SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3738-16T2

M.C.,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

DIVISION OF MEDICAL ASSISTANCE 

AND HEALTH SERVICES, and 

MONMOUTH COUNTY BOARD OF

SOCIAL SERVICES,

Respondents-Respondents.

___________________________________

Argued December 17, 2018 – Decided

Before Judges Haas and Sumners.

On appeal from the New Jersey Department of Human 

Services, Division of Medical Assistance and Health 

Services.

Laurie M. Higgins argued the cause for appellant (Sb2, 

Inc. attorneys; John Pendergast, on the brief).

Jacqueline R. D'Alessandro, Deputy Attorney General,

argued the cause for respondents (Gurbir S. Grewal, 

Attorney General, attorney; Melissa H. Raksa, 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

January 3, 2019
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Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Jacqueline R. 

D'Alessandro, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Over sixty years ago, Chief Justice Vanderbilt observed that New Jersey's 

appeals system is guided by the general principle that litigants are entitled "to 

one appeal as of right[.]" State v. Lefante, 14 N.J. 584, 591 (1954). In that 

appeal, the appellant "must present all arguments in support of his [or her] stand" 

and, if the party "fails to present all of the points on which he [or she] rests 

[their] case[,] [the party] is deemed to have waived them and . . . cannot at some 

later stage in the same proceeding . . . argue points which [the party] has in effect 

abandoned." Ibid. Accordingly, "the filing of separate appeals by the same 

party from the same judgment is an obvious, untenable, and intolerable violation 

of the overriding policy of judicial administration that litigation be conducted 

expeditiously, economically, and efficiently." Shimm v. Toys From The Attic, 

Inc., 375 N.J. Super. 300, 304 (App. Div. 2005) (quoting In re Unanue, 311 N.J. 

Super. 589, 598-99 (App. Div. 1998)).

This matter involves appellant M.C.'s third successive appeal from the 

alleged failure of the Department of Human Services, Division of Medical 

Assistance and Health Services (DMAHS), to afford her a hearing on her request 

for an undue hardship waiver for the period of ineligibility for Medicaid benefits 
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imposed due to an asset transfer. In her first appeal,1 we determined that 

appellant abandoned her claim on this point by failing to brief the issue. After 

disposing of that matter, we granted DMAHS' motion to dismiss appellant's 

second appeal,2 where she again raised the exact same argument. Having 

already had two bites at the apple, appellant has now filed her third appeal on 

the identical issue. Guided by Chief Justice Vanderbilt's decades-old guidance, 

we dismiss this appeal.

The procedural history and facts of this matter are fully set forth in the 

opinion we rendered in appellant's first appeal and, therefore, only a brief 

summary is necessary here. M.C. v. DMAHS, No. A-1755-14 (App. Div. Dec. 

13, 2016). M.C. applied for Medicaid benefits while she was living in a nursing 

home. Id. at 2. On October 7, 2013, the Monmouth County Board of Social 

Services, which was the County Welfare Agency for Monmouth County (CWA), 

determined that her eligibility was subject to a 623-day period of ineligibility 

because she had transferred over $160,000 to her daughter for less than fair 

market value during the sixty-month "look-back period" that governs eligibility. 

Id. at 5.

 

1

 Docket No. A-1755-14.

2

 Docket No. A-3738-16.
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On January 9, 2014, M.C. submitted an undue hardship waiver application 

to the CWA seeking relief from the transfer penalty. Two months later, she 

reapplied for Medicaid benefits, and the CWA denied the application. Id. at 6. 

M.C. requested a hearing and the matter was transmitted to the Office of 

Administrative Law (OAL). Ibid. After conducting a hearing, the 

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) issued an Initial Decision, recommending that 

the transfer penalty be upheld. Id. at 6-7. On October 20, 2014, the DMAHS 

Director rendered a final agency decision adopting the ALJ's recommendation. 

Id. at 7.

M.C. filed a notice of appeal from the Director's final decision and from 

the inaction of DMAHS on her request for a hardship waiver. In describing the 

agency decision being appealed, M.C. stated:

[DMAHS] issued a Final Agency Decision on October 

20, 2014 ignoring the Petition for Undue Hardship 

Waiver timely submitted to the assigned caseworker 

and raised again during the hearing at the [OAL] in 

New Jersey on August 15, 2014. [Appellant] appeals 

the Final Agency Decision because it does not address 

the Undue Hardship Waiver. [Appellant] hereby 

requests that the matter be remanded to the ALJ for a 

hearing.

M.C.'s case information statement likewise stated that the only issue "to be 

raised on appeal" was DMAHS' "failure to address [her] request for an Undue 
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Hardship Waiver exception on the penalty issued by DMAHS with regard[] to 

[her] Medicaid eligibility[.]"

In spite of this, M.C. did not brief this issue or otherwise present any 

argument concerning it. Ibid. n.1. Accordingly, we determined that M.C. had 

abandoned this contention. Ibid. We stated:

In her notice of appeal, M.C. stated the Division 

ignored her petition for undue hardship waiver and 

sought a remand. However, the argument is not 

addressed in her initial or reply brief, and is deemed 

waived. R. 2:6-2(a)(5); accord El-Sioufi v. St. Peter's 

Univ. Hosp., 382 N.J. Super. 145, 155 n.2 (App. Div. 

2005) (holding an issue that is not briefed is deemed 

waived upon appeal); Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. 

Court Rules, comment 4 on R. 2:6-2 (2016).

[Ibid.]

3

Approximately two weeks before M.C.'s first appeal was submitted to us 

for disposition, she filed a second appeal, raising the identical issue presented 

in the then-pending matter. In this notice of appeal, M.C. again stated that she 

was appealing from "[t]he failure of [DMAHS] and [the CWA] to issue an 

approval or denial of M.C.'s undue hardship waiver application[.]"

 

3

 We also upheld the transfer penalty imposed by the DMAHS Director. 
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Ten days after we rendered our decision in M.C.'s first appeal on 

December 13, 2016, DMAHS filed a motion to dismiss M.C.'s second appeal. 

DMAHS primarily argued that the second appeal was "duplicative of [her] prior 

appeal[,]" where we had already concluded that M.C. had abandoned and waived 

any argument concerning the waiver application.4 We agreed with this 

contention and dismissed M.C.'s second appeal in a January 25, 2017 order.

Three months later, M.C. filed the present appeal, her third, again 

challenging the failure of DMAHS to address her request for a hearing on the 

waiver application.5 Just as she did in her two prior notices of appeal, M.C. 

contends that "[b]ecause it is undisputed that M.C.'s inaction appeal has gone 

unanswered by [DMAHS], her undue hardship waiver application should be 

granted or, alternatively, the matter should be transmitted to the [OAL]." 6

 

4

 DMAHS also argued that any appeal concerning the application was untimely 

under Rule 2:4-1(b) and, even if this court had not already disposed of this issue 

in the first appeal, M.C. had not exhausted her administrative remedies.

5 M.C. alleges that prior to filing this appeal, she sent a letter on March 2, 2017 

to DMAHS requesting a fair hearing on the waiver application. DMAHS asserts 

it has no record of receiving this request.

6

 DMAHS thereafter filed another motion to dismiss the appeal. On August 22, 

2017, we denied this motion "without prejudice to [DMAHS'] ability to raise 

before the merits panel that [M.C.] has waived her right to seek this relief or that 

the appeal is untimely as to the requested relief."
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As we stated at the outset, a party is only entitled to one appeal, not three. 

M.C.'s arguments to the contrary are without sufficient merit to warrant 

discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). Therefore, we dismiss 

M.C.'s appeal.

Appeal dismissed.