IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 14-1182

Filed May 6, 2015

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF BRIAN WALTER PRUIN

AND LAURA M. PRUIN

Upon the Petition of

BRIAN WALTER PRUIN,

Petitioner-Appellee,

And Concerning

LAURA M. PRUIN,

Respondent-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Bremer County, Gregg Rosenbladt, 

Judge.

Laura Pruin appeals from the district court’s ruling on her application to 

modify the physical care provisions of the parties’ dissolution decree. 

AFFIRMED.

Andrew B. Howie of Hudson, Mallaney, Shindler & Anderson, P.C., West 

Des Moines, and Karen L. Thalacker of Gallagher, Langlas & Gallagher, P.C., 

Waverly, for appellant.

Shanna Chevalier and Lana L. Luhring of Laird & Luhring, Waverly, for 

appellee.

Considered by Danilson, C.J., Potterfield, J., and Miller, S.J.*

*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2015).
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DANILSON, C.J.

Laura Pruin and Brian Pruin were married in September 1998 and had 

four children together. A dissolution decree was entered in August 2011 in which 

the court ordered shared physical care of the four minor children. Laura filed a 

petition to modify the decree on April 10, 2013, seeking to end the shared care 

arrangement and have the children placed in her physical care. Following a May 

2014 trial, the district court ruled Laura had failed to meet her burden to prove a 

substantial change of circumstances warranted modification of the decree and 

she failed to prove she was a better parent. See Melchior v. Kooi, 644 N.W.2d 

365, 369 (Iowa 2002) (recognizing that an initial shared care arrangement 

resulted from a finding that both parents are capable parents and that in those 

circumstances to prove a modification is warranted, the petitioner must show

both a change of circumstances and that the petitioner is a better parent). The 

court wrote in part:

Laura and Brian do have different styles and outlooks on 

parenting. However, both are very invested in spending time with 

the children, and contributing to their growth and development. 

Laura is clearly the more “intense” of the two parents. She believes 

it is important to have the children involved in services, and 

believes it is very important that all appointments be kept and that 

the children receive all appropriate treatment for their diagnoses. 

Brian is the more “laid-back” of the two parents. He does not seem 

opposed to the children being involved in counseling or medication

management, but he seems to have more interest, for example, in 

having the children engage in exercise or other outdoor activities to 

help handle some of their hyperactive behaviors. After hearing the 

testimony of both parties, the Court finds that while their parenting 

styles and theories are somewhat different, the parents’ outlooks 

are complementary to each other, and both contribute toward the 

well-being of the children.

. . . .

At the conclusion of trial, Laura requested that she be 

granted primary physical care of the children. Brian requested that 
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the Court not modify disposition at all, and that the Court keep the 

original visitation schedule as contained in the 2011 decree. Brian 

noted that due to a continued “upward trend” in communication 

between himself and Laura, and because this “upward trend” also 

applied to the children’s situation (as supported by the testimony of 

[special education teacher] Peggy Martin-Holdiman and [teacher] 

Katie Johnston) that the shared care arrangement was working 

remarkably well.

The Court concurs with that thought. The parties are 

attempting to co-parent four younger children with special needs, in 

two different households. The scheduling and the transitions are 

understandably challenging. However, it seems to the Court that

things are going as well as or better than could be expected under 

the circumstances.

The Court will comment as well on the test of “better”

parenting. If a substantial change in circumstances had been 

found, the Court would need to analyze in more detail who could 

provide the “better” parenting for the four children. The Court has

indirectly discussed this issue above. Each parent has a slightly 

different outlook on the children, and each parent obviously has 

strengths and weaknesses. Those qualities are discussed above. 

Both Laura and Brian are credible, they are both clearly interested 

in the children’s well-being, and their parenting styles and strengths 

and weaknesses complement each other in certain respects. The 

Court cannot find and does not find that either parent provides 

“better” parenting than the other at this time.

Laura appeals, contending the district court erred in failing to grant her 

modification petition.

Upon our de novo review, see Iowa R. App. P. 6.907 (stating we review an

equity action de novo), we find no reason to modify the district court’s ruling. The 

district court wrote a thoughtful and considered ruling, accurately stating the legal 

principles at play. Its factual findings are fully supported by the record. We 

acknowledge the situation with the children sleeping at their grandmother’s 

house is not an ideal joint physical care arrangement, and we hope that it is only 

temporary. Brian’s abuse of one of the children is troubling, but he accepted 

responsibility for the incident, and it has been fully dealt with by the Iowa 
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Department of Human Services, which is no longer involved. And for now, as the 

district court stated, “[T]hings are going as well as or better than could be 

expected.” The parents undoubtedly will have many new challenges to face in 

the future and, in time, the joint physical care arrangement may prove to be 

unworkable or they may succeed notwithstanding the challenges. At this 

juncture, we agree the change in circumstances since the entry of the decree 

does not support modification of the physical care arrangement. Further 

discussion would be of little value, and we therefore affirm without further 

opinion. See Iowa Ct. R. 21.26(1)(b), (d), (e).

Brian requests an award of appellate attorney fees. An award 

of appellate attorney fees is not a matter of right, but rests within our sound 

discretion. In re Marriage of Okland, 699 N.W.2d 260, 270 (Iowa 2005). “We 

consider the needs of the party making the request, the ability of the other party 

to pay,” and the relative merits of the appeal. In re Marriage of Berning, 745 

N.W.2d 90, 94 (Iowa Ct. App. 2007). While Brian has prevailed, we note he 

makes about twice as much as Laura, who has a limited income. We do not 

award appellate fees. Costs are assessed to Laura. 

AFFIRMED.