*********************************************** 

The “officially released” date that appears near the beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was 

released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions 

and petitions for certification is the “officially released” 

date appearing in the opinion. 

All opinions are subject to modification and technical 

correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut 

Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of 

discrepancies between the advance release version of an 

opinion and the latest version appearing in the Connecticut 

Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports 

or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is to 

be considered authoritative. 

The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the 

opinion as it appears in the Connecticut Law Journal and 

bound volumes of official reports are copyrighted by the 

Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not 

be reproduced and distributed without the express written 

permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. 

*********************************************** 
ZBIGNIEW S. ROZBICKI v. J. MICHAEL

SCONYERS ET AL.

(AC 41654)

Bright, Moll and Devlin, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff sought to recover damages, including treble damages pursuant

to statute (§ 52-568), for vexatious litigation, alleging that the defendants

had filed special defenses and brought a counterclaim against him without probable cause and with malicious intent. In a prior civil action,

the defendants L and his building company, L Co., had retained the

plaintiff to defend them in that action. During the course of his representation by the plaintiff, L contacted his insurance company to inquire

about providing a defense for L and L Co. in the civil action pursuant

to their liability insurance policy. The insurance company then engaged

a law firm on L and L Co.’s behalf to defend them. The plaintiff later

commenced an action against L and L Co. seeking to collect outstanding

legal fees incurred for his services in the prior civil action. L and L Co.

retained the services of the defendants S, an attorney, and the law firm

in which he was a partner, A Co., to defend them in the collection action

and, on the advice of S and A Co., L and L Co. filed an answer, two special

defenses and a counterclaim sounding in legal malpractice against the

plaintiff, alleging, inter alia, that the plaintiff had neglected to inquire

of L’s insurance company whether defense coverage was available for

the prior civil action and failed to inform L of the insurance carrier’s

obligation to defend. The plaintiff and L and L Co. reached a settlement

in the collection action, and the counterclaim was withdrawn. The trial

court thereafter granted the separate motions for summary judgment

filed by S and A Co. and L and L Co. in the vexatious litigation action.

On appeal, the plaintiff alleged that the trial court improperly rendered

summary judgment on the grounds that the defendants had probable

cause to assert special defenses and file a counterclaim against the

plaintiff in the collection action and L and L Co. relied in good faith on

the advice of S and A Co. in asserting the special defenses and filing

the counterclaim. Held:

1. The trial court improperly granted the motion for summary judgment

filed by L and L Co.: a genuine issue of material fact existed as to

whether L and L Co. had probable cause to assert the special defenses

and to file the counterclaim in the collection action; although L and L

Co. submitted a number of exhibits indicating that L was not aware, at

the time he hired the plaintiff in the prior civil action, that insurance

coverage entitling him to a defense was available to him, the plaintiff

submitted several exhibits indicating that L was aware at the time he

hired the plaintiff that insurance coverage was available to him but that

he did not wish to submit a claim for such coverage because, inter alia,

he did not want his insurance premiums to increase; moreover, a genuine

issue of material fact existed as to whether L and L Co. relied in good

faith on the advice of S and A Co. in asserting the special defenses and

filing the counterclaim as a factual dispute existed as to whether L

conveyed to S all material facts within his knowledge, as the evidence

demonstrated that L conveyed to S that he did not know of the availability

of insurance defense coverage at the time he hired the plaintiff to defend

him in the prior civil action, but there existed a genuine issue of material

fact as to whether L knew of the availability of insurance coverage and,

thus, whether the advice of S and A Co. was given after a full and fair

statement of all facts within L’s knowledge.

2. The trial court did not err in granting the motion for summary judgment

filed by S and A Co.: the plaintiff’s claim that S failed to perform an

adequate investigation before asserting the special defenses and filing

the counterclaim was unavailing, as S relied on statements and documents provided to him by his clients, consultation with other attorneys,

his own experience as a practicing attorney in Connecticut for thirtysix years and legal research, and this information provided S a reasonable

basis on which to assert the special defenses and to file the counterclaim;
moreover, the plaintiff’s claim that S lacked probable cause because he

was not an experienced legal malpractice litigator was unavailing, as S

acted as a reasonable attorney familiar with Connecticut law in believing

that he had probable cause.

Argued February 4—officially released July 7, 2020

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for vexatious litigation,

and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in

the judicial district of Litchfield, where the court, Hon.

John W. Pickard, judge trial referee, granted the

motions for summary judgment filed by the named

defendant et al. and rendered judgment thereon, from

which the plaintiff appealed to this court. Reversed in

part; further proceedings.

Zbigniew S. Rozbicki, self-represented, the appellant (plaintiff).

Cristin E. Sheehan, with whom, on the brief, was

Robert W. Cassot, for the appellees (named defendant

et al.).

Patrick J. Markey, for the appellees (defendant Frederick J. Laser et al.).
Opinion

MOLL, J. The plaintiff, Zbigniew S. Rozbicki, appeals

from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court

in favor of the defendants, Frederick J. Laser (Laser),

Laser Building Company, J. Michael Sconyers, and Ackerly Brown, LLP, on his one count complaint sounding

in vexatious litigation. On appeal, the plaintiff claims

that the court improperly rendered summary judgment

in favor of the defendants on the grounds that (1) the

defendants had probable cause to assert special

defenses and to file a counterclaim in a prior action

commenced by the plaintiff against Laser and Laser

Building Company (Laser defendants),1 and (2) the

Laser defendants relied in good faith on the advice of

J. Michael Sconyers and Ackerly Brown, LLP (Sconyers

defendants),2their counsel in the prior action, in

asserting the special defenses and filing the counterclaim. We affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment

of the trial court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. In June, 2012,

Laser retained the plaintiff, who, at the time, was an

attorney with an active license to practice law in Connecticut,3

to defend the Laser defendants in a civil action

captioned Frey v. Noorani, Superior Court, judicial district of Litchfield, Docket No. CV-10-6003549-S (Frey

action).4

In March, 2013, while represented by the plaintiff, Laser contacted NGM Insurance Company (NGM)

to demand that it provide the Laser defendants with a

defense in the Frey action pursuant to their liability

insurance policy. Soon thereafter, NGM engaged the

law firm Hassett and Donnelly, P.C., to appear on behalf

of the Laser defendants in the Frey action. On March

15, 2013, Attorney Peter G. Barrett filed an appearance

on behalf of the Laser defendants, in lieu of the plaintiff,

in the Frey action.5 Following his appearance in the

Frey action, Attorney Barrett negotiated a settlement

that resolved the action as to the Laser defendants at

no additional cost to them.

In September, 2013, the plaintiff commenced an

action against the Laser defendants seeking to collect

$11,782.50 in outstanding legal fees incurred for his

services in the Frey action. See Rozbicki v. Laser, Superior Court, judicial district of Litchfield, Docket No.

CV-13-6009417-S (collection action).6 Laser hired the

Sconyers defendants to defend the Laser defendants in

the collection action.

In the collection action, the Laser defendants, acting

through the Sconyers defendants as their counsel, filed

an answer, two special defenses, and a one count counterclaim sounding in legal malpractice. The first special

defense alleged that ‘‘[t]he plaintiff’s fees are extreme,

excessive, and unreasonable.’’ The second special

defense alleged that ‘‘[t]he sums already paid to the
plaintiff by the [Laser defendants] far exceed the value

of the services performed by the plaintiff.’’

The counterclaim alleged in relevant part as follows:

‘‘[The plaintiff], in violation of his duty [as the Laser

defendants’ counsel in the Frey action], neglected to

inquire of Laser’s insurance company whether coverage

was available and whether it would defend the lawsuit

under a reservation of rights. . . . [The plaintiff] knew

or should have known that Laser’s insurance company

would defend the action under a reservation of rights

but failed to inform Laser of that fact and in fact counseled Laser not to involve his insurance company in

the proceedings. . . . Laser was informed of the fact

that his insurance company had a duty to defend him

under a reservation of rights by opposing counsel at

his deposition [during the Frey action]. . . . Once

informed of this fact, Laser contacted his insurance

company, which then filed an appearance on his behalf

and was able to promptly settle the matter at no cost

to Laser. . . . The legal advice given by [the plaintiff]

and the course of action undertaken by [the plaintiff] in

representing [the Laser defendants] was inappropriate,

time consuming, costly, and unnecessary. . . . The

fees charged by [the plaintiff] were excessive and unreasonable. . . . [The plaintiff’s] negligence and failure to

properly handle the matter for which his legal services

were retained constitute legal malpractice. . . . Due to

[the plaintiff’s] failure to inform Laser of his insurance

carrier’s obligation to defend, [the plaintiff’s] failure to

contact Laser’s insurance company to inquire about the

policy and the obligation to defend, and [the plaintiff’s]

own incompetence in litigating the case, Laser lost

$7500 which he paid to [the plaintiff] for unnecessary

and unreasonable legal fees.’’ Ultimately, the parties

reached a settlement in the collection action, and the

counterclaim was withdrawn on May 21, 2014.

On July 6, 2015, the plaintiff commenced the present

action against the defendants. In his one count complaint sounding in vexatious litigation,7

the plaintiff

alleged in relevant part that the defendants asserted

the special defenses and filed the counterclaim in the

collection action without probable cause and with a

malicious intent to vex and trouble him. As relief, the

plaintiff sought compensatory damages, in addition to

double and treble damages pursuant to General Statutes

§ 52-568.8 The Laser defendants and the Sconyers defendants, respectively, filed separate answers to the complaint denying the material allegations set forth therein.

The Laser defendants also filed several special

defenses, in support of which they alleged that they

had asserted the special defenses and filed the counterclaim in the collection action with probable cause, without malice, and in reliance on the advice of counsel.

On July 3, 2017, the Sconyers defendants filed a

motion for summary judgment accompanied by a sup-
porting memorandum of law and exhibits. On July 5,

2017, the Laser defendants filed a separate motion for

summary judgment accompanied by a supporting memorandum of law and exhibits. The plaintiff filed separate

memoranda of law, with exhibits appended thereto, in

opposition to the defendants’ respective motions for

summary judgment. On March 21, 2018, following argument held on November 27, 2017, the trial court, Hon.

John W. Pickard, judge trial referee, issued a memorandum of decision granting the defendants’ respective

motions for summary judgment. On April 10, 2018, the

plaintiff filed a motion to reargue, which the court

denied on April 19, 2018. This appeal followed. Additional facts and procedural history will be set forth

as necessary.

Before addressing the plaintiff’s claims on appeal,

we set forth the relevant standard of review and legal

principles governing our analysis. ‘‘Practice Book [§ 17-

49] provides that summary judgment shall be rendered

forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof

submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law. . . . In deciding a motion

for summary judgment, the trial court must view the

evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving

party. . . . The party seeking summary judgment has

the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue

[of] material facts which, under applicable principles

of substantive law, entitle him [or her] to a judgment

as a matter of law . . . and the party opposing such

a motion must provide an evidentiary foundation to

demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material

fact. . . . A material fact . . . [is] a fact which will

make a difference in the result of the case. . . . Finally,

the scope of our review of the trial court’s decision to

grant [a] motion for summary judgment is plenary.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rutter v. Janis, 334

Conn. 722, 729, 224 A.3d 525 (2020).

‘‘In Connecticut, the cause of action for vexatious

litigation exists both at common law and pursuant to

statute. Both the common law and statutory causes

of action [require] proof that a civil action has been

prosecuted . . . . Additionally, to establish a claim for

vexatious litigation at common law, one must prove

want of probable cause, malice and a termination of

suit in the plaintiff’s favor. . . . The statutory cause of

action for vexatious litigation exists under § 52-568, and

differs from a common-law action only in that a finding

of malice is not an essential element, but will serve as

a basis for higher damages.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Rockwell v. Rockwell, 196 Conn. App. 763,

769–70, A.3d (2020).

‘‘[T]he legal idea of probable cause is a bona fide

belief in the existence of the facts essential under the

law for the action and such as would warrant a person
of ordinary caution, prudence and judgment, under the

circumstances, in entertaining it. . . . Probable cause

is the knowledge of facts, actual or apparent, strong

enough to justify a reasonable man [or woman] in the

belief that he [or she] has lawful grounds for prosecuting the defendant in the manner complained of. . . .

Thus, in the context of a vexatious suit action, the

defendant lacks probable cause if he [or she] lacks a

reasonable, good faith belief in the facts alleged and

the validity of the claim asserted. . . . [T]he existence

of probable cause is an absolute protection against an

action for [vexatious litigation], and what facts, and

whether particular facts, constitute probable cause is

always a question of law. . . .

‘‘[In Falls Church Group, Ltd. v. Tyler, Cooper &

Alcorn, LLP, 281 Conn. 84, 912 A.2d 1019 (2007)] [o]ur

Supreme Court . . . had the opportunity to consider

whether a higher legal standard of probable cause

should be applied to attorneys and law firms sued for

vexatious litigation. . . . After considering the statute

and the competing policy interests, the court concluded

that a higher standard should not apply. . . . Instead,

in assessing probable cause, the court phrased the critical question as whether on the basis of the facts known

by the law firm, a reasonable attorney familiar with

Connecticut law would believe he or she had probable

cause to bring the lawsuit. . . . As is implied by its

phrasing, the standard is an objective one that is necessarily dependent on what the attorney knew when he

or she initiated the lawsuit.’’ (Citations omitted; internal

quotation marks omitted.) Byrne v. Burke, 112 Conn.

App. 262, 274–75, 962 A.2d 825, cert. denied, 290 Conn.

923, 966 A.2d 235 (2009).

‘‘[P]robable cause may be present even where a suit

lacks merit. Favorable termination of the suit often

establishes lack of merit, yet the plaintiff in [vexatious

litigation] must separately show lack of probable cause.

. . . The lower threshold of probable cause allows

attorneys and litigants to present issues that are arguably correct, even if it is extremely unlikely that they

will win . . . . Were we to conclude . . . that a claim

is unreasonable wherever the law would clearly hold

for the other side, we could stifle the willingness of a

lawyer to challenge established precedent in an effort

to change the law. The vitality of our [common-law]

system is dependent upon the freedom of attorneys to

pursue novel, although potentially unsuccessful, legal

theories.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Falls Church Group, Ltd.

v. Tyler, Cooper & Alcorn, LLP, supra, 281 Conn.

103–104.

As it relates to the present action, the counterclaim

filed by the defendants in the collection action sounded

in legal malpractice. ‘‘Malpractice is commonly defined

as the failure of one rendering professional services to
exercise that degree of skill and learning commonly

applied under all the circumstances in the community

by the average prudent reputable member of the profession with the result of injury, loss, or damage to the

recipient of those services . . . . Generally, a plaintiff

alleging legal malpractice must prove all of the following elements: (1) the existence of an attorney-client

relationship; (2) the attorney’s wrongful act or omission; (3) causation; and (4) damages.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Costello & McCormack, P.C. v.

Manero, 194 Conn. App. 417, 431, 221 A.3d 471 (2019).

I

We first turn to the plaintiff’s claim that the trial court

improperly granted the Laser defendants’ motion for

summary judgment. Specifically, the plaintiff contends

that there were genuine issues of material fact as to

whether the Laser defendants (1) had probable cause

to assert the special defenses and to file the counterclaim in the collection action, and (2) relied in good

faith on the advice of the Sconyers defendants in

asserting the special defenses and filing the counterclaim. We agree.9

The following additional facts and procedural history

are relevant to our resolution of this claim. In their

memorandum of law in support of their motion for

summary judgment, the Laser defendants claimed that

they asserted the special defenses and filed the counterclaim with probable cause, without malice, and in reliance on the advice of the Sconyers defendants. As to

probable cause, the Laser defendants contended that

Laser asked the plaintiff during the Frey action for

advice about duty to defend coverage in connection

with the Frey action, but the plaintiff failed to determine

whether the Laser defendants had such coverage and

dissuaded Laser from demanding a defense from NGM.

The Laser defendants further asserted that Sconyers

advised them that the plaintiff had breached an obligation that he owed to them to determine whether they

had duty to defend coverage available to them with

respect to the Frey action and, if so, to demand a

defense. As to their advice of counsel defense, the Laser

defendants claimed that Laser provided to Sconyers all

relevant documents and facts regarding the Frey action

and the collection action, and that, on the basis thereof,

Sconyers recommended that the Laser defendants

assert the special defenses and file the counterclaim.

The Laser defendants further contended that they relied

in good faith on Sconyers’ advice. The Laser defendants

submitted several exhibits in support of their motion

for summary judgment, including personal affidavits of

Laser and Sconyers.

In opposing the Laser defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff argued, inter alia, that there

were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether

the Laser defendants (1) had probable cause to assert
the special defenses and to file the counterclaim and

(2) relied in good faith on the advice of the Sconyers

defendants. Specifically, the plaintiff argued that there

was evidence in the record demonstrating that, at the

time that Laser retained the plaintiff to represent the

Laser defendants in the Frey action, Laser knew that

there was duty to defend coverage available to the Laser

defendants in the Frey action, but, for financial reasons,

he chose to retain the plaintiff as counsel rather than

demand a defense from NGM. The plaintiff asserted

that Laser’s knowledge of the Laser defendants’ duty

to defend coverage deprived the Laser defendants of

probable cause to assert the special defenses and to

file the counterclaim, which were predicated on the

plaintiff’s failure to advise Laser about insurance coverage. Additionally, the plaintiff argued that there was

evidence in the record establishing that Laser provided

Sconyers with false or incomplete information, and,

therefore, the Laser defendants could not have relied

in good faith on the advice of the Sconyers defendants.

The plaintiff submitted several exhibits in support of

his memorandum of law in opposition to the Laser

defendants’ motion for summary judgment, including a

personal affidavit and copies of correspondence

exchanged between the plaintiff and Laser.

In granting the Laser defendants’ motion for summary

judgment, the trial court concluded that, although not

yet recognized in Connecticut, an attorney’s obligation

to his or her client ‘‘arguably’’ includes the duty to

advise the client ‘‘on the most affordable course of

action including an investigation of potential insurance

coverage,’’ such that the Laser defendants’ belief that

the plaintiff had a duty to advise Laser as to insurance

coverage during the Frey action was reasonable. The

court further concluded that, on the basis of evidence

submitted by the Laser defendants indicating that Laser

had told Sconyers that the plaintiff did not advise him to

seek a determination regarding duty to defend coverage

but rather dissuaded him from pursuing such a determination, there was no genuine issue of material fact that

the defendants had probable cause to file the counterclaim sounding in legal malpractice in the collection

action. The court proceeded to reject several of the

plaintiff’s arguments directed to the Sconyers defendants, and determined that the plaintiff’s personal affidavit raised no genuine issue of material fact as to

whether probable cause existed to file the counterclaim.

Having concluded that the Laser defendants had

probable cause to file the counterclaim, the court concluded that they likewise had probable cause to assert

the special defenses. Specifically, the court stated that if

the plaintiff had advised the Laser defendants regarding

insurance coverage during the Frey action, then NGM

would have assigned counsel to defend them at the

outset of the Frey action at no cost, and, thus, they
never would have incurred the plaintiff’s legal fees.

Additionally, the court granted the Laser defendants’

motion for summary judgment on the separate ground

that there was no genuine issue of material fact that

the Laser defendants relied in good faith on the advice

of the Sconyers defendants in asserting the special

defenses and filing the counterclaim—advice of counsel

being an absolute defense to the plaintiff’s vexatious

litigation claim.

On appeal, the plaintiff does not assert that a legal

malpractice claim predicated on an attorney’s failure

to advise his or her client regarding insurance coverage

is not viable, nor does he dispute that he did not advise

Laser about insurance coverage. Instead, the plaintiff

maintains that he had no reason to counsel Laser about

insurance matters because, as evidence in the record

indicated, Laser, when he retained the plaintiff in the

Frey action in June, 2012, knew that NGM would provide a defense to the Laser defendants in the Frey

action, but, for financial reasons, Laser chose to retain

the plaintiff rather than submit to NGM a demand for

a defense.10 In essence, the plaintiff contends that there

was a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether

the Laser defendants had probable cause to assert the

special defenses and to file the counterclaim, both being

predicated on the plaintiff’s failure to advise Laser about

insurance coverage. Additionally, the plaintiff argues

that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to

whether the Laser defendants relied in good faith on

the advice of the Sconyers defendants because there

was evidence in the record indicating that Laser did

not provide Sconyers with all material facts within his

knowledge. We address each claim in turn.

A

We first consider the plaintiff’s claim that there was

a factual dispute regarding Laser’s knowledge, at the

time that he retained the plaintiff in the Frey action in

June, 2012, of duty to defend coverage available to the

Laser defendants, and, therefore, a genuine issue of

material fact existed as to whether the Laser defendants

had probable cause to assert the special defenses and to

file the counterclaim in the collection action. We agree.

As a preliminary matter, we observe that the factual

issue of whether Laser, in June, 2012, knew that the

Laser defendants were entitled to a defense provided

by NGM was material to the legal question of whether

the Laser defendants had probable cause to assert the

special defenses and to file the counterclaim. See Rutter

v. Janis, supra, 334 Conn. 729 (‘‘[a] material fact . . .

[is] a fact which will make a difference in the result of

the case’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)). The legal

theory underlying the special defenses and the counterclaim was that the plaintiff, when retained by Laser in

the Frey action, had a duty to determine whether the
Laser defendants had insurance coverage for the

defense of the Frey action and, if so, to advise Laser

to seek a formal determination regarding said coverage.

The Laser defendants contended that, as a result of the

plaintiff’s breach of that duty, Laser did not discover

the Laser defendants’ entitlement to a defense by NGM

until nearly one year following their involvement in the

Frey action, during which time they incurred legal fees

owed to the plaintiff that never would have accrued

had they been provided with a defense by NGM at the

outset of the Frey action. Implicit in the Laser defendants’ claim was that Laser, when he hired the plaintiff

in the Frey action, was unaware that NGM would have

provided a defense to the Laser defendants in the Frey

action immediately upon the submission of a proper

demand. Consequently, if Laser knew at that time that

the Laser defendants were entitled to such a defense,

then the Laser defendants would not have had a reasonable, good faith basis on which to assert the special

defenses and to file the counterclaim predicated on

the plaintiff’s failure to determine whether Laser had

insurance coverage and to advise Laser thereabout. To

summarize, if a genuine issue of material fact existed

as to Laser’s knowledge, at the time that he had hired

the plaintiff in the Frey action, regarding the Laser

defendants’ entitlement to a defense by NGM in connection with the Frey action, then the Laser defendants

were not entitled to summary judgment as to the issue

of probable cause.

The Laser defendants submitted a number of exhibits

indicating that Laser was not aware in June, 2012, when

he retained the plaintiff in the Frey action, that insurance coverage entitling the Laser defendants to a

defense in the Frey action was available. In his personal

affidavit, Laser averred that he submitted a demand for

a defense to NGM in connection with the Frey action

only after learning from opposing counsel during his

deposition in the Frey action, conducted on March 5,

2013, that NGM was likely obligated to provide the Laser

defendants with a defense. In a letter addressed to the

plaintiff dated August 20, 2013, Laser similarly represented that he was prompted to submit a demand for

a defense to NGM once opposing counsel in the Frey

action had advised him that NGM was obligated to

provide the Laser defendants with a defense in the

Frey action. Additionally, in an e-mail from Laser to

the plaintiff dated October 15, 2013, Laser wrote that,

during his first meeting with the plaintiff in the course

of the Frey action, Laser told the plaintiff that Laser’s

wife had been informed by their insurance agency, Curtis Insurance Agency, Inc. (Curtis), that the Laser defendants were not entitled to insurance coverage with

respect to the Frey action. Collectively, this evidence

suggests that, at the time that Laser hired the plaintiff

in the Frey action, Laser was under the impression that

duty to defend coverage in connection with the Frey
action was not available to the Laser defendants and

that he first became aware of such coverage in

March, 2013.

In contrast, the plaintiff submitted several exhibits

indicating that Laser was aware in June, 2012, that the

Laser defendants had duty to defend coverage available

to them in connection with the Frey action. In his personal affidavit, the plaintiff averred that Laser, when

Laser retained him in the Frey action, told him that

Curtis informed Laser that insurance coverage would

be available to the Laser defendants with respect to the

Frey matter, but Laser did not wish to submit a claim

for such coverage because, inter alia, he did not want

his insurance premiums to increase. Additionally, Paul

Koneazny, an employee of Curtis, during his deposition

in the collection matter, testified in relevant part that

(1) sometime prior to the Laser defendants’ involvement

in the Frey action, Laser’s wife told Curtis that there

was a possibility that a legal claim would be made

against the Laser defendants, (2) Curtis instructed

Laser’s wife to notify it promptly if any such claim was

filed, (3) Curtis never advised Laser or his wife that they

were not entitled to insurance coverage with respect

to the Frey action, and (4) Curtis first learned of the

Frey action in March, 2013. Finally, in an e-mail from

Laser to another attorney involved in the Frey action,

on which the plaintiff and Attorney Barrett were copied,

dated April 1, 2013, Laser wrote in relevant part that

‘‘when [Laser] initially spoke with [the plaintiff] about

the [Frey action] [Laser] was under the impression that

due to the overreaching and frivolous nature of the

lawsuit it would be thrown out with minimum cost and

paperwork. [The Laser defendants] did not anticipate

the case would become as complicated and expensive

as it has become thus the recent involvement of the

insurance company.’’ (Emphasis added.) Collectively,

this evidence suggests that Laser knew, in June, 2012,

that the Laser defendants were entitled to a defense in

connection with the Frey action, but that he chose to

forgo submitting a demand for a defense to NGM until

the complexity and cost thereof became too great.

In light of the foregoing, we agree with the plaintiff

that there existed a genuine issue of material fact

regarding Laser’s knowledge, at the time that he

retained the plaintiff in the Frey action, of the Laser

defendants’ entitlement to insurance coverage for the

defense of the Frey action. Accordingly, the trial court

improperly granted the Laser defendants’ motion for

summary judgment on the ground that the Laser defendants had probable cause to assert the special defenses

and to file the counterclaim in the collection action.

B

We next address the plaintiff’s claim that there was

a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Laser

defendants relied in good faith on the advice of the
Sconyers defendants in asserting the special defenses

and filing the counterclaim in the collection action.

Specifically, the plaintiff asserts that there was a factual

dispute as to whether Laser conveyed to Sconyers all

material facts within his knowledge. We agree.

‘‘Advice of counsel is a complete defense to an action

of . . . [malicious prosecution or] vexatious suit when

it is shown that the [client] . . . instituted his [or her]

civil action relying in good faith on such advice, given

after a full and fair statement of all facts within his [or

her] knowledge, or which he [or she] was charged with

knowing. . . .

‘‘In determining whether a [client] gave a full and fair

statement of the facts within his or her knowledge to

counsel, reliance on whether the omitted information

would have had any impact on counsel’s decision to

bring the allegedly vexatious action . . . is irrelevant

. . . because, as a matter of law, showing an impact

on an attorney’s ultimate course of action is not an

element of the defense of reliance on counsel. . . . The

ultimate issue is whether the [client] failed to provide

his or her counsel with a fact within his or her knowledge that was material to the action. . . . In other

words, a client should not be permitted to rely upon

the defense of advice of counsel if the client did not

disclose all of the material facts related to a potential

claim, because the lawyer cannot render full and accurate legal advice regarding whether there is a good faith

basis to bring the claim in the absence of knowledge

of all material facts. In such instances, a client’s reliance

on the advice of counsel is unreasonable regardless of

whether the material facts would have altered counsel’s

assessment of the validity of the claim.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Rogan v.

Rungee, 165 Conn. App. 209, 227–29, 140 A.3d 979

(2016).

Our resolution of this claim is guided by our conclusion in part I A of this opinion that a genuine issue of

material fact existed as to whether Laser, at the time

that he hired the plaintiff in the Frey action, had knowledge of the availability of duty to defend coverage to

the Laser defendants. The evidence submitted with

regard to the Laser defendants’ motion for summary

judgment, including the respective personal affidavits

of Laser and Sconyers, in addition to correspondence

exchanged between Laser and the plaintiff that Sconyers reviewed, demonstrates that Laser conveyed to

Sconyers that Laser, at the time that he retained the

plaintiff in the Frey action, was unaware that the Laser

defendants were entitled to a defense provided by NGM

in the Frey action. If the information provided from

Laser to Sconyers was inaccurate or incomplete, then

Laser could not have relied in good faith on Sconyers’

advice. Thus, because there existed a genuine issue of

material fact as to Laser’s knowledge regarding insur-
ance coverage in the defense of the Frey action, a genuine issue of material fact also existed as to whether

Laser provided Sconyers with all of the material facts

that he knew. Accordingly, the trial court improperly

granted the Laser defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the ground that the Laser defendants relied in

good faith on the advice of the Sconyers defendants,

given after a full and fair statement of all facts within

Laser’s knowledge, in asserting the special defenses

and filing the counterclaim.11

II

We next address the plaintiff’s claim that the trial

court improperly granted the Sconyers defendants’

motion for summary judgment. For the reasons that

follow, we disagree.

The following additional facts and procedural history

are relevant to our resolution of this claim. In their

memorandum of law in support of their motion for

summary judgment, the Sconyers defendants asserted

that a reasonable attorney familiar with Connecticut

law would have believed that probable cause existed

in the collection action to assert the special defenses

and to file the counterclaim. Underlying their claim was

Sconyers’ belief that, on being retained in the Frey

action, the plaintiff had a duty to advise Laser to make a

formal determination as to whether there was insurance

coverage available to provide the Laser defendants with

a defense in the Frey action.

With respect to the special defenses in particular, the

Sconyers defendants contended that Sconyers investigated whether the legal fees that the plaintiff charged

the Laser defendants with regard to the Frey action

corresponded to the services that the plaintiff had provided to them, and, on the basis of his forty years of

experience as a practicing attorney, Sconyers determined that the plaintiff’s services did not correspond

to the fees and that the fees were unwarranted and

excessive. Additionally, Sconyers determined that, had

the plaintiff advised Laser to seek a formal determination regarding duty to defend coverage, NGM would

have defended the Laser defendants at the outset of

the Frey action, which would have eliminated the need

for the Laser defendants to hire the plaintiff and incur

his legal fees. As to the counterclaim specifically, the

Sconyers defendants asserted that, on the basis of the

information known to Sconyers, including that the

plaintiff never investigated whether Laser had liability

insurance coverage, Sconyers believed that the plaintiff

had committed legal malpractice. The Sconyers defendants submitted several exhibits in support of their

motion for summary judgment, including a personal

affidavit of Sconyers, appended to which were copies

of correspondence exchanged between Laser and the

plaintiff, and a personal affidavit of Laser.
In opposing the Sconyers defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff argued, inter alia, that the

Sconyers defendants lacked probable cause to assert

the special defenses and to file the counterclaim

because Sconyers (1) lacked any experience in legal

malpractice claims, (2) failed to perform an adequate

investigation before pursuing the special defenses and

counterclaim, and (3) lacked a good faith belief in the

facts alleged in support of the special defenses and the

counterclaim. In support of his memorandum of law

in opposition to the Sconyers defendants’ motion for

summary judgment, the plaintiff attached several exhibits, including a personal affidavit and copies of additional correspondence exchanged between the plaintiff

and Laser.

In granting the Sconyers defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the trial court concluded that Sconyers

was free to rely on the information provided to him

by Laser and that a reasonable attorney familiar with

Connecticut law could have believed that the plaintiff

had violated a duty to the Laser defendants by failing

to advise Laser as to insurance matters during the Frey

action. The court proceeded to reject the plaintiff’s

arguments, determining, inter alia, that (1) Sconyers’

inexperience in the area of legal malpractice was immaterial as to whether he had probable cause to pursue

the legal malpractice claim, (2) Sconyers was entitled

to rely on the information provided to him by Laser, and,

thus, the plaintiff’s argument as to Sconyers’ purported

lack of proper investigation was not viable, and (3) the

plaintiff’s affidavit failed to address the duty of care

issue raised by the Sconyers defendants, and, therefore,

it failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to

whether probable cause existed to file the counterclaim.

Having concluded that the Sconyers defendants had

probable cause to file the counterclaim in the collection

action, the court concluded that they equally had probable cause to assert the special defenses. Specifically,

the court stated that if the plaintiff had advised the

Laser defendants regarding insurance coverage during

the Frey action, then NGM would have assigned counsel

immediately to them at no cost, and, thus, they never

would have incurred the legal fees that they owed to

the plaintiff.

On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the Sconyers

defendants lacked probable cause because Sconyers

failed to perform an adequate investigation prior to

asserting the special defenses and filing the counterclaim. More specifically, the plaintiff contends that

Sconyers, inter alia, failed to consult an expert witness,

interview Laser’s insurance agent, or review certain documentation predating the collection action that purportedly was available to him. Had Sconyers performed a

proper investigation, the plaintiff posits, he would have
discovered that Laser did not provide him with accurate

information12 and that there was no reasonable, good

faith basis on which to pursue the special defenses and

the counterclaim. Additionally, the plaintiff contends

that Sconyers’ lack of experience in litigating legal malpractice cases further deprived him of probable cause.13

These claims are unavailing.14

Turning first to the plaintiff’s assertion that Sconyers

failed to perform an adequate investigation before

asserting the special defenses and filing the counterclaim, we are not persuaded. In his personal affidavit,

Sconyers averred that he relied on the statements and

documents provided to him by Laser, his consultation

with another attorney, and his own experience as a

practicing attorney in Connecticut for thirty-six years.

In addition, during his depositions in the present case,

Sconyers testified that he also interviewed Laser’s wife,

consulted additional attorneys, and performed legal

research. The information received by Sconyers indicated that (1) Laser did not know of the Laser defendants’ entitlement to insurance coverage that provided

a defense in the Frey action when he hired the plaintiff

in the Frey action, and (2) Laser sought advice from

the plaintiff about insurance coverage but the plaintiff

dissuaded Laser from pursuing insurance coverage and

failed to further investigate the insurance coverage

issue, which provided Sconyers with a reasonable basis

on which to assert the special defenses and to file the

counterclaim. The uncontroverted evidence reflects that

Sconyers prepared sufficiently prior to asserting the special defenses and filing the counterclaim, and he was

not obligated to take every imaginable step to confirm

the veracity of the information that he obtained.15 See

52 Am. Jur. 2d 250, Malicious Prosecution § 73 (2019)

(with respect to malicious prosecution action,16 ‘‘[a] person is not required to verify the correctness of all the

information supporting his or her action to be protected

from a malicious prosecution action, but if a reasonable

person would investigate further before beginning the

prosecution, the defendant in a malicious prosecution

action will be liable for his or her failure to do so’’

(footnote omitted)). In addition, without any indication

that Sconyers had reason to believe that Laser had given

him inaccurate information; see footnote 14 of this opinion; Sconyers was entitled to rely on the information

provided to him by Laser. See 4 Restatement (Third),

Torts, Liability for Economic Harm § 24, comment (f)

(2019) (‘‘an attorney is generally entitled to rely on the

factual claims made by a client so long as they are not

patently unreasonable or known to be false’’). Accordingly, the plaintiff’s claim fails.

Additionally, the plaintiff’s contention that Sconyers

lacked probable cause because he was not an experienced legal malpractice litigator is unavailing. Although

Sconyers admitted that he had never tried a legal malpractice case prior to being retained by the Laser defen-
dants in the collection action, the uncontroverted evidence in the record demonstrates that Sconyers

practiced law for forty years, thirty-six years of which

were focused on his practice in Connecticut, and that

he consulted several attorneys and performed legal

research prior to asserting the special defenses and filing

the counterclaim sounding in legal malpractice. The

probable cause standard requires consideration of

whether ‘‘a reasonable attorney familiar with Connecticut law would believe he or she had probable cause

. . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Byrne v.

Burke, supra, 112 Conn. App. 275. An attorney is not

required to have extensive experience in the area of law

at issue in order to meet this standard. Thus, we reject

the plaintiff’s claim.

In sum, with respect to the trial court’s granting of

the Laser defendants’ motion for summary judgment,

we agree with the plaintiff that there existed genuine

issues of material fact as to whether the Laser defendants (1) had probable cause to assert the special

defenses and to file the counterclaim and (2) relied in

good faith on the advice of the Sconyers defendants,

and, therefore, we conclude that the court improperly

granted the Laser defendants’ motion for summary judgment. With respect to the court’s granting of the Sconyers defendants’ motion for summary judgment, we

reject the plaintiff’s claims, and, therefore, we conclude

that the court did not err in granting the Sconyers defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

The judgment is reversed in part and the case is

remanded with direction to deny the motion for summary judgment filed by Frederick J. Laser and Laser

Building Company on July 5, 2017, and for further proceedings in accordance with law; the judgment is

affirmed in all other respects.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 The record reflects that Laser is the vice president of Laser Building

Company.

2

J. Michael Sconyers is a partner at Ackerly Brown, LLP.

3 The plaintiff’s license to practice law in Connecticut currently is suspended.

4 Laser Building Company was named as a defendant in the Frey action,

but Laser, in his individual capacity, was not a party thereto. The record in

the present action is inconsistent on this point; that is, Laser, Laser Building

Company, and the Laser defendants collectively are each referred to as

defendants in the Frey action. In its memorandum of decision granting the

defendants’ respective motions for summary judgment, the trial court stated

that the plaintiff was retained to represent the Laser defendants collectively

in the Frey action. For the sake of avoiding confusion, and because none of

the parties raises the issue of the discrepancy, we refer to the Laser defendants

collectively as having been named defendants in the Frey action.

5 On June 6, 2013, Hassett and Donnelly, P.C., filed a firm appearance in

lieu of the individual appearance filed by Attorney Barrett.

6 The plaintiff named ‘‘Fred Laser D/B/A Laser Building Company’’ as the

sole defendant in the collection action. The plaintiff named both Laser and

Laser Building Company as defendants in the present action and alleged that

their conduct, as well as the conduct of the Sconyers defendants, in the

collection action constituted vexatious litigation. In its memorandum of decision granting the defendants’ respective motions for summary judgment, the

trial court also stated that the plaintiff filed the collection action against the
Laser defendants collectively. In an effort to avoid confusion, and because

none of the parties raises the issue of the discrepancy, we refer to the Laser

defendants collectively as having been named defendants in the collection

action. Notwithstanding the foregoing, it is unclear on what basis the plaintiff

could prevail on a vexatious litigation claim against Laser Building Company

when the only defendant named in the collection action was Laser individually.

7 The plaintiff improperly combined in one single count of his complaint

claims for both common-law vexatious litigation and statutory vexatious

litigation under General Statutes § 52-568. See Practice Book § 10-26 (distinct

causes of action shall be numbered separately in complaint).

8 General Statutes § 52-568 provides: ‘‘Any person who commences and

prosecutes any civil action or complaint against another, in his own name

or the name of others, or asserts a defense to any civil action or complaint

commenced and prosecuted by another (1) without probable cause, shall

pay such other person double damages, or (2) without probable cause, and

with a malicious intent unjustly to vex and trouble such other person, shall

pay him treble damages.’’

9 The plaintiff also claims that the exhibits submitted by the Laser defendants in support of their motion for summary judgment were inadmissible

because, inter alia, none of the exhibits complied with Practice Book § 17-

46. In his principal appellate brief, the plaintiff provides only a cursory

analysis of this claim, and, therefore, we decline to review it. See Starboard

Fairfield Development, LLC v. Gremp, 195 Conn. App. 21, 31, 223 A.3d 75

(2019) (‘‘We are not required to review issues that have been improperly

presented to this court through an inadequate brief. . . . Analysis, rather

than [mere] abstract assertion, is required in order to avoid abandoning an

issue by failure to brief the issue properly. . . . We do not reverse the

judgment of a trial court on the basis of challenges to its rulings that have

not been adequately briefed.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)).

10 The plaintiff also asserts that Laser did not retain him in the Frey action

to provide advice about insurance matters. Because we conclude that the

trial court improperly granted the Laser defendants’ motion for summary

judgment when there existed a genuine issue of material fact concerning

Laser’s knowledge regarding the Laser defendants’ entitlement to insurance

coverage, we need not consider this issue further.

11 In their appellate brief, the Laser defendants claim for the first time that

the granting of their motion for summary judgment may be affirmed on the

alternative ground that the plaintiff’s vexatious litigation claim is untenable

because the collection action ended by way of a settlement, which, according

to the Laser defendants, did not constitute termination of the action in the

plaintiff’s favor. The Laser defendants did not present this claim to the trial

court or, in accordance with Practice Book § 63-4 (a) (1) (A), raise this claim

as an alternative ground for affirmance in their preliminary statement of the

issues. As a result, we decline to consider it. See Red Buff Rita, Inc. v.

Moutinho, 151 Conn. App. 549, 557, 96 A.3d 581 (2014) (declining to consider

appellee’s alternative ground for affirmance raised for first time on appeal

and without compliance with § 63-4 (a) (1) (A), and observing that ‘‘[o]nly

in [the] most exceptional circumstances can and will this court consider a

claim, constitutional or otherwise, that has not been raised and decided in

the trial court. . . . This rule applies equally to alternat[ive] grounds for

affirmance.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)).

12 As we explained in part I of this opinion, the plaintiff does not claim on

appeal that a legal malpractice claim grounded in an attorney’s failure to

advise his or her client regarding insurance issues is not viable, nor does he

dispute that he did not advise Laser regarding insurance coverage; rather,

his position is that Laser, when he retained the plaintiff in the Frey action

in June, 2012, knew that the Laser defendants were entitled to insurance

coverage for a defense in the Frey action and that any contrary representations made by Laser were false.

13 The plaintiff also claims that the exhibits submitted by the Sconyers

defendants in support of their motion for summary judgment were inadmissible because, inter alia, none of the exhibits complied with Practice Book

§ 17-46. Like his identical claim directed to the granting of the Laser defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff has failed to adequately

brief this claim, and, therefore, we decline to review it. See footnote 9 of

this opinion.

14 Throughout his principal appellate brief, the plaintiff thinly asserts that

Sconyers knew that the information provided to him by Laser was false. To

the extent that the plaintiff is claiming on appeal that the Sconyers defendants
lacked probable cause on the additional ground that Sconyers filed the counterclaim and special defenses with knowledge that the facts underlying them

were false, the plaintiff has failed to provide a meaningful analysis of this

claim in his appellate briefs, including a recitation of the specific evidence

in the record supporting it, and, therefore, we decline to review it. See

Starboard Fairfield Development, LLC v. Gremp, 195 Conn. App. 21, 31, 223

A.3d 75 (2019) (‘‘We are not required to review issues that have been improperly presented to this court through an inadequate brief. . . . Analysis, rather

than [mere] abstract assertion, is required in order to avoid abandoning an

issue by failure to brief the issue properly. . . . We do not reverse the

judgment of a trial court on the basis of challenges to its rulings that have

not been adequately briefed.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)). Even

assuming that the plaintiff properly raised this claim on appeal, the evidentiary

record with respect to the Sconyers defendants’ motion for summary judgment reflects no indication that Sconyers had reason to believe that the

information provided to him by Laser was false.

15 Indeed, ‘‘civil proceedings sometimes must be brought before significant

investigation of the facts is possible; the means of conducting such an investigation may become available only with commencement of a lawsuit.’’ 4

Restatement (Third), Torts, Liability for Economic Harm § 25, comment

(a) (2019).

16 Our Supreme Court has explained that ‘‘the elements of malicious prosecution and common-law vexatious litigation essentially are identical. . . .

Although the required showing for both torts essentially is the same, there

is a slight difference in that a plaintiff in a malicious prosecution action must

show initiation of the proceedings by the defendant. In our cases discussing

vexatious litigation claims, we have overlooked this difference because, ordinarily, it is not significant for purposes of considering a claim for vexatious

litigation.’’ (Citations omitted.) Bhatia v. Debek, 287 Conn. 397, 405, 948 A.2d

1009 (2008); see also Falls Church Group, Ltd. v. Tyler, Cooper & Alcorn,

LLP, supra, 281 Conn. 94 (‘‘[a] vexatious suit is a type of malicious prosecution

action, differing principally in that it is based upon a prior civil action,

whereas a malicious prosecution suit ordinarily implies a prior criminal

complaint’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)).