NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 10-2103

CRAIG WILLIAMS; ERNEST PORTER; 

SAHARRIS ROLLINS; RONALD CLARK, 

 Appellants.

v.

*SECRETARY PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; 

LOUIS S. FOLINO, Superintendent

*(Pursuant to Rule 43(c), Fed. R. App. P.)

On Appeal from the United States District Court

For the Western District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. No. 2-10-cv-00212)

District Judge: Honorable Nora B. Fischer

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

on October 27, 2011

Before: FISHER, VANASKIE and ROTH, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: January 25, 2012)
2

O P I N I O N

ROTH, Circuit Judge:

Four state prisoners, who await resentencing after their death sentences were 

vacated, appeal the dismissal of their pro se petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, which 

sought an order directing their transfer from death row to the general prison population. 

The District Court dismissed the petition sua sponte, before the respondents had been 

served, on the ground that the underlying claim should not have been brought as a habeas 

corpus petition but rather as an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For the reasons that 

follow, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.

I. Background

On February 16, 2010, state prisoners Craig Williams, Ernest Porter, Saharris 

Rollins, and Ronald Clark1

 1

 Clark was resentenced to life imprisonment on August 16, 2011. As a result, he 

has been released from his status as a death sentence prisoner and is no longer on “death 

row.” Because he could not benefit from the relief sought in this action, his complaint 

will be dismissed as moot.

filed a pro se habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, 

challenging the “illegal confinement of them” by Jeffrey A. Beard, Secretary of the 

Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, and Louis S. Folino, Superintendent of the 

State Correctional Institution at Greene (SCI-Greene), where all of the prisoners were 

then confined. 
3

Each prisoner’s death sentence, but not his conviction, has been vacated.2

In their petition, the prisoners alleged that they will remain in the “condemned to 

die unit (also known as death row/capital case housing unit),” unless or until they are 

resentenced to life imprisonment. Conditions of that unit are similar to those of 

administrative or disciplinary custody, which are more stringent than those for the 

general prison population. The restrictive conditions include no contact visits, access to 

the prison law library only every seven to ten days, and then in single cages, and 

confinement to their cells for 22 hours on weekdays and 24 hours on weekends. The 

prisoners further alleged that such conditions inhibit their ability to investigate, prepare, 

and develop relevant mitigation evidence to be presented at their resentencings. The 

prisoners sought an order requiring their transfer from death row to the general prison 

population. 

 Under 

Pennsylvania’s Post-Conviction Relief Act, Williams’ death sentence was vacated in 

2006, and Clark’s death sentence was vacated in 2003. In federal habeas proceedings, 

Porter’s death sentence was vacated in 2003, and Rollins’ death sentence was vacated in 

2005. 

On March 31, 2010, after considering the prisoners’ objections thereto, the District 

Court adopted the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge and thereby 

dismissed the petition sua sponte (and before the respondents had been served). (App. 1-

 2

 According to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, appeals by Williams, Rollins, 

and Clark of their convictions were unsuccessful, and Porter’s appeal of his conviction is 

pending before us at Nos. 03-9006 and 03-9007. (Amicus Br. 6-7.)
4

4.) The District Court found that “the underlying claim is one properly brought in a civil 

rights action” and denied a Certificate of Appealability. (App. 3-4.) 

The prisoners appealed. We issued a Certificate of Appealability and appointed 

counsel. 

II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review

The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. We have 

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a).

We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s legal conclusions. Woodall 

v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 432 F.3d 235, 239 n.3 (3d Cir. 2005). 

III. Discussion

The sole issue before us is whether the District Court erred in concluding that the 

prisoners’ challenge to their confinement on death row, after their death sentences had 

been vacated, rather than in the general prison population, is not cognizable in a petition 

for habeas corpus.

 “Although both § 1983 and habeas corpus allow prisoners to challenge 

unconstitutional conduct by state officers, the two are not coextensive either in purpose or 

effect.” Leamer v. Fauver, 288 F.3d 532, 540 (3d Cir. 2002). A habeas petition must be 

used for a challenge to “the validity of the continued conviction or the fact or length of 

the sentence.” Id. at 542. An action under § 1983 is appropriate for a challenge to “a 

condition of confinement such that a finding in plaintiff’s favor would not alter his 

sentence or undo his conviction.” Id. 
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The prisoners do not challenge the fact or duration of their imprisonment. Instead, 

they complain of the restrictive conditions of death row and seek to be transferred into 

the general prison population. As such, the prisoners raise “conditions of confinement” 

claims that do not lie at the core of habeas and thus are properly brought pursuant to § 

1983. See id. We find, therefore, that the District Court correctly dismissed the 

prisoners’ habeas petition. 

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.