### In the



# United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit

No. 13-1899

DAVID R. SNYDER, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

J. BRADLEY KING, TRENT DECKARD, LINDA SILCO TT, and PAM BRUNETTE, Defen dants-Appellees.

Appe al f ro m the Uni ted S tates Distri ct Co urt fo r the So uthern Distri ct o f Indi ana , Indi ana pol i s Divisi on. No. 1: 10 -cv-01 01 9 — Will ia m T. Lawre nce , Judg e.

A RGU E D S E PT E MB E R 30, 2013

— D E C I D E D M ARC H 11, 2014

B efore W OOD, Chief Judge, and B AU E R and K AN N E, Circ u i t Judges.
K AN N E, Circui t Judge. Thi s case i s about small town poli tic s, a bare- k nu ckle brawl, and the right to v ote

. But the appeal2 No. 13-1899
before us i s li mi ted to drier subjects: sov ereign i mmu ni ty , and the pleading requirements for a ci vil rig hts acti on again st a muni ci pali ty

. The di st ric t judge di smi ssed the state-affi li ated defendants on i mmu ni ty gr ounds, and found that the plainti ff fai led to state a clai m again st the county-affi li ated defendants. He then w ent on to consi der whether injuncti v e or declarator y relief mi ght be av ai lable to the plaint iff, but that w as unnec essary

. Hi s ini tial findings w ere corr ect, and they di spose of the case enti rely

. W e affi rm the dis mi ssal

. I. B A C K G R O U N D In 2003, Davi d Snyder w as elect e d to the Roseland T own Counci l, whi ch serv es a sm a l l in c or p orated commu ni ty located at the nor t h e nd of So uth Bend, Indi ana, near the Indi anaM ichi gan line. It i s fai r to describe Snyder ’s tenure o n t he Roseland T

own Counci l as contro v ersi al. See, e.g., W elcome to Snyder ville (Notr e Dame St udent Film Festiv al 2007), availab le
a t h t t p : / / w w w
. y o u t u b e

. c o m / w a t c h ? v = X z y n y

_ b T h H s (pub li shed Feb. 28, 2013). At a counc i l meetin g on January 11, 2007, S ny der w as inv olv ed in a fi stfi ght wi th fellow counc i l member T

ed Penn. He w as arr ested and charged wi th batter y , as defined at Ind. Code § 35-42-2- 1, and wi th felony inti mi dation, as defined at Ind. Code § 35-45-2-1(a)( 2). On July 31, 2008, a jury conv ict ed Snyder of batter y as a Class A mi sdemeanor , but acqui tte d hi m of the felony inti mi dation charge. The cour t handed down a one-y ear sentence, wi th si x months sus pended and si x months to be executed on home d e tention. In Februar y 2009, the court deter mined that Snyder had violated the te rms of hi s probat i on and found t hat a period of incarceration w as w arr anted.No. 13-1899 3 Snyder serv ed the remain der o f his sentence at the St

. Joseph County Jail. H e w as released in May 2009. On Mar ch 4, 2009, whi le Snyder w as sti ll incarcerated, defendants Li nda S i lcott and P a m Br unette, then members of the St

. Joseph County V ote r Registration Board, sent hi m a lette r announc ing that hi s v ote r reg i strat i on h a d b e e n canc elled pursuant to Ind. Co de § 3-7-46. Section 3-7- 46-2 prov i des that “[a] person i mpri soned following convic tion of a cr ime i s di sfranch i sed during the person’s i mpri sonment,” and Section 3 -7 -46-1 di rects that “a county v ote r reg i strat i on offi ce shall
remove from the offi ci al li st of reg i stered v ote rs the name of a
v ote r who i s di sfranchi sed under thi s chapter due to a cri minal convic tion.” Indi ana law di d (and does) permi t Sn y d e r t o rereg i ster to v ote at any tim e following hi s release from jail, and Snyder knew he could exer ci se that right. See Ind. Code § 3-7- 13-5. Nonetheless, Snyder refused to re-regis ter

. He w ent to the polls to v ote in a speci al e l e ct io n in Nov ember 2009, and, to nobody’s surpris e, he w as turned aw ay

. Thi s laws ui t follow ed. Inv oking 4 2 U.S.C. § 1983 as the basi s for hi s acti on, Snyder sued J. Bradley K ing a nd T rent Deckard (“Stat e Defendan ts”) in their offi ci al capac i ties as CoDi recto rs of the Indi ana Election Divi si on, and he su ed Linda Silc ott and P am Brunette (“County Defendants”) in their offi ci al capac i ties as members of the S t

. Joseph County V ote r R e g ist r a t io n B o a r d

. He a l l e g e d t ha t his t e mp o r a r y di senfranchi sement violated the National V ote r Registration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg; the Help Americ a V ote Act of 2002, 42 U.S.C. § 15301; the Civi l Ri ghts Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 197 1 ; t he First and Four teenth Amendments to the Uni ted St ates Constituti on; and Art i cle 2, Section 8, of t he I ndi ana4 No. 13-1899
Constituti on. Not ably

, he di d not inc lude any allegations that hi s injury w a s caus ed by a muni ci pal-lev el cus tom or poli cy promulgat ed by the Co unty Defendants. At the request of the parti es, the di stric t c ourt certifi ed the Indi ana consti tutional questi on to the Indi ana Supreme Court

. Snyder ’s arg ument w as that Art i cle 2, Section 8, only authorizes the General Assemb ly to di senfranchi se those convic ted of “infamous cri mes,” and, since hi s w as not an “infamous cri me,” he could not be stripped of hi s v oting rights. T h e I n d i a n a S u p r e m e C o u r t a g r e e d t ha t S ny d e r ’ s di senfranchi sement w as not authorized un der the particu lar p r o v ision at i ssu e, but held that the Indi ana Constituti o n
s e p a r a t e l y a u t h o r i z e d t h e a s s e m b l y t o t e m p o r a r i l y di senfranchi se anyincarcerated c onvict: “the Indi ana General Assemb ly has authority under i ts gener al p o l i ce pow er to di senfranchi se persons incarcerated upon convic tion of a cri me, so l o ng as the di senfranchi sement lasts only for the duration of incarceration.” Snyde r v
. Kin g, 958 N.E.2d 764, 785- 86 (Ind. 2011). After the Indi ana Supreme Court i ssu ed i ts ruling , the parties cross-m ov ed for sum mary judgment on the remain ing clai ms in the di str ict court. Before ruling on the motions, how ev er , the di stric t court, acting sua sponte, or dered the parties to file addi tional bri efing addressing the continued justic i abi li ty of the contr ov ersy . The i ssu es were fully briefed, and both parties too k the posi tion—alb ei t for di ffer e nt reasons—that the case w as not moot and could continue. Regar dless, the di stric t court di smi ssed the case. Snyde r v
. Kin g, No. 1:10–cv–0 1 0 1 9, 2013 WL 1296791 (S.D. Ind. Mar ch 28, 2013).No. 13-1899 5
As a threshold matter

, the di stric t c ourt held that the St ate Defendan ts w e r e not a proper party to the sui t on sov ereign i mmu ni ty gr ounds. Nei ther party take s i ssu e wi th that conclu si on. Next, the di stric t court held that the sui t again st the C o un ty Defendan ts also fai led, becau se a county “cannot be held li able under Section 1 9 8 3 fo r acts that i t di d under the command of state or federal law .” Id. a t * 2 (quoting Bethesda Luthe ran Homes and Servs., Inc. v
. Leean , 154 F .3d 716, 718 (7th Ci r
. 1998)). That rule i s based on the statuto ry elements of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 clai m again st a muni ci pal entity , as di scu ssed by Monell v
. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. , 4 3 6 U

. S

. 658 (1978), and i ts prog eny

. Despi te the Monell di smi ssal, the d ist r ict court w ent on to separately consi der Snyder ’s clai m for injuncti v e and declarator y reli ef again st the County Defendants. The di stric t court found those clai ms insu ffi ci ent to preserve a li v e contro v ersy for tw o reasons. First, the speci fi c language of the complaint sought an injuncti on “prev entin g” the d e fendants from removing Snyder from the v ote r rolls. Sinc e Snyder had already been removed, the d ist ric t court held that i t had no pow er to redress hi s injury thro ugh the reli ef requested: “one cannot ‘preven t’ something t ha t has already occurred.” Id

. at *3. Second, to the ext ent that Snyder ’s clai m for injuncti v e relief mi ght be construed more broadly as a demand for r e in s ta te ment to the v ote r ro lls, the di str ict court found t hat no contro v ersy exis ted becau se Snyder w as free to re-re gis ter at any tim e i f he

w ould si mply choose to do so. Id . at *4. On appeal, the parties continue to agr ee that the case i s not moot, and jo intly ask us to rev erse the di smi ssal by the di stric t court. Thei r reasons di ffer in some respects. Sny d e r beli ev es6 No. 13-1899
that a li v e contro v ersy exis ts becau se no minal damages are av ai lable again st the County Defenda nts and becau se hi s req ue sts for declarator y and injuncti v e relief—n amely , reins tate ment to the v ote r ro lls under hi s p r e v i ous reg i strat i on—ar e sti ll pending. The defendants di sagree as t o the av ai labi li ty of money dam ages of any kind, but agr ee that S nyder may sti ll seek equi table relief from the Count y Defendan ts. W e are not at all bo und to find t hat a di spute is justic i able sim ply becau se both parties beli ev e that i t i s, and thi s i s an instance where w e mus t exe rci se our prer ogat i v e to hold other wi se. Snyder has affi rmativ ely w ai v ed any ch a llenge to the di smi ssal of the St ate Defendan ts, and he has fai led to state
a Monell clai m again st the County Defendan ts. As a result, he si mply has no laws ui t left; moot ness i s not the i ssu e

. Despi te
some confus i on along the w ay , the di stric t court reached the right result, and w e affi rm i ts di smi ssalof the case. II. A N A L

Y S I S The di stric t court ulti mately di smi ssed the case because i t beli ev ed that t he cas e w as moot. But t he di stric t c ourt arr i v ed at the moot ness questi on only after reaching sev eral prelim inary conclu si ons. First, the di stric t court found that the St ate Defendan ts w ere not proper parties to the sui t. Next, the d ist r ict court threw out the clai m again st the County Defendan ts on Monell gr ounds, essenti ally finding that Snyder fai led to state a clai m. Fin ally , the di stric t c ourt found that the remain ing claim for injuncti v e relief again st the County Defendan ts w as moot, and di smi ssed the c ase enti rely

.No. 13-1899 7
W e rev i ew each of the di strict court’s conclu si ons de novo

. See, e.g., Lavalais v

. V

illage of Melros e P ar k

, __ F .3d __, 2013 WL 5753781 at *2 (7th Ci r
. Oct. 24, 2013) (“W e rev i ew de novo a Rule 12(b) (6) di smi ssal for fai lure to state a claim

. ” ); W isconsi n v
. Ho-Chunk Nation , 512 F .3d 921, 929 (7th Ci r
. 2008) (we rev i ew a gr ant or deni al of sov ereign i mmu ni ty de novo ); Home Builder s Ass’n of Greater C hi. v
. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs , 335 F .3d 607, 614 (7th Ci r
. 2003) (we rev i ew questi ons of justic i abi li ty de novo, look ing bey ond the pleadings i f necess ary ). Our rev i ew shows that the di stric t court’s last step—the moot ness analysi s—w as unnec essary

. The laws ui t i s proper ly di smi ssed o n i mmuni ty and Monell gr ounds alone. W e there fore affi rm the di smi ssal of the case wi thout r eaching the moo tness ques tion. A. The State Defendants
W e fi rst rev i ew t he d ismi ssal of the St ate Defendan ts. The speci fi c gr ounds for the d ist r ict court’s di smi ssal of the St ate Defendan ts are not di scu ssed in i ts or der , bu t it is clear that they were di smi ssed. Snyder knew di smi ssal w as a possi bi li ty; the di stric t court’s or der demanding addi tional bri efing by the parties hi ghli ghted i ts concerns about the viab i li ty of the St ate Defendan ts as parties to thi s sui t. But Snyder ’s bri efing di d not respond to tho se concerns at all, nor has Snyder attacke d the di stric t court’s di smi ssal of the sui t again st the St ate De fendants on appeal. Accordingly , any arg ument on the subject i s w ai v ed. Lue llen v
. City of East Chicago , 350 F .3d 604, 612 nn.4–5 (7th Ci r
. 2003) (arguments not rais ed on appeal are
w ai v ed); Schoenf

eld v
. Apfel , 237 F .3d 788, 793 (7th Ci r
. 200 1 ) (“W e hav e long held that ‘[i ]ss ues that a clai mant fai ls to rais e before the dist r i ct court are w ai v ed on appeal.’”) (quoting Ehr hart v
. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs. , 969 F .2d 534, 537 n.8 No. 13-1899
4 (7th C i r
. 1992)). Mor eov er , Snyder has affi rmatively conceded that he cannot obtain any meaningful rel ief again st the St ate Defen d ants. The di stric t court’s di smi ssal of the St ate Defendan ts mus t ther efore be affi rmed.
B. The County Def

endants The second questi on i s whether Snyd e r can obtain any relief from the C o un ty Defendan ts. He beli ev es that he can, both in ter ms of nominal damages for a proven consti tutional violati on and in ter ms of injuncti v e and declarator y relief. The defendants di sagree as to nominal damages, but agr ee as to the
av ai labi li ty of injuncti v e or declarator y relief. In fact, nei ther i s av ai lable.
1. Nominal Damages Snyder fi rst arg ues that hi s case i s not moot becau se he may obtain nominal damages fr o m t he County Defendan ts in the
ev ent that a federal consti tutional violati on i s shown. Snyder ’s arg ument i s based on the gener al rule that a plainti ff who
suc cess ful l y proves a consti tutional violati on i s entitled to at least a nominal aw ard. See, e.g., Calhoun v
. DeT ella , 319 F .3d 936, 941–42 (7th Ci r
. 2003). But that arg ument mi sses the poin t. Under w ell-establi shed precedent, a plainti ff cannot state a S e cti on 1983 clai m again st a muni ci pal entity , or again st a muni ci pal office r in hi s or her offi ci al capac i ty , unles s certain requirements are met. If Snyder has not stated an act io na ble clai m again st the County Defendan ts, then he cannot possi bly be entitled to any damages again st the County Defendants, reg ardless of whether a suc cess ful plainti ff mi ght be entitled to nominal damages in some other hy pothet i cal c ontex t.No. 13-1899 9 a. Snyder Has Not Stated aSection 1983 C laim. Snyder sued the County Defen dants in their offi ci al capac i ties under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, whi ch i s essenti ally another

w ay o f suing the county-affi li ated entity they repr esent. Thi s means t hat Snyder can only proceed again st the County Defendant s t o t he ext ent that he w ould be able to proceed again st the county—or

, more speci fi cally

, again st the St

. Joseph C ounty V

ote r Registration Board—itself. Monell , 4 3 6 U. S. a t 6 9 0 n.55

. Accor dingly

, w e apply the rules governing muni ci pal li abi li ty to deter mine whether Snyder has st ated a clai m again st the County Defendan ts. In doin g so , w e note that a di stric t court’s sua sponte di smi ssal on Monell gr ounds, whi le
unus ual, i s not legally i mpermi ssi ble so long as the di stric t court giv es the parties an op p or tuni ty to resp ond. Pour ghoraishi

v
. Flyin g J, Inc. , 449 F

. 3d 751, 765 (7th Ci r
. 2006). The di stric t court did s o inthi s cas e. Section 1983 only permi ts an indi vidu al to sue a “person”

wh o d e p riv es that indi vidu al of hi s or her federally- gu a rante e d rights under color of state la w
. L o cal governing bodi es—and the offi cers ther eof, acting in their offi ci al capac i ties —do ge ne rally quali fy as “persons” under the statute. Monell , 436 U.S. at 690–95 (establi shing the foundati onal rule). But that i s not tr ue when a local governing body acts solely as an ext ensi on of the St ate, becau se St ate governments a nd S t ate offi ci als are not “persons” wi thin the ambi t of Section 1983. See, e.g., Kaimowitz v
. Bd. of T rs. of Univ

. of Ill. , 951 F .2d 765, 767 (7th Ci r
. 1 9 9 1) (ci tin g W

ill v
. Michigan Dep’t of S tat e Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989))

. As a result, whether or not a plainti ff has stated
a Section 1983 clai m again st a muni ci pal entity typical ly hinges on the ext ent to whi ch that muni ci pal entity w as10 No. 13-1899
independentl y responsi ble for the allegedly unc onsti tutional act. In answering that questi on, courts hav e focus e d on wh e the r “there i s a di rect caus al link betw een a muni ci pal poli cy or cus tom and the alleged consti tutional depriv ation.” City of Canton v
. Harris , 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989); Leahy v
. Bd. of T rs. , 912 F .2d 917, 922 (7th Ci r
. 1990) (“Proximate caus ation betw een the muni ci pali ty’ s poli cy or cus tom and the plainti ff’s injury mus t be p resent.”) (quoti ng Strauss v
. City of Chicago , 760 F .2d 7 6 5 , 767 (7 t h C ir

. 1985)). T

o say that any such di rect caus al link exis ts when the only local government “ p olicy” at i ssu e i s gener al compli ance wi th the di ctates of state law i s a bri dge too far; under those ci rcums tances, t he state law i s the prox i mate
caus e of the plainti ff’s inj ur y

. See Surplus Store and Exchange, Inc. v
. City of Delphi, 928 F .2d 788, 791-92 (7th C ir

. 1 991)); Whitesel v
. Sen genber

ger, 222 F

. 3 d 861, 872 (10th Ci r
. 2000) (county cannot be li able for “merely i mplementing” a poli cy created at the state lev el); Familias U nidas v
. Briscoe, 619 F .2d 391, 404 (5th Ci r
. 1980) (mu ni ci pal entity cannot be held li able for si mply enforcing state law becau se the muni ci pal poli cy in that instance “may more fai rly be ch a r a ct erized as the effectuati on of the poli cy of the St ate

... embodi ed in that statute, for whi ch the ci tizens of a particu lar county should not bear singular res p o ns ibi li ty .”). Thi s i s the rule to whi ch the di stric t court w as refer ring when i t inv oke d Bethesda : a county “cannot be held li able under Section 1 9 8 3 for acts that i t di d under the command of s tate or federal law .” 154 F .3d at 718. The oper ativ e complaint in thi s case i s dev oid of any remot el y speci fi c allegation that a county-lev el poli cy or custom caus ed Snyder ’s harm. That alone i s gr ounds fo rNo. 13-1899 11
di smi ssal

. See, e.g., Pam v
. C i ty of Michigan City, No. 3:12-CV

265, 2012 WL 4060970 at *3 (N.D. Ind. Sept

. 7, 2012) (collecting cases from di stric t courts wi thin our ci rcui t). For one reason or another , both the parties and t he co urt expanded their di scu ssi on to inclu de mat t ers outsi de of the pleadings, r ather than gr apple wi th the obvio us defect in the complaint i tself. But ev en when those outsi de matte r s are take n into accoun t Snyder has f ai led to stat e an acti onable clai m. Sny d e r a r gues that hi s injury w as di rectly caus ed by the Co un t y Defendan ts becau se they made a “consc i ous poli cy choi ce [to remove hi m from the v ote r ro lls] fr o m a mo ng exis tin g alter nati v es, a choi ce whi ch violated the consti tution.” (A ppellant’s Br

. at 18.) There are three basi c steps to hi s arg ument. First, Snyder clai ms that the Indi ana Code defines the w or d “cri me,” a s used in Section 3-7-46- 2 and elsewh ere, in such a w ay that i t i s ambi gu o us , meaning ei ther “felony ,” “mi sdemeanor

,” or both. Second, Snyder a r g ues that the County Defendan ts, in remov ing hi m from the v ote r r o lls, th e mselves resolv ed the “cri me” ambi gui ty in the v ote rdi se nf r anchi sement prov i si ons in questi on to inclu de both felon ie s and mi sdemeanors. Thi rd, Snyder arg ues that, in doin g so, the bo a r d too k an acti on that w as merely “authorized,” not “compelled,” by state law , and that thi s case there fore falls outsi de th e sc o pe of Bethesda and relat ed authoriti es. Putting i t all tog ether , Snyder sees an independent poli cy deci si on by the County Defendan ts to remove hi m from the v ote r ro lls, one made pos sibl e—but not di ctated—by statute. I f each step of Snyder ’s arg ument w as corr ect, i t w ou l d indeed lead to t he conclu si on he desi res. See, e.g., V ives v
. City12 No. 13-1899 of New Y

ork , 524 F .3d 346, 35 1 (2 d C ir

. 2008) (collecting authoriti es whi ch, to v ary ing degr ees, found “that a muni ci pali ty engages in poli cy making when i t determines to enforce a state law that authorizes i t to perfor m certain acti ons but does not mandate that i t do so.”); Cooper v
. Dillon , 403 F .3d 1208 (11th Ci r
. 2 0 0 5 ). The problem i s that none of them are corr ect. The fi rst step in Snyder ’s arg ument i s hi s asserti on that the
use of the w or d “cri me” in the statute i s ambi guous, be ca us e the w o r d “ cr ime” in the Indi ana Code can refer to a felony , a mi sdemeanor

, or both. Snyder i s mostly right about the meaning of the w or d. For our purposes, “‘crim e’ means a felony or a mi sde me a no r .” Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2- 75(a) (emphas i s added). But nothin g about that makes the relev ant 1 code prov i si on ambi guous. Replacing the p hr ase “a cri me” wi th the phrase “a felony or a mi sdemeanor” in the tex t i llus tr ates our po int. Section 3-7-46- 2 w ould read, “[a] per son i mpri soned following convic tion o f [a fe lony or a
m i s d e me a no r ] is d i s f r a n c h i s e d d u r i n g t h e p e r s o n ’ s i mpri sonment.” No rule of usage in the Engli sh language supp or ts construing that sentence to create a “reader ’s choi ce”
scen ario, in whi ch local boards choose whi ch crim es it cov ers a nd whi ch i t does not. That sentence means that a p e r so n convic ted of either a felony or a mi sdemeanor i s tempor arily

This i s co nsistent wi th wha t any layperson wo uld understand the wor d 1

“ c r i me ” to mean

. There are few word s i n the l egal l exico n with a mo r e wid el y understoo d pl ain meani ng than “cr i me,” def i ned generall y as “[ a]n act tha t the l aw mak es punishab l e; the b reach of a l egal duty treated as the sub jec t-matter o f a cri minal pro ceed i ng.” Black’s Law Dict ionary (9 th ed. 20 09 ).No. 13-1899 13
di senfranchi sed. There i s no ambi gui ty to the statute, and that alone inv ali dates Snyder ’s arg ument. Contr ary to hi s asserti ons, the statuto ry di rectiv e does not leav e t he r e a der wi th any ro om to choose how br o a dly to define the w or d “cri me.” The sec ond step in Snyder ’s arg ument i s hi s ass ert i on that the County Defendan ts themselv es deci ded to broadly interpr et the w or d “cri me” in the statu t e. That asserti on i s independently faulty

. Ev en i f there w as ro om to inte rpr et the statute—and there i s n ot

— the C ounty D e fe n d ants w ou l d n e ver be the ones doin g the interpr etat i on. The mechan i sm by whi ch di senfranchi sement o f inc ar ce r a ted persons occurs is lai d out in t he code. Under the sch eme, on a quar t e r l y basi s, a county sheri ff m ust prov i de the c ounty v ote r regis tr ation board wi th
a li st of ev ery indi vidu al wh o “(1) is a resi dent of Indi ana; (2) has been convic ted of a cri me; and (3) has been pla ce d in a county corr ecti onal faci li ty during the prev i ous quarter .” Ind. Code § 3-7-46- 6. Whe n the county v ote r reg i strat i on board receiv es such notic e, i t “ shall

... remove the name of the person from the v ote r reg i strat i on recor ds[.] ” I nd

. Code § 3-7-46- 7.5 (emphas i s added). In other w or ds, there i s no oppor tuni ty for the County Defendants—as members of the v ote r reg i strat i on board—t o deci de what consti tutes “a c rim e ” un d er Section 3-7- 46-2. The county sh eriff , i f any one, deci des who quali fi es for t he di senfranchi sement li st; all the v ote r reg i strat i on board does i s delete the names the sheri ff p r o v ide s. The ro le of the local v ote r regis tr ation boards i s there fore purely reacti onary

. It i s easy to see, giv en the flaws in t he fir st tw o steps in Snyder ’s arg ument, why the thi rd step and hi s conclu si on are also wi de of the mark. Snyder hopes to paint thi s case as one14 No. 13-1899
in whi ch the County Defendan ts made an independent choi ce from among v arious alter nati v es autho rized by state law , but that characterizati on i s based on an inaccurate understanding of the Indi ana system. The statute in questi on does not merely
a ut horize remov al from the v ote r ro lls for incarcera t e d convic ts. The sta t ut o r y language i s compuls or y

. And to the 2 ext ent that any di screti on is permi tte d, i t i s exer ci sed by actor s other than the County Defendan ts. Snyder knows that; the “Factual Allegat i ons” secti on of hi s own Amended Complaint places interpr etive responsibi li ty squarely on the shoulders of St ate-lev el actor s, and n ot o n the County Defendan ts. For all of these r e a so ns, thi s si tuation does not supp or t a finding of Monell li abi li ty

. When st a t e law unequi v ocally instructs a muni ci pal entity to produce binary outcome X i f
co ndi tion Y occurs, w e cannot say that the muni ci pal entity’s “deci si on” to follow that di rectiv e inv olv es the exer ci se of any meaningful independent di scretio n, let alone final poli cymaking author i ty

. It i s the s tatut or y di rectiv e, not the follow- 3

In addi tio n to the pro v i sio ns conce rning how remo v al i s carri ed out, see 2 the general di recti v e at Ind. Co de § 3- 7- 46 -1 : “a county v ote r regi stratio n of fi ce sh a l l r e mo ve fro m the of fi ci al l i st of regi stered v ote rs the nam e of a
v ote r who i s di sfranc hi se d

... due to a cri minal convicti on.” (emphasis added)

.
We say tha t the cod e se c tio ns i nstruct county regi stratio n b oards to 3 pro duce a certai n “binary outco me” under the ci rcumstan ces prescri b ed b ecause a perso n ei ther is, or i s not, remo v ed fro m the v ote r ro l l s. There i s no i n-b etween, and there are n o consti tutio nall y or s tatutori l y meani ngful

v ariab l es tha t govern the manner i n which the act of remo v al fro m the v ote r ro l l s i s accompl i shed. We highl i ght this reali ty to di stingui sh the i nstant (co ntinued. ..)No. 13-1899 15

t hr o ug h, whi ch caus es the harm of whi ch the plainti ff complains. Fin ally , w e note that i t makes no di fference that the County D e fe n d ants e xe rc i s e broad independent di screti on wi th re s p e c t to other matter s of electi on l aw and procedure; the questi on i s whether the plainti ff has i denti fi ed the deci si onmaker “responsible for establi shing fina l poli cy wi th respect to the subject matter in questi on.” Pembaur v
. Cin cin nati, 475 U.S. 469, 483 (1986). The subject matter in questi on i s the rem o v a l o f incarcerated convic ts from the v ote r ro lls, a nd the only “poli cy” the County Defendan ts establi sh e d wi th respect to that i ssu e w as to follow the mandatory mechan i sm lai d out by statute. Whether one view s their ro le as merely i mplementing the statuto ry di rectiv e, or as carry ing out the remov al of those i denti fi ed as statuto rily appropr i ate by the local sheri ff, the

( ...c onti nued) 3

c as e f r o m those i n which state l aw i nstructs a munici pal of fi ci al to take a certai n actio n, b ut l eav es ro om fo r ab undan t di screti on i n deter mini ng the
manner i n which such an actio n shoul d b e carri ed out. For exa mple , i n Mer cad o v. Dart, 60 4 F.3d 36 0, 36 5 (7 th Ci r. 20 10 ) , we explained tha t even i f the Il l i noi s cod e pro v i sio n auth or i zing county sherif fs to perf or m a st r i p search of all i nma tes enteri ng a county jai l i s read to make a strip search
ma nd at o ry, i t stil l l eav es ro om fo r the sherif fs to set l ocal pol i cy wi t h respect to the l evel of intrusi v eness i nv ol v ed and the manner i n which the search i s conduc ted. Id . 365 . A given sherif f’s i ndependent deci sio ns, with respect to those s eco ndary questio ns, coul d easil y b e the di ffe rence b etween
an u nc o ns t i tutio nall y i ntrusive search and o ne which was not. Id

. But the i ns t ant case i s cl early di ffe rent. The all eged consti tutio nal v i ol atio n is the
remo v al fro m v ote r ro l l s—the v ery thing man dated b y statu te—and there i s no more to i t than tha t. It i s not as i f r e mo val by whi te-o ut might b e consti tutio nall y suspect, whi l e re mova l by dele te key cl early i s not.16 No. 13-1899
l o ca l v ote r reg i strat i on boards si mply do not make an independent poli cy judgment. “Th e mere authority to i mplement pre-existing rules i s not the authority to set poli cy ,” Kill inger v
. Johnson , 389 F .3d 765, 771 (7th Ci r
. 2004), and nei ther i s i t enough t o sustain a su i t under S ecti on 1983. b. Nominal Damages Are Not Available. The next questi on i s whether Snyder may sti ll obtain nominal damages from the County Defendan ts despi te the fact that he has not stated a clai m again st them under Section 1983. It i s clear that he cannot. No plainti ff can recov er any kin d of damages ag ainst a defendant wi thout fi rst obtaining a judgment again st that defe ndant, and a prer equi si te to a judgment i s a laws ui t. Snyder does not hav e a laws ui t again st the County Defendan ts, becau se he fai led to stat e a clai m. 2. Injun ctive and Dec larato ry Reli ef Both t he p art i es and the di stric t court spoke about the possi bi li ty of inj un cti v e and declarator y relief again st the County Defendants as though i t w ere an is sue to tally di stinct from whether Snyder adequately stated a Monell clai m again st those defendants. That w as incorre ct. The Supreme Court has squarely held that Mon ell ’s “poli cy or cus tom” requirement appli es in Section 1983 cases i rr especti v e of whether the relief soug ht i s monetar y or prospectiv e. Los Angeles Cnty ., Cal. v
. Humphr ies , 131 S. Ct. 447, 453–54 (2010). Snyder cannot obtain injuncti v e or declarator y relief again st the County Defendan ts for the same reason he cannot obtain nominal damages: he has not adequately pleaded a su i t again st them. It i s there fore
unnec essary to consi der whether any clai m for injuncti v e relief i s moot.No. 13-1899 17
III. C O N C L U S I O N W e acknowledge that the right to v ote i s fund amental, and

w e do not take any case allegin g i ts infringement li ghtl y

. But i t i s incu mbent on a li tigant to i denti fy a proper defendant for hi s sui t and to proper ly plead an acti on again st that defendant. Snyder has not done so. Becaus e S ny d e r has w ai v ed any challen ge to the di smi ssal of the St ate Defendan ts, and becau se he has fai led to state a clai m again st the County defendants, w e AFF IRM the di stric t court ’s di smi ssalof hi s su i t.