2019 WI 17 

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN

CASE NO.: 2018AP520-D 

COMPLETE TITLE: In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 

Against Melinda Alfredson, Attorney at Law: 

Office of Lawyer Regulation, 

 Complainant, 

 v. 

Melinda Alfredson, 

 Respondent. 

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST ALFREDSON 

OPINION FILED: February 26, 2019 

SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 

ORAL ARGUMENT: 

SOURCE OF APPEAL: 

 COURT: 

 COUNTY: 

 JUDGE: 

 

JUSTICES: 

 CONCURRED: 

 DISSENTED: 

 NOT PARTICIPATING: 

 

ATTORNEYS: 

 
2019 WI 17

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further 

editing and modification. The final 

version will appear in the bound 

volume of the official reports. 

No. 2018AP520-D 

 

STATE OF WISCONSIN : IN SUPREME COURT 

In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 

Against Melinda Alfredson, Attorney at Law: 

Office of Lawyer Regulation, 

 Complainant, 

 v. 

Melinda Alfredson, 

 Respondent. 

FILED 

FEB 26, 2019 

Sheila T. Reiff 

Clerk of Supreme Court 

ATTORNEY disciplinary proceeding. Attorney's license 

suspended. 

¶1 PER CURIAM. We review the report of the referee, 

Attorney John Nicholas Schweitzer, recommending that the court 

suspend the Wisconsin law license of Attorney Melinda Alfredson 

for 90 days and order her to pay the full costs of this 

disciplinary proceeding. The referee wrote the report after 

Attorney Alfredson and the Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) 

entered into a stipulation concerning Attorney Alfredson's 

misconduct in two client matters and her failure to cooperate 

with the OLR's investigation into her misconduct. Neither party 
No. 2018AP520-D 

2 

has appealed from the referee's report and recommendation, and 

thus our review proceeds under Supreme Court Rule 

(SCR) 22.17(2).1 

¶2 We agree that Attorney Alfredson's professional 

misconduct warrants a 90-day suspension. We further agree that 

Attorney Alfredson should pay the full costs of this matter, 

which total $2,649.59 as of November 15, 2018. No restitution 

was sought and none is ordered. 

¶3 Attorney Alfredson obtained her Wisconsin law license 

in 2009. In 2017, this court suspended her law license for 60 

days based on 16 counts of misconduct arising out of her 

representation of two clients, her various trust account 

violations, and her failure to cooperate with the OLR's 

investigation into her misconduct. See In re Disciplinary 

Proceedings Against Alfredson, 2017 WI 6, 373 Wis. 2d 79, 890 

N.W.2d 13 ("Alfredson I"). 

¶4 In March 2018, the OLR filed the underlying complaint 

against Attorney Alfredson. The OLR alleged that Attorney 

Alfredson had engaged in six counts of misconduct based on her 

work for clients R.R. and M.T., as well as her failure to 

 

1 SCR 22.17(2) provides: 

If no appeal is filed timely, the supreme court 

shall review the referee's report; adopt, reject or 

modify the referee's findings and conclusions or 

remand the matter to the referee for additional 

findings; and determine and impose appropriate 

discipline. The court, on its own motion, may order 

the parties to file briefs in the matter. 
No. 2018AP520-D 

3 

cooperate with the OLR's investigation into her misconduct. The 

OLR sought a four-month suspension of Attorney Alfredson's law 

license. 

¶5 In mid-October 2018, following the filing of an answer 

and the appointment of the referee, the parties executed a 

stipulation in which Attorney Alfredson withdrew her answer and 

stipulated to the factual allegations and misconduct charges of 

the complaint, as amended in the stipulation. Both the OLR and 

Attorney Alfredson agreed that a 90–day suspension was 

appropriate. The parties further agreed that the stipulation 

was not the result of plea bargaining; that Attorney Alfredson's 

entry into the stipulation was knowing and voluntary; and that 

she understood the misconduct allegations as amended by the 

stipulation, her right to contest those allegations, and the 

ramifications of her entry into the stipulation. 

¶6 In late October 2018, the referee filed his report and 

recommendation. The referee accepted the parties' stipulation 

and found, based on the stipulation, that the following facts 

were true. 

Representation of R.R. (Counts 1-4) 

¶7 In February 2015, R.R. and his wife divorced. R.R. 

was represented by counsel other than Attorney Alfredson at the 

time. 

¶8 In approximately September 2015, R.R. hired Attorney 

Alfredson to represent him after he had fallen behind on certain 

post-divorce obligations. R.R. owed his ex-wife past-due 

maintenance and attorney's fees. In addition, R.R. had not yet 
No. 2018AP520-D 

4 

attempted to sell a boat that he and his ex-wife had owned 

during their marriage, even though the divorce judgment required 

that the boat be placed on the market for sale. 

¶9 In mid-October 2015, a family court commissioner found 

R.R. in contempt and imposed a $2,405.95 purge condition. 

¶10 On October 20, 2015, R.R. informed Attorney Alfredson 

that he had sold the boat for $7,500. Attorney Alfredson and 

R.R. agreed that the proceeds from the sale would be deposited 

into Attorney Alfredson's trust account; that the proceeds would 

be used to pay the $2,405.95 purge amount; and that the 

remainder of the proceeds ($5,094.05) would be held in trust 

pending documentation of receipts for storage and the bank 

payoff for the boat, for which R.R.'s ex-wife was partially 

responsible. 

¶11 Attorney Alfredson never deposited the boat sale 

proceeds into a trust account. Rather, on October 22, 2015, she 

deposited the check that R.R. had received for the boat in a 

non-trust account held by the law firm where she worked at the 

time. Attorney Alfredson subsequently transferred a portion of 

the funds to a second non-trust account held by the firm, and 

transferred another portion of the funds to a third non-trust 

account held by the firm. 

¶12 In November 2015, Attorney Alfredson provided R.R.'s 

ex-wife's lawyer with a check, drawn from one of these non-trust 

accounts, for the $2,405.95 purge amount. Attorney Alfredson 

also used some of R.R.'s funds for her own personal use. 
No. 2018AP520-D 

5 

¶13 In April 2016, R.R. terminated Attorney Alfredson and 

retained a new lawyer. In a May 9, 2016 letter to R.R., 

Attorney Alfredson agreed to forward the remaining proceeds from 

the boat sale to R.R.'s new lawyer. Later in May 2016, Attorney 

Alfredson provided the OLR with a carbon copy of a purported 

check that she allegedly wrote to R.R.'s new lawyer in the 

amount of the boat sale proceeds left after the $2,405.95 purge 

payment; i.e., $5,094.05. 

¶14 In early June 2016, the circuit court ordered that 

$5,000 of the proceeds from the boat sale were to be paid to 

R.R.'s ex-wife's lawyer within ten business days. In mid-June 

2016, R.R.'s ex-wife's lawyer wrote R.R.'s new lawyer, inquiring 

about the status of the $5,000 payment and stating that 

"Attorney Alfredson advises that she sent the monies from her 

trust to you." Attorney Alfredson was copied on this letter. 

In response, R.R.'s new lawyer wrote Attorney Alfredson to say 

that she had not received any trust funds from Attorney 

Alfredson. Almost four months after receiving this letter, in 

October 2016, Attorney Alfredson delivered a $5,094.95 check 

made payable to R.R.'s ex-wife's lawyer. The check was drawn 

from a non-trust account. 

¶15 In April 2016, R.R. filed a grievance with the OLR 

against Attorney Alfredson. In mid-July 2016, the OLR notified 

Attorney Alfredson of the investigation of R.R.'s grievance and 

requested certain information and records from her. She did not 

respond. 
No. 2018AP520-D 

6 

¶16 In August 2016, the OLR sent Attorney Alfredson a 

second request for information and records via certified mail. 

Although Attorney Alfredson signed the return receipt for the 

letter, she did not respond. 

¶17 In early September 2016, the OLR personally served 

Attorney Alfredson with a letter in which it threatened to move 

for a temporary license suspension for failure to cooperate with 

its investigation. In late September 2016, the OLR received a 

letter response from Attorney Alfredson to R.R.'s grievance. 

Attorney Alfredson failed to disclose in her letter that there 

was any issue with respect to the delivery of the remaining 

proceeds from the boat sale. 

¶18 In April 2017, Attorney Alfredson wrote a letter to 

the OLR stating that in May 2016, she had sent a $5,094.05 check 

to R.R.'s new lawyer, but she stopped payment on the check when 

that lawyer informed her that she had never received the check. 

¶19 In May 2017, the OLR sent a letter to Attorney 

Alfredson requesting additional information and documents. 

Attorney Alfredson did not respond. 

¶20 In June 2017, the OLR wrote Attorney Alfredson again, 

reminding her of her duty to cooperate. In a July 2017 

telephone conversation with OLR staff, Attorney Alfredson stated 

that her response was in the mail and that she would fax a copy 

of the response to the OLR. The OLR received nothing from 

Attorney Alfredson. 

¶21 In August 2017, the OLR personally served Attorney 

Alfredson with a letter in which it threatened to move for a 
No. 2018AP520-D 

7 

temporary license suspension for failure to cooperate with its 

investigation. In late August 2017, the OLR received Attorney 

Alfredson's faxed response to the OLR's May 2017 letter. 

Representation of M.T. (Counts 5-6) 

¶22 In October 2015, M.T. hired Attorney Alfredson to 

represent him in a divorce. In a May 9, 2016 letter to Attorney 

Alfredson, M.T.'s wife's lawyer identified certain personal 

property items that her client wanted to retrieve from the 

marital residence but that M.T. had allegedly prevented her from 

retrieving. Attorney Alfredson did not directly communicate 

with M.T. regarding this issue. M.T.'s wife moved for contempt 

based on M.T.'s failure to return some of the items on the 

personal property list. 

¶23 In June 2016, M.T. retained a new lawyer. That same 

month, M.T.'s new lawyer asked Attorney Alfredson to provide him 

with M.T.'s file as soon as possible. His office followed-up 

that request with numerous written requests and phone calls 

asking for the file. Attorney Alfredson did not provide M.T.'s 

file until September 2016, over three months after the new 

lawyer's initial request for the file. 

¶24 The referee reviewed the complaint and stipulation and 

concluded that, in connection with her work for R.R. and M.T., 

Attorney Alfredson had committed the following forms of 

misconduct: 
No. 2018AP520-D 

8 

• Count One: By failing to hold R.R.'s funds in trust, 

Attorney Alfredson violated SCR 20:1.15(b)(1).2 

• Count Two: By failing to promptly deliver funds that 

she collected in connection with her representation of 

R.R. to R.R.'s ex-wife's lawyer, Attorney Alfredson 

violated former SCR 20:1.15(d)(1), and 

SCR 20:1.15(e)(1).3 

• Count Three: By converting R.R.'s funds that she 

received in connection with her representation of R.R. 

 

2 SCR 20:1.15(b)(1) provides: 

A lawyer shall hold in trust, separate from the 

lawyer's own property, that property of clients and 

3rd parties that is in the lawyer's possession in 

connection with a representation. All funds of 

clients and 3rd parties paid to a lawyer or law firm 

in connection with a representation shall be deposited 

in one or more identifiable trust accounts. 

3 By S. Ct. Order 14-07, 2016 WI 21 (issued Apr. 4, 2016, 

eff. July 1, 2016) former SCR 20:1.15(d)(1) was renumbered as 

SCR 20:1.15(e)(1). The text of the rule was not changed. 

Former SCR 20:1.15(d)(1) and current SCR 20:15(e)(1) provide: 

Upon receiving funds or other property in which a 

client has an interest, or in which the lawyer has 

received notice that a 3rd party has an interest 

identified by a lien, court order, judgment, or 

contract, the lawyer shall promptly notify the client 

or 3rd party in writing. Except as stated in this 

rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement 

with the client, the lawyer shall promptly deliver to 

the client or 3rd party any funds or other property 

that the client or 3rd party is entitled to receive. 
No. 2018AP520-D 

9 

for her own personal use, Attorney Alfredson violated 

SCR 20:8.4(c).4

• Count Four: By failing to timely provide the OLR with 

a written response to R.R.'s grievance, and by failing 

to timely provide the OLR with a response to the OLR's 

additional request for information, Attorney Alfredson 

violated SCR 22.03(2),5 enforced via SCR 20:8.4(h).6 

• Count Five: By failing to address with M.T. the 

personal property issue set forth in his wife's 

 

4 SCR 20:8.4(c) provides: "It is professional misconduct 

for a lawyer to engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, 

deceit or misrepresentation." 

5 SCR 22.03(2) provides: 

Upon commencing an investigation, the director 

shall notify the respondent of the matter being 

investigated unless in the opinion of the director the 

investigation of the matter requires otherwise. The 

respondent shall fully and fairly disclose all facts 

and circumstances pertaining to the alleged misconduct 

within 20 days after being served by ordinary mail a 

request for a written response. The director may 

allow additional time to respond. Following receipt 

of the response, the director may conduct further 

investigation and may compel the respondent to answer 

questions, furnish documents, and present any 

information deemed relevant to the investigation. 

6 SCR 20:8.4(h) provides: "It is professional misconduct 

for a lawyer to fail to cooperate in the investigation of a 

grievance filed with the office of lawyer regulation as required 

by SCR 21.15(4), SCR 22.001(9)(b), SCR 22.03(2), SCR 22.03(6), 

or SCR 22.04(1)." 
No. 2018AP520-D 

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lawyer's May 9, 2016 letter, Attorney Alfredson 

violated SCR 20:1.3.7 

• Count Six: By failing to timely deliver M.T.'s case 

file to successor counsel, Attorney Alfredson violated 

SCR 20:1.16(d).8

¶25 The referee then considered appropriate discipline. 

He adopted, without analysis, the OLR's reasoning and 

recommendation set forth in its sanction memorandum. In that 

memorandum, the OLR discussed certain cases that, in its view, 

justified a 90-day suspension period. See In re Disciplinary 

Proceedings Against Briggs, 2014 WI 119, 358 Wis. 2d 493, 861 

N.W.2d 528 (90-day suspension for lawyer with no prior 

discipline who committed 12 counts of misconduct); see also In 

re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Woods, 2008 WI 79, 311 

Wis. 2d 213, 751 N.W.2d 840 (90-day suspension for lawyer with 

an extensive disciplinary history who committed four counts of 

 

7 SCR 20:1.3 provides: "A lawyer shall act with reasonable 

diligence and promptness in representing a client." 

8 SCR 20:1.16(d) provides: 

Upon termination of representation, a lawyer 

shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable 

to protect a client's interests, such as giving 

reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for 

employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and 

property to which the client is entitled and refunding 

any advance payment of fee or expense that has not 

been earned or incurred. The lawyer may retain papers 

relating to the client to the extent permitted by 

other law. 
No. 2018AP520-D 

11 

misconduct). The OLR also discussed various aggravating and 

mitigating factors. On the aggravating side of the scale, the 

OLR noted that Alfredson has a disciplinary history, converted 

client funds for personal use, and engaged in misconduct with a 

pattern of neglect, dishonesty, and failure to cooperate. On 

the mitigating side of the scale, the OLR noted Attorney 

Alfredson's "lack of substantial legal experience," her 

acknowledgement of her misconduct, and her provision of 

"confidential information to OLR regarding family and medical 

issues which affected her ability to practice law during the 

time period in question." 

¶26 Ultimately, the referee accepted the parties' 

stipulated discipline and recommended a 90-day suspension. He 

also recommended that Attorney Alfredson be held responsible for 

all the costs of this disciplinary proceeding, which total 

$2,649.59 as of November 15, 2018. 

¶27 No appeal was filed, so we review this matter pursuant 

to SCR 22.17(2). We will affirm the referee's findings of fact 

unless they are clearly erroneous. We review conclusions of law 

de novo. See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Eisenberg, 

2004 WI 14, ¶5, 269 Wis. 2d 43, 675 N.W.2d 747. We may impose 

whatever sanction we see fit, regardless of the referee's 

recommendation. See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 

Widule, 2003 WI 34, ¶44, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 660 N.W.2d 686. 

¶28 There is no showing that any of the referee's findings 

of fact, based on the parties' stipulation, are clearly 

erroneous. Accordingly, we adopt them. We also agree with the 
No. 2018AP520-D 

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referee's legal conclusions that Attorney Alfredson violated the 

supreme court rules noted above. 

¶29 The central issue for this court is whether a 

suspension greater than the 90-day recommended suspension is in 

order. Our concern over the length of suspension is prompted by 

our February 2017 decision in Alfredson I, in which we noted 

that the 60-day suspension we imposed was "modest" given the 

facts at hand, and cautioned that a longer suspension would have 

been in order had Attorney Alfredson been previously 

disciplined. Alfredson I, 373 Wis. 2d 79, ¶35. We warned 

Attorney Alfredson "that the court may impose progressively 

severe sanctions when an attorney engages in repeated 

misconduct," and we imposed the stipulated 60-day suspension 

"with the expectation that Attorney Alfredson will not commit 

future misconduct subjecting her to additional discipline." Id. 

Attorney Alfredson is now back before us——and, troublingly, the 

facts show that she failed to cooperate with the OLR's 

investigation regarding her representation of R.R. even after 

the February 2017 issuance of Alfredson I. 

¶30 "This court has long adhered to the concept of 

progressive discipline in attorney regulatory cases." In re 

Disciplinary Proceedings Against Netzer, 2014 WI 7, ¶49, 352 

Wis. 2d 310, 841 N.W.2d 820. The question for us here is 

whether moving from a 60-day suspension to the recommended 90-

day suspension constitutes a sufficiently serious step in the 

progressive discipline process. 
No. 2018AP520-D 

13 

¶31 On these facts, we conclude the answer is yes——though 

it is a close call. The closeness of the call stems from the 

weakness of certain mitigating circumstances identified by the 

OLR in its sanction memorandum——which, again, the referee 

endorsed in its entirety without analysis. The OLR stated that 

Attorney Alfredson's "lack of substantial legal experience" 

should count as a mitigating factor. But Attorney Alfredson was 

admitted to the bar in 2009, and the misconduct in this case 

occurred years later, in 2015 through much of 2017. By this 

time, Attorney Alfredson was not a brand-new lawyer. Moreover, 

the ethical principles she violated are not elusive: hold 

client funds in trust; do not spend them on personal matters; 

pay client funds owed to third parties promptly; communicate 

with clients diligently; cooperate with the OLR, etc. Even the 

greenest lawyer is charged with knowledge of these basic rules. 

Surely Attorney Alfredson, with multiple years of experience 

under her belt, should have known better. 

¶32 We also cannot assign any weight to the OLR's 

statement in its sanction memorandum that Attorney Alfredson 

provided "confidential information" to the OLR regarding "family 

and medical issues which affected her ability to practice law 

during the time period in question." Problematically, there is 

no evidence in the record regarding the nature of Attorney 

Alfredson's alleged family and medical issues, or their possible 

nexus to her misconduct. The parties' stipulation provides no 

details, and the issues went unaddressed by the referee. Thus, 

nothing stands behind the assertion that Attorney Alfredson's 
No. 2018AP520-D 

14 

family and medical issues should partially excuse her misconduct 

except the parties' own say-so. That is not enough. See In re 

Disciplinary Proceedings Against Davig Huesmann, 2018 WI 114, 

¶40, 385 Wis. 2d 49, ___ N.W.2d ___ (declining to consider 

lawyer's personal and substance abuse problems as mitigating 

factors absent a "showing in [the] record that those problems 

were the cause of her professional misconduct"); In re 

Disciplinary Proceedings Against Sosnay, 209 Wis. 2d 241, 243, 

562 N.W.2d 137, (1997) ("Absent a causal connection between an 

attorney's medical condition and that attorney's professional 

misconduct, the medical condition may not be considered a factor 

mitigating either the seriousness of the misconduct or the 

severity of discipline to be imposed for it.") 

¶33 Nevertheless, we conclude that a 90-day suspension of 

Attorney Alfredson's law license is sufficient to impress upon 

her the seriousness of her professional duties and to deter her 

and others from engaging in similar misconduct. We note the 

presence of certain mitigating factors. Attorney Alfredson did, 

ultimately, endeavor to rectify the consequences of her 

misconduct. She also entered into a stipulation that resolves 

this disciplinary proceeding, wherein she explicitly 

acknowledged that her misconduct caused harm and that she was 

wrong for failing to cooperate with the OLR's investigation. In 

addition to these mitigating factors, we note that a roughly 

analogous case, In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Wood, 

2014 WI 116, 358 Wis. 2d 472, 854 N.W.2d 844, provides support 

for a 90-day suspension. See id. (imposing a 90-day suspension 
No. 2018AP520-D 

15 

on a respondent-lawyer who had been suspended the previous year 

in his first disciplinary matter, and who stipulated to seven 

misconduct counts, including failing to keep a client informed 

of the case status, failing to cooperate with the OLR, and 

various trust account violations). We impose this 90-day 

suspension with the same caveat that we gave in Alfredson I: we 

expect that Attorney Alfredson will not commit future 

misconduct, and should this expectation be disappointed, our 

progressive discipline system will await. 

¶34 As is our normal practice, we find it appropriate to 

impose the full costs of this disciplinary proceeding on 

Attorney Alfredson. See SCR 22.24(1m). 

¶35 Finally, as to restitution, none was sought and none 

is ordered. 

¶36 IT IS ORDERED that the license of Melinda Alfredson is 

suspended for a period of 90 days, effective April 9, 2019. 

¶37 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 

of this order, Melinda Alfredson shall pay to the Office of 

Lawyer Regulation the costs of this proceeding, which are 

$2,649.59 as of November 15, 2018. 

¶38 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Melinda Alfredson shall 

comply with the provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of 

a person whose license to practice law in Wisconsin has been 

suspended. 

¶39 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that compliance with all 

conditions of this order is required for reinstatement. See 

SCR 22.28(2). 
No. 2018AP520-D 

1