1

Filed 1/25/16; pub. order 2/18/16 (see end of opn.)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY FORCE 

ACCOUNT COUNCIL, INC.,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

ROSS VALLEY SANITARY DISTRICT 

et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

A139069, A139550

(Marin County

 Super. Ct. No. CIV1202540)

This is an action for mandamus and declaratory relief brought by plaintiff 

Construction Industry Force Account Council, Inc., a trade association whose 

membership includes unions, contractors’ associations and contractors throughout 

California. Following discovery and a contested hearing, the trial court ruled that 

defendant Ross Valley Sanitary District (the District) lacked statutory authority under 

Public Contact Code section 20803 to engage its own work force to complete a sewer 

system improvement project costing over $15,000 without putting the project out for 

competitive bid and contract.1 The trial court thereafter granted a peremptory writ of 

mandate commanding the District to, inter alia, cease and desist from taking further 

action with respect to about 139 miles of its small diameter sewer pipe with force account 

 

1

The District’s Board of Directors is also a named defendant in these proceedings. 

For purposes of this appeal, the District and its Board of Directors are collectively 

referred to as “the District.”
2

workers, and to conduct all future replacement of this pipe through competitive bid and 

contract. 

The District has appealed this decision, challenging both the trial court’s 

interpretation of Public Contract Code section 20803, as well as certain factual findings 

underlying its conclusion that the District undertook a “district project,” within the 

meaning of the statute, costing in excess of the $15,000 statutory threshold. For reasons 

set forth below, we reverse.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Section 20803 of the Public Contract Code was enacted in its original form in 

1983 as part of Article 52, the provisions of which “shall apply to contracts by sanitary 

districts as provided in the Sanitary District Act of 1923 pursuant to Division 6 

(commencing with Section 6400) of the Health and Safety Code.”2 (§ 20800.) Section 

20803, in particular, provides: “When the expenditure required for a district project 

exceeds fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000), it shall be contracted for and let to the lowest 

responsible bidder after notice, subject to Section 20805.” “District project,” in turn, is 

defined for purposes of Article 52 as “any construction, reconstruction, alteration, 

enlargement, renewal, or replacement of sewer facilities which the district is authorized 

to do, including, but not limited to, the furnishing of supplies or materials for any such 

work.” (§ 20801.) 

In its original form, the statute applied to sanitary district projects exceeding five 

thousand dollars ($5,000) in value. In 1985, the statute was amended such that the dollar 

amount was increased to ten thousand dollars ($10,000), and in 1998, pursuant to another 

amendment, this amount was increased to the current level of fifteen thousand dollars 

($15,000).3 (Added Stats 1983 ch 256 § 95; Amended Stats 1985 ch 472 § 2; Stats 1998 

ch 142 § 8 (SB 1860).) 

 

2 Unless otherwise stated, all statutory references herein are to the Public Contract 

Code.

3 Historically, section 20805 derived from former Health and Safety Code section 

6515.1, enacted in 1961 and amended in 1967 and 1975. (Former Health & Saf. Code, 
3

The District, as a local sanitary district charged with operating and maintaining 

approximately 200 miles of collection sewer lines and 20 pumping stations in Marin 

County, is governed by Article 52. (See Health & Saf. Code, §§ 6400 to 6803.) Most of 

these sewer lines are “neighborhood” lines ten inches or less in diameter (referred to 

herein as small diameter sewer pipe). The District has long recognized the need to 

eventually replace about 139 miles of this small diameter sewer pipe, which has become 

old and dilapidated in many locations. 

Historically, the District’s work on its aging sewer lines has been accomplished by 

performing “spot repairs” on problematic sections of pipe. This work, as well as manhole 

rehabilitation or replacement, was performed by the District’s in-house construction and 

maintenance personnel, which is comprised of varying numbers of full-time District 

employees, as well as by private contractors. 

However, in recent years, a more modern technique known as “pipebursting” has 

become the preferred method for addressing problem areas along the District’s sewer 

lines. In 2010, the District began experimenting with this new technique, which allows it 

to replace sections of sewer line by digging two holes about 350 feet apart, and then 

using a hydraulic pump to pull a torpedo-like device through the old pipe, bursting the 

old pipe and leaving a new pipe in its wake. With pipebursting, the District can replace 

350-foot sections of pipe in about three days and without trenching, rather than engaging 

in weeks of work-intensive spot repairs. 

In 2011, the District’s Board authorized the hiring of a team of new employees 

capable of doing pipebursting work, as well as more traditional maintenance work, to 

address problem sections within the approximately 139 miles of small diameter sewer 

lines. Public meetings were held at which the Board discussed this plan. Plaintiff, in 

 

§ 6515.1, as added Stats 1961 ch 1445 § 3, amended Stats 1967 ch 1017 § 1, Stats 1975 

ch 367 § 3.) In 1983, former Health and Safety Code section 6515.1 was recodified as 

section 20803 when, as part of an omnibus reorganization, all contract-related 

requirements for public agencies were moved into newly-enacted Article 52 of the Public 

Contract Code. (Stats. 1983, ch 256, § 95.) Section 20800, in turn, was added as part of 

this statutory reorganization. (Ibid.)
4

attendance at these meetings, objected orally and in writing on the ground that the Public 

Contract Code required the District to put out to competitive bid any of its pipebursting 

work. The District, however, rejected plaintiff’s position. Thereafter, in 2011 and 2012, 

the District used in-house workers to perform pipebursting work on several roads in 

Marin County. 

On June 1, 2012, plaintiff filed its petition for a writ of mandate in Marin Superior 

Court, seeking a peremptory writ pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1085 to 

compel the District to put out to competitive bid its “Capital Pipe Bursting Project” 

(hereinafter, Project). In this petition, plaintiff alleged that the Project exceeded $15,000 

in cost, and had already been implemented using in-house workers on sewer lines at San 

Francisco Boulevard and Los Angeles Boulevard in San Anselmo, and at Bothin Road in 

Fairfax. The petition further alleged the District was proceeding in violation of section 

20803 by refusing to comply with the statute’s competitive bidding requirements with 

respect to the Project. Finally, the petition alleged plaintiff and its members would suffer 

irreparable harm if the District were permitted to continue violating the Public Contract 

Code’s competitive bidding procedures. 

After discovery and a contested hearing, the trial court entered a “Writ of 

Mandate” on May 10, 2013. This writ set forth the trial court’s findings that section 

20803 is a “force account limit” statute, and that the District’s decision to hire and train a 

new “Capital Pipe Bursting Crew” was primarily for the purpose of replacing its aging 

pipes and, thus, constituted a “district project” under section 20801. 

On June 19, 2013, plaintiff submitted for the court’s consideration a “[Proposed] 

Judgment Directing Issuance of Peremptory Writ of Mandate to Respondents Ross 

Valley Sanitary District and Ross Valley Sanitary District Board of Directors and a 

Peremptory Writ of Mandate.” The District objected on the ground that the writ of 

mandate entered May 10, 2013 constituted the judgment in this case, and that any further 

judgment would be “substantively improper.” The trial court overruled this objection 

and, on July 18, 2013, entered judgment directing issuance of a peremptory writ of 

mandate to the District. On August 1, 2013, the clerk of the superior court executed the 
5

peremptory writ of mandate, which commanded the District to: (1) cease and desist from 

taking further action with respect to about 139 miles of its small diameter sewer pipe with 

force account workers, (2) conduct all further and future replacement of the 

approximately 139 miles of sewer pipe ten inches in diameter or less through competitive 

bid and contract; and (3) conduct all further and future work in excess of the limits 

imposed by section 20803 through competitive bid and contract. This appeal ensued. 

DISCUSSION

“A writ of mandate lies ‘to compel the performance of an act which the law 

specially enjoins, as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station; . . .’ [Citation.] 

‘ “Two basic requirements are essential to the issuance of the writ: (1) A clear, present 

and usually ministerial duty upon the part of the respondent [citations]; and (2) a clear, 

present and beneficial right in the petitioner to the performance of that duty [citation].” 

[Citation.]’ [Citation.] [¶] As to the petitioner’s interest, the writ may not be issued where 

the injury is purely theoretical and the petitioner fails to show any benefit would accrue 

to him if the writ were issued, or that he will suffer any detriment if it is denied. 

[Citations.]” (Steelgard, Inc. v. Jannsen (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 79, 83.)

Here, the District challenges the trial court’s grant of the peremptory writ of 

mandate on the following grounds. First, the District contends the trial court 

misinterpreted section 20803 as a “force account limit statute” that required the District 

to put out for competitive bid any “district project” costing over $15,000. Second, the 

District contends two of the trial court’s underlying factual findings lack the support of 

substantial evidence – to wit, that the District’s pipebursting work constitutes a “district 

project” (§ 20801) and that this project exceeds $15,000 in costs. Finally, the District 

contends the trial court made several manifest errors of a procedural nature, including its 

decisions to reject the District’s request for a statement of decision, to overrule its 

demurrer, and to issue a “second judgment” after the District had already filed a notice of 

appeal of the May 10, 2013 writ of mandate. We address these contentions below to the 

appropriate extent.
6

I. Is Section 20803 A “Force Account Limit Statute” Requiring The District To 

Put Out For Competitive Bid Any “District Project” Costing Over $15,000?4

Both parties recognize the primary issue on appeal is one of statutory 

interpretation, which we review independently. (Cal-Air Conditioning, Inc. v. Auburn 

Union School District (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 655, 666.)5 The rules of statutory 

interpretation are, of course, well-established. “ ‘[O]ur fundamental task is to ascertain 

the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the purpose of the statute. [Citation.] We begin 

with the language of the statute, giving the words their usual and ordinary meaning. 

[Citation.] The language must be construed “in the context of the statute as a whole and 

the overall statutory scheme, and we give ‘significance to every word, phrase, sentence, 

and part of an act in pursuance of the legislative purpose.’ ” [Citation.] In other words, 

“ ‘we do not construe statutes in isolation, but rather read every statute “with reference to 

the entire scheme of law of which it is part so that the whole may be harmonized and 

retain effectiveness.” [Citation.]’ ” [Citation.] If the statutory terms are ambiguous, we 

may examine extrinsic sources, including the ostensible objects to be achieved and the 

legislative history. [Citation.] In such circumstances, we choose the construction that 

comports most closely with the Legislature’s apparent intent, endeavoring to promote 

rather than defeat the statute’s general purpose, and avoiding a construction that would 

lead to absurd consequences. [Citation.]’ (Smith v. Superior Court (2006) 39 Cal.4th 77, 

83 [45 Cal.Rptr.3d 394, 137 P.3d 218].)” (Boy Scouts of America National Foundation v. 

Superior Court (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 428, 443.)

 

4 Generally speaking, a “force account limit statute” is one that imposes a ceiling on 

“the value of public works construction, repair, and maintenance projects which local 

agencies may perform for themselves without ‘contracting out’ the work to private 

bidders.” (See Lockheed Information Management Services Co. v. City of Inglewood

(1998) 17 Cal.4th 170, 184, fn. 13; see also Construction Indus. Force Account Council 

v. Amador Water Agency (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 810, 814, fn. 3.) 

5 Both parties have filed requests for judicial notice of the legislative history of 

section 20803, as well as its predecessor statutes. Neither party contends this legislative 

history is an improper subject for judicial notice and, accordingly, we grant the parties’ 

requests.
7

“Additionally, ‘ “[w]e examine the history and background of the statutory 

provision in order to ascertain the most reasonable interpretation of the measure.” 

[Citation.]’ (Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 543 [67 Cal.Rptr.3d 330, 

169 P.3d 559].) Even where the plain language of the statute dictates the result, the 

legislative history may provide additional authority confirming the court’s interpretation 

of the statute. (Id. at p. 544.)” (Boy Scouts of America National Foundation v. Superior 

Court, supra, 206 Cal.App.4th at p. 443.)

In our case, the District argues section 20803 should not be interpreted to require 

competitive bidding for district projects exceeding the $15,000 threshold amount. 

Rather, the District asks us to interpret section 20803 to permit a sanitary district to use 

in-house employees to complete a project regardless of total cost, and to require a 

district’s compliance with the competitive bidding procedures in Article 52 only if it 

chooses to contract out to a third party a project meeting the $15,000 cost threshold. In 

promoting this interpretation, the District reasons as follows. 

First, the District notes section 20803 contains no express statutory directive 

limiting a sanitary district’s authority to perform force account work. The District then 

turns its focus to section 20800, another provision of Article 52, providing that “this 

article shall apply to contracts by sanitary districts.” (Italics added.) According to the 

District, the term, “contracts,” in section 20800 would be “pure surplusage” unless the 

provision as a whole is interpreted to mean Article 52 is triggered only when a district 

contracts out work. 

We agree with the District’s interpretation, if not its entire analysis. Like the 

District, we begin with the fact that section 20803 contains no express statutory directive 

limiting a sanitary district’s authority to perform force account work. This silence is 

indeed significant. As our appellate colleagues in the Third District explain, when called 

upon to determine whether a statute sets a force account limit based on the value of a 

local agency’s public works project, courts must “start with the premise that, absent a 

statutory directive, a public entity is not bound to engage in competitive bidding.” 

(Construction Indus. Force Account Council v. Amador Water Agency (1999) 71 
8

Cal.App.4th 810, 815 [Amador Water].) The reason is this: “While there are ‘powerful 

purposes served by competitive bidding [e.g., preventing waste, favoritism, and 

corruption], there is no all-pervasive public policy that requires all public entities to 

engage in that practice. Rather, the Legislature imposes competitive bidding requirements 

on public entities within its purview when the Legislature determines it is in the public 

interest to do so.’ ” (Ibid.) 

Nor can any such statutory directive be found in section 20800. Like section 

20803, section 20800 is silent with respect to force account work and, in particular, with 

respect to any supposed limitation on a sanitary district’s right to rely on force account 

work rather than competitive bidding. Rather, section 20800 simply states that Article 52 

applies to “contracts by sanitary districts.” We agree with the District this provision, read 

in a straightforward manner, means Article 52, which includes section 20803, applies 

when a district contracts with a third party for public work, and not when a district relies

on force account work. 

Moreover, to the extent there is any ambiguity in the language of sections 20803 

or 20800, we apply the above-stated rule requiring us to harmonize all parts of the entire 

legal scheme, giving significance to each word, phrase, sentence and part of the Act in 

pursuance of the legislative purpose, which, in this case, is to hold public entities to open 

contract bidding procedures so as to “ ‘guard against favoritism, improvidence, 

extravagance, fraud and corruption; to prevent the waste of public funds; and to obtain 

the best economic result for the public.’ [Citations.]” (Construction Industry Force 

Account Council v. Delta Wetlands (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1589, 1595-1596 [Delta 

Wetlands].) Reasonably construing sections 20800 and 20803 conjunctively in light of 

this legislative purpose, we are left to conclude that section 20803 only operates to 

require competitive bidding when a sanitary district contracts out a district project costing 

over $15,000. Indeed, to interpret these statutes otherwise would require us to: (1) import 

language into the statutes restricting a sanitary district’s autonomy to use force account 

work for certain projects that otherwise is not there and, (2) ignore clear language in 

section 20800 restricting application of Article 52 “to contracts by sanitary districts.” 
9

The law forbids both. It is equally improper to “read things into statutory provisions, 

particularly when they are clearly stated as here” (Delta Wetlands, supra, at p. 1594), and 

to render statutory language “mere surplusage” (Brown v. Superior Court (1984) 37 

Cal.3d 477, 488). (See also San Diego Serv. Auth. for Freeway Emergencies v. Superior 

Court (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 1466, 1472 [“A court should not presume the Legislature 

intended to legislate by implication. [Citation.] Although in years past it may have been 

necessary for courts to read into a statute provisions not specifically expressed by the 

Legislature, the modern rule of construction disfavors such practice”].) 

Our need to respect the existing statutory language and overall legal scheme is 

particularly important in light of the legislature’s demonstrated capacity to enact force 

account limit statutes that directly say what they mean – to wit, that a public entity may 

not complete a public work project with its own labor force, but must put the work out for 

competitive bid. (E.g., § 20642 [“When work is not to be done by the district itself by 

force account, and the amount involved is thirty-five thousand dollars ($35,000), or more, 

any contract for the doing of the work shall be let to the lowest responsible bidder . . .”]; 

§ 20783 [“When work is done by the district itself by force account, the amount shall not 

exceed . . . ($5,000). When the expenditure required for the work exceeds . . . ($35,000), 

it shall be contracted for and let to the lowest responsible bidder”]. See also Amador 

Water, supra, 71 Cal.App.4th at p. 817 [“The Legislature has shown it can make clear 

(when it chooses to do so) whether projects must be bid or can be completed by the 

agency itself. Under these circumstances, it is improper to infer from the provision a 

limitation on the Agency’s authority, nor does it advance the purposes of competitive 

bidding to infer a limitation”].) 

At the same time, declining to accept the trial court’s interpretation of section 

20803 does not undermine the legislative policies reflected in the statutory scheme. As 

the Delta Wetlands court explained, the legislative goals of guarding against favoritism, 

corruption and fraud, and ensuring prudent expenditure of public funds are less relevant 

where a public entity opts to use its own work force rather than to engage in public 

contracting. (Delta Wetlands, supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 1596.)
10

The legislative history provides further support for our conclusion. For example, 

an excerpt from the 1985 Legislative Counsel Digest, prepared in connection with the 

statutory amendment to increase section 20803’s dollar threshold, states: “Under existing 

law, . . . [i]f a contract is for any unit of work or project estimated to cost in excess of 

$5,000, the contract shall be let according to specified bidding procedures. [¶] This bill 

would increase to $10,000 the threshold amount which requires that a contract be let 

according to the bidding procedures.” (AB 1036 (Stats. 1985, c. 472 [italics added].)

Similarly, the Legislative Counsel’s Digest statement for the current version of section 

20803 states: “Under existing provisions of the [the Local Agency Public Construction 

Act], a . . . sanitary district . . . , when letting various contracts over a specified dollar 

amount, [is] required to let the contracts to the lowest responsible bidder.” (SB 1860 

(Stats. 1998, c. 142 § 8 [italics added].) We agree with the District these statements 

suggest section 20803 applies only when a district chooses to contract out work rather 

than to use it own labor force. (See Souvannarath v. Hadden (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 

1115, 1126, fn. 9 [The Legislative Counsel’s Digest “constitutes the official summary of 

the legal effect of the bill and is relied upon by the Legislature throughout the legislative

process, [and] thus it is recognized as a primary indication of legislative intent”].)

We hasten to add, however, in agreeing with the District’s proposed interpretation 

of section 20803, that we disagree with its reliance on two California cases, Amador 

Water, supra, 71 Cal.App.4th 810 and East Bay Garbage Co. v. Washington Township 

Sanitation Co. (1959) 52 Cal.2d 708 (East Bay Garbage). Simply put, neither case 

definitively answers the legal question raised herein of whether section 20803 is a force 

account limit statute. In Amador Water, for example, the reviewing court affirmed denial 

of injunctive and declaratory relief to the Construction Industry Force Account Council, 

after concluding the relevant Public Contract Code provision permitted, but did not 

require, the agency to let to bid a contract for certain construction work costing over 

$12,500. However, in Amador Water, the relevant statute was section 21451, not section 
11

20803, which applies to water agencies and contains distinct statutory language.6 

(Amador Water, supra, 71 Cal.App.4th at p. 813, quoting § 21451.) In East Bay 

Garbage, in turn, the California Supreme Court was called upon to apply former Health 

and Safety Code section 6515.5, a predecessor statute to section 20803, which provided: 

“If the total cost of any work exceeds . . . ($2,500), the district shall publish a notice 

requesting bids therefor by publication for once a week for two consecutive weeks in a 

newspaper of general circulation in the county in which the district is located and award 

the contract to the lowest responsible bidder. . . .” (East Bay Garbage, supra, 52 Cal.2d 

at p. 711, citing former Health & Saf. Code, § 6515.5.) The issue there, however, was 

not whether former section 6515.5 should be interpreted as a force account limit statute, 

but whether the statute applies only to contracts requiring contract payments to be made 

by the sanitary district, or more broadly, as in that case, to contracts authorizing contract 

payments to be made by district ratepayers. (East Bay Garbage, supra, 52 Cal.2d at

pp. 712-713.) In holding that the statute’s competitive bidding procedures applied under 

either scenario, the California Supreme Court described former Health and Safety Code 

section 6515.5 as, “in effect, authoriz[ing] two methods for the district’s handling of the 

work involved. The district might do the work itself or it might contract with someone 

else to do it. If the latter course were chosen, then where the expenditure involved was in 

excess of $2,500, no valid contract could be made unless the bids were publicly 

advertised as prescribed and unless the contracts were let to the lowest responsible 

bidder.” (East Bay Garbage, supra, 52 Cal.2d at p. 713.) While the District insists this 

interpretation should carry over to section 20803 because section 20803 derives from 

 

6 Unlike section 20803 (which, recall, provides that“[w]hen the expenditure 

required for a district project exceeds . . . ($15,000), it shall be contracted for and let to 

the lowest responsible bidder”), section 21451 provides that“[a]ll contracts for any 

improvement or unit of work, when the cost according to the estimate of the engineer will 

exceed . . . ($12,500), shall be let to the lowest responsible bidder . . . as provided in this 

article. . . . If . . . the estimated cost of the work does not exceed . . . ($12,500), or the 

work consists of channel protection, maintenance work, or emergency work, the board 

may have the work done by force account without advertising for bids. . . .” (Amador 

Water, supra, 71 Cal.App.4th at p. 813, quoting § 21451, italics added.) 
12

former Health and Safety Code section 6515.5 , we agree with plaintiff the high court’s 

description of former section 6515.5 is mere dicta. (See Western Landscape Constr. v. 

Bank of Am. (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 57, 61 [“To determine the precedential value of a 

statement in an opinion, the language of that statement must be compared with the facts 

of the case and the issues raised. Only statements necessary to the decision are binding

precedents; explanatory observations are not binding precedent”].)

Finally, in declining to interpret section 20803 as a force account limit statute, we 

acknowledge plaintiff’s point that the legislature has, for the most part, taken an ad hoc 

approach to these sorts of public contract statutes. Indeed, in Amador Water, the 

reviewing court acknowledged the “statutory hodgepodge” contained within the Public 

Contract Code, explaining “that the Legislature takes an ad hoc approach, whether by 

design or default, to the authority of these various public agencies to complete projects 

without competitive bidding by outside contractors.” (Amador Water, supra, 71 

Cal.App.4th at p. 817.) Within this hodgepodge, for example, “there are numerous 

statutes which explicitly except all work done by force account from competitive bidding 

requirements, [fn. omitted] and others which explicitly prohibit use of force accounts for 

projects valued over a dollar threshold.” (Id. at p. 816.) In a footnote, the court then 

identified the following statutes falling within the latter category of statutes “which 

explicitly prohibit use of force accounts for projects valued over a dollar threshold”: 

former section 20783 (“When work is done by the district itself by force account, the 

amount shall not exceed . . . ($5,000)”; section 21221 (“In all work of improvement . . . 

when expenditures exceed . . . ($4,000), the work shall be done by contract”); section 

21271 (“All improvement . . . shall be performed in accordance with the following 

procedures” which prescribe when work by day labor, unbid contracts, and bid 

contracts); sections 21581, 21591, 21601, 21631 (all of which provide “Any improvement 

. . . when the cost . . . will exceed [x dollars] . . . shall be done by contract”); sections 

21572, 21621/21623 (same requirement of contract when cost exceeds threshold 

amount). (Amador Water, supra, at p. 816, fn. 6 [italics added].) 
13

However, while acknowledging these apparent statutory inconsistencies, the law 

of statutory interpretation is nonetheless quite clear that we must focus on the statute at 

hand (to wit, section 20803), read in the context of the applicable statutory framework (to 

wit, Article 52), in order to decipher legislative intent. (Boy Scouts of America National 

Foundation v. Superior Court, supra, 206 Cal.App.4th at p. 443.) Indeed, consistent with 

this mandate, as stated above, the Amador Water court also pointed out, that “[a]bsent a 

statutory directive, a public entity is not bound to engage in competitive bidding.” 

(Amador Water, supra, 71 Cal.App.4th at p. 815.) As such, whether these other statutes, 

applicable to public works of other local agencies, contain comparable language is 

largely, if not entirely, beside the point.

Accordingly, for all the reasons stated, we disagree with the trial court’s 

conclusion that section 20803 constitutes a “force account limit” statute. To the contrary, 

we find nothing in the applicable statutory language or scheme that would limit the 

District’s autonomy to complete its pipebursting project or projects using its own labor 

force. The District should thus be free to undertake future pipebursting projects with its 

own personnel without regard for the projects’ overall costs. 

Moreover, in light of our conclusion, plaintiff is not entitled to writ relief in this 

case. Simply put, the District owed plaintiff no statutory duty under section 20803 to 

submit its pipebursting project(s) to the competitive bidding process. (See Steelgard, Inc. 

v. Jannsen (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 79, 83 [“ ‘Two basic requirements are essential to the 

issuance of the writ: (1) A clear, present and usually ministerial duty upon the part of the 

respondent [citations]; and (2) a clear, present and beneficial right in the petitioner to the 

performance of that duty’ [citations]”].) Reversal of the judgment is thus required.7

 

7

In light of our reversal of the judgment on this ground, we need not address the

District’s alternative arguments on appeal relating to, among other things, the sufficiency 

of the evidence supporting the trial court’s underlying factual findings.
14

DISPOSITION

The judgment is reversed, and the writ of mandate dated May 10, 2013, and 

peremptory writ of mandate dated August 1, 2013, are vacated. Costs on appeal are 

awarded to appellants.

_________________________

Jenkins, J.

We concur:

_________________________

McGuiness, P. J.

_________________________

Pollak, J.
15

Filed 2/18/16

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY FORCE 

ACCOUNT COUNCIL, INC.,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

ROSS VALLEY SANITARY DISTRICT 

et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

A139069, A139550

(Marin County

 Super. Ct. No. CIV1202540)

THE COURT:

The opinion in the above-entitled matter filed on January 25, 2016, was not 

certified for publication in the Official Reports. For good cause it now appears that the 

opinion should be published in the Official Reports and it is so ordered.

DATE: ______________ ___________________________ P.J.*

 Justice Jenkins and Justice Pollak concur.
16

Construction Industry Force Account Council, Inc. v. Ross Valley Sanitary District et al., A139069, A139550

Trial Court: Marin County Superior Court

Trial Judge: Hon. Roy Chernus, Judge

Counsel for Defendants and Appellants Ross 

Valley Sanitary District and Ross Valley 

Sanitary District Board Of Directors:

Jolie Houston, John F. Domingue, 

Thomas P. Murphy, Miles J. Dolinger

Berliner Cohen

Counsel for Plaintiff/Respondent Construction 

Industry Force Account Council, Inc.:

Barry E. Hinkle, Patricia M. Gates, 

Roberta D. Perkins, Sharon Seidenstein

Weinberg, Roger & Rosenfeld

Construction Industry Force Account Council, Inc. v. Ross Valley Sanitary District et al., A139069, A139550