IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Rogele, Inc., :

Petitioner :

:

v. :

:

Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board :

(Hall), : No. 595 C.D. 2018

Respondent : Submitted: August 24, 2018

BEFORE: HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION BY 

JUDGE COVEY FILED: November 30, 2018

Rogele, Inc. (Employer) petitions this Court for review of the Workers’ 

Compensation (WC) Appeal Board’s (Board) March 28, 2018 order affirming the 

portion of the Workers’ Compensation Judge’s (WCJ) decision granting John V. 

Hall’s (Claimant) Petition to Review Medical Treatment and/or Billing (Review 

Medical Petition). Employer presents two issues for this Court’s review: (1) whether 

the WCJ and the Board lacked jurisdiction and were barred from ordering Employer 

to pay for Claimant’s medical treatment that controlling decisions had declared were

not reasonable and necessary; and (2) whether the WCJ and the Board erred by 

ordering Employer to pay for Claimant’s intrathecal pump replacement and its 

refills.

1

 After review, we affirm.

 

1

[An] intrathecal pump is a moderate-sized implantable device that is 

able to deliver small doses of medication directly to the spinal fluid. 

The pump consists of a small battery-powered, programmable pump 

that is implanted under the subcutaneous tissue of the abdomen and 

connected to a small catheter tunneled to the site of spinal entry.

Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 64a. Refills are required every 21⁄2 to 31⁄2 months. See R.R. at 125a126a.
2

The facts of this case are not disputed. Claimant sustained a workrelated injury on January 25, 1999, described as an L1 vertebrae fracture/L1 

compression fracture, lumbosacral sprain/strain, and disk herniation/internal disk 

disruption at T12-L1, L1-L2 and L2-L3. On December 16, 2004, a WCJ approved a 

Compromise and Release of Claimant’s wage loss claim, but Employer remained 

responsible for paying reasonable and necessary medical treatment that is causally 

related to Claimant’s work injury.

Claimant’s treating physiatrist/pain specialist Steven E. Morganstein, 

D.O. (Dr. Morganstein) was managing Claimant’s pain with 80 mg of Oxycontin 

three times per day, six 350 mg tablets of Soma per day, 600 mcg of Actiq three 

times per day and an occasional Lidoderm patch. As a result of WCJ hearings on 

Employer’s November 2008 petitions to review, petition to review medical 

treatment/billing and review medical petition, on February 22, 2010, WCJ Robert 

Vonada (WCJ Vonada), crediting in part testimony by both Dr. Morganstein and 

Employer’s witness, treating physiatrist S. Ross Noble, M.D. (Dr. Noble), declared 

that Claimant’s prescribed medications were reasonable and necessary, but ordered 

that a random toxicology screen be conducted before each office visit. Although 

recommendations had been made as far back as August 2005 for Claimant to be 

evaluated for an intrathecal pump, Claimant did not desire one at that time.

In November 2010, Vitaly Gordin, M.D. at Hershey Pain Center (Dr. 

Gordin) implanted an intrathecal pump in Claimant that dispensed narcotic pain 

medications. The pump required periodic monitoring and refills approximately every 

2 months. In addition, Dr. Gordin prescribed Oxycodone 30 mg 1 to 2 tablets 2 to 3 

times per day as needed. Because Dr. Gordin did not conduct complete drug screens 

before each visit as previously ordered, Employer denied payment for Claimant’s 

prescription medications. 
3

On November 19, 2012, Claimant filed a penalty petition due to 

Employer’s failure to pay for his medications. On February 28, 2013, Claimant filed 

a petition to review utilization review determination. On May 31, 2013, Employer 

sought review of whether Claimant’s medical treatment, including his prescription 

narcotic pain medication, was reasonable and necessary. The matters were 

consolidated. On May 29, 2014, WCJ Patrick Sheldon (WCJ Sheldon) denied the 

penalty petition based on Dr. Gordin’s failure to drug test Claimant. WCJ Sheldon 

concluded based on the utilization reviewer’s opinion that the additional Oxycodone 

was not reasonable and necessary “[i]n light of the prior implantation of the morphine 

pump,” Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 36a, but found credible the utilization 

reviewer’s conclusion “that the programming and refill of the intrathecal pain pump 

from October 11, 2012 and ongoing every two months was reasonable and 

necessary.” R.R. at 33a. WCJ Sheldon ordered Employer to reimburse Claimant’s 

litigation costs. Claimant appealed to the Board which, on June 11, 2015, affirmed 

WCJ Sheldon’s decision, but modified the litigation cost award.

On February 18, 2016, Employer filed a petition to review WC benefits 

(Review Petition), seeking reimbursement from Claimant of the litigation costs the 

Board deemed not payable. Claimant denied the allegations, but stipulated to 

receiving the costs from Employer. On February 19, 2016, Claimant filed the Review 

Medical Petition, alleging that Employer had not paid medical expenses related to a 

2015 pump replacement or the medication refills therefor. Employer denied the 

averments contained in the Review Medical Petition. Claimant also filed a Penalty 

Petition, wherein he alleged that Employer’s failure to pay medical bills violated the 

WC Act (Act).

2

 Employer denied the allegations asserted in the Penalty Petition. 

 

2 Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S. §§ 1-1041.4, 2501-2708. 
4

WCJ Vonada held hearings on March 16 and August 25, 2016. On 

January 19, 2017, WCJ Vonada granted Employer’s Review Petition and ordered 

Claimant to reimburse Employer $1,654.50 for costs it overpaid under the prior 

Board order. WCJ Vonada also granted Claimant’s Review Medical Petition, thereby 

requiring Employer to reimburse Claimant for expenses related to the replacement 

pump and its refills. WCJ Vonada denied Claimant’s Penalty Petition. Claimant 

appealed from WCJ Vonada’s grant of the Review Petition, and Employer appealed 

from WCJ Vonada’s grant of the Review Medical Petition. On March 28, 2018, the 

Board affirmed WCJ Vonada’s determination that Employer is responsible for 

expenses related to the replacement pump and refills, and modified WCJ Vonada’s 

cost award to $203.69. Employer appealed to this Court.3

 Employer argues that WCJ Vonada and the Board lacked subject matter 

jurisdiction and were barred from ordering Employer to pay for treatments that 

controlling decisions had declared were not reasonable and necessary. Employer also 

contends that there was no utilization review request before WCJ Vonada, and his 

February 22, 2010 decision created a “necessary condition precedent” that Dr. 

Gordin’s treatment “is not reasonable and necessary on an ongoing basis unless a 

drug screen is performed before each office appointment,” Employer Br. at 17. 

Employer specifically asserts: 

As the drug screening requirement concerns only the 

reasonableness and necessity of Claimant’s medical 

treatment, and has remained binding upon the parties as the

result of prior Utilization Review determinations and 

resulting litigation, WCJ Vonada lacked subject matter 

jurisdiction to determine whether Claimant’s circumstances 

 

3

“On review[,] this Court must determine whether constitutional rights were violated, errors 

of law were committed, or necessary findings of fact were supported by substantial competent 

evidence.” Stepp v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (FairPoint Commc’ns, Inc.), 99 A.3d 598, 601 n.6 

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2014). “Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a 

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id.
5

have changed such that Dr. Gordin’s medical treatment is 

now reasonable and necessary without the requisite drug 

screens. Moreover, Claimant was precluded by the doctrine 

of res judicata from relitigating this issue.

Employer Br. at 17-18.

“It is accepted that, pursuant to [Section 301(c) of] the [Act], an 

employer is only liable to pay for a claimant’s medical expenses that arise from and 

are caused by a work-related injury. 77 P.S. § 411(1)[.]” Kurtz v. Workers’ Comp. 

Appeal Bd. (Waynesburg Coll.), 794 A.2d 443, 447 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002) (footnote 

omitted). Although the burden is initially on the claimant to establish that the injury 

is work-related, once the employer acknowledges liability for the injury, “the 

claimant is not required to continually establish that medical treatment of that 

compensable injury is causally related because the injury for which the claimant is 

treating has already been established.” Id. Accordingly, thereafter, the employer has 

the burden of proving that a medical expense is unreasonable, unnecessary, or is not 

related to the accepted work injury. See id.

“[T]his Court has recognized that the issue of causation is separate and

distinct from the reasonableness and necessity of medical treatment.” J.D. 

Landscaping v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Heffernan), 31 A.3d 1247, 1253 (Pa.

Cmwlth. 2011).

Th[is] Court explained in Bloom [v. Workmen’s 

Compensation Appeal Board (Keystone Pretzel Bakery), 

677 A.2d 1314 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996)], that a petition to 

review medical treatment relates to the issue of the causal

connection between medical treatment and the work injury, 

but utilization review relates to the reasonableness of and 

necessity for medical treatment. A challenge to particular 

medical treatment as not being causally related to a work 

injury, . . . must be filed directly with a WCJ. A challenge

to particular treatment as being not reasonable or necessary 

must be pursued through the administrative utilization 

review procedures. Id.
6

Mercy Douglas Corp. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Davis), 713 A.2d 722, 725 (Pa.

Cmwlth. 1998). 

By November 2005, May 2006 and January 2007 utilization reviews,

Claimant’s treatment with the prescribed pain medications was ruled reasonable and 

necessary. See R.R. at 49a-53a. Relative to Employer’s appeal from the last 

utilization review, WCJ Vonada “accept[ed] the opinion of Dr. Morganstein and the 

[u]tilization reviewers that [Claimant’s] treatment regimen is reasonable and 

necessary.” R.R. at 53a. Dr. Noble expressed that regular checks are necessary to 

ensure that a patient’s metabolites are consistent with prescribed medications, and to 

confirm that the patient is using medications as prescribed.4 Dr. Morganstein testified 

that Claimant had signed a narcotics contract on September 22, 2005, giving Dr. 

Morganstein the right to ask for random urine and toxicology screens and pill counts. 

See R.R. at 52a. Dr. Morganstein agreed that, although he never ordered any such 

tests because he was never concerned that Claimant was diverting his medications, 

Claimant should be more closely monitored. See R.R. at 52a. 

On February 22, 2010, WCJ Vonada concluded: “[Employer] has met its 

burden in this matter to establish by sufficient, competent, credible evidence that 

regular toxicology testing which verifies [Claimant] is taking all medicine which 

is prescribed is integral to a finding that the medicine prescribed is reasonable 

and necessary.” WCJ February 22, 2010 Op. at 5 (R.R. at 53a) (emphasis added). 

Accordingly, WCJ Vonada ordered: “Claimant’s treating physician must order a 

random toxicology screen before each of [Claimant’s] office visits to demonstrate 

 

4 Notably, the record evidence reflects a 2008 report by Claimant that his medications were 

stolen from his vehicle. See R.R. at 52a. Also, in the February 6, 2013 utilization review report 

related to Claimant’s pump, the reviewer stated: “The records reflect indications of lost 

prescriptions on several occasions. On [October 28, 2011], [a] phone message indicate[s] a ‘last 

chance’ after [Claimant] reportedly complained that the pharmacy lost his prescriptions.” R.R. at 

62a. 
7

[Claimant] is using all of his medications as prescribed and allow [his physician] 

to adjust [Claimant’s] prescriptions to dispense what [Claimant] needs.” WCJ 

February 22, 2010 Dec. at 6 (R.R. at 54a) (emphasis added).

Further, in December 2012, Employer sought utilization review of the 

reasonableness and necessity of Claimant’s pain management prescribed by Dr. 

Gordin from October 11, 2012 and ongoing. On February 6, 2013, utilization 

reviewer Nathan Schwartz, M.D. (Dr. Schwartz) concluded: “[P]rogramming and 

refill of [Claimant’s] implantable intrathecal pump delivering hydromorphone 

(opiate) and bupivacaine (local anesthetic) from [October 11, 2012] and ongoing 

once every two months . . . is reasonable and necessary.” R.R. at 64a (emphasis 

added). On May 31, 2013, Employer filed a petition to review medical treatment. 

On May 29, 2014, WCJ Sheldon found Dr. Schwartz’s conclusion credible, declared 

that the medications administered through the pump were reasonable and necessary, 

but granted Employer’s petition in part, stating that oral Oxycodone administered 

outside the pump was excessive and not reasonable and necessary.

5

 See WCJ May 

29, 2014 Dec. at 7 (R.R. at 36a). At the August 25, 2016 WCJ hearing, Claimant 

testified that he receives all of his work-related pain medication through the pump. 

Employer refused to pay for the pump’s replacement and refills because Claimant’s 

physicians were not conducting toxicology screens at each office visit as previously 

ordered. 

It is clear from the record evidence that Claimant’s pump and his 

attendant medications have been ruled reasonable and necessary and that their use is 

causally related to Claimant’s work injury. Accordingly, Employer’s argument that 

WCJ Vonada and the Board lacked subject matter jurisdiction and were barred from 

 

5 WCJ Sheldon acknowledged, however, that “[a] different ‘cocktail regime’ in conjunction 

with the [] pump could potentially be reasonable and necessary.” WCJ May 29, 2014 Dec. at 7 

(R.R. at 36a). 
8

ordering Employer to pay for Claimant’s pump and medication refills is without 

merit.6 

Moreover, nothing in the record suggests that toxicology screening is a 

condition precedent to Claimant’s pump use. Rather, the toxicology screenings were 

a condition precedent only when Claimant controlled his medications, to insure that 

he was taking them as prescribed. WCJ Vonada’s February 22, 2010 decision 

sustained the utilization reviewer’s determination that Claimant’s oral narcotic 

medications were reasonable and necessary. WCJ Sheldon’s May 29, 2014 decision 

upheld the utilization reviewer’s opinion that medications administered through 

Claimant’s pump were reasonable and necessary, and the additional oral medications 

prescribed for breakthough pain (e.g., short-acting oral narcotic medications for 

periodic pain exacerbations used because the pump cannot account for exacerbations) 

were not reasonable and necessary in conjunction with the pump. WCJ Sheldon 

acknowledged therein that WCJ Vonada’s order mandating toxicology screenings 

was binding, but the screenings were limited to when oral narcotics are prescribed 

outside the pump. Once the pump was implanted and Claimant’s physicians 

 

6

“Res Judicata, or claim preclusion, prevents a future suit between the same parties on the 

same cause of action after final judgment is entered on the merits of the action.” Linton v. Workers’ 

Comp. Appeal Bd. (Amcast Indus. Corp.), 991 A.2d 376, 381 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010). 

Technical res judicata applies when the following four factors all are 

present: (1) identity of the thing sued upon or for; (2) identity of the 

cause of action; (3) identity of the persons and parties to the action; 

and (4) identity of the quality or capacity of the parties suing or sued. 

. . . Generally, causes of action are identical when the subject matter 

and the ultimate issues are the same in both the old and the new 

proceedings. 

Henion v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Firpo & Sons, Inc.), 776 A.2d 362, 365-66 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2001) (citations omitted). Here, the thing sued upon differs from the questions the WCJs previously 

had before them. The issue before WCJ Vonada in this instance is whether Employer is responsible 

for paying for the replacement pump and its attendant refills which had not been previously 

litigated. 
9

completely controlled all of his medications, the purpose for ordering toxicology 

screenings no longer existed. Since the reasonableness and necessity of the 

medications delivered through the pump has been established, WCJ Vonada properly 

declared: 

Claimant has met his burden to establish by sufficient, 

competent, credible evidence in this matter that properly 

payable medical expenses are unpaid. At the time Dr. 

Noble recommended drug testing prior to an appointment 

when narcotics were refilled, [] Claimant was taking several 

types of narcotic medications. Presently, [] Claimant is 

receiving medication only through the intrathecal pain 

pump. The amount of medication in the pump is 

monitored by Dr. Gordin and there can be no use that 

Dr. Gordin is not aware of. So long as [] Claimant is not 

receiving oral or topical narcotic prescriptions, the 

requirement for toxicology screens before each office 

visit is immaterial. Accordingly, refills should be 

reimbursed by [Employer].

WCJ January 19, 2017 Dec. at 5 (R.R. at 143a) (emphasis added). Accordingly, the 

issue remaining before the Court is whether Employer is responsible for the cost of 

Claimant’s replacement pump and its refills. 

Employer contends that the WCJ and the Board erred by ordering 

Employer to pay for a replacement pump and its refills when evidence established 

that a home incident, rather than wear and tear, prematurely rendered the pump 

inoperable.

Section 306(f.1)(1)(i) of the Act specifies, in pertinent part, that “[t]he 

employer shall provide payment . . . for reasonable surgical and medical services, 

services rendered by physicians . . . , including . . . medicines and supplies, as and 

when needed.” 77 P.S. § 531(1)(i). Section 306 (f.1)(1)(ii) of the Act further states, 

in relevant part: “In addition to the above service, the employer shall provide 

payment for medicines and supplies, hospital treatment, services and supplies and 
10

orthopedic appliances, and prostheses in accordance with this section.” 77 P.S. § 

531(1)(ii). Employers must also pay for replacements necessary because of normal 

wear and tear or obsolescence. See Zuback v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Paradise 

Valley Enter. Lumber Co.), 892 A.2d 41 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006); see also Bowlaway 

Lanes v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Caparosa), 496 A.2d 99 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1985). 

Here, Employer’s evidence that the pump’s replacement was necessary 

because of a non-work-related intervening incident consisted of the following

records:

 Dr. Gordin’s February 5, 2015 report: 

[Claimant] called my office . . . stating that he was 

working on his house the day before the phone call

in the evening and sustained an electrical shock, 

after which he started noticing that his pain pump 

was alarming every 30 minutes. . . . The pump was 

interrogated and it was discovered that the pump 

was in a stall mode and it has been since the 

accident last night and its function was never 

recovered. We contacted the technical support of 

Medtronic, [which] indicated that the pump [was] 

not salvageable and need[ed] to be replaced. We 

interrogated the pump and programmed it to be 

stopped, which means that the pump’s function 

cannot be restored. 

R.R. at 75a.

 James McInernery, M.D.’s February 9, 2015

Neurosurgery Clinic report: [Claimant] . . . who has 

a long history of intrathecal Dilaudid and 

bupivacaine pump [that was working well], but he 

was shocked recently by electricity and after that his 

pump was stalled and not functioning well and so 

we recommended bringing him to the operating 

room [to] revise the pump.

R.R. at 73a.
11

 Claimant’s agreement in the parties’ Stipulation of 

Undisputed Facts that “[a] number of medical bills have 

also resulted from Claimant’s need to have a morphine 

pump re-implanted on or about February 9, 2015 after 

Claimant was shocked at home.” R.R. at 56a.

See Employer Br. at 33-35. Employer argues that Claimant has the burden of proof 

in this case, but further maintains that, “regardless of which party bore the burden of 

proof on this issue, substantial evidence established the Claimant’s need for a 

replacement pump was due to a non-work-related incident at home, not the work 

injury[] resulting in medical treatment, normal wear and tear or obsolescence.” 

Employer Br. at 35.

At the August 25, 2016 WCJ hearing, Claimant explained that he 

obtained the replacement pump because when he underwent numerous MRIs for his 

back pain “the pump would just go completely crazy with alarms and just beep,” 

which necessitated visits to Dr. Gordin to be sure the pump continued to work 

properly. R.R. at 124a-125a. He further described that he experienced a series of 4 

or 5 small shocks (i.e., like “getting hit on the end of the finger”) while assisting 

electricians working on his house at the end of 2014. R.R. at 128a. He declared that 

the shocks did not make the alarm sound, and they did not require him to seek 

medical treatment. However, Claimant stated that the pump completely failed on 

February 5, 2015 because it was at the end of its life expectancy, causing the alarm to 

sound and Claimant began to suffer from narcotics withdrawal. See R.R. at 129a130a. Claimant returned to Dr. Gordin to evaluate the pump’s function. According 

to Dr. Gordin’s February 5, 2015 outpatient report, Dr. Gordin “contacted the 

technical support of [pump manufacturer] Medtronic, [which] indicated that the pump 

[was] not salvageable and need[ed] to be replaced.” R.R. at 75a. The pump was

replaced on February 9, 2015, and Claimant has not experienced any further 

problems.
12

The law is well-settled that “[t]he WCJ has exclusive authority to act as 

fact finder, determine credibility of witnesses, and weigh the evidence. The WCJ’s 

findings will not be disturbed if they are supported by substantial, competent 

evidence.” Stepp v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (FairPoint Commc'ns, Inc.), 99 

A.3d 598, 601 n.6 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014) (citation omitted).

‘Moreover, we are to draw all reasonable inferences which 

are deducible from the evidence in support of the 

factfinder’s decision in favor of that prevailing party.’ It 

does not matter if there is evidence in the record supporting 

findings contrary to those made by the WCJ; the pertinent 

inquiry is whether the evidence supports the WCJ’s 

findings.

3D Trucking Co., Inc., v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Fine & Anthony Holdings 

Int’l), 921 A.2d 1281, 1288 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007) (citation omitted) (quoting 

Waldameer Park, Inc. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Morrison), 819 A.2d 164, 168 

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2003)).

Accordingly, neither the Board nor the Court may reweigh the evidence 

or the WCJ’s credibility determinations. Sell v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (LNP 

Eng’g), 771 A.2d 1246 (Pa. 2001). Specifically, “Section 422(a) [of the Act, 77 P.S. 

§ 834,] does not permit a party to challenge or second-guess the WCJ’s reasons for 

credibility determinations. [Thus, u]nless made arbitrarily or capriciously, a WCJ’s 

credibility determinations will be upheld on appeal.”

7

 Pa. Uninsured Emp’rs Guar. 

Fund v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Lyle), 91 A.3d 297, 303 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014)

(quoting Dorsey v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Crossing Constr. Co.), 893 A.2d 

191, 195 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006)). Finally, “borderline interpretations of the Act are to 

 

7 Capricious disregard “occurs only when the fact-finder deliberately ignores relevant, 

competent evidence.” Williams v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (USX Corp.-Fairless Works), 862 

A.2d 137, 145 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004). Capricious disregard, by definition, does not exist where, as 

here, the WCJ expressly considered and rejected the evidence. Id.
13

be construed in the injured party’s favor.” Griffiths v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. 

(Seven Stars Farm, Inc.), 943 A.2d 242, 255 (Pa. 2008).

Here, based on the record evidence, including Claimant’s hearing 

testimony which WCJ Vonada found credible, WCJ Vonada concluded as to the 

Review Medical Petition:

The medical records are clear that the pain pump began 

alarming every 30 minutes after [] Claimant sustained an 

electrical shock. However, no physician offered an opinion 

that the electrical shock was the substantial contributing 

factor in comparison to exposure to an MRI machine or 

some other cause. Furthermore, the occasions when [] 

Claimant was shocked were accidental. The intrathecal 

pain pump was found to be reasonable and necessary 

treatment and recommended by several physicians who 

reviewed [] Claimant’s case to control his pain. [Employer]

should be responsible for the costs of its replacement.

Accordingly, the cost of replacement of the intrathecal 

pump should be reimbursed by [Employer].

WCJ January 19, 2017 Dec. at 5 (R.R. at 143a). The Board affirmed the WCJ’s 

decision, stating: “The WCJ . . . found that no physician offered an opinion that the 

electrical shock was the substantial contributing factor in the failure of the pump. 

The WCJ’s finding is supported by the records, which . . . do not assign a cause to the 

failure of the pump.” Board Dec. at 11.

Based upon this Court’s review, drawing all reasonable inferences in 

Claimant’s favor on the Review Medical Petition as we must, we hold that credible 

record evidence supports WCJ Vonada’s conclusion that, but for Claimant’s work 

injury he would not need the pump, and Claimant experienced issues with the pump 

before he was shocked in February 2015. Accordingly, the WCJ and the Board 

properly declared that Employer is obligated to reimburse Claimant for the 

replacement pump and its attendant refills. 
14

Based on the foregoing, the Board’s order is affirmed. 

__________________________

ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Rogele, Inc., :

Petitioner :

:

v. :

:

Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board :

(Hall), : No. 595 C.D. 2018

Respondent :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 30th day of November, 2018, the Workers’ 

Compensation Appeal Board’s March 28, 2018 order is affirmed.

___________________________

ANNE E. COVEY, Judge