IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-51061

Summary Calendar

DAVID BRIAN JENNINGS,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

RISSIE OWENS, in her Official Capacity as Presiding Officer of the Texas Board

of Pardons and Paroles; STUART JENKINS, in his Official Capacity as Director

of the Parole Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice; IVY

ANDERSON-YORK, in her Official Capacity as Director of Region I of the Parole

Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice; LINDA MCCARVER, in

her Official Capacity as Supervisor of Parole Officers within Region I of the

Parole Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice; and ERNESTO

ALVAREZ, in his Official Capacity as Direct Parole Officer within Region I of

the Parole Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice,

Defendants-Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 1:06-CV-990

Before REAVLEY, SMITH, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

David Brian Jennings, a Texas parolee, brought suit sunder 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 challenging three sex offender parole conditions imposed on him when he

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

September 26, 2011

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

Case: 10-51061 Document: 00511613246 Page: 1 Date Filed: 09/26/2011
No. 10-51061

was paroled in 2005 after serving a prison sentence for debit card fraud. These

three conditions were based on of a sex offense he pleaded guilty to in 1979 and

for which he completed his sentence in 1988. He claimed that the imposition of

these conditions violated his right to procedural due process.

The magistrate judge, presiding with the consent of the parties, originally

granted summary judgment in favor of Jennings and ordered the conditions

removed from the terms of Jennings’s parole. We reversed that decision and

remanded. Jennings v. Owens, 602 F.3d 652, 654 (5th Cir. 2010). Relying on our

decision, the magistrate judge then granted the defendants’ new motion for

summary judgment and dismissed the case, explaining that Jennings could not

show that he experienced stigma on the basis of the parole conditions.

We review the grant of summary judgment de novo. Nickell v. Beau View

of Biloxi, L.L.C., 636 F.3d 752, 754 (5th Cir. 2011). Summary judgment is proper

if the evidence shows that there is no genuine dispute as to a material fact. Id.;

FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(2) (As of December 1, 2010, this proposition is codified in

FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).). To establish the unconstitutional infringement of a

liberty interest regarding the conditions of parole, a plaintiff must show, among

other things, that the conditions cause stigma, meaning that they falsely label

the plaintiff and imply guilt of serious wrongdoing. Jennings, 602 F.3d at 657-59

& n.9. Jennings argues that summary judgment is not warranted because he

presented evidence that the special parole conditions falsely label him as

someone who continues to be a threat to the community. However, we have

already determined that because Jennings is a convicted sex offender and has

had the ability to challenge that status, he is not stigmatized by the imposition

of sex offender parole conditions. Jennings, 602 F.3d at 659. Because Jennings

cannot establish that a liberty interest was infringed, summary judgment in

favor of the defendants was proper. Accordingly, the judgment is AFFIRMED.

2

Case: 10-51061 Document: 00511613246 Page: 2 Date Filed: 09/26/2011