TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-23-00265-CV

Bo Ren and Wei Liu, Appellants 

v. 

Service King Collision Austin, Appellee

FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 1 OF TRAVIS COUNTY

NO. C-1-CV-22-001693, THE HONORABLE TODD T. WONG, JUDGE PRESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

This is a dispute over certain fees that Service King Collision Austin charged 

appellants Bo Ren and Wei Liu in connection with repairing their vehicle after an accident. 

Appellants, who represent themselves, challenge the trial court’s grant of summary judgment 

based on the statute of limitations. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

On March 13, 2019, appellants took their car to Service King on the 

instructions of their insurer to repair damage from a collision. Service King completed repairs 

on March 25, 2019. Appellants picked up the car the same day after paying $866.54 in towing, 

storage fees, and repair costs. 

Appellants, acting pro se, sued Service King in justice court on March 30, 2021. 

They alleged that Service King “refused to release” their vehicle and “forced” them to pay those 
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fees and costs to recover their car. Construing this as a claim for conversion, Service King filed 

a traditional motion for summary judgment on the pleadings based on the statute of limitations. 

See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 16.003(a) (requiring person to bring suit for conversion “not 

later than two years after the day the cause of action accrues”). Service King argued in the 

motion that appellants’ original petition was filed two years and five days after the claim 

accrued. The justice court granted Service King’s motion and dismissed the case.

Appellants appealed to the county court for a trial de novo. Service King filed a 

traditional motion for summary judgment based on limitations and lack of diligence in service.

Appellants filed a response in which they argued generally that summary judgment was

inappropriate because fact questions existed but did not address limitations. On January 30, 2023, 

the trial court signed a final judgment granting Service King’s motion and dismissing the case 

with prejudice. On February 6, 2023, appellants filed, without leave of court, an amended 

petition adding claims for breach of contract and fraud. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

Appellants have filed a pro se brief challenging the trial court’s judgment in 

twelve issues. Liberally construing appellants’ brief, we understand them to assert that the trial 

court erred by (1) granting Service King’s motion for summary judgment on conversion, a claim 

which they had not pled; and (2) “ignoring” the claims for fraud and breach of contract in their 

amended petition.

1 As relief, they ask us to remand to the trial court for a jury trial on 

those claims.

1 Although litigants who represent themselves must meet the same standards as licensed 

attorneys, Wheeler v. Green, 157 S.W.3d 439, 444 (Tex. 2005), we construe pro se filings 

“liberally and with patience ‘so as to obtain a just, fair and equitable adjudication of the 
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Standard of Review

We review a trial court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Zive v. Sandberg, 

644 S.W.3d 169, 173 (Tex. 2022). To prevail on a motion for traditional summary judgment, the 

movant must show that “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact” and that it is “entitled

to judgment as a matter of law.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c). A genuine issue of material fact exists 

if the conflict “rises to a level that would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to differ in 

their conclusions.” First United Pentecostal Church of Beaumont v. Parker, 514 S.W.3d 214, 

220 (Tex. 2017) (citing Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 711 (Tex. 

1997)). Evidence does not create an issue of material fact if it is “so weak as to do no more than 

create a mere surmise or suspicion” that the fact exists. Id. (citing Kia Motors Corp. v. Ruiz, 

432 S.W.3d 865, 875 (Tex. 2014)).

Although a plaintiff’s pleadings are generally not competent summary-judgment 

evidence, “they may form the basis of summary judgment when the defendant asserts 

limitations” as an affirmative defense. South Tex. Coll. of Law v. KBR, Inc., 433 S.W.3d 86, 90 

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. denied). When a motion for summary judgment is 

directed solely at the plaintiff’s petition, we take “all allegations, facts, and inferences in the 

pleadings as true, viewing them in a light most favorable to the pleader,” and will affirm 

summary judgment “only if the pleadings are legally insufficient.” Natividad v. Alexsis, Inc., 

875 S.W.2d 695, 699 (Tex. 1994). If the pleading on its face “conclusively shows the moving 

party is entitled to summary judgment based on its affirmative defense,” the motion should be 

granted. South Tex. Coll. of Law, 433 S.W.3d at 90.

parties’ rights,’” Housing Auth. of City of Austin v. Elbendary, 581 S.W.3d 488, 491 n.1 (Tex. 

App.—Austin 2019, no pet.) (quoting Veigel v. Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Found., Inc., 

549 S.W.3d 193, 195 n.1 (Tex. App.—Austin 2018, no pet.)).
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Conversion

Appellants argue in their first issue that the trial court erred by granting Service 

King’s motion for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations. Appellants argue that 

Service King sought summary judgment on a claim—conversion—that they never asserted. 

They do not, however, provide an alternative label for their claim. Service King responds that 

the substance of appellants’ claim is for conversion and that there is no genuine issue of material 

fact that appellants filed suit beyond the limitations period.

We agree with Service King. “The true nature of a cause of action depends on the 

facts alleged in the petition, the rights asserted, and the relief sought, not on the descriptive terms 

or labels used.” Charlie Thomas Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Martinez, 590 S.W.3d 9, 17 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, no pet.). In the absence of special exceptions, we construe the 

pleadings liberally and will “uphold the petition as to a cause of action that may be reasonably 

inferred from what is specifically stated, even if an element of the cause of action is

not specifically alleged.” Texas Dep’t of State Health Servs. v. Crown Distrib. LLC, 

No. 03-20-00463-CV, 2021 WL 3411551, at *3 n.2 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 5, 2021, no pet.)

(mem. op.) (citing Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593, 601 (Tex. 1993))).

Appellants alleged the following against Service King in their original petition:

On 3/25/2019, Defendant forced Plaintiffs to pay the bill of TOWING, 13 days 

STORAGE and 4 hours of labor which caused Plaintiffs’ vehicle to be TOWED. 

Otherwise, Defendant would continue to refuse to release Plaintiffs’ vehicle and 

continue to charge Plaintiffs STORAGE everyday. After Defendant and 

Defendant’s Partner Insurer Progressive’s estimates, on the morning of 3/13/2019, 

Plaintiff drove Plaintiffs’ vehicle to Defendants for 41.8 hours REPAIR and got 

the rental there by Defendant’s Partner Insurer Progressive’s arrangement. 

Defendant caused more than $20,000 damages to Plaintiffs’ recovery from the 

car accident.
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Construing the petition liberally, appellants allege that Service King unlawfully and without 

authorization refused to return appellants’ vehicle unless they paid certain fees. Conversion is

the “unauthorized and wrongful assumption and exercise of dominion and control over the 

personal property of another, to the exclusion of or inconsistent with the owner’s rights.” 

Waisath v. Lack’s Stores, Inc., 474 S.W.2d 444, 447 (Tex. 1971). The elements of a conversion 

claim are (1) “the plaintiff owned or had legal possession of the property or entitlement to 

possession”; (2) the defendant “unlawfully and without authorization assumed and exercised

dominion and control over the property to the exclusion of, or inconsistent with, the plaintiff’s 

rights as an owner”; (3) “the plaintiff demanded return of the property”; and (4) “the defendant 

refused to return the property.” Smith v. Maximum Racing, Inc., 136 S.W.3d 337, 341 (Tex. 

App.—Austin 2004, no pet.). The substance of appellants’ claim is for conversion.

We also agree with Service King that there is no issue of material fact that 

limitations bars appellants’ suit. To obtain traditional summary judgment based on limitations, 

“the defendant must conclusively prove (1) when the cause of action accrued, and (2) that the 

plaintiff brought its suit later than the applicable number of years thereafter—i.e., that ‘the 

statute of limitations has run.’” Draughon v. Johnson, 631 S.W.3d 81, 89 (Tex. 2021) (citing 

Provident Life & Acc. Ins. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211, 220 (Tex. 2003)). A person must bring suit 

for conversion of personal property “not later than two years after the day the cause of action 

accrues.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 16.003(a).

A cause of action accrues “when a wrongful act causes some legal injury, even if 

the fact of injury is not discovered until later, and even if all resulting damages have not yet 

occurred.” Archer v. Tregellas, 566 S.W.3d 281, 288 (Tex. 2018). Generally, a claim for 

conversion accrues at the time of the unlawful taking. Wells Fargo Bank Nw., N.A. v. RPK 
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Capital XVI, L.L.C., 360 S.W.3d 691, 700 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.). If the original 

possession of the property was lawful, however, the claim does not begin to accrue “until the 

return of the property has been demanded and refused, or until the person in possession has

unequivocally exercised acts of domination over the property inconsistent with the claims of the 

owner or the person entitled to possession.” Id.

Appellants allege in their original petition that on March 25, 2019, Service King 

allegedly “forced [appellants] to pay the bill of TOWING, 13 days STORAGE and 4 hours of 

labor” or Service King “would continue to refuse to release [appellants’] vehicle” and continue 

to charge them fees. In other words, appellants allegedly demanded return of their property and 

Service King wrongfully refused. Taking that allegation as true, appellants’ conversion claim 

accrued when Service King refused to return their vehicle without payment on March 25, 2019.

See Wells Fargo Bank Nw., 360 S.W.3d at 700. Appellants filed suit on March 30, 2021, two

years and five days later. Their original petition conclusively shows that Service King is entitled 

to summary judgment based on the statute of limitations.

2 See South Tex. Coll. of Law, 

433 S.W.3d at 90 (“If the pleading on its face conclusively shows the moving party is entitled to 

summary judgment based on its affirmative defense . . . the motion will be granted.”). We 

overrule appellants’ first issue.

2 Because we uphold the trial court’s ruling on limitations, we do not reach Service 

King’s alternative argument that appellants were not diligent in effecting service. See Tex. R. 

App. P. 47.1 (“The court of appeals must hand down a written opinion that is as brief as 

practicable but that addresses every issue raised and necessary to final disposition of 

the appeal.”).
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Fraud and Breach of Contract

Appellants argue in what we construe as their second issue that the trial court 

erred by granting a final judgment without addressing their claims for fraud and breach of 

contract. Service King responds that those claims were not properly before the trial court

because the amended petition was not on file when the trial court signed the judgment.

We agree with Service King. Our rules provide that a traditional motion for 

summary judgment must be rendered on the pleadings “on file at the time of the hearing, or filed 

thereafter and before judgment with permission of the court.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c). A trial 

court generally cannot grant permission to file amended pleadings after it has rendered judgment. 

Murphy v. Arcos, 615 S.W.3d 676, 697 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2020, pet. denied); see Greenhalgh 

v. Service Lloyds Ins, 787 S.W.2d 938, 940 (Tex. 1990) (“It is well established that a party may 

amend its pleading after verdict but before judgment.”). Because appellants’ amended petition 

was not filed before judgment with permission of the court, the trial court did not err by refusing 

to consider either claim. See Prater v. State Farm Lloyds, 217 S.W.3d 739, 741 (Tex. App.—

Dallas 2007, no pet.) (concluding trial court was not required to consider amended petition filed 

after court signed final judgment). We overrule appellants’ second issue.

CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
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__________________________________________

Rosa Lopez Theofanis, Justice

Before Chief Justice Byrne, Justices Kelly and Theofanis

Affirmed

Filed: April 24, 2024