FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

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No. 1D17-4173

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HALA M. FARID,

Appellant,

v.

CLAUDE RABBATH,

Appellee.

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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon County.

Dawn Caloca-Johnson, Judge.

May 16, 2019

PER CURIAM.

Hala M. Farid, the former wife, appeals an order 

redistributing property and finding both parties in violation of the 

equitable distribution terms in the final judgment. Because the 

trial court’s order is an impermissible modification of the final 

judgment in an enforcement proceeding, we reverse.

A Final Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage was issued on 

November 29, 2007, and a Supplemental Final Judgment entered 

in 2010. As part of the equitable distribution, the former husband, 

Claude Rabbath, was awarded personal property shipped from 

Kuwait, which the court valued at $100,000. The former husband 

was then ordered to pay the former wife $111,357.80 over the 

following four years at a rate of $2,319.95. monthly. 
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On March 16, 2016, the former wife filed a Verified Motion for 

Civil Contempt and Enforcement, alleging the former husband had 

willfully failed to comply with the final order by not making any 

payments toward the equitable property distribution. Thereafter, 

on May 13, 2016, the former husband filed a Verified Motion for 

Enforcement, Contempt and Attorney’s Fees and Costs. The 

former husband requested the former wife be held in contempt for 

failing to deliver the $100,000 in personal property he was 

awarded.

At the enforcement hearing, the trial court found that both 

parties had violated the terms of the final judgment. However, 

instead of enforcing the final judgment, the trial court changed the 

terms of distribution. The former wife was awarded ownership of 

the personal property shipped from Kuwait, and the former 

husband a $100,000 credit for the property awarded to the former

wife against his equitable distribution equalization payment of 

$111,357.80. The former husband was ordered to pay the balance, 

$11,357.80, plus interest, and minus alimony and child support 

overpayment.

This Court reviews orders on motions for enforcement for 

abuse of discretion. See Dugan v. Dugan, 498 So. 2d 989, 991 (Fla. 

1st DCA 1986). However, where a trial judge fails to apply the 

correct legal rule, the action is erroneous as a matter of law. 

Kennedy v. Kennedy, 622 So. 2d 1033, 1034 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993).

“A party’s property rights, if determined by a final judgment 

of dissolution of marriage, are fixed as a matter of law by the 

judgment, unless there is a reservation of jurisdiction.” Fort v. 

Fort, 951 So. 2d 1020, 1022 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007); see also Bridges 

v. Bridges, 848 So. 2d 403, 404 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (reversing the 

lower court when, in an attempt to enforce the final judgment of 

dissolution of marriage, the lower court changed the former wife’s 

award of tangible property into an award of money damages); 

Janovic v. Janovic, 814 So. 2d 1096, 1100-01 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) 

(“A trial court may not, in the guise of enforcement proceeding 

readdress the distribution of property when the property has been 

previously distributed . . .”). Once the final judgment becomes 

final, the lower court does not retain the power to modify the 
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equitable distribution of property. McEachin v. McEachin, 154 So. 

2d 894, 896 (Fla. 1st DCA 1963).

Here, the parties’ interest in the property was set when the 

final judgment was entered—the former wife had a property 

interest in the $111,357.80 equalization payment; and the former 

husband had a property interest in the personal property shipped 

from Kuwait. Thus, unless there was a reservation of jurisdiction 

over the distribution of property by the final judgment of 

dissolution, the final judgment establishing property rights could 

not be modified. See Fort, 951 So. 2d 1020 (reversed finding the 

lower court improperly “shuffled” property rights, which were 

settled at final judgment, where there was no reservation of 

jurisdiction). The final judgment states, “This Court reserves 

jurisdiction to modify and enforce terms [of] this final judgment . . 

. .” However, a “blanket reservation of jurisdiction for any 

modification of the final judgment is erroneous as a matter of law 

and legally unnecessary.” Knecht v. Palmer, 252 So. 3d 842, 847

(Fla. 5th DCA 2018); see also Daoud v. Daoud, 153 So. 3d 312, 312

(Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (“the general reservation of jurisdiction for the 

enforcement of its dissolution judgment does not empower a trial

court to address or redistribute vested property between the 

parties.”); Encarnacion v. Encarnacion, 877 So. 2d 960, 963 (Fla. 

5th DCA 2004) (“At the time a judgment of dissolution of marriage 

becomes final, the parties’ property rights, if determined by the 

judgment, are fixed as a matter of law . . . [and] a trial court lacks 

jurisdiction . . . to determine property rights, unless the final 

judgment reserves jurisdiction for a specific purpose regarding 

identified property.”). Thus, because the reservation of rights here 

is nothing more than a blanket reservation of jurisdiction, it fails 

to provide the lower court the jurisdiction needed to modify the 

final judgment. Therefore, the trial court erred when it “shuffled” 

the property interests previously determined in the final judgment

when neither party had properly plead for modification, and we 

reverse this portion of the order on appeal.

The trial court’s finding that the former wife violated the final 

judgment is supported by competent, substantial evidence; thus, 

we affirm this issue. The remaining issues raised by the former 

wife are rendered moot by this opinion.
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Accordingly, we AFFIRM in part, REVERSE in part, and 

REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

ROWE, KELSEY, and M.K. THOMAS, JJ., concur.

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Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

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Summer N. Boyd of the Law Office of Summer Boyd, Jacksonville,

for Appellant.

Claude Rabbath, pro se, Appellee.