J-S07032-19

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

MITZI ANNE WITTMAN AND WILLIAM 

W. WITTMAN 

Appellants

v.

JONATHAN BROWN, ASHLEY 

BROWN, AND BROWN HILL TREE 

CO., INC.

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 895 MDA 2018

Appeal from the Judgment Entered May 24, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Susquehanna County Civil Division at 

No(s): 2013-01131

MITZI ANNE WITTMAN AND WILLIAM 

W. WITTMAN

v.

JONATHAN BROWN, ASHLEY 

BROWN, AND BROWN HILL TREE 

CO., INC. 

Appellants

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 965 MDA 2018

Appeal from the Judgment Entered May 24, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Susquehanna County Civil Division at 

No(s): 2013-01131

BEFORE: OLSON, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and PELLEGRINI*, J.

MEMORANDUM BY PELLEGRINI, J.: FILED MARCH 12, 2019

Mitzi Anne and William W. Wittman (Wittman) and Jonathan and Ashley 

Brown and Brown Hill Tree Co., Inc. (Brown) cross appeal from the declaratory 
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judgment entered by the Court of Common Pleas of Susquehanna County (trial 

court). After careful review, we affirm.

This case involves real property owned by Wittman over which Brown

has an easement. The dispute is over whether the easement is limited to 

residential uses and, if it is, is Wittman, by his forbearance of commercial 

uses, barred by laches from enforcing his easement and to what extent.

I.

We take the following pertinent facts and procedural history from our 

independent review of the certified record. On November 19, 1976, Pen-Jer, 

Inc. transferred a portion of its real property to Frederick L. and Elaine A. 

Meder (Meder). Pen-Jer filed a corrective deed (the Corrective Deed) on 

January 31, 1977, “[t]he purpose of which [was] to place of record the correct 

survey map, as well as the respective rights of the parties hereto, with 

reference to the fifty (50) foot right-of-way.” (Corrective Deed, 1/31/77, at 

2). The Corrective Deed provided, in pertinent part:

EXCEPTING AND RESERVING unto Pen-Jer, Inc. . . . a right of 

ingress, egress and regress as a covenant running with the land 

above described, over and along a certain fifty (50) foot right-ofway situated on the Easterly side of the [Meder] parcel . . . as the 

same is depicted on a map of said survey, a true and correct copy 

of which is attached hereto and recorded herewith. It is 

specifically understood that the said right-of-way is reserved for 

non-commercial, non-industrial use.

TOGETHER WITH a right unto [Meder], their heirs, successors and 

assigns, of ingress, egress and regress . . . over and along a 

certain fifty (50) foot right-of-way which runs through the lands 

of Pen-Jer, Inc. . . . to the [Meder] parcel, described herein, as 

the same is depicted on the map attached hereto and recorded 
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herewith, said right-of-way to be used for residential purposes 

only. It is specifically understood that this exception and 

reservation shall not be for commercial or industrial use.

(Id.) (emphasis added). Wittman purchased the Meder property on May 25, 

1999, subject to the same terms.

Pen-Jer, Inc. conveyed the adjacent property which contained the above 

described right-of-way to Robert and Judy Saylor (Saylor). In 2000, Saylor 

constructed a commercial automotive repair building on the property and used 

the right-of-way for access to this business. On December 18, 2003, with 

knowledge that Saylor used the property for the automotive repair business, 

Brown purchased the property and relocated the Brown Hill Tree Co. to that 

location. The deed conveying the property stated that it concerned the same 

land surveyed in 1977 and that the conveyance was 

UNDER AND SUBJECT to that certain fifty (50) foot right-of-way 

excepted and reserved by the Grantors—said right-of-way having 

previously been granted to [Meder] . . . as more specifically set 

forth in a deed dated January 31, 1977, and recorded in 

Susquehanna County Deed Book 371, page 1139.

(Brown deed, 12/18/03, at 2).

In April 2012, Wittman complained about Brown’s commercial use of the 

property for the first time. In October 2012, the parties, through counsel, 

drafted a Right-of-Way Use Agreement but did not sign it. (See October 2012 

Right-of-Way Use Agreement). On September 9, 2013, Wittman filed a 

complaint against Brown for declaratory judgment and to quiet title seeking 

to limit Brown’s use of the easement to residential purposes only. Brown filed 
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an answer to the complaint asserting several affirmative defenses, including 

laches. At the time Wittman filed his complaint, Brown had begun to use the 

easement for heavy commercial activities, including placing heavy machinery 

and large piles of mulch on the easement’s border. By the time the matter 

proceeded to the bench trial, Brown had stopped using the right-of-way for 

heavy commercial use. He continued to use it for light commercial use as he 

had since 2003, i.e., access by his employees and large trucks to and from 

the commercial building and parking employee vehicles and commercial 

equipment.

On February 8, 2018, after a bench trial, the trial court entered an order 

finding in favor of Wittman and against Brown on the actions for declaratory 

relief and to quiet title, declaring “that the subject easement is intended to 

have a residential character.” (Order, 2/08/18, at 1 ¶ 1, 2). “As to [Brown’s] 

affirmative defense of laches, the court [found] in favor of [Brown] and against 

[Wittman] as it relates to [Brown’s] light commercial use of the subject 

easement.” (Id. at 1 ¶ 3). The court found in favor of Wittman on Brown’s

remaining affirmative defenses, enjoined Brown from using the right-of-way 

for heavy commercial purposes but allowed him to continue to utilize it for 

“light commercial use in a manner consistent with its use from 2000 to 2012.” 

(Id. at 2 ¶ 5; see id. at 1 ¶ 4). The court denied post-trial motions and the 

parties cross-appealed. The parties and the court complied with Rule 1925. 

See Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
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II.

On appeal, Brown claims that the court erred in finding that his deed 

contained the same commercial restriction for the easement as the Wittman 

deed and in denying his affirmative defenses other than laches. Wittman

challenges the court’s decision finding in favor of Brown on the affirmative 

defense of laches and declaring that he could continue to use the easement 

for light commercial purposes. After thorough review, we conclude that the 

parties’ issues lack merit.1

A.

For ease of disposition, we first review Brown’s claim that the court erred 

in finding that the Brown deed contained the commercial restriction on the 

easement.2 (See Brown’s Brief, at 25-27).

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1 When reviewing the decision of the trial court in a declaratory 

judgment action, our scope of review is narrow. Consequently, 

we are limited to determining whether the trial court’s findings are 

supported by substantial evidence, whether an error of law was 

committed or whether the trial court abused its discretion[.] . . . 

When this [C]ourt reviews the findings of the trial judge, the 

evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the victorious 

party below and all evidence and proper inferences favorable to 

that party must be taken as true and all unfavorable inferences 

rejected.

PARC Holdings, Inc. v. Killian, 785 A.2d 106, 110 (Pa. Super. 2001), appeal 

denied, 796 A.2d 284 (Pa. 2002) (citations omitted).

2 “Whether a trial court properly interpreted a contract is a question of law 

and our scope of review is plenary.” PARC Holdings, Inc., supra at 112 

(citation omitted).
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“The[] rules [of construction applicable to the grant of an easement] 

provide that if the location, size or purpose of an easement is specified in the 

grant, then the use of an easement is limited to the specifications.” PARC 

Holdings, Inc., supra at 111 (citations omitted). “[H]owever, [if] the 

language of a granting deed is ambiguous regarding these matters, then the 

intent of the parties as to the original purpose of a grant is a controlling factor 

in determining the extent of an easement.” Id. (citation omitted).

In this case, the trial court found that Brown’s commercial use “is not 

consistent with the residential character of the easement, and that such 

continued use would unreasonably interfere with Wittman’s enjoyment of the

easement.” (Trial Court Opinion, 2/08/18, at 10). We agree.

The Corrective Deed from common grantor Pen-Jer, Inc., provided 

Meder with an easement across Pen-Jer’s property for “ingress, egress and 

regress” with the understanding that it “shall not be for commercial or 

industrial use.” (Meder deed, at 2). Pen-Jer retained an easement “reserved 

for non-commercial, non-industrial uses” to use that portion of the right-ofway that extended over the Meder parcel for ingress and egress to its 

property. (Id.). Reading those two paragraphs together, the language clearly 

reflects an intent to maintain a residential character for the right-of-way over 

both the Meder (Wittman) and Pen-Jer (Brown) properties.

The Brown deed, in describing the right-of-way, expressly states that it 

previously had been granted to Meder “as more specifically set forth in the 
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deed dated January 31, 1977, and recorded in Susquehanna Deed Book 371, 

page 1139.” (Brown deed, at 2). Although the Brown deed did not contain 

the non-commercial use language on its face, it referenced the specific 

language of the Corrective Deed, which did contain such restriction. Hence, 

based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court properly found that

the deeds creating and transferring the right-of-way reflected an intent to 

maintain its residential character, and that Brown’s deed incorporated that 

language.

3

 Brown’s claim to the contrary lacks merit.4

B.

Having concluded that the trial court properly found that the easement 

language precluded non-residential purposes, and that this was referenced in 

and made a part of the Brown deed, we next address Wittman’s claim that the 

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3 Our reasoning noting the Brown deed’s incorporation of the language of the 

Corrective Deed differs slightly from that of the trial court. However, “we may 

affirm the trial court’s order on any valid basis.” Plasticert, Inc. v. 

Westfield Ins. Co., 923 A.2d 489, 492 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation omitted). 

Also, the trial court did refer to this language in its denial of Brown’s estoppel 

claim and in its finding that Brown had a duty to investigate the nature and 

scope of the easement based on it. (See Trial Ct. Op., at 13).

4 We also note that, “[o]rdinarily, when a tract of land is subject to an 

easement, the servient owner may make any use of the land that does not 

unreasonably interfere with the use and enjoyment of the easement.” 

Ephrata Area School Dist. v. County of Lancaster, 938 A.2d 264, 267-68 

(Pa. 2007). Here, it is undisputed that Brown utilized Wittman’s easement on 

its property for commercial purposes. We agree with the trial court that this 

“continued use would unreasonably interfere with the Wittman’s enjoyment of 

the easement[,]” in violation of Brown’s duty as the servient property owner. 

(Trial Ct. Op., at 10).
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court erred in applying Brown’s affirmative defense of laches to allow the 

easement to be used for light commercial use.

“[L]aches is . . . principally a question of the inequity of permitting [a] 

claim to be enforced[.]” Sernovits v. Dershaw, 127 A.3d 783, 788 (Pa. 

Super. 2014) (citation omitted). “[It] is an equitable bar to the prosecution 

of stale claims and is the practical application of the maxim[:] those who 

sleep on their rights must awaken to the consequence that they have 

disappeared.” In re Estate of Moskowitz, 115 A.3d 372, 379 n.6 (Pa. 

Super. 2015), appeal denied, 130 A.3d 1291 (Pa. 2015) (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). In other words:

Laches bars relief when the complaining party is guilty of want of 

due diligence in failing to promptly institute the action to the 

prejudice of another. Thus, in order to prevail on an assertion of 

laches, respondents must establish: a) a delay arising from 

petitioner’s failure to exercise due diligence; and, b) prejudice to 

the respondents resulting from the delay.

Id. at 380 (citation omitted). “Laches arises when a party’s position or rights 

are so prejudiced by length of time and inexcusable delay, plus attendant facts 

and circumstances, that it would be an injustice to permit presently the 

assertion of a claim against him.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted). “[T]he party asserting laches as a defense must present evidence 

demonstrating prejudice from the lapse of time. Such evidence may include 

establishing that . . . the defendant has changed his position in anticipation 

that the opposing party has waived his claims.” Id. (citation omitted).

In the instant matter, the trial court found:
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Brown has demonstrated that substantial delay occurred in 

connection with Wittman’s enforcement of the residential 

character of the easement. Approximately 12 years lapsed prior 

to Wittman taking any action to restrict the use of the easement 

to residential purposes only. The record also established Brown 

was prejudiced by Wittman’s delay. Brown knew Saylor used the 

property to operate an Auto Body Repair garage and that the 

easement was utilized to allow access to the commercial garage. 

Brown would not have purchased the real property but for his 

knowledge that Saylor had been operating a commercial 

enterprise at this location for several years without interference 

from Wittman. Thus, Wittman’s failure to seek enforcement of the 

residential character of the easement resulted in prejudice to 

Brown. For these reasons, Brown has met his burden of 

demonstrating that the doctrine of laches bars Wittman’s attempt 

to enforce the easement as it relates to Brown’s light commercial 

use of [the] easement.[a]

[a] As to “light commercial use” of the easement, such 

use relates to the need for Brown, Brown’s employees, 

Brown’s customers[,] and Brown’s commercial 

vehicles to gain access to the commercial garage, the 

need to utilize portions of the easement for employee 

parking and/or equipment storage, and the use of 

portions of the easement for small mulch piles that do 

not become to obtrusive. . . . Saylor and Brown 

utilized [the easement for “light commercial use”] 

prior to 2012. . . .

(Trial Ct. Op., at 11-12) (one citation omitted).

We discern no abuse of discretion. As long ago stated by the 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court:

If the one in possession of land acts from an honest conviction 

that his legal position is sound, and this belief is based in large 

part on his adversary’s conduct, which leads him to the opinion 

his title is well founded, and on the faith of which he expends large 

sums of money, the duty of the rival claimant to assert his title 

promptly is imperative.
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Gailey v. Wilkinsburg Real Estate & Trust Co., 129 A. 445, 449 (Pa. 

1925).

Here, contrary to Wittman’s claims that Brown did not change his

position based on Wittman’s failure to act, in 2000, Saylor constructed a 

commercial automotive repair building on the property and used the right-ofway for access to this business without objection. In 2003, Brown purchased 

the property and expended the sums to move his business, Brown Hill Tree 

Co., Inc., to the subject property based on his belief that the ability to operate 

a business on the land would continue after his purchase. Thereafter, he 

financed the business and undertook the actions necessary to run the Brown 

Hill Tree Company from that location until 2012 when Wittman complained for 

the first time when he began to use the property for heavy commercial use. 

Where Wittman “[slept] on [his] rights [to enforce the easement’s terms by 

allowing a light commercial use, he] must awaken to the consequence that 

they have disappeared.” In re Estate of Moskowitz, supra at 379 n.6 

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).5 We find no error in the trial 

court’s finding that Brown could continue to use the easement for light 

commercial purposes only based on Wittman acceding to such use from the 

time Saylor built his garage until 2012 when he first objected to it.

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5 Because they do not affect our disposition, we need not review Brown’s 

remaining issues challenging the court’s failure to apply his other affirmative

defenses. The trial court provides a thorough and correct review of these 

theories in its opinion. (See Trial Ct. Op., at 13-16).
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Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/12/2019