COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Chief Judge Felt on, Judges Benton and Petty Argued at Richmond, Virginia

KATE ROSE TRENT MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY v. Record No. 1777-06-2 JUDGE WILLIAM G. PETTY APRIL 24, 2007 PRINCE EDWARD COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PRINCE EDWARD COUNTY Richard S. Blanton, Judge Andrea C. Long (Boone, Beal e, Cosby & Long, on brief), for appellant. Jody Holyst Fariss; Calvin S. Spencer, Jr ., Guardian ad litem for the minor child 1 (Jody Holyst Fariss, P.C.; Harris, Matthews & Crowder, P.C., on brief), for appellee.
Kate Trent appeals the trial court’s decision terminating her parental rights to her daughter pursuant to Code § 16 .1-283(B). On appeal, Trent co ntends the trial court erred in terminating her parental rights (1) based upon a find ing that the child was ab used or neglected when she was burned by a ci garette; and (2) after th e Prince Edward County Department of Social Services (“PDSS”) failed to provide Trent with a dditional rehabilitative servi ces once it determined that the child was injured by a ciga rette burn. Because we find no e rror in the trial court’s rulings, we affirm.

* Pursuant to Code § 17. 1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication. Moreover, as this opinion has no precedential value, we re cite only those facts necessary to our holding.

1 Calvin S. Spencer, Jr., as Guardian ad litem for the minor child, f iled a joint responsive brief with appellee.- 2 - I. BACKGROUND We view the evidence in the “‘light most favor able’ to the prevailing party in the circuit court and grant to that party the benefit of ‘all re asonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom.’” Toms v. Hanover Dep’t of Soc. Servs. , 46 Va. App. 257, 262, 616 S.E.2d 765, 767 (2005) (quoting Logan v. Fairfax County Dep’t of Human Dev. , 13 Va. App. 123, 128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 463 (1991)). Kate Trent gave birth to the child on August 23, 2002. Cumberland County DSS (“CDSS”) originally removed the child from Tr ent’s care on December 25, 2002, after the child suffered from Shaken Baby Syndrome while Tr ent’s boyfriend James Clinton was babysitting her. Following an investigation, Trent agreed to have no contact with James Clinton. CDSS returned custody of the child to Trent on A ugust 1, 2003, and rehabilitative services were provided to Trent, including couns eling and assistance in obtaining Me dicaid and other benefits. On September 4, 2003, CDSS officials located Tr ent and the child with James Clinton in violation of the court order. The PDSS took the ch ild into foster care where she has remained to date. Following the child’s removal, Trent co ntinued her involvement with Clinton. On one occasion, agency workers discovere d Trent had taken the child to the jail to see Clinton. While the child was in foster care, Trent c ontinued to receive a num ber of rehabilitative services to address a broad range of issues. Through the Family Strides Program Trent received assistance with employment, housing, childcare, child development, and financial resources. Individual sessions were provided for Trent through the Northwest Center for Family Services to assist with improved decision-making skills an d to address future planning and parenting

matters. Following a weekend visi tation in August 2005, Trent returned her daughter to daycare with an injury to the ba ck of her right wrist. A daycare worker immediately noticed the injury and- 3 - notified social services. Trent telephoned social services later that morn ing and acknowledged that the child had been under her excl usive care throughout the weekend. Trent explained that the child injured her wrist when she fell at a fami ly outing and suffered a rug burn. Dr. Hussien Al-Shammaa, the child’s pediatri cian, examined her la ter that morning and determined that a lit cigarette caused her injury. In reaching this conclusion he first relied upon the characteristics of the wound, which he described as a “small, round lesion, raised and crusted around the perimeter and deep in the center.” Further, he stressed that no additional abrasions were apparent outside of the injury s ite and that the locatio n of the child’s injury is “consistent with abuse” and inconsistent with a ru g burn. He explained that a rug burn is a superf icial injury and would not have the characteristics shown here with a “round, raised crusted perimeter with a deeper center.” He opined, that to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, the child’s injury was a third-degree burn resulting from a lit cigarette and was not a rug burn. Angie Redford, a nurse employ ed by Dr. Al-Shammaa, initia lly examined the child when she arrived at the physician’s office for her appoint ment. Nurse Redford described the injury as the “size and shape of the tip of a cigarette.” She de tailed how the injury had a “raised crusted portion along the outer perimeter and a deeper central port ion” that was “raw, red, you almost could see muscle tone.” The child told Nu rse Redford that her mother had bu rned her with a “cigga” and then the child took an unlit cigarette and placed it against her wrist to show how her mother had harmed her. Dr. Laurie Shinn, an inde pendent medical examiner and Board Certified Pediatric Dermatologist, examined the child at Trent’s request, several months after the incident, on December 22, 2005. Duri ng the examination, the child told Dr. Shinn that “her mommy” burned her and caused the injury. Because of the passag e of time, Dr. Shinn could not render an opinion concerning the cause of the in jury; however, she agreed that the location of the injury was- 4 - inconsistent with a rug burn and agreed that it would be “a stretc h” to conclude that the injury could have resulted from a rug burn. Moreover, she testified that the in jury described by Dr. Al-Shammaa was consistent with a cigarette burn.
II. ANALYSIS Trent argues that the trial court erred in findi ng that the child was a bused or neglected. Moreover, she contends that because PDSS failed to provide her with additional services after the child sustained the injury to her wrist, the trial court erred by termin ating her parental rights to the child under Code § 16.1-283(B). “‘The termination of parental rights is a gr ave, drastic and irreversible action.’” Helen W. v. Fairfax County Dep’t of Human Dev. , 12 Va. App. 877, 883, 407 S.E.2d 25, 28-29 (1991) (quoting Lowe v. Dep’t of Public Welfare of the City of Richmond , 231 Va. 277, 280, 343 S.E.2d 70, 72 (1986)). However, “[i]t is clearly not in the best interests of a child to spend a lengthy period of time waiting to find out when, or even if, a parent will be capable of resuming his [or her] responsibilities.” Kaywood v. Halifax County Dep’t of Soc. Servs. , 10 Va. App. 535, 540, 394 S.E.2d 492, 495 (1990). In deciding what is in the best interests of a child, we have stated: a court must evaluate and consider many factors, including the age and physical and mental condition of the child or children; the age and physical and mental condition of the parents; the relationship existing between each parent and each child; the needs of the child or children; the role which each parent has played, and will play in the future, in the upbringing and care of the child or children; and such other factors as are necessary in determining the best interests of the child or children. Barkey v. Commonwealth , 2 Va. App. 662, 668, 347 S.E.2d 188, 191 (1986). In determining whether sufficient facts suppor t the trial court’s decision to terminate Trent’s parental rights under s ubsection (B), we presume the tr ial court “‘thoroughly weighed all the evidence, considered the statutory requireme nts, and made its determination based on the- 5 - child’s best interests.’” Fields v. Dinwiddie County Dep’t of Soc. Servs. , 46 Va. App. 1, 7, 614 S.E.2d 656, 659 (2005) (quoting Farley v. Farley , 9 Va. App. 326, 329, 387 S.E.2d 794, 796 (1990)). “The trial court’s judgment, ‘when based on evidence heard ore tenus , will not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.’” Id. at 8, 614 S.E.2d at 659 (quoting Logan , 13 Va. App. at 128, 409 S.E.2d at 463). Under Code § 16.1-283(B), the pa rent of an abused or neglect ed child may have his or her parental rights terminated if the court finds by cl ear and convincing evidence that termination is in the best interests of the child and that: 1. The neglect or abuse suffered by such child presented a serious and substantial threat to his lif e, health or development; and 2. It is not reasonably likely th at the conditions which resulted in such neglect or abuse can be subs tantially corrected or eliminated so as to allow the child’s safe retu rn to his parent or parents within a reasonable period of time. In making this determination, the court shall take into consideration the efforts made to rehabilitate the parent or parents by any pub lic or private social, medical, mental health or other rehabilita tive agencies prior to the child’s initial placement in foster care. In the case before us, the evidence supports the trial court’s conclu sion that termination of Trent’s parental rights is in the child’s best interests. At the time of the termination hearing, the child was forty-six months old and had spent forty-one of those forty-six months in foster care. At four months of age, the child su ffered from Shaken Baby Syndrome and was first removed from Trent’s care. She was returned to Trent on the condition th at Trent would have no contact with Clinton. Seven m onths later in September 2003, so cial workers discovered Trent and the child with Clinton. Trent’s actions resu lted in yet another foster care placement for the child. Despite the child’s removal, Trent mainta ined contact with Clinton and even took her to the jail to visit Clinton while he was incarcerated. Later, Tr ent misled social workers about her visit to the jail to see Clinton.- 6 - Following a weekend visitation in 2005, Trent returned her daughter with a third-degree burn, inflicted during the visitation period. Despite the provision of rehabilitative services over an extended period of months and ample time for Trent to demonstrate th at she is capable of resuming responsibility in caring for the child, sh e has failed to do so. As we have observed, “‘past actions and relationships over a meaningf ul period serve as good indicators of what the future may be expected to hold.’” Winfield v. Urquhart , 25 Va. App. 688, 695-96, 492 S.E.2d 464, 467 (1997) (quoting Linkous v. Kingery , 10 Va. App. 45, 46, 390 S.E.2d 188, 194 (1990)). Trent’s actions provided the tr ial court with clear and c onvincing evidence that the “neglect or abuse” suffered by the child “presented a serious and substantia l threat” to her life, health or development and made it “not reasonably likel y” that the conditions which resulted in such neglect or abuse could be substantially corr ected or eliminated so as to allow the child’s safe return to Trent within “a reasonable period of time.” Code § 16.1-283(B). With the evidence presented, the trial court reasonably concl uded that the child’s be st interests would be served by the entry of the pa rental termination order. Lastly, we address Trent’s claim that the trial court erred in terminating her parental rights under Code § 16.1-283(B) because PDSS failed to provide her with additional rehabilitative services. The record demonstrat es that over an extende d period of time, Trent received numerous rehabilitative services tailored to remedy a pparent deficiencies in Trent’s parenting skills and decision-making abilities. These services included individual counseling sessions. Additionally, practical resources were ma de available to Trent to assist with housing, employment and future planning issues. Moreover, “[n]othing in Code § 16.1-283 or the larger statutory scheme,” requires that rehabilitative services “be provided in all cases as a prerequisite to te rmination under subsection
B.” Toms , 46 Va. App. at 268, 616 S.E.2d at 771. Furt her, subsection (B)(2) “does not create- 7 - specific timeframes” within which rehabilitative serv ices must be provided to a parent, “nor does it mandate that a public or private agency provide any services to a parent after the child enters foster care.” Id. at 269, 616 S.E.2d at 771 (internal quot ation marks and citation omitted). Therefore, Trent was not entitle d to receive additional services , and the trial court was only required to consider “whether reha bilitation services, if any, have been provided to a parent.” Id. at 268, 616 S.E.2d at 771. In the case before us, the record supports the trial court’s compliance with the statutory obligation.
III. CONCLUSION Because sufficient evidence supports the trial co urt’s findings of fact and no error of law undermines its judgment, we affirm the trial co urt’s order terminating Trent’s parental rights under Code § 16.1-283(B).

Affirmed.