[Cite as In re S.A. , 2013-Ohio-3047.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR MONTGOMERY COUNTY, OHIO

IN RE: S.A. :

: C.A. CASE NO. 25532

: T.C. NO. 2010-8794 : (Civil appeal from Common Pleas Court, Juvenile Division) :

:

. . . . . . . . . . O P I N I O N

Rendered on the 12th day of July , 2013.

. . . . . . . . . . PATRICK J. CONBOY II, Atty. Reg. No. 0070073, 5613 Brandt Pike, Huber Heights, Ohio 45424 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant D.G., Miamisburg, Ohio 45342 Defendant-Appellee (Father)

. . . . . . . . . . DONOVAN, J. {¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant Mother appeals a judgment of the Montgomery County2 Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, overruling her objections and adopting the decision of the magistrate which awarded cust ody of S.A. to defendant-appellee Father. {¶ 2} The magistrate’s decision awarding Father legal custody of S.A. was issued on October 18, 2012. On November 16, 2012, the tr ial court issued its judgment adopting the decision of the magistrate. Mother filed a timely notice of appeal with this Court on December 14, 2012. {¶ 3} The instant action commenced on April 12, 2012, when Father filed a motion for change of custody regarding his daughter, S.A., born January 26, 2009.

Instructions for service to Mother were filed by Father on April 12, 2012. On April 30, 2012, a summons was sent to Mother at her la st known residence in Indiana regarding the motion for change of custody and the accompanying hearing scheduled to be held on July 16, 2012. The summons was sent by both certif ied mail and regular mail. On July 25, 2012, a notice of failure of servi ce was filed with respect to th e summons issued by certified mail. Conversely, the summons sent by re gular mail was not retu rned, and there is no

indication in the record that it was sent back or otherwise refused. {¶ 4} On August 1, 2012, the magistrate gr anted a continuance of the custody hearing at the request of Mother. The reason for Mother’s request does not appear in the record. The magistrate rescheduled the h earing by entry dated for October 12, 2012. On October 10, 2012, just two days before the re-sch eduled hearing, Mother filed a motion with the magistrate to continue the October 12, 2012, hearing date. In her motion, Mother stated that the she was pregnant and, according to her doc tor, at a high risk for miscarriage. Thus, Mother argued that she was unable to travel from Florida where she resided at the time. In3 support of her motion, Mother faxed a letter from her doctor citing complications from her pregnancy as the reason she could not travel by air. {¶ 5} Nevertheless, the magistrate proceeded with the custody hearing on October 12, 2012, as scheduled. Father a ttended the hearing, but Mother did not. On October 18, 2012, the magistrate issued its decision granting custody of S.A. to Father. Mother filed timely objections to the magistrate’s d ecision on October 29, 2012. On November 16, 2012, the trial court overruled Mother’s objections and a dopted the decision of the magistrate. {¶ 6} It is from this judgment that Mother now appeals. {¶ 7} Mother’s first assignment of error is as follows: {¶ 8} “THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN GRANTING

FATHER’S MOTION FOR CHANGE OF CUSTODY.” {¶ 9} In her first assignment, Mother contends that the trial cour t erred in adopting the decision of the magistrate granting Father’s motion for change of custody. Specifically, Mother argues that she was not properly served with a copy of the motion to change custody, and she did not “voluntarily or involuntarily submit to the jurisdiction of the Court.” Accordingly, Mother asserts that the judgment against her is void. {¶ 10} Personal jurisdiction can be obtained th rough service of process pursuant to the Civil Rules, voluntary appearance, or waiver. Turner v. Duncan , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 20208, 2004-Ohio-6790, citing Maryhew v. Yova , 11 Ohio St.3d 154, 464 N.E.2d 538 (1984). Without personal jurisdic tion, a trial court is without authority to render judgment against a party to an action. Id . at 156. Pursuant to Civ. R. 75(J), Father was required to4 obtain service of process over Mother in order to invoke the court’s c ontinuing jurisdiction to hear his motion for a change in custody. In re Seitz , 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2002-T-0097, 2003-Ohio-5218. The deter mination of the sufficiency of service of process

is within the sound discre tion of the trial court. Enroute Card v. Roysden , 2d Dist. Greene No. 96 CA 100, 1997 WL 435700 (Aug. 1, 1997). {¶ 11} In the instant case, it is apparent from the record that the summons sent on April 30, 2012, by certified mail was returned on July 25, 2012, as unclaimed. The Clerk also sent service of the summons by regu lar mail on April 30, 2012. Civ. R. 4.6(D) governs regular mail service and states as follows: If a certified or express mail envelope is returned with an endorsement showing that the envelope was unclaimed, the clerk shall forthwith notify, by mail, the attorney of record or if there is no attorney of record the party at whose instance process was issued. If the attorney, or serving party, after notification by the clerk files with the clerk a written request for ordinary mail service, the clerk shall send by ordi nary mail a copy of the summons and complaint or other document to be served to the defendant at the address set forth in the caption, or at the addre ss set forth in written instructions furnished to the clerk. The mailing shall be evidenced by a certificate of mailing which shall be completed and filed by the clerk. Answer day shall be twenty-eight days after the date of mailing as evidenced by the certificate of mailing. The clerk shall endorse this answer date upon the summons which is sent by ordinary mail. Service shall be deemed complete when the fact of5 mailing is entered of record, provided that the ordinary mail envelope is not returned by the postal authorities with an endorsement showing failure of delivery. If the ordinary mail envelope is returned undelivered, the clerk shall forthwith notify the attorney, or serving party, by mail. {¶ 12} Pursuant to the foregoing rule, service is effective when the fact of mailing is entered on the record, unless the ordinary ma il envelope is return ed undelivered. In State v. Cheatham , 2d Dist. Greene No. 92-CA-57, 1992 WL 371846 (December 18, 1992), the plaintiff contemporaneously sent notice of a support arrearage hearing to the defendant by certified mail and regular mail. On appeal, th e defendant argued that by doing so the plaintiff failed to comply with the service requirements in Civ. R. 4.6(D), and he was, therefore, not properly served notice of the hearing. Id . The plaintiff acknowledged that rather than wait until the certified mail had been returned as unclaimed before sending the hearing notice to the defendant by regular ma il, she sent the notice utilizing both methods simultaneously. Id . Upon review, we held that serv ice on defendant had, in fact been achieved by regular mail wh en we found the following: Although [plaintiff] jumped the gun by sending the regular mail notice prematurely[,] we fail to see how the [defendant] sustained any prejudice in this case. [The defendant] does not dispute that he received regular mail notice of the May 19, 1992, hearing in time to defend the motion. *** [The defendant’s] due process rights under the Federal and Ohio Constitutions

were not violated. Cheatham , 2d Dist. Greene No. 92-CA-57. {¶ 13} The ordinary mail envelope containing the summons was not returned as6 undelivered in the instant case. Under these ci rcumstances, a presumpti on arises that proper service has been perfected, as l ong as the ordinary mail was sent to an address where there is a reasonable expectation that it will be delivered to the defendant. Portfolio Recovery Assoc., L.L.C. v. Thacker , 2d Dist. Clark No. 2008 CA 119, 2009-Ohio-4406. Because the ordinary mail envelope containing the summons was not returned as undelivered, it was reasonable for the magistrate to conclude that service had been perfected on Mother at 5748 Wyckfield Way, Indianapolis, Indiana 46220, where the lette r was sent by ordinary mail pursuant to Civ. R. 4.6. In light of our holding in Cheatham, Mother was not prejudiced when Father contemporaneously sent notice of the custody hearing to her by certified mail and regular

mail. Significantly, Mother provided the trial court with no evid entiary materials to support her claim that she did not receive service of the summons at that address, and she appeared by seeking and obtaining a continuance of th e initial hearing date of July 16, 2012. Thus,

the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it found that se rvice of the summons for the custody hearing was perfected on Mother. {¶ 14} Mother’s first assignment of error is overruled. {¶ 15} Mother’s second and final assign ment of error is as follows: {¶ 16} “THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING

APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE OF THE HEARING DATE.” {¶ 17} In her final assignment, Mother argues that the trial court erred when it implicitly overruled her motion for a continuance of the custody hearing filed on October 10, 2012. Mother, however, failed to object to th e magistrate’s denial of her motion for

continuance before the tr ial court. Juv.R. 40(D)(3 )(b)(iv) provides: “(iv) Waiver of right to7 assign adoption by court as error on appeal. Except for a claim of plain error, a party shall not assign as error on appeal the court’s adop tion of any factual findi ng or legal conclusion, whether or not specifically desi gnated as a finding of fact or conclusion of law under Juv.R. 40(D)(3)(a)(ii), unless the party has objected to that finding or conclusion as required by Juv.R. 40(D)(3)(b).” Juv.R. 40(D)(3)(a)(iii) re quires a magistrate’s decision to include conspicuous language informing the parties of their responsibility to object to, rather than simply appeal, the magistrate’s decision. {¶ 18} The magistrate’s decision issued on October 18, 2012, complied with Juv.R. 40(D)(3)(a)(iii). Mother failed to object to the magistrate's decision regarding the denial of

her motion for continuance filed on October 10, 2012, as required by Juv.R. 40(D)(3)(b)(iv). As the Supreme Court of Ohio has noted, the “failure to follow procedural rules can result in forfeiture of rights.” Goldfuss v. Davidson , 79 Ohio St.3d 116, 122, 679 N.E.2d 1099 (1997). Absent a showing of plain error, Moth er’s argument has been waived for purposes of appeal since she failed to object below. “‘In appeals of civil cases, the plain error

doctrine is not favored and ma y be applied only in the ex tremely rare case involving exceptional circumstances where error, to which no objection was made at the trial court, seriously affects the basic fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial process, thereby challenging the legitimacy of the unde rlying judicial pro cess itself.’ (Citation omitted).” In the Matter of A.J.S. & R.S. , 2d Dist. Miami No. 2007 CA 2, 2007-Ohio-3433, ¶ 16. After a thorough review of the record, there is no evidence of plain error in this case. The magistrate had already gran ted one continuance at Mothe r’s request. The request was

made on the eve of the second scheduled hearin g, and there is no evidence Mother could not8 have traveled via automobile in order to attend the hearing. {¶ 19} Mother’s second and final assi gnment of error is overruled. {¶ 20} All of Mother’s assignments of error having been overruled, the judgment of

the trial court is affirmed. DONOFRIO, J., concurs. FROELICH, J., concurring in judgment: {¶ 21} Civ.R. 4 requires that the clerk sh all issue a summons for service upon each

defendant. {¶ 22} Civ.R. 4.1 lists all methods of service of the original complaint. It provides for service by the clerk by certified or express mail or by commercial carrier service. Civ.R. 4.6(D) states that “[i]f *** certif ied mail envelope attempting service *** is returned with an endorsement stating that the e nvelope was unclaimed, the clerk [upon request of the attorney at whose instance process was issued] shall se nd by ordinary mail a copy of the summons and complaint.” {¶ 23} Civ.R. 5 provides how service shall be made of pleadings and other papers subsequent to the original complaint; it permits service by “mailing it to the person’s last known address by United States mail, in which event servi ce is complete upon mailing.” Civ.R. (5)(B)(2)(c). {¶ 24} By the explicit language of Civ.R. 4.6, ordinary mail service of the original complaint cannot be requested or made until the cer tified mail is unclaimed. Completion of this “process is necessary to clothe the trial court with the jurisdiction to proceed.” In Re: B.P.H., 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2006-04-090, 2007-Ohio-1366, ¶ 14. The B.P.H. court9 distinguished our Cheatham case based on the fact that Cheatham dealt with service of a notice of hearing to establish child support not, as in B.P.H. , the original service of a summons and complaint for legal custody. Moreover, the original pleading in Cheatham was a request to register a fo reign support order pursuant to UR ESA; it was sent by certified

mail and was returned unclaimed. Subsequently, “the Clerk se rved [the defendant] with copies of the registration of the foreign support order.” Cheatham at *1. {¶ 25} Here, the original action commenced when Father filed a motion for change of custody; it was not service of papers “subse quent to the original complaint,” therefore, service could not be by ordinary mail until certified mail was attempted and returned unclaimed and the attorney then requests ordinary mail service. {¶ 26} My review of the record does not fi nd that regular mail was ever sent to

Mother. The Instructions for Service of the Motion completed by Father on April 12, 2012, requests “residential service” at an Indianapolis address. The print-out of the Juvenile Court’s “Docket Entry History” reflects that service by certified mail was issued to Mother on April 30, and, on July 26, the history notes “service failed for the following reason:

refused/unclaimed. . . .” Howe ver, on April 30, the “history” further only says “[D.G.]

issued return N/A with a summons-cus tody on April 30, 2012, via regular mail.” {¶ 27} “It is rudimentary that in order to render a valid persona l judgment, a court must have personal jurisdic tion over the defendant.” Maryhew v. Yova , 11 Ohio St.3d 154, 156, 464 N.E.2d 538 (1984). Personal jurisdicti on over a party may be obtained not only through proper service of process, but also by the voluntary appearance of the party or by actions of the party that constitu te an involuntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court.10 Id. The record does support a finding that th e Plaintiff-Appellant Mother submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the court. {¶ 28} She requested and obtained a continuance of the August hearing until October; shortly before that scheduled October date she file d a motion to continue it and faxed a physician’s letter to the court. At no time did she object to the court’s proceeding, only that she wanted the matter continued. {¶ 29} In her objections, filed on October 29, to the magistrate’s decision of October 18, she raised concerns about what sh e deems to be false information provided by

Father and attached documentati on in support of her position on custody. It is true that she writes, “As well, until Octobe r 24, 2012 I had received no pape rwork from the courts.” However, she knew, well before October 24, the nature of the scheduled hearings and requested continuances of them without su ggesting that she objected to the court’s proceedings with the hearing. {¶ 30} Civ.R. 12(H)(1) provides that a “defen se of lack of jurisdiction over the person...is waived...(b) if it is neither made by motion under th is rule nor included in a responsive pleading or an amendment thereof permitted by Rule 15(A) to be made as a

matter of course.” A reasonabl e interpretation of her brief st atement is that she did not receive the magistrate’s deci sion until October 24; it does not raise a defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person. {¶ 31} In Vance v. Nichols , 2d Dist. Darke No. 1697, 2007-Ohio-3819, petitioner filed for a civil stalking protection order. The ex parte order was denied, but the petition was set for a second hearing because “Respondent requested a second hearing.” Prior to the11 new date, the Respondent filed a handwritten motion for a continuance stating she needed the delay to request time off work and to contact her attorney. The court did not grant the second continuance and the Respondent did not appear. We held that “Regardless of whether [respondent] received [p etitioner’s] petition, she consente d to the court’s personal jurisdiction over her when she file d her motion for continuance.” Id. ¶ 8. {¶ 32} In our case, Appellant argues that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction to rule on the petition because she did not recei ve service of proce ss in a timely manner. {¶ 33} A party seeking to challenge a void judgment must file a motion to vacate or set aside the judgment. CompuServe, Inc. v. Trionfo , 91 Ohio App.3d 157, 161, 631 N.E.2d 1120 (10th Dist. 1993). A party should not file a Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment in order to have a void judgment vacated or set aside, since Civ.R. 60(B) motions apply only to judgments that are voida ble rather than void. See the 1970 Staff Note to Civ.R. 60(B). The power to vacate a void judgment does not arise from Civ.R. 60(B), but rather, from an inherent power posse ssed by the courts in this state. Patton v. Diemer , 35 Ohio St.3d 68, 518 N.E.2d 941 (1988), pa ragraph four of the syllabus. {¶ 34} Nevertheless, where a party attempts to vacate a void judgment through a Civ.R. 60(B) motion, courts treat the motion as a common law motion to vacate or set aside the judgment, finding that it is “not significan t” that the motion has been styled as a Civ.R. 60(B) motion. CompuServe , 91 Ohio App.3d at 161, citing U.S. Sprint Communications Co. v. Mr. K’s Foods, Inc. , 10th Dist. Franklin No. 90AP-629, 1990 WL 250516 (Dec. 31, 1990). Regardless, the appeal before us is not of a motion to vacate or a R. 60 motion. {¶ 35} I would not find that every motion fo r continuance is a submission to the12 court’s jurisdiction. But on direct appeal and with the record in this case, the trial court did not err in holding that it had personal jurisdic tion over the Appellant a nd, therefore, I concur

in the affirmance.

. . . . . . . . . . (Hon. Gene Donofrio, Seventh Distri ct Court of Appeals, sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Ohio). Copies mailed to: Patrick J. Conboy, II D.G. Hon. Nick Kuntz