[Cite as State v. Wilson , 2012-Ohio-4756.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY, OHIO STATE OF OHIO : Plaintiff-Appellee : C.A. CASE NO. 24978 vs. : T.C. CASE NO. 2011-CR-0145 TERRY R. WILSON : (CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM COMMON PLEAS COURT) Defendant-Appellant :

. . . . . . . . . O P I N I O N Rendered on the 12 th day of October, 2012.

. . . . . . . . . Mathias H. Heck, Jr., Prosecuti ng Attorney, Kirsten A. Br andt, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Atty. Reg. No. 0070162, P.O. Box 972, 301 West Third Street, Dayton, Ohio 45422 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee Brandin D. Marlow, Atty. Reg. No. 0076381, 150 North Limestone Street, Suite 219, Springfield, Ohio 45501 Attorney for Defendant-Appellant

. . . . . . . . . GRADY, P.J.: {¶ 1} On October 17, 2011, Defendant Terry R. Wilson entered guilty pleas to three counts of gross sexual imposition involving tw o children, one under ten years of age and the other thirteen. On November 8, 2011, the trial court imposed concurrent 48-month sentencesfor two of the offenses and a sentence of 48 mont hs for the third offense, to run consecutive to the other two 48-month sentences. {¶ 2} Defendant filed a motion for leave to file an untimely notice of appeal from his convictions. We granted the motion. He presen ts two assignments of error, both concerning the sentences the court imposed. {¶ 3} First Assignment of Error: “THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED OHIO REVISED CODE § 2929.11 WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER IF ITS SE NTENCE ACCOMPLISHES SENTENCING PURPOSES WITHOUT IMPOSING AN UNNECESSARY BURDEN ON GOVERNMENT.” {¶ 4} R.C. 2929.11 sets out the overriding purposes and principles of sentencing the court must consider when imposing a felony sentence. Those overriding purposes are to punish the offender and to protect the public from future crime committed by the offender and others. R.C. 2929.11 was amended by H.B. 86, effective September 30, 2011, to require the court to impose the minimum sanctions that the court determines “will accomplish those purposes without imposing an unnecessary burden on state or local government resources.” {¶ 5} Defendant argues that while the trial court indicated why it was imposing more than the minimum and consecutive sentences, nothing suggests, other than the court’s general statement that the court considered the purposes and principles of sentencing, that the court also considered the minimum sanctions th at would accomplish those purposes without imposing an unnecessary burden on state resources. {¶ 6} Although resource burdens are a releva nt sentencing criterion under newly enacted language in R.C. 2929.11(A), a sentencing court is not required to elevate resource3 conservation above se riousness and recidivism factors. State v. Luyando, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97203, 2012-Ohio-1947, ¶ 14, citing State v. Burton, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 06AP-690, 2007-Ohio-1941, ¶ 19. Accord, State v. Ober, 2d Dist. Greene No. 97 CA 0019, 1997 WL 624811 (Oct. 10, 1997). “Where the interests of public protection a nd punishment are well served by a prison sentence, the claim is difficult to make that the prison sentence imposes an unnecessary burden on gove rnment resources.” State v. Bowshier, 2d Dist. Clark No. 08-CA-58, 2009-Ohio-3429, ¶ 14, citing Ohio Felony Sentencing Law, 2007 Ed. Griffin and Katz, at 966. {¶ 7} When determining whether a prison sentence is warranted, the trial court must consider the benefit to society in assuring that Defendant will not be free to continue to re-offend. State v. Vlahopoulos, 154 Ohio App.3d 450, 2003-Ohio-5070, 797 N.E.2d 580, ¶ 5 (8th Dist.). “Many people sleep better at night knowing that certain offenders are incarcerated. They would no doubt consider a lengthy incarceration worth the cost of housing those offenders.” Id. {¶ 8} Prior to imposing sentence upon Defendant , the trial court considered the pre-sentence investigation report, the statements of the parties, and th e sentencing memoranda submitted. The trial court explained that it considered “the purposes and principles of sentencing in the Ohio Revised Code” includi ng “the seriousness a nd recidivism factors contained therein.” A senten cing court satisfies its oblig ations under R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12 when it considers the general guidance factors set forth in those sections. State v. Watkins, 186 Ohio App.3d 619, 2010-Ohio-740, 929 N.E.2d 1072, ¶ 39 (2d Dist.). The court is not required to make specific findings or to use the exact wording of the statute. Id.4 {¶ 9} The trial court acknowledged that Defendant had pled guilty to the charges, “which eliminated the necessity of the victims testifying.” The court pointed out that Defendant’s convictions were pa rt of a course of conduct, vi ctimizing multiple young female relatives, and that the harm caused by those offe nses “was so great and unusual that no single prison term can adequately reflect the serious ness of the offender’s conduct.” Furthermore, the court found that Defendant’s “history of th is kind of criminal conduct demonstrates that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect th e public from future crime by the defendant.” {¶ 10} The court’s statement that in imposing Defendant’s sentences it considered the purposes and principles of sentencing enco mpasses the “unnecessary burden on government resources” constraint against ex cessive sentences in R.C. 2929.11( A). Having said that, the court satisfied its burden to make the determin ation that a lesser sent ence would not suffice. Watkins . Further, the reasons the court gave for the sentences it imposed demonstrate that the court’s determination wa s not incorrect. Defendant offers no basis to conclude otherwise. {¶ 11} The first assignment of error is overruled. {¶ 12} Second Assignment of Error: “OHIO REVISED CODE § 2929.11 VIOLATES WILSON’S PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS RIGHTS BECAUSE IT FAILS TO REQUIRE A TRIAL COURT TO PLACE ON THE RECORD THE SPECIFIC FACTS IT CONSIDERS WHEN ORDERING CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES.” {¶ 13} Wilson complains that R.C. 2929.11 is unc onstitutional, as a violation of his due process rights of notice and an opportunity to be heard, because it does not require the5 sentencing court to specify the facts on which it relies to make the findings that section requires: Due process under the Ohio and United St ates Constitutions demands that the right to notice and an opportunity to be heard must be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner where the state seeks to infringe a protected liberty or property interest. Greene v. Lindsey (1982),456 U.S. 444, 102 S.Ct. 1874, 72 L.Ed.2d 249; Boddie v. Connecticut (1971),401 U.S. 371, 378, 91 S.Ct. 780, 786, 28 L.Ed.2d 113; Williams v. Dollison (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 297, 299, 16. O.O.3d 350, 351, 405 N.E.2d 714, 716. However, the concept of due process is flexible and varies depending on the importance attached to the interest and the par ticular circumstances under which the deprivation may

occur. Walters v. Natl. Assn. Of Radiation Survivors (1985), 473 U.S. 305, 320, 105 S.Ct. 3180, 3189, 87 L.Ed.2d 220, 232. State v. Hochhausler , 76 Ohio St.3d 455, 459, 668 N.E.2d 457 (1996). {¶ 14} Defendant entered guilty pleas to the thr ee offenses of which he was convicted. Those pleas constitute a complete admission of his guilt. Crim. R. 11(B). Defendant’s acknowledgment of his guilt narrows the due process right on whic h he relies with respect to the sentencing court’s notification to the Defe ndant of the facts on which it relied in imposing sentences for those offenses. {¶ 15} The court did notify Defendant of the facts on which it relied in the court’s references to Defendant’s “c ourse of conduct in victimizing young fema le victims” and his6 “history” of such conduct. Due process does not require the court to give a defendant who pleads guilty prior notice of those facts or to delineate them in a more specific way. {¶ 16} With respect to his consecutive senten ces, Defendant’s argument is misplaced. R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) requires the court, when im posing consecutive sentences, to make one or more of three alternative findings: (a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses while the offender was waiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction imposed pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised Code, or was under post-release control for a prior offense. (b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of the multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no single prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses of conduct adequately reflects the serious ness of the offender’s conduct. (c) The offender’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the pub lic from future crime by the offender. {¶ 17} The particular findings the court made accord with the findings that R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(b) and (c ) contemplate. {¶ 18} There is no constitutional requirement that a sentencing court make findings of fact before ordering consecutive sentences. State v. Hodge, 128 Ohio St.3d 1,7 2010-Ohio-6320, 941 N.E.2d 768, ¶ 26. While R. C. 2929.14(C)(4) requires a sentencing court to make specific findings before impos ing consecutive sentences, the statute does not require a sentencing court to sp ecifically identify the factual base s for those findings. In other words, contrary to Defendant’s assertion, a sentencing court is not required to explicitly identify the matters upon wh ich it relied in imposing consecutive sentences. {¶ 19} Prior to entering his guilty pleas, Defendant was made aware of the charges against him in the form of the indictment, a bill of particulars, and full discovery pursuant to both Crim. R. 16 and the Montgomery Count y Common Pleas Court Management Plan. Additionally, prior to sentencing , Defendant was given further in formation as contained in the State’s sentencing memorandum and in the pr e-sentencing investig ation report, which included not only the details of the gross sexu al imposition convictions, but also Defendant’s criminal history. Therefore, Defendant had notice of what the trial court was referring to with respect to a course of conduct, the harm caused to the victims, and the extent of his criminal history. Defendant’s claim that he was denied his due process rights to notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard is without merit. {¶ 20} Defendant’s second assignme nt of error is overruled. {¶ 21} The judgment of the trial court will be affirmed. Froelich, J., concurring: {¶ 22} I concur, but am concerned that the decision will be read as minimizing, if not negating, the legislature’s amendment of R.C. 2929.11(A). 2011 H.B. 86, effective September 30, 2011, added the requirement that a court accomplish the purposes of felony sentencing (protection of the public and puni shment of the offender) “using the minimum8 sanctions that the court determines acco mplish those purposes without imposing an unnecessary burden on state or lo cal government resources.” {¶ 23} Similar language (“The sentence sha ll not impose an unnecessary burden on state or local government re sources”) was previously in cluded in R.C. 2929.13(A), which applied to various specific offe nses and degrees of offenses, but was removed by H.B. 86. The difference between former R.C. 2929.13(A) a nd current R.C. 2929.11(A) is the change of the word “sentence” to “sanctions” and the requirement of the court’s “using the minimum sanctions” that the court de termines do not impose an unn ecessary burden on resources. {¶ 24} State v. Luyando , 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97203, 2012-Ohio-1947, was correct that “although resource burdens are relevant sentencing cons iderations under former R.C. 2929.13(A) and newly enacted language in R.C. 2929.11, a sentencing court is not required to elevate resource conservation above se riousness and recidivism factors.” Id. at ¶ 14. However, the mandate that the court impose the minimum sanctions means more than we discussed in State v. Bowshier , 2d Dist. Clark No. 08-CA -58, 2009-Ohio-3429, which was decided under former R.C. 2929.13(A). I find th e language to mean that there is a requirement for the imposition of the minimum sanctions necessary to achieve the goals of punishment and protection (without an unnecessary burden on gove rnment resources) and that a silent record, or even one that by rote statement says that the purpose and principles and seriousness and recidivism fact ors were considered, would not support a greater sanction. {¶ 25} Here, I agree with the majority that the trial court made a sufficient record that the minimum sanction would not accomplish those goals and that the sanction’s burden on government resources was “necessary.”9 Hall, J., concurring: {¶ 26} I agree that, in this case, the trial c ourt satisfied its R.C. 2929.11(A) sentencing obligation by stating that it considered “the purposes and principles of sentencing” and “the seriousness and recidivism factors” of the Ohio Revised Code. I also agree that by stating that it considered the purposes and principles of sentencing, the trial court had included R.C. 2929.11(A)’s minimum-sanctions and unnecessary-burden-on-government-resources language. The court was not required to refer separately to either the minimum sanction or the government’s burden. This is consistent with our prior jurisprudence. “Furthermore, even if there is no specific mention of those statutes in the record, ‘it is presumed that the trial court gave proper consideration to th ose statutes.’” State v. Miller , Clark No. 09CA28, 2010–Ohio–2138,

 43, quoting State v. Kalish , 120 Ohio St.3d 23, 2008–Ohio–4912, 896 N.E.2d 124, Fn.4. {¶ 27} The “minimum sanctions” in this st atute should not be mistaken for a minimum prison sentence within a statutory range. A sentencing court is not required to make findings or give any reasons for more than a minimum prison sentence. State v. Foster , 109 Ohio St.3d 1, 2006–Ohio–856, 845 N.E.2d 470. “Minimum sanctions” are those conditions, circumstances, programing, restri ctions or incarceration that the sentencing court determines will accomplish the overriding purposes of fe lony sentencing without imposing an unnecessary burden on government resources. The second sentence in R.C.2929.11(A) defines the “overriding purposes of felony sentencing.” They are to protect and to punish using the minimum sanctions that accomplish protecti on and punishment without imposing an unnecessary burden on government resources. T hus, if a court considers the purposes and10 principles of sentencing, the court has nece ssarily considered both “minimum sanctions” and “unnecessary burden.” {¶ 28} Finally, I question whether trial courts are in a position to evaluate what the minimum sanctions are that accomplish the purposes of felony sentencing that will not burden government resources. Resource burdens are th e province of the executive and legislative branches of government. And, unlike R.C. 2929.12, which gives courts guidance in evaluating seriousness and likelihood of r ecidivism, R.C. 2929.11(A) gives no guidance whatsoever in evaluating whether a sancti on burdens resources. Copies mailed to: Kirsten A. Brandt, Esq. Brandin D. Marlow, Esq. Hon. Gregory F. Singer