne our c o n f i d e nce i n the fai rness o f the tri al . For

2 the reasons expressed b e l ow, the judgments are vacated and the cases are remanded for further proceedi ngs. 3 4 S T A N D A R D O F R E V I E W 5 W e w i l l reverse a vi ol a ti on of a defendant’s ri ght to be present at every 6 tr ia l s t age when the error i s not harml ess. Un ited States v. Collins , 6 65 F.3d 454, 7 460 (2d C i r. 2012). An error i s n o t h arml ess i f there i s a reasonabl e possibi l i ty 8 that the error compl ai ned o f mi ght have contributed to the convi cti on. United 9 States v . B rutus , 505 F .3d 80, 88 (2d Ci r. 2007). For other errors to whi ch counsel 10 fai l ed t o o b j e c t

, we wi l l revi ew for pl ai n error. Fed. R. C ri m. P. 5 2(b). We may 11 correct an error that i s c l ear and obvi ous, affected the d efendants’ subst a n ti al 12 ri ghts, and seri o usl y affected the fai rness, in tegri ty, or publ i c reputati on of the 13 judi ci alproceedi ngs. Un ited States v. Olano , 507 U.S. 725, 732–36 (1993). 14 D I S C U S S I O N 15 I 16 A defendant i n a cri minal case has the ri ght, rooted i n the Si xth 17 A m e ndment C o nfrontati on C l ause and Fi fth Amendment Due Process C l ause, to

101 be present at every tri al stage. Collins , 665 F.3d a t 459; United States v. Canady, 126

2 F.3d 352, 3 6 0 ( 2 d C i r. 1997) (“The defendant’s ri ght to be present at every stage of 3 tri al i s scarcel y l ess i m portant to the accused th a n th e ri ght of tri al i tsel f.”). “The 4 ri ght to be present has been extended to requi re that m essages from a jury shoul d 5 be d i scl osed to counsel and that counsel shoul d be afforded an opportuni ty to be 6 heard before the tri al judge responds.” United States v. Mejia , 356 F . 3 d 470, 474 7 (2d C i r. 2004). 8 In United Stat e s v. Collins , we rei t erated the practi ces to be fol l o wed when 9 the di stri ct court recei ves an i nqui ry from a jury: 10 (1) the jury i nqu i r y s h o u l d be i n wri ti ng; (2) the note shoul d be 11 marked as the court’s exhibi t a nd read i nto the record wi th counsel 12 and defendant present; (3) counsel shoul d have an o ppo rtuni ty to 13 suggest a response, a nd the ju d g e shoul d i nform c o unsel of the 14 re s p o n s e t o be gi v en; and (4) on the recal l of the jury, the tri al judge 15 shoul d r e a d th e note i nto the record, al l o wi ng an opportuni ty to the 16 jury to correct the i nqu i ry or to el aborate upon i t . 17 665 F.3d at 460 (quoting Mejia , 356 F.3d at 4 75 ) . A d d i ti onal l y, we have been cl ear 18 that “the tri al cour t s h o u l d not respond to a jury note in an ex parte manner” 19 because such communi cati o ns are “pregnant w i th possibi l i ti es for erro r ” a nd

111 “unexpected questi o n s or comments can generate uni ntended and mi sl eadi ng

2 i mpressi ons of the judge’s subjecti ve personal vi ews.” I d. 3 H e r e , o ur i nstructi ons i n Collins were not fol l owed, and that fai l ure w as 4 cl ear and obvi ous error. The juro r s w e r e not asked to put thei r i nqui ri es i n 5 wri ti ng. Rather, afte r r e c e i v i ng noti fi cati on from the cl erk, the judge went i nto 6 the jury room and met w i th the fi ve jurors who had asked to speak wi th hi m. As 7 C o l lins w arned, the j udge found hi msel f requi red t o respond t o unexpected 8 questi ons i n a context where i t was di f f i c ul t to a nti ci pate, much l ess contai n, the 9 di recti on the conversati on woul d take. See id. 10 Nei ther the defendants nor c ounsel w ere i nformed before the ex parte 11 meeti ng that the judge had recei ved an inqu i ry. C onse qu e ntl y, counsel coul d 12 nei ther suggest how to handl e the i nqui ry nor comment on the j u dge’s proposed 13 resp o n s e . S e e United States v. Ronder , 639 F.2d 931, 935 (2d C i r. 1981) (reversi ng 14 where tri a l c ourt fai l ed to di scuss several jury notes w i th counsel because 15 di scl o s u re of at l east one of the notes “mi ght wel l have prompted counsel to 16 suggest a response a ppropri atel y tai l ored t o the ci rcumstances”). Thi s l o st 17 opportuni ty was i n no sense a formal i ty. The cri m es charg e d in the indi ctment

121 w e r e n on-vi ol ent cri m es. Y et the judge’s comments to the jurors strongl y

2 i mpl i ed that the d efendant s p o s e d s ome threat of physi c a l danger to the jurors. 3 After bei ng i nformed by th e jurors that they bel i eved they were bei ng observed 4 b y tw o of the defendants, the judge d escribed the defendants’ behavi or as 5 “di sturbi ng,” “i nappropri ate,” a n d unusual i n hi s “years and years” of 6 e x p eri ence. J.A. 769–70. Had defense counsel been gi ven an opportuni ty t o 7 respond, they l i kel y woul d have provi ded an al ternati ve a c c o unt of the 8 ci rcumstances, and one that coul d wel l have f ul l y addressed the j urors’ percei ved 9 safety concerns. 10 Moreover, th e j u dge’s account of the meeti ng to counsel di d not ful l y 11 c a p tu r e the extent of the di scussi ons at the ex parte meeti ng. For exampl e , th e 12 judge di d not menti on that h e had described the two defendants’ behavi or as 13 “di sturbi ng” and “ i nappropri ate” wi thout i nqui ri ng i nto the rati onal e behi nd the 14 jurors’ reacti ons. Id. Instead, the judge ass ur e d c o u nsel that he had si mpl y made 15 th e jurors feel c omfortabl e and had not a cted beyond the bounds o f ordi nary 16 practi ce. Id. a t 782–83.

131 The judge al so f ai l ed to take acti on to mi ti gate th e p rejudi ci al effects of the

2 ex parte m e e t i ng. See, e.g., Sher v. Stoughton , 666 F.2d 791, 793–95 (2d C i r. 1981) 3 (fi ndi ng no prejudi ce wher e th e judge had conducted prompt voi r di re and 4 offered curati ve i nstructi ons af t e r a p o tenti al l y prejudi ci al cal l t o jurors). For 5 exampl e , the content o f the meeti ng was never di scussed wi th the ful l jury, 6 l eavi ng the other j urors to specul a te a s to what had happened in the pri vate 7 meeti ng. Thi s omi ssi o n created the very real ri sk that some or al l o f th e jurors 8 reached unfounded concl usi on s ab o u t the defendants, ei ther on thei r own or 9 through i nformal di scussi o ns wi th o th er jurors, wi thout any gui d ance from the 10 Di stri c t C ourt or from counsel . Further, the jurors were never a sked i f they coul d 11 remai n i mparti a l d e s pi te knowl edge that some jurors harbored apprehensi ons 12 about the defendants. See id. (fi ndi ng no prejudi c e where e a c h j u ror assured 13 court that they coul d remai n i mparti al ). 14 We do not s ug g e s t that such an i nqui ry i s necessary whenever a juror 15 rai ses a securi ty concern. “The mere occurrence of an ex parte conversati on 16 b e tween a t ri al judge and a juror does not consti tute a depri v a ti on of a n y 17 consti tuti onal ri ght.” United States v. Gagnon , 470 U.S. 5 2 2 , 526 (1985) (per

141 curi am). Taken col l ecti vel y, howe v e r, the aforementi o ned deci si ons run contrary

2 to our i ns t r u c t i o n s on the handl i ng of j ury communi cati ons and i mpl i cate the 3 preci se concerns that ani mated our deci si on i n Collins . 4 II

T h e 5 prejudi ce resul ti ng from the ex parte meeti ng was compounded by th e 6 ch a r g e t o th e j ury that i t “may consi der the f act that a defendant’s i nterest i n the 7 outcome of the case creates a moti ve for fal se testi m ony.” J.A. 1 0 9 3. We have 8 repeatedl y hel d, i n no u ncertai n terms, th at thi s charge i s forbi dden; di stri ct 9 court s ma y n ot tel l juri es that a testi f yi ng d efendant’s personal i nterest i n the 10 outcome of a tri alsuppl i es a moti ve to l i e. 11 In United States v. Gaines , we hel d that “ di stri ct courts shoul d not i nstruct 12 juri es t o the effect that a testi fyi ng defendant has a deep personal inter e st i n the 13 case.” 457 F.3d 238, 249 (2d C i r . 2006). A year l ater, we hel d i n United States v. 14 Brutus that such an i nstructi on “undermi nes the presumpti on of i nnocence 15 because i t presupposes the d efendant’s gui l t.” 505 F.3d at 8 7. The i nstructi on i s 16 i m permi ssibl e, we stated, even i f i t i s “bal a nced by other, more favor ab l e 17 l anguage,” such as a di stri ct court’s i nstructi on that a defe n d a n t m ay have

151 testi fi ed truthful l y d e s p i te havi ng an i nterest i n the o utcome of the tri al . Id.

2 Indeed, the Government concedes that the Di stri ct C ourt’s i nstructi on vi ol ated 3 thi s C i rcui t ’s l a w . 2 S ee Appel l ee’s Br. at 41. I t is th e r e f o r e u ndi sputed that the 4 i nstructi on consti tuted cl ear and obvi ous error. 3 5 III 6 The presumpti on of i nnocence “i s the u ndoubt e d l a w , axi omati c and 7 el emen t a r y . ” G a i nes , 457 F.3d at 245 (quoting Coffin v. United States , 156 U.S. 432, 8 453 (1895)). “To i mpl ement th e presumpti on, the Supreme C ourt has warned, 9 c o u r ts must be al ert to f actors that may undermi ne the fai rness of the f act-fi ndi n g 10 process.” Brutus , 505 F .3d at 85 (quoting E stelle v. W i l l i a m s , 425 U.S. 501, 503

2 Nev erthel ess, the G ov ernm ent argues that the error di d n ot affec t the defendants’ sub stanti al ri ghts o r the f ai rness, integri ty, or p ub l i c reputati on of the proc eedi ngs. Appel l ee’ s Br. at 41. 3 In Br ut us and Ga i ne s , we rec om m e n d e d la n guage that properl y instruc ts the jury on how to ev al u ate a def endant’ s testi m ony:

You shoul d judge the defendant’ s testi m o ny in the sam e way that you judge the testi m ony of

any other wi tness.

. . . . The defendant in a c ri m inal c ase nev er ha s any duty to testi f y o r c om e f orward wi th any ev i denc e. Thi s i s b ec ause, as I hav e tol d you, the b urden of proof b eyond a reasonab l e doub t rem ai ns on th e gov ernm ent at al l ti m es, and the defendant i s presum ed i nnoc ent. . . . 505 F.3d at 88 nn. 6–7 ( quoting Ga i ne s , 457 F.3d at 249 nn. 8– 9)

.

161 (1976)). We concl u de that the errors i n questi o n jeopardi zed the fai rness of the

2 proceedi ngs and compel us to vacate the judgments of convi cti on. 3 The chargi ng error undermi ned the presumpti on of i nnocence, wh i c h i s 4 not o nl y one of the most f undamental pri nci pl es of our cr i mi n a l j u sti ce system, 5 but al so one of th e p r i n ci pl es most wi del y known and understood by the publ i c 6 at l arge. See Gaines , 457 F.3d at 245. Further, the effect of the error was ampl i fi ed 7 by the manner i n whi ch the i nqui ry from the jurors was handl ed. Speci fi cal l y, 8 the ex parte m eeti ng a nd i ts aftermath compromi sed the i ntegri ty of the jury 9 process, thus v i o l ati ng the defendants’ su b s t a n t i al ri ghts. Thi s case boi l ed down 10 to the jury’s determi nati ons of th e d e fendants’ credibi l i ty. See Gaines , 4 57 F.3d a t 11 250. B ased on our revi ew of the evi dence presented at tri al, there i s a reasonabl e 12 probabi l i ty that the errors compl ai ned of mi ght have c o n tributed to the 13 convi cti ons. See B r u t u s , 5 0 5 F.3d at 88. Furthermore, the errors no doubt 14 undermi ned the fai rness, integri ty, and publ i c reputati on of the judi c i al 15 proceedi ngs. See Gaines , 4 5 7 F.3d at 245–46. We therefore vacate the d e f e n d ants’ 16 convi cti ons and remand for retri al .

171 IV

2 Defendants were charged under § 1 3 2 5(c), whi ch provi d es that an 3 i ndi vi dual who “knowi ng l y enters i nto a marri age for the purpose of evadi ng 4 any provi si on of the i mmi grati o n l aws” commi t s marri age fraud. 8 U.S.C . 5 § 1325(c). Isha requested the fo l l o w in g jury i nstructi on on the marri age fraud 6 charge: 7 In order t o fi nd a person gui l ty of marri age fraud th e g o v e rnment 8 must prove beyond a reasonabl e d o u bt that a person knowi ngl y 9 e n t ered i nto a marri age without intending to live together as husband 10 and wife, for the purpose of e v a di ng the i mmi grati on l aws o f the 11 Uni ted States. 12 13 J.A. 35 (emphas i s a d d e d ) . The judge di d not adopt thi s l anguage, a nd i nstead 14 i nstructed the jury: 15 If th e m a rri a ges referenced i n counts one and four were entered f or 16 legitimate rea s o n s , then there i s no evasi on of the i mmi grati on l a w. . . . 17 You must determi ne w h ether the defendant you are consi deri ng 18 woul d not have ent e red the marri a ge unless the purpose was to 19 avoi d the i m mi grati on l aws rel ati ng to a l i ens remai ni ng i n the 20 Uni ted States. 21 22 Id. at 1100 (emphasi s added). Defendant s a r g u e that the fai l ure to i ncl ude thei r 23 p r o p o s ed “i ntent to l i ve t ogether as husband a nd wi fe” l anguage w as error

181 because i t al l owed the ju r y to convi ct even i f the defendants had l egi ti mate

2 moti vati o ns, i n addi ti on to o b t a i n i ng i mmi g rati on benefi ts, for enteri ng i nto thei r 3 respecti v e marri ages. We di sagree. 4 As an i ni ti al matter, defendants are not enti tl ed to have the e xact l anguage 5 th e y propose read to the jury. United States v . Russo , 74 F.3d 1383, 1393 ( 2 d C i r . 6 1996). The t ri al court has substanti al di screti on to fashi on the l a n g u a g e o f jury 7 i nstructi ons, so l ong a s i t i s fai r to both si des. Id. The judge’s instructi ons were 8 fai r to both si des, and i n f a c t adequatel y addressed the v ery concerns the 9 defendants rai se on appeal . Th e j u d g e i nstructed the jury that i f there were 10 l egi ti mate reasons for the defendants’ marri a ges, they coul d not be c onvi cted of 11 marri age fraud. He al s o in s t ructed the jury that i f the defendants woul d have 12 entered the marri age for other l egi ti mate reas o n s, notwi thstandi ng the 13 i mmi grati on benefi t s they woul d recei ve, they coul d not be c o n v i c ted of 14 marri age fraud. 15 In a n y c a s e , the judge’s i nstructi ons a re i n accordance wi th the l aw of o ur 16 C i rcui t. S ee, e.g. , 2 L eonard B. Sand et al ., Modern Federal Jury Instructions-Criminal 17 ¶ 33A.07 cmt. (2018) (expl a i ni ng that the purposeful evasi on el ement of § 1 325(c)

191 “requi res the government to prove that the marri ag e w as a sham, entered i nto by

2 the de f e n d a nt onl y for the purpose of evadi ng the i m mi grati on l aws”). Thus, the 3 Di stri c t C ourt di d not err i n rejecti ng the proposed i nstructi o n. 4 CONCL USION 5 F o r th e reasons set forth, we VACATE the judgments of the Di stri ct C ourt 6 and RE MAND for proceedi ngs consi stent wi th thi s opi ni o n.

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