Revised November 12, 1999

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 98-31016

In The Matter Of: LAURENCE LUCIUS LAMBERT,

Debtor.

MISSISSIPPI STATE TAX COMMISSION,

Appellant,

versus

LAURENCE LUCIUS LAMBERT,

Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

November 11, 1999

Before POLITZ, HIGGINBOTHAM, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

POLITZ, Circuit Judge:

The Mississippi State Tax Commission appeals the district court’s affirmance

of a ruling by the bankruptcy court respecting the proper rate of interest on a state

tax liability of the bankruptcy debtor. For the reasons assigned, we affirm.2 BACKGROUND

On July 15, 1997, Laurence Lucius Lambert submitted his third amended

propose d plan of reorganization under Chapter 11 of the bankruptcy code. The

Mississippi State Tax Commission objected thereto on se veral grounds. After a

confirm ation hearing, the bankruptcy court confirmed Lambert’s proposed plan and

directed the parties to submit post-hearing briefs on the two remaining issues: the

rate at which Lambert’s tax liability should accrue interest, and whether quarterly

or monthly payments were required. In due course the bankruptcy court held that

11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(C) permitted the debtor to pay a market rate of interest to

the Commission on a quarterly basis and confirmed Lambert’s plan.

The Commission appealed to the district court, contending that 11 U.S.C. §

1129(a)(9)(C) requires that post-petition claims for deferred taxes accrue interest

a t the rate set by the Mississippi taxing statutes and not, as the ban kruptcy court

held, at the market rate. The district court rejected the Commission’s contentions

and affirmed the bankruptcy court’s holding that 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(C)

requires a market rate of interest. This appeal followed.

ANALYSIS

The sole issue posited by this appeal is whether the post-petition interest on

a tax liability under 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(C) accrues at the market rate or at the1 The Commission does not advise that its 12% per annum interest rate reflects the

market rate of interest or that it is adjusted to reflect current market conditions. Thus, the

sole issue before us is whether its statutory rate of interest is appropriate under 11 U.S.C. §

1129(a)(9)(C).

2 In re Garcia , 955 F.2d 16 (5 th Cir. 1992).

3 statutory rate set by the taxing entity. As applied in the instant case, the question

is whether Lambert must pay post-petition interest at the 12% annual rate required

by M ISS

. C ODE A NN

. § 27-7-53(3), o r the recognized market rate. 1 The

interpretation of 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(C) poses a legal question which we review

de novo

. 2

Under 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(C), a plan may give a holder of an unsecured

tax claim “deferred cash payments, over a period not exceeding six years after the

date of assessment of such claim, of a value , as of the effective date of the plan,

equal to the allowed amount of such claim.” In interpreting this section to require

a market rate of interest, both the bankruptcy court and the district court relied on

an analysis provided in C OLLIER ON B ANKRUPTCY :

[The] language is the Code’s signal that the present value of the

payment stream offered has to equal the allowed amount of the claim.

This is typically done by providing a payment stream that will equal

in princip al payments the allowed amount of the claim and which

carries a market rate of interest. Many governmental entities have

special interest rate provisions which are, in nonbankr u ptcy cases,

applied to tax claims. Section 1129(a)(9)(C), however, has been

interpreted to require a market rate of interest, to which the tax rate3 7 C OLLIER ON B ANKRUPTCY ¶ 1129.03[9][c][i] at 1129-60 to -61 (Lawrence P. King,

et al., eds., 15 th

ed. 1997) (citations omitted).

4 818 F.2d 1503 (9 th

Cir. 1987).

5 709 F.2d 647 (11 th Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub nom.

, Southern States Motor Inns,

Inc. v. United States , 465 U.S. 1022 (1984).

4 may be relevant, but is certainly not determinative. 3

C OLLIER thus suggests that 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) (9)(C) treats the bankruptcy debtor’s

nonpayment of taxes as a loan from the state to the debtor, fo r which the state

receives compensation at the prevailing market rate.

Two decisions by our sister circuit colleagues cited by C OLLIER in support of

the market rate, In re Camino Real Landscape Maintenance Contractors, Inc. 4 and

In re Southern States Motor Inns, Inc.

, 5 provide further support for the proposition

that the market rate is the proper rate of interest on deferred taxes under 11 U.S.C.

§ 1129(a)(9)(C). In both cases, the United States contended that the rate of interest

set forth in 26 U.S.C. § 6621 for unpaid federal tax liabilities was the appropriate

rate of interest for calculating deferred payments of federal taxes under 11 U.S.C.

§ 1129(a)(9)(C). Both circuit courts turned to the legislative history to determine

the meaning of the phras e “value, as of the effective date of the plan” and the

proper payment required under the section. They found that the legislative history

reflect ed that the phrase required the promised payment under the plan to be6 Camino Real

, 818 F.2d at 1505; Southern States

, 709 F.2d at 650 (citing H.R.Rep.

No. 595, 95 th Cong. 1 st Sess. 408, r eprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6364; and 124

Cong. Rec. 32,406, 34,006 (1978)).

7 Camino Real

, 818 F.2d at 1505 ( citing 5 C OLLI ER ON B ANKRUPTCY ¶1129.03[4][f][i]

at 1129-65 (Lawrence P. King, et al., eds.,15 th ed. 1987)).

8 Southern States , 709 F.2d at 652.

5 discounted to present value as of the effective date of the plan. 6 Citing C O LLIER

,

the Ninth Circuit explained the present value analysis thusly:

The appropriate discount rate must be determined on the basis of the

rate of interest which is reasonable in light of the risks inv o lved.

Thus, in dete rmining the discount rate, the court must consider the

prevailing market rate for a loan of a term equal to the payout period,

with due consideration of the quality of the s ecurity and the risk of

subsequent default. 7

As the Eleventh Circuit noted, this approach is consistent with the history behind

the phrase and ensures that a creditor with a priority tax claim who is required to

accept installment payments remains in as good a position as if its claim had been

paid immediately. 8

The Southern States and Camino Real courts held that the government, as

a creditor under 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(C), was entitled to the present value of its

claim. They further concluded that several considerations militated against

adoption of the government’s general inter est rate for deferred taxes under 26

U.S.C. § 6621 as a proxy for the market rate in determining the present value of the9 Id.

10 Camino Real , 818 F.2d at 1506; Southern States , 709 F.2d at 652.

11 Southern States , 709 F.2d at 652.

12 Camino Real , 818 F.2d at 1507.

13 Id. The court noted that the interest rate on deferred taxes, although presently

adjusted to the prevailing interest rates of the economy, have historically been higher than

the prevailin g market rates to encourage prompt payment of taxes. Such a policy is not

consistent with Congress’ intent that the interest rate of deferred taxes in bankruptcy reflect

the prevailing rates in the commercial loan market.

6 government’s claim. First, Congress did not designate that general interest rate as

the proper in terest rate under 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(C). 9 Second, because of

fluctuations in interest rates, the rate under 26 U.S.C. § 6621 may differ from the

actual market rate and thus be disadvantag eous to the government. 1 0 Third, the

application of the rate under 26 U.S.C. § 6621 ignores the variations between the

length of the payout period, the quality of the security, and the risk of subsequent

default. 11 Fourth, the rate set by taxing statutes is inappropriate under 11 U.S.C. §

1129(a)(9)(C) because the statutes reflect the government’s tax objectives. 12 These

objectives are different from the governmen t’s bankruptcy objectives and often

involve a punitive-element dimension unrelated to bankruptcy objectives. 13

Applying t hese considerations to the case at bar, it is abundantly manifest

that Mississippi’s fixed 12% annual rate required by M ISS

. C ODE A NN

. § 27-7-53(3)14 In re Garcia , 955 F.2d 16 (5 th Cir. 1992); United States v. Noland

, 517 U.S. 535

(1996); Bruning v. United States

, 376 U.S. 358 (1964); and In re Al Copeland

Enterprises., Inc. , 991 F.2d 233 (5 th Cir. 1993).

7 is not the appropriate rate of interest for def erred taxes under 11 U.S.C. §

1129(a)(9)(C). Like the federal rate, this rate does not account for fluctuations in

the market interest. It likewise does not take into account the length of the payout

period, the quality of the security, and the risk of subsequent default. The

Commission does not contend that a fixed rate is an appropriate proxy for the

market rate of interest. Rather, the Commission urges us to adopt its fixed rate as

the appropriate rate of interest under 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(C), despite the

legislative history behind the provision and the compelling logic of the holdings in

Southern States and Camino Real

. The Commission advances several different

arguments in support of the adoption of the state interest rate, all of which we reject

for the following reasons.

The Commission first maintains that the courts à quo used “flawed

reasoning” in adopting the market rate of interest as the appropriate rate under 11

U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(C), and urges us to disregard this reasoning and to defer to the

state taxing statutes. In support of its position, the Commission relies on several

cases in which courts have adopted and applied the rate of interest set by the taxing

authorities to provisions of the bankruptcy code. 14 None of the cases cited,15 In re Garcia addressed the issue whether pre-petition interest on a tax liability in

a Chapter 13 case was entitled to the same priority as the underlying tax; Noland addressed

the interest rate on a post-petition claim for taxes; Bruning involved the interest rate of nondischargeable taxes; and Al Copeland, Inc. involved the interest rate on sales taxes collected

by the debtor which the debtor held in trust for the state.

16 Camino Real , 818 F.2d at 1506.

8 however, addresses the proper rate of interest under 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(C). 15

The cases cited by the Commission are not dispositive, nor do they provide a

convincing rationale for departing from the accepted interpretation of this statute.

The Commission further attempts to distinguish Camino Real and Southern

States from the instant case, contending that the court’s concern in Camino Real

that the rate of interest for deferred federal taxes under 26 U.S.C. § 6621 might “lag

behin d the true market rate” 1 6 is not present under the Mississippi rate. The

Commission argues that the Mississippi rate, unlike the federal interest rate which

fluctuates to track the market, is fixed at twelve percent, and thus there is no danger

that the Mississippi rate will constantly lag behind the mark et rate. The fixed

Mississippi rate can be either disadvantageous or advantageous to the Commission,

depending on the current market rate.

We find this argument unpersuasive. As our colleagues in the Ninth Circuit

concluded, 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(C) applies to all deferred taxes, not just federal17 Id. at 1507 n.2.

18 Id

. The Commission further contends that the district court erred in holding that the

Mississippi rate is punitive in nature. A close review of the district court’s decision reveals

that the court merely reiterated the concern from Camino Real that state taxing statutes may

include a punitive element and thus the market rate is a ppropriate under 11 U.S.C. §

1129(a)(9)(C). This contention is thus without merit.

19 Southern States , 709 F.2d at 652-53.

20 89 F.3d 1123 (3 rd Cir. 1996), cert. denied sub nom

. DeSarno v. Allegheny County

, 519 U.S. 1108 (1997).

9 taxes. 17 The concern is that the taxing statutes of any taxing entity – federal, state

or local

– may include a punitive element which reflects the tax objective of

encouraging prompt payment of taxes, and which is inimical to the financial

rehabilitation o f the debtor. 1 8 Adoption of the market rate of interest under 11

U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(C) promotes the bankruptcy objectives of putting the creditor

in the same position it would have o ccupied if it had been allowed to end the

relationship at the point of bankruptcy, 19 and ensuring that there is no adverse

treatment of the debt or. These objectives are unaffected by the identity of the

taxing entity.

The Commission further urges us to adopt the reasoning in the Third Circuit

decision of Rankin v. DeSarno

. 20 In R ankin

, the court found that the statutory

interest rate for post-petition interest on a secured municipal tax liability under 11

U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) was analogous to the interest rate of a market loan, and21 Rankin , 89 F.3d at 1129-30.

22 Id. at 1130.

23 In re DeMaggio

, 175 B.R. 144 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1994); In re Jordan

, 130 B.R. 185

(Bankr. N.J. 1991).

24 Rankin , 89 F.3d at 1132 (Sarokin, J., dissenting).

10 thus the taxing entity was entitled to the 12% interest rate established by

Pennsylvania l aw. 21 The R ankin court adopted the state interest rate out of a

concern that a fluctuating market rate would create “ case-by-case litigation and

inconsistent results.” 22 The Commission points out that 11 U.S.C. §

1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) has been treated identically to 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(C) by most

courts, 23 and urges us to adopt the statutory interest rate in determining the present

value of a claim under 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(C). Although it is true that these two

provisions have been treated identically in some cases, we decline to adopt the

Rankin court’s rationale for our interpretation of the provision in question. As the

dissent in Ranki n noted, many statutory interest rates were fixed at their current

rate in the early 1980s and have not been modified despite a sharp drop in rates

since that time. 24 Thus, the concerns present in C amino Real and Southern States

– that the rate of inte rest set by the taxing statutes contains a punitive element

which is inimical to the aims of bankruptcy law – is especially relevant when the25 Id.

26 Id. at 1133 (citing Camino Real

, 818 F.2d at 1508)

. In a similar vein, Judge

Sarokin noted that because the claims in question were secured claims and the creditors were

first in line to receive the amounts owed, it was not necessary to account for the particular

characteristics of each debtor. He suggested that in the case of secured claims under 11

U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii), the appropriate rate would be the prime rate of interest charged

by commercial banks to prime commercial loan customers. This rate would compensate the

creditor for its various costs, but because it tracked the market rate would not contain the

punitive element inimical to the aims of the bankruptcy system.

11 interest rate has no relation to current economic conditions. 25 Further, unlike 11

U.S.C. 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii), the provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(C) apply to

unsecur e d claims and thus the creditors are at a higher risk of not receiving

payment. Because the claim is unsecured, a case-by-case determination of the rate

of interest the reorganizing debtor would have to pay to obtain a loan on equivalent

terms in the open-market ensures that the creditor is compensated at an appropriate

rate. 26

Finally, the Commission contends that policy concerns militate in favor of

the adoption of the statutory interest rate. Specifically, the Commission asserts that

the present value of a tax claim cannot be determined according to the market rate

because the state, unlike other creditors, cannot adjust the rate of interest depending

on the credit risk of an individual taxpayer. Because the state ostensibly lacks all

control over the nonpayment of a tax obligation, the Commission insists that the

legislature shoul d be able to compensate the state for the increased cost of27 Camino Real , 818 F.2d at 1505-06.

28 Id. at 1506.

12 administration. The legislative history, however, clearly reflects that the rate of

interest on deferred taxes should be the rate of interest that the debtor would pay

to borrow a similar amount on the commercial market. 27 It is thus the debtor’s

characteristics, e.g., the quality of the debtor’s security and the risk of default, that

determine the interest rate under 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(C); the fact that the debt

i s for taxes due to a taxing entity is irrelevant in determining the proper interest

rate. 28 We have found no authority for the proposition that compensation of the

taxing entity for administrative expenses was one of the poli cy considerations

behind 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(C), and we thus reject the C ommission’s suggestions

with respect thereto.

We therefore conclu de and hold that the proper rate of interest under 11

U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(C) is the current market rate equivalent to the rate the debtor

would have to pay to borrow the same amount in the commercial loan market. In

so holding, we recognize that the statutory rates may be relev ant to, but not

dispositive of, the bankruptcy court’s determination of the current market rate

under 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(C). Because the Mississippi rate in question does not

track the market rate or reflect the rate of interest that the debtor would pay on13

similar terms in the commercial loan market, it is not relevant in the determination

of the market rate of interest under 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(C).

The judgment appealed is AFFIRMED.