[Cite as In re I.G. , 2024

- Ohio

- 2335.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

PICKAWAY COUNTY

IN THE MATTER OF: :

:

I.G

. , : Case No. 23CA 2 7

:

AN ALLEGED :

DELINQUENT CHLD

. :

:

:

:

: DECISION AND JUDGMENT

: ENTRY

:

APPEARANCES :

Judy C. Wolford

, Pickaway County Prosecuting Attorney, and Lynne R. Nothstine,

Pickaway County Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Circleville , Ohio, for Appell ant

.

Evan N. Wagner, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellee.

Smith, J.

{¶1} Appellant, the State of Ohio , appeal s the trial court’s decision that

dismissed the delinquency complaint filed against Appellee, I.G

. For the reasons

that follow, we sustain Appellant ’ s first assignment of error , overrule the second

assignment of error as moot, and reverse the trial court’s judgment.

FACTSPickaway App. No. 23CA 2 7 2

{¶2} On June 12, 2023, a law enforcement officer filed a sworn complaint

that alleged Appellee is a delinquent child for knowingly caus ing or attempt ing to

cause physical harm to another, in violation of R.C. 2903.13(A). The complaint

asserted that Appellee is 14 years of age and list ed her date of birth as December

10, 2008.

{¶3} The officer also filed an affidavit containing the allegations forming

the basis for the complaint. This affidavit likewise states that Appellee’s date of

birth is December 10, 2008

. Furthermore, the affidavit alleged that the delinquent

conduct occurred at Circleville M iddle School and indicated that Appellee is a

student at the middle school.

{¶4} On June 30, 2023, Appellee appeared before the court and denied the

delinquency allegation. The trial court memo rialized Appellee’s denial in a

“Judgment Entry on Initial Appearance

. ” This entry listed Appellee’s birth date as

December 10, 2008.

{¶5} Appellee filed a financial disclosure form that listed her date of birth

as December 10, 2008. Appellee certified that the information that she provided

on the form “is true to the best of [her] knowledge.” The trial court subsequently

appointed counsel to represent Appellee.

{¶6} On October 23, 2023, the trial court held a n adjudication hearing

.

A.H.

, t he student Appellee allegedly assaulted, testified as follows. S he is 14 yearsPickaway App. No. 23CA 2 7 3

of age and currently is homeschooled. Last school year, she attended Circleville

Middle School. She stated that on May 25, 2023, Appellee, another middle school

student, “hit [her] in the head really hard.”

{¶7} After A.H.’s testimony, Appellant rested. At that time, Appellee’s

counsel asserted that she did not believe “that the State proved jurisdiction as far as

[Appellee] ’s age as being a juvenile.” Appellee thus requested the court to dismiss

the complaint “for lack of proof of jurisdiction.”

{¶8} Appellant countered that Appellee’s financial disclosure statement in

which she wrote her date of birth establishes the juvenile court’s jurisdiction

.

Appellant pointed out that Appellee’s date of birth, December 10, 2008, shows that

she is under 18 years of age and thus within the juvenile court’s jurisdiction

.

Appellee’s counsel asserted that Appellant could not rely on that document

because it was not notarized. The court stated that it would take the matter under

advisement.

{¶9} Appellee then presented character witnesses. The first witness

, a

former middle school a ssistant p rincipal

, stated that he knew Appellee as a student

and described her as a “wonderful student.” Another witness, t he middle school

counselor

, likewise indicated that Appellee was a middle school student. The

middle school Language Arts Intervention Specialist

, another middle schoolPickaway App. No. 23CA 2 7 4

intervention specialist

, and a middle school teacher similarly testified that Appellee

was a middle school student.

{¶10} After the adjudicatory hearing, the court permitted the parties to

submit written arguments regarding Appellee’s motion to dismiss the complaint

.

Appellee asserted that Appellant failed “to prove age jurisdiction at the

adjudicatory trial.” Appellee recognized that this court held

, in In re S.S.

, 4th Dist.

Vinton No. 10CA682, 2011

- Ohio

- 4081

, that an indigency affidavit suffices to

establish the individual’s age. Appellee contend ed

, however, that at the time we

decided S.S.

, indigency affidavits were required to be notarized or sworn.

Appellee asserted that since our 2011 S.S. decision, the rules have changed

, and

financial disclosure forms no longer need to be sworn under oath and notarized.

She cited Juv.R. 29(E)(3), which requires testimony to be “under oath or

affirmation,” and argued that Appellant could not rely upon an unsworn,

unnotarized document to prove her age. Appellee thus claimed that Appellant

failed to present competent evidence demonstrating that she is less than 18 years of

age

. Appellee argued that the court

, therefore, must dismiss the complaint.

{¶11} Appellant countered that “by appearing and proceeding with the

adjudication trial on October 23, 2023,” Appellee waived the argument that the

court lacked personal jurisdiction over her due to Appellant’s alleged failure to

establish her age

. Appellant further asserted that the record contained sufficientPickaway App. No. 23CA 2 7 5

proof that Appellee is under 18 years of age

. Appellant disputed Appellee’s claim

that her financial disclosure form was not competent evidence to establish her age.

Appellant pointed out that our S.S. decision did not indicate that the state must

establish age by means of sworn statements or testimony under oath

.

{¶12} Appellant also argued that Appellee’s financial disclosure form was

“reliable enough for the court t o appoint counsel based upon that information,” and

thus, “it is likewise reliable enough to prove the child’s age.” Appellant

additionall y asserted that “a juvenile’s age may be proved by evidence other than

sworn testimony.” Appellant contended that a court could rely upon observing the

child in person and deducing that the child is under 18 years of age. Appellant

stated that Appellee “appeared before the court at least three times during the

pendency of the proceeding, so th [e ] court had ample opportunity to observe that

she is a juvenile.”

{¶13} The trial court did not agree with any of Appellant’s arguments. The

court did not find our decision in S.S. to be dispositive. Instead, the court

distinguished that case by noting that in 2011, “an individual had to submit a

sworn, notarized Affidavit which would have included the juvenile’s date of birth.”

Since th a t time, however, the “form was modified to a Financial Disclosure Form

which is not a sworn, notarized Affidavit.” The court further noted that “Juv.R.

29(E)(3) mandates that evidence shoul d be submitted under oath or affirmation.”Pickaway App. No. 23CA 2 7 6

{¶14} The court also rejected Appellant’s argument that Appellee submitted

to the court’s personal jurisdiction. The court determined that in S.S.

, this c ourt

had refused to follow those appellate courts that have held that failure to raise the

issue before the adjudication hearing results in a waiver. The trial court stated:

“The Fourth District has long held that the establishment of age relates to the

jurisdiction of the juvenile court with proof of age being adduced at any time

[during] the proceeding.”

{¶15} The court found that Appellant failed to “present any testimony at the

adjudicatory hearing to establish” Appellee ’s age. The court further found that the

record did “not contain any sworn statement upon which [ Appellant ] can rely to

establish” Appellee ’s age. The court recognized that Appellee’s financial

disclosure form listed her date of birth. The court found, however, that th is

document “is not a sworn statement and does not meet the requirements of Juv.R.

2 9(E) (3). ”

{¶16} Thus, o n November 1, 2023, the trial court granted Appellee’s motion

to dismiss the delinquency complaint based upon Appellant’s “failure to establish

age jurisdiction at the adjudicatory trial.” This appeal followed.

ASSIGNMENT S OF ERROR

I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY REFUSING TO

ACCEPT THE DATE OF BIRTH STATED IN THE

AFFIDAVIT OF INDIGENCY AS SUFFICIENTPickaway App. No. 23CA 2 7 7

EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH THE COURT’S

PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER I.G.

II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FINDING THAT I.G.

DID NOT WAIVE OBJECTION TO THE JUVENILE

COURT’S PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER HER

.

FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

{¶17} In its first assignment of error, Appellant essentially asserts that the

trial court erred by granting Appellee’s motion to dismiss the complaint

.

Specifically , Appellant argues that the trial court erred by dismissing the complaint

based upon Appellant’s alleged failure to establish that Appellee is under 18 years

of age . Appellant contends that Appellee ’s financial disclosure form constitutes

sufficient evidence to establish her age.

{¶18} Appellee asserts that the trial court correctly determined that it lacked

subject matter jurisdiction due to Appellant’s failure to present sufficient evidence

to prove Appellee’s age. Appellee claims that in a delinquency proceeding, the

state must present evidence regarding the alleged delinquent child’s age in a form

that satisfies Juv.R. 29(E)(3), which requires testimony to be “under oath or

affirmation.”

{¶19} Appellee additionally argues that Juv.R. 29(E)(4) requires juvenile

courts to “[d]etermine the issues by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Appellee

contends that t his language means that in a delinquency proceeding, the state must

present admissible evidence regarding the alleged delinquent child’s age , and thePickaway App. No. 23CA 2 7 8

evidence must establish the alleged delinquent child’s age “beyond a reasonable

doubt.” Appellee thus asserts that unsworn testimony or documents, like a

financial disclosure form, are not competent evidence to establish an alleged

delinquent child’s age “by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Standard of Review

{¶20} A p pellate court s review trial court decision s regarding a motion to

dismiss based upon a lack of subject matter or personal jurisdiction under a de

novo standard of review. State v. Hudson , 169 Ohio St.3d 216, 2022

- Ohio

- 1435,

203 N.E.3d 658, ¶ 19; Fraley v. Estate of Oeding , 138 Ohio St.3d 250, 2014

- Ohio

452, 6 N.E.3d 9, ¶ 11.

Subject Matter Jurisdiction

{¶21} “Subject matter jurisdiction refers to the constitutional or statutory

power of a court to adjudicate a particular class or type of case.” State v. Harper

,

160 Ohio St.3d 480, 2020

- Ohio

- 2913, 159 N.E.3d 248, ¶ 22; Pratts v. Hurley

, 102

Ohio St.3d 81, 2004

- Ohio

- 1980, 806 N.E.2d 992, ¶ 11

- 12, 34. “ ‘[T] he focus is on

whether the forum itself is competent to hear the controversy. ’ ” Corder v. Ohio

Edison Co. , 162 Ohio St.3d 639, 2020

- Ohio

- 5220, 166 N.E.3d 1180, ¶ 14, quoting

Harper at ¶ 23, citing 18A Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice and

Procedure , Section 4428, at 6 (3d Ed.2017) ; accord State v. Jackson , 2023

- Ohio

3895, 226 N.E.3d 518, ¶ 20 (4th Dis t.).Pickaway App. No. 23CA 2 7 9

{¶22} Importantly, s ubject matter jurisdiction is a “ ‘ condition precedent to

the court’s ability to hear the case. If a court acts without jurisdiction, then any

proclamation by that court is void. ’ ” Pratts at ¶ 11 , quoting State ex rel. Jones v.

Suster , 84 Ohio St.3d 70, 75, 701 N.E.2d 1002 (1998). “ Because subject matter

jurisdiction goes to the power of the court to adjudicate the merits of a case, it can

never be waived and may be challenged at any time. ” Id. (citations omitted).

{¶23} The Ohio Constitution, Article IV, Section 4(B), provides that “[t]he

courts of common pleas and divisions thereof shall have such original jurisdiction

over all justiciable matters” as may be “provided by law.” “Therefore, the general

subject matter jurisdiction of Ohio courts of common pleas is defined by the

legislature.” In re K.K. , 170 Ohio St.3d 149, 2022

- Ohio

- 3888, 209 N.E.3d 660, ¶

52.

{¶24} “ R .C. 2151.07 establishes Ohio ’ s juvenile courts, which are divisions

of the courts of common pleas, and R.C. 2151.23(A) vests them with ‘ exclusive

original jurisdiction * * * [c]oncerning any child who on or about the date

specified in the complaint * * * is alleged * * * to be * * * a delinquent * * *

child. ’ ” Hudson at ¶ 24. A delinquent child includes “[a]ny child, except a

juvenile traffic offender, who violates any law of this state or the United States, or

any ordinance of a political subdivision of the state, that would be an offense if

committed by an adult.” R. C. 2152.02(E)(1). “ ‘Child’ means a person who isPickaway App. No. 23CA 2 7 10

under eighteen years of age, except as otherwise provided * * *.” R.C.

2152.02(C)(1). Accordingly, “ the juvenile court has the exclusive subject matter

jurisdiction over any case concerning a child who is alleged to be a delinquent. ”

State v. Wilson , 73 Ohio St.3d 40, 44, 652 N.E.2d 196 (1995) ; accord Hudson at ¶

29 (“juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction ” for acts committed as a juvenile that

would be felonies if committed by an adult); In re M.P. , 124 Ohio St.3d 445, 2010

-

Ohio

- 599, 923 N.E.2d 584, ¶ 11 (“[j] uvenile courts possess exclusive jurisdiction

over children alleged to be delinquent for committing acts that would constitute a

crime if committed by an adult ”)

.

Personal Jurisdiction

{¶25} “Personal jurisdiction refers to the court ’ s power to render a valid

judgment against a particular individual.” State v. Henderson , 161 Ohio St.3d 285,

2020

- Ohio

- 4784, 162 N.E.3d 776, ¶ 36. For instance, “[i] n a criminal matter, the

court acquires jurisdiction over a person by lawfully issued process, followed by

the arrest and arraignment of the accused and his plea to the charge. ” Id.

Additionally, a court may acquire jurisdiction over a person if that person “ does

not object to the court ’ s exercise of jurisdiction over him. ” Id.

Analysis

{¶26} In the case at bar, during the proceedings below, Appellee framed her

argument to the trial court’s assertion of jurisdiction as an “age jurisdiction” issue.Pickaway App. No. 23CA 2 7 11

On appeal, s he has clarified that she challenged the court’s subject matter

jurisdiction

, not its exercise of personal jurisdiction

. Additionally, the trial court

appears to have reviewed Appellee’s motion as challenging its subject matter

jurisdiction. Thus, we likewise will review Appellee’s challenge as a challenge to

the court’s subject matter jurisdiction.

{¶27} T he allegations contained in Appellee’s delinquency complaint wer e

sufficient to invoke the juvenile court’s subject matter jurisdiction under R.C.

2151.23(A)

. See State ex rel. Parker v. Black , 168 Ohio St.3d 368, 2022

- Ohio

1730, 198 N.E.3d 860, ¶ 17, quoting Click v. Eckle , 174 Ohio St. 88, 89, 186

N.E.2d 731 (1962) (a court’s “ ‘felony jurisdiction is invoked by the return of a

proper indictment by the grand jury of the county’ ”); State v. Mbodji , 129 Ohio

St.3d 325, 2011

- Ohio

- 2880, 951 N.E.2d 1025, ¶ 21 (“a complaint that meets the

requirements of Crim.R. 3 invokes the subject matter jurisdiction of a [municipal]

court”) ; State v. Filiaggi , 86 Ohio St.3d 230, 240, 714 N.E.2d 867 (1999), quot ing

In re Waite (1991), 188 Mich.App. 189, 200, 468 N.W.2d 912, 917, quoting

Jackson City Bank & Trust Co. v. Fredrick (1935), 271 Mich. 538, 544

– 546, 260

N.W. 908, 909 ( w hen “ ‘ “ it is apparent from the allegations that the matter alleged

is within the class of cases in which a particular court has been empowered to act,

jurisdiction is present ” ’ ” )

. T he complaint (1) alleged that Appellee is a

delinquent child for having committ ed a n act that would be a criminal offense if anPickaway App. No. 23CA 2 7 12

adult had committed the offense, and (2) stated that she was 14 years of age at the

time of the alleged delinquent conduct

. These allegations we re sufficient to invoke

the juvenile court’s jurisdiction. In re H.M.M. , 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C

- 210590,

2022

- Ohio

- 473, ¶ 15 (“[t]he complaint’s allegations bring the matter within the

juvenile court’s subject matter jurisdiction”); In re C.T. , 2nd Dist. Montgomery

No. 24036, 2010

- Ohio

- 5887, ¶ 13 (“[s]ince the complaint alleged C.T. to be a

delinquent child, the court was rebuttably presumed to have subject matter

jurisdiction”); In re Burton S. , 136 Ohio App.3d 386, 391

– 92, 736 N.E.2d 928 (6th

Dist.1999) (“[s]ince the complaint in this case alleged appellant to be a delinquent

child, the juvenile court had subject matter jurisdi ction”) ; s ee generally State v.

Washington , 2nd Dist. Montgomery No. 20218, 2004

- Ohio

- 5283, ¶ 14 (explaining

that if the defendant “ did not satisfy the statutory definition of a child, it follows

that original jurisdiction over the charges against him did not lie with the juvenile

court ”)

.

{¶28} Appellee nevertheless asserts that upon her objection, our precedent

( In re S.S. , 4th Dist. Vinton No. 10CA682, 2011

- Ohio

- 4081, and In re Patrick , 4th

Dist. Scioto No. 1618 (May 13, 1987)) require d Appellant to introduce competent

,

admissible evidence to prove her ag e, and, hence, the court’s subject matter

jurisdiction

. In both cases, we stated that “ ‘age is not an element in establishing

delinquency, but relates only to the jurisdiction of the court.’ ” S.S. at ¶ 17,Pickaway App. No. 23CA 2 7 13

quoting Patrick at *2

, citing In re Fudge , 59 Ohio App

. 2d 129, 132 , 392 N.E.2d

1262 ( 2d Dist. 1977). We further concluded that “ proof of age must be ‘ adduced at

any time in the proceeding .’ ” Id. , quoting Patrick at *2

.

{¶29} In S.S.

, at the end of the adjudicatory hearing, the alleged delinquent

child asked the court to dismiss the complaint because the state failed to prove his

age . W e determined that the state could establish the child’s age at any time in the

proceeding and did not need to present evidence regarding the alleged delinquent

child’s age during the adjudicatory h e aring. We pointed out that the alleged

delinquent child had submitted a “financial disclosure/affidavit of indigency” form,

and we concluded that this form constituted sufficient proof to establish the alleged

delinquent child’s age. Id. We pointed out that the form “certif[ied] that the

information [the child] provided [in his] financial disclosure form [was] true to the

best of [his] knowledge.” Id.

{¶30} In Patrick

, the alleged delinquent child filed a motion at the end of the

state ’s case that asked the court to dismiss the complaint based upon the state’s

failure to introduce any evidence during its case

- in

- chief to prove the alleged

delinquent child ’s age. W e concluded that “ while it was error to not require proof

of age when the motion was made, the error was not prejudicial when the age of

appellant was subsequently adduced upon cross examination of appellant and prior

to the adjudication of delinquency. ” Id. at *2

. We agreed in principle, however,Pickaway App. No. 23CA 2 7 14

that if “ no proof of age [ had ] been adduced at any time in the proceeding, a

reversal would have been required .” Id.

{¶31} I n the case at bar, the record contains ample evidence to show that

Appellee was under 18 years of age at the time of the delinquent conduct.

{¶32} First, Appellee submitted a financial disclosure form that listed her

birth date as December 10, 2008. As in S.S. , Appellee certified that the

information that she provided on the form was “true to the best of [her]

knowledge.” When the alleged May 25, 2023 delinquent conduct occurred,

therefore, Appellee would have been 14 years of age, which obviously is less than

18 years of age.

{¶33} We do not agree with the trial court’s conclusion that Juv.R. 29(E)(3)

or our precedent requires a sworn statement or testimony to prove an alleged

delinquent child’s age. By its terms, Juv.R 29(E)(3) applies to testimony given at

the adjudication hearing . As S.S. and Patrick make clear, an alleged delinquent

child’s age may be shown “ ‘at any time in the proceeding,’ ” with “proceeding”

meaning “ ‘ [t]he regular and orderly progression of a lawsuit , including all acts and

events between the time of commen cement and the entry of judgment.’ ” S.S. at ¶

17, quoting Black ’ s Law Dictionary (9 Ed.2009) . Neither S.S. nor Patrick

indicates that age must be shown through sworn testimony.Pickaway App. No. 23CA 2 7 15

{¶34} Furthermore, the trial court’s “Judgment Entry on Initial Appearance”

listed Appellee’s birth date as December 10, 2008.

{¶35} The trial court additionally observed Appellee on multiple occasions

and never questioned whether Appellee was less than 18 years of age. Fudge

, 59

Ohio App.2d at 132 (observing that the child “ appeared with counsel ” and “ was

seen and observed by the court ,” which “ may constitute sufficient evidence that the

subject is a juvenile” ).

{¶36} Moreover, even if age must be shown through sworn testimony,

multiple witnesses testified at the adjudication hearing that

, at the time of the

offense, Appellee was a middle school student. See In re D.M. , 5th Dist. Stark No.

2010CA00213, 2011

- Ohio

- 276, ¶ 24 (evidence sufficient to establish appellant was

less than 18 years of age when trial testimony referred to appellant and others

involved in the incident as “kids,” and when one witness testified that appellant

attended high school or was home schooled)

. Plus, i t is common knowledge that

middle school students are less than 18 years of age.

{¶37} For all of the foregoing reasons, we believe that the record contains

sufficient evidence to establish that Appellee was less than 18 years of age at the

time of the alleged delinquent conduct. Therefore, the trial court incorrectly

dismissed the delinque ncy complaint.Pickaway App. No. 23CA 2 7 16

{¶38} Accordingly, based upon the foregoing reasons, we sustain

Appellant’s first assignment of error.

SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

{¶39} In its second assignment of error, Appellant contends that the trial

court erred by concluding that Appellee did not waive the argument that the court

lacked personal jurisdiction over her due to Appellant’s alleged failure to submit

adequate evidence to e stablish that Appellee is under 18 years of age. Appellant

argues that in State v. Bear

, 4th Dist. Gallia No. 18CA8, 2019

- Ohio

- 466 , this court

recognized that “the age of an alleged delinquent juvenile relates to the personal

jurisdiction of the court over the child,” and that “personal jurisdiction can be

waived expressly, or by failure to object.” Appellant claims that Appellee wa ived

the right to challenge the court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction by failing to

object to the court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction at the earliest opportunity and

by voluntarily submitting herself to the court’s jurisdiction.

{¶40} Appellee counters that her objection to the juvenile court’s

jurisdiction involve d a challenge to the court’s subject matter, not personal,

jurisdiction. As such, she asserts that Appellant’s waiver argument is meritless.

{¶41} Appellee further asserts that our previous statement in Bear that “age

relates to the personal jurisdiction of the court” does not require us to reach the

same conclusion in the case at bar. She contends that Bear involved an adult,Pickaway App. No. 23CA 2 7 17

criminal defendant who had sought post

- conviction relief. Appellee thus claims

that Bear does not apply to her case, which involves a delinquency complaint in

juvenile court. Appellee additionally argues that Bear stands “in direct conflict

with Patrick , and the myriad of other authorities indicating issues regarding age

relates [sic] to the subject matter jurisdiction of the juvenile court.”

{¶42} We believe that o ur disposition of A ppellant ’ s first assignment of

error renders her remaining assignment of error moot. See State ex rel. Cincinnati

Enquirer v. Hunter , 141 Ohio St.3d 419, 2014

- Ohio

- 5457, 24 N.E.3d 1170, ¶ 4

(internal quotations omitted) (explaining that issues are moot “when they are or

have become fictitious, colorable, hypothetical, academic or dead”); State v.

Hudnall , 4th Dist. Lawrence No. 15CA8, 2015

- Ohio

- 3939, ¶ 7 (“A[n issue] is

moot when a court ’ s determination on a particular s ubject matter will have no

practical effect on an existing controversy.”); State v. Moore , 4th Dist. Adams No.

13CA987, 2015

- Ohio

- 2090, ¶ 6 and 7 (“The principle of “judicial restraint”

mandates that Ohio courts should not exercise jurisdiction over questions of law

that have been rendered moot”; and “an issue is moot when it has no practical

significance and, instead, presents a hypothetical or academic question.”); Schwab

v. Lattimore , 166 Ohio App.3d 12, 2006

- Ohio

- 1372, 848 N.E.2d 912, ¶ 10 (1st

Dist.) ( “The duty of a court of appeals is to decide controversies between parties by

a judgment that can be carried into effect, and the court need not render anPickaway App. No. 23CA 2 7 18

advisory opinion on a moot question or a question of law that cannot affect the

issues in a case.”). We therefore need not address A ppellant ’ s second assignment

of error. 1 App.R. 12(A)(1)(c).

{¶43} Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s second assignment of error as

moot.

CONCLUSION

{¶1} We sustain Appellant’s first assignment of error, overrule its second

assignment of error as moot, reverse the trial court’s judgment, and remand for

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

JUDGMENT REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR FURTHER

PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION

.

1 We observe that t he Ohio Supreme Court has indicated that age relates to a juvenile court’s subject matter

jurisdiction. In re A.W. , 160 Ohio St.3d 183, 2020

- Ohio

- 1457, 155 N.E.3d 819, ¶ 1 and 8 (stating that “juvenile

court lacked subject matter jurisdiction” to invoke the adult sentence under a serious youthful offender specification

once juvenile reached 21 years of age); see also State v. Walls , 96 Ohio St.3d 437, 2002

- Ohio

- 5059, 775 N.E.2d

829, ¶ 14 (stating that “the age of the offender upon apprehension [is] the touchstone [for] determining juvenile

court jurisdiction”); accord In re R.B. , 162 Ohio St.3d 281, 2020

- Ohio

- 5476, 165 N.E.3d 288, ¶ 27 (“[t]he general

rule is that a juvenile court has jurisdiction over juveniles who have been adjudicated delinquent until they reach the

age of 21”); State ex rel. Jean

- Baptiste v. Kirsch , 134 Ohio St.3d 421, 2012

- Ohio

- 5697 (juvenile court lack ed

jurisdiction to perform an initial sex offender classification once disposition complete and adjudicated delinquent

turns 21 ); In re J.V. , 134 Ohio St.3d 1, 2012

- Ohio

- 4961 (juvenile court lack ed jurisdiction to hold new sentencing

hearing to correct disposition and impose post

- release control after adjudicated delinquent turns 21 ).Pickaway App. No. 23CA 2 7 19

JUDGMENT ENTRY

It is ordered that the JUDGMENT BE REVERSED AND REMANDED

FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION and that

costs be assessed to Appell ee

.

The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the

Pickaway County Common Pleas Court, Juvenile Division, to carry this judgment

into execution.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule

27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Abele, J., and Hess, J., concur in Judgment and Opinion.

For the Court,

_____________________________ Jason P. Smith

Presiding Judge

NOTICE TO COUNSEL

Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final

judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the

date of filing with the clerk.