IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 18-60656

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

WILLIE TERRELL THOMAS,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Mississippi

USDC No. 3:18-CR-19-1

Before STEWART, HIGGINSON, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Willie Terrell Thomas appeals his 60-month sentence following his guilty 

plea to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and § 924(a)(2). First, he argues that his above-guidelines 

sentence was substantively unreasonable because the district court erred in 

balancing the sentencing factors. We review the substantive reasonableness 

of a sentence under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

December 13, 2019

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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No. 18-60656

2

States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). The district court relied on appropriate 18 

U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors in determining that an upward variance was 

warranted, as its reasons addressed Thomas’s history and characteristics and 

the need to deter Thomas from future criminal conduct, to protect the public, 

to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment. See § 3553(a); 

United States v. Gerezano-Rosales, 692 F.3d 393, 400 (5th Cir. 2012). Nothing 

suggests that the district court failed to consider a factor that should have 

received significant weight, gave significant weight to an improper factor, or 

made a clear error of judgment in balancing the sentencing factors. See 

Gerezano-Rosales, 692 F.3d at 401. We therefore defer to the district court’s 

determination that the § 3553(a) factors, on the whole, warrant the variance, 

see id., and justify the extent of the upward variance imposed, see United States 

v. Broussard, 669 F.3d 537, 551 (5th Cir. 2012). 

Second, Thomas challenges a special condition of supervised release 

requiring him to permit a United States Probation Officer to search his 

“person, property, house, residence, vehicle, papers, electronic communication 

devices, or office . . . . when reasonable suspicion exists that [he has] violated 

a condition of [his] supervision and that the areas to be searched contain 

evidence of this violation.” The condition stated further that “[a]ny search 

must be conducted at a reasonable time and in a reasonable manner.” Thomas 

contends that this condition is not reasonably related to the appropriate

§ 3553(a) factors or narrowly tailored. The record shows that the district court 

considered appropriate § 3553(a) factors, including the need to deter criminal 

behavior and to protect the public. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). While the court 

did not specifically explain its reasons for imposing the challenged special 

condition, its reasoning for the condition was apparent from the record and the 

sentencing transcript. See United States v. Caravayo, 809 F.3d 269, 275 (5th 

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Cir. 2015). Moreover, the electronic search condition is narrowly tailored 

because it only allows a search to occur at a reasonable time and in a 

reasonable manner, and it requires reasonable suspicion that a violation has 

occurred and that evidence of the violation will be found in the area searched. 

See United States v. Scott, 821 F.3d 562, 570 (5th Cir. 2016); see also United 

States v. Acosta-Navarro, No. 18-60564, 2019 WL 3058607, at *4 (5th Cir. July 

11, 2019) (unpublished).

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

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