alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Joseph BAKER, Appellant, v. CITY OF KANSAS CITY, Missouri, et al., Respondents.

No. WD 49629.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.

May 30, 1995.

Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer to Supreme Court Denied Aug. 1, 1995.

Application to Transfer Denied Sept. 19, 1995.

M. Corinne Corley, Corley Law Firm, Kansas City, for appellant.

Kathleen A. Hauser, City Atty., Walter J. O’Toole, Asst. City Atty., Kansas City, for David Marak and Kansas City.

Dale H. Close, Lisa S. Morris, Kansas City, for Lane, Walker and Rey.

Before BRECKENRIDGE, P.J., and ELLIS and LAURA DENVIR STITH, JJ.

*ORDER*

PER CURIAM:

Appeal from judgments in malicious prosecution and civil rights actions.

Judgment affirmed. Rule 84.16(b).
Exhibit 13.2

CERTIFICATION

(pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to

Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002)

In connection with this Amendment No. 2 to the Annual Report on Form 20-F/A for the fiscal year ended November 30, 2008 of Acergy S.A. (the
Company) as filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the Commission) on the date hereof (the Report) and pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, I, Simon Crowe, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, that:

(1) the Report fully
complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

(2) the
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



|                        |  |  |  |     |  |                                    
|----------------------- |  |  |  | --- |  | -----------------------------------
|Date: November 23, 2009 |  |  |  | By: |  | /s/    Simon Crowe                 
|                        |  |  |  |     |  | Simon Crowe Chief Financial Officer
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

April 21, 2004

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 03-50998

Summary Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

TERRY HAYES ESTES,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. W-03-CR-39-2

--------------------

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DAVIS and PRADO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Terry Hayes Estes pleaded guilty pursuant to a written plea

agreement to the manufacture of methamphetamine, and he was

sentenced to 235 months’ imprisonment, three years’ supervised

release, a $1,000 fine, and a $100 special assessment.

Estes argues on appeal that he was improperly sentenced

because the district court erred in calculating the amount of

methamphetamine involved. Estes’s arguments concern the amount
No. 03-50998

-2-

of methamphetamine contained in items seized at his home and at

the home of Robert Melton. However, the presentence report

(“PSR”), which was adopted by the district court, based Estes’s

sentence on evidence of Estes’s production of 3.18 kilograms of

methamphetamine during the prior seven months, rather than the

amount of methamphetamine seized at the two residences. Because

Estes has failed to brief the issue whether the use of the 3.18

kilograms in determining his sentence was accurate, the issue is

deemed abandoned. See Brinkmann v. Dallas County Deputy Sheriff

Abner, 813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1987). 

Furthermore, to the extent that Estes does argue that he was

not responsible for the 3.18 kilograms of methamphetamine

attributed to him, the district court did not clearly err in

relying on information contained in the PSR because Estes did not

meet his burden of proving that the information was “materially

untrue, inaccurate or unreliable.” See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3; United

States v. Vital, 68 F.3d 114, 120 (5th Cir. 1995); United States

v. Rogers, 1 F.3d 341, 344 (5th Cir. 1993). 

AFFIRMED.
<PAGE>

Exhibit 32


                    CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
                     AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER PURSUANT TO
                      SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT


         In connection with the Report of Nascent Wine Company, Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-QSB for the for the nine months and quarter ended
September 30, 2006 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the
date hereof (the "Report"), we, Sandro Piancone, Chief Executive Officer and
William Lindberg, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify pursuant to 18
U.S.C. section 1350, as adopted pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.


/s/ Sandro Piancone
----------------------------------
Sandro Piancone
Chief Executive Officer
November 20, 2006

/s/ William Lindberg
----------------------------------
William Lindberg
Chief Financial Officer
November 20, 2006
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

January 23, 2019

RE: Product Exclusion Request Number: USTR-2018-0025-7095

ECM Industries LLC:

The purpose of this letter is to inform you that the product exclusion request referenced 

above has been denied. As you are aware, USTR published a Federal Register notice (83 FR 

28710) on June 20, 2018, that announced the Trade Representative’s determination to impose an 

additional duty of 25 percent on certain products from China. On July 11, 2018, the Trade 

Representative published a Federal Register notice (83 FR 32181) which announced that a 

process had been established under which interested persons could request that products falling 

within a covered HTSUS subheading be excluded from the additional duties announced on June 

20. 

Your request was reviewed in accordance with the factors and procedures set forth in 

Section B(1) of the July 11 notice. Based on that review, and after careful consideration, your 

request was denied because the request failed to show that the imposition of additional duties on 

the particular product would cause severe economic harm to you or other U.S. interests.

Because USTR will grant exclusion requests on a product specific basis, you may still 

benefit from a product exclusion if a similar product is granted an exclusion. Products for which 

an exclusion has been granted will be periodically announced on the USTR website. Product 

exclusions will become legally effective once published in the Federal Register. 

Sincerely,

Stephen P. Vaughn

General Counsel
I 

118TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 5441 

To reauthorize Long Island Sound programs, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

SEPTEMBER 13, 2023 

Mr. LALOTA (for himself and Mr. COURTNEY) introduced the following bill; 

which was referred to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, and in addition to the Committee on Natural Resources, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned 

A BILL 

To reauthorize Long Island Sound programs, and for other 

purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Long Island Sound 

5 Restoration and Stewardship Reauthorization Act of 

6 2023’’. 


kjohnson on DSK7ZCZBW3PROD with $$_JOB
2 

•HR 5441 IH

1 SEC. 2. REAUTHORIZATION OF LONG ISLAND SOUND PRO2 GRAMS. 

3 (a) LONG ISLAND SOUND GRANTS.—Section 119(h) 

4 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (33 U.S.C. 

5 1269(h)) is amended by striking ‘‘2019 through 2023’’ 

6 and inserting ‘‘2024 through 2028’’. 

7 (b) LONG ISLAND SOUND STEWARDSHIP GRANTS.— 

8 Section 11(a) of the Long Island Sound Stewardship Act 

9 of 2006 (33 U.S.C. 1269 note; Public Law 109–359) is 

10 amended, in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by strik11 ing ‘‘2019 through 2023’’ and inserting ‘‘2024 through 

12 2028’’. 

13 (c) TECHNICAL AMENDMENT.—Section 119(g) of the 

14 Federal Water Pollution Control Act (33 U.S.C. 1269(g)) 

15 is amended by redesignating paragraph (4) as paragraph 

16 (3). 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK7ZCZBW3PROD with $$_JOB
CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS



We consent to the use of our report dated March 30, 2007 to the shareholders of Dundee Corporation on the consolidated balance sheets of Dundee Corporation as at December 31, 2006 and 2005 and the consolidated statements of operations, changes in shareholders equity and cash flows for the years then ended and our report dated May 8, 2007 related to the supplemental note Differences Between Canadian and United States Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, which are included in Dundee Corporations Form 40-F filing.  We have not audited any financial statements of Dundee Corporation subsequent to December 31, 2006 or performed any audit procedures subsequent to the date of our audit reports.





[usgaap002.gif]



Toronto, Canada

Chartered Accountants

May 8, 2007

Licensed Public Accountants
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 9
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the
consolidated condensed statement of financial condition and the consolidated
condensed statement of income and is qualified in its entirety by reference to
such financial statements.
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<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
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<CASH>                                          18,128
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                               0
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<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                    441,847
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<LONG-TERM>                                    590,150
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<INTEREST-LOAN>                                118,624
<INTEREST-INVEST>                               99,780
<INTEREST-OTHER>                                     0
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                               218,404
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                             102,261
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             137,170
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                           81,234
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                    1,400
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                               7,511
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                                 43,063
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 52,690
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<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    30,515
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     3.44
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     3.44
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                    2.72
<LOANS-NON>                                     12,120
<LOANS-PAST>                                       509
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                                     0
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                  3,707
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                                13,267
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<RECOVERIES>                                       241
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                               14,370
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                            14,370
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
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</TABLE>
#### Kenneth WHITBY, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent.

No. 69365.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division One.

Aug. 27, 1996.

*69John M. Schilmoeller, Asst. Public Defender, St. Louis, for appellant.

Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Attorney General, Breek K. Burgess, Assistant Attorney General, Jefferson City, for respondent.

GARY M. GAERTNER, Judge.

Appellant, Kenneth Whitby (“movant”), appeals the judgment of the Circuit Court for the City of St. Louis denying his Rule 24.035 motion without an evidentiary hearing. We vacate the judgment of the motion court and remand for dismissal.

On July 13,1993, movant pled guilty to one count of distribution of a controlled substance and two counts of sale of a controlled substance, RSMo § 195.211 (1994), and was sentenced to ten years on each count, said sentences to run consecutively. The trial court suspended the execution of the sentences and placed movant on two years probation. The court revoked the probation on January 5,1995, and executed the sentences. On April 22,1995, movant filed a *pro se*Rule 24.035 motion. The motion gave the date movant was delivered to the custody of the Department of Corrections as January 12, 1995. An amended motion was subsequently filed. The motion court denied movant’s motions without an evidentiary hearing. This appeal followed.

We need not address movant’s appeal, for the record shows movant’s *pro se*Rule 24.035 motion was filed out of time. A Rule 24.035 motion must be filed within ninety days of the date the movant was delivered to the Department of Corrections. Rule 24.035(b). Failure to file within the time provided by the rule constitutes a complete waiver of any right to proceed under the rule and of any claim that could be raised under the rule. *Id.*The time limits of Rule 24.035 are constitutional and mandatory. *Seward v. State,*871 S.W.2d 16, 17 (Mo.App. W.D.1993). If a Rule 24.035 motion is filed out of time, the motion court cannot address the merits of the motion but must dismiss it, even if the state does not request the court to do so. *Id.; see Butler v. State,*841 S.W.2d 192, 193 (Mo.App. E.D.1992).

Here, movant was delivered to the Department of Corrections on January 12, 1995, but did not file a Rule 24.035 motion until April 22, 1995, a hundred days later. Movant therefore waived his rights to proceed under Rule 24.035, and the motion court should have dismissed his claims. The fact that the state raised this issue for the first time on appeal is of no consequence. *See id.*

The judgment of the motion court is vacated and cause is remanded for dismissal of movant’s Rule 24.05 motion.

DOWD, P.J., and REINHARD, J., concur.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Pedro Hernandez, Appellant.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Aiello, J.), rendered June 23, 1987, convicting him of murder in the second degree (two counts), upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The proof at trial established that on the afternoon of February 16, 1986, the defendant and his friend, Sonny Rodriguez, sat in the defendant’s basement apartment at 78 Nor-wood Avenue in Brooklyn and planned to rob Miguel Rubio, the defendant’s landlord, in order to obtain money to buy drugs. The defendant lured Rubio, who was in the process of collecting rent from his tenants, down to the basement apartment, where the defendant and Rodriguez robbed and killed him. After stuffing Rubio’s body into a sleeping bag and concealing it in a wardrobe in his apartment, the defendant flew to Florida, where he was arrested for the murder some two weeks later.

On appeal, the defendant maintains that he was denied his right to a fair trial by the prosecutor’s cross-examination of him, which included certain sarcastic questions and an insinuation that he had an unspecified prior criminal record. Those contentions are without merit.

We note that when the prosecutor asked the defendant whether he had planned the robbery of Miguel Rubio with Sonny Rodriguez on the afternoon of the day the murder was committed, the defendant unexpectedly responded: "Of course not. I never been incarcerated for robbery. Sonny is doing time for robbery right now”. The prosecutor then asked if the defendant had been "incarcerated for other things”. Clearly, the prosecutor did not deliberately elicit testimony regarding whether or not the defendant had ever been incarcerated for robbery. In any event, the defendant’s nonresponsive answer to the prosecutor’s question "opened the door” to the prosecutor’s subsequent inquiry *(see, People v Melendez,*55 NY2d 445).

In this instance, as in the others complained of by the *550defendant on appeal, the defendant did not respond to the prosecutor’s question or remark; and the court sustained defense counsel’s objection and issued prompt curative instructions, with the result that any potential prejudice was dispelled *(see, People v Gibbs,*59 NY2d 930; *People v Galloway,*54 NY2d 396). In general, the prosecutor’s questions served to clarify the testimony and were not improper *(cf., People v Alicea,*37 NY2d 601; *People v Stewart,*92 AD2d 226). To the extent that some of the prosecutor’s questions or comments were tinged with more sarcasm than is altogether desirable, any error was harmless in view of the overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt, which included three separate confessions *(see, People v Crimmins,*36 NY2d 230; *People v Ketchum,*35 NY2d 740, *cert denied*420 US 928; *People v Roopchand,*107 AD2d 35, *affd*65 NY2d 837). Thompson, J. P., Eiber, Rosenblatt and Miller, JJ., concur.
* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

__________________ No. 96-40231 Conference Calendar

__________________ KOYTON GANT, Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus ROBERT C. CHESHIRE, District Judge, Defendant-Appellee.

- - - - - - - - - - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. CA-V-95-84
- - - - - - - - - - June 25, 1996 Before HIGGINBOTHAM, BARKSDALE, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Koyton Gant, # 666003, appeals the judgment of the district court dismissing his civil rights action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). He argues inter alia that Judge Cheshire is not entitled to absolute immunity in his function as the presiding judge in his state habeas corpus application. We have reviewed the record and Gant's brief and conclude that the district courtNo. 96-40231 -2- did not abuse its discretion. Gant v. Cheshire , No. CA-V-95-84 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 14, 1996). The appeal is without arguable merit and thus frivolous. See Howard v. King , 707 F.2d 215, 219-20 (5th Cir. 1983); 5th Cir. R. 42.2. We caution Gant that any additional frivolous appeals filed by him or on his behalf will invite the imposition of sanctions. To avoid sanctions, Gant is further cautioned to review all pending appeals to ensure that they do not raise arguments that are frivolous because they have been previously decided by this court. APPEAL DISMISSED. SANCTION WARNING ISSUED.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Preston Jones, Appellant.

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Alfred Kleiman, J.), rendered January 4, 1989, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of grand larceny in the fourth degree and sentencing him to an indeterminate term of imprisonment of from 2 to 4 years, and judgment of the same court (Leon Becker, J.), rendered January 5, 1989, convicting defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of grand larceny in the fourth degree and sentencing him to an indeterminate term of imprisonment of from 2 to 4 years, to run concurrently with the sentence imposed in the judgment rendered on January 4, 1989, are unanimously affirmed.

The evidence was legally sufficient and the guilty verdict was not against the weight of the evidence. The complainant felt his keys being pulled from his pocket, immediately turned around, saw a very tall man in a distinctive olive green shirt running away, saw the man drop the keys, and did not take his eyes off him for more than a second until he caught up with him in a subway station almost at the exact moment *152when the man, defendant herein, was arrested by a police officer who joined the chase upon observing the commotion it created. The complainant’s friend also saw defendant as he took the keys and, though he momentarily lost sight of him during the approximately 30-second chase, identified him as the thief when he caught up with defendant, the complainant and the police officer.

Defendant also claims that he was deprived of a fair trial by the testimony of the arresting officer as to the out-of-court description of defendant given by the complainant’s friend during the case, and the out-of-court identification of defendant made by the complainant immediately upon the arrest. However, in light of the strength of the in-court identification testimony, any error in admitting this testimony was harmless *(People v Mobley,*56 NY2d 584).

With respect to the judgment rendered on January 5, 1989, defendant argues that this court should vacate his guilty plea since it was induced by the understanding that the sentence would be concurrent with the sentence imposed for his conviction following trial in the other case. The argument presupposes a reversal of the trial conviction, and necessarily fails in the event of an affirmance. Concur—Ross, J. P., Asch, Kassal and Wallach, JJ.