J. S58014/17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: 

H.T. A/K/A H.D., A MINOR 

:

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

:

APPEAL OF: 

C.D., BIOLOGICAL MOTHER

:

:

No. 753 MDA 2017

Appeal from the Order Dated April 4, 2017,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County

Juvenile Division at No. CP-35-DP-0000015-2017

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., SHOGAN, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. 

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED SEPTEMBER 19, 2017

C.D. (“mother”) appeals from the April 4, 2017 order entered in the 

Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County that adjudicated her 

biological daughter H.T. a/k/a H.D. (“minor child”) dependent and, due to 

the presence of aggravated circumstances, ordered that no further efforts to 

preserve or reunify the minor child with mother were necessary. We affirm.

The trial court set forth the following factual and procedural history:

Minor child came into the [Lackawanna County 

Office of Youth and Family Services’ (“Agency”)] 

custody following her discharge from the hospital 

subsequent to her birth on February [], 2017. 

Initially, the Agency was seeking immediate custody 

due to [mother]’s history with the Agency in regards 

to domestic violence, drug and alcohol use, 

homelessness, mental health issues, psychiatric 

hospitalizations, and inability to understand how to 

care for a child. [Mother] has been involved with the 

Agency since 2010, at which time [mother] gave 

birth to a child. [Mother]’s rights were voluntarily 

terminated on that child on September 11, 2012.
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[Mother] has an IQ score of 64. Case worker 

Jennifer Dunston (hereinafter “Ms. Dunston”) 

testified that [mother] has been diagnosed with PDD 

(pervasive developmental disorder), intellectual 

disability, depression, ODD (oppositional defiant 

disorder), and ADHD (attention-deficit/hyperactivity 

disorder). Since being involved with [mother], the 

Agency has had concerns about [mother]’s cognitive 

and emotional delays. For example, at one time 

[mother] reported to that Agency that she was living 

with two (2) friends but did not know their names or 

where she was living. In 2010, [mother] met 

someone on the Internet, took a cab to Pittsburgh, 

and upon arrival in Pittsburgh did not have the 

$400.00 to pay the taxi driver.

Subsequently, [mother] gave birth to another 

child on February [], 2014 and the Agency again 

became involved. It was reported that [mother] was 

not taking her required medications, and that minor 

child was placed into custody with the Agency 

following a domestic violence incident with her 

paramour with whom she resided, [V.S.]. When that 

child was in custody with the Agency, [mother] was 

inconsistent with services and scheduled visits with 

the child. Following the placement of the minor 

child, [mother] was again homeless and unable to 

maintain housing. Ms. Dunston testified that the 

record notes that [mother] did not have an 

understanding of the child’s development. 

[Mother]’s rights were involuntarily terminated with 

respect to that child on September 17, 2015. 

[Mother] was not present for that hearing, and her 

whereabouts were unknown.

[Mother]’s rights were voluntarily terminated 

on a third child on June 2, 2016. [Mother] was again 

homeless, and inconsistent with services provided by 

the Agency and visits with that minor child. 

Subsequently, [mother] gave birth to a fourth child, 

J.T., who was placed in custody of the Agency on 

June 10, 2016. [Mother]’s fourth minor child is 

currently in kinship with his paternal aunt and uncle. 
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Regarding minor child J.T., the Agency was granted 

aggravated circumstances on September 19, 2016 

by the Honorable Judge Chester Harhut, with no 

attempts of reunification. Stephanie Herne, the 

caseworker that worked specifically with [mother] 

and minor child J.T., testified that [mother] could 

have attended twenty-two (22) visits with J.T. but 

only showed to fourteen (14). Ms. Herne further 

testified that [mother] displayed low empathy, 

required prompts to care for the basic needs of the 

minor child during every visitation, and struggled 

with her own hygiene. Since September, [mother] 

made no progress in terms of her ability to care for 

the minor child. [Mother] consistently missed 

parenting assessments, and is only at the beginning 

stages with the child at issue.

The Agency has continued to offer [mother] 

with services. The Agency was aware of [mother]’s 

pregnancy with the child at issue in our case in 

September of 2016, and attempted to prepare 

[mother] for said child by offering parenting services 

and through working with Scranton Counseling 

Center. While [mother] did participate in a few 

visitations with minor child J.T., she was very 

inconsistent and unable to care for the child on her 

own. [Mother] was not compliant with any services 

until March of 2017. In March 2017, [mother] began 

attending parenting sessions through the Agency and 

Scranton Counseling Center, attended a medication 

management appointment and a therapy 

appointment, and completed an intake assessment 

at PATH for drug and alcohol. While [mother] 

completed an intake for drug and alcohol, she was a 

no-call no-show for her first appointment at PATH.

The minor child at issue is [mother]’s fifth 

child, and at the time the Agency took custody, the 

father was unknown. Paternity has since been 

established to be [V.S.]. The Agency still must 

assess [V.S.’s] parenting to assure that he is capable 

to care for the minor child properly. [V.S.] also has 

a history of domestic violence against [mother], and 

was incarcerated for the same in 2014 for a period of 
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one (1) year. The Agency is seeking to reunify the 

minor child with [V.S.], and is not looking to find 

aggravated circumstances against [V.S.]. [V.S.] was 

to begin supervised visitation through the Agency in 

late April.

Minor child is currently in placement in kinship 

foster care with [mother]’s cousins [T. and S.B.]. 

The minor child is also residing with a biological 

sibling who will be adopted by the [kinship foster 

caretakers]. Minor child was born premature at 

thirty-four (34) weeks, was on a feeding tube and 

could not breathe on her own. Minor child was 

discharged from the hospital on February 28, 2017, 

and placed on vitamins and iron due to being born 

premature. While in the NICU at the hospital, 

[mother] had unlimited access to the minor child but 

had not visited with the minor child since 

February 20, 2017. Currently, minor child does not 

have any medical issues.

An adjudication hearing was held on April 4, 

2017, wherein this Court found minor child 

adjudicated dependent, custody placement 

remaining with the Agency. This Court found clear 

and convincing evidence that the parental rights of 

[mother] have been involuntarily terminated with 

respect to another child of [mother], and voluntarily 

terminated with respect to two (2) other children of 

[mother]. This Court also found that this is 

[mother]’s fifth child, and that she has not followed 

recommendations of the Agency for the last 

seven (7) years. Therefore, aggravated 

circumstances exist with minor child []. The Court 

held that [mother] is not obligated to accept, nor is 

the [A]gency obligated to provide, services to 

[mother].

[Mother] filed the current appeal of our April 4, 

2017 Order on May 4, 2017. [Mother] 

simultaneously filed a concise statement of 

errors/matters complained of on appeal pursuant to 

[Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)] alleging that following a finding 

of aggravated circumstances, this Court erred as a 
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matter of law and manifestly abused its discretion in 

determining that the Agency is not required to make 

efforts to reunify [mother] and minor child.

Trial court opinion, 6/1/17 at 1-5 (citations to notes of testimony omitted).

Mother raises the following issue for our review: “Whether following a 

finding of aggravated circumstances, the trial court erred as a matter of law 

and/or manifestly abused its discretion in determining the Agency is not 

required to make efforts to reunify biological mother and the [minor] child?” 

(Mother’s brief at 6 (capitalization omitted).)

Our standard of review in dependency cases is well 

established; the standard this Court employs is 

broad. We accept the trial court’s factual findings 

that are supported by the record, and defer to the 

court’s credibility determinations. We accord great 

weight to this function of the hearing judge because 

he is in the position to observe and rule upon the 

credibility of the witnesses and the parties who 

appear before him. Relying upon his unique posture, 

we will not overrule the trial court’s findings if they 

are supported by competent evidence.

R.P. v. L.P., 957 A.2d 1205, 1211 (Pa.Super. 2008) (internal citations, 

quotation marks, and brackets omitted).

Our Supreme Court, in In re M.L., 562 Pa. 646, 757 

A.2d 849, 850-51 (Pa. 2000), stated that a court:

is empowered by 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] 

§ 6341(a) and (c) to make a finding that 

a child is dependent if the child meets 

the statutory definition by clear and 

convincing evidence. If the court finds 

that the child is dependent, then the 

court may make an appropriate 

disposition of the child to protect the 

child’s physical, mental and moral 
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welfare, including allowing the child to 

remain with the parents subject to 

supervision, transferring temporary legal 

custody to a relative or a private or 

public agency, or transferring custody to 

the juvenile court of another state. 

42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 6351 (a).

Id. (citation omitted). 

A dependent child is one who:

is without proper parental care or 

control, subsistence, education as 

required by law, or other care or control 

necessary for his physical, mental or 

emotional health, or morals. A 

determination that there is a lack of 

proper parental care or control may be 

based upon evidence of conduct by the 

parent, guardian or other custodian that 

places the health, safety or welfare of 

the child at risk, including evidence of 

the parent’s, guardian’s or other 

custodian’s use of alcohol or a controlled 

substance that places the health, safety 

or welfare of the child at risk[.]

42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 6302(1).

Id. (brackets in original).

The Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] §§ 6301-65, which 

was amended in 1998 to conform to the federal 

Adoption and Safe Families Act (“ASFA”), 42 U.S.C. 

§ 671 et seq., controls the adjudication and 

disposition of dependent children. The policy 

underlying these statutes aims at the prevention of 

children languishing indefinitely in foster care, with 

its inherent lack of permanency, normalcy, and 

long-term parental commitment. Furthermore, the 

1998 amendments to the Juvenile Act, as required 

by ASFA, place the focus of dependency proceedings 

on the child. Safety, permanency, and the 
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well-being of the child must take precedence over all 

other considerations, including the rights of the 

parents. 

Id. at 1217 (internal citations to case law omitted).

Under the definitions section of the Juvenile Act, an aggravated 

circumstance is defined, among other circumstances, as when “[t]he 

parental rights of the parent have been involuntarily terminated with respect 

to a child of the parent.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6302 (definition of “aggravated 

circumstances,” Subsection (7)). 

Pursuant to the Juvenile Act, if a court finds that 

aggravated circumstances exist in a given case, the 

court must then “determine whether or not 

reasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate the need 

for removing the child from the home or to preserve 

and reunify the family shall be made or continue to 

be made . . . .” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6341(c.1). A court 

may end reasonable efforts at its discretion.” See 

In re A.H., 2000 PA Super 357, 763 A.2d 873, 878 

(Pa. Super. 2000).

In the Interest of L.V., 127 A.3d 831, 839 (Pa.Super. 2015); accord R.L., 

957 A.2d at 1217 (finding that the existence of an aggravated circumstance 

permits a trial court to suspend efforts at reunification).

Here, mother neither disputes the trial court’s dependency 

adjudication nor its aggravated circumstance finding. Mother’s sole 

contention is that the trial court abused its discretion in determining that the 

Agency is not required to make reunification efforts. We disagree.

Following a hearing on this matter, where two Agency caseworkers 

and mother testified, the trial court explained its findings of dependency and 
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aggravated circumstances and its decision to order that no further efforts to 

preserve or reunify the minor child with mother were necessary, as follows:

Based upon my review of the testimony that was 

provided here today, there’s no question that the 

Agency has met by clear and convincing evidence 

that an aggravating circumstance does exist, that 

being [mother] had one other child wherein her 

parental rights were involuntarily terminated.

The next step would be as to what we do subsequent 

to that. And the Court has made additional findings 

as part of the record here today, that being that 

there’s a seven year history that the Agency has with 

[mother].

[Minor child] is her fifth child and made reference to 

the fact that one child, her rights were involuntarily 

terminated. There were two others where her rights 

were voluntarily terminated, and a 4th child, [J.T.] 

the third, who was born on May [], 2016, that 

aggravating circumstances existed in that particular 

case with no efforts to reunify child with mother.

Also, that there is evidence that mother has a history 

of mental illness, which she admitted to on the stand 

today. That there is inconsistent stable housing, 

even though there were periods that there were, but 

there’s still over the seven year period that there’s 

[sic] inconsistencies with regards to stable living 

conditions.

There’s also a history wherein [mother] did not or 

could not follow the recommendations of the Agency 

over the past seven years. Albeit that there has 

been some effort over the last month. I don’t think 

that’s enough with regards to this particular case 

involving [minor child].

Notes of testimony, 4/4/17 at 79-80.
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We have carefully reviewed the record in this case. As the record 

supports the trial court’s factual findings, we discern no abuse of discretion.

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/19/2017