Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2738 | May 14, 2020 Page 1 of 22

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Anthony C. Lawrence

Anderson, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Frances Barrow

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Matter of the Involuntary 

Termination of the Parent-Child 

Relationship of:

K.E. (Minor Child)

 and

J.E. (Father),

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

Indiana Department of Child 

Services,

Appellee-Petitioner.

May 14, 2020

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-JT-2738

Appeal from the

Henry Circuit Court

The Honorable Bob A. Witham, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

33C01-1903-JT-32
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2738 | May 14, 2020 Page 2 of 22

Altice, Judge.

Case Summary

[1] J.E. (Father) appeals from the involuntary termination of his parental rights to 

his minor child, K.E. (Child), claiming that his due process rights were violated 

during the CHINS and termination proceedings. 

[2] We affirm.

Facts & Procedural History

[3] Father and A.C. (Mother)1 are the biological parents of Child, born in February 

2013, and Mother was the custodial parent. At the time of Child’s birth, Father 

was on probation for a November 2012 conviction for Class D felony 

possession of a controlled substance. Thereafter, Father was convicted, 

following guilty pleas, of Level 6 felony possession of methamphetamine in 

March 2016, Level 6 felony forgery in May 2016, and Class B misdemeanor 

visiting a common nuisance in November 2016.

2

 In July 2017, Father was 

charged with Level 6 felony theft and Class A misdemeanor theft.

1 Mother’s parental rights were also terminated but she does not participate in this appeal. Accordingly, we 

will focus on the facts related to Father.

2 For the possession of methamphetamine conviction, Father was sentenced to two years and 180 days at the 

Indiana Department of Correction (DOC), with two years suspended and the 180 days to be served as a 

direct commitment to the Henry County Jail. For the forgery conviction, Father was sentenced to 730 days 

at the Henry County Jail, with 692 suspended, to be served concurrently with the possession of 

methamphetamine conviction. For the visiting a common nuisance conviction, Father was sentenced to 120 

days at the Henry County Jail. 
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[4] In November 2017, Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS) received a 

report that Child was staying with maternal grandparents and that Mother and 

a relative, Stacy, had been in and out of the home and were using illegal 

substances and alcohol. At the time, there was a safety plan in place under 

which Mother’s mother (Grandmother) was not to allow Stacy into the home 

or be around Child if Grandmother observed Stacy to be under the influence. 

On November 7, 2017, DCS assessment case manager Kimyi Taylor (FCM 

Taylor), accompanied by a law enforcement officer, went to the home and 

spoke to Grandmother. Child was present in the home as well.

[5] FCM Taylor observed that Grandmother’s hand was bandaged, which 

Grandmother reported was the result of an injury she sustained during a

physical altercation with Mother that occurred earlier in the week and in the 

presence of Child. FCM Taylor smelled burnt marijuana in the home, and 

Grandmother admitted she had smoked marijuana within the last hour. 

Grandmother was at that time the only caretaker in the home for Child. 

Neither Grandmother nor DCS was able to make contact with Mother. 

[6] From Grandmother’s home, FCM Taylor called Father on his cell phone at 

approximately 7:00 p.m. and reached him at work in Connersville, which was 

approximately 45 minutes away. According to FCM Taylor, “upon hearing 

about what was going on with [Child,] [Father] said that he would leave 

Connersville and come directly to the DCS office” to take custody of Child. 

Transcript at 43. FCM Taylor stayed at the office with Child until 

approximately 11:00 p.m. but Father never arrived or called. At some point 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2738 | May 14, 2020 Page 4 of 22

that evening, Mother came to the DCS office and was angry and aggressive. 

FCM Taylor suspected that Mother was “under the influence,” but Mother 

refused to submit to a drug screen. Appellee’s Appendix at 3. Child was placed 

that night with Father’s aunt (Aunt). Father was also living at Aunt’s residence 

at that time.

[7] On November 8, 2017, DCS filed a child in need of services (CHINS) petition. 

Father did not appear at a number of initial hearings that were called and reset 

a number of times between November 2017 and February 2018. Father 

appeared at a hearing on February 13, 2018 but failed to appear at others in the 

following weeks. On March 13, 2018, the trial court received correspondence 

from Father requesting appointment of counsel, and on March 15, counsel filed 

an appearance on Father’s behalf and represented Father throughout the 

remainder of the CHINS and termination proceedings. On June 4, 2018, 

Father pled guilty to the pending counts of theft and was sentenced to two years 

at the DOC, with one year suspended and one year to be served as a direct 

commitment to the Henry County Community Corrections program. 

[8] On June 5, 2018, the court held a fact-finding hearing, where Father appeared 

with counsel, and the court adjudicated Child a CHINS. On June 21, 2018, the 

court held a dispositional hearing, at which Father appeared with counsel. The 

trial court adopted in open court recommendations of DCS, and both parents 

were ordered to comply with DCS services, including: remain in contact with 

the FCM, notify DCS of any arrest or criminal charges, not use or sell any 

illegal controlled substances, obey the law, submit to drug screens, participate in 
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a parenting assessment and a substance abuse assessment, maintain safe and 

reliable housing, and secure and maintain stable income. On July 11, 2018, the 

trial court issued a written dispositional order consistent with the orders it had 

issued at the June 21 hearing. 

[9] Meanwhile, on July 8, Father cut off his home detention ankle bracelet, and, on 

July 11, 2018, Father was charged with Level 6 felony escape. Also on July 11, 

Father was charged under another cause number with three Level 6 felonies –

possession of methamphetamine, unlawful possession of syringe, and 

maintaining a common nuisance-controlled substance – for acts committed on 

June 26, 2018, which was five days after the dispositional hearing. On July 12, 

2018, Father was arrested and has been continuously incarcerated since that 

time. 

[10] Father was scheduled for drug screens with Redwood Toxicology on June 29,

2018, July 2, 2018, and July 13, 2018. After Father failed to submit to screens 

on those dates, Redwood canceled Father’s participation for non-compliance. 

On August 31, 2018, Father pled guilty to the possession of methamphetamine

and the escape charges. The pleas were accepted by the court in September 

2018, and he was sentenced to 548 days at the DOC for each of the two 

convictions, to be served consecutive to each other. The escape sentence was 

also ordered to be served consecutive to the felony theft sentence. Father’s 

projected release date is in June 2020. 
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[11] In October 2018, placement of Child was changed from Aunt to Mother’s niece

(Niece), where Child has remained. A permanency hearing was held on 

January 23, 2019, at which Father appeared by phone and by counsel.3

 On

January 31, 2019, the court issued a permanency order with a concurrent plan 

of reunification and adoption. The order memorialized that, at the hearing, 

Father told the court that he had been incarcerated since the day after the 

dispositional order was written and that he had not had an opportunity to 

participate in the services recommended by DCS, but had participated in other 

programming while incarcerated. Father told the court that he planned to 

participate in substance abuse programming and would try to participate in 

parenting classes as well.

[12] On March 25, 2019, DCS filed a petition to terminate Father’s parental rights.4 

Thereafter, on April 22, 2019, FCM Kimberly Thornberg filed a progress report

in the CHINS case indicating that she had visited Child once per month from 

January through April 2019, Child was living with a relative and had no

contact with Mother, and Father was incarcerated. The report also indicated 

that Child was in kindergarten, was intelligent and happy, was in good health, 

and participated in softball and other activities. The report indicated that there 

3 Mother consented at the hearing to the termination of her parental rights to Child.

4 We note that, although Father was represented by counsel, the record reflects that he filed several pro se 

pleadings in April 2019, including a pro se appearance and a pro se Response/Objection to the termination of 

his parental rights.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2738 | May 14, 2020 Page 7 of 22

“were no further services recommended” for Mother or Father at that time. 

Exhibit Vol. at 136 (Exhibit 14). 

[13] In August 2019, the trial court, on Father’s request, ordered Heritage Trail 

Correctional Facility (HTCF), where Father was incarcerated, to submit a 

progress report to the court, which HTCF did on August 23, 2019. The HTCF

progress report reflected that Father had completed the Thinking for a Change 

program and had been referred to other programs including Business 

Technology. The report also showed that Father had been found guilty of 

conduct violations including engaging in unauthorized financial transactions, 

fighting, and unauthorized possession or destruction of state property, all 

occurring in March 2019, and impairment of surveillance, occurring in June 

2019.

[14] The termination hearing was held on September 17, 2019. FCM Taylor 

testified that she was involved only in the assessment aspect of the case, which 

lasted about two weeks. She testified that she never received a call from Father 

during her time on the case, but noted that Father had her phone number 

because she had used her cell phone to call Father on the night Child was 

removed. She stated that during the assessment period, she met with Aunt and 

Child at Aunt’s home on two or three occasions but Father was not present. 

[15] Aunt testified that around the time of Child’s removal in November 2017, 

Father was living with her, and he had lived with her on other occasions as 

well. He sometimes helped with utilities but did not pay rent. Aunt described 
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that Father had a “typical” and “good” relationship with Child. Transcript at 

57. She said that, during his incarceration, he regularly called her and would 

ask about Child. Aunt testified that, at Father’s request, she had not told Child 

that Father was incarcerated and would instead tell Child that Father was “at 

work.” Id. at 62. She stated that for about twenty years, Father had struggled 

with drugs and alcohol at different periods of his life.

[16] Niece testified that Child had been living with her for almost a year and that,

during that time, Father never contacted her to reach Child and that Child 

never asked about Father. She testified that she was willing to adopt Child and 

believed it was in Child’s best interest to be with her.

[17] The director of the Henry County CASA office, Susan Stamper, testified that 

she believed it was best for Child to remain where she was currently placed, 

noting that “for the first time” Child had stability and continuity, which she did 

not have when placed with Mother. Id. at 68. Stamper acknowledged that she 

had not met or talked to Father but observed that Father had “not provided that 

stability” since she became involved in the case.5

 Id. at 69. When asked on 

cross-examination whether Father was aware that she was involved in the case, 

she replied, “He should have been” because her reports “usually go to counsel.” 

Id. at 70.

5 The record reflects that the court appointed a CASA in November 2017 shortly after Child was removed, 

but Stamper did not specifically testify as to when she became involved in the case.
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[18] FCM Thornberg testified that she had been working on the case for eight 

months, after receiving it from a prior FCM who moved. Father was already 

incarcerated when she began on the case. FCM Thornberg stated that she did 

not receive any calls or letters from Father and that any such communication he 

might have sent to the prior FCM would have been directed to her. FCM 

Thornberg acknowledged that she did not notify Father when she took over the 

case or contact him at HTCF, nor did she contact the facility about setting up 

visits for Father. FCM Thornberg recommended termination of Father’s 

parental rights and adoption.

[19] Father, who was incarcerated at the time of the hearing, also testified. He

stated that he had been part of Child’s life “off and on” for three and one-half to 

four years of her six years, and he asked the court not to terminate his parental 

rights and keep Child with Niece to allow him to participate in services and 

“make things right with [his] daughter.” Transcript at 91, 96. Father stated that 

his plan for employment was to get his union job back or find other union 

work, although he conceded that he had not maintained active status. He 

acknowledged that during the CHINS case he was convicted of three felonies

(theft, escape, and possession of methamphetamine) and that he had attempted

no contact with Child since his incarceration in July 2018. Father testified that 

he did not want Child to know he was incarcerated and that, at his request, 

family members including Grandmother and Aunt had been telling Child that 

he was at work. Father stated that every Sunday he telephones Grandmother

and Aunt and inquires about Child and her activities.
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[20] Father stated that when he received a call from FCM Taylor on the night Child 

was removed, he told her that he did not have a driver’s license and would 

attempt to find someone to drive him to the DCS office, but he was unable to 

secure a ride and returned to Aunt’s the next day. He acknowledged that he did 

not call or contact FCM Taylor that night or at any time during her two weeks 

on the case. Father testified that DCS had not contacted him during his 

incarceration to discuss the case or arrange visitation but that he had received 

five or six DCS progress reports while incarcerated. Father acknowledged that 

he did not notify DCS of his arrest or incarceration and that he had not 

attempted to contact DCS. 

[21] Regarding drugs and alcohol, Father testified that he currently did not have a 

problem with substances, but he did in the past. Father admitted that he

attended AA and NA in 2009, but that he again used drugs and alcohol. Father 

stated that in 2015, as part of probation, he received treatment but 

acknowledged he consumed again, stating, “I have used but I didn’t relapse.” 

Transcript at 38. When asked about dates of his consumption of illegal 

substances, Father stated that the only time he consumed illegal substances 

were the dates that resulted in criminal charges. Later in his testimony, Father 

assured the court that he is “absolutely” willing to participate in therapy and 

submit to drug screens as set forth in the dispositional order. Id at 94.

[22] On October 22, 2019, the trial court issued an order terminating Father’s 

parental rights. The court’s findings and conclusions included the following:
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8. [Father] failed, without explanation or further contact with 

FCM Taylor, to come to or contact the DCS office after having 

indicated he was on his way from an adjoining county to collect 

her on the evening of detention.

* * *

12. Father had the knowledge of both the CHINS case’s

existence and of how to involve himself in it but chose to not do 

so for several months after [Child] was detained.

* * *

17. [Father] has violated the terms of the dispositional order in 

several ways, including but not limited to: failure to contact the 

Family Case Manager each week in person, by letter, email or 

telephone; failure to notify the Family Case Manager of any 

arrest or criminal charges; failure to complete the substance 

abuse assessment within 30 days; failure to maintain suitable safe 

and stable housing for the child; failure to maintain a stable and 

legal source of income adequate to support the child; not use, 

consume... trade... or sell any illegal controlled substances; obey 

the law; ensure that the child be engaged in home-based 

counseling; submit to random drug screens; and comply with 

substance abuse evaluation and screens through his criminal case 

sentencing order.

* * *

21. [Father] has an extensive history of criminal convictions that 

occurred both before and after [Child]’s birth.

* * *
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29. [Father] has a long-established history of substance abuse 

including convictions in cases from 2008, 2012, 2016, and 2018 

on substance-related charges.

30. [Father] has been ordered to participate in substance abuse 

treatment by the criminal courts.

3l. Nevertheless, [Father] testified at hearing that he is not an 

addict and does not have an addictive personality.

32. Father also testified that since February 5, 2013, he had 

consumed an illegal substance only on the individual days about 

which he was criminally charged and convicted.

33. The Court finds it not credible that [Father] used substances 

illegally only on the specific individual dates for which he was 

subsequently charged and convicted.

34. [Father]’s inability or unwillingness to candidly disclose the 

full extent of his substance abuse disorder reflects that he, while 

possibly not using controlled substance at this time, is unlikely to 

maintain long-term sobriety upon his release from imprisonment.

* * *

40. Father paid no rent at [Aunt’s] property, although on 2 or 3 

occasions over his seven months’ stay he gave her money toward 

utilities.

41. [Father] has never during the pendency of the CHINS case 

provided housing for [Child]; instead, [Aunt] allowed him to stay 

at her residence and accepted placement of [Child] after she was 

detained from her mother.
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* * *

44. Father has not maintained consistent, reliable employment 

either before the case arose or after its filing.

* * *

46. [Father] was ordered to comply with substance abuse through 

Redwood Toxicology. After his failure to submit a sample on 

June 29, 2018, July 2, 2018, and July l3, 2018, Redwood 

Toxicology canceled his screening visits due to his 

noncompliance.

47. Father has made no attempt at communication with DCS 

family case managers, and [Child]’s case file contains no letters 

or telephone messages from him seeking services while he is 

incarcerated.

48. [Father] has received copies of progress reports on his CHINS 

case and has attended case hearings by telephone since his 

current incarceration.

* * *

54. [Father] has not spoken with his daughter in the over 15 

months that he has most recently been incarcerated.

55. Father prevailed upon his family and friends . . . to lie to 

[Child] by telling her that Father has been away for work, rather 

than telling her truthfully that he is and has been for the period 

incarcerated.
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56. [Father] had funding and ability to contact relatives by 

telephone from prison but has chosen to not speak with [Child]

during this current incarceration.

* * *

62. Father not only did not request visitation to maintain his 

relationship with [Child] during his incarceration, he actively 

avoided any direct contact to reinforce his ruse that he is at 

liberty.

63. The Court, while acknowledging the statutory amendment 

enacted on July l, 2019 regarding incarcerated parents, finds it of 

minimal relevance to this matter in that it was enacted almost 

two years after [Child] was detained and several months after the 

Termination action was filed.

64. The Court finds that the law controlling to this case is that 

which was in place at the time of its filing.

65. While [Father] raises concerns about not having be[en]

provided Child and Family Team Meetings, the Court finds that 

any deficit in service offerings is directly tied to his own failure to 

participate[.]

Appellant’s Appendix Vol. 2 at 111-16.

[23] The court determined that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions 

that resulted in Child’s removal or the reasons for the placement outside the 

parent’s home will not be remedied, that it is in Child’s best interests to 

terminate Father’s parental rights, and that there is a satisfactory plan for her 

care, namely adoption by Niece. Father now appeals.
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Discussion & Decision

[24] When reviewing the termination of parental rights, we consider the evidence in 

the light most favorable to the prevailing party, and we will not reweigh the 

evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. Matter of M.I., 127 N.E.3d 

1168, 1170 (Ind. 2019). To prevail, the challenging party must show that the 

court’s decision is contrary to law, meaning that the probative evidence and 

reasonable inferences point unerringly to the opposite conclusion. Id. 

[25] It is well recognized that a parent’s interest in the care, custody, and control of 

his or her children is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests. In 

re R.S., 56 N.E.3d 625, 628 (Ind. 2016). Although parental rights are of 

constitutional dimension, the law provides for the termination of these rights 

when parents are unable or unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities. In 

re R.H., 892 N.E.2d 144, 149 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). In addition, a court must 

subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the child when evaluating the 

circumstances surrounding the termination. In re K.S., 750 N.E.2d 832, 836 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2001). The purpose of terminating parental rights is not to 

punish the parents, but to protect their children. Id.

[26] Before an involuntary termination of parental rights can occur in Indiana, DCS 

is required to allege and prove, among other things: (A) that the child has been 

removed from the parent for at least fifteen of the most recent twenty-two 

months; (B) that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions resulting in 

the child’s removal will not be remedied or the continuation of the parent-child 
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relationship poses a threat to the child’s well-being; and (C) termination is in 

the best interests of the child. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2). “As a matter of 

statutory elements, it has been established that DCS is not required to provide 

parents with services prior to seeking termination of the parent-child 

relationship.” In re T.W., 135 N.E.3d 607, 612 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. 

denied.

[27] When the State seeks the termination of a parent-child relationship, it must do 

so in a manner that meets the requirements of the Due Process Clause. In re 

H.L., 915 N.E.2d 145, 147 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). “Due Process has never been 

defined, but the phrase embodies a requirement of ‘fundamental fairness.’” In 

re C.G., 954 N.E.2d 910, 917 (Ind. 2011). Due process in parental rights cases 

involves the balancing of three factors: (1) the private interests affected by the 

proceeding; (2) the risk of error created by the State’s chosen procedure; and (3) 

the countervailing government interest supporting the use of the challenged 

procedure. Id. The private interest affected by the proceeding is substantial – a 

parent’s interest in the care, custody, and control of his or her child – and the 

State’s interest in protecting the welfare of a child is also substantial. S.L. v. 

Indiana Dep’t of Child Servs., 997 N.E.2d 1114, 1120 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). 

Because the State and the parent have substantial interests affected by the 

proceeding, we focus on the risk of error created by DCS’s actions and the trial 

court’s actions. Id. This court has observed,

For a parent’s due process rights to be protected in the context of 

termination proceedings, DCS must have made reasonable 
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efforts to preserve and/or reunify the family unit in the CHINS 

case (unless the no reasonable efforts exception applies). What 

constitutes “reasonable efforts” will vary by case, and . . . it does 

not necessarily always mean that services must be provided to the 

parents. 

In re T.W., 135 N.E.3d at 615.

[28] Here, Father does not challenge the sufficiency of the trial court’s findings or its 

conclusions.6

 Rather, Father argues that he “has been deprived of his due 

process rights” due to “significant procedural irregularities in the CHINS 

proceedings which created a risk of the erroneous filing of a petition to 

terminate Father’s parental rights.” Appellant’s Brief at 19. He also asserts that 

his “substantive and procedural due process rights were violated where [DCS]

denied [him] the opportunity to maintain contact throughout the case during 

his incarceration and provide reasonable services to reunify the family.”7

 Id. at 

5. He asks that we reverse the termination of parental rights order, that the 

CHINS proceeding resume in a manner consistent with due process, and that 

6 Father has thus waived any claim that the termination was not supported by sufficient evidence. See A.D.S. 

v. Indiana Dep’t of Child Servs., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1156 n.4 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (noting that where parent fails 

to raise specific, cogent argument challenging trial court’s termination conclusions, those challenges are 

waived on appeal), trans. denied.

7 Father indicates that his due process claim is pursuant to both the federal and state constitutions. Our 

courts have recognized that in the termination context the due process analysis under each constitution is the 

same. Matter of D.H., 119 N.E.3d 578, 586 n.16 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), modified on reh’g 122 N.E.3d 832, trans. 

denied.
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he be given an opportunity to engage in appropriate services to assist in 

reunification with Child. Id. at 8.

[29] We begin by examining the time period that preceded his July 2018 

incarceration. There is no dispute that Father was aware of Child’s removal in 

November 2017 and of the ensuing the CHINS proceedings. He did not come 

to the DCS office to pick up Child on the night of her removal or call FCM 

Taylor to explain any circumstances preventing it. Nor did he contact FCM 

Taylor in the two weeks that followed. He did not appear for initial hearings in 

November 2017 through January 2018, eventually appearing in court for a 

hearing on February 13, 2018. He was in attendance at the June 21, 2018 

dispositional hearing where the trial court adopted DCS recommendations and 

ordered parents to follow the same. Less than two weeks later, on or around 

July 8, Father cut off his home detention ankle bracelet and left without 

permission. On July 11, he was charged with felony escape, and, among other 

things, possession of methamphetamine which stemmed from acts committed 

on June 26, days after the dispositional hearing. Father was arrested and 

incarcerated on July 12 and has remained so since that time. Father 

acknowledged that he did not contact DCS or attempt to participate in any 

DCS services before he was arrested.

[30] Turning to the period after his incarceration, we reject Father’s claim that he

was denied “the opportunity” to maintain contact with Child and was thus 

denied due process. Appellant’s Brief at 5, 18. Rather, we agree with DCS that 

Father “chose to avoid Child instead of maintaining a bond with her.” 
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Appellee’s Brief at 27. That is, Father did not desire to exercise parenting time

with Child while he was in prison because he did not want Child to know he 

was incarcerated out of concern that “that’s going to change up how she views 

me.” Transcript at 91. To perpetuate the falsehood that he was not in prison, 

Father persuaded family and friends to tell Child that he was at work. Father

agreed that he did not contact Niece, with whom Child had been living for 

almost a year, or otherwise send any mail, cards, or communication to Child. 

These facts do not support his claim that he was denied the opportunity to have 

contact with Child.

[31] Father also asserts that, during his period of incarceration, DCS failed to 

provide reasonable services to him to reunify him with Child. While DCS is 

generally required to make reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify families 

during CHINS proceedings, Ind. Code § 31-34-21-5.5, “the CHINS provision is 

not a requisite element of our parental rights termination statute, and a failure 

to provide services does not serve as a basis on which to directly attack a 

termination order as contrary to law.” In re H.L., 915 N.E.2d at 148 n.3 (citing 

In re E.E., 736 N.E.2d 791, 796 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000)). Furthermore, we have 

found that a failure to provide services to a parent while incarcerated does not 

necessarily result in deprivation of due process. See In re H.L., 915 N.E.2d at

148 (finding no due process violation where “the absence of services was due to 

Father’s incarceration” and he “[did] not point to any evidence that he 

specifically requested visitation or other services”).
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[32] In addition to a lack of offered services, Father asserts that DCS failed to 

maintain meaningful contact with him during the period of his incarceration, 

arguing, “No FCM . . . encouraged [Father’s] involvement, nor communicated 

and engaged in planning with [him]” such that he was not “afforded an 

opportunity to be involved in all aspects of the planning and decision-making 

progress.” Appellant’s Brief at 17. He maintains that, due to such procedural 

failings, his case is similar to In re D.H., where this court accepted a mother’s 

argument that DCS mishandled her case to such an extent that it denied her 

due process of law and reversed the trial court’s termination of the mother’s 

parental rights “[i]n light of DCS’s significant and admitted procedural failings 

in this case[.]” 119 N.E.3d at 591. We find D.H. distinguishable. First, the 

mother in that case was not incarcerated, as is Father. Second, and in contrast 

to the present case, the mother repeatedly requested and expressed willingness 

to participate in services. Here, Father did not ever contact DCS, purposely did 

not maintain contact with Child, and received a number of conduct violations 

while incarcerated.

[33] To the extent that Father suggests he did not know how to reach DCS or his 

FCM, we disagree. Father acknowledged that, while incarcerated, (1) he 

received five or six DCS progress reports, (2) he read them thoroughly, and (3) 

each report identified the FCM. As this court has observed, “[T]he 

responsibility to make positive changes will stay where it must, on the 

parent[,]” and “[i]f the parent feels the services ordered by the court are 

inadequate to facilitate the changes required for reunification, then the onus is 
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on the parent to request additional assistance from the court or DCS.” Prince v. 

Indiana Dep’t of Child Servs., 861 N.E.2d 1223, 1231 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).

[34] While we recognize that procedural irregularities in a CHINS proceeding may 

be of such significance that they deprive a parent of procedural due process with 

respect to the termination of his or her parental rights, we do not find that any 

procedural irregularities in this case rose to the level of a deprivation of Father’s 

due process rights. See C.A. v. Indiana Dep’t of Child Servs., 15 N.E.3d 85, 93 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (no due process violation where the only procedural 

irregularity argued by Mother was that she did not receive or sign a case plan8

and “[t]he record indicates that it was not Mother’s lack of knowledge or 

direction as to what she needed to do to get her children back, but rather her 

lack of participation”); Castro v. State Office of Family & Children, 842 N.E.2d 367, 

376-77 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (“[A]ny procedural irregularities that occurred in 

this case are largely attributable to the fact that Castro has been incarcerated 

throughout the proceedings. And we cannot say that those flaws that are not 

attributable to Castro’s incarceration rise to the level of a deprivation of 

Castro’s due process rights.”), trans. denied; compare Matter of C.M.S.T., 111 

N.E.3d 207, 213-14 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (procedural irregularities in the 

8 In his case, Father likewise argues that he did not receive a case plan. However, DCS documents in the 

record refer to a “case plan”, indicating that one existed, and FCM Thornberg testified that, at some point, 

she had prepared one, although could not testify to specifics. See Exhibits Vol. at 136 (April 22, 2019 Progress 

Report) and 146 (Nov. 26, 2018 Order Approving Permanency Plan); Transcript at 75. Like our colleagues in 

C.A., we “caution the DCS to be more cognizant of the statutory framework by which it is to abide, which 

includes providing a case plan to each parent,” but we do not conclude that, in this case, any failure resulted 

in a procedural irregularity so egregious that Father was denied due process of law.” 15 N.E.3d at 93.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2738 | May 14, 2020 Page 22 of 22

CHINS case—including multiple FCMs, inappropriate behavior by FCMs, and 

apparent bias of FCMs—contributed to parents’ non-compliance such that 

termination of their parental rights amounted to a denial of their due process 

rights).

[35] Judgment affirmed.

Bailey, J. and Crone, J., concur.