alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Robert Turley, Also Known as Robert Cortez, Appellant.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Suffolk County (Seidell, J.), rendered November 14, 1985, convicting him of murder in the second degree (two counts), attempted rape in the first degree and sexual abuse in the first degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of those branches of the defendant’s omnibus motion which were to suppress statements made by him to the police and identification testimony.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

We have examined the lineup photographs and conclude that the hearing court properly found that the composition of the panel of lineup suspects was not unduly suggestive. All of the men appear to be of similar appearance and hairstyle. They all sported a moustache and had dark hair, and each wore a white jumpsuit provided by the police *(see, People v Diaz,*138 AD2d 728; *People v Rodriguez,*124 AD2d 611; *People v Norris,*122 AD2d 82).

Further, we agree with the hearing court that the defendant’s initial statements to the effect that he was a monster and that he had killed the 12-year-old victim were spontaneous and not the result of any custodial interrogation *(see, People v Lynes,*49 NY2d 286; *People v Wade,*143 AD2d 703; *People v Lyons,*125 AD2d 593). We reject the defendant’s argument that suppression of his subsequent statements made following the administration of the *Miranda*warnings was required because the waiver of his rights was unknowing in light of his minimal intelligence. A knowing waiver may be made by a person of subnormal intelligence *(see, People v Williams,*62 NY2d 285; *People v Love,*57 NY2d 998; *People v Bucknor,*140 AD2d 705). In the instant case, the defendant clearly understood the import of the warnings and the waiver was valid.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution *(see, People v Contes,*60 NY2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual *565review power, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (CPL 470.15 [5]).

We decline to disturb the determination of the sentencing court and, having reviewed the defendant’s remaining contentions, including those raised in his supplemental *pro se*brief, we conclude that they are either unpreserved for appellate review or without merit. Bracken, J. P., Eiber, Sullivan and Rosenblatt, JJ., concur.
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

March 15, 2019

RE: Product Exclusion Request Number: USTR-2018-0025-6549

Apergy ESP Systems, LLC:

The purpose of this letter is to inform you that the product exclusion request referenced 

above has been denied. As you are aware, USTR published a Federal Register notice (83 FR 

28710) on June 20, 2018, that announced the Trade Representative’s determination to impose an 

additional duty of 25 percent on certain products from China. On July 11, 2018, the Trade 

Representative published a Federal Register notice (83 FR 32181) which announced that a 

process had been established under which interested persons could request that products falling 

within a covered HTSUS subheading be excluded from the additional duties announced on June 

20.

Your request was reviewed in accordance with the factors and procedures set forth in 

Section B(1) of the July 11 notice. Based on that review, and after careful consideration, your 

request was denied because the request failed to show that the imposition of additional duties on 

the particular product would cause severe economic harm to you or other U.S. interests.

Because USTR will grant exclusion requests on a product specific basis, you may still 

benefit from a product exclusion if a similar product is granted an exclusion. Products for which 

an exclusion has been granted will be periodically announced on the USTR website. Product 

exclusions will become legally effective once published in the Federal Register. 

Sincerely,

Stephen P. Vaughn

General Counsel
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

February 4, 2019

RE: Product Exclusion Request Number: USTR-2018-0025-6690

CRRC MA Corporation:

The purpose of this letter is to inform you that the product exclusion request referenced 

above has been denied. As you are aware, USTR published a Federal Register notice (83 FR 

28710) on June 20, 2018, that announced the Trade Representative’s determination to impose an 

additional duty of 25 percent on certain products from China. On July 11, 2018, the Trade 

Representative published a Federal Register notice (83 FR 32181) which announced that a 

process had been established under which interested persons could request that products falling 

within a covered HTSUS subheading be excluded from the additional duties announced on June 

20.

Your request was reviewed in accordance with the factors and procedures set forth in 

Section B(1) of the July 11 notice. Based on that review, and after careful consideration, your 

request was denied because granting the request would undermine the objective of the Section 

301 investigation.

Because USTR will grant exclusion requests on a product specific basis, you may still 

benefit from a product exclusion if a similar product is granted an exclusion. Products for which 

an exclusion has been granted will be periodically announced on the USTR website. Product 

exclusions will become legally effective once published in the Federal Register. 

Sincerely,

Stephen P. Vaughn

General Counsel
Amendment No.2 to Note (Master Revolving Note)



 Exhibit 10.3 





    Amendment No. 2 to Note 
  

 
 This Amendment to Note (“Amendment”),
made, delivered, and effective as of May 5, 2010, by and between MANITEX LIFTKING, ULC (“Borrower”) and COMERICA BANK (“Bank”). 

WHEREAS, Borrower and Bank are parties to that certain Master Revolving Note in the original principal amount of US $4,500,000 dated July 9, 2009,
as amended (“Note”); and 
 WHEREAS, Bank and Borrower desire to amend the Note as set forth below; 

NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises and the mutual promises contained in this Amendment, Borrower and Bank agree as follows:

  

	1.	The definition of “Applicable Margin” in the Note is amended by deleting the figure “two percent (2%) per annum” and replacing it with
“one and one-half percent (1.50%) per annum”. 

  

	2.	The execution of this Amendment shall not be deemed to be a waiver of any Default or Event of Default. 


 

	3.	All the terms used in this Amendment which are defined in the Note shall have the same meaning as used in the Note, unless otherwise defined in this Amendment.


  

	4.	This Amendment is not an agreement to any further or other amendment of the Note. 


 

	5.	Borrower expressly acknowledges and agrees that except as expressly amended in this Amendment, the Note, as amended, remains in full force and effect and is ratified,
confirmed and restated. 

 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed and delivered this Amendment on the date set forth
above. 
  

									
	MANITEX LIFTKING, ULC	 		 	COMERICA BANK
					
	By:	 	 /s/ David H. Gransee
	 		 	By:	 	 /s/ James Q. Goudie

	Its:	 	 VP & CFO
	 		 	Its:	 	 VP & AGM
**Exhibit 23**

**CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM**

TheBoard of Directors 

First State Bancorporation: 

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the registration statements on Form S-3 (333-17727 and 333-156517) and Form S-8 (333-3048, 333-92795, 333-83132, 333-107061, 333-131642, and333-145816) of First State Bancorporation of our report dated March 31, 2010, with respect to the consolidated balance sheets of First State Bancorporation and subsidiary as of December 31, 2009 and 2008, and the related consolidatedstatements of operations, comprehensive income (loss), stockholders’ equity, and cash flows for each of the years in the three-year period ended December 31, 2009, which reports appear in the December 31, 2009, annual report on Form10-K of First State Bancorporation. 

Our report dated March 31, 2010 contains an explanatory paragraph stating that First StateBancorporation and its subsidiary First Community Bank (the “Bank”) entered into a written agreement, dated July 2, 2009, with their primary banking regulators that among other things, restricts certain operations, and requires theCompany and the Bank to maintain sufficient capital and to submit a capital plan. The capital plans for the Company and the Bank were not accepted by their primary banking regulators. Further declines in their capital ratios or failure tomaintain sufficient capital could expose the Company and the Bank to additional restrictions and regulatory actions, including being placed into a FDIC-administered receivership or conservatorship. These matters raise substantial doubt aboutthe Company’s ability to continue as a going concern. The consolidated financial statements do not include any adjustments that might result from the outcome of these uncertainties. 

 

Albuquerque, New Mexico

March 31, 2010
Exhibit 23.1


ERNST & YOUNG

                      o Kost  Forer  Gabbay  &  Kasierer
                        3 Aminadav St.                   o Phone: 972-3-6232525
                        Tel-Aviv 67067, Israel             Fax:   972-3-5622555





                     Consent of Independent Public Auditors



We  hereby  consent  to the  incorporation  by  reference  in  the  Registration
Statement on Form S-8 (No. 333-06246)  pertaining to the Magal stock option plan
(1993) and in the  Registration  Statement  on Form F-3 (No.  333-9050) of Magal
Security  Systems Ltd. of our report,  dated  February 10, 2004 (except for Note
10e,  which is dated  February  18, 2004 and except for Note 18,  which is dated
April 28, 2004) with respect to the consolidated  financial  statements of Magal
Security  Systems  Ltd.  included in Form 20-F for the year ended  December  31,
2003.







                                          /s/ Kost Forer Gabbay and Kasierer
Tel Aviv, Israel                              KOST FORER GABBAY & KASIERER
June 28, 2004                                 A member of Ernst & Young Global
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

February 4, 2019

RE: Product Exclusion Request Number: USTR-2018-0025-4592

OMRON Management Center of America, Inc:

The purpose of this letter is to inform you that the product exclusion request referenced 

above has been denied. As you are aware, USTR published a Federal Register notice (83 FR 

28710) on June 20, 2018, that announced the Trade Representative’s determination to impose an 

additional duty of 25 percent on certain products from China. On July 11, 2018, the Trade 

Representative published a Federal Register notice (83 FR 32181) which announced that a 

process had been established under which interested persons could request that products falling 

within a covered HTSUS subheading be excluded from the additional duties announced on June 

20.

Your request was reviewed in accordance with the factors and procedures set forth in 

Section B(1) of the July 11 notice. Based on that review, and after careful consideration, your 

request was denied because the request failed to show that the imposition of additional duties on 

the particular product would cause severe economic harm to you or other U.S. interests.

Because USTR will grant exclusion requests on a product specific basis, you may still 

benefit from a product exclusion if a similar product is granted an exclusion. Products for which 

an exclusion has been granted will be periodically announced on the USTR website. Product 

exclusions will become legally effective once published in the Federal Register. 

Sincerely,

Stephen P. Vaughn

General Counsel
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

April 12, 2019

RE: Product Exclusion Request Number: USTR-2018-0025-6525

OK International, Inc: 

I am pleased to notify you that the United States Trade Representative has determined to 

grant the above-referenced exclusion request submitted pursuant to the notice published at 83 FR 

32181 (‘July 11 notice’). The exclusion determination is set out in a formal notice which has 

been submitted to Office of the Federal Register for publication (‘the exclusion notice’). A prepublication version of the exclusion notice has been posted on the USTR website, at

https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/enforcement/301Investigations/Notice_of_Product_Exclusions

_04.15.19.pdf.

The scope of the exclusion is governed by the formal HTSUS language in the annex to 

the product exclusion notice, and not by the product descriptions set out in any particular request 

for exclusion. An exclusion in response to your request has been granted by excluding from the 

additional tariffs products covered by a specially drafted description contained in the annex to 

the product exclusion notice. 

In accordance with the July 11 notice, the exclusion applies as of the July 6, 2018 

effective date of the tariff action, and will extend for one year after the exclusion notice is 

published in the Federal Register. As stated in the exclusion notice, U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection will issue additional instructions on entry guidance and implementation.

Sincerely,

Stephen P. Vaughn

General Counsel
#### Carl Andros, Respondent, v Richard J. Roderick et al., Defendants, and Gary G. Nelson, Appellant.

Mercure, J.

Appeal (transferred to this court by order of the Appellate Division, Second Department) from an order of the Supreme Court (Dickinson, J.), entered July 28, 1989 in Putnam County, which denied defendant Gary G. Nelson’s motion for a change of venue.

Plaintiff commenced this action in Supreme Court, New York County, to recover for property damage alleged to have resulted from a five-vehicle accident which occurred in Putnam County. It is undisputed that no party to the action is a resident of this State, permitting plaintiff to select the county of venue *(see,*CPLR 503 [a]). Defendant Gary G. Nelson moved pursuant to CPLR 510 (3) for a discretionary change of venue to Putnam County. Supreme Court denied the motion and this appeal followed.

*814We affirm. The party moving for a change of venue under CPLR 510 (3) has the burden of proof and is required to supply the names, addresses and occupations of the witnesses whose convenience he claims will be affected, indicate that the prospective witnesses have been contacted and are willing to testify on his behalf and specify the substance of each witness’s testimony, which must be necessary and material *(see, Jansen v Bernhang,*149 AD2d 468, 469; *Maynard v Oakes,*144 AD2d 229). Here, the papers submitted in support of the motion failed to fulfill these requirements. Notably, in no case is the substance of the witness’s testimony indicated with sufficient particularity to permit a finding of necessity and materiality *(see, Barney v Rochester Inst. of Technology,*105 AD2d 516). Thus, it has not been demonstrated that Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying the motion.

Order affirmed, with costs. Mahoney, P. J., Casey, Weiss, Yesawich, Jr., and Mercure, JJ., concur.
[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 71 (Thursday, April 13, 1995)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Page 18778]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-9048]



-----------------------------------------------------------------------


DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
43 CFR Public Land Order 7137

[CO-930-1920-00-4357; COC-52206]


Transfer of Public Land for the Maybell Disposal Site; Colorado

AGENCY: Bureau of Land Management, Interior.

ACTION: Public land order.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: This order permanently transfers 140.49 acres of public land 
to the Department of Energy in accordance with the terms of the Uranium 
Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act of 1978 (42 U.S.C. 7916 (1988)), as 
amended.

EFFECTIVE DATE: April 13, 1995.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Doris E. Chelius, BLM Colorado State 
Office, 2850 Youngfield Street, Lakewood, Colorado 80215-7076, 303-239-
3706.
    By virtue of the authority vested in the Secretary of the Interior 
by the Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act of 1978 (42 U.S.C. 
7916 (1988)), as amended, it is ordered as follows:
    1. Subject to valid existing rights, the following described public 
land is hereby permanently transferred to the Department of Energy, and 
as a result of this transfer, the land is no longer subject to the 
operation of the general land laws, including the mining and the 
mineral leasing laws, for the Maybell Disposal Site:

Sixth Principal Meridian

T. 7 N., R. 94 W.,
    Sec. 19, lots 10, 12, 14, and 16, W\1/2\E\1/2\SW\1/4\NE\1/4\, 
W\1/2\E\1/2\NE\1/4\SW\1/4\NE\1/4\, W\1/2\SW\1/4\NE\1/4\, SE\1/
4\NW\1/4\, W\1/2\W\1/2\NE\1/4\NW\1/4\SE\1/4\, and W\1/2\NW\1/4\SE\1/
4\.

    The area described contains 140.49 acres of public land in 
Moffat County.

    2. The transfer of the above-described land to the Department of 
Energy vests in that Department full management, jurisdiction, 
responsibility, and liability for such land and all activities 
conducted therein, except as provided in paragraph 3.
    3. The Secretary of the Interior shall retain the authority to 
administer any existing claims, rights, and interests in this land 
established before the effective date of the transfer.

    Dated: April 7, 1995.
Bob Armstrong,
Assistant Secretary of the Interior.
[FR Doc. 95-9048 Filed 4-12-95; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4310-JB-P
#### Philip J. Kassover, Individually and as Executor of Nathan Kassover, Deceased, et al., Appellants, v Lawrence Kassover et al., Respondents, and Paula K. Fiedler, Intervenor-Respondent.

Order of the Supreme Court, New York County (Carol Huff, J.), entered March 5, 1990, which granted the motion of defendant the Garden City Company, Inc. for an order disqualifying the law firm of Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler as plaintiffs’ attorneys, unanimously affirmed, with costs.

Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler (Kaye Scholer) represented the corporate defendant on two separate occasions during 1986 and 1988 with respect to matters related to the claims and counterclaims advanced in both of the unconsolidated arbitration proceedings currently pending between the parties. While its activities on behalf of the corporate defendant may concern the second arbitration proceeding (numbered 13-168-00440-89) more than the first, the law firm’s representation of the plaintiffs in either matter would be equally inappropriate since the ultimate goal of both proceedings is to compel the board of directors of the corporation to accept plaintiff Philip Kassover as a director and as the representative of the Nathan Kassover family group.

A lawyer " 'may not place himself in a position where a conflicting interest may, even inadvertently, affect, or give the appearance of affecting, the obligations of the professional relationship’ ” *(Cardinale v Golinello,*43 NY2d 288, 296). The professional relationship continues between an attorney and a former client. Thus, attorneys have traditionally been prohibited from representing a party in a lawsuit where an opposing party is the lawyer’s former client *(Greene v Greene,*47 NY2d 447, 453). Finally, there is no indication that the motion to disqualify Kaye Scholer as plaintiffs’ counsel was employed solely as a maneuver by defendant corporation to stall the *403proceedings in order to gain a strategic advantage. Concur— Ross, J. P., Asch, Kassal, Wallach and Rubin, JJ.
Exhibit 32.1








CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002











I, Jerome
Mahoney, hereby certify, pursuant to and solely for the purpose of 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:





1.
            The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
      the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
and





2.
            The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
      Company.








Date:  
May 15, 2009
  By: 
/s/ Jerome
Mahoney
 Jerome
Mahoney
 President,
Chief Executive Officer and
 Chief
Financial Officer
#### STATE of Missouri, Plaintiff/Respondent, v. Ralph MOSLEY, Defendant/Appellant. Ralph MOSLEY, Movant/Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent/Respondent.

Nos. 65745, 68083.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division Five.

Aug. 20, 1996.

Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer to Supreme Court Denied Oct. 1,1996.

Robert E. Steele, Jr., Asst. Public Defender, St. Louis, for appellant.

Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen., Cheryl A Caponegro, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.

Before AHRENS, C.J., and CRANDALL, J., and CHARLES B. BLACKMAR, Senior Judge.

*ORDER*

PER CURIAM.

A jury found Ralph Mosley guilty of murder in the first degree in violation of Sec. 565.020, RSMo.1994, assault in the first degree in violation of Sec. 565.050, RSMo.1994, and two counts of armed criminal action in violation of Sec. 571.015, RSMo.1994. He was sentenced concurrently to life imprisonment without probation or parole on the murder conviction, fifteen years for assault and life for each count of armed criminal action. Post conviction relief pursuant to Rule 29.15 was denied. He appeals, but has not briefed any claims of error in the 29.15 proceeding and has therefore abandoned any claim for relief from that conviction. *State v. Nelson,*818 S.W.2d 285, 287 (Mo.App.1991).

No jurisprudential purpose would be served by a written opinion. However, the parties have been furnished with a memorandum opinion for their information only, setting forth the facts and reasons for this order.

The judgments of the trial court and motion court are affirmed in accordance with Rules 80.25(b) and 84.16(b).