JAMES

v. 

MISSO

SOCIAL

MEDIC

COMPL

 

Before 

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enter the

judgmen

S DYE, DD

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Division O

ames Dye, 

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S, ET AL.,

pellants, 

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CES, MISS

IT AND 

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pondent. 

peal from th

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One: Anthon

DDS ("Dy

eal a judg

"MMAC").

because the

red, renderi

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ssouri C

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T OF 

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he Circuit 

e Honorable

ny Rex Gab

and Cynthi

ye") and Br

gment in 

 Appellant

ey filed a m

ing the judg

 

 

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WD

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Court of C

e Jon E. Bee

bbert, Presid

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renda Herrm

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trict

D78352 

INION FIL

Cole Count

etem, Judge

ding Judge,

n, Judge 

man, DDS

the Misso

at the trial c

oluntarily di

lity. Findin

als 

LED: Dece

ty, Missour

e

, Victor C. 

("Herrman

ouri Medic

court lacked

ismiss their

ng no error,

ember 8, 2

ri 

Howard, Ju

n") (collect

caid Audit 

d jurisdictio

r case befor

, we affirm.

015 

udge 

ively 

and 

on to 

re the 

.
2

Factual and Procedural History 

 In May 2013, the MMAC informed Dye that it would be conducting an audit of 

Medicaid claims Dye and his dentist office, All About Smiles, LLC, had filed with the 

MMAC. In June 2013, the MMAC informed Dye that it was sanctioning Dye by 

requiring him to file Medicaid claim forms by mail, rather than electronically, permitting 

the MMAC to review all claims prior to payment ("Sanction"). Dye and All About 

Smiles, LLC appealed this administrative decision by filing a petition for review with the 

Administrative Hearing Commission. 

 On June 25, 2013, Dye and All About Smiles, LLC separately filed a petition in 

the Greene County Circuit Court. The petition sought a temporary restraining order to 

prevent the MMAC from enforcing the Sanction "until such time as the Administrative 

Hearing Commission can conduct a review of" the MMAC's decision. The petition 

alleged, among other things, that Dye's due process rights had been violated by the 

imposition of the Sanction without prior notice and a hearing. The lawsuit was 

transferred to the Circuit Court of Cole County on July 3, 2013, based on a change of 

venue. 

 The docket sheet reflects that an amended petition was filed on July 26, 2013, 

again seeking a temporary restraining order, and that a second amended petition seeking a 

temporary restraining order was filed on August 21, 2013. 

A hearing was conducted on September 5, 2013, regarding Dye's request for a 

temporary restraining order. During the hearing, the parties argued about whether Dye 

had administrative remedies available, whether Dye's amended petition properly invoked 
3

the trial court's authority to conduct judicial review of a noncontested agency decision 

under section 536.150,1

 and whether the amended petition properly sought a temporary 

restraining order pursuant to Rule 92.2

 The trial court expressed reservations about 

whether Dye's petition was sufficient to request judicial review pursuant to section 

536.150. A September 5, 2013 docket entry indicates that the trial court denied Dye's 

request for a temporary restraining order "without prejudice," and dismissed Dye's 

petition "with leave granted to file an amended pleading within the next twenty (20) days 

and failing to do so, the cause will be dismissed." 

On September 17, 2013, the docket sheet indicates that Dye filed an "amended 

petition for judicial review and preliminary injunction." The amended petition is not 

included in the record on appeal. According to the docket sheet, MMAC filed a motion 

to dismiss the amended petition with respect to All About Smiles, LLC, suggesting that 

All About Smiles, LLC was also named as a plaintiff in the amended petition.3

 MMAC 

also filed a motion opposing the request for preliminary injunctive relief. 

On September 24, 2013, the parties appeared for a hearing, presumably to address 

MMAC's pending motions. The docket sheet indicates that on October 2, 2013, the trial 

court entered an order granting in part and denying in part the petition for preliminary 

injunction and dismissing the amended petition as to plaintiff All About Smiles, LLC. A 

copy of the trial court's written order addressing these rulings has not been made a part of 

 1

All statutory references are to RSMo 2000 as supplemented unless otherwise indicated. 2

All citations to the Rules are to Missouri Court Rules Volume I--State (2015). 3

Because Herrman is an Appellant, we assume she was also named as a plaintiff in the amended petition. 

There had been discussion during the September 5, 2013 hearing about whether Herrman was properly before the 

court as a plaintiff since she was not named in the caption of the several petitions filed by Dye before the September 

5, 2013 trial court order dismissing his petition with leave to refile. 
4

the record on appeal. And no transcript from the September 24, 2013 hearing has been 

provided. We thus cannot discern from the record on appeal the extent to which evidence 

was taken at the hearing to support the trial court's subsequent entry of a preliminary 

injunction--primary relief sought by the Appellant's amended petition.4

 

 According to the docket sheet, on January 7, 2014, Appellants sought leave to file 

a second amended petition. MMAC opposed the motion. According to the docket sheet, 

on January 23, 2014, MMAC filed a motion to amend the trial court's October 2, 2013 

preliminary injunction order. 

The trial court conducted a hearing on January 23, 2014, the transcript for which 

has been made a part of the record on appeal. The trial court addressed MMAC's motion 

to amend the preliminary injunction. The docket sheet indicates that an amended order 

granting and denying in part Appellants' petition for preliminary injunction was entered 

on January 23, 2014. A copy of this order is not included in the record on appeal. 

During the same hearing the parties also discussed the remaining matters to be 

determined as framed by Dye and Hermann's amended petition and the best way to 

resolve those matters. Appellants' counsel advised the trial court that he "think[s] we 

should just set it for trial." The parties agreed on a trial date of April 18, 2014. 

 4

Because we otherwise conclude that the Appellants had no right to voluntarily dismiss their lawsuit 

without prejudice without an order from the trial court, we need not resolve whether the introduction of evidence to 

secure a preliminary injunction constitutes the submission of evidence at trial pursuant to Rule 67.02(a) when a 

preliminary (and not a permanent) injunction is the principle relief sought by a petition. Cf. Cook v. McElwain, 432 

S.W.3d 286, 290 (Mo. banc 2014) (noting that "[g]enerally, a preliminary injunction hearing is not . . . considered a 

'trial',' meaning a trial on the merits," in a case where a permanent injunction was sought by the petition) (citation 

omitted). 
5

On April 18, 2014, the parties appeared for trial. At that time, Appellants' counsel 

advised the trial court that because of developments in proceedings before the 

Administrative Hearing Commission, he no longer needed the trial court to review 

documentation involving claims that remained subject to the Sanction and only needed 

the court to determine whether his due process rights had been violated by the denial of a 

pre-deprivation hearing before imposition of the Sanction. Appellants' counsel advised 

the trial court that he had "a trial brief and a motion for judgment on the pleadings, [and] 

associated exhibits, that I would like to offer to the court." [Tr. 91] Counsel then advised 

the court that "[t]he only thing that I intend to put on today is evidence with regard to the 

question of notice, what notice and what opportunity to be heard, the due process issue, 

that is all I intend to put on." [Tr. 92] The pleadings and exhibits submitted by the 

Appellants to the trial court have not been included in the record on appeal. 

After receiving the materials submitted by the Appellants, and hearing argument 

from both parties regarding the Appellants' due process claim, the trial court reiterated 

that it would only be deciding whether the Appellants' due process rights were violated 

and then stated: "I'll show the cause submitted on that basis." Docket entries for April 18, 

2014, show that evidence was taken and that the cause was taken under advisement. 

 On July 9, 2014, Appellants filed a motion to dismiss their lawsuit without 

prejudice. The motion made no reference to Rule 67.02(a) and instead argued that the 

trial court did not have jurisdiction to entertain the due process issue submitted to it for 

decision. MMAC opposed the motion. The trial court did not rule on the motion. 
6

On December 31, 2014, the trial court entered a judgment ("Judgment") ruling that 

the Appellants' due process rights were not violated by imposition of the Sanction. 

 The Appellants timely appeal. 

Analysis 

 In their sole point on appeal, the Appellants argue that the trial court lacked 

jurisdiction to enter the Judgment because they filed a motion to dismiss their case 

without prejudice pursuant to Rule 67.02(a) before the Judgment was entered, rendering 

any subsequent action by the trial court a nullity. 

 Rule 67.02(a) provides that "a civil action may be dismissed by the plaintiff 

without order of the court anytime . . . [i]n cases tried without a jury, prior to the 

introduction of evidence at the trial." "A voluntary dismissal is effective on the date it is 

filed with the court." State ex rel. Frets v. Moore, 291 S.W.3d 805, 812 (Mo. App. S.D. 

2009) (internal citation omitted). "Consequently, a trial court loses jurisdiction to enter 

any subsequent orders regarding the dismissed action." Id. "The circuit court may take 

no further steps as to the dismissed action, and any step attempted is viewed a nullity." 

Id. Thus, the dispositive question presented in this case is whether the Appellants' 

motion to dismiss was filed "prior to the introduction of evidence at the trial." We 

conclude that it was not. 

 We note at the outset that the motion to dismiss without prejudice filed by the 

Appellants did not purport to be based on Rule 67.02(a) but instead argued a substantive 

basis for dismissal--that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the due process 
7

issue submitted to it for decision on April 18, 2014. We are not persuaded, therefore, that 

the Appellants ever attempted to exercise their rights pursuant to Rule 67.02(a).5

 Even if we view the motion to dismiss without prejudice as having been filed 

pursuant to Rule 67.02(a), the Appellants' claims not already resolved by the grant of a 

preliminary injunction were set for trial at the Appellants' request on April 18, 2014. The 

parties appeared on that date prepared to proceed to trial. The Appellants' announced that 

given intervening developments before the Administrative Hearing Commission, the 

Appellants were withdrawing all remaining issues framed by their petition except 

whether imposition of the Sanction without prior notice and a hearing violated their due 

process rights. The Appellants submitted the materials they deemed essential to the trial 

court's determination of this issue. Those materials included a trial brief, a motion for 

judgment on the pleadings, and related exhibits. The trial court's docket entries reflect 

that "evidence" was taken on April 18, 2014, and that the case was taken under 

advisement. This was a trial. 

The Appellants argue that no "evidence" was submitted to the court, and that no 

trial occurred on April 18, 2014, because the trial court needed only resolve an issue on 

the pleadings. The limited record on appeal we have been provided refutes both 

assertions.6

 The case was set for trial on April 18, 2014. The docket sheet states that 

 5

During oral argument, the Appellants took the position that they are alternatively claiming error on appeal 

because the Judgment is legally erroneous, as the trial court had no legal authority to determine the due process issue 

framed by the Appellants' amended petition, and submitted to the trial court for decision on April 18, 2014. 

Appellants' point on appeal does not raise this claim of error, and no such claim of error is preserved for our review. 6

We are aided in our conclusion that the record refutes the Appellants' contentions by what the Appellants 

have failed to include in the record on appeal. The Appellants have not provided us with the version of their petition 

giving rise to the Judgment; with preliminary injunction orders affording the Appellants the primary relief sought in 

their lawsuit; or with the pleadings and exhibits submitted to the trial court on April 18, 2014. Rule 81.12(a) 
evidence

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