Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Anna G. Aita , Misc. Dock et No. 90,

September Term 2016. Opinion by Hotten, J.
ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE

— SANCTIONS

— DISBARMENT The Court of Appeals disbarred Respondent, Anna G. Aita , from the practice of law in Maryland

. Respondent violated Maryland Lawyers ’ Rules of Professional Conduct 1.1, 1.3, 1.4(a) and (b), 1.5, 1.15(a), (c), and (d), 1.16(d), 3.3(a)(1), and 8.4(a), (c), and (d). Additionally, Respondent violated former Marylan d Rules 16

- 604 and 16

- 606.1. These violations stemmed from Respondent ’ s representation of two former clients in immigration matters. Responde nt failed to represent these clients competently and diligently, failed to communicate with them about the status of their cases, failed to appear in court with them, failed to safeguard their funds, charged the client an unreasonable fee, and failed to refund unused immigration filing fees to the client. Respondent misrepresented material facts to an immigration ju dge, failed to ascertain the status of the client ’ s case, and failed to advise clients of the status of their cases. Disbarment is the appropriate sanction for Respondent ’ s misconduct.Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County

Case No. C

- 02

- CV

- 17

- 564 Argued: January 8, 2018 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
Misc. Docket AG No. 90 September Term, 20 16

__________________________________ ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION OF MARYLAND

v. ANNA G. AITA

__________________________________ Barbera, C.J. , Greene , Adkins , McDonald , Watts, Hotten , Getty , JJ.

__________________________________

Opinion by Hotten, J.

__________________________________ Filed: March 27, 2018On or about November 18, 2016, the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland

(“Petitioner”) , directed that charges be filed against Anna G. Aita (“ Respondent ”)

. On February 16, 2017, Petitioner, acting through Bar Counse l, filed in this Court a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action (“Petition”) against Respondent

. The misconduct stemmed from Respondent ’ s representation of two former clients in immigration matters. Specifically, Petitioner alleged that Respondent failed to represent these clients competently and diligently, f ailed to communicate with them regarding the status of their cases, failed to appear in court on their behalf , failed to safeguard their funds, charged the
client s an unreasonable fee, failed t o refund unused immigration filing fees to the client, misrepresented material facts to an immigration judge, failed to ascertain the status of the
client s’ case s , and failed to advise the clients of the status of their cases. Based on the misconduct, Pe titioner alleged violations of Maryland Lawyers ’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MLRPC”) 1.1 (Competence), 1.3 (Diligence), 1.4 (Communication), 1.5 (Fees), 1.15 (Safekeeping property), 1.16(d) (Declining or Terminating Representation), 3.3(a)(1) (Candor T owards the Tribunal), and 8.4(a) , (c) , and (d) (Misconduct). Petitioner further
averred violations of former Maryland Rules 16

- 604 (Trust Account

– Required Deposits)
and 16

- 606.1 (Attorney Trust Account Record

- Keeping). 1

1 E ffective July 1, 2016, the Maryland Lawyers ’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MLRPC”) were renamed the Maryland Attorneys ’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MARPC”) and re

- codified, without substantive change, in Title 19 of the Maryland Rules. Rules governing attorney discipline were also recodified in Title 19 of the Maryland Rules. Respondent ’ s mis conduct occurred prior to t he recodification and renaming of the relevant rules. Therefore, we refer to the MLRPC , and the Maryland Rules by their former designations, throughout this opinion

.2

On February 27, 2017 , this Court transferred the matter to Judge Glenn L. Klavans (“the hearing judge”), of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County , to conduct an evidentiary hearing (“the hearing”). The Clerk of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County issued a summons on February 28, 2017. The Petition and summons were served on Respondent on April 3, 2017. After receiving an extension of time, an Answer was filed on May 3, 2017. Petitioner and Respondent met with the hearing judge for a scheduling c onference on April 21, 2017. Petitioner filed an Amended Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action on May 18, 2017. Respondent filed a timely Answer on June 2, 2017. An evidentiary hearing took place , from July 24, 2017 , through July 27,
2017

. At th e conclusion of the hearing, the hearing judge directed the parties to file Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law by August 21, 2017.

THE HEARING JUDGE ’ S FINDINGS OF FACT

We summarize the he aring judge’s findings of fact. Respondent was adm itted to
the Maryland Bar on June 19, 2002. She began a solo law practice in May of 2003, and
described her areas of concentration as immigration, criminal, traffic, family , and civil litigation. She speaks, reads, and writes in both English and Spanish. Although Respondent resides in Easton, Maryland, she maintains her office for the practice of law in Glen Burnie, Maryland. Respondent testified that she has experienced recurrent health problems, including problems with sciatica on both sides , and bulging discs in her back. She also testified that she had vertigo in 2013 and micro colitis, which is similar to irritable3

bowel syndrome. Respondent did not present any evidence confirming the aforementioned diagnoses or treatment. The misconduct rel ated to th is investigation by Bar Counsel involves Respondent ’ s representation of two clients, Isaac Escalante and Ingris Ardon. Representation of Isaac Escalante Isaac Escalante (“Escalante”) is a native of Gua temala who entered the United
States in Feb ruary of 2002. He resides with his partner, Francisca Calmo Ramos (“Calmo Ramos”) , in Sudlersvill e, Maryland. They have five children together who are all United
States citizens . Escalante does not speak or read English fluently. In March of 2012,
Esca lante was arrested for traffic violations in Queen Anne ’ s County , Maryland, and was taken into custody by the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), Immig ration and
Customs Enforcement. Thereafter, Escalante was placed in removal proceedings

. In April of 2012, Calmo Ramos retained Respondent to represent Escalante in his
cri minal and immigration matters. A retainer agreement was provided to Escalante in both English and Spanish. The total fee for representat ion in both cases was $2,500

. Esc alante paid Respondent $2,500 in increments. The funds were not held in a n attorney trust account, and had not been previously earned at the times of payment. Escalante did not provide his informed consent, in writing, agreeing to the deposit of his advance fee payments in a non

- trust account

. Respondent contended that the payments were not place d
in a n attorney trust acco unt because they were received to o close in time to when they were earned, or alternatively, that such incremental payments had been earned. However,4

Respondent produce d no account records, timesheets , or other evidence to substantiate
these claims. Escalante was satisfied with the services that Respondent rendered regarding
his traffic case.
In Escalante ’ s immigration case, Respondent filed an Applicati on for Cancellation
of Removal with the immigration c ourt. Sometime in 2012 , during Escalante ’s detention , Respondent came to his house to sort through the family ’ s personal documents with Calmo
Ramos , to ascertain which documents would be he lpful in supporting Escalante ’ s application for Cancella tion of Removal. Respondent made copies of the family ’ s original
documents , but never returned the originals. Respondent also did not file any of the
documentation she collected from Calmo Ramos

. During the hearing, Respondent testif ied
that these documents were n ot helpful to Escalante’s case, but also denied ever receiving the supporting documentation

. A Master Calendar hearing 2 was scheduled in Escalante ’ s case for Novembe r 26,
2013 at 1:00 p.m. at the immigration c ourt in Baltimore, Maryland. At 1:05 p.m. that day , Respondent sent Escalante a text message indicating that her partner attorney, Charles
Yates (“Yates”) , would be substituting for her in immigration court

. In actuality, Yates

w as not Respondent ’ s partner, but rather an independent attorney acting as a substitute.

2 A Master Calendar hearing is an individual’s first appearance before an immigration judg e in removal proceedings. Immigration Court Practice Manual, Ch. 4: Hearings before Immigration Judges, https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2012/11/08/ Chap%204.pdf , ( https://perma.cc/LP2G

- VAMA ) (last visited February 27, 2018).5

Escalante replied t o Respondent by text message, “[w] hen is my court?” A t 2:10 p

. m
. , Respondent replie d, “[t] oday 1:00 p [.] m.” Escalante replied, “ I didn ’ t know .” A t the time that he received Respondent ’ s text message at 2:10 pm, Escalante was working on the
Eastern Shore of Maryland. Yates appeared at the immigration court on Respondent ’ s behalf, but Escalante did not appear. Yates contacted Respondent to alert her that Escalante had failed to appear, but received no response. The immigration j udge ordered Escalante
removed from the United States of America in absentia

. Escalante contacted Respondent
on the afternoon of Novem ber 26, 2013, through a text message saying “I am Isaac, please answer me. I need to speak with you.” Respondent never replied. Escalante sent another text message on November 27, 2013, inquirin g about the status of his case. Again, Respondent did not r eply. Respondent initially testified that she had a telephone conversation with Escalante on the morning of November 26, 2013, and advised him of the hear ing and Yate s ’ representation. Later, Respondent chang ed her testimony and asserted that she le ft
E scalante a telephone message. Additionally, Respondent testified that she failed to appear on behalf of Escalante in immigration court because her cat died. Respondent presented a copy of a letter in English from her client file, addressed
to Escalante , dated October 19, 2013. The letter reflects that a Master Calendar hearing is scheduled for November 26, 2013 , at 1: 00 pm. The letter also states “[i] f you do not6

understand this document, I further note that it is your responsibility to have it transl ated.” No proof was offered that the letter was mailed

. Escalante never received it

. On January 20, 2014, Escalante again attempted to contact Respondent by text and asked if he could reopen his immigration case. Respondent replied, “[y]ou can. I am going to need 295 dollars.” On February 18, 2014, Respondent filed a Motion to Reopen
Escalante ’ s case. Escalante paid the $110 filing fee for the motion. Respondent deposited
Escalante ’ s fees into her firm ’ s o p erating a ccount. In the Motion to Re open, Respondent falsely represented to the immigration court that Escalante failed to appear for his hearing on November 26, 2013 , because Escalante ’ s “car broke down while he was over one hour away in an area with no taxi service and no public transporta tion. He was unable to find someone to bring him to court on the day of his [ M ] aster [ C ] alendar hearing.”
On February 19, 2014, the immigration judge granted the Motion to Reopen and set another hearing for March 11, 2014. Respondent never informed Esc alante th at his case was reopened and scheduled for another hearing. On March 11, 2014, both Escalante and Respondent failed to appear, and Escalante was ordered removed in absentia for a second
time. In 2015, Escalante was arrested by DHS, taken into cu stody, and denied bond
because of the final order of removal. After learning of Escalante ’ s arrest, Calmo Ramos telephoned Respondent. Calmo Ramos paid Respondent $200 to file a second Motion to Reopen on Escalante ’ s behalf. Respondent did not file the Motion to Reopen and later sent7

Calmo Ramos a money order for $295, representing the motion filing fees, the Cancellation of Removal application fee, and a DHS biometrics fee. Escalante filed a complaint with the Attorney Grievance Commission in July of 2 015. Escalante first learned that he was
ordered removed in absentia after he filed a complaint with the Attorney Grievance
Commission. Escalante subsequently retained Rene Swafford (“Swafford”) , Esq uire

. Swafford tried several times to contact Respondent by telephone, and left two messages for her , but Respondent never ret urned the calls. In September of 2015, Swafford requested a copy of
Escalante ’ s client file from Respondent, but received no response

. Respondent contende d
that she did not provide Escalante ’ s file because Swafford did not present a release signed by Escalante , granting permission

. In December of 2015, Bar Counsel requested that Respondent provide Escalante ’ s file to Swafford

. In Janua ry of 2016, Respondent complied. Representation of Ingris Ardon Ingris Ardon (“A rdon”) is a native of Guatemala, who does not speak or read English fluently. She resides in Reisterstown, Maryland with her three children , who are
all United States citize ns
. In July 2013, Ardon retained Respondent to represent her at her
individual calendar hearing 3 on October 29, 2013

. Pursuant to the retainer agreement,

3 “ Ev identiary hearings on contested matters are referr ed to as individual calendar hearings or merits hearings . Contested matters include challenges to removability and applications (continued . . . )8

which was in both English and Spanish, Respondent charged Ardon a flat fee of $3,000 for the represe ntation, with $1,000 due at signing, and the balance due over a period of four months in installments of $500 each. Ardon paid Respondent a total of $2,500 in
increments. The funds were not deposit ed into a trust account, and were not previously earned at the times of payment. Ardon also paid Responden t $185 on September 14, 2013, to be used for the filing fee for the Application for Suspension of Deportation and biometric fee charged by DHS. Respondent did not deposit this paym ent into a trust account. Ardon did not provide her informed consent, in writing, agreeing to the deposit of her advance fee payments and filing
fee in a non

- trust account. Respondent claimed that such payments were not deposited into
a trust account bec ause they were received so close in time to when they were earned, or alternatively, that because they were paid in increments, the incremental payments had
been earned. However, Respondent could produce no evidence, account records or
timesheets to subst antiate these claims. Respondent instructed Ardon to bring documents to her office to demonstrate her eligibility for Suspension of Deportation. Ardon provided Respondent with 585 pages of documents. Respondent also instructed Ardon to write out a person al history. Ardon did

(. . . continued) f or relief. ” Immigration Court Practice Manual, Ch. 4: Hearings before Immigration Judges, https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir /legacy/2012/11/08/Chap%204.pdf , (https://perma.cc/LP2G

- VAMA) (last visited February 27, 2018).9

not understand what she was supposed to compose and sought clarification. Respondent replied that Ardon should seek assistance from her children and canceled several of their appointments. Respondent never filed any applications, p leadings , or supporting
documentation on Ardon ’ s behalf

. According to Respondent, she was not provided sufficient proof of continuous physical presence, or proof of hardship to Ardon ’ s children,
should Ardon be deported to Guatemala.
In October 2013, Res pon dent reminded Ardon that a $500 payment was due on October 20, 2013. On October 19, 2013, Respondent granted Ardon an extension. On October 21, 2013, Ardon texted Respondent that, “ I sent the check by mail. I hope it ’ s not lost and you receive it.” A rdon followed up by text o n October 24, 2013 by asking, “[t] ell me did you get the ch eck,” and Respondent replied, “[y] es.” However, Respondent later sent correspondence to Ardon claiming that she never received the $500 payment in
October of 2013. No pr oof was presented regarding receipt of the check, or process by any
bank. Ardon was supposed to be fingerprinted by DHS as a requirement for her Application for Suspension of Deportation

. Respondent advised Ardon on the procedure for fingerprinting via text message. After going to several administr ative offices within
DHS to secure documents for fingerprinting , Ardon was unable to do so. On October 29, 2013, Ardon and her three children appeared in immigration court
for the scheduled individual hea ring. Respondent sent Ardon a text message just prior to the scheduled hearing that she would not be coming to court with her because Respondent ’ s10

family member had an emergency. However, Respondent testified that her cat sustained a fatal blood clot. Re spondent informed Ardon that a substitute attorney, Yates , would a ppear on her behalf and seek a continuance. Ardon had never met Yates previously

. When Yates arrived, he told Ardon and her family “I know nothing about your case.” It appeared that
the h earing had been rescheduled due to a government shutdown. However, Respondent

was unaware of the rescheduling, and made no effort to ascertain its status. On December 18, 2013, Respondent sent Ardon a letter releasing her as a client
because of Ardon ’ s failure to make the October and November 2013 payments pursuant to the retainer agreement. The letter also indicates that Respondent was going to withdraw
from Ardon ’ s case, but Respondent never entered her appearance with the court. On December 20, 20 13, Respondent sent Ardon a letter informing her that Respondent would apply the $185 filing fee towards Ardon ’ s balance. Ardon requested a refund of all of her
money, but Respondent failed to refund funds specifically paid to her in trust for the payment of filing fees. Expert Witness Testimony
Petitioner called John F. Gossart, Jr. (“Judge Gossart”) , a retired federal immigration Judge, as an expert in immigration law an d immigration court procedure

. Judge Gossart testified that Respondent ’ s representation of Escalante and Ardon was incompetent. Judge Gossart opined that an Application for Cancellation of Removal is a discretionary one, and while Escalante met the basic r equirements under the law, he would11

need supporting evidentiary documents to demonstrate that removal to Guatemala would result in extreme and unusual hardship to his five children. According to Judge Gossart,

t he application Respondent filed was bare bon es, illegible in parts, and lacked supporting
evidence. The hearing judge did not accept Judge Gossart ’ s opinions regarding the merits
of Escalante ’ s case, but conceded that the documents Respondent did not file were relevant. There was conflicting evid ence in Ardon ’ s case regarding her eligibility for relief , because Ardon could not demonstrate seven years of continuous physical presence in this country

. Judge Gossart testified that Ardon had provided Respondent with evidence to support an application for Suspen sion of Deportation. Ardon provided Respondent with bank statements, pay stubs, tax returns, personal references, and her children’s school records, among other things, which would have been relevant evidence for such an application. Judge Goss art opined that Respondent ’ s failure to file anything with the immigration court , including a Motion to Continue, an Entry of Appearance, or any supplemental evidence to go forward on Ardon ’ s Application for Suspension of Deportation, reflected incompetenc e
. In Ardon ’ s case, the immigration court would not have been able to notify Respondent that the hearing was going to be postponed because Respondent had not filed an Entry of Appearance. Respondent called Ronald Richey (“Richey”), Esquire, to testify on her behalf as an expert in immigration law and immigration court pr ocedure. Richey opined that Respondent ’ s representation of Escalante and Ardon was competent and diligent, but he12

also pr ovided conflicting testimony. Regarding Escalante, Richey said that he would have
filed more supporting document s , not sent a Spanish

- speaking client a letter in English,
and that an at torney should file a Motion to R eopen a case for a detained client, no t ignore
the matter. Further, Richey asserted that an attorney could call the immigration court, visit the court, or call a toll free telephone number to inquire about the status of a matter. Regarding representation of Ar don, Richey explained that it w as not a violation of a standard of care to request a continuance when a client has not provided all the necessary evidence to support her case. However, Richey determined that the evidence Ardon provided to Respondent was relevant. Respondent’s Testimony Respondent’ s explanation as to why she did not place client funds in a tru st account was because she “ earned the fees fairly quickly, ” and that there were occasions when she could not deposit money in the bank for ten or fifteen days. She t estified that she wished
she had discontinued Ardon ’s representation sooner. The hearing judge noted a lack of remorse, and that Respondent was protecting her own self

- interest. On cross

- examination, Respondent admitted that she has been practicing immigration law for fourteen years. She
was familiar with a toll

- free telephone system to check on matters, but could not explain why she did not follow up on Escalante’s case. When confronted with her failure to inform Escalante of his hearing dates, s he blamed him for not returning her calls

. Re garding Escalante’ s new counsel’ s request for his file, Respondent initially denied receiving the13

calls, but then blamed Swafford for not stating the reason for her call. Regarding the $500 payment sent by Ardon in October 201 3 that Respondent later denied receiving in a letter, Respondent explained that she did not return Ardon’s fees because she felt Ardon still owed her money.

V arious friends, colleagues, and associates of Respondent testified on her beha lf
that she was ho nest and a good lawyer. None of those witnesses were knowledgeable on the subject o f immigration law or Respondent’ s reputation within the immigration law community , except Yates

.

THE HEARING JUDGE ’ S CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Based on the aforementioned findin gs of fact, the hearing judge concluded that the evidence concerning Respondent ’ s representation of Escalante and Ardon established violations of MLRPC 1.1 (Competence), 1.3 (Diligence), 1.4(a) and (b) (Communication), 1.5 (Fees), 1.15(a), (c), and (d) (Sa fekeeping Property), 1.16(d) (Declining or Terminating Representation), 3.3(a)(1) (Candor Towards the Tribunal), and 8.4(a) and (c) (Misconduct). The hearing judge additionally found violations of former Maryland Rules
16

- 604 and 16

- 606.1. The following are summaries of the relevant M L RPC and the hearing judge ’ s reasoning for concluding Respondent violated each part :

Rule 1.1 Competence A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.14

Respondent violated Rule 1.1 in Ardon’s matter b y failing to pursue any relief before the immigration court, all while allowing the client to rely on Respondent ’ s representations that she would do so. In both Escalante ’s and Ardon ’ s matters, Respondent
violated Rule 1.1 b y sending Yates, a substitute attorney with no knowledge of the matters and no relationship with the clients , on her behalf

. Rule 1.3 Diligence A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.
Respondent violated Rule 1.3 in Escalante ’ s case because she failed to ensure that he was aware of his November 26, 2013 , hearing or to file any of his supporting evid ence with the court

. Respondent further lacked diligence because she failed to file an Entry of Appearance, supporting documentation, witnes s list, or a Motion to Continue on Ardon ’ s behalf.

Rule 1.4 Communication (a) A lawyer shall: (1) promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance with respect to which the client ’ s informe d consent, as defined in Rule l .0(f), is required by these Rules; (2) keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter; (3) promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; and (4) consult with the client about any relevant limitation on the lawyer ’ s conduct when the lawyer knows that the client expects assistance not permitted by the Maryland Lawyers ’ Rules of Professional Conduct or other law. (b) A lawyer shal l explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.15

In Escalante ’ s matter , Respondent violated Rule l.4(a) when she failed to keep him reasonably informed about the status of his case , most particularly , the scheduled hearing
dates. She failed to promptly comply with reasonable requests for information from Escalante and his partner, Calm o Ramos. Regarding Ardon, Respondent violated Rule 1.4(a) when she failed to keep her reasonably informed regarding the status of her case.

In Escalante ’ s case, Respondent purportedly sent him letters in English, a language
he cannot read or write. Re spondent ’ s inclusion in the letter that “ [ i ] f you do not
underst and this document... it is your responsibility to have it translated ” makes clear that Respondent violated Rule l.4(b) when she did not communicate w ith the client in a manner
that allows the cl ient to make an informed decision.

Rule 1.5 Fees A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge, or collect an unreasonable fee or an unr easonable amount for expenses . The factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the f ollowing: (1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment of the lawyer; (3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services; (4) the amount involved and the results obtained; (5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances; (6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; (7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and (8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.16

In Ardon ’ s matter, Respondent ’ s fee of $3,000 ($2,500 of which was paid)

con stit uted an unreasonable fee, because Respondent filed nothing on her behalf. Rule 1.15 Safekeeping Property (a) A lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons that is in a lawyer ’ s possession in connection with a representation separate from the lawyer ’ s own property. Funds shall be kept in a separate account maintained pursuant to Title I6, Chapter 600 of the Maryland Rules[ ].

**** (c) Unless a client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing, to a different arrangement, a lawyer shall de posit legal fees and expenses that have been paid in advance into a client trust account and may withdraw those funds for the lawyer ’ s own benefit only as fees are earned or expenses incurred. (d) Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person. Except as stated in this Rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the client, a lawyer shall deliver promptly to the client or third person any fund s o r other property that the client or third person is entitled to receive and, upon request by the client or third person, shall render promptly a full accounting regarding such property.

  In both Escalante ’ s and Ardon ’ s cases, Respondent failed to hold any of the clients ’
funds in an attorney trust account , including their filing fees for Cancellation of Removal for Escalante and Suspension of Deportation for Ardon. Both clients wer e also required to pay an $85 fee to DHS to be fingerprinted, and those funds were also not held in an attorney

trust account

. Respondent had not earned such fees when paid, nor did she have the clients ’ informed consent, in writing, to hold these funds outside of the trust account. In Ardon ’ s17

case, Respondent also violated Rule 1.15(d) because she failed to refund $185 paid for
Ardon ’ s fingerprint and biometrics fees, and rather kept the fees for herself.

Rule 1.16 Declining or Terminating Representation

** ** (d) Upon termination o f representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client ’ s interests, such as giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and property to which the c lient is entitled and refunding any advance payment of fee or expense that has not been earned or incurred. The lawyer may retain papers relating to the client to the extent permitted by other law. In Escalante ’ s case, Respondent violated Rule 1.16(d) by failing to forward his file to his new attorney, Rene Swafford, after she made several requests. In Ardon ’ s case, Respondent violated Rule 1.16 (d) when she failed to refund Ardon ’ s property, specifically,
the $ 185 that she gave Respondent to be used for D HS filing fees.

Rule 3.3 Candor Toward the Tribunal (a) A lawyer shall not knowingly : (1) make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer [

. ]   In Escalante ’ s case, Respondent violated Rule 3.3 (a)(1) when she falsely stated in the February 18, 2014 , Motion to Reopen that Escalante failed to appear for his
i mmigration hearing on Novemb er 26, 2013 , because h is “ car broke down while he was

over one hour away in an area with no taxi service and no public transportation. He was unable to find someone to bring him to court on the day of his [ M ] aster [ C ] alendar hearing.”18

This statement was false. Escalante testified credibly that he did not appea r for his Master
Calendar hearing on November 26, 2013 , because Respondent never informed him.
Escalante ’ s testimony is supported by text messages between him and Respondent from
November 26, 2013, when Escalante texted, “[w] hen is my cour t [date]?” and Re spondent replied “[t]o day at 1:00 pm[,]” to which Escalante responded, “I didn ’ t know

. ”

Rule 8.4 Misconduct It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: (a) violate or attempt to violate the Maryland Lawyers ’ Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another ; ** ** (c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fr aud, deceit or misrepresentation; (d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial t o the administration of justice[.]

  It is a violation of Rule 8.4(a) for an attorney to violate or attempt to violate any of
the Rules. Therefore, because Respondent has violated Rules 1.1, 1.3, l.4(a) and (b), 1.5, l.15(a), (c ) and (d), l.16(d), and 3.3(a)(l), it follows that she has viol ated Rule 8.4(a) in both
the Escalante and Ardon matters. Respondent violated Rule 8.4(c) for the same reasons that she violated Rule 3.3(a)(l). Her statement in the Motion to Reopen filed on Escalante ’ s behalf that he failed to appear for c ourt because his car broke down was a misrepresentation. The hearing judge did not find a violation by clear and convincing evidence of Rule of 8.4(d) because no evidence was produced that Respondent ’ s actions were likely to impair public confidence in the profession.19 Maryland Rule 16
- 604. Trust Account
- Required deposits. Except as otherwise permitted by rule or other law, all funds, including cash, received and accepted by an attorney or law firm in this State from a client or thi rd person to be delivered in whole or in part to a client or third person, unless received as payment of fees owed the attorney by the client or in reimbursement for expenses properly advanced on behalf of the client, shall be deposited in an attorney trust account in an approved financial institution. This Rule does not apply to an instrument received by an attorney or law firm that is made payable solely to a client or third person and is transmitted directly to the client or third person. Respondent violated former Rule 16

- 604 in both Es calante and Ardon ’ s cases when she failed to place any of the clients ’ funds in an attorney trust a ccount. Maryland Rule 16
- 606.1 Attorney Trust Account Record
- Keeping (a) Creation of Records. The following records shall be created and maintained for the receipt and disbursement of funds of clients or of third persons: (1) Attorney trust account i dentification. An identification of all attorney trust accounts maintained, including the name of t he financial institution, account number, account name, date the account was opened, date the account was closed, and an agreement with the financial institution establishing each account and its interest

- bearing nature. (2) Deposits and d isbursements. A r ecord for each account that chronologically shows all deposits and disbursements, as follows:

(A) for each deposit, a record made at or near the time of the deposit that shows (i) the date of the deposit, (ii) the amount, (iii) the identity of the client o r third person for whom the funds were deposited, and (iv) the purpose of the deposit; (B) for each disbursement, including a disbursement made by electronic transfer, a record made at or near the time of disbursement that shows (i) the date of the disburs ement, (ii) the amount, (iii) the payee, (iv) the identity of the client or third person for whom the disbursement was made (if not the payee), and (v) the purpose of the disbursement; (C) for each disbursement made by electronic transfer, a written memo randum authorizing the transaction and identifying the attorney responsible for the transaction.20 (3) Client matter records. A record for each client matter in which the attorney receives funds in trust, as follows:

(A) for each attorney trust account transaction, a record that shows (i) the date of the deposit or disbursement; (ii) the amount of the deposit or disbursement; (iii) the purpose for which the funds are intended; (iv) for a disbursement, the payee and the check number or other payment ident ification; and (v) the balance of funds remaining in the account in connection with the matter; and (B) an identification of the person to whom the unused portion of a fee or expense deposit is to be returned whenever it is to be returned to a person other than the client.

** ** Respondent failed to keep any records of funds received in both Escalante and
Ardon ’ s matters as required by former Rule 16

- 606.1. Aggravating and Mitigating Factors The hearing judge found nine aggravating factors, among the list of aggravating factors recognized by the American Bar Association, and this Court. In Attorney Grievance
Commission of Maryland v. Shuler , 443 Md. 494, 506

– 07, 117 A.3d 38, 46 (2015), this Court explained th at the following aggravating factors should be considered: (1) prior attorney discipline; (2) a dishonest or selfish motive; (3) a pattern of misconduct; (4) multiple violations of the MLRPC; (5) bad faith obstruction of the attorney discipline proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with the Maryland Rules or orders of this Court or the hearing judge; (6) submission of false evidence, false statements, or other deceptive practices during the attorney discipline proceeding; (7) a refusal to acknowled ge the misconduct ’ s wrongful nature; (8) the victim ’ s vulnerability; (9) substantial experience in the practice of law; (10) indifference to making restitution or rectifying the misconduct ’ s consequences; (11) illegal conduct, including that involving the use of controlled substances; and (12) likelihood of repetition of the misconduct.21

As for the aggravating factors, the hearing judge concluded factors two, three, four, six, seven, eight, nine, ten, and twelve were present

.
This Court has also recognized mitigating factors established by the American Bar Association in fashioning sanctions, and also determining whether any aggravating and mitigating factors are present. See Attorney Grievance Comm ’ n of Maryland v. McDonald , 437 Md. 1, 45, 85 A.3d 117, 14 3 (2014) (explaining that was rev iew “American Bar Association [ ] Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (1992) for guidance in determining an appropriate sanction, including whether any aggravating factors are present
in relation to the miscond uct.”)

. Mitigating factors include the following: Absence of a prior disciplinary record; absence of a dishonest or selfish motive; personal or emotional problems; timely good faith efforts to make restitution or to rectify consequences of misconduct; full and fr ee disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings; inexperience in the practice of law; character or reputation; physical or mental disability or impairment; delay in disciplinary proceedings; interim rehabilitation; imposition of other penalties or sanctions; remorse; and finally, remoteness of prior offenses.

Attorney Grievance Comm’ n of Maryland v. White , 448 Md. 33, 73, 136 A.3d 819, 842 (2016)

. Respondent has no prior disciplinary record, and a positive reputation

.
STANDARD OF REVIEW It is well established that “[t]his Court has original and complete jurisdiction over attorney discipline proceedings in Maryland. ” Attorney Grievance Comm ’ n of Maryland
v. Hodes , 441 Md. 136, 168, 105 A.3d 533 , 552 (2014) (internal qu otations omitted)

. At22

all times, Petitioner has the burden of proving the allegations against the Respondent by clear and convincing evidence. Attorney Grievance Comm ’ n of Maryland v. Edib , 415 Md. 696, 706, 4 A.3d 957, 964 (2010). See also Md. Rule 16

- 757(b) (“[The Commission] has the burden of proving the averments of the petition by clear and convincing evidence.”). As we have often explained: We conduct an independent review of the record and accept the hearing judge ’ s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Deference is accorded to the hearing judge ’ s findings, who is in the best position, as the fact

- finder, to assess the credibility of a witness. Findings of fact to which neither party takes exception may be treated by u s as conclusively established. How ever, if exceptions are filed, the Court of Appeals shall determine whether the findings of fact have been proven by the requisite standard of proof outlined in Md. Rule 16

– 757(b)

. [ 4 ] We review de novo , the hearing judge ’ s conclusions of law. White , 448 Md. at 50, 136 A.3d at 828

– 29 (internal citations, q u otations, and brackets omitted). DISCUSSION Both parties present ed exceptions to the hearing judge’s findings of fact and
conclusions of law. Petitioner ’ s sole exception rests on the hearing judge ’ s conclusion that Respondent did not violate MLRPC 8.4(d). Respondent asks us to overrule Petitioner ’ s

4 Former Md. Rule 16

- 757(b) provides: (b) Burdens of Proof. The [Commission] has the burden of proving the averments of the petition by clear and co nvincing evidence. A respondent who asserts an affirmative defense or a matt er of mitigation or attenuation has the burden of proving t he defense or m atter by a preponderance of the evidence.23

exception , and presents her own factual and legal challenges to the hearing judge ’ s rulings and the appropriate disposition in this case.
Respondent ’ s Exceptions Respondent ’ s exceptions one through seven are factual in nature , while exceptions eigh t through eighteen are legal in nature

. As explained supra , we accept the hearing judge ’ s finding s of fact unless clearly erroneous. Attorney Grievance Comm ’ n of Maryland
v. Lara , 418 Md. 355, 364, 14 A.3d 650, 656 (2011). A hearing judge ’ s factual finding is not clearly erroneous “[i]f there is any competent material evidence to support [it].” YIV O
In st. for Jewish Research v. Zaleski , 386 Md. 654, 663, 874 A.2d 411, 416 (2005). “ We review, de novo , the hearing judge’ s conclusions of law. ” White , 448 Md. at 50, 136 A.3d

at 82 9. As we shall explain infra , Respondent ’ s factual and legal exceptions are overruled.
Exception One Respondent excepts to the adverse findings concerning Respondent ’ s credibility as
a witness

. Respondent contends that where she gave inconsistent statements, the hearing judge failed to sufficiently consider that she was test ifying to matters that occurred between
2012 and 2015, and that he r recollection , understandably , had dimmed in the interim

. Further , Respondent asserts that the stress of the proceedings may have inhibited her ability
to recall the events. Respondent al so called fifteen character witnesses including judges, attorneys, and former clients, who all testified to Respondent ’ s honesty and credibility generally, which the hearing judge failed to adequately credit.24

We do not believe that the hearing judge erroneously found that Respondent was not a credible witness, or that the testimony of Respondent’s witnesses was not credible. The hearing judge ’ s findings of fact reflect that Respondent ’ s testimony was considered , and that her inconsistent statements were weighed, in conjunction with the other testimony presented. For example, Respondent excepts that the stressful four day trial diminished her ability to recall matters as clearly as she would have under normal circumstances. When questioned about whether Respondent received a call or letter from Swafford about
Escalante ’ s file, Respondent initially denied recei ving any communication. Respondent
later acknowledged that she received a phone call , bu t blamed Swafford for not indicating
the reason for her call. When pressed further about a letter from Swafford, Respondent replied “every now and then, my fax breaks...

. ” Ba sed on the inconsistencies in the testimony, it was not erroneous to credit Swaffo rd’s testimony over Respondent ’ s
. Where Respondent called character witnesses to testify regarding her honesty and credibility, the hearing judge considered their testimony, but a lso considered the gravity of
the conduct alleged by two different c lients. Accordingly, it was not improper to weigh substantiated evidence over testimony that Respondent is generally an honest person.
Exception Two Respondent secondly excepts that there was no evidence to substantiate the fact that
Escalante ’ s payments “were no t deposited into a trust account because they were received
so close in ti me to when they were earned, or alternatively, that because they were paid in25

increments, such incremental payments had been earned.” Respondent asserts that she and
Escalante had a $2,500 fee arrangement, paid in increments of $1,000 per month. Although Escalante agreed to a flat fee arrangement, Respondent in dicated that her rate was $200 per
hour. Respondent testified that as soon as s he was retained , she interviewed Escala nte i n detention, which lasted seven or eight hours. She also represented Escalante in a bail hearing in May 2012, met with him in June, July, and August 2012, and represented him in immigration court in July 2012. Thus, Respondent alleged that she earned her fees as Escalante paid her. Respondent produced no evidence, account records, or timesheets to substantiate
her claims , so those claims were rejected by the hearing judge. It was not clearly erroneous to find that Respondent did not earn the fees when ev idence was produced that Respondent
did not obtain Escalante ’ s informed consent, in writing, agreeing that his payments would be held outside of a trust account, and Respondent produced no evidence to rebut the finding.
Exception Three Respondent ’ s third exception is to the hearing judge ’ s findings concerning the
documents that Escalante and Calmo Ramos provided in support of Escalante ’ s Application for Cancellation of R emoval. Respondent contends that the hearing judge
made no findings concerning the rel evancy of the documents to Escalante ’ s case, and the hearing judge did not identify which of the documents should have been submitted.26

Respondent argues that m ost of these documents were irrelevant to Escalante ’ s case and, even if submitted, would not hav e secured Escalante the immigration relief he sought. Respondent ’ s own testimony is inconsistent regarding whether these documents
were ever received. Respondent maintained that she never received the documents because Escalante was always “too busy to get them[,]” but also that the documents were irrelevant. Respondent would have had to revi ew some documentation to determine whether the
documents were legally irrelevant. Considering the inconsistency of this argument and Respondent ’ s own statement s , it was not clearly erroneous for the hearing judge to find that Escalante and Calmo Ramos gave Respondent documentation that she d id not file.
Exception Four Fourth, Respondent excepts to the hearing judge ’ s findings that Escalante did not receive Responden t ’ s October 19, 2013 , letter informing him of a Master Calendar hearing in the immigration c ourt on November 26, 2013, and the hearing judge ’ s finding that other letters were not actually mailed. Respondent suggests that there was no evidence reflecting

t hat she di d not mail letters to Escalante; that Escalante has lied under oath during a deposition previously ; and that Escalante had a strong motive to deny receiving notice of the November 26, 2013 , hearing because the Motion to R eopen his immigration cas e was premised on the claim that he had no notice of the prior hearing. As a preliminary matter, where an attorney attempts to shift blame onto the client, we prefer to focus squarely on the conduct of the attorney. Attorney Grievance Comm ’ n27

of Maryland v. Bocchino , 435 Md. 505, 530, 80 A.3d 222, 236 (2013). Respondent presented a letter from the client file dated October 19, 2013, informing Escalante of the November 26, 2013 , hearing. The letter was entirely in English , a language Escalante

ne ither read s n or speak s fluently. Respondent did not present evidence to support that the letter was actually sent. Respondent ’ s claim that she sent Escalante notice of the November 26, 2013 , hearing is at odds with Escalante ’ s text messages to Responden t on the same day , asking when his hearing was scheduled

. When Respondent replied that the hearing was that day, Escalante pleaded to speak with the Respondent , but she never

answer ed. Based on the text messages reflecting that Escalante was not aware of the hearing , and Respondent ’ s failure to rebut a showing that any oth er letters were actually mailed, i t was not clearly erroneous to find that the other letters were never mailed.
Exception Five In her fifth exception, Respondent contests the hearing judge ’ s finding that her statement to the immigration court at the February 18, 2014 hearing for the Motion to
R eopen Escalante ’ s case was “false,” and that “Escalante failed to appear for his immigration court hearing because Respondent failed to properly advise him of same[. ]” Respondent asserts that she advised Escalante of his court date in the November 26, 2013, letter, but Escalante failed appear. She argues that after reminding Escalante of his court date at 1:06 p.m. by text message, he could hav e found a way to get to court, but chose not
to do so. Respondent ’ s allegation is premised on the fact that Escalante had problems with28

arranging transportation in the past, so on this particular occasion , it wa s appropriate to
conclude that he had troubl e arranging transportation to court. For the same reasons that the hearing judge found that Respondent never sent notice
of Escalante ’ s November 26, 2013 hearing, we conclude that the hearing judge properly found that Respondent made a false statement to the immigration court

. Escalante ’ s text message to Respondent at 1:05 p.m. saying “[w]hen is my court?... I didn ’ t know[, ]” is inconsistent with Respondent ’ s testimony to the court that Escalante had car troubles. Accordingly , we decline to disturb the hearing judge ’ s finding that Respondent ’ s statement was false.
Exception Six Respondent disputes the hearing judge ’ s finding that Respondent did not ear n fees
on Ardon ’ s case before or soon after Ardon made payments. Respondent presented her

own records s howing she spent more than nineteen hours on Ardon ’ s case. Ardon agreed to pay Respondent $3,000 in installments for the entire representation. Ardon retained Respondent on July 25, 2014. Based on Respondent ’ s records, at her hourly rate of $200, by August 5, 2013, she spent seven hours working on Ardon ’ s case, and thus had earned $1,400, but Ardon had only paid her $1,000.
Respondent ’ s framing of the facts materially omits that Ardon paid Respondent $1,000 when Ardon signed the retainer agreement. T he $2,000 balance was to be paid in $500 installments over four months. None of the fees were eve r deposited in a trust29

account. As Ardon paid $1,000 at the beginning of the representation, upon executing the retainer agreement, Respondent could not have already earned t he fee

. Exception Seven Respondent excepts that the hearing judge did not credit her testimony that “[t]here were times when, you know, it would be 10 or 15 days before I could go

— daytime, you know, to the bank to drop off the money.” It appears that the hearing judge found this testimony to be not credible because it was proposed as an excuse for why Respondent
failed to hold her client ’ s fun ds in a trust account. As such, it was not clearly erroneous to reject being busy as a viable exc use for failing to properly handle a client ’ s fee payments. Exception Eight Respondent excepts to the conclusion that she violated Rule 1.1, the duty of competency. Her reasoning is that she properly advised Escalante and Ardon throughout her representati on. Additionally, she asserts that use of the substitute attorney, Yates, was

not per se incompetent, as concluded by the hearing judge. Rule 1.1 requires that an attorney represent clients competently. A viola tion occurs when an attorney is not “suffici ently thorough or prepared.” Attorney Grievance Comm ’ n of Maryland v. Brady , 422 Md. 441, 457, 30 A.3d 902, 911 (2011). Clear and convincing evidence exists that Respondent was not sufficiently thorough or prepared during her representation of both
Escalante and Ardon. Respondent ’ s representation of Escalante was incompetent because she failed to notify him of his court dates, failed to appear on his behalf , and faile d to adequately pursue30

the appropriate relief on his behalf

. Respondent alleges that she properly advised Escalante of his court dates by letter. The text messages reflecting that Escalante was not aware of
those dates demonstrate s that Respondent was not suffic iently thorough in notifying
Escalante of his obligation to attend. Respond ent failed to appear on Escalante ’ s behalf after the Motion to Reopen was granted. Respondent alleges that she never receiv ed notice that the Motion to Reopen had
been granted. Respondent also never inquired on the status of Escalante ’ s Motion to Reopen , despite her own expert’s testimony th at she could have called a toll

- free number , or the court , to inquire about the status of his matter

. When Escalante was ordered removed
in abs entia as a result of his and Respondent ’ s failure to appear at a hearing for the first Motion to Reopen, Respondent agreed to file a second Motion to Reopen on Escalante ’ s behalf. Respondent never filed the second motion. By failing to file the motion, Respondent did not p rovide competent representation

. Respondent ’ s representation of Ardon was also problematic

. Respondent did not
file documents in support of Ardon ’ s appli cation, which Respondent alleged were not relevant or helpful to Ardon ’ s matter. As the hearing judge concluded, it was incompetent for Respondent to tell Ardon that she was pursuing relief on her behalf, all while pu rsuing
no relief whatsoever. Respondent never filed an Entry of Appearance on Ardon ’ s behalf, so that she could receive notification. Respondent ’ s representation of Ardon was legally incompetent, and a violation of Rule 1.1.31

As Respondent asserts, use of a substitut e attorney is not per se incompetent. However, u sing a substitut e attorney and providing no information about the s ubject of the representation constitutes incompetence

. Therefore, Respondent ’ s delegation of representation to Yates was a lso incompetent. Exception Nine Respondent excepts to the conclus ion that she violated her duty of diligence as prescribed in Rule 1.3. An attorney violates Rule 1.3 when he or she does “nothing
whatsoever to advanc e the client ’ s cause or endeavor.” Attorney Grievance Comm ’ n of Maryland v. De La Paz , 418 Md. 534, 554, 16 A.3d 181, 193 (2011) (internal citations omitted). For the reasons that Respondent violated Rule 1.1, she also violated Rule 1.3. Respondent failed to ensure that Escalante was aware of his November 26, 2013 , hearing. She then failed to appear on his behalf in his first Motion to Reopen, and then never filed a second Motion to Reopen, despite a promise, and fees paid, indicating that she would. Respondent also failed to advance Ardon ’ s case when she failed to file an Entry of Appearance or any supporting documents on Ardon ’ s behalf.
Exception Ten In Exception Ten, Respondent contests that she violated the duty of communication
tha t is reflected in Rule 1.4

. She reiterates that she informed Escalante of his hearing dates, and updated Ardon reg arding the status of her case, by letters, text messages, and in

- person meetings. Rule 1.4 (a)(2) and (3) requi re s a lawyer to keep his or her client reasonably
informed about the status of the case, and to promptly respond to reasonable requests for32

infor m ation from the client. Attorney Grievance Comm’ n of Maryland v. Nelson , 425 Md. 344, 354

– 55, 40 A.3d 1039, 1045 (2012). Respondent violated Rule 1.4(a) (2) during
Escalante ’ s representation when she failed to keep him informed of his hearing dates. Resp ondent violated Rule 1.4(a)(3) when she failed to respond to Escalante’s text messages requesting information. Respondent also violated Rule 1.4(a) (2) when she failed to inform
Ardon that she did not file anything on Ardon ’ s behalf. Rule 1.4(b) requires that “a lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.”
In Escalante ’ s representation, Respondent ’ s failed to notify Escalante or Calmo Ra mos that
she was not going to file a second Motion to Reopen. Had Escalante known this , he likely
would not have paid her additional fees. In addition to determining that Respondent violated Rule 1.4(b) regarding her representation of Escalante, we also conclude that Respondent violated Rule 1.4(b) in her representation of Ardon. Respondent failed to inform Ardon that she would be ineligible for relief, which did not afford Ardon the opportunity to render an informed decision on whether to continue pursu ing , and paying for, the r epresentation

. Exception Eleven Respondent excepts to the conclusion that she violated Rule 1.5 related to fees. Rule 1.5(a) prohibits a lawyer from collecting an unreasonable fee. Respondent ’ s exception is again based on her c ontention that she spent over nineteen hours working on Ardon ’ s case. Pursuant to Rule 1.5(a)(4 ) a factor to be considered for determining the reasonableness of33

the fee is the “amount involved and the result obtained [.]” We have found violations of 1.5( a) when a lawyer continually fails to file for any meaningful relief on behalf of the
client. See Attorney Grievance Comm ’ n of Maryland v. Lewis , 437 Md. 308, 321, 85 A.3d 865, 873 (2014). As in Ardon ’ s representation, a fee is unreasonable where Respond ent filed nothing on the client ’ s behalf.
Exception Twelve Respondent excepts to the hearing judge ’ s conclusion that she violated Rule 1.15 involving safekeeping property. Rule 1.15(a) requires that client funds be held in a trust account, part (c) does not allow withdrawal of those funds unless the client gives written informed consent, and part (d) requires a lawyer to return any monies the client is entitled
to receive. In both Escalante ’ s and Ardon ’ s cases, Respondent failed to hold the client s ’
funds in an attorney trust account , in violation of Rule 1.15(a). Respondent had not earned such fees when paid, nor did she have the clients ’ informed consent, in writing, to avo id the use of her trust account, in violation of 1.15(c). In violation of Rule 1.15(d), Respondent never returned Ardon ’ s $185 fingerprint and biometrics fee after terminating the representation. We find clear and convincing ev idence that Respondent vi olated Rule 1.15(a), (c), and (d).
Exception Thirteen Respondent asserts that she did not violate Rule 1.16. Rule 1.16(d) requires a lawyer
to surrender the client ’ s papers and property at the t ermination of a representation. Respondent violated Rule 1.16(d) by failing to forward Escalante ’ s documents to him or34

his new attorney after Swafford ’ s repeated phone calls and requests

. Additionally, Respondent violated Rule 1.16(d) when she terminated Ardon ’ s representation , but did not

return the $185 filing fees.
Exception Fourteen Respondent disputes the conclusion that she violated Rule 3.3. Rule 3.3(a)(1) requires that a lawyer shall not knowingly “make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal...

. ” Respondent argues that her sta tement to the immigration court that Escalante did not appear for the November 26, 2013, hearing because of transportation

- related issues , is supported by the evidence, including Escalante ’ s testimony that he had car troubles in the past. As explained supra , R espondent advised the immigration court that Escalante did not appear due to car problems , despite receiving a text message from Escalante that he did not know he was due in court that day.
Exception Fifteen Respondent excepts to the hearing judge ’ s conc lusion that she violated Rule 8.4, parts (a) and (c). Rule 8.4(a) establishes that it is professional misconduct to violate the MLRPC, and Rule 8.4(c) prohibits conduct involving “dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation [.]” For the reasons that Resp ondent violated the above discussed sections of the MLRPC, she violated Rule 8.4(a). Closely linked to the reasoning that Respondent violated Rule 3.3 , she violated R ule 8.4(c). Respondent misrepresented the underlying reason why Escalante did not appear in court for the November 26, 2013 , hearing , when she told the court that his car broke down over an hour away, as opposed to35

the fact that he did not know that he needed to appear in court that day, as he wrote in his text message to Respondent.
Excepti on Sixteen In this exception, Respondent disputes that she violated former Maryland Rules 16

- 604 and 16

- 601.1. As explained supra , each of these rules respectively require s client funds be held in a trust account, and that records of the trust account be maintained. Respondent alleges that she earned the attorney ’ s fees in both matters before or soon after the payme nts were made. She concedes that failing to hold these fun ds in a trust account was a violation of Rules 16

- 604 and 16

- 601.1, but maintains that these were de minimis technical violations. Respondent did not hold either client ’ s fees in a n attorney trust

account or maintain records of her attorney trust account a s required by the Maryland
Rules. Thus, we find by clear and convincing evidence a violation of former Rules 16

- 604
and 16.601.1.
Exception s Seventeen and Eighteen In Exception Seventeen, Respondent objects to the hearing judge ’ s findings of multiple aggr avating factors. In Exception Eighteen, Respondent proposes that the hearing judge should have found additional mitigating factors. We categorically reject Respondent ’ s proposition that additional mitigating factors should have been found, and
conclude t hat clear and convincing evidence exists to support findings of aggravating factors two, three, four, six, seven, eight, nine, ten, and twelve.36 Petitioner ’ s Exception Petitioner ta k es exception to the hearing judge ’ s finding that Respondent did not violate MLRPC 8.4(d) by engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. Specifically, the hearing judge found that “[Respondent ’ s] conduct in both the Escalante and Ardon matters was prejudicial to the i ndividual clients, but no evidence was produced that it had wider consequences likely to impair public confidence in the profession, impact the image of the legal profession or engender disrespect for the court.” Petitioner asserts
that t his finding was c ontrary to the Court ’ s holding in Attorney Grievance Comm issio n of Maryland v. Basinger , 441 Md. 703, 109 A.3d 1165 (2015). In Basinger , the Attorney Grievance Commission similarly excepted to a finding that the attorne y did not violate MLRPC 8.4(d). Id. at 711, 109 A.3d at 1170. Basinger was retained by a client, who was
also his sister

- in

- law, Rosina Keys (“Keys”)

. Id. at 706, 109 A.3d at 1167. In his capacity as her attorney, Basinger sent letters to Keys in which he called her multiple derogatory terms and accused her of being responsible for causing her grandson ’ s death. Id. at 713,
109 A.3d at 1170. This Court applied a n objective standard, examining whether “a reasonable member of the public could well look askance at an arrangement... and not the subjective standard of whether the lawyer ’ s conduct actually impacted the public and/or a particular person ( e.g., a complainant) who is involved with the attorney discipline proceeding .” Id. at 716, 109 A.3d at 1172

– 73 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Respondent asks us to overrule Petitioner ’ s exception. Respondent posits that the hearing judge did not misapply the holding in Basinger , and her conduct did not have wider37

consequences beyond her two clien ts. We disagree that an application of the Basinger ’ s objective standard merits such a result. A reasonable member of the public could impute Respondent ’ s continued failures to diligently represent her two clients to a fail ure of the legal profession at large. Four key factors are critical to our consideration. First, Respondent continually failed to appear on behalf of Escalante and Ardon during their immigration hearings. The clients never agreed to be represented by the substitute attorney, Yates, w ho knew nothing about either client ’ s matter and could not diligently pursue their
interests. Second , when Escalante was taken into DHS custody because of Respondent ’ s repeated failure to inform Escalante when he was required to appear, Respondent collect ed a fee to reopen his matter , which she never did. Third, Respondent falsely informed the immigration court that Escalante did not appear because of car troubles, when in reality Escalante did not appear because he was not informed of his court date. Fo urth, Respondent collected payments and documents from Ardon and filed for no relief
whatsoever on her behalf. The public must be able to trust that when utilizing a lawyer ’ s service, the lawyer will appear on their behalf when required and pursue the ap propriate remedies. See Attorney Grievance Comm ’ n of Maryland v. Walker

- Turner , 428 Md. 214, 232, 51 A.3d 553, 564 (2012) (opining “an attorney plays such an integral role in the judicial process that without his presence the wheels of justice mus t, neces sarily, grind to a halt[] ”)

. Contrary to the hearing judge ’s determination , we find that Respondent ’ s various failures

to appear for her clients and actively pursue results in their matters certainly disparage the38

image of the legal profession. A s such, we sustain Petitioner ’ s exception and conclude that Respondent violated MLRPC 8.4(d).

SANCTION Upon our de novo review of the record before us we hold that Respondent violated
MLRPC 1.1, 1.3, 1.4(a) and (b), 1.5, 1.15(a), (c), and (d), 1.16(d), 3.3(a)(1), and 8.4(a), (c), and (d). Respondent additionally violated former Maryland Rules 16

- 604 and 16

- 606.1.
We find the following aggravating factors: a dishonest or selfish motive; a pat tern of misconduct; multiple violations of the MLRPC; submission of false evidence, false statements, or other deceptive practices during the attorney discipline proceeding; a refusal to acknowledge the misconduct ’ s wrongful nature; the victim ’ s vulnerabil ity; substantial experience in the practice of law; indifference to making restitution or rectifying the
misconduct ’ s consequences; and likelihood of repetition of the misconduct. We also note two mitigating factors: the absen ce o f prior attorney discipli ne and positive character or reputation.

Former Maryland Rule 16

- 759(c) provides that “[t] he Court of Appeals may order (A) disbarment, (B) suspension, (C) reprimand, (D) inactive status, (E ) dismissal of the discip linary or remedial action, or (F ) a re mand for further proceedings.” Petitioner requests disbarment, and naturally , Respondent request s a lesser sanction. Respondent
recommends that she be required to attend trainings concerning sound practice management as a solo practitioner. She recommen ds that any sanction be designed to improve her practice of law, not simply to punish her.39

When fashioning a sanction for attorney misconduct, we are mindful that a
sanction ’ s primary purpose is to protect the public from the attorney ’ s misconduct.
Basi nger , 441 Md. at 720, 109 A.3d at 1175. In Attorney Grievance Comm issio n of Maryland v. Thomas , 440 Md. 523, 558, 103 A.3d 629, 649 (2014), we noted that “[d] isbarment is warranted in cases involving flag rant neglect of client affairs , ” and particularly considered the vulnerable nature of an immigration client ’ s status. In Thomas , we determined disbarment was the appropriate remedy when the attorney failed to respond
in a client ’ s matter, and failed to appear at an immigration hearing , resulting in the client’s
removal from the United States

. Id. Respondent ’ s clients, both citizens of other countries , with a poor grasp of the English language, comprise a particularly vulnerable class of people. Such clients wholly rely on their lawyer ’ s expertise and assurances that the lawyer
is working in the ir best interest. Respondent ’ s clients were a part of a gr oup easily susceptible to abuse. As such, Respondent’s conduct merits disbarment.

IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT SHALL PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY THE CLERK OF THIS COURT, INCLUDING COSTS OF ALL TRANSCRIPTS, PURSUANT TO MARYLAND RULE 19
- 709(d), FOR WHICH SUM JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IN FAVOR OF THE ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION AGAINST ANNA G. A ITA.