* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is

therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is

not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,

and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value

consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

January 15, 2008

Elisabeth A. Shumaker

Clerk of Court

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

LEO COLUMBUS BRAY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

STATE OF OKLAHOMA ex rel.

OKLAHOMA DEPARTMENT OF

PUBLIC SAFETY; BOB A. RICKS;

GARY ADAMS; JERRY CASON;

GEORGE GREEN; G.D.

THORNBERRY; MIKE THOMPSON;

DOUG GRIFFITH; BOB GRIFFITH;

KEVIN WARD,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 06-6361

(D.C. No. CIV-03-1562-T)

(W.D. Okla.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

Before HOLMES, HOLLOWAY, and SEYMOUR, Circuit Judges.

Plaintiff Leo Columbus Bray appeals from the district court’s grant of

summary judgment to defendants on his claims of racial discrimination and
1 Mr. Bray’s claim arising from his termination was dismissed for failure to

exhaust administrative remedies in an order filed on March 29, 2006. He does not

challenge that dismissal on appeal. 

-2-

retaliation arising from his demotion during his employment with the Oklahoma

Highway Patrol. He also appeals from the district court’s denial of his motion for

reconsideration and request for leave to file amended motion for reconsideration

with request for evidentiary hearing. Although he was represented by counsel in

the district court, he appears pro se on appeal. We have jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.

The parties are familiar with the facts. Mr. Bray, an African-American,

was first promoted at work, and then was demoted and eventually terminated from

employment.1

 The district court thoroughly reviewed the evidence and the

governing law, concluding that Mr. Bray failed to present evidence tending to

show that his demotion was based on racial discrimination or retaliation and

granting summary judgment to defendants.

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, using the same legal

standard the district court applied. Young v. Dillon Co., 468 F.3d 1243, 1249

(10th Cir. 2006). Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if

any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the

moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
-3-

We view the evidence and draw any inferences in a light most favorable to the

party opposing summary judgment, but that party must identify sufficient

evidence that would require submission of the case to a jury. Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-52 (1986). Accordingly, summary judgment is

appropriate against any party who “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish

the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party

will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,

322 (1986). We review the district court’s denial of Mr. Bray’s postjudgment

motions for abuse of discretion. See Price v. Philpot, 420 F.3d 1158, 1167 n.9

(10th Cir. 2005). 

We have carefully examined the parties’ briefs, the record, and the district

court’s orders in light of the governing law. We conclude that the district court

correctly decided this case, and we affirm for substantially the same reasons as

those thoroughly explained in the district court’s orders entered on November 7

and December 5, 2006.

AFFIRMED.

Entered for the Court

Stephanie K. Seymour

Circuit Judge