### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 8 -00 516 -CV

Te xa s D e par tm e ntof P ublic Safe ty , A ppe lla nt

v. Cox Texas Newspap ers, LP and H earstNewspap ers, LLC , Appellees

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 261S T JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. D-1- GN-07- 0041 16 , HO NORAB LE SCO TT H. JENK INS , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

O P I N I O N This is a lawsuit broug ht pursuant to the Tex as Public I nformation Ac t. The appe llee newspa pers f iled suit ag ainst appellant, the Te x as De partment of Public Safe ty (DPS), seeking
acc ess to voucher s that relate t o trave l by the Tex as Governor. The district court g rante d the re lief reque sted by

appellee s. The DPS argues that the vouc hers a re c onfidential due to (1) the c ommonlaw rig ht of privac y , based on specia l c ircumstance s of an imminent thre at of phy si ca l d an ger,
an d ( 2 ) a c o n s ti tu ti o n a l p r iv a c y

in te r e s t u

n d e r th e F o u rte e n th

A me n dme n t o f

th e U n it e d

St a te s Co n s ti tuti o n , b a s e d

o n a s u b s ta n ti a l r is k o f s e r io u s b o d il y

h ar m f r o m a p e r c e iv e d

li k e ly thr e a t. We
a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he dis tr ic t c ourt
. Fac tua l an d P

ro c e dural B ackg

ro und Ap pe lle e Cox Te xas N e ws pa pe rs , L P pu

bli sh e s si x d ail y ne ws pa pe rs in T e xas, including the Austin American-Statesman
. O n Ju l y 2 , 2 0 0 7 , t h e D P S r e c e i v e d a w r i t t e n r e qu e st2

fr om C ox Te xas N e ws paper s, se e kin g “ tr a ve l vo uc he rs fo r G ov . Ri c k Pe rr y ’s se c ur ity

de ta il fo r a ll tri ps out of

state ” duri ng20 01 and

fr om Janu ary

thr ou g h J un e of 20 07 . App e lle e He ars t Newspa pers, L L C publishes e leven newspa pers in T exas, inc luding the Sa n A nto nio Ex pr ess- Ne ws and the Ho us ton Chr on ic le . O n Augus t 8, 20 07 , th e DPS re c e ive d a wr itt e n r e qu e st f

ro m H e ars t Newspa pers se eking “ac cess to or c opies of travel vouche rs for Gov. Rick Perry ’s sec urity detail.” The re quested vouc hers r elate to the Gover nor Protective D etail division of the DPS, which provides
se c ur ity for the Go ve rn or , h is f

amil y , a nd fo re ig n d ig nit ari e s v isi tin g Te xas. Me mbe rs of thi s div isi on a c c omp any

the Go ve rn or

wh e n h e tr a ve ls. I n or de r to r e c e ive re imb ur se me nt f ro m th e DPS fo r e xpe ns e s in c ur

re d du ri ng su c h tr a ve ls, a me mbe r o f t

he div isi on

mus t su bmi t a vo uc he r t o the DPS ite mizin g the e xpe ns e s in c ur re d. Th e DPS c oll e c ts, a ss embl e s, and ma int a ins the se tr ave l vo uc he rs .

The DPS re quested ruling s from the Texas A ttorney Gene ral that t h e i nformation soug ht by appellee s was excepted from required disclosure under the Public I nformation Ac t. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 552.301(a) , (b), (e) (West Supp. 2008). The attorney g ener al deter

mined that th e inf

or matio n r e qu e ste d b y

a pp e lle e s w a s conf

ide nti a l and , th e re fo re , th a t th e DPS mus t withhold the information in its entirety
. SeeTex. Att’y Gen. OR2007-11405 ( 2007). Appellee s filed suit ag ainst the DPS on November 29, 2 007, seekinga wr it of mandamus to compel the disclosure of the vouc hers unde r the Public Information Ac t. See Te x. Go v’ t Code Ann
. § 552 .3 21 (We st 2 00 4) ; Thomas v. Cornyn , 71 S.W .3d 473, 481 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.). Followinga benc h trial, the distri ct court c oncluded that the information soug ht by appellee s was not conf

identi al. The district c ourt enter ed judg ment on3

Aug ust 1, 2008, g rantingappellee s’ petition for wr it of mandamus compellingthe DPS to produce the vouche rs t o appellee s as requested. On appea l, the DPS asserts: (1) the e vidence is leg ally and fac tually in s u f f ic ie n t t o s u

p p o rt t h e d is tr ic t c o u r

t’ s f in d in g th a t p u

b li c d is c lo s u r e o f

th e v o u c h ers would not “put any

person in an imminent t h re at of phy sical dang er,” and ther efor e, the vouc hers
ar e c o n f i d e n t i a l b a s e d o n a “ s p e c i a l c i r c u m s t an c e s ” c o mp o n e n t o f t h e c o m m o n - l aw r i g h to f p r i v a c y; and (2) the evidenc e is leg ally and fa ctually

insu fficie nt to support the district court’s finding that public disclosure of the voucher s would not “ cre ate a substantial r isk of serious bodily harm fr om a per ceive d likely

threat,” and ther efor e, the vouc hers a re co n fi d ential base d on a constitutional pr iva c y int e re st und e r t

he F ourt e e nth

Am e ndme nt.
Anal y sis Under

the Public I n formation Ac t (the “PIA”) , “public information” includes information that is “collec ted, assembled, or maintained
. . . i n connec tion with the transaction of officia l business” by

a g overnme ntal body
. Tex. Gov’ t Code Ann. § 552.002(a) (West 2004)
. The PI A d oe s n ot a

uth or iz e a g o ve rnme nta l bo dy ’s wi thh old ingof pu bli c inf or matio n e xce pt a s e xpre ssl y provided. Id. § 552.006 (West 2004). The PI A is to be liberall y co n s t rued in fa vor of g ranting reque sts fo r i n fo rm at i on. Id. § 552.001(b) ( West 2004). As a g ener al rule, infor mation must be disclosed to the public. See id. § 552.021 (West 2004). Whil e the PI A contains multiple exceptions to th is g e n e r a l r

u le , s ee id. §§ 552.101-.148 (West 2004 & Supp. 2008), cer tain information is ex cep t ed fr o m required disclosure only if it is “expressly

confide ntial under other

law,” see id. § 552.022(a) (West 2004). This ty pe of information includes “ information in an ac count, vouche r, or contra ct re lating to the r ece ipt or expenditure of public or other funds by a g overnme ntal body .”4

Id. § 552.022(a) (3). The parties a g ree that the vouche rs re quested by app el l ees contain this ty pe of infor m at i o n. There fore , for the vouc hers to be w ithheld as reque sted by the DPS, some law other than the PI A must make them conf idential. Se e In re Ci ty of Ge or ge tow n , 53 S.W .3d 328, 331 (Tex. 2001). Common-law right of pr ivacy The DPS argues that the voucher s are confide ntial based on the c ommon-law rig ht to privacy
. See Ce nter for Econ. Justic e v. American Ins. Ass’n , 39 S.W .3d 337, 348 (Tex. App.—Austin 2001, no pet
. ) (c o m m o n law ser ves as “ other law ” under

section 552.022(a ) of the PI A). The Texas Supreme Court has held t h at i n fo rm ation is protected f rom disclosure
un de r t he PI A b y a c omm on -l aw r ig ht of

pr iva c y if : “ (1 ) t he inf or matio n c on ta ins highly

int imate or embarra ssing facts the publication of which would be hig hly objectionable to a

rea sonable pe rson, and (2) the information is not of leg itimate conce rn to the public.” Industrial Foun d. of the S. v. Texas I

ndus. Accide nt Bd. , 540 S
. W
. 2 d 6 68, 685 (Tex. 1976). The DPS conce des that the
vo uc he rs do no t con ta in any “ hig hly int imate or e mba rr a ssi ng fa c ts. ” Th e re fo re , in a c c or da nc e wi th Industrial Foundation , th e c omm on -l aw r ig ht o f p ri va c y do e s n ot a

pp ly to t he vo uc he rs . The DPS argues, howe ver, that the common-law r ight of privac y incorporates
a “spec ial circ umstances” exception, suc h that a g overnme ntal entity must wi t h h o l d information if its disclosure would likely cause someone to fa ce a n imminent threat of phy sical dang er. A

“ sp e c ia l c ir c ums tanc e s” e xce pti on ha s a pp e are d in op e n re c or ds de c isi on s by the a tto rn e y g e ne ra l. See T e x. A tt ’ y

G e n . O RD
- 1 6 9 ( 1 9 7 7 ) ; T e x. A tt ’ y G e n . O RD
- 1 2 3 ( 1 9 7 6 )
. I nO p e nRe c o r ds Dec ision 169, the attorney g ener al consider ed whe ther state e mploy ees’ home addr es s es could be5

withheld under the PI A’s “per sonnel information” exception to disclosure. Tex. Att’y Gen. ORD16 9, a t 1; see Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 552.102 (West 2004) (pe rsonnel information ex ception). The attorney g ener al recog nized that while an employ ee’ s home address g ener ally “ca nnot be consider ed a hig hly intimate or embar

rassingfac t,” it could be withheld in the case of “spe cial cir cumstance s,” which would include “ an imminent threat of phy sical dang er,” as o p p o s ed to “a g ener alized and speculative fea

r of ha rassment or r etribution.” Tex. Att’y Gen. ORD- 169, at 6. After the attorne y

g ener al identified a

“spec ial circ umstances ” ex ception in the context of the PI A’s “per sonnel information” pr ovision, thi s Court held in Hubert v. H arte-Hank

s Texas Newspapers, Inc

. , 652 S.W .2d 546 (Tex. App.—Austin 1 9 8 3 , writ ref ’d n.r.e .), that the
su pr e me c ourt ’s Industrial Foundation te st a pp lic a ble to t he c omm on -l aw r ig ht o f p ri va c y is e qu a lly applicable to the personne l information provision. See 65 2 S.W.2 d at 550 . Thi s Co ur t’ s h old ingin Hu be rt c a ll s into qu e s ti o np r io r o p e nr e c o r d s d e c is io n s b y th e a tt o r n e y g e n e r a l t h a t c o n s tr

u ed the per sonnel information provision without a pply ing the Industrial Foundation test, such as Op e n Re c or ds De c isi on

16 9. No ne the le ss, the atto rn e y g e ne ra l ha s c on tin

ue d to a pp ly its sp e c ia lc ir c ums tanc e s e xce pti on

in i ts i nf or ma l le tte r r

uli ng s:
Or d i n ar i ly , information is protecte d by common law priva cy

only if (1) the i n formation contains highly intimate or embar

rassingfac ts, the relea se of whic h would be hig hly

objectionable to a

rea sonable pe rson, and

(2) the information is not of leg itimate conce rn to the public. See I ndustrial Found. [540 S .W.2d at] 6 85. Howeve r, information also m ay b e withheld under se ction 552.101 in conjunction with common law privac y upon a showing of certa in “spec ial circ umstances.” See Open Rec ords Dec ision No. 169 (1977).T h e D P S a l s o c i te s N

. W

. E n t er p rises, Inc. v . City of Houston , 27 F. Supp. 2d 754 1 (S.D. Tex. 1998), aff

’d in p ar t, r e v ’d

in p ar t , 3 5 2 F
. 3 d

1 6 2 ( 5 t hC i r . 2 0 0 3 ) , t o ar g u e t h a t f ed eral courts have order ed information remain confide ntial under the PIA bec ause of phy sical and othe r harm that mig ht be ca

used if the infor

mation were rele ased. In N.W . Enterprises , the information at issue was deeme d confide ntial based on a “First Amendment rig ht to fre e speech.” 27 F. Supp. 2d at 773. The c ourt addre ssed whethe r a g overnme ntal body could disclose conta ct information of enter tainers who work in sexually oriented businesse s. See id. at 841-43. The c ourt deter mined that if such disclosure wer e required, some enter tainers c ould experience “unwe lcome har assment from a g g re ssi ve su ito rs and

ov e rze a lou s opp on e nts of se xua lly or ie nte d b us ine sse s, ” c a

us ingthe c ourt

to conclude that disclosure of the information would likely have a chilling eff

ect on protec ted spee ch. Id. at 842-43. N.W

. Enterprises does not aff ect our analy sis , h o we ver, be cause the DPS does not alleg e that any

issue of protec ted spee ch under the Fir st Amendment is involved in this case . 6 Tex. Att’y

Gen. OR2005-07052 ( 2005), at 6. The DPS asks this Court to follow the attorney g ener al’s ana ly sis and adopt its special-c ircumstance s exception. We c ann ot a do pt t

he a tto rn e y

g e ne ra l’ s spe c ia l- c ir c ums tanc e s exce pti on be c a us e it direc tly conflicts with Texas Supreme Court pr ece dent. The supre me cour t in Industrial Foundation decla red its two-pa

rt test to be the “sole criter ia” f or the disclosure of information to be deemed a wrong ful publication of private i nformation under common law. See I ndustrial Found. , 540 S.W .2d
a t 68 6; Texas Co mp t r o l l er of Pub. Acc ounts v. Attorney Ge n. of Tex. , 244 S.W .3d 629, 638 (T e x. Ap p. —Aus tin 20 08 , pe t. g ra nte d)
. We are re qu ir e d to fo llo w the su pr e me c ourt ’s pr e c e de nt, see Petco Animal Suppl ies, Inc. v . Schuster , 144 S.W .3d 554, 565 (Tex. A pp.—Austin 2004, no pe t.) (“ As an inte rm e diate a

pp e llate c ourt , w e are no t f re e to m old T ex as law a s w e se e fi t but mu st instead follow the pr ece dents of the Te x as Supreme Court unless and until the high cour t overrule s the m or the Te xas L e g isl a tur e su pe rs e de s th e m by

statut e .” ), and

de c lin e the D PS’ s invit a tio n to expand the boundarie s of common law as established by the supreme court, see Bu rgess v . E l P as o Can c e r Tr e atm e nt C

tr. , 881 S.W .2d 552, 556 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1994, writ denied) ( “[C] hang es in the common law should be lef t to the Texas L eg islature and our Supreme Court.”)
. 1T h e D PS c o n te n d s th a t t h e e v id e n c e is le g a ll y

an d f a c tu a ll y in s u f f ic ie n t t o s u

p p o rt t he 2 dis tr i c t c o u rt ’ s f

i n d i n g o f f

a c t t h a t p u

b l i c d i s c l o s u r e o f t h e i n f o r m a t i o n i n t h e v o u c h e rs “ wo uld not put any

person in an imminent threat of phy sical dang er.” Havingconclu d ed t hat there is no “spec ial circ umstances” exception to the Industrial Foundation test, we ne ed not consider the DPS’s ev i d en t i ary

ar gu m en t s re gar d i n g t h i s fi n d i n g. 7 Given the DPS’s c oncession that the first fac tor of the Industrial Foundation test for wrong ful publication of private information is not met, the vouche rs ca nnot be withheld base d on t h e c o m m o n - l aw r i g h to f

p r i v a c y. 2
Constit utional ri

ght of privacy T h e D PS n e xt a

r g u e s th a t t

h e tr a v e l v o u c h e r s mu s t b e k e p t c o n f id e n ti a l b a s ed on a rig ht of privac y

under the United States Constit ution. Accor ding to the DPS, the F ourte e nth

Am e ndme nt p ro hib its the DPS fr om d isc los inginf or matio n if dis c los ur e wo uld

c re a te
a su bs tanti a l r isk

of se ri ou s b od ily

ha rm fr om a perc eiv ed li ke ly

thr e a t, u nle ss a le g iti mate state int e re st i n d isc los ingthe inf or matio n o utw e ig hs the thr e a t to a pr iva c y int e re st. A rig ht of privac y

is not ex plicitly

menti o n ed in the Constit ution. However , the Supreme Court has he ld that a rig ht of persona l privac y , or a g uara ntee of cer

tain are as or z ones of privac y , does exist und er the Due Proce ss Clause of the F ourtee nth Amendment. See Carey

v. Population Servs. Int’l , 431 U.S. 678, 684 (1977). The cases addressing the consti tutional right of privac y g ener ally involve two differ ent ki nds of intere sts. See W halen v. Roe , 429 U.S. 589, 598- 99 (1 97 7) . O ne is an in div idu a l’ s in te re st i n in de pe nd e nc e in m a kin g c e rt a in k ind s o f d e c isi on s, inc lud ingmatte rs re latin g to m arr ia g e , p ro c re a tio n, con tra c e pti on , f a mil y re latio ns hip s, and

c hil d
rea ring and educ ation. See id. a t 59 9- 60 0, 60 0 n .2 6. Th e ot her is th e ind ivi du a l’ s in te re st i nOn re mand, the Ohio district c ourt revised its finding s of fac t after rec eiving copies of the 3 personne l rec ords re lease d by the City and d et er m i n i ng that, contra ry to the alleg ations in the plaintiffs’ aff

idavits, most of the persona l inf ormation had actua lly been reda cted prior to disclosure of the re cords. See Kallstrom v. City of Columbus , 165 F. Supp. 2d 686, 700- 01 (S.D. Ohio 2001). 8 avoiding disclosure of pe rsonal matters. See id. a t 59 9. Th e latte r i s at is su e he re . T his a sp e c t, which the Texas Supre me Court ha s ref err ed to a s “disclosura l pr ivacy ,” encompa sses the ability of ind ivi du a ls t o d e te rm ine fo r t he mse lve s w he n, ho w, and to wh a t e xten t inf or matio n a bo ut t he m is communicated to other s. Industrial Found. , 540 S.W .2d at 679. I t is clea r, howeve r, that not eve ry pu bli c a tio n of

pe rs on a l in fo rm a tio n a

bo ut a n in div idu a l c on sti tut e s a

n inva sio n o f a

c on sti tut ion a lly protec ted zone of privac y . Id. at 680.

I n its attempt to place the trave l vouc hers within a constitutionally

protec ted zone of privac y , the DPS relies ex clusively on the Six th Circuit’s opinion in Kallst rom v. City of Columbus , 136 F.3d 1055 ( 6th Cir. 1998)
. I n Kallst rom , the plaintiffs we re unde rcove r police of fice rs who we re actively involved in the drug conspirac y investigation of a violent g ang called the Short North Posse, and in the prose cution of seve ral g angmembers on the c harg es t h at arose from the inve stigation. 1 3 6 F
. 3 d a t1 0 5 9
. I na c c o r d an c e w i t hO h i o o p e nr e c o r d s l aw , t h e C i t y r e l e a s e d t h e p l a i n t i f

f s’ personne l rec ords—which alleg edly included their curr ent addresses and phone number s, copies of the ir dr ive rs lic e ns e s, and

the name s, a dd

re sse s, and

ph on e numbe rs of

imm e di ate fa

mil y members —to the g ang members’ defe nse counsel, who may have pa ssed the information on to the 3 g angmembers themse lves. See id. The plaintiffs c ontended that the dissemination of the ir persona l i n formation viol ated their rig ht to privacy

as guara nteed by the Due Proc ess Clause of the Four teenth Amendme nt. See id. a t 10 60 . The S ix th Cir c uit a g re e d, ho ldi ngthat th e pla int if fs ’The Six th Circ uit itself rec ently observe d that “the Kallst rom court broke new g round,” a nd 4 that its holdi ng “is virtually unique amongcourts of a ppeals.” Barber v. O verton , 496 F.3d 449, 455 (6th Cir. 2007). 9 privac y interests implicated a

fundame ntal liberty

interest, spec ifically

their intere st in preserving their per sonal secur ity

and bodily

integ rity
. See id. at 1062. Acc ording to the S ix th Circuit, the rele ase of information rises to constitutional dimensions “whe re the relea se of pr ivate information place s an individual at substantial risk of serious bodily harm, possibly even de ath, from a

perc eived likely threat.” Id. at 1064. The DPS contends that, as in Kallst rom , rele ase of the t rave l voucher s would place the Gover nor, his family

and sec urity

detail, and other s travelingwith the Gover nor at su b s tantial risk of ser ious bodily

harm fr om a per ceive d likely threat
. At t ri al, L t. David Armistead, the head of the Gover

nor Protective D etail division, testified reg arding the “magnitude and numer ous thr e a ts” tha

t are dir e c te d at th e Go ve rn or and his fa mi ly . A c c or din g to A rm ist e a d, ind ivi du a ls seekingto harm the Gove rnor or a member of hi s trave l g roup could use the information containe d in t he vo uc he rs to t

he ir ta c tic a l a dv anta g e by

fi ndin g “ c on sis te nc ie s and patte rn s in

mov e me nts
and me tho ds of

mov e me nts .” Suc h in fo rm a tio n c ou ld in clud e the numbe r o f o ff ic e rs that tr a ve l, how fa r in adv ance they

arr ive, and the ide ntities of hotels, other place s fre quented, a nd transportation used.

We note that no Texas court h as followed Kallst rom or dete rmined that constitutional p r iv a c y inte r e s ts w o u ld

a p p ly in th e ty p e o f c ir c ums ta

n c e s a t i s s u e in

th a t c a s e. W e need not

4 deter mine whether

the Kallst rom test should be followed by Texas courts, howe ver, be cause even if we w ere to apply

the Six th Circuit’s approa ch in this case , we would conclude that the evidenc e10

is leg ally and fa ctually

suffici en t to support the district court’s findingthat public disclosure of the vo uc he rs “ wo uld

no t . . . c re a te a

su bs tanti al ri sk of ser iou s b od ily ha rm fr om a re a so na bly perc eived likely

threat.” The DPS, as the g overnme n tal body seeking to withhold information, bears the burden of establishing that the reque sted information falls within an exception to disclosure unde r the PI A. See Thomas , 71 S.W .3d at 488. For a lega l sufficie ncy challeng e, we revie w the evide nce in the light fa

vorable to the verdic t, cre diting fa vorable evidenc e if a rea sonable fa ct-finde r could a nd disreg arding contra

ry evidenc e unless a r easona ble fa ct-finde r could not. City of Keller v. W ilson , 168 S .W.3d 802, 807 (Tex. 2005). W e will sustain the DPS’s point on appeal base d on leg al
su ff ic ie nc y on ly if the e vid e nc e c on c lus ive ly e sta bli sh e s, a s a

matte r o f l aw, a

su bs tanti a l r isk of serious bodily harm from a reasonably perc eived likely threat. Se e Do w Ch e m. Co. v . F ra nc is , 46 S.W .3d 237, 241 (Tex. 2001). For a fa ctual suff

iciency challeng e, we consider a

nd weig h all the evi d en ce i n the re cord, both supportingand ag ainst the finding , to decide whether the judg ment shoul d b e s et aside. Id. a t 24 2. I n r e vie wi nga pp e lla nts ’ f a c tua l su ff

ic ie nc y c ha lle ng e , w e wi ll
se t a sid e the jud g me nt o nly if the e vid e nc e is s o weak or th e di stric t c ourt ’s fi nd ingis s o a g a ins t the g reat weig ht and pre pondera nce of the evidenc e as to be clea rly wrongand unjust. I

d. ; Cain

v . B ain , 709 S.W .2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986).

The Six th Circuit revisited the Kallst rom holding in 2007 and co n cluded that

“ Kallst rom cre ated a narr owly tailored rig ht, limited to c ircumstance s wher e the information dis c los e d w a s p art ic ula

rl y se ns iti ve and th e pe rs on s to wh om i t w a s d isc los e d w e re pa rt ic ula rl y da ng e ro us v is- a- v is t

hepla int iff

s .” Barber v. Ov erton , 496 F.3d 449, 456 (6th Cir. 2007). Thus, the11

Six th Circuit interpreted Kallst rom to require that, for infor mation to be protec ted by

a constitutional rig ht of privac y based on substantial risk of se rious bodily harm fr om a per ceive d likely threat, there must be rea son to fear

reta liation from the per sons to whom the i nformation would be disc losed. See id. I n Kallst rom , for e x ample, the infor mation at issue included curr ent addre sses of the plaintiffs
and the ir fa mil y me mbe rs , a

nd it wa s d isc los e d to an atto rn e y wh o “ a pp e ar[e d] to have pa sse d [it ] on” to seve ral of the m ember s of a violent g ang during the criminal trial in which the plaintiffs we re testifying a g ainst the members. Kallst rom , 136 F.3d at 1059. Consequently , for the D PS t o succe ed in its evidentiary

challeng e, ther e must be similar evidence t hat would conc lusively establish the exis tence of a substantial risk of serious bodily harm from a perc eived likely threat, or that evidenc e of su c h a ri sk is s o o ve rwhe lmi nga s to make a fi nd ingof

no su c h r isk

c le arl y wr on g and

un jus t. The e vidence in the rec ord does not satisfy t h is burden. The DPS did not put on evidenc e of a

substantial risk from a “ perc eived likely threat.” Rather, the evidenc e was to the e ffe ct that di sc los ur e of

the vo uc he rs a t al l c ou ld r e su lt i n th e ir fa lli ngint o th e ha

nd s o f s ome c ur

re ntl y
u n kn o w np e r s o no r

p e r s o n s w h o m ay tu r

n o u tt o b e a

t h r e a t
. A r

m i s t e a d t e s t i f i e d t h a t“ m y d i f

f i c u l t y, in my un de rs tand ingof

op e n r e c or ds re qu e sts , is that g oes t o a ny bo dy , a ny bo dy that w ants to make that r equest.” The DPS’s conc ern is dire ct ed at future , potential, and unknown r equestors and re cipients of the same information who might turn out to be thre ats. Such a c oncer n—relating to un k n o wn an d speculative threats—cannot constitute a “ perc eived likely threat” in acc ordanc e wi th t he Sixth C ir c uit

c a se law on whi c h th e DPS re lie s f or its c on sti tut ion a l pr iva c y argume nt. There fore , even if

the Ka ll s trom s t andar d acc urate ly ref lects the c urre nt state of the law as to the
c o n s ti tuti o n a l p ar ame te r s o f p r iv a c y in th is c o n te xt, w e c o n c lu d e th a t th e e v id e n c e is le g ally and12

fa c tua lly su ff ic ie nt t o su

pp or t the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s fi nd ing that pu bli c dis c los ur e of the vo uc he rs wo uld
no t c re a te a

su bs tanti a l r isk

of se ri ou s b od ily

ha rm fr om a pe rc e ive d li ke ly

thr e a t. Our c onclusion does not mean that we attach li ttle signific ance to the right of priva cy or the DPS ’s concern for t he saf ety of the Gove rnor a

nd his travel g roup. We simply hold that the DPS ’s int e re st i n n on dis c los ur e of tr a vel vo uc he rs ba se d o n s a fe ty c on c e rn s d oe s n ot i mpl ic a te constitutional privacy

interests under the current st ate of the l aw. Whether t he privacy interests at issue here sh ou ld

merit protec tion under the PI A is a question for the leg islature.
Conclu sion The DPS has fa i l ed to establish t hat the information contained in the Gove rnor Protective D e ta il officer s’ trave l voucher s is confidential under either a common-law r ight of

privac y
or a c on sti tut ion a l r ig ht o f p ri va c y . We a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he dis tr ic t c ourt
.

__________________________________________ G. Alan Waldrop, Just ice Be fore J ustices Patterson, Pember ton and Waldrop Affir med Filed: May

29, 2009