NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL- TEXT P UBLICA TION File Name: 12 a06 04n. 06
No. 10 -584 6 UNITED STA

TES COURT OF A PPE A LS FOR THE SIX TH CIRCUIT

PAULA B. BROW N, Plaint if f -Appe llant,

v

. L E X I N G T O N

- F A Y E T T E U R B A N COUNTY GOVE RNMENT, e t al., Def end ant s-Appe llees. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APP EAL FROM T HE UNIT ED ST AT ES DIST RICT COURT FOR T HE EAS T ERN DIST RICT OF KE NTUCKY

Bef ore: DAUGHT REY, MOORE, an d McKE AGUE, Circuit Judges.

Martha Craig Daughtrey, Circuit Judge. Plaint if f Pau la Brown a p p e a ls f rom the district court’s orde r of sum ma ry judgme nt ent ered in f avor of the def end ant s in this

em ploymen t discri min ation suit, charging retaliat ion und er Title VII of the Civ il Rig hts A ct of 196 4, as am end ed, 42 U.S.C. §§ 200 0e - 200 0e-1 7, and the inten t io n a l inf liction of

em otion al distress und er state law

. T he d istrict court held tha t Brown had f ailed to
esta blish a prim a facie case und er T itle VII and the elem ent s of Ken tucky’s app licable tort law

. Altho ugh the record bef ore us suggests tha t the me rits of the plaint if f ’s retaliat ion claim

a re
– a t best – ten uou s, w e have no dou bt tha t she w as able to esta blish the easily- me t burd en of a prim a facie case and tha t, as a result, the district court’s ruling o n tha t issue

cann ot be uph eld. Ind eed , this record illustrates the inhe rent risk in limiting ana ly sis to theNo. 10-5846

Brown v. Lexington-Fay ette County, et al. prim a facie stage of T itle VII litig ation

. It thu s beco me s nece ssary to rev erse sum ma ry judgme nt on tha t portio n of Brown’s retaliat ion cause of action tha t f ocuse s upo n her
suspe nsion and ref erral f or psychological evaluation and rema nd tha t ma tter to the district
court. How ever, beca use the plaint if f f ailed to allege the sort of out rageous cond uct on the part of the individual def end ant s tha t is nece ssary to supp ort a claim of inten tiona l inf liction of em otion al distre ss, we af f irm th at p ortion of

the district co urt’s jud gmen t.

FA CTUA L A ND PROCEDURA L BA CKGROUND

At all time s relevant to this litig a tion, Pau la Brown, an Af rican-Am erican w om an,

w as em ployed by the Lexington-Fayette Urban Coun ty Governme nt, having bee n initially hired in 200 1. By May 200 5, she had been giv en a raise and promot ed to the positio n of “staf f assista nt se nior” in th e Divi sion o f Bu ilding Inspe ction. In tha t po sition, Brown w as

c h a rg e d w ith the respo nsibility of “provi d[ing] time ly prof ession al serv ice to custo me rs purch asing Electrical and Mecha nical Perm its,” “f ollow[ing ] the required policies and
proce dure s in obt aining app rov al f or leave,” “t a k [ in g] and f ollow[ing ] directives f rom supe rv isor(s) and ma nagem ent , ” a n d “perf orm[ ing] all the assigned job dut ies of the Electrical/Mech anica l Sect ion Sta f f Assistan t Sr. in a time ly and ef f icient ma nne r accord ing
to e stab lished policies, proce dure s an d sta nda rds.”

Brown alleged tha t, throu ghout her ten ure w it h the divi sion, she experience d prob le m s wit h une qual or unre ason able distribut ion of assigned tasks and w ith une qual
app lication of esta blished disciplinary proce dure s. W hat is clear f rom the app ellate record, - 2 -No. 10-5846

Brown v. Lexington-Fay ette County, et al. howev er, is th e f act t hat Brow n also had an em ploymen t history of host ile con f ronta tions

w ith her co- wo rk ers and supe rv isors. For examp le, in Novembe r 200 4, the Div ision of Hum an Resou rces f iled a com plaint against the plaint if f f or threa ten ing ano the r em ployee. Add itiona lly , in April 200 6, “[a]n ant agonistic conversation w as initiate d by [Brown] in f ront of several em ployees regarding secreta ry ’s day,” and in June 200 6, the plaint if f w as giv en

an oral w arning af

ter she adm itted initiating a v erba l conf ronta tion w ith a co-w orker in f ront of oth ers.

On the oth er han d, w hile serv ing un der the supe rv ision of def end ant s Dew ey Crow e, Geo rg e Dillon, and Ste pha nie Northington , Brown com plaine d to an em ployee-assista nce program specia list abo ut “[b]u lly ing beh avior, includin g aggr ession and intim idatio n, on the part of her supe rv isors” and “[w ]orkpla c e re t a li ation by her supe rv isors.” Spe cif ically , Brown alleged tha t in Janu ary 200 7, Northington , the plaint if f ’s im m e diate supe rv isor, shoo k a pen cil in Brown’s f ace w hile y elling at her me nacin gly

. On ano the r occasio n, “Northington conf ined her in a storage closet by physically blocking the doo r, w hile shou ting

a stream of dem and s f or com pliance w ith her aut hority.” Accordin g to a co-w orker, in the

sum me r of 200 7, w hen Brown w as conf ined to a w hee lchair af te r a n in ju ry , Dillon instructe d the co-w orker “not to assist Plaint if f in any w ay, no ma tter w hat

. . . [an d] state d tha t th ey w ould no t m ake accom mo dat ions f or [Bro w n].”

In 200 8, Brown cont inue d to com plain abo ut hara ssing treat me nt. In March , f or in s t ance , she claime d to "h ave bee n subje cted to dif f eren t term s and cond itions o f

- 3 -No. 10-5846

Brown v. Lexington-Fay ette County, et al.

em ploymen t in tha t [she w as] required to put [he r] v ines inside [he r] cubicle and take down [he r] perso nal sig ns [she] displayed." T hat same mo nth , she fe ll f rom a rolli ng step stoo l

w hile stan ding on it "to a d ju s t h e r s c reen over her w orkspa ce" and hit her back on her desk. Even tho ugh rules and regulation s of the Ken tucky Occup ation al Saf ety and Health Program required tha t all such w orkplace injuries be recorde d on "a n OSHA 300 log," the def end ant s f ailed to include Brown's in jury in the gov ernm ent 's repo rt. T he plaint if f thu s f illed out an em ployee gr ievance f orm in w hich she sought to hold def e n d a nts Bry ant , Dillon, and Crow e "a ccoun tab le f or Uneth ical beh avior of f alsif y ing, signing & f iling this Legal Docum ent w ithou t allowi ng [he r] the opp ortun ity to have any inpu t on it or to even

rev iew it f or accu racy ."

In early April 200 8, Brown f iled charges w ith the Equal Em ploymen t Opp ortun ity Com mission (EEOC) and w ith the Lexington-Fayette Urban Co u nty Hum an Rig hts Com mission , claimin g discrimina tion base d upo n her race and sex. In part, tho se charges claime d tha t Brown h ad not bee n prom ote d to the positio n of t e a m lead er in June 200 7, and , in part, com plaine d of dispa rate treat me nt in bein g required to keep the v ines of her plan ts w ithin her ow n cubicle a nd in be ing required to r em ove “person al sig ns” display ed

w ithin h er w orkspa ce.

T ensio ns bet w een Brown and Dew ey Crow e, the divi sion directo r, reach ed a hea d

on May1, 200 8, when, acco rding to Crowe:

- 4 -No. 10-5846

Brown v. Lexington-Fay ette County, et al. T he Plaint if

f w as given clear instructio ns to assist a custo me r and to com plete the [he ating, v ent ilation, and air cond itioning] perm its f or w hich the custo me r w as w aiting. T he Plaint if f lef t the custo me r una tten ded at the coun ter, lef

t her w orkstat ion, and engaged in a v erba l conf ronta tion w ith [Crow e]. [Crow e] inf o rm e d the Plaint if f to return to her w orkstat ion, and com plete the w ork fo r the w aiting custom er, but instea d the Plaintif f l ef t the prem ises

. . . . Othe r em ploye e s f inished the custo me r’s reque st and the y also com plete d several unf inished p e rm it s tha t the Plaint if f w as previously instructe d to com plete

.
Brown dispu tes Crow e’s v ersion of the events of tha t day, howev er. In a f iling in the district court, she set out he r v ersion of the incide nt:

In her atte mp t to mo re quickly com plete at least ten form s, she asked a cow orker (wh o wa s sitting idly , w aiting f or the pho nes to ring) , to num ber the f orms w hile she cont inue d to f ill in the cont ent s. Crow e began sma cking his f ist and shout ing, “I told y ou to stop asking oth er peop le to do y our w ork fo r y ou. ”

In any eve n t , f ollowi ng the inciden t Brown lo dged a gr ievance against Crow e and

w as place d on a 30-d ay adm inistrative leave, app aren tly w ith f ull pay. Upon returnin g f rom tha t leave, howev er, Crow e suspe nde d Brown f or 40 hou rs, w ithou t pay, as a result of the alleged in subo rdinat ion d em onst rated du ring the May 1 incid ent

.
Furthe rmore , abo ut the time of the alterca tion w ith Crow e, the plaint if f requeste d a transf er to ano the r dep artm ent w ithin the gov e rn m e n t

. T he request w as den ied, and Brown w as told tha t her opt ions include d returnin g to her existing job or resigning. Brown allegedly respo nde d, “I w on’t resign my job. I’ll keep on w orking even if the stress y ou all

are put ting me und er kills me .” Inte rp re t in g tha t rema rk as an expression of suicidal

- 5 -No. 10-5846

Brown v. Lexington-Fay ette County, et al. idea tion, the def end ant gov e rn m e n t initiate d a ma nda tory ref erral of the plaint if f to the

e mp loyee assistan ce program. Even tho ugh the psychologists and psychiatrists wh o evaluate d Brown beginnin g on July 7, 200 8, concu rred tha t the state me nt ma de by the plaint if f had bee n take n out of cont ext and did not nece ssarily indica te Brown’s inten t to harm herself , Brow n w as not release d f or a return to w ork unt il August 18, 200 8 and w as not perm itted to return unt il Octob er 13, 200 8. During the period of evaluation , mo reover, Brown receiv ed no pay unt il her lawy er be cam e involv ed in th e situ ation an d se cured for the plaint if

f back pay covering the time she w as und ergoing coun seling. W hile participa ting in the coun seling session s, Brown f iled a secon d EEOC com plaint , this one “charging her

em ployer w ith ret aliation f or hav ing f iled the April 200 8 EEOC discri min ation compla int.” T he EEOC issu ed Brown a right-to-sue lette r on Sep tem ber 1 9, 2 008

.
Even af ter the plaint if

f returne d to w ork, she cont inue d to com p la in tha t she w as t re a t e d dif

f eren tly f rom oth er em ployees. Her supe rv isors coun tered by claimin g tha t Brown’s insu bord inatio n and inef f iciency interf ered w ith her job perf orma nce. T hey also den ied und er oat h tha t the y had retal ia t e d against Brown f or f iling v arious com plaint s. Finally , Brown w as suspe nde d f ro m em ploymen t on Decem ber 31, 200 8, pen ding a hea ring bef ore the Civ il Service Com mission , a hea ring tha t resulte d in term inatio n of the plaint if f ’s em ploymen t ef

f ective May

7, 200 9.

In the me ant ime , Brown f iled this law suit in f ede ral court, initially seeki n g a prelimin ary injunct ion restoring her to her positio n w ithin the Lexingt o n -Fa y ette Coun ty

- 6 -No. 10-5846

Brown v. Lexington-Fay ette County, et al. Urban Governme nt. T he district court den ied the request f or injunct iv e relief and f urthe r orde red the plaint if

f to show cause w hy her comp laint shou ld not be dism issed f or f ailure to id ent if y a the oryupon w hich h er case cou ld be ba sed. In an ef f ort to com ply w ith th at request, Brown f iled an am end ed com plaint add ing add itiona l cause s of action

. T he def end ant s respo nde d w ith a mo tion f or s u m m a ry judgme nt, w hich the district court
gr ant ed in part, reservi ng only Brown’s claim against the gov ernm ent f or retaliat ion and the claim against the individual def end ant s f o r inten tiona l inf liction of em otion al distress. Eventua lly , the district judge conclu ded tha t the plaint if f had f ailed to raise a genuine issue of ma terial f act regarding a causa l conn ection bet w een her prote cted a c t ivi t y and any adverse em p lo ym ent action by the def end ant em ployer, and dism issed the retaliat ion action

. T he district court also held tha t the plaint if f had f aile d t o me et the stan dard f or

ma intain ing a tort a ction und er sta te la w an d d ismissed the claim f or inte ntion al inf liction of em otion al distress. F o ll owi ng the district court’s den ial of Brown’s mo tion to alter or

am end the judgme nt, the plaint if f f iled this app eal. Altho ugh the not ice of app eal purp orts
to cont est the district court’s initial gr ant of partia l sum ma ry ju dgme nt to the def end ant s, the subse quent orde r dism issing the rema ining claims, and the den ial of the mo tion to alter

or am end , Brown’s brief s on app eal challen ge only the dism issal of the retaliat ion and inten tiona l-inf liction-of -emo tiona l-distress claim s.

- 7 -No. 10-5846

Brown v. Lexington-Fay ette County, et al. DISCUSSIO N

Standard of Review

W e rev iew de novo the gr ant of sum ma ry judgme nt by a district court. See Cim inillo

v. Streiche r

, 434 F.3d 461 , 464 (6th Cir. 200 6). Sum ma ry judgme nt shou ld be gr ant ed “if the mo v ant shows tha t the re is no genuine dispu te as to any ma terial f act and the mo v ant is ent itled to judgme nt as a ma tter of law .” Fed. R. Civ

. P. 56(a ). A gen u in e is s ue of

ma terial f act exists only w hen , assum ing the truth of the non -moving party’s evidence and
const ruing all inf eren ces f rom tha t evidence in the lig ht mo st f avorable to the non -moving party, the re is suf

f icient evidence f or a trier of f act to f ind f or tha t party. A non -moving party

cann o t w ithsta nd sum ma ry judgme nt, howev er, by introd uction of a “mere scintilla” of evidence in its f avor. See Cim inillo , 43 4 F.3 d a t 46 4.

Retalia tion Claim

Brown cont end s tha t the district court shou ld not have gr ant ed sum ma ry judgme nt
to Lexington-Fayette Coun ty on her claim o f re t a liation beca use she add uced suf f icient evidence to raise at least a f actu al dispu te tha t w ould preclud e a f inding in t he
gov ernm ent ’s f avor. Lexington-Fayette Count y , on the othe r han d, insists tha t the distri ct
court correctly conclu de d tha t Brown f ailed to esta blish tha t she suf f ered an adverse

em ploymen t action and tha t, even if she had , tha t adverse action w as not relate d to the exercise of

an y prot ecte d a ctiv ity

.
- 8 -No. 10-5846

Brown v. Lexington-Fay ette County, et al. In orde r to esta blish a prim a facie case of retaliat ion und er T itle VII, a plaint if f mu st dem onst rate tha t:
(1) [s]he engaged in activity prote cted by T itle VII; (2) this exercise of p ro tecte d rig hts w as known to the def end ant ; (3) the def end ant the re a f t e r too k a ma terially adverse action against the plaint if f or subje cted the plaint if f to severe and pervasiv e retaliat ory hara ssme nt; and (4) the re w as a causa l conn ection bet w een the prote cted activity and the ma terially adverse action

.
Lind say v. Yat es , 578 F.3d 407 , 418 (6 t h Cir. 200 9). In this case, Lexington-Fayette Coun t y d o e s n ot cont est the f act tha t Brown’s f iling of charges w ith the Ken tucky Occu pa ti on al Saf ety and Health Program and w ith the EEOC const itute d prote cted activity

. Add ition a ll y, t h e def end ant doe s not dispu te tha t it w as aware of the existence of tho se f ilings. As indicat ed abo v e, howev er, Lexington-Fayette Coun ty doe s ma intain tha t Brown suf f ered no adverse em ploymen t action and tha t the plaint if f has esta blished no causa l

conn ection bet w een any such adverse action and th e f iling of her adm inistrative

com plaint s.

At the prim a facie stage of the litig at io n , howev er, the burd en upo n the plaint if f is
min ima l. See EEOC v. Avery Denn ison Corp. , 104 F.3d 858 , 861 (6th Cir . 1997 ). “[I]t ‘is

a burd en easily me t,’” W renn v. Gou ld , 808 F.2d 493 , 500 (6th Cir. 198 7), and “i s not

one rous.” Jackson v. RKO Bot tlers of Toled o, Inc. , 743 F.2d 370 , 377 (6th Cir. 198 4). “All tha t is required of plaint if f at the prim a facie stage is to dem onst rate tha t [s]he has a case, tha t the evidence is on h[e r] side.” Avery Denn ison Corp. , 104 F.3d at 861

. Furthe rmore ,

- 9 -No. 10-5846

Brown v. Lexington-Fay ette County, et al. in conju nction w ith the stan dard s f or rev iew of sum ma ry judgme nts, w e mu st v iew all evidence in th e light m ost f avorable t o th e n on-m oving pa rty – h ere, the plain tif

f

.

In this app eal, Br o wn a s s erts tha t her EEOC com plaint s f iled in April 200 8 and in July 200 8, as w ell as her com plaint to the Ken tucky Occup a tiona l Saf ety and Health Program in June 200 8, led Lexington-Fayette Coun ty to retaliat e against her by suspend ing her w ithou t pay in June and in July throu gh Octob er of 200 8 f or psychiatric eval u a t io ns, and by eventua lly term inatin g her em ploymen t on De c e m b e r 31, 200 8. Neithe r party dispu tes tha t term inatio n of em ploymen t is an adverse action tha t satisf ies the third pron g of the prim a facie ana ly sis app licable to a T itle VII retaliat ion case. Le xin gton-Fayette Coun ty neverthe less atta cks the plain t if f ’s retaliat ion claim by cont end ing tha t the Julythrou gh-Octobe r sus p ensio n cann ot be consid ered an adverse em ploymen t action beca use, even tho ugh the suspe nsion w as initially w ithou t pay, t h e em ployer later paid Brown the salary she had not received during the suspe nsion

. A c c o rd in g to the def end ant ’s argum e n t, the ref ore, beca use the plaint if f w as eventua lly ma de w hole f inan cially , no ad v erse e mp loyment actio n o ccurred.

But , in Burlingt on Northe rn & S ant a Fe Railwa y Co. v. W hite , 54 8 U.S . 53 (200 6), the United Sta tes Sup reme Court rejecte d just such an argume nt. In tha t case, the plaint if f

w as place d on involuntary leave statu s w ithou t pay f or 37 days but later received back pay f or tha t period of time

. Faced w ith an argume nt tha t such restitut ion negate d the possib ility tha t the plaint if

f could esta blish an adverse em ploymen t a c t io n , the Court f oun d to the

- 10

-No. 10-5846

Brown v. Lexington-Fay ette County, et al. cont rary , det ermin ing tha t “an ind e f inite suspe nsion w ithou t pay could w ell act as a det errent [to prote cted activity ], even if the suspe nde d em ployee eventua lly re ceived backp ay.” Id. at 73. W ithou t question , the ref ore, plaint if f Brown has, in this case, a lso satisf ied the “easily me t” burd en of dem onst rating an adverse em ploymen t action , bot h in regard to her suspe nsion w ithou t pay f or psychological eval uat ion and in regard to her
term inatio n f rom em ploymen t.

T he question rema ins w het her Brown has also sat isf ied the f ourth pron g of the prim a-facie

- case ana ly sis by dem onst rating a causa l conn ection bet w een her EEOC and Occup ation al Health and Saf ety f ilings and her suspe nsion and term inatio n. As this court has previously

no ted :

Causa tion can be proven indirectly throu gh circumsta ntial evidence such as suspiciou s timin g. Spe cif ically , this Court has f oun d tha t tem pora l proximity bet w een an assertio n of T itle VII rig hts and a ma terially adverse action , is suf f icient to esta bli s h t h e causa l conn ection elem ent of a retaliat ion claim “[w ]he re an adverse em ployme n t action occurs very close in time af ter an em ployer learns of a prote cted activity .” W here the nexus is not “v ery close,” w e h ave decline d to f ind a cau sal con nect ion b ased on tim ing alone

.
Lind say , 57 8 F.3 d a t 41 8-19 (citation s an d p aren the tical explana tions om itted ).

In this case, Brown f iled her v arious adm inistrative charges against LexingtonFayette Coun ty in April, June , and July of 200 8. Her Decem ber 200 8 term inatio n thu s did
not occur unt il bet w een f ive and eight mo nth s af ter the prote cted activities. Giv en the
p a ssage of tha t period of time , as w ell as the abse nce of oth er record evidenc e t h a t t h e

- 11

-No. 10-5846

Brown v. Lexington-Fay ette County, et al. term inatio n f low ed f rom the f ilings wit h t he EEOC and Occup ation al Saf ety and Health Program, the plaint if

f has f ailed to esta blish or even to imp ly any causa l conn ection bet w een the prot ecte d a ctiv ities an d h er ultim ate term inatio n.

Less tha n one mo nth af ter the April EEOC f iling, howev er, the plaintif f w as placed

on a 30-d ay adm inistrative leave, w ith pay, af ter the conf ronta tion w ith Dew ey Crow e, and

w as the n reinsta ted , only to be suspe nde d f or 40 hou rs w ithou t pay, reinsta ted again, and
prom ptly re f e rr e d f or psychological coun seling f or all or part of the next three mo nth s. Altho ugh the def end ant argues tha t the adm inistrative leave, the 40-h our suspe nsion , and the psychological ref erral stem me d f rom an alleged act of in s u b o rd in ation and f rom the plaint if f ’s reactio n to it, Brown coun ters tha t Crow e’s reactio n to an inno cent requ e s t f or assistan ce prom pte d the “conf ronta tion” a n d wa s an indicat ion of his desire to “g et” her,
presu ma bly beca use of her exercise of prote cted activities. Conse quently, v iew ing the evidence in the lig ht mo st f avorable to the plaint if f , as w e are required to do at this junctu re in t h e li t ig ation , w e mu st conclu de tha t the inf orma tion bef ore the district court arguably
supp orts the inf eren ce tha t Brown’s supe rv isor treat ed her w ith exception al harsh ness shortly a f

ter the initial EEOC f iling. Th e se lf -serv ing den ial by L exing ton -Fay ette Coun ty and the claim tha t an y

discipline w as met ed out on ly f or insu bord inatio n d o n ot e stab lish tha t the def ense v ersion of the events is nece ssarily accura te. I n s t e a d , Brown’s
prese nta tion of af

f idavits and oth er evidence tha t Crow e, Dillon, and Northington w ere “out
to get” her and tha t the y w arne d oth er em ployees not to associa t e o r a s s is t the plaint if f

- 12

-No. 10-5846

Brown v. Lexington-Fay ette County, et al. create s at least a dispu te of f act regarding t he mo tiv ation of the individual def en d a nts in disciplining the plain tif

f an d te mp orarily

de priv ing her o f

pa y

. Similarly, Brown has a d d u c e d e viden ce tha t, upo n her return to w ork in Octob er af ter the conclu sion of the psychological evaluation pe ri o d , a n unm ana geable w orkload

w as place d upo n her in orde r to ensu re tha t she could not accom plish the tasks set out f or her. Brown alleged tha t she w as orde red to com plete her regular w ork and all the w ork tha t had backlo gg ed during her abse nce, and tha t she wa s e xp e cted to f inish it w ithou t assistan ce and w ithou t utiliz ing overtim e. T he unre ason able ness of tha t dem and w as brou ght to lig ht in the sw orn af f idavit of Christine W u, a colleague of the p laintif f , w ho relate d tha t “[ f ] o r t h e f irst tw o w eeks af ter [the plaint if

f ] w as f ired

. . ., her w orkload w as divi ded bet w een tw o f ull time and three part time emplo y ees. T he third w eek af ter Pau la Brown stop p e d wo rk in g

. . . , Pau la’s w orkload w as divi ded bet w een three f ull time

em ployees.”

W ithou t question , the def end ant has of f ered legitim ate explanat ions f or the
treat me nt of the plaint if f tha t have no relation w hat soever to her f iling of the EEOC and Occup ation al Saf ety and Health c o m p la ints. A plaint if f ’s burd en in esta blishing a prim a facie case of T itle VII retaliat ion “is not one rous,” howev er. T hus, the f act tha t Brown has add uced cont rary evidence suggesting a possib ly imp rope r mo tiv e f or the suspe nsion and initially -unp aid psychological ref erral is suf f icient to und ermin e the district court’s sum ma ry judgme nt ru ling premise d u pon a f ailure t o e stab lish a prim a fa cie case

.
- 13

-No. 10-5846

Brown v. Lexington-Fay ette County, et al. Intentional Inflic tion of Emotional Dis tress Claim

In her secon d issue on app eal, Brown cont end s tha t she also put f o rt h s u f f icient evidence to create a dispu te of ma terial f act and thu s preclud e sum ma ry judgme nt f or the individual def end ant s on the plaint if f ’s state -law claim of inten tiona l inf liction of em otion al distress. T he plaint if

f ’s burd en of esta blishing a prim a facie case of such a tort is, howev er, extremely dif

f icult. Kentu cky

courts have instructed that, in orde r f or a plaint if f to recover f or the inten tiona l inf liction of em otion al distress, she mu st show tha t: “(1) the w rongdoe r’s cond uct w as inten tiona l or reckless, (2) the wro n gd oer’s cond uct w as out rageous and intole rable, (3) the re is a c a u s a l c o nne ction bet w een the cond uct and the em otion al distress, and (4) the em otion al distress suf f ered is severe.” Ben ning field v. Pet tit Envt l., Inc. , 18 3 S .W .3d 56 7, 5 72 (Ky . Ct. A pp. 20 05) (citat ion o mitt ed).
“[N]ot ev eryupset plaintif f can r ecover f or emot iona l distress,” howev er. First and Farm er’ s Ban k of Somerset, Inc. v. Hend erson , 763 S.W .2d 137 , 143 (Ky

. Ct. App

. 198 8). Rathe r, Ken tucky courts have looke d to the com me nta ry to section 46 of the Restat em ent (Secon d) of Torts f or guidance in def ining the type of acts tha t w ill justif y tort recovery

. T hat com me nta ry

provides:

T he cases thu s f ar decid ed have f oun d liability only where the def end ant ’s cond uct has bee n extreme and out rageous. It has not bee n eno ugh tha t the def end ant has acte d w ith an inten t w hich is tortiou s or even criminal, or tha t he has inten ded to inf lic t e m otion al distress, or even tha t his cond uct has b e e n chara cteriz ed by “malice, ” or a degree of aggr avation w hich w oul d e n t it le the plaint if

f to pun itiv e dam ages f or ano the r tort. Liab ility has b e e n

- 14

-No. 10-5846

Brown v. Lexington-Fay ette County, et al. f oun d only w here the cond uct has bee n so out rageous in chara cter, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond a ll b o u n d s of dece ncy, and to be regarded as atrocio us, and utte rly intole rable in a civ iliz ed com mu nity. Gen erally , the case is one i n w hich the r ecitat ion of the fa cts to an av erage me mb er of t h e c o m mu nity w ould arou se his resen tm ent against the acto r, and lead him to exclaim, “Out rageous! ”

S tringe r v. W

al-Mart Sto res, Inc. , 151 S.W .3d 781 , 789 (Ky

. 200 4) (citing Restat em ent (Secon d) of Torts § 46(1 ) cmt

. d (1 9 6 5 ))

. T hus, Ken tucky co urts have allowed recovery f or inte ntion al inf liction o f em otion al distre ss in inst ance s in which a d ef end ant :
(1 ) h a rassed the plaint if f “by keep ing her und er surv eillance at w ork and hom e, telling her over the CB radio tha t he w ould put her husb and in jail and driv ing so as to f or c e h e r v ehicle into an opp osing lane of traf f ic”; (2) inten tiona lly f ailed to w arn t he plaint if f f or a period of f iv e mo nth s tha t def end ant ’s buildin g, in w hich plaintif f w as engaged in the remo v al of pipe s a n d d u c ts, cont aine d asbe stos; (3) engaged in “a plan of atte mp ted f raud , dece it, sland er, and interf er e n c e with cont ractua l rig hts, all caref ully orche strate d in an atte mp t to bring [plain tif f ] to his knee s”; (4) com mitt ed sam e-sex sexual hara ssme nt in the f orm of “f requent inciden ts of lew d nam e call in g coup led w ith mu ltiple unso licited and unwante d requests f or hom osexual sex” ; (5) w as a Catho lic priest w ho “used his relatio n s h ip [ a s ma rriag e coun selor f or] the [plain tif f ] husb and and the w if e to obt ain a sexual af f air w ith the w if e”; (6) agreed to care f or p la in t if f ’s long-time com pan ionanim als, tw o registered App aloo sa horse s, and the n imm edia tely sold the m f or s la u gh t e r; and (7) subje cted plaint if f to nea rly daily racial indignities f or app rox ima tely sev en y ears.
Stringe r , 15 1 S .W .3d at 789 -90 (f oot not es a nd citation s om itted ).

Unde r this strict stan dard , “[m]e re term inatio n clearly doe s not rise to the level of
out rageous cond uct required to supp ort an IIED claim. ” Ben ning field , 183 S.W .3d at 572

. Ind eed , as this court has held i n a case seeking recovery under similar Ohio tort law , “an

- 15

-No. 10-5846

Brown v. Lexington-Fay ette County, et al.

em ployee’s term inatio n, even if base d upo n dis c ri m in a t io n , doe s not rise to the level of ‘extr em e and out rageous cond uct’ w ithou t proo f of som eth ing mo re.” God fredso n v. Hess & Clark, In c. , 17 3 F.3 d 3 65, 37 6 (6t h Cir. 19 99).

Here, Brown atte mp ts to bolste r her tort claim by highlig hting the f act tha t som e of the individual def end ant s app eare d to atte mp t to isolate the plaint if f at w ork, coun sel oth er

em ployees n o t to associa te w ith Brown, and require the plaint if f to obt ain perm ission anytime she lef

t her w ork statio n. Altho ugh such action s ma y be imm at u re , p e t t y , and dest ructiv e of an ef

f icient w orking environme nt, as a ma tter of law the y do not com e close
to app roach ing the level of out rageous beh avior nece ssary to supp ort a c la im f or inten tiona l inf liction o f

em otion al distre ss un der e stab lished Ken tucky law

.

CONCLUSION

For the reaso ns set out abo v e, w e conclu de tha t the district court’s dism issal of tha t portio n of Brown’s retaliat ion claim tha t involv es her suspe nsion and ref er ra l f or psychological evaluation mu st be REVERSE D and the case REMANDED f or such f urthe r proce edin gs a s are nece ssary

. W e AFFIRM the district court’s judgme nt dism issing th e plaint if f ’s claim f or inte ntion al inf liction o f em otion al distre ss.

- 16

-