[Cite as State v. Darrington, 2024-Ohio-2299.]

Released 6/12/24

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

SCIOTO COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO, :

:

Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 22CA4007

: 

v. : 

: DECISION AND

DEWAYNE DARRINGTON, : JUDGMENT ENTRY

:

Defendant-Appellant. :

_____________________________________________________________

APPEARANCES:

Valerie M. Webb, The Office of Valerie M. Webb, LLC, Portsmouth, Ohio, for 

Appellant.

Shane A. Tieman, Scioto County Prosecuting Attorney, and Jay Willis, Assistant 

Scioto County Prosecuting Attorney, Portsmouth, Ohio, for Appellee.

_____________________________________________________________ 

Smith, P.J.

{¶1} Dewayne Darrington, Appellant, appeals from the judgment of the 

Scioto County Court of Common Pleas convicting him of one count of trafficking 

in cocaine in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2) and (C)(4)(e), and one count of 

trafficking in heroin in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2) and (C)(6)(e), both seconddegree felonies. On appeal, Darrington raises a single assignment of error 

contending that the trial court erred in sentencing him to a harsher term than that of 

the jointly-recommended sentence. However, after considering the totality of the 
Scioto App. No. 22CA4007 2

circumstances, we cannot conclude that Darrington’s guilty plea was not knowing, 

intelligent, or voluntary or that the trial court erred in its acceptance of the plea or 

in imposing sentence. Thus, we find no merit to Darrington’s argument. 

Accordingly, Darrington’s sole assignment of error is overruled and the judgment 

of the trial court is affirmed. 

FACTS

{¶2} On November 6, 2019, Darrington was indicted on four felony counts 

as follows:

Count One: Trafficking in cocaine in violation of R.C. 

2925.03(A)(2) and (C)(4)(e), a seconddegree felony;

Count Two: Possession of cocaine in violation of R.C. 

2925.11(A) and (C)(4)(d), a second-degree 

felony;

Count Three: Trafficking in heroin in violation of 

R.C. 2925.03(A)(2) and (C)(6)(e), a seconddegree felony; and

Count Four: Possession of heroin in violation of 

R.C. 2925.11(A) and (C)(6)(d), a seconddegree felony.

Darrington initially entered pleas of not guilty to the charges and the matter 

proceeded toward trial.

{¶3} Darrington thereafter entered into plea negotiations with the State 

which resulted in him agreeing to plead guilty to counts one and three, trafficking 
Scioto App. No. 22CA4007 3

in cocaine and heroin, respectively, as well as agreeing to dismiss his pending 

motion to suppress, in exchange for the State’s agreement to dismiss counts two 

and four. Additionally, the plea agreement included an agreement between 

Darrington and the State for a jointly-recommended sentence of two years on each 

count, to run concurrently. 

{¶4} A change of plea hearing was held on August 30, 2022. The trial court 

engaged in a plea colloquy with Darrington that, in addition to providing him with 

the required constitutional and nonconstitutional advisements required by Crim.R. 

11, also informed him that the trial court was not bound by the joint sentencing 

recommendation agreed to by both Darrington and the State. The trial court 

accepted Darrington’s guilty pleas, released him on bond, and set the matter for a 

sentencing hearing on a later date. 

{¶5} A sentencing hearing was held on September 27, 2022; however, 

Darrington failed to appear. Defense counsel advised the court that Darrington did 

not have a valid driver’s license and that the transportation he had arranged had 

fallen through. The trial court revoked Darrington’s bond, issued a warrant, but 

ordered that the warrant be held until the next day in the hopes that Darrington 

would arrive by the next morning. When Darrington failed to appear the next day, 

the warrant was issued. 
Scioto App. No. 22CA4007 4

{¶6} Darrington voluntarily turned himself in three days later. The 

rescheduled sentencing hearing took place on October 17, 2022. Defense counsel 

again explained the reasons for Darrington’s failure appear and requested that the 

jointly recommended sentence be imposed. The State, however, took the position 

that Darrington had violated the agreement by failing to appear, reminded the trial 

court that the State’s earlier position on sentencing had been two years on each 

count to be served consecutively for an aggregate four-year sentence, but 

ultimately asked the trial court to impose whatever sentence it “deemed 

appropriate.” 

{¶7} The trial court sentenced Darrington to three years on count one and 

two years on count three, to be served concurrently for a total of three years, which 

was within the statutorily-permitted range for two second-degree felonies. 

Darrington thereafter filed his appeal, setting forth a single assignment of error for 

our review. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SENTENCING 

APPELLANT TO A HARSHER TERM THAN THE 

JOINTLY RECOMMENDED SENTENCE.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I 

{¶8} In his sole assignment of error, Darrington contends that the trial court 

erred in sentencing him to a harsher term than the jointly recommended sentence. 
Scioto App. No. 22CA4007 5

While he acknowledges “that the trial court was not bound by the sentencing 

recommendation,” he argues that “ he may not have gone through with the 

agreement had he known the court would not adopt the recommendation.” He 

further argues that “he may have chosen to proceed with his Motion to Suppress 

and, ultimately, trial.” Thus, Darrington essentially argues that his plea was not 

made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Darrington requests “that this 

Court reduce [his] sentence from three years to two years on Count 1 of the 

indictment.” 

{¶9} The State first responds by arguing “that the sentence imposed in this 

matter effectively remained an agreed sentence despite Appellant’s failure to 

appear and the imposition of a slightly longer sentence by the trial court.” The 

State next argues that “this appeal should be dismissed outright because Appellant 

entered a plea agreement for a sentence authorized by law that was jointly 

recommended by the defense and prosecution and imposed by the sentencing 

judge.” However, we reject the State’s arguments because the record clearly 

demonstrates that the trial court did not impose the sentence jointly recommended 

by the parties. The parties agreed to two-year sentences each for counts two and 

four, to run concurrently for an aggregate two-year sentence. Instead, the trial 

court ended up sentencing Darrington to three years on count one and two years on 

count three, to be served concurrently for an aggregate sentence of three years. 
Scioto App. No. 22CA4007 6

Three years is not “effectively” the same as two years. Thus, we find no merit to 

the first two counter arguments raised by the State. The State alternatively argues 

that Darrington cannot “show that his plea was not voluntarily made.” For the 

following reasons, we agree with this argument made by the State.

Standard of Review

{¶10} Crim.R. 11(C)(2) governs the acceptance of guilty pleas by the trial 

court in felony cases and provides that a trial court should not accept a guilty plea 

without first addressing the defendant personally and:

(a) Determining that the defendant is making the plea voluntarily, 

with understanding of the nature of the charges and of the 

maximum penalty involved, and, if applicable, that the defendant 

is not eligible for probation or for the imposition of community 

control sanctions at the sentencing hearing.

(b) Informing the defendant of and determining that the 

defendant understands the effect of the plea of guilty or no 

contest, and that the court, upon acceptance of the plea, may 

proceed with judgment and sentence.

(c) Informing the defendant and determining that the defendant 

understands that by the plea the defendant is waiving the rights 

to jury trial, to confront witnesses against him or her, to have 

compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in the defendant's 

favor, and to require the state to prove the defendant's guilt 

beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which the defendant 

cannot be compelled to testify against himself or herself.

{¶11} “Thus, prior to accepting a guilty plea, a ‘court must inform the 

defendant that he is waiving his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, 

his right to jury trial, his right to confront his accusers, and his right of compulsory 
Scioto App. No. 22CA4007 7

process of witnesses.’ ” State v. Tolle, 2022-Ohio-2839, 194 N.E.3d 410, ¶ 9 (4th 

Dist.), quoting State v. Ballard, 66 Ohio St.2d 473, 423 N.E.2d 115, paragraph one 

of the syllabus (1981). See also Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c). “ ‘In addition to these 

constitutional rights, the trial court must determine that the defendant understands 

the nature of the charge, the maximum penalty involved, and the effect of the 

plea.’ ” Tolle at ¶ 9, quoting State v. Montgomery, 148 Ohio St.3d 347, 2016-

Ohio-5487, 71 N.E.3d 180, ¶ 41.

{¶12} When reviewing a defendant's constitutional rights (right to a jury 

trial, right to call witnesses, etc.), a trial court must strictly comply with Crim.R. 

11(C)(2)(c). Tolle, supra, at ¶ 10; State v. Veney, 120 Ohio St.3d 176, 2008-Ohio5200, 897 N.E.2d 621, ¶ 18. In contrast, when reviewing a defendant's nonconstitutional rights (maximum penalty involved, understanding effect of plea, 

etc.), a trial court must substantially comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) and (b). 

Tolle at ¶ 11; State v. Veney, supra, ¶ 18. “ ‘[S]ubstantial compliance’ means that 

‘under the totality of the circumstances the defendant subjectively understands the 

implications of his plea and the rights he is waiving.’ ” State v. Morrison, 4th Dist. 

Adams No. 07CA854, 2008-Ohio-4913, ¶ 9, quoting State v. Puckett, 4th Dist. 

Scioto No. 03CA2920, 2005-Ohio-1640, ¶ 10, citing State v. Stewart, 51 Ohio 

St.2d 86, 364 N.E.2d 1163 (1977); State v. Carter, 60 Ohio St.2d 34, 396 N.E.2d 

757 (1979).
Scioto App. No. 22CA4007 8

{¶13} As this Court observed in Tolle, supra, the Veney Court held as 

follows regarding the acceptance of guilty pleas:

“ ‘When a defendant enters a plea in a criminal case, the plea 

must be made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Failure 

on any of those points renders enforcement of the plea 

unconstitutional under both the United States Constitution and 

the Ohio Constitution.’ ” Veney, supra, at ¶ 7, quoting State v. 

Engle, 74 Ohio St.3d 525, 527, 660 N.E.2d 450 (1996); State v. 

Montgomery, supra, at ¶ 40; State v. Barker, 129 Ohio St.3d 472, 

2011-Ohio-4130, 953 N.E.2d 826, ¶ 9.

See Tolle, at ¶ 12. 

“ ‘It is the trial court's duty, therefore, to ensure that a defendant “has a full 

understanding of what the plea connotes and of its consequence.” ’ ” Tolle, at ¶ 

13; quoting Montgomery at ¶ 40, in turn quoting Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 

244, 89 S.Ct. 1709 (1969); State v. Conley, 4th Dist. Adams No. 19CA1091, 2019-

Ohio-4172, ¶ 34.

{¶14} When an appellate court evaluates whether a defendant knowingly, 

intelligently, and voluntarily entered a guilty plea, the court must independently 

review the record to ensure that the trial court complied with the Crim.R. 11 

constitutional and procedural safeguards. See Tolle, at ¶ 14; State v. Leonhart, 4th 

Dist. Washington No. 13CA38, 2014-Ohio-5601, ¶ 36; State v. Eckler, 4th Dist. 

Adams No. 09CA878, 2009-Ohio-7064, ¶ 48; Veney, supra, at ¶ 13 (“Before 

accepting a guilty or no-contest plea, the court must make the determinations and 

give the warnings required by Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) and (b) and notify the defendant 
Scioto App. No. 22CA4007 9

of the constitutional rights listed in Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c)”); State v. Kelley, 57 Ohio 

St.3d 127, 128, 566 N.E.2d 658 (1991) (“When a trial court or appellate court is 

reviewing a plea submitted by a defendant, its focus should be on whether the 

dictates of Crim.R. 11 have been followed”); See also State v. Shifflet, 2015-Ohio4250, 44 N.E.3d 966 (4th Dist.), ¶ 13, citing State v. Smith, 4th Dist. Washington 

No. 12CA11, 2013-Ohio-232, ¶ 10.

{¶15} “The purpose of Crim.R. 11(C) is ‘to convey to the defendant certain 

information so that he can make a voluntary and intelligent decision whether to 

plead guilty.’ ” Tolle at ¶ 15, quoting Ballard, supra, at 479-480. As set forth 

above, although literal compliance with Crim.R. 11(C) is preferred, it is not 

required. See State v. Clark, 119 Ohio St.3d 239, 2008-Ohio-3748, 893 N.E.2d 

462, ¶ 29, citing State v. Griggs, 103 Ohio St.3d 85, 2004-Ohio-4415, 814 N.E.2d 

51, ¶ 19. Therefore, an appellate court will ordinarily affirm a trial court's 

acceptance of a guilty plea if the record reveals that the trial court engaged in a 

meaningful dialogue with the defendant and explained “in a manner reasonably 

intelligible to that defendant” the consequences of pleading guilty. Ballard at 

paragraph two of the syllabus; Barker at ¶ 14; Veney at ¶ 27; Conley at ¶ 37.

{¶16} Additionally, it has been held that a defendant who seeks to 

invalidate a plea on the basis that the trial court partially, but not fully, informed 

the defendant of his or her non-constitutional rights must demonstrate a prejudicial 
Scioto App. No. 22CA4007 10

effect. See Tolle at ¶ 16; Veney at ¶ 17; Clark at ¶ 31. To demonstrate that a 

defendant suffered prejudice due to the failure to fully inform the defendant of his 

or her non-constitutional rights, the defendant must establish that, but for the trial 

court's failure, a guilty plea would not have been entered. See Clark at ¶ 32, citing 

State v. Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d 106, 108, 564 N.E.2d 474 (1990) (stating that “[t]he 

test is ‘whether the plea would have otherwise been made’ ”). However, when a 

trial court completely fails to inform a defendant of his or her non-constitutional 

rights, the plea must be vacated, and no analysis of prejudice is required. See 

Clark at ¶ 32, citing State v. Sarkozy, 117 Ohio St.3d 86, 2008-Ohio-509, 881 

N.E.2d 1224, ¶ 22.

Legal Analysis

{¶17} As set forth above, the present case involves a trial court’s imposition 

of a sentence that exceeded the sentence that was jointly recommended by the 

parties. We initially note that generally, “a ‘trial court is not bound by a 

[sentencing] recommendation.’ ” State v. Howard, 2017-Ohio-9392, 103 N.E.3d 

108, ¶ 58 (4th Dist.), quoting State v. Bailey, 5th Dist. Knox No. 05-CA-13, 2005-

Ohio-5329, ¶ 15. We explained in Howard that “ ‘ “[a] trial court does not err by 

imposing a sentence greater than ‘that forming the inducement for the defendant to 

plead guilty when the trial court forewarns the defendant of the applicable 

penalties, including the possibility of imposing a greater sentence than that 
Scioto App. No. 22CA4007 11

recommended by the prosecutor.’ ” ’ ” Howard at ¶ 58, quoting State ex rel. 

Duran v. Kelsey, 106 Ohio St.3d 58, 2005-Ohio-3674, 831 N.E.2d 430, ¶ 6, 

quoting State v. Buchanan, 154 Ohio App.3d 250, 2003-Ohio-4772, 796 N.E.2d 

1003, ¶ 13 (5th Dist.), in turn quoting State v. Pettiford, 12th Dist. Fayette No. 

CA2001-08-014, 2002 WL 652371, *3 (Apr. 22, 2002). 

{¶18} As set forth above, Darrington not only argues that the trial court 

erred by imposing a sentence that exceeded the one that was agreed upon, he 

argues that had he known the trial court would not impose the jointly 

recommended sentence, he “may not have gone through with the agreement” and 

he might have instead pursued his suppression motion and further proceeded to 

trial. Thus, he appears to contend that his plea was less than knowing, intelligent 

and voluntary to the extent he was not informed that the trial court was not bound 

by the sentencing recommendation. However, the hearing transcript from the 

change of plea hearing clearly demonstrates that Darrington was informed that the 

trial court retained discretion in sentencing in general, and in particular that if 

Darrington should fail to appear for sentencing, the trial court was not bound by 

the joint recommendation. For example, the following exchange took place 

between the trial court and Darrington:

THE COURT: Now sir, the lawyers have indicated to me 

this is what’s known as a jointly 

recommended and agreed sentence, which 

means when we come back for sentencing 
Scioto App. No. 22CA4007 12

you and your lawyer will be recommending a 

two year sentence on each of these, to be run 

concurrently, or at the same time, for – which 

would mean a two year sentence, and the 

Prosecutor would be making a sentencing 

recommendation. Do you understand that if 

I adopt that joint recommendation that by 

proceeding with sentencing in that fashion 

that you’d be waiving your right to appeal the 

sentence that I give you?

DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: All right. Now, the other side of that is we’re 

not going to do sentencing today. So, do you 

understand that I’m not bound by that joint 

recommendation? In other words, if you 

would get in trouble between now and then, 

or if you wouldn’t come back for sentencing, 

or otherwise violate the conditions of your 

bond, do you understand I’m not bound by 

this joint recommendation?

DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Is this all what you want to do here 

today?

DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

{¶19} Darrington fails to cite any cases in support of his argument that a 

trial court errs by imposing a sentence that exceeds the sentence jointly 

recommended by the parties. Further, as set forth above, this Court has held the 

very opposite by finding that “ ‘ “[a] trial court does not err by imposing a sentence 

greater than ‘that forming the inducement for the defendant to plead guilty when 
Scioto App. No. 22CA4007 13

the trial court forewarns the defendant of the applicable penalties, including the 

possibility of imposing a greater sentence than that recommended by the 

prosecutor.’ ” ’ ” Howard, supra, at ¶ 58, quoting State ex rel. Duran v. Kelsey, 

supra, at ¶ 6, quoting State v. Buchanan, supra, at ¶ 13, in turn quoting State v. 

Pettiford, supra, at *3. In addition to these cases, we find several other cases to be 

instructive on this question.

{¶20} For instance, State v. Ohler involved an appellate court affirmance of 

a trial court’s decision to vary from an otherwise stipulated sentence. State v. 

Ohler, 3d. Dist. Crawford No. 3-22-23, 2022-Ohio-4066. In Ohler, the court 

“made much of the fact that the trial judge was specific on the record that if 

[Ohler] tested positive for drugs or violated the terms of her bond, the agreement 

would likely not be followed.” Here, the trial court specifically warned Darrington 

that should he get into more trouble between the change of plea and sentencing 

hearings, fail to appear for sentencing, or violate the terms of his bond, it would 

not be bound to impose the jointly recommended sentence. 

{¶21} We further find the recent reasoning set forth in State v. Bakos, 2023-

Ohio-2827, 223 N.E.3d 516 (11th Dist.) to be helpful in analyzing the question 

before us. In Bakos, the court of appeals held that the trial court violated Bakos’ 

due process by accepting the parties’ stipulated sentencing recommendation and 

then imposing a harsher penalty than agreed. Id. However, in Bakos, it was 
Scioto App. No. 22CA4007 14

specifically determined that the trial court “accepted the stipulated sentencing 

recommendation.” Id. at ¶ 33. The trial court in Bakos stated in its sentencing 

entry that the “sentence is a stipulated sentence pursuant to R.C. 2953.08.” Based 

upon those facts, the Bakos court held that the trial court was bound to impose the 

agreed, or stipulated, sentence. Id. at ¶ 40. In reaching its decision, the Bakos 

court explained as follows:

Due process concerns are implicated in “whether the accused 

was put on notice that the trial court might deviate from the 

recommended sentence or other terms of the agreement before 

the accused entered his plea and whether the accused was given 

an opportunity to change or to withdraw his plea when he 

received this notice.” [City of Warren v. Cromley, 11th Dist. 

Trumbull No. 97-T-0213, 1999 WL 76756, *3], citing Katz & 

Giannelli, Criminal Law, Section 44.8, at 154-155, (1996).

There is no due process violation where the defendant is 

forewarned of the possibility that the trial court may impose a 

greater penalty than the one forming the inducement for the plea.

State ex rel. Duran v. Kelsey, 106 Ohio St.3d 58, 2005-Ohio3674, 831 N.E.2d 430, ¶ 6.

“[T]he touchstone for determining constitutional fairness in plea 

submissions is notice.” [State v. Elliott, 1st Dist., 2021-Ohio424, 168 N.E.3d 33], ¶ 18. Where the trial court does not provide 

adequate notice that it will not accept a stipulated plea, “the 

remedy is to resentence the defendant in accordance with the 

recommendation or allow the defendant to withdraw his plea.” 

Id. at ¶ 19; See [State v. Allgood, 9th Dist. Lorain Nos. 

90CA004903, 90CA004905 and 90CA004907, 1991 WL 

116269, *3 (June 19, 1991)].

Bakos at ¶ 28-30. (Emphasis added). 
Scioto App. No. 22CA4007 15

{¶22} Similarly, in State v. Bonnell, the court determined that the trial court

made a sentencing promise to Bonnell that was “definite and certain[,]” and that 

“the trial court did not give [Bonnell] any notice that it intended to deviate from the 

terms of the plea bargain.” State v. Bonnell, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2001-12-

094, 2002-Ohio-5882, ¶ 19-20. Based upon those findings, the court found 

reversible error “because the trial court explicitly promised appellant it would not 

sentence him to prison, then failed to follow through on its promise at the 

sentencing hearing without stating its intention and without giving appellant the 

opportunity to withdraw his plea.” Id. at ¶ 22. In reaching its decision, the Bonnell 

court reasoned as follows:

The facts of this case differ from cases in which a trial court 

states that it is inclined to sentence a defendant in a particular 

way and states that inclination in conditional terms. See State v. 

Burton (1977), 52 Ohio St.2d 21, 368 N.E.2d 297 (defendant 

cautioned by trial court that he would not receive consideration 

in sentencing if arrested before hearing). The facts also differ 

from those cases in which the state recommends a sentence and 

the trial court is not directly involved in plea negotiations. State 

v. Gastaldo (Sept. 21, 1998), Tuscarawas App. No. 98AP010006 

(trial court informed defendant that it was not bound by 

recommended sentence); State v. Skrip, Greene App. No.2001-

CA-74, 2002-Ohio-538930 (trial court stated that it did not 

promise anything with regard to plea agreement and that the 

underlying agreement was between the defendant and the state, 

not the court).

Bonnell at ¶ 19. (Emphasis added).

{¶23} The Bonnell Court further reasoned as follows:
Scioto App. No. 22CA4007 16

The analysis in cases such as this one centers on whether the 

defendant was put on notice that the trial court might deviate 

from the terms of the plea agreement and whether the defendant 

was given an opportunity to withdraw his plea after receiving 

notice. See Warren v. Cromley (Jan. 29, 1999), Trumbull Co.

App. No. 97-T-0213.

Id. at ¶ 21.

Because the Bonnell court determined that the trial court did not clearly warn 

Bonnell that it might deviate from the plea agreement, it held that the case had to 

be remanded and one of two remedies must be offered. Id. at ¶ 23. “Either the 

trial court must sentence appellant in accordance with the plea agreement or if it 

determines such a sentence is no longer appropriate, it must allow appellant the 

opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea.” Id. 

{¶24} As such, when viewed together the above cases indicate that if it is 

determined that a trial court accepted a jointly recommended sentence and 

unequivocally agreed to impose it, and then imposes a harsher sentence than that 

agreed upon without warning a defendant that it might vary from the agreement if 

certain conditions are not met, then reversible error occurs which necessitates 

either a remand for resentencing in accordance with the terms of the original plea 

agreement, or to allow the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea. Importantly, 

however, no reversible error occurs when it is determined that a trial court 

sufficiently warned a defendant that a harsher sentence than the one agreed upon 
Scioto App. No. 22CA4007 17

may be imposed if certain conditions are not met, or if certain conduct occurs, 

between the plea and sentencing hearings.

{¶25} Here, aside from contending that the trial court erred in sentencing 

him to a harsher sentence than the one agreed upon with the State, Darrington does 

not argue that the trial court otherwise failed to comply with Crim.R. 11 in 

accepting his guilty pleas. Moreover, a review of the change-of-plea hearing 

transcript demonstrates that the trial court complied with Crim.R. 11(C) in 

accepting Darrington’s guilty pleas. Unlike Bakos and Bonnell, this was not a 

situation where the trial court accepted a jointly recommended sentence and 

unequivocally agreed to impose that sentence. 

{¶26} Instead, the record demonstrates that the trial court clearly informed 

Darrington that imposition of the jointly recommended sentence was contingent 

upon Darrington staying out of trouble, appearing for sentencing, and abiding by 

the terms of his bond. Darrington voiced understanding and agreed to these terms 

in entering his pleas of guilt. Darrington’s failure to appear for his sentencing 

hearing, despite his lack of transportation, voided the terms of his plea agreement 

and released the trial court from any obligation it may have had to impose the 

jointly recommended sentence. The record demonstrates that although the trial

court issued a warrant for Darrington’s arrest upon his failure to appear for 

sentencing, it ordered that the warrant be held for one day in the hopes Darrington 
Scioto App. No. 22CA4007 18

would appear later in the day or by the next morning. Unfortunately, when a day 

passed and Darrington still failed to appear, the warrant was issued. 

{¶27} In light of the facts presently before us, and after considering the 

totality of the circumstances, we cannot conclude that Darrington’s guilty plea was

not knowing, intelligent, or voluntary or that the trial court erred in its acceptance 

of the plea or imposition of sentence. Accordingly, we find no merit to 

Darrington’s sole assignment of error and the judgment of the trial court is 

affirmed.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
Scioto App. No. 22CA4007 19

JUDGMENT ENTRY

It is ordered that the JUDGMENT BE AFFIRMED and costs be assessed to 

Appellant.

The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the 

Scioto County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution.

IF A STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE AND RELEASE UPON 

BAIL HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY GRANTED BY THE TRIAL COURT OR 

THIS COURT, it is temporarily continued for a period not to exceed 60 days upon 

the bail previously posted. The purpose of a continued stay is to allow Appellant 

to file with the Supreme Court of Ohio an application for a stay during the 

pendency of proceedings in that court. If a stay is continued by this entry, it will 

terminate at the earlier of the expiration of the 60-day period, or the failure of the 

Appellant to file a notice of appeal with the Supreme Court of Ohio in the 45-day 

appeal period pursuant to Rule II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of the Supreme 

Court of Ohio. Additionally, if the Supreme Court of Ohio dismisses the appeal 

prior to expiration of 60 days, the stay will terminate as of the date of such 

dismissal.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 

27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Abele, J. and Hess, J., concur in Judgment and Opinion.

For the Court,

_____________________________

Jason P. Smith 
Scioto App. No. 22CA4007 20

Presiding Judge

NOTICE TO COUNSEL

Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final 

judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the 

date of filing with the clerk.