[Cite as Majeed v. Majeed, 2016-Ohio-7243.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

MONTGOMERY COUNTY 

LATISHA MAJEED 

Plaintiff-Appellee 

v. 

ABDUR R. MAJEED 

Defendant-Appellant

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

:

C.A. CASE NO. 26957 

T.C. NO. 15DV775 

(Civil Appeal from Common Pleas 

 Court, Domestic Relations) 

. . . . . . . . . . . 

O P I N I O N 

Rendered on the ___7th___ day of _____October_____, 2016. 

. . . . . . . . . . . 

LATISHA MAJEED, 4522 Prescott Avenue, Dayton, Ohio 45406 

Plaintiff-Appellee 

 

GEORGE A. KATCHMER, Atty. Reg. No. 0005031, 1886 Brock Road N.E., 

Bloomingburg, Ohio 43106 

 Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 

FROELICH, J. 

{¶ 1} Abdur Majeed appeals from a judgment of the Montgomery County Court of 

Common Pleas, which issued a domestic violence civil protection order (CPO) to his wife, 

Latisha Majeed. For the following reasons, the trial court’s judgment will be affirmed. 

I. Facts and Procedural History 

{¶ 2} On June 26, 2015, Latisha Majeed (“Latisha”) filed a petition for a domestic 
-2- 

violence CPO, claiming that she and her husband, Majeed, were residing separately, and 

that Majeed would come to her residence, control her, and mentally abuse her. She 

asserted that he had come to her residence, blocked her driveway, and refused to allow 

her to go to crisis groups and therapy appointments. She stated that she was scared to 

come outside and for her life, and that he controlled her access to food and money. Her 

petition indicated that she would be filing a petition for divorce that same day. 

{¶ 3} After an ex parte hearing, the trial court issued an ex parte CPO and 

scheduled a hearing before a magistrate for July 9, 2015. Majeed was personally served 

with the order and notice of hearing on July 7, 2015. 

{¶ 4} A hearing was held before a magistrate on July 9, as scheduled. Majeed 

did not appear. Nothing in the record suggests that Majeed contacted the court prior to 

the hearing to seek a continuance. 

{¶ 5} At the hearing, Latisha reiterated that her husband “is very controlling and 

he’s mentally abusing me.” She testified that he controls her food and how she drives, 

and he has forbidden her to work. Latisha stated that she used to be a nurse, that she 

has no income, and that he pays for everything. She indicated that she suffers from 

anxiety. 

{¶ 6} Latisha described several incidents involving her husband. First, she 

described an incident on April 14, 2015, in which Majeed “took his hand” and “shoved” 

her neck while she was driving. Latisha had pulled over at a gas station and kicked 

Majeed out of the car, “because [she] was scared for [her] life.” The police were called 

(by someone other than Latisha) as a result of this incident, and she went to a hospital 

for treatment. Latisha was diagnosed with a cervical strain; she provided documentation 
-3- 

of her hospital visit as an exhibit. Second, Latisha testified that she has four puppies 

and that Majeed killed one of her dogs; she indicated that this incident was also reported 

to the police. Third, Latisha indicated that she was unable to get a daycare started at 

her home, because Majeed came to her backyard, took his clothes off, and acted as if he 

were “ejaculating at me.” 

{¶ 7} Near the end of the hearing, the magistrate stated, “[W]e’re going to help you 

* * * by issuing a civil protection order,” and she informed Latisha that she would issue a 

written decision. 

{¶ 8} A week later, on July 16, 2015, the magistrate issued a domestic violence 

CPO to Latisha. The order contained findings of fact, which read: 

The parties are husband and wife. They have split and are 

divorcing. Nevertheless, the respondent still attempts to control the 

petitioner, causing her mental anxiety and stress in attempting to control her 

food, as well as her driving. They had argued a lot. 

 On April 14, 2015, while petitioner was driving, the respondent hit her 

in the neck, causing her to swerve. Petitioner suffered a cervical strain 

from the blow [Exhibit 1]. Petitioner was able to get respondent out of the 

car at a gas station. The police were called at the gas station, and she 

went back and made a police report. 

 Petitioner testified that the respondent called her to tell her that he 

had killed one of her puppies. 

 The petitioner is in fear of the respondent because of his actions and 

is entitled to a five year Civil Protection Order as she has proven her case 
-4- 

by the preponderance of the evidence. 

The order was signed by both the magistrate and the trial court, and it included notification 

about filing objections to the order. See Civ.R. 65.1 (governing civil protection orders). 

{¶ 9} The CPO was served on Majeed on July 27, 2015. Two days later, he filed 

objections to the July 16 decision, and he requested a transcript and an opportunity to 

supplement his objections. 

{¶ 10} Majeed filed timely supplemental objections on October 6, 2015. In his 

objections, he indicated that he had “made numerous calls to police dispatch regarding 

the violent acts committed by the petitioner [Latisha] toward me that occurred in and 

around our home and in other public places.” Majeed stated that his wife had repeatedly 

thrown heavy objects and knives at him, hit him, was verbally abusive, and made false 

accusations against him. He stated that his wife blamed him for her use of alcohol and 

smoking, lack of employment, and poor mental health. 

{¶ 11} Majeed provided an alternative version of the events that occurred in April 

2015 in the van, stating that his wife had become upset with him, that she drove around 

for hours cursing him, and that he had made several phone calls to police dispatch while 

in the van. Majeed further stated that, when Latisha stopped at a gas station, she began 

hitting him with a shovel or axe handle as he exited the vehicle. Majeed called the police, 

who “suggested that we amend our differences and that me and my wife go home.” 

Majeed stated that his wife’s neck issues began while she was working as a nurse and 

were aggravated by an automobile collision in 2014. 

{¶ 12} Majeed apologized for his absence from the July 9 hearing. He explained 

that his father, who was 98 years old, had a “life threatening accident and my brother and 
-5- 

I were assisting him thru hospital procedures, relocation to rehab and to assisted living.” 

{¶ 13} Latisha responded to Majeed’s objections, providing additional 

documentation to support her testimony. 

{¶ 14} On November 18, 2015, the trial court overruled Majeed’s objections, 

concluded that Latisha had proven her case by a preponderance of the evidence, and 

issued a five-year CPO against Majeed. The trial court stated that it had carefully 

considered the magistrate’s decision, the findings of fact contained therein, Majeed’s 

objections, Latisha’s response to the objections, and the transcript of the proceedings. 

The trial court summarized Latisha’s testimony at the hearing and reviewed the definition 

of domestic violence set forth in R.C. 3113.31. The court found that “Latisha has shown 

by a preponderance of the evidence that [Majeed’s] actions have resulted in an act of 

domestic violence as defined by statute. [Majeed’s] objections have no evidentiary 

basis.” 

{¶ 15} Majeed appeals from the trial court’s judgment, raising two assignments of 

error. 

II. Petitioner’s Case was Proven by Preponderance of Evidence 

{¶ 16} In his first assignment of error, Majeed claims that the trial court erred in 

determining that Latisha had proven her case by a preponderance of the evidence. 

{¶ 17} R.C. 3113.31 authorizes the domestic relations court to issue a domestic 

violence CPO to protect family and household members from domestic violence. R.C. 

3113.31(A)(1) defines “domestic violence” to mean, in part, “the occurrence of one or 

more of the following acts against a family or household member: (a) Attempting to cause 

or recklessly causing bodily injury; (b) Placing another person by the threat of force in fear 
-6- 

of imminent serious physical harm or committing a violation of section 2903.211 

[menacing by stalking] or 2911.211 [aggravated trespass] of the Revised Code; * * *.” 

R.C. 2903.211(A)(1) provides: “No person by engaging in a pattern of conduct shall 

knowingly cause another person to believe that the offender will cause physical harm to 

the other person or a family or household member of the other person or cause mental 

distress to the other person or a family or household member of the other person.” 

{¶ 18} “[W]hen granting a protection order, the trial court must find that petitioner 

has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that petitioner or petitioner’s family or 

household members are in danger of domestic violence.” Felton v. Felton, 79 Ohio St.3d 

34, 42, 679 N.E.2d 672 (1997), citing R.C. 3113.31(D). When reviewing whether a 

protection order should have been granted, we must determine whether “sufficient 

competent, credible evidence” was presented to support a finding that the respondent 

engaged in acts or threats of domestic violence. Charles v. Peters, 2d Dist. Greene No. 

2015-CA-52, 2016-Ohio-1259, ¶ 9. 

{¶ 19} Latisha was the sole witness at the July 9 hearing on the domestic violence 

CPO. As detailed above, Latisha testified that her husband controlled various aspects 

of her life, and she described several specific incidents with her husband, including one 

where he injured her neck when he grabbed her while she was driving on April 15. 

Latisha indicated that Majeed has been mentally abusing her and that she has anxiety 

and is fearful. She stated, “It’s scary to me. I don’t know what he’s going to do.” 

{¶ 20} Latisha’s testimony, if believed, was sufficient to prove, by a preponderance 

of the evidence, that Majeed had committed domestic violence, as defined by R.C. 

3113.31(A)(1). The trial court reasonably credited her testimony, and it did not err in 
-7- 

determining that Latisha had proven her case by a preponderance of the evidence. 

{¶ 21} Majeed presented an alternative version of events in his objections. 

However, he did not testify at the July 9 hearing, and his objections were merely unsworn 

statements. The trial court did not err in rejecting Majeed’s objections for lack of an 

evidentiary basis. 

{¶ 22} Majeed’s first assignment of error is overruled. 

III. Comment by the Magistrate 

{¶ 23} Majeed’s second assignment of error states, “The Court inappropriately 

showed religious favoritism and violated the Appellant’s right to equal protection of law.” 

{¶ 24} In this assignment of error, Majeed claims that the magistrate made an 

inappropriate religious comment at the July 9 hearing and that her comment indicated a 

religious bias against him. 

{¶ 25} While describing the experiences that led her to seek a domestic violence 

CPO, Latisha testified that Majeed was “Islamic” and “Muslim.” At the conclusion of the 

hearing – after the magistrate had indicated that she would grant a domestic violence 

CPO and would issue a written decision – the following exchange occurred: 

THE PETITIONER: Thank you very much for your time. 

THE COURT: Be careful. Take care of yourself. 

THE PETITIONER: Yes, with God’s help I’ve been depressed and it’s the 

worst feeling in the world to feel like Jesus is not real. I just got back with 

Jesus and I’d like it to stay there. 

THE COURT: An[d] He would like you to stay there also. 

THE PETITIONER: Yes, ma’am. 
-8- 

THE COURT: Thank you, ma’am. 

THE PETITIONER: God bless. 

{¶ 26} “Judicial bias is ‘a hostile feeling or spirit of ill will or undue friendship or 

favoritism toward one of the litigants or his attorney, with the formation of a fixed 

anticipatory judgment on the part of the judge, as contradistinguished from an open state 

of mind which will be governed by the law and the facts.’ Trial judges are ‘presumed not 

to be biased or prejudiced, and the party alleging bias or prejudice must set forth evidence 

to overcome the presumption of integrity.’ ” (Internal citations omitted.) Weiner v. Kwait, 

2d Dist. Montgomery No. 19289, 2003-Ohio-3409, ¶ 89-90. 

{¶ 27} There is nothing in the record to suggest that the magistrate was biased 

against Majeed due to his faith. Even if we were to construe the magistrate’s remark as 

reflecting that she held different beliefs than Majeed, as he apparently alleges, there is 

no suggestion in the record that the magistrate was biased toward those of one faith 

and/or against those of other faiths. 

{¶ 28} Certain statements may create the appearance that a court is improperly 

basing its ruling on the judge’s personal beliefs, and we caution judicial officers against 

making any comments that could reasonably be interpreted or perceived as affecting their 

impartiality. In this case, however, there is nothing in the record to indicate that religious 

beliefs affected the trial court’s issuance of a domestic violence CPO. The magistrate’s 

comment occurred at the end of the hearing, after the magistrate had informed Latisha of 

how she would rule, and it was in direct response to a religious comment made by Latisha. 

Although the magistrate knew throughout the hearing that Majeed was Muslim, there is 

no indication that Majeed’s religion affected the magistrate’s analysis or that the 
-9- 

magistrate improperly considered anything other than the relevant law and the evidence 

presented at the hearing in determining that Latisha was entitled to a domestic violence 

CPO. 

{¶ 29} Significantly, the judgment on appeal is not the magistrate’s ruling, but the 

judgment entered by the trial court after objections to the magistrate’s ruling by Majeed. 

The trial court’s decision indicated that it had conducted an independent review of the 

record. Upon that review, the trial court found that Latisha had proven by a 

preponderance of the evidence that Majeed’s actions resulted in an act of domestic 

violence, that Majeed’s objections lacked merit, and that Latisha was entitled to a fiveyear domestic violence CPO against Majeed. There is no suggestion, either by Majeed 

or in the record, that religious beliefs had any bearing on the trial court’s determination. 

See Cutler v. Reed, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2015-06-105, 2016-Ohio-1151, ¶ 22 (any 

alleged bias or prejudice exhibited by the magistrate in issuing CPO was rendered 

harmless by virtue of the trial court’s review of the record). Accordingly, we find no basis 

to conclude that the domestic violence CPO was the result of religious bias or that the 

trial court violated Majeed’s right to equal protection of law. 

{¶ 30} Majeed’s second assignment of error is overruled. 

IV. Conclusion 

{¶ 31} The trial court’s judgment will be affirmed. 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . 

FAIN, J. and HALL, J., concur. 

Copies mailed to: 

Latisha Majeed 

George A. Katchmer 
-10-

Hon. Timothy D. Wood