J-S19042-18

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

 Appellee

v.

SCOTT E. WILLS 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2475 EDA 2017

Appeal from the PCRA Order July 10, 2017

in the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County 

Criminal Division at Nos.: CP-09-CR-0004950-2015 

CP-09-CR-0005671-2015

BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., NICHOLS, J., and PLATT*, J.

MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.: FILED JULY 13, 2018

Appellant, Scott E. Wills, appeals from the order of July 10, 2017, that 

denied, following a hearing, his first petition brought under the Post Conviction 

Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. On appeal, Appellant claims 

he received ineffective assistance of plea counsel. Appellate counsel has filed 

a motion to withdraw. For the reasons discussed below, we grant counsel’s 

motion to withdraw and affirm the denial of the PCRA petition.

We take the underlying facts and procedural history in this matter from 

our review of the certified record and the PCRA court’s October 2, 2017 

opinion. On November 19, 2015, approximately one week before his 

scheduled trial, Appellant entered a negotiated guilty plea at two separate 

criminal informations to two counts of robbery, one count each of burglary, 
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criminal trespass, unlawful restraint, theft by unlawful taking, receiving stolen 

property, and escape. The charges on the first case arose out of a June 16, 

2015 robbery of a home wherein Appellant tied up an elderly woman and stole 

jewelry, a cell phone, and money from her residence. The charge on the 

second case arose out of Appellant’s escape from the district court on August 

3, 2015, while he was awaiting his preliminary hearing. 

There was an approximately three-day period between Appellant’s 

signing of the written guilty plea colloquy and the plea hearing. Appellant did 

not seek to withdraw his guilty plea during that period. On November 19, 

2015, following a hearing, the trial court accepted the guilty plea and 

sentenced Appellant in accordance with the terms of the negotiated guilty plea 

to an aggregate term of incarceration of not less than fifteen nor more than 

thirty years. Following the plea hearing, Appellant never contacted counsel, 

did not seek to withdraw his guilty plea, and did not file a direct appeal. 

On November 18, 2016, Appellant, acting pro se, filed the instant, timely 

PCRA petition. On November 29, 2016, the PCRA court appointed counsel, 

who filed an amended PCRA petition alleging ineffective assistance of plea 

counsel. A PCRA hearing took place on June 30, and July 6, 2017. The PCRA 

court denied Appellant’s PCRA petition on July 10, 2017. The instant, timely 

appeal followed. Appellant filed a timely concise statement of errors 

complained of on appeal on July 28, 2017. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). On 

October 2, 2017, the PCRA court filed an opinion. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a). 
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On appeal, Appellant raises the following questions for our review:

a. [Was counsel] ineffective under the Sixth and 

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and 

Art. I, §9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution [for] coercing 

[Appellant] to plead guilty when counsel knew he was under the 

influence of drugs that clouded his judgment given to him by the 

Bucks County Correctional Facility[?]

b. [Was counsel] ineffective under the Sixth and 

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and 

Art. I, §9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution for advising [Appellant] 

to plead guilty when the evidence was not conclusive of guilt[?]

c. [Was counsel] ineffective under the Sixth and 

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and 

Art. I, §9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution for advising [Appellant] 

to plead guilty by threatening him with the possibility of 

unrealistically severe sentences[?]

(Turner/Finley Letter, at unnumbered pages 3-4).

Here, as noted, Appellant’s court-appointed counsel has petitioned this 

Court for permission to withdraw and has submitted a Turner/Finley letter. 

Appellant has not responded to the motion to withdraw. Court-appointed 

counsel who seeks to withdraw from representing an appellant on appeal of a 

denial of a PCRA petition on the basis that the appeal lacks merit must review 

the case zealously. See Commonwealth v. Wrecks, 931 A.2d 717, 721 

(Pa. Super. 2007). 

Turner/Finley counsel must then submit a “no-merit” letter to 

the trial court, or brief on appeal to this Court, detailing the nature 

and extent of counsel’s diligent review of the case, listing the 

issues which the petitioner wants to have reviewed, explaining 

why and how those issues lack merit, and requesting permission 

to withdraw. 
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Counsel must also send to the petitioner: (1) a copy of the 

“no-merit” letter/brief; (2) a copy of counsel’s petition to 

withdraw; and (3) a statement advising petitioner of the right to 

proceed pro se or by new counsel. 

Id. (citations omitted). Here, counsel has substantially complied with the 

dictates of Turner/Finley.

 When this Court receives a Turner/Finley letter, we conduct an 

independent review of the record in light of the PCRA petition and the issues 

set forth within it, as well as of the contents of the petition of counsel to 

withdraw. See Wrecks, supra at 721. We will grant the petition to withdraw, 

where, as here, we agree with counsel that the PCRA petition is meritless. 

See id. Accordingly, we grant counsel’s petition to withdraw and proceed to 

conduct an independent review of Appellant’s claims.

Our standard of review for an order denying PCRA relief is well settled:

This Court’s standard of review regarding a PCRA court’s 

order is whether the determination of the PCRA court is supported 

by the evidence of record and is free of legal error. Great 

deference is granted to the findings of the PCRA court, and these 

findings will not be disturbed unless they have no support in the 

certified record. 

Commonwealth v. Carter, 21 A.3d 680, 682 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations 

and quotation marks omitted). 

In the instant matter, Appellant claims that he received ineffective 

assistance of plea counsel. (See Turner/Finley Letter, at unnumbered pages 

3-4). “A criminal defendant has the right to effective counsel during a plea 

process as well as during trial.” Commonwealth v. Rathfon, 899 A.2d 365, 
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369 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation omitted). Further, “[a]llegations of 

ineffectiveness in connection with the entry of a guilty plea will serve as a 

basis for relief only if the ineffectiveness caused the defendant to enter an 

involuntary or unknowing plea.” Commonwealth v. Hickman, 799 A.2d 

136, 141 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citation omitted). Also, “[w]here the defendant 

enters his plea on the advice of counsel, the voluntariness of the plea depends 

upon whether counsel’s advice was within the range of competence demanded 

of attorneys in criminal cases.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations 

omitted). 

We presume that counsel is effective, and Appellant bears the burden 

to prove otherwise. See Commonwealth v. Bennett, 57 A.3d 1185, 1195 

(Pa. 2012). The test for ineffective assistance of counsel is the same under 

both the Federal and Pennsylvania Constitutions. See Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); Commonwealth v. Jones, 815 

A.2d 598, 611 (Pa. 2002). Appellant must demonstrate that: (1) his 

underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) the particular course of conduct 

pursued by counsel did not have some reasonable basis designed to effectuate 

his interests; and (3) but for counsel’s ineffectiveness, there is a reasonable 

probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different. 

See Commonwealth v. Pierce, 786 A.2d 203, 213 (Pa. 2001), abrogated 

on other grounds, Commonwealth v. Grant, 813 A.2d 726 (Pa. 2002). A 

failure to satisfy any prong of the test for ineffectiveness will require rejection 
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of the claim. See Jones, supra at 611. Where, as here, Appellant pleaded 

guilty, in order to satisfy the prejudice requirement, he must show that “there 

is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have 

pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Rathfon, supra at 

370 (citation omitted). Appellant has failed to do so.

Appellant first claims that plea counsel was ineffective for allowing him 

to plead guilty while he was under the influence of psychotropic medication, 

which allegedly clouded his judgment. (See Turner/Finley Letter, at 

unnumbered pages 4-5). The record does show that Appellant was taking 

psychotropic medication. (See Written Guilty Plea Colloquy, 11/16/15, at 2). 

However, nothing demonstrates that it clouded his judgment. 

Initially, we note that, in the written guilty plea colloquy, which as noted 

above, Appellant signed three days prior to the guilty plea hearing, he

acknowledged that he was taking medication but stated that it did not affect 

his ability to understand the proceedings. (See id. at 2, 9). Appellant did not 

seek to withdraw his plea or continue his plea hearing in the days between 

executing the written plea colloquy and the plea hearing. 

At the plea hearing, when asked if his responses to the question asked 

in the written colloquy would be the same as they were on the date he 

executed it, Appellant replied “[y]es.” (N.T. Guilty Plea Hearing, 11/19/15, at 

23). Appellant also admitted at the plea hearing that plea counsel had him 

assessed for competency and the examiner found he was competent to stand 
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trial. (See id. at 25). Moreover, he completed a drug and alcohol evaluation. 

(See id. at 25, 27-28). 

Plea counsel questioned Appellant about his mental health history and 

placed on the record the fact that Appellant was taking medication. (See id. 

at 28-29). At no point did Appellant ever state that he was unable to 

understand the proceedings because of the medication. Moreover, as 

discussed above, Appellant never sought to withdraw his guilty plea at all, let 

alone on the basis that he was incompetent to enter it because of the 

psychotropic medication. Further, Appellant did not file a direct appeal.

At the PCRA hearing, plea counsel testified that he was aware that 

Appellant was on psychotropic medication but that Appellant had never 

complained to him that the medication was clouding his judgment, and he 

himself never saw any indication that the medication was affecting Appellant’s 

ability to enter a guilty plea. (See N.T. PCRA Hearing, 6/30/17, at 27-29, 32-

33, 38-39, 51-53). Moreover, counsel reaffirmed that, because of Appellant’s 

history, he had him examined for competency and that the expert found him 

competent for trial. (See id. at 28-29, 48-49). 

At the PCRA hearing, Appellant agreed that an examiner found him 

competent for trial. (See N.T. PCRA Hearing, 7/06/17, at 5-6, 18). He further 

acknowledged that he understood that he was coming to court in November 

2015 to plead guilty. (See id. at 6-7). He admitted that he never told either 

plea counsel or the trial court that the medication in any way affected his 
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ability to understand the proceedings. (See id. at 7-8). He even stated that, 

at the time he entered the guilty plea, he did not believe the medication 

caused problems. (See id. at 7-8, 14, 30-31). He also conceded that he 

understood the written guilty plea colloquy and that counsel explained 

“everything” to him. (Id. at 14). 

He testified that, it was not until after he was moved from county jail to 

state prison and the medical staff changed his medications that he began to 

believe that the medication altered his “mindset” and that he “started 

questioning how much it played a part in my decision-making to accept the 

deal in the first place.” (Id. at 8; see also id. at 14). Appellant did not 

provide any medical evidence to support a contention that the medication he 

was taking at the time he entered his guilty plea would have impaired his 

abilities.

Our review of the record demonstrates that there is nothing to support 

Appellant’s belated1 and self-serving claim that counsel was ineffective for 

allowing him to plead guilty because the psychotropic medication was 

impairing his judgment. Moreover, Appellant’s insistence that his 

simultaneous guilty plea to escape was voluntary, undercuts his claim that the 

medication impaired his judgment with respect to entering the guilty plea for 

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1 We note that Appellant admitted at the PCRA hearing that he did not raise 

the claim that counsel was ineffective for allowing him to plead guilty when he 

was taking psychotropic medication which clouded his judgment in his original 

pro se PCRA petition. (See id. at 33-34). 
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robbery and the related offenses. (See N.T. PCRA Hearing, 6/30/17, at 7-8). 

Appellant fails to cite any legal support for a contention that a defendant can 

be incompetent to enter a guilty plea on one set of charges while being 

competent to enter a guilty plea on another set of charges at the same 

hearing. 

Accordingly, we find that Appellant has failed to set forth the 

ineffectiveness analysis required by Strickland. See Strickland, supra at 

687. Because Appellant has not established any of the three prongs, we must 

deem counsel’s assistance constitutionally effective. See Commonwealth v. 

Rolan, 964 A.2d 398, 406 (Pa. Super. 2008) (holding that where appellant 

fails to prove any one of three prongs of ineffectiveness test, he does not meet 

his burden of proving ineffective assistance of counsel, and counsel is deemed 

constitutionally effective). Thus, there is no basis to upset the PCRA court’s 

finding that Appellant was not entitled to PCRA relief on this issue.

Appellant next argues that plea counsel was ineffective for advising him 

to plead guilty “when the evidence was not conclusive of guilt.” 

(Turner/Finley Letter, at unnumbered page 4). The record at the PCRA 

hearing simply does not support this claim. At the hearing, counsel testified 

in detail as to the basis for his belief that Appellant could not prevail at trial. 

He discussed his concern that, despite filing a motion to sever, he believed it 

would be unsuccessful and that trying the escape charge simultaneously with 

the robbery charges “would be difficult for a jury trial in this case or any type 
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of trial” because Appellant escaped on the day of his preliminary hearing on 

the robbery and related charges. (N.T. PCRA Hearing, 6/30/17, at 19, see 

id. at 43). Counsel explained that, even if he succeeded on his motion to 

sever, evidence of the escape would be admissible at trial as consciousness of 

guilt. (See id. at 44). 

Counsel noted that the evidence showed that the case initially started 

as a burglary because the eighty-four year-old victim was not present but that 

when she returned home, Appellant, who was outside the residence, went 

back in, tied her up, gagged her, and then started rummaging around the 

house to find items to steal. (See id. at 21). He explained that the fact that 

Appellant could have avoided the more serious charges by remaining outside 

the residence when he saw the victim return rather than by going back inside 

and escalating things was a problem. (See id. at 34). 

Counsel stated that the only possible defense was misidentification and 

he had an expert look at the case but the expert said her testimony at trial 

would not be helpful to Appellant. (See id. at 21-22, 25). He averred that 

he believed that the trial court would admit both the victim’s out-of-court and 

in-court identification of Appellant at the preliminary hearing, at trial, and that 

the victim was a strong witness. (See id. at 40-43). He pointed out that the 

victim contacted the police within minutes of the robbery; the police 

discovered Appellant only a short distance away from her home by using the 
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victim’s cell phone tracker, and some of the items stolen from her home were 

in his immediate vicinity. (See id. at 23). 

Counsel acknowledged that Appellant admitted guilt to him. (See id. at 

45). He also explained that he believed that he could not put Appellant on 

the stand to testify at trial in his own defense because of a prior conviction for 

burglary and other convictions for crimen falsi. (See id. at 56). He also 

reiterated his concerns, expressed to Appellant at the time, that, if a jury 

found him guilty at trial, he would likely face severe consequences at 

sentencing given Appellant’s prior record, the age of the victim, and the fact 

that Appellant escalated the situation by reentering the residence when the 

victim came home. (See id. at 20-21, 31-32, 34, 46-48).

At the PCRA hearing, Appellant never testified that he told counsel that

he was actually innocent or that he wanted to go to trial. He was unable to 

answer his own attorney’s question about what evidence of guilt he believed 

was inconclusive. (See N.T. PCRA Hearing, 7/06/17, at 9). Instead, he baldly 

stated that he “wasn’t the person who committed this crime.” (Id.). He 

admitted that he knew that, if he went to trial, the court would admit evidence

of his escape. (See id.). He also acknowledged that he had stated at his 

guilty plea hearing that he felt sorry for the victim. (See id. at 10). His 

explanation of why he said this if he was innocent was less than clear. (See 

id.). Appellant then alternately claimed that he pleaded guilty because he 

was afraid that if he went to trial and the jury convicted him he would get a 
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lengthy sentence and that he believed he would succeed at trial, despite the 

evidence and his prior criminal record. (See id. at 11-12). 

With respect to the question of whether counsel’s advice to a defendant 

to plead guilty was ineffective, this Court has stated:

. . . where the claim is that counsel ineffectively advised the 

defendant to accept a plea, the question is simply whether that 

advice itself is constitutionally sound. Where the defendant enters 

his plea on the advice of counsel, the voluntariness of the plea 

depends on whether counsel’s advice was within the range of 

competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. . . .

Herein, [a]ppellant has made no showing whatsoever that 

the advice to accept the plea was not within the range of 

constitutionally competent advice. . . . [Here,] there is simply no 

attorney error to speak of with respect to this advice, which clearly 

had a reasonable strategic basis designed to effectuate 

[a]ppellant’s interests. . . . 

. . . The PCRA court therefore correctly rejected his claim.

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 179 A.3d 1153, 1160-61 (Pa. Super. 2018)

(citations and quotation marks omitted).

Here, as in Johnson, Appellant has simply not shown that counsel’s 

advice to plead did not have “a reasonable strategic basis designed to 

effectuate [his] interests.” Id. at 1161. The PCRA court did not err in finding 

that Appellant was not entitled to PCRA relief on this basis.

In his third claim, Appellant complains that counsel, “threaten[ed] him 

with the possibility of unrealistically severe sentences.” (Turner/Finley

Letter, at unnumbered page 4; see also id. at unnumbered page 7). 

However, the record does not support this claim. Appellant did not testify at 
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the PCRA hearing that counsel threatened him. Rather, he testified that 

“attorneys and lawyers” told him that he “would probably receive” a lengthy 

sentence if he did not plead guilty. (N.T. PCRA Hearing, 7/06/17, at 10). As 

discussed above, counsel expressed a reasonable basis for his belief that, if 

found guilty, Appellant would likely receive a sentence on or close to the 

maximum. (See N.T. PCRA Hearing, 6/30/17, at 20-21, 31-32, 34, 46-48). 

Moreover, Appellant admitted his complaint was less that counsel threatened 

him and more that counsel, as is required, informed him of the possible 

maximum sentences, and Appellant did not wish to hear that information. 

(See N.T. PCRA Hearing, 7/06/17, at 15-16). We will not fault counsel for 

adequately informing his client about the possible maximum range of 

sentences. The PCRA court did not err in denying Appellant’s PCRA petition 

on this basis.

In any event, we have held that where the record clearly shows that the 

court conducted a thorough guilty plea colloquy and that the defendant 

understood his rights and the nature of the charges against him, the plea is 

voluntary. See Commonwealth v. McCauley, 797 A.2d 920, 922 (Pa. 

Super. 2001). In examining whether the defendant understood the nature 

and consequences of his plea, we look to the totality of the circumstances. 

See id. At a minimum, the trial court must inquire into the following six 

areas: 

(1) Does the defendant understand the nature of the charges to 

which he is pleading guilty?
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(2) Is there a factual basis for the plea?

(3) Does the defendant understand that he has a right to trial 

by jury?

(4) Does the defendant understand that he is presumed 

innocent until he is found guilty?

(5) Is the defendant aware of the permissible ranges of 

sentences and/or fines for the offenses charged?

(6) Is the defendant aware that the judge is not bound by the 

terms of any plea agreement tendered unless the judge 

accepts such agreement?

Id. (citation omitted); see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 590, Comment. 

Defense counsel or the attorney for the Commonwealth, as permitted 

by the court, may conduct this examination. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 590, 

Comment. Moreover, the examination may consist of both a written colloquy 

that the defendant read, completed, and signed, and made a part of the 

record; and an on-the-record oral examination. See id. 

Here, Appellant signed a written plea colloquy and engaged in an oral 

colloquy with the trial court. (See Written Guilty Plea, 11/16/15, at 9; N.T. 

Guilty Plea Hearing, 11/19/15, at 2-43). At the guilty plea hearing, Appellant 

testified that he understood the charges against him, was pleading guilty 

because he had committed the crimes charged, had signed the written guilty 

plea colloquy, and understood the written colloquy. (See N.T. Guilty Plea 

Hearing, at 24-26). Appellant agreed that the facts as stated by the 

Commonwealth were substantially correct; he understood that he could go to 
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trial and what a trial entailed; he had no questions for his counsel, the 

Commonwealth, or the trial court; was satisfied with counsel’s representation; 

and wanted to plead guilty. (See id. at 11, 15-17, 21, 26). Appellant did not 

make any complaints or voice any dissatisfaction with counsel’s representation 

during the plea colloquy. (See id. at 2-43). As discussed above Appellant 

never sought to withdraw his guilty plea and did not file a direct appeal. 

The statements made during a plea colloquy bind a criminal defendant. 

See Commonwealth v. Muhammad, 794 A.2d 378, 384 (Pa. Super. 2002). 

Thus, a defendant cannot assert grounds for withdrawing the plea that 

contradict statements made at that time. See Commonwealth v. Stork, 

737 A.2d 789, 790-91 (Pa. Super. 1999), appeal denied, 764 A.2d 1068 (Pa. 

2000). Further, “[t]he law does not require that appellant be pleased with the 

outcome of his decision to enter a plea of guilty: ‘All that is required is that 

[appellant’s] decision to plead guilty be knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently 

made.’” Commonwealth v. Yager, 685 A.2d 1000, 1004 (Pa. Super. 1996) 

(en banc), appeal denied, 701 A.2d 577 (Pa. 1997) (citation omitted). Here, 

Appellant has not shown that his decision to enter the guilty plea was 

involuntary. He has therefore failed to prove prejudice. Thus, his claims of 

ineffective assistance of plea counsel lack merit. 

Accordingly, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm the denial 

of Appellant’s PCRA petition.

Motion to withdraw granted. Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/13/2018