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TOWN OF NEWTOWN v. SCOTT E.

OSTROSKY ET AL.

(AC 42176)

Alvord, Suarez and Pellegrino, Js.

Syllabus

The defendant O appealed to this court, challenging the trial court’s denial

of his motion to reargue and for reconsideration of the trial court’s

judgment of foreclosure by sale. The plaintiff, the town of Newtown,

had sought to foreclose a mortgage and filed a motion for default as to

O for his failure to plead pursuant to the applicable rule of practice

(§ 10-18). The court clerk thereafter granted the motion. O claimed that

the foreclosure judgment should be opened and vacated because, inter

alia, the default entered by the clerk was invalid and could not serve

as the basis for the foreclosure judgment. Held that the trial court

properly denied the motion to reargue and for reconsideration; because

the claim raised by O in this court essentially reiterated the claim he

raised in the trial court, which thoroughly addressed his arguments, this

court adopted the trial court’s well reasoned memorandum of decision

as a statement of the facts and applicable law.

Argued November 18—officially released December 22, 2020

Procedural History

Action to foreclose a mortgage on certain of the

named defendant’s real property, and for other relief,

brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district

of Danbury and transferred to the judicial district of

Fairfield, where the named defendant was defaulted for

failure to plead; thereafter, the court, Hon. Alfred J.

Jennings, Jr., judge trial referee, granted the plaintiff’s

motion for a judgment of strict foreclosure and rendered judgment of foreclosure by sale; subsequently,

the court denied the named defendant’s motion to reargue and for reconsideration, and the named defendant

appealed to this court. Affirmed.

Robert M. Fleischer, for the appellant (named

defendant).

Alexander Copp, with whom, on the brief, was Jason

A. Buchsbaum, for the appellee (plaintiff).
Opinion

PER CURIAM. This is an appeal from a denial of a

motion to reargue and for reconsideration filed by the

defendant Scott E. Ostrosky1from the judgment of foreclosure by sale rendered by the trial court in favor

of the plaintiff, the town of Newtown. On appeal, the

defendant claims that the judgment should be opened

and vacated because (1) the default that was entered

by the court clerk was invalid and cannot serve as the

basis for the foreclosure judgment and (2) the motion

for a judgment of foreclosure was filed prematurely by

the plaintiff. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to the resolution of this appeal. The plaintiff instituted foreclosure proceedings against the defendant on

October 17, 2016. On May 23, 2018, the plaintiff filed a

motion for default for failure to plead, pursuant to Practice Book § 10-18. On June 6, 2018, the plaintiff filed a

motion for a judgment of strict foreclosure, pursuant

to Practice Book § 17-25 et seq. On June 7, 2018, the

court clerk granted the plaintiff’s motion for default for

failure to plead. On June 18, 2018, the court rendered

judgment of foreclosure by sale against the defendant,

setting a sale date of December 8, 2018. On July 3,

2018, the defendant filed a motion to reargue and for

reconsideration, claiming that the default entered by

the court clerk was invalid and could not serve as the

basis for the foreclosure judgment, and that the plaintiff’s motion for judgment was filed prematurely. On

September 13, 2018, the court denied the defendant’s

motion to reargue and for reconsideration.

The defendant appealed to this court from the denial

of his motion to reargue and for reconsideration and

challenged the trial court’s judgment of foreclosure by

sale. On appeal, he essentially reiterates the same claim

that he raised in the trial court in support of his motion

to reargue and for reconsideration, namely, that the

default entered by the court clerk was invalid and could

not serve as the basis for the foreclosure judgment

and that the plaintiff’s motion for judgment of strict

foreclosure was filed prematurely.

We carefully have examined the record of the proceedings before the trial court, in addition to the parties’

appellate briefs and oral arguments, and we conclude

that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.

Because the court, Hon. Alfred J. Jennings, Jr., judge

trial referee, thoroughly addressed the arguments

raised in this appeal, we adopt its well reasoned decision denying the defendant’s motion to reargue and for

reconsideration as a statement of the facts and the

applicable law with respect to the issues raised in this

appeal. See Newtown v. Ostrosky, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV-16-6060962-S

(September 13, 2018) (reprinted at 201 Conn. App. ,
A.3d ). Any further discussion by this court

would serve no useful purpose. See, e.g., Woodruff v.

Hemingway, 297 Conn. 317, 321, 2 A.3d 857 (2010).

The judgment denying the motion to reargue and for

reconsideration is affirmed and the case is remanded

for the purpose of setting a new sale date.

1 The other defendants in this action are the town of Monroe, the Planning

and Zoning Commission of the Town of Monroe, the Inland Wetlands Commission of the Town of Monroe, and Joseph Chapman, in his capacity as

land use enforcement officer for the town of Monroe. Because they are not

participating in this appeal, we refer to Ostrosky as the defendant.