THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

Behrooz Taghivand, Plaintiff, 

v. 

Rite Aid Corporation, Eckerd Corporation, d/b/a Rite 

Aid, and Steve Smith, Defendants. 

Appellate Case No. 2014-000073 

CERTIFIED QUESTION 

ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE UNITED STATES 

DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH 

CAROLINA 

Richard M. Gergel, United States District Judge 

Opinion No. 27485 

Heard September 23, 2014 – Filed January 28, 2015 

CERTIFIED QUESTION ANSWERED 

Allan R. Holmes, Sr. and Timothy O. Lewis, both of 

Gibbs & Holmes, of Charleston, for Plaintiff. 

Benjamin P. Glass and Luci L. Nelson, both of Ogletree, 

Deakins, Nash, Smoak, & Stewart, P.C., of Charleston, 

for Defendants. 
JUSTICE HEARN: This certified question from the federal district court 

asks us to delineate the parameters of the public policy exception to the doctrine of 

at-will employment. Specifically, this question requires us to consider whether the 

public policy exception is broad enough to permit a cause of action in tort for 

employees who are terminated for reporting a suspected crime, in this case, 

shoplifting. We hold it does not. 

FACTUAL/PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

The facts are drawn from the district court's certification order. Behrooz 

Taghivand was the manager of a Rite Aid store in a high crime area of North 

Charleston, South Carolina. While on duty, Taghivand observed a patron acting 

strangely and milling around the store with no apparent purpose. The patron 

stopped briefly in the section directly in front of the cashier, selected a few items, 

and made a purchase. After the patron checked out, the cashier told Taghivand 

that when the patron entered the store, he was carrying a bag that appeared to be 

empty but now had items in it. 

Taghivand instructed the cashier to call the police. An officer arrived at the 

scene and gathered together the items the patron claimed he purchased from the 

store, and Taghivand confirmed these as belonging to the patron. The officer also 

searched the patron's bag, and found it contained only dirty clothes. 

Taghivand was terminated effective that day, and was informed the incident 

was the reason for his termination. As a result, Taghivand filed this action against 

Rite Aid Corporation, Eckerd Corporation d/b/a Rite Aid, and Steve Smith in 

federal court for wrongful termination; the defendants moved to dismiss. After 

finding that South Carolina law was not clear on the issue raised by the motion to 

dismiss, the district court certified this question. 

CERTIFIED QUESTION 

Under the public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine in 

South Carolina, does an at-will employee have a cause of action in tort for 

wrongful termination where (1) the employee, a store manager, reasonably 

suspects that criminal activity, specifically, shoplifting, has occurred on the 

employer's premises, (2) the employee, acting in good faith, reports the suspected 

criminal activity to law enforcement, and (3) the employee is terminated in 

retaliation for reporting the suspected criminal activity to law enforcement? 

LAW/ANALYSIS 
Taghivand first argues that there are specific statutory and common law 

authorities which establish a clear mandate of public policy favoring the reporting 

of crimes, and second, that there is a general public policy favoring the reporting of 

crimes inherent in the functioning of this state's criminal justice system. We find 

neither of these arguments availing. 

South Carolina has a strong policy favoring at-will employment. Prescott v. 

Farmers Tel. Coop., Inc., 335 S.C. 330, 335, 516 S.E.2d 923, 925 (1999). As we 

have explained before, "the policy of employment at-will provides necessary 

flexibility for the marketplace and is, ultimately, an incentive to economic 

development." Id. Accordingly, absent a contractual provision to the contrary, an 

employee may be terminated at any time for any reason or no reason, with or 

without cause. Barron v. Labor Finders of S.C., 393 S.C. 609, 614, 713 S.E.2d 

634, 636 (2011). 

However, our adherence to the at-will employment doctrine is not without 

limits. Under the public policy exception, an employee who is terminated in 

violation of a clear public policy may pursue a cause of action in tort for wrongful 

termination. Ludwig v. This Minute of Carolina, Inc., 287 S.C. 219, 225, 337 

S.E.2d 213, 216 (1985). Courts have invoked the public policy exception in two 

instances: (1) where an employer requires an employee, as a condition of continued 

employment, to break the law, see id., and (2) where an employer's termination is 

itself illegal, see Culler v. Blue Ridge Elec. Coop., Inc., 309 S.C. 243, 422 S.E.2d 

91 (1992). While we have made clear that the exception "is not limited to these 

situations," we have specifically recognized no others. Barron, 393 S.C. at 614, 

713 S.E.2d at 637. 

We exercise restraint when undertaking the amorphous inquiry of what 

constitutes public policy. As the United States Supreme Court has recognized, 

"public policy embodies a doctrine of vague and variable quality, and, unless 

deducible in the given circumstances from constitutional or statutory provisions, 

should be accepted as the basis of a judicial determination, if at all, only with the 

utmost circumspection." Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 306 (1930), 

abrogated by Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) (emphasis added). This 

comports with our understanding that "[t]he primary source of the declaration of 

the public policy of the state is the General Assembly; the courts assume this 

prerogative only in the absence of legislative declaration." Citizens' Bank v. 

Heyward, 135 S.C. 190, 204, 133 S.E. 709, 713 (1925). 
 

 

1 

Taghivand points to three specific statutory and common law authorities 

which he argues establish the basis for a public policy exception to protect the 

good faith reporting of suspected crime: Section 16-9-340 of the South Carolina 

Code (2003), common law obstruction of justice, and Section 16-3-1505 of the 

South Carolina Code (2003). We disagree that any clear or articulable public 

policy emanates from these authorities. 

Section 16-9-340 reads in pertinent part: "It is unlawful for a person by 

threat or force to . . . intimidate or impede a judge, magistrate, juror, witness, or 

potential juror or witness . . . in the discharge of his duty as such." § 16-9-

340(A)(1). Taghivand's argument is that section 16-9-340 protects those involved 

in legal proceedings—potential witnesses included—from intimidation or 

interference that is connected with their role in the proceedings. As an extension, 

Taghivand argues that the public policy behind this statute should give rise to his 

cause of action for wrongful termination. 

The fallacy underlying Taghivand's argument is that his employer 

terminated him in response to the reporting of a crime, not to influence or impede 

his further involvement in any proceeding related to that crime. The thrust of 

Taghivand's argument is not that section 16-9-340 applies to him as a potential 

witness in the reported shoplifting, but rather, that a broad public policy favoring 

the reporting of crimes can be derived from the legislature's decision to protect 

potential witnesses. We find the plain language of the statute does not support his 

assertions. Taghivand was not prevented by threat or force from participating in a 

legal proceeding; he was discharged for incorrectly reporting a crime. Without a 

more definite statement from the General Assembly that the reporting of crime 

should be protected, we refuse to read such a policy into this statute.1 

This is the same reasoning applied in the authority from Maryland cited by 

Taghivand. Although Maryland's highest court found the public policy exception 

to apply where an employee was fired after reporting a suspected crime, the statute 

it relied upon, while similar to that which exists in South Carolina, also protects 

those people "reporting a crime or delinquent act." Wholey v. Sears Roebuck, 803 

A.2d 482, 498, 500 (Md. 2002). In fact, in an earlier case interpreting the 

Maryland statute before it was changed to apply to those who reported suspected 

crimes, the same court refused to recognize a public policy exception. Adler v. 

Am. Standard Corp., 432 A.2d 464 (Md. 1981). The change in the statute by the 

legislature was the basis of the Maryland court's later decision, and we apply the 

same judicial restraint today. 
 

Taghivand also argues to the extent section 16-9-340 does not lay out a 

general public policy favoring the reporting of suspected crime, its common law 

equivalent does. He bases this assertion on the offense of obstruction of justice, 

which criminalizes doing "any act which prevents, obstructs, impedes, or hinders 

the administration of justice." State v. Codgell, 273 S.C. 563, 567, 257 S.E.2d 748, 

750 (1979). However, he is not arguing his employer obstructed justice in this 

case; rather, his argument is that a broad public policy protecting those who report 

suspected crimes can be read from the common law of obstruction of justice. 

Accordingly, for the same reason as above, we find his argument unpersuasive. 

As to section 16-3-1505, which is the legislative intent section of the Victim 

and Witness Service Act, Taghivand argues it lays out a general public policy 

favoring the reporting of suspected crimes. The relevant part of the section reads: 

In recognition of the civic and moral duty of victims of and witnesses 

to a crime to cooperate fully and voluntarily with law enforcement 

and prosecution agencies, and in further recognition of the continuing 

importance of this citizen cooperation to state and local law 

enforcement efforts and to the general effectiveness and the wellbeing of the criminal and juvenile justice systems of this State, and to 

implement the rights guaranteed to victims in the Constitution of this 

State, the General Assembly declares its intent, in this article, to 

ensure that all victims of and witnesses to a crime are treated with 

dignity, respect, courtesy, and sensitivity; that the rights and services 

extended in this article to victims of and witnesses to a crime are 

honored and protected by law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, and 

judges in a manner no less vigorous than the protections afforded 

criminal defendants . . . . 

§ 16-3-1505. As this Court has recognized, the primary purpose of the Victim and 

Witness Service Act is to ensure "victims are informed of their rights and any 

alternative means that might be available to them if the criminal prosecution is 

unable to meet their needs." Ex Parte Littlefield, 343 S.C. 212, 218, 540 S.E.2d 

81, 84 (2000). Thus, while the legislative intent section indicates the General 

Assembly recognizes the importance of the people's civic duty to cooperate with 

law enforcement, there is no indication the General Assembly intended this 

concept to extend outside the context of the ongoing criminal proceeding at the 

heart of this statute. Accordingly, we also find this argument without merit. 
Finally, we are unpersuaded by Taghivand's argument that there is a general 

mandate of public policy for the reporting of crimes inherent in the functioning of 

this state's criminal justice system. This argument is derived from the holding in 

the split decision of Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876 (Ill. 

1981). In Palmateer, a manager was terminated after reporting an employee to law 

enforcement for a violation of the criminal code. Id. at 877. Recognizing public 

policy to be an amorphous concept, the court determined that a matter "must strike 

at the heart of a citizen's social rights, duties, and responsibilities" to rise to the 

level of public policy. Id. at 878–79. Further, the court held "[t]here is no public 

policy more important or more fundamental than the one favoring the effective 

protection of the lives and property of citizens," and thus although "[n]o specific 

constitutional or statutory provision requires a citizen to take an active part in the 

ferreting out and prosecution of crime . . . public policy nevertheless favors citizen 

crime-fighters." Id. at 879–80. 

In one of two Palmateer dissents, Justice Ryan stated that the question of 

public policy is first and foremost a matter of legislative concern. Id. at 881. His 

dissent criticized the majority for recognizing a public policy based not in any 

expression by the legislature, but rather in the vague concept of citizen crime 

fighting. Id. at 882. While his dissent found the reporting of suspected crime to be 

"praiseworthy," it concluded the decision of an employer to terminate an employee 

for this reason does not bring the behavior "within the area of any public policy 

that has been articulated by the legislature." Id. at 884. The dissent's reasoning has 

been adopted by other courts. See Hayes v. Eateries, Inc., 905 P.2d 778, 786 

(Okla. 1995) ("Although we believe most people, including members of this Court, 

would agree that, generally speaking, the reporting of crimes to appropriate law 

enforcement officials should be lauded and encouraged . . . we must decide in this 

case whether the reporting of this particular crime against this particular victim . . . 

is so imbued with a clear and compelling public policy such that a tort claim is 

stated if the employer discharges the employee for so reporting. In our view, such 

reporting is not so protected."); Wholey, 803 A.2d at 498 ("[W]e decline to create a 

tort cause of action based solely on transcendental notions of that which is in the 

public interest, particularly when our own legislature has declined to make 

individual citizens criminally responsible for failing to investigate or report 

criminal activity."). 

Given our deference to the General Assembly in matters of public policy, we 

decline to adopt the Palmateer majority's reasoning. Unquestionably, society 

benefits from citizen participation in the criminal justice system, and no one can 

reasonably dispute that reporting the commission of a crime is a commendable act. 
 

However, the question before us today is not whether this state applauds citizen 

participation in the criminal justice system, but whether this interest mandates an 

exception to the at-will employment doctrine. 

Moreover, the public policy of this state finds expression in our longstanding 

adherence to at-will employment; any exception to this doctrine, which is itself 

firmly rooted in the public policy of this state, should emanate from the General 

Assembly, and from this Court only when the legislature has not spoken. Absent a 

more clear and articulable definition of policy from the General Assembly 

regarding those who report suspected crimes, we refuse to broaden the exception to 

the at-will employment doctrine today. 

CONCLUSION 

For the above stated reasons, we answer the certified question: no. 

TOAL, C.J., BEATTY and KITTREDGE, JJ, concur. PLEICONES, J., 

concurring in a separate opinion. 
 

JUSTICE PLEICONES: I agree with the majority that we should answer the 

certified question "No." I write separately to express my belief that this Court has 

the authority to create a public policy exception to the common law at-will 

employment doctrine,2

 even in the absence of legislative action. E.g., Russo v. 

Sutton, 310 S.C. 200, 422 S.E.2d 752 (1992) (Court will not hesitate to change 

common law "when public policy is offended by outdated rules of law"). 

2 E.g. Ludwick v. This Minute of Carolina, Inc., 287 S.C. 219, 337 S.E.2d 213 

(1985) (court recognized exception to at-will employment doctrine where 

employee's retaliatory discharge violated clear public policy).