In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 99-2102

ROGENE GORENCE, JAN WOLF,

and CARY BRUCE,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

EAGLE FOOD CENTERS, INCORPORATED,

a Delaware corporation,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 93 C 4862--Blanche M. Manning, Judge.

Argued January 17, 2001--Decided March 8, 2001

 Before EASTERBROOK, EVANS, and WILLIAMS, Circuit

Judges.

 EVANS, Circuit Judge. Three employees of the

Eagle Food Center, having a boatload of

complaints against Eagle, have brought a hodgepodge of unrelated employment discrimination

claims which the district judge dismissed on

summary judgment in three separate, lengthy

decisions of 28, 33, and 40 pages. Upon

reconsideration, the judge once again found that

the cases should be dismissed. The unhappy

employees appeal.

 Cary Bruce was hired as a store clerk in 1958

and eventually became the manager of several

different stores. In 1990, when he was 47, he was

made a district manager, in charge of 17 suburban

Chicago stores. In June 1990 new personnel

arriving on the scene demoted him. He was

replaced by a 56-year-old man. Bruce became the

manager of a store in Libertyville, Illinois.

 In 1991 one of the district managers resigned.

Bruce applied for the position but did not get

that one or other positions he applied for.

Instead, he was transferred from Libertyville to

a store in Round Lake Beach and then in 1993 to

a store in Belvidere. In January 1996 he was

suspended from the Belvidere position because,

according to Eagle, he had an inappropriate

personal relationship with the wife of another

employee. After his reinstatement, Bruce was
transferred to a store in McHenry, Illinois. He

claims that Eagle discriminated against him

because of his age and in retaliation for his

filing a charge of discrimination.

 Jan Wolf began working for Eagle as a cashier

in April 1976. She was promoted to personnel

specialist at corporate headquarters in December

1985. In December 1987 she was promoted to

training manager, but at a lower salary than the

person she replaced. Wolf did not get promotions

she sought for positions as an industrial

engineering manager or a director of human

resources. After a reorganization in 1995, Wolf

became a human resources specialist. Her claims

are that the company engaged in sex

discrimination and violated the Equal Pay Act.

 Rogene Gorence began working for Eagle as a

cashier in March 1965. In 1973 she became a

personnel specialist at corporate headquarters.

In 1975 Eagle expanded her duties to include

interpreting and administering labor agreements

and processing union grievances, but she did not

like negotiating and, in fact, has not negotiated

a labor contract since 1984. Eagle hired two

lawyers to negotiate, arbitrate, and handle labor

and employment matters. Gorence was paid less

than one of the attorneys, and she contends this

is gender discrimination.

 In 1991 Gorence applied to be an assistant

warehouse manager; she was not hired. Then in

1992 she applied to be human resources manager,

another position she did not get. She became

Eagle’s labor relations manager in 1993, but her

position was eliminated in 1995, and she, like

Wolf, became a human resources specialist. Her

allegations include sex and age discrimination.

 The plaintiffs’ primary gripe on this appeal is

that their claims were analyzed under the

framework set out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.

Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), that is, by employing

an indirect method of proof, when they should

have been analyzed under the direct method of

proof. They claim that the McDonnell Douglas

formula puts too heavy a burden on them. However,

in what might be an abundance of caution, the

three plaintiffs also contend that they survive

summary judgment under McDonnell Douglas.

 In Troupe v. May Department Stores, 20 F.3d 734

(7th Cir. 1994), we said that under the direct

method of proof a plaintiff must show either an

acknowledgment of discriminatory intent by the

defendant or circumstantial evidence that

provides the basis for an inference of

intentional discrimination. That evidence can be

(1) suspicious timing, ambiguous statements,
etc., (2) evidence that similarly situated

employees were treated differently, or (3)

evidence that the employee was qualified and

passed over for the job and the employer’s reason

for the difference in treatment is a pretext for

discrimination. In Huff v. Uarco, 122 F.3d 374

(1997), we noted that the third type of

circumstantial evidence in a direct case is

substantially the same as the evidence required

under McDonnell Douglas.

 No application of law to facts, however, is

ever quite so simple as setting out principles of

law. After over three and a half decades of laws

prohibiting employment discrimination in one form

or another, employers are fairly unlikely to be

caught making statements such as, "I fired Judy

because she was an old woman." Workplaces remain,

though, places filled with persons who express

thoughts which often reveal bias or ignorance.

Those persons can be caught saying, for example,

something like, "Old women are hard to deal

with." The first statement proves intentional

discrimination; the second, without more, does

not. Inevitably, in cases we see, we deal with

what falls in between.

 The second hypothetical statement we just used

might be bigoted. But we have said that bigotry,

per se, is not actionable. It is actionable only

if it results in injury to a plaintiff; there

must be a real link between the bigotry and an

adverse employment action. Miller v. American

Family Mut. Ins. Co., 203 F.3d 997 (7th Cir.

2000). The comment would more than likely be what

we label a "stray" remark--a remark which fails

to show discrimination unless it is related to

the employment decision. Cianci v. Pettibone

Corp., 152 F.3d 723 (7th Cir. 1998); Fuka v.

Thomson Consumer Elec., 82 F.3d 1397 (7th Cir.

1996). We cautioned in Hunt v. City of Markham,

Ill., 219 F.3d 649 (7th Cir. 2000), that our

cases should not be overread to mean that "stray

remarks" of a derogatory character are never

evidence of discrimination. What our cases hold,

we said, is that if someone not involved in the

decisionmaking in a plaintiff’s case expressed

discriminatory feelings, that is not evidence

that the decision was discriminatory. It is

different, we said,

when the decision makers themselves, or those who

provide input into the decision, express such

feelings (1) around the time of, and (2) in

reference to, the adverse employment action

complained of.

At 652. It might be, in fact, that remarks

meeting these criteria are not "stray" at all.

Finally, evidence of inappropriate remarks not
shown to be directly related to the employment

decision may not support a direct-method-of-proof

case, but, in connection with other evidence,

might support a case under McDonnell Douglas.

 Another principle could emerge from this

particular case; that is, that an amorphous

litany of complaints about a myriad of workplace

decisions regarding promotions, salary, etc. does

not necessarily meet a plaintiff’s burden of

proof. In this case, we have been buried in

details about employment decisions, some of which

are, and some of which are not, really involved

in this case. For instance, Bruce’s 1990 demotion

is now admitted to be outside the time limits for

this action. Nevertheless, it occupies pages and

pages in this record. Little has been done,

particularly by the three plaintiffs, to make

slogging through the record here either more

efficient or more pleasant. And it is simply not

true, we want to emphasize, that if a litigant

presents an overload of irrelevant or

nonprobative facts, somehow the irrelevancies

will add up to relevant evidence of

discriminatory intent. They do not; zero plus

zero is zero.

 To bring some order to the chaos we find in

this record, we tether our analysis to the claims

set out in the second amended complaint and the

charges of discrimination filed with the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission. Particularly

in employment discrimination cases, we cannot

range far and wide looking for any bad acts ever

committed by an employer and then conclude that

because the employer is bad, it must have

discriminated against a particular plaintiff.

Title VII, the ADEA, and other discrimination

statutes require more focus than that. They

require that a plaintiff’s claims first be

presented to the agency. 29 U.S.C. sec. 626(d);

42 U.S.C. sec. 2000e-5(f). Although we read

charges of discrimination liberally in order to

allow a claim of discrimination that is

reasonably related to the allegations in the

charge, it is the claims presented to the agency

and claims reasonably related to those in the

charge which form the basis for a federal court

lawsuit. Bielfeldt v. Commissioner, 231 F.3d 1035

(7th Cir. 2000). In turn, a federal court

complaint needs to give notice of what the claims

are. Cheek v. Peabody Coal Co., 97 F.3d 200 (7th

Cir. 1996). As an aside, we also note that

although we have managed to find in the record

all but one of the administrative charges filed

by these plaintiffs, finding them has not been

very easy.

 Gorence’s charge before the EEOC, filed May 26,

1992, stated that she did not receive the title
of manager in 1992 (manager of what she doesn’t

say) and that she was denied promotion to

warehouse and distribution center manager in

August 1991. She also claimed she was retaliated

against and that males were treated more

favorably. In her second amended complaint in the

district court, Gorence states claims under the

Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C.

sec. 621 et seq., and Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. sec.

2000e et seq. In count I she contends that she

was denied a promotion (in 1991) to the position

of assistant warehouse and distribution center

manager, and a less qualified, younger male got

the spot. The complaint also states:

 15. From July 1, 1973 through the present,

Plaintiff GORENCE has been denied and continues

to be denied promotions and compensation because

of her age and sex.

 16. From July 1973 through March 1993,

Plaintiff GORENCE was involved in training

Defendant’s personnel managers while holding the

title of Personnel Specialist. She was denied

promotions to the manager level based on her age

and sex.

Apparently these allegations, coupled with the

EEOC charge of discrimination, are somehow

supposed to provide notice that she was denied

two other promotions: to industrial relations

manager in 1992 and to labor relations director

in 1993. Perhaps the denial of promotion to

industrial relations manager is the one she

refers to cryptically in her charge before the

EEOC. It is hard, however, to find a sufficient

relationship between the claims in the charge

before the agency and the denial of a promotion

to director of labor relations, which she claims

she was denied in 1993. Also, it is hardly worth

noting that any claim dating back to 1973 is too

stale to recognize.

 In her complaint, Gorence also alleges that she

was paid less than male employees with titles

similar to hers as labor relations manager. And

in count II she claims that Eagle retaliated

against her by changing her title from labor

relations manager to that of human resources

specialist.

 Evidence which she says supports a finding of

intentional discrimination includes an

unfortunate statement that Donan McAuley, a

disgruntled former employee, attributed to

decisionmaker Doug Edwards. McAuley said that

Edwards said that "he didn’t want to talk to any

middle-aged menopausal women." It is something of

a leap to say that this statement means that the
reason Gorence was not hired as warehouse manager

was that she was a middle-aged woman. Even if he

did not want to talk to middle-aged women,

Edwards did, in fact, interview Gorence. He did

not hire her because his view was that her

qualifications did not meet those required for

the assistant warehouse manager.

 Other evidence on which all the plaintiffs rely

to support an inference of discriminatory

employment practices includes their largely

unsupported claim that Eagle was willing to

promote young men to management positions even

though they did not have the requisite

experience. Similarly, plaintiffs cite "evidence"

of wage disparities along gender-based lines. For

instance, the evidence of salary disparities in

Gorence’s case involves her affidavit in which

she says that other persons, all male, who were

"specialists" as she was were "compensated at a

much higher level" than she was. She lists ten

such persons. Then as support for her statement,

she compares her salary with two of the males

whose salaries are higher. In a vacuum, without

information regarding duties, experience, etc.,

the comparisons are not evidence of intentional

discrimination.

 Gorence offers, as well, her claim that the

qualifications for assistant warehouse manager

were changed when she applied for the position;

whereas in the past it had been a position for a

person with human resources experience, the

qualifications were changed to require warehouse

experience, which Gorence did not have. Eagle

says that the new warehouse manager needed an

assistant with warehouse experience. We are not

convinced that a requirement that an assistant

warehouse manager have warehouse experience shows

discriminatory intent, even if the job

description had recently been changed.

 In addition to our uncertainty as to whether

these claims are actually in the lawsuit,

Gorence’s claims regarding promotion to

industrial relations manager and labor relations

director fail as well because, at the time she

applied for the positions, they did not exist,

and no one was ever placed into those positions.

 Gorence’s claim that she was discriminated

against because McAuley was paid more than she

was also fails. McAuley had a different

educational background--he had a law degree and

she did not. He also performed different duties,

including arbitrations and labor negotiations,

and she did not. On this record, we cannot find

discrimination.

 Finally, Gorence claims that she was retaliated
against because her title was changed from labor

relations manager to human resources specialist.

This change in title did not, however, result in

a loss of pay or benefits. Gorence has not shown

by the direct method of proof that Eagle acted

with discriminatory intent.

 Turning to a McDonnell Douglas analysis of

Gorence’s Title VII claims, we find that she

cannot show she was qualified for the positions

or that the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons

given for the employment action are pretextual.

Under McDonnell Douglas she, as well as Wolf,

must establish a prima facie case of

discrimination, after which Eagle must offer

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the

employment action. She must then rebut the

employer’s legitimate reason by proving that it

is a pretext for discrimination. A prima facie

case requires her to show that she is a member of

a protected class, has applied for and was

qualified for an open position, was rejected, and

the position was filled with a person not in the

protected class or remained open. Mills v. Health

Care Serv. Corp., 171 F.3d 450 (7th Cir. 1999).

The McDonnell Douglas analysis is also applicable

to ADEA claims. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing

Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 120 S. Ct. 2097

(2000). Obviously, the prima facie case

necessarily involves age-related factors: she and

also Bruce must establish that they are in the

protected age group and that substantially

younger persons obtained the positions they

wanted. Paluck v. Gooding Rubber Co., 221 F.3d

1003 (7th Cir. 2000). For a retaliation claim,

the prima facie case includes three elements:

that the plaintiff engaged in protected activity;

that she suffered an adverse job action; and that

there is a causal link between the protected

activity and the adverse job action. Miller v.

American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 203 F.3d 997 (7th

Cir. 2000). Then the employer must present a

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its

action and the plaintiff must establish pretext.

 Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, Eagle

claims that Gorence simply was not qualified for

the job as warehouse assistant manager. What the

qualifications for a position are, even if those

qualifications change, is a business decision,

one courts should not interfere with. Dale v.

Chicago Tribune Co., 797 F.2d 458 (7th Cir.

1986). We do not tell employers what the

requirements for a job must be. Given the

qualifications which Eagle set out for the

position, Gorence simply did not measure up. All

in all, her claims were properly dismissed.

 Next we turn to Wolf’s claims. She alleges in

the amended complaint that on March 30, 1992, she
was denied a promotion to the position of

director of human resources. She also alleges in

general that after taking a psychological test to

determine her management ability, she "did not

receive a promotion as a result of submitting to

that test despite her high marks thereon." The

complaint is unclear exactly what promotion that

would be; however, her second of three charges

before the EEOC refers to a position as

industrial engineering manager. This case has

been litigated as to that position as well as her

claim that a position as the director of training

management should have been created for her in

1992. The latter may or may not be encompassed

within the EEOC charges./1 Wolf also claims that

she was retaliated against for filing EEOC

charges by suffering cutbacks in her staff, by

the denial of promotions, and by a job change

from training manager to human resources

specialist. Wolf also asserted a claim of unequal

pay under the Equal Pay Act and Title VII, but

she now concedes that those claims are untimely.

 Wolf does not present evidence to support her

promotion claims under the direct method of

proving intentional discrimination. Her claims

were properly analyzed under McDonnell Douglas.

Using that mode of analysis, we find that Wolf

fails to show that she was qualified for the

position of human resources director in 1992. She

had never negotiated a collective bargaining

agreement and her experience in such a position

was not comparable to that of the person

ultimately hired, Bill Crigger. In fact, Wolf

admitted that she did not have the experience

that Crigger had. The same facts go to whether

Eagle had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason

for preferring Crigger over Wolf. He had worked

for another company where he was a human resource

manager for one division and a training

coordinator and personnel manager for another

division. Other than generalized claims that

Eagle did not have females in higher level

positions, there is nothing to show that Eagle’s

preference for Crigger in this situation was a

pretext for discrimination.

 Wolf’s other promotion claims fail as well. The

position of industrial engineering manager went

to a person who had been working for the

consulting firm which handled the

responsibilities of the position for 10 months.

That Eagle chose to hire that person to continue

the work he had been doing is a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for not promoting Wolf.

Again, Wolf has presented no evidence of pretext.

The other position--that of director of training

development--was never created. Therefore, if

there is a claim in this lawsuit that Wolf should

have been given the position, it fails.
 Some of Wolf’s retaliation claims could hardly

be said to rise to the level of adverse job

actions with which a federal court should be

concerned--loss of secretarial support, for

instance. Even the change in title from human

relations manager to human relations specialist

did not involve a loss of pay or benefits. Such

a change does not constitute an adverse job

action. See Ribando v. United Airlines, 200 F.3d

507 (7th Cir. 1999).

 Cary Bruce’s claims are for age discrimination

and retaliation. In the amended complaint he

claims that he was demoted from a position as

district manager and then later was not promoted

to other district manager positions; rather,

younger less qualified males were selected. He

acknowledges that his claim that he was demoted

in 1990 is barred because his EEOC charge was

filed more than 300 days after the demotion--on

August 5, 1992. See Lever v. Northwestern Univ.,

979 F.2d 552 (7th Cir. 1992). That leaves Bruce

with claims that he should have been promoted in

1991 and 1992 and that he was retaliated against

after he filed his charge by being suspended and

transferred to less desirable locations.

 Bruce’s evidence of intentional discrimination

through the direct method of proof includes

statements made by certain Eagle officials. The

problem with all of the statements is that they

are not sufficiently connected with any decision

regarding Bruce. In 1993 one official asked for

a protocol to get rid of older store managers.

The statement having been made a year after any

relevant employment decision, it is not

sufficiently connected to Bruce’s claims.

Similarly, McAuley said that Steve Bryan

commented in 1990 that Bruce was not one of the

younger managers that Bryan "wanted to put in

place." A problem with this statement is that

Bryan did not begin to work for Eagle until 1991.

It also is not connected with any particular

employment decision. Finally, Bruce claims that

Bryan often used terms "young and aggressive"

when referring to managers. Again there is no

connection to a decision regarding Bruce.

 Looking at Bruce’s claims through the prism of

McDonnell Douglas, we also find that Eagle’s

contention that Bruce was not qualified and that

it had legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for

not promoting him is supported in the record. In

1991 and 1992 Eagle wanted to change the noninnovative culture which had prevailed at the

company. Eagle wanted district managers who did

well at problem identification and problem

solving. The company wanted effective leaders who

were good communicators and motivators and who
had flexible management styles. Eagle considered

Bruce deficient in these categories. Bruce was

seen as someone who allowed outdated merchandise

in his store, who had problems with store

conditions and cleanliness, and who was the

target of a number of employee grievances. The

company questioned his leadership style and

general performance. Bruce has not shown that

these concerns were a pretext for discrimination

on the basis of age.

 Bruce’s retaliation claims involve transfers to

different stores and a suspension without pay.

The suspension was a result of his having an

affair with an employee’s wife. There is no

evidence that the reason was pretextual. The

transfers did not constitute an adverse

employment action; he retained the same pay and

benefits.

 As to all three plaintiffs, the judgment of the

district court is

AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTE

/1 Looking in the record in places where such things

would reasonably be expected to appear, we have

found only two of the three charges Wolf

apparently filed with the EEOC.