NOTICE: NOT FOR PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE

LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

KELLY B., Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, L. L., J. L., Appellees.

No. 1 CA-JV 14-0246

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JD510936

The Honorable Karen L. O’Connor, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

The Stavris Law Firm, PLLC, Scottsdale

By Alison Stavris

Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Michael Valenzuela

Counsel for Appellee

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge John C. Gemmill delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Kenton D. Jones and Judge Donn Kessler joined.
KELLY B. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

2

G E M M I L L, Judge:

¶1 Kelly B. (“Mother”) appeals the juvenile court’s order 

terminating her parental rights to her daughter, L.L., and son, J.L. 

(collectively, “the children”). Mother argues that there was insufficient 

evidence to support the rulings. For the following reasons, we affirm.

¶2 Mother, 33 years old, is the biological parent of her six-yearold daughter, L.L. and two-year-old son, J.L. Mother has a long history of 

methamphetamine use starting at the age of 21. She acknowledged using 

the drug every day until she became clean in April 2008. Mother relapsed 

in December 2012, resuming daily use. Mother has previously lost custody 

of four other children who are not subject to this severance dispute.

¶3 On March 24, 2013, Mother was caught trespassing by the 

Scottsdale Police Department at the home of a recently deceased person. 

She confessed to burglarizing the home and selling the goods at pawn 

shops in Mesa, Arizona. Police found Mother’s friend and both children 

waiting in Mother’s rental car outside of the home. After police conducted 

a search incident to Mother’s arrest, they recovered methamphetamine and 

drug paraphernalia from the vehicle. The Arizona Department of Child 

Safety (“DCS”)1 took the children into temporary physical custody that 

same day. On March 28, 2013, DCS filed a petition alleging that the children

were dependent because Mother was unable to care for them due to 

substance abuse and because there was no other person willing or able to 

care for them. The State charged Mother with one count of second-degree 

burglary and two counts of trafficking in stolen property.

¶4 The court found the children dependent on May 9, 2013 and 

approved an initial case plan of family reunification. The court notified

Mother that DCS would offer various substance abuse and parenting 

services and warned her that failure to cooperate with those services may 

lead to the loss of her children forever.

 

1 Child Protective Services (“CPS”) was formerly a division of the Arizona 

Department of Economic Security (“ADES”). Effective May 29, 2014, the 

Arizona legislature repealed the statutory authorization for creation of CPS 

and for ADES’s administration of child welfare and placement services 

under title 8, and the powers, duties, and purposes from those entities were 

transferred to the newly established DCS. See 2014 Ariz. Sess. Laws 2d 

Spec. Sess., Ch. 1, §§ 6, 20, 54. For simplicity, our references to DCS in this 

decision encompass both ADES and the former CPS, as appropriate.
KELLY B. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

3

¶5 DCS requested that Mother participate in random urinalysis 

and hair follicle drug testing through TASC and warned her that a missed 

test was considered a positive test for drugs. On March 29, 2013, Mother’s 

hair follicle test results were positive for methamphetamine, although her 

urinalysis was clean. Mother refused to submit to further testing until after 

mediation. After mediation in May 2013, however, Mother continued to 

decline testing until July 16, 2013 at which time her urinalysis returned a 

negative result. Between March 29, 2013 and January 1, 2014, Mother 

participated in only ten of twenty-nine mandatory urinalysis tests, and all 

ten were negative. In contrast, a hair follicle test in October 2013 returned

a positive result for amphetamines.

¶6 Mother did not attend the DCS-recommended substance 

abuse classes through Arizona Families F.I.R.S.T. (Terros). Instead, she 

enrolled herself in Community Bridges, a different substance abuse 

program. Community Bridges diagnosed Mother with amphetamine 

dependency and set a plan for her to attend group meetings twice a week. 

Mother attended only two of these group meetings between May 31, 2013 

and June 20, 2013. At the severance hearing, Mother explained that she did 

not attend more than two sessions because of the distance from her home 

— a two and a half hour bus ride. Community Bridges subsequently 

discharged Mother with a referral to a closer substance abuse treatment 

program, Center for Excellence.

¶7 Mother did not follow up on the Center for Excellence referral 

and instead enrolled herself in a 15-week program at the Steps House for 

Women, a half-way house. The half-way house is a custodial program that 

required daily alcohol or narcotics anonymous courses. Although Mother 

considered her time at the house successful, she admittedly went on a threeday methamphetamine binge following her completion of the program. 

The drug binge lead to her positive hair follicle test in October 2013.

¶8 On October 4, 2013, the goal of Mother’s case plan remained 

family reunification with a target date of December 14, 2013. Her case 

manager continued to refer Mother to parent-aide services as they were 

necessary to reach the goal. Nevertheless, between August 2013 and April 

2014, Mother attended only 29 of 47 supervised visitations with her children 

and only 9 of 17 one-on-one parenting sessions. Due to her variable and 

inconsistent participation in the required services, the court changed her 

case plan to severance and adoption on December 23, 2013. DCS 
KELLY B. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

4

subsequently moved to terminate Mother’s rights to both L.L. and J.L. on 

grounds of substance abuse and nine months’ out-of-home placement.

¶9 The following year Mother continued to be inconsistent with 

her drug testing, missing two hair follicle tests requested by her case 

manager in February and March. On February 18, 2014, Mother applied 

and was accepted by the Phoenix Dream Center’s Sofia House, a residential 

“Life Recovery Program.” Around that time Mother pled guilty to theft 

and trafficking in stolen property in relation to her March 2013 arrest. As 

part of her plea, the court required Mother to spend 120 days in jail. 

Accordingly, she did not reside at Sofia House from March 4 until July 2, 

2014, because of her incarceration.

¶10 After Mother’s release from jail, the Sofia House allowed her 

to reenter the program. At that point, Mother began weekly emotional 

counseling sessions with a licensed counselor and substance abuse sessions 

led by fellow participants. At the time of the severance hearing, Mother 

continued to participate in the program and was in the first “block” of four 

60-day blocks of treatment.

¶11 The juvenile court held a contested severance hearing on 

August 26 and 27, 2014. On September 4, 2014, the court filed a signed 

ruling severing Mother’s parental rights to both children on the grounds of 

substance abuse and nine months’ out-of-home placement. The court made 

a number of significant findings, including the following:

(1) “Mother is unable to discharge her parental responsibilities because 

of substance abuse. Mother’s history with methamphetamines dates 

back 10 years and there are reasonable grounds to believe that the 

condition will continue for a prolonged indeterminate period.”

(2) “[T]here is no documentation that Mother successfully completed a 

drug treatment program comparable to the drug treatment program 

and services provided by TERROS.”

(3) “Mother has substantially neglected or willfully refused to remedy 

the circumstances that caused the children to be in an out-of-home 

placement including, but not limited to, the refusal to participate in 

reunification services.”

¶12 Mother timely appeals the severance order. We have 

jurisdiction under A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A), 12-120.21(A)(1), and -2101(A)(1).
KELLY B. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

5

DISCUSSION

¶13 This court reviews a juvenile court’s termination order “in the 

light most favorable to sustaining the court’s decision and will affirm it 

‘unless we must say as a matter of law that no one could reasonably find 

the evidence [supporting statutory grounds for termination] to be clear and 

convincing.’” Denise R. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 221 Ariz. 92, 95, ¶ 10, 210 

P.3d 1263, 1266 (App. 2009) (quoting Murillo v. Hernandez, 79 Ariz. 1, 9, 281 

P.2d 786, 791 (1955)) (alteration in original). 

¶14 Mother presents two issues for review: (1) whether the 

juvenile court erred in severing Mother’s parental rights on the basis that 

she is unable to discharge her parental responsibilities due to substance 

abuse; and (2) whether the juvenile court erred in severing Mother’s 

parental rights on the basis of nine months’ out-of-home placement.

¶15 The juvenile court must meet two elements in order to sever 

parental rights under state law. First, the juvenile court must find by clear 

and convincing evidence that the facts of the case fulfill at least one of the 

statutory grounds for termination that are enumerated in A.R.S. § 8-533(B). 

Shawanee S. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 234 Ariz. 174, 176-77, ¶ 9, 319 P.3d 

236, 238-39 (App. 2014). Next, the juvenile court must find by a 

preponderance of the evidence that the termination would be in the child’s 

best interests. Id. Mother does not challenge the court's finding that 

severance was in the children's best interests, and we therefore do not 

address that issue.

¶16 Mother’s rights were severed under the substance abuse 

ground of A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3) and the nine months’ out-of-home placement 

ground of A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(a). “If clear and convincing evidence 

supports any one of the statutory grounds on which the juvenile court 

ordered severance, we need not address claims pertaining to the other 

grounds.” Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 280, ¶ 3, 53 P.3d 

203, 205 (App. 2002). Because sufficient evidence supports the juvenile 

court’s findings on the substance abuse ground under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3), 

we need not address the out-of-home placement ground under A.R.S. § 8-

533(B)(8)(a).

¶17 To terminate parental rights under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3), a 

court must find that 1) the parent has a history of chronic abuse of 

controlled substances; 2) the parent is unable to discharge parental 

responsibilities because of his or her chronic abuse of controlled substances; 
KELLY B. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

6

and 3) there are reasonable grounds to believe that the condition will 

continue for a prolonged and indeterminate period. A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3); 

Raymond F. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 224 Ariz. 373, 377, ¶ 15, 231 P.3d 377, 

381 (App. 2010).

¶18 There is clear and convincing evidence to support the juvenile 

court’s finding that Mother has a history of chronic substance abuse. A

finding of “chronic” use does not require “constant” use, but rather use that 

has existed or continued for a long time. Raymond F., 224 Ariz. at 377, ¶ 16, 

231 P.3d at 381. The facts indicate that Mother used methamphetamine 

between roughly 1996 and 2008 and then again from 2012 until the present. 

During these periods her use was usually daily. This history can reasonably 

be found by the juvenile court to be “chronic.”

¶19 Mother contends, however, that the juvenile court erred in 

finding that due to her chronic abuse she is unable to discharge her 

responsibilities and that there are grounds to believe that the abuse will 

continue for a prolonged and indeterminate period. We conclude, 

however, that the evidence supports both of those findings. Severance

under this section “does not require that the parent be found unable to 

discharge any parental responsibilities but rather that the parent be unable 

to discharge ‘the parental responsibilities’”. Maricopa Cnty. Juvenile Action 

No. JS-5894, 145 Ariz. 405, 408, 701 P.2d 1213, 1216 (App. 1985) (emphasis 

in original). Those responsibilities establish a flexible standard that allows 

the juvenile court to look at the particular circumstances of each case. Id. at 

409, 701 P.2d at 1217. 

¶20 The circumstances here, unfortunately, indicate that Mother 

has been unable to lead a substance-free lifestyle and adequately care for 

her children. Mother claims that although she did not complete the courtinstructed Terros program, she did participate in other services such as the 

Steps House for Women that “she believed to be stricter on her than 

Terros.” The trial court’s ruling, however, is reasonably supported by the 

fact that after the completion of the “strict” program, Mother went on a 

three-day methamphetamine binge. 

¶21 Additionally, Mother continuously neglected her mandatory 

urinalysis testing, completing only ten of the required twenty-nine tests 

during 2013. During and after this period, Mother attended only 29 of 47 

supervised visitations with her children and only 9 of 17 one-on-one 

parenting sessions.
KELLY B. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

7

¶22 Finally, Mother has failed to demonstrate that she can 

maintain sobriety in a non-custodial setting. Both the Steps House program 

and Mother’s more recent Sofia House program were residential in nature. 

Again, immediately upon completion of the former program, Mother 

restarted drug use. As for the latter program, Mother was at the beginning 

stage of the services at the time of the severance hearing. Her late effort to 

remedy her situation could have been regarded by the juvenile court as “too 

little, too late” in support of the findings. Based on Mother’s history of drug 

use and non-compliance with important aspects of the services provided by 

DCS, the juvenile court reasonably found that the evidence supporting 

termination was clear and convincing. 

CONCLUSION

¶23 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the juvenile court’s order 

terminating Mother’s parental rights to L.L. and J.L.