[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 70 (Wednesday, April 12, 1995)]
[Notices]
[Pages 18613-18617]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-8966]



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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Office of the Attorney General
[AG Order No. 1962-95]
RIN 1105-AA36


Proposed Guidelines for the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against 
Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registratioan Act

AGENCY: Department of Justice.

ACTION: Proposed guidelines.

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SUMMARY: The United States Department of Justice (DOJ) is publishing 
Proposed Guidelines to implement the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against 
Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act.

DATES: Comments must be received by July 11, 1995.

ADDRESSES: Comments may be mailed to Bonnie J. Campbell, Director, 
Violence Against Women Office, U.S. Department of Justice, Tenth and 
Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20530, 202-616-8894.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Section 170101 of the Violent Crime Control 
and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 2038 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. Sec. 14071), contains the Jacob Wetterling 
Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act 
(hereafter referred to as the ``Jacob Wetterling Act'' or ``the Act''). 
The Act provides a financial incentive for states to establish 10-year 
registration requirements for persons convicted of certain crimes 
against minors and sexually violent offenses, and to establish a more 
stringent set of registration requirements for a sub-class of highly 
dangerous sex offenders, characterized as ``sexually violent 
predators.'' States that fail to establish such systems within three 
years (subject to a possible two year extension) face a 10% reduction 
in their Byrne Formula Grant funding (under 42 U.S.C. 3756), and 
resulting surplus funds will be reallocated to states that are in 
compliance with the Act.

Proposed Guidelines

    These guidelines carry out a statutory directive to the Attorney 
General, in Sec. 170101(a)(1), to establish guidelines for registration 
systems under the Act. Before turning to the specific provisions of the 
Act, four general points should be noted concerning its interpretation 
and application.
    First, states that wish to achieve compliance with the Jacob 
Wetterling Act should understand that its requirements constitute a 
floor for state registration systems, not a ceiling, and that they do 
not risk the loss of part of their Byrne Formula Grant funding by going 
beyond its standards. For example, a state may have a registration 
system that covers a broader class of sex offenders than those 
identified in the Jacob Wetterling Act, or requires address 
verification for such offenders at more frequent intervals than the Act 
prescribes, or requires offenders to register for a longer period of 
time than the period specified in the Act.
    Exercising these options creates no problem of compliance, since 
the provisions in the Jacob Wetterling Act concerning duration of 
registration, covered offenders, and other matters, do not preclude 
states from imposing additional or more stringent requirements that 
encompass the Act's baseline requirements. The general objective of the 
Act is to protect people from child molesters and violent sex offenders 
through registration requirements. It is not intended, and does not 
have the effect, of making states less free than they were under prior 
law to impose registration requiremnts for this purpose.
    Second, states that wish to achieve compliance with the Jacob 
Wetterling Act also should understand that they may, within certain 
constraints, use their own criminal law definitions in defining 
registration requirements, and will not necessarily have to revise 
their registration systems to use technical definitions of covered sex 
offenses based on federal law. This point will be explained more fully 
below.
    Third, the Jacob Wetterling Act contemplates the establishment of 
programs that will impose registration requirements on offenders who 
are subsequently convicted of offenses in the pertinent categories. The 
Act does not require states to attempt to identify and impose 
registration requirements on offenders who were convicted of offenses 
in these categories prior to the establishment of a conforming 
registration system. Nevertheless, the Act does not preclude states 
from imposing any new registration requirements on offenders convicted 
prior to the establishment of the registration system.
    Fourth, the Act gives states wide latitude in designing 
registration programs that best meet their public safety needs. For 
instance, the Act allows states to release relevant information 
necessary to protect the public, including information released through 
community notification programs. Some state registration and 
notification systems have been challenged on constitutional grounds. A 
few courts have struck down registration requirements in certain cases. 
See Rowe v. Burton, No. A94-206 (D. Alaska July 27, 1994) (on motion 
for preliminary relief); State v. Babin, 637 So.2d 814 (La. App. 1994), 
writ denied, 644 So.2d 649 (La. 1994); State v. Payne, 633 So. 2d 701 
(La. App. 1993), writ denied, 637 So.2d 497 (La. 1994); In re Reed, 663 
P.2d 216 (Cal. 1983) (en banc). However, a majority of courts that have 
dealt with the issue have held that registration systems like those 
contemplated by the Jacob Wetterling Act do not violate released 
offenders' constitutional rights.
    A few recent decisions, currently on appeal, have held that aspects 
of New Jersey's community notification program violate due process 
guarantees, or violate ex post facto guarantees as applied to persons 
who committed the covered offense prior to enactment of the 
notification statute. See Artway v. Attorney General of New Jersey, No. 
94-6287 (NHP) (D.N.J. Feb. 28, 1995); Diaz v. Whitman, No. 94-6376 
(JWB) (D.N.J. Jan. 6, 1994); John Doe v. Deborah Poritz, No. BUR-1-5-95 
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Feb. 22, 1995). However, the Department of 
Justice takes the position in briefs filed that the New Jersey 
community notification statute at issue in those cases does not violate 
the Ex Post Facto Clause, and that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due 
Process Clause of its own force does not require recognition of such a 
liberty interest on the part of offenders affected by that statute.
    The remainder of these guidelines address the provisions of the 
Jacob Wetterling Act in the order in which they appear in Sec. 170101 
of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994.

General Provisions--Subsection (a)(1)-(2)

    Paragraph (1) of subsection (a) of Sec. 170101 directs the Attorney 
General to [[Page 18614]] establish guidelines for state programs that 
require:;
    (A) Current address registration for persons convicted of ``a 
criminal offense against a victim who is a minor'' or `'a sexually 
violent offense,'' and
    (B) Current address registration under a different set of 
requirements for persons who are determined to be ``sexually violent 
predators.''
    Paragraph (2) of subsection (a) states that the determination 
whether a person is a ``sexually violent predator'' (which brings the 
more stringent registration standards into play), and the determination 
that a person is no longer a ``sexually violent predator'' (which 
terminates the registration requirement under those standards), shall 
be made by the sentencing court after receiving a report by a state 
board composed of experts in the field of the behavior and treatment of 
sexual offenders.
    ``State board'' in paragraph (2) should be understood to mean a 
body or group containing twos or more experts that is authorized by 
state law or designated under the authority of state law. Beyond the 
requirement that a board must be composed of experts in the field of 
the behavior and treatment of sexual offenders, the Act affords states 
discretion concerning the selection and composition of such boards. For 
example, a state could establish a single permanent board for this 
purpose, could establish a system of state-designated boards, or could 
authorize the designation of different boards for different courts, 
time periods, geographic areas or cases.

Definition of ``Criminal Offense Against a Victim Who is a Minor''--
Subsection (a)(3)(A)

    The Act prescribes a 10-year registration requirement for persons 
convicted of a ``criminal offense against a victim who is a minor''. 
Subparagraph (A) of paragraph (3) of subsection (a) defines the term 
``criminal offense against a victim who is a minor.'' ``Minor'' should 
be understood to mean a person below the age of 18, consistent with the 
normal understanding.
    The specific clauses in the definition of ``criminal offense 
against a victim who is a minor'' are as follows:
    (1) Clauses (i) and (ii) cover kidnapping of a minor (except by a 
parent) and false imprisonment of a minor (except by a parent). All 
states have statutes that define offenses--going by such names as 
``kidnapping,'' criminal restraint,'' or ``false imprisonment''--whose 
gravamen is abduction or unlawful restraint of a person. States can 
comply with these clauses by requiring registration for persons 
convicted of these statutory offenses whose victims were below the age 
of 18. The Act does not require inclusion of these offenses in the 
registration requirement when the offender is a parent, but states may 
choose to require registration for parents who commit these offenses.
    (2) Clause (iii) covers offenses consisting of ``criminal sexual 
conduct toward a minor.'' Such offenses include convictions under 
general provisions defining sexually assaultive crimes--such as 
provisions defining crimes of ``rape,'' sexual assault,'' or ``sexual 
abuse''--in cases where the victim is in fact a minor. Coverage is not 
limited to cases where the victim's age is an element of the offense 
(such as prosecutions for specially defined child molestation 
offenses).
    States can comply with clause (iii) by requiring registration for 
persons convicted of all statutory sex offenses under state law whose 
elements involve physical contact with a victim, where the victim was 
below the age of 18 at the time of the offense. Offenses that do not 
involve physical contact, such as exhibitionism, are not subject to the 
Act's mandatory registration requirements pursuant to clause (iii), but 
states are free to require registration for persons convicted of such 
offenses as well if they so choose.
    (3) Clause (iv) covers offenses consisting of solicition of a minor 
to engage in sexual conduct. This covers any conviction for an offense 
involving the solicitation of conduct that would be covered by clause 
(iii) if carried out.
    (4) Clause (v) covers offenses consisting of using a minor in a 
sexual performance. This includes both live performances and using 
minors in the production of pornography.
    (5) Clause (vi) covers offenses consisting of solicition of a minor 
to practice prostitution.
    (6) Clause (vii) covers offenses consisting of any conduct that by 
its nature is a sexual offense against a minor. This clause is intended 
to insure uniform coverage of convictions under statutes defining sex 
offenses in which the status of the victim as a minor is an element of 
an offense, such as specially defined child molestation offenses, and 
other offenses prohibiting sexual activity with underage persons. 
States can comply with this clause by including convictions under these 
statutes uniformly in the registration requirement.
    (7) Considered in isolation, clause (viii) gives states discretion 
whether to require registration for attempts to commit offenses 
described in clauses (i) through (vii). However, any verbal command or 
attempted persuasion of the victim to engage in sexual conduct would 
bring the offense within the scope of the solicitation clause (clause 
(iv)), and make it subject to the Act's mandatory registration 
requirements. Morever, this provision must be considered in conjunction 
with the Act's requirement of registration for persons convicted of a 
``sexually violent offense,'' which does not allow the exclusion of 
attempts if they are otherwise encompassed within the definition of a 
``sexually violent offense.''
    Hence, state discretion to exclude attempted sexual offenses 
against minors from registration requirements pursuant to clause (viii) 
is limited by other provisions of the Act. The simplest approach for 
states would be to include attempted sexual assaults on minors (as well 
as completed offenses) uniformly as predicates for the registration 
requirements.
    At the conclusion of the definition of ``criminal offense against a 
victim who is a minor,'' the Act states that (for purposes of the 
definition) conduct which is criminal only because of the age of the 
victim shall not be considered a criminal offense if the perpetrator is 
18 years of age or younger. For example, suppose that state law 
prohibits sexual relations with a person below the age of 16, where the 
defendant is more than 4 years older than the victim. Suppose further 
that an 18-year-old is convicted of violating this prohibition by 
engaging in consensual sexual relations with a 13-year-old, where the 
conduct would not violate state law but for the victim's age. Under the 
provision, if a state did not require such an offender to register, the 
state would still be in compliance with the Act. However, here again, 
states are free to go beyond the Act's baseline requirements. The 
exemption of certain offenders based on age from the Act's mandatory 
registration requirements does not bar states from including such 
offenders in their registration systems if they wish. Moreover, the 
scope of subsection (a)(3)(A)'s exemption is also limited by other 
provisions of the Act that require registration of persons convicted of 
``sexually violent offenses'' (as defined in (a)(3)(B)), with no 
provision excluding younger offenders where the criminality of the 
conduct depends on the victim's age.
    Since the Act's registration requirements depend in all 
circumstances on conviction of certain types of offenses, states are 
not required to mandate registration for juveniles who are adjudicated 
delinquent--as opposed to adults convicted of crimes [[Page 18615]] and 
juveniles convicted as adults--even if the conduct on which the 
juvenile delinquency adjudication is based would constitute an offense 
giving rise to a registration requirement if engaged in by an adult. 
However, states remain free to require registration for juvenile 
delinquents, and the conviction of a juvenile who is prosecuted as an 
adult does count as a conviction for purposes of the Act's registration 
requirements.
    Definition of ``Sexually Violent Offense''--Subsection (a)(3)(B)
    The Act prescribes a ten-year registration requirement for 
offenders convicted of a ``sexually violent offense,'' as well as for 
those convicted of a ``criminal offense against a victim who is a 
minor.''
    Subparagraph (B) of paragraph (3) defines the term ``sexually 
violent offense'' to mean any criminal offense that consists of 
aggravated sexual abuse or sexual abuse (as described in sections 2241 
and 2242 of title 18, United States Code, or as described in the State 
criminal code), or an offense that has as its elements engaging in 
physical contact with another person with intent to commit such an 
offense. In light of this definition, there are two ways in which a 
state could satisfy the requirement of registration for persons 
convicted of ``sexually violent offenses'':
    First, suppose that a state has offenses in its criminal code that 
are designated ``aggravated sexual abuse'' and ``sexual abuse,'' or has 
a definitional provision in its criminal code that characterizes 
certain offenses (however denominated) as constituting ``aggravated 
sexual abuse'' and ``sexual abuse'' for registration purposes or other 
purposes. Such a state could comply simply by requiring registration 
for all offenders who are convicted of these state offenses, and all 
offenders convicted of any state crime that has as its elements 
engaging in physical contact with another person with intent to commit 
such an offense.
    Second, a state could comply by requiring registration for 
offenders convicted for criminal conduct that would violate 18 U.S.C. 
2241 or 2242--the federal ``aggravated sexual abuse'' and ``sexual 
abuse'' offenses--if subject to federal prosecution. (The second part 
of the definition in subparagraph (B) of paragraph (3), relating to 
physical contact with intent to commit aggravated sexual abuse or 
sexual abuse, does not enlarge the class of covered offenses under the 
federal law definitions, since sections 2241 and 2242 explicitly 
encompass attempts as well as completed offenses.)
    Specifically, 18 U.S.C. 2241-42 generally proscribe non-consensual 
``sexual acts'' with anyone, ``sexual acts'' with persons below the age 
of 12, and attempts to engage in such conduct. ``Sexual act'' is 
generally defined (in 18 U.S.C. 2245(2)) to mean an act involving any 
degree of genital or anal penetration, oral-genital or oral-anal 
contact, or direct genital touching of a victim below the age of 16 in 
certain circumstances even without penetration.
    States that elect this second option--requiring registration for 
offenses that consist of aggravated sexual abuse or sexual abuse as 
defined in federal law provisions (18 U.S.C. 2241-42)--do not 
necessarily have to refer to these federal statutes in their 
registration provisions, but could alternatively achieve compliance by 
requiring registration for the state law offenses that encompass types 
of conduct proscribed by 18 U.S.C. 2241-42. Moreover, a state does not 
have to have sex offenses whose scope is congruent with 18 U.S.C. 2241-
42 to take the latter approach. If state law does not criminalize some 
types of conduct that are covered by 18 U.S.C. 2241-42, then a person 
who engages in the conduct will not be subject to prosecution and 
conviction under state law, and there will be no basis for a 
registration requirement. On the other hand, if state sex offenses are 
defined more broadly than 18 U.S.C. 2241-42, then states are free to 
require registration for all offenders convicted under these state 
provisions (notwithstanding their greater breadth), and this would be 
sufficient to ensure coverage of convictions for criminal conduct that 
would violate 18 U.S.C. 2241-42 if subject to federal prosecution.

Definition of ``Sexually Violent Predator''--Subsection (a)(3)(C)-(E)

    Offenders who meet the definition of ``sexually violent predator'' 
are subject to more stringent registration requirements than other sex 
offenders.
    (1) Subparagraph (C) defines ``sexually violent predator'' to mean 
a person who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense and who 
suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes 
the person likely to engage in predatory sexually violent offenses.
    (2) Subparagraph (D) essentially defines ``mental abnormality'' to 
mean a disorder involving a disposition to commit criminal sexual acts 
of such a degree that it makes the person a menace to others. There is 
no definition of ``personality disorder'' in the Act; hence, the 
definition of this term is a matter of state discretion. For example, a 
state may choose to utilize the definition of ``personality disorder'' 
that appears in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders: DSM-IV. American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed. 1994).
    (3) Subparagraph (E) defines ``predatory'' to mean an act directed 
at a stranger or at a person with whom a relationship has been 
established or promoted for the primary purpose of victimization.
    As with other features of the Jacob Wetterling Act, the sexually 
violent predator provisions only define baseline requirements for 
states that wish to maintain eligibility for full Byrne Formula Grant 
funding. States are free to impose these more stringent registration 
requirements on a broader class of offenders, and may use state law 
categories or definitions for that purpose, without contravening the 
Jacob Wetterling Act.
    As noted earlier, the Act provides that the determination whether 
an offender is a ``sexually violent predator'' is to be made by the 
sentencing court with the assistance of a board of experts. The Act 
does not require, or preclude, that all persons convicted of a sexually 
violent offense undergo a determination as to whether they satisfy the 
definition of ``sexually violent predator.'' It also does not specify 
under what conditions such an inquiry must be undertaken. A state that 
wishes to comply with the Act must adopt some approach to this issue, 
but the specifics are a matter of state discretion. For example, a 
state might provide that the decision whether to seek classification of 
an offender as a ``sexually violent predator'' is a matter of judgment 
for prosecutors, or might provide that a determination of this question 
should be undertaken routinely when a person is convicted of a sexually 
violent offense and has a prior history of committing such crimes.

Specifications Concerning State Registration Systems Under the Act--
Subsection (b)

    Paragraph (1) of subsection (b) sets out duties for prison 
officials and courts in relation to offenders required to register who 
are released from prison, or who are placed on any form of post-
conviction supervised release (``parole, supervised release, or 
probation'').
    The duties, set out in subparagraph (A) of paragraph (1), include: 
(i) Informing the person of the duty to register and obtaining the 
information required for registration (i.e., address information), (ii) 
informing the person that he must give written notice of a new address 
within 10 days to a designated state law enforcement 
[[Page 18616]] agency if he changes residence, (iii) informing the 
person that, if he changes residence to another state, he must inform 
the registration agency in the state he is leaving, and must also 
register the new address with a designated state law enforcement agency 
in the new state within 10 days (if the new state has a registration 
requirement), (iv) obtaining fingerprints and a photograph if they have 
not already been obtained, and (v) requiring the person to read and 
sign a form stating that these requirements have been explained.
    Beyond these basic requirements, which apply to all registrants, 
subparagraph (B) of paragraph (1) of subsection (b) requires that 
additional information be obtained in relation to a person who is 
required to register as a ``sexually violent predator.'' The 
information that is specifically required under subparagraph (B) is the 
name of the person, identifying factors, anticipated future residence, 
offense history, and documentation of any treatment received for the 
mental abnormality or personality disorder of the person.
    States that wish to comply with the Act will need to adopt statutes 
or administrative provisions to establish these duties and ensure that 
they are carried out. These informational requirements, like other 
requirements in the Act, only define minimum standards, and states may 
require more extensive information from offenders. For example, the Act 
does not require that information be obtained relating to registering 
offenders' employment, but states may legitimately wish to know if a 
convicted child molester is seeking or has obtained employment that 
involves responsibility for the care for children.
    Paragraph (2) of subsection (b) states that the responsible officer 
or court shall forward the registration information to a designated 
state law enforcement agency. The state law enforcement agency must 
immediately enter the information into the appropriate state law 
enforcement record system and notify a law enforcement agency having 
jurisdiction where the person expects to reside. States that wish to 
achieve compliance with the Act may need to modify state record systems 
if they are not currently set up to receive all the types of 
information that the Act requires from registrants.
    The state law enforcement agency is also required to immediately 
transmit the conviction data and fingerprints to the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation. No changes will be required in the national records 
system because the Act only requires transmission of conviction data 
and fingerprints, which the FBI already receives. The Act should not be 
understood as requiring duplicative transmission of conviction data and 
fingerprints to the FBI at the time of initial registration if the 
state already has sent this information to the FBI (e.g., at the time 
of conviction).
    Paragraph (3) of subsection (b) relates to verification of the 
offender's address. In essence, annual verification of address with the 
designated state law enforcement agency is required for offenders 
generally, through the return within ten days of an address 
verification form sent by the agency to the registrant. However, the 
verification intervals are 90 days (rather than a year) for ``sexually 
violent predators.'' As noted earlier, these are baseline requirements 
which do not bar states from requiring verification of address at 
shorter intervals than those specified in the Act.
    Paragraph (4) requires the designated state law enforcement agency 
to notify other interested law enforcement agencies of a change of 
address by the registrant. Specifically, when a registrant changes 
residence to a new address, the designated law enforcement agency must 
(i) notify a law enforcement agency having jurisdiction where the 
registrant will reside, and (ii) if the registrant moves to a new 
state, notify the law enforcement agency with which the offender must 
register in the new state (if the new state has a registration 
requirement).
    Paragraph (5) further requires an offender who moves out of state 
to register within ten days with a designated state law enforcement 
agency in his new state of residence (if the new state has a 
registration requirement). This partially reiterates the requirements 
concerning notice of changes of address by the offender that were 
described above.
    Subparagraph (A) of paragraph (6) states that the registration 
requirement remains in effect for ten years. As noted earlier, states 
may choose to establish longer registration periods.
    Subparagraph (B) of paragraph (6) states that the registration 
requirement for ``sexually violent predators'' under the Act terminates 
upon a determination that the offender no longer suffers from a mental 
abnormality or personality disorder that would make him likely to 
engage in a predatory sexually violent offense. This provision does not 
require review of the offender's status at any particular interval. For 
example, a state could set a minimum period of 10 years before 
entertaining a request to review the status of a ``sexually violent 
predator,'' the same period as the general minimum registration period 
for sex offenders under the Act.
    Moreover, this termination provision only affects the requirement 
that a person register as a ``sexually violent predator'' under 
subparagraph (B) of subsection (a)(1) of the Jacob Wetterling Act. It 
does not limit states in imposing more extensive registration 
requirements under their own laws, and does not limit any registration 
requirement that arises independently under other provisions of the 
Jacob Wetterling Act from the person's conviction of a ``criminal 
offense against a victim who is a minor'' or a ``sexually violent 
offense.''

Criminal Penalties for Registration Violations--Subsection (c)

    The Act provides that a person required to register under a state 
program established pursuant to the Act who knowingly fails to register 
and keep such registration current shall be subject to criminal 
penalties. Accordingly, states that wish to comply with the Act will 
need to enact criminal provisions covering this situation as part of, 
or in conjunction with, the legislation defining their registration 
systems, if they have not already done so. If the violation by a 
registrant consists of failing to return an address verification form 
within 10 days of receipt, the state may allow a defense if the 
registrant can prove that he did not in fact change his residence 
address, as provided in subsection (b)(3)(A)(iv).

Release of Registration Information--Subsection (d)

    Subsection (d) governs the disclosure of ``information collected 
under a State registration program.'' Restrictions on the release of 
information under this subsection do not constrain the release of 
information that a state would have independently of the operation of 
the registration system. For example, a state will normally have 
criminal history information about an offender, and will often have 
current address information as part of general probation or parole 
supervision requirements, independently of any special requirements 
imposed as part of the sex offender registration system. The Act does 
not limit the release of such information.
    Subsection (d) states specifically that the information collected 
under a state registration program shall be treated as private data, 
except under specified conditions.
    The first condition under which disclosure is authorized--paragraph 
(1)--is that ``such information may be disclosed to law enforcement 
agencies [[Page 18617]] for law enforcement purposes.'' This exemption 
permits use of the information for all law enforcement purposes, 
including all police, prosecutorial, release supervision, correctional, 
and judicial uses.
    Paragraph (2) in subsection (d) says that registration information 
may be disclosed to government agencies conducting confidential 
background checks. ``Confidential'' should be understood to mean a 
background check where information is disclosed to an interested party 
or parties--such as a background check conducted by a government agency 
that provides information concerning prospective employees to public or 
private employers--as opposed to release of the information to the 
general public. Release to the public, and other non-law enforcement, 
non-background check uses, are governed by paragraph (3).
    Paragraph (3) in subsection (d) says that the designated state law 
enforcement agency, and any local law enforcement agency authorized by 
the state agency, may release relevant information that is necessary to 
protect the public concerning a specific person required to register 
under this section. The Act does not impose any limitations on the 
standards and procedures that states may adopt for determining when 
public safety necessitates community notification. For example, states 
could implement this authority by engaging in particularized 
determinations that individual offenders are sufficiently dangerous to 
require community notification concerning the offender's presence. 
Alternatively, states could make categorical judgments that protection 
of the public necessitates community notification with respect to all 
offenders with certain characteristics or in certain offense 
categories.
    Releases of information for public-protection purposes short of 
general community notification--such as giving notice about an 
offender's location to the victims of his offenses, or to agencies or 
organizations in specified categories--are also permitted under 
paragraph (3).
    The language in paragraph (3), like that in paragraphs (1) and (2), 
is permissive, and does not require states to release information. 
Paragraph (3) also does not deprive states of the authority to exercise 
centralized control over the release of information, or if the state 
prefers, to generally authorize local agencies to release information 
as necessary. In addition to permitting proactive community 
notification and other notification, as discussed above, paragraph (3) 
and other provisions of the Act do not bar states from making 
registration information available upon request, if it is determined 
that such access is necessary for the protection of the public 
concerning persons who are required to register.
    A proviso at the end of paragraph (3) in subsection (d) states that 
the identity of the victim of an offense that requires registration 
under the Act shall not be released.
    The purpose of this proviso is to protect the privacy of victims, 
and its restrictions may accordingly be waived at the victim's options. 
The proviso only applies to paragraph (3), and does not limit the 
disclosure of victim identity pursuant to paragraphs (1) and (2), 
relating to law enforcement uses and confidential background checks.

Immunity for Good Faith Conduct--Subsection (e)

    Subsection (e) states that law enforcement agencies, employees of 
law enforcement agencies, and state officials shall be immune from 
liability for good faith conduct under the Act.

Compliance--Subsection (f)

    States have three years from the date of enactment to come into 
compliance with the Act unless the Attorney General grants an 
additional two years where a state is making good faith efforts at 
implementation. States that fail to come into compliance within the 
specified time period will be subject to a mandatory 10% reduction of 
Byrne Formula Grant funding, and any funds that are not allocated to 
noncomplying states will be reallocated to states that are in 
compliance. The reallocated funds will be distributed among complying 
states in proportion to their populations.
    States are encouraged to submit descriptions of their existing or 
proposed registration systems for sex offenders in conjunction with 
their applications for Byrne Formula Grant funding, even prior to the 
expiration of the ``grace period'' provided by the Act for achieving 
compliance. Those submissions will enable the Department of Justice to 
review the status of state compliance with the Act, and to suggest any 
necessary changes to achieve compliance before the funding reduction 
goes into effect.
    To maintain eligibility for full Byrne Formula Grant funding 
following the three-year grace period, states will be required to 
submit information that shows compliance with the Act in at least one 
program year, or an explanation of why compliance cannot be achieved 
within that period and a description of good faith efforts that justify 
an extension of time (but not more than two years) for achieving 
compliance. States will also be required to submit information in 
subsequent program years concerning any changes in sex offender 
registration systems that may affect compliance with the Act.

    Dated: April 7, 1995.
Janet Reno,
Attorney General.
[FR Doc. 95-8966 Filed 4-11-95; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-01-M