NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JACQUELYNE ZUERCHER, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

JANINA M. HOSKINS; et al., 

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 22-15550 

D.C. No. 4:21-cv-05142-YGR 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted April 5, 2024**

San Francisco, California

Before: M. SMITH, HURWITZ, and JOHNSTONE, Circuit Judges.

Jacquelyne Zuercher appeals the dismissal of her complaint against two 

bankruptcy trustees, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), the U.S. Marshals 

Service (“USMS”), and various federal agents. The complaint alleged that Zuercher

received a Mercedez-Benz McLaren from her mother, Monica Hujazi, on her 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

APR 9 2024

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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sixteenth birthday as a gift, and that the defendants wrongfully seized the automobile 

in connection with Hujazi’s Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings. We have 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.

1. Zuercher’s claims against bankruptcy trustees Janina Hoskins and Lynn 

Schoenmann are foreclosed by the Barton doctrine, under which “a party must first 

obtain leave of the bankruptcy court before it initiates an action in another forum 

against a bankruptcy trustee or other officer appointed by the bankruptcy court for 

acts done in the officer’s official capacity.” In re Crown Vantage, Inc., 421 F.3d 

963, 970–71 (9th Cir. 2005); see Barton v. Barbour, 104 U.S. 126, 127 (1881).

Zuercher’s allegations against Hoskins and Schoenmann arise from officialcapacity acts “that affect the administration of” bankruptcy estates. In re Crown 

Vantage, Inc., 421 F.3d at 971. The bankruptcy court approved an agreement

between Hoskins and Hujazi requiring litigation about the McLaren to be conducted 

in that court. Schoenmann later received permission from the bankruptcy court to 

treat the McLaren as abandoned; her only other involvement with the car was turning 

it over to federal authorities, who had a warrant to seize it. Zuercher was therefore

required to seek leave from the bankruptcy court before bringing her claim against 

Hoskins and Schoenmann in the district court. See In re Yellowstone Mountain Club, 

LLC, 841 F.3d 1090, 1094 (9th Cir. 2016) (“A district court is considered to be 

‘another forum,’ requiring leave of the bankruptcy court before a lawsuit can be 
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brought.”).

Zuercher’s claim that the Barton doctrine does not apply because the McLaren 

was not a bankruptcy asset and she was not a party in Hujazi’s bankruptcy 

proceedings is not persuasive. And, even if Zuercher actually owned the McLaren, 

the Barton doctrine would apply. See, e.g., In re Crown Vantage, Inc., 421 F.3d at 

969, 977 (applying the Barton doctrine to claims brought by a third-party law firm

against a trustee).

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2. The district court did not err in dismissing the claims against Stephen 

Jobe, the FBI Legal Forfeiture Unit Chief, for lack of personal jurisdiction. Zuercher 

argues that Jobe had the required minimum contacts with California because he sent 

Zuercher letters refusing to release the McLaren to her after it was seized pursuant 

to a warrant. But this alone does not show “purposeful availment” of California law, 

see Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et L'Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 

1206, 1207–08 (9th Cir. 2006), and Zuercher does not allege that Jobe played any 

role in securing the warrant, seizing the McLaren, or supervising the federal agents 

who did. 

1 Zuercher’s claim that Hoskins illegally notified the U.S. Trustee’s Office that 

the McLaren was an unreported bankruptcy asset is similarly unavailing. Hoskins 

simply complied with her statutory duty to report suspected bankruptcy fraud. See 

18 U.S.C. § 3057(a).
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3. The district court also did not err in dismissing the claims against the 

remaining federal defendants for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The 

Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) requires that a tort claim against the United 

States or a federal employee acting within the scope of employment must previously 

have been “presented [] to the appropriate Federal agency” and “finally denied by 

the agency in writing.” 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). Section 2675(a), which is

jurisdictional, requires a claim to contain “(1) a written statement sufficiently 

describing the injury to enable the agency to begin its own investigation, and (2) a 

sum certain damages claim.” Warren v. U.S. Dep't of Interior Bureau of Land 

Mgmt., 724 F.2d 776, 780 (9th Cir. 1984). Zuercher failed to show that her petitions 

to the FBI satisfied these requirements. 

4. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend 

the complaint. Leave to amend may be denied if “the proposed amendment is futile 

or would be subject to dismissal.” Wheeler v. City of Santa Clara, 894 F.3d 1046, 

1059 (9th Cir. 2018). Zuercher does not explain how amendment would cure the 

numerous jurisdictional defects in her complaint—failure to seek leave from the 

bankruptcy court, failure to comply with the FTCA, and failure to establish personal 

jurisdiction over Jobe.2

2 Zuercher argues that she alleged sufficient facts to state a claim against the 

federal defendants. We do not address that argument because the district court did 

not dismiss for failure to state a claim. Zuercher fails to challenge the district court’s 
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AFFIRMED.

findings that (1) Zuercher’s tort claims against the federal defendants are barred by 

sovereign immunity, and (2) her claims against the USMS and FBI agents who 

seized the McLaren are barred by quasi-judicial immunity. She has thus waived 

those issues. See Greenwood v. FAA, 28 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 1994).