18566 Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 70 / Wednesday, April 12, 1995 / Proposed Rules

and maintenance activities and five-year

reviews will not be conducted.

However, if new information becomes

available which indicates a need for

further action, the federal government

may initiate remedial actions. Whenever

there is a significant release from a site

deleted from the NPL, the site may be

restored to the NPL without the

application of the Hazard Ranking

System.

III. Deletion Procedures

The following procedures were used

for the intended deletion of this Site: (1)

EPA Region 10 selected No Action as

the selected remedy in the Record of

Decision for the Site. The No Action

Record of Decision qualifies the Site for

inclusion on the Superfund Site

Construction Completion List and may

be used to initiate Deletion from the

NPL procedures. (2) The Washington

State Department of Ecology concurred

with the proposed deletion decision. (3)

A notice has been published in the local

newspaper and has been distributed to

appropriate Federal, State, and local

officials and other interested parties

announcing the commencement of a 30-

day public comment period on EPA’s

Notice of Intent to Delete; and, (4) All

relevant documents have been made

available for public review in the local

Site information repositories.

Deletion of the Site from the NPL does

not itself create, alter, or revoke any

individual rights or obligations. The

NPL is designed primarily for

informational purposes to assist Agency

management. As mentioned in Section

II of this Notice, § 300.425(e)(3) of the

NCP states that deletion of a site from

the NPL does not preclude eligibility for

future response actions.

For deletion of this Site, EPA’s

Regional Office will accept and evaluate

public comments on EPA’s Notice of

Intent to Delete before making a final

decision to delete. If necessary, the

Agency will prepare a Responsiveness

Summary if any significant public

comments are addressed.

A deletion occurs when the Regional

Administrator places a final notice in

the Federal Register. Generally, the NPL

will reflect deletions in the final update

following the Notice. Public notices and

copies of the Responsiveness Summary

will be made available to local residents

by the Regional office.

IV. Basis for Intended Site Deletion

The following site summary provides

the Agency’s rationale for the proposed

deletion of this Site from the NPL.

Hamilton Island is located adjacent to

the Columbia River, approximately one

and an half miles downstream from the

Bonneville Dam, in Skamania County

Washington, 40 miles east of Portland,

Oregon. The area surrounding the Site is

part of the Columbia River Gorge

National Scenic Area. Adjacent areas to

the Site are used for commercial,

residential and open space.

The Site was used by the U.S. Army

Corps of Engineers (USACE) for the

disposal of earthen materials and the

old town of North Bonneville during the

construction of the Bonneville Dam

Second Powerhouse between 1977 and

1982.

The Site was placed on the NPL on

October 14, 1992 as a Federal Facility.

The basis of the listing was for possible

releases of arsenic, copper, lead, zinc

and toluene above Ambient Water

Quality Criteria to the Columbia River

and other sensitive ecological areas. The

USACE entered into a Federal Facility

Agreement on September 24, 1993 with

USEPA and the Department of Ecology

to conduct a Remedial Investigation/

Feasibility Study and the necessary

Remedial Actions.

The Remedial Investigation

determined that there was not

unacceptable risk to human health or

the environment, in fact the only

contamination, above federal or state

health based levels, detected was low

level petroleum contamination in soils.

On November 29, 1994 USACE

proposed, in consultation with EPA and

Department of Ecology to take No

Action at the Site. No comments were

received in opposition to the proposal.

Human health and ecological risk

assessments were performed to assess

current or future potential adverse

human health or ecological effects

associated with exposure to chemicals

detected in soils, groundwater, surface

water and sediments at Hamilton Island.

Based on comparison of site specific

analytical data with EPA and State riskbased screening criteria, ecological

benchmarks, toxicity values, and the

detection frequency and exposure

potential of chemical constituents, it

was concluded that chemicals at

Hamilton Island do not pose an

unacceptable risk to human health or

the environment, under any land use

scenario. Accordingly, EPA will not

conduct ‘‘five-year reviews’’ at this Site.

One of the three criteria for deletion

specifies that EPA may delete a site

from the NPL if ‘‘the remedial

investigation has shown that the release

poses no significant threat to public

health or the environment and,

therefore, taking of remedial measures is

not appropriate’’. EPA, with

concurrence of Ecology, believes that

this criterion for deletion has been met.

It is concluded that there is no

significant threat to public health or the

environment and, therefore, no further

remedial action is necessary.

Subsequently, EPA is proposing

deletion of this Site from the NPL.

Documents supporting this action are

available from the docket.

Dated: March 30, 1995.

Chuck Clarke,

Regional Administrator, Region 10.

[FR Doc. 95–8882 Filed 4–11–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6560–50–M

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

National Highway Traffic Safety

Administration

49 CFR Part 571

[Docket No. 92–66; Notice 3]

RIN 2127–AF36

Federal Motor Vehicle Safety

Standards; Fuel System Integrity

AGENCY: National Highway Traffic

Safety Administration (NHTSA),

Department of Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Advance notice of proposed

rulemaking (ANPRM).

SUMMARY: This notice announces the

agency’s plans to consider upgrading

Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard

(FMVSS) No. 301, Fuel System Integrity,

by making the current crash

requirements more stringent and by

broadening the standard’s focus to

include mitigation concepts related to

fuel system components and

environmental and aging tests related to

components. This notice requests

comments on the agency’s plans to

explore a three-phase approach to

upgrading the standard. The notice also

requests data, methods, and strategies,

which may assist in the agency’s

regulatory decisions in defining specific

requirements and test procedures for

upgrading the standard.

DATES: Comments must be received on

or before June 12, 1995.

ADDRESSES: Comments should refer to

the docket and notice numbers above

and be submitted to: Docket Section,

National Highway Traffic Safety

Administration, 400 Seventh Street SW.,

Washington, D.C. 20590. Docket hours

are 9:30 a.m. to 4 p.m., Monday through

Friday.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dr.

William J.J. Liu, Office of Vehicle Safety

Standards, National Highway Traffic

Safety Administration, 400 Seventh

Street SW., Washington, D.C. 20590.

Telephone: (202) 366–2264.
Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 70 / Wednesday, April 12, 1995 / Proposed Rules 18567

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Introduction

The National Highway Traffic Safety

Administration (NHTSA) is announcing

its plans to consider upgrading Federal

Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS)

No. 301, Fuel System Integrity. The

purpose of this rulemaking is to further

reduce fatalities and injuries from fires

resulting from motor vehicle crashes.

Specifically, the agency is considering

whether to make more stringent the

current crash requirements applicable to

vehicles with a gross vehicle weight

rating (GVWR) of 10,000 pounds (4,536

kg) or less. It is considering also

whether to broaden the standard’s focus

to include ways to prevent or decrease

the severity of vehicle fires by exploring

regulations related to fuel system

components and tests of the resistance

of components to environmental and

aging factors.

Today’s notice outlines NHTSA’s

plans to explore a three-phase approach

to upgrading the standard. In Phase

One, the agency would evaluate

performance criteria for components to

ensure that the flow of fuel from the

tank is stopped in a crash. Phase Two

would involve defining upgraded crash

test performance for frontal, side, and

rear impacts (e.g., higher test speeds,

additional impact barriers, etc.). During

Phase Three, NHTSA would address the

effect of environmental and aging

factors such as corrosion and vibration

on components in the fuel system.

Today’s notice also summarizes issues

related to vehicle fires and discusses the

agency’s recent work in this area. The

agency is seeking public comment on

the merits of the agency’s rulemaking

efforts to explore alternative ways to

upgrade the present standard. Today’s

notice also supplements a previous

notice published on December 14, 1992,

in which the agency requested

comments about making FMVSS No.

301 more stringent (57 FR 59041, Docket

92–66, Notice 1).

On December 2, 1994, Secretary of

Transportation Federico Pen ̃ a

announced a settlement of an

investigation by NHTSA of an alleged

safety defect in certain General Motors

(GM) pickup trucks with fuel tanks

mounted outside the frame rails. Under

that settlement, GM will contribute over

$51.3 million for a variety of safety

initiatives. Among other things, the

settlement will fund research on ways to

reduce the occurrence and effects of

post-crash fires. All relevant results of

this research will be placed in the

public docket for this rulemaking.

The Fire Problem

While vehicle fires are relatively rare

events (occurring in only one percent of

towed vehicles in crashes), they tend to

be severe in terms of casualties. The

agency’s General Estimates System

(GES) reports that, in 1992,

approximately 21,000 passenger cars,

light trucks, and multipurpose vehicles

had a fire related to a crash. Based on

an analysis of the agency’s Fatal

Accident Reporting System (FARS), four

to five percent of occupant fatalities

occur in crashes involving fire (the

fatality being due to burns and/or

impact injuries). Overall, the fire itself

is deemed to be the most harmful event

in the vehicle for about one-third of

these fatalities.

An analysis of 1979–1986 National

Accident Sampling System (NASS) data

(Reference: ‘‘Fires and Burns in Towed

Light Passenger Vehicles,’’ Docket No.

92–66–N01–001) shows that about

29,000 occupants per year were exposed

to fire in towed light passenger vehicles

(cars, light trucks, and multipurpose

vehicles), of whom three percent

received second or third degree burns

over at least six percent of the body. The

Abbreviated Injury Scale (AIS) defines

these burns as moderate and more

severe (AIS 2 and greater). Half of those

with moderate and more severe burns

had second or third degree burns over

more than ninety percent of the body;

these maximum-severity (AIS 6) burns

are always fatal. These estimates are

based on all 47 occupants with

moderate and more severe burns

received in vehicle fires that were

investigated as part of the NASS during

the eight years from 1979 to 1986.

NASS investigated vehicle fires that

involved another 44 occupants with

moderate and more severe burns

between 1988 and 1990. The eleven

years of NASS data suggest that each

year 280 surviving occupants and 725

fatally-injured occupants received

moderate or more severe burns (AIS 2 or

greater). These injuries and fatalities

may have been caused by burns or

impacts.

NASS 1988 to 1990 data also indicate

that potential escape from the fire was

made more difficult for most occupants

(87 percent) with moderate or more

serious burns because they (1) were

sitting next to a door that was jammed

shut by crash forces, (2) did not have a

door at their position, or (3) had a part

of their body physically restrained by

deformed vehicle structure.

Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard

No. 301

FMVSS No. 301, Fuel System

Integrity, first became effective for

passenger cars in 1968. The

requirements in the current standard

apply to all vehicles with a Gross

Vehicle Weight Rating (GVWR) of

10,000 pounds (4,536 kg) or less since

September 1, 1977, and to school buses

that have a GVWR greater than 10,000

pounds (4,536 kg) GVWR since April 1,

1977. FMVSS No. 301 only applies to

vehicles that use fuel with a boiling

point above 32 degrees Fahrenheit (0

degree Celsius).

FMVSS No. 301 limits the amount of

fuel spillage from fuel systems of

vehicles tested under the procedures

specified in the standard during and

after specified front, rear, and lateral

barrier impact tests. The standard limits

fuel spillage due to these required

impact tests to 1 ounce (28.4 grams) by

weight during the time from the start of

the impact until motion of the vehicle

has stopped and to a total of 5 ounces

(142 grams) by weight in the 5-minute

period after the stop. For the subsequent

25-minute period, fuel spillage during

any 1-minute interval is limited to 1

ounce (28.4 grams) by weight. Similar

fuel spillage limits are required for the

standard’s static rollover test procedure,

which is conducted after the front, rear

and lateral impact tests.

The required impact tests for all

vehicles that have a GVWR of 10,000

pounds (4,536 kg) or less are: a 30 mph

(48.3 kmph) frontal fixed rigid barrier

impact with the barrier face

perpendicular to the line of travel of the

vehicle or at any angle up to 30 degrees

from the perpendicular; a 30 mph (48.3

kmph) rear moving flat rigid barrier

impact with the barrier face

perpendicular to the longitudinal axis of

the vehicle; and a 20 mph (32.2 kmph)

lateral moving flat rigid barrier impact

in a direction perpendicular to the

longitudinal axis of the vehicle (i.e.,

with the barrier face parallel to the

longitudinal axis of the vehicle). The

weight of the moving barrier is 4,000

pounds (1,814 kg). A rollover test is

conducted following the barrier

impacts.

The required impact test for large

school buses that have a GVWR greater

than 10,000 pounds (4,536 kg) is a 30

mph (48.3 kmph) moving contoured

rigid barrier impact at any point and

angle. The weight of the barrier is 4,000

pounds (1,814 kg). The static rollover

test is not required for large school

buses.

The standard does not apply to large

non-school buses or other vehicles that
18568 Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 70 / Wednesday, April 12, 1995 / Proposed Rules

have a GVWR greater than 10,000

pounds (4,536 kg).

December 14, 1992 Notice

On December 14, 1992, NHTSA

published a Request for Comments

notice in the Federal Register (57 FR

59041, Docket No. 92–66, Notice 1)

stating that the agency ‘‘is considering

initiating rulemaking to upgrade the

protection currently provided by’’

FMVSS No. 301. The notice also

requested answers to specific questions

related to test impact speeds, impact

barriers, effect of vehicle aging on the

likelihood of fire, contribution of

occupant entrapment to the likelihood

of fire-related injuries, etc.

NHTSA received 35 public comments

by October 1994 including comments

from most of the major vehicle

manufacturers, the American

Automobile Manufacturers Association

(AAMA), Advocates for Highway and

Auto Safety (Advocates), the Center for

Auto Safety (CAS), and the Insurance

Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS).

Commenters raised issues regarding the

safety need, the adequacy of the current

test procedures, the availability and

necessity of developing new test

procedures, and the existence and

feasibility of countermeasures. Many

commenters stressed the need for

further detailed investigation of realworld crash data to determine the

causes of vehicle fires and fire-related

occupant fatalities and injuries. In

addition to support for the test

procedures currently used in FMVSS

No. 301, commenters suggested several

alternatives, including substituting the

dynamic side-impact test procedures of

FMVSS No. 214 for those currently

specified in FMVSS No. 301, adding

frontal offset crash conditions, and

developing new barriers that might be

more representative of real-world crash

conditions.

The agency has initiated work related

to several fire safety issues that need to

be considered to define mitigation

concepts to reduce fatalities and

injuries. Due to resource considerations,

not all the safety issues discussed in the

previous notice are included in this

notice. The issues discussed in this

ANPRM include crash conditions,

origin of fires, and vehicle age.

Agency Efforts Related to Fuel System

Integrity

NHTSA has undertaken the following

activities to more-fully understand

motor vehicle fires. These include

comparing fuel system safety

requirements in this country with those

in other countries, conducting extensive

test crashes related to fuel system

integrity, and analyzing data of realworld crashes.

Comparison of U.S. and Foreign Fuel

System Safety Requirements

FMVSS No. 301’s requirements have

been compared to the following foreign

fuel system integrity standards: (1) The

Canadian CMVSS No. 301, Fuel System

Integrity (Gasoline, Diesel); (2) the

Economic Commission for Europe (ECE)

Regulation No. 34, Uniform Provisions

Concerning the Approval of Vehicles

with Regard to the Prevention of Fire

Risks (01 Series, Amendment 1, January

29, 1979) (Thirteen European countries

have agreed to adopt ECE Reg. No. 34,

including Germany, France, Italy,

Netherlands, Sweden, Belgium,

Czechoslovakia, United Kingdom,

Luxembourg, Norway, Finland,

Denmark, and Romania); and (3) the

Japanese Standard, Technical Standard

for Fuel Leakage in Collision etc.

(Amended on August 1, 1989).

The Canadian CMVSS No. 301 has

requirements identical to those of the

U.S. FMVSS No. 301.

In terms of application to vehicles:

FMVSS No. 301 applies to all vehicles

10,000 pounds (4,536 kg) or less GVWR

and school buses over 10,000 pounds

(4,536 kg) GVWR. ECE Reg. No. 34 only

applies to passenger cars, and the

Japanese standard applies to passenger

cars and multipurpose passenger

vehicles 5,600 pounds (2,540 kg) or less.

In terms of required impact tests: As

described above, FMVSS No. 301

requires frontal, rear and side impact

tests at 30, 30, and 20 mph (48.3, 48.3

and 32.2 kmph), respectively, plus a

static rollover test, for vehicles 10,000

pounds (4,536 kg) or less GVWR.

FMVSS No. 301 also requires a 30 mph

(48.3 kmph) impact test for school buses

over 10,000 pounds (4,536 kg) GVWR.

The ECE Reg. No. 34 requires a 48.3

to 53.1 kmph frontal fixed barrier

impact test and a 35 to 38 kmph rear

moving flat barrier impact test. The flat

rigid barrier weighs 1,100+20 kg. A

pendulum can be used as the impactor.

ECE Reg. No. 34 does not require a

rollover test. The standard requires a

hydraulic internal-pressure test for all

fuel tanks and special tests (impact

resistance, mechanical strength, and fire

resistance) for plastic fuel tanks.

The Japanese standard requires a 50+2

kmph frontal fixed barrier impact test

and a 35 to 38 kmph rear moving flat

barrier impact test. The flat rigid barrier

weighs 1,100+20 kg. A pendulum can be

used as the impactor.

In terms of test performance

requirements: all three standards limit

fuel spillage. As in FMVSS No. 301, the

ECE Reg. No. 34 and the Japanese

standard, in general, also limit fuel

spillage to about 1 ounce/min (28.4

grams/min). The Japanese standard lists

the ECE Reg. No. 34 and FMVSS No.

301 as examples of equivalent

standards.

In summary, FMVSS No. 301 applies

to more vehicle classes and to higher

vehicle weights than the ECE Reg. No.

34 or the Japanese standard. FMVSS No.

301 requires testing in all crash modes

(frontal, side, rear, and rollover). ECE

Reg. No. 34 and the Japanese standard

require only frontal and rear impact

tests. FMVSS No. 301 uses a much

heavier moving barrier for impact tests

than the ECE and Japanese standards

(1,814 kg vs. 1,100 kg). However,

FMVSS No. 301 does not require a

hydraulic pressure test for fuel tanks, a

battery retention requirement, or

additional tests for plastic fuel tanks;

ECE Reg. No. 34 does. In addition, the

ECE Reg. No. 34 requires that ‘‘no fire

maintained by the fuel shall occur’’ and

no failure of the battery securing device

due to the impact. Since ECE Reg. No.

34 also requires filling the impacted

vehicle’s fuel tank ‘‘either with fuel or

with a non-inflammable liquid,’’ the nofire requirement is actually interpreted

from the observed fuel leakage. It is the

agency’s understanding that in practice,

when the ECE Reg. No. 34 tests are

conducted, the fuel tank is filled with

non-inflammable liquid.

Safety Issues Related to Vehicle Fires

A. Crash Conditions

The crash conditions discussed in this

section refer to real-world crash

conditions that result in vehicle fires

and their implications for compliance

test conditions and performance

requirements for the current FMVSS No.

301. To further refine the relationship

between real-world and laboratory crash

conditions, this notice has examined

certain engineering parameters such as

impact speeds, impact locations, objects

struck, and damage patterns.

Laboratory Crash Test Results

Between 1968 and 1994, the agency

has conducted 563 FMVSS No. 301

compliance tests in the frontal impact

mode: 14 failures resulted (3%), the last

occurring in 1992. Effective September

1, 1976, the standard was amended by

requiring rear impact tests for all

vehicles and side-impact tests for

passenger cars only. Side-impact testing

was extended to all vehicles and became

effective on September 1, 1977. For

model years 1977 through 1994, 331

rear impact and 25 side-impact

compliance tests have been conducted;

26 rear impact failures (8%) and 1 side
Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 70 / Wednesday, April 12, 1995 / Proposed Rules 18569

impact failure (4%) resulted. In

computing these failure rates, the

rollover test is considered a part of the

frontal, rear, or side impact test.

The agency conducted a research test

program on FMVSS No. 214, Side

Impact Protection, for light trucks. Since

December 1988, 24 crash tests have been

conducted, 2 tests produced fuel leakage

at a rate higher than FMVSS No. 301

requirements. Both tests used the

FMVSS No. 214 test protocol.

Between 1979 and 1986, 12 out of 201

(6%) frontal New Car Assessment

Program (NCAP) tests indicated leakage

at a rate above the fuel spillage

requirements of FMVSS No. 301 at 35

mph (56.3 kmph). In addition, during

the same period, NCAP conducted 53

FMVSS No. 301 rear impact tests at 35

mph (56.3 kmph), and 6 (11%) leaked

at a rate above the fuel spillage

requirements of the standard. Rollover

tests were not conducted following any

of the frontal or rear impact NCAP tests.

Some of these vehicles were retested at

30 mph (48.3 kmph), but none failed. In

1993, NCAP resumed examining

FMVSS No. 301 fuel spillage

requirements, and added a rollover test

following the frontal impact tests. To

date, only one of the approximately 80

vehicles tested leaked at a rate above the

requirements of the standard at the

higher speed.

Between April and June 1993, the

agency conducted six baseline vehicle

crash tests (all 1993 models) as part of

its initial research effort for exploring

potential upgrades to FMVSS No. 301.

In addition, the Federal Highway

Administration (FHWA) conducted a

seventh crash test for the agency.

Information on the seven tests has been

entered into the docket.

The test conditions for the seven

crash tests represent a baseline of deltav (change of velocities), impact barrier,

and impact location. The tested cars

were chosen based on their high sales

volume as well as agency experience

with the cars in other test programs.

The six NHTSA tests include two in

each of the crash modes: frontal, side,

and rear. Three tests used a 4,000-pound

(1,814-kg) moving contoured barrier—a

frontal impact into a Chevrolet Corsica

at 65 kmph (40.5 mph), a side impact

into a Toyota Corolla at 49.4 kmph (30.7

mph), and a rear impact into a Ford

Escort at 56.6 kmph (35.2 mph). None

of these three tests resulted in a loss of

fuel system integrity.

The other three tests were: a frontal

impact of a Chevrolet Corsica into a 305-

mm (12-inch) diameter stationary pole

at 56.3 kmph (35 mph), a side impact

into a Toyota Corolla with a 1,361-kg

(3,000-pound) deformable moving

barrier (FMVSS No. 214 side impact

barrier) at 87.1 kmph (54.1 mph), and an

offset rear impact into a Ford Mustang

with the same type of FMVSS No. 214

moving barrier at 84 kmph (52.2 mph).

The only fuel system failure was a

ruptured fuel tank from the rear impact

to the Ford Mustang by the FMVSS No.

214 deformable moving barrier,

resulting in a delta-v of about 39 kmph

(24 mph). The head and chest injury

measurements on the instrumented

driver and passenger dummies exceeded

the criteria specified in FMVSS No. 208,

Occupant Crash Protection. Thus, the

survivability of this crash in the absence

of a fire is questionable. However, the

agency would like to point out that

FMVSS No. 208 is for frontal tests and

the test dummies used for the tests were

not specifically designed to collect

impact data for rear impact tests.

The crash test conducted by FHWA

was on a Toyota Corolla, which was

crashed into a 203-mm (8-inch)

diameter stationary pole directed at the

fuel tank location, in a side impact

orientation at 32.2 kmph (20 mph).

There was no fuel system integrity

failure. No dummy instrumentation was

used in this test.

The agency also conducted other

frontal impact tests. These tests

primarily consisted of high speed,

vehicle-to-vehicle offset crashes. In

addition, several side impact tests were

conducted using the FMVSS No. 214

test procedure. Since December 1990, a

total of 25 crash tests have been

conducted. One test, involving a

Chevrolet Corsica, resulted in a small

fuel leak from the fuel return line

(within FMVSS No. 301’s limit). This

test was conducted in an oblique

configuration with a Honda Accord

striking the left front corner of the

Corsica.

At the request of NHTSA’s Office of

Defects Investigation (ODI), the Vehicle

Research Test Center (VRTC) conducted

24 side-impact crash tests (including

one test with no instrumentation to

determine appropriate test speed) of the

1973–1987 General Motors full-size

pickup trucks and peer pickup trucks of

the same vintage. These tests were

conducted as a part of a safety defect

investigation, EA 92–041. Seven of these

tests were FMVSS No. 301 type side

impact tests, three were FMVSS No. 214

moving deformable barrier tests, three

were vehicle-to-pole side impact tests,

and eleven were various vehicle-topickup side impact tests. Reports of

these tests are included in the public

file for EA92–041.

The summary report for this test

program notes that the FMVSS No. 301

type tests produced no leaks in a test of

a new replacement fuel tank; however,

one of the four GM trucks tested with

‘‘as received’’ GM tanks leaked an

amount in excess of the FMVSS No. 301

requirements in a rusty area. Non-tank

components of one Ford and one GM

truck did leak during the static rollover

test.

In the three GM truck tests using the

FMVSS No. 214 barrier, one at 53.1

kmph (33 mph) and two at 72.4 kmph

(45 mph), one caused a leak in the seam

of the tank which resulted in a damp

area, while the other two did not leak.

In the vehicle-to-vehicle tests, the ride

height of the striking vehicle was

adjusted to simulate heavy braking. At

72.4 kmph (45 mph) with a Taurus

striking car, the GM fuel tank

significantly leaked at the sending unit,

filler nose, and a rusty area and small

cut in the tank. Although no leakage

was noted from the fuel tank during a

similar test of a Ford F–150, significant

fuel leakage was noted from the fuel

reservoir mounted on the inside of the

left rail.

For the 80.5 kmph (50 mph) tests,

significant leaks were noted from the

GM vehicles (in ‘‘as received’’ and new

condition), but no leaks were noted

during a similar test on an F–150.

In the 96.6 kmph (60 mph) tests, both

the GM and Ford F–150 vehicles leaked

significant amounts, with the GM truck

rupturing and the Ford F–150 trucks

being punctured, forming small holes.

One pole test was conducted at 48.3

kmph (30 mph) on a GM pickup truck

with significant vehicle damage and

significant fuel leakage. In the pole tests,

at 32.2 kmph (20 mph) the GM tank

leaked significantly, but in a similar test

of a Ford F–150, no leakage was

observed.

Data Analysis of Real-World Crashes

Accurate data on vehicle fires are

scarce, which makes it difficult to

define cause/effect relationships under

all circumstances. Unlike many other

crashes, investigations of crashes

involving fire are hampered by the

destruction of evidence needed for crash

reconstruction and analysis. The origin

of fire in vehicle crashes needs to be

understood better to help define

possible countermeasures and

performance requirements.

NHTSA has reviewed real-world

crashes involving fuel system integrity

at great length. This analysis includes a

review of the National Accident

Sampling System (NASS) file, a recent

analysis by the agency of the Fatal

Accident Reporting System (FARS) data,

a detailed hard copy study of accident

cases involving fire from NASS and
18570 Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 70 / Wednesday, April 12, 1995 / Proposed Rules

FARS, and an analysis of State accident

files.

The NASS review referenced in the

December 14, 1992, Request for

Comments notice, ‘‘Fires and Burns in

Towed Light Passenger Vehicles’’

(Docket No. 92–66–N01–001), noted that

most fires occurred in crashes with a

delta-v of less than 32.2 kmph (20 mph).

This figure is from all fires, regardless

of injury level.

When the same NASS files were

analyzed for occupant burn injuries at

AIS 2 or greater, the sample size was

very small, even after the 1991 data

were added. The delta-v for frontal

impacts resulting in fire was estimated

to be from 33.8 to 106.2 kmph (21 to 66

mph), with a 66 kmph (41 mph) median,

based on 14 cases. The delta-v for side

impacts was estimated to be from 16.1

to 66 kmph (10 to 41 mph), with a 43.4

kmph (27 mph) median, based on seven

cases. The delta-v for rear impacts was

to be estimated from 12.9 to 96.5 kmph

(8 to 60 mph), with a 41.8 kmph (26

mph) median, based on 11 cases.

The following are estimates of the

delta-v’s. For vehicle- to-vehicle

crashes, a 32.2 to 64.4 kmph (20 to 40

mph) delta-v range could result from

impact speeds in the 64.4 to 128.8 kmph

(40 to 80 mph) range for equal mass

vehicles. Similarly, the same delta-v

range could be the result of other high

impact speeds for crashes involving

unequal mass vehicles.

The FARS study analyzed real-world

crash data related to vehicle fires to

establish which barrier design most

closely replicates the damage seen in

real-world fatal crashes involving fire.

Preliminary results of the agency’s

FARS study indicate that the combined

1979–1992 data from FARS for light

vehicles of model years 1978 and later

include 9,440 vehicles with a postcrash fire, of which 2,840 were crashes

where fire was classified as the most

harmful event. Of the latter vehicles,

approximately half were involved in

single-vehicle crashes, and half were in

multi-vehicle crashes.

For frontal and side fatal crashes

involving a fire, approximately 60

percent involved multiple vehicles,

while for rear-impact crashes involving

in a fire, approximately 90 percent of

the crashes involved multiple vehicles.

Narrow objects, including trees and

poles, account for approximately 40

percent of the objects struck in single

vehicle crashes resulting in a fire.

The agency recently completed a

detailed hard copy study of a sample of

accident cases involving fire from NASS

and FARS. The detailed case study

report has been entered into the docket

of this notice. The title of the report is:

‘‘Fuel System Integrity Upgrade—NASS

& FARS Case Study,’’ a NHTSA

sponsored research study, by GESAC,

Inc., DOT Contract No. DTNH–22–92–D07064, March 1994.

The GESAC study selected 150 NASS

cases for detailed analysis, which were

selected from recent years and involved

fire with any occupant injury of AIS 2

or greater. One of the objectives of the

analysis was to suggest a laboratory

simulation for accidents that led to

vehicle fires. The suggested crash

simulations include impact mode,

speed, barrier, location, and orientation.

The report presents information on a

possible barrier test that most accurately

‘‘simulates’’ crashes that resulted in

‘‘moderate’’, ‘‘severe’’, and ‘‘very

severe’’ fires. A ‘‘moderate’’ fire is

defined as fire damage to between 25%

and 50% of the vehicle surface, a

‘‘severe’’ fire has fire damage to between

50% and 75% of the vehicle surface,

and a ‘‘very severe’’ fire has fire damage

to more than 75% of the vehicle surface.

For this analysis, only the cases for

which a simulation was defined were

included. Simulations were not defined,

for example, for cases where the fire

originated outside the vehicle or where

the crash conditions were too

complicated—these events included

multiple impacts, undercarriage

impacts, or rollover events, etc. Based

on these criteria, there were 64 vehicles

selected for simulations.

For vehicles receiving frontal damage,

the report indicates that a pole would be

the most common simulation barrier

type. For rear damage, a moving

deformable barrier with a partial overlap

(a partial width of the vehicle involved

in the crash) was cited most often as a

simulation procedure. For side impacts,

a pole impact was the most common

simulation procedure. The GESAC

report also presents information on

impact speed for these simulations.

For frontal impacts, the delta-v ranged

from 23 kmph to 105 kmph (14 to 65

mph) with a 55 kmph (34 mph) medium

delta-v. For rear impacts, the delta-v

ranged from 11 kmph to 73 kmph (7 to

45 mph) with a 42 kmph (26 mph)

medium delta-v. Overlap, which is

defined as the percentage of the frontal

or rear width engaged in a crash, ranged

from 40% to 100% for frontal crashes,

with an average level of 72% overlap.

For rear crashes, the overlap ranged

from 30% to 95% with an average level

of 71%. This real-world crash is similar

to the Ford Mustang test, discussed in

the previous section, that resulted in a

ruptured fuel tank.

Based on these analyses, NHTSA

tentatively concludes that in developing

any new performance requirements, it

should consider alternatives to the

FMVSS No. 301 barriers in addition to

possible changes in impact speeds.

Possible alternatives to be considered

are changes to simulate single vehicle

crashes, pole tests, and offset tests.

NHTSA also needs to consider the

likelihood of an occupant surviving the

crash forces in high severity crashes that

are associated with many fire fatalities.

To address this issue, the agency may

have to develop new test dummies that

are capable of collecting meaningful

data at higher impact speeds and in rear

impacts.

To further define crash conditions

that lead to fires, NHTSA anticipates

conducting additional analysis of the

FARS and NASS files, the GESAC

study, and experimental crash testing.

Additional full-scale crashes are being

considered to help identify possible

upgraded performance requirements.

Response to the Request for Comments

Notice

Impact Speeds

FMVSS No. 301 specifies that the

frontal and rear crash tests be conducted

at 30 mph (48.3 kmph) and the lateral

crash test be conducted at 20 mph (32.2

kmph). The December 1992 notice asked

about appropriate test speeds.

In response to that notice, Advocates

and CAS supported testing with

increased impact speed. Specifically,

Advocates stated that impact testing for

all crash modes should be conducted at

least at 56.3 kmph (35 mph). It also

stated that the current side impact 32.2

kmph (20 mph) test speed of existing

FMVSS No. 301 is especially

inappropriate in light of the agency’s

current consideration of dynamic lateral

test regimens for light trucks. CAS

stated that based on crash protection

technology in new vehicles, the

standard should be amended to provide

for no fuel leakage in a 72.4 kmph (45

mph) frontal fixed barrier crash, a 72.4

kmph side moving barrier, and a 72.4

kmph fixed rear barrier.

In contrast, Mazda, Mitsubishi,

Volkswagen (VW), Toyota, GM,

Chrysler, Mercedes-Benz, BMW, Ford

Motor Company and the American

Automobile Manufacturers Association

(AAMA) questioned the need for testing

at higher impact speeds or stated that

more data are needed before considering

such an increase. For instance, Toyota

stated that the data and analyses on

injuries and deaths from vehicle fires

are insufficient to support a compliance

test requirement for higher impact

speeds. Similarly, Mercedes stated that

increased impact speed as part of a

compliance test does not appear to have
Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 70 / Wednesday, April 12, 1995 / Proposed Rules 18571

great potential for increasing real-world

fire safety. AAMA stated that the

difference in impact speeds for side

versus front and rear tests is

representative and reasonable.

Impact Barrier, Location, and

Orientation

FMVSS No. 301 requires either fixed

or moving rigid impact barriers for the

crash tests as described previously in

this notice. In the December 1992

notice, NHTSA posed several questions

about the appropriate barrier, including

whether the current impact barriers

should be replaced by the moving

contoured rigid barrier for testing large

school buses.

National Truck Equipment

Association (NTEA), Mazda, Advocates,

VW, Toyota, AAMA, BMW, and Ford

said no; and no commenter favored this

approach. NTEA objected to extending

the existing contoured barrier to other

vehicles because of economic

considerations. Mazda stated that the

FMVSS No. 214 barrier represents realworld crashes better than the contoured

barrier.

In the December 1992 notice, NHTSA

also asked whether the current barriers

are representative of typical real-world

crash situations.

While GM and BMW stated ‘‘yes,’’

Advocates, Ford, and Volvo said ‘‘no.’’

GM stated that the FMVSS No. 301

moving barrier side impact test is an

appropriate surrogate for real-world side

impact circumstances because it

properly measures the fuel system

performance regardless of component

location. Advocates stated that the

current perpendicular barrier crash test

conditions for frontal and rear impact

tests should be replaced by offset and

angle impacts. Advocates also suggested

that the current side impact test should

be replaced by a pole impact test,

claiming that such a test is more

representative of real-world situations.

The December 1992 notice also asked

whether all vehicles with GVWR of

10,000 pounds (4,536 kg) or less should

be subjected to the impact test

requirements for large school buses.

Advocates, VW, Toyota, AAMA,

Mercedes, BMW, and Ford all opposed

this approach, while no commenter

favored it. These commenters stated that

the contoured barrier does not simulate

vehicles in use now.

Another question was whether the

FMVSS No. 214 dynamic side impact

test should be incorporated into FMVSS

No. 301, thereby replacing FMVSS No.

301’s current lateral requirements. Of

the twelve commenters responding to

the question 11 answered ‘‘yes’’ (Mazda,

Advocates, Mitsubishi, VW, GM,

Chrysler, AAMA, Mercedes, BMW,

Ford, and Volvo). Only Toyota said

‘‘no.’’ In general, the commenters stated

that the FMVSS No. 214 side impact test

conditions are more representative of

real-world accidents than the current

FMVSS No. 301 side impact test

requirements. GM and AAMA also

suggested allowing the FMVSS No. 214

test as an optional test to the FMVSS

No. 301 side impact test. In contrast,

Toyota stated that available accident

data do not demonstrate the need to

replace the FMVSS No. 301 test with the

FMVSS No. 214 test.

B. Origin of Fires

The origin of fire in vehicle crashes

needs to be understood better to help

define possible countermeasures and

performance requirements.

The agency’s NASS collects

information on the origin of fires in

towed light vehicles. NASS classifies

fires as either minor or major. Fires were

classified as major if they involved the

whole passenger compartment or

several different compartments such as

the engine compartment, trunk

compartment, undercarriage, etc.

Approximately 65 percent of crashinduced light vehicle ‘‘major’’ fires

began in the engine compartment, 28

percent began in the fuel tank or another

part of the fuel system, which includes

the fuel supply lines, vent lines, and

tank filler neck, and seven percent

others.

A recently published British article

also concluded that the engine

compartment was the most common

source of fires. This was attributed to

the varied electrical and mechanical

systems. The article stated that:

‘‘Investigators found that a

disproportionately high number of

crash/collision fires start in cars built

after 1985—especially where the

vehicles are fitted with a fuel-injection

system. The investigations also showed

that fuel line integrity was more at risk

from heat and fire than from impact

damage.’’ (Ref: ‘‘CACFOA Urges Action

by Car Manufacturers on Fire Risks,’’

Fire Prevention, October 1992.)

C. Vehicle Age and Fires

Both the FMVSS No. 301 evaluation

report referenced in the December 14,

1992, Request for Comments notice and

more recent analysis of real-world crash

results indicate that older vehicles

involved in crashes represent a

disproportionate number of cases in

which there was a fire compared to

newer crash vehicles. The agency’s

FARS analysis showed that vehicle age

has a statistically significant

relationship to fire in fatal crashes. The

agency is conducting an extensive

statistical analysis of fire occurrence in

fatal and other crashes, as a function of

the factors that may influence the

likelihood of post-collision vehicle fires.

Fire occurrence in FARS was examined

in fatal crashes with any occurrence of

a fire and in those crashes for which the

fire was the ‘‘Most Harmful Event.’’

Preliminary results indicate that as

vehicles (especially passenger cars) age,

the likelihood of a fatal fire increases.

The preliminary findings also indicate

that while trucks involved in fatal

crashes have a somewhat higher rate of

fire occurrence than cars, there is not an

increase in the likelihood of fire as light

trucks age.

Preliminary findings indicate that for

cars, light trucks, and vans as a group

and with all other factors held constant,

a vehicle that is ten years older than

another is on average, 29.3 percent more

likely to be involved in a fatal fire. Most

of this increase is found in cars.

Although there is an indication that as

light trucks and vans age the probability

of a fire increases in fatal crashes, the

estimated increase is less than the

increase for cars only. However, the

number of cases in the current data base

is insufficient to produce statistically

significant results using vehicle age as a

variable.

The combined data for cars, light

trucks, and vans do not suggest any

relationship between vehicle age and

likelihood of involvement in a fatal

crash where the most harmful event is

fire. Nevertheless, post-crash fires

should be avoided to the extent

practicable. The possible effect of

vehicle aging, therefore may need to be

addressed in an upgrade of FMVSS No.

301.

To address the problems associated

with older vehicles, requirements may

need to address such factors as

corrosion, stress cracking, fatigue, and

mechanical damage. Various aging tests

are available, such as the Salt Spray

(Fog) Test (ASTM B117), Humidity Test,

Laboratory Cyclic Testing and

Electrochemical Testing to simulate

corrosive environments. However, if the

problem of aging in relation to fuel

system leakage and fires were attributed

to cracking of fuel hoses, etc. then there

are other options. Standards with

performance requirements for aging of

fuel lines and tanks may be one

approach to mitigating this problem.

A question related to this subject was

posed in the December 1992 notice.

Eight commenters did not support

setting up an aging test standard within

FMVSS No. 301 (Mazda, Mitsubishi,

Toyota, GM, AAMA, Mercedes, BMW,

and Ford). Advocates and Volvo
18572 Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 70 / Wednesday, April 12, 1995 / Proposed Rules

supported a component test procedure

for aging. VW opposed aging tests on a

total vehicle basis but not for

components.

Mitsubishi indicated that the design

of various replacement parts, their

materials and conditions of use and

exposure will all vary, and it is not

practical to set up a standard specifying

time or mileage limits for each part.

BMW stated that age-related degradation

can occur not only in fuel system

components, but also in other parts,

components, and structures and could

be a significant factor related to

degradation, along with differences in

vehicle use, operational and

environmental conditions and

maintenance.

Mazda, VW, and Volvo recommended

periodic inspection or replacement of

certain fuel system components. Mazda

recommended it be performed by the

vehicle owner and VW suggested

upgraded periodic inspections for

vehicle condition be performed under

local or state government programs.

Mazda also stated that, in the long term,

durability testing of critical fuel system

components may be advisable.

Advocates strongly supported

simulation of fuel system component

deterioration and overall system

performance loss due to aging effects.

Advocates suggested utilizing test

standards to detect the deleterious

effects of aging and/or exposure to

operating or environmental conditions

that degrade fuel system integrity.

The agency requests specific

comments on the wisdom and

practicability of adopting existing test

procedures or developing new

component test procedures related to

aging effects. Individual fuel system

components could be evaluated using

accelerated aging or corrosion treatment

tests.

Phased Rulemaking Approach

Based on the above discussions and

preliminary analyses, the agency is

considering research and rulemaking

activities to amend FMVSS No. 301 to

address the following areas:

1. The definition of performance

criteria for fuel system components

directed at mitigating the cause and

spread of vehicle fires.

2. The modification of the existing

FMVSS No. 301 crash test procedures

and performance criteria to better

simulate the events that lead to serious

injury and fatalities in fires.

3. The definition of the role of

environmental and aging factors such as

corrosion and vibration as it affects fuel

system integrity, and, if appropriate, the

specification of performance criteria

related to this area.

The agency is considering whether to

initiate rulemaking using a phased

approach. The basis of this approach

lies in the varying complexity of

addressing the different issues listed

above. The initial phase would focus on

requirements for component

performance, the second phase would

address system performance, and the

third phase would deal with issues

related to environmental and aging

effects.

Phase 1: Component Level Performance

A. Objectives of Component Approach

The first phase would focus on the

specification of performance criteria, at

a component level, to attempt to ensure

that the flow of fuel from the fuel tank

or fuel lines will stop in a crash. It

would also focus on minimizing the

possibility of an electrical spark of

sufficient intensity to act as an ignition

source. These specifications would

primarily affect fires that originate in

the engine compartment. However, they

would also help to shut off the fuel flow

for all crash modes, including a rollover

crash.

Shutting off the fuel flow quickly

during or immediately after a crash will

eliminate a major fire and fuel source

and therefore should both reduce fire

incidents and limit the spread of fire, if

one were to start. It also appears that

many new vehicles incorporate different

techniques for addressing this problem.

An electric current shut-off device

would minimize the possibility of a

spark. The performance associated with

the fuel shut-off and the electric current

shut-off devices can be incorporated

into the present crash tests in FMVSS

No. 301 or other compliance tests such

as those conducted as part of FMVSS

No. 214.

As discussed below, the agency is also

seeking comment about component test

requirements for fuel tanks, fuel pumps,

the vehicle’s electrical system, and

engine fire extinguishes.

The agency requests information on

the performance, cost, and practicability

aspects of various systems in shutting

off the fuel flow and the electric power.

The agency also requests comments on

ways to develop a practicable test

procedure and to define specific criteria

with sufficient objectivity that test

variability is reduced to a minimum. In

the event that other, more appropriate,

component tests would satisfy the

objectives of the Phase 1 effort,

interested parties are requested to

provide this information to the agency.

B. Components Now in Use

The agency believes that technology

already exists for detecting and

identifying conditions when the fuel

flow should be shut off. Most new

vehicles sold in the United States are

already equipped with devices that shut

off the fuel pump in any collision that

causes the engine to stop.

In some vehicles, sensors detect the

consequence of severe engine damage

(rotation stops for camshaft, crankshaft

or alternator) and immediately shut off

the fuel pump. Often, signals from more

than one sensor are used to determine

if the engine has stopped running and

the decision for fuel pump shut-off is

left up to the vehicle’s onboard

computer (such as the Engine Control

Unit or Electronic Control Module).

Manufacturers also use a ‘‘central’’ for

collecting and routing crash signals

through a central collision detection

bus.

Other vehicles are equipped with an

inertia switch. Inertia switches can be

used to shut off the fuel flow as well as

the electric current. Inertia switches

operate on sudden impact to open the

electrical circuit to the fuel pump or the

battery during the crash. An inertia

switch can be designed to operate at

various levels of impact intensity and

direction, and thus could be effective in

all crash modes.

The agency requests information on

the different components used in

vehicles for shutting off the fuel flow or

electric current.

C. Component Test Procedures

Fuel system components must operate

in a real-world environment surrounded

by extreme conditions imposed by

modern engine technology. The

materials and parts used to assemble

fuel system components are already

subject to manufacturers’ specifications,

often derived from or directly related to

other engineering standards such as the

publications of the American Society for

Testing and Materials (ASTM). Some of

the test requirements are generic to

many of the ASTM standards, for

example: vibration, shock, endurance

testing, temperature cycling,

temperature extremes, compatibility

with other materials, etc.

Comments are requested regarding the

extent and scope of component test

requirements that should be developed

as part of the FMVSS No. 301.

The agency has identified the

following fuel system and vehicle

components as potential candidates for

this approach:

a. Fuel tank, including filler pipe

b. Fuel pump(s)
Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 70 / Wednesday, April 12, 1995 / Proposed Rules 18573

c. Vehicle’s electrical system

d. Engine fire retardant/extinguisher

The agency has not included fuel

lines in this proposed list because the

potential to shut down the entire fuel

delivery system when the fuel pump

shuts down already exists. Comments

are requested about this decision.

a. Fuel tank, including filler pipe.

During a vehicle crash, the fuel tank

may receive crash forces great enough to

move or dislodge the tank from its

mountings and/or to rupture the tank. If

the tank moves significantly, the filler

pipe, which is attached to the vehicle

body to provide access during refueling,

may rupture or break away. If the filler

pipe ruptures, fuel could spill. Fuel

spillage can be expected under some

crash conditions even if the fuel pump

is shut off.

One concept would include a check

valve located in the filler pipe that is

normally closed to prevent fuel flow but

that would open automatically during

refueling. For example, inserting of the

pump filler nozzle could cause the

closed check valve to open to permit

fuel flow; withdrawing the nozzle

would cause the valve to close.

Another concept would use a check

valve similar in function to the valves

used on heavy truck crossover fuel

lines. Applied to the filler neck, this

concept would require a large valve,

normally open, that would close

automatically upon detachment of the

filler neck due to a crash.

Comments are requested on how filler

check valves should be evaluated during

safety compliance tests. For example:

1. Should the filler valve pass a

simple go no-go test or should the valve

be subjected to many cycles of

operation?

2. What test condition would be

appropriate for filler check valves:

dynamic pendulum or other impact

tests?

3. What are the critical engineering

parameters that would characterize the

proper operation of a filler pipe check

valve?

4. Are there alternative ways to

control spillage from broken filler

pipes?

b. Fuel pump(s). Today’s passenger

cars, light trucks, and vans use

electrically operated fuel delivery

pumps almost exclusively. Some

electric fuel pumps shut down if certain

engine operating parameters, such as

crankshaft rotation, indicate that the

engine has stopped. The agency is

interested in how manufacturers use

engine sensing to control fuel pump

operation and under what conditions

the fuel pump is shut off. Specifically:

1. Is current sensing time response

adequate to prevent fuel spillage? If not,

what would improve response time?

2. How does cessation of engine

rotation typically relate to the frontal

crash pulse; i.e., after engine

disintegration begins, how long does it

take for the rotating parts to stop?

3. During this time interval, how

much fuel spillage could occur,

assuming that the crash has damaged

the fuel lines, making fuel spillage

imminent?

4. How would sensing engine rotation

provide benefit to vehicles involved in

a rear impact? rollover? side impact? in

any crash where engine damage may be

slight?

5. With regard to vehicle rollover,

would a separate rollover switch

prevent fuel spillage? Could this

function be practicably combined in a

single switch that would respond to all

crash modes?

6. Does fuel pump shut-off prevent

gravity-induced fuel flow through the

pump?

7. Should a single fuel pump cutoff

switch be used to replace the functions

currently performed by sensing engine

rotational parameters?

8. What advantages/disadvantages

would such an installation incur? Some

manufacturers currently use inertia

switches to interrupt the flow of

electricity to the fuel pump when a

crash is sensed, thereby causing the fuel

pump to shut down.

1. Could an inertial switch be

substituted for the systems that sense

engine shut down to disable fuel

pumping?

2. Under what conditions would such

a substitution be impracticable or too

costly?

3. What sensitivity of operation

should an effective inertia switch have?

4. Can inertia switches be

manufactured with sufficient durability

and reliability to function for long

periods of time unattended in a

relatively harsh automotive

environment?

5. Are there any other features of an

inertia switch that would be detrimental

to occupant safety; e.g., what measures

must an occupant take to restart the

vehicle after an inertia switch has

stopped fuel flow?

The agency is also interested if

manufacturers or others have any

alternative techniques for

accomplishing fuel shut-off during a

crash.

c. Vehicle’s electrical system. Other

means exist to cause the fuel pump to

shut down in a crash. For example, a

battery shut-off device could remove all

electrical power from the vehicle at the

onset of a crash. However, battery shutoff may have unintended consequences

if electrically operated door locks or

windows are rendered inoperative

during a crash. Comments are requested

regarding the relative costs and

practicability of battery shut-off devices.

d. Engine fire retardant/extinguisher.

After ignition takes place, vehicle fires

could be controlled or extinguished if

the proper equipment were available

and functioning. Examples of

equipment that could help control or

extinguish a fire include an onboard fire

extinguisher mounted in the engine

compartment and fire retardant

blankets. A fire extinguisher using

carbon dioxide or other gaseous

mixtures could be operated by means of

existing vehicle sensors (such as the

inertia switch) or by other signals. Fire

retardant blankets attached underneath

the vehicle’s hood could drop down

onto the engine to smother a fire in the

event of a crash. Comments are

requested on the costs and practicability

of these concepts.

Phase 2: System Level Performance

The second phase would focus on the

process of defining upgraded crash test

performance for frontal, side, and rear

impacts. The present crash tests

specified in FMVSS No. 301 require a

frontal fixed barrier impact at 30 mph

(48.3 kmph), a moving barrier impact of

20 mph (32.2 kmph) into the side of a

stationary vehicle, and a moving barrier

impact of 30 mph (48.3 kmph) into the

rear of a stationary vehicle.

From the information discussed in

this notice, it appears that the present

tests in FMVSS No. 301 may not be

representative of the severity of the

crash conditions associated with fatal

and severe injury-causing fires.

However, it is difficult at this time to

define specific upgrades to these crash

conditions without further tests. Some

potential tests that appear promising for

upgrading FMVSS No. 301 test

procedures are the offset/oblique tests in

the frontal mode, the FMVSS No. 214

offset barrier in the rear test mode and

a pole impact or FMVSS No. 214 barrier

for the side impact.

As identified in the GESAC study, a

key objective for such tests may be to

limit the engagement to a narrower area

than engaged with current barriers. The

specific crash conditions that cause fuel

system loss of integrity must be defined,

along with an understanding of which

crashes would be survivable if fire was

avoided. Accident data analyses and

crash testing are being considered to

further explore these issues, which is

expected to be the second phase of
18574 Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 70 / Wednesday, April 12, 1995 / Proposed Rules

rulemaking, which may be conducted

concurrently with the first phase.

The agency requests comments on the

performance aspects and practicability

of this approach.

Phase 3: Environmental and Aging

Effects

The third phase would explore the

issue of environmental and aging effects

on vehicle condition and the possible

relationship to fire occurrence. The

agency’s preliminary analyses of FARS

and State accident files indicate that the

likelihood of fire increases with the age

of the vehicle. The analysis also

attempted to determine the possible

differences, if any, in the occurrence of

fire in fatal crashes in states that

typically experience more inclement

weather (i.e., snow and ice) and as a

result, use more salt and other corrosive

substances on public roadways, when

compared to other states.

Passenger cars registered in the ‘‘salt

belt’’ states and involved in fatal crashes

were found to have an approximately 25

percent greater rate of fire occurrence in

fatal crashes, compared with passenger

cars in fatal crashes in the ‘‘sun belt’’

states. (It should be noted that when the

fire itself was deemed to be the most

harmful event in the vehicle, the ‘‘salt

belt’’ states had a lower rate compared

to the ‘‘sun belt’’ states.) It is not clear

at this time whether this possible

relationship between vehicle aging,

weather and use of salt and similar

substances and fire occurrence may be

due to environmental characteristics, to

changes in vehicle design, to differences

in operator characteristics, or a

combination of these factors. If this

disparity can be attributed to

environmental factors, it may be

possible to add environmental tests,

such as corrosion, to FMVSS No. 301.

Further work is needed to associate

vehicle fires with environmental and

aging factors and to define possible

performance tests. Because of this, the

agency is considering addressing this

problem in a third phase of rulemaking.

The agency requests comments on

this phased approach. This approach

may be implemented either sequentially

or concurrently, depending on the

timing of the research.

Rulemaking Analyses

NHTSA has considered the impact of

this rulemaking action under Executive

Order 12866 and the Department of

Transportation’s regulatory policies and

procedures. The agency has determined

that this notice is significant under

Department’s policies and procedures.

The agency notes that the increase in

vehicle production costs and

corresponding increases in consumer

costs that would result from upgrading

the requirements of FMVSS No. 301

would depend on the stringency and

nature of the new requirements and the

extent to which present and planned

new production vehicles would already

meet them, i.e., the type and extent of

vehicle changes that would be

necessary. Since the agency is still in

the research and analysis phase of the

rulemaking, including assessing new

vehicle hardware and fuel system crash

integrity, it cannot provide a cost

estimate at this time. Nevertheless, a

more comprehensive discussion of this

notice’s cost impacts is discussed in the

Preliminary Regulatory Evaluation,

which has been placed in the public

docket.

Submission of Comments

Interested persons are invited to

submit comments on the proposal. It is

requested but not required that 10

copies be submitted. All comments

must not exceed 15 pages in length (49

CFR 553.21). Necessary attachments

may be appended to these submissions

without regard to the 15-page limit. This

limitation is intended to encourage

commenters to detail their primary

arguments in a concise fashion.

If a commenter wishes to submit

certain information under a claim of

confidentiality, three copies of the

complete submission, including

purportedly confidential business

information, should be submitted to the

Chief Counsel, NHTSA, at the street

address given above, and seven copies

from which the purportedly confidential

information has been deleted should be

submitted to the Docket Section. A

request for confidentiality should be

accompanied by a cover letter setting

forth the information specified in the

agency’s confidential business

information regulation 49 CFR Part 512.

All comments received before the

close of business on the comment

closing date indicated above will be

considered, and will be available for

examination in the docket at the above

address both before and after that date.

To the extent possible, comments filed

after the closing date will also be

considered. Comments received too late

for consideration in regard to the

ANPRM will be considered as

suggestions for further rulemaking

action. Since NHTSA will continue to

file relevant information as it becomes

available in the docket after the closing

date, it is recommended that interested

persons continue to examine the docket

for new material.

Those persons desiring to be notified

upon receipt of their comments in the

rules docket should enclose a selfaddressed, stamped postcard in the

envelope with their comments. Upon

receiving the comments, the docket

supervisor will return the postcard by

mail.

Issued on April 6, 1995.

Barry Felrice,

Associate Administrator for Safety

Performance Standard.

[FR Doc. 95–9025 Filed 4–11–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–59–P