alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
*Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_____________________

No. 98-50211

Summary Calendar

_____________________

FREDERICO FIERRO,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

KENNETH S. APFEL, Commissioner of

Social Security,

Defendant-Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. A-94-CV-822

_________________________________________________________________

November 3, 1998

Before JOLLY, SMITH, and WIENER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Frederico Fierro appeals the affirmance of the Commissioner’s

decision denying him social security disability and supplemental

income benefits.

Fierro argues that the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) failed

to consider nonexertional impairments, namely, hearing loss,

depression, and a history of somatization, as well as the

exertional limitation to Fierro’s right elbow. Because Fierro

failed to raise this argument before the Appeals Council, and thus
2

failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, we have no

jurisdiction to consider the matter. See Paul v. Shalala, 29 F.3d

208, 210 (5th Cir. 1994).

Fierro challenges the ALJ’s consideration of his complaints of

chronic pain. Our review of the record reveals that the ALJ

applied the correct legal standard by utilizing the correct

analysis and that the determination concerning Fierro’s subjective

complaints of pain is supported by substantial evidence. See Falco

v. Shalala, 27 F.3d 160, 163 (5th Cir. 1994); Wren v. Sullivan, 925

F.2d 123, 128 (5th Cir. 1991); Anderson v. Sullivan, 887 F.2d 630,

633-34 (5th Cir. 1989).

Fierro also argues that the report by Dr. Charles Parker

should have been considered as new evidence. We find no error by

the district court in refusing to remand the case to the

Commissioner. See Haywood v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 1463, 1471-72 (5th

Cir. 1989).

A F F I R M E D.
[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 63 (Monday, April 3, 1995)]
[Notices]
[Page 16882]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-8073]



=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

Fish and Wildlife Service
[PRT-800377]


Receipt of Application(s) for Permit

    The following applicant has applied for a permit to conduct certain 
activities with endangered species. This notice is provided pursuant to 
Section 10(c) of the Endangered Species Act of 1973, as amended (16 
U.S.C. 1531, et seq.).
    Applicant: Loreen Allphin, Biology Department, University of Utah, 
Salt Lake City, Utah.
    The applicant requests a permit to include collect fruits of the 
Sentry milk-vetch (Astragalus cremnophalax var. cremnophalax) and 
Mancos milk-vetch (Astragalus humillimus) for the purpose of scientific 
research and enhancement of propagation and survival of the species as 
prescribed by Service recovery documents.

ADDRESSES: Written data or comments should be submitted to the 
Assistant Regional Director, Ecological Services, U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service, P.O. Box 1306, Albuquerque, New Mexico 87103, and 
must be received by the Assistant Regional Director within 30 days from 
the date of this publication.
    Documents and other information submitted with this application are 
available for review, subject to the requirements of the Privacy Act 
and Freedom of Information Act, by any party who submits a written 
request for a copy of such documents to the above office within 30 days 
of the date of publication of this notice. (See ADDRESSES above.)
James A. Young,
Acting Regional Director, Region 2, Albuquerque, New Mexico.
[FR Doc. 95-8073 Filed 3-31-95; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4310-55-M
# Fourth Court of Appeals **San Antonio, Texas**

March 30, 2021

No. 04

- 21

- 00028

- CV

IN THE INTEREST OF N.M.B., A CHILD

From the 438th Judicial District Court

, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 2016

- EM5

- 06049 Honorable Antonia Arteaga , Judge Presiding



### ORDER

In the underlying cause, appellant filed a petition in intervention in a suit affecting the parent

- child relationship. On January 20, 2021, the trial court signed an order dismissing her suit for lack of standing. On January 27, 2021, appellant filed a notice of appeal, stating her intent to appeal from the tr ial court’s January 20, 2021 order. The clerk’s record does not reflect that a final order has been signed disposing of all the pending parties and claims in the underlying suit affecting parent

- child relationship. Thus, appellant appears to be appealing f rom an interlocutory order.

Unless an interlocutory appeal is expressly authorized by statute, we have jurisdiction only over an appeal taken from a final judgment. Lehmann v. Har

– Con Corp. , 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001). Section 109.002 of the Texas Fam ily Code governs appeals in cases under Title Five of the Texas Family Code, which are suits affecting the parent

- child relationship. See T EX

. F AM

. C ODE § 109.002. Subsection (a) provides that “[a]n appeal from a final order rendered in a suit, when allowe d under this section or under other provisions of law, shall be as in civil cases generally.” Id . § 109.002(a). Subsection (b) provides that “[a]n appeal may be taken by any party to a suit from a final order rendered under this title.” Id . § 109.002(b). T hus, a final order is necessary for an appellate court to have jurisdiction over these types of appeals in the absence of some other authority allowing interlocutory appeals. We cannot, however, find any statutory authority that allows a party to appeal fr om an interlocutory order that dismisses a party’s suit for lack of standing.

Therefore, we ORDER appellant to show cause in writing by Apr il 15, 2021 why this appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. We suspend all appellate deadlines
p ending our determination of whether we have jurisdiction over this appeal.________________ _________________ Liz a A. Rodriguez , Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said court on this 30th day of March, 2021

.

_____________ ______________________ MICHAEL A. CRUZ
, Clerk of Court
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

March 30, 2021

No. 04-21-00028-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF N.M.B., A CHILD

From the 438th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2016-EM5-06049

Honorable Antonia Arteaga, Judge Presiding

ORDER

In the underlying cause, appellant filed a petition in intervention in a suit affecting the 

parent-child relationship. On January 20, 2021, the trial court signed an order dismissing her suit 

for lack of standing. On January 27, 2021, appellant filed a notice of appeal, stating her intent to 

appeal from the trial court’s January 20, 2021 order. The clerk’s record does not reflect that a 

final order has been signed disposing of all the pending parties and claims in the underlying suit 

affecting parent-child relationship. Thus, appellant appears to be appealing from an interlocutory 

order.

Unless an interlocutory appeal is expressly authorized by statute, we have jurisdiction 

only over an appeal taken from a final judgment. Lehmann v. Har–Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 

195 (Tex. 2001). Section 109.002 of the Texas Family Code governs appeals in cases under Title 

Five of the Texas Family Code, which are suits affecting the parent-child relationship. See TEX.

FAM. CODE § 109.002. Subsection (a) provides that “[a]n appeal from a final order rendered in a 

suit, when allowed under this section or under other provisions of law, shall be as in civil cases 

generally.” Id. § 109.002(a). Subsection (b) provides that “[a]n appeal may be taken by any party 

to a suit from a final order rendered under this title.” Id. § 109.002(b). Thus, a final order is 

necessary for an appellate court to have jurisdiction over these types of appeals in the absence of 

some other authority allowing interlocutory appeals. We cannot, however, find any statutory 

authority that allows a party to appeal from an interlocutory order that dismisses a party’s suit for 

lack of standing.

Therefore, we ORDER appellant to show cause in writing by April 15, 2021 why this 

appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. We suspend all appellate deadlines 

pending our determination of whether we have jurisdiction over this appeal.
_________________________________

Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 30th day of March, 2021.

___________________________________

MICHAEL A. CRUZ, Clerk of Court
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

March 15, 2019

RE: Product Exclusion Request Number: USTR-2018-0025-7830

Alps Electric (North America), Inc:

The purpose of this letter is to inform you that the product exclusion request referenced 

above has been denied. As you are aware, USTR published a Federal Register notice (83 FR 

28710) on June 20, 2018, that announced the Trade Representative’s determination to impose an 

additional duty of 25 percent on certain products from China. On July 11, 2018, the Trade 

Representative published a Federal Register notice (83 FR 32181) which announced that a 

process had been established under which interested persons could request that products falling 

within a covered HTSUS subheading be excluded from the additional duties announced on June 

20.

Your request was reviewed in accordance with the factors and procedures set forth in 

Section B(1) of the July 11 notice. Based on that review, and after careful consideration, your 

request was denied because the request concerns a product strategically important or related to 

‘‘Made in China 2025’’ or other Chinese industrial programs.

Because USTR will grant exclusion requests on a product specific basis, you may still 

benefit from a product exclusion if a similar product is granted an exclusion. Products for which 

an exclusion has been granted will be periodically announced on the USTR website. Product 

exclusions will become legally effective once published in the Federal Register. 

Sincerely,

Stephen P. Vaughn

General Counsel
Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia Clerk's Office, Atlanta, February 10, 2017. I certify that the above is a true extract from the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia. Witness my signature and the seal of said court hereto affixed the day and year last above written. , Clerk. 

# Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia
ATLANTA, February 10, 2017 The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order A17A0621. NEUROPATH, LLC v. CLINICAL NEURODIAGNOSTICS, LLC.
Upon consideration of the APPELLANT'S motion FOR PERMISSION TO WITHDRAW THE APPEAL in the above styled case, it is ordered that the motion is hereby GRANTED.
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

May 7, 2019

RE: Product Exclusion Request Number USTR-2018-0025-7458

Carestream Health, Inc:

The purpose of this letter is to inform you that the product exclusion request referenced 

above has been denied. As you are aware, USTR published a Federal Register notice (83 FR 

28710) on June 20, 2018, that announced the Trade Representative’s determination to impose an 

additional duty of 25 percent on certain products from China. On July 11, 2018, the Trade 

Representative published a Federal Register notice (83 FR 32181) which announced that a 

process had been established under which interested persons could request that products falling 

within a covered HTSUS subheading be excluded from the additional duties announced on June 

20.

Your request was reviewed in accordance with the factors and procedures set forth in 

Section B(1) of the July 11 notice. Based on that review, and after careful consideration, your 

request was denied because the request concerns a product strategically important or related to 

“Made in China 2025” or other Chinese industrial programs.

Because USTR will grant exclusion requests on a product specific basis, you may still 

benefit from a product exclusion if a similar product is granted an exclusion. Products for which 

an exclusion has been granted will be periodically announced on the USTR website. Product 

exclusions will become legally effective once published in the Federal Register. 

Sincerely,

Joseph Barloon

General Counsel
Supreme Court of Florida

____________

No. SC17-726

____________

DANIEL BURNS, JR., 

Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF FLORIDA, 

Appellee.

[January 23, 2018]

PER CURIAM.

We have for review Daniel Burns, Jr.’s appeal of the circuit court’s order 

denying Burns’ motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. 

This Court has jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. 

Burns’ motion sought relief pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s 

decision in Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016), and our decision on remand in 

Hurst v. State (Hurst), 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2161 

(2017). This Court stayed Burns’ appeal pending the disposition of Hitchcock v. 

State, 226 So. 3d 216 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 513 (2017). After this 
- 2 -

Court decided Hitchcock, Burns responded to this Court’s order to show cause 

arguing why Hitchcock should not be dispositive in this case.

After reviewing Burns’ response to the order to show cause, as well as the 

State’s arguments in reply, we conclude that Burns is not entitled to relief. Burns 

was sentenced to death following a jury’s unanimous recommendation for death. 

Burns v. State, 699 So. 2d 646, 652 (Fla. 1997). Burns’ sentence of death became 

final in 1998. Burns v. Florida, 522 U.S. 1121 (1998). Thus, Hurst does not apply 

retroactively to Burns’ sentence of death. See Hitchcock, 226 So. 3d at 217. 

Accordingly, we affirm the denial of Burns’ motion.

The Court having carefully considered all arguments raised by Burns, we 

caution that any rehearing motion containing reargument will be stricken. It is so 

ordered.

LABARGA, C.J., and POLSTON, and LAWSON, JJ., concur.

PARIENTE, J., concurs in result with an opinion.

LEWIS and CANADY, JJ., concur in result.

QUINCE, J., recused.

PARIENTE, J., concurring in result.

I concur in result because I recognize that this Court’s opinion in Hitchcock 

v. State, 226 So. 3d 216 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 513 (2017), is now 

final. However, I continue to adhere to the views expressed in my dissenting 

opinion in Hitchcock.
- 3 -

An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Manatee County, 

Diana Lee Moreland, Judge - Case No. 411987CF002014CFAXMA

James Vigianno, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Mark S. Gruber, and Julie 

A. Morley, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Temple Terrace, 

Florida,

for Appellant

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Lisa Martin, Assistant Attorney General, 

Tampa, Florida,

for Appellee
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                                18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with this Quarterly Report of Edmonds 1, Inc. (the "Company") on
Form 10-QSB for the period ending January 31, 2006, as filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Edward Roffman,
Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certifies to the best of his knowledge,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Sec. 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1)  Such Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB for the period ending January 31,
     2006, fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
     Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)  The information contained in the Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB for the
     period ending January 31, 2006 fairly presents, in all material respects,
     the financial condition and result of operations of Edmonds 1, Inc.

/s/ Edward Roffman
--------------------------
Edward Roffman
Chief Financial Officer

March 17, 2006
#### Hobert Stanley KIGHT, Jr., Appellant, v. Joan Irene KIGHT, Respondent.

No. 62563.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Southern Division.

Nov. 23, 1993.

David G. Beeson, Jackson, for appellant.

James Michael McClellan, Sikeston, for respondent.

Before CARL R. GAERTNER, P.J., and GRIMM and CRAHAN, JJ.

*ORDER*

PER CURIAM.

Husband, Hobert Stanley Eight, appeals the judgment of the Circuit Court of Cape Girardeau County, Missouri, finding him to be bound by the divorce decree to a permanent and non-modifiable obligation to pay all of Wife’s uninsured medical and pharmacy bills. We affirm.

The judgment of the trial court is supported by substantial evidence and is not against the weight of the evidence. No error of law appeal’s. An opinion would have no precedential value. We affirm by written order pursuant to Rule 84.16(b). The parties have been furnished with a memorandum for their information only, setting forth the reasons for our holding.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS AT October 31, 1999 AND THE
CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF INCOME FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED
October 31, 1999 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO
SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          OCT-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             NOV-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               OCT-31-1999
<CASH>                                          76,349
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   58,720
<ALLOWANCES>                                       874
<INVENTORY>                                     83,247
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               223,678
<PP&E>                                         365,583
<DEPRECIATION>                                 157,106
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 479,944
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          108,216
<BONDS>                                        301,380
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                     (81,731)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   479,944
<SALES>                                        531,669
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               531,669
<CGS>                                          468,170
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  468,170
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                38,031
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                   (84)
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              32,030
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  1,584
<INCOME-TAX>                                    (4,279)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              5,863
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     5,863
<EPS-BASIC>                                      .00
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .00



</TABLE>
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

February 7, 2019

RE: Product Exclusion Request Number: USTR-2018-0025-7276

TI Group Automotive Systems, LLC:

The purpose of this letter is to inform you that the product exclusion request referenced 

above has been denied. As you are aware, USTR published a Federal Register notice (83 FR 

28710) on June 20, 2018, that announced the Trade Representative’s determination to impose an 

additional duty of 25 percent on certain products from China. On July 11, 2018, the Trade 

Representative published a Federal Register notice (83 FR 32181) which announced that a 

process had been established under which interested persons could request that products falling 

within a covered HTSUS subheading be excluded from the additional duties announced on June 

20.

Your request was reviewed in accordance with the factors and procedures set forth in 

Section B(1) of the July 11 notice. Based on that review, and after careful consideration, your 

request was denied because the request failed to show that the imposition of additional duties on 

the particular product would cause severe economic harm to you or other U.S. interests. 

Because USTR will grant exclusion requests on a product specific basis, you may still 

benefit from a product exclusion if a similar product is granted an exclusion. Products for which 

an exclusion has been granted will be periodically announced on the USTR website. Product 

exclusions will become legally effective once published in the Federal Register. 

Sincerely,

Stephen P. Vaughn

General Counsel
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

April 12, 2019

RE: Product Exclusion Request Number: USTR-2018-0025-7173

ECM Industries LLC: 

I am pleased to notify you that the United States Trade Representative has determined to 

grant the above-referenced exclusion request submitted pursuant to the notice published at 83 FR 

32181 (‘July 11 notice’). The exclusion determination is set out in a formal notice which has 

been submitted to Office of the Federal Register for publication (‘the exclusion notice’). A prepublication version of the exclusion notice has been posted on the USTR website, at

https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/enforcement/301Investigations/Notice_of_Product_Exclusions

_04.15.19.pdf.

The scope of the exclusion is governed by the formal HTSUS language in the annex to 

the product exclusion notice, and not by the product descriptions set out in any particular request 

for exclusion. An exclusion in response to your request has been granted by excluding from the 

additional tariffs products covered by a specially drafted description contained in the annex to 

the product exclusion notice. 

In accordance with the July 11 notice, the exclusion applies as of the July 6, 2018 

effective date of the tariff action, and will extend for one year after the exclusion notice is 

published in the Federal Register. As stated in the exclusion notice, U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection will issue additional instructions on entry guidance and implementation.

Sincerely,

Stephen P. Vaughn

General Counsel
<PAGE>   1
                             INCO HOMES CORPORATION
                 EXHIBIT 23.1 -- CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS



We consent to the use of our report dated March 19, 1996, except to Note 12,
second paragraph, as to which the date is March 20, 1996, included in the Annual
Report on Form 10-K of Inco Homes Corporation for the year ended December 31,
1996, with respect to the consolidated financial statements as of December 31,
1995 and for the years ended December 31, 1995 and 1994 included in this Form
10-K.






                                    ERNST & YOUNG LLP

Los Angeles, California
April 14, 1997