1

Filed 12/12/23

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

MATTHEW VANN,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN 

FRANCISCO et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

 A165231

 (San Francisco County

 Super. Ct. No. CGC21596140)

Plaintiff and appellant Matthew Vann (appellant), a firefighter with 

the San Francisco Fire Department (SFFD), was injured when Louis Yu (Yu), 

a bus driver with the San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency 

(SFMTA), drove through an active emergency scene and over a fire hose, 

which broke off from a fire engine and struck appellant. He now appeals 

from a judgment of dismissal entered in favor of defendants and respondents 

City and County of San Francisco (City) and Yu after the trial court 

sustained their demurrer to the complaint without leave to amend on the 

basis that the action was barred by the exclusivity provisions of the Workers’ 

Compensation Act (Lab. Code, § 3200 et seq.).1 We affirm. 

1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Labor Code.
2

BACKGROUND

The Facts and the General Setting2

On November 2, 2020, appellant, a firefighter with the SFFD,

responded to an emergency on Spear Street between Market Street and 

Mission Street in the City and County of San Francisco. Yu, a bus driver 

with the SFMTA, then drove a bus through the location of the active 

emergency. The bus went over a firehose, which became entangled with the 

bus’s wheels and stretched until it broke off the fire engine it was attached to. 

When the firehose broke away, it hit appellant’s legs, sweeping him off his 

feet and causing him to slam backwards onto the ground. His helmet flew 

off, and the back of his head struck the street surface. As a result, appellant 

sustained catastrophic injuries, including a traumatic brain injury, a 

fractured left clavicle, an internal hemorrhage in his right eye, and damage 

to his throat and vocal chords. 

2 Our summary of facts is based upon the allegations in appellant’s 

complaint, which we accept as true if properly pled. (Amiodarone Cases 

(2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 1091, 1100 (Amiodarone Cases).) We also rely on 

matters that are the subject of judicial notice (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 

39 Cal.3d 311, 318 (Blank)), which, as pertinent here, include the City’s 

notice of payment of workers’ compensation benefits to appellant, his 

government tort claim presented to the City, and the City’s denial of the 

claim. In the trial court, the parties filed separate, unopposed requests to 

take judicial notice of these and other documents, including: provisions of the 

Charter of the City and County of San Francisco (“City Charter”); the ballot 

pamphlet for Proposition E, which was approved by City voters in 1999 and 

created the SFMTA (S.F. Voter Information Pamp. (Nov. 2, 1999) (“Prop. E. 

Pamphlet”); and the ballot pamphlet for Proposition A, which was approved 

by City voters in 2007 and expanded SFMTA’s authority over its operations 

and additional funding (S.F. Voter Information Pamp. (Nov. 6, 2007). The 

trial court did not rule on these requests. The parties then filed in this court 

requests for judicial notice of the same materials for which they sought 

judicial notice below, which requests we granted. 
3

On November 4, the City sent appellant a “Notice Regarding Disability 

Pay/Labor Code section 4850 benefits.” The notice stated that the “City and 

County of San Francisco is handling [appellant’s] workers’ compensation 

claim on behalf of SF Fire Dept.,” and that he was receiving workers’ 

compensation benefits for the injuries he sustained in the November 2, 2020 

incident. 

On August 18, 2021, appellant submitted an application for leave to 

present a late government tort claim to the City pursuant to Government 

Code section 910 et seq., along with the proposed claim. In the application,

appellant asserted that he is a “City and County San Francisco[] firefighter”;

that he was “discharging his duties as a firefighter for the City and County of 

San Francisco” when responding to the emergency call in November 2020;

and that “the City and County of San Francisco has been on notice of the 

illegal conduct of its Muni Bus driver, Yu.” (Italics added.) And on the claim 

form, he wrote in Yu’s name where it asked to identify the name and “City 

Department of City Employee who allegedly caused injury or loss.” (Italics 

added.) 

On August 31, the City granted appellant leave to present a late claim, 

but denied the claim. 

The Proceedings Below

On November 8, appellant filed a form complaint against the City and 

Yu (when referred to collectively, respondents), alleging causes of action for 

motor vehicle negligence, general negligence, and negligence per se. The 

complaint is sparse on detail: it alleges “Defendants negligently operated an 

SF Muni Coach 8800,” before briefly describing how the incident caused 

appellant’s injuries, and also alleges “Defendants violated [Vehicle Code 

sections 21707 and 21708].”
4

On February 2, 2022, respondents filed a demurrer on various grounds, 

including that the Workers’ Compensation Act (§ 3200 et seq.) provides the 

exclusive remedy for appellant’s claims against the City as his employer 

(§§ 3600, subd. (a), 3602, subd. (a)), and against Yu as his coemployee 

(§ 3601, subd. (a)). As such, respondents argued, the trial court lacked 

subject jurisdiction over this action.

Appellant opposed the demurrer, arguing that workers’ compensation 

is not his sole remedy. As to Yu, appellant asserted he and Yu were not 

coemployees because (1) appellant was employed by SFFD, while Yu was 

employed by SFMTA, and (2) SFFD and SFMTA are separate legal entities 

akin to separate businesses within a multiunit corporate enterprise. As to 

the City, appellant argued there were no facts at that procedural juncture to 

support the conclusion that the City, as opposed to SFFD, was his employer 

as a matter of law. 

Respondents filed their reply, arguing appellant’s assertion “that 

neither he nor Mr. Yu is a City employee is untenable as a matter of law,” 

because SFFD and SFMTA, as municipal departments, “have no ‘legal 

personality separate from’ the City.” In addition, citing Walker v. City and 

County of San Francisco (1950) 97 Cal.App.2d 901 (Walker) and Colombo v. 

State of California (1991) 3 Cal.App.4th 594 (Colombo), respondents 

contended that California courts have rejected appellant’s theory that 

government departments are akin to separate business entities and can thus 

be subdivided into different entities for purposes of the workers’ 

compensation law. Thus, respondents maintained that appellant and Yu 

share the same employer—the City. Respondents separately asserted that 

City Charter provisions establish that the City employed both appellant and 

Yu. 
5

On March 23, after holding a hearing, the trial court issued an order

sustaining the demurrer to the complaint without leave to amend. Relying 

on Walker and Colombo, the court was unpersuaded by appellant’s attempt to 

draw an analogy between SFMTA and SFFD as two separate corporate 

entities within a large corporation. Instead, the court determined: “In 1999, 

the City’s municipal transportation agency was formed to, inter alia, operate 

the City’s street cars and buses. However, that agency, along with the City’s 

fire department, remains part of ‘a single governmental entity’—the City.” 

And the court held, “[appellant] is receiving workers’ compensation and the 

City correctly asserts that is his sole remedy.” 

Judgment was entered in favor of respondents. 

This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

The Standard of Review

As we explained in Amiodarone Cases: “Our standard of review is wellestablished. We accept as true the well-pleaded allegations in the operative 

complaint. (Chiatello v. City and County of San Francisco (2010) 

189 Cal.App.4th 472, 480.) ‘ “ ‘ “We treat the demurrer as admitting all 

material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or 

conclusions of fact or law. [Citation.] We also consider matters which may be 

judicially noticed.” [Citation.] Further, we give the complaint a reasonable 

interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context. 

[Citation.]’ ” [Citation.] We likewise accept facts that are reasonably implied 

or may be inferred from the complaint’s express allegations. [Citations.] 

‘ “ ‘ “A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint . . . .” [Citations.] 

On appeal from a dismissal after an order sustaining a demurrer, we review 

the order de novo, exercising our independent judgment about whether the 
6

complaint states a cause of action as a matter of law. [Citations.]’ ” ’ (Ibid.)

“Although our review is de novo, it is plaintiffs’ burden to affirmatively 

demonstrate that the demurrer was erroneously sustained as a matter of 

law . . . . (Intengan v. BAC Home Loans Servicing LP (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 

1047, 1052.)” (Amiodarone Cases, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1100–1101.) 

Further, our Supreme Court has stated that when a complaint “is 

sustained without leave to amend, we decide whether there is a reasonable 

possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment: if it can be, the trial 

court has abused its discretion and we reverse; if not, there has been no 

abuse of discretion and we affirm.” (Blank, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 318.) 

“[T]he burden is on the plaintiff to demonstrate that the trial court abused its 

discretion. [Citations.] Plaintiff must show in what manner he can amend 

his complaint and how that amendment will change the legal effect of his 

pleading.” (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349 (Goodman).) 

The Workers’ Compensation Exclusive Remedy Rule

Section 3600, subdivision (a) provides that, with exceptions not 

relevant here, an employer’s liability to pay compensation under the Workers’ 

Compensation Act is “in lieu of any other liability whatsoever” if specified 

“conditions of compensation3 concur . . . .” (§ 3600, subd. (a); Kuciemba v. 

Victory Woodworks, Inc. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 993, 1006.) So, when the statutory 

conditions for recovery are met, the employer is immune from civil damages 

liability for on-the-job injuries because workers’ compensation is the injured 

3 There are 10 conditions of compensation, two of which are relevant 

here: “Where, at the time of injury, the employee is performing service 

growing out of and incidental to his or her employment and is acting within 

the course of his or her employment” (§ 3600, subd. (a)(2)), and “[w]here the 

injury is proximately caused by the employment, either with or without 

negligence.” (Id., subd. (a)(3).)
7

employee’s “exclusive remedy.” (§§ 3600, 3601, 3602, subd. (a).) 

A parallel exclusive remedy provision is section 3601, subdivision (a), 

which “prohibits actions against coemployees for injuries they cause when 

[acting within the scope of their employment.]” (Hendy v. Losse (1991) 

54 Cal.3d 723, 730.) “To prevent employees from circumventing the 

exclusivity rule by bringing lawsuits for work-related injuries against coemployees, who in turn would seek indemnity from their employers, the 

Legislature . . . provided immunity to co-employees acting within the scope of 

their employment. (§ 3601, subd. (a) . . . . ) In other words, the purpose of 

the exclusivity rule would be defeated if employees could bring actions 

against fellow employees acting in the scope of employment such that the 

fellow employees’ negligence could be imputed to their employers. [Citation.] 

Therefore, workers’ compensation was also made the exclusive remedy 

against fellow employees acting within the scope of employment.” (Torres v. 

Parkhouse Tire Service, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 995, 1002 (Torres).) In short,

“[f]or conduct committed within the scope of employment, employees, like 

their employers, should not be held subject to suit.” (Ibid.)

“The Workers’ Compensation Act is to be liberally construed in favor of 

awarding workers’ compensation benefits. (§ 3202; King v. CompPartners, 

Inc. (2018) 5 Cal.5th 1039, 1051.) ‘The rule is not altered because a plaintiff 

believes that he can establish negligence on the part of his employer and 

brings a civil suit for damages.’ (Freire v. Matson Navigation Co. (1941) 

19 Cal.2d 8, 10.)” (Reynaud v. Technicolor Creative Services USA, Inc. (2020) 

46 Cal.App.5th 1007, 1020.) “If the injury falls within the scope of the act, a 

proceeding thereunder constitutes his exclusive remedy.” (Freire v. Matson 

Navigation Co., supra, 19 Cal.2d at p. 10.)

The exclusive remedy rule is an affirmative defense to an action at law. 
8

(See Doney v. Tambouratgis (1979) 23 Cal.3d 91, 96.) “[W]here the complaint 

affirmatively alleges facts indicating coverage by the workers’ compensation 

laws, if it fails to state additional facts negating application of the exclusive 

remedy provision, no civil action will lie and the complaint is subject to a 

general demurrer.” (Roberts v. Pup ‘N’ Taco Driveup (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 

278, 284, citing Doney v. Tambouratgis, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 97 and 

Iverson v. Atlas Pacific Engineering (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 219, 224.) 

The Trial Court Properly Sustained the Demurrer to the 

Complaint Without Leave to Amend

Introduction

Appellant reasserts that workers’ compensation is not his exclusive 

remedy based on the same theories he asserted below. He presents these 

arguments in his opening brief under two main subheadings: (1) “[Appellant] 

and Defendant Yu Are Not Co-Employees Because They Are Employed by 

Different Entities: the San Francisco Fire Department and the San 

Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency,” and (2) “Nor Can It Be Said 

That as a Matter of Law, [Appellant] Is Employed by the City and County of 

San Francisco.” 

Appellant’s arguments treat the City, SFMTA, and SFFD as three 

separate legal entities. His position presupposes that for purposes of a 

lawsuit for damages, a municipal department can and does possess a legal 

identity separate and apart from the municipality by which it was created.

However, appellant does not present any argument in his opening brief to 

support this premise. 

This omission is curious, considering that respondents and the trial 

court treated the issue of whether SFFD and SFMTA are entities 

independent from the City as significant to the overarching question of 

whether workers’ compensation is appellant’s exclusive remedy. Specifically, 
9

respondents summarily argued below that appellant’s attempts to divide

SFMTA and SFFD, and SFFD and the City, for workers’ compensation 

purposes fail, because SFFD and SFMTA have no legal existence separate 

from the City. The trial court agreed with this, finding that SFMTA and 

SFFD “remain[ ] part of ‘a single governmental entity’—the City,” before 

concluding workers’ compensation is appellant’s sole remedy. We imply from

the court’s order that its reasoning was this: If SFMTA and SFFD have no 

legal existence separate from the City, then they are merely two subsidiary 

components of the same entity, the City. The conclusion that would follow is 

that the City employs both appellant and Yu. In turn, appellant’s theory that 

SFMTA and SFFD are separate employers for purposes of the workers’ 

compensation exclusivity rule would fail. Likewise, his argument that SFFD, 

as opposed to the City, is his employer.

It is not until his reply brief that appellant raises the argument that 

SFMTA “has a legal existence independent of the City,” an assertion based 

largely on a statutory interpretation analysis—namely of the City Charter 

and other legislative materials—which appellant argues support that SFMTA 

was “plainly intended” to have a separate legal existence.4 Even considering 

the arguments in appellant’s reply brief, he fails to persuade us that the trial 

court erred in sustaining the demurrer to his complaint without leave to 

4 Taken as a whole, appellant’s reply brief reads like a new opening 

brief. His opening brief is 40 pages, and much of it appears to be a nearly 

verbatim rehash of the opposition he filed below. In contrast, his reply brief 

is 58 pages, which, as noted, consists largely of a statutory interpretation 

analysis, and discusses a number of authorities not mentioned in his opening 

brief. Perhaps appellant might have believed that he did not need to raise

the issue of whether SFMTA is independent of the City until it appeared in 

the respondents’ brief. However, we would not find such a belief justified, 

given that the issue is key, as explained above. 
10

amend.

Analysis 

We begin by addressing whether SFMTA and SFFD each has a legal 

existence independent of the City, an issue we find significant to the 

fundamental question of whether workers’ compensation is appellant’s 

exclusive remedy. 

As noted, respondents assert that both SFMTA and SFFD have no legal 

existence independent of the City. In his reply brief, appellant disputes 

respondents’ assertion as to SFMTA, but raises no such challenge as to

SFFD. Indeed, appellant agrees with respondents that SFFD is part of the 

City’s executive branch. (S.F. Charter, §§ 4.108, 4.128.) As such, we take 

this as appellant’s concession that SFFD is not a legal entity separate from 

the City.5 

Turning to whether SFMTA is independent from the City, the parties 

refer us to a number of authorities for guidance on the issue. One of those is

Government Code section 945, which provides that “[a] public entity may sue 

and be sued.” (Gov. Code, § 945.) “Public entity” is defined to include “the 

state . . . , a county, city, district, . . . public agency, and any other political 

subdivision or public corporation in the State.” (Gov. Code, § 811.2.) 

However, the California Law Revision Commission’s comments to 

Government Code section 811.2 state that “[t]his definition [of ‘public entity’] 

is intended to include every kind of independent political or governmental 

entity in the State.” (Recommendation Relating to Sovereign Immunity (Jan.

1963) Cal. Law Revision Com. com., Gov. Code, § 811.2, 1 Cal. Law Revision 

5 Based on this, as explained below, we reject appellant’s argument that 

SFFD, as opposed to the City, is his employer for purposes of the workers’ 

compensation laws. 
11

Com. Rep. (1963) p. 836, italics added.) 

Bauer v. County of Ventura (1955) 45 Cal.2d 276, 288–289 (Bauer), 

which both parties cite, is instructive on whether a public entity is

independent or a subsidiary of another entity. In Bauer, the plaintiffs sued 

Ventura County (county), the Saticoy Storm Drain Maintenance District

(district), and individual members of the County of Board of Supervisors for 

damage to the plaintiff’s property resulting from the overflow of water from 

the County’s and District’s storm drain system. (Bauer, at pp. 281–282.) The 

trial court entered a judgment of dismissal after it sustained demurrers from 

the defendants, and the Supreme Court ultimately affirmed the judgment. 

(Id. at pp. 282, 291–292.) Among other things, the court held the district was 

improperly joined as a party defendant. (Id. at p. 289.) It rejected the 

“assumption that the district is a governmental agency separate and distinct 

from the county,” reasoning as follows:

“A reading of the Storm Drain Maintenance District Act [(Stats. 1937, 

ch. 265, p. 566, as amended by Stats. 1949, ch. 496, p. 854, and Stats. 1953, 

ch. 546, § 1, p. 1805)] supports the conclusion that the district is a unit 

created for purposes of taxes and administration. The operational powers of 

the district are vested in the county board of supervisors and other county 

officers. The board creates and governs the district (§ 1), and has power to 

enter into contracts for the district, make rules and regulations and do all 

things necessary to accomplish the purposes of the act (§ 5). The board of 

supervisors is given power to acquire and dispose of property for the district 

but only in the name of the county (§ 5). Taxes are levied by the board of 

supervisors but they must be levied and collected at the same time and 

manner as general county taxes; and when collected are paid into the county 

treasury to the credit of the district and may be used only for district 
12

purposes (§ 7). Storm drain maintenance districts created pursuant to the 

act are not given the power to sue and be sued; nor are they created as 

independent public corporations.

“In other acts dealing with water control problems the Legislature 

made clear provision for the creation of state instrumentalities with separate 

legal personalities. (See acts collected in 1 Water Code, Uncodified Acts.) 

The Ventura County Flood Control Act (1 Water Code, Uncodified Acts, 

No. 8955, p. 899 et seq.), for example, provides that the ‘Ventura County 

Flood Control District is hereby declared to be a body corporate and politic,’

and the district’s powers include: perpetual succession, the power to sue and 

be sued, to take title to real and personal property, to incur indebtedness and 

issue bonds, to levy taxes, to make contracts and to employ labor (§ 7). The 

Storm Drain Maintenance District Act, on the other hand, vests the 

defendant district’s much less extensive powers in the county board of 

supervisors rather than in the district itself. Neither the legislative intention 

nor the stated purposes of the Storm Drain Maintenance District Act requires 

the districts created pursuant thereto to enjoy a legal personality separate 

from the county. (See Anaheim Sugar Co. v. County of Orange [(1919)] 181 

Cal. 212 [(Anaheim Sugar Co.)]; Mortimer v. Acquisition & Imp. Dist. No. 36 

[(1951)] 105 Cal.App.2d 298; Mortimer v. Acquisition & Imp. Dist. No. 36

[(1947)] 79 Cal.App.2d 404.) It therefore seems clear that the Saticoy Storm 

Drain Maintenance District was improperly joined as a party defendant.” 

(Bauer, supra, 45 Cal.2d at pp. 288–289.) 

As Bauer illustrates, if an entity is not independent, it is not properly 

named as a defendant. (Bauer, supra, 45 Cal.2d at pp. 288–289; accord,

Sheehan v. Board of Police Commissioners (1922) 188 Cal. 525, 532, 

disapproved on other grounds in Mass v. Board of Ed. of San Francisco 
13

Unified School Dist. (1964) 61 Cal.2d 612 [Board of Police Commissioners 

“has no separate existence” from the City and County of San Francisco and 

“is incapable of being sued”]; Talbot v. City of Pasadena (1938) 28 Cal.App.2d 

271, 274, disapproved of on other grounds in Dillon v. Board of Pension 

Commissioners of City of Los Angeles (1941) 18 Cal.2d 427, 431 [citing 

Sheehan and reaching the same conclusion as to the fire and retirement 

boards of the City of Pasadena].) If an entity is a subsidiary, an action must 

be filed against the parent entity. (1 Cal. Governmental Tort Liability 

Practice (Cont.Ed.Bar 4th ed. Cal. 2023) (Governmental Tort Liability 

Practice) § 3.4, citing Hovd v. Hayward Unified School Dist. (1977) 

74 Cal.App.3d 470, 471–472 [holding that a vocational skills center which 

was a subdivision of school district was not independent unit of local school 

district although operating under fictitious business name and conducting 

business away from school district’s premises].) 

Factors that may be considered in determining if an entity is 

independent include whether there is “[a]n express statutory declaration that 

the entity is a body corporate and politic”; whether the entity has “[a] 

governing body separate from that of the city, county, or district”; or whether 

it has “[s]tatutory power to own property, levy taxes, or incur indebtedness in 

its own name.” (Governmental Tort Liability Practice, supra, § 3.5, citing 

Bauer, supra, 45 Cal.2d at pp. 288–289; Johnson v. Fontana County Fire 

Protection Dist. (1940) 15 Cal.2d 380, 385–387; Elliott v. County of Los 

Angeles (1920) 183 Cal. 472, 474–475; Anaheim Sugar Co., supra, 181 Cal. at 

pp. 217−220.) 

Contrary to appellant’s assertions, our review of the City Charter, City 

municipal codes, and other legislative materials leads us to conclude, as a 

matter of law, that SFMTA does not have a legal existence separate and 
14

apart from the City.

Appellant does not point us to any “express statutory declaration that 

[SFMTA] is a body corporate and politic.” (Bauer, supra, 45 Cal.2d at 

pp. 288–289.) To the contrary, SFMTA is described throughout the City 

Charter and other municipal codes as an agency that is a part of the City. 

(See, e.g., S.F. Charter, § 8A.102(h) [SFMTA “shall be subject to the 

provisions of this Charter applicable to boards, commissions, and 

departments of the City and County”]; S.F. Admin. Code, § 43.13.2 [under 

article pertaining to the SFMTA revenue bond law, SFMTA is defined as 

“San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency of the City” (italics added)]; 

id., § 22E.1 [“A number of City departments control fiber-optic facilities that 

they use to provide municipal and other services. . . . [T]hese departments

include the Municipal Transportation Agency . . .” (italics added)]; id, § 94A.2 

[for purposes of the San Francisco Shared Spaces Program, “ ‘Core City 

Agencies’ are the City departments and agencies participating in the . . . 

Program: . . . Municipal Transportation Agency” (italics added)]; see also S.F. 

Environment Code, § 701 [for purposes of municipal green building 

requirements, “ ‘City Department’ means any agency of the City and County 

of San Francisco. Any other local, state, or federal agency doing business in 

San Francisco is not a City Department, such as the San Francisco Unified 

School District, the San Francisco Community College District, the Office of 

Community Investment and Infrastructure, and the San Francisco Housing 

Authority”; SFMTA not listed (italics added)].)

As to its governance, although appellant correctly notes that SFMTA is 

governed by its own board of directors, those directors must be appointed by 

the Mayor (the chief executive officer and the official representative of the 

City) and confirmed by the Board of Supervisors (the legislative branch of the 
15

City) after a public hearing. (S.F. Charter, §§ 2.100, 3.100, 8A.102(a).) 

Additionally, appellant omits mentioning Article VIIIA of the City Charter, 

which states: “this Article is intended to ensure sufficient oversight of 

[SFMTA] by, among other things, preserving the role of the City’s Controller 

as to financial matters, the City Attorney as to legal matters, and the Civil 

Service Commission, as to merit system issues.” (S.F. Charter, § 8A.100€, 

italics added.) These provisions confirm that SFMTA does not have a

governing body separate from that of the City.

In addition, the fact that SFMTA’s funding is segregated from other 

City funds (S.F. Charter, § 8A.105(a), (b)) does not mean it is “fiscally 

separate” from the City, as appellant asserts. (See Anaheim Sugar Co., 

supra, 181 Cal. p. 219 [“It is true that the money collected by means of the 

tax provided for in the statute is to be paid into the county treasury ‘for the 

use’ of the [road] division [of Orange County]. . . . This, however, is nothing 

more than a provision that the money so paid shall constitute a special fund 

for a special purpose. The existence of such a fund does not necessarily imply 

the existence of a corporate entity separate and distinct from the county as 

beneficiary . . .”].) Also undermining appellant’s assertion that SFMTA is 

“fiscally separate” are City Charter provisions stating that SFMTA “may not 

exercise any powers and duties of the Controller” (S.F. Charter, § 8A.101(f)) 

and that it must submit a proposed budget every two years for review and 

consideration by the Mayor and the Board of Supervisors. (S.F. Charter, § 

8A.106(a), (b).) 

While SFMTA does have exclusive authority power to acquire control, 

and operate property under its jurisdiction, including real and personal 

property and financial assets, as well as over contracting, leasing, and 

purchasing (S.F. Charter, § 8A.102(b)(1)), it cannot transfer or dispose any 
16

property of the City without approval from the Board of Supervisors. (Ibid.) 

Moreover, SFMTA may not incur any debt or issue bonds for SFMTA 

purposes without the concurrence of the Board of Supervisors. (S.F. Charter, 

§ 8A.102(b)(13).) And it may not incur debt on behalf of the City without 

certification from the Controller and authorization from the Board of 

Supervisors. (Ibid.)

As for legal affairs, the City Charter provides that “[t]he City and 

County may appear, sue and defend in all courts in all matters and 

proceedings.” (S.F. Charter, § 1.101.) There is not a similar, express 

provision as to the SFMTA. Although appellant correctly notes that SFMTA 

“is empowered to approve compromises, settlements, or dismissals of ‘any 

litigation, legal proceedings, claims, demands or grievances,” he omits 

mentioning that this authority is subject to that of the City Attorney, whose 

recommendation is required prior to any such compromise, settlement, or 

dismissal. (S.F. Charter, § 8A.102(e).) Indeed, the City Charter provides 

that SFMTA may not “exercise any power and duties of the . . . City 

Attorney” and “shall contract with . . . the City Attorney” for legal matters. 

(S.F. Charter, § 8A.101(f).) 

Appellant notes that SFMTA is afforded its own personnel/labor 

relations office, and assumes powers of the Department of Human Resources 

with respect to “service-critical” employees, defined to include those who 

operate, dispatch, or maintain a transit vehicle. (S.F. Charter, § 8A.104(a)–

(e).) However, the City’s Department of Human Resources maintains 

authority over all other types of employees. (S.F. Charter, § 8A.104(c).) 

Based on all of the above, we reject appellant’s assertion that SFMTA 

was “plainly intended” to exist independently of the City. While SFMTA

undoubtedly enjoys autonomy over various aspects of its operations, in other 
17

significant areas it still must collaborate with, or answer to, other 

departments of the City and its elected officials. SFMTA is simply a part of,

and subordinate to, the City it serves.

We are not persuaded otherwise by appellant’s citations to the ballot 

pamphlet for Proposition E, which, adopted by City voters in 1999, combined 

the San Francisco Municipal Railway and the Department of Parking and 

Traffic under a single new entity: SFMTA. (S.F. Charter, § 8A.101(a); Prop. 

E. Pamphlet, supra, Digest by Ballot Simplification Committee, p. 81.)

Appellant relies on the paid arguments of certain proponents in favor of the 

proposition. For example, the San Francisco Chamber of Commerce stated 

that “Prop E provides the comprehensive change needed to give Muni 

management the authority to make decisions, implement reforms and 

operate the system without the interference of City Hall politics.” (Prop. E. 

Pamphlet, supra, p. 84, italics added.) The Building Owners and Managers 

Association of San Francisco stated that Proposition E would “give[] MUNI 

the resources and operational control it must have . . . .” (Id. at p. 85, italics 

added.) The original sponsors of the Muni Reform charter amendment 

argued that Proposition E “give Muni the tools it needs to deliver service 

[under specific standards] by establishing an autonomous Transportation 

Agency with a protected budget.” (Id. at p. 89, italics added.) Also, the San 

Francisco Democratic Party stated that the Proposition E would “create an 

effective and reliable transit system” “[b]y establishing an independent, fullyfunded Municipal Railway under a new Municipal Transportation Agency.” 

(Ibid., italics added.) 

We agree with appellant the above excerpts show that Proposition E 

intended to give SFMTA greater authority than its predecessor departments 

over transit in the City. (See S.F. Charter, § 8A.100(a) & (d).) But we 
18

disagree that because SFMTA is afforded some operational autonomy, this 

means it was intended to exist independently of the City. Rather, as 

discussed, SFMTA functions as a mere instrumentality or subsidiary of the 

City it serves.

6

Appellant’s reliance on McKee v. Los Angeles Interagency Metropolitan 

Police Apprehension Crime Task Force (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 354 (McKee) is 

misplaced. In McKee, the court held an intergovernmental crime-fighting 

task force was a “local agency” and its board of directors and executive 

council were “legislative bodies” as defined by the Ralph M. Brown Act (Gov. 

Code, § 54950 et seq.), making them subject to the requirement that their 

meetings be public. (McKee, supra, at pp. 357–364.) The agreement creating 

L.A. Impact, the crime-fighting task force in question, specified that the 

parties intended to create a separate entity. (Id. at p. 359.) L.A. Impact was 

“governed by a board of directors and executive council, with operations 

conducted under a separate command structure.” (Id. at p. 360.) It was a 

“fiscally separate entity” with a $9 million operating budget, funded “through 

public grants routed through member cities, through contributions of 

personnel and equipment contributed by member cities, and primarily 

through the division of the proceeds of seized assets. . . .” (Ibid.) It was 

6 Other courts have reached the same conclusion. (E.g., Cornejo v. 

Tumlin (N.D.Cal. Oct. 20, 2021, Case No. 20-cv-05813) 2021 WL 4893392 *2 

[“Although the Complaint names SFMTA as a defendant . . . , CCSF argues 

that SFMTA is not an independent public corporation with the power to sue 

or be sued. . . . The Court agrees. . . . SFMTA is not a proper defendant in 

this case and is therefore dismissed”]; King v. City and County of San 

Francisco (N.D.Cal. July 22, 2021, Case No. 21-cv-02843) 2021 WL 3111633, 

at *1, fn. 1 [“King brought this action against CCSF [and] [SFMTA] . . . . 

SFMTA, as a department of CCSF, cannot be sued individually. . . . For 

purposes of this motion, the Court will construe all claims asserted against 

SFMTA to be asserted against CCSF”].) 
19

authorized to enter into contracts and in fact had purchased a rotorcraft. 

(Ibid.) Additionally, L.A. Impact was expressly created as a “joint powers 

authority” under Government Code, section 6500 et seq. (McKee, at p. 357.) 

And “L.A. Impact only constitutes a public agency if it was formed under the 

Joint Exercise of Powers Act.” (McKee, at p. 359; see Gov. Code, § 6500.)

Here, as discussed, the City Charter does not indicate an intention to 

create a separate entity, unlike the agreement in McKee. And contrary to 

plaintiff’s assertion, SFMTA is not a “fiscally separate entity” from the City. 

We have already explained that the fact that SFMTA’s funding is segregated 

from other City funds does not make it “fiscally separate” from the City. (See 

Anaheim Sugar Co., supra, 181 Cal. p. 219.) 

Nor does Brassinga v. City of Mountain View (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 195 

(Brassinga), the case heavily relied on at oral argument, assist appellant. 

Brassinga addressed whether a regional special weapons and tactics (SWAT) 

team, composed of the SWAT teams of the Mountain View, Palo Alto, and Los 

Altos Police Departments, qualified as an “ ‘employer’ ” for workers’ 

compensation purposes. (Id. at pp. 210–211.) In that case, Officer Brassinga, 

a Palo Alto reserve officer who was not a member of its SWAT team, was

accidentally shot to death by Officer Acton, a Mountain View police officer

who was a member of its SWAT team and of the regional team, during one of 

the regional team’s training sessions. (Id. at pp. 205–207.) When Brassinga’s 

heirs sued, Mountain View claimed Brassinga was either its own or the 

regional team’s “special employee” and sought to limit the heirs’ recovery to 

amounts payable under the Workers’ Compensation Act. (Id. at pp. 208–

209.) The Sixth District held that the regional team did not qualify as an “ 

‘employer’ ” under Labor Code section 3300, which includes “ ‘[e]ach county, 

city, district, and all public and quasi public corporations and public agencies 
20

therein.’ ” (See Brassinga at pp. 211–213. The regional team was concededly 

not created as a public agency by virtue of any joint powers authority. (Id. at 

p. 211.) Also, the undisputed evidence showed that the regional team had no 

office, property, employees, letterhead, phone number, or any other indicia 

that it functioned as a “ ‘public agenc[y].’ ” (Id. at p. 213.) Thus, the Sixth 

District held the regional team was not an employer of anyone within the 

meaning of Labor Code section 3300. (Brassinga at p. 213.)

Appellant argues that unlike in Brassinga, the record here contains (or 

could potentially contain after conducting discovery) indicia that SFMTA and 

SFFD each functions as a “ ‘public agenc[y]’ ” and thus as an “ ‘employer’ ” for 

workers’ compensation purposes. However, these purported factual

distinctions between this case and Brassinga do not undermine our analysis

above, because Brassinga does not address the precise issue before us, which 

is whether a municipal department exists independently from the 

municipality from which it derives.

This leads us to Walker and Colombo, which the trial court relied upon 

to conclude that workers’ compensation is appellant’s exclusive remedy. As 

respondents observe, “[c]onsistent with the principle that a municipal 

department does not exist independent of the municipality,” this court in

Walker “has already determined that . . . firefighters and transit workers are 

City employees for workers’ compensation purposes.” And in Colombo, 

another appellate court followed the reasoning in Walker to conclude that the 

State of California, not its departments, is, as a matter of law, the relevant 

employer for workers’ compensation purposes. 

As summarized in Colombo, supra, 3 Cal.App.4th at page 599: “In 

Walker, a firefighter was killed when his fire truck collided with a streetcar 

operated by a municipal streetcar employee. Both the firefighter and the 
21

streetcar employee were employed by the City and County of San Francisco. 

The decedent’s widow and daughters brought a negligence action against the 

city and county. On appeal from a judgment on the pleadings, they claimed 

that workers’ compensation was not the exclusive remedy because the 

municipal railway was operated by San Francisco in its proprietary capacity, 

while fire protection is a governmental function. ([Walker, supra,] 

97 Cal.App.2d at p. 902.) Thus, they suggested the case presented an analogy 

to a large, parent corporation which owns a smaller corporation, and argued 

that where an employee of the larger corporation is injured by an employee of

the smaller company, the injured employee should not be relegated solely to 

workers’ compensation simply because the smaller company is owned by the 

larger corporation. (Id., at pp. 903–904.)

“The Walker court was unpersuaded, seeing a clear distinction between 

two separate corporate entities and a single governmental entity. ([Walker, 

supra,] 97 Cal.App.2d at pp. 904–908.) Noting that the City and County of 

San Francisco was the employer of both the decedent and the allegedly 

negligent streetcar operator, the court concluded that workers’ compensation 

was the sole remedy. (Ibid.)” 

The court in Colombo followed Walker to hold the workers’ 

compensation exclusivity rule barred the plaintiffs’ claims against the State 

of California and its Department of Transportation (DOT). (Colombo, supra, 

3 Cal.App.4th at pp. 599–600.) In Colombo, a California Highway Patrol 

(CHP) traffic officer was struck by a car traveling on the highway while he 

was on duty. (Id. at p. 595.) The officer filed a personal injury action against 

the State of California and DOT, alleging DOT was negligent. (Id. at p. 596.) 

The officer’s spouse also asserted a claim for loss of consortium. (Ibid.) The 

trial court sustained the demurrer of DOT and State of California to the 
22

operative complaint without leave to amend, on the grounds that it lacked 

subject matter jurisdiction because workers’ compensation was the plaintiffs’ 

exclusive remedy against the officer’s employer, the State of California, an 

entity which encompasses both the CHP and DOT. (Ibid.) 

As in Walker, the plaintiffs on appeal attempted to draw an analogy 

between the State of California, with its DOT and CHP, and a multiunit 

corporate enterprise. (Colombo, supra, 3 Cal.App.4th at p. 598.) Relying on 

Gigax v. Ralston Purina Co. (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 591 (Gigax), a case also 

cited by appellant here, the plaintiffs argued that the CHP and DOT are 

separate entities within state government, each with distinct responsibilities. 

(Colombo, at p. 598.) The Colombo court disagreed, concluding that “[a]s part 

of the Business, Transportation and Housing Agency of state government 

[citation], both departments and their employees are agents of the state. 

[Citation.] Hence, lawsuits against state agencies are in effect suits against 

the state. [Citations.]” (Ibid.) And the court held: “Plaintiff Russell 

Colombo was an employee of the State of California, as were the DOT 

employees whose alleged negligence purportedly caused his injuries. Because 

the state was his employer, Officer Colombo was precluded from bringing an 

action at law against the State, via its DOT. [Citations.] Since workers’ 

compensation is the exclusive remedy, the trial court properly sustained the 

state’s demurrer without leave to amend.” (Id. at p. 599.) And because the 

officer’s action was barred, so too was his spouse’s claim. (Ibid.) 

Applying the reasoning of Walker and Colombo here compels the 

conclusion that because SFFD and SFMTA are merely parts of the same 

entity, the City, it is the City that effectively employs both appellant and Yu. 

It follows that workers’ compensation provides the exclusive remedy for 

appellant’s claims against the City as his employer (§§ 3600, subd. (a), 
23

3602, subd. (a)), and against Yu as his coemployee (§ 3601, subd. (a)). To the 

extent appellant attempts to draw an analogy between SFMTA and SFFD 

and two separate business entities within a multiunit corporate enterprise, 

such an analogy was rejected in Walker and Colombo. (See Walker, supra, 

97 Cal.App.2d at pp. 903–904; Colombo, supra, 3 Cal.App.4th at p. 598.) And 

we reject it here. 

Appellant’s attempts to show that Walker and Colombo are inapplicable 

are unavailing. He first contends they are not controlling because they were 

decided before the creation of SFMTA in 1999, and thus “ ‘are not authority 

for propositions not considered.’ ” But even though Walker and Colombo did 

not involve the same public entities as in this case (with Walker in particular 

involving SFMTA’s predecessor, the Municipal Railway), appellant offers no 

persuasive reason why they should be limited to the public agencies at issue 

in those cases. To the contrary, we find the cases’ reasoning persuasive and 

conclude they supply the appropriate rule for this case.7 

Appellant next attempts to factually distinguish Walker and Colombo. 

He argues that “SFMTA operates largely, if not wholly, independently of the 

various departments within the City and County of San Francisco, including 

the San Francisco Fire Department. There was no similar degree of 

7 Walker is consistent with cases from other jurisdictions, as indicated 

in Walker itself, as well as in a treatise on workers’ compensation law, which 

sets forth the law this way: “Attempts have several times been made to 

subdivide [an employer, such] as a municipality, and assert common-law 

rights on behalf of an employee of one city department against a different city 

department as if it were a stranger. These attempts have been consistently 

unsuccessful.” (1 Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law (2023), § 113.05

[citing Walker, supra, 97 Cal.App.2d 901; Holody v. City of Detroit (1982) 

117 Mich.App. 76 [323 N.W.2d 599]; Spencer v. City of Seattle (1985)

104 Wn.2d 30 [700 P.2d 742]; and Osborne v. Commonwealth (Ky. 1962) 

353 S.W.2d 373].) 
24

separation between the CHP and Caltrans in Colombo and the Fire 

Department and the Municipal Railway (SFMTA’s predecessor) in Walker.” 

He goes on, “the Fire Department and the Municipal Transportation Agency 

are ‘governed by different [provisions of the San Francisco Charter] and have 

different organizations, powers, and duties.’ ” This argument is 

unpersuasive. The holdings of those cases did not hinge on the “degree of 

separation” between the two entities at issue in each case. It was 

acknowledged that the agencies (the Municipal Railway and fire department 

in Walker and DOT and CHP in Colombo) were different from each other in 

the obvious sense that they were different departments within their

respective City or State government performing different functions. But as 

explained in Colombo, the fact that two agencies perform different functions 

does not negate that they remain a part of the same entity. (See Colombo, 

supra, 3 Cal.App.4th at p. 598.)

Appellant further contends that Walker and Colombo are either 

wrongly decided or no longer viable because they predated the decisions of 

People ex rel. Lockyer v. Superior Court (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1060 

(Lockyer) and Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Dept. of Cal. Highway Patrol (2013) 

213 Cal.App.4th 1129 (Greyhound). The cases are distinguishable.

Lockyer involved a discovery dispute. The court held that “to obtain 

documents and witnesses” from non-party state agencies, the defendant had 

to “serve subpoenas directly upon” those agencies, rather than the State of 

California (the People). (Lockyer, supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at p. 1080.) The 

court recognized that the non-party state agencies were distinct entities for 

purposes of discovery requests, noting among other things that each agency 

was responsible for maintaining its own records. (Id. at p. 1079.) The court 

added, “It would be unduly burdensome if any time the People are a party to 
25

litigation they are required to search for documents from any and all state 

agencies that the propounding party demands.” (Ibid.) Contrary to 

appellant’s suggestion, we do not read Lockyer as standing for the broad 

proposition that various state or municipal entities must be treated as 

distinct entities for all purposes, much less for purposes of the workers’ 

compensation laws. 

Greyhound relied on Lockyer to conclude that two state agencies were 

separate parties for purposes of determining whether the judgment was 

appealable under the one final judgment rule. (Greyhound, supra, 

213 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1134–1135.) CHP and Caltrans were named as 

defendants. On appeal, CHP argued that the judgment dismissing it from 

the cross-complaint was not appealable because Caltrans was still a party to 

the action, and both CHP and Caltrans are departments of the State and 

therefore not separate entities for purposes of a judgment. (Id. at p. 1134.) 

The Greyhound court disagreed, finding that the parties were separate 

parties and therefore that the judgment dismissing CHP was appealable. (Id.

at p. 1135.) The court also explained that allegations against the two 

departments were completely different and that they conducted themselves 

as separate parties, as each party was represented by its own counsel and 

filed a separate responsive pleading to the cross-complaint. (Ibid.) 

Appellant asserts that Greyhound’s “recognition that departments or

agencies of a public entity can be ‘distinct and separate government 

entities’ . . . extends logically to the workers’ compensation context.” 

Greyhound addressed an appealability issue, and it is well settled that the 

statutory “ ‘ “right to appeal is remedial and in doubtful cases should be 

resolved in favor of the right whenever the substantial interests of a party 

are affected by a judgment.” ’ ” (In re S.B. (2009) 46 Cal.4th 529, 537; County 
26

of Humboldt v. Appellate Division of Superior Court (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 

298, 310.) The Greyhound court treated CHP as a party distinct from 

Caltrans and permitted CHP to pursue its appeal, a determination that 

appears consistent with resolving any doubts in favor of the right to appeal. 

Here, in contrast, we are dealing with the Workers’ Compensation Act, 

which must be liberally construed in favor of awarding workers’ 

compensation benefits. (§ 3202; King v. CompPartners, Inc., supra, 5 Cal.5th 

at p. 1051.) Application of these principles cuts against concluding that 

SFMTA and SFFD are distinct entities, and therefore that Yu and appellant 

have separate employers. To do so would have the effect of circumventing the 

workers’ compensation exclusivity rule, which prevents employees from

bringing actions against fellow employees acting in the scope of employment,

such that the fellow employees’ negligence could be imputed to their 

employers. (Torres, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1002.) Further, Greyhound is 

factually distinguishable. The complaint here does not contain “completely 

different” allegations as to the City and Yu, the allegations directed at both 

defendants the same. Also, unlike the two state agencies in Greyhound, the 

City and Yu have not conducted themselves as separate parties. To the 

contrary, they are represented by the same counsel and together filed the 

underlying demurrer. 

For these and additional reasons, we reject appellant’s argument that 

“Nor Can It Be Said That as a Matter of Law, [Appellant] Is Employed by the 

City and County of San Francisco.” In support of this argument, appellant 

relies on the “right to control” test used to determine an employer 

relationship. Citing Gigax, supra, 136 Cal.App.3d at pages 598 to 601 and 

similar cases, appellant argues that the test specifically refers to the ‘“right 

to control the manner and means of accomplishing the desired result.’ ” 
27

Appellant argues that “to be considered [his] employer, the City . . . must 

have the right to control the details of his work as a firefighter,” and here, 

there are no allegations or matter subject to judicial notice that the City, as 

opposed to SFFD, had the right to control the details of his work. Thus, 

appellant contends that the issue cannot be resolved at this procedural 

juncture, before discovery has taken place, as a matter of law. We are 

unpersuaded. 

Initially, to the extent appellant argues the trial court erred in 

sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend, he bears the burden of

demonstrating how the complaint can be amended to support his theory

(Goodman, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 349)—a burden he has not met. As 

respondents aptly put it, “[b]esides vaguely arguing that discovery might 

support his separate-employer theory . . . , Appellant fails to identify 

anything he could add to his pleadings that would negate the workers’ 

compensation exclusivity rule. . . . Appellant, therefore, has not satisfied his 

burden of proving a ‘reasonable possibility’ that he can cure his defective 

Complaint through amendment.” As such, appellant cannot show the court 

abused its discretion in sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend. 

(Ibid.) 

In any event, appellant’s theory that SFFD, not the City, is his 

employer is untenable. It rests on the premise that SFFD exists as an entity 

separate and apart from the City, a premise that appellant did not attempt to

establish, and we have rejected in any case. Accordingly, it is the City that in 

substance employs appellant, and appellant’s attempt to divide the City and 

SFFD into separate entities for purposes of the workers’ compensation

exclusivity rule fails. 
28

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Respondents shall recover their costs on 

appeal.
29

_________________________

Richman, Acting P. J.

We concur:

_________________________

Miller, J.

_________________________

Markman, J. *

Vann v. City and County of San Francisco (A165231)

*Superior Court of Alameda County, Judge Michael Markman, sitting as 

assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California 

Constitution.
30

Trial Court: San Francisco County Superior 

Court

Trial Judge: Honorable Richard B. Ulmer; 

Attorneys for Plaintiff and 

Appellant Matthew Vann:

Abbey, Weitzenberg, Warren & 

Emery, P.C., Scott R. 

Montgomery; Law Offices of 

Tiffany J. Gates, Tiffany J. Gates;

Attorneys for Defendants and 

Respondents, City and County of 

San Francisco, et al.:

David Chiu, City Attorney; 

Meredith B. Osborn, Chief Trial 

Deputy; Katherine B. Bearman, 

Deputy City Attorney.