*

The appellee notified this court that it was never served with process in the

district court and would not be filing a brief or otherwise participating in this

appeal. After an examination of the appellants’ brief and the record, we have

concluded that oral argument is unnecessary. Thus the appeal is submitted on the

appellants’ brief and the record. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted May 3, 2007*

Decided May 7, 2007

Before

Hon. RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge

Hon. MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

Hon. DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge

No. 06-3550

CARLTON TAYLOR and THE

HOUSE OF THE LORD OUR 

GOD, INC.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

CITY OF GARY, INDIANA,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of

Indiana, Hammond Division

No. 2:06-CV-275

Theresa L. Springmann, 

Judge.

O R D E R

Carlton Taylor claims that the City of Gary, Indiana violated his rights under

the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C.

§§ 2000cc to 2000cc-5, and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment when

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

 Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 06-3550 Page 2

it decided to demolish part of a former Methodist church to create a public ruins

garden instead of giving the church to him. The district court dismissed the case

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) for failure to state a claim, and we affirm.

Taylor identifies himself as a minister in The House of the Lord Our God, a

not-for-profit corporation he describes as a “restoration ministry.” According to his

complaint, Taylor made inquiries in June 2005 about taking over the former City

Methodist Church, a property owned by the City of Gary. Taylor wanted to acquire

the building so he could restore it for use as a place of worship. The City refused to

give him the property and, in January 2006, announced that it planned to demolish

part of the church building and turn it into a ruins garden. Because Taylor sought

to proceed in forma pauperis, the district court examined his complaint under 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and dismissed it, concluding that Taylor lacked standing to sue

because he had no property interest in the church.

Even if we assume that Taylor has standing, his complaint clearly fails to

state any claim under RLUIPA. That enactment prohibits land use regulations that

place a substantial burden on religious practice, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1), but a land

use regulation is defined as a regulation that restricts a claimant’s ability to use

land in which he holds a property interest, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(5); Vision Church v.

Vill. of Long Grove, 468 F.3d 975, 998 (7th Cir. 2006). Taylor’s complaint makes

clear that he does not have any legally recognized property interest in the City

Methodist Church.

Taylor also has failed to state a claim under the Free Exercise Clause. He

does not allege that the City confiscated a church that he owned or used. Rather,

he alleges that he is unable to construct a place of worship in his preferred location

because the City owns that location and will not give it to him. But the Free

Exercise Clause does not give Taylor the right to demand that the City provide him

with municipally-owned property as a place of worship. See Prater v. City of

Burnside, Ky., 289 F.3d 417, 427-28 (6th Cir. 2002) (pointing out that “Free Exercise

Clause is written in terms of what the government cannot do to the individual, not

in terms of what the individual can exact from the government” and holding that

city did not violate clause by refusing to abandon public road in favor of church

(internal citation and quotation marks omitted)). 

For the above reasons, we AFFIRM.