IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Respondent,

v. DESHAWN ISAIAH ANDERSON, A.K.A.: DESHAW E N ISAIAH ANDERSON , Appellant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) No. 34655

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UNPUBLISHED OPINION

S IDDOW AY , J.

— DeShawn Anderson appeals what is effectively a lifetime sentence imposed fo r charges arising out of his multipl e - victim assault with a firearm and later a murder, both of which took place in a several week period. All were grudge and retaliation cr imes committed by Mr. Anderson shortly after he turned 18. We reject his argumen ts that the trial court failed to recognize that youth can be a mitigating factor supporting an exceptional downward sentence and that his trial lawyer provided ineffective assistance by failing to advocate for such a sentence. We agree with Mr. Anderson’s challenge to a n un constitutionally vague gang

- related community custody condition and remand for resentencing so that the court can either clarify the 

### FILED NOVEMBER 1 , 2018
In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals, Division IIISt

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2 condition or strike it. The trial court can correct two scrivener’s errors conceded by the
State and conduct a Blazina 1 inquiry at the same time. We reject seven challenges to Mr. Anderson’s convictions that he raises in a pro se statement of additional grounds. The convic tions are affirmed.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On Nov ember 18, 2014, law enforcement responded to a report of a shooting in Pasco, Washington. Four men had been sitting in a car when two men opened fire at the occupants . All four occupants were hi t by t he gunshots. One of the occupants yelled, “I think that was Shawn,” during the shooting. R eport of P roceedings (RP) at 1030

. Investigation reveal ed the occupants in the car to be Florencia

- 13 gang members. 2 Mr. Anderson quickly become a suspect i n the November 18 shooting but could not be located by police. The next day, apparently in retaliation for the shooting, three men attacked a
location that Mr. Anderson and his associates often visited. During this attack, Mr. Anderson’s cousin was shot a nd injured. One of Mr. Anderson’s friends , Anthony Guerrero, was shot and killed.

1 State v. Blazina , 182 Wn.2d 827, 344 P.3d 680 (2015)

. 2 A t trial, the State did not offer evidence to the jury that Mr. Anderson had a gang a ffiliation, although it offered evi dence of the gang affiliation of other individuals. It contended outside the presence of the jury that Mr. Anderson was a gang member.St

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3 Two weeks later, on December 3, Pasco law enforcement responded to the shooting of Lorenzo “Ritchie” Fernandez in front of the Stonegate A partments. He had
been fatally sho t inside his car and was pronounced dead within 45 minutes of the officers’ arrival at the scene. Like the victims of the first shooting, Mr. Fernandez was associated with the Florencia

- 13 gang. A w itn ess saw two men jump the fence at the apartment compl ex immediately after shots were fired and run from the scene. One was carrying a pistol. Within a week, Mr. Anderson had become a suspect in Mr. Fernandez’s shooting. He was located and arrested on December 11. On December 12, Mr. Anderson’s pregnant gi rlfriend was allowed to visit him at jail. After that meeting, Mr. Anderson a sked to speak to law enforcement. In a recorded interview led by Detective Anthony Aceves, Mr. Anderson admitted that he had committed the November 18 shooting and had shot Mr. Fernandez on December 3. Mr. Anderson told Detective Aceves that he committed the November 18 shooting following longstanding problems with the four victims, who he ran into at the Crazy Moose Casino in Pasco on the night of the shooting. He told the de tective that he liked to street fight and had “never lost, and I don’t stop,” but that the gang members carried guns, forcing him to “run and then fucking hope I don’t get shot.” Ex

. 71 at 9. He said he had been shot at by Florencia

- 13 gang members seven times , and gang members had hit his brother in the head with a brick. He told Detective Aceves that he was “tired ofSt

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4 this motherfucker cheesing on me everywhere I go. Just laughing about the shit like it’s funny because I don’t shoot.” Ex. 71 at 9.
A female friend of Mr. Anderson’s later testified that he sent her a text message the night of November 18 asking her to pick him up from the casino, which she did. S he testified that Mr. Anderson got in to her car angry, telling her he had “issues inside” and that the four men had “laughed at him.” RP at 930. Video footage from the casino from the night of shooting was later admitted at trial and showed the four men present at the casino at the s ame time as Mr. Anderson , but it revealed no verbal or other confrontation

. In closing argument, though, t he prosecutor told jurors, “[I] f you look at the surveillance photo here, you can see in the grainy footage just the hint of a bit of a smirk on the face of Tapia Torres.

. . . [S] o there’ s no issue of a phys ical or verbal altercation that night. It’ s really about this look and the idea in the defendant’ s mind the idea that pricked his
ego that he was being laughed at, that he was being disrespected. ” RP at 1501. Mr. Anderson told Detective Aceves that he la ter killed Mr. Fernandez because Mr. Fernandez was associated with the Florencia

- 13 gang and he wanted to get back at them for what they did to Anthony Guerrero

. He claimed he called Mr. Fernandez, pretended to be someone from Mr. Fernandez’s “hood,” and arranged for them to meet in front of the Stonegate A partments. Ex. 71 at 35

- 36. Mr. Anderson said he waited about 10 minutes for Mr. Fernandez to show up before he shot him. Other evidence placed Mr.St

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5 Anderson at the scene but suggested that he had his cousin’s wife contact Mr. Ferna ndez, and that Mr. Fernandez had traveled to the Stonegate A partments thinking he was picking up a girl. The State initially charged Mr. Anderson with one count of first degree murder and four counts of first degree assault . It later amended the charges to include two counts of unlawful possession of a firearm. The jury found Mr. Anderson guilty as charged

. It returned special verdicts finding that Mr. Anderson was armed wi th a firearm at the time of each assault and the murder

. At sentencing, defense counsel ask ed the c ourt to “ recognize that Mr. Anderson was very young at the time, barely an adult in this matter. He’s ultimately going to spend the rest of his life in prison. We ask the Court take that into considerat ion in sentencing him.” RP at 1579. In announcing Mr. Anderson’s sentence the trial court made no mention of his age, however. I nstead, the court emphasized the premeditated and wholly unjustified character of Mr. Anderson’ s actions. The court commente d that surveillance video from the casino showed that Mr. Anderson’s victims “did absolutely nothing to Mr. Anderson on November 18 ” ; as for Mr. Fernandez , he did nothing more than be “labeled part of a group seen as an enemy.” RP at 1584. The court stat ed that the killin g of Mr. Fernandez “wasn’t a gunfight. It was an execution.” RP at 1586.St

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6 The court explicitly stated that there was no reason warrant ing a downward departure. It imposed a mid range sentence , with a total period of confinement of 1,12 6

mo nths, or 93 years and 10 months. Mr. Anderson appeals.
ANALYSIS I. T HE TRIAL COURT DID N OT MISAPPREHEND ITS AUTHORITY TO IMPOSE AN EXCEPTIONAL SENTENCE AND INEFFECTIVE ASSI S TANCE OF COUNSEL IS NOT SHOWN Mr. Anderson contends the trial court abused its di scretion by failing to appl y current Washington case law and consider youth as a mitigating factor . A lternatively , he contends his trial lawyer was ineffective for failing to argue for an exceptional mitigated
sentence. A defendant generally cannot ap peal a standard range sentence

. RCW 9.94A.585(1); State v. Williams , 149 Wn.2d 143, 146, 65 P.3d 1214 (2003). He can appeal a failure by the sentencing court “to comply with procedural requirements of the [Sentencing Reform Act of 1981, chapter 9.94A RCW ,] or constitutional requirements.”
State v. Osman , 157 Wn.2d 474, 481

- 82, 139 P.3d 334 (2006); RCW 9.94A.585(2). Where a defendant appeals a sentencing court’s failure to consider a request for an exceptional sentence, “review is limited to circumstance s where the court has refused to exercise discretion at all or has relied on an impermissible basis for refusing to impose anSt

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7 exceptional sentence below the standard range.” State v. Garcia

- Martinez , 88 Wn. App. 322, 330, 944 P.2d 1104 (1997). Under RCW 9.94A.535(1), a court may impose an exceptional sentence below the standard range “if it finds that mitigating circumstances are established by a preponderance of the evidence.” In State v. O’Dell , 183 W n.2d 680, 695

- 96, 358 P.3d 359 (2015) our Supreme C ourt made clear that while youth is not a per se mitigating factor, a defendant’s youth can justify an exceptional sentence below the standard range

. In so holding, it disavowed the reasoning of prior case law to the extent it was inconsistent

. Id. at 69 6. The court remanded O’Dell’s case for resentencing because “the trial court clearly believed that [it was] absolutely prohibited . . . from considering whether youth diminished [the defendant’s] capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of
his conduct or conform that conduct to the requirements of the law.” Id

. Mr. Anderson contends that his sentencing suffered from the same infirmity, with “[t]he trial court erroneously believ[ing] it had no discretion to depart from the standard
range. ” Br. of Appellan t at 7. B ut the record does not support that contention. No one argued at sentencing that the court could not consider Mr. Anderson’s youth as a mitigating factor. Mr. Anderson’s lawyer argued that he “was very young at the time, barely an adult.” RP a t 1579. The trial court directly addressed the exceptional sentence option, stating that it had no reason to deviate from the standard range, not that it lackedSt

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8 the legal ability to do so. See RP at 1585 (stating that Mr. Anderson would get a standard

ra nge sentence “[a]bsent a reason to depart, and here there is none ” )

. The court explained its sentence as warranted by the premeditated and wholly unjustified nature of Mr. Anderson’s actions.
Mr. Anderson also asserts conclusorily that his trial lawyer pr ovided ineffective representation by failing to raise O’Dell and the related case law recognizing a connection between youth and decreased moral culpability for criminal conduct. But he fails to present any analysis of the two showings required for an ine ffective assistance claim. 3 See Br. of Appellant at 13. Passing treatment of an issue or lack of reasoned argument is insufficient to merit judicial consideration. Holland v. City of Tacoma , 90 Wn. App 533, 538, 954 P.2d 290 (1998); RAP 10.3(a)(6).
II. T HE GANG

- RELATED COMMUNITY CU STODY CONDITION IMPOSED BY THE COURT IS UNCONSTITUTIO NALLY VAGUE IN ITS P RESENT FORM Mr. Anderson next argues that the trial court violated due process when it imposed an unconstitutionally vague crime

- related prohibition as a community custody condition. The challenged condition requires that Mr. Anderson not possess “gang paraphernalia

3 To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show two things: “(1) defense counsel’s represent ation was deficient, i.e., it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness based on consideration of all the circumstances; and (2) defense counsel’s deficient representation prejudiced the defendant, i.e., there is a reasonable probability that, exc ept for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” State v. McFarland , 127 Wn.2d 322, 334

- 35, 899 P.2d 1251 (1995) (emphasis omitted).St

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9 including clothing, insignia, medallions, etc.” C lerk’s P apers (CP) at 142. Alt hough Mr. Anderson did not object to the condition at senten cing, challenges to community custody conditions as illegal or erroneous may be made for the first time on appeal. State v. Bahl , 164 Wn.2d 739, 744, 193 P.3d 678 (2008). “Sentencing conditions must adequately inform the offender of what conduct they
eit her require or proscribe; failure to provide sufficient clarity runs afoul of the due process protection against vagueness.” State v. Villano , 166 Wn. App. 142, 143, 272 P.3d 255 (2012). This court found that a condition similar to that challenged here w as unconstitutionally vague in S tate v. Weatherwax , 193 Wn. App. 667, 677

- 78, 376 P.3d 1150 (2016), rev’ d in part on other grounds , 188 Wn.2d 139, 392 P.3d 1054 (2017). In Weatherwax , the challenged condition was that “ the defendant shall not wear clothin g, insignia, medallions, etc., which are indicative of gang lifestyle. Furthermore, that the defendant shall not obtain any new or additional tattoos indicative of gang lifestyle.” Id.
at 676 (internal quotation marks omitted)

. Weatherwax discussed Was hington and federal cases holding that general prohibitions of gang - related clothing or paraphernalia are unconstitutionally vague, but
that a crime

- related prohibition specific to a gang with which a defendant i s associated might not be. As explained by the federal circuit court in United States v. Soltero , 510 F.3d 858 , 865

- 66 (9 th Cir. 2007), in which a member of the Delhi gang appealed aSt

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10 condition forbidding him to wear or display Del hi paraphernalia, the district court was entitled to presume that the defendant would be familiar with his own gang’s paraphernalia. As we did in Weatherwax , we remand for resentencing with directions that the
gang - related condition be stricken or clarified

. II I

. M R
. A NDERSON IDENTIFIES A ND THE S TATE CONCEDES TWO SC RIVENER ’ S ERRO RS IN THE JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE Mr. Anderson next assigns error to two related scrivener’s errors in the judgment and sentence. The first is language on the second page, checked as applying, which states, “A special verdict/finding returned/entered that the defendant used firearm in the commission of Counts I, II, III, IV and V.” CP at 133 (boldface omitted) . The second is language on page 7a, also checked as applying, which states, “The confinement time on Counts I, II, III, IV, and V includes 60 months as enhancement for [X] firearm.” CP at 140. In fact, the jury was not asked nor did it find use of a firearm in connection with count II, which charge d Mr. Anderson with first degree unlawful possession of a firearm. The confinement time for that count did not include a 60

- month enhancement. The State concedes the error. At resentencing, t he court is directed to strike or exclude coun t “II” from the language in each case.
IV

. S INCE WE REMAND FOR RESENTENCING , M R
. A NDERSON ’ S ABILITY TO PAY DISCRET IONARY LEGAL FINANCIAL OBLI GATIONS ( LFO S ) MAY BE ADDRESSED AT THAT TIMESt

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11 Finally, Mr. Anderson argues that the trial court did not conduct the required Blazina inquiry into his current and li kely future ability to pay discretionary LFOs and
that his counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to challenge his ability to pay. During sentencing, the court ’s only inquiry into Mr. Anderson’s current or future ability to pay LFOs was to ask defense counsel’s “position on [his] ability to pay costs
and fine s and fees.” RP at 1583. Defense counsel responded: Your Honor, my client has the ability to work at this point in time. I always tell the Court when we have these types of cases I don’t know what his ability, his future ability will be, so we’ll have t o address that at some point in time. Obviously if he’s going to prison, he won’t be working per se.
RP at 1583

- 84. The court imposed LFOs totaling $11,203.01, with restitut ion to be determined. Of that sum, $10,403.01 were discretionary costs incl uding a $250 .00 jury demand fee, $700 .00 for a court appointed attorney, a $500 .00 fine, and $8,953.01 for a court appointed defense expert and other defense costs. Defense counsel did not object. Since we remand for resentencing, a Blazina inquiry can be conducted and Mr. Anderson may raise whatever objections he has to any discretionary LFOs imposed.

STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL GROUNDS In a pro se statement of additional grounds (SAG), Mr. Anderson raises seven. They can be consolidated into four contenti ons : (1) that Mr. Anderson’s confession wasSt

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12 involuntary, false, and not independently corroborated, (2) juror misconduct, (3) a violation of his speedy trial right, and (4) ineffective assistance of counsel. Involuntary, false, and uncorroborated confessio n. Mr. Anderson contends that his confession was improperly admitted at trial because it was involuntary and uncorroborated. The State presented ample corroboration. Mr. Anderson does not e xplain why we should conclude that his confession was involuntary . The trial court ruled the statement to be voluntary and admissible following a CrR 3.5 hearing and entered findings and conclusions explaining its ruling. Mr. Anderson does not assign error to any of the findings. His SAG does not suffi ciently
inform us of the nature of the claimed error. See RAP 10.10(c). Mr. Anderson also argues that his confession was clearly false because the evidence at trial showed that someone named Andres Alegria actually committed the crimes. A forensic scientist in the DNA 4 section of the Washington State Patrol Crime Lab oratory testified at trial that one amm unition magazine provided for her analysis bore DNA that, when run through CODIS, 5 was a match with an individual named Andres Alegria. Law enforcement testified that they unsuccessfully tried to track down Mr. Alegria.

4 Deoxyribonucleic a cid. 5 Combined DNA Index System

.St

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13 During closing argument, Mr. Anderson’s trial lawyer argued that the DNA evidence and law enforcement’s failure to make contact or question Mr. Alegria called Mr. Anderson’s guilt into question. The pr osecution responded that the DNA result was

unsu rprising because the 9 mm pistol used to shoot Mr. Fernandez had reportedly been purchased earlier that day from an acquaintance of an acquaintance, “[s]o it would make sense that somebody else’s DNA was on i t.” RP at 1547. The State presented substantial evidence linking Mr. Anderson to the crimes.
W hether his confession was true or false was a question for the jury. Juror misconduct

. Mr. Anderson argues his convictions should be reversed o n account of m isconduct by jurors 6 and 13. During trial, the local newspaper ran a story about the trial that included a front

page picture of Mr. Anderson’s handcuffs being removed in the courtroom. While the
defense argued that the publication warranted a mistrial and change of venue, the trial court instead questioned jurors individually about whether they had seen the newspaper.
Juror 6 admitted that he saw the photo briefly while buying coffee that morning

. He said he could still be impartial and that seeing t he photo did not affect his view of Mr. Anderson. Asked if he remembered anything about the photo, juror 6 said he “just [saw] the defendant standing up and part maybe of the defense attorney, the back of her head or something, and that’s all [he] remembe r[ed] seeing.” RP at 604.St

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14 Shortly after that issue was raised, the pr osecutor brought it to the trial court’s attention that a testifyin g detective recognized juror 13. Juror 13 was brought in for examination. She said she did know the testifying dete ctive and had indicated as much on her witness list form. Upon examinati on by defense counsel, juror 13 indicated that she would “give [the detective’s testimony] the same weight [she] g[a]ve everybody else’s testimony” and that she could still be fair an d impartial. RP at 614.
A trial judge has broad discretion to conduct an investigation of jury problems and may investigate accusations of juror misconduct in the manner most appropriate for a particular case. State v. Elmore , 155 Wn.2d 758, 773

- 75, 12 3 P.3d 72 (2005). The court need not follow any specific format. State v. Jorden , 103 Wn. App. 221, 229, 11 P.3d 866 (2000). Additionally, “[t]he decision of the trial court will be overturned on appeal only for an abuse of discretion. If misconduct is found, great deference is due the trial court’s determination that no prejudice occurred.” Richards v. Overlake Hosp. Med. Ctr ., 59 Wn. App. 266, 271, 796 P.2d 737 (1990) (citations omitted). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that there was no juror misconduct or prejudice to Mr. Anderson

. Speedy trial right violation. Mr. Anderson asserts that his speedy trial rights were violated. But o n September 8, 2015, Mr. Anderson signed a waiver of speedy trial rightsState v. Anderson No. 34655-2-III

and told the trial court that he understood he was waiving that right. RP (Sept. 8, 2015)

at 4-5. No error is shown. Ineffective assistance of counsel, including conflict of interest. Finally, Mr.
Anderson argues his counsel was ineffective for failing to meet and confer with him, lying to the trial court about the amount of time spent with him, and failing to raise requested issues with the trial court. Because these complaints are almost entirely based

on facts outside the record, Mr. Anderson's remedy is to present any supporting evidence
in a personal restraint petition. State v. Norman, 61 Wn. App. 16, 27-28, 808 P.2d 1159 (1991 ). We affirm Mr. Anderson's convictions and remand for resentencing. The issue of

costs on appeal will be addressed by our commissioner.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but it will. be filed for public record pursuant to RCW
2.06.040.

WE CONCUR:

Pennell, A.CJ.

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