15-4088 

Jin v. Sessions 

BIA 

Hom, IJ 

A205 222 247 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED 

ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE 

PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT 

FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE 

(WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY 

OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for 

2 the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States 

3 Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 

5th 4 day of May, two thousand seventeen. 

5 

6 PRESENT: 

7 GUIDO CALABRESI,

8 RICHARD C. WESLEY, 

9 RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,

10 Circuit Judges. 

11 _____________________________________ 

12 

13 MINGCHUN JIN, 

14 Petitioner, 

15 

16 v. 15-4088 

17 NAC 

18 JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, UNITED STATES 

19 ATTORNEY GENERAL,* 

20 Respondent. 

21 _____________________________________ 

22 

23 FOR PETITIONER: Carly B. Wiskoff, New York, N.Y. 

24 

25 FOR RESPONDENT: Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy 

26 Assistant Attorney General; M. 

 

* Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2), Attorney 

General Jefferson B. Sessions III is automatically substituted for 

former Attorney General Loretta E. Lynch as the Respondent in this 

case.
2 

1 Jocelyn Lopez Wright, Senior 

2 Litigation Counsel; Anthony J. 

3 Messuri, Trial Attorney, Office of 

4 Immigration Litigation, United 

5 States Department of Justice, 

6 Washington, D.C. 

7 

8 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 

9 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 

10 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is 

11 DENIED. 

12 Petitioner Mingchun Jin, a native and citizen of the 

13 People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a November 23, 2015 

14 decision of the BIA affirming a July 30, 2014 decision of an 

15 Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Jin’s application for asylum, 

16 withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against 

17 Torture (“CAT”). In re Mingchun Jin, No. A205 222 247 (B.I.A. 

18 Nov. 23, 2015), aff’g No. A205 222 247 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City 

19 July 30, 2014). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the 

20 underlying facts and procedural history in this case. 

21 Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed the 

22 IJ’s decision as modified by the BIA. See Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. 

23 Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir. 2005). Because 

24 the BIA did not affirm or rely on the adverse credibility 
3 

1 determination we, as did the BIA, assume credibility. See Yan 

2 Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271-72 (2d Cir. 2005). 

3 Accordingly, the dispositive issue is whether the agency erred 

4 in its alternative conclusion that Jin failed to meet her burden 

5 of proof. The applicable standards of review are well 

6 established. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4); Chuilu Liu v. Holder, 575 

7 F.3d 193, 194, 196 (2d Cir. 2009); Diallo v. INS, 232 F.3d 279, 

8 287 (2d Cir. 2000). 

9 In assessing whether an applicant meets her burden of 

10 proof, the agency “may weigh the credible testimony along with 

11 other evidence of record.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii). 

12 The agency may require corroboration despite otherwise 

13 credible testimony, and deny an application based on the 

14 failure to provide such corroboration, if the corroborating 

15 evidence is reasonably available. Id.; Yan Juan Chen v. 

16 Holder, 658 F.3d 246, 251-52 (2d Cir. 2011). Before denying 

17 a claim solely because of an applicant’s failure to provide 

18 corroborating evidence, the IJ generally must, either in his 

19 decision or otherwise on the record, (1) identify the missing 

20 evidence and explain why it was reasonably available, and 

21 (2) provide an opportunity for the applicant to explain the 
4 

1 omission and assess any explanation given. Chuilu Liu, 575 

2 F.3d at 197-99. “No court shall reverse a determination made 

3 by a trier of fact with respect to the availability of 

4 corroborating evidence . . . unless the court 

5 finds . . . that a reasonable trier of fact is compelled to 

6 conclude that such corroborating evidence is unavailable.” 8 

7 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4). 

8 The IJ sought corroboration in the form of an affidavit 

9 from Jin’s husband who resided in China and had knowledge of 

10 Jin’s abortion and access to documentation of the family 

11 planning policy specific to Jin’s home region as it relates 

12 to persons of Korean descent. The record does not compel a 

13 conclusion that the evidence was not reasonably available. 

14 Id. Jin had over two years to obtain the evidence, and her 

15 speculation that her husband’s letter was “intercepted by the 

16 government” due to its sensitive subject matter was not 

17 compelling given that she testified to receiving other 

18 documents from her husband. Chuilu Liu, 575 F.3d at 197-98; 

19 see also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4). And Jin admitted she made no 

20 effort to provide documentation of the family planning policy 

21 in her region of China. See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 
5 

1 138, 142, 148, 156-57, 165, 170 (2d Cir. 2008) (noting that 

2 applicants must demonstrate that their violation of the family 

3 planning policy would be punished in their local area in a way 

4 that would give rise to an objectively reasonably fear of 

5 persecution).

6 The agency also reasonably afforded limited weight to the 

7 evidence Jin produced. “We generally defer to the agency’s 

8 evaluation of the weight to be afforded an applicant’s 

9 documentary evidence.” Y.C. v. Holder, 741 F.3d 324, 332 (2d 

10 Cir. 2013). The records of the abortion and IUD insertion 

11 were labeled as consent forms for the procedures and made no 

12 mention of force or coercion. See Jian Hui Shao, 546 F.3d at 

13 165, 172. 

14 Jin’s failure to corroborate her alleged violation of 

15 China’s coercive family planning policy is dispositive of 

16 asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief because all 

17 three forms of relief were based on the alleged forced abortion 

18 and IUD insertion and the accompanying fear of sterilization. 

19 See Lecaj v. Holder, 616 F.3d 111, 119-20 (2d Cir. 2010). 

20 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 

21 DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal 
6 

1 that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, 

2 and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition 

3 is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument 

4 in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of 

5 Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 

6 34.1(b). 

7 FOR THE COURT: 

8 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk