Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 68 / Monday, April 10, 1995 / Notices 18153

achieve the underlying purpose of the

rule. The underlying purpose of the

requirement to perform Type A

containment leak rate tests at intervals

during the 10-year service period, is to

ensure that any potential leakage

pathways through the containment

boundary are identified within a time

span that prevents significant

degradation from continuing or

becoming unknown. The NRC staff has

reviewed the basis and supporting

information provided by the licensee in

the exemption request.

As previously noted, the initial Type

A test failed. This failure was due to

three sources: (1) The containment

recirculation sump isolation valve,

MOV–4145; (2) the temporary level

indicators on the steam generators; and

(3) the packing gland of a main steam

line inboard vent valve. The first

leakage source was identified as a

problem with the limit switch setting on

MOV–4145 that prevented full closure.

Resetting the switches and closing the

valve electrically corrected the source of

leakage. This valve is now tested

periodically to ensure the limit switch

settings allow full closure, and the value

has not demonstrated excessive leakage

in any subsequent Type A test. The

temporary level indicators, are

components which are only in place

while the plant is shutdown. Upon

identification of the leakage path, the

temporary configuration was isolated

and has not resulted in any further

leakage. The third component condition

which led to an excessive leakage rate

during this test was attributed to a

packing failure in the main steam

inboard vent valves. This condition was

corrected by backseating the vent valves

to eliminate leakage. In a subsequent

refueling outage, the vent valves were

removed and the connection was sealed

with blind flanges. Following the

licensee’s prompt identification and

corrective actions, three additional Type

A tests have been successful and have

demonstrated a good containment

performance. Thus, the Type A test

results only confirm the results of the

Type B and C test results. The NRC staff

has noted that the licensee has a good

record of ensuring a leak-tight

containment. Since the first failure, all

Type A tests have passed with

significant margin and the licensee has

noted that the results of the Type A

testing have been confirmatory of the

Type B and C tests which will continue

to be performed.

The NRC staff has also made use of

the information in a draft staff report,

NUREG–1493, which provides the

technical justification for the present

appendix J rulemaking effort which also

includes a 10-year test interval for Type

A tests. The integrated leakage rate test,

or Type A test, measures overall

containment leakage. However,

operating experience with all types of

containments used in this country

demonstrates that essentially all

containment leakage can be detected by

local leakage rate test (Type B and C).

According to results given in NUREG–

1493, out of 180 ILRT reports covering

110 individual reactors and

approximately 770 years of operating

history, only 5 ILRT failures were found

which local leakage rate testing could

not detect. This is 3 percent of all

failures. This study agrees well with

previous NRC staff studies which show

that Type B and C testing can detect a

very large percentage of containment

leaks. The CC–2 experience has also

been consistent with these results as

previously noted.

The Nuclear Management and

Resources Council (NUMARC), now the

Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), collected

and provided the NRC staff with

summaries of data to assist in the

appendix J rulemaking effort. NUMARC

collected results of 144 ILRTs from 33

units; 23 ILRTs exceeded 1.0La. Of

these, only nine were not due to Type

B or C leakage penalties. The NEI data

also added another perspective. The NEI

data show that in about one-third of the

cases exceeding allowage leakage, the

as-found leakage was less than 2La; in

one case the leakage was found to be

approximately 2La; in one case the asfound leakage was less than 3La; one

case approached 10La; and in one case

the leakage was found to be

approximately 21La. For about half of

the failed ILRTs the as-found leakage

was not quantified. These data show

that, for those ILRTs for which the

leakage was quantified, the leakage

values are small in comparison to the

leakage value at which the risk to the

public starts to increase over the value

of risk corresponding to La

(approximately 200La, as discussed in

NUREG–1493). Therefore, based on

these considerations, it is unlikely that

an extension of one cycle for the

performance of the appendix J, Type A

test at CC–2 would result in significant

degradation of the overall containment

integrity. As a result, the application of

the regulation of these particular

circumstances is not necessary to

achieve the underlying purpose of the

rule.

Based on generic and plant specific

data, the NRC staff finds the basis for

the licensee’s proposed exemption to

allow a one-time exemption to permit a

schedular extension for CC–2 of one

cycle (24 months) for the performance of

the appendix J, Type A test, and to

permit the third Type A test to be

performed during the spring 1999

refueling which extends the second 10-

year service period to 12 years to be

acceptable. As a condition for granting

this exemption, the licensee will

perform visual containment inspections.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the

Commission has determined that

granting this Exemption will not have a

significant impact on the environment

(60 FR 14979).

This Exemption is effective upon

issuance and shall expire at the

completion of the 1997 refueling outage.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 3rd day

of April 1995.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Steven A. Varga,

Director, Division of Reactor Projects—I/II,

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

[FR Doc. 95–8707 Filed 4–7–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–M

[Docket Nos. 50–275 and 50–323]

Pacific Gas & Electric Co., Diablo

Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Unit Nos.

1 and 2; Environmental Assessment

and Finding of No Significant Impact

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (the Commission) is

considering issuance of exemptions

from Facility Operating License Nos.

DPR–80 and DPR–82, issued to Pacific

Gas and Electric Company (the licensee)

for operation of Diablo Canyon Nuclear

Nuclear Power Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2,

located in San Luis Obispo County,

California.

Environmental Assessment

Identification of the Proposed Action

The proposed action would grant

relief from the requirement in Section

III.D.1.(a) of Appendix J to 10 CFR Part

50 that the third Type A test in a 10-year

service period be conducted when the

plant is shut down for the 10-year plant

inservice inspections and allows the

licensee to perform the three Type A

tests at approximately equal intervals

within each 10-year service period.

The proposed action is in accordance

with the licensee’s application for

exemption dated February 16, 1994.

The Need for the Proposed Action

The proposed action is needed so that

the licensee, given the 18-month fuel

cycles at Diablo Canyon, is not required

to perform a fourth Type A test in order

to meet the Appendix J requirement and

the Diablo Canyon Technical

Specification requirement that Type A

tests be conducted at 40 months plus or
18154 Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 68 / Monday, April 10, 1995 / Notices

minus 10 months during each 10-year

service period.

Environmental Impacts of the Proposed

Action

The proposed exemption would not

adversely affect primary containment

integrity. The three required Type A

tests would still be conducted within

the 10-year service period while giving

the licensee flexibility in scheduling

consistent with Diablo Canyon’s 18-

month fuel cycles. The combination of

the Appendix J requirement and the

current Diablo Canyon Technical

Specification requirement would

necessitate that the licensee, because of

Diablo Canyon’s 18-month fuel cycles,

perform Type A tests at the second and

fourth refueling outages but then would

not permit the third Type A test to be

conducted on a schedule that meets

both requirements. The Commission has

completed its evaluation of the

proposed action and concludes that the

intent of Section III.D.1.(a) of appendix

J that containment leak-tight integrity be

verified periodically throughout service

lifetime is met when licensees perform

three sets of Type A tests at

approximately equal intervals over the

10-year service period. Therefore, the

change will not increase the probability

or consequences of accidents, no

changes are being made in the types or

amounts of any effluents that may be

released offsite, and there is no

significant increase in the allowable

individual or cumulative occupational

radiation exposure. Accordingly, the

Commission concludes that there are no

significant radiological environmental

impacts associated with the proposed

action.

With regard to potential

nonradiological impacts, the proposed

action involves features located entirely

within the restricted area as defined in

10 CFR part 20. It does not affect

nonradiological plant effluents and has

no other environmental impact.

Accordingly, the Commission concludes

that there are no significant

nonradiological environmental impacts

associated with the proposed action.

Alternatives to the Proposed Action

Since the commission has concluded

there is no measurable environmental

impact associated with the proposed

action, any alternatives with equal or

greater environmental impact need not

be evaluated. As an alternative to the

proposed action, the staff considered

denial of the proposed action. Denial of

the application would result in no

change in current environmental

impacts and would result in a larger

expenditure of licensee resources to

perform a fourth Type A test within a

10-year service period. The

environmental impacts of the proposed

action and the alternative action are

similar.

Alternative Use of Resources

This action does not involve the use

of any resources not previously

considered in the Final Environmental

Statement for Diablo Canyon Nuclear

Power Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2.

Agencies and Persons Consulted

In accordance with its stated policy,

on February 16, 1995, the staff

consulted with the California State

official, Mr. Hank Kocol of the

Department of Health Services,

regarding the environmental impact of

the proposed action. The State official

had not comments.

Finding of No Significant Impact

Based upon the environmental

assessment, the Commission concludes

that the proposed action will not have

a significant effect on the quality of the

human environment. Accordingly, the

Commission has determined not to

prepare an environmental impact

statement for the proposed action.

For further details with respect to the

proposed action, see the licensee’s letter

dated February 16, 1994, which is

available for public inspection at the

Commission’s Public Document Room,

the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street,

NW., Washington, DC, and at the local

public document room located at the

California Polytechnic State University,

Robert E. Kennedy Library, Government

Documents and Maps Department, San

Luis Obispo, California 93407.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 31st day

of March 1995.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Theodore R. Quay,

Director, Project Directorate IV–2, Division

of Reactor Projects III/IV, Office of Nuclear

Reactor Regulation.

[FR Doc. 95–8706 Filed 4–7–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–M

[Docket No. 50–322]

Environmental Assessment and

Finding of No Significant Impact

Regarding Termination of the

Shoreham Nuclear Power Station,

Nuclear Power Facility License No.

NPF–82

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission is considering the issuance

of an Order modifying the June 11,

1992, Order (the decommissioning

Order) that authorized the Long Island

Power Authority (LIPA or the licensee)

to decommission the Shoreham Nuclear

Power Station (SNPS), Unit 1, at Wading

River, New York. The SNPS is located

in the town of Brookhaven, Suffolk

County, New York, about 50 miles east

of New York City, on the north shore of

Long Island. The modifying Order

would terminate License No. NPF–82

and release the site for unrestricted use

based on the successful completion of

decommissioning.

Environmental Assessment

Identification of Proposed Action

By letter dated June 27, 1991, the

former licensee, Long Island Lighting

Company (LILCO), and supplemented

by letter dated August 4, 1994, the

current licensee, LIPA, requested

termination of the SNPS, Nuclear Power

Facility (NPF) License No. NPF–82

(Docket No. 50–322). NRC approved, by

Order dated June 11, 1992, the

decommissioning of the SNPS. The June

11, 1992, Order contained the staff’s

Environmental Assessment and Finding

of No Significant Impact related to the

decommissioning of SNPS.

The licensee has completed the

decommissioning and Final

Termination Surveys of the SNPS.

Representatives of the Oak Ridge

Institute for Science and Education

(ORISE), under contract to NRC,

conducted a series of independent

confirmatory surveys, during four site

visits from February 1993 through

November 1994. The proposed action

would be to terminate the SNPS License

No. NPF–82 and release the facility and

site for unrestricted use.

The Need for the Proposed Action

To release the SNPS for unrestricted

access and use, License No. NPF–82

must be terminated.

Environmental Impact of License

Termination

In June 1992, NRC approved, by

Order, the decommissioning of the

SNPS. The June 11, 1992, Order

contained the staff’s Environmental

Assessment and Finding of No

Significant Impact related to the

decommissioning of SNPS.

Based on an agreement between the

Philadelphia Electric Company (PECo)

and LIPA, the slightly irradiated fuel

stored in the SNPS spent fuel pool was

transferred to the Limerick Generating

Station for use. The dismantlement and

decontamination of the SNPS began in

June 1992 and was completed in

accordance with an approved

decommissioning plan (DP), as

supplemented, in August 1994. All