Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 70 / Wednesday, April 12, 1995 / Notices 18613

Washington, DC 20005, (202) 624–0892.

A copy of the proposed Stipulation and

Settlement Agreement may be obtained

in person or by mail from the Consent

Decree Library, 1120 G Street NW., 4th

floor, Washington, DC 20005. In

requesting a copy, please refer to the

referenced case and enclose a check in

the amount of $1.50 for the Stipulation

and Settlement Agreement (25 cents per

page reproduction costs), payable to the

Consent Decree Library.

Joel M. Gross,

Acting Chief, Environmental Enforcement

Section, Environment and Natural Resources

Division.

[FR Doc. 95–9002 Filed 4–11–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4410–01–M

Office of the Attorney General

[AG Order No. 1962–95]

RIN 1105–AA36

Proposed Guidelines for the Jacob

Wetterling Crimes Against Children

and Sexually Violent Offender

Registratioan Act

AGENCY: Department of Justice.

ACTION: Proposed guidelines.

SUMMARY: The United States Department

of Justice (DOJ) is publishing Proposed

Guidelines to implement the Jacob

Wetterling Crimes Against Children and

Sexually Violent Offender Registration

Act.

DATES: Comments must be received by

July 11, 1995.

ADDRESSES: Comments may be mailed to

Bonnie J. Campbell, Director, Violence

Against Women Office, U.S. Department

of Justice, Tenth and Pennsylvania

Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20530,

202–616–8894.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Section

170101 of the Violent Crime Control and

Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L.

No. 103–322, 108 Stat. 2038 (codified at

42 U.S.C. § 14071), contains the Jacob

Wetterling Crimes Against Children and

Sexually Violent Offender Registration

Act (hereafter referred to as the ‘‘Jacob

Wetterling Act’’ or ‘‘the Act’’). The Act

provides a financial incentive for states

to establish 10-year registration

requirements for persons convicted of

certain crimes against minors and

sexually violent offenses, and to

establish a more stringent set of

registration requirements for a sub-class

of highly dangerous sex offenders,

characterized as ‘‘sexually violent

predators.’’ States that fail to establish

such systems within three years (subject

to a possible two year extension) face a

10% reduction in their Byrne Formula

Grant funding (under 42 U.S.C. 3756),

and resulting surplus funds will be

reallocated to states that are in

compliance with the Act.

Proposed Guidelines

These guidelines carry out a statutory

directive to the Attorney General, in

§ 170101(a)(1), to establish guidelines

for registration systems under the Act.

Before turning to the specific provisions

of the Act, four general points should be

noted concerning its interpretation and

application.

First, states that wish to achieve

compliance with the Jacob Wetterling

Act should understand that its

requirements constitute a floor for state

registration systems, not a ceiling, and

that they do not risk the loss of part of

their Byrne Formula Grant funding by

going beyond its standards. For

example, a state may have a registration

system that covers a broader class of sex

offenders than those identified in the

Jacob Wetterling Act, or requires

address verification for such offenders

at more frequent intervals than the Act

prescribes, or requires offenders to

register for a longer period of time than

the period specified in the Act.

Exercising these options creates no

problem of compliance, since the

provisions in the Jacob Wetterling Act

concerning duration of registration,

covered offenders, and other matters, do

not preclude states from imposing

additional or more stringent

requirements that encompass the Act’s

baseline requirements. The general

objective of the Act is to protect people

from child molesters and violent sex

offenders through registration

requirements. It is not intended, and

does not have the effect, of making

states less free than they were under

prior law to impose registration

requiremnts for this purpose.

Second, states that wish to achieve

compliance with the Jacob Wetterling

Act also should understand that they

may, within certain constraints, use

their own criminal law definitions in

defining registration requirements, and

will not necessarily have to revise their

registration systems to use technical

definitions of covered sex offenses

based on federal law. This point will be

explained more fully below.

Third, the Jacob Wetterling Act

contemplates the establishment of

programs that will impose registration

requirements on offenders who are

subsequently convicted of offenses in

the pertinent categories. The Act does

not require states to attempt to identify

and impose registration requirements on

offenders who were convicted of

offenses in these categories prior to the

establishment of a conforming

registration system. Nevertheless, the

Act does not preclude states from

imposing any new registration

requirements on offenders convicted

prior to the establishment of the

registration system.

Fourth, the Act gives states wide

latitude in designing registration

programs that best meet their public

safety needs. For instance, the Act

allows states to release relevant

information necessary to protect the

public, including information released

through community notification

programs. Some state registration and

notification systems have been

challenged on constitutional grounds. A

few courts have struck down

registration requirements in certain

cases. See Rowe v. Burton, No. A94–206

(D. Alaska July 27, 1994) (on motion for

preliminary relief); State v. Babin, 637

So.2d 814 (La. App. 1994), writ denied,

644 So.2d 649 (La. 1994); State v. Payne,

633 So. 2d 701 (La. App. 1993), writ

denied, 637 So.2d 497 (La. 1994); In re

Reed, 663 P.2d 216 (Cal. 1983) (en

banc). However, a majority of courts that

have dealt with the issue have held that

registration systems like those

contemplated by the Jacob Wetterling

Act do not violate released offenders’

constitutional rights.

A few recent decisions, currently on

appeal, have held that aspects of New

Jersey’s community notification

program violate due process guarantees,

or violate ex post facto guarantees as

applied to persons who committed the

covered offense prior to enactment of

the notification statute. See Artway v.

Attorney General of New Jersey, No. 94–

6287 (NHP) (D.N.J. Feb. 28, 1995); Diaz

v. Whitman, No. 94–6376 (JWB) (D.N.J.

Jan. 6, 1994); John Doe v. Deborah

Poritz, No. BUR–1–5–95 (N.J. Super. Ct.

Law Div. Feb. 22, 1995). However, the

Department of Justice takes the position

in briefs filed that the New Jersey

community notification statute at issue

in those cases does not violate the Ex

Post Facto Clause, and that the

Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process

Clause of its own force does not require

recognition of such a liberty interest on

the part of offenders affected by that

statute.

The remainder of these guidelines

address the provisions of the Jacob

Wetterling Act in the order in which

they appear in § 170101 of the Violent

Crime Control and Law Enforcement

Act of 1994.

General Provisions—Subsection (a)(1)–

(2)

Paragraph (1) of subsection (a) of

§ 170101 directs the Attorney General to
18614 Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 70 / Wednesday, April 12, 1995 / Notices

establish guidelines for state programs

that require:;

(A) Current address registration for

persons convicted of ‘‘a criminal offense

against a victim who is a minor’’ or ‘’a

sexually violent offense,’’ and

(B) Current address registration under

a different set of requirements for

persons who are determined to be

‘‘sexually violent predators.’’

Paragraph (2) of subsection (a) states

that the determination whether a person

is a ‘‘sexually violent predator’’ (which

brings the more stringent registration

standards into play), and the

determination that a person is no longer

a ‘‘sexually violent predator’’ (which

terminates the registration requirement

under those standards), shall be made

by the sentencing court after receiving a

report by a state board composed of

experts in the field of the behavior and

treatment of sexual offenders.

‘‘State board’’ in paragraph (2) should

be understood to mean a body or group

containing twos or more experts that is

authorized by state law or designated

under the authority of state law. Beyond

the requirement that a board must be

composed of experts in the field of the

behavior and treatment of sexual

offenders, the Act affords states

discretion concerning the selection and

composition of such boards. For

example, a state could establish a single

permanent board for this purpose, could

establish a system of state-designated

boards, or could authorize the

designation of different boards for

different courts, time periods,

geographic areas or cases.

Definition of ‘‘Criminal Offense Against

a Victim Who is a Minor’’—Subsection

(a)(3)(A)

The Act prescribes a 10-year

registration requirement for persons

convicted of a ‘‘criminal offense against

a victim who is a minor’’. Subparagraph

(A) of paragraph (3) of subsection (a)

defines the term ‘‘criminal offense

against a victim who is a minor.’’

‘‘Minor’’ should be understood to mean

a person below the age of 18, consistent

with the normal understanding.

The specific clauses in the definition

of ‘‘criminal offense against a victim

who is a minor’’ are as follows:

(1) Clauses (i) and (ii) cover

kidnapping of a minor (except by a

parent) and false imprisonment of a

minor (except by a parent). All states

have statutes that define offenses—going

by such names as ‘‘kidnapping,’’

criminal restraint,’’ or ‘‘false

imprisonment’’—whose gravamen is

abduction or unlawful restraint of a

person. States can comply with these

clauses by requiring registration for

persons convicted of these statutory

offenses whose victims were below the

age of 18. The Act does not require

inclusion of these offenses in the

registration requirement when the

offender is a parent, but states may

choose to require registration for parents

who commit these offenses.

(2) Clause (iii) covers offenses

consisting of ‘‘criminal sexual conduct

toward a minor.’’ Such offenses include

convictions under general provisions

defining sexually assaultive crimes—

such as provisions defining crimes of

‘‘rape,’’ sexual assault,’’ or ‘‘sexual

abuse’’—in cases where the victim is in

fact a minor. Coverage is not limited to

cases where the victim’s age is an

element of the offense (such as

prosecutions for specially defined child

molestation offenses).

States can comply with clause (iii) by

requiring registration for persons

convicted of all statutory sex offenses

under state law whose elements involve

physical contact with a victim, where

the victim was below the age of 18 at the

time of the offense. Offenses that do not

involve physical contact, such as

exhibitionism, are not subject to the

Act’s mandatory registration

requirements pursuant to clause (iii),

but states are free to require registration

for persons convicted of such offenses

as well if they so choose.

(3) Clause (iv) covers offenses

consisting of solicition of a minor to

engage in sexual conduct. This covers

any conviction for an offense involving

the solicitation of conduct that would be

covered by clause (iii) if carried out.

(4) Clause (v) covers offenses

consisting of using a minor in a sexual

performance. This includes both live

performances and using minors in the

production of pornography.

(5) Clause (vi) covers offenses

consisting of solicition of a minor to

practice prostitution.

(6) Clause (vii) covers offenses

consisting of any conduct that by its

nature is a sexual offense against a

minor. This clause is intended to insure

uniform coverage of convictions under

statutes defining sex offenses in which

the status of the victim as a minor is an

element of an offense, such as specially

defined child molestation offenses, and

other offenses prohibiting sexual

activity with underage persons. States

can comply with this clause by

including convictions under these

statutes uniformly in the registration

requirement.

(7) Considered in isolation, clause

(viii) gives states discretion whether to

require registration for attempts to

commit offenses described in clauses (i)

through (vii). However, any verbal

command or attempted persuasion of

the victim to engage in sexual conduct

would bring the offense within the

scope of the solicitation clause (clause

(iv)), and make it subject to the Act’s

mandatory registration requirements.

Morever, this provision must be

considered in conjunction with the

Act’s requirement of registration for

persons convicted of a ‘‘sexually violent

offense,’’ which does not allow the

exclusion of attempts if they are

otherwise encompassed within the

definition of a ‘‘sexually violent

offense.’’

Hence, state discretion to exclude

attempted sexual offenses against

minors from registration requirements

pursuant to clause (viii) is limited by

other provisions of the Act. The

simplest approach for states would be to

include attempted sexual assaults on

minors (as well as completed offenses)

uniformly as predicates for the

registration requirements.

At the conclusion of the definition of

‘‘criminal offense against a victim who

is a minor,’’ the Act states that (for

purposes of the definition) conduct

which is criminal only because of the

age of the victim shall not be considered

a criminal offense if the perpetrator is

18 years of age or younger. For example,

suppose that state law prohibits sexual

relations with a person below the age of

16, where the defendant is more than 4

years older than the victim. Suppose

further that an 18-year-old is convicted

of violating this prohibition by engaging

in consensual sexual relations with a

13-year-old, where the conduct would

not violate state law but for the victim’s

age. Under the provision, if a state did

not require such an offender to register,

the state would still be in compliance

with the Act. However, here again,

states are free to go beyond the Act’s

baseline requirements. The exemption

of certain offenders based on age from

the Act’s mandatory registration

requirements does not bar states from

including such offenders in their

registration systems if they wish.

Moreover, the scope of subsection

(a)(3)(A)’s exemption is also limited by

other provisions of the Act that require

registration of persons convicted of

‘‘sexually violent offenses’’ (as defined

in (a)(3)(B)), with no provision

excluding younger offenders where the

criminality of the conduct depends on

the victim’s age.

Since the Act’s registration

requirements depend in all

circumstances on conviction of certain

types of offenses, states are not required

to mandate registration for juveniles

who are adjudicated delinquent—as

opposed to adults convicted of crimes
Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 70 / Wednesday, April 12, 1995 / Notices 18615

and juveniles convicted as adults—even

if the conduct on which the juvenile

delinquency adjudication is based

would constitute an offense giving rise

to a registration requirement if engaged

in by an adult. However, states remain

free to require registration for juvenile

delinquents, and the conviction of a

juvenile who is prosecuted as an adult

does count as a conviction for purposes

of the Act’s registration requirements.

Definition of ‘‘Sexually Violent

Offense’’—Subsection (a)(3)(B)

The Act prescribes a ten-year

registration requirement for offenders

convicted of a ‘‘sexually violent

offense,’’ as well as for those convicted

of a ‘‘criminal offense against a victim

who is a minor.’’

Subparagraph (B) of paragraph (3)

defines the term ‘‘sexually violent

offense’’ to mean any criminal offense

that consists of aggravated sexual abuse

or sexual abuse (as described in sections

2241 and 2242 of title 18, United States

Code, or as described in the State

criminal code), or an offense that has as

its elements engaging in physical

contact with another person with intent

to commit such an offense. In light of

this definition, there are two ways in

which a state could satisfy the

requirement of registration for persons

convicted of ‘‘sexually violent offenses’’:

First, suppose that a state has offenses

in its criminal code that are designated

‘‘aggravated sexual abuse’’ and ‘‘sexual

abuse,’’ or has a definitional provision

in its criminal code that characterizes

certain offenses (however denominated)

as constituting ‘‘aggravated sexual

abuse’’ and ‘‘sexual abuse’’ for

registration purposes or other purposes.

Such a state could comply simply by

requiring registration for all offenders

who are convicted of these state

offenses, and all offenders convicted of

any state crime that has as its elements

engaging in physical contact with

another person with intent to commit

such an offense.

Second, a state could comply by

requiring registration for offenders

convicted for criminal conduct that

would violate 18 U.S.C. 2241 or 2242—

the federal ‘‘aggravated sexual abuse’’

and ‘‘sexual abuse’’ offenses—if subject

to federal prosecution. (The second part

of the definition in subparagraph (B) of

paragraph (3), relating to physical

contact with intent to commit

aggravated sexual abuse or sexual abuse,

does not enlarge the class of covered

offenses under the federal law

definitions, since sections 2241 and

2242 explicitly encompass attempts as

well as completed offenses.)

Specifically, 18 U.S.C. 2241–42

generally proscribe non-consensual

‘‘sexual acts’’ with anyone, ‘‘sexual

acts’’ with persons below the age of 12,

and attempts to engage in such conduct.

‘‘Sexual act’’ is generally defined (in 18

U.S.C. 2245(2)) to mean an act involving

any degree of genital or anal

penetration, oral-genital or oral-anal

contact, or direct genital touching of a

victim below the age of 16 in certain

circumstances even without

penetration.

States that elect this second option—

requiring registration for offenses that

consist of aggravated sexual abuse or

sexual abuse as defined in federal law

provisions (18 U.S.C. 2241–42)—do not

necessarily have to refer to these federal

statutes in their registration provisions,

but could alternatively achieve

compliance by requiring registration for

the state law offenses that encompass

types of conduct proscribed by 18

U.S.C. 2241–42. Moreover, a state does

not have to have sex offenses whose

scope is congruent with 18 U.S.C. 2241–

42 to take the latter approach. If state

law does not criminalize some types of

conduct that are covered by 18 U.S.C.

2241–42, then a person who engages in

the conduct will not be subject to

prosecution and conviction under state

law, and there will be no basis for a

registration requirement. On the other

hand, if state sex offenses are defined

more broadly than 18 U.S.C. 2241–42,

then states are free to require

registration for all offenders convicted

under these state provisions

(notwithstanding their greater breadth),

and this would be sufficient to ensure

coverage of convictions for criminal

conduct that would violate 18 U.S.C.

2241–42 if subject to federal

prosecution.

Definition of ‘‘Sexually Violent

Predator’’—Subsection (a)(3)(C)–(E)

Offenders who meet the definition of

‘‘sexually violent predator’’ are subject

to more stringent registration

requirements than other sex offenders.

(1) Subparagraph (C) defines

‘‘sexually violent predator’’ to mean a

person who has been convicted of a

sexually violent offense and who suffers

from a mental abnormality or

personality disorder that makes the

person likely to engage in predatory

sexually violent offenses.

(2) Subparagraph (D) essentially

defines ‘‘mental abnormality’’ to mean a

disorder involving a disposition to

commit criminal sexual acts of such a

degree that it makes the person a

menace to others. There is no definition

of ‘‘personality disorder’’ in the Act;

hence, the definition of this term is a

matter of state discretion. For example,

a state may choose to utilize the

definition of ‘‘personality disorder’’ that

appears in the Diagnostic and Statistical

Manual of Mental Disorders: DSM–IV.

American Psychiatric Association,

Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of

Mental Disorders (4th ed. 1994).

(3) Subparagraph (E) defines

‘‘predatory’’ to mean an act directed at

a stranger or at a person with whom a

relationship has been established or

promoted for the primary purpose of

victimization.

As with other features of the Jacob

Wetterling Act, the sexually violent

predator provisions only define baseline

requirements for states that wish to

maintain eligibility for full Byrne

Formula Grant funding. States are free

to impose these more stringent

registration requirements on a broader

class of offenders, and may use state law

categories or definitions for that

purpose, without contravening the Jacob

Wetterling Act.

As noted earlier, the Act provides that

the determination whether an offender

is a ‘‘sexually violent predator’’ is to be

made by the sentencing court with the

assistance of a board of experts. The Act

does not require, or preclude, that all

persons convicted of a sexually violent

offense undergo a determination as to

whether they satisfy the definition of

‘‘sexually violent predator.’’ It also does

not specify under what conditions such

an inquiry must be undertaken. A state

that wishes to comply with the Act must

adopt some approach to this issue, but

the specifics are a matter of state

discretion. For example, a state might

provide that the decision whether to

seek classification of an offender as a

‘‘sexually violent predator’’ is a matter

of judgment for prosecutors, or might

provide that a determination of this

question should be undertaken

routinely when a person is convicted of

a sexually violent offense and has a

prior history of committing such crimes.

Specifications Concerning State

Registration Systems Under the Act—

Subsection (b)

Paragraph (1) of subsection (b) sets

out duties for prison officials and courts

in relation to offenders required to

register who are released from prison, or

who are placed on any form of postconviction supervised release (‘‘parole,

supervised release, or probation’’).

The duties, set out in subparagraph

(A) of paragraph (1), include: (i)

Informing the person of the duty to

register and obtaining the information

required for registration (i.e., address

information), (ii) informing the person

that he must give written notice of a

new address within 10 days to a

designated state law enforcement
18616 Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 70 / Wednesday, April 12, 1995 / Notices

agency if he changes residence, (iii)

informing the person that, if he changes

residence to another state, he must

inform the registration agency in the

state he is leaving, and must also

register the new address with a

designated state law enforcement

agency in the new state within 10 days

(if the new state has a registration

requirement), (iv) obtaining fingerprints

and a photograph if they have not

already been obtained, and (v) requiring

the person to read and sign a form

stating that these requirements have

been explained.

Beyond these basic requirements,

which apply to all registrants,

subparagraph (B) of paragraph (1) of

subsection (b) requires that additional

information be obtained in relation to a

person who is required to register as a

‘‘sexually violent predator.’’ The

information that is specifically required

under subparagraph (B) is the name of

the person, identifying factors,

anticipated future residence, offense

history, and documentation of any

treatment received for the mental

abnormality or personality disorder of

the person.

States that wish to comply with the

Act will need to adopt statutes or

administrative provisions to establish

these duties and ensure that they are

carried out. These informational

requirements, like other requirements in

the Act, only define minimum

standards, and states may require more

extensive information from offenders.

For example, the Act does not require

that information be obtained relating to

registering offenders’ employment, but

states may legitimately wish to know if

a convicted child molester is seeking or

has obtained employment that involves

responsibility for the care for children.

Paragraph (2) of subsection (b) states

that the responsible officer or court shall

forward the registration information to a

designated state law enforcement

agency. The state law enforcement

agency must immediately enter the

information into the appropriate state

law enforcement record system and

notify a law enforcement agency having

jurisdiction where the person expects to

reside. States that wish to achieve

compliance with the Act may need to

modify state record systems if they are

not currently set up to receive all the

types of information that the Act

requires from registrants.

The state law enforcement agency is

also required to immediately transmit

the conviction data and fingerprints to

the Federal Bureau of Investigation. No

changes will be required in the national

records system because the Act only

requires transmission of conviction data

and fingerprints, which the FBI already

receives. The Act should not be

understood as requiring duplicative

transmission of conviction data and

fingerprints to the FBI at the time of

initial registration if the state already

has sent this information to the FBI (e.g.,

at the time of conviction).

Paragraph (3) of subsection (b) relates

to verification of the offender’s address.

In essence, annual verification of

address with the designated state law

enforcement agency is required for

offenders generally, through the return

within ten days of an address

verification form sent by the agency to

the registrant. However, the verification

intervals are 90 days (rather than a year)

for ‘‘sexually violent predators.’’ As

noted earlier, these are baseline

requirements which do not bar states

from requiring verification of address at

shorter intervals than those specified in

the Act.

Paragraph (4) requires the designated

state law enforcement agency to notify

other interested law enforcement

agencies of a change of address by the

registrant. Specifically, when a

registrant changes residence to a new

address, the designated law enforcement

agency must (i) notify a law

enforcement agency having jurisdiction

where the registrant will reside, and (ii)

if the registrant moves to a new state,

notify the law enforcement agency with

which the offender must register in the

new state (if the new state has a

registration requirement).

Paragraph (5) further requires an

offender who moves out of state to

register within ten days with a

designated state law enforcement

agency in his new state of residence (if

the new state has a registration

requirement). This partially reiterates

the requirements concerning notice of

changes of address by the offender that

were described above.

Subparagraph (A) of paragraph (6)

states that the registration requirement

remains in effect for ten years. As noted

earlier, states may choose to establish

longer registration periods.

Subparagraph (B) of paragraph (6)

states that the registration requirement

for ‘‘sexually violent predators’’ under

the Act terminates upon a determination

that the offender no longer suffers from

a mental abnormality or personality

disorder that would make him likely to

engage in a predatory sexually violent

offense. This provision does not require

review of the offender’s status at any

particular interval. For example, a state

could set a minimum period of 10 years

before entertaining a request to review

the status of a ‘‘sexually violent

predator,’’ the same period as the

general minimum registration period for

sex offenders under the Act.

Moreover, this termination provision

only affects the requirement that a

person register as a ‘‘sexually violent

predator’’ under subparagraph (B) of

subsection (a)(1) of the Jacob Wetterling

Act. It does not limit states in imposing

more extensive registration

requirements under their own laws, and

does not limit any registration

requirement that arises independently

under other provisions of the Jacob

Wetterling Act from the person’s

conviction of a ‘‘criminal offense against

a victim who is a minor’’ or a ‘‘sexually

violent offense.’’

Criminal Penalties for Registration

Violations—Subsection (c)

The Act provides that a person

required to register under a state

program established pursuant to the Act

who knowingly fails to register and keep

such registration current shall be subject

to criminal penalties. Accordingly,

states that wish to comply with the Act

will need to enact criminal provisions

covering this situation as part of, or in

conjunction with, the legislation

defining their registration systems, if

they have not already done so. If the

violation by a registrant consists of

failing to return an address verification

form within 10 days of receipt, the state

may allow a defense if the registrant can

prove that he did not in fact change his

residence address, as provided in

subsection (b)(3)(A)(iv).

Release of Registration Information—

Subsection (d)

Subsection (d) governs the disclosure

of ‘‘information collected under a State

registration program.’’ Restrictions on

the release of information under this

subsection do not constrain the release

of information that a state would have

independently of the operation of the

registration system. For example, a state

will normally have criminal history

information about an offender, and will

often have current address information

as part of general probation or parole

supervision requirements,

independently of any special

requirements imposed as part of the sex

offender registration system. The Act

does not limit the release of such

information.

Subsection (d) states specifically that

the information collected under a state

registration program shall be treated as

private data, except under specified

conditions.

The first condition under which

disclosure is authorized—paragraph

(1)—is that ‘‘such information may be

disclosed to law enforcement agencies
Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 70 / Wednesday, April 12, 1995 / Notices 18617

for law enforcement purposes.’’ This

exemption permits use of the

information for all law enforcement

purposes, including all police,

prosecutorial, release supervision,

correctional, and judicial uses.

Paragraph (2) in subsection (d) says

that registration information may be

disclosed to government agencies

conducting confidential background

checks. ‘‘Confidential’’ should be

understood to mean a background check

where information is disclosed to an

interested party or parties—such as a

background check conducted by a

government agency that provides

information concerning prospective

employees to public or private

employers—as opposed to release of the

information to the general public.

Release to the public, and other non-law

enforcement, non-background check

uses, are governed by paragraph (3).

Paragraph (3) in subsection (d) says

that the designated state law

enforcement agency, and any local law

enforcement agency authorized by the

state agency, may release relevant

information that is necessary to protect

the public concerning a specific person

required to register under this section.

The Act does not impose any limitations

on the standards and procedures that

states may adopt for determining when

public safety necessitates community

notification. For example, states could

implement this authority by engaging in

particularized determinations that

individual offenders are sufficiently

dangerous to require community

notification concerning the offender’s

presence. Alternatively, states could

make categorical judgments that

protection of the public necessitates

community notification with respect to

all offenders with certain characteristics

or in certain offense categories.

Releases of information for publicprotection purposes short of general

community notification—such as giving

notice about an offender’s location to

the victims of his offenses, or to

agencies or organizations in specified

categories—are also permitted under

paragraph (3).

The language in paragraph (3), like

that in paragraphs (1) and (2), is

permissive, and does not require states

to release information. Paragraph (3)

also does not deprive states of the

authority to exercise centralized control

over the release of information, or if the

state prefers, to generally authorize local

agencies to release information as

necessary. In addition to permitting

proactive community notification and

other notification, as discussed above,

paragraph (3) and other provisions of

the Act do not bar states from making

registration information available upon

request, if it is determined that such

access is necessary for the protection of

the public concerning persons who are

required to register.

A proviso at the end of paragraph (3)

in subsection (d) states that the identity

of the victim of an offense that requires

registration under the Act shall not be

released.

The purpose of this proviso is to

protect the privacy of victims, and its

restrictions may accordingly be waived

at the victim’s options. The proviso only

applies to paragraph (3), and does not

limit the disclosure of victim identity

pursuant to paragraphs (1) and (2),

relating to law enforcement uses and

confidential background checks.

Immunity for Good Faith Conduct—

Subsection (e)

Subsection (e) states that law

enforcement agencies, employees of law

enforcement agencies, and state officials

shall be immune from liability for good

faith conduct under the Act.

Compliance—Subsection (f)

States have three years from the date

of enactment to come into compliance

with the Act unless the Attorney

General grants an additional two years

where a state is making good faith

efforts at implementation. States that

fail to come into compliance within the

specified time period will be subject to

a mandatory 10% reduction of Byrne

Formula Grant funding, and any funds

that are not allocated to noncomplying

states will be reallocated to states that

are in compliance. The reallocated

funds will be distributed among

complying states in proportion to their

populations.

States are encouraged to submit

descriptions of their existing or

proposed registration systems for sex

offenders in conjunction with their

applications for Byrne Formula Grant

funding, even prior to the expiration of

the ‘‘grace period’’ provided by the Act

for achieving compliance. Those

submissions will enable the Department

of Justice to review the status of state

compliance with the Act, and to suggest

any necessary changes to achieve

compliance before the funding

reduction goes into effect.

To maintain eligibility for full Byrne

Formula Grant funding following the

three-year grace period, states will be

required to submit information that

shows compliance with the Act in at

least one program year, or an

explanation of why compliance cannot

be achieved within that period and a

description of good faith efforts that

justify an extension of time (but not

more than two years) for achieving

compliance. States will also be required

to submit information in subsequent

program years concerning any changes

in sex offender registration systems that

may affect compliance with the Act.

Dated: April 7, 1995.

Janet Reno,

Attorney General.

[FR Doc. 95–8966 Filed 4–11–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4410–01–M

Drug Enforcement Administration

Manufacturer of Controlled

Substances; Notice of Application

Pursuant to § 1301.43(a) of Title 21 of

the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR),

this is notice that on January 30, 1995,

Ganes Chemicals, Inc., Industrial Park

Road, Pennsville, New Jersey 08070,

made application to the Drug

Enforcement Administration (DEA) for

registration as a bulk manufacturer of

the basic classes of controlled

substances listed below:

Drug Schedule

Methylphenidate (1724) ................. II

Amobarbital (2125) ........................ II

Pentobarbital (2270) ...................... II

Secobarbital (2315) ........................ II

Glutethimide (2550) ....................... II

Methadone (9250) .......................... II

Methadone-intermediate (9254) ..... II

Dextropropoxyphene, bulk (nondosage forms) (9273).II

The firm plans to manufacturer the

controlled substances for distribution as

bulk products to its customers.

Any other such applicant and any

person who is presently registered with

DEA to manufacture such substances

may file comments or objections to the

issuance of the above application and

may also file a written request for a

hearing thereon in accordance with 21

CFR 1301.54 and in the form prescribed

by 21 CFR 1316.47.

Any such comments, objections, or

requests for a hearing may be addressed

to the Deputy Assistant Administrator,

Office of Diversion Control, Drug

Enforcement Administration, United

States Department of Justice,

Washington, D.C. 20537, Attention: DEA

Federal Register Representative (CCR),

and must be filed no later than May 12,

1995.