Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 62 / Friday, March 31, 1995 / Notices 16627

3The CBOT notes that a weekly average of 298

and 222 shipping certificates were outstanding

during the 1992/93 and 1993/94 crop years,

respectively.

number of outstanding shipping

certificates for all territories combined

for the crop year is 300 or more. No

changes in the locational price

differentials currently may be made if

this average is less than 300.

The proposed amendment would

reduce to 150 from 300 the minimum

weekly average number of outstanding

shipping certificates during a crop year

that must be observed in order to

activate the contract’s automatic

adjustment procedure for locational

price differentials for the next

succeeding calendar year.

The CBOT indicates that the purpose

of the proposed amendment is to allow

the contract’s locational price

differentials to reflect cash market

locational price relationships. The

CBOT indicates, in this respect, that

reducing the minimum weekly average

number of outstanding shipping

certificates needed to permit changes in

the contract’s price differentials will

allow such differentials to adjust more

quickly toward changing cash market

price differences between the contract’s

delivery territories. The CBOT notes

that, while the current automatic

adjustment feature has been in effect for

three years, adjustments to the

contract’s locational price differentials

were made only in 1993, the first

calendar year in which such changes

were possible under the automatic

adjustment procedure. The CBOT

further indicated that, since that time,

no changes have been made to the price

differentials, because the weekly

average number of shipping certificates

outstanding during the immediately

preceding crop years for each of these

years was less than 300 shipping

certificates.3 According to the CBOT, if

the standard were 150 outstanding

certificates, as proposed, the abovenoted adjustment formula would have

resulted in changes in the locational

price differentials for several delivery

territories during 1994 and 1995.

The CBOT proposes to make the

amendment effective for adjustments in

the locational price differentials for the

January 1997 and subsequent contract

delivery months.

Copies of the proposed amendment

will be available for inspection at the

Office of the Secretariat, Commodity

Futures Trading Commission, 2033 K

Street NW, Washington, D.C. 20581.

Copies of the amended terms and

conditions can be obtained through the

Office of the Secretariat by mail at the

above address or by telephone at (202)

254–6314.

The materials submitted by the CBOT

in support of the proposed amendment

may be available upon request pursuant

to the Freedom of Information Act (5

U.S.C. 552) and the Commission’s

regulations thereunder (17 CFR Part 145

(1987)). Requests for copies of such

materials should be made to the FOI,

Privacy and Sunshine Act Compliance

Staff of the Office of the Secretariat at

the Commission’s headquarters in

accordance with CFR 145.7 and 145.8.

Any person interested in submitting

written data, views or arguments on the

proposed amendment should send such

comments to Jean A. Webb, Secretary,

Commodity Futures Trading

Commission, 2033 K Street NW.,

Washington, D.C. 20581 by the specified

date.

Issued in Washington, D.C. on March 27,

1995.

Blake Imel,

Acting Director.

[FR Doc. 95–7971 Filed 3–30–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6351–01–P

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Office of the Secretary

Record of Decision for the Theater

Missile Defense Extended Test Range

Final Environmental Impact Statement

AGENCY: Ballistic Missile Defense

Organization (BMDO).

ACTION: Record of Decision text is as

follows:

INTRODUCTION: This document records

[BMDO Director’s] decision for the

Ballistic Missile Defense Organization to

conduct tests at two of four alternative

test ranges. The potential for

environmental impacts at these ranges

was analyzed and documented in the

Theater Missile Defense Extended Test

Range Final Environmental Impact

Statement (FEIS), and the public was

notified of its availability on January 13,

1995. The following ranges were

considered for extended range testing:

White Sands Missile Range (WSMR),

New Mexico, Eglin Air Force Base

(AFB) Florida, Western Range,

California, and Kwajalein Missile Range

(KMR), U.S. Army Kwajalein Atoll

(USAKA), Republic of the Marshall

Islands.

In September 1993, [BMDO] issued

[BMDO’s] Record of Decision (ROD) for

the TMD Final Programmatic

Environmental Impact Statement which

analyzed potential environmental

impacts over the life-cycle of the TMD

Program. That document addressed

potential environmental consequences

of the proposed research, development,

testing and production, basing, and

eventual decommissioning activities. It

serves as the foundation for the TMD

Extended Test Range FEIS. [BMDO

Director] have also carefully considered

the requirements of Executive Order

12898, Federal Actions to Address

Environmental Justice in Minority

Populations and Low Income

Populations (Feb. 11, 1994), that this

action not have a disproportionate

impact on minority or low-income

populations.

Need

The proposed extended range testing

arises from compelling national security

needs recognized by both the Congress

and the Administration. Effective

Theater Missile Defense (TMD) is

necessary to protect forward deployed

and expeditionary elements of the

Armed Forces of the United States and

U.S. friends and allies overseas.

Extended range testing is critical to the

development of an effective theater

missile defense.

Purpose

Extended range tests for TMD must

realistically test missile defense systems

under circumstances similar to a theater

of operations. This includes

construction of target launch facilities;

development and testing of sensors,

Battle Management Command, Control,

and Communications components, and

defensive missiles; and intercepts of

missiles over land and water areas.

System operational needs require

conducting target and other missile

system flight tests and intercepts at

altitudes and over distances, greater

than can be accommodated by current

ranges. These tests validate system

design and operational effectiveness of

ground-based interceptors to protect our

forces and allies overseas from theater

ballistic missiles.

Decision

[BMDO Director’s] decision is to

proceed with the extended range testing

at the WSMR and the KRM. At WSMR,

[BMDO Director] select the option to

launch target missiles from Fort Wingate

Depot Activity (FWDA) using Booster

Drop Zone C, with intercepts over

WSMR. It is part of [BMDO Director’s]

decision to take action to reserve a

portion of FWDA for the proposed TMD

activities. On February 28, 1994, the

BMDO notified the Secretary of the

Army of its potential need for sufficient

property at FWDA to conduct missile

launch activities, including provision
16628 Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 62 / Friday, March 31, 1995 / Notices

for security, safety, and access. The

BMDO will confirm its need for

property at FWDA and take other

necessary actions to ensure such

property is not disposed of under the

provisions of the Base Realignment and

Closure Act. [BMDO Director] have

decided not to select sea-based target

missile launches at this time. [BMDO

Director] select only the land-based

target launch option from Wake Island

for the KMR alternative. Missile

intercepts will take place over existing

impact areas or open sea areas at KMR.

Proposed Action and Alternatives

Background: The proposed action

analyzed in the TMD Extended Test

Range FEIS was to conduct extended

range tests of target missiles, defensive

missiles, and sensor systems at one or

more of four alternative test range areas.

The tests would involve target and

defense missile launches from existing

test ranges and from off-range locations

with intercepts over existing ranges or

open ocean areas. Preparations and

testing would begin in 1995 and

continue into the next century. The

FEIS compared the impacts of

alternative test range areas and a noaction alternative.

As individual TMD system programs

mature to the point of defining specific

flight/intercept test requirements, the

most appropriate test range area(s)

capable of meeting test requirements

will be identified. The proposed action

includes safety measures and standard

range operating procedures to ensure

the safety of the public and the

environment. Some of these safety

measures include (1) activating new or

existing restricted airspace, (2) the

establishment and evacuation of launch

hazard areas and booster drop zones,

including temporary closure of

associated roads, and (3) public

notification of launch activities,

including Notices to Airmen and

Notices to Mariners.

No-Action Alternative: Ongoing

activities and operations would

continue to be performed at all

locations. The development of ground

based TMD missile and sensor systems

would continue, with missile flight tests

and target intercepts being conducted

utilizing existing test ranges. Testing for

TMD would likely increase at WSMR

and possibly at the KMR. Ground-based

TMD testing of missile and sensor

systems at Eglin AFB and the Western

Range would not occur. The missile

testing restrictions associated with

existing ranges, particularly with shorter

range missile flights conducted at

WSMR, place artificial limits on system

test capabilities. This would make it

impossible to fully validate system

design and operational effectiveness in

a variety of realistic theater

environments. Although this alternative

is the environmentally preferable

alternative, it was not selected because

it fails to meet BMDO’s mission

requirements. A comparison of the

impacts at the four ranges revealed the

least impacts to resources at the KMR.

Impacts to resources at Western Range,

Eglin AFB, are roughly equivalent. The

greatest potential impacts were

identified for the WSMR alternative and

are primarily related to land use,

cultural, and transportation issues

associated with the initial booster drop

zones analyzed in the Draft EIS.

White Sands Missile Range Candidate

Test Area Alternative: This alternative

included defensive missile launches

from WSMR, New Mexico, and Fort

Bliss, Texas, and off-range target missile

launches from FWDA, New Mexico, and

the Green River Launch Complex

(GRLC), Utah, with intercepts over

WSMR. Testing of TMD radars,

positioned on WSMR, would occur

during these flight tests. This option

also included Army tactical missile

launches from FWDA with impacts on

WSMR. [BMDO Director] anticipate

approximately 6 to 8 launches per year

from FWDA.

Two potential booster Drop Zones (A

and B) were analyzed in the Draft EIS

for both the FWDA and GRLC target

launch options. Substantial concerns

were raised over the use of these drop

zones. Although a number of

mitigations could have been

implemented to minimize the land use

and other impacts, they could have

become significant. In addition, [BMDO

Director] am sensitive to general

concerns about missile overflight of

substantial areas of Native American

lands in Utah and New Mexico.

Accordingly, other booster drop zones

were identified and analyzed for both

the FWDA and GRLC options in a

supplement to the Draft EIS. In both

cases, these drop zones were further

away from the launch position and

further along the flight path and

required smaller launch hazard areas at

the launch site due to a less vertical

trajectory at launch. This enabled the

respective launch hazard areas to be

reduced in size, responsive to the

concerns about proximity to schools,

residences, and other potential users of

surrounding areas at FWDA. It also

avoided the requirement to close

Interstate 70 and portions of the Green

River during launches for the GRLC

option.

In the case of the GRLC target launch

options, both Booster Drop Zones A and

B would have created significant land

use problems associated with restricting

access to Canyonlands National Park

and Dead Horse State Park. Use of either

of these drop zones would also have

necessitated temporary closure of

Interstate 70 and portions of the Green

River adjacent to the launch area, due to

the requirement for a large launch

hazard area. The new Booster Drop

Zones C1 and C2 for GRLC included

Bureau of Land Management (BLM)

state of Utah, and private land, as well

as the Bridger Jack Mesa and Fish Creek

Canyon Wilderness Study Areas.

Concerns included restrictions on

public access for recreation, and

hunting. Booster impacts within the

wilderness study area could be avoided,

and missile launches could be timed so

as to minimize impacts to recreation

and avoid nesting and breeding seasons

of sensitive species. However, the

authority to use BLM lands for military

purposes, including the proposed

missile tests involving booster drops,

would require a lengthy process that

would not be responsive to current

testing needs. Consequently GRLC

options are not under current

consideration.

In the case of the FWDA option, use

of either Booster Drop Zone A or B

would require a launch hazard area

extending up to 41⁄2 miles from the

launch site. This caused substantial

safety concerns for the local community

about a nearby school and residences

and other areas at FWDA. In addition,

Booster Drop Zone B included portions

of the El Malpais National Monument

and the El Malpais National

Conservation Area, which encompassed

wilderness and wilderness study areas.

Use of this drop zone would be

considered significant because it

restricts access to recreational areas and

conflicts with the statutory purposes for

these special use areas. Booster drop

zones A and B will not be used.

The new Booster Drop Zone C for

FWDA includes U.S. Forest Service and

private land. Both the public land

manager and private owner have

expressed their willingness to allow use

of these lands for booster drops. Use of

this booster drop zone greatly reduces

the launch hazard area at FWDA and

significantly improves safety for nearby

schools and residences, in keeping with

the purpose of E.O. 12898 to avoid

disproportionate impacts on minorities,

such as the Indian communities in the

Fort Wingate area. No significant

environmental impacts have been

identified associated with this drop

zone.

Kwajalein Missile Range, USAKA,

Republic of the Marshall Islands
Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 62 / Friday, March 31, 1995 / Notices 16629

Alternative: This alternative included

missile launches and sensor testing at

KMR and Wake Island. USAKA would

be primarily used for launching

defensive missiles, however, there is a

possibility that target missiles may be

launched from USAKA. Wake Island

would primarily be used for target

missile launches, however, it also could

be used for defensive missile launches.

Technical difficulties with launches and

costs removed sea-based target missile

launches from consideration. Existing

facilities at KMR and at Wake Island

and planned construction of Wake

Island (analyzed in the Wake Island

Environmental Assessment, 1994)

would be adequate for TMD interceptor

and target launching activities; therefore

minimal environmental impacts are

anticipated. Issues of concern included

potential impacts on sensitive plant and

animal species at the KMR and Wake

Island, particularly in undisturbed

areas, the potential for damage,

destruction, or vandalism of cultural

resources, and safety issues. Mitigations

included avoidance of areas of native

vegetation and sea turtle nesting areas.

consultation with appropriate U.S. and

Marshallese officials to establish

procedures to protect cultural resources

such as data recovery, and avoidance.

Mitigations also establish hazard areas

and place operating restrictions on

radars to avoid significant impacts. No

significant environmental impacts are

predicted with the use of KMR or Wake

Island.

Eglin Air Force Base Candidate Test

Area Alternative: This alternative would

include missile launches and sensor

testing at Eglin AFB on Santa Rosa

Island and at Cape San Blas, Florida,

with missile launches from a sea-based

platform in the Gulf of Mexico. No

significant impacts are predicted with

the use of Eglin AFB. Health and safety

and airspace impacts would be avoided

by the issuance of Notices to Airmen

and Notices to Mariners, and ensuring

that the launch, booster drop, and

intercept debris impact areas are clear of

air and water traffic before proceeding

with the test flights. This alternative is

not selected at this time because test

objectives could be met at other ranges,

sea-launch capabilities will not be

available, and additional test

instrumentation is needed.

Western Range Test Area Alternative:

This alternative would include missile

launches and sensor testing at

Vandenberg AFB, San Nicolas Island of

the Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons

Division, and San Clemente Island of

the Naval Air Station North Island,

California, with off-range missile

launches from a sea-based platform in

the Pacific Ocean. No significant

impacts are predicted with the use of

Western Range. Health and safety and

airspace impacts would be avoided by

the issuance of Notices to Airmen and

Notices to Mariners, and ensuring that

the launch, booster drop, and intercept

debris impact areas are clear of all air

traffic before proceeding with the test

flights. This alternative is not selected at

this time because test objectives could

be met at other ranges, sea-launch

capabilities will not be available, and

additional test instrumentation is

needed.

Alternatives Considered But Not

Carried Forward: Initially eleven

candidate test range areas were

considered for TMD testing. Criteria

used to evaluate candidate test ranges

included weather, scheduling, range

instrumentation, range safety, and

debris recovery. All but the four ranges

analyzed in the FEIS were eliminated by

the criteria established at the beginning

of the selection process.

Mitigation, Monitoring, and

Enforcement

All practicable means to avoid and

minimize environmental harm will be

taken. [BMDO Director] direct BMDO

Deputies and Program Executive

Officers to monitor extended range

testing activities and ensure the

following mitigation measures described

in the TMD Extended Test Range FEIS

are implemented. Specifically, at the

WSMR, and the associated FWDA,

mitigations will include implementing

the Evacuation Plan, Booster Recovery

Plan, and Emergency Response Plan.

Launches will be avoided during

weather conditions that would have

adverse effects on air quality or on test

safety. To the extent possible, launches

will be scheduled to avoid major events

such as major military maneuvers (i.e.,

Roving Sand Operations), holidays,

hunting seasons, cattle roundups, or

local festivities that could be effected by

the testing activities. Maximum advance

notice of launch activities will be

provided to local communities,

travelers, etc., as described in the FEIS.

Prior to conducting launches and

starting construction, consultation with

appropriate Federal and state agencies,

as discussed in the EIS will occur

concerning specific debris impact areas,

debris recovery activities, and

prelaunch and preconstruction surveys

in order to protect cultural resources

and threatened and endangered species.

American Indian concerns regarding

access to and disturbance of sacred

lands will be addressed during

consultation with each affected

American Indian group on a regular

basis and prior to each missile launch.

Consultation with local community

groups will establish the procedures,

and coordinate times for use of FWDA

lands under BMDO control during

periods of launch inactivity.

At the USAKA, the existing USAKA

mitigation plan will be followed. Other

mitigations include: International

Notices to Airmen and Notices to

Mariners, timely coordination with the

International Civil Aviation

Organization through the Federal

Aviation Administration, adherence to

established procedures for keep-out

zones, hazard areas, and limitations on

use of radars, and a scheduling plan will

be implemented to minimize airspace

and health and safety impacts.

Preconstruction surveys and/or other

mitigation measures will be

accomplished in coordination with the

appropriate Federal agencies and the

Republic of the Marshall Islands

Environmental Protection Authority to

protect cultural resources and

threatened and endangered species.

[BMDO Director] will implement

appropriate safeguards as subsequent

decisions are made regarding system

components and basing locations, and

as their accompanying environmental

documents elaborate specific

requirements for monitoring and

enforcement.

Date and Signature

Record of Decision was signed March

21, 1995 by Malcolm R. O’Neill,

Lieutenant General, United States Army,

Director, Ballistic Missile Defense

Organization.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Mr. Rick Lehner, BMDO/SRE,

Washington, DC 20301–7100, (703) 695–

8743.

Dated: March 27, 1995.

Patricia L. Toppings,

Alternate OSD Federal Register Liaison

Officer, Department of Defense.

[FR Doc. 95–7892 Filed 3–30–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 5000–04–M

Meeting of the Commission on Roles

and Missions of the Armed Forces

AGENCY: Department of Defense,

Commission on Roles and Missions of

the Armed Forces.

ACTION: Notice.

SUMMARY: Notice is hereby given of a

forthcoming meeting of the Commission

on Roles and Missions of the Armed

Forces.

The Commission is charged with

providing an independent review of the

roles and missions of the armed services