IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 19-30252

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

EDDIE KENDRICKS JACKSON, also known as Mookie, also known as Mook 

Dog,

Defendant - Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Louisiana

USDC No. 1:17-CR-172-1

Before BARKSDALE, ELROD, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Eddie Kendricks Jackson pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute 50 

grams or more of methamphetamine and 500 grams or more of a mixture 

containing methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. 

The district court sentenced him to, inter alia, 300-months’ imprisonment,

 

* Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. 

R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

December 3, 2019

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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below the advisory Sentencing Guidelines range of 324- to 405-months’ 

imprisonment. 

Challenging only his sentence, Jackson asserts primarily that the court 

erred by treating his convictions at age 17 as predicate offenses in determining 

he was a career offender under the Guidelines, despite the Louisiana 

legislature’s having recently changed the age at which an offender must be 

considered an adult to 18-years-old. (As discussed infra, his other sentencing 

issue is waived.) 

Although post-Booker, the Guidelines are advisory only, the district 

court must avoid significant procedural error, such as improperly calculating 

the Guidelines sentencing range. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46, 51 

(2007). If no such procedural error exists, a properly preserved objection to an 

ultimate sentence is reviewed for substantive reasonableness under an abuseof-discretion standard. Id. at 51; United States v. Delgado-Martinez, 564 F.3d 

750, 751–53 (5th Cir. 2009). In that respect, for issues preserved in district 

court, its application of the Guidelines is reviewed de novo; its factual findings, 

only for clear error. E.g., United States v. Cisneros-Gutierrez, 517 F.3d 751, 

764 (5th Cir. 2008). 

“The Guidelines define a ‘career offender’ as an offender with at least two 

prior felony convictions for violent or drug-related crimes.” Buford v. United 

States, 532 U.S. 59, 60 (2001) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

“To serve as a predicate for the career-offender enhancement, a conviction 

must be an adult conviction.” United States v. Bams, 858 F.3d 937, 947 (5th 

Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). A conviction obtained at age 17 “is an adult 

conviction if it is classified as an adult conviction under the laws of the 

jurisdiction in which the defendant was convicted”. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 cmt. n.1. 

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Jackson does not dispute that his predicate convictions were classified 

as adult convictions under Louisiana law. He instead asserts the State has 

since raised the age for adult convictions. He speculates that, because the 

Supreme Court made retroactive its holdings that it is unconstitutional to 

execute an individual who was under 18-years-old at the time he committed a 

capital crime, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578–79 (2005), and to impose a 

mandatory sentence of life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile 

offenders, Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 732 (2016), Louisiana will 

make its new law retroactive. 

The Louisiana act, however, was written prospectively, defining a child

as “any person under the age of twenty-one . . . who commits a delinquent act” 

(a) before turning 17; (b) “on or after March 1, 2019, when the act is not a crime 

of violence . . . and occurs before the person attains eighteen years of age”; and

(c) “on or after July 1, 2020, and before the person attains eighteen years of 

age”. La. Child. Code Ann. art. 804(1) (2018). Under Louisiana law, “the 

legislature’s intent as to the retroactive application of a statute must be 

present in the wording of the Act”. Sher v. Lafayette Ins. Co., 988 So. 2d 186, 

200 (La. 2008) (citations omitted). Nothing in the Louisiana act suggests it is 

retroactive. Jackson, therefore, has not demonstrated the district court 

misapplied the Guidelines in determining he was a career offender.

Relying on a district-court decision from another circuit, which was 

rendered before his original brief on appeal was filed, Jackson asserts in his 

reply brief that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because Guideline 

§ 2D1.1(c), pertaining to controlled substances and quantity, overemphasizes

purity and amount of methamphetamine and does not accurately account for 

his actual role in the conspiracy. Jackson’s not raising this issue until his reply 

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brief results in its being waived. See United States v. Clay, 921 F.3d 550, 557 

n.2 (5th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). 

AFFIRMED.

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