IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Respondent,

v.

GLENARD TREVELL POOLE, a/k/a 

GLENARD T. POOLE,

Appellant.

No. 86167-1-I 

DIVISION ONE

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

SMITH, C.J. — In October 2019, Glenard Poole and his girlfriend, Alyssa 

Chastain, were involved in a high-speed chase with multiple law enforcement 

vehicles. Poole was later convicted of attempting to elude a pursuing police 

vehicle with a firearm enhancement. On appeal, Poole contends that the trial 

court violated his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury drawn from a fair 

cross section of the community when it denied his motion for a new jury panel. 

He also contends that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction of 

attempting to elude a pursuing police vehicle. Because Poole fails to show a 

Sixth Amendment violation and because sufficient evidence exists to support his 

conviction, we affirm.

FACTS

Background

In the early morning hours of October 4, 2019, a Washington State Patrol 

(WSP) trooper observed Alyssa Chastain and Glenard Poole speeding in a 
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maroon-colored Nissan on a highway in east Pierce County. Chastain was 

driving. The trooper activated the lights and siren of his unmarked patrol car to 

attempt a traffic stop, but the Nissan continued to accelerate. The trooper alerted

dispatch officers and followed the vehicle. The Nissan continued to flee and 

drive recklessly, straddling lanes, running a red light, and turning off all its lights. 

WSP eventually advised the trooper to terminate his pursuit.

WSP alerted other police agencies of the pursuit over dispatch. Several 

Pierce County Sheriff’s deputies began pursuing the Nissan. Each of the Pierce 

County Sheriff deputies were in marked police vehicles with their lights and 

sirens on.

As the pursuit continued, Chastain leaned out of the window and fired a 

gun repeatedly at the officers. One of the shots shattered the back window of the 

car. Two others hit the officers’ patrol vehicles. One of the deputies was able to 

perform a precision immobilization technique (PIT) maneuver, stopping the 

vehicle.

Once the Nissan came to a stop, police vehicles surrounded it. Officers 

commanded Chastain and Poole to exit the vehicle. Chastain and Poole 

remained in the vehicle, bent down, and appeared to reach toward the floor of 

the car. At that point, several officers opened fire. Chastain got out of the car 

and started running away. Poole then complied with officers and exited the 

vehicle and was arrested. On the floor of the passenger side of the car, officers 

recovered a black semi-automatic handgun. Another handgun was later 

recovered from the car. Forensic analysis revealed DNA from both Chastain and 
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Poole on both guns.

After Poole was arrested, he was transported to the Tacoma Police 

Department headquarters and interviewed by police. Poole told the officers that 

he was aware that he and Chastain were being pursued by the police and that he 

saw the lights and sirens behind them. At one point, Poole told officers that he 

had instructed Chastain to stop driving. But his story changed during the 

interview and he later denied telling Chastain to pull over or stop driving. Poole 

also indicated that he told Chastain to “try to lose” the police and to “try to get to 

her mom’s.” He explained to the officers that he told Chastain to “just do her 

thing” and that he loved her. Poole initially insisted that he was not aware there 

were firearms in the car, but he later admitted he knew about the guns. Poole 

also told officers that while Chastain shot at the pursuing police vehicles, he 

grabbed the wheel to steady the car.

Poole was charged with assault in the first degree and with attempting to 

elude a pursuing police vehicle. In both charges, Poole was named as a 

principal or, in the alternative, as an accomplice. Both charges included firearm 

enhancements.

Jury Selection

During voir dire, the State asked if any of the jurors thought that their 

experience as a witness or victim to a crime would affect their ability to be fair 

and impartial. Juror 4 replied that she wished to answer the question in private. 

Outside the presence of the other jurors, juror 4 disclosed that during a traffic 

stop, a police officer had “roughed [] up” her former husband, who is Black. The 
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juror explained that she felt at the time that she and her husband were the 

victims of racial profiling. Juror 4 also disclosed that she had been raped in the 

1980s and that she felt the police did not do a good job investigating her case. 

Despite these experiences, juror 4 expressed that she could still fairly and 

impartially consider the evidence and apply the law given by the trial court.

But the next day, juror 4 changed her mind. Juror 4 stated: “I personally 

don’t think that I could be unbiassed with this case.” She then elaborated: “I 

have—with everything that’s going on right now with—for me, I’m African 

American, and the police departments—I don’t think that I would be a good juror.” 

Then, when asked by the State if she was willing to give the State a fair trial, juror 

4 answered, “No.” When asked by defense counsel if she would be able to 

follow the court’s instructions, juror 4 answered, “No.”

The State moved to excuse juror 4 for cause. Poole did not object to the 

State’s challenge but instead asked the court to disqualify the entire jury panel 

and start with a new panel. He argued that juror 4 was the only Black juror on 

the panel and that without her, Poole would “not have a jury with even one peer 

on it.” Poole acknowledged that he did not challenge the venire when it was first 

empaneled and he also acknowledged that he was not challenging the process 

by which the jury was assembled.

The court dismissed the juror and denied Poole’s request for a new jury 

venire. The court explained that “jury pools are created on a random basis” and 

that “[t]here has been nothing presented in the record to indicate that in any way 

or any populations being intentionally or systematically excluded from the jury 
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pool or jury selection process.” The court noted that “[b]ecause of the random 

selection process, there is no guarantee of jury composition of a new jury group if 

[the parties] were to call one from jury administration.” The court then denied 

Poole’s motion for a new jury panel.

Later, at the beginning of trial, seated juror 1 asked a court employee why 

there were no Black jurors on the panel when the defendant is Black. Poole 

opted not to address the issue with the jury. The court agreed that this was the 

best course of action and the issue was not discussed further.

Verdict and Sentencing

The jury convicted Poole of attempting to elude a pursuing police vehicle 

and found that he or an accomplice was armed with a firearm during the 

commission of the crime. The jury acquitted Poole of the charge of assault in the 

first degree.

The court sentenced Poole to 30 days for the attempt to elude conviction 

and 18 months for the firearm enhancement for a total of 19 months of 

confinement.

Poole appeals.

ANALYSIS

Sixth Amendment Right to Fair Cross Section of the Community

Poole contends that the test for determining whether a defendant’s Sixth 

Amendment right to a jury drawn from a fair cross section of the community is 

insufficient and urges this court to craft a new test that requires some 

representation of traditionally underrepresented groups in the venire. We are 
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unpersuaded. Poole provides no Gunwall1 analysis demonstrating that our state 

constitution commands a more stringent test than the federal constitution in this 

context. Moreover, Poole’s suggested approach appears to violate the 

randomness requirement of venire selection. Our State Supreme Court recently 

declined a similar request in State v. Rivers, 1 Wn.3d 834, 533 P.3d 410 (2023),

concluding that the test set forth in Duren2 still applies to such claims. Rivers is 

determinative here.

We review constitutional issues de novo and a trial court’s rulings on 

challenges to the venire process for abuse of discretion. State v. Jorgenson, 179 

Wn.2d 145, 150, 312 P.3d 960 (2013) (constitutional issues); State v. Clark, 167 

Wn. App. 667, 674, 274 P.3d 1058 (2012) (venire process). 

The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the right to trial by 

an impartial jury. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. This right includes the right to jury 

panels drawn from a fair cross section of the community. Rivers, 1 Wn.3d 

at 851; Duren, 439 U.S. at 358-59. Representation of jurors does not need to be 

perfectly proportional to the population and defendants are “not entitled to exact 

cross-representation in the jury pool.” State v. Hilliard, 89 Wn.2d 430, 440-42, 

573 P.2d 22 (1977).

To prove a fair cross section violation under the Sixth Amendment under 

 

1 To determine whether our state constitution provides broader rights than 

the federal constitution in a particular context, we examine the constitutional 

guaranties in light of the six criteria outlined in State v. Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d 54, 

720 P.2d 808 (1986).

2 Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 99 S. Ct. 664, 58 L. Ed. 2d 579 (1979).
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the test set forth in Duren, a defendant must show (1) a distinctive group (2) that 

is unreasonably underrepresented in the defendant’s venire and in venires 

generally (3) as a result of systematic exclusion in the jury process. 439 U.S. at 

364. “Systematic” means “inherent in the particular jury-selection process 

utilized.” Duren, 439 U.S. at 366. All three factors must be met to establish a 

constitutional violation and the defendant bears the burden of proving that their 

jury selection system is unconstitutional. Duren, 439 U.S. at 364; Rivers, 1 

Wn.3d at 863. Washington courts have consistently applied the Duren test to 

claims of underrepresentation on juries. See, e.g., In re Pers. Restraint of Yates, 

177 Wn.2d 1, 18-23, 296 P.3d 872 (2013); State v. Cienfuegos, 144 Wn.2d 222, 

230-32, 25 P.3d 1011 (2001); State v. Rupe, 108 Wn.2d 734, 746-48, 743 P.2d

210 (1987).

As an initial matter, we note that Poole only requested a new jury panel 

after the State challenged juror 4, suggesting that Poole first deemed the venire 

underrepresented once that juror was excused. But the fair cross section 

requirement “applies to the selection of the venire, not to the dismissal of 

individual jurors at the jury panel stage.” State v. Meza, 22 Wn. App. 2d 514, 

533, 512 P.3d 608, review denied 200 Wn.2d 1021 (2022). Nevertheless, we 

turn to the merits of Poole’s claim.

Poole easily meets the first Duren element. Black people are a distinctive 

group for Duren purposes. Yates, 177 Wn.2d at 20. 

In support of the second element, underrepresentation, Poole cites a 2022 
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Interim report for the Administrative Office of the Court3 which concluded that 

Washington State juries are not demographically representative of their county of 

jurisdiction. But Poole makes no attempt at distinguishing underrepresentation in 

his venire from underrepresentation of Black jurors in venires generally. 

Moreover, “underrepresentation” in the sense that a group’s representation is not 

at least equal to its proportion of the community, is not sufficient to show that the 

representation is not “fair and reasonable.” Duren, 439 U.S. at 364. Without 

additional information or argument, Poole fails to meet this element.

Finally, Poole does not address the third Duren factor, whether the 

method of selecting venires systematically excludes a distinctive group.

Because Poole fails to meet the second and third Duren factors, his claim 

necessarily fails. Despite this, we acknowledge the challenges defendants like 

Poole face in making a fair cross section claim; historically, jury pools have not 

been representative of the larger community and the burden of proving such a 

claim is high.

Sufficiency of Evidence

Poole contends that there was insufficient evidence for the jury to find him 

guilty of attempting to elude a pursuing police vehicle. We disagree.

“Evidence is sufficient to support a guilty verdict if any rational trier of fact, 

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, could find the 

 

3

 PETER COLLINS, BROOKE GIALOPSOS & BAILEY TANAKA, STATEWIDE JUROR 

SUMMONS DEMOGRAPHIC SURVEY PROJECT: AN ANALYSIS OF SELECTED COUNTY 

DATA, 2022 INTERIM REPORT (Dec. 2022) https://www.courts.wa.gov/subsite/mjc/

docs/Washington%20State%20Jury%20Summons%20Demographic%20Study%

20Interim%20Report%202022.pdf [https://perma.cc/W8LS-VQAZ].
No. 86167-1-I/9

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elements of the charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. CardenasFlores, 189 Wn.2d 243, 265, 401 P.3d 19 (2017). When a defendant challenges 

the sufficiency of the evidence, they admit the truth of the all the State’s 

evidence. State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992). On 

review, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and draw 

reasonable inferences in the State’s favor. Cardenas-Flores, 189 Wn.2d at 265-

66. Direct and circumstantial evidence carry equal weight. State v. O’Neal, 159 

Wn.2d 500, 506, 150 P.3d 1121 (2007). “This standard of review ‘is highly 

deferential to the jury’s decision, and we do not consider questions of credibility, 

persuasiveness, and conflicting testimony.’ ” In re Pers. Restraint of Arntsen, 2

Wn.3d 1022, 543 P.3d 821, 825 (2024) (internal quotation marks omitted) 

(quoting State v. Davis, 182 Wn.2d 222, 227, 340 P.3d 820 (2014)).

A person attempts to elude a pursuing police vehicle if they (1) willfully fail 

or refuse (2) to immediately bring their vehicle to a stop (3) and drive in a 

reckless manner (4) while attempting to elude a pursuing police vehicle after 

being given a visual or audible signal to stop. RCW 46.61.024(1).

An individual is guilty as an accomplice if he or she “ ‘solicits, commands, 

encourages, or requests’ ” another person to commit a crime. State v. 

Everybodytalksabout, 145 Wn.2d 456, 472-73, 39 P.3d 294 (2002) (quoting 

RCW 9A.08.020(3)(a)(i)).

Here, testimony from responding officers constituted sufficient evidence to 

support Poole’s conviction. Pierce County Sheriff Deputy Holly Clark testified 

that when she turned her lights on to initiate a traffic stop, Chastain and Poole did 
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not slow down or stop. Deputy Clark also testified that the vehicle was “swerving 

in and out of traffic and continuing to drive at a high rate of speed” along a 

populated road. At one point, Deputy Clark witnessed Chastain and Poole drive 

into an oncoming lane of traffic, causing other vehicles to swerve out of the way 

to avoid crashing. Pierce County Sheriff Deputy Matthew Hirschi testified that 

when Poole and Chastain drove into lanes of oncoming traffic, they were going 

about a hundred miles per hour. Tacoma Police Sergeant Stuart Hoisington 

testified that Poole stated he knew police were following him and Chastain and 

that Poole saw the lights and sirens behind them. Sergeant Hoisington also 

explained that Poole informed him that he urged Chastain to continue driving and 

to try to lose the police. Tacoma Police Detective Philip Hoschouer testified that 

Poole told Chastain to “just do her thing” and try to outrun the police. Detective 

Hoschouer also testified that Poole stated Chastain’s driving was “crazy.” This 

testimony was sufficient for the jury to find all the essential elements of 

attempting to elude and for the jury to find that Poole acted as a principal or as 

an accomplice.

We affirm.

WE CONCUR: