PRESENT: Kinser, C.J., Lemons, Goodwyn, Millette, and Mims, 

JJ., and Lacy and Koontz, S.JJ. 

GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES INSURANCE 

COMPANY, ET AL. 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 100332 JUSTICE WILLIAM C. MIMS 

 April 21, 2011

UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBILE 

ASSOCIATION, ET AL. 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF HAMPTON 

Randolph T. West, Judge Designate 

In this appeal, we consider whether the evidence adduced 

at trial was sufficient to establish liability under either of 

two automobile insurance policies. 

I. BACKGROUND AND MATERIAL PROCEEDINGS BELOW 

In April 1999, Thomas Laffey was injured when a 1989 Acura 

Legend collided with his vehicle. Sharon Bass (“Sharon”) owned 

the car and her daughter, Krystal Bass (“Krystal”), was its 

primary user. Steven Parent (“Steven”) was driving the car at 

the time of the collision. 

Sharon had a family automobile insurance policy (“Sharon’s 

Policy”) issued by Government Employees Insurance Company 

(“GEICO”), which listed the car. Sharon’s Policy afforded 

bodily injury liability coverage for those it insured while 

they operated the car. As defined by the policy, in such 

circumstances the insured included (1) Sharon, as the named 

insured, or any resident in her household, and (2) “any other 

person using [the car] with the permission of the named 
insured, provided his actual operation . . . thereof is within 

the scope of such permission.” 

Steven’s mother, Annie Parent (“Annie”) had a family 

automobile insurance policy (“Annie’s Policy”) issued by GEICO 

Indemnity Insurance Company (“GEICO Indemnity”). Annie’s 

Policy afforded bodily injury liability coverage for those it 

insured while they operated a car owned by another. As defined 

by the policy, in such circumstances the insured included (1) 

Annie, as the named insured, and (2) “any relative, but only 

with respect to a private passenger automobile . . . provided 

his actual operation . . . thereof is with the permission, or 

reasonably believed to be with the permission, of the owner and 

is within the scope of such permission.” 

Following the collision, Laffey presented claims to GEICO 

and GEICO Indemnity for coverage under Sharon’s Policy and 

Annie’s Policy, respectively. Each denied the claims on the 

ground that Steven lacked permission to operate the car at the 

time of the collision, which was necessary to incur liability 

under either policy. Laffey then filed a motion for judgment 

alleging that Steven had been negligent in his operation of the 

car.1 Laffey also served his own automobile insurance carrier, 

United Services Automobile Association (“USAA”), to invoke his 

 1

 A separate claim of negligent entrustment against Sharon 

was subsequently dismissed and is not before us in this appeal. 

2
uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage. GEICO and GEICO 

Indemnity then filed a declaratory judgment action against 

USAA, Annie, Steven, Sharon, Krystal, and Laffey seeking a 

determination that neither carrier had any coverage obligation 

for the collision. The declaratory judgment action was tried 

to the circuit court in September 2009. 

A. EVENTS PRECEDING THE COLLISION 

1. KRYSTAL’S TESTIMONY 

Krystal testified that she had planned to meet her 

boyfriend, Charlie Daniels, on the evening of April 16. They 

were to meet either at Steven’s house (the “Parent House”) or 

at the home of Elaine Pamplin (“Elaine”), Daniels’ aunt, which 

was two blocks away (the “Pamplin House”). Krystal drove first 

to the Pamplin House, then to the Parent House a few minutes 

later, arriving between 8:00 and 8:30 p.m. Because she did not 

carry a purse, she placed her keys, cigarettes, and lighter on 

a coffee table. 

A group of Daniels’ and Steven’s mutual friends were 

there, listening to music, playing cards, and drinking beer. 

Krystal took a “couple of sips” of beer. At some point during 

the three hours she waited for Daniels to arrive, she noticed 

her keys were missing. When she asked where they were, Steven 

said he had taken them so they would not get lost. 

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After Daniels arrived, he and Krystal began arguing. The 

argument moved from the house to the street, where he hit her 

and walked away toward the Pamplin House. She returned to the 

Parent House in tears and asked for her keys so she could go 

home. She told Steven and the others that Daniels had struck 

her. Agitated, Steven insisted on confronting Daniels at the 

Pamplin House. He and one of his friends, Josh Robey, went to 

the car. Steven, with the keys, got into the driver’s seat. 

Krystal got into the passenger seat and Steven drove to the 

Pamplin House.2

When they arrived at the Pamplin House, Krystal took the 

keys from the ignition. Steven and Robey went into the house 

to confront Daniels. As Krystal approached the house, she 

placed her keys, cigarettes, and lighter either on the front 

step or on a nearby table on the porch. When she entered the 

Pamplin House, one of the occupants told Steven and Robey that 

Daniels had not hit Krystal. Krystal and Daniels then spoke 

privately in the back of the living room. Minutes later, Chris 

Pamplin (“Chris”), Elaine’s son and Daniels’ cousin, yelled to 

Krystal that Steven had taken the car. 

Krystal ran outside but Steven and the car were gone. She 

called the police to report it stolen and then called her 

 2

 During cross-examination, Krystal admitted that she had 

said in an earlier deposition that she drove the car to the 

Pamplin House. 

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parents. The police later came to the Basses’ house and 

informed them that the car had been in a collision. Sometime 

thereafter, Steven spoke to her and said that he had taken the 

car because he was angry, believing she had lied to him about 

Daniels hitting her. 

2. OTHERS’ TESTIMONY 

Sharon corroborated that Krystal had called her to tell 

her the car had been stolen and that Krystal had reported the 

theft to the police. Sharon also testified that the police 

came to their home after Krystal returned and informed them 

that the car had been in a collision. 

Chris contradicted much of Krystal’s description of the 

events prior to the collision. He testified that earlier that 

day, Krystal and Robey had driven together in Robey’s car. 

During that time, Steven used her car to pick Chris up and take 

him to the store. Daniels and Krystal subsequently met at the 

Pamplin House, where the argument began. Krystal then drove 

her car to the Parent House and soon thereafter Steven drove up 

to the Pamplin House in the car with Krystal, Robey, and two 

more of Steven’s friends. Krystal and Daniels resumed their 

argument in the front yard and Chris told Steven that Daniels 

had not hit her. Steven then glared at Krystal, got into the 

car, and drove away. Krystal did not object for 30 to 45 

minutes when Steven had not returned. She then called the 

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police to report the car had been stolen. When the police 

arrived to investigate her report, Chris told them that Steven 

had not stolen the car. 

Steven testified that he had been at the home of his 

girlfriend, Shelly Roell, on the afternoon preceding the 

collision. Roell lived across the street from the Pamplin 

House. He went over to the Pamplin House around 4:00 p.m. and 

Krystal and Daniels were already there. He then walked to the 

Parent House where he and his friends watched television and 

played cards. He did not recall seeing Krystal again until 

around midnight, when she came in crying and said Daniels had 

hit her. She then gave him her keys and he drove her, Robey, 

and another friend to the Pamplin House, where Chris told him 

that Daniels had not hit her. He believed she had lied to him 

to start a fight between him and Daniels so he got in the car 

and drove off to “blow[] off steam.” He denied that he had 

taken her keys from the coffee table at the Parent House and 

that she had ever taken them back from him after he drove her 

back to the Pamplin House to confront Daniels. He admitted, 

however, that she had not given him permission to drive the car 

after they arrived there. He also denied speaking with her 

about the collision after it occurred. 

B. THE COLLISION 

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Officer Paul Hogge of the Poquoson Police Department was 

working radar near the boundary between Hampton and Poquoson in 

the early morning hours on April 17. At approximately 1:00, he 

saw an Acura speed from Poquoson into Hampton at 90 miles per 

hour. Hogge pursued and discovered the car he was pursuing had 

collided with another car about a quarter mile inside the 

Hampton city limits. 

Thereafter Officer Brian Wyer of the Hampton Police 

Department responded to the scene. He ascertained that the 

Acura Hogge had pursued was the car owned by Sharon and that 

Steven had been driving it. Wyer detected the odor of alcohol 

coming from the car, which contained at least twelve beer 

bottles, many of which were empty. 

C. PERMISSION TO USE THE CAR 

Sharon testified that she and her husband expressly and 

repeatedly instructed Krystal not to allow anyone else to use 

the car. She also testified that she never had met Steven, and 

if Krystal allowed others to use the car it was without her 

knowledge and without her permission. 

Krystal also testified that her parents had expressly and 

repeatedly instructed her not to allow anyone else to use the 

car. However, she testified that she had allowed Daniels to 

drive the car once, contrary to their instructions. She 

further testified that she concealed the fact of Daniels’ use 

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from them because she would get in trouble if they found out. 

She testified that she never allowed Steven or anyone else to 

drive the car. 

Chris contradicted Krystal’s testimony that she allowed 

only Daniels to drive the car, and only once. According to 

Chris, Krystal routinely let anyone who asked use the car while 

she was at work or while she was at the Parent House or Pamplin 

House with the group of friends. He testified that Daniels had 

driven it on multiple occasions, and that Krystal and Daniels 

previously argued because Daniels had been seen driving it. 

Chris also testified that he himself had driven it multiple 

times and that he had seen Robey and Steven drive it three or 

four times each before the day of the collision. Chris 

recalled only one occasion when she denied a request to use the 

car, when she told Robey he could not use it because he had not 

put gas in it after a prior use. 

Steven testified that he had driven the car once or twice 

before the events leading up to the collision, but only between 

the Pamplin House and the Parent House. He also testified that 

he had seen Daniels drive the car ten times but had never seen 

anyone else drive the car. 

Roell testified that she also had seen Daniels drive the 

car three or four times. Sometimes he drove the car alone and 

other times Krystal or Robey accompanied him. She also 

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testified that Steven had told her he had used the car before 

the collision. 

Christina Parent, Steven’s older sister, testified that 

she had seen Daniels drive the car countless times, and Krystal 

would lend it to anyone who asked. She also testified that she 

witnessed Krystal give the car keys to Steven the evening 

before the collision, telling him to take them from her because 

she had been drinking. However, Christina also testified that 

she believed Krystal gave him the keys to hide because she was 

upset and had been drinking, rather than to use himself. 

D. THE CIRCUIT COURT’S JUDGMENT 

The circuit court announced its ruling from the bench: 

Quite candidly, it was difficult for me to 

believe the testimony of a lot of the witnesses, 

and I assure you, particularly the testimony of 

Krystal and her mother. If either of you or any 

of you watched Krystal as she testified, every 

time she started--got stammered in any way, she 

would look to her mother for assurances over 

what she was saying, every time. She wasn’t 

sure if she was testifying to what her mother 

wanted her to testify. 

. . . . And . . . to have somebody come in, 

such as [Sharon] and say, Oh, I have told my 

daughter that she is to never ever let someone 

else drive this car, and the daughter comes in 

and says, Yes, that’s exactly what she told me, 

and I never let anybody else drive the car. The 

only thing that gives me any problem in this 

case is that no one testified that [Sharon] had 

ever seen anyone else drive this vehicle. 

. . . . The everyday conduct that 

[Krystal] exhibited, and the use of the vehicle, 

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I don’t believe for a moment that nobody else 

drove this car. I have every belief that, in 

fact, anybody that wanted to use this car used 

it. 

Is that sufficient to say that there is no 

dispute as to whether or not the prohibition 

that the mother testified to was sufficient? 

And I think that’s the only question that I have 

in this case. I don’t have any doubt about 

[Annie’s Policy]. That policy is going to be 

effective as far as this Court is concerned. 

Krystal allowed people to use that car. I 

have every reason to believe that from the 

evidence here, that Steven had the permission. 

He had the keys. That’s the way I read the 

evidence, so I don’t have any problem with that 

whatsoever. 

The only one that gives me a problem is 

whether or not . . . the course of conduct set 

forth – and I agree that the case says it’s 

irrelevant who owned the car[– b]ut I say for 

all practical purposes in this case[,] that the 

daughter was the owner of this vehicle. 

[W]ho used the vehicle? The mother said 

they used the vehicle occasionally to take 

trips. I have very little confidence in the 

conduct of the mother. 

. . . . I think the course of conduct in 

this was general use of the vehicle. I’m going 

to [find] both policies effective. 

Accordingly, the circuit court entered a final order that 

Steven was entitled to coverage under both Sharon’s Policy and 

Annie’s Policy. We awarded GEICO and GEICO Indemnity this 

appeal. 

II. ANALYSIS 

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

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The case was tried to the circuit court without a jury. 

We therefore review the judgment for clear error and will not 

set it aside unless it is plainly wrong or there is no evidence 

to support it. County of Albemarle v. Keswick Club, L.P., 280 

Va. 381, 389, 699 S.E.2d 491, 495 (2010). We consider the 

evidence and all reasonable inferences fairly deducible from it 

in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below. 

Syed v. ZH Techs., Inc., 280 Va. 58, 68, 694 S.E.2d 625, 631 

(2010). We review questions of law de novo. Id.

B. ANNIE’S POLICY 

Annie’s Policy covered Steven’s use of the car only if the 

use was “with permission, or reasonably believed to be with the 

permission, of the owner and is within the scope of such 

permission.” GEICO Indemnity concedes that Krystal was a 

custodian of the vehicle and that by operation of Code § 38.2-

2204(A) she had the authority to give Steven permission to use 

it for the purpose of Annie’s Policy. It also concedes that 

the circuit court had the discretion to weigh the testimony and 

the credibility of the several witnesses: it does not 

challenge the court’s finding that Krystal allowed “anybody 

that wanted to use” the car to use it. However, GEICO 

Indemnity asserts there is no evidence establishing that Steven 

was operating within the scope of that permission at the time 

of the collision. We agree. 

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A trial court sitting without a jury is the judge of the 

weight of the testimony and the credibility of the witnesses. 

Cheatham v. Gregory, 227 Va. 1, 4, 313 S.E.2d 368, 370 (1984). 

Nevertheless, “[t]here must be some evidence in order to 

support the verdict.” Barnes v. Hampton, 149 Va. 740, 744, 141 

S.E. 836, 837 (1928). 

Generally, there are two types of evidence 

presented during a trial – direct evidence and 

circumstantial evidence. Direct evidence is 

offered to prove as a fact the point in issue. 

Circumstantial evidence, by contrast, is offered 

to prove a fact not directly in issue, from 

which a fact in issue may reasonably be 

inferred. 

Commonwealth v. Hudson, 265 Va. 505, 512, 578 S.E.2d 781, 785 

(2003). 

“There is no distinction in the law between the weight or 

value to be given to either direct or circumstantial evidence,” 

id., and we have expressly stated that “[c]ircumstantial 

evidence, if convincing, is entitled to the same weight as 

direct testimony.” Britt v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 569, 573, 

667 S.E.2d 763, 765 (2008). Thus, “[t]he finder of fact is 

entitled to consider all of the evidence, without distinction, 

in reaching its determination.” Hudson, 265 Va. at 512-13, 578 

S.E.2d at 785. 

We agree with GEICO Indemnity that the circuit court was 

wholly within its singular competence to observe the witnesses 

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and evaluate their credibility, thereby weighing their 

testimony and making its findings of fact. The circuit court 

discounted as unreliable Krystal’s testimony that she only 

allowed Daniels to drive the car, and only once. We accept the 

court’s finding that she routinely allowed others to drive the 

car. Based on that finding, Steven reasonably could have 

believed he had her permission to use the car. However, we 

also must examine whether his particular use – the angry 

escapade that culminated in the collision – was within the 

scope of that permission. 

Each witness testified that those whom Krystal allowed to 

drive the car did so with her express permission and that they 

drove only for short distances, either between the Parent House 

and the Pamplin House, within the confines of the neighborhood 

encompassing those houses, or to nearby stores. No witness, 

including Steven and Chris, who themselves drove the car, 

testified that Krystal ever had permitted anyone to drive the 

car out of Hampton into surrounding localities. To the 

contrary, though Chris substantially discredited much of 

Krystal’s testimony, he testified that she called police to 

report the car stolen when Steven failed to return within 30 to 

45 minutes, indicating that such a lengthy excursion was 

extraordinary and unexpected. He also testified that she 

routinely warned those to whom she lent the car to “[b]e 

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careful,” “take care of it,” and not to “go out . . . hot 

riding in it.” 

There simply is no evidence in the record supporting the 

circuit court’s judgment that Steven’s use of the car at the 

time of the collision was within the scope of the permission he 

may reasonably have believed he had. Likewise, such a 

conclusion is not a reasonable inference from the direct 

evidence in the face of the contradictory testimony. 

Accordingly, we will reverse that portion of the court’s 

judgment. 

C. SHARON’S POLICY 

Sharon’s Policy covered Steven’s use of the car only if 

the use was “with the permission of the named insured,” i.e., 

Sharon, provided the use was “within the scope of such 

permission.” The parties agree that there is no evidence that 

Sharon either met Steven before the collision or expressly 

granted him permission to use the car. GEICO concedes that 

under Code § 38.2-2204(A) Sharon’s permission may be express or 

implied. 

When a named insured entrusts a car to another for his 

general use, the person so entrusted--i.e., the first 

permittee-- also may permit a third person to use the car--

i.e., the second permittee. In such instances, we have held 

that the second permittee has the implied permission of the 

14
named insured to use the vehicle. Virginia Farm Bureau Mut. 

Ins. Co. v. Appalachian Power Co., 228 Va. 72, 77, 321 S.E.2d 

84, 87 (1984). The second permittee then is covered under the 

policy of the named insured. Code § 38.2-2204(A) (“No policy 

or contract of bodily injury or property damage liability 

insurance, covering liability arising from the ownership, 

maintenance, or use of any motor vehicle . . . shall be issued 

or delivered in this Commonwealth . . . unless the policy 

contains a provision insuring the named insured, and any other 

person using or responsible for the use of the motor vehicle 

. . . with the expressed or implied consent of the named 

insured, against liability for death or injury sustained, or 

loss or damage incurred within the coverage of the policy or 

contract as a result of negligence in the operation or use of 

such vehicle . . . by the named insured or by any such 

person.”) 

Code § 38.2-2204, the omnibus clause, is a remedial 

statute enacted to serve the public policy of broadening the 

coverage of automobile liability insurance for the protection 

of the injured persons. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tiller, 189 

Va. 544, 548-49, 53 S.E.2d 814, 816 (1949). Whether a 

particular operator of a vehicle comes within such coverage 

depends on the facts of each case. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of New 

York v. Harlow, 191 Va. 64, 68, 59 S.E.2d 872, 874. (1950). 

15
Accordingly we have resolved coverage questions by determining 

whether the actions of a permittee who operated the vehicle 

were consistent with the scope of the actual or implied 

permission from the named insured. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 189 

Va. at 549, 53 S.E.2d at 816 (citing State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. 

v. Cook, 186 Va. 658, 666-67, 43 S.E.2d 863, 867 (1947)). 

However, we have not addressed directly the circumstances in 

which a permittee vested with general use permission from the 

named insured may limit coverage under the omnibus clause to a 

second permittee by imposing restrictions on the use of the 

vehicle. 

In Robinson v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York, 190 

Va. 368, 57 S.E.2d 93 (1950), we considered the argument that 

operation of the vehicle by a second permittee beyond the scope 

of permission granted by the first permittee negated coverage 

of the second permittee under the omnibus clause. In that 

case, the first permittee, who had been given general use of 

the vehicle by the named insured, loaned the vehicle to a 

second permittee but did not loan the car to the second 

permittee for “his general personal use.” Id. at 372, 57 

S.E.2d at 95. The second permittee was using the vehicle for 

his personal use at the time of the accident. We concluded 

that, considering the facts of that case, a jury could find 

that the use by the second permittee was reasonably within the 

16
scope of his authority to drive the car. Id. at 372-73, 57 

S.E.2d at 94-95. 

Although coverage under the omnibus clause was sustained 

in Robinson, we acknowledged that under different facts 

coverage could be limited under the omnibus clause for a second 

permittee based on the scope of permission received from the 

first permittee. Whether the second permittee exceeded such 

permission was a factual issue to be resolved by the factfinder. Id. at 373, 57 S.E.2d at 95; see also Columbia Cas. 

Co. v. Hoohuli, 437 P.2d 99, 106 (Haw. 1968) (opining as dictum 

that a first permittee may limit the permission of a second 

permittee). This case presents such facts. We hold that a 

first permittee with general use has authority to permit either 

general use or to impose such limits on use by a second 

permittee as the first permittee may find prudent, just as a 

named insured may limit use by a first permittee. 

Thus, we may assume without deciding that Krystal had 

permission for general use from Sharon and thus, pursuant to 

the omnibus clause, Stephen had Sharon’s implied permission to 

use the car. However, we have determined for the purposes of 

Annie’s Policy that Stephen’s use of the car at the time of the 

accident, unlike that of the second permittee in Robinson, was 

beyond the scope of the permission given him by Krystal, the 

first permittee. Just as the remedial purpose of the omnibus 

17
clause is not extended to provide coverage when the first 

permittee operates a vehicle beyond the scope of permission 

received, it should not be extended to circumstances in which a 

second permittee operates the vehicle beyond the scope of 

permission received from the first permittee who “ ‘st[ands] in 

the shoes’ ” of the named insured. Virginia Farm Bureau Mut. 

Ins. Co., 228 Va. at 78, 321 S.E.2d at 87 (quoting Robinson, 

190 Va. at 371, 57 S.E.2d at 94). 

Accordingly, we will reverse that portion of the circuit 

court’s judgment extending coverage for the collision under 

Sharon’s Policy. 

III. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the judgment of 

the circuit court and enter final judgment in favor of GEICO 

and GEICO Indemnity. 

Reversed and final judgment.

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