No. 14608 

IN THE SUPREME COW OF THE ST= OF PONTANA 

1979 

STATE OF ICWTANA, 

Plaintiff and Respondent, 

THOMAS CRAIG HILrn, 

Defendant and Appellant. 

Appeal fm: District Court of the Third Judicial District, 

Hon. Robert J. Boyd, Judge presiding. 

Counsel of Record: 

For Appellant: 

Byron Boggs argued, Anaconda, Mntana 

For Respondent: 

Hon. Mike Greely, Attomey General, Helena, bbntana 

Chris Theeten argued, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, 

Mntana 

John Radonich, County Attorney, Anaconda, Mntana 

Kevin Campana argued, Deputy County Attomey, Anaconda, Mntana 

submitted: June 4, 1979 

Decided: -mk 2 3 1979 

JIJi 3 jcjm Filed: 
Mr. Chief Justice Frank I. Haswell delivered the Opinion of 

the Court. 

This appeal is from an order of the District Court for 

Deer Lodge County denying defendant's motion to withdraw a plea 

of guilty to the charge of first degree murder. 

Defendant confessed that on October 12, 1973, he forced 

Elwood Maney, a resident of Anaconda, into the trunk of a car, 

drove him into the surrounding countryside and shot him. After 

his arrest, he entered a plea of not guilty and gave notice 

of his intention to rely on the defense of mental disease or 

defect. He was then committed to Warm Springs State Hospital 

for examination and testing. While at the hospital, he was 

examined by Dr. M. F. Gracia, a psychiatrist, who found him 

competent to stand trial, able to appreciate the criminality of 

his conduct and capable of conforming his conduct to the requirements 

of law. Due to behavioral problems at the hospital he was transferred 

to the State Prison at Deer Lodge where he was examined by Dr. 

Dean Beismeyer, a clinical psychologist. Dr. Beismeyer agreed 

with Dr. Gracia's findings regarding defendant's competency to 

stand trial but testified that in 1973, he felt there was "a 

very good question about his ability to be [criminally] responsible." 

Dr. Beismeyer's report did not influence Dr. Gracia to alter his 

opinion. In addition, defendant was examined by Dr. Vern Cressey, 

a psychiatrist who had previously treated him. Dr. Cressey's 

report concurred with Dr. Gracia's. 

After the psychiatric reports were filed, defendant withdrew 

his plea of not guilty and pleaded guilty to first degree murder 

on March 27, 1974. Although no transcript of these District 

Court proceedings is available, the minute entry is as follows: 

"State is ready to proceed, nefendant is ready to 

proceed with hearing. This being the time set for 

hearing change of plea. Mr. Scanlon one of counsel 

for Defendant moved the Court that Defendant be 

allowed to change plea of Not Guilty of First Degree 
Murder to plea of Guilty. Mr. Hilton is present 

at this time with his counsel. State has no objection Mr. Hilton was questioned by the Court. Defendant was advised of his right to trial by Jury, 

witnesses State offered dismissal of Count #I1 

Defense counsel had opportunity to seek all evidence. 

Mr. Yelsa counsel for State of Montana gave summary 

of incident which took place, the time of the murder. 

Defendant was asked if he wished to enter a plea 

at this time to which he answered, yes. Let the 

records show that the Court makes the following 

findings : 

"(1) That the Defendant is competent to enter a plea. 

"(2) That this is knowingly made with the understanding of the nature of the charge and of the direct 

consequences. 

" (3) That it is voluntary and made without any improper inducements or conditions and free from 

coersion [sic] with the understanding of the nature 

of the charge and indirect consequences. 

"That the plea was made after consultation with 

competent counsel. 

"That there is factual bases for the plea and at 

this time the Court will accept a motion from the 

County Attorney for dismissal of Count #II. Court 

accepts the plea of guilty. Defendant waived 2 days 

to enter plea. Upon conclusions of all testimony, 

the Defendant was sentenced to commitment to 

Montana State Penitentiary for the rest of His Natural 

Life. Defendant was then delivered to the custody 

of the Sheriff of Deer Lodge County for delivery to 

Montana State Prison commitment to State Penitentiary signed and filed. " 

In September 1978, defendant filed pro se motions for 

additional psychiatric examination, appointment of counsel and 

for vacation of his guilty plea and sentence. From the motion 

it is clear that defendant desires to stand trial and rely on the 

defense of mental disease or defect. Counsel was appointed and 

advised defendant that his guilty plea would have to be withdrawn 

before trial could take place. A hearing on the matter was held 

in November 1975, before the Honorable Robert Boyd in the District 

Court for Deer Lodge County. 

Dr. Beismeyer testified that he now felt there was a "very 

high probability" that defendant suffered from a mental disease 

"at the instance of the crime" and that when the crime was 
allegedly committed, he did not appreciate the criminality of 

his conduct and was not able to make his conduct conform to 

the requirements of law. Defendant testified that he pleaded 

guilty for three reasons: (1) He was afraid to return to 

Anaconda for trial because of fear of personal injury to himself. 

(2) He had formed an intimate relationship with another inmate 

at the prison and his main concern at the time was to continue 

the relationship. (3) At the time he was unable to effectively 

communicate with the appointed psychiatrists and psychologists but 

is now able to accept his possible insanity. 

Judge Boyd found, concluded and ruled as follows: 

"I am sure that after five years in the prison 

there are relatively few prisoners who would not be 

willing to explore any avenue possible to them to 

relieve themselves of that imprisonment. I find 

it extremely difficult to buy Mr. Hilton's humanitarian reasons for wanting to be in the prison when 

I consider the related circumstances of the offense, 

including lying in wait, stuffing Mr. Maney in the 

trunk of his car and then putting a shotgun to his 

head, all of which took a substantial period of time. 

"I do not believe that if the testimony of Dr. 

Beismeyer had been presented to me at the same time 

as the reports of the psychiatrists who have testified that I would come to any other or different 

conclusion and would still find that and do still 

find that Mr. Hilton was competent to enter a plea 

at the time that he entered the plea, that he did 

it freely and voluntarily, that he had consultation 

of competent counsel, that by so doing he waived 

any technical defenses that he might have. 

"The motion for additional psychiatric evaluations 

is denied. 

"The motion to withdraw the plea of guilty and 

enter a plea of not guilty by reason of mental disease 

or defect is likewise denied." 

The sole issue faced by this Court is whether the District 

Court erred in denying defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty 

plea. We hold it did not. 

Section 46-16-105 (2) PICA provides : 

"At any time before or after judgment the court 

may, for good cause shown, permit the plea of guilty 

to be withdrawn and a plea of not guilty substituted. " 
Such requests are addressed to the sound discretion of the 

trial court and are subject to review only where an abuse of 

discretion is shown. State v. pepperling (1978), Mont . 

Various circumstances surrounding the entry of a plea, 

mandate withdrawal of a guilty plea. 

A plea may be withdrawn if defendant is persuaded or coerced 

into pleading guilty by his attorney, State v. Nicholas (1912), 

46 Mont. 470, 472-473, 128 P. 543, 544, or if the plea is 

entered involuntarily or by one not competent to know the consequences of his action or by one who is induced to plead guilty 

by "fear, persuasion, promise or ignorance." State ex rel. Foot 

81 Mont. 

v. District Court et al. (1928),/495, 504, 263 P. 979, 982. 

Likewise, if the plea is entered because of mistake or apprehension, 

it may be withdrawn. State v. McAllister (1934), 96 Mont. 348, 

353, 30 P.2d 821, 823. The thread which runs throughout the 

cases is that the plea must be entered voluntarily and with an 

understanding of the nature of the action. State v. Mack (1958), 

134 Mont. 301, 330 P.2d 968; State v. McBane (19541, 128 Mont. 

369, 275 P.2d 218; State v. Casaras (1937), 104 Mont. 404, 66 

P.2d 774. It is to these questions that the District Court's 

discretion is addressed. State v. Pepperling, supra. 

"The fundamental purpose of allowing the withdrawal 

of a plea of guilty is to prevent the possibility 

of convicting an innocent man. Therefore, a plea 

of guilty need be deemed involuntary only where it 

appears that the defendant was laboring under such 

a strong inducement, fundamental mistakes, or 

serious mental condition that the possibility exists 

he may have pleaded guilty to a crime of which he 

is innocent. (Citing cases.)" State v. Pelke 

(1964), 143 Mont. 262, 271, 389 P.2d 164, 169. 

The most recent case on point is State v. Huttinger (19791, 

Mon t . , 595 P.2d 363, 36 St.Rep. 945. In that case, 

we found an abuse of discretion in the trial court's refusal to 

allow a withdrawal of the plea. Our decision was based primarily 
on the fact that the interrogation by the judge was inadequate 

to determine if Huttinger's plea was truly voluntarily and 

freely entered. 

In the instant case, there is no contention that the 

guilty plea was involuntary or unintelligently entered. The 

thrust of defendant's argument is that new evidence showing 

him to be mentally incompetent at the time of the alleged crime 

mandates the vacation of his plea. From our examination of the 

record we are unable to agree that any new evidence exists. Dr. 

Beismeyer testified that in 1973 he believdthere was a "good 

question" as to whether defendant was criminally responsible. 

By 1978 the "good question" had evolved into a "high probability". 

Once a defendant properly pleads guilty he waives all factual 

defenses as well as constitutional violations which occur prior 

to the plea. State v. Turcotte (1974), 164 Mont. 426, 428, 524 

P.2d 787, 788. Thereafter, "[hle may only attack the voluntary 

and intelligent character of his plea . . ." Tollett v. Henderson 

(1973), 411 U.S. 258, 267, 93 S.Ct. 1602, 1608, 36 L.Ed.2d 235, 

243; Pepperling, 582 P.2d at 346, 35 St.Rep. at 1079; Turcotte, 

164 Mont. at 428, 524 P.2d at 789. 

In Falu v. United States (S.D. N.Y. 1969), 308 F.Supp. 

1051, aff'd 421 F.2d 687, the court held: 

"[The] contention [that he was not criminally 

responsible for the crime because of insanity] 

was waived when petitioner, in full possession 

of his faculties and represented by able counsel, 

freely, voluntarily and intelligently pleaded 

guilty to the crime charged. " 

In State v. Barber (1972), 262 La. 443, 263 So.2d 719, the 

facts were nearly identical to those here. Defendant pleaded 

not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity and was found, 

by a sanity commission, to be mentally competent. He withdrew 

his plea and entered a guilty plea. Upon request to withdraw 

the plea, the Court said: 
"A plea of guilty waives all defects prior to the 

plea except those jurisdictional defects which 

appear on the face of the proceedings." Barber, 

263 So.2d at 719. 

At the time defendant entered the guilty plea, the 

District Court found he did so freely and voluntarily. The 

finding was repeated upon defendant's motion to withdraw and 

was not an abuse of discretion by the trial court. Thus, it 

is not subject to attack. State v. Nance (1947), 120 Mont. 

152, 184 P.2d 554. Judge Boyd, as the trier of the facts, 

determined the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to 

be given their testimony. He was well within his powers when 

he discounted defendant's asserted "humanitarian reasons" for 

pleading guilty and dismissed them as a cause of involuntariness. 

Likewise he was correct in viewing Beismeyer's testimony as 

pertinent only to defendant's mental state when he entered the 

plea. 

As the trier of fact, Judge Boyd was able to believe some 

witnesses and disbelieve others. He recited that Beismeyer's 

testimony did not influence him to change his mind about the 

voluntary nature of defendant's plea; nor would it have influenced 

him if available at the time of entry of the plea. 

Alternatively, defendant argues that certain anonymous 

threats caused him to plead guilty. If this had in fact been a 

cause of the plea, withdrawal would be proper. Apparently the 

trial court discounted defendant's credibility and considered 

these as an afterthought. It was within its discretion to do so. 

We note that when threats are received such as would deprive a 

defendant of a fair trial, a motion for a change of venue is proper. 

The order of the District Court is affirmed. 

Chief Zustice 
We Concur: 

Justices