S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

SUPREME COURT

ANTHONY PELLEGRINO, as Personal 

Representative of the Estate of SHIRLEY 

ANN PELLEGRINO, Deceased, and 

ANTHONY PELLEGRINO, individually,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v No. 137111

AMPCO SYSTEMS PARKING,

Defendant-Appellant.

Statement of Justice Young Denying Plaintiff’s Motion to Disqualify

November 18, 2009

YOUNG, J. After careful consideration of the plaintiff’s motion for recusal, I deny 

the motion. I am deciding this motion under this Court’s current and traditional rules of 

disqualification because they are still in effect and the new rule recently considered by 

my colleagues is patently unconstitutional. 

Reasons for Denial of Plaintiff’s Motion to Disqualify

A. No new claims of bias have been raised and those raised are without merit 

and have been repeatedly and unsuccessfully previously litigated by 

plaintiff’s counsel
2

Plaintiff’s counsel (and his firm) has filed numerous motions for my recusal, either 

in his capacity as a party or as an attorney on behalf of his clients. Each of the prior 

motions has involved various allegations of claimed bias, principally stemming from my 

Michigan Supreme Court judicial campaigns.1

As stated, plaintiff’s counsel has sought my recusal on numerous occasions. After 

careful consideration, and in accordance with this Court’s longstanding practice of 

handling motions for judicial recusal,

 Significantly, the current motion asserts 

no new factual basis for recusal than the more than a dozen previous disqualification 

motions plaintiff’s counsel has filed against me. Moreover, even though it asserts no new 

grounds for disqualification, this motion was strategically filed on the eve of oral 

arguments in this case. 

2

 1 By counsel’s own admission, he has filed motions for my recusal in the following cases:

Tate v City of Dearborn, 477 Mich 1101 (2007); Johnson v Henry Ford Hosp, 477 Mich 

1098 (2007); Flemister v Traveling Med Services, P.C., 729 NW2d 222 (2007); Short v 

Antonini, 729 NW2d 218 (2007); Ansari v Gold, 477 Mich 1076 (2007); State 

Automobile Mut Ins Co v Fieger, 477 Mich 1068 (2007); Grievance Administrator v 

Fieger, 476 Mich 231 (2006); Lewis v St John Hosp, 474 Mich 1089 (2006); Heikkila v 

North Star Trucking, Inc, 474 Mich 1080 (2006); Stamplis v St John Health Sys, 474 

Mich 1017 (2006); McDowell v Detroit, 474 Mich 999 (2006); Harter v Grand Aerie 

Fraternal Order of Eagles, 693 NW2d 381 (2005); Gilbert v DaimlerChrysler Corp, 469 

Mich 883 (2003); Graves v Warner Bros, 469 Mich 853 (2003).

I have denied each of these prior motions as 

lacking merit. While counsel’s political life outside the courtroom has relevance in that 

2 As has been explained previously, see, e.g., Johnson, supra, 477 Mich at 1099, this 

Court’s longstanding practice of judicial recusal is nearly identical to that of the United 

States Supreme Court. See also Statement of Recusal Policy, United States Supreme 

Court, November 1, 1993, available at 483 Mich 1237.
3

realm, it has no bearing on my consideration of his or his clients’ legal matters.3 

Counsel’s clients are entitled to justice under law, no more or less. I have previously and 

will continue to entertain the arguments counsel makes on behalf of his clients with due 

regard to their merits under law. As explained in the brief opposing the motion for 

disqualification, some of my decisions in cases involving plaintiff’s counsel have been 

favorable to counsel’s position,4

Heretofore, the only appeal from a Michigan Supreme Court Justice’s denial of a 

motion for disqualification was to the Supreme Court of the United States and plaintiff’s

counsel has availed himself of that appellate route. Plaintiff’s counsel has appealed my 

previous denials of his motions to disqualify to the United States Supreme Court at least 

three times, and that Court has denied certiorari on each occasion.

while others have not been favorable, as the merits of 

each case required.

5

 3 Indeed, I have ruled both for and against Mr. Fieger when he was the party. See, e.g., 

Grievance Administrator v Fieger, 670 NW2d 563 (2003). What has always and only 

mattered and will continue to matter to me is the merits of his and his client’s claims.

 Moreover, counsel 

4 See, e.g., Beaudrie v Henderson, 465 Mich 124 (2001); Amtower v William C Roney & 

Co, 232 Mich App 226 (1999). Moreover, I have denied leave to appeal in numerous 

other circumstances where counsel has received relief from the Court of Appeals. See, 

e.g., Cauff v Fieger, Fieger, Kenney & Johnson, PC, 483 Mich 1021 (2009); Wilson v 

Keim, 483 Mich 900 (2009); Rodriguez v ASE Industries, Inc, 483 Mich 853 (2009);

Overbay v Botsford Gen Hosp, 482 Mich 1154 (2008); Jackson-Ruffin v Metro Cars, Inc, 

482 Mich 1017 (2008); LaBarge v Walgreen Co, 480 Mich 1136 (2008); Briggs v 

Oakland Co, 480 Mich 1006 (2007); Conn v Asplundh Tree Expert Co, 478 Mich 930 

(2007); Janusz v Sterling Millwork, Inc, 476 Mich 859 (2006).

5 Graves, supra, cert den 542 US 920 (2004); Gilbert v DaimlerChrysler Corp, supra, 

cert den 546 US 821 (2005); Grievance Administrator v Fieger, supra, cert den 549 US 

1205 (2007).
4

has litigated in federal court the constitutionality of this Court’s historic practice of 

handling motions for judicial recusal under which I am deciding this motion.

6

 Again, he 

has been unsuccessful.7

B. Caperton has no applicability to plaintiff’s motion to disqualify

 This history of litigation in the federal courts further underscores

that plaintiff’s claims of prejudice are without merit. 

While there is nothing new presented in plaintiff’s motion to disqualify that has 

not been considered and rejected more than a dozen times, there is one area of the law 

that has changed since counsel’s last motion for recusal. The United States Supreme 

Court recently decided Caperton v Massey and required a justice’s recusal in what it 

repeatedly described as an “extraordinary situation” based on “extreme facts.”8

 In 

Caperton, the Court concluded that “there is a serious risk of actual bias—based on 

objective and reasonable perceptions—when a person with a personal stake in a particular 

case had a significant and disproportionate influence in placing the judge on the case by 

raising funds or directing the judge’s election campaign when the case was pending or 

imminent.”9

 6 Fieger v Ferry, 2007 WL 2827801 (E D Mich, 2007).

 Plaintiff’s motion does not make any allegations of this nature. 

Accordingly, Caperton is inapposite to counsel’s motion and does not require my recusal.

7 Id.

8 Caperton v AT Massey Coal Co, Inc, 556 US __, 129 S Ct 2252, 2263 (2009).

9 Id. at ____, 129 S Ct at 2263-2264.
5

For all of these reasons, I therefore deny plaintiff’s motion for recusal. I direct 

that the Clerk of the Court transmit my denial statement to the parties forthwith.

Justice Robert P. Young, Jr.

Michigan Supreme Court