Filed 9/21/16 In re Ca.R. CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

In re Ca.R. et al., Persons Coming Under the 

Juvenile Court Law.

2d Juv. No. B268396

(Super. Ct. Nos. J069259, J069260)

(Ventura County)

VENTURA COUNTY HUMAN 

SERVICES AGENCY,

 Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

Y.V. et al.,

 Defendants and Appellants.

Y.V. (mother) and C.R. (father) appeal the juvenile court’s orders denying 

their modification petition and terminating parental rights to their minor children Ca.R. 

and Ci.R. with adoption as the permanent plan (Welf. & Inst. Code,1 §§ 366.26, 388). 

Appellants contend the court erred in denying their modification petition and in finding 

that the beneficial parental relationship and sibling relationship exceptions to adoption 

(§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i) & (v)) did not apply. Appellants further contend the court 

erred in concluding that Ca.R. and Ci.R.’s trial counsel, who also represented appellants’ 

 

1 All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
2

minor child A.R. in a separate dependency proceeding, did not have a conflict of interest 

in representing all three children. We affirm.2

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Detention, Jurisdiction/ Disposition, and 6- and 12-Month Review

Ci.R. was born in March 2012, and Ca.R. was born in March 2013. Three 

days after Ca.R.’s birth, HSA filed dependency petitions as to both children alleging that 

mother and Ca.R. tested positive for methamphetamine at the time of Ca.R.’s birth. 

Appellants also had histories of substance abuse and father had prior convictions for 

using drugs and engaging in acts of violence.

Ca.R. and Ci.R. were placed together in a foster home and attorney Mandee 

Sanderson was appointed to represent them. The court sustained the allegations in the 

petitions and granted appellants reunification services and visitation. At the conclusion 

of the six-month review hearing, services were continued for six months. HSA was 

granted discretion to liberalize visitation to overnight and weekends and extended periods 

not to exceed 60 days.

A.R. was born in February 2014 and was taken into custody pursuant to a 

section 300 petition. He was placed with his siblings in foster care and Sanderson was 

appointed to represent him. In May 2014, all three children were placed with the 

prospective adoptive parents.

At the contested 12-month review hearing, HSA and Sanderson 

recommended that services be terminated as to Ca.R. and Ci.R. and that the matter be set 

for a section 366.26 hearing with a permanent plan of adoption. HSA reported that the 

children’s 60-day visit with appellants had been terminated 30 days early after it was 

discovered they were living in unsanitary conditions and that appellants had 

 

2 The Ventura County Human Services Agency (HSA) recommended a permanent 

plan of long-term foster care for Ca.R. and Ci.R. Because HSA disagreed with the 

court’s decision to terminate parental rights, it declined to file a respondent’s brief in this 

appeal. Pursuant to the recommendation of Ca.R. and Ci.R.’s trial attorney, we appointed 

counsel to represent them on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.661(c).)
3

misrepresented the extent of their participation in their case plans. The court nevertheless 

granted an additional six months of services as to Ca.R. and Ci.R and granted six months 

of services as to A.R.

18-Month Review, Termination of Services, and Setting of Section 366.26 Hearing

In its 18-month report, HSA again recommended that services be 

terminated as to Ca.R. and Ci.R. and that the matter be set for a section 366.26 hearing 

with a permanent plan of adoption. HSA reported that father had been discharged from 

therapeutic services due to several absences and his failure to benefit from the sessions he 

attended. He had also missed half of his random drug tests and appellants had yet to 

obtain suitable housing.

At the contested 18-month review hearing, HSA reported that appellants 

had recently obtained housing for the children. Although HSA still recommended that 

services be terminated as to Ca.R. and Ci.R., it also “request[ed] the discretion to 

liberalize visitation to unsupervised, overnights, and weekends.” HSA referred to “the 

importance of keeping siblings together” and offered “[i]f the parents are given an 

opportunity have six more months of Family Reunification Services with the youngest 

sibling, [A.R.], then it will allow them to complete the rest of their case plan services. It 

will also provide them an opportunity to have their visitation liberalized with [A.R.] The 

plan would be for [HSA] to be able to liberalize [Ci.R.] and [Ca.R.’s] visitation up to 

weekend visits. . . . If the parents continue to make progress in the case plan services 

while meeting the needs of the children, then in approximately two months, a 388 can be 

filed to request to have the parents’ services reinstated and to potentially begin an 

extended 60-day visit . . . [to] coincide with [A.R.’s] extended visit. If the 60 days visit is 

deemed as successful then [HSA] will recommend the parents receive Family 

Maintenance services for all three children.”

At the conclusion of the hearing, the court terminated services as to Ca.R. 

and Ci.R. and set the matter for a section 366.26 hearing. HSA’s request for liberalized 

visitation was denied and single weekly overnight visits as previously ordered were 
4

continued. Appellants did not seek writ relief from the court’s order. An additional six 

months of services were offered as to A.R.

Dr. Kwan’s Bonding Study

Pursuant to HSA’s request, the court appointed psychologist Heidi Y. 

Kwan to conduct a bonding study and continued the section 366.26 hearing for 90 days. 

Dr. Kwan reviewed the records, interviewed appellants and the prospective adoptive 

parents, and conducted a telephone interview with Ci.R.’s therapist. She also observed 

Ca.R. and Ci.R.’s interactions with appellants and the prospective adoptive parents on 

two occasions each and conducted a “play session” with Ci.R. The doctor concluded that 

although Ca.R. and Ci.R. were attached to both appellants and the prospective adoptive 

parents, “the children, particularly [Ca.R.], appear to have a higher degree of attachment 

to their [prospective adoptive] parents than to [appellants] at this time . . . .”

Dr. Kwan deemed it “difficult” to address whether Ca.R. and Ci.R. would 

be “greatly harmed if parental rights were terminated” and whether the benefits of 

maintaining the parental relationship outweighed the benefits of adoption. Although the 

children would “continue to form stronger attachments with the parental figures no matter 

whom they will be with permanently” and “would experience a sense of loss” regardless 

of the permanent plan, the doctor found it determinative that “[i]n addition to the 

children’s emotional attachment to [appellants], both [mother and father] have completed 

their mandated services, and reportedly attend NA meetings regularly to maintain their 

sobriety. They have also maintained full-time employment, and secured housing in the 

recent past. These factors suggest their motivation to regain custody of their children. 

Therefore, it is not recommended that their parental rights be terminated at this time.” 

The doctor also opined that “both children, particularly [Ci.R.], seem to have formed a 

significant attachment to their brother, [A.R.], who currently is residing with [appellants]. 

Both [Ci.R.] and [Ca.R.] would experience additional loss if they separate from their 

brother, in the event of their adoption by their [prospective adoptive] parents.” Dr. Kwan 

recommended that any return to appellants happen “gradually,” that the children “receive 
5

therapy to address the issue of loss and separation from their [prospective adoptive]

parents,” and that both mother and father maintain their sobriety.

Sanderson’s Alleged Conflict of Interest

In May 2015, appellants’ attorneys alleged that Sanderson had a conflict of 

interest due to her representation of all three children. At a June 2015 hearing on the 

matter, Sanderson expressed her belief that there was no such conflict. HSA’s counsel 

argued that Sanderson merely had a potential conflict of interest rather than an actual 

conflict. The court asked Sanderson if her recommendation that Ca.R. and Ci.R. be freed 

for adoption created a conflict of interest in her representation of all three children. 

Sanderson replied that she was recommending termination parental rights as to A.R. as 

well, not merely Ca.R. and Ci.R. At a continued hearing, the court found that Sanderson 

did not have a conflict of interest.

The Section 366.26 Hearing and Appellants’ Section 388 Petition

In a May 2015 memorandum, HSA recommended that “the permanent plan 

for the children be changed to Long Term Foster Care, that [HSA] be granted discretion 

to continue liberalizing visits between [the] children and [appellants], and that a 90 day 

Interim hearing be set to determine the appropriateness of granting family maintenance 

orders to [appellants].” The contested section 366.26 hearing began on June 24, 2015, 

and was continued for further hearing. The court also ordered a referral for an open 

adoption mediation.

On August 17, 2015, appellants filed a section 388 petition requesting that 

Ca.R. and Ci.R. be returned to appellants with family maintenance services. Appellants 

alternatively asked the court to order a permanent plan of long-term foster care and grant 

liberal visitation as advocated by HSA. Appellants offered that they had “participated in, 

completed and benefitted from” their case plan as to A.R., who had been living with them 

for almost five months.3 Father also offered, “I am sober and continue to comply with 

 

3 Although A.R. began what was supposed to be a 60-day visit with appellants on 

March 20, 2015, he ended up staying with them indefinitely.
6

the testing component of my case plan.” As to A.R., appellants filed a section 388 

petition requesting a home-of-parent order with family maintenance services. The court 

found a prima facie showing had been made as to that petition, set the matter for hearing, 

and ordered that A.R. not be removed from appellants absent a warrant or exigent 

circumstances.

HSA contended that no prima facie showing had been made to support 

return of Ca.R. and Ci.R. to appellants as asserted in their section 388 petition. HSA 

submitted on appellants’ alternative request for long-term foster care. Sanderson asserted 

that no prima facie showing had been made as to either request. The court ordered that a 

hearing on the petition be held in conjunction with the continued section 366.26 hearing.

Prior to the continued hearing, HSA reported that father had recently been 

arrested for being under the influence of drugs.4 Although HSA found this “deeply 

concerning,” it was “reluctant to recommend something as permanent as terminating 

parental rights for the parents when there is still a chance that some mistake was made.” 

After the lab results came back positive, father continued to deny he had taken drugs and 

claimed the results were erroneous. HSA also discovered that father had four pending 

criminal matters and had missed another drug test.

At the continued section 366.26 hearing, Dr. Kwan testified that father’s 

recent drug use and arrest “is a concern based on what I mentioned and based on what I 

said in [my] report.” When asked if it affected her conclusions, she replied, “I cannot 

make any recommendations regarding the outcome of the children’s custody, because . . . 

there’s [sic] so many factors involved.” When asked to identify the benefits of 

 

4 During a court appearance on a prior arrest, the courtroom deputy observed 

father exhibiting symptoms of drug use. Father admitted to the deputy that he had eaten a 

marijuana cookie earlier that day and taken a four-milligram dose of the opiate drug 

Dilaudid. A dipstick test of father’s urine was positive for THC (the active ingredient in 

marijuana) and opiates. Father’s urine sample was sent to the lab for full testing. He 

denied to the social worker that he had used drugs or admitted doing so and claimed “the 

lab results will prove” the dipstick test was a “mistake.”
7

reunification versus adoption, she said, “it is not really my role to make that 

recommendations [sic]. It’s really the Court’s decision . . . .”

At the conclusion of the hearing, HSA reiterated its recommendation of 

long-term foster care for Ca.R. and Ci.R. and asked the court to liberalize visitation so the 

children could begin an extended visit with appellants. HSA also requested a 90-day 

review “to come back . . . and see if the visit was successful and could go to family 

maintenance.” HSA recommended a home-of-parent order as to A.R., who had been 

living with appellants for over six months.

Sanderson recommended that appellants’ section 388 petition as to Ca.R. 

and Ci.R. be denied and that parental rights be terminated as to both children with a 

permanent plan of adoption. Sanderson also recommended that reunification services be 

terminated as to A.R, whose dependency had reached the 18-month review period, and 

that the matter be set for a section 366.26 hearing. Sanderson acknowledged that the 

latter recommendation was “not a very strong position, but I think a 60-day visit should 

not go into . . . family maintenance and [A.R.] should be returned to the [prospective 

adoptive parents].” Sanderson later stated that “because of [HSA’s] actions in moving 

. . . [A.R.] too quickly [into] the parents’ home,” it was apparent that “family 

maintenance exists at this point regarding [A.R.]” Although she would have “liked to 

argue them as a sibling group,” HSA’s actions precluded her from doing so. Sanderson 

also argued that the benefits Ca.R. and Ci.R. would obtain through adoption outweighed 

the detriment they would suffer if their relationships with appellants and A.R. were 

terminated. She offered, “they shouldn’t be bounced around anymore. And what the 

parents want to do and what [HSA] is proposing to the Court is going to be just that:

bouncing them around.”

After taking the matter under submission, the court denied appellants’ 

section 388 motion, terminated parental rights as to Ca.R. and Ci.R., and selected 

adoption as the permanent plan. The court found by clear and convincing evidence that 

the children were likely to be adopted and that none of the exceptions to adoption had 
8

been established. Appellants were granted a farewell visit. A.R. was placed in 

appellants’ custody under family maintenance services.

DISCUSSION

Appellants’ Section 388 Petition

Appellants5 contend the court abused its discretion in denying their section 

388 modification petition, which requested that Ca.R. and Ci.R. be returned to them with 

family maintenance services or placed in long-term foster care. We disagree.

The grant or denial of a section 388 petition is committed to the sound 

discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed unless abuse of discretion is clearly 

established. (In re Shirley K. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 65, 71.) “After the termination of 

reunification services, the parents’ interest in the care, custody and companionship of the 

child are no longer paramount. Rather, at this point, ‘the focus shifts to the needs of the 

child for permanency and stability’ [citation] . . . .” (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 

295, 317.) To prevail on a section 388 petition, the parent bears the burden of proving by 

a preponderance of the evidence (1) that new or changed circumstances exist; and (2) that 

the proposed order would promote the best interests of the child. (In re D.B. (2013) 217 

Cal.App.4th 1080, 1089; In re Marcelo B. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 635, 641-642.) “The 

denial of a section 388 motion rarely merits reversal as an abuse of discretion. 

[Citation.]” (In re Amber M. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 681, 685-686.)

The court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellants’ section 388 

petition. Although the court found circumstances had changed to the extent appellants 

“appear to have made some changes that have stuck” and “have a stable home,” 

circumstances had not changed in one very significant respect. Appellants’ drug use was 

the primary reason for the children’s removal. Not long after appellants filed their 

section 388 petition, father was arrested for being under the influence of drugs. HSA 

chose to characterize father’s drug use as a mere one-time “relapse,” but his continued 

 

5 Although appellants make the same claims, their arguments are not identical. 

For ease of reference, we treat each argument as if it were raised by both parties.
9

refusal to acknowledge the incident raises serious concerns regarding his commitment to 

sobriety. The court reasoned that “although the parents . . . appear to be doing better, we 

have what I find an unexplained and, frankly, not credible explanation for a positive drug 

test by the father. [¶] So I just don’t think returning now would be in the best interest of 

the children, and I don’t think long-term foster care would be in the best interest of these 

children. Both of them—well, at least the latter would certainly create instability. And 

the former, I don’t think . . . the parents are ready yet.”

Appellants downplay the significance of father’s recent drug use and his 

refusal to acknowledge it. They also fault the court for focusing on Ca.R. and Ci.R.’s 

need for permanence and stability to the detriment of their interest in family reunification. 

Appellants’ cited cases make clear, however, that the children’s need for permanence and 

stability became the paramount consideration after reunification services were 

terminated. (See, e.g., In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 309 [“Once reunification 

services are ordered terminated, the focus shifts to the needs of the child for permanency 

and stability”]; In re Michael D. (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1074, 1083 [same].) Contrary to 

appellants’ claim, the court did not “engage[] in an exercise of weighing which were the 

preferable caretakers.” Instead, it reasonably found that appellants had failed to meet 

their burden of demonstrating they are currently capable of providing permanency and 

stability to these children.

We reject appellants’ assertion that the court’s finding regarding A.R. is 

inconsistent with its findings regarding Ca.R. and Ci.R. Reunification was still the goal 

for A.R., while the primary concern of Ca.R. and Ci.R. was their need for stability and 

permanence. In light of father’s unacknowledged relapse, the court did not abuse its 

discretion in finding that Ca.R. and Ci.R.’s best interests would not be served by 

returning them to appellants or placing them in long-term foster care.6

 

6 Appellants assert that because “the juvenile court apparently relied upon a clear 

and convincing legal standard when reviewing the section 388 petition for [A.R.], it 

cannot be presumed” the court applied the correct burden of proof (i.e., preponderance of 

the evidence) in ruling on the section 388 petition as to Ca.R. and Ci.R. We can infer, 
10

Mother also complains that “[t]he court failed to recognize the extent of 

Mother’s changes independently from Father, and the significance those changes had on 

the question of stability for the children if they were returned to her care.” It was made 

clear to mother and her counsel, however, that mother and father were being treated as “a 

package deal” for purposes of the section 388 petition. In arguing against the petition, 

Sanderson also asserted that appellants should be treated as a couple rather than 

individuals because they lived together as a couple. Mother did not object or inform the 

court that she was prepared to separate from father if necessary to preserve her parental 

rights to the children. Although two years earlier she told a social worker “I’ll do it on 

my own,” her subsequent actions indicated otherwise. Mother thus cannot be heard to 

now complain for the first time on appeal that the court treated her and father as a couple 

in adjudicating their section 388 petition.

Beneficial Parental Relationship Exception (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i))

Appellants contend the court erred in finding that the beneficial parental 

relationship exception to adoption did not apply. We conclude otherwise.

“At a section 366.26 permanency planning hearing, the juvenile court 

determines a permanent plan of care for a dependent child, which may include adoption. 

[Citations.] ‘If the dependent child is adoptable, there is strong preference for adoption 

over the alternative permanency plans.’ [Citations.] In order to avoid termination of 

parental rights and adoption, a parent has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of 

the evidence, that one or more of the statutory exceptions to termination of parental rights 

set forth in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A) or (B) apply. [Citations.] The court, ‘in 

exceptional circumstances,’ may ‘choose an option other than the norm, which remains 

adoption.’ [Citation.] The parental benefit exception applies when there is a compelling 

reason that the termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child. This 

 

however, that the court’s reference to “clear and convincing evidence” related to the 

assertion of HSA’s counsel that “HSA would need a warrant, exigency or consent to 

detain [A.R.] from his parents’ care, and they would need to show clear and convincing 

evidence to keep him removed from parental care.”
11

exception can only be found when the parents have maintained regular visitation and 

contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship. 

(§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).)” (In re Anthony B. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 389, 394-395.) 

“We apply the substantial evidence standard of review to the factual issue of the 

existence of a beneficial parental relationship, and the abuse of discretion standard to the 

determination of whether there is a compelling reason for finding that termination would 

be detrimental to the child. [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 395.)

It is undisputed that appellants maintained visitation with Ca.R. and Ci.R.

and that the children were attached to them. The court did not abuse its discretion, 

however, in finding that appellants had failed to meet their burden of proving the children 

would benefit from continuing the relationship, i.e., that “the relationship promotes the 

well-being of the child[ren] to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child[ren] 

would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents.” (In re Autumn H. (1994) 

27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575.) In making this determination, “the court balances the strength 

and quality of the natural parent/child relationship in a tenuous placement against the 

security and the sense of belonging a new family would confer. If severing the natural 

parent/child relationship would deprive the child[ren] of a substantial, positive emotional 

attachment such that the child[ren] would be greatly harmed, the preference for adoption 

is overcome and the natural parent's rights are not terminated.” (Ibid.)

Father’s recent drug use supports the conclusion that the beneficial parental 

relationship exception to adoption did not apply. (See In re Noah G. (2016) 247 

Cal.App.4th 1292, 1304 [“drug abuse is evidence continuing the parent-child relationship 

would not be beneficial”].) The court also properly considered the children’s young ages 

and the fact they had spent the majority of their lives out of appellants’ custody in 

concluding the children would not be greatly harmed if parental rights were terminated. 

(In re Angel B. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 454, 468.)

Appellants point to Dr. Kwan’s bonding study report and HSA’s adoption 

of the doctor’s conclusions as virtually irrefutable evidence that Ca.R. and Ci.R. would 

be greatly harmed if their relationships with appellants are terminated. Dr. Kwan’s 
12

conclusions, however, were based on circumstances as they existed in May 2015. When 

she testified in October 2015, she effectively withdrew her prior opinions and offered it 

was “not really [her] role” to recommend whether the benefits of reunifying outweighed 

the benefits of adoption. Moreover, the doctor’s initial recommendation erroneously 

deemed it determinative that appellants had demonstrated “their motivation to regain 

custody of the children.” “By the time of the section 366.26 hearing, family preservation 

is not an object of the statutory scheme. Family preservation is of critical importance 

from the time the minor is removed from parental custody (§ 202, subd. (a)) through the 

reunification period. However, when reunification efforts cease, the scale tips away from 

the parent's interest in maintaining family ties and towards the child's interest in 

permanence and stability. [Citation.] At that point, adoption becomes the preferred 

permanent plan. [Citations.]” (In re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1344.)7

Other aspects of Dr. Kwan’s report support a finding that Ca.R. and Ci.R. 

would not be greatly harmed if parental rights were terminated. She concluded the

children were more attached to the prospective adoptive parents and that “the issues of 

loss and abandonment,” which would arise if parental rights were terminated, could be 

addressed in therapy. She also recognized the children “have good capacity for 

attachment to parental figures” and “will continue to form stronger attachments with the 

parental figures no matter whom they will be with permanently.”

Appellants cite several cases in support of their position that the beneficial 

parental relationship exception applied here. Suffice to say that the cases are inapposite. 

Appellants “are essentially asking us to reweigh the evidence and to substitute [our] 

judgment for that of the trial court.” (In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 51-52.) 

The question is not whether the court could have found that the beneficial parental 

 

7 Dr. Kwan’s report also gives short shrift to the substantial benefits Ca.R. and 

Ci.R. will derive from adoption, most notably permanence and stability. Other than 

noting “there are many” such benefits, the doctor merely offered that the prospective 

adoptive parents “are likely to provide the children more resources than the birth parents 

can, based on their socio-economic status” and concludes “one cannot decide on the 

children’s home placement based on financial resources only.”
13

relationship exception to adoption applied, but rather whether it abused its discretion in 

finding otherwise. This simply is not the kind of “extraordinary case” in which

“preservation of the parent’s rights will prevail over the Legislature’s preference for 

adoptive placement.” (In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1350.)

Sibling Relationship Exception (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(v))

Appellants claim the court erred in failing to find that the termination of 

their parental rights as to Ca.R. and Ci.R. was precluded by the sibling relationship 

exception set forth in subdivision (c)(1)(B)(v) of section 366.26. We disagree.

Section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(v) provides an exception to the 

preference for adoption when the juvenile court finds termination of parental rights would 

be detrimental to the child because “[t]here would be substantial interference with a 

child's sibling relationship, taking into consideration the nature and extent of the 

relationship, including, but not limited to, whether the child was raised with a sibling in 

the same home, whether the child shared significant common experiences or has existing 

close and strong bonds with a sibling, and whether ongoing contact is in the child's best 

interest, including the child's long-term emotional interest, as compared to the benefit of 

legal permanence through adoption.” (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 54 (Celine 

R.).) “Reflecting the Legislature’s preference for adoption when possible, the ‘sibling 

relationship exception contains strong language creating a heavy burden for the party 

opposing adoption. It only applies when the juvenile court determines that there is a 

“compelling reason” for concluding that the termination of parental rights would be 

“detrimental” to the child due to “substantial interference” with a sibling relationship.’ 

[Citations.]” (Id. at p. 61.)

Establishing the sibling relationship exception would have required 

appellants to show that Ca.R. and Ci.R. had a significant relationship with A.R., that 

ongoing contact with A.R. was in their best interests, that termination of that contact 

would be detrimental, and that such detriment would outweigh the benefits of adoption. 

(In re L.Y.L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 951.) No such showing was made here. 

Although the court believed it had to assume there would be no further contact between 
14

the siblings if Ca.R. and Ci.R. were freed for adoption, it was appropriate to consider the 

prospective adoptive parents' willingness to maintain the sibling relationship. Where 

evidence exists that sibling contact will continue after termination of parental rights, the 

court may consider this in determining whether parental termination would substantially 

interfere with the sibling relationship and whether such interference would outweigh the 

benefits of adoption. (See, e.g., In re Valerie A. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 987, 1014; In re 

Megan S. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 247, 254.) As of the section 366.26 hearing, appellants 

and the prospective adoptive parents were working with an open adoption mediator. 

According to the mediator, both parties had expressed their willingness to develop a plan 

that allows the children to maintain contact with each other.

In any event, the court did not abuse its discretion in finding that

maintaining Ca.R. and Ci.R.’s relationship with A.R. outweighed the benefits of 

adoption. Although the children are bonded and shared some common experiences, they 

are very young. At the time of the section 366.26 hearing, Ci.R. had yet to reach the age 

of four and Ca.R. was two-and-a-half years old. A.R. was about twenty months old and 

had been living with appellants for over seven months. During that period, Ca.R. and 

Ci.R. only spent one night a week with him. Although the children lived together for the 

first year of A.R.s life, Ca.R. was less than a year old when A.R. was born and Ci.R. was 

younger than two. Moreover, Dr. Kwan expressed no opinion whether the sibling 

relationship was strong enough to outweigh the benefits of adoption. The doctor merely 

offered that Ca.R. and Ci.R. “would experience additional loss if they separate from their 

brother . . . .” On this record, the court did not abuse its discretion in finding that 

appellants had failed to meet their “heavy burden” of proving that the sibling relationship 

exception to adoption applied. (Celine R., supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 61.)

Alleged Conflict of Interest

Appellants claim the court erred in failing to appoint separate counsel for 

Ca.R., Ci.R., and A.R. because Sanderson had a conflict of interest in representing all 

three of them. We disagree.
15

“At the outset of dependency proceedings, a court generally appoints a 

single attorney to represent all the siblings. [Citation.] A court must later relieve counsel 

from multiple representation of siblings ‘if, but only if, there is an actual conflict among 

the siblings or if circumstances specific to the case . . . present a reasonable likelihood 

an actual conflict will arise.” [Citation.]” (In re T.C. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 1387, 

1390-1391 (T.C.).) “For an actual conflict to arise at the permanency planning stage, 

there must be a showing that the siblings have different interests that would require their 

attorney to advocate a course of action for one child which has adverse consequences to 

the other. Standing alone, the fact that siblings have different permanent plans does not 

necessarily demonstrate an actual conflict of interest. [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 1391.)

Assuming that the claim is cognizable in this appeal,8 appellants may raise 

it as to Ca.R. and Ci.R. only because the notices of appeal are limited to the court’s 

rulings as to them. (See, e.g., Dakota Payphone, LLC v. Alcaraz (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 

493, 504 [“[j]urisdiction of the Court of Appeal is limited in scope to the notice of appeal 

and the judgment appealed from”].) In other words, appellants cannot claim that A.R.’s 

interests were adversely affected by Sanderson’s representation of his siblings.

In any event, any interests of the children vis-à-vis each other did not create 

a conflict for Sanderson. Sanderson reasonably determined it was in Ca.R. and Ci.R.’s 

bests interests to advocate for termination of parental rights and a permanent plan of 

adoption. The possibility this would be detrimental to their sibling relationship with A.R. 

did not create an actual conflict of interest requiring the appointment of separate counsel.

The sibling relationship exception considers the effects on the children being freed for 

adoption, not their siblings. (Celine R., supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 54, T.C., supra, 191 

Cal.App.4th at p. 1392.) In other words, the court could only consider “whether [Ca.R. 

 

8 The issue whether Sanderson had a conflict was argued at a hearing held on 

June 4, 2015. The court issued its ruling at a hearing held on June 22, 2015, and issued a 

minute order reflecting its ruling on that same date. The notices of appeal refer only to 

the October 28, 2015 order denying appellants’ section 388 petition as to Ca.R. and Ci.R., 

the October 28, 2015 order terminating parental rights, and “all other orders made on said 

dates [sic].”
16

and Ci.R.’s] interest in maintaining the relationship with [A.R.] outweighed [their] 

interest in the stability and permanence [they] could receive in an adoptive home.” (T.C., 

supra, at p. 1392.) Advocating for Ca.R. and Ci.R.’s interest in adoption did not 

adversely affect A.R.'s interest in permanence and stability.

Moreover, “[t]o the extent there was a ‘conflict’ between the applicability 

of the sibling relationship exception to this case and [Ca.R. and Ci.R.’s] interest in the 

permanence and stability of adoption, it was not a ‘conflict of interest’ caused by dual 

representation. Rather, it was ‘conflict’ arising from the tension between [Ca.R. and 

Ci.R.’s] competing self-interests. These are the kinds of competing interests that counsel 

and the courts appropriately deal with in virtually every permanency planning hearing 

involving siblings. They do not require appointment of separate counsel.” (T.C., supra, 

191 Cal.App.4th at p. 1392.)

Appellants assert that the sibling relationship issue is only “one narrow 

aspect of Sanderson’s conflicted representation for the three children . . . .” According to 

appellants, “Sanderson already had made clear on June 4 that she had decided to sacrifice 

[A.R.’s] interests in his relationship with his parents for purposes of furthering her goal of 

adoption for the two older children . . . .” Appellants further assert that “Sanderson 

violated the rule of undivided loyalty with her apparent advocacy for the [prospective 

adoptive] parents. As a result, her representation evolved into the appearance of being a 

mouthpiece for the [prospective adoptive parents], rather than an independent advocate 

for each child.” These assertions and the remainder of appellants’ arguments on the issue 

merely reflect their disagreements with Sanderson’s positions. They do not establish that 

a conflict of interest required the court to appoint new and separate counsel.

Even if separate counsel should have been appointed, appellants fail to 

show how it was prejudicial to Ca.R. and Ci.R.’s interests. “A court should set aside a 

judgment due to error in not appointing separate counsel for a child or relieving 

conflicted counsel only if it finds a reasonable probability the outcome would have been 

different but for the error.” (Celine R., supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 60.) Contrary to 
17

appellants’ claim, the fact Sanderson took a position adverse to HSA’s does not render it 

reasonably probable that different representation would have led to a different result.

DISPOSITION

The judgment (order terminating parental rights) is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

PERREN, J.

We concur:

YEGAN, Acting P. J.

TANGEMAN, J.
Tari L. Cody, Judge

Superior Court County of Ventura

______________________________

Lori A. Fields, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant 

and Appellant Y.V.

Megan Turkat Schirn, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 

Defendant and Appellant C.R.

Michelle L. Jarvis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Minors 

Ca.R. and Ci.R.