Filed 10/6/22

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

ENTERPRISE RENT-A-CAR OF 

LOS ANGELES,

 Petitioner,

v.

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE 

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES,

Respondent;

DONARA GRIGORYAN,

 Real Party in Interest.

B321016

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. BC654195)

ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS; petition for writ of mandate.

David A. Rosen, Judge. Petition granted.

Polsinelli, Wesley D. Hurst, J. Alan Warfield, and 

Stephanie L. Bowlby for Petitioner.

Mgdesyan Law Firm, George Gevork Mgdesyan, and 

Araksya Boyadzhyan for Real Party in Interest.
2

INTRODUCTION

Vehicle Code1 section 14608 provides, in relevant part: “(a) 

A person shall not rent a motor vehicle to another person unless 

both of the following requirements have been met: [¶] (1) The 

person to whom the vehicle is rented is licensed under this code 

or is a nonresident who is licensed under the law of the state or 

country of his or her residence. [¶] (2) The person renting to 

another person has inspected the driver’s license of the person to 

whom the vehicle is to be rented and compared either the 

signature thereon with that of the person to whom the vehicle is 

to be rented or the photograph thereon with the person to whom 

the vehicle is to be rented.”

In this case of first impression, we consider whether section 

14608 imposes a duty on a rental car agency to investigate a 

prospective renter’s residence status when he or she, at the time 

of rental, provides the agency with: (1) a facially valid foreign 

driver’s license; and (2) a local California address on the rental 

paperwork. We decide it does not. As discussed further below, 

requiring a rental car agency to investigate whether a 

prospective renter who presents a facially valid foreign driver’s 

license is still a resident of that jurisdiction at the time of rental

goes beyond the scope of duties prescribed by the Legislature.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 2015, Donara Grigoryan was injured in a car accident 

involving a rental car driven by Izat Murataliev. Harutyan 

Ajaryan rented the car involved in the accident from Enterprise 

1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the 

Vehicle Code.
3

Rent-A-Car Company of Los Angeles (ERAC-LA). Murataliev was

listed as an additional authorized driver in the rental agreement 

between Ajaryan and ERAC-LA. At the time of rental, 

Murataliev presented ERAC-LA with a facially valid driver’s 

license issued by Kyrgyzstan, and a local California address on 

the rental paperwork.

Grigoryan sued ERAC-LA, Murataliev, and EAN Holding, 

LLC (EAN) for negligence.2 Specifically, Grigoryan alleged 

ERAC-LA negligently entrusted Murataliev with the rental 

vehicle, and therefore proximately caused her injuries.

ERAC-LA moved for summary judgment on Grigoryan’s 

claim against it for negligent entrustment, arguing the claim 

failed as a matter of law because ERAC-LA complied with section 

14608. Grigoryan opposed the motion, arguing Murataliev was a 

resident of California, and the visual inspection of a foreign

license does not satisfy the requirements of section 14608.

Rather, she contended ERAC-LA was required to determine 

whether Murataliev was still a resident of Kyrgyzstan to comply 

with section 14608. Grigoryan further argued material factual 

disputes exist regarding ERAC-LA’s inspection of Murataliev’s 

foreign driver’s license. 

At the hearing on the motion, the trial court requested 

supplemental briefing regarding whether ERAC-LA had a duty 

under section 14608, subdivision (a)(1) to determine whether the 

prospective renter is a “California resident or not at the time of 

2 Murataliev died while this case was pending in the trial 

court. Grigoryan subsequently added Murataliev’s estate as a 

defendant. EAN owned the rental vehicle. The trial court granted 

EAN’s motion for summary judgment on grounds not relevant to 

ERAC-LA’s petition. 
4

the rental.” The trial court explained that issue was

determinative of the case: “Now, [section] 14608 [subdivision] 

(a)(2) talks about a requirement that the rental agency inspect 

the renter’s driver’s license and . . . determine whether it’s 

facially valid, either by comparing signatures or comparing 

photograph [of] face [to] in-person face. There’s no dispute here 

about [section] 14608 [subdivision] (a)(2), and there’s no dispute 

as far as I can see that the defendants complied with it. [¶] . . . 

[ERAC-LA] confirmed that Murataliev[,] the person with the 

license[,] was Murataliev the person in the shop. So it all focuses 

– the inquiry for the briefing focuses on [section] 14608 

[subdivision] (a)(1).”

After considering the supplemental briefing, the trial court 

denied ERAC-LA’s motion, finding that “where, as here, a 

prospective renter provides a local address and a foreign driver’s 

license which is otherwise facially valid, . . . it is the duty of the 

rental agency, per [section 14608, subdivision (a)(1)], to inquire at 

the rental transaction how long the prospective renter has 

resided locally. Then, and only then, can the rental agency 

determine within the bounds of its statutory duty, whether the 

prospective renter has presented a valid driver’s license.” 

ERAC-LA filed a petition for writ of mandate in this court 

to reverse the trial court’s order denying its motion for summary 

judgment. We issued an alternative writ ordering the court to 

either: (1) after notice of the parties and an opportunity to be 

heard, vacate the May 24, 2022 order denying ERAC-LA’s motion 

for summary judgment and enter a new order granting the 

motion on the ground that ERAC-LA has no duty under section 

14608 to inquire into a person’s length of stay in California; or, in 

the alternative (2) show cause why a peremptory writ of mandate 
5

should not issue. In response to the alternative writ, the trial 

court issued an order providing Grigoryan an opportunity to file a 

brief responding to the trial court’s intention to comply with the 

alternative writ by vacating its order denying ERAC-LA’s motion 

for summary judgment and entering a new order granting the 

motion. The order also provided ERAC-LA an opportunity to file 

a reply brief to Grigoryan’s response. 

After the parties submitted their briefs, the trial court

issued a new order declining our “invitation . . . to change its 

ruling of May 24, 2022.” The court stated: “The issue before the 

court appears to be a case of first impression; the narrow issue as 

to whether [section 14608, subdivision (a)(1)] places a duty upon 

a rental agency to inquire into the renter’s residence so as to 

determine if [the] renter satisfies the requirement to have a 

facially valid California driver’s license (‘under this code’) or a 

facially valid foreign driver’s license (‘from the jurisdiction where

he resides’) by and through its express reference to same.” In 

holding the rental car agency has a duty to inquire into the 

prospective renter’s residence, the court explained: “Here, the 

prospective renter presented only a facially valid Kyrgyzstan 

driver’s license and a local California address. Thus, the rental 

agency could not, without asking the renter/decedent at least one 

more question; to wit, ‘how long have you lived at this local 

address?’ fulfill its duty to determine whether decedent had a 

valid driver’s license under the California vehicle code, or 

whether decedent’s facially valid Kyrgyzstan license was 

acceptable because that is where he lived at the time of rental. It 
6

is this determination that the rental agency is also required to 

make under [section 14608, subdivision (a)(1)].”3

DISCUSSION

A. Rental Car Agency’s Duties

Section 14604, subdivision (a) provides: “No owner of a 

motor vehicle may knowingly allow another person to drive the 

vehicle upon a highway unless the owner determines that the 

person possesses a valid driver’s license that authorizes the 

person to operate the vehicle. For the purposes of this section, an 

owner is required only to make a reasonable effort or inquiry to 

determine whether the prospective driver possesses a valid 

driver’s license before allowing him or her to operate the owner’s 

vehicle. An owner is not required to inquire of the [Department of 

Motor Vehicles (DMV)] whether the prospective driver possesses 

a valid driver’s license.” “A rental company is deemed to be in 

compliance with subdivision (a) if the company rents the vehicle 

in accordance with sections 14608 and 14609.” (§ 14604, subd. 

(b).)

As previously discussed, section 14608 provides in relevant 

part that “a person shall not rent a motor vehicle to another 

unless” the renter is “licensed under this code” or under the law 

of another state or country of residence, and “[t]he person renting 

to another person has inspected the driver’s license of the person 

to whom the vehicle is to be rented and compared either the 

signature thereon with that of the person to whom the vehicle is 

3 Our alternative writ provided Grigoryan with the 

opportunity to file a return to the writ by August 1, 2022. She did 

not do so.
7

to be rented or the photograph thereon with the person to whom 

the vehicle is to be rented.” (§ 14608, subds. (a)(1) & (a)(2).)

Section 14609 requires those renting a motor vehicle to 

another person to keep a record of the vehicle’s registration 

number, the name and address of the renter, and the renter’s 

driver’s license number, expiration date, and issuing jurisdiction.4

B. ERAC-LA is Entitled to Summary Judgment 

1. ERAC-LA Complied with Section 14608

ERAC-LA contends it is entitled to summary judgment as a 

matter of law because it complied with section 14608 by visually 

inspecting Murataliev’s Kyrgyzstan driver’s license to confirm it 

was facially valid. It argues it was not required under section 

14608, subdivision (a)(1) to investigate whether Murataliev was 

still a resident of Kyrgyzstan, or whether he had permanently

moved to the California address he provided in the rental 

paperwork. Grigoryan counters that the plain language of section 

14608, subdivision (a)(1) (i.e., the reference to “residence”)

imposes a duty on the rental car agency to determine the 

prospective renter’s residence in addition to the requirements set 

forth in subdivision (a)(2) to inspect the signature or photograph 

on the license. We agree with ERAC-LA. As discussed below, 

although no court has directly addressed this narrow issue,

California courts have repeatedly declined to impose additional 

investigatory duties on rental car agencies absent a clear 

legislative declaration to the contrary.

4 ERAC-LA’s compliance with section 14609 is not at issue 

here.
8

In Philadelphia Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Montes-Harris (2006)

40 Cal.4th 151, 155 (Philadelphia), our Supreme Court addressed 

whether “the duty of an insurer to investigate the insurability of 

an insured . . . appl[ies] to an automobile liability insurer that 

issues an excess liability insurance policy in the context of a 

rental car transaction[.]” The court concluded: “[W]here, as here, 

the sale of excess liability insurance in a rental car transaction 

occurs after the rental car customer presents a facially valid 

driver’s license and after the license inspection and signature 

verification requirements of . . . section 14608, subdivision (b),[

5]

have been met, the excess insurer has no obligation to conduct a 

further inquiry regarding the validity of the customer’s driver’s 

license.” (Ibid.) The court noted that at oral argument, it “asked 

the claimants what additional investigation should be required of 

excess insurers to ferret out rental car customers whose driver’s 

licenses appear facially valid but in fact are suspended or 

revoked.” (Id. at p. 162.) The claimants “suggested that rental car 

agents should affirmatively ask potential rental customers 

whether their driver’s licenses have been suspended or revoked, 

and whether they have moved in the last year without notifying 

the DMV. They conceded, however, that such questioning might

not be effective in those cases where, as here, a customer tenders 

a facially valid license that he or she knows or has reason to 

know has been suspended or revoked.” (Id. at p. 163)

In further support of its holding, the Philadelphia court 

explained: “[T]he Legislature surely is aware that rental car 

companies, as owners of vehicles, typically supply the mandatory 

financial responsibility law coverage as part of the rental 

5 Effective January 1, 2013, section 14608, subdivision (b) 

was redesignated subdivision (a)(2). (Stats. 2012, ch. 406, § 2.)
9

transaction. Yet, armed with that knowledge, the Legislature has 

determined that a rental car company ‘is deemed to be in 

compliance’ with the requirement that an owner make a 

reasonable effort or inquiry to determine whether a prospective 

driver possesses a valid driver’s license if, before renting to a 

customer, it visually inspects the customer’s driver’s license and 

verifies the customer’s signature in accordance with section 

14608, subdivision (b), and also maintains records in accordance 

with section 14609. (§ 14604, subd. (b).) Because the Legislature 

has not seen fit to require DMV license checks or other specific 

investigatory measures on the part of an owner and typical 

provider of mandatory coverage in the rental car context, we shall 

decline to judicially impose such obligations on the offeror of 

optional excess coverage for purposes of preserving its rights to 

rescind an excess policy or invoke an exclusion clause based on a 

rental car customer’s presentation of a facially valid but 

suspended driver’s license. Moreover, while the Legislature might 

consider after this opinion whether further investigation should 

be required of a rental car company, and by extension an excess 

insurer, we remain mindful that the Legislature stands in the 

best position to identify and weigh the competing consumer, 

business, and public safety considerations that present 

themselves in the rental car context.” (Philadelphia, supra, 40 

Cal.4th at p. 163.)

Relying on Philadelphia, the court in Flores v. Enterprise 

Rent-A-Car Co. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1055, 1059 (Flores) held 

rental car agencies have no duty to investigate the customer’s 

license and driving records beyond the visual inspection required 

by section 14608. In Flores, the plaintiffs alleged the renter had 

prior DUI convictions in the last 48 months, and the rental 
10

agency should have known this information and should have 

declined to rent the vehicle to him. (Id. at p. 1060.) The plaintiffs

urged the Court of Appeal to find the decision in Osborn v. Hertz 

Corp. (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 703 (Osborn) “no longer viable”

because “electronic driver’s license checks are now available to 

the rental car industry.”

6 (Flores, supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at p.

1062.) The Flores court concluded, however, “that the availability 

of electronic driver’s license checks does not render the rationale 

and holding of Osborn obsolete.” (Ibid.) To the contrary, it found 

our Supreme Court’s decision in Philadelphia, decided after 

Osborn, demonstrates “that rental car companies have no duty to 

conduct an electronic search of the driving records of their 

customers before entrusting a vehicle to them.” (Ibid.) The Flores

court took from the reasoning of Philadelphia “two salient 

points”: “The first is that through section 14604, the Legislature 

has balanced the danger caused by those who drive with revoked 

or suspended licenses against ‘the unique nature and operational 

constraints of the rental car business’ (Philadelphia, supra, 40 

Cal.4th at p. 162), and made the policy decision that the scope of 

a rental car agency’s ‘reasonable effort or inquiry’ into the license 

status of its customers (§ 14604, subd. (a)) is limited to 

performing the tasks required by section 14608, subdivision 

[(a)(2)]: ‘inspect[ing] the driver’s license of the person to whom 

the vehicle is to be rented and compar[ing] the signature thereon 

6 The court in Osborn held: “an agency has no duty to ask 

questions to investigate the driving record of the customer, and 

the agency may rely on presentation of a valid driver’s license as 

sufficient evidence of fitness to drive, absent a legislative 

declaration to the contrary.” (Flores, supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 

1062.)
11

with the signature of that person written in his or her presence.’

The rental car agency is not required to make a DMV check of the 

customer’s license status. (Philadelphia, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 

163; § 14604, subd. (a).) Second, because of this specific policy 

decision, and because the Legislature is better suited to ‘weigh 

the competing consumer, business, and public safety 

considerations that present themselves in the rental car context’

(Philadelphia, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 163), any expansion of the 

duty of investigation imposed on rental car agencies is a matter 

for legislative, not judicial, action. Significantly, despite

Philadelphia’s invitation to the Legislature to require rental car 

agencies to perform further investigation, the Legislature has not 

changed the relevant statutes. The absence of statutory changes 

suggests that the Legislature approves the Supreme Court’s 

reasoning.” (Flores, supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 1069, fn. 

omitted.)

Consistent with Philadelphia, Osborne, and Flores, we 

conclude a rental car agency complies with section 14608 by 

visually examining the license and verifying either the signature 

on the license or the photograph. This conclusion does not, as the 

trial court held, “render the terms ‘resident’ and ‘nonresident’ [in 

section 14608, subdivision (a)(1)] superfluous.” Rather, a rental 

car agency is entitled to rely on the prospective renter’s 

presentation of a foreign driver’s license as sufficient evidence of 

residence in the country from which the driver’s license was 

issued.

The trial court’s reliance on Lindstrom v. Hertz Corp.

(2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 644 (Lindstrom) is misplaced. According to 

the trial court, the Lindstrom court “highlighted the duty of

rental car agencies with regard to residency in stating under the 
12

heading ‘duty’, that ‘rental car agencies are required by state law 

to determine whether a potential customer possesses a valid 

driver’s license from the jurisdiction where he resides.’” We 

disagree. In Lindstrom, a foreign citizen with a valid driver’s 

license from his country rented a car from a rental agency in 

California. (Id. at p. 646.) Shortly after, he was involved in an 

accident in which the plaintiff was injured. (Ibid.) The plaintiff 

argued the rental agency had a duty to determine whether the 

renter was familiar with California rules of the road. (Id. at p. 

649.) The Lindstrom court disagreed with the plaintiff, holding

the rental car agency was not liable for negligent entrustment 

because its “duty of care is limited to determining whether the 

lessee has a valid driver’s license as required” by section 14608; it 

“has no duty to determine the lessee’s familiarity with 

California’s traffic rules.” (Id. at 647.) Thus, contrary to the trial 

court’s reading of Lindstrom, the Court of Appeal neither held, 

nor had the opportunity to hold under the facts of the case, that a 

rental agency has a duty to further inquire into a prospective 

renter’s residence after visually verifying the foreign driver’s 

license.

Moreover, apparently acknowledging that nothing in 

section 14608 suggests the Legislature intended to impose 

investigatory duties on the rental car agency, the trial court held 

ERAC-LA did not have a duty to “investigate, per se” but to 

inquire how long Murataliev had been living at the local 

California address provided in the rental paperwork. Asking how 

long he had lived in California, however, would not have allowed 

ERAC-LA to determine whether Murataliev “resided” in 

California. Physical presence in the state, even where the person 

maintains a residence for an extended period of time, is not 
13

sufficient to determine whether the person “resides” in California

for purposes of issuing a driver’s license. (See § 12505, subd. 

(a)(1) [“[R]esidency shall be determined as a person’s state of 

domicile. ‘State of domicile’ means the state where a person has 

his or her true, fixed, and permanent home and principal 

residence and to which he or she has manifested the intention of 

returning whenever he or she is absent.”].) Section 12505, 

subdivision (c) permits a foreign resident to drive in California on 

a foreign license for 10 days from the date of establishing 

residence in the state. To determine whether a person has 

established residence in the state, section 12505, subdivision 

(a)(1) includes a nonexhaustive list of evidence, which may suffice 

to establish a prime facie case (i.e., a rebuttable presumption) of 

residence, including: address where registered to vote; payment 

of resident tuition at a public institution of higher education; 

filing a homeowner’s property tax exemption; or other acts, 

occurrences, or events that indicate presence in the state is more 

than temporary or transient. (§ 12505, subd. (a)(1).) Thus, even if 

ERAC-LA asked Murataliev how long he had been living in 

California, his response would not have revealed whether he had 

sufficiently manifested an intent to be domiciled in California as 

opposed to Kyrgyzstan (and thus whether he was required to 

have a facially valid California driver’s license to legally drive or 

rent a vehicle in this state). We therefore decline to impose the 

proffered duty on a rental car agency, when it is neither expressly 

provided for in the statute, nor effective at ensuring statutory 

compliance. 

Our conclusion that a rental car agency is entitled to rely 

on a foreign driver’s license as sufficient evidence of residence in 

the country from which the driver’s license was issued finds
14

further support in other provisions of the Vehicle Code. (See 

Curle v. Superior Court (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1057, 1063 [statute 

must be interpreted in the context of the entire statutory scheme 

of which it is a part].) Specifically, section 12805, subdivision

(a)(6) prohibits the DMV from issuing a driver’s license to a 

person “[w]ho holds a valid driver’s license issued by a foreign 

jurisdiction unless the license has been surrendered to the 

[DMV], or is lost or destroyed.” That Murataliev still had a 

facially valid foreign license in his possession after also having 

apparently been issued a California driver’s license7 may indicate 

a failure on the part of the DMV, or dishonest conduct on the part 

of Murataliev. As discussed above, however, section 14604 

requires only that a rental car agency “‘make a reasonable effort’

to determine whether the prospective driver possesses a valid 

driver’s license”; “that reasonable effort does not include checking 

DMV records.” (See Flores, supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 1066.)

2. No Material Factual Disputes Exist

Having concluded ERAC-LA cannot, as a matter of law, be 

held liable for negligent entrustment based on its failure to 

inquire how long Murataliev lived in California at the time he 

presented ERAC-LA with his foreign driver’s license, we now 

turn to Grigoryan’s alternative argument that material factual 

disputes exist regarding whether ERAC-LA complied with 14608, 

subdivision (a)(2).

7 In support of her supplemental brief in opposition to ERACLA’s motion for summary judgment, Grigoryan submitted 

additional evidence purportedly demonstrating that, at the time 

of the accident, Murataliev had a suspended California driver’s 

license.
15

As previously noted, at the initial hearing on ERAC-LA’s 

motion for summary judgment, the trial court concluded there 

was no dispute regarding whether ERAC-LA complied with 

section 14608, subdivision (a)(2): “There’s no dispute here about 

[section] 14608 [subdivision] (a)(2), and there’s no dispute as far 

as I can see that the defendants complied with it. [¶] . . . [ERACLA] confirmed that Murataliev[,] the person with the license[,]

was Murataliev the person in the shop.” On this point, we agree

with the trial court.

In support of its motion for summary judgment, ERAC-LA 

presented the following evidence: (1) at the time of rental, 

Murataliev presented a driver’s license issued by Kyrgyzstan; (2) 

ERAC-LA’s rental records indicate Murataliev’s license 

information was obtained at the time of the rental; and (3) 

records from Kyrgyzstan confirmed Murataliev’s driver’s license 

number and birthday, which matched ERAC-LA’s rental records.8

Based on this evidence, we conclude ERAC-LA met its prima 

facie burden of establishing its compliance with section 14608, 

subdivision (a)(2) by adequately inspecting Murataliev’s foreign 

driver’s license.

8 On behalf of ERAC-LA, a Kyrgyzstan attorney sent an 

“Attorney Information Request” to a Kyrgyzstan Office of 

Government Agency (referred to as “Unaa”) to confirm

Murataliev was issued a Kyrgyzstan driver’s license on June 25, 

2010. In response, ERAC-LA received a document titled 

“Response to Attorney Information Request from Ministry of 

Digital Development of the Kyrgyz Republic, ‘Unaa Government 

Agency’,” which was then translated by a certified Russian 

interpreter and translator. The response, signed by the Deputy 

Minister of the Unaa, confirmed Mr. Murataliev was issued a 

Kyrgyzstan driver’s license on June 25, 2010.
16

The burden therefore shifted to Grigoryan to establish the 

existence of a triable issue of fact regarding ERAC-LA’s 

inspection of Murataliev’s driver’s license. (See Code Civ. Proc., 

§ 437c, subd. (p)(2).) In her preliminary opposition to ERAC-LA’s 

petition, Grigoryan argues material factual disputes exist based 

on the following facts: (1) Kendra Carter, the ERAC-LA employee 

who handled the 2015 rental transaction with Murataliev, could 

not recall at her 2018 deposition whether she verified

Murataliev’s name and address information, and further testified 

she did not examine Murataliev’s signature; (2) ERAC-LA’s 

records indicate Murataliev’s license was verified at two different 

times; and (3) Carter did not follow ERAC-LA’s internal policies 

and procedures regarding foreign licenses. This evidence is 

insufficient to create a triable issue of material fact.

First, section 14608, subdivision (a)(2) requires that the 

rental car agency either verify the signature or the photograph on 

the license. At her deposition, Carter testified she always

examines the photograph on the license to check that it matches 

the person presenting the license. Thus, whether she also verified 

the signature is immaterial.

Second, we reject Grigoryan’s contention that because 

ERAC-LA’s rental tickets indicate the rental was recorded on 

both July 20 and July 21, a material question of fact exists 

regarding whether Murataliev’s license was verified. ERAC-LA 

explained “that information was recorded simultaneously into 

two different databases, which are located [in] different time 

zones.” The basis for the discrepancy is immaterial, however. 

That ERAC-LA’s electronic records list the same action occurring 

at two different times does not create a factual dispute regarding 
17

whether Carter verified Murataliev’s license by checking the 

photograph.

Third, Grigoryan argues ERAC-LA violated its own 

requirement that a prospective renter with a foreign license in a 

language other than English must also present an international 

driver’s permit or suitable translation. But even assuming ERACLA had an internal policy requiring an examination of an 

international permit or a translation of the foreign license, that 

policy would impose requirements in addition to those in section 

14608. “Violation of a self-imposed rule does not create actionable 

negligence unless plaintiff (1) suffers the type of harm sought to 

be prevented by the rule and (2) is a member of the class of 

people for whose protection the rule was promulgated.” (Software 

Design & Application LTD. v. Hoefer & Arnett, Inc. (1996) 49 

Cal.App.4th 472, 482.) Grigoryan neither argued, nor submitted 

evidence, indicating ERAC-LA’s policy exists for her protection.

Finally, Grigoryan contends “[i]t is also disputed as to 

whether Ms. Carter in fact took steps to determine if Defendant

Murataliev was fit to operate a vehicle.” The complaint, however, 

does not allege Murataliev was impaired or otherwise unfit to 

drive the rental vehicle. (See Nieto v. Blue Shield of California 

Life & Health Ins. Co. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 60, 74 [“It is well 

established that the pleadings determine the scope of relevant

issues on a summary judgment motion.”].) Whether Murataliev

was fit to drive, therefore, is an immaterial fact. 

Accordingly, we conclude Grigoryan failed to carry her 

burden to demonstrate a triable issue of material fact exists 

regarding ERAC-LA’s compliance with section 14608, subdivision 

(a)(2).
18

DISPOSITION

Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue directing 

respondent court to vacate its May 24, 2022 and July 29, 2022 

orders denying ERAC-LA’s motion for summary judgment and 

enter a new order granting the motion. ERAC-LA is awarded its 

costs in this proceeding.

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

CURREY, J. 

We concur: 

WILLHITE, Acting P.J. 

COLLINS, J.