2021 IL App (1st) 190494-U

No. 1-19-0494 

Order filed April 2, 2021 

Fifth Division

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the 

limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

______________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

JAMES LEWIS, 

 

Defendant-Appellant. 

)

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Appeal from the

Circuit Court of

Cook County. 

No. 17 CR 15527 

Honorable 

Charles P. Burns, 

Judge, presiding. 

JUSTICE HOFFMAN delivered the judgment of the court.

 Presiding Justice Delort and Justice Rochford concurred in the judgment. 

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: We affirm defendant’s conviction for burglary over his contentions that the 

evidence presented was insufficient to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt

and that his sentence was excessive. 

¶ 2 Following a jury trial, defendant James Lewis was found guilty of burglary (720 ILCS 

5/19-1(a) (West 2016)) and sentenced, based on his background as a Class-X offender, to nine 

years and six months’ imprisonment. On appeal, he contends that the State’s evidence was 

insufficient to sustain his conviction because the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
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that he had the requisite intent. He also asserts that his sentence was excessive because it was 

disproportionate to the seriousness of the offense. For the following reasons, we affirm.

¶ 3 Defendant was charged by indictment with a single count of burglary. Specifically, the 

indictment alleged that on October 3, 2017 defendant entered a garage belonging to Arturo Gomez

with the intent to commit a theft therein. 

¶ 4 At defendant’s trial, Gomez testified that he lived in the 2200 block of West Erie in 

Chicago. He owned a detached “two and a half” car garage that opened onto an alley. He used the 

garage to store equipment, tools, and other property. On the morning of October 3, 2017, he left 

the garage door open when he left for work at around 8 a.m. Approximately 15 minutes later, he 

received a call from his wife. He immediately returned and “found my garage open.” He looked 

inside the garage and noticed that a seven-foot ladder, a folding chair and a small toolbox were 

missing. Gomez acknowledged that he forgot to close the garage door when he left that morning.

He denied that he ever met defendant or gave him permission to enter the garage. 

¶ 5 Robert Larocco testified that he lived on the 2200 block of West Ohio Street. On the 

morning of October 3, 2017, he went into the alley to throw out garbage and noticed a car that was 

not familiar to him. He saw a man, whom he identified in court as defendant, “stepp[ing] out of a 

garage with a ladder and toolbox and a chair.” Larocco testified that defendant “was coming out 

of the neighbor’s garage” and moving toward a car that was stopped in the alley. Larocco asked

defendant if he lived there, and defendant told him that he did. Larocco testified he knew that 

defendant “wasn’t the guy that lived there.” Larocco took out his cell phone and “started taking 

pictures” of defendant, who placed the ladder, chair and toolbox in the trunk of the car and then

drove away. Larocco then “went through the garage and knocked on [the] back door” and “Ms. 
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Garcia” answered.

1 Larocco told her what he had seen and sent her the photographs he had taken 

with his phone.

¶ 6 On October 8, 2017, Larocco spoke with detectives. After he read a photo lineup advisory 

form, he identified defendant in a photo array. The advisory form and photo array were admitted 

as People’s Group Exhibit 3, which was published to the jury.

¶ 7 Larocco identified People’s Exhibit 1 as a photograph he took of defendant getting into a 

car, in which the front license plate of the car is visible. He identified People’s Exhibit 2 as a 

second photograph he took of defendant in the alley. People’s Exhibits 1 and 2 were admitted and 

published to the jury.

¶ 8 On cross-examination, Larocco testified that he saw defendant carrying the ladder, chair 

and toolbox toward the vehicle but did not see the items being placed in the car. When Larocco

“turn[ed] around to snap pictures,” he saw the items were in the car. He further acknowledged that 

he did not see defendant inside the garage. 

¶ 9 Chicago police officer Ruben Romero testified that on October 8, 2017, he was assigned 

to locate a vehicle involved in a burglary. He entered a license plate number into a database that 

indicated a “hit” for the license plate number at a certain location. Romero proceeded to the 

location and found the vehicle. A short time later, defendant entered the vehicle and was arrested. 

¶ 10 Officer Ruben Ramirez testified that he was present when police interviewed defendant on 

October 8, 2017. According to Ramirez, defendant told police that he “wanted to tell the truth,” 

admitted he had a “drinking problem,” and gave details about the burglary. Defendant was shown 

1 The first name of “Ms. Garcia” is not identified.
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photographs from the date of the incident and “identified himself in the photographs as well as the 

vehicle belonging to him.”

¶ 11 Defendant elected not to testify, and the defense did not present any evidence. Following 

closing arguments, the jury found defendant guilty of burglary. Defendant’s motion for a new trial 

was denied.

¶ 12 Defendant’s presentence investigative report (PSI) reflected that he was born in 1968 and, 

since 1996, had nine prior felony convictions, including five burglary convictions and one 

residential burglary conviction. His most recent felony conviction was in 2016 for “aggravated 

battery/use deadly weapon” for which he was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment. The PSI also 

reflected two pending cases, one in which defendant was charged with burglary and criminal 

damage to property (case 17 CR 1552601) and a second case in which he was charged with 

burglary (17 CR 1552801).

¶ 13 At defendant’s sentencing hearing, the State noted that his criminal history made him

subject to mandatory Class X sentencing. In aggravation, the State emphasized defendant’s nine 

prior felonies. The State also pointed out that both of defendant’s pending cases involved him 

backing his vehicle into a garage door and then attempting to lift the door. The State emphasized 

that both of those incidents occurred in early October 2017, within a week of the burglary in this 

case. The State requested the maximum sentence based on defendant’s “lengthy history of criminal 

activity.” 

¶ 14 In mitigation, defense counsel noted that defendant had worked in a factory and had 

completed a number of programs while in custody, including job training. Counsel stated that 

defendant was working to address “addiction issues,” and that he had supportive friends and 

family. With respect to the two pending cases, counsel noted the lack of allegations that defendant 
No. 1-19-0494 

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actually entered the garages. Arguing that defendant had been making “good [use] of his time” in 

custody, defense counsel asked that the court impose the minimum sentence of six years’ 

imprisonment. 

¶ 15 In allocution, defendant stated that he was “truly sorry for what I did,” that he wanted to 

“take responsibility,” and that it will “never happen again.”

¶ 16 In imposing sentence, the court noted that defendant had been “respectful” in court and

found that he was sincerely remorseful. The court told defendant that it “t[ook] into consideration 

the fact that you are accepting responsibility” and stated its belief that defendant had rehabilitative 

potential. However, the court also emphasized his criminal history, remarking that “it seems like 

you pick up case after case.” The court pointed out that the October 3, 2017 burglary of Gomez’ 

garage occurred only one week after defendant had been released on parole for his aggravated 

battery conviction, and remarked that “[i]t does appear that this is your lifestyle.” The court 

sentenced defendant to nine years and six months’ imprisonment. Defendant’s motion to 

reconsider sentence was denied.

¶ 17 On appeal, defendant first contends that the State failed to prove his guilt beyond a 

reasonable doubt. 

¶ 18 “When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, this court considers 

whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact 

could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Emphasis in 

original; internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Wheeler, 226 Ill. 2d 92, 114 (2007). The 

reviewing court “must allow all reasonable inferences from the record in favor of the prosecution.” 

People v. Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d 274, 280 (2004). The trier of fact “is not required to disregard 

inferences that flow from the evidence, nor is it required to search out all possible explanations 
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consistent with innocence and raise them to a level of reasonable doubt.” (Internal quotation marks 

omitted.) People v. Peoples, 2015 IL App (1st) 121717, ¶ 63.

¶ 19 “The reviewing court will not retry the defendant or substitute its judgment for that of the 

trier of fact on questions involving the weight of the evidence, conflicts in the testimony, or the 

credibility of witnesses. [Citation.]” People v. Corral, 2019 IL App (1st) 171501, ¶ 71. “Only 

where the evidence is so improbable or unsatisfactory as to create reasonable doubt of the 

defendant’s guilt will a conviction be set aside. [Citation.]” Id. ¶ 72. 

¶ 20 In this case, to prove defendant guilty of burglary, the State had to prove that he, without 

authority, “knowingly enter[ed]” Gomez’s garage “with intent to commit therein a felony or theft.” 

720 ILCS 5/19-1(a) (West 2016). 

¶ 21 In this court, defendant does not dispute that he took items from the garage. Rather, he 

argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he entered the garage with the requisite 

intent to commit a theft therein. Defendant acknowledges that intent may be proved by 

circumstantial evidence, but he claims that the State improperly relied upon “conjecture and 

assumption” to prove intent. He argues that, even if he took items, that does not establish his intent 

to commit a theft before he entered the garage. He suggests there are “myriad reasons” why he 

may have entered the garage and that it is “just as likely that [he] formed an intent” to take the 

items once he was inside the garage. He maintains that the State failed to present any evidence, 

direct or circumstantial, that would allow the jury to reasonably infer the requisite intent. On that 

basis, he asks that we reverse his conviction.

¶ 22 A conviction for burglary may be proved by circumstantial evidence as long as the 

elements of the crime have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Smith, 2014 IL App 

(1st) 123094, ¶ 13. Circumstantial evidence is proof of facts and circumstances from which the 
No. 1-19-0494 

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trier of fact may infer other connected facts which reasonably and usually follow according to 

common experience. Id. The requisite intent for burglary may be inferred from the facts in 

evidence, and “it is the responsibility of the trier of fact to draw reasonable inferences from basic 

facts to ultimate facts. [Citation.]” Id. In determining whether an inference is reasonable, the trier 

of fact “need not look for all possible explanations consistent with innocence. Id. In burglary cases, 

“[a]ssessing a person’s intent at the time of entry is a task that is well within a trier of fact’s 

competency, even if intent must often be proven by circumstantial evidence. [Citations.]” People 

v. Johnson, 2019 IL 123318, ¶ 25 (discussing circumstantial evidence of intent to commit theft 

from retail store).

¶ 23 After viewing the evidence presented in the light most favorable to the State, we find that 

the jury could conclude that defendant entered the garage with the requisite intent to support his 

burglary conviction. 

¶ 24 In reaching this conclusion, we are guided by cases discussing the inference permitted to 

establish the analogous intent required to prove residential burglary. See 720 ILCS 5/19-3(a) (West 

2018) (a person commits residential burglary when he or she “knowingly and without authority 

enters * * * within the dwelling place of another, or any part thereof, with the intent to commit 

therein a felony or theft.”). Our court has recognized that a fact finder “may infer the offender’s 

intent to commit a residential burglary from proof that the offender unlawfully entered a building 

containing personal property that could be the subject of a larceny.” People v. Moreira, 378 Ill. 

App. 3d 120, 129 (2007) (quoting Matthew M., 335 Ill. App. 3d 276, 282-83 (2002)); see also 

People v. McKinney, 260 Ill. App. 3d 539, 544 (1994) (in discussing garage burglary, recognizing 

that “ ‘[i]n the absence of inconsistent circumstances, proof of unlawful entry into a building which 

contains personal property that could be the subject of larceny gives rise to an inference that will 
No. 1-19-0494 

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sustain a conviction of burglary.’ ” (quoting People v. Loden, 27 Ill. App. 3d 761, 762 (1975)).

“The inference is grounded in human experience which justifies the assumption that the unlawful 

entry was not purposeless, and in the absence of other proof, indicates theft as the most likely 

purpose.” Moreira, 378 Ill. App. 3d at 129. “Other relevant circumstances include the time, place, 

and manner of entry into the premises, the offender’s activity within the premises, and any 

alternative explanations offered for the offender’s presence.” Id. (citing People v. Maggette, 195 

Ill. 2d 336, 354 (2001)). 

¶ 25 In this case, the circumstantial evidence permitted the jury to reasonably infer that 

defendant entered Gomez’ garage with the intent to commit a theft. Gomez testified that the garage 

opened up to an alley, and that he stored various items within the garage, including a seven-foot 

ladder, chair and toolbox. On the morning of the incident, Gomez left the garage door open to the 

alley; from this testimony, the jury could infer that items within the garage could be seen by 

someone in the alley. Larocco testified that he saw defendant bringing these same items to a car in 

the alley. The jury could reasonably infer that, from the alley, defendant saw items in the open 

garage and formed an intent to commit a theft before he entered it. Moreover, Gomez’s testimony 

that he never authorized defendant to enter the garage supported an inference that defendant’s 

“unlawful entry was not purposeless, and in the absence of other proof, indicate[d] theft as the 

most likely purpose.” Moreira, 378 Ill. App. 3d at 129.

¶ 26 In his reply brief, defendant notes that the State did not specifically argue to the jury the 

hypothesis that he was driving in the alley, saw the open garage and formed an opportunity to 

commit a theft. He asserts that because the State did not argue this “drive-by theory” to the jury, it 

has been “waived” on appeal. We disagree. 
No. 1-19-0494 

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¶ 27 In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we are not constrained to limit our review to

the particular evidence mentioned in the State’s arguments. Rather, we review all of the evidence 

presented to the jury and ask whether the jury could reasonably conclude that guilt was proven 

beyond a reasonable doubt. Wheeler, 226 Ill. 2d at 117-18 (“we must ask, after considering all of

the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, whether the record evidence could 

reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”). Given the evidence presented, 

we have answered that question in the affirmative. 

¶ 28 Defendant nevertheless suggests that, because there was no evidence that he broke into the 

garage, the State cannot rely on Moreira or other cases permitting the “assumption that unlawful

entry is not purposeless, and in the absence of other proof, indicates theft as the most likely 

purpose.” 378 Ill. App. 3d at 129. He points out that case law recognizing this inference stems 

from our supreme court’s decision in People v. Johnson, 28 Ill. 2d 441 (1963), in which owners of 

a tavern heard glass breaking and saw defendant enter through a broken door. In the course of

affirming the defendant’s burglary conviction, our supreme court held: “in the absence of 

inconsistent circumstances, proof of unlawful breaking and entry into a building which contains 

personal property that could be the subject of larceny gives rise to an inference that will sustain a 

conviction of burglary.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 443. 

¶ 29 Defendant argues that our supreme court in Johnson referred to breaking and entering as 

supporting the inference of intent, but “did not opine that unlawful entry, which would include 

entry with or without force, was sufficient to give rise to the inference.” In turn, he urges that there 

must be a forcible breaking and entering to justify an inference of an intent to commit a theft. He 

maintains that mere unlawful entry “does not generate the same inference.” He acknowledges that 

a number of decisions of our court have stated that “unlawful entry” gives rise to the inference of 
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unlawful intent. See, e.g., Moreira, 378 Ill. App. 3d at 129; People v. Boguszewski, 220 Ill. App. 

3d 85, 88 (1991); People v. Collins, 53 Ill. App. 3d 114, 119 (1977). However, he argues that such 

decisions “unwittingly disregarded the limitation of the inference” derived from Johnson and are 

“missing language” requiring a forcible breaking and entering to justify an inference of intent to 

commit theft. 

¶ 30 Defendant essentially suggests that because our supreme court in Johnson referred to 

“breaking and entry” as supporting an inference of intent to commit theft, this inference may not 

be drawn from an unlawful entry without the use of force. However, nothing in Johnson prohibits 

a jury from making that inference. We decline to disregard this court’s precedent that “unlawful 

entry into a building containing personal property that could be subject of larceny gives rise to an 

inference of intent sufficient to sustain a burglary conviction,” in the absence of circumstances 

inconsistent with an intent to commit a theft. Boguszewski, 220 Ill. App. 3d at 88.2

¶ 31 In sum, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to State, the jury could reasonably 

infer that defendant formed an intent to commit a theft before he entered the open garage. In other 

words, we cannot say the evidence is so improbable or unsatisfactory as to create a reasonable 

doubt of defendant’s guilt. Corral, 2019 IL App (1st) 171501, ¶ 72. 

¶ 32 Defendant next contends that his sentence of nine years and six months’ imprisonment was 

an abuse of discretion because it was disproportionate to the seriousness of the offense. 

¶ 33 “The Illinois Constitution requires a trial court to impose a sentence that achieves a balance 

between the seriousness of the offense and the defendant’s rehabilitative potential.” People v. 

Knox, 2014 IL App (1st) 120349, ¶ 46. In doing so, the court must consider aggravating and 

2 Notably, defendant does not identify any circumstances in the record of this case that are 

inconsistent with an intent to commit a theft. 
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mitigating factors including “the nature and circumstances of the crime, the defendant’s conduct 

in the commission of the crime, and the defendant’s personal history,” including criminal history. 

Id.

¶ 34 A reviewing court gives great deference to the trial court’s judgment regarding sentencing 

because the trial court has a far better opportunity to consider these factors than the reviewing 

court. People v. Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d 205, 212-13 (2010). “[T]he reviewing court must not 

substitute its judgment for that of the trial court merely because it would have weighed these factors 

differently.” People v. Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d 203, 209 (2000).

¶ 35 The trial court’s discretion “is not without limitation,” as Supreme Court Rule 615(b)(4) 

grants the reviewing court the power to reduce the sentence imposed. Id.; Ill. S. Ct. R. 615(b)(4).

However, “[a] reviewing court may only reduce a sentence under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 615 

when the record shows that the trial court abused its discretion. [Citation.]” People v. Busse, 2016 

IL App (1st) 142941, ¶ 20. 

¶ 36 After reviewing the record, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it 

sentenced defendant to nine years and six months’ imprisonment. Burglary of a building is a Class 

2 felony, which ordinarily implicates a sentencing range of 3 to 7 years. 720 ILCS 5/19-1 (West 

2018), 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-35(a) (West 2018). However, because defendant had two prior Class 2 

or greater Class felony convictions, he was subject to mandatory sentencing as a Class-X offender. 

730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-95(b) (West 2018). In turn, the applicable sentencing range was 6 to 30 years’ 

imprisonment. 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-25 (West 2018). 

¶ 37 Because defendant’s sentence of nine years and six months is within statutory guidelines, 

it is “presumed to be proper” and “will not be disturbed absent an affirmative showing that the 

sentence is at variance with the purpose and spirit of the law or is manifestly disproportionate to 
No. 1-19-0494 

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the nature of the offense.” Knox, 2014 IL App (1st) 120349, ¶ 46. Defendant has not made that 

showing. 

¶ 38 In this court, defendant urges that his sentence was disproportionate to the seriousness of 

the offense. He argues that he only took “three relatively insignificantly valued items” from an 

open garage, did not cause any damage, and did not threaten harm to any person. He also notes the 

trial court’s comments that he was respectful, remorseful, and had rehabilitative potential. Under 

these circumstances, he claims the court abused its discretion by imposing “almost a decade of 

incarceration.” He requests that this court reduce his sentence to the minimum of six years. In 

support of this argument, defendant cites to other cases where a reviewing court reduced sentences 

as disproportionate to the seriousness of the offense. See Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d 203 (reducing 

consecutive 25-year sentences for criminal sexual abuse and aggravated criminal sexual abuse for

grabbing the breasts of two teenagers); People v. Allen, 2017 IL App (1st) 151540 (reducing 

burglary sentence from 10 1⁄2 years to Class X minimum of six years where defendant took a hat 

and two packs of cigarettes from a vehicle); People v. Busse, 2016 IL App (1st) 142941 (reducing 

12-year sentence to Class X minimum of six years where defendant stole $44 in coins from a 

vending machine).

¶ 39 The cited cases do not persuade us to reduce the sentence for this particular defendant. We 

do not engage in comparative sentencing, as our supreme court has held that it “does not comport 

with our sentencing scheme’s goal of individualized sentencing and would unduly interfere with 

the sentencing discretion vested in our trial courts.” People v. Fern, 189 Ill. 2d 48, 55 (1999). Thus, 

“[t]he fact that a lesser sentence was imposed in another case has no bearing on whether the 

sentence in the case at hand is excessive on the facts of that case.” (Emphasis in original.) Id. at 

56. 
No. 1-19-0494 

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¶ 40 In any event, we do not find defendant’s sentence was manifestly disproportionate. 

Moreover, the trial court’s remarks reflect that, in imposing a sentence three and a half years above 

the minimum, it relied on defendant’s significant criminal history which spanned over two 

decades, including several burglary convictions as well as a conviction for aggravated battery. It 

was certainly within the trial court’s discretion to consider these factors and impose a sentence 

three years and six months above the statutorily required minimum. See People v. Evangelista, 

393 Ill. App. 3d 395, 399 (2009) (defendant’s “criminal history alone” may warrant a sentence 

“substantially above” the minimum). 

¶ 41 We also note that the trial court’s remarks reflect that it considered various mitigating 

factors before electing to impose a sentence that was at the lower end of the applicable Class X

sentencing range. In sum, we cannot say that the sentence imposed was greatly at variance with 

the spirit and purpose of the law, or manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense. 

Accordingly, the sentence was not an abuse of discretion.

¶ 42 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County. 

¶ 43 Affirmed.