J-A10035-19

2019 PA Super 184

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

JASON GREENLEE 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

No. 1331 EDA 2018

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence April 17, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0002494-2016

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and OTT, J.

OPINION BY GANTMAN, P.J.E.: Filed June 10, 2019

Appellant, Jason Greenlee, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, following his bench 

trial convictions for possession of a controlled substance and persons not to 

possess a firearm.1 We reverse Appellant’s conviction for persons not to 

possess a firearm, vacate the judgment of sentence, and remand for 

resentencing. 

The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. 

On February 26, 2007, Appellant received an aggregate sentence of four (4) 

to ten (10) years’ incarceration for possession with intent to deliver (“PWID”), 

criminal conspiracy, persons not to possess a firearm, and possession of an 

____________________________________________

1 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16) and 18 Pa.C.S.A. 6105(a)(1), respectively. 
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instrument of crime (“PIC”). Appellant was released on parole on June 2, 

2011, subject to special conditions governing his parole. While on parole, on 

January 13, 2016, Appellant admitted to his parole agent, Caleb Tyson, that 

Appellant had used marijuana and tested positive for use of marijuana and 

benzodiazepine, in violation of the terms of his parole. That same day, parole 

agents searched Appellant’s home and discovered in his bedroom a baggie of 

marijuana, a bottle of medication made out to another individual, a loaded 

handgun, and a bag of ammunition. The Commonwealth subsequently 

charged Appellant with persons not to possess a firearm and possession of a 

controlled substance. On July 15, 2016, Appellant filed a suppression motion, 

which the court denied following a hearing on August 15, 2016. On February 

14, 2018, Appellant proceeded to a bench trial. The court heard testimony 

from Agent Tyson, parole agent Michael Van Osten, and police officer 

Christopher McCue, who all testified on behalf of the Commonwealth. 

In its opinion, the trial court accurately summarizes the trial testimony 

of Agent Tyson as follows:

[A]gent, Caleb Tyson, testified that on January 12, 2016, he 

went out to 1457 Stevens Street in the city and county of 

Philadelphia, to make a field contact or home visit 

with...Appellant whom he had started supervising in 2015. 

Agent Tyson testified that when he first entered the 

residence that day he could smell a strong odor of marijuana 

in the residence. Agent Tyson asked...Appellant if anybody 

had been smoking marijuana and Appellant told him that no 

one had. At that point, Agent Tyson requested a urine 

sample from...Appellant and they went upstairs. Agent 

Tyson testified that while they were upstairs to get the urine 

sample, he had asked Appellant what room he stays in and 
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Appellant identified the front room of the house to the left 

when you go upstairs. ... Appellant was unable to give a 

urine sample so Officer Tyson requested that Appellant 

report the following day to his office to give one. 

The following day on January 13, 2016, Agent Tyson 

testified that Appellant reported to his office and provided a 

urine sample which came back positive for marijuana and 

benzodiazepine. At this time, based on what Agent Tyson 

had observed at the house the prior day and the positive 

urine, Appellant was taken into custody. Agent Tyson along 

with his supervisor and other agents then took Appellant 

back to the house located at 1457 Stevens Street to search 

the residence. When they got to the house, Appellant’s 

mother answered the door and the agents informed her that 

they needed to search the residence for belief of a parole 

violation by Appellant. There was also a young female at 

the residence who the agents believed to be Appellant’s 

girlfriend. ... 

After doing a common search of the downstairs for 

everyone’s safety, Agent Tyson testified the agents went 

upstairs to search what had been identified as Appellant’s 

room. Officer Tyson testified that he searched next to the 

bed, and subsequently [located] to the left of the bed, a 

shoe box on the floor that he opened and he found inside a 

small bag of suspected marijuana and pills labeled Milon Al 

which is a benzodiazepine which was prescribed to Michael 

Hutchinson. 

(Trial Court Opinion, filed July 11, 2018, at 2-4) (internal citations to record 

omitted). 

During cross-examination of Agent Tyson, Appellant introduced as 

Exhibit D2 a June 2011 “Order to Release on Parole/Reparole” (“Parole 

Order”). (N.T. Trial, 2/14/18, at 23; Parole Order, Appellant’s Brief at Exhibit 

“D”). The Parole Order contains information related to Appellant’s release on 

parole from incarceration on the 2007 judgment of sentence. At trial, 
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Appellant elicited testimony from Agent Tyson that Appellant’s residency 

address on the Parole Order differs from the address where parole agents 

discovered contraband in January 2016. In addition to a parole residency 

address, the Parole Order contains minimal information regarding Appellant’s 

2007 judgment of sentence. Specifically, the Parole Order lists under the 

heading “Offense(s)/Charge(s)” the following: “DRUG-M/S/D OR PWI TO CC 

DRG-M/S/D OR PWI TO” and “PERSONS NOT TO POSS USE, ETC FIREARMS 

PIC (GENERALLY)”. (Parole Order, Appellant’s Brief at Exhibit “D”). The Parole 

Order also indicates Appellant received an aggregate sentence of four to ten 

years’ incarceration on February 26, 2007. (Id.)

After Agent Tyson testified, the trial court heard the testimony of Agent 

Van Osten and Officer McCue, which the court accurately summarizes in its 

opinion as follows:

Parole Agent Michael Van Osten, one of the other agents 

searching the house, testified...that he was in Appellant’s 

bedroom searching the dresser when he found a small bag 

with some ammunition in it underneath some male clothing 

[in] the uppermost drawer. He also testified that in the next 

drawer down underneath some more male clothing, he 

found a loaded revolver.

Upon finding the drugs and guns, the agents immediately 

called the Philadelphia Police Department. Police Officer 

Christopher McCue testified at trial that on that day he and 

his partner were serving as backup for the parole agents 

and they were called to go to the location of 1457 Stevens 

Street. Upon arrival at that location, the officers were 

directed upstairs by the parole agents to...Appellant’s 

bedroom to recover the drugs and the gun. After recovering 

the items, the officers took Appellant to be processed and 

the narcotics and guns were placed on a property receipt.
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(Trial Court Opinion at 4-5) (internal citations to record omitted). At the 

conclusion of testimony, the parties stipulated as follows: (1) an analyst from 

the Philadelphia Police Department laboratory would testify the drugs, which 

the agents discovered in Appellant’s bedroom, tested positive as marijuana 

and Alprazolam; and (2) police would testify they identified the handgun that 

the agents found as a .32 caliber revolver and determined it was operable. 

Subsequently, the court admitted all the exhibits into evidence. On February 

14, 2018, the court convicted Appellant of one count each of persons not to 

possess a firearm and possession of a controlled substance. 

On April 13, 2018, Appellant filed a post-verdict motion for extraordinary 

relief, requesting an arrest of judgment on the conviction for persons not to 

possess a firearm, because the Commonwealth had not proved Appellant was 

currently disqualified from possessing a gun under Section 6105. Following a 

hearing on April 17, 2018, the court denied Appellant’s post-verdict motion. 

That same day, the court sentenced Appellant to a term of three (3) to six (6) 

years’ incarceration for the persons-not-to-possess conviction, with no further 

penalty for the possession-of-a-controlled-substance charge. 

On May 8, 2018, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. The court 

ordered Appellant on May 14, 2018, to file a concise statement of errors 

complained of on appeal per Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). On May 31, 2018, Appellant

filed a timely Rule 1925(b) statement and a contemporaneous request for 

leave to file a supplemental concise statement upon receipt of notes of 
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testimony from the trial court proceedings. By order dated June 1, 2018, the 

court granted Appellant’s request.2 On June 22, 2018, Appellant filed a 

supplemental Rule 1925(b) statement. 

Appellant limits our appellate review to the following issue:

WAS NOT THE EVIDENCE INSUFFICIENT TO CONVICT 

[APPELLANT] OF 18 PA.C.S.A. § 6105 (PERSONS NOT TO 

POSSESS FIREARMS) IN THAT THERE WAS NO PROOF THAT 

HE HAD ONE OF THE ENUMERATED CONVICTIONS THAT 

WOULD MAKE HIM A PERSON PROHIBITED FROM 

POSSESSING A FIREARM UNDER THE STATUTE?

(Appellant’s Brief at 3).

When examining a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence:

The standard we apply...is whether viewing all the 

evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable 

to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to 

enable the fact-finder to find every element of the 

crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the 

above test, we may not weigh the evidence and 

substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In 

addition, we note that the facts and circumstances 

established by the Commonwealth need not preclude 

every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding 

a defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder 

unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that 

as a matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn 

from the combined circumstances. The 

Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving 

every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt 

by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. 

Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record 

____________________________________________

2 The certified docket entries indicate the court’s June 1st order permitting 

Appellant to file a supplemental concise statement was docketed on various 

dates in May 2018, although the court did not order the Rule 1925(b) 

statement until May 14, 2018, and Appellant did not file for an extension until 

May 31, 2018. 
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must be evaluated and all evidence actually received 

must be considered. Finally, the trier of fact while 

passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the 

weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, 

part or none of the evidence.

This standard is equally applicable in cases where the 

evidence is circumstantial, rather than direct, provided that 

the combination of evidence links the accused to the crime 

beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Commonwealth v. Orr, 38 A.3d 868, 872-73 (Pa.Super. 2011) (en banc), 

appeal denied, 617 Pa. 637, 54 A.3d 348 (2012) (internal citations, quotation 

marks, and emphasis omitted). 

Appellant argues the Commonwealth failed to meet its burden to 

establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant was prohibited from 

possessing a firearm under Section 6105, as of January 2016. Appellant 

submits the Commonwealth did not introduce any evidence Appellant had 

been previously convicted of a disqualifying offense under Section 6105. 

Appellant avers the Parole Order does not specify whether Appellant was

convicted of or merely charged with, inter alia, possession with intent to 

deliver (“PWID”) PWID and persons to possess a firearm in 2007. Appellant 

maintains that even if the Parole Order demonstrates Appellant was convicted 

of PWID in 2007, it does not establish the alleged PWID conviction constituted

a disqualifying offense under Section 6105. Appellant contends the Parole 

Order also does not cite a subsection of the PWID statute, indicate what illegal 

substance was involved, or establish what sentence the court imposed on each 

conviction. Appellant claims the Parole Order does not indicate his alleged 
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2007 PWID conviction carried a potential maximum sentence of two years’ 

incarceration, which would render him ineligible to possess a firearm under 

Section 6105 in January 2016.

Appellant further argues that even if the Parole Order establishes he was 

convicted under Section 6105 in 2007, the Parole Order does not contain 

information about that offense to prohibit him from possessing a firearm in 

January 2016. Appellant contends the Parole Order does not indicate whether 

the 2007 Section 6105 conviction stemmed from Appellant having been 

previously: (1) convicted of an enumerated disqualifying offense, which would 

have precluded him from possessing a firearm under Section 6105

permanently; or (2) included him among one of several classes of individuals 

temporarily prohibited from possessing a firearm. Appellant submits the trial 

evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for persons not to possess a 

firearm. Appellant concludes this Court should vacate his current conviction 

for persons not to possess a firearm. 

In response, the Commonwealth initially argued the Parole Order, by its 

purpose and nature, establishes Appellant was convicted of and sentenced on

the offenses denoted in the document. The Commonwealth contended

Appellant necessarily had a disqualifying prior conviction under Section 6105 

prior to 2007, on the grounds that the Parole Order demonstrates Appellant 

was convicted of persons not possess a firearm in 2007. The Commonwealth 

averred the 2007 conviction for a violation of Section 6105 alone showed that 
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Appellant was prohibited from possessing a firearm in January 2016. The 

Commonwealth adjusts its position in its sur-reply brief, however, to agree 

with Appellant that the Parole Order does not show the specific offenses or 

the bases for Appellant’s convictions in 2007. The Commonwealth concedes 

it presented insufficient evidence at trial to prove Appellant was prohibited 

from possessing a firearm as of January 2016. The Commonwealth concludes 

this Court should reverse Appellant’s conviction for persons not to possess a 

firearm and vacate the judgment of sentence. For the following reasons, we 

agree. 

Section 6105 of the Pennsylvania Uniform Firearms Act provides, in 

relevant part, as follows:

§ 6105. Persons not to possess, use, manufacture,

control, sell or transfer firearms

(a) Offense defined.—

(1) A person who has been convicted of an offense 

enumerated in subsection (b), within or without this 

Commonwealth, regardless of the length of sentence or 

whose conduct meets the criteria in subsection (c) shall not 

possess, use, control, sell, transfer or manufacture or obtain 

a license to possess, use, control, sell, transfer or 

manufacture a firearm in this Commonwealth. 

* * *

(c) Other persons.— In addition to any person who has 

been convicted of any offense listed under subsection (b), 

the following persons shall be subject to the prohibition of 

subsection (a):

* * *

(1) A person who is a fugitive from justice. ... 
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(2) A person who has been convicted of an offense under 

the act of April 14, 1972 (P.L. 233, No. 64), known as The 

Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act, or 

any equivalent Federal statute or equivalent statute of any 

other state, that may be punishable by a term of 

imprisonment exceeding two years.

(3) A person who has been convicted of driving under 

the influence of alcohol or controlled substance as provided 

in 75 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 3802 (relating to driving under influence 

of alcohol or controlled substance) or the former 75 

Pa.C.S.[A.] § 3731, on three or more separate occasions 

within a five-year period. For the purposes of this paragraph 

only, the prohibition of subsection (a) shall only apply to 

transfers or purchases of firearms after the third conviction.

(4) A person who has been adjudicated as an 

incompetent or who has been involuntarily committed to a 

mental institution for inpatient care and treatment under 

section 302, 303 or 304 of the provisions of the act of July 

9, 1976 (P.L. 817, No. 143), known as the Mental Health 

Procedures Act. ... 

(5) A person who, being an alien, is illegally or 

unlawfully in the United States.

(6) A person who is the subject of an active protection 

from abuse order issued pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 6108, 

which order provided for the relinquishment of firearms 

during the period of time the order is in effect. This 

prohibition shall terminate upon the expiration or vacation 

of an active protection from abuse order or portion thereof 

relating to the relinquishment of firearms.

(7) A person who was adjudicated delinquent by a court 

pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 6341 (relating to adjudication) 

or under any equivalent Federal statute or statute of any 

other state as a result of conduct which if committed by an 

adult would constitute an offense under sections 2502, 

2503, 2702, 2703 (relating to assault by prisoner), 2704, 

2901, 3121, 3123, 3301, 3502, 3701 and 3923.

(8) A person who was adjudicated delinquent by a court 
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pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 6341 or under any equivalent 

Federal statute or statute of any other state as a result of 

conduct which if committed by an adult would constitute an 

offense enumerated in subsection (b) with the exception of 

those crimes set forth in paragraph (7). This prohibition 

shall terminate 15 years after the last applicable delinquent 

adjudication or upon the person reaching the age of 30, 

whichever is earlier. 

(9) A person who is prohibited from possessing or 

acquiring a firearm under 18 U.S.C.[A.] § 922(g)(9)

(relating to unlawful acts). ... 

* * *

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(a)(1), (c) (effective December 16, 2008, to January 2, 

2017) (emphasis added).

In other words, an individual commits an offense under Section 6105 if 

the individual (1) possessed, used, controlled, sold, transferred, or 

manufactured a firearm (or obtained a license to do any of the foregoing 

activities); and (2) has been convicted of a specific type of offense listed in 

Section 6105(b) or 6105(c), or meets one of the miscellaneous conditions set 

forth in Section 6105(c). 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(a)(1). Under Section 6105, A 

previous conviction under The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device, and 

Cosmetic Act (“CSA”), 35 P.S. §§ 780-101 et seq., constitutes a disqualifying 

offense only if the drug offense is punishable by more than two years’ 

incarceration. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(c)(2). Additionally, Section 6105 

precludes firearm possession of individuals under certain enumerated 

circumstances, some of which may be temporary. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(c)(1), 

(3), (5), (6), (8). For example, subsections (c)(1), (c)(5), and (c)(6)
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respectively prohibit an individual from possessing a gun if that person is a 

fugitive, an illegal alien of the United States, or subject to an active protection 

from abuse (“PFA”) order. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(c)(1), (5), (6). Section 6105 

does not prohibit an individual from possessing a firearm, however, once that

individual is no longer fleeing justice or in the United States unlawfully, or the 

PFA order against the individual has expired or been vacated. Id. 

Section 780-113 of the CSA, defines and sets forth penalties for PWID. 

See generally 35 P.S. § 780-113. To establish the offense of PWID, the 

Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 

possessed a controlled substance with the intent to deliver it. 

Commonwealth v. Jones, 874 A.2d 108, 121 (Pa.Super. 2005). Section 

780-113 establishes several offenses proscribing the delivery of controlled 

substances. See e.g., 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(1), (30), (32), (33), (36). The 

CSA sets forth different sentences for the various offenses defined in Section 

780-113(a). 35 P.S. § 780-113(b)-(o). Section 780-113 provides some PWID 

offenses are punishable by a potential maximum sentence of more than two 

years’ imprisonment. See 35 P.S. § 780-113(f)(1)-(3), (l). Other PWID 

offenses, however, carry a potential maximum incarceration term not to 

exceed one year. See 35 P.S. 780-113(b), (f)(4), (i). The sentence for each 

PWID offense differs depending upon several factors, including the specific 

offense committed, the controlled substance involved, the schedule 

classification of that controlled substance, the intended receiver of the 
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controlled substance, and whether the offender had committed PWID 

previously. See 35 P.S. § 780-113(b), (f) ,(i), (l). 

Instantly, Appellant received on February 26, 2007, an aggregate 

sentence of four to ten years’ incarceration for PWID, criminal conspiracy, 

persons not to possess a firearm, and PIC. While on parole in January 2016, 

Appellant admitted having used marijuana and tested positive for marijuana 

and benzodiazepine, in violation of the terms of his parole. During a resultant 

search, parole agents discovered marijuana, Alprazolam, a loaded handgun, 

and ammunition in Appellant’s bedroom. 

At Appellant’s bench trial, the Commonwealth’s witnesses testified to 

the circumstances surrounding the search of Appellant’s bedroom and the 

contraband that the parole agents discovered there. During crossexamination of Appellant’s parole agent, Agent Tyson, Appellant introduced 

the Parole Order. The Parole Order provides, inter alia, minimal information 

regarding the convictions underlying Appellant’s 2007 judgment of sentence. 

Under the heading “Offense(s)/Charge(s),” the Parole Order lists the 

following: “DRUG-M/S/D OR PWI TO CC DRG-M/S/D OR PWI TO” and 

“PERSONS NOT TO POSS USE, ETC FIREARMS PIC (GENERALLY)”. (Parole 

Order, Appellant’s Brief at Exhibit “D”). The Parole Order notes the court 

sentenced Appellant on February 26, 2007, to an aggregate term of four to 

ten years’ incarceration. (Id.) At the conclusion of testimony, the parties 

made two stipulations: (1) a Philadelphia Police Department laboratory analyst 
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would testify the laboratory identified the drugs from Appellant’s bedroom as 

marijuana and Alprazolam; and (2) police would testify to the type of handgun 

agents found in Appellant’s bedroom and that the handgun was operable. 

Immediately following trial, the court convicted Appellant of one count each 

of possession of a controlled substance and persons not to possess a firearm. 

On this record, the Commonwealth concedes it failed to prove beyond a 

reasonable doubt that Section 6105 prohibited Appellant from possessing a 

firearm as of January 2016. At trial, the Commonwealth introduced no 

evidence Appellant (1) had been previously convicted of an offense 

disqualifying him from gun possession under Section 6105(b); or (2) that 

Appellant met in January 2016 any of the several enumerated conditions 

precluding an individual from possessing a firearm under Section 6105(c). 

Rather, the trial court relied upon the Parole Order to establish Appellant was 

prohibited from firearm possession under Section 6105, because the Parole 

Order demonstrated Appellant had committed a disqualifying offense in 2007. 

The Parole Order, however, provides too little detail about Appellant’s 2007 

convictions and judgment of sentence to sustain Appellant’s current conviction 

for persons not to possess a firearm. 

Specifically, the Parole Order does not demonstrate Appellant 

committed any of the disqualifying offenses enumerated in Section 6105(b). 

Regarding Section 6105(c), the Parole Order suggests Appellant was convicted 

in 2007 of, inter alia, PWID and persons not to possess a firearm, both of 
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which could possibly but not definitively disqualify Appellant from future gun 

possession or for how long the prohibition would last. The Parole Order, 

however, does not include the following information about Appellant’s 2007 

PWID offense: the specific PWID offense Appellant committed; the controlled 

substance involved; the schedule classification of the controlled substance;

the intended recipient of the controlled substance; and whether Appellant had 

committed that same or another kind of PWID offense prior to 2007. See 35 

P.S. § 780-113(b), (f), (i), (l). Thus, the Parole Order does not establish 

Appellant’s 2007 PWID conviction carried a potential maximum sentence of 

more than two years’ incarceration. See 35 P.S. § 780-113(b), (f), (i), (l). 

As such, the Parole Order does not demonstrate Appellant’s 2007 PWID 

conviction constituted a disqualifying offense under Section 6105 in 2016. 

See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(c)(2). 

Furthermore, the Parole Order does not provide the grounds for 

Appellant’s conviction of persons not to possess a firearm in 2007. The Parole 

Order fails to indicate whether Appellant had been convicted of one of the 

offenses enumerated in Section 6105(b) prior to 2007, which would have 

prohibited Appellant from possessing a gun in January 2016. Notably, the 

Parole Order also does not demonstrate whether the Commonwealth 

established Appellant met in 2007 any of the Section 6105(c) conditions, and 

if so, which condition. Because several of the Section 6105(c) conditions are 

temporary, the Parole Order gives insufficient detail to prove Appellant 
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currently met the same prohibitive Section 6105(c) condition he had met in 

2007. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(c)(1), (5), (6). Although the Parole Order 

suggests Appellant was convicted of persons not to possess a firearm in 2007, 

the Parole Order fails to support Appellant’s current Section 6105 conviction. 

See Orr supra; 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(a)(1). On this record and without more, 

the Commonwealth did not meet its burden to prove beyond a reasonable 

doubt that Appellant was prohibited from possessing a firearm in January 

2016. See Orr supra; 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(a)(1). 

Based upon the foregoing, we reverse Appellant’s conviction for persons 

not to possess a firearm, vacate the judgment of sentence in its entirety, and 

remand for resentencing on the remaining possession of a controlled 

substance conviction. See Commonwealth v. Bartrug, 732 A.2d 1287 

(Pa.Super. 1999), appeal denied, 561 Pa. 651, 747 A.2d 896 (1999) (holding 

sentencing error on one count in multi-count case generally requires all 

sentences for all counts to be vacated so court can restructure entire 

sentencing scheme). See also Commonwealth v. Goldhammer, 512 Pa. 

587, 593, 517 A.2d 1280, 1283 (1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 950, 107 S.Ct. 

1613, 94 L.Ed.2d 798 (1987)) (stating generally if appellate court alters 

overall sentencing scheme, then remand for re-sentencing is proper).

Judgment of sentence vacated; case remanded for resentencing. 

Jurisdiction is relinquished. 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 6/10/2019