Filed 11/15/23 P. v. Joshua CA2/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

LAQUIST JOSHUA,

Defendant and Appellant.

B323960

Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. TA147191-02

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Lynn D. Olson, Judge. Affirmed.

Eric R. Larson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, 

for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant 

Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Nikhil Cooper, Deputy Attorneys 

General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_________________________
2

In March 2019, defendant and appellant Laquist Joshua 

entered into a plea agreement with the People. Joshua pleaded 

no contest to one count of attempted murder and admitted he had

personally inflicted great bodily injury on the victim within the 

meaning of Penal Code section 12022.7.

1 Joshua also admitted

an allegation under section 12022.53, subdivision (b) that

a principal had personally used a firearm in the commission 

of the offense. In February 2022 Joshua filed a petition for 

resentencing under section 1172.6.2 The trial court denied 

Joshua’s petition. We affirm because, by admitting he personally 

inflicted great bodily injury on the victim, Joshua admitted 

he was the perpetrator of the attempted murder and not merely 

an accomplice. Accordingly, he is ineligible for resentencing 

as a matter of law.

BACKGROUND

1. The charges, plea agreement, and sentence

In 2018 the People charged Joshua with several offenses. 

In a second amended felony complaint filed February 11, 2019, 

the People charged Joshua with the willful, deliberate, 

premeditated attempted murder of two victims, Belizhane 

Miranda (count 5) and Demore Newsome (count 6), with shooting

at an occupied motor vehicle (count 7), and with being a felon 

in possession of a firearm (count 8), on February 3, 2017. As to 

counts 5 through 7, the People alleged Joshua personally used 

and personally and intentionally discharged a firearm, and a 

principal did the same. As to counts 5 and 7, the People alleged 

1 References to statutes are to the Penal Code.

2 Effective June 30, 2022, former section 1170.95 was 

renumbered section 1172.6, with no change in text. (Stats. 2022, 

ch. 58, § 10.)
3

Joshua personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing 

great bodily injury to Miranda, and a principal did so as well.

As to counts 5 and 7, the People further alleged Joshua

personally inflicted great bodily injury on Miranda. The People 

alleged the crimes were committed for the benefit of, at the 

direction of, and in association with a criminal street gang. 

Finally, the People alleged Joshua had a strike prior.

3

On March 29, 2019, Joshua entered into a plea agreement

with the prosecution. Facing a possible maximum of 29 years 

plus 55 years to life, Joshua agreed to plead to count 5 (victim 

Miranda) and to admit allegations that he personally inflicted 

great bodily injury on the victim and that a principal personally 

used a firearm in the commission of the offense, in exchange 

for a determinate sentence of 22 years. The prosecution agreed 

to strike the allegation that the attempted murder was willful, 

deliberate, and premeditated and to move to dismiss the 

remaining counts and allegations.

In response to the prosecutor’s questions, Joshua confirmed 

he understood his rights and the consequences of his plea, and 

he was pleading freely and voluntarily. Joshua then pleaded 

no contest to attempted murder. He also admitted the allegation

that, in the commission of the offense, a principal used a firearm. 

Joshua’s counsel stipulated to a factual basis for the plea 

3 In the same second amended complaint, the People charged 

Joshua’s co-defendant Elvone Robinson with two counts of willful, 

deliberate, premeditated attempted murder (of Miranda and 

Newsome), shooting at a motor vehicle, and misdemeanor 

vandalism. The People alleged firearm and gang enhancements 

as to Robinson as well. The People did not allege that Robinson 

personally used or discharged a firearm or that he personally 

inflicted great bodily injury on either victim.
4

“based upon the police reports, probation report and any other 

discovery.”

Joshua asked to postpone his sentencing. The parties 

returned on April 18, 2019 for sentencing. The court noted 

Joshua had not yet admitted the great bodily injury allegation. 

After conferring with his counsel, Joshua confirmed counsel 

had answered his question and he was ready to proceed. The 

prosecutor, referring to Joshua’s plea to count 5, asked him, 

“[D]o you additionally admit that in the course of that 

commission that you violated Penal Code section 12022.7(a), 

causing great bodily injury to B. Miranda? Do you admit or 

deny that additional allegation?” Joshua replied, “I admit.” 

Again, Joshua’s counsel joined.

In accordance with the parties’ agreement, the court

sentenced Joshua to 22 years in the state prison, calculated 

as the high term of nine years for the attempted murder plus

three years for the personal infliction of great bodily injury and

10 years for the firearm enhancement. The court dismissed

the remaining counts and allegations on the People’s motion.4

2. Joshua’s petition for resentencing

On February 17, 2022, Joshua, representing himself, filed 

a form petition for resentencing under section 1172.6. Joshua

checked boxes on the form stating (1) the complaint filed in 

his case “allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of . . .

4 Robinson also entered into a plea agreement with the 

People. Robinson pleaded no contest to count 1 (attempted 

murder of Miranda) and admitted allegations under section 

12022.53, subdivisions (b) and (e)(1) that “a principal personally 

used a firearm,” in exchange for a determinate sentence of 

15 years (the low term of five years for the attempted murder 

plus ten years for the firearm enhancement).
5

attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences 

doctrine,” (2) he was convicted of attempted murder “following 

a trial or [he] accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which 

[he] could have been convicted of . . . attempted murder,” and 

(3) he “could not presently be convicted of . . . attempted murder 

because of changes made to Penal Code §§ 188 and 189, effective 

January 1, 2019 [sic].” Joshua also checked a fourth box that 

stated, “Having presented a facially sufficient petition, I request 

that this Court appoint counsel to represent me.”

The court appointed counsel for Joshua. The court ordered

the People to file a response to the petition by April 18 and 

Joshua to file a reply by May 18. The court set a date for “further 

proceedings re: prima facie hearing on 6/1/22.”

On April 11, 2022, the prosecution filed a response to

Joshua’s petition. In its statement of facts, the prosecution said

Joshua and Robinson had driven to the intersection of Main and 

109th Street in Los Angeles on February 3, 2017. Joshua drove 

and parked. Robinson got out and starting spray painting graffiti 

on a wall. Miranda and Newsome were in a car leaving the

parking lot near where Joshua was parked. The victims saw 

Joshua looking at them. As Newsome drove away, Joshua got 

out of his car with a semi-automatic firearm and fired about 

four times at Newsome’s car. One of the bullets hit Miranda 

in the head and Newsome crashed the car. Robinson got into 

the driver’s seat, Joshua got into the back passenger seat, and 

Robinson drove them away. Miranda survived.

The prosecution asserted Joshua was not entitled to relief 

under section 1172.6 because he was “a direct perpetrator” of the 

crime and he “could not have been convicted of attempted murder 
6

based upon the natural and probable consequences doctrine.”5 

Joshua did not file a reply to the People’s response.

On June 1, 2022, the court called the case for hearing. 

While the reporter’s transcript is unclear, it appears both the 

prosecutor and defense counsel appeared “via speakerphone.”6 

The court stated it had received and considered the People’s 

response. The court continued, “Mr. DeBlanc, it appears that 

Mr. Laquist [sic] is not eligible for the relief requested, pursuant 

to Penal Code section 117[2.6].” Counsel replied, “Yes. I did 

receive a couple of documents yesterday, basically the charging

document, the information, and the plea transcript; and based 

on all of that, I would submit to the court. So submitted.” 

The prosecutor said he had nothing to add.

The court stated, “The court is finding that Mr. Laquist 

[sic] is ineligible for any requested relief, pursuant to Penal Code 

5 The prosecution stated Joshua had “admitted to 

discharging a firearm at the victim,” and his “admission to 

personally using a firearm during the offense” was “an admission 

to being a direct perpetrator and harboring express malice in

this case.” The prosecution was mistaken about the firearm 

enhancement. Joshua did not admit having personally used

a firearm; he admitted that a principal had done so.

6 The reporter’s transcript states, “Appearances: Defendant 

Joshua Laquist [sic], present with counsel Albert DeBlanc, Esq.; 

Alex Hogue, Deputy District Attorney, appearing via 

speakerphone.” However, the minute order states, “Defendant 

is not present in court, but represented by A. DeBlanc Jr. 

bar panel attorney. . . . Deputy District Attorney, Alex Hogue, 

appears telephonically.” The minute order for an earlier setting 

date, March 23, 2022, states, “Defendant is not present in 

court, but represented by A. DeBlanc Jr. bar panel attorney[.] 

Defendant appearing by counsel pursuant to Penal Code 

section 977 et seq., by A. DeBlanc Jr. bar panel attorney.”
7

section 117[2.6]. The petition is denied.” The court then added, 

“[J]ust to make the record—a more thorough record, pursuant 

to the plea transcript, the defendant admitted the charge 

as well as the 12022.53 allegation and the 12022.7 allegation. 

And the defendant’s plea does provide proof that he is the 

direct perpetrator, and this is pursuant to his admission that 

he personally discharged the firearm.”

DISCUSSION

1. Section 1172.6

Senate Bill No. 1437 (Senate Bill 1437) took effect on 

January 1, 2019. (See Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 4.) The bill 

amended existing law on accomplice liability for murder “ ‘to 

ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is 

not the actual killer . . . .’ ” (People v. Gutierrez-Salazar (2019) 38 

Cal.App.5th 411, 417, quoting Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f); 

§ 189, subd. (e)(1).) To accomplish this goal, Senate Bill 1437

limited accomplice liability under the felony-murder rule and 

eliminated the natural and probable consequences doctrine as it 

relates to murder, to ensure a person’s sentence is commensurate 

with his individual criminal culpability. (People v. Gentile

(2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842–843 (Gentile); People v. Lewis (2021) 

11 Cal.5th 952, 957, 971 (Lewis).)

Senate Bill 1437 also authorized, through new section 

1172.6, an individual convicted of felony murder or murder based 

on the natural and probable consequences doctrine to petition 

the sentencing court to vacate the conviction and be resentenced

on any remaining counts if he could not have been convicted of 

murder because of Senate Bill 1437’s changes to the definition 

of the crime. (See Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 959–960; 

Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 843.)

If the petition contains all the required information, 

including a declaration by the petitioner that he was convicted 
8

of murder and is eligible for relief (§ 1172.6, subd. (b)(1)(A)), 

section 1172.6, subdivision (c) requires the court to direct 

the prosecutor to file a response to the petition and permit 

the petitioner to file a reply,

7 and to determine if the petitioner 

has made a prima facie showing that he is entitled to relief. 

(See Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 959–960.)

In determining whether the petitioner has carried the 

burden of making the requisite prima facie showing he falls 

within the provisions of section 1172.6 and is entitled to relief, 

the superior court properly examines the record of conviction, 

“allowing the court to distinguish petitions with potential merit 

from those that are clearly meritless.” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th

at p. 971.) However, “the prima facie inquiry under [section 

1172.6,] subdivision (c) is limited. Like the analogous prima facie 

inquiry in habeas corpus proceedings, ‘ “the court takes 

petitioner’s factual allegations as true and makes a preliminary 

assessment regarding whether the petitioner would be entitled 

to relief if his or her factual allegations were proved. If so, 

the court must issue an order to show cause.” ’ . . . ‘However, 

if the record, including the court’s own documents, “contain[s] 

facts refuting the allegations made in the petition,” then 

“the court is justified in making a credibility determination 

adverse to the petitioner.” ’ ” (Ibid.; see People v. Daniel (2020) 

57 Cal.App.5th 666, 675.)

Senate Bill No. 775 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 

775), effective as of January 1, 2022, amended section 1172.6 

in various respects. The bill clarified that “persons who were 

convicted of attempted murder . . . under . . . the natural [and]

7 Section 1172.6, subd. (b)(3) also requires the court to 

appoint counsel to represent the petitioner, if requested. Here, 

the trial court did appoint counsel for Joshua.
9

probable consequences doctrine are permitted the same relief

as those persons convicted of murder under the same theor[y].” 

(Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 1, subd. (a).) Senate Bill 775 also clarified 

that the burden of proof at a section 1172.6 evidentiary hearing 

is beyond a reasonable doubt and a trial court’s finding that there 

is substantial evidence to support a conviction is insufficient to 

meet this burden. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)

We independently review a trial court’s determination of 

whether a petitioner has made a prima facie showing. (People v.

Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 52 (Harden).)

2. The trial court was not required to issue an order 

to show cause or conduct an evidentiary hearing 

because—as the direct perpetrator of the attempted 

murder—Joshua is ineligible for resentencing 

as a matter of law

As noted, Senate Bill 775 extended resentencing eligibility 

to individuals convicted of attempted murder under the natural 

and probable consequences doctrine. (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 1, 

subd. (a).) In his reply brief on appeal, Joshua asserts he was 

required to establish only “that he could have been prosecuted 

under a natural and probable consequences theory of liability.” 

But neither in the trial court, nor here on appeal, has Joshua 

offered any factual premise or theory under which he “could have 

been prosecuted under a natural and probable consequences 

theory of liability.” Indeed, throughout these proceedings, 

Joshua has offered no facts about the crime, his role (if any), 

or Robinson’s role.

Nor was there any discussion of this issue in the trial court. 

The court gave two reasons for finding Joshua ineligible for 

relief under section 1172.6: he “admi[tted] that he personally 

discharged the firearm,” and he admitted he personally inflicted

great bodily injury on the victim. The Attorney General agrees 
10

with Joshua that the first of these two reasons was incorrect: 

Joshua admitted that a principal personally used a firearm, 

not that he personally used a firearm in the attempted murder 

of Miranda. (See People v. Offley (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 588, 592, 

597 (Offley) [true finding that a principal to the crime—not the 

defendant himself—discharged a firearm does not disqualify 

defendant from relief under section 1172.6].)

But the second reason the court gave was valid: Joshua 

admitted he personally inflicted great bodily injury on Miranda. 

A true finding on an allegation under section 12022.7 that a 

defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury on the victim 

means that defendant is ineligible for relief under section 1172.6. 

(See Harden, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at pp. 48, 54–55.) “The 

natural meaning of ‘personally inflicted’ is that the defendant 

[himself] inflicted the injury.” (Id. at p. 55. See People v. Cole

(1982) 31 Cal.3d 568, 578–579 [under section 12022.7, “personally 

inflict” means those who “directly perform” the act causing 

physical injury].)

Joshua cites Offley, supra, 48 Cal.App.5th 588 and argues 

its reasoning applies equally to his admission that he personally 

inflicted great bodily injury on the victim. Joshua is mistaken.

Offley involved an attack by five defendants on two victims. 

At least three of the defendants fired shots into the victims’ car. 

One victim was killed and the other was seriously wounded.8 

(Offley, supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at p. 592.) The trial court 

instructed the jury on “the natural and probable consequences 

doctrine in cases of conspiracy.” (Id. at p. 593.) Although the 

8 As Offley was decided before Senate Bill 775 extended relief 

to defendants convicted of attempted murder, Offley petitioned 

for relief only on his murder conviction. (Offley, supra, 48 

Cal.App.5th at p. 592.)
11

prosecution alleged Offley had personally and intentionally fired 

a handgun causing the victim’s death, the prosecutor “agreed” 

during the trial “that a bullet from Offley’s gun could not have 

killed” the victim. (Id. at pp. 592, 594.)

The trial court denied Offley’s petition for resentencing 

without appointing counsel and the appellate court reversed. 

The court stated that—given the prosecutor’s closing argument 

relying on a natural and probable consequences theory—it could 

not “exclude the possibility that the jury believed Offley acted 

without intending to kill [the victim] or consciously disregarding 

that risk,” and thus without malice aforethought. (Offley, supra, 

48 Cal.App.5th at pp. 594, 597, 599.)

Joshua’s contention that the “malice aforethought” issue 

discussed in Offley applies to his section 12022.7 admission here 

misses the first, critical inquiry in any analysis of a section 

1172.6 petition: was the petitioner merely an accomplice, or 

does the record of conviction demonstrate he was the direct 

perpetrator of the shooting? The whole point of section 1172.6 

is to provide relief for individuals who were accomplices to 

murders and attempted murders. A defendant who was not 

an accomplice but instead was the direct and actual perpetrator 

of the attempted murder is not eligible for resentencing. (See, 

e.g., Harden, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at pp. 53–54, 56; People v. 

Myles (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 688, 692–694 [affirming denial of 

resentencing because defendant, as actual killer, was directly—

not vicariously—liable]; People v. Edwards (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th

666, 669, 671, 674 [affirming summary denial of resentencing 

petition where record of conviction showed petitioner was actual 

killer].) By admitting he personally inflicted great bodily injury 
12

on Miranda, Joshua admitted he was the actual shooter.

9 He 

therefore is ineligible for relief under section 1172.6 as a matter 

of law.

DISPOSITION

Based on our independent review, we agree with the trial 

court that Laquist Joshua failed to make a prima facie showing 

for relief. We therefore affirm the trial court’s order denying his

petition for resentencing.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

EGERTON, J.

We concur:

EDMON, P.J. ADAMS, J.

9 While Joshua’s check-the-boxes petition was facially 

sufficient, “it is devoid of factual allegations” concerning the 

shooting of Miranda. (See People v. Pickett (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th

982, 989, review granted Oct. 11, 2023, S281643.) Neither in 

the trial court—where his counsel submitted based on the record 

of conviction—nor here on appeal has Joshua denied he was the 

shooter. Nor does he assert that another person fired the shot 

that struck Miranda in the head. “He merely states the legal 

conclusion that he could not now be convicted of [attempted]

murder because of changes made to the law of [attempted] 

murder under Senate Bill No. 1437.” (See ibid.)