F OR P UBLICATION



### UNIT E D ST AT E S CO URT O F APPE AL S FO R T H E NINT H CIRCUIT

J A M U L A C T I O N C O M M I T T E E ; J A M U L C O M M U N I T Y C H

U R C H ; D A R L A K A S M E D O ; P A

U L S C R I P P S ; G L E

N R E V E L L ; W I L L I A

M H E N D R I X , Plaintiffs-Appellants
,

v

.

J O N O D E V C H A

U D H U R I , Chairwoman of the National I

ndian Gaming Commission; S A L L

Y J E W E L L , Secretary of the U.S. Department of the I nterior; K E V I

N K. W A S H B U R

N , Esquire, Assistant Secretary - I n dian Affairs, U.S. Department of the I nterior; A M

Y D U T S C H K

E , Reg ional Director, B ureau of I

ndian Affairs; P A U L A L

. H A R T , Director of the Office of I

nidan Gaming , B ureau of I ndian Affairs; J O H

N R Y D Z I K , Chief, Division of Environmental, Cultural Resources Manag e ment and Safety of the B ureau of I

ndian Affairs; D A W N H O U L E , Chief of Staff for the National I n dian Gaming Commission; U.S. D E P A R T M E N T O F
T H E I N T E R I O R ; N A T I O N

A L I N D I A N G A M I N G C O M M I S S I O N ; R

A Y M O N D H U N T E R , Chairman, J amul I ndian N o. 15-16021

D.C. No. 2:13-cv-01920- KJ M-KJ N

OPI NI ONJ AC V

. C H A U D H U R I 2

Villag e ; C H A R

L E N E C H A M B E R L A I N ; R O B E R T M E S A ; R I C H

A R D T E L L O W ; J U L I A L O T T A ; P E

N N N A T I O N

A L , I N C .; S A N D I E G O G A M I

N G V I L L A G E , L L C; C.W

. D R

I V E R , I N C ., Defendants-Appellees

.

A ppeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California Kimberly J . Mueller, District J u dg e, Presiding

Arg u ed and Submitted December 7, 2015 San F rancisco, California

F iled J une 9, 2016

B efore: Alex Koz inski, J ay S. B y bee, and Morg an Christen, Circuit J udg es.
Opinion by J udg e ChristenJ AC V

. C H A U D H U R I 3

SUMMARY *

Indian G am ing / Environm e ntal Law

The panel affirmed the district court’s denial of a petition for a writ of mandamus under the A dministrative Procedure Act of a g roup of tribal members a nd o rg aniz a tions, alleg ing that the National I n dian Gaming Commission violated the National Environmental Policy Act w hen it app r o v e d the J amul I nd i a n V illag e’s g aming ordinance for a casino in J amul, California, without first conduc t i n g a N EPA environmental review.

The district c ourt held th a t the Gaming Commission’s approval of the 2013 g aming ordinance w as not “major federal action” w ithin the meaning of N E P A requiring the preparation of an environmental impact statement.

Affirming on different g rounds than the d istrict court, the panel held that even if the G aming Commission’s approval o f the g aming o rdinance was a major federal ac t i o n within the meaning of NEPA, the Gaming Commission was not r equired
to prepare an environmental impact statem e n t because there

was an irreconcilable statutory c onflict between NE P A a nd the I ndian G a m i n g Reg u latory Act, pursuant to S a n Luis & Delta-Mendota W

ater A uth. v

. Jewell
, 7 47 F .3d 581, 648 (9th Cir. 2 014) (holding that an ag e ncy need not adhere to N EPA “where doing so ‘ would create an irreconcilable a nd fundamental conflict’ with the substantive statute at issue”).

* T h is su m m ary co n stitu

tes n o part o f th e o p in io n o f th e co u rt. It h as b een p rep ared b y

co u rt staf

f f o r th e co n v en i en ce o f

th e read er.J AC V

. C H A U D H U R I 4

COUNSEL

Kenneth Robert W illiams (arg ued), Sacramento, California, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Eliz abeth Ann Peterson (arg ued), W illiam B

. L az a

rus, J udith Rabinowitz
, and B arbara M.R. Marvin, A t t o rney s; J ohn C. Cruden, Assistant A ttorney Genera l, Environment a nd Natural Resources Division; U nited States Depar tment o f J ustice, W ashing ton, D .C.; Rebecca Ros s , Office of the Solicitor, United States De p a r t ment of the I nterior, W a shing ton, D.C.; J ohn Hay
, Office of the General Counsel, National I ndian Gaming Commission, W ashing ton, D.C.; for F ederal Defendants-Appellees.

F rank L awrence (arg

ued), L a w O f

fice of F rank L awrence, Grass Valley
, California, for Tribally -Related DefendantsAppellees.

Pa t rick D

. Webb (arg

ued), Webb & Carey
, San Dieg o, California, f

or Ami c i Curiae W alter Rosales and Karen Tog g ery

.

OP INION

CHRI STEN, Circuit J udg e:

This case is about a

n I ndian g aming casino in J amul, California, a rural community close to San Dieg o, California. The J a mul I ndian V illag e, a federally recog niz ed I ndian tribe and a non-party to this suit (“the Tribe”), is building a casino in J a mul. A sub-g roup of tribal members and org aniz ations, including the J amul A ction Committee, t h e J amulJ AC V

. C H A U D H U R I 5

Community Church, and four residents of rura l J amul (collectively “J AC”), o pposes the casino. This lawsuit is J AC’s most recent eff

o r t t o s top its construction. See, e.g. , R osales v. United States
, 275 F

. App’x 1 (D.C. Cir. 20 0 8 ). J AC contends that the N ational I ndian Gaming Commission (“NI GC”) violated the National En v ironmental Policy A ct (“NEPA”) when it ap proved the T r ibe’s g aming ordinance (“GO”) without first conducting a NEPA environ m en tal review. J A C p etitioned the district court f or a w r it o f mandamus under the A dministrative Procedure Act (“APA”),
arg uing that the NEPA environmental r eview wa s “ ag ency action unlawfully withheld.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(1). The district
court denied relief. W e h a v e jurisdiction un d e r 2 8 U .S.C. § 1292(a)(1), and we affirm. 1

I.

A.

This appeal turns on the interplay between two federal
statutes: the I ndian Gaming Reg u l a t o r y Act ( “I GRA”), 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701–27 2 1
, and NEPA, 42 U .S.C. §§ 4321–4370h.

Cong r ess enacted I GRA to re gu l ate g a ming on I ndian lands. B ig Lagoon Rancheria v

. California
, 7 8 9 F. 3 d 947, 949 (9th Cir. 2015) (en b a n c )

. I GRA divides g aming activities into “classes” based on the ty pes of g ames involved. Class I I I g a ming (the kind at issue here) “often involves ‘the ty pes of h ig h-stakes g ames u sually a ssociated with Nevada-

1 In th i s op in io n w e ad d ress o n ly J A C ’ s co n ten tio n

th at NIGC v io l ated NEP A w h en it ap pro v ed th e GO. W e ad d ress J A C’ s rem ain in g arg u m en ts in a m em o ran du m d i sp o sitio n f iled co n tem

p o ran eo u sly w ith t

h is o pin io n

.J AC V

. C H A U D H U R I 6

sty le g a mbling ,’” id. ( citation omitted), such as banking card
g ames and slot machines. 25 U .S

. C. § 2703(8). I GRA permits class I I I g aming only if it is “con d u cted in conformance with a Tribal–State compact entered into by the I ndian tribe and the State,” id. § 2 710(d)(1)(C), and approved by the Secretary

of the I nterior, id. § 2710(d)(3)(B )

.

I GRA requires I ndian tri b es to receive NI GC’s approval of a g a ming ordinance before eng ag ing in class I I I g a ming on I ndian land. N. Cty. Cmty. All., Inc. v

. Salazar
, 573 F .3d 738, 741 (9th Cir. 2 0 0 9 ). A g aming ordinance is a resolution adopted by the tribe that describes how the tribe will operate its g ambling facilities. 2 5 U.S.C. § 2710(b) ( 2 )(B ). NI GC “shall” a p p r o ve a g aming ordinance that meets I GRA’s requirements “by not later than the d a t e t h a t is 90 day s a fter the date on which [ the ordi n a n ce] is submitted to the Chairman.” Id. § 2710(e). I f NI GC h as not acted on the proposed ordinance by the end o f the ninety -d a y p e riod, the
g aming ordinance “shall b e considered to have been approved by the Chairman, but only to the ex tent s u c h ordinance o r resolution is consistent with the p rovisions of” I GRA. I d

. ; AT & T Corp. v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe
, 295 F .3d 8 99, 906 n.9 (9th Ci r

. 2002) (noting that NI GC’s tacit approval of a proposed g aming ordinance is final ag ency action).

NEPA “is o ur b asic national charter for p rotection of the

e n vironment.” 40 C.F .R. § 1500.1(a). NEPA impos e s o n federal a g encies certain “ ‘action-forcing ’ procedures that require that ag encies take a ‘hard look’ at envi r onmental consequences” of major federal action. Robertson v. M ethow Valley C i t izens Council
, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989); see also 42 U.S.C. § 4332. Those procedures are desig ned to “insure [ sic] that environmental information is available to public

o f f icials and citiz ens before decisions are made and b ef o r eJ AC V

. C H A U D H U R I 7

actions are taken,” 40 C.F .R. § 1500.1(b), and to “help public officials make decisions that are b a s e d on understanding o f environmental conseque n ces,” id. § 1500.1(c). Preeminent
among these “action-forcing procedures” is NEPA’s
req u irement that federal a g encies contemplating “major F ederal action[ ] ” prepare an e nvironmental impact statement ( “ E I S”) analy

z ing that action. See 4 2 U.S.C. § 4332 ; 40 C.F .R. § 1502.3. “ NEPA directs that, ‘to the fullest ex tent possible

. . . public laws of the United States shall be interpreted a

nd administered in accordance with [ it] .’” W estlands W

ater Dist. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council
, 43 F .3d 457, 4 6 0 ( 9th Cir. 1994) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1988) ). Therefore, NEPA a

p plies “unless the ex isting law applicable
to such ag ency ’s operations e x pressly prohibits or makes full compliance with one of the directives impossible.” Jones v. Gordon
, 7 92 F .2d 821, 826 (9th Cir. 1986) ( q u oting 115 Cong . Rec. 39703 (1969)).

B.

The J amul I ndian Villag e casino h as been in the works for

more than f

ifteen y ears. T he Tribe f i rst enacted a g aming ordinance for class I I I
, ca sino-sty le g aming in J amul in the l ate 1 990s, and NI GC published notice of approval of t h e ordinance in the F ederal Reg ister o n J anuary 29, 1999. 64 F ed. Reg

. 4,722, 4
, 7 2 3 (J a n. 29, 1999). The nex t y ear, the Tribe e n t e re d into a c ompact w ith the State of California to conduct class I I I g aming

. 6 5 F e d

. Reg

. 31,189 (May 16, 2000) (Secretary of the I nterior’s notice of approval of the compact). The Tribe initially planned to build part s o f the casino on non-tribal lands that it requested from the Secretary of the I nterior in the form of a trust-transfer under the I ndian Reg ulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. § 4 61; see 67 F ed. Reg

. 15,582 (Apr. 2, 2002), but it ultimately redesig ned the p rop o s e dJ AC V

. C H A U D H U R I 8

project to e liminate the need for the t r u s t land, 78 F ed. Reg

. 21,398, 2 1
, 3 9 9 (Apr. 10, 2013). The Tribe soug h t a nd obtained NI GC’s approval of a revised g aming ordinance for the redesig ned project i n 2 013. Site preparation f or the casino beg an early in 2 01 4
, an d as of the time we held oral
arg ument, construction was underway

.

C.

I n September 2013, plaintiffs sued NI GC, its chair, a n d several o ther federal actors (“F ederal Defendants”); tribal offi c i als in their individual capacities (“Tribally -related d efendants”); and several private companies alleg ing
, inter alia
, tha t d efendants f

ailed to comply with NEPA when evaluating the J amul casino. I n J anuary 2015, plaintiffs filed in the district court a motion for a writ of mandam u s u n der 5 U.S.C. § 706(1). That part of t h e APA enables federal
courts to “compel ag e ncy action unlawful l y w ithheld o r unreasonably delay ed.” Id. I n their m o t i o n, plaintiffs

r e q uested “a writ of mandate to the F ederal Defendants d i recting them to comply with NEPA and finaliz e a n d circulate a draft [ supplemental environmenta l i mpact statement] SEI S while there is still time to avoid the
consequences of the Defendants’ n on-c o m p liance with NEPA.” The d istrict court denied relief, holding
, in relevant part, that NI GC’s approval of the 2013 g a ming ordinance was not “ major f

e deral a ction” within the meaning of N E P A

. 40 C.F .R. § 1508.18 (defining “major federal action”).

II.

W e review de novo the district court’s decision on issues of law, including whether NEPA applies to the ag ency action
at issue h ere. S

ee San Luis & Delta-Mendota W ater Auth. v

.J AC V

. C H A U D H U R I 9

Locke
, 776 F .3d 971, 991 (9th Cir. 2014). W e review J AC’s petition for a writ of mandamus under the “arbitrary o r capricious” standard of review. Dep’t of Transp. v

. P ub. Citizen
, 541 U .S. 752, 7 63 (2004) (“An ag ency ’ s decision not to prepare an E I S can be s et aside only upon a showing that it was ‘arbitrary
, capric i ous, an abuse of discretion, o r otherwise not in accordance with law.’”).

III.

On appeal, J AC a rgu e s that NEPA required NI GC to

c onduct an environmental review before it approved t h e Tribe’s 2013 g aming ordinance, and NI GC’s failure to do so

means that it “unlawfull y w i t h h eld

. . . ag ency action.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(1); Norton v. S. Ut a h W ilderness Alliance
, 542 U.S. 5 5
, 64 (2004) (“[ A ] claim under § 706(1) can proceed only where a plaintiff asserts that an ag e ncy failed to take a discrete ag ency action that it is required to take .”). W e disag ree. Even if, as appellants a rg ue, NI G C ’s approval o f the g aming ordinance was a “major F ederal action[ ]” within
t h e meaning of NEPA, 42 U .S.C. § 4332, NI GC was n o t required to prepare an EI S because there is an irreconcilable statutory conflict between NEPA and I GRA.

The f e deral respo n d e n t s contend (and the district court concluded) that our decision in North Coun t y C o mmunity Alliance v. Salazar
, 5 73 F

. 3 d 7 3 8
, 740 (9th Cir. 2009), conclusively resolves the NEPA issues presented here. W e respectfully d i sag ree. The p laintiffs in North County sued NI GC a fter the Commissioner ap proved a tribal g aming ordinance without f

irst determining whether the tribe’s proposed casino was on “I ndian lands,” as defined b y I GRA. The c rux o f the plaintiffs’ complaint was that the a ge ncy violated I GRA b ecause it failed to make an “I ndian landsJ AC V

. C H A U D H U R I 10

determination.” Id. The North County p laintiffs also a rg u ed that N I G C v iolated N EPA, a challeng e we resolved a s follows:

T he Alliance claims that N I GC’s failure t o

m a k e a n I n d i a n l a n d s d e t e r m i n a t i o n constit u t e d a “major F ederal action[ ] ” under 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) requiring environmental review, including preparation of an EI S, under NEPA. W e d isag ree. There has been no major f ederal action in this c ase. Therefore
, the A ppellees had no oblig ation under NEPA.

Id. at 749. North Count y d o e s n o t settle the NEPA issue presented here beca u s e we limited our NEPA analy sis in North County to the issue p r e s e nted: W hether “NI GC’s failure to make an I ndian lands determination co n stituted a ‘major F e deral action[ ] ’ under 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) requiring environmental review, including preparation of an EI S, under NEPA.” Id. ; see also A ppellant’s Reply B rief a t * 15 n.7, North County
, 573 F.3d at 738 (No. 07-36048), 2007 W L 5445598 (the I ndian lands determination would have “provide[ d] the ‘major f ederal acti o n ’ required to trig g er NEPA”). Nor th County did not address whether N EPA requires NI GC to c onduct an environmental review before approving a g aming o rdinance. We have not had o ccasion to address this issue in our prior decisions, but we turn to it now.

O u r court has r ecog n iz ed two c ircumstances where an ag ency need not complete an EI S even in th e p r e s e n ce o f major federal action and “despite an absence of ex press statutory ex e m p tion.” San Luis & Delta-Mendota W ater Auth. v. Jewell
, 747 F .3d 581, 648 (9th Cir. 2014). F irst, an
ag ency need not adhere to NEPA “ where doing so ‘wouldJ AC V

. C H A U D H U R I 11

create an irreconcilable and fundamen t al conflict’ with the substantive statute at issue.” Id. Second, in limited instances,

a substantive statu t e “ displaces” NEPA’s procedural requirements. Id. This case falls into the first categ ory

.

The Suprem e C ourt f

irst c onsidered the presence of “an irreconcilable and fundamental conflict” in Flint R idge Development Co. v. Scenic Rivers Ass’n of Oklahoma

. 426 U.S. 776 (1976). Flint Ridge involved a statute requiring developers o f subdivisions to p repare a statement about their
propose d project before marketing homes to the public. Id.
at 779–80. Developers w ere required to file their statement with the U .S. D epartment of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD ”)

. The statute provided that a d e v e l o p e r ’ s s t a t e m e n t w o u l d “ b e c o m e [ ] e f f e c t i v e automatically on the 30th da y a f ter filing
, or on such earlier date as the [ HUD] Secretary may determine.” Id. at 781. Defendants proposed construction of a su bdivision n ear the I llinois Ri v er in Oklahoma. W hile the paperwork was pending
, plaintiffs petitioned HUD to prepare an EI S to study the impact of the subdivision on the riv e r

. HUD rejected plaintiffs’ request, and they soug ht j udicial review. The Supreme Court upheld the ag ency ’s a ction, concluding that there was a

n i r reconcilable conflict between the HUD statute’s thirty d a y timeline and NEPA: “I t is inconceivable that an environmental impact statement could, in 30 day s, be drafted, circulated, commented u pon, and then reviewed a

nd revised in lig ht of the comments.” Id. at 788– 8 9

. T hus, “even if the Secretary ’s a ction in this case constituted major federal action sig nificantly affecting the quality of the human environment so that an e n vironmental impact statement would o rdinarily be re q u i r e d, there would be a clear a nd fu n d a mental conflict of statutory duty ” between the HUD
statute and NEPA, su ch that “NEPA’s impact statementJ AC V

. C H A U D H U R I 12

requirement is inapplicable.” Id. a t 791. Under Flint Ridge
, “[ a] n irreconcilable conflict is created if a statute mandates a fix ed time period for implementation and this time period is
too short to allow the ag ency to c omply with NEPA.” W estlands W

ater Dist. , 43 F .3d at 460.

Our court has been reticent to find a statutory conflict between N EPA and other provisions of the U

. S. Code lest Flint Rid g e ’ s ex ception undermine Cong ress’s intent that NEPA apply broad l y

. See, e.g. , Forelaws on B oard v

. Johnson
, 743 F .2d 677
, 6 8 3 (9th Cir. 1985) (“NEPA’s leg islative history reflects Cong r ess’s co n c e rn that ag encies

m i ght attempt to avoid any compliance with NEPA b y narrowly construing other statutory directiv es to create a conflict with N EPA.”), as amended

. Thus, we have held that

a short time frame for ag e n c y a ction does not c reate a statutory conflict under Flint Ridge when an ag ency , not Cong r ess, imposes a deadline. Id. a t 6 8 3 –85. T h ere is likewise no “irreconcilable conflict” under Flint Ridge when the trig g ering a ct for a short statutory time table “is w ithin the control of the” ag e n cy

. Jones
, 792 F .2d at 826; see a lso id. (declining to find a statutory conflict between N EPA and the Marine Mammal Protection Act’s permit approval timeline because “the trig g e r ing a ct f or the statutory time table, the publication of no t i c e of a permit application, is within the control” of the ag ency , and the ag ency “co u l d w i thhold publication long enoug h to comply with any N EPA requirement f

or preparation of an” EI S). B y co n t r a st, an irreconcilable conflict does ex ist where “Cong ress did not g ive the Secretary discretion over when he may c arry out his duties,” W

estlands W

ater Dist.
, 43 F .3d at 460, and the statute imposing the time table provides that the p r o p o s e d action is

a p p r o v ed “ unless the [ ag ency ] a cts before the e x piration of the statutory period,” Vill. of Barrington, Ill. v. Surf aceJ AC V

. C H A U D H U R I 13

Transp. Bd.
, 636 F .3d 650, 6 6 2 (D.C. Cir. 2 0 11) (disting uishing Flint Ridge on this g round); see also F lint Ridge , 426 U.S. at 781.

Here, like in Flint R idge a n d W estlands W

ater District
, Cong r ess imposed an uny ielding statutory d e a d l i n e for
ag ency action. I GRA requires NI GC to approve a g aming ordinance o r resolution “ by not later t h a n the date that is 90 day s after the date on which any tribal g aming ordinance o r resolution is submitted to the Chairman

. . . if it meet s the requirements of this sectio n

. ” 2 5 U.S.C. § 2710(e). Courts routinely interpre t this provision of I GRA as creating a mandatory de adline for ag e ncy a ction. See, e.g. , Coeur d’Alene Tribe
, 295 F

. 3d at 906 n.9 (an ag ency ’s tacit approval of a g aming o rdinance u n der § 2710(e) is a final ag ency action for p urposes of the APA); Massachusetts v

. AQUINNA H

, No. 13-13286-F DS, 2015 W L 7185436, at *6

n

. 4 ( D. Mass. Nov. 1 3, 2015) (“A g aming ordinance is automatically approved by N I GC, by oper a tion of law, if it does not act on the ordinance within 90 day s.”) ; c f

. Gottlieb

v

. P eña
, 41 F .3d 730, 7 31 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (contrast i n g § 2710(e), a mandatory deadline f o r ag ency action, with the “ten-month period for final ag ency action on applications for correction of Coast Guard records,” a discretionary deadline for ag ency a ction). The d eadline at issue here was imposed by Cong ress, not NI GC. See 25 U.S.C. § 27 1 0 ( e). And, unlike in Jones
, t h e act trig g ering I GRA’s timetable is not within NI GC’s control because it is a tribe’s submission of a proposed g aming ordinance to the ag ency that tri g g ers the statutory c ountdown. Id. ; c f. Jones
, 7 92 F .2d at 826. F inally
, lik e i n Flint Ridge
, a g aming ordinance or resolution automatically takes effect a f ter n inety da y s with o r without action by the Commissioner. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(e) (“Any such

o rdinance or resolution not acted upon at the end of t h atJ AC V

. C H A U D H U R I 14

90-day period shall be considered to have been a pproved b y the Chairman . . . .”).

There is no question that it w ould be impossible for NI GC
t o p repare an EI S in the ninety day s it has to a pprov e a g aming ordinance. The Supreme Court in Flint R idge
recog niz ed that

[ d] raft environmental impact statemen ts on simple projects p r epared by ex perienced
p e r s o n nel take some three to f ive months to complete, at least in the Depa rt m e nt of the I n t e r i or.

. . . O nce a draft statement i s prepared, [ Council o n E n v i r o n mental Quality ]
g uidelines p r o vide that ‘[ t] o the max imum

ex t ent practicable’ no action should be taken

s o o n e r t h a n 9 0 d a y s a f t e r a d r a f

t environmental impact statement (and 30 day s after the final statement) has been made available for comment.

Fl i n t Ridge
, 426 U.S. at 789 n.10. I n keeping w ith the Supreme Court’s analy sis, we have p revious l y a ssumed that it takes an ag ency a t l e a s t 3 6 0 d ay s to prepare an EI S. See Jones , 792 F .2d at 825.

NEPA’s reg ulations confirm that a n ag ency cannot prepare an EI S in ninety day s. B efore p ublishing its final E I S

on a proposed project, an ag e n c y m u s t: (1) publish in the F ederal Reg ister a n o tice of intent to prepare an EI S, 40 C.F. R

. § § 1508.22, 1501.7; (2) g ather input on the scope of issue s t h e E I S should address ( this is called scoping ), id. § 1501.7; ( 3) prepare a draft EI S and publish that document in the F ederal Reg ister, id. § § 1502.9, 1 506.10(a); (4) provideJ AC V

. C H A U D H U R I 15

the public an opport u n i t y t o comment on the draft EI S a nd respond to those comments, id. § 1503.4; (5) prepare the final EI S, id. § 1502.9; and (6) prepare and issue a r e c ord o f decision, id. § 1505.2. The reg ulations make it impossible for

an ag ency to complete these steps within ninety day s. NI GC has previously g iven the public thirty day s to c omment on the

sco p e and implementation of a proposed EI S. See 78 F ed. Reg

. 21,398 (Apr. 10, 2013). An a g ency must provide forty

five day s for public comment on a d r a f t EI S, 40 C.F .R. § 1506.10(c), and it must wai t at least thirty d ay s a fter publishing the final EI S b e f ore finaliz ing the proposed action, id. § 1506.10(b)(2). I n all ca s es, “ [ n] o decision o n the
p r o p o s ed action shall be made o r recorded

. . . until

. . . [ n] inety ( 90) day s a fter publication of the” notice of the draft EI S in the F ederal Regi s t e r

. Id. § 1 506.10(b)(1). So, assuming it takes no time to respond to the public’s view on
scope a n d implementation, prepare a draft EI S, a nd incorporate public c o mments into the final EI S, the s hortest time frame in which NI GC could prepare a n EI S would be

on e h u n dred and twenty day s. Plainly
, there is an irreconcilable statutory conflict between the mandat o ry ag ency deadline in 25 U.S.C. § 2710(e) and NEPA.

This conclusion is consistent with NI GC’s informal analy sis of its o w n NEPA oblig ations. NI G C published a draft NEPA Handbook in 2009 that say s: “I n some cases, the NI GC’s statutory requirements are inconsistent with NEPA. The f o llow i ng NI GC a ction(s) have b een determined to fit into this c ateg ory :

. . . Approval of Tribal g aming ordinances

or r esolutions as p r ovided in § 2710 of the I GRA, w hich must be completed within ninety (90) day s of submission to the NI GC.” 74 F ed. Reg . 63,765, 63,769 (Dec. 4, 2009).J AC V

. C H A U D H U R I 16

Contrary to J AC’s arg uments, N I GC’s approval of the Tribe’s g aming ordinance without conducting a N EPA environmental rev i ew did not violate NI GC’s o blig ations under NEPA b ecause “where a clear and u navoidable conflict in statutory authority ex ists, NEPA must g ive way .” F l int Ridge
, 426 U.S. at 788. Thoug h the district court r e l i e d on other g rounds, we affirm its denial o f p laintif f ’ s requested writ of mandamus.

CONCLUSION

The decision of the district court is

AF F IRMED.