J-A24034-23 

 2024 PA Super 146 

 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellant 

 v. 

KENNETH FRYE 

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

 PENNSYLVANIA 

 No. 140 EDA 2023 

Appeal from the Order Entered December 21, 2022 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0005402-2022 

BEFORE: STABILE, J., DUBOW, J., and SULLIVAN, J. 

OPINION BY SULLIVAN, J.: FILED JULY 15, 2024

The Commonwealth appeals from the order granting the motion of 

Kenneth Frye (“Frye”) to “quash the return of transcript”1 and dismiss the 

third-degree murder2 charge against him. After careful review, we reverse 

and remand for further proceedings. 

The trial court provided the factual and procedural history of this case, 

which we set forth in relevant part, as follows: 

On April 15, 2022, Eric Pope (“[the Victim]”) died outside of 

the Tabu Lounge and Sports bar . . . in Philadelphia. He was 41 

____________________________________________ 

1

 A pre-trial motion for writ of habeas corpus challenging the sufficiency of the 

evidence presented by the Commonwealth at a preliminary hearing is 

generally referred to in Philadelphia County as a “motion to quash the return 

of transcript.” See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Ouch, 199 A.3d 918, 922 n.2 

(Pa. Super. 2018). The Commonwealth certified the trial court’s order 

substantially handicaps its prosecution; therefore, we have jurisdiction over 

this appeal. See id. at 922 n.3 (applying Pa.R.A.P. 311(d) in these 

circumstances). 

2 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(c). 
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years old and weighed 161 pounds. The stipulated medical 

examiner’s report indicated that the immediate cause [of] death 

was from complications due to blunt impact injuries of the head. 

The manner of death was ruled a homicide. 

At the preliminary hearing, the Commonwealth called Johan 

Markocki (“Markocki”) as a witness. Markocki is the assistant 

general manager for the bar. He testified that he received a call 

from security to go to the front door of the bar. Outside the front 

door, Markocki found [the Victim] on the sidewalk facing the 

building[,] unconscious and not moving. [Markocki] testified that 

he, along with the security guards, looked for signs of life such as 

breathing or stomach movements. Markocki testified that security 

told him that [the Victim] fell and hit his head on the ground. He 

stated that there were [three] security officers when he arrived, 

and he asked if anyone [had] called 911. The security guards 

responded no and suggested that Markocki should call 911, which 

he did immediately. He explained that it was not company policy 

to wait for a manager to call 911 in emergencies. Markocki 

testified that rescue services came quickly and performed CPR. 

Markocki testified that when he went back to his office, he played 

the security footage that covers the front door and observed that 

[Frye had] walked out into the street and punched [the Victim] in 

the face. [Markocki] was then asked if he recognized anyone in 

the courtroom, and Markocki pointed to [Frye]. Markocki testified 

that [Frye had] worked for Tabu for a few years as a security 

officer. 

On cross-examination, Markocki testified that he found [the 

Victim] on the sidewalk and that all the security guards agreed 

with the initial story that [the Victim] fell and hit his head. He 

continued to testify that he did not know when he began to check 

for vitals. . . . He testified that when he found [the Victim], he 

did not see any injuries, blood, or seizures occurring at the time. 

Markocki stated that [Frye] remained at the scene when 

emergency services arrived. 

On redirect, Markocki testified that he noticed [the Victim] 

on the first floor of the bar before the incident occurred. He 

explained that he was behind the bar at this point and noticed [the 

Victim] stumbling. Another patron [] caught him, and Markocki 

assisted the patron in getting [the Victim] in a chair. He then 

called security and told them to either help get [the Victim] home 

or sober [the Victim] up so he would stop falling around. One of 
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the security officers he called was [Frye]. Markocki testified that 

he observed [Frye] sitting at the table with [the Victim] before he 

went upstairs. 

The Commonwealth also called Detective Thorsten Lucke 

[(“Detective Lucke”)] as a witness. He put together a compilation 

video of the security footage that recorded the incident. Detective 

Lucke testified that the punch occurred between 12:54 a.m. to 

12:55 a.m. . . .. 

A summary of the video is as follows: the video shows the 

security guards removing [the Victim] from the bar. [The Victim] 

appears to fall or has been pushed out of the side door into an 

alley. Two security guards follow [the Victim] outside and appear 

to help stabilize him[,] and direct him to leave. [The Victim] then 

leans against a pole, and the security guards leave him in that 

location. 

[The Victim] eventually walks out of the alley and goes back 

to the front door of the bar. He begins to dance in front of the 

bar, and he remains in that area. He then walks away from the 

bar towards a parked car. He stands as if he is waiting to cross 

the street for about a minute. Then he reaches down and picks 

something up off the ground. He continues standing in the street 

for a moment and then starts dancing on the side of the street. 

One of the bouncers tries to pull [him] out of the road, but [the 

Victim] resists and keeps dancing. He then turns and walks back 

towards the bar. [Frye] walks toward [the Victim] and punches 

him in the face one time causing him to fall to the ground and hit 

his head on what appears to be a metal manhole cover. 

[The video reveals that the Victim laid immobile and 

motionless on the ground without any assistance from onlookers.] 

Eventually, the security officers realize that [the Victim] is not 

getting up. . . . Two security officers move him from the street 

onto the sidewalk. The video speeds up, and the employee who 

testified at the preliminary hearing comes into view and calls 911. 

Not long after, emergency services arrive [at] the scene. 

* * * * 

[Later in] April [] 2022, [Frye] was arrested on homicide 

charges. A preliminary hearing was held [i]n July [] 2022. At the 

conclusion of the preliminary hearing, the municipal court judge 
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held [Frye] over for a third-degree murder charge. Following the 

preliminary hearing, [Frye moved to quash the return of transcript 

and/or petitioned for writ of habeas corpus, seeking dismissal of 

the third-degree murder charge. The trial court held a] hearing 

on [the] motion to quash [i]n December [] 2022[, and, thereafter, 

the trial c]ourt granted [the] motion. The Commonwealth timely 

filed a [n]otice of [a]ppeal . . .. 

Trial Court Opinion, 3/7/23, at 1-4 (paragraphs re-ordered for clarity). Both 

the trial court and the Commonwealth complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. 

The Commonwealth raises the following issue for our review: 

Did the lower court err as a matter of law in dismissing the 

third-degree murder charge for which [Frye] had been held for 

court, when the evidence at [Frye’s] preliminary hearing—

including surveillance video showing [Frye] striking and fatally 

injuring the defenseless [V]ictim and then leaving him lying in 

the street unconscious and motionless, without attempting to 

provide or call for aid—would reasonably permit a trier of fact 

to find that [Frye] acted (a) with gross recklessness or extreme 

indifference to the value of human life or (b) with specific intent 

to cause serious bodily injury? 

Commonwealth’s Brief at 4. 

Our standard of review for an order dismissing a criminal charge, based 

on the sufficiency of the evidence establishing a prima facie case at a 

preliminary hearing, is as follows: 

It is settled that the evidentiary sufficiency, or lack thereof, of the 

Commonwealth’s prima facie case for a charged crime is a 

question of law as to which an appellate court’s review is plenary. 

The trial court is afforded no discretion in ascertaining whether, 

as a matter of law and in light of the facts presented to it, the 

Commonwealth has carried its pre-trial prima facie burden to 

make out the elements of a charged crime. Therefore, we are not 

bound by the legal determinations of the trial court. 

Ouch, 199 A.3d at 923 (internal citations, quotations, and brackets omitted). 
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With respect to preliminary hearings, this Court has explained the 

purpose of the hearing is: 

. . . [T]o determine whether the Commonwealth has made 

out a prima facie case for the offenses charged. A prima facie

case consists of evidence, read in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth, that sufficiently establishes both the commission 

of a crime and that the accused is probably the perpetrator of that 

crime. . . . 

The Commonwealth establishes a prima facie case when it 

produces evidences that, if accepted as true, would warrant the 

trial judge to allow the case to go to a jury. The Commonwealth 

need not prove the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable 

doubt; rather, the prima facie standard requires evidence of the 

existence of each and every element of the crime charged. 

Moreover, the weight and credibility of the evidence are not 

factors at this stage, and the Commonwealth need only 

demonstrate sufficient probable cause to believe the person 

charged has committed the offense. Inferences reasonably drawn 

from the evidence of record which would support a verdict of guilty 

are to be given effect, and the evidence must be read in the light 

most favorable to the Commonwealth’s case. 

Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted; emphasis in original). 

The Commonwealth challenges the trial court’s order dismissing Frye’s 

third-degree murder charge based on what it asserts was an erroneous 

conclusion that the Commonwealth failed to put on a prima facie case, 

specifically as to the requisite mens rea of the offense. This Court has 

explained the law relevant to mens rea for third-degree murder as follows: 

Pennsylvania retains the common law definition of murder, 

which is a killing conducted “with malice aforethought.” Section 

2502 of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code categorizes murder into 

degrees. See generally 18 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 2502(a)-(c). Thirddegree murder is defined as “all other kinds of murder,” i.e., those 

committed with malice that are not intentional (first-degree) or 

committed during the perpetration of a felony (second-degree). 
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Id. The pertinent provision of the aggravated assault statute 

[also] requires proof that the defendant “attempt[ed] to cause 

serious bodily injury to another, or cause[d] such injury 

intentionally, knowingly or recklessly under circumstances 

manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life.” 18 

Pa.C.S.[A.] § 2702(a)(1). . . . [T]he mens rea required for a 

conviction of aggravated assault, like third-degree murder, 

is malice; only the result of the crimes differ. See

Commonwealth v. O’Hanlon, 653 A.2d 616, 618 (Pa. 1995) 

(“Aggravated assault is, indeed, the functional equivalent of a 

murder in which, for some reason, death fails to occur.”); 

[Commonwealth v.] Kling, 731 A.2d [145,] 147 [(Pa. Super. 

1999)] (“There is no distinction between the malice essential to 

third degree murder and that necessary for aggravated assault.”). 

Commonwealth v. Packer, 168 A.3d 161, 168 (Pa. 2017) (some internal 

citations and quotations omitted; emphasis added). 

Regarding the “malice” requirement, this Court has explained: 

. . . Malice is a legal term, implying much more [than the ordinary 

understanding]. It comprehends not only a particular ill-will, but 

every case where there is wickedness of disposition, hardness of 

heart, cruelty, recklessness of consequences, and a mind 

regardless of social duty, although a particular person may not be 

intended to be injured. 

Id. (internal citation omitted). For either third-degree murder or aggravated 

assault, malice is “present under circumstances where a defendant did not 

have an intent to kill, but nevertheless displayed a conscious disregard for an 

unjustified and extremely high risk that his actions might cause death or 

serious bodily harm.” Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). Malice 

also “would be present if the defendant had an intent to do the deceased great 

bodily harm.” Commonwealth v. Buzard, 76 A.2d 394, 396 (Pa. 1950). 
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“Ordinarily[,] where an assault is made with bare fists only, without a 

deadly weapon, and death results[,] there would only be manslaughter.” 

Commonwealth v. Dorazio, 74 A.2d 125, 129 (Pa. 1950). For such an 

attack to rise to murder, the intent involved must be to produce a bodily injury 

“as may be expected to involve serious consequences, either [periling] life or 

leading to great bodily harm.” Id. Crucially, “[w]hether the malice 

necessary to constitute murder may be implied from the use of fists 

alone must depend on the particular circumstances.” Id. at 130 

(emphasis added). Relevant factors include “[t]he size of the assailant, the 

manner in which the fists are used, the ferocity of the attack and its duration[,] 

and the provocation are all relevant to the question of malice.” Id. 

Additionally, “it is not necessary that the injury be intended to be permanent 

or dangerous to life[;] it is malicious to intend injury such as to seriously 

interfere with health and comfort.” Id. Indeed, “the Commonwealth may 

show, and the jury is not precluded from finding, that malice existed even 

though a deadly weapon was not used. Malice may be found from the 

attending circumstances.” Buzard, 76 A.2d at 396. Lastly, “the mens rea

required for a conviction of aggravated assault, like third-degree murder, is 

malice; only the result of the crimes differ.” Packer, 168 A.3d at 168. 

As noted above, the Commonwealth argues the trial court erred in 

dismissing Frye’s third-degree murder charge based on its conclusion that a 

single punch, as a matter of law, cannot establish the requisite malice. The 
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Commonwealth first observes that there is no per se rule that would preclude 

a finding of malice where there is just one punch. See Commonwealth’s Brief 

at 14. The Commonwealth argues that such a rule would be inconsistent with 

applicable case law which provides that the particular circumstances of each 

case must be considered in determining whether there is malice. See id. The 

Commonwealth maintains that the evidence, when viewed in the light most 

favorable to it, establishes that Frye had specific intent to cause serious bodily 

injury or acted recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme 

indifference to the value of human life (in which case malice is established for 

purposes of both aggravated assault and third-degree murder). See id. at 

15, 17. The Commonwealth emphasizes the size disparity between Frye and 

his smaller victim; the unprovoked nature of Frye’s blow; “the victim’s visible 

impairment and apparent defenselessness, of which [Frye] would have been 

aware”; the blow, having occurred in the street, predictably would have 

concluded with a “hard fall to the pavement”; Frye’s “apparent lack of surprise, 

alarm, or even concern when the victim was . . . rendered motionless and 

unconscious”; and, lastly, Frye’s consciousness of guilt as demonstrated by 

his lie to Markocki that the victim had just fallen down. See id. at 16. 

The trial court considered the Commonwealth’s argument and rejected 

it: 

Here, [Frye] was acting in his capacity as a security guard 

during his interactions with [the Victim]. While the video did not 

pick up the audio clear[ly] enough to hear what is said between 

the two, footage clearly shows that [Frye] walked up to [the 
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Victim] and punched him in the face while [the Victim] was 

intoxicated. Aside from the punch, the Commonwealth did not 

present any other evidence that would suggest malice. Like [in 

Commonwealth v.] Thomas[, 594 A.2d 300 (Pa. 1991),] where 

the [a]ppellant punched the decedent when he was aware of [the] 

decedent’s medical issues and intoxication level[, and thereby 

caused him to die, Frye] also punched the [Victim] likely knowing 

the [Victim’s] level of intoxication. The facts of the instant case 

do not rise to the level of Buzard[,] where the defendant pursued 

the decedent and punched him repeatedly with both hands[,] 

causing death. [Frye] punched [the Victim] one time. Pursuant 

to Pennsylvania’s case law, one punch without a weapon does not 

provide the requisite malice for third[-]degree murder. 

Trial Court Opinion, 3/7/23, at 7. 

Following our review, we conclude the trial court committed an error of 

law in dismissing Frye’s third-degree murder charge based on its conclusion 

that, as a matter of law, a single punch cannot establish malice. As noted 

above, whether an assault by fists alone demonstrates malice for purposes of 

third-degree murder, depends on the “particular circumstances” of the case. 

See Dorazio, 74 A.2d at 130. Factors including “[t]he size of the assailant, 

the manner in which the fists are used, the ferocity of the attack and its 

duration[,] and the provocation are all relevant to the question of malice.” Id. 

The evidence, and all inferences therefrom, in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth establish the following: the Victim was 5’10” and 161 pounds, 

see N.T., 7/19/22, at 4, and while the testimony does not establish Frye’s size 

and weight, it is readily apparent there is a significant size and weight disparity 

between the two in that Frye is much larger. Accord Frye’s Motion to Quash, 

11/18/22, at 10-11 (stating, that Frye “was admittedly bigger than the 
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[Victim] . . ..”). Additionally, the video reveals that Frye, with no provocation, 

and in his capacity as a bouncer, and knowing the Victim’s severe intoxication 

prior to the punch, deliberately walked up to the Victim, who was visibly 

inebriated and unaware that Frye was about to hit him, and punched the 

Victim in the face, causing him to fall and causing his head to land on a manhole cover, after which he lay unmoving on the ground. See N.T., 7/19/22, 

Ex. C-2, at 5:28-30 (identification of the Victim);3id. at 7:20-54 (the Victim 

non-violently resisting when Frye’s colleague attempted to pull him out of the 

street; and then Frye walking from some distance up to the Victim and 

punching him in the face without provocation); id. at 7:55-8:52 (the Victim 

lying motionless on the ground with no attempts to administer aid); id. at 

9:10-10:28 (showing, from a different angle, the Victim dancing in the street 

and Frye walking up and hitting him in the face, after which the Victim fell 

violently to the ground and lay there motionless). Given the size disparity, 

the lack of provocation, Frye’s knowledge that the Victim was intoxicated and 

defenseless, we conclude the evidence, when viewed in the light most 

favorable to the Commonwealth, establishes a prime facie case of Frye’s 

malice, that is, his conscious disregard for an unjustified and extremely high 

risk that his actions might cause death or serious bodily harm. See, e.g., 

Interest of N.A.D., 205 A.3d 1237, 1240-41 (Pa. Super. 2019) (single punch 

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3

 Citations to the video reference the runtime of the video rather than the 

timestamp on the screen. 
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sufficient evidence a juvenile “acted recklessly under circumstances 

manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life”); 

Commonwealth v. Faulk, 928 A.2d 1061, 1070 (Pa. Super. 2007) (“Each 

case must be evaluated on its own particular facts, but under appropriate 

circumstances, even a single punch to the face can constitute aggravated 

assault”); Commonwealth v. Patrick, 933 A.2d 1043, 1047-48 (Pa. Super. 

2007) (single punch to an unsuspecting victim sufficient to show at a 

preliminary hearing “reckless indifference under circumstances which virtually 

assured serious bodily injury”). 

The trial court’s reliance on Thomas and Commonwealth v. 

MacArthur, 629 A.2d 166, 169 (Pa. Super. 1993) is misplaced. In Thomas, 

this Court concluded a single punch to the face was insufficient to establish 

the requisite malice for third-degree murder. However, there, this Court noted 

the defendant and decedent were “approximately equal in size,” had been 

“drinking together for hours,” and there was a single blow. See 594 A.2d at 

303. We also noted that while the punch knocked the decedent down and he 

died after his head struck the pavement, “there was no testimony that [the] 

blow was a powerful one, merely that it was unexpectedly delivered to a man 

with a stiff neck.” Id. Conversely, here, Frye and the Victim were not 

approximately equal in size; they had not been drinking together for hours, 

but, instead, the Victim was intoxicated while Frye was not; and the video 
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evidence shows that the blow was indeed a powerful one delivered by a person 

in control of his faculties to a person incapable of defending himself. 

In MacArthur, the decedent and MacArthur got into a disagreement 

about MacArthur’s dog urinating on the decedent’s lawn. As we described it, 

“[a] physical confrontation ensued[,] and the two men tangled on [the 

decedent’s] porch. MacArthur pushed the bigger man away. [The decedent] 

lost his balance, somersaulted backwards over a railing, fell down five steps 

and landed on the back of his neck.” 629 A.2d at 168. There, we concluded 

the “injury was the tragic but improbable result of a single push.” Id. at 169. 

Here, there was no physical confrontation between Frye and the Victim; nor 

was there a push during a physical confrontation; instead, Frye walked up to 

the intoxicated and unsuspecting Victim incapable of defending himself, and 

landed an unprovoked punch to his face. Thomas and MacArthur are thus 

distinguishable. Based on the foregoing, we reverse the trial court’s order 

granting Frye’s motion to quash the third-degree murder charge, and remand 

for further proceedings consistent with this decision. 

Order reversed. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished. 

Date: 7/15/2024