NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. 

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE 

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

IN RE MH2014-003678 

No. 1 CA-MH 15-0004

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County 

No. MH2014-003678 

The Honorable Susan G. White, Commissioner 

AFFIRMED 

COUNSEL 

Maricopa County Legal Defender’s Office, Phoenix 

By Anne Phillips 

Counsel for Appellant 

Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, Phoenix 

By Bruce P. White, Anne C. Longo 

Counsel for Appellee

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

Judge Patricia K. Norris delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Donn Kessler and Judge Andrew W. Gould joined. 
In re MH2014-003678 

Decision of the Court 

2

N O R R I S, Judge: 

¶1 After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the superior court 

found by clear and convincing evidence Appellant was, as a result of a 

mental disorder, persistently or acutely disabled, in need of psychiatric 

treatment, but unwilling and unable to accept voluntary treatment. 

Accordingly, the superior court ordered Appellant to undergo a 

combination of inpatient and outpatient treatment. On appeal, Appellant 

argues we should vacate the treatment order because the superior court did 

not allow her additional time to retain private counsel. We disagree. 

¶2 By statute, Appellant had the right to retain private counsel. 

See Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) sections 36-528(D), -536(A), -

537(B)(1) (Supp. 2015). The superior court, however, has “wide latitude in 

balancing the right to counsel of choice against the needs of fairness, and 

against the demands of its calendar,” though the court’s decision may not 

be “unreasoning and arbitrary.” State v. Aragon, 221 Ariz. 88, 90, ¶ 5, 210 

P.3d 1259, 1261 (App. 2009) (citations omitted); see also In re MH 2003-

000240, 206 Ariz. 367, 369, ¶ 9, 78 P.3d 1088, 1090 (App. 2003) (superior court 

has discretion to grant motion to continue); A.R.S. § 36-535(B) (Supp. 2015) 

(superior court may grant a patient a continuance of up to 30 days). On 

review, we consider the particular circumstances of this case, including: 

whether other continuances were granted; 

whether the defendant had other competent 

counsel prepared to try the case; the 

convenience or inconvenience to the litigants, 

counsel, witnesses, and the court; the length of 

the requested delay; the complexity of the case; 

and whether the requested delay was for 

legitimate reasons or was merely dilatory. 

Aragon, 221 Ariz. at 90, ¶ 5, 210 P.3d at 1261 (citation omitted);1 see also MH 

2003-000240, 206 Ariz. at 369-70, ¶ 10, 78 P.3d at 1090-91 (no abuse of 

discretion in denying motion to continue when appellant first raised the 

 

1Although Aragon arose out of a criminal prosecution, it 

discusses relevant factors a court should consider in deciding whether to 

allow a continuance to retain private counsel. See In re Jesse M., 217 Ariz. 

74, 78, ¶ 19, 170 P.3d 683, 687 (App. 2007) (“[a]lthough a civil commitment 

proceeding cannot be equated to a criminal prosecution, . . . the standards 

in criminal cases have been examined” in various analogous contexts.) 

(internal quotations and citations omitted). 
In re MH2014-003678 

Decision of the Court 

3

issue at the hearing, witnesses were ready and waiting, delay would result 

in significant expense to the hospital, and appellant could not pay for 

private counsel). 

¶3 The petition for court-ordered evaluation (served on 

Appellant on November 3, 2014) and the petition for court-ordered 

treatment (served on Appellant on November 4, 2014) informed Appellant 

of her right to private counsel. Appellant did not request an opportunity to 

retain private counsel, however, until November 12, 2014, the first day 

scheduled for the evidentiary hearing, although she had been detained in 

an inpatient setting for nine days. At the evidentiary hearing, Appellant 

did not move to continue, and in fact, her counsel opposed Petitioner’s

motion to continue; Appellant did, however, advise the court of her 

differences with court-appointed counsel and requested the opportunity to 

retain private counsel.

¶4 Although Appellant requested private counsel, she failed to 

present any information to the court that would have led it to reasonably 

believe she would be able to retain private counsel. A.R.S. § 36-535(B) 

(Supp. 2015). She presented only contradictory and ambiguous 

information to support her request, including: she had not yet retained 

private counsel; she was unable to retain private counsel because of the 

hospital’s phone restrictions; yet she had contacted many attorneys by 

phone since her hospitalization; and she may or may not have been able to 

pay for private counsel. Furthermore, Appellant’s court-appointed counsel 

and counsel’s supervisor both stated counsel was “very thoroughly 

prepared” to proceed with the hearing, and Appellant did not present any 

evidence—and indeed does not even argue on appeal—counsel failed to 

adequately represent her or perform her statutory duties. A.R.S. § 36-537. 

Petitioner’s witnesses were ready to proceed the next day, and Appellant 

did not say when she might be able to retain counsel. 

¶5 Under these circumstances, and given the personal liberty 

interest at stake, In re MH 2006-000749, 214 Ariz. 318, 321, ¶ 14, 152 P.3d 

1201, 1204 (App. 2007), the superior court was not “unreasoning and 

arbitrary” in refusing to delay the evidentiary hearing so that Appellant 

could retain private counsel. See supra ¶ 2. 
In re MH2014-003678 

Decision of the Court 

4

¶6 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the superior court’s 

treatment order.