In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 13‐3454

FEDELL CAFFEY,

Petitioner‐Appellant,

v.

KIM BUTLER, Warden,

Respondent‐Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 09 C 5458 — Matthew F. Kennelly, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED OCTOBER 29, 2014 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 22, 2015

____________________

Before RIPPLE, KANNE, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.

KANNE, Circuit Judge. Fedell Caffey is serving a life sen‐

tence in Illinois on triple‐murder and aggravated kidnap‐

ping convictions. Caffey maintains he is innocent. He peti‐

tioned the district court for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming

that his trial and post‐conviction proceedings in state court

were marred by numerous violations of his constitutional

rights. The district court held an evidentiary hearing, thor‐

oughly reviewed the record, and issued a detailed opinion
2 No. 13‐3454

denying Caffey’s petition. We affirm the district court’s deni‐

al of Caffey’s habeas corpus petition.

I. BACKGROUND

On the night of November 16, 1995, Debra Evans was fa‐

tally shot and stabbed in her apartment in Addison, Illinois.

She was nine months pregnant. The assailants cut open her

womb and removed the unborn baby inside, whom Debra

had named Elijah. Debra also had three older children—

Samantha (age 10), Joshua (age 7), and Jordan (age 2). Sa‐

mantha was killed in the apartment along with her mother.

Elijah and Joshua were taken from the scene. Two‐year‐old

Jordan was left behind, alive, with his dead mother and sis‐

ter. The next day, police found Joshua’s lifeless body in an

alley in Maywood, Illinois.

Police arrested Debra’s former boyfriend Laverne Ward,

who was the father of Jordan and Elijah—the only children

who survived. Police also arrested Ward’s cousin Jacqueline

Annette Williams and her live‐in boyfriend Fedell Caffey, the

defendant‐petitioner in this case. A grand jury indicted

Ward, Williams, and Caffey on multiple counts of first‐

degree murder and aggravated kidnapping. Each defendant

was tried separately.

In 1999, a jury found Caffey guilty of the first‐degree

murder of Debra, Samantha, and Joshua, as well as the ag‐

gravated kidnapping of Joshua. Caffey received a sentence

of death on the murder convictions and a consecutive thirty‐

year prison term on the aggravated kidnapping conviction.

In 2003, Illinois Governor George Ryan commuted Caffey’s

death sentence to life without parole.
No. 13‐3454 3

Caffey claims in this appeal that his trial was fundamen‐

tally unfair because certain evidence was excluded or other‐

wise not presented to the jury. In order to assess his claims,

we first have to take stock of the evidence that was present‐

ed—a lengthy endeavor given the voluminous trial record.

In doing so, we walk on well‐trodden ground: the state court

decisions under review and the district court decision below

already provide detailed summaries of the evidence. We as‐

sume familiarity with those opinions and highlight only the

most relevant facts here. We presume that the state courts’

account of the facts is accurate, unless the petitioner rebuts

this presumption “by clear and convincing evidence.” 28

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also Etherly v. Davis, 619 F.3d 654, 660

(7th Cir. 2010).

A. The Case against Caffey

The State’s theory at trial was that Williams faked a preg‐

nancy with Caffey’s knowledge, and that Williams, Caffey,

and Ward planned to kill Debra Evans, steal her unborn

child, and pass the child off as Williams and Caffey’s. Wil‐

liams and Caffey were unable to conceive their own child

naturally because Williams had had tubal ligation years ear‐

lier in connection with a caesarian birth. And Ward was

driven to act, according to the State, because he was angry at

Debra for preventing him from seeing his son Jordan.

The State’s evidence at trial tended to show the following.

James Edwards, who lived with Debra and her children in

Addison, left for work around 5:30 p.m. on November 16.

When he returned at 2:30 a.m. the next morning, two‐year‐

old Jordan greeted him at the door. Edwards found Debra’s

and Samantha’s bodies and immediately called 911. Several
4 No. 13‐3454

items were missing from the apartment, including Edwards’s

Grambling State University Tigers Starter jacket.  

1. The Testimony of Scott and Pruitt

Williams’s friend Patrice Scott and her boyfriend Dwight

Pruitt testified that Williams showed up at their apartment

in Villa Park, Illinois, around 1 a.m. on November 17 accom‐

panied by a young boy, who turned out to be Joshua Evans.

Williams was wearing a Starter jacket and a white sweater

spotted with blood. Joshua was wearing a T‐shirt, coat, and

boots, but no pants or socks. Scott noticed a gray car parked

outside. Williams told Scott that the boy’s mother had been

shot and asked whether he could spend the night at Scott

and Pruitt’s home. Scott agreed. Williams said she would

pick Joshua up in the morning. She also claimed to have just

given birth to a baby. (A month earlier, she had told Scott she

was pregnant.)  

Scott heard Joshua crying during the night. Joshua was

still crying in the early morning, when he told Scott that he

needed to go home because his younger brother Jordan was

there alone, and because Edwards would not know where he

(Joshua) was. Joshua explained that four burglars had en‐

tered his home and cut his mother and sister. Scott asked

who they were, and Joshua answered: “Annette, Levern, and

Fedell,” and someone Joshua called “Boo Boo.” Joshua re‐

peated this statement more than three times. He explained

that he was hiding but came out as the burglars left, ran out‐

side, and then bumped into Williams.

Pruitt overheard Joshua’s comments from the bedroom,

where Pruitt was watching television with the volume low‐

ered. He testified that Joshua said: “Annette”; “Vern”; a
No. 13‐3454 5

name that sounded like “Vedelle”, “Adelle”, or “Ladelle”;

and a fourth name Pruitt could not make out.  

Around 9 a.m. on November 17, Williams returned, driv‐

ing the same gray car that Scott had seen the night before.

Scott told Williams what Joshua had said. Williams became

angry, cursed at Joshua, and accused him of lying. Joshua

insisted he was telling the truth. Williams told Joshua to take

his medicine, but he said he did not take any medicine. Wil‐

liams led him to the kitchen; the boy soon emerged gagging,

went to the bathroom, and vomited. Police later found an

empty iodine bottle in the kitchen garbage can.

Williams asked Scott to accompany her to the townhouse

where Williams and Caffey lived in Schaumburg, Illinois.

Williams explained that she wanted to check on her new‐

born baby, and that she also had some gifts for Scott’s infant

daughter Alexis. Scott agreed to go along. She, Williams, and

Joshua left the apartment. Scott asked Pruitt to watch Alexis,

but he refused, so Scott brought Alexis with her.  

While they were gone, Pruitt saw a television report on

the Evans murders and recognized Joshua’s picture. Pruitt

left the apartment looking for a telephone but could not find

one that worked. Unsuccessful, he returned home.

When Scott arrived at Williams and Caffey’s home, she

went upstairs with Williams while Joshua watched Alexis in

the living room. Scott testified that she saw Caffey lying on a

bed with a “really pale” baby who had “tape across his na‐

vel.” Scott went back downstairs to feed Alexis. Later, Wil‐

liams called Scott down to the lower level, where the garage

and laundry room were located. Williams asked Scott to

bring Joshua downstairs, which she did.
6 No. 13‐3454

Waiting in the lower‐level laundry room were Caffey,

Williams, and an unidentified man, who soon left. Scott testi‐

fied that she heard Caffey ask Williams why she had not

taken Joshua “to the projects” as he instructed. Williams ex‐

plained that Joshua “talked too much” and knew their

names. Caffey and Williams then began to strangle Joshua

with a white cord. Scott screamed and pushed Williams,

forcing her to release her end of the cord. Williams left and

returned with a knife. Scott screamed again and asked Wil‐

liams to take them home. Scott took Joshua upstairs and

tried to leave, but the door was locked. Scott went back

down to the laundry room with Joshua and Alexis. Caffey

warned Scott not to say anything or else he would “get me

and my daughters.”  

Caffey then instructed Williams to take Scott home. They

all went to the garage and got into the gray car. Scott was in

the front passenger seat with Alexis. Joshua was behind her

in the back seat, and Caffey was sitting next to him. Williams

was standing along the driver’s side and appeared to be

holding Joshua. Scott testified that she saw Caffey repeated‐

ly stab Joshua, causing him to gasp and kick the front seat.  

Williams then climbed into the driver’s seat and drove to

Maywood, where she and Caffey took Joshua out of the car,

took him to the back of a building, and then returned with‐

out him. Williams left Caffey in Maywood and took Scott

back to her apartment. They arrived around 12:15 p.m. At

Williams’s request, Scott gave her cleaning supplies.  

Pruitt observed that Scott seemed to be “trying to get rid

of [Williams].” Pruitt told Scott to lock the door while he

went to call the police. On his way out, he saw Williams

cleaning her car. Pruitt called the police from a nearby hair
No. 13‐3454 7

salon. Scott subsequently led them to the location in May‐

wood where Williams and Caffey had taken Joshua. Police

recovered Joshua’s dead body in a nearby alley. They then

drove to Williams and Caffey’s home and arrested them. At

the time of arrest, Williams was carrying Elijah, who had a

bloody piece of gauze taped over his navel. Caffey was

wearing Edwards’s Starter jacket, which had blood stains on

the right cuff.  

2. Physical and Forensic Evidence

The State presented the following physical and forensic

evidence. In the Evans apartment, investigators found Wil‐

liams’s bloody fingerprint on a piece of paper. On the side‐

walk in front of the apartment, they found a pair of poultry

shears covered with Samantha’s blood. Police did not find

Caffey’s fingerprints or DNA in the Evans apartment.  

Police searched Williams and Caffey’s house. In a gar‐

bage bag in the garage, they found a white coaxial cable with

Joshua’s blood on it; Scott identified it as the cable used to

strangle Joshua. In the dishwasher, police recovered a butch‐

er knife, which Scott identified as the knife that Caffey used

to stab Joshua. On the kitchen counter were two counterfeit

birth certificates stating that Williams gave birth to a baby,

fathered by Caffey, on November 16, 1995. The certificates

had been prepared on a typewriter belonging to a woman

named Vikki Iacullo. In Williams and Caffey’s closet, police

found a bedsheet and pillowcase that matched the blood‐

stained sheet discovered seven blocks from Joshua’s body.

(The blood was Joshua’s.) On the backseat carpet in Williams

and Caffey’s car, police found Joshua’s blood, which had

been treated with cleaner.  
8 No. 13‐3454

Iacullo and Dorothy Hale later directed police to a lake in

Wheaton, where they found the gun used to shoot Debra

Evans. Iacullo invoked her Fifth Amendment privilege and

refused to testify. She was later charged with obstruction of

justice.

Several doctors testified about the forensic evidence. Ac‐

cording to them, the main cause of Debra Evans’s death was

a gunshot wound to the head. She also had multiple stab

wounds, including a thirteen‐inch jagged incision across her

abdomen consistent with poultry shears. Based on blood

spatters around Debra’s body and the fact that her baby (Eli‐

jah) survived, Debra’s obstetrician opined that she was still

alive when Elijah was cut from her womb. The doctor

opined further that two or three sets of hands would have

been necessary to perform such a procedure.  

Samantha had defensive wounds on her arms and inci‐

sions on her neck, which were also consistent with poultry

shears. Joshua’s neck bore ligature marks consistent with

strangulation and stab wounds consistent with a butcher

knife. Joshua’s right lung was aspirated, meaning he inhaled

his own vomit, causing damage consistent with the ingestion

of iodine. His wounds and the lack of defensive marks sug‐

gested that he may have been restrained.

3. Other Witnesses’ Testimony

Other witnesses provided additional details about the de‐

fendants’ activities leading up to and on the night of the

murders. Dawn Killeen knew Williams and Caffey because

she was their neighbor, and because her husband dealt

drugs with Caffey and Ward. Killeen testified that she went

to Williams and Caffey’s house in May 1995 to borrow a
No. 13‐3454 9

vacuum cleaner. Ward stormed in “yelling and screaming

that Debbie [Evans] wasn’t allowing him to see Jordan.”

Ward “said he was tired of her shit and he wanted to ... . kill

the bitch.” He punched a hole in the wall. Caffey asked

Ward whether he wanted a gun or a knife. Vikki Iacullo was

also there. Killeen overheard them talking about a baby.

Williams’s cousin John Pettaway saw Williams, Caffey,

and Ward together on the day of the murders. Pettaway and

Ward were together that afternoon, smoking crack cocaine

and driving around Wheaton. They twice encountered

Caffey and Williams, and on each occasion Ward got out of

the car to speak with them for 15 minutes or so. Ward told

Pettaway several times that he (Ward) needed to find Caffey.  

Kassandra Turner, Williams’s friend, testified that Caffey

called her on the evening of November 16 to tell her that he

and Williams were going to have the baby. Williams had told

Turner months earlier that she was pregnant. The following

day, Caffey reported to Turner that Williams had given birth

to a “real light skinned” baby boy.

Jacci Sullivan and Tennie Clay lived in Evans’s apartment

complex. Sullivan testified that she heard a shot between

8:30 and 9:30 p.m. on November 16. Clay said she heard

voices outside around 9:15 p.m., looked out her window, and

saw four people talking on a sidewalk. She believed three

were African‐American and the other was a light‐skinned

Hispanic. One of them was wearing a dark Starter jacket.  

Joy Wilson, age 15, and her aunt Tiffany Wilson, age 16,

were babysitting at Tiffany’s house on the night of Novem‐

ber 16. Tiffany was Ward’s and Williams’s cousin. Joy and

Tiffany testified that Ward entered the house that night car‐
10 No. 13‐3454

rying a plastic bag stuffed full of what looked like clothing.

Joy said she noticed a hole in Ward’s pants and blood on his

clothes. Ward went to the bathroom and emerged wearing

different clothes; the grocery bag appeared fuller. Joy was

frightened by the family dog and ran outside. There, she saw

a gray car with three people inside: two men in the front and

a woman in the back. She later identified two of them as

Caffey and Williams. They were honking and calling for

Ward. Ward got in the car and they drove off.

Mohammid Siddiqui, a clerk at 7‐Eleven in Schaumburg,

testified that Caffey and a woman matching Williams’s de‐

scription entered his store on November 17 between 1:30 and

2:00 in the morning. Caffey bought baby wipes and candy.

The store register recorded a sale at 1:49 a.m. for one item at

$1.99, which is the cost of baby wipes, and one item at $0.99.

Williams called her sister, Tina Martin, around 3:30 a.m.

on November 17 and told her the baby had arrived. Tina and

her mother drove to Iacullo’s house, where they saw Wil‐

liams, Iacullo, Caffey, and the baby. The baby’s complexion

was so light that neither Martin nor her mother believed it

really was Williams and Caffey’s. Tina and her mother left

after just a few minutes.

B. Caffey’s Defense

Caffey maintained (and still maintains) his innocence.

The defense’s theory of the case was that Williams was pos‐

sessive and jealous, so she planned to trap Caffey by faking a

pregnancy, stealing Elijah Evans, and then passing him off as

their child. Williams allegedly conspired with Ward and

Iacullo to pull off her plan.  
No. 13‐3454 11

The defense introduced evidence of Williams’s jealousy.

She had good reason to be jealous: Caffey began dating Wil‐

liams in 1994 but continued to have sexual relationships

with other women, including his former girlfriend, Katrina

Montgomery, with whom he had a child. Williams did not

like Caffey’s relationship with Katrina, and the two women

had physical and verbal altercations from 1994 through 1995.

Williams also had a history of feigning pregnancies, accord‐

ing to Caffey and another witness.

In February 1995, Williams told Caffey she was pregnant.

Caffey testified that he did not know about Williams’s tubal

ligation or her inability to conceive any more children. Wil‐

liams first told him the baby was due in August but then

changed the date to mid‐October. When that date passed,

Caffey stopped believing she was pregnant.

Caffey testified that he was at home in Schaumburg with

Williams’s children on the night of the murders. Williams

went out around 7:15 p.m. on November 16. Shortly after

that, Joyce Hotz came over and bought drugs from Caffey.

Then Caffey watched New York Undercover with Williams’s

daughter Christina from 8 until 9 p.m., when the girl went to

bed. At 1:30 a.m., Williams still had not come home. Caffey

grew worried and went to the nearby 7‐Eleven to use a pay

phone. He called Martin and asked her to page Williams.

Caffey denied buying baby wipes at that time.  

Caffey admitted calling Turner earlier that evening but

denied telling her that he and Williams were going to have a

baby. According to Caffey, Turner had bought drugs from

him the previous day, and he was calling to inform her that

her check had bounced. Caffey also admitted to meeting
12 No. 13‐3454

with Ward earlier in the day, but only to sell drugs—not to

plan any murders.

Caffey testified that he saw Iacullo’s car pull into his

driveway around 2:30 a.m. Caffey went outside and saw

Williams in the car with a baby. Back inside the house,

Iacullo explained that Williams had gone into labor at

Iacullo’s house. They went to a hospital, where Williams

gave birth, but they had to leave because Williams did not

have insurance. Caffey was initially skeptical of their story

but seeing the baby’s umbilical cord bleeding somehow con‐

vinced him it was true. They all went to Iacullo’s house to get

Williams’s car. While there, Williams called Martin and gave

her the news.  

Caffey testified that he and Williams then left Iacullo’s

house and returned to the 7‐Eleven a little before 5 a.m. It

was at that time, according to Caffey, that he bought baby

wipes. The store register recorded a purchase of an item for

$1.99, the cost of baby wipes, at 4:49 a.m. They returned

home, and Caffey fell asleep next to the baby. He stayed

there most of the day. That night, Caffey, Williams, and the

baby went to Iacullo’s house, where Iacullo gave Caffey a

Grambling Starter jacket as a “Daddy’s Day present.” When

Williams and Caffey returned home, they were arrested.

In addition to presenting Caffey’s version of events, the

defense attacked the credibility of the State’s witnesses and

drew out inconsistencies in their testimony. Patrice Scott

admitted on cross‐examination that she did not contact the

police, despite Joshua’s naming of the four burglars, Wil‐

liams’s administration of Joshua’s “medicine,” and other

suspicious behavior. Moreover, Scott did not tell any of the

investigating officers who initially interviewed her that
No. 13‐3454 13

Joshua had named Caffey as one of the burglars. Scott ex‐

plained that she was afraid to name Caffey because he had

threatened to hurt her and her family.

Pruitt admitted that he was serving a prison sentence for

a weapons charge, was a gang member, and had prior con‐

victions. He conceded that he did not initially call the police.

And when he did eventually call the police, he did not tell

them about the names Joshua had mentioned. Nor did he

report that information to the investigating officers who ini‐

tially interviewed him. Pruitt explained, however, that he

was not formally interviewed on those occasions.  

The defense theorized that Pruitt and Scott were falsely

implicating Caffey in the murders, perhaps to minimize their

own culpability. Another possible reason was that Scott

feared Bo Wilson, who may have been the fourth burglar, the

one Joshua called “Boo Boo.” Wilson may also have been the

unidentified man who was in the laundry room at Williams

and Caffey’s house. Scott denied that the man was Wilson.

But a detective testified that about a month‐and‐a‐half later,

Scott told him Wilson was the man in the laundry room.

The defense elicited testimony to impeach other witness‐

es too. For example, Kassandra Turner, who testified that

Caffey called her on November 16 to say that he and Wil‐

liams were going to have a baby, did not relay that infor‐

mation to police until more than two months after the

crimes. Joy Wilson did not initially tell police that she had

seen any specific people in the gray car outside Tiffany’s

house. And Mohammid Siddiqui, the 7‐Eleven clerk, recalled

seeing Caffey in the store only after police showed him a

photograph.  
14 No. 13‐3454

Finally, the defense called witnesses whose testimony

tended to show that Iacullo supplied the gun for the mur‐

ders and disposed of it afterward by throwing it in a pond.

She burned several documents in one witness’s kitchen but

saved a birth certificate with Caffey’s name on it. The wit‐

nesses also implicated Dorothy Hale in these acts.  

After deliberating, the jury found Caffey guilty of the

first‐degree murder of Evans, Samantha, and Joshua, as well

as the aggravated kidnapping of Joshua.  

C. Post‐Conviction Procedural History

In February 2000, Caffey appealed his conviction and

sentence to the Illinois Supreme Court. He raised numerous

arguments, including that: (1) the trial court improperly ex‐

cluded hearsay statements made by Ward, Williams, and

Iacullo, and thereby deprived Caffey of the ability to mount

an effective defense; (2) his trial counsel was constitutionally

ineffective for failing to introduce statements by Iacullo and

Hale that the trial court had ruled admissible; and (3) the tri‐

al court improperly admitted Joshua’s hearsay statements

naming Caffey as one of the assailants. The Illinois Supreme

Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment in a detailed opin‐

ion. People v. Caffey, 792 N.E.2d 1163 (Ill. 2001) (“Caffey I”).

The U.S. Supreme Court denied Caffey’s petition for a writ

of certiorari. Caffey v. Illinois, 536 U.S. 944 (2002).

In April 2000, while his direct appeal was pending,

Caffey filed a petition for post‐conviction relief in the Circuit

Court of DuPage County. Because Caffey was under a sen‐

tence of death, the court appointed counsel to represent him

in the post‐conviction proceedings. The case was then re‐

peatedly continued. Meanwhile, Caffey served subpoenas,
No. 13‐3454 15

deposed Pruitt, and gathered other evidence. In 2004, Caffey

amended his post‐conviction petition. He alleged, among

other things, that the State violated its obligations under

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by failing to disclose

that: (1) Pruitt received special benefits because he knew

about drug sales to one of the prosecuting attorneys, Assis‐

tant State’s Attorney (“ASA”) Jeffrey Kendall; (2) ASA Thom‐

as Epach interceded to prevent Cook County from prosecut‐

ing Scott for Joshua’s murder; and (3) Cara Walker told po‐

lice that Iacullo sold drugs to Kendall and said that she

would reveal this information if charged for the Evans mur‐

ders. The trial court dismissed Caffey’s petition for post‐

conviction relief. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed, Peo‐

ple v. Caffey, No. 2–05–0787, slip op. (Ill. App. Ct. Apr. 7,

2008) (“Caffey II”), and the Illinois Supreme Court denied

Caffey’s petition for leave to appeal, People v. Caffey, 897

N.E.2d 256 (Ill. 2008).

In September 2009, Caffey filed a petition for a writ of

habeas corpus in the Northern District of Illinois. He re‐

newed the arguments enumerated above from his direct ap‐

peal and his post‐conviction petition in Illinois. The district

court granted an evidentiary hearing to further develop the

factual basis for Caffey’s Brady claims relating to Scott and

Iacullo. Caffey v. Atchison, No. 09 C 5458, 2012 WL 5230298

(N.D. Ill. Feb. 3, 2012) (“Caffey III”). After discovery, Caffey

dropped the Brady claim concerning Scott, leaving only the

claims concerning Pruitt and Iacullo.

On October 7, 2013, the district court denied Caffey’s ha‐

beas petition on the merits. Caffey v. Harrington, No. 09 C

5458, 2013 WL 5529760 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 7, 2013) (“Caffey IV”).

The court acknowledged, however, that its ruling was “fairly
16 No. 13‐3454

debatable,” so it granted a certificate of appealability. Id. at

*34.  

This appeal followed. Caffey renews all of his arguments

below, except for the portion of his ineffective‐assistance

claim concerning Dorothy Hale and his challenge to the ad‐

mission of Joshua Evans’s hearsay statements.

II. ANALYSIS

We review de novo a district court’s denial of a habeas

corpus petition. Smith v. McKee, 598 F.3d 374, 381 (7th Cir.

2010). A state prisoner is entitled to seek habeas relief on the

ground that he is being held in violation of federal law or the

U.S. Constitution. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). But if a state court has

already adjudicated the petitioner’s claim on the merits, the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”)

precludes habeas relief unless the state court’s decision “was

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Su‐

preme Court of the United States” or “was based on an un‐

reasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

“Clearly established Federal law” refers to the holdings

of the Supreme Court that existed at the time of the relevant

state court adjudication on the merits. Greene v. Fisher, 132 S.

Ct. 38, 44 (2011); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000). A

decision is “contrary to” federal law if the state court applied

an incorrect rule—i.e., one that “contradicts the governing

law” established by the Supreme Court—or reached an out‐

come different from the Supreme Court’s conclusion in a

case with “materially indistinguishable” facts. Williams, 529

U.S. at 405–06. A state court unreasonably applies federal
No. 13‐3454 17

law when it “identifies the appropriate standard but applies

it to the facts in a manner with which a reasonable court

would disagree.” Etherly v. Davis, 619 F.3d 654, 660 (7th Cir.

2010) (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 413, and Williams v. Thur‐

mer, 561 F.3d 740, 742–43 (7th Cir. 2009) (per curiam)). Mere

error is not enough to overcome AEDPA deference; instead,

the state court’s decision must be objectively unreasonable,

Etherly, 619 F.3d at 660, meaning it is “beyond any possibility

for fairminded disagreement,” Mosley v. Atchison, 689 F.3d

838, 844 (2012) (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103

(2011)).

Where a state court’s decision is “contrary to” federal

law, or where no state court adjudicated the particular claim

on the merits in the first place, AEDPA deference does not

apply. See Ruhl v. Hardy, 743 F.3d 1083, 1091 (7th Cir. 2014);

Mosley, 689 F.3d at 844. In that event, we review the petition‐

er’s claim under the pre‐AEDPA standard of 28 U.S.C. § 2243

and dispose of the matter “as law and justice require,” which

is essentially de novo review. Eichwedel v. Chandler, 696 F.3d

660, 671 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Morales v. Johnson, 659 F.3d

588, 599 (7th Cir. 2011)).

With those principles in mind, we turn to the issues on

appeal.  

A. Exclusion of Hearsay Statements  

Caffey contends, first, that the trial court improperly ex‐

cluded several hearsay statements by Iacullo, Ward, and Wil‐

liams. According to Caffey, the Constitution guaranteed him

the right to present those statements to the jury. We disagree.
18 No. 13‐3454

1. The Right to Present a Defense  

A criminal defendant has a constitutional right, ground‐

ed in the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, to “a meaning‐

ful opportunity to present a complete defense.” Crane v. Ken‐

tucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986) (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted). That includes the right to present relevant

evidence. United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998). Of

course, that right is not unfettered but is instead subject to

the states’ “broad latitude ... to establish rules excluding ev‐

idence from criminal trials.” Id. In some instances, however,

strict application of a state evidentiary rule must yield to the

defendant’s constitutional rights.

The leading example is Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S.

284 (1973), where the Supreme Court vindicated a defend‐

ant’s right to present reliable, critical evidence that would

otherwise have been excluded by a state hearsay rule. Leon

Chambers was convicted of murdering a police officer dur‐

ing a melee in a local bar. One witness testified that he saw

Chambers shoot the officer. 410 U.S. at 286. But another man

named McDonald had confessed to the murder on several

occasions, including in a sworn statement to Chambers’s

counsel. McDonald was arrested but later repudiated his

confession. Id. at 287–88.

Chambers called McDonald as a witness at trial. The

court admitted McDonald’s written confession into evidence,

but McDonald again repudiated it. The court prevented

Chambers from cross‐examining McDonald and challenging

his repudiation based on the common‐law “voucher rule”

that a party may not impeach his own witness. Id. at 295.

Chambers then sought to introduce the testimony of three

witnesses to whom McDonald had admitted he was the
No. 13‐3454 19

shooter. The trial court excluded their testimony as hearsay.

Id. at 298.

On direct appeal, the Supreme Court reversed. It held

that the prohibition on cross‐examination of McDonald plus

the exclusion of his hearsay confessions violated Chambers’s

constitutional right to present a defense. Id. at 302. The con‐

fessions, although hearsay, bore “considerable assurance of

their reliability.” Id. at 300. Specifically, the statements were:

(1) made spontaneously to a close acquaintance shortly after

the shooting; (2) corroborated by other evidence, including

McDonald’s written confession and the testimony of an

eyewitness; and (3) “self‐incriminatory and unquestionably

against interest,” which made the statements more reliable

and brought them “well within the basic rationale of the

[hearsay] exception for declarations against interest.” Id. at

300–02. Moreover, (4) McDonald was present in the court‐

room and under oath, so he could have been cross‐examined

by the prosecution. Id. at 301. The Court emphasized that

this final factor “significantly distinguish[ed]” Chambers

from cases where the declarant was unavailable at trial. Id.

The Court also found that the excluded testimony was

“critical to Chambers’ defense.” Id. at 302. The proof at trial

excluded the possibility that there was more than one shoot‐

er, so McDonald’s incriminating confession also tended to

exculpate Chambers. Id. at 297. In these circumstances, the

Court held, “the hearsay rule may not be applied mechanis‐

tically to defeat the ends of justice.” Id. at 302.  

Chambers is one case in a line of Supreme Court decisions

considering constitutional challenges to state evidentiary

rules. Sometimes the rule has had to yield. See, e.g., Washing‐

ton v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 22 (1967) (rejecting rule that accom‐
20 No. 13‐3454

plices may testify for prosecution but not for defense); Green

v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 97 (1979) (per curiam) (rejecting exclu‐

sion of hearsay confession); see also Kubsch v. Neal, No. 14‐

1898, 2015 WL 4747942, *10 (7th Cir. Aug. 12, 2015) (collect‐

ing cases). But those instances are “rare[].” Nevada v. Jackson,

133 S.Ct. 1990, 1992 (2013) (per curiam).

The general standard is that rules of evidence restricting

the ability to present a defense cannot be “arbitrary” or

“disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to

serve.” Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 308. The exclusion of hearsay

transgresses that standard only where the excluded state‐

ments: (1) bear “considerable assurance of their reliability,”

sufficient to compensate for not being subject to cross‐

examination or given under oath; and (2) are “critical” to the

defense. Chambers, 410 U.S. at 299–300, 302.  

The Chambers Court identified four factors to help assess

reliability, although that list is not exhaustive. Sharlow v. Isra‐

el, 767 F.2d 373, 377 (7th Cir. 1985). We already discussed

those four factors above. The Court also clarified what it

means by “critical” evidence in United States v. Valenzuela‐

Bernal: evidence is critical if it is “favorable and material,” in

the sense that “there is a reasonable likelihood that the tes‐

timony could have affected the judgment of the trier of fact.”

458 U.S. 858, 872–74 (1982); see also Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 1264

(stating that exclusion of evidence is unconstitutional “only

where is has infringed upon a weighty interest of the ac‐

cused”); Green, 442 U.S. at 97 (finding constitutional viola‐

tion where excluded hearsay was “highly relevant to a criti‐

cal issue”); Washington, 388 U.S. at 16 (finding violation

where evidentiary rule excluded testimony that was “rele‐

vant,” “material,” and “vital” to defense); Sharlow, 767 F.2d
No. 13‐3454 21

at 377–78 (recognizing that Valenzuela‐Bernal standard de‐

fines “critical” for purposes of Chambers analysis). The

Chambers “critical” standard is thus the same as the material‐

ity requirement employed in the Brady line of cases, as we

recognized in Harris v. Thompson, 698 F.3d 609, 627–28 (7th

Cir. 2012).  

Deciding whether excluded hearsay is sufficiently relia‐

ble and material to trigger a Chambers violation in a given

case is a fact‐intensive inquiry. Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S.

37, 52 (1996) (reading Chambers as “an exercise in highly

case‐specific error correction”). It requires balancing the

state’s legitimate interests against the hearsay statement’s

trustworthiness and importance to the defendant See Shar‐

low, 767 F.2d at 377 (citing Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302).  

2. Iacullo’s Statements to the Police

After the police arrested Williams and Caffey, they ques‐

tioned Vikki Iacullo on November 18, 1995, and several

times thereafter. Iacullo gave the following account to the

police: Williams arrived at Iacullo’s house early on Novem‐

ber 17 with a baby. The baby’s umbilical cord was bleeding,

so Iacullo supplied gauze and tape. Williams had a cut on

her hand and blood on her shirt. Iacullo drove Williams

home and, once there, presented the baby to Caffey, saying,

“Surprise, Baby Fedell Jr.” Williams gave Iacullo Edwards’s

Grambling Tigers Starter jacket and told her to present it to

Caffey as a “new daddy present,” which Iacullo did. Also, at

Williams’s behest, Iacullo prepared a false birth certificate

and gave it to Williams outside of Caffey’s presence. See

Caffey I, 792 N.E.2d at 1192.  
22 No. 13‐3454

The State charged Iacullo with obstruction of justice for

her role in these crimes. She invoked the Fifth Amendment

and refused to testify on Caffey’s behalf. Defense counsel

then sought to introduce Iacullo’s out‐of‐court statements to

the police, but the trial court excluded them as inadmissible

hearsay under Illinois law.

On direct appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed

their exclusion. Id. at 1198. The court acknowledged that

state hearsay rules must sometimes yield to a defendant’s

constitutional right to present a defense under Chambers. But

the court found that Iacullo’s hearsay statements lacked suf‐

ficient indicia of reliability: three of the four reliability fac‐

tors identified in Chambers were missing. Id. at 1192–95. In

particular, the court found that Iacullo’s statements were not

self‐incriminating because “[t]here is no crime in: allowing

into one’s home a friend who claims to have just given birth;

helping to bandage a baby; driving that friend to her home

and presenting the baby to the alleged father; or giving

someone a jacket.” Id. at 1194. The court did find the state‐

ment regarding the false birth certificate to be “somewhat

self‐incriminating” but insufficient to satisfy Chambers. Id.

The district court below disagreed. It concluded that the

Illinois Supreme Court unreasonably applied Chambers and

Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594 (1994), which teaches

that “whether a statement is self‐inculpatory or not can only

be determined by viewing it in context.” Caffey IV, 2013 WL

5529760, at *17–18. The district court therefore assessed the

issue de novo and concluded that Iacullo’s statements “bore

considerable assurances of trustworthiness when assessed in

the way that Williamson requires.” Id. Nevertheless, the dis‐

trict court found the statements immaterial because there
No. 13‐3454 23

was no reasonable likelihood that they could have affected

the jury’s verdict. Id. at *18–19. Therefore, the district court

ultimately found no Chambers violation. Id. at *19.

a) Reliability

Unlike the district court, we think the Illinois Supreme

Court reasonably applied Chambers in finding the excluded

statements unreliable, although it is close question. We con‐

sider the four Chambers factors in turn. The first was missing:

these were not spontaneous statements to a close acquaint‐

ance, but rather answers given during interrogation by the

police.  

The second factor, corroboration, was present. Caffey tes‐

tified that he first encountered the baby when Iacullo pre‐

sented it to him at 2:30 a.m., and that Iacullo gave him the

Starter jacket as a gift. This is some corroboration of Iacullo’s

statements but not much. Compare Chambers, where there

was a sworn confession, eyewitness testimony, and other ev‐

idence to corroborate McDonald’s three hearsay confessions.

410 U.S. at 300. See also Kubsch, 2015 WL 4747942, at *13

(holding that exclusion of hearsay was constitutional where,

among other reasons, there was only “minimal corrobora‐

tion” for excluded statement).

The third factor—whether Iacullo’s statements were self‐

incriminating—is disputed. We agree with the district court

that Iacullo’s statements were at least somewhat against her

penal interest. There was evidence linking Iacullo to the

murders—e.g., showing that she provided and then disposed

of the gun used to kill Debra Evans. The police had already

arrested Williams and Caffey, and by the time they were

questioning Iacullo, it was apparent they suspected she too
24 No. 13‐3454

was involved. Viewed in this context, Iacullo’s statements

that she presented the baby to Caffey and gave him the jack‐

et tend somewhat to implicate her, at least in the kidnapping

of Elijah Evans, if not in the larger conspiracy.  

On the other hand, the statements did not implicate

Iacullo in the murders themselves; in that way, they are con‐

siderably less self‐incriminating than the confessions at issue

in Chambers. See 410 U.S. at 300–01. Moreover, Iacullo was in

custody when she made the statements and likely knew she

was a suspect. She may therefore have had a motive to falsi‐

fy or embellish her testimony to curry favor or gain leverage

with the police. Her statements could also be interpreted as a

form of damage‐control, a way of downplaying her actual

role in the crimes, which may have been greater, by admit‐

ting to a lesser role. Caffey argues that if Iacullo had really

wanted to gain leverage she would have implicated him in

the crimes to take the heat off herself. Not necessarily. Per‐

haps, for example, Iacullo did not want to turn Caffey

against her for fear that he would reveal information about

her involvement. The fact that she did not implicate him

does not bolster the veracity of Iacullo’s statements.

Turning to the fourth factor, it is undisputed that Iacullo,

having invoked the Fifth Amendment, was unavailable for

cross‐examination at Caffey’s trial. “The availability of cross‐

examination was ... central to Chambers.” Kubsch, 2015 WL

4747942, at *14. But here, that “powerful assurance of relia‐

bility,” id., was missing.  

In these circumstances, we think it is a close question

whether Iacullo’s hearsay statements were sufficiently relia‐

ble to trigger a Chambers violation. But for that very reason,
No. 13‐3454 25

we cannot say that the state court’s conclusion on this point

was objectively unreasonable.

b) Materiality

Additionally, we agree with the district court that

Iacullo’s statements were not sufficiently material to Caffey’s

defense to trigger a Chambers violation. Because the state su‐

preme court rested its holding on its finding of unreliability,

it did not consider the statements’ materiality. We therefore

review that issue de novo.

As a threshold matter, Caffey contends that he does not

have to show that Iacullo’s statements were material, but only

that their exclusion had a “substantial and injurious effect”

on the jury’s verdict. Federal courts generally employ the lat‐

ter standard, taken from Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619

(1993), to determine whether a constitutional error is harm‐

less or prejudicial in habeas corpus cases under § 2254. Fry v.

Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 121–221 (2007). The materiality require‐

ment of Chambers, however, is not the same as harmless‐

error analysis. Caffey’s argument wrongly substitutes the

latter for the former. Chambers materiality sets a higher bar

than Brecht: Caffey must show a reasonable likelihood that

the excluded evidence could have affected the verdict. Valen‐

zuela‐Bernal, 458 U.S. at 874.1

                                                 

1 That is why “Chambers error is by nature prejudicial.” Fry, 551 U.S. at

124 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). An eviden‐

tiary ruling that unconstitutionally excludes critical evidence under

Chambers is necessarily harmful under Brecht. Cf. Kyles v. Whitley, 514

U.S. 419, 435–36 (1995) (making the same observation about Bagley error).
26 No. 13‐3454

Caffey contends that Iacullo’s statements constituted the

only corroboration for his version events. It is true that her

statements, if accepted by the jury, would have supported

his explanation of why he was wearing the blood‐stained

Starter jacket taken from the Evans apartment on the night of

the murders—which was one important piece of physical

evidence against him. Iacullo’s statements also would have

corroborated Caffey’s story that Williams and Iacullo pre‐

sented the baby to him at 2:30 a.m., which would tend to

support Caffey’s claim that he did not know about the baby

before then.  

Iacullo’s statements would not, however, have corrobo‐

rated the rest of Caffey’s story. Nor, crucially, would they

have undermined the other powerful evidence against him,

including:

 Patrice Scott and Dwight Pruitt’s testimony that

Joshua identified Caffey as one of the burglars who

cut his mother and sister;

 Scott’s eyewitness testimony that Caffey strangled

and stabbed Joshua, then took him to the alley in

Maywood where his body was eventually found;

 The testimony of the 7‐Eleven clerk that Caffey and

Williams entered his store around 1:30 a.m. and

bought baby wipes—an hour before Caffey claims

he even knew about the baby’s arrival;

 Dawn Killeen’s testimony that months before the

murders she heard Caffey (perhaps in jest) ask

Ward whether he wanted a gun or a knife to kill

Debra Evans, and then overhead Caffey, Williams,

Ward, and Iacullo talking about a baby;
No. 13‐3454 27

 John Pettaway’s testimony that he saw Caffey with

Williams and Ward on the day of the murders, and

that Ward said he needed to find Caffey;

 Kassandra Turner’s testimony that Caffey called

her on the evening of the murders to say that the

baby was on its way;

 Tennie Clay’s sighting of a light‐skinned individual

matching Caffey’s complexion with three other Af‐

rican‐Americans, one of whom had a Starter jacket,

on the sidewalk outside the Evans apartment on

the night of the murders;  

 Joy Wilson’s testimony that she saw Caffey in the

gray car with Williams and Ward, who had blood

on his clothes, on the night of the murders; and

 The implausibility of certain parts of Caffey’s tes‐

timony—for example, his claim that he did not

know about Williams’s tubal ligation despite dating

her for roughly a year, and his claim that he be‐

lieved Elijah was his child despite his initial skepti‐

cism and even though others who saw the baby

thought he was too light‐skinned to belong to Wil‐

liams and Caffey.

Caffey points to weaknesses in the State’s case—e.g., prior

inconsistent statements by witnesses, possible biases, and

motives they may have had to lie. In particular, neither Scott

nor Pruitt told the officers who originally questioned them

that Joshua had identified Caffey as one of the assailants.

The problem with Caffey’s argument is that the jury heard

all of this impeachment evidence yet still found Caffey guilty

beyond a reasonable doubt. Caffey does not claim that the
28 No. 13‐3454

evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction. Moreo‐

ver, he has given us no reason to think that the admission of

Iacullo’s excluded hearsay statements would have changed

the jury’s evaluation of the evidence or the witnesses, or that

it might have tipped the balance in Caffey’s favor. In short,

there is no reasonable probability that the excluded state‐

ments would have altered the outcome of Caffey’s trial—we

are confident he still would have been convicted.

The fact that the prosecution in its closing argument em‐

phasized the lack of corroboration for Caffey’s story does not

change our analysis. The State also argued that the evidence

of Caffey’s guilt was overwhelming. As we read the record,

the jury did not merely opt for the State’s theory of the case

because Caffey’s theory lacked corroboration. No; the prose‐

cution prevailed because it presented strong, positive proof

of Caffey’s participation in the crimes.2

In sum, the Illinois Supreme Court did not “mechanisti‐

cally” apply its hearsay rule to exclude Iacullo’s statements

to the police. Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302. Those statements

bore insufficient indicia of reliability and lacked the exculpa‐

tory significance necessary to support a constitutional claim

under Chambers. We therefore affirm the denial of habeas re‐

lief on this claim. We now turn to Caffey’s other Chambers

arguments, which we can dispose of more quickly.

                                                 

2 Nor are we troubled by the isolated reference in the State’s closing ar‐

gument to Iacullo’s race (white), for the reasons given by the Illinois Su‐

preme Court. See Caffey I, 792 N.E.2d at 1197.  
No. 13‐3454 29

3. Ward’s and Williams’s Statements  

The trial court excluded (1) John Pettaway’s testimony

that on the afternoon of the murders Ward said he needed to

find Caffey to buy drugs from him; and (2) the testimony of

Williams’s friend Kimberly Young that Williams said she

would fake a pregnancy to keep a man. Caffey contends the

first statement supports his claim that he and Ward met only

to sell drugs, not to plan murders. Caffey contends the sec‐

ond statement corroborates his testimony that Williams

duped him into believing she was pregnant.

The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the exclusion of

both statements. Caffey I, 792 N.E.2d at 1188–92. It held that

no state law hearsay exception applied, and it found further

that any error was harmless because the statements were

merely cumulative of other evidence. Although the court an‐

alyzed the issues under state law rather than Chambers, its

harmless‐error analysis was essentially the same as the

Chambers materiality inquiry. So the state supreme court’s

conclusion still deserves AEDPA deference. See Gilbert v.

Merchant, 488 F.3d 780, 793 n.2 (7th Cir. 2007) (noting that

state court need not cite federal cases so long as its analysis

is consistent with Supreme Court precedent).

The district court thought the state court’s ruling was a

reasonable application of federal law. We do too. The jury

heard testimony from Pettaway that he and Ward smoked

crack together and that Ward bought drugs from Caffey.

Caffey also testified that he sold drugs to Ward. Thus, there

was already ample evidence from which the jury could draw

the inference that Caffey’s meetings with Ward concerned

drugs. Ward’s excluded hearsay statements would not have

added anything material to that evidence. Nor would the
30 No. 13‐3454

fact that Ward and Caffey’s meetings concerned drugs ex‐

clude the possibility that they also concerned the Evans

murders.

As for Williams’s excluded statement, Caffey presented

evidence at trial of Williams’s jealousy, and Caffey and other

witnesses testified that she had faked pregnancies before. So

the jury was already aware of the possibility that Williams

would use a sham pregnancy to trap Caffey. The jury simply

did not believe that story in light of all the evidence. Wil‐

liams’s hearsay statement would have added nothing mate‐

rial to the defense’s argument. There is no reasonable proba‐

bility that Williams’s excluded statement would have

changed the verdict.  

For these reasons, we find no Chambers violation in the

trial court’s exclusion of Ward’s and Williams’s hearsay

statements.

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Before trial Caffey’s counsel sought admission, under ex‐

ceptions to the hearsay rule, of several out‐of‐court state‐

ments that Iacullo made to friends. Ryan Berger would have

testified that a few hours before Debra Evans’s murder,

Iacullo asked him how to clean fingerprints off a gun; and

between midnight and 4 a.m. the next day, she asked him

how to clean powder burns off her hand.  

Patricia Mitchell stated that Iacullo said she found a gun

under the front seat of her car and was concerned her fin‐

gerprints might be on it.  

Dorothy Hale stated that Iacullo told her to get cleaner to

wipe fingerprints off a gun, bullets, and a magazine.
No. 13‐3454 31

David Drenk stated that in the early fall of 1995, Iacullo

asked to borrow a gun. A week before the murders, she

asked him whether he could obtain a false birth certificate;

he said no. On the day of the murders, November 16, 1995,

he saw Williams at Iacullo’s apartment. On November 17,

Iacullo asked Drenk for help getting a birth certificate; the

next day she told him how she would go about falsifying a

birth certificate herself. A few days later, Iacullo told Drenk

she was going to throw the gun into the Fox River.  

The trial court ruled that these statements were admissi‐

ble, but defense counsel did not present them to the jury.

Caffey argues that this was an error and that it deprived him

of his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel.

We assess ineffective‐assistance claims by asking (1) whether

counsel’s performance fell below an objectively reasonable

standard; and (2) whether there is a reasonable probability

that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, the result of the

proceeding would have been different. Strickland v. Washing‐

ton, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984). By “reasonable probability” we

mean “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in

the outcome.” Id.  

The Illinois Supreme Court rejected Caffey’s claim for

failure to meet the second prong. Caffey I, 792 N.E.2d at 1198.

The district court below agreed with that conclusion. Caffey

IV, 2013 WL 5529760, at *20. We afford AEDPA deference to

the state court’s ruling regarding Strickland prejudice, but not

regarding the first prong, which the state court did not ad‐

dress.

We do not know why trial counsel decided (assuming it

was a decision and not an oversight) not to present Iacullo’s

statements to the jury. Neither side has identified a strategic
32 No. 13‐3454

reason or given any other explanation. It seems a questiona‐

ble move, particularly after counsel went to the trouble of

obtaining the right to admit the statements into evidence.

Counsel might have used Iacullo’s statements, for instance,

to argue that she was present in the apartment during the

murders, which might have cast some doubt on the accuracy

of Joshua’s statement identifying the four “burglars,” be‐

cause Iacullo was not one of people he named. But even if

counsel’s conduct was objectively unreasonable (which we

do not decide), we find no error in the state court’s holding

that Caffey suffered no Strickland prejudice.

Iacullo’s statements tend to show her involvement in the

crimes, specifically in obtaining and disposing of the gun

and in fabricating birth certificates, though evidence to that

effect was already presented at trial. Iacullo’s statements

could also be interpreted to show that she participated in the

planning of the murders, or perhaps even that she fired the

gun. In short, the statements tend to inculpate Iacullo. But

they do not tend to exculpate Caffey, which is what matters

here. This is not a case like Chambers, where the evidence

pointed to only a single participant in the shooting, so that

hearsay statements tending to implicate another shooter

necessarily also tended to exculpate the defendant. 410 U.S.

at 297. The evidence here shows that several people partici‐

pated in the Evans murders, the planning, and the cover‐up.

The fact that Iacullo may have been one of them does not ex‐

clude Caffey as another participant—and there was ample

evidence that he was. In these circumstances, the state court

reasonably applied Strickland in finding no prejudice. There‐

fore, Caffey’s ineffective‐assistance claim fails.
No. 13‐3454 33

C. Caffey’s Brady Claims

Caffey next argues that the State wrongfully withheld ev‐

idence relating to Dwight Pruitt and Vikki Iacullo. The Su‐

preme Court held in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963),

that due process requires the prosecution to disclose evi‐

dence favorable to the defense. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419,

432–33 (1995). Both exculpatory and impeachment evidence

qualify as “favorable.” Id. at 433. Suppression of such evi‐

dence violates Brady, however, only where the evidence is

material, meaning “there is a reasonable probability that,

had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of

the proceeding would have been different.” Id. (quoting

United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985)). A “reasona‐

ble probability” exists where suppression of the evidence

“undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.” Id. at

434 (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678).  

1. Benefits Received by Pruitt

In his petition for post‐conviction relief in Illinois, Caffey

alleged that the State suppressed evidence of two benefits it

had given to Dwight Pruitt: favorable treatment in the Du‐

Page County Jail and non‐prosecution for his involvement in

drug sales to ASA Kendall, one of Caffey’s prosecutors.

Caffey claims he could have used this evidence at trial to

impeach Pruitt’s credibility, establish his bias in favor of the

prosecution, and show that he may have falsified or embel‐

lished his testimony in exchange for the benefits he received.

The state trial court allowed Caffey to develop his claim

by taking Pruitt’s deposition. Pruitt testified, in relevant part,

as follows. Years before Caffey’s trial, Pruitt twice drove a

man he knew as “Black” to a meeting point to sell cocaine to
34 No. 13‐3454

a buyer who Pruitt later learned was ASA Kendall. Pruitt

saw Black and Kendall meet but did not witness hand‐to‐

hand drug transactions. Pruitt later told one of the State’s at‐

torneys what he had seen, but the attorney told him “not to

worry about it” and to discuss the matter no more. Pruitt

was never prosecuted for his role in the drug transactions.  

Pruitt further testified that at the time of Caffey’s trial,

Pruitt was incarcerated on a gun charge in the DuPage

County Jail. While there, he believed he received better

treatment than the other prisoners. He was allowed to take

“off the deck” showers three or four times; he ate “restaurant

food” while in the courthouse being interviewed or prepar‐

ing for trial; he was permitted to smoke and make telephone

calls; and he was allowed a personal visit with Scott and his

daughter in the courthouse with an attorney for the State

present. When Pruitt was involved in an altercation with a

correctional officer, he received no formal discipline, though

he was placed in segregation. One of the State’s attorneys

told Pruitt that he was “getting the VIP treatment.”  

Pruitt insisted that his testimony at Caffey’s trial was

“strictly the truth.” He said no one in the prosecutor’s office

ever asked him to lie or promised him anything in exchange

for his testimony: “They never asked me to lie. They never

told me to make up nothing ... . I wasn’t paid or nothing.”  

After reviewing the evidence, the state trial court dis‐

missed Caffey’s petition on the merits. The Illinois Appellate

Court affirmed, concluding that the undisclosed evidence

was immaterial under Brady. Caffey II, slip. op. at 41–52. Giv‐

ing AEDPA deference to that conclusion, the district court

held that it represented a reasonable application of federal

law. Caffey IV, 2013 WL 5529760, at *33–34. We agree.  
No. 13‐3454 35

To be sure, Pruitt’s testimony was important to the prose‐

cution’s case. He and Scott were the only witnesses who tes‐

tified to Joshua Evans’s identification of Caffey as one of the

assailants who killed Debra and Samantha. But for several

reasons, we do not think it reasonably probable that the un‐

disclosed evidence about the benefits Pruitt received would

have affected the jury’s verdict.  

In the first place, Pruitt had only minimal personal

knowledge about the drug transactions involving Kendall—

he never saw drugs or money change hands. Similarly,

Pruitt’s benefits in jail were relatively minor. A few good

showers, decent food when in court, smoking privileges, tel‐

ephone calls, one family visit, and reduced discipline—we

do not think these are powerful enough incentives to have

convinced a jury that Pruitt falsified his testimony, at least

not without evidence of some kind of quid pro quo.  

There was no such evidence. On the contrary, Pruitt testi‐

fied that he had no deal or understanding with prosecutors

to testify in a particular way at Caffey’s trial. Pruitt said he

testified truthfully. To back up that claim, there was the tes‐

timony Pruitt gave during a pretrial hearing on the admissi‐

bility of Joshua Evans’s hearsay statements. That hearing

took place before Pruitt’s stint in DuPage County Jail and be‐

fore Pruitt realized that ASA Kendall was the man involved

in the drug transactions—that is, before he received or had

reason to expect any benefits from the State. Yet, Pruitt’s pre‐

trial testimony was consistent with his later testimony at

Caffey’s trial. Additionally, Pruitt’s testimony was corrobo‐

rated by Patrice Scott.

Considering all these circumstances together, we con‐

clude that the state court reasonably found the undisclosed
36 No. 13‐3454

evidence concerning Pruitt to be immaterial. Therefore,

Caffey’s Brady claim regarding Pruitt fails.

2. Iacullo’s Statements to Cara Walker

Finally, Caffey argues that the State violated Brady by not

disclosing statements that Vikki Iacullo made to Cara Walk‐

er, the mother of Iacullo’s daughter’s friend. On the weekend

of November 18, 1995, Iacullo asked Walker to watch her

daughters for a few days. Iacullo explained that she was in a

bit of trouble. Walker agreed. During the girls’ stay, Walker

stopped by Iacullo’s home to get them some clothes. While

there, Walker spoke with Iacullo. Walker later (but before

Caffey’s trial) reported to the police what Iacullo had said.

According to Walker, Iacullo claimed knowledge of and pos‐

sibly involvement in the Evans murders. Furthermore,

Iacullo said that if she were arrested or charged, she would

reveal that she had knowledge of illegal drug use by DuPage

County prosecutors, including Kendall.3  

Iacullo’s statements to Walker were never disclosed to

Caffey before or during his trial. He claims that he was enti‐

tled to them under Brady and that they were material to his

defense because they would have bolstered his case for the

admission of Iacullo’s statements to the police (discussed in

section II.A.2 above). The state court did not address this

claim on the merits but instead dismissed it on procedural

                                                 

3 At the hearing before the district court, Kendall testified that he never

bought drugs from Iacullo or Pruitt but asserted his privilege against

self‐incrimination regarding his prior drug use generally. See Caffey IV,

2013 WL 5529760, at *30.
No. 13‐3454 37

grounds.4 The district court therefore reviewed the issue de

novo, held an evidentiary hearing, heard from multiple wit‐

nesses, and made factual findings. The district court ulti‐

mately rejected Caffey’s claim because it regarded the state‐

ments at issue as immaterial. Caffey IV, 2013 WL 5529760, at

*31–32.

We agree with the district court’s conclusion and analy‐

sis. Iacullo’s statements to Walker would have added little to

the reliability analysis under Chambers and nothing to the

materiality analysis. So Iacullo’s statements to the police still

would have been inadmissible. But Caffey argues that the

statements somehow show foul play by the prosecution.

Caffey’s argument is sketchy, but he seems to suggest that

the prosecution procured Iacullo’s unavailability at trial, and

ensured her silence about Kendall’s drug use, in exchange

for an agreement not to charge her with murder.

As the district court found, there is no evidence of any

such agreement. Nor do the facts plausibly suggest the exist‐

ence of a tacit agreement or understanding. There is nothing

untoward about Iacullo’s invocation of her Fifth Amendment

privilege; she was, after all, charged with obstruction of jus‐

tice and may have been guilty of worse. And there is nothing

suspicious about the fact that Iacullo was not charged with

murder. One of the prosecutors testified before the district

                                                 

4 The State argues that the state law procedural grounds supply an inde‐

pendent and adequate basis for us to reject Caffey’s claim here without

even reaching the Brady issue. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722,

729–30 (1991). The district court disagreed. Caffey III, 2012 WL 5230298, at

*12–13. We need not decide this issue because we hold that Caffey’s

Brady claim fails on the merits in any event.
38 No. 13‐3454

court that the State considered bringing such charges but de‐

cided not to because it could not place Iacullo at the murder

scenes.  

We agree with the district court that Iacullo’s statements

to Walker were immaterial, so we reject Caffey’s Brady claim

regarding Iacullo.  

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the denial of

Caffey’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus.