[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 9 (Friday, January 13, 1995)]
[Notices]
[Pages 3281-3283]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-923]



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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket No. 50-286]


Power Authority of the State of New York; Indian Point Nuclear 
Generating Unit No. 3; Exemption

I

    The Power Authority of the State of New York (the licensee) is the 
holder of Facility Operating License No. DPR-64, which authorizes 
operation of the Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 3 (IP3). The 
license provides, among other things, that the licensee is subject to 
all rules, regulations, and orders of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(the Commission) now or hereafter in effect.
    The facility consists of a pressurized water reactor at the 
licensee's site located in Westchester County, New York.

II

    By letter dated November 30, 1993, as supplemented July 6, 1994, 
the licensee requested an exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 
Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2, which specifies requirements to 
ensure that one train of redundant equipment necessary to achieve and 
maintain hot shutdown remains free of fire damage. Specifically, the 
licensee requested an exemption from Section III.G.2.f such that the 
redundant wide-range steam [[Page 3282]] generator water level sensing 
lines and the redundant pressurizer level sensing lines, located inside 
containment, need not be separated by noncombustible radiant energy 
shields.
    The steam generator water level and the pressurizer water level are 
parameters needed to achieve and maintain safe shutdown following a 
fire. The wide-range steam generator water level sensing lines and the 
pressurizer level sensing lines transmit pressure changes from the 
steam generator and the pressurizer to their respective pressure 
transmitters.
    The redundant wide-range steam generator sensing lines are routed 
within 20 feet of each other at elevation 48'-0'' (Fire Zone 70A). The 
lines run vertically along a wall from elevation 48'-0'' to their 
respective transmitters, which are located in a common instrument rack 
at elevation 68'-0'' (Fire Zone 70A). At this point, the sensing lines 
are separated by about 2 feet. The three redundant pressurizer level 
sensing lines are spaced about 8 feet apart at elevation 117'-0'' (Fire 
Zone 86A). From here the lines are routed down the outside of the 
concrete structure surrounding the pressurizer. At elevation 95'-0'' 
(Fire Zone 86A) the lines penetrate the floor and continue down the 
inside of the crane wall to the elevation of their respective low level 
sensing lines. At this point, each reference leg is paired with its 
variable leg. The redundant lines then run in opposite directions along 
the inside of the crane wall until they penetrate the wall at 
approximately the 65'-0'' elevation (Fire Zone 70A). The sensing lines 
enter a common instrument rack on elevation 68'-0'' (Fire Zone 87A).
    The cables inside containment are rubber insulated with a glass/
asbestos braided jacket. As reported in a fire test that was 
transmitted to the NRC by letter dated November 22, 1982, and accepted 
in NRC Safety Evaluation dated February 2, 1984, the cables will not 
propagate a fire to any significant degree.
    Fire detection inside containment in Fire Zones 70A, 77A, and 71A 
at elevation 68'0'' includes four photo electric smoke detectors, one 
mounted above each reactor coolant pump. Fire suppression at this 
elevation includes nine carbon dioxide extinguishers and three water 
hose stations. In Fire Zones 70A and 71A, at elevation 46 feet, there 
are four water hoses, five carbon dioxide extinguishers, and three 
photoelectric smoke detectors located in the penetration area.
    Section III.G.2 of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50 provides options 
for the protection of cables and equipment and associated nonsafety 
circuits of redundant trains located inside noninerted containments. 
Certain segments of the wide-range steam generator water level sensing 
lines and the pressurizer level sensing lines are not provided with the 
level of fire protection required by Section III.G.2 of Appendix R to 
10 CFR Part 50. The licensee has requested an exemption from Section 
III.G.2.f which specifies that such equipment be separated by a 
noncombustible radiant energy shield.

III

    Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12, the Commission may, upon application by 
any interested person or upon its own initiative, grant exemptions from 
the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50 when (1) the exemptions are 
authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to public health and 
safety, and are consistent with the common defense and security and (2) 
when special circumstances are present as set forth in 10 CFR 
50.12(a)(2).
    The staff was concerned that the lack of radiant energy shields 
between these redundant trains of instrument sensing lines could result 
in erroneous pressurizer or steam generator level indications in the 
event of a fire. The wide-range steam generator sensing lines are 
routed within 20 feet of each other starting at elevation 48'-0'' (Fire 
Zone 70A) up into the transmitter at elevation 68'-0'' (Fire Zone 70A). 
With the exception of reactor coolant pump lube oil (discussed below), 
the maximum fire severity of the in-situ combustibles located within 20 
feet of the wide-range steam generator sensing lines is less than 6 
minutes. A fire involving these combustibles would be of limited 
magnitude and extent. In addition, the smoke and hot gases from the 
fire would be directed upwards into the higher elevations of the 
containment and away from the sensing lines. Therefore, the staff does 
not believe that these in-situ combustibles present a threat to the 
sensing lines. A transient combustible fire appears to be the only type 
of fire that could directly expose the wide-range steam generator 
lines, because transient combustibles can only be placed in the 
vicinity of the lines at the instrument rack where they converge 
(Instrument Rack 21). The licensee has addressed this potential 
transient fire exposure by providing a radiant energy shield in the 
front of the instrument rack that will protect one channel of steam 
generator wide-level instrumentation from a floor-based transient 
combustible fire at elevation 68'-0''.
    The three pressurizer sensing lines are spaced approximately 8 feet 
apart from their initiation point at elevation 117'-0'' (Fire Zone 86A) 
down the outside of the concrete structure surrounding the pressurizer 
down to the 95'-0'' level. After penetrating the 95'-0'' level (Fire 
Zone 86A) they are routed down the inside of the crane wall (Fire Zone 
70A) to the elevation of their respective low-level sensing lines. The 
reference leg is paired with its variable leg. The redundant lines then 
run in opposite directions along the inside of the crane wall until 
they penetrate the wall at about the 65'-0'' elevation (Fire Zone 70A). 
Their route is terminated upon entering a common instrument rack (Fire 
Zone 87A).
    A fire involving the cables in the vicinity of the pressurizer 
sensing lines could expose the sensing lines to elevated temperatures. 
However, it is expected that a cable fire in the vicinity of the 
sensing lines will not damage the sensing lines because of the large 
open containment and the limited potential for flame propagation along 
the cables.
    Each of the four reactor coolant pumps is provided with a 
seismically designed oil collection system that collects oil from 
pressurized and unpressurized oil leakage sites from the reactor 
coolant pump lube oil system. This provides reasonable assurance that a 
lube oil leak will be contained by the oil collection system. The oil 
collection system should prevent escaping oil from reaching potential 
hot surfaces which will significantly reduce the probability of a fire.
    Fire detection and manual fire suppression is available in the 
vicinity of the sensing lines. In the event of a fire, it is expected 
that the detector will alarm and the fire brigade will respond to 
extinguish the fire in its incipient stages.
    On the basis of its evaluation, the NRC staff concludes that a 
postulated fire in the vicinity of the redundant wide-range steam 
generator water level sensing lines and the redundant pressurizer level 
sensing lines in containment Fire Zones 70A, 77A, and 86A would not 
prevent the operators from achieving and maintaining safe shutdown. The 
NRC staff also concludes that the level of fire protection provided for 
the wide-range steam generator water level sensing lines and the 
pressurizer level sensing lines is adequate and that the lack of 
radiant energy shields is an acceptable exemption from the technical 
requirements of Section III.G.2.f of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50.
    In summary, the licensee has established that special circumstances 
[[Page 3283]] are present. The exemption request satisfies the criteria 
of 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) as follows: The underlying purpose of the 
rule is to ensure that safe shutdown can occur notwithstanding the 
possibility of a fire. Application of the rule is not necessary to 
achieve the underlying purpose because with respect to the possibility 
of a fire affecting safe shutdown, (1) the fixed combustible loading in 
containment is insignificant and the location of the sensing lines are 
remote from the fixed combustibles that do exist; (2) automatic smoke 
detectors are installed above each of the reactor coolant pumps; (3) 
personnel access to the containment is restricted during power 
operations, thus, the potential for transient combustible material to 
accumulate is low; (4) the inherent fire retardant properties of the 
power cables used in containment would minimize fire propagation; and, 
(5) the effects of a fire inside containment are bounded by the worst 
case loss-of-coolant accident analysis, thus safe shutdown would be 
achievable.

IV

    Accordingly, the Commission has determined, pursuant to 10 CFR 
50.12, that (1) the Exemption as described in Section III is authorized 
by law, will not endanger life or property, and is otherwise in the 
public interest and (2) special circumstances exist pursuant to 10 CFR 
50.12(a)(2)(ii). Therefore, the Commission hereby grants the following 
Exemption:
    (1) The Power Authority of the State of New York is exempt from the 
requirement of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, Section III.G.2.f, to the 
extent that the redundant wide-range steam generator water level 
sensing lines and the redundant pressurizer level sensing lines, 
located inside containment, need not be separated by noncombustible 
radiant energy shields.
    Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the Commission has determined that the 
granting of this Exemption will have no significant impact on the 
quality of the human environment (59 FR 11810).
    This Exemption is effective upon issuance.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 5th day of January 1995.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Herbert N. Berkow,
Acting Director, Division of Reactor Projects--I/II, Office of Nuclear 
Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 95-923 Filed 1-12-95; 8:45 am]
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