alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 67 (Friday, April 7, 1995)]
[Notices]
[Page 17825]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-8558]



-----------------------------------------------------------------------


NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION

Special Emphasis Panel in Biological Sciences; Notice of Meeting

    In accordance with the Federal Advisory Committee Act (Pub. L. 92-
463, as amended), the National Science Foundation (NSF) announces the 
following meeting.

    Name: Special Emphasis Panel in Biological Sciences (1754).
    Date and Times: April 27-28, 1995; 9:00 a.m.-5:00 p.m.
    Place: National Science Foundation, Room 320, 4201 Wilson 
Boulevard, Arlington, VA.
    Type of Meeting: Part open.
    Contact Person: Dr. Karen Sigvardt, Program Director, Division 
of Integrative Biology and Neuroscience, Suite 685, National Science 
Foundation, 4201 Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, VA 22230, Telephone: 
(703b 306-1416.
    Purpose of Meeting: To provide advice and recommendations 
concerning proposals submitted to NSF for financial support.
    Minutes: May be obtained from the contact person listed above.
    Agenda: Open Session: April 28, 1995, 11:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon, 
to discuss goals and assessment procedures. Closed Session: April 
27, 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.; April 28, 9:00 a.m. to 11:00 a.m. and 
12:00 noon to 5:00 p.m. to review and evaluate Biosystems Analysis 
and Control (BAC) proposals as part of the selection process for 
awards.
    Reason for Closing: The proposals being reviewed include 
information of a proprietary or confidential nature, including 
technical information; financial data, such as salaries; and 
personal information concerning individuals associated with the 
proposals. These matters are exempt under 5 U.S.C. 552b(c) (4) and 
(6) of the Government in the Sunshine Act.

    Dated: April 3, 1995.
M. Rebecca Winkler,
Committee Management Officer.
[FR Doc. 95-8558 Filed 4-6-95; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7555-01-M
```

[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 552 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

118th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 552

     To prohibit United States contributions to the United Nations 
International Organization for Migration (IOM), the United Nations High 
 Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and the United Nations Relief and 
 Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), and for 
                            other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            January 26, 2023

Mr. Gooden of Texas (for himself, Mr. Duncan, Mr. Gaetz, Mrs. Miller of 
Illinois, Mr. Gosar, Mr. Tiffany, Mr. Donalds, Mr. Biggs, Mr. Weber of 
 Texas, Mr. Perry, Mr. Sessions, Mr. Jackson of Texas, Mr. Babin, and 
  Mr. Ogles) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                      Committee on Foreign Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
     To prohibit United States contributions to the United Nations 
International Organization for Migration (IOM), the United Nations High 
 Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and the United Nations Relief and 
 Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), and for 
                            other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``No Tax Dollars for the United 
Nation's Immigration Invasion Act''.

SEC. 2. PROHIBITION.

    Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Federal Government 
may not make a contribution to the United Nations International 
Organization for Migration (IOM), the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR), or the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for 
Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA).

SEC. 3. GAO STUDY AND REPORT.

    (a) Study.--The Comptroller General of the United States shall 
conduct a study to--
            (1) identify all Federal assistance programs that provide 
        funds in the form of grants or loans to the United Nations IOM, 
        UNHCR, and UNRWA;
            (2) for each of fiscal years 2021 and 2022, identify the 
        total amount of funds provided to IOM, UNHCR, and UNRWA, 
        including the amount provided under each Federal assistance 
        program identified under paragraph (1);
            (3) identify any restrictions under each Federal assistance 
        program identified under paragraph (1) regarding such funding; 
        and
            (4) assess and specify the amount of funds IOM, UNHCR, and 
        UNRWA should repay to the United States Government.
    (b) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General shall submit to Congress 
a report that contains the results of the study required by subsection 
(a).
                                 <all>
```
#### In the ESTATE OF Robert J. STROETKER, decedent, Joseph Stroetker, Personal Representative, Appellant, v. Albert L. CASKEY, Respondent.

No. 69221.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division Three.

Nov. 19, 1996.

Nicholas G. Gasaway, Darrell E. Missey, Hillsboro, for appellant.

T. Richard Mager, Jeffrey S. Berkbigler, Feirich, Mager, Green & Ryan, Carbondale, IL, for respondent.

HOFF, Judge.

Joseph Stroetker (Stroetker), personal representative of the estate of Robert J. *36Stroetker (decedent), appeals the judgment entered by the trial court on his petition to discover assets and to declare and distribute a trust. The trial court denied Stroetker’s request to impose a constructive trust upon assets that decedent’s nephew, Albert L. Caskey (Caskey), acquired through operation of law as a joint tenant with right of survivor-ship on assets with decedent.

In his first, second, and third points, Stroetker argues alternatively that the joint tenancy with right of survivorship was actually an express trust, resulting trust, or constructive trust.

Because Stroetker’s only theories on appeal allege alternative theories of trust, we hold he does not have standing as personal representative for the decedent’s estate to bring this appeal. Under his alternative theories regarding the establishment of a trust, the heirs of the estate would not benefit, but rather the individuals named in the trust.

In order to have proper standing, the party seeking relief must show two things. *Mattis v. Schnarr,*502 F.2d 588, 593 (8th Cir.1974). First, the party must show that he is sufficiently affected by the action he is challenging to justify consideration by the court of the validity of the action, and second, that the action violates the rights of the particular party who is attacking it and not of some third party. *Id.*

Because the estate cannot benefit by the relief requested on appeal, the personal representative has no standing on appeal.

Appeal dismissed.

CRAHAN, P.J., and GRIMM, J., concur.
The State of



# Fourth Court of Appeals

**San Antonio, Texas**

December 28, 2015

N o. 04

- 15

- 00530

- CR

Abelardo Gerardo GONZALEZ

, Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From the 111th Judicial District Court, Webb County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2008CRR000662

- D1

Honorable David Peeples, Judge Presiding



### ORDER

Sitting: Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice

Karen Angelini, Justice

Marialyn Barnard, Justice

Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice

Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice

Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

Jason Pulliam, Justice

The Court has considered the Appellant ’ s Motion for Rehearing En Banc, and the motion

is DENIED.

_________________________________ Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said

court on this 28th day of December, 2015

.

___________________________________ Keith E. Hottle

Clerk of Court
#### Linda Marie Lemus CANTU, Appellant, v. Dennis David CANTU, Appellee.

No. 04-89-00165-CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas, San Antonio.

July 26, 1989.

Sharon Trigo, Laredo, for appellant.

Charles R. Borchers, Person, Whitworth, Ramos, Borchers & Morales, Laredo, Richard R. Orsinger, San Antonio, for appellee.

Before BUTTS, CHAPA and CARR, JJ.

ON APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR REHEARING

PER CURIAM.

Appellant’s motion for rehearing is granted. Our opinion of May 3, 1989, is withdrawn, and the appeal is reinstated.

We dismissed this appeal for want of jurisdiction on May 3, 1989, on the ground that the transcript failed to show that appellant had filed a timely cost bond or a motion for extension of time to file the bond. TEX R.APP.P. 41(a).

Appellant argues in her motion for rehearing that the time time to perfect her appeal had not expired because she did not receive actual notice of the signing of the divorce decree within 20 days of the date of judgment. *See*TEX.R.APP.P. 5(b)(4). She also states that she filed her Rule 5(b)(4) *430motion and that the trial court had set it for hearing on May 22,1989. As of June 6, however, the motion had not been heard.

On June 6, 1989, we ordered the trial court to hold the hearing and to determine the date on which appellant first received notice or had actual knowledge of the signing of the divorce decree.

We have now received the trial court’s order from that hearing. The court found that neither appellant nor her attorney received notice of the judgment or acquired knowledge of its signing until January 17, 1989.

January 17, 1989, is more than 20 days after the divorce decree was signed on December 20, 1988. Therefore, pursuant to Rule 5(b)(4), the appellate timetable in this case shall run from January 17, 1989. Appellant’s cost bond, now due by April 17, 1989, and filed on March 21,1989, is timely. Her appeal is ordered reinstated.

Pursuant to the modified timetable, the record is due by May 17, 1989.
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

July 3, 2019

RE: Product Exclusion Request Number USTR-2018-0025-6889

Sears Holdings Management Corporation:

The purpose of this letter is to inform you that the product exclusion request referenced 

above has been denied. As you are aware, USTR published a Federal Register notice (83 FR 

28710) on June 20, 2018, that announced the Trade Representative’s determination to impose an 

additional duty of 25 percent on certain products from China. On July 11, 2018, the Trade 

Representative published a Federal Register notice (83 FR 32181) which announced that a 

process had been established under which interested persons could request that products falling 

within a covered HTSUS subheading be excluded from the additional duties announced on June 

20.

Your request was reviewed in accordance with the factors and procedures set forth in 

Section B(1) of the July 11 notice. Based on that review, and after careful consideration, your 

request was denied because the request did not contain a sufficient product identification or was 

determined to be non-administrable.

Because USTR will grant exclusion requests on a product specific basis, you may still 

benefit from a product exclusion if a similar product is granted an exclusion. Products for which 

an exclusion has been granted will be periodically announced on the USTR website. Product 

exclusions will become legally effective once published in the Federal Register. 

Sincerely,

Joseph Barloon

General Counsel
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

J. D. JORDAN,

Plaintiff

- Appellant,

v.

JAY C. HOAG, Founding General Partner,

Technology Crossover Ventures; et al.,

Defendants

- Appellees. No. 18

- 15451

D.C. No. 5:15

- cv

- 01819

- EJD

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Edward J. Davila, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted March 12, 2019 **

Before: LEAVY, BEA, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

J.D. Jordan appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his

action alleging a claim under § 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act. We have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district court’s

dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), Hebbe v. Pliler , 627

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unani mously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

MAR 19 2019

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLER K

U.S. COURT OF APPEAL S2 18

- 15451

F.3d 338, 341 (9th Cir. 2010), and we affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Jordan’s action because Jordan failed

to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim. See 17 C.F. R. § 240.16b

– 6(a)

(“ The establishment of

. . . a call equivalent position



### . . . shall be deemed a

purchase of the underlying security for purpos es of section 16(b) of the Act

. . . .”)

,

§ 240.16b

– 6(b) ( disposition of underlying securities due to the exercise of a put

equivalent position shall be exempt from the operation of § 16(b)) ; Strom v. United

States , 641 F.3d 1051, 1060

- 62 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth elements of a § 16(b)

claim; concluding that “unvested securities are acquired, and thus ‘purchased’

under § 16(b), when granted ” ); Hebbe , 627 F.3d at 341

- 42 (although pro se

pleadings are construed liberally, a plaintiff must present factual allegations

sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief).

Appellees’ motion for summary affirmance and sanctions (Docket Entry No.

10) is denied.

Appell ant ’ s motion for judicial notice (Docket Entry No. 18) is denied.

AFFIRMED.
[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 71 (Thursday, April 13, 1995)]
[Notices]
[Page 18850]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-9101]



-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
[VT-046-01-1430-00]


Notice of Realty Action, Conveyance of Public Land in Garfield 
County, Utah, Panguitch City Airport, UTU-71137; Correction

SUMMARY: In notice document UTU-71137 beginning on page 9393 in the 
issue of Friday, February 17, 1995, the lands to be conveyed are 
incorrectly described. On page 9394, in the first column, under the 
heading, ``Panguitch City Airport'', in the land description, in T. 34 
S., R. 5 W., ``Section 14, SW\1/4\NW\1/4\SW\1/4\NE\1/4\; W\1/2\SW\1/
4\SW\1/4\NE\1/4\; S\1/2\NE\1/4\SE\1/4\NW\1/4\; SE\1/4\NE\1/4\SE\1/
4\NW\1/4\; E\1/2\SW\1/4\SE\1/4\NW\1/4\; SE\1/4\SE\1/4\NW\1/4\'' should 
read ``Section 14, SW\1/4\NW\1/4\SW\1/4\NE\1/4\; W\1/2\SW\1/4\SW\1/
4\NE\1/4\; S\1/2\NE\1/4\SE\1/4\NW\1/4\; SE\1/4\NW\1/4\SE\1/4\NW\1/4\; 
E\1/2\SW\1/4\SE\1/4\NW\1/4\; SE\1/4\SE\1/4\NW\1/4\''.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION:
Detailed information concerning this action is available for review at 
the Kanab Area Office, 318 North 1st East, Kanab, Utah 84741, telephone 
(801) 644-2272.

    Dated: April 7, 1995.
G. Von Swain,
Acting District Manager.
[FR Doc. 95-9101 Filed 4-12-95; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4310-DQ-M
Exhibit 32.1

Certification of CEO Pursuant to

18 U.S.C. Section 1350,

As Adopted Pursuant to

Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

In connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K of First State
Bancorporation, a New Mexico corporation (the Company), for the period ended December 31, 2008, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Michael R. Stanford, as President
and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results
of operations of the Company.

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to First State
Bancorporation and will be retained by First State Bancorporation and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.



|                                                         
|---------------------------------------------------------
|                                                         
|/s/    MICHAEL R.
STANFORD                               
|Michael R. Stanford President and Chief Executive Officer

March 31, 2009

This certification accompanies the Report pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not, except to the extent required by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, be deemed filed by the Company for
purposes of §18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.
Exhibit6.14

 

 

INDEPENDENT AUDITOR’SCONSENT

 

We consent to the incorporation by reference in Registration StatementNo. 333-61782 of Mountain Bank Holding Company on Form S-8 of our report, datedJanuary 15, 2001, appearing in this Annual Report on Form 10-KSB of MountainBank Holding Company for the year ended December 31, 2001.

 

 

/s/ Knight Vale &Gregory PLLC

 

Tacoma, Washington

March 8, 2002

 

 

1

----

 

INDEPENDENT AUDITOR’SCONSENT

 

We consent to the incorporationby reference in Registration Statement No. 333-61782 of Mountain Bank HoldingCompany on Form S-8 of our report, dated January 11, 2002, appearing in thisAnnual Report on Form 10-KSB of Mountain Bank Holding Company for the yearended December 31, 2001.

 

 

/s/ McGladrey & Pullen,LLP

 

Tacoma, Washington

March 8, 2002

 

 

2

----
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Elliot Warner, Also Known as Maurice Warner, Appellant.

Appeal by the defendant from two judgments of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Appelman, J.), both rendered September 14, 1987, convicting him of criminal possession of stolen property in the first degree under indictment No. 5999/86, and attempted robbery in the first degree under indictment No. 4197/87, upon his pleas of guilty, and imposing sentences.

Ordered that the judgments are affirmed.

We have reviewed the record and agree with the defendant’s assigned counsel that there are no meritorious issues which could be raised on appeal. Counsel’s application for leave to withdraw as counsel is granted *(see, Anders v California,*386 US 738; *People v Paige,*54 AD2d 631; *cf., People v Gonzalez,*47 NY2d 606). Thompson, J. P., Brown, Rubin, Balletta and Miller, JJ., concur.
#### Melvin E. OGLE, Respondent, v. DIRECTOR OF REVENUE, Appellant.

No. WD 50089.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.

Feb. 28, 1995.

*404Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen., Rodney P. Massman, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Mo. Dept, of Revenue, Jefferson City, for appellant.

Mark L. Williams, Kirksville, Seth D. Shu-maker, Lancaster, for respondent.

Before FENNER, C.J., P.J., and LOWENSTEIN and BERREY, JJ.

FENNER, Chief Judge.

On March 10, 1994, the Director of Revenue (“Director”) issued a notice to respondent, Melvin E. Ogle, indicating that his driving privilege would be suspended for thirty days for accumulating eight or more points in an eighteen month period. On April 14, 1994, Ogle filed a petition in the Circuit Court of Adair County seeking review of this suspension. After a hearing, Judge Bruce Normile entered an order on August 15, 1994, setting aside the suspension action ordered by the Director. The Director appeals this order.

In its sole point on appeal, the Director contends the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to set aside the suspension action because Ogle failed to timely file his petition for review.

Section 302.311, RSMo 1994, provides that in the event a license is suspended, the licensee may appeal to the circuit court within thirty days of the date of the notice of suspension. The rule is well established that failure to file a petition for review of an administrative decision within thirty days, as prescribed by § 302.311, RSMo 1994, deprives the circuit court of subject matter jurisdiction. *Welch v. Director of Revenue,*859 S.W.2d 230, 231 (Mo.App.1993). The thirty-day time limitation is triggered by the sending of the notice by the Director. *Id.*In this case, the notice was mailed on March 10, 1994. Therefore, Ogle’s petition, filed on April 14, 1994, was filed four days after the expiration of the thirty-day time limitation.

Lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised for the first time on appeal. *Welch,*at 231 (citing *Ferguson v. Director of Revenue,*783 S.W.2d 132, 133 (Mo.App.1989)). Any action taken by a court lacking subject matter jurisdiction is null and void. *Ferguson,*783 S.W.2d at 133. Since Ogle filed his petition for review out of time, the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to set aside his driver’s license suspension. Therefore, the order setting aside the suspension is void and is hereby vacated.

All concur.
DENY and Opinion Filed September 23 , 2022

In The 

### Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05 - 22 - 00760 - CV IN RE THE STATE OF T EXAS , Relator Original Proceeding from the County Court at Law No. 2

Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. CC - 22 - 02427 - B MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Myers, Nowell, and Goldstein

Opinion by Justice Myers Relator, the State of Texas, has filed this petition for writ of mandamus complainin g that (1) the trial court abused its discretion by striking the State’s intervention and (2) real party in interest lacks standing to bring the underlying suit

. Entitlement to mandamus relief requires relator to show that the trial court clearly abused it s discretion and that relator lacks an adequate appellate remedy. In re Prudential Ins. Co

. of Am. , 148 S.W.3d 124, 135

– 36 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding). After reviewing the petition and the record before us, we conclude that the State has failed to demon strate that the trial court abused its discretion. Accordingly,

we deny the petition for writ of mandamus. See T EX . R. A PP . P. 52.8(a).– 2

–

Also pending before the Court is relator’s motion to consolidate th is original proceeding with two related appeals. Hav ing denied the petition for writ of mandamus, we deny the motion as moot.

220760f.p05 /Lana Myers/ / LANA MYERS JUSTICE
#### Donald HOLLIDAY, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent.

No. 63878.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division One.

Nov. 2, 1993.

John Klosterman, Asst. Public Defender, St. Louis, for appellant.

Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen., John M. Morris, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.

Before CRANDALL, P.J., and REINHARD and CRIST, JJ.

*ORDER*

PER CURIAM.

Defendant appeals the denial of his Rule 24.035 motion without an evidentiary hearing. We find no clear error and affirm pursuant to Rule 84.16(b)(2).

Further, we find an opinion in this matter would have no precedential value and affirm by written order. We have provided a memorandum for use by the parties only.
#### Beverly J. WATKINS, Respondent, v. Larry D. WATKINS, Appellant.

No. WD 46949.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.

July 13, 1993.

Steven D. Wolcott, Liberty, for appellant.

Michael Svetlic, Steven M. Petry, Kansas City, for respondent.

Before BERREY, P.J., and BRECKENRIDGE and HANNA, JJ.

ORDER

PER CURIAM.

Appeal from a decree of dissolution.

Affirmed. Rule 84.16(b).