alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
extendtwo.htm


10(D)(2)


 


AMENDMENT NO. 2


 


to the


 


SERVOTRONICS, INC.


 


2001 LONG-TERM STOCK INCENTIVE PLAN


 


WHEREAS, Servotronics, Inc. (the “Company”), established the Servotronics, Inc. 2001 Long-Term Stock Incentive Plan (the “Plan”), effective July 3, 2001, and


 


WHEREAS, the Board of Directors of the Company reserved the right to amend the Plan at any time, provided the amendment does not have an adverse effect on the rights of any participant under any outstanding award or, without the approval of the Company's stockholders, increase the aggregate number of shares for which awards may be granted or decrease the minimum exercise price specified in respect of options or change the class of employees eligible to receive incentive stock options under the Plan, and


 


WHEREAS, the Board of Directors previously adopted Amendment No. 1 to the Plan, which provides that Optionees can offer to surrender to the Company certain Options in exchange for a payment from the Company; and


 


WHEREAS, the Company desires to clarify the Options to which Amendment No. 1 applies;  and


 


WHEREAS, the Board of Directors has approved the amendment of the Plan set forth below;


 


NOW, THEREFORE, the Plan is hereby amended effective as of January 30, 2008 as follows:


 


1. The additional paragraph added to the end of Section 6.7 (entitled “Exercise of Options”) by Amendment No. 1 is hereby amended to read as follows, effective as if included in the said Amendment No. 1:


 


“Each Optionee of Options that are NQSOs granted pursuant to this Plan may, in the Optionee's sole discretion, offer to surrender to the Company some or all of the Optionee's currently exercisable NQSOs in exchange for a payment by Company check not exceeding the aggregate Current Market Value of the Company's Common Stock which would have been issuable on exercise of such  Options offered for surrender, less the aggregate exercise price of such Options, and plus a single transaction fee of $350.  The Company, in its sole discretion, may accept or reject the Optionee's offer.  The Chief Executive Officer of the Company, or any person to whom he delegates this authority, is authorized on behalf of the Company, to accept or reject the Optionee's offer in his or her sole discretion.  If the Company does not accept the Optionee's offer, the Optionee will retain the offered Options, which will remain exercisable according to their terms and, before expiration, may again be offered by Optionee at Optionee's discretion for surrender to the Company by Optionee (if not previously exercised) in accordance with the preceding provisions of this paragraph.”







 


IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Company has caused this amendment to be executed as of February 22, 2010, effective as of January 30, 2008..


 


 




	 	SERVOTRONICS, INC.	 
	 	 	 	 
	 	 	 /s/ Dr. Nicholas D. Trbovich, President	 
	 	 	 	 
	
 

	
By: 

	Dr. Nicholas D. Trbovich	 
	 	 	President
# Fourth Court of Appeals **San Antonio, Texas**

May 29, 2024

No. 04

- 24

- 00207

- CR

IN RE Christopher

- Jarvis PAYNE

Original Proceeding 1

ORDER

On March 22, 2024, relator filed a petition for writ of mandamus. After considering the petition, this court concludes relator is not entitled to the relief sought. Accordingly, the petition for writ of mandamus is DENIED

. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 52.8(a)

.

I t is so ORDERED on May 29, 2 024

.

_____________________________ Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said court on this 29th day of May, 2024

.

_____________________________ Luz Estrada

, Chief Deputy Cler k

1 This proc eeding arises out of Cause No. 2021CR3349, 2022CR6932 , styled State of Texas v. Christopher Payne

, pending in the Criminal District Court, Magistrate Court

, Bexar County, Texas, the Honorable Andrew Carruthers presiding.
ex10-1.htm


EXHIBIT 10.1


 







  





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6
Exhibit 12.2

                                  CERTIFICATION

I, Stuart Jackson, certify that:

1.   I have reviewed this annual report on Form 20-F of Stolt Offshore S.A.;

2.   Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of
     a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the
     statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements
     were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this
     report; and

3.   Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
     information included in this report, fairly present in all material
     respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of
     the company as of, and for, the periods presented in this report.

Date:  August 15, 2005

                                              /s/ Stuart Jackson
                                             -----------------------------------
                                             Stuart Jackson
                                             Chief Financial Officer
                                             (Principal Financial Officer)
### THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS

13

- 15

- 00450

- CV
WILMINGTON TRUST, NA TIONAL ASSOCIATION, AS SUCCESSOR TRUSTEE TO CITIBANK, N.A. AS TRUSTEE FOR BEAR STEARNS ASS ET BACKED SECURITIES I TRUST 2006

- HE4 ASSET

- BACKED CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2006

- HE4 v. ESTELLA S ALINAS, JAIME SALINA S AND ALL OTHER OCCUPANTS 502 EL PIN TO ROAD, SULLIVAN, T X 78595

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No

. 4 of Hidalgo County , Texas

Trial Cause No. CL

- 14

- 3562

- D

JUDGMENT THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS, having considered this cause on appeal, concludes that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed . The Court orders the judgment of the trial court AFFIRMED . Costs of the appeal are adjudged against appellant s

. We further order this decision certified below for observance. September 1 , 2016
**EXHIBIT      32(b)**

| 1) |   | The                Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d)                of                the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;                and |
|----|--------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| 2) |   | The                information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material                respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the                Company. |
|----|--------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|                                                                 |   |   |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|--------|
|  By:              /s/ David C. Stuebe                           |   |
|                  David C. Stuebe                                |   |   |
| Vice                President, Treasurer and Chief Financial Officer |   |   |
| (Principal                Financial Officer)                         |   |   |
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

May 7, 2019

RE: Product Exclusion Request Number USTR-2018-0025-7488

General Motors:

The purpose of this letter is to inform you that the product exclusion request referenced 

above has been denied. As you are aware, USTR published a Federal Register notice (83 FR 

28710) on June 20, 2018, that announced the Trade Representative’s determination to impose an 

additional duty of 25 percent on certain products from China. On July 11, 2018, the Trade 

Representative published a Federal Register notice (83 FR 32181) which announced that a 

process had been established under which interested persons could request that products falling 

within a covered HTSUS subheading be excluded from the additional duties announced on June 

20.

Your request was reviewed in accordance with the factors and procedures set forth in 

Section B(1) of the July 11 notice. Based on that review, and after careful consideration, your 

request was denied because the request concerns a product strategically important or related to 

“Made in China 2025” or other Chinese industrial programs.

Because USTR will grant exclusion requests on a product specific basis, you may still 

benefit from a product exclusion if a similar product is granted an exclusion. Products for which 

an exclusion has been granted will be periodically announced on the USTR website. Product 

exclusions will become legally effective once published in the Federal Register. 

Sincerely,

Joseph Barloon

General Counsel
[Cite as State v. Pence, 2022-Ohio-2468.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

TRUMBULL COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

- vs -

RANDY PENCE,

Defendant-Appellant.

CASE NO. 2022-T-0062

Criminal Appeal from the

Warren Municipal Court

Trial Court No. 2022 CRB 000275

M E M O R A N D U M

O P I N I O N

Decided: July 18, 2022

Judgment: Appeal dismissed

Nicholas J. Graham, Warren City Assistant Law Director, 141 South Street, Warren, OH 

44483 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).

Randy Pence, pro se, P.O. Box 1002, Warren, OH 44481 (Defendant-Appellant). 

CYNTHIA WESTCOTT RICE, J.

{¶1} On June 16, 2022, appellant, Randy Pence, pro se, filed a notice of appeal 

in the Warren Municipal Court. Appellant appeals the court’s May 16, 2022 entry which 

found him guilty of disorderly conduct and sentenced him to serve 30 days in jail, with 12 

days suspended; pay a $50 fine; and one year probation.

{¶2} A timely notice of appeal was due no later than June 15, 2022, which was 

not a weekend or a holiday. Thus, the appeal is untimely by one day.
2

Case No. 2022-T-0062

{¶3} “* * * [A] party who wishes to appeal from an order that is final upon its entry 

shall file the notice of appeal required by App.R. 3 within 30 days of that entry.” App.R. 

4(A)(1).

{¶4} However, an appellant make seek leave to file an untimely criminal appeal 

by strictly following App.R. 5(A) which provides: 

{¶5} “(1) After the expiration of the thirty day period provided by App.R. 4(A) for 

filing a notice of appeal as of right, an appeal may be taken by a defendant with leave of 

the court to which the appeal is taken in the following classes of cases: 

{¶6} “(a) Criminal proceedings; * * *. 

{¶7} “(2) A motion for leave to appeal shall be filed with the court of appeals and 

shall set for forth the reasons for the failure of the appellant to perfect an appeal as of 

right. Concurrently with the filing of the motion, the movant shall file with the clerk of the 

trial court a notice of appeal in the form prescribed by App.R. 3 and shall file a copy of 

the notice of appeal in the court of appeals. The movant also shall furnish an additional 

copy of the notice of appeal and a copy of the motion for leave to the clerk of the court of 

appeals who shall serve the notice of appeal and the motion upon the prosecuting 

attorney.” 

{¶8} Because appellant has neither complied with the thirty-day rule set forth in 

App.R. 4(A)(1) nor sought leave to appeal under App.R. 5(A), this court is without 

jurisdiction to consider the appeal. Appeal dismissed, sua sponte, as untimely.

THOMAS R. WRIGHT, P.J.,

MATT LYNCH, J.,

concur.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Virgilio Rivera, Appellant.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Kramer, J.), rendered March 20, 1987, convicting him of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the fifth degree, criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree, and criminal possession of a hypodermic instrument, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant maintains on appeal that the judgment should be reversed because no record was made of the infor*729mal *Sandoval*hearing conducted by the court. While the absence of a record makes impossible any intelligent review of the Trial Justice’s *Sandoval*determination, the procedure was apparently undertaken with the defendant’s consent and no objection was taken on the record to the informal hearing. Thus, the defendant waived any right to a formal *Sandoval*determination and failed to preserve any issue of law with respect thereto for appellate review *(see, People v Roundtree,*45 AD2d 731; *see also, People v Robinson,*159 AD2d 598; *People v Udzinski,*146 AD2d 245; *People v Worrell,*110 AD2d 733).

Similarly, by failing to oppose the People’s request for closure of the courtroom during the testimony of the undercover police officers, the defendant waived his claim that the closure resulted in the denial of his right to a public trial *(see, People v Palasciano,*155 AD2d 623; *People v Scott,*134 AD2d 379).

The defendant contends that the court erred in admitting testimony of other criminal activity not charged in the indictment that the police observed in the defendant’s building during the so-called "buy and bust” operation leading to the defendant’s arrest. We disagree. No objection was raised during trial to the admission of this testimony. Therefore, any issue of law with respect thereto is similarly not preserved for appellate review *(see,*GPL 470.05 [2]; *People v Quesada,*118 AD2d 604). In any event, evidence of the other criminal activity did not involve the defendant, but was proper to complete the narrative of events leading up to the defendant’s arrest *(see, People v Vails,*43 NY2d 364; *People v Bowden,*157 AD2d 789; *People v Quesada, supra; People v Gantz,*104 AD2d 692; *People v Hop Sing,*216 App Div 404, 405).

We have considered the defendant’s remaining contentions and find them to be without merit. Brown, J. P., Rubin, Eiber and Rosenblatt, JJ., concur.
#### STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Jeffrey BELL, Appellant. Jeffrey BELL, Movant-Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent.

Nos. 62099, 63887.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division One.

Oct. 12, 1993.

Gary E. Brotherton, Office of the State Public Defender, Columbia, for appellant.

Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen., John M. Morris, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.

Before CRANDALL, P.J., and REINHARD and CRIST, JJ.

*524
      *ORDER*

PER CURIAM.

Defendant, Jeffrey Bell, appeals from his conviction, after a jury trial for possession of a controlled substance. He was sentenced as a prior and persistent offender to imprisonment for twenty years. Defendant also appeals from the denial of his Rule 29.15 motion without an evidentiary hearing.

No jurisprudential purpose would be served by a written opinion regarding defendant’s direct appeal. The judgment of conviction is affirmed. Rule 30.25(b).

The judgment of the trial court denying defendant’s Rule 29.15 motion is based on findings of fact that are not clearly erroneous; no error of law appears. An opinion would have no precedential value. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Rule 84.16(b).
#### Nathaniel CATO, Movant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent.

No. 63414.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division One.

Sept. 7, 1993.

Elizabeth Haines, St. Louis,' for movant.

Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen., John M. Morris, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.

Before CRANDALL, P.J., and REINHARD and CRIST, JJ.

ORDER

PER CURIAM.

Movant, Nathaniel Cato, appeals from the denial of his Rule 24.035 motion without an evidentiary hearing. The judgments of conviction which movant sought to vacate were for sixteen counts of robbery in the first degree and thirteen counts of armed criminal action. Movant was sentenced as a prior and persistent offender to concurrent terms of imprisonment of twenty-five years on each count.

The judgment of the motion court is based on findings of fact that are not clearly erroneous; no error of law appears. An opinion would have no precedential value.

The judgment of the motion court is affirmed. Rule 84.16(b).
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

February 7, 2019

RE: Product Exclusion Request Number: USTR-2018-0025-7222

TI Group Automotive Systems, LLC:

The purpose of this letter is to inform you that the product exclusion request referenced 

above has been denied. As you are aware, USTR published a Federal Register notice (83 FR 

28710) on June 20, 2018, that announced the Trade Representative’s determination to impose an 

additional duty of 25 percent on certain products from China. On July 11, 2018, the Trade 

Representative published a Federal Register notice (83 FR 32181) which announced that a 

process had been established under which interested persons could request that products falling 

within a covered HTSUS subheading be excluded from the additional duties announced on June 

20.

Your request was reviewed in accordance with the factors and procedures set forth in 

Section B(1) of the July 11 notice. Based on that review, and after careful consideration, your 

request was denied because the request failed to show that the imposition of additional duties on 

the particular product would cause severe economic harm to you or other U.S. interests. 

Because USTR will grant exclusion requests on a product specific basis, you may still 

benefit from a product exclusion if a similar product is granted an exclusion. Products for which 

an exclusion has been granted will be periodically announced on the USTR website. Product 

exclusions will become legally effective once published in the Federal Register. 

Sincerely,

Stephen P. Vaughn

General Counsel
#### HOUSING AUTHORITY OF the CITY OF EL PASO, et al., Appellants, v. Luisa Rodriguez YEPEZ and Carmen Talamantes, Appellees.

No. 08-90-00038-CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas, El Paso.

April 18, 1990.

Rehearing Overruled May 16, 1990.

Edward Dunbar, Michael C. Crowley, Christie, Berry & Dunbar, El Paso, for appellants.

Pedro Martin, Maria B. Ramirez, El Paso Legal Asst. Society,- El Paso, for appellees.

Before FULLER, WOODARD and KOEHLER, JJ.

OPINION

WOODARD, Justice.

This is an appeal from a temporary order by the district court enjoining the Housing Authority from prosecuting a forcible entry and detainer action against the Appel-lees in justice court.

Petitioners for the injunction contended that they are tenants of the Housing Authority, and that the Housing Authority must provide them with a grievance hearing as a part of their rental contract and mandated by 42 U.S.C.A. sec. 1437d(k) (West Supp.1989) and 24 C.F.R. secs. 966.-51-966.58 (1989) prior to eviction. They further contend that by denying them the hearing, their rights to equal protection of the law have been denied to them under the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution.

Section 966.51(a) provides that the grievance procedure may be excluded in evictions based upon a tenant's creation or maintenance of a threat to the health or safety of other tenants or Housing Authority employees.

For the district court to enjoin the exercise of the justice court’s exclusive jurisdiction in a forcible entry and detainer case, there must be a showing that the justice court is without jurisdiction to proceed in the cause or the defendant has no adequate remedy at law. *McGlothlin v. Kliebert,*672 S.W.2d 231 (Tex.1984).

Any action by the district court is premature. The justice court had jurisdiction to determine the status of the litigants, whether a grievance procedure was to be allowed or if the facts of the case placed it *731within the exclusion. There is adequate remedy at law.

The temporary injunction is dissolved.
EXHIBIT 32.2

SARBANES-OXLEY ACT SECTION 906 CERTIFICATION

In connection with this Report on Form 10-Q of
Foundation Coal Corporation for the period ended September 30, 2008, I, Frank J. Wood, Chief Financial Officer of Foundation Coal Corporation, hereby certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:



|1. | This Form 10-Q for the period ended September 30, 2008 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
|-- | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|2. | The information contained in this Form 10-Q for the period ended September 30, 2008 fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of
operations of Foundation Coal Corporation.
|-- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Date: November 14, 2008



/s/ FRANK J. WOODFrank J. Wood Chief Financial
Officer
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Clinton Ivory, Appellant.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Mullen, J.), rendered June 8, 1988, convicting him of attempted rape in the first degree, attempted rape in the second degree, sexual abuse in the first degree, and sexual abuse in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of that branch of the defendant’s omnibus motion which was to suppress statements made by him to law enforcement authorities.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The record establishes that the warrantless arrest of the defendant was legal as he voluntarily consented to the officers’ entry into his home after they identified themselves and specified the purpose of their visit. It also establishes that the defendant voluntarily accompanied them to the police station where he knowingly and voluntarily confessed, *inter alia,*to the crimes for which he was indicted and ultimately convicted *(see, Payton v New York,*445 US 573, 577; *People v Nonni,*141 AD2d 862).

Moreover, we reject the defendant’s contention that it was improper to allow into evidence that portion of his confession which contained admissions of other crimes without redaction. Since his admissions regarding the other crimes were insepar*552ably connected with his confession to the crimes with which he was subsequently charged, introduction into evidence of the entire confession was proper *(see, People v Loomis,*178 NY 400; *People v Mitchell,*40 AD2d 117; Richardson, Evidence § 552, at 556 [Prince 10th ed]).

Nor was it error for the trial court to allow into evidence expert testimony on child sexual abuse syndrome to help explain why the victim did not fully report the attempted rape for approximately 18 months *(see, People v Taylor, 75*NY2d 277; *People v Keindl,*68 NY2d 410, 422; *People v Benjamin R.,*103 AD2d 663).

We have considered the defendant’s remaining contentions and find them to be either waived or unpreserved for appellate review, or without merit *(see, People v Pohliner,*32 NY2d 356, 369-370, *cert denied*416 US 905; *People v Baldi,*54 NY2d 137; *People v Hunt,*148 AD2d 836; *People v Grimsley,*60 AD2d 980; *see also, People v Suitte,*90 AD2d 80). Kunzeman, J. P., Harwood, Balletta and O’Brien, JJ., concur.
#### Pauline THOMAS v. Will PRYOR.

No. D-3664.

Supreme Court of Texas.

Nov. 3, 1993.

Agreed Motion of the parties pursuant to settlement filed herein on November 2, 1993, is granted; the application for writ of error is granted without reference to the merits; judgments of the courts below are set aside without reference to the merits, and the cause is remanded to trial court for entry of judgment in accordance with the settlement agreement of parties.