United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit 

Chicago, Illinois 60604 

Submitted December 7, 2018*

Decided December 14, 2018 

Before 

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge 

AMY C. BARRETT, Circuit Judge 

MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge

No. 16-4150 

JEFFERY MITCHELL, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

MARY RICHARD, et al., 

 Defendants-Appellees.

 Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Central District of Illinois. 

No. 16-1042 

Michael M. Mihm, 

Judge. 

O R D E R 

 Jeffery Mitchell, an Illinois prisoner, acting pro se, makes a constitutional case out 

of his unfortunate breakup with his girlfriend. Mitchell alleges that officers at Pontiac 

Correctional Center told Mitchell’s cellmate, Andrés Reyes, to pack up Mitchell’s 

belongings from his property storage boxes for his transfer to another prison facility. 

Unsupervised, Reyes pilfered Mitchell’s personal property, including private 

correspondence and photographs of Mitchell’s girlfriend, Genina Johnson. With the 

 

*

 We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the appellate 

brief and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument 

would not significantly aid the court. See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C). 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION 

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 
No. 16-4150 Page 2 

intelligence gained from his plunder, Reyes wrote to Johnson, complimenting the 

photographs of her and impugning Mitchell’s character to persuade her to desert 

Mitchell. Eventually, she did. 

 Mitchell sued the officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his rights to 

privacy under the Fourth Amendment and due process and equal protection under the 

Fourteenth Amendment, as well as violations of state law. Consistent with the screening 

procedures of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the defendants were not served with process in the 

district court and are not participating in this appeal. However, for the purposes of 

these proceedings the allegations in Mitchell’s complaint are treated as true. Echols v. 

Craig, 855 F.3d 807, 809 (7th Cir. 2017). 

On June 15, 2016, upon screening of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, 

the district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, and assessed a 

strike, see id. § 1915(g). The district judge determined that Mitchell had no reasonable 

expectation of privacy in his cell and that the officers’ negligent loss of his personal 

property did not violate the Constitution. Further, the court concluded, Mitchell could 

not bring a federal constitutional claim for alleged violations of Illinois prison 

regulations. Judgment was entered in accordance therewith on June 16, 2016. 

On July 16, 2016, Mitchell moved under FED. R. CIV. P. 59(e) to alter or amend the 

judgment. Consistent with the original determination in the merits screening, the 

district court denied Mitchell’s motion to alter or amend the judgment. 

We review the dismissal of Mitchell’s complaint de novo, see McGowan v. Hulick, 

612 F.3d 636, 640 (7th Cir. 2010), and the denial of his post-judgment motion for abuse 

of discretion, see Doe v. Village of Arlington Heights, 782 F.3d 911, 914 (7th Cir. 2015). 

Because Mitchell fails to assert a federal claim, we affirm. 

In his appeal, Mitchell initially raises the argument “never decided by the federal 

judiciary,” that prisoners have a right to privacy in their personal effects “in relation to 

other inmates.” He argues that the correctional officers violated this right by directing 

his cellmate to pack his belongings, unsupervised, which led to the theft of his 

possessions. As an initial matter, Mitchell’s assertion that the express right to privacy 

conferred by Article I § 6 of the Illinois Constitution is enforceable under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983, because it is similar to the right of privacy under the United States Constitution 

as interpreted by the courts, is incorrect. Mitchell cannot enforce a provision of the 
No. 16-4150 Page 3 

Illinois Constitution by suing under section 1983, which vindicates violations of federal

law by state actors. 

As for his federal constitutional claim, Mitchell invokes Fourth Amendment 

principles, not an implied right to privacy. Mitchell recognizes the settled precedent 

that, for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, prisoners have no reasonable expectation 

of privacy in their personal effects. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526 (1984). But he 

says that this principle applies only against prison officials, not “in relation to other 

inmates”; in other words, his cellmate could violate his right to privacy although the 

officers could not. This is wrong because, with few exceptions, the Constitution protects 

citizens from government action, not the actions of private individuals. DeShaney 

v. Winnebago Cty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989). And, even if we assumed 

that Reyes, acting in cahoots with the correctional officers, were a “state actor,” 

see Wilson v. Warren County, 830 F.3d 464, 468 (7th Cir. 2016), then Mitchell runs right 

back up against the proposition he concedes: he has no reasonable expectation of 

privacy under the Fourth Amendment “as to prison security officers.” 

Next, Mitchell contends that the theft of his personal belongings violated his 

procedural due-process and equal-protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. 

This confusing due-process claim appears premised on the notion that Illinois statutes 

and prison regulations created an enforceable “liberty interest” with mandatory 

language that reserves only to the inmate the ability to pack his own items. Mitchell 

argues that the officers violated this right, without notice or any procedural safeguards. 

But a state actor’s violations of state law do not form the basis of a federal constitutional 

claim. Garcia v. Kankakee Cty. Hous. Auth., 279 F.3d 532, 535 (7th Cir. 2002). Moreover, 

Mitchell does not allege that the officers intended to deprive him of his belongings; he 

argues that they were negligent in letting Reyes pack them unsupervised. The Due 

Process Clause does not apply to the negligent acts of prison officials that cause 

unintended property loss. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986). As for the equal 

protection claim, Mitchell does not develop an argument that the officers singled him 

out for discriminatory treatment. See Home Care Providers, Inc. v. Hemmelgarn, 861 F.3d 

615, 625 (7th Cir. 2017) (explaining that undeveloped appellate arguments are waived). 

Finally, although he generally challenges the district court’s denial of his motion 

to alter or amend the judgment, Mitchell does not argue that he established a manifest 

error of law or presented newly discovered evidence warranting relief. See FED. R. CIV.

P. 59(e); Anderson v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 759 F.3d 645, 652–53 (7th Cir. 2014). He 

rests on the same arguments made in opposition to the dismissal. 
No. 16-4150 Page 4 

 We have considered Mitchell’s remaining arguments, but none merits further 

discussion. The district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.