Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A-CR-203 | October 2, 2020 Page 1 of 13

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Andrew Bernlohr

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General

Tina L. Mann

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Geovany Diaz,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

October 2, 2020

Court of Appeals Case No.

20A-CR-203

Appeal from the 

Marion Superior Court

The Honorable 

Shatrese M. Flowers, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

49G02-1812-MR-042357

Vaidik, Judge.

Case Summary

[1] Geovany Diaz shot two men during a robbery. One victim died, the other 

survived. Diaz was convicted of murder and Level 5 felony robbery with regard 

to the deceased victim and Level 2 felony robbery resulting in serious bodily 
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injury with regard to the surviving victim. He appeals his conviction for Level 5 

felony robbery, arguing that it constitutes double jeopardy in light of his 

conviction for murder. After Diaz filed his brief on appeal, our Supreme Court 

decided Wadle v. State, in which it established a new framework for analyzing 

double-jeopardy claims like the one made by Diaz. We find no double jeopardy 

under either pre-Wadle law or the Wadle analysis and therefore affirm Diaz’s 

convictions. We also affirm Diaz’s sentence of seventy-eight years in prison.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] The evidence most favorable to the State can be summarized as follows. On 

November 30, 2018, Dejon Wooden posted a video on Instagram showing 

Xanax pills that his friend Jesse Harris wanted to sell. Diaz, who knew 

Wooden, sent him a message that he wanted to buy the pills. Wooden and 

Harris went to Diaz’s apartment complex to complete the sale. Wooden was in 

the driver’s seat, Harris was in the front passenger seat, and Diaz got into the 

passenger-side back seat, behind Harris. After seeing the pills, Diaz said he 

wanted to buy them and started counting his money. However, he then pointed 

a handgun at Wooden and told him to “come off everything,” which Wooden 

took to mean that Diaz “wanted all the pills and everything.” Tr. Vol. II p. 122.

Wooden grabbed Diaz’s arm that was holding the gun and pushed it down. In 

doing so, Wooden was shot in the right shoulder. He opened his door and got 

on the ground. Inside the car, Diaz shot Harris multiple times, killing him, and 
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took his wallet and phone. He also took Wooden’s wallet and phone, as well as 

the pills, and told Wooden to leave. Diaz was arrested shortly thereafter.

[3] The State filed six charges against Diaz: murder (knowingly killing Harris); 

felony murder (killing Harris while committing robbery); Level 2 felony robbery

of Harris (elevated from a Level 5 felony because it resulted in serious bodily 

injury); Level 2 felony robbery of Wooden (elevated from a Level 5 felony 

because it resulted in serious bodily injury); Level 3 felony robbery of Wooden 

(elevated from a Level 5 felony because Diaz was armed with a deadly 

weapon); and Level 5 felony battery of Wooden (elevated from a Class B 

misdemeanor because it was committed with a deadly weapon). The case 

proceeded to a jury trial, and the jury found Diaz guilty on all six counts. 

However, due to double-jeopardy concerns, the trial court entered only three 

convictions: murder, Level 5 felony robbery of Harris (reduced from a Level 2 

felony because Harris’s death supported both the serious-bodily-injury 

enhancement and the murder charge), and, with regard to Wooden, Level 2 

felony robbery resulting in serious bodily injury.

[4] In sentencing Diaz, the court found four aggravating circumstances: (1) Diaz’s 

criminal history (four drug-related Level 6 felony convictions in 2017 and 2018, 

a misdemeanor conviction for possession of marijuana, and a juvenile 

adjudication for theft); (2) the fact that Diaz was serving community-corrections 

sentences for prior convictions when he committed these offenses, which the 

court found to be a “substantial aggravator”; (3) “the nature and the 

circumstances of this offense”; and (4) the IRAS assessment indicated that Diaz 
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presents a high risk of re-offending. Tr. Vol. IV p. 66. The court also found two

mitigating circumstances: Diaz has a substance-abuse problem and “a

prolonged period of incarceration would be an undue hardship on [Diaz’s]

dependents and his family.” Id. at 65-66. Finding that the aggravators outweigh 

the mitigators, the court imposed an above-advisory sentence for each count: 

fifty-eight years for the murder of Harris, five years for the Level 5 felony 

robbery of Harris, and twenty years for the Level 2 felony robbery of Wooden.

The court ordered the two sentences relating to Harris to run concurrent to each 

other but consecutive to the sentence relating to Wooden, for a total sentence of 

seventy-eight years.

[5] Diaz now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. Double Jeopardy

[6] Diaz first contends that his convictions for both the murder and Level 5 felony 

robbery of Harris constitute double jeopardy because his acts “occurred over the 

course of a few very brief moments” and were really “one action.” Appellant’s 

Br. p. 13. He argues that the convictions violate the double-jeopardy clause of 

the Indiana Constitution under the actual-evidence test established by our 

Supreme Court in Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d 32 (Ind. 1999). Alternatively, 

he asserts that the two convictions are impermissible under the common-law

continuous-crime doctrine.
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[7] A few weeks after Diaz filed his brief, our Supreme Court issued two opinions 

that significantly altered the approach to claims of double jeopardy that, as 

here, are based on multiple convictions in a single prosecution. See Wadle v. 

State, 151 N.E.3d 227 (Ind. 2020); Powell v. State, 151 N.E.3d 256 (Ind. 2020). 

The Court distinguished these claims of “substantive double jeopardy” from 

claims of “procedural double jeopardy”—where a defendant is charged with the 

same offense in successive prosecutions. Previously, claims of substantive 

double jeopardy could be made under constitutional tests established in 

Richardson (including the actual-evidence test) or under a variety of statutory 

and common-law rules (including the continuous-crime doctrine). In Wadle and 

Powell, however, the Court did away with the existing rules and tests for claims 

of substantive double jeopardy and set forth new tests for such claims, with a 

focus on statutory interpretation. See Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 247 (“[W]e now 

proceed to articulate an analytical framework in which to resolve claims of 

substantive double jeopardy.”); Powell, 151 N.E.3d at 263-65.

[8] Having reviewed Diaz’s convictions under both the old law and the new law, 

we see no double-jeopardy violation under either. We reiterate that Wadle did 

away with the “old law” on claims of substantive double jeopardy, including 

the Richardson constitutional tests and all common-law rules like the 

continuous-crime doctrine. We address pre-Wadle law here only because there 

are outstanding questions about whether Wadle should be applied retroactively. 

Our conclusion that there is no double jeopardy in this case under either Wadle
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or the “old law” allows us to avoid that potentially sticky issue, which has not 

been briefed here.

A. Pre-Wadle law

[9] Diaz’s convictions for the murder and Level 5 felony robbery of Harris do not 

violate the actual-evidence test or the continuous-crime doctrine.

[10] Under the actual-evidence test, the defendant must demonstrate “a reasonable 

possibility that the evidentiary facts used by the fact-finder to establish the 

essential elements of one offense may also have been used to establish the 

essential elements of a second challenged offense.” Richardson, 717 N.E.2d at 

53. No such possibility exists here. The murder conviction was based on the 

evidence that Diaz killed Harris. That evidence, alone, could not have been 

used to find Diaz guilty of robbery, since robbery requires the taking of 

property. See Ind. Code § 35-42-5-1. Likewise, the robbery conviction was based 

on the evidence that Diaz took property from Harris by using force. That 

evidence, alone, could not have been used to find Diaz guilty of murder, since 

murder requires a killing, i.e., death. See Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1. The actualevidence test is not violated when “each conviction required proof of at least 

one unique evidentiary fact.” Bald v. State, 766 N.E.2d 1170, 1172 (Ind. 2002); 

see also Carrico v. State, 775 N.E.2d 312, 314 (Ind. 2002) (finding that defendant’s 

convictions for murder and robbery did not violate the actual-evidence test 

because the defendant’s killing of the victim by shooting him “established one 

element of robbery (force) but not all”).
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[11] Diaz’s argument under the continuous-crime doctrine also fails. The doctrine 

defines those instances where a continuous course of conduct amounts only to a 

single chargeable crime. Hines v. State, 30 N.E.2d 1216, 1219 (Ind. 2015). It does 

not seek to reconcile the double-jeopardy implications of two distinct 

chargeable crimes. Id. It is implicated only where the defendant is convicted of 

(1) multiple counts of the same statutory offense (e.g., multiple counts of 

battery) or (2) an offense and an included offense, i.e., “a crime for which all of 

the elements necessary to impose criminal liability are also elements found in”

the other crime. Id. at 1220-21. Here, Diaz was not convicted of multiple counts 

of murder or multiple counts of robbery with regard to Harris, and each offense 

requires an element the other does not (murder requires a killing, robbery 

requires the taking of property). Murder and robbery are two distinct chargeable 

crimes to which the continuous-crime doctrine does not apply.

1

B. Wadle analysis

[12] Wadle established the new double-jeopardy framework to be applied when, as 

here, “a single criminal act or transaction violates multiple statutes with 

common elements.” 151 N.E.3d at 247. (Powell, on the other hand, established 

the framework to be applied “when a single criminal act or transaction violates 

1 Diaz also cites the “very same act” rule, which prohibits “[c]onviction and punishment for a crime which 

consists of the very same act as another crime for which the defendant has been convicted and punished.”

Guyton v. State, 771 N.E.2d 1141, 1143 (Ind. 2002). However, he doesn’t develop an argument under the rule.

See Appellant’s Br. p. 12. Therefore, he waived any such claim. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a) (“The 

argument must contain the contentions of the appellant on the issues presented, supported by cogent 

reasoning.”). Waiver notwithstanding, Diaz’s robbery conviction could not have been based on the “very 

same act” as his murder conviction, since the robbery conviction required the taking of property.
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a single statute and results in multiple injuries.” 151 N.E.3d at 263.) The Court 

summarized the test as follows:

[W]hen multiple convictions for a single act or transaction 

implicate two or more statutes, we first look to the statutes 

themselves. If either statute clearly permits multiple punishment, 

whether expressly or by unmistakable implication, the court’s 

inquiry comes to an end and there is no violation of substantive 

double jeopardy. But if the statutory language is not clear, then a 

court must apply our included-offense statutes to determine 

whether the charged offenses are the same. See [Ind. Code] § 35-

31.5-2-168. If neither offense is included in the other (either

inherently or as charged), there is no violation of double 

jeopardy. But if one offense is included in the other (either 

inherently or as charged), then the court must examine the facts 

underlying those offenses, as presented in the charging

instrument and as adduced at trial. If, based on these facts, the 

defendant’s actions were “so compressed in terms of time, place,

singleness of purpose, and continuity of action as to constitute a 

single transaction,” then the prosecutor may charge the offenses 

as alternative sanctions only. But if the defendant’s actions prove 

otherwise, a court may convict on each charged offense.

Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 253.

[13] Applying the test here, we first observe that neither the murder statute nor the 

robbery statute clearly permits (or prohibits) multiple punishment for the 

murder and robbery of the same victim. The murder statute simply provides 

that “[a] person who: knowingly or intentionally kills another human being . . . 

commits murder, a felony.” I.C. § 35-42-1-1(1). The robbery statute provides 

that “[a] person who knowingly or intentionally takes property from another 

person or from the presence of another person: (1) by using or threatening the 
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use of force on any person; or (2) by putting any person in fear; commits 

robbery, a Level 5 felony.” I.C. § 35-42-5-1.

[14] Therefore, we move to the second step of the test: determining whether either 

offense is included in the other (“either inherently or as charged”) under the 

included-offense statute, Indiana Code section 35-31.5-2-168. If not, there can 

be no double jeopardy.

[15] Section 35-31.5-2-168 defines “included offense” as an offense that:

(1) is established by proof of the same material elements or less 

than all the material elements required to establish the 

commission of the offense charged;

(2) consists of an attempt to commit the offense charged or an 

offense otherwise included therein; or

(3) differs from the offense charged only in the respect that a less 

serious harm or risk of harm to the same person, property, or 

public interest, or a lesser kind of culpability, is required to 

establish its commission.

I.C. § 35-31.5-2-168. Subsection (1) is not implicated here. Murder is not 

established by proof of Level 5 felony robbery because murder requires a killing 

and Level 5 felony robbery does not. Likewise, Level 5 felony robbery is not 

established by proof of murder because robbery requires the taking of property

and murder does not. Subsection (2) does not apply either, because Diaz was 

not charged with or convicted of any attempt crime. And subsection (3) does 

not apply because murder and Level 5 felony robbery differ in more respects 
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than just the degree of harm or culpability required. As just noted, each offense 

requires some conduct the other does not (i.e., murder requires a killing, Level 5 

felony robbery requires the taking of property).

[16] Because neither murder nor Level 5 felony robbery is included in the other,

Diaz’s convictions do not constitute double jeopardy under Wadle, and there is 

no need to further examine the specific facts of the case under the third step of 

the test.

II. Sentence

[17] Diaz also argues that the trial court should have found his age to be a mitigating 

factor and that, in any event, his total sentence of seventy-eight years is 

inappropriate.

A. Age as a mitigator

[18] We first address Diaz’s argument that his age—twenty-one at the time of the 

offenses, twenty-two at the time of sentencing—is a mitigating factor. “Our trial 

courts enjoy broad discretion in identifying aggravating and mitigating factors, 

and we will reverse only for an abuse of that discretion.” McCoy v. State, 96 

N.E.3d 95, 99 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018).

[19] Diaz’s contention is that people in his age range “have a unique opportunity 

and incentive to rehabilitate themselves during their time in DOC.” Appellant’s 

Br. p. 15. As the State notes, however, “In three short years since becoming a 

legal adult, [Diaz] has obtained four felony convictions, had the opportunity to 
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be on probation which was revoked, had the opportunity to be on home 

detention, which [Diaz] violated, and committed the most serious crime with 

one of the highest penalties in the State of Indiana.” Appellee’s Br. p. 22. Given 

that history, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion by not 

finding Diaz’s age to be a mitigator.

2

B. Inappropriateness

[20] Diaz also argues that his seventy-eight-year sentence is inappropriate and asks 

us to revise it under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), which provides that an 

appellate court “may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due 

consideration of the trial court's decision, the Court finds that the sentence is 

inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the 

offender.” “Whether a sentence is inappropriate ultimately turns on the 

culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to 

others, and a myriad of other factors that come to light in a given case.” 

Thompson v. State, 5 N.E.3d 383, 391 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (citing Cardwell v. 

State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind. 2008)). Because we generally defer to the 

judgment of trial courts in sentencing matters, defendants have the burden of 

2

In addition to his age, Diaz asserts that “[e]vidence provided established that [he] was uniquely 

remorseful.” Appellant’s Br. p. 15. He does not develop this argument any further or cite anything in the 

record to support it. As such, it is waived. See App. R. 46(A)(8)(a) (“The argument must contain the 

contentions of the appellant on the issues presented, supported by cogent reasoning. Each contention must be 

supported by citations to the authorities, statutes, and the Appendix or parts of the Record on Appeal relied 

on, in accordance with Rule 22.”).
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persuading us that their sentences are inappropriate. Schaaf v. State, 54 N.E.3d 

1041, 1044-45 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).

[21] For the murder of Harris, Diaz faced a sentencing range of forty-five to sixtyfive years, with an advisory sentence of fifty-five years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-3. 

The trial court imposed an above-advisory term of fifty-eight years. For the 

Level 5 felony robbery of Harris, Diaz faced a sentencing range of one to six 

years, with an advisory sentence of three years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-6(b). The 

court imposed an above-advisory term of five years but ordered it to run 

concurrent to the murder sentence. For the Level 2 felony robbery of Wooden, 

Diaz faced a sentencing range of ten to thirty years, with an advisory sentence 

of seventeen-and-a-half years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-4.5. The court imposed an 

above-advisory term of twenty years, to run consecutive to the fifty-eight-year 

sentence for murder.

[22] Diaz’s argument focuses on the nature of his offenses: 

[T]he facts of the case demonstrate that the death of Jesse Harris 

was not planned. Viewed in a light most unfavorable to Diaz, the 

facts suggest that this was a poorly planned robbery gone horribly 

wrong. While the death of an individual is not entirely 

unforeseeable when guns enter into a drug deal involving large 

sums of money, no evidence indicates that the death [of] either 

Harris or [Wooden] was the intent or purpose of Diaz. Diaz had 

no reason to seek to kill Jesse Harris. It was only when, again 

when taken in a light most unfavorable to Diaz, Harris and 

[Wooden] began to fight back that shots were fired and Harris 

was killed.
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Appellant’s Br. pp. 14-15. He makes no mention whatsoever of his criminal 

history, which includes four felony convictions in the two years before these 

offenses, or of the fact that he was actively serving community-corrections 

sentences for those convictions when he committed these offenses. The trial 

court properly found the latter to be a “substantial aggravator.” This history 

reflects poorly on Diaz’s character and supports the above-advisory sentences 

imposed by the trial court, even if the nature of the offenses does not. 

Moreover, the existence of multiple victims supports the imposition of 

consecutive sentences. See Myers v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1069, 1082 (Ind. 2015), 

reh’g denied. Diaz has failed to convince us that his sentence is inappropriate.

[23] Affirmed.

Bailey, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.