COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Benton, Humphreys and Clements Argued at Chesapeake, Virginia

SHERRI L. PATTERSON MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY v. Record No. 2090-04-1 JUDGE JEAN HARRISON CLEMENTS JULY 26, 2005 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK Charles D. Griffith, Jr., Judge Phillip S. Georges, A ssistant Public Defender (Office of the Public Defender, on briefs), for appellant. Michael T. Judge, Assistant Attorney Ge neral (Judith Williams Jagdmann, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

Sherri L. Patterson was conv icted in a bench trial of misd emeanor stalking, under Code § 18.2-60.3, and required to give a “recognizance to keep the p eace” for threatening bodily harm, under Code § 19.2-20. On appeal, Patterson contends (1) the trial court abused its discretion by imposing, as a condition of the suspension of the execution of her sentence on the stalking conviction, the requiremen t that she be of uniform good beha vior for eighty years and (2) her “conviction” for threatening bodily harm is void because Code § 19.2 -20 is not a criminal offense. Finding appellate review proc edurally barred, we affirm. As the parties are fully co nversant with the record in this case, and because this memorandum opinion carries no precedential value, th is opinion recites only those facts and incidents of the proceedings as ar e necessary to the parties’ unders tanding of the disposition of this appeal.

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opin ion is not designated for publication.- 2 - I. BACKGROUND The record on review includes two misdemeanor arrest warrants, two misdemeanor trial orders, and, in lieu of any hearing transcripts, a wr itten statement of facts ma de a part of the record pursuant to Rule 5A:8. The record establishes that Patterson was charge d in the warrants with stalking Angela Craven, the wife of the father of Patterson’s son, between March 15, 2003, and March 23, 2004, in violatio n of Code § 18.2-60. 3, and threatening to kill or injure Craven on March 11, 2004, in violation of Code § 19.2-20. Following her convictio n in general district court, Patterson appealed to the trial court, where a bench trial was held. At that trial, the Commonwealth’s witn esses, Craven and her hu sband, testified about numerous incidents between March 15, 2003, and March 23, 2004, in whic h Patterson made hostile contact, by phone and in person, with Craven, incl uding threatening to kill her on more than one occasion. Testifying on her own behalf, Patterson denied st alking Craven, e xplaining she had neither the time nor inclination to harass Craven or her family. In closing argument, Patterson’s counsel argued solely that the evidence was insuff icient to prove she had stalked or threatened to kill Craven and asked the tr ial court to find her not guilty. Patterson’s couns el further argued that Patterson “had no reason to engage in [the alleged] behavior” and that she only “wished for her son to have a relationship with his father.” The trial court found the evidence proved Pa tterson committed the stal king offense and also threatened bodily harm. With respect to the threat ening-bodily-harm offense, the trial court, citing Code § 19.2-20, required Patterson to give a peace bond in the amount of $ 1,000. The condition of the bond was that Patterson be of good behavior and have no contact with Craven or her family for one year. With respect to the stalking conviction , the trial court sentenced Patterson to a fine of $2,500 and twelve months in jail. The court suspended execution of the fine and jail time upon the condition that Patterson pe rform one hundred hours of community service, ob tain a mental health- 3 - evaluation, have no contact with the victim or the victim’s fami ly, and remain of uniform good behavior for eighty years. In explaining why he imposed the good-behavior condition for eighty years, the trial judge to ld Patterson that her behavior was “deplorabl e” and the condition was intended to last for “the entirety of [her] life” so that she would never “have hostile contact with these victims ever again.” At that point, “the case was concluded.” This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS On appeal, Patterson contends the trial court abused its discretion in unreasonably requiring her, as a condition of the suspension of her se ntence for stalking, to be of good behavior for eighty years. Patterson also contends her “conviction” for threatening bodily harm is void because the statutory offense cited in the arrest warrant, Code § 19.2-20, deals with the issuance of warrants and is not a criminal offense. In response, the Comm onwealth contends that Patterson’ s objections on appeal to the imposition of the eight y-year term of good beha vior and to the threaten ing-bodily-harm warrant are barred because she failed to raise those objections before the trial court. We agree with the Commonwealth. Rule 5A:18 provides, in pertinent part, that “[n]o ruling of the trial court . . . will be considered as a basis for reversal unless the ob jection was stated toge ther with the grounds therefor at the time of the ruling.” Thus, we w ill not consider a claim of trial court error as a ground for reversal “where no timely obj ection was made.” Ma rshall v. Commonwealth , 26 Va. App. 627, 636, 49 6 S.E.2d 120, 125 (1 998). In other word s, “a litigant must object to a ruling of the circuit court if that litigant desires to ch allenge the ruling on ap peal.” Comm onwealth v. Washington , 263 Va. 298, 304, 559 S.E.2d 636, 639 (2002). The purpos e of the rule is to ensure that any perceived error by the tria l court is “promptly brou ght to the attention of the trial court with- 4 - sufficient specificity that the a lleged error can be dealt with an d timely addressed and corrected when necessary. . . . Errors can usually be corrected in the trial court, particularly in a bench trial, without the necessity of appe al.” Brown v. Commonwealth , 8 Va. App. 126, 131, 380 S.E.2d 8, 10 (1989). Hence, “we will notice e rror for which there ha s been no timely ob jection only when necessary to satisfy the ends of justice.” Id. Furthermore, our review on appeal “is limite d to the record.” Turner v. Commonwealth , 2 Va. App. 96, 99, 341 S.E.2d 400, 401 (1986). Where the record fails to establish that the issues appealed by appellant were raised in the trial court by an objection with a statement of the reasons therefor[, w]e cannot assume that appellant’s objection and reasons were proffered but not made a pa rt of the record. Rule 5A:8 requires appellant to present a complete transcript for this Court to consider his or her issues on appeal.
Lee v. Lee , 12 Va. App. 512, 516, 404 S. E.2d 736, 738 (1991) (en banc). Thus, the burden is on the appellant to present a sufficient record from which we may determine that he or she preserved the claimed errors for appeal. Here, Patterson presented a record insufficien t to prove she preserved the claimed errors for appeal. Nothing in the record shows that Patter son objected in the trial court to the imposition of eighty years of uniform good behavior as a cond ition of the suspension of the execution of her sentence on the stalking conviction. 1 Likewise, the record contains no indication that Patterson raised any objection in the trial court to the warrant charging her with threatening bodily harm.

1 Patterson contends that an objection to all aspects of th e sentence is im plicit in a defendant’s plea of not guilty. However, the numerous cases in which Rule 5A:18 and Rule 5: 25, Rule 5A:18’s counterpart for the Supreme Court, have been applied to claimed sentencing errors belie that assertion. See, e.g. , Lewis v. Commonwealth , 267 Va. 302, 316-17, 593 S.E.2d 220, 228-29 (2004) (holding that appella nt’s claim that she was errone ously sentenced to death was barred on appeal under Rule 5:25 because she did not raise it in the tr ial court); Overton v. Commonwealth , 260 Va. 599, 604, 539 S.E.2d 421, 423 (2000) (holding that appellant’s “failure to make contemporaneous objections at trial precludes consideration,” under Rule 5:25, of certain claimed sentencing errors raised on appeal); Brown , 8 Va. App. at 131-34, 380 S.E.2d at 10-12 (invoking the “ends of justice” exception to Rule 5A:18 to redress a sentencing error).- 5 - Accordingly, the record befo re us fails to establish that Patterson presented th e issues she raises on appeal to the trial court, as required by Rule 5A:18. See Parker v. Commonwealth , 42 Va. App. 358, 379, 592 S. E.2d 358, 369 (2004), aff’d , 269 Va. 174, 608 S.E.2d 925 (2005) (per curiam). Conceding the possibility that she never objected in the trial court to the imposition of the good-behavior condition, Patterson argues that we should consider her claim on appeal because the “ends of justice” exception to Ru le 5A:18 applies. We disagree. Rule 5A:18 provides for considerat ion of a ruling by the trial court that was not objected to at trial “t o enable the Cour t of Appeals to attain the ends of justice.” “‘The ends of justice exception is narrow and is to be used sparingl y’” when an error at trial is “‘clear, substantial and materi al.’” Redman v. Commonwealth , 25 Va. App. 215, 220-21, 487 S.E.2d 269, 272 (1997) (quoting Brown v. Commonwealth , 8 Va. App. 126, 132, 380 S.E.2d 8, 10-11 (1989)). “In order to avail oneself of the exception, a[n appellant] must affirmatively show that a miscarriage of justice has occurred, not that a miscarriage might have occurred.” Id. at 221, 487 S.E.2d at 272 (citing Moun ce v. Commonwealth , 4 Va. App. 433, 436, 357 S.E.2d 742, 744 (1987)). Legette v. Commonwealth , 33 Va. App. 221, 224, 532 S.E.2d 353, 354 (2000) (first emphasis added). Here, Patterson does not affirmatively show th at a miscarriage of justice has occurred. Patterson argues that the eighty- year good-behavior condition of suspension is unreasonable because “the customary period of probation in misdem eanor cases is two years,” this is “her first criminal conviction of any kind,” the surrounding circumstances of the stalking offense reflect nothing more than “a domestic situation” in which she was trying to have her son’s father “get to know and spend some time with their son,” a nd the imposition of the condition was punitive rather than rehabilitative. However, nothing in the record affirmativ ely supports any of the grounds upon which Patterson bases her argument. Accordingly, Patterson fails to affirmatively demonstrate a miscarriage of justice sufficient to invoke the “ends of justice” exception to Rule 5A:18.- 6 - Moreover, Patterson does not argue that we should invoke the “ends of justice” exception with respect to her threatening-b odily-harm claim of error. We wi ll not consider such an argument sua sponte . Edwards v. Commonwealth , 41 Va. App. 752, 761, 58 9 S.E.2d 444, 448 (2003) (en banc), aff’d , No. 040019 (Va. Sup. Ct. Order of 10/15/ 04). We note, however, that Code § 19.2-19 and Code § 19.2-20 auth orize the trial court to issue a warrant and require a person “to give a recognizance to keep the peace” when that person“threatens to kill or injure another.” For these reasons, we conclude that appellate review of the claimed errors is barred under Rule 5A:18, and we affirm Patterson’s sentence on the stalking conviction and the trial court’s order requiring Patterson to give a “recog nizance” for threatening bodily harm. Affirmed.