Of the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation. *

Not for Publication in West’s Federal Reporter

United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

No. 07-2301

LIFEI LIN,

Petitioner, 

V.

MICHAEL MUKASEY, ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Respondent. 

ON PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER

OF THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS

Before

Lipez, Circuit Judge,

 Merritt, Senior Circuit Judge, *

and Howard, Circuit Judge.

David V. Bernal, Assistant Director, Office of Immigration

Litigation, LaTia N. Bing, U.S. Department of Justice, and Anthony

C. Payne, Senior Litigation Counsel with Office of Immigration

Litigation, U.S. Department of Justice, were on brief for

Respondent.

Wei Jia was on brief for Petitioner.

May 8, 2008
The immigration judge also denied Lin’s request for protection 1

pursuant to the Convention Against Terror, but Lin did not appeal

that part of the decision.

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MERRITT, Senior Circuit Judge. Petitioner Lifei Lin, a

citizen of the People’s Republic of China, applied for asylum,

relief from withholding of removal and relief under the Convention

Against Torture on the ground that he had been arrested and

mistreated by Chinese authorities due to violations of Chinese

family planning laws. Lin seeks review of the Board of Immigration

Appeals’ July 25, 2007, decision dismissing his appeal from an

immigration judge’s March 20, 2006, decision, which denied his

application for asylum and withholding of removal. This Court’s 1

jurisdiction is governed by section 242 of the Immigration and

Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1252, as amended by the REAL ID Act of

2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, Div. B, 119 Stat. 231, which provides for

review of final orders of removal. Lin contends that the adverse

credibility findings of the immigration judge and upheld by the

Board of Immigration Appeals are not supported by substantial

evidence. Lin also contends that the Board impermissibly engaged

in its own fact finding and that he was deprived of his due process

rights when the immigration judge failed to explicitly state in the

decision her reliance on the REAL ID Act in assessing his

credibility under a “totality of the circumstances” standard. For

the following reasons we deny the petition.
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I.

Mr. Lin was born in Fuzhou City, China, on March 7, 1983. He

“married” on September 10, 2002, with a celebration among family

and friends, but Lin acknowledges that the marriage was not

official because both the bride and groom were underage under

Chinese law. A child was born to the union on November 17, 2003.

Lin’s “wife” and son remain in China. Upon learning of the

pregnancy and the underage marriage, the authorities arrested Lin.

Lin claims he was detained by authorities when he refused to

disclose the whereabouts of his girlfriend for fear she would be

forced to abort and because he was unable to pay the fine. Lin

left China in 2003 because he feared future persecution based on

his failure to follow China’s family planning laws by marrying

underage and by having a child without permission, as well as his

failure to pay a fine imposed due to the violations. 

After leaving his home, Lin went into hiding – first in China,

then in Holland and Peru. He eventually made his way to the United

States and arrived at Miami International Airport on February 6,

2005. Lin had no valid travel documents or other papers and paid

$7,000 or $8,000 for a smuggler to get him into the United States.

He requested political asylum and said he left China because he was

“afraid of being punished for impregnating [his] girlfriend.” Lin

fears that he would be persecuted if he returned to China for

violations of the family planning laws. 
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II. 

To qualify for asylum, an alien needs to demonstrate that he

is a refugee due to previous persecution or a well-founded fear of

future persecution based on race, religion, nationality, membership

in a particular social group, or political opinion. 8 U.S.C. §

1158(b)(1); Berrio-Barrera v. Gonzales, 460 F.3d 163, 167 (1st

Cir. 2006). With regard to a fear of future persecution, the

applicant must demonstrate an objectively well-founded fear of

persecution on a protected ground and that this fear is genuine.

Aguilar-Solis v. INS, 168 F.3d 565, 572 (1st Cir. 1999) (proving

the objective and subjective components of a well-founded fear of

future persecution requires the petitioner to show her fear is

“both genuine and objectively reasonable”). Fear of forced

abortion or sterilization is categorized as fear of persecution on

account of political opinion. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (“A person

who has a well-founded fear that he or she will be forced to

undergo [a forced abortion or sterilization] procedure or [is]

subject to persecution for failure, refusal, or resistance [to

undergoing such a procedure] shall be deemed to have a well-founded

fear of persecution on account of political opinion.”); Zheng v.

Gonzales, 475 F.3d 30, 34 (1st Cir. 2007). In addition, the spouse

of a person forced to undergo sterilization or abortion procedures

may be deemed to have a well-founded fear of persecution. Lin v.

Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 18, 21 (1st Cir. 2004). Lin claims persecution
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as the result of the Chinese government’s efforts to enforce its

coerced population control policies, including the possibility of

forced sterilization for him or his girlfriend should he return to

China.

Lin’s applications were denied because the immigration judge

found that he lacked credibility, primarily due to inconsistencies

among his testimony at the hearing, his asylum application and

statements made during two interviews held shortly after he entered

the country. See Oral Decision of the Immigration Judge at 9-11.

The immigration judge set out numerous discrepancies in detail in

her decision. Based on these discrepancies, the immigration judge

discredited the majority of Lin’s claimed fear of persecution and

torture should he return to China.

For example, the immigration judge found a discrepancy as to

when Lin’s girlfriend’s pregnancy was reported to the authorities.

Lin testified at his hearing that his “wife” had been pregnant for

little over a month when the authorities found out, but notes taken

during an earlier credible fear interview suggest that she was five

months pregnant. The immigration judge also found a discrepancy as

to the reasons given by Lin for his detention by the authorities.

Lin did not mention during his credible-fear interview any concern

about his girlfriend being forced to have an abortion or fear that

either or both of them would be forcibly sterilized at a later

date. The only fear Lin expressed at that time about returning to
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China concerned the punishment he might face for his failure to pay

the fine. Later, however, during direct examination at the

hearing, Lin expressed a fear of forced sterilization should he

return to China. He also testified that he fled China because he

feared further beatings based on the beating he says he received by

Chinese authorities when he refused to divulge the whereabouts of

his girlfriend for fear she would be forced to have an abortion.

Also noted by the immigration judge was a discrepancy about the

duration of detention: Lin reported the detention as lasting two

days during the asylum interview but said it was four days on

direct examination during his hearing before the immigration judge.

Lin also reported being beaten with an electric baton in his asylum

interview, but did not mention until his hearing that he had been

injured and hospitalized due to the beating. 

The immigration judge also noted the unexplained discrepancy

in why Lin originally claimed to have been arrested on January 5,

2003, but then later testified that he was actually arrested on

March 30, 2003. Similarly, the immigration judge noted a

discrepancy between Lin’s application for asylum and his asylum

interview concerning the date he left China. June 20, 2004, was

the date given at the asylum interview, but October 20 2003, is the

date Lin gave in his asylum application. Lin has also submitted

contradictory evidence regarding the events that took place
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subsequent to his arrest in China and prior to his arrival in the

United States.

Based on these multiple discrepancies, the immigration judge

found that Lin had failed to meet his burden of proof with regard

to his asylum application. Because Lin failed to meet the burden

of proof for asylum, he was also unable to meet the more stringent

standard for withholding of removal. Rodriguez-Ramirez v.

Ashcroft, 398 F.3d 120, 123 (1st Cir. 2005) (finding that because

the burden of proof necessary to establish an asylum claim is lower

than the burden of proof required to prevail on a withholding of

removal claim, “the BIA’s rejection of the petitioner's asylum

claim, if sustainable, sounds the death knell for his counterpart

claim for withholding of removal”).

Lin appealed the denial of his applications to the Board of

Immigration Appeals, which affirmed on the ground that the adverse

credibility finding was not clearly erroneous. The Board decision

focused primarily on the discrepancies concerning various dates,

such as when Lin left China, when he was arrested, and the date on

which his girlfriend’s pregnancy was discovered by the authorities

as well as the circumstances surrounding the disclosure of the

pregnancy to the authorities. The Board also noted the

inconsistencies in Lin’s statements concerning the events that took

place after he was arrested and his activities and whereabouts
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prior to entering the United States. Decision of the Board of

Immigration Appeals, July 25, 2007. 

Lin petitions this Court for review of the Board’s decision.

He contends that the adverse credibility finding was not supported

by substantial evidence. We review the Board’s findings of fact

under a substantial evidence standard, under which the agency’s

findings are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be

compelled to conclude to the contrary. We review the entire record

to assess whether the findings are supported by substantial

evidence. Where the Board adopts the immigration judge’s ruling,

but also engages in discussion of its own, as here, we review both

decisions. Hem v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 67, 69 (1st Cir. 2008). Under

the deferential substantial evidence standard, we consider whether

the agency’s ruling is supported by “reasonable, substantial and

probative evidence on the record as a whole.” INS v. EliasZacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992). Upon review of the entire

record, we hold that substantial evidence supports the findings of

the immigration judge as affirmed by the Board of Immigration

Appeals. The discrepancies are well documented in the immigration

judge’s decision and the record does not compel a contrary

conclusion.

Lin also contends that the Board violated its scope of review

because it impermissibly engaged in fact finding when it

“determined that Lin originally claimed to have been arrested on
The new language provides: 2

Credibility determination. Considering the totality of

the circumstances, and all relevant factors, a trier of

fact may base a credibility determination on the

demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of the applicant or

witness, the inherent plausibility of the applicant’s or

witness’s account, the consistency between the

applicant’s or witness’s written and oral statements

(whenever made and whether or not under oath, and

considering the circumstances under which the statements

were made), the internal consistency of each such

statement, the consistency of such statements with other

evidence of record (including the reports of the

Department of State on country conditions), and any

inaccuracies or falsehoods in such statements, without

regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or

falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim, or

any other relevant factor.

8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); see also 8 U.S.C. §§ 1231(b)(3)(C)

& 1229a(c)(4)(C) (credibility determination for removal

proceeding).

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January 5, 2003, but then later testified that the event occurred

on March 30, 2003.” Lin claims the immigration judge made no such

finding in her decision. Petitioner’s Br. at 10. Contrary to

Lin’s argument, however, the immigration judge explicitly found a

discrepancy when she said “in the asylum interview respondent

asserts he was arrested on January 5, 2003, as opposed to March 30,

2003, according to his direct testimony.” Oral Decision of the

Immigration Judge at 11. Accordingly, Lin’s argument concerning

impermissible fact finding by the Board fails.

Lin also argues that his due process rights were violated

because the immigration judge did not clearly indicate that new

amendments to the REAL ID Act applied to Lin’s asylum application 2
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and yet the Board, on appeal, explicitly applied the provisions.

The import of the amendments to the REAL ID Act is to eliminate the

“heart of the claim” rule and instead to rely on a “totality of the

circumstances” rule in making credibility determinations. The

change allows the immigration judge to make credibility findings

based on all the evidence – not just evidence that goes to the

“heart” of the petitioner’s claims. See Castañeda-Castillo v.

Gonzales, 488 F.3d 17, 23 n.6 (1st Cir. 2007) (en banc) (under Real

ID Act “fact-finder is entitled to draw the falsus in omnibus

inference based on inaccuracies, inconsistencies, or falsehoods,

without regard to whether they go to the heart of the applicant's

claim,” although the amendment would not have changed result in

case at bar) (internal quotation marks and punctuation omitted);

Chen v. United States Att'y Gen., 454 F.3d 103, 106-07 n.2 (2d Cir.

2006) (per curiam) (in case in which Real ID Act inapplicable,

stating that new provision would seem to overrule certain Second

Circuit credibility determination rules); Chen v. United States

Att'y Gen., 463 F.3d 1228, 1233 (11th Cir. 2006) (applying Real ID

Act; rejecting argument that discrepancy was trivial); Jibril v.

Gonzales, 423 F.3d 1129, 1138 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005) (opining that if

Real ID Act applied to the case, it would change result dictated by

Ninth Circuit's heart of the claim rule); In re J-Y-C-, 24 I. & N.

Dec. 260, 265 (BIA 2007) (not necessary under Real ID Act that
The immigration judge is entitled to a presumption of 3

regularity in her rulings such that the failure to explicitly

mention that the REAL ID Act applied to the application does not

violate Lin’s due process rights. Enwonwu v. Gonzales, 232 Fed.

Appx. 11, 15 (1st Cir. May 10, 2007) (no due process violation

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inconsistencies relied on in credibility determinations go to the

heart of the claim). But see Kadia v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 817, 821-

22 (7th Cir. 2007) (in case in which Real ID Act not applicable,

expressing skepticism that Real ID Act revives “discredited”

doctrine of falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus). 

Consequently, we may not reverse the Board’s decision on the

ground that the inconsistencies it relied on in affirming the

adverse credibility do not go to the “heart” of Lin’s claim.

However, the immigration judge found Lin’s testimony not credible

with regard to several facts that “go to the heart” of Lin’s asylum

claim. Oral Decision of the Immigration Judge at 8, Mar. 20, 2006.

Therefore, Lin’s application fails to meet the necessary burden

under either the new, more-stringent standard of the REAL ID Act

amendment that allows the immigration judge to assess credibility

based on every fact put forth by the applicant in support of his

application or under the former “heart of the claim” standard that

requires the immigration judge to look only to those facts central

to the claims in the application. Accordingly, even if the

immigration judge did not apply the new “totality of the

circumstances” language from the REAL ID Act amendments, and we

have no reason to believe that she did not, Lin suffered no 3
where presumption of regularity attaches to agency action absent

petitioner putting forth “concrete evidence” to the contrary);

McLeod v. INS, 802 F.2d 89, 94-95 & n.8 (3d Cir. 1986) (same).

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prejudice from the immigration judge’s reliance on the “heart of

the claim” standard for assessing credibility. 

For the foregoing reasons, the petition is denied.