In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: October 1, 2024

S24A0834. REDDING v. THE STATE.

LAGRUA, Justice.

Following a 2018 jury trial, Appellant Merrick Redding was 

found guilty of felony murder and aggravated assault in connection 

with the death of Joseph Davis. This is Redding’s fourth appeal to 

this Court. In his first three appeals, we vacated the trial court’s

judgment and remanded for the trial court to apply the correct facts 

and legal analysis to Redding’s allegation of a violation of his Sixth 

Amendment right to a speedy trial.1 See Redding v. State, 309 Ga. 

124 (844 SE2d 725) (2020) (“Redding I”); Redding v. State, 313 Ga. 

730 (873 SE2d 158) (2022) (“Redding II”); Redding v. State, 318 Ga. 

1 “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a 

speedy and public trial. . . .” U.S. Const. amend. VI.
2

225 (897 SE2d 801) (2024) (“Redding III”).2

On remand after Redding III, the trial court denied Redding’s 

2 The crimes occurred on September 5, 2016. Redding was arrested for 

Davis’s killing on September 12, 2016. On September 28, 2017, Redding filed 

a “Motion to Dismiss Charge Based on Violation of Constitutional Right to 

Speedy Trial.” On April 24, 2018, a Muscogee County grand jury indicted 

Redding for malice murder, felony murder, and aggravated assault with a 

“closed fist.” He was reindicted on the same charges on May 22, 2018. At a trial 

from October 24 to November 5, 2018, the jury found Redding not guilty of 

malice murder but guilty of the remaining counts. The trial court orally denied 

the speedy-trial motion at the pretrial conference and ultimately sentenced 

Redding to life in prison without the possibility of parole for felony murder and 

a concurrent term of 20 years to serve in prison for aggravated assault. 

Redding filed a timely motion for new trial, which the trial court denied on 

June 4, 2019. Redding filed a timely notice of appeal, and in Redding I, this 

Court held that the evidence presented at Redding’s trial was legally sufficient 

to support his murder conviction but otherwise vacated the judgment and 

remanded the case for the trial court to make factual findings and legal 

conclusions regarding Redding’s speedy-trial motion. 309 Ga. at 129-130 (3). 

On remand, the trial court merged the aggravated assault count into the felony 

murder conviction, resentenced Redding to serve life in prison without the 

possibility of parole for felony murder, and entered its first written order 

denying Redding’s speedy-trial motion. Redding filed a timely notice of appeal. 

In Redding II, this Court again vacated the judgment and remanded for further 

proceedings on the speedy-trial motion “because the trial court misstated and 

misapplied the law regarding the prejudice factor, failed to weigh each Barker

factor, and conflated its consideration of some of the factors.” 313 Ga. at 736 

(2). On remand, the trial court entered a second written order denying the 

speedy-trial motion on March 6, 2023. Redding filed a timely notice of appeal. 

In Redding III, this Court a third time vacated the judgment and remanded 

because the trial court “erred factually and legally and should have weighed 

factors one and two against the State.” 318 Ga. at 232 (2) (e). On remand, the 

trial court entered a third written order denying the speedy-trial motion on 

February 29, 2024. Redding filed a timely notice of appeal, and the case was 

docketed to this Court’s April 2024 term and submitted for a decision on the 

briefs.
3

speedy-trial motion a fourth time. Redding then filed this appeal, 

raising his constitutional speedy-trial claim again along with claims 

that the trial court erred by allowing the State to impeach him with 

prior convictions under OCGA § 24-6-609 (“Rule 609”) and that the 

trial court erred by admitting evidence of prior acts under OCGA § 

24-4-404 (b) (“Rule 404 (b)”).3 We affirm.

As recited in Redding I, the evidence presented at trial showed 

the following:

On September 5, 2016, Jason Bellamy hosted a 

barbeque at his house for his family. During the 

barbeque, Davis came over to visit. Redding also came to 

the house with his young grandchildren, though Redding 

had not been invited. Around the time of the incident, 

Bellamy was preparing to grill meat in an area adjacent 

to the house that witnesses characterized as an outdoor 

patio or carport. Davis was leaning against a truck in the 

driveway, “talking to friends” and “taking it easy.” 

Another resident of the house, Debbie Render, also was 

sitting outside. Bellamy’s stepfather, Jerry Ferrell, was in 

the washroom vacuuming up water, but he came out to 

the patio periodically.

While standing at the grill, Bellamy saw Redding 

approach Davis and start talking to him. Bellamy could 

3 Redding raised his Rule 609 and Rule 404 (b) claims in his previous 

appeals, but we declined to address them given our remand on the speedy-trial 

claim.
4

not hear what Redding was saying, but he heard Davis 

repeatedly tell Redding, “Leave me alone.” Both Bellamy 

and Render testified that they heard Davis ask something 

like, “Why do you think I’m a p***y motherf r?” They 

also heard Redding call to Ferrell to “come get” Davis. 

Bellamy further testified that Davis said to Redding, “Go 

get a job . . . I work hard for my money, why won’t you get 

a job,” and turning to Bellamy, Davis said, “What’s wrong 

with him, Jason?” Bellamy did not think much of this 

confrontation and went inside the house laughing, but he 

kept looking through the screen door to see “what’s going 

on,” and he saw Redding move closer to Davis.

As Bellamy went back outside through the kitchen 

door, he saw Redding hit Davis once in the head. Bellamy 

testified that, just before the hit, Redding “looked back 

because I was in the house. You know, he looked back and 

he said something to [Ferrell], you know, while he was 

looking back, and when he turned around, he turned 

around and just swung like this. You know, and when he 

swung, it was like he was walking away at the same 

time.”

Demonstrating the hit in front of the jury, Bellamy 

described it as a “swing” with his right hand (rather than 

a “forward punch”), and he testified that Redding hit 

Davis with a “closed” fist. Render, who also observed the 

incident, similarly testified that Redding “just hit [Davis] 

’side the head with his fist . . . . It was loud.” Both Bellamy 

and Render testified that Redding hit Davis with his right 

hand and that the blow landed somewhere on the left side 

of Davis’s head. Both also testified that Davis did not 

provoke Redding before being hit.

As soon as Davis was hit, Bellamy testified, “it just 
5

looked like all life left out of him. . . . He fell straight down. 

He never moved from the position he had been in all day. 

He fell straight down and he slumped up against my tire 

on my truck.” Bellamy explained that Davis did not fall 

over and hit his head on something, but rather “went 

straight down. And when I got there, he was sitting up on 

the side of my truck just like I’m sitting in this chair, and 

it sounded like he was snoring. . . . [H]e hadn’t hit his 

head.” Render also testified that Davis did not hit his 

head while falling: “He just went around like that and he 

just like slid down beside the truck.”

Davis was taken to the hospital, but he never 

regained consciousness and was taken off life support the 

next day. Dr. Steven Atkinson, the medical examiner who 

conducted an autopsy on Davis, testified that there was a 

“large abrasion in the back of the head on the left side,” 

as well as a fracture on the back right side of the skull. 

Dr. Atkinson explained that the fracture “was more 

centered on the back right, but . . . it crossed the midline 

and went into the back left, but it also wrapped around 

and went into the base of the skull.” Dr. Atkinson 

concluded that the cause of death was blunt force head 

trauma, and that the head injury could have resulted 

from any blunt object, including a fist strike to the head 

or the head hitting the ground.

Redding testified in his own defense. He said that he 

came to Bellamy’s house at the request of Ferrell, who had 

asked him to help with a washing machine. After doing 

some work inside the washroom, Redding sat on the patio 

and had a beer. Sometime later, Redding testified, Davis 

came to the carport area from a shed nearby where people 

were known to take drugs. According to Redding, Davis 

then purchased some crack cocaine from Bellamy, and 
6

this transaction occurred near the truck. Redding 

testified that he then came up to Davis to trade beers, but

after a verbal exchange, Davis pushed him twice and 

“poked” him. This prompted Redding to hit Davis with an 

“open hand slap.” Redding testified that Davis stumbled 

back a little, slid down the side of the truck, and fell to the 

ground, hitting his head on the concrete “lip.”

Redding I, 309 Ga. at 125-126 (2).

1. Redding contends that the trial court again erred by denying 

his speedy-trial motion. We see no abuse of discretion.

As we have explained, “[a] constitutional speedy-trial claim is 

evaluated under the two-part framework set out in Barker v. Wingo, 

407 U.S. 514, 530 (92 SCt 2182, 33 LE2d 101) (1972), and Doggett v. 

United States, 505 U.S. 647, 652 (112 SCt 2686, 120 LE2d 520) 

(1992).” Redding III, 318 Ga. at 226 (1). Part one asks whether the 

delay in bringing the defendant to trial was presumptively 

prejudicial. Id. Generally, a delay of a year or more between a 

defendant’s arrest and trial is long enough to be considered 

presumptively prejudicial, and we held in Redding I that the 

threshold was crossed here. Redding I, 309 Ga. at 129 (2). “This 

appeal concerns part two, where the trial court “appl[ies] a context-
7

focused, four-factor balancing test to determine whether the 

defendant was denied the right to a speedy trial.” Redding III, 318 

Ga. at 226 (1). These four factors are (1) the length of the delay; (2) 

the reasons for the delay; (3) the defendant’s assertion of his right to 

a speedy trial; and (4) the prejudice to the defendant from the delay.

Id.

When reviewing the trial court’s application of the balancing 

test, this Court “must accept the factual findings of the trial court 

unless they are clearly erroneous, and we must accept the ultimate 

conclusion of the trial court unless it amounts to an abuse of 

discretion. . . .” Henderson v. State, 310 Ga. 231, 235 (2) (850 SE2d 

152) (2020) (citation and punctuation omitted). But, 

if the trial court’s factual findings are clearly erroneous or 

the trial court significantly misapplies the law, then the 

trial court’s exercise of discretion can be affirmed only if 

the appellate court can conclude that, had the trial court 

used the correct factual and legal analysis, it would have 

had no discretion to reach a different judgment. If the 

trial court would still have discretion to reach a different 

judgment, we remand for the trial court to reweigh the 

factors and exercise its discretion using the correct factual 

and legal analysis.
8

Redding III, 318 Ga. at 227 (1) (citations and punctuation omitted); 

see also State v. Pickett, 288 Ga. 674, 678-780 (2) (d) (706 SE2d 561 

(2011). In Redding III, we held that the trial court’s order denying 

Redding’s speedy-trial motion contained factual and legal errors in 

its analysis of the length-of-delay and reasons-for-delay factors and

that the trial court should have weighed those two factors against 

the State rather than neutrally. Id. at 232 (2) (e). Although we 

explained that “the trial court may be authorized to deny Redding’s 

speedy-trial motion after assigning weight and balancing anew the 

four factors in accordance with the applicable law and directions 

outlined in this opinion,” we also explained that, in Redding’s case,

“the trial court is [not] necessarily compelled to do so.” Id. Therefore, 

we remanded “for the entry of an order containing appropriate 

findings of fact and conclusions of law on the speedy-trial claim.” Id. 

at 233 (2) (e).

In its new order, the trial court weighed the length-of-delay 

and reasons-for-delay factors slightly against the State in 

accordance with Redding III and weighed the assertion-of-right 
9

factor slightly against Redding. Redding does not dispute these 

three factors. We see no factual or legal errors, and we hold that the 

trial court did not abuse its discretion in weighing these three 

factors as it did.

Redding disputes only the prejudice factor, which the trial 

court weighed heavily against Redding. “The prejudice associated 

with unreasonable delay before trial includes oppressive pretrial 

incarceration, anxiety and concern of the accused, and the 

possibility that the accused’s defense will be impaired by dimming 

memories and loss of exculpatory evidence.” Henderson, 310 Ga. at

239 (2) (d) (citation and punctuation omitted). Redding’s arguments 

here fail because he merely repeats the arguments that we rejected 

in Redding III. Redding again claims that a potential witness died 

during the pretrial delay, but the trial court found — just as it did 

before — that the witness’s death did not prejudice Redding’s 

defense. The trial court also again found that Redding did not suffer 

any kind of pretrial oppressiveness or anxiety due to the delay. In 

Redding III, we already held that the trial court did not abuse its 
10

discretion in weighing this factor heavily against Redding for these

same reasons. See Redding III, 318 Ga. at 231-232 (2) (d). Under the 

law-of-the-case rule, that holding is binding here. See OCGA § 9-11-

60 (h).

The trial court ultimately weighed the four Barker-Doggett

factors together and found that Redding’s Sixth Amendment right 

to a speedy trial was not violated. The trial court did not misapply 

the law or make erroneous factual findings. We hold that the trial 

court did not abuse its discretion in its ultimate decision to deny 

Redding’s speedy-trial motion. See Cash v. State, 307 Ga. 510, 515-

520 (2) (b) (837 SE2d 280) (2019) (holding that the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion in denying speedy-trial claim after weighing 

factors one and two “benignly” and not “too heavily” and against the 

State but factors three and four against the defendant).

2. Redding contends that the trial court failed to comply with 

Rule 609 when it allowed the State to impeach Redding with three 

prior convictions – from 2015, 2009, and 2007 respectively – without 

specifying how the court weighed the convictions’ probative value 
11

against their prejudicial effect. We review this question of law de 

novo. See, e.g., Wilder v. State, 290 Ga. 13, 15 (717 SE2d 457) (2011) 

(holding that on a motion to suppress, the trial court’s “application 

of the law to undisputed facts is subject to de novo review”) (citation 

omitted). 

We conclude that the trial court did not err by admitting 

Redding’s 2015 and 2009 convictions without listing on the record 

the factors supporting its finding that the probative value of the 

convictions outweighed their prejudicial effect. We further conclude 

that any assumed error in the admission of the 2007 conviction was 

harmless.

(a) The Evidence Admitted Under Rule 609

Rule 609 applies when a witness’s character for truthfulness 

can be impeached with a prior criminal conviction. Subpart (a) 

provides the general rule: certain prior convictions “shall be 

admitted if the court determines that the probative value of 

admitting the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the 

accused.” Rule 609 (a) (1). But subpart (b) lays out different 
12

requirements for convictions where more than ten years have

elapsed since “the date of the conviction or the release of the witness 

from the confinement imposed for such conviction, whichever is the 

later date[.]” Rule 609 (b). Such convictions are admissible only if 

“the court determines, in the interests of justice, that the probative 

value of the conviction supported by specific facts and circumstances 

substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect.” Id. (emphasis 

supplied).

At trial, after Redding announced that he was going to testify, 

the State sought permission to impeach Redding with evidence of 

three felony convictions: (1) a 2015 Habitual Violator Conviction; (2) 

a 2009 Obstruction of an Officer Conviction; and (3) a 2007 

Obstruction of an Officer Conviction. The trial court expressly ruled 

that the probative value of these three convictions outweighed their 

prejudicial effect and admitted them under Rule 609 (a) (1). While 

cross-examining Redding, the State questioned him regarding these

three past convictions, which Redding admitted, further testifying

that he had pleaded guilty and “served [his] time, [his] punishment” 
13

for them. Records of the convictions were admitted as exhibits over 

defense counsel’s objection.

Redding argues that the trial court erred by failing to identify 

on the record the specific factors that formed the basis of its 

conclusion that the probative value of the three prior convictions 

outweighed their prejudicial effect.4 Redding was tried pursuant to 

the current Evidence Code, and the trial court admitted the prior 

convictions under Rule 609 (a) (1). Since the adoption of the current 

4 Again, Redding does not argue that the trial court’s ultimate conclusion

was an abuse of discretion or that the trial court was wrong to weigh the 

probative value against the prejudicial effect as it did. He merely argues that 

the trial court erred by making an express conclusion about probative value 

and prejudicial effect without also putting on the record the factors it 

considered to reach that conclusion. In support of this contention, Redding cites

Quiroz v. State, 291 Ga. App. 423, 428-429 (4) (662 SE2d 235) (2008), a decision 

concerning Rule 609 (a) (1)’s predecessor in the old Evidence Code, OCGA § 24-

9-84.1 (a) (2). In Quiroz, the Court of Appeals listed factors for trial courts to 

consider when balancing the probative value of a prior conviction against its 

prejudicial effect. Id. However, in Clay v. State, 290 Ga. 822 (725 SE2d 260) 

(2012), this Court addressed Quiroz and held that OCGA § 24-9-84.1 (a) (2) did 

not require a trial court to list the specific factors it considered in ruling on the 

probative value of convictions not more than ten years old. Id. at 836-837 (3) 

(b). Having said that, because Georgia’s Rule 609 is “materially identical to 

Rule 609 of the Federal Rules of evidence, we look to federal case law with 

respect to the interpretation and application of the rule.” Brown v. State, 307 

Ga. 24, 36 (6) n.2 (834 SE2d 40) (2019) (citation and quotes omitted). See also

Anderson v. State, 307 Ga. 79, 84 (3) (b) n.14 (834 SE2d 830) (2019) (citing to 

Brown), infra. Thus, Quiroz and Clay no longer control this issue. 
14

Evidence Code, we have not yet addressed whether Rule 609 (a) (1) 

requires a trial court to explain on the record what factors it 

considered when concluding that the probative value of a prior 

conviction outweighs its prejudicial effect. We hold that it does not.

“Rule 609 of Georgia’s new Evidence Code is materially 

identical to Rule 609 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and, as such, 

we look to federal case law with respect to the interpretation and 

application of [Rule 609].” Anderson v. State, 307 Ga. 79, 84 (3) (b)

n.14 (834 SE2d 830) (2019) (citation and punctuation omitted). 

United States v. Preston, 608 F2d 626 (5th Cir. 1979)5 is a leading 

case on this question. There the Court of Appeals for the Fifth 

Circuit held that

a Trial Judge must make an on-the-record finding that 

the probative value of admitting a prior conviction 

outweighs its prejudicial effect before admitting a non609 (a) (2) prior conviction for impeachment purposes 

under [Federal] Rule 609 (a) (1). . . . Although the Rule 

does not on its face mandate, we think it useful for Trial 

Judges to conduct a hearing on-the-record at which the 

pertinent factors are explicitly identified and weighed.

5 The Eleventh Circuit has adopted as binding precedent decisions made 

by the Fifth Circuit handed down on or before September 30, 1981. See Bonner 

v. City of Prichard, 661 F2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
15

Id. at 639 (citations and punctuation omitted). Other federal courts 

have interpreted Rule 609 (a) (1) the same way. See, e.g., United 

States v. Martinez-Martinez, 369 F3d 1076, 1088 (II) (E) (9th Cir. 

2004) (“While a trial court need not analyze each of the five factors 

explicitly, the record should reveal, at a minimum, that the trial 

judge was aware of the requirements of Rule 609 (a) (1).” (citation 

and punctuation omitted)); United States v. Lipscomb, 702 F2d 1049, 

1064 (III) (A) (D.C. Cir. 1983) (“A comparison of Rule 609 (a) (1) with 

Rule 609 (b) strongly suggests that Rule 609 (a) (1) does not require 

the district court always to inquire into the facts and circumstances 

underlying a prior felony conviction”). 

We adopt Preston’s holding that Rule 609 (a) (1) does not 

mandate an explicit analysis of factors; we also reiterate Preston’s

observation about the usefulness of an explicit analysis of factors. 

Here, the trial court made an on-the-record finding that the 

probative value of Redding’s three prior convictions outweighed 

their prejudicial effect. For the 2015 and 2009 convictions, that was 
16

sufficient to admit them under Rule 609 (a) (1). Contrary to 

Redding’s argument, Rule 609 (a) (1) did not require the trial court 

to put on the record the specific factors supporting that finding. See 

Preston, 608 F2d at 639. Thus, the trial court did not legally err

when it admitted Redding’s 2015 and 2009 convictions without 

expressly stating any specific factors regarding probative value and 

prejudicial effect. With respect to the 2007 conviction, the record is 

unclear about whether Redding was released more than 10 years 

before his trial. If so, the trial court should have analyzed that 

conviction under Rule 609 (b), which imposes a stricter standard for 

admission than Rule 609 (a).6 However, assuming without deciding 

that Rule 609 (b)’s more stringent standard applies, and that the 

trial court erred by admitting the 2007 conviction, we conclude that 

any such error was harmless.

6 Rule 609 (b) prohibits the admission of a conviction more than ten years 

old unless the trial court “determines, in the interests of justice, that the 

probative value of the conviction supported by specific facts and circumstances 

substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect.” OCGA § 24-6-609 (b) (emphasis 

added).
17

(b) Harmless Error Analysis

“The test for determining nonconstitutional harmless error is 

whether it is highly probable that the error did not contribute to the 

verdict.” Moore v. State, 307 Ga. 290, 293 (2) (835 SE2d 610) (2019) 

(citation omitted). In making our determination, “we review the 

record de novo and weigh the evidence as we would expect 

reasonable jurors to have done[.]” Id. “In the context of Rule 609, 

error is harmless if the witness’ credibility was sufficiently 

impeached by other evidence, or if the State’s case was strong 

enough to support a conviction even apart from the witness’ 

testimony.” Patterson v. State, 314 Ga. 167, 179 (2) (h) (875 SE2d 

771) (2022).Here, eyewitnesses Bellamy and Render “sufficiently

impeached” Redding’s credibility. Patterson, 314 Ga. at 179 (2) (h).

Both witnesses testified that Redding struck Davis in the head with 

a closed fist, without any provocation. Bellamy characterized 

Redding’s behavior as “bullying,” and testified that, after Redding 

hit Davis, blood started “trickling” from Davis’s ear. Render testified 

that the strike was “loud” enough for her to hear it from where she 
18

was sitting. We conclude that it is highly improbable that evidence

of Redding’s 2007 conviction for obstruction of a police officer, 

discussed in further detail in Division 3 (a) below, contributed to the 

jury’s verdict. See, e.g., Denard v. State, 305 Ga. 463, 466 (2) (826 

SE2d 61) (2019) (holding that any error in the admission of felony 

convictions over ten years old without making on-the-record 

findings that their probative value outweighed their prejudicial 

effect was harmless because “the evidence of murder was 

overwhelming, while the evidence of provocation was scant at best”). 

3. In a related enumeration of error, Redding contends that

the trial court erred in admitting other-acts evidence under Rule 404 

(b). We review the trial court’s ruling admitting such evidence under 

Rule 404 (b) for abuse of discretion, see Pritchett v. State, 314 Ga. 

767, 774 (2) (a) (879 SE2d 436) (2022), and conclude that any abuse 

of discretion was harmless.

(a) The Evidence Admitted Under Rule 404 (b)

Rule 404 (b) concerns the admissibility of a defendant’s 

“crimes, wrongs, or acts” other than the crime charged. The Rule 
19

provides that these other acts are not admissible “to prove the 

character of a person in order to show action in conformity 

therewith.” OCGA § 24-4-404 (b). But other acts are admissible for 

certain other purposes, including “motive, opportunity, intent, 

preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 

accident.” Id.

Prior to trial, the State gave notice pursuant to Rule 404 (b) 

that it intended to offer evidence of two other acts involving 

obstruction of a law enforcement officer (resulting in the 2007 and 

2009 obstruction convictions referenced above). The trial court 

admitted the other-acts evidence for purposes of intent, plan, and to 

disprove mistake, accident, and self-defense.

During trial, the State presented evidence of the two other acts. 

Regarding the first incident, a law enforcement officer testified that 

in 2006 he attempted a traffic stop of Redding’s vehicle due to 

outstanding warrants. Redding stopped his vehicle, exited, and fled.

The officer pursued Redding and was attempting to arrest him when 

they began to engage in “close quarters combat.” The officer testified 
20

that he “could smell the alcohol on [Redding’s] breath,” and that 

Redding “attempted several times to try to gain control” of the 

officer’s weapon. The officer testified that he thought Redding was 

attempting to harm him, and he was concerned for his own safety 

during the encounter.

Regarding the second incident, a law enforcement officer 

testified that in 2008 he conducted a traffic stop of Redding’s vehicle.

Redding exited his vehicle and “was kind of unsteady on his feet.”

The officer smelled alcohol and attempted to “grab [Redding’s] wrist” 

when Redding “swung back, not swinging at [the officer] but just —

he just didn’t want [the officer] to grab his hand.” Another law 

enforcement officer “tried to grab [Redding’s] hand . . . and [Redding] 

just swung away.” Then, Redding “pulled back” and “t[ook] an 

aggressive stance.” The law enforcement officer used his TASER on 

Redding who grabbed it but “never once swung at [the officer] or 

tried to hit [him].”

(b) Harmless Error Analysis

Many on this Court have serious doubts that this other-acts 
21

evidence should have been admitted. However, assuming without 

deciding that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the

evidence, we conclude that any such error was harmless and thus 

does not require reversal. 

As we stated above, nonconstitutional error is harmless where 

“it is highly probable that the error did not contribute to the verdict.”

Moore v. State, 307 Ga. at 293. Again, “we review the record de novo 

and weigh the evidence as we would expect reasonable jurors to have 

done[.]” Id. “Generally, we have found Rule 404 (b) errors harmless 

where the properly admitted evidence was so strong that the 

prejudicial effect of the other-acts evidence had no significant 

influence on the guilty verdicts.” Nundra v. State, 316 Ga. 1, 6 (2) 

(885 SE2d 790) (2023) (citation and punctuation omitted). 

Here, the evidence against Redding was strong. Bellamy and 

Render testified that Redding and Davis were engaged in an 

argument when Redding hit Davis. During the argument, Bellamy 

heard Davis tell Redding to “leave me alone,” and both witnesses 

heard Davis ask Redding something similar to “do you think I’m a 
22

p** *y?” Bellamy saw Davis wave his hand in the air as if to tell 

Redding to leave, but neither Bellamy nor Render saw Davis 

physically provoke Redding or touch him in any manner. Both 

witnesses testified that Redding then used his right hand to hit 

Davis on the left side of his head in a swinging motion with a closed 

fist. Both also testified that Davis fell down after the hit, his body 

slumping against a truck and blood coming out from his ear. Medical 

evidence showed that Davis died from the injury to his head. 

On the stand, Redding similarly testified that Davis repeatedly 

asked him, “Do y’all think I’m a p***y?”, but, in contrast to Bellamy 

and Render, Redding claimed that Davis pushed and poked him as 

well. Redding nonetheless did not dispute that he hit Davis and 

caused him to fall, but Redding claimed he did so only with an open 

hand and only after that physical provocation. 

Based on our review, it is clear that Redding’s claim of selfdefense was weak, relying only on his self-serving testimony. In 

contrast, evidence of Redding’s guilt was strong, having been 

corroborated by the testimony of two eyewitnesses and the physical 
23

evidence showing that Davis died of blunt force head trauma causing 

“severe” brain injury and hemorrhage. See Johnson v. State, 301 Ga. 

277, 279 (2) (800 SE2d 545) (2017) (holding that even if erroneously 

admitted, other-acts evidence was harmless where Appellant 

testified that he accidentally stabbed the victim in self-defense, in 

part because other testimony instead detailed “Appellant’s lengthy 

and persistent attack upon the unarmed victim”). See also 

Mondragon v. State, 304 Ga. 843, 844-845 (2) (823 SE2d 276) (2019) 

(holding that any error in sequencing Rule 404 (a) (2) evidence was 

harmless because other evidence showed that the shooting victims 

did not provoke Appellant, were unarmed, and were shot from 

several feet away, which contrasted with Appellant’s testimony that 

the victims were pushing him when he fired at them). 

Indeed, it is difficult to see how the other-acts evidence here 

would have had a “significant influence” on the jury. See Nundra, 

316 Ga at 6. Both incidents occurred over eight years prior to the 

murder and were not materially similar to Redding’s charges in this 

case. Redding was accused of felony murder predicated on 
24

aggravated assault after an argument at a friend’s barbeque, while 

the other-acts evidence detailed belligerent (and possibly drunken) 

behavior at two traffic stops — behavior that did not result in any 

injuries to others. To the extent that the other-acts evidence still 

painted Redding as an aggressive and agitable person, such 

evidence painted that picture no clearer than Redding himself, who 

admitted that he hit Davis after minimal provocation with enough 

force to knock him to the ground. 

Moreover, Redding testified that he pleaded guilty to the 

offenses and that he “served [his] time, [his] punishment” for them. 

This “reduces the risk that the jury convicted [Redding] to punish 

him for his other crimes,” because the jury heard that Redding “had 

already been punished for those crimes.” Nundra, 316 Ga at 8. 

Further, the State did not mention the other-acts evidence in its 

opening statement, and only briefly referenced it in closing 

argument, which minimized the prejudicial effect. Finally, the trial 

court provided limiting instructions regarding the other-acts 

evidence, both after the law enforcement officers testified about the 
25

traffic stops,7 and again in the court’s charge of law to the jury. See, 

7 The court instructed the jury that:

In order to prove its case – and that’s the case that you’re 

hearing – on this indictment on Counts 1, 2 and 3, the State of 

Georgia, once again, must prove each and every element of each 

charge in that indictment, and they must show in order to do that 

the elements of intent or a plan, or must negate or disprove 

mistake, an accident, or self-defense in this case.

To do so, the State has offered evidence of other crimes 

allegedly committed by the accused. You are permitted to consider 

that evidence only insofar as it may relate to those issues of intent, 

plan or disprove mistake, accident, or self-defense, and not for any 

other purpose. You may not infer from such evidence that the 

defendant is of a character that would commit such crimes in this 

indictment. 

The evidence may be considered only to the extent that it 

may show the intent element or issues that the State is required 

or authorized to prove in the crimes charged in this case now on 

trial. Such evidence, if any, may not be considered for you – by you

for any other purpose.

The defendant is on trial for the offenses charged in this bill 

of indictment only, and not for any other acts, even though such 

acts may incidentally be criminal and may have results [sic] in a 

conviction.

Before you consider any other alleged acts for the limited 

purposes stated here, you must first determine whether it is more 

likely than not that the accused did commit the alleged act. If so, 

you must then determine whether those alleged acts shed any light 

on the elements of the offenses or issues for which the act was 

admitted and the crimes charged in the indictment in this trial.

Remember to keep in mind the limited use and the 

prohibited use of this evidence about other acts of the defendant.

By giving this instruction, the Court in no way suggests to 

you the defendant has or has not committed any other acts, nor 

whether such act, if committed, prove anything. That is a matter 

totally within the province of the jury and for your determination.
26

e.g., Howell v. State, 307 Ga. 865, 875 (3) (838 SE2d 839) (2020)

(holding that any error in the admission of other-acts evidence was 

harmless in light of the other strong evidence of guilt and the trial 

court’s limiting instructions, and noting that “[w]e ordinarily 

presume that jurors follow their instructions”); Taylor v. State, 306 

Ga. 277, 283 (2) (830 SE2d 90) (2019) (holding that any error in the 

admission of other-acts evidence was harmless, noting that “the 

State spent a minimal amount of time eliciting evidence concerning 

the [other act], presenting just two witnesses who took the stand 

briefly, and there is no contention that the State mentioned or relied 

upon the incident during its closing argument to the jury”). We 

therefore conclude that it is highly improbable that any error in 

admitting the other-acts evidence contributed to the verdict. 

4. Although Redding does not argue that we should conduct a 

cumulative error review, we conclude that the record does not reflect

cumulative error.

To establish cumulative error necessitating a new trial, “an 

appellant must show that (1) at least two errors were committed in 
27

the course of the trial; and (2) considered together along with the 

entire record, the multiple errors so infected the jury’s deliberation 

that they denied the appellant a fundamentally fair trial.” Greene v. 

State, 316 Ga. 584, 607-08 (7) (889 SE2d 864) (2023) (citation and 

punctuation omitted). See also State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 14-18 (1)

(383 SE2d 808) (2020). Considering the strength of the evidence (as 

already discussed) and the harmlessness of any individual errors, 

we conclude that the presumed errors at issue here did not “so 

infect[] the jury’s deliberation” that combined they denied Redding 

a fundamentally fair trial. Greene, 316 Ga. at 608 (7). See also

Kirkland v. State, 318 Ga. 639, 664 (11) (898 SE2d 536) (2024) 

(identifying no cumulative error from erroneously admitted otheracts evidence and improper jury instructions considering the strong 

evidence of guilt). Therefore, the trial court’s errors, if any, do not 

merit reversal.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.