Filed 5/1/14 P. v. Williams CA2/1 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DIVISION ONE 

THE PEOPLE, 

 Plaintiff and Respondent, 

 v. 

STEPHEN LAMONT WILLIAMS, 

 Defendant and Appellant. 

 B243120 

 (Los Angeles County 

 Super. Ct. No. TA122155) 

 APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Allen J. 

Webster, Judge. Affirmed. 

 Joanna Rehm, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant. 

 Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney 

General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, James William Bilderback II and 

Alene M. Games, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
2

 A jury found Stephen Williams guilty of one count of second degree burglary, two 

counts of assault with a deadly weapon and found true one great bodily injury 

enhancement. Williams attacks the assault convictions and the sufficiency of the 

evidence to support the great bodily injury enhancement. We affirm the judgment. 

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW 

 In the still-dark hours of the morning on February 21, 2012, Viridiana Lopez 

walked out of her house intending to go to work. She noticed that the dome light was 

on inside her brother Raul’s truck and saw Williams sitting in the driver’s seat. She 

recognized Williams from having seen him in the neighborhood. Viridiana screamed, 

“Raul!” Williams pulled his hoodie over his head, got out of the truck and rode off on a 

bicycle. Hearing Viridiana’s screams, her husband Marvin and her brother Raul ran out 

of the house. Marvin got a quick look at the person who had been in the truck before he 

disappeared on the bicycle. It was too dark to see the person’s face but he could tell it 

was a male. No one called the police. 

 Ten or fifteen minutes later Viridiana drove to a gas station to buy coffee and 

Marvin and Raul followed her in Raul’s truck. When the group pulled into the gas 

station Viridiana saw Williams walking down the sidewalk. She pointed to him and 

told Raul, “that’s him.” Marvin and Raul, in Raul’s truck, drove along side Williams 

who began to run as soon as he saw them. As he ran, Williams spontaneously shouted: 

“I didn’t get inside your truck.” 

Marvin and Raul got out of the truck and pursued Williams on foot. When 

Williams tripped and fell Raul “grabbed” him and Marvin came to assist. Together 

Marvin and Raul tried to hold Williams down. Marvin pressed his knee into Williams’ 

stomach and he and Raul tried to seize Williams hands. 

 Viridiana arrived on the scene while the struggle was underway and told Raul and 

Marvin that Williams was the man she saw in the truck that morning. Raul told Viridiana 

to call the police. 
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While Viridiana was calling the police, Williams escaped the grasp of Raul and 

Marvin and started swinging at them and Viridiana with screwdrivers he held in each 

hand. Williams hit Viridiana with his fist and stabbed Marvin with a screwdriver on the 

right side of his face. At some point in the scuffle Raul suffered a lacerated lip. Raul, 

Marvin and Viridiana managed to wrestle Williams to the ground. Viridiana stood 

behind Williams holding his hoodie with one hand and using her other hand to call the 

police on her cellphone. She and the two men were able to detain Williams until the 

police arrived. 

 Williams testified in his own defense. He stated that he was walking from 

his home to a donut shop when he was “‘jumped by some fuck’in Mexicans.’” A truck 

made a quick U-turn and stopped near him. Two men (later identified as Raul and 

Marvin) got out. Raul said: “Come here mother fucker.” Williams started to run 

because he thought the men might be members of a rival gang. Raul and Marvin chased 

Williams down the street. When they caught up with him Raul accused him of “fuck’in 

with my truck.” Williams responded: “No man. It wasn’t me.” Raul and Marvin began 

“kicking” and “stomping” Williams. Later, Williams said, Viridiana joined Marvin and 

Raul and the three of them were “standing over me beating me, kicking me and hitting 

me.” Williams testified that when he heard Viridiana say she was going to call the 

police: “I started fighting back . . . because I was on the run from parole.” He also 

testified that he took a screwdriver and an ice pick with him everywhere he went because 

“I’m in a war zone, you know.” 

 The jury found Williams guilty of one count of second degree burglary and two 

counts of assault with a deadly weapon. It found Williams personally inflicted great 

bodily injury upon Marvin. 
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DISCUSSION 

I. WILLIAMS FORFEITED ANY COMPLAINT ABOUT ERRORS 

IN THE INSTRUCTIONS ON SELF-DEFENSE BY FAILING 

TO RAISE THEM IN THE TRIAL COURT. 

 At trial Williams claimed that he was not the person in Raul’s truck, did not 

know why Raul and Marvin jumped him and that he fought them when they attacked 

him because he thought they were rival gang members. 

 The court instructed the jury on the right of self-defense in general 

(CALCRIM No. 3470)1

 , the right to self-defense of one who engages in mutual 

 

1

 CALCRIM No. 3470 provides: “Self-defense is a defense to Assault With A 

Deadly Weapon. The defendant is not guilty of those crimes if he used force against the 

other person in lawful self-defense. The defendant acted in lawful self-defense if: 

1. The defendant reasonably believed that he was in imminent danger of suffering 

bodily injury; 

2. The defendant reasonably believed that the immediate use of force was necessary 

to defend against that danger; 

AND 

3. The defendant used no more force than was reasonably necessary to defend 

against that danger. 

Belief in future harm is not sufficient, no matter how great or how likely the harm is 

believed to be. The defendant must have believed there was imminent danger of bodily 

injury to himself. Defendant’s belief must have been reasonable and he must have acted 

because of that belief. The defendant is only entitled to use that amount of force that a 

reasonable person would believe is necessary in the same situation. If the defendant used 

more force than was reasonable, the defendant did not act in lawful self-defense. 

When deciding whether the defendant’s beliefs were reasonable, consider all the 

circumstances as they were known to and appeared to the defendant and consider what a 

reasonable person in a similar situation with similar knowledge would have believed. If 

the defendant’s beliefs were reasonable, the danger does not need to have actually 

existed. 

A defendant is not required to retreat. He or she is entitled to stand his or her ground 

and defend himself or herself and, if reasonably necessary, to pursue an assailant until the 

danger of bodily injury has passed. This is so even if safety could have been achieved by 

retreating. 

The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 

did not act in lawful self-defense. If the People have not met this burden, you must find 

the defendant not guilty.” 
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combat (CALCRIM No. 3471) that the right of self-defense does not apply if 

the defendant provokes a fight with the intent to create an excuse to use force 

(CALCRIM No. 3472) and that the right to use force in self-defense expires when 

the attacker withdraws or is no longer capable of inflicting injury (CALCRIM No. 3474). 

 On appeal Williams contends that those instructions were insufficient. He argues 

that the court had a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury that a person performing a 

citizen’s arrest may use only that amount of restraint as is reasonable to detain the 

arrestee until law enforcement officers arrive2

 and that the arrestee is privileged to “use 

reasonable force to defend life and limb against excessive force[.]” (People v. Curtis

(1969) 70 Cal.2d 347, 357; 4 Witkin, Cal. Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Pretrial Procedure 

§ 13, p. 248.) 

 Williams forfeited this argument by not requesting the customized instruction he 

now claims should have been given. 

 As a general rule courts will not consider alleged errors that could have been cured 

in the trial court had they been presented there. (People v. Saunders (1993) 5 Cal.4th 

580, 589-590.) In some instances, an appellant may seek review of an instruction “even 

though no objection was made thereto in the lower court” if the “substantial rights of the 

defendant were affected thereby.” (Pen. Code, § 1259.) But this exception to the usual 

rule of forfeiture only applies to an instruction “given, refused or modified.” (Ibid.) 

 We agree with Williams that the trial court must instruct sua sponte on the general 

principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence. (People v. Flannel (1979) 

25 Cal.3d 668, 681.) This duty is met where the instructions correctly state the 

applicable law. The court does not have a duty create on its own additional or clarifying 

instructions. As our high court explained in People v. Lang (1989) 49 Cal.3d 991, 1024, 

“A party may not complain on appeal that an instruction correct in law and responsive to 

 

2

 Penal Code section 835 states in relevant part: “The person arrested may be 

subjected to such restraint as is reasonable for his arrest and detention.” 
6

the evidence was too general or incomplete unless the party has requested appropriate 

clarifying or amplifying language.” Here the court instructed the jury on the general right 

to use force in self-defense. If the jurors had believed Williams’ contention that Raul, 

Marvin and Viridiana attacked him for no valid reason and that he fought back only to 

protect his “life and limb” against imminent danger of bodily injury and that he used no 

more force than was reasonably necessary to defend against that danger the jurors would 

have acquitted him of the burglary and the assault charges. Instructions on the privilege 

to use force in resisting detention or arrest would have been surplusage. 

 Williams argues, however, that instructions on citizens’ arrests and resisting arrest 

were necessary because the prosecutor introduced that issue into the case in her closing 

argument to the jury. The prosecutor told the jury: “[I]f you believe the testimony of the 

witnesses, [Williams] doesn’t have a right to self-defense. He does not. They were 

trying to detain a fleeing suspect until the police came. They have a right to do that. 

There is no law in those instructions telling you that they acted unlawfully unless you 

believe [Williams] is the wrong person who had no idea what was going on and really felt 

that he was being chased by gang members.” Williams was not prejudiced by this 

argument because it conceded the legal basis of his defense: he was not guilty of assault 

if he reasonably believed that he was being pursued and attacked by gang members. In 

any case, defense counsel did not object to the prosecutor’s argument and so the issue 

cannot be addressed in this appeal. (People v. Harris (2013) 57 Cal.4th 804, 852.) 

 Finally, Williams maintains that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in 

failing to request an instruction on the privilege to use self-defense in resisting an 

unreasonable detention and failing to object to the prosecutor’s argument that a fleeing 

felon has no right to self-defense. We disagree. An instruction on the privilege to resist 

excessive force in a detention would only make sense if Williams was willing to concede 

there was evidence that would allow the jury to find he burglarized Juan’s truck. 

Otherwise, as we discussed above, the instruction would add nothing to the general 

instruction on self-defense that the court gave. Defense counsel could reasonably 
7

conclude that as a tactical matter it would be better to stick with the SODDI3

defense rather than present the jury with two conflicting defenses. 

II. SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE SUPPORTED THE ENHANCEMENT 

 FOR GREAT BODILY INJURY TO MARVIN. 

Penal Code section 12022.7, subdivision (f) defines “great bodily injury” 

as “a significant or substantial physical injury.” This standard is commonly 

established by “evidence of the severity of the victim’s physical injury, the resulting 

pain, or the medical care required to treat or repair the injury.” (People v. Cross

(2008) 45 Cal.4th 58, 66.) The jury, instructed in the language of Penal Code 

section 12022.7, subdivision (f), found that Williams inflicted great bodily injury 

on Marvin based on the following evidence. 

 In his attempt to detain Williams, Marvin received a laceration on the right 

side of his face. An officer who responded to the scene testified that the cut was a 

quarter inch long. Paramedics applied a Band-Aid to the cut and Marvin went to 

work. Later that day, however, blood soaked through the Band-Aid and after work 

Marvin went to the hospital where a doctor cleaned the wound and applied six 

stitches. When Marvin testified at trial four months after the incident he exhibited 

a scar which the prosecutor estimated as between two-thirds and three-fourths inch 

in length. 

 Williams argues on appeal that a quarter inch cut that required six 

stitches does not meet the standard of a “significant or substantial” injury as a 

matter of law. The evidence showed, however, that while the cut appeared 

superficial at first it continued to bleed throughout the day and had to be sutured 

at a hospital suggesting that the wound was a deep puncture, not a shallow 

 

3

 In the jargon of criminal law attorneys the acronym SODDI stands for “Some 

Other Dude Did It.” (Uleman, Conditional Relevance and the Admission of Party 

Admissions (2008) 36 Sw.U. L.Rev. 657, 668.) 
8

scratch. Moreover, the cut left a scar between two-thirds and three-fourths of an inch on 

the side of Marvin’s face. 

 Here, the court instructed the jury on what constitutes a “great” bodily injury and 

the jury, applying contemporary community norms, found that Marvin’s injury met that 

standard. We cannot say as a matter of law that the jury erred. 

DISPOSITION 

The judgment is affirmed. 

 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED. 

 ROTHSCHILD, Acting P. J. 

We concur: 

 CHANEY, J. 

 JOHNSON, J.