* After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral argument is

unnecessary.  Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record.  See FED. R. APP. P.

34(a)(2).

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted April 16, 2008*

  Decided May 13, 2008

Before

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge

         DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge

         ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge

No. 07‐3182

TYRONE V. WORLDS,

           Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

NANCY SPIEGLA, et al.,

Defendants‐Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of

Indiana, South Bend Division.

No. 3:06cv174 RM

Robert L. Miller Jr.,

Chief Judge.

O R D E R

Tyrone Worlds, a former inmate of the Indiana State Department of Corrections,

brought this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that prison officials violated his right to

due process when, because of an error, the prison extended his incarceration by four and a

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 07‐3182 Page 2

half months.  The district court granted the defendants’ motions for summary judgment

because Worlds did not show that the defendants acted with the requisite intent.  We affirm.

In 2001, guards at Indiana’s Westville Correctional Center discovered a pair of

officer’s gloves in Worlds’ cell and charged him with violating prison rules.  He pleaded

guilty to “unauthorized relocation,” a Class C violation,  before a three‐person Conduct

Adjustment Board (CAB).  David Leonard was chairman of the CAB and Nancy Spiegla

was a member of the panel.  Leonard, when filling out his report, incorrectly wrote the

numerical code for “unauthorized possession,” a more serious Class B violation, although in

the box labeled “offense” Leonard wrote “unauthorized relocation.”  Spiegla, who signed

the report as a member of the CAB,  failed to notice the discrepancy between the offense

code and the listed offense.  The wrong offense code was entered into a computer database

and the error ultimately resulted in Worlds losing credit for good behavior.  Worlds

complained to prison authorities, but his complaints fell on deaf ears.  Finally, in December

2004, a federal district court issued a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and

overturned the CAB’s finding for unauthorized possession, the Class B violation.  Worlds v.

Buss, No. 3:02CV498‐AS, (N.D. Ind. Dec. 3, 2004).  Worlds’s victory, however, was hollow,

because he had already been freed from prison on parole and, according to him, spent four

more months in prison than he otherwise would have.  It is unclear whether the parole

board shortened his period of parole as a result of the decision. See White v. Ind. Parole Bd.,

266 F.3d 759, 763 (7th Cir. 2001).

Worlds sued Spiegla, Leonard, and J. David Donahue, the Commissioner of the

Indiana Department of Corrections, under § 1983, alleging that they violated his right to due

process.  Worlds did not make any specific allegations regarding Donahue, but he alleged

that Spiegla and Leonard were responsible for his prolonged incarceration. The district

court granted the defendants’ motions for summary judgment, and Worlds now appeals.

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.  Levy v. Minn. Life Ins. Co.,

517 F.3d 519, 520 (7th Cir. 2008).

To obtain relief under § 1983, Worlds must show that the defendants deprived him

of his constitutional rights. Kramer, 384 F.3d at 861;  Bublitz v. Cottey, 327 F.3d 485, 488 (7th

Cir. 2003).  Worlds suggests that his victory on his petition for writ of habeas corpus entitles

him to relief on his claim against the defendants in this case.  It is true that the unlawful

deprivation of Worlds’s good‐time credits violated his constitutional rights:  The district

court issued a writ of habeas corpus to Worlds, and § 2254 allows relief only when a

prisoner “is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United

States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).  But that does not translate into personal liability of the current

defendants, who were not parties to the collateral proceedings under § 2254; they have have

not had the opportunity to litigate the claims presented here.  See Garza v. Henderson, 779
No. 07‐3182 Page 3

F.2d. 390, 393‐394 (7th Cir. 1985) (although district court had previously issued petitioner a

writ of habeas corpus because inmate’s constitutional rights had been violated when he did

not receive notice of a disciplinary hearing, defendants sued in their private capacity could

not be estopped from challenging the lack of notice.) See also H‐D Mich., Inc. v. Top Quality

Serv., Inc, 496 F.3d 755, 760 (7th Cir. 2007) (requiring identity of parties for a decision to

have collateral estoppel effect).  Therefore, Worlds cannot rely on the habeas corpus

judgment to show that the current defendants are liable under section 1983.

To sustain a claim under § 1983, Worlds must show that an official recklessly

deprived, made a deliberate decision to deprive, or acted with gross negligence in depriving

him of life, liberty, or property.  Brokaw v. Mercer County, 235 F.3d 1000, 1012 (7th Cir. 2000);

Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1277 (3d Cir. 1994).  Negligent

conduct on the part of a state official is insufficient to make out a constitutional violation.

Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331, 333‐34 (1986); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 347‐48

(1986);  Russ v. Watts, 414 F.3d 783, 788‐89 (7th Cir. 2005).

Here, Leonard provided an affidavit with his motion for summary judgment stating

that the mis‐coding of Worlds’s offense was a simple mistake.  Spiegla averred that she

relied on Leonard to fill out the form correctly, signed it without reading it, and did not

notice the discrepancy between the offense code and the stated offense.  Worlds did not

even allege that Leonard and Spiegla possessed the required intent to deprive him of his

liberty, let alone submit evidence to show they acted recklessly or deliberately.  As to

Donahue, Worlds does not allege that he contributed to or knew about the mistake, and a

supervisor is not vicariously liable for a subordinate’s conduct that violates a plaintiff’s

constitutional rights absent the supervisor’s knowledge and approval of the conduct.

Chavez v. Ill. State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 651 (7th Cir. 2001).  Accordingly, the district court

properly granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants.

AFFIRMED.