NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 07a0851n.06 F iled: Dec em ber 14, 2007 06-3731 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT

UNITED STAT ES O F AMERICA, Plaintif f-Appellee

, v. ARTHUR LEE B ILLMAN, JR. , Defendant-

Appellant

. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P E AL F ROM THE UN I TE D ST AT ES D I STR I CT CO UR T F OR

T H E N O R T HE RN D IS T R IC T O F O H IO

O P I N I O N

BEF OR E: BA TC HELD ER , C OLE a nd G RI F F IN , C ir c uitJudg e s. R. G UY COLE, J R. , Ci rcuit Judge. Def endant- Appellant Ar

thur L ee B illman, J r. (“B illman”) appe als his jury conviction for being a fe lon in possession of a fire arm in or a ffe cting interstate c ommerce on or about Septembe r 24, 2003, in violation of Title 18, Section 922(g )(1) of the United States Code. B illman presents the following issue s o n ap p eal: 1) a cha lleng e to the district court’s de nial of his pretria l motio n to suppress evidenc e obtained dur ing two se arc hes of B ill man’ s h ou se ; 2) a

c la im that th e e vid e nc e pr e se nte d w a s in su ff ic ie nt fo r co nv ic tio n; 3) a c la im of pr os e c uto ri a l mi sc on du c t; a nd 4) a c la im that c umu la tiv e e rr or s re su lte d in the de nia l of a fa ir tr ia l. F or the re a so ns se t f

or th b e low , w e AF F I RM.06-3731

United States v. Billman

- 2 - I. BACKG ROUND A. F acts 1. September 16 Sea rch On September

16, 2003, Billman’s son Jon called 911 to repor t an ar med robbe ry

at Bi ll ma n ’ s h o me . B il lm an an d h is li v e - in g ir lf r ie n d , E u g e n ia B e r

r in g , r e s id e d a t 2 1 9 2 Br ownlee Av e nu e in C anto n, Oh io. B a se d o n th e de sc ri pti on pr ov ide d b y

Jon, the po lice de ta ine d Ro bb ie Umbles as he w as wa lking in a near by neig hborhood. Police esc orted B illman to the sit e whe re Umbles was being detained, and based on a posi tive identification by Billman, took Umbles to the police station. Billman ac companied the office rs to the station, w here he and Umbles both entere d statements re g ardingthe incident. Umbles c laimed that he was purcha sing marijuana from Billman when he instead stole t he drugs at g unpoint; Umbles also informed police that Billman’s ba sement housed an o p e r a ti o nto g r o w ma r ij u an a . B il lm anc la im e d th a t h e w a s p u r c h a s in g ma r ij u an a f r om Umbles when U mbles robbed B illman at gunpoint. No c harg es we re f iled ag ainst Billman and following the entry

of the voluntary

statement, officers offer ed to drive him home. Billman ac cepte d the ride, but re quested to be dr opped off at an a uto repa ir store instead of home. During the time that the offic ers we re inter viewing Bi llman, Canton Pol ice De partment Detec tive J oseph Mong old inquired at the Canton Prosec utor’s Off ice a s to whether the information provi d ed by

Umbles combined with historical c omplaints about a marijuana operation at the Br own l ee residenc e we re suf ficient to allow the of

fice rs to obtain a sea

rch w arr ant for the home.06-3731

United States v. Billman

- 3 - The prose cutor a

nswere d in the neg ative and sug g ested that the de tec t ives try to obtain more inf or ma tio n b e fo re fi lin g fo r a wa rr ant. Mong old and Off

icer J ohn Clark proc eede d to the Br ownlee home to conduct a visu al inspection of the premises and to de termine if a K-9 drug -dete ction dog would aler t to the presenc e of drug s. W hen they

arr ived, the off

icer s found that B err ing w as at home. B err ing g rante d the office rs per

mission t o enter

the y ard a

nd sear ch the e x terior of

the home. This sea

rch turne d up no inf or ma tio n th a t w ou ld s up po rt a se arc h w arr ant f

or the pr e mis e s. Mong old also reque sted Be rring ’s per mission t o sear ch the inside of the home. B err ing stated that t he officer s could s ear ch the residenc e only if they had a sear ch warra nt. Serg eant Vic tor Geor g e, an of

fice r whom Berr ing knew and trusted, was called on a ce llular phone by Mong old and spoke with both Mongold a nd Be rring . At this point , the testimony of Mong o l d and B err ing diverg es. Mong old states that following the conver sation with G eorg e, Be rring assented to t he

s ea rc h

. Be rringstates that while she did sig n a conse nt-to-sea rch f orm following the ar

rival of Geor g e, she did so base d on the understanding that office rs wer e in the proce ss of obtaining a

sear ch

wa rr ant. During the sea

rch of the home, the dr

ug -dete ction dog aler

ted to the prese nce of drug residue on a g row lig ht in the basement a nd a locke d safe in the g ara g e. The office rs re quested that B err ing op e n th e sa fe , w hic h s he e ve ntu a lly did in t he pr e se nc e of

Ge or g e . B e rr ing st ates th a t sh e on ly opened the safe beca

use Mong old threate ned to obtain a se arc h war rant, take the safe downtown, and have it cut open. Be rring then s tated that the i tems in the s afe belong ed to her and B illman’s father ,06-3731

United States v. Billman

- 4 - Arthur B illman Sr., who l ived across the s tree t. Geor g e did not seize any of t he prope rty in the safe , bu t he ob se rv e d mu lti ple fi re arm s and oth e r i te ms.

2. September 24 Sea rch At some point on September 24, Georg e wa s directe d by the Canton Police Chief to proce ed to the Ci t y

Prosecutor’ s Offic e with Serg eant John Ditt more to obtain a se arc h war rant. Instead, Geor g e proc eede d to the office with Detec tive Daniel H ea ton. At or around this time, Patrolman Br uce L awve r, who was providing surveillance on the B rownlee Avenue home, contac ted Dittmore to i nf or m hi m th a t a truc k wa s leavin g the ho me . Dittmor e the n a sk e d Cl ark to e ff e c tuate a tr a ff ic stop so that the office rs could continue the investigation. Clark direc ted B err ing, the driver of the t ruck, to stop and approac hed her vehicle , informing her that Dittmore wanted to spea k with her. B err ing c laims that Clark t old her she could not leave , and that she the n waited ten minutes for Dittmore to arr ive. Dittmore and L ieutenant Ronald Shank

arr ived in an unmar

ked ca r, ac companied by two marke d car s, at which time Clark moved his c ruiser in front of a

nd fac ing Be rr i ng ’s truck, but not blocking it in. Ditt more infor med B err ing that the office rs were doing a follow-up investi g ation reg ardingthe wea pons in the safe and that the police

wa nte d a c c e ss t o th e we a

po ns , b ut t

hat th e y did no t ha ve a wa rr ant. Be rringcontends that she refuse d consent absent a warra nt, and that at s ome point Dittmore ang rily waived a pi ece of paper and stated “here is y our warra nt. Now let’s g o back to the house .” (Joi nt Appendix (“J A”) 488.) B err ing c laims that she believed the paper to be a war rant. Dittmore06-3731

United States v. Billman

- 5 - and the other

office rs pre sent den y t h at Di t t m o re ma de any statements of this sort. Shank and Of fi c e r R on a ld B ro a dw a te r t he n s po ke wi th B e rr ing wh ile Di ttm or e too k a ph on e c a ll. Duri ngthi s

conver sation, the offic ers state that Be rringg ave c onsent to a search of the saf e. B err ing the n drove back to he r home a

nd the offic ers f

ollowed behind. Upon arriving at her home, Be rring opened the g ara g e door from the outside and e ntere d the g ara g e, and the n opened the safe . The off icer s asked B er ri n g t o s tep awa y from the sa fe, w hich

c on ta ine d v isi ble fi re arm s, un til Ag e nt C ha rl e s T ur ne r a rr ive d w itha

con sen t- to- se arc h f

or m. Of fi ce rs s t at e t h at d

u ri n g t h e t i m e t h ey

wa i t ed , Be rr i n g wa s ca l m a n d c h a t t edab o u th u n t i n g,

vo lun te e ri ngto s ho w the of fi c e rs he r t

ro ph y ro om a nd stu ff e d a nim a ls. Turner claimed that B err ing se emed c alm when he arr ived at the house . Turner , Br oadwater, and B err ing sat at a dining table while Tur ner e x plained the c onsent form. Turner asked if Be rring was literate, to which she a nswere d in the aff

i rm at i v e. T u rner rea d the form out loud and a sked Be rringif she understood it. Be rring stated t hat she unde rstood the form, a nd limit ed the sc ope of her c onsent to the safe in the g ara g e, asking Turner to c hang e the wr iting on the f orm to ref lect the limit ation. Turner

indicated the limi tation on the form a nd Be rringsigne d it, at which point office rs proce eded to c ollect the evide nce f rom the saf

e. The off icer s s ei z ed 26 guns, B illman’s expi red dr iver’s lice nse, an invoice dated a fter Billman’s fe lony

conviction and made out to Billman for a g un part, as well as other items. During this ti me, B err ing a lleg edly d es cr i b ed t o the offic ers whic h g uns were hers a nd which we re B ill man’ s. 3. September 25 Sea rch Warr ant and Sea

rch06-3731

United States v. Billman

- 6 - O f f i c e r s o b t a i n e d

a s e ar c h w ar

r an t o n S e p t e mb e r 2 5 an d e x e c u t e d t h e s e ar c h o nt h e s a m e d a y. Billman objec ted t o the validi ty of t he wa rra nt based on the suppor

ting a ffidavit. The Gover nment did not concede that the war rant wa s invalid, but stipulated that it would not introduc e any evidenc e ob ta ine d f ro m th is s e arc h d

ur ingthe tr ia l. B. Pr ocedural History Billman wa s indicted on Novembe r 16, 2004. On F ebru a r y 2 , 2005, a super seding indictment was filed, acc using Billman of unlawful possession of 25 firea rms on or about September 24, 2003. Prior to trial, Billman filed a motion to suppress the e vidence obtained duringthe September 16, 24, and 25 sea

rche s. The district cour

t conducted a

hear ing on thes e m otions and denied the motions with respec t to the September 16 a n d 2 4 s ea rche s. Billman proc eede d to trial pro se with the assistance of two standby counsel fr om the Fe dera l Publi c De fende r’s Of fice

. Over the cour se of the tr ial, the Gover nment p re s en t ed evidenc e that ea ch of the g uns had been ma nufac tured in anothe r state. Dur ing the direc t examination of the Government’ s expert, the prosec ution specifica lly

asked the expert about the g un which the jury ultimately

found that B illman unlawfully

possessed, re fer

ring to it both as Ex hibit 12 and as a Revelation 410 shotgun. The expert testified that the g un was manuf actur ed in Connecticut. Billman pre sented e vidence that the g un was housed in a s af e t o which he did not have

a c c e ss, that th e sa fe and

g un s in sid e it b e lon g e d to B e rr ingand B ill man’ s f

a the r, and that the c ou

ple had sig ned an ag ree ment prior to the sea rch de monstrating the items in the safe be longe d to Be rring

and no t B ill man. Th e Go ve rnme nt p re se nte d e vid e nc e tha t a re c e ipt fo r a gun part ma de ou t to B ill man w a s in

the sa fe and

that a g un that B ill man h a d p os se sse d at on e tim e wa s in the sa fe a s w e ll.06-3731

United States v. Billman

Th e su pe rs e din g ind ict men t and the dis tr ic t ju dg e a t on e po int re fe rr e d to the g un

a s a 1 Remington 410 g aug e shotg u n , wh i l e the ve rdict for m and all other tria l refe renc es ar e to a Re ve la tio n 41 0 g a

ug e sh otgun . Th e a t- tr ia l id e nti fi c a tio n b y B ill man a

nd the Go ve rnme nt’ s w itn e ss is sufficient to show that the c ourt was at all times refe renc ing E x hibit 12. - 7 - On e of the Go ve rn

me nt’ s a g e nts te sti fi e d th a t B e rr ingha d in fo rm e d h im that B ill man h a d a ke y to the sa fe a s w e ll. B ill man a nd the Go ve rnme nt s tip ulate d th a t E xhibi t 12 , th e 41 0- g a ug e sh otgun , b e lon g e d to Nicholas B err ing, B illman ’s 10-y ear -old son. Both sides pre sented e vidence that Billman 1

a c c omp anie d me mbe rs of his fa mil y on hunts a nd that O hio law r e qu ir e d a du lt s up e rv isi on wh ile minors wer e hunti ng . The Government produc ed a Ma y 2004 photogr aph of B illman and three of his children in hunting g ear , including N icholas, who wa s holding a shotgun. On J anuar y 24, 2006, the j ury found B illman guilty of possessing Ex hibit 12, the Revelation 410-g aug e shotg un, model 330A, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 92 2 (g) (1 ). On J anuar y 31, 2006, Billman filed a

motion for judgme nt of ac quittal, pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 29, and a motion for

a new trial, pursuant to F ed. R. Crim. P. 33. I n addre ssing Billman’s sufficiency -of- the-e vidence claim, the dis trict court r

uled that the jury ’s ver dict was ba sed on suffic ient evidenc e and w as thus not unrea sonable. II. M ot ion to Suppr e ss Billman ar g ues that the district cour t erre d in finding that Be rr i n g’s consent to sea rch w as

vo lun tary on bo th S e pte mbe r 1 6 a

nd 24 . Wh en revie wi nga

dis tr ic t c ourt ’s ru lin g on a mot ion to suppress, this Court r eviews the district court’s fa ctual finding s for c lear err or and the conclusions06-3731

United States v. Billman

- 8 - of law de novo. United States v. Richardson , 385 F.3d 625, 629 (6th Cir. 2004) (c itations omi tted).

A war rantless e ntry and sear ch of a home is va lid unde r the Four th Amendment “whe n police ob ta in t he vo lun tary

c on se nt o f a

n o c c up ant w ho sh are s, or is r e a so na

bly be lie ve d to sh are , a

uth or ity over the are a in common with a co-occ upant who later objects to the use of

evidenc e so obtained.” Georgia v. Randolph , 547 U.S. 103, 106 (2006) (citations omitted). Consent “that is the product of officia l i n t i m idation or hara ssment is not consent at all.” Florida v. Bostick , 501 U.S. 429, 438 (1 99 1) . F ur

the r, “ c re dib ili ty

is a ke y iss ue ” in co ns e nt ca se s and thi s c ourt “ a c c or d[s] c on sid e ra

ble defe renc e to the cr edibility finding s of the trial c ourt.” United States v. Cooke , 915 F.2d 250, 252 (6th Cir. 1990). Th e Go ve rnme nt b e ars the burd e n of de mon str a tin g “ that the c on se nt wa s in fa c t vo lun tari ly g iven, and not the result of dure ss or coe rcion, e x press or implied.” Sc hn e c k lot h v . B us tam on te , 412 U.S. 218, 248 (1973). The Sc hn e c k lot h Court continued, stating : “Voluntarine ss is a question of fac t t o b e d et ermined f

rom all the circ umstances.” Id. a t 2 4 8

- 4 9

. T h e “ ‘ d i s t r i c t c o u rt ’ s f i n d i n g s w ith reg ard to voluntar iness [of c onsent to se arc h] wil l not be reve rsed unless c lear ly err oneous.’” United States v. Salvo , 1 3 3 F. 3 d

9 4 3 ( 6 t h C i r . 1 9 9 8 ) ( qu o t i n g United States v. Taylor , 956 F.2d 572, 777 (6th Cir. 1992) (a lteration in orig inal). I n deter mining that the September 16 consent was voluntary , the district c ourt summarized the evidenc e bef

ore it and de tailed the re asons that the conse nt was valid: Mis s B e rr ing ’s c on se nt w a s v olu nta ry and freel y

g ive n. Ipo int

ou t th a t th is i s consistent with her testimony under oath at the Gra

nd J ury , an d whi le she testified06-3731

United States v. Billman

- 9 - differently

in this courtroom, her testimony in this courtroom was simply not cre dible. First, Serg eant Ge org e, who obviously was friendly with Miss Be rring , and who wa s the re a t th e tim e a nd

wa s th e on e who ob ta ine d th e c on se nt, te sti fi e d th a t sh e did vo lun tari ly

and fr e e ly c on se nt. Se c on d, a s I

sa id, sh e ha d p re vio us ly

te sti fi e d und e r o a th t

hat sh e did

c on se nt. Third, I watche d her de meanor

on the stand and did not find her to be cr edible. She crie d on cue, she chang ed the nature of her testimony

more than onc e. I t was not internally consistent. And the Court f inds that her ability , her e ffor t to retrac t from h er p ri o r sworn te stimony under oath before the Gra nd J ury was unavailing a

nd u n co n v i n ci n g. (JA 50 9- 51 2. ) T he dis tr ic t c ourt ’s c re dib ili ty de te rm inatio n is g ive n d e fe re nc e by thi s Co ur t, a nd in any event is s u p p orted by

the evidenc e. The district court’s de termination that the conse nt was knowing and volunt ary is a factual determination that is not clearly err oneous and is supported by the evidenc e. For the September

24 sear ch, the district c ourt once a g ain summarized the evidenc e, made

a re a so ne d d e c isi on

ba se d o n th e e vid e nc e , a

nd a c c ounte d fo r a ll of de fe nd ant’ s argume nts a g a ins t fi nd ingc on se nt: The other office rs have testified t hat t here wer e no raised voic es, there was nothing untoward, that no one eve r plac ed a ha nd on Miss Ber ri n g, and that she w as not intimi dated. The other off icer s say that she wa s as k ed t o go back to the home and that she did do so.

. . . . On c e the [co ns e nt t o s e arc h] for m did ar ri ve , the Court fi nd s tha t Miss B e rr ingdid execute it. Ag ain, s he testi fied under oath that she di d not execute it

. She testified to t hat e ff e c t he re in the su

pp re ssi on he ari ng . But th a t te sti mony is i nc on sis te nt w ith h e r s w o r nt e s t i m o n y b e f

o r e t h e G r an d

J u r y.06-3731

United States v. Billman

- 10 - I n addition the Court affor ded the de fenda nt the opportunity

to hire a han d wr i t i ng s p e c ia li s t. T h e Co u rt p a id f o r th e s e r

v ic e s o f a h an dw r it in g s p e c ia li s t and no testimony was pre sented . . . So the Court finds that ulti mately , Miss Ber ring ’s dec ision to return home, to open the safe , and to allow a subse quent sea rch of the safe , was a lso a voluntary decision to consent to that sear ch. (JA 514-17.) Once ag ain, the district cour t’s fac tual finding s are not clear ly err oneous and a

re supported by

the evidenc e. III. Su ff iciency of the Evid ence A m oti on fo r j ud gment of a c qu itt a l pu rs ua nt t o Ru le 29 du e to i ns uf fi c ie nt e vid e nc e is revie wed unde r the same standard as an ins ufficie nt evidenc e cla im. United States v. Bowke r , 372 F.3d 365, 387- 88 (6th Cir. 2004). Followinga convic tion, a defe ndant “be ars a very heavy burden in his sufficie ncy of t he evidence challeng e to his conviction.” Un ite d S tat es v . D av is , 397 F.3d 340, 344 (6th Cir. 2005) (quotation omitted). For this Court, I n re vie wi ng a dis tr ic t court ’s de nia l of a moti on fo r jud g me nt of a c qu itt a l on

a c la im of insufficient evidenc e, “the rele vant question is w hether afte r viewingthe evidenc e in the light most favor able to the pr osecution, anyrational trier of fa ct co u ld have found the e ssential elements of the crime be y ond a re asonable doubt.” United States v. Lloyd , 1 0 F. 3 d 1 1 9 7 , 1 2 1 0 (6 t h C i r. 1 9 9 3 ) ( qu o t i n g J ac k so n v . V irg ini a , 4 43 U. S. 307, 319 (1979))

. The pa rties stipulated that Nicholas owne d the 410-g aug e shotg un, and the r e w a s n o e v idence that B ill man h a d a c tua l po sse ssi on of it. Thus , it

mus t be tha

t th e jur y fo un d B ill man w a s in constructive posse ssion of the g un.06-3731

United States v. Billman

- 11 - I n United States v. Grubbs , No. 04 -5 40 3, 20 07 U. S. App . L EX I S 24 25 2, (6 th C ir . 2 00 7) , th is Court summarized the circuit’s c onstructive possession law: “Constructive possession exis ts w hen a person does not ha ve possession but instead knowing ly has the power and the intention at a g iven time to exercise dominion and control over an object, either directly or t hroug h others.” [ United States v. Craven , 478 F.2d 1329, 1333 ( 6th Cir. 1973).] I n contra st to a situation where the def endant has phy sical conta ct with a firear m . . . constructive posse ssion may be prove n if the defe ndant mere ly had “dominion ove r the premises wher e the firea rm is l o ca t ed.” United States v. Gardne r , 488 F.3d 700, 713 ( 6th Cir. 2007) (interna l quotations and citations omitt ed). Howeve r, it is without questi on that “‘[p]resence al o ne’ ne ar a g un . . . does not ‘show the requisite knowledge , power , or i ntention to ex erc ise control over ’ the gun to prove c onstructive possession.” Un ite d S tat es v . A rn old , 4 86 F .3 d 1 77 , 1 83 (6 th C i r. 2 0 0 7 ) ( qu o t i n g United States v. Birmley , 529 F.2d 103, 107-08 (6th Cir. 1976)).

“ [O]th e r i nc ri min a tin g e vid e nc e , co up le d with pr e se nc e ” is ne e de d to “tip the sc a le in favor of

sufficie ncy .” Id. Id. at *11-12. I n this case, the e vidence supporting c onstructive possession i n cl udes the undisputed evidenc e that B illman’s son owned the 410-g aug e shotg un, the g un was store d in a safe in B illman’s g ara g e, and that Billman was at times in close prox imity to his ten-y ear -old son holding a shotgun. Given the testimony

that adults must supervise minors when hunting, B illman’s testimony that he

acc ompanied his children during hunts, a nd the ag ent’s testimony that Be rring stated B illman had possession of a ke y

to the safe , the district court’s f inding t h at t h ere was suff icient evidenc e of constructive posse ssion was not clea rly err oneous. The jur

y ’s ver dict was a lso s u pported by the evidenc e.06-3731

United States v. Billman

- 12 - IV. P rosec utorial Misconduct B ill man c omp la ins tha

t th e pr os e c uto r’ s con du c t at tri a l r e su lte d in re ve rs ibl e e rr or . Wh ile the prosec utor made some improper statements during the trial, the statements do not w arr ant a new trial when r eviewe d either individually or as a whole. The question of whether a prosec utor’s conduct amounts to prosecutoria l misconduct, and whether it render ed the tria l fundame ntally unfair, a re mixed questions of law and f act that a re revie wed de novo. See Un ite d Sta te s v . F ra nc is , 1 70 F .3 d 5 46 , 5 49 (6 th C ir . 1 99 9) . Wh e n th e re is no objection at trial, the a lleg ed improper conduc t i s review ed for plain err or. United States v. Car ro ll , 26 F.3d 1380, 1383 ( 6th Cir. 1994). Alleg ed conduct that is subjec t to an objec tion at trial is r eviewe d de novo. United States v. Owens , 426 F.3d 800, 806 (6th Cir. 2005). I n conductingour revie w, we e mploy

a two-step a

naly sis, determining first whethe r the prose cutor’s c on duct was improper a

nd second w hether

it was flag rant. United St ates v. Tarwater , 308 F.3d 494, 511 (6th Cir. 2002). “I mproper remar

ks that are flag rant amount to pe r sereve rsible er ror; improper

err ors that

are not flag rant may amount to reve rsible error in certain cir cumstance s.” United States v. Hargrove , 416 F.3d 486, 493 ( 6th Cir. 2005). I n deter min i n g wh et h er a statement wa s flag rant, the Court

c on sid e rs : (1) whe ther the r emar

ks tended to m i s l ea d t h e jury or to prejudice the ac cused, [i ncluding whether

the trial judge g ave a

n appropr iate ca

utionary instruction to the jur y ]; ( 2) wh e the r the y we re iso la te d o r e xten siv e , ( 3) wh e the r t he y we re de lib e rate ly or accidenta lly place d befor e the jury ; and (4) the s treng th of t he evidence a g ainst the acc used. United S t ates v. Abboud , 438 F.3d 554, 585 ( 6th Cir. 2006) (alter ation in orig inal) (c itations omitted). I f t he st atement was improper but not flag rant, rever sal is only appropr iate when “(1) proof06-3731

United States v. Billman

- 13 - of defendant’ s g uilt is not overwhe lming, and (2) de fense counsel objec ted, and (3) the tr ial court failed to c ure the err or with a n admonishment to the jury .” Car ro ll , 2 6 F. 3 d

at 1 3 8 5 -8 6 (c i t i n g United Sta te s v . B ess , 593, F.2d 749, 757 ( 6th Cir. 1979) (emphasis in orig inal). A. The Instances Com plain ed of are Im proper. B ill man c omp la ins of

thr e e ins tanc e s o f m isc on du c t. F ir st , th e pr os e c uto r o ff e re d E xhibi t 67 in to e v id e n c e , d e s p it e it s r e f e r e n c e to B il lm an ’ s p arti c ip a ti o n in a dr u g - tr e a tm e n t p r o g r a m, a subject which the district c ourt previously deter mined could not be re fer ence d at trial. Second, the pr o s e c u t o r ’ s qu e s t i o n i n g o f B i l l m an ’ s p ar o l e o f f i c e r e l i c i t e d t e s t i m o n y a

b o u t B i l l m an ’ s p a ro le viol ations, a subject that the district c ourt had a lso determined wa s inadmissibl e. Third, the pr os e c uto r’ s c los ingargume nts fa lse ly a sse rt e d that Ex hib it 5 0 w a s a pic tur e of

a “ c ri me a s it

oc c ur re d, ” wh e re Exhi bit

50 wa s th e ph ot ograp h o f B ill man s tand ingne ar h is s on Ni c ho la s, in hunting g ear , wh ile Nicholas he ld a shotg un. Although the prosec utor’s conduc t in the afor ementioned instanc es wa s improper, it was not fla g rant a nd does not requir e a ne w trial. B. Th e Misc ondu ct was Not F lagrant. 1. Ex hibit 67. During its c ross-examination of Billman, the Gover nment produce d a par ole condition form signe d by Billman. Billman was unable to make out the signature on the scre en and reque sted that the Government enlar g e the imag e, which the Gover nment then did. The for

m contained a

ref ere nce to psy cholog ical tre atment and dr ug testing. B illman requested to a pproac h the benc h and the following side bar oc curr ed on the r ecor d:06-3731

United States v. Billman

- 14 -

MR. B I L L MA

N: Yo u have ba

nn e d Mr

. Cor

ts [th e pr os e c uto r] n ot t o br ing up dr

ug s and c ouns e lin g , a

nd he br ou g ht i t up . T he y

a ll j us t loo ke d at it

. MR. CORTS : That’s the - - MR B I L L MA

N: Rig ht the re it i s. Dr

ugc ouns e lin g , a

nd y ou jus t di d it. MR. CORTS : That’s over here

.

. . . . MR

. C O R T S : T h e o n l y r e a s o n I w o u l d b e u s i n g t h e s e t w o thi ng s is he sig ne d, and

the n w he n h e wa s r e le a se d, that ha s th a t c on dit ion in there that he ca

n never own or purc hase a wea

pon. I ’ll put those up there

. MR. BI L L MAN: They

alre ady seen that now. MR. CO RTS : T he y

did n’ t se e it. MR. B I L L MA

N: Ise e n it

. THE COURT: Well - - MS. CRA ME R: T he y

on ly sa w the e nla

rg e d p art

.

. . . THE COURT: [A] t this poi nt I am getting so nervous about the fac t that y ou have g one so fa

r down this road that Ialre ady know I have to give the jury a limiting instruction, and if we g o any far ther down that r oa d, I ’m

g oin g to h a ve to t e ll the m to dis re g ard it a ll. So if y ou want to sa

y , just so there ’s no debate and conf usion, “When y ou wer e on par ole, y ou understood that y ou couldn’t own or possess a we apon, rig ht? ” I f y ou want to ask him that question, y ou c an, bu t do n’ t us e thi s d oc ume nt. (JA 645-49.) Thus , it a pp e ars that th e imp ro pe r p or tio n o f E xhibi t 67 wa s sh ow n to the jur y by a c c ide nt. I n addition, the district court noted that t h e j u ry was unlikely

to have se en the r efe renc e to drug counseling beca

use it was in small ty

pe, the pr osecutor f

ocused the scre en on B illman’s signature quickly , and no re fer ence was made to the such treatment duri n g t h e ex amination. After Billman objected to the use of the document, the di strict court inst ructe d the Government to avoid using the document and it wa s not presente d befor e the jury ag ain. Although no curative instruction w as g iven06-3731

United States v. Billman

- 15 - to the jury , the display

was brie f and the focus was on a diff ere nt portion of the document. Thus, the conduct wa s not flag rant a nd does not rende r the trial f undamentally

unfair. 2

. P ar o l e O f

f i c e r S l a t e r ’ s T e s t i m o n y. Af te r o bta ini ngini tia l ba c kg ro un d in fo rm a tio n f ro m O ff ic e r David

Slate r a bo ut h is d uti e s, the prosec ution procee ded to pursue que stioning re g ardingBillman’s pe riod of par ole:

Q. Can y ou tell us about any incidents at that time? A. Th e tim e that I ’m re fer ri ngto i s w he n h e wa s r e tur ne d to prison as a violator. Q. And what wa s that for? A. Th e re we re nume ro us vio la tio ns . MR. B I L L MA

N: Ob je c t. T HE COURT: Sust ained. The jury will disreg ard that comm ent. The [G]overnment was instruc ted that that was inappropriate evidenc e. (JA 54 5. ) S later

the n te sti fi e d th a t th e re ha d b e e n a n in c ide nt w itha

ha nd g un that w a s f

ound in Billman’s be droom. The pr osecutor c ontinued:

Q. An d d o y ou

kn owif it w a s lo a de d o r n ot? A. Yes, it was. Eig ht in the clip and one in the c hamber

. MR. BI L L MAN: Objec tion. THE COURT: Sustained. Approa ch. (At side bar

on the re cord.) THE COURT: Idon’t k n o w i f y ou are trying to invite a mis tr ia l, b ut you

are g e tti ngpr e tty c los e . Yo u ar e c e rt a inl y g e tti ngmy ang er. I t o l d y ou not to do this . Itold y ou y ou could establish the continued owne rship. There ’s no rea son to even a ddress the que stion of wh e the r it w a s lo a de d, and Itol d y ou to s tay awa y fr om v iol a tio ns . MS. CRA ME R: I

wa s sh oc ke d th a t he ans we re d v iol a tio ns . TH E CO UR T: Di d y ou

ta lk t o h im a

bo ut t he lim itatio ns . MS. CRA ME R: Ye s, Judg e , a t le a st thr e e tim e s. At le a st three times, Your Honor. THE COURT: Why

did y ou ask him if it wa s loaded? Of what r e l e v an c e i s t h a to t h e r

t h ant o t r y t o p r e j u d i c e t h e j u r

y?06-3731

United States v. Billman

- 16 - (JA 546.) Th is d oe s n ot r ise to t

he le ve l of fla g ra

nt misc on du c t. While the dis tr ic t c ourt e xpre sse d it s

s t r o n g d i s a

p p r o v a l t o t h e G o v e r

n m e n t , t h e d i s t r i c t

c o u rta l s o i s s u e d

a c u r a t i v e i n s t r

u c t i o nt o t h e j u r

y, instructing the m to disreg ard the questions beca use they wer e im proper . This misconduct, followed by a cur ative stateme nt, is not flagr ant and doe s not warr ant a ne w trial. See United States v. Sales , No. 05-2522, 2007 U.S. App. L EXI S 21869, * 19-20 (6th Cir. 2007) (finding that the prosec utor’s statement reg arding defe ndant’s prior felonies, while improper, were not flag rant when followed by

a cur ative instruction). 3. Pr os e c uto r’ s Cl os ingAr g ume nt. Duri ngthe Go ve rnme nt’ s clo sin g argume nt, the pr os e c uto r m a de c omm e nts that r e su lte d in the issuing of

a cur ative stateme nt by the district c ourt. The Gover nment display ed Ex hibit 50, the photogr aph of B illman a

nd his c hildren, and stated: “The signific ance of this picture is, w ith it, y ou

are g etting to see the crime.” L ater , the Gover nment’s counse l stated: “So what y ou are looking at in this phot o is the defe ndant in possession of fire arms. . . . The person in c ontrol is the person who has alwa y s been in c ontrol, the defe ndant, Arthur L ee B illman, J r.” ( J A 659.) B illman objected and the district court stated:

L a die s and g e ntl e me n, the [G]ov e rnme nt jus t mis sp ok e, s eri ou sly misspoke. Ms. Cramer repr esente d that the photog raph showe d the crime oc curr ing in this ca se. There ’s no evidenc e at a ll that this photogr aph wa s taken on September 23, 2004 [sic]. There’ s n o indication that it was eve n close to that date. We have no ide a whe n that photogr aph wa s taken

. . . . [T] he statement that this shows a crime occur ring is an incorr ect06-3731

United States v. Billman

- 17 -

statement, and e ven Ms. C rame r admitted at side ba r that that’s not w h a ts h e m e an tt o s ay. So its important that y ou understand that this is not evidenc e of any crime that’s at issue her e. (JA 660.) Duri ng the Go ve rnme nt’ s r e bu tta l du ri ngc los ing

argume nt, B ill man o nc e a g a in o bje c te d to the Go ve rnme nt’ s argume nt:

(MR. CORTS: ) B ut, y ou know, a lot of times in these drugcase s, we encounte r - - MR. THOMPSON: Objection THE COURT: Sustained. Now y ou are g oing of f into other circ umstances. You ne ed to wra p it up, Mr. Corts. This i s supposed to b e a br ie f r e bu tta l. MR. C OR TS: I n some ca ses people w ho are committing c ri me s h ide the fr

uit s o f t ho se in l ots of

dif fe re nt p la c e s. MR. THOMPSON: Objection. THE COURT: S u stained. Mr. Courts, I sustained the ob je c tio n to that be fo re . D o n ot s pe c ulate a bo ut w hat ha

pp e ne d in o t h e r c i r c u m s t an c e s , an d l a d i e s a n d g e n t l e m e n , y o u m u s t i g n o re a ll su c h a rgume nt. (JA 661-62.) Given the c urative state ments, and the instruction to the jury to disreg ard the prosec utor’s

rema rk, any prejudice from the pr osecutor’ s remar ks were dissipated by

the Court’s admonition. 4. The Statements Taken Tog ether

. Re vie wi ng the state me nts take n a s a wh ole , the pr os e c uto r’ s mis c on du c t is no t f lagran t. Under the first fa ctor, “w h et h er t he re marks tende d to misl ead the jury or pre judice the a ccuse d [i ncluding whether

the trial judg e g ave a

n appropr iate ca

utionary instruction to the jury ]” Abboud , 438 F.3d at 584 (alteration in the origina l), the st at em en t s are not the ty pe that would mislead the06-3731

United States v. Billman

- 18 - jury . Ex hibit 67 was likely not even seen by the j ury , and the rema ining statements were addre ssed clea rly and dire ctly

by the district court. F urther, w hile the statements may have be en pre

judicial, the district court’s instruction to the jury dissipated any prejudice from the statements. As a re sult, the first fac tor weig hs ag ainst Billman. The sec ond fac tor requir es t he C ourt to look at whether t he im proper rema rks wer e isolated or extensive. Id. The thre e instances complained of by Billman, sprea d over a multi-day trial, do not rise to the level of extensive imprope r rema rks. Acc ording ly , this factor w eig hs ag ainst Billman as

we ll. The third fa ctor re quires a r eview of whether the improper e vidence and re m ar ks were “deliber ately

or ac cidentally place d befor e the jury .” Exhibi t 67’s introduction appea rs to have be en an unintentional violation of the parties’ stipulation. Whil e the prosec utor’s questioning of Slater was obv io u s ly

in te n ti o n a l, Sl a te r

w a s aw ar e th a t h e s h o u ld a v o id an y te s ti mo n y

a b o u t p rior violations, making it appe ar that Slater’s re sponse was not solicited by the prosec ution a nd may have bee na c c id e n ta l. T h e s tate me n ts r e g ar d in g th e E xh ib it 5 0 p h o to g r a

p h w e r e in te n ti o n a l, b u t t he prosec utor at side-ba

r asse rted that she did not intend to s ug g est that the phot og raph was evidenc e of the c rime. I t thus appear s that her state ments were not deliberately place d befor e the jury

. L astly , the cour

t examines the streng th of the evidence ag ainst the def endant. In this case, the evidenc e wa s not particularl y strong . Howeve r, there was suff icient evidenc e supporting Billman’s possession of the 410- g aug e shotg un.

IV. Cum ulative Errors R esulting in a Denial of a Right to a F air Trial06-3731

United States v. Billman

- 19 - This Court revie ws the cumulative eff ect of err ors m ade at trial de novo in order to determine whether the er rors c reated a tria l that amounted to a denial of due process. Lundy v. Burson , 888 F.2d 467, 481 (6th Cir. 1989). B illman asserts th at t h e denia l of his suppression motion, the dist rict court’s r uling on his i nsufficie nt evidenc e claim, and the prosec utor’s m isconduct constitute er rors that should r esult in a new trial. Howeve r, as addre ssed above, none of the district cour t rulings that B ill man c omp la ins of

a bo ve a re e rr or s, and , a s suc h, the y do no t im pa c t B ill man’ s d

ue pr oc e ss r ig hts

and do no t c on sti tut e g ro un ds fo r r e ve rs a l. V. CO NC LU SION F or the re a so ns state d a

bo ve , th is C ourt AF F IRMS the def endant’ s conviction.

.