1 The Honorable Jimm Larry Hendren, Unite d States District Judge for the Western District of Arkansas. 

## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 08-3242

___________

* United States of America, *
* Plaintiff – Appellee, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * Western District of Arkansas. Phasung Lu Baccam, *
*
* Defendant – Appellant. *

___________ Submitted: April 14, 2009 Filed: April 28, 2009

___________ Before MURPHY, HANSEN, and BYE, Circuit Judges.

___________ MURPHY, Circuit Judge.
Phasung Lu Baccam was c onvicted under 18 U.S.C. § 2250 for failing to register as a sex offender after he moved to Arkansas from Calif ornia where he had been convicted of a sex offense unde r state law. The district court 1 denied his motion to dismiss the indictment on the ground that he had not received no tice of the federal sex offender registration law. Baccam appeals, and we affirm.2 During the Senate consideration of th e Act, Senator Orri n Hatch pointed out that "[l]aws regarding registration for sex offenders have not been consistent from State to State," and that there may have been as many as "150,000 sex offenders who are not complying." 152 Cong. Rec. S8012-02, *S8013 (2006) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
-2- In 1996 Baccam was convicted in California of sexual contact with a minor female. Under California law this convicti on required him to maintain registration as a sex offender throughout his lifetime. Cal. Penal Code § 290(b) (Deering 2009). Two "Notice of Sex Offender Registrati on Requirement" forms that Baccam signed on February 8, 1999 and N ovember 10, 2003 not only de tailed his registration requirements within California, but also notif ied him that if he moved to another state he would need to register in that state w ithin ten days and notify the law enforcement agency with which he was last registered of his change of residence. After Baccam was arrested in California fo r failure to update his registration he signed another form on September 19, 2005. That form requi red him to initial his acknowledgment that he was required to register as a sex offender in any stat e to which he might relocate.

In the summer of 2007 Baccam moved to Arkansas but did not register as a sex offender. When he was arrested in Sept ember 2007 for traffic violations, officials discovered that he had not registered as a sex offender in their state as required by California, Arkansas, and fe deral law. He was later i ndicted under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 18 U.S.C. § 2250, for his failure to register.

SORNA is part of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 590 (2006). When enacting the law, Congress declared that "in order to protect the public from se x offenders and offende rs against children, and in response to the vicious attacks by violent predators," it was establishing a "comprehensive national system for registration of those offenders." 42 U.S.C. § 16901 (2008). 2To improve coordination and information sharing between-3- jurisdictions, SORNA encourages each stat e to maintain a sex offender registry conforming to national standards and ties the receipt of certain federal funds to compliance with those standards. Id. §§ 16912, 16925(a).

SORNA requires a sex offender to register in each juri sdiction where he or she resides, works, or is a student. Id. § 16913(a). Within three business days of any change of name, residence, employment, or student status, the offender must appear in person in either the old or new state to update his or her registration. Id. § 16913(c). That state must then transmit th e information to other places where the offender is required to register. Id. SORNA also created a federal criminal offense for a sex offender who travel s in interstate commerce and knowingly fails to register or update a registration as required by federal law. 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a). The statute applies to sex offenders convi cted under federal law even when they do not travel in interstate commerce. Violation of § 2250( a) carries a prison se ntence of up to ten years.
Baccam moved to dismiss the indictment charging him under § 2250(a). After the district court denied the motion, Baccamentered a conditional guilty plea and was sentenced to twenty four months. We review de novo the denial of a motion to dismiss an indictment. See United States v. Cvijanovich , 556 F.3d 857, 862 (8th Cir. 2009).

Baccam contends that he could not, as a matter of law, knowingly fail to register under SORNA because he was ne ver told of his specific registration obligations under that law. A provision in SORNA entitled "Duty to notify sex offenders of registration requi rements and to register" st ates that "[a]n appropriate official shall . . . inform the sex offender of the duties of a se x offender under this title and explain those duties." 42 U.S.C. § 16917( a). Baccam contends that because there is no evidence that he was ever inform ed about his duties under SORNA, which had been enacted in 2006 after he had signed the California forms informing him of his-4- duty to register if he m oved to a different state, the government cannot prove an element of the offense and the indictment should have been dismissed.

The government argues that the scient er requirement in § 2250(a) does not require that Baccam specifically knew he was violating SORNA, but only that he knew he was violating a lega l registration requirement upon relocating. It urges that Baccam knew he was required to register in a new state because of the information provided him on the California forms he had signed in 1999, 2003, and 2005.

We have previously had occasion to ru le on challenges to the application of SORNA. In United States v. May , 535 F.3d 912 (8th Cir. 2008), we addressed a number of challenges to SORNA and specifically to § 2250(a). We held that § 2250(a) was authorized by the Commerce Clause, that SORNA applies to sex offenders convicted prior to the statute's passage, and that suchapplication does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. Id. at 918–22. We also rejected May's argument that his prosecution under SORNA violated due process because he had not received notice of the statute's registration requirements. Id. at 921. Then, in United States v. Howell , 552 F.3d 709, 717 (8th Cir. 2009), we c oncluded that the § 16913 registration requirement itself was also a constitutiona l exercise of Congress's commerce power.

The defendant in May raised a due process argum ent similar to Baccam's claim that he had no notice of SORNA's require ments, and we observed there that May "admitted he knew, based on previously enact ed state laws, he had an obligation to register and keep his registration current when moving between jurisdictions." 535 F.3d at 921. Thus, there was no constitutional infirmity in his conviction. Other courts of appeals have also rejected lack of notice due process challenges to SORNA when the defendant had received notice of state law registration requirements. See, e.g. , United States v. Dixon , 551 F.3d 578, 584 (7th Cir. 2008); United States v. Hinckley , 550 F.3d 926, 938–39 (10th Cir. 2008); United States v. Samuels , No. 08- 5537, 2009 WL 877698, at *3 (6th Cir. Apr. 2, 2009).-5- Baccam states that his appeal is not controlled by May because that case addressed only the notice re quired by due process. Hecontends that Congress provided for greater notice than the Constitu tion requires. In essence he argues that because SORNA requires officials to info rm sex offenders about the statute's requirements, "the general rule that ignorance of the law . . . is no defense to criminal prosecution" does not apply. SeeCheek v. United States , 498 U.S. 192, 199 (1991). He cites no authority for the argument that a lack of § 16917 notice is a defense to prosecution under § 2250(a). Numerous districtcourts have rejected this defense. E.g. , United States v. Trent , 568 F. Supp. 2d 857, 866–67 (S.D. Ohio 2008); United States v. LeTourneau , 534 F. Supp. 2d 718, 722–23 (S .D. Tex. 2008); United States v. Gould , 526 F. Supp. 2d 538, 544–45 (D. Md. 2007); United States v. Adkins , 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90737, *14–15 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 7, 2007); United States v. Lovejoy , 516 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1037–38 (D.N.D. 2007).

We conclude that it would be inconsis tent with SORNA's purpose of protecting the public by strengthening the system of se x offender registration not to give effect to state law notifications that relocation requires registration in the new jurisdiction. There is no reason to believe that the SORNA notice provision in § 16917 was intended to dilute the effect of state notice requirements, given the stated congressional intent to protect the public by establishing a comprehensive national system for registration of sex offenders. 42 U.S.C. § 16901.

We conclude that Baccam had adequate notice of his registration obligations based on the information provided him in th e California registration forms, even if that notice did not explain that failure to re gister would be a viol ation of federal law as well as state law. Baccam does not deny that he knew that he needed to register in3 SORNA requires a sex offender to register within three days of moving to a new state, while Baccam was info rmed in California that he needed to register within ten days. This difference is immaterial gi ven the fact that Baccam did not register for several months after moving to Arkansas.
-6- Arkansas. Had he done so, he would have received notification of SORNA's requirements, and would have been in compliance with federal law. 3

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

_____________________________