### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 7 -00 651 -CR NO. 03-07-00652- CR NO. 03-07-00653- CR

De nnis Al e xa nde r , A ppe lla nt

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 403RD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NOS. D-1-D C-06 -3017 53, D -1-DC -06-30 1777 & D -1-DC -06-30 1778 , HO NORAB LE MARK

R. LUITJEN, JUDGE P RESIDING

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N
These thr ee c ause numbers wer e consolidated for trial. I n cause number 06-301753, a jury found appe llant Dennis Alexander guilty of t h ef t o f a motorcycle. See Tex. P enal Code Ann. § 31.03 (West Supp. 2008). I n cause number 06-301777, the jury found Alexander guilty

of theft of a motor vehicle. See id. I n cause number 06-301778, the jury found Alexander guilty

of placinga ser ial number on a vehicle wi t h t h e intent to chang e the identity of the ve hicle. See Te x. Tr ans p. Cod e Ann. § 5 01 .1 51 (We st 200 7)
. Th e tr ia l cou rt a sse sse d pun ish me nt at te n y e ars ’ imprisonment for ea ch of the theft offe nses and thirty -five y ear s’ imprisonment for the se rial number of fe ns e . A le xan de r a

pp e a ls, arguin g that th e e vid e nc e wa s le g a lly and fact ual ly insuf

fi c ie nt t o
su pp or t th e se ri a l numb er of

fe ns e and tha t hi s tr ia l c ouns e l w a s in e ff e c tiv e fo r f

a ili ngto m ov e to quash the ha

bitual offende r portion of the se rial number indictment. We hold that the evide nce w as2

leg all y and fa ctually

sufficie nt to support the verdict a nd that Alexander wa s not prejudiced by ineffe ctive assistanc e of tria l counsel. We aff irm the judg ments of conviction.
BACK GR OUND On J uly 31, 2006, Detec tive J ohn Spill ers of the Austin Police Depa rtment rec eived a phone c all on the auto thef t tip li ne. The caller told Detec tive Spill ers that a man was adve rtising
a 19 90 s mo de l V olv o f

or sa le a s a 19 80 s mo de l V olv o at 18 12 Clif fo rd Av e nu e in Aus tin , T e xas. Detec tive Spill er s an d Detec tive Robert Hig htower dr ove to the Clifford Ave nue addre ss—Alexander’s home. In the back y ard, they found a w hite 1990s model Volvo that matched the desc ription give n by the caller, a white box trailer, a gre en mot orcycle, a Toy ota, and a

tow truck. Alexander told the off

icer s that he ran a tow business and that he had rec ently towed the Volvo a

nd the white box trailer and was s t o ri n g t h em for customers. He told them that he ow ned the g ree n motorcy cle, the T oy ota, and the tow tr uck. The off icer s ran the license plate on the Volvo, a nd it came ba ck as “ no rec ord.” The Vo lvo ha d two dif

fe re nt ve hic le ide nti fi c a tio n numb e rs (V I Ns ). Th e VI

N that w a s o n th e fr on t da sh plate and the eng ine compar tment plate wer e fr om a 1980s model Vo l v o wh i l e the VI N on the dr i v e r ’ s s i d e d o o r w a s t h e o r i g i n a l an d s h o w e d t h a tt h e v e h i c l e h a d b e e nr e p o rt e d

s t o l e ni ne ar l y J u l y. The inspec tion sti cker

on the Volvo’s windshield was from a Toy ota. Offic er Spi llers testified that people ty pically switch VI

Ns and ins pection st icker s on stolen vehicles “ so they don’t g et ca

ug ht by the police a

nd they don’t g et pulled over

on inspections.” Th e de te c tiv e s ne xt n oti c e d that the bo x tr a ile r ha d be e n s tr ipp e d o f i ts V I N a nd a ll other i d en t ifying ma

rker s. When they

opened up the trailer, the y discovere d a re d Kawa saki3

motorcy cle inside. T h e m o t o rc y cle wa s taped with blue pa inter’s tape , in prepa ration for being painted. The red motorc y cle still had its original VI N. When the offic ers r an the VI N, they lear ned that the motorcy cle wa s repor ted stolen on J uly 2, 2006. Alexander initially expressed surprise that the motorcy cle was inside the trailer and claimed that he did not know the motorcycle wa s inside, but later acknowle dg ed that he had known t he mot orcycle wa s inside the trailer, that he was the one who place d the painter ’s tape on the bike, and that he had planned to pa int the bike in prepa ration fo r s e lli ngit. Th e of

fi c e rs c on fi sc a te d th e Vo lvo , th e bo x tra ile r, and the re d K awa saki. Detec tive Spill ers testified that, over the course of the next wee k, Alexander c alled more than onc e and g ave the m various name s o f p eople for whom he ha d supposedly towed the vehicles and offe red to show the offic ers f rom wher e he ha d towed the ve hicles. Spillers testified, “We tried to follow-up on some of the lea ds he g ave us a s far as the pe ople re questing tows, but they turned out to be de ad ends. W e finally ended up ha

ving to g o back on the 7th of Aug ust [ and] knock
on his do or

to r e qu e st h is r e c or ds .” Al e xan de r w a s una ble to p ro du c e bu sin e ss r e c or ds bu t,
ac cordingto Spil lers, “[h]e ag ree d that he wa s g oing to c ome down and g ive us an intervie w, and it was our under standing at that time that he would be able to produce standard doc umentation for operating a

tow business, rec eipts for towing , and people ’s information as r equire d by statutes.” The ne x t day , Alexander c ame to the pol ice station and w as interview ed by Detec tives Spil lers and H ightowe r. The int er v i ew wa s rec orded a nd a video of

the interviewwas admitted into e vidence and play ed for the jury at trial. In the interview , Alexander a cknowledg ed that his tow business was not lice nsed and his tow truck wa s not insured, that he did not kee p rec ords on his tow jobs, and that he did not reque st identification or owne rship proof f rom the pe o p le forWhen the detec tives pointed out that they confiscated the ca

r only seven da y s after the 1 J uly 24 date that Ale x ander purportedly towed the Volvo, Alexander stated that he definitely had the c ar f or tw o to thr e e we e ks . H e tol d th e de te c tiv e s th a t th e July 24 date mus t th e re fo re be inc or re c t, but that he was unc erta in what th e co rr ec t date wa s, stating only that it was some time afte r the J u l y 4 h o l i d ay. 4 wh o m h e towed vehic les. He initially claimed that he towed the Volvo f or a ma n named Ric k M a so n, bu t he c ou ld n ot g ive the de te c tiv e s the man’ s ph on e numbe r o r a ny wa y to c on ta c t hi m. Al e xan de r s a id t

hat Mas on ask e d h im t o to w the c ar o n July 24 , 2 00 6, and

to s tor e it o ve rn ig ht. Mason w a s to c o me b y th e n e xt d ay an d g o w it h A le xan d e r to ta

k e th e c ar to th e V o lvo shop. Alexander said he kept the ca r for two to three w eeks, but whe n Mason did not come bac k and the sto ra g e fe e s b e g an to a c c umu la te , A le xan de r d e c ide d to se ll the c ar t o r e c ou p h is c os ts. Alexander

1 said that he put a sign in the window adver tising it f or sale a nd tried to sell it but all the prospective buy e rs ba c ke d o ut w he n th e y le arn e d h e did

no t ha ve tit le to the c a

r. At so me po int , a c c or din g to Alexander, a

man named D on King—who Alexander claimed lived in A lexander’s ne ighbor hood
and wh om Al e xan de r sa id he ha d k no wn fo r y e a rs bu t f or wh om A le xan de r c ou ld n ot p ro du c e va lid contac t information—offe red to buy the ca r. Alexander told the de tectives that, t h e day afte r the of fi c e rs c on fi sc a te d th e Vo lvo , Ri c k M a so n c a me loo kin g fo r his c ar, bu t w he n A le xan de r t ri e d to contac t the police so Mason c ould speak to them about his ca r, Mason sped of

f. Alexander ha d a si milar story for the trailer and t he red motorcy cle. He admitted that he ha d li e d to the de te c tiv e s w he n h e tol d the m tha t he did no t know a bo ut t he mot or c y c le be c a

us e he wa s conce rned a

bout goingto jail. He told the detectives that a man named J ames ha d reque sted
a tow so me tim e in e arl y

July . H e did

no t ha ve a ph on e nu

mbe r f or James or knowJame s’ s la st name. Ale x ander

claimed to have met J ames in a L uby ’s par king l o t b ef

o re following him to an5

apar tment complex on East Oltorf in Austin. Alexander sa id he then towed the trailer, w ith the motorcy cle inside, a

nd stored them in his backy ard. When the of fi ce rs asked Alex ander

what ca r J ames wa s driving, A lexander initially responde d that J ames wa s in a white F ord truck w ith tan stripes. When the offic ers a sked Alexander w hy J ames ha d not towed his own trailer and motorcy cle, Ale x ander

chang ed his story

and claimed that J ames’s truc k was broke n down and wa s sitti ng in the complex parking lot near the trailer a nd that J ames ha d been dr iving a For d Escort. As with the Volvo, Alexander c laimed that J ames ne ver pic ked up his vehicle s , s o when someone of fe re d to pay $8 00 to take the tr a ile r an d bike , he a g re e d. Al e xan de r la te r sa id that King of fe re d to buy both the motorcy cle a

nd the Volvo. Detec tive Hig htower the n confr onted Alex ander with proof that Alexander ha d the white trailer

in his y ard a s ear ly

as F ebrua ry 2006 and told Alexander that the motorcy cle wa s stolen
on July 10 fr om t

he a pa rtme nt c omp le x fr om w hic h A le xan de r c la ime d to have tow e d it
. Ale xan de r’ s st or

y the n c ha ng e d c omp le te ly . A le xan de r c la ime d th a t K ingbr ou g ht t he bik e to Alexander a

nd asked A lexander to hide the bike in t h e tra iler. Alexander sa id that when King broug h t t h e m o t orcycle ove r, King saw the V olvo and offe red to buy both the car

and the bike. When the detec tives asked Ale x ander why King would buy a bike he broug ht over, Ale x ander then
corr ecte d himself and said King was g oing to pa

y Al ex ander

to paint the bike. When they asked Alexander how he knew what complex t he motorcy cl e was stol en fr om, he claimed that Ki ngtol d h im. Alexander a lso chang ed his story reg ardingthe Volvo. He sa id that he re ceive d the Volvo from a man named Chris and claimed to have give n Chris an old Chevrolet Capric e in trade
.6

Alexander said that Chris did not have title to the Volvo an d d i d n o t g ive him the key s to the car
. B ut A le xan de r s oo n c ha

ng e d h is sto ry a g a in, sa

y ing that he tos se d out the ke y s tha t Ch ri s g a ve him
. Al e xan de r m a int a ine d th a t he ha d n ot s wi tc he d th e Vo lvo ’s VI N or lic e ns e plate s, and

sa id t hat Ch ri s must have done that. Alexander did not know Chris’s last name or telephone number, but off ere d to take the de tectives t o wh er e C h ri s worked. H e denie d having chang ed the Volvo’ s VI N and
c la ime d th a t th e Vo lvo wa s a lr e a dy “ ri g g e d u p” wh e n h e re c e ive d it
. Over the cour se of his interac tions with the de tectives, Ale x ander moved from sa

y ing he wa s running a leg itimate towing business, to saying he ran a n unlicensed business, to say ing he “just took the cash and ran” when people reque sted suspicious tows, to say ing he knowing ly rec eived stolen items and took steps to concea l th ei r i d en t i t ies. He a dmitted that he planned to paint the mot or c y c le so he c ou ld s e ll it and that he pla nn e d to e ith e r se ll the Vo lvo or dis mantl e it a nd se ll i ts parts. De tective Spillers and Hig htower both te stified that all of the various leads Alexander g ave the m f or wh e re and fr om wh om he ha d g ott e n the ve hic le s w e re de a d e nd s and that A le xan de r d id not give them any

cre dible leads for

who else c ould have c hang ed the c ar’ s VI N. Al e xan de r w a s c ha

rg e d wi th the ft of the mot or c y c le and the ft of the Vo lvo and wi th chan gi n g t h e VIN on the Volvo. The jury convicted A lexander of a ll three c ounts. Each of the indictments also alleg ed that Alexander had two prior felony convictions, making him an habitual offe nder. Th e habitual offe nder a lleg ations resulted in incre ased se ntencingg uidelines. See T e x. Penal Code Ann. § 12.42(d) (West Supp. 2008). On appea l, Alexander ar g ues that the e vidence was leg ally and fa ctually

insufficient to suppor

t the conviction for c hang ing the VI N on the Volvo and that his trial counsel wa s ineffe ctive beca use he fa iled to move to quash the habitual off ender portion of the VI N i nd ic tme nt.7 DI SCU SSIO N Legal and F actual Suf

fi ciency of the Evidence I n r e vie wi ngthe le g a l su ff ic ie nc y of the e vid e nc e , we re vie w a ll of the e vid e nc e in the light most favor able to the ve rdict. Cla y ton v . S tat e , 235 S.W .3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). The que stion presented is whe ther a rational trier

of fa ct co u ld have f

ound the essential elements of the offe nse beyond a re asonable doubt. J ac k so n v . V irg ini a , 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979); Clayton , 2 3 5 S
. W
. 3 d a t 7 7 8
. W e a s s u m e t h a tt h e t r i e r o f f a c tr e s o l v e d

c o n f l i c t s i nt h e t e s t i m o n y,
we ighed the e vid e nc e , a nd dr e w r e a so na

ble inf e re nc e s in

a mann e r t

hat su pp or ts the ve rd ic t. Clayton , 235 S.W .3d at 778.

I n r e vie wi ngthe fa c tua l su ff ic ie nc y of the e vid e nc e , we c on sid e r a ll the e vid e nc e in
a neutra l lig ht, w hile g iving due defe renc e to the jury ’s deter mination. Se e Sim s v . S

tat e , 99 S.W .3d 60 0, 60 1 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 03 ); Va sq ue z v. Stat e , 67 S.W .3d 229, 236 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). This involves a

two-par t inquiry
. See J

oh ns on v . S

tat e , 23 S.W .3d 1, 6-7 (Te x . Crim. App. 2000). W e first look at the e vidence prese nted in support of the guilty verdic t and re verse only if the evidenc e “is so wea

k as t o be clearly wrongand manife stly unjust.” Id. at 11. I f the e vidence that tends to prove the ve rdict is sufficien t standing alone, we then compar e it with the evidenc e the defe ndant produce s ag ainst the verdic t, id. at 7, and r ever se only if afte r the c omparison the ver dict “is ag ainst the g reat weig ht and pre pondera nce of the ava ilable evidenc e,” id. at 11. The jury is the sole judg e of the cre dibilit y of the witnesse s and the we ight to be acc orded their testimony
. Vasquez , 6 7 S
. W
. 3 d a t 2 3 6
. W e m ay n o t r e w e i g h t h e e v i d e n c e an d s u b s t i tu t e o u r j u d g m e n tf

o r t h a to f t h e j u r y. W ats on v . S tat e , 20 4 S.W. 3d

40 4, 41 7 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 06 ); Kin g v . S tat e , 29 S.W .3d 556, 563 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).Whil e the e vid e nc e c ou ld a lso su pp or t an inf e re nc e that Al e xan de r me re ly a tte mpt e d to se ll 2 t h e v eh i cl e k n o wi n g i t

h ada f al s e V I N, t h e jo b o f ch o o s i n g b et we en t h es e tw o i n fe re n ce s b el o n gs to the jury , who is ta sked with the responsibility “to weig h the evidenc e, to judg e the c redibility of the witnesses, a

nd to choose be tween c onflicting theories of the ca se.” Ge esa v . S

tat e , 820 S.W .2d 154, 159 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). He re, the jury weig hed the e vidence and wa s convince d bey ond a re asonable doubt that Alexander “pla ced” the VI N on the Volvo. 8 I n his fir st a

nd se c on d p oin ts o f e rr or , A le xan de r a rgue s th a t th e e vid e nc e is l e g a lly and fac tually insufficient to sustain the serial number conviction. Under the transpor

tation code, “ [a] p e r s o n c o mm it s an o f

f e n s e if th e p e r s o n s ta

mp s o r p la c e s a s e r ia l n u mb e r o n a v e h ic le o r p art of a vehic le with the intent of cha ng ing the identity

of the ve hicle.” See Tex. Tr ansp . C o de Ann. § 501.151. Alexander ma intains th at t h e S t at e o nly proved that he was in possession of a vehicle that had a f

alse VI N and not that he pe rsonally place d the fa lse VI

N on the Volvo. The ref

ore,
acc ording to Alexander, the State’s evidenc e only supports a convic tion for tamper ing w ith a VI N, which is a c lass A misdemeanor rathe r than a

felony
. Com

pa re T ex . P en al Code Ann. § 31.11(a) (2)( A) (West 2003), with Te x. Tr ans p. Cod e Ann. § 5 01 .1 51 ; se e als o B ou dr e au xv . S tat e , 24 S.W. 3d

50 3, 50 7 ( Te x. Ap p. —T e xar ka na 20 00 , n o p e t.) (h old ingthat of fe ns e of pla c ingfa lse VI N o n v e hic le re qu ir e s p ro of be y on d th a t nec e ssa

ry to pr ov e tampe ri ngof

fe ns e ). Whil e the State did no t pr e se nt a

ny dir e c t e vid e nc e tha

t A le xan de r h ims e lf

pla c e d the fa lse VI

N o n th e Vo lvo , it

did introduce suf

ficient ci rc u m s t an tial evidence to allow a re asonable jury to infer that he did so. 2 Spe c if ic a lly , th e State int

ro du c e d e vid e nc e that A lexan de r: (1 ) atte mpt e d to se ll the a dmi tte dly stolen Volvo, (2) took steps to conce al the identity of other ve hicles in his possession, and (3) lied to t he po lic e a

bo ut h owhe ob ta ine d th e sto le n v e hic le s.9

Attempting to Sell the Stolen Volvo

A l e x an d e r

a d m i t t e d t o t r y i n g t o s e l l t h e V o l v o , w h i c h h e k n e w w a s s t o l e n . In addition, Detec tive Spill ers testified that the tip-line caller told him Alex ander

adver tised the Volvo as a 1980s model Volvo; the incor rec t VI N t hat was place d on the Volvo was f rom a 1980s model vehicle. F rom this, a rea sonable jury could infer

that Alexander kne w that the VI N was from a 1980s mod e l be c a

us e he wa s th e on e wh o p la c e d th e fa lse 19 80 s V I N o n th e c ar i n o rd e r t o s e ll i t. Altering the Identification of Vehicles in His Possession

Fur ther, the jury

was prese nted with e vidence that Alexander took other ste ps to alter the stolen vehicle s in his poss es s i o n . Not only had the VI

N bee n chang ed on the Volvo, but the license plate and inspec tion sti cker had bee n chang ed as well. The inspection sticker on the V olvo
wa s f ro m a To y ota a nd the re wa s a

n o ld T oy ota

sittin gin A le xan de r’ s y ard , fr om w hic h a re a so na ble jury could infer

that Alexander re moved the inspec tion sti cker from the Toy ota and place d it on the Volvo. I n addition, Alexander admitted to the detectives that he knew the motorcy cle wa s stolen and that he ha d ta

ke n s te ps to p a int

it i n o rd e r t o c on c e a l it s id e nti ty
. Al e xan de r a lso po sse sse d a wh ite trailer from which the VI

N and a ll other identifying ma rker s had bee n remove d. The jury could have
c on c luded that a

pe rs on wh o ta ke s th e se ste ps to c ha

ng e the ide nti ty

of ve hic le s is mor e lik e ly

to
c h an g e a s t o l e nv e h i c l e ’ s V IN t o c o n c e a l i t s i d e n t i t y. Lying to the Police

Finally , the State introduced e vidence that Alexander lied to the police about how he obtained the ve hicles in order to lessen his culpability . During the t aped interview with DetectivesThe owne r of the Volvo testified at trial that her car was stolen in ear ly J uly . Alexander 3 admitted to having the ca

r for two to three weeks, which is consistent with his having stolen the c ar in ear ly J uly and thus being the onl y person to possess it and have the opportunity to chang e the VI

N. 10 Spi lle rs and

Hi g hto wer, Al ex ander

re pe a te dly

a sk e d th e de te c tiv e s w hat he ne e de d to do to a vo id j a i l
. E a c h t i m e , t h e d e t e c t i v e s t o l d h i m h e n e e d e d

t o t e l l t h e m h o w h e o b t a i n e d t h e v e h i c l e s . In response , Alexander told the detec tives sever al differ ent inconsistent stories, rang ing f rom running a leg itimate towing business to knowing ly rec eiving stolen items. Alexander c ould not provide the de te c t i v e s w i t h n u mb e r s f o r an y o f t h e p e o p l e f

r o m w h o m h e s u

p p o s e d l y r e c e i v e d t h e v e h i c le s. Nonethele ss, the detec tives testified that they attempted to f ollow up on eac h of these lea ds and that
a ll o f t he m w e re de a d en ds
. Th e jur y c ou ld h a ve inf

e rr e d th a t A le xan de r g a ve the de te c tiv e s f a lse le a ds in a n a tte mpt to c on c e a l th e fa c t th a t A le xan de r h ims e lf sto le the ve hic le s. I f A le xan de r s tol e the Vo lvo in ea

rl y July , the n it wa s mo re lik e ly that he wa s th e on ly

pe rs on wh o h a d th e op po rt

un ity to chang e the VI

N. The jury could have further deter mined that Alexander, who chang ed his story 3
sever al times and admitted to ly ing to the police in or der to ke ep from g oing to ja il, wa s ly ing w hen he told the detec tives that he had not c hang ed the VI N. The c ombined forc e of a ll the circumstantial evide nce—inc luding that Ale x ander
a dv e rt ise d th e c ar f

or sa le a s a mod e l th a t matc he d th e inc or re c t V I N, wa s in po sse ssi on

of mul tip le stolen vehicles, took steps to conce al the identity of those vehic les, lied to the police a bout how he ob ta ine d thos e ve hic le s, ha d no bus ine ss re c or ds to sup po rt his c la im that he ra

n a tow ingbu sin e ss, and cha ng ed his story

multipl e times—was suff icient to allow a rea sonable jury to conclude be y ond
a re a so na ble do ub t th a t A le xan de r p la c e d the in corr e c t V I N o n th e Vo lvo in o rd e r t o c on c e a l it s11

identity
. See Clayton , 235 S.W .3d at 778. Ther efor e, we hold that the evidence is leg ally sufficie nt to sustain Alex ander ’s conviction, and w e over rule his first point of er

ror. L ike wi se , th e e vid e nc e in s up po rt of the g uil ty ve rd ic t is no t so wea k a s to be c le arl y
wr on g and

manif e stl y un jus t, a nd Al e xan der

did no t pr od uc e e vid e nc e a g a ins t th e ve rd ic t so a s to make the guilty

verdic t a g ainst the g reat w eig ht a nd preponde ranc e of the available evidenc e. See Johnson , 2 3 S. W.3 d at 6- 7, 11
. Th e re fo re , we ho ld t ha t th e e vid e nc e is f

a c tua lly su ff ic ie nt t o s us ta in Alexander’s c onviction, and we ove rrule his sec ond point of err or.
Ineff ect ive Assistance of Counsel I n revie wi n g a cla im of ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel, we f irst ask whethe r an att orney ’s per formanc e wa s deficie nt. Strickland v. W ashington , 4 6 6 U
. S. 6 6 8 , 6 8 7 ( 1 9 84); H e rn a n d e z v . S t a te , 98 8 S .W .2 d 770 , 7 74 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 99 ). An a tto rn e y ’s pe rf

or manc e is defic ient if it falls below an obje ctive st an d ard of rea sonablene ss. Strickland , 466 U.S. at 687; Tho mp so n v . S

tat e , 9 S.W. 3d

80 8, 81 2 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 99 ). I f the pe rf or manc e wa s d e fi c ie nt,
we a sk whether

that defici en cy

prejudice d the def

ense. Strickland , 466 U.S. at 687; Thompson , 9 S.W .3d at 812. An attorne y ’s def icient per formanc e is prejudicia l when, but for the attorney ’s
un pr of e ssi on a l c on du c t, t

he re is a re a so na ble pr ob a bil ity that th e ou tc ome of

the pr oc e e din g wo uld have be en diffe rent. Strickland , 466 U.S. at 694.

Alexander a

rg ues that his trial counsel’ s perf ormanc e wa s defic ient beca use he f ailed to move to quash the habitual off ender portio n o f t h e indictment for the VI N offe nse and that Alexander wa s prejudice d when he rec eived a longe r sentenc e as a result. Under section 12.42 of the penal code, an habitual offe nder is one who “has previously been f inally convicted of

two felony12

offe nses, and the se cond pre vious felony conviction is for a

n offe nse that occ urre d subsequent to the first previous c onviction having become final.” Tex. Penal C ode Ann. § 12.42(d). I f a de fenda nt is convicted a

nd is shown to be an hab i t u al offe nder, his sente nce must be be tween twe nty -five and ninety -nine y ear s or life in prison. Id. Th e State mus t g ive a de fe nd ant n oti c e that it

int e nd s to
s ee kenhanc ed punishment under this sec tion. Br oo k s v . S tat e , 9 5 7 S
. W
. 2 d

3 0 , 3 3 ( T e x. C ri m. App. 1997). Th e ind ic tme nt f or the VI N c a se c on ta ine d th e fo llo wi nge nh anc e me nt a lle g a tio ns :
And the Gr and Jury

further prese nts that previousl y Dennis Alex ander had bee n c on vic te d o f t

he fo llo wi ngfe lony

of fe ns e s: of POC S ( CO CA I

NE ) o n the 20 th day of

Se pte mbe r, 19 99 , in

Ca us e N u mb e r 9 7
- 2 6 3 9 i n t h e 3 3 1 s t

J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c tC o u rto f T RA V IS County , T e xas; of POC S ( CO CA I

NE ) on the 20 th day

of Se pte mbe r, 19 99 , in

Ca us e N u m b e r 9 7
- 0 9 1 0 i nt h e 3 3 1 s t J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c tC o u rto f T RA V IS County , T e xas; wh ic h c on vic tio ns ha d b e c ome fi na l be fore the c omm iss ion of the [VI N] o ff e ns e alleg ed in the pre cedingpara g raph. And the G ra nd J ury

further prese nts that previously Dennis Alexander ha d been c on vic te d o f t

he fo llo wi ngfe lony

of fe ns e s: of UUMV on the 30th da y of Jul y , 1991, in Cause Number 101,042 in t he 33 1s t Judi c ia l D istri c t Co ur t of TRA VI S Cou

nty , T e xas; of AGG RAVATED A SSAUL T W/ S ERI OUS BO DI L Y I NJ URY on the 30 th da

y of July , 19 91 , in Ca

us e Numbe r 99 -0 12 in the 331st Judic ia l D istri c t Co ur

t of TRA VI S Cou

nty , T e xas; which convic tions had become fi nal bef ore the commission of the offe nse alleg ed ag ainst the pea ce a

nd dignity

of the State.13

Alexander a

rg ues that the indictment wa s insufficient to alleg e that he w as an ha bitual offende r be c a us e it did no t sp e c if

ic a lly a lle g e that he c omm itt e d the se c on d fe lony of fe ns e a ft e r he wa s f

ina lly
co nvicted for

the first fe lony

offe nse, citing to Gu tie rre z v . S tat e , 5 5 5 S
. W
. 2 d

4 5 7 ( T e x. C ri m. App. 1977), a

nd Se als v . S

tat e , 634 S.W .2d 899, 906 (Tex. A pp.—San Antonio 1982, no pet.). He contends that it was c onceiva ble that the convic tion for the 1991 offe nse wa s not y et final whe n he committed the 1999 offe nse. Alexander a rg ues that a motion to quash would there fore have be en g rante d and he w ould have r ece ived a lig hter sente nce.

The statute c lear ly require s the State to prove that the f irst conviction was fina l before the se c on d o ff

e ns e wa s c omm itt e d in

or de r t o invo ke the ha

bit ua l of fender sent e nc ingg uid e lin e s,
see Tex. P enal Code A nn. § 12.42(d), a nd the State did so i n t h i s ca s e t h roug h Alexander’s stipulation t o that fac t. The question prese nted is whether the State’s fa ilure to allege this fact in the ind ic tme nt i s a

fata l e rr or . We ho ld t

hat it is n ot. Whil e the case s cited by

Alexander do a

ppear to state a brig ht line rule that, in order to invoke the habitual of

fende r statute, the indictment must alleg e “that eac h succe eding conviction be subsequent both in point of t ime of t he commis sion of t he offense a nd the conviction ther efor ,”

se e Se als , 634 S.W .2d at 906, later case s have “moved toward a rela x ation of the rig id technica l rules of the past” and instead focuse d on whether the indictment provided suff icient notice or

whether the defe ndant was sur

prised to his detriment. Fr e da v . S tat e , 704 S
. W
. 2 d 4 1 , 4 3 (Tex. Crim. App. 19 86 ); se e als o W

ill iam s v . S

tat e , 980 S.W .2d 222, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Di st.] 1998, pet. re f’d)
. The que stion then becomes whe ther the indictment g ave A lexander suffic ient notice that the State was invoking the habitual off ender statute. The indictment indicate d the following14

c on c e rn ingAl e xan de r’ s p ri or c on vic tio ns : c a

us e numbe rs ; dis tr ic t numbe r and c ounty of the c ourt ; of fe ns e c ha rg e d and its fe lony natur e ; and the date of c on vic tio n. Th is i nf

or ma tio n is su ff

ic ie nt t o notify Alexander that he was be ing c harg ed as a n habitual offe nder. Se e J ing le s v . S tat e , 752 S.W .2d 126, 129 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 1987, pet. re f’d) . This information enable d Alexander “to find the re cord a

nd make pr epar ation for a trial of the question whether he is the convic t named there in.” Se e Br own v . S

tat e , 636 S.W .2d 867, 868 (Tex. App.—For t Worth 1982, no pet.). Fur thermore , Alexander a sserted no de fense to the enhanc ement alleg ation; indeed, he plea de d tr

ue to t he e nh anc e me nts and

sti pu la te d th a t th e c on vic tio n f or the 19 91 of

fe ns e beca me final be fore he committed the 1999 o ffe nse. When a de fenda nt has no defe nse to an enhanc ement alleg ation and makes no sug g estion of t he need for a continuance in order to prepa re
a d e f e n s e , n o ti c e g iv e na s late a s th e b e g inn in g o f th e p u n is h me n t p h a s e is s u f f icient. Villescas

v . S tat e , 1 89 S.W. 3d

29 0, 29 4 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 06 ); Ma y fie ld v . S tat e , 219 S.W .3d 5 3 8 , 5 40 (Tex. App.—Texarkana

2007, no pet.). Alexander has not shown that he wa s unfairly surprised whe n the State soug ht to have his punishment assessed under the habitual off

ender statute. Be cause he wa s not unfairly surprised, t h e t ri al cour

t need not have g rante d a motion to quash had one be en made
. See W illiams , 980 S.W .2d at 227. There fore , Alexander has not shown that a diffe rent outcome was likely , as he
m u s t p r o v e i n o r d e r t o s h o w h e w a s p r e j u d i c e d b y h i s t r i a l c o u n s e l ’ s f a i l u r e t o ma ke a mot ion to quash the e nhance ment portion o f t h e al l eg ation. See Strickland , 4 66 U. S. at 69 4. As a re su lt, Alexander’s c laim of ineff ective a ssistance of c ounsel must fail. We ove rr ule Alexander’ s third point of err or.15 CO NC LU SION Be cause we hold that the evidenc e was leg ally and fa ctually sufficie nt to sustain the conviction for pla cing a ser ial number on a vehicle w ith the intent to chan ge t h e i d entity of the
ve hic le and

that A le xan de r w a s n ot p re jud ic e d by ine ff

e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l, w e ov e rr

ule his three points of error

and sustain the judg ments of conviction.

__________________________________________ Diane M. H enson, Jus tice Be fore Chief J ustice Jones, J ustices Pury ear and He nson Affir med Filed: May

1, 2009 Do No t Pu

bli sh