COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Willis, Elder and Bray 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

SHANNON MICHAEL BREITBACH 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 1808-00-2 JUDGE JERE M. H. WILLIS, JR. 

 JUNE 5, 2001 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LOUISA COUNTY 

Daniel R. Bouton, Judge 

 Stephen C. Harris (Graven W. Craig; Graven W. 

Craig, PLLC, on brief), for appellant. 

 Thomas M. McKenna, Assistant Attorney General 

(Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on brief), 

for appellee. 

 On appeal from his conviction of operating a motor vehicle 

while under the influence of alcohol, in violation of Code 

§ 18.2-266, Shannon Michael Breitbach contends that the trial 

court erred in denying his motion to suppress. Breitbach argues 

that because the arresting officer acted outside his territorial 

jurisdiction, the traffic stop was unlawful and the resulting 

evidence was inadmissible. We disagree and affirm the conviction. 

I. BACKGROUND

 In reviewing the trial court's denial of the motion to 

suppress, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable inferences deducible 

therefrom. See Giles v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 527, 532, 507 
S.E.2d 102, 105 (1998). Although we review the trial court's 

findings of historical fact only for "clear error," we review de

novo the trial court's application of defined legal standards to 

the facts of the case. See id.

 On August 29, 1999, Breitbach was operating a motor vehicle 

heading out of the Town of Louisa into Louisa County. Before 

Breitbach had passed a point one mile from the town limits, 

Aubrey O. Robertson, police officer for the Town of Louisa, 

using his moving radar, clocked Breitbach's speed at seventy 

miles per hour in a posted fifty-five miles per hour zone. At 

that time, Officer Robertson's vehicle was located outside of 

one mile from the town limits, but Breitbach's speeding car was 

within that limit. Turning while still outside one mile from 

the town limits, Officer Robertson pursued and stopped 

Breitbach. Based on his observations of Breitbach, Officer 

Robertson arrested him and charged him with driving while 

intoxicated. 

 Officer Robertson wore a Town of Louisa police uniform and 

displayed a Town of Louisa police badge during the incident. 

 Breitbach moved to suppress all evidence obtained upon the 

traffic stop, arguing that the stop was unlawful because Officer 

Robertson lacked authority to act as a police officer or to 

operate radar outside one mile from the Louisa town limits. The 

trial court denied the motion. 

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II. ANALYSIS

 Code § 19.2-250 provides that, in criminal cases involving 

offenses against the Commonwealth, the jurisdiction of a city or 

town "shall extend within the Commonwealth one mile beyond the 

corporate limits of such town or city . . . ." 

 In discussing the purpose of predecessor statutes 

substantially similar to Code § 19.2-250, the Supreme Court of 

Virginia stated: 

"Code, sections 15-560 and 17-139 do not 

purport to extend the effect of municipal 

ordinances beyond the corporate limits of a 

city. They are statutes of enforcement of 

the effective law within the area specified. 

Their purpose is plain, that is, to prevent 

the territory contiguous to a city from 

becoming a refuge for criminals and to 

confer on the corporation courts of cities 

power to enforce the police regulations and 

law of the area involved." 

Squire v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 260, 261, 199 S.E.2d 534, 536 

(1973) (quoting Murray v. Roanoke, 192 Va. 321, 326-27, 64 S.E.2d 

804, 808 (1951)). 

 Inasmuch as the purpose of the statute is the effective 

enforcement of the law within the extended boundary, it is 

irrelevant where the arresting officer was located when he 

observed the speeding violation. The relevant question is whether 

the offense occurred within the Town of Louisa's jurisdiction as 

defined by Code § 19.2-250. 

 Citing Code § 46.2-882, Breitbach contends that because 

Officer Robertson was acting as a Town of Louisa officer and 

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wearing a Town of Louisa uniform and badge, he was authorized to 

operate radar and to make consequent arrests for speeding only 

within the one-mile radius from the Town of Louisa's corporate 

limit. He argues that because Officer Robertson operated the 

radar while outside the one-mile limit, the resulting information 

was unlawfully obtained and could not serve as the predicate for a 

lawful stop. He argues that Officer Robertson's stopping him was 

thus unlawful and violative of the Fourth Amendment and that all 

resulting evidence should have been suppressed. We reject this 

argument. 

 Although Officer Robertson was located outside the one-mile 

limit, he employed the radar to observe events within that limit. 

So acting, he perceived circumstances that gave him probable cause 

to believe that Breitbach was speeding within the one-mile limit. 

These observations supported Officer Robertson's hot pursuit of 

Breitbach. See Neiss v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 807, 809-10, 

433 S.E.2d 262, 264 (1993). The resulting stop, observations of 

Breitbach, and driving while intoxicated charge were thus amply 

supported and proper. 

 The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 

 Affirmed.

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