J-S12030-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

KEITH ALEXANDER 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1954 EDA 2021

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered September 7, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0702301-2002

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., BOWES, J., and DUBOW, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED MAY 19, 2022

Keith Alexander appeals from the September 7, 2021 order dismissing 

his petition pursuant to the Post-Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). We affirm.

Due to the nature of our holding in this case, we will review the factual 

history of this case only briefly, as follows: 

Appellant was arrested and . . . charged in connection with the 

2002 non-fatal shooting of Maurice Stuart in Philadelphia. On April 

1, 2005, following a jury trial presided over by the [trial court], 

Appellant was convicted of attempted murder, aggravated 

assault, conspiracy, and violations of the Uniform Firearms Act. 

On May 20, 2005, the trial court sentenced Appellant to an 

aggregate term of twenty-six and one-half to fifty-six years of 

incarceration.

Commonwealth v. Alexander, 224 A.3d 366 (Pa.Super. 2019) (unpublished 

memorandum at 1) (“Alexander V”) (affirming dismissal of Appellant’s fourth 

PCRA petition). On direct appeal, this Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of 

sentence and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania denied his application for 
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allowance of appeal on October 24, 2007. Appellant did not seek a writ of 

certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. From 2008 through 2020, 

Appellant filed a succession of four unsuccessful PCRA petitions.

1

 

While Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal in our Supreme Court 

was pending in Alexander V but prior to it being denied, he filed a fifth, pro 

se PCRA petition. The PCRA court took no action in response to this 

submission, ostensibly recognizing that no subsequent PCRA petition could be 

filed while a prior PCRA petition remained under active appellate review. See 

Commonwealth v. Lark, 746 A.2d 585, 588 (Pa. 2000) (“[W]hen an 

appellant’s PCRA appeal is pending before a court, a subsequent PCRA petition 

cannot be filed until the resolution of review of the pending PCRA petition by 

the highest state court in which review is sought, or upon the expiration of 

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1

 For the sake of legal posterity and in anticipation of future filings from 

Appellant, we note the chronology of these proceedings in this footnote. See 

Commonwealth v. Alexander, 928 A.2d 1117 (Pa.Super. 2007) (nonprecedential decision) (direct appeal) (“Alexander I”), allowance of appeal 

denied, 934 A.2d 1275 (Pa. 2007). Commonwealth v. Alexander, 990 A.2d 

34 (Pa.Super. 2009) (non-precedential decision) (first PCRA) (“Alexander 

II”), allowance of appeal denied, 4 A.3d 1050 (Pa. 2010); Commonwealth 

v. Alexander, 116 A.3d 688 (Pa.Super. 2014) (non-precedential decision)

(second PCRA) (“Alexander III”), allowance of appeal denied, 114 A.3d 415 

(Pa. 2015); Commonwealth v. Alexander, 175 A.3d 411 (Pa.Super. 2017) 

(non-precedential decision) (third PCRA) (“Alexander IV”), allowance of 

appeal denied, 176 A.3d 849 (Pa. 2017); Commonwealth v. Alexander, 

224 A.3d 366 (Pa.Super. 2019) (unpublished memorandum) (fourth PCRA) 

(“Alexander V”), allowance of appeal denied, 224 A.3d 366 (Pa. 2019), 

certiorari denied, 140 S.Ct. 2780 (2020).
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the time for seeking such review.”), abrogated in part on separate grounds, 

Commonwealth v. Small, 238 A.3d 1267, 1286 (Pa. 2020).

On February 11, 2021, Appellant re-filed this latest PCRA petition as an 

attachment to a motion seeking a response from the PCRA court. See Motion 

for Honorable [sic] to Respond, 2/11/21, at Exhibit 1 (“PCRA Petition”). By 

this point, Appellant’s petitions for allowance of appeal in both the United 

States and Pennsylvania Supreme Courts had been denied in Alexander V. 

In this filing, Appellant asserted claims that: (1) his trial counsel was 

ineffective; and (2) that the prosecutor assigned to Appellant’s case 

committed fraud. See PCRA Petition at 1-15. Although not cited in the 

petition, Appellant’s arguments on this second point implicated Brady v. 

Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) and allegations that the Commonwealth 

withheld impeachment and/or exculpatory evidence. With respect to 

ineffectiveness, Appellant asserted “[t]here is no sign that [trial counsel] tried 

to defend his client or clear him of the charges,” citing a number of examples 

from the proceedings. PCRA Petition at 6-8. As to fraud, Appellant claimed

the Commonwealth obtained his conviction “by using uncorrected testimony 

that the prosecutor [knew] to be false[.]”2 Id. at 5.

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2

 We also note that Appellant’s first trial ended in a mistrial due to a lack of 

unanimity amongst the jurors before he was convicted in a second proceeding. 

Many of Appellant’s allegations of attorney error and prosecutorial fraud 

appeared to relate to events that took place during his first trial. See 

Appellant’s brief at 9 (“The issues of the first trial were not remedied by the 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Treating Appellant’s motion seeking a response as a newly filed PCRA 

petition, the PCRA court filed notice of its intent to dismiss it without a hearing 

pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. Specifically, the PCRA court concluded the

petition was untimely. See Order, 6/21/21, at 1 (“As you failed to plead and 

prove one of the exceptions to the PCRA’s time-bar, this Court is without 

jurisdiction to consider the merits of your claims or offer any form of relief.”).

Appellant did not respond to the Rule 907 notice and the PCRA court 

dismissed his petition. See Order, 9/7/21, at 1. Thereafter, Appellant filed a 

timely notice of appeal to this Court. The PCRA court did not direct Appellant 

to file a concise statement of errors pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) and he did 

not file one. In a brief opinion, the trial court set forth its justification for 

dismissing the petition, i.e., untimeliness. See Opinion, 9/16/21, at 1-2. 

Appellant presents a single issue for our consideration, which he has chosen 

to phrase as follows: “Whether the PCRA court acknowledged the Brady

violation in the first trial[?]” Appellant’s brief at 7.

Our standard of review in this context is “limited to examining whether 

the PCRA court’s determination is supported by the record evidence and free 

of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Whitehawk, 146 A.3d 266, 269 

(Pa.Super. 2016) (cleaned up). However, “[b]efore addressing the merits of 

Appellant’s claims, we must first determine whether we have jurisdiction to 

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prosecution in the second trial.”); see also PCRA Petition at 4-8. Appellant 

also referenced evidence admitted at his second trial, but not his first. Id. 
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entertain the underlying PCRA petition.” Id. Specifically, the timeliness 

limitations pursuant to the PCRA are jurisdictional, mandatory, and “a court 

has no authority to extend filing periods except as statute permits.” 

Commonwealth v. Jackson, 30 A.3d 516, 519 (Pa.Super. 2011).

Instantly, timeliness under the PCRA is governed by 42 Pa.C.S. 

§ 9545(b), which provides in pertinent part as follows:

(b) Time for filing petition.--

(1) Any petition under this subchapter, including a second 

or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the 

date the judgment becomes final, unless the petition alleges 

and the petitioner proves that:

(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the 

result of interference by government officials with the 

presentation of the claim in violation of the 

Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the 

Constitution or laws of the United States;

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were 

unknown to the petitioner and could not have been 

ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or

(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was 

recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States 

or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time 

period provided in this section and has been held by 

that court to apply retroactively.

(2) Any petition invoking an exception provided in 

paragraph (1) shall be filed within one year of the date the 

claim could have been presented.

(3) For purposes of this subchapter, a judgment becomes 

final at the conclusion of direct review, including 

discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United 

States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the 

expiration of time for seeking the review.
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42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)-(3). Accordingly, “[i]f the petition is determined to 

be untimely, and no exception has been pled and proven, the petition must 

be dismissed without a hearing because Pennsylvania courts are without 

jurisdiction to consider the merits of the petition.” Jackson, supra at 519

(citation and quotation marks omitted).

For the purposes of § 9545(b)(3), direct review of Appellant’s judgment 

of sentence concluded when the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania denied his 

petition for allowance of appeal on October 24, 2007. Appellant did not seek 

a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court and his time in which 

to do so expired on January 22, 2008. See U.S. Sup. Ct. Rule 13(1) (providing 

that a petitioner has ninety days after “entry of judgment” to file “[a] petition 

for a writ of certiorari seeking review of a judgment of a lower state court”). 

Thus, Appellant had until January 22, 2009 to file a timely PCRA petition. The

instant PCRA petition was filed on February 11, 2021. Accordingly, it is facially 

untimely by more than twelve years.

In his instant petition, Appellant has pleaded the applicability of two 

timeliness exceptions, namely that: (1) the alleged interference by 

unidentified government officials; and (2) the facts upon which the claims are 

predicated were unknown to Appellant and could not have been ascertained 

by the exercise of due diligence. See PCRA Petition at 3; 42 Pa.C.S. 

§ 9545(b)(1)(i)-(ii). We will address each section seriatim. From the outset 

of our analysis, we emphasize that the PCRA requires that any petition 
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invoking one of these timeliness exceptions must be filed within one year of 

the date the claim could have been presented. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2). 

Both the governmental interference and newly discovered facts timeliness 

exceptions must comply with § 9545(b)(2). See Commonwealth v. 

Natividad, 200 A.3d 11, 28 (Pa. 2019). 

We discern that Appellant’s allegations as to governmental interference 

are predicated upon his Brady claims. However, these specific claims have

already been addressed in an earlier memorandum of this Court:

Appellant attempts to invoke the “governmental interference” 

exception to the statutory time-bar per Section 9545(b)(1)(i), 

claiming the prosecution withheld exculpatory evidence from 

Appellant at his second trial in violation of Brady. Specifically, 

Appellant avers the prosecution withheld a police officer 

memorandum, investigative report, and two eyewitness 

statements, one of which exonerates Appellant. The record belies 

Appellant's contentions. Appellant's trial counsel received the 

evidence at issue prior to Appellant's second trial, specifically 

referenced the “withheld” evidence at trial, and discussed the 

eyewitness statement at length.

Commonwealth v. Alexander, 175 A.3d 411 (Pa.Super. 2017) (nonprecedential decision at 2) (cleaned up) (“Alexander IV”). In light of this 

memorandum published approximately five years ago, Appellant has failed to 

comply with the requirements of § 9545(b)(2). Specifically, the discussion in 

Alexander IV evinces that Appellant has been fully aware of these alleged 

Brady violations for the better part of a decade. Thus, Appellant’s allegations 

of governmental interference could have been (and, in fact, were) raised at 

an earlier date. Accordingly, § 9545(b)(1)(i) does not apply.
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Turning to Appellant’s allegations of newly discovered facts pursuant to 

§ 9545(b)(1)(ii), he relies upon trial counsel’s purported ineffectiveness on 

this point. However, the ineffectiveness complained of by Appellant would 

have been immediately evident during Appellant’s first and second trials. In 

pertinent part, Appellant has offered no discussion of why he has waited over 

a decade to raise this claim. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2). Furthermore, 

Appellant has not offered any argument concerning due diligence in his filings. 

See Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 204 A.3d 524, 526 (Pa.Super. 2019) 

(“Due diligence demands that the petitioner take reasonable steps to protect 

his own interests; a petitioner must explain why he could not have learned 

the new facts earlier with the exercise of due diligence.”). Accordingly, 

Appellant is not entitled to the benefit of § 9545(b)(1)(ii).

Based upon the foregoing, we conclude that the PCRA court’s dismissal 

is supported by the record and free of legal error. Appellant’s fifth PCRA 

petition is patently untimely and not entitled to any exception.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/19/2022