### IN THE UNI TED STATES COURT OFAPPEALS FOR THE FIF TH CIRCUIT

No. 10-51061 Summary Calendar

DAVID BRIAN JENNINGS, Plaintiff-Appellant
v. RI SSIE OWENS, in her Official Capacity as Presiding Officer of the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles; STUART JENKINS, in his Official Capacity as Director of the Parole Division of the Tex a s D e p a rtment of Criminal Justice; IVY ANDERSON-YORK, in her Official Capacity as Director of Region I of the Parole Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice; LINDA MCCARVER, in her Official Capacity as Supervisor of Parole Officers within Region I of the P arole Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice; and ERNEST O ALVAREZ, in his O f

ficial Capacity as Direct Parole Officer within Region I of the Parole Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Defendants-Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas USDC No. 1:06-CV-990

Before REAVLEY, SMITH, and PRADO, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * David Brian Jennings, a Texas parolee, brought suit s u n d e r 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenging three sex offender parole conditions imposed on him when he U n i te d S ta te s C o u rt o f A p p ea l s

F i ft h C i rc u i t 

### F I L E D Sep tem ber 2 6, 2 011 Lyle W . Cayce Clerk

Purs uant to 5 T H C IR

. R. 47.5 , the court hasd ete rm inedthat this op inion sho uld not * be publ ish ed and is not pr ece dent excep t unde r the lim ite d cir cum st ance s se t forth in 5 T H C IR

. R. 47.5 .4. Case: 10-51061 Document: 00511613246 Page: 1 Date Filed: 09/26/2011No. 10-51061

was paroled in 2005 after serving a prison sentence for debit card fraud. These three conditions were based on of a sex offense he pleaded guilty to in 1979 and for which he completed his sentence in 1988. He claimed that the imposition of these conditions violated his right to procedural due process. The magistrate judge, presiding with the consent of the parties, originally granted summary judgment in favor of Jen ni n g s a nd ordered the conditions

r e m o v e d from the terms of Jennings’s parole. We reversed that decision a n d remanded. Jennings v. Owens , 602 F.3d 652, 654 (5th Cir. 2010). Relying on our decision, the magistrate judge then granted th e d e f e n dants’ new motion for summary judgment and dismissed the case, explaining that Jennings could not show that he experienced stigma on the basis of the parole conditions. We review the grant of summary judgment de novo. Nickell v. Beau View of Biloxi, L.L.C. , 636 F.3d 752, 754 (5th Cir. 2011). Summary judgment is proper if the evidence shows that there is no genuine dispute as to a material fact. Id. ; F E D
. R. C IV
. P. 56(c)(2) (As of December 1, 2010, this proposition is c o dif i e d i n F E D
. R. C IV
. P. 56(a).). To establish the unconstitutional infringement of a liberty interest regarding the conditions of parole, a plaintiff must show, among other things, that the conditions cause stigma, meaning that they falsely label the plaintiff and imply guilt of serious wrongdoing. Jennings , 602 F.3d at 657-59 & n.9. Jennings argues tha t s u m m a ry judgment is not warranted because he presen t e d e vi dence that the special parole conditions falsely label him as
someone who continues to be a threat to the commu nity. However, we have already determined that because J e n ni n g s is a convicted sex offender and has had the ability to challenge that status, he is not stigmatized by the imposition of sex offender parole conditions. Jennings , 602 F.3d at 659. Because Jennings cannot es t ablish that a liberty interest was infringed, summary judgment in favor of the defendants was proper. Accordingly, the judgment is AFFIRMED.

2 Case: 10-51061 Document: 00511613246 Page: 2 Date Filed: 09/26/2011