The Honor able Sea n F. Cox, Unit ed States District Judge f or the Ea stern District of * Michig an, sitting by

desig nation. 1 NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION File Na me: 09a0289n.06 Filed: Apr il 17, 2009 No. 07-5250 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT UNITED STAT ES O F AMERICA, P laintif f-App ellee, ON AP P EAL FR OM THE UNITE D v. STA TES D ISTRIC T C OU RT F OR THE WEST ERN D ISTRIC T OF TEN NE SSEE CURTIS McDONA LD, Defendan t-Appellant. ________________________________/

BEFORE: BATCHEL DER and CLAY, Circuit Judges; and COX, Distric t Judge. * COX, Distric t Judge . F oll ow inga jur y tr ia l, D e fendan t- Ap pe lla nt C ur tis Mc Do na ld (“ M c D o n a l d ” ) w a s c o n v i c t e d o f f i f t e e nc o un t s o f

dr u g tr a f f i c k i n g an d

m o n e y l a un d e r i n g . I nthi s appea l, M cD o n al d

ar gu es t h at t h e d i s t ri ct co urt i mp ro p er l y ch ar ac t er i z edh i s “N un c P ro T un c M o tion for Ac quittal” as a se cond motion pursuant to 28 U .S.C. § 2255, and theref ore imprope rly

found that it lacked jurisdiction to enter tain the motion. For the re asons below, we AF F IRM the judg ment of the district court.2 BA CKGROUND The unde rlying f

acts whic h led to Mc Donald’s orig inal conviction wer e laid out in depth by this Court i n Un ite d S

tates v . M c Do na ld , 173 F.3d 430, 1999 WL149658 (6th Cir. 1999). A brie f sy n o p s i s o f t hose fa cts, as we ll as the proce dural fa cts leadingto the instant moti on, are included below. Mc Do na ld w a s o ne of se ve ra l de fe nd ants ind ic te d a nd c on vic te d f

or his inv olv e me nt w ith

a dr ug -t ra ff ic kin g and

mon e y la un de ri ngop e ra

tio n th a t tr ans po rt e d c oc a ine fr om H ou sto n, Te xas t o Memphis, Tennesse e. The Gover nment alleg ed that McD onald was one of two individuals who controlled the Me mphis end of the conspira cy , distributed thousands of kilogr ams of coc aine, a nd shipped milli ons of dollars bac k to Colom bia. A jury found McDona ld guilty of fifte en counts of dr ug tr a ff ic kin g and mon e y la

un de ri ng on Oc tob e r 31 , 19 96

. Th e low e r c ourt se nte nc e d M c Do na ld on Fe bruar

y 28, 1997 to life imprisonment, plus a five y ear period of supe rvised re lease

. At trial, the Gove rnment off ere d a tape d phone conve rsation (“ the W illiams Tape”) betwee n
c o- de fe nd ant Je rle e n M c Ne il ( “ Mc Ne il” ) a nd un ind ic te d c o- c on sp ir ator Mo se Willi ams (“W il li ams ” )

. O nth e Wi ll ia ms T a p e , M c N e il id e n ti f

ie d M c D o n a ld

a s o n e o f

th e le a d e r s o f

the conspirac y . Wil liams was not available for cross-e x amination at trial, as he passed a way befor e the g rand jury

returne d an indictment. McDona ld objected whe n the Gover nment moved to a dmit the Wil liams Ta pe into evidenc e. Th e tr ia l c ourt

ov e rr ule d M c Do na ld’ s o bje c tio n, fi nd ingthat Mc Ne il’ s sta te me nts we re a dmi ssi ble under F ED . R. E V ID . 801(d)( 2)(A) . Wil liams’s half of the conver sation on tape wa s admitted not for the truth of the matter s asserte d, but to put McNeil’s half of the conve rsation into context.3

Mc Do nal d raise d mu lti ple argume nts in h is o ri g ina l a pp e a l to thi s Co ur

t, i nc lud inghis objection to the trial court ’s admission of the Wil liams Tape. This Court af firmed Mc Donald’s conviction and se ntence
. Se e Un ite d States v . M c Do na ld , 173 F.3d 430, 1999 WL149658 (6th Cir. 1999), cert. de nied , 528 U.S. 873 (1999). On Octobe r 2, 2003, McDona ld filed a pr o s e motion for habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. I n that motion, McDonald did not c ontest the admission of the Wil liams Ta pe. The trial court de nied McDona ld’s § 2255 motion, which was af firmed on a

ppeal to thi s Court. See McD onald v. United States , 101 Fe d. Appx. 84, 2004 W L1303362 (6th Cir. 2004). On J uly 16, 2006, McDona ld filed another pr o s e motion in t he trial c o u rt , entitled “Nunc Pro Tunc Motion for Acquittal” ( “the Motion”). I n the Motion, McDonald adva nces thre e primar

y
argume nts : 1) that a dmi ssi on of the Willi ams Ta pe , wi tho ut an op po rt

un ity fo r M c Do na ld t o c ro ssex am i n e W i l l i am s , v i o l at edM cD o n al d ’s ri gh t s un d er the Confrontation Clause pursua nt to Cra wfo rd v. W ashington , 5 41 U. S. 36 (2 00 4) ; 2) tha t he ars ay state me nts of

ano the r c o- c on sp ir a tor , M arc ie la J ara millo, were a llowed at trial; and 3) th at M cDona ld should have bee n allowed to play tapes of

c e rt a i ng o v e r

n m e n tw i t n e s s e s a tt r i a l

. T h e d i s tr i c tc o urtd e t e r m i n e d th a ti tl a c k e d

j ur i s d i c t i o nto g rant the r elief soug ht by

McDonal d , and denie d the motion. I t is the denial of the Motion by the district court which Mc Donald now a ppeals. A N A LY S IS Mc Do na ld c la ims the dis tr ic t c ourt ha d jur isd ic tio n to de c ide his mot ion purs ua nt t o A rt ic le I I I , § 2 o f t

he Un ite d S tat es Const itutio n. As wa s n ote d in the low e r c ourt , “ Ar

tic le I I Ise ts f

or th g e ne ra l pr inc ipl e s g ov e rn ingthe fe de ra l ju dic iary . Apa rt fr om v e sti ngjur isd ic tio n in fe de ra l c ourt sI n In re She lton , this Court advised that “district courts should not rec hara cter ize a 1 mot ion purp or te dly ma de un de r § 22 55 " un le ss t he mov ant i s a dv ise d o f t he po te nti a l a dv e rs e conseque nces of

such re char acte rization (i.e. that the re char acte rized petition may be his first and only chanc e to see k relief

under § 2255) . 295 F.3d at 622. Howeve r, those conc erns would not be pr e se nt i n th e ins tant c a se be c a us e , a s d isc us se d b e low , M c Do na ld’ s mo tio n w ou ld n ot b e his first § 2255 motion and he would alre ady be re quired to see k permission from this Court to file a succe ssive petition. 4 of ca ses ar ising under t he Constituti on or laws of the United States, U.S. Const., art. I I I , § 2, cl. 1, nothing in Ar

ticle I I Ihas any

direc t releva

nce to this motion.” [R . 934]. The fe dera l judiciary

often will liberally

construe the post-judgme nt filings of pr o s e criminal defe ndants “for

eff iciency ’s sake and out of a sense of fairne ss to pro se petitioners.” United States v. Miller , 197 F.3d 644, 646 (3d Cir. 1999). This Court has sanctioned similar pr actice s, noting that “[m] any pro se pe titioner s fi l e inartfully draf ted post-conviction motions, without specifying the leg al basis for the reque sted relief

. District courts, in an ef

fort to assist pro se litiga

nts unawar e of the applica

ble statutory fra

mework, often re-cha

rac terize such filing s . . . .” In re She lton , 295 F.3d 620, 621 (6th Cir. 2002). Thus, the lower court c ould liberally

construe Mc Donald’s Motion, and 1

c ou ld h ave a tte mpt e d to fi t McD on ald ’s c la ims int o o ne of se ve ra l ava ila

ble ave nu e s f

or re lie f t o criminal def

endants. Whil e the lowe r cour

t could liberally

construe Mc Donald’s Motion, t h e co urt could not consider its merits unless the c ourt had jurisdiction over the Motio n ’s s u b j ect matter . “[F]edera l courts have an indepe ndent obligation to investi g ate a nd police the bounda

ries of the ir own j u ri sdiction.” Douglas v. E.F. Baldwin & Assocs., Inc

. , 1 5 0 F

. 3 d 6 0 4 , 6 0 7 ( 6 th Ci r . 1 998). The low e r c ourt

c or re c tly no te d th a t Mc Do na ld wa s lim ite d to tw o po te nti a l ave nu e s b y wh ic h h e c ou ld pursue the Motion: 1) under t h e p rovi sions of the Fe dera l Rules of Criminal P roce dure; or 2) in a5

collater al re view of his convic tion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Neither of these avenue s confe rs jurisdiction for the lower court to have enter

tained McD onald’s Motion. I . The District Court Did Not Have Jurisdi ction Over McDona ld’s Motion P ursuant to The F eder al Rules of Criminal Procedur e. The F eder al Rules of Criminal Procedur e “g overn the proce dure in a ll c riminal case s in the United S t at es District Courts.” F ED . R. C R IM . P. 1 (a ). Ac c or din g ly , M c Do na ld c ou ld b ri nghis Motion pursua

nt to the post-conviction reme dies aff orded him in the Fe dera l Rules of C riminal Pr oc e dure . T wo su c h r

ule s e xist with in the F e de ra l Ru le s o f C ri min a l Pr oc e dure fo r d e fe nd ants to seek r elief f

rom a c onvict i o n af

t er the jury

rende rs a ve rdict: Rules 29 and 33. Ne ither Rule, howeve r, would allow McD onald to challeng e the a dmission of evidence so long a fter the date of his conviction. Criminal defenda

nts may file a “M o t i o n for a

J udg ment of Ac quittal” pursuant to Fe dera l Rule of Criminal Procedur e 29 afte r t he jury in their t rial renders a verdic t. Such motion, however, must be made “within 7 day s afte r a g uilty verdic t or after the c ourt dischar g es the jury , whicheve r is later.” F ED . R. C R IM . P. 29(c)( 1). Ac cording ly , the district court lost the power to gr ant s u ch a motion in M cDona ld’s favor in November

of 1996. Criminal defenda

nts may also file a “ Motion for New T ri al ” p u rsuant to Feder al Rule of Cr imi na l Pr oc e dure 33 . Ru le 33 re qu ir e s su c h mo tio ns to be fi le d with in ce rt a in t ime re qu ir e me nts ; if based upon newly discovere d evidenc e, the motion must be filed “ within 3 y ear s after the ver dict

o r f in d in g o f g u ilty ,” F ED . R. C R IM . P. 33(b)(1), or for a ny other re ason, “w ithin 7 day s after the verdic t or finding of guilty .” F ED . R. C R IM . P. 33(b)( 2). McDona ld raises no argument based upon6

ne wl y dis c ov e re d e vid e nc e , b ut e ve n if he did , h is r ig ht t o fi le a Rul e 33 mot ion te rm inate d in November

of 2000. Acc ording ly , there is no avenue under the Fe dera l Ru l es of Criminal Procedur e by which Mc Do na ld c an d ir e c tly

c ha lle ng e his c on vic tio n. Mc Do na ld h a s a lso e xha us te d h is d ir e c t a

pp e a ls to this C ourt. McDona ld is, th er ef o re , left with only

one possible ave nue to cha lleng e his 1996

c on vic tio n: h is C on g re ssi on a lly -e na c te d r ig ht t o co llate ra lly a tta c k the c on vic tio n und e r 28 U .S. C. § 2255. I I . The District Court Did Not Have Jurisdi ction Over McDona ld’s Motion P ursuant to 22 U.S.C. § 2255. “In its 1948 revision of the J udicial Code, Cong ress provide d that prisoners in custody under sentenc e of a

fede ral c ourt may

move the sente ncingcourt to v ac at e, s et aside, or c orre ct any sentenc e subjec t to collatera l attack.” United States v. Hay man , 34 2 U.S. 205, 207 (1952). 28 U.S.C. § 2255 codifies the Eng lish common law writ of habeas corpus fo r f e de ra l pr iso ne rs : A p ri so ne r i n c us tod

y un der se nte nc e of

a c ourt e sta bli sh e d b y

Ac t of Con g re ss c la imi ng the ri g ht t o b e re le a se d u po n th e g ro un d th a t th e se nte nc e wa s im po se d in vi o l ation of the Constituti on or laws of the United States, or that the c ourt was wi t h o u t jurisdiction to im pose such se ntence , or that the sente nce w as in excess of the maxim um allowed by law, or is otherwise s ubject to collater al attack, may move the cour t which imposed the sentenc e to vac ate, se t aside, or c orre ct the sente nce. 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Howeve r, federa l prisoners only have the rig ht to file one motion under § 2255;

a ll s ub se qu e nt § 22 55 mot ion s may on ly be fi le d by le ave of the a pp ro pr iate c ir c uit

c ourt of a pp e a ls. “A se con d o r s u c c e s s iv e mo ti o n mu s t b e c e rti f ie d a s p r o v id e d in s e c ti o n 2 2 4 4 b y a p an e l o f the

a pp ro pr iate c ourt

of a pp e a ls

. . . .” 28 U. S.C. § 2 25 5; see also Castro v. United States , 540 U.S. 375, 3 7 7 (2 0 0 3 ) (noting“re strictive conditions that fede ral lawimposes upon a ‘sec ond or succ essive’ (b ut n ot a fi rs t) fe de ra l ha

be a s mo tio n” ); Martin v. Pere z , 319 F.3d 799, 803 ( 6th Cir. 2003).7

The lowe r cour

t corre ctly

noted that McDona ld ha d alre ady filed a § 2255 motion in 2003, which the district c ourt dismiss ed and the Six th Circ uit a ffirme d on J une 9, 2004. Se e Mc Do na ld v. United States , 101 Fe d.Appx. 84, 2004 W L1303362 (6th Cir. 2004). McDona ld has not sought leave from this Court p u rs u an t t o 28 U.S.C. § 2244 to file a subsequent § 2255 motion. As Mc Do na ld h a d a lr e a dy

fi le d a pr e vio us § 225 5 moti on , the low e r co ur t did not have jur isd ic tio n to enter tain a sec ond such motion without l eave havingbeen grante d by this Court.

I I I . This Court, Pursuant to 28 U.S.C . § 2244, Could Not Grant McDona ld A Second § 2255 Motion. As sug g ested a

bove, thoug h not as k ed t o d o s o here , this Court could consider g ranting McDona ld leave to f

ile a sec o n d § 2 2 55 motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C . § 2244. Section 2244, ho we ve r, on ly

a llo ws su c h mo tio ns to b e g ra nte d und e r t

wo lim ite d c ir c ums tanc e s: A claim pre sented in a se cond or succe ssive habea s corpus application. . . that wa s not presente d in a prior a

pplication shall be dismissed unless - (A) the applicant shows that the c laim relies on a new rule of c onstitut ional law, ma de re tr oa c tiv e to c a se s o n c oll a te ra l r e view by the Sup re me Court, that was pre viously unavailable ; or (B )( i) t h e f

a c tu a l p r e d i c a t e c o u l d

n o th av e b e e nd i s c o v e r e d p r e v i o u s ly throug h the exercise of

due dilige nce; a

nd (ii) the fa cts underly

ing the claim if prove n and viewe d in light of the evidenc e as a

whole, would be suf

ficient to es t abli sh by

clea r and c on vin c inge vid e nc e tha

t, but fo r c on sti tut ion a l e rr or , no re a so na ble fac tfinder c ould h ave found the applica nt guilty of the unde rlying offe nse. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (2). It is undisput ed that none of the three arguments in McDonald’s Motion

wer e included w ithin his orig inal § 2255 Motion. Two of the three arguments in McDona ld’s Motion - t he st atements by J ara millo and the trial court’s r efusa l to allow McDonald to play tapes - pe rtain to evidentiar y ruli n g s made by

the trial8

court. The se ar g uments do not rais e n ew fac ts unknown at the time of trial, a s would be re quired under § 2244(b)( 2)(B ), nor do they implicate a ne w rule of

constitutional law. As such, this Court is without power to g rant a second or

succe ssive § 2255 Motion to McDonald o n these g rounds. McDona ld’s argument with r espec t to the Wil liams Ta pe is based upon the Supreme Court’s holding in Cra w

f o r d v. W ashington , 541 U.S. 36. Under § 2244( b)(2) (A), Mc Donald would be elig ible for a

second § 2255 motion only if Cra wfo rd

was “made retroac tive to case s on collatera l

re vie w. ” 28 U. S.C. § 2 24 4( b) (2 )( A) . A s w ill be dis c us se d b e low , th e Suprem e Co urt ha s h e ld Cra wfo rd does not apply

retroa ctively

. Prior to 1989, the Supreme Court a pplied a ca se-by -ca se appr oach to de termining whether its criminal proce dure de cisions applied re troac tively

. Li n kl ett er v. W alker , 381 U.S. 618, 629 (1965). That standard wa s abrog ated in Teague v. Lane , 489 U.S. 28 8 (1989), whe re the Court

e nd or se d a

g e ne ra l r ule of no n- re tr oa c tiv ity fo r ca se s on col late ra l re vie w. “ Un le ss the y fa ll w ith in

an e xce pti on to the g e ne ra l r ule , n e w c on sti tut ion a l r

ule s o f c ri min a l pr oc e dure wi ll n ot b e a pp lic a ble to those case s which have become final befor e the new rules are announce d.” Teague , 489 U.S. at 310. Under

the Teague fr ame wo rk , th e Suprem e Court he ld t hat th e c ha

ng e s ma de to C o nfrontation Clause jurisprude nce by the Cra wfo rd h o ld in g ar e n o t r e tr o a c ti v e ly a p p li e d

. See Da nfo rth v . M

inn eso ta , 12 8 S. Ct. 10 29 , 10 35 (2 00 8) . T he Sixth C ir c uit ha s a lso re fu se d to a

pp ly Crawf ord retroa ctively

. S

e e D o a n v. Carter , 548 F.3d 449, 457 ( 6th Cir. 2008) (“ Cra wfo rd , a s a ‘new ly promulg ated r

ule [] of cr iminal procedur e,’ doe s not apply retroa ctively to case s on collatera l revie w under

the Teague fr ame wo rk .” ); Adams v. Holland , 168 Fe d.Appx. 17, 20 (6th C ir. 2006). As Cra wfo rd

may not be re troac tively

applied to Mc Donald’s case , McDona ld is unable to satisfy9

the re quirements of § 2244, and this Court theref ore c annot g rant McD onald leave to pursue anothe r § 2255 motion. I n summary , McDona ld’s Motion was not filed within the time require ments for r elief unde r the Fe dera l Rules of Cr i m i n al Procedur e. As McD onald had a lrea dy filed a § 2255 motion on October 2, 2003, the district c ourt did not have jurisdiction to consider the insta n t M o t i o n . T he Court also notes that any reque st by

McDona ld to file the Motion as a sec ond or succ essive 28 U.S.C. § 2255 mot ion would fail to meet the re quirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2244. As such, the Court aff irms the holding of

the lower court that it lac ked jurisdiction to consider Mc Donald’s “Nunc Pro Tunc Motion for Ac quittal.” CONCL USI ON For these re asons, we AF F IRM the holding of the lower court.