alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Honorable M. S. Ryan CountyAuditor Webb County Laredo, Texas Dear Sir: OpinionNo:04313 Re: Money in jury ,fundcannot be transferredto other fund. Your request-foropinionhas been received and carefully consideredby this department. We quote from yo.ur request as follows: "Reference Ismade to Article 1630, R.C.S., Texas, 1925, relative to transfer of funds. 'In o'ur

Jury Fund we have an excess of funds over what will be needed for its expense and we wish~to transfer a certain amount to other funds. I have been told we cannot do that.'We are on a cash basis and my undersbanding is thatwe can legally transfer to other funds any excess overwhat o'urexpensewould be." Section 9,Article 8 of,the' Texas Constitution, prescribes the maximum rate of taxes for general purposes, for roads and bridges, for juriesand for permanent improvements,respectively. The moneys arising from taxes levied and collected for each of the above named purposes are constitutionalfunds.

Article 1630,Vernon's Annotated Texas Civil Statutes, cited by you inyour letter, applies to **Statu** torny funds and does not apply to constitutional funds such as the jury fund. The courtshave repeatedlyheld that the CommissionerstCourt has no authority to transfer money from one to another constitutionalfund, or to expend, for one purpose, tax money raised ostensibly forHon. M. S.Ryan, page 2 (o-4813)

another purpose. The Immediatepurpose of the constitutional provision (Article8, Section 9) is to limit the amount of taxes that may be raised for the several purposes set out therein, respectively,and is also designed to inhibit excessiveexpenditures for any of such purposes and to require that any and all monies raised by taxation for any purpose shall be applied to that particularpurpose and no other. See the following authorities:

Carroll v. Williams, 202 S.W. 504 Ault v. Hill County, 1.16S.W. 359 Henderson County v. Burk, 262 S.W. 94 11 Tex. Jur.,pp. 609-10-11 We respectfully advise that a transfer of funds raised by taxation from the jury fund to another fund of the county is prohibitedby Article 8, Section 9 of our State Constitution. Very truly yours ATTORNEY GENERALOF TEXAS

WJF:GO:am APPROVED SEP 4, 1943 /s/ Gerald C. Mann ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS By /s/ Wm. J. Fanning Wm. J. Fanning Assistant

APPROVED OPINION COMMITTEE By /s/ B.W.B. Chairman
H. R. 5476 

One Hundred Eighteenth Congress 

of the 

United States of America 

AT THE SECOND SESSION 

Begun and held at the City of Washington on Wednesday, 

the third day of January, two thousand and twenty-four 

An Act 

To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located at 1077 River 

Road, Suite 1, in Washington Crossing, Pennsylvania, as the ‘‘Susan C. Barnhart 

Post Office’’. 

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 

the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

SECTION 1. SUSAN C. BARNHART POST OFFICE. 

(a) DESIGNATION.—The facility of the United States Postal 

Service located at 1077 River Road, Suite 1, in Washington 

Crossing, Pennsylvania, shall be known and designated as the 

‘‘Susan C. Barnhart Post Office’’. 

(b) REFERENCES.—Any reference in a law, map, regulation, 

document, paper, or other record of the United States to the facility 

referred to in subsection (a) shall be deemed to be a reference 

to the ‘‘Susan C. Barnhart Post Office’’. 

Speaker of the House of Representatives. 

Vice President of the United States and

President of the Senate.
#### Corey HINES, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent.

No. 63842.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division One.

Oct. 12, 1993.

S. Paige Canfield, St. Louis, for appellant.

Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen., Michael J. Runzi, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.

Before CRANDALL, P.J., and REINHARD and CRIST, JJ.

*ORDER*

PER CURIAM.

Defendant pleaded guilty to distributing a controlled substance near a school and possession of a controlled substance on June 4, 1991. The trial court sentenced Defendant on that date. Defendant was delivered to the custody of the Department of Corrections on June 10, 1991. He filed a Rule 24.035 motion on March 9, 1993, which was denied as untimely.

On appeal, Defendant contends the mandatory time limits of Rule 24.035 violate his due process rights. We deny Defendant’s point pursuant to the mandate of the Missouri Supreme Court in *Day v. State,*770 S.W.2d 692, 695[1] (Mo. banc 1989). In that ease, the Supreme Court found the time limits of Rule 24.035 to be reasonable, “serv[ing] the legitimate end of avoiding delay in the processing of prisoners claims and prevent the litigation of stale claims.” *Id.*Point denied.

Judgment affirmed pursuant to Rule 84-16(b)(2).
#### Larry E. HILL, Movant-Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent.

No. 16364.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District, Division Two.

Jan. 30, 1990.

S. Dean Price, Sp. Dist. Defender, Springfield, for movant-appellant.

William L. Webster, Atty. Gen., Robert P. Sass, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.

PER CURIAM.

Movant Larry E. Hill appeals from the trial court’s denial, after evidentiary hearing, of his Rule 24.0351 motion seeking to vacate a judgment and sentence pronounced by that court on July 28, 1986. The judgment was entered pursuant to a plea of guilty. The sentence was executed on May 20, 1987, after movant’s probation had been revoked.

The instant motion was filed on January 5, 1989, and was untimely. Movant had not filed a prior motion under Rule 27.26. Accordingly, the deadline for filing the instant motion was “on or before June 30, 1988,” Rule 24.035(2), because the sentence was pronounced prior to January 1, 1988.

The time limitations contained in Rule 24.035 are valid and mandatory. *Day v. State,*770 S.W.2d 692, 695[1] (Mo. banc 1989). The failure of movant to file a motion on or before June 30, 1988, “constituted a complete waiver of the right to proceed under [Rule 24.035].” Id. at 696[2]. See also *White v. State,*779 S.W.2d 571 (Mo. banc 1989).

Although the trial court heard the motion on the merits and denied it, its correct course would have been to enter an order of dismissal. Pursuant to Rule 84.14, this court hereby sets aside the order of the trial court and, in lieu thereof, enters the following order: “This proceeding is dismissed for the reason that it was not filed within the time limit prescribed by Rule 24.035(1), V.A.M.R.”

As so amended, the judgment is affirmed.

All concur.

1

. All references to rules are to Missouri Rules of Court, V.A.M.R.
[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 76 (Thursday, April 20, 1995)]
[Notices]
[Page 19718]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-9731]



-----------------------------------------------------------------------


DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
Rural Utilities Service


Lamar Electric Membership Corporation; Finding of No Significant 
Impact

AGENCY: Rural Utilities Service, USDA.

ACTION: Notice of finding of no significant impact.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: Notice is hereby given that the Rural Utilities Service (RUS) 
has made a finding of no significant impact (FONSI) with respect to a 
request by Lamar Electric Membership Corporation (EMC) to use its 
general funds to construct an office and operations center in Lamar 
County, Georgia. The FONSI is based on a Borrower's Environmental 
Report (BER) submitted to RUS by Lamar EMC. RUS conducted an 
independent evaluation of the report and concurs with its scope and 
content. In accordance with RUS Environmental Policies and Procedures, 
7 CFR 1794.61, RUS has adopted the BER as its environmental assessment 
for the project.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Lawrence R. Wolfe, Chief, Environmental Compliance Branch, Electric 
Staff Division, RUS, Ag. Box 1569, Washington, DC 20250-1569, telephone 
(202) 720-1784.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The office and operations center is proposed 
to be located at the 1300 block of Highway 341/Georgia Highway 7 
approximately 1.5 miles south of Barnesville, Georgia, on the west side 
of Highway 341. The size of the proposed site for the center is 16.8 
acres of which 10 acres will be developed for buildings, storage, 
parking, traffic lanes, and a landscaped yard.
    The office and operations center will consist of the following:

A 38,000 square foot building to be made up of 13,083 square feet of 
office space and 24,829 square feet of warehouse, loading dock, and 
vehicle storage space,
A 3,600 square foot building that will contain an equipment maintenance 
area and wash bay for vehicles and equipment,
Outdoor concrete pads and platforms for storage of special equipment 
such as regulators and transformers,
A fuel service island with two 10,000 gallon fuel storage tanks,
Sixty-eight employee parking spaces and 27 visitor parking spaces, and 
Traffic lanes into, around, and out of the facility.

    RUS considered the alternatives of no action and remodeling Lamar 
EMC's existing headquarters facility and adding a warehouse at that 
site as opposed to approving the use of general funds for construction 
at the proposed site.
    Copies of the environmental assessment and FONSI are available for 
review at, or can be obtained from, RUS at the address provided herein 
or from Lamar Electric Membership Corporation, 314 College Drive, 
Barnesville, Georgia 30204, telephone (404) 358-1383.

    Dated: April 13, 1995.
Adam M. Golodner,
Deputy Administrator, Program Operations.
[FR Doc. 95-9731 Filed 4-19-95; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3410-15-M
## SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 

## Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

**501 CAF 14-02288**  PRESENT: SMITH, J.P., CENTRA, DEJOSEPH, CURRAN, AND SCUDDER, JJ.

IN THE MATTER OF IAN WALKER, PETITIONER-RESPONDENT,

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

SUNSHINE CARROLL, RESPONDENT-APPELLANT. (APPEAL NO. 1.)

DAVID J. PAJAK, ALDEN, FOR RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

BENNETT SCHECHTER ARCURI & WILL, LLP, BUFFALO (ANDREW F. EMBORSKY OF COUNSEL), FOR PETITIONER-RESPONDENT.

LYDIA V. EVANS, ATTORNEY FOR THE CHILD, FREDONIA.

Appeal from an order of the Family Court, Chautauqua County (Judith S. Claire, J.), entered June 24, 2014 in a proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 6. The order, inter alia, awarded petitioner sole custody of the subject child.

It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: In appeal No. 1, respondent mother appeals from an order that, inter alia, granted petitioner father’s petition seeking sole custody of the parties’ child. In appeal No. 2, the mother appeals from an order that denied her motion pursuant to CPLR 4404 (b) and 5015 (a) to vacate the order that is the subject of appeal No. 1.

Contrary to the mother’s contention in appeal No. 1, “this proceeding involves an initial court determination with respect to custody and, [a]lthough the parties’ informal arrangement is a factor to be considered, [the father] is not required to prove a substantial change in circumstances in order to warrant a modification thereof” ( Matter of DeNise v DeNise , 129 AD3d 1539, 1539-1540 [internal quotation marks omitted]). Contrary to the mother’s further contention, affording great deference to Family Court’s assessment of witness credibility, we conclude that the court’s determination that the best interests of the child would be best served by awarding custody to the father has a sound and substantial basis in the record ( see Matter of Thillman v Mayer , 85 AD3d 1624, 1625). We likewise affirm the order in appeal No. 2. Even assuming, arguendo, that the mother’s request for relief under CPLR 4404 (b) was timely pursuant to CPLR 4405, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in**-2- 501 CAF 14-02288** 

denying the motion pursuant to CPLR 4404 (b) and 5015 (a) ( see Matter of Ramsey H. [Benjamin K.] , 99 AD3d 1040, 1043, lv denied 20 NY3d 858; Marine Midland Bank v Cramer , 177 AD2d 1009, 1009, lv dismissed 79 NY2d 915).

Entered: June 10, 2016 Frances E. Cafarell Clerk of the Court
[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 71 (Thursday, April 13, 1995)]
[Notices]
[Pages 18804-18805]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-9052]



=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Department of the Army

Army Science Board; Closed Meeting
    In accordance with Section 10(a)(2) of the Federal Advisory 
Committee Act (Pub. L. 92-463), announcement is made of the following 
Committee Meeting:
    Name of committee: Army Science Board (ASB).
    Date of meeting: 2 & 3 May 1995.
    Time of meeting: 0930-1700, 2 May 1995; 0800-1700, 3 May 1995.
    Place: 2 May 1995--Norfolk, VA--Atlantic Command (ACOM); Ft. 
Monroe, VA-TRADOC. 3 May 1995--Ft. Lee, VA--Combined Arms Support 
Command (CASCOM)
    Agenda: The Army Science Board's Logistics and Sustainability 
Subgroup will meet on current doctrine, missions, functions, force 
structures and modules, and technologies reference ``Army Logistical 
Support to Military Operations Other Than War.'' Discussions will 
cover the ACOM, TRADOC and CASCOM logistics 

[[Page 18805]]
perspectives on Military Operations Other Than War. These meetings will 
be closed to the public in accordance with Section 552b(c) of title 
5, U.S.C., specifically subparagraph (1) thereof, and Title 5, 
U.S.C., Appendix 2, subsection 10(d). The classified and 
unclassified matter to be discussed is so inextricably intertwined 
so as to preclude opening any portions of these meetings. The ASB 
Administrative Officer, Sally Warner, may be contacted for further 
information at (703) 695-0781.
Sally A. Warner,
Administrative Officer, Army Science Board.
[FR Doc. 95-9052 Filed 4-12-95; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3710-08-M
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 9
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1999
<CASH>                                           3,240
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                           3,583
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                                     0
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                     0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                     27,043
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                               0
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                                 0
<LOANS>                                         24,051
<ALLOWANCE>                                        607
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  91,741
<DEPOSITS>                                      81,246
<SHORT-TERM>                                         0
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                                 97
<LONG-TERM>                                         42
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           924
<OTHER-SE>                                       9,238
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>                  91,741
<INTEREST-LOAN>                                  4,694
<INTEREST-INVEST>                                1,552
<INTEREST-OTHER>                                   293
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                                 6,539
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                               2,357
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               2,360
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                            4,179
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                        0
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                                   0
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                                  3,961
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  1,014
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                       1,014
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                       704
<EPS-BASIC>                                       0.77
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.73
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                    5.30
<LOANS-NON>                                          0
<LOANS-PAST>                                         0
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                                     0
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                      0
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                                   618
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                     (18)
<RECOVERIES>                                         5
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                                  607
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                               607
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                              0


</TABLE>
<TABLE> <S> <C>




<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-27-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-27-1998
<CASH>                                      12,623,817
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                3,075,066
<ALLOWANCES>                                 (456,448)
<INVENTORY>                                  2,867,662
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             2,558,960
<PP&E>                                     152,747,531
<DEPRECIATION>                              26,574,751
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             155,545,834
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       28,557,356
<BONDS>                                              0
<COMMON>                                        20,300
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<OTHER-SE>                                           0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>               155,545,834
<SALES>                                    129,972,093
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                           142,588,196
<CGS>                                       17,453,312
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               99,136,829
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                            25,301,744
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           1,532,380
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              3,378,631
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          3,378,631
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                            153,436,882
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               156,815,513
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
#### Beverly Ann ASBURY, Respondent, v. William Joseph ASBURY, Appellant.

No. WD 41171.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.

Sept. 26, 1989.

Robert G. Smith, Brookfield, for appellant.

Cynthia A. Suter, Kyser & Suter, Moberly, for respondent.

Before SHANGLER, J., Presiding, and LOWENSTEIN and ULRICH, JJ.

ORDER

PER CURIAM:

The twenty-eight-year marriage of Mr. and Mrs. Asbury was dissolved on June 8, 1988. Mr. Asbury now appeals alleging error in (1) the division of marital property, (2) the award of maintenance, and (3) the award of attorney fees on appeal. The judgment is affirmed. Rule 84.16(b).
Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia Clerk's Office, Atlanta, November 09, 2015. I certify that the above is a true extract from the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia. Witness my signature and the seal of said court hereto affixed the day and year last above written. , Clerk. 

# Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia
ATLANTA, November 09, 2015 The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order A16D0090. STEPHEN THOMAS HOLMES v. THE STATE . Upon consideration of the Application for Discretionary Appeal, it is ordered that it be hereby DENIED.
LC NUMBERS: 2009CR0119
#### KENTUCKY BAR ASSOCIATION, CLE COMMISSION, Movant, v. Julia Caldwell MORRIS, Respondent.

No. 92-SC-1044-KB.

Supreme Court of Kentucky.

Feb. 18, 1993.

ORDER

Pursuant to SCR 3.669, this Court finds that Julia Caldwell Morris, respondent, has not shown cause for her failure to comply with the minimum continuing legal education requirements of SCR 3.661.

Respondent is hereby notified of her proposed suspension from the practice of law twenty (20) days from the date of this order, pursuant to SCR 3.668(2), unless before that date she complies with the requirements of SCR 3.667(2), including her application for extension of time and payment of the filing fee.

Upon failure to timely comply with the terms of this order, respondent, Julia Caldwell Morris, is suspended from the practice of law pursuant to SCR 3.668(2).

Entered: February 18, 1993.

/s/ Robert F. Stephens Chief Justice
**Exhibit 3.3**

**AMENDMENT TO THE****BYLAWS****OF****MOUNTAIN BANK HOLDING COMPANY**

 

            As adoptedby a majority of the Board of Directors of Mountain Bank Holding Company at ameeting held on January 16, 2001.

  TheBoard of Directors approves the following amendment to the Bylaws by adding thefollowing new Section 2.3 to the Bylaws and renumbering the subsequent sectionsaccordingly.

2.3     Mandatory Retirement.  Upon attaining the age of 75, a directorwill submit a written notice of resignation to the Board of Directors.  The Board, at its discretion, may determine not to accept the resignation.
#### William D. STIVERS, Plaintiff/Respondent, v. Paul EBERT, Defendant/Appellant.

No. 76643.

Supreme Court of Missouri, En Banc.

Nov. 22, 1994.

John G. Enright, Eric A. Ruttencutter, St. Louis, for appellant.

David T. Butseh, Michael A. Lawder, St. Louis, John Allen Taylor, Louisville, Kentucky, for respondent.

PER CURIAM.

The parties agree that the circuit court granted additur but that the Defendant neither had the option of a new trial nor consented to additur. This Court thus reverses based on *Tucci v. Moore,*875 S.W.2d 115, 117 (Mo. banc 1994), decided three months after the judgment in this case.

The only issue is the scope of remand. Defendant contends that the circuit court, on remand, must reinstate the jury’s damages verdict. The circuit court overruled the Plaintiffs motion for new trial, which alleged the verdict was

> inadequate, given the facts and evidence presented, and was, in fact, against the weight of evidence presented.

However, the court granted additur, finding the verdict was

> inadequate because the amount of the jury verdict is less than fair and reasonable compensation for plaintiffs injuries and damages given the evidence presented.

The rulings of the circuit court are inconsistent. Additur requires a finding that “a new trial on damages is warranted.” *Tucci,*875 S.W.2d at 116. On remand, the circuit court shall reconsider and reconcile the post-trial rulings and then proceed in accord with *Tucci*

The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the
Annual Report of Destination Maternity Corporation (the Company) on Form 10-K/A for the period ending September 30, 2010 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), the
undersigned certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

1. The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results
of operations of the Company.



|                                                                                 
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|/S/  EDWARD M. KRELL                                                             
|Edward M. Krell Chief
Executive Officer & President (Principal Executive Officer)

January 11, 2011