*

 After an examination of the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral

argument is unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record.

See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted February 10, 2006*

Decided April 13, 2006

Before

Hon. JOHN L. COFFEY, Circuit Judge

 Hon. MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

 Hon. ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

No. 05-1358

JOHN B. ALLEN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

THOMAS A. GIBBONS, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of

Indiana, Fort Wayne Division

No. 2:02-CV-320

William C. Lee,

Judge.

O R D E R

John B. Allen is before us a third time arguing that his constitutional rights

were violated during his criminal prosecution on drug and money-laundering

charges. Allen pleaded guilty to two of five counts pursuant to a written agreement,

and in November 1998 he was sentenced to a total of 156 months in prison. Later

he moved under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate or correct his sentence; he claimed that

the government had breached a promise to seek a reduced sentence under U.S.S.G.

§ 5K1.1 for substantial assistance, and that after the plea colloquy his lawyers and

UNPUBLISHED ORDER

Not to be cited per Circuit Rule 53
No. 05-1358 Page 2

the government had filed an unauthorized “joint amendment” to the plea agreement

that increased the agreed maximum prison sentence and gave the government

leeway to limit any downward departure to the 10-year statutory minimum that

otherwise would apply to the drug count. The government conceded that Allen

should have been questioned about the amendment in open court before it was

accepted. Allen, though, did not want his guilty pleas set aside, so the district court

resentenced him under the terms of the original plea agreement. This time the

government moved for a downward departure, and in August 2000 the court

imposed a total term of 119 months. Allen appealed, but we allowed counsel to

withdraw and dismissed the case. United States v. Allen, 39 F. App’x 354 (7th Cir.

2002) (unpublished). In particular we rejected Allen’s pro se argument that the

amendment to his plea agreement “tainted” the original agreement and rendered

his pleas “legally void”; like counsel, we concluded that Allen’s reaffirmation of the

original agreement during the § 2255 proceedings would render frivolous any

attempt to challenge that agreement or his guilty pleas. See id. at 356-57. Allen

then filed another § 2255 motion, but the district court concluded—as did we—that

relief was unavailable because he was attempting to challenge aspects of his plea

agreement and sentence that should have been raised in his first § 2255 motion.

See Allen v. United States, No. 05-1845 (7th Cir. Jun. 13, 2005) (unpublished order).

In his current lawsuit, rather than attacking his convictions and sentences

directly, Allen seeks damages under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of

Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Allen alleges that the three

defense attorneys who represented him in his criminal case conspired with the

prosecutor, a DEA agent, and the regional counsel of the Bureau of Prisons to deny

him his rights to counsel, due process, equal protection, and access to the courts. 

The district court, in two comprehensive orders, granted the defendants’ motions to

dismiss the suit on a number of grounds, varying by defendant. We will not address

them all, because we find a sufficient basis for dismissal of the entire suit under the

Supreme Court’s decision in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).

Heck holds that a plaintiff may not seek damages for violations of his civil

rights arising from a criminal prosecution if a judgment in his favor “‘would

necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence.’” Vangilder v. Baker,

2006 WL 73401, at *1-2 (7th Cir. Jan. 13, 2006) (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 487);

see also Wiley v. City of Chicago, 361 F.3d 994, 996 (7th Cir. 2004); Johnson v.

Litscher, 260 F.3d 826, 830 (7th Cir. 2001). Allen argues that his conspiracy and

related claims are not barred by Heck because he can show that a federal court

issued a § 2255 decision in his favor. But his focus on this limited relief misses the

point of Heck. A suit that if successful would undermine a conviction or sentence

“must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or

sentence has already been invalidated.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 (emphasis added). 

And although Allen did achieve resentencing after filing his § 2255 motion, he also
No. 05-1358 Page 3

ended up with the same convictions and with lengthy terms of imprisonment and

supervised release. That is why Heck remains an obstacle.

What Allen seeks to undermine is the still-valid August 2000 judgment. He

contends that all three of his defense attorneys (the two who signed off on the

amendment and a third who represented him at sentencing) conspired against him

with the prosecutor, and if “counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution’s case to

meaningful adversarial testing, then there has been a denial of Sixth Amendment

rights that makes the adversary process itself presumptively unreliable.” United

States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984); see also Van Patten v. Deppisch, 2006 WL

162992, at *2 (7th Cir. Jan. 24, 2006) (applying Cronic). Taking Allen’s allegations

as true, we cannot imagine how they could not undermine the validity of his

convictions and sentences. And, indeed, as we have noted, that was the very

argument Allen made to us when he unsuccessfully appealed the August 2000

judgment. The goal of Heck, of course, is to prevent “‘the creation of two conflicting

resolutions arising out of the same or identical transaction.’” Vangilder, 2006 WL

73401, at *1 (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 484). Like the district court, we conclude

that Allen’s aim is to do just that. Accordingly, his complaint is barred under Heck.

AFFIRMED.