RECORD IMPOUNDED

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-2583-15T4

L.S.T.,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

C.V.,

Defendant-Appellant.

_________________________________

Argued May 17, 2017 – Decided 

Before Judges Alvarez and Lisa.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Morris County, 

Docket No. FV-14-000552-16.

Tanya N. Helfand argued the cause for 

appellant (Helfand & Associates, attorneys; 

Ms. Helfand, of counsel and on the briefs).

Jessica Ragno Sprague argued the cause for 

respondent (Weinberger Law Group, LLC, 

attorneys; Ms. Ragno Sprague, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant appeals from the January 20, 2016 final restraining 

order entered under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act of 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." 

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.

June 28, 2017
2 A-2583-15T4

1991 (Act), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35, in favor of plaintiff. The 

predicate offense was harassment (N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4). See N.J.S.A.

2C:25-19a(13). Defendant argues that the entry of the order was 

error because the judge's credibility determinations and factual 

findings were not supported by the record, a purpose to harass was 

not proven, the court failed to state why a restraining order was 

necessary for plaintiff's protection, and the judge's findings of 

fact and conclusions of law were not based on a sufficient analysis 

of the testimony and evidence. We reject these arguments and 

affirm.

The parties are both nationals of India. They were married 

in India in 2007 in an arranged marriage. Defendant had already 

been living in the United States. After the marriage, plaintiff 

moved to the United States to live with her husband. Both parties 

hold masters degrees and at all times relevant to this case they 

were employed full-time in professional positions in the 

information technology field. They had one child, a son, Ken 

(fictitious name), who was born in 2011. The predicate offense 

occurred on January 10, 2016. Ken was then four-and-one-half 

years old. 

The original domestic violence complaint listed assault as 

the predicate offense and alleged that defendant struck plaintiff 

in the face and pushed her on the couch, and that he pushed Ken 
3 A-2583-15T4

to the floor using his leg. The complaint also stated that there 

was a past history of physical violence. Prior to the hearing, 

an amended complaint was filed adding harassment as an additional 

predicate offense. The amended complaint also set forth a detailed 

statement of prior domestic violence, listing multiple events that 

occurred on specified dates throughout the years of the parties' 

marriage.

The hearing on the domestic violence complaint was conducted 

on January 20, 2016. Both parties were represented by counsel. 

Both parties testified, as did the police officer who responded 

to the scene at the time of the precipitating incident and 

defendant's cousin, who had acted as an informal mediator between 

plaintiff and defendant in the events leading up to the 

precipitating event. A summary of the evidence follows.

After Ken's birth, the parties engaged in a routine by which 

plaintiff's mother would assist in caring for him. She would take 

him each year to her home in India for an extended stay of several 

months. She would return to the United States to the parties' 

home and live with them for up to six months at a time, caring for 

Ken while both parties worked at their full-time jobs.

Plaintiff testified as to numerous specific events when 

defendant became verbally and physically abusive toward her, her 

mother, and Ken. We set forth some examples. 
4 A-2583-15T4

Plaintiff said her husband often drank excessively and, when 

he came home, he became argumentative. She cited an incident in 

2007 when one of these episodes occurred, and "with that argument, 

he -- he just grabbed my neck and then he hit me onto the wall." 

In 2009, another similar episode occurred. After drinking, 

defendant came home, an argument ensued, and he banged plaintiff's 

head into the wall and threw things at her. Plaintiff described 

that defendant starts with verbal abuse, and when the argument 

heats up, "he usually hits me, like he -- he slaps me or he bangs 

my head onto the wall or throws things that he has in his hand at 

me. Like he throws phone or plate, whatever he has in his hand 

towards me." When asked whether this happened more than once, 

plaintiff answered in the affirmative. 

After the 2009 incident, plaintiff said she "couldn't take 

it anymore, so [she] went back to India." Defendant traveled to 

India and convinced her and her family that he would "change his 

behavior." Plaintiff agreed to return with defendant to the United 

States.

Plaintiff testified that in 2010, when her brother was here 

with them, defendant slapped her. Her brother warned him "saying 

like, if you ever do that again, he said he'll call the cops." 

Plaintiff described an incident in 2015, when her mother was 

staying with the parties. When plaintiff returned from work, her 
5 A-2583-15T4

mother told her that defendant had been very abusive toward her. 

Plaintiff told defendant, "if you have any issues, then you have 

to deal with me, my mom is just visiting." And "that's when he 

hit me again." Plaintiff did not call the police, but her mother 

called plaintiff's brother in California, and "he called cops from 

there because he was very worried for me and my mom." When the 

police arrived, plaintiff testified that defendant directed her 

not to "mention about any physical abuse or anything otherwise I'm 

going to give you a hard time." She complied and told the police 

these were only verbal arguments, and no complaints were filed.

Plaintiff moved out of the marital home on January 4, 2016. 

She had already rented an apartment and was planning to move out 

of the marital home. On January 3, 2016, she was eating her lunch 

in the marital home, when defendant became very aggressive. He

"came charging" at her and pushed her bowl of food off the table 

and onto the floor. She produced a photograph of the bowl and 

food on the floor. 

Throughout the years, different family members served as 

informal mediators, attempting to assist the parties with their 

marital difficulties. During the time leading up to the 

precipitating event, defendant's cousin fulfilled this role. With 

his assistance, the parties agreed that when plaintiff would move 

out of the home, Ken would stay in the marital home with defendant. 
6 A-2583-15T4

Plaintiff would pick Ken up at daycare each day and spend time 

with him, after which she would return her son to the marital home 

to sleep. On weekends, if plaintiff wanted to spend time with 

Ken, she would give defendant advance notice and would be able to 

do so. 

During the first week that plaintiff was out of the home, the 

parties abided by these arrangements. As the weekend approached, 

plaintiff called defendant on Friday and said she wanted to see 

Ken over the weekend. Defendant refused. She called defendant 

again on Saturday, and he again refused demanding that she provide 

at least three days' notice. 

On Sunday, plaintiff went to the marital home. Defendant and 

Ken were there. Plaintiff said she wanted to take Ken with her 

to stay with her. She said the present arrangement was not 

acceptable. The parties argued and they called defendant's cousin. 

Plaintiff testified that defendant's cousin "said he will convince 

him for me to take my son with me to my new place and I can take 

care of complete custody of my child." The understanding was that 

this informal arrangement would continue until the parties 

eventually went to court, as it was contemplated, seeking a divorce 

or other relief arising out of the marital relationship. At that

future time, a legal order would be issued determining custody and 

parenting rights.
7 A-2583-15T4

The parties ended the conversation, which they had conducted 

on a speaker phone, with defendant's cousin. Plaintiff then 

described what happened next: 

After hanging up the phone again he came 

charging at me saying like, no, no, you cannot 

take [Ken] with you, I'm not even going to 

listen to my cousin this time, you cannot take 

him. And it -- he -- he slapped me and then 

he pushed me on to the couch. I fell on couch. 

He went sit on the (indiscernible) and off on 

the couch -- my son went to him saying like 

no, I want to go with mom and then he hit my 

son with his leg on my son's neck and head, 

he fell on the floor. That's when he was 

crying. I console him and I -- I was 

frightened because he was very aggressive, so 

I call cops then. I called the cops.

Plaintiff described that she felt "[v]ery frightened." When asked 

how Ken reacted, she said: "He was frightened too. He said he 

never want to go back to his dad again." 

A police officer arrived in response to plaintiff's 911 call. 

The parties provided written statements to the police. Plaintiff's 

statement was consistent with the testimony she gave at the 

hearing. She did not complain of any injuries, and declined any 

medical treatment for herself and Ken. The initial complaint was 

filed and a temporary restraining order was issued.

In his testimony, defendant denied ever striking plaintiff. 

He also denied excessive alcohol consumption or being verbally or 

physically abusive to plaintiff, Ken, or plaintiff's mother. With 
8 A-2583-15T4

respect to the precipitating event, defendant took the position 

that the parties had struck an agreement, albeit informal and not 

legally binding, and plaintiff should have been required to adhere 

to it. He denied striking her or Ken during that episode. He 

testified that he feared that plaintiff might take Ken and go to 

India.

Defendant's cousin confirmed that at the time of the 

precipitating event, he spoke to the parties on the phone and 

urged that the informal arrangement be changed in accordance with 

plaintiff's wishes. He testified:

So then we -- I kind of told her, if you want, 

take him totally, I will make him agree to 

your terms until you decide on the court who 

can keep the kid based on the legal terms 

because I don't -- I'm not a legal person, I 

cannot decide.

So even on that day then, this is what I said, 

then you can take -- take him and I also make 

him say, if you want take the kid, I'm not 

going to -- I don't have any problem, but we'll 

decide in the court.

Because the critical facts in this case were disputed by the 

conflicting testimony of plaintiff and defendant, the judge's 

assessment of their credibility was critical to deciding the case. 

In no uncertain terms, the judge found plaintiff's testimony 

extremely credible, describing it as "very compelling." 

Conversely, he found defendant to be very incredible, based upon 
9 A-2583-15T4

his demeanor and inconsistencies in his testimony. The judge 

commented that various aspects of defendant's testimony did not 

make sense. 

He believed plaintiff's version of the events, including the 

history of prior acts of domestic violence and her description of 

what happened on January 10, 2016. The judge also found that, 

during her testimony, plaintiff's 

demeanor clearly showed to me that she was 

frightened. Her demeanor of the past events 

clearly showed to me that she was frightened 

of this man and lived in a very controlled 

environment for -- for many years during the 

course of their marriage. 

With respect to the precipitating event, the judge said:

I believe he pushed her and slapped her and 

pushed her to the couch, told her she wasn't 

taking the child, told her that he did not 

agree with his cousin, didn't care what his 

cousin said and she had no other choice but 

to call the police. And that's what she did.

The judge went on to find that because there was no evidence 

of injuries to plaintiff or Ken, the elements of simple assault 

were not met. See N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1a(1). However, he was satisfied 

that the elements of harassment had been proven by a preponderance 

of the evidence. The judge set forth the definition of harassment 

under N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4b, namely, that a person commits the offense 

if, with purpose to harass another, he subjects another to 

striking, kicking, shoving or other offensive touching. Based 
10 A-2583-15T4

upon his credibility determination, the judge made the factual 

finding that the offensive touching did occur, and he found that 

"defendant's purpose to harass may be inferred from the evidence 

presented from common sense and experience." He made this 

determination based upon his consideration of "the totality of the 

circumstances."

Based upon these findings, the judge issued a final 

restraining order. The order included a provision awarding 

plaintiff temporary custody of Ken. 

Our standard of review of the factual findings of a trial 

court sitting without a jury is very limited. Such findings are 

binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial, 

credible evidence. Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co., 

65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974). Further, the findings and conclusions 

of a trial judge are entitled to enhanced deference in family 

court matters, given the special jurisdiction and expertise of 

family court judges in such matters. Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J.

394, 413 (1998). We have reviewed the complete record of these 

proceedings. Applying the principles stated above, we are 

satisfied that the judge's factual findings are amply supported 

by the record, and we have no occasion to interfere with them.

Likewise, we recognize that the trial court enjoys the 

benefit, which we do not, of observing the parties' conduct and 
11 A-2583-15T4

demeanor in the courtroom and in testifying. Through this process, 

trial judges develop a feel of the case and are in the best 

position to make credibility assessments. We will defer to those 

assessments unless they are manifestly unsupported by the record. 

Weiss v. I. Zapinsky, Inc., 65 N.J. Super. 351, 357 (App. Div. 

1961). The judge's credibility assessments are supported by the 

record, and we defer to them.

Accordingly, we reject defendant's argument that the trial 

court's credibility determinations and factual findings are not 

supported by the record. On a related subject, we also reject 

defendant's argument that the judge's findings of fact and 

conclusions of law were not based on a sufficient analysis of the 

testimony and evidence. In an effort to persuade us on this point, 

defendant's brief calls to our attention selected portions of 

testimony that were favorable to him or that demonstrate apparent 

conflicts with other evidence that was unfavorable to him. 

Defendant then criticizes the trial judge for not addressing each 

of those points in his statement of reasons. A trial judge is not 

required to address every such piece of evidence in order to render 

a sound decision. The judge set forth more than ample reasons, 

rooted in the evidence, supporting his credibility determinations. 

From those determinations, his factual findings flowed with 

sufficient reference to the evidence presented.
12 A-2583-15T4

Defendant argues that a purpose to harass was not proven. We 

do not agree. Rarely do individuals announce their purpose for 

conduct in which they engage. The judge correctly predicated his 

determination of defendant's purpose on all of the attendant 

circumstances, including things that were said and done by the 

parties. Plaintiff's version of the events, which the judge 

believed, clearly provided the basis for the judge's inference

that, by engaging in the conduct he did, it was defendant's purpose 

to harass plaintiff.

Finally, we address defendant's contention that because the 

court failed to expressly state that a restraining order was 

necessary for plaintiff's protection, with reference to the 

factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29a, the final restraining 

order must be set aside. Defendant relies primarily on our 

decision in Silver v. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. 112 (App. Div. 2006). 

He insists that Silver requires an express statement, with factual 

references from the record, as to which factors listed in N.J.S.A.

2C:25-29a(1) to (6) make the issuance of a restraining order 

necessary.

Indeed, it is well settled that a restraining order will not 

issue solely because of the commission of a predicate offense 

listed in the Act. Bittner v. Harleysville Ins. Co., 338 N.J. 

Super. 447, 454 (App. Div. 2001). There is a second prong, which 
13 A-2583-15T4

requires consideration of additional factors, including the 

previous history of domestic violence between the parties, 

including threats, harassment and physical abuse, the existence 

of immediate danger to the victim, and the best interests of the 

victim and any child. N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29a(1), (2) and (4). See 

also Bittner, supra, 338 N.J. Super. at 454 (quoting N.B. v. T. 

B., 297 N.J. Super. 35, 40 (App. Div. 1997)); Cesare, supra, 154 

N.J. at 401. 

In Silver, we restated this well-established principle. 

Silver, supra, 387 N.J. Super. at 125-27. In that case, the trial

court found that a predicate offense had been established. 

However, the trial court's findings were ambiguous as to whether,

and to what extent, he believed either party's testimony regarding 

some prior episodes. The judge did not issue a restraining order. 

We remanded for clarified findings regarding the second prong, 

namely, whether a restraining order was necessary to protect the 

victim, considering such factors as a history of prior acts of 

domestic violence. Id. at 126-28.

We found such clarification necessary for this reasons: 

Although it might be inferred from the 

conclusion of dismissal reached by the trial 

judge that he did not believe plaintiff was 

in immediate danger and that a restraining 

order was not necessary to prevent further 

abuse, the judge appears to have based his 

finding that "domestic violence" had not 
14 A-2583-15T4

occurred on his determination that the record 

did not support a finding that there had been 

"a pattern of abuse and a pattern of 

controlling behavior."

[Id. at 128.]

In our discussion about the second prong, we observed:

Although this second determination—whether a 

domestic violence restraining order should be 

issued—is most often perfunctory and selfevident, the guiding standard is whether a 

restraining order is necessary, upon an 

evaluation of the factors set forth in 

N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29a(1) to -29a(6), to protect 

the victim from an immediate danger or to 

prevent further abuse. 

[Id. at 127.]

 

We also noted that "it is clear that a pattern of abusive and 

controlling behavior is a classic characteristic of domestic 

violence." Id. at 128, citing Cesare, supra, 154 N.J. at 397-98.

The case before us falls into the broad category in which

there is a clear and extensive pattern of abusive and controlling 

behavior. The judge found: "I believe her testimony that this 

wasn't the first time she was hit. I believe her testimony that 

in the past, she was and I believe that he was very controlling 

of her throughout the relationship." As we have previously stated, 

the judge was convinced, referencing plaintiff's demeanor as she 

testified, that she was frightened, that the past events happened 
15 A-2583-15T4

and frightened her, and that she had lived in a very controlling

environment throughout the course of the marriage.

Although the judge did not expressly refer to the factors in 

N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29a, he found that there was a previous history of 

domestic violence, including threats, harassment and physical 

abuse, that plaintiff was justifiably in fear for her safety, and 

that defendant's conduct constituted a pattern of abusive and 

controlling behavior that persisted for many years. In light of 

those findings and the fact that the judge issued a restraining 

order, we infer that the judge implicitly made the requisite 

finding under the second prong that a restraining order was 

necessary for plaintiff's protection. It would have been 

preferable had the judge expressly made the finding, but any error 

in this regard is harmless because this is one of those cases we 

described in Silver in which an express finding would have been 

"perfunctory and self-evident." Silver, supra, 387 N.J. Super.

at 127.

Affirmed.