### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT KNOXVI LLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs Jul y 27, 200 4

STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. CL INTON WAD E KET RON

Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for K nox Coun ty No. 69967 Richard Baumgar tner, Judge

No. E2003-02455-CC A-R3- CD - F iled Novem ber 3, 2004

Th e De fe nd a nt, Clin tonWad e Ke tr on , p le d g uil ty to on e c ou nt o f o pe ratin g a mot or ve hic le wh ile adjudg ed to be a

Habitual Motor Ve hicle Of fend er (HMVO) , a Class E fe lony , and one c ount of criminal impersonation, a Class B misdemea nor. Pursuant to a plea ag ree ment the Def

endant wa s
se nte nc e d to c on c ur

re nt t e rm s o f o ne y e ar f

or his fe lon y

HM VO c on vic tio n a ndsix mo nth s f or his misdemeanor c riminal impersonation conviction. The trial court denie d alternative sentenc ing and order ed the Defe ndant t o serve his sentenc es i n confine ment. The De fendant raises only one issue on app eal: The trial court e rre d in sentencing the Def endant to serve his one y ear felony sentenc e wi th the Te nn e sse e De pa

rt me nt o f C or

re c tio ns a ndin s e nte nc ing him to s ix mon ths in the c ou nty ja il fo r h is mis de me a no r c on vic tio n in ste a d o f p la c ing him on e nh a nc e d p ro batio n o r i mpo sin g so me oth e r f orm of a lte rn a tiv e se nte nc e . We a ff irm th e jud g me nts of

thetria l c ou rt

. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nts of

the Cr im inal Cou rt A ff irm ed

D AVI D H. W EL L ES , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court , i n which J ER R Y L. S MI TH and J AM ES C UR WO OD W I TT , J R ., J J ., joined.

J oe M. F elknor, Knoxvill e, Te nnessee , for the a ppellant, Clinton W ade K etron.

Paul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l a nd Re po rt e r; Re ne e W. T urne r, As sis ta nt A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; Ra nd a ll E . N ic ho ls, Di stric t A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; andPaula

Ham, A ssi stant D ist

ri c t A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l, for the a ppellee, State of

Tenne ssee.

OP IN ION

FACTS

On the eve ning of

J uly 13, 1999, Detec tive J im Murray of the Knoxvi lle Police Depa rtment sto pp e d th e De fe nd a nt f

or drivi ng on thewr on g sid e of thero a d a nddrivi ng wi th a de fe c tiv e ta ill ig ht. The detec tive noticed that the Def endant had an odor of a lcohol about him and observe d other fa ctors“I t i s unl awf ul fo r any p ers o n t o o p erat e any m o t o r vehi cl e i n t hi s st at e whi l e t he judgm ent or o rder o f t he co urt 1

p ro h ib iti n g the o p e ra tio n re m a ins in e ff e c t.” T e n n . C o d e A n n . § 5 5 -1 0 -6 1 6 (a ).

“A p erso n c o m m i t s crim i na l i m p erso na t i o n w ho , w i t h int en t t o i nju re o r d efrau d an o t he r p erso n: A ssum es a 2
false id e n tit y.” T e n n . C o d e A n n . § 3 9 -1 6 -3 0 1 , (a )( 1 ).
-2- in his f a c e , e y e s a n d s p e e c h th a t i n d ic a te d h e w a s in to xic a te d

. T h e D e f e n d a n t f a ls e ly id e n tif ied himself as “Te rry

Ketron,” who was later de termined to be the Def endant’ s brother. Adriver’ s license photo I .D. che ck re veale d that the Def endant w as ac tually

Clint on Ketron, and additional b ac k gro u n d ch ec k s re v ea l ed t h e D ef en d an th ad b ee n ad

j u d i ca t ed a H ab i tu al M otor Vehic le Off ender

.
An indictment was re turned a g ainst the Def endant a lleg ing the commission of two criminal offe nses pertaining to the J uly 13, 1999, incident. Count one allege d the Def endant unlaw fully

and fe l o n i o u s l y d r o v e a m o t o r v e h i c l e a f t e r h a v i n g b e e n a d

j u d g e d t o b e a H ab i t u a l M o tor Ve hic le Offe nder in violation of Tenne ssee Code A nnotated 55-10- 616. Count two alleg ed the De fendant 1 unlawfully

and with intent to defra

ud assumed a f

alse name when arr ested by Detec tive J im Murray in violation of TennesseeCode Annotated 39- 16-301. 2

I n J une of 2003, the Def

endant and the State enter ed into a written plea ag ree ment wher eby the Def endant would plea d g uiltyto both char g es, and the State would drop a se parate fe lony HMVO char g e and a

misdemeanor c harg e of driving on a revoke d licens e, both pending ag ainst the Def endant f rom a sepa

rate incident that occ urre d in November of 2000. The plea ag ree ment further
s t i p u l at ed t h att h e D ef

en d an two u l d re ce i v e o n e y ear f o r t h e fe l o n y HM VO co n v i ct i o n as a R an ge I stand ard offende r, and w ould rec eive a six -month sentencefor his misdemeanor criminal impersonation convicti o n t o b e served conc urre ntly with the one y ear

felony sentenc e. While the ple a a g re e me nt p ro vid e d th a t th e De fe nd a nt w ou ld b e c on sid e re d a s a c a nd idate fo r p ro batio n, it d id
no t sp e c if y the ma nn e r i n w hic h th e se nte nc e s w ou ld b e se rv e d b ut r a the r l e ft thi s d e te rm inatio n to thedis c re tio n o f the tria l c ou rt

. Following a plea

ag ree ment submissi on hearing in June of 2003, the trial court acc epted the plea a g ree ment and found the Def endant g uilty of the two offe nses. On September 5, 2003, the trial
c o u rth e l d a

s e n t e n c i n g h e ari n g

. T h e S t a t e p r e s e n t e d a s a w i t n e s s O f

f i c e r F l o r e s o f t h e K no xvill e Police Depa

rtment, who testified that on the eve ning of J une 3, 2003, he obse rved the Def endant top a hill and then stop the vehic le he wa s driving very abruptly when he came into view of the police

. Offic er F lores next observed the D efe ndant swapping seats with t he passeng er a s he appr oache d the vehicle. T he De fendant could not produce a valid drive r’s lice nce and was plac ed in custody

.
At the conclusion of the sentenc ing hearing, the trial court announced its finding s and ruled from the bench. After first acknow ledg ing that it ha d “the power to put [t he Def endant] on enhanc ed probation” if it so chose , the cour t found that the De fendant’s criminal history and inability to abide by the conditions of his rele ase prog ram, as evidenc e by his continued unlawful ope ration of a motor vehicle, w eig hed ag ainst g ranting probati o n . The c ourt enter ed a judg ment sentenc ing the Def endant to one y ear

in the custody of the Tenne ssee Depa rtment of Correc tion with rele ase elig ibilit y afte r serving 30% of his sentenc e for the felony HMVO conviction, and si x months for the misdemeanorT h e D ef en dan t c l ai ms t h at t h e t r i al c ou r t e r r ed wh en i t fou n d t h e D ef en dan t h ad a fel on y H M V O c on v i ct i on 3
in B lo u n t C o unt y , and t hat hi s June 3 , 20 0 3 , H M V O vi o l at i o n oc curred whil e t he sent enci ng heari ng was “ p e n d ing .” T h e D e fen d a n t a rg u e s tha t th e p re -se n te n c e r e p o rt re lied o n b y th e tr ia l c o u rt id e n tif ie s the B lo u n t C o u n ty vio la tio n o n ly

as “ H M O ” an d i s t h er ef or e i n con cl u s i v e. H owe v er , w e f i n d t h at thi s co nvi ct i on a ppea r s t o be a f el on y a s i t c ar r i ed a
s ent enc e of

one y ear an d t hat t he t r i al j udge i s pres umed t o r ecogn i ze and un ders t and t he codes r out i nel y us ed i n pr esent ence rep o rt s. W e f

urt her no t e t hat t he D efend ant p res ent ed no evi d ence i nd i cat i ng he was not co nvi ct ed of a fel o ny H M V O vio la tio n in B lo u n t C o u n ty. T he D efend ant al so cl ai m s t hat b ecause hi s June 3, 2 0 0 3 , H M V O vi o l at i o n o ccurred “al m o st t wo (2) weeks p rio r” to his e n try o f a g u ilt y p le a , (w h ic h , h e a rg u e s, is re q u ire d b e fo re “se n te n c ing ” c a n b e g in) the vio la tio n tec h n ic a lly d i d n ot oc cu r w h i l e t h e s en t en ci n g h ea r i n g w as “ pen di n g ” as s t at ed by t h e cou r t

. W e f i n d t h i s s ema n t i ca l a r gum ent

u n p e rs u a siv e

. -3- criminal impersonation conviction to be serve d concur rently with the felony sentenc e. The Def endant timely

filed a N otice of A ppeal.

A N A LY S IS The De fendant arg ues that the trial co u rt err ed in sentenc ing him to servehis effe ctive
se nte nc e of

on e y e a r in a sta te pe nit e nti ary

ins te a d o f o n p ro batio n o r thr ou g h s pli t c on fi ne me nt w ith time served in the Knox CountyJ ail. The De fendant further asserts that the trial court’s r uling should not be p re s u m ed cor rec t because it made e ssential finding s of fa ct not supported by the
rec ord. Finally , the Def endant c laims t h at b o t h the evidenc e and a proper application of 3 T e n n e s s e e ’ s s e n te n c in g p r o c e d u r e s w o u ldr e q u ir e a lt e r n a ti v e s e n te n c in g f o r th e D e f e n d a nt. W e disag ree

.
Be fore a trial c ourt imposes a sentence upon a convicted criminal defe ndant, i t must consider (a) the evidenc e adduc ed at the trial and the sentenc ing he aring ; (b) the pr esente nce r eport; (c ) the principles of se ntencing and ar g uments as to sentenc ing a lternatives; (d) the nature and char acte ristics of the criminal conduct involved; (e) evidenc e and inf ormation offe red by

the parties on the enhanceme nt and mitigating fac tors set forth in Tenne ssee Code Annotated se ctions 40-35- 113 and 40-35- 114; and (f) any statement th e d ef

en d an t wishes to make in the de fendant’s own behalf about sentenc ing. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210( b); State v. I mfeld, 70 S.W.3d 698, 704 (T e nn . 2 00 2) . T o f

a c ili tate app e llate re vie w, thetria l c ou rt is requ ire d to pla c e on there c or d it s
rea sons for imposing the specific sentenc e, in cl u d ing the identification of the mitig ating and enhanc ement fa ctors found, the s p ec i fi c facts supporting eac h enhanc ement fa ctor found, and the
me tho d b y

wh ic h th e mitig a tin g a nde nh a nc e me nt f a c tor s h a vebe e n e va luated and bal a nc e d in determining the se ntence . See State v. Samuels, 44 S.W.3d 489, 492 (Tenn. 2001).
Upon a c halleng e to the sente nce imposed, this court has a duty to conduct a denovo revie w of t he sentence with a presumption that the determinations made by the trial court are corr ect. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-401(d) . Howeve r, this presumption “is conditioned upon the af firmative sh ow ing in there c or d th a t th e tria l c ou rt c on sid e re d th e se nte nc ing princ ipl e s a nda ll r e le va nt f a c ts and cir cumstance s.” State v. Ashby , 823 S.W .2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991) . I f our r eview r efle cts that the trial court followed the statutory sentenc ing pr ocedur e, that the court imposed a lawf ul sentence afte r having g i v en due conside ration and pr oper w eig ht to the fac tors and princ iples set out under the s entenc ing law, and that the t rial court’s finding s of fa ct ar e ade quately supported by

the re cord,-4-

then the pre sumption i s applicable , and we may not modify

the s en t en ce ev en if we would have pr e fe rr e d a

dif fe re nt r e su lt. Se e State v. Pik e , 97 8 S. W.2 d 9 04 app . at 92 6- 27 (T e nn . 1 99 8) . We wi ll uphold the sentenc e imposed by the tri al co u rt i f (1 ) the sente nce c omplies with the purposes and principles of the 1989 Sentencing Act, and ( 2) the trial c ourt’s finding s are adequately supported by th e reco rd. Se e State v. Arne tt, 49 S.W. 3d25 0, 25 7 ( Te nn . 2 00 1) . T he bu rd e n o f s ho wi ng that a sentenc e is imprope r is upon the appea ling party

. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-40 1 S en t en cing Commi ssion Com ments; Arnett, 49 S.W.3d at 257.

Neve rtheless, a

defe ndant who does not posse ss a criminal history

showing a cle ar disre g ard fo r s oc ie ty ’s la ws a nd mor a ls, wh o ha s not fa ile d pa st re ha bil itatio n ef

fo rt s, a nd wh o “is a n e sp e c ia lly mit ig a te d o r sta nd ard of

fe nd e r co nv ic te d of a C la ss C , D , o r Efe lon y is p re su me d to be a

fa vo ra ble candidate for a lternative se ntencing options in the a bsence of evide nce to the c ontrary .” Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35-1 0 2 (6 ). S ee als o State v. Fields, 40 S.W.3d 435, 440 (Tenn. 2001). The following
c on sid e ratio ns pr ov ideg uid a nc e re g ard ing wh a t con sti tut e s “e vid e nc e to the c on tr ary ” wh ic h w ou ld
re b u tt h e p re s u m p t i o n o f a l t er n at i v e s en t en ci n g:
(A) Confinement is ne cessa ry to pr otect society by restraining a defe ndant who has
a lon g his tory

of c ri min a l c on du c t; (B ) Confinement is nec essary to avoid depreciating the seriousness of the offe nse or
c on fi ne me nt i s p art ic ula

rl y su ite d to p ro vid e a n e ff

e c tiv e de te rr e nc e to o the rs lik e ly to commit si milar offe nses; or (C) Mea sures less re st rictive than c onfinement ha ve fr equently or re cently

been applied unsucc essfully

to the defe ndant[.]
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-103(1) ; see a lso St ate v. Hoope r, 29 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tenn. 2000).

Additionally , the principles of sentenc ing r efle ct that the sente nce should be no g reater than that deserved for the offe nse committed and should be the least seve re me asure nece ssary to achieve the purposes f

or which the sentenc e is imposed. See Te nn. Code Ann. § 40- 3 5 -1 03(2), ( 4). The court should also consider the def endant’ s po t en t i al fo r re habilitation or treatment in dete rmining the appr opriate se ntence . See id. § 40-35-103( 5).

The trial c ourt denied the Def endant a lternative se ntencing beca use of the D ef

en dant’s
c ri min a l hi sto ry , be c aus e he wa s a po or c a nd idate fo r r e ha

bil itatio n a s e vid e nc e d b y his pr op e ns ity for c ontinued criminal vi olations while not incar cer ated, and to protec t the public. The tria l court also clea rly place d on the record its rea sons for deny ing alternative sentenc ing. After c onsidering thee vid e nc e pr e se nte d at th e se nte nc ing he ari ng , th e tria l ju dg e ma de thefo llo wi ng fi nd ing s:

He [the Def

endant] has a- -as I

count them, one, tw o , t h ree , four, f ive, six , seven, eig ht, nine, ten, eleve n--e leven prior misdemeanor s; one, two, three , four, five of w hich ar e DUI s. He ha s two pri o r fe l o n y convictions, one in 1978 for which he w ent to the penitentiary

and a violation of ha

bitual motor vehicle off

ender law in 1996 over

in Blount County

. He was char g ed with this offe nse which occur red in 2000 and has now suff ere d a-5-

conviction for violation of habitual motor vehicle offende r l aw which he is here today to be sentenc ed on. Pe nd ing thi s se nte nc ing he ari ng

-- thi s c a se we nt on fo r a lon g tim e , a ndpe nd ing thi s
se nt e n c i n g h e ar i n g

- - t h e C o u rtf i n d s t h e r e ’ s r e a s o n ab l e b a s i s b a s e d o n O f f i c e r F l or e s’ testimonyto conclude that Mr. Ketron was again out driving while t his sentenc ing he aring was pe nding, in violation of his driving privileg es having been r evoked. I think it’s ti me for y ou to go to the pe nitentiary , Mr. Ketr on.

Furthermore , in the “spec ial conditions” section of the J udg ment, the trial court noted that it denied the Def endant’ s application for

probation bec ause the evidenc e re quired imprisonment of the Def endant “ for his own be st interest and e specia lly for the pr otection of the public.”

We find sufficient e vidence in the rec ord to support the dec ision of the trial court to deny the Def endant a sentenc ing a lternative to inca rce rat i o n an d find no rea son to doubt the corre ctness of the determinations made by the trial court. The re cord on appea l r efle cts that the Def endant had an
e xten siv e c ri min a l his tory that e vid e nc e d a c le ar dis re g ard fo r so c ie ta l la ws a nd mor a ls. At thetim e of his sentenc ing the Def

endant ha d a criminal recor d that spanned four decade s with no less than
e le ve n mi sd e me a no r c on vic tio ns , tw o f e lon y c on vic tio ns , a nd sev eral ch arg e s p e nd ing . H is convictions rang ed fr om simpl e tra ffic violations to five DUI s and drug possession. Moreover , the De fe nd a nt h a s a

his tory of un la wf ull y drivi ng a ndthe n b e ing un truth fu l to thepo lic e wh e n c aug ht,
as evidenc ed by his two rec ent convictions for criminal impersonation, one in the ca se at ha nd and another in 2000. This evidenc e of the Defenda nt’s leng thy and continually g rowing criminal history
su pp ort a se nte nc e of inc arc e ratio n. Se e Te nn . Code An n. § 40- 35 -1 02 (5 ); se e a lso State v. B ott oms , 87 S.W .3d 95, 102-03 (Te nn. Crim. App. 2001) (the de fendant’s history of criminal conduct re butted his presumed e ligibility

for pr obation and supported incarc eration for his Class C felony conviction to which he ha d enter ed a g uiltyplea)

.
The evidence on rec ord supports the trial c ourt’s sentenc e of c onfinement be cause previous less restric tive measure s had bee n unsucce ssful. See Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 103(1)( C). The
e vid e nc e a lso su pp orts c on fi ne me nt b e c aus e pa st e ff orts at r e ha

bil itatio n wi th ou t r e so rt ing to confine me n t h a v e f

a il e d , r e n d e r in g th e D e f

e n d a n t a p o o r c a n d id a tef

o r r e h a b il it a ti o n

. Se e T enn. Code Ann. §§ 40-35- 1 0 2 (5 ); 40-35-103( 5). See a lso St ate v. B ottoms, 87 S .W.3d at 104-05 (potential for

reha bilitation or lack there of was proper c onsideration in a de cision to deny alternative sentenc ing to a

defe ndant who wa s presumptively elig ible for pr obation where the de fendant was unable to re frain from illeg al activity ); State v. Elam, 7 S.W .3d 103, 106 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999) (the de fendant’s inabilityto abide by sentenc es involving re lease into the communitysupported trial court’s de nial of alternative sente ncing ).

F ina lly , th e e vid e nc e on re c or d s up port s th e tria l c ou rt ’s inc arc e ratio n o f the De fe nd a nt t o protec t the public

. I n h i s ap p ell ate brief, the D efe ndant admits it is “obvious” from his criminal
rec ord that he ha s two problems: “[the Def endant] has cle arly

had an a lcohol abuse pr oblem and he has continued to drive contra ry to the court orde r dec laring him to be an HMVO and making it ill eg al for him to operate a vehicle.” Additionally , the t rial court rec og nized that five of the De fendant’s
e le ve n mi sd e me a no r c on vic tio ns we refo r D UI s. Th e e vid e nc e on re c or d a lso re ve a ls that in theJuly-6-

1999 inciden t t h at l ed to t he De fendant’s felony HMVO c onviction in the caseat hand, the Defendant e x hibited signs of be ing intoxicated. The e vidence on rec ord re veals a clea r pattern of criminal conduc t on the part of the Def endant whic h place s the publ ic s afe ty at risk. The trial c ourt
was we ll within i ts discretion to sentence t h e De fe n d an t to confinement for the protec tion of the public. See Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 103(1)( A).

We find the Defenda nt has failed to demonstrate that the s entenc e im posed by the t rial court
wa s e rr on e ou s. We fu rthe r fi nd that the tria l c ou rt c omp lie d wi th the se nte nc ing g uid e lin e s a ndits finding are supported by

the re cord. Acc ording ly , we conclude that the trial court ne ither er red nor abused its discre tion. This is sue has no merit.

CONCLUSI ON Ha vin g fo un d n o e rr or , w e a ff irm th e jud g me nt o f the tria l c ou rt

.

___________________________________ DAVID H. WELLES, J UDGE