No. 2—09—0900 Opin ion f il ed March 16, 2011

______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APP ELL ATE C OURT

OF IL LINO IS SECOND DI STRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ THE PEOPL

E OF TH E STATE ) Ap peal f rom th e Ci rcui t Court OF ILLINOIS, ) o f La ke Co un t y. ) Plai ntif f-A ppelle e, ) ) v. ) No. 08—CF—580 ) ILDIFO NSO CERV

ANTES, ) Ho no r ab le ) Char les D. Jo hnso n, De f en da n t-A pp el l an t. ) Judge, Presi din g.

______________________________________________________________________________ JUS TI CE BOWMAN deliver ed t he judg ment o f the co ur t , w ith o pinion. Jus t ices S cho st ok and B irke t t co ncur re d in t he judg ment a nd o pinion.
OPINI ON Fo llowing a ben

ch trial , defen dant, Ildifons o Cervantes, was conv icted of resi stin g a peace off ic er ( 720 ILCS 5/ 31—1(a—7 ) (West 200 8)). The offense was a Class 4 fel ony because defen dant’s conduct proxim

ately caused i nj uries to an offi cer. Defendant appeals, contendi ng that his a ct o f run ning fr o m t he po lice wa s no t t he pr o ximat e c au se o f t he o ffice r ’s inju r ies
. We affir m. Defend ant was cha

rged with two counts of aggravated driv in g under the in fl uence (625 ILCS 5/11—501(d) (West 2008)), drivi ng wi th a revoked

li cense(625 IL CS 5/6

—303( d) (West 200 8)),
re sist inga pea

ce of f i cer (7 20 IL CS 5/3 1—1(a —7) (W est 200 8)), and a ggr avat ed fleeing a nd elud ing (625 ILCS 5/11—2 04.1( a)(4) (West 2008)). The trial court conducteda b en ch t r ial. We se t o ut o nly the evi den ce re l ati ng to the charge of resi sti ng a peac e of f i cer.No. 2—09—0900

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Ro und Lake B ea ch po lic e o ffi cer Kennet h Lup i tes t ifi

ed t hat , o n Febr uar y 10, 200 8, he recei ved a r ep ort of a hi

t-and-run accident. He arrived at the address report ed and saw a car that appeared t o ha ve be en st ruc k b y ano t he rca r . He no t ice d a blu e C ad ill ac le avi ng the area. He
acti v ate d h i s ov er h ead l i gh ts a n d f oll owe d th

e C ad i l l acon to Lak e Shore Driv

e. Whe n the Cadi

ll ac did n ot stop, Lupi

activated hi s si

ren; h owever, the Cadill

ac contin ued north on Lake Shore Driv e. Lupi saw t he Cadi

l l acdri ve thr ough two s top signs wi

thout stopping. Even

tuall y, h e turned
o ff his li ght s and siren be cau se t he Ca dillac bega n t o s kid o n ice and sno w co ver ingt he road. After th at, the Cadill

ac began to obey all traf fi c l aws bef

ore sto ppin

g at a sto p s ign at 15 00 Ha ine sville Road. Th e C adi l l acsoon

pul l ed ove r i n th e v i ci ni ty of Will iams Avenue a nd

t he dr iver g ot ou t . T he dri ver, whom L

upi i dentif ie d as def endan t, began runn

in g through woods an

d ba cky ards
. Lupi

chased defen dant wi th the hel p of Sergeant Way

ne W il de, who had also arrived on the scene. The weather was sn

owy, wi th temper at ur es be low zero. Bot h Lupi and W il de fel l s everal t imes whi l e ch

asi ng d ef endan t. The pair chas ed d efenda nt for abo ut one minute befo re defend ant fell
an d W i l de wa s a b l e to catch up to him

and keep h

im on the ground whi

le a third of fi cer han dcuff ed him. Lupi

test if ied that Wil

de sustained abrasions t o his s hin, his lit t le fin ge r , an d t he sid e o f his head. Lup i sta t ed t hat Wilde injured his head when he slipped on a n i cy dr ive wa y o n Willia ms Avenue. He i

nj ured hi s shi

n cl im bi ng a f ence, an d he i nj ured hi s little f

in ger fal li ng on ice. Wi lde testifi ed that he was b ehi

nd Lupi ’s car as

Lupi fol lowed the Cadi

ll ac. Wilde saw t he Cadill ac pull off the road. The driver, wh om he ide ntif ie d as def endan t, fle d t hro ugh a b acky

ard. Wi lde exite d his sq uad car and ordered def endan t to stop. Howeve

r, defen dant contin

ued runni ng. Wi lde ch as ed hi m f orab out a m

i nute
. Du ring t he c has e, Wilde sp ra ined t he lit t le fing er o n his le ft hand and suf

f ered a bra sions on

the l ef t si de of his f orehe ad an

d hi s ri ght shi n f rom “ hoppi ng a f ence.”No. 2—09—0900

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On cr o ss - ex amina t io n, Wilde ac kn o wle dg ed t ha t de fen da nt did not push or shove hi m . Rat her , he slip pe d a nd fe ll o n a n ic y dr ive wa y. The co u rt fou nd de fendant guilt y of felony re sist ing a pe ace officer , no t ing t hat defend ant sho uld ha ve f oresee n that, upon

run ni ng f rom th e pol i ce, the of f i cers would f oll ow hi m . The court sentence d defend ant t o 18 mo nt hs’ pr o ba t io n inc lud ing 90 da ys in t he co un t y jail. De fen da nt t imely appeals. Defend ant co nt en ds t ha t t he St at e fa iled t o pr o ve be yo nd a r ea so na ble dou bt t hat de fendant’s conduct proxi

matel y caus ed W

i l de’ s i nj uries. He maint ains t hat he did no t punc h or kick t he off ic er and t hat t he we at her co ndit ions on the date in question were suc

h an extraordinary

ci rcumstance that defendan t’s conduct cannot be deemed the pro xi mate cause of the offi

cer’s in juries. One is guilty o f resist ing o r o bst ru ct inga p ea ce o ffice rwh en he o rshe “k no win gly res i sts or obstructs t he perf

ormance by one known

t o t he person to be a peace off ic er *** of any

authorized act wit hin hi s of f i ci al ca pa ci ty .” 7 20 I LC S 5/31— 1(a

) (W es t 200 8). Moreover, a “

pers on convi cted f ora v i ol ati on of thi s S ec ti on who se vio latio n was t he proxim ate cause of an

in jury to a peace off

ic er
*** is gui lty of a Class 4 f

elony .” 720 I LCS 5/31—1( a—7) (West 2008)
. Thu s, t o c onvict defend ant of a fel ony, the State had to pro ve that defe ndan t’s conduct proxim

ately caused i nj ury to a peace off i cer. We note tha

t sub section

(a—7) i s wri tten as i f proxi mate ca use i s i n the natureo f a

sent encing
en h an cem en t. Sub se cti

on (a—7) p rovi de s th

at a “pers on c onv

i cte d f or a v i ol ati on of thi s S ec ti on whose violation was the pro xi mate cause of an i

nj ury to a pea ce offi

cer *** is g u il

ty of a Class 4 f elony .” 720 ILCS 5/ 31— 1( a—7 ) ( West 200 8) . T hus, re ad lit er ally, the statut ory enh ancem ent does not apply until after an offen

der has been “convicted,” in other wo rds, at sentencin g. Nevert heless, because proxim

ate cause elevates t he se nt en cin g r an ge , it is a ct ua lly i n th e n atu re of an el em en t of t he felony o ffense, and the State ha d to prove i

t bey ond a reas onab l e doubt. Apprendiv. New Jersey ,No. 2—09—0900

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530 U.S. 466, 490 (2 000 ) ( “Ot her t han t he fact of a pr ior co nvictio n, a ny fact t hat increa ses t he pen al ty for a cr ime beyond the prescri bed statuto ry m

axi mum mus t be subm ittedto a j ury, an

d proved bey ond a reas onab l e doubt.”). Defend ant chal

le ngest he su ffi

ciency o f the evidenc e. When a d efenda nt makes suc h a chal le nge, t he qu est ion is whe t her , a fte r view ing all the e vidence in the light most favo ra ble to t he Stat e, an y rati onal trie r of f act coul d ha ve f ound, b ey ond a re aso nable do ubt , t he fact in ques t ion. People v. Lee , 213 Il

l . 2d 218 , 225 (2 004). Defe ndan t argues that hi s conduct did n ot proxim ately cause W il de’s i nj uries , because they resul ted not fro m any act of d efenda nt b ut f rom th e s ev ere w ea th er con di ti on s. De f

en da n t pos i ts that the weather was an

extraordinary

ci rcumstance f

or which he can not be hel d li abl e. We di sagree. Our research h

as not di scl osed a ny cas e sp eci

f i cal l y i nterpreti ng s ubs ecti on (a— 7). Howev

er, bot h par t ies re ly on People v. Hudson , 222 Ill . 2d 392 (2006). T here, the def endan t was convi

cted of fe lo ny murder af

ter an off -duty poli ce off ic er shot and kill

ed a codefen

dant whi le resi stin g a
ro bber y att empt . T he de fendant co nt ende d t hat t he t rial co ur t er re d by instr uct ing t he jury t hat t he defendant’s actions h

ad to cause the v ic tim ’s deat h but omit t ing an element of c aus at ion, foreseeab il

ity . The suprem

e court not ed

t hat Illinois law p ro vides t hat a de fendant may becharged wi th f el on y m urder u n der the “ ‘prox i mate cause’ ” the ory , i.e. , t hat his acts were a pro xi mate cause of the v i cti m ’sdeath
. Id. at 401. A l thou gh the suprem e court found the instructions at iss ue adequate, it emp ha siz ed t ha t fo r es ee ab ilit y wa s in de ed an el em en t of prox i mateca us ati on f or purposes of the f

el ony-m urder statut e, stating: “In gene ra l, Illinois law p ro vides t hat a de fendant ma y b e ch arged with m

urder pur sua nt to the ‘proxi

mate ca use ’ the ory

of f elony m urder. People v. Lo w

ery , 178 Ill . 2d462 (1997 ). The term ‘proxi

ma te cause’ describes two distinct requiremen ts: cau se in fact and le gal caus e. First Springfield Bank & Trust v. Galman, 188 Ill. 2d 252 , 2 57- 58 ( 199 9) . WeNo. 2—09—0900

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have stat ed, ‘We bel

iev e that t he anal

ogies between civ

il and crim

in al cases i n wh

ic h i n di v i du als a rei n j ur ed or ki l l ed are s o cl ose th at th e p ri n ci pl e of prox i mate ca us e a pp l i es to b oth cl asses of

cases . Ca us al r ela tion

i s the uni versal f actor com mon to all

l egal l i ab i l i ty.’ Low ery, 17 8 I ll. 2d at 46 6. Le ga l ca us e ‘ is e ss en t iall y a q ue st io n o f fo r es ee ab ilit y’ ; th e rel evant inq ui r y i s ‘whether the inj ury i s of a type that a r easonable person would see as a like ly result o f his or her co nduct .’ Galman, 18 8 I ll. 2 d a t 25 8. Fo r es ee ab ilit y is added t o t he cause-i n-f act r eq uir eme nt be ca us e ‘ ev en wh en ca us e in fac t is e st ab lis h ed, it must be determi ned t hat any variation be

tween the resul

t intende d *** and the resul

t actuall y a chi eved is n ot s o ex

tra ordi n ar y th at i t wou l d b e u n f ai r to hold t he de fendant responsi ble for the actual resul t.’ 1 W. LaFav

e, Substantiv

e Cri mi nal Law §6.4, at 464 (2d ed. 2003). ” Id. Here, t he t r ial c o ur t r ea so na bly found that def

endan t’s conduct of lead ing t he o ffi cer s o n a cha se t hro ugh ice - a nd sno w- co ver ed yar ds a nd dr iveways p ro ximately cau sed Wilde’s inj uries
. Contra ry to def endan t’s a rgum en t, the wi ntery cond i tions we re not the ty

pe of “extraordi

na ry ci rcumstance” that would break the causal co nnect ion. Defend ant was pr esu mably aware of t he weather condi

tions. Wh

en h e chose to run from the pursui ng poli ce, it wasr ea so na bly

fo r es ee ab le that the officers wou ld continue the chase on fo ot and, in do ing so , might be injure d by falli ng o n t he
sn owor ice. It is si

mpl y n ot extraordinary

to slip on i

ce i n Feb ruary. Moreover, Wi

lde testifi ed that he su ffered add itio nal injuries by climbi ng a f en ce , wh i ch wa s a ppa ren tl y not related to t he weather
co ndit ions at all. Aga in, de fendant sho uld r eas ona bly have for ese en t hat a pu rsu ing o ffi cer might be inju r ed by a f

all. De f en da n t, ci ti ng a c om men t to the Il l i noi s P attern Ju ry In stru cti on de f i n i n g p rox i mate cause, contends th at a

de f en da n t’s acti on s m

us t b e t he sole

pr oximat e ca use of a n officer ’s injury. T he
co mmentrefers to a case f

rom thi s court “discus s[in

g] a p ri nc i ple of statut ory construction whe n ‘the’ is use d i nstead of ‘a.’ ” Il l i noi s Pattern

Jury Instructions, Cri

mi nal , No. 4. 24 (West, Westlaw throughNo. 2—09—0900

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2008 update), Co mm

ittee Note (citing Sibenall er v. Milschew ski , 379 Ill . App. 3d 717, 721-22 (2008 )). Sibenaller

observed that

us ing t he ar t icle “t he ” u su ally r efe r s t o a s pe cific t hing , us ua lly one that has al ready been me ntioned, as

opposed t o “a” or “an,” wh ic h can refer to a num

ber of things. Sibenall er, 379 Ill . App. 3d 722. While we do no t dis pu t e t his prin ci ple , the statut e at i ss

ue doe s n ot re f er to “th e p rox

i mate
caus e,”bu t r efe r s o nly t o an inju ry “pr o xim ately ca used” by

a defendan

t’s conduct . 720 I LCS 5/31—1(a—7) (Wes t 200 8) . I n t he ana log ou s co nt ext o f felo ny mu r de r , co ur t s ha ve r o ut ine ly held that t he St at e nee d no t pr ove t hat a de fendant ’s ac t s we re t he so le and i m med i ate ca us e of de ath b ut,
ra th er , m us t sh ow th at th e def en da n t’s acts were a c o nt r ibu t ing ca us e o f de at h, su ch t ha t de at h d id not resul t f rom a source unconnected with or in dependen t o f those acts. See People v. Jones , 376 Ill. App. 3d 3 72, 387 (20 07) ; People v. Martin , 112 Ill . App. 3d 486, 499 (1983). Here, it i s clear that def endan t’s act of ru

nnin g fr o m the officers was a cont ributin g cause of Wilde’s i

nj uries, al though it was n

ot the only

cause. The j udgme

nt of the ci

rcuit court o f L ake County is af fi rmed. Af fi rmed.